Court Opinion

ID: 9915934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 01:00:42.074576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:12.897605
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30699     Document: 00517025399         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/08/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                            FILED
                                                                  January 8, 2024
                                 No. 22-30699
                                                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                            Clerk

   Carolyn Johnson,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and
   Agricultural and Mechanical College,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:19-CV-12823
                  ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A Higginson, Circuit Judge:
          Plaintiff-Appellant Carolyn Johnson (“Johnson”) appeals summary
   judgment on her claims of Title VII harassment and retaliation against former
   employer Defendant-Appellee LSU Health Sciences Center (“LSUHSC”).
   For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
                                        I.
          Johnson is an African-American female who worked at LSUHSC as
   an Administrative Coordinator in the Division of Animal Care. Her
Case: 22-30699        Document: 00517025399             Page: 2      Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                        No. 22-30699

   responsibilities included performing administrative duties for the veterinari-
   ans at LSUHSC. To facilitate this, Johnson’s desk was located in an open
   area which connected to the offices of certain veterinarians, including Dr.
   Jeffrey Schumacher (“Schumacher”).
           On Friday, August 10, 2018, Schumacher slapped Johnson on her but-
   tocks (“the Incident”). According to Johnson, this was predated by many
   acts of sexual and racial harassment in the preceding months (together, “pre-
   Incident conduct”), during which Schumacher: (i) referred to her as “Boo”;
   (ii) looked down her blouse three or four times; (iii) talked about sex with
   African-American women with a coworker in Johnson’s presence, including
   making a remark that “black women have big asses”; (iv) made daily com-
   ments about Johnson’s appearance and perfume; and (v) suggested “getting
   together about five times.”
           On Tuesday, August 14, Johnson emailed her direct supervisor, Shan-
   tell Curtis,1 to express that she needed to talk. Curtis called and Johnson told
   her what happened, and Curtis sent an e-mail to human resources (“HR”)
   about the Incident. Two days later, on August 16, Johnson called Curtis to
   see if there was any response. After Curtis told her that no one from HR had
   responded to the email, the two went and spoke with Jason Johnson (“Ja-
   son”), an employee in HR. Jason explained that because Schumacher was
   faculty and Johnson was staff, he had to wait for Vice-Chancellor Moerch-
   bacher to return from vacation to handle the complaint.
           Following the conversation with Jason, Johnson was temporarily relo-
   cated. First, she was moved to a space near Curtis, which was located in

           _____________________
           1
              The record inconsistently identifies Curtis’ first name (sometimes spelling it
   “Shantell,” and sometimes spelling it “Chantell”), but this opinion adopts “Shantell,”
   the spelling taken from Curtis’ deposition.

                                              2
Case: 22-30699      Document: 00517025399          Page: 3   Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                    No. 22-30699

   another building, separate from the faculty for whom Johnson worked, from
   August 20 through August 24. Then on August 27, she was moved back to a
   storage room in Animal Care, which was located around the corner from
   Johnson’s original workstation. Johnson testified that the storage room to
   which she was relocated was full of gnats, emitted an odor, and had windows
   that were covered with black paper. Johnson complained about the bug prob-
   lem, and Curtis responded by buying “at least six or seven different kinds of
   bug sprays,” but Johnson was not relocated.
          Upon Moerchbacher’s return on August 27, LSUHSC initiated an in-
   vestigation, which concluded on September 18 and ultimately substantiated
   Johnson’s complaint. Johnson was informed that she could return to her orig-
   inal workspace and Schumacher would be moved.
          On September 25, 2019, Johnson sued LSUHSC. After some of her
   claims were dismissed, she filed an amended complaint alleging sexual har-
   assment, racial discrimination, and retaliatory harassment in violation of Ti-
   tle VII based on pre-Incident conduct, the Incident, and Johnson’s relocation
   to the storage room. The district court granted LSUHSC’s motion for sum-
   mary judgment as to all three claims, and Johnson appealed.
                                         II.
          A summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same standards
   as the district court. EEOC v. Agro Distr., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir.
   2009). Summary judgment is proper when the moving party can demonstrate
   that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
   party, there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that they are entitled
   to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also LifeCare Mgmt.
   Servs. LLC v. Ins. Mgmt. Adm’rs Inc., 703 F.3d 835, 840-41 (5th Cir. 2013).
   “A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a
   reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Rogers v.

