Court Opinion

ID: 9406879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-04 13:07:24.067791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:33.978648
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                     NO. 03-23-00042-CV

                              R. G., J. C., and C. M., Appellants

                                                v.

               Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

               FROM THE 261ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
      NO. D-1-FM-21-000350, THE HONORABLE KARIN CRUMP, JUDGE PRESIDING

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Appellants R.G. (Father), J.C. (Mother), and C.M. (Grandmother) each appeal

from the district court’s order, following a bench trial, terminating Father’s and Mother’s

parental rights to their twin children, two-year-old S.C. (Sally) and M.C. (Molly), and appointing

the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) as the sole managing

conservator of the children. 1 In two issues on appeal, Father and Mother each challenge the

district court’s findings that (1) termination of their parental rights and (2) appointment of the

Department as sole managing conservator was in the best interest of the children. Grandmother,

who is proceeding pro se (as she did in the court below), also challenges the district court’s

appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator. We will affirm the district court’s

termination decree.

       1  For the children’s privacy, we refer to them using pseudonyms and to their parents and
other relatives by their familial relationships to each other, and we refer to the children’s
approximate age when trial concluded. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
                                        BACKGROUND

                 The case began shortly after the twins were born, when the Department received a

referral alleging that Mother and one of the twins had tested positive for amphetamines when the

twins were born, the meconium of both twins had tested positive for methamphetamines, and

Mother had tested positive for methamphetamines during her pregnancy. The Department’s

removal affidavit, a copy of which was admitted into evidence, averred that Mother reported that

her “drug of choice” was marijuana but that she “sometimes” uses methamphetamine, including

as recently as one month before the twins were born.

                 During the subsequent Department investigation, Mother reported that she

currently lived with a friend but did not know the friend’s address. Mother also reported that she

had been involved with the Department in the past, that her two older children had been adopted

by Grandmother, and that she wanted the twins to be placed with Grandmother while the case

was ongoing. The Department contacted Grandmother, who confirmed that she had adopted

Mother’s older children and expressed interest in the twins staying with her while Mother “get[s]

the help she needs.” The twins were placed with Grandmother following a home assessment

and interview.

                 Approximately one year after the case began, Father was adjudicated the twins’

father, following DNA testing that established his paternity, and thereafter he was made a party

to the suit. Both Father and Mother were ordered to complete various services during the case,

including random drug testing. Neither parent was successful in completing services. Father

tested positive for cocaine in April 2022 and did not communicate with the Department for

several months after that.      Mother failed to maintain consistent communication with the

Department or submit to most of the Department’s requested drug tests but, in February 2022,

                                                 2
tested positive for THC, methamphetamines, and opiates upon giving birth to another child.

That child tested positive for methamphetamines and opiates in his urine and THC,

amphetamines, methamphetamines, and opiates in his meconium.

               This case proceeded to a four-day bench trial, at the conclusion of which the

district court took the matter under advisement. The district court later issued a decree of

termination, having found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s and

Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children and that Father and Mother had:

(1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings

which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the children; (2) engaged in conduct or

knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the

physical or emotional well-being of the children; (3) constructively abandoned the children; and

(4) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions

necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the children.             See Tex. Fam. Code

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2). The district court additionally found that Mother had used

a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the children and that

Mother had been the cause of the children being born positive for a controlled substance. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(P), (R). Regarding conservatorship, the district court found that it would be in

the best interest of the children to appoint the Department as the nonparent sole managing

conservator of the children. Finally, the district court ordered that Grandmother, who had

intervened in the suit shortly before trial, “shall be entitled to have a relationship with the

children until they are adopted, if they are adopted” and that she “shall be allowed to continue to

have regularly scheduled visits with the children as determined by further order of the court at

regularly scheduled review hearings.” This appeal followed.

