Court Opinion

ID: 9836707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:52.340523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:12.157328
License: Public Domain

COX, Senior Judge
(concurring in the result):
The admission of the clinical psychological evaluation report to introduce statements of appellant that he had committed totally unrelated offenses was clearly erroneous in my view, for several reasons. First, in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996), the Supreme Court recognized that there is a federal common law privilege regarding confidential communications to a psychologist. Although a majority of this court has denied servicemembers the very protection against intrusions into their private and confidential communications with their mental health counselors that them fellow citizens enjoy in every other federal court in the land, I would find the privilege exists. See United States v. Rodriguez, 54 MJ 156 (2000) (Gierke, J., joined by Cox, S.J., dissenting).
Second, the statement by appellant that “I have tried” to obey the law is an expression of a subjective belief by appellant, not a statement of fact. Judge Sullivan has hit the nail on the head in his separate opinion. There is no difference between “I feel” and “I tried.” See United States v. Cleveland, 29 MJ 361, 364 (1990). The only problem is that Judge Sullivan got it wrong in Cleveland.
Third, this is an “unsworn” statement. The Government consistently wants to elevate an “unsworn” statement to the level of “evidence.” I suggest that this desire to hammer an accused who is seeking mercy through his last desperate plea to the sentencing authority demonstrates a complete lack of confidence in military court members and military judges. The proper way to deal with an unsworn statement is for the military judge to give a proper instruction to the members regarding the accused’s right of allocution, including a reminder to the members that the statement is “unsworn” and that the accused is not subject to cross-examination.
*168Fourth, it is clear that the prejudicial impact of any evidence of prostitution, adultery, and drug abuse ordinarily far outweighs any probative value in a case like this. Appellant was being sentenced for child molestation. That is serious enough. He should not be sentenced based upon his own confidential admissions that he used drugs or slept with prostitutes on four separate occasions. The admission of this evidence is outrageous. Indeed, under some circumstances, even if appellant had been convicted of these offenses and sent to jail, his convictions could not be used to enhance his sentence. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980)
In spite of the fact that I am of the opinion that the admission of appellant’s clinical record was erroneous, I am likewise convinced that because this was a military judge alone sitting as a special court-martial, the military judge was not improperly swayed by this erroneous material. Art. 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a).