Court Opinion

ID: 9758897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:55:07.684241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:29.594111
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
The command of Batson and its progeny is to eliminate the use of peremptory challenges in an unconstitutional manner, not to deprive a party of legitimate, case-based, non-diseriminatory reasons for striking potential jurors. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1716-18, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The majority’s holding succeeds in accomplishing only the latter. The record simply does not support the conclusion that the trial court clearly erred in determining that counsel for the representative of Mrs. Baucom’s estate (the estate) did not engage in purposeful discrimination in exercising its peremptory strikes. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-69, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (burden of proving purposeful discrimination rests with the opponent of the strike) (citation omitted). Rather, the record supports the trial court’s ruling that the estate’s reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges were legitimate ones which do not infringe equal protection. See id.
In this medical negligence case against a hospital and physician, counsel for the estate exercised two of its three peremptory challenges to exclude from the jury two members of the venire whom he had challenged unsuccessfully for cause. One (juror 494) was vice-president of a management company, whose clients for the past twenty-five years had “all been hospitals and physician organizations” and who stated that she had “a stronger understanding of the issues that surround hospitals and physicians in today’s environment.” Indeed, she said that, because of her experience, she “would err on the side of understanding the issues that would surround hospitals or physicians.” When probed about her ability to put aside her experiences in deciding the case, some reservation was implicit in her answer, as she stated more than once only that she would “endeavor” to do so. However, she acknowledged candidly that she had a “basis of knowledge which [she had had] for a long time,” and that “[t]he degree to which that would prejudice me, I am not sure.” Understandably, competent counsel would not want one with such experiences, and probable predispositions, to resolve his client’s claim against a hospital and physician. Neverthe*775less, the court denied the estate’s motion to strike this juror for cause, and the estate’s attorney used a peremptory challenge to exclude her.
The other venire member challenged initially by the estate for cause was a nurse (juror 800) and the director of a health clinic, who had specialized knowledge concerning one of the issues central to the estate’s negligence claim. Counsel for the estate argued for her dismissal for cause because of her awareness of the standard of care involved and a realistic assessment that one with such specialized knowledge might have difficulty separating it from the evidence presented at trial. In arguing that juror 800 should be stricken for cause, counsel explained:
Given that’s the only real issue in this case and there will be a serious debate about that issue, I don’t think that we should have any “expert jurors” sitting on the jury putting forth their own positions and perhaps formulating the facts of the case to their own expert opinion and I would challenge her for cause.
Again, the trial court rejected the challenge for cause, but expressed its own opinion that “[s]he may be a very attractive candidate for a peremptory.” Not surprisingly, counsel exercised a peremptory strike against her. Subsequently, during the Batson inquiry, the estate’s attorney offered the very same reasons for striking juror number 800 as he had before it became the subject of a Batson challenge.
Your Honor, the reason that I struck her, Juror Number 800, is because she is a nurse and she has had training on the issue of the application of Posey restraints and she works within the medical field. Judge, I was concerned that she would utilize her own training and skill and substitute that for the Plaintiff’s experts in this case.
Counsel’s concern had a reasonable basis in the record. One of the claims of negligence was that the hospital and Dr. Trowell breached the standard of care in failing to order the use of a “posey” restraint to prevent ambulation by the decedent, Mrs. Bau-com, which proximately resulted in her fall and injuries. Juror 800, the nurse, had stated during voir dire that whether posey restraints should be applied was a question being debated at the time that she did her training and that she continued to work in the medical-surgical field. Juror 800 was unique among the venire members in having both a management position at a health care facility and an exposure to the controversy surrounding the use of posey restraints.
While the estate’s reasons for exercising its third peremptory strike to eliminate juror 061 were not as compelling as its reasons for the other two, they were nevertheless, as the trial court found, legitimate, non-discriminatory ones. The estate’s attorney explained that he struck juror 061, a twenty-six year-old woman, because of concern that she would not be able “to relate to the ability of a 75-year-old lady [Mrs. Baucom], to ambulate after having suffered a stroke” and because, in his opinion, her employment suggested “a liberal nature” which he preferred not to have on the jury.1 Strikes based upon youth and employment have been determined to be constitutionally permissible. See Baxter v. United States, 640 A.2d 714, 718 n. 5 (D.C.1994) (citations omitted); see also Nelson v. United States, 649 A.2d 301, 311 n. 13 (D.C.1994) (citing United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862, 865 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1045, 112 S.Ct. 907, 116 L.Ed.2d 807 (1992) and United States v. Romero-Reyna, 889 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1818, 108 L.Ed.2d 948 (1990)).
Contrary to the trial court’s findings, my colleagues find that the reasons given with respect to juror 061 were pretextual, primarily because of the estate’s failure to strike a 26-year-old black female (juror 862). The fallacy in this argument is that juror 061 was among the first jurors seated and the first to be stricken, while juror 862 was not called into the box until the last round of strikes. *776Therefore, 061 and 862 were not the subject of comparison at that point.2 My colleagues take the position that the challenge to 061 because of her age was not applied evenhandedly because 862 was not stricken for the same reason. Essentially, this means that the estate should have stricken 862 for her youth in lieu of juror 800. This argument ignores the unique experiences of juror 800 and the plausible reasons which suggested that her experience might interfere with her ability to perform properly her duties as a juror. As stated previously, juror 800 was the nurse, who ran a medical clinic and who had knowledge of the debate surrounding the application of posey restraints, which was the subject of the estate’s negligence claim3 In light of the compelling reason for striking juror 800 and the order in which the strikes were made, it is not unreasonable for the trial court to have found no pretext for the strikes. The trial court’s findings of whether a party intentionally discriminates in exercising peremptory challenges turns largely on an evaluation of credibility, and we accord great deference to the trial court in reviewing those findings. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1721 n. 21; see also Jefferson v. United States, 631 A.2d 13, 17 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted); Little v. United States, 613 A.2d 880, 885 (D.C.1992) (citation omitted). The majority fails to accord the trial court’s findings the deference due. On this record, it cannot be said fairly that the trial court’s finding and determination that the hospital and physician failed to meet their burden of showing purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous. See Purkett, supra, 514 U.S. at 767-69, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with the opponent of the strikes) (citation omitted).
