Court Opinion

ID: 9408375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 16:08:23.484965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.534639
License: Public Domain

J-A07020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 DOUGLAS JOHN LAMBERT, IV              :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 747 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 3, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-15-CR-0004126-2017

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 DOUGLAS JOHN LAMBERT, IV              :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 748 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 3, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-15-CR-0004157-2017

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 DOUGLAS JOHN LAMBERT, IV              :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 749 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 3, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-15-CR-0001143-2018

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-A07020-23

                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
    DOUGLAS JOHN LAMBERT, IV                     :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   No. 750 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 3, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-15-CR-0001964-2018

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                               FILED JULY 12, 2023

       Douglas John Lambert, IV appeals from the judgment of sentence

following his convictions for flight to avoid apprehension, trial or punishment;

firearms not to be carried without a license; two counts of persons not to

possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms; possession with

intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”); and accidents involving

damage to unattended vehicle or property.1 Lambert challenges the denial of

his motion to suppress and argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

PWID conviction. We affirm.

       On September 23, 2017, police were notified of a vehicle accident. When

they arrived on the scene, the driver of the vehicle was not present. Police

later identified Lambert as the driver and filed charges against him. Lambert

filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from his vehicle, a later search

of his home, and any DNA testing results. See Defendant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial
____________________________________________

118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5126(a), 6106(a)(1), 6105(c)(8); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30),
and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3745(a), respectively.

                                           -2-
J-A07020-23

Motion, filed 11/27/18. He argued that officers did not have probable cause

to search his vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 7. He claimed that the search warrant for

his home likewise “lack[ed] sufficient probable cause” and that “[t]here was

no nexus between the crimes under investigation and the search proposed in

the warrant.” Id. at ¶ 9. He also argued that “the affidavit contain[ed] material

misstatements[.]” Id.

      The trial court made the following findings of fact following the

suppression hearing:

         On September 23, 2017 at approximately 3:00 a.m., Officer
         [John] Bogan was on duty working the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00
         a.m. shift. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T.
         9-10). . . .

         At approximately 3:02 a.m., Officer Bogan was dispatched
         to the area of Oak Street and Virginia Avenue for an accident
         in the City of Coatesville. (Suppression Hearing Transcript,
         1/10/19, N.T., 10, 82). . . . Officer Bogan arrived at the
         scene at approximately 3:04 a.m. (Suppression Hearing
         Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 82).

         When he arrived at the scene, Officer Bogan observed a
         Chevy Malibu that had struck a utility pole, causing the pole
         to split in half approximately halfway up the pole.
         (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 10-11). The
         power in the neighborhood had gone out. (Suppression
         Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 70). The Chevy Malibu
         was still running, with its hazard lights activated, albeit
         unattended. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T.
         71; 1/10/19, Ex. C-4; 1/15/19, Ex. D-3). The Chevy Malibu
         was stopped on the berm of the road, not blocking traffic.
         (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 23;
         1/15/19, Ex. D-3). The Chevy Malibu had heavily tinted
         windows. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T.
         27).

         Officer Bogan observed that the vehicle “sustained heavy
         front end damage. There was – the windshield of the vehicle

                                      -3-
J-A07020-23

       had an indent where it appeared that the driver’s head
       struck. The telephone pole was split in half about halfway
       up.” (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 10-11;
       1/10/19, Ex. C-4).

       The impact deployed the vehicle’s airbag. (Suppression
       Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 11; 1/10/19, Ex. C-4).

       Officer Bogan spoke to one Officer Batykefer, who had
       already arrived on the scene. (Suppression Hearing
       Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 18, 19). There were multiple
       people at the scene, including various emergency service
       personnel, many of whom were shining flashlights in and
       around the vehicle. (Suppression Hearing Transcript,
       1/10/19, N.T. 20).

       Officer Batykefer told Officer Bogan that he observed blood
       on the vehicle. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19,
       N.T. 19).

       When standing next to the exterior of the driver’s side of the
       car, Officer Bogan observed blood on the airbag and blood
       on the driver’s side rear door. (Suppression Hearing
       Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 11, 13, 26-27; 1/10/19, Ex. C-4).

