Court Opinion

ID: 9481865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:34:15.560352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:37.857501
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I join my colleagues in their reverence for our nation’s Constitution. And I accordingly believe that what the Constitution says on the subject of oaths and affirmations should be at least the starting point for our consideration. The Constitution speaks to this subject in several places, most prominently in clause 3 of Article YI:
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” (Emphasis added).1
*1221It would thus appear that the Constitution recognizes that affirmations, as distinguished from oaths, are not religious tests, that government officers must be required to take either an oath or affirmation,2 and, by implied extension, that requiring witnesses, jurors, or the like to do so is perfectly proper.
The Constitution does not speak to the exact form or manner of making an affirmation (or an oath),3 but it is reasonably inferable that what was intended was the same sort of formal, conscience-arousing, express and unequivocal personal commitment — in the case of a witness, to tell the truth — made before an appropriate officer, as is involved in taking an oath, but without the latter’s invocation or involvement of any form of deity or religious obligation.4
This is not to say that some particular nonessential aspect of the form of what is tendered as an affirmation within the foregoing general definition may not nonetheless be, to the person called upon to make it, the equivalent of an oath invoking a deity or religious obligation. To some the word “affirm” may have the same sort of religious significance that the word “swear” does to others; similarly, to some the raising of a hand on such an occasion may constitute the making of a religious sign. See Ferguson v. CIR, 921 F.2d 588 (5th Cir.1991) (witness considers use of the word “affirm” to be prohibited by the same Biblical directives that preclude use of “swear”); Gordon v. State of Idaho, 778 F.2d 1397, 1400, 1401 (9th Cir.1985) (witness Gordon had “religious objection to taking an oath or using the word ‘affirmation.’ The court abused its discretion in insisting that Gordon use either the word ‘swear’ or ‘affirm’ in light of Gordon’s sincere religious objections”; “Gordon has demonstrated that raising his right hand and swearing an oath or making an affirmation violates his sincerely-held religious beliefs”); United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir.1969) (witness, member of Radio Church of God, objects on religious grounds to holding up his hand, as *1222well as to any oath or affirmation that has “ ‘God’s name in it’ ”). Of course, these examples do not exhaust the genre. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 348 U.S. 966, 75 S.Ct. 530, 99 L.Ed. 753 (1955) (error to prevent testimony by member of Harsh-manite Church who declined “because of religious scruples, to use the word ‘solemnly’ in affirming to tell the truth”; “[t]here is no requirement that the word ‘solemnly’ be used in the affirmation”).
In marked contrast to the foregoing, however, there may be those — and nothing in this record suggests that appellant O’Hair is not among them — who object to formally making, to a public official authorized to administer an oath or affirmation, any sort of express declaration of unequivocal personal commitment to tell the truth, on the basis that any such exercise by its very nature is religious in character (or contravenes the objector’s religion) so that by engaging in it the person either expresses a belief in religion (or a religious belief) that he does not have or does something forbidden by his religion. Purely for ease of reference, I refer to this variety of objection as a “generic” objection. I conclude that the Constitution does not mandate that such a generic objection be sustained, but rather permits the government to require a thus-objecting witness to formally make to the appropriate officer some express declaration of unequivocal personal commitment to tell the truth.5 In my view, the accommodation of religious and expressive freedom with the needs of civil administration has in essence been made in the constitutional provisions allowing affirmations in lieu of oaths, but requiring one or the other while prohibiting religious tests.
Thus far my ultimate conclusions do not depart significantly, if at all, from those of the majority, however different may be the roads we have travelled in arriving there. From here on, however, the destinations are distinct.
Judge Herman advised O’Hair that he respected her “right to exercise your constitutional rights to freedom of religion and, therefore, I will offer an affirmation without any recognition or any statement, any reference to God or anything of that nature, and at this time I would like you to raise your hand and be affirmed by the Court” (emphasis added). O’Hair replied “I cannot affirm, sir. That is just as religious as an oath.” Judge Herman then advised “I am merely asking you to affirm that whatever questions would be propounded to you, that you will give true answers.” O’Hair responded “I am trying to evade participating in a religious statement”; Judge Herman stated “I am not asking you to participate in a religious statement”; O’Hair then asserted “an affirmation, my understanding, is a religious statement”; to which Judge Herman rejoined “the Court does not agree with you on that matter.”
There is no showing that O'Hair ever made anything other than a generic objection to the entire affirmation process. She never told Judge Herman that she objected to the particular word “affirm,” or to raising her hand, or to any identified specific aspect of what she was being asked to do. Most significantly, O’Hair never informed Judge Herman, expressly or implicitly, that she was willing to formally make to him any sort of express declaration of personal commitment to tell the truth or that “whatever questions would be propounded to you, that you will give true answers.”6 Nor is there any indication that Judge Herman took advantage of or tricked O’Hair. On the contrary, Judge Herman was patient and engaged in dialogue with her, and did not cut her off; she was obviously prepared for the occasion and was represented by counsel.
*1223In this respect, the present case is far removed from those decisions relied on by the majority. In Moore the defendant, a member of the Harshmanite Church, was not allowed to testify as he had “declined, because of religious scruples against oath taking, to use the word ‘solemnly’ in affirming to tell the truth.” The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on direct appeal, observing “[t]here is no requirement that the word ‘solemnly’ be used in the affirmation.” Thus there was a specific objection to a specific word, and, inferentially, a manifested willingness to affirm without use of that specific word. The Looper court relied on Moore, and reversed a conviction on direct appeal, because the defendant, a member of the Radio Church of God, was not allowed to testify when he refused the judge’s direction that he “hold up his right hand and appeal to God,” although the defendant informed the court “I can’t if it has God’s name in it. If you ask me if I’ll tell the truth, I can say that” and “I can’t hold up my hand, Judge.” There the demanded form was facially religious, specific objection was made, and there was an affirmative indication of a willingness to make a declaration in which the specifically objected-to matters were removed. A divided Ninth Circuit panel in Gordon relied on Moore and Looper in reversing on direct appeal the dismissal of a civil action due to the pro se plaintiff’s refusal to take an affirmation in the precise form, including the word “affirm,” which the district court had specified “despite Gordon’s religious objection to ... using the word ‘affirmation.’ ” 778 F.2d at 1400. The majority held that “[t]he court abused its discretion in insisting that Gordon use ... the word ... ‘affirm’ in light of Gordon’s sincere religious objections.” Id. Again, there was a specific objection to a specific word.
