Court Opinion

ID: 9365724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 20:02:27.638982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:47.393572
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/24/23 P. v. Sanchez CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B314807

         Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                             (Los Angeles County
         v.                                                  Super. Ct. No. VA020059)

FRANKLIN D. SANCHEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Roger T. Ito, Judge. Affirmed.

      Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                ______________________________
       In 1994, defendant and appellant Franklin D. Sanchez was
convicted by a jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd.
(a))1 and kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), finding true the special
circumstance allegation that the murder was committed in the
course of a kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B)). He was
sentenced to life in state prison without the possibility of parole
(LWOP).
       Defendant appealed, and we affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Sanchez (Oct. 1, 1996, B088897) [nonpub. opn.], at
p. 7.)
       In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95.2 The trial court issued an
order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
former section 1170.95, subdivision (d).
       After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
defendant’s petition. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
He argues that (1) the trial court employed the incorrect standard
in concluding that he was ineligible for resentencing relief;
(2) insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that
he was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted
with reckless indifference to human life; and (3) he was 19 years
old at the time of the crime, and the trial court failed to consider
how his ability to evaluate and respond to any risk must be
viewed through the lens of his relative youth and inexperience.

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2     Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

                                  2
     We affirm.
                  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       “[O]n the morning of November 26, 1993, which was the
day after Thanksgiving, appellant enticed Mark Albanese to go to
the Fullerton house appellant shared with Mark Driskill to ‘help
[appellant] with some work.’ Albanese was initially reluctant
because of his concern that appellant might be “set[ting] [him]
up” with appellant’s friend, Bradley Joe Arrowood. Arrowood
was very antagonistic toward Albanese, who had had an affair
with Arrowood’s wife, and had chased Albanese with a firearm in
September 1993, warning him, ‘“When I get my hands on you, I
am gonna kill you.”’ Although Arrowood was, in fact, waiting at
appellant’s house, appellant assured Albanese he was not being
‘set up.’ Albanese therefore agreed to appellant’s request for
assistance.
       “Because appellant had been transported to Albanese’s
apartment on Driskill’s motorcycle, Driskill took appellant home
and returned for Albanese. Upon Albanese’s arrival at
appellant’s house, he was beaten about the face and head, duct
tape was placed over his nose and mouth, his wrists were
handcuffed and his ankles were bound. Appellant and Arrowood
carried the struggling Albanese to the garage, where he was
placed in Arrowood’s car, covered with a blanket and dumped
several miles away near a loading dock at the Flint Ink company
in Santa Fe Springs.
       “When Albanese failed to return home, his common-law
wife, Marty Sutherland, questioned appellant about his
disappearance. Appellant claimed to have last seen Albanese at
the Buena Park mall on the afternoon of November 26. He
reported Albanese had left the mall with a woman. In a

                               3
subsequent encounter between Arrowood and Sutherland,
however, Arrowood confirmed that Albanese was dead and said,
“His body will show up sooner or later.” At that point,
Sutherland notified the police.
      “On November 29, 1993, a worker returning to the Flint
Ink plant after the Thanksgiving holiday found Albanese’s body
covered with a blanket. His ankles were still bound and several
pieces of additional duct tape were discovered lying nearby. The
coroner determined Albanese had died from asphyxiation due to
smothering.
      “Appellant was interviewed by the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department on November 30, 1993. On December 2,
1993, deputy sheriffs executed a warrant to search the house
appellant and Driskill shared and the Anaheim motel room
where Arrowood resided. They discovered a partial roll of duct
tape from each location. A scientific comparison of some of the
duct tape recovered near Albanese’s body and that seized from
appellant’s residence showed the two possessed identical
properties. The tape found in Arrowood’s motel room did not
match any of the duct tape found at the crime scene.
      “Appellant relied upon a duress defense, testifying that he
had agreed to invite Albanese to his home to facilitate Arrowood’s
planned assault only after Arrowood had repeatedly threated to
beat and/or kill appellant and others if appellant refused to
capitulate to Arrowood’s demands. Notwithstanding Arrowood’s
coercive tactics, appellant had initially declined to cooperate and
even after finally agreeing, had attempted to extricate himself
from the situation on multiple occasions, up to and including the
point where he shouted at Arrowood for placing a gun to
Albanese’s head and refused to continue helping Arrowood carry

