Court Opinion

ID: 9370132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 21:02:01.845663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.565991
License: Public Domain

REL: FEBRUARY 10, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                 Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                                _________________________

                                         CR-2022-0543
                                   _________________________

                                 Michael Carvese Williams

                                                      v.

                                         State of Alabama

    Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division
  (CC-16-665, CC-16-666, CC-16-667, CC-16-668, CC-16-669, CC-16-
            670, CC-16-671, CC-16-672, and CC-16-673)

KELLUM, Judge.

        The appellant, Michael Carvese Williams, was convicted of two

counts of rape in the first degree, see §13A-6-61, Ala. Code 1975; three

counts of the sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12, see § 13A-6-69.1,

Ala. Code 1975; two counts of sodomy in the first degree, see § 13A-6-63,
CR-2022-0543

Ala. Code 1975; one count of enticing a child for immoral purposes, see §

13A-6-69, Ala. Code 1975; and one count of facilitating the travel of a

child for an unlawful sexual act, see § 13A-6-125, Ala. Code 1975.1 The

circuit court sentenced Williams to 20 years in prison for each rape

conviction, 10 years in prison for each sexual abuse conviction, 20 years

in prison for each sodomy conviction, 10 years in prison for the enticing

conviction, and 10 years in prison for the facilitating conviction. The

circuit court ordered that the sentences run concurrently with the

exception of the sentences for the rape convictions, which the court

ordered were to run consecutively.

      Williams does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to

support any of his convictions, thus, we give only a brief rendition of the

facts presented at trial. A.W. testified that at the time of trial she was

18 years old.2 In the summer of 2015, A.W. was 11 years old and was

living with her mother, stepfather, and her brothers in Edgewater. (R.

272.) Williams was her stepfather's brother and would often visit when

      1The State moved that the nine charges be consolidated; Williams
did not object and that motion was granted. (R. 3.)
      2Pursuant   to Rule 52, Ala. R. App. P., we are using the victim's
initials.
                                     2
CR-2022-0543

her parents were not at home. The first time he touched her, A.W. said,

Williams "put [her] hand in his private area and made [her touch him].

Once stuff started coming out, that is when he stopped." (R. 276-77.) At

this time, she said, Williams told her that if she told anybody he was

"going to kill my momma and my stepdad." (R. 282.)

     In another instance, she said, she was in her room and Williams

came in and tried to make her watch pornography on his cellular

telephone. "[Williams] told me to look at a couple of videos to show me

how to do the nasty. So, he -- I didn't want to watch the video. I told him

no. So, he put his phone back up. After that, he put me on my bed and

he pulled my pants down. He tried to eat my stuff [her privates, she

explained] but [she] wouldn't let him." (R. 278.) A.W. said that he then

put his penis in her butt but "pulled it out and then he stopped." (R. 279.)

     Another time, A.W. said, her mother and stepfather were getting

ready to go out and Williams was going to go with them. She said that

Williams came back and told her to go into the living room and get on the

couch. A.W. testified: "When I laid down, he told me he isn't going to

stick it in too far because he didn't want to pop my cherry." (R. 284.)

A.W. said that he put his penis in her vagina and that she told him to

                                     3
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stop because it hurt and that he stopped once "the white stuff came out."

(R. 285.) She said that she bled and went to the bathroom to clean

herself.

     The last time, A.W. testified, Williams took her to a park late at

night. A.W. testified: "Cars were flying by -- passing by. So he turned

around and we got back in the car. And once we got in the car, he tried

to put his hands in my pants. And he used his fingers but he didn't stick

his fingers all the way in me. He rubbed my -- my private." (R. 289.)

     A.W. testified that her grandmother was notified by a friend that

A.W. had been at a nearby park with an adult man late at night. When

her grandmother confronted her, she said, she "just broke down" and she

told her family what Williams had done to her. (R. 291.)

     The jury convicted Williams of the nine counts charged in the

indictment. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                   I.

     Williams first argues that the circuit court erred in allowing the

State to present evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ala.

R. Evid. Specifically, he argues that the circuit court erred in allowing

                                    4
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two witnesses to testify that when Williams was 18 years old he had been

arrested and charged with the rape of a 12-year-old.

     The record shows that the State filed notice that it intended to

present Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., evidence. The notice read that the

State intended to present "any incidents of [Williams], being an adult,

engaging in sexual intercourse with minors around the age of 11 or 12

years old." (C. 51.) Williams moved in limine that the court bar the State

from presenting any Rule 404(b) evidence. He argued that the probative

value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, that there was no purpose to be served in admitting the

evidence, and that the evidence was barred by § 15-19-5, Ala. Code 1975,

because, he said, he had been granted youthful-offender status for the

prior offense. 3 (C. 157.) This motion was discussed at a pretrial hearing.

(R. 5-24.) The following discussion occurred:

     "THE COURT: Next is a motion in limine by the defense. I
     think this follows a notice of Rule 404(b) evidence by the
     State. Although the State was not specific in its 404(b) notice
     of what it intends to offer, the defense in their motion seems

     3Section 15-19-5, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part: "No
statement, admission or confession made by a defendant to the court or
to any officer thereof during the examination and investigation [to
determine whether a defendant is treated as a youthful offender] shall be
admissible as evidence against him or his interest."
                                    5
CR-2022-0543

    to be saying it expects the State to offer the defendant's prior
    plea of guilty and conviction for youthful offender in an
    underlying case where the charge is rape in the second degree.
    Is that what the State wishes to offer?

    "[Prosecutor]: In part, Your Honor. But what we actually
    want to offer is the conduct, not the conviction necessarily, but
    the conduct to show motive. The State did put in its motion
    specifically as our 404(b), that [Williams] being an adult
    involving with sexual intercourse with minors around the age
    of 11 or 12. It is that conduct to prove motive which is always
    admissible to show an unnatural attraction for little girls. I
    have lots of caselaw. If you want him to go first or argue the
    caselaw showing that the conduct is admissible and not
    necessarily the adjudication of the case -- not the guilty plea
    but the conduct of the unnatural attraction to little girls is
    always admissible to prove motive. That is what we would
    introduce as 404(b). …

    "THE COURT: And how would you do that? How would you
    introduce it?

