Court Opinion

ID: 9816486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 03:11:52.643699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:55.519886
License: Public Domain

McEVERS, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 21] I respectfully dissent. I agree that the majority opinion has set forth the correct standard of review regarding jury instructions. I disagree that the district court abused its discretion by including the “sudden emergency” instruction.
[¶ 22] This Court has time and again cautioned on instructing on the “sudden emergency” doctrine. See Kreidt v. Burlington Northern R.R., 2000 ND 150, ¶ 8, 615 N.W.2d 153 (discussing Ebach v. Ralston, 510 N.W.2d 604 (N.D.1994) (stating the continued use of the sudden emergency instruction has been criticized in negligence actions because it may suggest a *187lower standard of care)); Hatfield v. Tate, 1999 ND 166, ¶ 11, 598 N.W.2d 840 (acknowledging criticism of the use of “sudden emergency” instructions under comparative negligence). Perhaps, it is time to do away with the “sudden emergency” doctrine. But, until we do, the district courts must attempt to divine when it is appropriate to use it.
[¶ 28] The facts of this case are not so different from another seemingly “ordinary accident” case where the district court was reversed for not giving the “sudden emergency” instruction. See Gronneberg v. Hoffart, 466 N.W.2d 809 (N.D. 1991). In Gronneberg, a collision occurred in “rush hour” traffic resulting in a chain reaction of sudden stops and Gronneberg collided with the rear of Hoffart’s vehicle. Id. at 810. Gronneberg testified that Hof-fart’s brake lights did not signal before the accident creating a “sudden emergency” because “he didn’t have adequate warning of the stop.” Id. Hoffart claimed that Gronneberg was following too closely and without proper lookout. Id. This Court stated, “[t]wo such different views of the evidence create an issue of fact. In a jury trial, it is the jury, not the court, that is the finder of fact and should determine which view of the evidence to accept.” Id. at 813.
[¶ 24] While this case did not involve “rush hour” traffic, which is fairly ordinary these days, a factual dispute exists as to whether Tidd had lights on her bike and whether that contributed to the collision. Kroshus claimed he did not see Tidd on her bike before the collision, because the bike had no lights. Tidd alleged Kroshus’ driving was negligent and the cause of the collision. I agree with the district court that based on two different views of the evidence the jury should decide which evidence to accept. See Gronneberg, at 813.
[¶25] Even if the majority is correct that the district court should not have given the instruction under these factual circumstances, the error was harmless. As the majority notes: “ ‘[w]hether a motorist was confronted with a sudden emergency [is a jury question] unless the evidence is such that reasonable men can draw but one conclusion therefrom.’ ” Majority, at ¶ 8 (quoting Tennyson v. Bandle, 181 N.W.2d 687, 691 (N.D.1970)). There lies the rub. If reasonable men can draw but one conclusion, it was, at best, harmless error to give the instruction. The majority stated, “[w]e hold no evidence exists from which a reasonable person could conclude Kroshus was faced with a dangerous situation before the collision -” Majority, at ¶ 13. If that is the case, even if the jury considered the instruction, they would not have applied it to Tidd’s detriment.
[¶ 26] Based on the standard of review, I would affirm. I would also have affirmed if the district court would have refused to give the instruction.
[¶ 27] LISA FAIR McEVERS