Court Opinion

ID: 9899028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 19:04:18.491072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:18.199713
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/15/23 P. v. Porter CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B318879

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. A968974)
           v.

 JOHN JAY PORTER et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed as to defendant and
appellant John Jay Porter. Affirmed and remanded with
instructions as to defendant and appellant Dayon Darren Lively.
      Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant John Jay Porter.
      Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Dayon Darren Lively.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   ____________________________

       This is an appeal from the denial of petitioners John Jay
Porter’s and Dayon Darren1 Lively’s petitions for sentencing
relief pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95, now
section 1172.6.2 We affirm.
       A jury convicted Porter and Lively of the first degree
murder of Latonjyia Stover (count 9) and second degree murder of
Jamee Finney (count 10). The same jury convicted petitioners’
confederates Lyndell Tyrone Jackson, Vincent Burks, and
Deautri Cosslolo Denard of murdering Stover and Finney. The
murders occurred after petitioners and their confederates sought
revenge for a drug transaction in which the drug dealer, Buford
“B.J.” Bates, substituted flour for cocaine.
       The resentencing court3 found, and petitioners do not
dispute, this case involved mistaken identity. Specifically, the
resentencing court found Lively participated “on this mission to
kill Nina Bates . . . . the sister of Buford Bates . . . who sold the
phony cocaine.” The resentencing court also found that Porter
“had the intent to kill Nina Bates, the sister of Buford Bates, and

      1 The record contains various spellings of Mr. Lively’s
middle name. We use the spelling contained in the abstract of
judgment.
      2   Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
      3 Different judicial officers presided over petitioners’ trial
and the order to show cause hearings on their petitions for
sentencing relief. We refer to the court presiding over the latter
hearings as the “resentencing court.”

                                     2
any member of her family or any person connected to Nina
Bates.” The murder victims—Stover and Finney—were not
connected to the drug transaction.
       With respect to the first degree murder of Stover, both
petitioners argue the resentencing court erred in finding they
failed to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for
resentencing. We conclude petitioners cannot establish a prima
facie case as a matter of law. The jury found petitioners had
aided and abetted the first degree murder with intent to kill, or
alternatively, were the actual killers.
       With respect to the second degree murder of Finney, Porter
argues the resentencing court applied the wrong standard of
proof at his order to show cause hearing. To the contrary, the
record demonstrates the court considered whether the
prosecution demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Porter
was guilty of murder under the current definition of murder.
       Lively, who had a separate order to show cause hearing,
argues the resentencing court erred in proceeding in his absence.
Lively was not absent from the hearing. He participated
remotely via Webex,4 a procedure he asked the resentencing
court to use. Lively does not demonstrate either error in
proceeding remotely or prejudice from doing so.
       The parties argue, and we agree, that the trial court
committed clerical error in the Lively judgment when it
transposed the names of certain counts comprising his
convictions. Upon remand, the resentencing court is instructed
to correct that clerical error and to forward a certified copy of the

      4 The parties do not dispute that Webex is a
videoconferencing platform.

                                     3
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

               PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In addition to the kidnapping of Kelly Timmons (also
known as Kelly Davis) for ransom and other crimes, a jury
convicted Porter and Lively of first degree murder (Stover) and
second degree murder (Finney). (People v. Denard et al. (Oct. 12,
1995, B066109) [nonpub. opn.].) With respect to the first degree
murder, the jury found two special circumstances true—murder
in the course of kidnapping and multiple murder. The jury
instructions allowed the jury to find those special circumstances
true only if the jury found petitioners intended to kill and aided
and abetted the first degree murder.
      On direct appeal, in 1995, this court affirmed the
judgments of conviction. (People v. Denard et al., supra,
B066109.)
      In 2019, petitioners filed petitions for resentencing
pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95, now section
1172.6. The resentencing court appointed counsel for petitioners.
      Lively substituted counsel after the resentencing court
denied his petition as to count 9 at the prima facie stage. His
new counsel filed a “Pre-Hearing Memorandum.” (Boldface &
some capitalization omitted.) The memorandum discussed a
declaration made by Deautri Denard, in which he took
responsibility for the “heinous crimes” and indicated Lively
was not responsible.
      Also according to Lively, Porter issued a declaration
providing: “On May 9, 1988, I John Porter was involved in the
murder of (Lato[njyia] Stover and Jam[e]e Finney) and the
kidnapping for ransom of (Kelly Timmons) . . . . I John Porter