    "[Prosecutor]: There are various ways you can introduce that
    testimony; statement by party opponent, his admission to
    other people about the charges, and of course witness
    testimony that have been there and have firsthand knowledge
    of the facts. There are several ways to introduce. We want to
    be able to present that evidence.

    "THE COURT: Would you also have an investigator -- a police
    investigator testify that they did an investigation of
    [Williams's] background and found this other case and what
    happened?

    "[Prosecutor]: Potentially, Your Honor. Yes, sir.

    "THE COURT:        You would elicit that testimony of an
    investigator?

                                   6
CR-2022-0543

     "[Prosecutor]: Investigator, witness or anybody that would
     have firsthand knowledge or were involved in the
     investigation or, again, admissions, by a party opponent that
     he engaged in these actions to other people. "

(R. 5-8.) The circuit court ruled that §15-19-5, Ala. Code 1975, did not

"exclude evidence of a youthful offender plea" and that "there is no code

section that excludes evidence of a youthful offender plea being

admissible for anything other than sentencing." (R. 14.) 4 When asked to

further explain how the previous conviction showed motive, the State

explained:

     "To the issue of motive, motive in the case that we represented
     to Your Honor, Brownlee v. State, [197 So. 3d 1024 (Ala. Crim.
     App. 2015),] case is very similar in that the State was trying
     to introduce prior bad acts or uncharged, actually, victims in
     the case, that he was charged with rape and it was a similar -
     - so the motive as defined is an inducement or that which
     leads or attempts to do or commit the crime. …

          "Specifically, in this case -- the caselaw in this case talks
     about the testimony regarding collateral acts of sexual abuse
     was admissible to show the defendant's motive, i.e., his
     unnatural sexual desire for young girls."

     4"An  adjudication of youthful offender status may not be considered
a prior felony conviction within the meaning of the Habitual Felony
Offender Act, § 13A-5-9 et seq." Gordon v. Nagle, 647 So. 2d 91, 95 (Ala.
1994). For a discussion of the use of a prior youthful offender
adjudication, see Thomas v. State, 445 So. 2d 992 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
                                     7
CR-2022-0543

(R. 19-20.) The circuit court found that the prior act was admissible to

establish motive and that "its probative value is substantial in this case

and is not outweighed by the prejudicial effect to [Williams]. (R. 22-23.)

       In this case, two witnesses testified concerning Williams's prior

rape charges -- Brenda Williams and Captain Jacob Reach. Brenda

testified that she is employed at the Jefferson County Department of

Human Resources as a supervisor in the Child Abuse and Neglect Unit.

(R. 117.) She said that she was involved in the investigation involving

A.W. and testified that as part of that investigation she examined

Department of Human Resources ("DHR") records to determine if

Williams had any prior contact with DHR and that she used the Family,

Adult and Child Tracking System. (R. 122.)

       "[Brenda Williams]: I found out that this particular person
       had a prior investigation in 2002, where this person was
       indicated for sexual abuse, sexual penetration of a child.

       "[Prosecutor]: And what does indicated mean, again?

       "[Brenda]: Indicated means that based on our investigation
       and based on all of the information that we gather; we have
       enough evidence to prove to the State that what this person
       did was true."

(R. 134-35.) She further testified that the victim in that case was 12 years

old.

                                     8
CR-2022-0543

     Captain Jacob Reach testified that he is a captain with the

Jefferson County Sheriff's Department and that in July 2002 he was

assigned to investigate a case involving Williams and the rape of a 12-

year-old girl. (R. 213.) He said that in 2002, Williams was 18 years old.

As a result of this investigation, he said, Williams was arrested for rape.

(R. 215-17.)

     "The decision whether to allow or not to allow evidence of collateral

crimes or acts as part of the State's case-in-chief rests within the sound

discretion of the trial judge." Blanco v. State, 515 So. 2d 115, 120 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1987). When discussing the application of Rule 404(b), Ala.

R. Evid., this Court has stated:

           "Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., provides, in pertinent part:

           " 'Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
           admissible to prove the character of a person in
           order to show action in conformity therewith. It
           may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
           such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
           preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
           of mistake or accident....'

     "A trial judge should exclude evidence falling within one of the
     exceptions listed in rule 404(b) only if the probative value of
     that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of
     unfair prejudice. See Ex parte Register, 680 So. 2d 225 (Ala.
     1994).

                                    9
CR-2022-0543

          "Under the general exclusionary rule in Rule 404(b), a
    prior act of sexual abuse would be inadmissible. However, in
    this case, the alleged prior bad act was offered to prove
    motive.

         " ' "Motive is defined as 'an inducement, or that
         which leads or tempts the mind to do or commit
         the crime charged.' Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 11,
         65 So. 972, 977 (1914). Motive has been described
         as 'that state of mind which works to "supply the
         reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to
         indulge the criminal intent." ' [Charles Gamble,
         Character Evidence: A Comprehensive Approach
         42 (1987).]

         " ' "Furthermore, testimony offered for the purpose
         of showing motive is always admissible.
         McClendon v. State, 243 Ala. 218, 8 So. 2d 883
         (1942). Accord, Donahoo v. State, 505 So. 2d 1067
         (Ala. Cr. App. 1986). ' "It is permissible in every
         criminal case to show that there was an influence,
         an inducement, operating on the accused, which
         may have led or tempted him to commit the
         offense." McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154 [(1878)].'
         Nickerson v. State, 205 Ala. 684, 685, 88 So. 905,
         907 (1921)." '

    "Hatcher v. State, 646 So. 2d 676, 679 (Ala. 1994), quoting
    Bowden v. State, 538 So. 2d 1226, 1237 (Ala. 1988).

