Court Opinion

ID: 9750712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:26:29.277531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:19.581366
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree that appellant waived whatever rights he may have had under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. I *218disagree, however, that he waived his rights under Rule 1100.
In Commonwealth v. Coleman, 477 Pa. 400, 383 A.2d 1268 (1978), the Supreme Court considered the efficacy of a Rule 1100 waiver form. The waiver form did not specify for how long a period the defendant was waiving his right to trial; nor did it inform the defendant that the result of a successful Rule 1100 motion would be final discharge. Since it therefore could not be said that the defendant’s act of signing the form showed an understanding of the right he was waiving, the Court found the form of “no legal significance.” 477 Pa. at 406, 383 A.2d at 1271. In doing so, the Court compared the form with the detailed explanations that must be given by a defendant before it may be found that he has waived his right to trial, by entering a guilty plea, Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974), or his right to trial by jury, Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 334 A.2d 610 (1975).
The waiver colloquy here was substantially identical to the waiver form in Coleman. Therefore, it too was of no legal significance.
The case should be remanded with instructions to the lower court to make a new computation of the period during which appellant had to be brought to trial under Rule 1100.