Court Opinion

ID: 9912429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:01:51.969498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:18.613649
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 22, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

   SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                   _________________________

                                         SC-2023-0421
                                   _________________________

                                       Leah Abbott Belser

                                                      v.

                                           Blount County

                          Appeal from Blount Circuit Court
                                   (CV-22-900108)

WISE, Justice.

        Leah Abbott Belser, the plaintiff below, appeals from a judgment

entered by the Blount Circuit Court in favor of Blount County, the

defendant below. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

                                 Facts and Procedural History
SC-2023-0421

     This case involves a lodging tax in Blount County that was levied

pursuant to Act No. 2019-410, Ala. Acts ("the Act"). In its judgment, the

trial court set forth the following undisputed facts:

          "1. Act 2019-410 was introduced as House Bill 564 in
     the 2019 Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature.

           "2.   [House Bill] 564 came before the House of
     Representatives on May 8, 2019. Because the general fund
     and education budgets had not yet been passed, Ala. Const.
     Art. IV, § 71.01 required the House to first pass a budget
     isolation resolution ('BIR') by 'not less than three-fifths of a
     quorum present.'

           "3. The House of Representatives has interpreted this
     requirement in two different ways since § 71.01 was passed in
     1981. From ratification until 2016, the House interpreted §
     71.01 as requiring that a budget isolation resolution be passed
     by at least three-fifths of the members present and voting.
     Beginning in the 2017 Legislative Session, the House started
     to require a minimum of thirty-two (32) votes on any budget
     isolation resolution, reasoning that 'a quorum present' is fifty-
     three of the one hundred and five members, and that three-
     fifths of fifty-three members is thirty-two members.

           "4. The House passed the BIR on May 8, 2019 ….
     [House Bill] 564 was signed into law by Governor Ivey on June
     6, 2019.

          "5. The Blount County Commission levied the tax in
     accordance with the authority granted to it by Act 2019-410."

                                     2
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On July 8, 2019, the Blount County Commission enacted a resolution

that provided that, pursuant to the Act, a 4% lodging tax would be levied

in Blount County effective September 1, 2019.

      On August 29, 2022, Belser filed a putative "Class Action

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunction, Tax Refund and Other

Relief," challenging the constitutionality of the Act. 1 Among other things,

she alleged that the Act is "void for violation of Amend. No. 448, 'the

Budget Isolation Amendment." Specifically, she contended:

            "29. The citizens of this state, being aware of what has
      transpired in the past regarding bills making basic
      appropriations, directly addressed the responsibilities of not
      only the Governor, but also of the Legislature, in their
      primary task of passing general fund and education budgets
      during each regular session of the Legislature. Amendment
      No. 448 to the Alabama Constitution requires that the
      Governor '[o]n or before the second legislative day of each
      regular session of the legislature ... transmit to the legislature
      for its consideration a proposed budget for the then next
      ensuing budget period.' Section (c) of Amendment No. 448
      provides that '[t]he duty of the legislature at any regular
      session to make the basic appropriations for any budget
      period that will commence before the first day of any
      succeeding regular session shall be paramount.' (Emphasis
      added). Ala. Const. Art. IV, § 71.01(C) (recodifying Ala. Const.
      Amend. No. 448, the 'Budget Isolation Amendment -- that
      appropriations bills must be 'paramount': passage of a Budget

      1The record does not indicate that the trial court ruled on Belser's

request for class certification.

                                      3
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    Isolation Resolution ('BIR'). 'The house in which a bill is
    pending can, by adoption of a resolution concurred in by three-
    fifths of the quorum present, consider other legislation Id.
    (Emphasis added). More specifically, Amendment 448(C)
    states, in pertinent part

         " '[P]rovided ... that following adoption, by vote of
         either house of not less than three-fifths of a
         quorum present, of a resolution declaring that the
         provisions of this paragraph (C) shall not be
         applicable in that house to a particular bill, which
         shall be specified in said resolution by number and
         title, the bill so specified may proceed to final
         passage therein.

    "Ala. Const. Amend. No. 448(C) (emphasis added).

           "30. The requirement of Amendment 448(C) is that 3/5
    of a 'quorum present' vote in favor of passing the BIR. Exhibit
    2 proves that the 'quorum present' at the vote on the BIR
    related to [House Bill] 564 was 92. It is axiomatic that three
    fifths of 92 equals 55.1.

          "31. On May 8, 2019, prior to the presentment of the
    State Education or General Fund Budgets to the Governor,
    the House of Representatives considered a BIR for [House
    Bill] 564. The recorded vote total for the BIR regarding
    [House Bill] 564 was yeas: 43, nays: 0, and abstains: 49. …
    Thus, in the presence of a quorum of 92, the 43 favorable votes
    fell below the 55 votes required to comply with Amendment
    448(C). Nonetheless, on May 8, 2019, the presiding officer of
    the House signed and transmitted [House Bill] 564 to the
    Senate in violation of Amendment 448, Ala. Const., Art. IV, §
    71.01. …

          "32. Accordingly, the Act is null, void, and unenforceable
    by reason of violation of Amendment 448(C), Ala. Const., Art.
    IV, § 71.01."
                                   4
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     On March 20, 2023, Belser filed a motion for a summary judgment.

In her motion, she argued that the Act "is unconstitutional because the

budget isolation resolution ('BIR') required by Amendment 448 to the

Alabama Constitution lacked sufficient favorable votes to comply with

Amendment 448(C)." She also argued:

          "2. On or about May 8, 2019, a Budget Isolation
     Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives for
     House Bill 564.

           "3. The recorded vote on the Budget Isolation Resolution
     relating to House Bill 564 was yeas: 43, nays: 0, and abstains:
     49.

         "4. On May 8, 2019, the State Education and General
     Fund Budgets had not been presented to the Governor.

          "5. On May 8, 2019, the presiding officer of the House of
     Representatives signed and transmitted House Bill 564 to the
     Senate."

