Court Opinion

ID: 9943398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 15:16:44.755676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:56.317221
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1984-22

PO DONG,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WEI LI,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued January 30, 2024 – Decided February 23, 2024

                   Before Judges Smith and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County,
                   Docket No. FM-13-0382-19.

                   Bettina E. Munson argued the cause for appellant
                   (Lomurro Munson LLC, attorneys; Bettina E. Munson
                   and Christina Vassiliou Harvey, of counsel and on the
                   briefs; Sean M. Wirth, on the briefs).

                   Richard A. Outhwaite argued the cause for respondent
                   (Weinberger Divorce and Family Law Group, LLC,
                   attorneys; Richard A. Outhwaite, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Wei Li appeals from the February 17, 2023 Family Part order,

denying reconsideration of a December 16, 2022 order that denied a plenary

hearing regarding a modification of her imputed income established in the

parties' marital settlement agreement (MSA) and an increase in plaintiff Po

Dong's alimony obligation based on changed circumstances. As defendant had

established a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, we reverse and

remand for a plenary hearing.

                                        I.

      The parties were married in November 1999 and share a son, born in May

2007, who is autistic and has special needs. In December 2018, the parties

divorced and incorporated into their judgement of divorce their MSA which

addressed alimony, child support, and parenting time.

      The parties' MSA recognized that given the nature of their son's disability,

he may never be emancipated. The parties agreed plaintiff would pay limited

duration alimony for nineteen years. At the time of the divorce, alimony was

established on plaintiff's annual gross income of $238,000 and defendant's part-

time income of $1,400 per year. The parties recognized defendant's "language

skills, education, and training" required advancement and agreed to calculate

alimony with a two-year "step-down arrangement" to provide time for defendant

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to gain employment. Defendant was imputed an annual income of $10,000 for

the first two years and $40,000 thereafter.

      The MSA included a lifestyle provision which stated:

            The parties have been advised by their attorneys of the
            case of Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11 (2000)[,] in every
            respect including the parties' respective right, after the
            divorce, to enjoy a lifestyle reasonably comparable to
            that enjoyed during the marriage. It is specifically
            agreed between [h]usband and [w]ife that after
            considering the equitable distribution of assets and the
            support provisions contained herein, as well as their
            respective abilities and obligations to provide for their
            own support, that neither party can maintain a lifestyle
            reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the
            marriage, but nevertheless accept the alimony
            provisions set forth herein.

      The parties did not designate a parent of primary residence as they agreed

to a fifty-fifty shared parenting schedule. At the time of the divorce, their son

was enrolled in middle school but was released in March of 2019 based on

behavioral issues. Three months later, following a period of homeschooling,

their son began attending a specialized school from 9:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. The

specialized school closed in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and

remained closed until September 2021.

      Almost one year after the parties' divorce, plaintiff permanently relocated

to California with his new wife for a new employment position. In April 2020,

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defendant filed a motion to relocate the parties' child to California. While the

matter was pending before the court, the parties consented to a best interests

evaluation and attended mediation. The parties eventually resolved parenting

time and child support. By way of a consent order, defendant was designated as

the parent of primary residence with their son remaining in New Jersey. The

agreement reduced plaintiff's parenting time to four weeks in the summer and

approximately one week for both winter and spring break. Plaintiff's child

support obligation was increased to $2,400 a month.

      In 2021, plaintiff's income increased to $480,144.20. His income in 2020

was higher based on a sign-on bonus and moving credit. Defendant had not

obtained employment near the imputed income.

      In August 2022, defendant moved to: modify her alimony based on the

plaintiff's increased income and decreased parenting time; modify her imputed

income; permit any modification to be retroactive; require discovery;

temporarily increase alimony pending a plenary hearing; create a second

litigation fund with plaintiff contributing seventy percent; and for the existing

litigation fund to be replenished by plaintiff. Plaintiff opposed and cross-moved

for the following relief: to deny defendant's motion; for reimbursement of

mediation fees; to enforce the defendant's imputed income in the MSA; to order

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defendant accompany their child during travel to California and pay a portion of

their travel expenses; and for attorney's fees and cost.

      The judge's December 16 order denied defendant's motion entirely and

granted in part plaintiff's motion, enforcing defendant's imputed income

pursuant to the MSA. In her written statement of reasons, the judge noted

defendant argued that "the change in parenting responsibilities ha[d] impacted

her ability to hold a better job" and that "there [wa]s no way . . . she c[ould] get

a job earning $40,000 per year because of her time commitments to [their son]."

