Court Opinion

ID: 9893397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 20:04:21.159694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:01.146932
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/26/23 Coleman v. Frontier Mission Fellowship CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 ROBERT COLEMAN,                                                B325148

      Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
      v.                                                        21STCV07636
 FRONTIER MISSION
 FELLOWSHIP, INC., et al.,

      Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Monica Bachner, Judge. Affirmed.
     Robert Coleman, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Lagerlof and Robert A. Bailey for Defendants and
Respondents.
           _______________________________________
                       INTRODUCTION

       Plaintiff Robert Coleman appeals from the judgment of
dismissal after the trial court sustained the demurrers of
defendants William Carey International University, Inc. (WCIU)
and Frontier Mission Fellowship, Inc. (FMF, and together,
defendants) to his first amended complaint (FAC) and second
amended complaint (SAC). Coleman’s complaints alleged causes
of action for breach of implied contract, quantum meruit,
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and
constructive fraud based on defendants’ sale of part of
defendants’ Pasadena campus, which served as the mission
center for their global development work, after Coleman donated
significant amounts of time to defendants between 1976 and 1990
with the understanding that defendants would permanently
maintain that campus. Coleman also challenges the court’s denial
of leave to further amend and the denial of his ex parte request to
file a surreply. We affirm.

       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.    Factual Allegations
       In the summer of 1975, Coleman completed his studies at
the California Institute of Technology and attended the Institute
for International Studies summer program, where he met
Dr. Ralph Winter. Coleman and Winter engaged in discussions to
form what became the World Mission Center-William Carey
International University while Coleman began studies at the
Fuller School of Intercultural Studies (Fuller). Winter negotiated
a purchase of real property consisting of 12 buildings on 17.5
acres (Pasadena Campus) and 17.5 acres with 85 residential
parcels and 120 homes in Pasadena, California. On November 5,

                                2
1976, Winter incorporated World Mission Center, Inc., which
later became FMF.1 WCIU was incorporated on February 25,
1977. The FMF-WCIU Boards were intended to be the same and
were the same throughout the founding decade of the FMF-
WCIU. WCIU would be a sister corporation controlled by the
FMF board and founded by the FMF Training Division. Coleman
left his studies at Fuller in fall of 1976 to help Winter develop the
FMF-WCIU.
       Winter also inspired and convinced Coleman to abandon
his plans for a PhD at MIT and instead tackle global development
issues by creating a permanent collaborative center where many
agencies could innovate new solutions to problems. According to
Winter, the entire Pasadena Campus, to be maintained in
perpetuity, would become the permanent center, or “mission
pentagon,” for this work. Winter insisted that the campus be
endowed from the beginning so that its future operations would
not rely on undependable fundraising, securing FMF-WCIU’s
legacy into the future. Winter often emphasized that because the
Pasadena Campus was “modest-sized,” they (Winter, Coleman
and the FMF-WCIU board) would need every square foot to
perform FMF-WCIU’s legacy.
       During Coleman’s studies at Fuller, during the
incorporation of FMF-WCIU, and during selection of the boards
of FMF-WCIU, and while he was chairman of the FMF-WCIU
boards, Winter promised Coleman that if Coleman applied
himself and his life’s efforts to develop FMF-WCIU by assisting
in soliciting donations for the down payment to purchase the

1 We will refer to this entity by its current name of FMF for purposes of

clarity.

                                   3
property and make mortgage payments, the Pasadena Campus
would be maintained and remain permanently in Pasadena as a
central mission pentagon. Coleman alleged that Winter’s promise
to him was approved by FMF-WCIU’s board, the promise is in
FMF-WCIU’s written archives, and that FMF-WCIU’s board
understood these writings to mean that the Pasadena Campus
would be maintained and remain a permanent “mission
pentagon.” Coleman applied his time, energy, and youth to
facilitate FMF-WCIU’s purpose and to solicit donations. Coleman
informed donors that the Pasadena Campus would be ongoing,
endowed and continue until “all hidden people groups” were
adequately reached. Both Winter and FMF-WCIU’s board
understood or reasonably should have understood Coleman’s
intent and condition.
       In reliance on Winter’s statements, Coleman devoted his
time and energy to establishing FMF-WCIU in Pasadena, giving
“his entire youth” from 1975 to 1991 to develop FMF-WCIU
under a condition the Pasadena Campus would remain part of
the legacy.
       In May of 1986, Coleman proposed a “Last Thousand”
fundraising campaign to the FMF-WCIU board to pay the
remainder of the mortgage payment for the Pasadena Campus.
The idea was to obtain $1,000 donations from approximately
8,000 donors and hold those donations in trust until all pledges
were made, allowing the donors to “step over the line” together to
save the Pasadena Campus.2 Coleman insisted that FMF-WCIU

2 The FAC alleges that the remaining mortgage payment was $8.5

million and 8,500 donors were needed, while the SAC alleges that the

                                  4
needed to make the same promise and commitment to these
donors that Winter and the FMF-WCIU board made to him
regarding the permanency of the Pasadena Campus.
        In 1988, Coleman left or was terminated from his position
as VP of Development after the “Last Thousand” fundraising
program, which the board of FMF-WCIU approved over Winter’s
dissent, succeeded.3 From September 1988 to December 1990,
Coleman remained a board member and provided time in
consultation with the FMF-WCIU boards but was not provided
any stipend for this time.
        Winter died in 2009. In April 2017, Coleman discovered
FMF-WCIU was in negotiations to sell the Pasadena Campus. In
September 2017, Coleman began discussions with the FMF-
WCIU board to cease and desist from selling as it would destroy
FMF-WCIU’s purpose and legacy. He also informed the board
that, if the sale proceeded, it would be required to return prior
donations if those donations were being used in a manner other
than for which the donations were solicited, including Coleman’s
donation of his time. The board took the position that FMF-
WCIU had no record that the Pasadena Campus would remain
permanently in Pasadena and that, given a change in
circumstances, the Pasadena Campus was no longer needed to
fulfill the FMF-WCIU’s purpose and intent. In December 2017,

remaining mortgage payment was $8 million and that 8,000 donors
were needed.
3 The FAC alleges that Winter terminated Coleman, whereas the SAC

alleges that Coleman willingly stepped away from his position, “not
wishing to distress a man Coleman had come to love as a surrogate
father.”

                                  5
Coleman sent a letter to defendants stating that, if the Pasadena
Campus was sold, they were required to return the donations
back to the donors, or to a charity of the donor’s choice.
Defendants sent an email stating that they did not intend to
substantively respond and that his letter contained many
inaccuracies. Specifically, defendants’ email stated: “We do not
intend to respond substantively to your communication at this
time, though we will do so at the appropriate time and place. It is
important however to be clear that we, along with our counsel,
find the positions articulated in your letter to be inaccurate and
lacking factual and legal support. [¶] The WCIU and FV Boards
will continue pursuing our vision and mission and the important
work at hand.”4
       In June 2018, Coleman learned FMF-WCIU was in the
process of finalizing an agreement for the sale and purchase of
the Pasadena Campus and 16 residential parcels adjacent
thereto. Coleman continued to attempt to persuade the board to
reconsider, and in February 2019 two board members were
convinced not to sell. FMF-WCIU sold the campus buildings plus
16 residential parcels in March 2019 for approximately $44
million, thereby failing to maintain the Pasadena Campus in
perpetuity. FMF-WCIU’s board did not reimburse Coleman for
the reasonable value of his time donated after the sale of the
property.

4 In analyzing a complaint, we may consider matters “matters shown

in exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference.”
(Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California,
Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 665.) The December 2017 letter and
defendants’ email in response are incorporated by reference in the
complaints and form part of the record.

