Court Opinion

ID: 9384041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 17:02:01.52739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.895575
License: Public Domain

Rel: March 31, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0524
                                _________________________

                           Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals

                      PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                              (In re: Jennifer Cross et al.

                                                  v.

                                 City of Muscle Shoals)

                      (Colbert Circuit Court: CV-20-900062)

COOK, Justice.
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     Certain residents of the Nathan Estates subdivision ("the

subdivision") in the City of Muscle Shoals ("the City") sued the City. They

sought, among other things, an injunction directing the City to enact a

comprehensive stormwater-management plan or to enforce its existing

stormwater-management ordinances to prevent its retention pond

located in the subdivision from overflowing and damaging the residents'

property.1 The City moved to dismiss the residents' claim for injunctive

relief on the basis that it was entitled to substantive immunity, but the

Colbert Circuit Court denied that motion. The City now petitions this

Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss the

     1The  residents who filed the initial complaint were Reginna Burrell;
William Burrell; Jennifer Cross; Jason Cross; Dana Fisher; Brady
Gregory; Amber Gregory, individually and as next friend for Lainey
Gregory, a minor; Brett King; Amanda King; Tammy Michael; Charles
Michael; Dustin Parker; Carolyn Pate; Jamie Reed; Mary Rowe; Jimmie
Rowe; Miller Terry; and Sonya Terry. On November 15, 2021, Amber
Gregory, as next friend for Lainey Gregory, a minor, stipulated to the
dismissal without prejudice of the claims asserted on Lainey Gregory's
behalf. On November 16, 2021, the trial court dismissed those claims. On
November 21, 2021, counsel for Reginna Burrell and William Burrell
filed a motion to withdraw. The City states: "Upon information and belief,
the Burrells are now proceeding pro se." Petition at 4 n.3. The Burrells
are not named as plaintiffs in the second amended complaint that added
the claim for injunctive relief or as respondents to the City's mandamus
petition.

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residents' claim for injunctive relief based on its entitlement to

substantive immunity. In short, the City argues that claims for injunctive

relief cannot be used as a means of directing a municipality to create new

policies or ordinances or to control how it enforces its existing policies or

ordinances. We grant the petition and issue the writ. However, in doing

so, we do not reach the question of whether (or when) a municipality

might be enjoined based on its own tortious conduct (as opposed to its

conduct in enacting or enforcing its policies and ordinances).

                         Facts and Procedural History

     In 2005, the City purchased a retention pond located in the

subdivision ("the retention pond"). The residents alleged that, unlike

most of the retention ponds in the City, the retention pond in the

subdivision was not equipped with a pump or any other device to divert

excess water but, instead, relied exclusively on evaporation and

absorption to prevent flooding. As a result of that system, the residents

further alleged, the retention pond would often overflow after heavy

periods of rainfall, and, they asserted, the City was aware of this issue.

     Shortly after purchasing the retention pond, the City solicited bids

for the purpose of making some improvements to it. The City retained

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the services of White, Lynn, Collins & Associates, Inc. ("the engineering

firm"), to come up with the overall design for those improvements, and it

later hired Jones Seaborn Colcock, Jr., and Parallax Building Systems,

Inc. ("the contractors"), to make those improvements.

     In 2011, the City enacted a stormwater-management ordinance

that became the City's Drainage Manual ("the drainage manual"). See

City of Muscle Shoals Code of Ordinances, Chapter 38, Article III, § 38-

141 et seq. According to § 38-144 of the drainage manual, its goals and

purposes were to "prevent flooding[] and erosion that may result from

stormwater runoff from development and redevelopment projects" and

"to protect existing natural stormwater resources, convey and control

stormwater in a safe and responsible manner, and meet water quality

goals." The drainage manual also included a disclaimer that "stormwater

management,     particularly   in   the   area   of   stormwater   quality

management, is an evolving science" requiring periodic updates to ensure

its goals and purposes are achieved.

