Court Opinion

ID: 9809222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:04:32.846866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:31.640790
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/9/23; Certified for Publication 8/31/23 (order attached)

             COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION ONE

                                  STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                               D079799

        Plaintiff and Respondent,

        v.                                                (Super. Ct. No. SCD280854)

KARL WILLIAM DORON,

        Defendant and Appellant.

        APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Laura W. Halgren and Howard H. Shore, Judges. Reversed and remanded
with directions.
        Lopas Law and Matthew A. Lopas for Defendant and Appellant.
        Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, and Christopher P. Beesley and
Michael D. Butera, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Karl William Doron appeals from a judgment following his guilty plea

to nine counts of robbery (Pen. Code, 1 § 211; counts 1-3, 5, 7-11), two counts
of attempted robbery (§§ 644, 211; counts 4 and 6), and allegations he was
armed with a firearm during the commission of counts 8 through 11 (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1)). Before entering into his plea, Doron unsuccessfully requested
pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36. Thereafter, the court
sentenced Doron to a prison sentence of 10 years four months in accordance
with his plea, consisting of consecutive one-year terms (one-third the
midterm) for each of counts 1-3, 5, 7, and 8; a consecutive eight-month term
(one-third the midterm) on each of counts 4 and 6; concurrent low terms of
two years on each of counts 9 and 11; and a two-year low term plus a
consecutive one year for the firearm enhancement allegation (§ 12022, subd.
(a)(1)) on count 10. The court struck the section 12022, subdivision (a)(1)
enhancements on counts 8 and 9 and imposed a concurrent one-year term for
the count 11 enhancement.
      In his initial appellate briefing, Doron contended the court abused its
discretion by ruling he had not made a prima facie showing he was entitled to

mental health diversion. 2 After the People filed their respondent’s brief, the
Legislature amended section 1001.36 to revise the eligibility test for pretrial
diversion (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023), and the parties

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2     Specifically, Doron maintained that in finding his mental illness was
not a significant factor in the commission of the offenses, the court applied an
overly burdensome and erroneous legal standard that lacked evidentiary
support. He contended the court invaded the Legislature’s province by
finding that even if his mental illness were a significant factor in the charged
crimes, the crimes were unsuitable for diversion.
                                        2
submitted supplemental briefing on the issue. Doron now contends under the
amended statute, which applies retroactively to his case, the trial court was
required to find his mental disorder was a substantial factor in the
commission of his crimes absent clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. He maintains there is no substantial evidence to rebut this
presumption, and thus he is both eligible and suitable for pretrial mental
health diversion. Doron alternatively asks that we remand his matter for an
evidentiary hearing governed by section 1001.36’s new principles.
      The People concede, and we agree, that amended section 1001.36
applies retroactively to Doron’s nonfinal judgment. They argue the proper
remedy is not for this court to engage in factfinding so as to decide whether
Doron meets the criteria for diversion, but to remand the matter for a new
prima facie evidentiary hearing consistent with section 1001.36’s
amendments. We agree with the People that the proper course is to remand
the matter with directions that the trial court consider Doron’s request for
mental health diversion under amended section 1001.36.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      We need not summarize the detailed facts of Doron’s underlying
offenses, as they are relevant only to the extent they bear on whether Doron
meets the criteria for mental health diversion, a question we leave for the
trial court.
      As alleged in the July 2019 information, or recounted from the
preliminary hearing transcripts cited in Doron’s motion for pretrial mental
health diversion, between December 28, 2018, and March 5, 2019, Doron
entered credit unions in San Diego County and robbed or attempted to rob

                                       3
tellers, at times handing the teller a note demanding money or orally
demanding money. Doron was armed with a handgun during two of the
robberies. Police arrested Doron on March 5, 2019.
      After the People charged Doron with the offenses and gun
enhancements, he moved the court for a grant of pretrial mental health
diversion under section 1001.36. Pointing out he was a United States Marine
Corps veteran, had obtained a Ph.D. and lacked any criminal record, he
asserted a mental health expert had diagnosed him with major depressive
disorder, a qualifying mental disorder, and he previously was treated for
ADHD. Doron argued there was a significant nexus between his mental
disorder and the charged crimes, which assertedly were the result of a
mistreated mental health condition, including an incorrect medication
regime. He argued his expert, clinical and forensic psychologist Clark
Clipson, would opine that the symptoms motivating his criminal behavior
had responded to mental health treatment. Doron supported his motion with
Dr. Clipson’s neuropsychological evaluation, as well as military records,
letters attesting to Doron’s good character, and jail records.
      The People opposed the motion, stating Doron had the burden of
proving he was entitled to relief. While the People conceded Doron had made
a prima facie showing that he suffered from a qualifying mental disorder,
they argued he did not show the disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of his offenses. They also argued Doron did not establish Dr.