          "In determining whether evidence of a collateral act of
    sexual abuse is admissible to prove motive, the trial court
    must consider the following factors: ' "(1) the offense(s)
    charged; (2) the circumstances surrounding the offense(s)
    charged and the collateral offense(s); (3) the other collateral
    evidence offered at trial; and (4) the other purpose(s) for which
    it is offered." ' Campbell v. State, 718 So. 2d 123, 130 (Ala.
    Crim. App. 1997), quoting Bowden, 538 So. 2d 1237."

                                   10
CR-2022-0543

Proctor v. City of Prattville, 830 So. 2d 38, 41-42 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001).

See also Garner v. State, 977 So. 2d 533 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Estes v.

State, 776 So. 2d 206 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).

     Williams first asserts that "[w]hatever motive that may have

existed in Williams's mind in 2002, given the different set of facts and

circumstances between the 2002 incident and the 2015 charged crimes,

did not lie latent for thirteen (13) years only to reappear for a period of

about one month in July and August of 2015." (Williams's brief at p. 21.)

     However, this Court has held:

           " 'Neither the Alabama Rules of Evidence nor Alabama
     caselaw sets a specific time limit for when a collateral act is
     considered too remote, other than a conviction for
     impeachment purposes.' McClendon v. State, 813 So. 2d 936,
     944 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001); see also C. Gamble, Gamble's
     Alabama Rules of Evidence, § 404(b) (2d ed. 2002). Rule
     609(b), Ala. R. Evid., specifically provides that a conviction
     that is more than 10 years old is not admissible for
     impeachment purposes unless the trial court determines 'that
     the probative value of the conviction supported by specific
     facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
     prejudicial effect.' Rule 609(b) has no application to the
     admission of collateral acts to establish motive."

Bedsole v. State, 974 So. 2d 1034, 1040 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). Thus, the

prior bad act was not barred on the basis of the passage of 13 years

between the bad act and the charged offenses.

                                    11
CR-2022-0543

     Williams next argues that the evidence that was presented

concerning the prior 2002 conduct was inadmissible because, he says, it

was all hearsay. Williams appears to contend that the only means of

adequately proving the prior bad act was through the testimony of the

2002 victim.

     "In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687, 108 S.Ct.
     1496, 1500, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), the United States Supreme
     Court 'expressly declined to require a level of proof of at least
     a preponderance of the evidence before the trial court could
     allow evidence of an extrinsic act to go before the jury.' Ex
     parte Hinton, 548 So. 2d [562] 567 [(Ala. 1989)]. 'Rather,
     "similar" acts evidence should be admitted if there is sufficient
     evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant
     committed the similar act.' Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685, 108
     S.Ct. at 1499."

Akin v. State, 698 So. 2d 228, 235 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). See also Ex

parte Hinton, 548 So. 2d 562 (Ala. 1989).

     Other courts have held that a police officer's testimony concerning

a prior bad act is sufficient for purposes of proof under Rule 404(b), Ala.

R. Evid.

           "The defendant primarily argues that the trial court
     erred in finding 'clear proof' that the defendant intentionally
     fractured Gregory's leg. We have previously affirmed 'clear
     proof' determinations where the State provided the trial court
     with evidence firmly establishing that the defendant, and not
     some other person, committed the prior bad act. See [State v.
     Simonds, 135 N.H. [203,] 208, 600 A.2d [928,] 931 [(1991)]

                                    12
CR-2022-0543

     (State proffered that victim would testify that defendant had
     sexually assaulted her on prior occasions); State v. Tarsitano,
     134 N.H. 730, 734-35, 599 A.2d 474, 476-77 (1991)
     (defendant's friend testified that he participated in burglaries
     with the defendant); State v. Dalphond, 133 N.H. 827, 831,
     585 A.2d 317, 320 (1991) (victim, who was member of
     defendant's household, described contents of pornographic
     material owned by the defendant); State v. Gruber, 132 N.H.
     83, 89, 562 A.2d 156, 159-60 (1989) (State introduced
     cancelled checks, receipts, and telephone records to prove that
     defendant had engaged in prior bad acts); [State v.] Trainor,
     130 N.H. [371] 374, 540 A.2d [1236] 1238 [(1988)] (police
     officer 'chronicled the events surrounding [a prior] indictment
     and linked the defendant to them'); State v. Barker, 117 N.H.
     543, 545-46, 374 A.2d 1179, 1180 (1977) (police officer testified
     that defendant had previously engaged in drug transactions)."

State v. Michaud, 135 N.H. 723, 727-28, 610 A.2d 354, 356 (1992). See

State v. Howard, 228 N.C. App. 103, 742 S.E. 2d 858 (2013); State v.

Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 1997).

     Captain Reach's testimony was based, in part, on his firsthand

knowledge of the investigation of the 2002 charges because he was the

investigating officer.   The information concerning the investigation was

not based on what someone had told him but on "what he knew from

firsthand knowledge." Williams v. State, 627 So. 2d 985, 991 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1991).   See Rivers v. State, 689 So. 2d 990, 991 (Ala. Crim. App.

1996) ("The probation officer's testimony is hearsay unless the officer has

firsthand knowledge of the facts in the probation report.").     Thus, his

                                    13
CR-2022-0543

"statements [based on the firsthand knowledge] are by definition not

hearsay." Stephens v. First Commercial Bank, 45 So. 3d 735, 738 (Ala.

2010). Also, Brenda Williams's testimony was based on official records

maintained by DHR. See Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Human Res. v. L.S., 60

So. 3d 308 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).

     Williams also argues that the circuit court erred in failing to give a

limiting instruction on the use of the Rule 404(b) evidence. The record

indicates that Williams did not request a limiting instruction at the

charge conference.   (R. 324-44.)   Neither did Williams object at the

conclusion of the circuit court's jury instructions.   (R. 435.)   As the

Alabama Supreme Court stated in Ex parte Billups, 86 So. 3d 1079 (Ala.

