Court Opinion

ID: 9788957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:23:17.400465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:17.994366
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J., Dissenting.
A majority of this court, while divided in their reasons for so doing, today join in immunizing from state constitutional scrutiny a commercial residential landlord’s suppression of speech among its tenants. Guided by our precedents and the clear language of our state Constitution, I respectfully dissent.

Background

Plaintiff Golden Gateway Center (Golden Gateway) is landlord of a multibuilding commercial and residential apartment complex containing 1,254 residential units; defendant Golden Gateway Tenants Association (Tenants Association), formed in 1982, is a group of residential tenants in the complex. Golden Gateway incorporates by reference in each of its residential lease agreements certain “Building Standards.” Among these, at relevant times through June 1996, was a provision entitled “Soliciting,” which read, in its entirety: “Any soliciting within the building is absolutely forbidden. Should a solicitor appear, please notify the Owner so that appropriate action may be taken.”
From the time of its formation in 1982 until 1993, the Tenants Association periodically distributed a newsletter on or under the apartment doors of Golden Gateway’s residents. For these approximately 11 years, Golden *1044Gateway did not object to the Tenants Association’s leafleting. Golden Gateway, for its part, also distributed papers under residents’ doors (and posted them in common areas, such as the elevators), when such modes of communication served its management’s needs and interests.
In 1993, citing the Building Standards, Golden Gateway asked the Tenants Association to stop distributing newsletters at tenants’ doors. The Tenants Association refused, inter alia, on constitutional free speech grounds, and continued to distribute its newsletters.
In 1996, shortly after the Tenants Association filed a lawsuit against Golden Gateway opposing “hotelization” of the complex and distributed some leaflets critical of Golden Gateway’s management, Golden Gateway demanded that the Tenants Association cease “dissemination of politically based material.” When the Tenants Association refused, Golden Gateway revised its Building Standards expressly to forbid all “leafleting,” stating that any such within the building “is absolutely forbidden” other than “on the bulletin boards located in the laundry rooms” or at the specific request of a tenant. The Tenants Association continued its distribution practices, and Golden Gateway ultimately sought the injunction that is the subject of this litigation. The Tenants Association cross-complained, seeking a declaration that it could continue leafleting at tenants’ doors.
The trial court preliminarily enjoined the Tenants Association from leafleting. After trial, however, the court dissolved the injunction, ruling that the Tenants Association had a contractual right to distribute its newsletter at tenants’ doors and on laundry room bulletin boards. The Court of Appeal reversed, and we granted review on petition of the Tenants Association.

