Court Opinion

ID: 9959675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:09:09.650224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:44.170342
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1278-22

JOAN VANUCCI,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DR. SAMUEL D. SCHENKER,
M.D.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________

                   Submitted March 18, 2024 – Decided April 12, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-1401-21.

                   Gary W. Moylen, attorney for appellant.

                   Ronan, Tuzzio & Giannone, attorneys for respondent
                   (Jennifer N. Cortopassi, of counsel and on the brief;
                   Jack Edwin Potash, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Plaintiff Joan Vanucci appeals from the trial court's March 21, 2022 order

dismissing her complaint with prejudice for failing to provide an affidavit of

merit ("AOM") under the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility

and Patients First Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-37 to -42. We vacate and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                         I.

      This is a medical malpractice action. Defendant Dr. Samuel Schenker

operates the "Pain Institute of Central Jersey and Neurology" in Toms River.

Plaintiff asserts defendant failed to timely refer her for a neurosurgical consult

despite being diagnosed with a large posterior disc herniation at L4-L5.

Eventually, plaintiff was admitted to a hospital where she underwent a

hemilaminectomy, foraminotomy, and discectomy.                 Plaintiff contends,

notwithstanding the surgery, she "now has severe and permanent spinal injuries

as a result of [d]efendant's negligence which have caused severe functional

disabilities, including difficulty in walking, climbing stairs, running[,] and other

normal activities of life."

      Plaintiff filed a complaint in May 2021. Defendant filed an answer in

October 2021. Plaintiff subsequently served an AOM signed by Dr. Avrom

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Brown on February 14, 2022. On February 28, 2022, defendant moved to

dismiss the complaint, arguing plaintiff failed to supply a "compliant" AOM.

      On March 2, 2022, a notice was uploaded on the electronic eCourts filing

system ("eCourts") advising the parties defendant's motion would be decided on

April 1, 2022. For an unknown reason, an eCourts notice uploaded later that

day stated the motion would be decided on March 18, 2022.

      On March 21, 2022, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with

prejudice. On March 24, 2022, apparently not realizing the court had dismissed

her complaint, plaintiff opposed the motion. At some point, plaintiff recognized

her complaint had been dismissed, and she took steps to file an appeal in May

2022. Her initial attempt to file an appeal was unsuccessful. In January 2023,

we granted plaintiff's motion to file a notice of appeal as within time.

                                        II.

      Plaintiff principally contends the trial court improperly granted

defendant's motion to dismiss on March 21, 2022, prior to the appropriate return

date of April 1, 2022. She asserts that by prematurely granting the motion, the

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                                        3
court "depriv[ed] [her] of the opportunity to submit papers in opposition and to

be heard on the matter."1

      We apply a de novo standard of review to trial court orders dismissing a

complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e). See Stop & Shop Supermarkets Co. v. Cty. of

Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290 (App. Div. 2017). Under the rule, we owe no

deference to the motion judge's conclusions. Rezem Fam. Assocs. v. Borough

of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011).

      The primary issue we address is the procedure by which the motion was

considered by the trial court. Defendant filed his motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 4:6-2,2 which in pertinent part, provides: "[a] motion to dismiss based on

[a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted], and any opposition

thereto, shall be filed and served in accordance with the time frames set forth in

[Rule] 4:46-1." (Emphasis added).

      Rule 4:46-1, in part, provides:

             [U]nless the court otherwise orders, a motion for
             summary judgment shall be served and filed not later

1
  This argument is derived from the fact section of plaintiff's merits brief and
the legal argument section of her reply brief. Plaintiff's merits brief focuses on
her request to allow her late appeal to be considered nunc pro tunc. As noted
above, we already granted that application.
2
  "If the plaintiff fails to provide an affidavit . . . it shall be deemed a failure to
state a cause of action." N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29.
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                                          4
            than [twenty-eight] days before the time specified for
            the return date; opposing . . . briefs . . . shall be served
            and filed not later than [ten] days before the return date;
            and answers or responses to such opposing papers or to
            cross-motions shall be served and filed not later than
            four days before the return date. No other papers may
            be filed without leave of court.

      Until recently, motions to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e) were governed by

the time frame for set forth in Rule 1:6-3. That is, these motions had the same

sixteen-day return period as ordinary motions. Now, motions to dismiss have

the same twenty-eight-day return period as summary judgment motions in

accordance with Rule 4:46-1. The comments to Rule 4:6-2 note:

            These motions are often complex and consequential in
            much the same fashion as a motion for summary
            judgment and the motion, in fact, is convertible into a
            summary judgment motion . . . . As a result the
            [sixteen-]day cycle for service and response of [Rule]
            1:6-3 was frequently insufficient and adjournments had
            been routinely granted. The [Rule] now provides
            instead for the [twenty-eight-]day cycle of [Rule] 4:46-
            1 (summary judgment). See also R. 1:6-3(a).[3]

            [Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt.
            4.1.1 on R. 4:6-2 (2024).]

