Court Opinion

ID: 9751596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:38:45.164436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:52.637218
License: Public Domain

HAERLE, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, I become concerned when an opinion of this court devotes as substantial an amount of space as the first part of the majority’s opinion does to citing, but then distinguishing, prior published opinions of both our sister courts and our Supreme Court. By my estimation, the majority devotes well over half of that portion of its opinion to distinguishing cases going the opposite way from its ruling. In any event, I find the holdings in those cases more compelling than the reasoning in the first part of the majority’s opinion.
Second, I am even more troubled by the fact that the majority reverses the summary judgment granted by the trial court on the basis of a theory—that *1500respondent’s agent’s conduct was either intentional or reckless—never either pled or urged by appellant in the trial court much less argued in her briefs to us.
I.
Probably the most obvious of the majority’s extensive efforts to distinguish cases holding differently than it does involves Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 197] (Benedek). In the course of the majority’s argument as to why the language of the instant release does not cover alleged negligence of the respondent, that case is cited many times and quoted extensively in several paragraphs. Possibly the key sentences in those paragraphs are these: “[Ujnlike the release in Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, the Release here does not exempt respondent ‘from liability for any personal injuries suffered while on [respondent’s] premises’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1490) whereas the release at issue in Benedek made clear that the defendant “cannot be held liable for any and all risks the releasor encounters while on the former’s premises or using its facilities.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1491.)
But a commonsense approach, as opposed to a “Charybdis of completeness” approach allegedly rejected by the majority (National and Internat. Brotherhood of Street Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 934, 937 [264 Cal.Rptr. 44]; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 1490),1 compels the conclusion that both releases fall into the same camp: without using the term “negligence,” they nonetheless come within the rule that broad language describing the risks encompassed by the release (or “Express Assumption of Risk” if one prefers—see 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 1346, pp. 756-757) means that it covers the alleged negligence of the defendant. Benedek summarizes the law on this point thusly: “An act of negligence is reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release was given if it is included within the express scope of the release. [Citation.] Thus, a release given in connection with parachuting activities releasing the releasee ‘forever,’ unlimited by time and place, and containing no exceptions, was applicable to injuries incurred while parachuting three years after the release was signed and in a different location than where the activities covered by the release originally began. [Citation.] In addition, a release given in connection with scuba diving activities was applicable to the death of a scuba diving student who was inadequately supervised and who *1501drowned. [Citation.] Similarly, releases given in connection with fitness activities were applicable to injuries incurred while engaging in fitness activities. [Citations.]” (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1357-1358; see also id. at p. 1356, fn. 1.)
The instant release/express assumption of risk did this by—among other phrases and provisions—the sentence reading: “I agree to assume responsibility for the risks identified herein and those risks not specifically identified.” It also did so, especially as applied here, by its earlier emphasis that “All horses . . . may and will . . . run and bolt uncontrollably. These actions may occur without warning and without apparent cause. They may be in response to external stimuli (such as . . . other horses ...)... which may [lead] to some degree of reflex action on the part of the horse.”
Despite all the effort the majority devotes to its attempt to distinguish Benedek, I simply do not understand how and why this language does not encompass defendant’s alleged negligence in supervising horseback riders, but the very general language used in the Benedek release relieved a health club for negligence allegedly resulting when one of its television sets fell on a member.
Yet another case distinguished at length by the majority makes this point clear. In Sanchez v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 62 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 902] (Sanchez), our colleagues in the Second District affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant health club and against an allegedly injured patron of that club, who had signed an application for membership that contained a release/express assumption of risk clause which did not specifically use the term “negligence,” but did provide that “ ‘ “all exercises and use of the fitness centers are undertaken by the member at the sole risk of the member, and ... the fitness center shall not be liable for any claims for injuries and damages whatsoever to person or property of the member . . . arising out of or connected with the use of the fitness center.” ’ ” {Id. at p. 68.)
The appellant in that case contended this language did not cover injuries caused by the fitness center’s negligence, but the court flatly rejected this argument: “Her contention that the absence of ‘[s]ome sort of verbiage, specifically describing in some adequate fashion the negligence of the defendant’ renders the release invalid is nothing more than her insistence that the term ‘negligence’ or the specific incident of active or passive negligence must appear in the provision. That, however, is not the law. ‘While it is true that the express terms of any release agreement must be applicable to the particular misconduct of the defendant [citation], that does not mean that every possible specific act of negligence of the defendant must be spelled out *1502in the agreement or even discussed by the parties.’ [Citation.] Here the specific activity is sufficiently described by the terms of the release and assumption of risk provision by reference to ‘injuries . . . arising out of or connected with the use of the fitness center.’ ” (Sanchez, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 68-69.)
