Court Opinion

ID: 9387681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 17:07:47.521797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:15.078463
License: Public Domain

April 18, 2023
                                                     Supreme Court

                                                     No. 2021-272-Appeal.
                                                     (WC 21-129)

Finnimore & Fisher Inc. d/b/a Island   :
           Moped et al.

                  v.                   :

      Town of New Shoreham.            :

          NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
          before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
          are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
          Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
          Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
          Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
          or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
          made before the opinion is published.
                                                           Supreme Court

                                                           No. 2021-272-Appeal.
                                                           (WC 21-129)

    Finnimore & Fisher Inc. d/b/a Island    :
               Moped et al.

                     v.                     :

         Town of New Shoreham.1             :

       Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

                                   OPINION

       Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The defendant, the Town of New

Shoreham (the town), appeals from the Superior Court’s entry of a preliminary

injunction enjoining enforcement of certain amendments to the New Shoreham

General Ordinance, chapter 8, article IV, entitled Motorized Cycle Rental. The

plaintiffs are New Shoreham businesses that rent mopeds: Finnimore & Fisher Inc.

d/b/a Island Moped; Miles-Un-Ltd., Inc.; Aldo’s Mopeds, Inc.; The Moped Man,

Inc.; and Ocean State Bikes, Inc.2 Before this Court, the town argues that the hearing

justice erred in her analysis and ultimate decision to grant in part the motion for

1
  The named defendant in this case is the Town of New Shoreham through the
members of the Town of New Shoreham Town Council, in their official capacities.
2
  A moped is a “motor scooter.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 1144 (5th ed. 2011).

                                           -1-
preliminary injunction brought by the plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth herein, we

affirm the order of the Superior Court.

                                           I

                                  Facts and Travel

      We derive the underlying facts of this case from the submissions of the parties

and the transcripts. We relate only the facts relevant to this appeal.

      On March 4, 2021, the town approved amendments to the New Shoreham

General Ordinances, chapter 8, article IV, entitled Motorized Cycle Rental (the

ordinance). The amendments affected three sections of the ordinance; at issue on

appeal are §§ 8-88 and 8-90. A second amendment was additionally made to § 8-90

on May 19, 2021.

      Specifically, the amendment to § 8-88, entitled “Hours of operation,” made

two changes. First, the hours during which mopeds may be rented changed from

9:00 a.m. - 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m. - 6:00 p.m. Second, the operational hours of

mopeds changed from 9:00 a.m. - 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m. - 6:00 p.m.

      There were two amendments made to § 8-90, entitled “Safety,” the latter of

which altered changes made in the former version of § 8-90. Those amendments,

acting together, ultimately modified the role of licensees—those businesses licensed

to rent mopeds and other motorized cycles. These amendments added language (1)

requiring licensees to instruct renters that no passenger shall ride in front of the

                                          -2-
driver; (2) requiring licensees to “ensure” that all passengers be “provided with a

separate rear seat, a separate foot-rest, and an appropriate handlebar or grip” and that

all passengers wear a helmet and can rest his or her feet on a foot rest; (3) requiring

licensees to “insure [sic]” that any passenger under twelve years old “has a properly

secured back-rest or equivalent, shall have his or her feet placed upon the foot-rest,

and shall be seated behind the operator unless a side car is provided”; (4) requiring

the licensees to instruct a renter about proper operation, as well as show renters a

training video, issue them a questionnaire, and administer to them a supervised

driving test; and (5) precluding the licensee from renting to an individual who is

visibly intoxicated. Language was also added to § 8-90(A), which stated: “In

addition, violations of this ordinance as well as any other [t]own ordinance or state

law or regulation, may result in suspension, revocation, and/or non-renewal of a

licensee’s license.”

      On the same day that the town approved the initial amendments, it also granted

plaintiffs their licenses for the 2021 season.      The plaintiffs thereafter filed a

complaint against the town in Washington County Superior Court on March 17,

2021, which requested declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged denial of state

and federal procedural and substantive due process, denial of state and federal equal

protection, and abuse of process. In their complaint, plaintiffs submitted that the

town had attempted to amend its ordinance regarding mopeds “in an impermissible

                                         -3-
manner[,]” in contravention of a settlement agreement reached between the parties

and in contravention of G.L. 1956 § 31-19.3-5. The complaint was subsequently

amended on May 24, 2021.3

      On March 26, 2021, plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction, to which the town objected. The hearing justice heard

arguments on the request for a temporary restraining order; and, on April 23, 2021,

an order entered granting the motion and scheduling a hearing on the prayer for

preliminary injunctive relief.