                                 4
the bound and gagged Albanese to the garage to be place in
Arrowood’s car. Appellant had also tried to come to Albanese’s
aid by loosening the duct tape when Albanese said he could not
breathe and challenged Arrowood when he saw Arrowood in the
garage standing over Albanese with a syringe. These efforts had
resulted in Arrowood punctuating his threats of violence against
appellant by pointing a gun at him, slapping him and ‘beat[ing]
[him] up pretty bad.’ On one occasion, Arrowood ‘kidnapped’
appellant and ‘slapped [him] around and stuff’ in the presence of
an ‘enforcer’ named ‘Coco.’
      “Despite Arrowood’s assaultive behavior toward him,
appellant insisted he had no idea Arrowood planned to kill
Albanese since Arrowood had consistently spoken of his plan to
‘beat up’ and possibly publicly humiliate Albanese. Even as
Arrowood drove off with the beaten, bound and gagged Albanese,
appellant assumed Arrowood was going to handcuff Albanese
naked to a street pole ‘and it would be over with.’
      “Appellant never contacted the police because he feared he
would be beaten or killed by Arrowood or one of his cronies, such
as ‘Coco.’” (People v. Sanchez, supra, B088897, at pp. 2–4.)
                PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Former Section 1170.95 Petition
      On June 17, 2019, defendant filed a petition to be
resentenced pursuant to former section 1170.95. He averred that
because he had been convicted of murder under either a felony
murder theory or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, he was entitled to resentencing relief.
      The trial court appointed counsel to represent him.

                                5
II. The People’s Opposition
       The People opposed defendant’s petition. The People
argued that the special circumstance finding rendered defendant
ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
III. Hearing on Defendant’s Petition and Trial Court Order
       On July 29, 2020, the trial court determined that defendant
had made a prima facie case for relief and issued an order to
show cause.
       At the evidentiary hearing on March 3, 2021, no party
introduced new evidence. The trial court began the hearing by
acknowledging that it was required to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant was liable for murder under a still valid
theory.
       Defense counsel then offered argument. Relying
extensively on the trial transcripts, he argued that the evidence
did not show that defendant, who was 19 years old at the time,
was a major participant in the kidnapping who acted with
reckless indifference to human life under the factors set forth in
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
       The prosecutor disagreed, arguing that the petition should
be denied because the evidence showed beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant was a major participant in the crimes who
acted with reckless indifference to human life under the same
factors. Alternatively, the prosecutor argued that the same
evidence also showed defendant’s intent to kill as a direct aider
and abettor to murder.
       The trial court entertained additional arguments and
reminded the prosecutor that he had the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Without objection, a CD containing “all the

                                6
transcripts” from defendant’s trial was marked as Exhibit 1 and
admitted into evidence.
       Thereafter, the trial court denied the petition as follows:
“I’m going to make the following findings. . . . [¶] [I]n my
estimation, there is beyond a reasonable doubt, number one, two
factors. That [defendant] was a major participant in the
kidnapping and also ultimately that kidnapping resulting in the
death of Albanese. That is borne out by his own statements and
behavior and some other forensic evidence that was recovered. In
particular the fact that there’s duct tape. My recollection it
matches the duct tape on the victim. I think there’s more than
one duct tape sample. But he has the actual duct tape that is
utilized that ultimately presumably leads to the asphyxiation of
the victim.
       “[The prosecutor] has also pointed out, which is quite
obvious, and that is Albanese was afraid of [Arrowood]. But for
[defendant], allaying his fears about whether he was going or
why he was coming over, Albanese does not show up and does not
end up dead. I mean—I understand this and I understand that
this could be . . . factors for a [People v. Franklin (2016) 63
Cal.4th 261] determination prospectively. I think they would
probably. You’ll be given the state of the—the current state of
the law.
       “But given the nature of this, this is not a passing and spur
of the moment decision-making process. This is something that
[Arrowood] clearly had in his mind, that [Arrowood] clearly was
intending to do.

