Court Opinion

ID: 9850532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:58:50.052904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:38.757615
License: Public Domain

Frankum, Presiding Judge,
dissenting as to Division 3. No Georgia case expressly passing upon the admissibility or probative value of testimony by a husband or wife as to non-access in a case where the issue is legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock has been called to the court’s attention, and none has been found by me. However, it appears to be the almost universal rule, though admittedly not without its exceptions, in other jurisdictions where this issue has been passed upon, that, where the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock is in issue, neither the husband nor the wife may testify as to non-access between them. See 10 AmJur2d 869, Bastards, § 33, nn. 11 & 12, and see Annotations, 60 ALR 381, 68 ALR 421, 89 ADR 912, 4 ALR2d 567, and Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217 (13 SE2d 224). As has been said, this rule rests on the broad ground of general public policy to protect the children born during the marriage as well as the parties, and it applies even though the husband is dead when the wife’s testimony as to non-access is offered. See Ray v. Ray, supra; Farley v. Farley, 138 W. Va. 598 (68 SE2d 353); Barr’s Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc., 220 S. C. 447 (68 SE2d 440). Under modem authorities the prohibition against the mother and her husband testifjdng is limited merely to testimony as to non-access. So, it has been held in some jurisdictions that the spouse may testify to independent facts and circumstances from which non-access and impossibility of parenthood may be inferred, and thus under this rule the wife may testify as to her illicit relations with another man. 10 AmJur 2d 870, Bastards, § 35. Obviously, such testimony alone is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy of any child where the possibility of access by the husband is not negatived. I think that the better rule is, however, that proof of non-access, if it is to be permitted at all, must come from independent sources and from the testimony of other persons who may show facts from which the impossibility of access may be inferred.
*800Though the point was not directly involved, the Supreme Court, on the second appearance of the Wright case (15 Ga. 160, at page 172), recognized the principle that the declarations of the wife and her husband would not be admissible in evidence to bastardize the issue. The court went on to say, however, that the wife and her husband being dead, such declarations were competent evidence so as to make an issue when considered with evidence of their other conduct as explanatory of their declarations. This court in the comparatively recent case of Colson v. Huber, 74 Ga. App. 339 (39 SE2d 539), clearly enunciated and applied the principle that a mother’s evidence could not be received to bastardize children born to her during lawful wedlock. That case is not direct authority, however, for the proposition now before us, because there the question was whether a void contract pleaded as the basis of the plaintiff’s action would support' it. This court rested its ruling there squarely on the proposition that good morals and public policy forbid that a woman be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of her children born in lawful wedlock, so as to furnish consideration for a contract, and that the legitimacy of her children is so conclusively presumed that she cannot rebut it and thereby secure to herself or to her children a cause of action based on a contrary assumption.
In Barr’s Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc., 220 S.C. 447, supra, the contest was between two classes of claimants under the South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act. That case more closely resembles on its facts the case before us than any I have found. In holding that the evidence of the mother of the minor claimant there involved could not be received to prove her to be the illegitimate daughter of the deceased employee where it appeared that at the time the child was conceived and born the mother was the wife of another man, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in an exhaustive and well reasoned opinion, clearly stated what I deem to be the law. I take the liberty of quoting at length from that opinion, at pages 462, 463, and 464:
“It seems now to be well established in most jurisdictions, that unless otherwise provided by statute, neither husband nor wife *801may testify as to non-access between them in any case where the question of the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is in issue. The evidence of non-access must come from third persons. 7 AmJur 640, § 21; Anno., 69 ASR 571; 126 ASR 261. In Jones on Evidence, Second Edition, Sec. 97 (96), page 102, the rule is stated as follows: ‘It is well settled on grounds of public policy, affecting the children born during the marriage, as well as the parties themselves, that the presumption of legitimacy as to children born in lawful wedlock cannot be rebutted by the testimony of the husband or the wife to the effect that sexual intercourse has or has not taken place between them; nor are the declarations of such husband and wife competent as bearing on the question. The rule not only excludes direct testimony concerning such intercourse, but all testimony of such husband or wife which has a tendency to prove or disprove legitimacy; for example, it was held incompetent to ask the husband, for the purpose of proving non-access, whether at a given time he did not live a hundred miles away from his wife and whether at that time he was not cohabiting with another person. Testimony of either party tending to show non-intercourse, or of