Court Opinion

ID: 9907231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 23:06:02.866015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:42.240382
License: Public Domain

12/05/2023

                                           DA 23-0108
                                                                                           Case Number: DA 23-0108

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                           2023 MT 235

IN RE THE PARENTING OF L.R.,

ANTHONY REED,

               Petitioner and Appellant,

         v.

CATHERINE MARTIN,

               Respondent and Appellee.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DR-16-552
                       Honorable James B. Wheelis, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Clifford B. Irwin, Irwin Law Office, P.C., Missoula, Montana

                For Appellee:

                       Brandi R. Ries, Emily A. Lucas, Ries Law Group, P.C., Missoula, Montana

                                                    Submitted on Briefs: October 4, 2023

                                                               Decided: December 5, 2023

Filed:

                                 ' 4,--6%--‘f
                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Anthony Reed (Anthony) appeals from the January 10, 2023, Order on Motion to

Amend Parenting Plan issued by the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, denying

his motion to modify the parenting plan. We reverse and remand for action consistent with

this Opinion.

¶2     We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

       1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Anthony’s motion
       to amend parenting plan without holding a hearing?

       2. Whether the District Court erred in declining to order a parenting evaluation
       and/or appoint a Guardian Ad Litem?

                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3     This is the second appeal relating to the District Court’s establishment of a parenting

plan and the continuation of that plan over the last nearly 8 years. To provide some context

we restate the factual background of the first appeal:

       Anthony and Catherine had a tumultuous relationship. As a result of their
       relationship, they have one child, L.R., born in 2013. After the parties
       separated in December 2015, L.R. resided on a primary basis with Catherine
       and Anthony initially parented a few hours on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and then
       Sundays. In March 2016, Anthony’s parenting time expanded to Tuesday
       and Thursday overnights and weekends. In June 2016, Anthony advised
       Catherine since the parties were parenting L.R. on an equal basis, he would
       not pay her child support. He further advised he was willing to take L.R.
       more to help her out. Thereafter, the parties’ relationship became more
       contentious. Anthony filed a Petition for Establishment of Permanent
       Parenting Plan on July 22, 2016, and the parties maintained the parenting
       arrangement with Anthony parenting Tuesday and Thursday overnights and
       weekends until November 4, 2016. Following hearing on November 1, 2016,
       the District Court issued its Order Adopting Respondent’s Proposed
       Parenting Plan as Interim Parenting Plan on November 4, 2016. Following
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       the court’s denial of Anthony’s motions for Appointment of a Guardian Ad
       Litem, for Court-Ordered Parenting Evaluation, for Joint Evaluation of
       Parents, and to Disqualify Presiding Judge, the District Court held trial on
       November 27, 2017. The parties each testified in support of their respective
       positions, presenting wildly divergent perceptions of their relationship and
       parenting abilities. Post-trial, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact,
       Conclusions of Law, and Decree Establishing Permanent Parenting Plan
       which adopted Catherine’s proposed parenting plan—previously adopted by
       the court as the interim parenting plan—as the Final Parenting Plan.

In re the Parenting of L.R., 2018 MT 294N, ¶ 3. At the time of the first appeal, Anthony

sought a parenting evaluation and/or appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem. We observed

that, “While a guardian ad litem or parenting evaluation may assist the court, both are

discretionary[]” and affirmed the parenting plan issued by the District Court which limited

Anthony to supervised visitation with L.R. Despite affirming the parenting plan, we

recognized that the parenting plan failed to provide Anthony a means to progress beyond

supervised visitation and failed to address L.R.’s needs over time:

       Although we conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
       establishing the Final Parenting Plan, we recognize there will likely be a
       future request to amend the parenting plan as the current plan provides no
       viable means to progress beyond supervised visitation and does not address
       L.R.’s needs as he matures and grows. Upon initiation of a modification
       action, it would be prudent for the court to order a qualified individual, such
       as a clinical psychologist with experience in child development, parenting
       assessment, and domestic violence to conduct a parenting evaluation and
       make recommendations regarding amendment of the parenting plan to
       progress beyond supervised contact between Anthony and L.R. and provide
       for L.R.’s needs as he matures and grows. It may also be advisable to appoint
       a guardian ad litem to represent L.R.’s best interest.

