Court Opinion

ID: 9452996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:59:06.390974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:27.173989
License: Public Domain

GEWIN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I can not agree with the majority decision that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for First Federal Savings and Loan Association because material questions of fact remain to be resolved. As I view the record in this case, the sole function of the district court was to construe, as a matter of law, the letter of August 3rd from American National Insurance Company to Zurich Building, Inc. The district court held that the letter clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously conferred authority upon Rogers to receive all the payments on the note, including the pre-payment made by First Federal. I believe that decision is unquestionably correct, and therefore I must dissent.
The motion for summary judgment filed by First Federal was not the usual barebones motion for summary judgment. The district court had before it numerous affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence relating to the question of Rogers’ authority. It concluded that none of this evidence altered or varied the clear meaning of the August 3rd letter. The letter of August 11th, while not relied upon by the attorney for First Federal, is but further evidence that the August 3rd letter conferred the necessary authority on Rogers to receive the prepayment. It manifestly indicates that American National meant in its August 3rd letter what the district court concluded it did, and what First Federal believed it did. In addition, the letter clearly indicates that First Federal acted reasonably and prudently in interpreting the earlier letter as it did. The affidavit quoted in the majority opinion does not raise any material question of fact as to the meaning of the August 3rd letter. It is conclusory in nature and amounts to little more than a statement, after the fact, as to what American National usually did in other cases and intended to do with respect to the note in question. At best, therefore, it is a layman’s interpretation of the meaning of the August 3rd letter. Regardless of what American National may have intended by its letter of *88August 3rd, it is bound by the legal consequences of the language used in that letter. The district court found that it created an apparent authority in Rogers to collect all payments on the note, including the payment made by First Federal in settlement of the loan. That construction is buttressed by the letter of August 11th. There is no factual controversy here; the district court’s holding is correct and it should be upheld.
Although, in my view of the case, it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether First Federal was obligated to warn American National of possible irregularities on the part of Agent Rogers, I can not agree with the conclusion of the majority that there is also an open factual issue as to whether First Federal was obligated to prod American National into an examination of the books of its own agent. The short answer is that American National chose Rogers as its agent, and it was its duty to maintain a proper relationship with him to protect its own interests from his misconduct. Indeed, American National owed a duty to those dealing with it through Rogers to protect such persons from the misconduct of its chosen agent. It had selected Rogers and had plainly and forcefully held him out to the public as its agent. Persons dealing with him were told by American National that they were dealing with it. The existence of any fiduciary relationship between American National and First Federal surely obligates American National to exercise due diligence to insure that First Federal would suffer no harm due to the misconduct of American National’s agent. To suggest the existence of a duty to warn American National of possible wrongdoing by one of its chosen agents of long standing on the part of an unsuspecting member of the public, who had no part in choosing the agent and who was not in nearly as good a position to discover such misconduct as American National, is to place the shoe on the wrong foot.
Essentially, this is a simple case. The district court, and this Court on review, are only required to examine a clear, unequivocal, direct, and unambiguous instrument to ascertain its meaning. The evidence introduced on the motion for summary judgment was not sufficient to raise any question or doubt as to the obvious and common sense meaning of the August 3 letter. No ambiguity was raised, and no factual conflict as to a material issue was established. The district court resolved the only question before it, a legal one, in a concise, direct, forthright, and correct manner. I agree with that decision. To say the least, it is an ominous decision to conclude otherwise in the fast moving and complex modern day marketplace where people, of necessity, must rely upon the assertions of the principal with respect to the authority they have vested in agents of their own deliberate choosing. This fact is of particular importance in this case where Rogers had been the Mississippi agent of American National for so many years, and whose office was designated in one of the documents in evidence as the office of American National in Jackson, Mississippi.
When all is said and done the district court will be required to do again what it has already done, that is, to determine the meaning of a clear, unambiguous, simple, unequivocal expression in writing. Without hesitancy, restraint, or reservation, I would affirm the summary judgment of the district court against American National.
Rehearing denied; GEWIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.