Court Opinion

ID: 9957513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 16:10:36.67803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:23.003081
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion P3
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                 RAMEL W. ORTIZ,                                           No. 85887
                 Appellant,
                 vs.
                 THE STATE OF NEVADA,                                       FILED
                 Respondent.
                                                                            APR 0 4 2024
                                                                          EL   4    H A. DROWN
                                                                       CLE         UP -
                                                                                   •
                                                                      BY
                                                                           C iEF DEPUTY CLERK

                            Appeal from a district court order denying a postconviction
                petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
                County; Michelle Leavitt, Judge.
                            Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with
                instructions.

                Steven. S. Owens, LLC, and Steven S. Owens, Henderson,
                for Appellant.

                Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
                Attorney, and Alexander Chen, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
                County,
                for Respondent.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, LEE, and BELL, JJ.

                                                 OPINION
                By the Court, BELL, J.:
                            Appellant Ramel Ortiz was convicted of six counts of sexual
                assault and other felonies after he broke into victim M.P.'s house and forced
                M.P. to engage in multiple sexual acts. Four of the sexual assault counts
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                   arose from an incident during which Ortiz subjected M.P. to intercourse in
                   different sexual positions. In this opinion, we consider whether appellate
                   counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the
                   sufficiency of the evidence to support multiple sexual assault convictions.
                                Nevada precedent provides that a change in sexual position
                   alone is insufficient to show that the resulting sexual acts constitute more
                   than one sexual assault offense. Appellate counsel applied that precedent
                   to unsuccessfully challenge jury instructions but failed to challenge the
                   multiple convictions for the same incident. We conclude that appellate
                   counsel's omission of a sufficiency challenge to the multiple convictions fell
                   below an objective standard of reasonableness. Because the sufficiency
                   challenge stood a reasonable probability of success had it been raised on
                   appeal from the judgment of conviction, we further conclude that Ortiz was
                   prejudiced by appellate counsel's omission of that challenge. The district
                   court erred in denying Ortiz's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas
                   corpus with respect to this ineffective-assistance claim. We reverse in part
                   and remand for the district court to vacate three of Ortiz's sexual assault
                   convictions. Because Ortiz's remaining claims lack merit, we affirm the
                   district court's decision as to those claims.
                                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTOR Y
                               During the early morning hours of March 9, 2017, Ortiz entered
                   M.P.'s home. When Ortiz encountered M.P. in a hallway, Ortiz pointed a
                   gun at M.P.'s back and began leading her through the house. Ortiz claimed
                   to be searching for a phone. Ortiz then demanded that M.P. engage in
                   various sexual acts with him. M.P. informed Ortiz that her adult daughter,
                   E.C., would be returning horne from work soon. Ortiz reassured M.P. that
                   E.C. would not be harmed if M.P. complied with Ortiz's demands. Ortiz led
                   M.P. into her bedroom and forced her to engage in vaginal intercourse with
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                him, moving into multiple sexual positions during the encounter. Ortiz
                eventually allowed M.P. to leave the bedroom but perpetrated additional

                offenses in other locations in the horne. When E.C. returned from work,
                M.P. offered Ortiz the keys to E.C.'s car. M.P. encouraged Ortiz to take the
                car and leave. Ortiz declined, stating that all three of them would be leaving

                together. Ortiz asked E.C. for a pair of socks, which E.C. retrieved from her
                room and gave to him.
                            Ultimately, M.P. and E.C. escaped by running outside and
                driving to safety. When police arrived, Ortiz was no longer present. Police
                discovered items had been taken from the home, including jewelry and
                E.C.'s socks. In the home, police recovered two pairs of orange boxer shorts

                and a pair of orange socks. These items bore the initials of the Clark County
                Detention Center (CCDC). DNA testing linked one of the pairs of boxer
                shorts to Ortiz, who had been released from CCDC the night before after an
                unrelated arrest.
                            A jury found Ortiz guilty of burglary, first- and second-degree
                kidnapping, robbery, assault, six counts of sexual assault, and three counts
                of open or gross lewdness.      The district court sentenced Ortiz to an
                aggregate prison term of twenty-five years to life. Ortiz appealed, and this
                court affirmed the convictions. Ortiz v. State, No. 78996, 2021 WL 1085375
                (Nev. Mar. 19, 2021) (Order of Affirmance).      Ortiz subsequently filed a
                timely postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging multiple
                instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Postconviction counsel filed a
                supplemental brief and waived an evidentiary hearing.              Following
                argument, the district court denied the petition.

