Court Opinion

ID: 9880995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 08:09:18.307479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:49.844560
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              ________________

                              NO. 09-21-00267-CV
                              ________________

                        LAWRENCE DEAN, Appellant

                                         V.

       FLINT MITCHELL, TOM MARTIN, FM PROPERTIES and
                 FLINT PROPERTIES, Appellees
________________________________________________________________________

                   On Appeal from the 284th District Court
                        Montgomery County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 20-05-05185-CV
________________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Lawrence Dean challenges the trial court’s summary judgment for

Flint Mitchell, Tom Martin, FM Properties, and Flint Properties (collectively,

“Defendants”). In four issues, Dean argues the trial court erred in granting

Defendants’ summary judgment because: (1) the evidence raises genuine issues of

material fact on whether the damage was caused by surface waters versus flood

waters, whether Martin was a proper party, and the necessity of injunctive relief; (2)

                                          1
Defendants failed to conclusively prove their affirmative defenses; (3) Defendants

failed to conclusively prove that Dean committed trespass; and (4) Defendants failed

to establish their reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees as a matter of law. For the

reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                I. BACKGROUND

      The underlying dispute pertains to alleged flooding on a four-acre tract of

property Dean owns located in Montgomery County, Texas. Dean purchased the

four-acres from FM Properties in October 2017. FM Properties is a Texas general

partnership owned by Flint Mitchell and Tom Martin. FM Properties owns one tract

next to Dean’s property, and Mitchell, Individually and d/b/a Flint Properties owns

the other adjacent tract. Martin is not the record owner of either tract, but Martin is

a member of the FM Properties general partnership. According to the record, the

water flows from east to west across the parties’ properties through “a ditch” fed by

“two culverts” which slopes down to what the parties described as a “ravine kind of

thing,” and that ditch is then described by Dean as “the drainage line.” It is

undisputed that the ditch or drainage flowed in that direction when Dean purchased

his four acre tract.

      In February 2018, Defendants began further development on their two tracts.

In March 2018, Dean’s property flooded, which he alleged resulted from an

elevation change caused by FM Properties’ development of their neighboring tracts.

                                          2
Dean also alleged that in February 2019, Defendants excavated and performed

construction work on their tracts and piled “tree trunks, tree limbs, topsoil, and other

clearing debris” against the property line and fence between his property and theirs.

      On September 17, 2019, Tropical Storm Imelda made landfall on the upper

Texas Gulf Coast. In September 2019, Dean’s property flooded again, which he said

was the worst flood he experienced on his property but denied the flooding occurred

during Tropical Storm Imelda. However, the National Oceanic & Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) rainfall data for Montgomery County revealed the only

significant rainfall for September 2019 occurred on September 18 and 19 when

between 9.2 inches and 16.88 inches of rain, and a local newspaper article reported

25 to 29 inches of rain fell in certain parts of Montgomery County. Dean claimed

the debris pile in “the drainage line” caused the water to back up onto his property,

resulting in the flood. Dean also testified in his deposition that the water was so deep

it flowed around the debris pile.

      In May 2020, Dean sued Defendants alleging trespass, water diversion,

negligence, negligence per se and requested attorney’s fees under the Declaratory

Judgments Act, temporary and permanent injunctions, and permanent harm to his

property with resulting damages for diminution in fair market value. The Defendants

answered, asserting several affirmative defenses including failure to mitigate,

contributory negligence, statute of limitations, intervening/superseding cause, and

                                           3
Act of God, among others. Defendants sought attorneys’ fees since they had to

respond to Dean’s declaratory judgment action. Defendants counterclaimed for

trespass, trespass to try title, Water Code violations, declaratory judgment and

recovery of attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief against Dean, alleging he had

entered their property without authorization.

                               II.
                 MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

      In March 2021, about ten months after Dean filed suit and after the discovery

period closed, Defendants filed their combined Traditional and No-Evidence

Motions for Summary Judgment. Defendants’ summary judgment evidence

included: Montgomery County Appraisal District (MCAD) Ownership Information

for 15064 Boyd Lane with map; Dean’s deposition testimony; MCAD Ownership

Information for 5682 and 5804 Waukegan Road; MCAD map of 15064 Boyd Lane

and surrounding tracts produced by Dean; overhead photograph of 15064 Boyd Lane

and “the drainage line” produced by Dean; FM Properties’ Answers to

Interrogatories; Dean’s Answers to Defendants’ First Set of Interrogatories;

September 2019 flood photographs produced by Dean; NOAA Record of

Climatological Observations for Montgomery County, Texas in September 2019;

National Hurricane Center Report on Tropical Storm Imelda; Houston Chronicle

article regarding Tropical Storm Imelda; Montgomery County Courier article

regarding Tropical Storm Imelda; February 2018 photograph of debris pile produced
                                        4
by Dean; a copy of Dean’s Original Petition; a copy of Dean’s Second Amended

Original Petition; Defendants’ Second Amended Original Answer; and counsel’s

affidavit with attached fee invoices.

      In their Traditional Motion, Defendants argued that the statute of limitations

barred Dean’s claims, because his claims accrued in March 2018 during the first

flood since he alleged permanent injury, but Dean did not file suit until May 2020,

and that they conclusively established their “Act of God” affirmative defense.

Defendants also argued they conclusively established that they were entitled to

summary judgment on all Dean’s claims because floodwaters from “the drainage

line” injured his property and not “diffuse surface waters.” Defendants also argued

that Martin was not liable individually, as he was not an owner of either tract.

Defendants also asserted that Dean was not entitled to a permanent injunction

because he has an adequate remedy at law in monetary damages for any alleged lost

fair market value. Finally, Defendants moved for summary judgment on their

trespass counterclaim, noting Dean’s deposition testimony conclusively established

that he came onto Defendants’ property without authorization (Dean admitted he

mowed the Defendants’ property).

