Court Opinion

ID: 9811329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:17:21.911186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:25.592305
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice,
concurring.
While I agree with the disposition of the case by the majority, I write separately because I believe section 54.656 of the Texas Government Code does not prohibit a magistrate from conducting jury selection. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 54.656(c) (Vernon 1998) (“A magistrate may not preside over a trial on the merits, whether or not the trial is before a jury.”) (emphasis added). Neither of our prior opinions related to this issue have ever reached the conclusion that the magistrate’s act prohibits a magistrate from conducting voir dire because it is part of the “trial on the merits.” See Lemasurier v. State, 91 S.W.3d 897, 900 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd); McKinney v. State, 880 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref'd). In both cases, the appellants failed to preserve error because they had failed to lodge an objection, so the issue was not before us in either case. Lemasurier, 91 S.W.3d at 900; McKinney, 880 S.W.2d at 870. The majority here concludes that appellant’s objection was insufficient to preserve error. Majority Op. at 537. I believe the record shows *541appellant clearly preserved error by his timely and sufficient objection — it was clear he was objecting to a magistrate conducting voir dire and was asking a district judge to handle voir dire. Thus, I believe the issue is squarely before us and should be addressed.
As noted by the majority, several courts have determined that “trial on the merits” commences after voir dire is completed. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 898 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (holding that if defendant fails to object to a defect in the indictment before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect — interpreting article 1.14(b) of the code of criminal procedure), overruled on other grounds, Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Thornton v. State, 957 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997) (concluding that a trial is considered to commence when jeopardy attaches, i.e., when jury is empaneled because it is at that point that defendant is “put to trial before the trier of facts”— interpreting section 3.04(a) of the penal code, when to sever), aff'd, 986 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Carpenter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997) (holding trial “commences” at the same point that jeopardy attaches — interpreting article 28.10 of the code of criminal procedure, when indictment can be amended), aff'd, 979 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Dixon v. State, 932 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1995, no pet.) (allowing amendment to the indictment up until the trial on the merits commences — interpreting article 28.10 of the code of criminal procedure); Hinojosa v. State, 875 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.) (holding trial on the merits under code of criminal procedure commences at the time the jury is empaneled and sworn, 1.e., at the same time jeopardy attaches— interpreting article 28.10); see also Tex. Code CRiM. PROC. Am arts. 1.14(b), 3.04, 28.10 (Vernon 1989 & Supp.2003). Therefore, I would hold that voir dire is not a portion of the “trial on the merits” for purposes of the magistrate’s act and that the trial court did not err in allowing the magistrate to conduct it.
Although I can see many compelling reasons we would prefer the trial court judge who will hear the “trial on the merits” to sit during voir dire, I do not believe the statute requires this. For this reason, I respectfully concur.