Court Opinion

ID: 9536341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:57:47.447432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:20.107331
License: Public Domain

*266LA PRADE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the disposition made of this case for two reasons: first, the recitation of the evidence contained in the majority opinion conclusively shows that the injuries sustained by appellee were proximately caused by the negligence (or physical instability) of the appellee in failing to take any precaution whatever to avoid a condition in the sidewalk with which she was thoroughly familiar; second, the evidence clearly established that the defect in the sidewalk complained of and as a result of which the appellee claims she was injured was so slight and inconsequential as not to form the basis of an action for negligence.
I agree that to hold that the facts here proved do not raise an inference of negligence on the part of the city requires a determination that the sidewalk was reasonably safe 'for pedestrian use, and that reasonable men under all the circumstances could not hold otherwise. I am firmly of the view that it was reasonably safe for use. No facts suggest that the city should have anticipated the accident. The plaintiff did not anticipate it. She had never complained to the city of the condition of the sidewalk; in fact, no one, as far as the record discloses, had ever complained of its condition though undoubtedly it had been traversed by thousands of people each month. This unevenness of the walk was not unusual but rather was and is a condition that exists in a thousand or more places throughout the city. One needs only to take a stroll around the capítol building or the courthouse, or anywhere on Washington, Adams, Monroe, or Van Burén Streets, in the heart of the city of Phoenix, to see similar conditions. At most of the crosswalks in the city of Phoenix" where the black asphaltic joins the concrete gutters you will find irregularities, some as much as 2 or 3 inches, where the asphalt spews up due to contraction and expansion occasioned by our extremes of temperature. This is a matter of common knowledge and understanding, and cannot be avoided unless cement is poured over reinforced steel. In our residential areas irrigated lawns are maintained up to the edge of the sidewalks; trees are grown adjacent to many miles of sidewalks. Under these circumstances the joint action of nature and the elements precludes the maintenance of smooth and level sidewalks. '
The nature of concrete, when used for sidewalk construction, requires that it be laid in small squares or intersections with expansion joints placed for the purpose of attempting to compensate for expan-, sion which occurs during the heat of the summer. The photographs of this particular sidewalk suggest to my mind that the pedestrian public was fortunate to have this concrete sidewalk. The risk of its continued use throughout the seasons should be borne by the users, in the absence of any substantial defects. To rule otherwise is to constitute the city of Phoenix and *267every other incorporated town or city in the state of Arizona an insurer of the safety of its sidewalks.
What are inconsequential or trivial defects is not a question of fact. The majority opinion has cited only one case, Ray v. Salt Lake City, 92 Utah 412, 69 P.2d 256, 119 A.L.R. 153, holding that a defect such as the one under consideration is not as a matter of law inconsequential, when taking into consideration the use made of sidewalks, the materials from which they are made, and the effects of the elements upon them. The California case of Whiting v. National City, Cal.App., 61 P.2d 504, 507, referred to in the majority opinion was reversed by the Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc. 9 Cal. 2d 163, 69 P.2d 990. The District Court of Appeals had held that where the edge of one square of sidewalk was raised about % of an inch above the surface of an adjoining square and about one inch from the bottom of the expansion joint between squares, such facts were sufficient to sustain a finding that the sidewalk was in a defective and dangerous condition rendering the municipality liable for injuries sustained by pedestrian falling because of such defect. This .California case was tried to a judge without a jury, and the judge personally inspected the .sidewalk. The appellate court (District Court of Appeals) relied on the finding of the trial court and said: “ * * * we cannot as a matter of law say that the break in the walk did not constitute a defective condition which was dangerous for those using ‡ if
The District Court then went on to quote from another California case to the effect that “No hard and fast rule can be laid down in cases of this kind, * * and concluded that the condition of the walk was always a question of fact and the de-. termination of the jury was conclusive. Likewise in the case under consideration the majority have taken refuge behind the verdict concurred in by ten jurors.