     In February 2019, the City experienced several days of heavy

rainfall that resulted in water overflowing out of the retention pond and

onto the property of the residents, damaging the real and personal

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property of the residents and, in some cases, inflicting physical injury.

     The residents sued the City on March 6, 2020, alleging claims of

negligence and trespass to land and chattel. 2 The residents alleged that

the City had failed "to properly construct, improve, and maintain" the

retention pond.

     In June 2020, the contractors filed a motion to intervene,

accompanied by a complaint seeking a judgment declaring that they did

not owe the City any defense or indemnity as to the residents' claims. The

circuit court granted the contractors' motion to intervene.

     On October 30, 2020, the residents filed their first amended

complaint, alleging claims of negligence and trespass to land and chattel

against the City, the engineering firm, and the contractors. The

engineering firm and the contractors filed motions for a summary

judgment, arguing that the residents' claims and a demand for

indemnification asserted by the City were barred by the applicable

statute of repose in § 6-5-221(a), Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court granted

     2The  residents also alleged a wantonness claim against the City;
however, the City filed an unopposed motion for a judgment on the
pleadings as to that claim, and that motion was granted.
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the summary-judgment motions, leaving only the residents and the City

as parties.

     On November 24, 2021, the residents filed a second amended

complaint against the City in which they added a claim for injunctive

relief and sought attorney fees. Count III of the second amended

complaint stated:

                 "COUNT III -- INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

          "43. The foregoing Paragraphs of this Complaint are
     incorporated by reference as if fully set out herein.

           "44. The [residents], on behalf of themselves and for the
     common benefit of other residents in Nathan Estates, the City
     of Muscle Shoals, and other residents and landowners in
     Colbert County, seek to compel the enaction of a
     comprehensive stormwater management plan, as required by
     the Drainage Manual, and/or to compel the compliance with
     the Drainage Manual in such a way as to prevent future
     flooding and subsequent damage.

           "45. When [the residents] obtain such injunctive relief,
     they will render a public service and result in a benefit to the
     general public in addition to serving the interests of the
     [residents].

           "46. As such, counsel for [the residents] are entitled to a
     common benefit attorneys' fee based on the lodestar method
     of calculation.

          "47. Injunctive relief from this Court is the only manner
     by which the City may be compelled to enact such a plan.

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          "Wherefore premises considered, the [residents]
     demand judgment against the City for injunctive relief,
     common benefit attorneys' fees, costs, and all other damages
     for which the City is liable to the [residents]."

(Emphasis added.)

     The City filed a motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief, to

which the residents responded. After a hearing, the circuit court entered

an order on March 17, 2022, denying the City's motion to dismiss that

claim. The City then filed the present mandamus petition, and this Court

subsequently ordered answers and briefs.3

                           Standard of Review

                 " 'A writ of mandamus is a

                 " ' "drastic and extraordinary writ that
                 will be issued only when there is: 1) a
                 clear legal right in the petitioner to the
                 order sought; 2) an imperative duty
                 upon the respondent to perform,
                 accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3)
                 the lack of another adequate remedy;
                 and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of
                 the court." '

     "Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte
     United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993)).

     3The   City's alleged liability for negligence and trespass to land and
chattel is not at issue in the present petition.
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     A petition for a writ of mandamus 'is an appropriate means
     for seeking review of an order denying a claim of immunity.'
     Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000). …

           "In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss by means
     of a mandamus petition, we do not change our standard of
     review. Id. … Under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., a motion to
     dismiss is proper when it is clear that the plaintiff cannot
     prove any set of circumstances upon which relief can be
     granted. Cook v. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc., 825 So. 2d 83, 89
     (Ala. 2001). ' "In making this determination, this Court does
     not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
     only whether [she] may possibly prevail." ' Id. (quoting Nance
     v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993)). We construe all
     doubts regarding the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of
     the plaintiff. Butts, 775 So. 2d at 177."

Ex parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 931 (Ala. 2003) (footnote omitted).

