Court Opinion

ID: 9785751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:19:30.359821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:32.840583
License: Public Domain

KESSLER, Judge,
dissenting.
¶27 I respectfully dissent from the decision of the court because the alleged loss here had no pecuniary impact on the victim and was thus not an “economic” loss. While the victim could seek damages for his loss of enjoyment of the class in a separate civil action, both our statutory scheme and due process considerations prohibit an award of non-economic damages as part of restitution.
¶ 28 It is undisputed that the victim paid the tuition for a culinary course in advance of the course and that he missed one day of class because of the delinquent act. It is also undisputed that, although the victim would not be reimbursed for the missed class, he did not incur any additional costs as a result of his absence and he completed the semester without having to make up the class. There was no evidence that missing the class had any subsequent monetary impact on the victim, such as additional tuition to make up the class, lost revenue by missing work to make up the class, or even in lost earning potential. In determining the loss resulting from Andrew’s assault on the victim, the juvenile court and the majority have superimposed an economic value on a loss that is non-economic in nature and demanded Andrew reimburse that loss.
¶29 I disagree with the majority’s approach to this question of statutory interpretation because restitution is reserved for true economic losses directly caused by the crime.5 While the statutory definition of “economic loss” is broad,6 the Arizona Supreme Court has limited the kind of losses subject to restitution to those that: (1) are economic, (2) would not have occurred but for the juvenile’s delinquent conduct, and (3) are directly caused by the delinquent conduct. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d at 1133. The loss here does not satisfy this test because it simply is not economic.
¶ 30 I agree with the majority’s analysis that the statutory definition of economic loss leaves us little guidance in determining whether a loss is “economic.” I further agree with the majority that, in the face of such ambiguity, we should resort to the common usage of the term, “economic,” as cata-*372logued in dictionaries. I do not, however, ascribe to the majority’s selection of a portion of a secondary definition to define a complex term. I believe this approach does not lead to an accurate portrayal of the commonly used, plain meaning of the term, “economic.”
¶ 31 The adjective “economic” has evolved since its introduction to the English language during the sixteenth century. See The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. I 831 (1971) (“OED”); Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www. etymonline.com/index.php?term= economy (last visited June 7, 2007) (“Online Etymology Dictionary”). It is derived from Greek and Latin terms for household management, and hence, its initial meaning was, “of or relating to a household or its management.” Definition of Economic — Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.webster.com/ dictionary/economic (last visited June 7, 2007) (“Merriam Webster”); OED, supra; Online Etymology Dictionary, supra. Over time, this definition came to denote private income and expenditure. OED, supra. Around the late eighteenth century, following the publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, the term “economic” became associated with the social science field of Economics. See OED, supra; Online Etymology Dictionary, supra. In this sense, the term can be said to mean, as aptly stated by the majority, “of, relating to, or based on the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services,” or “of or relating to an economy.” Merriam Webster, supra. Thus, in addition to its relationship to the study of Economics, the accepted meanings of the adjective “economic” have come to include: “marked by careful, efficient, and prudent use of resources: thrifty;” “having practical or industrial significance or uses: affecting material resources;” and “profitable.” Merriam Webster, supra.
¶ 32 In this array of meaning, a common thread may be detected: pecuniary interests and material resources. Common usage of the term “economic” then, has consistently related to pecuniary interests and material resources. While consumption of goods and services is subsumed in that usage, as the majority aptly points out, the consumption of goods and services does not subsume the entirety of the common understanding of the term “economic.” In relying heavily upon one aspect of a broad term, the majority thereby redefines the term in a way not necessarily indicative of its common usage.
¶33 I therefore part with the majority’s definition of the term “economic” in favor of a definition that better encompasses the common usage of the term; that is, involving pecuniary interests and material resources. Thus, I would hold that the statutory limitation of loss compensable through criminal restitution to economic loss evinces legislative intent that those losses must involve pecuniary interests and material resources.
¶ 34 The reimbursement of pre-paid tuition awarded in this case does not meet that criterion. The tuition for the culinary class was a fixed cost, paid prior to the assault. The victim paid to attend the class he missed prior to the assault. To the extent the victim experienced a loss involving his pecuniary interests or material resources, then, under the facts presented in this case, the loss occurred prior to the assault. There is no evidence the victim had to pay for anything associated with the class after the assault, nor is there any evidence that missing that class had any detrimental effect on the victim’s pecuniary interests or material resources. The only loss to the victim occurring after and resulting from the assault was a loss of enjoyment of the class. Such a loss of enjoyment is not compensable as restitution in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
¶ 35 The majority contends that loss of enjoyment is compensable as a criminal restitution award. I disagree. Enjoyment in and of itself is non-economic in nature. It is the ability to participate in and derive pleasure from a given activity. See Ogden v. J.M. Steel Erecting, Inc., 201 Ariz. 32, 39, ¶¶ 29-31, 31 P.3d 806, 813 (App.2001) (claim for loss of enjoyment of life compensates victim for subjective knowledge he can no longer engage in life’s pursuits as well as objective loss of ability to participate in those pursuits); Sheppard v. Crow-Barker-Paul No. 1 Ltd. P’ship, 192 Ariz. 539, 549, ¶ 52, 968 P.2d 612, 622 (App.1998) (distinguishing claim for loss *373of enjoyment of activity from loss of earning potential). While enjoyment in this sense certainly has value, that value is non-material and transcends pecuniary interests. It is therefore non-economic. The loss of enjoyment therefore is not subject to a criminal restitution award.7
