Court Opinion

ID: 9931117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 16:03:02.983972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:43.872924
License: Public Domain

PRELIMINARY PRINT

             Volume 601 U. S. Part 1
                               Pages 1–22

       OFFICIAL REPORTS
                                    OF

   THE SUPREME COURT
                             December 5, 2023

Page Proof Pending Publication

                   REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
                           reporter of decisions

    NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
  the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
  of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543,
  pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
                       CASES ADJUDGED
                                IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   AT

                     OCTOBER TERM, 2023

           ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
                  the rst circuit
    No. 22–429. Argued October 4, 2023—Decided December 5, 2023

Page        Proof
The Court granted   reviewPending               Publication
                             in this case to consider whether Deborah
  Laufer has Article III standing to sue hotels whose websites failed to
  state whether they have accessible rooms for the disabled as required
  by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, even if Laufer had no
  thought of staying at the hotels, much less booking a room. After a
  lower court sanctioned her lawyer, Laufer voluntarily dismissed her
  pending suits, including her case against Acheson Hotels, LLC, and fled
  a suggestion of mootness in this Court. Though Laufer's case is moot,
  the circuit split on the issue briefed and argued in this Court is very
  much alive.
Held: This case is vacated as moot. The Court has the authority to ad-
  dress jurisdictional issues of mootness and standing in any order it
  chooses. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549
  U. S. 422, 431. And while the Court is sensitive to Acheson's concern
  about litigants manipulating this Court's jurisdiction, the Court is not
  convinced that Laufer abandoned her case in an effort to evade the
  Court's review. Pp. 4–6.
50 F. 4th 259, vacated and remanded.

  Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ.,

                                                                  1
2               ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                                 Syllabus

joined. Thomas, J., post, p. 6, and Jackson, J., post, p. 14, fled opinions
concurring in the judgment.

  Adam G. Unikowsky argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Lindsay C. Harrison, Sally A.
Morris, and Andrianna D. Kastanek.
  Erica L. Ross argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were
Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney General
Clarke, Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, Bonnie I. Robin-
Vergeer, and Yael Bortnick.
  Kelsi Brown Corkran argued the cause for respondent.
With her on the briefs were Rupa Bhattacharyya, Amy L.
Marshak, and Joseph W. Mead.*

   *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Atlantic Legal
Foundation et al. by Lawrence S. Ebner and Sarah Elizabeth Spencer; for
The Buckeye Institute et al. by Larry J. Obhof, Jr., Robert Alt, and David
C. Tryon; for the Center for Constitutional Responsibility by Steven
Page Proof Pending Publication
P. Lehotsky, Andrew B. Davis, Karen R. Harned, and Drew F. Waldbeser;
for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by
Mark A. Perry, Jennifer B. Dickey, Jonathan D. Urick, and Thomas
Pinder; for the Restaurant Law Center et al. by Dylan B. Carp and An-
gelo I. Amador; and for the Retail Litigation Center, Inc., et al. by Shay
Dvoretzky, Parker Rider-Longmaid, Michael W. McTigue, Jr., Meredith
C. Slawe, Jeremy Patashnik, Deborah R. White, and Jason D. Russell.
   Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Constitu-
tional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne J. Gorod;
for Disability Antidiscrimination Law Scholars by Hyland Hunt and Ruth-
anne M. Deutsch; for the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund
et al. by Karla Gilbride, Amy Farr Robertson, and Maria Michelle Uzeta;
for Fair Housing Organizations et al. by Reed Colfax, Lila Miller, Gemma
Donofrio, Daniel Woofter, and Diane L. Houk; for the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Janai S. Nelson, Samuel
Spital, Christopher Kemmitt, Michael Skocpol, David D. Cole, Sunu
P. Chandy, Rachel E. Smith, Damon Hewitt, Jon Greenbaum, Thomas
Silverstein, ReNika Moore, Sandra Park, Zachary L. Heiden, Jocelyn D.
Larkin, Lindsay Nako, Karen L. Loewy, and Raymond P. Tolentino; for
Public Citizen by Scott L. Nelson and Allison M. Zieve; and for Philip L.
Schuler et al. by Michael M. Epstein, pro se.
   Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts et al. by Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of Massachusetts,
                        Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)                      3

                          Opinion of the Court

  Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court.
   Deborah Laufer has sued hundreds of hotels whose web-
sites failed to state whether they have rooms accessible to
the disabled. As the sheer number of lawsuits suggests, she
does not focus her efforts on hotels where she has any
thought of staying, much less booking a room. Instead,
Laufer systematically searches the web to fnd hotels that
fail to provide accessibility information and sues to force
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), 104 Stat. 327, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. Ordinarily,
the hotels settle her claims and pay her attorney's fees. But
some have resisted, arguing that Laufer is not injured by
the absence of information about rooms she has no plans to
reserve. Only plaintiffs who allege a concrete injury have
standing to sue in federal court. Laufer, these hotels have
argued, is suing to enforce the law rather than to remedy
her own harms.
Page Proof Pending Publication
   Laufer has singlehandedly generated a circuit split. The
Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that she lacks
standing; the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held
that she has it. We took this case from the First Circuit to
resolve the split. 50 F. 4th 259 (2022); 598 U. S. ––– (2023).
Though Acheson Hotels, LLC, fled the petition, Laufer sup-
ported the grant.
   After we granted review, the case took an unusual turn.
In July, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland suspended Laufer's lawyer, Tristan Gillespie, from
the practice of law for defrauding hotels by lying in fee peti-