                                                3
                                           DISCUSSION

Termination of parental rights

               “Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code requires two findings to support

termination of a parent’s legal rights: (1) the parent’s acts or omissions must satisfy an

enumerated statutory ground for termination; and (2) termination must be in the children’s best

interest.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021); see In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232

(Tex. 2019) (per curiam); A.C. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 577 S.W.3d 689, 697

(Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied). In this appeal, Father and Mother do not challenge the

evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination of their parental rights. Instead, they

each argue that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the district court’s

finding that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of the children.

       Standard of review

               “Proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship implicate rights of

constitutional magnitude that qualify for heightened judicial protection.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d

624, 626 (Tex. 2018). Parental rights have been characterized as “essential,” “a basic civil right

of man,” and “far more precious than property rights.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.

1985) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). They are “perhaps the oldest of the

fundamental liberty interests” protected by the United States Constitution. Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); E.E. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 598 S.W.3d 389, 396

(Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.). “When the State initiates a parental rights termination

proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.”

                                                  4
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982). “Consequently, termination proceedings should

be strictly scrutinized, and involuntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the

parent.” Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. “Because termination of parental rights ‘is complete, final,

irrevocable and divests for all time’ the natural and legal rights between parent and child,” a trial

court “cannot involuntarily sever that relationship absent evidence sufficient to ‘produce in the

mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be

established.’” A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630 (quoting Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; Holick, 685 S.W.2d

at 20). “This heightened proof standard carries the weight and gravity due process requires to

protect the fundamental rights at stake.” Id.

               “A correspondingly searching standard of appellate review is an essential

procedural adjunct.” Id. “The distinction between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent

to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” Id. “Evidence is legally

sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the fact-finding and

considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or

conviction that the finding was true.” Id. at 631. “Factual sufficiency, in comparison, requires

weighing disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.”

Id. “In a factual-sufficiency review, the appellate court must consider whether disputed evidence

is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding.” Id.

“Evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that the

factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id.

               However, “an appellate court’s review must not be so rigorous that the only

fact-findings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt.”

                                                 5
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).             “While parental rights are of constitutional

magnitude, they are not absolute.” Id. “Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the

constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional

and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.” Id.

       Best-interest considerations

               We review a factfinder’s best-interest finding in light of the non-exhaustive list of

considerations set out in Holley v. Adams, which include the child’s wishes, the child’s

emotional and physical needs now and in the future, emotional or physical danger to the child

now and in the future, the parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody, programs available

to help those parties, plans for the child by the parties seeking custody, the stability of the

proposed placement, the parent’s acts or omissions indicating that the parent-child relationship is

improper, and any excuses for the parent’s conduct. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see

A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631; In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex. 2012); C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.

The Holley factors are not exhaustive, not all factors must be proved, and a lack of evidence

about some of the factors does not “preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong

conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence

[was] undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” C.H., 89

S.W.3d at 27. “We must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances in light of the Holley factors’

to determine whether sufficient evidence supports” the best-interest finding. In re J.M.G., 608

S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (quoting In re B.F., No. 02-07-

00334-CV, 2008 WL 902790, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

                                                  6
       Evidence presented

               Evidence regarding Father and Mother

               Father had a history of committing domestic violence against Mother. A victim-

services counselor for the family-violence unit of the Austin Police Department (APD) testified

about an incident that occurred in January 2019, in which Mother reported that Father had

assaulted and strangled her. According to the counselor, the assault resulted in “bruising and

leaking under [Mother’s] eye and a cut on her lip.” An APD officer who responded to the

assault provided similar testimony regarding Mother’s injuries and provided more detailed

testimony regarding the strangulation, explaining that Father had “wrap[ped] his right arm

around [Mother’s] neck with her neck like in the crook of [Father’s] elbow,” “dragged her back

to the “bed, threw her on to her back on the bed and then climbed on top of her and then used

both of his open hands and placed them around [Mother’s] neck and began to choke her” until

Mother told Father that she could not breathe and that her “vision started to go dizzy and she said

she was starting to see spots in her vision.”

