Court Opinion

ID: 9851091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:07:19.280477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:48.498855
License: Public Domain

PORTER, Justice
(dissenting).
As a court of law we are bound to apply to the case before us the applicable statutory law of this state, and the precedent established by previous decisions of this court. Where neither statute nor our own precedent supply the answer, we may seek guidance from the words and reasoning of the courts of other jurisdictions and the text writers, but these are not binding precedent. We are obligated to fashion our own precedent to apply to the facts. We seek the precedent which best accords with reason and justice under the circumstances presented.
The testimony at issue here was not given by a wife but by an unmarried woman. Thus it is facially not within the bar of SDCL 19-2-1 which in pertinent part provides:
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent; * * *.
Even though SDCL 19-2-1 apparently first came into our statutes in 1887, this court has never applied it to bar testimony given as in this case. State v. Burt, 17 S.D. 7, 94 N.W. 409 (1903); State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933); and State v. Goff, 64 S.D. 80, 264 N.W. 665 (1936) each involved a case in which the viva voce testimony of a wife was given or offered at the trial of the husband. It is plain enough that if the spouse of this defendant had been called as a witness at the trial and required to give testimony over his objection, SDCL 19-2-1 would require reversal. But that is not the case here. Defendant’s wife, Illa, has given no testimony against him during their marriage. The issue is not whether we favor the marital privilege [SDCL 19-2-1], Instead the issue is whether the marital privilege applies at all to the facts here. We are free to adopt a precedent which will resolve the issue since the language of SDCL 19-2-1 does not expressly bar the testimony here, and we have no pertinent binding precedent of this court.
Did the legislature intend that testimony already given by an unmarried woman against a defendant should, upon the subsequent marriage of the two, become, simply by operation of SDCL 19-2-1, the testimo*566ny of a spouse. “There should be no strained construction of the statute to effect a result so easily obtained by plain enactment if needed or wanted.” State v. Dailey, 57 S.D. 554, 565, 234 N.W. 45, 50 (1931). If the legislature intended to bar testimony given before marriage, it could have said so.
“It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a statute must be construed with reference to the objects intended to be accomplished by it.” Dorman v. Crooks State Bank, 55 S.D. 209, 219, 225 N.W. 661, 665 (1929); see also Stocker v. Stocker, 112 Neb. 565, 569, 199 N.W. 849, 851 (1924). The object of the legislature in enacting SDCL 19-2-1 [in substance, in 1887] was to protect the marital relation. This was the policy underlying the common law rule, as the court recognized in People v. Hayes, 140 N.Y. 484, 35 N.E. 951, 954 (1894):
The rule * * * was founded upon a wise public policy, adopted and pursued for the purpose of encouraging to the utmost that mutual confidence between husband and wife, which is the strongest guaranty of a happy marriage. To this end the common law provided that all communications between husband and wife, which were of a confidential nature, should be kept inviolate, and should not be drawn from either party by any process of law. [Citations omitted]. The law appreciated the fact that even truth itself might be pursued too keenly, and might cost too much. The general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation between parties occupying such relations to each other would be too great a price to pay for the chance of obtaining and establishing the truth in regard to some matter under legal investigation.
When Ilia testified at the preliminary hearing, she was unmarried, and had never been the wife of defendant. She testified in the presence of defendant, and was cross-examined by his attorney. Illa Jaques took no part when the transcript of the preliminary hearing testimony of Ilia Hammond was read to the jury at the trial.
Everything Ilia did in this case which could conceivably have any effect upon the marital relation she did before her marriage to defendant. Defendant knew all of this when he married her. Ilia did nothing in this case after her marriage which could affect the marital relation. Should we subvert the noble purpose underlying the marital privilege by allowing this defendant to raise it as a shield?
“The privilege suppresses relevant testimony, and should be allowed only when it is plain that marital confidence cannot otherwise reasonably be preserved. Nothing in this case suggests any such necessity.” Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 17, 54 S.Ct. 279, 281, 78 L.Ed. 617, 621-22 (1934).
The testimony of Ilia Hammond was properly received, and the judgment upon the jury verdict of guilty should be affirmed.