Court Opinion

ID: 9692488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:55:33.00956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.764303
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
dissenting in part.
I disagree with the Court’s determination to disbar respondents Angel Pena and Glenn Rocca. I have reached this conclusion by traveling a different route than the other members of this Court. My reasoning is set forth in my concurring opinion in In re Litwin, 104 N.J. 362, 370, 517 A.2d 378 (1986).
When I joined the Court in 1981, one of the most difficult cases of that term was In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 446 A.2d 1208 (1982). Hughes had been unable to clear up a federal tax lien on real estate in his father’s estate. To save his mother embarrassment, he offered a bribe to a federal agent to secure a release of the tax lien. Justice Schreiber dissented from the Court’s decision disbarring Hughes. Id. at 39, 446 A.2d 1208. I joined his opinion. I *235believed that the Court had no consistent set of principles to guide it to the result in that ease. In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175, 364 A.2d 777 (1976) was on the books. Sears had been convicted of attempting to influence a Federal Securities and Exchange Commission investigation and had received a suspension. I believed that our disciplinary system should have consistent principles for decision.
I [thus] dissented from the Court’s imposition of a suspension in In re Infinito, 94 N.J. 50, 462 A.2d 160 (1983) [a ease involving the misuse of funds of a ward], because I could not find a satisfactory basis to distinguish that case from In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 446 A.2d 1208 (1982), in which the Court disbarred an attorney for conviction of a crime of dishonesty.
I believed at the time In re Infinito, supra, was decided that the Court should have a consistent principle that would require disbarment of attorneys convicted of crimes of the first or second degree, or crimes involving acts of dishonesty. See R. 1:20-6 (calling for automatic temporary suspension of attorneys convicted of serious crimes, which are defined as crimes of the first or second degree or those involving dishonesty).
I rejoined the majority in In re Verdiramo, 96 N.J. 183, 475 A.2d 45 (1984), because I believed the Court had stated a new principle of law, applicable to cases arising after that date, that conviction of serious crimes, especially those involving dishonesty, would almost invariably warrant disbarment.
[Litwin, supra, 104 N.J. at 370, 517 A.2d 378.]
I.
Verdiramo had prompted a witness to lie before a grand jury and had pled guilty to influencing a witness. In Verdiramo, the Court expressed clearly the principle that certain crimes that “poison the well of justice” will almost invariably require disbarment. 96 N.J. at 186, 475 A.2d 45. Over a long period of time thereafter, the Court developed a consistently principled system of administering discipline in cases involving dishonesty. Criminal convictions that taint the administration of justice or involve public corruption or fraud on the marketplace will generally result in disbarment. Examples of such discipline are In re Obringer, 152 N.J. 76, 703 A.2d 895 (1997) (making false statement to tribunal, engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, and stealing of funds from court registry, which was crime reflecting adversely on his fitness as attorney, warrant disbarment); In re Jones, 131 N.J. 505, 621 A.2d 469 (1993) *236(soliciting bribe while a public official for his own personal gain as prohibited by law warrants disbarment); In re Messinger, 133 N.J. 173, 627 A.2d 162 (1993) (convictions on several serious federal charges involving income tax fraud for purposes of advancing complex criminal scheme warrants disbarment); In re Zauber, 122 N.J. 87, 583 A.2d 1140 (1991) (conviction of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy and soliciting kickbacks in connection with employee benefit plan and pleading guilty to obtaining controlled dangerous substances by fraud or misrepresentation and to forgery warrants disbarment); In re Conway, 107 N.J. 168, 526 A.2d 658 (1987) (participating in conspiracy to secure dismissal of criminal prosecution by bribing witness warrants disbarment); In re Tuso, 104 N.J. 59, 514 A.2d 1311 (1986) (convictions for conspiracy to commit bribery and solicitation of misconduct and two-counts of offering bribe warrants disbarment); In re Surgent, 104 N.J. 566, 518 A.2d 215 (1986) (conspiracy to commit theft by deception and fourteen felony offenses including conspiracy, stock fraud, sale of unregistered securities, and subornation of perjury warrants disbarment); In re Friedland, 95 N.J. 170, 470 A.2d 3 (1984) (federal felony criminal convictions warrants disbarment).