                                   4
shot and kill (Laton[jyia] Stover and Jam[e]e Finney), with a
nine-millimeter, I shot numerous times into the little red car on
the corner of Vernon and St. Andrews Street. At the time, I shot
into the car, I was thinking that it was (Nina Bates) the sister of
(Buford Bates) that (Kelly Timmons) gave the money to and got a
five pound bag of flour, that should have been a kilo of cocaine for
fourteen thousand, five hundred dollars. I had to kidnap (Kelly
Timmons) to make her tell me ware (Buford Bates—aka—B.J.)
drug house and ware he hanged out. I declare that (Dayton
Lively, Vincent Burks, and Lyndell Jackson) had no involvement
of the murders of (Laton[jyia] Stover and Jam[e]e Finney). I shot
and kill both (Stover and Finney) on my own, I pull the trigger
until there was no movement in the car.” In his “Pre-Hearing
Memorandum,” Lively reserved the right to testify.
       With respect to the Stover murder, the resentencing court
found petitioners failed to present a prima facie case. The court
relied on the absence of a first degree felony murder instruction
(because at the time of trial, kidnapping was not a qualifying
offense for first degree felony murder). The court noted “in-
camera hearings” of a recorded conversation by Denard
indicating Denard and Porter were the shooters. The court also
noted that at trial, the People did not rely on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine with respect to the Stover
murder. The court found petitioners failed to establish a prima
facie case for resentencing relief because they directly aided and
abetted murder with intent to kill—a valid murder theory under
current law.
       With respect to the murder of Finney, the resentencing
court issued an order to show cause. Lively’s hearing was held
separately in order to secure Lively’s presence. After the

                                    5
hearings and considering over 100 volumes of reporter’s trial
transcripts, the resentencing court denied the petitions.
Petitioners timely appealed.

                  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       On appeal, Porter and Lively rely exclusively on the factual
background from our opinion in their direct appeals. We
recognize that opinion is not admissible to establish the facts in
an order to show cause hearing under section 1172.6. (People v.
Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 712–713 (Vance).) By relying
exclusively on the factual background in our prior appellate
opinion and failing to summarize the evidence before the
resentencing court, Porter and Lively have forfeited any objection
to the inadmissibility of the prior opinion. (Id. at p. 713.) We
thus quote our prior opinion, the only factual summary
petitioners provide on appeal. (People v. Denard, supra,
B066109.)
       “On May 9, 1988, Porter telephoned Roland Timmons and
asked if Timmons knew where Porter could buy cocaine for
Denard. Timmons, who previously had sold drugs with Porter,
asked his sister, Kelly Timmons, if she could set up the
transaction. Ms. Timmons arranged for Porter and Denard to
give $14,000 to B.J. Bates, a drug supplier, in exchange for a kilo
of cocaine, with herself as go-between. Ms. Timmons drove to
Porter’s house, met Porter and Denard, and received the money.
After counting the money, Timmons met Bates’ underling at the
agreed meeting place, gave him the money, and received a plastic
bag containing white powder. Ms. Timmons drove back to
Porter’s house and gave the bag to Porter and Denard. As
Ms. Timmons was leaving, Porter and Denard ran outside,

                                    6
shouting that she had given them flour instead of cocaine, and
forced her inside the house at gunpoint.
       “Ms. Timmons, who had not known the powder was flour,
unsuccessfully tried to telephone Bates. She made a series of
calls to her brother in which she told him Porter and Denard
wanted their money or the cocaine and would kill her if Timmons
did not comply. During the calls, Porter and Denard repeatedly
told Timmons they would kill his sister if their demands went
unmet. During one of these calls, Timmons heard Denard blame
Porter for the situation and threaten to kill Porter. Porter
sounded scared in the initial calls, but never asked for help.
       “Denard telephoned Lively. Shortly thereafter, Lively and
Burks arrived in a beige jeep. Lively and Denard forced
Ms. Timmons into the jeep at gunpoint, and Ms. Timmons,
Burks, Denard, Lively, and Porter drove a circuitous route to an
apartment. En route, Denard called [Meridith Yulonda] Carter[5]
on a cellular telephone and told her to bring guns to the
apartment. The men also called Timmons again and repeated
their threats to kill Ms. Timmons unless they received the
cocaine or money.
       “Jackson arrived at the apartment shortly after the beige
jeep, as did another man named Moe. Carter and a woman
named Red arrived a little later. After Denard told Carter what
had happened, Carter pointed a gun at Ms. Timmons and said
Carter should kill her.
       Lively and Denard forced Ms. Timmons to give them
information about Bates, his sister, family, address, and cars.

