Court Opinion

ID: 9710431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:09:45.020773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:56.773426
License: Public Domain

Hood, P.J.
(dissenting in part). I must respectfully dissent from those portions of the majority decision which vacate the jury’s verdict against the City of Detroit and which approve the trial court’s ruling as to the absence of defendant David Murray.
First, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclu*531sion that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to support a jury verdict.
In Napier v Jacobs, 145 Mich App 285, 291; 377 NW2d 879 (1985), this Court stated that the standard for review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a civil case is comparable to the standard used in ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict:
"A judgment notwithstanding the verdict on defendants’ motion is appropriate only if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a judgment for plaintiff. Basic Food Industries, Inc v Grant, 107 Mich App 685, 695; 310 NW2d 26 (1981). In reaching a decision, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence. Isom v Farrugia, 63 Mich App 351, 354-355; 234 NW2d 520 (1975). If after viewing the evidence in this manner reasonable men could differ, the question is one for the jury and judgment notwithstanding the verdict is improper. Id.” Drummey v Henry, 115 Mich App 107, 110-111; 320 NW2d 309 (1982), lv den 417 Mich 895 (1983).
As explained in Killen v Benton, 1 Mich App 294, 298; 136 NW2d 29 (1965), a " 'judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be allowed only if there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to make an issue for the jury.’ ”
As indicated by its special verdict, the jury in the instant case accepted plaintiffs’ theory that defendant had a custom or policy of inadequately training its officers in the care and custody of intoxicated persons.
In support of this theory, plaintiffs introduced the testimony of two expert witnesses. Dr. Beck-man stated that according to national standards a *532doorman must have training in the care and safety of prisoners to detect a prisoners’ degree of intoxication or the effects of drugs. Based upon his review of Murray’s deposition, Beckman concluded that Murray had had no special training for his position as doorman and, accordingly, that Murray had not been properly trained. In addition, Beck-man opined that neither Lieutenant Coleman nor Officer Wilson had been properly trained. Finally, when questioned on the overall training provided by the City of Detroit between the years 1970 and 1979, Beckman responded that the training methods "did not and never have” met the national standards.
Mr. Donley concurred in Beckman’s assessments. Like Beckman, Donley testified that Murray had not been properly trained as a doorman. Unlike Beckman, however, Donley asserted that in 1978 and 1979 the City of Detroit had a "well written program” for training doormen, but that the program had not been effectively carried out. Finally, Donley explained that, for a number of reasons, a visibly intoxicated prisoner should not be removed from his cell to make a phone call:
Well, there is a number of reasons. A person could fight. When he is in the cell, locked in a cell, it is very unlikely — not much harm can be done to anybody. If he is taken out of the cell and his contact with an officer or people out in the lobby area, he can cause quite — if a person is in fact intoxicated, stumble and fall and cause an injury.
In addition, Lieutenant Coleman testified that letting plaintiff, an allegedly intoxicated prisoner, out of his cell to make a phone call was consistent with procedures in effect at the precinct.
When this testimony is viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs and plaintiffs are given *533the benefit of every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence, I conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to establish that the city either had a policy of failing to train its doormen or that the training provided was so grossly negligent that it amounted to "deliberate indifference.” Furthermore, Donley’s testimony establishes that the lack of adequate training was likely to cause the very danger which befell plaintiff. Because the doorman was inadequately trained, he permitted a visibly intoxicated person to leave his cell thereby rendering it likely that an injury would occur. Accordingly, the jury could infer that, by failing to train its doormen, the city exhibited a deliberate indifference to the resulting violation. That there was testimony that the city met state standards is not dispositive if those standards are themselves inadequate.
