Court Opinion

ID: 9397638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 19:10:22.664765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:26.417604
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/25/23
                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION TWO

 BRANDON JACK, et al.,
         Plaintiffs and Respondents,
                                             A165103, A165386
 v.
 RING LLC,                                   (San Francisco County
                                             Super. Ct. No. CGC-20-588258)
         Defendant and Appellant.

       Ring LLC (Ring) manufactures and sells home security and smart
home devices including video doorbells, security cameras, and alarms.
Brandon Jack and Jean Alda (together, plaintiffs) purchased video doorbell
and security camera products from Ring and subsequently filed a class action
complaint against Ring asserting claims under various consumer protection
statutes. In their lawsuit, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief requiring Ring to
prominently disclose to consumers certain information about its products and
services.
       Ring moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in
its terms of service. Opposing the motion, plaintiffs did not dispute that they
agreed to Ring’s terms of service, but they argued the applicable arbitration
provision violates the California Supreme Court’s holding in McGill v.
Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 961 (McGill) that a predispute
arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable under state law insofar as

                                        1
it purports to waive a party’s statutory right to seek public injunctive relief.
The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, and Ring appeals.
      We affirm.
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit
      Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on November 19, 2020. They alleged Ring
did not inform them “at the time of purchase that the video recording,
playback, and snapshot features[,] which were key components of these
products[,] would only operate if Plaintiffs paid an additional fee of $3 per
month (or $30 per year) per device for a . . . ‘Protect Plan.’ ” They alleged
Ring’s failure to clearly disclose the necessity of the Protect Plan before
purchase constitutes a deceptive and misleading practice, and brought three
causes of action under (1) the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code,
§ 1750 et seq.; CLRA), (2) the false advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17500 et seq.), and (3) the Unfair Competition Law (id., § 17200 et seq.;
UCL). Plaintiffs sought “a public injunction” requiring Ring to disclose on its
website and on the packaging for its products that many features are not
available unless the purchaser also buys a plan from Ring for an additional
fee of $3 per month or $30 per year, per device.
Ring’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
      Ring filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the action. Ring
submitted 10 versions of its terms of service—attached as Exhibits B through
K to John Modestine’s supporting declaration—without identifying which
version or versions it believed controlled. However, in describing the
arbitration provision, Ring cited two versions of its terms of service: (1)
Exhibit C to Modestine’s declaration, which appeared on Ring’s website
August 18 to October 2, 2017, and was, according to Ring, in effect “[a]t the

                                        2
time of Mr. Alda’s purchase” and (2) Exhibit G, which appeared on Ring’s
website August 1, 2018, to October 23, 2019, and was in effect “at the time of
purchase for Mr. Jack.”
      These versions of Ring’s terms of service provide, “You and Ring agree
that any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of, or relating to your use
of the services and or products, to this agreement, or to the content, any
relationship between us and/or any recording on the services and/or products
shall be resolved only by final and binding, bilateral arbitration” except that
(1) “you” [i.e., customers] may bring claims that qualify for its jurisdiction in
small claims court and (2) either party may seek injunctive or other equitable
relief in state or federal court in Los Angeles County to protect that party’s
intellectual property rights. (Capitalization omitted.) 1
      Ring asserted the arbitration provision includes an express delegation
clause delegating issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator, again citing
Exhibits C and G. These versions of the arbitration provision specify that
“the arbitrator, and not any federal, state or local court or agency, shall have
exclusive authority to resolve all disputes arising out of or relating to the
interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of these Terms,
including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of these Terms are
void or voidable, or whether a claim is subject to arbitration.” 2

      1Ring noted that its terms of service had been “updated since the
relevant time period, but the quoted language concerning arbitration has not
materially changed during this time period,” citing all 10 versions of the
terms of service attached to Modestine’s declaration. We further observe that
the two most recent versions of the terms of service provided by Ring,
Exhibits J and K, contain the same language except that “and or” has been
replaced by “and/or.”
      2   The same language is found in Exhibits J and K.

                                        3
      Opposing the motion, plaintiffs pointed out that Ring never identified
which version of the terms of service it was attempting to enforce, and they
urged that Ring’s vagueness “waived its right and obligation to identify which
version governs.” In any event, plaintiffs argued that each of the 10 versions
“(1) specifies that a court decides the enforceability of the prohibition of
public injunctive relief, (2) violates McGill due to the prohibition of public
injunctive relief; and (3) contains a poison pill which states that, in the event
of a McGill violation, the entire claim or set of claims is to be tried in a court.”
(Bolding and italics omitted.)
      Plaintiffs took the position that the terms of service in effect at the time
their lawsuit was filed, Exhibit J to Modestine’s Declaration, governed. 3
      Plaintiffs argued that, despite the delegation clause relied on by Ring,
the trial court could decide whether the arbitration provision was enforceable
under McGill because the provision includes “a carve-out” from the
delegation clause “for McGill-style issues.” They quoted the following
language (citing Exhibit J): “We each agree that any dispute resolution

      3  Plaintiffs argued the version of the terms of service shown in Exhibit
J applies to their current dispute with Ring because, “[w]ith each new version
of the Terms, Ring purported to effect a novation that extinguished the prior
version” (citing Civ. Code, § 1530), and, thus, “Exhibit J superseded Exhibit I,
which superseded Exhibit H, etc.” But they posited Exhibit K (which
appeared on Ring’s website starting on December 8, 2020) could not apply to
their current dispute because Ring could not unilaterally alter the terms of
the arbitration provision after plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in November 2020,
citing In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 361
F.Supp.2d 237, 253 [“when a defendant contacts putative class members for
the purpose of altering the status of a pending litigation, such communication
is improper without judicial authorization”] and Balasanyan v. Nordstrom,
Inc. (S.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2012) 2012 WL 760566, * 4 [invalidating a new
arbitration agreement because it was an “improper attempt to alter the pre-
existing arbitration agreement with putative class members during
litigation”].)

