Court Opinion

ID: 9918893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 21:03:30.393195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:28.284974
License: Public Domain

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
                  2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

                                    2024 CO 2

                      Supreme Court Case No. 23SA140
                   Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21
                 Weld County District Court Case No. 21CR586
                  Honorable Marcelo Adrian Kopcow, Judge

                                       In Re
                                     Plaintiff:

                       The People of the State of Colorado,

                                         v.

                                   Defendant:

                               James Herman Dye.

                              Rule Made Absolute
                                    en banc
                                January 16, 2024

Attorneys for Plaintiff:
Michael J. Rourke, District Attorney, Nineteenth Judicial District
Steve Wrenn, Chief Deputy District Attorney
      Greeley, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant:
Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Reshaad Shirazi, Deputy Public Defender
Jennifer Ahnstedt, Deputy Public Defender
John Walsh, Deputy Public Defender
      Greeley, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent Weld County District Court:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Emily Burke Buckley, Senior Assistant Attorney General
      Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE
GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

                                      2
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1    In whodunnit criminal cases, the defendant will sometimes point the finger

at another person—in legal parlance, an alternate suspect. The alternate suspect

defense seeks to cast reasonable doubt on the defendant’s guilt by tying someone

else to the charged crime and making the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator

less probable.

¶2    In this whodunnit criminal case, James Herman Dye informed the district

court during a pretrial hearing that he was considering presenting alternate

suspect evidence at trial to defend against charges that he murdered a woman in

rural Greeley, Colorado, over forty years ago. But he asked the court to declare

that he was under no obligation to endorse the alternate suspect defense, let alone

disclose before trial any information related to that defense. The prosecutors

objected, arguing that Dye was seeking permission to subject them to trial by

ambush. They requested that, if Dye intended to pursue the alternate suspect

defense, he be required to disclose any alternate suspect’s name and all the

evidence bearing on that defense. They further urged the court to hold a pretrial

hearing to address the admissibility of any alternate suspect evidence.

¶3    Although the district court acknowledged that there is no provision in Rule

16 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Discovery and Procedure Before

Trial”) expressly addressing pretrial disclosures related to the alternate suspect

                                        3
defense, it nevertheless ordered Dye to disclose, at least forty-five days before trial,

“all evidence” related to that defense. See Crim. P. 16(II)(c). In doing so, the court

relied on the provision in Crim. P. 16(II)(c) that directs a defendant to disclose “the

nature of any defense, other than alibi.” Dye then invoked our original jurisdiction

by filing a C.A.R. 21 petition, and we, in turn, issued a rule to show cause.

¶4    Dye now contends that the requirement in Crim. P. 16(II)(c) to disclose “the

nature of any defense” is inapposite because it covers only affirmative defenses.

The alternate suspect defense, Dye maintains, is not an affirmative defense. The

district court and the prosecution counter that Colorado law authorizes the

challenged discovery order. We agree with neither proposition. On the one hand,

our construction of “the nature of any defense” in Crim. P. 16(II)(c) differs from

Dye’s. On the other, we conclude that the district court’s order requiring Dye to

provide all evidence bearing on the alternate suspect defense is overbroad.

¶5    We hold that “any defense” in Crim. P. 16(II)(c) means any defense, not just

any affirmative defense. It follows that the reference to “any defense” necessarily

includes the alternate suspect defense; therefore, the alternate suspect defense

must be endorsed before trial.

¶6    We further hold that when the alternate suspect defense is endorsed, Crim.

P. 16(II)(c)’s disclosure requirement regarding “the nature of any defense”

includes the identity of any alternate suspect.        An alternate suspect who is

                                           4
unidentifiable by name must be otherwise identified—e.g., the person whose

DNA profile was located at the crime scene but who has not yet been identified by

name. Further, to the extent a defendant intends to call an alternate suspect to

testify at trial, the alternate suspect’s address, just like the address of any other

defense witness, must be provided to the prosecution. See Crim. P. 16(II)(c). All

these disclosures must be made no later than thirty-five days before a felony trial

or seven days before a non-felony trial, unless the court extends the applicable

deadline for good cause. Id. In the alternate-suspect-defense context, Crim.

P. 16(II)(c) permits a defendant to do nothing less and authorizes a trial court to

order nothing more.

¶7     Once a defendant timely endorses the alternate suspect defense, identifies

any alternate suspects, and discloses the addresses of any alternate suspects who

will be called to testify, Crim. P. 16(II)(c) is satisfied. It is then up to the prosecution

to conduct its own investigation into any alternate suspect identified. Following

any such investigation, if the prosecution has a good faith belief that alternate

suspect evidence is inadmissible under the criteria we articulated in People v.

Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, 351 P.3d 431, it must file, without undue delay, a pretrial

objection explaining its position.1

1 In Elmarr, we held that “the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence ultimately

depends on the strength of the connection between the alternate suspect and the

                                             5
¶8    But that begs the question: Should a trial court resolve disputes related to

the admissibility determinations delineated in Elmarr before trial or may it wait to

do so until the middle of trial? Today we clarify that, given the weighty and

consequential character of those determinations, a trial court should resolve any

such dispute before trial, though we leave to its sound discretion when precisely to

take this pretrial action. We caution trial courts to guard against proceeding

prematurely. At the other end of the spectrum, we caution trial courts to guard

against letting the issue linger until the eve of trial.

¶9    Along the same lines, we conclude that whether to hold a hearing in

connection with the Elmarr-required admissibility determinations is also a matter

within a trial court’s discretion. Depending on the circumstances involved in a

particular case, a hearing may (or may not) be warranted. If a trial court does hold

a hearing, a defendant may proceed by offer of proof. We stress that the purpose

of any such hearing would be strictly to permit the adjudication of a good faith

charged crime.” ¶ 22, 351 P.3d at 438. The evidence must be relevant (meaning,
in this context, that it must establish a non-speculative connection between the
alternate suspect and the crime), and its probative value must not be substantially
outweighed by any of the concerns listed in CRE 403. Id. at ¶¶ 22–23, 351 P.3d at
438. Relatedly, we provided a roadmap in Elmarr for ascertaining the admissibility
of other acts or transactions and out-of-court statements by an alternate suspect.
Id. at ¶¶ 23–24, 351 P.3d at 438.

                                            6
objection to the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence, not to allow the

prosecution to embark upon a fishing expedition.

¶10   When confronting a prosecutor’s good faith objection, a trial court’s

gatekeeping function under Elmarr may occasionally require a defendant to share

additional information about the alternate suspect defense; otherwise, a trial court

may be unable to make the requisite admissibility determinations.             Such

information would not implicate Crim. P. 16(II)(c) because it would not constitute

discovery to be provided to the prosecution. Instead, it would be akin to the type

of information defendants must sometimes proffer to permit a trial court to make

pretrial rulings on the admissibility of their proposed evidence.

¶11   The district court and the prosecution observe that the information already

in discovery and previously adduced during pretrial hearings will almost always

suffice to permit a trial court to make the admissibility determinations mandated

by Elmarr. We are inclined to agree and thus expect that a defendant will rarely

need to offer a trial court previously undisclosed information regarding the

alternate suspect defense.

¶12   All that to say that today’s decision carves out a path between Dye’s overly

restrictive reading of Crim. P. 16(II)(c)—requiring no disclosures related to the

alternate suspect defense—and the district court’s overly broad order—requiring

disclosure of all the evidence bearing on that defense. Thus, we strike a balance

                                         7
between the two proposed disclosure approaches: not too little and not too much.

Along the way, we reject Dye’s argument that requiring him to make any

disclosures related to the alternate suspect defense violates his constitutional

rights. Accordingly, while we decline to provide the relief Dye requests, we

nevertheless make the rule absolute.

                       I. Facts and Procedural History

¶13   Just five days after Thanksgiving in 1979, Charles “Chuck” Day notified the

police that his wife, Evelyn “Kay” Day, was missing.2 He explained that he had

last heard from her the previous evening when she called to let him know she

would be staying late at Aims Community College (“Aims”), where she worked

as a lab monitor. According to Chuck, he had driven to the Aims campus and had

also called Kay’s doctor, friends, and colleagues, but had been unable to find her.

Additionally, he’d contacted a hospital and the couple’s bank to no avail.

¶14   Later, as Patricia Harden, one of Kay’s colleagues, was leaving the Aims

campus, she and her carpool noticed Kay’s car parked on the shoulder of the road.

As they approached for a closer look, they discovered that Kay’s body was in the

2 Because the victim and her husband share the same last name, we refer to him as

“Chuck” and to her as “Kay.” This informality is solely for the purpose of
avoiding confusion; we mean no disrespect.

                                        8
back of the vehicle. It was later determined that Kay had been sexually assaulted

and then strangled by the belt removed from the jacket she was wearing.

¶15   During Kay’s autopsy, the coroner collected vaginal swabs, and those

swabs, along with some items of clothing, were tested in 1979 and 1980. This

testing revealed the presence of both spermatozoa on the vaginal swabs and

seminal fluid on the crotch area of Kay’s underwear. Although Chuck was

excluded as the source of the spermatozoa, he was considered the prime suspect

in the investigation.

