Court Opinion

ID: 9369367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 17:00:33.251354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.625708
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 20-1386     Document: 010110810027       Date Filed: 02/08/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                        PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       February 8, 2023

                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 20-1386

  JOSHUA OMAR GARCIA,

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Colorado
                          (D.C. No. 1:17-CR-00358-CMA-1)
                        _________________________________

 J. Bishop Grewell, Assistant United States Attorney (Matthew T. Kirsch, Acting United
 States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

 Shira Kieval, Assistant Federal Public Defender, (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public
 Defender, Jacob Rasch-Chabot, Assistant Federal Public Defender, and Joshua Omar
 Garcia with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.
                          _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

 CARSON, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________

       Violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right compels a severe

 remedy: dismissing the indictment with prejudice. But a defendant cannot avail

 himself of that protection when he did not diligently assert that right. After a
Appellate Case: 20-1386    Document: 010110810027        Date Filed: 02/08/2023     Page: 2

 shoplifting incident at a Colorado Kmart and a shootout two days later, the federal

 and state governments both indicted Defendant Joshua Garcia. The federal

 government waited nearly twenty-three months to prosecute Defendant, while the

 state prosecution ran its course. The district court held the delay violated

 Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and dismissed the federal

 indictment against him. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18

 U.S.C. § 3731, we reverse.

                                            I.

       On July 3, 2017, Defendant allegedly shoplifted from a Kmart in Aurora,

 Colorado. When he exited the store, Kmart employees, who had been watching him,

 confronted him. While talking with the employees outside the store, Defendant

 brandished and discharged a firearm at the ground before fleeing. Authorities did not

 apprehend Defendant until two days later, when they responded to a complaint of a

 man with a gun in a trailer. During his arrest, Defendant allegedly shot at law-

 enforcement officers. The District Attorney’s Office filed a complaint against

 Defendant on July 11 based on the July 5 incident.

       Then, on September 27, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment

 against Defendant based on the July 3 events. The indictment alleged that Defendant

 possessed a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), robbed a Kmart store in

 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and knowingly used, brandished, or discharged a

 firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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 § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), and (iii). The indictment remained sealed for almost two years

 while Colorado’s case against Defendant proceeded in state court.

       In state court, Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree assault, and the court

 sentenced him to twenty-three years’ imprisonment on August 16, 2019. The day

 before, the government moved for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum,

 requesting authorities bring Defendant from the state detention facility into the

 United States Marshal’s custody to begin prosecuting the federal case.1 The district

 court granted that motion, unsealed the federal indictment, and on August 20, 2019,

 Defendant made his initial appearance in federal court.2

       Defendant filed three motions to exclude 210 days from the speedy-trial clock,

 all of which the district court granted. And, eight months after his initial appearance

 in federal court, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice for

 violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court granted

 Defendant’s motion and dismissed the indictment against him, finding that all factors

 set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–32 (1972), favor Defendant and that

 the government violated his right to a speedy trial. The district court determined that

 the delay prejudiced Defendant because it resulted in lost evidence and an

       1
          Defendant contends that he spent the entire twenty-three-month pretrial
 period incarcerated only because of the federal detainer preventing him from bonding
 out of state custody, because though he could not afford the bond at first, his family
 committed to raising the money.
       2
         Defendant also asserts that he did not learn of the sealed federal indictment
 against him pending in the District of Colorado until May 2019.
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 unnecessary two years’ pretrial incarceration for him. The government then moved

 for reconsideration, but the district court denied that too because the government had

 not shown that the court “misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the law.”

 United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 539 (10th Cir. 2014). The government

 appeals both the indictment’s dismissal and the denial of its motion for

 reconsideration.

                                            II.

       “The Sixth Amendment guarantees that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the

 accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.’” United States v. Jumaev,

 20 F.4th 518, 532 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Medina, 918 F.3d 774,

 779 (10th Cir. 2019)). Although we have described the speedy-trial right as

 “somewhat amorphous,” the remedy for violating that right is “severe: dismissal of

 the indictment with prejudice.” United States v. Black, 830 F.3d 1099, 1111 (10th

 Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). To determine whether a delay violates a defendant’s Sixth

 Amendment speedy-trial right, we apply the four-part balancing test set forth by the

 Supreme Court in Barker. Jumaev, 20 F.4th at 532. “The four factors are: ‘(1) the

 length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right;

 and (4) prejudice to the defendant.’” Medina, 918 F.3d at 780 (quoting United States

 v. Yehling, 456 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2006)).