      Among other things, Defendants argued in their No-Evidence Motion that

there was no evidence their conduct caused Dean’s damages, a required element for

each cause of action asserted. Defendants also argued no evidence supported Dean’s

                                         5
request for permanent injunction and specifically there is no evidence they

committed a wrongful act, of imminent harm, of irreparable harm, or that Dean lacks

an adequate remedy at law. Defendants argued they were entitled to summary

judgment on the declaratory judgment action because there is no evidence a

justiciable controversy exists under the warranty deed referenced in Dean’s Petition,

and there is no evidence the alleged controversy will be determined by the judgment

sought. Finally, Defendants moved for summary judgment on their attorneys’ fees

claims of $35,647.44 for defending the declaratory judgment claim, arguing the fees

were reasonable and necessary and the award would be equitable and just. The

Motion for Summary Judgment was set on the submission docket for April 16, 2021.

      On April 9, 2021, Dean filed combined Objections to Summary Judgment

Evidence, Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance of Summary Judgment Hearing, and

Response in Opposition to Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Traditional and No-

Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment. Dean’s responsive summary judgment

evidence included: Defendant’s Discovery Requests; photographs produced by

Dean in response to Defendant’s discovery requests; Assumed Name Certificate for

FM Properties Partnership; MCAD Property Detail for 5804 Waukegan Road;

Property Tax Balance, Payment Information, Certified Owner Receipt for 5804

Waukegan Road for 2018–2020; emails from Defendants’ counsel’s legal secretary;

Defendants’ October 6, 2020 invoice; average hourly billing rates for similarly

                                         6
situated attorneys in Conroe and adjacent jurisdiction; FM Properties’ Answers to

Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories; and Dean’s own counsel’s affidavit and

business records of attorneys’ fees/invoices. However, it should be noted that Dean’s

counsel’s affidavit did not controvert any specific amount of fees or calculations

sought by Defendants.

      Dean objected to Defendants’ using his discovery responses and materials he

produced in response to discovery as summary judgment evidence, including

photographs and maps, contending that Defendants failed to file the requisite notice

of intent to use those responses. Dean further objected to Defendants’ using their

own discovery responses as evidence. Dean complained that the NOAA records and

a photograph of the debris pile he had produced in discovery were inadmissible

because they were not properly authenticated. Finally, Dean complained that a

National Hurricane Center Report and news articles on Tropical Storm Imelda had

not been properly authenticated and each was also inadmissible.

      Dean also moved to continue the submission date on the summary judgment

motion, arguing he needed more time to conduct discovery, even though the

discovery deadline had expired. Dean requested more time to conduct discovery into

opposing counsel’s billing practices and to obtain evidence “to rebut the basis for

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment[.]”

                                         7
      Dean responded to the substance of the Traditional and No-Evidence Motion

for Summary Judgment and argued that the statute of limitations did not bar his

claims. He also asserted that his property was damaged by surface waters rather than

flood waters, noting that Defendants’ Interrogatory Answers described their

improvements to their tracts in 2017. Dean argued that Martin had an ownership

interest in the partnership in one of the adjacent tracts. In his Response to the No-

Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, Dean only addressed his own trespass

claim, arguing the evidence shows that Defendants made unauthorized entry on his

property when they created the debris pile. Dean disputed the defendants’ allegations

that the water was flood water, instead he argued it was diffuse surface water and

that “the accumulated rainwater, running from east to west, across both Plaintiff’s

and Defendants’ properties was diverted prior to any water reaching the far west

boundary of Defendants’ property, where ‘drainage’ began.” In support of this, he

noted the allegations in his petition and photographs of his property. Dean did not

specifically address the other claims, including those for declaratory and injunctive

relief. Finally, Dean argued that Defendants did not establish their right to recover

attorneys’ fees.

      Defendants then filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Objections to Summary

Judgment Evidence, Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance, Objections to

Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Evidence, and Reply in Support of Summary

                                         8
Judgment. As to Dean’s objections, Defendants countered they provided the

requisite notice that they intended to use unfiled discovery when they stated in their

Motion for Summary Judgment they intended to use unfiled discovery in support of

the Motion; and the NOAA data, National Hurricane Center’s Report on Imelda, and

the newspaper articles were authenticated and admissible under Texas Rules of

Evidence 901 and 902. Defendants also argued that the photographs Dean produced

in discovery were admissible per Rule 193.7, and Dean waived any objection to

Defendants using their interrogatory responses when he quoted those responses.

      Defendants challenged Dean’s requested continuance of the submission date

on their Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Dean failed to use diligence in

pursuing discovery and that the discovery period closed two months before the

submission date, among other things. Defendants included emails as evidence

showing counsel had offered deposition dates and asserted Dean failed to notice any

depositions. Defendants also objected to Dean’s summary judgment evidence based

on lack of authentication for a photograph and hearsay as to Dean’s exhibit of a

report of attorney rates for Montgomery County and the surrounding area.

      In their Reply to Plaintiff’s Response, Defendants argued that Dean failed to

produce any evidence that their conduct proximately caused the flooding on his

property, a requisite element of Dean’s negligence, negligence per se, trespass, and

Texas Water Code claims. Defendants argued that Dean only addressed his trespass

                                          9
claim in his Response to their No-Evidence Motion and failed to address his

remaining claims entirely. Defendants also replied that they had established the

statute of limitations barred Dean’s claims because his property first flooded in

March 2018, he claimed a permanent injury, yet he did not sue until May 2020. They

argued that Dean failed to produce any competent summary judgment evidence that

surface waters caused injury to his property. Defendants further asserted that while

Dean argued their attorneys’ fees were not reasonable and necessary, he provided no

evidence of what constituted a reasonable and necessary fee, and he offered no

controverting affidavit, so they were entitled to their fees.

