Court Opinion

ID: 9892936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 16:07:00.570899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:40.625152
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 21-1866
                             Filed October 25, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ZACHARIAH COULEYON SIDNEY,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.

      The defendant challenges his convictions on five counts of sexual abuse in

the third degree. AFFIRMED.

      Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
                                           2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

       A jury convicted Zachariah Sidney of five counts of third-degree sexual

abuse against M.S.1 Sidney appeals, arguing (1) the court wrongly declared a

mistrial over the parties’ objections after learning Sidney had been exposed to

COVID-19, which constituted an abuse of discretion and violated his right to be

free from double jeopardy when he was tried and convicted by a different jury in a

new trial; (2) the district court erred by giving an incomplete jury instruction defining

the “by force or against will” element; and (3) the greater weight of the credible

evidence does not support his convictions, so the district court should have granted

his motion for new trial. Upon our review, we do not reach the merits of Sidney’s

claims about the court declaring a mistrial, we find no error in the challenged jury

instruction, and also find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Sidney’s motion for new trial. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

       Sidney was charged with five counts of third-degree sexual abuse against

M.S., who was initially believed to be his daughter.2 Two of the charges were

1 In counts I and II, Sidney was convicted of engaging in a sex act with M.S. when

she was thirteen to fifteen years old and a member of his household. See Iowa
Code § 709.4(1)(b)(2) (child of twelve or thirteen), (1)(b)(3)(a) (child of fourteen or
fifteen and the child is a member of the person’s household) (2013). In counts III
through V, Sidney was convicted of engaging in a sex act by force or against the
will of M.S. See id. § 709.4(1)(a) (sex act committed against the force or will of the
person). All five convictions are class “C” felonies.
2 M.S. lived in Sidney’s home from the age of thirteen until she went to college;

both M.S. and Sidney believed M.S. was Sidney’s daughter during this time period.
But later DNA testing—completed after M.S. made reports to the police about
Sidney’s actions—established he is not biologically related to her. While Sidney
was originally also charged with incest, the State dismissed that charge after
receiving the DNA results.
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based on allegations Sidney engaged in sex acts with M.S. before she was sixteen,

while the other three were based on allegations Sidney engaged in sex acts with

M.S. by force or against her will when she was sixteen or older. Sidney entered

pleas of not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.

       The case first went to trial in August 2021. On the second day—after the

jury was impaneled and opening arguments were completed—the court was

informed that Sidney had been exposed to COVID-19 and the unit where he was

being held at the local jail was “going into a lockdown.” Over the State’s and

Sidney’s objection, the court sua sponte declared a mistrial, reasoning it was

necessary for the “health of the community in general and the jury members in

specific.”

       The second trial took place in October 2021. M.S. testified she went to live

with Sidney in 2013, when she was twelve or thirteen3—after first her mother and

then her grandmother were no longer able to take care of her. M.S. lived with

Sidney; his wife, Jackie; and their two sons in an apartment in Des Moines. She

had been living with Sidney for only a few months when one night, while M.S. was

sleeping in his bed after having a nightmare, Sidney used his hand to rub “up the

back of [her] thigh to [her] butt.” M.S. was shocked and asked Sidney what he was

doing; he was teary-eyed and showed remorse. But then Sidney began sleeping

in M.S.’s bed with her sometimes, telling his wife M.S. needed him because of her

night terrors. Some nights Sidney would “rub himself against [her]” with their

clothes on. As time progressed, Sidney began pulling both his and M.S.’s clothes

3 M.S. was born in the fall of 2000.
                                          4

down and then rubbing his penis against the outside of her vagina, anus, or both.

According to M.S., Sidney also touched her vagina with his mouth and fingers.

While the family lived in Des Moines, these incidents occurred a couple times each

month.

         Then, in the summer of 2015 (while M.S. was still fourteen and before her

freshman year began), the family moved from Des Moines to Ankeny. After they

moved to the new home, M.S. had her own bedroom—separate from Sidney and

Jackie’s sons. In this new home, the sexual contact continued but, according to

M.S., it “stopped being just touching of a variety of parts, and it became actual

penetration” with Sidney using his penis to penetrate M.S.’s vagina and anus. M.S.

testified:

         So as the relationship, both sexual and just a normal relationship,
         would progress, he became more aggressive with what he wanted
         out of me in both sexual relationships and as a daughter.
                So the abuse would happen inside, like, during the sexual
         interaction or if he was just upset with me in general. So many times
         I’d get choked or slapped or shoved or pushed against the wall or
         objects.

