Court Opinion

ID: 9373733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:07:00.454964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:43.055866
License: Public Domain

1

                           UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     RICHARD HORNSBY,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DC-0752-15-0576-I-2

                  v.

     FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE                         DATE: April 28, 2022
       AGENCY,
                  Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           David H. Shapiro, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Debra L. Roth, and Christopher J. Keeven, Washington, D.C., for
             the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                  Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision,
     which reversed the appellant’s removal on a charge of conduct unbecoming a
     Federal manager.     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s
     petition for review, REVERSE the administrative judge’s finding that the agency

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contra st, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                           2

     failed to prove the charge, and AFFIRM the administrative judge’s finding that
     the appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense . The appellant’s removal
     is SUSTAINED.

                                         BACKGROUND
¶2           Effective December 5, 2011, the agency appointed the appellant to the
     Chief Operating Officer (COO) position. Hornsby v. Federal Housing Finance
     Authority, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0576-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 6 at 89.     The appellant reported directly to the agency’s Acting Director,
     E.D., until January 6, 2014, when the agency appointed another individual as
     Director. Id. at 55. Thereafter, the appellant reported directly to the Director,
     and E.D. returned to his prior position as Senior Deputy Director for the agency’s
     Division of Housing, Mission, and Goals until April 30, 2014, when he retired
     from Federal service. IAF, Tab 28 at 48; Hornsby v. Federal Housing Finance
     Authority, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0576-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF),
     Hearing Transcript, Day 1 (HT1) at 155-56, 173, 228, 272 (testimony of E.D.).
¶3           Although he no longer supervised the appellant once the Director took
     office, E.D. was responsible for issuing the appellant’s 2013 performance
     evaluation because he had been the appellant’s immediate supervisor for the 2013
     rating period.     HT1 at 173-74 (testimony of E.D.); Hearing Transcript, Day 2
     (HT2) at 203-04 (testimony of the Director).          In March 2014, E.D. gave the
     appellant a performance rating for 2013 of “Fully Successful,” which precluded
     him from receiving an executive bonus. 2 IAF, Tab 6 at 74-88; HT1 at 176-77,
     199 (testimony of E.D.).
¶4           As COO, the appellant was the immediate supervisor of several agency
     office directors, including the Director of the Office of Human Resource
     Management (HR).         IAF, Tab 5 at 93.     On April 28, 2014, the HR Director
     notified the agency’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) that the appellant had

     2
         The appellant’s performance rating for 2012 was “Outstanding.” IAF, Tab 6 at 92-97.
                                                                                          3

     made statements to him earlier in the month indicating that the appellant might
     harm E.D. and commit suicide. HT1 at 423-24 (testimony of the HR Director).
     Based on these alleged statements, the agency removed the appellant from the
     workplace on April 28, 2014, and placed him on administrative leave. IAF, Tab 5
     at 88. The appellant was arrested on April 30, 2014, and charged with one felony
     count of threatening to injure a person. Id. The charge was subsequently reduced
     to two misdemeanor counts of attempted threats to do bodily harm.             Id.   On
     November 20, 2014, the appellant was acquitted of the criminal charges. IAF,
     Tab 25 at 20, 29.
¶5         In the meantime, the agency’s Office of Inspector General (OIG)
     investigated the appellant’s alleged statements about harming E.D., as well as
     other complaints it had received regarding the appellant’s conduct, including
     allegations that he had interfered with the agency’s equal employment
     opportunity (EEO) process. IAF, Tab 5 at 447-52. 3 In July 2014, the agency’s
     Acting Inspector General issued a memorandum to the Director detailing the
     results of OIG’s investigation. Id. at 447-49. On October 6, 2014, the Director
     issued a notice proposing to suspend the appellant indefinitely. Id. at 88.
¶6         Following the appellant’s acquittal, the Director asked OGC to provide him
     “all information that was available” about the appellant so that he could decide
     whether the appellant should be allowed to return to work.                HT2 at 236
     (testimony of the Director). After receiving this information, the Director issued
     a December 19, 2014 notice rescinding the proposed indefinite suspension and
     proposing to remove the appellant based on a charge of conduct unbecoming a
     Federal manager.       IAF, Tab 5 at 88-96.        The charge was supported by
     18 specifications. Id. at 89-92.

     3
       As part of its file, the agency submitted three pages of a five-page July 23, 2014
     memorandum from the Deputy Inspector General for Investigation to the Acting
     Inspector General regarding the appellant’s alleged interference in the EEO process and
     retaliation. IAF, Tab 5 at 450-52. Due to an apparent error, the agency omitted pages 2
     and 4 of the memorandum.
                                                                                                  4

¶7            The appellant provided oral and written responses to the proposed removal.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 38-87.        By letter dated March 19, 2015, the Director 4 sustained
      all of the specifications and the agency removed the appellant effective
      March 21, 2015. Id. at 22, 27-33.
¶8            The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging his removal and raising
      an affirmative defense of retaliation for his prior EEO activity. IAF, Tab 1 at 4.
      In support of his affirmative defense, the appellant alleged retaliation for filing
      an EEO complaint and for participating in the settlement of an HR employee’s
      EEO complaint in his capacity as the agency’s EEO settlement officer.
      IAF, Tabs 17, 19. The appellant’s initial appeal was dismissed without prejudice
      to refiling and later, automatically refiled. I-2 AF, Tabs 1-2.
¶9            Following a 5-day hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial
      decision that reversed the appellant’s removal, finding that the agency failed to
      prove any of the specifications supporting the charge.            I-2 AF, Tab 17, Initial
      Decision (ID) at 1, 10, 12, 16.         The administrative judge also found that the
      appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense.           ID at 16-17.    Because the
      administrative judge reversed the removal action, she ordered the agency to
      cancel the removal and retroactively restore the appellant with back pay plus
      interest. ID at 17-18. The initial decision did not address the issue of interim
      relief.     See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.111(b)(4) (stating that, if the appellant is the
      prevailing party, the initial decision shall contain a statement as to whether
      interim relief is provided).
¶10           The agency has filed a petition for review, the appellant has filed a response
      to the petition for review, and the agency has filed a reply to the appellant’s
      response. 5 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 5, 12-13. The appellant also has

      4
          The Director was both the proposing and the deciding offici al. IAF, Tab 5 at 33, 96.
      5
        Neither of the parties has challenged the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense of EEO reprisal, and we discern no
      reason to disturb this finding.
                                                                                              5

      filed a request for an order of interim relief, and the agency has filed a response
      in opposition to the request. PFR File, Tabs 7, 11.

                                            ANALYSIS
      The appellant’s request for interim relief
¶11         Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2), if the appellant is the prevailing party, the
      initial decision will provide appropriate interim relief to the appellant effective
      upon the date of the initial decision and remaining in effect until the date of the

      The Age Discrimination in Employment Act states that “personnel actions . . . shall be
      made free from any discrimination based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). Similarly,
      title VII requires that such actions “shall be made free from any discrimination based on
      race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). In Savage v.
      Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶¶ 48-50 (2015), clarified on other grounds
      by Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶¶ 30-31 (2016), the
      Board adopted the analytical framework of Mt. Healthy City School District Board of
      Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), for analyzing claims arising under title VII.
      The Board in Savage held that it first inquires whether the appellant has shown by
      preponderant evidence that the prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the
      contested personnel action. Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51. Such a showing is
      sufficient to establish that the agency violated title VII. Id. If the appellant meets her
      burden, the Board then inquires whether the agency has sho wn by preponderant
      evidence that it still would have taken the contested action in the absence of the
      discriminatory or retaliatory motive. Id. If the agency makes that showing, its title VII
      violation will not require reversal of the action. Id.
      After Savage was decided, the Supreme Court interpreted the language in 29 U.S.C.
      § 633a(a) in Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020). The Court held that
      to obtain “injunctive or other forward-looking relief,” the plaintiff must show that age
      discrimination “play[ed] any part in the wa y a decision [was] made.” Babb, ___ U.S.
      at ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1173-74, 1177-78. However, a plaintiff “must show that age
      discrimination was a but-for cause of the employment outcome” to obtain
      “reinstatement, backpay, . . . or other forms of relief related to the end result of an
      employment decision.” ___ U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1177-78. Thus, under both
      Savage and Babb, some relief is available if the prohibited consideration was a
      motivating factor in the challenged personnel action, but full relief is available only if
      the prohibited consideration was a but-for cause of the action. Although Savage and
      Babb appear to diverge on the question of which party has the burd en to prove or
      disprove but-for causation, we need not decide in this case whether the analytical
      framework applied in Savage must be revised in light of Babb. Because the appellant
      here failed to prove his initial burden that a prohibited factor played any part in the
      agency’s decision, we do not reach the question of whether EEO reprisal was a but-for
      cause of that decision.
                                                                                                6

      final order of the Board on any petition for review unless, among other things, the
      administrative judge determines that granting interim relief is not appropriate.
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.111(c)(1). The appellant asserts on review that, because he is the
      prevailing party in this appeal and there has been no determination that granting
      interim relief would be inappropriate, he is entitled to interim relief. PFR File,
      Tab 7 at 5.    He further asserts that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2), he is
      entitled to the relief that the agency was ordered to provide him in the initial
      decision, i.e., cancellation of his removal and restoration to his position effective
      the date of his removal. Id.; ID at 17.
¶12         Contrary to the appellant’s contention, 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A) and the
      Board’s regulations governing interim relief provide that the effective date of
      such relief is the date of the initial decision, not the date of the adverse action.
      See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.111(b)(4), (c)(1)-(2).            In any event, the appellant’s
      arguments regarding interim relief are now moot because interim relief is in
      effect only pending the disposition of a petition for review.                See 5 U.S.C.
      § 7701(b)(2)(A); Garcia v. Department of State, 106 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶ 7 (2007).
      Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s request for interim relief. 6

      The charge
¶13         On review, the agency challenges the administrative judge’s findings that it
      did not prove any of the specifications supporting the charge, and it asserts that it
      proved every specification. PFR File, Tab 5. A charge of conduct unbecoming

      6
        As a part of the initial decision, an interim relief order is subject to challenge in a
      petition for review or cross petition for review. Merino v. Department of Justice,
      94 M.S.P.R. 632, ¶ 6 (2003); Brown v. U.S. Postal Service, 54 M.S.P.R. 275, 277
      (1991). Because the appellant did not file a petition for review or cross petition for
      review of the initial decision, we find that his failure to do so is an additional basis for
      denying his request for interim relief. See Thompson v. Department of the Air Force,
      104 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 7 (2007). Even if we were to construe the request as a cross
      petition for review, the administrative judge’s failure to address interim relief in the
      initial decision was not reversible error because we find that the appellant is not entitled
      to any relief in this case. See Marshall-Carter v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      94 M.S.P.R. 518, ¶ 14 n.2 (2003), aff’d, 122 F. App’x 513 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
                                                                                            7

      has no specific elements of proof; the agency establishes the charge by proving
      the appellant committed the acts alleged under this broad label. See Canada v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 113 M.S.P.R. 509, ¶ 9 (2010). The agency
      also must prove that the conduct was unattractive, unsuitable, or detracted from
      the appellant’s character or reputation.        Miles v. Department of the Army,
      55 M.S.P.R. 633, 637 (1992).
¶14            For ease of discussion, we have divided the specifications into two groups
      based on the administrative judge’s reason for finding that the agency failed to
      prove the specification. The first group consists of specifications 5-11 and 18.
      The administrative judge found that the appellant engaged in the conduct
      described in these specifications; however, it was not conduct unbecoming a
      Federal manager. ID at 14-16. As for the second group, i.e., specifications 1-4
      and 12-17, the administrative judge found that the agency failed to prove that the
      conduct described in these specifications occurred. 7 ID at 7-10, 12-14. We first
      consider specifications 5-11 and 18.

      Specifications 5 and 6
¶15            Specifications 5 and 6 involve comments that the appellant made about EEO
      complaints during meetings with various agency officials in 2012. IAF, Tab 5
      at 90.     In specification 6, the agency alleged that on September 7, 2012, the
      appellant told a group of agency employees—including the EEO Director, the HR
      Director, the HR Deputy Director, and agency attorneys—that employees
      should not be allowed to make anonymous EEO complaints and that EEO
      complainants should have more “skin in the game.”            Id.   Yet notes from the
      meeting appear to show that the appellant’s remarks followed the EEO Director
      describing in the meeting how resolving EEO complaints is more difficult when

      7
         Regarding specification 12, which involved the appellant’s alleged threats to
      outsource the agency’s HR function, the administrative judge further found that, even if
      the appellant had committed the specified conduct, it would not constitute conduct
      unbecoming a Federal manager. ID at 13 n.14.
                                                                                             8

      the complainants are anonymous. IAF, Tab 28 at 87. Thus, the appellant sharing
      his   opinion     on   this   matter   does not   necessarily   seem    out   of   place.
      In specification 5, the agency alleged that in late August or early September of
      2012, the appellant told the agency’s EEO and Diversity Director and an EEO
      Counselor that he did not believe any of the complaints about the HR Deputy
      Director, and that if there were any more complaints about her, there would be
      “serious consequences,” or words to that effect. Id. This allegation is in fact
      quite troubling, as such a statement expresses retaliatory intent and could clearly
      have a chilling effect in the agency. Nevertheless, as the administrative judge
      noted of both specifications, the agency failed to impose discipline on the
      appellant when the remarks were made in 2012, instead merely taking the
      remedial step of advising the appellant of the legal and policy importance of
      allowing employees to file anonymous internal complaints.              ID at 14.   Given
      these circumstances, we find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s
      findings that the agency failed to prove specifications 5 and 6.

      Specification 7
¶16         In specification 7, the agency alleged that, during an April 22, 2013 meeting
      with a Senior Economist who had sent the appellant an email seeking clarification
      about pay raises, the appellant held up a copy of the email and said, “[L]ooking at
      this email . . . I found it [expletive] offensive.” IAF, Tab 5 at 90, Tab 6 at 63-64.
      The agency further stated that when the Senior Economist responded by saying
      that he had to leave because the appellant had just cursed at him, the appellant
      apologized, and the employee stayed. IAF, Tab 5 at 90.
¶17         In finding that the agency failed to prove this specification, the
      administrative judge reasoned as follows:              “Most adults curse at least
      occasionally and [F]ederal managers are adults.” ID at 15. The administrative
      judge found that “a single instance of uttering the word ‘[expletive]’ in this
      context, especially if one apologizes afterward, is not conduct unbecoming a
      [F]ederal manager.” Id.
                                                                                      9

¶18        Based on our review of the record, we find that the behavior described in
      specification 7 is conduct unbecoming a Federal manager.          The Board has
      frequently held that rude, discourteous, and unprofessional behavior in the
      workplace is outside the accepted standards of conduct reasonably expected by
      agencies and can be the subject of discipline.    See Holland v. Department of
      Defense, 83 M.S.P.R. 317, ¶¶ 10-12 (1999) (sustaining a removal for rude and
      discourteous behavior); Wilson v. Department of Justice, 68 M.S.P.R. 303, 309-10
      (1995) (sustaining a removal for disrespectful conduct and the use of insulting,
      abusive language).   Although an employee may be allowed more leeway with
      disrespectful conduct in “certain emotional, confrontational contexts,” the
      conduct at issue in this specification occurred in a normal employment setting
      where the appellant should have expected normal standards of conduct to appl y.
      See Hamilton v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 115 M.S.P.R. 673, ¶¶ 11, 13
      (2011). Moreover, the Board has held that, in a conduct unbecoming charge, an
      agency can hold a supervisor to a higher standard of behavior than other
      employees. See Ray v. Department of the Army, 97 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 58 (2004),
      aff’d, 176 F. App’x 110 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Special Counsel v. Zimmerman,
      36 M.S.P.R. 274, 293 (1988) (stating that, because the appellant was a supervisor,
      he is held to a higher standard of conduct than subordinate employee s and should
      set an example for other employees to follow). Accordingly, we find that the
      agency proved specification 7 of the charge.

      Specification 8
¶19        In specification 8, the agency alleged that, on several occasions, the
      appellant made remarks about specific employees in inappropriate settings and/or
      in the presence of employees who should not have heard these comments. IAF,
      Tab 5 at 90-91.   This specification consists of three allegations:   (1) during a
      November 13, 2013 meeting with employees from various offices, including
      Facilities Operations and OGC, the appellant stated in front of everyone in
      attendance that a specific Senior Facilities Management Specialist (FMS) should
                                                                                         10

      be put on a performance improvement plan (PIP); (2) during a March 26, 2014
      meeting with the Manager of Contracting Operations (MCO), the appellant made
      a comment about a specific Senior Management Analyst who had filed an EEO
      complaint against the agency, stating something to the effect that the employee,
      who did not work in Contracting Operations, had a “situation that was bringing
      outside people into the agency”; and (3) on other occasions, the appellant made
      remarks in front of the MCO about the performance of employees that she did not
      supervise, such as words to the effect that, “you can be sure this” 8 will negatively
      “affect [the Chief Information Officer’s] rating.” 9           Id. (brackets as in
      the original).
¶20         The administrative judge found that “while criticizing one employee in
      front of others is not a management best practice, under the circumstances
      described in the record it is also not conduct unbecoming a [F]ederal manager.”
      ID at 15. The administrative judge does not identify the basis for her conclusion
      that the appellant’s criticism of specific employees in front of other employees
      was not conduct unbecoming.       ID at 15; see Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (stating that an initial decision must
      identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize the e vidence, resolve
      issues of credibility, and include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law
      and his legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).
      Consequently, to determine whether the agency proved specification 8, we have
      considered the context in which the appellant made the statements at issue in
      this specification.
      8
        The record shows that the appellant was referring to the allegations in the MCO’s
      grievance against the agency’s Chief Information Officer (CIO), who reported directly
      to the appellant. Hearing Transcript, Day 4 (HT4) at 265 (testimony of the appellant).
      In her grievance, the MCO claimed that the CIO and some members of his staff had
      created a hostile work environment. Hearing Transcript, Day 3 (HT3) at 250 (testimony
      of the MCO).
      9
       The proposal notice and decision letter incorrectly identify the CIO as the “Chief
      Operating Officer.” IAF, Tab 5 at 30, 91.
                                                                                        11

