Court Opinion

ID: 9778036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:30:39.932257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.266106
License: Public Domain

KINKEADE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully and vigorously dissent. I would grant the State’s motion to dismiss this appeal because we do not have jurisdiction. I do not think that a document entitled “Defendant’s Notice of Appeal and Pauper Oath Appointment of Attorney on Appeal” which contains the notation that “defendant refused to sign” written below the blank provided for appellant’s signature gives us jurisdiction to entertain an appeal.
Rule 40(b)(1)1 requires that a “notice of appeal shall be given in writing filed with the clerk of the trial court. Such notice shall be sufficient if it shows the desire of the defendant to appeal from the judgment or other appealable order_” Because the words “defendant refused to sign” appear on this notice of appeal form, I do not think that there is any timely notice of appeal in writing, and this appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
I would not overrule this Court's decision in Chambers v. State, 735 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.), but would follow it. As this Court stated in Chambers, an “unsigned form does not satisfy the requirement that the notice of appeal ‘be given in writing.’” 735 S.W.2d at 294.
Moreover, in its recent decision in Shute v. State, 744 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that an “independent written notice of appeal” must be filed by the appellant. The court concluded that, in the absence of a timely, written notice of appeal, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The court stated that the reduction to writing by the clerk of the trial court of the appellant’s oral notice of appeal was not sufficient to meet the requirements of rule 40(b)(1). The court noted that the writing which appellant argued invoked the jurisdiction of the court of appeals was a form that was used merely as an acknowledgment by the trial court of receipt of the appellant’s oral notice. 744 S.W.2d at 97.
I disagree with the majority that the facts in Shute are distinguishable from this case. In Shute, there was no document filed that would constitute an “independent written notice of appeal” — only a form that was used by the clerk of the trial court.2 Likewise, in this case, we have no independent written notice of appeal — only an unsigned form which, like an unsigned check or promissory note, is evidence of nothing. Indeed, I do not see how an unsigned form can evidence a “desire ... to appeal” as required by rule 40(b)(1). Otherwise, any piece of paper with the word “appeal” which was not signed by the appellant might be considered sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court.
If it were not for the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Shute, I might be inclined to agree with the majority in this case to overrule this Court’s holding in Chambers. Of course, I agree that an appellant who desires to appeal should be entitled to appeal his conviction. But the Court of Criminal Appeals has spoken, and I think that its holding squarely controls the facts in this case. Therefore, our jurisdiction has not been invoked in this case, and the lack of signing cannot be amended under rule 83.
I would conclude that we are without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

. All references to rules herein are to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

. I note that this form was routinely used prior to the enactment of the Rules of Appellate Procedure on September 1, 1986, when notice of appeal was sufficient if given orally.