Court Opinion

ID: 9928181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:31.802334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:51.177263
License: Public Domain

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          DESSA, LLC v. PETER RIDDLE ET AL.
                      (AC 45072)
                        Cradle, Suarez and Flynn, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The defendant J appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court,
    which found that J and his father, P, were jointly and severally liable
    for unpaid rent and other expenses in connection with the plaintiff
    landlord’s lease of an apartment to P. J testified at trial that he had
    never resided at the apartment and had never seen or known of the
    lease until he was served with process when the plaintiff commenced
    suit. P testified that, after the plaintiff had informed him that his credit
    was insufficient to rent the apartment, he used J’s Social Security number
    and identity to acquire the lease, told the plaintiff that J would also be
    a tenant at the apartment and forged J’s signature on the lease and
    placed utilities in J’s name, all without J’s knowledge. The court, Spader,
    J., found that, although P and J were ‘‘largely credible,’’ it also stated
    that it did not believe J had known nothing about P’s actions and credit
    issues. Judge Spader stated that, ‘‘[s]peaking personally, as a son,’’ he
    would have let his father use his name and credit in similar circum-
    stances, and that, even if J had not given explicit permission to P, ‘‘as
    a dutiful son,’’ permission to do so was implied. Held:
1. This court was unpersuaded by J’s claim that newly discovered evidence
    demonstrated that the plaintiff had commenced this action with unclean
    hands and without probable cause under fraudulent premises: J’s failure
    to raise those issues at the time of trial or by way of an appropriate
    posttrial motion undermined his ability to raise those issues on appeal;
    moreover, whether the plaintiff’s conduct amounted to the misconduct
    J had alleged was an issue of fact that had to be decided by the trial
    court in the first instance, and, even if the court had found that wilful
    misconduct on the part of the plaintiff had been proven, the issue of
    an appropriate sanction had to be determined in the trial court’s sound
    discretion and was not an issue for this court to decide in the first
    instance.
2. This court concluded that the trial judge’s statements that he would have
    permitted his father to use his name and credit in similar circumstances
    and that doing so was the obligation of a dutiful son left it with the
    definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed: the
    trial judge appeared to have relied on those beliefs, rather than on the
    evidence, in finding that J had guaranteed the debt P incurred with
    respect to the lease; moreover, regardless of whether there was a rational
    view of the evidence that might have supported the court’s findings of
    fact, the court’s decision was difficult to reconcile in key respects, as
    the finding that P and J were largely credible was difficult to reconcile
    with the court’s determination that it was ‘‘hard to believe’’ J’s testimony
    as to whether he was aware that he was guaranteeing P’s debts; further-
    more, because the court concluded that J acted both explicitly and
    implicitly, it was unclear what legal theory the court relied on to impose
    joint and several liability; accordingly, because the court’s decision was
    apparently based in part on improper considerations, the judgment was
    reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
     Argued September 20, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

                             Procedural History

  Action to collect unpaid rent, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Stamford-Norwalk, Housing Session at Norwalk; where
the court, Spader, J., denied the motion to dismiss filed
by the defendant Jonathan Riddle; thereafter, the case
was tried to the court; judgment for the plaintiff, from
which the defendant Jonathan Riddle appealed to this
court. Reversed; new trial.
  Jonathan Riddle, self-represented, the appellant
(defendant).
  Thomas C. C. Sargent, for the appellee (plaintiff).
                           Opinion

   SUAREZ, J. The plaintiff landlord, Dessa, LLC, com-
menced the underlying action against the defendants,
Peter Riddle (Peter) and his son, Jonathan Riddle (Jona-
than), to collect unpaid rent pursuant to a written lease
agreement that was allegedly entered into between the
parties.1 Jonathan appeals from the judgment of the
trial court finding the defendants jointly and severally
liable for damages in the amount of $11,113.06. Jona-
than claims that (1) newly discovered evidence demon-
strates that the plaintiff interfered with the court’s abil-
ity to be impartial and equitable in this case, and (2)
the court’s findings are clearly erroneous. We reverse
the judgment of the trial court.
