Court Opinion

ID: 9410567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 20:00:47.601334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.598737
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13249    Document: 58-1     Date Filed: 07/21/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 21-13249
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       LARRY LYNN GARY,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cr-00124-JLB-MRM-1
                           ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                21-13249

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Larry Lynn Gary appeals his 180-month sentence for being
       a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of
       18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). On appeal, Gary argues that his
       sentence was erroneously enhanced because his prior conviction
       for aggravated assault under Florida law does not qualify as a
       violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18
       U.S.C. § 924(e). After careful review of the record, we affirm
       Gary’s 180-month sentence.
                            I.     BACKGROUND
       A.    Offense Conduct
               On August 6, 2020, law enforcement officers conducted a
       traffic stop on a Buick sedan because a search of the motor vehicle
       database records revealed that the Buick’s license plate was
       expired. Defendant Gary was the front passenger in that Buick
       sedan.
              Officers asked the driver and Gary to exit the vehicle so that
       a canine officer could perform a free air sniff of the vehicle. Gary
       removed a small, single-strap, blue satchel from around his neck
       and chest and placed the satchel on the rear floorboard behind the
       center console.
               Gary then exited the vehicle and fled the area on foot,
       initiating a foot pursuit. While fleeing, Gary dropped a cellphone
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       21-13249              Opinion of the Court                       3

       and a cigarette pack. A canine officer assisted in the chase and
       located Gary, who was hiding in bushes.
              Officers searched the area and seized the cigarette pack
       which contained a small blue plastic baggie containing 0.5 grams of
       MDMA. During a search of Gary’s satchel, officers seized (1) a
       firearm loaded with ammunition, (2) a clear plastic baggie
       containing 6.4 grams of fentanyl, (3) a red baggie containing 1.1
       grams of MDMA, and (4) a small digital scale.
       B.    Indictment and Guilty Plea
              In October 2020, a federal grand jury indicted Gary for
       unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted
       felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). In May
       2021, Gary pleaded guilty.
       C.    Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)
              Gary’s PSR assigned him a base offense level of 24 pursuant
       to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). The PSR added four levels under
       U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for Gary’s possession of “a firearm and
       ammunition while facilitating, or potentially facilitating, further
       felonies of Trafficking Fentanyl (4 grams or more) and Possession
       of MDMA/Controlled Substance.” Gary’s adjusted offense level
       was 28.
              The PSR increased Gary’s offense level from 28 to 33 under
       U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B) because it concluded that Gary qualified
       as an armed career criminal under the ACCA and U.S.S.G.
       § 4B1.4(a). Relevant for our purposes, one of the necessary
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13249

       predicate offenses for the ACCA enhancement and the § 4B1.4
       offense-level increase was a 2016 Florida conviction for aggravated
       assault with intent to commit a felony.
              Finally, the PSR reduced Gary’s offense level by three under
       U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of responsibility. This
       yielded a total offense level of 30.
              With a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history
       category of IV, Gary’s advisory guidelines range was 135 to 168
       months’ imprisonment. The mandatory minimum sentence for a
       defendant classified as an armed career criminal under the ACCA
       is 15 years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Accordingly,
       the PSR recommended an advisory guidelines term of 180 months’
       imprisonment.
       D.    Sentencing and Appeal
              Before and at sentencing, Gary argued that he was not an
       armed career criminal under the ACCA and objected to the
       application of the § 4B1.4 offense-level increase. The district court
       overruled those objections, adopted the calculations in the PSR,
       and sentenced Gary to 180 months’ imprisonment, followed by
       three years of supervised release. Gary timely appealed.
                              II.    DISCUSSION
               In this direct appeal, Gary does not challenge his guilty plea
       or his conviction. Rather, Gary challenges his sentence and the
       district court’s determination that he qualified as an armed career
       criminal under the ACCA.
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       21-13249               Opinion of the Court                         5

             Gary argues that his sentence was erroneously enhanced
       because his prior conviction for aggravated assault under Florida
       law does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA. We
       review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as
       a crime of violence for purposes of the ACCA. United States v.
       Deshazior, 882 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 2018).
              The ACCA requires a 15-year minimum prison sentence for
       a defendant who possesses a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
       § 922(g), and has three or more prior convictions for a violent
       felony or a serious drug offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The
       ACCA’s elements clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) defines a
       “violent felony” as any crime punishable by more than one year in
       prison that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
       threatened use of physical force” against another person. Id.
       § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). A defendant subject to the ACCA’s enhanced
       sentence is likewise deemed an armed career criminal under the
       Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a).
               To determine whether a defendant’s prior conviction
       qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of an ACCA enhancement,
       courts employ a “categorical approach,” in which they look “only
       to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses” rather than the
       underlying facts of the prior conviction. Shular v. United States, 589
       U.S. ----, 140 S. Ct. 779, 783 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). If
       the least serious conduct criminalized by the statute does not
       necessarily involve “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
       physical force,” then the statute of conviction does not
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  21-13249