Belser went on to argue:

          "The … language [of Amendment 448] clearly and
     unambiguously reveals the purpose and intent of Amendment
     448 in four critical ways. First, that the objective of the
     Amendment is to make adoption of the state budgets the
     paramount -- or primary -- duty of the legislature. Second, to
     accomplish this objective when the legislature has failed to
     make basic appropriations, the Amendment prohibits the
     presiding officers of the house and senate from signing or
     transmitting any non-appropriations bill without first
     passing a [Budget Isolation Resolution ('BIR')] that complies
     with the Amendment's formula. Third, by expressly and
                                   5
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    unambiguously setting the number of votes required to
    lawfully adopt a BIR at three-fifths of a quorum present, the
    Amendment intentionally establishes a high minimum
    threshold of votes necessary to proceed with a non-
    appropriations bill when the legislature has not yet met its
    paramount constitutional duty to make basic appropriations.
    Ala. Const., Amendment No. 448(C). And fourth, the
    Amendment restrains legislative authority by expressly
    prohibiting the legislature from altering the number of votes
    required to adopt a BIR by rule or statute. Ala. Const.,
    Amendment 448(E).           Taken together, these clearly
    demonstrate that Amendment 448's primary objective is to
    force the legislature to prioritize basic appropriations and to
    restrain legislative authority to act upon other matters unless
    and until it has met this paramount duty.

         "Despite Amendment 448's express prohibition against
    rules or statutes altering the constitutional formula for
    determining the number of votes required to adopt a BIR[,]
    Defendant relies upon House Rule 36 …, which purports to
    diminish Amendment 448's constitutional threshold of votes
    necessary to adopt a BIR by authorizing the legislature to
    adopt a budget isolation resolution with only 'three-fifths [of
    a] majority of the members present and voting.' Specifically,
    House Rule 36 provides:

         " 'The following provisions shall apply to budget
         isolation resolutions (BIRs) that are provided for
         in Subsection C of [Amendment 448] of the
         Constitution of Alabama ...:

         " '(1) The Speaker shall determine the time allowed
         for debate before calling for a vote.

         " '(2) If the resolution receives the three-fifths
         majority of the members present and voting
         required by the Constitution of the State of
         Alabama …, the Clerk shall call the attached bill.
                                  6
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           " '(3) If the resolution is not adopted, the House
           shall proceed with other business.

           " '(4) Each resolution is subject to one motion for
           reconsideration.

           " '([5])  Pertaining     to    local   bills   and
           notwithstanding [House] Rule 31, following
           adoption of the resolution, any member may make
           a motion to provide for an expression of local
           courtesy on the resolution. Such motions, which
           are not subject to debate or reconsideration, may
           only be voted on by members who represent areas
           outside the counties or municipalities affected by
           the bill associated with the resolution. Yea votes
           on the motion shall be reflected in the Journal as
           those members who voted for the resolution only
           as a matter of local courtesy and not as a position
           for or against the bill. All votes on motions to
           express local courtesy must be recorded votes.'

     "Ala. House Rule 36 (emphasis added)."

Belser argued that House Rule 36(2) "is a clear violation of Amendment

448(E)." Specifically, she contended that

     "[t]he purpose and intent of House Rule 36 is immediately
     evident -- to circumvent Amendment 448(C) by substituting a
     lesser favorable vote requirement than the constitutionally-
     mandated 'three-fifths of a quorum present,' in effect allowing
     the adoption of a [budget isolation resolution] with as few as
     two affirmative votes when only three votes are cast in the
     House of Representatives, a legislative body containing 105
     members."

                                   7
SC-2023-0421

     Belser attached an affidavit from Jeff Woodard, the Clerk of the

House of Representatives. In his affidavit, Woodard stated:

           "2. I am the Clerk of the Alabama House of
     Representatives. I was elected to this position in May 2012
     as the 'clerk in waiting' to take over when the former clerk
     retired. I officially took office on October 1, 2012, and was re-
     elected to serve a full term in January 2015.

          "3. The duties of the clerk include, but are not limited
     to: certifying each bill that passes as required by House of
     Representative Rule 82; enforcing the House Rules as
     appropriate; providing parliamentary advice to the House;
     keeping its records; and supervising other legislative staff.

         "4. I previously served as the Assistant Clerk from
     January 2011 to May 2012.

          "5. Prior to becoming the Assistant Clerk, I was the
     Chief of Staff to the Speaker of the House from January 1999
     to January 2011, and a Confidential Assistant from January
     1991 to January 1999.

          "6. I worked as a journalist covering Alabama politics for
     various publications from 1982 until 1991.

           "7. I have personal knowledge of the way in which the
     Alabama House of Representatives has interpreted and
     implemented Ala. Const. Art. IV, § 71.01 since it was
     proclaimed as ratified on December 10, 1984. This knowledge
     is based on both my own personal observations and experience
     as well as my familiarity with legislative history and records.

          "8. From ratification of the amendment until 2016, the
     Alabama House of Representatives interpreted § 71.01 as
     requiring a budget isolation resolution be passed by at least
     three-fifths of the members present and voting.          This
                                    8
SC-2023-0421

    interpretation was based on historic, legal, and practical
    considerations, which were discussed at length during the
    litigation in Jefferson County v. Taxpayers, Civil Action No.
    CV-2015-903133.00, Appeal Nos. 1150326 and 1150327[,]
    specifically including in the Brief of Amici Curiae the Speaker
    of the Alabama House of Representatives and the President
    Pro Tempore of the Alabama Senate in Support of Jefferson
    County and the Jefferson County Commission. This practice
    was formally codified in Alabama House of Representatives,
    Rule 36, in 1995.

          "9. The House of Representatives has always
    maintained that its interpretation is a valid exercise of the
    House's inherent authority to govern its own proceedings, and
    that Rule 36 is a valid exercise of the House's duty and
    authority under Alabama law to adopt formal rules of
    parliamentary procedure. Nevertheless, beginning in the
    2017 Legislative Session, the House -- out of an abundance of
    caution -- started to require a minimum of thirty-two (32)
    votes on any budget isolation resolution. A budget isolation
    resolution must be passed by a vote of 'not less than three-
    fifths of a quorum present (Ala. Const. § 71.01(C) (emphasis
    added)). 'A quorum present' in the House is fifty-three of the
    one hundred and five members. Three-fifths of fifty-three
    members is thirty-two members. This procedure has been
    followed in each succeeding session.

