Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2024-02-01 15:00:51.899059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:53.791426
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USCA11 Case: 22-12280     Document: 62-1       Date Filed: 02/01/2024   Page: 1 of 14

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 22-12280
                            ____________________

        SHEKEARA ADMORE,
        individually and on behalf of others
        similarly situated,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        HOSPICE OF PALM BEACH COUNTY INC.,
        d.b.a. Trustbridge Hospice Foundation, Inc.,

                                                       Defendant-Appellee.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12280

                        D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80047-BER
                             ____________________

        Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                From 2017 to 2020, Shekeara Admore was employed by
        Hospice of Palm Beach County, Inc. (“Hospice”). In January 2020,
        Admore applied for and was granted leave for anxiety under the
        Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). In July 2020, Hospice
        terminated Admore’s employment. Admore then sued Hospice
        under the FMLA. Following a jury trial before a magistrate judge,
        the jury found that Admore was entitled to FMLA leave -- which
        she received -- but found that Hospice neither interfered with that
        leave nor retaliated against Admore for taking the leave. Accord-
        ingly, the district court entered judgment for Hospice.
               Admore, now proceeding pro se, appeals the jury verdict.
        Primarily, Admore alleges deficiencies in her counsel’s perfor-
        mance at trial and errors in the jury instructions. However, inef-
        fectiveness of counsel is not a ground for a new trial in civil matters.
        Nor do we, after careful review and with the benefit of oral argu-
        ment, find any error in the jury instructions. Accordingly, we
        AFFIRM.
                                           I.
              Hospice is a provider of end-of-life care for patients. Ad-
        more is a registered nurse. In 2017, Admore was hired to work for
        Hospice as a Float Manager. As a Float Manager, Admore was
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        22-12280                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        required to cover for other managers who were out due to vaca-
        tion, sickness, or other reasons. In January 2020, Admore applied
        for, and was granted, FMLA leave due to anxiety. Admore was
        scheduled to return from FMLA leave on April 27, 2020, after a to-
        tal of twelve weeks of leave.
                On April 24, 2020, Hospice announced that it was requiring
        all of its Float Managers to return to in-person work, including
        working in Hospice’s inpatient units three days per week. In re-
        sponse, Admore informed Hospice that she would not work in an
        inpatient setting out of concern for her son, who had a health con-
        dition that made him vulnerable to COVID-19. Hospice responded
        by providing Admore with a modified schedule, which lasted for
        60 days, during which time she was permitted to work two days
        per week from home. Hospice terminated Admore’s employment
        on July 1, 2020, after Admore continued to refuse to work with
        COVID-positive patients in the inpatient unit.
               In August 2020, Admore sued Hospice in the United States
        District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging FMLA
        interference and retaliation. 1
               After both parties consented to trial before the magistrate
        judge, the case proceeded to a jury trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a).
        The jury returned a verdict finding that Admore was entitled to

        1       Admore additionally sued Hospice for alleged violations under the
        Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). The trial court entered a directed verdict
        for Hospice on the FCRA claims. Admore has not appealed from the trial
        court’s directed verdict and those claims are not at issue in this appeal.
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12280

        FMLA leave but she did not prove that Hospice interfered with or
        retaliated against her FMLA leave. The district court entered final
        judgment in favor of Hospice on June 10, 2022.
               This timely appeal followed on July 8, 2022. On November
        9, 2022, after the notice of appeal was filed but before any briefs
        were filed in this Court, Admore’s counsel withdrew from the case
        citing “[i]rreconcilable differences.”
                                           II.
                This Court reads the briefs of pro se litigants liberally. United
        States v. Hung Thien Ly, 646 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011). How-
        ever, “[d]espite construction leniency afforded pro se litigants, we
        nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.”
        Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Moon v.
        Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[O]nce a pro se . . .
        litigant is in court, [s]he is subject to the relevant law and rules of
        court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
               “We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether
        they misstate the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
        objecting party.” United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806, 814 (11th
        Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1085
        (11th Cir. 1993)). We look to determine whether the jury instruc-
        tions given by the trial court “create a substantial and ineradicable
        doubt that the jury has been misled in its deliberations.” Cent. Ala.
        Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., 236 F.3d 629, 635 (11th Cir.
        2000) (quoting Wood v. Spring Hill Coll., 978 F.2d 1214, 1218 (11th
        Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). “So long as the ‘instructions,
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        22-12280               Opinion of the Court                         5