                                 Analysis

     The City first argues that it has a clear legal right to have the

residents' claim for injunctive relief dismissed. Relying on Rich v. City of

Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1982), the City contends that the circuit court

erred when it denied the City's motion because, it argues, substantive

immunity bars the residents' claim for injunctive relief. The residents

argue that the City does not have a clear legal right to have their claim

for injunctive relief dismissed. We agree with the City.

     Generally, application of the rule of substantive immunity

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      " 'prevent[s] the imposition of a legal duty, the breach of
     which imposes liability, in those narrow areas of
     governmental activities essential to the well-being of the
     governed, where the imposition of liability can be reasonably
     calculated to materially thwart the City's legitimate efforts to
     provide such public services.' "

Payne v. Shelby Cnty. Comm'n, 12 So. 3d 71, 78 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)

(quoting Rich, 410 So. 2d at 387). In Rich, a backup of a sewer line caused

sewage to overflow into the plaintiffs' residence. They sued the City of

Mobile, alleging "negligent failure to inspect or negligent inspection of

the lines and the connection between Plaintiffs' residence and the main

system." 410 So. 2d at 385. The City filed a motion to dismiss the

plaintiffs' complaint and the trial court granted that motion.

     On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's decision and stated

that, to impose liability in the case overlooked "what [the Court]

perceive[d] as overriding public policy reasons to hold to the contrary."

Id. at 386. Specifically, the Court held:

           "These policy considerations may be expressed in terms
     of the broader requirement of the City [of Mobile] to provide
     for the public health, safety, and general welfare of its
     citizenry. While, as here, the individual homeowner is
     affected by the discharge of the City sewer inspector's duty,
     the City's larger obligation to the whole of its resident
     population is paramount; and the imposition of liability upon
     the City, particularly where the Plaintiffs' reliance upon the

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     public inspection is secondary and inferential to their reliance
     upon the building contractor, necessarily threatens the
     benefits of such services to the public-at-large.

           "A municipality, in contrast to the State, which has
     immunity under Ala. Const. 1901, § 14, is generally
     chargeable with the negligence of its employees acting within
     the line and scope of their employment. In Jackson v. City of
     Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So. 2d 68 (1975), we interpreted §
     11-47-190, [Ala.] Code 1975, as so mandating. We believe
     these public policy considerations, however, override the
     general rule and prevent the imposition of a legal duty, the
     breach of which imposes liability, in those narrow areas of
     governmental activities essential to the well-being of the
     governed, where the imposition of liability can be reasonably
     calculated to materially thwart the City's legitimate efforts to
     provide such public services."

410 So. 2d at 387 (emphasis added).

     In announcing this rule of "substantive immunity," the Court did

not restrict the application of the rule to sewer-line-inspection cases but

held "that the substantive immunity rule of this case must be given

operative effect only in the context of those public service activities of

governmental entities … so laden with the public interest as to outweigh

the incidental duty to individual citizens." Id. at 387-88.

     The City maintains that the holding in Rich has been applied

consistently by this Court to provide substantive immunity to

municipalities   when    the   conduct    complained     of   involves   the

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municipality's enactment or enforcement of local laws relating to the

delivery of public services. See, e.g., Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So.

2d 889 (Ala. 1991) (barring claims alleging negligent inspection of

electrical wiring at an apartment complex); Nichols v. Town of Mount

Vernon, 504 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1987) (barring claims alleging negligent

failure to provide adequate police protection); Garrett v. City of Mobile,

481 So. 2d 376 (Ala. 1985) (same); Calogrides v. City of Mobile, 475 So.

2d 560 (Ala. 1985) (same).

      As to the residents' claim for injunctive relief, the City points to two

cases in which our appellate courts have expressly held that substantive

immunity bars a local entity's liability for claims alleging improper

enactment, interpretation, or enforcement of local laws --           Payne v.

Shelby County Commission, 12 So. 3d 71 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), and Bill

Salter Advertising, Inc. v. City of Atmore, 79 So. 3d 646 (Ala. Civ. App.

2010).