                                 7
      “And on top of that, I think it’s under the [Toledo][3]
doctrine. If we are relying upon the statements of [defendant] in
part to convict him, then I’m going to rely for the most part in
those statements he’s afraid of [Arrowood] and he’s afraid of
[Arrowood] going to kill him and he’s afraid. [Arrowood] is a
scary and dangerous man. Yet when he decides to do—he decides
to assist [Arrowood] in luring the victim to a location, he assists
[Arrowood] in securing his body.
      “We don’t know exactly how involved he was in the beating,
although he’s denied he’s involved in any kind of real physical
beating of the victim. But no doubt he is—the reason why
[Arrowood]—that Albanese is at the location where the assailant
is waiting, ready to effectuate his revenge.
      “After, when we talk about Banks and Clark, after the
actual abduction and the time of the duct taping occurs, the fact
that [defendant] says, well, you know, I wanted to move his duct
tape because I didn’t know if he could breathe, in and of itself I
would say that is also evidence to suggest just how scary and how
dangerous this behavior is.

3     People v. Toledo (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 577. Under “the so-
called Toledo doctrine,” our Supreme Court has observed: “‘The
courts may sometimes say that the prosecution is “bound by”
extrajudicial statements of defendant which are introduced by
the prosecution and which are irreconcilable with guilt, but this
concept is applicable only where there is no other competent and
substantial evidence which could establish guilt.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 248.) “Opinions
rendered by the Courts of Appeal subsequent to Toledo
demonstrate that its holding has been superseded at least in
part.” (People v. Burney, supra, at p. 248.)

                                8
       “Whether or not he did move the tape to the side or
whether or not he did not because he was afraid that [Arrowood]
would kill him because of that, all of that suggests, look, this
guy’s getting tied up and he’s getting tied up so tightly he’s going
to suffocate. It’s extremely distressing even for a 19 year old to
see if somebody’s being tied up to such an extent it doesn’t even
look like they’re breathing. Then to me that suggest not only
that he’s a major participant but also that he is acting with
reckless disregard.
       “And what’s more, when he—when the victim is
transported and when he is given the opportunity—he’s not with
[Arrowood] the entire time . . . . Albanese expires in a trunk or
blanket wrapped up in some kind of location and dies in the
darkness by himself by suffocating to death, when a man who
could have saved him and could have intervened given these
factors decided what are reasons not do it.
       “I understand the factors, I understand, [defense counsel],
you pointed out to me. I’m not going to disbelieve. He’s a kid and
he’s acting stupidly. This bottom line though is in my estimation
all about a guy dies in the darkness by himself suffocating to
death while there’s a man out there, who presumably didn’t mean
him any harm, could have done something about it and he didn’t,
in my estimation acts with reckless disregard beyond a
reasonable doubt.
       “Therefore, I believe that the special circumstance that was
found true by the jury and that imposed ultimately, an LWOP
sentence on him, was valid. And so notwithstanding the
arguments to the contrary, [defense counsel], I am going to deny
the petition.”

                                 9
       As noted in the trial court’s written order, its denial was
based on its consideration of the parties’ arguments and its
review of the entire record.
                            DISCUSSION
I. Relevant law
       Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill 1437) was enacted to “amend the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To accomplish this,
Sen. Bill 1437 amended sections 188 and 189. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, §§ 2-3.) As amended, section 188 provides: “Except as
stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) As added by
Sen. Bill 1437, section 189, subdivision (e), provides: “A
participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable
for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The
person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the
actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (See
People v. Ramirez (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 923, 928.)

                                 10
        Sen. Bill 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now
section 1172.6, which provides a mechanism whereby people “who
believe they were convicted of murder for an act that no longer
qualifies as murder following the crime’s redefinition in 2019[]
may seek vacatur of their murder conviction and resentencing by
filing a petition in the trial court.” (People v. Drayton (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 965, 973, overruled in part on other grounds in
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 963.)
        In order to obtain resentencing relief, the petitioner must
file a facially sufficient section 1172.6 petition. (§ 1172.6, subds.
(a)(1)-(3), (b)(1)(A).) If a petitioner does so, then the trial court
proceeds to section 1172.6, subdivision (c), to assess whether the
petitioner has made a prima facia showing for relief, thereby
meriting an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 957.)
        If the trial court determines that the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) At the evidentiary hearing, the parties may rely upon
evidence in the record of conviction or new evidence to
demonstrate whether the petitioner is eligible for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), also
provides that the trial court may “consider the procedural history
of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.” The
prosecution bears the burden of proving, “beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Only if the prosecution cannot meet its
burden, and the petitioner prevails, is he entitled to vacatur of
the murder conviction and resentencing as set forth in section
1172.6, subdivision (e).

