Court Opinion

ID: 9810521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:52:24.601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:59.326086
License: Public Domain

CoNNOR, J.,
dissenting: I regret that I cannot concur in the opinion of the majority of the Court in this case. This Court hag uniformly held, beginning with the case of Davidson v. Alexander, 84 N. C., 621, that a judgment confessed pursuant to the provision of section 803 of the Revisal is invalid unless the requirements of the statute be strictly complied with. I do not think that, tested by what is said in that case, and every other decision of the Court which follows and approves it, the record before us is in accordance with the statutory requirement, that it must state concisely the facts out of which the indebtedness arose. We have in this case a statement “that the amount is partly due from defendant to plaintiffs for bills of goods bought from plaintiffs by the defendant and received by him during the time elapsing be*358tween 1 January, 1896, and October, 1896, and tbat the amount of $823.15 is part for bills of groceries bought in the time named.”
There is a painful uncertainty in respect to the facts out of which the alleged indebtedness arose. It is said that it is “partly due” and that the amount is “part for bills of groceries.” The very pertinent inquiry arose, What part of it is due for goods bought and what part is for bills of groceries ? There is nothing in the statement which gives the slightest response to this inquiry. As was said by Ruffin, J., in Davidson v. Alexander, supra, “The object of the statute in this is to protect the other creditors of the debtor; to enable them not only to see the extent of Ms liabilities, but to test the tona fides of this particular debt to which he is giving a preference; and that they may have full opportunity to do this, the parties are commanded to spread upon the record specifically the circumstances and business transactions out of which it originated.. A mere statement that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in a sum certain arising from the acceptance of a draft, of which the following is a copy, etc., falls far short of the demands of the statute.” The language of the learned Justice is applicable to the record in this case. “Compared with these requirements, how meager is the information as to the consideration of the debt and the transaction out of which it grew, is the statement of the debtor when confessing the judgment under consideration.” What is there in this statement of facts which would enable a creditor to institute an investigation to ascertain the tona fides of the debt? He is told that the amount for which judgment is confessed is “partly due” and is “part for” bills of groceries, etc. He would seek in vain for any information given him by the record by which he would be enabled to test the validity of the judgment. This Court has with absolute uniformity applied the principle ánnounced in *359Davidson v. Alexander, supra. In Davenport v. Leary, 95 N. C., 203, the judgment was declared void because the confession of judgment did not embrace the account upon which it was based.
In Smith v. Smith, 111 N. C., 348, in which all the cases are reviewed, it is said, referring to the section of The Code in question: “The proceeding is in derogation of common right, and, to prevent the perpetration of fraud in such cases, that section requires that the consideration be stated and that it appear that the amount for which the judgment is confessed is justly due. If the statutory requirements are not complied with the judgment is irregular and void because of a want of jurisdiction in the Court to render judgment, which is apparent on the face of the proceedings. * * * In the absence of such statement, or the statement at least of facts showing that the debt was still due, the judgment was properly held void, for without compliance with the statute on the face of the proceeding the Court had no jurisdiction to enter up the judgmentD
I cannot concur in the suggestion that any estoppel can arise against the parties to the judgment, because it is absolutely void, as the Court is without jurisdiction; hence, whenever it is called to the attention of the Court and any relief asked upon it, the application should be declined. "While it may be conceded that leave to issue execution would not affect the rights of creditors to attack the judgment, it is at' least a recognition of its validity which should not be had. In my opinion, there is no • judgment upon which the Court can direct execution to issue.
Walker, L, concurs in this dissenting opinion.