Court Opinion

ID: 9950442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 23:03:08.395561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:10.391398
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Boone CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B328913

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA326464)
           v.

 VELTON BOONE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court, Los Angeles
County, Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Affirmed.
      Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Blythe Leszkay, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

      Velton Boone appeals from the superior court’s order
denying a recommendation by the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation to recall his sentence and
resentence him under Penal Code section 1172.1.1 Boone argues
that, after the superior court declined to vacate his sentence, the
court erred in failing to consider reducing his sentence. Because
section 1172.1 does not require the court to consider such a
reduction where, as here, the court finds the defendant currently
poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     A Jury Convicts Boone of Aggravated Kidnapping
             and Other Crimes, and We Mostly Affirm
      Early one morning in July 2007, Boone and a companion
entered a supermarket through the delivery door and pointed
their guns at a truck driver in the warehouse. Either Boone or
his companion shoved a gun into the driver’s chest. The two men
took the driver to an adjacent room in the back of the store, tied
his wrists with a cord, left for a few minutes, returned, untied
him, and told him to find the store manager. After the driver
located the manager, Boone and his associate forced the driver
and manager to walk to one of the aisles of the store, where two
other store employees were trying to hide. Boone and his
companion told all four employees to lie face down on the floor.
Boone ordered the manager to open the store safes and place

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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$1,800 (the contents of the safes) into a bag in a milk crate.
Boone and his companion walked toward the loading dock, but
when they discovered the police had surrounded the store, they
went back inside. After a stand-off with the police, officers
entered the store and found Boone hiding. (People v. Boone,
Aug. 25, 2011, B223335 [nonpub. opn.] (Boone I).)
       A jury convicted Boone on two counts of kidnapping to
commit robbery (aggravated kidnapping) (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)),
attempted second degree robbery (§§ 211, 664), second degree
burglary (§ 459), and four counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found true firearm-use allegations
under sections 12022.53, subdivision (b), and 12022.5,
subdivision (a). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found
Boone had suffered four prior convictions or adjudications for
felonies (three for robbery and one for murder) that were serious
or violent felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and serious felonies
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The court sentenced Boone
to an aggregate prison term of 262 years to life. (Boone I, supra,
B223335.)
       Boone appealed, arguing that substantial evidence did not
support his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, that the trial
court erred in denying his motions under People v. Marsden
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 to replace appointed counsel and under
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 to represent himself,
and that the admission of certain expert witness testimony
violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We
reversed one of the convictions for aggravated kidnapping,
modified the judgment to correct an unauthorized sentence, and

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otherwise affirmed the judgment. On remand the trial court
reduced Boone’s sentence to 105 years to life.2

      B.      The Superior Court Denies the Secretary’s Request
              To Recall Boone’s Sentence
       On September 8, 2022 the Secretary wrote a letter to the
superior court recommending that, based on Boone’s commitment
offense and his conduct in prison, the court recall Boone’s
sentence and resentence him under section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1). The Secretary stated that, effective
January 2019, section 1385 gave the court the discretion to strike
enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a), for prior serious
felony convictions. The Secretary observed that the trial court
had imposed 12 such enhancements and that Boone would not be
eligible for parole until 2087.
       The superior court appointed counsel to represent Boone.
Counsel for Boone filed a memorandum in support of the
Secretary’s recommendation, arguing that Boone’s record of
rehabilitation and plan to reenter society supported the
Secretary’s recommendation, that Boone’s continued
incarceration was no longer in the interest of justice, and that
Boone did not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if
released.

2     It appears the trial court did not follow the direction in
footnote 16 of our opinion in Boone I that, as a result of our
decision to reverse one of the convictions for aggravated
kidnapping and strike one of the firearm enhancements, the
aggregate prison term for Boone should be 195 years to life.
(Boone I, supra, B223335.)

                                  4
       At the hearing counsel for Boone argued that Boone had
served 13 years of his sentence, that he had not violated any
prison rules and had participated in self-help programs, and that
prison officials had commended him for his work and positive
behavior. Counsel acknowledged that Boone had a prior “super
strike” (a juvenile court adjudication for murder), but stated that,
given Boone’s age (64 years old) and his physical disabilities, he
did not pose a risk to public safety. The prosecutor argued that
Boone posed an undue risk of danger to public safety because he
had two convictions or adjudications for felonies that qualified as
super strikes, the murder he committed as a juvenile and the
aggravated kidnapping conviction in this case. The prosecutor
added that Boone had three other robbery convictions involving
firearms, as well as a federal conviction for armed robbery of a
post office, all of which demonstrated what he was “likely to do
once he is out in the community.”
       The superior court stated that, although Boone had “done
well within the institution,” the court remembered “this
particular case” and found the crime “was an egregious and
aggravated offense.” The court reviewed Boone’s criminal history
and stated: “What really bothers me about this case is the
continued use of firearms when [Boone is] out. You cannot ignore
that. You can’t pretend it’s not happening. And outside of prison
and inside of prison are two completely different things.” The
court ruled it could not “in good conscience possibly think of
returning him to society when he has served 13 years of a 105-
year[-to-life] sentence” (which, as noted, should have been a 195-
to-life sentence) and expressed concern Boone “apparently knows
how to arm himself.” The court determined Boone “would
clearly” endanger public safety if the court allowed his release.

