Court Opinion

ID: 9381768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 18:02:30.536744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.431804
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/23/23
                         CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                               (Lassen)
                                                 ----

    In re L.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court               C096775
    Law.

    LASSEN COUNTY HEALTH AND SOCIAL                              (Super. Ct. No. 2020-
    SERVICES AGENCY,                                              JV0066398, J6529)

                   Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.

    M.B.,

                   Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Lassen County, Candace J.
Beason, Judge. (Retired judge of the L.A. Sup. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)

            Law Office of Linda J. Conrad, Linda J. Conrad for Defendant and Appellant.

      Prentice Long, Margaret E. Long and Scott A. McLeran for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

*       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is
certified for publication with the exception of part II of the discussion.

                                                  1
       Appellant M.B., mother of minor L.J., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders
terminating parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§§ 366.26, 395.)1 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by: (1) denying her
request to admit self-made recordings of her visits with the minor to support her
argument that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) beneficial parental relationship
exception applied and to impeach the evidence of the visits; and (2) finding the beneficial
parental relationship exception did not apply to prevent the termination of parental rights.
       We will affirm.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                              I
                              Initial Dependency Proceedings
       On February 2, 2020, law enforcement responded to a disturbance at mother’s
home. The minor’s half sibling, B.B., reported that mother and another half sibling, T.B.,
were in an argument, and mother stomped her feet in the hallway causing a portable shelf
to fall and hit the minor. The minor did not have visible injuries. Two days later, law
enforcement responded to a 911 call stating that mother was forcing B.B. and T.B. to
leave the residence and threatening to have known drug dealers beat them. According to
the responding officer, mother was hysterical and appeared to be under the influence.
Mother initially denied using illicit substances but then admitted that she used
methamphetamine, claiming that she did not use it in front of her children.
       On February 7, 2020, Lassen County Health and Social Services Agency (the
Department) filed a petition alleging that the minor, then age three years, came within the
provision of section 300, subdivision (b)(1), failure to protect, and section 300,
subdivision (g), no provision for support. The petition alleged that mother was unable to

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                              2
provide appropriate parental care and supervision for the minor due to her illicit drug use.
The petition further alleged that while screaming at her children, mother caused a heavy
closet door to fall, nearly striking the minor. At the initial detention hearing, the juvenile
court ordered the minor detained.
       On February 20, 2020, the Department filed a jurisdiction report, reporting that
during a visit, mother gave the minor candy despite being told not to give her candy due
to her untreated cavities. This caused the minor to begin crying due to tooth pain.
Mother also failed to attend a scheduled phone visit. At the March 9, 2020, contested
jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true and
sustained the petition.
                                              II
                                         Disposition
       The Department’s disposition report noted the minor initially became extremely
upset when leaving mother at the end of visits, but she quickly began to say goodbye to
mother without incident after her successful transition to her placement. During most
visits, mother would interact with the minor only minimally and end the visits early. At
the dispositional hearing on March 23, 2020, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a
dependent, ordered minor removed from mother’s physical custody, and ordered
reunification services be provided to mother. Mother’s case plan consisted of general
counseling, a domestic violence/anger management program, a parent education program,
and substance abuse treatment.
                                              III
                                        Status Review
       On August 4, 2020, the Department filed a section 388 petition for modification,
requesting that mother’s reunification services be terminated. The Department alleged
mother made no progress in her case plan, engaged minimally in visits with the minor,

                                              3
refused to work on her case plan, had irrational behaviors, tested positive for
methamphetamine, and refused to drug test since May 2020.
       The Department’s August 31, 2020, status review report showed that mother had
called law enforcement claiming that the Department lost the minor and that the minor
had been kidnapped and was being held for ransom. It was reported that mother did not
attend several scheduled visits. At mother’s request, the social worker arranged
residential substance abuse treatment, but mother did not follow through. Mother
completed intake for a substance abuse treatment program, general counseling, and anger
management services; however, mother did not attend any scheduled appointments or
services.
       In an addendum report, the Department reported that mother had recently
attempted suicide and was taken to the hospital. Thereafter, mother announced that she
had decided to “do whatever is needed.” Around this time, September 2020, mother
reported that she had not used illicit substances for 10 days, began anger management,
and completed intake for rehabilitation services. Mother began attending community
support meetings, found a sponsor, and registered for child endangerment and parenting
classes. Nonetheless, the Department did not change its recommendation and request that
mother’s services be terminated.
       At the contested six-month status review hearing on October 26, 2020, the juvenile
court found that mother had made significant progress and found good cause to provide
an additional six months of reunification services, effectively denying the Department’s
section 388 petition.
       In a December 2020, interim review report, the Department reported that mother
had engaged in her case plan and provided negative drug tests. Mother had regular visits
with the minor and began overnight visits in January 2021. On March 8, 2021, the
juvenile court returned the minor to mother under a plan of family maintenance.

