Court Opinion

ID: 9956349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 20:12:15.156057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:53.235492
License: Public Domain

Brand Squared LLC v Ryse Up Sports Nutrition, LLC
               2024 NY Slip Op 31031(U)
                     March 25, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 654218/2023
                Judge: Margaret A. Chan
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
 Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
 State and local government sources, including the New
  York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.
 This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
                       publication.
                                                                                                    INDEX NO. 654218/2023
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22                                                                          RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/27/2024

            SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
            COUNTY OF NEW YORK: COMMERCIAL DIVISION PART 49M
            -------------·--------X
                BRAND SQUARED LLC                                                 INDEX NO.         654218/2023

                                                Plaintiff,
                                                                                  MOTION DATE        10/18/2023
                                         - V-
                                                                                  MOTION SEQ. NO.     MS 001
                RYSE UP SPORTS NUTRITION, LLC,

                                                Defendant.                         DECISION+ ORDER ON
                                                                                         MOTION
            ---------------------X

             HON. MARGARET A. CHAN:

            The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
            12, 14, 15, 16
            were read on this motion to/for                               DISMISS

                   This action arises out of a representation agreement between a licensing
            agency and its client. Plaintiff Brand Squared LLC (BSQ) and defendant Ryse Up
            Sports Nutrition, LLC (Ryse) entered an agreement by which plaintiff would
            negotiate licensing agreements with third-party licensors on defendant's behalf and
            defendant would pay royalties on all sales resulting from those licensing
            agreements. Defendant eventually stopped paying royalties and sent plaintiff a
            letter accusing plaintiff of defaulting on the agreement. Plaintiff responded by
            commencing this action asserting claims of breach of contract, breach of the duty of
            good faith and fair dealing, constructive trust, accounting, unjust enrichment, and
            declaratory judgment. Defendant now moves to dismiss all but the breach of
            contract claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 [a] [7] for failure to plead all the elements of
            each cause of action. For the reasons below, defendant's motion is granted.

                                                             BackgroundI
                   Plaintiff is a licensing agency that assists clients in creating licensing
            relationships with third-party licensors (NYSCEF # 2, Complaint, ,r 11). According
            to the affidavit of plaintiffs managing partner and co-founder, Michael Dresner,

            1
              Unless otherwise stated, the below allegations are taken from the complaint and are presumed true
            for the purposes of this motion.

                654218/2023 BRAND SQUARED LLC vs. RYSE UP SPORTS NUTRITION, LLC                      Page 1 of 9
                Motion No. 001

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22                                                          RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/27/2024

            plaintiff has "more than two decades of experience in creating license agreements
            and positioning manufacturers with licensors" and "decades· long relationships with
            many agencies that manage brand owners" (NYSCEF # 12, Dresner Aff, ,r,r 4-5).
            Defendant is a sports nutrition company (NYSCEF # 2 ,r 12). Around August 2020,
            defendant hired plaintiff to "create strategic licensed partnerships, thereby enabling
            [d]efendant to grow its distribution, rapport with trade buyers, and increase volume
            shipments and revenues, with products resulting from these licenses" in "an effort
            to enhance [defendant's] brand" (id ,r 13; NYSCEF # 8, Def. MOL at 1). The parties
            subsequently entered into a Representation Agreement ("Agreement") on August
            10, 2021, back-dating it to August 24, 2020 (NYSCEF # 2 ,r 14). The Agreement was
            later amended to extend the term to September 1, 2025 (id ,r 25).

                    Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff would negotiate licensing agreements
            with third-party licensors on defendant's behalf; defendant was prohibited from
            negotiating directly with any licensors (id ,r,r 15, 16). In exchange, defendant would
            pay plaintiff royalties equal to 3% of sales of licensed merchandise sold under those
            license agreements (id ,r,r 15, 18). The Agreement also required defendant to send
            plaintiff a sales report at the end of each month along with the calculated royalties
            (id ,r 19). Past-due royalties would accrue interest (id).