     5 The jury did not convict another co-defendant, Meredith
Yulonda Carter, of murder but only of false imprisonment.

                                  7
Lively said the men should retaliate against Bates. Porter and
Denard, in a series of telephone calls to Timmons, repeated their
death threats against Timmons and his family. They also
telephoned such a threat to Timmons’ mother. Meanwhile,
Timmons called the police, who came to his house and placed a
telephone trap on Timmons’ line to determine the threatening
calls’ origin.
       “Denard sent Burks and Porter to get ammunition. They
returned with it. Denard and Lively said they were going to
retaliate against Bates. At Denard’s request, Carter supplied a
box of surgical gloves and a bag containing a dark sweatshirt, ski
masks, and gloves. Burks, Lively, and Porter donned surgical
gloves and wiped off several guns. Denard distributed masks to
Burks, Lively, and Porter. Denard and Lively put gloves in their
pockets. Denard announced they were going to find and kill
Bates and told Carter and Jackson to stand guard over
Ms. Timmons. Burks, Denard, Lively, and Porter, all armed, left
together, leaving Carter, Jackson, Moe, and Red to guard
Ms. Timmons.
       “While the 4 men were gone, Carter and Jackson tied up
Ms. Timmons. At one point, Ms. Timmons called out a window to
a passerby. Jackson and Carter threw Ms. Timmons into a door
and onto the floor, and repeatedly kicked, punched and beat her.
       “Meanwhile, several witnesses, some of whom knew the
four men, saw a blue jeep driven by Denard and a beige Jeep
occupied by Lively, each with other men inside, approach a red
Pontiac parked near 45th Street and St. Andrews. The men wore
masks and dark clothes. Latonjyia Stover and Jamee Finney,
two women unconnected to these events, were inside the Pontiac,
talking to a pedestrian. When Stover and Finney saw the two

                                   8
jeeps drive by, they drove off, telling the pedestrian they feared a
shooting was about to happen. The two jeeps followed.
       “Witnesses heard gunshots and saw the jeeps stop near the
Pontiac and drive off. Stover and Finney each died of multiple
gunshot wounds. Shortly thereafter, Robert [N.] heard gunshots
and went outside. Witnesses saw the beige Jeep occupants twice
fire shots at [Robert N.]’s house, and once at another nearby
house. [Robert N.] saw the beige jeep occupants firing at people
in the street. [Robert N.] saw Lively, who[m] he knew, in the
rear of the beige jeep pointing a gun. [Robert N.] ran. The beige
jeep stopped and its occupants fired shots at [Robert N.]
Witnesses placed Lively and Porter inside the beige jeep when
these shots were fired.
       “Burks, Denard, Lively, and Porter returned to the
apartment where Ms. Timmons was being held. Denard, Lively,
and Porter all boasted of the killings. During another telephone
call to Timmons, Denard told Timmons the defendants wanted
their money.
       “Meanwhile, Los Angeles Police Detective Mark Arneson
learned from the telephone company that the calls from the
defendants to Timmons had come from 13132 South Vermont
Ave., apartment 6. The police set up a command post nearby and
began surveilling the apartment. Porter left the apartment and
drove off in a yellow Toyota. Denard told Carter to go and warn
his mother to leave her house because of potential retaliation
from Bates. Carter left. When a police helicopter arrived
overhead, Denard walked down the apartment hallway, went
outside, and was arrested by police.
       “When the remaining occupants saw Denard’s arrest,
Burks and Lively each telephoned their mothers and told them of

                                    9
the killings and to leave their homes to avoid retaliation. Lively
then ordered Ms. Timmons to leave the apartment first, so if the
police fired on them as they left, Ms. Timmons would be hit.
Ms. Timmons, Lively, Jackson, and Burks then left the
apartment, and police arrested the 3 men. Shortly thereafter,
Carter returned in a white Hyundai owned by Denard.
Ms. Timmons identified Carter and police arrested her. The
police traced Porter to another house and arrested him the next
day.
        “Much circumstantial evidence also linked the defendants
to the crimes. Police found the beige jeep parked behind the
apartment. The jeep contained a bullet hole, bullet crease,
powder burns, and an expended bullet. Lively, Porter, and Burks
left fingerprints on the jeep, and Denard left a fingerprint on a
plastic bag found inside it. Inside the apartment, police found
ammunition, sunglasses, caps, and gloves. Some of the gloves
contained gunshot residue.
        “In the late afternoon of May 9, Porter telephoned Erik
Taylor and asked Taylor to put 3 guns Taylor had under his
mattress in a bag. Taylor did so. Porter arrived shortly
thereafter and the 2 men drove to a nearby house. Porter took
the bag inside the garage, then drove Taylor home. The next day,
the police interviewed Taylor, who took them to the garage.
Inside, the police found 2 guns and ammunition.
        “At the murder scene, police recovered numerous shell
casings and bullet fragments of similar caliber ammunition as
used by the types of guns recovered in the garage and which
witnesses described Burks, Denard, Lively, and Porter carrying
during the crimes. Police also recovered a black cap near the

