Court Opinion

ID: 9750258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:42:25.915307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:05.361228
License: Public Domain

BEDSWORTH, Acting P. J., Dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. While this is a difficult call, I cannot agree that Probate Code section 16061 or Probate Code section 17200, subdivision (b)(7)1 permits a remainder beneficiary of a pre-July 1, 1987 living trust to petition for an annual accounting that he is denied under section 16062. The majority’s well-intentioned effort is based on a reading of the applicable statutes that is fundamentally at odds with my understanding of them.
The majority concludes that a section 16061 particular account may include an “accounting for a full year, depending on the relief the probate court considers appropriate under the circumstances.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 525.) It then reads the trial court’s order as finding that, in effect, a statutory annual accounting (formal account) was needed to protect plaintiff Stephen W. Esslinger’s interests, and affirms the order as one properly made under section 16061. I think that misreads both the scope of section 16061 and the decision below.
I cannot agree that a remainderman may have an annual accounting under the guise of a section 16061 particular accounting. A broad accounting—yes. One as broad as needed to protect his interests—yes, again. But not an annual accounting under section 16062, with its attendant statutorily-required schedules and detail. (§§ 16063, 1060-1064.) To my mind, that is what the Law Revision Commission comment to section 16061 means when it says “[a] beneficiary who is not entitled to an annual account under Section 16062 may be entitled to information or a particular account under this section.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 54A West’s Ann. Prob. Code (1991 ed.) foll. § 16061, p. 52 [1990 enactment], italics added.)
Nor do I believe a particular accounting was ordered in this case. To begin with, Stephen did not ask for one. The petition alleged Stephen had complied with section 16061 in making a demand on the trustee, but what he demanded, and sued for, was a statutory annual accounting available only *530under section 16062. And that is what the trial court ordered. The issue of a particular account was not raised, no evidence was offered as to what information Stephen needed, and no decision was made as to what was necessary to protect his interests, all of which would be required for a section 16061 petition. So I cannot agree that the trial court acted under section 16061, nor that the relief ordered was within its power under that statute.
I must also take exception to the majority’s suggestion that section 17200, subdivision (b)(7) permits a court to order an annual accounting that cannot be had under section 16062. Here, my concern is the Law Revision Commission comment that states: “For limitations on the right of a beneficiary to compel the trustee to account or report under paragraph (7), see Sections 15800 and 16060-16064.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 54A West’s Ann. Prob. Code, supra, foll. § 17200, p. 194 [1990 enactment].)
Reasonably read, the Law Revision Commission comment to section 17200, subdivision (b)(7) means the right to petition for a report of information or accounting is limited by the section 16062 and section 16061 rules: A remainderman does not get an annual accounting (§ 16062, subd. (a)), the trustee of a pre-July 1, 1987 living trust is exempted from the duty to render an annual accounting to anyone (§ 16062, subd. (b)), and a beneficiary denied an annual accounting may still have a particular account. (§ 16061.)
Since Stephen is a remainderman, and this is a pre-July 1, 1987 living trust, he is not entitled to an annual accounting under section 16062. As a beneficiary denied an annual accounting, he is entitled to a report of information that may include a particular account under section 16061. But what Stephen cannot have under section 16062—an annual accounting—he should not be allowed to obtain under either section 16061 or section 17200.
The majority avoids the Law Revision Commission comment to section 17200, subdivision (b)(7) by reading the word “limitation” as referring only to portions of sections 16060 to 16064 that expressly say something such as “ ‘the trustee is not required to’ ” perform a certain act. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 528.) I think they are wrong.
Theirs is a narrow, subjective reading of the word “limitation,” and there is nothing in the comment or elsewhere to suggest it was intended. A limit is, after all, “something that bounds, restrains, or confines,” and a limitation is “a restriction or restraint imposed from without.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1981) p. 1312.) To my mind, the only reasonable reading of the comment is that sections 16061 and 16062 are restrictions or restraints on a beneficiary’s rights under section 17200, subdivision (b)(7).
*531My colleagues’ rationale for this construction of section 17200, subdivision (b)(7) is that it harmonizes sections 16061, 16062 and 17200, subdivision (b)(7). They are also concerned that a beneficiary’s ability to protect his interests would be impaired if he were denied the right to petition for an annual accounting under section 17200, subdivision (b)(7). I do not believe either point withstands analysis.
There is no need to harmonize the provisions if one accepts the section 17200 Law Revision Commission comment at face value. It seems to me the majority creates an inconsistency where none exists only by its strained reading of the comment, and then exerts herculean efforts to “remedy” that inconsistency.
The majority also suggests that section 17200, subdivision (b)(7) may allow a court to order an annual accounting by a trustee of a trust created prior to My 1, 1987.1 think that is contrary to the plain language of section 16062, subdivision (b).
The limitation regarding pre-1987 trusts in section 16062, subdivision (b) represented a choice by the Legislature. In my view, it is one we must abide by. The requirement of an annual account was first imposed with the adoption of former section 16062. (Stats. 1986, ch. 820, § 40, p. 2750, operative My 1, 1987, repealed by Stats. 1990, ch. 79, § 13, p. 463.) Subdivision (b) was inserted to make it clear that the new rule did not apply to trusts in existence on the operative date of the new rule. (18 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1986) p. 673.2) Current section 16062 continues without change former section 16062 of the repealed Probate Code. (See Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 54A West’s Ann. Prob. Code, supra, foll. § 16062, p. 53 [1990 enactment].)
The Legislature having seen fit to expressly provide that the annual account requirement applied prospectively only to trusts created after My 1, 1987, it ill behooves us to now suggest it should be applied retroactively. Without regard to Stephen’s status as a remainderman, the trustee of the instant pre-1987 living trust is exempt from the annual account requirement under section 16062, subdivision (b). The majority’s dissatisfaction with that result has convinced them a right to such an accounting may be found in section 17200, subdivision (b)(7). It has not convinced me.
*532In my view, the order appealed from should be reversed because Stephen is not entitled to an annual accounting. I would remand the matter with directions to consider the petition as one for relief under section 16061 and allow such further proceedings in that regard as may be proper.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 27, 2006, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 17, 2007, S148651. Moreno, J., did not participate therein.

 All further statutory references are to the Probate Code.

 The Law Revision Commission comment to former section 16062 states: “Subdivision (b) makes clear that the annual accounting required by subdivision (a) does not apply to pre-operative date trusts. This section does not affect any requirement for an account that may exist under prior law, whether pursuant to a statute, trust instrument, or court order.” (18 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1986) p. 673.)