      On April 14, 2021, two days before the scheduled submission date on

Defendants’ Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, Dean

filed Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant’s First Amended Objections to Summary

Judgment Evidence, Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance of Summary Judgment

Hearing, and Response in Opposition to Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Traditional

and No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment. Dean included the following as

additional summary judgment evidence with his Amended Response: Defendant’s

Discovery Requests; photographs Dean produced in response to discovery requests;

April 27, 2016 Assumed Name Certificate for FM Properties; MCAD Property

Detail for 5804 Waukegan Road; Property Tax Balance, Payment Information, and

Certified Owner Receipt for 5804 Waukegan Road for 2018–2020; emails from

                                        10
Defendants’ counsel’s legal secretary; Defendants’ October 6, 2020 Invoice; average

hourly billing rates for attorneys in Conroe and adjacent jurisdiction; FM Properties’

Answers to Dean’s First Set of Interrogatories; and Affidavits of Dean’s counsel

proving up her fees and authenticating business records with attached billing

invoices.

      In the Amended Response, Dean objected to Defendants’ summary judgment

evidence for the same reasons raised in his initial Response. Dean again moved to

continue the summary judgment submission date, citing the need for further

discovery but did not describe his diligence in seeking discovery. In his Amended

Response to Defendants’ Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment, Dean argued

the statute of limitations did not bar his claims, disputed that the damage was caused

by floodwaters and instead contended surface waters caused the damage, argued that

Defendants failed to establish their “Act of God” affirmative defense, and asserted

that Martin had an ownership interest “by partnership” in one of the tracts. In his

Amended Response to Defendants’ No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment,

Dean again only addressed his trespass claim against the defendants and generally

discussed his deposition testimony about the debris pile. Dean did not specifically

address his other causes of action. Finally, Dean contested Defendants’ entitlement

to attorneys’ fees without filing a controverting affidavit and asserted that he was

                                         11
owed attorneys’ fees for preparing his Response to the Traditional and No-Evidence

Motion for Summary Judgment.

      The Defendants filed a Motion to Strike and Supplemental Reply to Plaintiff’s

First Amended Objections to Summary Judgment Evidence and First Amended

Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendants’

Objections to Plaintiff’s Amended Summary Judgment Evidence. Defendants

argued that Dean’s Amended Response was untimely and should be struck because

it was filed less than forty-eight hours before the submission date for their Motions

for Summary Judgment without leave of court. The Defendants argued that although

Dean attached the same summary judgment evidence, he relabeled the exhibits, so

the objections no longer corresponded to the exhibits. Defendants objected to Dean’s

newly labeled exhibits, and argued that Dean’s Amended Response attached no new

evidence and relied solely on conclusory legal argument. Defendants argued that

Dean again failed to respond to their No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment

on his negligence, negligence per se, Texas Water Code claims, and requests for

injunctive and declaratory relief. Finally, Defendants asserted they had a right to

attorneys’ fees and defended counsel’s billing entries.

      The trial court signed an Order on Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs’ Traditional

and No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment that included rulings on Dean’s

Motion for Continuance, Defendants’ Motion to Strike, Plaintiff’s Objections, and

                                         12
Defendants’ Objections. The trial court denied Dean’s Motion for Continuance

reasoning that he provided no reason why depositions had not been completed,

especially before the discovery deadline, and that while he requested more time to

obtain opposing counsel’s billing records of attorneys’ fees, he failed to file an

affidavit controverting those fees. The trial court granted the Defendants’ Motion to

Strike Dean’s Amended Response because it was untimely, and he failed to obtain

leave. The trial court also noted that the Defendants’ Objections to the Amended

Summary Judgment evidence were moot given the ruling striking the Amended

Response. Based on the trial court striking the Amended Objections and Response,

the trial court outlined its rulings on Dean’s initial Objections and Response to the

Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court

sustained only two of Dean’s objections to the Defendants’ summary judgment

evidence, sustaining Dean’s objection: 1) to the Defendants’ use of their own

Answers to Interrogatories; and 2) to a February 2018 photograph of a debris pile

produced by Dean because it was not authenticated. The trial court sustained all

objections that the Defendants raised to Dean’s summary judgment evidence.

Specifically, the trial court sustained objections to photograph LD47 showing a

debris pile and a notation on the photograph, explaining that the photograph was

unauthenticated and the notation was hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection

to Dean’s document purporting to show rates of comparable attorneys as

                                         13
unauthenticated and that it constituted hearsay. Finally, the trial court sustained

objections to Dean’s counsel’s affidavit proving up attorneys’ fees and invoices as

irrelevant. The trial court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

except as to the request for attorneys’ fees. The trial court likewise denied Dean’s

request for attorneys’ fees for preparing a Response to the Motion for Summary

Judgment. Finally, the trial court ordered that Dean was “liable to Flint Mitchell

d/b/a Flint Properties and FM Properties (a Texas partnership) for trespass[,]” but

damages for the trespass would be determined at trial.

      Before trial, the Defendants requested an award of nominal damages for

Dean’s trespass on their property. They also filed their “Motion for Reconsideration

of Order Denying Defendants’ Request for Attorneys’ Fees Under the Declaratory

Judgment Act” citing Dean’s failure to file an affidavit controverting Defendants’

attorneys’ fees and urging the trial court to award at least a portion of their fees. The

day of trial, Dean filed his “Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for

Reconsideration of Order Denying Defendants’ Request for Attorneys’ Fees Under

the Declaratory Judgment Act” contending that Defendants failed to establish the

attorneys’ fees were reasonable and necessary. Dean referenced a controverting

affidavit in his Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration

but failed to attach one. Finally, before the trial on damages, the trial court signed an

Order non-suiting all counterclaims brought by the Defendants with prejudice except

                                           14
their trespass claim against Dean. The trial court awarded Defendants $50 in nominal

damages for Dean’s trespass on both lots, for a total award of $100.

