Court Opinion

ID: 9964327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 18:00:57.118697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:19.012006
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10934    Document: 60-1      Date Filed: 04/29/2024   Page: 1 of 56

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10934
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        VICTOR HILL,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00143-ELR-CCB-1
                            ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10934

        Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
        ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
                The notion that “[n]o man is above the law and no man is
        below it” 1 is fundamental to our democratic republic’s continuing
        viability. That principle applies equally to sheriffs (and other offic-
        ers of the law) and detainees. And 18 U.S.C. § 242 vindicates that
        principle. It imposes criminal liability on anyone who, under color
        of law, willfully deprives another person of their constitutional
        rights. Under § 242, a jury convicted Victor Hill, the former Sheriff
        of Clayton County, Georgia, of using his position as the Sheriff to
        deprive detainees in his custody of their constitutional rights. Hill
        now appeals.
               Hill oversaw the Clayton County Jail. At that jail, officers
        used restraint chairs for “safe containment” of pretrial detainees
        “exhibiting violent or uncontrollable behavior.” But six times, Hill
        ordered individual detainees who were neither violent nor uncon-
        trollable into a restraint chair for at least four hours, with their
        hands cuffed behind their backs (or, in one instance, to the sides of
        the chair) and without bathroom breaks. Each detainee suffered
        injuries, such as “open and bleeding” wounds, lasting scars, or
        nerve damage. Based on these events, a jury convicted Hill of six

        1 President Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 7,

        1903), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/third-annual-message-
        16 [https://perma.cc/W6UT-AAEG].
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        23-10934                   Opinion of the Court                                  3

        counts of willfully depriving the detainees of their constitutional
        right to be free from excessive force, in violation of § 242.
                Hill challenges that conviction on three grounds. We reject
        each one. First, Hill had fair warning that his conduct was uncon-
        stitutional—that is, that he could not use gratuitous force against a
        compliant, nonresistant detainee. Second, sufficient evidence sup-
        ported the jury’s conclusion that Hill’s conduct had no legitimate
        nonpunitive purpose, was willful, and caused the detainees’ inju-
        ries. Third, the district court did not coerce the jury verdict but
        properly exercised its discretion in investigating and responding to
        alleged juror misconduct.
             So after careful consideration, and with the benefit of oral
        argument, we affirm Hill’s conviction.
                                    I.       BACKGROUND

                                         A. Factual Background2

               Defendant-Appellant Victor Hill served as Sheriﬀ of Clayton
        County, Georgia, from 2005 to 2008 and from 2013 to 2022. As
        Sheriﬀ, Hill oversaw the county jail, where pretrial detainees are
        incarcerated. Hill characterized the jail, under his supervision, as a
        “paramilitary facility” with “a lot of rules” like “in a military boot
        camp.”

        2 We take these facts from the evidence presented at trial, and we view them

        in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Verdeza, 69 F.4th 780,
        785 n.1 (11th Cir. 2023).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10934

               In his role as Sheriﬀ, Hill received annual use-of-force train-
        ings. Consistent with this training, Hill adopted a use-of-force pol-
        icy deﬁning “excessive force” as “any force used in excess of the
        amount of force reasonably required to establish control over or to
        prevent or terminate an unlawful act of violence.”
               In 2018, Hill bought restraint chairs for the Clayton County
        Jail and established a policy for their use. At trial, the Government
        introduced the following photo of a restraint chair:
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        23-10934                Opinion of the Court                          5

                Hill adopted a general policy for the use of all types of phys-
        ical-restraint devices. It provided that a detainee posing a risk of
        “actual violence for [himself] or others . . . shall be placed into iso-
        lation” first. And it emphasized that only if the detainee “continues
        to exhibit physical violence toward staff, [himself], or others”
        should he “be placed into restraints.”
               Besides this policy, Hill adopted a speciﬁc restraint-chair pol-
        icy. Under it, the chairs were “for emergencies,” such as “safe con-
        tainment of an inmate exhibiting violent or uncontrollable behav-
        ior” and preventing “self-injury, injury to others or property dam-
        age.” Chair use, the policy continued, could “never be authorized
        as a form of punishment.” And when a situation called for chair
        use, oﬃcers were to remove handcuﬀs, and detainees were to be
        “kept in the restraint chair no longer than four (4) hours unless ex-
        igent circumstances exist, i.e., inmates [sic] continued violent be-
        havior.” Also under the policy, a detainee had to receive medical
        clearance before being put in the chair. Finally, the policy man-
        dated regular medical checks and “scheduled exercise periods” for
        those who were restrained.
               Hill and his deputies used the chair about 600 times. Accord-
        ing to Hill, he ordered chair use as a “preventative measure” based
        on “pre-attack indicators” and the “totality of [the] circumstances.”
        And when Hill ordered chair restraint of a detainee, only Hill could
        order his release from the chair, typically after “at least four hours.”
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                     23-10934

              This case concerns Hill’s restraint-chair use on six3 pretrial
        detainees in 2019 and 2020. We recount the facts of each arrest and
        detention, organized by detainee, below.
                                   1. Raheem Peterkin
               In December 2019, Raheem Peterkin was arrested for alleg-
        edly pointing a gun at two men outside his apartment and “barri-
        cading” himself in the apartment despite oﬃcers’ repeated requests
        to come outside. According to the arresting oﬃcer, during his ar-
        rest and booking, Peterkin was never violent, uncontrollable, or
        threatening.
               After Peterkin arrived at the jail, Hill and specialized security
        oﬃcers—known as the “Scorpion Response Team” (“SRT”)—
        visited Peterkin’s holding cell and questioned Peterkin about his al-
        leged oﬀenses. Hill said, “I wish I was there. I would have riddled
        your ass with bullets.” And then he told SRT members to “put that
        bitch in the chair.”
               On Hill’s order, oﬃcers strapped Peterkin into a restraint
        chair. Peterkin remained there, with his hands cuﬀed behind his
        back, for four hours. While in the chair, Peterkin experienced pain
        in his wrist and side. He testiﬁed that the pain was “the worst thing
        [he] ever felt,” and the restraints left scars on both of his wrists.

        3 The indictment charged Hill with seven counts, for seven detainees. But the

        jury acquitted Hill of one count: the count related to Joseph Harper. That
        acquittal is not before us on appeal.
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        23-10934                 Opinion of the Court                            7

        Oﬃcers did not allow him to use the restroom, so he was forced to
        urinate on himself.
                                   2. Desmond Bailey
               In February 2020, oﬃcers arrested Desmond Bailey for drug
        and ﬁrearm possession. While oﬃcers were executing a search
        warrant, Bailey left his house in a car, requiring oﬃcers to follow
        him before they could stop and arrest him. The arresting oﬃcer
        testiﬁed that during his arrest and booking, Bailey was never vio-
        lent, uncontrollable, or threatening.
                In his holding cell at the jail, Bailey told detectives that he did
        not want to speak to them without a lawyer present. But several
        hours later, Hill, the detectives, and SRT members arrived, and Hill
        questioned Bailey about his alleged oﬀenses. Bailey again refused
        to answer questions without a lawyer present. Hill replied, “You
        think you’re a big badass. Oh, you think you’re a gangster. Put his
        ass in the chair.”
               On Hill’s order, oﬃcers strapped Bailey into a restraint chair.
        There Bailey sat, with his hands cuﬀed behind his back, for six
        hours. Bailey described his time in the chair as “horrible” and “ter-
        rifying.” He testiﬁed that he was in extreme pain and eventually
        felt numb. The restraints cause Bailey to suﬀer “open and bleed-
        ing” cuts on both wrists, which required medical treatment and left
        scars.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10934

                                  3. Joseph Arnold
               In February 2020, oﬃcers arrested Joseph Arnold for assault-
        ing two elderly women during a dispute about who was next in line
        at a grocery store, though they did not arrest him until three weeks
        after the incident. Following the incident, Hill put Arnold on the
        Sheriﬀ’s Department’s “top ten” most wanted list and oﬀered
        “$2500 of [his] own money to anyone who would lead authorities
        to identify” Arnold. The arresting oﬃcer testiﬁed that Arnold was
        cooperative, non-threatening, and did not resist arrest.
              Upon Arnold’s arrival at the jail’s booking area, Hill con-
        fronted Arnold. The jury saw an oﬃcer’s surreptitious recording
        of that interaction. When Arnold, who was handcuﬀed, asked
        whether he was entitled to a fair and speedy trial, Hill responded,
              You entitled to sit in this chair, and you’re entitled to get the
              hell out of my county and don’t come back. That’s what
              you’re entitled to. You sound like a damn jackass. Don’t you
              ever put your hand on a woman like that again. You’re for-
              tunate that wasn’t my mother or grandma or you wouldn’t
              be standing there. Now, sit there and see if you can get some
              damn sense in your head.
               On Hill’s order, oﬃcers strapped Arnold into a restraint
        chair. There Arnold remained, with his hands cuﬀed to the sides
        of the chair, for at least four hours. Arnold testiﬁed that the re-
        straints were “painful and humiliating” and left marks on his wrists
        that did not heal for weeks.
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        23-10934                Opinion of the Court                         9