                                             4
                                            IV
                                   Subsequent Petition
       On May 21, 2021, the Department filed a section 342 subsequent petition under
section 300, subdivisions (b) (1) and (c), alleging that on or about May 19, 2021, the
minor had been exposed to a violent confrontation between her mother and mother’s new
husband, J.K., during which they struck and spat on each other while the minor was
present, and mother threatened to commit suicide. It was further alleged that this was the
second time in approximately one month that the minor was exposed to a violent
confrontation between mother and J.K.
       The detention report further stated that on May 20, 2021, it received an early
morning request to respond to a gas station because mother was fighting with J.K. in a
vehicle and the minor was present. By the time the social worker arrived, they were
gone. Meanwhile, J.K. went to the Department’s office to show a video of the incident,
and as the social worker was holding J.K.’s phone, mother sent a text message to J.K.
asking him to pick her up because she and the minor were going to leave the area. The
social worker directed mother to bring the minor to the Department or a warrant would be
filed. J.K. told the social worker that mother was using drugs, and the video he took
showed mother possibly hitting and spitting on J.K., preventing him from leaving, and
threatening suicide.
       When interviewed by the social worker, the minor reported that J.K. hit her with a
book, causing a visible bump on her forehead. The minor also reported that she saw J.K.
and mother hit each other. Mother subsequently tested positive for methamphetamine.
The juvenile court found the minor came within section 300, and the minor was again
detained.
       In the June 2021, jurisdiction report, the Department reported that mother did not
appear for two scheduled visits and during a third visit, mother was erratic and had an
outburst in the lobby. It took the social workers much of the visit time just to calm

                                             5
mother. It was also reported that mother’s June 2, 2021, oral swab drug test was positive
for methamphetamine. The juvenile court sustained the supplemental petition on July 26,
2021.
                                            V
                                  Subsequent Disposition
        In an August 2021, disposition report, the Department reported that mother had
entered a residential substance abuse treatment program. She also made even more
serious allegations against J.K., saying he had raped her, and she would be filing a
restraining order. The Department personnel observed the minor “enthusiastically
greeting [Mother] at the beginning of each in-person visit.” The minor’s speech was
noticeably worse upon re-detention than when she was initially returned to mother’s care.
The minor also exhibited “signs of anxiety and stress following visits with [mother] and
maternal family members.” Since re-detention, mother had participated in 20 scheduled
visits and missed three scheduled visits. The social worker was concerned that mother
discussed adult issues with the young minor during her visits, causing the minor stress
and anxiety. In an addendum report, the Department reported that mother left the
residential program without explanation. Mother was still in a relationship with J.K. and
wanted reunification services for him.
        At the September 20, 2021, contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court found
clear and convincing evidence that reunification was not going to occur, and it was not in
the minor’s best interests to extend reunification services. The court terminated
reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section
366.26.
                                            VI
                                  Section 366.26 Hearing
        In the December 30, 2021, section 366.26 report, the Department reported that the
care providers wanted to adopt the minor and had been found to be suitable adoptive

                                             6
parents. Mother had three visits with the minor since the last hearing, and the social
worker reported mother behaved inappropriately at each visit and had to be redirected
numerous times. The minor had significant behavioral issues following two of the three
visits with mother.
       In a May 2022, addendum report, the Department provided additional information
regarding the nature of the relationship between mother and the minor in order to address
the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights. The
Department conceded that mother met the first element of regular visitation and contact,
despite having missed several visits.
       Regarding the second element, the Department opined mother had not shown a
beneficial relationship because of a series of problems over the past 26 months: the
minor had resided with mother for only 72 days; the quality of mother’s visitation with
the minor was generally poor; mother “seemed focused on meeting her own needs rather
than attending to [the minor’s] needs and interests”; mother’s interactions with the minor
caused the child to cry and become dysregulated during seven visits, including during
each of the most recent visits since reunification services were terminated; mother
chastised the minor when she referred to her caregiver as “mommy,” upsetting the minor;
and mother lacked understanding of the damage it could cause the minor by her
insistence the minor embrace mother’s abuser as family.
       After supervised visits, the minor “reportedly expressed guilt, screamed and threw
tantrums.” Further, “upon return to the resource family home [the minor] appeared
uncomfortable talking about [mother],” referring to her as “ ‘her’ ” or by mother’s given
name. After visits, the minor sought reassurance from the care providers that she would
remain safe.
       Regarding the third element, whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the minor, the Department reported that the minor was “stable,
comfortable, and happy when not in [mother’s] presence.” The minor had not