Discussion

Our state Constitution provides that “[ejvery person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a); hereafter section 2(a) or the state free speech clause.)1 This unambiguous language should afford California apartment complex dwellers the freedom, subject to reasonable regulation, to communicate in writing with each other on their residential premises, including, as relevant in this case, at each others’ front doors, about matters in their common interest as tenants.
*1045At the outset, it is important to emphasize the narrowness of the question we are called upon to decide. No question is raised as to whether the Tenants Association or its members have waived their leafleting or other communicative rights. Nor do we have before us a landlord’s attempt to curb purely commercial or nontenant activity. Finally, Golden Gateway’s property rights are not those “ ‘of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment’ ” (Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, 910 [153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341] (Robins), affd. sub nom. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) 447 U.S. 74 [100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741]). We need not decide today, therefore, what result an appropriate constitutional analysis would generate in such cases. The sole question we face is whether the residents of a large multibuilding apartment community have the right, as against the landlord’s wishes, to communicate with each other through the distribution at their front doors of leaflets, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations and the right of any resident who so wishes to opt out of receiving such communications. I would hold that they do.
I.
In providing that all Californians “may freely speak, write and publish” their sentiments, the framers of the state free speech clause drew no distinction, among those who might seek to obstruct such activities, between state and private actors. They specified instead, in plain language, a right of free speech that runs against both—and protects against interference by either. Thus, as we observed only last year, section 2(a)’s “right to freedom of speech, unlike the First Amendment’s, is unbounded in range. It runs against the world, including private parties as well as governmental actors.” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 492 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720] (Gerawan), citing Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 908-911; Fritz, More Than “Shreds and Patches": California’s First Bill of Rights (1989) 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. 13, 31; Friesen, Should California’s Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply Against Private Actors? (1989) 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. 111, 118, 119-122 (Private Actors).)
Section 2(a) also, as the lead opinion emphasizes, provides that “[a] law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press,” thus explicitly prohibiting state legislative, and implicitly prohibiting state executive and judicial, suppression of protected speech. But the latter proviso neither grammatically nor legally qualifies the simple and sweeping free speech ■ guarantee with which section 2(a) begins. Nor, contrary to the lead opinion, does that proviso indicate an intent that the clause as a whole protect against *1046only state actions (lead opn., ante, at pp. 1023-1024). Rather, as the lead opinion concedes and as commentators have observed, that the “express prohibition against a ‘law’ restraining or abridging free speech” (id. at p. 1023) resides in (and on its face purports to govern) the second sentence, alone, “arguably bolsters such an interpretation” (ibid.) of the clause as a whole as would infer “an intent to protect the right to free speech against private intrusions” (ibid., citing Private Actors, supra, 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. at pp. 119-121).
In consequence of section 2(a)’s plain language, we consistently have rejected any suggestion that California’s free speech clause carries a state action limitation. We first held more than 20 years ago that it carries no such limitation. (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 910.)
In Robins, we stated “that sections 2 and 3 of article I of the California Constitution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned.” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 910, italics added.) Although our rejection in Robins of a state action requirement was only implicit, the lead opinion is mistaken in asserting we there did not address whether California’s free speech clause protects against only state action or against private conduct as well. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1020.) We had no choice but to address that issue, as the conduct complained of in Robins—a commercial landlord’s policy “not to permit any tenant or visitor to engage in publicly expressive activity” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 902)—was “that [of] a private individual” (Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 816, 838 [182 Cal.Rptr. 813]). We properly treat courts’ implicit holdings as equivalent, legally and logically, to their explicit ones (see, e.g., Chapman v. Pitcher (1929) 207 Cal. 63, 68 [276 P. 1008]; People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1121 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210]), and no reason appears why we should treat Robins differently.
Some commentators apparently, at least for a time, found Robins’ s applicability outside its context of a large shopping center uncertain because we there discussed “the role of the centers in our society” and emphasized the case did not implicate “ ‘the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment’ ” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 910). But any questions left open by Robins on the state action question were laid to rest in Gerawan, where we stated unambiguously that the right of free speech granted by the state free speech clause “runs against the world, including private parties as well as governmental actors” (Gerawan, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 492). Indeed, we cited Robins (23 Cal.3d at pp. 908-911) for that very proposition.
