Court Opinion

ID: 9378420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 15:04:40.882021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.145878
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0423-MR

DARRELL D. BROWN                                                      APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 18-CR-00623

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND ECKERLE,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Darrell D. Brown (“Appellant”), pro se, appeals

from an order of the Hardin Circuit Court denying his Kentucky Rules of Criminal

Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

Appellant raises several arguments in support of RCr 11.42 relief including trial

counsel’s failure to move to sever the trafficking and bail jumping charges; failure

to argue voluntary intoxication as a defense and to seek a jury instruction on the
defense; improperly opening the door to rebuttal questions suggesting that

Appellant was a convicted felon; and failure to object to prejudicial and irrelevant

expert testimony. Appellant seeks an opinion reversing his conviction and

ordering a new trial. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order on

appeal.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             Appellant’s underlying criminal conviction was adjudicated on direct

appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court in Brown v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-SC-

0268-MR, 2020 WL 7395355 (Dec. 17, 2020). In the interest of judicial economy,

we adopt the Supreme Court’s recitation of facts as that of this Court. It stated:

                    At almost midnight, grocery store employees
             called police asking officers that they check on
             Appellant’s car in the public parking lot. In the call, the
             store employees stated the lights were on in Appellant’s
             vehicle, and it had been there a few hours. When police
             arrived, they knew the store was closed. Officers
             observed Appellant’s car in the parking lot with the
             engine running. Officers noticed loose tobacco, and saw
             Appellant leaning over the center console, “with his arms
             wrapped up like he was laying on his arms.” Officers
             knocked on the window, and after approximately six-
             seconds, Appellant rolled the window down.

                     After speaking to Appellant, police took his
             driver’s license back to the police cruiser to check his
             driver’s status and determine if he had any outstanding
             warrants. Officers learned Appellant had a similar
             encounter with officers approximately two weeks prior
             when he was also sitting in his car while waiting on his
             girlfriend. After running Appellant’s license, police re-

                                         -2-
approached Appellant’s car and ordered him to exit the
vehicle pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Once out of the car, Appellant consented for police to
search his person.

       Officers then ordered Appellant to the front of the
police cruiser for further questioning. Police testified
they did not smell alcohol, marijuana, or meth during the
interaction. Appellant told police he was waiting on a
call from his girlfriend so he could go to her house after
work but had fallen asleep in the car. When asked about
the loose tobacco, Appellant told police he rolls his own
cigarettes, explaining it is cheaper.

       After some time, police requested permission to
search Appellant’s car, but he refused. Police
acknowledged the refusal, and ordered Appellant to wait
at the front of the police cruiser, away from his car, while
officers looked around the exterior of the car, peering
inside at different angles with a flashlight. Eventually,
police noticed marijuana in the floorboard and called
Appellant over, who confirmed the identity of the
substance in the baggie. Police subsequently searched
Appellant’s car, where they found drug paraphernalia,
methamphetamine, and marijuana. Officers arrested
Appellant after finding the drugs.

       While on bond, Appellant failed to appear for his
preliminary hearing and the trial court issued a warrant.
After officers arrested Appellant, a grand jury indicted
him for first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance
(methamphetamine, less than two grams), possession of
drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, first-degree
bail jumping, and first-degree persistent felony offender.

       Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence
related to the police search, arguing the search and
seizure violated his rights pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. After a

                            -3-
               hearing, the trial court denied the motion. It found the
               police were performing a welfare check, and,
               alternatively, that the officers had reasonable suspicion of
               criminal activity. Further, the trial court found police did
               not unlawfully extend the stop.

                      Before trial, Appellant filed a motion to exclude a
               detective’s testimony, or alternatively, to have a hearing
               to determine whether the detective was qualified to
               testify as an expert. The trial court found the detective
               was qualified to testify. During trial, Appellant argued
               the Commonwealth elicited testimony from its witnesses
               that implied the felony status of Appellant, although
               Appellant did not testify. After the jury trial, Appellant
               was convicted of all charges and sentenced to twenty
               years’ imprisonment.

Id. at *1-2.

