Court Opinion

ID: 9757447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:40:59.285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:39.463377
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT
POMEROY, Justice. .
Appellant, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., is the owner and publisher of The Philadelphia Inquirer, a major daily newspaper of general circulation in the city of Philadelphia. (appellant will sometimes hereinafter be referred to as “the Inquirer”). In early 1974, members of the Inquirer reporting staff began an investigation into the background of Joseph P. McLaughlin, a newly appointed assistant district attorney of Philadelphia County, who was sworn into office on January 8, 1974. The purpose of this inquiry was to gather information which the reporters believed would be useful in assessing Mr. McLaughlin’s qualifications for his recently obtained position.
During the course of its investigation, the Inquirer learned that, while engaged in the private practice of law, McLaughlin had been the subject of disciplinary proceedings before the court of common pleas of Philadelphia County. In accordance with long-standing local practice in that court, the proceedings were conducted privately and the record of the hearing was impounded in order to preserve confidentiality. Thus, there is no public record of the nature of the charges brought against Mr. McLaughlin or of their ultimate disposition. All that is known from the record before us is that criminal misconduct was not at issue and that the disciplinary court was satisfied that public discipline was not warranted. Believing that the record would, nevertheless, be relevant to the object of its investigation, the Inquirer sought access to it by petitioning the court to vacate the impoundment order and to permit the Inquirer personnel to inspect and photocopy the record. After *107hearing argument, the court of common pleas dismissed the petition. This appeal ensued.1
Appellant contends that McLaughlin, by accepting a position of public trust, has become a public figure; that the public has a right to be informed as to his fitness to fulfill the obligations of his office; that it is the function and responsibility of the press, as here represented by the Inquirer, to effectuate this end by ferreting out pertinent information; and that it is constitutiorfally impermissible to deny the press access to records bearing directly on a public official’s fitness to hold the office he has assumed. In short, the Inquirer claims that the “freedom of the press” clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942), guarantees access to records of a disciplinary proceeding against a public official, notwithstanding that the record was impounded pursuant to a long-standing local procedure in order to assure confidentiality, and notwithstanding that this was done at a time when the official was a private citizen and did not occupy a position of public trust. We do not agree, and will affirm.
An analysis of appellant’s contention requires an inquiry into both the scope of the Inquirer’s First Amendment right, and the nature of the disciplinary proceedings the confidentiality of which appellee seeks to maintain. To these considerations we now turn.
I.
Perhaps at no time in the history of this nation have the American people been more acutely sensitive to the issue of the legitimacy of governmental secrecy; and it is *108with increased scepticism that the public responds to the justifications offered by government for its refusal to divulge particular information possessed by it alone.2 In events still fresh in public memory we as a society have recently borne witness to the vital democratic safeguards which inhere in a free and unbridled press. In exposing the abuses that some would have shielded behind a cloak of officially sanctioned secrecy, the press has rekindled our appreciation of its constitutionally designed function:
“Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.”
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437,16 L.Ed.2d 484, 488 (1966).
It is, then, with great caution that we must proceed in weighing an allegation that the state is impermissibly impairing this fundamental function. Yet we must do so with the knowledge that the Constitution has not granted unrestricted power to the press to pursue its purpose, and that the press has been denied access to information, notwithstanding contentions that its function would be impermissibly impaired. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 308 *109A.2d 888 (1973); Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972).
At the outset it should be noted that this is not a case which calls into question the right of the press to print, publish and distribute information which it has already acquired. As such it stands on a different constitutional footing than decisions which have shielded the press from the chilling effect of potential defamation judgments, Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed.2d 789 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed.2d 686 (1964); and freed the press from the shackles of prior restraint, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). In those cases the freedom of the press clause was held to afford broad protection against governmental interference with the publication of information in the possession of the press; they in no way decided or explored the related but distinct question of the right of the press to gather news. Accordingly, they are of little assistance in resolving the issues now before this Court, for what appellant is asserting is not a right to publish information in its possession, but a constitutional right to acquire information not now in hand.3
The perimeters of the right of the press to gather information remain largely uncharted. A right of access founded solely on the freedom of the press clause was *110first asserted in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). There the United States Supreme Court held that the freedom of the press clause does not accord a newsman a privilege against testifying before a grand jury as to the identity of his sources or as to information received in confidence, where the.request is made in good faith and the information sought is relevant to the inquiry. Although the justices of the Court disagreed as to the scope of the newsman’s privilege, all members of the Court did recognize that the press, of necessity, has a limited constitutional right to gather news: 4
“Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.” Id. at 681, 92 S.Ct. at 2656, 33 L.Ed.2d at 639. (opinion of the Court, per White, J.).
This recognition was echoed broadly in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice STEWART, in which Mr. Justice BRENNAN and Mr. Justice MARSHALL joined:
