Court Opinion

ID: 9903948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:11:37.499083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.222614
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                   FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                   DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

REYNALDO FRADERA,

            Appellant,

v.                                        Case No. 5D22-53
                                          LT Case No. 2018-DR-4198
EVELYN FRADERA,

          Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed November 4, 2022

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Seminole County,
Susan Stacy, Judge.

Brandon M. Tyson, of
Tyson Law Firm, LLC,
Winter Park, for Appellant.

Christopher V. Carlyle, of
The Carlyle Appellate Law Firm,
Orlando, for Appellee.

WOZNIAK, J.

     In this marriage dissolution proceeding, Reynaldo Fradera appeals the

trial court’s order determining that it had personal jurisdiction over Mr.

Fradera. Mr. Fradera argues the trial court erred when it found that his
motion requesting appointment of a special magistrate to conduct the sale of

marital property at issue in Evelyn Fradera’s partition claim subjected him to

personal jurisdiction. We agree and therefore reverse.

                                  Background

      In 2018, Ms. Fradera filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the

trial court. Mr. Fradera responded by filing a motion to quash service and

dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction and a supporting affidavit.

He asserted that he was a New York resident and was served with the

petition in New Jersey and that the trial court did not possess personal

jurisdiction over him.

      Ms. Fradera then filed an amended petition for dissolution of marriage,

adding a claim seeking partition of real property owned by Mr. Fradera and

Ms. Fradera as tenants by the entirety located in Seminole County. Shortly

thereafter, Mr. Fradera and Ms. Fradera jointly stipulated that the trial court

did not possess personal jurisdiction over Mr. Fradera and that Mr. Fradera

would withdraw his motion to quash service; Ms. Fradera also “agreed that

she will not seek any relief that would require the court to assume personal

jurisdiction over [Mr. Fradera].” The trial court ratified the joint stipulation by

order.

                                        2
      Mr. Fradera later filed a motion for appointment of special magistrate

pursuant to section 64.061(4), Florida Statutes (2021), to conduct a private

sale in order to partition the property at issue, stating, “It is undisputed in this

case that the Real Property is indivisible and cannot be divided without

prejudice to the parties.” Ms. Fradera then filed a motion to determine

personal jurisdiction, asserting that by seeking materially beneficial

affirmative relief, i.e., appointment of a special magistrate, Mr. Fradera had

subjected himself to personal jurisdiction.

      After a hearing, the trial court granted Ms. Fradera’s motion. Citing to

the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in First Wisconsin National

Bank of Milwaukee v. Donian, 343 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), the trial

court held that Mr. Fradera’s motion for appointment of special magistrate

requested affirmative relief from the trial court that would be materially

beneficial to Mr. Fradera, and therefore Mr. Fradera was subject to personal

jurisdiction.

                                     Analysis

      We review a trial court’s determination of personal jurisdiction de novo.

France v. France, 90 So. 3d 860, 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The question

before this Court is whether Mr. Fradera’s request for appointment of a

special magistrate to sell the marital property stepped beyond in rem

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jurisdiction and constituted a request for affirmative relief, thereby subjecting

him to personal jurisdiction. We hold that it did not.

      “Personal jurisdiction refers to whether the actions of an individual or

business entity as set forth in the applicable statutes permit the court to

exercise jurisdiction in a lawsuit brought against the individual or business

entity in this state.” Borden v. E. European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591

(Fla. 2006) (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 500

(Fla. 1989)). In contrast, in rem jurisdiction is “jurisdiction over a thing or a

piece of property” rather than a person. Springbrook Commons, Ltd. v.

Brown, 761 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). “If the cause of action

has the object of requiring the court to act directly on property or on the title

to property, it is an in rem action.” Seven Hills, Inc. v. Bentley, 848 So. 2d

345, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing State, Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Antioch

Univ., 533 So. 2d 869, 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)). “[A] partition judgment is

unquestionably in rem,” Sammons v. Sammons, 479 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla.

3d DCA 1985), and in dissolution proceedings, both the dissolution of the

marriage and the division of property rights may be conducted through in rem

jurisdiction. Montano v. Montano, 520 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)

(citing Davis v. Dieujuste, 496 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla. 1986)). Because the

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action below dealt exclusively with the dissolution of the marriage and the

parties’ property interests, the action was subject to in rem jurisdiction.

      In an in rem action, a “court is not required to acquire in personam

jurisdiction over the landowner as a prerequisite to a valid court action.”

