Court Opinion

ID: 9899136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 23:00:26.261192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:44.657538
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

No. 20-1789

                   EBER ISAIAS HERNANDEZ-MENDEZ,

                            Petitioner,

                                v.

                        MERRICK B. GARLAND,*
                         Attorney General,

                            Respondent.

                PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
                 THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

                               Before
                        Barron, Chief Judge,
                       Howard, Circuit Judge,
                    and Singal, District Judge.*

     Daniel T. Welch, with whom Kevin P. MacMurray and MacMurray
& Associates were on brief, for petitioner.

     Aric A. Anderson, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, was on
brief, for respondent.

     *  Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General
Merrick B. Garland has been substituted for former Attorney General
William P. Barr.
     *   Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.
November 15, 2023

     - 2 -
             HOWARD, Circuit Judge.           Eber Isaias Hernandez-Mendez, a

citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of an order of the Board

of   Immigration     Appeals     ("BIA")      affirming    the       denial    of   his

application    for      withholding   of      removal    and   asylum       under   the

Immigration    and      Nationality   Act      ("INA").        For    the    following

reasons, we deny the petition.

                                         I.

                                         A.

             Eber Isaias Hernandez-Mendez ("Hernandez-Mendez") is a

30-year-old Guatemalan citizen who has lived in the United States

since 2013.    Because the IJ found him credible and the BIA did not

disturb that finding, "we accept as true [Hernandez-Mendez's]

testimony about the historical facts."                  See Palma-Mazariegos v.

Gonzales, 428 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2005).

             Hernandez-Mendez is a member of the Mam ethnic group, an

indigenous group with its own dialect.             He speaks both Spanish and

Mam.   He was born in Choapequez, a village that has a population

of   about   400   or    500   people.        Throughout    his      childhood,     the

residents of Choapequez were involved in an ongoing and violent

land dispute over a border with the residents of the municipality

of Tajumulco.

             Hernandez-Mendez's       family      was     extremely         poor;   his

youngest brother passed away at some point due to malnutrition.

When Hernandez-Mendez was fifteen or sixteen years old, he moved

                                      - 3 -
from his town of Choapequez to the capital city, Guatemala City,

to work so that he could financially support his family.                He

remained in Guatemala City for about one year.

              Two incidents that occurred in Guatemala City (and a

later   one    in   Choapequez)   are   relevant   to   Hernandez-Mendez's

petition for review.        First, about two or three months after

Hernandez-Mendez moved to Guatemala City, he was walking in the

streets and was approached by a group of three or four people, who

"asked [him] why was [he] was [] in that place [and] [told him]

that [he] shouldn't be there" and who "treated [him] like [], like

an indigenous person."       The group was unarmed, and he was not

physically harmed, but "received [] threats from them . . . to

leave that place."

              Second, about two to three months later, Hernandez-

Mendez was approached again, this time by a group of six to seven

people, two of whom had been involved in the previous incident,

and this time they were armed with knives, firearms, and long

sticks. He testified that "they said that if they ever found [him]

once more, they need[ed] [him] to know what was going to happen,"

which he understood to mean that "they wanted to kidnap [him]."

They robbed him of his belongings but did not physically harm him.

                                   - 4 -
He reported the second incident to the police.1

          After that second incident, Hernandez-Mendez returned to

live with his parents in his hometown of Choapequez.       When he

returned, the land dispute with Tajumulco was still ongoing and

had grown "even worse," and community members approached him and

asked him to engage in the fighting with them.    He declined to do

so because he was "afraid" and did not want to "lose [his] life

because they were really fighting with fire guns."   They told him

that he should think about it "very carefully," because they were

going to ask him again.     Two months later, Hernandez-Mendez's

mother had passed away, and he became more frightened, because he

thought that it was more likely that they would come back again

and ask him to join the fighting, now that his mother was gone.

     1 In a March 2018 affidavit, Hernandez-Mendez attested that,
in addition to those two incidents, on several other occasions,
the same gang members in Guatemala City tried to recruit him, asked
him for money, and threatened to kill him. He was cross-examined
about those additional incidents at the hearing before the IJ, and
affirmed that such statements were true.
     In his petition for review before this court, however,
Hernandez-Mendez does not mention those additional incidents. In
addition, at oral argument, his counsel asserted that we should
not rely on the portion of the affidavit describing them as part
of the case because language barriers between Hernandez-Mendez and
his counsel, among other items, had affected that portion of the
affidavit, and Hernandez-Mendez had in fact been discussing
threats he received from members of his village, not from gang
members in Guatemala City (though, threats of that nature are not
mentioned in his petition for review in describing his interactions
with members of his village, either). Accordingly, we have not
considered any other incidents with gang members in Guatemala City
in our consideration of Hernandez-Mendez's petition for review.

