Court Opinion

ID: 9307040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:17:53.479647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:57.635243
License: Public Domain

BUTLER, District Judge
(dissenting). I regret that I cannot unite in the above conclusion. I do not propose to enter upon an argument to sustain my views, but to state very briefly the reasons on which they are founded.
While the government may take land for public use, the use must be such as arises out of the exercise of its legitimate functions. It is not necessary, however, that the land or the use be indispensable. It is sufficient if it be convenient and serviceable. Within this limitation congress and the executive cannot be controlled; they are the judges. The courts can only interfere where the limit is transcended. The constitution does not define the special uses for which land may be taken; they could not be so defined; the occasion for them changes with the change of circumstances. As for instance, the government has the care and wardship of the Indian tribes. It must provide for them, protect its citizens against them, and keep the public peace in this respect. Of recent times it has come to be believed that this duty can best be, discharged by teaching them the arts and industries of civilized life. The government has adopted this view, and consequently established schools for the purpose. Schoolhouses have thus become necessary. In some instances government buildings have been appropriated to this use, and jn others buildings have been rented. That land may be taken for thé erection of such schoolhouses I cannot doubt.
That land may be taken for customhouses, courthouses, post offices, etc., is not now questioned, though it was formerly denied. Here the use is virtually indispensable. If however, it were a convenience merely, which facilitated the discharge of the government’s duties, the right to take would be equally clear.
It is the duty of the government to raise and maintain armies, and to fight battles when necessary. As a consequence, it is necessary to establish military schools, barracks, hospitals, etc. That land may be taken for these purposes is plain. It is absolutely necessary to a discharge of the duty. The right to take, however, is just as clear in the absence of such necessity, when the use aids the government in this respect. If the construction of a railroad between the capital and the seaboard, or any other point where none exists, should become a military necessity or a useful con*873venience in tlie discharge of these duties, by facilitating the transportation of troops or munitions of war, the. government might take land and construct it—without seeking for authority in any other constitutional provision. The power to raise and maintain armies imposes the duty of caring for its soldiers, promoting their welfare during life, and providing for decent burial (at least) after death—whether they die in battle or- in time of peace. It may, therefore, do whatever is necessary to these ends. Consequently if may establish hospitals, take land for cemeteries, etc. It could not leave its dea.d to fester where they fall. To do so would not only outrage public decency, but would raise a serious obstacle to the discharge of its express duty—the maintenance of armies—by inclining men to avoid its service. It may erect monuments to. commemorate special acts of heroism, and award pensions for meritorious services; because these and similar acts, directly and materially tend to aid it in discharging the duty stated.
The land described in the petition is adjacent to the Gettysburg National Cemetery. I cannot doubt that it might have been taken to enlarge and improve that property. How much is necessary to that purpose congress and the executive are the judges of. This however is not the purpose named in the statute.
The land is required to carry out the provisions of the act of 1893, to wit:
“For the purpose of preserving the lines of battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. and for properly marking with tablets the positions occupied by the various commands of the armies of the Potomac and of Northern Virginia on that field, and for opening and improving avenues along the positions occupied by troops upon, those lines, and for fencing the same, and for determining the leading tactical positions of batteries, regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and other organizations with reference to the study and correct understanding of the battle, and to mark the same with suitable tablets, each bearing a brief historical legend.”
In my judgment this is a legitimate public use of the land. The battle was a great lesson in military science, the greatest ever taught on this continent, at least—a most important illustration in strategy, and the art of war. That it may be fully understood and appreciated hereafter, it is necessary to do just what is proposed— preserve the battle field in its original condition, mark the positions and movements of the troops, and file different arms of the service, at the various stages of the battle; so that it may be seen, as upon a great chart, precisely how the battle was fought. The government proposes to perpetuate and secure this lesson for the sake of what it may teach to those who at present constitute its armies, as well as to those who will hereafter constitute them. In my judgment this is a legitimate purpose; and it can only be accomplished by taking the land. The power to take it is, I believe, embraced in the power to main lain armies and teach them military science.
I understand the very able counsel who opposes the proceeding to say that the government should own the land, but should obtain It by purchase. If the government should own the land, it is because the government has a legitimate use for it; otherwise it has *874no power to purchase, or even to accept it as a gift, and expend money for its improvement. By what authority can the government take and hold land' in trust for such purposes, unless they serve a legitimate public use, and especially expend money upon them? A concession that it may purchase, or accept the land as a donation, for the uses stated, seems to me to be a plain concession of the right .to take. The government has repeatedly accepted and improved lands for such uses; and the propriety of it has not even been questioned. It so accepted and improved the lands embraced in the Gettysburg National Cemetery and in the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park, expending large sums of money on each.
Furthermore this battle field is of transcendent national interest. The ground is hallowed and made sacred by the blood shed upon it, at the most important epoch in the nation’s history—in the supreme hour of its life. All right-minded men would say, I think, that it is fitting the nation should own and preserve it from desecration. It may be replied that this is mere sentiment. I think, however, it is something more. But if it is not, it is a most healthy sentiment, the encouragement of which directly tends to preserve the nation, and thus to aid the government in discharging its highest duty. It may be said the same reasons require the ownership of all other important battle fields of the nation; I think not. If they do, however, the government should own them, for the sake of what they teach, and the love of country which they inspire. I believe the other objections urged against the proceeding, as well as the exceptions to the report of the jury, should also be dismissed.