In our recent Ferguson decision we reversed on direct appeal a Tax Court decision for the government, holding that that court erred in refusing to allow the pro se taxpayer Ferguson to testify when she would not use the word “affirm,” which she regarded as equally prohibited by the Bible as the word “swear.” The Tax Court gave her almost no chance to make any explanation and refused to consider her tendered form of declaration taken from that approved by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Staton v. Fought, 486 So.2d 746 (La.1986). We relied on Moore, Looper, and Gordon, and observed concerning the latter: “Like Ms. Ferguson, Gordon objected to using either the word ‘swear’ or ‘affirm’ and offered an alternative statement. The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to even consider Gordon’s proposed alternative.” Ferguson, 921 F.2d at 589. Plainly, Ferguson does not compel the result here, for there the pro se witness, unlike the counseled O’Hair, affirmatively indicated her willingness to make a satisfactory declaration to the judge.
Further, it must be recalled that Moore, Looper, Gordon, and Ferguson are all direct federal appeals. This is a section 1983 suit challenging the actions of a state judge in a previous state proceeding before him. Neither Moore nor Looper purports to invoke constitutional principles. While Gordon and Ferguson do invoke the First Amendment, they clearly do so in the context of applying and interpreting the rather open-ended provisions of Fed.R.Evid. 603 (and related Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Nor do either Gordon or Ferguson purport to be constitutionally based insofar as they may expressly or impliedly speak to the matter of what burden rests on the judge, and what on the objecting party, to make their respective positions clear to one another. Indeed, Gordon observes “[b]y failing to explore less restrictive means of assuring truthful deposition testimony, the district court abused its discretion_” Id., 778 F.2d at 1401 (emphasis added). In Ferguson we relied heavily on Gordon, and inferentially adopted the same approach. Thus, Ferguson observes that if the Tax Court “had attempted to accommodate Ms. Ferguson by inquiring into her objections and considering her proposed alternative, the entire matter might have been resolved,” and particularly noting in this connection that “Ms. Ferguson was proceeding pro se.” Ferguson, 921 F.2d at 590-91.
*1224There is simply no warrant in principle or authority for transmuting an “abuse of discretion” into a constitutional mandate. Moreover, I find nothing to support the notion — necessarily implicit in the majority’s holding — that a state is constitutionally barred from requiring a prospective witness or juror, especially one represented by counsel, to adequately articulate each particular, specific aspect of a proffered oath or affirmation to which there is objection and the reasons for each objection.
O’Hair, though represented by counsel and given full opportunity to do so, made no objection to any specific, identified particular word or gesture in the procedure designed to have her make a formal declaration to the judge of her personal commitment to tell the truth; she suggested no alternate form; and she never indicated any willingness to make any form of such a declaration. Nothing establishes that O’Hair had (or, indeed, has) anything other than a generic objection to the procedure. In these circumstances, Judge Herman did not violate the Constitution by insisting that O’Hair be either sworn or affirmed.
Finally, it also seems to me that in any event it is wholly inappropriate for this Court to grant O’Hair declaratory relief against Judge Herman. Judge Herman is the sole defendant, and O’Hair is the sole plaintiff, with respect to whom we grant such relief. No one else is benefitted or bound thereby. The incident made the basis of this suit took place, and concluded, more than three years ago. Except as regards that discrete, completed incident, there is no pending dispute or relationship between Judge Herman and O’Hair. In his dealings with O’Hair on that particular previous occasion, it is apparent that Judge Herman, insofar as the majority finds his conduct unconstitutional, followed no preconceived set or standard manner of proceeding (either of his own creation or as specified by state or local law), but rather acted entirely ad hoc. He was faced with a situation and dealt with it as best he could. There is no indication that, should the matter again arise, he would not of his own proceed with enough more “back-and-forth interaction” to achieve the majority’s blessing. More significantly, there is no showing of any real and immediate threat that O’Hair will again be called upon by Judge Herman to take an oath or affirmation. There is nothing to indicate that O’Hair has ever been before Judge Herman since the incident in question, or that there is anything pending or threatened that is likely to bring her before him. Travis County, where O’Hair and Judge Herman live, has over 500,000 residents, 13 district judges, 7 county-court-at-law judges, 1 probate court judge, and five justices of the peace.
In circumstances such as these, O’Hair would appear to lack standing to seek declaratory relief against Judge Herman. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969); Rocky v. King, 900 F.2d 864 (5th Cir.1990); Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1446-47 (5th Cir.1984); Northern Virginia Women’s Medical Center v. Batch, 617 F.2d 1045, 1048-49 (4th Cir.1980). Even if there were standing, the granting of declaratory relief “rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2759 at 645. Considerations of comity and the gross intrusiveness of the remedy — micromanaging a state judge’s future handling of any oath or affirmative process involving a particular individual — balanced against the remote and speculative nature of any future relevant controversy between the parties, strongly point to exercising any such discretion so as to deny declaratory relief.7 Cf. Seniors v. Arnold, 284 F.2d 106 (5th Cir.1960). At the very least, such relief should not be granted on appeal without having been first addressed by the trial court.
*1225I would uphold the judgment in Judge Herman’s favor. And, in any event, I would not grant O’Hair declaratory relief against him. I accordingly dissent from the majority’s contrary holdings.