      Hearings on the preliminary injunction were held on various dates in May and

June 2021. At the hearings, the parties presented evidence and the testimony of

several witnesses. The parties additionally submitted memoranda on their respective

positions.

      On June 23, 2021, the hearing justice filed her written decision. She began

her analysis by addressing plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, indicating that she need

not reach those claims because the motion could be decided on other grounds.

      The hearing justice then reviewed § 31-19.3-5 of what she called the “New

Shoreham Moped Statute[,]” which states:

             “(a) The town council of the town of New Shoreham may
             enact reasonable ordinances establishing procedures and

3
 The amended complaint incorporated a reference to the second amendment to the
ordinance and further procedural history that occurred since the filing of the original
complaint. It contained the same counts as the original complaint.

                                         -4-
standards for the licensing, supervision, regulation, and
control of the rental of motorized bicycles, motor scooters
and motorized tricycles.

“(b) An ordinance enacted pursuant to this section may:

      “(1) Establish a fee to be charged for the issuance or
      renewal of any license for the rental of motorized
      bicycles, motor scooters and/or motorized tricycles
      the holder of the license is authorized to rent or lease
      and shall not exceed the sum of forty dollars
      ($40.00) per motorized bicycle, motor scooters or
      motorized tricycle.

      “(2) Establish a maximum number of licenses
      which may be granted for the rental of motorized
      bicycles, motor scooters and/or motorized tricycles.

      “(3) Establish hours during which motorized
      bicycles, motor scooters and/or motorized tricycles
      may be rented.

      “(4) Establish a maximum number of motorized
      bicycles, motor scooters and/or motorized tricycles
      which a license holder may rent or lease under the
      license.

      “(5) Provide that no motorized bicycle, motor
      scooters or motorized tricycle shall be rented or
      leased in the town of New Shoreham unless the
      operator thereof has a valid license issued under the
      provisions of § 31-10-1, or a similar license issued
      by a state other than Rhode Island.

      “(6) Require all motorized bicycles, motor scooters
      and/or motorized tricycles to pass inspection
      annually and be issued a certificate by a duly
      authorized state inspection facility indicating that
      the vehicle has passed inspection to be conducted at
      inspection agencies which shall be created and

                            -5-
                   governed by rules and regulations promulgated by
                   the department of revenue.”

The hearing justice observed that subsection (a) of the statute contained a broad

provision allowing the town “to ‘enact reasonable ordinances’ that establish

‘procedures and standards for licensing, supervision, regulation, and control of the

rental of’” mopeds, while subsection (b) of the statute “enumerates what an

ordinance pursuant thereto may require.” See § 31-19.3-5. Applying rules of

statutory construction and distinguishing relevant caselaw, she found that, in this

instance, the enumerated list in subsection (b) restricts the subject matter for which

the town can enact moped-related ordinances. Thus, she determined that, “if an

ordinance falls outside one of the enumerated categories,” then it is not reasonable

and, consequently, if the ordinance fell “into one of the six enumerated categories,

it must be reasonable.” She then addressed the amendments individually.

      In reviewing the amendment to § 8-88, the hearing justice found that, while

§ 31-19.3-5(b)(3) allows the town “to enact an ordinance that establishes rental

hours for the mopeds,” plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that the

amendment was unreasonable. In particular, she found that the amendment is “not

fair and appropriate because the record is [de]void of any evidence demonstrating

that this one-hour reduction will address safety and traffic concerns[,]” highlighting

that only three accidents in a six-year period took place between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00

a.m. She further determined that it was “patently unreasonable for the [t]own to

                                        -6-
place liability onto the moped owners for a violation of the operational hours” and

for a renter’s “noncompliance[.]” She ultimately concluded that plaintiffs had

proven on a prima facie basis that they had a “reasonable likelihood of success on

the merits that the [t]own did not have the authority to enact an ordinance reducing

the rental and operational hours because that section of the” ordinance was “not fair

and appropriate given the circumstances.”

