Court Opinion

ID: 9537450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:18:29.836596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:41.703731
License: Public Domain

*346TONGUE, J.,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe that the technicality which provides the basis for the dismissal of this appeal by the majority, thus delaying, if not avoiding, the decision of a difficult and important question which needs to be decided by this court, represents a triumph of form over substance.
This court allowed plaintiff’s petition for review in this case because of the importance of the question whether not only the Court of Appeals, but the prior decisions by this court, were correct in holding that although a landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to a business guest or invitee who comes upon his property and is injured because of its defective condition, a landowner is not liable for injury to a social guest (licensee) who comes upon his property in the absence of "active or affirmative” negligence, as distinguished from "passive negligence.” See Blystone v. Kiesel, 247 Or 528, 431 P2d 262 (1967). Some other courts have abandoned that distinction. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal 2d 108, 70 Cal Rptr 97, 443 P2d 561 (1968).
As stated by the majority, after a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in this case, defendant filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and an order was entered allowing that motion. Plaintiff then appealed from that order. No question relating to the propriety of that appeal was raised by either the defendant (which cross-appealed) or by the Court of Appeals.
It was not until after the allowance by this court of plaintiff’s petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that ruling by the trial court, and at the time of oral argument before this court, that a member of this court, sua sponte, raised the question of the appealability of that order. Supplemental memoranda were then submitted by the parties, both contending that the order was an appealable *347order and that this court has jurisdiction to decide this case.
The majority lays emphasis upon the fact that the parties "cite no case which has treated an order allowing a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as coming within the statute” (ORS 19.010), and that Barr v. Linnton Plywood Ass’n., 223 Or 541, 352 P2d 596, 355 P2d 256 (1960), as cited by them, is not directly in point. In recent years, however, the majority of this court has not felt restrained either by stare decisis or by lack of precedent in making new law on subjects not previously presented for decision.
In deciding whether an order entered by a trial court is an appealable order, the primary consideration is not whether costs and disbursements have been awarded, but whether the order in question is a "final order” in the sense that it is an order which is a "final determination of the rights of the parties.” See 1 Freeman on Judgments, 55, § 33 (1925) as quoted with approval by this court in David M. Scott Construction v. Farrell, 285 Or 563, 568, 592 P2d 551 (1979). Cf. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Lotches, 276 Or 81, 84, 554 P2d 169 (1976).
The order in this case satisfied that basic requirement because it effectively terminated the case on its merits in favor of the defendant and forever precluded recovery by the plaintiff. It was also so regarded and acted upon not only by both of the parties, but also by the Court of Appeals. To now hold that under these facts and circumstances this order was not an appealable order because it did not bear the label "judgment” is simply to ignore reality in favor of technicality and to emphasize form over substance.
In addition, since a member of this court raised the question of the appealability of this order at the time of oral argument of this case, both parties have joined in a motion by which, among other things, they request leave to supplement the record in this case by inclusion of a formal judgment in favor of *348defendant entered on June 6, 1980, together with a notice of appeal on June 10,1980, from that judgment. The parties have also stipulated that the filing of further briefs be waived and have joined in a motion for an "expedited appeal.” The majority has disposed of that motion by a footnote.
Although it is true that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court by stipulation of the parties, now that a formal judgment has been entered in the case, so as to satisfy the primary objection raised by the majority, I am of the opinion that this motion by the parties provides a proper and practical basis upon which this court may and should now proceed to decide the merits of this case, rather than force upon the parties the substantial delay that will necessarily result from the taking of a further futile appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In its present capacity as a court of review, the primary function of this court is to review decisions by the Court of Appeals which may make or perpetuate "bad law.” In my opinion, once this court has, for that reason, allowed a petition for review of a decision by the Court of Appeals, it should then proceed to decide the merits of the question which provided the reason for allowance of the petition for review, rather than "look under the bed” for "ghosts” of jurisdictional defects or other reasons to avoid or delay the decision of such a question. Cf. dissenting opinion in State v. Beason, 289 Or 215, 217, 611 P2d 1150 (1980). The dismissal by the majority of this petition for review will, at the least, result in a substantial delay in any recovery by the injured plaintiff in this case, in the event that she is ultimately held to be entitled to recovery, and will also delay a final resolution of the question of the liability of the school district in this and other similar cases, in the event that it is ultimately held not to be liable for the injury to the plaintiff in this case. Cf. specially concurring opinion in State v. Classen, 285 Or 221, 238, 590 P2d 1198 (1979).
For these reasons I respectfully dissent.