Court Opinion

ID: 9778500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:09:44.296038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:10.524228
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Appellant asked state’s witness, Officer Williams, if he had made the prior contradictory statements and the witness admitted that he did. Yet, the trial court refused to allow him to explain those discrepancies. This is error. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 612(a).
The State’s trial objections that appellant was not following the requirements of Tex. R.Crim.Evid. 612, were not proper objections because they lacked specificity. See Goodrich v. State, 632 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). These objections were not specific and failed to state which aspect of Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 612 was purportedly not being followed. Further, the State’s hearsay objection should have been overruled because the prior statements were not hearsay because they were offered to show the inconsistency and not as proof of the statements themselves. Also see Tex.R. Crim.Evid. 801(e)(1)(A).
In order to establish the predicate to impeach Williams, appellant was not required to recite the exact words used in the inconsistent testimony in order to cross examine Williams about such inconsistencies. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 612 does not require a particular question reciting specific words when providing the predicate. Also, the absence of a particular form of rule 612’s predicate does not take precedence over the substance presented and appellant’s right to a fair trial. See generally Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. articles 1.03, 1.04 and 1.05 (Vernon 1977). All that Tex.R. Crim.Evid. 612 requires is that the witness be warned that counsel intends to question him about prior contradictory statements and their contents, as well as the timing and location of those statements, such that there is sufficient certainty to make the witness aware of the particular statements. Clearly, appellant tried to meet this requirement. Williams was told the contents of the statement and was allowed to read his prior inconsistent testimony. Appellant set the date of Williams’ prior statements by asking Williams if he recalled his August 11, 1988 testimony. Further, by asking Williams to explain the difference in the August 11 examining trial testimony and his testimony during the past two days of trial, appellant called the witnesses’ attention to the contradictory statement. When the court continually sustained nonspecific objections, appellant tried to have Williams read his prior testimony aloud. Lastly, when all other attempts to question Williams about his prior inconsistent testimony failed, appellant tried to introduce the prior testimony pursuant to Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 612.
In summary, appellant tried to lay the predicate three separate ways: (1) he tried to have Williams testify and explain the prior inconsistencies; (2) he tried to have Williams read his prior testimony into the record; and (3) he tried to introduce the prior inconsistent statement into evidence. There was nothing further appellant could have done to lay the proper predicate to impeach the witness; therefore, the court erred.
Additionally, the requirement of materiality and harm were met because the witness’s stories differed as to the place, time and identity of the persons involved in the alleged-crime. These facts are material because they are the elements of the crime with which appellant was charged and thereby critical to the States’ burden of proof. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. articles 21.02 and 21.03 (Vernon 1989). Further, Officer Williams’ credibility was essential to the States’ case as he was the only fact witness who testified against the appellant. Therefore, inconsistencies in Williams’ testimony were absolutely essential to appellant’s defense that Williams purchased cocaine from another person and that the arresting officers, who did not *642participate in the transaction, mistook appellant as that person. The jury was wrongfully deprived of the opportunity to test the credibility of Officer Williams.
Appellant also met the inconsistency requirement of Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 612. Williams originally stated that he was the only person to whom appellant sold drugs. However, in later testimony he stated that appellant also sold drugs to some unknown third party. To fulfill the inconsistency requirement of Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 612, the witness’s stories need not directly contradict each other. Inconsistency may be found in evasive answers, inability to remember, silence or changes of position. U.S. v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 873 (8th Cir.1985). Witness testimony may also be impeached with prior statements that are inconsistent with the “impression” created by the testimony. Pyles v. State, 755 S.W.2d 98, 115 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 543, 102 L.Ed.2d 573 (1988). Therefore, Williams’ statements substantiated the inconsistency requirement of Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 612. Although Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 612 provides that a witness may be cross-examined as to prior inconsistent statements, it was permissible for appellant to ask Williams on cross-examination about inconsistent statements in order to lay a predicate for impeachment. McCormick and Ray, supra, § 693, at 633-4.
The state argues that the instant case is controlled by Ellingsworth v. State, 487 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) and Weaver v. State, 472 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.Crim.App.1971). Both defendants in those cases tried to introduce examining trial testimony for impeachment purposes. The trial court sustained objections to the introduction of that evidence and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. However, in both cases no questions were asked of the witnesses before the defendant attempted to introduce the inconsistent testimony. These cases are inopposite as there was no attempt to lay the required predicate. Ellingsworth, 487 S.W.2d at 112; Weaver, 472 S.W.2d at 520.
I find it was error for the court to sustain the state’s objections and to deny proper cross-examination of Williams about his prior inconsistent testimony. The majority has placed form over substance, allowed the trial court to sustain objections that are improper and incomplete, and that fail to put the appellant on notice of how he has failed to lay the proper predicate per Tex.R. Crim.Evid. 612(a).
I also find that harm resulted because a reasonable doubt exists as to whether this error contributed to appellant’s conviction. I would reverse and remand to the trial court for a new trial. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2).