Court Opinion

ID: 9388985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-23 16:09:45.355221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:24.303652
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                       OF TEXAS

                                  NO. PD-0905-21

                MARKERRION D’SHON ALLISON, Appellant

                                           v.

                             THE STATE OF TEXAS

         ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
               FROM THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
                         GREGG COUNTY

      MCCLURE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which HERVEY,
RICHARDSON, NEWELL, and SLAUGHTER, JJ., joined. YEARY, J. filed a concurring
opinion. KELLER, P.J., and KEEL, J., concurred. WALKER, J., dissented.

                                    OPINION

      We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to decide if the

Confrontation Clause was violated when an expert testified to the meaning of a slang

phrase he learned from other people. We hold the admission of the expert opinion did not
                                                                                   ALLISON — 2

violate evidentiary rules or Appellant’s constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

                                       BACKGROUND

The charged offense

       On September 8, 2016, complainant Jose Jimenez was alone at a house on

Clearwood Drive in Longview playing video games and smoking marihuana when

someone knocked on the door and asked for William Benicaso. Benicaso lived at the house

with Jimenez and sold marihuana. Jimenez presumed the person was there to buy

marihuana, so Jimenez told the person that nobody else was in the house and that there was

no marihuana in the house either.

       Later that night, Jimenez was still alone at the house when he heard another knock

on the door. Jimenez testified, “I had a really funny feeling as if something bad was going

to happen.” When he opened the door, he saw the end of a shotgun barrel. Jimenez tried to

close the door, but four individuals forced their way inside.

       One of the individuals hit Jimenez on the back of the head with a pistol, asking

where “it” was. Jimenez told them that “there wasn’t anything.” He testified that he did not

know exactly what they wanted, but “figured it was money or drugs.” The four individuals

proceeded to “ransack” the house, at one point forcing Jimenez to flip over a bed in one of

the bedrooms.

       The suspects then sent Jimenez back to the living room and ordered Jimenez to his

knees. Jimenez testified, “[T]hey started saying . . . go get T.K. . . . I want to kill this fool.”
                                                                                   ALLISON — 3

The individuals then told Jimenez, “[Y]ou’re going to die today. You’re going to die today

for no reason.” The last thing Jimenez recalled was the laser site of a handgun trained on

the back of his head. 1

       One of the men shot Jimenez in the head. Jimenez survived, but suffered a fractured

skull causing him to experience a “brain shift” of two or three centimeters to the left.

Jimenez has skull fragments permanently lodged in his brain, permanent vision loss, and

lost “some gray matter,” which was found at the crime scene.

       Jimenez described the assailants to investigators. He described one of the intruders

as wearing a mask, black, dark-skinned, “lanky,” around 5’8,” wearing dark clothing, and

no more than twenty-two years old. Although this description was consistent with

Appellant’s appearance, Jimenez was unable to identify Appellant in a photospread lineup.

Jimenez did identify two of the other individuals involved in the robbery from a

photographic lineup, however: Sean Owens-Toombs and Trekeymian Allison (referred to

as T.K.).

January 6: Subsequent arrest of 3 of the 4 suspects

       On January 6, 2017, three individuals were arrested for the September 8 robbery:

R.J. (a minor), Owens-Toombs, and T.K. An arrest warrant was also issued for Appellant,

but he was not initially apprehended.

       1
          Jimenez testified, “I remember—I don’t know who it was, but someone had pointed a
laser site that was on a gun, you could kind of tell. Kind of left it towards my vision to where I
could see it and slowly drug it over. I could feel where it was touching the back of my head. Even
[though] they don’t emit heat, I could almost feel where it was, and after that, I just kind of woke
up on the carpet. The front door was open. I was in a pool of my own blood.”
                                                                              ALLISON — 4

January 7: Jail call between Appellant and T.K.

       On January 7, 2017, Appellant and T.K. spoke on a recorded telephone line while

T.K. was in jail. Appellant said the police were looking for him, and that people were

talking about the shooting. T.K. opened the call by asking Appellant, “Hey. . . What’s on

the street?” Appellant responded, “Everybody thinking, ‘Oh, shot a n****r in the head or

(inaudible).’” Appellant then referred to his mother telling him, “[Inaudible] said they came

to her house looking for me early this morning.” T.K. asked, “For what?” Appellant

responded, “You know. For that s**t.”

       After a brief exchange, T.K. said, “I need you to pull a Carlos,” to which Appellant

asked, “Yeah?” T.K. answered in the affirmative. T.K. told Appellant “We all’s in there

together” to which Appellant agreed. T.K. then asked, “Why [did R.J.] turn himself in?”

