Court Opinion

ID: 9585150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:56:51.403898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:59.302207
License: Public Domain

Thomas Gallagher, Justice
(dissenting).
1. I am of the opinion that a fair construction17 of Rules 26 to 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, sometimes designated as the “discovery rules,” would compel affirmance of the court’s order directing production of defendant’s automobile liability insurance policy. The basic purpose to be achieved by their construction, as stated in Rule 1 thereof, is the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” It can scarcely be disputed that a fair and equitable settlement of an action is often a more just, and certainly a more speedy determination of it, than ordinarily follows an actual trial of the issues therein. If, as is often the case, disclosure of the insurance coverage will bring about such settlements, it would seem that the ends sought by the Rules, as above disclosed, are thereby effectively attained.
2. It is suggested that compulsory disclosure of insurance limits in effect would be the same as compelling a defendant to disclose his financial condition prior to judgment. There are several answers to this argument. The one that first suggests itself is that through garnishment proceedings, prior to judgment, a plaintiff, to a very large degree, may ascertain a defendant’s financial status, and in fact may compel the segregation of a portion of his assets as security in whole or in part for any judgment plaintiff may obtain in the action. Further, ordinarily the credit rating; the real or personal property owned; and many other facts bearing on a defendant’s financial status may be discovered through private credit agencies or credit reporter systems organized and operating for just such purposes. *564Resort thereto, and to the knowledge gained therefrom, no doubt, has resulted in speedy settlement of innumerable cases and has saved countless hours and days of litigation.
3. Rule 26.02 provides that “the witness may be examined regarding any matter * * * which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” though “inadmissible at the trial.” The words “subject matter” as used therein should be construed to include the entire scope of an action from its origin to the collection of any judgment thereby obtained. Under the standard form of automobile liability insurance contract, the insurer is virtually substituted as a party defendant. It employs counsel, investigates claims, interviews witnesses, and in fact controls the entire defense of any action covered by the policy. To hold that the amount of coverage in such a policy is not “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” would seem to bring about a result exactly the oppo • site to the speedy and just determination of litigation sought to be achieved by the rules. As stated in Maddox v. Grauman (Ky.) 265 S. W. (2d) 939, 942:
“If the insurance question is relevant to the subject matter after the plaintiff prevails, why is it not relevant while the action pends ? We believe it is. An insurance contract is no longer a secret, private, confidential arrangement between the insurance carrier and the individual but it is an agreement that embraces those whose person or property may be injured by the negligent act of the insured. We conclude the answers to the propounded questions are relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and within the spirit and meaning of OR 26.02.”
4. It is true, as indicated in the majority opinion, that the courts are divided on this issue. Those supporting the viewpoint of the writer, including a number of federal district court decisions, are Brackett v. Woodall Food Products, Inc. (E. D. Tenn.) 12 F. R. D. 4; Maddox v. Grauman (Ky.) 265 S. W. (2d) 939; Orgel v. McCurdy (S. D. N. Y.) 8 F. R. D. 585; Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. (2d) 749, 235 P. (2d) 833. An able summary on the issue is *565set forth by Professor Wright in his commentary to Eule 26 set forth in Wright, Minnesota Eules, p. 164. Therein he states:
“* * * If the requirement of relevancy is to be given the broad interpretation argued for in section 3 of this Commentary, it must be said that insurance coverage is ‘relevant’; as a practical matter, a plaintiff’s attorney may be more interested in knowing about insurance coverage than he is even in knowing the facts on liability. To say that insurance is irrelevant would be patently unrealistic. Further, knowledge of the extent of insurance coverage should aid the objectives of Eule 1 by leading to more purposeful discussions of settlement, and thus helping eliminate court congestion and ensuring the more speedy and inexpensive determination of many controversies.
“On the other hand, the language in Eule 26.02 that testimony obtained must appear ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ is extremely troublesome. What admissible evidence can possibly result from knowledge of defendant’s insurance coverage ?
“* * * We are impressed by the fact that a decisive majority of experienced Minnesota judges have held such discovery proper. We are impressed, too, by the strong decision from the California Supreme Court discussed earlier. A decision in point from so authoritative a court will carry great weight.”
Based upon the foregoing considerations, I am of the opinion that the trial court was correct in its determination of the question.

In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 507, 67 S. Ct. 385, 392, 91 L. ed. 451, 460, it was said: “* * * the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. * * * Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.”