Court Opinion

ID: 9907858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 15:06:43.431531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:47.826662
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                      SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                      APPELLATE DIVISION
                                      DOCKET NO. A-0372-22

D.T.,

        Plaintiff-Appellant,                 APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
                                                      December 7, 2023
v.                                                  APPELLATE DIVISION

ARCHDIOCESE OF
PHILADELPHIA and
MICHAEL J. MCCARTHY,

     Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________

              Argued October 10, 2023 – Decided December 7, 2023

              Before Judges Gilson, Berdote Byrne, and Bishop-
              Thompson.

              On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
              Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County,
              Docket No. L-1327-20.

              Ruxandra M. Laidacker argued the cause for appellant
              (Kline & Specter, PC, attorneys; Charles L. Becker,
              David K. Inscho, Lorraine H. Donnelly, and Ruxandra
              M. Laidacker, on the briefs).

              Nicholas M. Centrella argued the cause for respondent
              Archdiocese of Philadelphia (Clark Hill PLC,
              attorneys; Nicholas M. Centrella, on the brief).

        The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILSON, P.J.A.D.

      Plaintiff D.T. alleges that Michael McCarthy, a former Catholic priest,

sexually abused him in New Jersey in 1971. 1 At that time, plaintiff was fourteen

years old, and McCarthy was serving as a priest and teacher in the Archdiocese

of Philadelphia (the Archdiocese). Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing

his claims against the Archdiocese for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because

there are no facts establishing that the Archdiocese purposefully availed itself

of any benefits in or from New Jersey related to McCarthy's alleged abuse of

plaintiff, we affirm.

                                        I.

      We discern the facts from the record developed during jurisdictional

discovery.    The Archdiocese is an unincorporated, religious, non-profit

association that operates in Pennsylvania. Its principal place of administration

is in Philadelphia, and it oversees Catholic parishes in five Pennsylvania

counties. The Archdiocese does not oversee or operate any churches, parishes,

or religious facilities in New Jersey. It also does not assign priests to any

parishes in New Jersey.

1
  Plaintiff used his initials in his complaint. We use initials to protect privacy
interests concerning allegations of child sexual abuse. See R. 1:38-3(c)(9).
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                                        2
      The Archdiocese does not currently own any real property in New Jersey.

In the past, the Archdiocese did own several properties in New Jersey that were

given to it, but those properties were sold before 2013. The Archdiocese also

owned and operated two properties in Ventnor, New Jersey, which it used as

vacation homes for priests. The Ventnor properties were acquired in 1963 and

sold in 2012 and 2013.

      McCarthy began working as a parish priest and teacher for the

Archdiocese in 1965. From 1965 to 1989, he taught at Cardinal O'Hara High

School in Springfield, Pennsylvania.       McCarthy lived at the St. Bernadette

Parish in Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania, from 1965 to 1975, where he also served as

a priest.

      It was while McCarthy was serving as a priest in Drexel Hill,

Pennsylvania, that he came to know plaintiff and plaintiff's family. In 1971,

McCarthy counseled plaintiff's family when plaintiff's parents decided to renew

their wedding vows and baptize plaintiff's father as part of the ceremony.

McCarthy also ministered to the family when plaintiff's father became ill and

died in 1971. At that time, McCarthy offered to mentor plaintiff, who was then

fourteen years old.

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                                       3
      In July 1971, McCarthy invited plaintiff to go with him to a home

McCarthy used in Margate, New Jersey. 2 Plaintiff's mother gave permission,

and McCarthy and plaintiff then drove to the Margate home. When they arrived,

plaintiff alleges that McCarthy showed him pornography, encouraged him to

drink alcohol, and sexually assaulted him.

      Plaintiff also alleges that the Archdiocese was "on notice" of McCarthy's

propensity for sexually abusing young boys beginning in 1986.         McCarthy

resigned as a parish priest in 1993. The following year, the Archdiocese placed

McCarthy on leave, and in 2003, McCarthy retired from serving as a priest.

      In 2005, a Philadelphia grand jury issued a report concerning sexual abuse

of minors by priests in the Archdiocese. McCarthy was identified as one of the

perpetrators. The report stated that the Archdiocese received allegations of

sexual abuse by McCarthy in 1986, 1991, and 1992. The report also included

summaries of witnesses' testimony, several of whom described sexual abuse by

McCarthy at the home in Margate.3            The following year, in 2006, the

2
   The record is not entirely clear, but one of McCarthy's relatives appears to
have originally owned the home in Margate. McCarthy purchased the home in
1973. It is undisputed that the Archdiocese did not own or conduct any activities
at the home in Margate.
3
  The Archdiocese contends that the grand jury report is hearsay and should not
be considered. We deem the report relevant discovery related to the question of

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                                       4
Archdiocese "laicized" McCarthy; meaning that McCarthy was dismissed from

the clerical state and lost all rights and obligations associated with ordination.

