Court Opinion

ID: 9494398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:37:12.008571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:23.754110
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
After receiving and considering evidence, a Missouri postconviction court found that Jerry King “did not suffer from mental disease or defect excluding criminal responsibility.” The majority and dissenting opinions present alternative interpretations of the postconviction court’s finding, which is the locus of our inquiry. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). I believe that we must deny King a writ of habeas corpus under either interpretation.
The majority finds implicit in the post-conviction court’s factual finding a determination that King lacked a mental disease or defect. The majority infers that because King lacked a mental disease or defect excluding criminal responsibility, he must also have lacked a mental disease or defect period. Ante at 825. Because King was obliged to present evidence of *826mental disease or defect to establish a diminished capacity defense, the majority concludes that King cannot demonstrate Strickland prejudice. I agree with this line of reasoning, assuming for argument’s sake that the majority’s interpretation of the postconviction court’s finding is valid.
In contrast, the dissent notes that the phrase “mental disease or defect excluding criminal responsibility” defines insanity under Missouri law, and so posits that the postconviction court’s factual finding does not speak to the issue of diminished capacity at all. Post at 821-22. This interpretation seems slightly sounder to me. But if the postconviction court truly did not address an ineffectiveness claim relative to diminished capacity, it is because King never raised the claim. By failing to raise the claim (and thus failing to exhaust the claim in state court), King deprived the Missouri courts of an opportunity to apply their law on diminished capacity. I find Missouri law on diminished capacity deeply puzzling, and I believe that is reason enough to acknowledge sua sponte King’s failure to exhaust the claim. Though I am reluctant to endorse frequent sua sponte forays into exhaustion questions, I believe federal courts may seek such a path of less resistance when necessary to avoid blundering into under-developed regions of state jurisprudence.