Court Opinion

ID: 9651292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:12:44.878082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:45.070533
License: Public Domain

Justice GOLDBERG,
concurring.
I concur in the well-reasoned opinion of the majority in this case, but I write separately because of the manner in which this case was “adjudicated” in the Family Court. The offender in this case, Paul Harrison (Harrison), was certified, in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 14-l-7.3(a)(2), and pled nolo contendere to first-degree sexual assault by force and coercion. According to the papers filed in this Court, it was “the particularly egregious and depraved nature of the first degree sexual assault committed by [Harrison] upon a sixteen year-old female victim, that prompted the Attorney General to move that [he] be certifiedf.]”15 Harrison was convicted of a serious felony and sentenced to fifteen years at the Adult Correctional Institutions, five years to serve (after the period of his minority was served at the Rhode Island Training School), followed by a ten-year suspended sentence and probation.
As is customary during the course of an adversary proceeding, this disposition was the result of a negotiated plea in which the state agreed to withdraw its petition for a waiver of Family Court jurisdiction over Harrison in exchange for certification in accordance with § 14-1-7.3 and a term of incarceration beyond Harrison’s minority. Negotiated plea dispositions are part of the foundation upon which our system of criminal justice rests. However, as the travel of this case demonstrates, adher*1000ence to these principles and even a basic understanding of the law as it relates to certification of juvenile offenders painfully was absent in this case.
Six months after the plea, during Harrison’s first review before the Family Court, the chief judge of that court, sua sponte, ordered Harrison transferred from the Training School, where he was midway through a rehabilitation program, and placed in temporary community placement. Although the suitability and efficacy of Ocean Tides and its rehabilitative programs for the state’s youth, including those who have been certified in accordance with § 14-1-7.3, is well known and unquestioned, the manner in which this order was issued, without regard to the parties (and the young victim), was inappropriate. Significantly, neither party sought nor asked for the issuance of this extraordinary relief, it was issued by a jurist who, the record reflects, appears to have had no understanding of the nature of the charge or the legal significance of statutory certification. See Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Gannon, 713 A.2d 218, 225 (R.I.1998) (stating that it is inappropriate for a trial justice to award a party relief that the party has not requested).
At the review proceeding, the chief judge was informed that Harrison had been sentenced in June 2008, that he had obtained a GED, completed substance-abuse counseling, and was progressing in the sex-offender unit of the Training School. According to the prosecutor, Harrison was in the beginning stages of treatment and eventually could be transitioned into a step-down program, but the prosecutor added that the Training School was “not willing to transition him at this time.” Significantly, Harrison’s lawyer asked for another review date in a few months. The Training School representative recommended a remand to that facility and suggested that a step-down program would be possible at some future time. Among the possible step-down options discussed were “Communities for People” or “Turning the Corner.” However, the tenor of the proceeding changed when defense counsel indicated that Harrison had been accepted at Ocean Tides before the plea in this case. The following colloquy occurred:
“The Court: Ocean Tides said they’d take him?
“[Defense Counsel]: That was back in May, Your Honor [before the disposition].
“The Court: What’s the alleged offense? Tell me what it was. What happened?
“[Prosecutor]: In this offense? Yes, Your Honor. It was first degree sexual assault.
“The Court: Tell me what it was.
“[Prosecutor]: I believe it was alleged that he gave oral sex to a woman without her consent while she was saying no. I only read the facts briefly, Your Hon-
or.
“The Court: Ocean Tides, if they take him, he’s placed there. Thank you very much.
“[Prosecutor]: As of when, Your Honor?
“The Court: Immediately. Henceforth.
“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, the [Training [S]chool is recommending remand.
“The Court: I don’t care what the [T]raining [S]ehool recommends. I’m the boss here. If Ocean Tides will take him, he is to go.”
The trial justice made no findings relative to whether Ocean Tides was appropriate and no findings with respect to Harrison or the nature of the crime; he summarily ordered that Harrison be transferred forthwith. His only colloquy with Harrison was the following:
*1001“The Court: Young man, you’re doing very well. That’s why I gave you a break, you understand?
“[Harrison]: Thank you, sir.”
Four days later, on January 16, 2009, the chief judge again took up this case. The state filed a motion to reconsider placement at Ocean Tides, based on the fact that Harrison had been certified and stood convicted of a felony. According to the prosecutor, Harrison had been certified by the Family Court based on the fact that he was incarcerated “on a pretty bad first degree sexual assault.” The motion to reconsider was denied again, without findings or explanation.
Five days later, on January 21, 2009, the parties again appeared before the chief judge. As is required by Article I, Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party must first seek a stay of an order in the lower court before this Court will entertain such a request. Although the prosecutor indicated that the state intended to seek review in the Supreme Court, the chief judge refused to decide the motion for a stay. After entertaining arguments from counsel both for and against the issuance of a stay, the following colloquy ensued:
“The Court: What’s the sentence here, AG?
“[Prosecutor]: The sentence?
“The Court: Yes.
“[Prosecutor]: Five years to serve. It was a 15-year sentence with five years to serve, [Y] our Honor.
“The Court: I can suspend that, can I not?
“[Prosecutor]: You can, [Y]our Honor. But under 14-l-41(c), there’s specific guidelines you’re required to meet in order to modify his certified sentence.
“The Court: I can suspend the sentence without guidelines, can I not?
“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, he’s technically not eligible under the statute for a modification and suspension of his sentence.
“The Court: Why isn’t he?
“[Prosecutor]: Because the statute sets out that there must be a hearing 30 days prior to either his eighteenth birthday or the one-year anniversary of his sentence, whichever is greater, and neither of those points [has] been met at this point. That will occur in, I believe, August of 2009.
“[Defense Counsel]: You haven’t modified his sentence. A modification requires findings and requires the sentence be suspended. You’re not suspending the sentence.
“The Court: It’s a TCP.
“[Defense Counsel]: This is exactly what you’re allowed to do under 14-1-7.3(a)2, which says you can send him to the Training School in a facility designated by the Court.
“The Court: Okay. The Court will reserve its decision. Thank you very much.
“[Defense Counsel]: Thank you, [Y]our Honor.
“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, can you just clarify that for me?
“The Court: Yeah. I reserve my decision. I’ll give you a decision some other day.
“[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, we have a motion pending in the Supreme Court.
“The Court: Young lady, did you hear what my decision was? I’m reserving the decision in this case. I may want to look at the memorandums. I may want to look at the law. If you want to be fresh, young lady, go right ahead. Thank you very much.
“[Prosecutor]: Can we have a date, [Y]our Honor, for the decision?
*1002“The Court: No. I’ll give you a decision when I’m ready.”
Later that day, the duty justice of this Court issued a temporary stay of Harrison’s transfer to Ocean Tides and, on February 5, 2009, this Court granted the state’s petition for a writ of certiorari, concluding that the chief judge’s ruling was not sustainable on the record before us. This Court noted that the record did not support the requisite factual and legal underpinnings for a transfer to community placement. We stayed the order and directed the Family Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and issue a new decision containing the necessary findings of fact and rulings of law sufficient to support the decision and allow for appellate review.
Shortly thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was held and a written decision ordering Harrison to community placement at Ocean Tides was produced. On March 12, 2009, this Court granted the state’s amended petition for writ of certiorari. Although Harrison was transferred to Ocean Tides, this Court directed that “the respondent shall be confined to the Ocean Tides premises and will not be eligible for any week-end passes or any other release.” Save for travel to medical appointments, Harrison has been confined to the premises at Ocean Tides for more than a year.
The manner in which this ease was handled is of concern; neither justice nor any party was served by the autocratic rulings of the trial justice. Harrison was removed from a rehabilitation program in which he was progressing and then confined to Ocean Tides for over a year because of the dearth of findings and summary rulings by the chief judge. Further, the state was prejudiced because within six months of reaching a negotiated plea disposition in a violent case, the state was confronted with a sua sponte order of community placement for this serious crime. The record discloses that the trial justice had no understanding of the offense to which Harrison pled, nor of the egregious circumstances under which it was committed. Additionally, he displayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the certification process and result.
The Family Court long has enjoyed a reputation for cutting-edge rehabilitative programs for youthful offenders, and its justices are among the most respected jurists in this state. However, that tradition was not reflected in this case. Hopefully what occurred in this instance will not be repeated.
Justice Indeglia took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal.

. This statement is contained in the state's memorandum in support of its petition for a writ of certiorari and stay of the order of transfer. We are confronted with a scant record of the facts underlying this serious felony crime. However, the juvenile sex offender evaluation report that was ordered by the Family Court and prepared by a clinical social worker set forth the factual allegations of this sexual assault; suffice it to say, this was a serious felony.