                                  10
dwellings which had been fired on. A hair found inside the cap
was similar to Lively’s hair.
       “Bates’ sister Nina Bates, a prosecution witness, received
telephone calls from Lively between Thanksgiving and Christmas
1988. Lively told Ms. Bates he had not committed the crimes, but
he knew what she looked like, where she lived, and could get her
if he chose to.” (People v. Denard, supra, B066109.)

                         DISCUSSION

A.   The Resentencing Law
      Prior to 2019, a jury could convict a defendant of murder
under the felony-murder rule and natural and probable
consequences doctrine without finding malice. Under the felony-
murder rule as it existed before 2019, malice was imputed if the
defendant intended to commit the underlying qualifying felony.
(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184 [“ ‘The felony-
murder rule imputes the requisite malice for a murder conviction
to those who commit a homicide during the perpetration of a
felony inherently dangerous to human life.’ ”].) Under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it existed before
2019, an aider and abettor could be held liable for any offense
that was the natural and probable consequence of the crime aided
and abetted. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158
[describing former law].)
      Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–4) modified the law
relating to accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a murder theory
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843) and more
narrowly defining felony murder. (People v. Strong (2022)

                                  11
13 Cal.5th 698, 703 (Strong); §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189,
subd. (e)(3)). With respect to the former modification, “to amend
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Senate Bill 1437
added section 188, subdivision (a)(3) (section 188(a)(3)): ‘Except
[for felony-murder liability] as stated in subdivision (e) of Section
189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed
to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’
[Citation.]” (Gentile, at pp. 842–843.) Senate Bill No. 1437 also
added former section 1170.95 providing the procedure for a
defendant convicted of felony murder or murder based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to request
resentencing relief. (Gentile, at p. 843.)
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 775) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2)
amended section 1170.95. In addition to convictions based on the
natural consequences and felony murder doctrines, persons
convicted on a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” are eligible
for resentencing relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see also former
§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) The bill clarified that persons convicted of
attempted murder or manslaughter also may petition for
resentencing. (People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 30.)
It further clarified that the burden of proof applicable in the
evidentiary hearing is beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1020–1021.) The Legislature
then renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6
without substantive change. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708,
fn. 2, citing Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

                                    12
       Section 1172.6 describes a multipart process for
resentencing petitions. The first step is making a prima facie
case for relief. “When the trial court receives a petition
containing the necessary declaration and other required
information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’
[Citation.] If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) When evaluating a petition, the resentencing court may
consider the record of conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 972.)
       If the petitioner makes a prima facie case for relief, the
court must issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “If
there has been ‘a prior finding by a court or jury that the
petitioner did not act with reckless indifference to human life or
was not a major participant in the felony, the court shall vacate
the petitioner’s conviction and resentence the petitioner.’
[Citation.] Additionally, the parties may stipulate that the
petitioner is eligible for resentencing. [Citation.] Otherwise, the
court must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution
bears the burden of proving, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under state
law as amended by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 708–709.)

B.    Neither Porter Nor Lively Made a Prima Facie Case
      for Resentencing on the Murder of Stover (Count 9)
      We review de novo the legal question whether petitioners
are ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Bodely
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)

                                   13
       Porter and Lively argue they made a prima facie case for
relief on count 9—the Stover murder. As part of a prima facie
case, petitioners must show they “could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).) Here, the record of conviction shows as a matter of
law that petitioners could be convicted of the Stover murder
notwithstanding changes to sections 188 and 189 effective
January 1, 2019.
       The jury found true a kidnapping and a multiple murder
special circumstance, which are dispositive of petitioners’
challenge to count 9. By way of introduction to the special
circumstances, the trial court instructed the jury:
       “If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a
human being, or if you are unable to decide whether the
defendant was the actual killer or an aider and abettor or
co-conspirator, you cannot find the special circumstance to be
true as to that defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill
aided and abetted, any actor in the commission of the murder in
the first degree.” The court further instructed the jury that the
jury “must decide separately each special circumstance alleged in
this case as to each defendant” and “must agree unanimously.”
       The kidnapping special murder instruction provided: “If
you find that the defendant was not the actual killer of a human
being, or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was
the actual killer, or an aider and abettor or co-conspirator, you
cannot find the special circumstance to be true as to that
defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that such defendant, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted any