                                   6
      Throughout the FAC and SAC, Coleman alleged that the
services he performed for defendants were a “donation” or
“conditional donation.”
2.    Procedural Background
       Coleman filed his initial complaint on February 25, 2021,
and served it on defendants on May 20, 2021. Following a pre-
demurrer meet and confer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 430.41, defendants indicated an intent to file a demurrer
and Coleman indicated a desire to file a FAC. Coleman provided
the proposed FAC to defendants for meet and confer purposes
and the court entered the parties’ stipulation to extend the time
for defendants to respond to the original complaint. On several
occasions, counsel for defendants met and conferred with
Coleman and an attorney that Coleman stated he intended to
retain and identified defects in the original complaint and
proposed FAC before defendants filed their demurrer to the FAC.
       The FAC asserted four causes of action against defendants:
(1) constructive fraud; (2) IIED; (3) breach of an implied contract;
and (4) quantum meruit. With respect to constructive fraud,
Coleman alleged that “a confidential relationship existed between
them when they founded FMF-WCIU based on the trust and
fidelity Plaintiff had in Defendants’ representations”; that
Coleman justifiably relied on that representation based on that
trust and fidelity; by 1990, Coleman fully performed his services;
and defendants had a duty to disclose that they would not
maintain the entire Pasadena Campus in perpetuity but did not
do so.
       In support of his IIED cause of action, Coleman alleged
that he “was induced to provide 15 ½ years of fully performed
services to establish FMF-WCIU and the Pasadena [C]ampus

                                 7
based on the fidelity and trust in the righteousness of Defendants
whose conduct assured him he would receive a more meaningful
life with the legacy, the Pasadena [C]ampus”; that “[t]he conduct
of the Defendants selling the Pasadena [C]ampus in March 2019,
and not maintaining the Pasadena [C]ampus in perpetuity
eviscerates the legacy and the promise of a more meaningful life
in a manner that is calculated to outrage”; that defendants’ sale
of the Pasadena Campus “concealed the original intent of
establishing the Pasadena [C]ampus” and that “[t]he
concealment, the ruse, was to create a fund of money and
property for Defendants”; that this concealment “breached
Plaintiff’s trust in the righteousness of Defendants who promised
to make his life more meaningful with a legacy”; and that
“Defendants’ actions and conduct in the aggregate, the failure
and refusal to maintain the Pasadena [C]ampus in perpetuity,
the sale of the campus Plaintiff gave his youth to create,
concealing their assurances and promises, and their conduct that
refused to refund Plaintiff any amount to rationalize their
concealment, are extreme and outrageous conduct.” (Italics
omitted.)
       Coleman alleged that the breach of implied in fact contract
was established by the following facts: “Defendants solicited
Plaintiff’s services since 1976, to co-found FMF-WCIU and solicit
donations”; “Plaintiff acted under the promise from Defendants
that if he did perform such services, they would maintain the
Pasadena [C]ampus in perpetuity and it would physically remain
in Pasadena in perpetuity as a mission pentagon and as a legacy”
(italics omitted); Coleman “performed labor and service for
Defendants’ benefit in which it was expressly and impliedly
agreed and understood that Plaintiff would receive as

                                8
consideration for his performed services, the legacy of having the
Pasadena [C]ampus remain in in perpetuity” (italics omitted);
Coleman fully performed his services and defendants voluntarily
accepted those benefits; and, in March of 2019, defendants sold
11 of the buildings on the Pasadena Campus and therefore
materially breached and repudiated the contract.
       With respect to the quantum meruit cause of action,
Coleman alleged that, in exchange for his performance of
services, “Defendants made an explicit and implicit promise that
Plaintiff would receive for his services, the legacy of the Pasadena
[C]ampus Defendants would maintain in perpetuity. The services
Plaintiff performed were rendered with an understanding and
expectation of Plaintiff and Defendants that Plaintiff’s services
were not gratuitous.” By selling a portion of the Pasadena
Campus, defendants “den[ied] to Plaintiff the very thing
Defendants promised Plaintiff.” Coleman alleged that defendants
were not entitled to retain the material benefit they received
“without restoring to Plaintiff, as a matter of justice, the
Pasadena [C]ampus, his services, or the 15 ½ years of his youth.”
       On the day before the hearing on the demurrer, Coleman
filed an ex parte application asking for leave to file a surreply
based on defendants’ citation to new authority in their reply
brief. The court denied the ex parte application. After hearing
argument from the parties, the court sustained the demurrer
with leave to amend as to the constructive fraud and breach of
implied-in-fact contract and without leave to amend as to the
IIED and quantum meruit causes of action.
       The court first sustained the constructive fraud and breach
of implied-in-fact contract causes of action, with leave to amend,
on the ground that the alleged agreement never to sell the

                                 9
Pasadena Campus fell within the statute of frauds and is void as
a matter of public policy and is unenforceable.
       With respect to the constructive fraud cause of action, the
court further concluded that the cause of action was time-barred
because Coleman alleged that he learned in April 2017 that
defendants intended to sell the Pasadena Campus. Since their
decision to sell was the breach of the duties owed, Coleman had
notice over three years before he filed the action. The court
concluded that Coleman had failed to allege the existence of a
confidential relationship between himself and defendants, as
opposed to Winter, for purposes of alleging a confidential
relationship as required to plead constructive fraud. The court
also observed that Coleman had not alleged a misrepresentation
or nondisclosure of a material fact that defendants were obligated
to disclose, that defendants intended to deceive him, or that he
changed his position because of the alleged nondisclosures.
       With respect to the IIED cause of action, the court
concluded that Coleman had failed to allege sufficient facts to
suggest that defendants engaged in outrageous conduct with the
intent, or reckless disregard of the probability, of causing
Coleman emotional distress. Specifically, their exercise of their
legal rights in pursuit of their own economic interest was not
outrageous.
       The court further concluded that Coleman had failed to
plead a cause of action for breach of an implied contract due to
the uncertainty of the allegations. The court found it was unclear
from the complaint whether the alleged contract was an oral
promise made by Winters and ratified by the board or implied in
fact. The allegations of the FAC were also unclear as to the terms

                               10
of the agreement. Allegations that he agreed to devote his youth
or life’s efforts were vague and insufficient.
       Finally, the court concluded that Coleman failed to allege
sufficient facts to state a claim for quantum meruit because
plaintiff alleged that his services were a conditional donation
and, as such, he did not expect payment in return. Coleman
alleged that he donated his time with the expectation that
defendants would maintain the Pasadena Campus in perpetuity,
and defendants’ failure to do so does not transform the intent
with which Coleman rendered his service.5
       In April 2022, Coleman filed the SAC, which asserted
amended causes of action for constructive fraud and breach of
implied-in-fact contract. The SAC incorporated additional
allegations concerning the relationship of trust and
confidentiality between Coleman and the board. Specifically,
Coleman alleged that he developed a deep and trusting
confidential relationship with the board of directors of FMF-
WCIU, each of which had far greater experience in the field of
international development than he did, and that “he was in a
vulnerable position in that he had no practical way to verify the
information the board had gained with their combined decades of
experience, and instead could only trust in the far superior global
knowledge and corporate-founding knowledge of the board, as
well as in the legal knowledge which the board and FMF-WCIU’s
attorneys had.”

5 In April 2022, Coleman filed a notice of appeal as to the trial court’s

order sustaining the demurrer to the FAC, which this court
subsequently dismissed.

                                    11
       With respect to the implied in fact contract, the SAC
further alleged that “[t]hose who worked to found FMF-WCIU
were induced by a shared and clearly understood agreement, not
by a specific written or oral contract. The shared agreement was
to pay the mortgage on an endowed campus in Pasadena CA in
exchange for the FMF-WCIU board maintaining the campus so
that it became a legacy out from which great good would come for
generations to help the world’s overlooked people groups.”
Coleman further alleged that “[t]he clear implied contract then,
the promise from FMF-WCIU, was that if a staff member,
including Coleman, gave a great deal of sacrificial work to
succeed in paying off the campus mortgage and the endowment
properties, FMF-WCIU would put in place the legal, financial,
and operational structures to maintain the campus as a
permanent university, so that both staff, including Coleman, and
board would be rewarded with the rare and valuable
consideration of the permanent legacy of having founded and
established an endowed, ongoing, continuing university doing
great good in the world for generations to come.”
       In June 2022, defendants filed a demurrer to the SAC,
which Coleman opposed. After defendants filed their reply,
Coleman again filed an ex parte application to file a surreply,
arguing that defendants had cited to additional authorities on
reply. The court denied the ex parte application.
       Following oral argument in August 2022, the court
sustained defendants’ demurrers.6 The court found that, despite

6 The court also held a hearing in June 2022 and issued a ruling before

it was informed that the remittitur had not yet issued in connection
with Coleman’s initial appeal. The court therefore vacated its order.