                                          3
Case: 22-30699      Document: 00517025399             Page: 4   Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                       No. 22-30699

   Bromac Title Servs., LLC, 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson
   v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
          In opposing summary judgment, a party “may not rest on mere con-
   clusory allegations or denials in its pleadings.” Smith v. Regional Transit
   Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hightower v. Tex. Hosp.
   Ass’n, 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1995)). A panel “may ‘affirm summary judg-
   ment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is different from that
   relied on by the district court.’” Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 438
   (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 928 (5th
   Cir. 2010)).
                                           III.
          Johnson brings claims for racial and sexual harassment, as well as re-
   taliation, pursuant to Title VII.
          Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an em-
   ployer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
   sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
   vidual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
   2(a)(1). Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination extends to protect
   against either “a tangible employment action, such as a demotion or denial
   of promotion, or . . . a hostile or abusive working environment.” Lauderdale
   v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 512 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Dediol
   v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[t]he
   phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ includes requiring
   people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment” (citing
   Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))). Johnson does not allege
   that any of the conduct constituted or resulted in a tangible employment ac-
   tion, such as a firing or a demotion. Thus, to establish that she was sexually
   or racially harassed in violation of Title VII, Johnson must show “that the

                                            4
Case: 22-30699       Document: 00517025399          Page: 5    Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                     No. 22-30699

   harassment created a hostile or abusive working environment.” Harvill v.
   Westward Commc’ns, LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005). To make this
   showing, Johnson must demonstrate that:
            (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was the victim
            of uninvited sexual [or racial] harassment; (3) the harassment
            was based on sex [or race] (4) the harassment affected a “term,
            condition, or privilege” of [her] employment; and (5) her em-
            ployer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed
            to take prompt remedial action.

   Id.; see also Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir.
   2012).
            Title VII also prevents retaliation by “forbid[ding] employer actions
   that discriminate against an employee . . . because he has opposed a practice
   that Title VII forbids or has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
   in a Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” Saketkoo v. Administra-
   tors of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 999 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quota-
   tion marks omitted) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
   U.S. 53, 59 (2006)).
            We first consider Johnson’s harassment claims related to the Incident,
   before turning to her harassment claims related to the pre-Incident conduct,
   and then to her retaliation claim related to her temporary relocation to the
   storage room.
                                          A.
            With respect to her Title VII harassment claims regarding the Inci-
   dent, Johnson has failed to make the requisite showing on the fifth element:
   that LSUHSC “knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
   take prompt remedial action.” Harvill, 433 F.3d at 434.

                                           5
Case: 22-30699         Document: 00517025399               Page: 6      Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                          No. 22-30699

           To constitute “prompt remedial action” by an employer, the remedial
   action “must be reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” Stewart v.
   Miss. Transp. Comm’n., 586 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 2009). This is “a fact-
   specific inquiry,” as “not every response by an employer will be sufficient to
   absolve the employer of liability under Title VII.” Williams-Boldware v. Den-
   ton County, 741 F.3d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). Nonetheless, “[i]n certain circumstances, we have held
   that an employer took prompt remedial action as a matter of law.” Id. (inter-
   nal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have so held, for instance,
   where immediately after the reported harassment, the manager separated the
   plaintiff and harasser and instructed the harasser to stay away. See Skidmore
   v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 617 (5th Cir. 1999); see
   also Kreamer v. Henry’s Towing, 150 F. App’x 378, 382-83 (5th Cir. 2005) (per
   curiam) (finding a prompt response where the employer issued a series of
   warnings and, after those warnings proved ineffective and the harassment
   sporadically continued and escalated over the course of six days, transferred
   offender away from the plaintiff).
           Here, after Johnson lodged her complaint with HR (on a Thursday),
   LSUHSC promptly took steps so that Johnson did not have to interact with
   Schumacher, including relocating her workspace that following Monday.2

           _____________________
           2
               Johnson alleges that she would run into Schumacher and was told that she would
   have to work with him during the pendency of the investigation. But there is no evidence
   of this in the record other than the allegations in her pleadings, which cannot be credited to
   defeat summary judgment. See Smith, 827 F.3d at 417; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)
   (requiring factual positions in summary judgment to be supported by citations to “materials
   in the record,” including “depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
   affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
   materials”).

