Court Opinion

ID: 9771564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:47:24.917763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:16.923747
License: Public Domain

SCALES, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. Lachmann v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 375 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1964, writ ref’d n.r. e.), is directly on point.
In Lachmann, the publisher brought suit against an advertiser under two written contracts. The first contract was signed: “Company: Artcraft Mattress Company, By: Albert Bentch;” the second was signed: “Company: Artcraft Mattress Company and House of Unpainted Furniture, By: Arno Lachmann.” Lachmann, 375 S.W.2d at 784. In affirming trial court’s judgment that Lachmann was personally liable on the contract signed by him, the court of appeals cited the well-settled rule that:
It is the duty of the agent, if he would avoid personal liability on a contract entered into by him on behalf of the principal, to disclose not only the fact that he is acting in a representative capacity, but also the identity of his principal, as the person dealt with is not bound to inquire whether or not the agent is acting as such for another.
Lachmann, 375 S.W.2d at 785. (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the court held that the use of a trade name in a contract is not a sufficient disclosure of the identity of a principal and the fact of agency.
The majority distinguishes Lachmann on the basis of a stipulation in that case that the business names appearing on the contract were trade names. Although there is no such stipulation in this case, Lassiter, in his fourth amended original answer, states that he is the president of “Turtle Creek Place, Inc. doing business as Turtle Creek Racquet Club” and that the contract “is filled in with the name Turtle Creek Racquet Club, in which said corporation, Turtle Creek Place, Inc., was doing business.” This assertion, that “Turtle Creek Racquet Club” is a trade name, is a formal judicial admission. See Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex.1983) (assertions of fact in live pleadings are regarded as formal judicial admissions). This is sufficient to establish that the company name appearing on the contract is a trade name, and thus the Lachmann rule should apply.1
*12The majority holds, however, that the printed word “company” preceding the trade name “Turtle Creek Racquet Club” satisfies the requirements of article 2.05 of the Texas Business Corporation Act so that Rotogravure was charged with notice that the business might be incorporated. I disagree. Article 2.05 states:
A. The Corporate name shall conform to the following requirements:
(1) It shall contain the word “corporation,” “company,” or “incorporated,” or shall contain an abbreviation of one of such words, and shall contain such additional words as may be required by law.
TEX.BUS.CORP.ACT ANN. art. 2.05(A)(1) (Vernon 1980) (emphasis added). Clearly, the name “Turtle Creek Racquet Club,” which does not contain the words “corporation,” “company,” “incorporated,” or any abbreviation of these words, does not satisfy the requirements of article 2.05. The word “company” in a printed form preceding a trade name, “Turtle Creek Racquet Club,” does not remove this case from the Lachmann rule, because the word “company” in a printed form is not part of the business name.
Because the only issue presented in Lachmann is the issue presented on this appeal and because Lachmann was given a “no reversible error” notation by the supreme court, I believe it should control the disposition of this case. I would affirm the summary judgment.
Before McCLUNG, ROWE1 and SCALES2, JJ.

. The majority cites the official comment to section 3.403 of the Uniform Commercial Code *12as authority that parol evidence is admissible to prove that a signature was made in a representative capacity where the instrument names the principal represented but does not show that the person signed in a representative capacity. Clearly, however, that comment is based on the statutory exception to the general rule that parol evidence is not admissible to show that the agent meant only to bind his principal. That statutory exception, provided by the Uniform Commercial Code, is applicable only to commercial paper, and does not apply here.