Court Opinion

ID: 9737525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:27:45.974336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.577657
License: Public Domain

Lesinski, C. J.
(dissenting). The record in this case discloses that a qualified expert in the field of mechanical and traffic accident reconstruction engineering was not allowed to give his expert opinion as to the speed of a codefendant’s vehicle at the time of the accident.
The expert was not an eyewitness, but he did have the facts presented upon which he could form an expert opinion, namely, the length of the skid marks (69'), the condition of the pavement (dry), the weight of both vehicles (defendant’s truck, 10,510 lbs. empty; Mr. Mukalla’s automobile, 3,801 lbs.), the additional weight of the defendant’s oil tank (approximately 4,500 lbs.), and the fact that the impact of the collision dislodged the oil tank onto the street.
The record discloses that the issue before the trial judge relative to the admission of the expert’s testimony centered on the admissibility of expert evidence on the question of speed of a vehicle in a criminal case.
The trial court requested counsel for defendant to provide citations to cases either from Michigan or other jurisdictions. The record does not show that defendant’s attorney was able to supply the trial judge with citations to his satisfaction. After defendant’s counsel requested help of his office, a recess *253was taken. After the reeess, a considerable discussion was bad off tbe record, after wbicb tbe case proceeded without tbe testimony of tbe expert witness as to bis opinion as to the speed of tbe co-defendant’s vehicle, or any objection to tbe court’s refusing to allow it.
Immediately, tbe failure to make objection to tbe court’s refusal to allow tbe testimony of tbe expert witness as to speed raises tbe issue of whether under such circumstances tbe issue is properly preserved for appeal.
While appellate courts will not generally review matters on appeal which have not been properly preserved below, they have not hesitated to do so under circumstances in wbicb failure to review tbe issue could result in a miscarriage of justice. See People v. Elliott (1948), 322 Mich 313.
Tbe principle that error not properly preserved will not be reviewed is sound. It is primarily intended to protect tbe trial and avoid unnecessary new trials. It is intended to call error or possible error to tbe attention of tbe trial judge with tbe view of avoiding tbe error or correcting it if possible during trial or by instructions.
In tbe instant case, tbe defendant sought to advise tbe court of bis right to tbe testimony of tbe expert. Tbe trial court was fully apprised of tbe issue. Unfortunately, neither tbe defendant’s lawyer nor tbe trial judge found tbe existing law wbicb would have validated tbe defendant’s request. This does not alter tbe defendant’s right to tbe testimony if it was in order.
Although tbe record is silent as to tbe nature of tbe conversations wbicb were bad off tbe record, tbe sequence of events leads this writer to conclude that at this point tbe trial judge must have again affirmed bis refusal to allow the expert witness’ testimony as *254to the speed of the codefendant’s vehicle. The writer will not normally indulge in such presumptions, particularly in criminal matters. Here, however, putting all the facts together, one must conclude that resolution of the issues was had off the record and that consequently the defendant’s attorney did not register his objection on the record. At this point in the proceedings; it was the trial court’s duty to rule on the. record upon the matter which was pursued, so as to allow counsel an opportunity to respond on the record to same if he so desired. While normally failure to object can be said to be acquiescence or waiver, under the circumstances of this case this cannot be said to be true.
Further, the writer recognizes that after having pursued the issue, as had the defendant’s counsel, that the bar of this State is generally timid to register its objection on the record, for fear of incurring the wrath of the trial judge in the balance of the trial. As unfounded as this reason for this reluctance may be, it is, nonetheless, a reality.
Under all the circumstances of this case, the issue has sufficiently been preserved for appeal.
The propriety of the testimony of the expert next determines its admissibility.
■ The defendant was on trial for the offense of negligent homicide, CL 1948, § 750.324, as amended by PA 1965, No 38 (Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 28.556). One of the elements which must be proven by the people beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction under the statute is the negligence of the defendant which resulted in a homicide.
In the case before us, reducing the issue to a minimum, the jury was called upon to’ determine if the defendant made an improper left turn into approaching traffic.
*255The defendant’s left turn was not a prohibited turn. Defendant’s left turn was improper and consequently negligently made only if he interfered with oncoming traffic based on reasonable observations.
Under these circumstances, the issue of speed of the codefendant’s car is of primary importance. It is not a question of whether the codefendant was negligent as a result of speeding. However, co-defendant’s speed is important in determining whether the defendant acted properly under the traffic conditions as they existed.
The point of travel and speed of the codefendant would be indicative of what the defendant observed or should have observed when he formed his judgment to make his turn.
The issue in this case on which the expert’s testimony was sought is such that a jury could not have formed a proper judgment without something more to assist it in determining the codefendant’s speed.
The established facts which would have formed the basis of the expert opinion were such as move this writer to say that the expert testimony was competent and material to the issue ©f defendant’s negligence and of vital importance to the defendant.
Provided all the facts that are necessary are established and a proper foundation is laid, the use of expert witness’ testimony by a defendant in a case such as this is proper and should have been allowed.
In this case we do not resolve the issue of whether the prosecution can initiate the proof of guilt by such evidence.
This case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.