When M.S. would tell Sidney she did not want the sexual encounters to happen

anymore, he would get defensive and invoke religion. And Sidney justified his

actions by telling M.S. he was having sexual contact with her to “correct [her].”

When she became more insistent that it should stop, Sidney “would get more

angry.       If [she] asked to stop while [they] were actually having the sexual

encounter, [she] suffered physical abuse, choking, pushing [her] head into the bed,

slapping. He’d get angry and say mean things to [her] or call [her] derogatory

names.” This continued throughout M.S.’s high school years; while it started with
                                          5

Sidney occasionally sleeping in M.S.’s bed, “he’d sleep in [her] bed every day, and

if not every day, most days out of the year” by the time she left for college.

       M.S. testified that there were times she gave Sidney verbal permission for

a sex act but did so because she did not feel “truly free to deny him permission.”

She testified that if she denied him:

                He’d get really angry. At first, it would start with really
       derogatory terms, and then he actually put his hands on me
       aggressively, like slapping, choking, pushing my head into the bed
       or the pillow.
                He would also ask me if I was seeing someone, and that’s
       why I didn’t want to share myself with him, and I wasn’t. But I knew
       that if I didn't let him, he would think that, and I would have to suffer
       even more if he thought I had a boyfriend.
                So a lot of times, it was really never me just—when he asked
       me and—it was never times as he asked, I would be—I’d have a
       positive response towards him. A lot of times, we'd argue for several
       minutes up to hours, and then I’d get tired, and I’d just say “okay.”

When asked if there were times a sex act occurred without her saying “okay,” M.S.

testified that happened, adding, “Well, it wasn’t like him forcing me down. I just

turned away, and he’d just—he’d do it anyway.”

       M.S. moved out of the family home in Ankeny to go to college. While she

was away, Sidney would contact M.S. through video calls and ask her to “show

him [her] vagina and [her] butt and [her] breasts while he was back at home.” And

the sexual encounters continued to occur when M.S. was home.

       Then, in December 2019, Sidney drove to M.S.’s college to pick her up for

Christmas break. While in her dorm room, Sidney penetrated M.S. anally. M.S.

was in a lot of pain and kept trying to pull away, but Sidney did not seem to care.

When she actually pushed away from him, Sidney “got really angry. . . . He looked

like he was full of rage, and he started choking [her] and pushed [her] against the
                                         6

bed and kind of wrestled [her] for a moment.” At some point, Sidney let M.S. go,

and she reported needing to use the bathroom. Once out of the room, M.S.

sprinted down the hallway until she found someone—a resident advisor for the

dorm (RA).

       Both M.S. and the RA testified that when M.S. found him, she began

repeatedly asking for help. They decided to walk to the security office on campus.

During the walk, M.S. spoke to Jackie on the phone, telling her about the sexual

abuse and how long it had been happening. According to M.S., Jackie convinced

her not to make a report to the police and to just stay on the phone with her while

riding back to Ankeny with Sidney. Jackie “promised [her] when [they] got back

home, she would talk it out with [her] and figure something out, and if he did do

these things to me, put him in jail.” M.S. complied with Jackie’s directive. But the

sex acts continued after M.S. returned to the family home. Eventually, after Sidney

begged for a number of days, and feeling Jackie did not believe her and doing so

would help her be able to return to college, M.S. recanted to Jackie.

       A few months later, while back at college and with encouragement from

others, M.S. made a report to the local police, alleging that Sidney had been

sexually abusing her for years. A couple of police officers traveled to Ankeny to

speak with Sidney and execute a search warrant on the family home. Detective

Troy Schneider, who was one of the officers, spoke with Sidney for several hours.

About forty-five minutes of the recorded discussion was played for the jury. During

that portion, Sidney admitted to having a sexual relationship with M.S., telling the

detective he slept in M.S.’s room three or four nights each week. Sidney told the

detective that he used the sexual acts to correct M.S.’s behavior or way of thinking.
                                          7

While admitting there were times M.S. told him she did not want their relationship

to include sex acts, Sidney described the sexual relationship as consensual and

claimed M.S. thought of him as “her man.” As part of the execution of the search

warrant, the bedding from M.S.’s room was seized.            Later testing identified

Sidney’s sperm on the bedding.

