Court Opinion

ID: 9915916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 23:02:44.407241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:37.161905
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/8/24

                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                 DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,             A165406

 v.                                            (Del Norte County
 GARY MARCUS HALL,                             Super. Ct. No. CRF219022)
         Defendant and Appellant.
                                             ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
                                             AND DENYING REHEARING

                                             [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

BY THE COURT: *
       It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on December 13, 2023, be
modified as follows:
       1. On page 9, after the last full paragraph ending “sentencing factors
           in aggravation,” add as footnote 4 the following footnote, which will
           require the renumbering of all subsequent footnotes:
       4 In his petition for rehearing, defendant urges that we misperceived

       his argument as one based solely on the recent amendments to section
       1170, subdivision (b)(1) and his argument was, in fact, based on a “line
       of California cases” like People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735 and
       therefore Pantaleon is inapposite. In Mancebo, our high court
       reiterated that “a defendant has a cognizable due process right to fair
       notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be

       * Margulies, J. (retired) did not participate in the consideration of the

rehearing petition.

                                         1
invoked to increase punishment for his crimes.” (Id. at p. 747, italics
added.) As the court in Pantaleon explained, there is a long-recognized
distinction between sentencing enhancements and aggravating factors.
(Pantaleon, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 939, 941.) The Court of
Appeal therefore rejected the defendant’s “constitutional theory of
error” that he had not only a statutory right to pleading notice of
aggravating factors, but also a “fair notice” due process right to
pleading notice of factors in aggravation. (Id. at p. 941.) Indeed, the
court observed the “defendant’s constitutional theory of error [was]
foreclosed by binding authority.” (Ibid., citing In re Varnell (2003)
30 Cal.4th 1132, 1135, 1141–1142.) Defendant asserts Pantaleon
confined its analysis to aggravating factors not required to be tried by a
jury, namely prior convictions of increasing seriousness and crimes
committed while the defendant was on probation. (Pantaleon, at
p. 938.) We fail to see how this is relevant to an argument that due
process requires the pleading of factors in aggravation, and as we shall
discuss, here, too, one of the factors in aggravation was defendant’s
prior criminal history. In sum, in the absence of any case holding that
constitutional due process requires that factors in aggravation be pled,
we shall follow established precedent to the contrary.

2. On page 24, delete the second full paragraph beginning “In his
   closing brief, defendant argues,” and replace it with the following
   paragraph and new footnote 12, which will require the renumbering
   of all subsequent footnotes:

       In his closing brief, defendant argues for the first time that Black
   II “is not good law as applied to amended section 1170.”12 He claims
   that under the amended law, a single aggravating factor is “no
   longer legally sufficient to make a defendant eligible for the upper
   term,” (some capitalization & boldface omitted) as was the law when
   Apprendi and Black II were decided, and he points to the split in the
   Courts of Appeal as to the applicable standard for determining
   “harmlessness with regard to SB 567 error.”
      12 We note that in his opening brief, defendant twice cited
   affirmatively to Black II in discussing the history and import of
   Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 270, with no hint Black II’s holding is
   no longer good law.

                                  2
      3. On page 25, the first sentence of the first full paragraph is modified
            to read:

                  Defendant cites no case holding that one factor in aggravation
                  is never sufficient to impose an upper term, even in a case like
                  this one where the court found no factors in mitigation.

There is no change in the judgment.

The petition for rehearing is denied.

Dated:                           ________________________________
                                       Banke, Acting P. J.*

* Justice Margulies did not participate in the consideration of the rehearing
petition.

                                          3
Filed 12/13/23
                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                              A165406
 v.
 GARY MARCUS HALL,                            (Del Norte County
                                              Super. Ct. No. CRF219022)
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                       I. INTRODUCTION

       In this case we consider a negotiated disposition entered into after the
effective date of the recent amendments to Penal Code section 1170, 1
subdivision (b) made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 567), and the sentence passed in accordance therewith. Defendant Gary
Marcus Hall pleaded no contest to two counts of committing lewd or
lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a)).
Consistent with the negotiated disposition, the trial court sentenced him to
10 years in prison, which included the upper term on one of the two counts.
       Defendant challenges his sentence on three grounds—(1) the court (and
the parties) mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for
probation; (2) the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded;
and (3) the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his

       1All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

                                          1
personal waiver in open court of his right to jury trial on the facts supporting
such factors. As to the latter ground, defendant advances only a Sixth
Amendment challenge and has expressly disavowed any challenge on the
basis of the recent amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b).
      In addressing his arguments we consider, among other issues, the
following: the distinction drawn by our Supreme Court between a
constitutionally sufficient general jury trial waiver and the sufficiency of a
waiver of statutory jury trial rights; forfeiture of the “certified record”
evidentiary requirement imposed by the recent amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b) by failing to object to use of the probation report to establish
defendant’s prior convictions; whether one prior conviction can, in this
particular case, constitute a factor in aggravation under California Rules of
Court rule 4.421(b)(2); and whether People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799
(Black II) remains controlling as to whether an aggravated sentence comports
with the Sixth Amendment when one aggravating factor has been found in a
constitutionally permissible manner and the trial court has found no factors
in mitigation.
      We conclude the judgment should be affirmed.

                                 I. BACKGROUND2
      Defendant, a registered sex offender, was friends, and resided, with the
two victims’ grandfather. The victims were under the age of 14 at the time of
the molestations. One recalled approximately 20 incidents of abuse,
including instances of defendant fondling his penis, masturbating him, and
orally copulating him. The last incident occurred when he was 12 or 13 years

      2 Our brief factual summary is based in part on the transcript of the
preliminary hearing, which the parties stipulated provided a factual basis for
defendant’s plea.