                                  12
Coleman’s allegations that the statute of limitations was tolled
until defendants refused to monetarily reimburse him for the
services he provided after the March 2019 sale of portions of the
Pasadena Campus, Coleman’s “logic supporting these conclusory
allegations is misplaced and belied by the underlying facts. As
alleged, Plaintiff had knowledge, that at no point was
contradicted, that Defendants were planning to sell the Pasadena
Campus and informed Plaintiff they were ignoring his request for
repayment of donations, at latest, in December 2017.” The court
again concluded that the breach of implied contract cause of
action was barred by the statute of frauds and was a restraint on
alienation and therefore void. The court found that Coleman
failed to meet his burden of establishing that these defects could
be cured by amendment and therefore sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend. The court further concluded that
Coleman had failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that
his constructive fraud cause of action was not barred by the
three-year statute of limitations. This cause of action was based
on defendants having promised not to sell the Pasadena Campus
from 1976 to 1990, on which Coleman relied in performing work
for defendants—promises that were false when made and were
made with the intent to induce Coleman’s performance. Thus, the
fraud occurred between 1976 and 1990, and, to toll the statute of
limitations such that the February 2021 complaint was not time-
barred, Coleman must have discovered facts constituting the
fraud no earlier than February 2018. However, Coleman had
notice that defendants intended to sell the Pasadena Campus,
and thus of the falsity of their prior statements, as of April 2017,
and at the latest December 2017. The court further concluded
that Coleman had not adequately pleaded that any tolling

                                13
doctrine applied and had not met his burden of establishing that
the defects could be cured by amendment.
      The court entered judgment in September 2022. Coleman
timely appealed.

                           DISCUSSION

       Coleman contends that the court erred in denying leave to
file his surreply to the FAC and by relying on new authorities
cited by defendants in issuing its ruling on defendants’ demurrer.
He also asserts that the court erred in concluding that he was
attempting to enforce a restraint on alienation. Coleman argues
that, even if the action does seek to enforce a restraint on
alienation, the restraint was reasonable and equitable estoppel
requires that it be enforced. Additionally, Coleman contends that
he adequately pleaded an IIED cause of action by alleging that
the sale of the Pasadena Campus and defendants’ concealment
destroyed the meaning in his life and his peace of mind. Coleman
further argues that he pleaded a quantum meruit cause of action
because he alleged that he fully performed his services and seeks
a return of the “thing” he expected to receive, the permanent
campus or its equivalent in money. Coleman contends that the
court erred in concluding that his constructive fraud cause of
action was time-barred because defendants committed continuing
violations through 2019. He also argues that he adequately
pleaded the elements of a breach of implied contract. Finally,
Coleman contends that the court erred in refusing to grant him
leave to amend his complaints.7

7 Although Coleman is self-represented, he is held to the same

standard as an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975,

                                  14
1.    The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
      Coleman’s ex parte request to file a surreply.
       Coleman does not cite the relevant standard of review for
the denial of an ex parte application or the denial of a request to
file a surreply. The decision whether to consider a surreply is
within the discretion of the trial court. (Guimei v. General
Electric Co. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 689, 703.) As defendants
observe, Coleman does not cite any authority supporting that a
party has a right to file additional briefing, such that the denial
of such a request may be considered prejudicial.
       To the extent Coleman argues that the court abused its
discretion in considering new authorities cited in defendants’
reply brief in support of its demurrers to the FAC, we perceive no
abuse of discretion. Coleman appears to take the position that
any new authority cited in a reply brief is improper. That is not
the law. “We will not ordinarily consider issues raised for the first

984–985.) Self-representation is not a ground for lenient treatment and
a person who represents himself “must follow correct rules of
procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)
Defendants identify several deficiencies in the record (some of which
Coleman has attempted to remedy with a reply appendix) and
Coleman’s failure to comply with various provisions of California Rules
of Court, rule 8.204, including the failure to include a statement of
facts containing citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(C) & (a)(2)(C).) To the extent it is intended to be a
statement of facts, the “Case Summary” portion of Coleman’s opening
brief provides only a cursory overview of the facts alleged in his
complaints and contains only occasional citations to the record. Two of
the citations are to the entire “General Allegations” portions of the
FAC and SAC, each of which are over 20 pages. Nevertheless, we
exercise our discretion to reach the merits of Coleman’s contentions.
(Id., rule 8.204(e)(2)(C).)

                                  15
time in a reply brief. [Citation.] An issue is new if it does more
than elaborate on issues raised in the opening brief or rebut
arguments made by the respondent in respondent’s brief . . . . [¶]
Defendants may cite new authorities in support of arguments
properly raised in the opening brief.” (American Indian Model
Schools v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
258, 275–276.) Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage
Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, which Coleman cites, does not
contradict this principle. Rather, Jacobs involved the
introduction of new evidence submitted on reply in support of a
motion for summary judgment. (Id. at p. 449.)
       Defendants argued in their demurrer to the FAC that a
restriction on alienation is void and cannot be enforced. They
cited Estate of Molino (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 913 and Civil Code
section 880.020 on reply for the proposition that an agreement is
void where it has the violation of public policy as its object. The
trial court could have reasonably interpreted these citations as
elaborating on the argument already made in the opening brief
that a restraint on alienation is void and unenforceable. The
court could have also reasonably concluded that these new
authorities responded to issues raised in Coleman’s opposition
brief, including his contention that he was not trying to enforce a
void restraint on alienation. Further, Coleman had the
opportunity to address new authorities at oral argument and may
well have done so. As the reporters’ transcripts are not part of the
record, we are unable to determine whether that was the case.
We therefore conclude that Coleman has failed to demonstrate
that the court abused its discretion by denying his application for
leave to file a surreply.

                                16
2.    The court did not err in sustaining defendants’
      demurrers to the FAC and SAC without leave to
      amend.
      2.1.   Standards of Review
       We independently review a trial court’s order sustaining a
demurrer to determine whether the operative complaint alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Ivanoff v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) We assume the
truth of all properly pled factual allegations and matters that are
judicially noticeable. (Ibid.) “An order sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend may be affirmed on any ground stated in
the demurrer, even if the trial court did not act on that ground.”
(Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los
Angeles (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 918, 934.) “ ‘It is the validity of the
court’s action in sustaining the demurrer which is here
reviewable, and not the court’s opinion or statement of reasons
for its action.’ ” (Weinstock v. Eissler (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 212,
225.)
       When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff
can amend his or her complaint to cure the defect. (Blank v.
Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) If the defect can be cured, “the
trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there
has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Ibid.) “The
burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the
plaintiff.” (Ibid.) “Contrary to long-standing rules generally
precluding a party from changing the theory of the case on appeal
[citations], a plaintiff may propose new facts or theories to show
the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action, thereby
showing the trial court ‘abused its discretion’ [citation] in not

                                 17
granting leave to amend.” (Connerly v. State of California (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 457, 460.) “The plaintiff ‘must show in what
manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment
will change the legal effect of his pleading.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
      2.2.   The court did not err in concluding that the
             alleged agreement to maintain the Pasadena
             Campus in perpetuity is void.
      Coleman asserts that the FAC and SAC did not seek to
enforce an agreement placing a permanent restriction on
alienation. However, even if Coleman is not seeking to invalidate
or enjoin the sale, the relief that Coleman seeks depends on the
enforceability of the implied agreement permanently restraining
alienation of the campus and defendants’ violation of that
agreement.
      “A void contract is without legal effect. [Citation.] ‘It binds
no one and is a mere nullity.’ [Citation.] ‘Such a contract has no
existence whatever. It has no legal entity for any purpose and
neither action nor inaction of a party to it can validate it . . . .’
[Citation.]” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62
Cal.4th 919, 929.) Civil Code section 711 states: “Conditions
restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created,
are void.” “Although at one time this section was construed to
prohibit all restraints on alienation regardless of degree or
duration, it is now settled that only unreasonable restraints are
invalid.” (Taormina Theosophical Community, Inc. v. Silver
(1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 964, 973 (Taormina).)
      Coleman contends that the implied agreement to never sell
the campus is enforceable because it was reasonable when made.
Specifically, he contends that the restraint on alienation was
“clearly and directly related to FMF-WCIU’s stated written