2010):

     "In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496,
     99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), the United States Supreme Court
     stated that, when evidence of a defendant's other crimes,
     wrongs, or acts is introduced under Rule 404(b), Fed. R. Evid.,
     'the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that the
     similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper
     purpose for which it was admitted.' 485 U.S. at 691–92, 108
     S.Ct. 1496 (citing United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229,
     235 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasis added))."

86 So. 3d at 1085 (emphasis added). See also Windsor v. State, 110 So.

3d 876 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012). We have held there is no error in failing

                                    14
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to sua sponte give a limiting instruction on the use of evidence of prior

bad acts when that evidence was not admitted for impeachment purposes

but was admitted as substantive evidence of guilt. See Dotch v. State, 67

So. 3d 936 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).

       In this case, the evidence of prior 2002 charges was introduced to

establish Williams's motive for the now-charged crimes and his

"unnatural sexual desire for young girls." See Garner v. State, 977 So.

2d at 537. Based on the decisions cited above, we hold that the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of Williams's 2002

rape charges.      Therefore, Williams is due no relief on his claims

regarding the admission of the Rule 404(b) evidence.

                                     II.

       Williams next argues that the circuit court erred in its application

of § 15-25-31, Ala. Code 1975. Specifically, he argues that it was a

violation of the ex post facto clause for the circuit court to apply the

current version of the statute rather than the version that was in effect

at the time that the offenses occurred. Williams further argues that the

2016 change to the statute was a substantive change, not a procedural

one.

                                     15
CR-2022-0543

     The record indicates that Williams made a motion in limine seeking

to have the version that was law at the time of the offenses, not the

current version of § 15-25-31, Ala. Code 1975, applied. (C. 70.) This

motion was discussed at a pretrial hearing. (R. 24-31.) The State argued

that the change to §15-25-31 was procedural and that matters concerning

procedure are governed by the law in effect at the time of trial, not at the

time of the offense. (R. 31.) The circuit court agreed with the State and

denied Williams's motion in limine. (R. 31.) During A.W.'s testimony the

State introduced a video copy of the interview that was conducted with

A.W. at the time that the charges were reported when A.W. was 11 years

old. (R. 295.) Williams again objected.

     Section 15-25-31, Ala. Code 1975, as amended effective May 11,

2016, provides:

          "An out-of-court statement made by a child under 12
     years of age at the time the statement is made, or by a
     protected person as defined in Section 15-25-1, concerning an
     act that is a material element of any crime involving a
     physical offense, sexual offense, or violent offense, as defined
     in Section 15-25-39, which statement is not otherwise
     admissible in evidence, is admissible in evidence in criminal
     proceedings, if the requirements of Section 15-25-32 are met."

     In 2015, this statute read:

                                    16
CR-2022-0543

          "An out-of-court statement made by a child under 12
     years of age at the time of the proceeding concerning an act
     that is a material element of any crime involving child
     physical offense, sexual offense, and exploitation, as defined
     in section 15-25-39, which statement is not otherwise
     admissible in evidence, is admissible in evidence in criminal
     proceedings, if the requirements of section 15-25-32 are met.”

     "A law or rule relating merely to matters of procedure, and not

depriving the accused of any substantial right, is not ex post facto."

Bighames v. State, 462 So. 2d 796, 797 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). Discussing

a procedural change versus a substantive change, this Court has stated:

           "The laws regarding substantive and jurisdictional
     matters in effect at the time of the crime are applied because
     changes in those laws occurring after the offense may
     constitute ex post facto laws. See generally Collins v.
     Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30
     (1990); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216
     (1925). In contrast, '[p]rocedural rules generally regulate trial
     proceedings, and these rules are not generally targeted as
     proscribing unwanted conduct [or otherwise falling within the
     definition of an ex post facto law]. Therefore, it does not seem
     unfair to require parties to comply with the rules of procedure
     applicable at the time in which they begin a new trial
     proceeding.' Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service
     Co., 963 F.2d 929, 939 (7th Cir. 1992), quoted in Brown v.
     Amoco Oil Co., 793 F. Supp. 846, 851 (N.D. Ind. 1992).

           " '[T]he word "procedural" ... refers to ... the procedures
     by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to ... the
     substantive law of crime.' Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. at
     45, 110 S.Ct. at 2720."

Prince v. State, 623 So. 2d 355, 362 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).

                                    17
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     The South Carolina Court of Appeals has addressed a similar issue

regarding the admission of a child's statement. In State v. Bryant, 382

S.C. 505, 675 S.E.2d 816 (2009), that court stated:

           "The purpose of an ex post facto clause is to prevent
     lawmakers from passing 'arbitrary or vindictive legislation.'
     Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96
     L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (citations omitted). An ex post facto clause
     also ensures that legislative enactments 'give fair warning of
     their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning
     until explicitly changed.' Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-
     29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). For a law to present
     an ex post facto violation, the law must (1) be retrospective
     and apply to events taking place prior to its enactment and
     (2) work to disadvantage the offender. State v. Huiett, 302
     S.C. 169, 171, 394 S.E.2d 486, 487 (1990).

          "The seminal case of Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 3 Dall.
     386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), sets forth four general categories of
     law that are violative of the ex post facto clause of the United
     States Constitution.

                  " '1st. Every law that makes an action, done
           before the passing of the law, and which was
           innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such
           action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
           makes it greater than it was, when committed.
           3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and
           inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
           annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every
           law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
           receives less, or different, testimony, than the law
           required at the time of the commission of the
           offence, in order to convict the offender.

                                   18
CR-2022-0543

    "Id. at 390.

