Court Opinion

ID: 9789687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:40:05.517903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:07.273149
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
dissenting.
In 1972 the Alaska Legislature amended the Open Meetings Act to express that
[i]t is the policy of the state that
(1) the governmental units mentioned in AS 44.62.310(a) exist to aid in the conduct of the people’s business;
(2) it is the intent of the law that actions of those units be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly;
(3) the people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them;
(4) the people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know;
(5) the people’s right to remain informed shall be protected so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.
AS 44.62.312(a) (emphasis added). It is clear that the Open Meetings Act provides for and protects a public right. The Act creates an obligation on the part of all state governmental bodies to open their meetings to public scrutiny. This court has held that the Act by its own language “plainly includes the state legislature.” Malone v. Meekins, 650 P.2d 351, 358 (Alaska 1982). Therefore, the legislature cannot now unilaterally and without public debate abrogate that right.
As tiie court recognizes, the contours of the doctrine of justiciability are not easily defined. To guide our deliberations, we have in the past looked to the criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). See Malone v. Meekins, 650 P.2d at 356-57. The relevant Baker criteri-um discussed by the court today is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commit*344ment of the issue to a coordinate political department_” 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710, 7 L.Ed.2d at 686. This court recognizes, and I do not contest, that the Alaska Constitution contains an express textual commitment authorizing the legislature to adopt its own rules of procedure.1 Yet the issue before the court is the public's statutory right to be informed. Our past cases have not held that resolution of this issue lies outside the province of the judiciary, contrary to the opinion of this court today.
In Malone, this court addressed the justi-ciability of legislative rules regarding who may call the legislature to order. This court refused to act as a “sort of super parliamentarian.” 650 P.2d at 359. We also declined to determine what public notice is “reasonable” under the Open Meetings Act. AS 44.62.310(e). I do not seek to overrule that precedent. If courts were to act as “super parliamentarians,” thereby denying the legislature reasonable interpretations of its internal rules, the legislature would be hobbled to the point of inactivity. However, the legislature’s disregard of a right granted by the Open Meetings Act does not deserve the same deference as its interpretation of a phrase contained in that Act. This is more than a matter of degree. It is a matter of the complete denial of the public’s express right to witness important legislative debate. Thus Malone does not control in the current case.
In Abood v. Gorsuch, 703 P.2d 1158 (Alaska 1985) we held non-justiciable the question of whether the President of the Senate could legally preside over a joint session of the legislature in the absence of the Speaker of the House. We agreed with the trial court to defer “to the wisdom of the legislature concerning violations of legislative rules which govern the internal workings of the legislature.” 703 P.2d at 1164 (emphasis added). We did, however, under the guise of constitutional interpretation, see fit to decide whether a quorum was present. At issue was whether the quorum must be composed of a majority of each house respectively or, alternatively, whether it need only be a simple majority of the total number of legislators. We held the latter, clearly deciding a procedural issue. Id. at 1162. Our definition of what constituted a “quorum,” a parliamentary matter seemingly committed to the rule making authority of the legislature, is distinct from “insurpng] compliance with the provisions of the Alaska Constitution.” Thus, Abood is inapposite to the current case because it dealt with a dispute solely between members of the legislature over their own rules. What precedential value the case does possess shows that this court will decide certain procedural issues for the legislature and that this court has not been completely deferential in the past.
The court also relies on Moffitt v. Willis, 459 So.2d 1018 (Fla.1984). The court argues that “[t]he facts in Moffitt are virtually identical to the facts in this case.” This simply is not so. The Moffitt court was faced with interpretation of a broad constitutional free speech clause and specific legislative rules. The court deferred to the legislature’s rule making power only after limiting the case by observing:
We are not confronted with whether a statute applies, rather we are asked to allow the courts to determine when and how legislative rules apply to members of the legislature.
Moffitt, 459 So.2d at 1022. Thus the Moffitt court expressly excluded from its holding the specific issue raised in the case at bar.
Moreover, we have recognized the public nature of the Open Meetings Act. In Alaska Community Colleges’ Federation of Teachers v. University of Alaska, 677 P.2d 886, 891 (Alaska 1984) we stated that
[sjection 312 makes clear that the (Open Meetings Act] exists primarily to advance the interests of “the people of this state.” When the sunshine act is breached it is “the people’s right to remain informed” which sustains injury.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 33, 52 S.Ct. 475, 478, 76 *345L.Ed. 954, 959 (1932) held that where the “construction to be given to the rules affects persons other than members of the Senate, the question presented is of necessity a judicial one.” Smith, then, is more analogous to the current issue than the other cases cited by this court.2 Whereas in Malone and Abood the controversy was between members of the legislature, who were parties to the rule making and enforcement proceedings, in Smith the affected person was other than a member of the [United States] senate and unable to personally participate in rectifying the wrong done him. So it is in the current case. The affected persons are not members of the legislature and in fact their interests are at odds with the legislature. Their only recourse is to the courts which, as Smith suggests, should not decline to decide these disputes.
Finally, it is observed that the doctrine of nonjusticiability of issues concerning legislative action “is primarily a function of the separation of powers.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. at 706, 7 L.Ed.2d at 682. But, while the separation of powers theory requires some deference by the judiciary to a coequal branch of government, the theory originated as a system of checks and balances on the power of each branch. The line between when this court should act with deference and when it should check the power of the legislature is not easily drawn. However, “where the rights of persons who are not members of the legislature are involved ...,” Malone, 650 P.2d at 359, this court should be more willing to defend those rights than it shows itself to be today.3

. Alaska Const, art. II, § 12. The fact that the legislature has adopted a rule which mirrors the statute should not confuse the issue before the court. Adoption of a rule similar to a statute cannot erode the force of the statute as law. If the legislature wishes to exempt itself from the requirements of the statute it can do so in the act itself.

. The court distinguishes Smith on the ground that in Smith a specific individual was affected whereas in the case at bar it is the right of the public that is affected. The court does not explain the significance of this distinction.

. I do not believe that the constitutional issue addressed in Part IV of the court’s opinion need be decided. The clear policy mandate of the statute should be dispositive of the issues presented in this case. This approach adheres "to the doctrine of abstaining from answering constitutional questions when other dispositive grounds exist." Deubelbeiss v. C.F.E.C., 689 P.2d 487, 491 (Alaska 1984) (Compton, J., concurring).