Court Opinion

ID: 9705856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:24:04.256408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:16.536851
License: Public Domain

*593Jacobs, J., joined by Proctor and Schettino, JJ.
(dissenting) . ' We are here concerned with the Hayes housing project, located in Newark on a tract bounded by Springfield Avenue, West Kinney Street, Belmont Avenue, 17th Avenue and Hunterdon Street. It consists of ten residential buildings, each 12 stories in height, and an administration center which includes 'a boiler room, management offices and community building. There are walks, play areas and parking areas throughout the project which accommodated almost 1500 families and had a population between 5 and 6 thousand persons. A Newark police officer was assigned to patrol the walks and streets on the project grounds but he was not permitted to enter any of the project buildings unless specifically called for in the performance of police functions. The entrances to the residential buildings were never locked and no doormen or other attendants were ever assigned to them. As of the time here involved the defendant had three special *594policemen who worked in patrol shifts at the project between the hours of 4:00 r. m. and 8:00 a. m. No special policemen were assigned for the daytime hours between 8:00 a. m. and 4:00 p. m.
The plaintiff had been making milk deliveries at the project since it was first opened in 1954. He customarily made deliveries at 8:00 a. m. but on December 24, 1957 he altered his hours and was making deliveries at 1:30 p. m. in a building designated as 45-17th Avenue. While in the building’s self-service elevator he was severely beaten and robbed and his assailants ran off and were never apprehended. In July 1958 he filed his complaint in the County Court seeking damages from the defendant for his injuries and charging that he suffered them because the defendant had negligently failed to “adequately supervise” the common passageways and elevators of the building, had negligently failed to take “proper measures” to keep the premises safe though it had knowledge of the dangers through the occurrence of prior assaults, and had negligently permitted dangerous acts to be performed and continued on the premises without taking “any precautions or safeguards” against their happening.
At the trial the plaintiff introduced evidence indicating that during the course of 1957 and prior to the assault upon him, the defendant had received many reports from its special policemen of crimes and acts of violence at the Hayes project; some of these reports related to daytime occurrences and many more bore on nighttime events. The daytime occurrences included several incidents involving armed intruders in parking lots at the project, a mugging in a hallway of a residential building, the arrest of a hallway loiterer who offered forceful reástance, an,d the molesting of a girl in the elevator of one of the residential buildings. A former special policeman at the Hayes project testified that during many monthly meetings prior to December 24, 1957 he had discussed the need for additional policing with Mr. Bland, who was employed by the defendant as manager of the Hayes project, and that he had recommended the employment of a *595special policeman for assignment between the hours of 8:00 A. m. and 4:00 p. m. In his testimony when called as a witness for the defendant, Mr. Bland acknowledged that he, in turn, had recommended to the defendant at or prior to December 1957 that another special policeman be employed at the project.
In addition to all of the foregoing, the plaintiff offered in evidence police records of the Uewark Police Department’s Fourth Precinct, which is located near the Hayes project. These records referred to numerous complaints of crimes and acts of violence at the project and included references not only to nighttime occurrences but also to daytime occurrences such as assaults and rapes or attempted rapes in the elevators and hallways of the residential buildings. The trial court refused to permit these police records into evidence although it is clear to me that they should have been admitted. Cf. N. J. S. 2A:82-35; Schwartau v. Miesmer, 50 N. J. Super. 399, 413 (App. Div. 1958), certif. denied, 28 N. J. 34 (1958); State v. Wingler, 25 N. J. 161, 180 (1957); 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 665 (3d ed. 1940); 6 Wigmore, supra §§ 1530, 1530A. The trial court did, however, admit into evidence the official records of meetings held by the Commissioners of the Housing Authority from June to October 1957 as bearing on the extent of the notice to' the defendant of alleged events at the Hayes project prior to the date of the assault. These minutes contained many comments relating to crimes and acts of violence at the defendant’s housing projects and the necessity for taking additional precautions. Thus at the meeting held on June 12, 1957 Commissioner Spatola referred to “a killing in one project and a raping in another” and the need for a mobile police force of “uniformed guards properly trained and sworn in.” Commissioner Purcell noted that the Uewark Police Department had been asked “for protection around Hayes” and expressed the view that “the crime center is not within our project but by people who come into our project.”