                                         2
old. The other victim recalled four instances where defendant molested him
when he was under or around 10 years old. Defendant variously sodomized
him, laid in bed with him and pulled down his underwear, and grabbed his
penis over his clothes.
      In 2021, the People charged defendant with sodomy of a child 10 years
old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)); two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a
child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)); and failure to register as a sex offender (§ 290.018).
The continuous sexual abuse counts included an enhancement allegation of a
prior conviction of section 288 (§ 667.51, subd. (a)). Defendant faced a
potential sentence of 25 years to life on the sodomy count, 16 years each on
the continuous abuse counts plus five years each for the related
enhancements, and one year on the failure to register count—in sum, 68
years to life.
      At the preliminary hearing, the trial court admitted evidence of a 1995
misdemeanor conviction for violation of section 288, subdivision (c)—lewd or
lascivious acts on a child 14 or 15 years old—which required defendant to
register as a sex offender.
      In February 2022, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the People filed
an amended information, adding two felony counts of committing lewd acts
upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a))—one count for each
victim— to which defendant pleaded no contest. As summarized on the
change of plea form, the disposition provided that the trial court “could grant
probation with time in jail all the way up to 10 years in prison (base term
plus 1/3 the middle term for the 2nd count if ran [sic] consecutive).”
Defendant initialed the provision of the form that stated, “I understand that I
am not eligible for probation in this case. Presumptively ineligible.”

                                         3
      Defendant also initialed the provision of the change of plea form
stating, “I understand the Court will not decide whether to accept a plea or
sentence bargain or to impose sentence or extend probation: until a Probation
Officer makes an investigation and reports on my background, prior record (if
any) and the circumstances of the case.”
      He additionally initialed the provisions of the form waiving his rights,
to among other things, a jury trial. These provisions stated, in pertinent
part, “10. I understand that, as to each charge I plead to and each special
allegation and/or sentence enhancement I admit to be true, I have the
following rights: [¶] . . . [¶] b. A speedy and public trial by jury. c.
Representation by an attorney at all times. d. See, hear, and question all
witnesses who testify against me. [¶] . . . [¶] 11. I understand that by this
plea and any admissions I am making, I give up all the rights which are
listed above except the continuing right to be represented by an attorney.”
      At the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor summarized the plea
agreement as follows: “A plea of no contest to Count 5 and a plea of no contest
to Count 6. All sentencing options would be open to the Court. The Court
could consider all aggravating factors. That’s the stipulation under
1170(b)”—a maximum potential exposure of 10 years. Defense counsel
agreed. Defendant, himself, also stated that was his understanding of the
negotiated disposition.
      Prior to accepting defendant’s no contest pleas, the court reviewed the
plea form with him, and defendant personally confirmed that he read and
understood it and had given up all the rights as stated therein, including his
“right to have a jury trial.” Counsel then stipulated that the preliminary
hearing transcript could be used as a factual basis for the plea, with defense
counsel stating defendant was “not admitting guilt in any way.” The

                                          4
prosecutor also asked that the record specifically reflect “the parties’
stipulation under Penal Code section 1170(b)(2) as to what the Court can
consider at sentencing,” and specifically “all aggravating factors” “in
[California Rules of Court] [r]ule 4.421.” 3 Defense counsel concurred. The
trial court then specifically asked defendant whether he had heard the
recited terms of the disposition, including that the “Court could consider all
aggravating factors,” and defendant confirmed that he had and these were,
indeed, the terms of the proposed disposition. The trial court then proceeded
to admonish defendant that the disposition included his giving up rights,
including the right to jury trial, and defendant expressly stated, “Yes,” he
was giving up that right.
      At the sentencing hearing, counsel confirmed the stipulation that the
trial court would consider all sentencing factors, both mitigating and
aggravating. Defense counsel agreed there was a “[s]tip to all aggravating
factors for the Court to be considered,” so “[t]he options open to the Court are
probation with jail time all the way up to the ten years. And that would be
the eight years with one-third the middle term of two if the Court decided to
run it consecutive.”
      Victim statements were given by a close friend of the victims’
grandmother, who had known the victims all their lives, and one of the
victims appeared.
      The prosecution urged the court to impose the upper term, pointing out
“[i]t only takes one factor [in aggravation] under the case law to—for the
Court to do an aggravated sentence.” He then urged the court to find

      3   All further references to the “rules” are to the California Rules of
Court.

                                         5
applicable all the factors in aggravation recommended in the probation
report, as well as several additional aggravating factors. The probation
officer emphasized the “long-term emotional, mental, and psychological
ramifications” for the victims.
      At the conclusion of the prosecution’s presentation, defendant spoke,
stating “The kids are lying. I have said that from the beginning, and I still
say it. . . . [T]heir behavior isn’t from anything I have done. They have been
rotten behavior from the get-go. . . . [¶] . . . They didn’t like the way I
disciplined. . . . [¶] It’s not me that didn’t show remorse. I didn’t do it. . . .”
Defense counsel agreed her client had maintained he was innocent from “day
one,” and acknowledged “he is angry; he is upset.” She also acknowledged
that his prior section 288 conviction “made this a very difficult case,” and
stated the only reason he agreed to a negotiated disposition was to avoid the
risk of a potential life sentence. Counsel asked the court to consider a
midterm and not impose consecutive sentences; “[a]gain, my client is
adamant that he’s been falsely accused.”
      The probation officer then provided further testimony, stating when he
asked defendant about his prior section 288 conviction, he said that case “was
all lies, and he was railroaded in that case.” “[F]or some reason the young
men in this case as well as the counselors in that [prior case] were out to get
him for some reason.”
      The court found defendant ineligible for probation and further found no
mitigating factors and seven aggravating factors set forth in rule 4.421.
Commenting that the aggravating circumstances “far, far outweigh” the
circumstances in mitigation, the court sentenced defendant to a 10-year
prison term, comprised of the upper term of eight years for count 5 and two