David C. Kravitz, Deputy State Solicitor, and Ann E. Lynch and David
R. Rangaviz, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective jurisdictions as follows: William Tong of Connecticut,
Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Kwame Raoul of Illinois,
Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey, Leti-
tia James of New York, Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, and Robert W.
Ferguson of Washington; and for the National Association of Home Build-
ers of the United States by Jeffrey B. Augello, Thomas J. Ward, and Feli-
cia K. Watson.
4               ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                          Opinion of the Court

tions and during settlement negotiations. See Order in In
re Gillespie, No. 1:21–mc–14 (July 5, 2023), ECF Doc. 14.
It based the suspension on a report fnding that Gillespie
demanded $10,000 in attorney's fees per case even though he
used “boilerplate complaints.” Report and Recommenda-
tion in No. 1:21–mc–14 (June 30, 2023), ECF Doc. 13, pp. 5,
26. In addition, Gillespie funneled six-fgure sums to the fa-
ther of Laufer's grandchild for investigatory work that he
never performed, raising the prospect that either Gillespie
or Laufer (or both) got a cut of the money. Id., at 28, 30.
Making matters still worse, the sanctions order against Gil-
lespie also implicated Laufer's former counsel of record be-
fore this Court, Thomas Bacon. Id., at 30–31.*
   Following these revelations, Laufer voluntarily dismissed
her pending suits with prejudice, including her complaint
against Acheson in the District of Maine. See Notice of Vol-
untary Dismissal in No. 2:20–cv–00344 (July 20, 2023), ECF
Doc. 45. She then fled a suggestion of mootness in this
Page Proof Pending Publication
Court. At this point, Acheson had already fled its principal
brief on the standing issue, and we deferred a decision on
mootness until after oral argument.
   Laufer does not argue that we must dismiss her suit for
mootness. She acknowledges that we can address jurisdic-
tional issues in any order we choose, see Sinochem Int'l Co.
v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U. S. 422, 431 (2007),
and so have authority to resolve the standing issue. But
mootness is easy and standing is hard, Laufer says. She
urges us to refrain from resolving a diffcult question in a
case that is otherwise over.

   *On November 14th, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the sus-
pension order, holding that the District Court gave Gillespie insuffcient
notice that it might sanction him not only for dishonesty to opposing coun-
sel, but also for failing to communicate with his clients. In re Gillespie,
No. 23–1819 (2023) (per curiam). Disciplinary proceedings remain pend-
ing in the District Court.
                    Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)               5

                      Opinion of the Court

   Acheson, on the other hand, stresses that the diffcult
standing issue is the reason we took this case. Though
Laufer's case is dead, the circuit split is very much alive.
This Court has received briefs and heard oral argument.
For effciency's sake, Acheson insists that we should settle
the issue now rather than repeating the work later. More-
over, Acheson warns that if we dismiss this case for moot-
ness, the standing issue might not come back anytime soon.
While Laufer has disavowed the intention to fle any more
ADA tester suits, Tr. of Oral Arg. 70, others will fle in the
circuits that sided with her, and hotels will settle, regarding
it as pointless to challenge circuit precedent in this Court.
Why would any hotel take a case this far, Acheson asks, if
the respondent can evade our review by abandoning a claim
rather than risking a loss?
   We are sensitive to Acheson's concern about litigants ma-
nipulating the jurisdiction of this Court. We are not con-
vinced, however, that Laufer abandoned her case in an effort
Page Proof Pending Publication
to evade our review. She voluntarily dismissed her pending
ADA cases after a lower court sanctioned her lawyer. She
represented to this Court that she will not fle any others.
Laufer's case against Acheson is moot, and we dismiss it on
that ground. We emphasize, however, that we might exer-
cise our discretion differently in a future case.

                         *      *      *
   The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit with in-
structions to dismiss the case as moot. See United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). Justice Jackson ob-
jects to this disposition, urging us to instead leave the First
Circuit's judgment in place. Post, at 16–20 (opinion concur-
ring in judgment). Our Munsingwear practice is well set-
tled. See, e. g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 584 U. S.
236, 240 (2018) (per curiam); Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nel-
6             ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

son, 442 U. S. 92, 93–94 (1979) (per curiam); Duke Power Co. v.
Greenwood County, 299 U. S. 259, 267 (1936) (per curiam); see
also S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Him-
melfarb, Supreme Court Practice § 19.5 (11th ed. 2019). We
decline Justice Jackson's invitation to reconsider it.
                                                 It is so ordered.
   Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
   Deborah Laufer has fled hundreds of lawsuits against ho-
tels she has no intention of visiting, claiming that their web-
sites lack accessibility information mandated by a federal
regulation. At both parties' request, this Court agreed to
answer a question that has divided the Courts of Appeals:
whether plaintiffs like Laufer have standing to bring these
claims. The Court decides not to decide that question be-
cause, after briefng began, Laufer voluntarily dismissed her
claim in the District Court. I would answer this important
Page Proof Pending Publication
and recurring question, which, as all agree, we have the au-
thority to do. And, I conclude that Laufer lacks standing.