   In its two count complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
it owned and leased the subject property in Stamford
and that, on September 4, 2016, the defendants signed
a written lease agreement requiring them to pay $2350
in rent each month, with a $150 late fee if not paid in
full by the tenth of each month. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants failed to pay rent from April through
August, 2017, and from September 1 through 15, 2017,
leading to an arrearage of $12,925 in unpaid rent and
$900 in late fees. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that
the written lease agreement required the defendants to
pay utility bills, $538.06 of which were unpaid. The
plaintiff further alleged that the defendants were jointly
and severally liable for damages in the amount of
$14,363.06. The plaintiff sought the damages alleged,
attorney’s fees as permitted under the terms of the lease
agreement, and any other form of relief that the court
may find just and proper.
   In his answer, Peter agreed that he had entered into
the written lease agreement but disagreed that he failed
to pay any moneys due under the lease. In his answer,
Jonathan disagreed with every allegation in the plain-
tiff’s complaint.
   A bench trial was held on May 20, 2021, by means of
a remote hearing, before the court, Spader, J. The court
heard testimony from Janine Cloutier, the sole member
of the plaintiff limited liability company, as well as both
defendants. In an order dated May 23, 2021, the court
set forth its decision: ‘‘On the surface, this is a straight-
forward collections matter. [Peter] took possession of
the plaintiff’s premises located at 35 West Broad Street
#205 in Stamford . . . pursuant to a lease dated Sep-
tember 4, 2016. [Peter], with his daughter, Jessica [Rid-
dle], resided in the premises from October 1, 2016,
through mid-September, 2017. Monthly rent was $2350.
The defendants were late on [their] payments and do not
contest the bulk of the debt due to the plaintiff . . . .
  ‘‘The issue in the case is that the second defendant,
[Jonathan] is also on the lease, and the plaintiff claims
he is jointly and severally liable for the debt due to it.
   ‘‘Following the denial of [Jonathan’s] motion to dis-
miss, this matter went to trial remotely . . . on May
20, 2021. The court heard from the parties and found
them largely credible. The plaintiff advised [the defen-
dants] that [Peter’s] credit was insufficient to make [the
plaintiff] consider renting the apartment to him. He was,
and is, in debt to the [United States Internal Revenue
Service] as well as other creditors. The plaintiff required
additional security guaranteeing payment of monthly
rent before renting to him. Peter alleges [that], at that
point, he used his son’s Social Security number to essen-
tially steal his son’s financial identity to acquire the
lease. He provided the plaintiff with an electronic trans-
fer of his son’s Experian credit report and advised [the
plaintiff that] his son would also be a tenant. When the
lease was drawn up, including Jonathan’s name, Peter
forged his son’s signature on the lease.
   ‘‘The plaintiff’s concerns with Peter ended up being
well founded when Peter defaulted on his rental obliga-
tions.
   ‘‘The plaintiff commenced this action for payment of
past due amounts against both Peter and Jonathan.
Jonathan alleged [that he had] no knowledge that his
name was used to obtain the apartment. He alleges that
he never resided there and never saw the lease or knew
of its existence until being served with this action. Peter
admits the debts due herein and admits to fraudulently
inducing the plaintiff to rent to him with his forgery
and theft of his son’s financial identity. If judgment
enters, Peter believes it should only be as to him, per-
sonally, based on his admitted dishonesty involving
his son.