The comments to Rule 4:46-1 further explain:

3
  Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, her opposition to the motion was not filed in
a timely manner as it should have been filed by March 22, 2022, not March 24,
2022. Nevertheless, even if the opposition had been filed on March 22, the court
had already granted the motion.
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                                         5
            A motion for summary judgment must be filed and
            served at least [twenty-eight] days before its return
            date. This four-week period is based on the recognition
            that the movant effectively has all the time needed to
            prepare the motion papers. It was therefore patently
            unfair to apply the time frames of [Rule] 1:6-3(a),
            which give the respondent only [eight] days in which to
            file and serve the response. Requiring the movant to
            file and serve [twenty-eight] days before the return date
            rather than the [sixteen] days provided for by [Rule]
            1:6-3(a) consequently affords the respondent
            approximately three weeks for response, thereby
            relieving [them] of having to rely on the court's
            discretion in granting an adjournment to permit proper
            preparation of defense to the motion.

            [Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on
            R. 4:46-1 (2024).]

      "When granting a motion [that] will result in the dismissal of a plaintiff's

case . . . , the motion is subject to Rule 4:46, the rule that governs summary

judgment motions." Seoung Ouk Cho v. Trinitas Reg'l Med. Ctr., 443 N.J.

Super. 461, 471 (App. Div. 2015). A trial court "should assure itself that the

parties have had a reasonable opportunity to obtain and submit material

information to the court" before granting summary judgment. Ziegelheim v.

Apollo, 128 N.J. 250, 264 (1992). "Fundamentally, due process requires an

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Doe

v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995).

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                                        6
      Here, because defendant's motion was filed under Rule 4:6-2(e), it was

subject to the timing requirements of Rule 4:46-1.       Defendant's motion to

dismiss was filed on February 28, 2022. On March 2, the notice on eCourts

initially stated that the motion would be decided on April 1, but was

subsequently changed to March 18.          Thereafter, the trial court dismissed

plaintiff's complaint, with prejudice, likely because no opposition was filed as

of March 21, 2022. There was no explanation on eCourts as to why the return

date for defendant's motion was changed from April 1, 2022 to March 18, 2022.

      Because of these procedural infirmities, we assume the court was

presented with the unopposed motion without being advised the return date had

been changed. The modification of the return date, however, impacted plaintiff's

ability to oppose the motion. In turn, this prevented the court from considering

the merits of the motion.

      As noted above, we are mindful plaintiff filed her opposition two days

late. However, we are certain the court would have considered the brief under

these circumstances.    In Tyler v. New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance

Underwriting Ass'n, we cautioned against trial courts refusing to consider

motion papers that were filed late but were available to the court before the

return date, stating:

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                                       7
            It is a mistaken exercise of judgment to close the
            courtroom doors to a litigant whose opposition papers
            are late but are in the court's hands before the return day
            for a motion which determines the meritorious outcome
            of a consequential lawsuit. "Swift justice demands
            more than just swiftness." Late filings of motion papers
            can be met with a variety of judicial responses afforded
            by existing court rules. Among them are sanctions
            designed to discourage late filings without determining
            the outcome of a case.

            [228 N.J. Super. 463, 468 (App. Div. 1988) (internal
            citation omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Bannan, 256
            F.2d 363, 390 (6th Cir. 1958) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).]

For these reasons, we remand this matter to the trial court to consider the

substance of plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss.

      Although we are remanding this matter, we note that the parties have

advanced several arguments regarding the sufficiency of Dr. Brown's AOM.

Defendant argues Dr. Brown was not qualified to author an AOM against him

because Dr. Brown is not a specialist in pain management. Plaintiff counters

that Dr. Brown, like defendant, is certified by the American Academy of Pain

Management, and his curriculum vitae references pain management as an area

of practice. Moreover, plaintiff argues the name of Dr. Brown's practice—

"Advanced Urgent Care and Pain Management"—is further evidence of his work

in the area of pain management.        Furthermore, plaintiff notes that neither

defendant nor Dr. Brown is board certified in pain management and that Dr.

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                                        8
Brown's "credentials and medical practice[] are approximately the same" as

defendant's.

      Whether Dr. Brown is appropriately qualified to provide an AOM as to

defendant was not squarely addressed by the court. Again, it appears the trial

court granted defendant's motion because it was unopposed, not based on the

sufficiency of Dr. Brown's AOM. Accordingly, plaintiff's opposition and Dr.

Brown's AOM should first be considered by the trial court, where it will have a

more robust record on which to address this issue.

      Our decision to remand should not be construed as an expression of an

opinion regarding the merits of defendant's motion. To the extent we have not

specifically addressed any other arguments raised on the appeal, we conclude

they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

      Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                                         A-1278-22
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