                                    ***

       Officer Bogan testified that the driver’s side rear door was
       locked. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 15).

       Officer Bogan testified that he was “very concerned due to
       the condition the vehicle was in and the split pole that I
       knew whoever was operating that vehicle could be seriously
       injured.” (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T.
       13).

       Officer Bogan testified that another officer “asked the radio
       room to notify the hospitals in the area for any walk-ins for
       injuries from the car accident” to make sure that whoever
       was driving the vehicle was okay and receiving medical
       treatment. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T.
       14).

                                    ***

       Officer Bogan also contacted a towing company.
       (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 14, 15). He

                                   -4-
J-A07020-23

       contacted the towing company because he needed to
       remove the vehicle from the roadway. (Suppression Hearing
       Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 14).

       The police ran the vehicle’s registration but the record came
       back only as a temporary tag registered to Lambert Auto
       Sales, indicating it was probably recently purchased.
       (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 14, 20, 24,
       37, 43). . . .

                                    ***

       The police body camera video played by the defense
       recorded somebody saying words to the effect of “that’s got
       to be Dougie, he live [sic] on Charles Street[.]”
       (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 28). Officer
       Bogan testified at the Suppression Hearing that he believes
       that the speaker was referring to [Lambert]. (Suppression
       Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 28; 1/15/19, Ex. D-3).
       Despite the references to “Dougie” on “Charles Street”, no
       officer went to check on [Lambert] at Charles Street.
       (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 29, 44).

                                    ***

       Officer Bogan had no verification of the truth of these
       statements referring to “Dougie” being the owner of the
       damaged vehicle. (Suppression Hearing Transcript,
       1/10/19, N.T. 54).

       The police body camera video played by the defense
       contains audio of Officer Batykefer saying words to the
       effect of “let’s just write it up as an unattended accident and
       move on from here [.]” (Suppression Hearing Transcript,
       1/10/19, N.T. 32-33; 1/15/19, Ex. D-3).

                                    ***

       When the tow truck arrived, the tow truck was able to pull
       the vehicle away from the embankment. (Suppression
       Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 14, 15, 42-43). Officer
       Bogan testified that this is not a gentle process, but
       sometimes results in the contents of the vehicles getting
       “jostled” around. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19,
       N.T. 56-57).

                                    -5-
J-A07020-23

       When the tow truck pulled the vehicle away from the
       embankment, Officer Bogan then entered the front
       passenger’s side door, which was now accessible to him.
       (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 14, 15, 43,
       69-70).

       Inside the vehicle, Officer Bogan reached into the glove
       compartment to see if he could find some type of
       registration or any information that would link the vehicle to
       an owner. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T.
       15, 44).

       Officer Bogan testified that he was motivated to search for
       the owner of the vehicle because he wanted to know “who
       and where they were and if they were okay.” (Suppression
       Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 15).

       Officer Bogan located a pink slip, or bill of sale, for the
       vehicle in the vehicle’s glove compartment that contained
       the names Chamise Bell and Douglas Lambert and listed an
       address on South First Avenue. (Suppression Hearing
       Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 16, 44, 60, 76). The pink slip was
       located in the glove compartment near the top.
       (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 49). Officer
       Bogan estimated that he was inside the vehicle for
       approximately thirty (30) seconds to one (1) minute.
       (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 49, 61).

       After the vehicle had been moved away from the
       embankment and Officer Bogan had discovered the pink
       slip, Officer Batykefer told Officer Bogan that he could now
       see a handgun on the driver’s side floorboard. (Suppression
       Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 16, 18, 19, 45, 58, 65).

       Officer Batykefer made this observation while standing
       outside of the vehicle and looking into the vehicle from the
       driver’s side. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19,
       N.T. 16, 45).

       Upon receiving this information, Officer Bogan put all of the
       paperwork back into the Chevy Malibu and exited the
       vehicle. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 16,
       69).

