Court Opinion

ID: 9672311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:52:30.902345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:39.191881
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(re § 20 only). I dissent as to § 20, third sentence. I sympathize with the feeling of my colleagues that the universities have been unwise and impolitic in seeking a resolution of these particular differences with the Legislature in this forum, and that by and large the universities and the Legislature have commendably resolved their problems by working together. However, I believe the opinion of the majority effectively ignores the precedent of a number of the decisions of this Court, which have, for over 100 years, set a pattern for the successful and generally harmonious cooperation of these two constitutional entities. In addition to attempt to dismiss certain decisions as confusing obiter dicta is to ignore what our predecessors actually held in these decisions.
I — Facts
Plaintiffs question the constitutionality of the higher education appropriation act of 1971, PA 122, §§ 13, 20 and 26, as conflicting with Const 1963, art 8, § 1 and § 5 in this declaratory action.
My Sister Coleman has well and ably detailed the facts of the dispute, and we are in accord with her proposed resolution of § 13 and § 26 and with her interpretation of Const 1963, art 8, § 3. We therefore turn to a discussion and analysis of § 20.
*78II — The Statute and the Constitution
This is the first case in this area to reach our Court under the 1963 Constitution. Constitutional sections relevant to our discussion are contained in article 8 (emphasis added):
"Sec. 4. The legislature shall appropriate moneys to maintain the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, Eastern Michigan University, Michigan College of Science and Technology, Central Michigan University, Northern Michigan University, Western Michigan University, Ferris Institute, Grand Valley State College, by whatever names such institutions may hereafter be known, and other institutions of higher education established by law. The legislature shall be given an annual accounting of all income and expenditures by each of these educational institutions. Formal sessions of governing boards of such institutions shall be open to the public.”
"Sec. 5. The regents of the University of Michigan and their successors in office shall constitute a body corporate known as the Regents of the University of Michigan; the trustees of Michigan State University and their successors in office shall constitute a body corporate known as the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University; the governors of Wayne State University and their successors in office shall constitute a body corporate known as the Board of Governors of Wayne State University. Each board shall have general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution’s funds. Each board shall, as often as necessary, elect a president of the institution under its supervision. He shall be the principal executive officer of the institution, be ex-officio a member of the board without the right to vote and preside at meetings of the board. The board of each institution shall consist of eight members who shall hold office for terms of eight years and who shall be elected as provided by law. The governor shall fill board vacancies by appointment. Each appointee shall hold *79office until a successor has been nominated and elected as provided by law.”
Section 20 of the higher education appropriation act of 1971 provides:
"It is a condition of this appropriation that none of the appropriations contained in this act shall be used for the construction of buildings or operation of institutions of higher education not expressly authorized in section 1. No contract shall be let for construction of any self-liquidating project at any of the state supported institutions of higher education without first submitting to the appropriate legislative committees, schedules for the liquidation of the debt for the construction and operation of such project. Funds appropriated herein to each institution of higher education may not be used to pay for the construction, maintenance or operation of any self-liquidating projects.”
, III — Relevant Precedent
This Court has, in the past, had to attempt to reconcile similar appropriation restrictions with similar constitutional provisions.1 All decisions *80have reinforced the concept of university autonomy.
Thus, in 1856, when faced with a petition for mandamus against the Regents of the University of Michigan to require them to establish a professorship in homeopathy,2 we noted:
’’The respondents are constitutional officers, to whom are conñded by the constitution (art. xiii, §8) ’the general supervision of the university, and the direction and control of all expenditures from the university interest fund.’ They are elected by the people. They come at short intervals fresh from the body of the people, and cannot be supposed to be influenced by sentiments not common to those they represent. To their judgment and discretion as a body is committed the supervision of the financial and all other interests *81of an institution in which all the people of this state have a very great interest.” People v Regents, 4 Mich 98,104 (1856).
The writ was denied because, in view of the broad discretion accorded the Board of Regents, it had not been demonstrated that they were seeking to evade the law.
The issue was clearly faced when we were asked to determine whether a statute requiring sufficient security by bond for the payment of labor and material claims resulting when public buildings were built or otherwise improved at state expense3 applied to the Regents of the University of Michigan. In Weinberg v Regents of the University of Michigan, 97 Mich 246; 56 NW 605 (1893), we held that it did not.