T.K. told Appellant, “I’m trying to figure out where they got our name from, for real.”

Appellant answered, “I dunno. This is bulls**t.”

       After another exchange in which Appellant and T.K. tried to figure out how their

names came up in the investigation, T.K. said, “Probably need you to do that Carlos for

me, put that money on the books.” T.K. continued, “These n****rs done got our, done got

our names in some bulls**t.” Appellant questioned what T.K. had just said, when T.K. told

Appellant, “That why n****rs you d- get that out the way.”

       Right before ending the telephone call, T.K. reiterated, “Go on and pull that Carlos,

though,” to which Appellant responded, “Uh huh.” T.K. then ended the call by telling
                                                                              ALLISON — 5

Appellant “All right. Bye. Be careful, boy.” Appellant answered, “That’s a bet.” Five times

during the call, T.K. told Appellant that he needed him to “pull a Carlos.”

January 8: Second Clearwood house shooting

       The day after the phone call, on January 8, 2017, four individuals surrounded the

Clearwood Drive house. Witnesses at the house saw two men wearing ski masks at the

front door, another man hiding behind a car in the driveway, and a fourth man inside the

carport, who was identified as a black man with long dreadlocks or braids. The man with

dreadlocks fired a gun at the house. No one was injured in the shooting, although a bullet

went through a bedroom window. No one was ever charged for the January 8 shooting, but

prosecutors sought to use it to show Appellant attempted to silence witnesses to the charged

offense.

Co-defendant’s trial testimony

       One of the co-defendants, R.J., testified that he participated in the robbery on the

evening of September 8, along with Appellant, Owens-Toombs, and T.K. R.J. said that he

had been to the Clearwood house on a prior occasion to buy marihuana from Benicaso,

who, according to R.J., sold “pretty good weed” at “a good price.”

       On the afternoon of September 8, R.J. walked to T.K.’s house to “chill” with Owens-

Toombs, T.K., and Appellant, along with some other people he did not know. T.K.’s house

was located only a few blocks away from the Clearwood house. Sometime around six

o’clock, R.J. decided to go to the Clearwood house to buy some marihuana from Benicaso,

but when he arrived, he learned from Jimenez that Benicaso was not home. R.J. asked
                                                                            ALLISON — 6

Jimenez to tell Benicaso that R.J. had come by the house, and then he left the Clearwood

house and returned to T.K.’s house.

       When he arrived back at the house, Owens-Toombs, T.K., and Appellant were still

there. R.J. said that, after he informed the group that Benicaso was not home, they decided

to go back to the Clearwood house to search it for marihuana. The group gathered their

guns and drove back to the Clearwood house sometime after dark. R.J. testified that T.K.

was carrying a shotgun, Owens-Toombs was carrying a handgun with a laser on it, and

Appellant had a small handgun.

       When they arrived at the Clearwood house, everyone except R.J. got out of the car.

R.J. testified that Appellant was wearing a mask. R.J. stated, “[T]hat’s how I knew it was

him.” R.J. said that none of the others were wearing a mask. When R.J. entered the house,

the first thing he saw was Appellant searching the living room. R.J. also saw blood on the

floor in the middle of the living room. R.J. said he went to look in the bathroom, which

was also in the front of the house, and began searching for the marihuana. According to

R.J., he could hear people yelling “back and forth” in one of the back rooms. While the

arguing continued, R.J. went into the living room and continued his search. R.J. said that,

by that time, Appellant had gone “deeper in the house.”

       R.J. testified that he never saw Jimenez during the time he was inside the house,

which was, in his opinion, about five to seven minutes. According to R.J., he and Appellant
                                                                                ALLISON — 7

exited the house before Owens-Toombs shot Jimenez. Owens-Toombs and T.K were called

as witnesses by the State, but both refused to testify. 2

Detective Juarezortega’s trial testimony

       The State called Detective Armando Juarezortega of the Longview Police

Department who authenticated a video containing a custodial interview of Appellant. In

the interview, Appellant claimed that he did not know if he had been near the robbery

location on the night of the robbery. The video also contained an exchange between

Juarezortega and Appellant regarding the phrase “pull a Carlos.” Multiple detectives asked

Appellant if he knew what the term “pull up a Carlo [sic]” meant, but each time Appellant

denied knowing what it meant and told Juarezortega that he would rather save that

discussion for another day. However, Appellant seemingly corrected the detectives by

saying “to pull a Carlos,” as opposed to “Carlo.” As the interview continued, Appellant

admitted that he had talked to T.K. on the phone while T.K. was in jail. Juarezortega told

Appellant that he would hear a recording of his conversation with T.K. during Appellant’s

trial, which included T.K. asking him to “pull a Carlos,” and Appellant agreeing to do so.

