Court Opinion

ID: 9620212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:39:52.316994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:29.606896
License: Public Domain

GEORGE, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority affirms a judgment granting a permanent injunction enjoining appellants from referring to themselves as “accountants” or describing the services they offer as “accounting.” Appellants include Bonnie Moore, who possesses a college degree with a major in accounting, and officers and members of the California Association of Independent Accountants, a nonprofit membership organization affiliated with the National Society of Public Accountants. I would reverse the judgment.
As explained more fully below, the Legislature has not required that all accountants be licensed. Instead, it has defined a special class of accountants comprised of certified public accountants and public accountants who exclusively are authorized to perform certain types of accountancy and thus must be licensed. Other accountants are prohibited by Business and Professions Code section 50581 and related statutes from using these titles, or similar titles that might be confused with these titles.
The majority acknowledges that unlicensed accountants may perform basic accounting services, but holds that such persons may not call themselves “accountants” or describe the services they offer as “accounting.” This holding is not based upon the language of section 5058, which does not expressly prohibit use of the terms “accountant” and “accounting” by unlicensed accountants, but upon a regulation promulgated by the Board of *1028Accountancy (the Board) which prohibits such use of these terms. I disagree with the majority.
I would hold that the Legislature has authorized unlicensed accountants to perform a wide range of accounting services and did not intend to prohibit such persons from accurately referring to themselves as accountants or describing the services they provide as accounting. Because an administrative regulation may not expand the scope of the statute it purports to enforce, the Board lacked the authority to alter this statutory scheme by prohibiting unlicensed accountants from using the terms “accountant” and “accounting.” Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to consider the impact of the First Amendment on this issue. (Ashwander v. Valley Authority (1936) 297 U.S. 288, 347 [80 L.Ed. 688, 711, 56 S.Ct. 466].)
“Pursuant to established principles, our first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided. The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. [Citations.]” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].)
A license is not required to practice “accountancy” in this state, but only to practice “public accountancy” as that term is defined. (§ 5050.)2
Section 5051 provides, in part, that an accountant is not engaged in the practice of public accountancy and, thus, does not require a license, if he or *1029she: “(f) Keeps books, makes trial balances, or prepares statements, makes audits, or prepares reports, all as a part of bookkeeping operations for clients, [ft] (g) Prepares or signs as the tax preparer, tax returns for clients, [ft] (h) Prepares personal financial or investment plans or provides to clients products or services of others in implementation of personal financial or investment plans, [ft] (i) Provides management consulting services to clients, [ft] . . . [As long as] he or she does not hold himself or herself out, solicit, or advertise for clients using the certified public accountant or public accountant designation.”3
Section 5052 provides that an unlicensed accountant may “contract[] with one or more persons, organizations, or entities, for the purpose of keeping books, making trial balances, statements, making audits or preparing reports, all as a part of bookkeeping operations, provided that such trial balances, statements, or reports are not issued over the name of such person as having been prepared or examined by a certified public accountant or public accountant.”
Sections 5055 and 5056 state that no person other than a certified public accountant (C.P.A.)4 or public accountant (P.A.)5 may use those titles or any other title or designation “tending to indicate” that the person is a C.P.A. or P.A.
*1030In similar fashion, section 5058 provides, in pertinent part: “No person or partnership shall assume or use the title or designation ‘chartered accountant,’ ‘certified accountant,’ ‘enrolled accountant,’ ‘registered accountant’ or ‘licensed accountant,’ or any other title or designation likely to be confused with ‘certified public accountant’ or ‘public accountant,’ or any of the abbreviations ‘C.A.,’ ‘E.A.,’ ‘R.A.,’ or ‘L.A.,’ or similar abbreviations likely to be confused with ‘C.P.A.’ or ‘P.A.’. . . .” (Italics added.)
What the foregoing statutes expressly prohibit is the use by unlicensed accountants of the titles C.P.A. or P.A., or any title or designation likely to be confused with C.P.A. or P.A. The latter titles are reserved for those accountants who are licensed to perform types of accountancy which unlicensed accountants may not perform. But the Legislature did not require that all accountants be licensed and, consistently, did not prohibit unlicensed accountants from using the title “accountant.”