      The hearing justice additionally found that the amendments to § 8-90 did not

stem from “the specifically enumerated powers set forth in § 31-19.3-5(b).” She

determined that the amendments to this section were unreasonable, observing that

the “possible loss of the license to rent mopeds” for a violation of this provision was

“unfair, inappropriate, and unreasonable under the circumstances.” She therefore

concluded that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case for success on the merits

of their claims under this provision.

      Having determined that plaintiffs established, on a prima facie basis, a

reasonable likelihood of success on the merits for their claims regarding the

amendments to §§ 8-88 and 8-90, the hearing justice then addressed whether

plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm by the passage of those amendments. She

found that plaintiffs had demonstrated irreparable harm because they could “lose

their licenses as well as the reputation of their businesses if they are not granted a

temporary injunction[,]” noting that this Court has “previously explained,

                                         -7-
prospective damage to a business’s good will and reputation is precisely the type of

irreparable injury for which an injunction is appropriate.” (Quoting Gianfrancesco

v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc., 112 A.3d 703, 711 (R.I. 2015).)

      The hearing justice next addressed whether the balance of the equities was in

plaintiffs’ favor. She stated that enjoining the amendments would still allow the

town “to regulate mopeds in a reasonable manner, as the previously enacted

[o]rdinance would remain in place[,]” but that a denial of injunctive relief would

mean plaintiffs could “stand to suffer from losing their licenses, and potentially their

livelihoods * * *.” She additionally found that granting the injunction would “not

negatively affect the public interest,” given that the town had not demonstrated how

the amendments would improve road safety. Finally, the hearing justice found that

the injunction would preserve the status quo because the town’s original ordinance

would remain in place.

      The hearing justice ultimately granted plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin

preliminarily enforcement of amendments to §§ 8-88 and 8-90 and denied the

motion to enjoin preliminarily enforcement of the amendment to a third section that

is not before us on appeal.4 An order to that effect entered on July 14, 2021. The

town filed a timely notice of appeal on July 16, 2021.

4
   The third section, which amends paragraph five of § 8-78 entitled
“Same-Application[,]” adds language requiring applicants (1) to submit “a site plan”
with specified information included and that identifies “where the applicant proposes

                                         -8-
                                         II

                               Standard of Review

      Direct appeal of a preliminary injunction is permissible pursuant to G.L. 1956

§ 9-24-7. Section 9-24-7 (“Whenever, upon a hearing in the [S]uperior [C]ourt, an

injunction shall be granted * * * an appeal may be taken from such order or judgment

to the [S]upreme [C]ourt in like manner as from a final judgment * * *.”). “When

reviewing a hearing justice’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction, this Court

applies an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 708

(quoting New England Stone, LLC v. Conte, 962 A.2d 30, 32 (R.I. 2009)). “If the

party requesting the preliminary injunction has established a prima facie case

warranting preliminary injunctive relief, this Court will not find an abuse of

discretion.” Id. “Under such a limited scope of review, this Court need not reach

nor resolve the underlying substantive issues as it would after the imposition of a

permanent injunction.” Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Sportsman’s Inn, Inc., 57 A.3d 313,

318 (R.I. 2012)).

      “Instead, ‘our role is limited to determining whether the hearing justice

considered and resolved each of the appropriate preliminary injunction factors

to operate a vehicle proficiency area where renters practice using the vehicle before
going onto state or Town roads” and (2) to submit a “plan for the off-season storage
of vehicles * * *.”

                                        -9-
without abusing his or her discretion.’” Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 708 (quoting

Vasquez, 57 A.3d at 318). These factors consist of the following:

             “whether the moving party (1) has a reasonable likelihood
             of success on the merits, (2) will suffer irreparable harm
             without the requested injunctive relief, (3) has the balance
             of the equities, including the possible hardships to each
             party and to the public interest, tip in its favor, and (4) has
             shown that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will
             preserve the status quo.” Id. (quoting Vasquez, 57 A.3d at
             318).

      Additionally, this Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo.

See, e.g., Butler v. Gavek, 245 A.3d 750, 754 (R.I. 2021). “In so doing, our ultimate

goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.” Id.