          "10. Based on my experience with and knowledge of the
    legislative process, it is my opinion that requiring budget
    isolation resolutions to be passed by three-fifths of the specific
    quorum actually present at the time in the House of
    Representatives would be impractical and would introduce
    uncertainty and needless complexity into the process.

         "11. All statements made in this Affidavit are based on
    my personal knowledge and are true and correct to the best of
    my knowledge. Any opinion is based on my personal
    knowledge and perceptions."
                                    9
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(Emphasis in original.)

     On May 10, 2023, Blount County filed its response in opposition to

Belser's motion for a summary judgment and its own motion for a

judgment on the pleadings. Relying on this Court's decision in

Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority v. City of Birmingham,

912 So. 2d 204 (Ala. 2005) ("BJCCA"), the County argued that this case

presents a nonjusticiable political question. 2

     On May 12, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on the parties'

motions. On May 31, 2023, the trial court entered its judgment, in which

it denied Belser's motion for a summary judgment and granted the

County's motion for a judgment on the pleadings. This appeal followed.

                                Discussion

     Belser argues that the language in Art. IV, § 71.01, Ala. Const. 1901

(Off. Recomp.), which was formerly Amend. No. 448, Ala. Const. 1901,

     2The County raised other arguments that are not relevant to our

disposition of this appeal. However, we do note that one of the County's
other arguments was a contention that the legitimacy of House Rule 36,
upon which Belser bases her argument, was not before the trial court
because the budget isolation resolution at issue in this case was passed
using a procedure other than the procedure set forth in House Rule 36,
which was explained in Woodard's affidavit.
                                   10
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requires that any budget isolation resolution ("BIR") be passed by at least

three-fifths of the members who were actually present and voting when

the BIR was passed. However, based on the information set forth in

Woodard's affidavit, the Alabama House of Representatives instead

requires a minimum of 32 votes on a BIR, based on the fact that a quorum

of the 105 members of the House is 53 members and that three-fifths of

53 members is 32 members. The trial court held that the question of how

to determine what constitutes "not less than three-fifths of a quorum

present" is a nonjusticiable political question.

     Belser argues that the trial court erred in concluding that this case

involves a nonjusticiable political question. In reaching its decision, the

trial court relied on this Court's previous decision in BJCCA, in which

this Court considered what constitutes a nonjusticiable political question,

explaining as follows:

           "The Constitution of Alabama expressly adopts the
     doctrine of separation of powers that is only implicit in the
     Constitution of the United States. Opinion of the Justices No.
     380, 892 So. 2d 332, 334 n.1 (Ala. 2004). This Court has said
     that the Alabama Constitution provides that the 'three
     principal powers of government shall be exercised by separate
     departments,' and it 'expressly vest[s] the three great powers
     of government in three separate branches.' Ex parte Jenkins,
     723 So. 2d 649, 653-54 (Ala. 1998). Section 42, Ala. Const.
     1901, provides:
                                    11
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               " 'The powers of the government of the State
         of Alabama shall be divided into three distinct
         departments, each of which shall be confided to a
         separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which
         are legislative, to one; those which are executive,
         to another; and those which are judicial, to
         another.'

    "Section 43 provides:

               " 'In the government of this state, except in
         the instances in this Constitution hereinafter
         expressly directed or permitted, the legislative
         department shall never exercise the executive and
         judicial powers, or either of them; the executive
         shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
         powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never
         exercise the legislative and executive powers, or
         either of them; to the end that it may be a
         government of laws and not of men.'

          " ' "Great care must be exercised by the courts not to
    usurp the functions of other departments of government. §
    43, Constitution 1901. No branch of the government is so
    responsible for the autonomy of the several governmental
    units and branches as the judiciary." ' Piggly Wiggly No. 208,
    Inc. v. Dutton, 601 So. 2d 907, 911 (Ala. 1992) (quoting Finch
    v. State, 271 Ala. 499, 503, 124 So. 2d 825, 829 (1960)). Thus,
    just as this Court will declare legislative usurpation of the
    judicial power violative of the separation-of-powers provision
    of our Constitution, see, e.g., Ex parte Jenkins, supra, so it
    must decline to exercise the judicial power when to do so
    would infringe upon the exercise of the legislative power.

         "The separation-of-powers provision of the Alabama
    Constitution limits the jurisdiction of this Court. …

                                  12
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          "… [Q]uestions regarding jurisdiction, that is, questions
    of the constitutional authority of the courts to exercise power
    over a matter -- going to the very core of the Constitution's
    structuring the government to constrain its exercise of power
    -- are of such importance that it is the duty of this Court to
    consider the absence of jurisdiction on our own initiative. See
    Baldwin County v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42 (Ala. 2003).
    The oath of office taken by the Justices on this Court to
    'support the Constitution of the State of Alabama' requires us
    to consider whether this Court has jurisdiction over a
    particular matter. See § 279, Ala. Const. 1901.

          "Because the judicial branch 'shall never exercise the
    legislative and executive powers, or either of them,' this Court
    will not decide 'political questions,' even if submitted to it.
    The Supreme Court of the United States has with some
    frequency      addressed     whether       certain   issues   are
    nonjusticiable political questions. We have previously
    referred to the United States Supreme Court's formulation of
    what constitutes a nonjusticiable political question, and we
    look to it again in this case. See, e.g., Ex parte James, 836 So.
    2d 813, 842 n.25 [(Ala. 2002)]; Ex parte James, 713 So. 2d 869,
    903 [(Ala. 1997)] ; State ex rel. James v. Reed, 364 So. 2d 303,
    305 (Ala. 1978). In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691,
    7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962), the Supreme Court of the United
    States offered the following description:

              " 'It is apparent that several formulations
         which vary slightly according to the settings in
         which the questions arise may describe a political
         question, although each has one or more elements
         which identify it as essentially a function of the
         separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of
         any case held to involve a political question is
         found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
         commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
         department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable
         and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3]
                                   13
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         the impossibility of deciding without an initial
         policy determination of a kind clearly for
         nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a
         court's undertaking independent resolution
         without expressing lack of the respect due
         coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
         unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
         political decision already made; or [6] the
         potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
         pronouncements by various departments on one
         question.'

