Court Opinion

ID: 9581775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:18:39.266727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:14.709056
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court improperly restricted Mangum’s cross-examination of the State’s juvenile witnesses concerning whether they had pending juvenile charges against them or were on probation stemming from juvenile charges, I must dissent to the reversal of Mangum’s conviction. However, because I conclude that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an in camera review of the witnesses’ juvenile records to determine whether they contained material that could be used to impeach the witnesses, I would remand the case to the trial court for it to conduct such an examination.
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the record does not support the conclusion that the trial court improperly limited the cross-examination of the juvenile witnesses. In a pre-trial hearing, Man-gum sought to have the trial court review the juvenile court records of the State’s witnesses, and inform Mangum of the witnesses who had juvenile cases pending against them. Although the trial court stated that it would not allow access to juvenile records or questions to a witness about the juvenile records themselves, it stated that it would allow the type of cross-examination permitted in Davis v. Alaska.7 At one point in the hearing, the trial court stated that juvenile court records are confidential and thus not subject to discovery; that Davis simply stands for the principle that a defendant has a right to cross-examine a witness; and that in Davis, the defense wanted to cross-examine a witness about “the fact that he was on probation in juvenile court — from the juvenile court for burglary when he testified against his client, and that had nothing to do with the integrity of the juvenile court records.” At another point, the trial court stated that although the defense could not “go into the juvenile records,” the defense could cross-examine the witness about whatever it wanted to, “[t]hat’s what was done in the Davis case.”
On balance, I think that a fair reading of the transcript of the pre-trial hearing shows that the trial court conveyed that it would not permit the discovery or the use of the juvenile records themselves, but that it would allow cross-examination about pending juvenile cases that was consistent with Davis. Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the fact that at trial the trial court allowed defense counsel, over the State’s objection, to question two witnesses about their pending juvenile cases. For example, when defense coun*580sel was questioning one juvenile witness, defense counsel asked the witness if a juvenile case for statutory rape was still pending against the witness. The witness responded that he was “done fighting it,” and defense counsel asked the witness if he was on probation, a permissible line of inquiry under Davis. The State objected to this line of questioning, but the trial court overruled the objection and let the questioning continue. Similarly, defense counsel asked another state’s witness if he was at a juvenile detention center because he had shot somebody. The witness responded that he was, and defense counsel asked whether he knew that if he violated any of the rules of that center, he could be sent to a “tougher place.” The witness stated that that was correct. Defense counsel then asked whether, if the prosecutor was angry at you, “she could send you to a different place.” The witness responded affirmatively. At that point, the State objected to the question, but defense counsel stated that the question “went to [the witness’s] motive and bias” and that it was a matter of the witness’s perception. Although the trial court made no specific ruling on the state’s objection, after the defense explained its reason for the question, defense counsel was permitted to finish the inquiry.
Because I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court impermissibly limited the type of cross-examination permitted in Davis, and because the majority reverses Mangum’s conviction based on its conclusion that “the rule in Davis v. Alaska was violated,” majority opinion at 576,1 must dissent to the reversal.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that “the defense was thwarted in its attempts to discover information concerning juvenile records of the State’s witnesses and to have the court conduct an in camera examination of those records to determine whether they could be used for purposes deemed appropriate in Davis v. Alaska” Majority opinion at 576. In this regard, the record shows that Man-gum told the trial court he had issued a subpoena for the production of the juvenile court records of the witnesses in question and that he then moved the trial court to review those records in camera in order to determine if any relevant material, as outlined in Davis v. Alaska, was contained within the juvenile records. The trial court refused to review the records in question. Thus, the majority correctly concludes that the trial court’s actions did thwart the defense’s efforts to determine whether the State’s juvenile witnesses had pending cases about which they could be cross-examined.
The present case is similar to Baynes v. State.8 In that case, defense counsel subpoenaed the records of a juvenile witness, and the State sought to quash the subpoena on the ground that juvenile adju*581dications could not be used to impeach a witness. Defense counsel responded that he had subpoenaed the records in order to use them for purposes consistent with Davis v. Alaska. The trial court quashed the subpoena, but the Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that under Davis, defense counsel was entitled to attack the witness’s credibility with any pending cases or any prior adjudications for which the juvenile was on probation. Because the record did not show whether such relevant juvenile court records existed, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for it to determine the status of the juvenile’s record. The Court of Appeals ruled that if the trial court determined that the juvenile witness had a pending juvenile case, the trial court should order a new trial, and that if the trial court determined that there was no such pending case, the trial court should enter an order to that effect and the defendant would then have 30 days in which to file an appeal.
In the present case, I conclude that defense counsel acted properly in subpoenaing the juvenile records and in asking the trial court to conduct an in camera review of those records to determine if they contained any relevant information. In this regard, requesting a trial court to review confidential records for relevant trial material is a procedure that has been approved by this Court,9 the Court of Appeals of Georgia,10 and the federal courts 11 to determine whether certain records contain information material to the defense. Accordingly, I conclude that the trial court improperly refused to review the juvenile records in question, and that therefore the case should be remanded to the trial court for it to examine the applicable juvenile records.12
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent to the majority’s reversal of Mangum’s conviction on the ground that the trial court improperly limited the type of cross-examination permitted in Davis v. Alaska. Instead, I would remand the case to the trial court for it to determine whether the witnesses’ juvenile records contained material that would have been relevant to Mangum’s trial under Davis v. Alaska.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice parley join in this dissent.
*582Decided November 19, 2001
Reconsideration denied December 14, 2001.
Bruce S. Harvey, David S. West, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, George W. K. Snyder, Jr., Bettieanne C. Hart, Elizabeth A. Baker, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Adam M. Hames, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 415 U. S. 308 (94 SC 1105, 39 LE2d 347) (1974).

 218 Ga. App. 687, 690-691 (463 SE2d 144) (1995).

 Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 212 (22) (345 SE2d 831) (1986); Stripling v. State, 261 Ga. 1, 6 (7) (401 SE2d 500) (1991).

 Bartlett v. State, 196 Ga. App. 174 (1) (396 SE2d 31) (1990); Sosebee v. State, 190 Ga. App. 746, 748-749 (380 SE2d 464) (1989).

 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39, 59-60 (107 SC 989, 94 LE2d 40) (1987).

 Although Mangum did cross-examine two witnesses about pending juvenile cases, it is possible that the witnesses were not forthcoming about their pending cases, and that a review of the juvenile records would have disclosed that fact. Moreover, in addition to those two witnesses, Mangum also requested that the trial court conduct an in camera review of the records of several other juvenile witnesses.