                                          6
years (one-third of the six-year middle term) for count 6. The remaining
counts were dismissed.
                                III. DISCUSSION
A. Ineligibility for Probation
      Defendant first contends the trial court (and counsel) erred in
assuming he was presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203,
subdivision (e)(5), as stated in the sentencing report. Defendant points out
section 1203, subdivision (e)(5) provides such a presumption only where there
has been a prior conviction of section 288 as a felony, and he was convicted of
violating section 288 as a misdemeanor.
      While defendant is correct that his misdemeanor conviction did not give
rise to a presumption of ineligibility for probation, he made no objection at
the time of sentencing to the court’s invocation of such presumption and has
therefore waived the issue on appeal. (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 353.) Recognizing this was likely the case, defendant alternatively
advances a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
      The standard of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is
well established. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687.) However, “a court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” (Id. at p. 697.) Indeed, it is
often easier to dispose of such a claim based on lack of sufficient prejudice
alone. (Ibid.) To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the

                                        7
petitioner must carry his burden of proving prejudice as a ‘demonstrable
reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of
counsel.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937, quoting People v.
Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 661.)
      We agree with the Attorney General that defendant cannot show
prejudice attributable to the asserted ineffectiveness of counsel. “The
standard for analyzing prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
mirrors the state standard for prejudicial error. (Richardson v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050–1051. . . .) That is, ‘a “miscarriage of
justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.’ (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836. . . .)” (People v. Lepere (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 727, 738.)
      There is no reasonable probability a result more favorable to defendant
would have ensued had counsel urged that defendant was fully eligible,
rather than presumptively ineligible, for probation. First, defendant was, in
fact, wholly ineligible, not merely presumptively ineligible, for probation
pursuant to section 1203.66, subdivision (a)(5) and (7). These provisions
state, “Notwithstanding Section 1203 or any other law, probation shall not be
granted to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (5) A person who is convicted of committing a
violation of Section 288 or 288.5 and who has been previously convicted of a
violation of Section 261, 264.1, 266, 266c, 267, 285, 286, 287, 288, 288.5, or
289, or former Section 262 or 288a . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [or] (7) A person who is
convicted of committing a violation of Section 288 or 288.5 against more than
one victim.” (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(5), (7).) Second, even if defendant was
fully eligible for probation, there is no reasonable probability the court would

                                         8
have granted probation, given the court’s statements at the sentencing
hearing and its imposition of the maximum allowable sentence under the
terms of the plea agreement.
B. “Pleading” Aggravating Factors
      Defendant contends the recent amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(1) made by Senate Bill 567 require the prosecution to “plead”
any aggravating factors it intends to urge at sentencing. After defendant
filed his opening brief, the Court of Appeal in People v. Pantaleon (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 932, 939–941 (Pantaleon) addressed and rejected this same
contention. We agree with the analysis in Pantaleon, which points out there
is a significant distinction between “enhancements,” which section 1170.1,
subdivision (e) requires “shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading” and
“ ‘circumstances in aggravation’ ” addressed by section 1170, subdivision (b),
which does not contain a like mandate. (Pantaleon, at pp. 939–940; see
Zepeda v. Superior Court (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 65, 96–97 (Zepeda) [amended
statute does not require prosecutor to present evidence supporting
aggravating factors at preliminary hearing].)
      In short, as Pantaleon holds, defendant’s sentence was not
constitutionally or statutorily infirm due to failure to allege sentencing
factors in aggravation.
C. Right to Jury Trial on Aggravating Factors
      In sentencing defendant to the upper term of eight years on one of the
section 288, subdivision (a) convictions, the trial court identified seven of the
aggravating factors enumerated in rule 4.421. 4 Five of these were crime-

      4 Section 1170, subdivision (a)(3) specifies that “[i]n sentencing the
convicted person, the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council.”

                                        9
based: the crime involved acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness,
or callousness (rule 4.421(a)(1)); the victims were particularly vulnerable (id.,
(a)(3)); defendant threatened one of the witnesses (id., (a)(6)); the manner in
which the crime was carried out indicated planning, sophistication or
professionalism (id., (a)(8)); and defendant took advantage of a position or
trust or confidence (id., (a)(11)). Two of the aggravating factors related to
defendant personally: he engaged in violent conduct that indicated a serious
danger to society (id., (b)(1)); and his prior convictions were numerous or of
increasing seriousness (id., (b)(2)).
      Defendant’s principal claim on appeal is that the aggravated term
imposed by the court is unlawful because he did not, himself and in open
court, waive his constitutional right to jury trial on the facts underlying the
aggravated factors, as required by Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.
270 (Cunningham) and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 (Blakely). 5
(See generally Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 816; Couzens et al.,
Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 10:1 et seq.)
      Federal constitutional precedent establishes that “ ‘[o]ther than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Apprendi [v. New Jersey (2000)] 530 U.S. [466,]
490 . . . [(Apprendi)].)” (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 814.) The “relevant
‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after

      5 At oral argument, counsel reiterated that defendant is advancing
only a constitutional claim under the Sixth Amendment and is not
challenging his aggravated sentence under section 1170, as amended by
Senate Bill 567.