                                   14
actor in the commission of murder in the first degree.” (Italics
added.) The multiple murder special circumstance instruction
contained the same language as above, including the italicized
language.
       The multiple murder special circumstance and murder
while kidnapping special circumstance instructions required the
jury to find the defendant was either the “actual killer” or “with
the intent to kill, aided and abetted any actor in the commission
of the murder in the first degree.” The jury’s true finding on the
special circumstance shows that Porter and Lively intended to
kill Stover and aided and abetted in the murder of Stover.
Because the jury necessarily made these findings, Porter and
Lively are ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (People
v. Bentley (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 150, 154 [petitioner does not
establish prima facie case where jury finding shows petitioner
intended to kill].) In the alternative, under the special
circumstance instructions, the jury could have concluded that
Porter and Lively were actual shooters. The actual shooter is not
eligible for resentencing. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1, 14; People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
       Porter and Lively’s remaining arguments do not undermine
the conclusion that the special circumstance instructions show
Porter and Lively were ineligible for resentencing. Porter
contends that the jury was also instructed on the natural and
probable consequence doctrine. That is accurate, but irrelevant
because as just described, the jury necessarily found Porter and
Lively intended to kill Stover, a currently valid theory of murder.
       Porter and Lively argue the resentencing court incorrectly
weighed the evidence. We do not address this issue because we
have considered petitioner’s eligibility for sentencing relief

                                   15
de novo and conclude, without weighing any evidence, that as a
matter of law, petitioners are ineligible.
       Porter and Lively rely on People v. Pacheco (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 118, 127 (Pacheco), a case pending in the
Supreme Court (review granted May 18, 2022, S274102), to argue
that the trial court was required to issue an order to show cause.
Pacheco does not support that conclusion.
       In Pacheco, the petitioner sought resentencing under
section 1172.6. A jury had convicted him of first degree murder
as an aider and abettor and attempted murder; the jury also
found true a gang special circumstance. (Pacheco, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 121, review granted.) The trial court’s
instruction as to the gang special circumstance provided: “ ‘The
defendant is charged with the special circumstance of committing
murder while an active participant in a criminal street gang . . . .
[¶] To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People
must prove that: [¶] 1. A perpetrator intentionally killed [the
victim]; [¶] 2. At the time of the killing, the defendant was an
active participant in a criminal street gang; [¶] 3. The
defendant knew that members of the gang engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity; [¶] 4. The murder
was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street
gang; [¶] AND [¶] 5. The defendant had the intent to kill at the
time of the killing.’ ” (Id. at pp. 127–128, review granted). The
resentencing court found the petitioner had failed to make a
prima facie case of eligibility for section 1172.6 relief because the
jury found the gang special circumstance true and thus, that he
had the intent to kill. The appellate court reversed.
       The trial court had also instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, and the prosecutor had argued

                                    16
that murder theory to the jury. Although the true gang special
circumstance finding showed intent to kill, the appellate court
reasoned the finding did not satisfy the actus reus element of
murder because the jury could have found defendant guilty of
aiding and abetting target crimes other than murder and then
convicted petitioner of murder based on the now invalid natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (Pacheco, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 128, review granted.) Because the
instruction did not require a finding on the actus reus of murder,
the court concluded the petitioner had demonstrated a prima
facie case of eligibility for resentencing. (Ibid., review granted.)
       Assuming arguendo that Pacheco is correctly decided, it
does not aid Lively or Porter. Although the special circumstance
instruction in Pacheco did not require a finding of aiding and
abetting the murder, the special circumstance instruction in this
case did, and the record of conviction thus demonstrates
petitioners were not convicted of Stover’s murder based on any
theory of imputed malice.
       Finally, Porter argues even though the special
circumstance instruction informed the jury that to find the
circumstance true, the jury had to find he aided and abetted the
Stover murder, the jury could still have found he aided and
abetted a crime other than murder. We reject Porter’s hypothesis
that the jury could have found something different from what the
instructions required. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30
[court presumes jury followed jury instructions].)