. Other references to oath or affirmation are: Article I, section 3, clause 6, providing that when the Senate tries impeachments "they shall be on Oath or Affirmation”; Article II, section 1, clause 8, providing that the President "shall take *1221the following Oath or Affirmation — ‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute Amendment Four, providing “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”

. Cf. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961) (striking down, under Fourteenth Amendment, Maryland requirement that state officers make "a declaration of belief in the existence of God” without reaching question whether Article Vi’s “no religious Test" language applies to state as well as federal officers, but inferentially relying by analogy on the same principle).

. With the sole exception of the unique presidential oath or affirmation.

. See, e.g., 58 Am.Jur.2d, Oath and Affirmation, § 3 at 1048-49:
"While an oath, in its strict sense, involves the idea of calling on God to witness what is averred as truth, an affirmation is an undertaking to tell the truth equally as solemn as the oath, but does not invoke the Deity.... The affirmation has evolved as an alternative for those who are unable to take the religious oath, either because the oath conflicts with their religious principles or because they do not subscribe to any religion at all.” (Footnotes omitted).
See also id. at § 6, p. 1050: "The affirmation has the same purpose [as an oath]: to bind the conscience. The only difference is that the affirmation does not impress the person taking it with a sense of religious obligation.” (Footnote omitted).
See also Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6044 at 274-75:
"Rule 603 [Federal Rules of Evidence] does at least suggest two necessary characteristics of both oaths and affirmations. First, they are declarations to tell the truth. This means that an oath or affirmation must contain an unequivocal promise or commitment to relate the truth. Second, these declarations must be administered in a solemn manner calculated to awaken the conscience and remind the witness of his duty to speak the truth.
“The manner in which the conscience of the witness is awakened by an oath, however, differs from the manner in which that effect is produced by an affirmation and has a significant effect on both form and content. In the case of an oath, the witness appeals to God for assistance or otherwise invokes God in connection with his promise to tell the truth. God is involved for the purpose of impressing the witness with the seriousness of the occasion and with the threat of divine punishment for lying. An affirmation does not invoke God. Rather, the conscience of the witness is aroused by the solemn manner in which the declaration is given and received.” (Footnotes omitted; emphasis added).

. Nor do I read the majority opinion as holding otherwise.

. Similarly, there is no suggestion that Judge Herman understood O'Hair to be merely making a specific objection to the word "affirm” (or to the raising of her hand) and to be willing to formally make to him some sort of express declaration of personal commitment to tell the truth if it but omitted that specific word (and/or gesture); or that had Judge Herman so understood he would nevertheless have insisted on use of the word “affirm” (or on hand raising).

. The only real practical effect of the declaratory relief is to make Judge Herman personally liable for O’Hair's attorneys' fees, likely a far more significant amount than any damages she might have recovered from him (under the majority’s analysis) had he not had qualified or absolute immunity.