Court Opinion

ID: 9959751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:02:55.605251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:52.291612
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                   STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D22-1603
                 LT Case No. 2019-CF-003146-A
                 _____________________________

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellant,

    v.

JAMES PAUL AVERY,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County.
Heidi Davis, Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Daniel
Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellant.

Blair Jackson, of Law Office of Corey I. Cohen & Associates,
Orlando, for Appellee.

                         April 12, 2024

PRATT, J.

    The State appeals James Paul Avery’s sentence, contending
that the trial court’s downward departure was not supported by
competent, substantial evidence. We agree.
                                I.

     The State charged Avery with 26 counts of possession of child
pornography and one count of promoting a sexual performance by
a child. Avery entered an open plea to all the charges. Soon
thereafter, a psychologist evaluated him and produced a written
report. The psychologist’s evaluation consisted of a clinical
interview, a review of documents, a mental status exam, and a
sexual violence risk assessment.

     The psychologist reported that Avery denied ever having been
Baker Acted or admitted for inpatient psychiatric hospitalization,
that he denied a family history of mental health issues, and that
he self-reported that he suffered from depression. Her evaluation
stated that Avery admitted to an addiction to adult pornography
beginning in 2011, and she found that he was at low risk of
recidivism. Most pertinent here, the report listed the following as
“diagnostic impressions”: “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,” “Major
Depressive Disorder,” and “Alcohol Use Disorder, in remission.”
The report stated that Avery “has had a history of mental health
issues including Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Major
Depressive Disorder” and “has just recently initiated mental
health treatment.” However, the report does not specify whether
these mental health issues were discovered by reviewing
documentation of past diagnoses by other professionals, were
instead the result of the psychologist’s own independent diagnoses,
or were instead self-diagnoses reported by Avery himself. The
evaluation went on to recommend that Avery continue
participating in mental health treatment, that he receive “possible
medication management to address his mental health issues and
provide guidance in setting appropriate interpersonal and sexual
boundaries,” and that he attend “AA and work[ ] with a sponsor.”

     On June 20, 2022, the court held the sentencing hearing. The
court began by noting that the court file contained a letter from
Avery’s brother, the psychologist’s evaluation, and the Department
of Corrections’ pre-sentence investigation report. The court heard
testimony from several defense witnesses, who generally testified
that Avery was hardworking, was devoted to his family, and had
quit drinking, smoking, and swearing. Avery’s wife also testified
that he had worked in Afghanistan as a contractor, and that

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experience—along with prior military service—made him nervous
in loud, crowded places. She also testified that she believed Avery
suffered from PTSD resulting from an abusive childhood.

    Avery then allocuted. He expressed remorse for his crimes. He
then testified that he grew up in a physically abusive, broken
home, and that he was receiving counseling for those childhood
experiences. He stated that his smoking, drinking, and
pornography habits developed during his military service. He also
described his failed first marriage and his dangerous work as a
contractor in Afghanistan, and he indicated that he had developed
a pornography addiction by the time he left Afghanistan. He then
described various further hardships he endured and testified that
he began overcoming his addictions through the support of family
and a counselor. On redirect, Avery admitted that he has not been
formally diagnosed “with PTSD or anything like that,” but that he
personally believes he suffers from PTSD.

     Avery’s guidelines score was 343.5 months of incarceration.
The defense argued for a downward departure sentence due to
Avery’s substance abuse issues and pornography addiction,
contending that he “required specialized treatment for a mental
disorder.” The State opposed a downward departure, observing
that Avery has never been diagnosed with PTSD or depression,
and that to qualify for a downward departure, he needs to suffer
from a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or
addiction and he must be amenable to treatment. It argued that
because alcohol use is substance abuse and pornography is
addiction, Avery could not meet his burden to qualify for the
downward departure.

     The court noted that Avery’s offenses carried stiff statutory
penalties, “and without a reason for a departure, I really don’t have
much.” The court further observed that, “I’ve got your testimony
saying you have never been diagnosed with PTSD,” and while the
psychologist indicated that Avery “has had a history of mental
health issues, including post-traumatic stress disorder and major
depressive disorder,” the court stated, “I don’t know where she got
that information unless it was from you.”

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     Before pronouncing sentence, the court clarified the basis for
the defense’s downward-departure request: “[T]he basis for the
downward departure is the specialized treatment for a mental
disorder. Are you considering the PTSD or arguing the self-
diagnosed PTSD is the mental disorder?” Avery’s counsel
responded: “Yes, Your Honor. And . . . also the fact that” the
psychologist “indicated—I know it was rather general, but just
mental health issues. And the fact that I’m not aware of any
treatment that he could receive in the department of corrections
for that specifically.”

     The court then sentenced Avery to a downward-departure
sentence of 10 years in prison, followed by 10 years of supervised
probation, the first two years of which would be community
control, Level 2. Regarding the basis for the downward departure,
the court stated: “[B]ased on this evaluation from [the
psychologist], and the state has agreed to it coming in, your
childhood, the active duty that you’ve served, this doctor’s
recognition of post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive
disorder, I am finding that that is a basis for a downward
departure.”

    The State made a contemporaneous objection on the record. It
then appealed.

