Court Opinion

ID: 9555229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 07:10:12.619496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:53.812266
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              ________________

                              NO. 09-22-00418-CV
                              ________________

                        ASHLEY MELTON, Appellant

                                         V.

                            WILBUR HAH, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________

                   On Appeal from the 128th District Court
                          Orange County, Texas
                        Trial Cause No. A220289-C
________________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to decide the applicability of the

Texas Citizens’ Participation Act (TCPA) to multiple causes of action arising from

a patient’s social media postings made about her physician. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.001–.011. The trial court failed to rule on Appellant Ashley

Melton’s TCPA Motion to Dismiss Appellee Wilbur Hah’s claims for defamation,

business disparagement, invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and injunctive relief

                                          1
within the statutory time frame, and the Motion was denied by operation of law. See

id. §§ 27.005(a), 27.008(a). In twelve issues, Melton contends the trial court erred

by implicitly denying her TCPA Motion to Dismiss because: (1) the TCPA applies

to Hah’s allegations made against her; (2) once the burden of proof shifted, Hah

failed to present clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case for each

of his claims; and (3) even if he did establish a prima facie case, she established

affirmative defenses for those claims. For the reasons discussed below, we will

reverse the trial court’s denial of Melton’s TCPA Motion to Dismiss and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                  I. Background

      In 2020, Melton approached Hah, a board-certified cosmetic surgeon, to

perform liposuction and a “tummy tuck” on her. As part of the preoperative process,

Melton and Hah signed a “Contract of Reasonable Expectations.” In that document,

Melton acknowledged that she was undergoing an elective procedure that was not

medically necessary and that she should not have unrealistic expectations. The

document also contained a provision addressing “social media and online content”

that stated, “I agree not to post any defamatory, derogatory, mean spirited, or

negative comments, reviews that is [sic] designed to damage the online reputation

                                          2
regarding Dr. Hah, Dr. Chen-Hah or Beauty MDs, LLC team based on my perception

of not having my cosmetic outcome expectations met.”

      After Melton underwent surgery, she and several other of Hah’s patients

began posting on social media about their experience with Hah. In August 2022, Hah

sued Melton and three other patients in separate lawsuits. Hah alleged that Melton

“contractually agreed[] to refrain . . . from posting false, defamatory, derogatory,

mean-spirited or negative comments or reviews on social media designed to damage

the Plaintiff’s reputation or livelihood, or to interfere with Plaintiff’s business

relations with other patients.” Hah further alleged he provided Melton “with

informed, elective cosmetic services within such reasonable expectations and

without any violation of the standard of care.” Hah also claimed that in “direct

violation of Defendant’s agreement,” she “published defamatory, derogatory, mean-

spirited, or negative comments or reviews on social media[.]” He specifically

claimed that Melton “published in a website labeled ‘Botched Cosmetic Surgeries

in Orange Texas’ and ‘Local Failed Cosmetic Surgeries’ false, defamatory,

derogatory, mean-spirited and negative materials on social media, intentionally, and

with malice, designed to damage” his livelihood or reputation and interfere with his

business relations with other patients, and that “Plaintiff is the only cosmetic surgeon

                                           3
in Orange, Texas.” Hah asserted claims for injunctive relief, breach of contract,

defamation, invasion of privacy, and business disparagement.

      In Melton’s Original Answer to Hah’s Petition, 1 Melton pleaded that she

underwent a seven-hour surgery, and after suffered from nerve pain and a belly

button that would not heal. She consulted a board-certified plastic surgeon after Hah

performed surgery, who told her she would need a “complete new tummy tuck.”

Melton stated that she and several other of Hah’s patients began posting their

experiences on social media, because they “wanted to share their stories” and

“spread awareness and hopefully keep others from going through the trauma[.]”

Melton claimed she first posted her story and those from a few other women on

TikTok but removed them when she received a cease-and-desist letter from Hah’s

attorney. Melton said she continued to receive messages from other women, and in

August 2022, another patient created a Facebook group called “Botched in Orange,

TX.” There, several people posted stories anonymously and “never mentioned the

doctor’s name.” According to Melton, “Hah’s name was not mentioned until his own

wife decided to start posting in this group making it known. The group ended up

being reported and shut down by an unknown person. A few days later four of us

were served with a lawsuit.” In her Original Answer and Amended Answer, Melton

      1Melton filed her Original Answer after her TCPA Motion to Dismiss.

                                         4
answered with a general denial and raised the following affirmative defenses, among

others: 1) there is a lack of consideration or failure of consideration for the contract;

2) Melton’s statements about Hah were true; 3) any opinions Melton gave about Hah

are unactionable and do not support a claim for defamation or disparagement; and

4) Melton’s statements are protected speech and an exercise of her right of

association and are constitutionally protected by the TCPA.

      Melton filed an Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss and for Attorney’s Fees under

the TCPA, claiming that Hah filed the lawsuit to “chill Defendant’s exercise of her

right to free speech[] and right of association.” Melton supported her TCPA Motion

to Dismiss with her affidavit and those of the three other patients Hah sued, April

Gage, Courtney Chesson, and Lauren Martynuik Robinson. Melton argued the

TCPA covered Hah’s claims against her, because the communications that form the

basis of his claims occurred in connection with a matter of public concern–the

manner in which a physician performed surgery on his patients in the Orange County

area–so, they relate to a matter of social or other interest to the community. She also

argued that Hah’s lawsuit was in response to her exercising her right of association.

Specifically, she contended the supporting affidavits established that the Facebook

postings Hah complained about have “a common theme and represent statements of

                                           5
persons with a common interest in the results of surgery, which is clearly a matter

of public concern.”

      Melton further asserted that after she showed the TCPA applied, Hah failed

to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential

element of his claims and that she could establish an affirmative defense. In her

affidavit, Melton averred that she was familiar with the Facebook Groups “Botched

Surgery in Orange Texas” and “Locally Failed Cosmetic Surgeries” referenced in

Hah’s Petition. She further averred that to the extent she discussed Hah’s treatment

of her with Gage, Chesson, and Robinson, or posted materials in a Facebook Group,

she did so “in an effort to collectively express, pursue or defend our common

interests relating to the manner in which Dr. Hah has treated patients like myself and

the other three people that he has sued.” Robinson, Gage, and Chesson’s affidavits

contained identical language, but Chesson and Gage denied they ever posted

anything to the specific Facebook Groups Hah mentioned in his Petition. Melton

also supplemented her Motion to Dismiss by attaching a corrected affidavit from

Chesson. Melton filed a Second Supplement to the Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss

and for Attorney’s Fees that addressed with greater particularity why this is a matter

of public concern and included counsel’s affidavit.

                                          6
       Hah filed his initial Response to Defendant’s TCPA Motion to Dismiss,

which did not include an affidavit. In his Response, Hah objected to any evidence

offered by Melton to the extent she is not an expert, plus complained Melton failed

to present evidence of attorney’s fees. Hah argued the TCPA does not apply, and the

2019 amendments removed “good, product, or service in marketplace” from the

definition of “matter of public concern.” Hah characterized this case as “a private

contract dispute to which the TCPA does not apply[.]” Hah contended that Melton

contracted with him to perform elective cosmetic services, and she agreed to refrain

from posting . . . negative comments or reviews on social media[.]” Hah alleged he

performed under the contract by completing the surgery, but Melton breached the

contract, and he incorporated photos and TikTok posts in the body of his Response.

Finally, he argued that Melton breached her contract with him by posting on social

media. However, Hah only asserted that he had shown a prima facie case for his

breach of contract claim, but he did not address the essential elements for any cause

of action. Hah attached a document entitled “Contract of Reasonable Expectations”

signed by Melton where she agreed not to post negative comments or reviews on

social media.

      Hah also filed a First Amended Response to Melton’s Motion to Dismiss. The

Amended Response included his previous objections that Melton was not an expert

                                         7
and could not say whether he deviated from the standard of care. His Amended

Response contained similar arguments about why this was not a matter of public

concern and characterized the action as a private contract dispute. He also asserted

that Melton posted photos showing that she was happy with the results Hah provided

and included the photos. Hah claimed that Melton later returned to his office

demanding a refund and secretly recorded him and his office without his permission.

