Court Opinion

ID: 9890836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 17:00:44.22097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:23.122241
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 23-1860
                                       __________

                                  BRIGITTE NELSON,
                                              Appellant

                                             v.

                       ACRE MORTGAGE & FINANCIAL INC;
                            CLASSIC QUALITY HOMES
                       ____________________________________

                    On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-17-cv-01050)
                   Magistrate Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
                     ____________________________________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                  October 13, 2023

                Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

                            (Opinion filed: October 16, 2023)

                                      ___________

                                       OPINION*
                                      ___________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

         Brigitte Nelson brought federal and state law claims against the defendants related

to a real estate transaction.1 Several of the claims went to jury trial, where she prevailed

on her breach-of-contract claim against Classic Quality Homes (“Classic”) but did not

obtain relief on her other state law claims against Classic or her claims against Acre

Mortgage & Financial, Inc. (“Acre”) under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Real

Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). She now appeals, broadly arguing, inter alia,

that she met her burden to show that both defendants violated TILA, RESPA, and

Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). But,

like most of her claims, that claim is unreviewable without the trial transcript, and her

other claims are meritless, so we will affirm.2

         An appellant must order, within 14 days of filing the notice of appeal, a transcript

of the parts of the District Court proceedings “not already on file as the appellant

considers necessary.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Our local rules also require an appellant

to order such a transcript, and they provide that an appellant who cannot afford the cost

of the transcript may move to have the transcript prepared at government expense

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 753(f). See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 11.1.

1
  As we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the procedural history,
including the earlier appeal (at C.A. No. 20-3126), and the facts of this case, we omit a
detailed description of the background.
2
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
                                             2
       Nelson, who paid the fees for filing and docketing this appeal, neither paid the

court reporter to produce that transcript nor moved for relief under § 753(f). And,

without the trial transcript, we cannot assess her claims that the evidence presented at

trial did not support the jury verdict; that defense counsel used “provocative language,”

Appellant’s Informal Brief at 9; and that an evidentiary decision about a polygraph test

was erroneous. See Morisch v. United States, 653 F.3d 522, 529-30 (7th Cir. 2011)

(discussing the inability to conduct “meaningful review” in the absence of a transcript).

Accordingly, we do not reach these claims.3 See id. (describing how the failure to order

the transcript can be grounds for forfeiture of a claim).

       Nelson’s other claims lack merit. She contends that the judgment entered in

Classic’s favor on the UTPCPL count (ECF No. 218) is inconsistent with the jury verdict

because she prevailed against Classic on her breach-of-contract claim. However, the

claims were separate, and the jury did not find in her favor on the UTPCPL claim.4 To

3
  Although the failure to order a transcript can be grounds for dismissal, see Fed R. App.
P. 3(a)(2), we will not dismiss this appeal. See Horner Equip. Int’l, Inc. v. Seascape Pool
Ctr., Inc., 884 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that “[d]ismissal of an appeal for
failure to comply with procedural rules is not favored”). Although we also could order
Nelson to supplement the record, see Fed. R. App. P. 10(e), we decline to do so because
she had an opportunity to address or correct the problem after the issue was raised in
Acre’s brief, and she took no action (she did not even discuss the matter in her reply
brief).
4
 The UTCPCL claim, which was slated for trial, see ECF No. 124, did not appear on the
verdict slip. But Nelson does not raise any issue related to that (and the other parties do
not discuss it), so we do not address it. See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna
Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the appellant forfeited
                                              3
the extent that Nelson challenges the District Court’s earlier decision to eliminate

recission from consideration by the jury as a possible remedy for a TILA or RESPA

violation, that challenge fails because the jury did not that such violations occurred.

       Nelson also contends that an admission pro hac vice of one of Acre’s attorneys,

Alexander Owens, was improper and undermines the validity of the verdict. However,

we discern no abuse of discretion, see United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 258 (3d

Cir. 1984), in Owens’ admission pro hac vice on a motion for admission using a

standardized form that included the necessary information, see M.D. Pa. Local Rule

83.8.2.1. Nelson’s claims relating to purported misconduct by attorneys in discovery, in

preparation for trial, and during jury deliberations (the last of which also implicated the

courtroom deputy and possibly implicated a member of the United States Marshals

Service), do not appear to have been raised in the District Court, so we have no rulings to

review.5

claims by failing to raise them in the opening brief). Even if the issue were before us, we
would be hard-pressed to determine what happened to that claim without the trial
transcript.
5
 If the issues were discussed and considered during the court of the trial proceedings, we
have no way of evaluating any decisions in the absence of the transcript.

                                              4
       In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgments.6 Nelson’s

requests for subpoenas, Appellant’s Informal Brief at 22-23, and for an opportunity to

submit a supplemental itemized list of damages, id. at 30, are denied.

6
  To the extent that Nelson makes arguments about her other state law claims or any other
earlier District Court rulings, they are either too fleetingly presented in her informal brief
or presented too late in her reply brief for our consideration. See United States v. Savage,
970 F.3d 217, 280 n.70 (3d Cir. 2020) (indicating that an appellant forfeits an issue if she
fails to raise it in his opening brief or makes only a passing reference to it in that brief).
In any event, as with many of her other claims, we would need the trial transcript to
consider any of her challenges to the jury verdict on the other state law claims.
Additionally, to the extent that Nelson challenges the District Court’s rejection of her
objection to the bill of costs as untimely filed, that ruling postdates her notice of appeal
and is not before us. And her arguments that the defendants are not entitled to costs are
misdirected. The bill of costs is not before us; it remains pending in the District Court.
                                                5