¶21         Based on our review of the record, we find that the appellant did not engage
      in conduct unbecoming either by stating that the Senior FMS should be put on a
      PIP or by telling the MCO that the allegations in her grievance against the CIO
      would be reflected in his performance evaluation.        During his testimony, the
      appellant explained that he made these statements while discussing the MCO’s
      allegations against the Senior FMS and the CIO.         Specifically, the appellant
      testified that, during the November 13, 2013 meeting, the MCO alleged that the
      Senior FMS had communicated with a bidder during a period when he was not
      allowed to do so, and, in response, he stated that if this allegation were true, then
      the Senior FMS should be held accountable and placed on a PIP.              Hearing
      Transcript, Day 4 (HT4) at 259, 261 (testimony of the appellant). The appellant
      similarly testified that, while discussing the MCO’s grievance against the CIO, he
      told the MCO that the allegations in her grievance, if true, would negatively
      affect the CIO’s performance evaluation. Id. at 265. Thus, the appellant made
      these statements to explain how the agency would address the MCO’s allegations
      against other employees if they were proven. Given these circumstances, we find
      that these statements were not improper.
¶22         We also find, however, that the appellant engaged in unbecoming conduct
      during his March 26, 2014 meeting with the MCO by telling her that a specific
      employee had filed an EEO complaint. IAF, Tab 6 at 69. The record indicates
      that the appellant made this statement during a discussion about outsourcing
      information technology services to illustrate that one advantage of outsourcing is
      that the agency does not have to deal with personnel matters involving services
      that have been outsourced.        IAF, Tab 5 at 101-02, Tab 6 at 69; Hearing
      Transcript, Day 3 (HT3) at 244-45, 285-86 (testimony of the MCO). 10             The
      appellant clearly could have made the same point without revealing the name of

      10
         The appellant testified that he did not remember making any statements about the
      EEO complainant to the MCO, but conceded that “it may have happened.” HT4
      at 263-64 (testimony of the appellant).
                                                                                         12

      an EEO complainant. Informing the MCO that a specific employee had filed an
      EEO complaint demonstrates poor judgment and is clearly unsuitable, particularly
      given the appellant’s position as COO.       Accordingly, we find that the agency
      proved this part of specification 8.      See Green v. Department of the Navy,
      61 M.S.P.R. 626, 633 n.10 (explaining that portions of a specification that
      constitute individual allegations of misconduct under a charge may be
      independently sustained), aff’d, 36 F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table).

      Specification 9
¶23         In specification 9, the agency alleged that, during a meeting with E.D. in
      late November 2013, the appellant became agitated when E.D. questioned him.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 91, Tab 22 at 24. The administrative judge found, and we agree,
      that “becoming agitated” is not conduct unbecoming a Federal manager. ID at 15.

      Specification 10
¶24         In specification 10, the agency asserted that, during a February 20, 2014
      meeting with several employees about the National Mortgage Database (NMD), 11
      the appellant placed his hand over the NMD Project Director’s mouth to prevent
      him from making further comments.          IAF, Tab 5 at 91.      In addressing this
      specification, the administrative judge noted that neither the appellant nor the
      Project Director remembered the appellant engaging in such conduct; however, it
      “made a big impression” on the lead counsel for the NMD project.             ID at 15
      (citing Hearing Compact Disc (CD) (testimony of the appellant, the Project
      Director, and the lead counsel)); HT2 at 332-35 (testimony of the lead counsel);
      HT3 at 359 (testimony of the Project Director); HT4 at 273-74 (testimony of the
      appellant).   The administrative judge concluded that the alleged conduct

      11
         The NMD is a resource that contains information about mortgages throughout the
      United States. HT3 at 245-48 (testimony of the NMD Project Director). The record
      indicates that about 20 people attended the meeting, including the General Counsel and
      the lead counsel for the NMD project. IAF, Tab 5 at 98; HT2 at 323, 330-31 (testimony
      of the lead counsel); HT3 at 380 (testimony of the Project Director).
                                                                                       13

      occurred; however, it probably was not a “big deal” to the Project Director, given
      his testimony that he “tends to need to be silenced” and that the appellant was his
      friend.    ID at 15; HT3 at 358 (testimony of the Project Director).            The
      administrative judge found that, under these circumstances, the appellant’s
      conduct was not unbecoming. ID at 15.
¶25         Although the Project Director was not offended by the appellant’s actions,
      we find that it was improper and unsuitable for the appellant—who was the
      Project Director’s immediate supervisor as well as COO—to place his hands over
      the Project Director’s mouth to prevent him from speaking during a meeting.
      HT3 at 344, 359-60 (testimony of the Project Director). Therefore, we find that
      the agency proved this specification.

      Specification 11
¶26         Specification 11 involves a statement that the appellant made in late
      February or early March of 2014, to the NMD’s lead counsel and another
      attorney, both of whom had drafted a memorandum to the Director addressing the
      agency’s potential liability for data breaches of the NMD. IAF, Tab 5 at 91, 98
      (written declaration of the lead counsel). The agency alleged that the appellant
      engaged in conduct unbecoming by telling the attorneys that issuing the
      memorandum might be a “career ender.” Id. at 91. The agency further stated that
      the lead counsel interpreted the appellant’s statement as referring to ending the
      careers of both attorneys, who then removed the information at issue from the
      memorandum. Id. at 91, 98. The appellant testified that he was referring to his
      own career when he used the term “career ender.” Id.; HT4 at 277-79 (testimony
      of the appellant).
¶27         The administrative judge found that telling a staff attorney that the contents
      of a memorandum could end a career is not conduct unbecoming a Federal
      manager.    She did not provide a basis for her conclusion.      ID at 15-16.   The
      agency challenges this finding on review, arguing that the attorneys “reasonably
      understood” the appellant’s statement as a threat to their careers and felt
                                                                                       14

      compelled to modify the memorandum to “diminish their analysis” of the risks
      associated with the NMD as a direct result of this “intimidating” statement . PFR
      File, Tab 5 at 38-39.
¶28        Regardless of whose career might be allegedly ended by the inclusion in the
      memorandum of the information in question, it is understandable that the
      attorneys felt intimidated into removing the information.     The record indicates
      that the attorneys had already revised the memorandum several times, but that the
      appellant continued to be unhappy with the memorandum includin g information
      on potential agency liability.   Given the appellant’s inappropriate behavior on
      multiple occasions and the alleged threatening statements the appellant made in
      2012 regarding EEO complaints, we find believable the attorneys’ allegations
      that, by his “career ender” remark, the appellant was intimidating them regarding
      their careers and not his own.     We believe it is reasonable for an agency to
      conclude that “an atmosphere of intimidation is not conducive to the productive
      flow of ideas and communication that is vital” to the agency, IAF, Tab 5 at 94,
      particularly as it relates to information about potential agency liability. Thus, we
      find that the conduct specified in charge 11 constituted conduct unbecoming a
      Federal manager and that the agency proved this specification.