          "A change in the law does not run afoul of the ex post
    facto clause if it only affects a mode of procedure and does not
    alter 'substantial personal rights.' Huiett, 302 S.C. at 171,
    394 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting Miller, 482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct.
    2446). Furthermore, in order for the ex post facto clause to be
    implicated, the statute at issue must be criminal or penal in
    purpose and nature. Id. at 172, 394 S.E.2d at 487. 'Even
    though a procedural change may have a detrimental impact
    on a defendant, a mere procedural change which does not
    affect substantial rights is not ex post facto.' Id. at 171-72,
    394 S.E.2d at 487.

          "The United States Supreme Court has determined
    changes in laws that made previously inadmissible evidence
    admissible did not violate the ex post facto clause. See
    Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 386-87, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43
    L.Ed. 204 (1898) (finding application of law admitting
    previously inadmissible handwriting samples did not violate
    ex post facto clause); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589, 4 S.Ct.
    202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884) (holding admission of convicted
    felon's testimony, inadmissible at the time homicide was
    committed, did not violate ex post facto clause).

          "Other jurisdictions that have considered the admission
    of hearsay statements of child victims have reached the same
    conclusion. See Hall v. Vargas, 278 Ga. 868, 608 S.E.2d 200,
    202 (2005) (holding statutory change permitting state to
    introduce additional evidence in the form of hearsay
    statements attributed to child victim did not present an ex
    post facto violation); Villalon v. State, 805 S.W.2d 588, 591-92
    (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (finding statutory amendment changing
    rule of evidence to eliminate hearsay as a bar to the
    admissibility of certain category of outcry statements did not
    violate the ex post facto clause); Glendening v. State, 503 So.
    2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (finding no ex post
    facto violation when statutory amendment 'did not increase

                                  19
CR-2022-0543

     the punishment or deprive [defendant] of a defense' and 'the
     statute had no effect upon whether [defendant] committed the
     crime but simply authorized the introduction of additional
     evidence to demonstrate his guilt').

           "The admission of the previously inadmissible
     videotaped interviews did not change the quantum of
     evidence required to convict Bryant nor did it change the
     elements of the crime. Once the jury determined Bryant's
     guilt, the admission of the videotape did not alter or effect the
     punishment to which he was subject. Rather than being penal
     in nature, section 17-23-175 deals with procedural,
     evidentiary matters. Consequently, we do not believe this
     addition to the statutory scheme allowing for such out-of-
     court statement falls into one of the four categories set forth
     in Calder."

State v. Bryant, 382 S.C. at 510-12, 675 S.E.2d at 819-20.

     We agree with the South Carolina Court of Appeals. The change to

§ 15-25-31, Ala. Code 1975, was procedural in nature and not a

substantive change in the law. The circuit court did not err in applying

the statutory procedural law at the time of trial. See Prince v. State,

supra. For these reasons, Williams is due no relief on this claim.

                                   III.

     Last, Williams argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to give

his requested jury instruction on unanimity. Specifically, he argues that

the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could find

"[Williams] guilty only if it unanimously agree[d] that he committed all

                                    20
CR-2022-0543

the incidents described by the victim." (Williams's brief at p. 29.) He

relies on the Alabama Supreme Court case of R.A.S. v. State, 718 So. 2d

117 (Ala. 1998), to support his argument. He asserts that the evidence

presented at trial was "generic and ambiguous as to specific incidents on

specific dates" and that, therefore, an unanimity instruction should have

been given by the court. (Williams's brief, p. 30.)

     The record indicates that at the charge conference, Williams

requested a jury instruction on unanimity. (R. 324-44.) Also, at the

conclusion of the court's jury instructions, defense counsel objected to the

court's failure to give its requested instruction and the following

occurred:

     "[Defense counsel]: … [T]he law says in this type of case
     where there are allegations of multiple offenses in over a
     period of time that when the State elects to -- when -- when
     the State elects to prosecute those cases that each individual
     juror must determine that every one of these sexual acts
     occurred, otherwise your verdict must be not guilty. That is
     supported by lots of case law.

     "THE COURT: This seems to say that if the jury determines
     that one of these alleged sex acts didn't occur, they must find
     the defendant not guilty. I don't think that is an accurate
     reflection of the law. Even in nine separate charges, the jury
     could very well determine that one of these or two of these
     didn't happen but the other seven did.

     "….

                                    21
CR-2022-0543

     "[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, the State would say as Your Honor
     already pointed out. We charged nine different offenses. This
     is more applicable if we charged one count of rape and there
     were multiple rapes over a period of time. But the State
     elected to charge just one count of rape, is where this is more
     applicable.
           "In this case, we charged for the individual -- she said
     she remembers four or five different times. We alleged the
     sodomy, the rape and the three counts of sexual abuse of a
     child less than 12. We have already broken that down. Like
     Your Honor said, if they want to decide some of those
     happened and some of those didn't, they already have that
     option because we charged multiple indictments on the
     different acts. I don't think this is applicable to this case. We
     did charge, you know, for multiple acts. We charged different
     indictments. We didn't elect to travel under one sexual
     abuse."

(R. 332-34.)

     In R.A.S., the Alabama Supreme Court held:

     "In cases, such as this one, that involve both generic and
     specific evidence, where evidence of multiple culpable acts is
     adduced to prove a single charged offense, jury unanimity
     must be protected. Therefore, in such a case, the defendant is
     entitled either to have the State elect the single act upon
     which it is relying for a conviction or to have the court give a
     specific unanimity instruction. If the State chooses not to
     elect the specific act, the trial court must instruct the jury that
     all 12 jurors must agree that the same underlying criminal
     act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby
     assuring a unanimous verdict on one criminal act. Cf. State v.
     Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 571, 683 P.2d 173, 178 (1984)
     (where, in a factually similar case, the Washington Supreme
     Court required either that the State make an election or that
     the trial judge provide an unanimity instruction to the jury).
     See also, People v. Aldrich, 849 P.2d 821, 825 (Colo. App.

