Court Opinion

ID: 9399192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 14:06:35.327168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.963236
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 26, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2022-CA-0238-MR

AARON TUCKER AND
RICKEY ELMORE                                                    APPELLANTS

                APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-00982

ANDREW G. BESHEAR, IN HIS
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITIES                                                           APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ECKERLE, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Aaron Tucker and Rickey Elmore bring this appeal from a

February 7, 2022, Order of the Franklin Circuit Court dismissing Tucker and
Elmore’s complaint against Andrew G. Beshear, in his official and individual

capacities.1 We affirm.

              Tucker and Elmore were state troopers employed by the Kentucky

State Police. Tucker was accused of improper use of force in effectuating an

arrest, and in a separate incident, Elmore was also accused of improper use of force

in effectuating an arrest.2 Tucker was sued by the arrestee in United States District

Court for the Western District of Kentucky in Heston v. Warren County, et al.,

1:20-cv-000480-GNS. Elmore was also sued in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky in Corimsely v, Elmore, 2:20-cv-00047-DLB-

CJS. Tucker was terminated for misconduct by the Kentucky State Police, and

Elmore resigned.

              On December 22, 2020, Tucker and Elmore filed a complaint in the

Franklin Circuit Court against Beshear. In relevant part, Tucker and Elmore

alleged that Beshear possessed a statutory duty per Kentucky Revised Statutes

(KRS) 12.213 to provide Tucker and Elmore with defense counsel in the federal

civil actions but failed to do so. Tucker and Elmore also pointed out that the

1
 The Kentucky State Police (KSP) was listed as a party in the Notice of Appeal but was not a
party in the circuit court action. As such, KSP was dismissed from this appeal by Order entered
April 28, 2023.
2
 Both Aaron Tucker and Rickey Elmore had less than one year of service with the Kentucky
State Police at the time of the incidents.

                                              -2-
Kentucky Attorney General refused to provide them with defense counsel;

however, they did not name the Attorney General as a party to the action.

             Beshear filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted per Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02.

Beshear claimed that KRS 12.213 did not impose a duty upon him to provide either

Tucker or Elmore with defense counsel. Beshear argued that Tucker and Elmore

misinterpreted KRS 12.213. Beshear also stated that he requested the Kentucky

Attorney General to determine whether his office could provide representation to

Tucker and Elmore in the civil actions under KRS 12.213; however, the Attorney

General determined that he would not provide a defense. See KRS 12.212.

Beshear further argued that the instant action was barred due to sovereign

immunity and/or qualified official immunity.

             By order entered February 7, 2022, the circuit court granted Beshear’s

motion to dismiss and dismissed Tucker and Elmore’s complaint. The circuit court

reasoned, in pertinent part:

                     Here, [Tucker’s and Elmore’s] claims are
             predicated on a fundamental misinterpretation of the duty
             that is imposed on the Governor by KRS 12.213. That
             statute simply requires to promulgate an administrative
             regulation setting forth the procedure governing the
             provision of legal defense for “employees or former
             employees of the Commonwealth pursuant to KRS
             12.211 to 12.215.” KRS 12.211 provides that the
             Attorney General may provide a defense for state
             employees, but it stipulates that such defense only applies

                                         -3-
            when the employee’s conduct is “made in the scope and
            course of his employment”, and that no employee or
            former employee “shall be subject to an action arising
            from discretionary acts”. The applicable statutes further
            provide that the Attorney General “may decline to
            provide for the defense of a civil action” when he
            determines that the conduct for which the employee was
            sued “was not within the scope and course of his
            employment as a state employee”, or it involved “actual
            malice”; or “the defense of the action would not be in the
            best interests of the Commonwealth.” KRS 12.212. That
            statute also allows the Attorney General to decline
            representation in cases of conflict of interests. However,
            nothing in the statute creates, or even implies an absolute
            right for a former employee to have the state provide a
            lawyer for the defense of such claims.

                   By promulgating the administrative regulation that
            sets forth the method of hiring counsel in cases in which
            the state agrees to provide such a defense, the Governor
            has done all that the statute requires. The statute requires
            the Governor to promulgate an administrative regulation
            setting forth the policy regarding hiring defense counsel;
            it does not require the Governor to provide defense
            counsel in every case. The assignment of counsel is
            purely discretionary, and it is dependent on a
            determination that the employee acted in good faith,
            without malice, and within the scope of his duties. Here,
            the Attorney General made a determination that the state
            should not provide a defense. This is not the Governor’s
            fault. Moreover, [Tucker and Elmore] have not named
            the Attorney General as a defendant. Here, there is no
            question that the Governor is entitled to official
            immunity, and there is no basis to impose liability on the
            Governor for performing a discretionary act for his
            performance of this essential governmental function.
            The Governor promulgated the administrative regulation
            as required. (Citation omitted.)

Order at 4-5. This appeal follows.

