Court Opinion

ID: 9961199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 13:00:49.446097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:26.695483
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LANCE MCDERMOTT,                                DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                          SF-0353-21-0159-I-1

             v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: April 17, 2024
              Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Lance McDermott , Seattle, Washington, pro se.

      Steven Bruce Schwartzman , Esquire, Seattle, Washington, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed this restoration appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant
petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision
contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an
erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                  2

the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as
expressly MODIFIED to find that the appellant failed to establish jurisdiction
over a second restoration claim, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      In September 2020, the appellant filed an appeal, which the administrative
judge construed as a claim that his December 2019 disability retirement was
involuntary.     McDermott     v.   U.S.   Postal   Service,   MSPB   Docket   No.
SF-0752-20-0705-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0705 IAF), Tabs 1-2.                 The
administrative judge would ultimately dismiss that appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
0705 IAF, Tab 32, Initial Decision (0705 ID). However, while adjudicating the
involuntary disability retirement appeal, the administrative judge recognized that
the appellant also presented allegations of a denied request for restoration.
0705 IAF, Tab 17 at 3. Therefore, she informed him that he could file a separate
restoration appeal if he wished. Id.
      In January 2021, the appellant filed the instant restoration appeal.
McDermott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. SF-0353-21-0159-I-1,
Initial Appeal File (0159 IAF), Tab 1. The following facts, as further detailed
throughout the records in the appellant’s involuntary disability retirement appeal
and this restoration appeal, appear to be undisputed.
      The appellant was previously employed as a Maintenance Technician, but
he had a history of injuries that interfered with his work. E.g., 0705 IAF, Tab 9
                                                                                 3

at 46-47; 0159 IAF, Tab 6 at 33. This included an April 2019 rotator cuff tear
and an older back injury. 0705 IAF, Tab 5 at 130, Tab 9 at 27; 0159 IAF, Tab 6
at 33.
         In May 2019, the appellant applied for disability retirement. 0705 IAF,
Tab 8 at 9-12, Tab 9 at 49. In October 2019, the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) notified the appellant and the agency that the disability retirement
application had been approved. 0705 IAF, Tab 8 at 13-15. Among other things,
this approval letter indicated that the agency should separate the appellant from
service to facilitate the start of interim retirement payments. Id.
         Despite OPM’s instruction, the agency did not immediately separate the
appellant. Instead, in the earliest days of December 2019, the agency searched,
without success, for limited duty work suitable for his restrictions. 0705 IAF,
Tab 12 at 38; 0159 IAF, Tab 6 at 47. Just days later, the appellant obtained
updated medical restrictions, 0705 IAF, Tab 5 at 122; 0159 IAF, Tab 11 at 28,
which led to the agency reversing course and offering him a limited-duty
position, 0705 IAF, Tab 9 at 36; 0159 IAF, Tab 9 at 9. Evidence submitted with
the instant appeal indicates that the position involved helping customers with his
left hand only; it did not require that the appellant do any pushing, pulling,
reaching, or lifting with his injured right arm. 0159 IAF, Tab 11 at 41.
         The appellant rejected the agency’s limited-duty position on or around
December 10, 2019, claiming it was “demeaning work” involving “heavy
packages.” 0705 IAF, Tab 9 at 36; 0159 IAF, Tab 9 at 9. The appellant also
indicated that he was rejecting the position because it was not his “regular job
position.”    0159 IAF, Tab 11 at 41.        In a subsequent Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs (OWCP) decision, the Department of Labor denied the
appellant’s request for compensation for the period that followed the
December 10, 2019 limited-duty offer.        0159 IAF, Tab 7 at 32-33, Tab 10
at 18-19. OWCP determined that the offered position would have appropriately
accommodated his limitation. 0159 IAF, Tab 7 at 32-33, Tab 10 at 18-19.
                                                                                   4

      On December 18, 2019, the agency processed the appellant’s separation by
disability retirement, identifying December 10, 2019, as his last day in pay status.
0705 IAF, Tab 8 at 17. As mentioned above, the appellant filed an appeal that
was construed as an involuntary disability retirement appeal and adjudicated
accordingly. His denied restoration allegations were separately docketed as the
instant restoration appeal.
      After developing the record, the administrative judge dismissed this
restoration appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 0159 IAF, Tab 23, Initial Decision
(0159 ID) at 1. The appellant has filed a petition for review. McDermott v. U.S.
Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. SF-0353-21-0159-I-1, Petition for Review
(0159 PFR) File, Tab 1.

The appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over his claim that the agency
improperly denied him restoration as a partially recovered individual in December
2019.
      The Board has jurisdiction to review whether an agency’s denial of
restoration to a partially recovered employee was arbitrary and capricious. Clark
v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 5 (2016), aff’d per curiam, 679 F.
App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and overruled on other grounds by Cronin v. U.S.
Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20 n.11; 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c). To establish
jurisdiction and obtain a hearing on the merits, an appellant is required to make
nonfrivolous allegations that: (1) he was absent from his position due to a
compensable injury; (2) he recovered sufficiently to return to duty on a part-time
basis, or to return to work in a position with less demanding physical
requirements than those previously required of him; (3) the agency denied his
request for restoration; and (4) the agency’s denial was arbitrary and capricious.
Clark, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 5.
      The administrative judge applied this standard and found that the appellant
failed to present nonfrivolous allegations pertaining to the third element—that the
agency denied his request for restoration. 0159 ID at 9-11. Among other things,
                                                                                    5

she explained that the agency offered him a limited-duty position at the time, and
OWCP deemed the offer suitable, notwithstanding the appellant’s decision to
reject the offer. Id.; see Bynum v. U.S. Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 403, ¶ 23
(2009) (recognizing that decisions on the suitability of an offered position are
within the exclusive domain of OWCP, and it is that agency, not the employing
agency and not the Board, which possesses the requisite expertise to evaluate
whether a position is suitable in light of that employee’s particular medical
condition), aff’d, 382 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
         On review, the appellant seems to argue that, although the agency did offer
him this limited-duty position in December 2019, the offer was improper because
it was not related to his past position and it was a meaningless “make work”
position. 0159 PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-9, 21, 30. However, unlike a fully recovered
employee, a partially recovered employee has no right to be restored to his former
position or an equivalent one. Hall v. Department of the Navy, 94 M.S.P.R. 262,
¶ 21 (2003). Plus, the appellant’s assertion that the limited-duty position was a
“make work” job is both conclusory and of no apparent relevance to his
jurisdictional    burden.      See   generally   Chen    v.   U.S.   Postal   Service,
114 M.S.P.R. 292, ¶ 10 (2010) (stating that “it is axiomatic that an agency must
determine what work is necessary and available to accomplish its mission”).
         The appellant also seems to assert that the administrative judge should have
applied the standards for a fully recovered individual to this claim, rather than the
standards for a partially recovered individual. 0159 PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. Yet we
found no substantive allegation that the appellant fully recovered from his
compensable injuries by the time of the agency’s December 2019 limited duty
offer.     See 5 C.F.R. § 353.102 (providing that “[f]ully recovered means
compensation payments have been terminated on the basis that the employee is
able to perform all the duties of the position he or she left or an equivalent one”).
To the contrary, throughout the remainder of his petition, the appellant repeatedly
                                                                                    6

describes himself as having “permanent” restrictions. E.g., 0159 PFR File, Tab 1
at 8, 11, 20.
      To the extent that any of the other arguments in the appellant’s petition for
review implicate this restoration claim, they are similarly unavailing.          The
appellant failed to present the requisite nonfrivolous allegations regarding at least
one element of his jurisdictional burden concerning the events of December 2019
—that the agency denied his request for restoration.           Instead, the record
unambiguously shows that the agency offered the appellant a limited-duty
position in December 2019, 0159 IAF, Tab 9 at 9, Tab 11 at 41, which the OWCP
found suitable, 0159 IAF, Tab 7 at 32, but the appellant rejected the offer for
reasons that included his own determination that the work was “demeaning,”
0159 IAF, Tab 9 at 9, Tab 11 at 41. Therefore, the administrative judge properly
dismissed this restoration claim for lack of jurisdiction. See Ballesteros v. U.S.
Postal Service, 88 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶¶ 7-12 (2001) (finding that the agency did not
deny the appellant restoration when it made a valid restoration job offer and the
appellant rejected it).

The appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over his claim that the agency
improperly denied him restoration as a fully recovered individual in July 2020.
      Like his petition for review, the appellant’s initial pleadings contained
extensive allegations, many of which pertain to other appeals or irrelevant
matters.   0159 IAF, Tabs 1, 6-7, 10-11.      During a prehearing conference, the
administrative judge attempted to clarify the limited issues to be addressed in this
appeal.    In her prehearing conference summary, she first recognized the
December 2019 restoration claim discussed above. 0159 IAF, Tab 12 at 1. Next,
the administrative judge indicated that the appellant was also alleging that the
agency improperly denied him restoration as a fully recovered individual in
July 2020. However, the initial decision contains no mention of this latter claim.
0159 ID.        To the extent that the appellant did intend to pursue this second
                                                                                 7

restoration claim—that the agency improperly denied him restoration as a fully
recovered individual in July 2020—we modify the initial decision as follows.
      Specific to his July 2020 restoration claim, the prehearing conference
summary noted that the appellant had referred to evidence that was not in the
record. 0159 IAF, Tab 12 at 1. Therefore, the administrative judge ordered the
appellant to submit that evidence—a “July 2020 OWCP letter” and “any response
from the agency to the purported July 2020 request for restoration.” Id. at 2-3.
More broadly, she instructed the appellant to meet his jurisdictional burden. Id.
Among other things, the administrative judge explained that his jurisdictional
burden for this claim included nonfrivolous allegations that the appellant had
fully recovered, had requested to return to work, and the agency had failed to
meet its obligations regarding the same. 0159 IAF, Tab 3 at 3-4; see Young v.
U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 424, ¶ 12 (2010) (describing these as among
the jurisdictional requirements for this type of restoration claim).           The
administrative judge separately ordered the appellant to present arguments and
evidence regarding the timeliness of his appeal. 0159 IAF, Tab 13.
      Although the appellant submitted responses, his arguments stray from the
limited issues of this restoration appeal extensively, and they are difficult to
understand. 0159 IAF, Tabs 14-15. In addition, the only evidence he submitted
is dated between November 2008 and February 2020. 0159 IAF, Tab 14 at 27-50.
None is the evidence specifically requested by the administrative judge, regarding
his alleged recovery or denied restoration in July 2020.     For that reason, the
agency argued that the administrative judge should dismiss the July 2020 claim.
0159 IAF, Tab 16 at 6-7.
      The appellant then submitted additional pleadings with additional evidence.
0159 IAF, Tabs 17-18. But these additional pleadings were untimely. Compare
0159 IAF, Tab 12 at 3 (setting a deadline of February 22, 2021, for the appellant
to submit his response regarding jurisdiction), Tab 13 at 4 (setting a deadline of
February 26, 2021, for the appellant to submit his response regarding the
                                                                                    8