                                     22
CR-2022-0543

     1992) (where the court held that the defendant's right to a
     unanimous jury was ensured because, (1) 'although the trial
     court denied the defendant's pre-trial motion to compel an
     election, at the close of the trial, the trial court did compel the
     prosecutor to elect the specific incidents of conduct upon
     which it relied,' (2) 'the jury ultimately was instructed as to
     the specific incidents upon which the charges were based,' and
     (3) the jury 'was also given a unanimity instruction' (emphasis
     omitted))."

R.A.S., 718 So. 2d at 122 (footnote omitted).

     First, R.A.S. is factually distinguishable from this case. The Court

in R.A.S. specifically noted that the question presented in that case dealt

with a resident sex offender who had unfettered access to the child victim.

Here, Williams did not live with the victim, did not have a key to her

residence, and did not have unfettered access to the victim. Also, the

evidence here was specific -- A.W. testified to separate acts involving

Williams.

     Second, as the State argues in brief, if there was any error, that

error was harmless based on this Court's holding in R.L.G. v. State, 712

So. 2d 348 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). In R.L.G., this Court stated:

           "Although the trial court erred, we conclude that it is
     harmless error. In [People v.] Jones, [51 Cal. 3d 294, 270 Cal,
     Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643 (1990),] the court observed that
     '[s]ome cases found harmless any error in failing either to
     select specific offenses or [to] give a unanimity instruction, if
     the record indicated the jury resolved the basic credibility

                                     23
CR-2022-0543

    dispute against defendant and would have convicted the
    defendant of any of the various offenses shown by the evidence
    to have been committed.' 51 Cal. 3d at 307, 270 Cal. Rptr. at
    617, 792 P.2d at 649 (emphasis in original; citing People v.
    Moore, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1400, 1415-16, 260 Cal. Rptr. 134
    (1989); People v. Winkle, 206 Cal. App. 3d [822,] 828–30, 253
    Cal. Rptr. 726[, (1988)]; People v. Schultz, 192 Cal.App.3d
    535, 539-40, 237 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1987); People v. Deletto, 147
    Cal. App. 3d 458, 466, 470-73 & n. 10, 195 Cal. Rptr. 233
    (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 952, 104 S.Ct. 2156, 80 L.Ed.2d
    542 (1984)). For example, in Winkle, the victim testified that
    the defendant, her uncle, had molested her regularly each
    week; the prosecution made no election and no unanimity
    instruction was given. The court concluded that no prejudice
    resulted. Because the defendant made only a weak attempt
    to assert an alibi defense, the ultimate question for the jury
    was the defendant's credibility and the verdict necessarily
    implied that the jury unanimously believed the victim.

         "….

          "As we have already noted, the present case hinged
    solely on credibility, i.e., the defense was designed to show
    that none of the incidents occurred. There was absolutely no
    rational basis by which the jury could have found that the
    appellant committed one of the incidents but not the others.
    Any juror believing that one incident took place would have
    unquestionably believed that all the incidents took place.
    Thus, we can say that no rational juror could have had a
    reasonable doubt as to any of the incidents alleged. By
    returning guilty verdicts, the jurors must necessarily have
    unanimously rejected the appellant's defense and, by
    believing the victim, unanimously found that all the incidents
    occurred. We must conclude that, under these circumstances,
    the jury in fact unanimously agreed on the act forming the
    basis of the verdicts. Moreover, the appellant's rights to
    notice of the charges against him, to the opportunity to
    formulate a defense, and to be convicted only upon sufficient

                                 24
CR-2022-0543

     proof were not injuriously affected. We conclude to a certainty
     that, upon the peculiar circumstances of this case, the trial
     court's failure to give a specific unanimity instruction,
     necessitated by the prosecution's inability to elect, was
     harmless error. Compare Ex parte Curry, 471 So. 2d 476, 479
     (Ala.1984) (in a case not addressing an election issue, where
     the jury was not instructed generally that it must reach a
     unanimous verdict in order to convict or acquit, the court
     stated that 'the unanimous-verdict is so fundamental to the
     rights of the defendant that an omission to charge on that
     requirement must necessarily be prejudicial' because 'one
     member of the jury could [have] alter [ed] the ultimate verdict
     had they been instructed')."

R.L.G., 712 So. 2d at 368-69.

     In this case, defense counsel's entire closing argument consisted of

attacking A.W.'s credibility. The jury's guilty verdict on all nine counts

meant that "the jurors must necessarily have unanimously rejected the

appellant's defense and, by believing the victim, unanimously found that

all the incidents occurred." R.L.G., 712 So. 2d at 369. Accordingly, any

failure to give an unanimity instruction was harmless based on this

Court's decision in R.L.G. For these reasons, Williams is due no relief on

this claim.

     For the above stated reasons, we affirm Williams's convictions.

     AFFIRMED.

                                   25
CR-2022-0543

     McCool, J., concurs. Windom, P.J., and Minor, J., concur in the

result. Cole, J., dissents, with opinion.

                                     26
CR-2022-0543

COLE, Judge, dissenting.

     I respectfully dissent from this Court's opinion affirming Michael

Carvese Williams's convictions. I believe the trial court, over numerous

objections by Williams's trial counsel, improperly allowed the jury to

consider inadmissible hearsay evidence regarding a prior rape allegedly

committed by Williams. This was reversible error.

     As the main opinion indicates, the State filed a pretrial notice of its

intent to introduce evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., of

"incidents of [Williams], being an adult, engaging in sexual intercourse

with minors around the age of 11 or 12 years old." (C. 51.) Williams filed

a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of his prior adjudication

as a youthful offender and to exclude evidence of the acts that resulted in

that adjudication. At the pretrial hearing on this issue, the State initially

indicated that it intended to present evidence of the "conduct" underlying

the youthful-offender adjudication, not the adjudication itself, through

means such as a "statement by party opponent, [Williams's] admissions

to other people about the charges, and of course witness testimony that

have been there and have firsthand knowledge of the facts." (R. 7.) The

trial court then asked if the State would also have "a police investigator

                                     27
CR-2022-0543

testify that they did an investigation of the defendant's background and

found this other case and what happened?"       (R. 7.)   The prosecutor

responded in the affirmative. As the main opinion notes, the State did

not call the victim of the previous rape to testify against Williams.