               The Kentucky Supreme Court determined that police officers

unconstitutionally extended Appellant’s vehicle stop. As such, the court ruled that

the fruits of the officers’ subsequent search should have been suppressed at trial.

The court reversed Appellant’s convictions for trafficking in a controlled substance

in the first degree, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1

It affirmed the bail jumping in the first degree and persistent felony offender in the

first degree (“PFO”) convictions, and remanded the matter to the trial court.2

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 218A.1412; KRS 218A.1422; and KRS 218A.500(2).
2
    KRS 520.070 and KRS 532.080(3).

                                            -4-
              Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion in Hardin Circuit Court seeking

to vacate or set aside his judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42. In support of the

motion, Appellant argued that his trial counsel failed to provide the effective

assistance to which he was constitutionally entitled. Specifically, Appellant

asserted that counsel improperly failed to: 1) sever the bail jumping charge from

the trafficking charge; 2) set forth a voluntary intoxication defense and related jury

instruction; 3) avoid opening the door to inadmissible evidence tending to reveal

that Appellant was a convicted felon; 4) seek to exclude inadmissible expert

testimony relating to drug trafficking; and 5) object to prosecutorial misconduct.

Appellant also argued that the cumulative effect of these errors required reversal.

The circuit court denied Appellant’s motion without a hearing, and this appeal

followed.3

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant

must show two things:

              First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
              performance was deficient. This requires showing that
              counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
              functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by

3
  Appellant appeals from the March 14, 2022 order denying his motion for RCr 11.42 relief, and
from the March 30, 2022 order denying his Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 59.05
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the March 14, 2022 order. Per Ford v. Ford, 578 S.W.3d 356
(Ky. App. 2019), however, an order addressing a CR 59.05 motion is interlocutory and not
subject to appellate review. As such, we will consider only the March 14, 2022 order.

                                             -5-
             the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
             that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
             This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
             serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
             whose result is reliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984). “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably

effective assistance.” Id.

                    An error by counsel, even if professionally
             unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
             judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
             effect on the judgment. The purpose of the Sixth
             Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a
             defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance
             on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any
             deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial
             to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance
             under the Constitution. (Internal citation omitted).

Id. at 691-92, 104 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (citation omitted). “It is not enough for the

defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of

the proceeding.” Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. “The defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.

Ct. at 2068. Additionally, “a hearing is required only if there is an issue of fact

which cannot be determined on the face of the record.” Stanford v.

Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993).

                                          -6-
                          ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             Appellant, pro se, now argues that the circuit court committed

reversible error in denying his motion for RCr 11.42 relief. Appellant first asserts

that his trial counsel improperly failed to move to sever the trafficking and bail

jumping charges. Specifically, Appellant argues that the facts used to prosecute

the trafficking charge, including the fact that Appellant was a convicted felon,

would not have been admissible at a separate trial for bail jumping. By allowing

the charges to be tried together, Appellant contends that his counsel improperly

allowed the jury to be influenced to return a guilty verdict on the bail jumping

charge. Appellant also directs our attention to guidelines published by the National

Legal Aid & Defender Association, and the American Bar Association, in support

of his contention that his trial counsel breached various duties to provide full and

effective assistance on this issue. He seeks an order reversing the circuit court’s

denial of his motion for relief, and remanding the matter for a new trial on the

charge of bail jumping.

             RCr 8.31 addresses separate trials. It states:

             If it appears that a defendant or the Commonwealth is or
             will be prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of
             defendants in an indictment, information, complaint or
             uniform citation or by joinder for trial, the court shall
             order separate trials of counts, grant separate trials of
             defendants or provide whatever other relief justice
             requires. A motion for such relief must be made before
             the jury is sworn or, if there is no jury, before any

                                         -7-
             evidence is received. No reference to the motion shall be
             made during the trial. In ruling on a motion by a
             defendant for severance the court may order the attorney
             for the Commonwealth to deliver to the court for
             inspection in camera any statements or confessions made
             by the defendants that the Commonwealth intends to
             introduce in evidence at the trial.

“A trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on an . . . [RCr 8.31] motion, and that

determination will not be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is

shown.” Elam v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Ky. 2016).