Appellant repeatedly said that the words meant nothing; yet he followed this comment by

referring to the term as “slang.”

       2
         The trial court ruled that neither witness had a Fifth Amendment privilege and ordered
both to testify under threat of contempt. Both Owens-Toombs and T.K. refused to answer the
prosecutor’s questions. Nevertheless, it does not appear from the record that either was held in
contempt of court.
                                                                              ALLISON — 8

       Juarezortega then questioned Appellant about the January 8 shooting at the

Clearwood house. Appellant responded by telling Juarezortega that he wanted to see a

video of the shooting.

Detective Reed’s trial testimony

       Following Juarezortega’s testimony, the State called Detective Jayson Reed who

testified as to his investigation of the term “pull a Carlos,” given the prevalence of that

term’s use during the jail call. The State offered the testimony in the attempt to prove that

Appellant participated at the second Clearwood house shooting and that it was done to

silence the witnesses to the charged offense.

       In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Detective Reed established that he had

been in law enforcement for twenty-eight years and that most of that time, his career

focused on counter-drug operations. During his counter-narcotic work, he dealt with

informants, sources, and cooperating witnesses. 3 Reed also undertook specialized training

on criminal gangs. He therefore became familiar with the use of slang terms. Reed

explained that there had been occasions when he was unfamiliar with a particular slang

term. When that happened, he would ask informants or his sources what the term or word

meant. Reed described a number of slang terms used in the narcotics world and how slang

terms are constantly changing and can vary by community.

       3
        Reed explained that “sources” referred to a person who does not receive anything in
exchange for the information he gives while a “cooperating witness” or “informant” receives
something in exchange for the information.
                                                                                        ALLISON — 9

        Reed then testified to being asked by the prosecutor to research the meaning of the

phrase “pull a Carlos” and explained how he contacted one of his confidential informants

to ask what the term meant. Detective Reed had worked with this particular informant since

1998 and considered him to be credible. Detective Reed did not tell the informant why he

needed the information. Detective Reed also consulted other potential sources of

information including Officer Bethard with the Longview Police Department and

Investigator Hall Reavis with the Gregg County Criminal District Attorney’s Office. As a

result of his research, Detective Reed developed an expert opinion as to what the term “pull

a Carlos” meant: “It all boils down to basically doing a shooting. Now, I’ve gotten—it’s

either drive-by do a shooting, take care of a witness. It[] all comes around as shooting.”

        Appellant objected to Reed’s testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds. The trial

court overruled the objection and found that Reed was an expert qualified to testify as to

the meaning of slang phrases including “pull a Carlos.”

        The State then called Reed to testify before the jury. Reed told the jury that he talked

to the confidential informant and the two other individuals in law enforcement and they

each said they were familiar with the term and its meaning. Reed then testified, without

objection, 4 that in his expert opinion, “pull a Carlos” means “[t]o conduct a shooting of

4
  Wright v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 581, 586–87 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that Texas law generally
requires defendant to make a specific Confrontation Clause objection to preserve such error); Lucio
v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (concluding that defendant’s objections
failed to alert trial court to any claim that State’s presentation of certain evidence violated her Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against her and, thus, failed to preserve such claims for
appellate review); Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that
Confrontation Clause claims are subject to preservation requirements under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 33.1(a)(1)(A)); Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App.
                                                                                   ALLISON — 10

some sort.” The jury convicted Appellant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to

twenty-five years’ confinement.

                                    COURT OF APPEALS

       On appeal, Appellant argued that Reed’s testimony about the meaning of “pull a

Carlos” violated the Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Court of Appeals agreed, finding that

under the circumstances of this case, disclosure of the out-of-court statements underlying

Reed’s opinion constituted the use of testimonial statements in violation of the

Confrontation Clause. The appellate court found that the statement was procured

specifically for use against Appellant at trial and was offered solely for the truth of the

matter asserted—that to “pull a Carlos” means to shoot someone. This information was

directly relevant to the State’s theory of Appellant’s consciousness of guilt. The court also

held that the State failed to show the statement was reliable, that it was firmly rooted in a

hearsay exception, that the source was unable to testify, and on what basis he had reached

the conclusion that “pull a Carlos” meant to shoot someone. Finally, the court found, Reed

merely recited what he had learned from the cooperating source and adopted those

statements as his own. The court expressed concern that “allowing a witness to simply

parrot . . . out-of-court testimonial statements directly to the jury in the guise of expert

opinion would provide an end run around Crawford, and this we are loath to do.” Allison

