Court Opinion

ID: 9840971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:04:58.052611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:38:43.794340
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 Friends of Muir Woods Park v. County of Marin CA1/5

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 FRIENDS OF MUIR WOODS PARK,
 et al.,
                                                                  A166427
          Plaintiffs and Appellants,
 v.
                                                                  (Marin County
 THE COUNTY OF MARIN, et al.,                                     Super. Ct. No. CIV2003248)
          Defendants and Respondents,
 DANIEL WEISSMAN,
      Real Party in Interest and
 Respondent.

      Friends of Muir Woods Park and Watershed Alliance of
Marin (collectively, appellants) appeal from an order awarding
them substantially reduced attorney fees in a case arising under
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub.
Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). They contend that the trial
court abused its discretion by awarding them only a fraction of
their $225,683 request. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND

                                               A.

      Real party in interest Daniel Weissman owns an eight-acre
residential parcel in Mill Valley, which he seeks to subdivide into
three parcels—one for his existing residence and the remaining

                                                1
two for new homes (the project). In 2020, the County of Marin
conducted an initial study, adopted a mitigated negative
declaration, and approved Weissman’s tentative subdivision map.

       Friends of Muir Woods Park, an association of individuals
who reside in the vicinity of Weissman’s property, and Watershed
Alliance of Marin filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging
that the county violated CEQA and the Subdivision Map Act
(Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq.; the Map Act). Appellants alleged
that the project’s grading and construction would result in
significant environmental impacts, including increased sediment
and polluted runoff in Redwood Creek, which is habitat for
endangered Coho and Steelhead salmon. The prayer for relief
asked the court to issue a writ compelling the county to set aside
its project and mitigated negative declaration approvals and to
issue an injunction suspending all project activities.

       In their opening brief in support of their petition,
appellants argued, primarily, that the county violated CEQA by
approving the subdivision without requiring an EIR. In support
of that argument, appellants asserted: (1) the county’s initial
study was inadequate because it only addressed the impacts of
two new homes instead of the combined impacts from 12 homes
that potentially could be built on the sites; (2) the project
description in the initial study failed to provide crucial
information about soil excavation and fill; (3) the initial study
failed to accurately describe the existing environment, including
soil stability around an existing fire road, hydrology, landslides,
the streambed and riparian corridor, location of wetlands, and
terrestrial and avian wildlife corridors; (4) the initial study failed
to provide substantial evidence for its conclusions regarding
impacts to human safety as well as geological, hydrological, and
biological resources; (5) the initial study did not properly consider
cumulative impacts because it failed to consider prior grading

                                  2
and other recently proposed residential projects; and (6) the
county failed to assess the project’s consistency with local plans.

       Appellants also maintained that the county’s approval of
the subdivision violated the Map Act because the project was
inconsistent with the general plan and various community plan
policies.

                                  B.

      After a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting
appellants’ petition in part and denying it in part. The court
ruled that the county had not violated the Map Act. While it
rejected most of appellants’ CEQA arguments, it determined that
the initial study omitted certain information.

       The trial court explained that the initial study failed to
satisfy CEQA’s “informational requirements” with respect to
three discrete issues—the description of the project as it pertains
to the location of surplus fill; the current condition of soil stability
around a fire road; and the location of drainages on the project
site in relation to stream or wetland conservation areas, any
mechanisms to be employed to divert water away from these
areas, and associated environmental impacts. The court
specifically rejected appellants’ arguments that the county should
have required an EIR; the court found no substantial evidence of
potentially significant environmental impacts. The court also
disagreed with appellants’ argument that the county was
obligated to analyze the impacts of a much larger project—12
potential new homes, rather than two.

       The court’s peremptory writ ordered the county to set aside
its resolution adopting the mitigated negative declaration and its
project approval. The county must “take further action as
necessary to comply with CEQA and the [CEQA] Guidelines,
specifically Section 15063, with respect to the . . . three specific
areas.” The writ made clear that the court was not directing the

                                   3
county to exercise its discretion in any way and was not directing
it to prepare an EIR.

                                C.

