Court Opinion

ID: 9404543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 14:05:41.400419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.081585
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 16, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0129-MR

JOSH BOGGS                                                          APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE JEFFREY L. PRESTON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 16-CI-00042

ANDREA BOGGS                                                           APPELLEE

                               OPINION
                AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
                          AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ECKERLE, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Appellant, Josh Boggs (Josh), and Appellee, Andrea Boggs

(Andrea), had their marriage dissolved by a Decree of Dissolution entered by the

Greenup Circuit Court, Family Division, on June 17, 2016. The parties were

awarded joint custody of their three children. Josh was ordered to pay child

support in a monthly amount of $671.93. He made no payments after June of

2016.
             In 2021, Andrea filed a motion for contempt and Josh filed a motion

for modification of timesharing/custody. The court held a hearing during which

the parties, their eldest daughter, and Josh’s mother testified. Josh testified that the

parties informally agreed that in lieu of child support payments, Andrea lived rent

free at their former marital residence (the Residence), which was owned solely by

Josh’s mother.

             In an order entered on December 16, 2021, the court determined that

Josh failed to pay child support for 32 months at the rate of $629.62 per month.

This included a discount for the number of months that Andrea lived rent free at

the Residence. The court ordered Josh to pay the total amount due within six

months, and that he also pay $1,000.00 in attorney’s fees. Based on his current

income, the court ordered Josh to pay $1,173.83 per month moving forward. Josh

filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the court’s order, which was denied. He

appeals to this Court as a matter of right. For the following reasons, we affirm in

part, reverse in part, and remand.

             “We review the establishment, modification, and enforcement of child

support obligations for abuse of discretion.” Wilson v. Inglis, 554 S.W.3d 377, 381

(Ky. App. 2018) (citation omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the

trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound

legal principles.” Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272 (Ky. 2004) (quoting

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Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)). With this standard

in mind, we now return to the record in the present case.

             Josh generally argues that the family court’s findings concerning child

support and attorney’s fees were erroneous and/or inaccurate. He raises additional

concerns that are either insufficiently preserved or are otherwise unpersuasive.

Therefore, we need not address those matters further. We will instead address the

merits of the issues properly before us – whether the court abused its discretion in

awarding the unpaid child support payments and attorney’s fees.

             Testimony indicates that Andrea lived in the Residence for some

period of time, possibly in lieu of receiving child support payments. And while the

details remain unclear, it is undisputed that this alleged agreement was not reduced

to writing. In addressing this issue, the court determined that it “does not accept

the allegation that there was an agreement between [Josh and Andrea] to live in the

[Residence] in lieu of paying child support. However, the [c]ourt does give [Josh]

credit for not paying child support for the 27 months that [Andrea] lived in the

home rent free.” The court’s remedy here is based on the evidence, equitable, and

is certainly not an abuse of its discretion.

             However, there does appear to be a discrepancy between the language

of the court’s order regarding Josh’s modified child support payment, and the

actual calculation of that amount on a monthly basis. The difference equates to

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approximately $538.66 per month. This issue was raised in Josh’s motion to alter,

amend, or vacate. Therefore, remand is necessary. To be clear, we are not taking

issue with the result of the court’s discretion in modifying child support, or the

methodology upon which the court relied. Rather, we remand for the court to

clarify the amount owed.

             We also remand for the court to consider Adams-Smyrichinsky v.

Smyrichinsky, 467 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2015) (requiring specific findings concerning

the allocation of the child tax exemption). That standard was not satisfied here.

See Bankston v. Mattingly, 661 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Ky. App. 2023) (“[F]or the

foregoing reasons, the order . . . awarding the dependent-child tax deduction to the

parties on alternating years is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the circuit

court for entry of any and all appropriate orders.”). See also Howard v. Howard,

Nos. 2021-CA-0865-MR and 2021-CA-0965-MR, 2022 WL 17838398, at *2 (Ky.

App. Dec. 22, 2022).

