Court Opinion

ID: 9683275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:25:40.037999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.794863
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Judge,
dissenting.
To the majority’s noble and majestic but quixotic voyage through the uncharted waters of statute captions, with its sails purportedly cut from the very parchment of the Texas Constitution, I dissent.
These cases come to this Court on petitions for discretionary review filed by the State’s Attorney from adverse rulings by the Third Court of Appeals sitting in Austin. That court granted habeas corpus relief to respondents/relators, hereinafter referred to as respondents. A majority of this Court would affirm the judgments of the Third Court of Appeals, and in doing so, declare House Bill 7301 unconstitutional, viz: “We hold that the ‘fair notice’ standard with which Texas Constitution, Article III, Sec. 35 is to be applied requires that the caption give reasonable notice of the contents of the bill to an average reader (citation omitted).”
The majority identifies the sole issue thusly:
“The question before us is, given the constitutional provision relating to captions, does the caption in H.B. 730, which states: An act relating to offenses and criminal penalties under the Texas Controlled Substances Act, give readers fair notice2 of the subject matter contained in the bill?
I believe that the issue, more properly framed is: does the caption of the bill give a legislator or other reader notice of the contents of the bill, to the end that surprise or fraud in legislation may be prevented? The difference between the “fair notice to the average reader” standard and the “fair *951notice to the reader to the end that surprise or fraud in legislation may be prevented” standard is significant, and goes to the very heart of this dissent. The majority disregards the precise intent of Art. Ill, Sec. 35 and the cases interpreting it for the last one hundred and twenty years.
Historically, the impetus for the adoption of a statute caption provision was furnished by the famous “Yazoo Act” of 1798, in which a Georgia legislature, under the guise of an act for the payment of “late state troops,” made large land grants to private persons. See Giddings v. San Antonio, 47 Tex. 548 at 556 (1877) and Jones, Statute Law Making (1926), pp. 65-68. Speaking to the purpose of Art. Ill, Sec. 35, the Texas Supreme Court, more than three-quarters of a century ago, opined:
“It would be burdensome, if not intolerable, to require that the title should be as full as the act itself. The word title implies that no such requirement exists. The purpose of the constitutional provision is merely to reasonably apprise the legislators of the contents of the bill, to the end that surprise and fraud in legislation may be prevented.” Gaines, C.J., in Doeppenschmidt v. International & G.N. Railroad, 100 Tex. 532, 101 S.W. 1080 (1907). See also Stone v. Brown, 54 Tex. 330 at 344 (1881).
In Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex.App. 216 (1880) and in Consolidated Underwriters v. Kirby Lumber Co., 267 S.W. 703 (Tex.Comm.App.1924), the appellate courts of Texas referred to the purpose of Art. Ill, Sec. 35 as being the prevention of the stealthy passage of legislation. Delving even further back into Texas jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Texas noted that in the usual case adequate notice would be given by naming the broad interest affected, such as “automobiles,” “labor,” “farming,” or “insurance.” See Battle v. Howard, 13 Tex. 345 (1855). More recently the appellate courts of Texas have reaffirmed the “notice to prevent surprise or fraud in legislation” standard. See Yeary v. Bond, 384 S.W.2d 376 (Tex.Civ.App.1965, ref. n.r.e.) (in an opinion written by the late Justice Denton) and Anguiano v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.Civ.App.1978, ref. n.r.e.). Indeed, in an opinion relied upon by the majority, White v. State, 440 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), Presiding Judge Onion opined:
“The reason underlying the constitutional requirement is to advise the legislature and the people of the nature of each particular bill so as to prevent the insertion of obnoxious clauses which might otherwise be engrafted on it and become law. Fraud and deception are rendered less likely if the caption or title of an act, which is often the only part of the bill read by the busy members of the legislature, fully apprises the members of the contents of the bill itself, (citations omitted)”
In adopting a “fair notice to the average reader” standard, the majority apparently borrowed language directly from the Tex-arkana Court of Appeals in City of Brownsville v. Public Utility Commission, 616 S.W.2d 402 (Tex.Civ.App.1981). In City of Brownsville, supra, the then Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals dealt with the caption of the Utility Regulatory Act, although the caption itself is not set out word for word in the case. The majority in the instant case fails to point out that the Tex-arkana Court in City of Brownsville, supra, found the caption of the Utility Regulatory Act to be constitutional and stated:
“The average legislator or interested citizen would not likely draw a distinction between public utilities and municipally owned public utilities. It is only by reading beyond the caption into the body of the Act that the reader learns that municipal utilities are defined out of the term ‘public utilities’ for most of the purposes of the Act. That the body of the Act must be studied to interpret the caption, as appellants would require, then Texas Constitution Art. Ill, Sec. 35 becomes meaningless.”
