Court Opinion

ID: 9897407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:10.826627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:21.784464
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    May 10 2023, 9:25 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara J. Simmons                                        Theodore E. Rokita
Batesville, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
                                                          George P. Sherman
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christopher G. Wellman,                                   May 10, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-1673
        v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Charnette D.
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Garner, Judge
                                                          The Honorable Ronnie Huerta,
                                                          Magistrate
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D35-2103-CM-6761

                               Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                              Judges Bailey and Brown concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023                             Page 1 of 13
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   Charged with three alcohol-related driving offenses, Christopher Wellman

      repeatedly asked the trial court to continue his case because the State had not

      yet provided the results of a blood test to which Wellman submitted on the

      night of his arrest. After 13 months of waiting, Wellman moved for discharge

      under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C).

[2]   The trial court denied Wellman discharge, attributing the 13-month delay to his

      “trial strategy” of waiting for the test results rather than forcing the State to

      proceed to trial without them. In so doing, the court effectively faulted

      Wellman for having to choose between his right to prepare a defense and his

      right to a speedy trial. But it was not Wellman’s action that placed him in that

      untenable position. We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to

      discharge Wellman under Criminal Rule 4(C).

      Facts
[3]   Police arrested Wellman for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and in

      compliance with Indiana’s implied consent law, Wellman submitted to a blood

      draw. The next day—March 5, 2021—the State charged Wellman with three

      alcohol-related driving offenses, including operating a vehicle with an “alcohol

      concentration equivalent” of 0.15 grams or more. Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b). The

      State promptly sent Wellman’s blood samples to a state laboratory for testing,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023            Page 2 of 13
      and pursuant to local court rules, the State was required to provide Wellman

      with the test results. LR49-CR00-107(a)(4).1

[4]   Over the next 13 months, the parties engaged in numerous pretrial conferences,

      all while awaiting Wellman’s blood test results and with Wellman consistently

      requesting continuances on that basis. Specifically, at Wellman’s initial hearing

      in April 2021, defense counsel reported that Wellman had not yet received

      discovery or “labs” from the State. Tr. Vol. II, p. 6. At the next three pretrial

      conferences, held in May, July, and August, defense counsel repeated that

      Wellman was still awaiting a plea offer and “labs.” Id. at 10, 14, 19. During the

      August conference, the trial court confirmed that the State had submitted

      Wellman’s blood samples for testing in March. Id. at 19. Yet Wellman was still

      awaiting a plea offer and “lab results” at the next two pretrial conferences, held

      in September and October. Id. at 22, 25.

[5]   Neither party ever requested a trial date. By the December pretrial conference,

      the State had tendered a plea offer, but Wellman’s blood test results were still

      not available. Id. at 28. At the next two pretrial conferences, held in January

      and February of 2022, Wellman repeated his request for “lab results.” Id. at 31,

      33. Finally, on April 5, 2022—396 days after he was charged—Wellman moved

      1
        LR49-CR00-107(a) provides, in pertinent part: “The State shall disclose the following material and
      information within its possession or control: . . . (4) Any reports or statements of experts, made in connection
      with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests,
      experiments, or comparisons.”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023                                   Page 3 of 13
      for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C), asserting that the State failed to bring

      him to trial within one year. The State received the test results exactly one week

      later.

[6]   At the discharge hearing, the trial court put the onus on Wellman for his case

      not being tried in a timely manner, stating, among other things: “I’ve always

      considered lab results as a trial strategy,” id. at 53; “[Defendants] need to hold

      [the State’s] feet to the fire,” id. at 62-63; and “You [Wellman] could’ve filed for

      a discovery deadline saying look, Judge, this is taking too long.” Id. at 63.

      Ultimately, the court attributed to Wellman the delay caused by the State’s

      failure to produce Wellman’s blood test results, effectively concluding that the

      State’s one-year countdown under Criminal Rule 4(C) was paused on the date

      of Wellman’s initial hearing.2 The trial court denied Wellman’s motion for

      discharge, and Wellman filed this interlocutory appeal.