                                         4
proceedings will be conducted only on an individual basis and not in a class,
representative or private attorney general action. Further, unless both you
and Ring expressly agree otherwise, the arbitrator may not consolidate more
than one person’s claims and may not otherwise preside over any form of a
representative or class proceeding. If a court decides that applicable law
precludes enforcement of any of this subsection’s limitations as to a
particular claim for relief, then that claim (and only that claim) must be
severed from the arbitration and may be brought in court.” (Capitalization
omitted, italics added.) 4
      Plaintiffs asserted the quoted subsection of the arbitration provision
“explicitly specifies that a court must decide the enforceability of this public
injunctive relief prohibition.” (Italics omitted.) They also called the final
sentence of the quoted subsection a “poison pill,” which requires, once a court
finds a McGill violation as to a claim, that such claim be litigated in court,
not in arbitration.
      On the merits, plaintiffs quoted language in the arbitration provision
that (1) prohibits a claimant from pursuing claims in a “private attorney
general action,” (2) limits the arbitrator to awarding relief “on an individual
basis,” 5 and (3) provides that the arbitrator may award injunctive relief “only
in favor of the individual party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary

      4The same language is found in Exhibits C and G, the versions of the
terms of service Ring quoted and cited in its memorandum of points and
authorities supporting its motion to compel arbitration, as well as in Exhibit
K.
      5 Plaintiffs quoted the following language (citing Exhibit J): “An
arbitrator, however, can award on an individual basis the same damages and
relief as a court (including injunctive and declaratory relief or statutory
damages), and must follow the terms of these Terms.” The same language is
found in Exhibits C, G, and K.

                                        5
to provide relief warranted by that party’s individual claim,” 6 and cited cases
in which these types of provisions were found to void arbitration agreements
under McGill.
      In its reply, Ring argued for the first time that Exhibit K (and not
Exhibits C and G, which it had cited in its memorandum of points and
authority) embodied the applicable terms of service. 7
Requests to File Additional Briefing and Evidence Regarding Ring’s Motion
      Three days before the scheduled hearing on Ring’s motion to compel
arbitration, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for leave to file a sur-
response. They argued Ring used its reply in support of its motion to raise
new arguments and plaintiffs “wish[ed] to briefly address” these arguments.
(Bolding, italics and underlining omitted.)
      On the day of the hearing, Ring filed a request to supplement the
record and for leave to respond to plaintiffs’ ex parte application. Ring
asserted that, although its “position has always been that both Plaintiffs are
bound by Ring’s Terms of Service dated December 8, 2020” (Exhibit K), it now
had “additional facts demonstrating that [plaintiff] Jack affirmatively
accepted the December 2020 Terms.” Ring requested leave to respond to
plaintiffs’ sur-response, which Ring claimed, “improperly raises new
arguments and rehashes prior arguments.”
The Trial Court’s Order and Ring’s Subsequent Filings
      After the scheduled hearing, the trial court issued a written order, filed
March 18, 2022, denying Ring’s motion to compel arbitration and denying

      6Again, plaintiffs cited Exhibit J. This language is also found in
Exhibits C and G but is not in Exhibit K.
      7Ring further argued that the arbitration provision was not void under
McGill because plaintiffs were not seeking public injunctive relief and
because the arbitration provision does not prohibit public injunctive relief.

                                         6
both parties’ “last-minute” ex parte applications for leave to file supplemental
briefs and to supplement the record.
      On March 28, 2022, Ring filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court’s order denying its motion to compel arbitration. Nine days later (April
6), Ring filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order of March 18, 2022,
denying its motion to compel arbitration.
      On May 24, 2022, the trial court issued an order taking Ring’s motion
for reconsideration off calendar. The court explained it lacked jurisdiction to
reconsider its ruling on the motion to compel arbitration because Ring had
appealed that ruling and the appeal was pending. Two days later (May 26),
Ring filed another notice of appeal from the trial court’s order of March 18,
2022, denying its motion to compel arbitration and from all other appealable
rulings, including the court’s order of May 24 taking Ring’s motion for
reconsideration off calendar.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Ring contends the question whether the arbitration provision is valid
under McGill must be decided by an arbitrator, not a court. Alternatively, it
contends the arbitration provision is valid under McGill and, even if the
agreement violates McGill, plaintiffs’ claims should be split by type of remedy
sought so that, to the extent plaintiffs seek relief that is not a public
injunction, that part of their claims should be sent to arbitration. Ring also
argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ring’s request to
supplement the record and its subsequent motion for reconsideration and
urges this court to find that the December 2020 terms of service control.
A.    Standards of Review
      “Under both federal and state law, arbitration agreements are valid
and enforceable, unless they are revocable for reasons under state law that

                                         7
would render any contract revocable.” (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 231, 239.)
      “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the
existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration
bears the burden of proving any defense.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v.
Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) When
the evidence is not in conflict, we review the trial court’s denial of a petition
to compel arbitration de novo. (Ibid.) When there is a dispute of fact, we
review the trial court’s findings of fact for substantial evidence. (Ajamian v.
CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 795 (Ajamian).)
      We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s denial of Ring’s
requests for leave to supplement the record and to file additional briefing.
(See Fowler v. Golden Pacific Bancorp, Inc. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 205, 217
[denial of a defendant’s request for additional time to file a sur-reply
reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 755, 765 [refusal to consider a plaintiff’s surrebuttal brief
reviewed for an abuse of discretion].)
      We review de novo the question whether the trial court had jurisdiction
to rule on Ring’s motion for reconsideration. (See People v. Bilbrey (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 764, 770–771 [reviewing de novo claim that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to grant a criminal defendant’s motion]; Conservatorship of Kane
(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 400, 405 [issues of law concerning jurisdiction are
subject to de novo review].)
B.    The Trial Court Properly Considered Plaintiffs’ McGill Claim
      “[W]hen parties have agreed to arbitration, challenges to the validity of
the underlying contract [(as opposed to challenges to the agreement to
arbitrate)], including contract defenses such as fraud in the inducement or