¶16   The case lay dormant for several decades. By 2011, however, technological

advances allowed for further forensic testing, which identified Chuck’s DNA on

the belt used to strangle Kay. He thus remained the primary suspect in his wife’s

murder.

¶17   But nine years later, after the Weld County Sheriff’s Office created a cold

case unit, the DNA profile developed from the sperm fraction found in the vaginal

swabs was resubmitted to the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), a

national DNA database. CODIS matched that DNA profile to Dye’s. Thereafter,

Dye’s DNA was also located on Kay’s coat, pantyhose, underwear, pants, and the

belt with which she’d been strangled, as well as underneath her fingernails.

¶18   As they focused their attention on Dye, investigators learned that he had

been a student at Aims in November 1979 (when Kay was killed), and that he had

                                        9
been on parole at the time for a 1977 sexual assault that shared similarities with

the one involving Kay. In March 2021, Dye was charged with Kay’s murder.

Specifically, the prosecution filed charges of first degree murder after deliberation

and felony murder.

¶19   At his preliminary hearing, Dye elicited testimony from the prosecution’s

witnesses aimed at implicating Chuck. Dye also called the investigation’s former

lead detective to the stand to discuss the evidence that initially led law

enforcement to consider Chuck the primary suspect. And in his written argument

to the court following the preliminary hearing, Dye asserted that the evidence

pointed to one conclusion: Chuck had killed his wife. There was no mention of

another alternate suspect either at the preliminary hearing or in Dye’s subsequent

written argument.

¶20   Following the preliminary hearing, the district court found that there was

probable cause to believe Dye had committed the crimes charged. Dye later filed

a prophylactic motion seeking an order declaring that there’s no requirement to

disclose before trial an intent to offer evidence of an alternate suspect. He argued

that there is “simply no mechanism—constitutional, statutory, rule[-based] or

otherwise—to require the defen[dant] to make disclosures about the nature or

content of the alternate suspect evidence he may introduce at trial.”            The

prosecutors objected, contending that Dye was seeking permission “to ambush”

                                         10
them at trial. According to the prosecutors, to prevent that from happening, they

were entitled to a pretrial hearing and disclosure of all of Dye’s evidence bearing

on the alternate suspect defense.

¶21   At a subsequent hearing, the district court expressed concern that it was

entertaining a purely “academic exercise,” since the cat was already out of the bag.

Given statements previously made by the defense at the preliminary hearing and

in multiple pleadings, the court discerned that the prosecution was clearly “on

notice” that Chuck was the alternate suspect. The court wondered, then, “why

we’re having this discussion.” Continuing, the court asked, “Is there another

alternate suspect?”    Dye’s counsel responded that he couldn’t “share that

information with the court.”

¶22   The district court ultimately ordered Dye to disclose both his intent, if any,

“to offer alternate suspect evidence” and “the nature of any alternate suspect

evidence.” More specifically, it ruled that, to the extent Dye intended to assert the

alternate suspect defense at trial, he was required to produce before trial “all

evidence” bearing on that defense. While acknowledging the absence of any “legal

provision regarding mandatory pretrial disclosures that mentions alternate

suspect evidence by name,” the court nonetheless reasoned that Crim. P. 16(II)(c),

which requires the disclosure of “the nature of any defense,” authorized its order.

Further, explained the court, given the age of the case and the voluminous

                                         11
discovery involved, the analysis related to the admissibility of any alternate

suspect evidence was likely to be laborious. To give itself “enough time to

examine any alternate suspect evidence” and make the admissibility

determinations required by Elmarr, the court ordered Dye to disclose all alternate

suspect evidence no later than forty-five days before trial. The court believed that

this deadline would prevent trial by ambush without prejudicing Dye.

¶23    Dye sought reconsideration of the district court’s order, but the court denied

his motion. That prompted Dye to invoke our original jurisdiction via a C.A.R. 21

petition. We then issued a rule to show cause. We explain next why we are

exercising our original jurisdiction.

                            II. Original Jurisdiction

¶24    C.A.R. 21 recognizes that the exercise of our original jurisdiction is entirely

within our discretion. C.A.R. 21(a)(1). Relief pursuant to our original jurisdiction

“is extraordinary in nature.” Id. Therefore, in the past, we have cabined the

exercise of our original jurisdiction to such circumstances as when the normal

appellate process would prove inadequate, a party may suffer irreparable harm,

or there is an issue of first impression that has significant public importance. See

People v. Platteel, 2023 CO 18, ¶ 21, 528 P.3d 176, 180 (citing People v. Hacke, 2023 CO

6, ¶ 7, 524 P.3d 8, 11).