      The only outstanding matter after trial was Defendants’ Motion for

Reconsideration for attorneys’ fees, which the trial court did not rule on during trial.

After trial, Dean filed his “First Supplemental Response in Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Defendants’ Request for

Attorneys’ Fees Under the Declaratory Judgment Act” which included his attorneys’

controverting affidavit contesting Defendants’ attorneys’ fees. Defendants filed their

Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Defendants’

Request Attorneys’ Fees. In their Reply, they argued that Dean failed to timely file

an affidavit controverting the reasonableness and necessity of Defendants’

attorneys’ fees in his Response to the Motions for Summary Judgment before the

submission date and did not request leave, therefore the trial court should not

consider it, and without a timely filed controverting affidavit, Defendants established

the reasonableness and necessity of the attorneys’ fees. Defendants argued that on

Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court should only consider the record as it

existed when it first heard and ruled on the summary judgment motion. Later, Dean

filed an Amended Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for

Reconsideration of Order Denying Defendants Request for Attorneys’ Fees Under

the Declaratory Judgment Act and again attached the Controverting Affidavit of

                                          15
Dean’s counsel. In his Amended Response in Opposition, Dean contended that he

pointed out questionable billing entries based on the evidence Defendants provided,

so they could not have conclusively established that the fees were reasonable and

necessary. The trial court conducted a hearing on Defendants’ Motion for

Reconsideration, and after considering it, granted Defendants’ Motion for

Reconsideration and awarded them attorneys’ fees.

      The trial court signed a Final Judgment, referencing its Order on the Motions

for Summary Judgment, the award of nominal damages at trial for Defendants’

trespass claim against Dean, and noting it was granting Defendants’ Motion for

Reconsideration of Order Denying Defendants’ Request for Attorneys’ Fees Under

the Declaratory Judgments Act. The trial court’s Final Judgment provided:

      1. Plaintiff Lawrence Dean takes nothing on his claims for relief against
      Defendants Flint Mitchell, Individually and d/b/a Flint Properties, Tom
      Martin, and FM Properties;
      2. Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Tom Martin takes nothing on his claims
      for relief against Plaintiff Lawrence Dean;
      3. Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Flint Mitchell, Individually and d/b/a
      Flint Properties, have and recover from Plaintiff Lawrence Dean,
      nominal damages in the amount of $50.00;
      4. Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff FM Properties, a Texas partnership,
      have and recover from Plaintiff Lawrence Dean, nominal damages in
      the amount of $50.00;
      5. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Flint Mitchell, Individually and d/b/a
      Flint Properties, and FM Properties, a Texas partnership, have and
      recover from Plaintiff Lawrence Dean prejudgment interest at the rate
      of five percent (5.0%) per annum on the amounts set forth above from
      August 10, 2020, the date Counter-Plaintiffs filed their trespass claim,
      through the date this Final Judgment is entered;

                                         16
      6. It is ORDERED that Flint Mitchell, Individually and d/b/a Flint
      Properties, and FM Properties shall have and recover from Plaintiff
      Lawrence Dean their reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and
      expenses totaling $35,647.44.
      7. Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs Flint Mitchell, Individually and d/b/a
      Flint Properties, and FM Properties, a Texas partnership, have and
      recover from Plaintiff Lawrence Dean postjudgment interest on the
      amounts set forth above at the rate of five percent (5.0%) per annum
      from the date of this Final Judgment until paid;
      8. Flint Mitchell, Individually and d/b/a Flint Properties, and FM
      Properties, a Texas partnership, have and recover from Plaintiff
      Lawrence Dean all costs of court incurred to date, which are hereby
      taxed against Plaintiff; and
      9. Flint Mitchell, Individually and d/b/a Flint Properties, and FM
      Properties, a Texas partnership, be allowed all such writs and processes
      as may be necessary, including execution, attachment, garnishment and
      other writs in process, to enforce or collect this judgment, and that all
      costs thereof be assessed against Plaintiff Lawrence Dean.

Dean filed a Motion for New Trial and an Amended Motion for New Trial, which

were overruled by operation of law. He then timely appealed.

                                  III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Summary Judgment: Dean’s Affirmative Claims

      We review a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.

See Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2015) (citation omitted). We

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. (citing City of

Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005)). In doing so, we indulge every

reasonable inference and resolve any doubts against the motion. See City of Keller,

168 S.W.3d at 824. “Undisputed evidence may be conclusive of the absence of a

material fact issue, but only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions
                                          17
as to that evidence.” Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012) (citation

omitted).

      When a no-evidence motion has been filed, it “is essentially a pretrial directed

verdict, and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence

summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict.” King Ranch, Inc.

v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003) (citations omitted).

      A no evidence point will be sustained when (a) there is a complete
      absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of
      law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to
      prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no
      more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes
      the opposite of the vital fact.

Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997) (citation

omitted). To defeat a no-evidence summary judgment motion, the nonmovant must

produce summary judgment evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material

fact on each element of the claims challenged by the movant. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i);

Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

      A party moving for traditional summary judgment has the burden of

establishing there is no genuine issue of material fact as to at least one requisite

element of the asserted cause of action and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E & P Onshore,

LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. 2017) (citations omitted). When the trial court does

not specify the grounds on which it granted summary judgment, we must affirm if
                                          18
any summary judgment grounds are meritorious. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City

of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872–73 (Tex. 2000) (citation omitted). If a defendant files

a combined traditional and no-evidence summary judgment motion, we first review

the judgment under the no-evidence standards of Rule 166a(i). Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d

at 600; Werth v. Johnson, 294 S.W.3d 908, 909 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no

pet.).