                     Notably, the Agreement requires defendant to pay these royalties for any
            license agreement made by plaintiff following the effective date, including any
            amendments, renewals, extensions or modification of the licensing agreements
            (NYSCEF # 2 ,r,r 15, 22). This provision survives the termination of the Agreement
            (id. ,r 21). Finally, the Agreement could be terminated if plaintiff materially
            breaches or defaults. Defendant then sends a written notice informing plaintiff of
            that breach, and plaintiff has 30 days to cure (id ,r 20).

                   Everything went smoothly under the Agreement for three years until,
            according to the Dresner, defendant stopped paying royalties in March 2023 and
            stopped sending sales reports after May 2023 (NYSCEF # 12 ,r 12). On July 3, 2023,
            defendant sent plaintiff a default letter that served as its termination of the
            Agreement; plaintiff, through its counsel, rejected defendant's termination letter
            because it was not compliant with the terms of the Agreement (NYSCEF # 2 ,r,r 27·
            29). Plaintiff sent a follow-up letter on August 1, 2023, that gave defendant more
            time to pay outstanding royalties totaling $374,877.08, as well as more time to send
            monthly sales reports for June and July 2023 (id. ,r 32). Defendant did not respond
            to the letter, invoices for June 2023, nor plaintiffs requests for more information
            about how plaintiff breached the Agreement (id. ,r,r 31-33). Plaintiff believes that
            defendant is negotiating directly with licensors in violation of the Agreement (id. ,r
            30). Dresner baldly asserts that "[d]efendant is informing Licensors not to contact or
            interact with [p]laintiff in regard to the License Agreements" (NYSCEF # 12 ,r 24).

             654218/2023 BRANO SQUARED LLC vs. RYSE UP SPORTS NUTRITION LLC           Page 2 of9
             Motion No. 001                                            '

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22                                                           RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/27/2024

                   On August 30, 2023, when defendant failed to pay the back-owed royalties or
            otherwise respond, plaintiff initiated the current lawsuit asserting six causes of
            action: (1) breach of contract for failing to pay past due royalties, refusing to pay
            future royalties, negotiating directly with Licensors, and violating exclusivity
            provisions in the Agreement; (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by
            "act[ing] for an illegitimate purpose and in bad faith in an attempt to not only
            retain Royalty Compensation ... due and owing ... but also to undercut [plaintiffs]
            long-term relationships with the very Licensors that created Licenses with the
            [d]efendant" (NYSCEF # 2 ,r 41); (3) constructive trust over the past-due royalty
            monies owed under the Agreement (id. ,r 48); (4) accounting of "all sales of all
            Licensed Articles related to this Agreement" (id. ,r 53); (5) unjust enrichment; and
            (6) a declaratory judgment requiring defendant to pay past and future amounts due
            under the Agreement. Despite its claim that defendant owes $374,877.08 in past·
            due royalties, plaintiff pleads $35 million in damages (id. ,r,r 39, 43, 58).

                   Defendant now moves to dismiss all but the breach of contract claim, arguing
            that the claims are not properly pled and are duplicative of the breach of contract
            claim (NYSCEF # 8, Deft's MOL). Plaintiff disagrees asserting that defendant's
            motion is based on defendant's dispute about the Agreement (NYSCEF # 11, Pltfs
            Opp). In response, defendant asserts that it does not dispute the existence or
            validity of the Agreement as shown by the fact that defendant did not move to
            dismiss the breach claim (NYSCEF # 16).

                                                        Legal Standard

                   CPLR 3211(a)(7) provides that a party may move for judgment dismissing
            one or more causes of action when a pleading "fails to state a cause of action" (CPLR
            3211 [a] [7]). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court "must
            accept as true the facts as alleged in the complaint and submissions in opposition to
            the motion, accord [the non·movant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference
            and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal
            theory'' ( Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arb. Partners, L.P. v Superior Well
            Servs., Inc., 20 NY3d 59, 63 [2012] [internal quotation omitted]; accord Pavich v
            Pavich, 189 AD3d 548, 549 [1st Dept 2020]). "[WJhether a plaintiff ... can
            ultimately establish its allegations is not taken into consideration in determining a
            motion to dismiss" (Phillips S. Beach LLC v ZC Specialty Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 493, 497
            [1st Dept 2008], lvdeniedl2 NY3d 713 [2009]). However, the court need not accept
            "conclusory allegations of fact or law not supported by allegations of specific fact"
            ( Wilson v Tully, 243 AD2d 229, 234 [1st Dept 1998]).

