Court Opinion

ID: 9860048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:08:23.79473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:10.560915
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Gilkison, J.
I concur in the opinion in so far as it holds that either party to the action is entitled to a change of judge upon proper application therefor, timely filed and presented. A denial of this right to appellant by the trial court constitutes reversible error, which may properly be presented on appeal.
I also concur in the opinion that the proper authorities may transfer an epileptic patient from the Indiana Village for Epileptics to another benevolent institution should occasion require but I rather violently disagree with the opinion that such a patient may be transferred from one institution to another when the institution to which the patient is so transferred is a penal institution.
Epilepsy is not a crime. On the contrary it is a disease with which many excellent people are affected. Many persons so affected are never hospitalized but continue to live and work in their respective field notwithstanding their affliction. Ancient instances of these are Saul, first King of Israel, and Julius Caesar. Our state determined to establish the Epileptic Village in 1905; the purpose of the institution is expressed in Section 1 of the Act as follows :
“There shall be established in this state a village for epileptics, the object of which shall be the scientific treatment, education, employment and custody of epileptics, and which shall be known as the Indiana village for epileptics. In the establishment of this institution, the general assembly recognizes the duty of the state to provide proper care for such of its citizens as are, or may become, *265affected with the disease of epilepsy. [Acts 1905, Ch. 159, § 1, p. 483].” § 22-2001, Burns’ 1950 Replacement.
As shown by this statute the purpose of the establishment of the Epileptic Village is, “the scientific treatment, education, employment and custody of epileptics, . . .” These are wholly benevolent purposes— they are not penal. The ancient idea that an epileptic patient is possessed of a devil, and the treatment prescribed that it must be beaten out of him, ceased to exist long ago. I do not think it is advisable to revive it now.
The Master Christian’s position with respect to epileptics is well expressed by his first disciple thus:
“And the report of him went forth into all Syria; and they brought unto him all that were sick, holden with divers diseases and torments, possessed with devils, and epileptic, and palsied; and he healed them.” Matthew 4-24—Holman’s Teacher’s Bible Revision of 1898.
This, I think, expresses the Christian thought. It was the evident intent of the Legislature to carry out this thought when it established the Indiana Village for Epileptics. It is an important duty of every department of government in the state and nation to see that this intent is not destroyed by erroneous rulings of administrative officers, and erroneous constructions by courts.
In 1909 our state established the “hospital for insane criminals.” The title of the Act is as follows:
“AN ACT authorizing and providing for the establishment of a ‘hospital for insane criminals’ as a part of the ‘Indiana state prison,’ making appropriations therefor, providing for its government and maintenance, defining the manner of holding insanity inquests in cases of convicts al*266leged to be insane and for their transfer and discharge, repealing all laws in conflict and declaring an emergency.” [Acts 1909, Ch. 87, p. 202].
The purpose of the institution is expressed in §§ 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Act as follows:
“Section 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the State of Indiana, That there be and hereby is established as hereinafter provided, a hospital for the care and treatment of male insane criminals which shall be known as the ‘Indiana hospital for insane criminals.’ (§ 13-301, Burns’ 1942 Replacement).
“Sec. 2. That the said ‘Indiana hospital for insane criminals’ shall be a part of the Indiana state prison located at Michigan City, Indiana, and shall be under the management of the board of trustees and warden of said Indiana state prison, and shall be governed by such rules and regulations, within the provisions of this act, as said board of trustees may adopt. (§ 13-302, Burns’ 1942 Replacement).
“Sec. 3. That the said board of trustees is hereby directed to select a suitable site on land now belonging to the state and set apart for the use of said Indiana state prison, and proceed to erect and equip thereon, according to such plans as it may adopt, suitable and substantial buildings and necessary appurtenances with an available capacity of not less than one hundred and forty-five (145) beds. Said structures must be sanitary, fire-proof and embody both prison and hospital features as far as practical and suitable for the care and proper treatment of insane criminals. (§ 13-303, Burns’ 1942 Replacement).
“Sec. 4. That for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act there be and hereby is appropriated out of any available funds in the state treasury the sum of sixty-five thousand ($65000)) dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, the same to be available from the day of the taking effect of this act to September 30th, 1910, when any unexpended balance shall revert to the general fund of the state treasury. The popu*267lation of said ‘Indiana hospital for insane criminals’ shall be considered as part of the population of the Indiana state prison and shall be maintained out of the funds appropriated for the Indiana state prison. All of said moneys may be drawn by the board of trustees on requisition on the auditor of state in the same manner as is by law required in the settlement and payment of other accounts of the Indiana state prison. (§ 18-304, Burns’ 1942 Replacement).