                                         8
illegality, are for the arbitrator to decide.” (Nielsen Contracting, Inc. v.
Applied Underwriters, Inc. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1107–1108.)
“However, challenges to the validity of the arbitration clause itself are
generally resolved by the court in the first instance.” (Id. at p. 1108, italics
added.) This is because the usual presumption is that a court, not an
arbitrator, decides threshold issues of arbitrability such as whether the
arbitration agreement itself is valid and enforceable. (Ajamian, supra, 203
Cal.App.4th at p. 781; Dennison v. Rosland Capital LLC (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 204, 209 (Dennison).)
      The parties may agree to delegate authority to the arbitrator to decide
threshold issues, but given the contrary presumption, evidence that the
parties intended such a delegation must be “clear and unmistakable” before a
court will enforce a delegation provision. (Ajamian, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th
at p. 781; Dennison, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 209.) “This is a ‘heightened
standard,’ higher than the evidentiary standard applicable to other matters
of interpreting an arbitration agreement.” (Ajamian, at p. 790.)
      Ring contends the trial court erred in deciding the threshold issue
whether the arbitration provision is enforceable under McGill because the
parties clearly and unmistakably delegated authority to decide this issue to
the arbitrator. It relies on (1) the arbitration provision’s delegation clause
and (2) its reference to “JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures.”
We are not persuaded.
      1.    The Delegation Clause and the “Poison Pill”
      “As a general matter, where one contractual provision indicates that
the enforceability of an arbitration provision is to be decided by the
arbitrator, but another provision indicates that [a] court might also find
provisions in the contract unenforceable, there is no clear and unmistakable

                                         9
delegation of authority to the arbitrator.” (Ajamian, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th
at p. 792.) “Even broad arbitration clauses that expressly delegate the
enforceability decision to arbitrators may not meet the clear and
unmistakable test, where other language in the agreement creates an
uncertainty in that regard.” (Ibid.)
      In Baker v. Osborne Development Corp. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 884, for
example, an agreement’s delegation clause provided, “ ‘Any disputes
concerning the interpretation or the enforceability of this arbitration
agreement, including without limitation, its revocability or voidability for any
cause, the scope of arbitrable issues, and any defense . . . shall be decided by
the arbitrator.’ ” (Id. at pp. 888–889, italics added.) But the same section of
the agreement included “ ‘a severability provision in the event that “any
provision of this arbitration agreement shall be determined by the arbitrator
or by any court to be unenforceable. . . .” ’ ” (Id. at p. 891, italics added.) The
trial court found the arbitration agreement “inconsistent” and ambiguous on
the question of delegation because the agreement “acknowledges the
possibility that enforceability issues will be decided, not by the arbitrator, but
rather by the court”; consequently, the court determined that it, and not the
arbitrator, would decide the “ ‘ “gateway” issue’ ” of whether the arbitration
agreement was enforceable. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial
court, reasoning: “[A]lthough one provision of the arbitration agreement
stated that issues of enforceability or voidability were to be decided by the
arbitrator, another provision indicated that the court might find a provision
unenforceable. Thus, we conclude the arbitration agreement did not ‘clearly
and unmistakably’ reserve to the arbitrator the issue of whether the
arbitration agreement was enforceable.” (Id. at pp. 893–894.)

                                        10
      Likewise, in Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 227, 240–241, an arbitration agreement provided “the arbitrator
is to decide enforceability questions,” but a severability provision recognized
a court may decide the same issue; Division Four of this court found the
agreement “point[ed] in two directions” and, as a result, “there [wa]s no clear
and unmistakable delegation.” (Accord Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 871, 877, 880 [where a delegation clause gave the arbitrator
“exclusive power” to resolve disputes relating to “enforceability” including
whether the agreement was void, but a severability clause allowed a court to
determine issues such as unconscionability, there was “no clear and
unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator to decide enforceability”];
Dennison, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 209–210 [where “a contract includes a
severability clause stating a court of competent jurisdiction may excise an
unconscionable provision, there is no clear and unmistakable delegation to
the arbitrator to decide if the arbitration agreement is unconscionable”];
Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1444–1445
[where a “delegation provision states that the arbitrator is to decide whether
the Agreement is enforceable while the severability provision contemplates
that a court has the same authority,” “the severability provision that a court
may decide the question of enforceability creates an ambiguity as to whether
an arbitrator should decide if an arbitration contract is enforceable”]; Parada
v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1565–1566 [where an
arbitration agreement provided that any dispute relating to enforcement or
validity of the agreement “ ‘shall be submitted to final and binding
arbitration’ ” but a severability provision contemplated a “ ‘trier of fact of
competent jurisdiction’ ” may find a provision of the agreement

                                        11
unenforceable, the agreement “did not ‘ “clearly and unmistakably” reserve’ ”
the threshold issue of enforceability to arbitration].)
      Similarly, in this case, the arbitration provision contains a delegation
clause (which is the same in Exhibits C, G, J, and K) providing the arbitrator
“shall have exclusive authority to resolve all disputes” relating to the
“enforceability . . . of these Terms,” including “any claim that all or any part
of these Terms are void or voidable.” But another provision, the “poison pill,”
contemplates that “a court” may decide the enforceability of the subsection of
the arbitration provision that requires arbitration to “be conducted only on an
individual basis and not in a class, representative or private attorney general
action.” (Capitalization omitted.) Thus, the arbitration provision points in
two directions on the question whether a court or an arbitrator is to decide
the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate, at least with respect to
challenges to the “subsection’s limitations as to a particular claim for relief”
such as plaintiffs’ claim here that the limitations are unenforceable under
McGill. Because of this uncertainty, we cannot conclude the parties clearly
and unmistakably delegated to the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide
whether the arbitration provision is valid under McGill. 8
      Ring argues the severability clause in the arbitration provision does not
create any ambiguity because the arbitration provision permits certain
claims to be brought in court: customers may bring claims in small claims
courts and intellectual property rights may be enforced in state or federal
court. We disagree.

      8Plaintiffs argue the language of the “poison pill” is clear that a court
must decide McGill issues. However, we need not decide whether the
arbitration provision requires a court to decide challenges related to the
subsection’s limitations; that the language suggests a court may decide
enforceability issues is enough to create uncertainty.

