Court Opinion

ID: 9902392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-26 23:02:12.973506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:49.810391
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 Bartoumian v. Chin CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 HAGOP BARTOUMIAN,                                                      B324106

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                     (Los Angeles County Super.
                                                                        Ct. No. 19AVCV00848)
           v.

 TERRY L.C. CHIN, et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen T. Morgan, Judge. Affirmed.
         Hagop Bartoumian in pro. per. for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         No appearance by Respondents.

                              ___________________________
       Hagop Bartoumian appeals from the denial of his motion to
set aside the dismissal of his personal injury action due to his
attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)1 We affirm.
                 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On November 13, 2019, Bartoumian filed a personal injury
action against Terry L.C. Chin, the County of Los Angeles, the
City of Los Angeles, and the State of California for an alleged
motor vehicle accident occurring on October 12, 2018.2 When the
parties failed to appear for a final status conference, the trial
court issued an order to show cause regarding dismissal and set a
hearing for January 29, 2021. That day, when Bartoumian and
the defendants failed to appear, the court dismissed the entire
action without prejudice for failure to prosecute.
       On June 23, 2022, approximately 17 months after the order
of dismissal was entered, Bartoumian filed a motion to set aside
the dismissal under section 473. In a declaration in support of
the motion, Bartoumian’s attorney explained he moved his office
to a new location in October 2020 and neglected to inform the
court of his new address. Although, he submitted a change of
address with the postal service, he never received the court’s
January 20, 2021 order to show cause regarding dismissal and
thus failed to appear at the hearing. He did not provide the date
he learned of the dismissal or how he learned of it.

1    All further section references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2     The case register shows Bartoumian has not filed proofs of
service on defendants and none of the defendants have appeared
in the trial court or on appeal.

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      The trial court denied Bartoumian’s motion, finding it was
untimely because applications for relief under section 473 had to
have been filed within six months after the dismissal order.3
Bartoumian appealed the ruling and is self-represented on
appeal. (Peltier v. McCloud River R.R. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th
1809 [an order denying plaintiff’s motion under section 473 to
vacate an order of dismissal for failure to diligently prosecute the
case is appealable].)
                             DISCUSSION
      On appeal, Bartoumian contends the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied the motion to set aside the dismissal
because “the policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried
upon its merits, and the court looks with disfavor upon a party,
who, regardless of the merits of the case, attempts to take
advantage of the mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or neglect of his
adversary.” In support of his argument, Bartoumian cites eight
cases without attempting to explain how they are relevant to
this appeal. We have read each of the cases and are not

3     Under section 473, subdivision (b), a court may, “relieve a
party or his or her legal representative from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her
through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” An application for discretionary relief under section 473
must be “made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six
months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was
taken.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) The same subdivision also provides
that a court “shall” vacate any dismissal “whenever an
application for relief is made no more than six months after entry
of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an
attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or neglect . . . .” (Ibid.)

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persuaded to reverse based on these authorities. All are
distinguishable.
       In each of the cases, the request for relief was either timely
made or was based on a court’s inherent equity power rather
than section 473. (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 855
[relief from a default judgment properly granted under court’s
inherent equity power where there has been extrinsic fraud or
mistake]; Freeman v. Goldberg (1961) 55 Cal.2d 622, 625 [motion
to vacate under section 473 was timely made within two and one-
half months after plaintiff learned that his motion to tax costs
had been denied]; Waybright v. Anderson (1927) 200 Cal. 374, 380
[application to set aside dismissal, made one month after entry of
judgment of dismissal, was timely]; Berri v. Rogero (1914)
168 Cal. 736, 739 [motion for relief from default was not made
under section 473 and was filed one month after default entered];
Crane v. Kampe (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 200, 204 [motion for relief
from default sought to invoke the court’s equity powers, not
section 473]; Stout v. Bakker (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 78, 84
[motions for relief from default under section 473 “were made
well within the six-month period allowed”]; Benjamin v. Dalmo
Mfg. Co. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 523, 533 [evidence was insufficient to
justify an order setting aside a default where defendant failed to
explain three-month delay in seeking relief under section 473
even after defendant learned of the default]; Montijo v. Robert
Sherer & Co. (1907) 5 Cal.App. 736, 738 [motion to set aside
default made one week after judgment entered].)
       None of the cases presents analysis or facts material to
whether Bartoumian filed his application for relief within the
timeline specified in section 473. Although there are no
respondents in this appeal and thus no respondent’s briefs,

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Bartoumian “still bears the ‘affirmative burden to show error
whether or not the respondent’s brief has been filed.’ ” (In re
Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 110.)
Bartoumian has failed to meet his burden on appeal to
demonstrate the trial court prejudicially erred.
       We also reject Bartoumian’s reliance on section 473.5 for
relief. First, Bartoumian has forfeited this argument because he
did not seek relief on this ground in the trial court. (Kashmiri v.
Regents of University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809,
830.) Second, section 473.5 allows a party who lacked actual
notice of the action to seek to set aside a default judgment.
Bartoumian, as the plaintiff in the matter, had actual notice of
the action; he filed it. Under these circumstances, section 473.5
does not apply to Bartoumian.
                              DISPOSITION
       The August 16, 2022 order denying relief under section 473
is affirmed.

                                           RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                        MOOR, J.

                        KIM, J.

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