      Discussion and Decision
[7]   Wellman argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge

      under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), thereby violating his right to a speedy trial.

      When faced with Criminal Rule 4 claims, we review questions of law de novo

      2
        At the discharge hearing, the State calculated the one-year period beginning from March 19, 2021—
      the date of Wellman’s initial hearing. Tr. Vol. II, p. 44. Criminal Rule 4(C) is triggered by the latter of
      two dates: the date the defendant is arrested or the date charges are filed. The rule is not triggered by the
      defendant’s initial hearing or arraignment. See Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608, 615 (Ind. 2020). Because
      Wellman was arrested on March 4 and charged on March 5, the State’s Criminal Rule 4(C) clock began
      ticking on March 5, 2021.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023                                Page 4 of 13
      and factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Harper, 135

      N.E.3d 962, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027,

      1039-40 (Ind. 2013)). “Clear error is that which leaves us with a definite and

      firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040.

      I. Speedy Trial Rights
[8]   “The right to a speedy trial is one of this country’s most basic, fundamental

      guarantees—one much older than the nation itself.” Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d

      608, 614 (Ind. 2020) (citing Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-24, 87

      S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967)). “It protects against ‘prolonged detention

      without trial’ as well as unreasonable ‘delay in trial.’” Id. (quoting Klopfer, 386

      U.S. at 224). “To safeguard these protections, the State and the courts—

      together, the government—have an obligation to ensure the timely prosecution

      of criminal defendants.” Id. When that obligation goes unfulfilled, Criminal

      Rule 4(C) provides defendants a “path to ensure the speedy administration of

      justice.”3 Id. at 615.

      II. Criminal Rule 4(C)
[9]   Criminal Rule 4(C) “places an affirmative duty on the State to bring a

      defendant to trial within one year of being charged or arrested, but allows for

      3
        A defendant has three sources from which to assert a violation of his right to a speedy trial: (1) the
      Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana
      Constitution; and (3) Criminal Rule 4. Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608, 614 (Ind. 2020). This appeal
      only concerns the latter.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023                                Page 5 of 13
       extensions of that time for various reasons.” Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064,

       1065 (Ind. 2004). The rule specifically states:

               No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer
               a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than
               one year from the date the criminal charge against such
               defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge,
               whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion,
               or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient
               time to try him during such period because of congestion of the
               court calendar . . . .

       Ind. Crim. Rule 4(C) (emphasis added). “[I]f a delay is caused by the

       defendant’s own motion or action, the one-year time limit is extended

       accordingly.” Cook, 810 N.E.2d at 1066.

[10]   There is no dispute that Wellman requested the continuances that pushed his

       case past Criminal Rule 4(C)’s one-year deadline. The State asks to end the

       analysis there, faulting Wellman for the delay even though the continuances

       were based on the State’s failure to produce his blood test results. Wellman

       points to the State’s failure and claims his actions did not cause the delay.

       III. State’s Delay in Providing Discovery
[11]   Under Criminal Rule 4(C), a defendant generally is chargeable with a delay

       effected by his own motion for a continuance. State ex rel. O’Donnell v. Cass

       Superior Ct., 468 N.E.2d 209, 210 (Ind. 1984). However, our Supreme Court has

       recognized an exception—which we shall call “the discovery exception”—when

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023            Page 6 of 13
       the continuance is caused by the State’s delay in providing discovery. As stated

       most recently in Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 2010):

               When a trial court grants a defendant’s motion for continuance
               because of the State’s failure to comply with the defendant's
               discovery requests, the resulting delay is not chargeable to the
               defendant.

       Id. at 1101 (citing Isaacs v. State, 673 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ind. 1996); see also

       Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 488 (Ind. 2001); State ex rel. Bramley v.

       Tipton Cir. Ct., 835 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ind. 2005).