             654218/2023 BRAND SQUARED LLC vs. RYSE UP SPORTS NUTRITION, LLC         Page 3 of 9
             Motion No. 001

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22                                                            RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/27/2024

                                                       Discussion

                   Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs causes of action for breach of the duty
            of good faith and fair dealing, constructive trust, accounting, unjust enrichment,
            and declaratory judgment.

            Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (2nd Cause ofAction)

                   In order to state a claim for violation of the implied covenant of good faith
            and fair dealing, "plaintiff must allege facts that tend to show that the defendant
            sought to prevent performance of the contract or to withhold its benefits from the
            plaintiff' (Dialcom, LLC v AT & T Corp., 20 Misc 3d llll(A) [Sup Ct, Kings County,
            2008]). However, "[a] cause of action to recover damages for breach of the implied
            covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be maintained where the alleged
            breach is 'intrinsically tied to the damages allegedly resulting from a breach of the
            contract"' (JJM Sunrise Automotive, LLC v Volkswagen Group ofAm., Inc., 46 Misc
            3d 755, 777 [Sup Ct, Nassau County, 2014], adhered to on rearg, 49 Misc 3d 1208(A)
            [NY Sup 2015]; see Tour Cent. Park Inc. v Thor38Park Row LLC, 223 AD3d 546,
            547 [1st Dept 2024] [dismissing good faith and fair dealing claim as duplicative "to
            the extent it was based on the same facts underlying the breach of contract claim"]).

                   Here, defendant has successfully shown that plaintiffs good faith and fair
            dealing claim merely duplicates the breach of contract claim. Both causes of action
            request the same relief in the form of $35 million in damages (compare NYSCEF # 2
            ,r 39 with id ,r 43 [seeking the same relief, $35 million, under each of these claims]).
            Both claims similarly allege the same harm - defendant's choice to stop paying
            royalties (compare id ,r 38 [defendant breached by "(i) failing to pay past due
            amounts due and owing to plaintiff under the terms of the Agreement"] with id ,r
            41 [defendant violated good faith and fair dealing by attempting to "retain Royalty
            Compensation monies contracted, due and owing to [plaintiff]"]).

                   And, while not as obvious, both causes of action also allege that defendant
            violated the Agreement by directly reaching out to licensors. The breach of contract
            claim alleges this directly (see id ,r 38 [defendant additionally breached by "(iii)
            negotiating directly with Licensors in direct contradiction of the Agreement"]). The
            good faith and fair dealing claim does not state this directly, instead it claims that
            defendant acted to "undercut [plaintiffs] long·term relationships with the very
            Licensors that created Licenses with the Defendant" (id ,r,r 41). The Dresner
            affidavit clarifies that defendants "undercut" plaintiffs relationships by "informing
            Licensors not to contact or interact with Plaintiff in regard to the License
            Agreements, and further unnecessarily de-positioning and harming Plaintiffs
             654218/2023 BRAND SQUARED LLC vs. RYSE UP SPORTS NUTRITION, LLC            Page 4 of 9
             Motion No. 001

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22                                                               RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/27/2024

            relationships and reputation in the industry" (NYSCEF # 12 ,r 24). Plaintiff argues
            that these breach and good faith and fair dealing allegations are not identical
            because there is a difference between reaching out directly to licensors and telling
            licensors not to interact with plaintiff (see NYSCEF # 11 at 5). However, even in the
            light most favorable to plaintiff, this is a distinction without a difference. If
            defendant is negotiating directly with licensors, then defendant almost certainly
            would tell licensors not to contact plaintiff about those contracts, or else cause
            confusion among its licensors. In other words, the allegations supporting the breach
            claim necessarily encompasses the allegations supporting the good faith and fair
            dealing claim. The two claims are therefore duplicative.

