Court Opinion

ID: 9671415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:36:18.19751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.939742
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(dissenting). Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff must comply with the 120-day notice requirement, I dissent because I would reject the requirement of prejudice engrafted upon the statutory notice provision by Hobbs v State Hwys Dep’t, 398 Mich 90; 247 NW2d 754 (1976). Accordingly, on the basis of the facts before the Court, I would hold that the statutory notice requirement bars plaintiff’s cause of action. Although the Court of Appeals improperly concluded that the sixty-day notice provision governed, it properly upheld the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for summary disposition. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds.
i
The statutory provision at issue in this case is straightforward, clear, and unambiguous. Nevertheless, this Court previously engrafted a requirement of prejudice upon it. The requirement has its origins in Reich v State Hwy Dep’t, 386 Mich 617; 194 NW2d 700 (1972), in which this Court, in a cursory opinion, struck down the sixty-day notice requirement as vio-lative of the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Court reasoned that the notice requirement divided the natural class of victims of negligent tortfeasors into arbitrary subclasses: victims of governmental negligence who must meet *370the notice requirement and victims of private negligence who are not subject to the notice requirement.
However, in Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), the Court retreated from this position and held that notice provisions are not necessarily unconstitutional. The Court upheld the constitutionality of notice provisions in cases in which prejudice to the government for failure to give such notice could be demonstrated.
In the Court’s subsequent decision in Hobbs, supra at 96, the Court upheld Carver and specifically required a showing of prejudice to the state before enforcement of the notice provision:
Because actual prejudice to the state due to lack of notice within 120 days is the only legitimate purpose we can posit for this notice provision, absent a showing of such prejudice the notice provision contained in MCL 691.1404; MSA 3.996(104) is not a bar to claims filed pursuant to MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).
This “constitutional” requirement engrafted by the Court is illusory. I note that “[w]hen scrutinizing economic and social legislation, this Court applies the rational basis standard of review.” Downriver Plaza Group v Southgate, 444 Mich 656, 666; 513 NW2d 807 (1994). The only inquiry, then, is whether this social legislation creating a 120-day notice requirement has a rational basis.
This particular legislation passes the minimal rational basis test, and the Court in Hobbs was without authority to require a showing of prejudice in each and every case. Notice provisions rationally and reasonably provide the state with the opportunity to investigate and evaluate a claim. The mere fact that in *371some cases the legislation prevents prejudice to the government by itself is a rational basis. No further “constitutional” analysis is permitted. Certainly, if the Legislature may provide no recovery at all, it may place a condition on recovery, i.e., a reasonable notice provision.1 The Court in Carver and Hobbs erred in that both failed to properly analyze this social legislation under the rational basis standard. Erroneously concluding that prejudice had to be shown in every case to preserve the legislation’s constitutionality, the Court ignored the rational basis test and created the prejudice requirement.
The statute clearly survives rational basis scrutiny and, is constitutional. The statute, therefore, must be read and applied as written.2 In contrast, this Court in Hobbs created a condition for the application of a notice requirement that is not supported by the language of the statute.
Hobbs is, therefore, in clear derogation of the fundamental precepts of statutory construction. I am unable to agree with this judicial intrusion into a leg*372islative function.3 As Justice Carr noted in Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 235; 111 NW2d 1 (1961):
The admission of the obvious fact that a change in the policy of governmental immunity from liability in cases of the nature here involved is within the scope of legislative authority carries with it the further admission that such action is not within the scope of judicial powers.
Although I agree with the result in Hobbs that notice provisions are constitutional, I cannot agree with its rationale. This conclusion remains loyal to our recent decision in Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), where we stated that the grant of immunity “is expressed in the broadest possible language . . . .” Id. at 618. The statutory exceptions, however, are “narrowly drawn.” Id. Plaintiff in this case is only able to bring his court action because the Legislature created an exception to governmental immunity. The Legislature requires timely notice of such a claim as quid pro quo for its relinquishment of immunity. I would uphold this notice requirement as written by the Legislature.
The majority relies on legislative acquiescence to uphold the Hobbs prejudice requirement.4 This argu*373ment is wholly without merit. In Hobbs, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 120-day notice provision provided that prejudice be read into the statute. To overcome the previously adjudged constitutional infirmities of notice requirements, the Hobbs Court simply held, albeit improperly, that actual prejudice to the state was the only legitimate purpose for the notice provision. Accordingly, the Court held that the requirement of prejudice saved the statute from constitutional infirmity. The Legislature, therefore, was without authority during the past twenty years to eliminate the prejudice requirement which the Hobbs Court engrafted upon the statute. The dissent’s legislative acquiescence argument ignores the fundamental principle that “[construction of the constitution is the province of the courts and this Court’s construction of a State constitutional provision is binding on all departments of government, including the legislature.” Richardson v Secretary of State, 381 Mich 304, 309; 160 NW2d 883 (1968). Accordingly, principles of legislative acquiescence are not relevant to this case.* 5
n
While I agree that plaintiff’s equal protection rights are violated by applying two distinct notice periods to *374the same cause of action for defective road and highway maintenance, I am not persuaded that the rule in Hobbs, requiring a showing of prejudice to the governmental agency, is supportable and would therefore overrule that decision. Proper application of the statute bars plaintiffs cause of action because he failed to provide the county road commission with notice of his claim within 120 days of his injury. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on different grounds.
Boyle, J., concurred with Riley, J.
Weaver, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 As noted by Justice Coleman in her dissent in Hobbs, unlike private tortfeasors, the state must consent to be sued. She noted that the Legislature placed conditions on its surrendering of a portion of its immunity, i.e., the claim must be brought in the Court of Claims, there is a two-year statute of limitations for injuries resulting from a defective highway, and the governmental agency must be notified of the claim within 120 days of its occurrence.

 “If the language used is clear and the meaning of the words chosen is unambiguous, a common-sense reading of the provision will suffice, and no interpretation is necessary.” Karl v Bryant Air Conditioning, 416 Mich 558, 567; 331 NW2d 456 (1982) (citations omitted). The fundamental principles of statutory construction were best summarized in Grand Traverse Co v State of Michigan, 450 Mich 457, 464; 538 NW2d 1 (1995): “[0]ur duty is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature as expressed by the plain meaning of the statute.”

 Justice Coleman aptly noted that “the law does not permit amendment of legislation by court edict.” Kerkstra v State Hwy Dep’t, 398 Mich 103, 109; 247 NW2d 759 (1976) (Coleman, J, dissenting).

 The majority also relies in large part on principles of stare decisis. As this Court previously stated in Wilson v Doehler-Jarvis, 358 Mich 510, 514; 100 NW2d 226 (1960):
Notwithstanding appellant’s quoted understanding of the oft-discussed doctrine of stare decisis, this Court will not close its eyes to a possible error it may have committed in the past. We do not believe that the doctrine of stare decisis means that this Court and the evolution of the law should be controlled by the “dead hand *373from the past.” Nor do we believe that this Court must perpetuate error simply because it may have reached a wrong result in one of its earlier decisions.
Having concluded that this Court failed to apply the proper constitutional scrutiny, i.e., rational basis, and improperly engrafted a prejudice requirement, stare decisis is not a credible basis to perpetuate this error.

 As Justice Cavanagh noted in People v Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 27; 485 NW2d 866 (1992), “this Court alone is the ultimate authority with regard to the meaning and application of Michigan law.”