      Appellants moved for an award of attorney fees, pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5,1 arguing that their
lawsuit—by purportedly protecting salmon habitat in Redwood
Creek—provided important public benefits. The lodestar amount
appellants initially requested (in their moving papers) included
272.4 hours that appellants’ lead attorney Edward Yates billed at
an hourly rate of $500 (for a total of $136,200) on the underlying
merits; 27.4 hours that Yates billed at the same rate (for a total
of $13,700) in connection with preparing the motion for fees; 12.6
hours that a second attorney, David Eisenmann, incurred at an
hourly rate of $400 (for a total of $5,040) on the underlying
action; and 6.8 hours that Eisenmann billed at the same rate (for
a total of $2,720) in connection with the fees motion.

      Additionally, appellants added to their requested lodestar
$39,889 that purportedly represents billings from another firm,
the Evans Law Firm, plus a proposed multiplier of 1.5, for a total
of $59,883.2 However, appellants submitted no evidence to
support these fees, much less evidence that any fees were
incurred on a contingent basis. Appellants further noted that
Yates discounted his fees by over $40,000 to eliminate billing for
administrative work, as well as the Map Act and related plan
consistency claims that were denied.

       In his opposition brief, Weissman argued that appellants
failed to satisfy the requirements for a fee award under section

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
      2 In this instance and several others, we note that

appellants presented the trial court with numbers that either do
not align (between their briefs and declarations) or that appear to
result from mathematical errors.
                                4
1021.5 and, in the alternative, argued that any fee award should
be substantially reduced. On the latter point, Weissman did not
challenge the requested hourly rates but argued that appellants’
fee claim should be reduced by 90 percent to reflect that the time
expended was excessive given appellants’ limited success. He
asserted that application of a negative multiplier (reducing the
requested award by 80 to 90 percent) would account for the fact
that appellants did not achieve their primary CEQA goal—the
preparation of an EIR that analyzes the impacts on salmon and
other natural resources of developing 12 homes at the site.

       In their reply brief, appellants argued that no reduction for
limited success was appropriate because they had obtained all
the relief they sought. They also requested an additional award
of fees for preparing the fees motion. As stated in Yates’s
supplemental declaration, Yates claimed 14.8 hours that he billed
at a $500 hourly rate (for a total of $7,400) in connection with
preparing the reply in support of appellants’ fee motion.
Appellants also claimed an additional 2.2 hours billed by
Eisenmann, at $400 per hour, in connection with preparing the
reply—for a total of $880. This brought appellants’ total lodestar
request to $225,683.

       The trial court granted appellants’ fee motion in part. The
trial court found that appellants were “successful parties” and
satisfied the remaining requirements for a section 1021.5 fee
award. However, the trial court reduced appellants’ total fee
award to $37,346.30—comprised of $16,420 for the fees motion
plus $20,926.30. The latter number represented 10 percent of
appellants’ merits lodestar and reply fees.

      The trial court explained that reduced fees were
appropriate because appellants achieved only limited success.
The court noted that it had rejected appellants’ main
arguments—that the county was required to analyze a much
larger development (12 potential units, rather than two) in a full

                                 5
EIR. Rather, the court identified only limited and discrete
problems with the initial study, which may not require mitigation
or any changes to the project and which the county could
potentially address through the inclusion of targeted additional
information.

      The trial court also indicated that it was reducing fees
because the amount requested was excessive, citing numerous
hours incurred in connection with a motion for relief from
dismissal (§ 473, subd. (b)) and a motion for leave to amend—
neither of which was related to the merits of appellants’ petition.
Finally, the trial court concluded that appellants’ attorneys were
not entitled to a positive multiplier, noting that the
“administrative record was not unusually voluminous and none of
the issues was particularly difficult or complicated.”

                           DISCUSSION

                                 A.

      Appellants insist that the trial court abused its discretion
by substantially reducing the fee award. We disagree.

                                  1.

       “[S]ection 1021.5 authorizes an award of attorney fees to a
‘private attorney general,’ that is, a party who secures a
significant benefit for many people by enforcing an important
right affecting the public interest.” (Serrano v. Stefan Merli
Plastering Co., Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1018, 1020.) The intent of
the statute is to encourage private actions enforcing important
public policies—which would otherwise “frequently be
infeasible”—by compensating successful litigants with attorney
fees.3 (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council

      3 The Sierra Club and the California Native Plant Society
filed an amicus brief, in which they argue that affirming the trial
                                 6
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 933; Children & Families Com. of Fresno
County v. Brown (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 45, 55.)

        “ ‘Attorney fees are recoverable under section 1021.5 (1) by
a successful party, (2) in an action that has resulted in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,
(3) if a significant benefit has been conferred on the general
public or a large class of persons, and (4) the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the
award appropriate.’ ” (Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn. (2006) 136
Cal.App.4th 1331, 1343.)

      To calculate a fee award, a trial court must first determine
the lodestar—the number of hours reasonably expended,
multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM Group, Inc. v.
Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The court may then adjust
the lodestar, based on various factors including the contingent
nature of any fee recovery, to fix the fee at the fair market value
for the legal services provided. (Ibid.)

      We review the amount of fees awarded for abuse of
discretion, mindful of the fact that the trial judge is in the best
position to assess the value of an attorney’s performance.
(Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (Ketchum).) It is
the appellant’s burden to prove that the trial court abused its
discretion. (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment
v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184
(SOURCE).)

      Reversal is appropriate when there is no reasonable basis
for the ruling, the trial court’s necessary findings are not
supported by substantial evidence, or when the court applied the
wrong test or standards. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1233, 1239; Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown

court’s award would conflict with the legislative purpose of
section 1021.5 and discourage CEQA enforcement actions.
                                 7
Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 894.) Unless an
appellant demonstrates otherwise, we assume the trial court
followed the law, considered the relevant factors, and acted
within its discretion. (Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc. (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 329, 378; Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp.
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 67 (Gorman).) However, an
“inscrutable” award—one that lacks any apparent reasonable
basis—will be deemed arbitrary. (Gorman, supra, at p. 101.)

                                 2.

      Appellants argue that, in reducing their fee award, the trial
court could not consider their limited success because the court
had already concluded that appellants were “successful” for
purposes of entitlement to an attorney fee award.4 They are
wrong.

       True, the general rule is that attorney fee awards “should
be fully compensatory” for all the hours reasonably spent.
(Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133.) But this comes with
important caveats: courts may reduce or even deny fee requests
when circumstances render the award unjust (ibid.), such as
when the request appears unreasonably inflated (Chavez v. City
of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 990) or when the party
achieved only limited success. (See, e.g., Laurel Heights
Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988)
47 Cal.3d 376, 428, fn. 29 [directing court of appeal to consider
CEQA petitioner’s lack of success on mitigation issue when
awarding fees]; SOURCE, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1185 [“the
extent of a party’s success is a key factor in determining the

      4 On appeal, respondents do not challenge the trial court’s
ruling that appellants are entitled to a fee award under section
1021.5. Accordingly, we need not address appellants’ arguments
on that point.
                                 8
reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded under section
1021.5”].)

       Even where a plaintiff’s successful and unsuccessful CEQA
claims are interrelated (as we assume they are here) a trial court
may reduce attorney fees if the plaintiff achieves only minimal
success. (SOURCE, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1185-1186;
Environmental Protection Information Center v. Department of
Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 238-239,
247-248 (EPIC); Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San
Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 612.) This Division has
previously made clear that a trial court “ ‘may appropriately
reduce the lodestar calculation “if the relief, however significant,
is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a
whole.” ’ ” (EPIC, supra, at p. 239.)

     In short, the trial court did not apply an incorrect legal
standard. A party’s limited success is a legitimate consideration.

                                 3.

       Nor can we agree with appellants that, by failing to
explicitly state the lodestar or make specific findings regarding
the reasonableness of appellants’ claimed rates and hours, the
trial court erroneously skipped over the first step of the required
lodestar analysis.

       Our Supreme Court acknowledges the discretion of the trial
court in setting attorney fees but has held that the exercise of
that discretion must be grounded in the “lodestar adjustment
method” to arrive at an objectively reasonable amount. (Press v.
Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322-324.) The first stage
of the lodestar analysis sets a basic fee for comparable legal
services in the community. At the next step, the trial court must
determine whether the litigation before it involved case-specific
factors that justify augmentation or reduction of the lodestar “to
approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Ketchum,

                                 9
supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) In setting that fair market value,
trial courts may consider various factors, including “(1) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill
displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature
of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys,
[and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ibid.) But the
award may not be upheld if no reasonable connection can be
found between the lodestar figure and the fee ultimately
awarded. (Press, supra, at p. 324.)

