Court Opinion

ID: 9642547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:02:27.651458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:49.525882
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
SEERDEN, Justice.
The State filed a motion for leave to file a late motion for rehearing. Pursuant to Rules 4 and 6, TEX.R.CRIM.APP.P., we granted the State’s motion to file a motion for rehearing. Cf. Marroquin v. State, 652 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.).
In its motion for rehearing, the State argues that an amendment to TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5561h is relevant to this case and provides a pertinent exception to the psychiatrist/patient privilege. The State urges, therefore, the communications between appellant and Dr. Nelson were not privileged and the conviction should be affirmed. We agree.
Prior to August 27, 1979, there was no psychiatrist/patient privilege recognized by Texas law. See Ex Parte Wilson, 606 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). In 1979, the Texas Legislature created a statutory privilege for such communications. Act of Aug. 27, 1979, ch. 239, 1979 TEX.GEN.LAWS 512. The 1979 version of Article 5561h provided exceptions to this privilege in Section 4, none of which are relevant to the instant case. Then, effective September 1, 1983, Section 4(a) was amended to provide the following exception: “See. 4(a) Exceptions to the privilege in court proceedings exist: ... (5) in any criminal prosecution where the patient is a victim, witness, or defendant....” Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 511, § 2, 1983 TEX.GEN.LAWS 2970, 2973. The conversations between appellant and Dr. Nelson occurred between March and May, 1983. This case went to trial on April 16, 1984 and these communications were admitted into evidence on April 17, 1984. Thus the communications were privileged when made, but not when admitted into evidence at trial.
Appellant argued in his original brief that Section 4(a)(5) was inapplicable in this case because it was not in effect when the communications were made. He argued that the statute requires the confidentiality to be preserved for all purposes after the communications were made. (Section 2(d)). The State did not address this point in its original brief. Our Court also overlooked this point in our initial consideration of this case.
*721The privileged communications at issue in this case clearly come within the Section 4(a)(5) exception. The question is whether that provision is operative in this case.
In absence of an express intent to the contrary, a procedural statute is operative from its effective date. Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex.Crim.App.1971); Neal v. State, 400 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex.Crim.App.1966). A rule relating to the admission of evidence is procedural. See Wilson, 473 S.W.2d at 535. Specifically, the Texas Supreme Court has stated that the privilege created by Article 5561h “relates to the admissibility of evidence and is procedural in nature.” Ex Parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 262 (Tex.1981).
The following cases are instances where the legislature changed a rule of evidence after a cause of action had arisen but before the trial of the case and the procedural change was held applicable as of its effective date: Harper v. State, 686 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985, no pet.); Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.2d 532; Ritchey v. State, 407 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.Crim.App.1966); see also Exxon Corporation v. Brecheen, 526 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Tex.1975).
Based on this analogous authority, we hold that Article 5561h is a procedural rule because it relates to the admissibility of evidence, and it was applicable to pending litigation as of its effective date. Section 4(a)(5), therefore, did provide an exception to the privilege at the time of trial. The trial court did not err in admitting Dr. Nelson’s testimony regarding her conversations with appellant.
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
NYE, C.J., concurs.