Rather, the State called Brenda Williams ("Brenda"), a supervisor of

child abuse and neglect at the Department of Human Resources ("DHR")

and Jacob Reach, a captain with the Jefferson County Sheriff's

Department, to testify about the previous conduct based upon their

investigation of the matter.

     I agree with the main opinion, and with the trial court, that

evidence of Williams's prior sexual assault was potentially admissible to

prove his motive for the crimes charged in this case because it was

important to establish his "unnatural sexual desire for young girls."

Garner v. State, 977 So. 2d 533, 537 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Yet, his

motive had to be proven through admissible testimony and evidence.

Although Williams argues on appeal that evidence of his prior acts

occurred approximately 13 years before the allegations in this case and

were not admissible, in any form, the main opinion correctly notes that

"[t]he decision whether to allow or not to allow evidence of collateral

                                   28
CR-2022-0543

crimes or acts as part of the State's case-in-chief rests within the sound

discretion of the trial judge." Blanco v. State 515 So. 2d 115, 120 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1987). When trial courts exercise this discretion and allow

the introduction of evidence of prior bad acts, this Court will not overturn

that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Yet, prior bad acts can

be proven only though the introduction of admissible evidence.           As

Williams argued at trial and argues on appeal, the evidence introduced

by the State in this case was inadmissible hearsay evidence.

     " 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted." Rule 801(c), Ala. R. Evid. "Hearsay is not

admissible except as provided by the Alabama Rules of Evidence or by

other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama or by statute. Ala.

R. Evid. 802." James v. State, 723 So. 2d 776, 779 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).

As previously noted, the testimony in question was elicited from Brenda

and Captain Reach over defense counsel's objections.         As the main

opinion states, Brenda testified that the DHR central registry records

indicated that in 2002, approximately four years before Brenda started

working for DHR and approximately 13 years before the incidents

                                    29
CR-2022-0543

underlying the current allegations occurred, that Williams "was

indicated for sexual abuse, sexual penetration of a child" who was 12

years old at the time. (R. 134-135.) On re-direct examination, again over

Williams's hearsay objection, Brenda testified that "based on our history,

we saw that Michael Williams and [others] -- I think about two of them.

I can't remember. They gang raped a child that was 12 years old." (R.

168." Not only did Brenda testify about the allegations, but she was also

allowed to testify that, when she said the charges were "indicated," she

meant that DHR representatives "have gathered enough information to

say, okay, based on what we gather, all or evidence, this is true." (R. 121.)

Captain Reach testified that he investigated the prior allegations and

that, after "setting up [an] interview with the victim and reaching out to

get statements from Michael Williams and others involved," "[they]

brought the individuals in and interviewed them … offered them

polygraph examinations" and subsequently brought juvenile rape

charges against Williams. (R. 215-217.)

     Although the main opinion asserts that "Captain Reach's testimony

was based, in part, on his firsthand knowledge of the investigation of the

2002 charges," ___ So. 3d ___, and that "[t]he information concerning the

                                     30
CR-2022-0543

investigation was not based on what someone had told him," ___ So. 3d

___, the record reveals otherwise. Captain Reach testified that, after

interviewing the offenders and offering them polygraph examinations, he

"brought charges against Michael Williams for rape second degree." (R.

215.) However, anything Captain Reach learned from the interviews or

polygraph examinations would not have been based on "firsthand

knowledge" but, rather, on information he received from others, which is,

by definition, hearsay, as Williams argued below and argues on appeal.

Although an incriminating statement made by Williams would have been

a nonhearsay statement "against a party" under Rule 801(d)(2), Ala. R.

Evid., Captain Reach never expressly testified whether Williams was one

of the individuals who gave a statement, nor did he testify to the contents

of any statement allegedly given by Williams regarding the earlier rape.

In sum, Captain Reach provided no nonhearsay testimony, and there is

no evidence that he witnessed the prior bad acts allegedly committed by

Williams.

     In relation to Brenda's testimony from DHR records, the main

opinion correctly notes that DHR records containing hearsay were also

used in Jefferson County Department of Human Resources v. L.S., 60 So.

                                    31
CR-2022-0543

3d 308 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). But the use of similar records in another

case does not make the use of those records in this case appropriate. L.S.

is a case involving the termination of a mother's parental rights in which

neither party raised any issues regarding the improper admission of

hearsay evidence. Thus, L.S. does not sufficiently support a holding that

testimony from DHR records was properly admitted into evidence in this

case because, unlike in L.S., the issue here was preserved and raised on

appeal by Williams.

     Clearly, testimony regarding information contained in DHR records

can be admissible, but information in DHR records is not admissible

merely because it is included in DHR's official records. This issue was

addressed in Y.M. v. Jefferson County Department of Human Resources,

890 So. 2d 103 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), in which a party objected to the

admission of hearsay evidence gleaned from DHR records. Y.M. involved

the termination of parental rights, and the Court of Civil Appeals held

that "to the extent that decisions of this court state or imply that a

written report containing hearsay may be received at the adjudicatory

phase of a parental-rights-termination proceeding so long as the author

of the report is present and available for cross-examination, they are

                                   32
CR-2022-0543

erroneous." Id. at 112. The Court of Civil Appeals in Y.M. reversed the

trial court because "[h]earsay [from DHR records] was erroneously

admitted." Id. at 114. T.C. v. Cullman County Department of Human

Resources, 889 So. 2d 281 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), and E.W. v. Jefferson

County Department of Human Resources, 872 So. 2d 167 (Ala. Civ. App.

2003), are two other cases in which the Court of Civil Appeals held that

hearsay from DHR records was improperly allowed into evidence, but in

both of those cases the judgments of the trial courts were affirmed

because the error was held to be harmless.