                   Even if the claims were not duplicative, plaintiffs good faith and fair dealing
            claim would still fail because the allegations supporting it are entirely conclusory.
            "A pleading which, fairly construed, fails to allege any facts which constitute a
            wrong but only general conclusions, is entirely insufficient and may be dismissed on
            that ground" (Kalmanash v Smith, 291 NY 142, 153 [1943]). Plaintiff only relies on
            three sentences across the complaint and the Dresner affidavit for the proposition
            that defendant is "undercutting" plaintiffs business:

                   1. "Upon information and belief, Defendant has negotiated directly with
                       Licensors without BSQ's presence or involvement, in contradiction to
                       Counsel's request and direct violation of the Agreement .... " (NYSCEF #
                       2 ,r 30).
                   2. "[Defendant] has acted for an illegitimate purpose and in bad faith in an
                      attempt to ... undercut BSQ's long-term relationships with the very
                      Licensors that created Licenses with the Defendant" (id. ,r 41).
                   3. "In fact, Defendant is informing Licensors not to contact or interact with
                      Plaintiff in regard to the License Agreements, and further unnecessarily
                      de-positioning and harming Plaintiffs relationships and reputation in the
                      industry" (NYSCEF # 12 ,r 24).

            Each of these allegations is conclusory in that there are no specific examples of
            licensors to whom defendant spoke or instances in which licensors were told not to
            contact plaintiff. Even in context, there are no additional factual allegations that
            would strengthen any of these conclusory statements. Allegations like these are
            insufficient to state a cause of action.

                   Given the above deficiencies, the court does not need to reach defendant's
            other arguments on this point. The good faith and fair dealing claim is dismissed.

             654218/2023 BRAND SQUARED LLC vs. RYSE UP SPORTS NUTRITION, LLC               Page 5 of 9
             Motion No. 001

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22                                                              RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/27/2024

            Constructive Trust (3rd Cause ofAction)

                   "Generally, a constructive trust may be imposed when property has been
            acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good
            conscience retain the beneficial interest" (Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121
            [1976]. The elements of constructive trust are "(1) a fiduciary or confidential
            relationship between the parties, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer of some asset in
            reliance upon the promise, and (4) unjust enrichment flowing from the breach of the
            promise" (Zuch v Zuch, 117 AD2d 397, 403 [1st Dept 1986]).

                   Plaintiffs constructive trust claim fails because there is no adequate
            allegation of a confidential or fiduciary relationship. Regarding confidential
            relationships, plaintiff argues that it created such a relationship by sharing
            confidential information with defendant, including "confidential long-term
            relationships" with licensors and plaintiffs "strategies and negotiation tactics for
            successfully pitched new Licensors" (NYSCEF # 11 at 8). However, "a confidential
            relationship is 'a relationship arising out of a close and intimate association which
            creates and inspires trust and confidence between the parties"' (A. Brod, Inc. v SK &
            I Co., L.L. C., 998 F Supp 314, 327 [SONY 1998], quoting 106 N.Y. Jur. Trusts§ 157
            [2nd Ed.1993]). For instance, confidential relationships have been found between
            siblings (Kissane, 217 AD3d at 934); close friends (Kohan v Nehmadi, 130 AD3d
            429, 430 [1st Dept 2015]); married and/or divorced couples (Goodman v Goodman,
            84 AD2d 344, 346 [1st Dept 1982]); people in other romantic relationships (e.g.,
            Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 120 [1976]; Canas v Oshiro, 221 AD3d 650, 651
            [2d Dept 2023]); situations in which one lawyer sits on both sides of a contractual
            transaction (Sharper v Harlem Teams for Self-Help, Inc., 257 AD2d 329, 332 [1st
            Dept 1999]); and parties with prior "longstanding business relationship[s] ... often
            without any formal written agreement" (Berry v Wallerstein, 219 AD3d 924, 925 [2d
            Dept 2023]). By contrast, plaintiff alleges merely that it had a contractual
            Agreement with defendant and shared some confidential information under that
            Agreement. There are no other facts showing the sort of "close an intimate
            association" needed to turn a corporate contract into a confidential relationship.

                   Plaintiff similarly fails to allege a fiduciary relationship. Plaintiff argues first
            that there was a fiduciary relationship because, again, plaintiff gave defendant
            confidential information. However, plaintiff offers no case law for the extreme
            proposition that merely sharing one's confidential information somehow turns a
            contractual relationship into a fiduciary one. But such proposition has faced
            rejection (see United States v Chestman, 947 F2d 551, 568 [2d Cir 1991] ["Reposing

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             Motion No. 001

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22                                                             RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/27/2024

            confidential information in another Ddoes not by itself create a fiduciary
            relationship"]).