       We review the legal question of whether the government violated a

 defendant’s Sixth Amendment right de novo “and any underlying district court

 factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Frias, 893 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th

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 Cir. 2018) (citing Black, 830 F.3d at 1111). “Clear error exists when a factual

 finding lacks any factual support in the record, or after reviewing the evidence, the

 record convinces us the district court made a mistake.” United States v. Rico, 3 F.4th

 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Hooks, 551 F.3d 1205, 1216

 (10th Cir. 2009)).

                                           III.

       Under Barker’s test to determine whether a delay violates the Sixth

 Amendment, “[n]o single factor is determinative or necessary”; we consider “all

 four . . . to determine whether a violation has occurred.” Black, 830 F.3d at 1111

 (quoting United States v. Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir. 2010)).

                                           A.

       The district court correctly determined that the first factor favors Defendant;

 and the government agrees. The length-of-delay factor typically serves as a

 gatekeeper. Frias, 893 F.3d at 1272. “We examine the other factors only when the

 delay is presumptively prejudicial,” Jumaev, 20 F.4th at 532 (quoting Frias, 893 F.3d

 at 1272)—a requirement that “[d]elays approaching one year generally satisfy,”

 United States v. Batie, 433 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Doggett v.

 United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992); Jackson v. Ray, 390 F.3d 1254, 1261

 (10th Cir. 2004)). “The delay period starts with the indictment or arrest, whichever

 comes first.” Jumaev, 20 F.4th at 533 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 919 F.3d

 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2019)). And it ends at conviction. Id. (citing Betterman v.

 Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 441 (2016)).

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       The grand jury returned the indictment against Defendant on September 27,

 2017, and federal authorities arrested him on August 20, 2019, when the district court

 unsealed the indictment. The parties do not contest the district court’s determination

 that Defendant’s rights attached when the government filed the sealed indictment on

 September 27, 2017—twenty-three months before Defendant’s arrest. Twenty-three

 months is presumptively prejudicial. See Batie, 433 F.3d at 1290 (“Delays

 approaching one year generally satisfy the requirement of presumptive prejudice.”).

 And the district court determined that “the delay stretche[d] beyond the bare

 minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” Seltzer, 595 F.3d at

 1176 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652) (stating that when the accused makes a

 showing that the delay is presumptively prejudicial, “the court must then consider, as

 one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare

 minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.) The government does

 not dispute this determination. Thus, the length of delay favors Defendant.

                                           B.

       The second Barker factor focuses on the reason for the delay. This factor is

 especially important. Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1177 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk,

 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986)). Both the prosecutor and the court have an affirmative

 constitutional obligation to timely try a defendant. Jumaev, 20 F.4th at 533 (citing

 United States v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558, 639 (10th Cir. 2021)). Thus, the

 prosecution must explain the cause of the pretrial delay. Id. (citing Muhtorov, 20

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 F.4th at 639). A deliberate attempt to delay trial to hinder the defense weighs heavily

 against the government. Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1177 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).

 A more neutral reason, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, weighs less

 heavily against the government—though the government still bears responsibility for

 “such circumstances.” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). But a valid reason, like

 a missing witness, justifies appropriate delay. Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531).

       The government asserts it delayed prosecuting Defendant until Colorado

 completed its case against him for, among other things, reasons of comity. Waiting

 for the completion of another sovereign’s prosecution can justify a delay in some—

 but not all—cases. See id. at 1178. The government must explain why it needed to

 wait in a particular case. Frias, 893 F.3d at 1272. Three subfactors can tip the

 second Barker factor in favor of the government: when (1) the charges or proceedings

 overlap, (2) “concurrent proceedings would . . . be logistically cumbersome,” or (3)

 the defendant faces complex charges. Medina, 918 F.3d at 781 (quoting Seltzer, 595

 F.3d at 1178).