                                 11
       We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1026
[“Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that appellant was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life”].)
II. The trial court properly denied defendant’s petition for
resentencing
       A. The trial court employed the correct standard
       The trial court properly denied defendant’s petition for
resentencing because, after the evidentiary hearing, the trial
court acted as an independent factfinder and determined, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that he was guilty of murder under current
law.4 (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 813–814.) In
fact, it expressly stated that it was making its findings “beyond a
reasonable doubt” several times. And, it acknowledged its role to
act as an independent factfinding by repeatedly stating that its
conclusion was based upon “my estimation” of the evidence.
       To the extent defendant suggests that the trial court erred
because it did not determine whether the jury actually rested its
verdict on a still-viable theory of murder, he is mistaken. The
plain language of section 1172.6, subdivision (d), confirms that at
the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution must convince the trial
court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant is guilty of
murder.

4      In reaching this conclusion, we do not adopt the People’s
argument that the jury’s true finding on the special circumstance
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) precluded defendant from making a prima
facie case for relief under Sen. Bill 1437. (See People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 721.)

                                12
       B. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings
       And substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
The evidence shows that defendant was actively involved in the
brutal kidnapping and murder of Albanese. In the weeks leading
up to these crimes, defendant told a friend that he was helping
Arrowood recover something that Albanese owed Arrowood.
About a week before the crimes, defendant and Arrowood were
seen having a discussion during which Arrowood carried a gun in
his hand. Defendant testified that Arrowood “always had his
gun.” This evidence establishes that defendant knew that
Arrowood could be violent.
       Furthermore, on the morning of the kidnapping, defendant
enticed Albanese to go to the Fullerton house that defendant
shared with Driskill to “help [defendant] with some work.”
Albanese was initially reluctant because of his concern that
defendant might be “set[ting] [him] up” with defendant’s friend,
Arrowood. Arrowood was very antagonistic toward Albanese,
who had had an affair with Arrowood’s wife, and had chased
Albanese with a .45-caliber firearm in September 1993, warning
him, “‘“When I get my hands on you, I am gonna kill you.”’”
Although Arrowood was, in fact, waiting at defendant’s house,
defendant assured Albanese he was not being “‘set up.’” Thus,
Albanese agreed to defendant’s request for assistance. As we
observed in our prior opinion affirming the judgment of
conviction, “[t]here was no question that Albanese was the victim
of a kidnapping and that appellant played a pivotal role in the
events leading up to and culminating in Albanese’s abduction.”
(People v. Sanchez, supra, B088897, at p. 5.)
       Furthermore, as the trial court recognized in denying
defendant’s petition, there was also substantial evidence that

                                13
Arrowood had committed violent acts in the past to put defendant
on notice of a particular risk of death that the kidnapping posed.
Defendant relied upon a duress defense, testifying that he agreed
to invite Albanese to his home to facilitate Arrowood’s planned
assault only after Arrowood had repeatedly threatened to beat
and/or kill defendant and others if defendant refused to
capitulate to Arrowood’s demands.
       And, defendant was physically present at the crime scene,
he was in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder,
and his actions played a particular role in Albanese’s death.
(People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 148.) Presence is
important to culpability because it allows defendants to observe
their cohorts’ actions and demeanors and determine whether
their behavior tends to suggest a willingness to use lethal force.
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) Presence also provides
defendants with the opportunities to act as restraining influences
on their cohorts and to render aid to wounded victims. (Ibid.)
       Here, when Albanese arrived at defendant’s house,
defendant went into the bedroom where he found Arrowood. At
the time, defendant knew that Arrowood stored his gun in a little
aluminum box in the bedroom. Defendant encouraged Arrowood
to beat Albanese by saying, “If you are gonna kick his ass, get out
there and kick his ass.” Defendant followed Arrowood (now
armed with his gun) out of the bedroom and into the living room
where Albanese was sitting on the couch. Albanese was beaten
about the face and head, duct tape was placed over his nose and
mouth, his wrists were handcuffed, and his ankles were bound.
Defendant and Arrowood carried the struggling Albanese to the
garage.