                                             7
experienced distress from being separated from mother. Mother demonstrated
“untreated, unstable mental health and exposure to domestic violence.” The Department
believed that termination of parental rights would alleviate the stress for the minor related
to visits with mother and allow her to become fully integrated into her new family.
       According to the attached adoption assessment, the assessor concluded that it was
not in the minor’s best interest to order guardianship, and any benefit to the minor of
continuing the legal relationship with mother was outweighed by the benefit of legal
permanence through adoption.
       On June 2, 2022, the juvenile court appointed special advocate (CASA) reported
that according to the minor’s therapist, the minor was suppressing her trauma. The
CASA reported that the minor suffered from “chaotic and confrontational visits with her
mother.” Mother would break visitation rules and bring gifts for the minor “only for [the
minor] to have to return the items at the end of the visit, as they are not allowed.”
Returning the gifts caused the minor “great distress,” and mother would become
confrontational and blame the social worker.
       Clinical Psychologist, J. Reid McKellar, conducted a bonding evaluation and
reported that on several occasions, as noted in the visitation records, mother engaged in
prolonged verbal disagreements with the social workers during visits, causing the minor
to exhibit visible signs of distress, during which mother did not disengage. Dr. McKellar
reported that mother brought half sibling T.B. to the bonding evaluation despite being
admonished not to do so because Dr. McKellar was tasked with evaluating only the bond
between mother and the minor. He observed that mother’s demeanor with the minor was
“more like a playful aunt than a primary care provider.” In addition to finding that
severance of the bond between mother and the minor would not have a detrimental
impact on the minor, Dr. McKellar also opined that the minor’s relationship with mother
is not beneficial for the minor “within the context of the case plan status and [In re]
Caden C. [(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 629 (Caden C.).]” He opined that if the minor were to

                                              8
be placed in a guardianship, mother’s “behavior would undoubtedly undermine the
stability of [the minor’s] placement.” At the request of mother’s counsel, Dr. McKellar
subsequently reviewed additional materials provided by mother, including audio/video
recordings she had taken during several visits with the minor. He noted that the
interactions on the recordings were consistent with his prior observations and did not
change his opinion that while there was a bond between the minor and mother, severance
of that bond would not be detrimental to the minor.
       At the contested section 366.26 hearing, which began on July 28, 2022, the
juvenile court heard testimony from the maternal grandmother, T.B., mother, and the
social worker. The maternal grandmother testified that she observed two or three visits
between mother and the minor, and she never saw the minor upset by these visits. She
testified that the minor appeared sad when the visits ended. T.B. testified that during the
bonding evaluation, he saw that the minor and mother were happy to see each other and
as the visit was ending, the minor “started crying to not leave.” Mother testified that the
minor was not distressed during visits and denied doing anything inappropriate. Mother
testified that she was unaware that it was against the law or rules for her to make
audio/visual recordings of just herself and the minor during visits. She claimed the minor
knew she was being recorded.
       The social worker testified that the social worker would sit outside the visitation
room during mother’s visits with the minor because the social worker noticed that mother
tended to engage more with her than with the minor if the social worker was in the room.
The social worker also testified that there was a sign posted in the lobby that visits were
not to be recorded, and she did not recall any of the social workers that supervised the
visits consenting to mother recording the visits. To her knowledge, the minor had not
requested more visits.
       At the conclusion of testimony, mother’s counsel sought to introduce the
audio/video recordings taken by mother during her visits with the minor on January 19,