        taken together, properly express the law applicable to the case,
        there is no error even though an isolated clause may be inaccurate,
        ambiguous, incomplete or otherwise subject to criticism.’”
        Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th
        Cir. 2014) (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Silver Star Health &
        Rehab, 739 F.3d 579, 585 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)).
                                         A.
                Admore’s primary claim on appeal is that her trial attorney
        breached the ﬁduciary duties of loyalty and failed to provide com-
        petent representation. More speciﬁcally, Admore says that her trial
        counsel agreed to a settlement she did not authorize, failed to op-
        pose Hospice’s motions in limine, made ineﬃcient use of time dur-
        ing trial prep, stipulated to facts that Admore claims limited her
        ability to plead her case, failed to object to various statements dur-
        ing the trial, and failed to communicate with Admore. Admore
        argues that she is therefore entitled to a new trial.
                Even if Admore’s grievances are legitimate -- which this
        Court does not weigh in on -- the law is crystal clear that she has
        no constitutional right to the eﬀective assistance of counsel in a
        civil case. See Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat’l Lab'ys, 711 F.2d 1510, 1522
        (11th Cir. 1983). For that reason, Admore “does not have any right
        to a new trial in a civil suit because of inadequate counsel.” Id. at
        1523 (quoting Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980) (per
        curiam)). Admore’s only remedy for ineﬀective counsel is a suit
        against her attorney for malpractice. Id.
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-12280

                Admore cites to a Ninth Circuit case, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
        Natural Beverage Distributors., 69 F.3d 337 (9th Cir. 1995), to support
        the proposition that “[a] new trial is warranted on the ground of
        attorney misconduct during the trial where the ‘ﬂavor of miscon-
        duct . . . suﬃciently permeate[s] an entire proceeding to provide
        conviction that the jury was inﬂuenced by passion and prejudice in
        reaching its verdict.’” Id. at 346 (quoting Kehr v. Smith Barney, Harris
        Upham & Co., 736 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984)). Notably, how-
        ever, the Ninth Circuit was discussing misconduct by the opposing
        party’s attorneys who were trying to inﬂame the jury, not ineﬀec-
        tiveness by the moving party’s attorney. 2 See id. at 342. Moreover,
        the law of this Circuit is altogether consistent with the Ninth Cir-
        cuit’s law in this regard. See, e.g., Vineyard v. Cnty. of Murray., 990
        F.2d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that mistrial
        in a civil matter is granted only when opposing attorney’s “remarks
        were such as to impair gravely the calm and dispassionate consid-
        eration of the case by the jury” (quotation marks removed)).
              In this case, however, Admore makes no claim of miscon-
        duct on the part of Hospice’s counsel attempting to inﬂame the

        2         Admore also cites a number of Florida District Court of Appeals cases,
        see, e.g., Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), as well as two
        cases from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Guam, Adams v. Duenas,
        1998 Guam 15 (Guam Sept. 4, 1998), and HRC Guam Co. v. Bayview II L.L.C.,
        2017 Guam 25 (Guam Dec. 29, 2017). None of these cases are binding on our
        Court. In any event, none involve ineffectiveness of counsel by the moving
        party’s attorney.
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        22-12280               Opinion of the Court                          7

        jury, but only to misconduct by her own attorney amounting to
        negligence and breach of duty. The cases Admore cites regarding
        attorney misconduct are inapplicable, and the longstanding rule
        that there is no appellate relief available for ineﬀectiveness of one’s
        own attorneys in a civil matter applies in this case. See Mekdeci, 711
        F.2d at 1522–23.
              The long and short of it is that Admore is not entitled to a
        new civil trial because of the claimed ineffectiveness of her trial
        counsel.
                                          B.
              Admore also argues that the trial court improperly denied
        her proposed jury instructions as to FMLA entitlement as un-
        timely. We are unpersuaded by this claim.
               After the close of evidence, but prior to receiving the court’s
        instructions, Admore’s counsel proposed an additional jury instruc-
        tion related to her entitlement to FMLA leave clarifying that “a se-
        rious health condition involving continuing treatment” can include
        chronic conditions under 29 C.F.R. 825.115(c). Admore’s counsel
        said that he had not proposed this instruction earlier because he
        had not anticipated that the court would instruct the jury on the
        issue of entitlement. The court denied the request as untimely, cit-
        ing Rule 51. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(a)(2) (permitting requests for jury
        instructions after the close of evidence only “with the court’s per-
        mission” or for “instructions on issues that could not reasonably
        have been anticipated by an earlier time that the court set for re-
        quests”). The trial court noted that “[i]t was clearly framed in the
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                         22-12280

