Court Opinion

ID: 9472513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:03:04.778982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:59.436000
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. The majority has misconstrued United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982) (.MacDonald); which applies in this case to exclude from the sixth amendment measurement of speedy trial the periods between live indictments against the defendants.
I
The majority observes that the speedy trial clause did not apply in MacDonald between the government’s good faith voluntary dismissal of military charges and a subsequent civil indictment. This does not mean, as the majority holds, that MacDonald fails to apply to involuntary dismissals or dismissals from which the government appeals. The Supreme Court, in a general statement of its holding, said: “Any undue delay after charges are dismissed, like any delay before charges are filed, must be scrutinized under the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial Clause.” Id. at 7, 102 S.Ct. at 1501. Nowhere in the remainder of its opinion is there any hint that the Court meant only voluntary dismissals. See id. at 7-11, 102 S.Ct. at 1501-1503. On the contrary, in a footnote it commented “[o]ur holding agrees with ... the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, ... that if charges are initially dismissed and later reinstated, the period between the dismissal and the reinstatement is not to be included in computing the time within which a trial must commence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(d), 3161(h)(6).” 456 U.S. at 7 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. at 1501 n. 7. Section 3161(h)(6) applies only to voluntary dismissals by the government. Section 3161(d), however, applies to dismissals on the motion of a defendant, “any charge contained in a complaint filed against an individual ... dismissed or otherwise dropped,” and dismissals “by a trial court and reinstated following an appeal.” For the MacDonald holding to agree, as it says it does, with section 3161(d), the theory of its holding must include dismissals other than voluntary dismissals by the government.
Later in the same footnote, the Supreme Court cited with apparent approval a number of Speedy Trial Act cases that excluded the period after dismissal of initial charges in counting time. See 456 U.S. at 7-8 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. at 1501-1502 n. 7. Among them was United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887 (D.C.Cir.1972), where the government charged the defendant in the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, appealed and lost after dismissal of the charges, and then brought the same charges in federal district court. See id. at 889, 891. This citation reinforces the clear meaning of MacDonald: delay after a dismissal of charges does not normally count for sixth amendment speedy trial purposes.
Applying the MacDonald rule to this case, the period from November 14, 1975 to May 12, 1976 counts for sixth amendment purposes for all defendants. A live indictment stood against them during that six-month period from arrest to dismissal of *1195the indictment with prejudice. The period from March 12, 1980 (for the dynamite matters) and June 18, 1980 (for the nondy-namite matters) to May 30, 1983 counts for sixth amendment purposes for all defendants except KaMook Banks. Live indictments stood against those defendants during that roughly three-year period from our reinstatement of the dynamite counts and the superseding indictment’s reinstatement of the nondynamite counts until dismissal of the indictment with prejudice again. The time between 1976 and 1980 when no live indictment stood against the defendants after the first dismissal with prejudice does not count for sixth amendment purposes under the MacDonald rule. The time between August 30, 1980 and January 31, 1983 when no live indictments stood against Kamook Banks does not count as to her for sixth amendment purposes under MacDonald. Thus, the speedy trial clause time for most of the defendants totaled approximately three and a half years. The speedy trial clause time for Kamook Banks totaled slightly more than one year.
According to MacDonald, the sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial “is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” 456 U.S. at 8. These concerns did not apply to the defendants during the times after dismissals when no live indictments were outstanding against them. They were not incarcerated then. They were not hobbled by bail then. They were not under arrest then. Had the district court imposed bail pending the appeals, see 18 U.S.C. § 3731, that restriction might have triggered the running of time for purposes of the speedy trial clause, but the defendants did not have to post bail. These facts indicate that excluding the times after dismissal when no live indictments stood against the defendants in this case comports both with the letter of the MacDonald rule and the purposes of the sixth amendment.