                                                 6
Case: 22-30699        Document: 00517025399              Page: 7       Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                         No. 22-30699

   LSUHSC also opened an investigation, which eventually substantiated John-
   son’s claims and led to permanently moving Schumacher.
           Though it is true that the official investigation was not commenced
   until August 27,3 eleven days after Johnson’s report to HR on August 16, this
   does not demonstrate that LSUHSC’s response was unreasonably calculated
   to end the harassment. Unlike Smith v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc., 813 F.3d 298
   (6th Cir. 2016), which Johnson invokes in support of her argument, it cannot
   be said that LSUHSC exhibited “total inaction for ten days,” id. at 312. In-
   deed, unlike in Smith, LSUHSC did not have a history of complaints and dis-
   ciplinary action against Schumacher, compare id. at 305; did immediately sep-
   arate Johnson and Schumacher, compare id. at 304, 312, and did conduct an
   investigation that was not alleged to be deficient, compare id. at 311.
           Here, LSUHSC quickly took action to separate Johnson and Schu-
   macher in order to prevent potential further harassment.4 LSUHSC’s ac-
   tions were very similar to those undertaken in other cases where this court
   has found prompt remedial action as a matter of law: Johnson and Schu-
   macher were physically separated, and Schumacher was instructed not to
   have contact with or be around Johnson. See Skidmore, 188 F.3d at 616. Be-
   cause Johnson has failed to demonstrate the fifth element, her harassment
   claims relating to the Incident fail.
                                               B.

           _____________________
           3
              To the extent the district court suggested that the investigation began on August
   16, it erred.
           4
             Johnson also alleges that because she ran into Schumacher, she became so afraid
   that, rather than leave the storage room to go to the bathroom, she urinated on herself two
   to three times. This is, however, only alleged in the complaint and not supported by
   evidence that might properly defeat summary judgment.

                                                7
Case: 22-30699       Document: 00517025399           Page: 8      Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                      No. 22-30699

          Johnson’s pre-Incident conduct claims also fail at the fifth element, as
   she fails to identify a genuine issue of fact showing that LSUHSC either
   “knew or should have known of the harassment.” Harvill, 433 F.3d at 434.
   For this analysis, “it matters whether a harasser is a ‘supervisor’ or simply a
   coworker.” Matherne v. Ruba Mgmt., 624 F. App’x 835, 839 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (quoting Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013)).5 That is because
   “[a]n employer can be put on notice of harassment, and therefore be required
   to take remedial action, [only] if a person within the organization who has the
   ‘authority to address the harassment problem’ or an ‘affirmative duty’ to re-
   port harassment learns of the harassment in question.” Abbt v. City of Hou-
   ston, 28 F.4th 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Williamson v. City of Houston,
   148 F.3d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1998)). “[T]he key to whose knowledge may be
   imputed to the employer is remedial power: There is no actual knowledge
   until someone ‘with authority to address the problem’ is notified.” Sharp v.
   City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929–30 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
          When the harasser is a co-worker, “the negligence standard governs
   employer liability,” and employers are only negligent if they “knew or should
   have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.” Hudson v. Lincare, Inc.,
   58 F.4th 222, 229–30 (5th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). “It weighs against
   finding negligence if the affected employee ‘unreasonably fail[s] to take ad-
   vantage of corrective opportunities provided by’ the employer.” Id. (citation
   omitted).
                                            (i)

          _____________________
          5
             A supervisor is defined as an employee “empowered . . . to take tangible
   employment actions against the victim.” Matherne, 624 F. App'x at 839 (quoting Vance,
   570 U.S. at 424).