                                        -4-
              To begin, as “matters outside the pleading[s] [were] . . . presented to

and not excluded by the court,” the motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion

for summary judgment.3 CR 12.02. Summary judgment is proper where there

exists no material issue of fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).

All facts and inferences therefrom are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id. And, our review of a summary judgment is de novo.

Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Hartson, 661 S.W.3d 291, 295 (Ky. App. 2023).

              Tucker and Elmore contend that the circuit court erroneously granted

Beshear’s motion to dismiss. Tucker and Elmore maintain that the circuit court

misread KRS 12.213 and that KRS 12.213 imposes a duty upon Beshear to appoint

defense counsel for them in their respective civil actions. Tucker and Elmore

argue that the language of KRS 12.213 provides that the governor “shall” provide

defense counsel to current and former employees and further argue that Beshear

breached this statutory duty by failing to provide defense counsel for them.

              The interpretation and construction of a statute are concerned

primarily with legislative intent. Miller v. Bunch, 657 S.W.3d 890, 894-95 (Ky.

3
 Andrew G. Beshear, in his official and individual capacities, filed documentation in the form of
printed email between his office and the office of the Kentucky Attorney General in the circuit
court action below.

                                               -5-
2022); Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011). To

ascertain legislative intent, the court initially looks to the language of the statute

and gives its words their plain and ordinary meaning. Miller, 657 S.W.3d at 895;

Commonwealth v. Moore, 545 S.W.3d 848, 851 (Ky. 2018). If the statutory

language is clear and unambiguous, legislative intent is derived from such

language, and “our inquiry ends.” Miller, 657 S.W.3d at 895; Moore, 545 S.W.3d

at 851.

             The statute at issue is KRS 12.213, which reads:

             The Governor shall provide by regulation for the defense
             of employees or former employees of the Commonwealth
             pursuant to KRS 12.211 to 12.215 by one (1) or more of
             the following methods:

             (1) By the Attorney General;

             (2) By employing other counsel for this purpose as
                 provided for in KRS 12.210;

             (3) By authorizing the purchase of insurance which
                 requires that the insurer provide or underwrite the
                 cost of the defense; or

             (4) By authorizing defense by counsel assigned to or
                 employed by the department, agency, board,
                 commission, bureau, or authority which employed the
                 person requesting the defense.

             KRS 12.213 is plain and unambiguous. It compels the governor to

“provide by regulation for the defense of employees or former employees” in

accord with its terms. Thus, the clear language of KRS 12.213 merely imposes a

                                           -6-
duty upon the Governor to promulgate a regulation that provides for the defense of

current or former employees in accordance with the statute’s terms.

               As a result of the statutory mandate set forth in KRS 12.213, it is

undisputed that 10 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) 1:011 was

promulgated to provide for the defense of present and past employees of the

Commonwealth. It must be emphasized that Tucker and Elmore have not attacked

the validity of the regulation (10 KAR 1:011);4 consequently, the promulgation of

this regulation fulfilled Beshear’s statutory duty under KRS 12.213. Hence, we

conclude that Beshear has not violated the provisions of KRS 12.213.

               Tucker and Elmore also assert that Beshear acted arbitrarily. Tucker

and Elmore argue:

                      Here, the Governor’s actions were clearly
               arbitrary. He was required to provide a defense for the
               Troopers. He not only failed to provide a defense, but
               actively used politics to get in the way of providing a
               defense. The Governor’s actions speak louder than
               words and his actions say “we have no problem with
               these Troopers being defended as long as the Republican
               Attorney General will do the defending. If the Attorney
               General’s Office will not defend, then you will not be
               provided a defense.” These actions are arbitrary and the
               Governor should be directed to follow the law and
               precedence.

4
  Under 10 Kentucky Administrative Regulations 1:011 § 3, the Attorney General was
responsible for deciding whether to provide a defense for Tucker and Elmore. The Attorney
General was not named a party to this action and whether he acted properly is not before this
Court on appeal.

                                               -7-
Tucker and Elmore’s Brief at 20.

             The Kentucky Constitution unequivocally prohibits the exercise of

arbitrary power in this Commonwealth. KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION § 2. It is

recognized that “whatever is essentially unjust and unequal or exceeds the

reasonable and legitimate interests of the people is arbitrary.” Ky. Milk Mktg. and

Antimonoploy Com’n v. Kroger, 691 S.W.2d 893, 899 (Ky 1985).

             In this case, Tucker and Elmore have not demonstrated that Beshear

acted arbitrarily. They have failed to advance any cogent legal argument that

Beshear is required to provide them with defense counsel. Therefore, we are of the

opinion that Beshear has not acted arbitrarily.

             We view any remaining contentions of error as moot or without merit.

             In summary, we hold that Beshear was entitled to summary judgment,

and the circuit court properly granting same dismissing Tucker’s and Elmore’s

action.

             For the foregoing reasons the Order of the Franklin Circuit Court is

affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -8-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Larry Shelton             S. Travis Mayo
Independence, Kentucky    Taylor Payne
                          Marc Farris
                          Laura C. Tipton
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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