Court Opinion

ID: 9713008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:04:51.952693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:08.988864
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: The charges were filed with the Department on February 8, 1988, and February 29, 1988. The Department filed the complaints on May 18, 1990, and March 22, 1990. The complaint as to Borling was filed 831 days after the charge was first filed. As to Schoultz, the complaint was filed 751 days after the charge was filed with the Department. The procedures set forth in section 7A — 102 of the Act, as applied to the instant case, do not appear complicated. The aggrieved party files a charge with the Department within 180 days (subsection (A)(1)); the Department gives notice of the charge to respondent within 10 days (subsection (B)); the Department, also within 10 days of the date the charge is filed, “send[s] written notice to the complainant informing the complainant of his or her option to file a complaint with the Human Rights Commission under subparagraph (2) of paragraph (G), including in such notice the dates within which the complainant may exercise such option.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 19890, ch. 68, par. 7A-102(B). The aggrieved party is not only accountable to know the limitations of subsection (G), the Department is also required to send notice of its limitations to him or her. If the aggrieved party files a complaint with the Commission, section 7A—102(G)(2) of the Act also provides the aggrieved party shall notify the Department that a complaint has been filed and “[u]pon such notice, the Department shall cease processing the charge.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 7A—102(G)(2).) Subsection (G)(3) is merely a follow-up directing the Department to continue its investigation unless and until the aggrieved party has filed his or her complaint pursuant to subsection (G)(2). Section 7A—102(G) of the Act sets the parameters within which the complaint must be filed. As stated in Springfield-Sangamon (71 Ill. 2d at 68, 373 N.E.2d at 1310), time periods are considered di rectory “only where the rights of the parties are not injuriously affected by the failure to act within the time indicated.” Subsection (3) does not require a different interpretation of section 7A—102(G) as a whole. The majority’s analysis as to subsection (G)(3) emasculates the balance of section 7A—102(G) of the Act and renders subsection (G)(1) meaningless. The asserted ambiguity in subsection (G)(2) does not require a different result. Twenty-nine days before the expiration of 300 days and 29 days after the expiration of 300 days are “[wjithin 30 days of the expiration of the 300-day period.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 7A—102(G)(2). Section 7A—102(G)(3) of the Act permits a continued investigation “[ujnless and until the aggrieved party files a complaint with the Human Rights Commission pursuant to paragraph (2).” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 7A—102(G)(3).) The word “[ujnless” cannot be read in isolation. “Unless and until” must be read together. As the injured party has 30 days within the expiration of the 300-day period, subsection (G)(3) cannot be an extension of the Department’s prerogative beyond that date. “Until” authorizes and limits the investigation to continue to a maximum of 330 days or the date the aggrieved party files a complaint, whichever is sooner. Section 7A — 102(G)(2) provides when the Department receives notice that a complaint has been filed by the aggrieved party, it “shall cease processing the charge.” This reasoning is consistent with Logan. The 30-day window period gives the aggrieved party the opportunity to file a complaint when the Department fails to meet the filing deadline. To remove all time limits, as the majority suggests, will impose severe hardships on respondents and aggrieved parties alike. The circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction. The petitioner’s prayer for injunction should have been granted.