                                            8
Case: 22-30699      Document: 00517025399          Page: 9    Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                    No. 22-30699

          As a threshold issue, Johnson alleged various facts in an affidavit sub-
   mitted in support of her opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
   which LSUHSC moved to strike on the grounds that it failed to meet the re-
   quirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) and contained inad-
   missible evidence, including statements for which Johnson lacked personal
   knowledge. Assuming without deciding that the affidavit statements were ad-
   missible, the district court nonetheless granted summary judgment because
   it found that none of the testimony in the affidavit created a genuine issue for
   trial. In particular, the district court found that Johnson’s statements as to
   “what other individuals saw, heard, thought, and did in relation to Dr. Schu-
   macher’s alleged conduct before the Incident” were conclusory and failed to
   present a genuine issue “‘in the face of conflicting and probative evidence’
   in the record,” including Johnson’s own prior deposition testimony and the
   absence of any witness deposition testimony recalling the conduct Johnson
   alleged.
          While we disagree that Johnson’s affidavit testimony was conclusory,
   we do agree that certain conflicting statements contained therein may be
   properly disregarded under the sham-affidavit exception. Under that doc-
   trine, a party cannot “defeat a motion for summary judgment using an affi-
   davit that impeaches, without explanation, sworn testimony.” Seigler v. Wal-
   Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 30 F.4th 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). The “bar for applying the doctrine,” however,
   “is a high one,” and “typically require[s] affidavit testimony that is inher-
   ently inconsistent with prior testimony.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted); see also Winzer v. Kaufman County, 916 F.3d 464, 472 (5th
   Cir. 2019) (noting that a district court may refuse to consider statements in
   an affidavit only where they are “so markedly inconsistent with a prior state-
   ment as to constitute an obvious sham” (internal quotation marks and cita-
   tion omitted)). Importantly, this inconsistency must be with the affiant’s own

                                          9
Case: 22-30699        Document: 00517025399               Page: 10        Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                           No. 22-30699

   prior testimony, not the testimony of others. See Seigler, 30 F.4th at 477 (“If
   a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of
   fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony,
   this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure
   for screening out sham issues of fact.”) (emphasis added).6
                                                (ii)
           In light of the above, we evaluate testimony as to each individual to
   whom Johnson claims she reported Schumacher’s pre-Incident conduct—
   Curtis, Johnson, and Birke—to determine whether it supports a genuine is-
   sue of fact that LSUHSC either “knew or should have known of the harass-
   ment.”
           First, Johnson’s affidavit states that she had had conversations with
   Curtis, her direct supervisor, on multiple occasions regarding Schumacher’s
   pre-Incident conduct. This is, however, contradicted by Johnson’s own un-
   ambiguous deposition testimony that she never reported Schumacher’s pre-
   Incident conduct to Curtis or HR, which Johnson herself concedes on appeal.
   As a result, Johnson’s affidavit testimony does appear to be “so markedly
   inconsistent with [her] prior deposition as to constitute an obvious sham,”
   Clark v. Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1988), and the district
   court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider it as evidence.

           _____________________
           6
             To the extent that the district court disregarded Johnson’s affidavit on the ground
   that it was contradicted by other witness testimony, such as because “[t]he record shows
   that no witness deposed in this case recalled the conduct Plaintiff now alleges,” this was
   likely an abuse of discretion. Such contradictions may negatively impact Johnson’s
   credibility, but credibility is a determination for the jury, not the court. Guzman v. Allstate
   Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 162 (“How much weight to credit self-interested evidence is a
   question of credibility, which judges may not evaluate at the summary judgment stage.”).

                                                 10
Case: 22-30699     Document: 00517025399           Page: 11   Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                    No. 22-30699

