Court Opinion

ID: 9797602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:25:08.698057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:20.011902
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
specially concurring.
I agree with the conclusion and most of the analysis contained in the majority’s opinion. I write separately, however, to express my view that the statutory sixty-day time limit for holding a revocation hearing under § 42-2 — 126(8)(e), C.R.S.2001, is not jurisdictional in these circumstances.
Both parties proceed on the assumption that the .sixty-day time limit is jurisdictional, following the ruling by a division of this court in Wilson v. Hill, 782 P.2d 874 (Colo.App.1989). That case, however, concerned a de*1100lay by the Department of Revenue, not a requested delay by the claimant. As I read Wilson, and the cases upon which it relies, e.g., Ursino v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App.3d 611, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404 (1974), the sixty-day time limit at issue here is “jurisdictional” only insofar as it requires the Department of Revenue to hold a hearing within that period.
As a division of this court observed in Minto v. Lambert, 870 P.2d 572 (Colo.App. 1993), the term “jurisdiction” has diverse and disparate meanings, encompassing both the appropriate exercise of power and the absence of power. Properly considered, lack of subject matter jurisdiction concerns the absence of power, while the issue here is the appropriate exercise of power.
Nothing in Wilson precludes waiver of the sixty-day time limit when a licensee or the licensee’s attorney requests a rescheduling of the hearing. Wilson and the cases on which it relies focus solely on government officials’ nondiscretionary duty to act within a specified period, rather than the Department of Revenue’s power to adjudicate license revocation cases. Thus, to the extent that the sixty-day time limit may be waived, the Department of Revenue would be free to reschedule license revocation hearings after the sixty-day period has expired. This reading of the statute would obviate the Department of Revenue’s concerns about the difficulty or impossibility of rescheduling a hearing within the sixty-day period.
While Wilson and the cases it cites emphasize the importance of an administrative agency carrying out its duties strictly within a particular statutory time period, there is no reason why a licensee should not be able to waive that statutory provision and obtain a hearing after the sixty-day period. Further, such a waiver is consistent with § 42-2-126(6)(a), C.R.S.2001, which provides that a revocation is not stayed during the period of any delay in a hearing caused or requested by the licensee or the licensee’s attorney. My interpretation furthers the licensee’s statutory right to counsel of his or her own choosing under § 24-4-105(9)(a), C.R.S.2001, and is consistent with the statutory provision contained in § 24-4-105(2)(a), C.R.S.2001, that “due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties and their representatives.”
Accordingly, I would conclude that the sixty-day time period is not jurisdictional in these circumstances and remand for further proceedings.