                              - 5 -
It was at that point that he decided to walk to the United States

through Mexico.    After walking and taking some trains as well, he

entered the United States without inspection in April 2013 at the

age of eighteen.

                                 B.

          The Department of Homeland Security served Hernandez-

Mendez with a Notice to Appear in April 2013, alleging that he was

removable as an unauthorized alien present without admission or

parole.   He admitted the factual allegations and conceded that he

was removable.     As relevant here, Hernandez-Mendez applied for

asylum and claimed withholding of removal, basing both on his

membership in two particular social groups -- "young men singled

out by gangs who have refused to obey gang instructions" and his

Mam ethnicity.

          The Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied Hernandez-Mendez's

applications and ordered him removed in an oral decision in April

2018. He appealed that decision, and the BIA dismissed that appeal

in August 2020.

          This petition for review followed.

                                 II.

          The BIA issued its own decision on Hernandez-Mendez's

claims; thus we review that final agency decision.      Reynoso v.

Holder, 711 F.3d 199, 205 (1st Cir. 2013).     Nevertheless, where

"the BIA accepts the IJ's findings and reasoning yet adds its own

                                - 6 -
gloss, we review the two decisions as a unit."                  Cabrera v. Lynch,

805 F.3d 391, 393 (1st Cir. 2015).                The parties agree that, with

one exception not relevant to our decision, the BIA accepted the

IJ's findings and reasoning.

              We   review    the   agency's    findings    of    fact    under   the

"substantial evidence" standard.             Bonilla v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 72,

76     (1st   Cir.    2008).        Under     that   standard,     the    agency's

determination        "must   be    upheld    if    'supported    by     reasonable,

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a

whole.'"      INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (quoting

8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4)).           "To reverse . . . we must find that the

evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels

it."    Id. at 481 n.1 (emphasis in original).

              In his petition, Hernandez-Mendez challenges the denial

of his asylum and withholding of removal claims.                      To establish

eligibility for asylum, a petitioner must prove that he qualifies

as a refugee.        8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).          A refugee is a person who

is unable or unwilling to return to his native country "because of

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion."               8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).        Thus, a

petitioner may establish eligibility for asylum either by (1)

demonstrating past persecution, thereby creating a presumption of

a    well-founded     fear   of    future    persecution;   or     (2)    otherwise

                                       - 7 -
demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution.                         See

Yatskin v. INS, 255 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2001).                   A well-founded

fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground means

a   "reasonable        possibility"    of   harm   for    purposes   of    asylum.

Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 2007).

            To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an

applicant must show that his "life or freedom would be threatened

in that country because of [his] race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."                   8

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).             The "threat to life or freedom" under

withholding   of       removal   is   "identical"    to     "persecution"    under

asylum,    except that the           "burden placed on the petitioner is

higher."    Wiratama v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2008).

Specifically, to qualify for withholding of removal, a petitioner

must demonstrate "either that [he] has suffered past persecution

on account of a protected ground (thus creating a rebuttable

presumption that [he] may suffer future persecution) or that it is

more likely than not that [he] will be persecuted on account of a

protected ground if sent to the destination country.”                     Id. at 4

(alteration       in    original)     (emphasis    added)    (quoting     Heng   v.

Gonzales, 493 F.3d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 2007)); see also INS v. Stevic,

467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984) (an applicant for withholding of

removal    must    establish     a    "clear    probability"    of   persecution

because of a protected ground).                 Thus, "an alien who cannot

                                        - 8 -
establish the elements of an asylum claim cannot prevail on a

counterpart claim for withholding of removal."                        Jianli Chen v.

Holder, 703 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 2012).

                                      III.

                                          A.

            We begin with Hernandez-Mendez's asylum claim.                         First,

he challenges the agency's conclusion that the mistreatment he

experienced did not rise to the level of past persecution.                          Here,

his focus is on the two incidents with gang members in Guatemala

City.