                               4. Cryshon Hollins (C.H.)
                In April 2020, oﬃcers arrested Cryshon Hollins (then 17
        years old) for vandalizing his family’s home. Deputy Allen, who
        happened to be Hill’s godson, spoke with Hill on the phone, texted
        Hill a photo of Hollins handcuﬀed in the back of the police car, and
        had this text message exchange with Hill:
               Hill: How old is he?
               Allen: 17
               Hill: Chair
        Again, the arresting oﬃcers, as well as oﬃcers who were in the jail’s
        intake area, testiﬁed that Hollins was never violent, uncontrollable,
        or threatening.
               On Hill’s order, oﬃcers strapped Hollins into a restraint
        chair immediately upon his arrival at the jail. Hollins cried because
        he felt like he was “being tortured,” and he was forced to urinate
        on himself. After four to ﬁve hours, oﬃcers released Hollins from
        the chair, and he fell asleep in a holding cell.
                An hour later, Hill scolded Hollins for disrespecting Hollins’s
        mother and ordered SRT members to strap Hollins into the re-
        straint chair. There Hollins sat for another ﬁve or six hours, with
        his hands cuﬀed behind his back. Hollins testiﬁed that the restraint
        felt “like torture” and left visible marks on his wrists and ankles.
               During the second restraint, Hill recorded a video of him-
        self, Hollins, and Joseph Harper, who was strapped into another
        restraint chair in the same room. In that video, among other
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                23-10934

        things, Hill said, “If I hear about you messing up your mama’s
        house again . . . I’m a sit your ass in that chair for sixteen hours
        straight . . . I need to hear from both of y’all that y’all not gonna
        show y’all’s ass in my county no more.” Hill texted that video to
        his girlfriend.
              At trial, Hill claimed that he tried to be “convincing” and do
        what Hollins’s mother wasn’t “capable of doing.” Hill testiﬁed that
        “the experience [Hollins] had overall,” and “the discussion [Hill]
        had with him, is part of the reason why he’s out of trouble now.”
                                   5. Glen Howell
               In April 2020, Glen Howell and Lieutenant Guthrie had a
        payment dispute over landscaping work that Howell performed
        (unrelated to Guthrie’s employment). One night, Hill called How-
        ell to ask why he was “harassing” Guthrie, to which Howell re-
        sponded by telling Hill to “go f himself ” and hanging up. Because
        Howell didn’t believe the caller was Hill but “thought somebody
        was impersonating the Sheriﬀ,” Howell called Hill back via
        FaceTime. On that call, Howell said, “Now you work for me,” to
        which Hill replied, “I’m coming to get you.” Hill then texted How-
        ell and warned Howell not to contact him anymore or Howell
        would be arrested for harassing communications. Howell re-
        sponded, “So this is Victor Hill correct,” but did not otherwise con-
        tact Hill again.
              Hill still instructed a deputy to prepare an arrest warrant for
        misdemeanor harassing communications. After texting Howell
        multiple times about the warrant, Hill sent a fugitive squad two
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        23-10934                  Opinion of the Court                               11

        counties over to arrest Howell. Two days later, after retaining
        counsel, Howell turned himself in. Surveillance footage and oﬃc-
        ers’ testimony both reﬂect that Howell was cooperative and com-
        pliant during arrest and booking.
               After Howell turned himself in, Hill arrived at the jail, ac-
        companied by Lieutenant Guthrie. Howell tried to shake Hill’s
        hand. But Hill replied, “We’re way past that. You had an oppor-
        tunity to ﬁx this before this part.” Hill then ordered deputies to
        “put [Howell] in the chair,” and they strapped Howell in with his
        hands cuﬀed behind his back. There Howell sat for at least four
        hours. Hill said that he was “going to teach [Howell] a lesson” and
        “if [Howell] crossed him or one of his deputies again, it [would] be
        the sniper team.”
                Howell testiﬁed that, while in the chair, he felt the “worst
        feeling of [his] life.” Although he “asked for a medic” because he
        felt like he was having a “panic attack,” oﬃcers “denied [him] a
        medic.” The restraints left visible marks on his wrists and caused
        his hands to swell. Howell also testiﬁed that he still suﬀers neck,
        back, arm, leg, and toe pain and numbness from a pinched nerve,
        which aﬀects his ability to work. 4

        4 Howell also filed a civil lawsuit against Hill seeking damages under 42 U.S.C.

        § 1983. Howell v. Hill, No. 1:20-cv-02662-WMR (N.D. Ga.). In that case, the
        district court denied Hill’s motion for summary judgment on qualified-im-
        munity grounds. Hill’s appeal is pending before this Court.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10934

                                 6. Walter Thomas
               In May 2020, an oﬃcer arrested Walter Thomas for speeding
        and driving with a suspended license. The arresting oﬃcer testiﬁed
        that Thomas (though crying, cussing, and pleading with the oﬃcer
        not to take him to jail) was never violent, uncontrollable, or threat-
        ening.
               In the holding cell at the jail, an oﬃcer told Thomas to stand
        up and face the wall while Hill approached. When a female oﬃcer
        told Thomas not to put his head against the wall, Thomas turned
        to look at her. SRT members then pinned Thomas against the wall.
        Thomas tried to explain that he was there for only a suspended li-
        cense, but Hill told him to “shut up” and ordered SRT to strap him
        into a restraint chair.
               Following Hill’s orders, oﬃcers strapped Thomas into the
        chair, and there he remained for ﬁve or six hours with his hands
        cuﬀed behind his back. While Hill was still present, oﬃcers covered
        Thomas with a “spitting hood” (even though he had not been spit-
        ting) and punched him in the face, which caused a bruised lip.
        Thomas cried and urinated on himself several times. And no oﬃc-
        ers or nurses came to check on him; indeed, he “had to kick the
        door for somebody to come check on” him. He testiﬁed, “I never
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        23-10934                   Opinion of the Court                            13

        felt that pain never [sic] before. Like, literally, I wouldn’t wish that
        on my worst enemy.”5
                                        B. Procedural History

                A federal grand jury indicted Hill for “willfully depriv[ing]”
        the detainees of their constitutional “right to be free from the use
        of unreasonable force by law enforcement oﬃcers amounting to
        punishment,” “under color of law” and with resulting “bodily in-
        jury.” See 18 U.S.C. § 242. That right derives from the Fourteenth
        Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
        395 n.10 (1989). Hill moved to dismiss the indictment. He asserted
        that he lacked fair warning that his conduct was criminal. The dis-
        trict court denied that motion.
               At trial, after the Government rested, Hill moved for a judg-
        ment of acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). He argued that insuf-
        ﬁcient evidence supported the conclusions that (1) his use of the
        restraint chair was objectively unreasonable; (2) he acted willfully;
        and (3) he caused the detainees’ injuries. The district court denied
        that motion. Hill renewed his motion at the close of the defense’s
        evidence, but the court again denied that motion. Hill also repeat-
        edly moved for a mistrial during jury deliberations, as we discuss
        below.

        5 Thomas also filed a civil § 1983 lawsuit against Hill.
                                                              Thomas v. Hill, 1:22-cv-
        3987 (N.D. Ga.). That lawsuit appears to have stalled or been dropped. The
        only docket entries include the complaint and summons.
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        14                          Opinion of the Court                    23-10934

                              1. Jury Deliberations and Verdict
               The court submitted the case to the jury, and just after noon,
        the jury began its deliberations. Upon request, the court released
        the jury for the day around 4:30 p.m.
               The next day of deliberations, at around 2:45 p.m., the jury
        sent the judge a note. It said that the jury had “agreed on [two]
        counts” but was “deadlocked” on the other ﬁve.
               The Government requested an Allen charge. 6 For his part,
        Hill asked the court to take the verdict on the two counts and de-
        clare a mistrial on the remaining ﬁve counts. The district court
        then gave the Eleventh Circuit pattern modiﬁed Allen charge. 7 In
        delivering that charge, though, the district court omitted the sen-
        tence, “The trial has been expensive in time, eﬀort, money, and
        emotional strain to both the defense and the prosecution.”
               Roughly an hour later, the jury foreperson sent a note asking
        how the jury should proceed “if a juror is exhibiting the inability to
        understand the [court’s] instructions,” “displaying general confu-
        sion with basic words, [and] altering meanings of words to con-
        form with personal opinions.” The note did not identify the juror,
        describe the juror as a holdout, or claim that the jury was

        6 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501–02 (1896).

        7 Judicial Council of the U.S. Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Criminal Pattern Jury

        Instruction T5 (Mar. 2022), https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/de-
        fault/files/courtdocs/clk/FormCriminalPatternJuryInstructionsRevised-
        MAR2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE27-FN36].
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        23-10934               Opinion of the Court                        15

        deadlocked. The court responded in writing, “We’ve given you the
        instructions, and it is up to you to deliberate according to those in-
        structions, and work within them to arrive at a verdict.” The jury
        deliberated for another half hour before requesting to be released
        until the next day because it was “not coming to an agreement.”
               The next morning, a juror informed the court that she could
        not continue because she was experiencing excruciating back pain.
        An alternate juror promptly replaced her. The district court in-
        structed the reconstituted jury to “start [its] deliberations anew”
        and “disregard entirely any deliberations taking place before [the]
        alternate juror was substituted.” The reconstituted jury then be-
        gan deliberating.
                Later that same morning, the foreperson sent a note “with
        questions regarding [a juror the foreperson later identiﬁed as Juror
        6’s] ability to: (1) answer yes/no questions, (2) acknowledge the law,
        [or] (3) be able to understand the instructions.” Another juror
        wrote that the same juror ( Juror 6) “appear[ed] to show the begin-
        nings of cognitive impairment,” was “unable to understand many
        basic English words,” and “literally closed eyes and covered ears”
        during deliberations. And Juror 6 allegedly “stated that the Sheriﬀ
        [and] the President are above the law and not required to follow the
        Constitution.”
              In response, the court questioned the foreperson and Juror
        6, whom the foreperson identiﬁed as the subject of the notes. Ac-
        cording to the foreperson, Juror 6 was engaging the other jurors
        but was not open to others’ viewpoints and was not applying the
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10934

        law or the court’s instructions. With Juror 6, the foreperson testi-
        ﬁed, “we just have not been able to get anywhere.” The court re-
        membered Juror 6, who the court had to “help . . . through voir
        dire” and “lead[] . . . in his questions.” Juror 6 told the court that
        he had been engaging in deliberations and following the court’s in-
        structions, though he had “annoyed people” with his deﬁnitions of
        “intent and willful.” He also recounted that he had been called “in-
        articulate or crazy.” The court declined to dismiss Juror 6, and the
        jury resumed deliberations.
                Shortly after 4 p.m., the jury sent the court three more notes,
        again questioning one juror’s behavior and cognitive abilities. The
        ﬁrst stated that the juror did “not recall a large chunk of testimony,”
        would “not respond” to questions, was “having diﬃculty constru-
        ing sentences,” and “was arguing with his notes.” The second
        added that the juror “state[d] he [was] biased against the detainees
        if they were violent” and “demonstrate[d] diﬃculty in separating
        diﬀerent events and the order they occurred.” The third and ﬁnal
        note said simply, “We are unable to reach a unanimous decision to-
        day. Can we start tomorrow?”
               Defense counsel again moved for a mistrial. For its part, the
        Government requested that the jury be allowed to resume deliber-
        ations the next day. Instead, the court proposed another Allen
        charge, to which defense counsel objected. The court released the
        jury at 4:25 p.m.
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        23-10934                 Opinion of the Court                           17