                               I
   Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place
of public accommodation,” such as a hotel. 42 U. S. C.
§§ 12182(a), 12181(7)(A). Title III defnes discrimination to
include “a failure to make reasonable modifcations” when
“necessary to afford . . . services . . . or accommodations to
individuals with disabilities.” § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). To en-
force the ADA's prohibition on discrimination, Title III cre-
ates a private cause of action that permits “any person who
is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability”
to sue for violations. § 12188(a)(1). Only injunctive relief
and attorney's fees are available to private litigants. Ibid.;
see also §§ 12205, 2000a–3(a). The Attorney General, how-
                    Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)               7

                Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

ever, may obtain damages or assess civil penalties.
§ 12188(b)(2).
   The Department of Justice promulgated a regulation
known as the Reservation Rule to aid in the implementation
of the ADA's prohibition on discrimination. The rule re-
quires hotels to “[i]dentify and describe accessible features
. . . in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with
disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or
guest room meets his or her accessibility needs.” 28 CFR
§ 36.302(e)(1)(ii) (2022). The rule also applies to reserva-
tions made “through a third party.” Ibid.
   Laufer, who is wheelchair bound, is a self-described “tes-
ter” of compliance with the Reservation Rule. From her
home in Florida, Laufer scours the internet for hotel web-
sites that do not contain the required accessibility informa-
tion. When she fnds a defcient website, she sues the hotel.
She often offers to settle immediately for $10,000 in attor-
Page Proof Pending Publication
ney's fees and corrective action. See Report and Recom-
mendation in In re Gillespie, No. 1:21–mc–14 (D Md., June
30, 2023), ECF Doc. 13, p. 5; No. 1:21–mc–14 (July 5, 2023),
ECF Doc. 14, p. 1, vacated on other grounds by In re Gilles-
pie, No. 23–1819 (CA4, Nov. 14, 2023) (per curiam). In the
past fve years, Laufer has fled over 600 lawsuits against
hotels.
   In this case, Laufer visited the website of a bed and break-
fast located in Maine, the Coast Village Inn. She fled suit
against the Coast Village Inn's owner, Acheson Hotels, for
failing to provide suffcient accessibility information. She
also contended that 13 third-party booking websites, such as
Expedia, failed to provide accessibility information for the
Coast Village Inn. Laufer initially alleged that she was
planning to visit the Coast Village Inn as part of a cross-
country trip from Florida to Maine to Colorado. But she
later disclaimed any intent to travel to Maine (or the Coast
Village Inn). 50 F. 4th 259, 267, n. 3 (CA1 2022); see also
Brief for Appellant in No. 21–1410 (CA1), p. 4, n. 1.
8            ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

               Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

   The District Court concluded that Laufer lacked standing
and dismissed her complaint. The First Circuit reversed,
relying primarily on this Court's holding in Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363 (1982), that a tester had
standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act. When Acheson
Hotels petitioned for certiorari, Laufer agreed. She high-
lighted that the Circuits were split as to her standing and
argued that “clarity from this Court is badly needed.” Brief
in Opposition 1. After we granted certiorari and set the
case for argument, Laufer fled a notice in the District Court
of her voluntary dismissal of her claim with prejudice. And,
even though Acheson Hotels (and several amici) had already
fled briefs, Laufer requested that we dismiss this case as
moot. We denied her request at that time, but agreed to
consider it at oral argument. The case has been fully
briefed and the Court has heard argument on the merits.
Today, however, the majority opts to resolve this case on
mootness. We can—and should—address the question on
Page Proof Pending Publication
which we granted certiorari.

                              II
   I would not dismiss this case as moot. There is no ques-
tion that we have authority to address Laufer's standing.
Standing and mootness are both jurisdictional doctrines that
fow from Article III. And, there is no mandatory “sequenc-
ing of jurisdictional issues.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 526 U. S. 574, 584 (1999). Indeed, as the majority and
Laufer herself acknowledge, we have the discretion to deter-
mine either “ `threshold groun[d] for denying audience to a
case on the merits.' ” Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l
Shipping Corp., 549 U. S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting Ruhrgas,
526 U. S., at 585); ante, at 4; Suggestion of Mootness 9
(“[T]his Court has discretion to resolve either issue frst”).
   We should address Laufer's standing, rather than resolve
this case on mootness. As an analytical matter, whether
Laufer had standing the day she fled her suit is logically
                    Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)              9

               Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

antecedent to whether her later actions mooted the case.
More importantly, whether Laufer has standing to bring her
Reservation Rule claims is a recurring question that only
this Court can defnitively resolve. As the majority ex-
plains, “Laufer has singlehandedly generated a circuit split”
on her standing. Ante, at 3. And Laufer is far from the
only Reservation Rule tester. See, e.g., Harty v. West Point
Realty, Inc., 28 F. 4th 435 (CA2 2022); Love v. Marriott Own-
ership Resorts, Inc., No. 20–cv–7523 (ND Cal., Mar. 29, 2021);
Sarwar v. Om Sai, LLC, No. 2:20–cv–483 (D Me., May 18,
2021). Beyond answering this question for our colleagues
on the Courts of Appeal and District Courts, we should an-
swer it for Acheson Hotels, which has spent signifcant time
and resources fully briefng a question that will now go
unanswered.
   What is more, the circumstances strongly suggest strate-
gic behavior on Laufer's part. After this case was well un-
Page Proof Pending Publication
derway in this Court, Laufer fled a notice with the District
Court voluntarily dismissing her claim with prejudice, osten-
sibly because another court sanctioned one of her attorneys
for misconduct related to some of Laufer's ADA cases. But
the attorney in question had nothing to do with the case
before us. Suggestion of Mootness 3 (acknowledging at-
issue attorney “had no involvement in the present case be-
fore this Court”). Laufer's logic is thus that she dismissed
her claim—and the Court should no longer address whether
she had standing—because an attorney she hired in an en-
tirely different case engaged in misconduct. An unrelated
attorney's conduct does nothing to change the analysis re-
quired to determine a plaintiff's standing. Laufer admits as
much, arguing only that the alleged misconduct “could dis-
tract from the merits of her ADA claims and everything she
has sought to achieve for persons with disabilities like her-
self.” Id., at 4. I would not reward Laufer's transparent
tactic for evading our review. Although the majority leaves
the door open to “exercise [its] discretion differently in a
10              ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                  Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

future case,” we have needlessly invited litigants to follow
Laufer's path to manipulate our docket. Ante, at 5. We
should not resolve this case about standing based upon moot-
ness of Laufer's own making.1

                                  III
   Turning to the question presented, Laufer lacks standing
to bring her ADA claims. Article III of the Constitution
extends the “judicial Power” to all “Cases” and “Controver-
sies.” Standing doctrine serves to “limi[t] the `judicial
power' to ` “cases and controversies of the sort traditionally
amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” ' ”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 343 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Vermont Agency of Natural Resources
v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 774 (2000)).
In doing so, standing “preserve[s] separation of powers by
preventing the Judiciary's entanglement in disputes that are
Page Proof Pending Publication
primarily political in nature.” Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 344.
   As I have previously explained, “[t]he mere fling of a com-
plaint in federal court . . . does not a case (or controversy)
make.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 446
(2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Our “judicial power [does
not extend] to every violation of the constitution [or law]
which may possibly take place, but to `a case in law or eq-
uity,' in which a right, under such law, is asserted in a Court
of justice.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 405 (1821).
To have standing, a plaintiff must assert a violation of his
rights. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555,
563 (1992) (“[T]he party seeking review [must] be himself
among the injured” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
After all, “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on
the rights of individuals.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137, 170 (1803). It is not to address a plaintiff's claim of

  1
   The majority vacates the opinion below in Laufer's favor, and rightly
so. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).
                         Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)                        11

                    Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

“only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper appli-
cation of the . . . laws.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 573.2
   Laufer lacks standing because her claim does not assert a
violation of a right under the ADA, much less a violation of
her rights. Her claim alleges that Acheson Hotels violated
the ADA by failing to include on its website the accessibility
information that the Reservation Rule requires. Yet, the
ADA provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the . . . services . . . of any place of public accommoda-
tion.” 42 U. S. C. § 12182(a). In other words, the ADA pro-
hibits only discrimination based on disability—it does not
create a right to information.
   Laufer's ADA claim is thus different from the tester's
claim under the Fair Housing Act that the Court addressed

