Court Opinion

ID: 9397633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 19:06:31.574098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:26.443468
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12415    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/25/2023   Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12415
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       SAVANNAH SYMONE DUNCAN,

                                                  Defendant- Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cr-00046-TPB-KCD-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12415     Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/25/2023    Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court               22-12415

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Savannah Duncan appeals her total sentence of 24 months’
       imprisonment, imposed after she pled guilty to 3 counts of passing
       counterfeit currency. On appeal, Duncan argues that the govern-
       ment breached the plea agreement by failing to recommend a two-
       level reduction for an acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.
       § 3E1.1(a).
              We review de novo whether the government breached the
       plea agreement. United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1269
       (11th Cir. 2008). We have stated that a plea agreement “is, in es-
       sence, a contract between the Government and a criminal defend-
       ant.” United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 1999).
       A plea agreement must be construed considering the fact that it
       constitutes a waiver of substantial constitutional rights requiring
       that the defendant be adequately warned of the consequences of
       the plea. United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir.
       1990). When a defendant enters into a plea agreement significantly
       based on a promise or agreement from the government to a point
       where that promise or agreement can be said to have induced the
       defendant to plead guilty, the government must fulfill that prom-
       ise. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
             In determining whether the government has breached a plea
       agreement, we must determine the scope of the government’s
USCA11 Case: 22-12415      Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/25/2023     Page: 3 of 4

       22-12415               Opinion of the Court                         3

       promises. United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir.
       2004). To determine the scope of the government’s promises, the
       question is whether the government’s conduct was inconsistent
       with the defendant’s reasonable understanding when she entered
       her guilty plea. United States v. Sosa, 782 F.3d 630, 637 (11th Cir.
       2015). We apply an objective standard to decide whether the gov-
       ernment’s actions were inconsistent with the defendant’s under-
       standing of the plea agreement, rather than reading the agreement
       in a “hyper-technical or rigidly literal manner.” United States v.
       Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks
       omitted).
               In Hunter, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to all four
       charges in exchange for the government’s recommendation at sen-
       tencing for a reduction in his offense level for acceptance of respon-
       sibility. Id. at 1322-23. The government refused to make the rec-
       ommendation and argued against the reduction at sentencing, ar-
       guing on appeal that it was excused from making the recommen-
       dation because the defendant had provided not credible testimony
       before the negotiation of the plea agreement. Id. at 1323-26. We
       held that the government could not avoid the recommendation
       based on facts of which it was aware prior to the plea agreement
       because “[s]uch a practice would render the government’s promise
       to recommend the reduction illusory.” Id. at 1326. We explained
       that, because the plea agreement constituted a contract between
       the parties, if the government knew of facts that would allow it to
       avoid making the recommendation at the time that it offered the
USCA11 Case: 22-12415     Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/25/2023    Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court               22-12415

       plea agreement, the agreement “would fail from the outset due to
       a lack of valid consideration.” Id. We determined that this refusal
       constituted a significant and deliberate breach of the plea agree-
       ment and vacated and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 1328,
       1330.
              Section 3E1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines states that, if
       “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility”
       for the offense, the defendant’s offense level is decreased by two
       levels. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) (2018). The commentary states that ap-
       propriate considerations for determining whether a defendant
       qualifies under § 3E1.1(a) include truthfully admitting the conduct
       comprising the offenses of conviction and voluntarily terminating
       or withdrawing from criminal conduct. Id. § 3E1.1, comment.
       (n.1).
              Here, the government did not breach the plea agreement by
       not recommending that Duncan receive a two-level reduction un-
       der U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) because, after executing the plea agree-
       ment, it learned that Duncan had committed similar offenses while
       on bond. The plea agreement expressly provided that the govern-
       ment would only make such a recommendation if it did not learn
       of adverse information suggesting that the recommendation was
       not warranted, and when it learned of Duncan’s subsequent of-
       fenses, the government was released from its obligation to make
       the recommendation.
             AFFIRMED.