Court Opinion

ID: 9375480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 21:07:59.669085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.179048
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Madrigal, 2023-Ohio-488.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals No. L-22-1014
                                                                       L-22-1071
       Appellee
                                                  Trial Court No. CR0199605761
v.                                                                CR0200701081

Jamie R. Madrigal                                 DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                 Decided: February 17, 2023

                                              *****

        Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Jamie R. Madrigal, pro se.

                                              *****

        DUHART, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Jamie Madrigal, appeals from a judgment entered by the Lucas

County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to compel the state of Ohio to honor

the terms of his plea agreement. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.
                       Statement of the Case and Relevant Facts

       {¶ 2} On April 30, 1995, during an armed robbery of the Pacific Crab House

restaurant in Maumee, Ohio, a restaurant employee was ordered to the floor by the

perpetrators. Upon his refusal to lie down on the floor, the employee was immediately

shot at close range and killed.

       {¶ 3} On April 12, 1996, during the course of an armed robbery of a Kentucky

Fried Chicken restaurant in Toledo, Ohio, a female manager was shot at point-blank

range in the back of the head and killed as she attempted to open the restaurant safe at the

command of the robber.

       {¶ 4} In case No. CR0199605761 (the “KFC case”), appellant was charged with,

and convicted of, murder with a firearm specification and aggravated robbery, for the

crimes that occurred at the Kentucky Fried Chicken. A jury recommended that appellant

be sentenced to death. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in

State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000). Appellant filed a petition

for writ of habeas corpus. A federal district court granted the writ on appellant’s claim

that his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were denied when

the trial court allowed out-of-court statements by a co-defendant who refused to testify at

trial. See Madrigal v. Bagley, 276 F.Supp.2d 744 (N.D. Ohio 2003), aff’d 413 F.3d 548

(6th Cir. 2005).

2.
       {¶ 5} On September 9, 2005, counsel was appointed to represent appellant in the

retrial of the KFC case. Numerous motions were filed and various hearings and pretrials

were held. Retrial was set for January 17, 2007.

       {¶ 6} On January 11, 2007, appellant was indicted in case No. CR200701081, for

the crimes that occurred at the Pacific Crab House (the “Crab House” case). The

following day, appellant withdrew his previous plea of not guilty and entered a plea of

guilty in the KFC case. In addition, he entered a plea of guilty, pursuant to North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970), in the Crab House

case. In return for his pleas, the state agreed to dismiss the death penalty specification in

the KFC case.

       {¶ 7} A sentencing hearing was held. The trial court found that appellant’s guilty

pleas were made knowingly, voluntarily, and with an understanding of the nature of the

charges, the maximum penalties involved, and the effect of the pleas of guilty. In the

KFC case, appellant was convicted of aggravated murder with a firearm specification and

aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 20 years to life in prison on the murder charge,

10-25 years in prison on the aggravated robbery charge, and three years in prison for the

firearm specification. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to one

other, for a total minimum term of 33 years, and, further, were ordered to be served

consecutive to the sentences imposed in the Crab House case.

       {¶ 8} In the Crab House case, appellant was convicted of aggravated murder with

a firearm specification, aggravated robbery, and seven counts of kidnapping. At the

3.
sentencing hearing, one count of kidnapping was merged with the murder charge.

Appellant was then sentenced to 20 years to life in prison on the murder charge, 10-25

years in prison on the aggravated robbery charge, 10-25 years in prison on each of the

remaining six kidnapping charges, and three years in prison for the firearm specification.

The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to one another, for a total

minimum term of 93 years. It was further ordered that the sentences in the Crab House

case be served consecutively to the sentences in the KFC case, for a total minimum term

of 126 years in prison.

       {¶ 9} Appellant filed a notice of appeal on March 6, 2007. This court dismissed

the appeal as untimely. On December 26, 2007, appellant, pro se, filed a motion for leave

to file a delayed appeal. In support of his motion, appellant claimed that the charges

brought against him in the Crab House case were “maliciously fabricated and utilized as a

tool to maintain [his] original conviction” in the KFC case and to “coerce” his guilty

pleas. We granted appellant’s motion for leave and appointed counsel. In his brief on the

merits, appointed counsel asserted only that the trial court erred in stacking the six

kidnapping sentences and that the indictments were defective because they failed to

allege a mens rea for the aggravated robbery counts. We found the appeal to be without

merit and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See State v. Madrigal, 6th Dist. Lucas

Nos. L-07-1417, L-07-1418, 2008-Ohio-6394.

       {¶ 10} On February 9, 2009, appellant filed an application to reopen his direct

appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B). On March 10, 2009, we denied his application.