       categorically match the federal standard and does not qualify as an
       ACCA predicate offense. Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. ----, 141 S.
       Ct. 1817, 1822 (2021).
              In Fla. Stat. § 784.011(1), Florida defines a simple “assault” as
       an “intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to
       the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so,
       and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other
       person that such violence is imminent.” Fla. Stat. § 784.011(1). In
       turn, Florida defines an “aggravated assault” as “an assault” that is
       committed either:
              (a) [w]ith a deadly weapon without intent to kill; or
              (b) [w]ith the intent to commit a felony.
       Id. § 784.021(1). So the first element of an aggravated assault under
       § 784.021(1) is an “assault,” which is defined in § 784.011(1).
               In Borden v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a
       criminal offense that requires only a mens rea of recklessness
       cannot qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. 593 U.S. at -
       ---, 141 S. Ct. at 1829–30 & n.6 (plurality opinion); 593 U.S. at ----,
       141 S. Ct. at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring).
              In light of Borden, this Court certified questions to the
       Florida Supreme Court in defendant Somers’s pending appeal to
       this Court where Somers was previously convicted of aggravated
       assault under § 784.021(1). See Somers v. United States, 15 F.4th 1049,
       1051, 1056 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Somers I”). This Court certified
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       21-13249              Opinion of the Court                        7

       questions regarding the mens rea required for a Florida simple
       assault offense under § 784.011(1). See id. at 1056.
              The Florida Supreme Court held that, based on the plain
       language of Florida’s assault statute—§ 784.011(1)—an “assault”
       offense under Florida law requires a mens rea of at least knowing
       conduct and “an intentional threat to do violence to another
       person.” See Somers v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887, 891–93 (Fla.
       2022) (“Somers II”). In other words, assault under § 784.011(1)
       demands the intent to direct a threat at another person and
       therefore cannot be violated by a reckless act. Id.
              Thereafter, this Court addressed whether defendant
       Somers’s Florida conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly
       weapon under § 784.021(1)(a) qualifies as a violent felony under the
       elements clause of the ACCA. See Somers v. United States, 66 F.4th
       890, 892 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Somers III”). With the benefit of the
       Florida Supreme Court’s answer to the mens rea required for a
       simple assault offense, this Court held that an aggravated assault
       conviction under § 784.021(1) “cannot be committed with a mens
       rea of recklessness,” “requires knowing conduct,” and “therefore
       qualifies as a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA.” See id. at 893–94.
       In conclusion, this Court held “that aggravated assault under
       Florida law categorically qualifies as a ‘violent felony’ under the
       ACCA’s elements clause.” Id. at 896.
             Gary argues that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in
       Somers II does not resolve the issue in his case because that court
       addressed only simple assault under § 784.011(1), not aggravated
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                21-13249

       assault under § 784.021(1)—which is the crime that enhanced his
       sentence.
              Gary ignores that the first element of an aggravated assault
       crime under § 784.021(1) is an “assault,” as defined by § 784.011(1).
       Indeed, in Somers II, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that
       simple assault always requires the intentional threat to do violence
       and therefore cannot be accomplished via a reckless act. 355 So. 3d
       at 891; see also Somers III, 66 F.4th at 896 (“The Florida Supreme
       Court has told us unambiguously that assault under Florida law
       requires a mens rea of at least knowing conduct; it cannot be
       committed recklessly.”).
               Under Florida law, as shown above, the definition of an
       aggravated assault crime incorporates the definition of simple
       assault. See Fla. Stat. § 784.021(1) (defining aggravated assault as
       “an assault” either “(a) [w]ith a deadly weapon without intent to
       kill; or (b) [w]ith an intent to commit a felony” (emphasis added)).
       So it does not matter which condition—either with a deadly
       weapon under § 784.021(1)(a) or intent to commit a felony under
       § 784.021(1)(b)—transforms a simple assault into an aggravated
       assault because the mens rea for the underlying simple assault is
       sufficient to meet Borden’s requirement that the crime be
       committed with intent. See Somers III, 66 F.4th at 894–96.
              In sum, Gary’s aggravated assault conviction under Fla. Stat.
       § 784.021(1)(b) categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the
       ACCA because, as our precedent in Somers III confirmed, Florida’s
       aggravated assault statute requires an intentional threat to use
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       21-13249             Opinion of the Court                      9

       violence against another person, regardless of whether it is
       committed under § 784.021(1)(a) or (b). See id. at 892, 894, 896.
       Therefore, Gary has the requisite three predicate offenses under
       the ACCA, and the district court did not err in sentencing him as
       an armed career criminal. We thus affirm Gary’s 180-month
       sentence.
             AFFIRMED.