Glossary     of     Terms,      The     Diocese      of     Springfield,   Mass.,

https://diospringfield.org/osevaglossaryofterms/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2023)

(defining "laicization").

      In May 2020, plaintiff filed this complaint against McCarthy and the

Archdiocese in New Jersey.        Plaintiff alleged that defendants negligently

provided pastoral services to him when McCarthy sexually abused plaintiff in

New Jersey. Plaintiff also contended that the Archdiocese was vicariously liable

for McCarthy's tortious acts and that the Archdiocese was negligent in hiring

and supervising McCarthy. In addition, plaintiff asserted a claim for assault and

battery against McCarthy.

      In November 2020, the trial court granted the Archdiocese's motion to

dismiss plaintiff's claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court

also denied plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery.

      We granted plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal and, on January 11, 2021,

summarily vacated and reversed the trial court's order of November 17, 2020.

personal jurisdiction over the Archdiocese. In doing so, we take no position on
whether the report is hearsay or whether it would be admissible for other
purposes.
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                                         5
We remanded the matter so that jurisdictional discovery could be conducted.

Order on Motion, D.T. v. Archdiocese of Phila., No. 0188-20 (App. Div. Jan.

11, 2021). The Supreme Court denied the Archdiocese's motion for leave to

appeal.

      On remand, the parties conducted jurisdictional discovery. Thereafter, the

Archdiocese again moved to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal

jurisdiction. On December 6, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting that

motion. The court also entered an order granting the Archdiocese's motion to

dismiss McCarthy's crossclaims against it.

      On January 14, 2022, we granted plaintiff's second motion for leave to

appeal and summarily vacated the trial court's December 6, 2021 order. Order

on Motion, D.T. v. Archdiocese of Phila., No. 1234-21 (App. Div. Jan. 14,

2022). We remanded the matter and directed the trial court to "create a proper

record" concerning the Archdiocese's ownership of property in New Jersey. In

the order, we stated in relevant part:

            After receiving competent proofs regarding [the
            Archdiocese's ownership of real property in New
            Jersey], the [trial] court shall [then] reconsider its
            decision based on this fully developed record and
            address whether the nature and extent of the
            Archdiocese's past ownership of property in New
            Jersey, during relevant time periods, shows that the

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                                         6
            Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of the privilege
            of conducting activities with New Jersey.

Thereafter, we denied the Archdiocese's motion for reconsideration, and the

Supreme Court denied the Archdiocese's motion for leave to appeal.

      Following the second remand, the parties conducted additional discovery

concerning the Archdiocese's former ownership of property in New Jersey. The

Archdiocese produced records and submitted a certification from a

representative of its Office of Property Services that described the real property

the Archdiocese had previously owned in New Jersey.              That discovery

established that plaintiff had never been to any of those New Jersey properties

and there was no evidence that McCarthy had ever sexually assaulted plaintiff

at any of those properties.

      The Archdiocese then moved for a third time to dismiss the claims against

it for lack of personal jurisdiction. On August 19, 2022, the trial court issued

an order and a statement of reasons granting that motion. The trial court found

that the Archdiocese's past ownership of property in New Jersey did not

constitute purposeful availment of any benefit from New Jersey related to

McCarthy's alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff. The trial court also found that the

Archdiocese had not purposefully availed itself of any benefit in New Jersey

related to plaintiff's allegations because those allegations "only involve[d] the

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                                        7
unilateral act[s] of [McCarthy]" and did not involve deliberate conduct by the

Archdiocese. In its written decision, the trial court also rejected plaintiff's

"agency" theory of jurisdiction, finding that there was "no credible evidence the

Archdiocese's supervisory activities purposefully targeted New Jersey."             In

addition, the trial court found that plaintiff's claims did not arise out of or relate

to any contact the Archdiocese had with New Jersey.

      Thereafter, plaintiff moved for, and we granted, leave to appeal the August

19, 2022 order dismissing the claims against the Archdiocese for lack of

personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff's claims against McCarthy are still pending.

                                         II.

