Court Opinion

ID: 9778410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:03:42.183507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:08.501829
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to the majority’s holding that the evidence in the present case affirmatively links the appellant to the minuscule amount of heroin in question.
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Damron v. State, 570 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) from the present case is tenuous at best. In Damron, we sustained an insufficiency of evidence contention on facts closely analogous to the present case for the following reasons:
“In the instant case the appellant was (1) not at the place searched at the time of the search,1 and (2) there were other persons present at the time of the search and shown to be living there so appellant was not in exclusive possession, (3) the marihuana was found in a closet in a bedroom without any showing it was appellant’s bedroom or the only bedroom in the house and no showing of appellant’s personal belongings in the closet or bedroom or even the observation of any men’s clothing, etc., and (4) appellant was not found in possession of any contraband at the time of arrest nor (5) was he under the influence of any narcotic and (6) he did not make any incriminating statements at the time of arrest.” Ibid, at 936.
In the present case, appellant had been living at the house in question for approximately four months with his wife and children, the number and ages of which are not reflected by the record. The house was furnished when it was rented and the utilities were connected in the name of appellant’s wife. On the night in question, appellant consented to the search and made no incriminating statements at that time. The other members of appellant’s family were also present when the search was conducted. The closet in which the heroin was found contained men’s as well as women’s clothing and a set of barbells, none of which was identified as belonging to the appellant. There was no showing that the bedroom in which the closet was located was the appellant’s bedroom or the only bedroom in the house. No contraband was found on appellant’s person at the time the search was conducted, nor was he at that time under the influence of narcotics.
The majority distinguishes the present case from Damron by saying that “In the instant case, clothing and a large amount of cash belonging to appellant were found in the closet. Appellant also admitted that the lactose was his. Unlike Damron, Mendoza was directly linked to the closet.” (Emphasis supplied.) This reasoning is not *399sound. The appellant must be affirmatively linked to the contraband itself rather than the immediate area in which it was found. Where an accused is not in exclusive possession of the premises where the contraband is found, it cannot be concluded that he had knowledge of the narcotic and had control of it unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the narcotics. Damron v. State, supra. See also Williams v. State, 521 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
In light of the circumstances of the present case and for the reasons announced in Damron, supra, I would conclude that the evidence is insufficient to prove that appellant knowingly possessed heroin as alleged in the indictment. Guitierrez v. State, 533 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Woods v. State, 533 S.W.2d 16 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and cases there cited.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction should be set aside and reformed to show an acquittal. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

. Unlike the majority, I fail to perceive the significance of this distinguishing factor under the facts of the present case.