                                        12
      Ring’s argument is premised on Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 880 (Aanderud), but the case is distinguishable. In Aanderud, a
solar power purchase agreement contained an arbitration provision that
permitted claims to be resolved “through binding arbitration or small claims
court instead of courts of general jurisdiction.” (Id. at pp. 885–886.) The
arbitration provision delegated issues of validity and enforceability of the
arbitration provision to arbitration. (Id. at p. 891.) A separate severability
clause in the purchase agreement provided for severance of any provision of
the agreement found “ ‘to be invalid, prohibited, or otherwise unenforceable
by an arbitrator or court of competent jurisdiction.’ ” (Id. at p. 894.) The
plaintiff in Aanderud argued the severability clause rendered the delegation
clause ambiguous because it suggested a court might find the arbitration
provision unenforceable. The Court of Appeal, however, found no ambiguity
because there was no suggestion that a court could decide whether the
arbitration provision (as opposed to any other provision of the purchase
agreement) was enforceable. (Id. at pp. 893–894.)
      The Aanderud court explained: “In contrast to the arbitration provision
in Baker, the arbitration provision here expressly states that any disputes,
which include those over the scope and applicability of the arbitration
provision, are to be resolved through binding arbitration except those within
small claims court jurisdiction. Since arbitration is not at issue in a small
claims court action, the small claims court can only find unenforceable
provisions of the [purchase agreement] other than the arbitration provision.
Thus, when the severability clause provides for severance of any provision of
the [purchase agreement] if it is ‘held to be invalid, prohibited, or otherwise
unenforceable by an arbitrator or court of competent jurisdiction,’ the court
being referred to is the small claims court, which is not empowered to

                                       13
determine the scope or applicability of the arbitration provision.” (Aanderud,
supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 894, italics added.)
      In other words, in Aanderud, the general severability clause’s reference
to a “court of competent jurisdiction” did not render the delegation clause
ambiguous because, first, the arbitration provision allowed certain claims to
be brought in small claims court (and, therefore, “court of competent
jurisdiction” referred to small claims court) and, second, although the
severability clause contemplated a small claims court might find a provision
of the purchase agreement to be unenforceable, it did not suggest that a small
claims court might decide whether the arbitration provision was enforceable.
      In this case, as in Aanderud, the arbitration provision allows certain
claims (small claims, intellectual property claims) to be brought in court.
But, unlike Aanderud, the severability clause (or “poison pill”) is not a
separate provision of an overall contract (the purchase agreement in
Aanderud, the terms of service here) that applies to the contract in general.
Instead, it is a subsection of the arbitration provision itself. 9 After limiting
arbitration to “an individual basis and not in a class, representative or
private attorney general action,” the subsection provides, “If a court decides
that applicable law precludes enforcement of any of this subsection’s
limitations as to a particular claim for relief, then that claim (and only that
claim) must be severed from the arbitration and may be brought in court.”
(Italics added.)
      Thus, in contrast to Aanderud, the severability clause in this case very
clearly contemplates that a court may decide whether the arbitration

      9 Indeed, the terms of services also contains a separate “Severability
and Survival” section that applies to the terms of service in general. (Some
capitalization omitted.)

                                        14
provision is enforceable when the provision is challenged based on the
limitations of the subsection itself. This uncertainty about who may decide
such challenges means there is no clear and unmistakable delegation of the
issue exclusively to arbitration. 10
      2.     JAMS Rules
      The arbitration provision specifies that arbitration will be administered
by JAMS, “pursuant to JAMS Streamlined Arbitration Rules & Procedures
then in effect” (JAMS Rules). Ring submitted evidence that JAMS Rules in
effect as of July 1, 2014, provided that “[j]urisdictional and arbitrability
disputes, including disputes over the . . . validity . . . of the agreement under
which Arbitration is sought . . . shall be submitted to and ruled on by the
Arbitrator” and the “Arbitrator has the authority to determine jurisdiction
and arbitrability issues as a preliminary matter.”
      We recently held that a similar reference to the AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules (which, like the JAMS Rules provide that the arbitrator
has authority to rule on the validity of the arbitration agreement) did not
constitute clear and unmistakable delegation in the context of an arbitration
agreement in the terms of service governing the relationship between a
mobile gaming platform and its users. (Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 1035.) We acknowledged contrary federal authority on the

      10Ring also relies on B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 931, 957–959, a case that followed Aanderud. To the extent B.D.
suggests that Aanderud’s holding would apply under the facts of this case, we
disagree with that conclusion. A severability clause that expressly
contemplates “a court” may decide whether a subsection of an arbitration
provision is enforceable “precludes any conclusion that the parties clearly and
unmistakably delegated” exclusive authority to decide the same issue to the
arbitrator. (Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc. (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 643, 656 (Nelson).)

                                        15
issue, but we agreed with the reasoning of Ajamian, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th
at page 781, Beco v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 292, 306,
and Eiess v. USAA Federal Savings Bank (N.D. Cal. 2019) 404 F.Supp.3d
1240, 1252–1254. For the reasons explained in Gostev, we conclude mere
reference to JAMS Rules in the arbitration provision does not constitute clear
and unmistakable delegation to the arbitrator of threshold issues of
enforceability.
      Moreover, the reference to the JAMS Rules does not cure the ambiguity
created by the severability clause/“poison pill.” (See Nelson, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 657 [where the “broad severability language confirms the
trial court’s retained authority to resolve questions concerning the validity or
enforceability of the agreement,” reference to AAA rules created, at best,
uncertainty about delegation].)
      In sum, Ring has not shown the parties clearly and unmistakably
delegated exclusive authority to the arbitrator to decide the threshold issue of
whether the arbitration provision is enforceable under McGill. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err by considering the issue.
C.    The Arbitration Provision Violates McGill
      Ring next argues the trial court erred in determining that the
arbitration provision violates McGill. We begin with a very brief discussion
of McGill.
      1.     McGill
      Public injunctive relief is relief that “benefits the general public” and
benefits an individual plaintiff only incidentally “or as ‘a member of the
general public.’ ” (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 955.) In contrast, private
injunctive relief “primarily ‘resolve[s] a private dispute’ between the parties
[citation] and ‘rectif[ies] individual wrongs.’ ” (Ibid.) In McGill, our high

