Court Opinion

ID: 9795689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:35:58.458998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:31:53.457718
License: Public Domain

SERCOMBE, J.,
dissenting.
I do not differ with the lead opinion in identifying the principles to be applied to determine the constitutionality of ORS 260.402 (2003)1 under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. Those principles were identified in State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649 P2d 569 (1982), and Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or 514, 931 P2d 770 (1997). Where I differ with the lead opinion is in the classification of the law under the principles enunciated in those cases.
The lead opinion infers a material and harmful effect from every violation of the statute — an infringement of the people’s “right to know” the source of all political contributions. That inference is the foundation of the lead opinion’s classification of ORS 260.402 under Robertson as a law regulating only the effects of speech. It is also the crux of the lead opinion’s reasoning that ORS 260.402 is the progeny of the common-law crimes of perjury and fraud, crimes that require proof of material harm in order to obtain conviction.
I disagree with the lead opinion’s reasoning in three respects. First, I do not believe that ORS 260.402 is a law that regulates only on the basis of the effects of speech. The undesired effects are not stated in the law itself or in the statutory context of the law. Because ORS 260.402 regulates the *101speech act itself, the “makfing of] a contribution,” rather than the effects of that speech, the statute is unconstitutional under Robertson unless the law fits within a well-established historical exception to the application of Article I, section 8. Second, even assuming that a more lenient constitutional test exists under Robertson to sustain a regulation of speech when the communication necessarily produces harm, ORS 260.402 does not qualify under that test. ORS 260.402 can be violated by conduct that does not produce any harmful effect. Finally, ORS 260.402 has nothing in common with any traditional crime that punishes untrue speech other than a common subject of false utterances. It does not fit within any well-established historical exception to the application of Article I, section 8.
I conclude that the statute restricts a communicative act (the making of a political contribution), without regard to any necessary effect of that act (as affecting voter behavior, the election process, or the content of public disclosures), and in an unprecedented fashion (because any historic regulation of untrue speech requires that the untruth be material and the deceit to be intentional). In light of those conclusions, I believe that ORS 260.402 is unconstitutional under Article I, section 8. I respectfully dissent from the lead opinion’s conclusions to the contrary.
I. CLASSIFICATION OF ORS 260.402 UNDER ROBERTSON
The constitutionality of ORS 260.402 under Article I, section 8, is tested by the framework adopted by the Supreme Court in Robertson. In that case, the court recognized a distinction between laws that criminalize speech based on its content and laws that regulate undesired effects of speech. Under Robertson, the first category of legislation regulated by Article I, section 8, consists of laws that restrain or restrict the content of speech in ways that were not historically established and intended to be allowed to continue after adoption of the Oregon Constitution. The Robertson court held:
“Article I, section 8, for instance, forbids lawmakers to pass any law ‘restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any *102subject whatever,’ beyond providing a remedy for any person injured by the ‘abuse’ of this right. This forecloses the enactment of any law written in terms directed to the substance of any ‘opinion’ or any ‘subject’ of communication, unless the scope of the restraint is wholly confined within some historical exception that was well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to reach. Examples are perjury, solicitation or verbal assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and fraud and their contemporary variants. See Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Am B Found Res J 645, 648-70. Only if a law passes that test is it open to a narrowing construction to avoid ‘overbreadth’ or to scrutiny of its application to particular facts.”
293 Or at 412 (footnote omitted).
If a law is aimed not at the content of speech but at specific harms or proscribed effects that could be caused by speech, its constitutionality is tested by the breadth of the law or particulars of its application. Robertson describes a second category of laws as those that expressly prohibit expression used to achieve forbidden effects:
“When the proscribed means include speech or writing, however, even a law written to focus on a forbidden effect * * * must be scrutinized to determine whether it appears to reach privileged communication or whether it can be interpreted to avoid such ‘overbreadth.’ ”
Id. at 417-18.
Thus, the meaning and effect of ORS 260.402 must be examined in order to categorize the statute under Robertson. See State v. Ausmus, 336 Or 493, 499, 85 P3d 864 (2003); Leppanen v. Lane Transit District, 181 Or App 136, 143, 45 P3d 501 (2002) (construing statutes before reaching facial constitutionality issues). The meaning of a statute, i.e., the legislative intent in its enactment, is discerned from the statute’s text and context, and then from the record of its adoption if the meaning remains unclear. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). The text and context of ORS 260.402 suggest a plain meaning of the statute.
