Court Opinion

ID: 9547962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:55:20.006153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:18.400299
License: Public Domain

DOOLIN, Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent to the majority opinion and in passing call your attention to the dissents in J. V. v. State of Oklahoma, DISRS In the Matter of L.M.H., 572 P.2d 1283 (Okl.1977) and In the Matter of: Keyes, Derrick 48 OBJ 2801, 574 P.2d 1026 (Okl.1977). As recognized by Justice Simms in these dissents, the Supreme Court of the United States holds the relationship of parents to their children to be a fundamental constitutionally protected right.1 While the majori*357ty acknowledges this basic tenet of American jurisprudence, its otiose application to Oklahoma’s termination procedures has gradually eroded any procedural due process guarantees that must be inherent in a proceeding to terminate this constitutional right. Either the majority is in error or our statutory termination procedure is blatantly unconstitutional.
If DISRS feels facts known at the time it files a petition to declare a child dependent or neglected are such as to warrant termination, it should be required to state this in its petition, or otherwise be held to have waived such request at that time. By this I do not mean that a termination is forever barred or that a child should be returned to the custody of its parents against his best interests. If facts or circumstances that justify termination are discovered subsequent to the original petition, a new petition and summons should be issued. Such procedure would guarantee parents the statutory time in which to correct the malignant conditions.
An adjudication of dependency or neglect is of much less ominous nature than that of termination. Yet if, as the majority proclaims, the statutory protections regarding an adjudication of dependency or neglect do not apply to termination proceedings, what constitutional procedural safeguards are granted to these parents? Other than the basic due process requirement of notice, there are none delineated in the statutes. We do not believe the Legislature would be so derelict.
I cannot concur in a policy that puts a stamp of approval on a practice of pleading for a declaration of dependency or neglect which, without further verified allegations or evidence, summarily and without a full hearing, terminates a fundamental right of a citizen to that special relationship with his children. Where does the right to seek termination through a motion such as used in this case arise? Section 1103 states, “If a termination of parental rights is desired, it must be stated in petition and summons.” (Emphasis supplied). There is no provision that a subsequent motion may be used to allow the court to terminate at the disposi-tional hearing.
A declaration of dependency or neglect invokes the jurisdiction of the district court for the purpose of determining custody of the children at the dispositional hearing. Termination should not be considered a custodial dispositional aspect of a declaration of dependency or neglect. This right is not at issue in the dispositional phase of the hearing unless the petition has made it an issue and the parents are on notice of the consequences of such a petition.
The adjudicatory hearing makes a determination as to the parents; whether they have acted in such a way as to deny their children the proper care. The dispositional hearing should make no further judgment as to the parents’ rights. It primarily concerns the disposition of the children. To adjudicate parents’ rights with dispositional procedures dangerously broadens the concept of a dispositional hearing.
I am authorized to state that WILLIAMS, J., and SIMMS, J., concur in the views herein expressed.

. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, *35767 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978).