    "369 U.S. at 217, 82 S. Ct. 691. The presence of one or more
    of the factors listed in Baker v. Carr indicates that a question
    is 'political,' that is, one reserved for, or more suitably
    determined by, one of the political branches of government. If
    a question is one properly to be decided by the executive or
    legislative branch of government, rather than by the judicial
    branch, we will not decide it. At least three of the factors
    enunciated in Baker v. Carr are present in this case.

         "1.   Textually     demonstrable constitutional
               commitment of the issue to a coordinate
               political department.

          "In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 113 S. Ct. 732,
    122 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993), a former chief judge of the United
    States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
    Judge Walter L. Nixon, was impeached by the United States
    House of Representatives and was convicted by the Senate.
    Nixon argued that Senate Rule XI, under which he was tried
    and convicted, was unconstitutional because it provided for a
    Senate committee, rather than for the full Senate, to
    participate in the evidentiary hearings.

          "The first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause,
    Art. I, § 3, cl. 7, United States Constitution, states that '[t]he
    senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.'
                                   14
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    The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the
    matter is nonjusticiable, holding that the language of the
    Impeachment Trial Clause demonstrates a commitment of the
    matter of impeachments to the Senate. The Supreme Court
    explained that in order to determine whether there is a
    textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of an issue
    to a coordinate political department, a court must, in the first
    instance, interpret the text in question and determine to what
    extent the issue is textually committed. 506 U.S. at 228, 113
    S. Ct. 732 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519, 89
    S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1969)). The Supreme Court
    concluded that the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial
    Clause is a grant of authority to the Senate and that the word
    'sole' indicates that the authority is reposed in the Senate and
    nowhere else. 506 U.S. at 229, 113 S. Ct. 732. The Supreme
    Court was unpersuaded by Nixon's argument that 'sole'
    means merely that the Senate, as opposed to the courts or a
    lay jury or a Senate committee, may try impeachments. The
    Supreme Court, quoting Webster's Third New International
    Dictionary (1971), noted that 'sole' is defined as ' "functioning
    ... independently and without assistance or interference," ' 506
    U.S. at 231, 113 S. Ct. 732, and that allowing judicial review
    of impeachments would be inconsistent with the use of the
    word 'sole.' The Court held, therefore, that the use of the word
    'sole' in the Impeachment Trial Clause means that the
    Senate's impeachment power is not subject to judicial review.

          "The Supreme Court's distinguishing of Nixon from
    Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed.
    2d 491 (1969), is instructive. In Powell, the Supreme Court
    had examined the issue whether the constitutional
    commitment to the House of Representatives of the authority
    to judge the qualifications of its members precluded judicial
    review of such a determination. Article I, § 5, provides: 'Each
    House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and
    qualifications of its own members.' However, Art. I, § 2,
    specifies three requirements for membership in the House: a
    member of the House must have attained the age of 25 years,
                                   15
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    must have been a citizen of the United States for 7 years, and
    must be an inhabitant of the state from which he is elected.
    In Powell, the Supreme Court held that those three specific
    requirements impart to the word 'qualifications' in Art. I, § 5,
    'a precise, limited nature.' 395 U.S. at 522, 89 S. Ct. 1944.
    Thus, the House's argument that its power to judge the
    qualifications of its own members is a textually demonstrable
    commitment of unreviewable authority is 'defeated by the
    existence of this separate provision specifying the only
    qualifications which might be imposed for House
    membership.' Nixon, 506 U.S. at 237, 113 S. Ct. 732
    (discussing Powell).

          "In Nixon, on the other hand, there is no separate
    provision of the Constitution that would be defeated by
    allowing the Senate final authority to determine the meaning
    of the word 'try' in the Impeachment Trial Clause. 506 U.S.
    at 237-38, 113 S. Ct. 732. The Supreme Court in Nixon
    recognized that, although courts do possess the power to
    review legislative or executive actions that transgress
    identifiable textual limits, the word 'try' in the Impeachment
    Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on
    the authority committed to the Senate to conduct
    impeachment proceedings. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court
    concluded, the question of how the Senate may 'try' an
    impeachment is a nonjusticiable political question.

           "In State of Alabama ex rel. James v. Reed, 364 So. 2d
    303 (Ala. 1978), this Court considered whether the question
    of a legislator's ability to hold office is nonjusticiable because
    it is committed to the legislature by the text of the Alabama
    Constitution. The State brought a quo warranto action
    challenging the qualifications of Thomas Reed to hold office
    as a member of the Alabama House of Representatives. Reed
    had been previously convicted of attempted bribery. This
    Court recognized that if the authority to pass on the question
    of Reed's eligibility is vested exclusively in the House of
    Representatives, then the question presented is a political one
                                   16
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    barred from judicial resolution by the separation-of-powers
    doctrine. 364 So. 2d at 305. Reed contended that §§ 51 and
    53, Ala. Const. 1901, are a textually demonstrable
    constitutional commitment of the issue of a House member's
    eligibility to the legislature and, therefore, that the question
    is nonjusticiable. Section 51 provides: 'Each house shall
    choose its own officers and shall judge the election, returns,
    and qualifications of its members.' Section 53 provides: 'Each
    house shall have power to determine the rules of its
    proceedings....'

           "This Court determined in Reed that §§ 51 and 53 do not
    demonstrate a constitutional commitment of the issue to the
    legislature. However, the holding expressly rested on the
    presence of § 60, Ala. Const. 1901, which provides that '[n]o
    person convicted of embezzlement of the public money,
    bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to
    the legislature, or capable of holding any office of trust or
    profit in this state.' This Court held that § 60 is a specific
    constitutional limitation on legislative authority, like the
    three requirements for membership in the United States
    House of Representatives the Supreme Court of the United
    States considered in Powell v. McCormack. Because § 60
    expressly limits legislative authority, this Court concluded,
    judicial enforcement of its mandate does not 'derogate the
    principle of separation of powers.' 364 So. 2d at 306. This
    Court concluded that to construe §§ 51 and 53 as vesting in
    the legislature exclusive authority on the issue, thereby
    removing it from judicial cognizance, would deprive § 60 of its
    field of operation. 364 So. 2d at 306-07.