At a later meeting held on July 10, 1957, Mr. Danzig, Executive Director of the Housing Authority, reported that *596he had met with the managers and the administrative staffs of the projects being operated by the defendant and that they were of the belief that the projects were not “adequately policed.” The Executive Director expressed the opinion that the special police should be augmented in specific areas and a committee was appointed to meet with the proper city officials and a representative of the Public Housing Administration. At a meeting of the Housing Authority on September 11, 1957 the Executive Director reported that conferences had been held with Newark’s Police Commissioner who had suggested that the defendant engage a retired high ranking police officer to make a study as to the need for additional special policemen. At a meeting on October 16, 1957 the Executive Director reported that a further conference with the Police Commissioner would be held and that a report thereon would be submitted. Although the Executive Director had testified before trial that there was “some measure of crimes and juvenile delinquency” at the Hayes project and had testified again during the course of the trial, the record contains nothing to suggest that any protective action was taken by the defendant prior to the date of the assault on the plaintiff.
After the plaintiff completed his testimony, the defendant introduced testimony by Mr. Bland and Mr. Danzig along with a copy of a cooperation agreement between the City of Newark and the Housing Authority. That agreement provided that the city would furnish to the Authority the facilities, including police and health protection, which were furnished to “other dwellings and inhabitants in the City.” Pursuant to this- agreement the city did provide a police officer who patrolled the streets and walks of the project, but the understanding, as testified to by Mr. Bland, was that city policemen were “not allowed to go into the buildings.” Similar testimony by Mr. Danzig was that city policemen were not permitted to enter the buildings of the project except when actually called because of the commission or threatened commission of a crime. Mr. Bland testified that the responsibility *597of maintenance men assigned to the project’s buildings was for “cleanliness” and other “janitorial duties,” and there is nothing to suggest that they had any responsibility with respect to safety and order. At the close of all of the testimony the trial court submitted the case to the jury which returned a verdict of $6,000 in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff was, of course, entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences which might be drawn from the evidence to support the verdict. See Menth v. Breeze Corporation, Inc., 4 N. J. 428, 438 (1950); 5 C. J. S., Appeal & Error § 1562(4), p. 1222 (1958). The Appellate Division sustained the jury’s verdict and the judgment entered thereon in an opinion reported at 70 N. J. Super. 245 (1961).
In its attack on the action of the Appellate Division, the defendant relied primarily on its position that it was under no duty to furnish any special “police protection” to guard against assaults. It did not deny that, as landlord, it retained possession and control of the hallways, elevators, and other common facilities, and owed a duty to keep them in reasonably safe condition. See Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N. J. 267, 272 (1954); Hedges v. Housing Authority, Atlantic City, 21 N. J. Super. 167, 170 (App. Div. 1952); Doud v. Housing Authority of Newark, 75 N. J. Super. 340, 344 (App. Div. 1962). It contended, however, that that duty related to the safety of the physical structure and did not extend to the furnishing of protection against crimes. Citing Genovay v. Fox, 50 N. J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 1958), reversed 29 N. J. 436 (1959), and Prosser, Torts 141 (2d ed. 1955), it relied on its stated proposition that “generally a property owner is not obliged to anticipate and guard against the criminal acts of others.” Assuming that to be so, courts have nonetheless repeatedly held that where there are special conditions from, which the owner or operator of the premises should recognize and foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to invitees from criminal or wrongful acts of others, he must take reasonable precautions which may, under the circumstances, fairly and justly entail the *598employment of special guards or police. See Exton v. Central R. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 7, 11 (Sup. Ct. 1898), aff’d 63 N. J. L. 356 (E. & A. 1899); Skillen v. West Jersey & Seashore R. R. Co., 96 N. J. L. 492, 494 (E. & A. 1921); Sandler v. Hudson & Manhattan R. R. Co., 8 N. J. Misc. 537, 539, 151 A. 99 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff’d 108 N. J. L. 203 (E. & A. 1931); Williams v. Essex Amusement Corp., 133 N. J. L. 218, 219 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Reilly v. 180 Club, Inc., 14 N. J. Super. 420, 424 (App. Div. 1951); Crammer v. Willston Operating Co., Inc., 19 N. J. Super. 489, 490 (App. Div. 1952); Becker v. Newark, 72 N. J. Super. 355, 358 (App. Div. 1962); cf. Neering v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N. E. 2d 497 (1943); Quigley v. Wilson Line of Massachusetts, 338 Mass. 125, 154 N. E. 2d 77, 77 A. L. R. 2d 499 (1958) ; Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459, 68 S. Ct. 140, 92 L. Ed. 73 (1947); McLeod v. Grant County School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P. 2d 360 (1953); Kendall v. Gore Properties, 98 U. S. App. D. C. 378, 236 F. 2d 673 (1956); Restatement, Torts § 348 (1934). See also Da Rocha v. New York City Housing Authority, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff’d 282 App. Div. 728, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 397 (1953); Geigel v. New York City Housing Authority, 225 N. Y. S. 2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Hansen v. New York City Housing Authority, 271 App. Div. 986, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 71 (1947); cf. Amoruso v. New York City Transit Authority, 12 App. Div. 2d 11, 207 N. Y. S. 2d 855 (1960); Abbott v. New York Public Library, 263 App. Div. 314, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 963 (1942); Siegel v. 1536-46 St. John’s Place Corporation, 184 Misc. 1053, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 473 (1945).
In Exton v. Central R. R. Co., supra, the plaintiff was knocked down by scuffling hackmen on a walkway used by passengers at the Central Railroad depot. She sued the defendant l’ailroad and introduced evidence that there had been prior scuffling and that the defendant had taken no steps to prevent it and resulting injury to passengers. The court held that the matter was properly submitted to the jury -which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. In the course of his *599opinion, Justice Lippincott pointed, out that the defendant, as a common carrier, was obligated to use reasonable care to keep its walkway safe for the use of its passengers and that while it was not required to furnish watchmen sufficient to overcome “all force or negligence, when unexpectedly happening” it was under a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect its passengers “from assaults from any quarter at which they might reasonably be expected to occur, under the circumstances of the case and the condition of the parties.” 62 N. J. L., at p. 14.
In Neering v. Illinois Central B. B. Co., supra, the principles expressed in Exton were applied to sustain recovery by a woman who had been assaulted at the defendant’s railroad station while awaiting the arrival of a suburban train. The evidence indicated that, although there had been no prior assaults, the defendant had permitted hobos, tramps and vagrants to loiter about its station and could reasonably have anticipated the commission of unlawful acts on patrons. Justice Thompson noted that the circumstances evidencing the potential danger of assault upon passengers placed an affirmative duty upon the railroad to “exercise reasonable care and caution for its prevention.” 50 N. E. 2d, at p. 503. See Quigley v. Wilson Line of Massachusetts, supra, where recovery by an assaulted ship passenger was sustained by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on a finding that the shipping company had negligently failed to discharge its duty of providing suitable protection. 154 N. E. 2d, at p. 80. See also Amoruso v. New York City Transit Authority, supra, where the court held that the plaintiff had a cause of action against the Transit Authority for injuries sustained as the result of an assault upon him at a subway station; it stated that it was for the jury to determine whether the defendant had taken “reasonable precautions” in discharging its duty of care. 207 N. Y. S. 2d, at p. 856.