*1047The lead opinion dismisses Gerawan’s discussion of state action as “nonbinding dictum.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1029.) Nevertheless, for many of the same reasons, presumably, as led the author of the lead opinion only eight months ago to sign the majority opinion in Gerawan, I disagree that Gerawan’ s dictum is unpersuasive. Gerawan based its rejection of a state action requirement on section 2(a)’s plain language (Gerawan, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 489-492), buttressed by “the peculiar character of constitutions [like California’s] dating to the 19th century, which are not so narrow” as to restrain only governmental actors (id. at p. 492). The Gerawan majority cited textual proof that the California Constitution must be counted among those that were drafted to protect against private, as well as governmental, intrusion on constitutional rights. (See Gerawan, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 493 [citing constitutional grant to wives of a separate property right as against their husbands and to husbands and wives a similar right as against one another].) I continue to find Gerawan’s analysis persuasive—its plain-language rationale for the reasons earlier stated, and its constitutional-character rationale on the basis of the scholarly authorities and textual examples that Gerawan provided.2
Gerawan’s progenitor, Robins, as the lead opinion recognizes, “has been the law in California for over 20 years” and is “embedded in our free speech jurisprudence with no apparent ill effects” (lead opn., ante, at p. 1022). Principles of stare decisis, therefore, oblige us to follow its holding. As explained above, that holding logically implies that section 2(a) carries no state action limitation.
Concededly, the result in Robins might be reconcilable with a rule— similar, perhaps, to that the lead opinion proffers—that would make free and open accessibility to the public a “threshold requirement” for applying the state free speech clause to the actions of a private property owner. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1033.) But our analysis in Robins would not be so reconcilable.
Thus, when we referred in Robins to Court of Appeal cases citing the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Marsh v. Alabama (1946) 326 U.S. 501 [66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265] and Food Employees v. Logan Plaza *1048(1968) 391 U.S. 308 [88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603], we did so not with implicit approval of any state action reasoning in those underlying federal decisions (see lead opn., ante, at p. 1032); rather, we believed the Court of Appeal opinions to be useful in illustrating “the strength of ‘liberty of speech’ in this state.” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 908.) Irrespective of federal principles, we noted, “[t]he duty of this court is to help determine what ‘liberty of speech’ means in California.” (Id. at p. 909, italics added.)
Ultimately, we explained our holding in Robins as “providing greater protection than the First Amendment now seems to provide” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 910), affirming the long-standing principle that a “ ‘protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment is contained in our state constitutional guarantee’ ” (id. at p. 908).
Our decision in Robins rested expressly on our understanding “that sections 2 and 3 of article I of the California Constitution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised,” even on private property (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 910) and not on any “functional equivalence of the shopping center to a traditional public forum” (lead opn., ante, at p. 1032). In Robins, far from finding this functional equivalence, we found, much more modestly, that “ ‘[a] handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations [citation] would not markedly dilute defendant’s property rights.’” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 911.) In considering the competing constitutional rights at stake, we nowhere referred, categorically, to “the public character of the property” (lead opn., ante, at p. 1032).3 Rather, we considered the interest in “speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised,” and “the role of [shopping] centers in our society” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 910) in facilitating the exercise of such rights as against the “ ‘defendant’s property rights’ ” (id. at p. 911), emphasizing that our result, in favoring free speech, might be different if “ ‘we . . . ha[d] under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment’ ” (id. at p. 910). We also expressly preserved property owners’ right, despite constitutional constraints, to impose “ ‘reasonable regulations’ ” (id. at p. 911), avoiding any implication “that those who wish to disseminate ideas have free rein” (id. at p. 910).
, In Robins we thus followed “the familiar and well-established constitutional analysis—applicable to other constitutional rights, such as freedom of *1049speech . . . —under which a court considers the extent to which a defendant’s actions infringe or intrude upon the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected interest and ‘balances’ or ‘weighs’ such infringement against the relative importance or ‘compelling’ nature of the defendant’s justifications for its actions (taking into account whether there are other, less intrusive means by which the defendant could achieve its objectives).” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 62 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633] (conc. & dis. opn. of George, J.).)4
We should adhere to our established constitutional jurisprudence in this case. Consequently, unless we conclude Golden Gateway’s leafleting ban is a reasonable regulation of the speech at issue, we must balance the private and societal interest in that speech against any competing constitutional concerns that would be implicated were we to rule that section 2(a) forbids enforcement of that ban. (See, e.g., Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 910-911 [balancing signature gatherers’ “wish to disseminate ideas” with concern “ ‘that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations’ ” and “ ‘property or privacy rights’ ” of occupants and owners].) We must also take into account the ban’s impact on the right of Californians, generally, to receive unsolicited communications. (See generally Van Nuys Pub. Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks (1971) 5 Cal.3d 817, 825-826 [97 Cal.Rptr. 777, 489 P.2d 809] (Van Nuys); see also Martin v. City of Struthers (1943) 319 U.S. 141, 148-149 [63 S.Ct. 862, 865-866, 87 L.Ed. 1313].)5