“Sec. 5. The warden of the Indiana state prison shall exercise the same supervision and authority over the said ‘Indiana hospital for insane criminals,’ its appurtenances and its entire population and shall have the same power of employment and discharge of all persons employed therein, as the law now confers upon him with relation to the Indiana state prison. The board of trustees of the Indiana state prison shall have the same authority over said Indiana hospital for insane criminals as it now has by law over said Indiana state prison and shall be clothed with the same powers and governed by the same regulations as to their methods of business as are now fixed by statute for the direction and control of the board of trustees of the Indiana state prison, except as hereinafter provided.” (§ 13-305, Burns’ 1942 Replacement) .
From these sections of the statute it is apparent that the Indiana hospital for insane criminals is but a part of the Indiana State Prison. No one will say that a prison is a benevolent institution. Persons are committed to that institution only for the “punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” Art. 1, § 37, Indiana Constitution.
From the benevolent purposes of the Indiana Village for Epileptics to the penal purposes of the Indiana hospital for insane criminals is a lengthy step indeed, and transfer of epileptic patients from the former to be prisoners in the latter can be made lawfully only *268in the manner and form as provided by the Constitution and laws of the State. The State Constitution provides :
“There shall be neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, within the State, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. . . .” Art. 1, § 37.
“All courts shall be open; and every man, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. . . .” Art. 1, § 12.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” Art. 1, § 13.
“. . . . No person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.” Art. 1, § 14.
One who is sent to the Indiana Village for Epileptics loses none of his rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness declared by our constitution; he retains all these rights, and because of his disease he gets the additional right of “scientific treatment, education, employment and custody.” The right of custody granted is not unlimited. It must be reasonably exercised to accomplish the purposes designed, which are treatment, education, and employment.
The declared rights under the Indiana Constitution heretofore noted, and the rights of all persons under Section 1, Amendment 14 of the United States Constitution as follows:
“. . . . No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities *269of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
are absolutely binding upon each department of our state government. These rights must be upheld with complete impartiality with respect to epileptics.
A statute in Indiana, which the opinion does not mention but which is the basis for the transfer of appellee to the state prison, provides:
“An inmate, being a male adult, of a hospital for the insane, the Indiana Village for Epileptics, school for feeble-minded youth, or the Indiana Colony for Feeble-Minded, on account of homicidal and criminalistic habits and tendencies to a degree requiring prison surroundings and protection of life or property, may be transferred to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals at Michigan City by the mutual understanding and consent of the warden and superintendent of the respective institutions, and with the approval of the governor, and not otherwise. Whenever, in the judgment of the physician in charge, an inmate so transferred shall have recovered his sanity, and may properly and safely be permitted to return to his home and place of legal settlement, the physician in charge shall certify the fact to the warden, who shall discharge him as the law provides for the discharge of other recovered inmates of the hospital for insane criminals. The expense of such a transfer to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals shall be paid by the institution making the transfer.” § 22-306, Burns’ 1950 Replacement.
By this statute an attempt is made to authorize transferring patients from the benevolent institutions named therein to the Indiana State Prison, under the name “Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals at Michigan City.” It seeks to justify this action by the hocus pocus proceedings named in the statute quoted. I am *270aware that any person may be sent to the state prison, when he has been properly charged with the commission of a specific crime in a court of competent jurisdiction, has had a fair trial agreeable with the constitutions of the state and nation, and has been found and adjudged guilty, and sehtenced agreeable with the law. But no man may ever be sent to the Indiana State Prison “on account of homicidal and criminalistic habits and tendencies to a degree requiring prison surroundings and protection of life or property,” as stated in this statute. The proceeding by which this unlawful result is accomplished is remarkable because of its simplicity. It is accomplished “by the mutual 'understanding' and consent of the warden and superintendent of the respective institutions, and with the approval of the governor, and not otherwise.” In this manner the statute noted seeks to destroy appellee’s Creator given, constitutionally guaranteed natural rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. But our constitutions are the supreme law of the state, binding alike upon governors, legislatures, courts and the people and the statute involved is clearly unconstitutional and void, being in contravention of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and of §§ 87, 12, 13 and 14, Art. 1 of the Constitution of Indiana hereinbefore noted.
The opinion is in error in stating that “appellee became a ward of the state of Indiana;” on the contrary he became a patient of the state to receive “scientific treatment, education and employment.” For these ends only the state is given his custody. Under the constitutions of the state and nation it may not abuse this right of custody, or use it for any purposes whatever other than those specifically named in the statute —as last above noted.
