Court Opinion

ID: 9603625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:08:19.625011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:41.669624
License: Public Domain

Winsor, J.
(dissenting)—I respectfully dissent because defendant was denied his right to a unanimous jury verdict. The majority determination that this case fits within the "continuing course of conduct" exception acknowledged in State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984) misconstrues that exception.
The majority relies upon State v. Gooden, 51 Wn. App. 615, 620, 754 P.2d 1000 (1988), which held that ''[promoting prostitution is a continuing course of conduct which falls within the Petrich exception." Gooden and the majority improperly simplify the necessary analysis of a continuing course of conduct issue, which must be made on a case-by-case basis and must focus on the criteria set forth in Petrich, giving particular attention to the evidence produced at trial.3
*487In Petrich, the petitioner was charged and found guilty of one count each of statutory rape and indecent liberties. At trial, the State presented evidence of numerous separate incidents of criminal sexual contact. On appeal, Petrich argued that "when the evidence shows several incidents which could form the basis of the one incident charged in the information, to ensure a unanimous verdict on the underlying crime, the State must tell the jury which act is relied on to convict." Petrich, 101 Wn.2d at 570.
The Petrich court agreed with this argument and reversed, reasoning:
Under appropriate facts, a continuing course of conduct may form the basis of one charge in an information. But "one continuing offense" must be distinguished from "several distinct acts," each of which could be the basis for a criminal charge. To determine whether one continuing offense may be charged, the facts must be evaluated in a commonsense manner. In the present case, each described incident occurred in a separate time frame and identifying place. The only connection between the incidents was that the victim was the same person; this is not enough to call the offense one transaction.
(Citations omitted.) Petrich, 101 Wn.2d at 571. It is this analysis that we must apply here.
Here, as in Petrich, the State presented evidence of several specific transactions between the defendant and Ms. Lott, any one of which, if believed by the jury, would have been sufficient to prove the crime charged. The described incidents occurred over a 2- to 3-month period in a variety of locations. Given this evidence, I believe it is error to treat Barrington's conduct as one continuous offense.
United States v. Berardi, 675 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1982), upon which the Gooden court relies, actually militates against finding a continuing course of conduct in both this case and in Gooden. In Berardi, the prosecution charged the crime, obstructing justice, as a single continuing offense consisting of three separate events. Berardi alleged this charge was prejudicially duplicitous and thus deprived him of the clear concurrence of all of the jurors in the verdict. *488With respect to Berardi's nonunanimous jury argument, the court found that despite the duplicitous charge, there was no danger of Berardi being convicted by a less than unanimous jury because the trial court had instructed the jury specifically that there had to be unanimity on at least one of the underlying events.4 Berardi, 675 F.2d at 899. Berardi thus does not support the holding in Gooden or the majority's position here because, unlike in Berardi, a unanimity instruction was not given in either case.
The Gooden court also cites People v. Mota, 115 Cal. App. 3d 227, 171 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1981), as support for its holding. Gooden, 51 Wn. App. at 619. Mota also militates against finding a continuing course of conduct in Gooden or in the instant case. The Petrich court cited Mota for the proposition, not here disputed, that there are occasional cases in which multiple criminal acts may properly be charged and proved as one continuing course of conduct. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d at 571. Mota illustrates that occasional case. In Mota, the charge was repeated gang rape of one victim by three men. All the acts of rape occurred in a moving vehicle within a 1-hour period. Under these facts, the California court found it unnecessary for the State to elect one act:
None of the election cases involved a gang rape with repeated and continuous acts of sexual intercourse within the relatively short period of approximately one hour, taking place in one location.
The election cases feature circumstances wherein the criminal acts were separated by days, weeks or months, and sometimes the acts occurred in different places, thus forcing the prosecution to choose which act they were relying upon . . .
Mota, at 232. Comparing the facts of Mota with the facts of the instant case establishes that ours is one of the "election cases" described in Mota.
*489Finally, the Gooden court reasons that promoting prostitution is a continuing course of conduct because defendant's enterprise was motivated by "a single objective. . . . to make money." Gooden, 51 Wn. App. at 620. This rationale confuses motive with conduct and is therefore unpersuasive. Under this reasoning, the acts in Petrich and Berardi could also be said to have been one continuing course of conduct for purposes of a jury unanimity analysis. The "single objective" of Petrich was to obtain sexual gratification from one victim. The "single objective" of Berardi was to obstruct justice by intimidating one witness.5 Yet in both Petrich and Berardi, a special unanimity instruction was held to be required to ensure a valid jury verdict.
Gooden, upon which the majority relies, relies upon three cases, Petrich, Berardi, and Mota, each of which supports a reversal, not an affirmance.6 I would reverse and remand and, like the Petrich court, order that upon retrial the State would have the option either of specifying which act of promoting prostitution is relied upon, or of giving a unanimity instruction requiring that to convict the jury must unanimously agree upon at least one same, particular act.
Review denied by Supreme Court January 10, 1989.

The Petrich court emphasized that in deciding whether a particular case falls within the "one continuing offense" exception to the requirement of jury unanimity, the evidence at trial must be carefully examined. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d at 571-73.

The Petrich court cited Berardi and concluded that in similar future cases the prosecution must choose between electing which underlying offense to rely upon or giving a special unanimity instruction. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d at 571.

The Berardi court did use the single objective analysis to support its conclusion that it was not error for the government to charge Berardi's acts as one count. Berardi, 675 F.2d at 898. This must be distinguished from the Berardi court's analysis of the jury unanimity issue where the court concluded that there was no unanimity problem only because a unanimity instruction was given. Berardi, at 899.

See also State v. Song, 50 Wn. App. 325, 748 P.2d 273 (1988) (a defendant's acts of promoting prostitution which occur at different times and promote the prostitution of different persons are separate crimes for purposes of sentencing outside the SR A).