       Officer Bogan entered the driver’s side of the vehicle and
       observed the firearm where Officer Batykefer had said he

                                   -6-
J-A07020-23

         observed it. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T.
         16-17, 65).

         Officer Bogan did not secure the firearm. (Suppression
         Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 17, 46). No officer
         touched the firearm that night. (Suppression Hearing
         Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 46-47).

         Officer Bogan testified that he did not secure the firearm
         because he knew that the police needed to apply for a
         search warrant. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19,
         N.T. 17).

                                     ***

         Officer Batykefer followed the vehicle while it was towed
         back to the police station. (Suppression Hearing Transcript,
         1/10/19, N.T. 17, 46, 48).

         Subsequently, a search warrant was obtained for the
         vehicle. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 17).

                                     ***

         Officer Bogan testified that he did not expect his
         investigation of this accident to become a criminal
         investigation. (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19,
         N.T. 35, 54). He thought he was investigating an accident
         and was concerned about somebody being injured.
         (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 54). He did
         agree however that at the time of his investigation, he did
         have evidence of the crime of leaving the scene of an
         accident that caused damage to unattended property.
         (Suppression Hearing Transcript, 1/10/19, N.T. 63).

Opinion, filed 6/5/19, at 3-10, ¶¶ 2-9, 11-13, 15-16, 18, 20-21, 24-34, 36-

37, 39 (footnotes omitted).

      Following the hearing, Lambert filed a brief in support of his motion to

suppress. He challenged the alleged misstatements in the affidavit, citing

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). He further claimed that “there

was not a sufficient nexus between the crime on the street and the [Lambert’s]

                                    -7-
J-A07020-23

residence,” and that officers violated the knock and announce rule of

Pa.R.Crim.P. 207. He further argued that police lacked probable cause to

search his car. See Defendant’s Brief in Support of His Motion to Suppress

Evidence, filed 3/11/19, at 9-13, 21-23, 26-28, 34-38.

      The trial court denied the motion to suppress. It concluded the

warrantless search of the car was covered by the public servant exception of

the community caretaking doctrine, citing Commonwealth v. Livingstone,

174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017). See Opinion, filed 6/5/19, at 40-43. It explained,

“Officer Bogan’s brief and limited warrantless intrusion into the interior of the

Chevy Malibu for the purpose of determining who the owner of the vehicle was

in order to determine if that person or another of which he might have

knowledge required assistance was justified under the public servant

exception of the community caretaking doctrine.” Id. at 46, ¶ 113. The court

also determined that the search was covered under Pennsylvania’s automobile

exception under the then-applicable precedent of Commonwealth v. Gary,

91   A.3d 102    (Pa. 2014)     (plurality), which was     later   overruled by

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020). See Opinion at

47-49.

      Two years later, Lambert filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that

neither the community caretaking doctrine nor the automobile exception

applied, that the firearm was not in plain view and that the basis for the

warrant of his home “was improper and had a multitude of misstatements and

omissions." Motion to Reconsider, filed, 8/30/21 at 12. He also claimed that

                                      -8-
J-A07020-23

the officer’s knock and announce at his home was insufficient. The court

denied the motion. See Order, 8/31/21.

      Lambert proceeded to a bench trial. Relevant to this appeal, Detective

Jonathan Shave testified that he along with other detectives executed a

warrant at 313 Charles Street. N.T., Trial, 9/1/21, at 40, 70. He said that the

Charles Street address was “the residence of Mr. Douglas Lambert.” Id. at 70.

Detective Shave testified that he recovered “a large clear plastic bag that had

methamphetamine particles in it” from the second-floor bedroom of the

Charles Street residence. Id. at 74, 124. In that same bedroom, Detective

Shave also recovered Lambert’s passport and mail addressed to him. Some

mail was addressed to the Charles Street address and other mail listed the

address on Lambert’s license. Id. at 75, 78, 122, 139.

      The court found Lambert guilty of the above-referenced crimes and

sentenced him to an aggregate term of eight and a half to 19 years’

incarceration. This timely appeal followed.