               The next day, the jury resumed deliberations. Around 1:30
        p.m., the court sua sponte gave the jury a modiﬁed8 version of the
        pattern Allen instruction. The transcript reﬂects that the court (ap-
        parently inadvertently) left out the word “not” in the following por-
        tion: “You must also remember that if the evidence fails to establish
        guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must have your
        unanimous verdict of [not] guilty.” The court instructed the jury
        to apply the new charge “in conjunction with all the other instruc-
        tions [it had] previously given.” Defense counsel objected to the
        court’s decision to give the Allen charge but not to the substance of
        that charge (as written or read).
               Around 2:30 p.m., the jury sent another note asking how to
        proceed if a juror stated that “they do not agree with the law in
        their opinion and [was] using that opinion to base their vote.” The
        court again separately questioned the foreperson, who conﬁrmed
        the note was about Juror 6. After that, the court received another
        note asking the court to “clarify” the willfulness instruction.
               The court again called in Juror 6. He told the court that he
        understood the law and was attempting to follow the law and the
        court’s instructions, but he thought “there was a passage that can
        be taken two diﬀerent ways.” The court left Juror 6 on the jury.

        8 The modifications included the removal of (1) the same sentence we’ve

        noted above and (2) the portion encouraging jurors in the minority to reex-
        amine their positions.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10934

               But at defense counsel’s request, the court asked the foreper-
        son whether the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, to which the fore-
        person responded, “I would not like to make that determination
        right at this moment. . . . With further deliberations, it may be we
        can get somewhere.”
               Around 4:20 p.m., the jury announced it had reached a ver-
        dict of guilty on six of the seven counts and not guilty on the sev-
        enth (the count involving Harper).
                                       2. Sentencing
               The district court determined Hill’s total oﬀense level to be
        23 and his Guidelines range to be 46 to 57 months. But it granted
        a “signiﬁcant” downward variance, sentencing Hill to 18 months of
        incarceration. In doing so, the court characterized the case as
        “novel” and noted that Hill’s behavior did not “involve violence,
        assaultive behavior, such as beating, tasing, shooting, et cetera, or
        an unlawful arrest.” Neither party challenges Hill’s sentence on
        appeal.
                                 II.       DISCUSSION

                Hill challenges his § 242 conviction on three grounds. First,
        Hill claims that he lacked fair warning that his conduct was uncon-
        stitutional. Second, he argues that the district court abused its dis-
        cretion in questioning a juror about alleged misconduct, giving two
        Allen charges to the jury, and omitting one word in the second Allen
        charge. Third, Hill asserts that the Government presented insuﬃ-
        cient evidence that his conduct (1) had no legitimate nonpunitive
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        23-10934                Opinion of the Court                             19

        purpose, (2) was willful, and (3) caused the detainees’ injuries. We
        ﬁnd none of Hill’s challenges availing.
                   A. Hill had fair warning that his conduct violated the de-
                       tainees’ constitutional right to be free from excessive
                                               force.

               We begin with Hill’s claim that he lacked fair warning that
        his actions violated the detainees’ constitutional right to be free
        from excessive force. We review de novo whether a defendant had
        fair warning that his conduct violated a constitutional right. See
        United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1207 (11th Cir. 2012) (reasoning
        that fair warning is a question of law).
                Criminal liability attaches under § 242 only if case law pro-
        vides the defendant “fair warning” that his actions violated consti-
        tutional rights. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997).
        “[T]he standard for determining the adequacy of that warning [is]
        the same as the standard for determining whether a constitutional
        right was ‘clearly established’ in civil litigation under § 1983.” Hope
        v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002) (citing Lanier, 520 U.S. at 270–71).
        We conclude that case law gave Hill “fair warning” that the use of
        restraint chairs on compliant, nonresistant detainees inﬂicted ex-
        cessive and thus unconstitutional force.
                         1. Restraint chairs qualify as “force.”
               First, Hill argues that restraint-chair use is not “force” in the
        ﬁrst place, so it could not have been excessive force. In support of
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10934

        this argument, Hill analogizes restraint chairs to “passive re-
        straints” like handcuﬀs or leg shackles. We are not persuaded.
               Even if restraint chairs were “passive restraints,” as Hill con-
        tends, we have repeatedly applied the constitutional use-of-force
        framework to such restraints. For instance, in Williams v. Burton,
        943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), we characterized
        the use of four-point restraints as “force.” And in Gold v. City of
        Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1446–47 (11th Cir. 1997), we referred to tight
        handcuﬃng for a twenty-minute period as a use of “force.” See also
        Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir. 2002) (same, for
        “[p]ainful handcuﬃng”). In other words, even if a restraint is “pas-
        sive,” that does not preclude the conclusion that it constitutes
        “force.”
               Similarly, in Hope, the Supreme Court noted that prior deci-
        sions had clearly established that “handcuﬃng inmates to cells or
        fences for long periods of time” was “punishment.” See 536 U.S. at
        742 (quoting Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974)). To
        be sure, “punishment” is not synonymous with “force,” but Hope
        demonstrates that even handcuﬃng may be subject to constitu-
        tional analysis in certain circumstances.
               Instead of this binding authority, Hill relies on several un-
        published cases involving restraint chairs that he claims “focus on
        the other violence and not the chair itself as the unlawful use of
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        23-10934                   Opinion of the Court                                21

        force” and therefore “support[] the inference that this Court does
        not classify the chair as force.” 9 We disagree.
              For starters, of course, those unpublished cases are not bind-
        ing on us. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2. But even if they were, they do not
        support Hill’s inferential leap.
                In none of those cases did we say that restraint-chair use was
        not “force.” To the contrary, in one case, we characterized the re-
        straint and pre-restraint force “as a single excessive force claim.”
        Jacoby, 755 F. App’x at 896. Put diﬀerently, that we focused on other,
        more egregious displays of force does not compel the conclusion
        that we viewed restraint chairs as not “force.” In short, we reject
        Hill’s argument that his restraint-chair use was not “force.”

        9 See Shuford v. Conway, 666 F. App’x 811, 814, 818–19 (11th Cir. 2016) (revers-

        ing grant of qualified immunity where officers used a “Pepperball gun,” Taser,
        and other physical force on “uncooperative” and “aggressive[]” detainees be-
        fore putting them in restraint chairs); Jacoby v. Mack, 755 F. App’x 888, 891–92,
        897 (11th Cir. 2018) (same, where officers pepper sprayed “disruptive” de-
        tainee then put him in a restraint chair without adequate decontamination for
        eight hours); Coffman v. Battle, 786 F. App’x 926, 930, 935 (11th Cir. 2019) (af-
        firming denial of qualified immunity where officer ordered resisting detainee
        into a restraint chair, then tased him twice); McNeeley v. Wilson, 649 F. App’x
        717, 720, 723 (11th Cir. 2016) (same, where officers sprayed “disobed[ient]”
        detainee with chemical agents and then put him in four-point restraints with-
        out a decontamination shower); Maldonado v. Unnamed Defendant, 648 F. App’x
        939, 945, 955–56 (11th Cir. 2016) (same, where officer put prisoner, who had
        violated jail rules, in restraint chair and then broke his finger, kicked him, and
        burned him with a lighter).
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        22                         Opinion of the Court                        23-10934

             2. Under clearly established law, Hill’s use of force was excessive.
               Next, we consider whether Hill’s use of force was constitu-
        tionally excessive. We conclude that, under clearly established law
        at the time, it was.
               For § 242 (and § 1983) purposes, “a right can be clearly es-
        tablished in one of three ways.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232,
        1240 (11th Cir. 2021). Those methods include “(1) ‘case law with
        indistinguishable facts,’ (2) ‘a broad statement of principle within
        the Constitution, statute, or case law,’ or (3) ‘conduct so egregious
        that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total ab-
        sence of case law.’” Id. (quoting Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach,
        561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009)). In conducting this analy-
        sis, “we look to binding decisions of the Supreme Court of the
        United States, this Court, and the highest court of the relevant
        state”—in this case, Georgia. Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207,
        1217 (11th Cir. 2018).
               Here, a “broad statement of principle,” see Crocker, 995 F.3d
        at 1240, within our case law clearly established that the use of force
        on compliant, nonresistant detainees is excessive. 10
                As the Supreme Court has clariﬁed, a pretrial detainee’s con-
        stitutional rights are violated when “the force purposely or