Hah alleged that when he failed to provide Melton a refund, she embarked on a

“social media campaign” and conspired with the other patients to “post[] false,

defamatory, derogatory, mean-spirited or negative comments or reviews on social

media designed to damage Plaintiff’s reputation or livelihood, or to interfere with

Plaintiff’s business relations with other patients on controversial social media site

Tik Tok.” Hah claimed Melton breached the agreement and posted negative,

defamatory, and derogatory comments with actual malice. Hah also asserted that

Melton and the three other patients he sued published photographs of him, his

patients, and his office without permission. Hah argued the court need not address

the TCPA’s applicability, because he established a prima facie case for his breach

of contract claim, to which Melton failed to establish an affirmative defense. As

exhibits to his Amended Response, Hah again included the “Contract of Reasonable

Expectations,” a narrative by Hah dated February 2021 regarding his treatment of

                                         8
Melton, his affidavit in which he complained that Melton breached their agreement

after he performed the surgery and stated the comments and social media postings

were true and correct copies, and his attorney’s affidavit with billing invoices.

      Hah’s one-page narrative stated that Melton requested more surgery to

remove excess skin, but he did not feel like it was safe, and he noted that she

responded by threatening to sue him. Hah averred in his affidavit that he provided

services “within the accepted standards of medical care[.]” He also averred that the

four patients, including Melton, “each conspired to post false, defamatory,

derogatory, mean-spirted, or negative comments or reviews on social media

designed to damage my reputation, as depicted in the attached, which are true and

correct copies of each’s postings on social media[.]” His Amended Response also

included additional screenshots of social media posts of photographs with the

hashtags “botched,” “botchedsurgery,” “botchedplasticsurgery,” and “False

Advertising.” Another TikTok screenshot with a photograph of Hah, stated,

“Presenting the surgeon that botched my tummy tuck leaving me with not only

excess skin but nerve damage, a tethered scar, and a leaky belly button!” There are

also screenshots of postings on “What’s Up Bridge City” that advised women

      who are interested in plastic surgery please do your research and use a
      Board Certified Plastic Surgeon! The COSMETIC surgeon in Orange
      who calls himself a plastic surgeon obviously has no clue what he’s
      doing and is extremely overpriced! When I spoke to him about my

                                         9
      concerns and all the pain I was in, he was extremely rude. I am now
      having to pay a board certified plastic surgeon to fix the mess the
      cosmetic surgeon in Orange left me with! I would hate for someone else
      to go through what I’m dealing with! I’ve also recently found out that
      I’m not the only woman he has done this too (sic). I’m completely
      shocked this man is still in business!”

In an apparent response to another commenter, Melton wrote,

      [H]e manages to have them all deleted! I’ve seen two board certified
      plastic surgeons who have told me this was his fault. I am not [sic]
      having to have a revision that is going to cost another $8,000 plus weeks
      of recovery. I had a friend who used him go with me and I also recorded
      the entire appointment.

      In other posts, Melton noted that she did not post his name, but posted that

“there’s only one cosmetic surgeon in Orange[,]” and “I’ve already reported and

hired an attorney[.]” Finally, she stated in a Facebook post,

      I’ve been in the hospital because of what that man has done! He not
      only botched me but damaged me to the point that I needed surgery to
      repair what he did! I told him at my last follow up that I was in pain and
      he did not give a damn! I had a friend with me and I recorded the entire
      appointment! I’m not a stupid women [sic]! How dare you get on here
      and attack me when you have NO clue what you are talking about!

      At the hearing, Hah sought to introduce a video he made and screenshots from

the video. Melton objected to any evidence or testimony being taken at the hearing,

and the trial court ruled she would not take testimony or admit the video as evidence.

After the hearing, Melton and Hah filed letter briefs with the trial court to address

the 2019 amendments and whether the TCPA applied. The trial court failed to rule

                                         10
on Melton’s Motion within thirty days from the date of filing, which functioned as

a denial by operation of law. See id. §§ 27.005(a), 27.008(a). This interlocutory

appeal followed. See id. §§ 27.008(b), 51.014(a)(12).

                              II. Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss de novo. See

Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 897 (Tex. 2018); Walker

v. Hartman, 516 S.W.3d 71, 79–80 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet. denied). We

consider the pleadings, evidence we could consider under Rule 166a, and affidavits

stating facts on which liability or any defense is based in the light most favorable to

the nonmovant. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.006(a); In re Lipsky,

460 S.W.3d 579, 587 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); see also Dall. Morning News,

Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019); Push Start Indus., LLC v. Hous. Gulf

Energy Corp., No. 09-19-00290-CV, 2020 WL 7041567, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont Nov. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted). We also review de

novo whether the parties met their burdens of proof under section 27.005 of the

TCPA. Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 45–46 (Tex.