*103ORS 260.402 provided, in part:
“No person shall make a contribution to any other person, relating to a nomination or election of any candidate or the support or opposition to any measure, in any name other than that of the person who in truth provides the contribution.”
As defined by ORS 260.005(3)(a), “contribution” includes:
“(A) The payment, loan, gift, forgiving of indebtedness, or furnishing without equivalent compensation or consideration, of money, services other than personal services for which no compensation is asked or given, supplies, equipment or any other thing of value:
“(i) For the purpose of influencing an election for public office or an election on a measure, or of reducing the debt of a candidate for nomination or election to public office or the debt of a political committee; or
“(ii) To or on behalf of a candidate, political committee or measure; and
“(B) Any unfulfilled pledge, subscription, agreement or promise, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution.”
Thus, a violation of ORS 260.402 occurs by an actual or promised transfer of money, certain services, or things of value directly or indirectly to a political campaign “in any name other than that of the person who in truth provides the contribution.” A false name contribution could occur by a contributor using either someone else’s name or money in the making of a contribution. In either event, the act that is regulated is the “makfing of] a contribution * * * relating to a nomination or election of any candidate or the support or opposition to any measure.” Some acts of “mak[ing] a contribution” are unlawful under ORS 260.402; others are not.
It is settled that the contribution of money to a political candidate or committee — the act at issue in this case — is part of the “free expression of opinion” or the “right to speak [or] write * * * freely on any subject whatever” that is protected by Article I, section 8. In Vannatta, 324 Or at 524, the Supreme Court held that “both campaign contributions and expenditures are forms of expression for the purposes of *104Article I, section 8.” At issue in Vannatta was the legality of campaign finance restrictions in an initiated statute (Measure 9), that directly limited the amount of money that could be contributed to a political campaign. The court reasoned:
“However, the contribution, in and of itself, is the contributor’s expression of support for the candidate or cause — an act of expression that is completed by the act of giving and that depends in no way on the ultimate use to which the contribution is put.”
Id. at 522 (emphasis in original).
The court determined that the restriction on the amount of political contributions was “written in terms directed to the substance of any ‘opinion’ or any ‘subject’ of communication” under Robertson. 324 Or at 536. Similarly, the court concluded that other limitations on the making of campaign contributions were category one laws under Robertson. For example, section 4 of the measure provided that a candidate or campaign committee “shall not make a contribution” to other candidates or committees. Section 16 inhibited corporations and labor organizations from “mak[ing] a contribution” to a candidate or political committee. The court determined that “the contribution provisions in Measure 9 are targeted at the content of speech, i.e., political support for a candidate, and thereby fall under the first level of Article I, section 8, scrutiny.” Vannatta, 324 Or at 537. The court observed:
“All the listed provisions of Measure 9 either expressly limit, or ban outright, campaign contributions that may be given to or that may be accepted by a candidate. By their terms, those provisions are targeted at protected speech.”
Id. at 537-38.
For the same reasons, I would hold that ORS 260.402 is a direct prohibition on a type of speech and that its legality is tested by the Robertson standards for category one laws. The conduct that is made unlawful by ORS 260.402 is based on what the speaker says (“mak[ing] a contribution”) and not on any particular effect of that speech. “Contribution” is defined, in part, as furnishing money or services *105“[flor the purpose of influencing an election.” ORS 260.005(3)(a)(A)(i). The statute restricts “makfing] a contribution” in a false name by attaching criminal penalties to that conduct. ORS 260.993(2) (violation of ORS 260.402 as Class C felony). That effect inhibits a person from expressing political support for a candidate or measure by contributing money to that candidate or measure using someone else’s money. Even if the implied source of the money is false, the contribution is nonetheless an expression of political support by the person making the contribution. ORS 260.402 directly restricts that expression of political support.
The lead opinion categorizes ORS 260.402 differently. It cites two observations by the Vannatta court as material to the analysis in this case. Because Vannatta notes that “many political contributions constitute expression,” the lead opinion reasons that “[i]t is important to emphasize that the court did not say that all contributions constitute expression.” 225 Or App at 89 (emphasis in original). ORS 260.402, however, is not restricted by its terms to applying only to contributions that do not express political support. Indeed, the contribution at issue in this case — the payment of money to a political candidate — is an expression of political support.
