Court Opinion

ID: 9460403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:49:20.389517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:36.219448
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting): abused its discretion when it overruled
In my opinion, the district court Yaughn’s objection to the proposed order of argument to the jury.
In the absence of the jury, Yaughn’s attorney articulated an objection to what he anticipated might happen as to arguments :
“MR. LARSEN: Please the Court, during the informal conference between the Court and counsel there was an indication as to arguments, that the United States Attorney does not propose to make an opening argument but proposes only to make a concluding argument after an argument by the defense.
“I object to this on the grounds that such procedure would deny due process to the defendant Yaughn in this respect. The argument, as I understand the process of law to be, the other side is to have an opportunity to rebut the argument. The closing argument on the part of the Government is intended in our system of law for the purpose of rebuttal to enable the Government to rebut the argument of the defense. It is not intended as a time to make an affirmative argument for the Government so that the defense has no opportunity to answer the theories and the arguments of the Government propounded in that closing argument.
“We object to a procedure that would enable the Government to pro*446ceed without making a full and fair disclosure of their position in argument at a time when we have an opportunity for rebuttal argument.” (App. 474-475.)
The court overruled this objection, saying:
“THE COURT: Well, taking the first motion first, I know of no rule that requires that the Government reserve their concluding argument only for rebuttal argument made by the defendant. As far as I know, there is no rule of that nature in the Fifth Circuit.
“It has always been the practice and custom in this court to allow them to have an opening and concluding argument within their imposed time limit, and, if they choose not to make an opening argument and reserve their time for concluding argument, they have that right.
“I don’t know why I should restrict that right for this particular reason. There is nothing unusual about this case that would in any way restrict it.” (App. 478.)
The attorney for Yaughn’s codefendant made a like motion, and the court denied it.
When the jury returned to the courtroom, the district judge announced that the evidence in the case was complete and that it was time to go forward with the arguments. The judge then stated: “The government has the opening and concluding argument.” (App. 480.) The government attorney responded: “Your Honor, the Government will waive its right to open at this time but would specifically reserve its right to con-elude.” (App. 480.) The attorney for Yaughn’s codefendant proceeded to argue the case. Then, Yaughn’s attorney argued the case to the jury. Finally, the government attorney presented the argument for the United States.
Admittedly, some courts have refused to find prejudicial error in situations similar to the circumstances of this case.1 2*Also, it has been stated generally that the order and extent of argument is entirely within the discretion of the court.2 However, in none of these cases is there an adequate discussion of the issue presented by Yaughn in this case.
The Supreme Court has held that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 1970, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.3 Thus, of course, the government has the burden of proof in a criminal trial. The order of argument should reflect this fundamental proposition. If the government is allowed to waive its opening argument, and to reserve an opportunity to make a full closing argument, the defendant is forced to argue his nonculpability before the government has fully revealed its theory of the case. This puts the burden of going forward upon the defendant at a critical stage in the trial, and may understandably lead to confusion among the jurors as to who has the burden of proof. It is true that the judge’s instructions to the jury will usually include a charge that the government carries the burden of proof. However, the existence of a curative instruction does not justify a potentially prejudicial *447practice which has no apparent advantage.
The order of argument utilized in this case also meant that the defendant had no adequate opportunity to reply to the arguments advanced by the government. As explained by the Florida Supreme Court,
“The purpose of allowing the attorney on whom the burden lies to open and conclude is that in his opening address he shall fairly state his case — the particular evidence, and the law upon which he relies — so that the opposite attorney may have an opportunity to discuss his position. The attorney who has thus opened his case has an opportunity to reply to his adversary. The whole case is thus fairly presented to the tribunal which has to decide it.”
Andrews v. State, 1930, 99 Fla. 1350, 129 So. 771, 773, quoting S.A.L. Ry. v. Rentz, 1910, 60 Fla. 449, 54 So. 20, 23. Yaughn’s attorney was forced to argue his case without any sure knowledge of the contentions which would be made in behalf of the prosecution. The government attorney was then permitted to conclude the argument by presenting the government’s case in full for the first time. Yaughn had no chance to respond to the government’s argument. A defendant in a criminal case has a right to defend himself against the charges of the prosecution. This right properly includes not only the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence, but also to reply to the prosecution’s argument to the jury.4
I think the district court clearly abused its discretion.5 In my opinion, the district court erred in holding that the government has a “right” to waive opening argument and to reserve all of its time for its closing argument. This Court compounds that error when it expresses agreement with the district court’s holding. At most, such a ruling may arguably be within the discretion of the trial court. Absent unusual circumstances, that discretion should be exercised to require the government to make a fair opening argument. In this case, Yaughn objected at an appropriate time to the government’s proposed waiver of its opening argument and reservation of closing argument. No unusual circumstances justified reversal of the usual order of argument. I would reverse because I think the district court abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant.6 I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Hale v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 410 F.2d 147; United States v. Kelly, 2 Cir. 1965, 349 F.2d 720; United States v. Barnes, 6 Cir. 1963, 313 F.2d 325, 328 (however, the court commented, “we think that open waiver of closing argument by the government in a criminal case is of dubious propriety”) ; United States v. El Rancho Adolphus Products, M.D.Pa.1956, 140 F.Supp. 645.

. United States v. Owens, 5 Cir. 1971, 453 F.2d 355; Hale v. United States, supra; Hardie v. United States, 5 Cir. 1927, 22 F. 2d 803.

. See discussion of this point in In re Win-ship, supra, at 361-364, including cases cited in support of the statement that “Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.” 397 U.S. at 362.

. See State v. Peterson, Mo.1968, 423 S.W.2d 825, 26 A.L.R.3d 1400; State v. Hale, Mo. 1963, 371 S.W.2d 249, 256; Burrow v. State, 1913, 109 Ark. 365, 159 S.W. 1123; Andrews v. State, 1930, 99 Fla. 1350, 129 So. 771; Tindall v. State, 1930, 99 Fla. 1132, 128 So. 494; Moore v. United States, 1965, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 173, 344 F.2d 558.

. Since I would hold that the district court abused its discretion, I would not explicitly reach the serious constitutional due process questions raised by the order of argument in this case.

. Closing argument is the last word of government counsel to the jury, and in our adversary system, it is usually the time when the prosecution delivers its most telling blows against the hapless defendant. This advantage already possessed by the government should not be magnified by changing the usual order of argument in the manner followed in this case.