      In Payne, landowners alleged that they had suffered damage as a

result of the Shelby County Commission's and the Shelby County

Planning Commission's alleged failure to enforce a conditional rezoning

resolution. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the county

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defendants on the basis that they were entitled to substantive immunity.

The Court of Civil Appeals applied the test formulated in Rich to decide

"whether a county's exercise of its zoning power is a public-service

activity so laden with the public interest as to outweigh any incidental

duty that activity might create to an individual citizen." 12 So. 3d at 78.

The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding

that "it cannot be disputed that zoning powers are a public-service

activity and may not be exercised for the benefit of individual landowners

to the exclusion of the interests and well-being of all citizens of a county

or municipality." Id.

     The Court of Civil Appeals also concluded that the acts taken by the

county defendants to enforce the conditional rezoning resolution at issue

in the case were protected by substantive immunity and that substantive

immunity extended as well to a governmental entity's decision regarding

how to enforce a local ordinance. Specifically, the Court of Civil Appeals

explained:

     "A governmental entity's decision regarding how a zoning
     ordinance should be enforced is as much a legislative matter
     as is the enactment of a zoning ordinance. See § 11-52-76, Ala.
     Code 197[5] ('The legislative body of [the] municipality shall
     provide for the manner in which such [zoning] regulations and

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     restrictions and the boundaries of such districts shall be
     determined, established and enforced and from time to time
     amended, supplemented or changed.' (emphasis added)).

           "Just as we have located no Alabama case holding that
     a governmental entity may be held liable in tort for its actions
     in adopting a zoning ordinance, we have located no Alabama
     case holding that a governmental entity may be held liable in
     tort for its failure to enforce local ordinances against third
     parties. We have, however, found numerous cases refusing to
     impose liability against a governmental entity for its failure
     to enforce ordinances and statutes. …

           "….

          "… If a governmental entity's failure to investigate or to
     enforce its own ordinance does not give rise to a tort action, a
     governmental entity's decision among various enforcement
     options as to how best to enforce a zoning ordinance likewise
     does not give rise to a tort action."

12 So. 3d at 80-81 (second and third emphases added).

     In Bill Salter Advertising, the plaintiff sued the City of Atmore and

one of its building officials after the defendants had decided that the city's

sign ordinance prevented the plaintiff from rebuilding a sign destroyed

by a hurricane. The Court of Civil Appeals found that the sign ordinance

was not enacted to provide a benefit to the plaintiff, but "was enacted to

benefit the municipality as a whole." 79 So. 3d at 652-53. Because the

Court of Civil Appeals determined that the defendants did not owe an

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individual duty to the plaintiff, the court affirmed the summary

judgment in their favor on the basis that substantive immunity barred

the plaintiff's claim for damages arising out of the defendants'

interpretation and enforcement of the city's own sign ordinance.

      In the present case, the operative complaint specifically asks the

circuit court to enter an injunction requiring the City to enact particular

policies or to enforce exiting policies to benefit the residents. It states:

"The [residents] … seek to compel the enaction of a comprehensive

stormwater management plan, as required by the Drainage Manual,

and/or to compel the compliance with the Drainage Manual in such a way

as to prevent future flooding and subsequent damage."              (Emphasis

added.) The "stormwater management plan" that the residents seek

would, by its nature, be "comprehensive" and, thus, would apply to the

entire City. The City correctly asserts that stormwater management is

a public-service activity exercised for the collective benefit of all residents

of the City, not just certain residents in the subdivision, and it refers to

§ 38-144 of the drainage manual, which states:

      "[T]he manual is intended to provide information to the
      general public on the city's stormwater policies and design
      practices, as well as assist developers, engineers, and city

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     staff in the preparation, review and approval of the
     stormwater report and construction drawings that must
     accompany private and public development proposals."

     The City contends that the residents are asking the circuit court to

compel the City to enact a plan or to enforce existing ordinances dealing

with a drainage system and that this is exactly the kind of claim to which

the protection offered by the substantive-immunity rule should apply.