                                 5
The court denied the request of the Secretary to recall his
sentence, and Boone timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

      Boone does not argue the superior court erred in finding he
currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
Instead, he contends that, when the Secretary asked the superior
court to recall his sentence and resentence him under
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(3)(A), the statute required the
court to consider reducing his sentence. According to Boone, the
court “is required under section 1172.1, subdivision(a)(3)(A) to
consider a reduction in the sentence upon receiving a
recommendation from the Secretary even though it declines to
vacate the conviction and release the defendant under
section 1172.1, subdivision(a)(3)(B).” Boone asserts “the plain
language of the statute . . . requires the court to at least consider
reduction of the sentence after the Secretary submits a
recommendation for recall.” The text of section 1172.1 does not
support Boone’s contention.

       A.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       “‘“‘Under settled canons of statutory construction, in
construing a statute we ascertain the Legislature’s intent in
order to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We must look to
the statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary
meaning. [Citation.] The statute’s plain meaning controls the
court’s interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’”’” (People
v. Pillsbury (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 776, 784; see People v.
McCallum (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 202, 211-212 [“‘“‘We interpret

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relevant terms in light of their ordinary meaning, while also
taking account of any related provisions and the overall structure
of the statutory scheme to determine what interpretation best
advances the Legislature’s underlying purpose.’’””].) “The proper
interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review
de novo.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961; see People
v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082; McCallum, at p. 211.)

      B.     Section 1172.1 Does Not Require the Court
             To Consider Reducing the Defendant’s Sentence if the
             Court Determines the Defendant Poses an
             Unreasonable Risk of Danger to Public Safety
      Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) (former section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)),3 authorizes the superior court, at any time
upon the recommendation of (among others) the Secretary, to
“recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still
in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater

3     In January 2022 the Legislature moved former
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), to former section 1170.03. The
Legislature clarified that, when recalling a sentence and
resentencing the defendant, the court should apply “any changes
in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion”
and added a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing.
(See former § 1170.03, subds. (a)(2), (b)(2); People v. McMurray
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040.) In June 2022 the Legislature
renumbered former section 1170.03 to section 1172.1, but made
no substantive changes to the statute. (People v. Braggs (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 809, 818.)

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than the initial sentence.”4 (See People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th
1155, 1165; People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035,
1040; People v. McCallum, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 205-206.)
       When the Secretary asks the court to recall the defendant’s
sentence and resentence the defendant,5 section 1172.1,
subdivision (b)(1), prescribes the procedures the court must
follow. Section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2), provides: “There shall
be a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the
defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the
defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.”
(See People v. Vaesau (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 132, 143.)
Section 1170.18, subdivision (c), defines an “‘unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety’” as “an unreasonable risk that the
petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of
clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e)
of Section 667.” “This ‘subdivision of section 667 identifies eight
types of particularly serious or violent felonies, known
colloquially as “super strikes.”’” (People v. Braggs, supra,

4      The Board of Parole Hearings (for a defendant in prison),
the county correctional administrator (for a defendant in jail), the
district attorney (of the county where the defendant was
sentenced), or the attorney general (if the Department of Justice
originally prosecuted the case) may also make the
recommendation. In addition, the court on its own motion may
recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).)

5     Or any one of the other executive branch officials listed in
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) (but not the court on its own
motion).

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85 Cal.App.5th at p. 818; see § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).) The list
includes any “homicide offense, including any attempted
homicide offense, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive,” and
any “serious or violent felony offense punishable in California by
life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv); see
Braggs, at p. 818, fn. 5.) Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(3),
provides that, when the court recalls a defendant’s sentence, the
court may, in the interest of justice: “(A) Reduce a defendant’s
term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence. [¶] (B) Vacate
the defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on any
necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense,
whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading,
with the concurrence of the defendant, and then resentence the
defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment.”6
       The language of section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2), provides
that the presumption favoring recall and resentencing is
overcome where, as here, the court finds the defendant poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety (a finding Boone does
not challenge). Because the court made this finding and did not
recall Boone’s sentence and resentence him, section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(3)(A), which authorizes the “resentencing court” to

6     At the time of Boone’s hearing, section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(3)(B), authorized the court to vacate the
defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily
included lesser offense or lesser related offense, “with the
concurrence of both the defendant and the district attorney of the
county in which the defendant was sentenced.” Effective
January 1, 2024, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(3)(B), provides
the court may vacate the defendant’s conviction and impose
judgment on a lesser offense “with the concurrence of the
defendant.”