                                 18
purpose.” However, the test for whether a restraint is reasonable
is not simply whether it advanced some purpose. “In determining
whether a restraint on alienation is unreasonable, the court must
balance the justification for the restriction against the quantum
of the restraint. The greater the restraint, the stronger the
justification must be to support it.” (City of Oceanside v. McKenna
(1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1427.) “The issue of reasonableness
is not a factual one, but rather a legal one.” (Id. at p. 1424.)
       In Taormina, Taormina Theosophical Community, Inc.
(TTC), a nonprofit California corporation, recorded certain
covenants, conditions and restrictions (CCRs) concerning
properties it purchased. (Taormina, supra, 140 Cal.App.3d at
p. 968.)8 It later ratified amendments to the CCRs that limited
ownership and occupancy of tracts of TTC’s land to persons
(1) who had been members of the Theosophical Society in
America for three years, or (2) in exceptional cases, who had been
members for less than three years, but had been approved by its
Board of Trustees, and (3) who were 50 years of age or over. (Id.

8 We are free to rely on cases not cited by the parties without providing

them an opportunity to file further briefing so long as we do not base
our opinion on an issue that was not raised by the parties. Specifically,
Government Code section 68081 provides: “Before . . . a court of appeal
. . . renders a decision in a proceeding other than a summary denial of
a petition for an extraordinary writ, based upon an issue which was not
proposed or briefed by any party to the proceeding, the court shall
afford the parties an opportunity to present their views on the matter
through supplemental briefing.” (Italics added.) It does not require a
court to seek the comment of the parties on each case and authority it
wishes to cite. As an example, because we cite Taormina to analyze an
issue raised and briefed by the parties (i.e., whether a permanent
restraint on alienation is reasonable), no further briefing from the
parties is required.

                                   19
at pp. 968–969.) On appeal from a judgment granting injunctive
relief to Taormina based on the breach of the CCRs, this Division
concluded that the covenant restraining ownership of the land
was unenforceable as an illegal restraint on alienation. (Id. at
pp. 967–968, 973–974.) Specifically, the court found that “[t]he
quantum of restraint in this case is very great. Southern
California is a highly desirable place to live and people from all
over the country seek to buy property here. In contrast to a vast
potential market, the number of Theosophists in the United
States is exceptionally small.” (Id. at p. 973.) “The purpose of the
restriction is to insure that those who settle in Taormina are
sincere in their commitment to Theosophy.” (Id. at p. 974.) The
court recognized that although “the gathering together of like
minded people may be a laudable goal, such purpose is not
sufficient to sustain the heavy burden on alienability.” (Ibid.) It
therefore concluded that the covenant was an unreasonable
restraint of alienation and void under Civil Code section 711.
(Ibid.)
       In the 40 years since the Taormina opinion issued, the
demand for property in Southern California has only grown. The
restraint at issue here is also even greater than the “very great”
restraint permitting the sale of property to only an “exceptionally
small” number of people. (Taormina, supra, 140 Cal.App.3d at
p. 974.) As defendants contend, there could be no greater
restraint on property than a permanent restraint on its sale and
use. The aspiration of “fulfill[ing] . . . the FMF-WCIU core
purpose to become a university that would stabilize and
galvanize the entire global international development . . .
movement” may be a laudable one, but advancing the goals of a
nonprofit organization is insufficient to sustain the heaviest

                                 20
possible burden on alienation. Coleman identifies no cases in
which a permanent restraint on alienation and purpose was held
to be reasonable. Thus, we conclude that the restraint was
unreasonable as a matter of law. (See Wood v. Nellis-Ryus (1929)
101 Cal.App. 447, 449 [restriction in agreement forbidding owner
from transferring any portion of property having less than a 60-
foot street frontage “render[ed] the agreement unreasonable and
unenforceable as a perpetual restraint against alienation of
property”].)
       We agree with defendants that the agreement to
permanently maintain the Pasadena Campus, whether an oral
promise, written promise, or implied in fact contract, was void.
Even if Coleman adequately alleged the requirements for
equitable estoppel, equitable defenses are inapplicable to void
contracts. (Tufeld Corporation v. Beverly Hills Gateway, L.P.
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 12, 27 [“[I]f a contract is void and not
merely voidable, the equitable defenses of estoppel, laches, and
waiver do not apply.”].)
       We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly
sustained the demurrer as to the breach of implied contract cause
of action and decline to reach the issue of whether that cause of
action was otherwise adequately alleged. However, we are not
persuaded that the fact that the contract is void necessarily bars
the remaining causes of action. (See, e.g., Huskinson & Brown v.
Wolf (2004) 32 Cal.4th 453, 461 [even though subject contract
was void as against public policy, “ ‘there arises an implied
contract to pay for services rendered thereunder, and the remedy
of action sounding in quantum meruit is available to recover the
reasonable value thereof’ ”].) We therefore assume that the fact
that the contract is void and unenforceable does not prevent

                               21
Coleman from pleading the remaining causes of action, which we
address separately.9
       2.3.   The court did not err in concluding that Coleman
              failed to adequately allege a cause of action for
              quantum meruit.
      “ ‘Quantum meruit refers to the well-established principle
that “the law implies a promise to pay for services performed
under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously
rendered.” . . . To recover in quantum meruit, a party need not
prove the existence of a contract . . . , but it must show the
circumstances were such that “the services were rendered under
some understanding or expectation of both parties that
compensation therefor was to be made” . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘ “The
measure of recovery in quantum meruit is the reasonable value of

9 Defendants also contend that Coleman’s claims are barred by the

statute of frauds. “[W]here assertion of the statute of frauds would
cause unconscionable injury, part performance allows specific
enforcement of a contract that lacks the requisite writing.
[Citation.] . . . [T]o constitute part performance, the relevant acts
either must ‘unequivocally refer[ ]’ to the contract [citation], or ‘clearly
relate’ to its terms. [Citations.] Such conduct satisfies the evidentiary
function of the statute of frauds by confirming that a bargain was in
fact reached.” (In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096, 1108.)
Questions of partial performance and whether a party is equitably
estopped from relying on the statute of frauds are typically questions
of fact. (See Pearsall v. Henry (1907) 153 Cal. 314, 327 [“The question
whether there has been a part performance of the oral agreement is
necessarily one of fact . . . .”]; Mehl v. People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks.
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 710, 715–716 [“Estoppel is a question of fact . . . .”].)
Because we conclude that Coleman did not adequately plead the
remaining causes of action on other grounds, we need not reach this
issue.

                                     22
the services rendered, provided they were of direct benefit to the
defendant.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[A] plaintiff must establish both that he
or she was acting pursuant to either an express or implied request
for such services from the defendant and that the services
rendered were intended to and did benefit the defendant.’
[Citation.]” (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health
Services (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1673.)
       We agree with the trial court that the allegations of the
FAC do not support a claim for quantum meruit as a matter of
law. The FAC refers to Coleman’s work for defendants as a
“conditional donation” and alleges that the condition for the
services he rendered was “that the Pasadena [C]ampus would
remain as a permanent mission pentagon.” Similarly, in his
opening brief, Coleman argues that he “expected to receive for his
conditionally donated but fully performed services the legacy of
FMF-WCIU maintaining the Pasadena [C]ampus permanently.
[Citation.] This is a form of payment Coleman expected to
receive.” (Italics omitted.) On reply, he similarly contends that he
“expected compensation of a permanent Pasadena [C]ampus.”
       Although the FAC alleges that Coleman expected
something in exchange for his donation of time and services, its
allegations do not support that Coleman offered his services for
the purpose of receiving compensation, or that defendants
understood that he was providing his services with the
expectation of compensation. Coleman does not argue, nor did he
allege, that the parties had an understanding that he would be
paid the market value of his labor, which he estimates at
approximately $550,000. The FAC also did not allege that the
cost of permanently maintaining the Pasadena Campus was of
comparable value to the labor that Coleman provided, or that any