       Here, the trial court explicitly found appellants’ attorneys
billed at reasonable rates, but it did not make findings on the
number of hours reasonably spent. The absence of such findings
is not a basis for reversal, however, because the court was not
required to issue a statement of decision or otherwise explain its
rationale. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140.) We “cannot
reverse an attorney fee award solely for lack of an explanation by
the trial court. We can reverse only if the record contains some
indication that the trial court considered improper factors or . . .
simply snatch[ed] its award ‘from thin air.’ ” (SOURCE, supra,
235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1189-1190; accord, Gorman, supra, 178
Cal.App.4th at p. 101.)

       The record does not support appellants’ claim that the trial
court snatched a number out of thin air. Because neither the
county nor Weissman objected to counsel’s hourly rates as
unreasonable and it was “impossible to tell from counsel’s
timesheets how much time was spent on each of the numerous
CEQA arguments,” the trial court grounded its award in
appellants’ lodestar request ($225,683). The court then deducted
the fees incurred in preparing appellants’ motion for fees
($16,420) and applied a negative multiplier to the remainder—
explaining that “10% number is the Court’s estimate as to the
percentage of the action on which [appellants] prevailed.” The
trial court also noted that the hours spent by appellants’ counsel

                                 10
on certain tasks—a motion for relief from dismissal (§ 473, subd.
(b)) and a motion for leave to amend—were excessive.
Accordingly, the trial court awarded a total fee award of
$37,346.30—representing the sum of $16,420 plus $20,926.30 (10
percent of $209,263 [$225,683 minus $16,420]).

       We read the court’s fee order not as a “guess” at reasonable
fees, as appellants theorize, but as an implicit determination that
a negative multiplier should be applied—to all fees other than
those incurred in connection with preparing the moving papers
for the fee motion itself. The trial court’s award is not
inscrutable because it supported its decision by indicating that
full compensation would be unjust in the circumstances, given
appellants’ limited success, and that the overall time spent was
excessive for a relatively simple CEQA case.

       Additionally, the trial court did not err in applying a
negative multiplier, rather than deducting specific hours. If a
trial court awards less fees than requested, it is “not required to
specify each and every claimed item found to be unsupported or
unreasonable.” (Gorman, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 67.) A
court may use a negative multiplier when “some identified,
legally justifiable circumstance” supports its decision to diverge
from the lodestar. (Rogel v. Lynwood Redevelopment Agency
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1329-1330; San Diego Police
Officers Assn. v. San Diego Police Department (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 19, 24 .)

      In SOURCE, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the use of a substantial
negative multiplier (approximately 16 percent) where the record
demonstrated the plaintiffs’ attorneys inflated their billing in an
uncomplicated CEQA case and succeeded on only one out of 10 of
their arguments. (Id. at pp. 1182-1187, 1189-1190.) The
reviewing court explained: “[A]lthough the court did not state
the lodestar amount or explain how it arrived at the amount

                                 11
awarded, it did make it clear that it intended to substantially
reduce the fees based on what it saw as outrageous overbilling. It
stated its opinion that the case was not complicated by CEQA
standards and could be handled by experienced CEQA attorneys
‘without having to reinvent the wheel,’ thus indicating a belief
that the billing was exaggerated. It also stated that it was basing
its fee reduction on [the plaintiffs’] limited success in the
litigation. . . . [T]hese are all legitimate reasons for reducing a fee
award. Because the record shows that the court acted for
legitimate reasons, we cannot find an abuse of discretion simply
because it failed to make its arithmetic transparent.” (Id. at p.
1190.)

       Here too, the record amply supports the trial court’s
application of a negative multiplier. The trial court concluded
that appellants achieved only limited success. The court focused
on the fact that appellants “argued the County should have
required an EIR, and in particular an EIR based on a theory that
would have required extensive environmental review based on 12
potential units on the property rather than two additional units.”
Essentially, the court concluded that appellants (unsuccessfully)
tried to make the case much bigger than it was.

      Appellants say they achieved all their goals, and they never
sought an order requiring the county to prepare an EIR.
Generally, when issuing a writ for a violation of CEQA, a court
cannot order a lead agency to exercise its discretion in a
particular manner (see Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.9, subd. (c))
although there are circumstances in which a court may direct an
agency to prepare an EIR. (See, e.g., Berkeley Hillside
Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1122
[courts may order preparation of an EIR if, considering the
circumstances, public agency lacks discretion to apply an
exemption or issue a negative declaration].) But this is beside
the point.