   ‘‘The plaintiff’s manager admits she never saw Jona-
than at the unit, nor provided him with keys but indi-
cates [that the plaintiff] . . . would not have rented
the apartment to the Riddles without Jonathan being
liable on the rental payments. She advised the court
that at least one [limited liability company] operated
by the Riddles indicated this property address as Jona-
than’s residence and indicated that the electric bills
were also in Jonathan’s name. The [limited liability com-
pany] issue is not relevant; although Jonathan’s resi-
dence is listed as this address, he never resided there,
his sister was the secretary [for the limited liability
company], and she completed the [limited liability com-
pany’s] paperwork using this address. The testimony
of the parties regarding the interconnectivity of the
[family’s] business affairs, however, makes it difficult
for the court to believe Jonathan knew nothing of his
father’s credit issues and his involvement with their
obtaining this premises.
  ‘‘Peter advised that he was also unable to obtain
credit to open utility accounts, so he also defrauded
those creditors by placing utilities in Jonathan’s name.
   ‘‘As the court noted [previously], at trial, the parties
were largely credible. Peter wouldn’t call his actions
‘fraud,’ but he admitted to misusing his son’s Social
Security number and placing debts in his son’s name.
Jonathan was also credible; however, the court does
not believe that he had no knowledge of his father’s
actions. Speaking personally, as a son, the undersigned
would have allowed my father to use my name and
credit if he was in a position where he had to. The
defendants ‘knew what they were doing,’ as they needed
to obtain an apartment, and [Peter] was not creditwor-
thy. It doesn’t matter that Jonathan did not occupy the
premises; he was on the lease, and if there was not
explicit permission from Jonathan for him to do so, as a
dutiful son, the permission was implied. The defendants
just did not expect this matter to get to the point where
the plaintiff would pursue them in court for their non-
payment.
  ‘‘When coupled with the utilities also being in Jona-
than’s name, it is hard to believe that Jonathan was not
aware that he was guaranteeing Peter’s debts. Jonathan
can seek legal remedies against his father criminally or
civilly if he truly believes his father acted without his
consent. He has not done so since ‘learning’ of his [sig-
nature] being included on the lease when this action
was commenced last year.
  ‘‘The court finds that both of the defendants, Peter
AND Jonathan . . . are jointly and severally liable for
the debt due to the plaintiff. ([Jonathan’s sister, Jessica]
would also be responsible were she made a party.) The
court finds that the surrender of the premises was not
until at least September 15, 2017, as the access keys/
fobs were not fully returned to the plaintiff until at least
that date. The court is not allowing late fees that were
requested by the plaintiff for reasons stated on the
record. The court finds for the plaintiff in the amount
of $11,113.06, detailed as follows:
  ‘‘Unpaid back rent: $12,925
  ‘‘Unpaid water/sewer/utilities: $538.06
  ‘‘Less: Security deposit balance: $2350
   ‘‘Legal fees are awarded in the amount incurred to
date of $1350. This amount is less than 15 percent of
the debt pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-4 and [is]
allowed under paragraph 16 of the lease.
  ‘‘The plaintiff can submit a bill of costs to request an
award of costs.
  ‘‘The court awards judgment interest at 10 percent.’’
  This appeal followed.
                             I
  Jonathan first claims that newly discovered evidence
demonstrates that the plaintiff interfered with the
court’s ability to be impartial and equitable in this case.2
He argues that ‘‘[n]ewly discovered evidence estab-
lishes [that] the plaintiff commenced this action with
unclean hands [and] without probable cause under
fraudulent premises.’’ Although Jonathan’s claim is not
framed with legal precision, Jonathan appears to argue
that this court should either sanction the plaintiff for
having wilfuly abused the judicial process or rely on
the doctrine of unclean hands to dismiss the plaintiff’s
action or preclude the plaintiff from recovering dam-
ages. We are not persuaded by this claim.