¶4     Anthony filed a Motion to Amend the Parenting Plan on August 9, 2019, asserting

a change in L.R.’s circumstances such that amendment of the parenting plan was necessary

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to serve his best interests. At that time, although the District Court acknowledged it should

appoint a Guardian Ad Litem, it did not do so and instead indicated it intended “to wait at

least two more years” to consider amending the plan. The District Court determined

Anthony failed to meet the requirements of § 40-4-219(1), MCA (which requires a showing

of changed circumstances) and denied Anthony’s motion without holding an evidentiary

hearing. Anthony did not appeal the denial of his motion.

¶5     Given the District Court’s prior guidance that it would not consider issues related to

amending the parenting plan for two years, Anthony, out of an abundance of caution,

waited three years to again seek amendment of the parenting plan. On November 16, 2022,

Anthony filed a Motion to Amend Parenting Plan, Authorize a Parenting Evaluation, and

Appoint a Guardian Ad Litem. Citing In re S.W.B.S., 2019 MT 1, 394 Mont. 52, 432 P.3d

709, he asserted that as the District Court in its October 27, 2019, order set review of the

parenting plan upon the expiration of two years, he did not need to establish a change in

circumstances. He also asserted though that since the District Court’s last evidentiary

consideration leading to issuance of the original Final Parenting Plan, there had been a

change in L.R.’s circumstances and that amendment of the parenting plan was necessary

to serve L.R.’s best interests. Anthony asserted that since issuance of the Final Parenting

Plan a number of changes had occurred affecting L.R. in addition to the significant amount

of time which had passed since then—6 years. Anthony asserted his overall situation had

improved such that he was now in a position to be a stabilizing influence on L.R. as he

matures and grows. L.R. was 3 years old when the court ordered contact between Anthony
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and L.R. to be supervised. L.R. was 4 ½ years old when the current Final Parenting Plan

was issued. Since adoption of the Final Parenting Plan, Anthony applied for, was accepted

into, and graduated from law school; he passed the bar exam; and he was accepted into the

legal bar. He practiced law for a year at a Missoula law firm and then took a position as

an attorney with the public defender’s office in Missoula where he continues to work. He

has entered into a committed and loving relationship with Liz, an archaeologist who works

for the Bureau of Land Management. Given the constraints of his supervised contact with

L.R., L.R. has been precluded from enjoying a relationship with Liz, who, like L.R. is one

of the most important people in Anthony’s life. L.R. has also been precluded from enjoying

a relationship with his paternal grandparents. Anthony asserted it to be in L.R.’s best

interests to engage in and develop a relationship with his paternal grandparents and with

Liz. Throughout the last 6 years, L.R. has grown from a preschooler to an elementary

student. By virtue of his age, he is no longer completely dependent and his activities have

significantly expanded. L.R. is now independently engaging in school, sports, and other

extra-curricular activities. Anthony believes it is in L.R.’s best interests for Anthony to be

able to participate with L.R. in school, sports, and extra-curricular activities. Anthony

asserts research has shown interaction with an engaged father benefits young boys as they

mature and grow and he asserts it is in L.R.’s best interests for Anthony to be more engaged

than merely having supervised contact with L.R. Both Anthony and L.R. have each been

engaging in independent therapy. As a result of his participation in therapy, Anthony

asserts he has a better understanding of himself and his interactions which he believes, in
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turn, is a benefit to L.R. and thus affects his best interests. He also believes it would be in

L.R.’s best interests for Anthony to be able to engage with L.R.’s therapist to provide the

therapist with a fuller understanding of the history and relationship of the parties to better

assist the therapist in working with L.R. Anthony asserts L.R. has expressed desire to

interact with Anthony at his home and in the community—doing activities such as

camping, hiking, biking, and skiing—such that now he believes supervised contact is

unhealthy for L.R. as it reinforces the unwarranted impression that Anthony is a

“second-class parent” and deprives L.R. of experiencing the fullness of a kind, loving, and

safe relationship with his father. Finally, Anthony also asserts Appellee, Catherine Martin

(Martin), over the years since adoption of the Final Parenting Plan, has engaged in parent

alienation continually undermining Anthony’s relationship with L.R. which is not in L.R.’s

best interest.

