Court Opinion

ID: 9585963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:05:37.255477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:17.654154
License: Public Domain

Justice MEYER
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
At the outset I hasten to say that, for the reasons stated by the majority, I agree that the complaint fails to allege a libel of *327the first class — a libel per se. Nor does it allege a libel of the second class as plaintiff did not allege that the editorial is susceptible of two meanings, one defamatory, and that the defamatory meaning was intended and was so understood by those to whom the publication was made. The complaint likewise fails to allege a cause of action for a libel of the third class — libel per quod— since it was not alleged that the plaintiff suffered special damages. While certain allegations of the complaint might be interpreted to allege special damages, the complaint refers to those allegations as supporting only a libel per se. Further, plaintiff conceded during oral argument that the complaint alleges libel per se, ie., a libel of the first class, or no libel at all.
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which addresses the issue of the false light invasion of privacy cause of action. Specifically, I do not agree with the majority opinion in its result on this issue —that no cause of action for false light invasion of privacy exists in this State, nor with the reasoning which guided the majority to that result. While there is indeed some overlapping in our existing action for libel per quod and false light invasion of privacy, they are not and should not be exclusive each of the other.
The distinctions between the defamation (libel and slander) and invasion of privacy torts are often blurred. While the interest protected in defamation actions is one’s reputation or good name, the interest protected in invasion of privacy actions is often characterized as one’s right to privacy or, simply stated, one’s right to be let alone. In false light actions it is not necessary that the publication be defamatory or that special damages be alleged. Whereas truth is an absolute defense in the defamation actions, it is not in the invasion of privacy actions, except in the false light cases. This is so because, in privacy actions, it is not just the inaccuracy of the matter published which is of concern but the mere fact that the matter is published.
Our courts have long recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Brown v. Boney, 41 N.C. App. 636, 255 S.E. 2d 784, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E. 2d 910 (1979); Barr v. Telephone Co., 13 N.C. App. 388, 185 S.E. 2d 714 (1972). While I cannot agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that *328these are “false light” cases, they are indeed invasion of privacy cases.
A number of state and federal courts have recognized actions for false light invasion of privacy. See Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W. 2d 840 (1979), cert. denied, Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 444 U.S. 1076, 62 L.Ed. 2d 759 (1980); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A. 2d 1317 (1982); Harrison v. Washington Post Co., 391 A. 2d 781 (App. D.C. 1978); Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W. 2d 816 (Iowa 1977); Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 516 P. 2d 993 (1973); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W. 2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975, 72 L.Ed. 2d 849 (1982); McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P. 2d 737 (Okla. 1980).
The elements of a false light invasion of privacy claim though variously stated include (1) publication (2) of a false statement concerning the plaintiff which places plaintiff in a false light that would be offensive to a reasonable person in plaintiffs position. The essence of the term “false light” is a major misrepresentation of a person’s character, history, activities or beliefs which places that person in an objectionable false position before the party or parties to whom it is communicated.
The Restatement has significantly tightened the elements by requiring that the false statement be “material,” that the matter be “highly offensive” rather than simply “offensive,” and that the actor know the material published is false or that the publication was made in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the material. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E; see also False Light: Invasion of Privacy? 15 Tulsa Law Journal 113 (1979).
Plaintiffs claim is consistent with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, entitled “Publicity Placing a Person In False Light,” which provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or *329acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
The Court of Appeals in Renwick related the following concerning false light invasion of privacy:
For liability to attach under Section 652E, it is essential that the matter publicized be untrue, although it is not necessary for the matter to be defamatory. Section 652E, Comment b. It is sufficient if the matter published attributes to the plaintiff characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false so that he is portrayed before the public in a false position. Id.; Brown v. Boney, supra, at 648, 255 S.E. 2d at 791. An action for defamation and a claim for false light invasion of privacy, however, are closely allied and the same considerations apply to each. Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1981); Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 Colm. L. Rev. 1205, 1207 (1976). It is for the Court to determine whether the communication in question is capable of bearing a particular meaning which is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Cibenko, supra at 766.
63 N.C. App. at 240, 304 S.E. 2d at 617.
I agree with the Court of Appeals that so much of the editorial as is contained in the complaint is reasonably capable of conveying the offensive meaning or the innuendo ascribed by the plaintiff as the basis for his invasion of privacy claim.
A cause of action for both false light invasion of privacy and libel may be joined in the same action. See Varnish v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F. 2d 608 (2nd Cir. 1968). However, there can be but one recovery for any particular publication. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E, Comment b. See 62 Am. Jur. 2d Privacy § 5 (1972).
I do not share the majority’s fear of conflict between our recognition of a false light invasion of privacy cause of action and the First Amendment limitations placed upon defamation actions by Sullivan and upon false light invasion of privacy actions by Hill For an examination of this problem, see “Privacy: The Search for a Standard,” 11 Wake Forest L. Rev. 659 (1975). The Court of Appeals has adequately and accurately addressed the is*330sues relating to constitutional privilege in some thirty-three pages of its fifty-four page opinion in this case. The Court of Appeals’ treatment of the constitutional issues is both scholarly and convincing. The First Amendment provides no absolute protection for any individual or member of the news media to make false material statements of fact and then to draw defamatory conclusions therefrom.
I agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint states a valid claim for relief for false light invasion of privacy. 63 N.C. App. at 241, 304 S.E. 2d at 617. I believe that such a cause of action should obtain in North Carolina. I would vote to modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Justice Exum dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that these complaints do not state claims for libel per se. The editorial on which the complaints are based identify plaintiff as “Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at Chapel Hill [and] formerly in charge of minority admissions.” The editorial then asserts that plaintiff in a 1978 newspaper article said 800 black students had been denied admission to the university between 1975 and 1978. Thereafter, the editorial asserts that plaintiffs 1978 statement was “flatly” denied by the present minority admissions director and that a 1979 faculty committee report showed only 36 blacks to have been denied admission between 1975 and 1979. The editorial ends by a reference to “irresponsible charges such as this one. ” (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, the last reference is to plaintiffs statement in his 1978 newspaper article. The entire thrust of the editorial is this: The “latest barrage” of “charges from Washington” is based on plaintiffs 1978 statement regarding black admissions to the university. Plaintiffs 1978 statement is wrong and grossly overstates the number of blacks denied admission. Plaintiff was then in a position to know what the true facts were. Plaintiffs 1978 statement is “irresponsible.”
Certainly these assertions in the editorial tend to “impeach” plaintiff in his position as Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. They also tend to subject him to ridicule, contempt, or disgrace. If the assertions are false and made with malice they constitute libel per se.
*331Plaintiff alleges that insofar as the editorial asserts that he said “between 1975 and 1978 about 800 black students had been denied admission” the editorial is false. He also alleges that the editorial was published by both defendants “with knowledge of [its] falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth, and with actual malice.” For purposes of the motion to dismiss the complaint, we must, of course, assume that these allegations are true.
I am satisfied the complaints have alleged a claim for libel per se.
I concur in Part II of the majority opinion.
For the foregoing reasons I vote to modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.