It was in this decision that we first articulated the distinction between the constitutionally-created and independent nature of the university and that of other state institutions.
"These institutions are the creations of the Legislature. They are under the exclusive control and management of the State. The State, which created them, may at any time repeal the laws by which they were established, and sell the property.” 97 Mich 246, 252.
On the other hand, "the general supervision of *82the University is, by the Constitution, vested in the Regents”. 97 Mich 246, 253. Therefore,
"The University is the property of the people of the State, and in this sense is State property, so as to be exempt from taxation. Auditor General v Regents, 83 Mich 467 [1890]. But the people, who are the corpora-tors of this institution of learning, have, by their Constitution, conferred the entire control and management of its affairs and property upon the corporation designated as 'the Regents of the University of Michigan,’ and have thereby excluded all departments of the State government from any interference therewith. The fact that it is State property does not bring the Regents within the purview of the statute. The people may, by their Constitution, place any of its institutions or property beyond the control of the Legislature.” 97 Mich 246, 254-255.
Thus, Weinberg was clear in emphasizing that the Legislature could not intrude upon the independence of the Regents in their management of the university. However, in obiter dicta it left open for later courts to clarify how this prohibition affected the nature of the Legislature-University relationship when appropriations were concerned.
"Under the Constitution, the State cannot control the action of the Regents. It cannot add to or take away from its property without the consent of the Regents. In making appropriations for its support, the Legislature may attach any conditions it may deem expedient and wise, and the Regents cannot receive the appropriation without complying with the conditions. This has been done in several instances.
"Property aggregating in value nearly or quite half a million of dollars has been donated to the University by private individuals. Such property is the property of the University. It is not under the control of the State when it acts through its executive or legislative depart*83ments, but of the Regents, who are directly responsible to the people for the execution of their trust. So, when the State appropriates money to the University it passes to the Regents, and becomes the property of the University, to be expended under the exclusive direction of the Regents, and passes beyond the control of the State through its legislative department.” 97 Mich 246, 254. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, once the Legislature appropriated funds to the university, those funds passed beyond legislative control, and their management was left solely to the discretion of the regents. However, before the funds got to the university, the. Legislature could establish certain conditions. The university could not accept these appropriations without complying with the° conditions. It is interesting there is no citation of the cases relied on allowing these conditions. We have been referred to none and know of none where this was the dispositive issue. The question for future courts to consider then became, what conditions could the Legislature constitutionally attach to university appropriations?
In Sterling v Regents of University of Michigan, 110 Mich 369; 68 NW 253 (1896), we reviewed the by then well-established historical independence of the university, 110 Mich 369-380, and noted that:
"for 46 years [the regents] have declined obedience to any and every act of the legislature which they, upon mature reflection and consideration, have deemed against the best interests of the institution. This court has sustained them in that position, and has on every occasion when asked denied its writ to interfere with their action.” 110 Mich 369, 379.
The act in question was but another chapter in the legislatively-mandated desire to regulate the *84teaching of homeopathy.4 The Sterling decision most effectively stated the rationale for holding unconstitutional such attempts to interfere with the independence of the University:
"Now, in the face of the facts that the regents have for 46 years exercised such control, and openly asserted their exclusive right to do so; that the courts have refused to compel them to comply with the acts of the legislature; that this court held in Weinberg v Regents, 97 Mich 246, that they were a constitutional body, upon whom was conferred this exclusive control; and in the face of this plain constitutional provision, — this court is now asked to hold that the regents are mere ministerial officers, endowed with the sole power to register the will of the legislature, and to supervise such branches and departments as any legislature may see fit to provide for. By the power claimed, the legislature may completely dismember the University, and remove every vestige of it from the city of Ann Arbor. It is no argument to say that there is no danger of such a result. The question is one of power, and who shall say that such a result may not follow? The legislature did once enact that there should be a branch of the University in every judicial circuit. If the regents comply with the present act, the next legislature may repeal it, and restore that department to the University at Ann Arbor, or place it elsewhere. Some legislatures have