       The jury found Sidney guilty of all five counts of third-degree sexual abuse,

and he was later sentenced to five terms of incarceration, each lasting for a period

of up to ten years, which the court ordered him to serve consecutively. Sidney

appeals.

II. Discussion.

       A. Mistrial.

       Sidney claims the district court abused its discretion when, on the second

day of his trial, after the court learned he had been exposed to COVID-19 while

being held in the local jail, it sua sponte declared a mistrial over both parties’

objections. But “[a]ny error in the first trial is not reviewable in an appeal of the

second trial.” State v. Longdon, No. 06-0778, 2008 WL 5003743, at *2 (Iowa Ct.

App. Nov. 26, 2008) (citing State v. Ash, 244 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Iowa 1976)).

       Sidney also claims his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated

when he was tried and convicted by a different jury in a second trial. However,

Sidney failed to move for dismissal based on the issue of double jeopardy before

the second trial, which is necessary to preserve error. See id. (“A claim of double

jeopardy arising from the declaration of a mistrial in an earlier trial must be raised

before the second trial.” (citing State v. Harrison, 578 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa

1998))); see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(4)(a) (requiring “[d]efenses and objections
                                          8

based on defects in the institution of the prosecution” to be raised prior to trial).

Under this reasoning, we do not consider Sidney’s claims about the court declaring

a mistrial.

       B. Jury Instruction.

       Next, Sidney argues the district court should have given the jury instruction

he requested on the meaning of “by force or against the will of” rather than using

the State’s proposed instruction.4 The instruction the district court ultimately gave

closely follows the language of Iowa Code section 709.5.5 As given, the instruction

stated:

              In Counts III–V (Instructions Nos. 15-17), the State must prove
       that the defendant committed a sex act “by force or against the will”
       of M.S. In order to do so, however, the State does not have to prove
       that M.S. physically resisted the defendant’s acts.
              You may consider all of the circumstances surrounding the
       defendant’s act in deciding whether the act was done by force or
       against the will of M.S.

Sidney proposed the model instruction, which includes two additional lines:

              Concerning element number 2 of Instruction No. _____, the
       State must prove that the defendant committed a sex act “by force or
       against the will” of (victim). In order to do so, however, the State
       does not have to prove that (victim) physically resisted the
       defendant’s acts. The force used by the defendant does not have to
       be physical. It may consist of threats of violence against [(]victim) or
       another person which overcame (victims) will by fear.

4 This claim on appeal applies to only counts III, IV, and V, as only those three

charges required a finding that Sidney acted with force or against M.S.’s will in
perpetrating the sex act.
5 Iowa Code section 709.5, which is titled “[r]esistance to sexual abuse,” states:

              Under the provisions of this chapter it shall not be necessary
       to establish physical resistance by a person in order to establish that
       an act of sexual abuse was committed by force or against the will of
       the person.       However, the circumstances surrounding the
       commission of the act may be considered in determining whether or
       not the act was done by force or against the will of the other.
                                          9

             You may consider all of the circumstances surrounding the
       defendant’s act in deciding whether the act was done by force or
       against the will of (victim).

Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 900.10 (emphasis added).

       On appeal, Sidney reiterates the argument he made to the district court

when arguing for his proposed instruction; he claims the two sentences that were

removed in the jury instruction “touched directly on his defense that the sex acts

were consensual.” In the district court, trial counsel argued:

               We believe that that instruction is important to add in there
       because I fear the instruction that is given allows the jury to find that
       if someone were to be convinced to engage in sex acts, by either
       cajoling them, by bugging them, by simply showering with love or
       affection, or doing things that would cause them to otherwise say “All
       right. Fine. I’ll go ahead and do it.” Similar to a husband and wife
       situation they probably see every day, it will allow them to find that
       that was against the will of the victim.
               I think that those two statements indicate that there is a higher
       burden, that there—that there is not just—this goes higher than just
       convincing. It actually results in overcoming someone’s will.
               So we believe those two statements that are contained within
       the stock instruction help better guide the jury to understand the
       threshold standard that they must meet here.