                                23
party understood it to be. Coleman’s quantum meruit claim is
thus an attempt to enforce the terms of a conditional donation,
rather than an attempt to enforce a quasi-contract for services.
We have not located, nor has Coleman cited, any case in which
quantum meruit was applied to permit a plaintiff to recover the
value of services that were conditionally donated to a nonprofit
institution.
       “As a general rule, where a fund collected for a charitable
purpose is made up of contributions from many persons, no one of
them is entitled to call the trustees to account for misapplication
of the fund or breach of trust. A mere contributor, to have a
foothold for questioning the disposition of the fund, must have
some special interest in the trust or a reversionary interest in the
fund different from that of fellow contributors. Additionally, the
donation of funds or property to a charitable institution, not
given in trust, does not give the donor standing to challenge the
institution’s governance or changes to its practices.” (15
Am.Jur.2d Charities, § 135, fns. omitted; accord, Hardt v. Vitae
Foundation, Inc. (Mo.Ct.App. W.D.2009) 302 S.W.3d 133, 137
[under common law, donors are “prevented from enforcing their
gifts in court, because non-trustee donors retained no interest in
the gift, ‘except the sentimental one that every person who
contributed’ to the charity would be presumed to have”].) This is
consistent with language in L.B. Research & Educ. Foundation v.
UCLA Foundation (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 171, 180–181, which
states that “ ‘ “the only person who can object to the disposition of
the trust property is one having some definite interest in the
property—he must be a trustee, or a cestui, or have some
reversionary interest in the trust property.” [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” The allegations of the FAC do not establish that

                                 24
Coleman has standing to question the disposition of his donation
or seek a return of his donation. There are no allegations
concerning how donations to defendants’ charities were held. It is
also unclear how Coleman’s labor could be held in trust or how he
could maintain a reversionary interest.
      In any event, the pertinent question with respect to the
quantum meruit cause of action is whether the FAC alleges that
Coleman’s “ ‘ “services were rendered under some understanding
or expectation of both parties that compensation therefor was to
be made” ’ ” (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health
Services, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1673), not whether he
potentially has standing to seek the return of his conditional
donation under some other theory. The FAC does not so allege,
nor could it without contradicting the many allegations
establishing that Coleman intended his services to be a donation.
We therefore conclude that the court properly sustained
defendants’ demurrer as to the quantum meruit cause of action.
      2.4.   Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
       “The elements of a cause of action for IIED are as follows:
(1) defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
(conduct so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in a
civilized community) with the intent to cause, or with reckless
disregard to the probability of causing, emotional distress; and (2)
as a result, plaintiff suffered extreme or severe emotional
distress. [Citation.] Additionally, ‘ “[i]t must be conduct directed
at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of the plaintiff of whom
the defendant is aware.” [Citation.]’ ” (Berry v. Frazier (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 1258, 1273.) “The complaint must plead specific facts
that establish severe emotional distress resulting from
defendant’s conduct.” (Michaelian v. State Comp. Ins. Fund

                                25
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1114.) “While the outrageousness of
a defendant’s conduct normally presents an issue of fact to be
determined by the trier of fact [citation], the court may determine
in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery.” (Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209
Cal.App.3d 878, 883.)
       “An assertion of legal rights in pursuit of one’s own
economic interests does not qualify as ‘outrageous.’ ” (Yu v. Signet
Bank/Virginia (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1398.) A person is
privileged to pursue his or her own legal or economic interests
even if the person knows the actions will cause another person
emotional distress; however, “the exercise of the privilege . . .
must be done in a permissible way and with a good faith belief in
the existence of the rights asserted. [Citation.] It is well
established that one who, in exercising the privilege of asserting
his own economic interests, acts in an outrageous manner may be
held liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
(Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d
376, 395–396.)
       The FAC alleges that “[t]he sale of the campus, refusal to
maintain the Pasadena [C]ampus in perpetuity, and the refusal
of a refund are extreme and outrageous conduct, acts that are so
extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency that are usually
tolerated in a civilized community.” We agree with the trial court
that it was not extreme or outrageous for defendants to pursue
their legal interests by declining to honor an agreement
restraining alienation that was void and contrary to public policy.
Moreover, the allegations of the FAC do not establish that
defendants disclosed their decision to enforce their legal rights in

                                26
an impermissible or outrageous manner. The December 2017
email from defendants, which was incorporated by reference in
the FAC, simply states that defendants rejected Coleman’s legal
and factual contentions. This is not extreme or outrageous
conduct as a matter of law.
       In his opposition brief below, Coleman argued that he
adequately pleaded defendants’ IIED in the FAC based on “the
campus sale that destroyed the meaning in [his] life.” He also
asserted that “Defendants’ conduct concealing their intent to
create a fund of money and property breached Plaintiff’s trust
and integrity in the righteousness of Defendants who promised to
make his life more meaningful with a legacy, but Defendants
destroyed the legacy and the meaning in Plaintiff’s life.” Coleman
did not rely on any allegation that defendants failed to reimburse
him for the services he rendered. To the extent this argument
was not waived, we are not persuaded that the FAC adequately
alleges that defendants’ refusal to reimburse Coleman for the
labor he conditionally donated to defendants constitutes extreme
or outrageous conduct. As discussed above, the allegations of the
FAC do not establish that Coleman had or could have had a
reversionary interest in the donation of his time, such that he
had standing to enforce the terms of his conditional donation.
Defendants’ refusal to accede to Coleman’s request for
reimbursement for his donation of his time decades prior was a
permissible exercise of their legal rights. Again, the FAC does not
allege any facts concerning the manner in which defendants
denied his request for reimbursement, and there is therefore no
basis to conclude that Coleman adequately alleged that they did
so in an impermissible manner. Although the FAC alleges that
the effect of defendants’ refusal to reimburse him was feelings of

                                27
outrage and despair, the fact that defendants’ conduct resulted in
Coleman’s emotional distress is not all the cause of action
requires.
       Defendants argue that Coleman’s contention that his IIED
claim was premised on defendants’ alleged concealment was not
pleaded or raised below. We do not entirely agree. The FAC refers
to defendants’ alleged concealment with respect to the IIED cause
of action. However, the FAC does not allege that “FMF-WCIU’s
conduct was concealing (deception) from Coleman that they never
intended to maintain the Pasadena Campus permanently and
never intended to give donors such as Coleman a refund if he
determined his conditional donation was being used other than
as he directed” (italics omitted), as Coleman argues on appeal
without citation to the record. Rather, the FAC alleged that
defendants’ sale of the Pasadena Campus “concealed the original
intent of establishing the Pasadena [C]ampus.” However,
according to the allegations of the FAC, the intent of creating a
permanent “mission pentagon” was known to Coleman before
defendants even existed as entities, when he and Winter first
discussed the purpose of the Pasadena Campus. The FAC further
alleges that defendants “conceal[ed] their assurances of
maintaining the Pasadena [C]ampus in perpetuity.” Had
defendants concealed these assurances and promises, it is not
clear how Coleman could have relied on them to his detriment.
       Even if we construe the FAC as alleging that defendants
concealed their intention not to abide by the original intent
behind establishing the Pasadena Campus, the claim overlaps
with his constructive fraud cause of action. We conclude that the
two claims must rise or fall together. A defendant that does not
have a confidential relationship with a plaintiff does not act in an