A. Is the ban a reasonable regulation of affected speech?
Golden Gateway unquestionably retains the right to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on expressive activity at its premises. *1050(Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 910-911; In re Hoffman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 845, 852-853 [64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353].) Such restrictions must, however, be “ ‘ “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored . . . , and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” ’ ” (Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1573 [273 Cal.Rptr. 302], quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984) 468 U.S. 288, 293 [104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221].)
1. Does the ban afford ample alternative channels for communication ?
Even assuming Golden Gateway’s leafleting ban can be considered content neutral,6 the record demonstrates that it fails to leave open ample alternative channels of communication, in that its only allowance for distribution of unsolicited printed matter is posting on laundry room bulletin boards.
Neither that the Tenants Association can use the public mails nor that it can distribute its leaflets off Golden Gateway’s premises provides a constitutional alternative to door-to-door leafleting. Mailing a single leaflet to each address, the record suggests, would cost the Tenants Association more than $500, even assuming it could muster the volunteers to assemble, stuff, and address 1,254 envelopes. (See generally City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council (7th Cir. 1986) 796 F.2d 1547, 1558 [mail and telephone not sufficient because “more expensive and less effective than in-person solicitation at the citizen’s residence”].) Nor would standing on the sidewalk near the complex afford Tenants Association speakers a reasonable opportunity to “directly communicate their message to their targeted audience” (Planned Parenthood v. Wilson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1662, 1674 [286 Cal.Rptr. 427]), some of whom (e.g., automobile drivers) may not use those sidewalks at all and all of whom, presumably, use them at most intermittently. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “the most effective way of bringing [informational materials] to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the homes of people.” (Schneider v. State (1939) 308 U.S. 147, 164 [60 S.Ct. 146, 152, 84 L.Ed. 155]; accord, Van Nuys, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 823-825.)
*1051Although oral communication among tenants may be permitted, as the concurring opinion suggests (conc, opn., ante, at p. 1041),7 the Building Standards forbid all unrequested published discourse by tenants except in the laundry rooms. As the state free speech clause protects the freedom of Californians to “write and publish” equally and identically with their right to “speak” their sentiments on all subjects, the Building Standards banning written and published discourse offend the clause equally and identically as would a rule that entirely forbade tenants to speak with each other on the premises except in the laundry rooms.
2. Is the ban narrowly tailored to accomplish its legitimate objectives?
The record also establishes that Golden Gateway’s ban on solicitations and leafleting goes much further than is necessary to address its asserted legitimate concerns for tenant safety, tenant privacy, or cleanliness of the premises. As Golden Gateway conceded at trial, no breaches of security have occurred as a result of leaflet distribution. With respect to litter concerns, Golden Gateway acknowledged the Tenants Association already has agreed to retrieve from around tenants’ doors, within 24 hours of distribution, any of its newsletters or leaflets that have not been collected by their intended recipients.
Nor would enforcing Golden Gateway’s ban necessarily significantly enhance tenant privacy. While one of Golden Gateway’s property managers opined at trial that unsolicited leafleting constituted an invasion of tenant privacy, he conceded that the only available alternative under Golden Gateway’s ban, unrequested mail or telephone calls, would equally be so. And Golden Gateway conceded at trial that the Tenants Association already has agreed not to distribute leaflets or newsletters to any tenant who indicates a desire not to receive them. Were Golden Gateway’s regulations more narrowly tailored in that direction, a tenant who prefers not to receive leaflets could simply post a “no leafleting” sign or appropriately advise the Tenants Association.
Golden Gateway’s ban thus operates far more broadly than is necessary to effect its legitimate purposes. It may not, therefore, be enforced as merely a reasonable regulation of the time, place, or manner of the speech it would affect. (Savage v. Trammell Crow Co., supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1573.)
*1052B. Balancing of affected constitutional interests
Since Golden Gateway’s ban is not a reasonable regulation, we must, in order to resolve this matter, balance the competing constitutional interests implicated in its efforts to prohibit the Tenants Association’s leafleting. (See Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 910-911.) Such interests include, on the one hand, the Tenants Association’s interest in freely speaking, writing and publishing to tenants at Golden Gateway Center and those tenants’ interest in receiving the Tenants Association’s written communications. They include, on the other hand, the privacy interests of individual tenants and Golden Gateway’s property interests.
1. Free speech
