Court Opinion

ID: 9729183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:28:53.942963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.932783
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached today by the majority. It is unnecessary to relitigate the claims summarily dismissed by the circuit court in the first stage of the post-conviction proceedings. However, it is unnecessary to relitigate the claims summarily dismissed in the first stage because, unlike the majority, I believe a circuit court has authority to summarily dismiss portions of the petition in the first stage of the post-conviction proceeding. As repeatedly recognized by this court, we must give effect to the language of the statute as written. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997); Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996). A plain language approach is a simple approach, which obviates the need to discuss legislative history. People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 261 (1994) (for purposes of construing a statute, courts should first consider the statutory language, and where statutory language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction). This court has also recognized that, “[a] fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that we must give effect to the entire statutory scheme rather than looking at words and phrases in isolation ***. [Citation.] In other words, statutes should be construed as a whole, with each provision evaluated in connection with every other section.” Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 196 Ill. 2d 70, 87-88 (2001), citing Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000); see also People v. Burpo, 164 Ill. 2d 261, 267 (1995), citing People v. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d 263, 270 (1987) (courts must give construction that is consistent with the purpose and policies of the statute); Santiago v. Kusper, 133 Ill. 2d 318, 327 (1990) (courts must construe an act so the legislative scheme is harmonious and consistent in all its parts). In the instant matter, the Act neither expressly permits nor prohibits partial first-stage summary dismissals of a post-conviction petition. It is apparent, however, from a review of the Act as a whole that partial summary dismissals in stage one of the post-conviction proceedings are consistent with the legislative scheme. Several provisions of the Act grant a trial judge great latitude and discretion in post-conviction proceedings. See People v. Wright, 149 Ill. 2d 36, 54 (1992). For instance, section 122—5 extends post-conviction trial judges discretion to make any orders regarding pleadings or amendments that he or she finds proper, and allows the trial judge to determine whether to permit the withdrawal of the petition upon the petitioner’s request. Wright, 149 Ill. 2d at 54. Additionally, section 122—6 grants the trial court discretion to receive evidence in support of the petition, such as affidavits, oral testimony, or depositions. Wright, 149 Ill. 2d at 54. Discretion is a necessary component of the Act, essential to address the volume of post-conviction litigation. Moreover, discretion permits the court to meet the needs of each particular petitioner, and achieve the overall goal of the Act — to provide relief from constitutional deprivations. Thus, I believe that partial summary dismissals in stage one of the proceeding are in accord with the overall legislative scheme of the Act which provides discretion to the trial court. Additionally, the authority to order partial summary dismissals is a matter of the inherent authority a court possesses to control its own docket, and the proceedings before it, through orders and actions that are neither authorized nor prohibited by the Act. People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 179-83 (1988); see also Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 166 Ill. 2d 48, 65 (1995) (recognizing a trial court’s inherent authority to dismiss a cause of action with prejudice for violations of court orders). In Fitzgerald, the defendant filed a post-conviction petition and issued subpoenas for the taking of discovery depositions of persons involved in the original trial proceedings. After the trial court denied its motions to block the taking of the depositions, the State sought a writ of mandamus, or, alternatively, a supervisory order, from this court to compel the trial court to vacate the orders granting discovery. We explained that post-conviction proceedings are sui generis in nature and, therefore, neither civil nor criminal discovery rules apply. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d at 181. Looking to the language of the Act, we noted that the Act is silent on whether a trial judge may order the taking of discovery depositions. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d at 179. However, because review under the Act is limited to a narrow range of constitutional issues that were not presented in the original proceeding, we held that the trial court clearly has inherent authority under the Act to order discovery to better manage the proceedings and avoid relitigating issues from the original proceeding. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d at 183. Just as the Act is silent on a circuit court’s authority to order discovery in post-conviction proceedings, the Act is also silent on the issue of partial summary dismissals of a post-conviction petition. Yet, partial summary dismissals permit a court to better manage its docket and the proceedings and avoid litigating issues which lack merit. Thus, pursuant to Fitzgerald, a trial court clearly possesses inherent authority to dismiss claims within a petition that are frivolous or patently without merit, rather than advance those claims for further consideration. I do not find that this outcome restricts a petitioner’s ability to redraft allegations that have been previously dismissed as frivolous in the first stage, and present those allegations to the court as amendments in the second stage of the proceedings. As discussed by the majority, counsel is appointed by the court to represent petitioners in the second stage of the proceedings if the court finds that the petition contains allegations that state the gist of a constitutional claim. Section 122 — 4 of the Act, and Supreme Court Rule 651(c), ensure that counsel reviews the allegations with the petitioner, examines the record, and makes necessary amendments, so the petition is presented in an adequate legal form. 725 ILCS 5/122 — 4 (West 2000); 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c); People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 238 (1993). Neither the provisions of the Act, nor holdings by this court, limit the right to amend a petition once the court finds that the petition contains non-frivolous claims. Rather, this court has stated that counsel may make any necessary amendments to the original petition, without limitation. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996); People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 358-59 (1990). This interpretation is also consistent with the language of Rule 651(c), which states that counsel may make “any” amendments to the petition. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c). Accordingly, an attorney may redraft allegations previously dismissed in stage one of the proceedings if he or she believes it is possible to articulate a more meaningful and meritorious claim. This interpretation does not hamper judicial administration or add confusion to the post-conviction process. In fact, it does the opposite. It preserves the limited resources of both the bar and the bench, and focuses the proceedings upon claims which have potential merit. Accordingly, I believe that partial summary dismissals are permitted in the first stage of a post-conviction proceeding.