Court Opinion

ID: 9851176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:08:33.303311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:50.608038
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that part of the majority opinion reversing the summary judgment for appellee Kalke, but I dissent from that part of it reversing the summary judgment for appellees Hussain and the Medical Center for Women. I believe the trial court properly held that the action against appel-lees Hussain and the Medical Center for Women was barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court did not err in applying the statute of limitations set out in § 1-3-107(a), W.S.1977,1 if appellants “discover*424ed” the fact that appellees had failed to diagnose and properly treat appellant Carolyn Metzger’s tumor [the “alleged act, error or omission” from which a cause of action arose] prior to May 12, 1982, one year after the last day of treatment by appellees.
The majority opinion places the fact of discovery on July 15, 1982, when appellant Carolyn Metzger’s treating physician in Lincoln, Nebraska, suggested to appellants’ attorney that appellees’ treatment had been wrongful. The attorney had been contacted by appellants in December 1981 with the request that he investigate the bases for legal action against appellees.
The majority opinion does not question the propriety of the summary judgment on the ground that there is a question of fact as to the date of “discovery,” but it decides that the “discovery” is at the time when it is learned that the treatment “was wrongful.” I agree that there is no issue of fact to prevent a summary judgment. The factual situation is not controverted. The problem is only from the application of the facts to the requirements of the statute.
To me the answer is simple. When the attorney was consulted in December 1981, appellants had reason to know the existence of the cause of action and the two-year statute of limitations applied without any extension due to “discovery” after the first year. The quotation in the majority opinion from Olson v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., Wyo., 696 P.2d 1294, 1297 (1985) is pertinent:
“ ‘Wyoming is a “discovery” state; therefore,, the statute of limitations is triggered when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know the existence of the cause of action. Duke v. Housen, supra [589 P.2d 334 (1979) ]; Banner v. Town of Dayton, Wyo., 474 P.2d 300 (1970). * * * (Emphasis added.)
Inconsistent with its holding, the majority opinion said that:
“In reaching this holding, we do not mean to imply that discovery of the alleged act under § 1-3-107(a)(iv) necessarily includes discovery of the legal theories which support a claim. We expressly rejected the notion in Olson v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., 696 P.2d at 1299, that a plaintiff does not discover her cause of action until she discovers her legal rights. * ⅜ * ”
Appellants contacted the attorney to ascertain their legal rights. They believed at that time that someone had done something wrong.2 They had reason to know of the existence of a cause of action. Why else see an attorney? Again, as quoted in the majority opinion from Graham v. Hansen, 128 Cal.App.3d 965, 180 Cal.Rptr. 604, 609 (1982):
“ ‘ * * * If plaintiff believes because of injuries she has suffered that someone has done something wrong, such a fact is sufficient to alert a plaintiff “to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies.” [Citations.]’ ”
It is beyond the legislative intent to allow an attorney to obtain a six-month extension of the statute of limitations by delaying his investigation into the matter until a year after the alleged act by means of failing to obtain a statement during the first year after the alleged act from the treating physician to the effect that other physicians had failed to make a proper diagnosis. It was not the intent to place such control in the attorney.
I do not disagree with the proposition supported by the cases cited in the majority opinion that the statute of limitations begins to run in malpractice cases, in light of *425the discovery rule, when the injured party discovers that the harm resulted from defendant’s wrongdoing. The scenario of this case is that such discovery occurred in December of 1981 when surgery was performed on appellant Carolyn Metzger and appellant Charles Metzger engaged the services of an attorney in connection with legal action against appellees.
I would affirm the summary judgment for appellees Hussain and the Medical Center for Women and reverse the summary judgment for Kalke.

. Section l-3-107(a), W.S.1977, provides in pertinent part:
"(a) A cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional or health care services shall be brought within the greater of the following times:
"(i) Within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a
cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:
“(A) Not reasonably discoverable within a • two (2) year period; or
"(B) The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) *424year period despite the exercise of due diligence;
******
"(iv) If under paragraph (i) or (ii) of this subsection, the alleged act, error or omission is discovered during the second year of the two (2) year period from the date of the act,
error or omission, the period for commencing a lawsuit shall be extended by six (6) months."

. The actual determination as to whether or not the act, error or omission was wrongful would not occur until the jury returned its verdict. The very purpose of the lawsuit is to make that determination.