       The district court determined the government failed to show this case’s

 circumstances necessitated the delay. It found: (1) the federal and state proceedings

 minimally overlapped because only Defendant’s involvement and discharge of the

 same firearm linked the July 3 and 5 incidents; (2) prosecuting both cases

 simultaneously would not unduly burden the government because each sovereign

 could work together to transfer Defendant from its custody and document the

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 firearm’s chain-of-custody transfers; and (3) the charges were not complex because

 the facts surrounding the July 3 incident are straightforward.

       The government argues Defendant’s state and federal charges significantly

 overlapped because the first count—possession of a firearm by a felon—included

 Defendant’s possession of the firearm on July 5 when he fired at the police officers,

 the event underlying Colorado’s case. And the government notes that if the state had

 prosecuted Defendant for illegal gun possession, the United States likely would not

 have needed to bring its own gun-possession charge. The government also contends

 that concurrent state and federal proceedings would have caused logistical difficulties

 due to the possibility of competing hearings, trials, and demands for witnesses and

 custody of Defendant, along with chain-of-custody issues with the firearm and the

 potential for inconsistent testimony. Last, the government asserts that Defendant’s

 attempted murder charge in the state case was complex because murder cases are

 inherently complex. See Nixon, 919 F.3d at 1272. And attempt crimes add the

 requirement of proving a substantial step “strongly corroborative of the firmness of

 the actor’s purpose to complete the commission of the offense,” Colo. Rev. Stat.

 Ann. § 18-2-101(1), making an attempted-murder charge arguably more complex.

       The district court erred in finding minimal overlap between the federal and

 state cases against Defendant. It detailed that, because the federal charges relate only

 to the July 3 shoplifting incident and the state charges involve only the July 5

 shooting-at-law-enforcement incident, the two cases have little in common. But

 count one of the federal indictment charges Defendant with unlawfully possessing a

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 firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) from July 3, 2017, up to and including

 July 5, 2017. So the district court incorrectly determined that the federal charges did

 not involve the July 5 firearm possession.

       The district court also gave insufficient weight to the difficulties that

 prosecuting Defendant’s federal and state cases simultaneously would place on the

 state and federal governments. In this Circuit, the undue burden inquiry has focused

 on varying factors, including the avoidance of jurisdictional conflicts and the burden

 of transporting the defendant to federal court. So, where dual court proceedings will

 require “ping-ponging [the defendant] between state and federal custody,” we have

 held that the government could permissibly delay proceedings. Nixon, 919 F.3d at

 1270. Similarly, where concurrent proceedings will pose a “logistical ordeal”

 because the defendant is in state custody many miles from the federal courthouse, we

 have upheld a delay in proceedings. Medina, 918 F.3d at 789. But where the state is

 holding a defendant only five blocks from the federal courthouse, we have found the

 burden of making a defendant appear in federal court less compelling. Seltzer, 595

 F.3d at 1178.

       In this case, the state held Defendant twenty-four miles from the federal

 courthouse. So, if the government sought to justify the delay based upon the

 difficulty of transport from state custody to the federal courthouse, it might be a close

 call. But the government’s justification in this case rests more on jurisdictional

 conflicts, issues of comity, and the logistical ordeal of transporting not only

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  defendant, but evidence critical to both cases.3 And that argument makes the case

  more akin to Nixon, where the state defendant resided within one and a half miles of

  the federal courthouse, but the “federal authorities weren’t waiting on the state case

  to save on mileage or time; they were waiting in order to avoid jurisdictional

  conflicts over custody.” Nixon, 919 F.3d at 1271. Thus, like we did in Nixon, we

  conclude the delay caused by the government’s decision to wait until the state

  prosecution finished to avoid jurisdictional conflicts was permissible.

        And the district court also erred in finding the charges against Defendant were

  not complex. Our authorities demonstrate that determining whether charges are

  complex can require a detailed inquiry. In Seltzer, we determined the defendant’s

  charges—“felon in possession of a firearm and four counts of counterfeiting (all of

  which arose out of a single incident)”—lacked complexity. Medina, 918 F.3d at 789

  (citing Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1173, 1175, 1178). But in Medina, which involved

  “multiple and different federal financial crimes that occurred in several states,”

  including bank fraud, mail theft, identify theft, and possession of a firearm by a

  felon, we held the charges were complex. Id. at 778, 789. And we have generally

  recognized that state murder cases are inherently complex and can support the federal

  government deferring to the state proceeding. Nixon, 919 F.3d at 1272.