4.
       {¶ 11} On January 29, 2010, appellant filed his first motion to withdraw his guilty

pleas, in the trial court. Appellant alleged that his sentences were contrary to law,

contrary to the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that he was denied

effective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing.

Appellant appealed. In State v. Madrigal, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-10-142, L-10-143,

2011-Ohio-798, we held that appellant’s claims were wholly barred by the doctrine of res

judicata. We explained: “claims submitted in support of a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to

withdraw plea that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not raised on direct

appeal, are barred by res judicata.” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Bryukhanova, 6th Dist.

Fulton No. F-10-002, 2010-Ohio-5504.

       {¶ 12} On August 11, 2011, appellant filed a motion to correct illegal sentences.

The motion was denied by the trial court on October 27, 2011.

       {¶ 13} On October 18, 2016, appellant filed a “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas

and/or Motion for New Trial,” in the trial court. Appellant’s claims for relief were based

on what he describes as “recently discovered new, exculpatory evidence.” Appellant

asserted the he was innocent, that the state fabricated his involvement in the Crab House

robbery, and that his trial counsel failed to conduct any investigation or discovery

regarding the Crab House case before advising him to plead guilty. In support of his

motion, appellant submitted 23 exhibits, including six affidavits of individuals known to

appellant at the time of the plea.

5.
         {¶ 14} On October 27, 2016, the state filed its opposition to appellant’s motions.

Shortly thereafter, appellant filed a reply. On January 4, 2017, the trial court issued

findings of fact and conclusions of law denying appellant’s second Crim.R. 32.1 motion

to withdraw plea. The trial court found that the affidavits submitted by appellant were

“neither credible nor supportive” of claims of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective

assistance, or actual innocence. In regard to his request for a new trial, the court below

found that because appellant entered pleas of guilty, “Crim.R. 33(B) has no application.”

         {¶ 15} Appellant, pro se, appealed from the January 4, 2017 judgment of the trial

court. He asserted seven multi-part assignments of error for review. He alleged

prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, lack of due process, actual

innocence, and failure to comply with Crim.R. 11. Appellant further alleged that his pleas

were not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered. He sought remand and a new

trial.

         {¶ 16} On February 16, 2018, this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of

appellant’s second motion to withdraw plea, concluding that all of the claims raised by

appellant could have been raised on direct appeal and, thus, were barred under the

doctrine of res judicata. This court further found that the evidence that appellant claimed

as new was either in existence or available to him at the time of the plea, or was

inadmissible hearsay.

         {¶ 17} On April 2, 2019, appellant filed a motion captioned “MOTION TO

VOID/VACATE SENTENCING JUDGMENT” claiming that the sentences for

6.
aggravated murder were imposed contrary to law. Specifically, appellant argued that for

each charge of aggravated murder a sentence of “‘20 years mandatory incarceration to

life in prison’ was issued, for which there exists no statutory authority in Ohio’s

sentencing scheme for aggravated murder” and that his sentences for kidnapping were

contrary to law because they were allied offenses and should have been merged. On

December 31, 2019, this court determined that both of these claims were barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. See State v. Madrigal, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-19-1193, L-19-

1194, 2019-Ohio-5426.

       {¶ 18} On October 15, 2021, appellant filed a motion to compel the state of Ohio

to honor the terms of the plea agreement in the Crab House case, and on October 18,

2021, appellant filed a third motion to withdraw plea. The trial court denied both

motions on December 8, 2021. An appeal to this court followed, and on April 14, 2022,

this court dismissed the appeal as to the portion of the trial court’s order denying

appellant’s motion to withdraw plea, on the grounds that the trial court’s ruling on a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea rendered after appellant’s conviction was affirmed on

appeal was void for lack of jurisdiction.

       {¶ 19} We consider, herein, the remainder of the trial court’s order, which denied

appellant’s motion to compel the state to honor the terms of the plea agreement.

7.
                                  Assignments of Error

       {¶ 20} Appellants asserts the following assignments of error on appeal:

       I. Appellant is denied [his] Const. Guarantee to Equal Protection of the law

and Due Process where a bargain/contract of “33 years to life” specifically stated

as being the “maximum * * *” in the journalized plea agreement forms is not

honored…[Art. 1, §2; Art. 1, §16; U.S. Amend 5 and 14].

       II. The Const. Guarantees to Equal Protection of the Law and Due Process

are violated in [a] plea deal/bargain (contract) where the Court, the prosecution,

and counsel misunderstood “the maximum penalty [***]” relative to the

applicable nondiscretionary statutory authority [of §2929.03]. [Art. 1, §2; Ar. 1,

§16; U.S. Amend 5 and 14].