   Jonathan essentially asks this court to find that the
plaintiff engaged in a wide range of actions, including
engaging in fraud, ‘‘maliciously’’ misrepresenting facts,
fabricating evidence, testifying falsely, and showing a
reckless disregard for the truth that undermined the
trial court’s ability to fairly adjudicate the case. Jona-
than, however, is unable to demonstrate that the factual
or legal issues he raises on appeal, in connection with
this claim, were either raised before or ruled on by the
trial court. ‘‘It is well known that this court is not bound
to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at
the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. Practice Book
§ 60-5. The requirement that [a] claim be raised dis-
tinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to
the attention of the court the precise matter on which
its decision is being asked. . . . The reason for the rule
is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal
that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for
the trial court . . . to address the claim—would
encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both
the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Emphasis omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ochoa v. Beh-
ling, 221 Conn. App. 45, 50–51, 299 A.3d 1275 (2023).
   Jonathan’s failure to have raised these issues either
at the time of trial or by way of an appropriate posttrial
motion undermines his ability to raise these issues in
the present appeal. This is because the issues of whether
the plaintiff, through its sole member, Cloutier, acted
in a fraudulent manner in connection with the present
litigation or acted wilfuly to abuse the judicial process
in connection with the underlying action are not only
related to what Cloutier’s actions were but depend on
a finding concerning her state of mind.3 Whether the
plaintiff’s conduct amounts to the misconduct Jonathan
alleges is an issue of fact that, in the first instance, must
be decided by the trier of fact, not an appellate tribunal.
It is axiomatic that ‘‘[an appellate] court does not try
issues of fact or pass upon the credibility of witnesses.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wasniewski v.
Quick & Reilly, Inc., 292 Conn. 98, 103, 971 A.2d 8
(2009). Moreover, even if the court had found that wilful
misconduct on the part of the plaintiff had been proven,
the issue of an appropriate sanction is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court; it is not an issue to be
decided in the first instance by this court.
   For similar reasons, Jonathan’s reliance on the doc-
trine of unclean hands, for the first time in this appeal,
does not fare any better. ‘‘Our jurisprudence has recog-
nized that those seeking equitable redress in our courts
must come with clean hands. The doctrine of unclean
hands expresses the principle that where a plaintiff
seeks equitable relief, he must show that his conduct
has been fair, equitable and honest as to the particular
controversy in issue. . . . For a complainant to show
that he is entitled to the benefit of equity he must estab-
lish that he comes into court with clean hands. . . .
The clean hands doctrine is applied not for the protec-
tion of the parties but for the protection of the court.
. . . It is applied . . . for the advancement of right and
justice. . . . The party seeking to invoke the clean
hands doctrine to bar equitable relief must show that
his opponent engaged in wilful misconduct with regard
to the matter in litigation. . . . The trial court enjoys
broad discretion in determining whether the promotion
of public policy and the preservation of the courts’
integrity dictate that the clean hands doctrine be
invoked.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Ridgefield v. Eppoliti Realty Co., 71 Conn.
App. 321, 334–35, 801 A.2d 902, cert. denied, 261 Conn.
933, 806 A.2d 1070 (2002).
   Our Supreme Court has stated that ‘‘[a]pplication of
the doctrine of unclean hands rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. A & B Auto Salvage, Inc.
v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 189 Conn. 573, 578, 456
A.2d 1187 (1983); accord Cohen v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 193,
196, 438 A.2d 55 (1980) ([i]t is clear that [the doctrine
of unclean hands] is to be applied . . . by the court in
the exercise of its sound discretion); DeCecco v. Beach,
174 Conn. 29, 35, 381 A.2d 543 (1977) ([t]he maxim
should be applied in the trial court’s discretion). The
exercise of [such] equitable authority . . . is subject
only to limited review on appeal. . . . The only issue
on appeal is whether the trial court has acted unrea-
sonably and in clear abuse of its discretion.’’ (Empha-
sis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomp-
son v. Orcutt, 257 Conn. 301, 308, 777 A.2d 670 (2001).
  For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by
Jonathan’s first claim.
                            II
   Next, Jonathan essentially challenges the court’s find-
ings as being clearly erroneous. Jonathan argues that
the court ‘‘ignored relevant factors’’ and ‘‘considered
irrelevant factors’’ in resolving the factual issues before
it. We agree with Jonathan.