The Supreme Court of California in its reversal, disregarding the question of sufficiency of notice upon the part of the city, said: “From the record herein, it must be concluded that the defect in the sidewalk in question was a minor defect; that no injury would ordinarily be suffered therefrom when ordinary care was exercised in using the sidewalk. * * * The holding in the Nicholson Case that the continued existence of a minor defect is in itself insufficient to impose liability upon the city for injuries resulting therefrom is recognized as the law in other jurisdictions. See Ford v. City of Kinsley, 141 Kan. 877, 44 P.2d 255; Hammer v. City of Philadelphia, 104 Pa.Super. 119, 158 A. 659; Johnson v. City of Ames, 181 Iowa 65, 162 N.W. 858; City of Dayton v. Fox, 254 Ky. 51, 70 S.W.2d 961; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, vol. 7, § 2974, and cases cited. * * * ” (Emp. sup.) (And *268these cases actually are in point.) [ 9 Cal. 2d 163, 69 P.2d 991.]
What was the record before the Supreme Court of California? In this behalf, the ■court said: “In the present case the gradual rise from nothing to three-quarters of an inch in the pavement had existed for many years in the same condition and in a much traveled portion of the business section of the city. Many people walked daily over the sidewalk at that point. The defect was plainly visible. Its existence was common knowledge in the community. The plaintiff herself knew of it. She tripped over it in the day time while she was walking toward the exposed side of the rise, without anything to obstruct her vision of the sidewalk area. She had good eyesight, was an excellent walker, and frequently walked several miles in a day.” This is almost the identical fact situation we have here. Plaintiff had walked over this defect daily for a period of eight months. Her excuse for not avoiding it was that she forgot its existence.
Under facts comparable to those in the present case, the following supreme courts have determined that a question of law was presented, and that minds of reasonable men could not differ thereon.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a difference of 2% inches in the level between cement squares of sidewalk on a much travelled street presented no defects creating liability. McCormick v. City of Racine, 227 Wis. 33, 277 N.W. 646.
The Supreme Court of Texas in Stinnett v. City of Waco, 142 Tex. 648, 180 S.W.2d 433, affirmed its Civil Court of Appeals, 177 S.W.2d 323, which had reversed a judgment for plaintiff based on claimed negligence where there was a difference in elevation of 1% inches in a sidewalk slab at the expansion joint.
In Maxwell v. Kansas City, 1932, 227 Mo.App. 234, 52 S.W.2d 487, it was held that actual measurements prevailed over speculative evidence, and then held that the measured difference of 1]4 inches between concrete slabs; was not actionable negligence.
In Bryant v. Village of Potsdam, 226 App.Div. 830, 235 N.Y.S. 599, the difference in elevations was 2 inches, and yet the court held the defect was too trivial to be negligent or actionable. In that case, too, the defect was actively and negligently created by the city itself in removing and replacing the section or slab of concrete, while in the case under consideration the defect was the result: of use coupled with nature’s slow and silent action.
In Walter v. City of Rockford, 1947, 332 Ill.App. 243, 74 N.E.2d 903, it was held that a defect in sidewalk which had a % inch crack between 2 concrete sections with one of these sections about 1 inch higher than the adjoining section was not such a defect as would render the city liable for injury sustained by pedestrian who stumped her toe on raised section, lost her balance, and fell. For other IF *269linois cases see City of Chicago v. Bixby, 84 Ill. 82, 83; City of Chicago v. Norton, 116 Ill.App. 570; Powers v. City of East St. Louis, 161 Ill.App. 163; Owens v. City of Chicago, 162 Ill.App. 196.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Ford v. City of Kinsley, 1935, 141 Kan. 877, 44 P.2d 255, reversed a judgment where the alleged negligence showed that the sidewalk was composed of cement blocks 3 feet square, and that one of them sagged below the general level about % to % inch. The court, “after looking into the decisions of other jurisdictions,” concluded that the difference in elevation of the sidewalk was inconsiderable, and that the trial court should have ruled as a matter of law that the city was not liable.