2004) (holding that defendant “failed to preserve error on Confrontation grounds” by failing to
assert that objection at trial); Briggs v. State, 789 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (“We
hold that in failing to object at trial, [defendant] waived any claim that admission of the videotape
violated his rights to confrontation and due process/due course of law.”).
                                                                                  ALLISON — 11

v. State, No. 06-20-00020-CR, 2021 WL 5345133 at *12 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 17,

2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. State, Nos. 05-09-00494-CR

& 05-09-00495-CR, 2011 WL 135897, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 18, 2011, no pet.)

(not designated for publication) (discussing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).

                STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 5

         The State’s petition for discretionary review presents novel grounds involving the

intersection of Rule 703 and the Confrontation Clause. All three grounds involve the

testimony of Detective Reed and his testimony that “pull a Carlos” means to “do a

shooting.” We will first address whether expert witnesses testifying on subject matters

within the soft sciences based on knowledge and experience are required to perform the

same level of independent testing or analysis of any hearsay information that forms the

basis of their opinion as is required of expert witnesses testifying to subject matters within

the hard sciences.

                                      LAW & ANALYSIS

         In its first ground, the State relies on Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 70 (2012),

arguing that the meaning of “pull a Carlos” was within Reed’s personal knowledge at the

   5
       This Court granted the following grounds on the State’s petition for discretionary review:

   (1) Once a witness learns the meaning of a phrase from other people is the meaning of that
       phrase thereafter part of the personal knowledge of the witness which the witness can then
       testify to without violating the Confrontation Clause?
   (2) Are non-hard science expert witnesses required under the Confrontation Clause to perform
       the same level of independent testing/analysis required of hard science expert witnesses
       before they can give an expert opinion based on hearsay evidence?
   (3) Did the Court of Appeals err by finding harm from the admission of Detective Reed’s
       testimony?
                                                                             ALLISON — 12

time he testified and that there is no Confrontation Clause violation when a witness testifies

to facts within their personal knowledge.

       In Williams, the defendant challenged a laboratory expert’s testimony that a DNA

report from a prior kidnapping, rape, and robbery—which was not introduced into

evidence—matched a DNA sample taken from the defendant upon his arrest on unrelated

charges. In a decision authored by Justice Alito, a plurality found there was no

Confrontation Clause violation where the report was not offered for its truth, but for the

limited purpose of explaining the basis for the assumptions underlying the expert’s

independent conclusion that the samples matched. Even if the expert report was admitted

for its truth, Justice Alito wrote, the report was not testimonial. Williams, 567 U.S. at 79

(plurality opinion). The five other justices in two opinions (Justice Thomas, concurring in

the judgment, and Justice Kagan, joined by three other justices, dissenting) expressed the

position that the report was offered for its truth. Id. at 103, 132 (Thomas, J., concurring)

(Kagan, J., dissenting). Those opinions differed, however, in that while Justice Thomas

found the report was not testimonial in nature, the dissenting justices found it was. Id. at

111, 134 (Thomas, J., concurring) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

       While the instant case and Williams are similar in that both cases involve testifying

experts who based their opinions on out-of-court statements that were not admitted into

evidence, Williams is of limited help as a nonbinding plurality opinion. Therefore, in our

analysis of a witness’s personal knowledge as it relates to the Confrontation Clause, we

turn to Texas Rule of Evidence 703 and Crawford v. Washington.
                                                                              ALLISON — 13

Texas Rule of Evidence 703

       In its second ground, the State argues that the Confrontation Clause is not violated

where an expert bases his opinion on inadmissible hearsay because that testimony is

expressly permitted by Rule of Evidence 703. Further, it argues that the appellate court’s

holding that Reed’s testimony was not “based on his own testing and/or analysis” and was

simply a “parrot” of out of court statements effectively required Reed (a non-scientific

expert) to conduct scientific testing before he could give an expert opinion. The State

complains that, in so holding, the court of appeals erroneously relied on cases involving

hard science expert witnesses testifying about matters readily subject to independent

scientific testing or analysis which is very different from the instant case involving an

expert testifying about linguistics and slang usage. The latter is a subject in which

conclusions are based on experience and training rather than formulaic scientific methods.

