Court Opinion

ID: 9898332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:00.565083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:03.095957
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Marriage of
                                                  No. 82894-1-I
 MONTEESHA REED,
                                                  DIVISION ONE
                     Respondent,
                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
              and

 RICHARD REED, JR.,

                     Appellant.

      BIRK, J. — Richard Reed challenges orders awarding maintenance to his

former spouse, Monteesha Howard.1 We hold the trial court had a tenable basis

to award maintenance for 24 months. However, its decision ordering Reed to pay

$1,860.20 per month does not evidence a fair consideration of the statutory

maintenance factors and, in particular, the parties’ respective financial resources

and abilities to meet their own needs. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand to the trial court to reconsider the monthly maintenance amount and enter

findings with regard thereto.     We also reverse the final maintenance order’s

provision allowing Howard to obtain a judgment for the entire amount remaining to

be paid if Reed fails to make a monthly payment in full. We do not reach Reed’s

      1 The trial court’s final dissolution decree changed Monteesha Reed’s name

to Monteesha Howard. Accordingly, and for clarity, we refer to her hereinafter as
Howard.
No. 82894-1-I/2

challenges to the trial court’s temporary maintenance order or its decision not to

reconsider or vacate that order, as those challenges are moot.

                                         I

      Howard and Reed married in Maryland in 2015. At the time, Howard was

on active duty in the U.S. Army, working as a medic.          She was honorably

discharged in August 2016, and the couple relocated to Washington in 2017.

      On September 10, 2020, Reed received an offer of employment from

Shasta Beverages, Inc. (Shasta) for a position as “Production Manager” with an

annual salary of $90,000.00. Four days later, Howard petitioned to end the parties’

marriage.

      In April 2021, Howard filed a motion for temporary maintenance. Howard

attested that after she and Reed moved to Washington, Reed was the family’s sole

provider while Howard was a full-time student, and her monthly net income was

zero. With regard to Reed’s income, Howard declared, “To my knowledge, [Reed]

most recently began working for Shasta . . . where I believe he made about

$90,000 per year.”     Howard approximated Reed’s net monthly income as

$5,768.00, which she based on an annual salary of $90,000.00.              Howard

requested maintenance, retroactive to the date of her petition, in the amount of

$3,567.00 per month. That amount was equivalent to the total of Howard’s monthly

expenses listed in her financial declaration, including housing, transportation,

utilities, personal, food, and household expenses.

      The first commissioner who considered Howard’s motion, at a hearing

where Reed did not appear, indicated he was having “difficulty” in two respects.

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No. 82894-1-I/3

First, the commissioner “didn’t see any income information for [Reed] whatsoever.”

Second, “[t]here[ was] no explanation for why” Howard was unable to secure

employment. The commissioner continued the hearing and entered an order

directing Howard “to use best efforts to provide evidence of [Reed]’s

income/financial situation for [the] next hearing.”

       Howard later filed a declaration “to provide the court with additional

information related to [her] request for a temporary order for maintenance.” She

attested that she had “struggled to obtain documentation of [Reed]’s current

income” and when she and Reed separated, she “had to leave the home suddenly”

and “was not able to bring [her] computer with [her] at that time, which contained

financial records documenting [Reed]’s income.” She also attested that Reed had

been unresponsive to her and her attorney’s efforts to reach him, and that he had

not responded to Howard’s discovery requests. Howard attested that she was

“working hard to obtain employment” but had “struggled due to an unpredictable

job market.” She stated, “I also need support as I pursue my degree, so that I can

finally get to a point where I can earn more stable income and support myself

independently.” Reed did not file a response to Howard’s motion for temporary

maintenance.

       In June 2021, the continued hearing on Howard’s motion was held before a

different commissioner. Howard appeared through counsel; Reed again was not

present. The commissioner ruled, “So [Reed’s] failure to respond means he

agrees, so I’ll sign the proposed order.” The commissioner entered an order

(Temporary Order) granting Howard’s motion in full, i.e., directing Reed to pay

                                          3
No. 82894-1-I/4

maintenance of $3,567.00 per month, retroactive to September 14, 2020.

Accounting for a prorated amount for September 2020, the total back maintenance

due under the Temporary Order was $30,377.00.

