Court Opinion

ID: 9522462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:26:16.503987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:51.599128
License: Public Domain

Landis, J.,
dissents for the reasons given in the majority opinion of this Court, written by Emmert, J., in Budkiewicz v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co. (1958), 238 Ind. 535, 150 N. E. 2d 897.

SEPARATE OPINION

Achor, J.
Appellant was riding as a guest in an automobile which collided with one of appellee’s trains which was standing upon a crossing. Appellant’s complaint was in two paragraphs. Separate demurrers were filed to each paragraph of complaint and each was sustained by the court. Appellant refused to plead further. The sustaining of the demurrer is presented to this court as cause for appeal.
The first paragraph of complaint alleges and proceeds upon the theory that prior to the particular collision it was appellee’s custom to have a flagman with *485a lantern or a flare at the intersection when trains were approaching or standing upon the intersection; that the driver of the automobile was familiar with this custom; that at the time he approached the intersection there was a section of one of appellee’s trains standing on the intersection but there was no signal or sign of any kind being displayed by the railroad and that the driver of the car depending upon the established custom of the railroad proceeded across the intersection without stopping, believing that the railroad intersection was clear, and finally he alleged that the collision in which the appellant was injured was the proximate result of the negligence of the railroad company, as above alleged.
Although these allegations could have been stated by appellant more concisely and in greater detail, nevertheless it is my opinion that under the rules of law, recognized in the opinion of Bobbitt, C. J., in this case, and as stated by the Appellate Court in the case of Gillies, by next friend v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co. (1954), 124 Ind. App. 382, 116 N. E. 2d 555 (Transfer denied April 1, 1954), appellant has stated a cause of action in his first paragraph of complaint on the theory of established custom and a resulting entrapment, sufficient to withstand a demurrer.1 Therefore, in my opinion the sustaining of the demurrer as to the first paragraph of complaint was reversible error and, for this reason, the cause must be remanded to the trial court, with instructions to set aside the judgment as to the first paragraph of complaint and to overrule the demurrer as to such first paragraph of complaint.
*486The second rhetorical paragraph, of appellant’s complaint (omitting the allegation regarding the custom of maintaining a watchman at the crossing) alleges that the appellee was negligent in that it had a cut of freight cars standing on the crossing; that the crossing was extra hazardous; that there were no lights, reflecting devices, or any other means of warning travelers of the existence of the cars on the crossing.
Appellant contends that this allegation of complaint is sufficient to constitute a charge of negligence within the terms of §10-3904, Bums’ 1956 Repl. which makes it unlawful for a railroad to permit its trains to “remain standing” across any public highway, street, alley or farm crossing.” The significance of this statute, as applicable to comparable facts, was considered in the case of Budkiewicz v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry. Co. (1958), 238 Ind. 535, 545, 547, 150 N. E. 2d 897.
As stated by Bobbitt, C. J., in the majority opinion of this case, and by Achor,- J., in the minority opinion of the Budkiewicz case, supra, it seems apparent that the legislature, which enacted the law, intended that the term “remain standing” should not and could not apply to the temporary, reasonable and necessary standing of trains or portions thereof upon crossings in the course of their normal reasonable and necessary operation. In order that the standing of trains upon a crossing constitute an unlawful act, the term “remain standing,” as used in the statute, supra, must be construed to mean that the condition prohibited continued for a period of such prolonged duration as to constitute an unwarranted obstruction and interference with the free enjoyment of the highways by the citizens of the state. It follows, as a necessary consequence of this construction that, in order to invoke the provisions of §10-3904, supra, as a basis of his course of action, appellant’s *487complaint must allege some facts essential to its application. The appellant’s complaint in this case does not allege any such facts with regard to the reason for or the period of time during which appellee’s train was upon the particular crossing, nor are facts alleged from which it can be inferred that the presence of appellee’s train upon the track was in violation of the statute. I am therefore of the opinion that the complaint does not allege a meritorious cause of action within the terms of §10-3904, supra. Insofar as the opinion of the Budkiewicz case contains language to the contrary, I concur with the opinion of Bobbitt, C. J., that that case was in error and should be overruled.
Furthermore, appellant asserts that rhetorical paragraph II alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action independent of the statutory provision of §10-3904, as applied to this case. In support of this contention, appellant asserts that because of the hazardous condition of the crossing it was the duty of the railroad company to provide protective signals or devices in addition to those required by statute, ordinance, custom or ruling of the public service commission. I do not believe this to be the law in Indiana. Upon this issue, I believe the law to be that as stated in the opinion of Bobbitt, C. J., in the present case, and as stated by Achor, J., in the dissenting opinion in the Budkiewicz case, supra. For the reasons which have been exhaustively considered in the opinions above cited, I am not in agreement with the concurring opinion of Arterburn, J., in the Budkiewicz case, which purports to construe the prevailing opinion in that case as placing the same responsibility on railroads to use due care in the operation of their trains as is placed upon motorists upon the highways. • • •
*488For the reason stated immediately above, I concur in the opinion of Bobbitt, C. J., that the demurrer to the second paragraph of complaint was properly sustained and that, as to this respect of the judgment of the trial court, the same should be affirmed.
Arterburn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

. “. . . the demurrer admits not only the facts directly and specifically alleged in the complaint but also all facts that can be implied from other allegations by reasonable and fair intendment. . . .” Lincoln Operating Company v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551, 558, 114 N. E. 2d 873.