2021) (citation omitted).

                                          11
                                    III. Analysis

A. TCPA Generally

      The TCPA is meant “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of

persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in

government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect

the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.002; see also McLane Champions, LLC v. Hous.

Baseball Partners LLC, No. 21-0641, 2023 WL 4306378, at *4 (Tex. June 30, 2023)

(citations omitted). The TCPA instructs courts to liberally construe it to ensure its

stated purpose and intent are fully effectuated, but it “does not abrogate or lessen

any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under other

constitutional, statutory, case, or common law or rule provisions.” Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. § 27.011(a), (b); ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d

895, 898 (Tex. 2017) (citation omitted) (noting directive to liberally construe).

Under the TCPA, a party may move to dismiss a “legal action” that is “based on or

is in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or

right of association[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003. The TCPA

defines the “[e]xercise of the right of free speech” as “a communication made in

connection with a matter of public concern.” Id. § 27.001(3); see Montano v.

                                          12
Cronan, No. 09-20-00232-CV, 2021 WL 2963801, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

July 15, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      The TCPA “provides a three-step process for the dismissal of a ‘legal action’

to which it applies.” Montelongo v. Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 296 (Tex.

2021) (citing Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 691 (Tex.

2018)); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(b)–(d). First, the

movant bears the initial burden to show that the “legal action is based on or is in

response to[]” the movant’s exercise of: “(A) the right of free speech; (B) the right

to petition; or (C) the right of association[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §

27.005(b)(1)(A)–(C). If the movant establishes that the nonmovant’s claim

implicates one of these rights, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “‘establish[] by

clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim

in question.’” Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587 (quoting Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

Ann. § 27.005(c)). A “prima facie case” means “evidence sufficient as a matter of

law to establish a given fact if it is not rebutted or contradicted.” Id. at 590 (citation

omitted). It is the “‘minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational

inference that the allegation of fact is true.’” Id. (quoting In re E.I. DuPont de

Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004)). Clear and specific evidence

means that the “plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its

                                           13
claim.” Id. at 591. Finally, if the nonmovant establishes their prima facie case, the

burden shifts back to the movant to establish each essential element of an affirmative

defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §

27.005(d); Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 679–80 (Tex. 2018); Coleman, 512

S.W.3d at 899.

B. Issues One, Two, and Three: TCPA Applicability

      In her first three issues, Melton argues that the TCPA applies since Hah’s

lawsuit implicated her right to free speech on a matter of public concern and her

right of association. Hah responds that the 2019 TCPA amendments removed “a

good, product, or service in the marketplace” from the definition of matter of public

concern.”

      The TCPA defines the “exercise of the right of free speech” as “a

communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(3). The TCPA further defines “matter of public

concern” as:

      . . . a statement or activity regarding:
      (A) a public official, public figure, or other person who has drawn
      substantial public attention due to the person’s official acts, fame,
      notoriety, or celebrity;
      (B) a matter of political, social, or other interest to the community; or
      (C) a subject of concern to the public.

                                         14
Id. § 27.001(7). The 2019 amendments removed “good, product, or service in the

marketplace” from the definition of “matter of public concern,” but the current

version of the statute includes “a statement or activity regarding . . . a matter of . . .

other interest to the community; or . . . a subject of concern to the public.” Act of

May 20, 2019, 86th Leg. R.S., ch. 378, § 1, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 684, 684 (current

version at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(7)); see also McLane

Champions, 2023 WL 4306378, at *5 (discussing 2019 amendments and changes to

definition of “matter of public concern”). “The phrase ‘matter of public concern’

commonly refers to matters ‘of political, social, or other concern to the community,’

and a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public, as opposed

to purely private matters.” Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591

S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 884

(Tex. 2017)); Montano, 2021 WL 2963801, at *4. Statements related to a physician’s

“professional competence and fitness to practice medicine” are “a subject matter that

has consistently been recognized by Texas courts as a matter of public concern.”