  Jonathan challenges the court’s decision on several
grounds. First, he argues that the evidence contradicted
the court’s findings. He relies on his testimony that he
did not authorize his father to use his credit history to
enter into the lease agreement, that he had not seen
the lease agreement until the plaintiff commenced the
present action, and that he did not sign the lease agree-
ment. Jonathan testified that he ‘‘had no understanding
that [he] was connected to this address in any way
legally or credit wise.’’ Jonathan also relies on Peter’s
testimony that Peter had used Jonathan’s credit history
in order to enter into the lease agreement and had
forged Jonathan’s signature on the lease agreement
without his knowledge.
  Second, Jonathan argues that the court erroneously
found that the address of the subject property was his
residence rather than the address of a limited liability
company owned by Jonathan, Peter, and Jessica.
   Third, Jonathan argues that Judge Spader’s findings
were impacted by the judge’s own personally held incli-
nation to let his father use his name and credit, which
Jonathan characterizes as a personal bias that ‘‘is legally
incorrect and would establish an entirely new and erro-
neous, generalized legal principle as it pertains to sons
of fathers.’’ Specifically, Jonathan refers to the portion
of the court’s decision in which Judge Spader stated
that he ‘‘would have allowed [his] father to use [his]
name and credit if he was in a position where he had
to’’ and that ‘‘if there was not explicit permission from
Jonathan for [Peter] to [use his name and credit], as
a dutiful son, the permission was implied.’’ Jonathan
argues that the court ‘‘is asserting that all sons, no
matter the relationship to the father or circumstances,
would allow the father to use their name and credit no
matter the consequences, with or without consent.’’
Jonathan also argues that it was improper for the court
to have based its findings on the fact that he had not
pursued any legal remedies against Peter for having
used his name and credit without his knowledge or
permission.
    Finally, Jonathan argues that the court’s factual find-
ings cannot be reconciled. Noting that he testified at
trial that he lacked any knowledge of Peter’s fraudulent
conduct until after the plaintiff commenced the underly-
ing action, Jonathan argues that the court’s initial find-
ing that his testimony was ‘‘largely credible’’ cannot be
reconciled with its subsequent finding that he and Peter
‘‘ ‘knew what they were doing’ ’’ in terms of using Jona-
than’s credit and identity to enter into the lease agree-
ment.
  ‘‘Our review is limited to a determination of whether
the decision made is logically consistent and supported
by the evidence.’’ Capmar Construction, Inc. v. Coyle,
4 Conn. App. 579, 580, 495 A.2d 1115 (1985). ‘‘[W]here
the factual basis of the [trial] court’s decision is chal-
lenged we must determine whether the facts set out
in the memorandum of decision are supported by the
evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the
pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly
erroneous. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it
. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. . . . Under the clearly erroneous standard
of review, a finding of fact must stand if, on the basis
of the evidence before the court and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from that evidence, a trier of
fact reasonably could have found as it did. . . . In
reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the
record to determine whether the [court] could have
reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .
Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . .
in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Circulent, Inc. v.
Hatch & Bailey Co., 217 Conn. App. 622, 629–30, 289
A.3d 609 (2023).