In Crammer v. Willston Operating Co., Inc., supra, the plaintiff was injured at a skating rink when a young man skated rapidly between her and her companion and threw her *600to the ground. The rink was crowded, the skating was very fast, and there were some acts bordering on rowdyism. There were two guards in attendance although ordinarily three were employed. In sustaining the judgment awarded to the 'plaintiff, the Appellate Division noted that the defendant’s duty of due care extended “to protection against the acts of third persons if he ought reasonably to have anticipated the occurrence” (19 N. J. Super., at p. 490) and that the evidence justified the inference that “better policing of the rink would have deterred” the injurious conduct. 19 N. J. Super., at p. 492. See Lee v. National League Baseball Club of Milwaukee, 4 Wis. 2d 168, 89 N. W. 2d 811, 814 (1958).
The principles underlying Crammer have been widely applied to varying situations in decisions which may carry implications bearing even more closely on the case at hand. In Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal App. 2d 141, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1962), the court sustained a recovery from a camp operator by a child who had been attacked by an intruder; it found that the occurrence “was one which the defendant should have foreseen and better guarded against.” 18 Cal. Rptr., at p. 895. In McLeod v. Grant County School Dist. No. 128, supra, the court sustained recovery from a school district by a child who had been attacked in the school gymnasium. The court held that a jury could properly find from the circumstances that the occurrence “was a danger reasonably to be anticipated” and that the school district was negligent in failing to take proper precautions to prevent it. 255 P. 2d, at p. 364. In Abbott v. New York Public Library, supra, the court noted that the defendant owed a duty of care to keep its place reasonably safe and that this included a duty to supervise it adequately “so that persons lawfully using it are not unreasonably exposed to danger”; it held that a visitor at the library had a cause of action against the library for injuries sustained when he was assaulted by another visitor whose dangerous tendencies had earlier been brought to the library’s attention. 32 N. Y. S. 2d, at p. 966. In Lillie v. Thompson, supra, the plaintiff was employed by the *601defendant as a telegraph operator to work alone at night in an isolated part of the railroad yard. While at work she was beaten by an intruder and seriously injured. She sued her employer for failing to .take adequate precautions for her safety. In holding that she had a cause of action, the Supreme Court pointed out that it was irrelevant that the foreseeable danger was from criminal conduct since the defendant "nonetheless had a duty to make reasonable provision against it.” 332 U. S., at p. 462, 68 S. Ct., at p. 142, 92 L. Ed., at p. 75.
In Kendall v. Gore Properties, supra, Miss Whitman was a tenant in an apartment building operated by the defendant. She was choked to death by Hickey who had been given a key to her apartment by the defendant fox the purpose of painting it. There was evidence from which a jury could find that care had not been taken in selecting Hickey or in supervising his activities. In holding that the administratrix of the estate of Miss Whitman had a cause of action against the defendant which should be submitted to the jury for its determination, the court broadly expressed its views as to the landlord’s duty of care under modern conditions and as to various hazards, noting that if the landlord knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care ought to know, of a dangerous situation and "fails to take such steps as an ordinarily prudent person, in view of existing circumstances, would have exercised to avoid injury to his tenant, he may be liable.” 236 F. 2d at p. 680. See also Siegel v. 1536-46 St. John’s Place Corporation, supra, where the defendant was held liable for injuries from a dog bite suffered by the plaintiff while he was walking along a common stairway of the apartment house owned by the defendant; the court pointed out that the defendant-landlord was under a duty to keep the common ways of the apartment in a reasonably safe condition and that this duty “extended to the exclusion of known vicious animals from frequenting thereabout.” 57 N. Y. S. 2d, at p. 474. Cf. State of Maryland v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Company, 176 F. 2d 414 (4 Cir. 1949), where the United States *602Government was held liable because of the death of a tenant from a disease transmitted by means of the bite of a flea from an infected rat at premises operated by the Eederal Public Housing Authority; the court found that the Authority had not discharged its obligation to exercise due care in its maintenance of the common areas of the premises. 116 F. 2d, at p. 416.