     Moreover, the City points out that, in Hilliard v. City of Huntsville,

585 So. 2d 889 (Ala. 1991), this Court upheld a trial court's determination

that the City of Huntsville was entitled to substantive immunity

regarding a claim alleging negligent electrical inspection because, the

Court said, "the imposition of tort liability in this area would serve only

to destroy the municipality's motivation or financial ability to support

this important service." 585 So. 2d at 892. The City argues that to deny

it substantive immunity puts the "public coffer" at risk to the detriment

of all the City's citizens and that to allow a municipality to be sued every

time an individual is aggrieved by a regulatory action or inaction would

set a costly and undesirable precedent. Based on the foregoing, the City

contends that the circuit court should have granted its motion to dismiss

the residents' claim for injunctive relief.

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     In response, the residents contend that this Court has long held

that when a municipality exercises its authority to construct or maintain

a drainage system, "a duty of care exists, and a municipality may be liable

for damages proximately caused by its negligence." Kennedy v. City of

Montgomery, 423 So. 2d 187, 188 (Ala. 1982). See also Fricke v. City of

Guntersville, 254 Ala. 370, 48 So. 2d 420 (1950); City of Birmingham v.

Flowers, 224 Ala. 279, 140 So. 353 (1932). The residents further contend

that the City's reliance on Rich and its progeny is misplaced and that this

case is controlled by those cases holding that the "action of a municipality

in constructing a drainage system is … attended by a duty to exercise due

care to 'avoid injury to persons and property.' " Lee v. City of Anniston,

722 So. 2d 755, 757 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Sisco v. City of Huntsville, 220

Ala. 59, 60, 124 So. 95, 95 (1929)).

     In support of their contention, the residents rely heavily on this

Court's decision in Kennedy v. City of Montgomery, 423 So. 2d 187 (Ala.

1982). In Kennedy, a case in which this Court neither addressed

substantive immunity nor cited Rich, individual homeowners sued the

City of Montgomery, alleging that their homes had been subject to

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flooding for several years and that the city had negligently failed to

provide adequate drainage for their property.

     However, the claims in Kennedy are different from those made

here. In that case, the homeowners alleged that the conditions created

by the City of Montgomery caused the flooding and constituted a

nuisance. The homeowners sought monetary damages and an injunction

prohibiting the city from causing further flooding. The trial court entered

a summary judgment in favor of the city.

     In reversing that summary judgment, this Court held:

           "The city apparently rests on the contention that it had
     no legal duty and therefore could not be negligent. We have
     already held that the plaintiffs are entitled to a trial on the
     negligence and wantonness counts since they may be able to
     establish that the city violated a duty of care. Accordingly, the
     summary judgment must also be reversed on the issue of
     injunctive relief for abatement of the alleged nuisance.

           "The city does not discuss in brief whether the
     conditions complained of constituted a nuisance, entitling the
     plaintiffs to compensatory damages. Rather, the city argues
     in reference to both nuisance and negligence, that the courts
     have no authority to review a policy decision concerning
     maintenance or improvement of the city's drainage system.
     This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the issues
     presented for decision. We hold only that the plaintiffs are
     entitled to a trial to prove the existence of a nuisance and of a

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     duty of care. Further exploration of the factual matters
     discussed above is necessary to determine if the city engaged
     in a nonreviewable policy decision or in culpable conduct,
     either negligent or wanton."

Kennedy, 423 So. 2d at 190.

     In Kennedy, this Court recognized a distinction between a policy

decision made by a city and culpable conduct engaged in by a city. We

recognize that distinction here. Thus, the residents cannot rely on

Kennedy to support their argument that they are entitled to an

injunction mandating the City's enactment of a stormwater-management

plan or its enforcement of the provisions of the drainage manual to

benefit the residents.

