Court Opinion

ID: 9702975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:35:13.097182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.409693
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
MUSMANNO, J.:
¶ 11 respectfully dissent.
¶2 Since 1992, Pennsylvania has followed the two-disease rule with regard to asbestos-related diseases. See Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., 417 Pa.Super. 440, 612 A.2d 1021 (1992) (en banc). In Marinari, this Court held that a plaintiff's “discovery of a nonmalignant, asbestos related lung pathology ... does not trigger the statute of limitations with respect to an action for a later, separately diagnosed, disease of lung cancer.” Id. at 1022.
¶ 3 In the instant case, while the Appellants previously recovered for fear of cancer, neither the Appellants nor Crane contend that Shaw or Abrams suffered from asbestos-related lung cancer prior to their respective diagnoses of that disease in December 2002. Clearly, lung cancer is a separate and distinct disease from the asbestos-related conditions for which the Appellants previously recovered. Further, recovery of damages for “fear of cancer” is not equivalent to recovery of damages after a diagnosis of the disease of cancer is made. There can be no dispute that lung cancer is a separate and distinct disease from the asbestos-related medical conditions for which the Appellants previously recovered damages. In addition, the record is clear that the Appellants did not sue Crane in the previous actions.
¶ 4 The record shows that Shaw and Abrams were diagnosed with lung cancer in 2002. They filed the present actions in 2003, well within the two-year statute of limitations. Therefore, I would conclude that the Appellants have valid claims, which are not precluded by the statute of limitations. The Appellants have not recovered anything from Crane, and they each sued within two years of Shaw’s and Abrams’s lung cancer diagnoses. Accord*398ingly, the Appellants should be entitled to a trial before a fact-finder.