Court Opinion

ID: 9603475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:06:38.485306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:11.896865
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. One of the principles of law firmly planted in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that a search made in the absence of a warrant is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable. To justify a warrantless search, it must be fitted within one of the narrow exceptions derived from the case law. This principle finds expression in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967): “[Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” (Footnotes omitted).
I am distressed that the majority so readily departs from this settled law.1 In spite of the clarity of the language in Katz, the majority weakens it by stating that “[t]he labels [for exceptions to the warrant requirement] do not always fit.” For this reason, decisions in warrant cases must “turn ... upon a close analysis of the facts.” 181 W.Va. at 490, 383 S.E.2d at 294. I submit that the majority’s approach turns Katz into a dog.
The majority asserts that it refuses to apply the emergency exception to the facts of this case.2 I recognize that courts in other jurisdictions have authorized a war-rantless search of an individual for identification when an officer encounters someone who is unconscious or otherwise unable to respond to questions even though there is *493no immediate medical emergency. The purpose of this “caretaker” function is to put the individual into some more secure place for his own protection and, necessarily, involves determining identity in order to contact family or other relatives. E.g., Vauss v. United States, 370 F.2d 250, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 228 (1966); Gilbert v. State, 289 So.2d 475 (Fla.App.1974); People v. Smith, 47 Ill.2d 161, 265 N.E.2d 139 (1970); State v. Miller, 486 S.W.2d 435 (Mo.1972); Perez v. State, 514 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.Crim.1974).
It should also be stressed, as Professor LaFave points out in his treatise, that the Supreme Court of the United States has never held that caretaker activities may justify a warrantless search.3 2 W. La-Fave, Search and Seizure § 5.4(c) at 525 n. 32 (1987). The Newman case,4 cited by the majority, is easily distinguished. Newman permitted a limited search for identification to enable police officers to return an inebriate to his home. This authority was derived exclusively from statute. Newman cannot be read to throw open the door to warrantless searches in other nonemergen-cy situations.
It is obvious, however, that “caretaker” facts simply do not exist in this case. The defendant was not in control of the police. He was at the hospital in control of the people in the emergency room. There was no need for the police to exercise a caretaker function when the defendant was already in competent medical care. The majority’s solicitous concern over the possible loss of the defendant’s clothing and personal effects as motivating the caretaker officer cannot be treated seriously. This is because after the officer rummaged through the defendant’s personal effects, he made no effort to have them placed in a more secure place.
The sole basis, then, on which the majority rests its decision is the duty to report vehicular accidents under W.Va.Code, 17C-4-7. This section requires police officers to prepare a report of every vehicular accident and to forward the same to the department of motor vehicles. This is a far cry from the type of exigency5 required to override an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
Finally, I am led to conclude, contrary to the majority, that the officer’s search for identification was merely a pretext for a broader search for evidence. Even the majority credits the testimony of the emergency room supervisor, who stated that identifying information was received from the defendant on his arrival. This information was recorded and the record was made available at the admissions desk. By his failure to inquire at the admissions desk, the officer ignored standard hospital procedure.
Other testimony also casts doubt on the innocent nature of the search. For example, the officer says that he questioned emergency room staff about whether the defendant’s identity was known. This fact is uncorroborated by any of the seven doctors, nurses, and orderlies who were on duty that night. Also notable is the fact that the all points bulletin for the defendant was issued at least two hours before the search was made. It is fairly inferable that the officer knew of the bulletin at the time of his search.
*494Most damaging of all is the testimony of Randall Franklin Day, the orderly who prepared the defendant for treatment. Day states that even before he removed the defendant’s pants or searched for identification, he was directed by the officer to search the defendant’s jacket for a weapon. One may reasonably wonder why the officer would make such a request if he believed the defendant simply to be an accident victim. Also overlooked by the majority is Day’s statement that he located a billfold in the defendant’s pants and handed it to the officer for his review. Day’s testimony clearly belies the State’s theory that the search was one for identification only.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. We have followed this rule in a number of cases, as illustrated by Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Moore, 165 W.Va. 837, 272 S.E.2d 804 (1980):
“Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. The exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.”
See also State v. Choat, 178 W.Va. 607, 363 S.E.2d 493 (1987); State v. Cook, 175 W.Va. 185, 332 S.E.2d 147 (1985).

. This exception is limited to circumstances that involve ”[t]he need to protect or preserve life.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 (1978); State v. Cecil, 173 W.Va. 27, 311 S.E.2d 144 (1983).

.Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), relied on by the majority, does refer to “caretaking" activities of local police in regard to an automobile which had been towed from the scene of an accident. This reference was made to support the proposition that since local police have routine contact with motor vehicles, they may be treated differently from houses for Fourth Amendment purposes. Cady does not, therefore, stand for the broader proposition for which it is cited by the majority.

. State v. Newman, 49 Or.App. 313, 619 P.2d 930 (1980), rev'd, 292 Or. 216, 637 P.2d 143 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 2915, 73 L.Ed.2d 1321 (1982).

. I am unimpressed by the majority’s attempts to emphasize as an "emergency” the need to locate identifying information as promptly as possible. W.Va.Code, 17C-4-7, requires only that the officer’s report be forwarded within twenty-four hours of the completion of his investigation. Presumably, the investigation would remain incomplete until the identity of those involved in the accident was ascertained.