attached conditions — and they have the undoubted right to do so — to appropriations for the support of the University, and a subsequent legislature has removed the conditions. Some legislatures have attached to appropri*85ations the condition for the establishment of a homeopathic professorship in the old medical department. Other legislatures have refused to attach any such condition. What permanency would there be in an institution thus subject to the caprice and will of every legislature? Under this power, the legislature could remove the law department from the University at Ann Arbor to Detroit, and provide that the law library, to which one citizen of Michigan has donated $20,000, should also be removed. It might scatter its great library (to the collection of which private citizens have contributed nearly or quite one-half), and also its great museums, laboratories, and mechanical appliances. Other results will readily suggest themselves. It appears to us impossible that such a power was contemplated.
"Furthermore, it renders nugatory the express provision of the Constitution that 'the regents shall have the direction and control of all expenditures from the University interest fund.’ It is significant that, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, this fund constituted the sole support of the University, aside from fees which might be received from students. The State had made no appropriations for its support, and there is nothing to indicate that any such appropriations were contemplated. It is unnecessary to argue that the above provision means what it says, and that it takes away from the legislature all control over the income from that fund. The power therein conferred would be without force or effect if the legislature could control these expenditures by dictating what departments of learning the regents shall establish, and in what places they shall be located. Neither does it need any argument to show that the power contended for would take away from the regents the control and direction of the expenditures from the fund. The power to control these expenditures cannot be exercised directly or indirectly by the legislature. It is vested in the board of regents in absolute and unqualiBed terms. This act, in express terms, prohibits the regents from using any of this fund to support a homeopathic department at the University at Ann Arbor, since it prohibits them from maintaining *86such a department there.” 110 Mich 369, 380-381. (Emphasis added.)
In sum, the Board of Regents and the Legislature derive their power from the same supreme authority, the Michigan Constitution, and "in every case except that of the regents, the Constitution carefully and expressly reposes in the legislature the power to legislate and to control and define the duties of those corporations and offices. * * * [T]he intention was to place this institution [the university] in the direct and exclusive control of the people themselves, through a constitutional body elected by them.” 110 Mich 369, 383.
Therefore, although Sterling did not involve a legislative appropriation, it does give us important guidance in determining what conditions may be attached to such appropriations:
1. The condition may not be designed to permit the Legislature to indirectly accomplish that which it may not do directly, interfere with the management and control of university affairs. 110 Mich 369, 381.
2. Where state appropriations are not involved, the Legislature may not require that branches and departments of the university be established, 110 Mich 369, 380, or, that these may not be established. 110 Mich 369, 381.
In Bauer v State Board of Agriculture, 164 Mich 415; 129 NW 713 (1911), mandamus was petitioned for in order to prevent Michigan Agricultural College (now Michigan State University) from constructing a United States post office in East Lansing. We rejected petitioner’s contention that the *87college did not have the power to engage in such business. We held that since the State Board of Agriculture was a constitutional body like the University of Michigan Board of Regents, the case was controlled by Sterling. Therefore, as to "the general supervision of the college and the direction and control of all agricultural college funds”, 164 Mich 415, 418, we concluded "the State board of agriculture has exclusive supervision and control”. 164 Mich 415, 418.
"We do not intend to hold that an act of the board might not be so subversive of the purposes for which the board was created as to warrant the intervention of the courts, but we do not think this record presents such a case, nor do we intend to hold that the legislature may not make appropriations for specific objects or attach conditions which would be binding upon the State board of agriculture in case they accepted the appropriations; but we do hold that as to the general funds appropriated for the general purposes of the agricultural college, the board has the exclusive control and direction, to the same extent that we find such power was possessed by the board of regents in the Sterling Case above referred to.” 164 Mich 415, 418-419. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, Bauer established the principle that the constitutionally-independent universities have exclusive control over "general funds appropriated for the general purposes” of the schools.
The independent judgment of the Board of Regents that funds were properly expended for the use and operation of the university was held to be superior to that of the Auditor General in Regents v Auditor General, 167 Mich 444; 132 NW 1037 (1911). We held that the Auditor General could not *88reject vouchers for expenditures5 once they were authorized by the regents even though the Legislature authorized the Auditor General to do so. 167 Mich 444, 450.
