Court Opinion

ID: 9632396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:13:02.240973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:14.927047
License: Public Domain

DON BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The pleadings allege Ms. Sunsinger was taken advantage of by her treating physician, Dr. Perez. Those pleading allege, among other things, that Dr. Perez was negligent in mishandling the “transference” phenomenon and in failing to refer Ms. Sunsinger for psychological treatment. The majority holds Dr. Perez’s affidavit is competent summary judgment evidence on this issue. I disagree.
Cluett v. Medical Protective Co., 829 S.W.2d 822, 828-29 nn. 4-5 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1992, writ denied), is instructive on transference:
Although no Texas court has addressed the issue of when sexual contact by a physician with a patient (FN4) is construed to be the rendition of professional medical services, (FN5) several other jurisdictions have considered this issue. The general rule in other jurisdictions is that the nature of the physician-patient relationship determines whether sexual contact should be considered to be based upon the rendition of professional services. These courts have held that sexual contact between physician and patient will not be considered by the courts to have arisen out of the rendition of professional services unless the patient is receiving psychothera-peutic treatment involving the transference phenomenon. The transference phenomenon occurs in the relationships of psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, and similar professionals with their patients. Transference is “[t]he process whereby the patient displaces [onto] the therapist feelings, attitudes *503and attributes which properly belong to a significant attachment figure of the past, usually a parent, and responds to the therapist accordingly.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 700 (Minn.1990) (quoting S. WALDRON-SKINNER, A DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 364 (1986)). Thus, the therapist, as part of the therapeutic relationship, serves as a substitute for the person with whom the patient has had difficulty communicating or acting out feelings. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir.1986); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 447 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Minn.Ct. App.1989), aff'd, 459 N.W.2d 698 (Minn.1990). Because the relationship between the therapist and the patient is crucial to the recovery of the patient, the mishandling of that relationship by the therapist’s becoming sexually involved with the patient has been declared by many courts to be malpractice. See Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365-66 (and cases cited therein); Love, 459 N.W.2d at 702.
Where the physician-patient relationship does not involve the transference phenomenon as part of the treatment of the patient, courts have held that sexual relations between physician and patient do not involve the rendition of professional services. E.g., Standlee v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 899, 693 P.2d 1101, 1102 (App.1984) (doctor’s sexual assault on minor patient in hospital did not “result from actions necessary in physician’s work”); Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 792, 683 P.2d 440, 444 (App.1984) (doctor’s sexual assault on minor patient whom he had drugged did not involve the “providing or withholding of professional services”); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Quintana, 165 Mich. App. 719, 419 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1988) (electroencephalograph technician’s sexual assault on patient was not committed “in connection with professional services rendered or which [should] have been rendered”); Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 353 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn.1984) (doctor’s sexual assaults on minor patients in medical clinic did not involve “[provision] or withholding of professional services”); South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liab. Ins. Joint Underwriting Ass’n v. Ferry, 291 S.C. 460, 354 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1987) (dentist’s taking of “indecent liberties with private parts of’ patients did not involve rendition of professional services); Washington Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Hicks, 49 Wash. App. 623, 744 P.2d 625, 627-28 (1987) (chiropractor who had sexual intercourse with patient during treatment session did not do so “in the furnishing of professional medical ... services”).
FN4. Whether Rose Cluett was a “patient” was disputed by the parties. Although the argument that Rose Cluett was a patient of Capino’s under the facts of this case is tenuous at best, we will assume, without deciding, that a doctor-patient relationship existed between hér and Capino.
FN5. The Fort Worth court decided a case involving sexual relations between a psychologist and his patient on statute-of-limitations grounds. Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1988, writ denied). The Texarkana court did not reach the issue of a plastic surgeon’s liability for negligence for having sexual relations with a patient. Wall v. Noble, 705 S.W.2d 727, 731 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1986, writ refd n.r.e.). The Texas Supreme Court has suggested that a patient may be able to bring a cause of action for medical malpractice against a psychiatrist if the psychiatrist has sexual relations with the patient. Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Tex.1985). A case involving the liability of a medical partnership for the tortious conduct of one of the partners in alienating the affection of a patient from her husband reached the supreme court, but that case involved only the issue of the liability of *504the partnership for protecting its patients from the tortious conduct of one of its partners, not whether the alienation of affection was the result of the rendition of professional services. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, 466 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.1971).
Similarly, Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101, 103 n. 2 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1988, writ denied), noted:
Where a therapist mishandles transference and becomes sexually involved with his patient, courts commonly hold such action to constitute malpractice. (FN2)
FN2. See e.g. Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1986); Waters v. Bourhis, 40 Cal.3d 424, 220 Cal.Rptr. 666, 709 P.2d 469 (1985); Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich.App. 537, 300 N.W.2d 627 (1980); Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc.2d 891, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1976); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo.1968). See also: Psychiatry’s Problem mth No Name: Therapist-Patient Sex, 37 Am.J. Psychoanalysis 43, 48-49 (1977).
Our Supreme Court in Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152-53 (Tex.1996), has enlightened us as to the “expert” issue:
Moreover, given the increasingly specialized and technical nature of medicine, there is no validity, if there ever was, to the notion that every licensed medical doctor should be automatically qualified to testify as an expert on every medical question. Such a rule would ignore the modern realities of medical specialization. The Heises’ proposed rule would also eliminate the trial court’s role of ensuring that those who purport to be experts truly have expertise concerning the actual subject about which they are offering an opinion. After all, the proponent of the testimony has the burden to show that the expert “possess[es] special knowledge as to the very matter on which he proposes to give an opinion.” 2 RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 1401 at 32 (Texas Practice 3d ed.1980)....
Dr. Perez’s affidavit does no more than establish his credentials as a family practitioner; it does not establish his knowledge of the transference phenomenon. Consequently, his affidavit was not competent summary judgment evidence on this issue and the summary judgment should not have been granted. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.