Court Opinion

ID: 9683460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:29:11.563057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:48.021950
License: Public Domain

WALKER, Chief Justice,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority correctly states: “The summary judgment evidence was that the plaintiffs’ probability of developing cancer was from one in a hundred (1.0%) - to one in five hundred thousand (0.0002%).” The majority admits these medical probabilities are quite low, yet are unwilling to say a fear of cancer from this slight risk is unreasonable, as a matter of law.
Unlike the majority, I do not consider this a close question. Dr. Jenkins acknowledged in some past eases, in talking to men who were exposed to asbestos about the risk of developing health problems from that exposure, he used the example they probably had a greater risk of harm from traffic while driving to his office than they did from their asbestos exposure. When asked if that analogy would hold true with regards to Carter and Wilson, Dr. Jenkins replied: “Probably so.” This says more- about the risk, and whether fear from this risk is reasonable, than any attempt at a numerical probability. Using this very common sense standard, I would hold Carter’s and Wilson’s fear of cancer is not a reasonable one. I would affirm the summary judgment on that ground.