Court Opinion

ID: 9570601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:24:34.927687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:43.713941
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority has completely overlooked the meaning of Code Ann. § 56-2409. This Code section is unambiguous. The section reads as follows: "All statements and descriptions in any application for an insurance policy or annuity contract, or in negotiations therefor, by or in behalf of the insured or annuitant shall be deemed to be representations and not warranties. Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless:
"(1) Fraudulent; or
"(2) Material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or
"(3) The insurer in good faith would either not have issued the policy or contract, or would not have issued a policy or contract in as large an amount, or at the premium rate as applied for, or would not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been known to the insurer as required either by the application for the policy or contract or otherwise.” The statute is clear and unambiguous. Statements in insurance policies are treated as representations. If the misrepresentation is (1) fraudulent; or (2) material to acceptance of the risk; or (3) such that it would affect the amount of coverage or the issuance of the policy, then recovery under the policy is barred. In the instant case, the misrepresentation was both material to the risk and of such significance that it would have precluded the issuance of the policy.
In reaching its decision, the majority has overlooked the Supreme Court case of Preston v. Nat. Life &c. Ins. Co., *727196 Ga. 217 (26 SE2d 439). The Supreme Court there related that a policy could not be avoided upon the ground of the falsity of a representation, though warranted, unless that representation was material and the variation from the truth such as to change the nature, extent, or character of the risk. The Supreme Court then stated, "This is true although the applicant may have made the representations in good faith, not knowing that they were untrue . . . The representations when made, if material, are warranties under the Code, but they differ from the ordinary warranty in that their falsity does not avoid the policy unless they are material and the variation from the truth is such as to change the nature, extent, or character of the risk. It is therefore immaterial whether the warrantor acted in good faith in making them...” Preston v. Nat. Life &c. Ins. Co., 196 Ga. 217, 229, supra. Clearly, knowledge of the truth or falsity of the representation is irrelevant.
It is apparent that the Supreme Court treated the statements as representations and that the falsity of the representations only avoids the policy when they are untrue and change the nature, extent or character of the risk. The Supreme Court stated that while the words "warranty” and "covenant” have each been used in decisions, and the Code itself in one section contains the word "covenanted,” such statements by applicants have been consistently construed as having no greater effect than mere representations.
An examination of the cases overruled by the majority "insofar as they treat responses to insurance applications as warranties” fails to reveal how, if at all, these cases treat such responses as warranties. On the contrary, these cases expressly refer to statements made in applications as "representations”; nowhere does the term "warranty” appear. Judge Clark, in Bridges v. World Service Life Ins. Co., 134 Ga. App. 923 (1) (216 SE2d 714), stated: "Insured’s representation that he was of good health was an incorrect statement.” (Emphasis supplied.) Judge Quillian, in All Am. Life &c. Co. v. Saunders, 125 Ga. App. 7 (186 SE2d 328) referred only to representations, not warranties. And Judge Deen, in Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Chalker, 127 Ga. App. 565 (194 *728SE2d 290) cited All Am. Life &c. Co. v. Saunders, supra, without once referring to warranties.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority places great emphasis on the Pitts "truth/untruth in an absolute sense ... truth/lie” standard. While such an interpretation may be appropriate in a philosophical context, the unalterable fact remains that the appellee made an incorrect statement which was material to the acceptance of the risk assumed by the insurer and therefore bars recovery. Mutual Benefit Health &c. Assn. v. Marsh, 60 Ga. App. 431 (2) (4 SE2d 84); General Assurance Corp. v. Roberts, 92 Ga. App. 834 (90 SE2d 70); Jessup v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 389 (160 SE2d 612); Brannon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 120 Ga. App. 467 (171 SE2d 319); All-American Life &c. Co. v. Saunders, supra; Bridges v. World Service Life Ins. Co., supra; Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Chalker, supra; Preston v. Nat. Life &c. Ins. Co., supra.
Sympathy for the family of the deceased child cannot obviate the plain meaning of the statute or the interpretation of this court and the Supreme Court of Georgia. If the statute yields a harsh result, it is for the legislature to change, not the court.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Quillian and Judge Webb join in this dissent.