      On appeal, plaintiff makes two arguments. First, he contends that the

Archdiocese is subject to specific jurisdiction in New Jersey through the actions

of McCarthy, who was an "agent" of the Archdiocese. In that regard, plaintiff

asserts that the Archdiocese "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of

conducting activities in New Jersey through the conduct of priests like

McCarthy."     Plaintiff goes on to contend that McCarthy's "pastoral and

mentoring activities" were not beyond the scope of the agency the Archdiocese

conferred on him as a priest. Second, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred

when it focused only on McCarthy's abusive actions in New Jersey.

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                                          8
      Having considered these arguments in light of the record and governing

law, we reject them.      The facts disclosed during jurisdictional discovery

established that the Archdiocese is not subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey

because it did not purposefully avail itself of activities in New Jersey sufficient

to satisfy the "minimum contacts" required for personal jurisdiction. See Int'l

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).

      A.    The Law Concerning Personal Jurisdiction.

      Personal jurisdiction is a "'mixed question of law and fact' that must be

resolved at the outset, 'before the matter may proceed.'" Rippon v. Smigel, 449

N.J. Super. 344, 359 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Est. of

Simpson, 290 N.J. Super. 519, 532 (App. Div. 1996)). We review a trial court's

findings of fact with respect to jurisdiction "to determine if those findings are

supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record," but conclusions of

law are reviewed de novo. Id. at 358. "A trial court's interpretation of the law

and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to

any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,

140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

      "A New Jersey court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-

resident defendant 'consistent with due process of law.'" Bayway Refin. Co. v.

                                                                             A-0372-22
                                        9
State Utils., Inc., 333 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting R. 4:4-

4(b)(1)).     New Jersey courts "exercise jurisdiction over non[-]resident

defendants 'to the uttermost limits permitted by the United States Constitution.'"

Jardim v. Overley, 461 N.J. Super. 367, 377 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Avdel

Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268 (1971)).

      To be subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum state, due process requires

that the non-resident defendant "have certain minimum contacts with it such that

the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,

311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 164 N.J. 38, 65

(2000).     "[T]he requisite quality and quantum of contacts is dependent on

whether general or specific jurisdiction is asserted." Citibank, 290 N.J. Super.

at 526.      General jurisdiction "requires affiliations 'so "continuous and

systematic" as to render'" a non-resident organizational defendant "'essentially

at home in the forum State.'" Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 133 n.11

(2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.

915, 919 (2011)). The parties agree that the Archdiocese is not subject to

general jurisdiction in New Jersey. Accordingly, we focus on whether there is

specific jurisdiction.

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                                       10
      To determine whether a non-resident defendant may be subject to specific

personal jurisdiction, courts examine the "relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation." Lebel v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 115 N.J. 317, 323

(1989) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). "In order for a

state court to exercise [specific] jurisdiction over a non[-]resident defendant, the

lawsuit 'must aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts with the

forum.'" Jardim, 461 N.J. Super. at 376 (third and fourth alterations in original)

(quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127); accord Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins.

Co., 138 N.J. 106, 119 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995); see also Ford

Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1025

(2021).

      "The 'minimum contacts' requirement is satisfied so long as the contacts

resulted from the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities

of the plaintiff." Lebel, 115 N.J. at 323 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)); see also Waste Mgmt., 138 N.J. at

126 (explaining that "the existence of minimum contacts turns on the presence

or absence of intentional acts of the defendant to avail itself of some benefit of

a forum state"). The contacts "must be the defendant's own choice and not

'random, isolated, or fortuitous.'" Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Keeton v.

                                                                              A-0372-22
                                        11
Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). Moreover, courts determine,

based on the defendant's "'conduct and connection' with the forum stat e . . .

whether the defendant should 'reasonably anticipate being haled into court [in

the forum state].'" Bayway Refin., 333 N.J. Super. at 429 (alteration in original)

(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).

      In determining whether the requirement to comport with "fair play and

substantial justice" is satisfied, courts evaluate several factors. Asahi Metal

Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). A court "must consider

the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's

interest in obtaining relief." Ibid. A court must also weigh "the interstate

judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of

controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering

fundamental substantive social policies."          Ibid. (quoting World-Wide

Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).

      B.    The Lack of Specific Jurisdiction Over the Archdiocese.

      Neither the Archdiocese's former ownership of properties in New Jersey

nor its supervision over McCarthy as one of its priests established specific

jurisdiction over the Archdiocese in New Jersey related to McCarthy's alleged

sexual abuse of plaintiff in New Jersey.