“No less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist.” Id. *111at 728, 92 S.Ct. at 2673, 33 L.Ed.2d at 667 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The “dimensions” of this right were recently given some definition by the Supreme Court in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). In Pell, members of the communications media challenged an administrative regulation promulgated by the Director of the California Department of Corrections which prohibited “ ‘ [p] ress and other media interviews with specific individual inmates’ ” of California prisons. Id. at 819, 94 S.Ct. at 2802, 41 L.Ed,2d at 500. It was asserted that the regulation infringed the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in that it denied the press access to sources of newsworthy information, viz., prison inmates who desired interviews with the press. In rejecting this claim, the Court first pointed out that, by virtue of a similar regulation, members of the general public were equally denied interviews with specifically named inmates, and that this regulation was a reasonable exercise of administrative discretion. Mr. Justice STEWART, writing for the Court, then went on to hold that the press has no greater right of access than that afforded to the general public — there is no independent “freedom of the press” right of access: 5
“It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of information not available to members of the general public, that he is entitled to- some constitutional protection of the confidentiality of such sources, cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, . . . and that the government cannot restrain the publication of news emanating from such sources. Cf. N. Y. Times v. United Slates . . . It is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the af*112firmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally. That proposition finds no support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court.” 417 U.S. at 834-35, 94 S.Ct. at 2810, 41 L. Ed.2d at 508-09.
Thus, the Court seems clearly to have equated the press’ right of access with the right of access of the public. See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974). It has been aptly observed, however, that this formulation “seems to have defined one unknown in terms of another”, for the public’s right of access was and remains a constitutionally undefined concept. Note, The Rights of the Press and the Public to Gather Information, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1505, 1507 (1974). Any circumscription of this right would be a delicate, sensitive process. The facts of this case do not require us to pursue so perilous an undertaking.
II.
This Court has long recognized that “the court before whom the attorney practices has the undoubted power to formulate such rules as it sees fit to discipline, disbar, or admit persons to practice,” Hanson’s Appeal, 330 Pa. 390, 391, 198 A. 113, 114 (1938), subject, of course, to the safeguards of procedural due process of law. In re Shigon, 462 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d 235, 241 (1974).6 In discussing the regularity of disciplinary *113proceedings held by the court of common pleas of Philadelphia County to hear allegations of misconduct by certain members of the Philadelphia bar, Chief Justice KEP-HART well summarized the powers of the court:
“It is the right and duty of a court to discipline its members who appear before it guilty of wrongdoing. In re Davies, 93 Pa. 116; In re Wolfe’s Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 A. 732, 50 A.L.R. 380. Courts have an inherent power to make and follow rules governing Such matters or to formulate new rules as the case demands so long as no right of the member charged is invaded. But the rules thus established do not restrict the general power of the courts; the power which establishes such rules in the first instance also enables the courts to disregard such rules and adopt the methods most suitable to the occasion.” In re: Disbarment Proceedings, 321 Pa. 81, 101, 184 A. 59, 68 (1936).
See also Office of the Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 464 Pa.-, 345 A.2d 616 (1975); In re Shigon, supra; Montgomery County Bar Ass’n. v. Hecht, 456 Pa. 13, 317 A.2d 597 (1974); Montgomery County Bar Ass’n. v. Rinalducci, 329 Pa. 296, 299, 197 A. 924 (1938). See generally ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement, 10-18 (1970) [hereinafter cited as “Clark Report”].7
The impoundment practice followed in the McLaughlin proceeding fully comports with present Rule 17-23 8 which provides, in relevant part:
“All proceedings involving allegations of misconduct by ... an attorney shall be kept confidential until and unless the Supreme Court enters its order *114for the imposition of public discipline or the respondent-attorney requests that the matter be public or the investigation is predicated upon a conviction of the respondent-attorney for a crime . . . ”
This rule, declaratory of prior practice in Pennsylvania, reflects the considered judgment that there is nothing to be gained and much to be lost, where an attorney’s reputation and livelihood are concerned, by opening to the public the record of proceedings concerning allegations of professional misconduct which are ultimately found to be groundless.9 Additionally, even where the charges brought against a lawyer have merit, it is often the case that the misconduct demands discipline of no greater magnitude than private reprimand.10 As a primary objective of such a minor penalty is the rehabilitation of the lawyer (in addition, of course, to the protection of the public interest), confidentiality may be considered essential to ensure that rehabilitative efforts are not *115thwarted by disclosures which may be prejudicial.11 Thus, when McLaughlin as a private practitioner appeared before the court of common pleas to answer allegations of a non-criminal nature concerning his private practice, he did so with the expectation, fully warranted, that unless public discipline were imposed, i. e. public censure, suspension or disbarment, the proceedings would remain confidential.
III.