         "Section 63, Ala. Const. 1901, states that 'no bill shall
    become a law, unless ... a majority of each house be recorded
    [upon the journals] as voting in its favor.' The question
    presented in the case before us today is whether the rules and
    procedure by which the Alabama House of Representatives
    determined that the bills that became Act No. 288 and Act No.
    357 each received a majority vote of the House are subject to
                                  17
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    judicial review. Section 53, Ala. Const. 1901, expressly
    provides that '[e]ach house shall have power to determine the
    rules of its proceedings.' The power of the legislature to
    determine the rules of its own proceedings is 'unlimited except
    as controlled by other provisions of our Constitution,' and
    'unless controlled by other constitutional provisions the courts
    cannot look to the wisdom or folly, the advantages or
    disadvantages of the rules which a legislative body adopts to
    govern its own proceedings.' Opinion of the Justices No. 185,
    278 Ala. 522, 524-25, 179 So. 2d 155, 158 (1965).

          "Unlike Reed, in which an express constitutional
    prohibition on a felon's serving in the legislature was
    applicable, and unlike Powell, in which express
    constitutionally identified qualifications for membership in
    the United States House of Representatives were applicable,
    there is in the case before us no provision of the Alabama
    Constitution that defines or limits what is meant by the term
    'a majority of each house,' and there is no other provision of
    the Constitution that would be defeated by allowing the
    legislature the final authority over its internal voting rules
    and procedures. Because the Alabama Constitution contains
    no limitation on the manner in which the legislature might
    interpret the phrase 'majority of each house' and because the
    Constitution clearly grants to the legislature the power to
    determine the rules of its own proceedings, whether a
    'majority of each house' has voted in favor of a bill must be
    decided by the rules established by the legislature. We
    conclude that there is a textually demonstrable constitutional
    commitment to the legislature of the question of how to
    determine what constitutes a 'majority of each house ... voting
    in [the bill's] favor.' See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230, 113 S. Ct. 732.
    Therefore, whether the legislature conducted its internal
    voting proceedings in compliance with § 63 is a nonjusticiable
    issue.

                                    18
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         "2.   Lack of judicially discoverable and
               manageable standards   for   resolving
               question.

          " '[J]udicial action must be governed by standard, by
    rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be
    inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the
    courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned
    distinctions.' Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278, 124 S. Ct.
    1769, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2004) (discussing the 'lack of
    judicially discoverable and manageable standards' factor
    enunciated in Baker v. Carr).

          "In Nixon v. United States, Nixon argued that his
    challenge to the constitutionality of Senate Rule XI was
    justiciable and that the word 'try' in the Impeachment Trial
    Clause imposes a constitutional requirement that an
    impeachment proceeding be in the nature of a judicial trial.
    The Supreme Court of the United States held, however, that
    a variety of definitions could be assigned to the word 'try' and
    that, therefore, the term lacks sufficient precision to afford a
    'judicially discoverable and manageable standard[]' for the
    judiciary to apply in reviewing the legislative action. 506 U.S.
    at 230, 113 S. Ct. 732. The Supreme Court addressed the lack
    of a judicially discoverable and manageable standard for
    review together with its consideration of the textually
    demonstrable commitment of the matter to the legislative
    branch of government. It held that the lack of a judicially
    discoverable and manageable standard strengthened the
    conclusion that there had been a textually demonstrable
    commitment of the question to a coordinate branch of the
    government, and that the question was, therefore,
    nonjusticiable.

          "Although this Court did not speak in terms of judicially
    discoverable and manageable standards in Reed, supra, the
    determination that the question presented in that case was
    justiciable rested on the existence of a separate constitutional
                                  19
SC-2023-0421

    provision limiting the authority of the legislature in
    determining the eligibility of its members. The specific
    limitation of § 60 as to who could serve in the legislature
    provided the Court with a judicially discoverable and
    manageable standard for its review of the issue.

          "The Constitution of Alabama, the only source of any
    limitation on the authority of the legislature, offers no such
    standard by which the judicial branch of the government can
    review the legislature's voting rules and procedures with
    respect to the legislature's determination that 'a majority of
    each house' voted in favor of the bills that became Act No. 288
    and Act No. 357. The Constitution does not define the term
    'majority of each house,' and the legislature's power to
    determine its rules regarding voting procedures is not limited
    by the text of the Constitution. Therefore, there is no
    manageable standard this Court can discover to guide our
    review of the legislative action at issue in this case. Because
    of the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
    standards for resolving the question presented to us, we
    decline to decide it.

         "3.   Lack of the respect due coordinate branches
               of government.

          " 'The preservation of the constitution in its integrity
    and obedience to its mandates, is exacted alike from the
    legislative and the judicial departments of the government.'
    Mayor of Mobile v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 570, 575 (1875).
    Legislators take the same oath of office that judges and
    justices take -- to 'support the Constitution of the United
    States, and Constitution of the State of Alabama.' See § 279,
    Ala. Const. 1901. The Constitution provides that '[e]ach
    house [of the legislature] shall have power to determine the
    rules of its own proceedings,' and the judiciary should
    presume that the legislators comply with their oath of office
    when they determine and apply those rules. If the judiciary
    questions the legislature's declaration that Act No. 288 and
                                  20
SC-2023-0421

    Act No. 357 were validly enacted by the legislature, we would
    be demonstrating a lack of the respect due that coordinate
    branch of government.

          "In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed.
    294 (1892), The Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, was challenged
    as not being a law of the United States. The Supreme Court
    of the United States stated:

                " 'The signing by the Speaker of the House of
         Representatives, and by the President of the
         Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an
         official attestation by the two houses of such bill as
         one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration
         by the two houses, through their presiding officers,
         to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
         received in due form, the sanction of the legislative
         branch of the government, and that it is delivered
         to him in obedience to the constitutional
         requirement that all bills which pass Congress
         shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus
         attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in
         the public archives, its authentication as a bill that
         has passed Congress should be deemed complete
         and unimpeachable. As the President has no
         authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress,
         an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of
         State, and having the official attestations of the
         Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
         President of the Senate, and of the President of the
         United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
         assurance by the legislative and executive
         departments of the government, charged,
         respectively, with the duty of enacting and
         executing the laws, that it was passed by
         Congress.       The respect due to coequal and
         independent departments requires the judicial
         department to act upon that assurance, and to
                                  21
SC-2023-0421

         accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
         authenticated in the manner stated: leaving the
         courts to determine, when the question properly
         arises, whether the act, so authenticated, is in
         conformity with the Constitution.'