     The City's decisions about its enactment of a plan or its enforcement

of existing ordinances concerning its drainage systems are public-policy

decisions made in connection with the City's responsibility to provide for

the public's safety, health, and general welfare and fall into the category

of actions excepted from the general rule of liability. That exception -- the

substantive-immunity rule -- is applied in "those narrow areas of

governmental activities essential to the well-being of the governed, where

the imposition of liability can be reasonably calculated to materially

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thwart the City's legitimate efforts to provide such public services." Rich,

410 So. 2d at 387. Thus, Rich and its progeny control in this case, and

substantive immunity applies to bar the residents' claim for injunctive

relief against the City.

     The residents also argue that they are entitled to injunctive relief

and that, therefore, mandamus relief is not appropriate here. The

residents cite City of Troy v. Watkins, 201 Ala. 274, 275, 78 So. 50, 51

(1918), in which this Court stated that a citizen "may enjoin a

municipality from taking or injuring his property," and Triple J Cattle,

Inc. v. Chambers, 551 So. 2d 280, 282 (Ala. 1989), in which this Court

stated that "[t]he primary reason for issuing an injunction is to prevent

an irreparable injury, i.e., one not redressable with pecuniary damages

in a court of law." We do not find either case to be applicable here.

     In City of Troy, the plaintiff alleged that his property had been

taken for public use without compensation, a circumstance not present

in this case. In Triple J Cattle, the plaintiff sought an injunction against

a private party, not a municipality, the case did not concern immunity,

and the plaintiff alleged that, under the circumstances, it could

demonstrate its entitlement to an injunction because, it asserted, it

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would be irreparably injured if it were not granted such relief.

     Finally, the residents argue that the City has adequate legal

remedies if this Court denies its mandamus petition. In support of their

contention, the residents rely on Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty

Co., 320 So. 3d 550, 553 (Ala. 2020) (noting that, "even though a trial

court may have erred in ruling on a motion to dismiss, that, by itself, is

an insufficient basis for obtaining mandamus review"), and Ex parte

Sanderson, 263 So. 3d 681, 688 (Ala. 2018) (noting that, "a writ of

mandamus is not available merely to alleviate the inconvenience and

expense of litigation for a defendant whose motion to dismiss ... has been

denied"). Neither of those cases involved immunity and, instead, only

stated the general rule developed by this Court regarding whether a writ

of mandamus is an appropriate remedy for the erroneous denial of a

motion to dismiss. This Court has carved out limited exceptions to that

general rule, however, including when the motion to dismiss asserts the

defense of immunity, stating that such a defense is " 'of such a nature

that a party simply ought not to be put to the expense and effort of

litigation.' " Ex parte Hodge, 153 So. 3d 734, 748 (Ala. 2014) (quoting Ex

parte Alamo Title Co., 128 So. 3d 700, 716 (Ala. 2013) (Murdock, J.,

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concurring   specially)).   Thus,   the   residents'   argument    here   is

unpersuasive.

                                Conclusion

     Because the City was entitled to substantive immunity, the

residents' claim for injunctive relief was due to be dismissed. We,

therefore, grant the City's petition and direct the circuit court to dismiss

Count III of the residents' second amended complaint.

     PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

     Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.

     Shaw, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

     Bryan and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.

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SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).

      I concur in the result. I write to note, as the main opinion indicates,

that the decision in Kennedy v. City of Montgomery, 423 So. 2d 187 (Ala.

1982), does not address the substantive-immunity doctrine adopted by

this Court in Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1982). The

distinction made in Kennedy between "a nonreviewable policy decision"

made by a municipality and "culpable conduct" by a municipality (423 So.

2d at 190), as recognized in the main opinion, is not a distinction

applicable in the context of substantive immunity, as other caselaw

demonstrates.

      Further, although injunctive relief, in some contexts, might not

impose "liability" for purposes of substantive immunity, in this case the

requested injunction would require the enaction of plans and, by

necessity, public expenditures to effectuate those plans.        Assuming,

without deciding, that a circuit court has the power to require a

municipality to legislate and execute public policy, in this case I see no

functional distinction between the requested relief and the imposition of

"liability."

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