Court Opinion

ID: 9573917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:00:24.822801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:39.801053
License: Public Domain

JONES, District Judge
(dissenting).
I reaffirm the views stated in my prior •opinion, 11 Utah 2d 159, 356 P.2d 281 and .add the following comments in dissent to -the opinion now adopted by the court. The -prevailing opinion disposes of the estoppel issue with the assertion that a reading of the findings (and record) reveals that these lien claimants were not induced by the plaintiff to act differently than they would otherwise have acted. Were the findings complete on this subject I would have to concur. But in my view, these findings (with one or two minor exceptions) are wholly deficient and silent on this important and controlling issue with which the trial court was confronted.
Nor can I concur with the proposition that findings on the estoppel issue become unnecessary because the record has been examined and the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff. I suggest that there is sufficient evidence in the record on which the trier of the facts might determine these facts; that cross-defendant Grow (alleged to be the principal stockholder and officer of plaintiff) and the defendant Mecham (owner-contractor), having suffered financial losses in connection with some kind of a joint-venture in home building, agreed to start new subdivisions and construction in order to recoup their losses; that accordingly, additional lands were acquired (some in the name of Mecham and some in the name of Grow); that “padded” notes se-' cured by real estate mortgages were executed by the Mechams and placed by Grow with his (alleged) alter-ego, the plaintiff. These lien claimants, by then, were delivering materials. Plaintiff ostensibly held *342these funds as a sort of trustee for the payment of claims arising during the new construction hut permitted payment in full to construction firms owned or controlled by Grow; acquiesced in the “siphoning off” of some of these funds to Grow and Mecham to recoup their past losses; honored some claims but summarily refused to pay certain material-men, including appellant. I am not saying here that each and all of the foregoing facts are true, but I do suggest that this litigation should not be concluded until express findings are made by the trial court on these issues. It is not sufficient, in my humble opinion, to simply sweep all of these factual issues under the rug with the assertion that an examination of the record discloses no merits to these lien claimants’ contentions. Under our rules and practice, as I understand it, these parties are entitled to have the facts spelled out in the findings, issue by issue.
I would, therefore, remand these cases back to the trial court with directions to make plenary findings on the issue of es-toppel as raised by the pleadings. And should these issues be resolved in favor of these material-men an appropriate conclusion might be reached that plaintiff is es-topped and that the liens are sufficient in law to be prior to plaintiff’s claim.
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissent of JONES, District Judge.