               Another APD officer testified about an incident that occurred in October 2020,

while Mother was pregnant with the children. The officer responded to a domestic disturbance

in which Father had punched Mother in the back of her head with his fist when she was trying to

leave their apartment following an argument, causing Mother intense pain and resulting in her

being transported to a hospital. Father claimed that during this incident, Mother had punched

him in his groin. A third APD officer testified about another domestic disturbance between

Mother and Father in February 2022 that did not result in physical violence but involved them

“screaming at each other” inside a car.

                                                7
               Mother also had a criminal history, including convictions for assault, arrests for

drug possession, and an arrest for burglary of a building that occurred while the case was

ongoing. An APD officer testified that in February 2022, he responded to a “burglary hot shot,”

i.e., a “burglary in progress with suspects actively breaking into a residence.” A white truck had

reportedly fled the scene following the burglary, and when the officer stopped the truck, he

found Mother inside the vehicle in the front passenger seat.                  Narcotics, including

methamphetamine, were found in a purse inside the vehicle, along with drug paraphernalia and

other possible contraband, and Mother admitted to the officer that she used methamphetamine.

Another APD officer testified about a separate incident during which a security camera recorded

a male and a female, later identified as Father and Mother, entering a vacant apartment. The

officer testified that based on this incident, arrest warrants for burglary of a building were issued

for Father and Mother and that the warrants had been issued that day, i.e., the day on which the

officer testified at the termination trial. The affidavits for the arrest warrants, copies of which

were admitted into evidence, reveal that the offense was committed in June 2022 and that in the

security video, Father could be seen stealing a washer and dryer from the apartment, with Mother

present at the apartment when the theft occurred.

               Father and Mother had each been ordered to engage in services to obtain the

return of their children. A Department supervisor testified that Father completed a psychological

evaluation but did not follow the recommendations provided, did not complete individual

counseling, failed to complete a batterers intervention and prevention program (BIPP), and had

not completed SAFE Fatherhood classes. Father also tested positive for cocaine in April 2022.

               The supervisor testified that Mother completed a psychological evaluation but

failed to follow the psychologist’s recommendations for treatment, completed some but not all of

                                                 8
her parenting classes, failed to complete a drug and alcohol assessment, and failed to participate

in drug testing or treatment. The supervisor also testified that Mother did not participate in a

domestic-violence class, although Mother testified that she completed the class but was unable to

download and print the certificate of completion. When asked why she had not engaged in

services earlier in the case, Mother testified that she “really just didn’t take [the case] . . . too

seriously” while the children lived with Grandmother.

               Father and Mother each had supervised visits with the children. At the beginning

of the case, Mother visited the children regularly at Grandmother’s house and, while she was

there, did the laundry, helped prepare bottles for the children, changed their diapers, and put the

children to sleep. However, Grandmother also testified that Mother “expected everything” from

her and would sometimes “take advantage” of Grandmother by not paying attention to the

children while she was there.

               Additionally, Grandmother testified about an incident that occurred during a visit

in May 2022 when Mother assaulted Grandmother’s sister. According to Grandmother, Mother

and Grandmother’s sister got into a “fist fight” during which the two were wrestling on the

ground, “punching and pulling hair,” and Mother “kept punching her and punching her and

punching her” until the sister “got her in a chokehold.” The assault occurred in the presence of

the children, and Grandmother had to take Sally to a neighbor’s house because Sally was scared,

screaming, and crying in response to the fight. Grandmother believed that Mother might have

been under the influence of drugs at the time. After that incident, Grandmother requested that

visits take place at the Department office, and the trial court subsequently ordered Mother to

“remain 200 yards away from any place that she expects the Children, or learns the Children, to

be, including their residence and daycare or school, except for court-ordered visitation.” The

                                                 9
trial court also ordered Father to “not cause or allow Respondent Mother [] to violate this order.”