                                II.

     “A trial court may impose a downward departure from the
lowest possible sentence only if there are circumstances or factors
to support the departure; a trial court may not impose a downward
departure in the absence of such circumstances or factors.” State
v. Sawyer, 350 So. 3d 427, 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (citing
§§ 921.0024(2), 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (2021)). The defendant
bears the burden “to establish that a valid reason for a departure
exists.” Id.

     Whether a downward departure sentence was properly
imposed is a mixed question of law and fact that we subject to a
“two-pronged analysis.” Id. “First, we must determine whether the
trial court applied the correct rule of law and whether such
application is supported by competent, substantial evidence.” Id.

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“Second, if the downward departure is supported by competent,
substantial evidence, we must ‘decide whether the trial court
[abused its discretion] in determining that the downward
departure sentence was the best sentencing option for the
defendant.’” Id. at 428–29 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 224 So. 3d 877, 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)). As to the first
prong, to establish his qualification for a downward departure,
Avery bore the burden to show that he “requires specialized
treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance
abuse or addiction” and that he “is amenable to treatment.”
§ 921.0026(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2022).

     On this record, the evidence was insufficient to support a
downward departure sentence under section 921.0026(2)(d). First,
to the extent that Avery presented evidence of alcohol abuse and
pornography addiction, that evidence was irrelevant; the statute
requires a showing of a mental disorder “that is unrelated to
substance abuse or addiction.” Id.; see also id. § 921.0026(2)(m).
Second, to the extent that Avery stated that he believes he suffers
from PTSD and depression, we have held that a defendant’s self-
report of a mental disorder does not constitute competent,
substantial evidence. See Sawyer, 350 So. 3d at 429. Third, to the
extent that Avery’s wife testified that he suffered from PTSD due
to childhood trauma, her testimony likewise did not indicate any
past diagnoses and instead appears to have rested on what Avery
had told her about his past.

     Fourth, to the extent that the psychologist reported that
Avery has a history of mental health issues including PTSD and
depression, the passage appears to recite Avery’s own self-
reporting. The report does not specify the source of the
information, cites no documentation of past diagnoses, and does
not state that the psychologist made any full, formal diagnoses
herself; her findings were listed as only “diagnostic impressions.”
And any lack of clarity about the basis for her report—including
the weight that her diagnostic impressions should carry—was
removed by Avery’s testimony and the trial court’s findings. Avery
conceded at sentencing that he had never been diagnosed “with
PTSD or anything like that,” but rather only personally believes
he suffers from it. See State v. McElroy, 145 So. 3d 866, 869 (Fla.
2d DCA 2014) (reversing a downward departure sentence where

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the defendant “offered no proof of a formal diagnosis made by a
physician”). And the court inferred from Avery’s testimony, “I don’t
know where [the psychologist] got that information unless it was
from you.” This amounts to a finding by the trial court that the
psychologist did not make any independent, formal diagnoses, but
instead merely recited Avery’s self-reports. Given that finding, the
trial court could not then rely on the report for competent,
substantial evidence of a mental disorder.

     Even assuming that Avery had presented competent,
substantial evidence that he suffers from a mental disorder
unrelated to substance abuse or addiction, he failed to present
sufficient evidence that the disorder requires specialized
treatment to which he is amenable. Avery testified that he has
seen a counselor to address his substance abuse, addictions, and
childhood trauma, but he did not testify that the counseling was
treatment for PTSD, major depressive disorder, or any other
mental disorder, much less that the counseling has a reasonable
prospect of successfully treating the disorder. See State v. Schuler,
268 So. 3d 242, 245 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (citing Green v. State, 257
So. 3d 474, 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)). Indeed, he testified that he
sought out counseling on his own, rather than at the behest of a
medical professional. As for the psychologist’s report, it lacked any
specificity on the nature of the treatment that Avery should
receive, stating only that he should “continue to participate in
mental health treatment and possible medication management to
address his mental health issues and provide guidance in setting
appropriate interpersonal and sexual boundaries.” And even
putting aside its lack of specificity, the report does not opine that
any specialized treatment has a reasonable possibility of
successfully treating a mental disorder. See id. (defining
amenability to treatment).

     In sum, the trial court did not have before it competent,
substantial evidence to justify a downward departure under
section 921.0026(2)(d).
                              III.

    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Avery’s sentence and
remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings
according to the remand instructions for open-plea resentencings

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set forth in McElroy. See 145 So. 3d at 870 (citing Jackson v. State,
64 So. 3d 90, 93 (Fla. 2011); State v. Sahadeo, 890 So. 2d 464, 465
(Fla. 2d DCA 2004)). Specifically, on remand, the trial court must
conduct a de novo resentencing hearing, and because Avery
entered an open plea, he is not entitled to withdraw his plea. Id.
However, “nothing within the [Criminal Punishment Code]
precludes the imposition of a downward departure sentence on
resentencing following remand” so long as any such downward
departure sentence “is supported by valid grounds.” Jackson, 64
So. 3d at 93.

    VACATED and REMANDED for Further Proceedings.

EDWARDS, C.J., and SOUD, J., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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