The Tenants Association understandably desires to communicate regularly with the tenants of Golden Gateway about Tenants Association business and tenants’ issues, generally. As previously noted, moreover, Golden Gateway tenants have a recognized interest in receiving even unsolicited communications. (See generally Martin v. City of Struthers, supra, 319 U.S. at pp. 147-148 [63 S.Ct. at pp. 865-866]; Van Nuys, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 825-826.) We should be mindful of the “paramount and preferred place” that free speech enjoys in the hierarchy of rights in this state (In re Lane (1969) 71 Cal.2d 872, 878 [79 Cal.Rptr. 729, 457 P.2d 561]) and also should strive to avoid any balancing of constitutional interests that would relegate California apartment dwellers, as a group, to inferior status among speakers.
2. Property rights
Plaintiff, as landlord, complains its property rights will be diminished if its leafleting ban is not enforced. Such concerns, legitimate in the abstract, would seem overblown in this case to the extent that the tenants of Golden Gateway already have undisputed rights to be present in the hallways and throughout the common areas of their complex. Pursuant to their lease agreements, the tenants have the contractual right to be present in the hallways and throughout the common areas of the Golden Gateway Center. They also possess property rights entitling them to occupy and utilize the premises. Leaseholds possessed by tenants are as much estates in property as is a landlord’s remaining ownership interest. Therefore, to construe section 2(a) to require of Golden Gateway a more appropriately tailored approach to regulation of tenant leafleting, as a matter of both law and fact, “ ‘would not markedly dilute [the landlord]’s property rights’ ” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 911).
*10533. Tenant privacy
Golden Gateway makes much of the insulation from unsolicited appeals (and the high rents assertedly paid for such insulation) that the Building Standards purportedly are designed to preserve. As demonstrated, however, Golden Gateway’s policies go far beyond reasonable regulation directed to such insulation. Even assuming that privacy concerns loom as large, practically speaking, as plaintiff would have us believe,8 we should remain mindful that “a community may not suppress ... the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful.” (Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) 319 U.S. 105, 116 [63 S.Ct. 870, 876, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81].)
Enforcement of Golden Gateway’s leafleting ban, which forbids the provision to any tenant of any leaflet not specially requested in advance, significantly would impact “the constitutional rights of those desiring to distribute literature and those desiring to receive it, as well as those who choose to exclude such distributers from the home.” (Martin v. City of Struthers, supra, 319 U.S. at pp. 148-149 [63 S.Ct. at p. 866].) The net effect of enforcing Golden Gateway’s total ban will be to deprive the residents of this sizable community of a traditional and important means of communicating with each other.
Ultimately, the appropriate “balance is tipped in favor of the right to voice ideas as opposed to the property rights or mere naked title of the owners” (Allred v. Shawley (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1489, 1496 [284 Cal.Rptr. 140]) of Golden Gateway Center.9 And in my view, “proper accommodation of the competing [free speech] and privacy values at issue requires that the initial burden be placed on the homeowner to express his objection to the distribution of material.” (Van Nuys, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 826.)10
*1054II.
The lead opinion never engages in a traditional analysis along the lines of the foregoing, arguing rather that Golden Gateway’s restrictions on tenant speech do not implicate the state free speech clause in the first place. It takes as its fundamental premise that the state free speech clause protects only against state action, defining “the scope of this limitation” (lead opn., ante, at p. 1031) as encompassing “the actions of a private property owner . . . only if the property is freely and openly accessible to the public” (id. at p. 1033).11
For support, the lead opinion cites Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458 [156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592], apparently for the proposition that state constitutional provisions carry a state action limitation “absent some ‘suggestion’ in the provision’s history” to the contrary. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1023.) But this court neither expressly nor impliedly addressed in Gay Law Students the question whether some kind of presumption of that nature might exist. Further, in Gay Law Students we spoke only to “the equal protection clause of the California Constitution” (24 Cal.3d at p. 466) and its “predecessor provision” (id. at p. 468). Similarly, in Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 333 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 949 P.2d 941], the other case cited by the lead opinion on this point, we spoke to the state search and seizure provision. As the lead opinion’s own authority notes, the question of “whether to apply constitutional restraints on private actors” is properly approached “only by reference to the text, history and purpose of individual clauses of the California Declaration of Rights. It must be answered separately for each clause, not generally for the entire constitution.” (Private Actors, supra, 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. at pp. 111-112.)
Next, while acknowledging the absence from section 2(a) of an explicit state action limitation, the lead opinion asserts the state free speech clause nevertheless is ambiguous as to the implicit presence or absence of such a limitation. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1024.) The lead opinion finds such ambiguity in the second sentence of the clause, asserting that its reference to *1055“law” abridging the liberty of speech or press might mean the framers feared only government intrusion, thus indicating an intent to protect only against state actions. (Ibid.) Such an inference is neither logically nor grammatically supportable.
First, although a type of state action requirement might be discerned in the clause’s second sentence if it stood alone or purported to qualify the first sentence, as noted it does neither. The second sentence is preceded by and makes no reference to the first sentence; the first sentence, in turn, grants the free speech right without any limitation except that of responsibility for abuse of the right. The presence of the second sentence, with its express reference to state action in the form of “law,” in fact bolsters the case for construing the first sentence in accord with its plain language, i.e., in accord with its lack of any such reference, and for construing the entire clause in accord with its plain language, i.e., in accord with the lack of any qualification on the scope of the free speech right it confers.
