Court Opinion

ID: 9645736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:33:58.769754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:30.982965
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s analysis and result in this case, I respectfully dissent.
Facts
T.S. testified that the first time Stewart assaulted her was at his home on Church Street. When this first assault occurred, however, is unclear from the record. T.S. testified variously — “[bjack in the summertime, around the time that school started in 1992”; when she was “in fifth [grade], I think”; when she was “at Lida Hoe Elementary”; she didn’t “know exactly what date this happened” but she thought it “happened about September” “[b]ecause it was near the time school started” and “because it was in the summer,” “at the end of summertime”; “school was about to start”; “school had started”; “it was still warm outside.” According to T.S., she told no one about the assault until “about a year” later because she was afraid of Stewart. Also, according to T.S., this first assault was followed by a second assault shortly thereafter at her home on Catherine Street. Then, according to T.S., Stewart moved away for “two years” and the assaults stopped.
Stewart returned to live at T.S.’s home during the summer of 1993 while he was recuperating from gunshot wounds. According to T.S., the assaults began again within a month of Stewart’s return and continued through the end of 1993. Although T.S. was afraid of Stewart, she told her paternal grandmother — Stewart’s mother — about the assaults that December, around Christmas. Her grandmother did not believe her. To escape the abuse, T.S. ran away — first in January 1994 and then several times between February and May 1994. Before running away the first time, T.S. told her twenty-eight year old boyfriend, James Edward Fuller, that Stewart had assaulted her. Fuller was sympathetic and, after the first time, when T.S. ran away, she ran to Fuller’s apartment.
The last time T.S. was picked up, in mid-July 1994, at Eddie’s apartment, she told the authorities about the abuse and was not returned to her grandmother’s home. She was instead placed in the Le Tot Center. When she was being placed in Le Tot, T.S. told her grandmother and Stewart that if they continued to take her home, she would press charges for Stewart’s assaults. In response to a question by the court as to the kind of charges she threatened to file, T.S. testified that she “was talking about the sexual charges because [she] was running away because [Stewart] was doing that to [her].”
At trial, Stewart offered into evidence the suit papers filed by the State on July 15, 1994. Stewart’s counsel did not seek to limit his offer, and no objection was lodged by the State. Attached to these suit papers were the statements of the Child Protective Services caseworker, Betsy Lyde, and T.S. T.S.’s statement states that she was first molested by Stewart in 1989 when she was eleven years old.
After several weeks at Le Tot, T.S. was placed in Buckner Children’s Home. While at a movie, T.S. ran away and called her mother in Quinlan, Texas. After staying with her mother for a few weeks, T.S. moved in with Fuller and his mother in Dallas. At the time of trial, T.S. was four months pregnant with Fuller’s child. Both she and Fuller testified that they would marry if T.S. were old enough.
*561In my view, the record establishes the following chronology of events:1
Date T.S.’s Age T.S.’s School/Grade Level Other Events
08/02/78 0 T.S. born (SF 16)
08/09/89 11 Lida Hoe Elem.; 5th grade Stewart’s first assault on T.S. if (SF 23; DX 2, Ex. 2) T.S.’s testimony that Stewart first assaulted her when she was in fifth grade at the Lida Hoe Elementary School is credited (SF 23); according to Stewart’s mother, it was in the fifth grade that she noticed a decisive change in T.S.’s personality but she attributed it to the death of T.S.’s maternal grandmother, her own surgery, and the fire that destroyed their Eighth Street home (SF 105), despite the fact that these events did not occur until the latter part of 1990 (DX 4)
08/00/90 12 Lida Hoe Elem.; 6th grade (See SF 23; DX 2, Ex.2)
10/10/90 12 Eighth Street home destroyed by fire (DX 4)
10/17/90 12 Death of T.S.’s maternal grandmother (DX 4)
12/00/90 12 Stewart’s mother’s surgery (DX 4)
08/00/91 13 W.E. Greiner Mid. Sch.; 7th grade (See DX 3)
01/00/92 Flacey’s daughter begins attending W.E. Greiner Middle School with T.S., and it is about this time (during their seventh and eighth grade years) that Flacey noticed a distinct change in T.S.’s personality (SF 76)
07/15/92 13 Alleged offense (TR 3)
08/00/92 14 W.E. Greiner Mid. Sch.; 8th grade (DX 3)
08/09/92 14 Stewart first assaulted T.S. in late summer or early fall of 1992 if T.S.’s testimony that Stewart first assaulted her in the late summer or early fall of 1992 is credited (SF 21, 24-25)
06/12/93 14 Stewart shot (DX 4)
*562Date T.S.’s Age T.S.’s School/Grade Level Other Events
06/26/93 15 Stewart released from hospital and returned to Catherine Street home to recuperate (DX 4); according to T.S., assaults resume within about a month of Stewart’s return (SF 31-32)
08/00/93 15 • Health Magnet Sch.; 9th grade After T.S. began ninth grade and (See DX 3-1) until January 1994, she helped Stewart with his nighttime repossession work (SF 33-35);17 during this time, Stewart continued to molest her (SF 33, 35-36)
12/00/93 15 Around Christmas, T.S. told her grandmother that Stewart was assaulting her (SF 33); before running away, T.S. told Fuller of Stewart’s assaults (SF 36-37)
01/04/94 15 Sunset High Sch.; 9th grade T.S. scheduled enrollment date at (DX 3-4) Sunset and the first time shé runs away (DX 4)
01/10/94 15 T.S. enrolled at Sunset (DX 4)
02/17/94 15 T.S. runs away for the second time (DX 4)
02/28/94 15 Flaeey’s Home School (SF 71; DX3)
03/19/94 15 T.S. runs away for the third time (DX4)
05/12/94 15 T.S. returns home (DX 4)
05/23/94 15 T.S. runs away for the fourth time (DX4)
07/15/94 15 T.S. picked up at Fuller’s apartment and put in Le Tot (DX 4); T.S. tells authorities about sexual assaults by Stewart and gives statement indicating abuse began in 1989 when she was in fifth grade (DX 2, Ex. 1-2); SAPCR filed (DX 2)
07/19/94 15 T.S. meets with Officer Nelson (SF 10)
08/12/94 16 Because T.S.’s time at Le Tot expired and the authorities did not want to return her to her grandmother’s home, T.S. was transferred to Buckner’s Children’s Home (DX 2, Ex. 1 at 2)
16 Indictment presented 08/19/94
*563Date T.S.’s Age T.S.’s School/Grade Level Other Events
08/20/94 16 T.S. runs away from Buckner’s Children’s Home (DX 4)
12/15/94 16 Trial begins
Dependant’s Exhibit 2
The majority criticizes this dissent for relying upon T.S.’s statement, which is attached to Defendant’s Exhibit 2, and in which T.S. states that Stewart first assaulted her in 1989 when she was eleven years old. According to the majority, there is no testimony to support this aspect of T.S.’s statement, and it was not briefed. I disagree. As demonstrated by the chronology set forth above, T.S.’s statement that Stewart first assaulted her in 1989 when she was eleven years old is consistent with her testimony that the first assault occurred when she was in the fifth grade. And T.S.’s testimony in this respect is corroborated in some measure by T.S.’s grandmother’s testimony that she first noticed a change in T.S.’s personality when she was in fifth grade. I further disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trier of fact was not aware of the possibility that the assaults began when T.S. was in the fifth grade, that is in 1989-90 when T.S. was eleven years old. To the contrary, the experienced trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, indicated he was aware of the discrepancy in T.S.’s testimony by his questioning of both T.S.’s grandmother and Plaeey as to whether the change in T.S.’s personality occurred when she was in fifth grade. SF 73, 75-78. Finally, the State argues that Stewart’s conviction is supportable by T.S.’s testimony that the assaults began when she was in the fifth grade. State’s Brief at 6-7.2
The majority further criticizes this dissent’s reference to the statement because “it could have been subject to a hearsay objection.” It is clear, however, that Stewart has not brought forward a point of error complaining that T.S.’s statement was inadmissible hearsay; Stewart was the proponent' of Defendant’s Exhibit 2, and his offer was not limited to Stewart’s fabrication defense; and the State did not object to the exhibit as inadmissible hearsay. SF 65-66. Accordingly, whether the exhibit contains hearsay is irrelevant; the statement is evidence with probative value — just as are the statements of T.S.’s grandmother and her friend Mrs. Flacey, which were also offered without limitation and admitted without objection. See Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 802.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Stewart was charged with sexually assaulting his niece, T.S., “on or about” July 15, 1992. As the majority states, “on or about” means any date before presentation of the indictment, provided the offense would not then be barred by the relevant statute of limitations. Mireles v. State, 901 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Accordingly, the trier of fact was authorized to find Stewart guilty of the crime charged if it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Stewart sexually assaulted T.S. at any time between August 19, 1984 and August 19, 1994. However, pursuant to the outcry statute in effect between 1983 and 1993, Stewart’s conviction for sexual assault is “supportable” by T.S.’s uncorroborated testimony only if T.S. was less than fourteen at the time of the offense. See and compare Act of June 17, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 382, 1983 Gen.Laws 2090, 2091 with Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 38.07 (Vernon Supp.1996).