        10 The Government also argues that the third alternative applies— that Hill’s

        conduct was “so egregious” that no reasonable law-enforcement officer could
        have believed it was constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Smith v. Mattox, 127
        F.3d 1416, 1419–20 (11th Cir. 1997). But because we decide this case based on
        a broad statement of principle, we need not reach that argument.
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        23-10934                Opinion of the Court                          23

        knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kings-
        ley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). Force is excessive if it is
        “not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
        purpose’” or if it “appear[s] excessive in relation to that purpose.”
        Id. at 398 (quoting Bell v. Wolﬁsh, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979)).
                In determining whether Hill’s use of force was objectively
        unreasonable, we consider factors including the relationship be-
        tween the need for force and the amount of force used, the extent
        of the detainees’ injuries, any eﬀort to temper the amount of force,
        the severity of the security problem, the threat reasonably per-
        ceived by the oﬃcer, and whether the detainees were actively re-
        sisting. Id. at 397. We also account for jail oﬃcials’ “legitimate”
        need “to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain in-
        stitutional security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 546–547.
               With these principles in mind, we turn to their application
        in our precedent. To be sure, our case law has not addressed the
        precise factual circumstances at issue: the use of restraint chairs on
        compliant, nonresistant detainees. But fair warning here did not
        require an “extreme level of factual speciﬁcity.” See Lanier, 520 U.S.
        at 268. Rather, even in the absence of “a case directly on point,”
        our precedent leaves the unconstitutionality of Hill’s conduct “be-
        yond debate.” See White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (citation and
        internal quotation marks omitted).
               We begin with Hope, the closest Supreme Court case on
        point. There, the Court found that prison guards who handcuﬀed
        a prisoner to a hitching post for seven hours as punishment for
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        24                         Opinion of the Court                        23-10934

        “disruptive conduct” committed an “obvious” and “clear violation”
        of the Eighth Amendment. Hope, 536 U.S. at 733, 741. The Court
        reasoned that, although “[a]ny safety concerns had long since
        abated,” the guards “knowingly subjected” the prisoner to “unnec-
        essary pain” and “deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a
        risk of particular discomfort and humiliation.” Id. at 738. While
        Hope arose under the Eighth Amendment,11 it stands for the prop-
        osition that restraint, especially prolonged and painful restraint,
        without any legitimate penological purpose is constitutionally im-
        permissible punishment. See id. at 741.
                Our precedent draws an even clearer line—one that Hill’s re-
        straint-chair use crossed. As we’ve explained, “force in the pretrial
        detainee context may be defensive or preventative—but never pu-
        nitive—[so] the continuing use of force is impermissible when a
        detainee is complying, has been forced to comply, or is clearly una-
        ble to comply.” Piazza v. Jeﬀerson County, 923 F.3d 947, 953 (11th Cir.
        2019).
               Several cases illustrate that line in practice. First, we found
        the use of four-point restraints permissible when a prisoner “posed
        a signiﬁcant security concern” and the restraints inﬂicted “no actual

        11 Excessive-force cases under the Eighth Amendment consider similar factors

        as Fourteenth Amendment cases, so they are instructive. See, e.g., Bozeman v.
        Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (“it makes no difference whether
        [the victim is] a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner because the applicable
        standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates applies
        equally to cases involving . . . pretrial detainees” (citation and internal quota-
        tion marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley, 576 U.S. 389.
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        23-10934               Opinion of the Court                        25

        injury.” Williams, 943 F.2d at 1575. In Williams, the prisoner was
        clearly noncompliant—he committed disciplinary violations and
        cursed at, “threatened to kill,” and spat on oﬃcers. Id. at 1574. Of-
        ﬁcers put the prisoner in four-point restraints for over 28 hours (ex-
        cept for “brief intervals for eating, physical exercise, and toilet
        use”), with “constant monitoring and examinations by medical per-
        sonnel.” Id. at 1574–75. We found that the oﬃcers had not violated
        the detainee’s constitutional rights. Id. at 1576–77. But we cau-
        tioned that “a Fourteenth Amendment violation could occur if . . .
        oﬃcers continue to use force after the necessity for the coercive
        action has ceased.” Id. at 1576.
              A decade later, we reiterated that, in any “custodial setting,”
        “oﬃcials may not use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has
        been already subdued or, as in this case, incapacitated.” Skrtich v.
        Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2002), overruled on other
        grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). In Skrtich, the
        oﬃcers “used an electronic shield to shock” the prisoner, who fell
        to the ground, and then struck him repeatedly, ultimately slam-
        ming his head into the wall. Id. at 1299–1300. Even though the
        prisoner had a “history of disciplinary problems,” we found that
        “no reasonable, similarly situated oﬃcial” could believe such force
        was justiﬁed when the prisoner “had been restrained . . . and no
        longer posed a threat.” Id. at 1299, 1304.
               Next, in a case involving a pretrial detainee speciﬁcally, we
        held that “[w]hen jailers continue to use substantial force against a
        prisoner who has clearly stopped resisting—whether because he
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10934

        has decided to become compliant, he has been subdued, or he is
        otherwise incapacitated—that use of force is excessive.” Danley v.
        Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds
        by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). There, the detainee “had a
        disagreement” with jail oﬃcers and refused to obey orders, so an
        oﬃcer pepper sprayed him and then left him in a “small, poorly
        ventilated cell.” Id. at 1303–04. That use of force, we found, was
        unconstitutional. Id. at 1310.
               Most recently, we found that repeated taser use on a “mo-
        tionless” and “unresponsive” pretrial detainee violated the de-
        tainee’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Piazza,
        923 F.3d at 950, 954. While “non-compliant, [the detainee] had nei-
        ther threatened nor attempted to harm the oﬃcers,” so, we rea-
        soned, “the severity of the problem and the corresponding risk to
        the oﬃcers in this case were—from the very outset—exceedingly
        minimal.” Id. at 954–55. Under these circumstances, taser use was
        objectively unreasonable. See id.
               Hill contends that Piazza and its precursors do “not apply
        with ‘obvious clarity’ to cases involving passive restraint,” or re-
        straint chairs speciﬁcally. But “we have never suggested that the
        longstanding prohibition on a jail oﬃcer’s use of force on an inca-
        pacitated detainee turns on as ﬁne a point as the particular weapon
        deployed.” Id. at 956. Indeed, in rejecting the oﬃcers’ qualiﬁed-
        immunity arguments in Piazza, we said, “it is no answer to say that
        Danley involved pepper spray, Skrtich kicks and punches, Williams
        four-point restraints, etc.—and that none of those cases concerned
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        23-10934                   Opinion of the Court                               27

        the use of a taser speciﬁcally.” Id. In other words, case law need
        not confront the type of force at issue if it clearly establishes that
        no force would be objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
        See id.
               And here, precedent clearly established that Hill could not
        use force against a compliant, nonresistant detainee. 12 Indeed, the
        relevant factors weigh against Hill here: no need for force existed,
        the detainees were not “actively resisting,” and Hill could not have
        “reasonably perceived” any “threat” from the detainees’ compliant
        behavior. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. Yet Hill still ordered each
        detainee into a restraint chair for at least four hours with his hands
        cuﬀed behind his back, without medical observation, and without
        bathroom (or other) breaks. Even accepting Hill’s “legitimate . . .
        purpose” of maintaining jail security, protracted restraint-chair use
        was “excessive in relation to that purpose.” See id. at 398. And con-
        trary to Hill’s contentions, four hours in a restraint chair is not “a
        de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not
        concerned.” See Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at
        539 n.21).

        12 Though it does not bear on our fair-warning inquiry, we note that several

        of our sister circuits have also concluded that, while restraint-chair use may be
        proper if a detainee is violent or noncompliant, it is impermissible once the
        detainee is compliant or subdued. Compare Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237,
        1242 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J.), and Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 181 (3d
        Cir. 2015), with Howell v. NaphCare, Inc., 67 F.4th 302, 321 (6th Cir. 2023), and
        Reynolds v. Wood County, No. 22-40381, 2023 WL 3175467, at *1, 4 (5th Cir.
        May 1, 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished).
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        28                      Opinion of the Court                    23-10934

                To be clear, we do not suggest that oﬃcers may never use
        “passive restraint” if the restrained individual is not actively resist-
        ing. We reiterate only the longstanding principle that force, includ-
        ing “passive restraint,” is excessive if it is “not ‘rationally related to
        a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’” Kingsley, 576 U.S.
        at 398 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 561). Oﬃcers sometimes have a
        “legitimate nonpunitive . . . purpose,” id., for restraining a compli-
        ant individual, such as ensuring oﬃcer safety when transporting a
        pretrial detainee to his arraignment. But here, Hill had no legiti-
        mate purpose for ordering compliant, nonresistant detainees who
        were in the secure jail environment into restraint chairs for at least
        four hours. Hill’s use of force was therefore excessive, and our
        precedent gave him fair warning of that fact. See id.; see also Piazza,
        923 F.3d at 953.
               As a ﬁnal matter, we brieﬂy address Hill’s invocation of our
        recent decision in Myrick v. Fulton County, 69 F.4th 1277 (11th Cir.
        2023). Of course, that decision issued after the events here, so it
        does not bear on the fair-warning inquiry. But even if it did, Myrick
        is not on point.
               In Myrick, we found that jail oﬃcers’ use of restraints, in-
        cluding a restraint chair “to transport” a detainee, did not violate
        clearly established law. Id. at 1303–04. That detainee, who had
        been diagnosed with substance-induced psychotic disorder, ex-
        pressed suicidal thoughts, refused to comply with oﬃcers’ com-
        mands, and “charged at the oﬃcers while screaming, kicking, and
        punching.” Id. at 1288–89. Oﬃcers tased and pepper-sprayed the
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        23-10934                    Opinion of the Court                                  29

        detainee, who continued to resist, before strapping him into a re-
        straint chair (along with leg restraints, handcuﬀs, and a spit mask).
        Id. at 1289–90.
                Myrick does not help Hill for two reasons. First, the detainee
        in Myrick was violently resisting and noncompliant, so the restraint
        used did not implicate the general legal principle that force used
        against a compliant, nonresistant detainee is excessive. Second, the
        oﬃcers left the detainee in the restraint chair only brieﬂy before he
        became unresponsive. Id. at 1291. Here, by contrast, the detainees
        were compliant and nonresistant, yet they were left in the restraint
        chair for at least four hours. “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on
        the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Kingsley, 576
        U.S. at 397 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Because Myrick is so
        distinguishable, it does not support the conclusion that Hill’s con-
        duct was reasonable.
               In sum, we conclude that Hill had fair warning that his con-
        duct violated the detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to be
        free from excessive force. 13 Hill’s ﬁrst challenge to his conviction
        fails.