Rockman v. Ob Hospitalist Grp., Inc., No. 01-21-00383-CV, 2023 WL 3311548, at

*12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citing

Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. 2015)) (other citations

omitted). As the Texas Supreme Court recently stated, “under the TCPA, the

                                           15
communication on which the suit is based must have some relevance to the public

audience[,]” and “the ‘connection’ between the communication and the matter of

public concern must exist when the communication is made.” McLane Champions,

2023 WL 4306378, at *7.

      The record before us shows that Melton’s posts were made in social media

groups directed to a local community where Hah practiced medicine. He complained

that the titles of the social media groups of “Botched in Orange, Texas” and “Local

Failed Cosmetic Surgeries” made clear what the subject matter would be. Her posts,

as well as those of the other patients he sued, addressed what she believed to be a

negative surgical experience. Other courts have determined that publishing

disparaging comments about a medical practice is a communication that constitutes

“a matter of public concern.” See San Angelo Cmty. Med. Ctr., LLC v. Leon, No. 03-

19-00229-CV, 2021 WL 1680194, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 29, 2021, pet.

filed) (mem. op.) (citations omitted) (concluding disparaging comments about

medical practice was a matter of public concern); Memorial Hermann Health Sys. v.

Khalil, No. 01-16-00512-CV, 2017 WL 3389645, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Aug. 8, 2017, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (mem. op.) (applying language in

prior version of statute and concluding that comments about healthcare

professional’s competence were a matter of public concern); see also Lippincott, 462

                                        16
S.W.3d at 510 (applying prior version of statute and concluding statements about a

healthcare professional’s competence related to matter of public concern under the

TCPA). People accessed or visited the Facebook groups labeled “Botched Cosmetic

Surgeries in Orange Texas” and “Local Failed Cosmetic Surgeries” which indicates

the posts were of “interest to the community” or “a subject of concern to the public.”

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(7)(B), (C). Melton’s posts did not

simply address private business negotiations in an arms-length transaction, rather

they explained what she described as her negative experience with a local surgeon,

the posts referenced the alleged substandard quality of a health professional’s

treatment of patients, were made for reasons that relate to public health and safety,

and were made to a public audience. See Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 509-10. As such,

Melton’s posts involved a “matter of public concern,” and thus she exercised her

right of free speech. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(3).

      Hah’s primary complaint about Melton seems to be that she posted “mean-

spirited or negative comments or reviews on social media.” Further, notwithstanding

certain enumerated exemptions, the TCPA applies to “a legal action against a person

related to the communication, gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of

consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer complaints, or reviews

or ratings of businesses.” Id. § 27.010(b)(2). Melton posted material on social media

                                         17
sites about the paid surgical services Hah provided and commented about her

experience with those services. Hah’s legal action against Melton was related to the

“posting . . . of consumer opinions or commentary[.]” See id.

      We conclude the TCPA applies to Hah’s legal action against Melton as it

involved the exercise of her right to speech and was related to the “posting . . . of

consumer opinions or commentary[.]” See id. §§ 27.003(a), 27.010(b)(2). We sustain

issue one. Based on our resolution of issue one, we need not address issues two and

three. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring appellate court to hand down a written

opinion as brief as practicable but addressing all issues necessary to final disposition

of the appeal).

C. Issues Four through Eight: Prima Facie Case for Each Cause of Action

      In issues four through eight, Melton argues that Hah failed to establish by

clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each of his causes of action. Having

concluded that the TCPA applies to Hah’s legal action against Melton, we now turn

to whether Hah met his burden to establish a prima facie case for each essential

element of his causes of action by clear and specific evidence. See Lipsky, 460

S.W.3d at 587; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c).

                                          18
      1. Issue Four: Business Disparagement

      In issue four, Melton asserts that Hah failed to meet his burden of establishing

a prima facie case for his business disparagement claim. “The torts of defamation

and business disparagement are alike in that ‘both involve harm from the publication

of false information.’” Innovative Block of S. Tex., Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply,

Inc., 603 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591). A

notable distinction is that “[d]efamation serves to protect one’s interest in character

and reputation, whereas disparagement protects economic interests by providing a

remedy for pecuniary losses from slurs affecting the marketability of goods and

services.” Id. (citation omitted). “The publication of a disparaging statement

concerning the product of another is actionable when (1) the statement is false, (2)

published with malice, (3) with the intent that the publication causes pecuniary loss

or the reasonable recognition that it will, and (4) pecuniary loss does in fact result.”