                                          12
¶25   Dye maintains that the district court’s order not only requires him to turn

over evidence that suggests what his defense is, it also forces him to reveal to the

prosecution all the evidence supporting that defense. What’s more, continues Dye,

the order imposes an earlier deadline than the one set forth in Crim. P. 16(II)(c).

Thus, according to Dye, the order adversely affects his ability to litigate the merits

of the case and, if erroneous, cannot be cured on direct appeal.

¶26   We agree with Dye that the normal appellate process is inadequate to

address the issues he raises. If the district court’s order were allowed to stand, it

would improperly obligate Dye to comply with the earlier deadline imposed and,

more importantly, to disclose all his alternate suspect evidence to the prosecution.

And an appellate court could not return the parties to their original positions. As

the old saying goes, “You can’t unscramble an egg.”

¶27   We also agree with Dye that this is a novel issue of significant public

importance. Although our decision in Elmarr established the proper framework

for analyzing the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence, in the eight years

since, we have not had occasion to outline the mechanism litigants and trial courts

should employ to implement that framework. Indeed, the district court correctly

noted that “[t]here is little law directly addressing if and when a defendant must

present the court and the prosecution with an offer of proof supporting the

introduction of alternate suspect evidence.”

                                         13
¶28   Because Dye has no other adequate remedy, and because his petition

presents an issue of first impression that is important to Coloradans, the exercise

of our original jurisdiction is warranted in this case.

¶29   We are not persuaded otherwise by the prosecution’s assertion that Dye is

seeking an advisory opinion on a hypothetical situation. The prosecution reminds

us that it is already on notice that Dye may seek to introduce evidence that Chuck

killed his wife. Further, it informs us that it does not intend to contest the

admissibility of any evidence in support of this theory, many aspects of which

have apparently been litigated and deemed admissible already.

¶30   But the prosecution appears to forget what prompted its objection to Dye’s

prophylactic motion in the first place—namely, Dye’s refusal to specify whether

he intends to rely on the alternate suspect defense at trial, and if so, whether Chuck

is the only alternate suspect. Dye is asking us to vacate the discovery order

requiring him to first make extensive pretrial disclosures before he may present

alternate suspect evidence. To be sure, if Dye doesn’t intend to present alternate

suspect evidence, the issue is moot. But, at this point, we don’t know what his

intention is, and he’s asking us to rule that he need not divulge his intention. Even

if Dye’s intention is to introduce alternate suspect evidence related solely to

Chuck, there are live issues as to whether Dye must disclose that intention and

make additional disclosures before trial. Of course, it’s possible Dye intends to

                                          14
point the finger at other alternate suspects; if that’s the case, the questions of

whether he must share that intent with the prosecution and make pretrial

disclosures regarding such individuals are certainly not moot.

¶31   Because we have jurisdiction over Dye’s petition, we move on to address

the questions he brings before us.

                                 III. Analysis

¶32   We set out on our analytical course by acknowledging the standard that

controls our review. Against that backdrop, we proceed to tackle the merits of the

legal issues presented. We start by construing the requirement in Crim. P. 16(II)(c)

to disclose “the nature of any defense.”      We then discuss the admissibility

determinations required by Elmarr when a defendant seeks to introduce alternate

suspect evidence at trial. Mindful of Crim. P. 16(II)(c) and Elmarr, we next lay out

the procedures litigants and trial courts should follow when a defendant wishes

to introduce alternate suspect evidence. After doing so, we consider but ultimately

reject Dye’s constitutional contentions. Because we make absolute the rule to show

cause, we end by providing remand instructions to the district court.

                           A. Standard of Review

¶33   Under article VI, section 21 of the Colorado Constitution, this court enjoys

“plenary authority to promulgate and interpret the Colorado Rules of Criminal

Procedure.” People v. Angel, 2012 CO 34, ¶ 13, 277 P.3d 231, 234. The fundamental

                                        15
purpose of the rules of criminal procedure is “to provide for the just determination

of criminal proceedings.” Crim. P. 2 (“Purpose and Construction”). The rules aim

“to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination

of unjustifiable expense and delay.” People v. Steen, 2014 CO 9, ¶ 10, 318 P.3d 487,

490 (quoting Crim. P. 2).

