Court Opinion

ID: 9700547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:34:42.182093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:10.910617
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge COHN JUBELIRER.
Respectfully, I must dissent for three reasons. First, I believe the majority ignores, without explanation, recent precedent of this Court. Second, I believe the majority disregards significant statutory authority and precedent that establishes schools as drug-free zones. Third, even if this case does not involve a core function, I believe the Arbitrator’s decision is inconsistent and does not meet the essence test.
Although the majority eloquently discusses the core function analysis, I believe it fails to apply, without explanation, binding precedent of this Court. See Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Fed’n of State, County and Mun. Employees, Dist. Council 33, Local 934(PHA), 900 A.2d 1043 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (en banc). This recent precedent, issued by this Court sitting en banc, exhaustively discussed core function. After doing so, the Court devised a test, based on our Supreme Court’s precedent, as to how to conduct a core function analysis. Under the principle of stare de-cisis, we are bound to follow the decisions of our Court unless they are overruled by the Supreme Court, or where other compelling reasons can be demonstrated.1 Pries v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Verizon Pennsylvania), 903 A.2d 136, 144 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 592 Pa. 762, 923 A.2d 412 (2007).
The issue of core function has been debated by the Supreme Court and this Court for years without a clear resolution. In PHA, this Court sought to harmonize and crystallize the precedent into a test to assist in determining if core function was applicable to a particular case.2 This present case presents an opportunity to apply and develop that test. However, despite the significant efforts of this Court in PHA, sitting en banc, the majority does not apply the test that this Court established in PHA.3
*84I believe that, by offering no explanation for its action, the majority further confuses an area of law that is already quite confusing. The PHA case provides the means for determining whether or not a core function is implicated. The majority errs by concluding that core function is not at issue, without applying the PHA case. As I would apply PHA as established precedent by this Court in this area of law and, further, would review the case in light of the test this Court articulated in PHA, I must dissent from the majority for its failure to do so.
Second, it seems clear to me that one of the core functions of any school district is to provide a safe environment for students and employees. The majority does not seem to question that conclusion but, instead, determines that core function was not implicated here because Employee’s drug use occurred offsite, and there was no evidence of actual impairment. I believe this assessment is inconsistent with our law.
Our General Assembly has gone to great lengths to establish schools as drug-free zones. See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317 (establishing drug-free school zones by setting mandatory minimum criminal sentences for drug violations occurring within the area of a school). This Court has similarly strictly interpreted case law involving drug use and schools, even if the use or possession was not on school grounds, and even if there were no apparent signs of impairment. See, e.g. DeShields v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 95 Pa.Cmwlth. 414, 505 A.2d 1080, 1084 (1986); Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia v. Puljer, 92 Pa.Cmwlth. 329, 500 A.2d 905, 907 (1985). The trial court appropriately relied upon this authority, and I respectfully contend the majority errs by overlooking it.4
In our recent articulation of the “core function” analysis, we noted the impact of the core function exception on the concept of “just cause”:
Both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and this court have held that a government employer cannot bargain away its power to fire for misconduct bearing directly upon the performance of its essential functions; this incapacity (referred to as contractual incapacity) imposes a legal restriction on an arbitrator’s interpretation as to what the parties meant by “just cause.”
*85PH A, 900 A.2d at 1046. Toward that end, Section 514 of the Public School Code of 1949 (Code)5 establishes that school boards “have the right at any time to remove any of its officers, employes, or appointees for incompetency, intemperance, neglect of duty, violation of any of the school laws of this Commonwealth, or other improper conduct.” 24 P.S. § 5-514 (emphasis added). Our precedent establishes that drug-related conduct, such as possession or use, occurring off school grounds, may constitute improper conduct under Section 514 of the Code for purposes of firing a school employee. DeShields v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 95 Pa.Cmwlth. 414, 505 A.2d 1080, 1084 (1986) (en banc); Puljer, 500 A.2d at 907. In both of these cases, the school boards discharged custodians for drug offenses that did not occur on school district property, and this Court upheld the decisions of each board. In Puljer, we rejected a trial court’s conclusion that the custodian’s drug possession was not punishable because it occurred off school grounds. We held that:
We vigorously disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of this section. The trial court’s holding that improper conduct must occur on or about school property is wholly without foundation in the statutory language. No qualification is attached to the phrase “other improper conduct”. The School Board has discretion in deciding what conduct is improper for its employees who act as adult models for school children. To limit this discretion because of the location or effect of the conduct is not reasonable, and is inconsistent with this Court’s case law. See, e.g., Lesley v. Oxford Area School District, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 120, 420 A.2d 764 (1980) (teacher’s dismissal for shoplifting at a supermarket upheld as immoral conduct.)
