Court Opinion

ID: 9711435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:31:39.447832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:04.944304
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge PELLEGRINI.
Based on the facts as found by the trial court, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Thomas A. McElwee & Son, Inc. (Property Owner) established that they were denied sufficient access to its property necessary to establish a temporary de facto taking had occurred. I dissent because in reversing the trial court, the majority applies the incorrect legal standard as enunciated by our Supreme Court, and even applying that incorrect legal standard, a de facto taking was not proven based on the factual findings made by the trial court.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) began construction between 61st Street and 63rd Street in January 2000 for the purpose of extending its public train service. Allegedly due to the construction project, Property Owner closed its business on May 1, 2003, with $20,000 in unpaid bills. In September 2003, Property Owner petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) for a Board of View alleging that SEPTA’s construction constituted a de facto taking of its property and caused it financial harm which forced the business to close. SEPTA filed preliminary objections to the petition. The trial court sustained SEPTA’s preliminary objections concluding that Property Owner failed to establish a de facto taking. The majority reverses, based on a standard that a property owner is entitled to reasonable access during the period of construction, and based on its finding that Property Owner provided evidence that it was more than temporarily inconvenienced by the construction because “there was extremely limited access to the Printing Company’s driveway throughout the three-year construction period and virtually no access during business hours when supplies were delivered or shipments were picked up.” (Slip op. at 14.) I believe the majority is incorrect because it finds facts different from those of the trial court and does not apply the correct law.
The “facts” used by the majority in its opinion are not those as found by the trial court. The trial court found that while Property Owner may have been inconvenienced by the construction activity, Property Owner was not deprived of all access to its property. Specifically, it found:
After construction began on their street, Appellants assert the workers often impeded ingress and egress to their driveway by parking there during the construction. For a temporary period in 2000 Appellants could not use their driveway to receive deliveries, instead they used a hand-truck to move products from the delivery truck to the building. (John McElwee Dep. At 18). The block where the business was located was closed-off to vehicle traffic entirely during office hours starting on September 22, 2002 lasting thru May, 2003 and occasionally Appellants had to park a block or two from the business. Appellants had unobstructed access to the driveway early in the morning and late at night. (John McElwee Dep. At 14). Although Appellants claim “no supplier could deliver goods to Plaintiffs business”, the Record belies this assertion.
*23Appellant John McElwee testified that, at most, there was one example of a supplier who may have come out to the business but could not make the delivery; the supplier returned the next day. (John McElwee Dep. At 79). Appellants claim they lost customers because they could not meet deadlines due to the difficulty in getting supplies, however there was never a time when a delivery could not be made. (John McElwee Dep. At 78-79, DeFlabia Dep. At 22). Appellants designated one employee to call SEPTA and complain, which, it is alleged, he did dozens of times. Appellants however never filed a formal, written complaint or attended any of the community programs set up by SEPTA to deal with business-related complaints. Appellants claim they did speak with Michael Tucker, a business mitigation and development consultant for SEPTA, but their complaints were ignored. Appellants never called the police department or the Philadelphia Parking Authority about the illegally parked cars and trucks that were blocking their driveway. (Thomas McElwee Dep. At 79-80).
(Trial court’s April 5, 2005 opinion at 2-3.) Based on these facts, the trial court established that there was not substantial interference with reasonable access to the property to constitute a de facto taking, even if that was the correct standard to apply.
That leads to the legal standard that the majority applies — that there is a taking where a property has been denied the right to reasonable ingress and egress to the property. Even though we have applied that standard in our more recent cases,1 it is not accord with the standard enunciated by our Supreme Court in Truck Terminal Realty Company v. Department of Transportation, 486 Pa. 16, 403 A.2d 986 (1979). In that case, a property owner alleged a de facto taking had occurred when it temporarily lost access to its property during construction because patrons had to travel an additional 14 miles to reach the owner’s business. In concluding that a taking had not occurred, our Supreme Court held that the Eminent Domain Code did not provide damages for the temporary loss of access to property, and no such claim existed at common law stating:
The cases almost uniformly hold that damages cannot be recovered for inconvenience in the transition of business ... caused by the work of making a public improvement; that this temporary inconvenience, and all losses therefrom, must be suffered, for the law permits a recovery only of the permanent depreciation in the value of property taken or injured ... such depreciation to be judged by the effect of the improvement when completed. (Citation omitted.) (Quoting from Iron City Auto. Co. v. Pittsburgh, 253 Pa. 478 at 493, 98 A. 679 at 684 (1916)).
Id. at 21, 403 A.2d at 988. It reasoned that a taking had not occurred where temporary access was denied because:
The actions of the governmental agency, ..., must fall into two distinct categories: the exercise of eminent domain power, which requires just compensation; and the valid exercise of the police power, not requiring compensation. Temporary interference with road access falls under the noncompensable, exercise of the police power necessary to effectuate public improvement, unless the alleged interference was accomplished in an arbitrary or unreasonable *24manner. (Citations and footnotes omitted.)
This holding was recently reiterated by our Supreme Court in Sienkiewicz v. Department. of Transportation, 584 Pa. 270, 883 A.2d 494, 502 (2005), where it stated:
[A] claim of impact based upon diversion of traffic flow during the period of actual construction, the law is that such impact is also non-compensable, absent extraordinary circumstances not present here. See Truck Terminal Realty Co. v. PennDOT, 486 Pa. 16, 23, 403 A.2d 986, 989 (1979). (“Temporary interference with road access falls under the noncom-pensable, exercise of the police power necessary to effectuate public improvement, unless the alleged interference was accomplished in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.”)
The most favorable interpretation in favor of a de facto taking occurring that can be gleaned from Terminal Freight and Sienkiewicz is that when access is denied but not required by construction necessities, such interference is arbitrary and unreasonable and a taking occurs.
The very narrow standard upon which a taking can be found is based upon recog1 nition of the fact that the privilege of receiving the benefits of life within a municipality or other governmental jurisdiction carries with it certain attendant burdens, including the obligation to suffer the inevitable inconvenience associated with public works construction without compensation. 2A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols’ The Law of Eminent Domain § 6.09[2] (rev.3d ed.1995):
Consequential damages to adjoining property owners in the way of diminution of business while construction is in progress does not constitute a taking of property for which compensation must be made under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Such losses are dam-num absque injuria [a loss or damage without injury] and, unfortunately, must be borne by the individual as part of the price that he or she pays for being a member of organized society and living in an urban community. Nichols’ (quoting Meyers v. District of Columbia, 17 F.R.D. 216, 217 (D.D.C.1955) and citing cases from 13 other states).
To make the state or a local public agency liable for damages caused by all public construction would place an impossible burden upon the taxpayers and would reduce the number of projects for the common good that increase road safety and would hamper the construction of public projects. See Rubano v. Department of Transportation, 656 So.2d 1264 (Fla.1995); Berman Corporation v. State ex rel. State Highway Commission, 24 Or.App. 813, 547 P.2d 192 (1976); Langley Shopping Center, Inc. v. State Roads Commission, 213 Md. 230, 131 A.2d 690, 693 (1957).
Accordingly, because Property Owner failed to prove that even reasonable access was denied, let alone that it was denied all access which was not necessary due to construction necessities, I would affirm the trial court.
Judge COHN JUBELIRER joins this dissenting opinion.

. See e.g. Newman v. Dept. of Transportation, 791 A.2d 1287 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002); Elser v. Department of Transportation, 651 A.2d 567 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1994).