¶34   Like questions of statutory interpretation, questions of rule interpretation

are questions of law subject to de novo review. People v. A.S.M., 2022 CO 47, ¶ 14,

517 P.3d 675, 678; see also Northstar Project Mgmt., Inc. v. DLR Grp., Inc., 2013 CO

12, ¶ 12, 295 P.3d 956, 959 (stating that we review de novo a district court’s

interpretation of a rule of procedure). We acknowledge that a discovery order is

committed to the sound discretion of a trial court. Angel, ¶ 13, 277 P.3d at 234.

However, the interpretation of the rule of procedure on which such an order is

grounded “is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Id.

¶35   In construing our rules of criminal procedure, we rely on “the same

interpretive rules applicable to statutory construction.” Id. at ¶ 17, 277 P.3d at 235

(quoting People v. Fuqua, 764 P.2d 56, 58 (Colo. 1988)). That is, we first read the

language of the rule to discern its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. If the language

is unambiguous, we go no further and apply it as written. Id.

                                         16
                                 B. Crim. P. 16(II)(c)

¶36    Crim. P. 16 governs discovery in criminal cases. Part II of the rule addresses

disclosures a defendant must make to the prosecution.           See Crim. P. 16(II).

Subsection (c) within Part II, titled “Nature of Defense,” provides that, “[s]ubject

to constitutional limitations,” a defendant must “disclose to the prosecution the

nature of any defense, other than alibi,” intended to be used at trial. Crim.

P. 16(II)(c).

¶37    Dye argues that Crim. P. 16(II)(c) is irrelevant because it covers only

affirmative defenses, and the alternate suspect defense is not an affirmative

defense.        But the language of Crim. P. 16(II)(c) contradicts Dye’s position.

Subsection (II)(c) refers broadly to any defense, not narrowly to any affirmative

defense. Had we intended to limit the scope of this provision to affirmative

defenses, we would have said so. Because the rule’s language is unambiguous,

we apply it as written based on its plain and ordinary meaning.

¶38    As pertinent here, the word “any” is defined as “every” or “all.” Any,

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

any [https://perma.cc/4WVN-K99T]; see also Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 14,

431 P.3d 215, 218 (“When determining the plain and ordinary meaning of words,

we may consider a definition in a recognized dictionary.”). Thus, we hold that

                                           17
Crim. P. 16(II)(c) requires a defendant to disclose the nature of every defense (other

than alibi), including the alternate suspect defense.3

¶39   According to Dye, however, even if Crim. P. 16(II)(c) is apposite, it requires

nothing more of him than to file an endorsement of the alternate suspect defense.

Again, we cannot agree.

¶40   Crim. P. 16(II)(c) says that a defendant must disclose “the nature of any

defense.”    As used in this context, the word “nature” means “the inherent

character,” “basic constitution,” or “essence” of the alternate suspect defense.

Nature,     Merriam-Webster    Dictionary,    https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/nature [https://perma.cc/M5GF-DRUG]; see also Nature, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A fundamental quality that distinguishes one thing

from another; the essence of something.”). Merely stating that a defendant intends

to point the finger at an alternate suspect without identifying who that suspect is

does not convey the inherent quality or essence of the alternate suspect defense.

Indeed, such a shallow disclosure imparts almost nothing of substance to the

prosecution.

¶41   Our conclusion is buoyed by the last sentence in Crim. P. 16(II)(c): “Upon

receipt of the information required by this subsection (c), the prosecuting attorney

3 We need not, and thus do not, address whether the alternate suspect defense is

an affirmative defense.

                                         18
shall notify the defense of any additional witnesses which the prosecution intends

to call to rebut such defense within a reasonable time after their identity becomes

known.” Without a defendant’s pretrial disclosure regarding the identity of an

alternate suspect(s), the prosecution may be forced to call an unendorsed rebuttal

witness at trial. That is precisely what the last sentence in Crim. P. 16(II)(c) aims

to prevent. And although permitting an unendorsed rebuttal witness to take the

stand may prejudice a defendant, a trial court would be hard-pressed to exclude

the proposed testimony.

¶42   Accordingly, we hold that Crim. P. 16(II)(c)’s disclosure requirement

regarding “the nature of any defense” includes the identity of any alternate

suspect. An alternate suspect who is unidentifiable by name must be otherwise

identified—e.g., the person whose DNA profile was located at the crime scene but

who has not yet been identified by name. To the extent defense counsel intends

to call an alternate suspect to testify at trial, the alternate suspect’s address, just

like the address of any other defense witness, must be provided to the prosecution.

See Crim. P. 16(II)(c).