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                                       12
      1.    The Archdiocese's Former Ownership of Property in New Jersey.

      There is no evidence that the Archdiocese's former ownership of real

properties in New Jersey had any relation to plaintiff's allegation of abuse by

McCarthy. Plaintiff has certified that he was abused by McCarthy at a private

home McCarthy was using in Margate, New Jersey in 1971. The Archdiocese's

former ownership of other properties in New Jersey was not related to

McCarthy's use of the home in Margate. Nor did plaintiff allege that McCarthy

used the former properties to sexually abuse plaintiff. Specific jurisdiction

requires "a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue."

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 265 (2017).

      The facts of Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Phila., in which the Law Division

held the Archdiocese had the requisite minimum contacts with New Jersey to

confer personal jurisdiction, are distinguishable. 461 N.J. Super. 406 (Law Div.

2019). In Doe 1 the Law Division took judicial notice that, from 1963 to 2013,

the Archdiocese owned properties in Ventnor and that the Diocese of Trenton,

New Jersey was "partners" with the Pennsylvania seminary that the priest

alleged to have abused Doe 1 attended. Id. at 424. The court also noted the

Archdiocese's property was "located only a few miles from the alleged location

of the abuse." Ibid. Unlike in Doe 1, there is no evidence in this record that

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                                      13
plaintiff's parish was "partnered" with any New Jersey diocese or parish.

Further, there is no indication that any sexual abuse of plaintiff occurred at the

Archdiocese's properties.    In short, the Archdiocese's former ownership of

property, absent a connection to plaintiff's cause of action, is insufficient to

establish personal jurisdiction.

      2.    The Archdiocese's Supervision and Employment of McCarthy.

      There is no evidence that the Archdiocese controlled, supervised, or was

even aware of McCarthy's alleged sexual assault of plaintiff in New Jersey. The

record does not contain any evidence that the Archdiocese had been notified of

McCarthy's attraction to young boys in or before 1971.          Indeed, plaintiff

concedes that the Archdiocese was first on notice of McCarthy's propensity to

sexually abuse young boys in 1986.

      Moreover, there was no evidence that the Archdiocese knew of, approved,

or sanctioned McCarthy taking plaintiff to a private home in Margate.

Accordingly, there is no evidence demonstrating that the Archdiocese

purposefully availed itself of any benefit or activity in New Jersey in connection

with plaintiff's allegations against McCarthy.

      We reject plaintiff's agency argument because the facts do not support it.

Plaintiff contends the Archdiocese employed and controlled McCarthy at all

                                                                            A-0372-22
                                       14
times when he was a priest of the Archdiocese. Plaintiff then argues that

McCarthy was counseling and ministering to plaintiff when he brought him to

New Jersey and sexually assaulted him.

      Initially, we note that determining personal jurisdiction is a separate

question from determining vicarious liability. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026

(explaining that the United States Supreme Court has "never framed the specific

jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring proof of causation—i.e., proof that the

plaintiff's claim came about because of the defendant's in-state conduct").

Nevertheless, the authorized acts of an agent can establish personal jurisdiction

over the principal. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 135 n.13.

      To hold a principal vicariously liable for an agent's tortious conduct, the

agent must be acting within the scope of his or her employment and

responsibilities. Haviland v. Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty., Inc., 250

N.J. 368, 378 (2022); Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405,

416 (1994). "An employee is acting within the scope of employment if the

action is 'of the kind'" that the employee is hired to perform; "it occurs

substantially within the authorized time and space limits;" and "it is actuated, at

least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer]." Abbamont, 138 N.J. at 416

(quoting Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 169 (1982)).

                                                                             A-0372-22
                                       15
      If an agent is acting outside the scope of his or her employment, the

employer may be held vicariously liable if it "delegates the authority to control

the work environment to a supervisor and that supervisor abuses that delegated

authority." Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 620 (1993). That

inquiry requires the factfinder to determine that: "(1) the employer gave the

authority to the supervisor to control the situation about which the plaintiff

complains; (2) the supervisor exercised that authority; (3) the exercise of

authority resulted in a violation . . . ; and (4) the authority delegated by the

employer to the supervisor aided the supervisor in injuring the plaintiff."

Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 188 N.J. 69, 101-02 (2006).

      Moreover, that individuals may be agents for one purpose, does not mean

that they are agents for every purpose. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 135; see, e.g.,

Thompson v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of Wash., 735 F. Supp. 2d 121, 129-30

(D. Del. 2010) (explaining that a priest did not act within the scope of his

employment because he performed the claimed act of sexual abuse for his own

gratification and not at the direction of the diocese); Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F.