¶ 36 The distinction between a loss of enjoyment and an economic loss is evident in this case. The enjoyment lost here was the victim’s ability to participate in and derive pleasure from the class he missed. This, in and of itself is non-economic in nature. Based on the record presented, the only aspect of the course that involved pecuniary interests and material resources was the tuition. The tuition was charged before the class occurred and was chargeable in full regardless of whether the victim did or did not participate in and derive benefit from the class he missed. The loss of enjoyment complained of here is independent of the sole economic aspect8 of the class established in the record.9
¶ 37 The distinction between an economic loss and loss of enjoyment is illustrated in eases involving damaged vehicles. In William L., for example, after the defendant “totaled” the victim’s vehicle, the juvenile court entered an award of restitution for the victim’s insurance deductible in purchasing a replacement vehicle and for the amount she paid in an accelerated payoff on the lien on the vehicle. 211 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 9,119 P.3d at 1042. In affirming the award, including the amount exceeding the fair market value of the vehicle, this Court emphasized the “financial burdens” the victim suffered as a result of the destruction of her vehicle. Id. at 240, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d at 1043. At no point, however, did this Court mention any enjoyment of the use or appearance of the vehicle the victim may have lost or missed out on, despite that the vehicle had been totally destroyed as a result of the delinquent act.
¶ 38 In Barrett, the defendant pled guilty to fraudulent schemes and artifices after he purchased a vehicle with a bad check. 177 Ariz. at 46 — 47, 864 P.2d at 1078-79. The trial court entered a restitution award based upon the dealership manager’s testimony that, because the vehicle was returned to the dealership after the release of a new edition of the Kelly Blue Book, the dealership had lost an amount of profit it would have realized had the vehicle legitimately sold prior to that release. Id. at 47, 864 P.2d at 1079. After holding that this purported lost profit margin was consequential damages, this Court went on to point out that there was no evidence to support the amount of the award. Id. at 48, 864 P.2d at 1080. This was because there was no evidence of the amount the victim had paid for the vehicle, the time and amount for which the vehicle sold, or the actual Blue Book value of the vehicle. Id. at 48-49, 864 P.2d at 1080-81. The absent evidence indicates the pecuniary and material aspect of economic losses: this Court insisted upon evidence of monetary values for the alleged lost profit. If such non-pecuniary losses were compensable in criminal restitution, the dealership’s loss of enjoyment of the vehicle during the period it was in the defendant’s possession would have been compensa-ble, and certainly provable by means other than showing actual monetary values.
¶ 39 In Morris, this Court affirmed an award of restitution for the cost of taxi fares and ear rental fees after the victim’s vehicle was damaged by the defendant. 173 Ariz. at 18-19, 839 P.2d at 438-39. The court stated that “basic necessities of everyday life” should be recoverable in criminal restitution. Id. at 19, 839 P.2d at 439. Although this Court declined to adopt an unduly narrow *374approach to compensable criminal restitution awards, the approach is nonetheless pragmatic. Significantly, the court’s illustrations of awards for the “necessities of life” involved subsequent expenditures for medical treatment, mental health counseling, and moving to a safer location. Id. In addition, the restitution awarded for the victim’s deprivation of the vehicle did not relate to his inability to use the vehicle or gaze upon its visage, but to the costs associated with replacing how he used the vehicle. Id. No such costs have been demonstrated here.
¶40 Absent such actual costs, in a strict economic sense the award here places the victim in a better pecuniary and material position than he was prior to the delinquent act, for he would not have had the benefit of the money awarded regardless of whether he attended the class. This is not an appropriate result in criminal restitution awards. Ryan A., 202 Ariz. at 25, ¶ 27, 39 P.3d at 549 (restitution should not result in a windfall to the victim). As mentioned above, I do not deny the victim experienced a non-eeonomic loss. Surely the loss of enjoyment of his class is a compensable loss. This loss, however, must be compensated after a civil trial.
¶ 41 Andrew’s liability for the victim’s loss must be litigated in a civil trial for constitutional reasons. A civil trial would afford Andrew due process rights not available in criminal restitution proceedings. As this Court has stated:
Disposing of civil liability cannot be a function of restitution in a criminal case. To begin with, the criminal justice system is essentially incapable of determining that a defendant is in fact civilly liable, and if so, to what extent. A judge may infer from a jury verdict of guilt in a theft case that a defendant is liable to the crime victim. But a trial court cannot properly conclude that the defendant owes money to a third party for other unproved or disproved crimes or conduct. A party sued civilly has important due process rights, including appropriate pleadings, discovery, and a right to a trial by jury on the specific issues of liability and damages. The judge in the criminal trial should not be permitted to emasculate those rights by simply declaring his belief that the defendant owes a sum of money.
State v. Reese, 124 Ariz. 212, 215, 603 P.2d 104, 107 (App.1979) (citation omitted). See also Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 29-30, ¶¶ 11-12, 39 P.3d at 1133-34 (limiting restitution to damages directly caused by crime prevents restitution statutes from conflicting with right to civil jury trial).10 If courts permit victims to be made whole by allowing all damages — economic and non-economic — from the crime to be subject to restitution, those rights will be violated.
¶42 Clearly, a victim who suffers non-economic harm from a crime can sue the perpetrator civilly to be made whole. Those losses, however, cannot be made part of a criminal restitution award. Consequently, I would hold that the juvenile court erred when it ordered Andrew to reimburse a portion of the pre-paid tuition to the victim and would vacate that portion of the restitution award.

