Court Opinion

ID: 9446911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:21:05.509642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:49.503634
License: Public Domain

HAND, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
I agree that the judgment must be reversed, but I do not think that, if the evidence is the same on a new trial, the case should be submitted to a jury. Indeed, were it not for the decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry., 344 U.S. 48, 73 S.Ct. 125, 97 L.Ed. 77, I should have thought that we might remit the case to the District Court with an instruction to direct a verdict for the defendant in compliance with its motion at the close of the evidence. I should do this because it appears to me that the New York law does not impose any liability upon an innkeeper for personal maltreatment of a guest by one of his servants, unless the servant was acting within the scope of his authority, or unless the innkeeper had not used due diligence in selecting the servant, or in supervising his conduct.
The only decisions of the Court of Appeals that have dealt with this situation are DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 860 and Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647; in both of which the servant was a hotel detective who in the discharge of his duties charged a guest with using the room for immoral purposes. Each opinion cites with apparent approval Clancy v. Barker, 8 Cir., 131 F. 161, at page 163, 66 L.R.A. 653, in which the majority said of hotel servants, that it was “too well settled to require the citation of any authority that the master is not responsible ordinarily for the negligent acts of his servants, unless they are committed while the servant is rendering some service for or in behalf of the master.” In DeWolf v. Ford, supra, after a somewhat inconclusive discussion of a number of decisions, the opinion concluded as follows (193 N.Y. at page 408, 86 N.E. at page 532): “All these cases bear certain analogies to the case at bar, but none are authoritative, for the precise principle is not involved. They have been cited because these analogies indicate, if they do not determine, that the innkeeper is not a lonely exception to the rule of respondeat superior, when a guest is assaulted or injured under circumstances which would generally make other employers liable for acts of their servants.” In Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co. (supra), 228 N.Y. on page 109, 126 N.E. on page 649, the same court followed the doctrine I have just quoted, saying: “The defendant is liable for the act of his servant. The rule of respondeat superior is applicable. A master is civilly liable for all acts done by his servant in the prosecution of the business of the master entrusted to him.” In both cases the servant was acting within his authority, and the only question was whether the innkeeper was exempt because he had an exemption peculiar to his occupation. It is true that the courts did not expressly declare that he would not also be liable when the servant acted outside his authority, but I submit that if they had approved any such doctrine they would not have spoken of the situation as one governed by the law that makes other employers liable. Moreover, not only does it appear that they were thinking only of a possi*674ble limitation upon the customary liability, as appears in the phrase, “lonely exception” in DeWolf v. Ford, supra; but the defendant had argued for a broad immunity of all innkeepers from any liability whatever for personal injuries to their guests (193 N.Y. at page 400, 86 N.E. 527). Both decisions squarely assimilated the position of an innkeeper to that of any other employer.
In Stone v. William M. Eisen Co., 219 N.Y. 205, 114 N.E. 44, L.R.A.1918B, 291, the plaintiff was assaulted by an employee of the defendant to which she had applied “to treat her feet and prescribe for and to fit upon her certain braces or appliances for the care, cure, and correction of the defects and injuries to her feet.” The court held that from this relation “(d)ecent and respectful treatment is implied in the contract from the confidential relation of the parties, and especially because of the necessary exposure of the person of the patient” (219 N.Y. at page 208, 114 N.E. at page 45). The decision seems to me irrelevant to the liability of an innkeeper to his guest. Besides, the employee’s misconduct was while he was engaged in the business for which he had been employed. In Aaron v. Ward, 203 N.Y. 351, 96 N.E. 736, 38 L.R.A.,N.S., 204, the misconduct was by an employee who was acting in the discharge of his duties, even assuming, as seems probable, that the court meant to assimilate a “bathing establishment” to a hotel (203 N.Y. at page 355, 96 N.E. 736).
McKeon v. Manze, Sup.Ct.Erie Co., 157 N.Y.S. 623, and Schell v. Vergo, 166 Misc. 839, 4 N.Y.S.2d 644, did indeed concern assaults that appear to have been outside the servant’s authority, and the courts apparently supposed that they were following the doctrine of DeWolf v. Ford, supra, 193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 860. However, each was the decision of a single judge, who did not discuss whether the servant's act was, or was not, authorized; and I cannot think that they justify the conclusion that the law of New York has departed from the long existing doctrine, going back to Calye’s Case, 4 Coke 202, 206, that an innkeeper is not an “insurer” of the safety of the person of his guest against injury; but is responsible only for “the exercise of reasonable care for the safety, comfort, and entertainment of his visitor,” Clancy v. Barker, supra, 131 F. at page 163.
In the case at bar there can be no doubt, I should suppose, that it will appear on the new trial as it did on the first, that the bellboy’s conduct was plainly beyond the scope of his authority; and, if so, the plaintiff must rest her case upon the defendant’s failure to exercise care in his selection for service as a bellboy, or at least in its supervision of him.
I altogether agree with my brothers that in no event is there any justification for punitive damages.