Court Opinion

ID: 9622995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:26:11.938027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:22.176713
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting).
Here for review is an interpretation of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, 53-51-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953 (enacted 1973), hereafter the Act; together with a document entitled “An Agreement between The Board of Education of the Nebo School District and the Nebo Education Association,” hereafter the Agreement. All statutory references are to U.C.A.1953.
Plaintiff was employed as a fifth-grade teacher for the school years of 1973-74 and 1974-75. On March 27, 1975, she was notified by letter that she would not' be offered a teaching contract for the coming school year. She requested a hearing before the Board of Education, which was granted. At the hearing the Board declined to state any reason for refusal to renew her contract. The Board further refused her request to summon and examine at the hearing plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, Mr. Stansfield, the principal of the school.
A trial to the court produced a judgment holding the Act not applicable to plaintiff’s fact situation, and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. We should reverse, and remand. The Act has as its purpose, the formulation of orderly termination procedures, specification of standards of due process, and causes for termination. A board of education of a school district may do this by contract with its educators, or their associations; or by its own resolution. Here we deal with an agreement struck between the Board of Education of the Nebo School District and the Nebo Education Association; and also the provisions of the Act. The Act, as the law, is a part of plaintiff’s contract, also a part of ‘the Agreement.
The Act defines dismissal or termination, as: (1) any termination of the status of employment of an educator, and (2) failure to renew the employment contract of an educator, who pursuant to the employment practices of the school, has a reasonable expectation of continued employment in successive years.1 It defines “educator” or “teacher,” as teaching and professional personnel holding positions requiring certification and valid certificates from the state board of education.2
Required by the Act, to be included in any procedure for orderly dismissal adopted by a district, is a right to a fair hearing. This right must be read in conjunction with 53-51-6, which refers to “all hearings,” and sets out the requisite procedure.
The Act goes on to cover the situation where a district intends not to renew the contract of employment of an individual entitled to employment in succeeding years, according to the district personnel program. In such situation, it provides for notice; the quality of the notice; that such notice leaves no doubt as to nonrenewal; and that it provide the “reasons” for the termination.3
The Agreement establishes two categories: career educators and qualifying educators. A career educator is one who has been in the employ of the district for a period of three consecutive years. As such, one is deemed re-employed for each succeeding year. The career educator’s option *1310to renew his contract for the succeeding school year may only be terminated for cause, after notice, and he is accorded a hearing. Plaintiff is not a career educator. The relevant provisions of the agreement relating to qualifying educators are:
5-6 Employment Period of Qualifying Educators.
Unless a contract of employment shall expressly provide otherwise, a qualifying educator shall be deemed to be employed for a period of one school year. Each qualifying educator may deem himself reemployed for the succeeding year unless otherwise notified to the contrary by the board of education in the manner hereinafter provided. [Emphasis added.] 5-7 Non-renewal of Qualifying Educator — Notice.
If the board determines not to reemploy a qualifying educator for an ensuing term, notice of such intention shall be given to the said educator in writing by personal delivery or by verified mail 60 days before the end of the current school year. Said notice shall contain the date of its execution and a clear and concise statement that the educator’s contract will not be renewed for the coming school year.
By statutory definition plaintiff is an educator, and as such her status was terminated.4 The statute says that any termination of an educator is a dismissal or termination. Plaintiff requested a hearing, thus was entitled to a fair hearing,5 the elements of which are set out in 53-51-6. Although plaintiff was given a hearing it did not meet required standards.
Plaintiff was not allowed to produce witnesses, hear the testimony against her, nor to cross-examine witnesses. This procedure is contrary to statute and to our decided case law.6
The purpose of such a hearing is to determine whether the testimony against her or the reasons for her dismissal are arbitrary or capricious.
The claim is made by the board that plaintiff was employed for one year only. This claim is made on the basis of 35-6 of the Agreement.
It is clear that plaintiff occupied a probationary status as an educator, but the Act makes no distinction between a probationary status and any other; so far as the right to a fair hearing is concerned.
Employment of the methods for termination of the status of an educator brings plaintiff squarely within the provisions of the Act.
Had plaintiff been employed for the period of one year only, it would not have been necessary to terminate her status. Her status would have come to an end without need to rely on the Act, and the Act would then not have been applicable.
The Roth, Sindermann and La Borde cases, relied on to support the main opinion, are not applicable to the facts here for review. Roth turned on the fact the contract of employment provided employment for one year only, without any allusion to additional employment. Sindermann dealt with a custom developed over a number of years. La Borde turned on a Louisiana statute which dealt specifically with probationary teachers — a statute significantly different from our own.
Here we are confronted with our own statute, which provides termination procedures for educators, and Rosemary Abbott is an educator. In addition, a reading of the statute shows the right to a fair hearing (53-51-5(1)) to be an independent requirement. A requirement which becomes operative when the status of an educator is terminated.
Plaintiff’s claim for damages in the form of .salary, and other benefits; and for an order reinstating her could not be ordered with a reversal. We should remand the matter to secure to plaintiff the procedures she is entitled to under the Act. Whether plaintiff would be entitled to reinstatement, *1311back salary and other benefits would depend upon whether the reasons given for her termination were, or were not, arbitrary or capricious.

. 53-51-3(2)(a), (b).

. 53-51-3(3).

. 53-51-5(1), (2).

. 53-51-3.

. 53-51-5.

. Hearn v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 548 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976).