Court Opinion

ID: 9475557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:31:06.960954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:47.194705
License: Public Domain

ROBERT MADDEN HILL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join parts I and II of the majority opinion. I agree with the majority that Hendricks’ initial nervousness at the primary inspection station alone is not sufficient to establish knowledge. However, when his nervousness is viewed in the context of his overall conduct at the border, I believe that there is sufficient evidence to allow the jury to infer that Hendricks had knowledge of the marijuana concealed in his truck.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s affirmance of Hendricks’ conviction on the conspiracy counts (counts 1 and 3). I agree with the majority that where all of the circumstantial evidence is based on the existence of a family relationship or “mere knowing presence,” a conspiracy conviction cannot be upheld. I further agree that White and Robertson do not dictate reversal of Hendricks’ conspiracy convictions. I would nevertheless reverse Hendricks’ conspiracy convictions because I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support Hendricks’ conspiracy convictions.
We have stated that we will not “lightly infer a defendant’s knowledge and acquiescence in a conspiracy.” United States v. Jackson, 700 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hicks v. United States, 464 U.S. 842, 104 S.Ct. 139, 78 L.Ed.2d 132 (1983). A showing that the defendant merely associated with those participating in a conspiracy is insufficient. Id. Similarly, the government cannot prove a conspiracy by presenting evidence that only places the defendant in “a climate of activity that reeks of something foul.” United States v. Galvan, 693 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir.1982).
It is important to emphasize that the elements of the crime of conspiracy are different than the elements for the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute or the crime of importing marijuana. While some of the elements of the crimes are identical, the elements must be examined in the context of the particular offense. Consequently, while the jury can make inferences regarding different offenses from the same evidence, the inferences that a defendant had knowledge sufficient to support a conviction on one crime are not necessarily sufficient to support a conviction on another crime. In a conspiracy case, therefore, the knowledge element of a conspiracy offense requires sufficient evidence that proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly entered into an agreement to violate the narcotic laws. In contrast, the knowledge element of the substantive offenses requires evidence that the defendant knowingly possessed the marijuana with intent to distribute or import it.
In examining Hendricks’ convictions on the substantive counts, it was clear as a matter of law that there was sufficient evidence to show that Hendricks possessed the marijuana, and that he intended to import it into the United States and distribute it. Our previous holdings made it clear that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the possession, importation, and intent to distribute elements of the substantive crimes. See Vergara (possession and in*505tent to distribute); Jonas (importation). On the knowledge element, the evidence that the government presented provided a sufficient basis for the jury to infer that Hendricks understood the nature of his acts.
In examining the evidence on the conspiracy convictions, however, I do not believe the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks and Williams knowingly agreed to violate the narcotic laws. The evidence that the government cites is insufficient in my view to show that there was an agreement between Hendricks and his son to violate the law.
I believe that the inferences that the jury had to draw from the evidence in order to find Hendricks guilty of conspiracy are too attenuated to show that an agreement existed between Hendricks and his son. The majority argues that the jury could infer that Hendricks entered into an agreement with Williams by the fact that Hendricks was never suspicious or asked questions about why gas stops were made so frequently on the way back to the United States when the truck had two fuel tanks. Williams’ uncontradicted testimony, however, indicates that he complained to Hendricks before the trip began that one of the gas tanks was not functioning. Thus, Hendricks had no reason to believe that the truck should have stopped less frequently. In addition, the fact that Hendricks accompanied his son on the trip to the United States despite his inability to drive does not indicate the agreement necessary to show that a conspiracy existed. There was evidence that Hendricks accompanied his son on the motor trip back from Honduras because Hendricks had a better command of Spanish and it was safer. There was no evidence which indicated that Hendricks should have been suspicious about his son’s explanation for the malfunctioning fuel tank.
Furthermore, unlike the majority, I believe that the fact that Hendricks owned the truck does not show that he knowingly and voluntarily entered into a conspiracy. Although ownership of the truck is sufficient to find that Hendricks had constructive possession in relation to the substantive counts, constructive possession is not sufficient to show the subjective agreement necessary to prove the existence of a conspiracy. While the evidence is sufficient to prove that Hendricks was guilty of the substantive counts, it is insufficient to show an agreement between Hendricks and Williams.
The majority asserts that there had to be “at least a tacit agreement” between Hendricks and his son because Hendricks owned the truck and inferentially had knowledge of the marijuana. This conclusion, however, is obtained only by drawing another inference from the combination of inferences that support Hendricks’ convictions on the substantive counts. I believe, however, that these inferences are too attenuated to support a conspiracy conviction.
Nor do I agree with the majority that United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 337, 66 L.Ed.2d 160 (1980), is a factually similar case. In Alfrey a ship sailing from the country of Colombia to Tampa Bay, Florida, was stopped and searched after Customs Patrol officers suspected there was marijuana on board. Upon boarding the vessel, they noticed several burnt marijuana cigarettes lying in plain view in the open wheelhouse and a small quantity of marijuana lying on a table in the salon. Upon opening a small hatch, the officers discovered that the trawler was loaded with over 19,000 pounds of marijuana. Id. at 554.
The majority, analogizing to Alfrey, states that the length of the trip, the quantity of the marijuana, and the “close relationship” of the father and son are sufficient evidence to show that a conspiracy existed. The instant case, however, is much different than Alfrey. In Alfrey, the conspirators were together for ten days in close quarters. Marijuana was openly left on the decks, and the conspirators were the captain and two crew members on the ship in question. The relationship was necessarily close in order for the trawler to function effectively. It was reasonable for the jury to infer that 19,000 pounds of marijuana could not just get on the ship *506without some cooperation from the people on board the trawler. In the instant case, however, Hendricks and Williams traveled together for only a few days. Perhaps the biggest difference between Alfrey and the instant case is that while the marijuana was openly displayed on the ship in Alfrey, the marijuana in this case was hidden in a fuel tank underneath the truck. Hendricks had no reason to check the fuel tanks; he had already been told by his mechanic son that one of the tanks was malfunctioning. In addition, unlike the working relationship in Alfrey that allowed the jury to infer that a conspiracy existed, Hendricks was merely accompanying his son due to his better command of Spanish. There was no reason for him to have an intimate knowledge of his son’s activities.
In sum, I do not believe that the government met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks knowingly and voluntarily entered into a conspiracy with Williams. At some point, the inferences from circumstantial evidence become too attenuated as a matter of law to allow a jury to conclude that the government has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, as in Sheikh, supra at 502, the government merely “pile[d] inference upon inference.”