The lead opinion then observes that Vannatta distinguishes between laws limiting financial contributions and expenditures and laws that “impose requirements distinct from contribution or expenditure limitations (e.g., requirements of disclosure of financing sources and the extent of any gift)” that “may not necessarily offend” Article I, section 8. Vannatta, 324 Or at 523. The lead opinion concludes that ORS 260.402 “does not limit contributions directly” but is a mere “reporting requirement,” a disclosure law that does not restrict expressive conduct. 225 Or App at 90-91. It labels ORS 260.402 as a second-category Robertson law in light of that classification.
ORS 260.402 is not a disclosure law in that sense. The statute does not provide that, if you make a contribution using someone else’s money, you must disclose the name of the owner of the money. It provides that you cannot make a contribution using someone else’s money — period. The statute restricts the act of contribution. If a person writes a check *106to a political committee, using funds given to that person for that purpose by someone else, ORS 260.402 is violated when the check is conveyed. The contribution is “in [the] name other than that of the person who in truth provides the contribution.” Even if that person later discloses the identity of the source of the money, the contribution itself is false and a violation of ORS 260.402. The statute does not require the maker of the check to separately verify the source of the funds or to attest to anything. The constitutionality of such a disclosure law is not before the court.
Instead, ORS 260.402 prohibits “mak[ing] a contribution” using another person’s money or name. In prohibiting the making of those two types of political contributions, ORS 260.402 targets the content of speech, an insincere expression of political support for a candidate or measure. Therefore, the statute is properly classified as a Robertson category-one law.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF ORS 260.402 BY ITS NECESSARY EFFECTS
In State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 920 P2d 535 (1996), the Supreme Court recognized that a restraint on speech could be a second-category law under Robertson if the “actual focus of the enactment” is on a proscribed harm or effect. Id. at 543. The statute at issue in Stoneman, ORS 163.680 (1987), made it unlawful to pay or give anything of value to observe or view reproductions of sexually explicit conduct by a child known by the person to be under 18 years of age. The court held that the statute prohibited the purchase of communicative materials “not in terms of their communicative substance, but in terms of their status as the products of acts that necessarily have harmed the child participants,” harm that was defined under child abuse criminal statutes that were contextually related to ORS 163.680. Id. at 548. Because that harm was identified in contextually related laws, and because the harm “necessarily” resulted from every violation of ORS 163.680, the court found the statute to be a second-category law, one written to focus on a forbidden effect. As noted by the lead opinion, City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174, 185-86, 759 P2d 242 (1988), requires *107that in order to qualify as a second-category law, the “operative text” of the statute must “specify the adverse effects.” The tension between Stoneman and Tidyman suggests that, at the very least, the Stoneman analysis should be confined to regulated communications that necessarily offend a related law.
The lead opinion concludes that Stoneman supports categorization of ORS 260.402 as a second-category law. It reasons that loss of a person’s “right to know” the source of campaign contributions necessarily results from making contributions in a false name and that this necessary effect should be inferred from the operation of the statute in the context of other campaign financing laws. I do not believe that unsatisfied curiosity is sufficiently identified as a harm in any statute related to ORS 260.402. As noted in Vannatta, “it is not sufficient to select a phenomenon and label it as a ‘harm.’ ” 324 Or at 539. Rather, “the ‘harm’ that legislation aims to avoid must be identifiable from legislation itself, not from social debate and competing studies * * Id. The text of contribution and expenditure reporting laws identified by the lead opinion does not expressly create any enforceable rights or identify any particular harm. Instead, the lead opinion creates a “right to know” from the purposes of the 1908 Corrupt Practices Act that were identified in Nickerson v. Mecklem, 169 Or 270, 277, 126 P2d 1095 (1942) (“People have the right to know — and it is so contemplated by the act — who is spending money and the amount thereof * * *.”). I believe that any harmful effects engrafted to a law under a Stoneman analysis must be clearly and expressly identified in a related law. The lead opinion does not identify any such related law to ORS 260.402.
