Court Opinion

ID: 9460022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:37:54.472872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:26.115277
License: Public Domain

TIMBERS, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in the judgment of the Court and in the majority opinion to the extent that they reverse that part of the order of the district court which suppressed the evidence seized from defendant Pagan’s purse.
With deference, however, I respectfully dissent from the reversal of that part of the order of the district court which suppressed the oral statements of defendant Vigo._
The majority holds that Vigo’s incul-patory statements are admissible. In *300holding these statements to have been “voluntary” and therefore admissible without the necessity of finding an “intelligent waiver”, the majority, it seems to me, has unjustifiably ignored the rationale and holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The instant case is strikingly different from those which have admitted voluntary exclamations. To hold Vigo’s inculpatory statements to have been “voluntary” so that Miranda warnings need not have been given, in effect is to return to the pre-Miranda test of voluntariness and to validate, sub silentio, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970).
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that persons in police custody are subject to a form of “compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings”. 384 U.S. at 458. In order to protect the individual against this inherent compulsion, and to safeguard his right “to remain silent unless he eho.oses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will”, id. at 460, the Court held that individuals in custody must be made aware of their “right of silence”, id. at 444, and must be given warnings prior to custodial interrogation. One of the required warnings — not given to Vigo — is that the person to be questioned be told that anything said “can and will be used against the individual in court”. Id. at 469. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of this specific warning:
“This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege [against self-incrimination], but also of the consequences of foregoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system — that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.” 384 U.S. at 469.
True, as the majority in the instant case correctly recognizes, a determination under Miranda of whether an individual “knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-inerimi-nation”, 384 U.S. at 475, is not a precondition to the admission of an inculpatory statement if it can be initially shown that the Miranda warnings need not have been given. The types of cases envisaged by the Supreme Court as not requiring Miranda warnings are those involving an absence of questioning which result in “volunteered statements”, such as where an individual “enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime”. Id. at 478. Thus, in United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d 424 (10 Cir. 1972), although the Miranda warnings were not given and there was no intelligent waiver, an inculpatory statement was properly admitted since it was “obviously not the product of interrogation but was simply a spontaneous utterance volunteered by the defendant”. 459 F.2d at 427. Similarly, other cases have recognized that incriminatory statements were admissible without the necessity of finding a Miranda waiver where it was found that such admissions were “spontaneous”, were made “before any questions had been asked”, were “entirely voluntary”, Pitman v. United States, 380 F.2d 368, 370 (9 Cir. 1967), and, “if the arresting officer has not attempted or is not attempting to have the arrested person incriminate himself”. United States v. Cruz, 265 F.Supp. 15, 20 (W.D.Tex.1967). See Parson v. United States, 387 F.2d 944 (10 Cir. 1968).
Here, it cannot be said that Vigo’s statements to Special Agent Smith, made after Vigo was placed in custody, were spontaneous or were made before questioning began. Vigo’s inculpatory statements were made during a discussion in response to questions by Smith which sought to elicit such admissions.1 *301The Miranda requirements therefore are applicable. As the district court found, 357 F.Supp. at 1366, since Vigo was not warned that anything he said could and would be used against him, the government has not satisfied its “heavy burden . . . [of demonstrating] that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination” (quoting from Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475).2
I think the majority also has erred in holding that Vigo’s statements were voluntary because “[n]one of the inherently compelling factors of station-house interrogation were [sic] present. The arresting agents did not coerce or deceive him”. Supra at 299. It was precisely this type of determination of voluntariness, required by pre-Miranda law, which Miranda rejected but which was codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).3 Furthermore, in holding that Vigo spoke “with evident knowledge of the meaning and consequences of what he said”, supra at 299, the majority seems to me to have rejected the rationale of Miranda and to have embraced the “totality of the circumstances” analysis prescribed by Section 3501(b).4 The validity of the majority’s criticism of Miranda cannot be gainsaid. It has been as a result of occasional unduly harsh Miranda rulings that this Court previously has interpreted Miranda to avoid having “[t]he criminal . . . . go free because the constable has blundered.” People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926) (Cardozo, J.). See, e.g., United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373 (2 Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 907 (1970). Dissatisfaction with a controlling Supreme Court decision, however, does not warrant judicial legislation. I am sure that my colleagues do not suggest it does. But their application of Miranda to the facts of the instant case strikes me as coming perilously close to frustrating the rationale of this controlling Supreme Court decision.
I would affirm the district court’s suppression of the oral statements of defendant Vigo.

. Agent Smith testified that, after advising Vigo of some of his constitutional rights, he and Vigo “discussed the package that he had. . . .i. é. [and] also discussed wheth*301er or not any of the other people in the car had knowledge. . . . ” Transcript of Suppression Hearing at 14. It is obvious from the testimony of Smith that “a lot of things were said”, id. at 14-15, and that Vigo was being questioned in detail.

. This is consistent with the government’s position on this appeal. It seeks reversal of the suppression order not on the ground that Miranda has been improperly applied, but rather on the ground that Section 3501 and not Miranda should govern. See Brief of Appellant at 6.

. Section 3501 provides that any confession is admissible if it is found to be “voluntarily given”. 18 U.S.O. § 3501(a) (1970). The statute further provides that:
“(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which lie was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.”

. The difficult questions of whether Section 3501 was intended to overrule Miranda, and whether it would be constitutional if it did, are not presently before us. Today’s opinions are not addressed to those questions.