Court Opinion

ID: 9950071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:03:08.489859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:44.672565
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                      TAVARIS ANTONIO JOHNSON,

                                 Appellant,

                                     v.

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                 Appellee.

                                No. 2D23-15

                              March 13, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Frederick P.
Mercurio, Judge.

Rachael E. Reese and Olivia M. Newton of O'Brien Hatfield Reese, P.A.
Tampa, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

BLACK, Judge.
     Tavaris Johnson appeals from the final order denying his motion
for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850. Because the portions of the record attached to the
postconviction court's order do not conclusively refute Johnson's claim
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to the
admission of a firearm, we reverse the order to the extent that claim was
summarily denied and remand for further proceedings. We affirm in all
other respects without comment.
      Johnson shot the victim while the victim was sitting in his vehicle,
which was parked under a carport. Following a jury trial, Johnson was
convicted of second-degree murder with a firearm and sentenced to life in
prison as a prison releasee reoffender. This court affirmed Johnson's
judgment and sentence. See Johnson v. State, 263 So. 3d 764 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2019) (table decision). Thereafter, Johnson moved for
postconviction relief, raising several claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, including that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
admission of the firearm—claim four. The postconviction court
summarily denied several of Johnson's claims, including claim four, and
the remaining claims were denied following an evidentiary hearing.
      Summarily denied claims are reviewed de novo, and we must
accept Johnson's factual allegations to the extent that they are not
refuted by the record. See Cooper v. State, 336 So. 3d 415, 416 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2022). "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant." Id. (citing Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255,
1261 (Fla. 2003)). "A legally and facially sufficient claim cannot be
summarily denied unless it is conclusively refuted by portions of the trial
court record attached to the postconviction court's order." Robledo v.
State, 359 So. 3d 850, 852 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023); see also Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.850(f)(4).
      In claim four of the motion Johnson alleged that counsel performed
deficiently by failing to object to the admission of the firearm because the
State had failed to establish a connection between the firearm and the

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crime, rendering it irrelevant and inadmissible. Johnson further alleged
that the admission of the firearm served no purpose but to confuse the
jury and that had the firearm not been admitted, the outcome of the trial
would have been different.
     The postconviction court found that Johnson's claim was
conclusively refuted by the record, and it attached excerpts from the trial
transcript in support of its determination. To demonstrate that the
firearm was relevant such that counsel's performance in failing to object
to its admission was not deficient, the postconviction court relied upon
transcript excerpts that established only that a crime scene technician
had located a firearm in the backyard of a residence and collected it as
evidence and that witnesses had observed Johnson with a revolver prior
to the murder but not after.1 And to demonstrate lack of prejudice, the
postconviction court relied upon the testimony from the State's firearms
expert that the bullet fragment recovered from the victim had not been
fired from the firearm recovered by the crime scene technician. The
postconviction court recognized that the expert's testimony "arguably
decreased the relevance of the firearm" but concluded that this testimony
also made it clear to the jury that the firearm admitted into evidence was
not the murder weapon such that Johnson had not been prejudiced.
     "Relevant evidence is evidence that tends to prove or disprove a
material fact." Green v. State, 27 So. 3d 731, 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
"Generally speaking, evidence that a defendant was in possession of a
gun or ammunition is admissible so long as it is sufficiently tied to the

     1 In its order the postconviction court stated that the crime scene

technician had located a revolver in the backyard. However, in the
excerpt of the trial transcript relied upon by the postconviction court the
technician did not specify that the firearm recovered from the backyard
was a revolver.
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crime charged." Holloway v. State, 114 So. 3d 296, 297 (Fla. 4th DCA
2013). "A gun different than the one used in a crime is not relevant to
prove that the crime occurred." Downs v. State, 65 So. 3d 594, 596 (Fla.
4th DCA 2011) (citing O'Connor v. State, 835 So. 2d 1226, 1230 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2003)). The testimony relied upon by the postconviction court fell
short of establishing the relevancy of the firearm. The limited transcript
excerpts attached to the order do not establish a link between the firearm
and the murder or even a link between the firearm and Johnson,
particularly since the State's expert testified that the firearm was not the
murder weapon. Cf. Green, 27 So. 3d at 737-38 ("Here, not only were
these two firearms not connected in any way to the charged offenses,
they were also not connected to [the defendant]. The fact that [the
defendant's] roommate possessed two .380 semiautomatic firearms that
were not connected to the charged offenses did not tend to prove or
disprove any material fact in controversy and thus had absolutely no
relevance whatsoever. Therefore, those firearms should not have been
admitted into evidence under any theory."); Sosa v. State, 639 So. 2d
173, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (holding that it was error to admit into
evidence bullets that had been found in the defendant's car because
those bullets had not been linked to the crime and an officer had testified
that "the bullets [from defendant's car] could not have been fired in the
gun that was fired at [the victim]" (first alteration in original)). "[I]f there
was no evidence linking . . . the[] firearm[] to the charged crime, evidence
of the firearm[] would be irrelevant, and should have been excluded upon
proper objection." Moore v. State, 1 So. 3d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 5th DCA
2009).
      As for Johnson's contention regarding jury confusion and
prejudice, the postconviction court's determination that the expert's

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testimony made it clear to the jury that the firearm in evidence was not
the murder weapon is well taken. But reliance on this singular
statement, without more, does not sufficiently refute the claim. It is not
clear, for example, from the limited record documents referenced by the
postconviction court how and to what extent the State relied upon the
firearm throughout trial. Cf. id. at 1179 (holding that the postconviction
court's reliance solely on the strength of the victim's testimony in
summarily denying defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the admission of the allegedly irrelevant firearm was
insufficient to establish that there was no reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different had the firearm not been
admitted).
     We therefore reverse the postconviction court's order to the extent
that the postconviction court summarily denied claim four. On remand,
the postconviction court shall either attach portions of the record that
conclusively refute Johnson's claim or hold an evidentiary hearing. See
Robledo, 359 So. 3d at 853; Phillips v. State, 339 So. 3d 1097, 1099 (Fla.
2d DCA 2022).
     Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.

NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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