Court Opinion

ID: 9561069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:02:20.027648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:31.096918
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting) — -The majority takes an overly simplistic and, it appears to me, a somewhat naive approach in its evaluation and resolution of the issue in the instant case. Consequently, because of this and for more specific and definitive reasons subsequently stated, I must dissent.
The court is confronted in this matter with a typical, often-recurring problem, i.e., the necessity of judicial interpretation of a provision of the state constitution. In this respect, our function is to determine the meaning of the constitutional provision in relation to the facts involved in *197this particular case. The function is not to be performed by a purely mechanical application of legalese in a rarified conceptualistic vacuum.
The majority focuses upon and embraces one of the most venerable, often used, and occasionally misunderstood maxims of interpretation to the effect that words or a collocation of words or phrases (in the constitution, in a statute, or other legal document) which can be said to be unambiguous require no interpretation or construction. The fallacy in embracing this old axiom too enthusiastically lies in the fact that there are two long recognized, highly respectable, and much used methods of interpretation: (1) the literal approach, and (2) the liberal or functional method. The two methods are antithetical but, again, each is a recognized and legitimate tool employed by courts in the process of construing and giving substance or juristic consequence to legal phraseology. The “nonambiguity” axiom is, in effect, the alter ego of, or another way of, expressing the literal approach or method of interpretation. In the instant case, the application of the maxim is a judicial choice which is made, and the result is a categorical rejection of the functional approach without conceding its existence.
It so happens that the statement by the majority that the provisions of Const, art. 2, § 131 are unambiguous is made in the face of the fact that this provision has been before the court in a number of cases cited by the majority in which the members of the court have disagreed as to the meaning of the constitutional language. This, and the fact that the members of this court today dispute the meaning of that same language, leaves little doubt in my mind that the majority’s rationale is unduly rigid and ill founded.
I am convinced that the emphasis should be placed on the intent and purpose of the constitutional language at *198issue, and not on its literal meaning. In fact, one of the most basic rules of construction is that the spirit or intention of the law prevails over the letter of the law. E.g., Department of Revenue v. Hoppe, 82 Wn.2d 549, 512 P.2d 1094 (1973).
*197“No member of the legislature, during the term for which he is elected, shall be appointed or elected to any civil office in the state, which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which shall have been increased, during the term for which he was elected.”
*198The intent and purpose of the provision, in my judgment, is to prevent members of the legislature from benefiting or profiting immediately and directly either by being appointed or elected to an office which was created, or benefiting from an increase in the salary of an office when either event was brought about by the enactment of a statute when the particular legislator was a member of the legislature that acted upon the particular measure.
The salary of the Secretary of State was increased by Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 263, p. 869, but the proviso of chapter 263, article 5, page 870,2 prohibits any then member of the legislature from receiving and benefiting from the increase in salary, i.e., the emoluments of the Office of Secretary of State.
In State ex rel. O'Connell v. Dubuque, 68 Wn.2d 553, 567, 413 P.2d 972 (1966), this court again emphasized the strong public policy that exists in favor of eligibility for public office and in preserving for the electorate a greater freedom of choice among potential candidates for office. In the Dubuque case, at page 567, the court reasoned that article 2, section 13, is
designed in part to prevent a member of the legislature from increasing the salaries of public officials and then, during the term for which he was elected legislator, ma*199neuvering to obtain the increased salary without an intervening election. But the words of limitation describe only the legislator’s term of office. If the office be elective, then the legislator should have the right to stand for election to it in common with all other citizens of the state when the term receiving the increased salary does not substantially overlap the legislative term.
*198“Provided Further, That a member of the legislature whose term of office is partly co-extensive with or extends beyond the present term of office of any of the officials whose salary is increased by virtue of the provisions of sections 1 through 5 of this act shall be eligible to be appointed or elected to any of the offices the salary of which is increased hereby but he shall not be entitled to receive such increased salary until after the expiration of his present term of office and his subsequent election or reelection to the office to which he was appointed or elected respectively during his term of office as legislator.” (Italics mine.)
*199In the instant case, neither Ceccarelli nor Laughlin could benefit from or receive the increased emoluments of the Office of Secretary of State unless (a) one of these two potential candidates is elected in the November 1975 general election, and until (b) the current term of office in the legislature of the successful candidate expires on January 10, 1977, and unless (c) the successful candidate is reelected to the position of Secretary of State in a subsequent election. Thus, the electorate has an opportunity to twice pass upon and sanction the action of the successful candidate who was a member of the legislature when it approved the salary increase for the Office of Secretary of State. In no event could the individual’s term receiving the increased salary as Secretary of State overlap with a current legislative term. The limitations in the proviso of chapter 263 not only fulfill the requirements of Dubuaue but also protect and foster the right of the electorate to choose their elected public officials.
Before concluding, I feel compelled to point out that the majority’s citation of State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wn.2d 133, 247 P.2d 787 (1952), in support of the nonambiguity approach is inapropos, to say the least. If ever there was a decision of this court that rejected the literal approach and emphasized the liberal or functional approach in regard to the problem of constitutional interpretation, State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood of Friends, supra, is that case. The majority simply lifts one sentence out of context and misapplies it in another.
For the reasons indicated, I must disagree and dissent.
Utter and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Finley, J.

 Const, art. 2, § 13, reads:

 The proviso states: