Court Opinion

ID: 9695673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:27:00.42767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:15.718477
License: Public Domain

JACOBS, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent.
This is an appeal from a final decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County enjoining defendant-appellant Helen Willing from uttering defamatory statements about appellees and from picketing their law offices. I do not believe that appellees are entitled to injunctive relief and I would therefore vacate the decree entered below.
Appellees are a two-member law firm with offices located at Room 612, Number Two Penn Center Plaza, Philadelphia. In 1968, appellant was represented by appellees in a claim for workman’s compensation benefits. The proceedings relating thereto ultimately resulted in a decision favorable to appellant. Appellees’ distribution *110of the settlement proceeds in that matter form the background for the instant controversy.
Based on her belief that appellees had wrongfully diverted $25.00 of the settlement proceeds, appellant, on September 29 and October 1, 1975, commenced demonstrating in front of appellees’ office building.1 Appellant’s activities lasted for several hours on each of the two days involved and consisted of pushing a shopping cart adorned with the American flag to and fro, of ringing a cow bell, and of blowing a whistle. She did so while wearing a sign accusing appellees of having stolen money from her and having sold her out to an insurance company. These activities were accomplished without obstruction or violence and appellant made no demands upon appellees in relation thereto. Her demonstration precipitated neither breaches of peace nor fights or disturbances in breach of peace.
On September 30, 1975 appellees filed a complaint in equity seeking to enjoin “the defendant or any of her agents preliminarily until hearing on the matter and perpetually thereafter from: . . . picketing, demonstrating, carrying placards, uttering defamatory statements or engaging in any other conduct which interferes in any way with the activities of plaintiffs . . . ; or defames the reputation of plaintiffs . . . .” Hearings were thereafter held, on October 3, October 22, and on November 3, 1975, and a final decree was entered on November 10, 1975 permanently enjoining appellant from démonstrating against and/or picketing the appellees and from uttering or publishing defamatory, slanderous or libelous matter with respect to them.2
*111The lower court, in its opinion, determined that appellant’s accusations were unfounded and inaccurate and held that “. . . unless stayed by this Court, defendant will resume her bizarre parade before plaintiffs’ office building, displaying her defamatory accusation which will not only offer plaintiffs continuous embarrassment and humiliation but do serious injury to their professional reputation as well.” The court below went on to state that “[i]n our view, this behavior falls well within equity’s traditional powers of interdiction”, concluding that “ [c] ertainly, plaintiffs here are threatened with injury that will be substantial and irreversible” and that the defendant’s “impoverishment makes any recourse to law an empty remedy. . . . ”
The action taken below was clearly erroneous. Injunctive relief for defamation is simply not within “equity’s traditional powers of interdiction”. It is the general rule in Pennsylvania and in an overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions that, absent independent grounds for equitable jurisdiction, equity lacks the power to issue an injunction restraining the publication of defamatory matter. This long-standing rule may be summarized by reference to the following statement of law, which is particularly appropriate to the instant case: “Equity does not have jurisdiction to act for the sole purpose of restraining the publication or utterance of a libel or slander, regardless of whether the defamation is personal or relates to a property right. Nor will a publication be enjoined merely because it is false, misleading, or amounts to nothing more than an expression of opinion. The jurisdiction of equity is necessarily somewhat limited, for *112any attempted censorship by the court through the writ of injunction is no less objectionable than is the exercise of that function by other departments of the government ; such censorship is in effect prohibited by constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and of the press, and by the constitutional right of trial by jury. The insolvency of the wrongdoer in such cases is not regarded as sufficient of itself to authorize such interference.
There are a few exceptions to the rule prohibiting an injunction against libel or slander. For example, an injunction may be granted where the false statements are part of a conspiracy to injure, or where there is intimidation or coercion. “. . . After a plaintiff has, by a judgment at law, established the fact that certain published statements are libelous, he may, on a proper showing, have an injunction to restrain any further publication of the same or similar statements. . . .”42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 135 (1969) (footnotes omitted). See 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 134 (1945); 18 P.L.E. Injunction § 26 (1959).
The preceding general rule has been specifically followed in Pennsylvania, in Baltimore Life Insurance Company v. Gleisner, 202 Pa. 386, 51 A. 1024 (1902), and my research has disclosed no decision suggesting subsequent adoption of a contrary rule. See Ashinsky v. Levenson, 256 Pa. 14, 100 A. 491 (1917); Frick v. Stevens, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 6 (C.P.Cumb.1967); McGinnis v. Duggan, 112 P.L.J. 48 (Pa.C.P.1963). See also Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Fed’n of Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers, 305 Pa. 206, 157 A. 588 (1931). Moreover, it is the rule of and has been consistently followed in the federal courts. Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 773 (C.C.Pa.1886). See United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 759 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1972). See also Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). Furthermore, the general rule above stated has been uni*113versally applied to deny injunctions in cases in other states in which the parties and/or activities involved were substantially similar to those present in the case at bar. See Gariepy v. Springer, 318 Ill.App. 523, 48 N.E. 2d 572 (1943) (defendant circulating letters to plaintiff attorney’s clients, defaming him); Greenberg v. DeSalvo, 254 La. 1019, 229 So.2d 83, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1075, 90 S.Ct. 1521, 25 L.Ed.2d 809 (1969) (defendant calling attorney “crook”, “crooked attorney”, etc.); Schmoldt v. Oakley, 390 P.2d 882 (Okl.1964) (displaying sign on street near plaintiff’s business disparaging auto sold to defendants by plaintiff); Stansbury v. Beckstrom, 491 S.W.2d 947 (Tex.Civ.App.1973) (defendant parading, standing, sitting or lying in front of physician’s office displaying libelous and false signs); Kwass v. Kersey, 139 W.Va. 497, 81 S.E.2d 237 (1954) (defendant widely circulating letters charging that plaintiff attorney was a “shyster” who had betrayed the interests of his client). See also Prucha v. Weiss, 233 Md. 479, 197 A.2d 253, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 992, 84 S.Ct. 1916, 12 L. Ed.2d 1045 (1964). In Stansbury v. Beckstrom, supra, it was specifically held that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, supra, precluded an order granting an injunction against a defendant patient who was protesting a bill she received from her physician by parading in front of his office displaying libelous signs. The Texas Court of Appeals noted in Stansbury that “[tjhere can be no justification for the utterance of a slander. It cannot be too strongly condemned. . . . But there is no power in courts to make one person speak only well of another. The Constitution leaves him free to speak well or ill; and if he wrongs another by abusing this privilege, he is responsible in damages or punishable by the criminal law.” Stansbury v. Beckstrom, supra at 949 (citations omitted). The decree of the court below is thus contrary to well-settled decisional law.