The judge stated:

            The [c]ourt has reviewed the certifications of the
            parties, the numerous exhibits, and the partie[s' c]ase
            [i]nformation [s]tatements [(CIS)]and does not find that
            defendant has met her burden regarding modifying the
            alimony. She asks the court to consider husband's
            newly increased income since he relocated to California
            with his new wife and family and argues that the court
            should impute no income to her, increase the alimony
            to cover her expenses, and take away the tax shifting
            which provided plaintiff with the ability to deduct the
            alimony from his gross income.

      On appeal, defendant raises a single argument, arguing the judge erred in

denying her request for a plenary hearing based upon her demonstration of a

prima facie change in circumstances. We agree.

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                                        II.

      "We accord deference to Family Part judges due to their 'special

jurisdiction and expertise in family [law] matters.'" Gormley v. Gormley, 462

N.J. Super. 433, 442 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare v.

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Our scope of review of Family Part orders

is limited. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411. A judge's findings "are binding on appeal

so long as their determinations are 'supported by adequate, substantial, credible

evidence.'" Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. at 442 (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-

12). Generally, a Family Part judge's findings regarding the modification of

alimony "should not be vacated unless the court clearly abused its discretion,

failed to consider all of the controlling legal principles, made mistaken findings,

or reached a conclusion that could not reasonably have been reached on

sufficient credible evidence present in the record." J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J.

Super. 475, 485 (App. Div. 2012). However, while "a family court's factual

findings are entitled to considerable deference, we do not pay special deference

to its interpretation of the law." Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283

(2016) (quoting D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012)).

       We also review orders denying reconsideration for abuse of discretion.

Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016). A court

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abuses its discretion "when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation,

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissibl e

basis.'"   Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012)

(quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

      "Alimony is an 'economic right that arises out of the marital relationship

and provides the dependent spouse with "a level of support and standard of

living generally commensurate with the quality of economic life that existed

during the marriage."'" Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 48 (2016) (quoting Mani

v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 80 (2005)). "Parties to a divorce . . . may enter into

voluntary agreements governing the amount, terms and duration of alimony , and

such agreements are subject to judicial supervision and enforcement." Ibid.

Matrimonial agreements are "'entitled to considerable weight with respect to

their validity and enforceability' in equity, provided they are fair and just,"

because they are "essentially consensual and voluntary in character." Dolce v.

Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 20 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Petersen v. Petersen,

85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981)).

      An alimony order establishes only the present support obligation and is

"always subject to review and modification on a showing of 'changed

circumstances.'" Cardali v. Cardali, 255 N.J. 85, 93 (2023) (quoting Lepis v.

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                                       7
Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980)); Crews, 164 N.J. at 28.             Pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, an alimony order "may be revised and altered by the court

from time to time as circumstances may require." Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J.

Super. 187, 197 (App. Div. 2020). When a party moves for a reduction in

alimony, the judge undertakes a two-step inquiry. Crews, 164 N.J at 28. The

judge must first determine whether the moving party has made a prima facie

showing of changed circumstances. R.K. v. F.K., 437 N.J. Super. 58, 62 (App.

Div. 2014). A "prima facie showing is distinct from the final proofs that are the

basis for an adjudication on the merits; it is simply a threshold showing."

Cardali, 255 N.J. at 108. "Changed circumstances such as child maturation,

increases in need, employment, or child emancipation may result in

a modification of support."    Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999).

Importantly, the moving party must demonstrate a change in circumstances from

those existing when the prior support award was fixed. Beck v. Beck, 239 N.J.

Super. 183, 190 (App. Div. 1990); see also Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J.

Super. 117, 127-29 (App. Div. 2009).

      The second step requires that "the party seeking modification of an

alimony award 'must demonstrate that changed circumstances have substantially

impaired the [movant's] ability to support himself or herself.'" Crews, 164 N.J.

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at 28 (quoting Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157). "[T]he ability to support oneself must be

understood to mean the ability to maintain a standard of living reasonably

comparable to the standard enjoyed during the marriage." Ibid. It is clear that

"the marital standard of living is the measure for assessing initial awards of

alimony, as well as for reviewing any motion to modify such awards." Id. at 35.