      Lambert presents the following claims:

         Whether the suppression court erred when it failed to
         suppress evidence obtained in violation of Article I, Section
         8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which reads, in pertinent
         part, as follows:

                  The people shall be secure in their
                  persons, houses, papers and possessions
                  from unreasonable searches and seizures,
                  and no warrant to search any place or to
                  seize any person or things shall issue
                  without describing them as nearly as may
                  be, nor without probable cause, supported

                                     -9-
J-A07020-23

                by oath or affirmation subscribed to by
                the affiant.

       1. The search warrant prepared by Detective Jonathan
          Shave is unconstitutionally overbroad. It did not set forth
          in clear and specific terms the items to be searched and
          seized. The warrant authorized a general search, and the
          kind of “rummaging” banned by Article I, Section 8 of the
          Pennsylvania Constitution. Assessment of the validity of
          the description contained in the warrant must be
          measured against those items for which there was
          probable cause to search. Any unreasonable discrepancy
          between the items for which there was probable cause
          and the description in the warrant requires suppression.
          In this situation, the search warrant was used as a device
          to rummage through the property at 313 Charles Street.
          In this case, the charge was firearms not to be carried
          without a license under 18 PACSA 6106. It is not a crime
          to have firearms in a house under 18 PACSA 6016. There
          was no reason to believe that an unlicensed firearm
          would be found at 313 Charles Street. Police had already
          seized an unlicensed firearm in the crashed vehicle, but
          there was no rational basis to assume another firearm
          would be found inside the property at 313 Charles Street,
          the property titled to Lambert’s grandfather. All evidence
          against Lambert must be suppressed as fruit of the
          poisonous tree of the general search of 313 Charles
          Street.

       2. The warrantless search of a 2008 Chevy Malibu which
          crashed into a pole in Coatesville, and was disabled.
          When police arrived, the vehicle was unoccupied, and
          had sustained severe front-end damage. The vehicle was
          so disabled it could not be driven away. When a tow truck
          arrived, the vehicle was searched without a warrant.
          Police discovered a firearm lying on the front driver’s side
          floor with serial number S3242133. There was no reason
          to believe the firearm was illegal. The police had no
          probable cause to search the vehicle. There were no
          exigent circumstances to support a warrantless search,
          and no probable cause. As stated above, the warrantless
          search recovered a stolen firearm but the police did not
          know it was stolen. The warrantless search without both
          probable cause and exigent circumstances violated
          Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A3d 177 (PA 2020).

                                   - 10 -
J-A07020-23

           The Alexander case is retroactive to cases pending on
           direct appeal. The warrantless search started the ball
           rolling, and it was the “poisonous tree” without which
           there was no case. It was the excuse for the search of
           Lambert’s grandfather’s house at 313 Charles Street
           where the police executed a warrant and found another
           firearm, and a relatively small amount of cocaine and an
           even smaller quantity of methamphetamine. There was
           no probable cause to believe these items would be found
           at 313 Charles Street. The items discovered in 313
           Charles Street are fruit of the poisonous tree of the
           warrantless search of the crashed vehicle. The items
           must be suppressed. All evidence against Lambert must
           be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

        3. The evidence was insufficient to prove that Lambert had
           knowledge of the drugs found at 313 Charles Street or
           constructive possession of the drugs found at 313
           Charles Street. The evidence indicated that Lambert and
           another man occupied 313 Charles Street. The evidence
           indicates Lambert did not have the drugs on his person
           eliminating a theory of actual possession. The theory of
           prosecution was constructive possession. Another person
           had access to the property. Constructive possession is
           evidence showing the intent and capability to exercise
           control over the drugs. There was no evidence that
           Lambert had dominion and control over the drugs found
           in 313 Charles Street. There was no evidence Lambert
           knew the drugs were present at 313 Charles Street.

Lambert’s Br. at 2-4.

     Lambert’s first and second issues challenge the court’s denial of his

motion to suppress. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we

determine “whether the factual findings are supported by the record and

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.”

Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1071 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(citation omitted). We “consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and

so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted.” Id.

