Court Opinion

ID: 9710416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:09:23.909438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:56.632842
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting.
The statute involved in this case, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-213 (Reissue 1979), dates back to territorial days. It was a part of the Code of Civil Procedure adopted in 1866. See Rev. Stat. tit. II, § 17 (1866). It has existed in substantially its present form since that time. Its purpose is to extend the time in which a person under disability may bring certain actions. It provides that such a person may bring such an action “within the respective times limited by this chapter after such disability shall be removed....” (Emphasis supplied.)
The disability we are concerned with in this case is infancy or minority. In 1969 the age of majority was reduced to 20 years. 1969 Neb. Laws, ch. 298, § 1, p. 1072. In 1972, the age stated in § 25-213 was reduced to 20 years. 1972 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1049. According to its title, one purpose of L.B. 1049 was to harmonize the provisions of the laws amended with previous legislation.
I agree that § 25-213 should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. That meaning is that the disability referred to is removed when the person reaches the age of 20 years, not 1 year after reaching that age.
In Albers v. Kozeluh, 68 Neb. 529, 97 N.W. 646 (1903) (opinion on rehearing), in discussing when an action might be brought, the opinion states at 533-34, 97 N.W. at 647:
An examination of the record discloses that at the time the foreclosure proceedings were had on which the sheriff’s deed in question is based, Stately’s wife was an inmate of the insane asylum, and his children were all minors. It further appears that the oldest child did not reach the age of majority until some time in the year 1888, and, of course, the others became of age, in turn, much later. This action was commenced in the latter part of 1897, and ten years had not elapsed after the statute of limitations began to run and before it was commenced. Therefore the action was begun in time.
*731Syllabus No. 3 to that opinion provides: “The statute of limitations, as to adverse possession, does not run against persons while under disability, such as minors; and an action brought to recover an interest in real estate within ten years after they arrive at the age of majority, is commenced in time.” (Syllabus of the court.) Id.
In Holmes v. Mason, 80 Neb. 448, 450-51, 114 N.W. 606, 607 (1908), this court said:
The statute of limitations as to each of the several defendants commenced to run when he arrived at his majority. So as to the defendants who were more than ten years past their majority at the time this action was commenced the bar of the statute of limitations was complete.
In Howe v. Blomenkamp, 88 Neb. 389, 391, 129 N.W 539, 540 (1911), this court said:
The next defense is that plaintiffs did not bring suit within five years after attaining majority, and that consequently the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Comp. St. 1909, ch. 23, secs. 117,118. This statute does not apply to a void sale of the property of a ward, and the rule applicable here is: “An action by an heir to quiet his title to the homestead of his ancestor may be maintained at any time within ten years after his right of action accrues, or the attainment of his majority.” Holmes v. Mason, 80 Neb. 448. Under this rule the action is not barred.
In Hughes v. Langdon, 111 Neb. 515, 520, 199 N.W 832, 833-34 (1924) (opinion on rehearing), this court said:
Therefore, the only disability under which he is shown to have stood at the time of the discharge of the guardian was that of minority. This was removed when he became of the ageof21 in the year 1906, and this we find to be the correct date of the removal of his disability as affecting this suit.
In Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 679 F.2d 1258, 1264 (8th Cir. 1982), on reconsideration 701 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1983), the court said, in construing § 25-213: “Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued while she was under 20 years of age. Under section 25-222 as modified by section 25-213, she could bring this action at any time before she *732reached age 20 or within two years thereafter.”
State v. Carlson, 223 Neb. 874, 394 N.W.2d 669 (1986), involved a different problem involving different language. It has no application to the facts of this case.
The phrase “within the age” has been in the statute for more than 100 years. It has been construed to mean during the disability or period of minority. So far as I have been able to discover, until this case, it has never been construed to mean anything else.
The plain meaning of § 25-213 is that “within the age of twenty years” means before reaching the age of 20 years. As we said recently in Macku v. Drackett Products Co., 216 Neb. 176, 183, 343 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1984), “Section 25-213, suspending the statute of limitations during Amy’s infancy, exists for the exclusive and personal benefit of Amy Macku . . ..” (Emphasis supplied.)
The judgment should have been affirmed.