       Rule 703 provides: “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or data that [he] has

personally observed. If experts in [his] field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts

or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion

to be admitted.” TEX. R. EVID. 703. Thus, the requirement of personal knowledge does not

apply to expert witnesses whose opinions and conclusions are reasonably based on facts or

data generally relied upon by experts in the particular field. Id. at 602, 703.

       In Kelly v. State, we presented the standard for determining whether an expert’s

scientific opinion was reliable: (a) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (b) the

technique applying the theory must be valid; and (c) the technique must have been properly
                                                                            ALLISON — 14

applied on the occasion in question. 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Rule

702 is not just limited to hard science experts, however. It also allows expert testimony as

to soft sciences and fields based primarily upon experience and training as opposed to

scientific methods. See Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998),

overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en

banc) (disapproving of Nenno’s holding that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article

38.22 applies only to custodial statements). Nenno recognized that soft science or non-

scientific expert testimony is held to a less rigorous standard than hard science expert

testimony. Specifically, we held:

       The appropriate questions are: (1) whether the field of expertise is a
       legitimate one, (2) whether the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is
       within the scope of that field, and (3) whether the expert’s testimony properly
       relies upon and/or utilizes the principles involved in the field.

Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561. Kelly is therefore confined to the evaluation of scientific expert

testimony. Because Detective Reed’s testimony constitutes specialized knowledge of law

enforcement, not scientific knowledge, the Kelly standards for admission do not apply.

Application of Nenno

   Applying the ‘soft’ science analysis of Nenno, we hold that the trial court did not err in

finding Detective Reed is an expert permitted to testify regarding the definition of “pull a

Carlos.”

   (1) Whether the field of expertise is a legitimate one

   While this Court has not specifically held that slang interpretation is a legitimate field

of expertise, multiple circuit courts have. See United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1169
                                                                              ALLISON — 15

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding “[t]his type of street intelligence might be misunderstood as either

remote. . . or hearsay. . . , but FRE 702 works well for this type of data gathered from years

of experience and special knowledge.”); see also United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318,

321 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996);

see also United States v. Quintana, 70 F.3d 1167, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 1995); see also

United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 232 (2nd Cir. 1991); see also United States v.

Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d

1299, 1310 (1st Cir. 1987). Importantly, Appellant does not challenge whether slang

translation is a legitimate field, only that Detective Reed does not qualify as a slang expert.

   (2) Whether the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within the scope of that field

   Detective Reed was qualified to testify on this subject matter based upon his experience

and training in that he (1) had been employed with the Longview Police Department for

about twenty-eight years, (2) dealt mostly with narcotics and gang-related crimes, while

also executing warrants and gathering intelligence, (3) dealt with many informants and was

familiar with both victims and suspects involved in the narcotics trade, (4) was familiar

with the connection between drugs and other crimes, and (5) had significant knowledge of

other slang terms. While defense counsel objected that he had no formal training in slang,

we are not persuaded that Reed’s extensive experience working in large-scale drug and

gang organizations left him unqualified as a slang expert.

   (3) Whether the expert’s testimony properly relies upon and/or utilizes the principles

       involved in the field
                                                                               ALLISON — 16

       As Don Vito Corleone so aptly remarked, “I have learned more on the streets than

in any classroom.” THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). Detective Reed did not

attend a formal course or training in drug and gang linguistics, if such courses exist. Reed

stated that there had been occasions when he might not be familiar with a particular name,

term, event, or situation. If that happened, Reed would contact somebody in the field,

specifically, other police agencies or “somebody that knows somebody and their informant

knows somebody in between” and then locate “somebody close to let [them] know what’s

going on.” Asking others in the same field what a word means (either by consulting a

dictionary, consulting an urban dictionary, or asking someone with direct knowledge) is

one of the prevailing methods for learning what a word means. Detective Reed gave

examples of several slang terms that might be outside a layperson’s vernacular, such as

“one plug,” (a source of information); “ice,” (methamphetamine); “eight ball,” (three and

one-half grams); “teenager,” (sixteenth of a gram); “ice cream,” (methamphetamine); “hard

and soft,” (crack cocaine and powder cocaine); and “wet,” (PCP). Detective Reed has

learned the meaning of these slang drug terms over the course of conversations with others

in the field. An officer’s knowledge of the jargon in drug trade and gang activities is critical

to criminal investigations. It is unclear how one is to obtain personal knowledge of the

terminology without asking trusted sources within the trade.