¶43   Based on its reading of Crim. P. 16(II)(c), the district court correctly

determined that the alternate suspect defense must be endorsed and that any

alternate suspect must be identified. But the court didn’t stop there. It also

directed Dye to disclose “all evidence” bearing on the alternate suspect defense.

                                          19
In fairness, the district court was validly concerned about tabling the admissibility

determinations required by Elmarr until the middle of trial. To understand why

the prospect of waiting gave the district court heartburn, we turn our attention to

Elmarr now.

                                    C. Elmarr

¶44    In Elmarr, we concluded that the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence

is moored to “the strength of the connection between the alternate suspect and the

charged crime.” ¶ 22, 351 P.3d at 438. Alternate suspect evidence is admissible

only if it “establishes a non-speculative connection or nexus between the alternate

suspect and the crime charged.” Id. at ¶ 23, 351 P.3d at 438. Because the touchstone

of relevance in this context is whether there is such a non-speculative connection,

alternate suspect evidence “must create more than just an unsupported inference

or possible ground for suspicion.” Id. at ¶ 32, 351 P.3d at 439. Otherwise, we risk

speculative blaming that heightens the prospect of jury confusion and invites the

jury to rest its verdict on emotion or prejudice. Id.

¶45    Evidence merely showing that someone else had a motive or an opportunity

to commit the charged crime is too speculative because it gives rise “to no more

than   grounds    for   possible   suspicion”;   there   must   also   be   evidence

“circumstantially or inferentially linking the alternate suspect to the charged

crime.” Id. at ¶ 34, 351 P.3d at 440. Whether the requisite connection exists entails

                                         20
a case-by-case analysis that considers all the evidence proffered by a defendant.

Id. at ¶ 31, 351 P.3d at 439.

¶46   If the evidence is related to other acts or transactions by the alternate

suspect, a trial court must be guided by the tenets of CRE 404(b) and “look to

whether all the similar acts and circumstances, taken together, support a finding

that the same person probably was involved in . . . the other act[s] and the charged

crime.” Id. at ¶ 23, 351 P.3d at 438. But “the overarching relevance inquiry remains

whether the evidence, taken collectively, establishes a non-speculative connection

between the alternate suspect and the charged crime.” Id. at ¶ 40, 351 P.3d at 441.

¶47   Lastly, if the evidence concerns out-of-court statements made by the

alternate suspect, a trial court must determine whether those statements satisfy

the requirements of any hearsay exception. Id. at ¶ 24, 351 P.3d at 438. Even if the

statements are admissible under our hearsay rules, the court must still decide

whether the statements, along with other proffered alternate suspect evidence,

establish the requisite non-speculative connection between the alternate suspect

and the charged crime. Id.

¶48   While Elmarr laid out the blueprint to analyze the admissibility of alternate

suspect evidence, we’ve never been called upon to pass judgment on the

applicable procedural mechanics. Mindful of Crim. P. 16(II)(c) and Elmarr, we do

our utmost now to provide some guidance in this regard.

                                        21
         D. Procedures Applicable to Alternate Suspect Evidence

¶49   A defendant must endorse the alternate suspect defense, identify any

alternate suspects, and disclose the addresses of any alternate suspects who will

be called to testify no later than thirty-five days before a felony trial or seven days

before a non-felony trial, unless the court extends the applicable deadline for good

cause.4 See Crim. P. 16(II)(c). In the alternate-suspect-defense context, Crim.

P. 16(II)(c) permits a defendant to do nothing less and authorizes a trial court to

order nothing more.

¶50   From there, it is up to the prosecution to conduct its own investigation into

any alternate suspect identified.       Following any such investigation, if the

prosecution has a good faith belief that alternate suspect evidence is inadmissible

under the criteria we articulated in Elmarr, it must file, without undue delay, a

pretrial objection explaining its position.5

4 Rather than extend the applicable deadline of no less than thirty-five days before

trial, the district court’s alteration shortened the applicable deadline by requiring
Dye to make disclosures even earlier (no less than forty-five days before trial). In
any event, the record does not appear to contain a finding of good cause to allow
the court to extend the applicable deadline.
5 Of course, prosecutors who forego filing a pretrial objection under Elmarr,
because they agree that the anticipated alternate suspect evidence is generally
admissible, may nonetheless raise objections to specific aspects of that evidence at
trial pursuant to our rules of evidence.

