Court Opinion

ID: 9635750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:02:24.920387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:59.908479
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell,
Plaintiff appeals from an order granting a new trial in a trespass case in which the jury awarded him a verdict of $25,000.
The lower Court in its opinion said:
“The jury’s verdict established that plaintiff, a longshoreman forty-two years of age, was crossing Dela*147ware Avenue from west to east on the morning of December 7, 1953. When Smith reached the island in the center of Delaware Avenue, he looked to his right for north-bound traffic. Seeing none, he started across the street; he was struck by defendant’s truck which was south-bound and bucking traffic, that is, the truck was on the east side of the safety island. An issue of fact was raised as to whether or not the south-bound lanes were blocked.
“The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the issue of defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s contributory negligence.
“We turn to consider the injuries and damages. Plaintiff suffered a broken little finger of the left hand, a broken bone in the right foot. He also complained of back pain, which was subsequently diagnosed as sub-acute lumbrosacral strain. In addition plaintiff was said to be suffering a post-concussion syndrome.
“As a result of the foregoing injuries plaintiff suffered a loss of earnings of about $800 and was given light work such as checking and pointing because he was physically unable to perform the usual arduous duties of a longshoreman. Total medical expenses were $260.00. [Plaintiff’s gross income both before and after the accident, as shown by income tax returns, was as follows: 1951, $5,666.93; 1952, $5,478.37; 1953, $5,-542.45; 1954, $4,706.52; 1955, $5,696.67.] . . .
“The record reveals that the verdict is not only grossly excessive, but it raises, in addition, the serious question as to whether or not the interests of justice require a new trial.
“The testimony introduced to establish the injuries and the diagnoses and prognosis left much to be desired. ...
*148“The crucial testimony concerns the back injury and a diagnosis of post-concussion syndrome. Dr. Martin A. Blaker testified that he examined plaintiff on three occasions, January 1, 1954, April 29, 1954 and January 6, 1956. Dr. Blaker found some limitation of back motion and prescribed a brace. The limitation of motion was' sufficient in Dr. Blaker’s opinion to warrant a diagnosis of suNacute lumbro-sacral strain; he also stated that the pain would continue and interfere with plaintiff’s ability to perform his normal duties.
“Dr. Blaker’s testimony was seriously weakened; in his direct examination, although he knew plaintiff had been involved in another accident affecting his back, he failed to mention it in making his prognosis. Upon cross-examination, he acknowledged that he had been informed of the .second accident, which occurred on February 19, 1954; at that time a 100-pound bag of wheat fell across plaintiff’s shoulders and knocked him to the floor of a truck, injuring plaintiff’s back. This second injury occurred between the first and second examinations by Dr. Blaker, but Dr. Blaker was not so advised until August, 1954.
“We can only observe that the testimony of Dr. Blaker was less than frank as to the effect of the second injury upon the condition of the plaintiff’s back. He was asked the following question: ‘Q. You mean to say now you want this jury to believe the entire ill-condition of Lee Smith, whatever it was that was wrong with this man following the second accident, was due to the first accident? A. No sir.’
“Thereafter, on re-direct, Dr. Blaker testified that an injury to the dorsal spine would not affect the lumbrosacral area. He explained the second answer -on the ground counsel for defendant did not indicate that the injury was to the dorsal area of the spine, although Dr. Blaker knew which part of the back was affected. *149The doctor was obviously fencing with defense counsel and his answers indicate a lack of the candor and frankness to which a court and jury is entitled.
“Dr. Orr testified for defendant that he had examined plaintiff for a workmen’s compensation carrier on April 29, 1954. The examination was for injuries sustained [in the second accident] on February 19, 1854. X-rays revealed no deformity or evidence of trauma. On that date there was no evidence of lumbar muscle spasms, but Dr. Orr noted pain on percussion and palpitation over the spinous processes of the 7th, 8th and 9th dorsal vertebrae. On June 9, 1954 plaintiff was again examined by Dr. Orr; and at that time Smith complained of pain over the tips of the lumbar transverse processes on the left side upon' palpitation.