         In his first issue, Dean argues the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment for Defendants because the evidence presents genuine issues of material

fact. In support of this issue, Dean argues that there is a material issue of fact about

whether damage was caused by flood waters versus surface waters, Martin’s

ownership in the property, and his claim for injunctive relief. The two components

of proximate cause are (1) “cause in fact” and (2) foreseeability. W. Invs., Inc. v.

Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. 2005); Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dall., Inc.,

907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995). “These elements cannot be established by mere

conjecture, guess, or speculation.” Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 477 (citing McClure v. Allied

Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1980)) (other citation omitted); see

also Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 551. The inquiry for cause in fact is whether the “act or

omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury,” absent which the

harm could not have occurred. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd.,

896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Doe, 907 S.W.2d at

                                          19
477; see also IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d

794, 799 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted).

      Dean asserted claims for water diversion under Texas Water Code section

11.086, trespass, negligence per se, and negligence. As pleaded, cause-in-fact is a

requisite element of the above claims. See Palma v. Chribran Co., 327 S.W.3d 866,

869 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (noting same for each of these causes of

action in context of water diversion case); see also Tex. Water Code Ann. §

11.086(a), (b) (requiring damages to be caused by a diversion of water); Union Pump

Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (explaining proof of cause-in-

fact is required in negligence and products cases); Zapata v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,

615 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex. 1981) (noting trespass claims requires proof of damages

caused by the trespass).

      Defendants filed a combined traditional and no-evidence summary judgment

motion, so we first review the judgment under the no-evidence standard. See

Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600; Werth, 294 S.W.3d at 909. Among other elements,

Defendants specifically challenged the causation element for Dean’s water

diversion, trespass, negligence per se, and negligence claims in their no-evidence

summary judgment motion. Accordingly, Dean was required to present evidence

sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation for each of those

claims. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600. Dean only

                                         20
addressed his trespass claim in response to the no-evidence motion for summary

judgment. In his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and on appeal,

Dean argues his lay opinions in the form of deposition testimony on the debris pile

constitute evidence of causation but points to no specific testimony. He also cited

cases involving jury trials where lay testimony was used to establish causation and

specifically, regarding the characterization of flood waters versus surface water.

       “The term surface water, as used in section 11.086, is not defined in the Water

Code, but has been interpreted by Texas courts to mean water ‘which is diffused

over the ground from falling rains or melting snows, and [it] continues to be such

until it reaches some bed or channel in which water is accustomed to flow.’” Tex.

Woman’s Univ. v. The Methodist Hosp., 221 S.W.3d 267, 277 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (quoting Dietrich v. Goodman, 123 S.W.3d 413, 417 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)); see also Michaelski v. Wright, 444

S.W.3d 83, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Our sister court in

Houston explained in Michaelski v. Wright,

      Diffuse surface water is distinct from flood waters and from waters
      entering or following a defined course or channel. Floodwaters are
      waters that have overflowed a natural water course but remain a
      continuous part of that original part of the water course. Waters
      entering or following a defined course or channel are not considered
      diffuse surface water. This includes water in a ditch, a pond, pipes, or a
      river.

                                         21
Michaelski, 444 S.W.3d at 93 (citing Tex. Woman’s Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 278).

There, the court concluded the plaintiffs “were required to prove the damage they

sustained was the result of diffuse surface water and not flood water or water from

a defined course or channel.” Id. (citing Tex. Woman’s Univ., 221 S.W.3d at 277).

      Here, the evidence shows that Dean’s property flooded in 2018 following

Defendants’ development of their lots before the debris pile existed, and Defendants

assert the 2018 flood would be time barred. Then, Dean claimed that in February

2019, the Defendants left a debris pile in a drainage area that caused the September

2019 flooding. Further, although Dean testified in his deposition that Defendants

piled debris in a drainage area that impeded the flow of water causing it to back up,

he also acknowledged that it did so after running into a “channel,” “the drainage

line” or “drainage ditch” and that the water was so deep it simply flowed around the

debris pile.

      Dean failed to provide evidence establishing that the damage he sustained

resulted from “diffuse surface water and not flood water or water from a defined

course or channel.” See Michaelski, 444 S.W.3d at 93; Tex. Woman’s Univ., 221

S.W.3d at 277–78. Thus, Dean failed to meet his burden of presenting evidence

creating a genuine issue of material fact on the element of causation, a requisite

element of his statutory water diversion, trespass, negligence per se, and negligence

claims. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).

                                         22
      Along with the claims that included causation as a requisite element, Dean

also sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment

affirming his “right of undisturbed possession, [and] use and enjoyment of the

property in dispute, as described in Plaintiff’s warranty deed; . . . to issue a

declaratory judgment affirming the Defendants have no right or interest of any kind

whatsoever in the property.” Once Defendants moved for summary judgment on no-

evidence grounds, the burden shifted to Dean to raise a genuine issue of material fact

to defeat the motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard,

P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002) (discussing non-movant’s burden in

responding to motion for summary judgment under Rule 166a(i)). Yet the summary

judgment record shows that Dean’s Response to the No-Evidence Motion for

Summary Judgment only addressed his trespass claim and failed to address his other

causes of action. Since Dean failed to respond to Defendants’ no-evidence summary

judgment motion on his Water Code, negligence per se, negligence, injunction, and

declaratory judgment claims, the trial court properly granted the no-evidence

summary judgment motion. See Gallien v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,

No. 14-11-00938-CV, 2013 WL 1141953, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Mar. 19, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citations omitted) (collecting cases and

holding that because non-movant failed to timely respond to no-evidence motion for

summary judgment, the trial court properly granted the no-evidence motion); see

                                         23
also Polecat Hill, LLC v. City of Longview, 648 S.W.3d 315, 334 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (concluding the trial court did not err in granting no-

evidence summary judgment on certain claims where non-movant failed to respond

to those specific claims).