1 conclude on this point by reiterating that I find no commonsense difference between a release/express assumption of risk (1) which covers “the risks identified herein [including the risk that a horse ‘may and will. . . run and bolt uncontrollably’] and those risks not specifically identified” and (2) one which covers “any and all risks the releasor encounters while on the former’s premises or using its facilities.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1491.) Notwithstanding its extended effort to distinguish these two formulations, I respectfully submit that the majority also fails.2
II.
Although much of part II of the majority’s opinion also involves attempts to distinguish several cases,3 any discussion of those efforts is unnecessary. This is so because the majority’s conclusion that the primary assumption of risk doctrine is inapplicable here is, I believe, wrong for two reasons: (1) nowhere in either its complaint or its pleadings in opposition to respondent’s motion for summary judgment does appellant either allege, argue, or present factual evidence showing intentional or reckless behavior by respondent or its employee and (2) contrary to the majority’s analysis, recklessness is not a subpart of negligence and, thus, allegations of and argument regarding the negligent behavior of a defendant cannot establish intentional or reckless behavior. I will discuss these points in that order.
A. The lack of any “allegation” or proof of reckless conduct.
The majority opinion says that, under the exception to the primary assumption of risk doctrine first articulated in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 320 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696] (Knight), and applied by that same court in Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d 30] (Kahn) and Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 *1503Cal.4th 482 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 165 P.3d 581] (Shin), it is possible that the conduct of respondent’s trail guide in this case was “ ‘reckless in the sense that it is “totally outside the range of the ordinary activity” [citation] involved in teaching or coaching the sport.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1493, quoting Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 996.) (See also Shelly v. Stepp (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1294-1295 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 323], applying the “intentional or reckless” standard to a case involving horseback riding.)
The first problem with this is that nowhere in either her complaint, her other pleadings in the trial court, or her briefs to this court does appellant come within the proverbial country mile of alleging that any action taken by respondent or any of its staff was “reckless” or anything close to it. And, under the authority principally relied upon by the majority, Kahn, both an allegation and plausible evidence of “recklessness” or intentional misconduct is an essential to liability in a case such as this.
In Kahn, our Supreme Court made clear that, unless an allegedly injured plaintiff both pleads and proves intentional or “reckless” conduct by the defendant or its agent, the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies. It stated: “These cases appropriately reason that, even keeping in mind the role of the coach or sports instructor, the imposition of a duty to avoid challenging a student to perform beyond his or her current capacity would have a chilling effect on the enterprise of teaching and learning skills that are necessary to the sport. These decisions properly emphasize that a coach or athletic instructor must challenge his or her students, and that learning itself can be a risky process, sometimes unavoidably so. These cases also properly recognize that while a student is engaged in the process of learning, he or she frequently is at greater risk than a proficient athlete would be, and a coach does not have a duty to eliminate all the risks presented by inexperience. [][] We agree that the object to be served by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk in the sports setting is to avoid recognizing a duty of care when to do so would tend to alter the nature of an active sport or chill vigorous participation in the activity. This concern applies to the process of learning to become competent or competitive in such a sport. Novices and children need instruction if they are to participate and compete, and we agree with the many Court of Appeal decisions that have refused to define a duty of care in terms that would inhibit adequate instruction and learning or eventually alter the nature of the sport. Accordingly, we believe that the standard set forth in Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, as it applies to coparticipants, generally should apply to sports instructors, keeping in mind, of course, that different facts are of significance in each setting. In order to support a cause of action in cases in which it is alleged that a sports instructor has required a student to perform beyond the student’s capacity or without providing adequate instruction, it must be alleged and proved that the instructor acted with intent to cause a student’s injury or that the instructor acted recklessly in the sense that the instructor’s *1504conduct was ‘totally outside the range of the ordinary activity’ [citation] involved in teaching or coaching the sport.” (Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1010-1011, italics added; see also Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 318-320; Shin, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 488-491, 497; Cheong v. Antablin (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1063, 1068 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 946 P.2d 817]; Bushnell v. Japanese-American Religious & Cultural Center (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 525 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 671] (Bushnell).)
Unfortunately, the majority rather conspicuously does not address the very specific and unambiguous holding italicized above. To be sure, later in Kahn, the court made clear that the complaint itself need not include a specific allegation of “recklessness” if the plaintiff “adequately alleged facts and produced evidence sufficient to support such a conclusion.” (Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1013, fn. 4.) But, a fortiori, if the plaintiff does not do so, rather clearly the allegations of the complaint are, indeed, significant.
Two Court of Appeal cases, both cited and quoted approvingly in Kahn, confirm that an allegation of negligence in a complaint is not the same as an allegation of reckless or intentionally harmful conduct and cannot be converted into one. (See Bushnell, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-535 and Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1371 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 813] (Allan).) This principle is especially applicable where there is an “utter absence in the moving papers of any evidence of ‘intentional misconduct or recklessness on the part of the instructor.’ ” (Allan, supra, at p. 1371, quoting Bushnell, supra, at p. 534.)4 And it is noteworthy that our Supreme Court quoted approvingly from Allan in Kahn, where it specifically noted that summary judgment was properly sustained in Allan on the basis of “the facts alleged in the case before it.” (Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1009, italics added.)