In violation of that order, Father and Mother attempted to visit the children at Grandmother’s

house in June 2022, and Grandmother had to call the police to get them to leave. After that,

Mother’s contact with Grandmother became inconsistent. Mother testified that she had not

visited the children since the Department began supervising visitation, and that it had been

“months” since she had last seen the children. When asked why she had not visited them,

Mother testified that it was because of her “separation anxiety.”

               Father visited the children three times in March 2022 but did not visit them

thereafter. Father testified that he loved the children and wanted to see them but that “the stress

of services . . . started to overwhelm [him] a little bit and then got in the way of [his] visits.”

Father testified that if the children were returned to him, his mother and younger brother, who

lived with Father, could assist him in caring for the children, although the Department supervisor

testified that both relatives had extensive criminal histories. Father testified that he wanted the

children to be placed with him but acknowledged that the trial court might not see him as a fit

parent “right now.” He asked that the children be placed with “somebody who can care and

provide for them, like, all the way,” which Father believed to be Grandmother.

               Mother similarly testified that she wanted the children returned to her but that

“the next best place for [her] children would be with [Grandmother].” Mother acknowledged

that she had not secured stable housing by the time of trial but had “just applied for some

housing” with a housing program and was on a waiting list. Mother “hoped” that she would

have housing “within a matter of weeks or months.” Mother also testified that she had just

started a job at a printing company, where she scanned, uploaded, and reprinted documents.

                                                10
However, Mother added that the company was “slow on work right now,” and she worked only

three- or four-hour shifts per day.

               The Department supervisor testified that the Department believed termination of

Father’s and Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. She explained,

       [Mother] and [Father] have not shown any significant change in their behavior. In
       fact, it appears as if they’re still engaging in criminal activity. They have a
       history of family violence. They have a history of substance use. Neither has
       tested a long enough time to show continued sobriety, and it would be in the best
       interest of [Sally] and [Molly] to be in a home, like I said, that’s drug free,
       violence free, stable, and safe.

               Evidence regarding plans and proposed placements

               The Department supervisor testified that the Department’s original plan for the

children when the case began was family reunification. However, that plan changed to relative

adoption in 2022 after Mother gave birth to a new child (Brother) who tested positive for drugs

at birth and Father tested positive for cocaine. When Brother was born in February 2022,

Grandmother was considered as a placement, but “because she had the older two boys and

[Sally] and [Molly], she declined.” Instead, Brother was placed with a foster family. At the time

of trial in Fall 2022, Father and Mother wanted the twins either returned to them or placed with

Grandmother. The Department’s plan, according to the Department supervisor, was for the

Department “to take permanent managing conservatorship of the girls and hopefully have them

adopted” by the foster family where Brother had been placed.

               The children had been placed with Grandmother and her husband since the case

began, days after the children were born, and Grandmother had already adopted Mother’s two

older sons, who were twelve and seven years old at the time of trial. At the time of placement,

                                                11
the Department provided resources to Grandmother to help her care for the children, including

“pack and plays, car seats, some formula, diapers, wipes, some basic necessities.”          The

Department supervisor testified that they did “all the necessary background and CPS checks, the

criminal history and the CPS checks” and then “move[d] forward with a home study” on

Grandmother that the Department approved. Thus, at the beginning of the case, the Department

believed Grandmother to be a safe placement.

               However, the Department supervisor testified that Grandmother’s home was

approved “for placement purposes only” and not for adoption because of financial concerns that

were raised during the home study and later during the case. The supervisor testified that

Grandmother and her husband were not “making enough money to cover all their rent and all the

bills.” Additionally, the Department was concerned about the children’s sleeping arrangements,

as they were sleeping on the floor on a mattress rather than on beds. In November 2021,

Grandmother reached out to the Department and told them that they were “very, very, very

behind in rent” in the amount of $9,000 and had received an eviction notice from their landlord.