                                        4
Clipson believed the symptoms motivating his behavior would respond to

treatment. 3
      The trial court denied the motion. In a June 2020 statement of
decision, it explained section 1001.36 vested in it discretion to decide whether
to grant diversion even if a defendant satisfied the statutory requirements.
Though the court found Doron had shown prima facie that his symptoms
would respond to mental health treatment, had proposed a specific treatment
plan, and he would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if
treated in the community, it ruled it could not conclude Doron’s mental
illness was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offenses.
The court reasoned: “With regard to whether defendant’s mental illness was
a significant factor in the commission of the charged offenses, defendant is
charged with committing [seven] completed robberies and [two] attempted
robberies of credit unions over a [three]-month period. The report submitted

3       As for whether the disorder played a significant factor, the People
asserted Doron’s evidence suggested another undiagnosed medical
condition—bipolar II disorder—might have contributed to the crimes. They
argued Dr. Clipson’s report did not show Doron’s diagnosed disorders played
a significant role in his commission of the robberies. As for Doron responding
to treatment, the People argued: “Rather than specifying a treatment plan
for an underlying mental disorder symptom that caused the behavior, Dr.
Clipson’s report merely spells out a plan that calls for [Doron] to be ‘further
evaluated to ensure an accurate diagnosis of his mood disorder.’ Dr. Clipson’s
non-committal with respect to whether the defendant even has this symptom
[sic] is shown by his statement . . . that ‘[i]f indeed he has a hypomanic
component to his depressive condition, he should be treated accordingly . . . .’
This is not an opinion that the symptom motivating the defendant’s criminal
behavior would respond to treatment. Rather, it is an outline of what the
defense still needs to do if they hope to obtain such an opinion.
Consequently, the court must also deny the defendant’s request for mental
health diversion on this prong of the statute as well.”
                                       5
by Dr. . . . Clipson diagnoses defendant with major depressive disorder,
unspecified attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ‘by history,’ and
medication[-]induced bipolar disorder. Dr. Clipson opines that the antisocial
behavior displayed in this case ‘is very much out of character’ for the
defendant. He notes that ‘being in a manic state in which he is feeling
agitated and grandiose could have caused (defendant) to spend money
excessively and ultimately contributed to his decision to engage in the bank
robberies, an activity with a high potential for painful consequences.’ [¶]
The preliminary hearing transcript includes evidence that the defendant
wore some combination of hats, sunglasses or face coverings during each
incident, and either presented demand notes or made verbal demands for
money to the tellers involved. In two of the incidents, he was armed with a
handgun, though he never used it. [¶] By his conduct and the language used
during these incidents, as well as the fact that these incidents occurred over a
[three]-month period, the defendant demonstrated significant planning and
an ongoing willingness to use force or fear to steal money from financial
institutions. His mental diagnoses certainly may have contributed to his
desire to perpetrate the charged crimes, but that contribution does not
support a conclusion that his mental illness was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offenses.”
      The court found an additional basis to deny Doron’s request, finding
that even if his mental illness was a significant factor in the charged crimes,
which were not statutorily disqualified, it would exercise its discretion to find
the offenses unsuitable for diversion: “Although mental health diversion
might satisfy the objectives of encouraging the defendant to lead a law-
abiding life and deterring him from future offenses, a series of [nine]
robberies or attempted robberies of financial institutions involves the use of

                                        6
force or fear on members of the public that justifies placing the goals of
punishment and deterrence of others by demonstrating the consequences of
such criminal behavior above the needs of the defendant.”