                                          22
¶51   Given the weighty and consequential character of the admissibility

determinations delineated by Elmarr, a trial court should resolve any disputes

related to those determinations before trial. Waiting until the middle of trial to

decide whether alternate suspect evidence is admissible is fraught with peril: It

may cause lengthy interruptions, force the judge to make rushed judgments on

difficult issues, prevent the parties from discussing concepts related to the

alternate suspect defense during jury selection and opening statements, and

preclude questioning of some witnesses about the proposed evidence. Aside from

causing disruptions during trial, failing to rule on the admissibility of alternate

suspect evidence before trial is also likely to hinder plea negotiations and inhibit

the prosecution’s ability to decide whether it may ethically proceed with the case.

¶52   We recognize that, at least in this context, the timeliness of pretrial

admissibility determinations rests on the horns of a dilemma. Much like steering

between Scylla and Charybdis, trial courts should do their utmost to thread the

needle: On the one hand, proceeding prematurely may be ineffective; on the other,

waiting until the eve of trial may be problematic.6

6 In Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus and his men confront Scylla and Charybdis, sea

monsters. See in re Briese, 196 B.R. 440, 443 n.1 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996). Scylla is a
multi-headed giant; Charybdis is a creature who apparently creates a whirlpool
by consuming the sea. Id. As these abominations live upon opposite shores of a
very narrow channel, it is virtually impossible to navigate away from one without
falling into the clutches of the other. Id.

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¶53   But must a trial court hold a hearing in connection with the Elmarr-required

admissibility determinations? Today we announce that this, too, is a matter within

a trial court’s discretion. Depending on the circumstances involved in a particular

case, a hearing may (or may not) be warranted. If a trial court does hold a hearing,

a defendant may proceed by offer of proof. We stress that the purpose of any such

hearing would be strictly to permit a trial court to adjudicate any good faith

disagreements related to the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence, not to

allow the prosecution to embark upon a fishing expedition.

¶54   When confronting the prosecution’s good faith objection, a trial court’s

gatekeeping function under Elmarr may occasionally require a defendant to share

additional information about the alternate suspect defense. Otherwise, a trial

court may be unable to make the requisite admissibility determinations. Relying

on our recent decision in People v. Kilgore, 2020 CO 6, 455 P.3d 746, Dye pushes

back on this front. We are unmoved.

¶55   In Kilgore, we disavowed a provision in the district court’s case management

order requiring the parties in every criminal case to exchange exhibits prior to trial.

¶ 25, 455 P.3d at 751. Of particular interest here, we concluded that “the district

court was devoid of authority to require Kilgore to disclose his exhibits to the

prosecution before trial.” Id. Kilgore is inapposite. Nothing we say today should

be understood as permitting a trial court to surpass the limits of its authority

                                          24
pursuant to the terms of Crim. P. 16. Id. at ¶ 23, 455 P.3d at 750; Richardson v. Dist.

Ct., 632 P.2d 595, 599 (Colo. 1981). Any information a defendant may need to share

with a trial court regarding alternate suspect evidence to permit the admissibility

determinations required by Elmarr would not implicate Crim. P. 16(II)(c) because

it would not constitute discovery to be provided to the prosecution. Instead, it

would be akin to the type of information defendants sometimes have to proffer to

permit a trial court to make pretrial rulings on the admissibility of their proposed

evidence. For example, a defendant’s proposed evidence related to the defense of

insanity, expert opinions of mental condition, other expert opinions, the rape

shield statute, and other acts or transactions under CRE 404(b) often requires a

court to make pretrial admissibility determinations. And to allow a court to do so

may require a defendant to provide information that goes beyond what has

already been produced in discovery pursuant to Crim. P. 16(II)(c).

¶56   We underscore that in the alternate-suspect-defense context a defendant

would only have to present such information to a trial court in the event the

prosecution raises a good faith objection. And then only if that information is

necessary to make Elmarr’s admissibility determinations.

¶57   The district court and the prosecution observe that the information already

in discovery and previously adduced during pretrial hearings will almost always

suffice to permit a trial court to make the admissibility determinations mandated

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by Elmarr. We are inclined to agree and thus expect that a defendant will rarely

need to offer a trial court previously undisclosed information regarding the

alternate suspect defense.

                    E. Dye’s Constitutional Contentions

¶58   Dye asserts that requiring him to make any pretrial disclosures related to

alternate suspect evidence violates his constitutional right to due process and his

privilege against self-incrimination. We are unpersuaded.

¶59   Dye’s reliance on Kilgore is unavailing here too. First, we acknowledge that

in Kilgore, we said that a trial court may not “require disclosures that infringe on

an accused’s constitutional rights.” ¶ 1, 455 P.3d at 748. But because we concluded

that the trial court’s order exceeded the discovery authorized by Crim. P. 16, we

didn’t have to address the merits of Kilgore’s constitutional claims. Id. at ¶ 2,

455 P.3d at 748. For that reason, we were content to simply note that the order

“arguably” infringed on Kilgore’s constitutional rights. Id. Indeed, Dye concedes

that we did not “decide the constitutional issue” in Kilgore.

