Court Opinion

ID: 9731163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:36:39.155223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:13.934403
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting in part1: I dissent in part. I concur in the majority’s determination that the writ of certiorari was a properly available form of procedural relief under the circumstances which confronted this plaintiff. The writ may be granted where a petitioner shows that an inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has failed to proceed according to law and no other mode of direct review is obtainable. (Loomis v. Wilkinson (1852), 13 Ill. 660, 663; Goodfriend v. Board of Appeals (1973), 18 Ill. App. 3d 412, 418, 305 N.E.2d 404.) Barden v. Junior College District No. 520 (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 1038, 271 N.E.2d 680, cert. denied (1972), 406 U.S. 920, 32 L. Ed. 2d 120, 92 S. Ct. 1777, cited as a ground for denying certiorari, although a sound decision, is distinguishable for two simple reasons; first, Maas alleges the violation of constitutional rights which are not properly reviewable in a contract action; second, and intertwined with the former, in a common law action in contract, reinstatement is not an available remedy because of the general rule that an employment contract will not be specifically enforced; thus, one of Maas’ chief interests in instituting the present litigation would not be served. However, upon reaching the merits of this cause, I would decline to resolve the constitutional issues of substantive and procedural due process raised by the appellant because of the opposing position I set out hereafter regarding the contractual agreement which existed between these parties. Since a decision according to this position would dictate reversal of the circuit court’s decision, there would be no necessity to add our voice to the already multitudinous opinions which have sifted the constitutional ramifications engaged by the discharge of public employees. Haughton v. Haughton (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 439, 448, 394 N.E.2d 385; Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc. (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 112, 116, 214 N.E.2d 746; In re Estate of Ersch (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 572, 577, 195 N.E.2d 149; see generally Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936), 297 U.S. 288, 347, 80 L. Ed. 688, 56 S. Ct. 466 (Brandeis, J., concurring); accord, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), 343 U.S. 579, 595, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 72 S. Ct. 863 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In resolving this extraordinarily contentious dispute the standard and scope of review which we are bound by has been clearly stated. The only province of the reviewing court is to consider the entire record, ascertain the presence or absence of jurisdiction in the tribunal below, and find whether it has proceeded according to law and acted upon evidence. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. v. City of Evanston (1975), 25 Ill. App. 3d 879, 884, 324 N.E.2d 65. In the case at bar it is necessary to decide whether evidence in the record fairly tends to support the conclusion of the board that Maas as a matter of law acted in breach of the terms of her sabbatical leave contract, thus constituting sufficient cause for her suspension and dismissal. If the findings of an administrative agency are erroneous as a matter of law, the appellate court need not defer to legal conclusions arrived at by the agency in making its decision; if not, and the evidence is properly supportive, the court is bound to uphold it. See Danison v. Paley (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 1036, 355 N.E.2d 230. The majority correctly emphasizes the importance of parol evidence in this case. But additional rules of construction need to be applied as well. In order to decide whether Maas acted in breach of contract, the terms of the agreement must be fully understood. If conditions to performance exist, they must be made free of ambiguity. In aid of this process there is the rule that where a contractual document is ambiguous its contents will be construed most strongly against the party responsible for its preparation; because that party chose the words used he is responsible for the ambiguity. The ultimate concern is to discern the substantial intent of the parties. To do that the agreement as a whole must be examined; its nature, purpose, subject matter and, if ambiguous, the circumstances under which it was made must all be taken into account to arrive at a proper construction. Marshall Field & Co. v. J. B. Noelle Co. (1967), 81 Ill. App. 2d 409, 414, 226 N.E.2d 454. Appellees place great weight on the content of a covering letter by Chancellor Spencer dated September 17 (reproduced by the majority at page 12), arguing that it must be read as a part of the agreement which Maas signed. Appellant, on the other hand, seeks to exclude this letter from consideration asserting that the notice of intent dated September 16 (reproduced below) must be interpreted as the operative document, complete on its face, executed by both parties, and making no reference whatsoever to the covering letter. The focus of either position is overly constricted where ambiguities exist and the parties’ understanding of the agreement has been called into question. In urging that the covering letter be read as part of the agreement appellees cite Rudolph v. O. D. Jennings & Co. (1962), 38 Ill. App. 2d 92, 97,186 N.E.2d 80. There the fundamental principle is stated that the introduction of other memoranda is prohibited by the parol evidence rule only when it is determined that a document is the complete and exclusive statement of the agreement of the parties, as the majority insists. Appellees would have us open the door but a notch; I believe we are obliged to open it further and examine what the light will reveal. To begin with, the September 16 and September 17 writings are in no way complete and exclusive. The long process of negotiation that preceded the signing of a contract for the 1975-1976 academic year began in November of 1974. The intermittent communications between the parties were plagued by confusion, inattention, misunderstanding, and what may charitably be called plain and wilful hard bargaining. It appears that Maas felt throughout entitled to a sabbatical on terms which the administration could not, for reasons beyond its control, accede to during the 1975-1976 academic year. Recognizing this, appellant reduced her demands on several occasions only to raise them again in frustration during later discussions. The appellees’ position remained consistent, being prepared to offer a leave for the fall quarter at full salary and a professional leave of absence without salary for the remaining winter and spring quarters. In all, four separate contractual memoranda were submitted to the appellant. Only the final operative instrument dated September 16, 1975, is material and it is set out below: “ANNUAL STATEMENT TO INSTRUCTORS ON TENURE ILLINOIS EASTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGES DISTRICT NO. 529 OLNEY, ILLINOIS DATE September 16, 1975 TO Christine Maas The Board of Trustees, Illinois Eastern Community Colleges, District No. 529, Olney, Illinois wishes to state: 1. That you are recorded as an instructor under continued contractual service as provided by the Board Rules and Regulations. 