II.
None of the attorneys in this case has been charged with or convicted of a crime. Consequently, the principles established in the cases that followed Verdiramo do not, strictly speaking, apply. Moreover, not every crime of dishonesty results in disbarment. For example, in three instances public prosecutors who were guilty of acts of dishonesty were not disbarred. See In re Asbell, 135 N.J. 446, 640 A.2d 837 (1994) (staging assassination attempt on his own life and filing false police report in attempts to obtain reappointment as county prosecutor warrants two-year suspension); In re Hoerst, 135 N.J. 98, 638 A.2d 801 (1994) (conviction for third-degree theft resulting from misuse of forfeiture funds to pay for himself and companion to attend out-of-state convention *237and three day side trip warrants six-month suspension); In re Farr, 115 N.J. 231, 557 A.2d 1373 (1989) (removing marijuana and PCP from evidence locker of prosecutor’s office and providing it to others warrants six-month suspension in addition to voluntarily served suspension). Those attorneys were not disbarred, not because what they did was not wrong, but because their conduct did not poison the well of justice or demonstrate irredeemable flaws of character.
Other crimes or acts of dishonesty have not resulted in disbarment. In re Giordano, 123 N.J. 362, 587 A.2d 1245 (1991) (conviction of attempted tampering with public records warrants three-year suspension when considered with lack of any evidence of criminal conspiracy); In re Youmans, 118 N.J. 622, 573 A.2d 899 (1990) (conduct, consisting of misrepresentation and deceit, fraud, gross negligence, and failure to keep client funds separate, warrants two-year suspension); In re Stier, 108 N.J. 455, 530 A.2d 786 (1987) (disorderly persons offense of tampering with public records by making false entry in public records warrants one-year suspension, suspended with probation); In re Kotok, 108 N.J. 314, 528 A.2d 1307 (1987) (conflict of interest warrants one-year suspension; false statement on bar application justifies conditional or provisional revocation of attorney’s license; inaccurate disclosure on application to purchase handgun warrants public reprimand; where attorney’s conduct in engaging in conflict of interest and making false statement on bar application occurred over ten years ago, during which time attorney demonstrates commendable record, warrants one-year suspension and conditional revocation of license, placement on probation for one year, with condition that attorney perform legal services of community nature; and making of inaccurate gun purchase permit application by judge warrants public reprimand and remand to advisory committee on judicial conduct); In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 502 A.2d 32 (1986) (filing by lawyer of false certification to induce court to grant relief for his benefit warrants three-year suspension); In re Yacavino, 100 N.J. 50, 494 A.2d 801 (1985) (repeatedly misrepresenting status of uncomplicated, pending adoption proceeding to clients and prepar*238ing two false court orders to stall client’s discovery of deficiencies warrants three-year suspension); In re Labendz, 95 N.J. 273, 471 A.2d 21 (1984) (knowing participation in attempt to perpetrate fraud upon federally insured savings and loan association to obtain mortgage for client warrants suspension for one year).
III.
How do the eases of respondents fit within this precedent? There is no revisiting the facts. Defendants lost the battle of the facts. (Actually it was a battle of faxes.) These were not nice people with whom respondents fell in. Constantino Santorella is a convicted felon, found guilty in 1976 of conspiracy to steal from foreign shipments for which he is now prohibited from holding any interest in a liquor license. Nevertheless, he has twice covered up his interests in the liquor business at 99 Washington Street, first using his son Charles as a cover, then his girlfriend, Courtney Krause. It was she who sold the business to respondents.