In his appeal, Stewart “moves for dismissal” because, he alleges, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the offense occurred on or about July 15, 1992. Stewart’s brief thus complains of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Under a legal sufficiency test, we are charged with *564reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and therefore resolving all credibility determinations in favor of the verdict; the ultimate question to be answered in conducting this review is whether a rational trier of fact could have found the appellant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). I agree with the majority, however, that the outcry statute does not establish the victim’s age as an element of the offense. But I disagree both with its suggestion that the State was required to prove that the victim was younger than fourteen by a preponderance of the evidence and with its apparent holding that we are authorized to reverse the conviction if the State failed to do so.
The outcry statute in effect in 1992 was codified as article 38.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 38.07 (Vernon 1979). The repealed article was located in a section entitled “Evidence in Criminal Actions.” See id. at 4. More particularly, however, article 38.07 is located right after article 38.06, subsection 2, which deals with the competency of child witnesses, and right in the middle of articles 38.06 through 38.13, all of which deal with the competency of persons to testify. See id. at art. 38.06-.13. Because of article 38.07’s location and subject matter, I believe it effectuated a legislative determination of a special rule of competency, consent, and complicity/trustworthiness for child victims of sexual assaults: If a sexual assault victim was less than fourteen years of age at the time of the offense, the victim was deemed competent to testify regarding the assault without corroboration; but if the victim was over fourteen years of age, the victim was not considered competent to testify absent corroborating evidence, whether it be the fact of an outcry within a specified period or some other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime charged. Cf. Vickery v. State, 566 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (articles 38.07 and 38.14 in pari materia; therefore, article 38.14’s accomplice witness corroboration requirement applies only if article 38.07 does not apply).
Because I view the question as one in the nature of competency, I believe Stewart, rather than the State, bore the burden in the trial court of raising and proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that T.S. was not competent to testify without corroboration. See Beavers v. State, 634 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 1982, pet. ref'd); Lujan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 854, 860 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd). And the proper standard of review of the trial court’s competency ruling is the abuse of discretion standard. See Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 176, 62 L.Ed.2d 114 (1979); see also Lujan, 626 S.W.2d at 860-61. Under the abuse of discretion standard, the trial court’s ruling may be reversed only “when it appears that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard, or when no reasonable view of the record could support the trial court’s conclusion under the correct law and the facts viewed in the light most favorable to its legal conclusion.” DuBose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).
In short, to say, as article 38.07 did (and does), that a conviction is “supportable” by certain testimony is to say that the testimony is competent and may be considered in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence; the testimony is not “no evidence.” Cf. Ex parte Reynolds, 588 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 1284, 63 L.Ed.2d 605 (1980) (if insufficient evidence to corroborate accomplice witness testimony, evidence is legally insufficient and judgment of acquittal must be rendered). If, on the other hand, the requirements of article 38.07 are not met, the evidence is considered “no evidence,” and it may not be used to support the conviction. But the threshold issue to determining Stewart’s legal sufficiency complaint is the propriety of the trial court’s implicit ruling that T.S. was younger than fourteen at the time of the offense, and that ruling should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. To reference the preponderance standard applicable in the trial court, as the majority does, confuses the burden of proof at trial and the standard of review on appeal. And to shift the burden of showing *565competency to the State is, in my view, simply erroneous.
Discussion
Stewart’s complaint should fail for two reasons. First, there is no indication in the record that he preserved the competency issue in the trial court. See Tex.R.App.P. 52(a); Beavers, 634 S.W.2d at 895-96; Lujan, 626 S.W.2d at 860. Second, even if the issue had been raised with the trial judge, T.S.’s testimony was internally conflicting, and it is up to the trial judge sitting as the trier, of fact — not this court — to resolve the conflicts. See DuBose, 915 S.W.2d at 496-98. In so doing, he might reasonably could have credited T.S.’s testimony that she was first assaulted when she in the fifth grade — a point in time at which T.S. was younger than fourteen. Accordingly, I would overrule Stewart’s legal sufficiency complaint and affirm the judgment.

. In light of the disparities between the majority and this dissent’s views of the record and briefs, I have included record references in this opinion.

. Because evidence, discussions between the trial judge and witnesses, and briefing indicating the offense may have occurred in 1989, I do not agree either that the charge was "not tried” or that Stewart's conviction raises "serious due process concerns.”