       We therefore find Detective Reed’s ‘soft’ science testimony permissible. Detective

Reed may not have performed scientific testing on the meaning of the phrase “pull a

Carlos” (since no such scientific testing was possible), but he did follow a widely-accepted
                                                                            ALLISON — 17

course of action to determine what the phrase meant by consulting other law enforcement

personnel and informants as to the meaning of “pull a Carlos.” As a soft-science expert

witness, Detective Reed should not be required to conduct scientific testing on the

information that forms the basis of his expert opinion prior to testifying to his expert

opinion.

       We now turn to the appellate court’s concern that cloaking inadmissible testimonial

hearsay in the basis for an expert opinion allows a witness to simply “parrot . . . out-of-

court testimonial statements directly to the jury in the guise of expert opinion [that] would

provide an end run around Crawford.” Allison, 2021 WL 5345133 at *12 (mem. op.)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61, 72

(2nd Cir. 2007)).

       However, was Detective Reed “parroting” the out-of-court statements? The State

argues that Detective Reed did not blindly “parrot” what someone told him, but reached a

conclusion after evaluating several descriptions and synthesizing the information.

Appellant argues that there was no such interpretation here, but rather wholesale repetition

of statements from the confidential informant and law enforcement personnel. We disagree.

       First, to analyze information is to “study or determine the nature and relationship of

the parts of something,” or “to subject to scientific or grammatical analysis.” Analyze,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/analyze

(last visited December 1, 2022). In this case, an expert conducted research in his particular

field in order to interpret the phrase “pull a Carlos.” Reed consulted with four people: one
                                                                                    ALLISON — 18

who did not know what the phrase meant, and three others that said the phrase meant to do

a shooting, to do a drive-by shooting, or “to take care of a witness.” 6 These responses were

not identical. After consulting with the sources, Detective Reed synthesized this

information and concluded that “pull a Carlos” meant to “do a shooting.” Reed did not

blindly recite what someone else told him, but rather investigated the meaning of the phrase

and only came to a conclusion after consulting a range of sources (including a source he

has known since 1998) to feel confident in his conclusion.

       Secondly, requiring a “proving up” of street slang would be an inquest into

perpetuity. For example, if Appellant were to call the confidential informant and Officers

Bethard and Reavis as witnesses, what would prevent Appellant from demanding those

witnesses produce the origins for their definition of the phrase? 7 Appellant’s request to

   6
       His testimony was, “It all boils down to basically doing a shooting. Now, I’ve gotten—it’s
either drive-by do a shooting, take care of a witness. It’s[sic] all comes around as shooting.”
     7
       It is worth noting that nothing in the record indicates that Appellant was prevented from
calling any additional out-of-court declarants. To the contrary, Hall Reavis, Investigator with the
District Attorney’s Office, did in fact testify. In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Reavis
testified that, in preparation for this case and the companion cases, he personally downloaded the
jail call at issue. During a trial prep conference with the trial prosecutor, Chris Bethard with the
Longview Police Department, came by the office. While the prosecutor and Reavis were
discussing the phrase ‘pull a Carlos,’ Bethard “out of the blue says, oh, that means to do a
shooting.”
Reavis then testified that while investigating an unrelated case, the same prosecutor and Reavis
were interviewing an inmate and Reavis asked the inmate if he ever heard of the phrase to pull a
Carlos. According to Reavis, the inmate immediately said the phrase meant to put a hit on a witness
or to shoot a witness to prevent someone from testifying. The State then made the name of the
inmate available to the defense and the trial court told defense counsel he could subpoena this
witness for trial. There is nothing in the record to indicate that this witness was unavailable.
As for Bethard, there is also nothing in the record to indicate that he was unavailable for defense
counsel to fully cross-examine. Bethard was listed as a State’s witness, but it does not appear he
                                                                               ALLISON — 19

cross-examine the primary and secondary witnesses to prove up a definition of a word

could extend to a tertiary level and beyond. How would the court determine a reasonable

limit for such an expedition? While we recognize the appellate court’s concern about using

an expert to “work around” the Confrontation Clause, it is judicially inefficient to require

a “proving up” of street slang. In the field of slang linguistics, it is most practical to gauge

the reliability of an expert opinion under a ‘soft’ science standard found in Nenno.

The Confrontation Clause

       Rule 703 and judicial economy aside, we now turn to whether Reed’s testimony was

a violation of Appellant’s right to confront witnesses. We hold that there was no

Confrontation Clause violation as his conclusion was non-testimonial and the jury heard

only the direct, in-court testimony of Detective Reed.