Nor could appellant have amended her complaint at the summary judgment stage. In Distefano v. Forester (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 813], our colleagues in Division One of the Fourth District affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a defendant in a primary assumption of risk case involving an off-road collision between a motorcyclist and a dune buggy. In a part of its opinion entitled—significantly at least to me—“Intentional or Reckless Conduct Not Pleaded,” the court wrote: “For purposes of determining whether Forester met his burden of establishing by undisputed facts his primary assumption of the risk defense under the Knight rule, our *1505next inquiry is whether there is evidence that he intentionally injured Distefano or engaged in conduct that was so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport of off-roading. [Citation.] The record shows that Distefano did not argue in the summary judgment proceedings (nor does he argue on appeal) that Forester intentionally injured him. Distefano does not allege in his form complaint that Forester’s conduct was intentional or reckless. His pleading alleges only that Forester ‘'negligently, carelessly and imprudently’ operated his dune buggy. (Italics added.) Ordinary negligence is thus the only standard pleaded. As already discussed, under the Knight mle a participant who is injured in a sporting activity may not sue another participant for mere negligence. [Citation.] [ft] In its written decision, the court noted Distefano’s failure to plead in his complaint that Forester’s conduct was reckless. On appeal, Distefano contends that case law would permit an amendment to his complaint to conform to proof, and the court erred by not considering his allegations outside his complaint that Forester’s conduct was reckless and increased the risks to Distefano over and above those inherent in recreational off-road activity. We reject these contentions. To create a triable issue of material fact, the opposition evidence must be directed to issues raised by the pleadings. [Citation.] If the opposing party’s evidence would show some factual assertion, legal theory, defense or claim not yet pleaded, that party should seek leave to amend the pleadings before the hearing on the summary judgment motion. [Citations.] Distefano does not assert on appeal, nor does the record show, that he sought leave to amend his complaint before the hearing on Forester’s summary judgment motion.” {Id. at pp. 1264-1265.)
Similarly, in Peart v. Ferro (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 60 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 885], our colleagues in Division Three of this district affirmed a grant of summary judgment in a primary assumption of risk case involving the collision of watercraft. In so doing, they rejected an argument that the defendant was (as Wimple clearly was here) a coach or instructor, but in the process stated: “Even if he could be construed as such . . . there would still be no basis for imposing liability on him in the absence of factual allegations and evidence showing that Ferro had acted recklessly or intentionally in such a way as to increase the risk of harm beyond those already inherent in the sport. [Citations.] [ft] Here, appellants failed to allege recklessness in their complaint. Neither have they adduced any specific evidence of intentional or reckless actions on the part of Ferro . . . that actually increased the risks inherent in operating a Sea-Doo sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to the applicability of the primary assumption of risk doctrine to this case.” {Id. at pp. 76-77, italics added.)5
*1506The majority’s argument also fails if one looks only at the evidence adduced by appellant in opposition to respondents’ motion for summary judgment. The documents filed by appellant in the trial court opposing respondent’s motion for summary judgment do not come close to alleging the sort of “reckless” or intentional behavior required to trigger this exception to the primary assumption of risk doctrine. In appellant’s extensive pleadings to the trial court opposing respondent’s motion for summary judgment, there is no suggestion whatsoever of “conduct that was so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved” in horseback riding. (Shin, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 488.) Indeed, appellant’s briefing to the trial court is quite to the contrary. Thus, in her memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to respondent’s motion for summary judgment, appellant summarizes the applicable law without even hinting at the concept of “reckless or intentional” conduct: “[T]he law is well defined that Defendant and its employee had a duty to avoid such conduct such as taking off at a gallop without warning or provocation and to conduct the trail ride in a manner so as to protect plaintiff against a particular risk of harm that caused her injury, i.e. falling off her horse.” (Italics added.) And, at the end of that memorandum of points and authorities, her contentions are summarized thusly: “Therefore, defendant and its employees owed a duty to avoid an unreasonable risk of injury to Plaintiff and to assure that the ride was not beyond the capability of Susan Cohen and her horse.”
Finally, in appellant’s 17-page combined response to respondent’s statement of undisputed material facts and “Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts,” there is, again, no allegation, mention, or even hint of “reckless” behavior on the part of respondent or its riding instructor-guide, Wimple. Thus, whether one considers (1) appellant’s complaint, (2) her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, (3) the evidence adduced by her to support that opposition, or (4) a combination of all three, the result is the same: under the principles articulated in Kahn, reemphasized in Shin, Peart, and other postKahn cases, there are simply no “allegations” or evidence of “reckless” or intentional misconduct.6
*1507Appellant’s briefs to this court are to the same effect. In her opening brief to us, the issue of primary assumption of risk is not addressed for the reason that the trial court granted summary judgment based on appellant’s execution of the release/express assumption of risk document. But respondent advances that argument in its brief to us as an alternative basis for affirmance of the summary judgment. There, it quotes Kahn to the effect that “a participant breaches a duty of care to a coparticipant only if he or she ‘intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’ ” (Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 995-996.) This point is repeated several times later in that brief, and the brief concludes with a three-page section entitled “Nothing in the Pleadings or Record Indicate that Mark Wimple was Grossly Negligent or Reckless.”