                                       16
court explained that public injunctive relief “is a substantive statutory
remedy that the Legislature, through the UCL, the CLRA, and the false
advertising law, has made available to [individuals] who meet the statutory
standing requirements for filing a private action.” (Id. at p. 965, italics
omitted.)
      The predispute arbitration provision at issue in McGill provided,
“(1) ‘[a]n award in arbitration shall determine the rights and obligations
between the named parties only, and only in respect of the Claims in
arbitration, and shall not have any bearing on the rights and obligations of
any other person, or on the resolution of any other dispute’; (2) ‘[t]he
arbitrator will not award relief for or against anyone who is not a party’;
(3) ‘the arbitrator may award relief only on an individual (non-class,
nonrepresentative) basis’; and (4) ‘neither you, we, nor any other person may
pursue the Claims in arbitration as a class action, private attorney general
action or other representative action.’ ” (McGill, 2 Cal.5th at p. 956.) The
parties agreed that the arbitration provision was intended to mean that
plaintiff McGill was precluded “from seeking public injunctive relief in any
forum.” (Ibid.)
      The McGill court held the arbitration provision was “invalid and
unenforceable under state law insofar as it purports to waive McGill’s
statutory right to seek” public injunctive relief under the UCL, CLRA, and
the false advertising law in any forum. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 961.)
Citing Civil Code section 3513 (which provides, in part, “a law established for
a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement”), our high
court reasoned that “the waiver in a predispute arbitration agreement of the
right to seek public injunctive relief under [these three laws] would seriously
compromise the public purposes the statutes were intended to serve.”

                                       17
(McGill, at p. 961.) The court rejected the defendant’s argument “that a
California rule precluding enforcement of the waiver would be preempted by
the FAA.” (Ibid.)
      2.    The Trial Court’s Decision
      The trial court found the arbitration provision in this case purports to
waive plaintiffs’ right to seek public injunctive relief in any forum. The court
found “recent cases following McGill . . . instructive,” discussing Mejia v.
DACM Inc. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 691 (Mejia) and Maldonado v. Fast Auto
Loans, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 710 (Maldonado). 11 The court reasoned:

      11 In Mejia, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at page 694, a credit card agreement
included an arbitration provision specifying that any party could require
arbitration as “ ‘the sole and exclusive forum and remedy for resolution of a
Claim.’ ” Under the provision, arbitration could not “proceed on a class,
representative, or collective basis (including as private attorney general on
behalf of others),” and an arbitration award could “determine the rights and
obligations of the named parties only” and could not “make an award for the
benefit of, or against, anyone other than a named party. . . .” (Ibid.,
capitalization omitted.) The defendant implicitly conceded that the
arbitration provision prevented the plaintiff from seeking a public injunction
in arbitration but argued there was “an ‘implied exception’ [from the
arbitration requirement] for seeking a public injunction” in court. (Id. at p.
705.) The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s proposed interpretation of
the provision, finding it “directly conflicts with the plain text of the
arbitration provision and the clear intent expressed in that text.” (Ibid.)
       In Maldonado, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at page 716, the arbitration
provision in a loan agreement required “arbitration take place on an
individual basis,” prohibited claimants from participating in “ ‘a class action,
private attorney general action, or other representative action’, ” and
specified the “arbitrator may only award relief on behalf of the named
parties.” The Court of Appeal concluded the “McGill rule applie[d]” and
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration on the ground “the provision was invalid and unenforceable
because it required consumers to waive their right to pursue public injunctive
relief.” (Id. at pp. 713, 720, capitalization omitted.)

                                       18
“[T]he arbitration agreement at issue here, precisely like the ones in McGill
and the other cases discussed above, purports to waive Plaintiff’s [sic] right to
seek public injunctive relief in any forum, judicial or arbitral.” “Under the
express terms of the agreement, an arbitrator cannot issue any injunction
that would benefit anyone other than an individual consumer who files a
demand in arbitration; any broader relief would run afoul of the explicit
restrictions in the arbitration agreement on the arbitrator’s authority to
grant broader relief. Defendant offers no example, nor can the Court imagine
one, of an injunction that an arbitrator could issue ‘on an individual basis’ or
‘only in favor of the individual party seeking relief’ that could intelligibly be
considered ‘public injunctive relief.’ ”
      3.     Analysis
      Ring moved to compel arbitration because it believes plaintiffs’ current
claims are subject to “final and binding, bilateral arbitration” and, thus,
plaintiffs cannot obtain any relief, including public injunctive relief, in court.
Ring does not dispute that plaintiffs seek public injunctive relief, but it
argues such relief is available in arbitration under the language of the
arbitration provision. We do not find Ring’s current interpretation of its
arbitration provision convincing.
      The arbitration provision in this case specifies arbitration is to be
“conducted only on an individual basis and not in a class, representative or
private attorney general action,” an arbitration award must be “on an
individual basis,” and the arbitrator may award injunctive relief “only in
favor of the individual party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary to
provide relief warranted by that party’s individual claim.”
      The arbitration agreement in McGill contained similar language;
claims could not be brought “ ‘as a class action, private attorney general

                                           19
action or other representative action,’ ” relief could be awarded “ ‘only on an
individual (non-class, nonrepresentative) basis’ ” and could not be awarded
“ ‘for . . . anyone who is not a party,’ ” and an arbitration award was limited to
“ ‘determin[ing] the rights and obligations between the named parties only.’ ”
(McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 956.) The parties in that case agreed that the
language meant McGill could not seek public injunctive relief in arbitration
(or in court). (Ibid.)
      Similarly, in Delisle v. Speedy Cash (S.D.Cal., June 10, 2019) 2019 WL
2423090, at *7, vacated and remanded on another point (9th Cir. 2020) 818
Fed.Appx. 608, the parties agreed that the arbitration provision was intended
to preclude the plaintiffs from seeking public injunctive relief in any forum
where it prohibited a claimant “from ‘act[ing] as a private attorney general in
court or in arbitration’ ” or “ ‘join[ing] or consolidat[ing] claim(s) . . . with
claims involving any other person.’ ” And in McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC
(N.D.Cal., Oct. 2, 2017) 2017 WL 4354998, at *1, *4, affd. (9th Cir. 2019) 772
Fed.Appx. 575 (McArdle), the parties agreed an arbitration provision
“purport[ed] to waive the arbitrator’s ability to award public injunctive relief”
where it provided, “The arbitrator may award declaratory or injunctive relief
only in favor of the individual party seeking relief and only to the extent
necessary to provide relief warranted by that party’s individual claim,” and
parties may only bring claims in an “individual capacity, and not as a
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative
proceeding.” (Capitalization omitted.)
      Ring argues that cases in which the parties agreed about the meaning
of the arbitration agreements do not help plaintiffs because the courts in
those cases did not interpret the contractual language. We nonetheless find
these cases relevant because they demonstrate that terms in arbitration