            We    review      "findings    of     fact      --     including      whether

persecution occurred on account of a protected ground -- under the

familiar and deferential substantial evidence standard."                       Ordonez-

Quino v. Holder, 760 F.3d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 2014) (quotations

omitted).        And   we   have   explained         that   persecution      "normally

involves    severe     mistreatment,"          meaning      that    the    "sum    of   [a

petitioner's] experiences . . . add up to more than ordinary

harassment, mistreatment, or suffering."                         See id.    at 87, 91

(alteration in original) (quotations omitted).                        And generally,

"some   regularity      and    frequency"       of    the    mistreatment      is   also

required.    Id.

            Unfulfilled threats "rarely" prove past persecution and

are typically construed instead "as evidence of a well-founded

fear of future persecution."              Touch v. Holder, 568 F.3d 32, 40

                                      - 9 -
(1st Cir. 2009).      However, in "certain extreme cases" such threats

may prove past persecution, "particularly where those threats are

combined      with   confrontation    or     other   mistreatment."      Id.

(quotations omitted).      To qualify, the unfulfilled threat must be

"so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm."

Id. (quoting Butt v. Keisler, 506 F. 3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 2007)).

              Here, Hernandez-Mendez was threatened on two occasions

in Guatemala City, but the threats -- which he understood to be

threats of kidnapping -- were not fulfilled.             The question is thus

whether those threats represent that extreme case in which, though

unfulfilled, they caused significant actual suffering or harm.            In

the   first    incident,   three     or    four   gang   members   surrounded

Hernandez-Mendez and told him that he should not be in Guatemala

City and to leave, but none of them were armed.              However, in the

second, though he again left unharmed, a group of six or seven

members, two of whom had been present during the first incident,

approached him armed with knives, firearms and long sticks, robbed

him of all of his belongings, and stated that "if they ever found

[him] once more" they needed him to know "what was going to

happen."      Both incidents were on account of his Mam ethnicity.

              We do not doubt that the mugging incident in particular

was terrifying, especially because the gang members preyed upon

Hernandez-Mendez because of his indigenous ethnicity.              But while

the threats were condemnable, the record does not compel the

                                   - 10 -
conclusion that they rose to the level of persecution.         Hernandez-

Mendez did return to his village after the second incident.            But

he   otherwise   does   not   explain   why   the   threats   caused    him

significant actual suffering or harm.

           In    his    petition,   Hernandez-Mendez      resists      that

conclusion by arguing that the IJ did not give his young age enough

weight when considering whether he had been persecuted.              It is

true that "age can be a critical factor in determining whether a

petitioner's experiences cross th[e] [persecution] threshold."

Ordonez-Quino, 760 F.3d at 91 (quotations omitted) (collecting

cases).   In Ordonez-Quino, we explained that "[w]here the events

that form the basis of a past persecution claim were perceived

when the petitioner was a child, the fact-finder must look at the

events from [the child's] perspective, [and] measure the degree of

[his] injuries by their impact on [a child] of [his] age []."           Id.

(alterations in original) (quoting Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales,

496 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007)).

           But the IJ does appear to have considered Hernandez-

Mendez's age at the time of the incidents at issue.                 The IJ

explicitly noted in the IJ's discussion of past persecution that

Hernandez-Mendez was "still of a relatively young age" when he

returned to his village at age seventeen and was recruited to join

the conflict between his village and Tajumulco, from which we can

infer that the IJ was aware of Hernandez-Mendez's age at the time

                                 - 11 -
of the incidents in Guatemala City as well.    In addition, the IJ

explicitly noted in the background section that he was fifteen or

sixteen when he moved to Guatemala City.   And, because Hernandez-

Mendez was at least fifteen or sixteen years old (and more likely

seventeen) by the time of the second incident, this case is unlike

Ordonez-Quino, in which the petitioner was five or six years of

age at the time of the incidents at issue.      Ordonez-Quino, 760

F.3d at 92. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, events experienced

"as a teenager" are distinguishable from those experienced "by the

far-younger asylum applicants."    Theodore v. Lynch, 640 F. App’x

653, 655 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307,

314 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that although the petitioner was a

minor, she was "near the age of majority -- she was sixteen" and

thus discounting the significance of her age in that case).