Moreover, any “right to know” created by the contribution and expenditure reporting laws is necessarily limited to the disclosures required by those laws. At the time of the alleged offenses in this case, ORS 260.083(l)(a)(A) required public reporting by candidates and committees of elections of the identity of donors of aggregated contributions in excess of $50. Other contributions are aggregated and reported as a single item in the contribution and expenditure report.2 *108Thus, there was no “right to know” the identity of contributors of smaller amounts. ORS 260.402 nonetheless punished false contributions of those lesser amounts. Because every violation of ORS 260.402 does not necessarily result in a loss of “right to know,” the statute does not regulate on the basis of that forbidden effect. Put another way, a violation of the statute can occur even when any inferred harm does not. That fact alone defeats any argument that the statute regulates effects.
III. HISTORICAL EXCEPTIONS ANALYSIS
I do not agree that ORS 260.402 fits wholly within any historical exception “that was well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to reach ” Robertson, 293 Or at 412; see State v. Moyle, 299 Or 691, 695, 705 P2d 740 (1985) (describing the historical exception as a crime that was “well established at the time our constitutional guarantee was enacted and demonstrably outside the aims of the guarantee of freedom of expression”). The examples given in Robertson were “perjury, solicitation or verbal assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and fraud and their contemporary variants.” Robertson, 293 Or at 412. The crimes listed in Robertson are all crimes where false or misleading speech is a core element of the crime — as laws “restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever.” Those laws would be invalid under Article I, section 8, but for the fact that those crimes were within a historical exception. Thus, the state is incorrect in arguing that, because ORS 260.402 affects only false speech, it falls outside the limitations of Article I, section 8.
A speech regulation may be a permissible “contemporary variant,” in the words of Robertson, of a historical exception to the constitutional limitations on laws directed to *109the substance of communication. I agree with the lead opinion’s contention that Robertson’s historical exception analysis does not require that “the statute under examination match precisely, element by element, a historical exception.” 225 Or App at 94. However, the spirit and intent of the statute that is considered the “variant” must at the very least embody that of the earlier version. For the reasons that follow, I believe that ORS 260.402 does not fit nicely into any historical exception.
As a matter of specific predicate, there was no well-established regulation of political campaign contributions at the time of the enactments of the federal and state constitutions. In Vannatta, the Supreme Court found that, “[a]t the time of statehood and the adoption of Article I, section 8, there was no established tradition of enacting laws to limit campaign contributions.” 324 Or at 538. As noted above, Oregon voters initiated and then adopted the state’s first campaign finance law, the Corrupt Practices Act, at the June 1908 election. Or Laws 1909, ch 3. At the time of the adoption of the Oregon Constitution in 1859, then, the regulation of campaign contributions and political campaigns was a half century away.
Similarly, federal regulation of campaign financing dates from 1907 with the passage of the Tilman Act. Act of Jan 26, 1907, ch 420, 34 Stat 864. The Tilman Act banned corporate contributions to campaigns for federal offices. Federal prohibitions on contributions in the name of another occurred in the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 USC section 441f. See Robert D. Probasco, Prosecuting Conduit Campaign Contributions — Hard Time for Soft Money, 42 S Tex L Rev 841, 846 (2001). Thus, neither the regulation of political campaign contributions in general, nor the preclusion of untruthful campaign contributions in particular, were established prior to the adoption of the free speech guarantees.
Therefore, to survive Article I, section 8, ORS 260.402 must fit within, or be a contemporary variant of, a traditional speech crime. At common law, the mere making of an untrue statement was not punished. Although lying was *110considered morally circumspect, Blackstone distinguished it from criminal liability:
“The vice of lying, which consists (abstractedly taken) in a criminal violation of truth and therefore in any shape derogatory from sound morality, is not however taken notice of by our law, unless it causes with it some public inconvenience * *
William Blackstone, Commentaries at 16 (Vol 4, ch 4). That “public inconvenience” was the production of a material and harmful effect by the lie. The creation of that effect is part of the crimes of fraud and perjury that the lead opinion pegs as the antecedents of ORS 260.402. The prohibition on making a campaign contribution in a false name does not require that effect.