                                             9
2022, February 25, 2022, and March 31, 2022, for the purpose of the juvenile court
observing their interactions. The minor’s counsel contended that the audio/video
recordings were not admissible if not authorized by both parties, and that on behalf of the
minor, he was not consenting to their introduction on grounds that the minor did not
provide affirmative permission. The Department’s counsel also objected to the
introduction of the audio/video recordings on grounds that they were not authorized and
were taken in violation of the Penal Code, and would also be cumulative since Dr.
McKellar had reviewed the recordings in forming his opinion for the bonding evaluation.
The juvenile court sustained the objections, stating that it was a misdemeanor to record
something without the consent/agreement of the other party, and the recordings were thus
inadmissible as evidence. The court found that because the minor was a ward of the
court, mother could not consent to the recordings on the minor’s behalf. The court
further noted that Dr. McKellar had reviewed the audio/video recordings and they did not
change his opinion that it would not be detrimental to have parental rights terminated.
       The juvenile court found that there was clear and convincing evidence the minor
was likely to be adopted, none of the exceptions to adoption existed, termination of
parental rights would not be detrimental to the minor, and it was in the best interest of the
minor to terminate parental rights. Regarding the parent-child exception, the juvenile
court stated: “The Court does find that the mother has not met her burden by a
preponderance of the evidence standard, that it would be detrimental to [the minor] to
have parental rights terminated. And while she does have the bond with mother,
grandmother and siblings, . . . the focus is on [the minor].” The court noted that the
minor had been removed twice and was not in mother’s care or custody for a significant
period of time. The court further noted that Dr. McKellar’s report indicated that while
there was a bond, it was closer to a relative-child bond. The juvenile court ordered
parental rights terminated and freed the minor for adoption.
       Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                             10
                                       DISCUSSION
                                               I
                         Request to Admit Audio/Video Recordings
       Mother contends that the juvenile court violated her constitutional right to due
process by excluding the audio/video recording she made of herself with the minor. She
claims she was prejudiced because the court’s refusal to admit this evidence prevented
her from meeting her burden of showing that the beneficial relationship exception
applies. We disagree.
       Section 706 provides the court shall receive in evidence the social study of the
children and such other relevant and material evidence as may be offered. “[T]he
provisions of Evidence Code section 352 (allowing the court to limit relevant evidence if
it is cumulative, time wasting, or likely to confuse the issues) are necessarily implied in
Welfare and Institutions Code section 706.” (In re Romeo C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
1838, 1843, fn. omitted.) “Trial courts are afforded discretion to work within existing
guidelines to determine the admissibility of evidence. [Citation.] The reviewing court
will not disturb their findings absent an ‘ “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1176.)
       Here, the juvenile court found mother’s recordings inadmissible, reasoning that
because the minor was a ward of the court, mother could not consent to the recordings on
the minor’s behalf. Accordingly, the court noted that it was a misdemeanor violation to
record something that the other party does not agree to, and the recordings were thus
inadmissible as evidence. The court excluded the evidence on these bases. The court
also noted that Dr. McKellar had reviewed the audio/video recordings, and they did not
change his opinion that it would not be detrimental to have parental rights terminated.
       Penal Code section 632 expressly forbids the recording of confidential
communications without the consent of all parties and makes such recordings
inadmissible “in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding.” For the purposes of

                                              11
Penal Code section 632, a confidential communication “means any communication
carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the
communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a
communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive, or
administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the
parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be
overheard or recorded.” (Pen. Code, § 632, subd. (c), partially abrogated as to criminal
proceedings, as stated in People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, 679-684.)
       Here, mother contends she was able to consent to the recordings on the minor’s
behalf. She is incorrect. In dependency proceedings, the child’s appointed counsel
serves as his or her guardian ad litem. (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 910.)
In such a role, the “guardian ad litem is responsible for both evaluating the ‘situation and
needs of the child’ and ‘mak[ing] recommendations to the court concerning the best
interests of the child.’ [Citation.] The guardian ad litem is required to ‘ “represent and
protect the rights and best interests of the child.” [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 910-911.)
There is no indication that minor’s appointed counsel was informed about these
recordings prior to the time when mother attempted to introduce them into evidence.
Further, the minor’s counsel denied any consent and objected to their introduction.
       Mother further argues that there is no statutory provision limiting a parent’s right
to consent to video recording her child. She misunderstands the law of juvenile
dependency. Here, the minor had been removed from her custody and care, was
adjudged a dependent child of the court, and was appointed counsel to act on her behalf.
While the statutory scheme for child dependency is silent as to whether a parent or the
minor’s counsel may consent to recording a minor, it does address the matter of consent
as to other sensitive matters affecting the minor’s rights, and most particularly, the
minor’s privacy rights and privileges. For example, the statutory scheme expressly
provides that the minor’s counsel shall be the holder of the psychotherapist-client

