Court Opinion

ID: 9847891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:09:23.95516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:43.234648
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion and write only to state my extended view of the meaning of OCGA § 33-34-2 (8) and (11). That section defines the terms “occupying” and “pedestrian” as follows: “(8) ‘Occupying’ means to be in or upon a motor vehicle or engaged in the immediate act of entering into or alighting from the motor vehicle. . . . (11) ‘Pedestrian’ means any person not occupying a motor vehicle or a motorcycle. ...” (Elsewhere a motor vehicle is defined so as to exclude a motorcycle. Some confusion is injected at this point by defining “occupying” in terms of a motor vehicle while defining a “pedestrian” in part as one not occupying a motorcycle. I will do as others have done and use the same definition for “occupying” whether it relates to a motorcycle or to a motor vehicle.) Since Collins was unquestionably not in, upon or entering into the motorcycle he can only have been occupying it if, at the time allegedly struck by the automobile, he was still in the immediate act of alighting from the motor vehicle. The focus is on the word “immediate.” It means, “acting or being without the intervention of another object, cause, or agency.” Websters’ New Third International Dictionary Unabridged. I completely agree with the majority that the conduct of Lovett in placing his vehicle so as to protect Collins in his precarious position lying in the roadway could constitute such an intervention so that Collins was no longer in the immediate act of alighting from the motorcycle. But, it is to be observed that other objects, causes or agencies might also act to intervene. In particular, I believe time itself *496may act as such an agency. In nearly every case, as it is here, it will be a question of fact as to whether one is still in the immediate act of alighting from a motorcycle or motor vehicle at the time of the injury. To the extent the views expressed herein conflict with some of the language of Partridge v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 172 Ga. App. 466 (323 SE2d 676) (1984), I would disapprove that decision.