In Da Rocha v. New York City Housing Authority, supra, the plaintiff was a child of a tenant at a 40-acre city housing project. He was injured by a bicycle improperly ridden along one of the paths within the project. Although the area was policed by three guards, none was observable at the time of-the accident. In holding that the plaintiff had a cause of action which could be asserted against the Housing Authority, the court pointed out that the absence of any supervision from a guard was vital and that it could fairly be inferred that if he had been present, the bicycle rider would have kept away. In Ceigel v. New Yorh City Housing Authority, supra, the plaintiff was injured when a boy who was playing punchball at the housing project ran into her. She sued the Housing Authority and introduced testimony that there was no guard or housing officer on duty in the immediate vicinity at the time of the accident and that the defendant had ample notice that children had been using the area for play -purposes. In awarding a judgment to the plaintiff, the court pointed out that the defendant was under a duty to keep the area “in a reasonably safe condition for the protection of its tenants” and that it could not ignore “the foreseeable dangers.” 225 N. Y. S. 2d, at p. 893.
It must be borne in mind that in the instant matter the court is not at all concerned with the ordinary private multidwelling or apartment house. There the owner’s customary reliance on the measure of protection afforded- by the public-police force against criminal acts by intruders may perhaps be viewed, as a matter of law, as not unreasonable in relation' to the nature of the risk involved. Cf. Genovay v. Fox, supra, 50 N. J. Super., at pp. 551-552. Here, the- court is con*603cerned with a special situation in which the defendant has built a high-rise multi-unit housing project which, by virtue of its size, composition and mode of operation, presents special dangers requiring special precautions. See Mulvihill, “Problems in the Management of Public Housing,” 35 Temp. L. Q. 163, 179 (1962); cf. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961); Harrington, “Slums, Old and New,” 30 Commentary 118 (1960) ; Salisbury, The Shoolc-Up Generation (1958). Such patrol and surveillance activities as were engaged in by the Newark police officers were confined strictly to the streets and walks. They were not permitted to enter the buildings and the Housing Authority relied entirely on its own employees for supervision in the buildings. It engaged special policemen between the hours of 4:00 p. M. and 8:00 a. m. but decided, for obscure reasons of its own, not to engage any special policemen between the daytime hours of 8:00 a. m. and 4:00 p. m. It took no action to alter its decision, notwithstanding specific recommendations from one of its special officers and its project manager at Hayes, notwithstanding its awareness of the daytime crimes and acts of violence at Hayes, and notwithstanding the repeated expressions by individual housing commissioners of the need for additional policing at Hayes and elsewhere. Nor did it take any action to alter its policy of permitting the entrances to the residential buildings at Hayes to remain always unlocked and unattended. Indeed, the record indicates that, though the daytime special dangers were evident, the defendant took no special precautions at all with respect to them. Under the circumstances it seems clear to me that a jury could readily find, that a reasonably prudent person, situated as was the defendant, would have foreseen and recognized an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to invitees such as the plaintiff, from criminal or wrongful acts of others, and would have taken reasonable protective precautions through the enlargement of its own special police force or in other appropriate manner. Cf. New York Times, September 13, 1962, p. 1, col. 5.
*604The defendant has advanced the contention that, assuming dereliction of duty on its part in failing to take precautions such as the employment of a daytime special policeman, there is nothing to indicate that his presence would have prevented the assault. It is, of course, true that no one knows for certain what the effect of a daytime policeman would have been; nor does anyone know whether the employment of additional guards would have prevented the injuries in Crammer, Geigel, or in the many other cases where recovery was allowed. Nevertheless, it is likely that the daytime policeman would have served as a deterrent and it could reasonably be found that his absence was, in a legal sense, the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. See Crammer v. Willston Operating Co., Inc., supra, 19 N. J. Super., at p. 492; Lee v. National League Baseball Club of Milwaukee, supra, 89 N. W. 2d, at p. 814. In the Lee case, a spectator at a ball game was injured when other spectators stampeded to recover a foul ball. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for money .damages against the ball club and this was sustained by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in an opinion which held that the jury was properly permitted to find that the defendant was negligent in failing to have an usher at his assigned position in the area. In response to the defendant’s contention that even the presence of the usher would not have prevented the injury, the court pointed out that the jury could reasonably have inferred that the usher’s presence “might have been effective” and that his absence constituted a “substantial factor” in the ultimate event. 89 N. W. 2d, at p. 815. A comparably broad approach may be found in recent cases in New Jersey where the court held that it is sufficient if the defendant’s negligence constituted a substantial factor in the occurrence; within wide outer limits, the issue of proximate cause is justly left to the jury. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N. J. 188, 203 (1959); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N. J. 359, 374 (1957).