Second, scholars have recognized that the phrase “being responsible for the abuse of this right” in the first sentence of section 2(a) offers contextual evidence the framers’ were aware the state free speech clause would limit private conduct. The reasoning is that the phrase likely was intended to preserve common law defamation actions for abusive speech, with the corollary that nonabusive speech “should not be suppressed by a private suit for injunctive or damage relief. This, then, is evidence of awareness that the constitution could not only shield conduct (nondefamatory speech) from civil liability but also limit other private conduct (damage suits for nondefamatory speech) .... At the very least, its inclusion in 1849 supports the argument that the document’s drafters . . . did not have a fixed notion that only the conduct of public actors could be affected by constitutional guarantees.” (Private Actors, supra, 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. at p. 122.)
Third, were it accurate that the framers “ ‘feared only government intrusions’ ” (lead opn., ante, at p. 1024), the proffered conclusion—that in drafting the state free speech clause as a whole the framers “intended to impose a state action requirement” (ibid.)—would not follow, for, as the lead opinion itself notes, the framers, regardless of what type of intrusion they feared most, evidently also “ ‘wished to declare generally the sanctity of free expression’ ” (ibid.) as against the world. (See also Gerawan, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 492-493.) The language they employed does just that.
Plain English is not ambiguous unless “there are two meanings which may reasonably be attributed to the term in question.” (Reserve Insurance Co. v. *1056Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 815 [180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764] [contract provision]; see also Davis v. City of Berkeley (1990) 51 Cal.3d 227, 235 [272 Cal.Rptr. 139, 794 P.2d 897] [constitutional provision].) Applying this fundamental principle of construction, we previously have held that a constitutional liberty conferred without qualification is neither “ ‘ambiguous or doubtful’ ” in scope but, rather, “ ‘applies to all . . . substantial . . . impairments]’ ” of the right conferred and “ ‘is not aimed solely at’ ” (Meriwether Invest. Co., Ltd. v. Lampton (1935) 4 Cal.2d 697, 703 [53 P.2d 147]) any subset thereof. (See also Welsh v. Cross (1905) 146 Cal. 621, 624 [81 P. 229].)12 Ultimately, the same principle applies here. In light of its unqualified statement of the free speech right, section 2(a) is not susceptible of being construed as applicable only against state or state-like action.
In short, the lead opinion fails to demonstrate that, despite its plain language and contrary to our pronouncements in Robins and Gerawan, section 2(a) contains ambiguities regarding state action the resolution of which requires recourse to extrinsic sources concerning the framers’ intent. But even were such ambiguities present, I would conclude, based on section 2(a)’s history and context, that—as Robins impliedly held and Gerawan confirmed—our Constitution grants a free speech right running against private parties as well as state actors.
The state free speech clause first ¿ppeared as article I, section 9 of the original California Constitution of 1849: “Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions ... for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.” (Cal. Const, of 1849, art. I, § 9.)
The clause next appeared as article I, section 9 of the present California Constitution of 1879. It was identical to its predecessor but for the addition of a sentence further relating to criminal libel. (See Cal. Const., art. I, former *1057§ 9, as adopted May 7, 1879.)13 In 1974, the clause was revised by the addition of new section 2 to article I and the deletion of old section 9: “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, added Nov. 5, 1974.)14 Finally, the clause was redesignated in 1980 as article I, section 2, subdivision (a).
Thus, like the present clause, the state free speech clause as originally drafted drew no distinction between state actors and private parties, impliedly therefore granting a free speech right that runs against both. Also like the present clause, the original clause expressly noted speakers’ responsibility for “abuse” of the free speech right, language that—to the extent it may be read as preserving the right of aggrieved private parties to sue for defamation (see Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1203 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 875 P.2d 1279])—the lead opinion’s proffered state action requirement would render superfluous.
Examination of the constitutional context of the original state free speech clause, as originally enacted and as it appears today, buttresses the conclusion that it grants a right of free speech running against private parties as well as state actors. Enacted together with the free speech clause in the Constitution of 1849 was a clause that granted to wives a separate property right as against their husbands, who were obviously private parties. (Cal. Const, of 1849, art. XI, § 14.) This separate-property clause clearly illustrates that the free speech clause was not unique, in 1849, in granting rights against private parties as well as state actors.
Today the state free speech clause appears in the same article as the privacy clause: “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these [is] . . . privacy.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) The right of free speech and the right of privacy complement each other, the former dealing with communication to others (see Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 510-511 [217 Cal.Rptr. 225, *1058703 P.2d 1119] [implying speech “communicates a message” from speaker to audience]), the latter dealing both with conduct apart from others and information kept from others (see Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 361, 387 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 63, 878 P.2d 1275]; Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 35-36). Just as the right of privacy runs against private parties as well as state actors (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 15-20), so too, as demonstrated, runs the right of free speech.