      We overrule issue one. Having determined the trial court properly granted

Defendants’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment, we need not address issue

two pertaining to whether they conclusively established their affirmative defenses in

their traditional motion for summary judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment: Defendants’ Trespass Counterclaim

      In his third issue, Dean argues that the trial court improperly granted summary

judgment on Defendants’ trespass claim against him, because they failed to establish

that Dean committed trespass. Defendants counterclaimed against Dean for

trespassing on their property and moved for traditional summary judgment on that

claim. Defendants’ summary judgment evidence included Dean’s deposition

testimony that he entered onto their property without consent. Specifically, Dean

testified that he entered Defendants’ property without Defendants’ authorization; he

parked equipment there and mowed without permission, despite understanding that

the property was not his.

      The requisite elements of trespass are: (1) entry (2) onto the property of

another (3) without the property owner’s consent or authorization. Envtl. Processing

                                         24
Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414, 419, 424–25 (Tex. 2015); OHAH,

Ltd. v. LNG Builders, LLC, No. 09-20-00292-CV, 2022 WL 16986573, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Nov. 17, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op). A plaintiff asserting a

trespass cause of action has the burden of proving it did not consent to defendant’s

entry onto the land. Envtl. Processing Sys., 414 S.W.3d at 425; OHAH, Ltd., 2022

WL 16986573, at *7. Despite his argument to the contrary, the summary judgment

evidence in the form of Dean’s deposition testimony showed that he entered

Defendants’ property without their consent or authorization, which conclusively

established the elements of a trespass claim. See Envtl. Processing Sys., 414 S.W.3d

at 425; OHAH, Ltd., 2022 WL 16986573, at *7. When Defendants established their

trespass claim as a matter of law, the burden shifted to Dean to present evidence that

raised a material fact issue. See Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996);

see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). On appeal, Dean focuses on the element of consent,

yet in the trial court he failed to present any summary judgment evidence

controverting his own testimony that he was not authorized to enter the property. See

Walker, 924 S.W.2d at 377; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). Since Dean failed to

raise a fact material issue on whether he had consent, the trial court properly granted

summary judgment on Defendants’ trespass counterclaim. See Walker, 924 S.W.2d

at 377; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). We overrule issue three.

                                          25
C. Motion for Reconsideration: Attorneys’ Fees

      In Dean’s final issue, he contends the trial court erred by awarding attorneys’

fees on summary judgment because Defendants failed to establish their reasonable

and necessary attorneys’ fees as a matter of law. In support of this issue, Dean

contends: 1) the interested witness rule applies to Defendants’ counsel’s affidavit,

which is not clear, positive, direct, and free from contradictions; 2) Defendants failed

to conclusively establish the billing rates were reasonable; 3) the fee is unreasonable

in light of the damages awarded, thus creating a genuine issue of material fact; 4)

attorneys billed for clerical or secretarial work and double-billed; 5) counsel failed

to segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees; and 6) the fees were not equitable

and just.

      Defendants moved for traditional summary judgment on their claim for

attorneys’ fees under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code section 37.009, arguing

they had to defend against Dean’s baseless and frivolous declaratory judgment

action. Defendants argued that because the claims arose from the same set of

operative facts, they could not be segregated. They supported their summary

judgment motion with counsel’s affidavit, which explained his use of the lodestar

method and attached billing records. The trial court initially denied the summary

judgment on the attorneys’ fees. Although Dean argued in his Response to the

Motion for Summary Judgment that the fees were not reasonable and necessary, he

                                          26
included no competent summary judgment evidence controverting the

reasonableness and necessity of the fees. On appeal, Dean also argues that the

document he attached to his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment shows

the average billable rate for an attorney in the Conroe area is $225–$350; however,

the trial court sustained Defendants’ objection to this document.

      After the trial court signed the Order granting Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment but denying their request for attorneys’ fees, Defendants filed a

Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Defendants’ Request for Attorneys’

Fees Under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Dean filed a Response, Supplemental

Response, and Amended Response to the Motion for Reconsideration. It was not

until Dean’s Supplemental Response and Amended Response that he attached his

attorneys’ controverting affidavit for the first time. Defendants replied to Dean’s

responses, arguing his failure to file a controverting affidavit before the summary

judgment submission date established the reasonableness and necessity of

Defendants’ attorneys’ fees. The trial court’s Final Judgment stated that it

“considered the pleadings and the evidence on file,” and determined the Motion for

Reconsideration was “meritorious and should be granted.” The trial court

incorporated “all prior rulings of the Court and its ruling granting the Motion for

Reconsideration,” into the Final Judgment, which among other things, awarded

                                        27
Defendants their “reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and expenses totaling

$35,647.44.”

      i. Evidence the Trial Court Considered and Summary Judgment Record

      We must first determine what evidence the trial court considered when

determining the attorneys’ fees issue. “A motion for reconsideration of a prior

summary judgment is like a motion for new trial, and we review a trial court’s ruling

on a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.” Foussadier v. Triple B

Servs., LLP, No. 01-18-00106-CV, 2019 WL 2127604, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] May 16, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Mullins v. Martinez R.O.W.,

LLC, 498 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.);

Chapman v. Mitsui Eng’g & Shipbuilding Co., 781 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied)). Acting without reference to any guiding

rules or principles or acting arbitrarily or unreasonably constitutes an abuse of

discretion. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex.

2002); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.

1985).

