Court Opinion

ID: 9499343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:45:22.434807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:26.289185
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Chief Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I agree that the district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss here. Be*534cause my reasoning differs slightly from that of the majority, however, I write separately.
As the majority correctly notes, in reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss, we may reverse “only if it appears beyond all doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 317 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For the reasons the majority outlines, I agree that it was clearly established at the time of the Governor’s remarks that a threat of increased government scrutiny, made in retaliation for Blankenship’s political speech, violated Blankenship’s First Amendment rights. That leaves the questions of whether Blankenship’s complaint demonstrates that Blankenship can prove no set of facts supporting (1) his claim that the Governor made such a threat, and (2) the proposition that a reasonable person in the Governor’s position would have understood at the time of his remarks that they constituted such a threat, see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (explaining that government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless, at the time of the alleged violation, “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates” the right in question).
Blankenship’s complaint alleges that in response to questions about the pension bond amendment, “the Governor threatened Plaintiff by warning that the government would scrutinize the affairs of Plaintiff and Massey even more closely in light of Plaintiffs decision to participate in the public debate over the pension bond amendment”; that “[t]he Governor went on to say, T think that is justified now, since [Blankenship] has jumped in there with his personal wealth trying to direct public policy’”; and that the Governor claimed that Massey was guilty of “ ‘many violations’ ” of state environmental regulations. J.A. 9 (emphasis added).
The Governor argues that the Gazette article provides the proper context for the statements and demonstrates that they were predictions of scrutiny by the media and the public rather than threats of additional governmental scrutiny. That argument fails to recognize, however, that we must accept as true the allegation in the complaint that the Governor warned Blankenship that the government would scrutinize him more closely in light of his decision to speak publicly regarding the pension bond amendment. The fact remains that even if the words quoted in the Gazette article do not comprise such a threat themselves, Blankenship may eventually prove such a threat by words that were not quoted in the article but that any reasonable official in the Governor’s position would have understood to have been a threat.
The Governor disagrees, observing that Blankenship’s complaint plainly states that “the Governor’s threats against Plaintiff were reported in the Charleston Gazette.” Id. But the Governor’s reliance on this language is misplaced. The Governor reads the complaint as if it alleged that the Governor’s threats against Blankenship were quoted in the Gazette. But, the identified language in the complaint may simply refer to the portion of the Gazette article that paraphrased the Governor’s words. See id. at 46 (“The governor said Blankenship, who has launched a personal campaign against the bond plan, should expect tougher scrutiny of his business affairs.”). In fact, not only does the complaint not plainly state that it is based only on words quoted in the Gazette article, but it actually suggests that it is not so limited. See id. at 9 (alleging that Governor threat*535ened further government scrutiny and then “went on to say” some of the words quoted in the Gazette).
For this reason, the Governor thus has not demonstrated that Blankenship cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief, and I therefore concur in the judgment affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss.