Court Opinion

ID: 9779468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:51:36.612589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:28.207332
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The record reflects appellant waited until the punishment hearing to raise his statute of limitations claim in what he called a “Motion for Instructed Verdict.” By this time, the jury had rendered its “verdict.” Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision that appellant waived his limitations claim because he did not raise it in a timely manner. See Tex.R.App.Proe. 52(a).
In reversing this conviction, the majority erroneously converts the limitations issue into one involving the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). However, this case does not present a sufficiency problem since, for purposes of determining whether the evidence supports a conviction, Jackson v. Virginia only requires a reviewing court to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 324 fn. 16, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 2792 fn. 16.
Under state law, the State has no burden of proving as part of its prima facie case that the offense occurred within the limitations period because this is not an essential element of the offense as defined by state law. Here, the State proved all the elements of the offense as defined by state law; therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and appellant is not entitled to an acquittal. And, appellant waived any limitations defense by not raising it in a timely manner. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 2.03; Tex.R.App.Proc. 52(a). Because the majority holds this legally guilty appellant is entitled to an acquittal, I dissent.
WHITE and MANSFIELD, JJ., join this dissent.