      On a motion for reconsideration of a motion for summary judgment, “the trial

court ordinarily may consider only the record as it existed when it first heard and

ruled on the summary judgment motion.” Foussadier, 2019 WL 2127604, at *3

(citations omitted). A party may not file summary judgment evidence late unless it

                                         28
has leave of court. See Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex.

1996). Rule 166a(c) requires a nonmovant’s summary judgment evidence to be on

file at least seven days before the hearing. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). A trial court

may accept late-filed evidence, even after summary judgment, if the court

“affirmatively indicates in the record that it accepted or considered the evidence.”

Mathis v. RKL Design/Build, 189 S.W.3d 839, 842–43 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also Foussadier, 2019 WL 2127604, at *4.

      While the trial court specified she considered the Motion for Reconsideration

and “pleadings and evidence on file,” she also incorporated her prior rulings, in

which she struck a late filed First Amended Response and attached evidence,

because Dean failed to obtain leave. The Final Judgment does not explain what the

trial court meant by its general reference to “evidence on file.” In Foussadier, a 2019

case from the First Court of Appeals, our sister court determined that where the trial

court recited it considered “evidence” such was insufficient to affirmatively show

that the trial court considered the late-filed evidence. See Foussadier, 2019 WL

2127604, at *5 (citing NMRO Holdings, LLC v. Williams, No. 01-16-00816-CV,

2017 WL 4782793, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 24, 2017, no

pet.) (mem. op.)). Ultimately, our sister court in Foussadier determined that because

the order did not expressly state the trial court considered the evidence attached to

the motion for reconsideration, the court did not consider that evidence. See id. This

                                          29
is like the situation before us, where the trial court considered the Motion for

Reconsideration but only generally acknowledged the pleadings and “evidence on

file.” Ordinarily, the trial court may only consider the evidence in the summary

judgment record that existed when it first ruled on the summary judgment motion.

See id. at *3. Since the Final Judgment does not affirmatively indicate that the trial

court specifically considered the controverting affidavit attached in Dean’s

Supplemental and Amended Response to the Motion for Reconsideration, we

conclude it was not part of the evidence in the summary judgment record the trial

court reconsidered. See id.

      ii. Propriety of Attorneys’ Fees Award

      Having determined that there was no controverting affidavit on file addressing

the attorneys’ fees at the time of the summary judgment hearing, we now turn to

whether the affidavit of Defendants’ counsel established the reasonableness and

necessity of their fees under section 37.009.

      [T]o secure an award of attorney’s fees from an opponent, the
      prevailing party must prove that: (1) recovery of attorney’s fees is
      legally authorized, and (2) the requested attorney’s fees are reasonable
      and necessary for the legal representation, so that such an award will
      compensate the prevailing party generally for its losses resulting from
      the litigation process.
Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 487 (Tex.

2019). Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (“UDJA”), “the court may

award costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees as are equitable and

                                         30
just.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009. A party defending against a

UDJA claim may also recover fees. See Devon Energy Prod. Co. v. KCS Res., LLC,

450 S.W.3d 203, 221–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)

(determining attorneys’ fees were recoverable for defending a claim under the UDJA

even where trial court ultimately determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over the declaratory judgment action).

      The reasonableness of attorney’s fees is generally a fact question. See,

e.g., Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); BBX Operating, LLC v.

Am. Fluorite, Inc., No. 09-19-00278-CV, 2021 WL 3196514, at *22 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont July 29, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Yet “the affidavit of the attorney

representing a claimant constitutes expert testimony that will support an award of

attorney’s fees in a summary judgment proceeding.” Haden v. David J. Sacks, P.C.,

332 S.W.3d 503, 513 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); Tesoro

Petroleum Corp. v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). An interested or expert witness’s

uncontroverted testimony can support summary judgment if “the evidence is clear,

positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and

inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).

“[W]hen a movant includes a prayer for attorney’s fees in its summary-judgment

motion, an attached affidavit may be considered as proof of the attorney’s fees

                                         31
incurred.” Lion Co-Polymers Holdings, LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC, No. 01-16-

00848, 2018 WL 3150863, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (citing Petrello v. Prucka, 415 S.W.3d 420, 431 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (awarding fees under the Declaratory Judgment

Act)). “‘[C]lear, direct, uncontroverted evidence of attorney’s fees is taken as true

as a matter of law, especially when the opposing party has not rebutted the

evidence.’” Med. Hosp. of Buna Tex., Inc. v. Wheatley, 287 S.W.3d 286, 295 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. denied) (quoting Collins v. Guinn, 102 S.W.3d 825, 836

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)) (discussing attorneys’ fees in the context

of a dismissal under the Medical Liability Act). “Unless a controverting affidavit is

filed, an affidavit as to the amount of attorney’s fees is presumed reasonable.”

Petrello, 415 S.W.3d at 431; see also Wheatley, 287 S.W.3d at 295.

      If a movant presents expert testimony in support of attorney’s fees, the burden

shifts to the non-movant to raise a fact issue. Jordan v. Centerpoint Energy Hous.

Elec., LLC, No. 14-18-00663-CV, 2019 WL 5565978, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Absent controverting evidence,

the movant’s affidavit will support summary judgment. Id. at *9; Tesoro, 754

S.W.2d at 767. “If an attorney’s affidavit regarding fees is properly controverted by

an opposing attorney, a fact issue is raised on reasonableness and summary judgment

is precluded.” Sun Tec Comput., Inc. v. Recovar Grp., LLC, No. 05–14–00257–CV,

                                         32
2015 WL 5099191, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); see

also Jordan, 2019 WL 5565978, at *10. To constitute competent summary judgment

evidence, an affidavit must be based on personal knowledge, set forth facts that

would be admissible in evidence, and affirmatively show the affiant’s competence

to testify as to the matters contained there. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f).

