Court Opinion

ID: 9930683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 16:02:19.143849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:24:35.257902
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8041     Document: 010110996267      Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       February 7, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  CHARLES ALFRED ARMAJO, JR.,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 23-8041
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00065-SWS)
  WYOMING PUBLIC DEFENDER, in her                             (D. Wyo.)
  official capacity a/k/a Diane Lozano;
  WYOMING PUBLIC DEFENDER TRIAL
  COUNSEL, in his official capacity a/k/a
  Brandon Booth; MICHAEL BENNETT,
  in his official capacity and individually;
  DIANE LOZANO, individually;
  BRANDON BOOTH, individually,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Charles Alfred Armajo, Jr., filed the underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights

 action against his criminal trial and appellate attorneys—two public defenders and a

 court-appointed attorney in private practice—alleging that they violated his

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-8041    Document: 010110996267        Date Filed: 02/07/2024     Page: 2

 constitutional rights to access to courts, counsel, and due process. The district court

 dismissed his claims with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for

 failure to state a claim, determined that the claims were frivolous under 28 U.S.C.

 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(l), and assessed a strike pursuant to § 1915(g).

 Mr. Armajo appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss this

 appeal as frivolous and assess another strike.

                                      Background

       Mr. Armajo was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse of a child in

 Wyoming state court. While he was detained in Minnesota on an Interstate Compact

 Detainer, the Wyoming Supreme Court (WSC) affirmed his conviction on direct

 appeal. He pursued state habeas relief before the WSC, which denied relief. His

 efforts to obtain habeas relief in federal court, including based on claims of

 ineffective assistance of counsel during his detention in Minnesota, have also failed.

       In his original and amended complaints (together, complaints), Mr. Armajo

 alleged his criminal attorneys violated his rights by (1) hindering his ability to pursue

 an appeal by withholding transcripts and other evidence from him; (2) missing the

 deadline for seeking United States review of the decision in his direct appeal; and

 (3) compromising the success of his appeal by refusing his phone calls and ignoring

 his correspondence. He also alleged that counsel’s failure to raise certain issues

 “affect[ed] the outcome” of his appeal and violated his “right to effective assistance

 of counsel at trial, and on appeal.” R. at 591 (capitalization omitted). He sought

 damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, and he asked the court to “review his

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 entire case de novo with the purpose of determining if his case is in fact, warranting

 of overturn and/or vindication in Wyoming.” R. at 54.

        On screening, the district court construed the complaints as asserting claims

 against each of the defendants in their individual and official capacities, and

 dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim on several grounds. First, it

 concluded that the individual-capacity claims failed because the defendants were not

 state actors. Second, it concluded that the official-capacity claims failed because

 Mr. Armajo did not plausibly allege that the Wyoming Public Defender’s Office has

 a policy or custom that causes constitutional violations or that any of the defendants

 followed a policy or widespread custom condoning deprivation of his rights. Third,

 it held that Mr. Armajo’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was barred under

 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on the merits of that claim

 would imply the invalidity of his conviction. See id. at 486-87 (holding that an

 action for monetary damages under § 1983 cannot be used to challenge the validity of

 a conviction). Finally, the court concluded that his allegations regarding counsel’s

 alleged interference with his ability to file a petition for writ of certiorari failed for

 several reasons, including on the ground that he did not have a constitutional right to

 counsel to pursue discretionary applications for review in the Supreme Court. So he

 cannot be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to

 file a timely petition. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982)

 (per curiam). The court then held that Mr. Armajo could not, as a matter of law,

 obtain the relief he sought against these defendants under § 1983 and that he could

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 not amend his complaint to state a claim on which relief could be granted. It thus

 dismissed the claims with prejudice, and because they were squarely foreclosed by

 Supreme Court precedent, it deemed his claims frivolous and imposed a strike.

                                  Standard of Review

       A district court must dismiss an action filed by a person seeking to proceed

 in forma pauperis (IFP) if it determines that the complaint “fails to state a claim on

 which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such

 dismissals de novo. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). We review

 “the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support

 a legal claim for relief.” Id. at 1218 (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so,

 we accept all well-pled factual allegations as true and view them in the light most

 favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 1217. But “the tenet that a court must accept”

 well-pled factual allegations as true “is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” so we are

 not bound by the plaintiff’s recital of legal principles supported by conclusory

 statements. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Dismissal of a pro se

 complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the

 plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him

 an opportunity to amend.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Mr. Armajo represents himself so we construe his filings liberally, but we will

 not serve as his advocate. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d

 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).