    "143 U.S. at 672, 12 S. Ct. 495 (emphasis added). The
    Supreme Court noted the uncertainty and instability that
    would result if every person were free to ' "hunt through the
    journals of a legislature to determine whether a statute,
    properly certified by the speaker of the house and the
    president of the senate, and approved by the governor, is a
    statute or not." ' 143 U.S. at 677, 12 S. Ct. 495 (quoting Weeks
    v. Smith, 81 Me. 538, 547, 18 A. 325, 327 (1889)).

          "We are here presented with a similar situation. In
    Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court of the United States stated
    that the appropriateness of attributing finality to an action of
    one of the political departments is a 'dominant consideration'
    in determining whether a question falls within the political-
    question category. 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S. Ct. 691. We, like
    the United States Supreme Court in Field v. Clark, are
    persuaded that uncertainty and instability would result if
    every person were free to 'hunt through the journals of a
    legislature to determine whether a statute, properly certified
    by the speaker of the house and the president of the senate,
    and approved by the governor, is a statute or not,' 143 U.S. at
    677, 12 S. Ct. 495 (quoting Weeks v. Smith, 81 Me. at 547, 18
    A. at 327), and the internal proceedings of the legislature
    when passing a bill were to be subject to judicial challenge.

          "The Supreme Court of the United States has explained
    that the language of Field v. Clark quoted above does not
    apply in the presence of a clear constitutional requirement
    that binds Congress. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S.
    385, 392 n.4, 110 S. Ct. 1964, 109 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1990). In
    Munoz-Flores, the Supreme Court of the United States was
    presented with a challenge to a revenue-raising act alleged
                                  22
SC-2023-0421

    not to have originated in the House of Representatives, as
    required by Art. I, § 7, cl. 1, of the Constitution of the United
    States. In Field v. Clark, the Supreme Court had held that
    courts should not question an authentication by Congress that
    a bill has passed; that authentication 'should be deemed
    complete and unimpeachable.' 143 U.S. at 672, 12 S. Ct. 495.
    However, the Origination Clause at issue in Munoz-Flores
    specifically mandates that all revenue-raising bills originate
    in the House, and there is no question as to the meaning of
    the constitutional requirement that '[a]ll Bills for raising
    revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.' We
    are not here presented with such a situation.

          "In the case before us today, there is no clear
    constitutional provision binding the legislature to a certain
    manner of determining whether a 'majority of each house' has
    voted in favor of a bill. Thus, the rationale of Field v. Clark is
    applicable, and the judiciary should not question the
    determination by the legislative branch of whether a bill was
    passed by the requisite majority vote of the house. To do so
    would be to demonstrate a lack of the respect due a coordinate
    branch of government.        As Justice Scalia says in his
    concurrence in Munoz-Flores:

         " 'Mutual regard between the coordinate branches,
         and the interest of certainty, both demand that
         official representations regarding such matters of
         internal process be accepted at face value.'

    "495 U.S. at 410, 110 S. Ct. 1964 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
    judgment).

          "Because judicial review of the issue whether the bills
    that became Act No. 288 and Act No. 357 received the
    favorable vote of a 'majority of each house' would express a
    lack of the respect due that coordinate branch of government,
    the question presented is nonjusticiable. We, therefore,
    decline to decide it.
                                   23
SC-2023-0421

                               "Conclusion

           "Section 53, Ala. Const. 1901, specifically commits to
     each house of the legislature the 'power to determine the rules
     of its own proceedings.' Our Constitution contains no
     identifiable textual limitation on the legislature's authority
     with respect to voting procedures that would permit judicial
     review of those procedures. There is also a lack of judicially
     discoverable and manageable standards for resolving whether
     the House of Representatives constitutionally passed Act No.
     288 and Act No. 357. Finally, for the judicial branch to declare
     the legislature's procedure for determining that a bill has
     passed would be to express a lack of the respect due that
     coordinate branch of government. For each of these three
     reasons, this case presents a nonjusticiable political
     question."

912 So. 2d at 212-21 (footnotes omitted).

     In its judgment in this case, the trial court stated, in relevant part:

          "This Court holds that the proper interpretation of Ala.
     Const. Art. IV, § 71.01 is a nonjusticiable political question
     under the authority of Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center
     Authority v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204 (Ala. 2005).

           "BJCCA was concerned with the proper interpretation
     of the voting requirement contained in Ala. Const. 1901, Art.
     IV, § 63. This case presents a very similar issue to that
     considered in BJCCA. Like the phrase 'a majority of each
     house' at issue in that case, 'three-fifths of a quorum present'
     is not specifically defined in the Alabama Constitution of
     1901, nor does § 71.01 purport to except this requirement from
     the general rule that the Legislature has the authority to
     determine its own rules of proceedings.

                                    24
SC-2023-0421

          "Also like § 63, § 71.01 can be interpreted in at least
    three different ways: 1) as applying only to that portion of a
    quorum present and voting; 2) as requiring a minimum
    number of thirty-two affirmative votes, representing three-
    fifths of a quorum present which is the method used in
    passing the budget isolation resolution attached to [the]
    Act…; or, 3) as requiring an affirmative vote of at least three-
    fifths of the members constituting the quorum present at the
    time, which is the method suggested by Plaintiff Belser. The
    validity of the first 'present and voting' method is not before
    this Court. The Parties' arguments regarding the second and
    third methods hinge on the use of the indefinite article 'a,' as
    opposed to the definite article 'the,' in § 71.01.