                                28
extreme or outrageous manner by failing to disclose information
to the plaintiff, nor can the nondisclosure of a fact that is not
material constitute extreme or outrageous conduct as a matter of
law. With respect to the constructive fraud cause of action, the
court concluded that the FAC had failed to allege facts sufficient
to suggest the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence
between Coleman and defendants. The court also concluded that
the FAC did not allege a misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a
material fact that defendants were obligated to disclose because
whether defendants would maintain the Pasadena Campus in
perpetuity was an opinion as to the future between 1976 and
1990, not a statement of existing fact.
       We are not persuaded that Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn.
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092 (Molko) supports Coleman’s contention
that he adequately alleged an IIED cause of action. In Molko, the
plaintiffs “contend[ed] the Church’s fraudulent and coercive
conduct was outrageous, was carried out with reckless disregard
of the probability of causing them emotional distress, and was the
actual and proximate cause of their severe emotional suffering.”
(Id. at p. 1120.) The plaintiffs relied on “the same conduct that
support[ed] their fraud actions—i.e., misrepresentation and
concealment of the Church’s identity for the purpose of inducing
them to submit unknowingly to coercive persuasion.” (Ibid.)
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, “by the time the Church
disclosed its true identity, the Church’s agents had rendered
them incapable of deciding not to join the Church, by subjecting
them, without their knowledge or consent, to an intense program
of coercive persuasion or mind control.” (Id. at pp. 1108–1109.)
“[I]n other words, . . . the Church deceived them into a setting in
which they could be ‘brainwashed,’ and that the Church could not

                                29
then ‘cure’ the deception by telling them the truth after their
involuntary indoctrination was accomplished.” (Id. at p. 1109.)
        The defendant challenged the plaintiff’s fraud claims on
constitutional grounds, and our Supreme Court “conclude[d] that
neither the federal nor state Constitution bars [the plaintiffs]
from bringing traditional fraud actions against the Church for
allegedly inducing them, by misrepresentation and concealment
of its identity, into unknowingly entering an atmosphere in which
they were then subjected to coercive persuasion.” (Molko, supra,
46 Cal.3d at p. 1119.) “The Court of Appeal, having found the
fraud theory constitutionally impermissible, naturally found the
same theory could not constitutionally provide the basis for a
different cause of action.” (Id. at p. 1120.) Having concluded that
the fraud claim was constitutionally permissible (id. at p. 1121),
the Supreme Court proceeded to analyze the plaintiffs’ IIED
claim and concluded that, “[v]iewed in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs, the Church’s continued deceptions might well be seen
as conduct breaching plaintiffs’ trust in the integrity of those who
were promising to make their lives more meaningful” and thus
“might well constitute an abuse of ‘a relation or position which
gives [the Church] power to damage the plaintiff’s interest.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1122–1123.)
        To the extent it is premised on concealment or
nondisclosure, Coleman’s cause of action for IIED, like the IIED
claim in Molko, relies on the same conduct as his fraud cause of
action. However, in Molko, the only challenge to the plaintiffs’
allegations of fraud was that they were not constitutionally
permissible. In contrast, the court here sustained a demurrer to
Coleman’s constructive fraud cause of action on multiple grounds.
Molko does not stand for the proposition that, where an IIED

                                30
cause of action based on misrepresentation or concealment
depends on the same allegations as a fraud cause of action, the
IIED cause of action will survive regardless of whether the
plaintiff has adequately pleaded the elements of the underlying
fraud.
      We therefore conclude that the court did not err in
sustaining the demurrer to the IIED cause of action. However,
since the court granted leave to amend with respect to the
constructive fraud cause of action, it arguably should have also
done so with respect to the IIED cause of action to the extent it
was premised on the allegations of defendants’ concealment,
given the overlap between the claims. As we discuss below, the
SAC also failed to plead specific facts supporting a nondisclosure
of material fact made by defendants with the intent to deceive.
Thus, we conclude that any error by the court in sustaining the
demurrer to the IIED cause of action without leave to amend was
not prejudicial.
      2.5.   The court did not err in sustaining the demurrer
             to the constructive fraud cause of action.
      The trial court sustained the demurrer to the constructive
fraud cause of action in the SAC on the ground that it was time-
barred. We agree with the court’s conclusion. Although we need
not proceed further to conclude that the court properly sustained
the demurrer with respect to the constructive fraud cause of
action, we also address the sufficiency of the substantive
allegations because they overlap with the IIED cause of action, as
discussed above.

                                31
      2.5.1. The trial court did not err in concluding that
             Coleman’s constructive fraud claim was time-
             barred.
       “The elements of the cause of action for constructive fraud
are: (1) fiduciary relationship; (2) nondisclosure (breach of
fiduciary duty); (3) intent to deceive, and (4) reliance and
resulting injury (causation).” (Younan v. Equifax Inc. (1980) 111
Cal.App.3d 498, 517, fn. 14.) “An action for relief on the grounds
of fraud or mistake must be commenced within three years.
However, such action is not deemed accrued ‘until the discovery,
by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake.’ [Citation.] The courts interpret discovery in this context
to mean not when the plaintiff became aware of the specific
wrong alleged, but when the plaintiff suspected or should have
suspected that an injury was caused by wrongdoing. The statute
of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has information
which would put a reasonable person on inquiry.” (Kline v.
Turner (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373–1374.)
       Assuming for the sake of argument that the SAC
adequately pleaded a cause of action for constructive fraud (a
conclusion we do not reach, as discussed below), we agree with
the trial court that “the alleged fraud occurred from 1976 to 1990,
and Plaintiff seeks damages for work he performed for
Defendants during this time span.” The SAC does not allege that
defendants continued to conceal their intent with respect to the
Pasadena Campus after that time or induced Coleman’s reliance
to provide further services.
       However, the cause of action did not accrue until Coleman
“suspected or should have suspected that an injury was caused by
wrongdoing.” (Kline v. Turner, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371.)

                                32
The allegations of the SAC and the documents incorporated by
reference therein establish that, as of December 2017, Coleman
was on notice that any further efforts to persuade defendants
against disclaiming the alleged agreement to never sell the
Pasadena Campus were in vain. Although defendants declined to
substantively respond to each of the points Coleman raised in his
December 2017 letter, they stated in their email response: “It is
important however to be clear that we, along with our counsel,
find the positions articulated in your letter to be inaccurate and
lacking factual and legal support” and that “[t]he WCIU and FV
Boards will continue pursuing our vision and mission and the
important work at hand.” Coleman had every reason to suspect at
this time that his labor had not secured the maintenance of the
Pasadena Campus in perpetuity and that he had therefore been
injured. Thus, we agree with the trial court that the statute of
limitations began to run at this time.10
       We do not agree that the “ ‘continuing violation’ ” doctrine
extends the statute of limitations in this case. “[T]he term
‘continuing violation doctrine’ refers loosely to ‘a number of
different approaches, in different contexts and using a variety of

10 Contrary to Coleman’s assertion, Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21

Cal.4th 383 is entirely consistent with this proposition. In Norgart, our
Supreme Court stated that “the plaintiff discovers the cause of action
when he at least suspects a factual basis, as opposed to a legal theory,
for its elements, even if he lacks knowledge thereof—when, simply put,
he at least ‘suspects . . . that someone has done something wrong’ to
him [citation] . . . .” (Id. at p. 397.) Coleman had strong reason to
believe that something wrong had been done to him— that is, that his
labor between 1976 and 1990 was based on a false promise that
defendants now refused to acknowledge and clearly indicated that they
did not intend to keep.

