Court Opinion

ID: 9746125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:00:35.651785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:09.213315
License: Public Domain

WOODS, J., Dissenting.
After receiving full disclosure from the prosecutor (Pen. Code, § 1054.1; statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are to the Penal Code) and after stating he intends to call a psychologist as a defense trial witness (§ 1054.3), may the defendant redact from the psychologist’s report the entire factual basis for the psychologist’s reported opinions? Relying upon Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1260 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 120], the majority say yes. I disagree.
Everyone agrees that when defendant talked to the psychologist, at the direction of his attorney, his communications were privileged. (Evid. Code, §§ 954 [lawyer-client], 1014 [psychotherapist-patient].)
Everyone also agrees that if defendant had chosen not to call the psychologist as a defense trial witness, those communications would remain privileged and immune from prosecutor discovery.
Further, no one contests that when defendant calls the psychologist as a trial witness and she testifies to opinions based upon what defendant told her, then her unredacted report containing defendant’s statements must be given to the prosecutor. (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 151-152 [255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32].)
The question is whether the reciprocal discovery statute (§§ 1054-1054.7) requires such delay, likely trial interruption, and possible waste of court time.
It would certainly appear that the statute itself says such delay is not required. It states: “This chapter shall be interpreted to give effect to all of the following purposes: [][] (a) To promote the ascertainment of truth in trials by requiring timely pretrial discovery. [][] ... To save court time in trial and avoid the necessity for frequent interruptions and postponements . . . .” (§ 1054, italics added.)
These purposes are accomplished by requiring a defendant to disclose sooner only what he would have to disclose later. If privileged information would never have to be disclosed by a defendant then it, of course, cannot be discoverable “sooner.” A defendant determines whether or not such privileged information is discoverable. So long as he does not intend to call *1616someone as a witness that person’s identity, statement, and report need not be disclosed. (Sandeffer v. Supreme Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 672, 678 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 261].) But when a defendant does intend to call a person as a witness, the witness’s identity, statement, and report must be disclosed. (§ 1054.3; Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 [285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304].)
This “accelerate[d] . . . timing” of disclosure has been held not to infringe on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 85-86 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 452-453, 90 S.Ct. 1893].)
I agree with Woods v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 178, 187 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 182]: . . while communications with an expert retained to assist in the preparation of a defense may initially be protected by the attorney-client privilege, the privilege is waived where as here the expert is identified, a substantial portion of his otherwise privileged evaluation is disclosed in his report, and the report is released.”
As to Rodriguez, I find it no more persuasive than did my Fourth District colleagues (Justices Huffman, Benke, and Froehlich) in Woods v. Superior Court.
Rodriguez failed to construe the reciprocal discovery statutes “so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Finance Loans (1970) 2 Cal.3d 594, 607-608 [86 Cal.Rptr. 793, 469 P.2d 665].) By its interpretation Rodriguez would thwart the statute’s clearly expressed purposes of requiring “timely pretrial discovery . . . [and] avoiding] the necessity for frequent interpretations and postponements.” (§ 1054.)
Rodriguez is also flawed by its seemingly inconsistent characterization of what information the psychologist, Dr. LaCalle, obtained from defendant and whether he relied upon that information. As the majority noted, Rodriguez states: “. . . petitioner does not deny that Dr. LaCalle may be testifying concerning statements petitioner made to him concerning the event and that his opinion could, conceivably, be based, in part, on those statements.” (Rodriguez v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1267.)
As the majority does not note, Rodriguez also states: “A review of Dr. LaCalle’s report does not demonstrate any reference to or reliance on petitioner’s statement regarding the offense. Therefore, nothing contained in the report can be construed as necessitating disclosure of petitioner’s statement in order to understand the balance of the report. In effect, real party is *1617arguing that disclosure of any portion of any conversation one may have had with a psychologist waives the privilege for all conversations. This is not so.” (14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270.)
As to how Rodriguez would regard disclosure if—as in the instant case— the psychologist had relied on defendant’s statements, the court observed: “Our perspective might be different had petitioner voluntarily disclosed Dr. LaCalle’s conclusions as to petitioner’s mental status at the time of the crime and said conclusions were based on petitioner’s version of events.” (14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270.)
For these reasons I would deny the writ.