          "At argument, Plaintiff criticized the Legislature for
    improperly attempting to thwart judicial review of the budget
    isolation resolutions by failing to include the necessary
    information in the Journals, indicating that the Legislature
    has stopped publishing even unofficial information regarding
    the vote on budget isolation resolutions on its website.
    Plaintiff stated that the Legislature easily could provide this
    information. As pointed out by Defendant, however, nothing
    in § 71.01 requires the Legislature to take or record the vote
    using any particular method, i.e., by yeas and nays. The
    courts cannot impose extra-Constitutional duties on the
    Legislature. See, e.g., Caudle v. Cotton, 234 Ala, 126, 128-
    129, 173 So. 847, 849 (1937); Cf. Ala. Const. 1901, Art. IV, §
    63.

          "Without the underlying information regarding the
    quorum present at the moment of a BIR vote and the number
    of legislators voting for, against, or abstaining from a vote, a
    court could never apply any particular interpretation of §
    71.01 to a specific case. The judiciary's role is to decide cases
    involving a 'definite and concrete' controversy brought before
    it by adverse parties; 'the declaratory judgment statutes do
    not empower courts to decide moot questions or abstract
    propositions or to give advisory opinions…' Baldwin County
                                   25
SC-2023-0421

    v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 46, 47 (Ala. 2003)(internal
    quotations and emphasis omitted). This Court accordingly
    does not have subject matter jurisdiction to issue a legal
    conclusion that does not and/or cannot resolve a justiciable
    controversy.

          "The Journal of the House of Representatives in this
    case indicates only that the BIR was passed by three-fifths of
    a quorum present. It is well-established that the Journals are
    the only admissible evidence of the actions of the Legislature;
    they 'can neither be contradicted nor amplified by loose
    memoranda made by the clerical officers of the house. Nor
    will it be presumed from the silence of the journals on a
    matter of which it is proper for them to speak that either
    house has disregarded a constitutional requirement in the
    passage of an act, except in those cases where the organic law
    expressly requires the journals to show the action taken, as
    where it requires the yeas and nays be entered.' State v.
    Joseph, 175 Ala. 579, 594, 57 So. 942, 947 (1911). The need to
    go so far beyond the text of [the] Act … and the Journals of
    the Legislature distinguishes this case from Magee v. Boyd,
    175 So. 3d 79 (Ala. 2015). This Court notes that Magee v.
    Boyd does not purport to somehow overrule or even limit
    BJCCA, but instead explicitly distinguishes the two cases.
    175 So. 3d at 104.

           "The fact that § 71.01 does not require the Legislature
    to take or record a budget isolation resolution vote by any
    particular method only emphasizes several key factors
    identified by the BJCCA Court in its determination,
    including:      '[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
    commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
    [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
    for resolving it; ... [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking
    independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
    due coordinate branches of government.' 912 So. 2d at 214-
    15."

                                    26
SC-2023-0421

     This Court's reasoning in BJCCA supports the trial court's

conclusion that this case involves a nonjusticiable political question. As

was the situation in BJCCA, the Alabama Constitution does not place a

limitation on the manner in which the legislature might interpret the

phrase "not less than three-fifths of a quorum present."        Also, the

Constitution clearly gives the legislature the power to determine the

rules of its own proceedings. Therefore, there is a textually demonstrable

constitutional commitment to the legislature of the question of how to

determine what constitutes "not less than three-fifths of a quorum

present." Additionally, there are not any judicially discoverable and

manageable     standards    for   resolving   whether   the   House     of

Representatives constitutionally passed the BIR for House Bill 564 that

became the Act. Finally, judicial review of the issue as to whether the

BIR for House Bill 564 received the favorable vote of a "not less than

three-fifths of a quorum present" would express a lack of the respect due

to a coordinate branch of government. For these reasons, we conclude

that the issue whether the legislature conducted its internal voting

proceedings in compliance with § 71.01 is a nonjusticiable political

question.

                                    27
SC-2023-0421

                               Conclusion

     For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.3

     AFFIRMED.

     Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and Cook, JJ.,

concur.

     Mitchell, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

     Shaw and Sellers, JJ., concur in the result.

     3Because we conclude that Belser's challenge of the Act raises a

nonjusticiable political question, we pretermit addressing the remaining
issues she has raised in her brief to this Court.
                                     28
SC-2023-0421

MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).

      The idea that courts should refrain from deciding "political

questions" is deeply embedded in our jurisprudence. See Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("Questions, in their nature

political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the

executive, can never be made in this [C]ourt."). But the application and

scope of the political question doctrine has generated confusion within

the courts -- including our own -- with Birmingham-Jefferson Civic

Center Authority v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204 (2005)

("BJCCA"), being a salient example.     I write separately in an effort to

clear up some of this confusion and to express my views on the limits of

the political question doctrine.

     In BJCCA, this Court said that political questions have

jurisdictional consequences. 912 So. 2d at 213 (noting that while neither

party had "argued that the issue before us is nonjusticiable … it is the

duty of this Court to consider the absence of jurisdiction" (emphasis

added)). Consequently, once the Court determined in BJCCA that the

issue presented was a nonjusticiable political question, it concluded that

                                   29
SC-2023-0421

it must dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See id.

at 225.

     In my view, that reasoning conflated two distinct concepts:

jurisdiction and justiciability. While the two often go hand in hand, they

are not synonymous; it is possible for our Court to exercise subject-matter

jurisdiction in a controversy that proves to raise a nonjusticiable issue.

That is true of cases raising political questions because the political

question doctrine does not "rest on limits on … courts' authority to decide

cases." John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 Am. U.L.

Rev. 457, 509 (2017). 4   Rather, it tells us under which circumstances

courts should accept the lawful authority of another political branch. Of

course, before courts may decide whether they should defer to the

     4The   leading United States Supreme Court case on the political
question doctrine, Baker v. Carr, 360 U.S. 186, 196 (1962), also preserved
this important distinction by "classif[ying] the political question doctrine
as one of non-judicial finality, not as a limitation on Article III or
statutory jurisdiction." Harrison, 67 Am. U.L. Rev. at 497. The Court
later decided another political question case, Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224 (1993), based on this distinction. In Nixon, the federal district
court concluded that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case
but dismissed it because the Court concluded that the controversy
presented a nonjusticiable political question. Both the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court went on to affirm that judgment, which was on
the merits.
                                    30
SC-2023-0421

discretion of another branch, they must first determine the scope of that

branch's discretion, which is a substantive inquiry that goes to the merits

of the case. The political question doctrine therefore acts as a substantive

rule.     And because it does, courts must exercise subject-matter

jurisdiction when they apply that rule, even if they ultimately enter a

judgment of dismissal.