                                  - 11 -
J-A07020-23

(citation omitted). “Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes only

the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial.” Id.

(citation omitted).

       Lambert claims that the search warrant of the Charles Street residence

was overbroad in its request to search for firearms and that the warrant was

insufficiently specific. This issue is waived. Rule 581(D) of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure provides that a motion to suppress “shall state specifically and with

particularity the evidence sought to be suppressed, the grounds for

suppression, and the facts and events in support thereof.” Pa.R.Crim.P.

581(D) (emphasis added). In his motion to suppress Lambert did not claim

that the search warrant was overbroad or not specific enough. Instead, he

claimed that no probable cause existed to search the home, that there was no

nexus between the search and recovery of the firearm from his vehicle and

Lambert’s home, and that there were misstatements in the search warrant.

See Lambert’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, filed 11/27/18, at ¶ 9. Nor did he

make any mention of an overbreadth issue at argument. See N.T., Motion to

Suppress, 1/10/19, at 4-5.2 The claim is waived. See Commonwealth v.

Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2015) (finding waiver of challenge

____________________________________________

2 On appeal, Lambert maintains that this issue is not waived and directs us to
his Brief in Support of Motion and his Motion for Reconsideration. See
Lambert’s Br. at 20 (citing Reproduced Record at 318, 326, 345-48) &
Lambert’s Reply Br. at 1 (citing Reproduced Record 318, 345-47). The pages
Lambert cites do not discuss his overbreadth issue, and we have not found
any other place in the briefs he cites where he makes the argument he now
makes.

                                          - 12 -
J-A07020-23

to consent to search and scope of consent where defendant failed to raise

challenge in motion to suppress or at suppression hearing).

      Lambert’s second issue addresses whether the court erred in denying

his motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle. Lambert claims that “the

officers searched the interior of the car and discovered the firearm.” Lambert’s

Br. at 22. He claims the court erred in concluding that the public servant

exception to warrantless searches applied because here “[t]he police action

was not independent of detection, investigation of evidence in a criminal

case.” Id. at 23. He further argues that the search violated Commonwealth

v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020).

      The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,

Section     8   of   the   Pennsylvania    Constitution   protect   citizens   against

unreasonable searches and seizures. This protection requires police to obtain

a warrant before conducting a search unless an exception applies. “[A] search

without a warrant may be proper where an exception applies and the police

have probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed.”

Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 625 (Pa. 2017) (citation

omitted).

      One such exception is the community caretaking doctrine. See id. at

625-626. The community caretaking doctrine encompasses three exceptions:

“the emergency aid exception; the automobile impoundment/inventory

exception; and the public servant exception, also sometimes referred to as

                                          - 13 -
J-A07020-23

the public safety exception.” Id. at 626-627.3 Under each of these exceptions,

an officer’s actions should be “motivated by a desire to render aid or

assistance, rather than the investigation of criminal activity.” Id. at 627.

       Under the public servant exception of the community caretaking

doctrine, the Commonwealth must establish: (1) “specific, objective, and

articulable facts that would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that

a citizen is in need of assistance[;]” (2) “the police caretaking action [was]

independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of criminal

evidence[;]” and (3) “the level of intrusion [was] commensurate with the

perceived need for assistance.” Id. at 634, 635, 637. For the final prong of

this exception, there must be “an assessment of the circumstances

surrounding the seizure, including, but not necessarily limited to, the degree

of authority or force displayed, the length of the seizure, and the availability

of alternative means of assistance.” Id. at 637. “Once assistance has been

provided or the peril mitigated, further police action will be evaluated under

traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id.