The traditional elements of common-law fraud required: (1) a false representation of material fact; (2) known to be false; (3) made with the intent to induce the recipient to act or refrain from acting; (4) where the recipient justifiably relied on the representation; and (5) the recipient was damaged by that reliance. Pollock v. D. R. Horton, Inc. - Portland, 190 Or App 1, 20, 77 P3d 1120 (2003). “[F]raud is one of the conventional speech crimes that can be regulated even if the law focuses on the speech itself.” State v. Porter, 198 Or App 274, 278, 108 P3d 107 (2005) (citing Robertson, 293 Or at 412). In Porter, the court considered the constitutionality of an identity theft statute, ORS 165.800, criminalizing deception or fraud. The court analyzed ORS 165.800 “only to the extent that it purported] to criminalize creating or uttering the identification of another with the intent to deceive.” Id. The inquiry was whether the law focused on speech per se. In concluding that the identity theft statute did not focus on speech per se, but rather on an attempt to cause a forbidden harm (deceit), we reasoned:
“At first blush, the identity theft statute appears to be of that type because it ‘makes the speaking of the words themselves criminal, if spoken with the requisite intent, even if no harm [is] caused or threatened.’ Spencer, 289 Or at 229. Closer scrutiny, however, yields a different conclusion. The harm that the statute targets is deception. A person who either creates or utters the identification of another and who intends that act to deceive has taken a substantial step *111toward accomplishing the deception; the person, in other words, has attempted to achieve harm.”
Id. at 279 (emphasis in original).
A violation of ORS 260.402 requires neither intentional conduct nor actual deception. As noted above, a false contribution above $50, for example, could result in a false reporting of that contribution in a contribution and expenditure report under ORS 260.083(l)(a)(A), a report that is filed as a public record. Requiring that kind of ill effect as a consequence of a false contribution might better align ORS 260.402(1) with traditional fraud. But ORS 260.402 requires no intended or obtained effect or materiality of the false speech and therefore it does not fit within the fraud exception.
The lead opinion suggests that ORS 260.402 qualifies as a contemporary variant of the peijury exception. Perjury, a sworn falsification, was a crime at common law, defined as a person willfully and corruptly giving false testimony on a material point in a judicial proceeding under oath. See Charles E. Torchia, 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 574 (15th ed 1993). See General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch XLVI, § 598, p 549 (Deady 1845-1864) (crime of peijury and subordination of peijury).3 An analogous crime at common law was that of “false swearing,” similar to peijury in that it required an oath and had to be material. However, false swearing differed from peijury “in that the false oath in perjury may relate only to testimony given in a judicial proceeding, whereas the false oath in false swearing may relate not only to testimony but also to a statement, and it may be given not merely in a judicial proceeding but in any proceeding or matter in which an oath is required or authorized by law.” Torchia, 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 579 (footnote omitted). Both false swearing and peijury required materiality, meaning that the statement had to be capable of affecting the *112“course or outcome” of the proceeding. Id. at § 591. Both crimes required the falsehood to be made in a governmental proceeding or to a public official, where an oath is required by law.
In State v. Huntley, 82 Or App 350, 728 P2d 868 (1986), rev den, 302 Or 594 (1987), we upheld ORS 260.715(1), a statute that punished the certification of false statements in the voters’ pamphlet, as constitutional under Article I, section 8. We found the law to be a contemporary variant of peijury, and the certification to be analogous to the purpose “served by oaths and affidavits: to impress upon the speaker the gravity of the occasion and the necessity for truth-telling.” Id. at 356. Thus, we held that,
“[w]hen a statement, required by the election laws, is certified as true by the signator, criminal prosecution and conviction for furnishing false information is a contemporary variant of peijury and is not beyond constitutional limits.7
Id. The lead opinion would expand the logic of Huntley and the peijury exception to campaign contributions made under a false name. 225 Or App at 94. The statute upheld in Huntley prohibited criminalized statements that “[although it is not a sworn statement, it is one certified as true.” Huntley, 82 Or App at 356. The statute in this case, ORS 260.402, does not contain any requirement that there be an oath, affirmation, certification, or verification of truthfulness in any respect, making it neither analogous nor a contemporary variant to perjury.