      Defendants’ summary judgment evidence supporting its request for attorneys’

fees included the affidavit of their attorney, along with itemized billing records and

invoices. Counsel described his experience, his familiarity with the case and subject

matter, the hourly rate charged explaining that it was reasonable considering the

location and subject matter of the litigation. He segregated the claims by estimating

that eighty percent of his time was spent defending “the negligence, negligence per

se, Texas Water Code Section 11.086, and trespass claims[, and] Plaintiff’s

declaratory judgment action is predicated on the same facts relating to these claims

and, therefore, is inextricably intertwined with these claims.” See Tony Gullo Motors

I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 314 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that separate time

entries are not required and allowing for an opinion setting forth a percentage was

permitted); Sheffield Dev. Co. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., No. 02-11-00204-CV, 2012

WL 6632500, at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 21, 2012, pet. dism’d) (mem.

op.) (concluding that affidavit estimating percentage of time attributable to claims

allowing for recovery of attorney’s fees that also set forth other requisite information

                                          33
was sufficient to support summary judgment awarding fees). Counsel also described

the various claims in the litigation, the tasks performed, and the billing records

showing who worked on what tasks, how long each worked on the task, and the

hourly rate each charged. He outlined the lodestar factors and averred he considered

them in determining the reasonable hourly rate. See El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370

S.W.3d 757, 761–63 (Tex. 2012) (discussing lodestar method). He also included a

total number of hours the attorneys reasonably worked on the litigation, and he

concluded that based on the rates and hours worked that $35,647.44 was a reasonable

fee for the work performed.1 The amount reflected eighty percent of the total fees

incurred. Even assuming Dean’s complaints about the segregation of fees in

Response to the Motion for Reconsideration preserved error, as explained above,

Defendants’ counsel assigned a percentage to the claims that were “inextricably

intertwined” with the declaratory judgment action, a permissible way to segregate

fees. See Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 314; Sheffield Dev. Co., 2012 WL 6632500, at *16.

Despite Dean’s arguments challenging the reasonableness of the fees and allegations

of double-billing or billing for secretarial work, such arguments are not evidence.

      1Counsel’s affidavit explained that the amount of $33,647.44 included, as

shown in the attached invoices, and there was an additional $2,000 for an upcoming
invoice. Calculations reveal this total amount is eighty percent of the $42,059.33 in
fees incurred in the litigation and was consistent with counsel’s affidavit that he
estimated he spent eighty percent of the time defending claims that were
“inextricably intertwined” with the UDJA claim.
                                         34
See Johnson v. Scott, 113 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet.

stricken) (“motions and arguments of counsel are not evidence”); see also Fallon v.

MD Anderson Physicians Network, 586 S.W.3d 58, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“Motions, arguments of counsel, and bare assertions are

not evidence.”).

      Once the Defendants presented this evidence, the burden shifted to Dean as

the nonmovant to provide controverting evidence raising a genuine issue of material

fact about the reasonableness of the fees. See BBX Operating, LLC, 2021 WL

3196514, at *22; Jordan, 2019 WL 5565978, at *10. Absent controverting evidence

from Dean, the affidavit of Defendants’ counsel supported the reasonableness and

necessity of the fees on summary judgment. See Jordan, 2019 WL 5565978, at

*9; Tesoro, 754 S.W.2d at 767. As we have discussed, the trial court’s review of the

attorneys’ fees on the Motion for Reconsideration was limited to the evidence at the

time it ruled on the summary judgment, which did not include an affidavit

controverting Defendants’ attorneys’ fees. See Foussadier, 2019 WL 2127604, at

*3; Benchmark Bank, 919 S.W.2d at 663.

      Finally, Dean argues the award of fees was not “equitable and just” based on

the same complaints addressed above and that Defendants received a nominal

damages award. Under the UDJA, a trial court has broad discretion in determining

whether to award attorney’s fees. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20. We will reverse

                                        35
an award attorney’s fees under the UDJA “only if the lower court abused its

discretion by either (1) awarding fees when there was insufficient evidence that the

fees were reasonable and necessary or (2) acting arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without

regard to guiding legal principles in its determination that the fees awarded were

equitable and just.” Merzi v. Brumfield, No. 09-21-00340-CV, 2023 WL 4113242,

at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 22, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Bocquet,

972 S.W.2d at 21). Dean has the burden of proving the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees under the UDJA. See id. On the record before

us, we conclude Dean failed to meet his burden to establish the trial court abused its

discretion in awarding the attorney’s fees.

      We conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented to the trial court that

the fees were reasonable and necessary, and the amount awarded by the trial court

was reasonable, based upon guiding legal principles, and related to the defense of

the declaratory judgment action filed by Dean. The trial court was free to conclude

that the amount awarded was equitable and just considering the circumstances,

including Defendants’ success in defending Dean’s declaratory judgment and that

the defense of the declaratory judgment was inextricably intertwined with a defense

of Dean’s other claims as described in counsel’s affidavit. See id. We conclude the

trial court did not err in awarding attorneys’ fees under section 37.009. We overrule

this issue.

                                         36
                                IV. CONCLUSION

      Having determined that Dean failed to present evidence raising a genuine

issue of material of fact on the element of causation for each of his claims in response

to Defendants’ No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, and the trial court did

not err in granting summary judgment for Defendants. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).

We also hold that Defendants established their trespass counterclaim and the trial

court properly granted the traditional summary judgment on that claim. See Tex. R.

Civ. P. 166a(c). Likewise, we affirm the trial court’s award of Defendants’ attorneys’

fees. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                      W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                           Chief Justice

Submitted on June 29, 2023
Opinion Delivered September 28, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

                                          37