       III. Appellant’s Const. Guarantee to counsel [in the first instance] is denied

upon C/A trial and appellate counsel’s failure to understand the nondiscretionary

statutory authority applicable to the terms of the plea bargain/contract … [Art. 1

§10; U.S. Amend. 6].

       IV. Non-performance of the stated “maximum penalty which can be

imposed by law, which is 33 years to life,” as set-forth in the plea

agreement/contract forms effected a breach of the terms of the plea

bargain/contract, as to case CR-07-1081, particularly…in violation of Appellant’s

Const. Guarantee to Due Process…[Art. 1, §16].

8.
       V. Where Appellant has been (1) denied effective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel in the first instance; has (2) diligently sought remedy of the

underlying issue(s), Pro Se; and (3) has not had such determined on the merits, the

application of res judicata is unwarranted and unfairly deprives appellant Due

Process...[Art. 1, §10; Art. 1, §16; U.S. Amend 6 and 5, 14].

                                          Analysis

       {¶ 21} Appellant’s five assignments of error all involve the underlying claim that

the state violated the terms of his plea agreement. In making this assertion, appellant

argues that the terms of his plea agreement required him to serve a term of imprisonment

of 33 years to life in each case, with a combined term of 66 years to life, rather than 126

years to life, as was imposed by the trial court.

              Appellant’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata

       {¶ 22} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment and conviction bars a

convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any

proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or claimed lack of due

process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at trial, which resulted

in that judgment of conviction, or on appeal from that judgment.” State v. Barcus, 5th

Dist. Licking No. 09-CA-115, 2010-Ohio-122, ¶ 16, citing State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d

93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996); and State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d

104 (1967). Inasmuch as “appellant would have known that the state breached its

agreement with him at his sentencing hearing, he could have brought such a claim in a

9.
direct appeal from his conviction and sentence.” State v. Dodson, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

16AP-160, 2016-Ohio-5953. Having failed to do so, res judicata bars him from doing it

now.

        Appellant was properly sentenced under the terms of his plea agreement

       {¶ 23} Appellant’s claim also fails on its merits. “[P]lea agreements represent

bargained-for exchanges whereby defendants limit their legal exposure and prosecutors

obtain guaranteed convictions * * *.” State v. Elliott, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190430,

2021-Ohio-424, ¶ 6. These agreements can be specifically enforced. Id. at ¶ 7, citing

Santobello v. New York, 40 U.S. 257, 263, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). When

the prosecutor’s agreement is “‘“part of the inducement or consideration, such promise

must be fulfilled.’”’ State v. Dye, 127 Ohio St.3d 357, 2010-Ohio-5728, 939 N.E.2d

1217, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 323, 294 A.2d 57 (1972), quoting

Santobello at 262; see also State v. Soto, 158 Ohio St.3d 44, 2019-Ohio-4430, 139

N.E.3d 889, ¶ 19 (“[B]ased on principles of contract law[,] * * * when a plea rests on a

promise made by the prosecutor, that promise must be fulfilled.”) (Internal citation

omitted.). If there is a breach, “‘[t]he trial court may either allow the negotiated plea to be

withdrawn or, alternatively, may require the specific performance of the plea bargain by

ordering the prosecution to fulfill its promise.’” State v. Pinchon, 11th Dist. Trumbull No.

2019-T-0030, 2019-Ohio-4928, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Olivarez, 11th Dist. Lake No. 97-

L-288, 1999 WL 262158, *3 (Mar. 31, 1999), citing Santobello at 263.

10.
       {¶ 24} In the instant case, the state fully complied with the terms of its agreement

with appellant. As agreed, once appellant entered his pleas, the state dismissed the death

specification in the KFC case.

       {¶ 25} As for the sentence that was ultimately imposed, we note that when

appellant entered his pleas of guilty, the trial court found that the pleas were made

knowingly, voluntarily, and with an understanding of the nature of the charges, the

maximum penalties involved and the effect of the pleas of guilty. As indicated above, in

the KFC case, appellant was sentenced to serve 20 years to life in prison on the murder

charge, 10-25 years in prison on the aggravated robbery charge, and three years in prison

for the firearm specification. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to

each other, for a total minimum term of 33 years, and consecutive to the sentences

imposed in the Crab House case.

