Court Opinion

ID: 9761379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:41:10.741021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:23.255891
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I agree with Judge Hoffman, dissenting in the Superior Court, that a construction of § 4105 which does not require an intent to defraud, invites litigants to use the criminal justice system to collect civil debts.
The majority opinion states that appellant is not being imprisoned for being a debtor but “for intentionally disrupt*435ing the flow of and undermining the soundness of commercial paper in this Commonwealth.” Under this guise or a similar one, every civil default could be converted into a criminal offense by stating that the accused is not being imprisoned for the civil default but rather is “being imprisoned for intentionally disrupting the flow of and undermining the soundness of [something] in this Commonwealth”— undermining deeds (trespass actions) support agreements (nonsupport actions), newspapers (defamation actions), traffic flow (negligence actions), any written contract (breach of contract actions). In all civil actions, it can be said that someone intentionally disrupted the flow of something and undermined the soundness of something. What is sacred about checks that they deserve special protection in the world of private commerce?
Moreover, the majority opinion starts out with the proposition that it was not proven that the defendant had an intent to defraud — the opinion ends up by concluding that the defendant had an intent to disrupt and undermine something. Where is the evidence as to the intent to disrupt and undermine? It is as lacking in the record as the intent to defraud.
I completely disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Article I, § 16. The majority opinion says that you cannot be imprisoned for debt only if you voluntarily show up at the courthouse and hand over your assets. That is not the meaning of Article I, § 16. In the civil law, there is an entire system in existence for reaching the assets of debtors including judgment, levy, execution, and sale. A citizen must deliver his assets for the benefit of creditors, under the constitutional provision, in such manner as shall he prescribed by law. This means he must not conceal nor assign assets from the process of judgment, levy, execution, and sale. Even in the case of concealment or the assignment of assets to a third party there must be a strong presumption of fraud. See In Re Young’s Petition, 327 Pa. 267, 192 A. 911 (1937). The burden is not on the citizen to prove he showed up at the courthouse and deposited his assets in the *436courtroom. The burden is on the prosecution to establish fraud, beyond a reasonable doubt, in the concealment of assets from the established processes of the law.
I must respectfully dissent from a conclusion that takes a dangerous step in bringing back debtors’ prisons.