        13 Hill also invokes the rule of lenity. But neither the excessive-force principle

        we recount above nor its application to the facts here involves any ambiguity.
        So there is nothing “for the rule of lenity to resolve.” See Shular v. United States,
        589 U.S. 154, 165 (2020).
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        30                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10934

                    B. The evidence sufficiently supported each element of
                                    Hill’s § 242 conviction.

               Next, we consider Hill’s challenges to the suﬃciency of the
        evidence against him. We review de novo the suﬃciency of the
        evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        Government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility
        choices in favor of the jury verdict. United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d
        1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2015). We uphold a verdict “if any reasonable
        construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to ﬁnd
        the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and
        internal quotation marks omitted).
               Hill asserts that the evidence did not suﬃciently show that
        his conduct (1) had no legitimate nonpunitive purpose, (2) was will-
        ful, and (3) caused the detainees’ injuries. We reject all three claims.
         1. Suﬃcient evidence supported a ﬁnding that Hill’s conduct had no le-
                            gitimate nonpunitive purpose.
               First, Hill argues that the evidence failed to suﬃciently show
        that his restraint-chair use had no “legitimate nonpunitive . . . pur-
        pose,” see Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398, and was thus constitutionally
        excessive. Among other purported ﬂaws, Hill points to the Gov-
        ernment’s failure to call a law-enforcement expert to opine on
        whether an oﬃcer in Hill’s position would believe that restraint-
        chair use was reasonable.
             But the Government need not have presented expert testi-
        mony to establish unreasonableness. The lay evidence at trial was
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        23-10934               Opinion of the Court                         31

        more than enough to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that Hill’s
        conduct lacked any legitimate nonpunitive purpose and thus was
        constitutionally excessive.
                We begin with Hill’s own policy. As a reminder, that policy
        allowed the use of restraint chairs for “safe containment of an in-
        mate exhibiting violent or uncontrollable behavior,” but it warned
        that such use “never be authorized as a form of punishment.”
        True, violation of law-enforcement “policies on the use of force
        [does] not by itself establish that [Hill’s] actions amounted to exces-
        sive force.” United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1296 (11th Cir.
        2019). But the policy provided examples of legitimate nonpunitive
        purposes for which restraint chairs could be used and expressly pro-
        hibited their use as a punishment. So that policy is relevant, espe-
        cially if the jury found that the detainees were not “exhibiting vio-
        lent or uncontrollable behavior” or otherwise requiring “safe con-
        tainment.”
               More importantly, multiple oﬃcers testiﬁed that each de-
        tainee was compliant, controllable, and non-violent before oﬃcers
        placed him into the chair. Yet the undisputed evidence shows that
        Hill ordered each detainee into the chair, anyway.
               And based on the detainees’ own testimony, a jury reasona-
        bly could have concluded that Hill authorized chair use purely as a
        form of punishment. For example, the jury knew about Hill’s per-
        sonal dispute with Howell and Hill’s statements that he was “going
        to teach [Howell] a lesson.” Similarly, the jury knew about Hill’s
        advance decision to order Hollins into the chair without any
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        32                      Opinion of the Court                   23-10934

        information about Hollins’s compliance during his arrest. It also
        knew about Hill’s choice to ﬁlm a video of himself with Hollins to
        send to his girlfriend. And the jury heard testimony that Hill had
        ordered Arnold into the chair because he “got irritated personally.”
        Plus, the jury saw a video of Hill ordering Arnold to “sit there and
        see if you can get some damn sense in your head.” Finally, the jury
        heard testimony that Hill told Peterkin, “I would have riddled your
        ass with bullets . . . put that bitch in the chair,” and told Bailey, “Oh
        you think you’re a gangster. Put his ass in the chair.” Based on this
        evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Hill had no
        legitimate purpose in using the restraint chairs on the six individu-
        als but only a punitive purpose.
               What’s more, Hill’s argument that no expert testimony es-
        tablished the unreasonableness of Hill’s conduct ignores that the
        defense itself called Deputy Chief Boehrer, the second-in-com-
        mand of the Clayton County Sheriﬀ’s Department, who has
        worked with that department for 25 years. To be sure, neither
        party tendered Boehrer as an expert, but Boehrer has decades of
        law-enforcement experience, and both parties asked Boehrer gen-
        eral questions on use of force. For instance, on cross, the Govern-
        ment asked Boehrer about several “hypothetical” scenarios that
        track the facts here. And Boehrer aﬃrmed that no policy or guide-
        line consistent with the Constitution would permit use of a re-
        straint chair in those circumstances without other “preattack indi-
        cators.” Taken together with the other evidence we’ve mentioned,
        Boehrer’s testimony also supports the jury’s ﬁnding of objective
        unreasonableness.
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        23-10934                Opinion of the Court                            33

                In sum, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Hill
        had no legitimate nonpunitive purpose for ordering each detainee
        into a restraint chair. And the jury was entitled to reject Hill’s tes-
        timony that if a detainee “ever did anything that was violent or ag-
        gressive, when they get to the jail, even if they are behaving, [he
        could] then order them strapped into a restraint chair.” Indeed,
        “[b]ecause we recognize that the jury is free to choose between or
        among the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the evidence
        presented at trial, our suﬃciency review requires only that a guilty
        verdict be reasonable, not inevitable, based on the evidence pre-
        sented at trial.” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th
        Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
        it was.
               Especially viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
        to the Government and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of
        the jury verdict, as we must, Hill’s ﬁrst suﬃciency challenge fails.
        See Wilson, 788 F.3d at 1308.
           2. Suﬃcient evidence supported a ﬁnding that Hill acted willfully.
                Hill next argues that insuﬃcient evidence showed that he
        “willfully,” see 18 U.S.C. § 242, deprived the detainees of their con-
        stitutional rights. This challenge fares no better.
               To prove willfulness, the Government must show that Hill
        acted “in open deﬁance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional
        requirement which ha[d] been made speciﬁc and deﬁnite.” Screws
        v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 105 (1945) (plurality opinion). Hill
        “need not have been ‘thinking in constitutional terms,’ so long as
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        34                     Opinion of the Court                23-10934

        his ‘aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen of a
        right and that right was protected by the Constitution.’” Brown,
        934 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 106). That purpose
        “need not be expressed; it may be reasonably inferred from all the
        circumstances.” Screws, 325 U.S. at 106.
               We have reasoned that a law-enforcement oﬃcer’s “training
        in the use of force supports the jury’s ﬁnding of willfulness.”
        Brown, 934 F.3d at 1296. And “where [the] oﬃcer’s actions so obvi-
        ously violate his training on the use of force, a jury may infer that
        the violation was willful.” Id. at 1297. Such an inference may be
        stronger when a defendant repeatedly uses force exceeding that au-
        thorized by his training. Cf. House, 684 F.3d at 1202.
               Here, suﬃcient circumstantial evidence established that Hill
        acted in “reckless disregard” or “open deﬁance” of constitutional
        requirements and his own policies. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 105. Hill
        testiﬁed that he had received use-of-force training and adopted use-
        of-force policies. Those policies deﬁned “excessive force” as “any
        force used in excess of the amount of force reasonably required to
        establish control over or to prevent or terminate an unlawful act of
        violence.”
               As we’ve discussed, the jury reasonably could have con-
        cluded that restraint-chair use was not “reasonably required to es-
        tablish control over” compliant, nonresistant detainees. Indeed,
        the jury reasonably could have found that Hill ordered the detain-
        ees into restraint chairs solely to punish them. And if it did, that
        conduct “so obviously violate[d]” Hill’s training and clearly
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        23-10934                Opinion of the Court                         35

        established law—namely, that force can never be used to punish
        pretrial detainees—that the jury reasonably could have “infer[red]
        that the violation was willful.” See Brown, 934 F.3d at 1297. Based
        on this record, we reject Hill’s argument that the jury needed ex-
        pert testimony to draw that an inference.
               So viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        Government and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the jury
        verdict, Hill’s second suﬃciency challenge fails. See Wilson, 788 F.3d
        at 1308.
        3. Suﬃcient evidence supported a ﬁnding that Hill’s use of force caused
                               the detainees’ injuries.
                Finally, Hill argues that, in three ways, the evidence failed to
        suﬃciently show that his conduct caused the detainees’ injuries.
        First, he says that he neither ordered nor foresaw that jail staﬀ
        would ignore policy that forbade leaving detainees handcuﬀed and
        without medical attention. Second, Hill theorizes that the detain-
        ees’ injuries could have resulted from being handcuﬀed before ar-
        riving at the jail. Third, he asserts that “discomfort from sitting in
        a chair for four hours . . . hardly rises to the level of physical pain
        that would support a felony conviction.” Again, we conclude that
        Hill’s arguments lack merit.
               For a § 242 conviction, “bodily injury” includes “(A) a cut,
        abrasion, bruise, burn, or disﬁgurement; (B) physical pain; (C) ill-
        ness; (D) impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or
        mental faculty; or (E) any other injury to the body, no matter how
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        36                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10934

        temporary.” United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1572–73 (11th Cir.
        1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
               Setting aside Hill’s speciﬁc arguments, the detainees’ testi-
        mony and photographs admitted into evidence satisfy this deﬁni-
        tion. All detainees testiﬁed that they experienced serious physical
        pain while in the restraint chair. Under our deﬁnition, that is
        enough. But the Government also introduced photographic evi-
        dence of the detainees’ injuries: the lasting scars on Peterkin’s
        wrists and Howell’s wrists, as well as the “open and bleeding”
        wounds on Bailey’s wrists. These marks qualify as “cut[s]” or
        “other injur[ies] to the body.” See id. Howell also testiﬁed that he
        continues to suﬀer neck, back, arm, leg, and toe pain and numbness
        from a pinched nerve. So the record evidence easily allowed a rea-
        sonable jury to ﬁnd that the detainees suﬀered “bodily injury” and
        that hours in the restraint chair on Hill’s orders caused that injury.
               Next, we turn to Hill’s three sub-arguments. First, suﬃcient
        circumstantial evidence allowed the jury to reasonably conclude
        that Hill foresaw that jail oﬃcials would not adhere to the restraint-
        chair policy. Hill visited detainees, including Hollins, while they
        were in the chair and saw them handcuﬀed with their hands behind
        their back. Hill was also present when oﬃcers placed a handcuﬀed
        Howell in the chair. On cross, Hill acknowledged that he did not
        order the handcuﬀs removed. Because Hill had seen multiple de-
        tainees handcuﬀed while in the restraint chair, a jury could reason-
        ably infer that Hill foresaw and knew that jail oﬃcials would not
        follow policy directives to remove handcuﬀs. On top of that,
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        23-10934               Opinion of the Court                        37

