Court Opinion

ID: 9811014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:06:09.256656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:23.767719
License: Public Domain

MeRRIMON, C. J.
(dissenting): I think the law of this State, in respect to bail, especially as to persons charged with and committed to prison to answer for capital crimes, as it prevailed before the adoption of the present Constitution, has not been materially, if at all, modified, by statute. The present* Constitution simply declares that “ excessive bail should not be required.”
The statutory provision (The Code, §1161) cited in the opinion of the Court and interpreted as having some modi*940fying effect (exactly what is not stated), it seems to me, ought not to be so construed. It prescribes that “Any Justice of the Supreme Court, or Judge of a Superior Court, or of a Criminal Court, shall have power to bail persons committed to prison charged with crime, in all cases. Any Justice of the Peace or Chief Magistrate of any incorporated city or town shall have the same power in all cases where the punishment is not capital.” The purpose of this regulation certainly is not to declare that persons committed to prison to answer for capital crimes shall be entitled to be let to bail in all cases and at all events, or to prescribe in what particular cases or class of capital cases, or under what circumstances of them, the persons in prison to answer for them shall be let to bail. The regulation does not purport to do so, nor has it such such purpose. It simply implies that the Judges designated shall have authority to let persons in prison on account of crime to bail in capital as well as other cases, when the person is entitled, under the general law of the State, to have bail. It confers on them general power as to bail. The other regulation (The Code, §1160) has like meaning. It provides, as to persons who are charged with crime and have not yet been committed to prison: “Any Justice of the Supreme Court, or a Judge of a Superior Court, or of a Criminal Court, in all cases,” may let the person so charged to bail. This likewise implies such power as to capital crimes, in all cases where the party charged is entitled to bail. That this is the correct interpretation appears the more manifest from other statutory provisions regulating the subject of bail, which expressly recognize a distinction between offences that are bailable and such as are not. Thus, the other regulation (The Code, §1156) provides that, “If the offence with which, the prisoner is charged be bailable,” etc., * * * “ or the offence be not bailable, the prisoner shall be committed to prison.” And so, also, the statutory regulation in respect to habeas corpus (The Code, *941§ 1647) provides that the petitioner shall be let to bail “ if the case be bailable,” etc. The distinction between bailable offences and such as are not bailable is distinctly recognized in many places and connections, but there is no constitutional or statutory regulation that at all prescribes in what case or under what circumstances a person charged with a capital offence, but not committed, or charged and committed to prison and held to answer, shall be let to bail. In such cases the prisoner may have bail as allowed by the common law, and not otherwise.
At common law all persons charged with capital felonies were, before conviction, bailable, but the Constitution of this State of 1776, section 39, modified that law by providing that “all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences, where the proof is evident or presumption great.” That Constitution, however, including the provision just cited, has been superseded by the present Constitution, which contains no such provision. Hence, the right to bail in capital cases is left as at the common law. The Code, § 641. By that law bail might be granted in such cases only by a high judicial officer, upon thorough scrutiny of the facts and great caution. Sir William Blackstone says: “ It is agreed that the Court of King’s Bench (or any Judge thereof in time of vacation) may bail for any crime whatsoever, be it treason, murder or any other offence, according to the circumstances of the case. And herein thé wisdom of the law is manifest. To allow, bail to be taken commonly for such enormous crimes would greatly tend to elude the public justice; and yet there are cases, though they rarely happen, in which it would be hard and unjust to confine a man in prison, though accused even of the greatest offence. The law has, therefore, provided one Court, and only one, which has discretionary power of bailing in any case; except only, even to this high jurisdiction, and, of course, to all inferior ones, such persons as are committed by *942either bouse of Parliament, so long as the session lasts; or such as are committed for contempts by any of the King’s Superior Courts of justice.” 4 Black. Com , 298, 299. The power thus conferred upon the Court of King’s Bench is conferred upon the Justices of the Supreme, and the Judges of the Superior and Criminal, Courts in this State. B.ut such power ought not, cannot, properl\ be exercised arbitrarily; it should be done with great care, and upon thorough scrutiny of .the evidence going to pr<>ve the prisoner’s guilt. If it satisfies the Judge that he is guilty, he should not allow bail, unless in very exceptional cases, such as where the prisoner is afflicted with some disease, and his continued confinement in prison will probably result in death.
The indictment for a capital offence raises a strong presumption of the pi’isoner’s guilt, and he ought not to have bail unless he alleges and proves to the satisfaction of the Judge that he is not guilty, except in the exceptional cases mentioned. The law intends that persons solemnly accused of capital crimes, when the evidence tends strongly to prove their guilt, shall not have opportunity to flee and escape justice; they must, therefore, be detained in jail, not to punish them, but to the end that they may certainly answer for the crimes charged against them. Their rights should be carefully observed, but the rights of society and the State should be observed as well. If, in possible cases, the prisoner is not guilty, when the evidence proves his guilt to the satisfaction of the Court, this is his misfortune, and he must submit to the inconvenience and distress occasioned thereby until, in the course of the law, he shall be tried. Until the adoption of the present Constitution it was understood to be the law of the State that after indictment for a capital offence a prisoner was not bailable. This was so by reason of the provision of the Constitution of 1776, above recited. It was, therefore, that the late Chief Justice RuupiN said, in State v. Mills, 2 Dev., 420, “for, after bill found, a defendant *943is presumed to be guilty to most, if not all, purposes, except that óf a fair and impartial trial before a petit jury. The presumption is so strong that, in the case of a capital felony, the party cannot be left to bail.” See also State v. Dew, Taylor’s Conference Reports, 88 (142). For the reasous .-tated, the law is now otherwise to the extent that the prisoner may rebut the strong presumption raised by the indictment.
I-do not concur in the disposition made of this case The writ of certiorari allowed by this Court in contemplation of law was directed to the Judge before whom the habeas corpus proceeding was pending, and who'heard the same, commanding him to certify to this Court the whole record of the proceeding, to the end it might review his action and correct his alleged errors. By consent, the case was treated as if he had done so. Upchurch v. Scott, 2 Winst., 137; Cox v. Gee, ibid., 131; Johnson v. Mallett, ibid., 125. The writ put this Court in relation with him as Judge, and, as it decided there was error, its decision should have been certified to the Judge below, directing him to proceed to hear and dispose of the proceeding before him according to law-. But by order of this Court the proceeding is left incomplete and unfinished, and the petitioner is told simply that he'may file another petition before some other Judge. It seems to me that this course is at least disorderly, and not warranted by principle, precedent or practice, nor is there necessity for it. This Court had no relation in the case with the Superior Court of the county of Durham. The writ of certiorari was not directed to that Court, nor did it have jurisdiction of the matter. It is true that habeas corpus proceedings are largely summary in their character, but they should have logical order, consistency and completeness. It might not be convenient for the Judge below to further hear and dispose of the case. If so, he might make an order transferring it to another Judge, to be heard and disposed of by him. A *944Judge, observing well settled practice, frequently grants the writ of habeas corpus upon application, and makes it returnable before another Judge, who hears and disposes of the matter. This is necessary frequently for the convenience of Judges, the parties and witnesses, and with a view to economy.
Per' Curiam. Error.