C.    The Court Applied the Correct Standard of Proof at
      Porter’s Order To Show Cause Hearing
      At Porter’s order to show cause hearing, the resentencing
court found Porter harbored intent to kill and aided and abetted

                                   17
the murder of Finney by purchasing bullets. The resentencing
court also concluded Porter could be convicted of felony murder
based on the underlying kidnapping and that Porter was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
The court further stated Porter and his confederates could be
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. Porter does not
dispute any of the resentencing court’s findings. Porter, however,
argues the resentencing court applied the incorrect standard of
proof. The record reveals otherwise.
       Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) requires the prosecution
to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” It expressly rejects substantial evidence as the applicable
burden: “A finding that there is substantial evidence to support a
conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       Contrary to Porter’s argument, the record unequivocally
reflects that the resentencing court applied the correct burden of
proof and acted as an independent factfinder. The resentencing
court evaluated the evidence and found it overwhelming. The
court stated it was basing its decision on “the evidence presented
at trial.” The court referred to the witnesses at trial and found
Timmons’s (also known as Davis’s) testimony credible. The court
comprehensively summarized the evidence as presented at trial
and highlighted the evidence the court believed supported its
findings. As if this were not enough, the court stated it was
applying a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and rejecting the
different standard in People v. Duke (2020) 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 264

                                  18
that in Senate Bill No. 775, the Legislature also subsequently
rejected.
       Porter emphasizes that the resentencing court referred to
People v. Rodriguez (2021) 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 342, which has been
depublished. Rodriguez held that the resentencing court was
required to act as an independent factfinder and apply a beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt standard. (Id. at p. 355.) That is the same
standard Porter argues the resentencing court should have
applied. There is no merit to Porter’s argument that the
resentencing court’s reference to the Rodriguez standard of proof
shows that it misunderstood the applicable standard.
       Porter also states the resentencing court erred in relying on
People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94. But just like
Rodriguez, Hernandez relied on the same beyond a-reasonable-
doubt standard of proof that Porter advocates. Put simply, the
resentencing court’s reference to those cases does not show the
court applied an incorrect standard of proof.
       Porter is correct that a resentencing court cannot rely on
the facts recited in an appellate opinion and must be an
independent factfinder. (Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.)
The record demonstrates that the resentencing court was an
independent factfinder, Porter’s misunderstanding of the court’s
remarks notwithstanding. The resentencing court did not rely on
facts recited in our prior opinion but instead, agreed with those
facts in stating the “language” of the appellate opinion is the
same as the facts the court “read [in] the trial transcript.” The
court expressly indicated, the “appellate opinion” was not a “bible
on what the facts are . . . .” The fact that the trial court
commented that its view of the evidence was consistent with the

                                   19
facts recited in our prior opinion does not demonstrate the court
failed to act as an independent factfinder.
       Porter also takes out of context the resentencing court’s
reference to “could be convicted” either during colloquy with
co-defendant Jackson’s counsel or in explaining its reasoning.
For example, in responding to counsel for Jackson’s argument
that Jackson could not be convicted of second degree felony
murder, the court stated, “The question is whether a valid
murder theory exists today based on the facts in the case that
your client could be convicted . . . .” The resentencing court
stated, “[The] evidence in this particular case is overwhelming
that they could still be convicted, under any of these theories, of
Ms. Finney’s murder under current law.” The court stated that
all petitioners (including Porter as well as his confederates
Jackson and Burks) “could be convicted today of a valid theory of
murder . . . .” The court found that Porter could be convicted of
felony murder because felony murder now includes kidnapping.
In making these statements, the resentencing court was merely
considering murder theories viable under current law, that is,
theories of which Porter “could” still be convicted
notwithstanding the changes to sections 188 and 189.
       Finally, Porter hypothesizes that “the court may not have
been entirely clear” on then “very recent statutory changes
effected through Senate Bill 775” because in discussing the
Stover murder (count 9), the court considered what the jury
found. The analysis for a prima facie case of eligibility is not the
same as the standard of proof applied at an order to show cause
hearing. The former addresses whether as a matter of law, the
record of conviction demonstrates “conclusively” that the
petitioner was convicted based on a currently valid murder

                                    20
theory. The latter requires a finding that the petitioner is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt under a still valid murder theory. The
resentencing court’s analysis of whether Porter made a prima
facie case of eligibility with respect to the murder of Stover is
thus not informative as to whether the court applied the correct
standard at the order to show cause hearing.
       Porter argues that the court abused its discretion in
applying an incorrect legal standard and that this purported
error prejudiced him. Because we conclude there was no such
error, we do not consider Porter’s prejudice claim further.

D.    Lively Was Present at the Order To Show Cause
      Hearing and Lively Demonstrates No Error in the
      Court’s Granting His Motion To Appear Via Webex
       Lively argues he was not present at the resentencing
hearing and that we thus must reverse the denial of his petition
for resentencing on count 10 (Finney murder). We first provide
additional background and then discuss his argument. We
conclude his argument is based on the incorrect premise that he
was not present at the hearing. Lively was present via Webex,
which he requested based on emergency rules in effect at the
time of Lively’s order to show cause hearing.