   2
     The traditional distinction between public and private rights shapes
the contours of the judicial power. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S.
Page Proof Pending Publication
330, 344 (2016) (opinion of Thomas, J.); Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif, 575 U. S. 665, 713 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Private rights,
such as the classic rights to life, liberty, and property, were “so called
because they `appertain[ed] and belong[ed] to particular men . . . merely
as individuals,' not `to them as members of society [or] standing in various
relations to each other'—that is, not dependent upon the will of the gov-
ernment.” Id., at 713 (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 119 (1765)). By contrast, public rights “belon[g] to the
public as a whole.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575
U. S. 138, 171 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also 4 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries 5 (1772). And “quasi-private rights, or statutory entitlements,
are those ` “privileges” ' or ` “franchises” ' that are bestowed by the govern-
ment on individuals.” B&B Hardware, 575 U. S., at 171. We need not
classify Laufer's legal interests because, regardless of which type of right
a plaintiff asserts, he must allege “the violation of his private legal right”
or his own injury based on a violation of a public right. Spokeo, 578 U. S.,
at 344 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (emphasis added); see also A. Woolhandler &
C. Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine? 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689,
723 (2004); C. Nelson, Vested Rights, “Franchises,” and the Separation of
Powers, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1429, 1433, 1437–1438 (2021). For the reasons
provided, Laufer has not alleged a violation of her rights or a cognizable
injury to herself.
12            ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363. In con-
trast to the ADA, the Fair Housing Act explicitly prohibits
“represent[ing] to any person because of race . . . that any
dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when
such dwelling is in fact so available.” § 3604(d). Accord-
ingly, when Havens Realty told a black tester that no apart-
ments were available but told a white tester that it had va-
cancies, the Court found that the black tester had standing
to sue. The Court explained that the statute created “a
legal right to truthful information about available housing.”
Id., at 373. The black tester had been personally denied
that truthful information, so she had standing to bring her
claim. Havens Realty thus has no bearing on Laufer's
standing as a tester of compliance with the ADA, which pro-
vides no such statutory right to information.
   Laufer points to the Reservation Rule, alleging that it cre-
ates an entitlement to accessibility information. But even
Page Proof Pending Publication
assuming a regulation could—and did—create such a right,
Laufer asserts no violation of her own rights with regard to
that information. Laufer does not even harbor “ `some day'
intentions” of traveling to Maine to visit the Coast Village
Inn. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 564. Her lack of intent to visit
the hotel or even book a hotel room elsewhere in Maine evis-
cerates any connection to her purported legal interest in the
accessibility information required by the Reservation Rule.
To put it in the “more pedestrian terms” used by then-Judge
Scalia, standing asks “ `What's it to you?' ” The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983). Acheson Hotels'
failure to provide accessibility information on its website is
nothing to Laufer, because she disclaimed any intent to visit
the hotel.
   Rather than assert a violation of her own rights, Laufer
casts herself in the role of a private attorney general, surfng
the web to ensure hotels' compliance with the Reservation
Rule. Laufer has described herself as “an advocate on be-
                    Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)               13

                Thomas, J., concurring in judgment

half of both [her]self and other similarly situated disabled
persons.” App. 17a. She admits that, “[a]s a tester, [she]
visit[s] hotel online reservation services to ascertain whether
they are in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities
Act.” Ibid. As a public offcial would do, Laufer even mon-
itors those hotel websites she has found lacking. She uses
“a system” to track each of the hundreds of hotels she has
sued. Id., at 19a. “Once a case is settled, [she] mark[s] the
date . . . when the defendant has agreed to fx its websites,”
and on that date, she “revisit[s]” the website to ensure the
hotel has complied. Id., at 19a–20a.
   Laufer sues “not to enforce specifc legal obligations whose
violation works a direct harm” on her, but to force hotels to
comply with the Reservation Rule. Allen v. Wright, 468
U. S. 737, 761 (1984). “Vindicating the public interest . . . is
the function of Congress and the Chief Executive,” however,
not private plaintiffs. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 576. The Presi-
Page Proof Pending Publication
dent is tasked with the duty to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,” U. S. Const., Art. II, § 3, and Executive
Branch offcials have discretion to choose whether and how
to enforce the law, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 831–
832 (1985). Yet, as Judge Newsom has explained, “[t]esters
exercise the sort of proactive enforcement discretion prop-
erly reserved to the Executive Branch,” with none of the
corresponding accountability. Laufer v. Arpan, LLC, 29
F. 4th 1268, 1291 (CA11 2022) (concurring opinion).
   This case exemplifes the dangers. An offcial could have
informed Acheson Hotels that its website failed to comply
with the Reservation Rule, and Acheson Hotels could have
updated its website to explain it had no accessible rooms.
Laufer, however, chose to “enforce” each technical violation
of the ADA she could uncover with a lawsuit. Because she
is a private plaintiff, no discretion was required or exercised.
And, of course, Laufer has been willing to forgo her suits if
a hotel pays up, even though the ADA provides for no dam-
ages for private litigants. Laufer's aggressive efforts to
14            ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                Jackson, J., concurring in judgment

personally impose fnancial penalties for violations of the
Reservation Rule go far beyond the role that Congress envi-
sioned for private plaintiffs under the ADA. Without a vio-
lation of her own rights, Laufer lacks standing to sue hotels
under the ADA. Ensuring and monitoring compliance with
the law is a function of a Government offcial, not a private
person who does not assert a violation of her own rights.