timeliness of his appeal), with 0159 IAF, Tabs 17-18 (appellant’s supplemental
responses   regarding     jurisdiction   and   timeliness,   dated   March   1   and
March 7, 2021).     Therefore, they need not be considered.           See 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.43(c) (providing that an administrative judge may refuse to consider any
motion or other pleading that is not filed in a timely fashion).
      Even if we were to consider the appellant’s belated filings, we would not
find that the appellant presented the requisite nonfrivolous allegations that the
agency improperly denied him restoration as a fully recovered individual in or
around July 2020.       Among other things, the appellant failed to present any
nonfrivolous allegation that he was “fully recovered” at that time, as the term is
defined for purposes of restoration. 5 C.F.R. § 353.102. To the contrary, his
belated evidence included updated medical documentation from July 2020,
indicating that he has permanent restrictions from his right arm injury, along with
an   OWCP     document     from    December    2020,   acknowledging    a    separate
compensable back impairment. 0159 IAF, Tab 17 at 16, Tab 18 at 62, 65, 84-86.
Without further explanation, the degree to which these ongoing impairments and
limitations might impact the appellant’s ability to work his Maintenance
Technician position or any other is not apparent.
      Additionally, it is not apparent that the appellant requested, and the agency
denied, any request for restoration during this period. Evidence the appellant
submitted does include April, May, and June 2020 letters addressed to various
offices within the Postal Service, OPM, and OWCP. 0159 IAF, Tab 18 at 66-77.
But those letters generally seem to assert past improprieties among all parties
involved—the Postal Service, OPM, and OWCP. Id. We recognize that these
lengthy and convoluted letters do include statements that he wanted the agency to
“return [him] to work after recovery from on-the-job-injury with full back pay
from the unwarranted personnel action – disability retirement,” and he “elect[s] to
stay on OWCP and limited duty that the agency offered [him] December 9, 2019.”
Id. at 67, 71. However, when viewed in their entirety, the letters appear to be
                                                                                    9

arguments about the propriety of his separation in December 2019, not an
unambiguous new request for restoration. Plus, none is dated July 2020, when
the appellant has alleged that he was denied restoration.
      In sum, to the extent that the appellant intended to pursue his claim that the
agency improperly denied him restoration as a fully recovered individual in or
around July 2020, we modify the initial decision to find that he failed to meet his
jurisdictional burden of presenting nonfrivolous allegations of the same.        The
appellant’s petition for review contains no substantive argument or evidence that
would support a different conclusion—none pertaining to his recovery status at
that time, and none pertaining to him submitting a request to the agency at that
time, asking for restoration. 0159 PFR File, Tab 1. We recall that the appellant’s
jurisdictional burden was to simply present nonfrivolous allegations. However,
the appellant’s pleadings are filled with cursory, convoluted, and contradictory
claims that do not satisfy that standard.

The appellant’s remaining arguments on review are unavailing.
      We note that the appellant is pro se. For that reason, we have construed his
pleadings   liberally.      Hosozawa        v.   Department   of   Veterans   Affairs,
113 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 7 (2010).      However, as alluded to above, many of the
appellant’s arguments do not pertain to the relevant issues at hand.
      To illustrate with an example, the appellant’s petition contains arguments
about “nexus, charges, and penalties.” 0159 PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. But those are
issues relevant to an adverse action appeal, not this restoration appeal. Shibuya v.
Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 18 (2013). The appellant also
presents arguments or assertions about issues from his prior appeals, which are
not before us at this time.      E.g., 0159 PFR File, Tab 1 at 17 (referencing
McDermott v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-13-0633-I-1). In
another example, the appellant repeatedly argues that certain officials within the
agency or OWCP have violated criminal laws by providing false statements in
connection with his OWCP claims and retirement. E.g., id. at 10-13. However,
                                                                                     10

the Board does not have jurisdiction over all matters regarding a Federal
employee that are allegedly unfair or incorrect; rather, the Board’s jurisdiction is
limited to matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by statute or
regulation. Johnson v. U.S. Postal Service, 67 M.S.P.R. 573, 577 (1995).
      We next note that the appellant presents general assertions that the
administrative judge was biased. 0159 PFR File, Tab 1 at 21, 23, 30. He does
not, however, present a substantive and persuasive explanation of the same. See
Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980) (recognizing
that a party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that
accompanies administrative adjudicators in making a claim of bias or prejudice
against an administrative judge).
      For all these reasons, the appellant has failed to establish jurisdiction over
his restoration appeal.

                          NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

2
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      11

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                 12

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC    review    of   cases   involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.         See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     13

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                              Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                              Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 3   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

3
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                14

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.