Court Opinion

ID: 9586388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:10:03.375885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:52.148999
License: Public Domain

MR CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES T. HARRISON
delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff, Charles D. Ashcraft, appealed from an order of the district court of Silver Bow County granting the defendant, Montana Power Company’s motion for summary judgment.
Stipulated facts are as follows-. On December 31, 1966, defendant contracted with Swain & Morris Construction Company, Inc., to construct electrical lines and facilities. Swain & Morris was designated as an independent contractor in the contract and conducted its work on the job as an independent contractor. Plaintiff was employed by Swain & Morris as a journeyman lineman, and his job on this particular project consisted of climbing power poles, replacing existing erossarms, and adding a third wire to the existing transmission system.
On October 30, 1967, plaintiff was performing his task when the power pole he had ascended toppled to the ground and injured him.
In their contract, defendant required Swain & Morris to comply with Montana Workmen’s Compensation Law to which Swain & Morris had previously ascribed and which was in effect when plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff’s claim for workmen’s compensation was paid under the plan carried by Swain & Morris but, in addition, plaintiff filed suit pursuant to section 92-204, R.C.M.1947, against defendant as a third party whose alleged negligence had caused his injury.
On the stipulated facts, the district court found defendant immune from third party suit according to section 92-438, R.C.M.1947. The issue here is whether or not the district court was correct in its interpretation of this statute.
Section 92-438, R.C.M.1947, reads in pertinent part-.
*370“* * * But the legal defense of independent contractor shall not bar otherwise compensable industrial accident claims against employers except when such defense is interposed on behalf of a party who has previously required the claimant’s immediate employer to come within the "Workmen’s Compensation Act.”
Defendant required plaintiff’s immediate employer, Swain & Morris, to come within the Workmen’s Compensation Act, therefore, defendant is in compliance with the exception of section 92-438, R.C.M.1947, and is not barred from using the independent contractor defense.
However, does the allowance of this defense when the general employer has required the immediate employer to carry workmen’s compensation insurance also provide the general employer with immunity from third party suits? This Court believes that it does where complete control of the details and means of accomplishing the project are left to the employee’s immediate employer, that is, where the immediate employer is an “independent contractor”.
Thus, the reasoning takes the form of a truism. When it is undisputed that the employee’s immediate employer is an independent contractor, required to carry workmen’s compensation insurance, the independent contractor defense is available to the general employer thereby absolving his liability. With regard to liability immunity under the independent contractor defense, this Court recently said in Wells v. Thill, 153 Mont. 28, 32, 452 P.2d 1015, 1017:
“ ‘In every such instance where the contractor is in full supervision and control of the work, he alone becomes liable to his employees under the statute for injuries sustained.’ ”
In effect, a general employer under these circumstances is immune from a third party liability suit.
This rule of law, which is axiomatic under section 92-438, R.C.M.1947, is strictly limited to circumstances in which the injured employee’s immediate employer is an independent contractor who is required to carry workmen’s compensation insurance by his general employer. This rule of law does not apply to *371any other situation where the status of the injured employee’s immediate employer is found to be other than an “independent contractor,” or where the general contractor does not require an independent contractor to carry workmen’s compensation insurance. Likewise, this rule of law does not apply to independent tortfeasors who are “strangers to the employment” under section 92-204, R.C.M.1947. Hoffman v. Johnston, 120 Mont. 231, 242, 181 P.2d 792.
Since the contract in the instant case designated Swain & Morris an independent contractor and Swain & Morris operated as an independent contractor who was required by the defendant to carry workmen’s compensation insurance, the defendant is completely immune from liability under section 92-438, R.C.M.1947.
Order affirmed.
MR. JUSTICES CASTLES and JOHN C. HARRISON, concur.
MR. JUSTICE HASWELL, not participating.