They were also behind in their utility bills in the amount of $5,000.           In response to

Grandmother’s request for financial assistance, the Department provided the family with $5,000,

beds for the children, gift cards, car seats, and a Thanksgiving turkey. The Department offered

to pay for daycare for the children so that Grandmother could obtain employment. Grandmother

“was also receiving kinship funds from the approved home study, and it got to a point where

there was not much more [the Department] could offer.” Even with the Department’s assistance,

Grandmother was “still financially having trouble staying . . . on top of everything.” The

Department also expressed concerns about a roach infestation inside the home and a front-door

lock that was “not as sturdy as it should have been.”

                                                12
               On Friday, July 22, 2022, the Department removed the children from

Grandmother’s home to visit the foster family for the weekend. The purpose of this visit,

according to the Department supervisor, was to allow Grandmother some time to “work on

getting the financials together, getting the roaches taken care of, fix[ing] the door, and look[ing]

for a daycare for the girls.”     The Department caseworker who picked up the girls from

Grandmother’s home testified that they “were a little dirty” and that “[t]heir hair was matted.”

The caseworker transported the girls to the Georgetown CPS office, where the foster family was

waiting to take them to their home.

               The foster mother, D.A. (Foster Mother) testified that she had worked as a nurse

for 19 years, including as a pediatric office nurse for several years. Currently, Foster Mother

worked as “a director of a small nonprofit” organization that operated three months out of the

year and as “a stay-at-home mom” for the other nine months of the year. She and her husband

had been married for over 20 years.

               Foster Mother testified that she had communicated with Grandmother “a couple

times a week on average” after Brother was placed in her care and had “invited her out to the

house” on multiple occasions. Most of the time, Grandmother could not visit the foster family

because of transportation issues, but on one occasion, Grandmother “brought the twins and came

out to [their] home to visit and meet baby [Brother].” Foster Mother testified that she was aware

of Grandmother’s financial difficulties and had sent her gift cards “during times when they

were struggling.”

               Foster Mother testified that when the children were brought to her for the

weekend visit, she “had a long list of concerns, including the condition they were in.” The

children “were very dirty,” and Molly “had an untreated rash all over her body” and a black eye.

                                                13
Immediately upon receiving the children, Foster Mother took photos of the black eye “so that no

one would think it happened in our care.” Copies of these photos were admitted into evidence.

Foster Mother also observed that the children did not use words to communicate but only cried

and screamed and that they were “constantly touching themselves and had their hands in their

pants,” which indicated to her that the children’s skin was irritated and itchy. Additionally, the

children had “fissures,” i.e., open sores, under their toes and “severe labial adhesions” that Foster

Mother discovered when she was changing their diapers. Foster Mother explained that when

“you’re changing a little girl, you have to spread the skin to clean everything out, and

unfortunately you couldn’t spread the skin” because “the labia [were] completely fused

together.” Foster Mother contacted the Department “first thing Monday morning” about her

concerns and arranged for them to see a pediatrician.

               On Tuesday, the Department removed the children from Grandmother’s care and

placed them with the foster family. A Department investigator testified that the change in

placement was prompted by an intake alleging physical abuse to Molly based on her having a

black eye and other facial bruising and further alleging medical neglect to both girls based on the

labial adhesions. The investigator also testified that the Department had concerns related to the

children’s development: “They were unable to feed themselves, and they were at an age where

they should have been able to do that, and they were using the wrong tools . . . like baby bottles

and things like that.” The investigator explained that at the time of trial, Grandmother “cannot

be a placement for the girls” because the Department had “an open investigation regarding her

household” and “ongoing concerns with medical neglect.” The investigator’s supervisor testified

that the Department had “reason to believe” that physical abuse had occurred while they were in

Grandmother’s care “based on [Molly] having bruises to her face.”