       On September 27, 2021, Reed, who had recently obtained counsel, filed a

motion for reconsideration of and to vacate the Temporary Order. Reed argued

that the Temporary Order was “factually unsupported about the couple’s finances.”

He also asserted that Howard’s motion for temporary maintenance and the

Temporary Order itself “were done without any actual notice to [Reed] and when

his new counsel found it[,] it was too late to do anything.”

       Reed declared that the September 2020 offer he received from Shasta was

later rescinded, and he never worked there. He testified similarly at trial. Howard

testified in contrast she inquired of Shasta and was told Reed had worked there,

but no longer did. Reed declared that he had been a laborer “for it seems like

forever” and that “most of the time since the divorce was filed 9/14/20 [he] had

been completely unemployed in COVID.” He declared that he found a job at

Georgia Pacific in April 2021, but given his monthly expenses and debt payments,

“[t]here is no way on God’s green earth [he] could pay any maintenance and

certainly not $3567 per month and now face a new debt from it over $30,000.”

However, Reed testified at trial he did not have a recent pay stub to verify his

representations about his earnings. The trial court denied a posttrial effort by Reed

to introduce new documentary evidence concerning his earnings, a ruling Reed

does not challenge on appeal.

                                          4
No. 82894-1-I/5

       In October 2021, the parties appeared for a bench trial. The sole disputed

issues for trial were (1) Reed’s pending motion to reconsider or vacate the

Temporary Order, (2) Howard’s request for ongoing maintenance, and (3) the

allocation of an approximately $4,000.00 debt associated with the parties’ tenancy

in their former rental home (move-out debt).

       After trial, the court allocated the move-out debt to Reed and denied Reed’s

motion to reconsider or vacate the Temporary Order. With regard to maintenance,

the court observed that Howard “needs, based on the marriage and the time

needed for her to graduate . . . some resources to be able to complete her

education.” But it also observed that Reed then owed Howard $44,645.00 under

the Temporary Order, and taking that and the move-out debt into consideration, as

well as Reed’s “assets, his income, and all of those factors that sort of go towards

his income and cash flow” and “the ability of [Reed] to meet his needs,” “Reed is

going to have difficulty in paying . . . whatever maintenance the court would

order . . . for the next two years in addition to making payments on all [his] debt.”

Accordingly, the court treated the $44,645.00 owing under the Temporary Order

as “equivalent . . . to the amount of maintenance that is owing to [Howard] given

all the factors that are being considered,” and it ordered Reed to pay that amount

over the next two years, at $1,860.20 per month. The court also ordered that if

Reed missed a payment, Howard could at her option obtain a judgment for “the

total amount remaining to be paid” (acceleration clause). Reed appeals.2

       2 It appears that Reed did not properly serve Howard with the notice of

appeal. According to the declaration of service filed with this court, Reed served
only Howard’s former counsel, who had already withdrawn pursuant to CR 70.1(b).

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No. 82894-1-I/6

                                          II

       Reed devotes his appellant’s brief almost entirely to challenging the

Temporary Order and the trial court’s refusal to reconsider or vacate that order.

Under RCW 26.09.060(10)(c), a temporary maintenance order generally

“[t]erminates when the final decree is entered.” Although “[d]elinquent support

payments accrued under an order for temporary support remain collectible and are

not extinguished when a final decree is entered,” that is not the case if “the decree

contains specific language to the contrary.” RCW 26.09.060(11).

       Here, the trial court’s final maintenance order provided that “maintenance

[would] be satisfied” if Reed paid maintenance for 24 months. The court expressly

provided Reed’s obligation to pay maintenance on a prospective basis superseded

Reed’s delinquency under the Temporary Order.3 The Temporary Order was

superseded by the final order. Consequently, Reed’s challenges to the Temporary

Order, including the trial court’s refusal to reconsider or vacate it, are moot, and

we do not reach them. See In re Marriage of T, 68 Wn. App. 329, 336, 842 P.2d

1010 (1993) (“[a]n issue is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief and

However, Howard has since filed a declaration in which she confirmed she is
aware of this appeal and requested an extension of time to file a brief of
respondent. Despite having been granted an extension, Howard did not file a
respondent’s brief. “A respondent who elects not to file a brief allows his or her
opponent to put unanswered arguments before the court, and the court is entitled
to make its decision based on the argument and record before it.” Adams v. Dep’t
of Lab. & Indus., 128 Wn.2d 224, 229, 905 P.2d 1220 (1995).
       3 We disagree with Reed’s assertion that the trial court’s final order “denied

future maintenance to [Howard].” Cf. In re Marriage of Thompson, 97 Wn. App.
873, 877, 988 P.2d 499 (1999) (interpretation of a dissolution decree is a question
of law).

                                          6
No. 82894-1-I/7

if the issue presented is purely academic” and “appellate courts normally will not

decide a moot issue”).

                                          III

       Notwithstanding Reed’s focus on the temporary order, the thrust of Reed’s

argument on appeal is that “maintenance should never [have] be[en] ordered here

given the parties’ financial situations,” whether on a temporary or final basis. We

interpret Reed’s argument as further challenging the trial court’s final order.

                                          A

       “Maintenance is ‘a flexible tool’ for equalizing the parties’ standard of living

for an ‘appropriate period of time.’ ” In re Marriage of Wright, 179 Wn. App. 257,

269, 319 P.3d 45 (2013) (quoting In re Marriage of Washburn, 101 Wn.2d 168,

179, 677 P.2d 152 (1984)). RCW 26.09.090(1) governs maintenance and directs

the court to consider the following, nonexclusive factors in determining the amount

and duration of maintenance:

              (a) The financial resources of the party seeking
       maintenance . . . and his or her ability to meet his or her needs
       independently . . . ;
              (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
       training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find employment
       appropriate to his or her skill, interests, style of life, and other
       attendant circumstances;
              (c) The standard of living established during the marriage . . . ;
              (d) The duration of the marriage . . . ;
              (e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial
       obligations of the spouse . . . seeking maintenance; and
              (f) The ability of the spouse . . . from whom maintenance is
       sought to meet his or her needs and financial obligations while
       meeting those of the spouse . . . seeking maintenance.

                                          7
No. 82894-1-I/8

“ ‘The only limitation on amount and duration of maintenance under RCW

26.09.090 is that, in light of the relevant factors, the award must be just.’ ” In re

Marriage of Valente, 179 Wn. App. 817, 821, 320 P.3d 115 (2014) (quoting In re

Marriage of Bulicek, 59 Wn. App. 630, 633, 800 P.2d 394 (1990)).

       We review a spousal maintenance award for an abuse of discretion.

Valente, 179 Wn. App. at 822. In exercising its discretion, “the trial court must

consider the factors listed in RCW 26.09.090(1).” In re Marriage of Anthony, 9 Wn.

App. 2d 555, 564, 446 P.3d 635 (2019). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its

decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable

reasons.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

“An award of maintenance that is not based upon a fair consideration of the

statutory factors constitutes an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82

Wn. App. 545, 558, 918 P.2d 954 (1996).

                                         B

       Reed contends the trial court erred inasmuch as it determined that

consideration of the statutory maintenance factors supported an award of

maintenance. We disagree.

       At trial, Howard testified she was a full-time student with two years left in

school. According to her financial declaration admitted at trial, her sole income

was $2,607.00 per month in G.I. Bill benefits for the months she was in school.

Howard also attested that she had monthly expenses of $3,380.00, including

housing, transportation, utilities, personal, food, household, and children’s

expenses. In other words, there was evidence introduced at trial that Howard had

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No. 82894-1-I/9

a monthly deficit of approximately $770.00. Additionally, Howard testified that she

had to pay for her text books out of pocket, and that in her most recent quarter of

school, her books cost about $700.00. She testified further that she was behind

on her electric bill by about $600.00 and her Xfinity bill by about $489.00; and that

she had an outstanding credit card balance of $581.00. Howard testified that

before she and Reed separated, she was a full-time student while Reed worked

full time. She also testified that Reed supported the couple for “basically the whole

marriage,” and that since their separation, she had been relying on public

assistance and charity to pay her rent and other bills.

       Meanwhile, according to Reed’s available Georgia Pacific pay stub, his net

pay for the two-week period from August 30, 2021 through September 12, 2021

was $2,150.81.4 A reasonable inference from this pay stub was that Reed had

actual net income of twice that, or approximately $4,300.00 per month. With

regard to his expenses, Reed relied on his financial declaration,5 which listed

$1,370.00 for rent and certain utilities, $15.00 for rental insurance, $585.00 for

transportation expenses, $440.00 for utilities not already factored into his housing

expenses, and $380.00 for groceries—for a total of $2,790.00,6 exclusive of debt

payments.

       4 Although the exhibit itself is not in the record, it is apparent from the record

that this pay stub, which is a part of the clerk’s papers, was admitted as an exhibit
at trial.
         5 Although the exhibit itself is not in the record, it is apparent from the record

that Reed’s financial declaration, which is a part of the clerk’s papers, was admitted
as an exhibit at trial.
         6 Reed’s financial declaration also includes a $410.00 expense for

“[i]nsurance premium,” but Reed testified that this was an error.

                                            9
No. 82894-1-I/10

       The evidence at trial supported a determination that Reed’s monthly income

exceeded his monthly expenses by as much as $1,510.00, depending on how

much he put toward certain outstanding debts.          The evidence supported a

determination that Reed had the ability to pay some amount of maintenance while

meeting his own needs and financial obligations. It also supported a determination

that Howard did not have the financial resources to meet all of her needs

independently, would need two years to complete her education, and had relied

on Reed for financial support during the marriage. Under these circumstances,

Reed does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that

maintenance was warranted for the two years Howard had left in school. Cf. In re

Marriage of Luckey, 73 Wn. App. 201, 209, 868 P.2d 189 (1994) (purpose of

maintenance is to support a spouse until she is able to earn her own living or

otherwise becomes self-supporting).

       Reed asserts that Howard’s income was $4,902.00 (not $2,607.00) per

month. He counts, as income to Howard, benefits from Temporary Assistance for

Needy Families, assistance from King County Veterans, and assistance from

Catholic Community Services. In re Marriage of Zahm held that “social security

benefits were an appropriate element for the court to factor into its consideration

of [a] maintenance award.” 138 Wn.2d 213, 227, 978 P.2d 498 (1999). But Reed

points to no authority holding that the availability of charitable benefits bears on

the court’s assessment of the maintenance recipient’s ability to meet their needs

“independently.” RCW 26.09.090(1)(a); cf. Hammond v. Hammond, 26 Wn. App.

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No. 82894-1-I/11

129, 132, 611 P.2d 1352 (1980) (distinguishing social security benefits from public

assistance).

       Reed also asserts that Georgia Pacific “reduced his hours from 40/wk down

to only 29/wk netting only about $2,000 per month going into the trial.” Reed

testified his hours had been reduced, but he did not submit a pay stub to

corroborate that testimony, and we do review the weight the trial court assigned to

the evidence. In re Marriage of Bundy, 12 Wn. App. 2d 933, 938, 460 P.3d 1111

(2020) (appellate court does not reweigh evidence). The trial court did not abuse

its discretion by ordering Reed to pay maintenance and to do so for two years.

                                         C

       We reach a different conclusion, however, concerning the amount of

maintenance the court ordered. In Anthony, the court similarly held that an award

of maintenance was appropriate. 9 Wn. App. 2d at 568. But because the trial

court “did not make a finding on the actual income of the parties,” this court

remanded with instructions to the trial court to “determine the income of each party

and enter a specific finding on income before considering the statutory factors for

maintenance.” Id. at 563. With regard to the statutory factors, the court said,

“Maintenance not based on a fair consideration of the statutory factors constitutes

an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 564. Even though the trial court had indicated it had

considered the factors, including RCW 26.09.090(1)(f), in the absence of a clear

finding of the income of the spouse ordered to pay maintenance, this court said

the record did not adequately “address [the paying spouse’s] ability to pay

maintenance or [meet] his needs and financial obligations.” Id. at 567.

                                         11
No. 82894-1-I/12

       The record does not show that the trial court specifically addressed the

amount of Howard’s need or whether Reed could both pay $1,860.20 per month

in maintenance and meet his own needs and financial obligations. See RCW

26.09.090(1)(a), (f).   The trial court orally ruled that Howard “need[ed] some

resources to be able to complete her education.” But nothing in its oral or written

findings reveals what amount of resources it found Howard needed, or how the

$1,860.20 figure was tethered to that need.       Howard’s financial declaration

indicated a shortfall of approximately $770.00. Meanwhile, the trial court found

that Reed “is employed and has the ability to remain employed, and therefore has

the ability to pay maintenance.” Although the trial court stated it considered the

“resources available to [Reed] to meet his needs,” it did not make findings as to

the amount of those resources or whether they were sufficient to cover Reed’s

expenses while paying maintenance. The evidence was uncontroverted at least

that Reed was not working at Shasta. No evidence admitted at trial showed that

Reed’s actual, monthly net income was more than $4,300.00. Nor did the trial

court make a finding that Reed was voluntarily underemployed or impute income

to him for that reason. Cf. RCW 26.19.071(6) (imputing income due to voluntary

underemployment for purposes of child support). While the trial court stated it

relied on “loans [Reed] received,” the only loan described at trial was a $6,300.00

loan Reed received from his mother. It is undisputed that Reed used that loan to

buy a car and pay his first and last month’s rent and security for his apartment.

The record does not support a determination that the loan enabled Reed to pay

maintenance.

                                        12
No. 82894-1-I/13

       RCW 26.09.090(1)(f) required the trial court to consider Reed’s ability to

pay while meeting his own needs and financial obligations. The court was not

required to make specific factual findings on this factor. Anthony, 9 Wn. App. 2d

at 564. Nevertheless, a trial court’s findings should, as a general matter, “be

sufficient to suggest the factual basis for the ultimate conclusions.” In re Marriage

of Monaghan, 78 Wn. App. 918, 925, 899 P.2d 841 (1995). Assuming monthly net

income of $4,300.00 and deducting the expenses listed in Reed’s financial

declaration—which were not contradicted—it appears Reed had a monthly surplus

of at most $1,510.00. This is substantially less than $1,860.20 even before taking

into consideration Reed’s debts. Considering the parties’ respective financial

resources and abilities to meet their needs, the record does not show the basis for

maintenance in this amount. Cf. In re Marriage of Spreen, 107 Wn. App. 341, 348,

28 P.3d 769 (2001) (“Of primary importance in the maintenance award are the

parties’ economic positions following the dissolution.”).

       It appears from the record that the trial court arrived at the maintenance

amount by taking the principal amount then owing under the Temporary Order and

dividing it by the two years—or 24 months—that Howard needed to complete her

education. The trial court’s reliance on the Temporary Order reflects the fact Reed

had not paid ordered maintenance at the time of trial. The trial court did not say

explicitly it intended the award of future maintenance to make up for Reed’s not

having paid maintenance in violation of the Temporary Order. But if this was the

court’s intent, the final order still needed to account for the statutory factor of

Reed’s ability to pay maintenance and meet his own needs. Yet here, the court

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No. 82894-1-I/14

based its final order on a temporary order that was entered as a matter of default:

The commissioner who entered it did not consider any of the statutory

maintenance factors and instead granted Howard’s maintenance request in full

based solely on Reed’s failure to respond. The amount of maintenance ordered

in the Temporary Order therefore does not serve to ground the final order in the

statutory factors in the manner required by Anthony.

       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse as to the monthly amount of

maintenance, and we remand to the trial court to reconsider that amount and enter

appropriate findings.     We necessarily also reverse the acceleration clause

authorizing Howard to obtain a judgment for the “entire amount remaining to be

paid” if Reed fails to make a monthly payment in full.

                                           IV

       As a final matter, Reed requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RCW

26.09.140, which gives the court discretion to order a party to pay the other party’s

reasonable attorney fees “after considering the financial resources of both parties.”

In making an award of attorney fees under the statute, “ ‘the court must balance

the needs of the one party against the other party’s ability to pay.’ ” In re Marriage

of Nelson, 62 Wn. App. 515, 521, 814 P.2d 1208 (1991) (quoting In re Marriage of

Coons, 53 Wn. App. 721, 722, 770 P.2d 653 (1989)). Where, as here, applicable

law requires this court to consider the financial resources of the parties regarding

a request for attorney fees, “each party must . . . file [and serve] a financial affidavit

no later than 10 days prior to the date the case is set for . . . consideration on the

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No. 82894-1-I/15

merits.” RAP 18.1(c). Reed did not timely file a financial affidavit. Accordingly,

we deny his request for fees on appeal.

      We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court to reconsider

the monthly maintenance amount and enter findings with regard thereto.

WE CONCUR:

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