(quoting Mello v. Killeavy, 205 A.3d 454, 459 (R.I. 2019)).

                                          III

                                      Discussion

      On appeal, the town specifies three errors by the hearing justice. First, the

town alleges that the hearing justice construed the enabling legislation too narrowly,

resulting in her improperly limiting the authority of the town to enact ordinances in

the interest of public health, safety, and welfare. Second, the town contends that the

hearing justice erred in substituting her judgment for the town’s as to the meaning

of the word “reasonable.” Third, the town argues that the hearing justice erred in

determining that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if enforcement of the

amendments in question were not enjoined.

                                         - 10 -
                              Statutory Interpretation

      We begin by addressing the town’s contention that the hearing justice

misconstrued the enabling legislation and improperly limited the authority of the

town. Specifically, the town takes issue with her determination that “the [t]own is

limited to enacting ordinances within the six prescribed areas enumerated in”

§ 31-19.3-5(b), and it asks this Court to consider the enabling legislation as a whole.

The town submits that the list enumerated in § 31-19.3-5(b) is not restrictive; rather,

it includes “examples of the reasonable ordinances establishing procedures and

standards for supervision, regulation and control of rental mopeds authorized by”

§ 31-19.3-5(a). In response, plaintiffs contend that the hearing justice properly

interpreted the enabling legislation.

      This Court interprets “ordinances and statutes in the same manner.” City of

Woonsocket v. RISE Prep Mayoral Academy, 251 A.3d 495, 500 (R.I. 2021). “If the

language of a statute or ordinance is clear and unambiguous, it is given ‘its plain and

ordinary meaning.’” Id. (quoting Sauro v. Lombardi, 178 A.3d 297, 304 (R.I. 2018)).

      In analyzing the statute, the hearing justice applied this Court’s rules of

statutory construction regarding specific and general provisions, observing that

subsection (a) of § 31-19.3-5 contained a broad provision allowing the town “to

‘enact reasonable ordinances’ that establish ‘procedures and standards for licensing,

supervision, regulation, and control of the rental of’” mopeds, while subsection (b)

                                        - 11 -
of the statute “enumerates what an ordinance pursuant thereto may require.” See

§ 31-19.3-5. She therefore determined that the enumerated list in subsection (b), as

the specific provision, restricts the areas in which the town can enact moped-related

ordinances. We agree.

      This Court has said, and the hearing justice correctly articulated, that “it is a

‘general rule of statutory construction that when a statute of general application

conflicts with a statute that specifically deals with a special subject matter, and when

the two statutes cannot be construed harmoniously together, the special statute

prevails over the statute of general application.’” RISE Prep Mayoral Academy, 251

A.3d at 501 (deletion omitted) (quoting Whitehouse v. Moran, 808 A.2d 626, 629-

30 (R.I. 2002)). “Moreover, it is an accepted rule of statutory construction that ‘an

express enumeration of items in a statute indicates a legislative intent to exclude all

items not listed.’” Terrano v. State Department of Corrections, 573 A.2d 1181, 1183

(R.I. 1990) (quoting Murphy v. Murphy, 471 A.2d 619, 622 (R.I. 1984)).

      While § 31-19.3-5(a) indicates that the town council may enact reasonable

ordinances “establishing procedures and standards for the licensing, supervision,

regulation, and control of the rental of” mopeds, § 31-19.3-5(b) enumerates

specifically what ordinances may be enacted, stating that “an ordinance enacted

pursuant to this section may * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

                                         - 12 -
      This Court has previously “availed [itself] of the rule of construction that

states that an express enumeration of items in a statute indicates a legislative intent

to exclude all items not listed.” Murphy, 471 A.2d at 622; see 2A Norman Singer &

Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:23 (7th ed.

Nov. 2022 Update) (“In practice * * * all versions of the expressio unius rule reflect

the same common-sense premise that when people say one thing, they do not mean

something else.”). Here, the Legislature quite clearly and succinctly listed the types

of ordinances that the town may enact in § 31-19.3-5(b), in accordance with its goal

of “establishing procedures and standards for the supervision and regulation of”

mopeds. Section 31-19.3-1.