¶6     Martin objected to amendment of the parenting plan, asserting Anthony did not

establish a change in circumstances as required by § 40-4-219, MCA. Although she did

not contradict the changes asserted by Anthony, she characterizes them as changes in

Anthony’s circumstances and not changes in L.R.’s circumstances. The District Court

agreed with Martin and on January 10, 2023, again denied Anthony’s motion to amend the

parenting plan without holding a hearing. Anthony appeals.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7     We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for a clear abuse of

discretion. State v. Terronez, 2017 MT 296, ¶ 19, 389 Mont. 421, 406 P.3d 947 (citing

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State v. Schulke, 2005 MT 77, ¶ 10, 326 Mont. 390, 109 P.3d 744). We review the

underlying findings in support of a district court’s decision to modify a parenting plan

under the clearly erroneous standard. Guffin v. Plaisted-Harman, 2010 MT 100, ¶ 20, 356

Mont. 218, 232 P.3d 888. We review a district court’s conclusions of law to determine if

they are correct. In re the Parenting of C.J., 2016 MT 93, ¶ 12, 383 Mont. 197, 369 P.3d

1028. A district court has broad discretion when considering the parenting of a child, and

we must presume that the court carefully considered the evidence and made the correct

decision. C.J., ¶ 13 (citation omitted). Accordingly, absent clearly erroneous findings, we

will not disturb a district court’s decision regarding parenting plans unless there is a clear

abuse of discretion. C.J., ¶ 13.

                                       DISCUSSION

¶8     1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Anthony’s motion
       to amend parenting plan without holding a hearing?

¶9     A district court may, in its discretion, “amend a prior parenting plan if it finds, upon

the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior plan or that were unknown to the court at

the time of entry of the prior plan, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the

child and that the amendment is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.” Section

40-4-219, MCA. Upon a parent filing an affidavit in support of a requested amendment

and receiving an opposing affidavit, if any, the court shall set a hearing on the request for

amendment if the court finds that adequate cause is established by the affidavits based on

the best interests of the children. Section 40-4-220, MCA.

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¶10    Martin asserts the only change in L.R.’s circumstances is mere aging and, citing In

re D’Alton, 2009 MT 184, ¶ 11, 351 Mont. 51, 209 P.3d 251, that this Court has determined

that the mere aging of a child is not a basis for modification of a parenting plan. She further

asserts the changed circumstances detailed by Anthony are changes in his circumstances,

not those of L.R.

¶11    Martin mischaracterizes our holding in D’Alton. In D’Alton, the district court issued

a dissolution decree and a parenting plan in which the parties shared parenting of their

children on a 70/30 basis.       Father sought modification seeking a 50/50 parenting

arrangement, asserting the children’s changed circumstances were that both children were

now in school and the children’s nanny was terminated. We affirmed the district court’s

conclusion that father had not established the initial threshold criteria required by

§ 40-4-219, MCA, as “the mere aging of children so that they are now in school could

hardly be considered ‘unknown to the court at the time of entry of the prior plan’ as required

by § 40-4-219(1), MCA.” D’Alton, ¶ 11. We affirmed the district court’s finding father

did not establish that modification was required to serve the children’s best interests. We

did not blanketly hold that aging of a child can never be considered in determining whether

there have been changes in the circumstances of the child and that amendment is necessary

to serve the best interests of the child. In fact, we have previously recognized that “a child

may undergo significant developmental changes as he grows and matures, and those

developmental changes may result in a substantial change in the child’s circumstances.

“When parents have not previously decided that periodic review is in their child’s best
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interest, a court must consider whether those developmental changes resulted in a change

in the child’s circumstances under § 40-4-219(1), MCA.” In re S.W.B.S., ¶ 15. D’Alton is

significantly different than the case at hand. In D’Alton, under the existing parenting plan,

both parents enjoyed unsupervised parenting time with their children in their own homes.

There was no assertion that father had improved his/her employment or stability in the

community which would have any impact on the children. There was no assertion that the

children’s relationships with father were being compromised to their detriment by the

existing parenting plan.      There was no assertion the children were being denied

relationships to their detriment with their extended family or individuals of significance to

father. There were no allegations that father was precluded by the current parenting plan

from engaging in school, sport, or extra-curricular activities with the children to their

detriment or that the children desired the requested amendment. Whether a parent is able

to establish the initial threshold criteria for the court to order a show cause hearing pursuant

to § 40-4-220, MCA, depends on the facts and circumstances alleged and how they are

purported to affect a child’s best interests.

