Court Opinion

ID: 9570908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:27:28.887341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:10.794876
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
concurring in Division 4 and the judgment.
1. The "Campaign Financing Disclosure Act” states in its title that its purpose is "to provide procedures for public disclosure of contributions and expenditures made in connection with campaigns for certain State offices . . .” As constitutionally interpreted under its title, it includes "the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Comptroller General, Commissioner of Agriculture, State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Labor and Public Service Commission, and members of the Georgia House of Representatives and Georgia Senate .. .’’All are offices of the Executive and Legislative branches of the State Government filled by public election. The appellee contends that the Act violates the equal protection clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions in that it excludes other state officers — judges and district attorneys. These excluded offices are found in Article VI (Judiciary) of the Georgia Constitution of 1945. Is this constitutionally impermissible classification? In my opinion it is not.
Under the equal protection clause, typically a "two-tier” analysis of a statute is given. We should ask whether a "suspect” classification is made, or whether a "fundamental” right is infringed. If our answer is yes to either, strict judicial scrutiny is appropriate. If not, the familiar "rational relationship” test is applied. In considering this campaign disclosure law, the *489fundamental rights of free speech and the vote must not be confused with the actual claims presented here: the asserted right of the citizen to make a non-disclosed political contribution, and the asserted right of the candidate not to disclose the source of his campaign funding. A classification which distinguishes between the judicial and the other branches of government is not "suspect”; the "rights” with reference to campaign contributions are not "fundamental” rights expressly protected by our or the Federal Constitution. See generally, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1087-1132.
Our test is therefore whether there is a rational relation between the classification made and the object of the legislation. See, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (93 SC 1278, 36 LE2d 16). Though perhaps a more thorough judicial analysis of legislative ends and means is signalled by the recent cases of United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (93 SC 2821, 37 LE2d 782) (eligibility for food stamps); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (92 SC 1400, 31 LE2d 768) (rights of illegitimate children under workmen’s compensation law); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (92 SC 1029, 31 LE2d 349) (availability of contraceptives); and Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (92 SC 251, 30 LE2d 225) (preference of male sex for administrator of decedent’s estate); still we do not apply the test of strict judicial scrutiny to these less stringently protected rights. See, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 57, 105-133.
Chief Justice Cardozo told us that "Legislation is not void because it hits the evil that is uppermost. Equally it is not void because it hits the evil that is nearest.” People v. Teuscher, 248 N. Y. 454, 460 (162 NE 484). The legislature is free to discern, or to think that it discerns, a greater need to protect the integrity of the democratic process in public elections of state officers in the legislative and executive branches of government than those within the judiciary. It may move to attack a harm where it is perceived, without any necessity for moving against it on other fronts where it may also be found. See, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (81 SC 1101, 6 LE2d *490393). Cf., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 489 (75 SC 461, 99 LE 563); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 151 (58 SC 778, 82 LE 1234); James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 125 (47 SC 308, 71 LE 569).
There could be no more reasonable classification than to distinguish the judicial branch of government from the executive and legislative branches. The separation of these three branches was one of the bedrocks upon which the Federal Constitution was built. As Chief Justice Marshall said, "the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law.” Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (23 U. S.) 1, 46 (6 LE 253). Our state Constitution places each branch in a separate Article. The judicial oath of office is different, requiring judicial officers to swear that they will "impartially” perform their duties of office. See Code §§ 24-2605 and 24-4004. No such requirement is found in the oath for officers of the other two branches. See Code Ann. § 2-3009. The reason for this is obvious. The members of the legislative and executive branches of government are expected to reflect the political views of a party and a constituency. A judge should not. Neither should he reflect the constantly changing majority view of public opinion at any given moment. His task is the impartial administration of the law.
This classification was recently asserted by both the legislature and the people of Georgia in 1972 by the enactment of a constitutional amendment creating the Judicial Qualifications Commission. Ga. L. 1972, p. 1364. The commission, composed of citizens, lawyers and judges, has authority to investigate complaints by any citizen about any court or any judge or justice in Georgia. Its power of investigation includes "wilful misconduct in office, or wilful persistent failure to perform his duties, or habitual intemperance; or for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute. ” (Emphasis supplied.) After investigations and hearings, a judge or justice of any court of the state can be removed from office or otherwise disciplined in accordance with prescribed procedures. This constitutional amendment relates solely to the *491judicial branch of government and seeks "to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.” Report of the Governor’s Commission on Judicial Processes, p. 1 (1971).
In keeping with the mandate of the constitutional enactment, this Court on December 17, 1973, adopted a "Judicial Code of Conduct” for the judicial branch of government. Canon 7 specifically regulates the conduct of candidates in an election, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office. A candidate may not "make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of duties of his office, [nor] announce his views on disputed legal or political issues . . .” The handling of campaign funds is provided for in the Canon.1