¶60   Second, while we expressed concern in Kilgore that allowing the prosecution

access to defense exhibits before trial could violate a defendant’s constitutional

rights by helping the prosecution meet its burden of proof, that concern was rooted

in the fact that the district court’s discovery order exceeded the contours of Crim.

P. 16(II). Id. at ¶¶ 23, 27, 29, 455 P.3d at 750–51. We explained that Crim. P. 16(II)

                                         26
“was carefully drafted,” and that an omission, far from being an oversight,

reflected a deliberate attempt “to prevent the impairment of constitutional rights

that arguably could result from a rule permitting the court to enlarge the categories

of prosecutorial discovery on the basis of an ad hoc evaluation of each case.” Id.

at ¶ 23, 455 P.3d at 750 (quoting Richardson, 632 P.2d at 599). Here, however, as it

relates to Crim. P. 16(II)(c), we simply hold that Dye must comply with the

requirement to disclose “the nature of any defense,” as we construe that phrase

today.

¶61   And Dye does not ask us to conclude that Crim. P. 16(II)(c), itself, is

unconstitutional—nor is there a tenable basis to do so. Courts have regularly

rejected the general argument that statutes and rules requiring defendants in

criminal cases to engage in reciprocal discovery are unconstitutional.           See

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81–82 (1970). As the Court eloquently put it in

Williams, “The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a

poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards

until played.” Id. at 82.

¶62   True, we conclude today that, if necessary to allow the district court to make

the admissibility determinations outlined in Elmarr, it is possible that Dye may

need to provide information beyond that produced pursuant to Crim. P. 16(II)(c).

But as we mentioned earlier, such information is not meaningfully different from

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pretrial information defendants sometimes must provide to permit a court to

determine the admissibility of their proposed evidence. And Dye does not suggest

that it is unconstitutional to compel defendants to share information about their

proposed evidence prior to trial. It isn’t. Simply advancing the timing of defense

disclosures from the middle of trial to earlier in the proceedings does not violate a

defendant’s constitutional rights. See People v. Martinez, 970 P.2d 469, 473 (Colo.

1998) (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 85).

¶63   Lastly, and most significantly, we side with Dye in disapproving of the

district court’s overbroad order requiring him to disclose “all evidence” related to

the alternate suspect defense.         Regardless of whether that order may have

threatened irreparable harm to Dye’s constitutional rights, our opinion does not.

To the contrary, our opinion should assuage Dye’s concerns. Accordingly, we

reject his constitutional challenge.

                           F. Instructions on Remand

¶64   Because the district court’s order requiring Dye to disclose “all evidence”

bearing on the alternate suspect defense exceeded the boundaries of Crim.

P. 16(II)(c), it is vacated. On remand, if Dye intends to rely on the alternate suspect

defense, he must do the following no later than thirty-five days before trial (or no

later than whatever extended deadline the court sets based on good cause):

(1) provide notice of his intent to introduce alternate suspect evidence, (2) identify

                                           28
any alternate suspects in accordance with this opinion, and (3) produce the

addresses of any alternate suspects he intends to call at trial. See Crim. P. 16(II)(c).

¶65   It will then be up to the prosecution to conduct its own investigation into

any alternate suspect identified. If Dye identifies someone other than Chuck as an

alternate suspect and the prosecution has a good faith belief that evidence related

to that suspect is inadmissible under Elmarr, it must file, without undue delay, a

pretrial objection explaining its position.7

¶66   In the event the prosecution files a good faith objection, the district court

should rule on it before trial—the most prudent course of action would be to make

this determination sometime after expiration of the thirty-five-day deadline (or

after whatever extended deadline the court sets based on good cause) but before

the eve of trial. In its discretion, the district court may hold a hearing strictly to

adjudicate a good faith objection advanced by the prosecution. If the district court

does so, Dye may proceed by offer of proof. The information already in discovery

and previously adduced during pretrial hearings may well suffice to permit the

district court to make the admissibility determinations mandated by Elmarr.

However, it is possible that the district court’s gatekeeping function under Elmarr

may require Dye to proffer additional information to the court.

7 Recall that the prosecution has already stipulated to the admission of any
alternate suspect evidence concerning Chuck.

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                             IV. Conclusion

¶67   For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s discovery order

regarding alternate suspect evidence. Accordingly, we make absolute the rule to

show cause.

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