      Specification 18
¶29        In specification 18, the agency alleged that, after he became aware of his
      “Fully Successful” performance rating, the appellant asked the HR Director to
      negotiate with E.D. on his behalf for a higher rating so that he would receive a
      bonus. IAF, Tab 5 at 92. The agency further alleged that the appellant sent the
      HR Director the following email on April 24, 2014:
            Please make sure [E.D.] does not give me a partial bonus.     I want the
            goose egg that reflects the unfair rating he gave me. If he   suggests a
            5 or 10 to further insult me I want it stopped before he      leaves. I
            want [the bonus] 0 to reflect what he told me to my face.     If he does
            otherwise I will seek legal counsel.
                                                                                           15

            He continues not to resolve my [job performance plan] escalation!
            He has been nonresponsive. There is no excuse for his behaviour.
  Id.; IAF, Tab 6 at 59.
¶30         The administrative judge found that, contrary to the specification, the HR
      Director testified that he volunteered to intervene on the appellant’s behalf with
      E.D. ID at 16 n.16 (citing Hearing CD). The administrative judge further found
      that “nothing about the contents of the email was unattractive or unsuitable,
      detracted from his character or reputation, or created an unfavorable impression. ”
      ID at 16.
¶31         The record does not support the administrative judge’s finding that the HR
      Director testified that he volunteered to negotiate with E.D. for a better
      performance rating for the appellant. 12 During the Board hearing and the criminal
      trial in this matter, as well as in his written statement dated April 28, 2014, and
      his interview with OIG agents the same day, the HR Director consistently stated
      that the appellant had asked him to negotiate with E.D. to improve the appellant’s
      performance rating.    IAF, Tab 5 at 316-17 (criminal trial testimony of the HR
      Director), Tab 6 at 33, 52; HT1 at 356-58; HT2 at 148-49, 151-52 (testimony of
      the HR Director).      Moreover, during the appellant’s criminal trial, the HR
      Director responded as follows when asked whether he volunteered to negotiate
      with E.D. to improve the appellant’s performance rating:               “That’s not an
      assignment I would volunteer for.” IAF, Tab 5 at 317 (criminal trial testimony of
      the HR Director). This statement is consistent with the HR Director’s testimony
      at the hearing that he felt awkward asking E.D. to improve the appellant’s
      performance rating. HT2 at 148-49 (testimony of the HR Director). Thus, the
      record shows that the appellant asked the HR Director to intervene with E.D. to
      improve his performance rating.

      12
         This finding also appears to contradict the administrative judge’s determination that
      the appellant “entreated [the HR director] to intervene” as part of his “campaign to
      change [E.D.’s] mind about the rating.” ID at 3 (citing IAF, Tab 6 at 59, 73; and
      testimony of the appellant, E.D., and the HR Director).
                                                                                      16

¶32        We find that it was improper for the appellant to do so.       As previously
      noted, the appellant was the HR Director’s immediate supervisor.          Thus, in
      making this request, the appellant was placing the HR Director in the untenable
      position of either refusing his supervisor’s request or negotiating with his former
      second-level supervisor for a better performance rating for his supervisor.
      Further, while the HR Director’s office was responsible for processing
      performance ratings and bonuses, HT2 at 166-67 (testimony of the HR Director),
      there is no evidence that HR Director’s duties vis-à-vis performance ratings
      entailed negotiating better ratings for agency employees.            Given these
      circumstances, we find that it was clearly unsuitable for the appellant to ask the
      HR Director to undertake such a negotiation on his behalf.
¶33        We also disagree with the administrative judge’s finding that there was
      nothing unsuitable about the appellant’s email to the HR Director. ID at 15. In
      the email, the appellant made disparaging remarks about E.D. to his subordinate,
      stating that E.D.’s behavior was inexcusable. IAF, Tab 6 at 59. The Board and
      our reviewing court have held that making disparaging comments about one’s
      superior to a subordinate employee constitutes conduct unbecoming a Federal
      employee. See Guise v. Department of Justice, 330 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
      2003) (affirming the removal of a supervisory correctional officer charged with
      making disparaging remarks to subordinate employees regarding the associate
      warden); Ray, 97 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 58 (finding that a supervisor’s disparaging
      comments about agency officials, including his superior, which were directed to a
      subordinate agency employee with no apparent need to know the appellant’s
      views regarding those officials, constituted conduct unbecoming a Federal
      employee). We therefore find that the agency proved specification 18.

      Specifications 1-4 and 12-17
¶34        We next consider the second group of specifications.       S pecifications 1-4
      involve the appellant’s alleged statements to the HR Director about E.D., which
                                                                                      17

