Court Opinion

ID: 9893484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 14:07:19.755162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:16.701071
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-0664-MR

JAMES RILEY                                                         APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CR-00702

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                             OPINION AND ORDER
                                 DISMISSING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: James Riley appealed to this Court as a matter of right from the

Campbell Circuit Court’s judgment sentencing him to a term of twelve months’

imprisonment, to be run consecutively to any other sentence. Riley’s appeal

concerns the use of consecutive rather than concurrent sentencing in his case.

However, on August 14, 2023, the Commonwealth moved this Court to dismiss the

appeal, asserting that Riley had served out his sentence and was no longer a

prisoner in the above matter. Because Riley only challenged the length of his
sentence and not the conviction itself, the Commonwealth asserts the matter is now

moot. Riley does not deny that he is no longer in custody, but he argues this Court

should consider the appeal on grounds that the issue may be “capable of repetition,

yet evading review,” an acknowledged exception to the mootness doctrine.

Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 100 (Ky. 2014).

              Having considered the Commonwealth’s motion, Riley’s response,

and the applicable law, we agree with the Commonwealth that the issue on appeal

is moot. A moot case is one in which “a judgment when rendered . . . cannot have

any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy.” Newkirk v.

Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Terrell, 464 S.W.3d 495, 498-99 (Ky. 2015)). The Commonwealth has correctly

pointed out that the result of any decision we make here will not affect Riley, as he

has already been released from his sentence.

              Riley argues that this matter is capable of repetition because the

Campbell Circuit Court may sentence another defendant to a consecutive twelve-

month sentence, and there will be no way to address the grievance promptly before

the defendant serves out the sentence. However, application of the exception

requires satisfying two elements: whether “the challenged action is too short in

duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration and . . . there is a

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subject to the

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same action again.” Commonwealth v. Collinsworth, 628 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Ky.

2021) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the

second element is not met. Although it is possible that Riley may be subject to a

similar action in the future, the prospect is too speculative to form a “reasonable

expectation” that he will be again subject to such an action.

                Riley has also suggested that the public interest exception to the

mootness doctrine may apply. However, the public interest exception requires

three elements: “(1) a question involving a public nature; (2) a need for an

authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) a

likelihood of future reoccurrence of the question.” Id. at 87 (citing Morgan, 441

S.W.3d at 102). Although sentencing questions are a matter of public interest,

satisfying the first element, we cannot agree that the second element is met here.

The sentencing statute concerning concurrent and consecutive terms of

imprisonment (KRS1 532.110) is frequently litigated, and appeals involving this

statute number in the hundreds. Public officers are certain to find guidance in one

or more of those opinions rendered by this Court or the Kentucky Supreme Court.

                Finally, we must remember that this Court “must be vigilant” and

guard against unnecessary use of exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Id. As a

court sitting in review, we “do[] not have authority to settle arguments or

1
    Kentucky Revised Statute.

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differences of opinion. As we often say, we do not render purely advisory

opinions.” Newkirk, 505 S.W.3d at 774 (quoting Terrell, 464 S.W.3d at 498-99).

            For the foregoing reasons, there being no justiciable controversy, the

above-styled appeal is ORDERED DISMISSED as moot.

            ALL CONCUR.

ENTERED: _October 20, 2023__
                                          JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                   BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kayley Barnes                           Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                     Attorney General of Kentucky

                                        Christopher Henry
                                        Assistant Attorney General
                                        Frankfort, Kentucky

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