Given that the history and context of the California free speech provision sufficiently confirm its meaning, any excursion into the history of the New York Constitution from which the clause derived is unnecessary. Nor is the relevance of that history clear. The lead opinion posits no evidence that the framers of California’s Constitution were aware of or indeed intended to adopt those aspects of the New York history that relate to state action. Nor does it persuade that the framers of the New York Constitution “intended its free speech clause ‘to serve as a check on governmental, not private, conduct.’ ” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1025.) The authorities underlying SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall (1985) 66 N.Y.2d 496 [498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 488 N.E.2d 1211], cited by the lead opinion, as well as the lead opinion’s other authorities, tend upon examination to support only the first half of that claim, i.e., that the New York framers wished to guard against government encroachments on speech, not the latter half, i.e., that they wished not to guard against private encroachments. (See, e.g., SHAD Alliance, supra, 66 N.Y.2d at p. 502 [488 N.E.2d at p. 1215] [citing various scholars for the truism that “a Bill of Rights is designed to protect individual rights against the government”].) One commentator, noting that the New York “minutes do not reveal why the delegates chose to declare an open-ended right rather than simply to prohibit oppressive ‘laws,’ ” reasons that “perhaps [the broader language] was more attractive precisely because it secured a precious liberty against the entire world.” (Private Actors, supra, 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. at p. 120.)
Finally, whatever the decisions of most of our sister courts (see lead opn., ante, at p. 1030), what matters is the meaning of California’s free speech clause. Any assertion that there exists a uniform and unchanging “American constitutional theory” (ibid.) is not supportable. (See generally Baum & Fritz, American Constitution-Making: The Neglected State Constitutional Sources (2000) 27 Hastings Const. L.Q. 199, 199-201; Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West (1994) 25 Rutgers L.J. 945, 952-956, 964-971.)
*1059Ultimately, neither the text of the state free speech clause, the history of its adoption, our prior pronouncements, nor considerations of constitutional theory support judicial imposition of a state action limitation on Californians’ free speech rights. Consequently, I join with the Chief Justice in rejecting the lead opinion’s discussion and conclusions with regard to the state action doctrine (conc, opn., ante, at p. 1036) and would adhere to our traditional understanding that, even when a restriction on speech “does not implicate any right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment, [it may nevertheless] implicate such a right under [California’s free speech clause]” (Gerawan, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 476).
III.
Regrettably, four justices of this court join today in denying constitutional protection to the tenant speech at issue here. The concurring opinion, like the lead opinion, emphasizes that Golden Gateway’s premises are not open to the public. To that extent, I agree this case is different from Robins factually. I disagree the distinction is dispositive. Rather, that the owner of private property may exclude members of the general public from entry onto the premises without necessarily implicating their free speech rights says little about the rights of those who are lawful members of a community occupying units of the property as their residences.
Both opinions, moreover, overlook a critical respect in which this case is factually similar to Robins'. The private property owner seeking to restrict speech already has for its own purposes surrendered to those whose speech it would restrict much of its interest in retaining exclusive control over the premises. Golden Gateway seeks to enjoin tenant speech (as the owners of the shopping center in Robins sought to restrict some patrons’ speech), but it already has surrendered to tenants, for virtually the entire range of activities and uses associated with daily living, the hallways and other common areas of the building. Similarly, as the lead and concurring opinions acknowledge, the owners of the shopping center in Robins had “invited [the public] to visit for the purpose of patronizing the many businesses” there (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 902).
The concurring opinion concludes that the tenant speech Golden Gateway’s leafleting ban would affect lies outside “the appropriate limit of th[e] substantive right of free speech” (conc, opn., ante, at p. 1036). But contrary to the concurring opinion, Golden Gateway’s ban is not a “ ‘reasonable regulation, by an owner, of conduct inside [its] multiple dwelling’ ” (ibid., quoting Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc., Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. *1060(1948) 297 N.Y. 399 [79 N.E.2d 433, 436-437, 3 A.L.R.3d 1423], italics in conc. opn. omitted). As explained above, the ban goes much further than is necessary to address any legitimate concerns Golden Gateway may have about tenant safety, tenant privacy, or cleanliness of the premises.
With the concurring opinion, therefore, I reject a view of our state free speech clause that “effectively would remove any state constitutional obstacle to any . . . action by a landlord, union, or employer” implicating an individual’s core free speech rights. (Conc, opn., ante, at p. 1043.) But I also reject the concurring opinion’s approach, which would do much the same with respect to published communications, despite their constitutionally equal—and traditionally cherished—status in this state as protected expressive activity.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Kennard, J., and Klein, J.,* concurred.