        pretrial stipulation that entitlement was going to be at issue.” Ad-
        more does not dispute that the proposed instruction was untimely,
        but instead argues that the proposed instruction was untimely due
        to the actions of her counsel, not herself. As we have already ex-
        plained, ineﬀectiveness of counsel in a civil case is not a ground for
        appellate relief. See Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1522–23. 3 The trial court
        acted well within its discretion in denying the requested instruction
        as being untimely.
                It’s also worth observing, however, that even if Admore’s
        proposed jury instructions had been timely submitted, she was not
        entitled to the wording of her choice so long as the instruction
        given by the trial court was accurate, which it was. See Farley v.
        Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting
        that trial judge has “wide discretion as to the style and wording” of
        jury instructions (quoting Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997,
        1005 (11th Cir. 1997))). The trial court gave an instruction on
        FMLA entitlement that included the Eleventh Circuit pattern jury
        instruction in full, except that it omitted the possibility that a

        3       Admore cites to a number of Florida state court cases for the principle
        that a party should not be punished for the neglect of her attorney when other
        sanctions for attorney misconduct are available. Setting aside the fact that
        these cases are not binding on our Court, these cases addressed instances
        where the state court dismissed a case or an appeal entirely -- the “ultimate
        sanction in the adversarial system” -- because of the attorney’s failure to timely
        file. Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 1993); see also, e.g., Lindsey v.
        King, 894 So. 2d 1058, 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Williams v. Udell, 690 So. 2d
        732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Admore has faced no such prejudice from the
        untimely filing in this case (or any prejudice at all, as we explain infra).
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        22-12280                   Opinion of the Court                                 9

        “serious health condition” could involve inpatient care in a hospital,
        hospice, or residential medical facility. 4 There was no evidence in

        4       In full, the trial court gave the jury the following instruction defining
        “serious health conditions” as they may relate to entitlement to FMLA leave:
                 A serious health condition as we use it in this law is an illness,
                 injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that in-
                 volves continuing treatment by a health care provider. So
                 that's another term I have to define for you, continuing treat-
                 ment by a health care provider.
                 Continuing treatment means a period of incapacity of more
                 than three consecutive full calendar days, and any subse-
                 quent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same
                 condition, that also involves either treatment two or more
                 times within 30 days of the first day of incapacity by a health
                 care provider, by a nurse under direct supervision of the
                 health care provider, or by a provider of health care services,
                 such as a physical therapist, under orders of or on referral by
                 a health care provider. So you can either show two or more
                 treatments within 30 days of the beginning of the incapacity,
                 or treatment by a health care provider on at least one occa-
                 sion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment un-
                 der the supervision of a health care provider. So there can be
                 one occasion of actual treatment followed by a regimen of
                 continuing treatment.
                 Now, a regimen of continuing treatment includes, for exam-
                 ple, a course of prescription medication, such as an antibiotic,
                 or therapy requiring special equipment to resolve or alleviate
                 a health condition, perhaps oxygen. A regimen of continuing
                 treatment that includes the taking of over-the-counter medi-
                 cations, such as aspirin, antihistamines, or salves, or bedrest,
                 drinking fluids, exercise, and other similar activities that can
                 be initiated without a visit to a health care provider is not by
                 itself sufficient to constitute a regimen of continuing
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                      22-12280

        this case or even any argument that Admore would have qualiﬁed
        under that prong. Additionally, the trial court elaborated on the
        Eleventh Circuit pattern jury instructions by deﬁning “continuing
        treatment,” since the term is undeﬁned in the statute. See 29 U.S.C.
        § 2611(11)(b). In order to deﬁne the term, the trial court drew on
        language found in 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.113(c) and 825.115(a), which de-
        ﬁne “continuing treatment.” The trial court did not err. We have
        held that the FMLA regulations are binding when ﬁlling out the
        deﬁnitions of the FMLA statute in jury instructions. Russell v. N.
        Broward Hosp., 346 F.3d 1335, 1342, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2003). The
        language used by the district court “properly express[ed] the law
        applicable to the case,” and “there is no error” despite Admore’s
        preferred instruction having been denied. See Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at
        1289.
               In any event, this Court will only reverse a jury verdict for
        an error of law in the jury instructions if the moving party was prej-
        udiced by that error. See Fid. Interior Const., Inc. v. Se. Carpenters
        Reg’l Council of United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 675 F.3d
        1250, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012). Here, Admore can show no prejudice

                treatment for purposes of FMLA leave. . . . Ordinarily, unless
                complications arise, the common cold, the flu, earaches, up-
                set stomach, minor ulcers, headaches, other than migraines,
                routine dental or orthodontia procedures, periodontal dis-
                ease, and other similar conditions do not meet the definition
                of a serious health condition and do not qualify for FMLA
                leave.
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        22-12280                Opinion of the Court                         11