      Thereafter, Doron pleaded guilty to all counts and allegations, 4 and
received the sentence indicated above.
                                 DISCUSSION
                           I. Retroactive Application
      Because Doron’s judgment is not final, recently amended section
1001.36 applies retroactively to his case. (Accord, People v. Frahs (2020) 9
Cal.5th 618, 624; People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 802.) In Frahs, the
California Supreme Court emphasized that courts look to the Legislature’s
intent to determine whether a law is meant to apply retroactively. (Frahs, at
p. 627.) Frahs held that neither the text nor history of then newly enacted
section 1001.36 clearly indicated a contrary intent by the Legislature as to
retroactivity, and thus, “defendants whose cases were not final on appeal,
and who had no opportunity to request diversion in the trial court, should be
permitted to do so.” (Braden, at p. 802, citing Frahs, at pp. 624, 628-637.)
      We have reviewed the amended statute as well as the Legislative
Counsel’s Digest to Senate Bill No. 1223, which changed the eligibility
criteria of section 1001.36, and reach the same conclusion as Frahs. Section
1001.36 still mitigates possible punishment for the class of persons who
suffer from a qualifying mental disorder; “the possibility of being granted
mental health diversion rather than being tried and sentenced ‘can result in
dramatically different and more lenient treatment.’ ” (People v. Frahs, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 631.) “On its face, the diversion statute states the legislative

4    Doron pleaded “to the sheet,” meaning he pleaded guilty to all counts
and admitted all enhancement allegations. (People v. Codinha (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 1047, 1059.)
                                         7
purpose ‘to promote . . . [¶] [i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental
disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal
justice system while protecting public safety’ (§ 1001.35, subd. (a)), and the
procedures instituted by the enactment carry the potential of substantial
reductions in punishment for the aforementioned parties.” (Ibid.)
      This conclusion holds for the amended law, which, as we explain more
fully below, changes the eligibility criteria so as to simplify and strengthen
the law, broadening the availability of mental health diversion in appropriate
cases. (See Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1223 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 23, 2022, pp. 6-7 [amendment to section
1001.36 codified Committee on Revision of the Penal Code recommendation
that “the law be changed to simplify the procedural process for obtaining
diversion by presuming that a defendant’s diagnosed ‘mental disorder’ has a
connection to their offense. A judge could deny diversion if that presumption
was rebutted or for other reasons currently permitted under the law,
including finding that the individual would pose an unreasonable risk to

public safety if placed in a diversion program”].) 5
  II. Mental Health Diversion, Amended Section 1001.36, and Standard of
                                     Review
      The Legislature in June 2018 enacted section 1001.36, creating a
pretrial diversion program for certain persons with mental health disorders.
(People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 624; People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 879, 886.) “The primary purposes of the legislation are to keep
people with mental disorders from entering and reentering the criminal

5     On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the cited portion of
Senate Bill No. 1223’s legislative history. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459;
People v. Sherman (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 325, 332, fn. 3.)

                                        8
justice system while protecting public safety, to give counties discretion in
developing and implementing diversion across a continuum of care settings,
and to provide mental health rehabilitative services. [Citation.] Diversion
can be ‘viewed as a specialized form of probation, . . . [that] is intended to
offer a second chance to offenders who are minimally involved in crime and
maximally motivated to reform . . . .’ ” (Qualkinbush, at p. 886.)
      “As originally enacted, section 1001.36 provided that a trial court may
grant pretrial diversion if it finds all of the following: (1) the defendant
suffers from a qualifying mental disorder; (2) the disorder played a
significant role in the commission of the charged offense; (3) the defendant’s
symptoms will respond to mental health treatment; (4) the defendant
consents to diversion and waives his or her speedy trial right; (5) the
defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) the defendant will not
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community.” (People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 626-627, citing former
§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)-(6).) The statute was later amended to specify that
defendants charged with certain crimes, such as murder and rape, were
ineligible for diversion. (Frahs, at p. 627, citing § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2), as
amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1005, § 1.) This version of the statute only
required that the court be “satisfied” the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor and provided the court could make such a conclusion based
on “any relevant and credible evidence,” including police reports, preliminary
hearing transcripts, statements by defendant’s mental health provider, and
other medical records. (Former section 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(B).)
      If the defendant made a prima facie showing that he or she met all of
the threshold eligibility requirements and that he or she and the offense were
suitable for diversion, and the trial court was satisfied that the recommended

                                         9
program of mental health treatment would meet the specialized mental
health treatment needs of the defendant, then the court had the discretion to
grant pretrial diversion. (People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 627; former
§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
      The most recent amendments to section 1001.36 went into effect on
January 1, 2023. The Legislature agreed with a recommendation to “simplify
the procedural process for obtaining diversion by presuming that a
defendant’s diagnosed ‘mental disorder’ has a connection to their offense” and
permit the court to deny diversion if the People rebutted the presumption.
(See Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Sen Bill No. 1223, supra, p. 6.) The
amended statute provides that a defendant is eligible for mental health
diversion if (1) the defendant presents evidence that in the last five years he
has been diagnosed by a qualified mental health expert with a mental
disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; and (2) the defendant’s mental
disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1), (2).)
      As to the second criteria, section 1001.36 now reads: “If the defendant
has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a
motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s
involvement in the alleged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
      If a defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements, the court then
must consider whether the defendant is suitable for diversion. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c).) Under the statute, a defendant is suitable when the following
criteria are met: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the