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                                        Discussion

       1. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

       To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove two elements:

 “(1) deprivation of a federally protected right by (2) an actor acting under color of

 state law.” Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp., 814 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016).

 The under-color-of-law requirement is “a jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action.”

 Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 315 (1981). And it poses an insurmountable

 obstacle for all of Mr. Armajo’s claims against these defendants.

       In Polk County, the Supreme Court held that “a public defender does not act

 under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel

 to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Id. at 325. The Court reasoned that

 although public defenders are paid by the state, they do not act on behalf of the state,

 but serve the public by advancing the individual interests of their clients. Thus, when

 defending a client, a public defender’s relationship to the state is necessarily

 independent, and even adversarial, and she exercises independent judgment in the

 same manner as an attorney in the private sector. Id. at 318-19, 321-22; see also id.

 at 319 (“This is essentially a private function, traditionally filled by retained counsel,

 for which state office and authority are not needed.”). The same rationale applies

 whether the attorney is “appointed[] or serving in a legal aid or defender program.”

 Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188,

 1188-89 (10th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that an attorney does not become a state actor

 merely by representing clients in court). Even if counsel’s deficient performance

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 “cause[s] the trial process to deprive an accused person of his liberty in an

 unconstitutional manner, the lawyer who may be responsible for the unconstitutional

 state action does not himself act under color of state law within the meaning of

 § 1983.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329 n.6 (1983) (citation omitted).

       Mr. Armajo’s complaints alleged that the defendants were his criminal defense

 attorneys and were acting as his attorneys at the time of the complained-of conduct.

 Thus, they were not state actors for § 1983 purposes, and the district court properly

 dismissed his claims on that basis. See Polk Cnty., 454 U.S. at 324-25 (affirming

 dismissal of claim against public defender stemming from her withdrawal from

 representing plaintiff in his criminal appeal); Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901,

 909-10 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 suit brought by criminal

 defendants against their court-appointed defense attorneys for violation of their rights

 to counsel and due process, explaining that “even if counsel performs what would

 otherwise be a traditional lawyer function . . . so inadequately as to deprive the client

 of constitutional rights, defense counsel still will not be deemed to have acted under

 color of state law,” id. at 910), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in

 Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011). 1

       1
          A public defender may act under color of law when acting outside her
 traditional functions as counsel, see Polk Cnty., 454 U.S. at 324-25, and “an
 otherwise private person” such as a public defender acts “under color of state law”
 when conspiring with state officials to deprive a client of constitutional rights, Tower
 v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984). Mr. Armajo did not allege either that the
 defendants were acting outside their traditional functions as counsel or conspiring
 with state officials. And his allegations that public defenders and prosecutors have a
 conflict of interest because they are both employed by the state, see R. at 41-42, did
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       We are not persuaded otherwise by Mr. Armajo’s insistence that his attorneys

 were acting under of color of law because they were employed by the state and were

 “Officers of the Court,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 6. Those arguments are squarely

 foreclosed by Polk County, in which the Court recognized that although public

 defenders are paid with state funds, they act independent of the state’s authority, and

 exercise independent judgment in representing a criminal defendant. See 454 U.S.

 at 317-19. Thus, despite the source of their payment, criminal defense attorneys do

 not act under color of law when representing their clients. See id. Polk County also

 made clear that “a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer

 of the court, a state actor under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.”

 Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       None of Mr. Armajo’s arguments on appeal call the district court’s ruling into

 question, and we can conceive of no amendments to his complaint that would satisfy

 the state-action element of his § 1983 claims against these defendants. Accordingly,

 it was appropriate for the district court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. See

 Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming with-prejudice

 § 1915(e)(2) dismissal where no amendments could cure pleading defects).