          Next, Johnson argues there is a triable issue due to the allegation in
   her affidavit that Jason from HR had seen a photo—where Johnson’s face
   and torso were put on top of a photo of a football player who was wearing
   “skin-tight football pants”—posted near Schumacher’s office, and merely
   laughed it off rather than addressing it. But as discussed above, Johnson
   agreed when asked at her deposition whether it was accurate that she did not
   report “any of . . . [the] inappropriate [pre-Incident] behavior” to HR, which
   would have necessarily included Jason. The breadth of Johnson’s deposition
   testimony therefore tends to contradict the allegation contained in the affida-
   vit.
          Johnson also argues that LSUHSC should have known about Schu-
   macher’s pre-Incident conduct, as there were “warning signals” from a pre-
   vious episode in which Schumacher was reported by an intern for initiating a
   conversation in which he, among other things, “asked whether she was in a
   relationship” and “described the sexual preferences of his family members.”
   The intern testified that she immediately reported the conversation and was
   promptly moved to the library (away from Schumacher), where she remained
   for the rest of her internship. While this evidence suggests that LSUHSC had
   general knowledge of one instance in which Schumacher had behaved inap-
   propriately prior to the Incident, it does not suggest that LSUHSC was on
   notice that Schumacher might engage in the type of behavior that Johnson
   alleges, nor does it imply that LSUHSC knew of Schumacher’s pre-Incident
   conduct towards Johnson. Based on the available deposition testimony from
   the intern, moreover, it appears that LSUHSC took quick action to remedy
   the situation—by moving the intern away from Schumacher, as it did with
   Johnson—and Johnson makes no allegation that any problems persisted.
   This evidence, then, is insufficient to impute knowledge to LSUHSC.
          Finally, Johnson argues that another veterinarian, Dr. Leslie Birke,
   was aware of, and was even attempting to address, Schumacher’s

                                         11
Case: 22-30699     Document: 00517025399            Page: 12    Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                     No. 22-30699

   harassment. Johnson stated that she had had multiple conversations with
   Birke about Schumacher’s inappropriate conversations, which Birke person-
   ally witnessed and even attempted to stop. Because Johnson identifies Birke
   as the “Acting Director of Animal Care,” she argues that those allegations
   are sufficient to demonstrate that LSUHSC knew about Schumacher’s pre-
   Incident harassment.
          It is a close question as to whether Johnson has presented sufficient
   evidence to create a factual dispute as to whether Birke was a supervisor with
   either “‘authority to address the harassment problem’ or an ‘affirmative
   duty’ to report harassment learns of the harassment in question.” Abbt, 28
   F.4th at 607. It is true that Birke had the title of Acting Director of Animal
   Care; and at oral argument, Johnson pressed this title. Reliance on that mere
   title alone, however, is insufficient to carry Johnson’s burden of establishing
   the elements of her claim at the summary judgment stage. Johnson provides
   no evidence, organization chart or otherwise, to support her allegations about
   Birke’s position relative to hers. Evidence in the record actually indicates that
   Johnson had a different employee classification than the veterinarians with
   whom she worked, and had different supervisory structures (as noted earlier,
   Jason had explained to Johnson “that because she was staff and Dr. Schu-
   macher was faculty he could not open up an investigation until he consulted
   with Vice-Chancellor Moerchbacher”). Indeed Birke, like Schumacher, was
   a veterinarian in the Animal Care division—and Johnson concedes that Schu-
   macher was not her supervisor.
          There is deposition testimony in which Birke is asked “did you ever
   instruct Dr. Schumacher to avoid and stay away from Ms. Johnson?”, to
   which Birke says “yes.” Inferring from this exchange that Birke had discipli-
   nary authority over Schumacher, however, would be an inference predicated
   on multiple assumptions, and seemingly contradicted by Johnson’s own sug-
   gestion that Schumacher would speak to Birke in a derogatory manner and

                                          12
Case: 22-30699     Document: 00517025399            Page: 13   Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                     No. 22-30699

   that Birke’s alleged attempts to stop Schumacher’s behavior were ineffec-
   tive. Moreover, such an inference is an argument that Johnson herself does
   not make. On balance, therefore, it has not been shown either that Birke, as
   faculty, would have had supervisory authority over Johnson, who was staff;
   or that Birke had disciplinary authority over Schumacher. We thus agree with
   the district court that there is insufficient evidence in the record upon which
   to impute knowledge of Schumacher’s pre-Incident events to LSUHSC.
                                          C.
          Johnson’s third claim is that LSUHSC retaliated against her for re-
   porting Schumacher’s harassment by moving her to the storage room while
   the investigation was ongoing.
          Although in her brief and at oral argument Johnson argues she has di-
   rect evidence of retaliatory intent from Curtis’ alleged statements, these are
   only found in Johnson’s complaint, and a party opposing a properly-sup-
   ported summary judgment motion “may not rest upon mere allegations con-
   tained in the pleadings, but must set forth and support by summary judgment
   evidence specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”
   Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing
   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-57 (1986)). “Where, as
   here, the plaintiff seeks to prove causation by circumstantial evidence, she
   carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation, and
   the retaliation claim is analyzed under a McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
   framework.” Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 1000 (citations and internal punctuation
   omitted).
          Under that framework, the employee must show that “(1) she en-
   gaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action;
   and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the ad-
   verse employment action.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

