Court Opinion

ID: 9534729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:42:25.302995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:44.576412
License: Public Domain

Andersen, J.
(dissenting)—I would affirm the Superior Court's dismissal of the charges against the defendant, as did the Court of Appeals in its unpublished opinion. Both of those decisions followed the well settled law as enunciated by this court.
It may well be that the defendant was falling down drunk, as the State's evidence would indicate, but it may also be that he was ill. While the former seems more likely in this case, the point is that it could have been the latter— and it also could be the latter in any number of cases which have yet to arise. In this case, as well as in similar future cases, we shall never know the answer for certain because of the absence of a Breathalyzer or other blood alcohol test.
Our rules of court are specific and unambiguous, "a person in custody who desires counsel shall be provided access to a telephone, the telephone number of the public defender or other official responsible for assigning counsel". (Italics mine.) Former JCrR 2.11(c)(2).10 The police violated this clearly stated rule. The defendant asked for a lawyer, a telephone was nearby and the police had the public defender's 24-hour phone number—yet the police declined to provide it.
Granted, the defendant refused the opportunity to take the blood alcohol test offered by police. But had the defendant been provided access to counsel in accordance with the requirements of the rule, counsel could have arranged for an independent Breathalyzer or other blood alcohol test. It is this opportunity which the police effectively took from the defendant. As we have declared in the past, " [w]hile the law enforcement authorities have no duty to volunteer to arrange for testing, they must not thwart an accused's attempts to make such arrangements." Blaine v. Suess, 93 Wn.2d 722, 728, 612 P.2d 789 (1980).
*153I also agree with the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals that dismissal is the proper remedy for this rule violation. In my view, the following excerpts from the unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case correctly state the applicable law.11 As Judge Munson, writing for that court, explained:
Mr. Kruger relies on State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wn.2d 436, 445, 610 P.2d 893, vacated, 449 U.S. 977, 66 L. Ed. 2d 240, 101 S. Ct. 390, aff'd, 94 Wn.2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980), in which the court, relying upon Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wn.2d 733, 741, 409 P.2d 867 (1966), held that when the error is not harmless, dismissal was the proper remedy for denial of access to counsel under former JCrR 2.11 in a DWI case because
the period immediately after arrest and charging in a driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor case is a "critical stage" because of the unique character of the evidence to be obtained and the trial strategy decisions which must be made then, if at all. . . .
Here, the officers' failure to provide Mr. Kruger the public defender's telephone number clearly denied him access to a lawyer. He, thus, was without counsel in deciding . . . whether to submit to additional, possibly exculpatory, tests. These potential defenses were forever lost and dismissal is warranted under the Fitzsimmons rationale,[12]
(Italics mine.)
I would affirm the Superior Court's dismissal.
Smith, J., concurs with Andersen, J.

This rule is now CrRLJ 3.1(c)(2). See also CrR 3.1(c)(2).

 Spokane v. Kruger, 54 Wn. App. 1048 (1989).

 See also Seattle v. Orwick, 113 Wn.2d 823, 784 P.2d 161 (1989).