*271It is quite erroneous to say that the necessary legal process to qualify one suffering from epilepsy to secure the benevolent and beneficial “scientific treatment, education, employment and custody” provided by the state for its unfortunate epileptics, is the same due process that the state must take in order to take away the natural liberties of an individual and confine him in the State Prison. It is extremely difficult to follow the reasoning that reaches such a result. To me the process of reasoning necessarily followed is intellectually immoral and I am wholly unable to agree thereto.
The appellee in this case is not a criminal. So far as shown by the record he has never been charged with the commission of a crime. He has had no trial before either court or jury and of course, no judgment has been rendered against him. The order of court committing him to the Indiana Village for Epileptics is not a criminal judgment, and it, in no manner, authorizes any administrative officer or court to sentence him to the State Prison. Any such action by any such administrative officers or courts is a direct violation of appellee’s rights under the State and Federal Constitutions heretofore noted.
The opinion attempts a construction of Chapter 385, Acts 1945 as amended by Chapter 67, Acts 1947, being § 22-4202, Burns’ 1950 Replacement. Section 2, Cl. 6 of this statute gives the Indiana Council for Mental Health authority “to transfer psychiatric patients in state hospitals and institutions for the care of such patients, from one such hospital or institution to another.” There is nothing in this act even indicating any intent on the part of the legislature to authorize the transfer of such patients from the benevolent care of such hospitals to the penal care of the prisons. If this statute attempted to authorize such a transfer *272it would be a contravention of the constitutions noted and therefore void. However, by the peculiar reasoning of the opinion, this statute is said to authorize such a transfer. I think the opinion thus does the statute an injustice. It is the- opinion that seeks to authorize such a transfer, not the statute, and so it is the opinion that violates the constitutions of both the state and the nation—not the statute.
Until the opinion in the instant case it has always been the law in Indiana, that:
“In construing a statute it is necessary to consider the whole act and all other law relating thereto, and, if possible, give effect to it in all its parts. Huff v. Fetch (1924), 194 Ind. 570, 143 N. E. 705.
“Furthermore that construction should be favored which grants equality of rights and which is against restrictions of liberty. Helms v. American Security Co. (1939), 216 Ind. 1, 6, 22 N. E. (2d) 822, 824; In re Petition of Leach, Ex Parte (1893), 134 Ind. 665, 671, 34 N. E. 641, 642, 21 L. R. A. 701, 706.” Dowd, Warden v. Johnston (1943), 221 Ind. 398, 401, 402, 47 N. E. 2d 976; Lee v. Burns (1932), 94 Ind. App. 676, 679, 182 N. E. 277; Willis v. Bayles (1886), 105 Ind. 363, 370, 5 N. E. 8.
“. . . all statutes are to be construed as far as possible in favor of equality of rights and all restrictions on human liberty and all claims for special privileges are to be regarded as having the presumption of law against them.” Lee v. Burns (1932), 94 Ind. App. 676, 679, supra; In Re Petition of Leach, Ex Parte (1893), 134 Ind. 665, 671, 34 N. E. 641, 642, supra.
The opinion ignores the clear and unambiguous terms of the statute creating the Hospital for Insane Criminals—the title of five sections of which are quoted in full in. this dissent. The opinion takes the position that because it is. called a “hospital” the court may ignore the qualifying words- “for insane criminals” and *273allow any epileptic to be sent to that so-called hospital, notwithstanding the fact that the constitutions of the state and nation forbid such action. I am unable to follow this reasoning.
We may not by a pretended construction legislate something into the statute that the legislature withheld therefrom. An old but thoroughly dependable rule of statutory construction is as follows:
“In the interpretation of statutes, if the words used express clearly' the sense and intention of the law, they must always govern. For as we have seen, it is not permitted to interpret what is plain and manifest, as it stands in no need of interpretation. When an act is conceived in clear and precise terms—when the sense is manifest, and leads to nothing absurd, there can be no reason to refuse the sense which it naturally presents to the mind:’’' Garrigus v. The Board of Commissioners of Parke County (1872), 39 Ind. 66, 70.
The opinion seems to violate all the rules of construction noted to accomplish a direct violation of appellee’s natural rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and to deny him the due course of law and due process of law guaranteed him by the state and national constitutions. Since appellee is but one of many Indiana epileptics, who by the same unlawful process without trial and without even a pretense of guilt have been dumped into the State Prison Hospital for Criminal Insane, not for treatment but merely for permanent custody, it is to be hoped that relief for these unfortunates may be found.
On this feature of the case, I think the judgment of the trial court is correct.
Note.—Reported in 96 N. E'. 2d 902.