2. That your base salary for the 1975-76 academic year as established by the official College Calendar (term of nine months) will be $5,483.33 (1/3 of salary for Sabbatical Leave) (Sabbatical Leave for Fall Quarter and Professional Leave for Winter and Spring Quarter) INFORMATION Year of Teaching 20 Degree Classification M + 60 College Olney Central. Will you kindly return within fifteen days one of the enclosed forms. By Order of Board of Trustees Date September 16,1975 /s/ James Spencer Chancellor NOTICE OF INTENT I, Christine Maas, instructor in the Illinois Eastern Community Colleges, District No. 529, Olney, Illinois, hereby state that I do intend a Sabbatical Leave in the said College District for the Academic year of 1975-76. (Signed) Christine Maas Instructor (Date) Sept. 26, 1975.” Along with this simple memorial, Chancellor Spencer’s covering letter dated September 17 (reproduced by the majority at page 12) was sent. It is the contention of the appellees that this letter must be read as part of the contract which Maas signed and agreed to perform. The majority in essence adopts this point of view. But this is to ignore other facts which I believe necessitate a differing outcome. Previous to signing the contract set forth above, the responsible administrative committee approved Maas’ sabbatical study proposal (submitted on March 20,1975) as required in regulations promulgated by the District. Language within the proposal clearly put the committee and the board on notice of the planned course of study which Maas intended to pursue. Its approval can leave no doubt that such a regime of study was academically and administratively acceptable to the defendants. In significant part it specified that: “The degree programs at Western Colorado University center around the concepts of the ‘Topic of Study’ and the ‘Graduation Contract’ as opposed to traditionally numbered courses and sequences. « * * I selected Western Colorado University because of its special programs and innovative strategies. In keeping with the University’s individualized, personalized philosophy of education, a flexible registration schedule has been implemented. e e e Students are classified under one of two headings: Internal or External. # # # Internal [sic] students are those individuals who are registered in a degree program at the University, but who are pursuing their studies at a location other than on the University campus. Such off-campus studies are normally supervised by external advisors, and may consist of independent study and research in a nearby library, formal courses taken at another approved college or university, or a combination of these and other learning approaches. It is also possible to carry on studies through taped instructions, written communication, telephone advisement, and programmed instructional material.” The administration argues that the parties agreed and Maas verbally acceded to a course of instruction which involved full-time enrollment at either E.I.U. or the University of Illinois. Both schools were already in session at the time of the September 6 meeting, a fact it is difficult to believe those involved did not know. Maas contends that she did not agree to alter her sabbatical arrangements, that she was to continue as an external student enrolled at W.C.U., and that she followed the course of study indicated to the committee by working independently on papers and sitting in on courses at E.I.U. There was no meeting of the minds regarding a change in the substantive content of Maas’ sabbatical plans as is proposed by the appellee and adopted by the majority as a result of the meeting of September 6, nor was there later on the 26th when Maas signed the notice of intent. The appellant always planned to use the facilities of E.I.U., and never intended to “attend” W.C.U. during the time in question. While there appears to have been a unilateral misunderstanding, the parties, at a minimum, agreed to the proposition which the administration, through its sabbatical leave committee, had put forward from the beginning and which Maas reluctantly accepted. This proposition had been voted by the board and incorporated the original sabbatical proposal adopted by the leave committee and recommended for board approval by the chancellor. The minutes concerning the board’s final resolution on the contract read as follows: “B. Contract Extended — Trustee William E. Hoffee made a motion that Christine Maas be extended a contract identical to the one extended in June, 1975 by the Board of Trustees and that it be broadened to include her pursuit of the Doctorate at Eastern Illinois University and the University of Illinois, under terms of the previous contract. Said contract must be accepted, if at all, within 15 days.” (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that Maas continued to work on her doctoral studies as a W.C.U. graduate student throughout the fall term and into 1976, the purpose for which professional leave was given to her. The record also shows that Maas had completed 60 post-graduate credit hours at E.I.U. prior to the proposed fall sabbatical. It does not appear from the record that “enrollment” at either of the Illinois universities, full-time or otherwise, was a prerequisite to the completion of her Ph.D. requirements as approved through proper channels of authority at OIney Central. Resolution of any dispute as to curriculum is certainly not within our authority. Even when the covering letter is read as part of the contract, it is not evident that it requires enrollment per se at these universities. For instance, the words “on a full-time basis” in that letter referred to pursuit of post-graduate study. There is nothing in the record to dissuade me from the belief that Maas performed according to her sabbatical proposal when it is considered in conjunction with these documents. The letter and the attached notice of intent are devoid of any more specific statement regarding the nature of the performance required. The only written source of greater detail is the approved and adopted sabbatical proposal of March 20,1975. Hence, I can arrive at no construction of the agreement which would lead me to believe that the board has been deprived of the benefit of its bargain. Maas’ dismissal, as the result of such a construction, would work a complete forfeiture of her contractual right to a tenured position. It follows from the above discussion that under these facts Maas did not breach the agreement which resulted, as a matter of law, between the parties. Thus, she was not guilty of any conduct which could be said to have been unbecoming of a faculty member or which could constitute unsatisfactory performance of contracted services. I find that the record fails to contain any evidence fairly tending to support the conclusion of the board of trustees and the decision of the circuit court upholding it. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.   Justice Moses W. Harrison replaced Justice George J. Moran, who retired after oral argument.