             Josh’s final claim of error concerns the attorney’s fees award. The

statute governing attorney’s fees is KRS 403.220. It has been summarized and

applied as follows:

                    Under this statute, a trial court may order one party
             to a divorce action to pay a reasonable amount for the
             attorney’s fees of the other party, but only if there exists
             a disparity in the relative financial resources of the
             parties in favor of the payor. But even if a disparity
             exists, whether to make such an assignment and, if so, the

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                 amount to be assigned is within the discretion of the trial
                 judge. There is nothing mandatory about it. Thus, a trial
                 court’s ruling on attorney fees is subject to review only
                 for an abuse of discretion.

Sexton, 125 S.W.3d at 272 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).

Furthermore, “[the trial court] is in the best position to observe conduct and tactics

which waste the court’s and attorneys’ time and must be given wide latitude to

sanction or discourage such conduct.” Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 938

(Ky. 1990). In the present case, the court ordered Josh to pay $1,000.00 in

attorney’s fees as a “sanction for . . . failing to pay the child support when it was

due.” The court also assessed the parties’ most recent income for purposes of

awarding child support. The order indicates that Josh’s income is in excess of

Andrea’s. Therefore, we believe that the court sufficiently considered the financial

resources of the parties for purposes of KRS 403.220. There was certainly no

abuse of discretion.

                                      CONCLUSION

                 For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.

We REMAND with instructions that the court enter a new order consistent with

this decision. Any additional hearings may be ordered at the discretion of the

circuit court.

                                             -5-
               ECKERLE, JUDGE, CONCURS.

               KAREM, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.

KAREM, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent and would reverse the

trial court’s order as to the amount of arrearages owed by Appellant. I agree in the

majority’s Opinion assessing the proper issues before the court but disagree with

the ultimate conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or act

arbitrarily.

               The trial judge held a hearing on the Appellee’s Motion for Contempt

and to Assess Arrearages. During the hearing the testimony is clear that the home

in which the Appellee lived, rent free, with the children following the divorce was

owned by Appellant’s mother. While no written document exists memorializing

any type of agreement with reference to rent, Appellee asserts that she made a deal

with Appellant’s mother that she would be allowed to move into the home rent free

to improve her credit, to eventually purchase the home for $35,000. Appellant

asserts that the deal was made with his mother that the Appellee could live there in

lieu of child support, although at this point he had already failed to make payments

for over two years after the divorce. After assessing all of the evidence, the trial

court did not accept the allegation that there was an agreement between the parties

for the Appellee to live in the home in lieu of paying child support. However, the

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trial judge went on to give Appellant credit for 27 months in which the Appellee

lived in the home rent free.

             In a similar case, this Court outlined when oral agreements to modify

child support obligations are enforceable.

             (1) [S]uch agreements may be proved with reasonable
             certainty, and (2) the court finds that the agreement is fair
             and equitable under the circumstances. In order to
             enforce such agreements, a court must find that
             modification might reasonably have been granted, had a
             proper motion to modify been brought before the court
             pursuant to KRS 403.250 at the time such oral
             modification was originally agreed to by the parties.
             Furthermore, in keeping with prior decisions, such
             private agreements are enforceable only prospectively,
             and will not apply to support payments which had
             already become vested at the time the agreement was
             made. See Dalton v. Dalton, Ky., 367 S.W.2d 840, 842
             (1963).

Whicker v. Whicker, 711 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Ky. App. 1986).

             In the case at bar, the first prong of the analysis fails. The trial court

found no oral agreement existed therefore the question ends there. The Appellant

owes child support as dictated in the original order and he must pay all arrearages

owed. To do otherwise fails to take into consideration the interest of the children.

Appellant therefore should not get any offset for the time Appellee lived in the

house rent free and granting the offset was completely arbitrary. As such, I would

reverse as to the amount of arrearages owed and remand for a calculation which

does not grant an offset.

                                          -7-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Robert T. Renfroe        Tracy D. Frye
Greenup, Kentucky        Marie E. Troxler
                         Nikki Burke
                         Russell, Kentucky

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