        though the policy allowed for chair restraint up to four hours, mul-
        tiple oﬃcers testiﬁed that Hill ordered detainees into restraint
        chairs for at least four hours. So a jury could reasonably infer that
        Hill foresaw that a detainee would remain handcuﬀed in the chair
        for four or more hours at a time, which could lead to physical pain
        and injury.
                Second, while it is theoretically possible that the detainees
        could have sustained wrist injuries from too-tight handcuﬀs before
        arriving at the jail, testimony from multiple detainees rebukes that
        theory. Bailey expressly testiﬁed that his wrist cuts were from his
        time in the chair, not handcuﬀs during his arrest. Other detainees
        testiﬁed similarly. So a jury reasonably could have found that the
        detainees’ time in the chair—not their prior handcuﬃng—caused
        their injuries.
               Third, the evidence rebuﬀs Hill’s claim that the restrained
        detainees experienced mere “discomfort.” For example, Hollins
        testiﬁed that the pain was “like torture,” and Peterkin called it “the
        worst thing [he] ever felt.” The detainees also testiﬁed to the pain
        of having to hold their urine and ultimately urinate on themselves.
        Cf. Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (noting the “risk of particular discomfort
        and humiliation” from denial of bathroom breaks). The jury rea-
        sonably could have accepted these detainees’ testimony about the
        pain they experienced and rejected Hill’s dismissal of it as mere
        “discomfort.”
             Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Gov-
        ernment and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the jury
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        38                        Opinion of the Court                    23-10934

        verdict, Hill’s third suﬃciency challenge fails. See Wilson, 788 F.3d
        at 1308.
                    C. The district court acted within its discretion in ques-
                          tioning jurors and giving two Allen charges.

               Finally, Hill challenges the district court’s juror questioning
        and Allen charges during jury deliberations. We review a district
        court’s investigation of alleged juror misconduct during delibera-
        tions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248,
        1253 (11th Cir. 2004). We also review a district court’s Allen charge
        for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352,
        1364 (11th Cir. 2008). But when a defendant does not object to the
        contents of that charge, we review for plain error. See United States
        v. Anderson, 1 F.4th 1244, 1268 (11th Cir. 2021).
              Here, we ﬁnd no merit to the challenge. The district court
        found itself in a diﬃcult position, and we conclude that it acted
        within the limits of its discretion.
         1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in investigating alleged
                                    juror misconduct.
               First, the district court acted within its discretion in ques-
        tioning the jury foreperson and Juror 6 twice each. The court re-
        ceived multiple reports that Juror 6 refused to follow the law, in-
        cluding an allegation that Juror 6 “stated that the Sheriﬀ [and] the
        President are above the law and not required to follow the Consti-
        tution.” And several jury notes claimed that Juror 6 could not or
        would not engage in deliberation. The foreperson corroborated
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        23-10934                Opinion of the Court                         39

        these allegations when called before the court. So the district court
        had cause for concern.
               When faced with allegations of juror misconduct, a district
        court has “broad” investigatory discretion. United States v. Yonn, 702
        F.2d 1341, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983).
        Among other courses of proceeding, juror questioning may be
        “necessary so as to avoid premature or unjustiﬁed dismissal” of a
        juror. Polar, 369 F.3d at 1253. Indeed, a “district court is uniquely
        situated to make the credibility determinations” related to “a ju-
        ror’s motivations and intentions” before taking such action as dis-
        missing the juror or declaring a mistrial. United States v. Abbell, 271
        F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002).
                We have repeatedly found no abuse of discretion on facts
        similar to those here. In Polar, for example, we held that the district
        court did not abuse its discretion in questioning the foreperson and
        another juror after it received notes that the juror “wishe[d] to ab-
        stain” from a verdict, “refused to vote,” and “indicated a mistrust
        of and bias against the government and the criminal justice sys-
        tem.” 369 F.3d at 1251, 1254. We rejected the defendant’s argu-
        ment that such questioning was “inherently coercive.” Id. at 1254;
        see also United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1133 (11th Cir. 2011)
        (ﬁnding no abuse of discretion where, after several complaints
        from jurors, the court asked a juror “only general questions that
        provided [her] with a suﬃcient opportunity to repeat or elaborate
        on the allegation[s]”); Yonn, 702 F.2d at 1344–46 (same, where dis-
        trict court interviewed each juror individually after one juror had
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        40                      Opinion of the Court                    23-10934

        improperly expressed her opinion on the evidence before delibera-
        tions).
               In fact, we have upheld juror dismissals on facts similar to
        those here. For instance, in Abbell, we found no abuse of discretion
        when the district court interviewed each juror and then dismissed
        a juror who allegedly said she was not going to follow the law and
        that the court’s instructions were only advisory. See Abbell, 271 F.3d
        at 1303–04; see also United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306, 1315, 1319
        (11th Cir. 2014) (same, after other jurors complained that the juror
        “simply disagree[d] with what the law is” and was following his
        own opinion “over the rules”). Of course, the district court did not
        dismiss Juror 6, so we express no opinion on whether it had suﬃ-
        cient cause to do so. But this precedent further favors the conclu-
        sion that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
                The district court acted consistently with our precedent’s di-
        rectives. The court assured Juror 6 that he was “not in trouble.”
        See Yonn, 702 F.2d at 1345. And rather than confronting Juror 6 with
        the speciﬁc allegations, the court asked him “only general ques-
        tions” like whether he was engaging in deliberations and following
        the court’s instructions. See Augustin, 661 F.3d at 1133. Our case
        law does not require a district court to declare a mistrial at the ﬁrst
        sign of jury conﬂict. Cf. United States v. Davis, 779 F.3d 1305, 1314
        (11th Cir. 2015) (“declaring a mistrial can impose a cost not just in
        time and resources but in the quality of justice . . . [s]o it is best not
        to declare a mistrial too soon”). Nor does it require a district court
        to sit back and do nothing in the face of “speciﬁc, consistent, and
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        23-10934                   Opinion of the Court                                41

        credible” evidence that a juror is not engaging in deliberations or
        following the law. See Godwin, 765 F.3d at 1318.
                To be sure, it was unusual for the district court to ask Juror
        6 essentially the same questions twice, including once after the
        court gave the reconstituted jury an Allen charge. 14 But none of the
        district court’s questions were coercive—even Hill does not argue
        that they were. And the court expressly told Juror 6 not to “go too
        far in[to] what [the jury] discussed.” Nor was the questioning in
        and of itself coercive. Though unusual for good reason, we cannot
        conclude on this record that the district court’s conduct constituted
        an abuse of discretion.
                So we conclude that, especially in the interest of avoiding
        either a mistrial or a juror dismissal, the district court did not abuse
        its discretion in investigating the claims against Juror 6. See Yonn,
        702 F.2d at 1344.
          2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in giving two Allen
                                         charges.
               Second, the district court acted within its discretion when
        giving both Allen charges. Like Hill, we focus on the second Allen
        charge. And for the sake of argument, we adopt Hill’s characteri-
        zation of the Allen charges as “successive,” though technically the
        reconstituted jury received only one Allen charge. Again, the dis-
        trict court told the jury to “start its deliberations anew,” and we

        14 As we discuss below, this was the reconstituted jury’s first Allen charge, not,

        as Hill contends, simply a second Allen charge.
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        42                     Opinion of the Court                23-10934

        have no reason to believe the jury did not follow that instruction.
        To the contrary, “[w]e have obediently followed and repeated the
        Supreme Court’s direction that we presume juries follow their in-
        structions.” United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1186–87 (11th Cir.
        2017) (en banc).
               A district court has “broad discretion” with respect to Allen
        charges “but must not coerce any juror to give up an honest belief.”
        Davis, 779 F.3d at 1312. We will conclude that “a district court has
        abused its discretion in giving a modiﬁed Allen charge only if the
        charge was inherently coercive.” Woodard, 531 F.3d at 1364. To
        determine coerciveness, “we consider the language of the charge
        and the totality of the circumstances under which it was delivered.”
        Id. And we have “never adopted a per se rule against successive Allen
        charges;” rather, “what counts is not the number of instructions
        but the overall circumstances and risk of coercion.” Davis, 779 F.3d
        at 1313.
                At the outset, any challenge to the language of the Allen
        charge fails, as we have “approved” the Eleventh Circuit pattern Al-
        len instruction, including with “minor wording changes,” “on nu-
        merous occasions.” Anderson, 1 F.4th at 1269, 1271 (quoting United
        States v. Bush, 727 F.3d 1308, 1320 (11th Cir. 2013)).
                Hill must rely, then, on the totality of the circumstances.
        The relevant circumstances include (1) the length of the delibera-
        tions; (2) the number of times the jury reported being deadlocked;
        (3) whether the court was aware of the numerical split when it in-
        structed the jury to continue deliberating; and (4) the time between
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        23-10934                  Opinion of the Court                               43

        the court’s ﬁnal instruction and the jury’s verdict. Brewster v. Hetzel,
        913 F.3d 1042, 1053 (11th Cir. 2019). 15 We discuss each below.
               As to the length of the deliberations, we begin by clarifying
        how long that period lasted. Hill contends that the jury deliberated
        for four days. But that collapses the original and reconstituted ju-
        ries. The original jury deliberated for roughly a day and a half,
        while the reconstituted jury deliberated for two days.
               Hill is right that the “[t]he risk of coercion increases as delib-
        erations run longer.” Davis, 779 F.3d at 1314. And a two-day period
        is considerably longer than other cases in which we have found Al-
        len charges to not be coercive. See, e.g., Anderson, 1 F.4th at 1252
        (three-and-a-half hours); Bush, 727 F.3d at 1317–1319 (roughly ﬁve
        hours); Davis, 779 F.3d at 1312 (“just over six hours”); Woodard, 531
        F.3d at 1359–60 (seven hours). But this factor, standing alone, does
        not render the district court’s second Allen charge coercive. See
        Brewster, 913 F.3d at 1053 (“eleven hours over two days . . . is not an
        inordinate amount of time”).
               Next, we turn to the number of deadlock reports. The re-
        constituted jury never reported that it was deadlocked, hopelessly
        or otherwise. To be sure, before one juror was replaced, the