      1.    Additional background
      On October 15, 2021, prior to the order to show cause
hearing, Lively’s counsel filed the “Pre-Hearing Memorandum”
stating that at the order to show cause hearing: “Petitioner
reserves the right to testify, to call witnesses, or to present any
documentary evidence following the prosecution’s case in chief at
the hearing. This includes, but is not limited to, potentially
asserting that [the detective who investigated the case]

                                   21
committed misconduct during the course of this case and that his
actions and omissions caused Petitioner, who is legally, factually,
and actually, innocent, to be convicted.”
      On January 6, 2022, the resentencing court continued
Lively’s order to show cause hearing because Lively could not be
transported from prison. The court indicated it would ask the
supervising judge “to give this special treatment so that this
person [Lively] can be transported.” Lively’s counsel stated, “In
the alternative, could we do it by Webex?” The court agreed to
proceed via Webex but only if Lively’s counsel was able to make
arrangements with prison officials.
      On March 14, 2022, counsel for Lively filed a motion
requesting that Lively appear “via video from High Desert State
Prison.” Counsel based the motion on the following grounds:
“California Judicial Counsel’s [sic] Emergency Rules Related to
COVID-19 and good cause appearing because Petitioner has
waived his appearance in-person at the hearing and requests to
appear via video from High Desert State Prison Housing.”
      The motion further indicated: “Petitioner has the right to
be present at the evidentiary hearing . . . Petitioner waives his
personal appearance and requests to attend the . . . hearing via
video from High Desert State Prison housing.” Counsel stated:
Lively “does not wish to be transported to personally appear for
the March hearing. Petitioner waives his personal appearance.
To protect the health and safety of the public, including court
users, both in custody and out of custody defendants, witnesses,
court personnel, judicial officers, and Petitioner, this Court
should order the warden of High Desert State Prison to produce
Petitioner via video for the March 24, 2022 hearing.” Counsel
declared under penalty of perjury that Lively “waives his

                                   22
personal appearance at the hearing and requests to attend via
video from State Prison.”
       The resentencing court found good cause and ordered
Lively to appear via Webex.
       Lively appeared at the March 24, 2022 order to show cause
hearing via Webex. The court asked Lively if he could hear and
Lively responded, “ Yeah. I barely can hear you.” The court
stated, “I’m using a microphone, so it’s not going to get much
better than this.” The court asked Lively to raise his hand and
Lively raised his hand.
       At the order to show cause hearing, the resentencing court
stated, “[T]he prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
each element of a first or second degree murder under current
law to establish a petitioner’s ineligibility for relief under the
statute. In order to meet this burden, the prosecution may rely
on the record of conviction and/or offer new or additional evidence
to support the claim that the petitioner is ineligible.” The court
“emphasize[d]” it was acting “as an independent fact finder.”
       Neither side offered new evidence. Counsel for Lively
argued Lively was not in the Jeep from which the shots were
fired. Counsel argued Lively was “innocent of the murder” and
“did not know about the murder during the shooting in the case.”
       The resentencing court found statements by Porter and
Denard indicating they were the shooters were “unreliable
because each of them has a motive to lie and help their friend
Lively get out of jail . . . .” The court indicated Lively also could
have been a shooter.
       The court found Lively aided and abetted the murder.
Lively was “all in” on the plan to kill Bates’s family members
because B.J. Bates cheated Porter and Denard. The court also

                                    23
found “most of the testimony” at trial showed Lively was in the
beige Jeep with Burks. The beige Jeep and the blue Jeep were in
the vicinity of the Pontiac (driven by Stover in which Finney was
a passenger) at the time of the shooting. The court observed that
Lively’s statements reflected his intent to kill when Lively said,
“ ‘It is all about killing. We dangerous people. That is our
money.’ ” The court also stated Lively could be convicted under a
valid felony-murder theory with kidnapping as the underlying
offense.
        At the conclusion of the hearing, Lively’s counsel pointed
out Lively’s video had disconnected a few seconds earlier. The
court stated, “He is off. I was going to conclude my decision
anyway. [¶] When did he go off?” Counsel responded, “Just a
couple seconds ago.” The court then stated, “Well, I have to
indicate, I don’t know how he left, if he left on his own, or
whatever, but I don’t really have anything else to say. That is my
decision; I’m denying 1170.95 motion on behalf of Mr. Lively.”