                                        10
finding additional facts, but the maximum [the judge] may impose without
any additional findings.” (Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 303–304.)
      There are two exceptions to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial on aggravating facts—facts admitted by the defendant and the fact
of a prior conviction. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 836–837
(Sandoval), citing Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 301, 303; Apprendi, supra,
530 U.S. at p. 490; see People v. Wiley (2023) __ Cal.App.5th __, 2023 WL
8252049, at p. *3 (Wiley) [“ ‘aggravating circumstances based on a defendant’s
criminal history that render the defendant eligible for the upper term include
a trial court’s finding that the defendant suffered a prior conviction,” citing
Black II].) Otherwise, the defendant must waive his Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial in order for the trial court to find aggravating circumstances that
increase the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum. (See
Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 816; People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36,
47–48 (French).)
      Applying the principles established in Apprendi and its progeny, our
Supreme Court ruled in Black II that “imposition of the upper term does not
infringe upon the defendant’s constitutional right to jury trial so long as one
legally sufficient aggravating circumstance has been found to exist by the
jury, has been admitted by the defendant, or is justified based upon the
defendant’s record of prior convictions.” (Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 816.) The court explained that “so long as a defendant is eligible for the
upper term by virtue of facts that have been established consistently with
Sixth Amendment principles, the federal Constitution permits the trial court
to rely upon any number of aggravating circumstances in exercising its
discretion to select the appropriate term by balancing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, regardless of whether the facts underlying those

                                       11
circumstances have been found to be true by a jury.” (Black II, at p. 813.)
“ ‘Judicial factfinding in the course of selecting a sentence within the
authorized range does not implicate the indictment, jury-trial, and
reasonable-doubt components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.’ (Harris v.
United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 558. . . .) Facts considered by trial courts
in exercising their discretion within the statutory range of punishment
authorized for a crime ‘have been the traditional domain of judges; they have
not been alleged in the indictment or proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is no reason to believe that those who framed the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments would have thought of them as the elements of the crime.’ (Id.
at p. 560; see Rita v. United States, supra, 551 U.S. at p. –––– . . . [the ‘Sixth
Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take
account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the
sentence in consequence’].)” (Black II, at p. 813.)
      Black II remains our high court’s most recent pronouncement on
whether an upper term sentence imposed on the basis of at least one
permissibly established aggravating factor passes muster under the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial. (See Sandoval, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 839
[holding, where no aggravating factors were found on a basis permissible
under Blakely and thus there was a Sixth Amendment violation, that “if a
reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, unquestionably would have found
true at least a single aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the
jury, the Sixth Amendment error properly may be found harmless”]; cf. Wiley,
supra, __ Cal.App.5th at p. ___, 2023 WL 8252049 at p.*3 [rejecting
defendant’s suggestion that Black II has been undercut by subsequent

                                        12
decisions; “we find no basis to ignore Black or Towne . . .[,] decisions from our
state’s high court that address the precise [recidivist] issue presented here”].)
      1. General Jury Trial Waiver
      The Attorney General points out defendant stipulated that the
preliminary hearing transcript provided a factual basis for his plea and
further stipulated that the court would consider factors in aggravation in
accordance with rule 4.421 and urges that these stipulations sufficed to waive
defendant’s constitutional right to jury trial on facts in aggravation.
      As to the Attorney General’s first point—that counsel’s stipulation to
the preliminary hearing transcript as a factual basis for the plea constituted
a sufficient waiver of defendant’s constitutional right to jury trial—the
analysis is straightforward. Case authority squarely holds it does not. (See
French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 46–47, 51 [“defense counsel’s stipulation to
the factual basis cannot reasonably be construed as an admission by the
defendant sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirements
established in Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. 270,” (fn. omitted)].)
      However, as to the Attorney General’s second point—that counsel’s
stipulation that “under Penal Code section 1170(b)(2)” the court would
“consider at sentencing” “all aggravating factors” “in Rule 4.421” constituted
a sufficient waiver of defendant’s right to jury trial—the analysis is more
complex.
      As we have recited, in his change of plea form defendant expressly
waived his right to jury trial not only as to each charge but also to any
“special allegation and/or sentence enhancement I admit to be true.” And in
open court he expressly confirmed that the terms of the disposition included
that the court would consider all aggravating factors set forth in rule 4.421,

                                       13
and after that confirmation, he went on to expressly confirm he was giving up
various rights, including, specifically, his right to jury trial.
      As our Supreme Court has explained, there is a distinction between
what is constitutionally required for a valid jury waiver and what may be
statutorily required under state law. (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th
151, 171 (Sivongxxay). In Sivongxxay, the defendant claimed his jury trial
waiver did not encompass a waiver of his right to jury trial on a special
circumstance allegation. (Ibid.) The court rejected his claim, stating
“[d]efendant demands more than the federal and state Constitutions require
for a valid waiver of the jury trial right. As discussed, a knowing and
intelligent jury waiver requires an appreciation of the nature of the jury trial
right and the consequences of forgoing this right. [Citation.] There is no
additional constitutional requirement that a defendant be specifically advised
of the specific charges, enhancements, allegations, or other issues to which a
general jury waiver will apply. On the contrary, with a comprehensive jury
waiver such as the one entered below, absent unusual circumstances not
present here ‘ “[i]t is settled that where a defendant waives a jury trial he is
deemed to have consented to a trial of all of the issues in the case before the
court sitting without a jury.” ’ (People v. Berutko (1969) 71 Cal.2d 84, 94 . . . ,
quoting People v. Russell (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 529, 532. . . .)” (Id., at
pp. 171, 173, italics omitted.)
      The majority reiterated the point in responding to the dissent’s
conclusion to the contrary, stating “The dissenting justices apparently read
the trial judge’s advisements differently, perceiving the failure to expressly
refer to the special circumstance allegation as somehow implicitly excluding
that allegation from a counseled and otherwise comprehensive jury waiver.
(See conc. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 203–206; conc. & dis. opn. of

                                         14
Cuéllar, J., post, at pp. 218–219.) We respectfully disagree with this
interpretation of the colloquy, for the reasons we have previously given. The
dissenting justices’ position boils down to the proposition that the judge was
constitutionally bound to utter the phrase ‘special circumstance’ at some
point in the waiver colloquy with defendant, even if the judge never went on
to explain what this phrase meant. But our waiver jurisprudence rejects the
notion that a knowing and intelligent waiver hinges on the recitation of a
‘ “talismanic phrase.” ’ [Citations.] The fact of the matter is that the
dissenting justices, like defendant, would require a degree of elaboration and
specificity in a jury waiver colloquy that has never been demanded for a jury
waiver to be considered knowing and intelligent under constitutional
standards.” 6 (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 175–176, fn. & italics
omitted.)