      the HR Director reported to OGC on April 28, 2014. IAF, Tab 5 at 89-90, Tab 6
      at 34. In these specifications, the agency alleged as follows:
            (1) On April 3, 2014, the appellant said to the HR Director, “I can
            understand how someone could go postal, if I decide to take myself
            out I will walk into [E.D.’s] office and blow his brains out and then
            kill myself.”
            (2) On April 3, 2014, the appellant also told the HR Director that he
            might not “blow [E.D.’s] brains out” but would shoot him in the
            kneecap and say, “don’t [expletive] with me.”
            (3) On April 24, 2014, the appellant told the HR Director that E.D.
            had done nothing about the appellant’s performance rating and made
            the following statement in reference to E.D: “[T]hat son of a
            [expletive] is not in his office today but if he was [I] would go there
            and rip him limb by limb from his office.”
            (4) On April 24, 2014, the appellant indicated to the HR Director
            that he would make a scene at E.D.’s retirement party and tell
            everyone the kind of person that E.D. really was, but that he
            would not physically hurt E.D. at the party.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 89-90.
¶35        In specifications 12-17, the agency alleged as follows:
            (12) On several occasions, when the appellant could not hire
            someone he wanted or an HR employee would complain to the
            Inspector General or E.D. about the HR Deputy Director, he told the
            HR Director that he would outsource the HR function.
            (13) When the MCO complained to the appellant about outsourcing
            contract services involving information technology to the
            Department of the Interior’s Business Center, the appellant
            frequently told the HR Director that he would outsource the MCO’s
            office if she did not stop complaining.
            (14) On April 3, 2014, the appellant told the HR Director that he
            wanted an HR employee fired because the appellant saw her having
            breakfast with E.D., although he had previously spoken to the HR
            Director about converting that employee to a permanent appointment
            because of her success with the agency’s recruiting program.
            (15) Between April 8 and 24, 2014, the appellant told the HR
            Director, “I can’t wait until the 30th when the Pope [referring to
            E.D.] leaves the building.”
                                                                                              18

             (16) The appellant lost his composure during an April 22, 2014
             meeting with various agency officials and expressed his desire to fire
             anyone who had complained about him.
             (17) The appellant repeatedly expressed his hatred of E.D. to the HR
             Director and, on multiple occasions, including April 22, 2014, told
             the HR Director in a very serious tone that he wanted to jump out o f
             his window or blow his brains out.
      Id. at 91-92.
¶36         In the initial decision, the administrative judge noted that the appellant and
      the HR Director provided conflicting testimony regarding wh ether the appellant
      engaged in the conduct described in these specifications. ID at 7-8, 12-14. She
      also noted that the HR Director provided the only evidence in support of several
      specifications, including specifications 1-4, which were based on alleged
      conversations during which only the appellant and the HR Director were present.
      Id. at 8, 14. Citing the Board’s decision in Hillen v. Department of the Army,
      35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), 13 the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
      denial that he made the statements in specifications 1-4 was “at least as credible”
      as the HR Director’s accusations that he did and that, therefore, the agency failed
      to prove these specifications by preponderant evidence.                  ID at 8.     The
      administrative judge similarly found that the record did not contain preponderant
      evidence supporting specifications 12-17. ID at 12-14. In making this finding,
      she explicitly credited the appellant’s testimony denying the cond uct described in
      specifications 14 and 15. ID at 13.

      13
         In Hillen, the Board held that, to resolve credibility issues, an administrative judge
      must identify the factual questions in dispute, summarize the evidence on each disputed
      question, state which version he believes, and explain in detail why he found the chosen
      version more credible, considering such factors as: (1) the witness’s opportunity and
      capacity to observe the event or act in question; (2) the witness’s character; (3) any
      prior inconsistent statement by the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of bias; (5) the
      contradiction of the witness’s version of events by other evidence or its consistency
      with other evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of the witness’s version of events;
      and (7) the witness’s demeanor. Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R. at 458.
                                                                                     19

¶37          The agency argues on review that the Board should not defer to the
      administrative judge’s credibility determinations because the initial decision
      makes no reference to witness demeanor. PFR File, Tab 5 at 22. The agency
      asserts that the Board should therefore reweigh the evidence and substitute its
      own judgment on the issue of whether the appellant’s testimony is more credible
      than the HR Director’s.     Id. at 22-23.   The agency contends that applying the
      Hillen factors to the evidence shows that the HR Director is “far more credible”
      than the appellant. Id. at 28.
¶38          This argument is unpersuasive. The Board must defer to an administrative
      judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly,
      on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing, and the Board
      may overturn such credibility findings only when it has “sufficiently sound”
      reasons for doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed.
      Cir. 2002). It is well established that when, as here, an administrative judge has
      heard live testimony, her credibility determinations must be deemed to be at least
      implicitly based upon the demeanor of the witnesses. See Purifoy v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that the Board
      must    defer   to   an   administrative    judge’s   demeanor-based   credibility
      determinations, “[e]ven if demeanor is not explicitly discussed”); Little v.
      Department of Transportation, 112 M.S.P.R. 224, ¶ 4 (2009). Thus, the Board
      may overturn credibility findings only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons
      for doing so, as when the administrative judge’s findings are incomplete,
      inconsistent with the weight of the evidence, and do not reflect the record as a
      whole. Rapp v. Office of Personnel Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 13 (2008).
¶39          Based on our review of the record, we find that the agency has not
      established that there are sufficiently sound reasons for overturning the
      administrative judge’s credibility determinations.     See Crosby v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
                                                                                       20

      drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions).         In the initial
      decision, the administrative judge explained in detail why she did not credit the
      HR Director’s testimony that the appellant engaged in the alleged misconduct. ID
      at 8-10, 12-14. For example, the administrative judge found that the HR Director
      had a motive to fabricate the allegations set forth in specifications 1-4 because he
      was under a great deal of stress in April 2014, due to the following
      circumstances:    (1) his employees were complaining about the HR Deputy
      Director; (2) he felt pressured to intervene to improve the appellant’s
      performance evaluation; (3) E.D., with whom he felt comfortable, was about to
      leave, and the additional work and uncertainty of a new Director were upon him;
      (4) he was in the middle of an ongoing dispute between his first - and second-level
      supervisors about the appellant’s performance rating; and (5) he was looking for
      another job. ID at 8-9. The administrative judge concluded that, as a result of
      these circumstances, the HR Director “had motive to act in an extreme manner to
      change his workplace dynamic.” ID at 9.
¶40        The agency argues on review that the Board should not defer to the
      administrative judge’s credibility determinations regarding specifications 1-4
      because the record does not support her finding that the HR Director’s work
      circumstances in April 2014, were “spectacularly stressful.”      PFR File, Tab 5
      at 26; ID at 9. Specifically, the agency asserts that: (1) complaints about the HR
      Deputy Director subsided after the HR office was reorganized in June 2013;
      (2) there is no evidence that the arrival of a new Director resulted in additional
      work for the HR Director; and (3) the HR Director was not involved in an
      ongoing dispute between his first- and second-level supervisors, as the Director
      was his second-level supervisor when he made the allegations against the
      appellant, and there was no dispute between his first -level supervisor (i.e., the
      appellant) and the Director at that time. PFR File, Tab 5 at 24-25. The agency
      also challenges the administrative judge’s finding that the HR Director had a
      motive to fabricate allegations because he was looking for a job.         Id. at 25;
                                                                                        21