A new legislative appropriation device was invalidated three years later, when we held that the Legislature "exceeded its powers in attempting to deprive the relator [State Board of Agriculture] of its constitutional control of agricultural college funds derived from the Federal government”. State Board of Agriculture v Auditor General, 180 Mich 349, 359; 147 NW 529 (1914).6 Once the funds were received from the Federal government for the endowment and maintenance of the agricultural college, they became an agricultural college fund, to be "annually applied to the specific objects of the original gift, grant or appropriation”. 180 Mich 349, 359. One purpose of the Federal grant was to maintain a department for the teaching of the mechanic arts. 180 Mich 349, 354. Such maintenance required $61,000 for the year ending June 30, 1913, 180 Mich 349, 355, a vast difference from the $35,000 limit mandated by the disputed act.
Further, we found that a budgetary restriction *89on the amount to be spent on a particular department amounted to unconstitutional "legislative supervision of the college. * * * It is something more than reducing a general appropriation so that the expenses in some or in all departments of the college must be reduced, leaving the proper supervisors to determine how efficiency can be best maintained under new conditions.” 180 Mich 349, 358.
These two Auditor General cases tell us:
1. The governing board of a university has absolute discretion to determine expenditures of funds once they have become part of the university’s funds.
2. While the Legislature may reduce general levels of appropriations to a university, it may not specifically earmark reduced levels of expenditures to apply to specific units of the university.
3. The Legislature may not interfere with university funds derived from sources other than state appropriations.
4. The state may attach specific conditions to appropriations to the university, but may not interfere with the exclusive expenditure of such funds once they pass under the control of the university.
5. Such conditional appropriations may not be part of the general appropriation.
These principles were further refined in State Board of Agriculture v Auditor General, 226 Mich 417; 197 NW 160 (1924).7 There we said:
*901. "There is, however, a distinction between funds received by way of appropriations and other college funds. The appropriation may be upon condition that the money shall be used for a specific purpose, or upon any other condition that the legislature can lawfully impose.” 226 Mich 417, 424-425. (Emphasis added.)
2. "[A] condition [cannot] be imposed that would be an invasion of the constitutional rights and powers of the governing board of the college [i.e.,] management and control of the college, or of any of its activities.” 226 Mich 417, 425.
3. Once a conditional appropriation passes into the hands of the college, it becomes its property and is under its exclusive control "but must be used for the purpose for which it was granted”. 226 Mich 417, 429._
*914. "The proper method of compelling a compliance with the condition that the money shall be expended for the purpose specified will readily suggest itself to the administrative board and its legal advisor.” 226 Mich 417, 429.
While it is said that the Legislature has power to condition specific or supplementary appropriations, and that once these funds are accepted the university is bound by the conditions, it is just as clear that the Legislature may not interfere with the management of the university, even to ensure that the funds are spent as required.
One further case touched on the issue in dictum. In Jackson Broadcasting & Television Corp v State Board of Agriculture, 360 Mich 481; 104 NW2d 350 (1960), plaintiff attempted to enjoin construction and operation of a television station by the State Board of Agriculture. Plaintiff claimed the project was self-liquidating and therefore violated 1958 PA 224, the general appropriation act for universities.
The relevant section of that act was:
"In view of the fact that state appropriations have been used for certain expenses in connection with self-liquidating projects, no contract shall be let for construction as to any self-liquidation project at any of the state supported institutions of higher education without prior approval therefor by the legislature.” 360 Mich 481, 485.
We found that plaintiff failed to establish that the television station was in fact self-liquidating or that general appropriations were to be expended on that project, and noted as well:
"If section 11 of that act were to be construed as a *92general prohibition against the board of trustees of Michigan State University, without regard to the source of the funds to be used or involved, it would exceed legislative authority.” 360 Mich 481, 497-498.
Therefore, the principles applicable to the declaratory action before us become:
1. The Legislature cannot interfere in the management of the university.
2. The Legislature cannot prohibit nor require the universities to take any particular action.
3. The Legislature cannot impose a condition on a general fund appropriation.
4. While there is much dicta saying that the Legislature can impose a condition in a special appropriation, we have not been cited nor have we found a single case where this was the dispositive issue.
IV — The Statute Construed
This is a general appropriation act. Section 20 of the statute contains, in effect, three separate provisions. By analyzing the effect of each requirement of the university, we can best determine whether each condition passes constitutional muster.