[12]   The discovery exception derives from Biggs v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1989), in which the two defendants requested a continuance due to the

       State’s failure to procure its out-of-state confidential informant for scheduled

       depositions. Id. at 1272-73. The trial court later denied the defendants’ motion

       for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C), and this Court reversed the trial court’s

       ruling on appeal. Id. at 1275-76. In finding the delay not attributable to the

       defendant, this Court reasoned:

               To put the defendants in a position whereby they must either go
               to trial unprepared due to the State’s failure to respond to
               discovery requests or be prepared to waive their rights to a speedy
               trial, is to put the defendants in an untenable situation.

       Id. at 1275.

[13]   This Court has since applied Biggs and the discovery exception in several cases

       in which a defendant requested a continuance due to the State’s failure to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023            Page 7 of 13
       provide test results it had not yet received from a state laboratory. See, e.g.,

       Martin v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (not attributing to

       defendant delay caused by pendency of State’s blood test results); Marshall v.

       State, 759 N.E.2d 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (not attributing to defendant delay

       caused by pendency of State’s DNA test results); see State v. Black, 947 N.E.2d

       503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (deciding case on other grounds but approving of trial

       court’s decision not to attribute to defendant delay caused by pendency of

       State’s chemical analysis of alleged drugs).

       IV. Defendant’s Motion for Continuance
[14]   Despite an abundance of case law recognizing and applying the discovery

       exception, the State argues that the delay caused by the State’s failure to

       produce Wellman’s blood test results should be attributed to Wellman because

       he requested the continuances that effected the delay. The State directs us to

       two cases in support of its argument: Sturgeon v. State, 683 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1997), and Hillenburg v. State, 777 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[15]   In Sturgeon, the parties agreed to continuances because the State had not yet

       received DNA test results from a state laboratory. 683 N.E.2d at 614. Though

       the trial court later found the State had been negligent in requesting those

       results, the court denied the defendant’s motion for discharge under Criminal

       Rule 4(C) because the defendant had agreed to the continuances. Id. at 615. In

       affirming the trial court’s ruling on appeal, this Court stated: “It does not matter

       that the defendant’s act was justifiable or meritorious, since it is not the motive

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023            Page 8 of 13
       behind defendant’s actions, but the effect of his actions, that determines

       whether the delay is chargeable to him.” Id. at 616 (quoting State v. Moles, 166

       Ind. App. 632, 647, 337 N.E.2d 543, 553 (1975)).

[16]   In Hillenburg, the defendant requested continuances due to the State’s failure to

       provide DNA test results it had not yet received from a state laboratory. 777

       N.E.2d at 105. The trial court later denied the defendant’s motion for discharge

       under Criminal Rule 4(C), and this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on

       appeal. Id. In attributing the delay to the defendant, this Court explained: “In

       Sturgeon, the defendant merely acquiesced in the State’s requests for

       continuance. Here, Hillenburg affirmatively sought them of his own initiative.”

       Id. at 104. This Court also reiterated: “[I]t is not the motive behind the

       defendant’s actions, but the effect of his actions, that determines whether the

       delay is attributable to him.” Id. (quoting Sturgeon, 683 N.E.2d at 616).

[17]   To the extent Sturgeon and Hillenburg still can be considered good law, we are

       not compelled to follow them in this case.4 Neither Sturgeon nor Hillenburg

       addressed this Court’s prior holding in Biggs or the discovery exception in

       general. And the language quoted in Sturgeon and reiterated in Hillenburg derives

       from a long line of Criminal Rule 4 cases in which the subject delay was

       effected by a motion for something other than a continuance. See State v. Grow,

       4
        Indiana does not recognize horizontal stare decisis. In re C.F., 911 N.E.2d 657, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
       While we respect the decisions of other panels, “each panel of this Court has coequal authority on an issue
       and considers any previous decisions by other panels but is not bound by those decisions.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023                                 Page 9 of 13
       255 Ind. 183, 185, 263 N.E.2d 277, 278 (1970) (attributing to defendant delay

       effected by defendant’s motion for change of judge).

       V. State’s Negligence Not Required
[18]   Nonetheless, the State seemingly insists that the discovery exception only

       applies when the State is negligent in its failure to comply with discovery.