Id. at 417 (citing Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 170

(Tex. 2003)).

      In his Response and Amended Response to Melton’s TCPA Motion to

Dismiss, despite attaching screenshots and photographs, Hah does not address the

essential elements of his business disparagement claim or how any of Melton’s

                                          19
purported statements on social media supported that cause of action. Rather, he

focuses solely on his breach of contract cause of action.

      Hah complains that Melton did not offer expert testimony to opine that Hah

acted below the standard of care. If Melton filed a medical malpractice claim, we

agree Melton would be required to comply with the Texas Medical Liability Act.

See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 74.001–.507. However, Melton has not

sued Hah for medical malpractice in this matter. Rather, Hah sued Melton for claims

as outlined above, the TCPA applies, and Hah has the burden to show a prima facie

case for his business disparagement cause of action by clear and specific evidence.

See id. § 27.005(b)–(c); Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590–92. Hah has failed to allege or

state how he suffered a pecuniary loss in his Responses or provide any evidence of

a pecuniary loss. See Innovative Block, 603 S.W.3d at 417 (including resulting

pecuniary loss as a requisite element of business disparagement). Hah failed to

establish a sufficient causal connection between any challenged statement Melton

made and any particular loss. See Landry’s, Inc., 631 S.W.3d at 54 (noting same in

the context of business disparagement claim and concluding party failed to meet its

burden of establishing prima facie case). Since business disparagement is solely

concerned with economic harm, “proof of special damages is ‘a fundamental

element of the tort.’” Innovative Block, 603 S.W.3d at 417 (quoting Waste Mgmt. of

                                        20
Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 155 (Tex. 2014)). His

affidavit did not state any specific damages that he sustained because of Melton’s

postings. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 592–93 (concluding that general averments that

non-movant “suffered direct pecuniary and economic losses” absent facts illustrating

how defendant’s remarks caused the losses were insufficient to meet the TCPA

requirement of clear and specific evidence of damages); Camp, 2017 WL 3378904,

at *7.

         We conclude that Hah failed to establish a prima facie case of his business

disparagement claim by clear and specific evidence. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code Ann. § 27.005(c); Innovative Block, 603 S.W.3d at 417; Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d

at 592–93. We sustain issue four.

         2. Issue Five: Defamation

         Melton argues in issue five that Hah failed to meet his burden to establish a

prima facie case for his defamation claim. For a defamation claim, a plaintiff must

show (1) the defendant published a false statement of fact to a third party, (2) that

was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (3) with the required degree of fault, at least

amounting to negligence, and (4) in some cases, damages. Innovative Block, 603

S.W.3d at 417 (citing Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593). “A defamatory statement is one

that ‘tends [] to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of

                                          21
the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.’” Id.

(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. L. INST. 1977)) (other

citation omitted).

      On appeal, Hah contends for the first time that Melton’s statements

constituted defamation per se and as such Hah had no obligation to show proof of

damages. A party seeking to recover on a defamation claim must plead and prove

damages, unless the defamatory statements are defamatory per se. Lipsky, 460

S.W.3d at 593. “A statement constitutes defamation per se if it ‘injures a person in

his office, profession, or occupation.’” Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 66

(Tex. 2013) (quoting Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings,

Inc., 219 S.W.3d 563, 581 (Tex. App.–Austin 2007, pet. denied)). “Historically in

Texas, defamation per se claims allow the jury to presume the existence of

general damages without proof of actual injury.” Id. at 65 (citations omitted). “In a

defamation case that implicates the TCPA, pleadings and evidence that establishes

the facts of when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature of the statements,

and how they damaged the plaintiff should be sufficient to resist a TCPA motion to

dismiss.” Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591. Defamation per se refers to statements that are

so obviously harmful that general damages may be presumed. Id. Whether a

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statement is defamatory per se is generally a question of law. See Lipsky, 460

S.W.3d at 596.

      Like his business disparagement claim, Hah failed to substantively address

the essential elements of his defamation cause of action in his Responses to Melton’s

TCPA Motion to Dismiss. While he generally attached screenshots of Melton’s

social media posts to his Response, he did not explain which of these statements

were defamatory, the defamatory nature of the statements, or specify how Melton’s

statements damaged him. See id.