                               IV
   Standing ensures that courts decide disputes over viola-
tions of a person's rights, not a defendant's compliance with
the law in the abstract. Because Laufer has not asserted a
violation of a right owed to her, she has no standing to bring
her Reservation Rule claims. The Court should not have
avoided reaching that conclusion due to Laufer's eleventh-
hour tactics. I respectfully concur in the judgment because
I would vacate and remand, with instructions to dismiss for
lack of standing.
Page Proof Pending Publication
  Justice Jackson, concurring in the judgment.
  I agree with the Court that this case is moot and that it
should be resolved on that basis. But the Court goes fur-
ther, ordering vacatur of the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals under United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36
(1950). See ante, at 5–6. In my view, when mootness ends
an appeal, the question of what to do with the lower court's
judgment, if anything, raises a separate issue that must be
addressed separately.
                              I
  Mootness and vacatur are distinct concepts. Start with
mootness. The doctrine of mootness stems from Article III
of the Constitution, which permits federal courts to adjudi-
cate only “Cases” and “Controversies.” “Simply stated, a
case is moot when the issues presented are no longer `live' or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496 (1969). If a case
                        Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)                       15

                   Jackson, J., concurring in judgment

becomes moot, “the existence of a case or controversy” is at
an end, and there is therefore no basis for “the exercise of
judicial power.” Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, 306, n. 3
(1964); see also Chapman v. Doe, 598 U. S. –––, ––– (2023)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). Mootness thus justifes only dis-
missal. Barring some other justifcation, we can go no
further.
   Vacatur is a different animal entirely. Vacatur is a rem-
edy that erases a judgment that has already been rendered.
Here, the Court invokes a so-called Munsingwear vacatur,
see ante, at 5–6, a species of vacatur that we have sometimes
applied to judgments in civil cases that have “become moot
while on [their] way here or pending our decision on the mer-
its,” 340 U. S., at 39.
   The precise origins of vacatur, both as a general matter
and in its Munsingwear form, are uncertain. In fact, some
have described the power of a court to vacate a judgment as
“shrouded in ancient lore and mystery.” Advisory Commit-
Page Proof Pending Publication
tee's Note on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b), 28 U. S. C. App.,
p. 289.1 It seems plausible that our authority to vacate a
lower court's judgment under Munsingwear arises from our
“supervisory appellate power” to “make such disposition of
the case as justice requires.” Walling v. James V. Reuter,
Inc., 321 U. S. 671, 676 (1944); see also U. S. Bancorp Mort-
gage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 21–22
(1994). All agree, however, that vacatur extends from the
historical practice of equity, which for centuries has provided
courts with the power “to protect all rights and do justice to
all concerned.” Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 805, 807

  1
    We have sometimes invoked 28 U. S. C. § 2106 as the source of our vaca-
tur authority after mootness arises, see, e. g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S.
692, 712 (2011), but that statute provides only that we may “direct the
entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such fur-
ther proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.”
§ 2106. And, of course, that statutory provision cannot confer jurisdiction
in excess of Article III, from which the limitation of mootness derives.
16            ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                Jackson, J., concurring in judgment

(1870). The Munsingwear remedy, like its vacatur kin, de-
veloped from “this equitable tradition.” Bancorp, 513 U. S.,
at 25.
   As an equitable remedy, vacatur “is not granted as a mat-
ter of course.” Salazar v. Buono, 559 U. S. 700, 714 (2010)
(opinion of Kennedy, J.). Instead, precisely “[b]ecause [vaca-
tur] is rooted in equity, the decision whether to vacate turns
on `the conditions and circumstances of the particular case.' ”
Azar v. Garza, 584 U. S. 726, 729 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting
United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Ac-
tien Gesellschaft, 239 U. S. 466, 478 (1916)). Per historical
tradition, a court that is asked to exercise its equitable au-
thority to vacate a lower court's judgment must determine,
in essence, whether it is “most consonant to justice” for the
judgment to “remain undisturbed” or be vacated. South
Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Min-
ing Co., 145 U. S. 300, 301–302 (1892) (emphasis deleted).

Page Proof Pending
             II    Publication
  Because mootness and vacatur involve different legal anal-
yses, see Part I, supra, I think courts should address them
separately. Moreover, at least in theory if not in practice,
vacatur does not—and cannot—automatically follow from
mootness.
  For one thing, automatic vacatur plainly fouts the require-
ment of an individualized, circumstance-driven fairness eval-
uation, which, as I have explained, is the hallmark of an equi-
table remedy. “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been
the power . . . to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case.” Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321
U. S. 321, 329 (1944). Vacatur is an “extraordinary” exercise
of an appellate court's “equitable” authority. Bancorp, 513
U. S., at 26. As such, it simply cannot be a one-size-fts-all
solution.
  Second, and perhaps even more fundamentally, automatic
vacatur is fatly inconsistent with our common-law tradition
                     Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)               17