This interpretation of section 5058 is supported by one of the basic tenets of statutory construction, the principle of ejusdem generis, which instructs that “ ‘ “where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. [It] is based on the obvious reason that if the [writer] had intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, [he or she] would not have mentioned the particular things or classes of things which would in that event become mere surplusage.” ’ [Citations.]” (Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1160 [278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873], fn. omitted.) This principle applies with particular force in the present case.
The “general words” in section 5058 form the catchall phrase, upon which the majority relies, prohibiting unlicensed persons from using “any other title or designation likely to be confused with ‘certified public accountant’ or ‘public accountant’ . . . .” (Italics added.) Considered apart from the context of the statute and the overall scheme of which the statute is a part, this, phrase could be construed to prohibit unlicensed accountants from using the term “accountant.” But under this construction, which the majority adopts, the enumeration of examples which precede the general words becomes mere surplusage, in violation of the principle of ejusdem generis.
This is so because each of the enumerated examples of titles likely to be confused with the titles C.RA. and P.A. is comprised of the term “accountant” coupled with a modifier, as are the titles C.P.A. and P.A. themselves. The principle of ejusdem generis leads me to conclude, therefore, that the *1031catchall phrase in section 5058 does not prohibit the use of the title “accountant” standing alone.
The majority states that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is inapplicable because its application “would frustrate the intent underlying the statute.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1012.) The majority fails, however, to describe the method it uses to discern the statute’s underlying intent. Instead, the majority simply states its conclusion without explaining its reasoning. I disagree that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is inapplicable; rather, it is a useful tool for determining the intent of the Legislature based on the language used in drafting the statute.
Had the Legislature meant to prohibit use of the unmodified term “accountant,” it simply would have said so. Just as sections 5055 and 5056 expressly prohibit unlicensed accountants from using the titles “certified public accountant” and “public accountant,” the Legislature could have added a similar provision expressly prohibiting unlicensed accountants from using the term “accountant” as well. Presumably the Legislature would have done so, had it intended to prohibit such accountants from calling themselves “accountants.” “ ‘Where the [Legislature] has demonstrated the ability to make [its] intent clear, it is not the province of this court to imply an intent left unexpressed.’ [Citation.]” (Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 50 [276 Cal.Rptr. 114, 801 P.2d 357].)
The majority agrees “that section 5058 does not itself expressly prohibit the use of the unmodified terms ‘accountant’ and ‘accounting’ ” (maj. opn., ante, p. 1013) and relies instead on a regulation promulgated by the Board which provides in pertinent part: “The following are titles or designations likely to be confused with the titles Certified Public Accountant and Public Accountant within the meaning of Section 5058 of the Business and Professions Code: [ffl (a) ‘Accountant,’ ‘auditor,’ ‘accounting,’ or ‘auditing,’ when used either singly or collectively or in conjunction with other titles.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 2.)
Such an administrative construction, “although not controlling, is entitled to great weight. [Citations.] . . . The final meaning of a statute, [however], rests with the courts. . . . ‘ “Administrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations.” [Citation.] And this is the rule even when, as here, “the statute is subsequently reenacted without change.” [Citations.]’ ” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1388-1389, italics added.)
*1032The above quoted regulation is invalid because it would expand the scope of section 5058. Nothing in section 5058, or in the statutory scheme of which it is a part, exhibits a legislative intent to prohibit unlicensed accountants from referring to themselves as accountants, or from describing the services they render as accounting. The Board may not expand the scope of section 5058 by enacting a regulation prohibiting conduct which section 5058 would permit.6
The majority concludes that by including the catchall phrase in section 5058, the Legislature vested the Board with discretion to prohibit unlicensed accountants from using the title “accountant” if the Board determined the public otherwise might be misled. I disagree for two reasons.
First, the Legislature would not have prefaced the catchall phrase in section 5058 with a list of examples, all of which consist of the term “accountant” coupled with a modifier, had it intended to prohibit, or to authorize the Board to prohibit, the use of the term “accountant” standing alone. Had the Legislature intended to vest the Board with unfettered discretion to prohibit the use of any title the Board found to be misleading, including the unadorned term “accountant,” it would have used only the catchall phrase employed in section 5058.