      6  We note that in French, the high court concluded the defendant had
not forfeited his constitutional claim that he was entitled to a jury trial of
aggravating facts, stating “At the time that defendant entered his plea of no
contest, he expressly waived his right to a jury trial on the substantive
offenses, but this waiver did not encompass his right to a jury trial on any
aggravating circumstances. The absence of such an explicit waiver is not
surprising. When defendant entered his plea, Blakely had not yet been
decided, and prior to that decision ‘it was widely assumed that for the
purposes of the rule established in Apprendi, the maximum term authorized
by the jury’s verdict was the upper term.’ [Citation.] . . . Defendant’s waiver
of jury trial on the offenses in connection with his no contest plea cannot
reasonably be interpreted to extend to proof of aggravating circumstances
when, at the time of the plea, no right to a jury trial on such circumstances
had been recognized. Defendant did not forfeit his Sixth Amendment right
by failing to request a jury trial on the aggravating circumstances, and his
claim must be addressed on the merits.” (French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 48,
fn. omitted.)
       Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Sivongxxay make clear
this statement in French applies where no jury trial right has yet been

                                       15
      The court reached a different conclusion with respect to the defendant’s
statutory right to jury trial on a special circumstance allegation as elucidated
by the court in its prior decision in People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658
(Memro). 7 (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 176–178.) In Sivongxxay,
“[t]here was no specific reference in the waiver colloquy to the need to
adjudicate the special circumstance allegation; the term ‘special

recognized. The majority’s discussion is set forth above. In his dissent,
Justice Cuéllar stated, “The gist of defendant’s claim is that the record fails
to show he was aware of his right to a jury trial on this phase of the trial or
that he waived it. State v. Williams (2005) 197 Ore.App. 21 . . . presents an
analogous situation. Williams similarly was unaware that he had the right
to a jury finding of the facts that could trigger an enhanced sentence; his trial
had predated Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 . . . , which held that
a criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to have a jury find the
facts that could subject him to a sentence greater than the statutory
maximum. The Williams court reasoned that no waiver could be implied in
those circumstances unless the record showed that the defendant was aware
both of ‘ “the right to have a jury determine the aggravating factors” ’ and
that ‘ “he was waiving that right.” ’ (Williams, at p. 1152; accord, People v.
French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 48 . . . [because the defendant entered his plea
pre-Blakely, his jury waiver on the substantive offense ‘did not encompass his
right to a jury trial on any aggravating circumstances’]; State v. Schofield
(2005) 2005 ME 82. . . .) Unlike the majority, I see no meaningful distinction
in the fact that Williams was unaware of his jury trial right because of an
intervening change in the law, while defendant was unaware of his jury trial
right because it was never mentioned anywhere in the colloquy. (Cf. maj.
opn., ante, at pp. 172–173, fn. 7.)” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 222–
223 (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)
      Here, in contrast, at the time defendant pleaded no contest, the
constitutional right to jury trial on facts in aggravation was well established.
      7  “Memro construed the [then applicable] statutes (as enacted by the
Legislature in 1977, see Stats. 1977, ch. 316, §§ 7, 12, pp. 1257, 1260), read
together, as requiring a ‘separate, personal waiver’ of the right to a jury for a
special circumstance allegation, above and beyond the standard guilt phase
and penalty phase waiver.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 176.)

                                       16
circumstance’ was never mentioned at all. Although such precision [was] not
required for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, [the high court
believed] that Memro’s requirement of a ‘separate waiver,’ ” even as that rule
was clarified in subsequent cases, “demand[ed] at least that much
specificity.” (Id. at pp. 177–178.) Thus, although the court recognized the
line it was drawing was “a narrow one,” it held the defendant’s “purported
waiver as to the special circumstance determination was deficient, as a
matter of state law.” (Id. at p. 178.)
      Given the clarity of the record here that defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to jury trial generally and did so fully advised
and personally agreeing in open court that the negotiated disposition
included that the court would consider all aggravating circumstances, we
conclude defendant’s jury waiver was constitutionally sufficient.
      2. Prior Convictions
      Even if we were to conclude defendant’s jury trial waiver was not
constitutionally sufficient, we agree with the Attorney General that the trial
court relied on at least one permissibly established aggravating
circumstance—defendant’s prior convictions—and therefore, under Black II,
the aggravated sentence is not constitutionally infirm.
      At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated defendant “had four
prior DUIs at the time of this conviction, including a prior 288 as a
misdemeanor. Now they have elevated to felony conduct.” While the record
of defendant’s section 288, subdivision (c) conviction was admitted into
evidence at the preliminary hearing, the four DUIs were identified in the
probation department presentencing report.
      Despite advancing only a constitutional challenge to his aggravated
sentence, defendant complains none of these convictions were, as now

                                         17
required by amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), based on a certified
record of conviction presented to the trial court at the sentencing hearing. 8
The Attorney General essentially ignores the DUI convictions and focuses on
the section 288, subdivision (c) conviction.
      Regardless of the state of the briefing, we conclude the prior section
288, subdivision (c) conviction and the DUI convictions support the trial
court’s reliance on the recidivist factor set forth in rule 4.421(b)(2). The
amended version of section 1170 went into effect four months prior to the
sentencing hearing. However, defendant made no objection to the trial
court’s consideration of either the section 288, subdivision (c) conviction or
the DUI convictions. The lack of certified copies of these convictions
presented at the sentencing hearing was a foundational, evidentiary issue
defendant could have, and should have, raised in the trial court. Indeed, had
defendant made such an objection, the foundational issue could have been
readily resolved. (Cf. Wiley, supra, __ Cal.App.5th at p. __, 2023 WL
8252049, at p. *2 [trial court continued sentencing hearing to enable
prosecutor to obtain certified record of convictions].) Having made no
objection to this evidence on any ground, let alone the specific ground of

      8   Historically, prior conviction findings based on the information in
probation reports have not been criticized in cases considering whether a
defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial was violated. (See, e.g., People
v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 76 [10 prior convictions listed in probation
report supported aggravating circumstance that prior convictions were
numerous]; Black II, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 818 [probation report’s list of
defendant’s prior convictions demonstrated convictions were both numerous
and of increasing seriousness]; see also People v. Falcon (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 911, 942, fn. 10 (Falcon) [“we presume prior conviction
findings made from a probation report would remain constitutionally sound,”
(italics omitted)], review granted Sept. 13, 2023, S281242.)

