Court Opinion

ID: 9684909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:18:40.369768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.122661
License: Public Domain

*141McCown, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Restatement, Conflict of Laws,. § 75, p. Ill, reads: “A state cannot exercise through its courts judicial jurisdiction over a person, although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, unless a method of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard.”
A court, by proper service of process, acquires jurisdiction over a domestic corporation. It is equally clear that in the field of conflict of laws and judgments, the validity of service of process depends upon whether the method of service prescribed is reasonably calculated to give notice of the action to the corporation and an opportunity to be heard. See, Restatement, Judgments, comment b, § 27, p. 119; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, comment b, § 87, pp. 135, 136.
At common law, jurisdiction of a court of a state over a domestic corporation is acquired by service of process upon its principal officer. The effect of local statutes extending the method of service are, of course, determined under the above rules, as to whether they are reasonably calculated to give the corporation knowledge of the action and an opportunity to be heard.
The particular statute of Nebraska, section 25-511, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “A summons against a corporation may be served upon the president, mayor, chairman of the board of directors or trustees, or other chief officer; or, if its chief officer is not found in the county, upon its cashier, treasurer, secretary, clerk, or managing agent; or, if none of the aforesaid officers can be found, by a copy left at the office or last usual place of business of such corporation. When the defendant is a foreign corporation, having a managing agent in this state, the service may be upon such agent.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The issue specifically involved here has not been passed upon in this state. It is important to' note, first, that the section obviously was intended to cover serv*142ice on a municipal corporation as well as a business corporation. The word “mayor,” for example, occurs in the list of titles described under the first portion of the statute which refers to the “chief officer.” We think it also apparent that the word “clerk,” appearing in the list of officers or agents who may be served if the chief officer is not found, was intended to refer to the clerk of a municipal corporation, and not simply any clerk of a business corporation. The word “cashier” in the same section obviously was intended to refer to banking corporations. This particular portion of the statute obviously was not intended to be limited to officers or agents with the specific titles designated because it concludes with the words “or managing agent" If this section were limited to the titles mentioned insofar as officers were concerned, it would omit all vice presidents, or executive vice presidents, or comptrollers, and we see no compelling reason to give it such limiting construction. For those reasons, however, the term “managing agent” may require some additional construction.
As early as 1915, this court held that a local poultry, egg, and cream buyer, whose conduct of the local business required judgment and discretion, was a managing agent of a domestic corporation. Brophy v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 98 Neb. 307, 152 N. W. 557, L. R. A. 1918A 367. See, also, Kron v. Robinson Seed Co., 111 Neb. 147, 195 N. W. 939. We believe the proper construction of section 25-511, R. R. S. 1943, should be that a managing agent upon whom service of summons may be made is an agent who has charge of the business activities of the corporation, or of some branch, department, or division thereof, and who, in respect to matters entrusted to him, is vested with powers requiring the exercise of independent judgment and discretion, and, under the circumstances here, is of sufficient rank to make it reasonably certain the defendant will be apprised of the service of summons. See, Dillon v. Gunderson, 235 *143Minn. 208, 50 N. W. 2d 275; Roehl v. Texas Company, 107 Cal. App. 691, 291 P. 255.
Mr. Dale Burns was director of personnel, and also supervisor of all bookkeeping activities of the accounting department. For purposes of service of summons, under the language of our statute, we believe he had sufficient rank to make it reasonably certain that the defendant would be apprised of the service. The language of the statute does not confine the term “managing agent” to the general manager, nor to the managing agent rather than a managing agent. The persons designated for' service if the “chief officer is not found” are all coequal, and the statute does not require service to be attempted consecutively on each applicable title designated. Service may be made upon any person coming within the class of officers or agents designated if the chief officer is not found.
There is no question here but that the deputy sheriff attempted to serve a summons upon the corporation by going to its home office and advising the switchboard operator that he had a summons to serve. There is dispute in the affidavits as to whether he asked for the highest officer present. The return of the summons made by the deputy sheriff specifically showed the summons was delivered to “Dale Burns, Managing Agent” personally in Douglas County, Nebraska. It was also stated: “No President, Mayor, Chairman of the Board of Directors or Trustees or other Chief Officer of said Corporation being found in Douglas County, State of Nebraska.” The defendant does not deny that the chief officer was not found, but contends that he could have been found if the deputy had inquired for him. The statute itself provides that if the president or chief officer “is not found,” the service may be made on the next category of officers or agents, but if none of them “can be found,” the service shall be made by leaving a copy at the office or usual place of business. If we permit the impeachment of a return of personal service of summons *144■merely because of affidavits indicating a lack of diligent inquiry for the chief officer before serving another officer or agent specifically authorized by statute to receive it, then a case by case determination of what is a reasonable or diligent inquiry or search must be undertaken. This case does not involve a situation in which personal service is omitted and a copy left at the office or last usual place of business.
We think it also important to note that the fault in service was the fault of the deputy sheriff. Even if an attorney had examined the return immediately upon filing, it appeared on its face to be sufficient. In modern practice in a metropolitan center, it would be almost a practical impossibility for an attorney to assume responsibility for the individual specific instruction of deputies as to service of process in each case involvng a corporation. In other connotations dealing with jurisdictional requirements previously held mandatory, we have held that where the fault lies with the court officer, substantial compliance with an otherwise mandatory statute will be sufficient. See Liljehorn v. Fyfe, 178 Neb. 532, 134 N. W. 2d 230. It seems only reasonable to apply the same principle in this case. The better rule would seem to be that where personal service was actually made upon an officer or agent of a domestic corporation within the class of those authorized by statute to receive service of summons, it will be deemed sufficient compliance with the statutes prescribing the manner of service of summons where it appears that the chief officer of the corporation was not found, even though a more diligent attempt to comply with the statute would probably have resulted in serving the chief officer.
Statutory enactments governing service of process against corporations were intended to be liberalizations and extensions of the common law rule which restricted service of process to the principal officer. Under these circumstances, technical form should not take precedence *145over the basic and fundamental requirement that personal service of process on a domestic corporation should be one reasonably calculated to give the corporation knowledge of the action, and an opportunity to be heard.