In her reply brief to us, appellant discusses none of the cases cited in that section (also cited and discussed below), nor the intentional or reckless behavior standard mandated by Knight, Kahn and subsequent authority. Indeed, the only use there of the word reckless appears in a single quotation from Kahn in that brief. But, even then, appellant continues to assert that the only issue regarding primary assumption of risk is “whether Mark Wimple, the trail guide, increased the risk of horse back riding by his actions” and: “Appellant is claiming that the actions of Respondent’s employee, Mark Wimple, made it more likely that she would be thrown form her horse by taking off unexpectedly on his horse without warning the riders.” Neither the words nor the concepts of reckless or intentional conduct are referenced in the slightest.
In summary, nowhere in either (1) her complaint in the trial court, (2) her opposition to respondent’s motion for summary judgment, or (3) her briefs to this court does appellant even hint that the conduct of Wimple was either intentional or reckless. But the majority ignores these failures and reverses the trial court’s grant of a summary judgment based on a legal theory never suggested by her either there or here.
B. “Recklessness” is not the same as “negligence.”
But there is an additional reason why summary judgment should be affirmed: contrary to the majority’s view, our Supreme Court has made clear—even before Kahn—that “recklessness” is not a subpart of “negligence.” In Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th 23, the court explained: “ ‘Recklessness’ refers to a subjective state of culpability greater than simple negligence, *1508which has been described as a ‘deliberate disregard’ of the ‘high degree of probability’ that an injury will occur [citations]. Recklessness, unlike negligence, involves more than ‘inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions’ but rather rises to the level of a ‘conscious choice of a course of action . . . with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it.’ (Rest.2d Torts, § 500, com. (g), p. 590.)” (Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 31-32, italics added.)
Section 500 of the Restatement Second of Torts, cited in Delaney, reads as follows: “The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 500, italics added.)
Comment g to section 500 of the Restatement Second of Torts is entitled, significantly: “Negligence and recklessness contrasted.” (Italics omitted.) It reads, in full: “Reckless misconduct differs from negligence in several important particulars. It differs from that form of negligence which consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions to enable the actor adequately to cope with a possible or probable future emergency, in that reckless misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course of action, either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. It differs not only from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but also from that negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. The difference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a difference in the degree of the risk, but this difference of degree is so marked as to amount substantially to a difference in kind.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 500, com. g, p. 590, italics added.)
I respectfully submit that the text of this comment, cited and relied upon by our Supreme Court a little over a decade ago, undermines the majority’s premise that a tort case pled and argued both in the trial and appellate courts on a theory of ordinary negligence can and should be treated as if it had been based on “recklessness.”
Further, even before Delaney, a panel of Division Four of this court applied the principle articulated there to a case involving primary assumption *1509of risk. In Stimson v. Carlson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1201 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 670] (Stimson), that court affirmed a summary judgment granted to a defendant boat owner in a personal injury action brought by a member of his sailing crew who was injured when hit by the mainsheet of the defendant’s boat while sailing on San Francisco Bay. But the plaintiff in that case had alleged only negligence, which that court held was insufficient. Justice Reardon wrote for a unanimous court: “Failing to call out course changes does not amount to intentional or reckless conduct. Stimson alleged that Carlson was negligent, not that he committed an intentional tort. Carlson’s failure to declare a course change before executing it was not so reckless as to be totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport. [Citing Knight.] While his conduct was unexpected, it did not alter the fundamental risk of sailing—the boom and its sheets remained the danger. Therefore, Carlson’s conduct did not breach any legal duty to Stimson, the case falls within the primary assumption of the risk doctrine barring Stimson’s action, and the trial court properly granted Carlson’s motion for summary judgment.” (Id. at p. 1206, italics added.)
Since Delaney, a panel of the Third District has specifically applied that case’s definition of “recklessness” to another primary assumption of risk case. In Towns v. Davidson (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 461, 470-473 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 568] (Towns), that court held that a trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to a ski resort and one of its employees who had been sued by a skier who had collided with the employee on one of the resorts slopes. After quoting exactly the same passage as appears above from Delaney, the court held: “To establish Davidson’s conduct was reckless and not shielded by primary assumption of risk, plaintiff must show the conduct was ‘so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.’ [Citing Knight.] ‘ “[C]onduct is totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport (and thus any risks resulting from that conduct are not inherent to the sport) if the prohibition of that conduct would neither deter vigorous participation in the sport nor otherwise fundamentally alter the nature of the sport.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Towns, supra, at p. 470.)7
*1510Thus, for two separate and independent reasons, I believe that the trial court’s decision was correct, and that we should affirm its order granting summary judgment.

 Although citing this case, the majority then attempts to distinguish it, too. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 1489-1491.) And that decision is not the only one where a California appellate court has lamented exactly what was going on both there and, now, here: strained efforts to narrow the terms of a release/express assumption of risk document. (See also, to the same effect, Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 162 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 245].)

 Probably the clearest example of this failure is the majority’s impenetrable footnote 2, which is apparently an attempt to respond to the point I make above. However, I respectfully submit that that footnote does not identify any commonsense difference between formulations (1) and (2) above.

 See, e.g., Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 578 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 671] and Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 971 P.2d 986] (Delaney). But perhaps of more significance are the many cases I rely upon in this section of my dissent which the majority opts to ignore. (See fns. 4, 5 and 7, post.)

 Neither Bushnell nor Allan is mentioned by the majority. This is particularly troublesome because both cases are discussed approvingly in Kahn (see Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1007-1010), and one of the holdings of Allan is that a pleading of negligence cannot be interpreted as a pleading of recklessness. (See Allan, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371; see also Bushnell, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 533-535.)

 Neither Distefano nor Peart is cited or discussed by the majority.

 The majority interprets my “main objection” to be that “appellant has failed to show the necessary ‘recklessness.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1496.) It then expands on this characterization a page later when it says that I place “the burden on appellant to persuade the court respondent has no such defense” rather than “asking whether respondent has established, as a matter of undisputed fact, ‘either that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established ....’” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1496-1497.) Both statements completely miss the mark: the core of my position is the express holding of Kahn—a holding that, as noted above, is inexplicably never even mentioned by the majority—that “it must be alleged and proved that the instructor acted with intent to cause a student’s injury or that the instructor acted recklessly ....” (Kahn, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1011, italics added.) Footnote 4 of Kahn makes clear (as also noted earlier) that such “allegations” need not be in the complaint. (Id. at p. 1013, fn. 4.) But clearly such allegations have to be somewhere in the record in the trial court, and *1507they are most certainly not in this record before us. Secondly, there was no “proof’ of such behavior in the record. Thirdly and finally, and as also noted above, appellant clearly did not understand the standard mandated by Kahn when it came time to write and file her briefs with this court.

 Neither Stimson nor Towns is cited or discussed by the majority, an omission perhaps 50 percent attributable to the fact that Towns, contrary to the majority’s statement in its footnote 6, relied on Delaney’s definition of “recklessness” in affirming the summary judgment in the primary assumption of risk case before it. (Towns, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 470.)