Court Opinion

ID: 9676189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:17:04.596418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:45.149774
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
Appellant on rehearing submits that our original opinion is contrary to prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Alabama and should be set aside. Appellant says that the contrary decisions of the Supreme Court referred to are Hajovsky v. Hajovsky, 276 Ala. 77, 159 So.2d 194; Stallworth v. Stallworth, 272 Ala. 449, 131 So.2d 867; Sappington v. Fort, 258 Ala. 528, 63 So.2d 591.
We have carefully studied these cases and do not find them contrary to the principle pronounced in our original opinion. Hajovsky and Stallworth give lip service to the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit in divorce and child custo*426dy cases. However, the reference must be considered in light of the matters in issue in the cases. In both cases, there was involved the almost simultaneous decrees of courts with concurrent jurisdiction. These cases merely hold that the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of one state resulting in a final decree on the issues, precludes the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the courts of another state in an action between the same parties on the same issues. This is merely recognition of the principle of res judicata upon which full faith and credit is founded. It was required in each of the decisions, that the decree entered by another state within a few days prior to the consideration in Alabama be accepted by Alabama courts as final and determinative of the issues decided. However, each case recognizes that should new issues be presented in the case presented to the Alabama court there could be a different result. Such new issue of course, involves matters affecting the best interest and welfare of the children occurring since the decree of the other state.
In the latter case cited by appellant on rehearing- — Sappington v. Fort, supra, it was said, quoting in part from Lawrence v. Sawyer, 250 Ala. 577, 35 So.2d 207, as follows :
“ ‘It has long been the settled rule in this jurisdiction that a minor is regarded as the ward of a court of chancery, and the court will not permit his well-being to be jeopardized by any judgment in a previous contest concerning his custody and care.’ The foregoing applies with equal force to foreign decrees, such as the one here involved .... State of New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133.”
The last paragraph in Sappington v. Fort, supra, furnishes the authority for the release of the courts of this state from the obligation of recognizing a prior decree of a foreign state pertaining to custody of children.
The remaining contention of appellant, that the evidence does not support the finding of a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children since the granting of the Illinois decree of November 16, 1966, is not realistic.
Rehearing is denied.
BRADLEY and HOLMES, JJ., concur.