Court Opinion

ID: 9754160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:47:03.992159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:50.047081
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR
concurring.
While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I have several differences with its reasoning. For example, whereas the majority finds one potentially material aspect of the Mandate Waiver Program to be unambiguous by way of reference to a dictionary, see Majority Opinion at 235-37, 934 A.2d at 1269-70, I find the ambiguity that the majority ultimately recognizes to be more pervasive in the statute. Moreover, I consider the relevant policy considerations to be more greatly mixed than the majority portrays, see id. at 238, 934 A.2d at 1271.
Nevertheless, in the end analysis, had the General Assembly intended Section 751(a) to be non-waivable, it had the opportunity to clarify this design in the most clear and straightforward manner by simply adding Section 751(a) to the list of non-waivable provisions. Absent such direction, I believe that it is appropriate to defer to the administrative interpretation, unless and until there is further direction from the Legislature. To the extent, moreover, that the Separations Act might independently apply notwithstanding any valid waiver of Section 751(a), I would conclude that the latter provision effectively replaces the former one for purposes of public school properties, as any other interpretation would render Section 751(a) of little practical effect. See generally Allegheny County Sportsmen’s League v. Rendell, 580 Pa. 149, 163-64, 860 *243A.2d 10, 19 (2004) (indicating that, for purposes of statutory construction, courts should avoid interpretations that render a statutory provision of no effect).