Court Opinion

ID: 9677558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:55:17.565333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:56.802766
License: Public Domain

*42SACKETT, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
I would reverse and remand for a- new trial.
The failure of the trial court to hold a competency hearing when it became very obvious through the testimony of attorney Larry Scalise that defendant was not competent was not corrected by hearing on remand.
Iowa Code section 812.3 provides:
If at any stage of a criminal proceeding it reasonably appears that the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents him or her from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense, further proceedings must be suspended and a hearing had upon that question. (Emphasis supplied).
In Myers, 460 N.W.2d at 460, the supreme court said:
If the court of appeals was correct in concluding that matters known to the trial court mandated a hearing under section 812.3, then we believe the failure to • hold such a hearing was probably not capable of being cured by an ex post facto determination of competency sometime after the trial was held. (Emphasis supplied).
The dictates of Iowa Code section 812.3 and State v. Myers, 460 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa 1990) are very clear. The trial must be stopped when the issue of competency arises and the failure to do so cannot be corrected by a later hearing.
The evidence relied on by the trial court to find the defendant competent was of persons not with her during trial. Scalise and Fultz who tried the case found her not competent. Her second batch of trial attorneys did little more than rest her case. Furthermore, her first batch of attorneys interpreted trial court orders as precluding them from communicating with her second batch of attorneys..
I also disagree with the majority on the issue of Marilyn and Charles Marsh asserting the Fifth Amendment. I would grant defendant a new trial on that issue, too.
Furthermore, I think Denise’s conviction of felony murder precludes her also being convicted of child endangerment.
I further disagree with the majority conclusion that defendant was presumed competent. The State agreed with defendant prior to hearing the burden was equal.
SCHLEGEL, J., joins this dissent.