Court Opinion

ID: 9963630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 21:32:32.974509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:54.515395
License: Public Domain

Vermont               Court
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VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT                                           1
                                                                ﬂ4               CIVIL DIVISION
Franklin Unit                                                                 Case No. 22-CV-02493
17 Church Street
St. Albans VT 05478
802-524-7993                                              ﬁﬁ

www.Vermontjudiciary.org

            Superior Technical Ceramics Corp. v. Specialty Seal Group, Inc.

                                ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title:           Motion for Attorney's Fees and Court Costs (Motion: 7)
Filer:           Jennifer E. McDonald
Filed Date:      February 01, 2024

        The court grants the motion in part. The contract between the parties clearly entitles
Plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees. The court notes, however, that Plaintiff has not sufﬁciently
supported the attorney’s fees. Counsel ﬁrst submitted a ﬁve-paragraph afﬁdavit that set forth a

gross ﬁgure for fees incurred and baldly asserted, with no backup or detail, that that ﬁgure “is
usual and reasonable for a Vermont civil dispute.” This falls well short of the required showing.
                                        ’
See Ring v. Carriage House Condo. Owners Ass ’n, 2014 VT 127, 198 Vt. 109, 1] 21 (“We
decline to diverge from the lodestar method in cases involving contractual provisions on

attorney's fees or to abandon our general principles placing upon the requesting party ‘the burden
to provide evidence of services upon which value can be determined’ . . . . ”). When challenged

by Defendant to make the kind of showing contemplated by well-settled law, Plaintiff persisted
in arguments that are untenable (and in some respects irrelevant). Further, while it submitted a

supplemental afﬁdavit, that afﬁdavit still fell short of providing all the information needed to
allow the court to determine the reasonableness of the fee request.
        In its discretion, the court declines to prolong the process, and so increase costs and delay

all around, by allowing Plaintiff a third bite at the apple. Instead, it notes that Defendant has

graciously conceded the reasonableness of most of the fees sought (just as, evidently, it declined
to contest motions that were clearly meritorious). The court therefore will restrict its scrutiny to

those aspects of the fee request that Defendant has challenged.

        Defendant ﬁrst questions the charges asserted for preparation, ﬁling, and service of suit

papers. Plaintiff’s supplemental afﬁdavit asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel spent 6.3 hours on this
Entry Regarding Motion                                                                   Page 1 of 3
22—CV—02493 Superior Technical Ceramics Corp. v. Specialty Seal Group, Inc.
work, while her paralegal spent 4.5 hours. Plaintiff, citing work product concerns, declined to
provide any detail to support these assertions; thus, the court is left to review Plaintiff’s filings
and attempt to determine the reasonableness of the time spent in preparing, filing, and serving
them. The speculative nature of this exercise alone would be enough to support a wholesale
rejection of these charges. See Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 254 (1986) (“While it is true
that the determination of ‘reasonable attorney fees’ is largely within the court's discretion,
counsel has the burden to provide evidence of services upon which value can be determined.”).
Instead, the court, in its discretion, reduces the fees sought here to reflect its best approximation,
based on the evidence that is available, as to fees that appear reasonable for this category of
work. It notes that the complaint and amended complaint are not unusually complex, and that
effecting service is largely ministerial, such that 6.3 hours of director time at $355 per hour
seems excessive; a more reasonable charge would be 4 hours for this category. Similarly, without
more explanation through time records or otherwise, 4.3 paralegal hours seems grossly excessive
(particularly 2.5 hours at $180 per hour for preparing a simple motion to extend the time for
service); here, a more reasonable charge would be 2 hours at $160 per hour. Thus, in this
category, the court reduces the requested fees by $1,296.50.
        Next, Defendant contests the reasonableness of the fees charged for summary judgment
practice. Here, again, Plaintiff’s supplemental affidavit baldly asserts that it incurred 3.4 hours of
director time, at $375 per hour, and 35.5 hours of associate time, at $210 per hour, in this
exercise. Again, with no detail to support these assertions, the court is left with no basis to
evaluate the reasonableness of these charges except the summary judgment papers themselves.
These papers do not support the reasonableness of the amount sought; $8,662.00 for a fairly
simple and straightforward motion seems excessive. Again, rather than rejecting the assertion out
of hand as insufficiently supported, the court, in its discretion, determines that a reasonable
charge for the motion for summary judgment would have been $5,000.00, and so reduces the
request by $3,662.00.
        Finally, Defendant contests any award for work related to Plaintiff’s supplemental
submission in support of the attorney’s fees request. As Defendant properly notes, this work was
necessitated entirely by the complete inadequacy of Plaintiff’s initial submission. This
inadequacy, in turn, increased costs to a defendant that has shown itself willing, on several
occasions, to accede to reasonable submissions. Moreover, as noted above, the supplemental
Entry Regarding Motion                                                                     Page 2 of 3
22-CV-02493 Superior Technical Ceramics Corp. v. Specialty Seal Group, Inc.
                                                                                     Vermont Superior Court
                                                                                             Filed
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submission itself fell short of What is required to support an award of attorney’s fees. The court
declines to reward such practice. It will allow no recovery for fees incurred with respect to the

supplemental submission.
                                                    ORDER
         The court grants the motion in part. Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s
fees in the amount of $23,284.50, plus costs in the amount of $671.25. Final judgment will enter

forthwith.

Electronically signed pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d): 4/ 19/2024 12:29 PM

  muel       ar
31$       Court Judge

Entry Regarding Modon                                                                     Page 3 of 3
22—CV—02493 Superior Technical Ceramics Corp. v. Specialty Seal Group, Inc.