Court Opinion

ID: 9629460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:43:16.277933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:19.657227
License: Public Domain

Gunderson, J.,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
My colleagues note that “the detective’s testimony was highly prejudicial.” However, they say: “It gives us solace that this was not a case in which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one.” Of course, this is quite true, in the sense that appellant may clearly have been guilty of something. Still, it remains unclear whether appellant committed first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter. Because of highly prejudicial testimony elicited from Detective Maddock — and, I believe, other inflammatory evidence improperly elicited from Victor Janway — appellant was deprived of a fair trial concerning the degree of guilt.
As a reading of the majority opinion will show, conflicting inferences might well be drawn from the proper and probative evidence, regarding appellant’s state of mind at the time of the killing. From the testimony legitimately before the court, issues such as premeditation, or heat of passion, could be seriously debated. Thus, it seems to me quite possible — indeed probable — that the improper, admittedly “highly prejudicial” evidence colored the jury’s determination of these central issues.