The cited precedents overwhelmingly support the plaintiff’s cause of action. They may, of course, be differentiated *605factually since none of them involved a negligence action for injuries suffered in the elevator of a Newark housing project. Cf. Frankfurter, J., concurring in Still v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 368 U. S. 35, 82 S. Ct. 148, 7 L. Ed. 2d 103, 111 (1961). But they may not be differentiated legally since all of them involved soundly grounded principles which are patently applicable; indeed, most of them involved'circumstances far less compelling than those, presented here. Highrise housing projects have brought with them problems which have caused serious concern throughout the nation. See Harrington, supra, at p. 122; Salisbury, supra, at p. 75. Cf. Newark Evening News, November 15, 1962, p. 7, col. 1; November 19, 1962, p. 20, col. 1. Jane Jacobs has referred specially to the dangers of violence in corridors and elevators of the projects and has suggested that the reasonably safe way of dealing with them is'to provide full-time'attendants (Jacobs, supra, at p. 399); and others have suggested the possibility of suitable alarm or “video guard” systems. See the New York Times, March 14, 1960, p. 20, col. 2. When an act of violence occurred recently at a New York City housing project, locks were changed and additional private guards were engaged. See the New York Times, September 13, 1962, p. 1, col. 5; September 15, 1962, p. 27, col. 1. Here the Newark Housng Authority had recognized some dangers and the need for taking precautions by engaging special policemen who were presumably employed in accordance with N'. J. S. A. 40:47-19 and the Civil Service specifications relating to housing guards. But it neglected to engage any for assignment during the daytime hours or to take any other suitable precautions though it was fully aware of the serious daytime as well as nighttime dangers. That this amounts to actionable negligence finds ample support not only in the precedents but also in the strong underlying considerations of fairness and justice.
The defendant’s duty was to take reasonable precautions; that duty was no more vague than is the test of reasonableness throughout our law generally. In Nash v. United States, *606229 U. S. 373, 33 S. Ct. 780, 57 L. Ed. 1232 (1913), Justice Holmes noted that even in the field of criminal law a test comparable to reasonableness may be applied without infringing any principles of fairness or due process. Similarly in United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 62 S. Ct. 374, 86 L. Ed. 383 (1942), the Supreme Court, through Justice Black, pointed out that the fact that a penal statute is so framed as to require a jury to determine the question oE reasonableness “is not sufficient to malee it too vague to afford a practical guide to permissible conduct.” 314 U. S., at p. 523, 86 L. Ed., at p. 390. Here there was no issue as to how many daytime guards would have been sufficient. The fact was that the defendant failed to engage even a single daytime guard or to take any other protective precautions insofar as daytime dangers were concerned. When the very serious nature of the dangers is considered, the cost of a daytime guard or other reasonable precaution fades into insignificance. Any suggestion that the defendant may fairly be entitled to an immunity because of the high-minded purposes of its fácil-ities is readily dissipated by reference to judicial opinions such as Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N. J. 29 (1958), where the court set forth fully the compelling reasons for discarding the common law immunity of charitable institutions. Furthermore, the pertinent legislation itself may properly be said to have rejected any notion that the Housing Authority was to be immunized from ordinary tort responsibility. See 70 N. J. Super., at pp. 250-253; cf. Taylor v. N. J. Highway Authority, 22 N. J. 454, 466 (1956); McCabe v. N. J. Turnpike Auth., 35 N. J. 26 (1961). See also Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 245, 60 S. Ct. 488, 84 L. Ed. 724, 728 (1940); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 59 S. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 784 (1939); cf. Knowles v. Housing Authority of the City of Columbus, 212 Ga. 729, 95 S. E. 2d 659, 61 A. L. R. 2d 1241 (1956); Muses v. Housing Authority of City & County of San Francisco, 83 Cal. App. 2d 489, 189 P. 2d 305 (1948); Manney v. Housing Author*607ity of the City of Richmond, 79 Cal. App. 2d 453, 180 P. 2d 69 (1947); Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So. 2d 527 (1943).