The trial court in the underlying civil action, characterized the credibility of Santorella and Krause as follows:
[Santorella] testified in this action that he was the sole owner. Santorella wrote to the Director of the ABC on April 29, 1991 requesting reinstatement of a work permit. That application contained numerous false statements. He testified in this court that he had been running Good & Plenti through Krause since April of 1989 and failed to disclose that to the Director. Santorella testified in this court that he gave testimony before an Administrative Law Judge that he had no interest in Good & Plenti. Santorella stated in this court that his prior testimony was a lie. He acknowledged that he and Krause were in a conspiracy to purchase a liquor license for an establishment called “Brokers” in which he would have had a secret interest. Santorella acknowledged that in an action for divorce filed by his former wife he and Krause, who was named as a correspondent, answered interrogatories and submitted affidavits which falsely asserted that he had no interest in Good & Plenti. It is not clear that Santorella filed any tax returns which reported income from his secret interest in bar businesses dating back to 1985. According to the weekly financial reports, the defendant and plaintiffs each netted more than $100,000.00 in cash during the period of joint operations from October 1993 to August 1994. Santorella claims that he filed an amended return during this law suit to report his 1993 cash earnings.
Krause has undoubtedly given as many false statements, under oath and otherwise as Santorella. If their testimony before this court is to be believed, Krause has filed false liquor license applications and renewals annually since 1989 *239and she has testified falsely in administrative hearings related to Santorella’s interest in the license. In this proceeding she has acknowledged that Santorella put her in the business-meaning Good & Plenti, that it was his business and that he controlled the corporate account despite the fact she was the only person appearing on the papers. She is complicit in a conspiracy to defraud Santorella’s ex-wife in connection with the latter’s claim for equitable distribution. Krause apparently has interests in other liquor licenses, including one recently granted to her in Jersey City. Certainly her testimony before this court ought to be sufficient basis for a revocation of that license. Whether the ABC can keep Santorella and Krause out of the liquor business is problematic. The[y] are apparently committed to and quite able to find shills and fronts to advance their economic interests.
When a disagreement arose concerning respondents’ choice of employees to run the business, Krause and Santorella did not react gracefully. The Special Master wrote: “She [Krause] was sitting at the bar with friends of hers and Santorella, one of whom threw Chenard [the employee] through a door out of the bar.” Unable to credit the testimony of Krause, Santorella, or their associates,2 the Law Division and the Special Master each found the most compelling evidence of respondents’ complicity in a series of financial reports that Krause and Santorella prepared weekly and faxed to respondents. Each sheet recorded “net sales” less certain cash payments made by Krause during the week for business expenses. Other figures recorded on the sheet were the amount to be deposited in the corporate bank account to cover expenses to be paid by cheek. Net sales less the deposits equaled “net profit” that were shown to be divided equally. The deposits recorded on those sheets tallied with the deposits recorded on the bar’s bank statements, copies of which were obtained from the bank.
Respondents claimed that this was an elaborate scheme of substituting these dummied-up reports for other faxed reports *240that were concocted by Santorella and Krause to extort money from them. The tribunals below found that the records were much too detailed to be a recent fabrication by Santorella and Krause for the sole purpose of establishing their claims. The single most compelling piece of evidence was a reply fax from Rocca to Santorella with a handwritten memo on one of the weekly reports.
IV.
I believe that the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) voted to disbar Pena because it believed him guilty of a pattern of dishonest conduct. Recall that the DRB had found Pena guilty of fraud in a sale of real estate to his close friends and recommended an eighteen month suspension. This Court found that, although there may have been a conflict of interest, there was not fraud. In re Pena, 162 N.J. 15, 738 A.2d 363 (1999).
The individual respondents do not differ greatly from Chen Kornreich, an attorney who came much closer to poisoning the well of justice. The Court found her to be young, susceptible, and capable of rehabilitation. In re Kornreich, 149 N.J. 346, 693 A.2d 877 (1997). Respondents \yere at the time of the events relatively young, and I believe susceptible. I do not believe that they are beyond rehabilitation. I find it difficult, then, to see what is so distinct about their conduct that merits disbarment. Recall that in Kotok and Giordano the attorneys involved were found to have falsified public records and yet were not disbarred.
