Court Opinion

ID: 9740125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:28:37.222631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.370079
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the mandatory revocation of a sex offender’s driver’s license, as provided in section 6 — 205(b)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95V2, par. 6— 205(b)(2)), is a denial of due process. Accordingly, I dissent. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse; the victims of the offenses were the defendant’s two stepdaughters. At the sentencing hearing, testimony of the defendant and the older stepdaughter, then aged 14, disclosed that the defendant had engaged in sexual activity with the older child for several years and with the younger child for a shorter period. By the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant was divorced from the victims’ mother and was no longer living with the family. Indeed, an order of protection had been issued in the divorce proceeding, forbidding the defendant to approach within 100 feet of his former -wife and stepdaughters. The defendant was employed, earning more than $800 a week, and was paying his former wife $125 a month in maintenance. Also, the defendant was attending a program of counseling designed for sex offenders. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to 36 months’ probation, extended the protective order for a like period of time, and ordered the defendant to continue undergoing psychological counseling. At the conclusion of the hearing, defense counsel made a motion requesting that the trial judge not forward the defendant’s driver’s license and record of conviction to the Secretary of State for revocation, as required by sections 6— 204(a)(1) and 6 — 205(b)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, pars. 6 — 204(a)(1), 6— 205(b)(2)). The trial judge subsequently granted the motion, declaring the provisions unconstitutional. In a written order, the judge noted that the defendant had not used a motor vehicle in committing the offenses here. The trial judge found that there was no public transportation between Naperville, where the defendant resided with his mother, and either Franklin Park, where the defendant was employed, or Bolingbrook, where the defendant attended counseling. The trial judge also found that the defendant would be unable to pay for counseling and maintenance if he lost his job and would be unable to attend counseling if he lost his driver’s license. The trial judge concluded that sections 6— 204(a)(1) and 6 — 205(b)(2) of the Vehicle Code denied the defendant due process under both the Federal and State Constitutions. Accordingly, the trial judge did not demand that the defendant surrender his driver’s license to the court. The broad power of the legislature to define offenses and prescribe penalties is subject, of course, to the requirements of due process. (People v. Upton (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 362, 373.) When a fundamental right is not implicated, a party challenging a statute as violative of substantive due process must establish that the measure is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. (People v. Kohrig (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 384, 397-98.) In this case, however, it appears that the trial judge invalidated the license revocation provision at issue here because of the personal inconvenience its operation would have caused the defendant. In affirming the circuit court’s judgment, the majority opinion takes a somewhat different approach and looks instead at what it believes to be the legislative purposes of the provision, the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles. Although purporting to apply the rational basis test, the majority concludes that section 6 — 205(b)(2) is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power and therefore upholds the lower court’s decision striking the statute as a denial of due process. As I shall demonstrate, the majority achieves this result only by adopting an unnecessarily crimped view of the purpose of the legislation and the interests served by it. It should be noted that the only question before us concerns the constitutionality, and not the wisdom, of the provision. The majority begins its search for legislative intent by examining a companion provision, section 6 — 205(a)(3) of the Vehicle Code, which requires license revocation whenever a driver is convicted of “[a]ny felony under the laws of any State or the federal government in the commission of which a motor vehicle was used.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6 — 205(a)(3).) The majority interprets section 6 — 205(a)(3) as allowing license revocation “if, and only if, a vehicle was used in the commission of [the] felony” and dismisses, as “wholly inconsistent with that intent,” the provision at issue here, section 6 — 205(b)(2), which requires license revocation upon a driver’s conviction of certain sex or drug offenses even if a motor vehicle is not involved in their commission. 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82. While it is certainly true that, under section 6— 205(a)(3), revocation will occur if a vehicle is used in the commission of any felony, it is by no means the case that revocation may occur only if a vehicle is used. Thus, the majority’s conclusion that “section 6 — 205(a)(3) clearly reflects the legislature’s intent that revocation be tied to offenses involving the use of a motor vehicle” (127 Ill. 2d at 181-82) is completely unwarranted. The majority next focuses its attention on what it considers to be the general purpose of the driver’s license revocation and suspension provisions. The majority purports to find that purpose in section 6 — 204(a) of the Vehicle Code, which makes reference to the statutory duty of the Secretary of State to revoke the licenses of drivers “found guilty of the criminal offenses or traffic violations which this Code recognizes as evidence relating to unfitness to safely operate motor vehicles.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6 — 204(a).) Relying on that statement, the majority concludes that the goal of the revocation and suspension scheme is limited to the promotion of highway safety. I do not believe, however, that section 6 — 204(a) was intended to express an overarching purpose applicable to all the various grounds for license revocation and suspension. Notably, the statement of purpose now found in section 6 — 204(a) predates the enactment of the statute at issue here. The reference to the safe operation of motor vehicles was originally enacted in 1953 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 95V2, par. 73.32); the provision in section 6 — 205(b)(2) requiring license revocation for sex offenders was not passed until 1961 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 95V2, par. 6 — 205(d)). It thus appears that the legislature failed to update section 6 — 204(a) to reflect the different rationales of later additions to the statutory scheme. Nor is section 6 — 205(b)(2) the only ground for revocation that is not directly related to highway safety. For example, revocation is required for one convicted of “[p]erjury or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the Secretary of State under this Code or under any other law relating to the ownership or operation of motor vehicles.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6 — 205(a)(5).) License revocation in that instance, while not arbitrary or unreasonable, is similarly unrelated to highway safety. In fact, the purpose of the license revocation and suspension scheme is broader than one can know merely by inspecting the grounds set out in sections 6 — 204 and 6 — 205 of the Vehicle Code. Section 6 — 205(b)(4) requires revocation of the driver’s license “[o]f any person when any other law of this State requires either the revocation or suspension of such license or permit.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6— 205(b)(4).) Thus, the general statement of intent found in section 6 — 204(a), with its reference to highway safety, cannot accommodate the entire range of grounds mandating license revocation or suspension. To be sure, the majority concedes the point, recognizing that the statutory scheme must actually serve at least one additional purpose not specified in the general statement of intent, that of promoting the legal operation of motor vehicles. 127 Ill. 2d at 182. Having invalidated section 6 — 205(b)(2) as an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power, the majority summarily rejects the State’s analysis of the statute. As I have indicated, the majority’s search for legislative intent is misdirected. There is, of course, a governmental interest served by section 6 — 205(b)(2), and it is apparent from the plain language of the provision. Mobility plays a large role both in the commission of offenses and in offenders’ escape from detection and apprehension. As the State suggests, it seems clear that the legislature considered that license revocation would, in no small part, reduce the mobility of offenders and that the immobilization of certain classes of offenders would be an appropriate consequence of their conviction for the specified offenses. I do not believe that we should overturn that judgment, and, on that basis, I would uphold the validity of the statute. Finally, I note that today’s decision invalidates not only the portion of section 6 — 205(b)(2) that is at issue in this case, relating to convictions for criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse, but the rest of the provision also, involving other sex offenses and certain drug offenses. Although the issue is not before us, for the same reasons I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion as well.