      ID at 9. Instead, the agency argues, because the HR Director was about to leave
      his position, it was likely that he would not act in such a manner in his final
      months at the agency. PFR File, Tab 5 at 25.
¶41         Even assuming that the HR Director did not have a motive to fabricate the
      allegations in specifications 1-4 based on the circumstances cited by the
      administrative judge, we find that this is not a sufficiently sound reason to
      overturn the administrative judge’s credibility determinations. The administrative
      judge’s conclusion that the HR Director had a motive to fabricate these
      allegations was not her only reason for finding the HR Director’s testimony not
      credible. The administrative judge also found that the HR Director’s version of
      several of the events at issue did not “incorporate logically with substantiated
      record evidence.” ID at 9-10. In particular, the administrative judge found that,
      during his testimony, the HR Director failed to satisfactorily explain why he
      did not tell E.D. about the appellant’s alleged statements until April 28, 2014, and
      why, after waiting so long, it was necessary to tell E.D. at all. ID at 10.
¶42         In assessing the relative credibility of the appellant and the HR Director, the
      administrative judge also found it “worth noting” that the appellant di d not
      incriminate himself in telephone calls that the HR Director initiated on April 28
      and 29, 2014, at OIG’s request for the purpose of eliciting the appellant’s
      acknowledgement that he made statements about harming E.D. ID at 9 n.12; IAF,
      Tab 6 at 20-32, 36-50.      The administrative judge noted that, during these
      telephone calls, the appellant did not acknowledge that he had threatened E.D. or
      indicate that he knew he was being recorded. ID at 9-10 n.12. In addition, the
      administrative judge found that, instead of directly confronting the appellant
      about his alleged statements concerning E.D., as OIG had instructed him to do,
      the HR Director told the appellant that investigators had questioned him about
      comments that the appellant had made to him about how the appellant would
      “take [E.D.] out” if he ever wanted to hurt himself, and the appellant disputed
      that characterization. ID at 10 n.12; IAF, Tab 6 at 28. The administrative judge
                                                                                        22

      also noted that the HR Director subsequently cut the appellant off whi le he
      appeared to be denying the alleged misconduct. ID at 10 n.12; IAF, Tab 6 at 29.
¶43         Moreover, the administrative judge’s credibility determinations regarding
      the HR Director are consistent with those of the superior court judge in the
      appellant’s criminal trial. In her written opinion, the superior court judge stated
      that there were numerous reasons to doubt the HR Director’s credibility,
      including his behavior during the recorded telephone calls between him and the
      appellant in late April 2014, and his delay in reporting the appellant’s purported
      statements about harming E.D. and committing suicide to anyone in a position to
      take action to protect E.D. and the appellant. IAF, Tab 5 at 76-87. Thus, we
      discern no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s credibility determinations
      regarding specifications 1-4.
¶44         As for specifications 12-17, the agency briefly argues on review that the
      administrative judge failed to consider “significant evidence” in finding that the
      record did not include preponderant evidence to support these specifications, and
      it asserts that the record shows that these specifications “are more likely true than
      not.” PFR File, Tab 5 at 32-33. This argument is essentially mere disagreement
      with the administrative judge’s explained findings and credibility determinations,
      and provides no basis for us to reweigh the evidence or substitute our assessment
      of the record evidence for that of the administrative judge ; therefore, we agree
      with her determination that the agency failed to prove specifications 12-17.
      Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 105-06.
¶45         In sum, we find no basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s findings
      that the agency failed to prove specifications 1-6, 9, and 12-17, and two parts of
      specification 8. We find, however, that the agency proved specifications 7, 10,
      11, and 18, and one part of specification 8. Because we find that the agency
      proved these specifications, we also find that it proved the charge of conduct
      unbecoming a Federal manager.        See Burroughs v. Department of the Army,
      918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that when more than one
                                                                                          23

      specification supports a single charge, proof of one or more, but not all, of the
      supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge).

      Nexus
¶46         Because the administrative judge found that the agency failed to prove the
      charge and reversed the appellant’s removal, she did not make findings as to
      whether there is a sufficient nexus between the appellant’s misconduct and the
      efficiency of the service, nor did she determine whether removal is a reasonable
      penalty. We address those issues here. It is well settled that there is a sufficient
      nexus between an employee’s misconduct and the efficiency of the service whe n,
      as in this case, the conduct occurred at work.       Parker v. U.S. Postal Service,
      819 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Miles v. Department of the Navy,
      102 M.S.P.R. 316, ¶ 11 (2006). Therefore, we find that disciplining the appellant
      for his misconduct promotes the efficiency of the service.

      Penalty
¶47         When examining the penalty imposed by the agency, the Board’s function
      is not to displace management’s responsibility or to decide what penalty it would
      impose, but to assure that management’s judgment has been properly exercised
      and that the penalty selected by the agency does not exceed the maximum limits
      of reasonableness.    Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306
      (1981). When, as here, the Board sustains the agency’s charge, but not all of the
      specifications of the charge, the agency’s chosen penalty is entitled to deference,
      and the Board will review that penalty to determine whether it is within the
      parameters of reasonableness.     Payne v. U.S. Postal Service, 72 M.S.P.R. 646,
      650   (1996);   see   generally   Douglas,   5 M.S.P.R.    at 305-06   (providing    a
      nonexhaustive list of factors that are relevant to determine the appropriate
      penalty). If the agency’s penalty is not reasonable, the Board will mitigate only
      to the extent necessary to bring it within the parameters of reasonableness, i.e.,
      the Board will apply a maximum reasonable penalty standard.                  Payne,
                                                                                      24