       In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment

confrontation right applies not only to in-court testimony, but also to out-of-court

statements that are testimonial in nature. 541 U.S. at 51. The Confrontation Clause forbids

the admission of testimonial hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the

defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id.

       The first step in a Confrontation Clause analysis is to determine whether the

statement at issue was testimonial or non-testimonial. In Crawford, the Supreme Court

drew a distinction between the two categories, although it did not explicitly define what is

was called by the State to testify at Appellant’s trial. However, the record before us does not
indicate that defense counsel was not able to confront Bethard due to unavailability.
                                                                               ALLISON — 20

considered testimonial and what is not. Id.; see Burch v. State, 401 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013) (“While the exact contours of what is testimonial continue to be defined

by the courts, such statements are formal and similar to trial testimony.”).

        The Crawford Court stated that “testimony” is “[a] solemn declaration or

affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Crawford, 541

U.S. at 51. According to the Supreme Court, an accuser making a formal statement to

government officials bears testimony in a sense that a person making a casual remark to an

acquaintance does not. Id. As examples of testimonial statements, the Crawford Court lists

affidavits, custodial examinations, depositions, prior testimony, confessions, or similar

pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used in a prosecution. The

Supreme Court also refers to statements that were made under circumstances leading an

objective witness to reasonably believe the statement would be available for use at a later

trial. Id. at 52.

        On the other hand, the Sixth Amendment does not bar the admission of non-

testimonial hearsay. Id. “An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and

thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to

the. . . abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted.” Id. at 51.

        Was the statement “[t]o conduct a shooting of some sort” testimonial in nature?

        In general, a statement is testimonial if a reasonable person would have understood

that law enforcement officers were conducting a criminal investigation and collecting
                                                                            ALLISON — 21

evidence for the purpose of prosecution. See Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 745 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006).

       Detective Reed testified that he was familiar with slang words due to his work in

the narcotics trade. He testified that if he ran across a slang term that he was not familiar

with, he would ask informants or sources what the term meant. Following this procedure

in the instant case, Reed asked four individuals if they were familiar with the phrase “pull

a Carlos.” Reed did not give a context for the phrase or otherwise tell his sources why he

was asking, nor is it apparent that any of the consultants were otherwise familiar with the

facts of this case. An informant that Reed has known since 1998 immediately told him

what the term meant. Likewise, a police officer and an investigator with the DA’s office

separately gave their interpretations of the term which were consistent with the meaning

given by the confidential informant. A fourth source did not know what the term meant.

       None of the four individuals, while speaking with Detective Reed, were told that

Reed was inquiring about the meaning of to “pull a Carlos” as part of an investigation.

Instead, it was likely that the sources believed the detective was simply trying to expand

his slang-term vocabulary by establishing the meaning of some phrase that he recently

heard. Nor did any of the four individuals have any expectation that his statement would

be of later use to accuse a defendant of a crime, as he spoke informally and without

coercion. A reasonable person would not expect that simply because a law enforcement

officer asks them the meaning of a certain phrase that that question was asked in order to

conduct a criminal investigation or collect evidence for purpose of prosecution.
                                                                             ALLISON — 22

       Accordingly, any definition of the term “pull a Carlos” that was relayed by the

confidential informant or law enforcement personnel to Detective Reed was a non-

testimonial statement. The rule in Crawford is therefore inapplicable because the

statements were not testimonial in nature. The trial court did not err in allowing Detective

Reed to testify as to the meaning of the phrase “pull a Carlos.”

       Did Detective Reed testify as to any out of court statements?

       As discussed above, Texas Rule of Evidence 703 allows an expert to base his or her

opinion on inadmissible hearsay. TEX. R. EVID. 703. This is because the testifying expert’s

opinion is not itself hearsay and the testifying expert is available for cross-examination. In

this case, Appellant had the opportunity to, and did in fact, cross-examine Detective Reed.

       Further, Detective Reed did not disclose the hearsay upon which his own opinion

was based. Detective Reed never testified before the jury as to what the confidential

informant and Officers Bethard and Reavis said specifically. Therefore, no out-of-court

statements were admitted at trial. Instead, the jury heard only the direct, in-court testimony

of Detective Reed that he spoke to some sources and then gave his own opinion of what

the phrase “pull a Carlos” meant. Accordingly, Detective Reed was the person “bearing

witness” against Appellant—not the people whom the Detective claimed made the original

statements. Because he was available for confrontation and cross-examination, the

requirements of the Confrontation Clause were satisfied.

