Court Opinion

ID: 9829331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:13:46.630519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:02.356391
License: Public Domain

HODGES, J.
The appellee sued the appellants, J. M. Burnett and wife, for the title and possession of a house and lot situated in the town of Alto, Tex. It claimed title by virtue of two conveyances, one executed by the appellants in May, 1914, and the other in February, 1915. The appellants resisted the suit upon the ground that the land was their homestead, and that the conveyances relied on were intended as mortgages. They also alleged that the second deed referred to above was, after its execution by them, placed in escrow, with the understanding that it was not to be delivered until Burnett received his discharge in bankruptcy, and upon the further condition that he had no further trouble with any of his creditors. In addition to the above, it was also alleged that Mrs. Burnett executed the second deed under duress. It appears from the evidence that the property in controversy had been purchased by Burnett for a homestead, and was being so used at the time the above conveyances were executed. In January, 1915, Burnett, on account of financial embarrassment, had filed a petition in bankruptcy, and the appellee was one of his creditors. The appellee also held as a claim against Burnett a balance of approximately $550 due upon the purchase price of the homestead, which had previously been acquired from the holder of the original purchase-money note. The court submitted special issues, and the jury returned the following findings of fact: That the first conveyance, that made on May 8, 1914, was a mortgage. That the second conveyance, the one dated February 3, 1915, was delivered to' Perkins & Perkins, attorneys, in escrow, to be delivered to the appel-lee upon Burnett’s discharge in bankruptcy. That Burnett was notified by Perkins & Perkins previous to the delivery of the deed to the appellee. That the property in controversy was worth, on the Sth day of May, 1914, $1250. That the conveyance of February 3, 1915, was properly acknowledged by Mrs. Burnett, and was not signed by her under duress. That there was at the date of the trial due upon a vendor’s lien note previously executed by Burnett, including interest and attorney’s fees, $549.46. Upon these findings the court rendered a judgment in favor of the appellee.'
The first error assigned assails the finding of the jury upon the issue of duress, as without sufficient evidence to support it. *173There was no motion to set aside this finding in the court below, nor was there any objection to the action of the court in submitting that issue. The objection here urged therefore comes too late. Blackwell v. Vaughn, 176 S. W. 912. But even if objection had been seasonably made, the state of the evidence is not such as to require a contrary finding as a matter of law. Appellants, having pleaded duress, assumed the burden of proving it. Burnett testified that prior to the execution of the deed he informed his wife that the attorney and the cashier of the appellee had told him that unless he and his wife gave the bank a good deed to the property, they would give him trouble in the federal court. He construed the intimation as meaning some form of criminal prosecution. Mrs. Burnett corroborated her husband as to what he told her prior to the execution of the deed concerning those threats. Burnett’s testimony was contradicted by the cashier and appellee’s attorney, both denying that any threats were made. If Burnett falsely represented to his wife that such threats had been made, and she was thereby induced to sign the deed, she was the victim of a fraud upon his part, and not of duress. Moreover, the jury was not bound to accept as true the statements of Burnett and his wife, both of whom are parties interested in the result of the suit.
The next assigned error complains of the refusal of the court to submit the following special issue:
“Did the defendant J. M. Burnett have any further trouble with any of his creditors after the execution of the deed by himself and wife dated February 3, 1915? Answer this ‘Ves’ or ‘No.’ ”
The relevancy of that issue must depend upon the following written agreement, which was entered into at the time of the conveyance of February 3, 1915:
“I sign this deed with the understanding that it is not to be turned over to the Continental State Bank until I am notified, and not then only on condition that we get a discharge and have no further trouble with any of the creditors. Perkins & Perkins agree to keep this deed in their possession until this contract is carried out, and also to notify me or my husband before turning over the deed.”
This agreement was signed by Perkins & Perkins and by both Burnett and his wife. At the time it was executed and the deed there referred to was signed Burnett had not received his discharge in bankruptcy, but did receive it some time before the deed was finally delivered to the appellee. The “further trouble” with his creditors, which is relied on to defeat the right to the delivery of the deed, grew out of a contract between Burnett and Sanger Bros., of Dallas, after the discharge in bankruptcy. The evidence shows that Burnett had previously transferred some of his accounts to the appellee and Sanger Bros, jointly, in settlement of a part of his indebtedness, due them.; that after the discharge in the bankruptcy court Burnett, at the suggestion of appellee’s cashier, purchased from Sanger Bros, their interest in those accounts, giving his note with personal security in payment. A dispute afterwards arose between the appellee and Burnett as to the extent of the interest in those accounts which had been owned by Sanger Bros.; and for some reason, not clearly explained, Burnett refused to pay the Sanger note when it became due. Sanger Bros, thereupon filed suit against Burnett to recover upon the note, and this suit was pending at the time of this controversy. This is the trouble which appellants rely upon to defeat their deed.
It is evident from an inspection of this collateral written agreement, in the light of the circumstances then surrounding the parties, that the “further trouble”, with creditors, mentioned as a condition, referred to the creditors of Burnett then existing and whose claims were then being settled. To hold otherwise, and say that it referred to all persons who might thereafter become creditors by reason of any future business transactions with Burnett, would keep the deed in abeyance indefinitely, and practically defeat it entirely. The facts show that the “trouble” or suit by Sanger Bros., grew out of a contract made after the termination of the bankruptcy proceedings, and clearly not that species of trouble, or trouble with that particular character of creditors, which the parties had in contemplation. We, therefore, conclude that the court correctly refused to submit the issue.
The remaining assignment is based upon the admission of testimony objected to upon the ground that it disclosed confidential communications between Burnett and his attorneys. The bill of exceptions does not point out any specific testimony to which a definite objection was applied, and for that reason we are unable to say that any error was committed in the admission of the evidence.
This judgment of the district court is affirmed.