                                        18
insufficient foundation, defendant has forfeited the issue on appeal. (See
People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 366 [defendant forfeited claim that
testimony lacked foundation by failing to object on this ground at trial]; see
Evid. Code, § 353, subd (a) [no reversal due to erroneous admission of
evidence unless “[t]here appears of record an objection to or a motion to
exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to
make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion”]; see also People v.
Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1047 (Achane) [where amended statute
had been in effect for almost seven months, defendant’s failure to request
that sentencing court apply new provisions of the statute when it imposed
suspended sentence forfeited any statutory challenge to the sentence;
defendant “offers no persuasive reason why the usual forfeiture rules should
not apply to his failure to raise his [amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)]
retroactivity argument].) 9
      Furthermore, we agree with the Attorney General that in this case the
section 288, subdivision (c) conviction, alone, was sufficient to support the
court’s invocation of the recidivist factor.
      As we have recited, the recidivist factor set forth in rule 4.421(b)(2),
states: “The defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions

      9  Nor could defendant base an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
on appeal on his counsel’s failure to object. “[W]hen the reasons for counsel’s
actions are not readily apparent in the record, we will not assume
constitutionally inadequate representation and reverse . . . unless the
appellate record discloses ‘ “no conceivable tactical purpose” ’ for counsel’s act
or omission. (People v. Hines [(1997)] 15 Cal.4th [997,] 1065, quoting People
v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 558. . . .)” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th
610, 674–675.) We can certainly conceive of a reasonable tactical reason
defense counsel did not object given the benefit to defendant of the negotiated
disposition.

                                        19
in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing
seriousness.” As defendant points out, this language refers to “convictions,”
plural.
      The advisory committee comment states, however, that, “In
determining whether to impose the upper term for a criminal offense, the
court may consider as an aggravating factor that a defendant has suffered
one or more prior convictions, based on a certified record of conviction.” (Rule
4.421, Adv. Com. comm., italics added.) As we have noted, section 1170,
subdivision (a)(3) directs that “[i]n sentencing the convicted person, the court
shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council.” An advisory
committee comment is effectively the voice of the Judicial Council, providing
further explanation as to the meaning of the language of a rule and guidance
in its application. Thus, it is apparent that the Judicial Council’s intent is
that a court may consider one conviction as an aggravating factor.
      The advisory committee’s note, moreover, is not inherently inconsistent
with the language of the rule. To begin with, the term “convictions,” plural,
can be used as an inclusive term, i.e., embracing one or more convictions. For
example, if a person having only one prior conviction were asked whether he
had prior convictions, plural, he would in all likelihood answer, “yes, I have a
conviction.” It strains credibility to suppose he would answer “no” reasoning
he was asked about convictions, plural, and leaving the person who asked the
question with the impression he, in fact, had no prior convictions. The rule
also speaks in terms of prior convictions that are “numerous or of increasing
seriousness.” (Rule 4.421(b)(2), italics added.) The numerosity option clearly
covers convictions, plural, while one prior conviction can permit an
assessment of comparative seriousness.

                                       20
      Furthermore, we cannot conceive the Legislature or the Judicial
Council would not consider defendant’s 1995 section 288, subdivision (c)
conviction—for lewd or lascivious acts on a child 14 or 15 years old and which
required him to register as a sex offender—an aggravating sentencing factor
in this case wherein defendant was convicted of two counts of section 288,
subdivision (a)—committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age
of 14 years. Indeed, it would seem an absurd result that the recidivism factor
would not apply to defendant because he had only “once” been convicted of
molesting a child 14 or 15 years old, before sustaining multiple convictions of
molesting children even younger than that. We are, of course, counseled by
the rules of construction not to interpret the language of statutes,
regulations, or rules, to lead to such end. (See Starbucks Corp. v. Superior
Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1449 [“ ‘ “the literal meaning of its words
must give way to avoid harsh results and mischievous or absurd
consequences” ’ ”], quoting Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal.3d 348, 357.)
      In addition, there is no practical distinction between a defendant who
sustains two prior section 288 convictions before sustaining a third such
conviction for which he receives a recidivist’s aggravated sentence, and
defendant’s situation, since he also now has three section 288 convictions. In
other words, we see no reasoned basis why the fact defendant’s third section
288 conviction occurred in a case involving two victims should shield him
from an aggravated recidivist sentence. Had defendant been separately
charged with molesting the two victims, one of the cases would necessarily
have been resolved before the other, resulting in defendant having two prior
section 288 convictions. In fact, one could say that effectively happened in

                                       21
this case when defendant pleaded guilty to the first of the two section 288,
subdivision (a) charges. 10
      Since we have concluded that at least one of the factors in
aggravation—recidivism under rule 4.421(b)(2)—was established in a

