Court Opinion

ID: 9838838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 14:05:55.088999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:14.548657
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1241-MR

JOSEPH B. ROBINSON, JR. AND
SHARON J. ROBINSON                                                 APPELLANTS

                   APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE JEFF L. DOTSON, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 20-CI-00250

JERRY R. LYNN AND SANDRA
LOVETT MITCHELL                                                      APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, ECKERLE, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Jerry R. Lynn (“Lynn”) filed a petition seeking to quiet

his title. Joseph B. Robinson, Jr., and Sharon J. Robinson (“the Robinsons”) filed

an answer and counterclaim for adverse possession of a portion of Lynn’s property

along the border of their property. The Boyle Circuit Court granted summary

judgment in favor of Lynn and entered a judgment quieting title and awarding
damages to Lynn. After careful review of the record and applicable law, finding

no error, we affirm.

                                  BACKGROUND

             On December 16, 2019, Lynn purchased a parcel of land identified as

61 Grubbs Lane from Sandra Lovett Mitchell (“Mitchell”). Prior to the sale to

Lynn, Mitchell acquired the property from her mother, Ruth Lovett (“Lovett”) on

May 19, 2016. Lovett had owned 61 Grubbs Lane since the 1980s.

             Lynn purchased the property to build on the lot, but he asserted his

building project was delayed by the Robinsons’ adverse possession claim. Thus,

Lynn filed a petition in the Boyle Circuit Court to quiet title to the property.

             The Robinsons filed a verified answer and counterclaim. They

claimed they became record owners of the adjoining property, 71 E. Grubbs Lane,

in 1994, and they have been “in the actual possession of a tract of land on the

eastern boundary of their real property which touches the western boundary of

[Lynn’s] real property . . . constituting and [sic] set off by a driveway and a

drainage ditch, and all land west of the drainage ditch.” Record (“R.”) at 34. The

Robinsons acknowledged Lynn’s deed and the survey performed on behalf of Lynn

speak for themselves. R. at 25, 26. However, the Robinsons denied that Lynn’s

property included the drainage ditch and any real property west of the drainage

ditch. Id.

                                          -2-
                The Robinsons made a counterclaim for adverse possession under

KRS1 413.010 asserting they had “uninterrupted adverse possession of the real

property from and including the drainage ditch that has divided the two

neighboring properties since the early 1970s, as well as all real property west of the

drainage ditch.” R. at 31. The counterclaim alleges the land west of the drainage

ditch has a marked boundary, but their answer states Lynn’s parcel has no clearly

marked boundaries. R. at 35, 32.

                Nine months after filing suit, Lynn deposed three witnesses all of

whom claimed the drainage ditch appeared after Mitchell obtained title to 61

Grubbs Lane in 2016. The Robinsons did not take any depositions.

                Almost one year after taking depositions, Lynn filed a motion for

summary judgment on the Robinsons’ counterclaim for adverse possession. Lynn

argued the Robinsons failed to meet the requirements to prove adverse possession,

and their use of the land was permissive. The Robinsons’ response to the motion

relied on the allegations in their answer and counterclaim and their own affidavits.

Though not mentioned in their answer and counterclaim, in their response, the

Robinsons argued they made two physical improvements between the driveway on

the border of their property and the drainage ditch. First, the Robinsons widened

their driveway to use for parking, which is referred to as a parking pad. The

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -3-
parking pad is on the allegedly adversely possessed land. Second, the Robinsons

repurposed a bathtub as a flower planter, which was placed on the allegedly

adversely possessed land in 1997.

             On July 8, 2022, the circuit court granted Lynn’s motion for summary

judgment. The circuit court found that the Robinsons failed to meet the burden of

proving all elements of KRS 413.010 for fifteen years. The court found that the

flower planter and parking pad were not substantial activities that gave rise to

adverse possession. The court’s judgment did not make a finding of permissive

use.

             Subsequently, Lynn filed motions to enter judgment to quiet title,

award damages for loss of use of real property and costs and attorney’s fees, and

appoint a special master commissioner. On September 20, 2022, the circuit court

entered an order quieting title, awarding Lynn costs incurred, and granted the

motion for a special master commissioner. The circuit court denied the other

motions. This appeal followed.

             On appeal, the Robinsons argue: (1) they met all five elements of

adverse possession; (2) permissive use is a question of fact for a jury to decide; and

(3) their affidavits were not flawed by failing to include a recitation of the elements

for adverse possession because that is inappropriate under Kentucky law.

                                          -4-
                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             In reviewing a property title dispute, our standard of review “is to

determine ‘whether or not the trial court was clearly erroneous or abused its

discretion[.]’” Vick v. Elliot, 422 S.W.3d 277, 279 (Ky. App. 2013) (quoting

Phillips v. Akers, 103 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Ky. App. 2002)). Additionally, “[w]e will

not set aside factual findings of the trial court ‘unless they are clearly erroneous,

that is not supported by substantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting Phillips, 103 S.W.3d

at 709).

                                     ANALYSIS

             The Robinsons argue they met all five adverse possession elements.

Under Kentucky law, the Robinsons were required to prove all of the following

“before adverse possession will bar record title: 1) possession must be hostile and

under a claim of right, 2) it must be actual, 3) it must be exclusive, 4) it must be

continuous, and 5) it must be open and notorious.” Moore v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71,

77 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown

Bottling Company, Inc., 824 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Ky. 1992)). Additionally, the

Robinsons were required to maintain all the common law elements of adverse

possession “for the statutory period of fifteen years, and it is the claimant's burden

to prove them by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 78 (citation omitted); KRS

413.010.

                                          -5-
             First, the Robinsons argue that the construction, maintenance, and use

of the parking pad and flower planter that crossed onto Lynn’s property fulfill the

“hostile” requirement. We note that the Robinsons seem to abandon any argument

regarding the drainage ditch as a boundary to satisfy this requirement. “Absent

proof that the possessor made physical improvements to the property, such as

fences or buildings, there must be proof of substantial, not sporadic, activity by the

possessor.” Phillips, 103 S.W.3d at 708. The circuit court found the Robinsons’

affidavits, the only evidence they submitted in support of their response to Lynn’s

motion for summary judgment, did not contain statements to prove their possession

of the land was hostile or under a claim of right. The Robinsons’ affidavits merely

state they did not have permission from Mitchell or Lovett to use the land on which

the parking pad and planter sat. Lack of permission does not meet the legal

standard to satisfy the hostile requirement.

             In Vaughan v. Holderer, 531 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Ky. 1975), the

Supreme Court of Kentucky found possession was not hostile because a fence

between two lots did not cut off the true owner’s access to the property:

             The evidence of record does not show that appellee has
             ever occupied and possessed lot number seven in an open
             and hostile manner against the claim of all other persons.
             Lot number seven joined her property with no visible
             boundary marking. The fact that her father paid taxes on
             the property and that she cut the grass over a number of
             years does not constitute adverse possession that will
             ripen into title. Kentucky Women’s Christian

                                         -6-
             Temperance Union v. Thomas, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 869
             (1967). The fence which was erected between lots
             numbers six and seven did not enclose the property and
             the record title holder was never cut off from access to or
             use of his property by act of the appellee.

Here, the parking pad and bathtub planter did not cut off Lynn’s access or use of

the property. The Robinsons did not maintain the land or pay property taxes.

Thus, we agree with the circuit court that the Robinsons’ use of the property was

not “hostile.”

             Second, the Robinsons argue their possession was “actual” because

the flower planter and parking pad are physical alterations that were on Lynn’s

property longer than the required statutory period. “[O]ne in adverse possession

without color of title must indicate the extent of his claim by well-defined

boundaries.” Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc., 824 S.W.2d at 880. The

circuit court found that a “bathtub planter and the parking pad area . . . are not

permanent structures such as a fence, a home, or outbuildings on a portion of land

that constitute a clearly defined boundary giving the title landowner notice the

possessor intends to take this land as his own under Tarter v. Tucker, 280 S.W.2d

150 (1955).” We agree. A bathtub planter and a parking pad are not permanent

structures that amount to actual possession under Kentucky case law.

             Third, the Robinsons argue that their possession of a portion of

Lynn’s property was “exclusive” because the lot is vacant. The circuit court found

                                          -7-
their possession was not “exclusive” because “[t]hese activities indicate that both

parties were treating the land in the manner consistent with that of a landowner as

defined in Scott v. Hedrick, [No. 2009-CA-000243-MR, 2010 WL 743758 (Ky.

App. Mar. 5, 2010)].” R. at 207.

             Use is exclusive when “all persons found upon the property without

permission were ‘put off’ the property.” Moore, 307 S.W.3d at 90. There is no

evidence that the Robinsons kept other persons off the property. The Robinsons

never instructed the Lovetts or their agents not to go on the land or cease mowing

and caring for it. They did not erect a fence to keep other persons off the land.