      More importantly, in the trial court, Hah did not raise or argue in his responses

or in his affidavit that any particular statements constitute defamation per se. Rather,

in his Responses, Hah confined his argument to his breach of contract cause of action

and asserted he “has met his burden to establish by clear and specific evidence a

prima facie case for each element of his breach of contract claim against Defendant

that Defendant did not attempt to establish a valid defense to the claim.” However,

“[T]he TCPA requires that on motion the plaintiff present ‘clear and specific

evidence’ of ‘each essential element[,]’” which Hah failed to do here. See id. at 590.

While it is generally true that defamation per se does not require proof of damages,

in the absence of “pleadings and evidence that establishes the facts of when, where,

and what was said, the defamatory nature of the statements, and how they damaged”

                                          23
Hah, he cannot avoid dismissal. See id. at 591; see also Bedford v. Spassoff, 520

S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. 2017). We conclude Hah failed to establish a prima facie

case for each element of his defamation claim by clear and specific evidence. See

Bedford, 520 S.W.3d at 904; Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c). We sustain issue five.

      3. Issue Six: Invasion of Privacy

      In issue six, Melton argues that Hah failed to meet his burden of establishing

a prima facie case for each element of his invasion of privacy claim. Hah counters

that “a fact issue exists as to whether Appellee suffered direct damages as a result

thereof by way of Appellant linking his image to the defamatory posts complained

of.” Hah also contends on appeal that “‘[i]nvasion of privacy’ can include

‘misappropriation’ that involves using another[] person’s name or likeness without

their permission.”

      In Texas, the recognized types of invasion of privacy include: (1) intrusion

upon seclusion or solitude or into one’s private affairs; (2) public disclosure of

embarrassing private facts; and (3) wrongful appropriation of name or

likeness. See Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1994) (outlining

cases recognizing each type of privacy right); Doggett v. Travis Law Firm, P.C., 555

S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). “Name

                                        24
misappropriation is a species of invasion of privacy, and Texas law applies a very

restrictive interpretation of the tort.” Cardiovascular Provider Res. Inc. v. Gottlich,

No. 05-13-01763-CV, 2015 WL 4914725, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 18, 2015,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). Elements of a misappropriation claim are:

1) the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the value associated

with it, and not in an incidental manner or for a newsworthy purpose; 2) the plaintiff

can be identified from the publication; and 3) there was some advantage or benefit

to the defendant. Watson v. Talia Heights, LLC, 566 S.W.3d 326, 329 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citations omitted). Texas law protects the value

associated with the name, rather than the name per se. See id. at 330; see also Express

One Int’l Inc. v. Steinbeck, 53 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)

(citation omitted).

      As explained in issues five and six, the question is whether Hah presented

clear and specific evidence of each essential element for his invasion of privacy

claim–not whether a fact issue exists. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590. Hah likewise

failed to address the essential elements of an invasion of privacy misappropriation

claim. Other than summarily averring in his affidavit and Responses to the Motion

to Dismiss that he did not authorize Melton to use or publish his likeness,

photographs, or videos of him, his offices, or other patients, Hah did not explain how

                                          25
his evidence satisfied each of the requisite elements of this claim. See Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c). Although the screenshots attached to Hah’s

Responses showed that Melton or the other patients may have used Hah’s image,

Hah failed to show that Melton appropriated his image to take advantage of the value

associated with Hah’s name or image. See, e.g., United Locating Services, LLC v.

Fobbs, 619 S.W.3d 863, 872–73 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.)

(explaining that plaintiffs failed to show the value associated with their names and

concluding they failed to establish “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case

for the first essential element of their Name Appropriation Claims”); see also

Watson, 566 S.W.3d at 331 (explaining in no evidence summary-judgment context

that plaintiff was required “to produce evidence showing that his name was

misappropriated to take advantage of his reputation, prestige, or other values[]”).

Hah therefore has also failed to establish a prima facie case for each requisite

element of his misappropriation invasion of privacy claim by clear and specific

evidence. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c); Watson, 566 S.W.3d

at 329; see also Fobbs, 619 S.W.3d at 872–73. We sustain issue six.

      4. Issue Seven: Breach of Contract

      In issue seven, Melton argues that Hah failed to make a prima facie case for

his breach of contract claim by clear and specific evidence. Melton specifically

                                          26
challenges the contract’s validity and contends that Hah failed to provide evidence

of damages proximately caused by Melton’s breach.