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 78 So. 3d 31, 33

(Fla. 2d DCA 2017). However, personal jurisdiction may be conferred by

consent or waived by a non-resident defendant if the defendant seeks

affirmative relief. Ge v. Swearingen & Assocs., Inc., 328 So. 3d 58, 60 (Fla.

5th DCA 2021) (quoting Sowden v. Brea, 47 So. 3d 341, 343 (Fla. 5th DCA

2010)); Empire Beauty Salon v. Com. Loan Sols. IV, LLC, 159 So. 3d 136,

140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (citing Babcock v. Whatmore, 707 So. 2d 702, 704

(Fla. 1998)). “‘Affirmative relief’ has been defined as ‘relief sought by a

defendant by raising a counterclaim or cross-claim that could have been

maintained independently of the plaintiff’s action.’” Empire, 159 So. 3d at

140 (quoting Affirmative Relief, Black's Law Dictionary 1482 (10th ed. 2014)).

“[T]hose who participate in litigation by moving the court to grant requests

materially beneficial to them, have submitted themselves to the court’s

jurisdiction.” Ge, 328 So. 3d at 61 (quoting Inglis v. Casselberry, 137 So. 3d

389, 393 Fla. 2d DCA 2013)); see also Mason v. Hunton, 816 So. 2d 234,

235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

                                       5
      Because Mr. Fradera’s motion is wholly reliant on Ms. Fradera’s

petition for partition and could not be maintained without it, we agree with Mr.

Fradera that the trial court incorrectly characterized his motion to appoint

magistrate as one seeking affirmative relief materially beneficial to him. Mr.

Fradera simply sought to initiate the next procedural step for the trial court in

the partition action pursuant to section 64.061(4), which states that once the

parties have agreed that dividing the property at issue would cause prejudice

to one or both of the parties (as Ms. and Mr. Fradera did in both the partition

petition and the motion to appoint magistrate), the trial court may, “on motion

of any party and notice to the others[,] . . . appoint a special magistrate or

the clerk to make sale of the property either at private sale or as provided by

s. 64.071.” § 64.061(4), Fla. Stat. (2022). Following the statutory procedural

steps to protect an interest in the property, as Mr. Fradera did, does not

amount to seeking affirmative relief; rather, it is the simple exercise of a

party’s due process right to be heard before the property rights at issue are

decided. Doersam v. Brescher, 468 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

As such, Mr. Fradera’s request did not waive personal jurisdiction by seeking

affirmative relief or material benefit, but rather the request was to move the

in rem proceedings forward and finalize the partition pursuant to section

64.061(4).

                                       6
      The sole case cited by the trial court in its order, First Wisconsin, is

distinguishable from the instant case. In First Wisconsin, a bank “sought to

foreclose on a mortgage where the Donians (appellees herein) were

guarantors of the underlying note obligation signed by other defendants.”

343 So. 2d at 944. Prior to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, all

parties filed a joint motion seeking the trial court’s approval of a stay

agreement. 1 Id. The trial court granted the stay agreement, but ultimately

the defendants—including the appellees—failed to fulfill their obligations. Id.

Final judgment was entered, and after the foreclosure sale, the bank moved

for a deficiency judgment against the defendants. Id. The appellees then

moved to abate the proceedings for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the trial

court granted the motion. Id. The Second District Court of Appeal held that

the appellees’ act of seeking the trial court’s approval of the stay agreement

amounted to a motion for materially beneficial relief. Id. at 945. The court

reasoned that the joint motion seeking the trial court’s approval of the stay

agreement was not merely a motion extending time for an answer—which

would not waive jurisdictional defenses—but rather was an attempt to “have

a respite of six to nine months during which the borrower and [the appellees]

      1
        Phyllis Donian, an appellee and one of the guarantors, did not sign
the stay agreement but she did sign the joint motion seeking approval of the
agreement. Id.

                                      7
could attempt to refinance the obligation being foreclosed by the Bank.” Id.

The court also noted that the appellees did not make an explicit challenge to

personal jurisdiction prior to or within the joint motion. Id.

      Unlike the appellees in First Wisconsin, Mr. Fradera did not seek to

stay the proceedings to give himself a material benefit or to substantially

delay the proceeding; rather, he merely moved for the trial court to proceed

in accordance with the statutory process for partition. Further, Mr. Fradera

previously raised the issue of personal jurisdiction in the action, and Ms.

Fradera stipulated—ratified by the trial court—that the trial court did not have

personal jurisdiction and that she would not seek any relief requiring personal

jurisdiction over Mr. Fradera. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in

determining that it had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Fradera.

      REVERSED.

WALLIS and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.

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