        because the jury found in her favor on the issue of entitlement an-
        yway.
               There was no error in the jury instructions as to the issue of
        entitlement and, even if there were, there was no prejudice to Ad-
        more.
                                          C.
                Finally, Admore argues that the trial court erred by issuing
        jury instructions inconsistent with the definition of “interference”
        as the term is used in the FMLA. However, Admore did not object
        to the trial court’s definition of interference at any time prior to
        appeal. Where a party fails to object to jury instructions, Federal
        Rule of Civil Procedure 51(d)(2) only provides for plain-error re-
        view if “(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error
        affected substantial rights; and (4) failure to correct the error would
        ‘seriously affect the fairness of the judicial proceeding.’” Vista
        Mktg., LLC v. Burkett, 812 F.3d 954, 975 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
        Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir.
        1999)). This means that we will reverse the jury’s verdict only if
        the error is “so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice.”
        Iervolino v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 796 F.2d 1408, 1414 (11th Cir. 1986)
        (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial court’s jury in-
        structions were not in error, much less in plain error.
             The trial court gave the following instruction as to the
        meaning of “interference”:
               For the fourth element you must determine whether
               the hospice interfered with Ms. Admore's FMLA
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12280

              rights. That element is satisﬁed if Ms. Admore has
              proven by a preponderance of the evidence that ei-
              ther she requested intermittent leave but hospice
              forced her to take continuous leave and/or hospice
              failed to restore her to an equivalent job position to
              that which she had prior to taking leave.

              An equivalent position is one that is virtually identical
              to the employee's former position in terms of pay,
              beneﬁts, and working conditions, including privi-
              leges, prerequisites, and status. It must involve the
              same or similar -- I'm sorry, the same or substantially
              similar duties and responsibilities which must entail
              substantially equivalent skill, eﬀort, responsibility,
              and authority.

        The Eleventh Circuit’s Pattern Instructions simply say, “For the
        fourth element, you must determine whether [name of defendant]
        [describe interference].” Pattern Civ. Jury Instr. 11th Cir. 4.16 at 3
        (2022). The trial court’s instructions accurately tracked and elabo-
        rated on the pattern instructions.
                Admore suggests that interference could include failing to
        place her in a similar circumstance upon return. However, the trial
        court’s jury instruction not only correctly included this theory of
        liability, but used the exact same language that Admore requests.
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        22-12280                    Opinion of the Court                                  13

        There was no error in the trial court’s jury instructions as to FMLA
        interference, much less plain error. 5

        5        Although we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, our law re-
        quires that we do not address arguments that have been abandoned. See Tim-
        son v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). An argument
        is abandoned when it is made in only “passing references,” is raised in a “per-
        functory manner without supporting arguments and authority,” is “embedded
        under different topical headings,” or is referenced only in the “statement of
        the case” or “summary of the argument.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
        739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). Admore’s remaining references to the trial
        court’s alleged misstatements, “irregularities,” and evidentiary rulings were
        referenced only in a passing or perfunctory manner, without developing a le-
        gal argument, or were mentioned only in the statement of the case and sum-
        mary of the argument. Therefore, this Court cannot address them.
                 Additionally, to the extent that Admore argues that Hospice “failed to
        provide intermittent leave as requested by Appellant which interfered with the
        employee’s exercise of her right to take intermittent leave,” or that “Appellee
        failed to place appellant in a similar circumstance upon return,” these are fac-
        tual issues that have already been settled by a jury.
                In any event, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings excluding evidence
        related to Admore’s deceased son and the 2019 incident involving threats from
        a coworker as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial were not, at least, in plain er-
        ror. Nor did the trial court commit plain error when it excluded evidence
        regarding emotional distress or other non-pecuniary damages because Ad-
        more was not entitled to such damages under the FMLA as a matter of law.
        See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A); see also Harley v. Health Ctr. of Coconut Creek, Inc.,
        518 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1370–71 (S.D. Fla. 2007). The trial court also did not
        plainly error in admitting Admore’s unobjected-to out of court statements of-
        fered by another witness because they were relevant statements of a party op-
        ponent offered against that party. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Finally, the ex-
        hibit board listing lawsuits that Admore had allegedly been involved with in
        the past was not shown to the jury, neither the board nor the document it
        related to were ever admitted into evidence, and the trial court subsequently
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        14                       Opinion of the Court                    22-12280

               The judgment of the district court is
                                      AFFIRMED.

        (and repeatedly) instructed the jury to only consider the testimony of wit-
        nesses and the admitted exhibits as evidence.