                                  12
      Appellants argued strenuously that the county violated
CEQA by failing to prepare an EIR, that the standard for
triggering an EIR (the so-called fair argument standard) was met
(Pub. Resources Code, § 21151; Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1316), and that the county improperly
restricted its analysis to a much smaller project (two homes
rather than 12). Had appellants prevailed, the county probably
would have to prepare an EIR to comply with the writ. But the
court rejected these arguments and required the county only to
correct discrete omissions in the initial study. Overall, the record
supports the trial court’s view that the plaintiffs achieved far less
than they sought. It was entitled to reduce the fee award
accordingly. (See EPIC, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 238-239,
247-248.)

                                 B.

       Appellants also contend that the trial court impermissibly
“disallowed” fees incurred in connection with the filing of their
reply brief (on the fee motion) as well as those incurred for
certain “indispensable tasks”—such as preparing the
administrative record and litigating a motion for relief from
dismissal. We need only briefly address these arguments because
appellants mischaracterize the record.

      The trial court did not award zero fees for the reply brief.
To the contrary, although the trial court made clear that it was
not applying the negative 0.1 multiplier to appellants’ requested
lodestar for their moving papers on the fees motion, it included
the reply fees in the lodestar against which the negative
multiplier was applied. The trial court did not explain why it
awarded full fees for the moving paper fees and only 10 percent of
what was requested for the reply, but we can infer that the trial
court viewed approximately $25,000 in total fees for an attorney’s
fees motion as excessive in this case. (See Gorman, supra, 178
Cal.App.4th at p. 101 [attorney fee award cannot be reversed due

                                 13
to absence of explanation if it can be rationalized in light of
record]; SOURCE, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186 [“to charge
nearly $10,000 for a run-of-the-mill attorney fees motion can
reasonably be viewed as excessive”].)

      Similarly, the court did not deny all fees for preparing the
administrative record and for filing a motion pursuant to section
473. Again, the trial court applied a negative multiplier to the
lodestar, which included all of appellants’ requested fees for such
tasks. The trial court apparently believed that the time spent on
these tasks was excessive or inflated.

      That implicit finding is supported. Appellants requested
$59,883 (representing 121.2 attorney, paralegal, and law clerk
hours enhanced by a positive multiplier of 1.5) for work assigned
to the Evans Law Firm. The only evidence in the record
supporting these fees is found in Yates’s declaration, which states
that he assigned the following work to the Evans Law Firm:
“Research and draft Motion and Points and Authorities for Relief
under Section 473, Points and Authorities for Motion to Amend
the Petition to Add Sierra Club as a Party; editing of Opening
Brief and oversight of law clerk preparation of Administrative
Record; filing proofs of service. Both firms attended hearings and
settlement and case management conferences.”

      On this record, appellants have not met their burden of
proving that the hours expended and fees sought for such tasks
were reasonable (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San
Bernardino, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 615) or that the trial
court abused its discretion by reducing them. (SOURCE, supra,
235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1184.)

                                C.

      Finally, appellants contend that the trial court abused its
discretion by declining to apply a positive lodestar multiplier to
the Evans Law Firm’s lodestar. We need not address appellant’s

                                14
argument because appellants do not cite any evidence in the
record supporting their argument that a multiplier was
appropriate. (See Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1138 [courts
are “not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic
lodestar figure for contingent risk . . . although it retains
discretion to do so in the appropriate case”]; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [briefs must “[s]upport any reference to a
matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number
of the record where the matter appears”]; Guthrey v. State of
California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115-1116 [appellate
court may disregard any assertion that is unsupported by
citations to the record].)

      In any event, the record shows that a 1.5 positive multiplier
for the work by the Evans Law Firm was built into the trial
court’s lodestar calculation. Appellants have not demonstrated
that the trial court abused its discretion.

                          DISPOSITION

     The challenged attorney fees order is affirmed.
Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, Rule 8.278(a)(2).)

                                15
                                    ______________________
                                    BURNS, J.

We concur:

____________________________
JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________
CHOU, J.

A166427

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