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                                                DISCUSSION
                Ineffective assistance of counsel
                            Ortiz argues that the district court erred in denying multiple
                claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.            To
                demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that
                counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
                and that the prejudice from the deficient performance creates a reasonable
                probability that there would have been a different outcome absent counsel's
                errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see also
                Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the
                Strickland test); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1113-
                14 (1996) (applying the Stricklan,d test to claims of ineffective assistance of
                appellate counsel). For purposes of the deficiency prong, counsel is strongly
                presumed to have provided adequate assistance and exercised reasonable
                professional judgment in all significant decisions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
                690. "With respect to the prejudice prong, la] reasonable probability is a
                probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Johnson v.
                State, 133 Nev. 571, 576, 402 P.3d 1266, 1273 (2017) (alteration in original)
                (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Both components of the inquiry must
                be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, and the petitioner must demonstrate
                the underlying facts of his or her claims by a preponderance of the evidence,
                Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We defer to
                the district court's factual findings that are supported by substantial
                evidence and not clearly wrong but review its application of the law to those
                facts de novo. Lader 1). Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166
                (2005).

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                Appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the
                sufficiency of the evidence to support multiple counts of sexual assault
                arising from a single encounter
                             Ortiz argues that appellate counsel should have challenged the
                sufficiency of the evidence to support the sexual assault convictions in
                counts 4-7.1 Specifically, Ortiz asserts that the sexual acts charged in these
                counts, all of which pertained to the conduct in M.P.'s bedroom, occurred
                during a single sexual encounter, and M.P.'s testimony was insufficient to
                support a finding of guilt as to more than one count of sexual assault.
                According to Ortiz, had appellate counsel raised this issue on direct appeal,
                three of the sexual assault convictions would have been reversed.
                             Nevada law provides that a person commits sexual assault
                when      the    person     "[s]ubjects    another     person     to    sexual
                penetration... against the will of the victim."           NRS 200.366(1)(a).
                "[S]eparate and distinct acts of sexual assault may be charged as separate
                counts and result in separate convictions 'even though the acts were the
                result of a single encounter and all occurred within a relatively short time."

                Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 651, 119 P.3d 1225, 1234 (2005) (quoting
                Wright v. State, 106 Nev. 647, 650, 799 P.2d 548, 549-50 (1990)).          For
                example, where acts of sexual assault occurring during a single encounter
                involve different types of penetration, this court has held that each different
                type of penetration necessarily constitutes a separate and distinct sexual
                offense. See, e.g., Peck v. State, 116 Nev. 840, 848-49, 7 P.3d 470, 475 (2000)
                (affirming two counts of sexual assault where the defendant digitally

                       1Ortiz was convicted of two other counts of sexual assault (counts 9
                and 10) occurring in a separate area of M.P.'s home but does not argue that
                appellate counsel should have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to
                support these convictions.
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                penetrated the victim, then forcibly engaged her in sexual intercourse),
                overruled on other grounds by Ro.sas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258, 1266, 147 P.3d
                1101, 1107 (2006), abrogated on other grounds by Alotaibi v. State, 133 Nev.
                650, 404 P.3d 761 (2017); Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103, 113, 867 P.2d
                1136, 1143 (1994) (upholding four counts of sexual assault for four methods
                of penetration occurring during a single attack), holding modified on other
                grounds by Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 275-76, 130 P.3d 176, 181
                (2006); Deeds v. State, 97 Nev. 216, 216-17, 626 P.2d 271, 272 (1981)
                (upholding two sexual assault convictions for forced oral and vaginal
                penetration during a single encounter); Wicker v. State, 95 Nev. 804, 806,
                603 P.2d 265, 266-67 (1979) (holding that vaginal, oral, and anal