      After a party seeking an alimony modification has made a prima facie

showing, "a court may order discovery and hold a hearing to determine the

supporting spouse's ability to pay." Miller, 160 N.J. at 420. "Although equity

demands that spouses be afforded an opportunity to seek modification, the

opportunity need not include a hearing when the material facts are not in genuine

dispute."   Lepis, 83 N.J. at 159.      However, when a party has "clearly

demonstrate[d] the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact," a hearing

is necessary. Ibid.

                                       III.

      After a review of the record in view of the governing legal principles, we

are constrained to reverse. Plaintiff's move to California indisputably resulted

in defendant's significantly increased parenting time, which, in addition to her

added responsibility to homeschool their son for over eighteen months during

the pandemic, demonstrated a prima facie showing of changed circumstances.

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Specifically, defendant's parenting time with the parties' special needs son

increased by over thirty-five percent, and she certified that her increased

parenting responsibilities inhibited her employment capacity. The judge also

overlooked that after defendant's move, plaintiff gained greater parental

responsibility as the only parent in the state where the child resided. Notably,

the majority of plaintiff's modified parenting time occurred over four weeks in

August. Our Supreme Court elucidated that a parent's reasonable belief "that

she could take only employment positions that provided her with scheduling

flexibility so as to be responsive to her children's special needs should be fairly

considered." Crews, 164 N.J. at 36. The exchange of discovery and a plenary

hearing were warranted.

      Sufficient credible evidence in the record demonstrates defendant

established a prima facie showing of a change in her parenting obligations

which, she claims, caused significant time limitations affecting her

employability. See Cardali, 255 N.J. at 109 ("[P]rima facie evidence is defined

as 'evidence that, if unrebutted, would sustain a judgment in the proponent's

favor.'" (quoting Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91, 118 (2001), overruled on other

grounds by Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309 (2017))). The extent of the effect

on defendant's employability caused by the increased parenting time and greater

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responsibilities is materially disputed. Interconnectedly, plaintiff's increased

income in relation to the parties' marital standard of living is also materially in

dispute. Full discovery was warranted on these issues.

      We also part ways with the judge's reconsideration findings that plaintiff's

substantial reduction in parenting time due to his relocation to California was

not a material change and that defendant "had [two] years to improve her

condition, during which most of that time [plaintiff] was still in New Jersey and

she had not made any effort to do so." Although the December 2018 MSA

provided defendant a two-year step-down before her imputed income rose to

$40,000, the judge failed to fully consider that during that period, the parties'

son was homeschooled for approximately three months after his removal from

school due to his increased behavioral issues.

      Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c), "[a]n award of alimony . . . may be

modified based either upon changed circumstances, or upon the nonoccurrence

of circumstances that the court found would occur at the time of the award,"

with the court's required reconsideration of the statutory alimony factors. As

defendant established sufficient factual predicates surrounding changed

circumstances, the judge was required to consider the alimony factors. We

conclude the judge did not accord appropriate consideration to the factors

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established in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) as she did not sufficiently address "(7) [t]he

parental responsibilities for the children" or "(8) [t]he time and expense

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking

maintenance to find appropriate employment." These factors are to be addressed

at a plenary hearing.

      Further, as defendant correctly argues, the alimony factors do not include

consideration of child support. The judge's partial reasoning that "child support

increased by approximately $2,000 . . . a month plus an increase in

extracurricular contributions," "the child support was already increased," and

"the child ha[d] already benefitted from his father's 'increased fortunes'" was

erroneous. Case law is clear that child support belongs to the child, and not the

custodial parent. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 591 (1995). Child support

amounts should not have been considered in determining whether defendant had

met her burden of showing a change in circumstances.

      Lastly, we disagree with the judge's finding that the standard of

defendant's lifestyle was not reduced in observing that "[i]t [wa]s sufficient to

simply review the CIS, see that the numbers [we]re comparable to what both

parties were spending when married, see that [defendant] even ha[d] spending

ability to send her mother $4[,]800 per year to support her in China." As our

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Supreme Court elucidated in Crews, "the CIS information generally reflects a

more current financial picture of the parties. It does not necessarily provide

information reflective of the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. "

164 N.J. at 27. Here, the parties' MSA provided "that neither party can maintain

a lifestyle reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage."

Therefore, the judge's alimony and lifestyle reasoning, which was based on a

review of defendant's CIS at the time of the divorce compared to her current

CIS, to deny a plenary hearing was misplaced.

      To the extent that we have not addressed the parties' remaining arguments,

it is because our disposition makes it unnecessary, or they lack sufficient merit

to be discussed in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Reversed and remanded for a plenary hearing consistent with this opinion.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

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