Court Opinion

ID: 9727492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:39:57.771371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:38.965515
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Hoffman in Kline v. Kramer (1979), 3d Dist., 179 Ind.App. 592, 386 N.E.2d 982 at 990 accurately observes that Echterling v. Kalvaitis (1955) 235 Ind. 141, 126 N.E.2d 573, upon which the Kline majority relied, in fact rewrote I.C. 32-1-20-1.
The statutory provision in question was enacted in 1927 and notwithstanding Echter-ling, decided in 1955, the provision has retained its straightforward, unambiguous and unchanged phrasing. One might well assume that the failure to amend the statute to conform to Echterling was a conscious failure intended to convey the legislative message that “we meant what we said.”
A common legal premise is that the legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial decisions and unless the legislature changes the common law through express declarations, no such change is deemed intended. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Structo Division, King Seeley Termos Co. (1989) Ind., 540 N.E.2d 597. When the legislature does enact an amendment it may be inferred that the legislation in its earlier form did not contain the newly added provision. However, when a statute is ambiguous, the legislature might well amend in order to clarify that the provision was intended to be and was in fact a part of the statute as originally enacted. Halley v. Board of School Trustees of Blackford County School Corp. (1988) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 531 N.E.2d 1182; Bailey v. Menzie (1987) 3d Dist.Ind.App., 505 N.E.2d 126; Indiana State Highway Commission v. Bates & Rogers Construction Inc. (1983) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 321. Conversely, it would seem that the fact that the legislature is charged with knowledge of a judicial decision which is contrary to legislative in-tendment does not compel or even warrant a statutory amendment to clarify what was clear in the first place.
It is entirely possible that the legislative language used in I.C. 32-1-20-1 was intended to make acquisition of title by adverse possession more difficult and to favor the title of the record owner rather than, as opined in Echterling, to be a mere supplement to the statute of limitations.
Although the statute as written may not, in the estimation of some, be good public policy, the enunciation of such policy is within the clear prerogative of the legislature. I know of no jurisprudential requirement or even existence of discretion to test legislation by its wisdom or lack thereof. “To the contrary, it is the duty of the courts to interpret a statute as they find it, without reference to whether its provisions are wise or unwise, necessary or unnecessary, appropriate or inappropriate, or well or ill conceived.” 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes § 267 (1974).
As stated in In the Matter of Grissom (1992) Ind., 587 N.E.2d 114, 116:
“Courts do not interpret statutes which are clear and unambiguous on their face. [Citation omitted] A statute which is clear and unambiguous must be given its apparent or obvious meaning”.
More to the point, perhaps, is Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. (1993) Ind., 608 N.E.2d 1362, 1363-1364, wherein the Court stated:
“[W]e are not free to construe a statute which is unambiguous, and our ability to effect perceived legislative purposes is necessarily limited to the language of the statute.”
Nevertheless, the Echterling decision is directly on point with respect to the statute *866in question. Unless and until overruled by our Supreme Court, Echterling is binding upon us.
A more satisfactory basis for my concurrence, however, lies in the fact that the Ried-dles do not base their appellate position, even in part, upon the Buckners’ failure to comply with the tax-paying requirement of I.C. 32-1-20-1. Any such failure, therefore is not cause to reverse the judgment of the trial court. For this reason, I concur in the result which affirms the summary judgment in favor of the Buckners.2 I fully concur in Part II of the opinion as to damages.

. In doing so, I am unable to agree with the majority’s statement that: "Possession is hostile so long as the claimant does not disavow his right to possess the property or acknowledge that it is subservient to the title of the true owner.” Op at 863. Certainly, if a claimant does disavow or acknowledge subservience of his claim, he cannot establish the requisite hostility of possession. However, the absence of those two factors does not in and of itself establish such hostility.