        3
           Physical possession of the firearm would have been necessary for both
  prosecutions; and transporting the firearm between jurisdictions would lead to chain-
  of-custody issues and an increased logistical burden on both sovereigns. True,
  custody logs could mitigate the potential for harm stemming from the transfers. But
  the fact that a burden can be, in part, mitigated, does not undermine its legitimacy.
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        The district court distinguished Nixon because the state charged Defendant

  with attempted murder (as opposed to murder) and Defendant ultimately pleaded

  guilty to assault. But the crime to which Defendant pleaded is not relevant to the

  complexity inquiry in this case because his plea did not take place until twenty-one

  months into the twenty-three-month delay. During the delay, the government could

  not have known that either the state or Defendant would agree to Defendant pleading

  to assault. So, for purposes of our inquiry, we must analyze the complexity issue

  based upon the crime with which the state charged him: attempted murder.

        Though attempted murder does not fall squarely within Nixon’s categorization

  of murder charges as complex, we conclude the charge at least minimally meets the

  definition of complex as described in Nixon. Indeed, attempted murder is arguably

  more complex because to prove an attempt crime, the government must show the

  intent to commit the substantive offense plus the “commission of an act which

  constitutes a substantial step towards commission of the substantive offense.” United

  States v. Vigil, 523 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.

  Smith, 264 F.3d 1012, 1015 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-2-

  101(1). Thus, we hold the second factor weighs in the government’s favor.

                                            C.

        The district court also erred when it determined the assertion-of-his-right

  factor favors Defendant. “Under the third Barker factor, we look to ‘whether the

  defendant has actively asserted his right to a speedy trial.’” Black, 830 F.3d at 1120

  (quoting Batie, 433 F.3d at 1291). While it matters that a defendant asserted the

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  right, we also consider “the frequency and force of the objections.” Id. (quoting

  United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498, 501 (10th Cir. 1975)). “The third Barker

  factor weighs against a defendant who weakly asserts his speedy-trial right long after

  he could have, but the factor weighs in favor of a defendant who early, frequently,

  and forcefully asserts his right.” Id.

        Frias illustrates the type of assertion that results in weighing this factor in

  favor of the defendant. There, the defendant’s federal indictment remained sealed for

  two years after her state-court sentencing and she moved to dismiss the indictment

  less than two months after her initial appearance in federal court. We held this factor

  slightly favored the defendant because we doubted she could have asserted her

  speedy-trial rights earlier. Frias, 893 F.3d at 1271, 1273. But in Nixon, we held this

  factor favored the government, even though it waited nearly a year to arraign the

  defendant, because he knew within two weeks of his federal indictment that the

  federal government was charging him but waited almost a year after indictment to

  invoke his right to a speedy trial. 919 F.3d at 1269, 1272–73.

        In this case, though the federal grand jury indicted Defendant on September

  27, 2017, the federal indictment remained sealed until August 20, 2019, while

  Colorado’s case against Defendant proceeded in state court. But Defendant’s

  attorney in the state-court proceedings contacted the U.S. Attorney’s Office

  (“USAO”) on May 17, 2019 to inquire about the existence of a federal case. The

  USAO did not provide any details about the substance of the federal charges, but it

  explained that the federal case would begin when the state court case ended. Still,

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  Defendant did not move to dismiss the federal indictment against him for violation of

  his speedy-trial rights until nearly a year after the discussion—and eight months after

  his initial appearance in federal court.

        The district court determined this factor favored Defendant because he only

  had a general impression that he could face federal charges and he could not have

  gained any additional information because the indictment was sealed. But the

  government does not challenge Defendant’s decision not to file a speedy-trial motion

  before the district court arraigned him in August 2019. Rather, the government

  argues that this factor favors it because, after appearing in federal court, Defendant

  waited eight months to file his speedy-trial motion and filed three continuances

  seeking to exclude 210 days from the speedy-trial clock.

        At bottom, the third “factor weighs against a defendant who requests

  continuances and waits for months to assert his speedy trial right.” United States v.

  Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1208 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Toombs, 574

  F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (10th Cir. 2009)). And, as in Nixon, where the defendant waited

  nearly a year to file his speedy-trial motion even though the indictment was available

  to him, Defendant waited eight months and requested three continuances before filing

  his motion after the court unsealed the indictment. Thus, we conclude the third

  Barker factor weighs in favor of the government.

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                                              D.

         Finally, the district court erred in determining that the fourth Barker factor

  weighed in Defendant’s favor. As the individual claiming the Sixth Amendment

  violation, Defendant must prove the delay prejudiced him. See Black, 830 F.3d at

  1121 (citing Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1179). Most of the time, failing to specify prejudice

  will “eviscerate the defendant’s claim.” United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312,

  1329 (10th Cir. 2014). We evaluate prejudice by considering the interests that the

  speedy-trial right protects: (i) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii)

  minimizing the accused’s anxiety and concern; and (iii) minimizing the possibility of

  impairing the defense. Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1179 (citing Toombs, 574 F.3d at 1275).

         The third interest—impairing the defense—is the most serious “because the

  inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire

  system.” Id. at 1179–80. And “[b]ecause the seriousness of a post-accusation delay

  worsens when the wait is accompanied by pretrial incarceration, oppressive pretrial

  incarceration is the second most important factor.” Id. at 1180 (quoting Jackson, 390

  F.3d at 1264). Some cases of extreme delay excuse the defendant’s obligation under

  this factor to show specific evidence of prejudice, but generally the court requires at

  least a six-year delay before allowing the delay itself to constitute prejudice. Id. at

  1180 n.3 (citing Jackson, 390 F.3d at 1263).

         The district court determined that Defendant suffered prejudice because:

  (1) the delay caused the loss of relevant evidence; and (2) Defendant experienced an

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  unnecessarily prolonged period of pretrial incarceration. We conclude that neither

  determination was correct.

                                             1.

        The district court determined that the government’s delay caused the loss of

  video evidence because the Kmart where the shoplifting incident occurred closed

  during the two years that the federal indictment was sealed. We evaluate whether the

  loss of evidence during a delay amounts to prejudice by considering “(1) the

  defendant’s ability to demonstrate with specificity how the evidence would have

  aided his defense; (2) whether the government’s delay in bringing the defendant to

  trial caused the evidence to be actually lost; and (3) whether the defendant took

  appropriate steps to preserve the evidence.” Medina, 918 F.3d at 781–82 (citing

  Jackson, 390 F.3d at 1264–66).

        Here, Defendant fails to carry his burden at the second element: “whether the

  government’s delay . . . caused the evidence to be actually lost.” Id. at 781 (citing

  Jackson, 390 F.3d at 1264–66). To satisfy the second element, “the defendant must

  show the government’s delay caused evidence to be unavailable” and that “the

  evidence was actually irretrievable for trial.” Id. at 782 (citing Jackson, 390 F.3d at

  1266; United States v. Vaughan, 643 F. App’x 726, 732 (10th Cir. 2016)). “This

  showing can include the defendant’s efforts to locate the evidence and why those

  efforts were unsuccessful.” Id.

        The Kmart where the incident took place closed approximately four months

  after the July 3 incident. And, based in part on this fact, the district court presumed

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  (and ultimately determined) that the loss was attributable to the government’s delay

  because of the likelihood the video recordings would have been available as evidence

  if this case had been prosecuted promptly.

        But Defendant never put forth evidence showing the video evidence would

  have been available at any time, even if the Kmart had not closed—and this was his

  burden. See Black, 830 F.3d at 1122. Contrary to the manner in which the district

  court considered the issue, it was not the government’s burden to disprove the loss of

  video evidence. Relatedly, Defendant makes no assertion that the lost footage would

  have been available if the government did not violate the speedy trial clock. The

  only assertion he makes is how the evidence—if available—could have helped his

  case. Those are distinct claims. As our case law makes clear, “the defendant must

  show the government’s delay caused evidence to be unavailable.” Medina, 918 F.3d

  at 782 (citing Jackson, 390 F.3d at 1266). Defendant did not make that showing.4

                                            2.

