Court Opinion

ID: 9707868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:23:34.665991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:39.139297
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds that evidence showing discrepancies in 72 percent of the cases handled by de*772fendant under the Medicaid Program was erroneously admitted.
Defendant was charged with obtaining money by false pretenses, i.e., by submitting false claims for remuneration. The charge is one requiring proof of an “intent to cheat and defraud.” The questions eliciting the evidence were objected to as calling for incompetent, immaterial, irrelevant testimony, and for insufficient foundation.
Irregularities in claims submitted for work done under the program were investigated by the Ethics Committee of the Omaha District Dental Society of which the witness was chairman. There were six members of the committee participating in the investigation. Three worked on Wednesday and three on Thursday. Patients were examined and dented work found compared with defendant’s reports of work done. Statements were signed as to irregularities present or absent in each case. The witness did not personally check each patient or report. On completion of the review, defendant was present for a session with the committee and another review of his patients. It appears defendant was kept fully apprised of the work of the committee and, of its findings. He knew or could readily ascertain the nature of the claims he had signed and submitted. He could ascertain from his own records the work done. Under such circumstances, findings of the committee regarding irregularities and the extent of them could not have taken him by surprise.
The defendant claimed that the irregularities with which he was charged, six in number, resulted from mistake and that he had no intent to cheat or defraud. Under the circumstances, evidence of other similar offenses was certainly relevant and material on the question of intent. See, State v. Kirby, 185 Neb. 240, 175 N. W. 2d 87; State v. Mayes, 183 Neb. 165, 159 N. W. 2d 203. Was it hearsay and consequently incompetent as held in the majority opinion? The hearsay rule has many *773exceptions and the present trend appears to be to narrow the operation of the rule. One evidence of this is the Uniform Composite Reports As Evidence Act. See, §§ 25-12,115 to 25-12,119, R. R. S. 1943. The act provides that any written report or finding of facts prepared by a distinterested expert containing conclusions resulting wholly or partly from written information furnished by the cooperation of several persons acting for a common purpose shall be admissible when testified to by one of the persons making such report or finding, if, in the opinion of the court, no substantial injustice will .be done the opposite party. Here the evidence is based on reports made by members of a disinterested committee acting for a common purpose. The result was testified to by one of the committee members, its chairman, who, in such capacity, was necessarily in charge of the work done.
The act provides broadly for cross-examination of all persons involved in the making of the report or finding. It further provides that notice must be given before trial of the intention to use such report or finding. No such notice was given in the present case, but this requirement is qualified by the following language: “* * * except that it may be admitted if the trial court finds that no substantial injustice would result from the failure to give such notice.”
The evidence is obviously reliable which nullifies, in this case, the principal evil inherent in hearsay evidence. The right of a full cross-examination is preserved by the act. The defendant was fully aware of the nature of the reports and findings by virtue of records available to him and of having reviewed them with the committee. Under such circumstances, no substantial injustice could result to the defendant by the waiver of notice and the admission of this evidence other than that it was simply additional evidence of guilt. Trute v. Skeede, 162 Neb. 266, 75 N. W. 2d 672, in referring to the act stated: “The act referred to gives the trial judge discretion to admit *774such evidence if the trial court finds that no injustice would result from the failure to give such notice.”
Although no cautionary instruction limiting this evidence to the question of intent was given, none was requested and assignments of error do not refer to this proposition. In any event, such instruction is not required in the absence of a request for it. See, Osborne v. State, 115 Neb. 65, 211 N. W. 179; 23A C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 1325 (5), p. 843.
The questioned evidence was properly admitted and I would, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
White, C. J., and Clinton, J., join in this dissent.