Court Opinion

ID: 9730853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:26:24.927514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:10.174668
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
Due process requires that a defendant be given notice of the crime or crimes with which he is charged so that he can prepare his defense. Lewis v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 1069, 1071. “Conviction of an offense neither charged nor included within the criminal conduct alleged constitutes a denial of due process.” McFarland v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 384 N.E.2d 1104, 1109. Furthermore, conviction of such an offense is fundamental error. Garcia v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 1207, 1209. Defendant was charged with Murder and Attempted Murder, but not with Assisting a Criminal, the crime of which he was convicted. The majority affirms his conviction, however, on the grounds that: (1) Assisting a Criminal is a lesser included offense of Murder; and (2) the error was invited.
The majority cites Smith v. State, (1982) Ind., 429 N.E.2d 956, for the proposition that Assisting a Criminal is a lesser included offense of Murder. I believe they are reading Smith too broadly. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that under the facts of that case Assisting a Criminal merged into the greater offense of Murder. The court did not hold that Assisting a Criminal was a necessarily included offense of Murder. An “included offense” is an offense that “is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged.” Ind.Code 35-41-1-2. An examination of the offenses of Murder and Assisting a Criminal reveals that proof of the two crimes requires vastly different elements to be established. See Ind.Code 35-42-1-1 and 35-44-3-2. Thus, Assisting a Criminal is not a necessarily included offense of Murder. Furthermore, the information did not allege facts sufficient to put Moore on notice of the crime for which he was convicted. Moore’s conviction was therefore improper based on the charging instrument. The majority would nevertheless still affirm his conviction because the error was “invited.”
Generally, I accept the doctrine of invited error. However, when the error is so fundamental that it denies the defendant due process, the invited error doctrine must give way to the fundamental error doctrine. I agree with Judge Shields that it is the trial judge who controls the trial. Wise v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 401 N.E.2d 65, 72 (Shields, J., dissenting). The trial judge is:
charged with the responsibility of instructing the jury as to all matters of law necessary for the consideration of their verdict. This includes an instruction setting forth the offense with which the defendant is charged and its elements. If the trial court undertakes to extend the charge to include lesser included offenses which the evidence supports, it has, in my opinion, an absolute, non-delegable duty to do so correctly.
Id. (Shields, J., dissenting). Thus, the blame for giving the incorrect instruction should be placed upon the trial judge and not borne by the defendant.
For these reasons I would reverse the conviction.