                                          13
Case: 22-30699         Document: 00517025399                Page: 14       Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                            No. 22-30699

   omitted). Upon that successful showing, the burden shifts to the employer to
   “provide ‘a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason’ for the adverse employ-
   ment action.” Id. (quoting Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571,
   577 (5th Cir. 2020). The employee can then attack any proffered reason as
   pretextual. Id.
           As the Supreme Court has expressed, an adverse action for the pur-
   poses of Title VII retaliation need only be one that a reasonable employee
   would have found “materially adverse,” meaning “it . . . might have dis-
   suaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting [protected activity].”
   Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68. As such, the district court erred when it required
   Johnson to show that she suffered an “adverse employment action” “con-
   sist[ing] of ‘ultimate employment decisions’ such as hiring, firing, demoting,
   promoting, granting leave, and compensating.”7 Johnson was not, therefore,
   required to show a specific adverse employment action to establish her retal-
   iation claim.
           Under the proper standard for Title VII retaliation—whether reason-
   able employees would have been dissuaded from protected activity—the par-
   ties dispute whether Johnson has established a prima facie case. We need not
   decide this issue. Even if we assume Johnson meets her burden in establishing
   that prima facie case, it is clear that Johnson fails under the third step of the
   McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework: LSUHSC provided a
           _____________________
           7
               This is, moreover, a standard that our court has recently summarily repudiated.
   Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (“Despite [Title
   VII’s] broad language, we have long limited the universe of actionable adverse employment
   actions to so-called ‘ultimate employment decisions.’ We end that interpretive incongruity
   today. . . . [W]e hold that a plaintiff plausibly alleges a disparate-treatment claim under Title
   VII if she pleads discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, or the ‘terms, conditions,
   or privileges’ of her employment. She need not also show an ‘ultimate employment
   decision,’ a phrase that appears nowhere in the statute and that thwarts legitimate claims
   of workplace bias.”).

                                                  14
Case: 22-30699     Document: 00517025399            Page: 15    Date Filed: 01/08/2024

                                     No. 22-30699

   legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Johnson’s relocation to the storage
   room, and Johnson advances no evidence of pretext to create a genuine dis-
   pute on the issue.
          Deposition testimony indicates the intention behind the relocation
   was to separate Johnson from Schumacher during the investigation. LSU-
   HSC believed it would be a “safe place” where she would not run into Schu-
   macher, and there was limited space. Johnson responds that LSUHSC should
   have found her another room, and that “[i]f LSU[HSC] could transfer her
   remotely once, LSU[HSC] could have done it again.” Speculation that she
   could have been assigned another room, however, does not demonstrate that
   LSUHSC’s reasons for assigning Johnson to the storage room were pre-
   textual. It is unclear what other rooms existed—Johnson does not provide
   any evidence to suggest those did exist—and Birke testified that there was
   limited space. Indeed, Johnson herself acknowledges that Curtis and HR
   thought she needed to be close to the faculty in Animal Services, as the stor-
   age room was. Therefore, Johnson has failed to marshal evidence to demon-
   strate that LSUHSC did not relocate her to the storage room for legitimate,
   non-retaliatory ends, and her claim for retaliation fails.
                                         IV.
          Because the record does not contain evidence to demonstrate a genu-
   ine factual dispute as to whether LSUHSC took prompt remedial action to
   address Johnson’s complaint about the Incident or LSUHSC’s knowledge of
   Schumacher’s pre-Incident behavior, we AFFIRM summary judgment on
   Johnson’s harassment claims. Similarly, because Johnson fails to create a
   genuine dispute of fact that LSUHSC’s reasons for relocating her to the stor-
   age room were pretextual, we also AFFIRM summary judgment on John-
   son’s retaliation claim.

                                          15