Court Opinion

ID: 9956038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-30 18:15:06.546729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.807934
License: Public Domain

NUMBERS 13-23-00136-CR, 13-23-00137-CR

                              COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                       CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ADRIAN MEDRANO,                                                                Appellant,

                                                 v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                             Appellee.

              ON APPEAL FROM THE 105TH DISTRICT COURT
                     OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

               CONCURRING MEMORANDUM OPINION
             Before Justices Benavides, Tijerina, and Silva
         Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

       I believe the majority should address the merits of Medrano’s constitutional

challenge to the community supervision condition at issue. Because it does not, I

respectfully concur.

       In terms of error preservation, first, the majority suggests that Medrano was

required to object to the trial court’s general requirement that he “comply with all the rules
and regulations, treatment programs[,] and contracts of [SATF]” at the time the condition

was imposed, or upon his entering the facility. But Dansby v. State is directly on point and

conflicts with the majority’s assertion. See 448 S.W.3d 441, 448–52 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (“Appellant . . . cannot be faulted for failing to assert an objection on Fifth

Amendment grounds to the trial court’s order requiring compliance with general sex

offender conditions.”). Next, the majority contends that Medrano “did not argue that rule

2.8 is unconstitutional as applied to him, facially invalid, or overbroad. Therefore, he has

not preserved these arguments.” However, Medrano specifically argued below, “Major

Rule 2.8, is a violation—or violates Mr. Medrano’s constitutional right to free speech.” The

trial court heard and denied this argument. I would hold that this is sufficient to preserve

an as-applied constitutional challenge. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Thomas v. State, 505

S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“The standards of procedural default are not to

be implemented by splitting hairs in the appellate courts.” (quoting Lankston v. State, 827

S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992))); Clarke v. State, 270 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008).

        Further, the issue that this Court should address is whether the revocation of

Medrano’s community supervision for failing to follow SATF’s rule passes constitutional

muster, not whether SATF’s rule is constitutional in a vacuum. Though appellant primarily

frames the issue as one involving the constitutionality of the treatment facility’s internal

rules, the substance of his argument is clear: He believes that revocation based on this

condition of his community supervision was not constitutional.1 See Few v. State, 230

        1In his brief, Medrano provides examples of hypothetical probationers who fail to comply with
SATF’s rules and states, “Under the [rule] as written, either, both, or neither could be penalized with the
                                                    2
S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

        This is an interesting and important question, and one that the court of criminal

appeals has flagged as warranting judicial review. See Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570,

577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“It would surely offend due process if a defendant were

discharged from his therapy program for a wholly inappropriate reason—such as illegal

discrimination or mere caprice—and the bare fact of that discharge were used as a basis

to revoke the defendant’s community supervision.”). Nonetheless, I would ultimately

conclude that the condition was constitutional, both as-applied to Medrano and in terms

of vagueness, and the trial court did not err by revoking Medrano’s community

supervision. See Crab v. State, 754 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1988, pet. ref’d); see also Archer v. State, No. 13-18-00059-CR, 2019 WL 2221677, at *3

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication). Therefore, I write separately to concur in the judgment.

                                                                        GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                                        Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
28th day of March, 2024.

revocation of their probation and remand to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, at the whim of the
SATF staff.”
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