                   Additionally, while plaintiff does not argue this outright, plaintiff seems to
            suggest that a fiduciary relationship existed because defendant had a duty to
            calculate and distribute royalties to plaintiff-in other words, that royalty contracts
            necessarily create fiduciary relationships (NYSCEF # 11 at 8). In denying this
            argument, it is helpful to refer to cases between music artists and recording
            companies. New York courts have held that "an artist's assignment of rights to a
            record company in exchange for royalties is contractual and does not create a
            fiduciary relationship or duty" (SI1vester v Time Warner, Inc., l Misc 3d 250, 257
            [Sup Ct NY County 2003] [collecting cases], affd, 14 AD3d 430 [1st Dept 2005]).
            Instead, to turn the contractual relationship into a fiduciary one, there must be "a
            separate duty other than to perform under the contract" (id), sometimes described
            as a "special circumstance" (see, e.g., Rodgers v Roulette Records, Inc., 677 F Supp
            731, 738 [SDNY 1988]; Universal-MCA Music Puhl. v Bad Boy Entertainment, Inc.,
            2003 NY Slip Op 51037(U) [Sup Ct, NY County, June 18, 2003] [stating that for co-
            authors of music, "special circumstances" required to turn "ordinary business
            relationship into a fiduciary one"]). Plaintiff does not allege a special circumstance
            of any sort. And this court sees no reason to dispense with the special circumstances
            requirement here. Because the fiduciary duty element is not met, this claim is
            dismissed.

            Accounting (4th Cause ofAction)

                   The elements of accounting are "[i] a fiduciary or confidential relationship, [ii]
            money entrusted to the defendant imposing the burden of an accounting, [iii] the
            absence of a legal remedy, and [iv] in some cases a demand and refusal" (Metro.
            Bank & Tr. Co. v Lopez, 189 AD3d 443, 446 [1st Dept 2020]). As explained above,
            plaintiff failed to allege a fiduciary or confidential relationship, and therefore the
            accounting claim must be dismissed.

            Unjust Enrichment (5th Cause ofAction)

                   Defendant argues that the unjust enrichment claim must be dismissed
            because it is duplicative of the breach of contract claim. Plaintiff does not deny that
            the two claims are duplicative but argues that the duplicity is allowed because
            plaintiff is merely pleading the two claims in the alternative given that defendant
            has not yet admitted the enforceability or applicability of the Agreement. Defendant
            replies that it does not dispute the existence of the Agreement as shown by the fact
            that defendant did not move to dismiss the breach claim.

             654218/2023 BRAND SQUARED LLC vs. RYSE UP SPORTS NUTRITION, LLC            Page 7 of 9
             Motion No. 001

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22                                                            RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/27/2024

                   "In New York, where there is both a claim for unjust enrichment and a
            contract claim, and there is no disagreement about the existence or terms of the
            contract, the unjust enrichment claim can be dismissed as duplicative of the
            contract claim" (Freedom Holding, Inc. v Haart, 76 Misc 3d 746, 764 [Sup Ct, NY
            County, 2022]). "Unjust enrichment is 'not a catchall cause of action to be used
            when other [causes of action] fail'" (E.J. Brooks Co. v Cambridge Sec. Seals, 31
            NY3d 441,455 [2018], quoting Corsello v Verizon N. Y., Inc., 18 NY3d 777, 790
            [2012]).

                  Here, not only does defendant not challenge the breach of contract claim,
            defendant also repeatedly holds itself out to accept that an Agreement exists, even
            attaching the Agreement to its reply papers to support its motion (see NYSCEF #
            14, Reply; # 15, Representation Agreement). Finally, plaintiff does not dispute that
            the unjust enrichment claim covers the same conduct and requests the same
            damages as the breach of contract claim (see NYSCEF # 11 at 15·16). The unjust
            enrichment claim is therefore dismissed.