      Furthermore, in other situations this Court has concluded that the Legislature

intended such a list to be non-exhaustive where it is preceded by the phrase

“including, without limitation * * *.” See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. State, 110

A.3d 1160, 1165 (R.I. 2015) (“That the Casino Act lists specific aspects over which

the state has authority does not limit the broad grant of power because it is clear that

by employing the language ‘including, without limitation,’ the specific enumerations

are not intended to be the exclusive aspects over which the state has control.”)

(emphasis added) (quoting G.L. 1956 § 42-61.2-2.1(c)); cf. In re Tavares, 885 A.2d

139, 147 (R.I. 2005) (noting that G.L. 1956 § 40.1-5.3-13—which includes language

stating that “[t]hese rights include, but are not limited, to the following”—“sets forth

                                         - 13 -
a non-exhaustive list of ‘general rights’”). Here, no such language was included.

See Narragansett Indian Tribe, 110 A.3d at 1165.

      We therefore conclude that the hearing justice did not err in determining that

the town was “limited to enacting ordinances within the six prescribed areas

enumerated in” § 31-19.3-5(b). We further agree with the hearing justice that the

types of ordinances listed in subsection (b) are presumed reasonable, because the

General Assembly has already contemplated them.

                Reasonable Likelihood of Success on the Merits

      The town additionally submits that the hearing justice erred in determining

that the amendments were unreasonable and that plaintiffs had established a

reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. The town argues that the hearing

justice should have engaged in a constitutional analysis to determine the

reasonableness of the ordinances; however, the town correctly points out that

plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances, for purposes of

the preliminary injunction.

      This Court has a “deeply rooted commitment not to pass on questions of

constitutionality unless adjudication of the constitutional issue is necessary.” State

v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 898 A.2d 1234, 1238 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Elk

Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004)). Additionally, we

have directed that a hearing justice should not reach “a perceived constitutional

                                        - 14 -
ground that was not raised or argued by the parties[,]” and instructed that “[n]either

this Court nor the Superior Court should decide constitutional issues unless it is

absolutely necessary to do so.” In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 151 (R.I. 2006) (citing

Lead Industries Association, Inc., 898 A.2d at 1238).          The plaintiffs did not

challenge the constitutionality of the amendments for purposes of the preliminary

injunction, but rather they challenged the “threshold issue” of “whether or not the

[t]own has the power to enact and enforce” the amendments under § 31-19.3-5.

Accordingly, the hearing justice acted properly in declining to pass upon this issue.

      Furthermore, after reviewing the record of the case, we are of the opinion that

the hearing justice did not err in her determination that plaintiffs had established a

reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. As to § 8-88, the hearing justice

determined that, although § 31-19.3-5(b) “expressly allows for the [t]own to enact

an ordinance that establishes rental hours for the mopeds,” plaintiffs “established a

prima facie case that the amendment is unreasonable.” (Emphasis omitted.)

Specifically, she took issue with (1) the lack of evidence in the record demonstrating

that a one-hour reduction in rental and operational time will address safety and traffic

concerns; (2) the fact that the list in § 31-19.3-5(b) does not address operational

hours of mopeds; and (3) the placement of liability on plaintiffs for a violation of

operational hours. She ultimately found that the town’s “hypothesis” regarding a

reduction of hours in the morning was unsupported by credible evidence, as was the

                                         - 15 -
town’s argument that the reduction of evening hours would assist in lessening

problems caused by difficult nighttime conditions.

      With regard to § 8-90, the hearing justice correctly noted that none of the

amendments therein relate to the powers specifically enumerated in § 31-19.3-5(b).

Therefore, she determined that they were per se unreasonable. Instead of ending her

analysis there, the hearing justice went on to engage in a reasonableness discussion

of the amendments, reviewing the evidence before her and making credibility

determinations within her discretion.        Ultimately, she still found that the

amendments were unreasonable because they were not “fair and appropriate * * *.”

      Indeed, the hearing justice engaged in thorough discussions regarding both

amendments, concluding that the evidence before her indicated that both were

unreasonable. We are therefore satisfied that her decision was within the bounds of

her discretion in “consider[ing] and resolv[ing]” the issue of whether plaintiffs had

established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Gianfrancesco, 112

A.3d at 708 (quoting Vasquez, 57 A.3d at 318).