*952Further, in City of Brownsville, supra, the Texarkana Court correctly noted that the general rule is that the caption should be liberally construed to uphold its validity if at all possible. See Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.1974) and C. Hayman Construction Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 471 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.1971). Of particular significance is the majority’s reliance on City of Brownsville, supra, for its application of Art. III, Sec. 35. In City of Brownsville, supra, the statute caption read as follows:
An Act defining public utilities and providing for their regulation; providing for the creation of the Texas Public Utility Commission, and the reappointment of commissioners and the fixing of their qualifications and compensation; prescribing the duties and the powers of the commissioners and the commission and Railroad Commission and the manner in which the jurisdiction and power conferred herein should be exercised; providing for employees and the salaries, duties and authority of employees; providing for reporting by public utilities; providing for territories and services; providing for regulation of public utility services and rates; providing for regulation of rates and division of revenue; providing for hearings and other procedures for regulation; defining certain offenses and providing penalties; providing procedures for public utility regulation by municipalities; providing for appeals and other procedures in the courts; providing for financing of commission operations .... ” See Art. 1446(c), Y.A.T.S.
As previously stated, the Texarkana Court upheld this caption, and in doing so opined:
“A reading of the caption itself provides reasonable notice that the Act relates to the regulation of public utilities.”
The significance of this statement of the Texarkana Court is that the Utility Regulatory Act has but one subject, i.e., the regulation of public utilities. However, as any reader can plainly see, the caption of the Utility Regulatory Act contains many provisions as opposed to “subjects.” Article III, Sec. 35 deals with the term “subject” rather than the term “provision.” Thus, a statute caption may have only one subject, but may have as many provisions as is necessary to carry forth the effect of the statute. See Beaumont v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 163 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.Civ.App.1942, err. ref. WOM).
In Phillips v. Daniel, 94 S.W.2d 1193 (Tex.Civ.App.1936), the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Austin held that any number of provisions may be contained in the same act, and, even though they may be diverse, there is no violation of Art. Ill, Sec. 35 as long as they are consistent with the general subject expressed in the caption and have a relation and connection with it, either directly or indirectly. See also Day Land and Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S.W. 865 (1887).
In Day Land and Cattle Co., supra, Judge Stay ton opined:
“Former constitutions of this state used the word “object” in the same connection as the word “subject” is used in Art. Ill, Sec. 35 of the constitution now in force; but the latter word perhaps expresses more accurately the meaning and intent of the constitutional provision. As used in the constitution, the word “subject” is that which is to be dominated or controlled by the particular law. Thus considered, there can be no doubt that the subject of the act was single, and consisted of all the public land in Greer County unappropriated at the time the Act was passed; and that this subject may have been appropriated to more than one purpose or end does not affect the question. “As said in Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Tex. [782] 793: ‘the intention doubtless was to prevent embracing in an act having an ostensible object, provisions having no relevancy to that object, but really designed to effectuate other and wholly different objects, and thus to conceal and *953disguise the real object proposed by the provisions of an act under a false or deceptive title. A title or act essentially single in subject, which does not thus conceal or disguise the real purpose, is not subject to constitutional objection, although the ends intended to be reached through the one subject may be many. The decisions made under former constitutions, in which the word “object,” in its ordinary signification means more nearly the same as “end” or “purpose” as does the word “subject,” was used, are conclusive of this question.’ (citations omitted)”
The majority finds fault with the fact that the body of H.B. 730 added ten new sections to the Controlled Substances Act and modified or amended portions of the Texas Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. The naming of the article or act to be amended directs attention to all provisions therein, as the subject of the amending act. See Katz v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 231, 54 S.W.2d 130; State v. McCracken, 42 Tex. 383; and Schlicting v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 158 Tex. 279, 310 S.W.2d 557, reh. den. Thus, necessarily the caption would draw the reader’s attention, not only to the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act itself, but also to the necessarily entertwined provisions of the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, which are embodied in the original Controlled Substances Act. See Day Land and Cattle Co., supra. The majority also erroneously concerns itself with the fact that “at least one section was repealed.” This fact is of no moment, because the failure to incorporate a provision for the repeal of a conflicting law in a caption of an act is not violative of Art. III, Sec. 35. See Geffert v. Yorktown Independent School District, 290 S.W. 1083 (Tex.Civ.App.1926, reversed on other grounds).