       Appellant’s Br. p. 13-14. Though some panels of this Court have distinguished

       Biggs and its progeny on such grounds, none has relied on this distinction in

       denying discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C). See C.L.Y. v. State, 816 N.E.2d 894

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing discovery delay under Indiana Juvenile Code

       provisions); Paul v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (analyzing

       discovery delay under Criminal Rule 4(B)).

[19]   The State specifically points to Cole v. State, 780 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2002), in which this Court observed that the State “diligently complied” with

       the defendant’s discovery requests while certain discovery exception cases

       involved “blatant and well-documented” discovery violations. Id. at 397. But

       this Court ultimately “follow[ed] the reasoning set out in Moles, Sturgeon, and

       Hillenburg” in denying the defendant’s motion for discharge under Criminal

       Rule 4(C). Id. This Court also found that the defendant waived his discharge

       claim by failing to object when his trial was set beyond the one-year deadline.

       Id. n.1. Accordingly, we do not read Cole as requiring negligence by the State

       before the discovery exception applies.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023        Page 10 of 13
[20]   To the extent the State asks us to adopt a negligence requirement, we decline. A

       defendant should not be forced to either waive the right to a speedy trial or

       proceed to trial unprepared. Biggs v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1989). And that “untenable situation” can arise with even the most innocent of

       State discovery delays. Id.

       VI. Criminal Rule 4(D)
[21]   We recognize that state laboratories sometimes face unavoidable backlogs of

       evidence to be tested, thereby driving delays that prosecutors cannot control.

       But the State has a relief valve in Criminal Rule 4(D). That rule provides:

               If when application is made for discharge of a defendant under
               this rule, the court be satisfied that there is evidence for the state,
               which cannot then be had, that reasonable effort has been made
               to procure the same and there is just ground to believe that such
               evidence can be had within ninety (90) days, the cause may be
               continued, and the prisoner remanded or admitted to bail; and if
               he be not brought to trial by the state within such additional
               ninety (90) days, he shall then be discharged.

       Crim. R. 4(D).

[22]   In determining whether the State is entitled to a continuance under Criminal

       Rule 4(D), “the trial court must be satisfied that the State made a reasonable

       effort to procure the evidence.” Dilley v. State, 134 N.E.3d 1046, 1049 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2019). “It is well established that Criminal Rule 4 places an affirmative

       duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial.” Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d

       1026, 1028 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). And “[a] defendant is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023              Page 11 of 13
       under no duty to take an affirmative action to ensure his being brought to trial

       within the time guidelines of the rule.” State ex rel. O’Donnell v. Cass Super. Ct.,

       468 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind. 1984). Criminal Rule 4(D) keeps the onus where it

       belongs—on the State—while allowing latitude when circumstances beyond the

       prosecutor’s control prevent the State from complying with discovery in time to

       bring a defendant to trial by the Criminal Rule 4(C) deadline.

[23]   When Wellman filed his motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C), the

       State failed to utilize Criminal Rule 4(D). Had the State used this tool, the trial

       court could have determined whether the State engaged in “reasonable efforts”

       to obtain Wellman’s blood test results. Although the record does not reveal the

       reason behind the 13-month delay in obtaining the blood test results, Wellman’s

       request for discharge finally spurred action from the State. The prosecutor

       emailed a coworker who regularly corresponds with the laboratory, and the

       State had the results back within a week. Tr. Vol. II, p. 60. The trial court noted

       this same pattern “has been going on for years.” Id. at 64. This begs the

       question of whether due diligence by the State could have produced Wellman’s

       results within the timeframe established by Criminal Rule 4(C).

       Conclusion
[24]   Because Wellman’s continuances were based on the State’s failure to produce

       his blood test results, the 396-day delay effected by those continuances was not

       attributable to Wellman. In the end, the State failed to bring Wellman to trial

       within the one-year deadline established by Criminal Rule 4(C). We therefore

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023            Page 12 of 13
       reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions for the court to

       grant Wellman’s motion for discharge under that rule.

[25]   Reversed and remanded.

       Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1673 | May 10, 2023       Page 13 of 13