Court Opinion

ID: 9622114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:12:01.797999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:13.384117
License: Public Domain

Judge DUBOFSKY
specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority but write separately to state that, on remand, defendant should be resen-tenced by the trial judge unless the evidence demonstrates there was a compelling reason for her not having done so initially.
3 ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 18-6.1(a) (2d ed. 1980) states that:
“If guilt was determined after a trial, the judge who presided at the trial should impose the sentence unless there are compelling reasons in a specific case to provide otherwise.” (emphasis added)
See Lawley v. State, 377 So.2d 824 (Fla.Dist.App.1979).
At the time of sentencing, the trial judge is better able than a replacement judge to place the crime in its factual and legal context. The trial judge knows the subtle and obvious mitigating or aggravating circumstances involved in the case. Furthermore, the trial judge has spent days, if not weeks, with the defendant. During that time, the judge develops a better understanding of the defendant and what punishment is best suited to him. See 3 ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 18-6.1 (2d ed. 1980) (commentary).
I believe that integrating the verdict and sentence before a single judge is of great importance to our criminal justice system and that the lottery-like quality of bringing in judges, who are strangers to the case, and having them impose sentences, should, if possible, be avoided. See Lawley v. State, supra.
Mere convenience to the judiciary does not justify a practice that departs from the well-recognized assumption that sentencing is an individual procedure and the knowledge and experience that the sentencing judge has with the case is critical in imposing a just sentence. See Lawley v. State, supra; United States v. Bakewell, 430 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 366, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970); United States v. Bowser, 497 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.1974).
I therefore concur in the remand of this case for a determination of the reasons for the sentencing by a replacement judge, but contrary to the majority, I would require resentencing by the trial judge unless a compelling reason for her absence at the initial sentencing is demonstrated.