                                                 14
               The Department caseworker who had brought the children to the foster family

testified that when she later visited them in the foster home, they had been clean and dressed

appropriately. Also, the children’s toe fissures “were pretty much all healed up,” the labial

adhesions were “almost cleared up as well,” and the children were able to say words. The

caseworker further testified that Grandmother had not acknowledged that the children had

medical issues, speech issues, and developmental delays and had not requested to attend any of

the children’s medical appointments or requested to see the children’s medical records. Another

caseworker testified that Grandmother told her that the labial adhesions might have been the

result of eczema, allergies, or diaper rashes; that the black eye was caused by Molly “running

from the couch and like falling off the couch area and then . . . bump[ing] her eye”; and that the

children’s rashes might have been caused by bug bites from playing outside. Grandmother also

told the caseworker that the children were “singing and speaking and interacting well” before

they were removed from her care and attributed any communication delays to the disruption

caused by their removal from her care.

               Foster Mother testified that she had “multiple different therapies . . . lined up” for

the children, including physical therapy, speech therapy, and possibly occupational therapy.

Currently, Foster Mother had the children seeing an Early Child Intervention (ECI) special skills

trainer who was teaching them verbal communication and sign language. Foster Mother also

testified that she spent a minimum of two hours per day with the children “catching up their

developmental delays as well as their communication, their sign language, et cetera.” She

further testified that the children’s labial adhesions “had completely opened up,” that their rashes

had cleared up, and that the children had no diaper rashes or urinary tract infections while they

were in her care.

                                                15
                  Foster Mother further testified that since the children had been placed in her care,

she had “a great relationship” with them and that they call her “mama.” Whenever she picked

them up from daycare, “they come running with their hands up happy and smiling and giggling.”

She added, “We’re a family.” Foster Mother testified that it was her “hope and goal” to adopt

the children, although she acknowledged that she had concerns about the adoption because one

of the girls had exhibited “some aggressive behavior towards [Brother], and his safety came into

question.” The foster family was attempting to work through this issue and was “taking it one

day at a time.”

                  Grandmother, in her testimony, denied abusing or neglecting the girls but

acknowledged that she could have done “a better job” caring for them and promised to do better

moving forward if they were returned to her. Grandmother acknowledged that at the time of

trial, she was still struggling financially and that she and her husband were planning on moving

because the landlord would soon raise their rent. Grandmother also testified that her priority was

“the girls and their safety” and that if they were returned to her, she would not allow Father and

Mother to see the girls until “they get their lives right.”

                  Evidence regarding the children

                  The ECI specialist who had been working with the children to improve their

communication testified that when she first met with them in September 2022, neither child used

words to communicate, even though at their age, they should have been able to use 20 to 25

words. Molly “wasn’t making the sounds towards . . . people” and “would just come up to

people and tap them to get their attention,” while Sally “was just babbling and making sounds”

when playing by herself, “but she wasn’t doing it to approach somebody.” The specialist also

worked with the children “on fine motor skills, self-feeding skills, and cognitive skills.” They

                                                    16
were feeding themselves with their fingers, had difficulty with attention and memory tasks such

as identifying animals in picture books, and lacked fine motor skills such as using a spoon.

Although the children had improved their functioning since meeting with her, the specialist

testified that they would continue to need therapy moving forward.

               Another ECI specialist who evaluated the children testified that Molly “was

delayed nine months in development at a 47 percent delay,” “12 months delayed at a 63 percent

delay” in receptive communication, and “16 months delayed and an 84 percent delay” in

expressive communication. Molly also had a 21 percent delay in gross motor skills and a 10

percent delay in cognitive function. Sally had similar delays. Dr. Neha Patel, a pediatrician who

had evaluated Molly, testified that at 22 months old, she was at a developmental age of

approximately 12 to 14 months.

               When the children were first brought into her care, Foster Mother had them

evaluated by Dr. Lynn Azuma, a pediatrician. Dr. Azuma testified that she examined both

children and observed that they had rashes, toe fissures, and labial adhesions as Foster Mother

had suspected. Azuma also observed during her initial evaluation that Molly had a bruise on her

right cheek. The labial adhesions were “moderate to severe,” and Azuma testified that their

cause was unknown, although possibilities included low estrogen, trauma, an infection, or dirty

diapers and poor hygiene. Azuma testified that she provided Foster Mother with medications

and treatment instructions for the children’s rashes, fissures, and adhesions and that “everything

improved” following treatment.