. The trial court typically has the discretion to apply the facts of the case to determine an appropriate restitution award. Ryan A., 202 Ariz. at 24, ¶20, 39 P.3d at 548. This case, however, turns largely on a question of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo. See State v. Cabanas-Salgado, 208 Ariz. 195, 196, ¶ 11, 92 P.3d 421, 422 (App.2003).

. Economic loss is defined by statute as "any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of an offense. Economic loss includes lost interest, lost earnings and other losses which would not have been incurred but for the offense. Economic loss does not include losses incurred by the convicted person, damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages or consequential damages.” A.R.S. § 13-105(14).

. The majority makes a point that there are other means of valuation besides fair market value for criminal restitution purposes. I agree there are different means by which a court in its discretion may value compensable economic loss. See Ellis, 172 Ariz. at 551, 838 P.2d at 1312. Valuation, however, is an inquiry separate from com-pensability.

. The result would be different if there was some evidence in the record indicating the missed class had some impact upon the victim’s material resources or pecuniary interests. There is none.

. My analysis remains the same in other like scenarios. Thus, in the hypothetical situations described by the majority, assuming no additional facts, I would conclude that the losses described were non-economic losses of enjoyment not compensable in criminal restitution proceedings. Instead, they would be more appropriately compensated in civil proceedings.

. The majority cites Wilkinson to state that its analysis passes constitutional muster. As the majority acknowledges, though, the analysis in Wilkinson had little bearing on the issue presented in this case. Majority at ¶ 16. Thus, the statement in Wilkinson declaring its own analysis satisfied constitutional protections does not lend support to the contention that the majority's analysis, which consciously does not rely upon Wilkinson, also satisfies those protections.