      72 M.S.P.R. at 651.       In applying this standard, the Board will consider the
      agency’s failure to sustain all of its supporting specifications. Id. That failure
      may require, or contribute to, a finding that the agency’s penalty is not
      reasonable.     Id.   Particularly pertinent to this appeal, we note that a general
      charge like the one here, i.e., conduct unbecoming, may be sustained when the
      Board finds that the appellant engaged in inappropriate behavior, even though it
      does not rise to the level of impropriety asserted by the agency; however, the
      penalty should reflect only the proven level of impropriety.     See Russo v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 284 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that
      mitigating the agency’s removal action to a lesser penalty was appropriate
      because the linchpin for imposing the penalty of removal was the agency’s
      determination that the appellant had made a racial comment and the Board did not
      find that such a comment was made).
¶48         The seriousness of the appellant’s offense is always one of the most
      important factors considered by the Board in assessing the reasonableness of an
      agency’s penalty determination.       Rosenberg v. Department of Transportation,
      105 M.S.P.R. 130, ¶ 30 (2007). Here, the agency only proved 5 of the charge’s
      18 specifications. In determining whether removal is a reasonable penalty for the
      appellant’s sustained misconduct, we consider the facts and circumstances
      surrounding each of the proven specifications. See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 297
      (stating that the facts and circumstances of each case are relevant to determining
      the penalty).
¶49         Specifications 7 and 8 involve incidents in which the appellant made
      improper statements.      In such cases, the Board has specifically found that we
      must consider the context and circumstances of the statement s in assessing the
      penalty.      Vernon v. U.S. Postal Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 392, ¶ 22 (2000).
      Specification 7 concerns the appellant’s use of profanity to describe a Senior
      Economist’s email while discussing the email with him.           We find that the
      seriousness of this misconduct is somewhat reduced because the appellant
                                                                                       25

      immediately apologized for cursing when the Senior Economist took offense,
      IAF, Tab 5 at 99; and did not use profanity during the rest of the meeting, id., see
      Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305 (stating that the factors relevant in determining the
      appropriateness of a penalty include whether the offense was repeated).
      However, in the absence of evidence showing that profanity was commonplace i n
      the work setting, the appellant’s use of profanity cannot be dismissed as
      inconsequential. As for specification 8, while it was improper for the appellant to
      reveal the name of an EEO complainant to those who did not need to know this
      information, there was no showing that this misconduct resulted in any harm to
      the complainant or the agency.
¶50        We next consider specification 10.       Although it was unsuitable for the
      appellant to place his hands over the mouth of the NMD Project Director during a
      meeting to prevent him from speaking, the appellant testified without
      contradiction that he and the Project Director are good friends and that the Project
      Director did not even remember the incident. HT4 at 274-75 (testimony of the
      appellant). Similarly, the Project Director confirmed that he had no recollection
      of this incident and, in any event, stated that such conduct would not have
      offended him, as he and the appellant had a good relationship. HT3 at 359-60,
      380-81 (testimony of the NMD Project Director).          Under the circumstances
      described above, we find that specifications 7, 8, and 10, standing alone, do not
      warrant severe disciplinary action.
¶51        Specification 11 concerns the appellant’s influencing the removal of
      liability information from a legal memorandum by intimidating the drafting
      attorneys.    This offense had wide implications for the agency, including the
      potential of financial repercussions and negative impact on the reputation o f the
      agency.      The misconduct on the appellant’s part appears to have been quite
      intentional, as the attorneys had already revised the memorandum several times
      but had not removed the contents with which the appellant disagreed.            The
      misconduct was also directly related to the appellant’s duties as COO, a senior
                                                                                       26

      role which unquestionably requires looking out for the overall interests of the
      agency. For these reasons, we find that specification 11 was highly serious and,
      in combination with the other sustained specifications, provides support for
      significant disciplinary action.
¶52         Specification 18 concerns the appellant’s asking the HR Director to
      negotiate with E.D. on his behalf for a higher rating and subsequently sending the
      HR Director an email with disparaging comments about E.D. This misconduct is
      directly related to the appellant’s duties as a supervisor and was committed for
      personal gain, as the appellant would have received a significant bonus if his
      performance rating had been higher.       Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305 (stating that
      relevant factors in determining the appropriateness of a penalty include whether
      the offense was committed for gain).            For these reasons, we find that
      specification 18 is the most serious of the sustained specifications, providing
      further support for significant disciplinary action.
¶53         In assessing whether removal is a reasonable penalty for the sustained
      specifications, we also have considered the following factors:      the appellant’s
      supervisory role; his past disciplinary record; his past work record; his length of
      service, and the notoriety of the offense. As mitigating factors, we acknowledge
      that the appellant has a good performance record and has not been subject to any
      prior disciplinary action. IAF, Tab 6 at 74-88, 92-97. Also, while the conduct at
      issue in specifications 1-4 generated a significant amount of press coverage, IAF,
      Tab 6 at 4-18, the record does not indicate that the conduct described in the
      proven specifications gained public notoriety. However, as aggravating factors,
      we note that the appellant served with the agency for only 3 years and that, as
      COO, the appellant was a high-ranking supervisor who occupied a position of
      trust and responsibility. IAF, Tab 6 at 103-05 (COO position description). Thus,
      the agency has the right to hold him to a higher standard of conduct for purpo ses
      of determining the penalty.    See Edwards v. U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R.
      173, ¶ 14 (2010) (finding that agencies are entitled to hold supervisors to a higher
                                                                                           27

      standard of behavior than nonsupervisors because they occupy positions of trust
      and responsibility); Walcott v. U.S. Postal Service, 52 M.S.P.R. 277, 284 (finding
      that an agency may hold a high-ranking supervisor to a higher standard of
      conduct for purposes of determining the penalty), aff’d, 980 F.2d 744 (Fed. Cir.
      1992) (Table).
¶54         Although the agency failed to establish much of the specific misconduct,
      the specifications we do sustain are without question quite serious. Thus, b ased
      on the specific facts of this case and the proven level of impropriety, we find that
      the agency’s chosen penalty is within the parameters of reasonableness and that
      the sustained specifications warrant removal.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 14
            This Final Order constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter.
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision.             5 U.S.C.
      § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for
      seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C.
      § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights,
      the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which
      option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below
      do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall
      within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you
      should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow
      all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum .
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

      14
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        28

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
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Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                29

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     30

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the     Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 15 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit

15
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              31

                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.