                                              12
privilege, physician-patient privilege, and clergyman-penitent privilege, and that counsel
may invoke these privileges on the minor’s behalf if the child is found by the court not to
be of sufficient age and maturity to consent. (§ 317, subd. (f).) The statute includes a
rebuttable presumption that the child is of sufficient age and maturity to consent if the
child is over 12 years of age. (Ibid.) Because the parents’ interests in dependency
proceedings are frequently in direct conflict with the minors’ interests and a recording
made by a parent may be selectively taken to benefit only the parent’s interests, we are
persuaded that minor’s counsel, as the guardian ad litem, must likewise consent to a
recording on behalf a minor, at least for those minors not of sufficient age and maturity to
consent to such a recording on their own.2
       Mother next contends that “where, as here, the visits were being supervised by the
[D]epartment and a social worker was stationed right outside the door, and everyone
including minor’s counsel knew the visits were supervised, there is, as a matter of law, no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.” This contention also lacks merit. Here,
the record shows the visits were held in a private visitation room, not open or subject to
public view or setting, with a social worker sitting outside the door. Indeed, there is a
sign, posted in the lobby, expressly stating that visits were not to be recorded, rendering it
unequivocally reasonable for any participant to expect the visit would not be recorded.
Moreover, mother essentially admitted the visits were private, as she testified that she
“was not aware that it was against the law if it was just [the minor] and [herself] that were
being recorded” and she made the recordings because “there was no one to witness” the
visits because only the minor and herself were present. Accordingly, these visits
qualified as confidential communications between mother and the minor.

2     We do not opine on whether and under what conditions an older minor may
consent to recordings.

                                             13
          Even absent authority under Penal Code section 632 to exclude the audio/video
recordings, the juvenile court had broad authority to determine the admissibility of this
evidence. (See In re Cole, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 911 [a juvenile court’s ruling on
the admissibility of evidence will only be disturbed if there is a clear showing of an abuse
of discretion].) Without any apparent judicial order or authorization, mother’s counsel
provided the recordings to Dr. McKellar. We question the propriety of counsel’s actions
in this regard but, in any event, note that as the juvenile court observed, Dr. McKellar
reviewed the recordings, which he concluded were consistent with his own observations
and did not change his opinion that it would not be detrimental to terminate parental
rights.
          Mother asserts that the juvenile court’s ruling that the recordings were not
admissible prevented her from being able to present a complete defense and violated her
due process rights. Due process during a dependency hearing generally requires that
parents be given the right to present evidence, to cross-examine adversarial witnesses,
and for counsel to be provided the opportunity to argue the merits of an issue. (In re
Lesly G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 904, 914-915.) “The due process right to present
evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue before
the court. [Citations.]” (In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817.) Mother’s
counsel had the opportunity to, and did, cross-examine the social worker at the hearing.
Audio/video recordings of visits at which the social worker was not present lacked
impeachment value as to the social worker’s testimony. Mother also introduced Dr.
McKellar’s report, who observed and discussed the recordings and noted they were
consistent with his observations. Mother also had the opportunity during her testimony to
describe the visits depicted on the recordings from her personal recollection.
Accordingly, mother was not precluded from presenting her case. The recordings were
cumulative of other evidence before the juvenile court, and the court acted well within its
discretion to exclude them.

                                               14
       Even if mother’s due process rights had been violated, which we conclude they
were not, mother cannot demonstrate prejudice here. Mother was given a full and fair
opportunity to be heard on the matter of visits and bonding, to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, and to testify at the hearing. Mother’s claim that her selective
recordings during three visits would have shown her relationship with the minor in a
more favorable light is inconsistent with the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Nor
could they have established that individuals who were not present were lying about what
went on during the visits. In view of the extensive documentation of mother’s
problematic visits with the minor, the numerous reports in the record, Dr. McKellar’s
report, and the testimony of the social worker and mother at the hearing, we conclude that
even if it was an error to exclude the recordings, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (In re Vanessa M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1132 [constitutional due process
violation in dependency context requires application of the harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt standard because an error is of federal constitutional dimension].)
                                              II
                        Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
       Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to find the beneficial parental
relationship exception to adoption. She argues that the juvenile court’s analysis was terse
and did not sufficiently state its considerations and findings on the record. She also
argues that the juvenile court erred in applying improper factors under Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at page 629. We disagree.
       At the section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, a juvenile court must
choose one of the several “ ‘possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . .
The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] If
the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent
circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) There are only limited circumstances that permit the court