By including the examples found in section 5058, the Legislature described the types of titles which might be confused with the titles C.P.A. and P.A. and which the Legislature intended to prohibit unlicensed accountants from using. The title “accountant,” standing alone, does not fit this description. To ignore these examples, as does the majority, violates the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a doctrine which merely reflects our common experience with the manner in which language is used.
Second, the Board’s decision to prohibit use of the term “accountant,” because it may be confused with the terms C.P.A. and P.A., constitutes a significant alteration of the statutory scheme. The Accountancy Act creates a rather subtle distinction between “public accountancy,” which only C.P.A.’s and P.A.’s may perform, and other types of accountancy, which unlicensed *1033accountants may perform. If the public finds this distinction confusing and erroneously believes that all accountants must be licensed, it must be left to the Legislature to alleviate this confusion by amending the statutes. Neither the Board nor this court possesses the authority to alter the statutory scheme established by the Accountancy Act, however beneficial such alterations might appear to be.
The majority finds persuasive the results of a public opinion poll, commissioned by the state, which posed the following questions: (1) “Do you think that persons who refer to themselves as accountants in advertising to the public are required to be licensed by the State of California,” and (2) “Do you think persons who advertise accounting services to the public are required to be licensed by the State of California to offer such services?” More than half the number of persons queried believed that a license was required in both situations.
The majority concludes that the results of this survey “support the inference that members of the public who believe that licensing is required would assume that a person who uses the title ‘accountant’ and the designation ‘accounting’ to describe the services offered is licensed by the state. [Fn. omitted.]” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1016.) This information, however, is not helpful in resolving the issue before us. It is not surprising that a person who erroneously believes that all accountants must be licensed would assume that a person using the title “accountant” is licensed. Just as significantly, the survey sheds no light on the relevant issue under section 5058; namely, whether the public is likely to confuse the terms “accountant” and “accounting” with the titles “certified public accountant” and “public accountant.” Instead, the survey reveals only that a majority of the public erroneously believes that all accountants must be licensed.7 It is beyond dispute that no license is required to perform certain types of accounting. The circumstance that a majority of the public believes otherwise is irrelevant.
Section 5058 prohibits unlicensed accountants from using any title that might be confused with the titles C.P.A. and P.A. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, the statute was not intended to prohibit, or to authorize the Board to prohibit, an accountant’s use of any term that the public might construe as implying licensure by the state. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1004.)
The importance of this distinction is demonstrated by the following example. The majority concedes that unlicensed accountants may use the *1034term “accountant” if “used in conjunction with a modifier or modifiers that serve to dispel any possibility of confusion . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 1005, 1024.) Consider an unlicensed accountant who uses the title “accountant” but adds an express disclaimer that he or she is not a C.P.A. or P.A. Such a designation certainly would dispel any possibility that the term “accountant” might be confused with the titles C.P.A. or P.A. and, accordingly, would satisfy even the most stringent interpretation of section 5058. It would not, however, dispel possible confusion concerning whether the accountant was licensed by the state because, according to the poll upon which the majority relies, the public mistakenly believes that all accountants are required to be licensed. It can be seen, therefore, that the public’s belief as to whether accountants must be licensed is irrelevant to the determination of the proper scope of section 5058.
Neither the Accountancy Act in general, nor section 5058 in particular, prohibits an unlicensed accountant from using the title “accountant.” As the majority recognizes, it is lawful for unlicensed accountants to perform certain types of accounting services. Nothing in the statutory scheme prohibits unlicensed accountants who lawfully provide accounting services from referring to themselves as accountants, nor does anything in the act authorize the Board to prohibit by regulation what the Legislature has permitted by statute.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. I reach this conclusion on the basis of the plain meaning of the words of the statute as interpreted with the aid of settled principles of statutory construction, and in the absence of any clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary, without regard, of course, to whether it would be good public policy for the Legislature to prohibit unlicensed accountants, whatever their level of education and experience, from calling themselves “accountants.”
Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., concurred.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied August 27,1992. Mosk, J., Kennard, J., and George, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code unless otherwise indicated.