      10  We realize our conclusion in this regard differs from statements in
Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at page 953, review granted September 13,
2023, S281242 and People v. Fernandez (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 669, 681
(Fernandez). In Falcon, evidence of two felony convictions was admitted at
trial. The jury was required to find true one of the convictions to convict the
defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. That left only one
felony conviction for consideration under rule 4.421(b)(2). The appellate
court stated, without further analysis, it was “unaware of any published
authority holding one or two prior convictions qualify as ‘numerous’ for
purposes of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2).” (Falcon, at p. 953.)
In Fernandez, the defendant was convicted of 155 counts of lewd and
lascivious conduct upon a child and one count of lewd conduct by force. He
admitted having one prior “ ‘serious felony’ ” conviction for rape and having
served a prior prison term for various felonies. He was sentenced to 330
years in prison. (Fernandez, at p. 674.) The Court of Appeal concluded the
trial had erred in numerous respects, including referring generically to the
probation report as support for a host of aggravating factors (a patently
insufficient explanation) and impermissible “dual use” of the rape conviction
as a sentencing enhancement and a factor in aggravation. (Id. at pp. 678–
681.) The court later commented, for purposes of remand, that taking the
rape conviction out of the equation left two convictions (one for false
imprisonment and one for possession of stolen property) and observed “[t]wo
prior convictions” are “not ‘numerous.’ ” It commented, without further
analysis, the “applicability of” the recidivism factor was “questionable.” (Id.
at p. 681.) We also note in French, the Supreme Court commented the
defendant’s only prior criminal convictions were two misdemeanor offenses
for which he had been placed on probation. (French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at
p. 42.) However, the trial court in French did not rely on the recidivist factor,
nor was any issue as to that factor raised or addressed by the high court.
      For the reasons we have discussed, in our view, use of the plural term
“convictions” is not dispositive and there is more to the analysis as to when
the recidivist factor may apply than is reflected by these cases.

                                       22
permissible manner (i.e., the fact of prior convictions of increasing
seriousness), the trial court’s finding of additional factors in aggravation did
not, under Black II, violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. (Black II,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 813 [“so long as a defendant is eligible for the upper
term by virtue of facts that have been established consistently with Sixth
Amendment principles, the federal Constitution permits the trial court to rely
upon any number of aggravating circumstances in exercising its discretion to
select the appropriate term by balancing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, regardless of whether the facts underlying those
circumstances have been found to be true by a jury”]; see Wiley, supra, __
Cal.App.5th at p. __, 2023 WL 8252049, at pp. *3–5 [separately discussing
constitutional jurisprudence and amended section 1170, subdivision (b), and
concluding the amended statute “ ‘preserves [the] distinction’ in Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence” as to the permissible use of prior convictions and
should not be construed “more narrowly” than is allowed under Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence].)
      We emphasize Black II did not hold that the defendant’s constitutional
right to jury trial had been violated but the violation was not prejudicial.
Rather, Black II held the aggravated sentence passed muster under the Sixth
Amendment because no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. (Black II,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 813–816.) Accordingly, there was no constitutional
error in Black II that required an assessment of harmlessness. In French, in
contrast, no aggravating factor was established by means permissible under
the Sixth Amendment. The same was true in Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
page 837––“[n]one of the aggravating circumstances cited by the trial court
[came] within the exceptions set forth in Blakely.” Thus, in both French and
Sandoval the high court was required to consider whether the violation of the

                                       23
defendants’ Sixth Amendment right was harmless. (French, supra,
43 Cal.4th at pp. 52–54; Sandoval, at pp. 838–843.)
       Defendant did not address Black II’s analysis in his opening brief.
Rather, he relied on French. However, even in French, the high court
reiterated that an upper term would have been constitutionally permissible
“if the prosecution had established an aggravating factor at the sentencing
hearing based upon defendant’s prior convictions or upon his admissions.”
(French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 45.) The difficulty in French, as we have
observed, was that the trial court had not found any aggravating factor on
such basis. (Id. at p. 43.) Accordingly, Black II’s analysis simply did not
apply.
       In his closing brief, defendant argues for the first time that Black II “is
not good law as applied to amended section 1170.” He claims that under the
amended law, a single aggravating factor is “no longer legally sufficient to
make a defendant eligible for the upper term,” (some capitalization &
boldface omitted) as was the law when Apprendi and Black II were decided,
and he points to the split in the Courts of Appeal as to the applicable
standard for determining “harmlessness with regard to SB 567 error.” It is
well established that the Courts of Appeal generally will not consider new
arguments advanced for the first time in a closing brief. (See People v.
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218–1219 (Rangel) [“ ‘[i]t is axiomatic that
arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be entertained
because of the unfairness to the other party’ ”]; People v. Taylor (2020) 43
Cal.App.5th 1102, 1114 [defendant forfeited arguments made for first time in
reply brief].) 11

        At oral argument, counsel maintained the discussion of Black II in
       11

defendant’s closing brief was not belated and was a response to the Attorney

                                        24
      In any event, defendant cites no case holding that one factor in
aggravation is never sufficient to impose an upper term, even in a case like
this one where the court found no factors in mitigation. In fact, recent cases
suggest the law in this regard remains unchanged. (See Zepeda, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 83 [under amended statute, court “has no authority to
impose an upper term sentence unless a jury has found one or more
aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt,” (italics added)]; id., at p.
86 [“a judge lacks the authority to impose an upper-term sentence in the
absence of a jury finding of one or more aggravating factors,” (italics added)];
Achane, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1044 [“trial court on remand can again
impose the upper term if at least one aggravating factor is properly
established by admission, finding beyond a reasonable doubt or certified
record of conviction,” (italics added)].)
      Nor does the language of the amended statute foreclose reliance on a
single aggravating factor in an appropriate case. 12 When speaking of a

General’s reliance on the case. However, given that defendant’s principal
argument on appeal is that his constitutional right to jury trial was infringed
and that Black II is one of our high court’s leading decisions on this issue, one
would reasonably expect a discussion of the case in defendant’s opening brief,
including a discussion of why, as defendant now maintains, the case is “no
longer good law.”
      12 Until January 22, 2023, section 1170 gave the trial court broad
authority to select the term (lower, middle, or upper) that “in the court’s
discretion, best serve[d] the interests of justice.” (Former § 1170, subd. (b), as
amended by Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 15.) As amended by SB 567, section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), now provides, “The court may impose a sentence exceeding
the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the
crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the
middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable

                                            25
sentencing court’s discretion to impose the upper term, section 1170,
subdivisions (b)(1) through (3) require that aggravating facts either be
admitted, found by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, or established
by certified copy and provide that a sentencing court may impose the upper
term “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term . .
. .” (§ 1170, subd. (b).) Thus, by its plain terms, the amended language
creates a rule limiting a trial court’s discretion to impose the upper term in
cases where no aggravating factor has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, stipulated to by the defendant, or established by certified record. It
does not establish any presumption as to how a sentencing court must
exercise its discretion within these bounds. Moreover, given the silence of the
statute in this regard, we must presume the Legislature left unchanged a
sentencing court’s well established discretion to impose, in an appropriate
case, the upper term of imprisonment on the basis of a single aggravating
factor. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 [“[o]nly a single
aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term”]; People v. Nicolas
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1182; see generally People v. Castaneda (1999)
75 Cal.App.4th 611, 614 [“A judge’s subjective determination of the value of a
case and the appropriate aggregate sentence, based on the judge’s
experiences with prior cases and the record in the defendant’s case, cannot be
ignored. A judge’s subjective belief regarding the length of the sentence to be
imposed is not improper as long as it is channeled by the guided discretion
outlined in the myriad of statutory sentencing criteria”]). Thus, reading

doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(2).)

                                       26
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) through (3) in the context of the law existing
at the time of its enactment, as we are required to do, we discern no change
in the law that one aggravating circumstance can justify imposition of the
upper term, particularly in a case, like this one, where the trial court finds no
mitigating factors.
      In his closing brief, defendant also points to comments by Justice Liu in
concurring in the denial of review in People v. Flores (S274232, June 15,
2022) in which Justice Liu observed “it may no longer be true” that an upper
term can be imposed on the basis of a single aggravating factor. 13 Again, we
generally will not consider an argument made for the first time in a reply
brief. Moreover, until the high court so holds, we will follow existing
precedent. We also point out that Justice Liu’s comment included the
additional observation that “it appears a defendant is subject to an upper
term sentence only if the aggravating circumstances are sufficient to ‘justify
the imposition’ of that term under all of the circumstances, which may
include evidence both in aggravation and in mitigation.” (Ibid., (conc. opn. of
Liu, J.)) The instant case presents a different scenario, as here the trial court
found no factors in mitigation.

      13  In Flores, unlike in the instant case, the defendant was sentenced
prior to the enactment of the section 1170 amendments, and on appeal he
claimed he was entitled to resentencing under the new statutory provisions.
In finding error under the new statutory provisions, and in concluding it was
harmless, the Court of Appeal quoted Osband for the proposition a single
aggravating factor is sufficient to support an upper term and applied
Sandoval’s harmless error standard. (Flores, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp.
500–501.) As we have pointed out, in Sandoval, none of the aggravating
factors found by the trial court satisfied the Sixth Amendment. Thus, in
Sandoval, in contrast to Black II, there was a constitutional violation,
requiring a harmless error analysis.

                                       27
      Furthermore, as we have discussed, defendant confined his opening
brief to a claim of constitutional error, i.e., that his Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial had been violated by imposition of the upper term. He made no
claim that any additional statutory rights set forth in amended section 1170
were violated. (See generally French, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 46–48
[discussing distinction between constitutional and statutory rights to jury
trial]; People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 359–360 [also distinguishing
between constitutional and statutory rights to jury trial].) Nor, as we have
observed, did defendant make any such claims in the trial court. He has
therefore forfeited any claims of error under the amended provisions of
section 1170 by failing to raise them in the trial court, as well as waived any
such claims by failing to raise them in his opening brief. 14 (See Achane,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1044 [defendant’s failure to request that
sentencing court apply new provisions of the statute when it imposed
suspended sentence forfeited any statutory challenge to the sentence]; see
also People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 274–276 [by allowing jury to be
discharged without objection, defendant forfeited statutory right to jury trial
on sentencing allegations]; People v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094,
1100 [by failing to object at the time of sentencing, defendant forfeited
“claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the six-

      14 As the court stated in People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346,
1353–1354, review granted March 15, 2023, S278266, the harmless error
standard being debated in the Courts of Appeal is the standard to assess
“error under Senate Bill 567” and is a “state law harmless error component”
of the harmless error analysis. (Italics added.) (See Falcon, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 920 [By focusing on the minimum requirements of the
Sixth Amendment, i.e., the prior conviction exception to the Apprendi rule,
the Flores approach generally “fails to recognize statutory noncompliance as
error and measure the effect of statutory noncompliance.”].)

                                       28
year middle term . . . because it failed to consider several mitigating factors
and ‘erroneously considered as aggravating factors facts that were elements
of the offense itself’ ”].) We therefore need not, and do not, weigh in on what
standard of harmlessness should apply when a defendant’s new statutory
jury trial right under amended section 1170 has been violated.
      In sum, we conclude defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his
constitutional right to jury trial, including as to aggravating facts, and his
aggravated sentence is constitutionally permissible for that reason, alone.
We further conclude that, even if defendant did not sufficiently waive his
constitutional jury trial right, the trial court found at least one aggravating
factor—recidivism pursuant to rule 4.421(b)(2)—on a basis consistent with
the Sixth Amendment and therefore, under Black II, his aggravated sentence
is not constitutionally infirm.
                                  IV. DISPOSITION
      The judgment is AFFIRMED.

                                        29
                                           _________________________
                                           Banke, Acting PJ.

We concur:

_________________________
Margulies, J.*

_________________________
Getty, J.**

*Retired Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

**Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A165406, People v. Hall

                                      30
Trial Court: Del Norte County Superior Court

Trial Judge:     Hon. Darren McElfresh

Counsel:

Christopher Stansell under appointment by the Court of Appeal for
Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Jefferey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Masha A.
Dabiza and Arthur P. Beever, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

                                    31