The majority argues that because the defendants “were ... subject to the imposition of such restraints at any time” during the appeals of the dismissed indictments, the sixth amendment applies to those periods. That contention is inconsistent with MacDonald where the Supreme Court distinguished Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967) (Klopfer), on grounds that the prosecutor in that case could activate the charges and restore the case for trial “ ‘without further order’ of the court.” MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8-9 n. 8, 102 S.Ct. at 1502 n. 8, quoting Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 214, 87 S.Ct. at 989. Contrary to Klopfer, imposition of restraints pending appeal on the defendants in this case would require “ ‘further order’ of the court.” They were in essentially no worse position than before their first arrest when the government had discovered probable cause but not yet successfully acted on it.
The Constitution provides “the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial.” U.S. Const, amend. VI. The Supreme Court recently stated in United States v. Gouveia, — U.S. -, -, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (citations omitted) (Gouveia), that this right “may attach before an indictment and as early as the time of ‘arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.’ ” But even Gouveia does not assist the defendants because the most public investigation, promise to prosecute, or government statement of criminal conduct does not reach the required threshold; the government had not imposed its formal power directly on any alleged wrongdoer. As United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) (emphasis added) {Marion), holds: “it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engaged the particular protections of the speedy trial provision ____” Accord, e.g., United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 902, 102 S.Ct. 409, 70 L.Ed.2d 221 *1196(1981). The government’s public intent to prosecute and its efforts on appeal to obtain the legal authority to do so did not constitute an exercise of formal power directly on the alleged wrongdoers. Because the government did not seek bail, no actual restraints were imposed. By misreading MacDonald, the majority has incorrectly extended the sixth amendment beyond these limits imposed by the Supreme Court.
II
Even after properly excluding part of the delay in this case under the MacDonald rule, a clear sixth amendment question remains. Three and a half years, the relevant period for most of the defendants, is a suspect delay. See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27, 94 S.Ct. 188, 190, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973). One year, the relevant period for Kamook Banks, is less suspect but I will assume for purposes of this appeal that it is also adequate to trigger the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (Barker). See id. at 530-31 & n. 31, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92 & n. 31.
In Barker, the Supreme Court identified four major factors for resolving a constitutional speedy trial claim: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Since Barker, the Supreme Court has reduced the last of these factors — prejudice —to, at best, minimal importance. See MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 1502. As foreshadowed as long ago as Marion, see 404 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. at 465, “prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time ... is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations,” MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 1502. See also, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2047-48, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); Fed.R.Crim.P. 48(b).
The defendants in this case adequately asserted their rights to a speedy trial. As a result, the length of delay and reasons for delay amount to the most important factors for speedy trial analysis. Of the three and a half year period applicable to most of the defendants, almost two years involved their own appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution. As the majority must concede, this period should not weigh against the government. The majority must also concede that the six months wasted by the defendants seeking rehearing en banc and certiorari in the face of new, directly controlling Supreme Court precedent, e.g., United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 3081, 73 L.Ed.2d 754 (1982), at least cannot weigh against the government. Such essentially frivolous petitions, see generally, e.g., Baker, A Practical Guide to Certiorari, 33 Cath.U.L.Rev. 611, 616-21, 622-23 (1984), should weigh against the defendants. But even considering that six month period as neutral, only one year remains that might possibly weigh against the government. Of that period, forty-one days are attributable to a trial date continuance ordered by the district court on its own motion. Given the complexity of this case, the time necessary to prepare all trial matters and the additional time necessary to prepare for trial again after interlocutory appeal, I cannot say that, on balance, this one year of delay violated the defendants’ sixth amendment rights to a speedy trial.
Kamook Banks’s case is less close. Of the slightly more than one year relevant to sixth amendment analysis, she wasted a good portion seeking certiorari along with the other defendants. I cannot say the remaining period violated her sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.
Ill
Because the district court failed to apply the MacDonald rule to exclude for sixth amendment purposes the periods between live indictments against the defendants, we should at least remand for reconsideration. The district court abused its discretion, see United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d at 787; United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, *1197832 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 854, 97 S.Ct. 148, 50 L.Ed.2d 130 (1976), by dismissing the last indictment on speedy trial grounds based on such an erroneous calculation of delay. Because I find the record sufficient to conclude that the remaining delays are largely excusable under the balancing test of Barker, I would prefer not to delay the resolution of this case further but to reverse and remand for trial.