             As the matter is before us from the denial of Appellant’s motion for

RCr 11.42 relief, the dispositive question is whether counsel’s performance at trial

was so deficient on this issue as to prejudice Appellant’s defense. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 669, 104 S. Ct. at 2055. That is to say, there must be a reasonable

likelihood that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. Id. at 669, 104 S. Ct. at 2055-56. Having closely

examined the record and the law, we conclude that there is no reasonable

likelihood that Appellant would have been found not guilty on the bail jumping

charge but for counsel’s decision not to move to sever the proceedings.       Evidence

was adduced that Appellant was released on a $5,000 bond after being charged

with trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and

possession of marijuana. As part of his release, Appellant acknowledged in

writing that he would be subject to a bail jumping charge if he did not appear. The

                                         -8-
release directed Appellant to appear in Hardin Circuit Court on a specific date and

time. Appellant then failed to appear as required by the condition of his bond and

a bench warrant was issued. He was eventually arrested and taken into custody.

              These facts were not contested at trial. Accordingly, even if

Appellant’s trial counsel successfully moved to sever the proceedings, the

underlying facts nevertheless would have supported a jury finding Appellant guilty

on the charge of bail jumping. We do not find that Appellant’s trial counsel failed

to act as “counsel” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, nor that counsel’s

performance was so deficient as to create a reasonable likelihood of a different

outcome had counsel moved to sever the proceedings. Strickland, supra.

Accordingly, we find no error in the Hardin Circuit Court’s denial of RCr 11.42

relief on this issue.

              Appellant goes on to argue that his counsel was ineffective in failing

to raise voluntary intoxication as a defense at trial. He again directs our attention

to the National Legal Aid & Defender Association guidelines, and the American

Bar Association guidelines, in support of his contention that his trial counsel

breached a duty to provide a complete defense to the bail jumping charge by

proving that Appellant was voluntarily intoxicated. Specifically, Appellant asserts

that he fully discussed with counsel how Appellant was a user of illegal drugs, how

his bail was revoked for failing to take a drug test, that police officers collected

                                          -9-
evidence of drug use including handheld torches and syringes, and how Appellant

tested positive for multiple illegal drugs at the time of his arrest. Appellant argues

that his counsel improperly failed to fully exploit these facts at trial, and appears to

assert that he would not have been found guilty of bail jumping, or would have

received a reduced sentence, had the jury been fully apprised of Appellant’s

ongoing struggle with drug use.

             A person is guilty of bail jumping in the first degree
             when, having been released from custody by court order,
             with or without bail, upon condition that he will
             subsequently appear at a specified time and place in
             connection with a charge of having committed a felony,
             he intentionally fails to appear at that time and place.

KRS 520.070(1).

                    The Penal Code makes voluntary intoxication a
             defense “only if such condition . . . [n]egatives the
             existence of an element of the offense.” KRS
             501.080(1). Here, the element subject to negation by
             intoxication is criminal intent – that is, “intoxication that
             negates an individual’s capacity to form a culpable
             mental state essential to the commission of the offense.”

King v. Commonwealth, 513 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Ky. 2017) (footnote and citation

omitted).

             Again, as this matter is before us via the denial of Appellant’s RCr

11.42 motion, and not by way of direct appeal, the question is whether Appellant’s

counsel provided ineffective assistance which created a reasonable probability of a

different outcome but for the ineffective assistance. Strickland, supra. As the

                                          -10-
Commonwealth properly notes, Appellant’s trial counsel may have chosen as a

matter of strategy not to bring undue attention to Appellant’s pattern of illegal drug

use when seeking a verdict of not guilty on the bail jumping charge. We are

required to be “highly deferential” to counsel’s trial performance without second-

guessing. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. There is a “strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance,” including the presumption that “the challenged action

might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellant has not overcome that

presumption.

             Further, Appellant has neither alleged nor cited to any evidence of

record that he was so intoxicated on illegal drugs at the time he failed to appear

that he no longer possessed the “capacity to form a culpable mental state essential

to the commission of the offense.” King, 513 S.W.3d at 923. In sum, Appellant

has not demonstrated that his trial counsel’s performance on this issue was so

ineffective as to deprive him of constitutionally-protected rights which altered the

outcome of the proceeding.