1. The First Sentence

Section 20 first provides:
"It is a condition of this appropriation that none of the appropriations contained in this act shall be used for the construction of buildings or operation of institutions of higher education not expressly authorized in section 1.”
We agree with our Sister Coleman that the change in the recent higher education appropria*93tion acts from language of condition to language of intent eliminates constitutional problems which might otherwise exist.

2. The Second Sentence

Section 20 then requires:
"No contract shall be let for construction of any self-liquidating project at any of the state supported institutions of higher education without first submitting to the appropriate legislative committees, schedules for the liquidation of the debt for the construction and operation of such project.”
As it stands, this is a mere reporting measure, without corollary of supervision or control on the part of the committees receiving the information. Although it is, as plaintiffs claim, a pre-audit rather than post-audit provision, such reporting is merely an attempt to give the Legislature information which should be public knowledge at any rate. Universities may still enter into construction contracts for self-liquidating projects without prior legislative approval. Therefore, the provision is valid.

3. The Third Sentence

Section 20 then requires:
"Funds appropriated herein to each institution of higher education may not be used to pay for the construction, maintenance or operation of any self-liquidating projects.”
Defendants urge that this is a reasonable limitation since, by definition, the projects will generate revenues sufficient to pay for themselyes. Further, they urge, if appropriated state funds may be used for self-liquidating projects, each becomes a "fait accompli in terms of the legislature having to *94provide state general fund moneys to be used for its construction, maintenance and operation”.
We agree with our Sister Coleman that the university calling a project self-liquidating, has, in effect, declared to the Legislature and taxpayers that it is not going to call for any funds and may establish some estoppel.
The provision, however, is an unconstitutional prohibition. Section 20, third sentence involves a prohibitory condition restricting the independent judgment of the Board of Regents. Further, it is a condition made, not in a specific appropriation, but in a general fund appropriation. The Legislature may not thus interfere with the decision-making process of the regents.
As our Sister Coleman suggests, this sentence reflects the desire of us all for orderly government. No one can fault the Legislature for what it desires. However, in this instance they chose an unconstitutional method of achieving it. While the legislative intent is understandable in thus laying out appropriate procedures, it is not enough to justify unconstitutional intrusions upon the delicate balance of power the people have decreed.
There are constitutional routes which the Legislature may pursue to achieve its ends. These are too well understood by the Legislature to require spelling out.
V — Conclusion
This case arises because two co-equal branches of our government have turned to a third and asked us, as is required by our constitutional role, to declare some of the constitutional ground rules in their cooperation. Insofar as this is a constitutional question, we hold the third sentence sets up *95conditions that invade the constitutional jurisdiction of the universities.
1. The Legislature may not interfere with the independence of the universities to manage their institutions and their funds.
2. The Legislature may not attach conditions to a general fund appropriation.
3. A prohibitory condition is unacceptable because it does not give the universities the option to refuse the appropriation and avoid the condition or to accept the appropriation and accept the condition. The latter leaves the management decision to the university. The former unconstitutionally substitutes legislative management.
It is our opinion, however, that if the universities would contravene the expressed legislative intention, they would be breaking faith with their expressed intentions to the Legislature and to the people of this state, quite possibly finding themselves legally estopped from so doing in addition.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court are affirmed as to the third sentence of § 20.
No costs, a public question.
Swainson and Lindemer, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.

A form of the present constitutional provision providing for university autonomy appeared in earlier incarnations:
"[A]nd it shall be the duty of the legislature, as soon as may be, to provide effectual means for the improvement and permanent security of the funds of said university.” Const 1835, art 10, § 5.
"The [University of Michigan] board of regents shall have the general supervision of the university and the direction and control of all expenditures from the university interest fund.” Const 1850, art 13, §8.
"The [University of Michigan] board of regents shall have the general supervision of the university and the direction and control of all expenditures from the university funds.” Const 1908, art 11, § 5.
"The board [of trustees] shall have the general supervision of Michigan state university, and the direction and control of all Michigan state university funds; and shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law.” Const 1908, art 11, § 8.
"The board of governors of Wayne state university shall have general supervision of Wayne state university and the duties of said *80board shall be prescribed by law. The legislature shall be given an annual detailed accounting of all income from whatever source derived by and all expenditures by Wayne state university.” Const 1908, art 11, § 16.
"The legislature shall maintain the university, ** * * ,the state agricultural college, * * * and other educational institutions, as may be established by law.” Const 1908, art 11, § 10.
"The legislature shall appropriate moneys to maintain the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University * * * . The legislature shall be given an annual accounting of all income and expenditures by each of these educational institutions.” Const 1963, art 8, § 4.
"Each board [University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University] shall have general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all' expenditures from the institution’s funds.” Const 1963, art 8, § 5. [Plaintiffs brief, 20-22]

 The application was based on a law providing:
"that 'the regents shall have power to enact ordinances, by-laws, and regulations for the government of the university; to elect a president; to fix, increase and reduce the regular number of professors, and tutors, and to appoint the same, and to determine the amount of their salaries: Provided, That there shall always be at least one professor of homeopathy in the department of medicine.’ ”
1855 PA 100, quoted in People v Regents, 4 Mich 98, 99 (1856). We found it unnecessary to reach the constitutionality of the requirement that there be a professor of homeopathy. 4 Mich 98, 103. However, that issue was raised in two later cases, but a divided Court was unable to resolve it. People v Regents of the University, 18 Mich 469, 482 (1869). People v Regents of the University, 30 Mich 473 (1874).

 "The section, as amended by Act No. 45, Laws of 1885, provides:
" 'That when public buildings or other public works or improvements are about to be built, repaired, or ornamented under contract, at the expense of this State, or of any county, city, village, township, or school-district thereof, it shall be the duty of the board of officers, or agents, contracting on behalf of the State, county, city, village, township, or school-district, to require sufficient security by bond for the payment by the contractor and all subcontractors for all labor performed or materials furnished in the erection, repairing, or ornamenting of such building, works, or improvements.’ ” Weinberg v Regents, 97 Mich 246, 249-250; 56 NW 605 (1893).

 "In 1895 the legislature passed Act No. 257, Pub. Acts 1895, the material part of which reads as follows:
" 'That the board of regents of the University of Michigan are hereby authorized and directed to establish a homeopathic medical college as a branch or department of said University, which shall be located in the city of Detroit, and the said board of regents are hereby authorized and directed to discontinue the existing homeopathic medical college now maintained in the city of Ann Arbor as a branch of said University, and to transfer the same to the city of Detroit.’ ” Sterling v Regents of University of Michigan, 110 Mich 369, 370; 68 NW 253 (1896).

 The relevant portion of this act was:
"Provided, further, That the State Treasurer be and is hereby authorized and directed to pay to the regents of the University, in the year eighteen hundred ninety-nine and each year thereafter, in such manner as is now provided by law, upon the warrant of the Auditor General, the amount of the mill tax provided for by this act; and that the State Treasury be reimbursed out of the taxes annually received from said mill tax when collected; and said Auditor General shall issue his warrants therefor as in the case of special appropriations.” 1899 PA 102, quoted in Regents v Auditor General, 167 Mich 444, 448; 132 NW 1037 (1911).

 The tax bill provided:
", 'Sec. 1(a). No part of this or any other appropriation shall be available in case a sum in excess of thirty-five thousand dollars from any or all sources, shall be expended in any one fiscal year for the maintenance of the mechanical and engineering department.’ ” State Board of Agriculture v Auditor General, 180 Mich 349, 350; 147 NW 529 (1914).

 "This proceeding calls for a construction of Act No. 308, Pub. Acts 1923, which reads:
" 'For carrying on the co-operative agricultural extension work under the provisions of an act of congress approved May eight, *90nineteen hundred fourteen, entitled "An act to provide for co-operative extension work between the agricultural colleges for the several States receiving the benefits of an act of congress approved July two, eighteen hundred sixty-two, and acts supplementary thereto, and the United States department of agriculture,” and such other extension work as the State board of agriculture may designate, the sum of
For Fiscal For Fiscal Year Year
1923-1924 1924-1925
Annual appropriation for extension work. $150,000.00 $150,000.00
Special fund for research work........... 35,000.00 35,000.00
Horticultural building including greenhouse and equipment............... 200,000.00 200,000.00
Extensions and additions to powerhouse and equipment..................... 75,000.00 75,000.00
Farm and miscellaneous buildings and incidental additions to buildings....... 50,000.00 50,000.00
Hospital................................ 50,000.00 _
Totals............................ $560,000.00 $510,000.00
“ 'Each of said amounts shall be used solely for the specific purposes herein stated, subject to the general supervisory control of the State administrative board.’ ” State Board of Agriculture v Auditor General, 226 Mich 417, 418-419; 197 NW 160 (1924).
We held that in attempting to exercise the "general supervisory control” of expenditures, the State administrative board was in effect controlling the work itself, thus "assuming to exercise authority vested by the Constitution solely in the board of agriculture”. 226 Mich 417, 425-426.