                                          20
agreements that prohibit “private attorney general” actions in arbitration,
limit arbitration awards to “an individual basis,” and limit injunctive relief in
arbitration to awards “only in favor of the individual party seeking relief and
only to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by that party’s
individual claim” are all commonly understood by the parties who agree to
these terms to mean public injunctive relief is not available in arbitration.
      Courts also routinely construe these terms as prohibiting awards of
public injunctive relief in arbitration. (E.g., Mejia, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 702–705 [arbitration provision that precludes arbitration “ ‘as private
attorney general on behalf of others’ ” violates McGill]; Blair v. Rent-A-
Center, Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 928 F.3d 819, 831 (Blair) [arbitration provision
that “prohibits the arbitrator from awarding ‘relief that would affect . . .
account holders other than you,’ and eliminates any ‘right or authority for
any dispute to be brought, heard, or arbitrated as a class, collective, mass,
private attorney general, or representative action’ ” “precludes the arbitrator
from awarding public injunctive relief”]; Dornaus v. Best Buy Co., Inc.
(N.D.Cal., Feb. 14, 2019) 2019 WL 632957, at *4 [arbitration provision that
permits “relief only on an individual basis” means “the arbitrator [is
precluded] from awarding public injunctive relief, which is relief intended to
benefit those other than the individual bringing the claim”]; Rogers v. Lyft,
Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2020) 452 F.Supp.3d 904, 917–918, aff’d (9th Cir., Feb. 16,
2022) 2022 WL 474166 (Rogers) [arbitration agreement providing “that the
‘arbitrator may award declaratory or injunctive relief only in favor of the
individual party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary to provide
relief warranted by that party’s claims’ ” “purported to waive the right to seek
[public injunctive] relief, [but] this waiver is invalid”].)

                                         21
      In MacClelland v. Cellco Partnership (N.D.Cal. 2022) 609 F.Supp.3d
1024, 1037 (MacClelland), the arbitration agreement contained language
identical to the arbitration provision in this case limiting injunctive relief in
arbitration to an award “ ‘only in favor of the individual party seeking relief
and only to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by that party’s
individual claim.’ ” The district court found, “By precluding injunctive relief
benefitting anyone other than the individual claimant, the contract prevents
Plaintiffs from seeking public injunctive relief in any forum.” (Ibid.; see also
Brown v. Madison Reed, Inc. (N.D.Cal., Aug. 30, 2021) 2021 WL 3861457, at
*7 (Brown) [where the arbitration agreement provides, “The arbitrator may
award declaratory or injunctive relief only in favor of the claimant and only
to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by the claimant’s
individual claim” (italics omitted), the “provision . . . does not allow [the
plaintiff] to seek public injunctive relief in arbitration”].)
      In line with these cases, we agree with the trial court that the
arbitration provision here prohibits public injunctive relief in arbitration.
      For its contrary position, Ring relies on DiCarlo v. MoneyLion, Inc. (9th
Cir. 2021) 988 F.3d 1148 (DiCarlo). There, the arbitration agreement
prohibited a claimant from “acting as a private attorney general” and
“ ‘authorize[d]’ the arbitrator to ‘award all [injunctive] remedies available in
an individual lawsuit under [California] law.’ ” (Id. at p. 1153.) The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals framed the question on appeal as whether “public
injunctive relief under the relevant statutes [is] available in an ‘individual
lawsuit’ without a plaintiff ‘act[ing] as a private attorney general.’ ” (Ibid.)
The court concluded the answer was yes because “[p]ublic injunctive relief is
available under California law in individual lawsuits—not just in private-

                                         22
attorney-general suits” and, therefore, “[the plaintiff] DiCarlo may secure
that relief in arbitration under the Agreement.” (Id. at p. 1155.)
      DiCarlo appears to conflict with cases like Maldonado, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th 710, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held an
agreement was invalid under McGill where it required arbitration “on an
individual basis,” prohibited private attorney general actions, and limited
awards in arbitration to “relief on behalf of the named parties.” (Id. at pp.
713, 716, 720; and see Dornaus v. Best Buy Co., Inc., supra, 2019 WL 632957,
at *4 [arbitration provision that permits “relief only on an individual basis”
means “the arbitrator [is precluded] from awarding public injunctive relief,
which is relief intended to benefit those other than the individual bringing
the claim”].) To the extent the case law cannot be reconciled, we do not find
DiCarlo more persuasive than the many cases we have cited above. But
DiCarlo is also distinguishable. Here, unlike in DiCarlo, the arbitration
provision also limits injunctive relief in arbitration to an award “only in favor
of the individual party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary to
provide relief warranted by that party’s individual claim.” Post-DiCarlo,
federal district courts have construed this language to mean public injunctive
relief is not available in arbitration. In Brown, the district court
distinguished DiCarlo on the ground the agreement at issue was “more
restrictive and authorizes an arbitrator to award ‘injunctive relief only in
favor of the claimant and only to the extent necessary to provide relief
warranted by the claimant’s individual claim,’ ” and this provision meant the
plaintiff was “not allow[ed] . . . to seek public injunctive relief in arbitration.”
(Brown, supra, 2021 WL 3861457, at *8; see also MacClelland, supra, 609
F.Supp.3d at p. 1037; Rogers, supra, 452 F.Supp.3d at pp. 917–918.)

