Court Opinion

ID: 9374270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 18:01:23.056513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.614086
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 22 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JENNY MATILDE RIVERA-DE                         No.    18-73083
MONTOYA; HAZEL ESTEFANI
MONTOYA-RIVERA,                                 Agency Nos.       A206-731-304
                                                                  A206-731-305
                Petitioners,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                          Submitted February 17, 2023**
                            San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND, BADE, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

      Jenny Matilde Rivera-De Montoya (“Rivera-De Montoya”) and her

daughter, Hazel Estefani Montoya-Rivera, are natives and citizens of El Salvador.

They petition this court for review of the dismissal by the Board of Immigration

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Appeals (“BIA”) of their appeal of the decision by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

      1.     Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioners

failed to meet the nexus requirement for asylum. To meet the nexus requirement

for asylum, the applicant must show a protected ground—race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion—was “at

least one central reason” that the applicant was or will be persecuted. Aden v.

Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). There is no evidence in the

record that Rivera-De Montoya or her daughter were personally harmed or

threatened while in El Salvador. Rivera-De Montoya testified that she fears

returning to El Salvador because the 18th Street Gang controls her neighborhood.

Specifically, Rivera-De Montoya testified to the following: First, gang members

went to her daughter’s school and tried to recruit students by threatening them.

Second, Rivera-De Montoya witnessed a gang member kill a bus fare collector

after the collector refused to give the gang member money. Third, gang members

threatened to kill Rivera-De Montoya’s grandfather and harm his family if he did

not pay them $5,000. The police investigated the extortion threats and made

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contact with the residents of the home where the extortion money was to be

delivered. Although the police did not capture the callers, the gang members did

not call again. Fourth, Rivera-De Montoya’s brother was approached by four gang

members at a car repair shop, where the gang members disrobed him and the

workers at the repair shop to check for gang tattoos and beat them with sticks and

machetes.

      Petitioners’ evidence of harm on account of general violence and crime is

insufficient to meet the nexus requirement for asylum. See Zetino v. Holder, 622

F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by

criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus

to a protected ground.”).

      2.     To be eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant must

demonstrate (1) the existence of a cognizable particular social group, (2) her

membership in that particular social group, and (3) a risk of persecution on account

of her membership in the specified particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch,

842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016). The BIA concluded that “[w]om[e]n who

are unable to protect themselves from the gang violence and extortion” was not a

cognizable social group because it failed the particularity and social distinction

requirements. Petitioners have pointed to no evidence that this group has social

distinction in El Salvador. The BIA therefore permissibly denied Petitioners’

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claims for withholding of removal.

      3.     Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that

Petitioners failed to show that they would more likely than not be tortured with the

consent or acquiescence of the Salvadorian government. To support their CAT

claim, Petitioners rely on the same evidence in support of their asylum and

withholding claims, but these facts and Petitioners’ country conditions evidence do

not compel the conclusion that Petitioners would more likely than not be tortured

or that such torture would occur with the consent or acquiescence of the

Salvadorian government. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th

Cir. 2016) (holding that a petitioner’s testimony about gang extortion was

insufficient to show it was more likely than not that the petitioner would be

tortured with the consent or acquiescence of the government, especially where

police “actively investigated” his aunt’s death).

      PETITION DENIED.

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