Appellant does not challenge the basic power which, prior to the adoption by this Court of the present Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, the court of common pleas possessed to formulate appropriate rules governing disciplinary proceedings, or to impound the records of such proceedings brought against private practitioners. Rather, it is contended that when the private practitioner becomes a public official the state’s interest in maintaining confidentiality through continued impoundment of the record must yield to the protections embodied in the freedom of the press clause of the First Amendment. In essence, appellant draws upon the “public official” concept which the Supreme Court has applied in order to protect the unfettered freedom of the press to report and comment on such a personage without having to serve as guarantor of the truth of its published statements. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The Inquirer would have us hold that this concept similarly should serve as the touchstone by which the amorphous public right of access to information can be given meaning. It is not at all clear, *116however, that the “public official” classification, so necessary to protect the press in its publication of critical information already in its possession, should be extended so as to grant the press a constitutional power to acquire such information. As Mr. Justice STEWART, author of the majority opinions in both Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 280, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L. Ed.2d 514 (1974), has written in a non-judicial context:
“So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it knows, and may seek to learn what it can. But this autonomy cuts both ways. The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in government. But the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed. There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. The public’s interest in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.” Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636 (1974) [Footnote omitted].
We need not here decide, however, whether as a general proposition the public official concept may be properly used as an aid in defining the public’s First Amendment right of access. Indeed, we need not here intimate any view as to whether such a right of access exists in this case, for even assuming a right of access to impounded court documents pertaining to a public official, we would conclude that the right is overborne by the paramount interest of the state in protecting the grant of confidentiality which prevailed in the circumstances here present. Because this interest of the state arose at a time McLaughlin was a private citizen, we have con-*117eluded that the interest is not affected by his lately acquired status as a public official.
This Court has held that the right of the press to gather news is not absolute, and that it must yield to a showing of a paramount state interest. McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973).12 In McMullan, we declined to hold that the press had a constitutional right of access to the names of persons receiving public assistance. The ground of our decision was that the state’s interest in preserving the family life and self-respect of the recipients outweighed any “non-absolute right of the press to ‘gather news’.” Id. at 165, 308 A.2d at 897. In the present case there is an equally weighty state interest, namely, that of “preventing public disclosures that would endanger . . . the interests of those from whom [the state] has obtained information on a confidential basis.” Note, The Right of the Public and the Press to Gather News, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1505, 1526 (1974). Assurance of confidentiality is a major inducement by which the government elicits cooperation with legitimate state processes. To the extent that such assurances are not carried out, not only is the integrity of the government compromised, but the cooperation sought to be secured is threatened.
Here, the information received by the court in the McLaughlin disciplinary hearing, as in any such case, was given by the complainant, McLaughlin, and perhaps *118other witnesses with the expectation of all concerned that unless public discipline were imposed the proceedings would remain confidential. Had McLaughlin remained a private practitioner, the state’s interest in protecting that expectation would seem undeniable. To hold that McLaughlin’s present position renders the state’s interest in protecting the same expectation any less worthy of protection would undercut the vital function that rules of confidentiality serve in assisting legitimate governmental processes to carry out their designated functions. New would volunteer information if the confidentiality upon which they relied remained protected only until such time as the information became too newsworthy, or the subject of the information too important. Thus, to repeat, even assuming a right of the press to obtain the investigatory information it seeks by the present petition, such right would be overborne by the compelling interest of the state to protect expectations of confidentiality such as those justifiably held by McLaughlin in this case.
It is important to note that the information here sought does not relate to governmental operations, nor did the court below suppress the statements of an otherwise voluntary source. Hence, the suppression sought to be upheld in this case seems to stand on an even stronger footing than that sanctioned in Pell, where the Court permitted denial of access to a voluntary source (inmates of a state prison) for the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of a governmental operation (the prison system of a state). See Note, The Right of the Public and Press to Gather Information, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 1505, 1524-25 (1974). Furthermore, we are not here dealing with an arbitrary suppression of information by the government, acting through the courts, relating to its own operation. The order to impound the record was made pursuant to a longstanding procedure and only after McLaughlin had been exonerated or found guilty of a violation deemed *119not sufficiently serious to warrant public censure, suspension, or disbarment. In either event the procedure for enforcing confidentiality may be deemed essential and within the administrative competence of a disciplinary board or court to determine. Compare Pell v. Procunier, supra, 417 U.S. at 830, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed. at 506-07.
In sum, we hold that the freedom of the press is not violated by denying the Inquirer access to court records of a disciplinary proceeding brought against a private lawyer, now in public office, concerning matters which were non-criminal and non-governmental in nature, where such proceeding was conducted with the expectation that it would remain confidential and an impoundment order was duly entered in accordance with standard practice, and where the lawyer involved desires that the confidentiality be maintained.
Order affirmed. No assessment of costs.
MANDERINO, J., concurs in the result.
ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

