Court Opinion

ID: 9517061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:02:30.268712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:12.231235
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
concurring in result.
I fully concur with the majority on every issue, and I concur in result as to Part LA. of the majority: opinion. While I agree with the conclusions that the majority reached, I write separately to note the difference between a lack of standing to raise a claim and waiver of that claim.
The majority agrees with the trial court that Polk lacked standing to raise the Fourth Amendment claim that the police illegally searched Lamberson's vehicle. But "[elvery person in a motor vehicle has a right to contest the stop of the vehicle in which he is traveling as either a driver or passenger." - McKnight v. State, 612 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). The problem is not that Polk had no standing to raise this claim; the problem is that Lam-berson effectively waived that right by giving the police consent to search her vehicle. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (upholding search of vehicle where police officer could have reasonably believed that the driver's general consent to search his vehicle included the search of a paper bag discovered on the floor of the vehicle).
Because Lamberson gave general consent to search her vehicle, and the evidence does not demonstrate that she did so due to fear, fraud, duress, or intimidation, Polk's right to contest the search was waived. Therefore, the majority rightly concluded that Polk's counsel was not deficient for failing to challenge Lam-berson's consent. For these reasons, I concur with the majority opinion, but concur in result as to part L.A.