Accordingly, "[w]hatever slight calibration" Hernandez-Mendez's

age may have warranted in the agency's analysis was "insufficient

to   transform    [his]   experiences . . . from   harassment   to

persecution."    Liu, 380 F.3d at 314.

          For those reasons, we conclude that this is not the rare

case in which the record compels a conclusion that the unfulfilled

threats Hernandez-Mendez experienced amounted to past persecution,

rather than ordinary harassment, mistreatment, or suffering.

                                  B.

          The next issue is whether the agency's finding that

                               - 12 -
Hernandez-Mendez also had not proved a well-founded fear of future

persecution on account of a particular social group is supported

by substantial evidence.          Hernandez-Mendez pointed to fear on

account of his Mam ethnicity and on account of his membership in a

group of "young males who have been singled out by gangs and who

have refused to obey gang instructions."           We address each in turn.

                                     i.

            As to Hernandez-Mendez's Mam ethnicity, although the IJ

acknowledged that that group was a cognizable particular social

group, the IJ found that Hernandez-Mendez had not established that

he had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of membership

in that group because efforts to recruit him into the land dispute

when   he   returned   to   his   village   were    unrelated   to   his   Mam

ethnicity.    The BIA agreed, adding that Hernandez-Mendez had not

established a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a

protected ground by the gang members from Guatemala City because

he did not testify that the gang members would further threaten

him in his village.     It noted that, rather, he feared returning to

his village because he did not want to get caught up in the land

dispute, which the BIA considered to be a general condition of

strife.

            The agency's findings in this regard were supported by

substantial evidence.       A petitioner does not have a well-founded

fear of persecution if he could "avoid persecution by relocating

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to another part of [his] country of nationality . . . if under all

the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect [him] to do

so."       8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii); see also Gao v. Barr, 950 F.3d

147, 153 (1st Cir. 2020); Singh v. Holder, 750 F.3d 84, 86-87 (1st

Cir. 2014) (noting that petitioner lacked a well-founded fear of

persecution given his "ability to move to Delhi and remain in India

for several months without further harassment or arrest after his

mistreatment at home").          Hernandez-Mendez has in no way challenged

the BIA's implicit finding that it was reasonable for him to

relocate to his village and that he did not have a well-founded

fear of persecution as a result.2

               As   noted   by    the    BIA,    Hernandez-Mendez   does   not

demonstrate that when he left Guatemala City, the gang members who

threatened him on account of his Mam ethnicity followed him to his

hometown of Choapequez or were present there in any other way;

rather, the mistreatment he experienced while he was back in

Choapequez involved the attempts of certain townspeople to recruit

       At oral argument, counsel for Hernandez-Mendez contended
       2

that his ability to relocate should be discounted because he went
to Guatemala City to find employment, leaving required him to
forfeit that employment, and his village lacks gainful employment
opportunities.   He has not challenged in any manner the BIA's
statement that returning to his village would alleviate the claimed
mistreatment by the gang members in Guatemala City. Thus, we do
not examine the merits of his contention raised at oral argument
because it is waived. See Piazza v. Aponte Roque, 909 F.2d 35, 37
(1st Cir. 1990) ("Except in extraordinary circumstances not
present here, a court of appeals will not consider an issue raised
for the first time at oral argument.").

                                        - 14 -
him for that violent dispute.     Hernandez-Mendez does not suggest

that those attempts were on account of his Mam ethnicity.

            For all of those reasons, substantial evidence supports

the agency's finding that Hernandez-Mendez has not established a

well-founded fear of persecution on account of his membership in

the Mam indigenous group.

                                  ii.

            Hernandez-Mendez   also   contends   that   he   has   a   well-

founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership in

a group of "young males who have been singled out by gangs and who

have refused to obey gang instructions."     We agree with the IJ and

the BIA that he has not demonstrated that that proposed group is

a cognizable social group.3

            For a proposed particular social group to be cognizable,

the BIA requires that it be "(1) composed of members who share a

common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity,

and (3) socially distinct within the society in question."             Paiz-

Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 2015) (quotations

omitted).    The question whether a group is a "particular social

     3 As noted, Hernandez-Mendez relies only on the two incidents
with gang members in Guatemala City and the recruitment by members
of his village in the land dispute as evincing his well-founded
fear of future persecution. And as to his claim of persecution on
account of his membership in the group of young males who have
refused to obey gang instructions, the persecutors at issue appear
to be the group in his village who have attempted to recruit him
into the land dispute.