*114The principal reasons behind the general rule that defamation will not be enjoined are threefold.3 First, it has been said that an injunction should not issue in such a situation because an adequate remedy at law is available. Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Gleisner, supra; Kidd v. Horry, supra; Greenberg v. DeSalvo, supra. Second, an injunction has been universally held to be an inappropriate remedy for defamation because the defendant’s right to trial by jury on the issue of the defamatory nature of the publication is precluded thereby. Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Gleisner, supra; Kidd v. Horry, supra. Finally, injunctive relief for libel and slander has been denied because the injunctive relief inhibits the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, thereby imposing an unconstitutional prior restraint on that right. Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, supra; Stansbury v. Beckstrom, supra. See also Near v. Minnesota, 288 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). It is patently apparent that the injunction issued in the case at bar is violative not only of the general rule that equity will not enjoin a defamation, but also of each of the aforementioned reasons for the rule. The court below, in deciding that appellant’s statements were not true, precluded a jury determination of that issue. Furthermore, an adequate remedy at law is available in this case, in the form of an action for damages. Additionally, the injunction decreed unquestionably imposes a prior restraint on appellant’s constitutional right to freedom of speech.4 See *115Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, supra; Stansbury v. Beckstrom, supra.
I am particularly troubled by the majority’s treatment of the question of an adequate remedy at law in this case. The majority first notes that damages are particularly difficult to prove in a defamation case. The majority opinion then observes that the defendant was indigent and concludes that the combination of these factors makes the remedy at law inadequate. While I can agree that proof of damages in a defamation case is a difficult task I am unprepared to state that because proof of damages is difficult an action for defamation at law is inadequate. If this proposition were followed to its logical conclusion, all defamation cases could initially qualify for equitable relief. This is not the law, however, as is noted supra. Moreover, appellees made no attempt to establish their actual damages at the hearings below and did not show that they could not be adequately compensated by damages at law. There is no evidence of record to establish that damages were irreparable, substantial, actual or continuing. All that is present on the record is the lower court’s conclusion that appellant’s activities could give rise to damages. While I agree with the accuracy of this observation I am unable to conclude that the possibility of damages may serve to substitute for proof thereof. See Annot. 47 A.L.R.2d 695, 725-26 (1956).
The majority also states that “we cannot disregard the fact that in the present case an action for damages would be a pointless gesture since the defendant is indigent.” I simply cannot accept the proposition that the presence of an impecunious defendant in the case renders an otherwise adequate remedy at law inadequate. To so hold would be to create a ground for equity jurisdiction based on the defendant’s wealth or lack of it. I do not believe that this distinction is the law of our Commonwealth nor *116do I think it should be. To the contrary, the law is well-settled that the fact that the appellant-defendant is insolvent, and that, therefore, a judgment at law might be uncollectible, is not a sufficient basis for the interdiction of equity. See Heilman v. Union Canal Co., 37 Pa. 100, 17 L.I. 356 (1860); 18 P.L.E. Injunction § 26 (1959); 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 135 (1969). As I have noted above, the only basis here relied on for a finding that no adequate remedy at law was available was the defendant’s indigency. The fact that damages are difficult to prove is not a proper additional basis for that conclusion. Moreover, even if indigency alone were a basis for a distinction, I would still not agree. There is scant evidence of record that appellant was in fact indigent other than the fact that she was represented by legal services counsel.
The rule that equity will not enjoin defamation is not without limited exception. Equitable jurisdiction to interdict libelous publication has been assumed under some circumstances, such as where the libel or slander is accompanied by coercion, breach of trust or violence, see Gariepy v. Springer, supra, where there is a conspiracy to maliciously injure a plaintiff’s business or property, see E. M. W. Bar Corp. v. Hilliard, 20 Pa.D. & C.2d 435 (C.P.Phila.1959); Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 363 Mo. 852, 253 S.W.2d 976 (1953), where a labor dispute is involved, see Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., 369 Pa. 359, 85 A.2d 851 (1952), where a right to privacy is invaded, see Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization to Rejuvenate Housing, 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622 (1969), but cf. Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, supra, see also Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974), or where the activity becomes a traditional nuisance, see Kershes v. Verbicus, 36 Pa.D. & C. 499 (C.P.Phila.1939). Evidence of the above factors is, however, undeveloped in the instant case and I dissent vigorously from the majority’s creation of a new exception based on the defendant’s indigency.
*117Nor am I convinced that appellant’s activities were properly enjoined because her publication was accomplished in conjunction with picketing. Initially, it must be noted that predominant purpose and effect of the instant decree was to enjoin defamation, not to halt unlawful picketing. While unlawful picketing may be restrained, 1621, Inc. v. Wilson, 402 Pa. 94, 166 A.2d 271 (1960); Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., supra, perfectly lawful picketing, unaccompanied by violence or violation of clearly defined law or public policy of the state is a constitutionally protected activity which could not justify the lower court’s decree. See Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, supra; Altemose Construction Co. v. Building & Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity, 449 Pa. 194, 296 A.2d 504, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 1901, 36 L.Ed.2d 392 (1972); Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization to Rejuvenate Housing, supra. See also Maple Corp. v. Briggman, 53 Pa.D. & C.2d 296 (C.P.Phila.1971) (Spaeth, J.). There is no evidence in the present case that appellant’s activities were accompanied by violence, coercion or other unlawful behavior. Moreover, it may not be said that her demonstration violated clearly defined law or public policy. The decree below enjoining appellant from defaming appellees may, therefore, not be upheld on the theory that the picketing accompanying the publication was enjoinable.
I would vacate the decree of the court below.
HOFFMAN and SPAETH, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. Appellant demonstrated in the pedestrian plaza located between the buildings Two and Three Penn Center Plaza, bounded by 15th and 16th Streets, Market Street and John F. Kennedy Boulevard, Philadelphia. The location is adjacent to City Hall and the Philadelphia courtrooms. Brief for Appellees at 2.

