Court Opinion

ID: 9680564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:33:56.280822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.345062
License: Public Domain

MARY K. HOFF, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent only to the extent the majority finds no plain error in the inclusion of paragraph Third and its “sudden passion” language in the second degree murder verdict director.
“Instructional error constitutes plain error when it is clear the trial court so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury ... that it is apparent the error affected the verdict.” State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294, 300 (Mo. banc 2000). Recent Missouri cases have found reversible plain error in verdict directing instructions for the offense of which defendant was convicted. Id.; State v. Ludwig, 18 S.W.3d 139 (Mo.App.E.D.2000). We have also reversed a conviction for error in an instruction pertaining to a lesser included offense, even though the defendant had been convicted of a higher degree of the offense, when the error prevented conviction of the lesser crime. State v. Kinnard, 671 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo.App.1984).
Here, the inclusion in the second degree murder verdict director of paragraph Third and its “sudden passion” language requires reversal for plain error due to the *27absence of a voluntary manslaughter instruction, the argument of counsel, and the jury’s obvious confusion. As the majority notes, paragraph Third and its “sudden passion” language must be included in the second degree murder verdict director when there is evidence supporting a finding the defendant killed the victim under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause. Additionally, a trial court is “required to give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant caused the death of the victim under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause.” State v. Redmond, 937 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Mo. banc 1996). In this dissent, I am not addressing whether there was evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction but rather that paragraph Third and its sudden passion language should not be included in the second degree murder verdict director in the absence of a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
Here, it appears the jury believed it had no second degree murder option due to the second degree murder verdict director’s language and the arguments of counsel. Counsel, in particular the prosecutor, clearly advised the jury this killing was either “cold-blooded” or “hot-blooded.” The latter reference intimates a killing due to “sudden passion arising out of adequate cause.” The instructions only gave the jury two options: first degree murder, which could be considered “cold-blooded”; and second degree murder. Due to counsel’s argument, the jury might consider the second degree murder offense as the “hotblooded” option. The second degree murder verdict director, however, did not allow a conviction for second degree murder if the jury found the case was “hot-blooded” or, in other words, involved “sudden passion arising out of adequate cause.” The jury’s inquiry of the trial court clearly questions the verdict director’s requirement that second degree murder be found if the killing did not result from sudden passion arising out of adequate cause. That inquiry clearly shows the jury considered, and determined it had to reject, the second degree murder offense because, contrary to the guidance of counsel’s argument, the verdict director for that offense expressly required the jury to find the killing involved no sudden passion. It is apparent that the instructional error may have affected the verdict in this case.
Under the circumstances, I find the paragraph Third language of the second degree murder verdict director may have prevented the jury from considering second degree murder and resulted in manifest injustice. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial on this ground. In all other respects, I concur in the majority opinion.