                                   33
formulations, to extending the statute of limitations in
employment discrimination cases.’ ” (Carroll v. City and County
of San Francisco (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 805, 820, quoting
Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 813; accord,
Alch v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 339, 368 [“the
continuing violation doctrine is ‘ “arguably the most muddled
area in all of employment discrimination law” ’ ”].) “The
continuing violation doctrine serves a number of equitable
purposes. Some injuries are the product of a series of small
harms, any one of which may not be actionable on its
own. . . . Allegations of a pattern of reasonably frequent and
similar acts may, in a given case, justify treating the acts as an
indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety,
notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside and
partially inside the limitations period.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business
Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1197–1198 (Aryeh).) Our
Supreme Court has applied this doctrine “where ‘some or all of
the component acts might not be individually actionable’ and the
plaintiff ‘may not yet recognize’ the acts ‘as part of a pattern.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1198, quoting Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36
Cal.4th 1028, 1058.)
       Although Coleman repeatedly uses the term “continuing
violation” in his briefing, the cases on which he relies primarily
concern the “continuous accrual” theory. “ ‘[C]ontinuous accrual
applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation:
“When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a
cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs,
triggering a new limitations period.” [Citation.]’ ” (Orange County
Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) 14
Cal.App.5th 343, 395.) “Because each new breach of such an

                                34
obligation provides all the elements of a claim—wrongdoing,
harm, and causation [citation]—each may be treated as an
independently actionable wrong with its own time limit for
recovery.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199.) “[U]nlike the
continuing violation doctrine, which renders an entire course of
conduct actionable, the theory of continuous accrual supports
recovery only for damages arising from those breaches falling
within the limitations period.” (Ibid.)
       The relevant “violation” under the “continuing violation” or
“continuous accrual” doctrine for a claim of constructive fraud
must necessarily be further fraudulent conduct, not conduct that
exposes prior fraudulent acts. As discussed, the final fraudulent
acts were alleged to take place in 1990, when defendants last
induced Coleman to provide services based on their alleged
failure to disclose that they did not intend to maintain the
Pasadena Campus as a permanent “mission pentagon.” As our
Supreme Court stated in Aryeh, the continuous accrual theory
relies on the fact that all elements are present in each recurring
breach. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199.) Coleman cannot
establish that all elements of constructive fraud were present in
defendants’ conduct between 2017 and 2019.
       Similarly, even if the continuous violation theory were to
apply in contexts outside of employment discrimination, it would
not assist Coleman. When applying the continuing violation
doctrine to a plaintiff’s disability accommodation and disability
harassment claims, our Supreme Court “held that when an
employer unlawfully refuses reasonable accommodation of a
disabled employee or engages in disability harassment, the
statute of limitations begins to run either ‘when the course of
conduct is brought to an end, as by the employer’s cessation of

                                35
such conduct or by the employee’s resignation, or when the
employee is on notice that further efforts to end the unlawful
conduct will be in vain.’ [Citation.]” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA,
Inc., supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1056, italics added.) Defendants
informed Coleman in December 2017 that they found his
positions legally and factually baseless and that they intended to
pursue their own vision. Thus, he was on notice as of December
2017 that further efforts to stop a sale would be in vain. The
statute of limitations therefore began to run at this time and
expired before Coleman filed his action in 2021.
       Finally, the allegations of the SAC do not establish that
equitable tolling applies. Coleman argues that “FMF-WCIU
deceptively chose an ‘appropriate time’ to respond and inform
him they would not give him a refund, that was after a time they
thought they could manipulate an argument that the limitations
period had expired.” However, the SAC does not allege that
defendants’ December 2017 response lulled him into the belief
that they would eventually respond. Rather, it alleges that
“FMF/WCIU sent an e-mail on December 29, 2017, effectively
stating they would not respond, and that the letter had contained
many inaccuracies.” (Italics added.) The email itself repudiates
all factual and legal claims asserted by Coleman. Although
Coleman contends that a third amended complaint would plead
facts supporting equitable tolling or equitable estoppel, he does
not identify any such facts, nor does he explain how he could do
so without contradicting his prior allegations and documents
incorporated by reference in his complaint.

                                36
      Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the
constructive fraud claim was time-barred.11
      2.5.2. Coleman fails to demonstrate that the court
             erred in sustaining the demurrer, even if the
             cause of action were not time-barred.
       “Fraud must be pleaded with specificity, to provide the
defendants with the fullest possible details of the charge so they
are able to prepare a defense to this serious attack. To withstand
a demurrer, the facts constituting every element of the fraud
must be alleged with particularity, and the claim cannot be
salvaged by references to the general policy favoring the liberal
construction of pleadings.” (Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical
Specialties, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 772, 782.) The
requirement that fraud be pleaded with particularity extends to a
claim of constructive fraud. (See Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 1239, 1250.) “The elements of the cause of action for
constructive fraud are: (1) fiduciary relationship; (2)
nondisclosure (breach of fiduciary duty); (3) intent to deceive, and
(4) reliance and resulting injury (causation).” (Younan v. Equifax
Inc., supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at pp. 516–517, fn. 14.)

11 In his reply brief, Coleman contends that Emergency Rule 9 applies

to toll the statute of limitations. He did not raise this argument before
the trial court or in his opening brief and has therefore forfeited it. (See
Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488,
fn. 3 [“It is axiomatic that arguments not asserted below are waived
and will not be considered for the first time on appeal”]; Paulus v. Bob
Lynch Ford, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 685 [“Courts will
ordinarily treat the appellant’s failure to raise an issue in his or her
opening brief as a waiver of that challenge.”].)

                                    37
       In his opening brief, Coleman does not address or rebut the
other grounds defendants advanced in support of their demurrer
to the constructive fraud cause of action, including: (1) that the
fraud claims in the SAC remained vague and non-specific; (2)
that the SAC failed to plead a confidential relationship between
Coleman and defendants; (3) that the SAC did not plead a
nondisclosure of material fact; (4) that the SAC did not plead that
defendants had an intent to deceive; and (5) that Coleman did not
and could not plead detrimental reliance in the SAC. “In order to
prevail on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, the
appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error. Specifically, the
appellant must show that the facts pleaded are sufficient to
establish every element of a cause of action and overcome all
legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer.”
(Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 1047, 1052.) An appellant acting in propria persona
has the same burden to affirmatively demonstrate reversible
error as one who is represented by counsel; they are not entitled
to any special treatment. (McComber v. Wells (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 512, 523.) Coleman failed to establish that the facts
pleaded in the SAC were sufficient to establish every element of
his constructive fraud cause of action in his opening brief.
       Even if we assume that he did not waive his contentions
with respect to the substance of his constructive fraud cause of
action by failing to raise them in his opening brief (Paulus v. Bob
Lynch Ford, Inc., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 685), Coleman’s
reply brief does not meet his burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error. On reply, Coleman cites to the entire
“General Allegations” portion of the SAC, comprising
approximately 30 pages, in arguing that he pleaded constructive

                                38
fraud with particularity. The failure to cite the record with any
particularity may be construed as a waiver. (See Landry v.
Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699–700
[“When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal
argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the
reviewing court is unnecessary.”]; Dills v. Redwoods Associates,
Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 891 [appellate court “will not
develop the appellants’ arguments for them”].)
       In support of the contention that the SAC pleaded a
confidential relationship between himself and the board after
defendants were in existence, Coleman cites two pages of the
SAC without identifying any specific allegations and cites a case
without a pin cite, direct quotation, or parenthetical. Coleman
does not identify the requirements for pleading a confidential or
fiduciary relationship. Although he contends that, “[d]espite [his]
education and degrees, he was still in a vulnerable position as he
did not have the legal, administrative, and global knowledge the
board had,” it is not clear that the existence of any disparity
between his knowledge and defendants’ knowledge is sufficient to
support a confidential relationship.
       In further support of the contention that a duty of
disclosure existed, Coleman string cites authorities without
analysis. He does not compare the facts alleged in the SAC to the
facts of the cited cases. Absent some explanation by Coleman, it
is unclear how these cases bolster Coleman’s claim that the
allegations of the SAC establish that defendants owed him a duty
for all or part of the period between 1976 and 1990. (See Kloehn
v. Prendiville (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 156, 161 [relationship where
“parties had established a de facto family” and lived together in
the same home]; Barbara A. v. John G. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d

                                39
369, 382 [attorney-client relationship]; Salahutdin v. Valley of
California, Inc. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 555, 561–562 [broker-client
relationship].) Coleman asserts that, “[i]f necessary, a TAC will
allege with further particularity the confidential relationship,
and how Coleman was vulnerable to the board.” However, no
additional facts are identified, nor is it explained how any
additional facts would address the requirements for pleading a
confidential relationship.
       Even if we assume that Coleman established the existence
of a confidential relationship supporting a duty of disclosure, we
conclude, as the trial court did with respect to the FAC, that the
SAC does not adequately plead the existence of a nondisclosure of
a material fact made with the intent to deceive.
       Coleman asserts that “[a] [third amended complaint] will
allege with particularity that FMF-WCIU’s promise, and
agreement was not an opinion or aspiration but were
misrepresentations that commit the fraud.” He does not argue
with citation to the record that the allegations of the SAC
establish that defendants’ statements about maintaining the
Pasadena Campus in perpetuity were not opinions about the
future, as the court concluded with respect to the allegations of
the FAC, but statements of existing fact as to which there was a
duty of disclosure.
       “ ‘A declaration of intention, although in the nature of a
promise, made in good faith, without intention to deceive, and in
the honest expectation that it will be fulfilled, even though it is
not carried out, does not constitute a fraud. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
A good faith expression of intent or opinion by one partner to
another does not come within the ambit of constructive fraud.”
(Edmunds v. Valley Circle Estates (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1290,

