Court Opinion

ID: 9590128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:51:46.130848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:59.222318
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANDERSON:
(dissenting).
It is difficult for me to read the portions, quoted in the majority opinion, of the title of Chapter 224, Laws of 1951, pp. 595, 596, and subsection (h) of section 1 of the Act and find from them a clear legislative intention that same were to be retroactive insofar as the payment of benefits thereunder are to be made. This is obviously what the majority of this court concludes.
I concede that the amended portion of Chapter 224, supra, supplies retrospect insofar as credit for the prior service is concerned and as to this the mandate of R. C. M. 1947, sec. 12-201, is met: The intention of the legislature to be gathered from the amendment and the title on this point is clear and is controlling.
Prior to the amendment, which became the law on March 5, 1951, the pensioner received $5.64. Since March 5, 1951, he has received $40 per month based upon the amendment granting credit for prior service. There is a serious constitutional question in view of Article v, see. 29, Montana Constitution, whether the pensioner should have been given the increase from $5.64 to $40. However, that question is not touched upon by the majority opinion and I reserve comment thereon. See Koehnlein *373v. Allegheny County Employees’ Retirement System, 373 Pa. 535, 97 A. (2d) 88.
I find no words in the amendment or the title to the Act which in any way imply, let alone suggest, an intent on the part of the legislature to grant, as a matter of right, a payment of money to the pensioner in retrospect.
It is argued that a liberal construction should be given to any Act wherein those who have yielded long and good service to their employer is involved. Granting here the inadequacy of $5.64 per month, I must likewise believe that $40 per month is almost as inadequate. However, these problems are for the legislature to resolve and not for the courts. “The question whether a statute operates retrospectively, or prospectively only, is one of legislative intent. In determining such intent, the courts have evolved a strict rule of construction against a retrospective operation, and indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it to operate prospectively only, and not retroactively.” 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, sec. 478, p. 494.
My natural inclination would be with the pensioner but he, like I, must bear in mind the retirement fund is not his money nor mine, but is a fund created and maintained on an actuarial basis belonging to all the employees of the State of Montana who are or may hereafter take advantage of it. It must be presumed that the retirement fund is maintained at the lowest possible cost for the greatest possible benefit to all its members.
If this court can read into the statute before us, in the instant case, something that is not contained in it for the purpose of causing the retirement board to pay out public retirement money, then a precedent is established wherein the fund itself is in jeopardy and the actuarial feature of the fund becomes lost.
Let us suppose that during the next session of the legislature the Act fixing the amount of retirement pay was doubled or quadrupled and that nothing was said regarding the effect of the statute whether it would be retroactive or prospective, and let us suppose that all of the then retired members under the *374Act came to the conclusion that they were entitled to the new amount, not only prospectively but retrospectively, and let us suppose that this court held that they Avere right, which if we follow the view in the majority opinion we would have to do, then it must be conceded that the fund which was created for the hundreds of employees of this state would be inadequate to meet the demands of the immediate pensioners and it would likely be so depleted as to be useless.
The retrospective features, if any, of the hypothetical suggestion above would be just as apparent as the retrospective features, if any, in the instant enactment.
If the majority opinion is correct in the interpretation of the statute, it would seem that R. C. M. 1947, sec. 12-201, which now reads, “No law contained in any of the codes or other statutes of Montana is retroactive unless expressly so declared”, would be better if it were changed to read, “No law contained in any of the codes or other statutes of Montana is prospective unless expressly so declared. ’ ’ See State ex rel. Mills v. Dixon, 68 Mont. 526, 219 Pac. 637; State ex rel. City of Billings v. Osten, 91 Mont. 76, 5 Pac. (2d) 562.
I think the judgment of the lower court was correct and should not be disturbed here.