“Dr. Fisher testified that he had examined plaintiff on December 29, 1955; on the basis of a history of recurrent dull right temporal headaches over a period of two years, and the fact that plaintiff was unconscious for some time [5-10 minutes] after the accident, he diagnosed plaintiff’s condition a post-concussion syndrome. An electroencephalogram was normal and he referred plaintiff to a neurologist, Dr. Yaskin.
“Dr. Fisher stated that he is an internist [who had been practicing for two years] and that his conclusion of post-concussion syndrome was based solely on the symptoms reported by the plaintiff. He added that he had recommended a spinal puncture, but it was not performed. ...
“. . . Where the record reveals a tenuous and strained connection between the trauma of the accident and the injuries claimed, and where the record further reveals that plaintiff omitted essential facts in discussing his physical well-being with the doctors, the *150accuracy and very foundation of the opinions expressed become open to serious question.
“. . . Dr. Blaker carefully refrained from any reference to the second injury to the back; on cross-examination and then on re-direct, his testimony was confusing with reference to the cause and effect of the first accident unrelated to the second; and then his opinion after consideration of the second injury, only adds to the confusion when his testimony is reviewed in its entirety. We cannot state from his testimony that the injury to the back was the result of the first accident only. He testified that he did not want the jury to think that all of plaintiff’s difficulty came from the first injury; thereafter he expressed his opinion to the effect that the second injury would not change his opinion that all plaintiff’s condition was the result of the first accident.
“It is further significant that plaintiff failed to complain of any head pain or headaches until December, 1955 when he was treated by Dr. Fisher. . . .
“To describe in further detail the medical testimony in this matter would belabor the obvious. The medical testimony fell far short of an effort to ascertain the truth of the matter. The doctors, particularly Drs. Blaker and Fisher, conceded that certain objective tests were available but not utilized. The opinions expressed were not based on any clinical evidence, unless one can term a limitation of motion as such evidence. Dr. Blaker did not even indicate any evidence of muscle spasm or pain until his examination on January 6, 1956.
“. . . Smith did not mention head pain to Dr. Blaker; Smith did not inform Dr. Qrr that he had previously injured his back. Obviously, doctors’ opinions based on incomplete histories are weakened; if plaintiff *151chooses to withhold essential facts he runs the peril of the omissions being exposed. The record indicates a lack of frankness and candor on the part of plaintiff and some of his witnesses.
“Plaintiffs omissions and evasions, intentional or otherwise, cast serious doubt on all of the medical testimony.
“. . . Suffice it to say that plaintiff failed to establish with sufficient competent testimony the medical facts to support the verdict rendered.
“Our duty is clear, the case must be retried so that the interests of justice may be served.”
A reading of the medical testimony presented on behalf of the plaintiff — even without considering the medical evidence presented by the defendant — raises very serious doubt as to whether it could justify the verdict. When to this bare record is added the lower Court’s disbelief in the reliability or credibility of plaintiff and his doctors, it is impossible for us to say that there had been an abuse of discretion in granting a new trial.
In Edelson v. Ochroch, 380 Pa. 426, 111 A. 2d 455, the Court said (page 429) : “The rule is well settled that where a trial Judge or Court, who saw and heard the witnesses, grants a new trial, we will not reverse unless there is a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which necessarily controlled the grant of the new trial or the outcome of the case: Foster v. Waybright, 367 Pa. 615, 80 A. 2d 801; Bellettiere v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 638, 81 A. 2d 857; Morse Boulger Destructor Co. v. Arnoni, 376 Pa. 57, 101 A. 2d 705; Harris v. Ruggles Lumber Company, 376 Pa. 252, 101 A. 2d 917.” Also Mozino v. Canuso, 384 Pa. 220, 223, 120 A. 2d 300.
Order affirmed.