Court Opinion

ID: 9904843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 01:00:40.166008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.225662
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20398        Document: 00516979406             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/27/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                      No. 22-20398                           FILED
                                                                     November 27, 2023
                                     ____________
                                                                         Lyle W. Cayce
   Kenneth Taylor,                                                            Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Bryan Collier; Kim Massey; Marcia Jackson; Kenneth
   Putnum; Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:21-CV-2161
                     ______________________________

   Before Jolly, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Kenneth Taylor, a Texas prisoner, appeals the district court’s
   summary judgment dismissal of his Americans with Disabilities Act
   (“ADA”), Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and constitutional claims. We
   AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-20398      Document: 00516979406          Page: 2    Date Filed: 11/27/2023

                                    No. 22-20398

                                          I.
           Taylor is an inmate in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
   system who is classified as a “heat sensitive offender,” meaning that he is
   especially susceptible to extreme temperatures. Because air-conditioned
   housing addresses Taylor’s particular risk of injury during heat spells, Taylor
   complained when the TDCJ housed him in an unconditioned facility.
   Consequently, Taylor filed this federal complaint seeking (1) monetary
   damages under the ADA, the RA, and the Eighth and Fourteenth
   Amendments; and (2) reassignment to an air-conditioned cell to address his
   condition. In response, prison officials moved Taylor to an air-conditioned
   facility elsewhere. Taylor, dissatisfied with these new accommodations for
   other reasons, requested another transfer. Defendants then returned Taylor
   to his original unairconditioned facility but agreed to provide air conditioning
   in the facility to him during the summer months. The record demonstrates
   that prison officials have kept that commitment.
           Nevertheless, his complaint proceeded through the court system. On
   summary judgment, the district court dismissed Taylor’s case. Now on
   appeal, Taylor argues that the district court erred (1) in dismissing his ADA
   and RA claims, (2) finding that Taylor had abandoned his constitutional
   claims, and (3) finding that Taylor’s request for air-conditioned housing as
   moot.
                                         II.
           The district court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant
   shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
   is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This
   court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo and applies the same
   standard as the district court. Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, L.L.C., 636 F.3d
   752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).

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                                    No. 22-20398

                                         III.
          Taylor contends that the district court erred in finding his claim for
   injunctive relief for a transfer to an air-conditioned dorm to be moot after he
   was in fact transferred to air-conditioned accommodations for the summer
   months. Appellant’s Br. 39-42. This court reviews legal questions relating
   to mootness de novo. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co.,
   704 F.3d 413, 421 (5th Cir. 2013). A claim for injunctive relief becomes moot
   when the petitioner receives the relief he requested. DeMoss v. Crain, 636
   F.3d 145, 151 (5th Cir. 2011). According to the record, Taylor will be housed
   in an air-conditioned cell during the summer months each year. ROA.334-
   35, 342.   This solution will provide Taylor with air-conditioned living
   quarters during the summer heat, when he is vulnerable to the extreme
   temperatures that trigger his heat sensitivity, which forms the basis for the
   requested injunctive relief. Consequently, Taylor’s request for injunctive
   relief is moot and the district court dismissal of that claim is AFFIRMED.
                                         IV.
          Taylor further argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
   Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Appellant’s Br. 29-
   33. The district court held that Taylor dropped these claims by failing to brief
   them at the summary judgment stage. ROA.418-19. In Taylor’s response to
   the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, he acknowledged that “[t]he
   claims the plaintiff brings are ADA and RA claims . . .. The whole basis of
   this suit was and is Intentional Discrimination of a Disabled Person under
   ADA, ADAAA and RA.” ROA.388-89.
          Issues raised in the complaint but ignored by the plaintiff in summary
   judgment proceedings to dismiss the complaint are waived and will not be
   considered on appeal. Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2002)
   (citations omitted). Although we liberally construe the filings of pro se

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                                    No. 22-20398

   litigants, such unrepresented parties must still brief issues to preserve them.
   Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). See also Yohey v. Collins,
   985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993) (“‘[A]rguments must be briefed to be
   preserved.’” (quoting Price v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th
   Cir.1988)). Because Taylor has failed to brief his constitutional claims at the
   summary judgment level, the district court dismissal is AFFIRMED.
                                         V.
          We turn to Taylor’s primary argument on appeal: the district court
   erred by dismissing his ADA and RA claims for damages. Appellant’s Br.
   20-29. The relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), provides that “[n]o
   Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or
   other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
   custody without a prior showing of physical injury....” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
   We have characterized § 1997e(e) as preventing “prisoners from seeking
   compensatory damages for violations of federal law where no physical injury
   is alleged.” Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 529 F.3d 599, 605 (5th Cir.
   2008) (citing Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2005)). We have
   repeatedly applied this principle to ADA and RA claims. See, e.g., Flowers v.
   Sutterfield, No. 20-10988, 2022 WL 2821953, at *2 (5th Cir. July 20, 2022),
   cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1057 (2023); Buchanan v. Harris, No. 20-20408, 2021
   WL 4514694, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 2021); Flaming v. Alvin Cmty. Coll., 777
   F. App’x 771, 772 (5th Cir. 2019).
          Here, Taylor’s claim for damages does not assert a physical injury.
   Instead, he alleged only that his placement in unairconditioned housing could
   subject him to extreme heat, which could aggravate his medical conditions
   and could result in physical harm, and that such risk had caused him pain and
   suffering, which in turn entitled him to damages. Appellant’s Br. 9, 36-39.
   Because he claims only concern about the risk of possible harm, and not any

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                                     No. 22-20398

   actual resulting physical injury, his claim for damages fails to overcome the
   hurdle of § 1997e(e). Thus, Taylor’s ADA and RA claims fail, and the
   dismissal of these claims is AFFIRMED.
                                         VI.
          In sum, Taylor’s claim for injunctive relief is moot, as he was
   transferred to air-conditioned housing; Taylor abandoned his constitutional
   claims by failing to brief them on summary judgment; and Taylor’s claims
   under the ADA and RA were properly dismissed because he has failed to
   allege a physical injury. Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of Taylor’s
   complaint is
                                                                   AFFIRMED.

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