   At the outset, we agree with Jonathan that the court’s
decision is somewhat difficult to reconcile in key
respects. It suffices to observe that Jonathan’s testi-
mony was brief, focused on the central issue of whether
he knew of Peter’s actions concerning the lease. It is
difficult for this court to reconcile the trial court’s find-
ing that Jonathan and Peter were ‘‘largely credible’’ with
its finding that Jonathan’s testimony about the principal
issue on which he testified—whether he was aware
that he was guaranteeing Peter’s debts—was ‘‘hard to
believe.’’ It is also unclear what legal theory the court
relied on to impose joint and several liability because
it concluded that Jonathan acted both explicitly and
implicitly. On the one hand, the court stated that the
defendants acted jointly in using Jonathan’s name and
credit, as the court found that they ‘‘knew what they
were doing’’ in order to obtain an apartment for Peter,
who was not creditworthy. On the other hand, the court
stated that Jonathan did not give Peter explicit permis-
sion to use his name and credit but that, ‘‘as a dutiful
son, permission was implied.’’4
   More importantly, however, we agree with Jonathan
that the court’s decision appears to have been based,
in part, on improper considerations. Regardless of
whether there was a rational view of the evidence that
might have supported the court’s findings of fact, it
appears that the court was swayed in its fact-finding
by its own attitudes garnered from personal life experi-
ence. ‘‘[Triers of fact] are not required to leave common
sense at the courtroom door . . . nor are they
expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge
or their own observations and experience of the affairs
of life’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) In re Kristy
A., 83 Conn. App. 298, 316, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied,
271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004); ‘‘[n]evertheless,
attitudes garnered from personal life experience cannot
serve as a substitute for properly admitted evidence at
a hearing where the court’s mandate is to ascertain the
intent of the parties. Judicial impartiality is the hallmark
of the American system of justice. . . . The back-
ground and experience of a trial judge are disqualifying
only if they prevent that judge from assessing the evi-
dence fairly and impartially. It is assumed that judges,
regardless of their personal backgrounds and experi-
ences in life, will be able to set aside any biases or
predispositions they might have and consider each case
in light of the evidence presented.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Schimenti v. Schi-
menti, 181 Conn. App. 385, 402, 186 A.3d 739 (2018).
  In the present case, the trial judge explicitly inter-
jected his personal observations and beliefs into the
decision. The judge stated that, in similar circum-
stances, he would have permitted his father to use his
name and credit. The judge also expressed his belief
that doing so was the obligation of ‘‘a dutiful son.’’
Regardless of whether the court found that Jonathan
acted explicitly or implicitly, it appears to have relied
on the aforementioned personal beliefs, rather than the
evidence, in finding that Jonathan had guaranteed the
debt that Peter incurred with respect to the lease. There-
fore, we are left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has occurred, for which the proper rem-
edy is to reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for a new trial.
  The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new trial.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     The defendants were self-represented before the trial court. Jonathan
is self-represented in this appeal. Peter has not participated in this appeal.
   2
     With respect to the allegedly newly discovered evidence, Jonathan
asserts that ‘‘(1) the alleged lease supporting the complaint was fabricated;
(2) [t]he case transcripts show beyond a reasonable doubt [that] the plaintiff
committed perjury under oath at trial; (3) [t]he complaint contains several
false and fraudulent misrepresentations by relying on the fabricated evi-
dence; (4) the plaintiff’s counsel submitted motions containing false state-
ments and maliciously misrepresented the facts to the court, causing mani-
fest injury and inequity; (5) the plaintiff gave knowingly false testimony and
showed a reckless disregard for the truth; [and] (6) [t]he facts provided
will conclude clearly and convincingly [that] the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s
counsel fraudulently took action against Jonathan knowing he was not a
proper party to the action.’’
   3
     To the extent that Jonathan argues that Cloutier engaged in fraudulent
conduct, we observe that, in basic terms, a finding of ‘‘fraud’’ requires a
subordinate finding of an intent to deceive. ‘‘Fraud consists in deception
practiced in order to induce another to part with property or surrender some
legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed. . . . The elements
of a fraud action are: (1) a false representation was made as a statement
of fact; (2) the statement was untrue and known to be so by its maker; (3)
the statement was made with the intent of inducing reliance thereon; and
(4) the other party relied on the statement to his detriment.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Billington v. Billington, 220
Conn. 212, 217, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991).
   4
     This inconsistency in the court’s decision is further clouded by the fact
that, in finding that the defendants were jointly and severally liable, the
court did not state whether it ultimately determined that Jonathan held
Peter out as his agent or whether the court ultimately determined that
Jonathan permitted Peter to exercise apparent authority on his behalf.