Court Opinion

ID: 9854945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:20.674068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:37.373034
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of summary judgment to the defendant proprietor in this case, as my review of the record indicates that defendant itself adduced the evidence indicating one of its employees was in a position to discern the hazard and warn the patron of any risk of injury. Consequently a jury question is presented as to whether plaintiff’s comparative negligence in failing to observe the hazard outweighs the negligence of defendant in failing to warn of or remove that hazardous spill.
Plaintiff Janice S. Moore brought this tort action against defendant, The Kroger Company, seeking to recover for personal injuries sustained when she slipped and fell due to a foreign substance on the floor of defendant’s grocery, “which substance [allegedly] was clearly visible to store employees, the same constituting a dangerous and defective condition.” Defendant denied the material allegations and, after a period of discovery, moved for summary judgment on the ground that “plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for her own *525safety.” In support of this contention, defendant relied on plaintiffs deposition testimony affirming that the hazardous substance “could have been a type of pasta sauce with chunks of vegetables in it[.]” Plaintiff intended to make lasagna, and she was carrying “two pounds of meat, a loaf of bread, and [about two pounds of mozzarella] cheese[.]” The floor tile in this store was “grayish-white or off white.” Plaintiff confirmed that, “[i]f [she] had been looking down, [she could] have seen the orange substance on the floor[;. . . that there was not] anything in the aisle preventing [plaintiff] from seeing the floor or looking down[; . . . and that there was not] anything distracting [her] as [she was] walking down the aisle[.]”
In opposition, plaintiff explained that she “[c]ame into the store [wearing flat shoes], went past the vegetable/bread aisle, past the meat case to get the. meat for the lasagna, came up the pasta aisle, and then . . . fell,” hurting her knee. “The substance.that was in the floor . . . was orangish-red in color and kind of mushy, like some chewed-up vegetable or carrot or whatever.” After she fell, from her position “on the floor, [plaintiff noticed the spilled matter] was in two spots,” about 12 inches apart. “It wasn’t like a blob. It was a smear in the floor.” In light of this testimony, I do not accept defendant’s characterization of an “ ‘orangish-red’ substance on the floor that was smeared over a 12 inch area.” (Emphasis supplied.) When cross-examined by defendant, plaintiff affirmed that “it was clearly visible to a Kroger employee[.]” Plaintiff specifically testified “the cashier, she had a clear view down that aisle. Also, in the back of the store, the meat counter, if someone was stocking the meat counter, they had clear view of that aisle.” Next, after plaintiff fell, “[t]he cashier yelled out, ‘A lady just fell in [the] aisle’. . . Two “Kroger employees, a male and a female, walked down the aisle.” The female employee told the male employee to “clean that up. He . . . got a bucket and a mop and he came back. . . . And [plaintiff] was there when he wiped it up.” Plaintiff also testified, “that little fellow that was running around that mopped up the stuff, that was his job to clean the aisles, so I feel like he didn’t check the aisle.” When asked, “if you had been looking down, it would have also been visible to you? [plaintiff answered,] I’m not sure of that. . . . If I had been walking with my head down, probably so. I do not — that’s not my practice in walking. There was no reason for me to look down that day in the store. I was interested in what was on the shelves.”
Plaintiff enumerates the grant of summary judgment as error, contending that factual issues remain as to whether she failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, and whether, under a comparative negligence analysis, defendant’s negligence caused plaintiff’s injuries in whole or in part. I agree.
“When an action is based on constructive knowledge, to avoid *526summary judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff must establish a question of fact whether the foreign substance remained on the floor for a sufficient length of time for knowledge of it to be imputed to the proprietor, showing that he had an opportunity to discover the defect and correct it. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 Ga. App. 808 (406 SE2d 234) (1991). This may be done by showing that employees of the proprietor were in the area and easily could have seen the hazard and corrected it. -. . . Queen v. Kroger Co., 191 Ga. App. 249-250 (1) (381 SE2d 413) (1989).” Smith v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 203 Ga. App. 565 (417 SE2d 202). Accord Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 622 (272 SE2d 327), citing Winn-Dixie Stores v. Hardy, 138 Ga. App. 342 (226 SE2d 142) and Sharpton v. Great A & P Tea Co., 112 Ga. App. 283 (145 SE2d 101).