                penetration constituted separate offenses, despite the acts occurring close
                in time to each other).
                            By contrast, when the acts of sexual assault occurring during a
                single encounter involve the same type of penetration, the acts support only
                one sexual assault conviction absent an interruption and subsequent
                reinitiation of activity. The decision in Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113,
                734 P.2d 705 (1987), is illustrative. There, this court reviewed the propriety
                of two sexual assault convictions where the defendant lubricated the
                victim's vaginal area, removed his hand to add more lubricant, then
                returned and penetrated her vagina with his finger. See id. at 120, 734 P.2d
                at 709-10. This court concluded that subjecting the defendant to two sexual
                assault convictions under these circumstances was "not sustainable," as it
                would result in "a hypertechnical division of what was essentially a single
                act." Id. at 121, 734 P.2d at 710. As this court later explained, "only one
                sexual assault occurred [because the defendant's] actions were continuous

                and did not stop between the different acts." Peck, 116 Nev. at 848, 7 P.3d
                at 475; cf. Wright, 106 Nev. at 650, 799 P.2d at 549-50 (holding that separate
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                          convictions for attempted and completed sexual assault were warranted
                          because, before the completed offense, appellant briefly "stopped and waited

                          while a car passed"). Thus, our precedent makes clear that multiple acts of
                          the same type of penetration, even when performed in multiple sexual
                          positions, are not separate and distinct sexual assaults when the encounter
                          is continuous and there is no break or interruption between the acts. This
                          court has not relied on instances of penetration alone to determine how
                          many distinct acts have been proven. See Townsend, 103 Nev. at 121, 734
                          P.2d at 710.
                                         On direct appeal, Ortiz's appellate counsel identified the
                          multiple sexual assault counts arising from the encounter in M.P.'s bedroom
                          as a potential source of error. Specifically, appellate counsel unsuccessfully

                          argued that the trial court erred by providing incorrect instructions and
                          refusing to proffer Ortiz's requested instructions regarding conditions
                          warranting multiple sexual assault convictions.        As support for that
                          instructional-error argument, appellate counsel relied on Townsend. After
                          considering the instructional-error argument, this court concluded that the
                          trial court did not abuse its discretion because the given instructions
                          accurately reflected the law and generally encompassed Ortiz's requested
                          instructions. See Ortiz, 2021 WL 1085375, at *2.
                                         Despite focusing on Townsend and observing in the opening
                          brief that "[s]eparate convictions for one continuous course of conduct
                          cannot stand," appellate counsel failed to raise a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
                          challenge.     And notably, the fact that appellate counsel identified the
                          relevant authority but failed to make the argument that most logically
                          flowed from it cannot be explained by the size limit placed on appellate
                          briefs given that the opening brief fell approximately 2,000 words short of
                          that limit. See NRAP 32(a)(7)(A)(ii) (setting forth type-volume limitation
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                for opening brief in a noncapital case). In these circumstances, we conclude
                that appellate counsel's omission of the sufficiency challenge based on
                Townsend and other similar cases fell below an objective standard of
                reasonableness.
                             Whether appellate counsel's deficient performance in this
                respect prejudiced Ortiz depends on the likelihood that the omitted
                sufficiency challenge would have succeeded on appeal. In that context, this
                court's inquiry on direct appeal would have been "whether, after viewing
                the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
                of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
                reasonable doubt." Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d
                1378, 1380 (1998) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
                             Here, M.P. testified that Ortiz penetrated her vagina with his
                penis in four sexual positions, all occurring on or next to her bed. M.P.
                thought Ortiz removed and then reinserted his penis when moving from one
                position to another, but she could not be sure and was unable to recall any
                details.    A victim in a sexual assault case must testify with some
                particularity about the incident and there must be some reliable indicia that
                the number of acts charged actually occurred. LaPierre v. State, 108 Nev.
                528, 531, 836 P.2d 56, 58 (1992). M.P.'s testimony did not reveal the amount
                of time that passed between positions, if any, or how the transitions
                occurred.    She could not remember any specific events, actions, or
                statements that would tend to show interruption in Ortiz's conduct. Even
                viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, our review of
                the record reveals that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
                reasonable doubt that each sexual position. amounted to a separate and
                distinct sexual act. We therefore conclude that Ortiz has demonstrated that
                but for appellate counsel's omission, there is a reasonable probability that
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                the result on direct appeal would have been different. See Kirksey, 112 Nev.
                at 998, 923 P.2d at 1114; see also LaPierre, 108 Nev. at 531, 836 P.2d at 58

