Court Opinion

ID: 9687979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:55:59.805517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:33.878621
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Judge
(dissenting).
I believe that appellant has demonstrated that she suffered prejudice as a result of the conflict of interest under which her attorney labored. At the close of the state's case, if not before that time, it should have been apparent to all concerned that there was an obvious conflict between appellant's position and Goode's position. At that point in the trial defense counsel must have known that for all practical purposes the defense of mental illness had been destroyed by the testimony of the state's expert witness. This left appellant with only two possible defenses: (1) that she did not participate in or aid and abet the physical abuse of her child, or (2) that while she may technically have aided and abetted *354Goode by not actively taking steps to prevent him from physically abusing the child, she was incapable because of Goode's influence over her of preventing Goode from harming the child. Because the evidence was clear that the child had been physically abused by someone, appellant could develop her first defense only by pointing the finger of guilt at Goode. There was no way that her defense counsel could effectively do this without prejudicing Goode. Likewise, there was no way defense counsel could establish appellant's second defense other than by showing that Goode was such an evil, vicious, depraved person that he had subjugated appellant to his will and thus rendered her powerless to protest his abuse of the child.
In one respect it can be said that appellant benefited from Goode's testimony and thus suffered no prejudice from the conflict, viz., because she was represented by the same attorney who represented Goode she had the benefit of Goode's testimony, whereas had Goode been represented by separate counsel undoubtedly he would have been explicitly advised by his separate counsel not to answer any questions concerning his participation in the disciplining of the child. This argument proves too much, however, because it demonstrates that it was in appellant's interest to point the finger of guilt at Goode, an avenue of attack that should have been unreservedly and vigorously pursued by an attorney who had absolutely no duty to protect Goode's interest.
I am compelled to conclude that appellant was prejudicied by the conflict of interest that was inherent in the very nature of the dual representation forced upon her attorney. Accordingly, the conviction should be reversed.