       Here, the court determined that all three factors of the public servant

exception to the community caretaking doctrine were satisfied. We discern no

error. Regarding the first prong, Officer Bogan testified he was “very
____________________________________________

3 While Livingstone involved a claim of an unreasonable seizure, the Court
there explained that the doctrine also applies to searches, stating, “[W]hen
the community caretaking exception is involved to validate a search or a
seizure, courts must meticulously consider the facts and carefully apply the
exception in a manner that mitigates the risk of abuse.” Livingstone, 174
A.3d at 637 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

                                          - 14 -
J-A07020-23

concerned due to the condition the vehicle was in and the split pole that I

knew whoever was operating that vehicle could be seriously injured.” N.T.,

Suppression Hearing, 1/10/19, at 13. He noted that there was blood inside

and outside of the vehicle, the vehicle had heavy front-end damage, and it

appeared that the driver had struck their head on the windshield. Id. 10-11,

13, 26-27. As to the second prong, Officer Bogan testified that he wanted to

determine the owner or driver of the vehicle to ensure “who and where they

were and if they were okay.” Id. at 15. He further testified that another officer

“asked the radio room to notify the hospitals in the area for any walk-ins for

injuries from the car accident” to ensure that whoever had been driving was

able to get medical treatment. Id. at 14. Lambert claims that the officers’

search of the vehicle originated from them investigating a crime. However,

Officer Bogan was “able to point to specific, objective, and articulable facts

which, standing alone, reasonably would suggest that his assistance [was]

necessary,” and therefore “a coinciding subjective law enforcement concern

by the officer will not negate the validity of that search” under this exception.

Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637.

      Finally, the evidence supports the determination that Officer Bogan’s

actions were tailored to the assistance that he sought to provide. He testified

that he was inside the vehicle for approximately 30 seconds to one minute as

he copied down the information from the pink slip, he recovered from the

glove compartment. Thus, his level of intrusion was commensurate with the

perceived need for assistance of the driver of the vehicle. Therefore, we

                                     - 15 -
J-A07020-23

conclude that Officer Bogan’s search of the vehicle by opening the glove

compartment was covered under the community caretaking doctrine.

      Lambert’s claim under Alexander does not warrant relief. The Court in

Alexander overruled Gary and held that Pennsylvania’s automobile exception

requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Alexander, 243

A.3d at 181, 209. Here, the trial court’s application of Gary’s version of the

automobile exception – which was the law at the time – does not warrant relief

as the court applied the public servant exception, and did so properly, as

explained above.

      Lambert’s final claim addresses the sufficiency of the evidence for

possession of methamphetamines recovered from the Charles Street

residence. He maintains that the Commonwealth failed to prove constructive

possession. He argues that no evidence connects him to the narcotics in the

house. He also notes that another male occupied the house and was the owner

of the narcotics and drug paraphernalia in the home.

      When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence we view

the   evidence   in   the   light   most   favorable   to   the   Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 215 A.3d 972, 980 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation

omitted). Evidence is sufficient where “it establishes each material element of

the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 A.3d 542, 552

(Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted). “The Commonwealth may sustain its

burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).

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      The Commonwealth may prove possession by establishing constructive

or actual possession. Constructive possession is “the power to control the

contraband and the intent to exercise that control.” Commonwealth v.

Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted). The

Commonwealth may prove constructive possession by a totality of the

circumstances. Id. Additionally, more than one person may constructively

possess the same item when “the item in issue is in an area of joint control

and equal access.” See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26 A.3d 1078, 1094

(Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

      Here, the trial court concluded that “[i]t is reasonable to infer from the

totality of the circumstances that [Lambert], who kept his personal belongings

on each level of the home, knew that the controlled substances and

paraphernalia were in the home, had the ability to exercise conscious

dominion over these items, the power to control these items, and the intent

to exercise that control[.]” Opinion Sur Rule 1925(a), filed 6/28/22, at 35.

      This was not error. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

Commonwealth,     the   evidence   was   sufficient   to   prove   that   Lambert

constructively possessed the methamphetamines found in the second-floor

bedroom. The narcotics were found in the same area as his personal items,

including his passport and mail. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 874 A.2d

667, 678 (Pa.Super. 2005) (finding sufficient evidence of constructive

possession of narcotics found in a basement along with mail addressed to

defendant). Furthermore, the fact that another individual lived in the home

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does not sway our conclusion because more than one person can

constructively possess an item. See Johnson, 26 A.3d at 1094.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/12/2023

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