       {¶ 26} In the Crab House case, appellant was sentenced to serve 20 years to life in

prison on the murder charge, 10-25 years in prison on the aggravated robbery charge, 10-

25 years in prison on each of the six kidnapping charges that did not merge with the

murder charge, and three years in prison for the firearm specification. The sentences in

the Crab House case were all ordered to be served consecutively to one another, for a

total minimum term of 93 years. When added to the total minimum term of 33 years that

was imposed in the KFC case, appellants’ aggregate minimum term was, in fact, 126

years, a figure which was included in each of the trial court’s January 26, 2007 judgment

entries relating to each case.

11.
       {¶ 27} The state points out that in the plea agreement forms that were signed by

appellant prior to sentencing, appellant stated that he understood that “* * * any sentence

that the court may impose in this case, being CR1996-5761, may be ordered to be served

consecutively with any sentence imposed in CR2007-1081, for a total maximum period

of incarceration for both cases totaling 126 years to life and fines totaling $130,000.”

       {¶ 28} Appellant, on the other hand, asserts that the first paragraph in each of the

two plea agreements includes an initial paragraph stating, “I have been advised of the

maximum penalty which can be imposed by law, which is 33 years to life with a

maximum fine of $35,000.00 * * *.” Unfortunately for appellant, although the first page

of the plea agreement in the KFC case is in the record before this court, the first page of

the plea agreement in the Crab House case is not. “An appellate court can only review

claims of error which are based on facts which appear in the record and not on facts as

alleged in an appellate brief.” State v. Walker, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-98-1210, 1999 WL

278120, *5 ((May 7, 1999).

       {¶ 29} Even assuming, without deciding, that appellant’s allegations are true, and

that both plea agreement documents contained identical initial paragraphs stating “I have

been advised of the maximum penalty which can be imposed by law, which is 33 years to

life * * *,” the inconsistency as related to the Crab House case is properly viewed as

nothing more than a harmless typographical error which, in light of all of the other

evidence set forth in the record, did not result in any actual misunderstanding of the

potential sentence on the part of appellant, or in any unfair prejudice to him, as he was

12.
aware of the plea he was entering. As set forth at Crim.R. 52(A), which addresses

harmless error, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect

substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Id.; see also State v. Snyder, 11th Dist. Ashtabula

Nos. 2017-A-0041, 2017-A-0042, 2018-Ohio-2826, ¶ 29 (citing Crim.R. 52(A), court

found that typos contained in a plea agreement of no contest referencing “guilty plea” had

no prejudicial effect on defendant, who was aware of the plea he was entering). Thus,

even assuming appellant’s allegations are true, under the harmless error standard, the

alleged typographical error does not warrant withdrawal of appellant’s plea.

                  Appellant’s Equal Protection claims are without merit

       {¶ 30} “Generally, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

protects inmates from invidious discrimination based upon race.” Watson v. Campbell,

6th Cir. No. 98-6132, 1999 WL 801578 (Sep. 28, 1999), at *1; see also Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418U.S. 539, 556, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974). To prove his claim

of a denial of Equal Protection, appellant must prove a racially discriminatory intent or

purpose in order to prevail in an equal protection case. Watson at *1. Appellant must

show that the state intentionally discriminated against him because of his membership in

a protected class. Id. Appellant’s brief fails to make any such claim. His Equal Protection

claims, therefore, fail.

13.
Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, nor has he proven such a
                                         claim

       {¶ 31} “In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must demonstrate [both] that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the

deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Liskany, 916 Ohio

App.3d 609, 2011-Ohio-4456, 964 N.E.2d 1073, ¶ 174 (2d Dist.), citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “In order to

show counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that counsel provided competent representation and must show that

counsel’s actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional

judgment.” State v. Harrington, 3rd Dist. Logan No. 8-20-37, 2021-Ohio-343, ¶ 20.

“Prejudice results when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” State v.

Liles, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-113-04, 2014-Ohio-259, ¶ 48, quoting State v. Bradley, 42

Ohio St.3d 136, 142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), citing Strickland at 691. “‘ A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.,

quoting Bradley at 142, and citing Strickland at 694.

       {¶ 32} In light of our earlier discussion, we conclude that appellant’s counsel was

not deficient for failing to object to a breach of the plea agreement where there was none.

As stated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, “Counsel is certainly not deficient for failing to

raise a meritless issue.” State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 31, 676 N.E.2d 82 (1997).

14.
Furthermore, appellant has not demonstrated that even if his attorney had at sentencing

clarified the agreement or objected to the prosecutor’s statements, the trial court would

have sentenced him differently. Consequently, appellant has not demonstrated prejudice.

       {¶ 33} For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant’s five assignments of error are

found not well-taken, and the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                        Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                               ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                  JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

15.