The city contends that municipal policy could never be established absent deliberate action by a designated municipal policymaker. While, concededly, Justice Rehnquist, in a footnote to Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808; 105 S Ct 2427; 85 L Ed 2d 791 (1985),1 raised the question, he also specifically refused to address it. See 471 US 824, n 7. And the actual holding of Tuttle is far more limited. Tuttle stands for the proposition that an isolated incident of police misconduct can never establish municipal liability. Since plaintiffs’ allegations of municipal policy are supported by more than the single incident complained of, Tuttle does not bar recovery in the instant action. Moreover, in light of the expert testimony regarding the city’s training program, the jury could infer that the absence of adequate training or the failure to routinely implement adequate training was a conscious decision by the city’s policymakers.
*534Unlike the situation in Tuttle, plaintiffs here presented evidence of a city-wide lack of adequate training or, at least, a grossly negligent training program. The jury’s decision was not based on the single, isolated incident, but, rather, on the city’s overall failure to provide adequate training as testified to by Beckman and Donley. The expert testimony was sufficient to establish a municipal policy upon which to render the city liable. While the defendant city cast considerable doubt on the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts, the jury, in weighing the experts’ testimony, obviously resolved those doubts in favor of plaintiffs.
Unlike the majority, I would hold that plaintiffs did establish an "affirmative link” between the city policy and the constitutional deprivation. Tuttle, 471 US 823. Both experts testified that proper training would have alerted a doorman to the dangers inherent in caring for intoxicated prisoners. Moreover, Donley specifically stated that one of the dangers attendant upon letting an intoxicated person out of his cell was that the prisoner might stumble, fall and injure himself. Accordingly, the complete failure to train the doorman made the risk of personal injury highly likely and the city’s failure to train could be viewed as the "moving force” of the violation, i.e., the injury. I would affirm.
I also cannot agree with the majority that the absence of defendant David Murray was adequately handled. The absence of David Murray was a point of confusion and contention throughout these proceedings. I am convinced that the plaintiffs were at least entitled to an instruction as to Murray’s absence.
One variation of the Standard Jury Instructions, SJI 2d 6.01, reads:
*535(The [plaintiff/defendant] in this case has not offered [the testimony of_/_]. You may infer that this evidence would have been adverse to the [plaintiff/defendant] if you believe that the evidence was under the control of the [plaintiff/defendant] and could have been produced by [him/her], and no reasonable excuse for [plaintiffs/defendant’s] failure to produce the evidence has been shown.)
This instruction, if requested, should be given when a question of fact arises regarding both "control” and "reasonable excuses.” Both questions were raised in the present case and, therefore, the instruction was applicable.
The Supreme Court has held that when an accurate and applicable Standard Jury Instruction has been requested by a party it should be given by the trial court if the court gives any instruction at all on the subject covered by the requested instruction. Socha v Passino, 405 Mich 458, 467; 275 NW2d 243 (1979). In Javis v Ypsilanti Bd of Ed, 393 Mich 689; 227 NW2d 543 (1975), our Supreme Court held that reversal was required where an applicable and requested jury instruction was not given. In Johnson v Corbet, 423 Mich 304; 377 NW2d 713 (1985), however, the Supreme Court decided that the Javis rule need no longer be applied.
Rather, the Johnson Court concluded that failure to give a requested and applicable jury instruction should be reviewed under the harmless error standard of GCR 1963, 529, now MCR 2.613(A), and that the appellate court should set aside a jury verdict only if the failure to do so would be "inconsistent with substantial justice.”
In my opinion, the Standard Jury Instruction was clearly applicable and appropriate to the present case. The instruction is meant to encompass *536situations where there is a question of fact regarding the cause of the defendant’s absence. Such a question of fact was obviously present in this case. In addition, the questions which the jury asked regarding Murray’s absence and the judge’s comments on his absence further indicate that the instruction was applicable. Moreover, the instruction given by the trial court deviated widely from the standard instruction and failed to make any reference to the inferences contained in the instruction.
Because the question of Murray’s absence was raised during the trial and because the court itself noted and instructed the jury on Murray’s absence, the court erred in failing to give SJI2d 6.01. Considering David Murray’s pivotal role in the events resulting in the injuries, the failure to give the appropriate instruction cannot be viewed as harmless error, and plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial as to David Murray, even if the jury verdict as to the city is overturned.
Except for these two points, I concur in the majority opinion.

 Relied on in the majority opinion.