Finally, it is common knowledge that in the past fifty years contested judicial elections are the exception, not the rule. It is also common knowledge that campaign contributions in these few races are usually de minimis.
Considering the office of District Attorney, it is not per se a judicial office, but the people of Georgia as well as the legislature have seen fit to treat it as part of the judicial branch of government. The Constitution of 1945 places the office in the judicial branch (Article VI) along with the judges and justices. The oath of the office of *492district attorney is similar to the judicial oath in that it requires that they will "impartially” perform their duties of office. Code § 24-2902. The legislature has historically seen fit to include them with all other judicial offices in Title 24 (Courts) of the Code of Georgia while all of the state offices covered in the "Campaign Financing Disclosure Act” are found in Title 40 (Executive Department) or Title 47 (General Assembly). It is also common knowledge that contested elections for the office of district attorney are similar to judicial elections in that they are the exception rather than the rule.
In summary, it cannot be said that the legislature has made an invidious classification having no rational relation to the object of the legislation. We must not forget that "the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief.” Williams v. Mayor &c. of Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36, 46 (53 SC 431, 77 LE 1015).
2. Having found that the provisions concerning county and municipal officers and the Ethics Commission are unconstitutional for the reason that these matters are "different from what is expressed in the Title” of the Act, we must answer the question whether the general legislative scheme may be preserved or whether it has been destroyed. Bennett v. Wheatley, 154 Ga. 591, 594 (115 SE 83). The answer is found in the opening words of the Act’s Title, "An Act to provide procedures for public disclosure of contributions and expenditures made in connection with campaigns for certain state offices . . .” It is disclosure which is sought. That is the general legislative scheme and as such it remains intact. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s wisdom on the reading of statutes, we have not picked plums from a pudding; we have pulled threads from a pattern.
It must be conceded that the Act does not read like the close mesh syntax of the "Epistles” of Saint Paul; however, the same criticism can be leveled at judicial opinions in the state and federal courts. Legislators, like judges, are fallible human beings subjected to the pressures of conflicting viewpoints and the race against time. "We do not pause to consider whether a statute differently conceived and framed would yield results *493more consonant with fairness and reason. We take this statute as we find it.” Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U. S. 20, 27 (53 SC 417, 77 LE 1004).
Both this court and the Supreme Court of the United States have stated that the starting point for determining legislative purpose is plainly an appreciation of the "mischief’ that the legislature was seeking to alleviate. Henderson v. Alexander, 2 Ga. 81, 85; I. C. C. v. J. T. Transport Co., 368 U. S. 81, 107 (82 SC 204, 7 LE2d 147). "Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what the judge must seek and effectuate, and he ought not be led off the trail by tests that have overtones of subjective design.” Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. R. 527, 538-539.
One would have to be deaf not to have heard the clamor throughout our state and nation both for and against proposed election reforms including the reporting and disclosure of campaign contributions. This involves matters of public policy which present conflicts of values and clashing political views. As Cardozo said many years ago, "Within the field where men of reason differ, the legislature must have its way.” Williams v. Baltimore, supra, 289 U. S., p. 42.
In the long run the people of our state and nation could hardly be expected to be more tolerant of judicial condemnation-of reasonable efforts by state legislatures to protect the integrity of the elective process than they were some decades ago of federal court nullification of state legislative efforts to advance their economic welfare or protect the security of their lives and property. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 74 (25 SC 539, 49 LE 937) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally, Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 23-26. Absent a debilitating constitutional flaw in this Act, this court must try as best it can to effectuate the common will expressed in the underlying purpose of the legislature. To go beyond this *494is to usurp a power which our constitutions have lodged in our elected legislature. See, Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 109; Wechsler, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1.2 The heart of this legislation can be, and therefore must be, preserved.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Grice and Justice Ingram concur in this opinion.

 "A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public election between competing candidates should not himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public support from lawyers. A candidate’s committees may solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than six (6) months before a primary election and no later than the date of the last election in which he participates during the election year. A candidate should not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of himself or members of his family.”

 "The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before them to review the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions, even though the action involves value choices, as invariably action does. In doing so, however, they are bound to function otherwise than as a naked power organ; they participate as courts of law. This calls for facing how determinations of this kind can be asserted to have any legal quality. The answer, I suggest, inheres primarily in that they are — or are obliged to be — entirely principled. A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved. When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches of the Government or of a state, those choices must, of course, survive. Otherwise, as Holmes said in his first opinion for the Court, 'a constitution, instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities, would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions . . .’ ” 73 Harv. L. Rev. 19.