                                14
       Albanese’s pleas for mercy were loud enough to be
overheard by someone in another room. Albanese suffered
contusions and bruises to both eyes, abrasions to the right side of
his face, and blunt force injuries to his head and face. Even
assuming that the trial court credited defendant’s testimony that
he helped Albanese breathe by pushing the duct tape away from
his nose, this merely shows that defendant was keenly aware of
the mortal danger Albanese faced.5
       Defendant’s reckless indifference to human life did not end
there. Once he helped Arrowood carry Albanese into the garage,
Albanese was placed in Arrowood’s car, covered in a blanket, and
dumped several miles away near a loading dock at the Flint Ink
company in Santa Fe Springs. Assuming Albanese was still alive
as the car drove away,6 he was badly beaten, bound, and helpless.
Defendant knowingly left him at the mercy of Arrowood, a man
that defendant knew was extremely violent, armed with a gun,
and had threatened to kill defendant and others moments earlier.
The risk of mortal danger in that situation was grave, and
defendant’s conduct unquestionably demonstrated reckless
indifference to human life. (See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 803.)
       The duration of the felony also supports the finding that
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. “Where

5     Defendant’s differing characterization of this evidence
amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, something
we cannot and will not do. (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826,
887.)

6    We do not know if Albanese was alive as the car drove
away or if he was killed later, when defendant was not present.

                                15
a victim is . . . restrained in the presence of perpetrators for
prolonged periods, ‘there is a greater window of opportunity for
violence’ [citation], possibly culminating in murder.” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620.)
       Here, the evidence demonstrates that a considerable
amount of force and effort was involved in subduing Albanese.
Duct tape was used to bind and gag Albanese, and he started
yelling that he could not breathe. The autopsy evidence showed
Albanese died as a result of asphyxia due to smothering.
Photographs of his corpse indicate that an object, such as tape,
prevented him from breathing. The defensive injuries found on
Albanese’s knuckles suggest a prolonged struggle. This evidence
supports the reasonable conclusion that all of the effort used to
restrain Albanese consumed a substantial amount of time,
increasing the risk of harm and death.
       C. The trial court considered defendant’s youth and
inexperience
       Defendant’s argument notwithstanding, the trial court did
consider defendant’s youth and inexperience when it denied his
petition for resentencing. 7 Defense counsel repeatedly brought

7     Recently, several Courts of Appeal have weighed in on
whether a defendant’s youth is a factor to be considered
whenever a Banks/Clark analysis is conducted for a defendant
who was a minor at the time of the offenses. (See, e.g., In re
Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 439; In re Harper (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 450, 470.) Those cases are readily distinguishable
from the instant appeal because defendant here was not a minor
when the crimes were committed; he was 19 years old. That said,
assuming without deciding that youth is a factor that must be
considered (even if the defendant was not a minor), the trial court

                                16
up defendant’s age at the time of the crimes and encouraged the
trial court to consider that as a mitigating factor in the
Banks/Clark analysis. And, the trial court expressly
acknowledged defense counsel’s argument about age, and invited
the prosecutor to respond. The prosecutor indicated that a
petitioner’s youth might be a relevant consideration, but argued
that defendant was an adult when he committed the crimes and
that his age did not outweigh the other factors under Banks and
Clark. Thereafter, the trial court carefully considered the parties’
arguments and reasonably concluded that defendant’s age and
inexperience did not counterbalance the other factors under its
Banks/Clark analysis. (See People v. Owens, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1026 [noting that the trial court considered
the petitioner’s youth in its Banks/Clark analysis but found that
other evidence supported a finding that he was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life].)
We find no error in the trial court’s analysis and conclusion.

did in fact consider defendant’s youth at the time it denied
defendant’s petition for resentencing.

                                17
                         DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant’s former section 1170.95
petition is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                               _____________________, Acting P. J.
                               ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

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