     With regard to the Captain Reach's testimony, the main opinion

cites State v. Michaud, 135 N.H. 723, 610 A. 2d 354 (1992), for the

proposition that "[o]ther courts have held that a police officer's testimony

concerning a prior bad act is sufficient for purposes of proof under Rule

404(b), Ala. R. Evid." ___ So. 3d at ___. Yet Michaud did not involve an

argument that hearsay had been improperly admitted, and most of the

cases cited in Michaud involved witnesses, including police officers, who

were testifying about prior acts that they had personally observed. Those

cases did not raise issues concerning the admissibility of hearsay

evidence; therefore, they do not support an argument that the hearsay

                                    33
CR-2022-0543

testimony of Brenda and Captain Reach was properly admitted into

evidence. Likewise, State v. Howard, 228 N.C. App. 103, 742 S.E. 2d 858

(2013), which is cited in the main opinion, involved evidence from a police

officer who personally "saw [the] defendant flee, tossing a black semi-

automatic handgun" and the officer chased him until he caught the

defendant and arrested him.       Id. at 107.     Thus, Howard involved

testimony about what an officer personally witnessed, not hearsay

testimony. As I noted previously, I disagree with the main opinion's

assertion that Captain Reach's testimony was based upon his personal

observations and his firsthand knowledge; therefore, Howard does not

apply to this case. Furthermore, State v. Johnson, 568 N.W. 2d 426

(Minn. 1997), does not support this Court's holding that the evidence

presented by Captain Reach and Brenda was admissible in that Johnson

affirmed the trial court's judgment because the prior-act evidence was

relevant, not because it was admissible over a hearsay objection.

     This Court has held on numerous occasions that

           " ' "[o]rdinarily, the reports of investigating officers are
     not admissible in evidence. Nettles v. Bishop, 289 Ala. 100,
     266 So. 2d 260 (1972). … They are deemed hearsay and do not
     fall within the 'business records' exception to that
     exclusionary rule. Pike Taxi Co v. Patterson, 258 Ala 508, 63
     So. 2d 599 (1952). Therefore, to be admissible, that portion of
                                    34
CR-2022-0543

        the report sought to be introduced must come within the
        ambit of some other exception to the hearsay rule." Dennis v.
        Scarborough, 360 So. 2d (Ala. 1978).' "

James, 723 S o . 2d at 780. Without testimony from the alleged victim or

an individual with firsthand knowledge of the prior rape, the trial court

erred in allowing Captain Reach to testify about the prior rape

investigation, the polygraph examinations, and Williams's arrest in that

case.

        Although the main opinion addresses this issue by holding that the

testimony from Brenda and Captain Reach was admissible and properly

admitted, the State merely argues on appeal that, "[i]f the trial court

erred in admitting this testimony, any error was harmless." (State's

brief, p. 12.) The State correctly notes that

              "[n]o judgment may be reversed or set aside, … on the
        ground of … the improper admission or rejections of evidence,
        … unless in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is
        taken or application is made, after an examination of the
        entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has
        probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the
        parties."

Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. This Court has held that

              " '[w]hether the improper admission of evidence of
        collateral bad acts amounts to prejudicial error or harmless
        error must be decided on the facts of the particular case.'
                                      35
CR-2022-0543

     R.D.H. v. State, 775 So. 2d 248, 254 Ala. Crim. App. 1997);
     Hobbs v. State, 669 So. 2d 1030 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995). The
     standard for determining whether error is harmless is
     whether the evidence in error was "harmless beyond a
     reasonable.' Schaut v. State, 551 So. 2d 1135, 1137 (Ala.
     Crim. App. 1989), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
     87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)."

Hunter v. State, 802 So. 2d 265, 270 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).

     " '[T]he reviewin g court must determine whether the
     "improper admission of the evidence … might have adversely
     affected the defendant's right to a fair trial, and before the
     reviewing court can affirm a judgment based upon the
     "harmless error" rule, that court must find conclusively that
     the trial court's error did not affect the outcome of the trial or
     otherwise prejudice a substantial right of the defendant.' "

Towle s v. State, 168 So. 3d 133, 140 (Ala. 2014) (quoting Ex parte

Crymes, 630 So. 2d 125, 126 (Ala. 1993) (emphasis omitted)).

     A review of the record indicates that the trial court's error in

admitting the hearsay testimony was not harmless. Only one individual

witnessed the acts in question in this case -- the victim A.W. She agreed

that she initially denied that Williams had sexually assaulted her. There

was no DNA evidence or other physical evidence to corroborate A.W.'s

version of the events. There was also testimony that A.W. had lied in the

past and that her mother had previously accused A.W. of lying about the

rape allegedly committed by Williams.          The State's case was not
                                    36
CR-2022-0543

overwhelmingly strong, but the inadmissible hearsay about Williams's

prior acts was incredibly damning.          Inadmissible testimony that

Williams and others "gang raped" a 12-year-old girl and that he was

arrested for the offense was extremely prejudicial.

           " ' "The basis for the [exclusionary] rule lies in the belief
     that the prejudicial effect of prior crimes will far outweigh any
     probative value that might be gained from them. Most agree
     that such evidence of prior crimes has almost an irreversible
     impact upon the minds of jurors." ' Ex parte Cof er, 440 So. 2d
     1121, 1123 (Ala. 1983), quoting C. Gamble, McElroy's
     Alabama Evidence § 69.01(1) (3d ed. 1977), also quoted in
     Hobbs v. State, 669 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995)."

Ex parte Case y , 889 So. 2d 615, 621-22 (Ala. 2004).

     The evidence of Williams's prior rape case was admitted through

inadmissible hearsay testimony.           The testimony was extremely

prejudicial to Williams, and its admission was not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would reverse Williams's convictions, and

I would remand this cause for a new trial. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

                                     37