Court Opinion

ID: 9638900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:57:49.338186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:10.547441
License: Public Domain

TURNAGE, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the language used in the special disability rider is ambiguous requiring the question of the meaning of the exclusion to be submitted to a jury.
The majority opinion clearly illustrates that the finding of ambiguity springs from the evidence rather than from the language employed. This is manifest from the majority’s statement that “(i)f there be any uncertainty under the evidence produced by appellant as to whether cancer is a disease of the lung, then appellant was entitled to have the jury resolve that question.” The majority also states “(a)t a minimum, the evidence demonstrated that under the circumstances of this case, the policy term ‘diseases of the lungs’ could be construed in more than one way when policy coverage is in issue.” Finally, the majority concludes by stating “(t)aking as we must for review of the directed verdict appellant’s favorable evidence and inferences, it is apparent the facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate that the language of the special disability rider is reasonably subject to more than one interpretation.”
It is well settled that ambiguity, such that should be submitted to a jury for determination of its meaning, must be found from the language used and not from extrinsic evidence. This was stated in J.E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club, 491 S.W.2d 261, 264[1-4] (Mo. banc 1973):
A court will not resort to construction where the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language for there is nothing to construe. Mickelberry’s Food Products Co. v. Haeussermann, Mo.Sup., 247 S.W.2d 731[5]. It is only where the contract is ambiguous and not clear that resort to extrinsic evidence is proper to resolve the ambiguity.
The court also stated that “where there is no ambiguity in a contract the intention of the parties is to be gathered from it and it alone, and it becomes the duty of the court and not the jury to state its clear meaning.” Id. at 264[1 — 4]. The court added that a contract is not rendered ambiguous by the fact that the parties do not agree upon its meaning. A contract is ambiguous only when it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions. Id. at 264[5-8].
Applying these rules to the facts in this case it is clear that ambiguity must be found within the words “or any disease of the lungs.” This determination is to be made from the language used and not with reference to testimony adduced in the case. No one suggests in what way the language “or any disease of the lungs” is ambiguous or susceptible of different constructions. The language is straightforward and clearly means that the policy excludes payment for expense incurred for any loss caused by any disease of the lungs. No one contends that cancer is not a disease and it is conceded that in this case the cancer was located in the lung. Therefore, the only question to be resolved is whether or not cancer of the lung is a disease of the lung. The answer is obvious.
I would hold that the language in the special disability rider is plain and unambiguous and for that reason the court cor*681rectly directed a verdict because cancer of the lung clearly falls within the exception.