               A nurse practitioner who had reviewed the children’s medical records prior to trial

testified that she reviewed photographs of the bruising to Molly and determined that “the

bruising was on two planes of the body, both on the front under actually the right eye, and then

                                               17
along the side of the face around the right eye.” She testified that the bruising was not consistent

with Grandmother’s claim that Molly fell and hit a table. The nurse practitioner opined that the

bruising was “concerning for physical abuse.” Regarding the adhesions, the nurse practitioner

did not determine that they were caused by neglect. However, she added, “[T]he only thing

that’s a little bit concerning and not necessarily neglectful is that a reasonable adult should have

noted that there were adhesions and the girls should have been brought in for a medical

evaluation for that.” She believed that “it would be apparent that the labia was fused” to an adult

who was “doing good hygiene and good cleaning.”

       Analysis

               In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that termination

of their parental rights is in the children’s best interest, Father and Mother focus almost

exclusively on favorable evidence regarding their proposed placement, Grandmother, including

evidence showing that the children were bonded to her, that she loved the children, that she had

raised them for more than half their lives, that she had adopted their older brothers, and that she

had received positive reports from the Department until the children’s visit with the foster family

in July 2022. Father and Mother also point out that the Department’s plan for the children,

adoption by the foster family, was uncertain at the time of trial. 2

       2   We note that a supplemental clerk’s record was filed with this Court that included a
docket-sheet entry indicating that at a post-trial permanency hearing, the attorney ad litem for the
children requested that the Department assist with finding “another placement that would be
willing to adopt the girls.” However, our review is limited to the evidence that was before the
district court at the time of its ruling. See D.R. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,
No. 03-22-00777-CV, 2023 WL 3102616, at *9 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 27, 2023, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
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               Although the above constitutes some evidence that is contrary to the finding that

termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest, ample

evidence in the record nevertheless establishes that termination of their parental rights was in the

best interest of the children. This includes evidence showing that: (1) Mother was never the

children’s primary caregiver, and although she visited them regularly at the beginning of the

case, she had stopped visiting the children once the Department began supervising the

visitations, and it had been “months” since she had last seen the children; (2) Father had never

been the children’s caregiver and had visited them on only three occasions; (3) Father and

Mother had a history of violent behavior, including multiple assaults that Father had committed

against Mother (including one assault that occurred while Mother was pregnant with the

children) and an assault that Mother had committed against Grandmother’s sister in the presence

of the children; (4) Father and Mother had a history of substance abuse, and both tested positive

for illegal drugs while the case was ongoing, with Mother giving birth to another child who

tested positive for drugs at birth; (5) Father and Mother continued to engage in criminal activity

while the case was ongoing, including a burglary offense for which warrants for their arrest were

issued during trial; (6) Father and Mother failed to complete their court-ordered services,

including services that were designed to address their ongoing issues with substance abuse and

domestic violence; (6) Mother did not have a stable home or consistent employment at the time

of trial; (7) Father lived with family members who the Department determined had extensive

criminal histories and were ineligible as placement options; (8) on one occasion, Father and

Mother had attempted to visit the children at Grandmother’s home in violation of a court order

that prohibited them from doing so; and (9) despite the evidence that adoption by the foster

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family was uncertain, there was considerable evidence presented that the children’s health and

development had improved while in the care of the foster family.

               Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we

conclude that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination of

Father’s and Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Therefore, the

evidence is legally sufficient to support the best-interest finding. Moreover, considering the

entire record, we cannot conclude that the evidence contrary to the finding is “so significant” that

the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Father’s and

Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Accordingly, the evidence is

also factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding.

               We overrule Father’s and Mother’s first issue.