Section 5050 states, in part: “No person shall engage in the practice of public accountancy in this State unless such person is the holder of a valid permit to practice public accountancy issued by the board ...”
Section 5051 provides that a person is “engaged in the practice of public accountancy” if he or she provides “professional services that involve or require an audit, examination, verification, investigation, certification, presentation, or review, of financial transactions and accounting records . . . H] [or] [prepares or certifies for clients reports on audits or examinations of books or records of account, balance sheets, and other financial, accounting and related schedules, exhibits, statements, or reports which are to be used for publication or for the purpose of obtaining credit or for filing with a court of law or with any governmental agency, or for any other purpose ... [5] [or] renders professional services to clients for compensation in any or all matters relating to accounting procedure and to the recording, presentation, or certification of financial information or data.” (§ 5051, subds. (c)-(e).)

This portion of section 5051, which the Legislature stated was “declaratory of existing law,” was added to the statute after the trial in the present case. (Stats. 1989, ch. 489, § 3.) “Under settled principles, the version of the [statute] in force at present is the relevant legislation for purposes of this appeal. ‘It is ... an established rule of law that on appeals from judgments granting or denying injunctions, the law to be applied is that which is current at the time of judgment in the appellate court.’ [Citations.]” (Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 306, fn. 6 [138 Cal.Rptr. 53, 562 P.2d 1302]; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Oxnard (1985) 40 Cal.3d 1, 3 [218 Cal.Rptr. 672, 706 P.2d 285].)

To use the title certified public accountant, a person must receive from the State Board of Accountancy (Board) a “certificate of certified public accountant” and hold a valid permit to practice. (§§ 5033, 5055.) In order to receive a certificate of certified public accountant, a person must earn a baccalaureate degree, with a major in accounting, from an accredited university or its equivalent (§ 5081.1), pass “written examinations in theory of accounts, in accounting practice, in auditing, in commercial law as affecting accountancy, and other related subjects as the certified public accountant members of the board may deem advisable” (§ 5082), and have from three to four years (depending upon the circumstances) of “public accounting experience” (§ 5083).

To use the title public accountant, a person must receive from the Board a “certificate of public accountant" and be issued a permit to practice public accountancy. (§§ 5034, 5056.) For limited periods of time, the first being within six months of the enactment in 1945 of the prohibition against practicing public accountancy without a license and the last ending in 1968, a person who had been engaged in the practice of public accountancy prior to 1945 (and some others including veterans of the armed forces) could receive a “certificate of public accountant” without passage of an examination or meeting any educational requirements. (Stats. 1945, ch. 1353, § 2, p. 2537; Stats. 1967, ch. 709, § 1, p. 2082; Stats. 1968, ch. 519, § 1, p. 1160.)

The majority also notes that both the Court of Appeal (People v. Hill (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 320 [136 Cal.Rptr. 30]) and the Attorney General (46 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 140, 141 (1965)) have concluded that unlicensed accountants are precluded from using the title “accountant.” Citing the decision in Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Johnson (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 297, 303 [129 P.2d 32], the majority concludes that it must be presumed that the Legislature was aware of these constructions of section 5058 when it thereafter amended the statute. I agree that these factors are significant, but, as recognized in Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Johnson, supra, 54 Cal.App.2d 297, 303, they “are only aids in statutory construction of a legislative enactment which is so general in its terms as to render an interpretative rule or regulation appropriate. They are not conclusive upon the courts.”

Assuming, without deciding, that the response to a public opinion poll is an appropriate basis for deciding an issue of statutory construction, a more useful query would have been: “Do you believe that persons who refer to themselves as accountants are certified public accountants?”