                                         23
      Ring points out that in DiCarlo, the arbitration agreement provided,
“ ‘The arbitrator . . . shall be authorized to award all remedies available in an
individual lawsuit . . ., including, without limitation, . . . injunctive . . .
relief,’ ” which the court characterized as an “all-remedies clause.” (DiCarlo,
supra, 988 F.3d at p. 1157.) The DiCarlo court reasoned that an
interpretation of the arbitration agreement prohibiting public injunctive
relief in arbitration contradicted the “all-remedies clause,” and observed, “We
do not honor the contracting parties’ expressed intent by creating internal
contradictions in the Agreement.” (Ibid.)
      In this case, the arbitration provision states, “An arbitrator . . . can
award on an individual basis the same damages and relief as a court
(including injunctive and declaratory relief or statutory damages), and must
follow the terms of these Terms [of Service].” Ring argues the phrase that an
arbitrator can award “the same damages and relief as a court,” including
injunctive relief, means public injunctive relief is available in arbitration.
But the very next phrase requires the arbitrator to “follow the terms,” which
includes the limitation that injunctive relief be awarded “only in favor of the
individual party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary to provide
relief warranted by that party’s individual claim.” This language, in turn, is
both commonly understood by parties to arbitration agreements to preclude
public injunctive relief in arbitration (McArdle, supra, 2017 WL 4354998, at
*4), and interpreted by courts to preclude public injunctive relief in
arbitration (MacClelland, supra, 609 F.Supp.3d at p. 1037; Rogers, supra,
452 F.Supp.3d at pp. 917–918; Brown, supra, 2021 WL 3861457, at *8.) By
giving meaning to the term limiting injunctive relief in arbitration to awards
“only in favor of the individual party seeking relief and only to the extent
necessary to provide relief warranted by that party’s individual claim,” we

                                          24
are not creating internal contradictions in the arbitration provision. To the
extent there is a contradiction, it is inherent in the arbitration provision
itself. Nor would be honoring the contracting parties’ expressed intent if we
were to ignore the term limiting injunctive relief in arbitration.
      Ring also relies on Maynez v. Walmart, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2020) 479
F.Supp.3d 890 and Maybaum v. Target Corporation (C.D. Cal., May 3, 2022)
2022 WL 1321246. In Maynez, the arbitration agreement allowed
“ ‘injunctive relief . . ., but only to the extent necessary to provide relief
warranted by the individual claim before the arbitrator.’ ” (Italics omitted.)
The district court recognized this term “might be read as a waiver of
Plaintiff’s right to seek public injunctive relief in arbitration,” (id. at p. 899),
but the court accepted defendant Walmart’s representation that the
agreement allowed the arbitrator to award a public injunction (id. at p. 900).
Similarly, in Maybaum, the district court “accept[ed] [defendant Target’s]
interpretation” that a similar term “permits public injunctive relief and thus
does not violate McGill.” (Maybaum, supra, 2022 WL 1321246, at *6.) Of
course, we are not required to accept Ring’s current interpretation of the
arbitration provision language over the reasonable interpretation urged by
plaintiffs. (Cf. Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 798
[“When ambiguities in a standardized contract . . . cannot be dispelled by
application of the other rules of contract interpretation, they are resolved
against the drafter”].) And, in any event, nothing in Maynez and Maybaum
persuades us to depart from MacClelland, supra, 609 F.Supp.3d 1024,
Brown, supra, 2021 WL 3861457, and Rogers, supra, 452 F.Supp.3d 904.
      4.     FAA Preemption
      The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) “requires courts
to ‘place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts

                                         25
[citation] and [to] enforce them according to their terms.’ ” (McGill, supra, 2
Cal.5th at pp. 961–962, quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563
U.S. 333, 339.) When a “state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a
particular type of claim,” the FAA preempts that law. (Concepcion, at p. 341.)
      Ring argues that, if the McGill rule means public injunctive relief is not
available in bilateral arbitration, then the FAA preempts the rule. But that
is not what the McGill court held, and that is not the basis of our decision in
this appeal. 12 In McGill, our high court held only that an arbitration
agreement is invalid and unenforceable insofar as it purports to waive a
claimant’s statutory right to seek public injunctive relief in any forum.
(McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 961.) Here, we conclude, as a matter of
contract interpretation, the arbitration provision at issue purports to do just
that because it requires arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims but does not allow
awards of public injunctive relief in arbitration. We do not rely on a rule that
bilateral arbitration agreements requiring arbitration of requests for public
injunctive relief are per se unenforceable. Thus, the FAA does not preempt
McGill’s holding. (Ibid.)

      12 Here, we pause to observe that California Supreme Court decisions
prior to McGill established that agreements to arbitrate claims seeking
public injunctive relief are not enforceable as a matter of state law; this is
known as the Broughton–Cruz rule. (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 953; see
Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303; Broughton v.
Cigna Healthplans of California (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1066.) In McGill, our high
court initially granted review to consider whether the FAA preempted the
Broughton–Cruz rule, but the court did not decide the question because the
parties agreed on appeal that the arbitration provision at issue did not
permit claimants to seek public injunctive relief in arbitration in the first
place. (McGill, at p. 956.) Here, we assume without deciding that state law
does not prevent parties from agreeing to arbitrate requests for public
injunctive relief.

                                       26
D.    Severability
      As we have described, the arbitration provision includes the following
severability clause/“poison pill”: “If a court decides that applicable law
precludes enforcement of any of this subsection’s limitations as to a
particular claim for relief, then that claim (and only that claim) must be
severed from the arbitration and may be brought in court.”
      Ring argues this means the parts of plaintiffs’ three causes of action
that involve a prayer for public injunctive relief should be severed from
arbitration and plaintiffs should be ordered to arbitrate “liability, damages,
and non-public injunctive relief.” We disagree.
      In Blair, supra, 928 F.3d 819, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered a similar severability clause in an arbitration agreement. It
provided: “If there is a final judicial determination that applicable law
precludes enforcement of this Paragraph’s limitations as to a particular claim
for relief, then that claim (and only that claim) must be severed from the
arbitration and may be brought in court. (Italics added.) The italicized
language is identical to the severability clause in this case. After finding the
arbitration agreement violated McGill, the court “read the [severability]
clause, as did the district court, to provide that the entire claim be severed for
judicial determination.” (Id. at pp. 831–832.) The defendant argued the
phrase “ ‘claim for relief’ ” referred “only to a particular remedy, not to the
underlying claim.” The district court found this interpretation “ ‘unnatural
and unpersuasive,’ ” as did the Ninth Circuit. (Id. at p. 831.) The Blair court
reasoned, “A ‘claim for relief,’ as that term is ordinarily used, is synonymous
with ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Ring argues we should reject Blair, asserting, “Lawyers and courts
routinely refer to remedies as ‘claims for relief’—as in ‘claims for public