        The district court also determined that Defendant experienced an unnecessarily

  prolonged period of incarceration because the federal detainer prevented him from

  bonding out in his state case. According to the district court, Defendant presented

        4
          Indeed, neither side presented evidence to the district court on the motion to
  dismiss regarding the availability of the video footage. Then, on the motion for
  reconsideration of the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, the only
  evidence before the district court suggested that Defendant could not show the
  government’s delay caused the evidence to be unavailable, because the video
  evidence was deleted thirty-six days after the July 3 incident and before the federal
  grand jury returned the indictment.
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  compelling evidence that his family started gathering funds to post bond when they

  learned that the federal detainer prevented him from bonding out of state custody.

  Thus, by waiting for the state case to conclude before beginning the federal

  prosecution and placing a federal detainer on him, the government assured that

  Defendant would be in custody until he was brought into federal custody. Relying on

  Seltzer and our recognition that “prolonged pretrial incarceration is a well-

  established type of prejudice that a defendant may rely upon,” the district court

  determined the fourth Barker factor weighed heavily in Defendant’s favor. Seltzer,

  595 F.3d at 1180. We disagree.

        In our view, the district court’s determination overlooks two key items that

  distinguish this case from Seltzer: (1) a twenty-three-month delay does not constitute

  presumptively extreme delay, see Toombs, 574 F.3d at 1275; and (2) the state court

  gave Defendant credit for his pretrial incarceration against his twenty-three-year state

  sentence, thus mitigating the potential oppressive effects of incarceration, see, e.g.,

  Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 762 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Credit for time served cannot

  cure every unexcused delay but where the defendant has not pointed to any evidence

  of additional, specific prejudice flowing from the delay, we are unwilling to infer

  prejudice based on incarceration that the defendant would ultimately have had to

  serve solely because fourteen and one-half months had elapsed between arrest and

  trial.”); Gray v. King, 724 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5th Cir. 1984) (explaining “credit for the

  time so served” “mitigate[s] the potential oppressive effects of this incarceration”).

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        Moreover, as in Toombs, “[e]ven assuming . . . prevention of oppressive

  pretrial incarceration and minimization of the accused’s anxiety and concern[] weigh

  in [Defendant’s] favor, the third, and most important [interest (impairing the

  defense)], does not.” 574 F.3d at 1275. That is, pretrial detainment alone (that is not

  presumptively extreme) is insufficient proof of prejudice. Under these

  circumstances, without evidence that the defense was hindered as a result of the

  delay, the fourth Barker factor simply cannot weigh in Defendant’s favor.

                                             E.

        In sum, the parties concede that the first factor, the length of the delay, favors

  Defendant. But the second factor, reason for the delay, and third factor, assertion of

  the speedy-trial right, favor the government because the government justified the

  delay and Defendant waited eight months and requested three continuances before

  moving to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial

  right. The fourth factor, prejudice, also favors the government because Defendant

  failed to carry his burden of showing that evidence was lost because of the delay.

  Although no single factor is dispositive, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances,

  Barker counsels us not to find a violation of the right to a speedy trial when the

  defendant’s actions indicate he had no desire for a speedy trial.” Larson, 627 F.3d at

  1211 (quoting Toombs, 574 F.3d at 1276); see also Jumaev, 20 F.4th at 545–46

  (holding that the defendant’s speedy-trial claim fails where factors one and four

  weigh in his favor and factors two and three weigh against him because “with the

  third factor weighing against Jumaev, his speedy trial claim fails”). Here, the

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Appellate Case: 20-1386    Document: 010110810027        Date Filed: 02/08/2023   Page: 19

  balance of factors favors the government and—more importantly—we echo the

  Supreme Court’s reluctance to find a constitutional speedy-trial-right violation when

  the defendant failed to adequately assert that right. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 536.

  Thus, we hold that the delay did not violate Defendant’s speedy-trial right and the

  district court improperly dismissed his indictment.

                                            V.

        The other issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying the

  government’s motion for reconsideration of the grant of Defendant’s motion to

  dismiss. But because we reverse and remand on the grant of the motion to dismiss in

  the first instance, we do not reach the government’s appeal of the denial of its motion

  for reconsideration.

        For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s decision dismissing

  Defendant’s indictment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this

  opinion.

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