Supp. 2d 742, 758 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (stating that it is "clear that [the priest's]

sexual molestation of [p]laintiff was not within the scope or nature of his

employment as a priest").

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                                      16
         McCarthy was not acting within the scope of his responsibilities as a priest

when he sexually assaulted plaintiff. In addition, in 1971, the Archdiocese had

no knowledge of prior sexual assaults by McCarthy, and, therefore, at least at

that time, would have had no reason to restrict or strip him of his priestly duties.

Further, there is no evidence that the Archdiocese delegated to McCarthy the

authority to control plaintiff by counseling and ministering to plaintiff in his

private home in New Jersey. Instead, the facts establish that plaintiff's mother

gave McCarthy permission to take plaintiff to the home in Margate.

         In reaching this holding, we have considered the New Jersey Legislature's

2019 enactment of the Child Victims Act (CV Act). L. 2019, c. 120. The CV

Act provides a two-year revival window for victims to file otherwise time-barred

claims for sexual abuses committed against them while minors. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-

2b(a).     The CV Act also amended the Charitable Immunity Act to allow

retroactive liability against religious and other charitable organizations.

N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c); N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b(b). While the CV Act evidences New

Jersey's strong public policy to protect and compensate children who were

sexually abused, the CV Act does not change the federal constitutional due

process protections concerning personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, to sue a non-

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                                         17
resident defendant in New Jersey, the non-resident defendant must still be

subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.

      Our holding is also consistent with rulings by other courts that have

considered whether Catholic dioceses, including the Archdiocese, are subject to

personal jurisdiction because of alleged sexual abuses committed by priests. 4

Like this case, those cases depended on the specific jurisdictional facts involved.

The facts in this case are analogous to the facts in the cases that have held there

is no personal jurisdiction. See Cath. Diocese of Green Bay, Inc., v. John Doe

119, 349 P.3d 518 (Nev. 2015) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over

the Catholic Diocese of Green Bay because the priest alleged to have committed

sexual abuse unilaterally sought employment in Nevada and the Diocese did not

maintain control or supervision over the priest's day-to-day work); Tercero v.

Roman Cath. Diocese of Norwich, 48 P.3d 50 (N.M. 2002) (concluding there

was no jurisdiction over the non-resident Diocese of Norwich because at the

time of the alleged abuse, the Diocese had little, if any, connection to,

participation with, or control over the priest or the treatment center it had sent

him to for therapy); Archdiocese of Detroit v. Green, 899 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist.

4
  The parties cite to several unpublished opinions. We, however, do not rely on
or cite to unpublished opinions because they do not constitute binding precedent.
R. 1:36-3.
                                                                             A-0372-22
                                       18
Ct. App. 2004) (finding no basis for jurisdiction on an agency theory when a

priest unilaterally moved to Florida and the Diocese later gave permission for

his incardination without any knowledge of the allegations of sexual

misconduct); Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Boise, Inc., 918 P.2d 17 (N.M. Ct.

App. 1996) (holding the Diocese of Boise was not subject to suit in New Mexico

because giving a priest permission to leave Idaho without retaining any control

over his ministerial duties did not constitute a purposeful act).

      By contrast, the facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts in

cases where courts have found personal jurisdiction.         See Archdiocese of

Milwaukee v. Superior Ct., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (finding

personal jurisdiction where the Milwaukee Archdiocese excardinated a priest

convicted of sexual perversion in Wisconsin and knowingly facilitated his

incardination in California despite the risk of harm to young boys); John Does

1—9 v. Compcare, Inc., 763 P.2d 1237 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (holding personal

jurisdiction existed where the Diocese of Lafayette in Louisiana relocated a

priest it had suspended for sexual misconduct with minors for treatment at a

Jesuit House in Spokane to avoid harmful publicity and additional legal

consequences stemming from his pedophiliac problems).

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                                       19
      Finally, we also reject plaintiff's vague contentions concerning sexual

abuses by other priests of the Archdiocese. Initially, we note that there is no

evidence or even an allegation that activities by other priests affected plaintiff.

More critically, as we have analyzed, to establish specific jurisdiction in this

case, plaintiff must establish that the Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of

benefits from New Jersey related to McCarthy's alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff.

Non-specific allegations about sexual abuse of other children by other priests of

the Archdiocese do not provide such proof.

      Affirmed.

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                                       20