Court Opinion

ID: 9699181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:12:28.631385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:47.126506
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:
I do not agree that appellee is precluded by the parol evidence rule from obtaining an accounting. Appellee is not attempting to alter or contradict the written agreement. Rather, he is claiming that there *256has been a failure of consideration within the terms of the contract, to wit: that he never received an accounting in accordance with the agreement. Such a failure of consideration strikes to the very heart of the contractual relationship and can be proved by parol evidence. Piper v. Queeney, 282 Pa. 135, 127 Atl. 474 (1925); Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Williamsport Wire Rope Co., 222 F. 2d 416 (1955), 15 P.L.E. Evidence §302, p. 11 (1959); 2 Henry, Pa. Evid., 4th Ed., §595, p. 9 (1953).
To hold otherwise, as the majority does here, defeats the very purpose of the parol evidence rule — that is, to promote certainty in contractual relations and to prevent the perpetration of fraud by a party to an agreement. By excluding evidence of the failure of the consideration expressed in the contract, the court rewards the appellant for his shrewdness in securing appellee’s release before he furnished the required accounting, and, thereby, permits him to suppress facts which might or might not reveal fraud on his part.
In settling accident cases, it is common practice for insurance companies to require claimants to sign releases wherein receipt of payment is acknowledged. Only after a claimant has returned the signed release does the insurer send a check in discharge of its obligation. Would this court hold that a claimant would be precluded by reason of such a signed release from attempting to show that a check was never sent by the insurer? I think not.
In the present situation, appellant suffers little from being required to offer proof that a complete and accurate accounting was given appellee. On the other hand, appellee is severely harmed if he had not received his rightful share of the profits earned in his business activities with appellant.
Mr. Justice Benjamin R. Jones joins in this dissenting opinion.