 In its entirety, section 2(a) provides: “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”

 The lead opinion suggests that the justices in Gerawan’s majority “did not carefully consider whether California’s free speech clause requires state action” (lead opn., ante, at pp. 1028-1029) when they stated that it “runs against the world, including private parties” (Gerawan, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 492), but that the statement may have been dictum does not mean it was ill considered. As explained above, moreover, and contrary to the lead opinion’s further assertion, the Gerawan majority provided ample analytical support (lead opn., ante, at p. 1029) for its statement.

 Actually, the private property involved in Robins, contrary to the lead opinion’s implication, was not open to the public without qualification, but only at certain times and “for the purpose of patronizing the many businesses.” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 902.)

 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 166 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 980 P.2d 846] (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) (“[balancing . . . First Amendment free speech rights with the equally weighty right of plaintiffs to be let alone at their jobsite, free of racial discrimination”); Sommer v. Metal Trades Council (1953) 40 Cal.2d 392, 401-402 [254 P.2d 559] (noting the “ ‘effort in the cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional protection of the element of communication in picketing and “the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants” ’ ”); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 224, 228 [253 P.2d 441] (holding the “right ‘to be let alone’ and to be protected from undesired publicity is not absolute but must be balanced against the public interest in the dissemination of news and information consistent with the democratic processes under the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and of the press”).

 Martin v. City of Struthers, supra, 319 U.S. 141, and Van Nuys, supra, 5 Cal.3d 817, both were cases decided in the First Amendment context, but the free speech interests they involved were similar to those with which this case deals. “As a general rule, [moreover, California’s] free speech clause and its right to freedom of speech are not only as broad and as great as the First Amendment’s, they are even ‘broader’ and ‘greater.’ ” (Gerawan, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 491, citing numerous authorities.)

 The assumption may be faulty. The current version of Golden Gateway’s ban, the first expressly to prohibit “leafleting,” was promulgated shortly after the Tenants Association distributed flyers criticizing Golden Gateway’s management and discussing a Tenants Association lawsuit against Golden Gateway. The record, moreover, suggests that Golden Gateway construes its ban as not restricting its own communicative prerogatives.

 But such communication is not without restriction. Under the Building Standards’ solicitation ban, tenants may not even speak with each other in the common areas of the building if to solicit membership in the Tenants Association, engage in religious proselytizing, distribute campaign literature, seek political or charitable contributions, or, indeed, seek support for causes of any kind.

 While Golden Gateway’s property managers testified in general terms to tenant concern about leafleting, the record reveals that Golden Gateway ultimately could document only one resident complaint about door-to-door leafleting in over 15 years.

 This is not to say, of course, that free speech rights, when implicated, always must prevail over competing considerations. As we observed in Robins, for example, appropriate constitutional balancing of free speech interests against “ ‘the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment’ ” (Robins, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 910) might come out differently.

 Golden Gateway’s ban does not distinguish between, and is not tailored separately to address, commercial and noncommercial speech. Moreover, Golden Gateway’s Building Standards by their terms bar, and the injunction Golden Gateway seeks would burden, only tenant speech. We need not decide, therefore, what result an appropriate balancing of *1054constitutional considerations would generate in a case implicating only commercial or only nontenant speech.

 For convenience, the discussion that follows occasionally employs the lead opinion’s apparent shorthand expression “state action” for the “state or state-like action” limitation on state free speech rights the lead opinion would impose. As will appear, however, I disagree that Robins stands for the proposition that “private property must be public in character before California’s free speech clause may apply” (lead opn., ante, at p. 1033). Still less am I willing to embrace the logically incoherent notion that “the actions of a private property owner constitute state action ... if the property is freely and openly accessible to the public” (ibid..).

 Specifically, in Meriwether we held that, in forbidding any “ ‘ “law impairing the obligation of contract,” ’ ” former article I, section 16 of the California Constitution plainly was “ ‘not aimed solely at laws which expressly destroy or annul contracts.’ ” (Meriwether Invest. Co., Ltd. v. Lampton, supra, 4 Cal.2d at p. 703.) In Welsh, we reasoned that, as that clause by its terms “is not aimed solely at” laws which expressly annul contracts, it “applies to all laws which in any substantial degree” have that effect. (Welsh v. Cross, supra, 146 Cal. at p. 624.)

 The additional sentence read: “Indictments found, or information laid, for publications in newspapers shall be tried in the county where such newspapers have their publication office, or in the county where the party alleged to be libeled resided at the time of the alleged publication, unless the place of trial shall be changed for good cause.” (Cal. Const., art. I, former § 9, as adopted May 7, 1879.)

 This revision retained, without substantial change, the state free speech clause at its core and removed the provisions relating to procedure in prosecutions for criminal libel as more suited to statute than constitution. (See Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1974) analysis of Prop. 7 by Legis. Analyst, p. 26.)

 Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.