What is to be feared is that the Court will revert to the ad hoc decision making that once characterized attorney discipline. If the Court intends to announce now a rule of invariable application that falsification of public records that is repeated will automatically result in disbarment, it should do so. I would not wish that to be the rule, but I believe that the Court should, in fairness, have consistent principles of decision.
We have ordinarily not disbarred attorneys unless the attorney’s conduct is so “immoral, venal, corrupt or criminal as to *241destroy totally any vestige of confidence that the individual could ever again practice in conformity with the standards of the profession.” In re Templeton, 99 N.J. 365, 376, 492 A.2d 1001 (1985). We thus reasoned in Farr, supra, that when the cause of ethical transgressions seems to be ‘“some mental, emotional, or psychological state or medical condition that is not obvious and ... could be corrected through treatment,’ ” the respondent “need not be disbarred to preserve confidence in the bar or to protect the public.” 115 N.J. at 237, 557 A.2d 1373 (quoting Templeton, supra, 99 N.J. at 374, 492 A.2d 1001). (That exception, however, does not apply to the knowing misappropriation of funds. In re Skevin, 104 N.J. 476, 517 A.2d 852 (1986)). In this case, the circumstances do not unerringly point to a conclusion that respondents have an utterly “unsalvageable professional character,” or are utterly “beyond the pale of professional rehabilitation,” the traits that call for disbarment. Templeton, supra, 99 N.J. at 376-377, 492 A.2d 1001.
One of the reasons proffered by the Court for disbarment is the allegation that Pena suborned perjury and Rocca compounded that perjury through his testimony. None of respondents, individually or collectively, were ever charged with suborning or committing perjury. It is utterly unfair to base disbarment on allegations not even charged, much less proven. The only count in the Ethics complaint charged respondents with violating R.P.C. 8.4(e), which prohibits conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in that they knowingly participated in a sham designed to conceal from licensing authorities Santorella’s continuing interest in the bar business. They told their side of the story. The other side was believed. Did they delude themselves into believing that Krause was a manager and that Santorella was only in the background?
Finally, I simply do not see how one can explain to the families of Rocca and Pena why it is that their partner, Ahl, has been spared and not they. The Special Master found that the three had “acted in concert.” He wrote:
*242I conclude that Respondents knowingly acted in concert from the outset of this matter to conceal their partnership arrangement with Santorella and Krause from the State ABC, State Police and City of Hoboken in order to thwart the ABC Director’s decision to compel Krause to transfer the liquor license and divest herself, and thereby also Santorella, from any interest in, or influence over, the Good N’ Plenti bar business.
It is most significant to me that the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) did not believe that disbarment was the appropriate discipline for Rocca. When Rocea petitioned to review the DRB’s determination to suspend him for three years, the OAE did not file a cross-petition. Instead, in reply to Rocca’s petition it wrote that “after discussing relevant case law ... the [Disciplinary Review] Board determined that the appropriate discipline for respondent Glenn M. Rocca is a three-year suspension. The Office of Attorney Ethics respectfully submits that the Board’s findings should not be disturbed.” (Emphasis added).
In my judgment, the Special Master is the person closest to this case. He studied the entire transcript of the civil action and, in addition, conducted the hearings in the disciplinary action. His sense of the parties and of the proper resolution of this matter is the most just. In his report he wrote:
I have carefully reviewed and considered the evidence and have concluded that Respondents’ conduct constitutes ethical misconduct. As a result of the foregoing, I must recommend specific discipline.
I have considered the testimony and evidence presented. I have also considered evidence submitted in mitigation by Angel Pena at the Ethics Committee hearing wherein Mr. Pena testified to his civic involvement and his unblemished record. I have requested and received from the Office of Attorney Ethics a report on each Respondent. It appears that there was one other disciplinary matter involving Mr. Rocca in 1992, when he received a private reprimand (the equivalent of an admonition), but none against Mr. Pena or Mr. Ahl. At the same time, I received no evidence nor have I considered any evidence in mitigation with respect to Messrs. Ahl and Rocea.