                                - 15 -
group" within the meaning of the INA is a question of law that we

review de novo.      See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).

              Here, the IJ      found that     Hernandez-Mendez's      proposed

group of "young males . . . singled out by gangs" who have "refused

to obey gang instructions" was not a cognizable social group

because, according to the IJ, (1) a social group cannot be defined

by the claimed persecution, and alternatively, (2) the proposed

group   was    not   socially     distinct    or   defined   with    sufficient

particularity.

              The BIA agreed with the IJ that the proposed group at

issue was not cognizable.          It added, however, that the group was

also "insufficient to establish particularity because 'victims of

gang violence often come from all segments of society, and they

possess no distinguishing characteristic or concrete trait that

would readily identify them as members of such a group," quoting

Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335 (A.G. 2018) ("A-B-I").

It further noted that "[Hernandez-Mendez] ha[d] not adequately

explained      how   his   case    is   distinguishable      from    applicable

precedent."

              As noted, Hernandez-Mendez agrees that the BIA adopted

the IJ's decision.         Here, the IJ found that Hernandez-Mendez's

proposed social group was not socially distinct or defined with

sufficient particularity.          Yet Hernandez-Mendez makes no effort at

all   in   his   petition    for    review    to   dispute   those    findings.

                                     - 16 -
Accordingly, because of that omission, he has waived any argument

as to them.    See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st

Cir. 1990).

           In any event, we disagree with the argument that he does

develop in his petition as to that proposed social group -- that

is, that the BIA's quotation of A-B-I requires remand because,

among other reasons, it was vacated by Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N.

Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021)     ("A-B-III")   after the BIA rendered its

decision in this case.

           The A-B-III opinion explained its reasons for vacating

A-B-I in relevant part as follows:

     [T]he [A-B-I] opinion beg[an] with a broad statement
     that 'victims of private criminal activity' will not
     qualify for asylum except perhaps in 'exceptional
     circumstances.' . . . That broad language could be read
     to create a strong presumption against asylum claims
     based on private conduct. As a result, A-B-I threatens
     to create confusion and discourage careful case-by-case
     adjudication of asylum claims.

A-B-III, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 308-09 (quoting A-B-I, 27 I. & N. Dec.

at 317).   For those reasons, among others, A-B-III held that "the

Board should no longer follow A-B-I . . . when adjudicating pending

or future cases . . . [and] should [instead] follow pre-A-B-I

precedent."   Id. at 309.

           Thus, Hernandez-Mendez is correct that the BIA quoted A-

B-I for a proposition that is no longer good law.    Nevertheless,

A-B-I did not create (nor did A-B-III abrogate) the existing

                              - 17 -
general   rule   stated     in   the    BIA's     decision   (just      before    the

problematic quotation) that for a particular social group to be

cognizable, it must be “(1) composed of members who share a common

immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3)

socially distinct within the society in question.”                     Paiz-Morales

v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).

And the BIA adopted the IJ's reasoning, which did not rely on A-

B-I   whatsoever      but   rather     found,     among   other    things,       that

Hernandez-Mendez had not demonstrated that his proposed social

group was defined with particularity or was socially distinct.

Accordingly, for both of those reasons, the BIA's affirmance was

based upon a case-specific application of that more established

test, and the problematic quotation does not require us to remand.

           We thus conclude that the agency did not commit legal

error in the legal standard that it applied.              We also see no merit

to Hernandez-Mendez's challenge to the agency's finding that he

did not establish that his group of "young males who have been

singled   out    by    gangs     and   who      have   refused    to    obey     gang

instructions" was a cognizable social group on the basis that

Hernandez-Mendez has failed to develop, and thereby has waived,

any arguments as to those findings.             Accordingly, any asylum claim

based on that group fails.

                                         C.

           A petitioner who cannot establish the elements of an

                                       - 18 -
asylum claim cannot prevail on "a counterpart claim for withholding

of removal."    Jianli Chen, 703 F.3d at 27.    Therefore, for the

same reasons we rejected his contentions as to his asylum claim,

we   also   reject   Hernandez-Mendez's   contentions   as   to   his

withholding of removal claim.

                                 IV.

            For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for

review.

                                - 19 -