Harm analysis
                                                                            ALLISON — 23

       Even if the trial court erred in allowing Officer Reed to testify as to the meaning of

the phrase “pull a Carlos,” Appellant was not harmed by its admission.

Standard of review

       We review constitutional error in the admission of testimonial statements in

violation of the Confrontation Clause under the standard specified in Rule 44.2(a) of the

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007); see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Constitutional error requires reversal of the judgment

“unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to

the conviction or punishment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).

       The following factors are relevant to our analysis: (1) the importance of the out-of-

court statement to the State’s case; (2) whether the out-of-court statement was cumulative

of other evidence; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting

the out-of-court statement on material points; and (4) the overall strength of the State’s

case. Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

       The emphasis of the harm analysis under Rule 44.2(a) is not on the propriety of the

outcome of the trial. Id. In other words, the question is not whether the jury’s verdict was

supported by evidence, but whether it is likely that the constitutional error was actually a

contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations. Id. That is, whether the error adversely

affected the integrity of the process that led to the conviction. Id.

       In analyzing harm, we may consider, in addition to the factors listed above and

without limitation, the source and nature of the error, the extent, if any, the error was
                                                                            ALLISON — 24

emphasized by the State, and how much weight the jury might have placed on the

erroneously admitted evidence compared to the remainder of the evidence as to the relevant

element or defensive issue. Id. We must ask whether there is a reasonable possibility that

the error moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion on a particular

issue. Id. Ultimately, we must be satisfied, to a level of confidence beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the error did not contribute to the conviction to conclude that the error was

harmless and affirm. Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690.

       A plurality of the court of appeals determined that the erroneous admission of

Officer Reed’s testimony was harmful constitutional error requiring reversal. Allison, 2021

WL 5345133 at *14. Justice Burgess’s concurrence would dispense with the harm analysis

in its totality since the State did not brief the issue. Id. at *18. The dissent, however,

conducted a harm analysis and would have held the admission of Detective Reed’s

statements harmless. Id. at *19.

       Error was harmless

       The meaning of the phrase “pull a Carlos” was offered during Detective Reed’s

testimony. Excluding Reed’s testimony, the State had a strong case against Appellant based

on the testimony of the complainant, Jose Jimenez, who gave a physical description of the

masked individual who robbed him, consistent with Appellant’s height, build, race, and

age. The State also put on the testimony of accomplice witness, R.J., who directly testified

to Appellant’s participation in the aggravated robbery and confirmed that Appellant was

the only robber who wore a mask. Further, it introduced and the recorded jail call between
                                                                              ALLISON — 25

Appellant and his accomplice, T.K. in which they discussed the charged aggravated

robbery offense in terms that implicated them to the offense (referred to the complainant

by his first name, discussed the complainant being shot in the head, etc.). This evidence

weighs heavily against a conclusion that Appellant was harmed by Detective Reed’s

testimony that the term “pull a Carlos” meant to conduct a shooting.

       The evidentiary value from Detective Reed’s testimony was slight as it related to an

extraneous offense. In fact, the State’s own witnesses, Detective Armando Juarezortega,

testified that the State did not have probable cause to link the second Clearwood house

shooting to a specific suspect. The trial court instructed the jury with a limiting instruction

and again in the jury charge that they could not consider this extraneous offense for any

purpose unless they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed

the second shooting at the Clearwater House. It is generally presumed that a jury follows

the trial court’s instructions. Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App.

1998). There is no evidence the jury did not follow the trial court’s instructions regarding

the extraneous offenses, so we presume the jury did follow the trial court’s instructions.

       Based on the foregoing, we are confident that the verdict was not attributable to

Detective Reed’s opinion as to what “pull a Carlos” meant. After carefully reviewing the

record, we hold that any error in the admission of Detective Reed’s opinion of the phrase

did not contribute to appellant’s conviction or punishment and was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a).

                                      CONCLUSION
                                                                           ALLISON — 26

       We find that under the less-rigorous ‘soft’ science standards, Detective Reed

properly offered expert witness testimony concerning the meaning of a term of gang slang.

We further find the Confrontation Clause was not implicated in this case for two additional

reasons. First, the out-of-court statements were non-testimonial in nature. Second, no out-

of-court statement was admitted at trial. Finally, we find that any error in admitting the

testimony was harmless. Because the court of appeals held otherwise, we reverse and

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Delivered: April 19, 2023

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