. At the hearings it was established that the dispute over the $25.00 centered around appellee’s payment, an accordance with a *111distribution schedule, of $150.00 to Doctor DeSilverio, the appellant’s treating psychiatrist. Appellant’s claim was that Doctor DeSilverio was actually paid only $125.00. Appellees introduced their original records into evidence, including cancelled checks evidencing payment to Doctor DeSilverio. In addition, Doctor DeSilverio was called as a witness, testifying that he was paid in accordance with appellee’s records. Appellant offered no evidence to contradict appellees’ evidence, but took the stand to reiterate her belief that appellees had cheated her out of $25.00.

. Originally a fourth objection to injunctive relief from defamation was often mentioned: that equity would not take jurisdiction where purely personal rights were involved. However, this reason was effectively discarded in Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955), wherein it was held that equity will protect personal rights by injunction on the same conditions upon which it will protect property rights by injunction.

. Not only the United States Constitution but also the Pennsylvania Constitution dictates this conclusion: “Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution . . was designed to prohibit the imposition of prior restraints upon the communication of thoughts and opinions, leaving the utterer lia*115ble only for abuse of the privilege.” William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 88, 173 A.2d 59, 62, cert. denied, 368 U. S. 897, 82 S.Ct. 174, 7 L.Ed.2d 93 (1961).