We hold that whether improper conduct takes place on or off school property or whether it affects job performance is irrelevant. The only question presented to the Board was whether Appellee’s possession of controlled substances constituted improper conduct. We hold that it did.
Puljer, 500 A.2d at 907.6 As we noted in PH,A, “serious misconduct is of a sort *86which has a direct negative impact on the public function of the employing agency ... putting at risk those persons the agency is charged to serve.” PHA, 900 A.2d at 1051 (emphasis in original). Applying the facts of this case to the test set forth in PHA, I agree with the trial court and would find that the conduct at issue has a direct negative impact on the District’s functioning.
Finally, the majority places much weight on the factual findings of the Arbitrator and concludes that, under the essence test, we are bound by those factual findings. While I agree that we are bound by the factual findings of the Arbitrator under the essence test, the decision of this Arbitrator does not, itself, seem rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement, as is required by the essence test. State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State College Univ. Prof'l Ass’n (PSEA-NEA), 560 Pa. 135, 743 A.2d 405 (1999)
Although the Arbitrator’s decision seems to find that Employee engaged in no wrongdoing that was subject to punishment, the Arbitrator nonetheless imposed a severe sanction. The Arbitrator initially reasoned that “an employer generally can not [sic] control an employee’s off duty behavior” and that the District in this case was “trying to extend control of an employee’s off duty behavior beyond the language of it’s [sic] written policy.” (Arbitrator Decision at 8.) The Arbitrator, thus, completely discounted the fact that Employee went to work with marijuana in her blood system and, instead, characterized the case as one involving off-duty actions that are not subject to the policy. The clear result that should follow from this is that Employee is not subject to discipline.
The Arbitrator, however, took a different course and imposed a severe sanction on Employee of nine months of salary loss. In explaining the basis for this sanction, the Arbitrator reasoned that “when confronted with drug use in the off hours, by an employee who refuses to admit such behavior until absolutely facing an inescapable result [sic] disciplinary action is justified.” (Arbitrator Decision at 8.) Given the Arbitrator’s statement that the drug policy did not cover the off-duty use of drugs, it is inconsistent for the Arbitrator to believe that Employee’s refusal to discuss her off-duty use is, nonetheless, punishable. If her conduct was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement and the drug policy, then there was no basis upon which to sanction her, period.
The Arbitrator did explain the basis for imposing a penalty, stating that “[p]rohib-iting drug use in the workplace clearly is a core function of the District” and “consideration must be given to the District’s obligation to protect the health, safety and welfare of the students as stated in Policy 551.” (Arbitrator Decision at 8.) So, after stating that the drug policy did not apply to the conduct off-hours, the Arbitrator then stated that the policy had to be considered. In explaining why it had to be considered, the Arbitrator relied on the District’s core function of preventing drug use at school.7
The effect of this discussion, which the majority, in its ruling, ends up endorsing, is the implicit establishment of a de facto “quasi-core function.” The Arbitrator’s decision effectively provided that, while the District, as part of its core function, *87can absolutely control drugs at school, it can “kind of’ control drug use at home — as long as it does not fire the employee. I would suggest that this simply is not rational. If the conduct of Employee coming to work with drugs in her system is not a violation of the drug policy or the collective bargaining agreement because the use occurred at home, and if the District’s core function is not implicated, there is simply no basis upon which to punish her.8 For these reasons, I find the Arbitrator’s decision internally inconsistent and not rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement; therefore, I would conclude that it does not meet the essence test.
One other point that needs to be considered is that the critical date in this case really is when Employee was injured at work. The Arbitrator had mentioned that there was no evidence that she was impaired at the time of the accident, but he seemingly failed to fully appreciate that the reason for the lack of evidence was Employee’s efforts at obstructing such a test. She went to great lengths to avoid taking a drug test at the time of the injury and did not do so until two weeks later. The nature of her work puts her in proximity with children and affords her an opportunity to put them at risk, whether intentionally or negligently. Our case law includes examples of students injured, not by their teachers who deal with them directly on a daily basis, but by others within the school who deal with them indirectly, like custodians. See generally Repko v. Chichester Sch. Dist., 904 A.2d 1036 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 592 Pa. 769, 923 A.2d 1175 (2007) (involving a child who was injured when a table that was negligently placed against a wall fell on the child). The work the custodians perform in our schools is important and, indeed, as illustrated in Repko, when that work is performed negligently, it can literally cause bodily harm to the children within the school. The critical point is whether, at the time that she was injured, Employee was under the influence and, because of her own tactics, we will never know.
In summary, we are applying an Arbitrator’s decision when it should be ignored, and ignoring mandatory and persuasive authority when they should be applied. This case involves a core function of the District, and the Arbitrator is without authority to interfere with the District’s handling of this particular matter. For the reasons expressed above, I must respectfully dissent.
President Judge LEADBETTER joins in this dissenting opinion.

. PHA is currently before the Supreme Court on a petition for allowance of appeal at No. 335 EAL 2006. According to the docket, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order in October 2006, holding the petition for allowance of appeal pending the resolution of another case before the Supreme Court at No. 51 WAP 2005, which is an appeal from this Court's decision in Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Association, PSEA/NEA, No. 1782 C.D.2004, 876 A.2d 1108 (Pa.Cmwlth., filed June 22, 2005).

. The test we set forth in PHA follows:
First, where serious misconduct is of a sort which has a direct negative impact on the public function of the employing agency, such as preying upon or otherwise putting at risk those persons the agency is charged to serve, there is no question that the core function test has been satisfied. On the other hand, where the conduct is of a type which will have only an indirect or potential impact on the agency’s public duties, such as embezzlement or a breach of trust, two conditions must be met. The misconduct must be work-related and must involve dishonesty or other misconduct so egregious that if the agency is unable to curtail such behavior it risks relinquishing control of the orderly functioning of its operations. As in cases like ISSU, City of Easton or Allegheny County, it is not necessary that the particular act(s) of the discharged employee, standing alone, impairs or threatens the agency’s operation, but rather that it is the type of conduct which, if left unchecked, may lead to such a result.
PHA, 900 A.2d at 1051 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis in original).

.The majority mentions the PHA case in a string cite of cases, distinguishing the present case from PHA and the other cases included in the string cite because in those cases, the employee was found to be guilty of the serious misconduct with which the employee was *84charged, whereas here, the Employee was not. The majority makes no mention of the test set forth in PHA.

. Very recently, the United States Supreme Court recognized, in the context of a First Amendment challenge, a public school's " 'important — indeed, perhaps compelling' interest" in deterring drug use by school children. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. —, —, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2621, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007). Citing to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), the Court noted the " Special characteristics of the school environment’ Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse reflected in the policies of Congress and myriad school boards [that] allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.” Morse at —, 127 S.Ct. at 2620. In the decision, the Supreme Court referenced how federal legislation, such as the Safe and Drug-free Schools and Communities Act of 1994, requires "schools receiving federal funds” under the Act to "convey a clear and consistent message that ... the illegal use of drugs [is] wrong and harmful.” Morse at —, 127 S.Ct. at 2628 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) (2000 ed., Supp. IV)). Pennsylvania precedent has also tacitly recognized the "special characteristics of the school environment” as it relates to the area of drugs, drug use, and possession by school employees, even off school grounds. DeShields v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 95 Pa.Cmwlth. 414, 505 A.2d 1080, 1084 (1986); Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia v. Puljer, 92 Pa.Cmwlth. 329, 500 A.2d 905, 907 (1985).

. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, 24 P.S. § 5-514.

. We reached a near identical result in DeSh-ields. In DeShields a custodian was arrested, off district property, for the possession of 115 grams of marijuana, and a criminal proceeding was brought against him. The marijuana was excluded from the criminal case under the exclusionary rule, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal charges and the ex-pungement of the custodian's arrest and prosecution. Following the entirety of the criminal proceeding, the school board conducted a hearing to terminate the custodian's employment or to reinstate his employment (he had been suspended without pay shortly after the arrest). The board concluded there was sufficient evidence to determine that he was in possession of the illegal substances to merit his termination, so the board voted to terminate him. This Court affirmed, noting that, in a previous case, it concluded that a custodian’s harassing phone calls constituted sufficient basis to terminate his employment under Section 514, such that "the possession of illegal narcotics by a school custodian, a much more serious offense, must also be considered improper conduct [particularly because tjhere is no question that a school custodian would have ample access to the student body, or a certain segment of a student body, if he had a mind toward that purpose.” DeShields, 505 A.2d at 1084.
Although both DeShields and Puljer arise from different procedural circumstances— specifically, local agency appeals of school board determinations and not arbitration appeals — the analysis of the provisions of the Code applied in each are instructive in our resolution here. Both indicate that, within the context of schools, illegal drug use and possession are issues for which the Code gives Districts significant authority to discipline.

. The Arbitrator phrased it in this matter: "consideration must be given to the District’s obligation to protect the health, safely and welfare of the students as stated in Policy 551 and the Grievant’s protracted delay in admitting marijuana use.” (Arbitrator Decision at 8 (emphasis added).)

. I agree with the astute analysis set forth by the trial court on this particular facet of the Arbitrator’s decision:
[T]he arbitrator’s decision also creates an awkward question about the suspension without pay he ordered for the employee. While the arbitrator seems to interpret the school district’s drug-free work place policy not to be violated, because the usage of marijuana did not occur at work, and did not affect the employee’s job performance, he still suspended her without pay for a nine month period. Was this for insubordination or her untruthfulness initially when confronted with the test result? If so, this conduct clearly occurred at work. Did the arbitrator simply decide to fashion his own view of the appropriate punishment for the circumstances presented?
It has been previously noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that an important caveat to the concept of judicial deference to decisions in arbitratio[n] is that an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement: "he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.”
(Trial Court Op. at 9 (citations omitted).)