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reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment, did not apply.
Contrary to Boone’s assertion, nothing in section 1172.1 requires
the superior court to consider reducing the defendant’s sentence
after the court has found that releasing the defendant will
endanger public safety. And we may not read such a requirement
into the statute. (See People v. Vaesau, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 150 [“‘it is not the proper function of the courts to supply
legislative omissions from a statute in an attempt to make it
conform to a presumed intention of the Legislature not expressed
in the statutory language’”]; People v. Superior Court (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 373, 379 [“[t]he court ascertains and declares
what is in the statute; it does not omit what has been inserted or
insert what has been omitted”]; People v. Bell (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 315, 342 [“when construing ‘any statute, we may
not broaden or narrow the scope of the provision by reading into
it language that does not appear in it or reading out of it
language that does’”].) Where the court has found releasing the
defendant would endanger the public, there is no point in
requiring the court to consider whether to reduce his or her
sentence.
       Our rejection of Boone’s proposed interpretation of
section 1172.1, subdivisions (a)(3)(A) and (b)(2), is supported by
the language of section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). (See In re N.R.
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 538 [courts “do not examine [statutory]
language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose
and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment” (internal
quotation marks omitted)]; People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
461 [courts “must harmonize the various parts of a statutory
enactment . . . by considering the particular clause or section in

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the context of the statutory framework as a whole” (internal
quotation marks omitted)].) The order in which the phrases
“recall the sentence” and “resentence the defendant” appear
shows the Legislature contemplated two distinct steps, first
recall, then resentence. (See Dix v. Superior Court (1991)
53 Cal.3d 442, 456 [“[o]nce the sentence and commitment have
validly been recalled,” former section 1170, subdivision (d),
“authorizes the court to ‘resentence . . . in the same manner as
if [the defendant] had not previously been sentenced’”]; People v.
E.M., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082 [“‘A trial court, upon
receiving a section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) letter from the
[Secretary], has broad discretion whether to recall the existing
sentence and resentence the incarcerated individual.’”]; People v
Pillsbury, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 785 [“once the
recommendation was made by the Secretary, it was within the
authority of the trial court to recall [the] defendant’s sentence
and then resentence him by exercising its discretion to dismiss or
strike the firearm enhancement”].) If the superior court decides
not to recall the defendant’s sentence because the defendant
poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, that is the
end of the court’s obligation to consider the Secretary’s request;
the court does not consider resentencing the defendant. As the
People put it, “regardless of whether the court might reduce
[Boone’s] sentence to time-served or to something more than that
but less than 105-years-to-life, the court would first have to
determine that he did not pose an undue risk of dangerousness.”
       Similarly, the language of section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(2),
which requires the resentencing court to apply any ameliorative
legislation, confirms that the court considers whether to apply
such legislation only after recalling the defendant’s sentence.

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Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(2) states that, “in recalling and
resentencing under this subdivision,” the court “shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as
to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” The qualifying phrase that precedes the
requirement makes clear the requirement does not apply if the
court does not recall the defendant’s sentence for resentencing.
(See People v. McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1041 [“The
legislative history [of former section 1170.03] . . . indicates that
[the statute] was intended to clarify certain aspects of former
section 1170(d)(1), . . . including that, ‘“when a sentence is
recalled or reopened for any reason, in resentencing the
defendant trial courts must apply ‘any changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion.’”’”].)
       Boone argues that this interpretation of section 1172.1
would thwart the “express goal of section 1172.1,” which “is to
promote uniformity in sentencing,” and that, instead of “having a
resentencing hearing where the disparity would hopefully be
remedied, a defendant would instead have to show that he is not
a risk to public safety if immediately released in order to be
resentenced.” But section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2), requires the
court to assess whether the defendant poses a danger to the
public “currently,” not in five years, 60 years (the total of Boone’s
12 enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)), 45 years
(105 – 60), or 135 years (195 – 60). The superior court found
there was an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if, in
Boone’s words, the court “immediately released” him. Once the
court made that determination, its finding of current danger
overcame the presumption in favor of recall and resentencing,

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and the court properly denied the Secretary’s request. Nothing in
the language of section 1172.1, subdivision (b)(2), refers to
correcting disparities in sentencing. (Cf. Dix v. Superior Court,
supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 456 [“The statutory language [of former
section 1170, subdivision (d)] does not link recall with disparity
at all, and declares only that any resentence ultimately imposed
shall apply the Judicial Council’s sentencing criteria so as to
minimize disparity.”].)

                         DISPOSITION

      The order denying the Secretary’s request to recall Boone’s
sentence and resentence him is affirmed.

                                          SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             FEUER, J.                    MARTINEZ, J.

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