Court Opinion

ID: 9791538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:13:23.147657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:36.791837
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur and dissent. (1) Defendant’s claim,' of self-deiense was met by trial court. The majority opinion states: Defendant also argues that, “. [all] of the evidence pointed to . self-defense . . . ,” and that therefore there was insufficient evidence to imply malice. (Emphasis added). Defendant did not contend “there was insufficient evidence to imply malice.” As I read his claim, he contended that all of the evidence pointed to self-defense. Defendant’s motion at the close of the state’s case was that “ * * * the only evidence regarding what happened * * * is clearly that the first shot was based on self-defense, * * * there is nothing to rebut that, * * We have actually proved that there was a legal and justifiable excuse. The first one is self-defense. “Implied malice” is not an issue on self-defense. It is an essential element of murder. Self-defense is a defense known as excusable and justifiable homicide. To seek an acquittal of homicide by reason of self-defense, as a matter of law, the evidence must be sufficient to sustain a directed verdict for the defendant. The trial court decided the issue of self-defense was a question of fact for the jury. The trial court submitted the issue of self-defense to the jury. At least five instructions were given on this subject. The state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of second degree murder. In his defense, the defendant testified that he went to the Chiquita Bar to pay a bill and sell his gun. After some argument about playing pool, he started back to the liquor bar and the decedent, whom he had never seen before, hit him on the back of his head with a cue stick and made him stagger. When defendant turned around, decedent kicked him and “buckled” him, and hit him again on the side of the head. Defendant got his gun out and decedent came after him using some pretty nasty words about the gun. Defendant was scared and fired his first shot between decedent’s legs. Decedent kept coming. Defendant wanted to shoot again, but someone hit the defendant and he fell forward on his knees. He had an upset stomach and was dizzy and went to the rest room and threw up. He returned to the bar, had a drink of tequilla and waited until the police came. This testimony does not constitute self-defense. Defendant presented no testimony that he inflicted the fatal wound on the decedent. Even if he did, appellant’s defense was not believed by the jury. State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282, 286, 442 P.2d 594 (1968). I concur with the majority opinion on this matter. (2) Defendant was prejudicially denied his discovery rights. On March 5, 1973, the trial court ordered the district attorney to comply with the discovery provisions of Rule 27. The district attorney had 10 days to comply. Rule 27(d) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure [Section 41-23-27(d), N.M.S.A. 1953 (2nd Repl.Vol. 6, Supp.1973)]. The district attorney did not comply. The order provided for the district attorney (1) to proditce and permit the defendant to inspect objects which are within possession of the state which are intended for use by the state as evidence at the trial, “including, but not limited to, any firearms, bullets and vest.” The same day, a second order was entered that the district attorney release the firearms, bullets and vest to defendant’s attorney for the purpose of having experts hired by the defense to study and examine the same and make a report of their findings. (2) to produce a list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which the district attorney intends to call at the trial. On April 10, 1973, some 35 days later, on the morning of trial, defendant moved for a continuance under Rule 30 because he had not received the names of the witnesses, and had not been furnished the material evidence for inspection. This motion was renewed in a motion for a new trial. The motion was denied. The denial of the continuance, the denial of the motion for a new trial were reversible error. (a) Failure to prodtice state's witnesses. On the morning of trial, the court advised the jury of the names of witnesses the state may call and asked : Are any of these witnesses kin to any of you ladies and gentlemen ? There were some affirmative answers. The names of witnesses for the state not mentioned, but called on to testify, were Dr. James E. Saltz, Arthur L. White, a patrolman, Charles Dunn, an apprenticed embalmer, and James A. Porter, Jr., special agent for the F.B.I. This was grossly unfair to defendant. Furthermore, if the district attorney does not disclose all the names of witnesses he will call for trial, defendant loses his right to take depositions, prepare for cross-examination, and provide the defendant with adequate assistance of legal counsel. It is of no significance that witnesses at trial had previously testified in preliminary hearings, grand juries, or were those of whom he had knowledge who might testify if called. Defendant should not be forced at trial to meet the challenge of unreported witnesses in the field of battle for life. When the district attorney failed to comply with the court’s order and the court violated its own order by refusing to grant defendant a continuance or a new trial, substantial justice has lost its virtue. Of what value are our rules of criminal procedure if they can be flouted indiscriminately? “These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of criminal proceedings.” Rule 2. The commentary says: Rule 27 is “self-executing.” Upon request of the defendant, subject to protective order, the government must disclose its witnesses and evidence discoverable under Rule 27. (Emphasis added). In State v. Billington, 86 N.M. 44, 519 P.2d 140 (Ct.App.1974), we said: District attorneys should not have the right to “inadvertently” overlook disclosing important witnesses until the day before trial, the morning of trial, or during trial. Defendant was entitled to a continuance as a matter of law. The time has come once again to remind each district attorney that he has a duty, not to seek conviction alone by any means. He has a duty to give the defendant a fair trial. Trial judges have the same duty. In State v. Chambers, 86 N.M. 383, 524 P.2d 999, decided June 19, 1974, we quoted the following with approval: It is as much the duty of prosecuting attorneys to see that a person on trial is not deprived of any of his statutory or legal rights as it is to prosecute him for the crime with which he may be charged. * * * * * * Courts owe a duty to themselves, to the public, and to the legal profession. The due and orderly administration of justice, the honor of the legal profession, and the dignity of the court forbid such practice. Under Rules 27 and 28 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the state and the defendant have a reciprocal duty to disclose. “The essential constitutional basis from which this right and duty derive is the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 8 Moore’s Federal Practice. Rules of Criminal Procedure, § 16.-06. (b) Failure to produce material evidence. The district attorney failed to produce the “firearms, bullets and vest.” Each of these items were used to convict the defendant. The defendant did not have these items for purposes of having experts examine them. A complete failure by the district attorney to comply with the court’s orders denied the defendant pre-trial discovery. This case should be reversed and defendant should be granted a new trial. Otherwise, the rules of pre-trial discovery are redundant. They might as well be removed from the Rules of Criminal Procedure and dumped in the waste paper basket. I dissent on the failure of the district attorney to comply with the court’s orders on pre-trial discovery.