Thus, there is a significant difference between ORS 260.402 and ORS 260.715(1), a law pertaining to false certifications in an election, that undercuts the peijury analogy for ORS 260.402. ORS 260.402 does not require the identity of the contributor to be certified, i.e., to be attested as true by the person making the contribution. There is nothing equivalent in ORS 260.402 to the oath or affirmation that is a fundamental part of the crime of peijury or the certification in *113Huntley that is the contemporary variant of an oath or affidavit. We recognized in Huntley that limitations on an uncertified statement posed a different question. I disagree with the lead opinion and would conclude that ORS 260.402 is not the progeny of the historic crimes of perjury or false swearing.4
ORS 260.402 is not an outgrowth, then, of traditional crimes involving untrue speech. The conduct that is the subject of ORS 260.402 lacks the required undesired effects of fraud and perjury, requirements that are core to the definitions of those crimes. Instead, ORS 260.402 directly proscribes false speech without regard to the materiality of the speech, the intended effect of the speech, or any official context of the speech. I am not prepared to say, as the lead opinion suggests, that the punishment of any false speech is constitutionally appropriate under Article I, section 8, because some types of untrue speech were proscribed historically. Instead, the common-law crimes involving untrue speech all require another quality to distinguish the lie from ordinary dissemblance — that the lie produce undesired consequences to private persons or entities or in governmental records or processes.5 ORS 260.402, by its terms as well as its *114necessary operation, regulates some speech without this quality. ORS 260.402 is unconstitutional under Article I, section 8, because it is a law directed to the substance of the communicative aspect of political contributions that has no well-established antecedent existing before the adoption of the Oregon Constitution. I dissent from the contrary conclusion reached by the lead opinion.
Armstrong, Wollheim, and Rosenblum, JJ., join in this dissent.

 Unless otherwise noted, references to ORS 260.402 in this opinion are to the 2003 version of that statute.

 Under ORS 260.057, political committees and candidates must file with the Secretary of State statements of contributions received and expenditures made by *108the candidate and political committee. ORS 260.083(l)(a) required those statements to include the “name, occupation and address of each person * * * that contributed an aggregate amount of more than $50 on behalf of a candidate or to a political committee and the total amount contributed by that person or political committee” as well as the “total amount of other contributions as a single item, but shall specify how those contributions were obtained.” The $50 benchmark was raised to $100 in 2007. Or Laws 2005, ch 809.

 Blackstone notes:
“The peijury must also be willful, positive, and absolute; not upon surprise, or the like: it also must be in some point material to the question in dispute; for if it only be in some trifling circumstances, to which no regard is paid, it is no more penal than in the voluntary extra-judicial oaths before-mentioned.”
William Blackstone, Commentaries at 16 (Vol 4, ch 10).

“7 We are not asked to decide whether an uncertified statement could be the subject of a constitutional limitation, and we offer no opinion on that issue.”

 ORS 260.402 may be distinguishable from peijury for a second reason. The statute regulates false statements to private persons or political committees, unlike ORS 260.715(1) that relates to false statements to election officials and the crimes of peijury or false swearing to public officials. The proscribed false name contribution is a communication to a candidate or to backers of a measure. It is not a communication to an election official or to the voters. As noted earlier, only some political contributions are reported to the public in campaign finance reports. Lying to a public official, as is the case for peijury and false swearing, has more presumed bad effects than lying to a private person and the historic regulation of both types of falsehoods differ. The lead opinion contends that ORS 260.402(1) is the functional equivalent of a communication to an election official or the voters because the identity of the contributor “is required by law to be passed on to the filing officer and, ultimately, to the public.” 225 Or App at 96. As noted earlier, aggregated contributions under $50 are not reported to the Secretary of State under ORS 160.083(l)(a)(A) and some contributions are not reported to the voters because they are not disclosed until after the election. Thus, not all communications proscribed by ORS 260.402 are conveyed to the state or the public.

 The statutes cited by the lead opinion, and noted in Vannatta, as contemporary variants of fraud qualify the untrue speech in this same way. 324 Or at 544. ORS 260.532(1) criminalizes some false publications relating to a candidate or measure, requiring that the publication be done “with knowledge or with reckless disregard that [the publication] contains a false statement of material fact relating to any candidate, political committee or measure.” (Emphasis added.) ORS 260.355 permits a court to deprive a person of a nomination or election to public office for a “deliberate and material” violation of an election law.