¶12    Here, although there is not an evidentiary record, the vast majority of the changes

asserted by Anthony are not contested. Martin ignores the significant developmental

changes L.R. has experienced in growing from a toddler to a 10-year-old and the way in

which those developmental changes have resulted in a substantial change in his

circumstances. Further, we have recognized that changes in a parent’s circumstances may

constitute a change in the circumstances of the child See, Sian v. Kooyer, 2010 MT 178,
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357 MT 215, 239 P.3d 121 (a change of circumstances was found when father became

disabled, moved out of state, and lost his employment); In re Marriage of Clay, 2007 MT

228, 339 Mont. 147, 168 P.3d 665 (changes in circumstance established by mother moving

and having to drive 90 miles each way to deliver the children to and from school and

households and father intending to move in with his significant other); In re Marriage of

Carter, 2003 MT 19, 314 Mont. 84, 63 P.3d 1124 (mother moved out of state). From the

allegations asserted by Anthony and not contested by Martin, together with the District

Court and this Court’s prior recognitions that the parenting plan provided no means to

progress beyond supervised visitation and did not provide for L.R.’s needs as he matures

and grows, it is apparent Anthony met his burden under § 40-4-219(1), MCA, that a change

of circumstances of the child has occurred and the District Court’s failure to hold a hearing

and finding otherwise was clearly erroneous.

¶13    The remote discord experienced between the parties does not support that L.R.

should forever be deprived of an unsupervised relationship between himself and his father.

Nor does it warrant denying L.R. a relationship with his paternal grandparents and other

relatives and significant individuals in Anthony’s life. Anthony has consistently exercised

the minimal parenting he has been allowed and has continually sought to take on more

parenting responsibilities. There is no history whatsoever of Anthony physically harming

L.R., yet L.R. has been deprived the opportunity to engage in activities and experience the

world on a day-to-day basis with his father. As we noted in In re L.R. I, the current

parenting plan “provides no viable means to progress beyond supervised visitation and
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does not address L.R.’s needs as he matures and grows.” Having established a change in

L.R.’s circumstances, it is imperative the District Court hold a hearing to consider

amendment of the parenting plan in L.R.’s best interests which provides for—through

periodic review or otherwise—his needs as he matures and grows.

¶14    2. Whether the District Court erred in declining to order a parenting evaluation or
       appoint a Guardian Ad Litem?

¶15    In the alternative to his Motion to Amend Parenting Plan, Anthony brought a motion

to authorize a parenting evaluation by a licensed clinical psychologist and/or appoint a

Guardian Ad Litem at Anthony’s expense. As we have concluded the District Court must

hold a hearing to consider amendment of the parenting plan in L.R.’s best interests, it is

not necessary for us to determine whether the District Court erred in not ordering a

parenting evaluation and/or appointing a Guardian Ad Litem. We do, however, recognize

that we are remanding to the District Court to hold a hearing to consider amendment of the

parenting plan in L.R.’s best interests. As such, and in light of the unusually contentious

history between the parties and the length of time L.R. and Anthony have endured

supervised contact, it does appear appropriate for the District Court to, at a minimum, order

a parenting evaluation to assist the court in determining L.R.’s best interests and, if the

District Court finds it appropriate, appoint a Guardian Ad Litem.

                                     CONCLUSION

¶16    Anthony met his burden under § 40-4-219(1), MCA, that a change of circumstances

of the child has occurred and the District Court’s failure to hold a hearing and finding

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otherwise was clearly erroneous. The motion, when considered in light of the supporting

affidavit and Martin’s response thereto, established a change in L.R.’s circumstances such

that it is imperative the District Court hold a hearing to consider amendment to the

parenting plan in L.R.’s best interests, which provides for—through periodic review or

otherwise—his needs as he matures and grows. At a minimum, to assist in this, the District

Court should order a parenting evaluation and, if the District Court deems necessary,

appoint a Guardian Ad Litem as well.

¶17    Reversed and remanded for action consistent with this Opinion.1

                                                     /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur:

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

1
  Anthony’s Opening Brief contains a subheading entitled “Motion for Substitution of District
Court Judge” where he asserts the District Court judge is biased and prejudiced against him and
he seeks to substitute the judge who has presided over this matter. We note that the district court
judge who has presided over this cause has retired and will not continue as the presiding judge.
As such, we need not address this issue further.

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