Court Opinion

ID: 9778813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:21:35.533074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.366845
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Smith,
dissenting.
There is no evidence in the record that relator “wilfully” or “persistently,” or in any other manner, permitted or caused the Alamo Street crossing to be blocked at any time. The temporary injunction was issued on January 20, 1956. Relator did not become President of the railroad company until June 1957. Since there was no evidence of guilt, the relator should have been acquitted and the contempt proceedings against him dismissed. It is fundamental that a person cannot be guilty of violating any order of which he had no knowledge. See Ex parte Stone, Texas Crimp Rep. 72 S.W. 1000, 1903. Under the circumstances here, as shown by the complete absence of evidence, the only proper order to have entered was one of “not guilty.” Such an order would have conformed to the evidence. See Rule 301, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The respondent judge was without authority or jurisdiction to render the judgment of contempt which it did render and such judgment is accordingly void. This court has jurisdiction to so hold in this mandamus proceeding. See Ex parte Joy Williams, this volume, 314, 330 S.W. 2d 605, (January 6, 1960) ; Ex parte Henry, 147 *503Texas 315, 215 S.W. 2d 588; Ex parte White, 154 Texas 126, 274 S.W. 2d 542; Ex parte Twedell, 158 Texas 214, 309 S.W. 2d 834.
It is true that the above cases are what we commonly denominate as habeas corpus cases, but, in my opinion, the conclusions expressed in each of such cases leads to the further conclusion that where a judge, as in the instant case, has determined to commit and fine a relator on a void contempt judgment, this court has the power to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a void act. See Yett v. Cook, 115 Texas 175, 268 S.W. 715 (1925), 281 S.W. 843; Article 5, Sec. 3, of the Constitution of Texas. This section of the Constitution provides that the legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus, etc., in such cases as may be specified, except as against the governor of the state. In Yett v. Cook, supra, this court said:
“The Supreme Court, or any justice thereof, shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus as may be prescribed by law, and the said court, or any justice thereof, may issue writs of mandamus, procedendo, certiorari and all writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of said court, and said court may issue writs of quo warranto or mandamus agreeable in the principles of law regulating such writs against any district judge, or Court of Civil Appeals or judge of the Court of Civil Appeals, or officer of the state government, except the governor of the state.”
This court in the case of State v. Ferguson, 1939, 133 Texas 60, 125 S.W. 2d 272, after quoting the above section of the Constitution and a relevant statute, said that mandamus would not lie to correct a merely erroneous or voidable order of a trial judge, but would lie to “correct” one which was void for lack of power to enter. The only way to “correct” the void judgment and to adequately relieve the relator from paying a fine of $4,000 and confinement of 240 days in the county jail, is for this court to perform its constitutional and statutory duty by entering a proper judgment granting the mandamus as prayed for, thereby prohibiting the respondent judge from proceeding further to sentence relator.
I respectfully submit that the course urged by the respondent judge and apparently adopted by the majority view here that the relator go to jail and then seek relief by habeas corpus is not an adequate remedy from a void judgment. No person, whether he be a member of labor, as was Twedell, in Ex parte Twedell, supra, or a president of a railroad company, the relator *504here, should be humiliated by incarceration for one minute as required when pursuing relief by writ of habeas corpus. The “long established” policy mentioned by the majority of requiring a person to go to jail has no basis in law, reason, or logic where immediate relief is necessary. Moreover, I respectfully disagree with the statement that the respondent judge possibly contemplates no enforcement of the contempt judgment. The evidence is undisputed that the judge fully intends to commit and fine relator unless prevented by this court. Therefore, it cannot under the circumstances be presumed that the respondent judge will not attempt to enforce his void judgment of contempt.
This court should issue its writ of mandamus compelling the respondent judge to vacate his void judgment of contempt against relator.
Opinion delivered February 24, 1960.