Court Opinion

ID: 9684796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:14:13.553295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:59.658079
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING IN NO. 65498
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for prostitution. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 43.-02(a)(2). After finding appellant guilty, the jury assessed punishment at 30 days and a fine of $500.00.
While we reverse for failure of the trial court to sustain the motion to quash, appellant’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction necessitates our review of this question. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1.
In her second ground of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. She maintains the State failed to prove “the ‘sexual contact’ with the complaining witness was with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of another.”
A.F. Rossi testified that he was with the vice division of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office. On October 2, 1979, Rossi met appellant at Models Galore in Houston. Appellant informed Rossi that the basic fee was $35.00 for a thirty minute “rap session.” Appellant also told Rossi that she worked off tips in the back room. With regard to his discussion of the tips with appellant, Rossi testified as follows:
“A. Yes sir. She said that for twenty-five dollars I could do to myself what she was going to do to me.
“Q. Did you ask her what that meant?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. What did she reply if anything?
“A. I told her that for the twenty-five dollars she was going to masturbate me. She said yes, but I didn’t say that, you did. That is about the size of it.
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“Q. She quote you any other prices?
“A. Yes sir. She said that the other price was fifty dollars and I asked her what was that for screwing and she said yes, how much can you spend. I told her that I wasn’t going to spend that much.
“Q. By the word screwing, did you mean sexual intercourse?
“A. Yes sir.
“Q. She agreed with you?
“A. Yes sir.”
Appellant was convicted for prostitution under the terms of Sec. 43.02(a)(2), supra, which provides:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he knowingly:
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“(2) solicits another in a public place to engage with him in sexual conduct for hire.”
With regard to the definitions of various terms within the prostitution subchapter, Sec. 43.01(1)(3)(4)(5), supra provides:
“In this subchapter:
“(1) ‘Deviate sexual intercourse’ means any contact between the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.
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“(3) ‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
“(4) ‘Sexual conduct’ includes deviate sexual intercourse, sexual contact, and sexual intercourse.
“(5) ‘Sexual intercourse’ means any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.”
The information herein alleged solicitation to engage in sexual conduct for hire. Rossi’s testimony established that he and appellant discussed two forms of sexual *469conduct, namely sexual contact and sexual intercourse. The definition of the term sexual intercourse does not by statute include the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. In its charge to the jury, the court used the term sexual conduct.
When this Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence, it will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. The State thus proved solicitation to engage in a form of sexual conduct, sexual intercourse, which does not statutorily include the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. We find the evidence sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
In her first ground of error, appellant contends the court erred in failing to grant her motion to quash the information in this cause. The information alleges in pertinent part that on October 2,1979, appellant did:
“... in a public place knowingly solicit A.F. Rossi to engage with the Defendant in sexual conduct for hire.”
The motion to quash complained that the information was insufficient to give appellant notice of the offense with which she was charged due to the numerous statutory meanings of the term “sexual conduct.” See V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 43.01(4). On original submission, a panel of this Court concluded that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to quash.
It is necessary to reexamine the panel’s conclusion in light of our opinions in Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Cr.App.) and Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.Cr.App.). In Thomas, the defendant filed a motion to quash his theft indictment. The motion complained that the terms “owner” and “without effective consent” were vague and indefinite due to the numerous statutory meanings of the terms. This Court found no error in the court overruling the motion to quash because the information sought was essentially evidentiary. It was further held that the terms “owner” and “effective consent” are not vague and indefinite because they are statutorily defined. Finally, the Court noted that the term “owner” did not go to an act or omission of the defendant.
In Ferguson, the defendant maintained the court erred in denying his motion to quash an indictment alleging the delivery of heroin. The defendant argued that he was entitled to notice of which type of delivery the State would rely upon to prove the allegations of the indictment. This Court found that the court erred in denying the motion to quash and stated:
“In the present case, while ‘delivery’ is statutorily defined, the statute does not present a single definition. Rather, the definition allows three different and distinct ways of establishing the accused’s criminal conduct. This is not like the situation of requesting the type of ‘owner’ to be alleged, for in that situation, as was stated above, the specific allegation would not affect the defendant’s defense preparations. Here, however, ‘delivery’ is the very heart of the offense. Which type of ‘delivery’ the State will attempt to prove would be critical to the appellant’s defense. The ‘delivery’ is the act by the appellant which constitutes the criminal conduct.
“... it is clear that even though an act or omission by a defendant is statutorily defined, if that definition provides for more than one manner or means to commit that act or omission, then upon timely request, the State must allege the particular manner or means it seeks to establish.”
The term “sexual conduct” is statutorily defined by Sec. 43.01(4), supra. The definition provides three different methods of such conduct. One of those methods, sexual contact, can in turn be committed in three different manners. Likewise, deviate sexual intercourse, can be committed in two different manners.
The type of “sexual conduct” the State sought to prove in the instant case was critical to appellant’s ability to present a defense. The solicitation to engage in some form of such “sexual conduct” was the essence of the offense with which appellant was charged. The statutory definition of *470“sexual conduct” provides a number of different manners by which appellant could have committed the offense of prostitution. Appellant’s motion to quash entitled her to the allegation of facts sufficient to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense and sufficient to give her precise notice of the offense with which she was charged. We conclude the court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to quash. Under such circumstances the information will be dismissed. See Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.Cr.App.).
The State’s motion for rehearing is denied.
TEAGUE, J., concurs in result.
DALLY, J., dissents.