Court Opinion

ID: 9834360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:31:16.021626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:14.173307
License: Public Domain

*495On Motion for Rehearing.
In addition to what we said in our original opinion with reference to Ordinance 1389, we wish to call attention to section 5 of the charter provisions quoted, which provides that: “5. It shall be the duty of the City Council, as soon as practicable after the adoption of this Charter, to provide for a revision, codification and publication of all the ordinances in force at that time in the City, and thereafter provide for a similar revision and publication as often as they may deem advisable.”
 The city council was' undoubtedly vested with power under the city’s home-rule charter to revise, codify, and publish in pamphlet form previous ordinances that were in force, and, Ordinance 1389 appearing in pamphlet form and purporting to be a revision and codification, the presumption exists that the council did what it was right to do and not that which was wrong. In other words, the presumption must be indulged that, in some form, extent, or detail, an ordinance relating to the general subject was in force which it was advisable to revise and codify. And we do not think the written agreement of counsel relating to the subject of publication is sufficiently specific and certain to overcome such presumption. This is especially true when considered in connection with the second paragraph of section 2 of the charter, quoted in our original opinion, and paragraph 1-1-4 of section 1, chapter 1, of Ordinance 1389 (quoted in the agreement of counsel, as set out in our original opinion). The record discloses that Ordinance 1389, as it appears in its pamphlet form, has 37 chapters of 130 sections, printed on 187 pages. It contains many regulations other than .those relating to cleaning establishments, and manifestly not of the character of those ordinances required to be published in a newspaper for the benefit of the public at large.
Paragraph 2, of section 2, of the charter, set out in the original opinion, declares that: "Revised or digested ordinances published in pamphlet form by authority of the City Council shall not be required to be published in a newspaper, and the publication in pamphlet of such ordinances shall be held and taken as sufficient publication, notwithstanding such ordinance may impose a fine, penalty or forfeiture or should contain a grant of easement or public franchise.”
Paragraph 1-1-4, of section 1, chapter 1, of the ordinance reads: “Conflicting ordinances repealed. All ordinances or parts thereof, insofar as they conflict with the provisions herein contained, are hereby repealed. Should any section, word or sentence, or any part of this ordinance be held to be invalid, the same shall not be construed to affect any other valid provision of same.”
It is thus apparent that' the city council has been given a very wide power in the matter of, printing ordinances in digested and pamphlet form, and when this has been done, as in the present case, paragraph 2, of section 2, of the charter, expressly declares that “the publication in pamphlet of such ordinances shall be held and taken as sufficient publication, ⅜ ⅝ * ” thus presenting a real, or apparent conflict with paragraph 1, of section 2, of the charter, which hence may be disregarded by virtue of said paragraph 1-1-4, of section 1, of chapter 1, of the ordinance.
From the nature of the subject, it is not to be presumed that the requirement of
Suit by J. R. Donges against Orville Beall, be applied to a codification of an entire system of laws on the part of the city. Codification necessarily must include a variety of subjects and many details, and constitute a volume of matter that cannot practically.be published in a newspaper, and we are npt prepared to say that in a case of codification it is not within the power of the council to embody new features or details germane to the general subject codified.
We accordingly retain the view originally expressed that Ordinance 4389 is valid. and enforceable. If so, its violation constituted negligence per se on the part of appellee, and, the jury having found that to have been a proximate cause of the resulting damage, the judgment below should have been for the defendant regardless of the remaining findings.
It follows that our conclusions relating to the issues of appellee’s common-law negligence were not necessary to support the general conclusion in our original opinion that the judgment below should be reversed and here rendered for appellant. In view of that fact, we should perhaps reserve" our conclusion that the jury’s findings that appellee’s general want of ordinary care were not the proximate or' contributing proximate cause of the damage done to await a final determination of whether the ordinance under consideration was valid and enforceable. Should the Supreme Court determine it to be invalid, we would then at least have the power to determine whether the jury’s findings that we ignored are sufficiently supported by the .evidence. However, in view of the earnest contention in behalf of appel-lee that we erred in this particular, we carefully read and considered the entire statement of facts before us, and, while detached portions of the testimony may give color to appellee’s contention, we do not feel quite prepared from the whole to say that we were in error. Nevertheless, in view of their immaterial character as we view the case, we have concluded to withdraw for the present what we said in our original opinion relating to the entire lack of evidence to support *496the findings of' the jury which we ignored, thus leaving that question, or the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain those findings, for future determination should necessity therefor ever become necessary.
Except ás just indicated, the motion for rehearing is overruled.