            Declaratory Judgment (6th Cause ofAction)

                    Similarly, plaintiffs declaratory judgment claim must be dismissed as
            duplicative of the breach claim. "A cause of action for declaratory judgment is
            'unnecessary and inappropriate when the plaintiff has an adequate, alternative
            remedy in another form of action, such as breach of contract' or injunctive relief'
            (Ithilien Realty Corp. v 180 Ludlow Dev. LLC, 140 AD3d 621, 622 [1st Dept 2016],
            quoting Apple Records v Capitol Records, 137 AD2d 50, 54 [1st Dept 1988] and
            Arthur Young & Co. v Fleischman, 85 AD2d 571, 571 [1st Dept 1981]).

                   Here, all the relief requested in the declaratory judgment claim is
            encompassed by the breach of contract claim. The declaratory judgment claim
            requests four different forms of relief. The first three are that (1) defendant should
            pay the $374,877.08 in past due royalties; (2) defendant should provide "monthly
            Licensed sales reporting not yet provided ... so new invoices can be created and
            sent to the Defendant"; and (3) defendant should pay the amounts due under these
            "new invoices" (NYSCEF # 2 ~ 62 [emphasis added]). The breach of contract claim
            condenses those three into a single breach: "(i) failing to pay past amounts due and
            owing to plaintiff' (id ~ 38 [emphasis added]).

                   The fourth and final form of relief under the declaratory judgment claim is
            that defendant shall "(4) pay [plaintiff] for all future Royalty Compensation" as
            "more fully set forth in the parties' Agreement" (id ~ 62 [emphasis added]).
            Similarly, the complaint alleges defendant breached the Agreement by "(ii) refusing
            to pay for all future amounts owed to Plaintiff under the Agreement" (id. ~ 38
            [emphasis added]). Because both the declaratory judgment and breach of contract

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             Motion No. 001

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 22                                                                       RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/27/2024

            claims concern both past and future royalties under the Agreement, the declaratory
            judgment claim is duplicative of breach and must be dismissed.

                    Plaintiff argues that the claims are not duplicative because New York courts
            allow parallel breach and declaratory judgment claims where the breach claim is
            brought for past damages and the declaratory judgment claim for future compliance
            (NYSCEF # 11 at 13, citing Barletta v 643-645 Ninth Ave Associates LLC, No
            153167/2015, 2016 WL 7440841, at *5 [Sup Ct, NY County, Dec. 23, 2016]). This
            argument holds no water because, as just explained, both the breach and
            declaratory judgment claims allege past and future violations. Moreover, plaintiffs
            breach of contract claim also requests $35 million in damages despite earlier
            allegations that defendant only owes $374,877.08 in past-due royalties (compare id.
            ,r 32 [counsel "provided more time to pay the approximate $374,877.08 in Royalty
            Compensation that is outstanding"] with id. ,r 39 [pleading "approximately $35
            million dollars" in damages for breach]). This hundred-times difference can only be
            explained by the prospect of future losses due to refusal to pay future royalties.

                                                         Conclusion

                    For the foregoing reasons, it is

                    ORDERED that defendant Ryse Up Sports Nutrition, LLC's motion to
            dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action is granted; and
            it is further

                   ORDERED that within 30 days of the e·filing of this order, defendant shall
            file an answer to the complaint; and it is further

                   ORDERED that a preliminary conference shall be held via Microsoft Teams
            on May 8, 2024, at 2:00 p.m. or at such other time that the parties shall set with the
            court's law clerk, provided, however, that the parties shall first meet and confer to
            determine if there is agreement to stipulate to a preliminary conference order,
            available at https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/courts/comdiv/NY/PDFs/part49·
            PC-Order-fillable.pdf.

                    03/25/2024
                      DATE                                                     MARGARET A. CHAN, J.S.C.

             CHECK ONE:                  CASE DISPOSED                  NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                         GRANTED         □ DENIED       GRANTED IN PART         □ OTHER
             APPLICATION:                SETTLE ORDER                   SUBMIT ORDER

             CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:       INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN     FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT   □ REFERENCE

             654218/2023 BRAND SQUARED LLC vs. RYSE UP SPORTS NUTRITION, LLC                     Page 9 of 9
             Motion No. 001

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