                Jackson, J., concurring in judgment

of case-by-case adjudication, which “assumes that judicial de-
cisions are valuable and should not be cast aside lightly.”
Chapman, 598 U. S., at –––. Our legal system rests not only
on the holdings of this Court, but also on the reasoned deci-
sions of duly authorized lower court judges. Jurists presid-
ing over cases at every level have a duty “to say what the
law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
That mootness can sometimes leave parties unable to appeal
does not bear on the continued validity of those lower court
opinions in any respect.
   We do not consider a court's judgment to be any less bind-
ing on the parties simply because there is not an appeal;
appeal or not, lower court rulings are still law. And it is
not as if a decision rendered by a lower court is less than
fnal, or is not perfected, unless and until it receives the im-
primatur of this Court. Indeed, many lower court determi-
nations are not even appealable as a matter of law. See,
Page Proof Pending Publication
e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) (providing that, with limited excep-
tions, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or other-
wise”); cf. § 1292(a) (authorizing appeals of only certain kinds
of interlocutory orders). Our legal system regards those de-
cisions as pronouncements of law nevertheless.
   In other words, even if a party cannot appeal, or opts not
to do so, lower court judgments are binding and presump-
tively valid. And the lack of an appeal, on its own, does not
suffce to rebut that presumption. Any suggestion to the
contrary misunderstands the scope of the authority that all
federal judges have pursuant to Article III, and disrespects
the time and talent of the jurists who have previously under-
taken to assess the merits of the matter.
   Nor is the validity of a lower court's judgment cast into
doubt as a result of the case's subsequent mootness. We do
not erase past precedents just because those cases cease to
be live, litigated matters. Every federal case fades to black
at some point, yet in our common-law system of case-by-case
18              ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                   Jackson, J., concurring in judgment

adjudication, the rulings that Article III judges have issued
in those cases remain good law. “[T]here is no particular
reason to assume that a decision, later mooted, is any less
valid as precedent than any other opinion of a court.” Ma-
honey v. Babbitt, 113 F. 3d 219, 222 (CADC 1997).

                                   III
                                    A
  Why, then, does the possibility of nullifying a lower court's
judgment by ordering Munsingwear vacatur exist? I sub-
mit that it serves a specifc, equitable function: to address
any unjust circumstances or unfairness that might stem from
the inability to appeal a particular lower court decision, not-
withstanding its presumptive validity. And just as in Mun-
singwear itself, “the party seeking relief from the status
quo of the appellate judgment” bears the burden of establish-
ing “equitable entitlement to [this] extraordinary remedy.”
Page Proof Pending Publication
Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26.2
  Thus, in my view, sound vacatur arguments must be
rooted in fairness. Likewise, I believe that a court's Mun-
singwear determination should involve a particularized as-
sessment of whether “the conditions and circumstances of
the particular case” warrant vacatur of the lower court's
judgment. Garza, 584 U. S., at 729 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

  2
    In United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950), the Federal
Government, as plaintiff, had brought both an injunctive claim and a dam-
ages claim; it lost the injunctive claim frst and was unable to appeal that
lower court determination because of intervening mootness. Id., at 37.
The unappealable lower court judgment with respect to the injunctive
claim then precluded the Government from litigating the merits of its dam-
ages claim. Ibid. This Court noted that a vacatur request had been
available to the Government to avert this unfairness, but that the Govern-
ment had “slept on its rights” in failing to seek that particular remedy.
Id., at 40–41.
                        Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)                     19

                   Jackson, J., concurring in judgment

   It is, of course, impossible to catalog all of the potential
circumstances that might justify vacatur of a lower court's
judgment on fairness grounds, so I will not attempt to do so
here. As a general matter, I believe that a party who claims
equitable entitlement to vacatur must explain what harm—
other than having to accept the law as the lower court stated
it—fows from the inability to appeal the lower court deci-
sion. The procedural history of Munsingwear provides one
example of the kind of harm that might warrant vacatur.
See n. 2, supra. Another stems from the fact that courts
“must also take account of the public interest” when making
a vacatur determination, Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26, which
raises broader fairness concerns—such as “the orderly oper-
ation of the federal judicial system,” id., at 27. For that
reason, I think that the Court's “sensitiv[ity] to Acheson's
concern about litigants manipulating the jurisdiction of this
Court,” ante, at 5, could be a relevant vacatur consideration,
Page Proof Pending Publication
and is likewise refected in our prior observation that it
would be “strange” to “permit a plaintiff to obtain a favor-
able judgment, take voluntary action that moots the dispute,
and then retain the beneft of the judgment.” Garza, 584
U. S., at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted).3
   It suffces for now to say that “[f]lexibility rather than
rigidity has distinguished” a court's equitable power and the
potential reasons for exercising it. Hecht, 321 U. S., at 329.
Still, it bears repeating that the reason for a vacatur remedy
must be more than “mere disagreement with the decision
that one seeks to have vacated.” Chapman, 598 U. S., at –––.