Besides Respondent Rocea’s prior disciplinary problem I find numerous facts in aggravation of the charges submitted against Respondents. First, although the specific charge against them is entering into an agreement for the purpose of thwarting a State statute, evading a divestiture order of the Director of the ABC and perpetrating a fraud on the ABC Boards of the City of Hoboken and the State of New Jersey, my finding that such an agreement existed necessarily leads to the obvious conclusion that Respondents, being well aware of the agreement they entered into with Santorella and Krause, lied about that interest before the State *243Police, the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, the City of Hoboken, Judge DTtalia in the underlying trial and, as to Mr. Pena, before this Committee. In addition, while Messrs. Ahl and Rocca did not testify, they submitted answers which denied the material allegations of the complaint and therefore I consider that action as having been taken in obstruction, rather than in furtherance, of this Committee’s investigation. (See R.P.C. 8.1.) Although these are not charges that were lodged and for which a recommended discipline can be imposed, they are certainly matters that must be considered in aggravation of the charges lodged against Respondents. See Matter of Kornreich, supra, 149 N.J. at 364, 693 A.2d 877 to 68 (continued denial of guilt and misrepresentations to municipal court and Ethics Committee; no admission of guilt).
This matter is obviously of the utmost seriousness. It is not an ethical violation that may have been inadvertent; this is knowing misconduct. Respondents have apparently not been charged with a crime. Their conduct was not directly related to the practice of law; moreover, their accusers, grievants Santorella and Krause, are hardly blameless. However, the true victims in this matter are the governmental entities defrauded and, through them, the public at large. Moreover, Respondents were not only engaged in dishonesty with respect to State and local bodies, they also appeared as officers of the court at the trial of the underlying action where they gave false testimony. In addition, Respondents Pena and Rocca apparently suborned perjury in connection with conducting direct examination of their other partners at the underlying trial.
At the conclusion of the ethics hearing, I asked both sides to brief appropriate discipline in this matter, including citing me to precedent to assist me in connection with this determination. I have also done independent research on the issue. I conclude that the following cases appear to deal with analogous situations: Matter of Komreich, supra, (lying about involvement in accident in municipal court and to Ethics Committee; no contrition; multi-year suspension); Matter of Asbell, 135 N.J. 446, 640 A.2d 837 (1994) (concocting phony assassination attempt and lying to police; two year suspension); Matter of Silverman, 113 N.J. 193, 549 A.2d 1225 (1988) (false statements under oath) (six year suspension); Matter of Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 502 A.2d 32 (1986) (filing of false certification to induce court to grant relief; three year suspension in light of extensive mitigating evidence); In re Labendz, 95 N.J. 273, 471 A.2d 21 (1984) (knowing submittal to federally insured savings and loan association of false loan application; considerable mitigating evidence; one year suspension); In re Silverman, 80 N.J. 489, 404 A.2d 301 (1979) (false answers filed with bankruptcy court; admission of guilt, obvious contrition; 18 month suspension); In re Mocco, 75 N.J. 313, 381 A.2d 1212 (1978) (misrepresentation to agencies, but no harm and Respondent not charged with crime; one year suspension). Although counsel for Respondent Pena submitted a post-hearing brief that cited various cases to suggest that a public reprimand or three month suspension should be the maximum penalty, I do not find his authorities analogous or persuasive. See, e.g., Matter of Eastwood [Eastmond], 152 N.J. 435, 705 A.2d 1204 (1998); Matter of Chalak [Chulak], 152 N.J. 443, 705 A.2d 1207 (1998); Matter of Butler, 152 N.J. 445, 705 A.2d 1208 (1998).