The procedural effort to confine the plaintiff narrowly to a thesis or theory of action based solely on the absence of special police seems to me to be a reversion to a bygone period where technism was placed above justice. In any event, it lacks the support of the trial record. The plaintiff’s complaint did not mention special police but asserted that the 'defendant had failed to exercise proper supervision over the common passageways and elevators, had failed to take proper measures to keep the premises safe though it had knowledge of the dangers, and had negligently permitted the performance of dangerous acts' without taking any precautions or safeguards against their happening. The supplemental pretrial order did refer to' special police, but it also referred to the absence of “other safeguards” and specifically set forth the plaintiff’s contention that “the defendant failed to take proper and adequate precautions and measures to safeguard persons on the premises including the plaintiff, with regard to their personal safety.” During the trial there was considerable evidence with respect to the insufficiency of the special police but there was also evidence indicating that the building was never locked, that no doorman or other attendant was ever assigned to it, and that no pertinent protective daytime precautions were ever taken. In his summation to the jury, counsel for the plaintiff stated that his case was predicated on the negligence of the defendant “in failing to furnish reasonable safety and protection to this plaintiff”; and while he paid considerable attention to the absence of special daytime police, he also referred to the “open self-service elevators,” to the fact that intruders slept “in the hallways and the stairways,” and to the fact that there were no locks on the doors or attendants in the building. At one point in his summation he noted that representatives of the Housing Authority had not testified why “they didn’t put *608.police there in the daytime, why they didn’t put locks on the doors, why they didn’t have an attendant in the daytime.”
In his charge to the jury the trial judge recognized the broad nature of the plaintiff’s claim. He did not at any time suggest that the claim rested solely on the absence of special police but, on the contrary, instructed the jury in the early part of his charge, as follows:
“The plaintiff in this action charges that his injury and loss of ■property- was caused by the defendant in that it failed to exercise .reasonable care for the safety and protection of persons having a lawful right to be on the premises. The defendant on the other hand asserts that it had no duty to provide the plaintiff with police protection, that it did not fail in any respect to any duty it owed the plaintiff because it could not have reasonably foreseen any danger to the plaintiff of the sort here encountered.”
In the remainder of his charge the trial judge dealt mainly in general terms with fundamental principles of negligence, contributory negligence and causation. He instructed the jury that the test to be applied by. it in deciding the issue of negligence was whether “the defendant exercised in the Operation of its Housing Authority the care which a reasonable, prudent man would have exercised at the time and place and under. the circumstances.” And in summarizing the responsibility of the jury, he suggested that it consider whether the defendant was aware of the' danger, whether there was a fáilure by the defendant to exercise reasonable care, and whether the defendant’s failure was the efficient, producing cause of the injury. In the light of all of the foregoing it is difficult to see how it may now be said that the plaintiff confined his claim strictly to the absence of police or that the case was submitted to the jury'on that issue.
After a full trial which was free of any prejudicial error (70 N. J. Super., at pp. 255-256), the jury found that the defendant had acted unreasonably in failing to take protective precautions despite notice of the serious dangers and that it should compensate the plaintiff for his resulting injury. Its verdict was firmly based on the evidence and on established *609principles of negligence law and the record presents no rational ground for upsetting it. Indeed, as I view the matter, the upsetting of the verdict not only operates unjustly to the plaintiff but also disserves the strong policy considerations which dictate that, in the maintenance and operation of its project, the defendant be placed under the traditional duty of due care and be justly accountable to those injured as the result of its breach. I vote to affirm.
For reversal — ’Chief Justice Wbintkatjb, and Justices Eranois, Hall and Haneman — 4.
For affirmance — Justices Jacobs, Pkoctok and Schettino —3.