Court Opinion

ID: 9618885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:18:31.966857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:18.479082
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICES HASWELL and DALY
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
We concur with the majority in affirming the decision of the district court, but we disagree with the rationale contained *337in the majority opinion and specifically dissent to the majority holding on the degree of proof required.
The ultimate issue upon appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the district court’s refusal to discharge applicant from the Montana state hospital pursuant to the procedure and requirements of section 95-508, R.C.M.1947. Under this statute, discharge requires a finding by the district court that applicant’s “condition is such that he can be released and returned to society without danger to himself or to other members of society.” The district court here refused to make such finding, but instead found “the evidence was insufficient for the court to determine that petitioner may safely be discharged or released without danger to himself or others.”
The evidence on this point consisted largely of conflicting expert opinion evidence of two psychiatrists at the Montana state hospital whose conclusions were based on applicant’s past history and behavior together with medical and psychiatric examinations. Where, as here, the district court is trier of the facts, its consideration of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence is governed by the same principles set forth in the standard instruction on this subject given to a jury in a jury case:
“The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness to be received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who by education, study and experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, and who is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and which is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if in your judgment the reasons given for it are unsound.” 1 Cal.Jur.Inst.Civ. 4th, No. 33.
*338Applying these principles to the instant case, the district court’s finding that the evidence was insufficient to determine that applicant could safely be discharged was supported by substantial credible evidence. Applicant’s prior escape from the hospital, his organic brain damage, his past history of drinking and its effect on his behavior, and the conflicting opinions of the two psychiatrists constitute substantial evidentiary support for the district court’s determination.
Our duty in reviewing findings of fact in a civil action tried by the district court without a jury is confined to determining whether there is substantial credible evidence to support them, and we will not disturb the district court’s findings unless there is a clear preponderance of evidence against them. State Highway Com’n v. West Great Falls F.C. & D.D., 155 Mont. 157, 468 P.2d 753, and cases cited therein.
We specifically dissent from the majority holding that an applicant under section 95-508, R.C.M.1947, must prove his entitlement to discharge from the Montana state hospital “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This is the degree, of proof required of the state to convict in a criminal case. Section 94-7203, R.C.M.1947 and section 93-2001-1, R.C.M.1947. This degree of proof requires the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis. In our view it is entirely unwarranted to require this degree of proof from a patient seeking discharge from the Montana state hospital pursuant to section 95-508, R.C.M. 1947.
The statute itself expressly provides that a section 95-508 hearing “shall be deemed a civil proceeding.” The degree of proof required of an applicant for relief in a civil proceeding is “a preponderance of the evidence.” Section 93-2001-1(5), R.C.M.1947. This simply means the greater weight of the evidence, or evidence having the more convincing force when weighed against the opposing evidence. Montana Jury Instruction Guide, #21.00, and cases cited thereunder.
Proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” is virtually impossible *339when predicting the future human behavior of an individual under unknown and indeterminable circumstances of future stress to which he might be subjected. In the words of Dr. Xanthopoulos, quoted in the majority opinion:
“We have been asked to express an opinion if this man is able to be returned to society. In view of his past history and lack of judgment, it would be impossible to predict his future behavior and this applies to any patient.” (Emphasis added)
And again the doctor testified on cross-examination as indicated in the majority opinion that he wouldn’t guarantee any individual’s future behavior because under certain conditions, we are all capable of homicide.
The statute quite properly places the burden of proof on the applicant for the protection of the public. However, it does not require the majority’s impossible and unattainable degree of proof. In our view the majority holding is tantamount to converting the Montana state hospital into a lifetime custodial institution from which there is no possibility of discharge.