Court Opinion

ID: 8123458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 15:03:02.070686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:06.907493
License: Public Domain

McCormick, J.
We think the demurrer well taken. The power to sell the lands given in the deed of trust mentioned is certainly such a power as w'ould be held at common law to have coupled with it an interest in the lands mentioned in the power, and would authorize its execution even after the death of the donor of the power. In this state it is held that such a power cannot be executed after the death of the donor, but this rule here is based on the Texas statutes regulating the administration of the estates of deceased persons. Those statutes give priority to funeral expenses, expenses of last sickness, allowances to the family, etc., over all other indebtedness, (except, perhaps, for purchase money,) and they make special provision for the execution of just such contracts and libns as this by administration. Robertson v. Paul, 16 Tex. 472.
*862In the ease just cited, the power under consideration was precisely similar to the one given Jack and Mott, under consideration by us in this case, and Judge Wheeleb, in his opinion in that case, clearly indicates his opinion that-in Texas, the common law being the rule of decision here, such a power could be executed after the death of the grantor, but for its contravening our system of administration of decedents’ estates.
A careful examination of the Texas statutes does not disclose any such provisions in reference to insane persons, or in regard to the management of the estates of persons of unsound mind, as those provisions of the law regulating the administration of the estate of deceased persons, which have been held in Robinson v. Paul, supra, and in subsequent cases in the Texas Reports, to cause the power to determine upon the death of the grantor. It is not necessary for us to consider what might have been the effect upon this power had the complainant been found insane by proper inquest, and guardianship of his estate granted by the proper court. We are clearly of opinion that the condition of complainant presented by the bill was not such as arrested or suspended the power granted by him in the deed of trust. No element of fraud is presented in the bill. The mere fact of making the sale while complainant was in the condition alleged, with knowledge thereof on the part of the defendant and of the trustees, is all that is charged ,in that direction.
The inadequacy of price complained of does not appear to have resulted from any improper act of defendant. From all that appears, the sale was made precisely as the complainant had provided it shoud be made, and the defendant became the purchaser because he was willing to give more for the land, and at the sale offered more for the land than any one else offered, and no reason suggests itself to us for setting aside the sale on that ground.
The demurrer is sustained.
Paedee, J., concurs.