Thus, the Robinsons’ use of the property did not meet the exclusivity requirement.

             Fourth, the Robinsons argue that their possession of a portion of

Lynn’s property was “continuous” because their parking pad and flower planter

have been on Lynn’s lot for longer than the statutory period of fifteen years. KRS

413.010. The circuit court did not explicitly find that using the parking pad and

flower planter was continuous for fifteen years because the Robinsons’ affidavits

failed to provide any affirmative evidence to establish the other four elements of

adverse possession. The Robinsons allege they maintained and used the driveway

for over fifty years but did not differentiate between the driveway and the parking

pad. They also alleged that the flower planter had been used on Lynn’s property

since 1997. Though the parking pad and flower planter may have been

                                         -8-
continuously used for over fifteen years, the Robinsons failed to satisfy the other

four elements of adverse possession. Satisfaction of all five elements is required to

establish adverse possession. Moore, 307 S.W.3d at 77. Therefore, even if the

Robinsons continuously used the parking pad and flower planter for over fifteen

years, their claim for adverse possession still fails.

             Fifth, the Robinsons argue their possession of a portion of Lynn’s

property was “open and notorious” because the flower planter and parking pad are

physical alterations that were on Lynn’s property longer than the required statutory

period. “The ‘open and notorious’ element requires that the possessor openly

evince a purpose to hold dominion over the property with such hostility that will

give the nonpossessory owner notice of the adverse claim.” Appalachian Regional

Healthcare, Inc., 824 S.W.2d at 880 (citing Sweeten v. Sartin, 256 S.W.2d 524,

526 (Ky. 1953)). Though the Robinsons’ parking pad and planter were openly on

Lynn’s property, the use of the property was not hostile. The Robinsons only used

a small sliver of Lynn’s property, and there was no fence or any actions taken to

prevent Lynn from using the property. Thus, the Robinsons’ parking pad and

planter on Lynn’s property do not meet the “open and notorious” requirement.

             Below, the circuit court’s analysis focused on the drainage ditch as the

Robinsons’ counterclaim asserted adverse possession of “all land west of the

drainage ditch.” R. at 204. The circuit court found the Robinsons failed to

                                           -9-
establish they adversely possessed a sliver of Lynn’s property for fifteen

continuous years. Images from the Boyle County Property Value Administrator’s

records show the drainage ditch did not exist on December 1, 2009. Lynn acquired

the property on December 16, 2019. Without conflicting evidence from the

Robinsons, the circuit court found “the Robinsons could have only possessed that

area of the real property for approximately 12.5 years.” R. at 206-7.

             Additionally, even if the parking pad and bathtub planter were on

Lynn’s property for the statutory period, their presence on the land only satisfies

the continuous use requirement. It fails to satisfy the other four elements of

adverse possession. Therefore, the circuit court correctly found that the Robinsons

did not adversely possess the portion of Lynn’s property on which the parking pad

and planter sit.

             Next, the Robinsons argue that whether the use of the property was

permissive is a question of fact for a jury to decide. Though Lynn argued in his

motion for summary judgment that Mitchell and Lovett gave the Robinsons

permission to use the land, the circuit court’s summary judgment was not based on

a finding of permissive use. Instead, the circuit court applied the elements of

adverse possession to the facts presented and concluded that the Robinsons did not

adversely possess the property.

                                        -10-
             Finally, the Robinsons argue that their affidavits were not flawed by

failing to include a recitation of the elements for adverse possession because that is

inappropriate under Kentucky law. Lynn does not address this argument in his

response brief. The circuit court found that “the Robinsons’ responsive Affidavits

failed to prove either hostile or exclusive possession of the real property, and they

have failed to prove that possession of a period of 15 years.” R. at 208. Though

the Robinsons are correct that “affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,”

their argument is misplaced. Appellant’s Brief at 18. The circuit court did not find

the Robinsons’ affidavits lacking for failure to recite the elements of adverse

possession. Instead, the circuit court found that the Robinsons’ affidavits did not

contain affirmative evidence that satisfied all elements of their adverse possession

claim. In conclusion, the circuit court’s findings of fact were not clearly

erroneous, and it did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment in

Lynn’s favor.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Boyle

Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -11-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Brendan J. Shelvin         H. Vincent Pennington, III
Danville, Kentucky         J. Hadden Dean
                           Danville, Kentucky

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