Court Opinion

ID: 9953497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 13:02:38.899643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:00.326547
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-1486
                   LT Case No. 2020-DR-369
                 _____________________________

MICHAEL REX VANDERHOOF,

    Appellant,

    v.

LAUREN BROOKE ARMSTRONG,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Nassau County.
Lester Bass, Judge.

Brian P. North, of Kenny Leigh & Associates, Fleming Island, for
Appellant.

Gary Baker, of Baker & Rhodes, Callahan, for Appellee.

                         March 22, 2024

EDWARDS, C.J.

     Appellant, Michael Vanderhoof (“Father”), appeals the trial
court’s order granting Appellee, Lauren Armstrong’s (“Mother”),
expedited temporary petition for parental relocation. Father
argues that the trial court erred in granting the petition because
(1) it made no findings, orally or in writing, regarding the
statutory factors; (2) the order is not supported by competent
substantial evidence; and (3) Mother’s petition was legally
insufficient. For the reasons stated below, we reverse.

                        Background Facts

     The parties, who resided in Nassau County, Florida, have
three young children in common. 1 Paternity and a timesharing
schedule were established by court order, with Mother having
majority time sharing on a 60/40 basis. The parties have both
spent almost their entire lives, and have extended family in the
North Florida/South Georgia area. While still living in that area,
Mother recently married. She and her new husband had a baby,
and the husband received orders from the U.S. Navy transferring
him to Cape Canaveral, Florida for a period of approximately two
years. Mother filed an expedited temporary petition for parental
relocation pursuant to section 61.13001, Florida Statutes (2022),
so that she could move to Cape Canaveral and take the parties’
children with her. 2 Father timely filed a written response and
objection to Mother’s petition.

     An evidentiary hearing was held during which Mother
testified that she wanted to move to Cape Canaveral so that she
could be with her new husband and new baby. During the
hearing, Mother offered no evidence in support of her petition’s

    1 The parties were not married. Father still resides in
Nassau County. At some point, Mother lived in Kingsland,
Georgia.
    2 Mother filed a “Petition to Relocate” on November 16,
2022.    On February 6, 2023, Mother filed her “Expedited
Temporary Motion to Relocate.” The substance of the two
documents in terms of allegations, relief sought, etc. is
substantially similar.   Although the order grants Mother’s
expedited temporary “petition” to relocate, it is apparent from the
record that it was the Expedited Temporary Motion to Relocate
that was considered and granted by the trial court. The
governing statute uses the term “petition” and unless otherwise
noted, our reference to the “petition” is to Mother’s “Expedited
Temporary Motion to Relocate.”

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conclusory allegation that the relocation would be “in the best
interest of the children.” Father’s evidence presented during the
hearing included his own testimony, and testimony from his
grandmother and one of his next-door neighbors. Through that
evidence, Father established that he was actively involved with
his children during their time with him, and that there was a
strong support system based on the extended family of both
parties in the North Florida/South Georgia area. He testified
that if the children were relocated to Cape Canaveral,
approximately three hours away by car, he would find it difficult
to maintain that relationship and the same level of involvement
with his children.

     Without orally announcing any findings, the trial court
simply orally granted Mother’s temporary motion. A written
order followed granting Mother’s expedited temporary petition to
relocate with the only finding being that Mother’s petition was
“filed in good faith and not for any ulterior motive.” The order
stated that Father would be entitled to exercise “meaningful
timesharing with the minor children” in accordance with the
Fourth Judicial Circuit’s Long Distance Guidelines.

                       Standard of Review

    “When reviewing an order on a petition to relocate, an
appellate court is limited to an abuse of discretion review based
on whether the statutory findings made by the trial court are
supported by competent, substantial evidence.”         Mignott v.
Mignott, 337 So. 3d 408, 410 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). However, the
question of whether the trial court properly applied the relocation
statute is reviewed de novo. Chalmers v. Chalmers, 259 So. 3d
878, 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

                             Analysis

    Section 61.13001 governs parental relocation of 50 miles or
more with minor children where there is a time-sharing order or
agreement in place. The process is commenced when the parent
seeking to move files a petition to relocate; all “pleadings must be
in accordance with this section.” § 61.13001(3), Fla. Stat. A

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temporary petition may be considered. 3 The statute provides
that there is no presumption for or against relocation. §
61.13001(7), Fla. Stat. In order to determine whether relocation
is in the best interests of the children, which is the overarching
requirement, that statute mandates that the trial court “shall
evaluate all” of the factors set forth in section 61.13001(7) in
reaching its decision on temporary or permanent relocation. 4 A

    3 See § 61.13001(6)(b):

        The court may grant a temporary order
        permitting the relocation of the child pending
        final hearing, if the court finds:

        1. That the petition to relocate was properly
        filed and is otherwise in compliance with
        subsection (3); and

        2. From an examination of the evidence
        presented at the preliminary hearing, that
        there is a likelihood that on final hearing the
        court will approve the relocation of the child,
        which findings must be supported by the same
        factual basis as would be necessary to support
        approving the relocation in a final judgment.

        (c) If the court has issued a temporary order
        authorizing a party seeking to relocate or move
        a child before a final judgment is rendered, the
        court may not give any weight to the temporary
        relocation as a factor in reaching its final
        decision.
    4 See § 61.13001(7):

        In reaching its decision regarding a proposed
        temporary or permanent relocation, the court
        shall evaluate all of the following:

        (a) The nature, quality, extent of involvement,
        and duration of the child's relationship with the
        parent or other person proposing to relocate

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with the child and with the nonrelocating
parent, other persons, siblings, half-siblings,
and other significant persons in the child's life.