                (vacating five counts of sexual assault on appeal where there was
                insufficient evidence to support a finding that the number of acts charged
                actually occurred). Accordingly, Ortiz has established that the district court

                erred in denying this claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
                            The district court also erred in determining that Ortiz waived
                this claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. The appellate-counsel claim
                could not have been raised on direct appeal, and the sufficiency challenge is
                properly considered in the context of that ineffective-assistance claim even
                if an independent claim based on the sufficiency challenge would be subject
                to procedural bars. Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 883, 34 P.3d 519, 535
                (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423
                n.12, 423 P.3d 1084, 1097 n.12 (2018).
                The remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lack merit
                            We have carefully considered the remaining ineffective-
                assistance-of-counsel claims raised in this appeal and conclude each lacks
                merit.
                            Ortiz argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
                by failing to challenge the same sexual assault convictions. While it is
                possible trial counsel was also ineffective, Ortiz's reply brief specifically
                disavows any ineffectiveness claim for failure of trial counsel to challenge
                the charging document. Ortiz did not articulate what trial counsel should
                have done. As a result, we conclude that Ortiz failed to establish either
                deficient performance or prejudice, and the district court properly denied
                this claim with respect to trial counsel.
                            Ortiz also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for reserving
                an opening statement at the beginning of trial and then not giving the
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                statement after the State rested its case. According to Ortiz, the lack of an
                opening statement prevented jurors from adequately considering the
                defense theory of the case. Even assuming trial counsel should have given
                an opening statement, Ortiz has failed to demonstrate prejudice. Ortiz
                testified at trial, stating that the encounter with M.P. was consensual.
                Furthermore, trial counsel presented a clear and organized closing
                argument, explaining Ortiz's defense and highlighting inconsistencies that
                could undermine the victims' credibility. Ortiz has not shown a reasonable
                probability of a different outcome at trial had counsel made an opening
                statement to outline Ortiz's case. See Watters v. State, 129 Nev. 886, 890-
                91, 313 P.3d 243, 247 (2013) (explaining that opening statements merely
                outline what evidence counsel expects to present); State v. Olivieri, 49 Nev.
                75, 77-78, 236 P. 1100, 1101 (1925) (explaining that opening statements "are
                not evidence ... and cannot be so considered by the jury").        Thus, we
                conclude that the district court did not err in denying this ineffective-
                assistance claim.
                            Next, Ortiz asserts that trial counsel should not have stipulated
                that the orange jail-issued clothing found in M.P.'s home was Ortiz's
                because doing so exposed jurors to evidence of uncharged bad acts stemming
                from an unrelated arrest.      Ortiz has failed to demonstrate deficient
                performance. Trial counsel's stipulation was not objectively unreasonable
                given Ortiz's DNA on the clothing. Additionally, the stipulation prevented
                the State from offering additional evidence about Ortiz's previous arrest
                and time in custody to link Ortiz to the clothing.
                            Likewise, Ortiz has failed to show prejudice for two reasons.
                First, any reference to the clothing having come from the Clark County
                Detention Center was redacted, and Ortiz failed to allege sufficient facts
                demonstrating that the jurors would infer the clothing was jail-issued based
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                solely on its color. Second, Ortiz took the stand and testified about the
                unrelated arrest. Ortiz further contends that by stipulating to ownership
                of both pairs of boxer shorts, rather than only the one containing Ortiz's
                DNA, trial counsel could not argue that the second pair of shorts pointed to
                an alternate suspect. Ortiz fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability
                that this argument would have changed the outcome of the trial given the
                implausibility of this theory and lack of evidence corroborating the presence
                of another unidentified person in M.P.'s home. Therefore, we conclude that
                the district court did not err in denying this ineffective-assistance claim.
                            To the extent that Ortiz contends trial counsel was deficient for
                failing to prepare him to testify, this argument is belied by the record. Ortiz
                testified during cross-examination to meeting with counsel three to four
                times to prepare the testimony.
                            Additionally, Ortiz contends that trial and appellate counsel
                should have challenged the testimony of M.P.'s ex-husband as improper
                victim-impact testimony. Ortiz has not shown deficient performance given
                that trial counsel objected to the ex-husband's testimony about the
                breakdown of his marriage to M.P., which the district court overruled.
                Given the overruling of the objection, Ortiz has not shown counsel could
                have successfully challenged the testimony with a pretrial motion or
                additional objection. See Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708,
                711 (1978) (holding that counsel is not deficient for failing to make futile
                motions). Ortiz's contention that counsel should have objected to the ex-
                husband's testimony as improperly vouching for M.P.'s credibility was also
                without merit. The ex-husband's explanation that the marriage ended due
                to his inability to work through M.P. being sexually assaulted did not
                directly state any opinion about the truth of M.P.'s testimony. See Farmer
                v. State, 133 Nev. 693, 705, 405 P.3d 114, 125 (2017) (explaining that
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                    impermissible vouching occurs when a witness "testif[ies] as to the
                    truthfulness of another witness" (quoting Perez v. State, 129 Nev. 850, 861,