  3
   The Court has accepted respondent's claim that she voluntarily dis-
missed her suit for legitimate reasons, see ante, at 5, and to be clear, I
concur with that conclusion. My only point is that any perception that
mootness has been procured tactically, based on its timing (here, the moot-
ness occurred after we granted review, oral argument was scheduled, and
briefng had begun) or otherwise, would be relevant to determining
whether the equitable vacatur remedy is warranted.
20            ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                Jackson, J., concurring in judgment

Every lower court loser would, of course, prefer that the
lower court's opinion not exist. But in each and every case
in our adversarial justice system, one side loses—and gener-
ally must accept that outcome.
   To me, such frst principles about the nature of the vacatur
remedy, the design of our common-law system, and the scope
of appellate authority best inform how this Court, and other
Courts of Appeals, should proceed when addressing a Mun-
singwear motion. Mindful that vacatur of a lower court's
judgment is an extraordinary equitable remedy designed to
ensure fairness, and fully cognizant of the danger of uproot-
ing presumptively valid legal precedents—contributions to
the common law that belong to all who are governed by the
rule of law in our constitutional system, not just the parties
in the particular case—we should carefully evaluate the pur-
ported need for vacatur, in terms of the harms it would
avert. And in the absence of any demonstrated harm-
related justifcation for vacating a lower court's opinion, we
Page Proof Pending Publication
should conclude that “[t]he `public interest' . . . is generally
better served by leaving appellate judgments intact.” Al-
varez v. Smith, 558 U. S. 87, 98 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

                                B
  All that said, I am aware that a party who is deprived of
the opportunity to appeal due to mootness (like Acheson)
might feel that loss acutely. It might even experience the
thwarting of its chance to obtain a reversal on appeal as a
grave injustice, on par with any other fairness-based justif-
cation for vacatur of the lower court's ruling. I also recog-
nize that this Court has previously expressed sympathy for
that view. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. 692, 713
(2011) (suggesting that the inability to challenge “a legally
consequential decision” warrants vacatur). But I disagree.
There is nothing inherently inequitable about not being able
to pursue an appeal.
                        Cite as: 601 U. S. 1 (2023)                    21

                  Jackson, J., concurring in judgment

   To reiterate the basic bottom line: The lack of jurisdiction
that prevents an appeal and the set of circumstances that
relate to whether the lower court's judgment should be per-
mitted to stand are entirely distinct. The lower court issued
its ruling while the case was alive. And so rendered, that
ruling is precedent—“presumptively correct and valuable to
the legal community as a whole.” Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26.
The observation that “what is done is done” is thus the start-
ing point for assessing any response to mootness beyond
mere dismissal of the appeal.
   It is true that the losing party would ordinarily have the
right to challenge a lower court's decision by pursuing an
appeal. But that right is not absolute or inviolate. Wanted
appeals sometimes cannot proceed for a host of reasons,4 and
in such instances, the losing party is normally stuck with the
outcome that the lower court announced after its consider-
ation of the matter in dispute. We do not consider the pro-
posers of unrequited requests for appellate review to have
Page Proof Pending Publication
been unjustly wronged.
   To be sure, in the instant case, there is another wrinkle:
We not only granted Acheson's petition for certiorari, but we
also heard oral argument related to the merits of its claim
that the lower court's judgment was erroneous. Thus,
Acheson had a better opportunity than most to achieve the
requested reversal of the Court of Appeals' unfavorable deci-
sion. But this Court's demonstrated interest in reviewing
Acheson's challenge to respondent's moot legal action does
not add anything to the fairness equation. Now that its ap-
peal has been mooted, Acheson is in no different position
than the multitude of other litigants who suffered defeat in
the Courts of Appeals and will not get a review of their case
on the merits from this Court. To sustain a request for va-
  4
    Our Court might decide not to grant a would-be petitioner's request
for certiorari, for example. Or, even after granting review, we might dis-
miss the petition after determining that certiorari was improvidently
granted.
22            ACHESON HOTELS, LLC v. LAUFER

                Jackson, J., concurring in judgment

catur, Acheson needs to rely on something more than its own
abject disappointment.
                          *     *      *
  The parties in this case have not provided any equitable
basis for vacatur of the Court of Appeals' judgment, nor has
the majority described any, beyond its reference to the
Court's past practices and a citation to Munsingwear. See
ante, at 5–6. For the reasons explained above, I would ordi-
narily not agree to the imposition of a vacatur remedy that
was not fully discussed, much less established. But I recog-
nize that this Court's vacatur ruling is consistent with our
“established practice” of vacating the judgment of the Court
of Appeals below “when mootness occurs through . . . the
unilateral action of the party who prevailed in the lower
court.” Arizonans for Offcial English v. Arizona, 520
U. S. 43, 70–71 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Garza, 584 U. S., at 729; supra, at 19, and n. 3. I concur
Page Proof Pending Publication
in the judgment on the basis of that precedent, despite my
own views of this practice, because respondent's voluntary
dismissal is the sort of “unilateral action” that we have pre-
viously deemed adequate for vacatur.
                             Reporter’s Note

  The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
Page Proof Pending Publication
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

p. 4, n., line 5: “(per curiam)” is inserted after “(2023)”
p. 5, line 4 from bottom: “Post, at 16–20 (opinion concurring in judgment)”
   is inserted after “place”
p. 10, line 10 from bottom: “in” is deleted
p. 16, line 5: “(opinion of Kennedy, J.)” is inserted after “(2010)”
p. 19, line 16: “manipulating this Court's jurisdiction” is replaced with “ma-
   nipulating the jurisdiction of this Court”