My colleagues fault the trial court for “discounting the statistical evidence,” i.e., that the estate exercised its three peremptory challenges against three whites.4 Judge Schwelb goes further and concludes that there is “a very high statistical probability indeed that the [estate] struck one or more potential jurors on account of race.” The estate had only three strikes to use. The trial court determined essentially that this number was too small to be statistically significant, particularly having considered the other relevant factors, as it was required to do. See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23.
This court has stated that “although the trial court may examine statistical disparities as one factor in assessing the prima facie case an inference of discrimination will not likely arise from a mere showing that the party used all of its peremptory challenges to exclude one race. Little, supra, 613 A.2d at 886 (citations omitted). Statistics, standing alone, are inadequate to fathom motive in this context because individuals, unlike marbles, which differ only in size and color, possess unique attributes and experiences which may bear upon their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict in certain cases.5
*777In Little, this court rejected the type of numbers analysis which my colleagues seek to adopt here. 613 A.2d at 886. We stated that “numbers alone are not sufficient either to establish or negate a prima facie showing.” Id. We held that defense counsel had failed to make even a prima facie showing of discrimination where “(1) ... the defendant was black and six of seven strikes were directed toward black persons, (2) ... several black persons were struck who had answered no voir dire questions at all, and (3) ... the only white person whom the prosecutor struck had answered a question.” Jefferson v. United States, 631 A.2d 13, 17-18 (D.C.1993) (citing Little). The case now before the court, with substantially fewer challenges and a record of voir dire examination which offers refutation of any discriminatory purpose, is far stronger for rejection of the challenge than in Little. See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (party’s statement during voir dire may support or refute inference of discriminatory purpose).
The facts of this case are more persuasive in refuting any prima facie claim of discriminatory intent than Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1206 (D.C.1993), upon which my colleagues rely. In Tursio, where the prosecutor struck nine out of ten blacks, we said that “the racially-charged nature of the case itself strengthened appellant’s prima facie showing.” Id. at 1210. Closer scrutiny is applied to the claim of race discrimination where the case is racially charged factually. Evans v. United States, 682 A.2d 644, 650 (D.C.1996). No such circumstances are claimed to be present here. In Tursio, we found that the trial court erred in its consideration of the Batson claim for several reasons, including that the court had focused exclusively on the plausibility of each challenge rather than assessing each challenge in the context of the overall case, which the defendant had requested. Tursio at 1209, 1211-12. In the present case, counsel for the hospital and physician did not seek to probe beyond the disclosures previously discussed, leaving a record which supports the trial court’s finding that they did not meet their burden of showing of purposeful discrimination.
A party’s burden in rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination in peremptory challenges is not an onerous one. Little, supra, 613 A.2d at 888 (citing Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24). The proponent of the strike must provide a legitimate reason for exercising the strike which is related to the case. Purkett, supra, 514 U.S. at 767-69, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (citations omitted). “What is meant by a ‘legitimate reason’ is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.” Id. (citation omitted). Seldom do we see a record like the one presented here where the reasons for the strikes are so clearly race-neutral and case related. If counsel cannot strike a juror who is knowledgeable about a central issue in the case, works in the specific field at issue and relates more to the cause of one side than the other, or by reason of youth and employment, in counsel’s opinion, may not appreciate fully the circumstances of an elderly woman’s claim, then the use of peremptory challenges is effectively barred. The record shows, as the trial court found, that appellants, the opponents of the strikes, failed to meet their ultimate burden of persuasion that the estate’s counsel engaged in purposeful discrimination. See id. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. The estate's counsel also offered that the manner in which juror 061 responded to questions entered into his decision to strike her. Such a reason is also neutral and does not offend equal protection. See Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 ("A legitimate reason’ is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.”). protection. See Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 ("A legitimate reason’ is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.”). at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 ("A legitimate reason’ is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.”).

.In any event, the estate had two objections to 061, age and employment, while there is no showing that 862 had an objectionable employment status. Thus, the two were not similarly situated:
[W]hen the Batson respondents proffer that a combination of characteristics provoked the striking of targeted-group members, it is neither fair nor persuasive to reject such explanations because the same characteristics exist singly, and not in the same combination, among accepted jurors.
Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned about Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame Law Review 447, 480 (1996) (emphasis added).
The concurring opinion suggests that the employment objection should be ignored. However, while questioned by the trial court, the reason was not ignored wholly. The trial court observed:
I suppose that it’s possible that [counsel] would — that he has a view that someone associated with that organization might have some view about nature taking its course and the survival of the fittest or that it’s wrong to lavish too many resources on old people or in keeping them in good shape or whatever and" that may he his reason behind it.

. Judge Schwelb appears to recognize that the record does not support a Batson challenge to jurors 800 and 494. (See concurring op. p. 771 n. 6.)

. One of these three venire members has been described as Hispanic.

. On the facts of this case, and particularly given the unique characteristics of the potential jurors, Judge Schwelb’s skepticism about the reasons for the strikes is not warranted.