        15 We note Brewster’s distinct procedural posture, as we applied de novo re-

        view to the district court’s denial of the defendant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
        petition. 913 F.3d at 1053. Here, by contrast, we review for abuse of discre-
        tion. See Woodard, 531 F.3d at 1364. That said, because Hill relies heavily on
        Brewster and because we find its articulation of the relevant factors useful, we
        work within that portion of its framework here.
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        44                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10934

        original jury reported that it had “agreed on [two] counts” but was
        “deadlocked” on the other ﬁve. And later, the reconstituted jury
        sent a note stating that it was “unable to reach a unanimous deci-
        sion today” (emphasis added). But at no time did the reconstituted
        jury say it could not reach a verdict at all. To the contrary, when
        the court asked whether the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, the
        foreperson responded, “I would not like to make that determina-
        tion right at this moment. . . . With further deliberations, it may
        be we can get somewhere.”
               We have found no coercion even when the jury did report
        deadlock. See Anderson, 1 F.4th at 1252 (jury sent a note stating that
        it could not reach a verdict); Davis, 779 F.3d at 1312 (jury reported
        deadlock before and after Allen charge); Woodard, 531 F.3d at 1359
        (jury declared that it was “hung” and “[would] not come to a unan-
        imous decision”); but see Brewster, 913 F.3d at 1047–48 (ﬁnding co-
        ercion where jurors sent six notes “stating that they could not reach
        a verdict,” including one expressing “no possibility of resolve”).
        This factor, then, does not support ﬁnding that the Allen charge was
        coercive.
               Turning to the jurors’ numerical split, we ﬁnd that the rec-
        ord doesn’t show that the court knew this information before it
        gave the Allen charge. In fact, during the court’s second question-
        ing of the foreperson, the court directed her not to share “the nu-
        merical breakdown” of the jurors’ votes. To be sure, the district
        court knew that Juror 6 was the subject of the jury’s notes and fore-
        person’s concerns, but it did not know (nor do we) that Juror 6 was
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        23-10934                  Opinion of the Court                               45

        the sole “holdout” juror on all (or any particular) counts. Indeed,
        the jury returned a not-guilty verdict on the count involving Har-
        per. And we have no information about whether any of the other
        jurors, at any point in the deliberations, leaned towards a not-guilty
        verdict on any of the other counts. In any case, the record here
        doesn’t provide a suﬃcient basis to conclude that this factor favors
        a ﬁnding of coercion. See Lowenﬁeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 234–35,
        241 (1988) (ﬁnding no coercion when trial court polled the jurors
        as to whether “further deliberations [would] enable [them] to ar-
        rive at a verdict,” eﬀectively revealing an 11-to-1 split, and then gave
        a supplemental instruction); but see Brewster, 913 F.3d at 1047 (ﬁnd-
        ing coercion where the jury revealed an 11-to-1 split twice).
               Finally, we consider the time between the court’s ﬁnal in-
        struction and the jury’s verdict. The jury deliberated for nearly
        three hours after the second Allen charge before it reached its ver-
        dict. We have repeatedly found no coercion even with shorter pe-
        riods between charge and verdict. See Davis, 779 F.3d at 1313 (just
        over two hours); Anderson, 1 F.4th at 1271 (an hour and a half );
        United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1458–60 (11th Cir. 1987) (same);
        United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 664 (5th Cir. 1972) (same), aﬀ’d
        en banc, 480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973); 16 Bush, 727 F.3d at 1319 (47
        minutes); United States v. Scrus, 583 F.2d 238, 239–41 (5th Cir.
        1978) (48 minutes, at nearly 11:30 p.m.); but see Brewster, 913 F.3d at

        16 All Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981, are binding prece-

        dent in this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.
        1981) (en banc).
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        46                      Opinion of the Court                   23-10934

        1056 (ﬁnding coercion when “only 34 minutes” elapsed between
        the ﬁnal charge and verdict). This substantial three-hour period
        contradicts any suggestion that a holdout juror was “forced to roll
        over without engaging in further conscientious deliberation.” See
        Anderson, 1 F.4th at 1271.
               The other circumstances here likewise fail to indicate coer-
        cion. So we conclude that the district court did not abuse its dis-
        cretion in giving two Allen charges.
        3. The district court’s inadvertent omission of “not” in the Allen charge
                                      was harmless.
               Finally, we address Hill’s claim that the misread Allen charge
        was itself coercive. As we’ve explained, the transcript indicates that
        the district court misstated the law when it instructed the jury that
        “if the evidence fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
        the defendant must have your unanimous verdict of guilty.” It
        should have said “not guilty.” But on this record, that error does
        not entitle Hill to relief.
                Because Hill failed to object to the contents of the Allen
        charge (either as written or read), we review for plain error. See
        Anderson, 1 F.4th at 1268. On plain-error review, Hill must prove
        that (1) error occurred, (2) that error was plain, and (3) it aﬀected
        Hill’s substantial rights. United States v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1319
        (11th Cir. 2022). Only if Hill can satisfy all three prongs do we then
        have discretion to correct the error if it “(4) seriously aﬀected the
        fairness of the judicial proceedings.” Id.
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        23-10934               Opinion of the Court                         47

                Hill can satisfy the ﬁrst and second prongs here, but not the
        third. As to the third, an error aﬀects a defendant’s substantial
        rights if it “aﬀect[s] the outcome of the district court proceedings.”
        Id. (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). Here,
        we know that the omission of “not” did not lead the jury to convict
        Hill when it would have otherwise acquitted because the jury, in
        fact, acquitted Hill of the count relating to Harper.
                But on top of that, the weight of the evidence here, as we’ve
        already discussed, was substantial, and the court’s other correct in-
        structions made it clear to the jury that it must ﬁnd Hill not guilty
        if it concluded that the evidence failed to establish guilt beyond a
        reasonable doubt. In this respect, the district court had already
        given an Allen charge and correctly read the phrase “not guilty.”
        And the court’s legal instructions at the beginning and end of the
        trial, which the jury took into the deliberation room, recited the
        correct legal standard.
                At bottom, then, the court’s plain error in leaving out the
        word “not” did not “aﬀect[] the outcome” of Hill’s trial. See id.; cf.
        also United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 822 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding
        that an “inadvertent[]” addition of “not,” especially “in the context
        of the charge as a whole,” was “clearly harmless beyond a reason-
        able doubt”); United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir.
        1983) (ﬁnding no prejudice from a “single slip of the tongue by the
        trial judge” where the record was otherwise “replete” with correct
        instructions on the burden of proof ).
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        48                    Opinion of the Court                23-10934

               Since Hill cannot satisfy the third requirement, we do not
        get to the fourth prong of plain-error review. See Malone, 51 F.4th
        at 1319. And Hill’s challenge to the district court’s second Allen
        charge fails.
                               III.   CONCLUSION

                For the reasons we’ve discussed, Hill had fair warning that
        his conduct was unconstitutional, the evidence was suﬃcient to
        convict, and the district court did not coerce the verdict. We aﬃrm
        Hill’s conviction on all counts.
              AFFIRMED.
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        23-10934              MARCUS, J., Concurring                        1

        MARCUS, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
                I concur fully in the Court’s opinion. I have no doubt Sheriﬀ
        Hill had fair warning that he violated the constitutional rights of
        six detainees when he ordered them strapped into a painful re-
        straint chair for four or more hours for no legitimate reason asso-
        ciated with maintaining safety and good order in a county jail. I
        also agree that the evidence was more than suﬃcient to sustain the
        jury’s verdicts. And I am satisﬁed that the district court judge acted
        within her considerable discretion when she questioned Juror 6
        two times during the course of the jury’s deliberations. I write sep-
        arately, however, to highlight the substantial dangers inherent in
        singling out a juror for judicial inquiry, particularly doing so twice
        within a relatively short time frame.
                Dealing with allegations of juror misconduct is an extraor-
        dinarily diﬃcult and dangerous undertaking for any trial judge. A
        defendant’s right to a trial by an impartial jury is a “fundamental
        reservation of power in our constitutional structure.” United States
        v. Brown, 996 F.3d 1171, 1183 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting
        Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004)); see U.S. CONST.
        amend. VI. So, when there are allegations that a juror cannot be
        impartial, or that he refuses to follow the court’s instructions, or
        that he refuses to deliberate with the other members of the jury,
        or, perhaps, that he has considered extrinsic evidence beyond the
        trial record, a district judge must take these claims seriously. See
        United States v. Caldwell, 776 F.2d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The
        more serious the potential jury contamination, . . . the heavier the
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        2                      MARCUS, J., Concurring                 23-10934

