Court Opinion

ID: 9562040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:20:42.864123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:11.218491
License: Public Domain

Felton, Justice,
dissenting. 1. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 95 Ga. 795, supra, cited by the majority in their first headnote, is not authority for its holding in this case under its peculiar facts. In this case this court simply ruled that a mere verdict denying a divorce was not final until a judgment was rendered on the verdict, and there was no such judgment in that case.
2. This is an unusual case and, insofar as I can determine, it is one of first impression. In this case the court reserved jurisdiction to render a judgment on temporary alimony (which I think all agree includes attorney’s fees) until after the final judgment in the divorce case. The decisions of this court have ap*523proved such action. The correctness of such decisions seems to be doubtful because the judgment on temporary alimony is not supposed to be influenced by anything bearing on the question which is brought out on the trial. The jury, on November 21, 1969, found against the appellee and denied her petition for a divorce and denied her permanent alimony. Judgment was entered on this verdict on November 24, 1969. She filed a motion for a new trial which has not been passed on. While the motion for a new trial was still pending, the trial court passed an order awarding temporary alimony, child support, attorney’s fees and the custody of the minor children to the appellee.
The facts to be remembered in deciding this case under the unreversed decisions of this court are: (1) The jury denied the appellee a divorce and permanent alimony. (2) A motion for a new trial has been filed in the divorce case. (3) The motion for a new trial is still pending. (4) The judgment following and carrying out the jury verdict is binding on the parties until set aside. (5) The award of temporary alimony, child custody, etc., was rendered after the motion for a new trial had been filed.
The big question in the case is: Under the law of this State, contained in decisions which have not been overruled or modified, can the trial court, under the above facts, award temporary alimony, attorney’s fees, child support and child- custody, in a judgment rendered after the jury verdict denying appellee a divorce and permanent alimony, a judgment thereon, and a motion for a new trial in the divorce case, which motion is still pending?
The rationale supporting a woman’s right to temporary alimony, child support and attorney’s fees, to wit, that she is entitled to these items as a wife, without regard to' whether the wife is granted a divorce and permanent alimony has been applied before the trial of the divorce cases where the temporary orders are issued before the trial of the divorce case. . Evidently the decisions on this question were decided when such questions as we have here were moot or were not urged.
However, in this case we run head on with' unanimous decisions by this court to the effect that where a -jury denies a divorce to a wife the right to attorney’s fee's (a ‘ part of the *524temporary alimony) is nullified and the court loses jurisdiction over the custody of children in the case. Since the jury denied the appellee a divorce in this case before the order of temporary alimony, attorney’s fees and the custody of the children and their support was rendered, it is my opinion that until, the cases cited below are overruled or modified the court is without authority or jurisdiction to render the judgment complained of in this case. The marriage is still intact and all questions left can be settled under the principles of applicable law outside of divorce law. The cases I refer to are, among others: Brightwell v. Brightwell, 161 Ga. 89 (129 SE 658); Connor v. Connor, 212 Ga. 92, 95 (90 SE 581); Stoner v. Stoner, 134 Ga. 368 (4) (67 SE 1030); Keppel v. Keppel, 92 Ga. 506 (17 SE 976). Shepard’s (Ga.) Citations shows 15 cases following some phase of Brightwell v. Brightwell, supra. Shepard’s (Ga.) Citations shows 7 cases following Connor v. Connor, supra, and shows 10 cases following Stoner v. Stoner, supra.
If the final temporary alimony and custody judgment in this case by the trial judge was an attempt on his part to issue a nunc pro tunc judgment as to temporary alimony it was abortive because the intervention of the verdict and judgment denying a divorce to appellee and the law in such cases absolutely precludes such a judgment. The award of the custody of the children was likewise abortive. As to custody, see Keppel v. Keppel, 92 Ga. 506, supra; Black v. Black, 165 Ga. 243 (140 SE 364); Dalton v. Dalton, 170 Ga. 502 (153 SE 22); Kniepkamp v. Richards, 192 Ga. 509 (16 SE2d 24); Hudgins v. Hudgins, 182 Ga. 493 (185 SE 870); Shipps v. Shipps, 186 Ga. 494 (198 SE 230); Harmon v. Harmon, 209 Ga. 474 (74 SE2d 75).