The State countered that the instruction it proposed “mirror[ed] the language of

Iowa Code section 709.5” and that Sidney’s proposed instruction was misleading

as it limited jury consideration of how someone’s will might be overcome to one

example and thus, could suggest to the jury there is only one way, when there can

be other circumstances a jury should weigh.           In addressing the competing

arguments, the district court referenced State v. Bauer, and opined that “[by force

or against one’s will] is broader than just threats of violence to overcome their

fear . . . broader than one example.” 324 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Iowa 1982) (holding

the question of “whether the sexual act was committed ‘by force or against the will’
                                           10

of the victim should be decided by considering the circumstances surrounding the

act. This, we take it, means all the circumstances, subjective as well as objective”).

       The district court is “require[d] to give a requested jury instruction if it

correctly states the applicable law and is not embodied in other instructions.”

Alcala v. Marriott Int’l. Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 707 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted).

And we review refusals to give a requested jury instruction for correction of errors

at law. Id. at 707–08. That said, it is “well-established law is that the district court

‘is not required to give any particular form of an instruction; rather, the court must

merely give instructions that fairly state the law as applied to the facts of the case.’”

State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1, 23 (Iowa 2022) (Appel, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). Here, the district court opted for the State’s version of the

instruction as a correct statement of the law with consideration of the specific

factual pattern developed at trial.

       When a party claims a jury-instruction error, we begin by reviewing whether

the instruction actually given correctly states the law. See State v. Ellison, 985

N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 2023). And here, the challenged instruction essentially

restates the language of Iowa Code section 709.5, “so its inclusion, without more,

contains no misstatement of the law.” Id. So, Sidney’s challenge to the jury

instruction fails.

       C. Weight of the Evidence.

       Sidney challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for new trial

regarding his claim the weight of the credible evidence does not support his
                                          11

convictions on counts I and II.6 For both counts, the State had to prove Sidney

engaged in a sex act with M.S. while she was under the age of sixteen and they

were members of the same household who were not husband and wife. For count

I, the State also had to prove the sex act was contact between Sidney’s penis or

his mouth and M.S.’s vagina. As for count II, the State had to prove sexual contact

between Sidney’s fingers and M.S.’s vagina.

       It is unclear which of these elements Sidney claims is not supported by the

appropriate weight of credible evidence. Sidney raises questions about much of

M.S.’s testimony that Sidney was physically aggressive toward her—both during

sex acts and other times. But Sidney is challenging the weight of the evidence on

counts I and II, neither of which contain the “by force or against the will” element.

In addition, Sidney attempts to raise doubts about M.S.’s overall veracity—pointing

out what he calls “inconsistencies” but what are generally just actions taken by

M.S. that are different than those he apparently thinks a victim should take—after

the district court explicitly found M.S.’s testimony credible, ruling:

               [Sidney] asserts that the State failed to provide sufficient
       evidence to prove [he] performed a specific sex act with M.S. while
       she was under the age of sixteen and that indicated that the sexual
       encounters between M.S. and him were inconsistent and not credible
       given her testimony based upon other evidence at trial. [Sidney]
       really doesn’t cite any specific instances of inconsistency but notes
       them in the argument.
               In contrast, though, in reviewing the testimony in this case,
       M.S. provided testimony that the Court believes was credible.
       Specifically, [M.S.] stated and testified that she moved in with the
       defendant in 2013 at the age of twelve or thirteen, and soon after
       moving in, while she was approximately thirteen years of age,
       [Sidney] began touching her in an inappropriate manner.
               This then progressed to full contact between [Sidney’s] penis
       and her vagina, [his] mouth and her vagina. She testified that there

6 Counts III through V are not challenged.
                                           12

       was contact between [Sidney’s] penis and her vagina and [Sidney’s]
       mouth and her vagina prior to them moving to Ankeny, which placed
       her at the age of approximately fifteen.
               While [Sidney] made statements that were in some ways
       different than this when he spoke for the officers, as the State
       purportedly notes, [Sidney] was not under oath at this time and was
       not subject to cross-examination.

And nothing Sidney argues on appeal convinces us the district court was wrong

about M.S.’s credibility. So, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion

in denying Sidney’s motion for new trial. See State v. Jackson Thomas, 987

N.W.2d 455, 464 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022) (reiterating that our review is for whether

the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new trial).

III. Conclusion.

       We do not reach the merits of Sidney’s claims about the court declaring a

mistrial, we find no error in the challenged jury instruction, and the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Sidney’s motion for new trial. We affirm.

       AFFIRMED.