                    313 P.3d 862, 870 (2013))). Therefore, neither trial nor appellate counsel
                    failed to raise a meritorious issue. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706,
                    137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006) ("[C]ounsel need not lodge futile objections to
                    avoid ineffective assistance of counsel claims."). Further, Ortiz has failed
                    to demonstrate prejudice arising from the jury's knowledge of M.P.'s
                    divorce, particularly given the nature of the offenses and overwhelming
                    evidence of guilt presented at trial. Therefore, we conclude that the district
                    court did not err in denying this ineffective-assistance claim.
                                Finally, Ortiz asserts that trial and appellate counsel should
                    have challenged the conviction for second-degree kidnapping of E.C. as
                    incidental to the robbery conviction. At trial, the evidence showed that M.P.
                    encouraged Ortiz to take E.C.'s car, but he declined. According to M.P.,
                    Ortiz stated, "no, the three of us are going to go." Ortiz's statement that
                    M.P. and E.C. would be leaving with him, after having shown both victims
                    that he had a gun, caused M.P. and E.C. to reasonably believe they could
                    not freely leave their home. A short time later, Ortiz asked E.C. for a pair
                    of socks, which she retrieved from her room and gave to him. The detention
                    of E.G., so that Ortiz could take her with him when he left the residence,
                    was not inherent to the robbery. See Mendoza, 122 Nev. at 275, 130 P.3d at
                    181 (holding that convictions for both robbery and kidnapping arising from
                    the same course of conduct may be sustained where "any movement or
                    restraint [stands] alone with independent significance from the act of
                    robbery itself'). Thus, the evidence supported the dual convictions, and
                    Ortiz has not shown that trial or appellate counsel omitted a meritorious
                    issue. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying
                    this ineffective-assistance claim.
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                                              CONCLUSION
                             By only eliciting testimony that established one type of sexual

                penetration on and near the victim's bed, without additional detail, the
                State failed to present evidence from which a rational juror could have
                found four separate and distinct acts of sexual assault. Because appellate

                counsel identified the possibility of error relating to these multiple
                convictions but failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
                them on direct appeal, we conclude that counsel's performance fell below an
                objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced Ortiz. We conclude
                that Ortiz's other claims lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse
                in part, and remand with instructions to grant the petition in part and to
                vacate the convictions of sexual assault imposed in counts 5-7.

                                                                                    J.
                                                     Bell

                We concur:

                      1444/11.4
                      6                         J.
                Stiglich

                Lee        6,4d                 J.

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