                                       10
defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder related to the criminal behavior
would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the defendant consents to
diversion; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (4) the
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as
defined in section 1170.18, if treated in the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)
      The court in its discretion may order the defendant to diversion if it
finds the defendant both eligible and suitable. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) Thus, a
diversion order is expressly discretionary with the court, even when all of the
criteria are met. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a) [“[T]he court may, in its discretion”
(italics added) grant pretrial diversion if the defendant satisfies eligibility
and the court determines the defendant is suitable]; People v. Gerson (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080.) “ ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an
arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard
[citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that
are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Gerson, at p. 1080, quoting
People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.)
III. The Matter Must Be Remanded for the Court to Apply the Amended Law
      Doron contends that given the new law, the trial court applied the
wrong standard. He further argues there is no substantial evidence to rebut
the presumption that his mental health disorder was a substantial factor in
the commission of his offenses. Thus, he asks that we reverse the court’s
order and direct the court to grant his motion on grounds he has shown he is
both eligible and suitable for pretrial mental health diversion.
      The People respond that there is no certainty Doron may be able to
establish eligibility. They argue neither party below presented evidence
suggesting Doron’s diagnosed mental disorders contributed to the commission
of his robberies. Rather, they point out Doron’s theory was that he was

                                        11
suffering from a misdiagnosed case of bipolar disorder and had committed the
crimes in a manic state. According to the People, that theory cannot suffice
because no qualified mental health professional has diagnosed Doron with
that condition. They also assert Doron’s expert attributed the onset of his
alleged mania to his increased dose of an antidepressant, a side effect of
medication rather than an underlying symptom of a diagnosed disorder, and
thus Doron’s claim about his mental state when he committed the crimes
could not satisfy the eligibility prong. The People argue that these
circumstances, combined with evidence of Doron’s rational financial motive
and planning, may constitute clear and convincing evidence his diagnosed
mental health disorders were not a motivating, causal or contributing factor
to his crimes. They ask us to remand for a new prima facie hearing to give
Doron the opportunity to prove his eligibility under the amended law.
      Doron was entitled to the court’s informed discretion on his motion for
mental health diversion. (Accord, People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354,
1391 [involving the court’s sentencing discretion].) A court unaware of the
scope of its discretionary powers “ ‘can no more exercise that “informed
discretion” than one whose [decision] is or may have been based on
misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.’ ” (Ibid.)
Under these circumstances, the proper remedy is to remand “unless the
record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Here, the trial court understandably did not apply the presumption and
clear and convincing evidentiary burden now in section 1001.36. We decline
to conclude that on this record, the court would clearly reach the same
conclusions about eligibility or suitability under the new law. (See, e.g.,
People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391; People v. Banner (2022) 77

                                       12
Cal.App.5th 226, 242 [addressing whether defendant’s mental illness was a
contributing factor to the crime for purposes of sentencing].) In particular,
whether the record contains “clear and convincing evidence that [any
qualifying mental illness] was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or
contributing factor to [Doron’s] involvement in the alleged offense[s]” is
“quintessential factfinding” (People v. Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p.
1079) and thus a question best left to the trial court to answer in the first
instance. We express no view concerning the proper resolution of Doron’s
motion and the eligibility or suitability factors on remand.
                                DISPOSITION
      We reverse the order denying Doron’s motion for mental health
diversion and remand the matter with directions that the trial court conduct
a new hearing to consider his application for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36 as amended by Senate Bill No. 1223.

                                                       O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

DATO, J.

                                       13
Filed 8/31/23

                         CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                DIVISION ONE
                            STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                  D079799
       Plaintiff and Respondent,             (Super. Ct. No. SCD280854)
       v.                                    ORDER CERTIFYING
KARL WILLIAM DORON,                          OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
       Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:
       The opinion in this case filed August 9, 2023, was not certified for
publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the requests pursuant to
rule 8.1120(a) for publication are GRANTED.

       IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for
publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
ORDERED that the words “Not to Be Published in the Official Reports”
appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be
published in the Official Reports.

                                                       O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties