Court Opinion

ID: 9743720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:41:27.713363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.053594
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KASSERMAN, dissenting: It is my opinion that the trial court erred in giving plaintiff’s instruction No. 21; therefore, I must respectfully dissent. The majority in its opinion recognizes that it is essential to a proper determination of the question of whether plaintiff was entitled to maintain this action under the Jones Act that the jury be accurately instructed as to the proper definition of the words “seaman” and “member of the crew.” It is my opinion that plaintiff’s instruction No. 21 fails in this respect; therefore, the giving of such instruction constituted reversible error. The authority cited as authorizing plaintiff’s instruction No. 21 was E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice & Instructions sec. 96.03 (2d ed. 1970); however, an examination of this publication indicates that it is a compilation of statements made in various cases in the Federal courts (Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co. (8th Cir. 1974), 506 F.2d 505; Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc. (5th Cir. 1960), 280 F.2d 523; Stanley v. Guy Scroggins Construction Co. (5th Cir. 1961), 297 F.2d 374; Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp. (1957), 352 U.S. 370, 1 L. Ed. 2d 404, 77 S. Ct. 415; Texas Co. v. Savoie (5th Cir. 1957), 240 F.2d 674). It is noteworthy that none of the quoted statements were given in the process of instructing the jury but were statements of law recited in the courts’ decisions. While the quoted portions of the various statements were proper statements of the law, they do not purport to be the basis for an instruction. Further, not all of the elements contained in plaintiff’s instruction No. 21 are based on direct quotes from these cases. The perils resulting from a court relying on compilations such as Federal Jury Practice & Instructions are best stated in Peymann v. Perini Corp. (1st Cir. 1974), 507 F.2d 1318, in which the court in a footnote stated: “We have frequently expressed our apprehensions with respect to general compilations of jury instructions. See, e.g., McMillen v. United States, 1 Cir., 1967, 386 F.2d 29, at 32. They are dangerous because no authors, however erudite, can have a comprehensive substantive background in all fields. In sec. 93.05 of Devitt & Blackmar there is a suggested special interrogatory, supposedly, (but, on investigation not), supported by authority, that would be jettisoned by any admiralty lawyer.” 507 F.2d 1318, 1324 n.2. Defendant’s instruction No. 12, which was refused by the court, stated: “A person is a crewman if: (1) he is more or less permanently attached to a vessel or fleet of vessels; (2) the vessels are in navigation; and (3) his primary and natural duty is to serve as an aid to navigation.” Defendant’s authority for such instruction was Richardson v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. (E.D. Va. 1979), 479 F. Supp. 259, a United States District Court decision based on the decisions in Whittington v. Sewer Construction Co. (4th Cir. 1976), 541 F.2d 427, and South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett (1940), 309 U.S. 251, 84 L. Ed. 732, 60 S. Ct. 544. In Ardoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co. (5th Cir. 1981), 641 F.2d 277, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue and stated: “In McKie v. Diamond Marine Co., 204 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1953), we set forth a definition of the phrase ‘member of the crew’ which, although restated and refined since, still articulates the basic compass of the term ‘seaman’ as used in the Jones Act. [The McKie court stated:] ‘The essential and decisive elements of the definition of a “member of a crew” are that the ship be in navigation; that there be a more or less permanent connection with the ship; and that the worker be aboard primarily to aid in navigation.’ 204 F.2d at 136. This definition has been our guide as we have attempted to resolve numerous riddles concerning the status of various types of ambiguous-amphibious workers involved in the offshore petroleum industry. See Offshore Co., v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959) (‘When is a roughneck a seaman?’). In this case the riddle is revived in the form of the question ‘When is a structural welder a seaman?’ ” 641 F.2d 277, 280. It is my conclusion that plaintiff’s instruction No. 21 fails to set forth the requirement that the ship be in navigation and fails to fully set forth the essential elements of “seaman” as set forth in Ardoin. Further, it accentuates matters which are not relevant to the instant case. Therefore, I am of the opinion that plaintiffs instruction No. 21 should have been refused by the trial court and defendants’ instruction No. 12 should have been given. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for new trial.