        burden to investigate.”); United States v. Harris, 908 F.2d 728, 734
        (11th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1278–
        79 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that “we would expect the district court
        to take . . . measures in investigating the potential prejudice to the
        defendants” where there were “troubling” allegations that two ju-
        rors had prejudged the defendants’ guilt). We have sustained the
        power of the trial judge to investigate allegations of misconduct by
        questioning jurors precisely in order to “avoid premature or unjus-
        tiﬁed dismissal.” United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir.
        2004). But in investigating misconduct, the judge must tread very
        carefully in order to respect the secrecy of the jury’s deliberative
        process and to avoid coercing a juror who may be at odds with the
        others into giving up his honestly held beliefs or for the sake of
        conforming to the majority. See Brown, 996 F.3d at 1186.
               It should go without saying that district court judges are best
        placed to handle allegations of juror misconduct because they
        “deal with jurors on a regular basis, and . . . are in the trenches
        when problems arise.” United States v. Dominguez, 226 F.3d 1235,
        1246 (11th Cir. 2000). They are therefore particularly well “situated
        to make the credibility determinations that must be made” when
        faced with an allegation of juror misconduct. United States v. Abbell,
        271 F.3d 1286, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001); cf. Owens v. Wainwright, 698
        F.2d 1111, 1113 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Appellate courts reviewing a cold
        record give particular deference to credibility determinations of a
        fact-ﬁnder who had the opportunity to see live testimony.”). For
        this reason, the trial judge has broad discretion in how to handle
        such allegations. See Dominguez, 226 F.3d at 1247. The applicable
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        23-10934              MARCUS, J., Concurring                        3

        abuse-of-discretion standard means that “there will be occasions in
        which we aﬃrm the district court even though we would have gone
        the other way had it been our call.” Id. (quoting In re Rasbury, 24
        F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994)). “The whole point of discretion is
        that there is [a] range of options open, which means more than one
        choice is permissible.” Id. We will defer to the district court’s su-
        perior ability to handle these issues unless we ﬁnd their choice re-
        ﬂects a clear error of judgment. See McMahan v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120,
        1128 (11th Cir. 2001).
               The district judge in this case was faced with a particularly
        diﬃcult judgment call. During the deliberative process, she had re-
        ceived a note from the foreperson of the jury complaining that Ju-
        ror 6 was incompetent, that he would not engage in deliberations
        with the others, and that he would not follow the court’s instruc-
        tions on the law. The trial judge questioned him to discern whether
        these allegations were true in whole or in part, and did so faithfully
        following our precedent. See Abbell, 271 F.3d at 1304 n.20 (recog-
        nizing that a judge may question jurors “to detect and rectify” mis-
        conduct). The problem, however, was compounded the next day
        when the judge received two more notes signed by the foreperson,
        again complaining that Juror 6 was incompetent and that he would
        not follow the judge’s instructions.
               The universe of options the district judge faced were lim-
        ited. She had four choices; none was ideal. First, she could have
        declared a mistrial -- the most extreme option -- but understandably
        decided that that would be premature, since the reconstituted jury
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        4                      MARCUS, J., Concurring                 23-10934

        had only deliberated for a day and a half. (The trial had lasted eight
        days.) Second, she could have dismissed Juror 6 and replaced him
        with an alternate -- but a judge can dismiss a juror only if she is sure
        there is “no substantial possibility” that he will deliberate according
        to instructions, and the juror’s notes, standing alone, almost surely
        did not meet this high standard. See id. at 1304. Third, she could
        have done nothing. This, too, was an unenviable choice because
        the district judge was faced with renewed allegations of serious
        misconduct that, if substantiated, would likely have warranted dis-
        missal. See id. (aﬃrming dismissal of a juror who indicated she
        would not follow the court’s instructions). Finally, the district
        court judge could have brought Juror 6 in again, as she did, for ad-
        ditional questioning in order to inform her decision about the ap-
        propriate course of conduct.
               Faced with these unenviable choices, the judge’s decision to
        question Juror 6 again was not an abuse of discretion. A district
        court judge could well have thought that it was too early to declare
        a mistrial and that the dismissal of Juror 6 based solely on the alle-
        gations of his fellow jurors was reversible error. See Brown, 996 F.3d
        at 1175. So, the judge had two real options: do nothing or carefully
        question the juror again. “[O]ur jury system works only when both
        the judge and the jury respect the limits of their authority,” and a
        juror who refuses to follow the court’s instructions “abdicates his
        constitutional responsibility and violates his solemn oath.” Id. at
        1184 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The allegations of
        misconduct were repeated and they were serious. The greatest
        concern was the claim that Juror 6 had told the other jurors he did
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        23-10934              MARCUS, J., Concurring                        5

        not agree with the law and “w[ould] not consider it.” Indeed, be-
        fore Juror 6 was questioned the ﬁrst time, the most serious allega-
        tion of misconduct was that he told the other jurors that “the sher-
        iﬀ [and] the president are above the law and not required to follow
        the constitution.” Thus, the trial judge was understandably reluc-
        tant to allow Juror 6 to continue deliberating without checking
        whether the juror actually refused to follow her instructions on the
        law. Although Juror 6 had said he was trying to follow the court’s
        instructions when the judge ﬁrst questioned him, the judge acted
        within her broad discretion to follow up on the repeated assertions
        from the foreperson.
               And when the judge did question Juror 6 on each occasion,
        she did so with care and tact, doing her best not to penetrate the
        jury’s deliberative process, and asking Juror 6 only general ques-
        tions that did not suggest he had done anything wrong. See United
        States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he record
        reveals the commendable caution exercised by the trial judge in
        questioning each juror.”). Under these circumstances, and done
        with such care, the judge did not abuse her discretion.
               The hard fact of life, however, is that questioning a juror al-
        ways comes with risk. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 620
        (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he very act of judicial investigation can at times
        be expected to foment discord among jurors.”). The more often
        you do it, the greater the danger. Among other things, the judge
        risks revealing information about the nature and extent of the
        jury’s deliberations, which must remain secret to promote the
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        6                             MARCUS, J., Concurring                  23-10934

        jury’s ability to debate freely, robustly, and fully. See United States v.
        Symington, 195 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Clark v. United
        States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (“Freedom of debate might be stiﬂed
        and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel
        that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the
        world.”). The trial judge also runs the risk of inﬂuencing the jury
        simply by singling out one of its members for separate inquiry. See
        Symington, 195 F.3d at 1086. No matter how careful a judge is, a
        questioned juror often will veer into a discussion about the jury’s
        deliberations -- as the judge discovered in this case when Juror 6
        revealed that the jury’s dispute centered on the meaning of speciﬁc
        intent and willfulness. 1
               Perhaps even more serious is the risk that, in questioning a
        juror, the court will inadvertently pressure a dissenting juror into
        giving up his honestly held beliefs. When one juror disagrees with
        the majority, there is always the danger that the majority will

        1 In the judge’s first inquiry of Juror 6, the following colloquy occurred:

                [Juror 6]: -- If I may also add?
                The Court: Yes, sir.
                [Juror 6]: I -- I have annoyed people by going to speciﬁc para-
                graphs of the document that you gave us, and the speciﬁcs of
                this case, and under three diﬀerent passages that related to in-
                tent and willful where you’re deﬁning the terms and then --
                The Court: Okay.
                [Juror 6]: And I --
                The Court: I don’t want to go too far in what you discussed.
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        23-10934              MARCUS, J., Concurring                        7

        mistakenly brand the dissenter incompetent or biased, when he is
        in fact simply harboring a reasonable doubt. See Abbell, 271 F.3d at
        1302; Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622. To dissent in the face of universal
        opposition often requires courage. See United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d
        1453, 1460 (11th Cir. 1987) (“In some cases, the duty of a juror is
        rigorous. Deliberations can be long, hard and heated. It is each
        juror’s duty to stand by his honestly held views; this can require
        courage and stamina.”). A dissenting juror is already under consid-
        erable pressure to fold, and the judge must take care not to add to
        that mix. “The last thing such a minority holdout juror needs is for
        the trial judge -- cloaked with the full authority of [her] oﬃce -- to
        even hint that” the juror should “just reconsider.” Id. A central
        feature of our criminal justice system and an important safeguard
        of liberty is the right to be free unless convicted by a unanimous
        jury. See Brown, 996 F.3d at 1182–83; see also Rey, 811 F.2d at 1460
        (“One of the safeguards against the conviction of innocent persons
        built into our criminal justice system is that a jury may not be able
        to reach a unanimous verdict.”).
               Questioning a juror once is risky enough; questioning the
        same juror twice is downright dangerous. The risks inherent in this
        kind of judicial inquiry are ampliﬁed each time the juror is ques-
        tioned. And, where the allegations of misconduct have not
        changed, there may be diminishing returns in bringing the juror
        out again -- after all, the judge has already had the opportunity to
        probe the allegations and decide if they are substantiated. Because
        the standard for dismissing a juror is so high, limited questioning
        and contextual clues will usually suﬃce to tell a judge that the
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        8                      MARCUS, J., Concurring                 23-10934

        standard for dismissal has not been met. See Brown, 996 F.3d at 1186
        (“‘A presiding judge faced with anything but unambiguous evi-
        dence that a juror [is engaging in misconduct] need go no further
        in [her] investigation’ of the alleged misconduct.” (quoting
        Thomas, 116 F.3d at 622)).
               Because “the twin imperatives of preserving jury secrecy
        and safeguarding the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict from
        an impartial jury” are so important, id. (quoting Symington, 195 F.3d
        at 1087), sometimes it may be wiser for a judge not to question the
        juror. See Symington, 195 F.3d at 1086 (accepting that, “[i]n refrain-
        ing from exposing the content of jury deliberations, . . . a trial judge
        may not be able to determine conclusively” whether allegations of
        juror misconduct are legitimate); see also Brown, 996 F.3d at 1195
        (Brasher, J., concurring) (“When disputes arise between jurors, the
        default response should be deliberation, not investigation.”).
        Sometimes, it may be wiser to “err on the side of too little inquiry
        as opposed to too much.” See Abbell, 271 F.3d at 1304 n.20.
              Put simply, questioning a juror repeatedly is not a path that
        should be taken lightly or without meticulous care. The terrain is
        dangerous and the traveler must proceed with great caution.