Court Opinion

ID: 9749552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:50:17.753803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:51.696477
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Cohen:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . .” In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that “the right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is a fundamental right and hence must be recognized by the States as part of their obligation to extend due process of law to all persons within their jurisdiction.” The majority recognizes these principles but finds that four factors inhere in the juvenile system which “render the right to a trial by jury less essential to the protection of an accused’s rights . . . than in the normal criminal process, and therefore not so ‘fundamental’ as to be constitutionally required.” These elements are (1) the different view of their role taken by judges in the juvenile courts as opposed to their counterparts in the criminal courts, (2) the availability to and the utilization by the juvenile system of various diagnostic and rehabilitative services, (3) the different end result of a declaration of delinquency compared with a finding of criminal guilt, and (4) the disruption of the unique nature of the juve*352nile process (that would result from the introduction of jury trials.
The majority apparently believes that the existence of these factors means that the due process of law is not denied juveniles when they are denied a jury trial and thus that the juvenile court system is an exception to the general rule enunciated in Duncan. First, I cannot agree with the majority that footnote 14 in Duncan or anything else in the opinion represents a restriction on the absolutism of its holding. In that footnote, 391 IT.®, at 149-50, the Court stated that incorporation was proper whenever “given this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental—whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.” The Court then stated that it could easily imagine a fair and equitable criminal system that used no juries and remarked that such a system “would make use of alternative guarantees and protections which would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the English and American systems.” That statement in no sense narrows the holding in Duncan; if anything, it amplifies it by emphasizing the role the jury plays in the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. Duncan clearly stands for the proposition that the due process of law requires that the states provide jury trials in all serious criminal cases.
Having determined that nothing in the Duncan opinion itself detracts from the absolutism of its holding, it is necessary to examine the four elements the majority believes distinguish the juvenile system from the criminal court system to see if they are legally and/or constitutionally relevant. The majority itself states that it does not rely heavily on the first factor (the view of their role taken by juvenile court judges), and the United States Supreme- Court, in the recent case of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the *353constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding), stated, 397 U.S. at 365-66, “[w]e made clear in that decision [Gault] that civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts. . .
As to the availability to and utilization by the juvenile system of various diagnostic and rehabilitative services (factor 2), this seems relevant to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process rather than to the adjudicative stage. Certainly the process by which one is adjudged a delinquent has little to do with the understanding and sympathetic treatment the juvenile system is capable of giving through correctional, rehabilitative and instructional attention. What is done with an individual after it is determined he is a delinquent is a very different problem from that concerning the process by which it is decided that he is a delinquent.
The majority’s third element is the different end result of a declaration of delinquency compared to a finding of criminal guilt. This includes no public record of the adjudication, the inadmissibility of the results in subsequent legal proceedings, the nonimposition of the disabilities which follow a criminal conviction, and the fact that institutions for juveniles are “something less than jails.” In WinsMp, however, the United States Supreme Court stated, 397 U.S. at 365: “We do not find convincing the contrary arguments of the New York Court of Appeals, (¡fault rendered untenable much of the reasoning relied upon by that court to sustain the constitutionality of §744(b). The Court of Appeals indicated that a delinquency adjudication ‘is not a “conviction” (§781) ; that it affects no right or privilege, including the right to hold public office or to obtain a license (§782); and a cloak of protective *354confidentiality is thrown around all the proceedings (§§783-784).’” In light of this, I feel that the third element is constitutionally irrelevant.
The final element is the disruption of the unique nature of the juvenile process which would allegedly occur with the introduction of trial by jury. There seems little doubt that the introduction of jury trials would necessitate the judge’s concerning himself with the technicalities of proper procedure to a greater extent than required now and would reduce somewhat the flexibility and informality of the hearing. It would seem, however, that the beneficial aspects of the juvenile system result not from the adjudicatory stage but rather from the pre- and post-adjudicative stages in. which, hopefully, some rehabilitation can be accomplished. It is difficult to see how the informality or flexibility of the hearing can have much effect on molding the juvenile’s outlook so that his conduct will be in conformity with the rules society has established. Informality and flexibility are not ends in themselves : the purpose of the adjudicatory stage is to determine whether the defendant is a delinquent, and as some loss of informality and flexibility will not have a great effect on whatever rehabilitation the juvenile system can accomplish, I do not see an alteration of the “traditional character of juvenile proceedings” as so weighty a factor as to render the right to a jury trial less fundamental in the juvenile system than in the ordinary criminal process.
Therefore, I do not feel that the elements on which the majority relies are of such relevance and validity as to distinguish the juvenile system from the criminal court system and thus malee the broad holding of Bun-can inapplicable.
Courts today appear to be of two minds with respect to the rights of juveniles. The United States *355Supreme Court decisions in Gault and Winship make clear that the essentials of due process and fair treatment must be applied to the adjudicatory stage of delinquency proceedings, but in Winship the Court was careful to point out that its holding would not destroy the beneficial aspects of the juvenile process. Thus, due process and parens patriae have come into direct conflict. Such conflict can be seen in the decisions of this Court. For example, the majority opinion in Wilson Appeal, 438 Pa. 425, 264 A. 2d 614 (1970), emphasizes constitutional requirements while the tone of the majority opinion in this action reflects the feeling that juveniles and tire juvenile court system are somehow different and special and that the beneficial aspects of the juvenile process will be destroyed by the application of too many of the rights given adults. The trend of the United States Supreme Court decisions, however, appears to be away from parens patriae in the adjudicatory stage, and the right to trial by jury is an essential part of the adjudicatory process. I do not see valid reasons why Duncan should not apply to the juvenile court system.
Finally, as the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in In re Burrus, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970), in which it will face the issue presently before us, we should not have filed the opinions in this action until the Bwrrus opinion is filed. We, of course, will be bound by its decision, and, as we have waited this long for this difficult issue to be resolved, we should wait until the matter is finally settled. Once the Bwrrus opinion is filed, our opinion in this action will be of no consequence, and it is a futile effort for us to deal with this issue at this time.
I dissent.