      Once Melton showed the TCPA applied to Hah’s claim, Hah needed to

establish “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential

element” of his breach of contract claim. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §

27.005(c); S & S Emergency Training Solutions, Inc. v. Elliot, 564 S.W.3d 843, 847

(Tex. 2018) (noting second step of analysis after TCPA applicability is whether non-

movant established by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case of each

essential element of its breach-of-contract claim). The essential elements of a breach

of contract cause of action are: “(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) the plaintiff

performed or tendered performance as the contract required; (3) the defendant

breached the contract by failing to perform or tender performance as the contract

required; and (4) the plaintiff sustained damages as a result of the breach.” USAA

Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 501 n.21 (Tex. 2018) (citations

omitted).

      Assuming without deciding the “Contract of Reasonable Expectations”

Melton signed constituted a valid contract, Hah must still establish damages caused

by Melton’s breach. See id.; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c).

Hah pleaded in his Petition that as a result of Melton’s breach, he has “suffered and

                                           27
continues to suffer actual damages” and generally averred in his affidavit that Melton

posted “false, defamatory, derogatory or mean-spirited or negative comments or

reviews on social media designed to damage my reputation[.]” Hah’s pleading and

affidavit alleging he has been damaged is conclusory and not “clear and specific

evidence” of particularized harm. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 592–93 (explaining that

general averment of economic losses failed to satisfy TCPA’s minimum

requirements); Gensetix, Inc. v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 616 S.W.3d 630, 647 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. dism’d) (noting same). Since Hah failed to

provide “clear and specific evidence” of damages, Hah failed to establish a prima

facie case for his breach of contract claim. See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590, 592–93;

Gensetix, Inc., 616 S.W.3d at 647; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §

27.005(c). We sustain issue seven.

      5. Issue Eight: Injunctive Relief

      In issue eight, Melton contends that Hah cannot establish his entitlement to

injunctive relief and has not attempted to. She also contends that it is “linked to one

or more causes of action[,]” which all fail, so the claim for injunctive relief fails.

“[T]he TCPA does not allow a request for injunctive relief to be separately

challenged when it is linked to a cause of action.” See Cavin v. Abbott, 613 S.W.3d

168, 171 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet. denied) (citations omitted). Hah concedes

                                          28
in his brief that his request for injunctive relief “is not an independent cause of action

but is rather ancillary to Appellant’s other claims.” Having determined he failed to

make a prima facie case for his other claims, we decline to address this separately

from his other causes of action. See id.; see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

D. Issues Nine through Twelve: Affirmative Defenses

      In issues nine through twelve, Melton asserts she established affirmative

defenses to Hah’s claims. Since Hah failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima

facie case for the essential elements of each of his causes of action by clear and

specific evidence, the burden did not shift back to Melton to establish her affirmative

defenses. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c)–(d); Youngkin, 546

S.W.3d at 679–80 (discussing TCPA’s burden shifting); Coleman, 512 S.W.3d at

899 (same). Accordingly, we need not address Melton’s remaining issues. See Tex.

R. App. P. 47.1.

                                    IV. Conclusion

      We conclude that Melton met her initial burden to show that Hah’s claims

against her fall within the TCPA. Therefore, the burden shifted to Hah to establish

by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of his

claims. Hah failed to meet his burden. Hah failed to establish a prima facie case for

his defamation, business disparagement, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract

                                           29
claims, and his claim for injunctive relief was derivative of those claims. We hold

the trial court erred by denying Melton’s TCPA Motion to Dismiss. We reverse the

trial court’s denial of Melton’s TCPA Motion to Dismiss, remand the case to the trial

court so that it can enter a judgment dismissing Hah’s defamation, business

disparagement, invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and injunctive relief claims,

and instruct the trial court to award Melton reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and

other expenses incurred as allowed under the TCPA. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code Ann. §§ 27.005, 27.009(a); River Plantation Cmty. Improvement Ass’n v.

River Plantation Props., LLC, No. 09-17-00451-CV, 2018 WL 4120252, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Aug. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (remanding for entry of

judgment dismissing causes of action and award of attorney’s fees).

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

                                                ___________________________
                                                   W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                        Chief Justice

Submitted on June 16, 2023
Opinion Delivered August 10, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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