      2.    Lively Was Present at the Order To Show Cause
            Hearing and He Demonstrates No Error or
            Prejudice In Appearing Remotely
       The parties do not dispute that a criminal defendant has a
constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical
proceedings. (People v. Whitmore (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 116, 124
(Whitmore).) Lively claims he was not present. As set forth
above, the record reveals he was present and appeared by Webex
at his request.
       Lively relies principally on one case to argue we
nevertheless must remand for a new evidentiary hearing on
count 10—People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 56–60. In
Basler, however, the petitioner was not present either in person

                                  24
or remotely. (Id. at p. 57.) The same is true in People v. Quan
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524, 530. These facts produced appellate
rulings that the petitioner’s complete absence was constitutional
error because the order to show cause hearing constitutes a
critical stage of criminal proceedings. (Basler, at pp. 57–58;
Quan, at pp. 532–534.) Neither Basler nor Quan considered
whether a petitioner’s remote appearance at an order to show
cause hearing is constitutionally infirm, and thus neither
supports remand for a new hearing on Lively’s petition. (B.B. v.
County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11 [“ ‘ “[C]ases are not
authority for propositions not considered.” ’ ”].)
       The resentencing court granted Lively’s motion to appear
via Webex. Lively based his motion on former emergency rule 3.
That rule was a response to the global COVID pandemic6 and
provided for remote appearance in “any criminal proceeding” as
long as the defendant consented.7 Although this rule has
sunsetted, it was in effect at the time of Lively’s hearing. (Rycz v.
Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 838, fn. 9.) Even
though he relied on this former rule below to secure Webex
appearance, Lively does not mention it on appeal. A fortiori,

      6   (See Whitmore, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 125.)
      7  Emergency rule 3(a)(2), provided in part: “In criminal
proceedings, courts must receive the consent of the defendant to
conduct the proceeding remotely and otherwise comply with
emergency rule 5. Notwithstanding Penal Code sections 865 and
977 or any other law, the court may conduct any criminal
proceeding remotely. As used in this rule, ‘consent of the
defendant’ means that the consent of the defendant is required
only for the waiver of the defendant’s appearance as provided in
emergency rule 5.” (Cal. Rules of Court, appen. I, former
emergency rule 3.)

                                    25
Lively does not argue that his counsel’s declaration was
insufficient to support his consent to Webex appearance under
former emergency rule 3.
       Even assuming arguendo that the resentencing court erred
in allowing Lively to appear remotely, Lively demonstrates no
prejudice.
       In Whitmore, the court rejected a due process challenge to
requiring the defendant there to appear remotely without his
consent but held it was a violation of state law to have required
the defendant to appear remotely at sentencing and other
proceedings without his consent. (Whitmore, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 125–126.) Accordingly, the error would be
reviewed for prejudice under the Watson8 standard. (Whitmore,
at pp. 125–127.) Under that standard, we “analyze whether it is
reasonably probable [petitioner] would have received a more
favorable result had he been physically present in the
courtroom.” (Id. at p. 127, fn. 6.)
       Lively does not argue that it is reasonably probable he
would have received a more favorable result had he been
physically present in the courtroom rather than appearing
remotely via Webex. Lively does not show anything would have
been different had he been in the courtroom. We thus conclude
he suffered no prejudice from appearing remotely instead of in
person.9

     8   People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
     9  Although we recognize Lively was absent for a few
seconds at the end of the proceeding, that absence was harmless
under any standard of prejudice. On appeal, Lively does not
argue otherwise.

                                   26
E.    The Parties Agree and the Record Shows Clerical
      Error in Lively’s Sentence
       The court sentenced Lively to a term of 15 years to life for
count 9 (the first degree murder of Stover) and life without the
possibility of parole for both count 1 (the kidnapping for ransom)
and count 10 (the second degree murder) of Finney. We agree
with the parties that the trial court transposed counts 9 and 10 in
its judgment. More specifically, the trial court imposed a first
degree murder sentence for the second degree murder and a
second degree murder sentence for the first degree murder. As
Lively argues in his reply brief, “it appears the trial court simply
committed a clerical error in transposing the appropriate and
mandatory sentences for Counts Nine and Ten, and it is
undisputed that such clerical errors in a defendant’s sentence can
be corrected at any time.” We agree. (See People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [trial court has inherent power to
correct clerical errors at any time].)

                                   27
                          DISPOSITION
      The orders denying John Jay Porter’s and Dayon Darren
Lively’s petitions for resentencing are affirmed. Lively’s case is
remanded to the resentencing court to correct the judgment.
Specifically, the term of life without parole shall be imposed for
count 9 and for kidnapping for ransom (count 1) and the term of
15 years to life shall be imposed for count 10. The resentencing
court shall send a certified copy of the amended abstract of
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             WEINGART, J.

                                   28