Court Opinion

ID: 9706396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:42:42.378548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:22.508064
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCHMIDT, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority’s decision that the presence of Barbara Lee on the pension board did not deny the plaintiff a fair hearing. However, I dissent from the remainder of the opinion. As the majority points out, section 3 — 115 of the Code reads, in part: “A disability pension shall not be paid unless there is filed with the board certificates of the police officer’s disability, subscribed and sworn to by the police officer if not under legal disability, *** and by the police surgeon (if there be one) and 3 practicing physicians selected by the board.” (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/3 — 115 (West 1996). The Board selected three physicians to exam the plaintiff. Two signed certificates stating the plaintiff was disabled. One signed a certificate stating the plaintiff was not disabled. The issue is what the legislature meant when it referred to “certificates of the police officer’s disability.” The language of a statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Franzese v. Trinko, 66 Ill. 2d 136, 361 N.E.2d 585 (1977). There is no rule of construction which allows courts to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports; where enactment is clear and unambiguous, a court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language .and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 630 N.E.2d 820 (1994). If legislative intent can be ascertained from a statute’s plain language, that intent must prevail without resort to other interpretive aides. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 688 N.E.2d 137 (1997). Like the other districts of the Illinois Appellate Court that have examined this statute, I find nothing ambiguous about the term “certificates of the police officer’s disability.” That is, section 3 — 115 plainly refers to a certificate stating that the police officer is disabled in one form or another. In a tortured, “Clintonesque” fashion, the majority states that the outcome is dependent on the definition of the word “of,” and therefore the statute is ambiguous. 347 Ill. App. 3d at 728. After finding the word “of’ ambiguous, the majority goes on to hold that a certificate of disability actually encompasses a certificate that says the police officer is not disabled. I cannot agree. Under this fine of reasoning, a sworn affidavit that said a person does not own a car would become a “certificate of title”; one that said he had no insurance would become a “certificate of insurance”; one that said an automobile owner had not paid the registration fees to the State would become a “certificate of registration,” and so on. You get the picture. I believe that the absurdity of the majority’s position is further illustrated by the fact that its view would allow the Board to pay a disability pension to a police officer where every certificate on file, including the officer’s, indicated that he was not disabled. Because I think the language is clear, there is no need for resorting to any of the tools of judicial interpretation, such as examining legislative intent. We should enforce the statute as clearly written. However, if we look at legislative intent, I draw an opposite conclusion from that of the majority. Section 3 — 115 of the Code, as previously mentioned, says that a disability pension shall not be paid without the requisite certificates. However, once all of the required certificates are filed, “the board may require other evidence of disability.” 40 ILCS 5/3 — 115 (West 1996). That is, even faced with three certificates of disability signed by physicians selected by the Board, the Board can require additional evidence of disability before awarding a disability pension. This shows a legislative intent to require very strong proof before the award of a disability pension. As the majority points out, two other districts of the appellate court have previously held that the statute means what it says. See Rizzo v. Board of Trustees of the Village of Evergreen Park Police Pension Fund, 338 Ill. App. 3d 490, 788 N.E.2d 1196 (2003); Daily v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 251 Ill. App. 3d 119, 621 N.E.2d 986 (1993). When the courts construe a statute and that construction is not interfered with by the legislature, it is presumed that such construction is in harmony with the legislative intent. Consumers Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 364 Ill. 145, 4 N.E.2d 34 (1936). The statute has not been amended since the Fourth District Appellate Court rendered its decision construing the statute in 1993. While the legislature clearly required that certificates of disability be filed by three practicing physicians selected by the Board, there is nothing in the statutory language to stop a claimant from petitioning the Board to appoint a fourth physician to examine him in an effort to secure the necessary three certificates of disability. I am not unsympathetic to police officers. Having more than a passing familiarity with police work, I note that the problems related by the plaintiff, save for the alleged suicidal ideation and the claim that he went to work with an unloaded gun, are certainly issues familiar to any experienced police officer. Were I in the legislature, I would vote in favor of rewriting the statute to allow the Board more flexibility with respect to the certificates of disability. I am not. Therefore, I must dissent. I would confirm the decision of the Board.