                                 40
1301; accord, Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 412,
430.) Thus, the SAC was required to allege that at least some of
the statements defendants made concerning the maintenance of
the Pasadena Campus in perpetuity were not made in good faith
or were made with an intent to deceive.
      The SAC alleges that “an FMF-WCIU board of directors
was formed which fully embraced the vision of a permanent ID-
focused center and university, first enumerated by Winter but
now shared enthusiastically by the entire FMF-WCIU board of
directors, a vision affirmed, acknowledged, agreed, approved, and
acted upon by the entire initial FMF-WCIU board.” These
allegations establish that, when the defendant entities were
founded, their board of directors shared Winter’s and Coleman’s
dream of a permanent Pasadena Campus. The SAC does not
allege when or how this intent or opinion changed. There are no
specific allegations about which members of the board of directors
made promises or representations to Coleman while concealing
that they did not believe that the Pasadena Campus would be
permanently maintained, or when such false promises or
representations were made.
      The allegations of the SAC indicate that it was not until
after Coleman ceased to be involved with defendants as a staff or
board member that the board no longer harbored the opinion or
intent of maintaining the Pasadena Campus in perpetuity. The
SAC alleges that: “Although Coleman always considered
returning to the campus when Winter retired or passed on and
was in conversation to do so after the 2015 re-affirmation of
FMF-WCIU’s permanence and value, Coleman had not realized
that the new Board Winter had chosen when the old board
resigned, perhaps because they had agreed to be subservient to

                               41
him as the absolute authority, but he was now gone, was unable
to administer the campus effectively and determined to deceive
Coleman and other conditional donors who had donated explicitly
and specifically to purchase the Pasadena Properties as an
ongoing center and university.” This alleged “deceit” was the
board of directors’ engagement in discussions to sell the
Pasadena Campus in April 2017. However, as discussed above,
the only relevant concealment of defendants’ intent was required
to be pleaded with respect to the period between 1976 and 1990,
when Coleman acted in reliance on defendants’ representations.
       One of the scant allegations we have located in the SAC
concerning the beliefs or intent of members of defendants’ board
of directors is the allegation that a statement made by a FMF-
WCIU board member in 2021 that “FMF-WCIU’s intent was
always about a mission and never about a place such as the
Pasadena Campus out from which the mission would emanate . . .
admits FMF-WCIU’s deception and fraud, that FMF-WCIU
intended to conceal that they never intended to permanently
maintain the Pasadena Campus out from which the mission
would emanate, and never intended to give any refund to any
donor who determined that their donation was being used in a
manner other than the donor directed.” (Italics omitted.)
Although we “accept[] as true the facts alleged in the complaint,
together with facts that may be implied or inferred from those
expressly alleged,” we do not accept “the truth of contentions or
conclusions of fact or law.” (Cadle Co. II v. Harvey (2000) 83
Cal.App.4th 927, 930.) We are not required to accept the
conclusions Coleman has drawn from the facts alleged. There are
no allegations in the SAC that support that this member of the
board of directors, speaking in 2021, had personal knowledge

                               42
regarding the intent or opinions of individuals who were
members of the board of directors between 1976 and 1990, more
than 30 years prior.
      Accordingly, the SAC fails to plead with particularity the
existence of any concealment by defendants of their true opinion
or intent for the purpose of deceiving Coleman.
      2.6.   The court did not abuse its discretion in denying
             Coleman leave to further amend his complaint.
       To satisfy the burden of proving there is a reasonable
possibility of amendment, “a plaintiff ‘must show in what manner
he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will
change the legal effect of his pleading.’ [Citation.] The assertion
of an abstract right to amend does not satisfy this burden.
[Citation.] Plaintiff must clearly and specifically set forth the
‘applicable substantive law’ [citation] and the legal basis for
amendment, i.e., the elements of the cause of action and
authority for it. Further, plaintiff must set forth factual
allegations that sufficiently state all required elements of that
cause of action.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.)
       As a preliminary matter, Coleman asserts that the court
committed prejudicial error in sustaining the first demurrers as
to the IIED and quantum meruit claims without leave to amend,
citing McDonald v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 297,
303. However, McDonald concerned an original complaint, not a
FAC filed following meet and confers between the parties, during
which defendants identified defects in the original pleading and
in the proposed FAC before it was filed. (Accord, Eghtesad v.
State Farm General Ins. Co. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411 [“for
an original complaint, regardless [of] whether the plaintiff has

                                43
requested leave to amend, it has long been the rule that a trial
court’s denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion
unless the complaint ‘shows on its face that it is incapable of
amendment’ ”].) Coleman has failed to establish that he is
relieved of his burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility
that he could amend those claims to state a cause of action.
(Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
       Coleman next contends that he could amend the complaint
to “truthfully/factually allege in a TAC that his IIED cause is not
based on verbal insults, is based on a legal protection against the
intentional invasion of his peace of mind, and FMF-WCIU’s
outrageous conduct is their deception, concealment, and they do
not have the right to defraud him and intentionally/recklessly
destroy the meaning in his life when pursuing their economic
interests, and refuse him a refund to recreate the meaning in his
life they intentionally/recklessly destroyed.” The court did not
sustain the IIED cause of action because it believed it was based
on verbal insults rather than the “invasion of [Coleman’s] peace
of mind.” The court sustained the demurrer because even an
intentional invasion of a plaintiff’s peace of mind is not actionable
if it was an exercise of defendants’ legal and economic rights.
Coleman does not explain how any new facts he might allege
(none of which are identified) would address this shortcoming.
       With respect to the quantum meruit cause of action,
Coleman asserts that any defect could be “can be cured in a TAC
by pleading more particularly CACI 370–371 (Coleman expected
to be paid, FMF-WCIU paid him, took the payment away, and
thus didn't pay him) and CACI 375 elements for restitution that
were already partially pled in SAC¶105.” Again, the broad
categories of new facts Coleman proposes to plead do not address

                                 44
the defect identified by the court, which is that there was no
understanding between the parties that Coleman would be
compensated for his services because they were a donation. “A
plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions
in an amended complaint that contradict the facts pleaded in the
original complaint or by suppressing facts which prove the
pleaded facts false.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 857, 877.) Although Coleman asserts in his reply
brief (without citation to pertinent authority or the record) that
he has a reversionary interest in his donation of services,
Coleman does not propose an alternative cause of action that
would permit him to seek reimbursement for his conditional
donation or identify additional facts he could allege to address
the challenges defendants raised with respect to his standing to
pursue a claim of misuse of a donation by a charitable
organization.
       Coleman further argues that, “[i]f there were any defects in
the SAC for the breach of implied in fact contract cause, leave to
amend to file a TAC should have been granted [citation] as the
defects can be cured by more specific allegations of FMF-WCIU’s
written and oral words and conduct that expressed their intent to
permanently maintain the Pasadena [C]ampus and refund
donations.” However, the allegation of further facts reflecting an
intent to maintain the Pasadena Campus permanently cannot
overcome the fact that a permanent restraint on alienation and
use was unreasonable as a matter of law. Thus, we conclude that
there is no reasonable probability that such amendments would
cure this defect.
       Finally, as alluded to above, Coleman fails to identify any
specific facts he would allege to salvage the constructive fraud

                                45
cause of action. Although Coleman proposes to amend the
complaint to allege various conclusions that he has drawn from
the December 2017 email that would support his tolling
argument, we have concluded that the failure to allege the
substantive requirements of constructive fraud provide an
independent ground to affirm.

                               46
                       DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed. WCIU and FMF shall recover
their costs on appeal.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                        LAVIN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

     EGERTON, J.

     ADAMS, J.

                              47