Court Opinion

ID: 9539872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:11:16.822441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:26.592819
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and concurring specially:
I concur in Part I and Part III (dismissal of the claim against Fire Chief Grimes). However, I concur only in the result in Part II which reverses the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against the owners, Tom and Gloria Fleming.
Plaintiff’s claim against the Flemings alleged three negligence theories: (1) breach of duty of reasonable care owed by a landlord to a tenant; (2) res ipsa loquitur; and (3) negligence per se — a violation of the Uniform Fire Code and/or I.C. § 6-320. The trial court granted summary judgment on all of the theories.
As to the res■ ipsa loquitur theory, the trial court noted that, “It is conceded by all parties that the cause of the fire has never been determined.” Accordingly, the trial court concluded that under our decision in Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615, 717 P.2d 1033 (1986), a claim based upon res ipsa loquitur will not stand. The majority opinion concurs in that conclusion, finding no basis for an inference of negligence merely from the fact that the fire occurred.
As to plaintiff’s assertion that the defendants were negligent per se for violation of the Uniform Fire Code, the trial court correctly concluded that the provisions of the Uniform Fire Code were not applicable to the Flemings’ premises, and therefore there is no basis for a negligence per se claim. The majority opinion agrees with the district court’s conclusion that the Uniform Fire Code does not apply to the building in question because it was constructed long before the fire codes came into existence, and therefore affirms the trial court’s dismissal on the negligence per se theory.
The majority reverses the trial court’s analysis of plaintiff’s first claim, i.e., that there is a material issue of fact over whether or not the Flemings, as landlords, breached a duty of reasonable care owed by a landlord to a tenant'under this Court’s decision in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984), and therefore remands that issue to the district court for a trial on that issue.
In Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984), this Court modified the common law rule that “a landlord is generally not liable to the tenant for any damage resulting from dangerous conditions existing at the time of the leasing,” in favor of a new “modern” rule which holds “that a landlord owes a duty to his tenants to exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances, and that it is for a jury to decide whether that duty was breached.” 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50. However, in order to prove a breach of duty a plaintiff still must come forward with some evidence that the landlord did not exercise reasonable care in order for the case to be submitted to the jury. Otherwise, in every landlord-tenant situation, regardless of how carefully the premises might have been constructed and maintained, and regardless of how reasonably the landlord may have acted, the plaintiff would be entitled to have the case submitted to a jury. Accordingly, a plaintiff must submit some evidence of unreasonableness in the landlord’s actions or a trial court properly should grant a landlord’s motion for summary judgment.
I write only to express my concern that today’s opinion might be misconstrued to hold that merely because premises are extremely old and not constructed to modem standards that a landlord is not acting reasonably in renting such premises to tenants. If that were the rule, landlords *534would virtually become insurers of any premises which did not meet current building codes. I do not believe that is the law in the State of Idaho or the policy set out in I.C. § 6-320.
Rather, the plaintiffs must introduce some evidence which a trial court can reasonably conclude would violate a landlord’s duty to the tenant. In the present case I believe the plaintiff has marginally done that. Most of the evidence contained in the affidavit of plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Howard, was not relevant to the issues. As the trial court correctly pointed out, Howard’s conclusions in his affidavit presupposed that the building was covered by the Uniform Fire Code, which it was not. Therefore, most of his affidavit and the conclusions contained therein were not admissible and could not be the basis of supporting the plaintiff’s claim. Nor could the fact that the room which the plaintiff’s decedent rented was at the end of a long hallway in and of itself constitute the basis of a claim. Unless we are prepared to state that all landlords are liable for injuries to tenants who lease premises which are not modern and not in compliance with all building codes, the old fashioned layout of a structure built in a different era cannot be the basis of a jury’s finding of unreasonableness.
However, in the present case, the failure of the landlord to install smoke detectors, which the affidavit of plaintiff’s expert Howard indicated could reasonably and inexpensively have given the plaintiff’s decedent advance warning of any fire, is sufficient in my view to raise an issue of fact over whether or not the landlord violated his duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment only as to Part II.