(b) The age and developmental stage of the
child, the needs of the child, and the likely
impact the relocation will have on the child's
physical,    educational,   and     emotional
development, taking into consideration any
special needs of the child.

(c) The feasibility of preserving the relationship
between the nonrelocating parent or other
person and the child through substitute
arrangements that take into consideration the
logistics of contact, access, and time-sharing, as
well as the financial circumstances of the
parties; whether those factors are sufficient to
foster a continuing meaningful relationship
between the child and the nonrelocating parent
or other person; and the likelihood of
compliance with the substitute arrangements
by the relocating parent or other person once he
or she is out of the jurisdiction of the court.

(d) The child's preference, taking into
consideration the age and maturity of the child.

(e) Whether the relocation will enhance the
general quality of life for both the parent or
other person seeking the relocation and the
child, including, but not limited to, financial or
emotional benefits or educational opportunities.

(f) The reasons each parent or other person is
seeking or opposing the relocation.

(g) The current employment and economic
circumstances of each parent or other person
and whether the proposed relocation is
necessary    to   improve    the    economic

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trial court’s failure to make oral or written statutory findings
hampers appellate review. Mignott, 337 So. 3d at 410. However,
there is nothing in this statute that requires the trial court to
make specific findings. “Although findings of fact are always
helpful to reviewing courts, we will defer to the legislative intent
which we glean to be that they are not required here.” Hardwick
v. Hardwick, 710 So. 2d 124, 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 5 There is
nothing in the record before us to indicate that the trial court
considered any of the statutory factors other than that relocation
was sought in good faith, which is insufficient by itself to support
relocation.

         circumstances of the parent or other person
         seeking relocation of the child.

         (h) That the relocation is sought in good faith
         and the extent to which the objecting parent
         has fulfilled his or her financial obligations to
         the parent or other person seeking relocation,
         including child support, spousal support, and
         marital property and marital debt obligations.

         (i) The career and other opportunities available
         to the objecting parent or other person if the
         relocation occurs.

         (j) A history of substance abuse or domestic
         violence as defined in s. 741.28 or which meets
         the criteria of s. 39.806(1)(d) by either parent,
         including a consideration of the severity of such
         conduct and the failure or success of any
         attempts at rehabilitation.

         (k) Any other factor affecting the best interest
         of the child or as set forth in s. 61.13.
    5  The Fourth District in Hardwick considered an earlier
version of this statute. Since the publication of Hardwick, the
legislature has had ample time and opportunities to amend the
statute to require trial courts to make specific findings, but so far
it has not done so.

                                 6
     Furthermore, section 61.13001(8) places the burden on
Mother, in this case, of “proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that relocation is in the best interest of the child[ren].”
Here, Mother testified that the reason for relocation was so that
she, her new husband, and their new baby could all be together.
She offered no evidence as to how this move would be in the best
interests of the parties’ children where her testimony established
that she was leaving the extended family network in their
current life-long hometown for a city in which neither she nor her
husband had any family and she had no friends. 6 She had not
visited the Cape Canaveral area in many years, she did not know
where they would live, she did not know which school the
children would attend, and although she claimed to have
investigated local schools, during the hearing she could not name
a single school that she supposedly checked out.

     Mother failed to show that “the proposed relocation would
improve the children’s school, family or even home life.”
Fredman v. Fredman, 960 So. 2d 52, 60–61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
(citing Berrebbi v. Clarke, 870 So. 2d 172, 173 (Fla. 2d DCA
2004)). Her testimony basically established that the “move would
improve the home life for the Mother and her new husband,”
which is no substitute for proof that the relocation would be in
the children’s best interest. Id. at 61. Mother failed to offer proof
of any of the statutory factors set forth in section 61.13001(7).
Accordingly, we reverse because the trial court’s order is not
supported by competent, substantial evidence. 7

     Further, we agree with Father that Mother’s petition was
legally insufficient and did not provide a foundation upon which

    6  The trial court did not announce any “best interests”
findings.
    7  Given that Mother had not carried her burden of proof,
Father had no obligation to establish anything. Nevertheless, he
offered the evidence outlined above which could be seen to have
shown, inter alia, how the move would have harmed the then-
existing father-children relationship.

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the trial court should have proceeded. Section 61.13001(3)
requires the petition to comply with the pleading requirements of
the statute, including specifically “[a] proposal for the revised
postrelocation schedule for access and time-sharing together with
a proposal for the postrelocation transportation arrangements
necessary to effect time-sharing with the child[ren].” §
61.13001(3)(a)(6), Fla. Stat. Mother’s petition offered nothing
that could be recognized as a postrelocation proposal, as it said
only that the trial court should determine same. 8 Failure to
provide a proposed postrelocation plan as called for in the just-
cited subsection “renders the petition to relocate legally
insufficient.” Id. Given the legal insufficiency of Mother’s
petition, we find the trial court reversibly erred in granting same.

                            Conclusion

     Given the pleading deficits and lack of competent substantial
evidence discussed above, we reverse.         The order granting
Mother’s temporary petition for relocation is hereby vacated. In
this case, we do not remand for entry of an amended, more
detailed order because there was no competent, substantial
evidence that could support granting the temporary petition. We
remand solely for the trial court to enter an order denying
Mother’s temporary petition for parental relocation.

    REVERSED and REMANDED for trial court to enter order.

SOUD and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

    8  Additionally, several allegations set forth in Mother’s
petition were contradicted by her testimony at the evidentiary
hearing.

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