When the evidence, including all favorable inferences, is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-movant, the jury would be authorized to find that defendant may be charged with knowledge of the hazard. This is established by the presence of its cashier, who was in a position to warn plaintiff even if she could not leave her register to clean up the spill herself. She also could have informed a coworker to attend to the spill. See, e.g., Food Lion v. Williams, 219 Ga. App. 352 (1), 354 (464 SE2d 913) (motion for directed verdict correctly denied when employee failed to warn that patron of spilled water). “Thus, the only question remaining is whether [plaintiff] had equal knowledge of the alleged . . . hazard, i.e., did she exercise ordinary care for her own safety?” Axom v. Wendy’s Intl., 219 Ga. App. 623, 625 (466 SE2d 613). In the case sub judice, plaintiffs hands were full of items she intended to purchase from defendant’s establishment and her attention was directed to items on the shelves as she focused on the purpose of her trip, purchasing a particular brand of sauce. The evidence would further authorize the jury to conclude that plaintiff did not necessarily fail to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, even though she did not notice the smeared orange substance against the grayish-white tile, since defendant’s employee failed to warn plaintiff. Dill’s Food City v. Johnson, 219 Ga. App. 654 (466 SE2d 250). “[I] cannot conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiff is barred from recovery merely because she admitted she was not looking at the floor in front of her when she fell. ‘Looking continuously, without intermission, for defects in a floor is not required in all circumstances.’ Choatas v. J. P. Allen & Co., 113 Ga. App. 731, 733 (149 SE2d 527) (1966).” Fletcher v. Family Center, 169 Ga. App. 376, 377 (2) (312 SE2d 856). “In [my] view, the case sub judice is therefore controlled favorably to plaintiff-invitee ... by the rationale employed in such recent whole court decisions as Jackson v. Camilla Trading Post, 218 Ga. App. 164, 167 (460 SE2d 849) [cert. denied] and Dept. of Human Resources v. Thomas, 217 Ga. App. 174 *527(1) (a), 176 (456 SE2d 724), cert. denied. In each of those cases, a majority of this Court agreed that the question whether a plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care on her own behalf, because she should have seen the hazardous foreign substance that she claimed she did not see, was for the jury to determine.” Dill’s Food City v. Johnson, 219 Ga. App. 654, 656, supra. In the case sub judice, the trier of fact might very well find that defendant should have seen the spilled orange substance, or might conclude that defendant’s employees could not reasonably have seen the spill to warn plaintiff because they were concentrating on other duties. “The customer must exercise ordinary care for his own safety, and must by the same degree of care avoid the effect of the merchant’s negligence after it becomes apparent to him or in the exercise of ordinary care he should have learned of it. He must use all of his senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things that might cause hurt to him.” (Emphasis supplied; citations and punctuation omitted.) Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623, supra. But, that ultimate determination, based on the credibility of the witnesses as well as the physical facts, is for the jury and not for the courts, except where the circumstances are plain, palpable, and admit of only one reasonable outcome. This is not such a case. “ ‘Even where there is no dispute as to the facts, it is . . . usually for the jury to say whether the conduct in question met the standard of the reasonable man.’ Wakefield v. A. R. Winter Co., 121 Ga. App. 259, 260 (174 SE2d 178) (1970).” James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 140 Ga. App. 859 (232 SE2d 274). See also Cunningham v. Nat. Svc. Indus., 174 Ga. App. 832, 836 (331 SE2d 899), and Presiding Judge Birdsong’s excellent survey of issues presenting jury questions. “The trial court erred[, in my view,] in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the evidence of record in this case.” Fletcher v. Family Center, 169 Ga. App. 376, 377 (2), supra. Since my colleagues in the majority would nevertheless affirm that unwarranted grant of summary judgment, I respectfully dissent.
Decided May 23, 1996
Graham G. McMurray, for appellant.
Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Robert M. Ethridge, Craig A. Brookes, for appellee.