Conservatorship

               In Father’s and Mother’s second issue and in Grandmother’s sole issue, they

assert that the district court abused its discretion in appointing the Department as Permanent

Managing Conservator of the children. In their view, Grandmother should have been appointed

managing conservator of the children.

               As an initial matter, because Father’s and Mother’s parental rights have been

terminated, and we are affirming that portion of the district court’s order terminating their

parental rights, Father and Mother lack standing to challenge the district court’s conservatorship

decision.   See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.206(b); In re H.M.M., 230 S.W.3d 204, 204-05

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also In re N.E., No. 01-22-00739-CV,

2023 WL 2530197, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 16, 2023, pet. denied)

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(mem. op.); A.K. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. and Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00285-CV,

2022 WL 14989625, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 27, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Accordingly, only Grandmother’s challenge to that decision is properly before us.

               Having terminated both Father’s and Mother’s parental rights, the trial court was

required to appoint either the Department or another permissible adult or agency as managing

conservator. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.207(a); In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 207 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Conservatorship determinations “are subject to review

only for abuse of discretion and may be reversed only if the decision is arbitrary and

unreasonable.” In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007). Legal and factual sufficiency are

not independent grounds of error under this standard but are factors used to determine whether

the trial court abused its discretion. In re K.S., 492 S.W.3d 419, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006,

pet. denied). Under this standard, an appellate court considers whether the trial court had

sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion and, if so, whether the trial court erred

in its application of discretion. Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588. The findings necessary to support

the trial court’s conservatorship decisions need be supported by only a preponderance of the

evidence, rather than clear and convincing evidence. See Tex. Fam. Code § 105.005; J.A.J.,

243 S.W.3d at 616.      A trial court does not abuse its discretion so long as there is some

substantive, probative evidence to support its decision. Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 587.

               Here, the district court explained its conservatorship decision in a letter sent to the

parties before it issued its decree. The court wrote:

       The evidence clearly demonstrated a significant bond between [Grandmother] and

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       the children. That they love each other and care for one another is certainly not in
       doubt. I do not find that [Grandmother] abused or neglected the children.
       However, the evidence also very clearly demonstrated some significant
       developmental delays in each child, which were apparent while the children were
       in her care but went undetected and untreated. The proven facts demonstrate the
       benefit of diagnosis and treatment of their physical, emotional, and developmental
       delays and the progress the children have made since their removal from the
       family. Treatment is ongoing and continues to be necessary to ensure that the
       children will overcome the identified deficits. In the final analysis, I find that it is
       the best interest of the children to deny the relief requested by the Intervenor and
       grant the petition by the Department of Family and Protective Services to be
       named the Permanent Managing Conservator of the children.

               “Some substantive, probative evidence” supports the district court’s decision. As

summarized above, medical professionals testified that the children had medical issues when

they were removed from Grandmother’s care and that their development and physical health

improved after the children received diagnosis and treatment. When the children’s medical

issues were brought to Grandmother’s attention, she either denied that the issues existed or

attempted to minimize their severity. She also did not notice the children’s labial adhesions,

which a pediatrician testified were “moderate to severe” and a nurse practitioner testified should

have been apparent to an adult who was “doing good hygiene and good cleaning” of the children.

Although Grandmother promised to do a better job caring for the children if they were returned

to her, the district court could have reasonably inferred that moving forward, the Department

would be better able to address the children’s ongoing special needs. Moreover, the district court

could have reasonably concluded that appointment of the Department as permanent managing

conservator would allow the foster family or some other family the opportunity to adopt the

children, which would provide the children with permanence and stability. On this record, we

cannot conclude that the district court’s decision to appoint the Department as permanent

managing conservator of the children was arbitrary or unreasonable.

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              We overrule Father’s and Mother’s second issue and Grandmother’s sole issue.

                                       CONCLUSION

              We affirm the district court’s termination decree.

                                            __________________________________________
                                            Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker and Triana

Affirmed

Filed: June 29, 2023

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