                                         27
injunctive relief.’ ” Ring notes that in McGill, Maldonado, and a few other
cases, the courts used the phrase, “claims for public injunctive relief.” But we
do not see how this suggests the phrase “claim for relief” as used in the
severability clause means “specific remedy requested” and not the more
commonly understood “claim” or “cause of action.” 13 Recall that the sentence
preceding the severability clause provides, “. . . the arbitrator may not
consolidate more than one person’s claims and may not otherwise preside
over any form of a representative or class proceeding.” (Italics added.) In
this context, it is far more reasonable to read “claim for relief” to refer to a
person’s claim and not to a particular remedy requested in respect to a claim.
      In short, we agree with the trial court that the severability clause/
“poison pill” means plaintiffs’ claims (that is, their three causes of action
under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, false advertising law, and UCL,
respectively) cannot be arbitrated and may be brought in court.
E.    Procedural Rulings
      1.    Denial of Ring’s Request to Supplement the Record
      Ring contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying its
request to supplement the record, which it filed on the day of the hearing on
its motion to compel arbitration. This contention lacks merit.
      Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b), moving
and supporting papers must be filed at least 16 court days before the hearing,
opposition papers must be filed at least nine days before the hearing, and
reply papers must be filed at least five days before the court hearing.

      13 Further, courts distinguish types of remedies sought from “claims for
relief.” For example, in PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs,
Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 398, the court
observed, “A constructive trust . . . is an equitable remedy, not a substantive
claim for relief.”

                                        28
      “[A] trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed
papers.” (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262.) Moreover, “[t]he general rule of motion
practice . . . is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.” (Jay v.
Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537, 1538 [no abuse of discretion in
the trial court declining to consider evidence submitted with a reply].)
      Here, after the time to file papers on the motion to compel had passed,
plaintiffs sought to file supplemental papers three days before the hearing
and Ring sought to file supplemental papers on the day of the hearing. At
the hearing, the trial court stated that “both sides seem to be under the
impression that once a matter is fully briefed, you can just keep filing
papers,” noting it “was just handed . . . additional papers a few minutes ago.”
The court then denied both parties’ requests. We see no abuse of discretion.
      Ring’s reliance on Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical
Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047 is misplaced. There, the Court of Appeal
held the moving parties’ supplemental declaration filed in support of their
motion to compel arbitration need not comply with the time limit for initial
moving papers where the moving parties already met their initial burden of
establishing an agreement to arbitrate in their moving papers. (Id. at pp.
1051–1052, 1060.) But the supplemental declaration in that case was filed
before the plaintiff filed his opposition. (Id. at p. 1054.) Nothing in Espejo
suggests it would be an abuse of discretion for a trial court to decline to
consider papers filed after the deadline for filing a reply.
      2.    Declining to Consider Ring’s Motion for Reconsideration
      Next, Ring argues the trial court was incorrect in determining that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider Ring’s motion for reconsideration once Ring
filed its notice of appeal of the underlying order.

                                        29
      Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a) (section 916(a)),
provides (with exceptions not relevant here), “the perfecting of an appeal
stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from
or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including
enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon
any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or
order.”
      Ring appears to suggest that section 916(a) does not apply to appeals
from orders denying motions to compel arbitration, but it does not explain
why this might be so. Then Ring cites Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v.
Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180 (Varian), in which the California Supreme
Court recognized section 916(a) does apply to appeals from denials of motions
to compel arbitration. The Varian court explained: “[A] proceeding affects the
effectiveness of the appeal if the very purpose of the appeal is to avoid the
need for that proceeding. In that situation, the proceeding itself is inherently
inconsistent with a possible outcome on appeal and must therefore be stayed
under section 916, subdivision (a). Thus, an appeal from the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration automatically stays all further trial court
proceedings on the merits.” (Varian, at pp. 190–191, italics added.)
      The stay under section 916(a) applies to any “trial court proceeding
[that] directly or indirectly seek to ‘enforce, vacate or modify [the] appealed
judgment or order.’ ” (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 189.) The trial court
correctly found it lacked jurisdiction to decide Ring’s motion for
reconsideration because the motion sought to vacate and modify the order
being appealed. (See Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 35, 53 [“the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

                                       30
continue to entertain the [appellant’s] reconsideration motion, as of the time
that the [appellant] filed its appeal”].)
F.    Which Version of the Arbitration Provision Governs
      Finally, Ring urges this court to “conclude that the December 2020
Terms control this dispute.” Ring misapprehends our role. “An ‘ “essential
distinction” ’ between trial courts and appellate courts is that ‘ “it is the
province of the trial court to decide questions of fact and of the appellate
court to decide questions of law. . . .” ’ (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396,
405.) Appellate courts do not make factual findings; we review ‘ “the
correctness of a judgment [or order] as of the time of its rendition.” ’ ” (People
v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 892.)
      To the extent Ring’s argument is that the trial court erred—and was
required as a matter of law to find that the December 2020 version of the
arbitration provision (Exhibit K) applies to plaintiffs’ claims—we reject this
argument. In its moving papers, Ring did not identify which of 10 versions of
its terms of service it believed governed, and, when it quoted the arbitration
provision, Ring cited Exhibits C and G and never specifically cited Exhibit K.
Ring first asserted Exhibit K should control in its reply papers. A trial court
has discretion whether “to accept arguments or evidence made for the first
time in reply.” (Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1009.) Thus, it
was within the trial court’s discretion to reject Ring’s new argument that
Exhibit K controlled. We find no error.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.

                                        31
                                         _________________________
                                         Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Markman, J. *

A165103, A165386, Jack v. Ring

     *Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                    32
Court: San Francisco County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Ethan P. Schulman

Davis Wright Tremaine, Scott R. Commerson, Rochelle L. Wilcox, James H.
Moon, Daniel H. Leigh, for Defendant and Appellant

Hattis & Lukacs, Daniel M. Hattis, Paul Karl Lukacs; DeNittis Osefchen
Prince, Stephen DeNittis, Shane T. Prince, for Plaintiff and Respondent

A165103, A165386, Jack v. Ring

                                    33