Our case of Dillow v. City of Yuma, ■cited in the majority opinion, is no authority for the proposition that any unevenness or irregularity in a sidewalk which produces injury is always a question of fact for the jury. The court specifically said: “Whether an injury caused by a defect in a street or sidewalk is actionable or whether the defect is so slight and inconsequential as not to form the basis -of an action for negligence is, or should be, primarily a question for the court; * * (Emp. sup.) [55 Ariz. 6, 97 P.2d 535, 536.]
The court there quoted with approval from the case of Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 320, 159 P. 530. In the latter case it was said: “ * * * It seems to qs that in case it is made to appear that reasonable men might arrive at different conclusions with regard to whether the maintenance of the particular defect in a sidewalk or street constituted negligence on the part of the municipality, the question should be submitted to the jury. * * * Of course there may be defects so slight and unimportant, or by reason of their location may be so unimportant, that a court might well say as a matter of law that the maintenance thereof did not constitute negligence on the part of the municipality. * * *
"We feel constrained to add that it must be obvious to all that not every raise dr projection in a street or sidewalk can be held objectionable. * * * ” (Emp. sup.)
With this statement of the rules applicable before it the court proceeded to apply them to the facts. What were the facts? The plaintiff had been injured by falling in a hole in the sidewalk 2 inches in depth, 24 inches in length, and 4 or 5 inches in width, the 'bottom of the hole being covered with gravel or loose cement. The court then said, in referring to this defect: “* * * The defect was not so slight that the court could say it was not dangerous. At most, it was in what one court designates as ‘a shadow zone,’ and every such case should be left to the jury. * * * ” Actually the court passed on the question as a matter of law.
The facts in the instant case are not in my judgment in any “shadow zone” or *270anything approaching it. If this slight defect which is physically hound to occur and recur in the sidewalks of the city of Phoenix is to he deemed negligence on the part of the city, then there is scarcely a sidewalk in the city that is reasonably safe. The law should not prescribe any such measure of duty so impossible of fulfillment, or a rule of liability so unjust. On a set of facts upon which “reasonable men” could not differ I prefer to align myself with those hundred or more judges of courts of last resort, rather than to be bound by the findings of this jury. It was the duty of the city to maintain the sidewalk so that it would be reasonably safe for pedestrians. I believe that the rule applicable to the standard of care to be observed is correctly stated in Reed v. Tarentum Borough, 213 Pa. 357, 62 A. 928 (a case in which the plaintiff was injured •by a fall occasioned by striking his foot against the edge of a stone projecting above the adjoining stones in the sidewalk) . “ * * * The law fixes the standard of duty as reasonable care, and it c'an-not be left to the judgment or caprice of a jury to establish any other standard. * * * and reasonable safety, as in the case of machinery and methods, is to be determined by the standard of ordinary usage. * * * ” (Emp. sup.) The question in this case is whether the sidewalk was reasonably safe. This was to be determined by the standard of ordinary usage and not by a standard the jury might set up.
It had never occurred to the plaintiff and the other thousands of people who had used this particular sidewalk that they were wanting in reasonable prudence in not reporting the condition to the city. If this defect was such that it might probably or possibly produce hurt, surely someone would have recognized it and reported it. The public is realistic. Under the times and circumstances, to them, it was a good sidewalk. It met the standards of ordinary construction and! maintenance.
The sum and substance of the rule herein established by the majority opinion is— “It is impossible for this court to prescribe exact limitations from which, in all cases, it may be determined what character of defect in a public street constitutes negligence on the part of a municipality. Given a defect and consequent injury, the question of negligence must be submitted to the jury.”
In the majority opinion it is stated that the Dillow case established or reaffirmed five principles which are set out, and presumably the majority opinion reaffirms them. Their principles 3 and 4 mean nothing at all. Any lawyer interested in this type of case can have prints made from the films in this case on file with the clerk of the superior court of Maricopa County. Prints from these films, together with the majority opinion, if presented to any trial court, will insure plaintiff getting his case submitted to the jury, and its determination of negligence will be conclusive on *271this court, under the rule established by the majority opinion in this case.
The case should be reversed with directions to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.