. Jurisdiction of the appeal is in this Court pursuant to The Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. II, § 202(4), 17 P.S. § 211.202(4) (Supp. 1975-76).

. See S. Ervin, Jr., Controlling Executive Privilege, 20 Loyola L. Rev. 1 (1974). See also Cohen, The Public’s Right of Access to Government Information Under the First Amendment, 51 Chi.Kent L.Rev. 164 (1974-75); Comment, The First Amendment and the Public Right to Information, 35 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 93 (1973).

. Appellant makes no claim, nor could one be successfully asserted, that the Pennsylvania “Right-to-Know Act”, Act of June 21, 1957, P.L. 390, 65 P.S. § 66.1 et seq., mandates disclosure of the desired records. By its terms the Act does not encompass “any record . . access to or the publication of which is prohibited, restricted or forbidden by order or decree of court.” As the impoundment in question was by court order, the Act would be of no avail to appellant. Its contention, therefore, is squarely founded on an asserted “freedom of press” right of access to the information.

. The Court was, however, clear in pointing out that the right is of limited scope.
“Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive session, and the meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal.”
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 at 684-85, 92 S.Ct. 2646 at 2658, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 at 641 (1972) (opinion of the Court, per White, J.).

. See Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 Hastings L.J. 639, 642 (1974).

. The local rule which governed the proceeding in question substantially comports with Rule 17-23 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, adopted March 21, 1972, effective July 1, 1972, 446 Pa. xxiii (1972), later extended to Nov. 1, 1972. The McLaughlin disciplinary proceeding took place prior to the adoption of this rule; therefore, the rule does not govern by its own force.
See Montgomery County Bar Ass’n v. Hecht, 456 Pa. 13, 317 A.2d 597 (1974). Because, however, Rule 17-23 substantially codified the local procedure as it existed in Philadelphia County, its language will be referred to for the purpose of analysis.

. The report has been so called because the chairman of the Special Committee was the Honorable Tom C. Clark, former Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

. See note 6 supra.

. See, e. g., Clark Report at 139:
Disclosure of the existence of that accusation may itself result in irreparable harm to the attorney. His practice may be diminished, if not substantially destroyed, by the resulting lack of confidence of old and new clients, judges before whom he has to appear and fellow attorneys with whom he must negotiate.
[T]he attorney never can recoup the financial loss caused by public disclosure of charges against him, even if he is subsequently exonerated. In fact, since later exoneration is never as newsworthy as the prior accusation, it is likely that the damage visited on him will continue even after the charges have been found not to have been sustained.

. Rule 17-4 of the Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement sets forth the types of Discipline that may be imposed against an attorney. Rule 17-4 provides:
“Misconduct shall be grounds for:
(a) Disbarment by the Supreme Court; or
(b) Suspension by the Supreme Court for a period not exceeding five years; or
(c) Public censure by the Supreme Court; or
(d) Private reprimand by The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; or
(e) Private informal admonition by Disciplinary Counsel.”

. These arguments are pressed by the court of common pleas of Philadelphia County, which has submitted a brief to this Court as amicus curiae. Amicus strongly urges that its practice of maintaining the confidentiality of disciplinary proceedings which involve allegations of professional misconduct of a noncriminal nature serves the state’s legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the court and bar, as well as protecting the privacy of lawyers and facilitating their rehabilitation.

. The author of this opinion, joined by Mr. Chief Justice JONES, dissented in McMullan, but the dissent was directed to the problems of construction of the two statutes there involved, viz., Pennsylvania’s “Right to Know Act,” 65 P.S. § 66.1 et seq. and the Public Welfare Code of 1967, 62 P.S. § 401 et seq. Given the majority view that the Right to Know Act, properly interpreted, did not extend to divulgence of the welfare records there sought, the dissenting opinion expressed agreement with that part of the opinion of the Court which held that the newspaper was not entitled as a matter of federal or state constitutional law to compel the production of the information which had been refused to it. See McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, at 181, 308 A. 2d 888, at 905 (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J.).