These decisions are obviously fact specific and do not reflect a consistent, bright-line approach to discipline. However, they do suggest that the type of dishonesty *244involved in this mater [sic], combined with the aggravating factors outlined above and the lack of mitigating factors, requires suspension and not a mere reprimand.
The issue to me is for what period I should recommend suspension and whether the recommendation should vary among the Respondents.
I believe from the evidence adduced that Messrs. Rocca and Pena played the dominant role in this entire transaction vis-a-vis them partner Michael Ahl. However, since Mr. Ahl had to have been a knowing participant in the original fraud and the coverup, and chose not to provide any evidence in mitigation at the hearing, I cannot justify distinguishing him from his partners.
The proofs adduced in this matter lead me to conclude that Respondents, having embarked upon their plan, held steadfastly to it through the investigations by the AJ3C, State Police and City of Hoboken, the pre-trial discovery and trial in the underlying civil litigation and, Anally, before this Committee. Therefore, there was a continuing course of conduct that was obviously engaged in deliberately by Respondents to dissemble and misrepresent the true facts to a variety of tribunals.
As a result of the foregoing, I conclude that a multi-year suspension is an appropriate recommendation in light of the fact that the misconduct was not a single, isolated incident, but was a knowing, lengthy, continuing fraud. While from Respondents’ standpoint they are obviously placed in the untenable position of having to continue their denials in order to avoid serious consequences, they must also face the consequences of that choice.
[Emphasis added.]
A “multi-year suspension” is, for each respondent, the appropriate discipline in this case, not a scattershot that spares one and fells two.
Justice LONG joins in this opinion.
For disbarment as to Angel B. Penna, Glenn M. Rocca — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices GARIBALDI, COLEMAN and VERNIERO — 4.
For suspension as to Michael S. Ahl — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices GARIBALDI, COLEMAN and VERNIERO — 4.
Dissenting as to Angel R. Pena and Glenn M. Rocca — Justices O’HERN and LONG — 2.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that ANGEL R. PENA of FORT LEE, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1984, and who thereafter *245was suspended from the practice of law by Order of this Court dated October 22, 1999, and who remains suspended at this time, be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this State, effective immediately; and it is further
ORDERED that ANGEL R. PENA be and hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further
ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing in any New Jersey financial institution maintained by ANGEL R. PENA pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 shall be restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court, for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial institution to the Clerk of the Superior Court, who is directed to deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the further Order of this Court; and it is further
ORDERED that ANGEL R. PENA comply with Rule 1:20-20 governing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further
ORDERED that ANGEL R. PENA reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that GLENN M. ROCCA of FORT LEE, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1983, be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this State, effective immediately; and it is further
ORDERED that GLENN M. ROCCA be and hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further
ORDERED that all funds, if any, currently existing in any New Jersey financial institution maintained by GLENN R. ROCCA pursuant to Rule 1:21-6 shall be restrained from disbursement except on application to this Court, for good cause shown, and shall be transferred by the financial institution to the Clerk of the *246Superior Court, who is directed to deposit the funds in the Superior Court Trust Fund pending the further Order of this Court; and it is further
ORDERED that GLENN M. ROCCA comply with Rule 1:20-20 governing disbarred attorneys; and it is further
ORDERED that GLENN M. ROCCA reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that MICHAEL S. AHL of FORT LEE, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1983, is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, effective June 5, 2000, and until the further Order of the Court; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent be restrained and enjoined from practicing law during the period of his suspension and that he comply with Rule 1:20-20 governing suspended attorneys; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.

 In addition, two attorneys involved with Santorella and Krause have since been disciplined for ethical improprieties. Thomas DeLuca, who represented complainants Santorella and Krause in the trial before Judge D’ltalia, was disbarred, 152 N.J. 59, 703 A.2d 268 (1997), and James Lisa, Santorella’s personal attorney and friend, who testified for him in the trial, has been suspended for three months for a criminal infraction. 152 N.J. 455, 705 A.2d 1213 (1998).