Court Opinion

ID: 9639752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:46:58.031767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:21.478149
License: Public Domain

*604BLEIL, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot join in the majority’s opinion on motion for rehearing.1 The majority characterizes the effect of certain evidence. Originally, it labeled the evidence “undisputed”; now the evidence is “uncontrovert-ed.” True, Rancho Guadalupe chose not to present evidence at the hearing on motion for new trial. Because there was no evidence or indication that the case was resolved on the basis of an unauthorized compromise settlement agreement, and because the Johnsons presented no evidence otherwise showing their entitlement to a new trial, Rancho Guadalupe may well have seen no need to present evidence. I enter my dissent to the majority's opinion on motion for rehearing.2

. I also decline to join in the dicta expressed by the majority concerning the inapplicability of our usual standards of review concerning the facts found by the trial court. The majority's view appears to be that a trial judge has no fact finding authority following a hearing on motion for new trial.

. In my original dissenting opinion, I invited Rancho Guadalupe’s attorney — the only attorney still in the case who was involved in the trial proceedings — to address the question of any concession by him that there was an agreed judgment if the majority’s memory be correct. On motion for rehearing he asserts, as he did at trial, that the judgment was not an "agreed judgment” or "consent decree” but rather was an "approved decree.” In his motion for rehearing, Mr. Moseley clarifies what he means by “approved decree.” He asserts that it means "that the counsel for the defense was accorded the courtesy of seeing a decree and approving it prior (o the time of trial, but with the judgment being based upon the evidence as it was produced at the time of trial.”