        That was true in BJCCA, in which this Court considered whether

the interpretation of § 63 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 -- which

provided that "no bill shall become a law" unless "a majority of each

house" votes in its favor -- was a political question committed to the

discretion of the Legislature. The city and the county challenging the

acts at issue in BJCCA argued that "a majority of each house" in the

Legislature meant that a bill must receive a majority of a quorum of the

House of Representatives. But the Legislature interpreted § 63 to mean

that "when a quorum is present and a bill receives a favorable majority

[of that number], then the bill has passed that house of the [L]egislature."

912 So. 2d at 208.

        Our Court never reached the ultimate question of whose

interpretation was superior because it concluded that its review was

                                    31
SC-2023-0421

foreclosed by a threshold political question. In particular, the Court

reasoned that § 63 was not sufficiently precise to afford any "judicially

discoverable and manageable standards for resolving whether the House

of Representatives constitutionally passed [an act]." Id. at 221. And the

Court determined that § 53 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 -- which

gave the Legislature the "power to determine the rules of its own

proceedings"    --   was   a   "textually    demonstrable    constitutional

commitment" to the Legislature to interpret § 63. Id. at 218. As a result,

the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

     But when I examine BJCCA, it seems clear that while our Court

characterized the fundamental issue as jurisdictional, it was, in

substance, a merits problem. That's because the decision was implicitly

premised on the Court's substantive determination that the Legislature's

interpretation of § 63 was within the realm of its lawful discretion to

make rules related to its own proceedings.

     To illustrate the point, imagine an otherwise identical fact pattern

in which the Legislature has interpreted the phrase "a majority of each

house" to mean that a bill may pass if zero legislators voted in its favor.

If a plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a bill "passed" without a

                                    32
SC-2023-0421

single affirmative vote of a legislator, we would hold the resulting statute

unconstitutional. That's because "zero votes" is not a plausible reading

of "a majority of [votes in] each house," and therefore does not fall within

the Legislature's discretion to construe rules related to its own

proceedings.

     That hypothetical is extreme, of course, but I believe it crystallizes

the distinction between jurisdiction and justiciability in this context. In

both BJCCA and in the example imagined above, the issue boils down to

whether the Legislature's interpretation of "a majority of each house"

falls within the bounds of its discretion under the political question

doctrine. And in making that threshold determination -- regardless of

the outcome -- the Court is exercising subject-matter jurisdiction.

Therefore, when we dispose of an appeal that presents a nonjusticiable

political question, we do so on the merits.

     Our better reasoned cases reflect that principle. A prime example

is our recent decision in Clay County Commission v. Clay County Animal

Shelter, Inc., 283 So. 3d 1218, 1228 (Ala. 2019). As in BJCCA, the issue

in Clay County was whether the Legislature had complied with a

constitutionally mandated procedure for passing a bill. Only this time,

                                    33
SC-2023-0421

the plaintiffs' challenge involved a requirement in § 73 that an

appropriations bill pass "by a vote of two-thirds of all the members

elected to each house." Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. IV, § 73. The

defendant conceded that the bill "did not receive the vote of two-thirds of

all the members elected to each house," 283 So. 3d at 1221, but

nonetheless argued that the validity of the resulting statute could not be

challenged because, in the defendant's view, any dispute over whether a

bill received the constitutionally mandated number of votes presented "a

nonjusticiable political question," id. at 1225.

     Our Court rejected that argument. We reasoned that since the

language of § 73 was a " 'clear constitutional mandate,' " there was no

" 'lack of judicially manageable standards' " that would trigger the

political question doctrine and require the Court to "defer to the

legislature's internal rules and procedures." Id. at 1226-27 (citations

omitted). In doing so, we distinguished BJCCA, in which the procedural

requirement of § 63 was susceptible to a range of interpretations and the

Legislature's determination had fallen within that permissible range. In

Clay County, by contrast, there was only one plausible interpretation of

§ 73, and the Legislature's actions did not comport with it. "[T]wo thirds

                                     34
SC-2023-0421

of all members elected to each house" meant exactly that: two-thirds of

all members. And because it was undisputed that less than two-thirds of

all the members elected to each house had voted in favor of the challenged

statute, there was no way to square the Legislature's actions

constitutionally.

     What Clay County underscores is that while § 53 is a "textually

demonstrable commitment" to the Legislature in determining the rules

of its own proceedings, that power is necessarily limited by a range of

permissible interpretations of the constitutional provision. And only a

substantive rule -- in these cases, the political question doctrine -- can

tell us whether the Legislature has exceeded its discretion.         Since

applying a substantive rule to the facts of a case necessarily entails

exercising subject-matter jurisdiction, I believe that the proper

disposition of a case that presents a political question is a dismissal on

the merits.

     The distinction between a dismissal for a lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction and a dismissal on the merits has practical consequences for

litigants. Because the former "does not operate as an adjudication on the

merits," Ex parte Stewart, 985 So. 2d 404, 409 (Ala. 2007), res judicata is

                                    35
SC-2023-0421

no bar; the plaintiffs could file an identical lawsuit in federal court the

day after the state suit was dismissed. By contrast, a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.

R. Civ. P., dismissal does operate as an adjudication on the merits under

Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and would therefore preclude the plaintiffs

from maintaining the suit in a different court.         The upshot is that

defendants in these cases may want to call courts' attention to this

distinction in order to preempt repetitious litigation. And if litigants

raise the issue in a future case, I would be willing to revisit BJCCA so

that we can iron out its wrinkles and reconcile it with our better reasoned

cases.

         That said, the parties to this case have not asked us to depart from

our reasoning in BJCCA. I therefore concur with the main opinion, which

faithfully applies that precedent. See Ex parte McKinney, 87 So. 3d 502,

509 n.7 (Ala. 2011) (noting that "this Court has long recognized a

disinclination to overrule existing caselaw in the absence of either a

specific request to do so or an adequate argument asking that we do so").

                                      36