      Accordingly, we conclude that the hearing justice did not err in declining to

reach the constitutionality of the amended provisions, and she correctly found that

plaintiffs had established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.

                                        - 16 -
                                 Irreparable Harm

      Finally, the town takes issue with the hearing justice’s determination that there

had been a showing of irreparable harm by plaintiffs. The town contends that the

hearing justice erred in finding that plaintiffs could be “cited for behavior that was

beyond their control.” Specifically, the town alleges that the ordinance requires

plaintiffs “to instruct renters concerning the proper location of passengers and to

provide helmets[,]” not that plaintiffs “would be in violation * * * if a renter failed

to comply with the instruction or failed to wear the helmet that had been provided.”

The town argues that the amendments do “not seek to impose any responsibility on

the rental company * * * once the renter leaves the premises.”

      “A party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that it stands to suffer

some irreparable harm that is presently threatened or imminent and for which no

adequate legal remedy exists to restore that plaintiff to its rightful position.” Nye v.

Brousseau, 992 A.2d 1002, 1010 (R.I. 2010) (quoting National Lumber & Building

Materials Co. v. Langevin, 798 A.2d 429, 434 (R.I. 2002)). “Irreparable injury must

be either presently threatened or imminent; injuries that are prospective only and

might never occur cannot form the basis of a permanent injunction.” Hebert v. City

of Woonsocket by and through Baldelli-Hunt, 213 A.3d 1065, 1077 (R.I. 2019)

(quoting Nye, 992 A.2d at 1010).

                                         - 17 -
      In the case at bar, the hearing justice began her analysis by correctly

articulating the standard for irreparable harm. She indicated that, if plaintiffs “are

cited for violations of the [amendments] for things outside their control, this could

ruin their multi-decade businesses’ good will and reputation.”

      This Court has “previously explained,” and the hearing justice correctly

highlighted, “prospective damage to a business’s good will and reputation is

precisely the type of irreparable injury for which an injunction is appropriate.”

Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 711 (quoting Iggy’s Doughboys, Inc. v. Giroux, 729

A.2d 701, 705 (R.I. 1999)). We agree with her determination that the potential loss

of a plaintiff’s license due to behavior of a customer is an injury that would have no

adequate remedy at law for the harm it would have on a plaintiff’s “good will and

reputation.”

      Specifically, we are troubled by the amended language of § 8-90(A) that states

“violations of this ordinance as well as any other [t]own ordinance or state law or

regulation, may result in suspension, revocation, and/or non-renewal of a licensee’s

license[,]” as applied to those amendment requirements wholly within the

customer’s control. For example, § 8-90(A) indicates that “[e]ach licensee shall

ensure * * * that all passengers wear a properly fitting helmet” and, further, “[e]ach

licensee shall insure [sic] that any passenger on a [moped] under twelve (12) years

of age * * * shall have his or her feet placed upon the foot-rest, and shall be seated

                                        - 18 -
behind the operator unless a side car is provided.” Furthermore, that broad language

applies to “any other [t]own ordinance”; presumably, this means that a customer’s

failure to return a moped by the end of operational hours, as amended in § 8-88,

could result in “suspension, revocation, and/or non-renewal of a licensee’s license.”

Accordingly, we hold that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion in finding

that plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed by the enforcement of these amendments.

      We therefore uphold the Superior Court order granting in part the plaintiffs’

motion for preliminary injunction.

                                         IV

                                     Conclusion

      For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.

The record may be returned to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

                                       - 19 -
                                              STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                         SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                               Licht Judicial Complex
                                                 250 Benefit Street
                                               Providence, RI 02903

                                     OPINION COVER SHEET

                                         Finnimore & Fisher Inc. d/b/a Island Moped et al. v.
Title of Case
                                         Town of New Shoreham.
                                         No. 2021-272-Appeal.
Case Number
                                         (WC 21-129)

Date Opinion Filed                       April 18, 2023

                                         Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
                                         Long, JJ.

Written By                               Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal                         Washington County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court        Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter

                                         For Plaintiffs:

                                         Elizabeth McDonough Noonan, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
                                         For Defendant:

                                         Mark T. Reynolds, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)