any fact from which non-access may be inferred, or of any collateral facts connected with the main fact, should be scrupulously excluded, and if the illegitimacy is to be proved, it must be proved by other testimony. “The rule rests not only on the ground that it tends to prevent family dissension, but on broad grounds of public policy; hence it applies when at the time of the examination of the husband or wife the other spouse is dead. Nor is the rule affected by the provisions of the codes enlarging the competency of the witnesses; nor does it depend upon the form of action or the parties; on the contrary it obtains whatever the form of legal proceedings, or whoever may be the parties. . . While the rule prevents the wife from testifying that she has not had intercourse with her husband, it does not prevent the wife from testifying that another person than her husband has had or has not had connection with her.’ The rule and the reasons therefor are well stated in Mink v. State, 60 Wis. 583 (19 NW 445, 446, 50 AR 386), where the court said: ‘This rule is founded on the very highest grounds of public policy, decency, *802and morality. The presumption of the law is in such a case that the husband had access to the wife, and this presumption must be overcome by the clearest evidence that it was impossible for him, by reason of impotency or imbecility, or entire absence from the place where the wife was during such time, to have had access to the wife, or to be the father of the child.’ . . . The presumption of legitimacy, although rebuttable, is one of the strongest known to the law. 10 CJS 18, Bastards, § 3b. No child born in lawful wedlock can be decreed a bastard on any showing of circumstances which only create doubt and suspicion. Tarleton v. Thompson, 125 S.C. 182 (118 SE 421); State v. Shumpert, 1 S. C. 85; Kennington v. Catoe, 68 S. C. 470 (47 SE 719). As was stated by this court in Wilson v. Babb, 18 S. C. 59: ‘The true test is whether the husband of the woman who gives birth to the child is its father; and this must, of necessity, in every case, be a question of fact. Where the child is born after lawful wedlock, and after the lapse of the usual period of gestation, it should require a very strong state of circumstances to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, such as impossibility of access, absolute non-access, abandonment, or something equally as conclusive.’ And it was held in the foregoing case that the burden in such cases is cast upon the party impeaching legitimacy, and such issue may be proved by any competent testimony sufficient to satisfy the mind of the tribunal before whom the question is raised.”
I recognize, as does the majority opinion, that the question presented here is one of first impression in Georgia, and that to that extent this court is free to adopt whatever rule it deems best comports with the spirit of our law. I think that the majority have1 glossed over and virtually ignored the chief consideration which should control this decision. That consideration is the welfare and interest of the silent, non-testifying, parties to this controversy, the innocent children whose rights are here being adjudicated. It was not out of consideration for the marriage relation (as intimated by the majority opinion) so much as out of consideration to protect the rights of innocent children that the rule creating a strong almost conclusive presumption of legitimacy was first formulated by common law *803courts. It is out of a consideration of this policy of our law that I would adopt the reasoning and the results reached by the Supreme Court of our sister state of South Carolina on this question. I, therefore, would hold that since the only evidence adduced before the deputy director as to access between Dorothy Gibbons and Thomas Gibbons during the time when the minor children here involved were conceived was the testimony of their mother, that such evidence was incompetent and without probative value and insufficient to sustain the finding of the deputy director that Thomas Gibbons was not the father of the children. I would hold that Dorothy Gibbons could not testify as to the non-access of Thomas Gibbons, and since there was no other evidence offered relating to the lack of access, the presumption as to the legitimacy of the children was not overcome. Such a holding, to my mind, would be more in harmony with the previous pronouncements of the Georgia courts which I have cited than the rule adopted by the majority.
However, even if it be conceded that the rule enunciated by the majority is a sound one and one which this court should adopt, I do not think that the evidence which was adduced was sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy as to any particular one of the children born in McKeesport, Pa. This is so, because, as pointed out in the majority opinion, during the period of time that Dorothy Gibbons lived in McKeesport she bore three of the children who are now claimants. Thomas Gibbons visited her on at least two occasions and had sexual relations with her on the occasion of each of those visits. The dates of those visits and their relation to the time of conception or birth of the three children born in McKeesport are not shown by the evidence. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to authorize any court to say, as to any particular one of the children, that it was impossible that it could have been conceived by Thomas Gibbons. Perhaps this is a matter which could be cleared up by remanding the case to the board for the taking of additional testimony, but, as the record now stands, the evidence is wholly insufficient to authorize a finding that the presumption of legitimacy has been effectually rebutted as to any particular one of those children.
*804I am authorized to state that Jordan and Pannell, JJ., concur in this dissent.