Court Opinion

ID: 9786245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:51:37.8637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:43.227392
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, J.,
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part:
T1 The majority disregards settled Oklahoma law which could be used to affirm this unremarkable case, preferring instead to rely on an interpretation of federal law which conflicts with settled law based on the Oklahoma Constitution. Essentially, the majority holds that, despite Oklahoma constitutional law to the contrary, probable cause to search for any reason justifies a search of an entire vehicle and any containers within it. I see no reason to substitute this conclusion for our own settled precedent. The only possible reason I can see for the majority's approach is to allow it to overturn Oklahoma precedent which interprets the Oklahoma Constitution differently than federal law interprets the federal Constitution.
12 This Court held in State v. Paul that, when interpreting the United States Constitution, the Fourth Amendment vehicle exeeption applies.1 In Pawl, we held that a dog sniff alert created probable cause for an offi *1149cer to search a vehicle without a warrant.2 Paul was based on the federal Constitution and did not discuss interpretation of the Oklahoma constitutional provision against warrantless search and seizure.3 I agree with the majority that, if probable cause to search is present, federal law does not require exigent cireumstances for a warrantless search. This Court has held that, under our state constitution, an officer must have both probable cause and exigent cireumstances to conduct a warrantless search after a vehicle stop.4 Our Davis and Whitehead cases sharply distinguish the permissible seope of a search which conforms to probable cause to believe a specific offense has occurred, from the excessive scope of an entire search of a vehicle and its containers based only on a narrow probable cause. The Court makes clear that probable cause to search a vehicle must be based on more than mere suspicion of a crime, and that absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless search must be limited to the extent of the probable cause. In each of these Oklahoma cases, the deciding issue appears to have been the absence of any probable cause whatsoever for a vehicle search based on the facts of the stops, rather than the absence of exigent cireumstances.
13 The majority admits that this Court can, and has, interpreted various provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution differently than federal courts have interpreted their federal constitutional counterparts.5 The majority recognizes that this is one such instance. The majority offers no particular criticism of this Court's analyses or holdings in Davis and Whitehead. However, the majority concludes that we should abandon our separate state constitutional protection, since the federal interpretation of federal law rests "on sound principles". In fact, the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment on this issue is most unsound. However, irrespective of one's view as to the Fourth Amendment, I fail to see why we should abandon the protections afforded to our citizens by our state constitution.
'I 4 Applying all the applicable law, I would affirm this case. Officer Burpo saw Gomez commit a traffic violation and pulled him over. When he approached the car, Burpo smelled alcohol and saw two unopened six-packs of some alcoholic beverage, with one missing. Burpo looked in the car for the missing container. He found an open Bacardi cooler in the center console. When he picked up the bottle, he could see a pipe, methamphetamine, and a scale. As the majority notes, a stop is justified where an officer has probable cause to believe a traffic law has been violated.6 Officer Burpo had probable cause to stop Gomez. After smelling the alcohol and seeing the bottles, Burpo also had probable cause to search the car for an open container.7 I can agree with the majority that Burpo lawfully looked around the car for an open container.
15 At this point I part ways with the majority analysis. The majority suggests that Burpo's probable cause to search for an open container gave him the right to search *1150any portion of the entire car, including any contained areas within the car. Under the Oklahoma Constitution, I believe that Burpo had probable cause to search for an open container or evidence of alcohol-related offenses. To justify any further search of the vehicle and containers within it, either Burpo would need probable cause to believe that a different offense was committed, or some exigent cireumstance must have been present. Burpo had no probable cause to suspect any offense other than a violation of the open container law, and the record does not reflect any exigent cireumstances. However, I believe the remainder of the search, which found the drugs and paraphernalia, is justified by the "plain view" exception. No warrant is required where an officer sees contraband or evidence of a crime in plain view.8 Burpo saw the contraband in plain view when he picked up the open Bacardi container. I would uphold the search, and Gomez's subsequent conviction, on these grounds.
T6 This conviction could be upheld under existing law. However, in affirming the case the majority needlessly overrules Oklahoma precedent interpreting the Oklahoma Constitution, in order to substitute a less demanding federal standard. This Court has determined that, in this area, Oklahoma citizens are afforded more protection than federal Fourth Amendment law requires. I cannot agree to any decision which would lessen that protection. I dissent to the portion of the majority opinion that does so.
17 I am authorized to state that Judge Charles Johnson joins in this opinion.

. State v. Paul, 2003 OK CR 1, 62 P.3d 389, 390.

. Id.

. In footnote 10, the majority suggests that my dissent relies upon Paul. On the contrary, I cite Paul to acknowledge our existing law as it interprets the federal Constitution, and for no other reason. Paul was decided on purely federal Fourth Amendment grounds, not under the Oklahoma Constitution. I also note again that this discussion of Paul's status obscures the real issue in this case. The majority could rely on the settled law I discuss, combining probable cause with the plain view exception, to decide this case. However, the majority chooses to focus on the differences in interpretation between the Oklahoma Constitution and federal constitutional law, refer to these differences as inconsistencies within state law, abandon our state cases, and adopt the federal interpretation for the Oklahoma constitutional provision.

. Davis v. State, 1980 OK CR 114, 620 P.2d 1346, 1347; Whitehead v. State, 1976 OK CR 35, 546 P.2d 273, 275; Lawson v. State, 1971 OK CR 184, 484 P.2d 1337, 1341.

. See, eg., Dennis v. State, 1999 OK CR 23, 990 P.2d 277, 285-86. See also Brumfield v. State, 2007 OK CR 10, 155 P.3d 826, 833 (state statute may give broader protection than federal Constitution).

. Dufries v. State, 2006 OK CR 13, 133 P.3d 887, 889.

. Paul, 62 P.3d at 390; Halley v. State, 2007 OK CR 2, 153 P.3d 66, 68-69.

. Wackerly v. State, 2000 OK CR 15, 12 P.3d 1, 9; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).