             Appellant next argues that his trial counsel improperly opened the

door to rebuttal questions which revealed that Appellant was a convicted felon.

Appellant contends that his trial counsel improperly asked Officer Slabaugh and

                                         -11-
Detective Turner if a gun was found in Appellant’s possession at the time of his

arrest. Appellant argues that this line of questioning opened the door for the

Commonwealth to ask the officer and detective on rebuttal questions which

suggested that Appellant was a felon. Appellant argues that but for his counsel’s

questions, the Commonwealth would not have been able to indirectly communicate

to the jury that Appellant was a felon and that this adversely affected the jury’s

decision-making process.

             In Appellant’s direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the high

court expressly found that neither Officer Slabaugh nor Detective Turner testified

that felons could not lawfully carry firearms, nor that Appellant was a convicted

felon. Brown, 2020 WL 7395355, at *6 n.1. Further, the court found that

Appellant’s counsel did not object to the Commonwealth’s questions because they

implied that Appellant was not a drug dealer since he was not in possession of a

firearm at the time of arrest. Id.

             Again, we are bound by the strong presumption that the challenged

action is sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.

Appellant’s counsel elicited responses from two law enforcement officials

demonstrating that Appellant was not unlawfully possessing a firearm at the time

of his arrest, and the Commonwealth’s rebuttal questions neither suggested nor

revealed that Appellant was a felon. We find no error on this issue.

                                         -12-
             Appellant’s fourth argument is that his counsel was ineffective in

failing to object to certain expert testimony. At trial, Detective Clinton Turner

provided expert opinion testimony that Appellant was probably trafficking in

methamphetamine. In support of this opinion, Turner noted that Appellant was

found with digital scales and several baggies containing the same amount of the

drug. He provided background information about methamphetamine trafficking,

and stated that traffickers are less likely to have cash on their person if they have

been “fronted” or given drugs in advance to sell.

             Appellant argues that his counsel should have objected to this

testimony as not relevant to the bail jumping charge. This is effectively the same

argument he made above that the trafficking and bail jumping charges should have

been severed. Whether Detective Turner’s testimony affected the jury’s decision-

making process on the bail jumping charge is highly speculative, and does not

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance at trial was effective.

Again, there was ample evidence to support a guilty verdict on the bail jumping

charge, irrespective of any testimony adduced on the other charges Appellant was

facing. We find no error.

             Lastly, Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct, and that the cumulative effect of the

foregoing errors supports his motion for RCr 11.42 relief. On the claim of

                                         -13-
prosecutorial misconduct, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth’s closing

argument so inflamed the jury with misleading and unfair assertions of guilt as to

deny Appellant the Due Process to which he was constitutionally entitled.

Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these

misleading and unfair assertions.

             A claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be grounded on proof that

the prosecutor engaged in improper or illegal acts intended to bring about a

wrongful conviction or an unjustified punishment. Commonwealth v. McGorman,

489 S.W.3d 731, 741-42 (Ky. 2016) (citation omitted). Appellant was not

wrongfully convicted on the charge of bail jumping, nor was the punishment

unjustified. Irrespective of whether Appellant’s counsel objected to the

Commonwealth’s closing argument, there was ample evidence to support the jury’s

verdict on the charge of bail jumping. We find no basis for concluding that the

circuit court erred in denying RCr 11.42 relief on this issue.

             Cumulative error may be found only where multiple harmless errors

have the combined effect of rendering the trial unfair. Mason v. Commonwealth,

559 S.W.3d 337, 344-45 (Ky. 2018). Having found no individual error, there can

be no aggregate finding of cumulative error.

                                         -14-
                                  CONCLUSION

             Appellant has not overcome the strong presumption set out in

Strickland that counsel’s performance was effective. There was no individual

error, and thus no cumulative error. The circuit court did not err in so finding.

Accordingly, we affirm the March 14, 2022 order of the Hardin Circuit Court

denying Appellant’s motion for RCr 11.42 relief from judgment.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Darrell D. Brown, pro se                   Daniel Cameron
Wheelwright, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Christopher Henry
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -15-