Having traced the origins and historical background of Art. Ill, Sec. 35, it becomes obvious that the intent of this constitutional amendment, as expressed in Tadlock v. Eccles, supra, beginning in 1858 and culminating in White v. State, supra, over one hundred years later, was to put the reader, be he a citizen or legislator, on fair notice as to the subject of a statute, to the end that surprise and fraud in legislation might be prevented.
Turning to the caption in the instant case in H.B. 730, the issue thus becomes whether or not the caption gives a legislator or other reader notice of the content of the bill to the end that surprise or fraud in legislation may be prevented. Expressed in another way, does the caption conceal or disguise the real purpose of H.B. 730 and does it contain more than one subject matter? The subject matter under consideration in the caption of H.B. 730 is obviously the Texas Controlled Substances Act. There is no other subject matter expressed in the caption, just as there was no other subject matter expressed in the Utility Regulatory Act in City of Brownsville, supra, other than the regulation of public utilities, though there were many provisions expressed in the bill. Secondly, does the caption of H.B. 730 conceal or disguise its real purpose? The caption says that it is an act relating to offenses and criminal penalties under the Texas Controlled Substances Act. It is difficult for this writer to understand how the caption in H.B. 730 would conceal or disguise anything at all. It puts a reader on notice of the treatment of one subject and alerts him to study, explore, and investigate the details of that subject. The caption actually affords a signal that is entirely conducive to informative and “aboveboard” legislative results. Additionally, this court need not operate in a vacuum in determining the question before it. This court can take judicial notice of the fact that H.B. 730, sometimes known as the “War on Drugs” legislation, was freely and liberally debated by both houses of the Texas Legislature in 1981 and freely and liberally debated by every form of news media in the state. It is certainly fair to say that the public debate over the question of the passage of H.B. 730 was as extensive as any *954proposed legislation in the history of this state. In the face of this public debate, and indeed in the face of the very nature and wording of the caption itself, the respondents in the case at bar can hardly be heard to complain that they or the legislature or any other person has in some form or fashion been misled or tricked by the caption of H.B. 730. Indeed, the respondents in the case at bar have at no point even claimed that they were surprised, misled, or tricked by the caption of H.B. 730.
If the majority opinion in this case is allowed to stand, three consequences will result therefrom: (1) a new standard for the interpretation of statute captions pursuant to Art. Ill, Sec. 35 of the Texas Constitution will have been adopted — a standard which is nothing more than a sentence taken out of context in a written opinion by Judge Cornelius in City of Brownsville, supra — a standard that is not even a second cousin to the original intent of the constitutional provision contained in Art. Ill, Sec. 35; (2) over one hundred and twenty years of state decisis will be overruled in cases such as Tadlock, supra, Day Land and Cattle Co., supra, Beaumont v. Gulf States Utility Co., supra, Phillips v. Daniels, supra, White v. State, supra, Yeary v. Bond, supra, and Doeppenschmidt v. International & G.N. Railroad, supra, and these cases will no longer have any force or effect; (3) with the adoption of a “fair notice to the average reader” standard, the majority will place in jeopardy virtually hundreds of statutes enacted by the legislature over the course of the history of this republic.
It is to these consequences that I respectfully dissent.
TOM G. DAVIS, W.C. DAVIS and McCORMICK, JJ., join in this dissent.

. H.B. 730, Acts of the 67th Leg., Reg.Sess., 1981, Ch. 268, Pg. 696-708, Eff. Sept. 1, 1981, hereinafter referred to as H.B. 730.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.