                                             15
to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would
be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such circumstance is the
so-called beneficial parental relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)
[beneficial parental relationship exception]; Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 629.)
       The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of
any circumstances that constitute an exception to the termination of parental rights.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243,
1252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(d)(2).) The parent “must show regular visitation
and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted.
Moreover, the parent must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent — the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship. And the parent must show that terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., at p. 636.)
       The beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption “must be examined on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child
bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody,
the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.”
(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The factual predicates of the
exception must be supported by substantial evidence, but the juvenile court exercises its
discretion in weighing that evidence and determining detriment. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We do not substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile
court as to what is in the child’s best interests. (Id. at pp. 640-641.)
       Here, the Department concedes, as it did in the juvenile court, that mother met the
first element of regular visitation and contact. As for the second and third elements, the
juvenile court concluded that while there was a bond between the minor and mother, the

                                              16
focus is on the minor, and mother did not meet her burden to establish that termination of
that attachment would be detrimental to the minor. The court noted the fact that the
minor had twice been removed from mother, the substantial length of time that the minor
had been in foster care, and that the bonding evaluation report by Dr. McKellar indicated
that while there was a bond between mother and the minor, it was not a bond “of a
significant strength to be an example of a mother-child bond but of a relative-child
bond.” As such, it appears the court found mother’s evidence of two of the required
elements to establish the beneficial parental relationship exception was lacking. (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636.)
       Mother further contends that the juvenile court improperly found that minor’s
bond with mother was not that of a mother-child, but more of a relative-child bond.
Mother incorrectly attributes this finding to the juvenile court; the court merely recited
Dr. McKellar’s findings in his bonding evaluation report. Moreover, Dr. McKellar’s
observation of the nature of the bond is supported by the fact that the minor referred to
mother as “ ‘her’ ” or by her given name.
       The juvenile court found that mother did not meet her burden to establish either
that the minor had “a substantial, positive, emotional attachment” to her, or that
termination of that attachment would be detrimental to the minor (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636). Mother offered nothing more than conclusory statements that there
was a bond that should not be severed. Conversely, the Department provided the court
with sufficient evidence, including reports and visitation logs, to determine the minor did
not have the kind of relationship with mother that would trigger the beneficial parental
relationship exception. Dr. McKellar’s bonding evaluation report requested by mother
reached the same conclusion.
       The minor’s anxiety and behavioral issues following visits with mother were well-
documented. From the outset of visitation and throughout the case, mother would often
miss visits and when she did visit the minor, interacted with her only minimally and

                                             17
ended the visits early. The minor exhibited “signs of anxiety and stress following visits
with [mother].” CASA reported that the minor suffered from “chaotic and
confrontational visits with her mother.” Mother was so frequently confrontational and
overly engaged with the social workers, instead of the minor, during visits that the social
workers began sitting outside the visitation room door.
       At the time of the hearing, the child was only six years old. Her first three years in
the care of the mother had been traumatic. By all accounts, the child was now in a safe
and secure permanent placement, where over several years she had developed a healthy
bond with her caregivers who were ready to adopt her. The mother’s contact with the
child was nothing more than one visit per month, with no prospects to increase in
frequency, and the evidence established that the visits were nothing more than playdates,
at best. In sum, when focusing on the well-being of the child, the negatives of continuing
the relationship — particularly, the child’s ongoing anxiety — far outweighed any
positives.
       Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence in the record and the court did not abuse its discretion in finding no
detriment to termination of parental rights.
       Finally, to the extent mother complains that the juvenile court failed to state, on
the record, its reasoning and findings in denying the application of the beneficial parental
relationship exception, the court is not required to make those findings on the record. (In
re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156, 1161 [no requirement that the juvenile court
makes specific findings when it finds beneficial parental relationship exception does not
apply].) The juvenile court did not err in finding the beneficial parental relationship
exception did not apply.

                                               18
                                      DISPOSITION
       The orders of the juvenile court, terminating parental rights and freeing the child
for adoption, are affirmed.

                                                     \s\                      ,
                                                 McADAM, J.*

       We concur:

           \s\             ,
       ROBIE, Acting P. J.

          \s\                 ,
       MAURO, J.

*       Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                            19