       Having concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the claims on the

 ground that the defendants were not state actors, we need not address the other

 not state a viable conspiracy claim. See Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1268
 (10th Cir. 1994) (dismissing § 1983 conspiracy claim against public defenders as
 conclusory and unsupported by facts).
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 grounds for dismissal. Accordingly, we do not address Mr. Armajo’s arguments

 challenging the district court’s conclusion that he failed to plead sufficient facts

 to support his official-capacity claim. We also need not address his argument

 that because he “never sought relief in the form of overturning his conviction,”

 Aplt. Opening Br. at 8, the district court erred by concluding that his

 ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was barred under Heck. We nevertheless

 note that his original complaint specifically asked the district court to “overturn”

 his conviction based on defense counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, R. at 54, and

 alleged that given his lack of success on direct appeal and in his state and federal

 court habeas proceedings, the only way he could get relief from what he

 characterized as his wrongful conviction was through his civil rights action. These

 allegations are precisely the type of claims barred by Heck, because success on the

 merits would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.

       2. Frivolousness Determination and Imposition of a Strike

       We reject Mr. Armajo’s challenge to the district court’s imposition of a strike

 pursuant to § 1915(g), and we assess another strike because he has not presented a

 reasoned, non-frivolous argument on appeal.

       Under the three-strikes provision of § 1915(g), “a prisoner is barred from

 bringing new civil cases or appeals in civil cases without the prepayment of filing

 fees if three prior civil cases or appeals in civil cases have been dismissed as

 frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim.” Smith v. Veterans Admin.,

 636 F.3d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir. 2011). “[A] dismissal under § 1915 counts as a strike

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 when the action was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim,

 the same grounds listed in § 1915(g).” Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d

 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson,

 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015).

        Here, the district court dismissed Mr. Armajo’s claims for failure to state a

 claim, which is a permissible basis for imposing a strike. See id. at 1178. Before

 doing so, it took judicial notice of his prior failed efforts to obtain relief based on the

 same and similar claims. See United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5

 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that federal courts may take judicial notice of publicly

 filed records in their own and “certain other courts concerning matters that bear

 directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”). Those prior actions included

 federal habeas proceedings raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that

 parrot some of the allegations in his § 1983 complaint. See Armajo v. Wyo. Att’y

 Gen., No. 22-8049, 2023 WL 2028967, at *1-2 (10th Cir. Feb. 16, 2023) (describing

 ineffective-assistance claims, including failure to raise issues on appeal), cert. denied

 sub nom. Armajo v. Hill, 143 S. Ct. 2601 (2023); Armajo v. State of Wyo.,

 No. 23-8052, 2023 WL 6173512, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 22, 2023) (describing

 ineffective-assistance claims, including that counsel were ineffective for withholding

 transcripts and other evidence). Mr. Armajo had also filed a prior civil rights action

 making similar allegations in the District of Minnesota, which was dismissed under

 § 1915A(b) for many of the same reasons the district court relied on in dismissing his

 claims in this case. See Armajo v. State of Minn., No. 22-CV-396, 2022 WL

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  2919447, at *2-3 (D. Minn. June 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted

  sub nom. Armajo v. Minnesota, No. 22-CV-396, 2022 WL 2918980 (D. Minn.

  July 25, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-2791, 2022 WL 18781409 (8th Cir. Oct. 6, 2022).

         We also take judicial notice of Mr. Armajo’s prior related litigation, and we

  find no error in the district court’s imposition of a strike for filing a frivolous action.

         Finally, we dismiss this appeal as frivolous and impose another strike. “An

  appeal may be frivolous if it consists of irrelevant and illogical arguments based on

  factual misrepresentations and false premises, or when the result is obvious, or the

  appellant’s arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Wheeler v. Comm’r,

  528 F.3d 773, 782 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the

  relevant caselaw, the result here was obvious and Mr. Armajo’s arguments to the

  contrary are meritless.

                                         Conclusion

         We dismiss the appeal as frivolous. Because we have determined that the

  appeal is frivolous, we also deny leave to proceed IFP on appeal, despite the district

  court’s order granting his motion to proceed IFP on appeal. See DeBardeleben v.

  Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that an appellant must show

  both a financial inability to pay “and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous

  argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal”). The

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  district court’s dismissal counts as one strike, see Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1177-78, and

  our dismissal counts as a second strike, see id. at 1179.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Allison H. Eid
                                              Circuit Judge

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