Court Opinion

ID: 9902218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:04:36.561899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.878046
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0820-MR

JAMES SAMUEL                                                         APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE ANDREW C. SELF, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CR-00251

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: DIXON, GOODWINE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: James Samuel appeals his conviction and sentence entered by

the Christian Circuit Court on December 8, 2021. After a careful review of the

briefs, record, and applicable law, we affirm.

          BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             James Samuel entered an unconditional guilty plea to the charges of

first-degree stalking, violation of a Kentucky domestic violence order, and theft by
unlawful taking over $500 in exchange for a ten-year recommended sentence and

the Commonwealth’s agreement not to oppose probation into a long-term

rehabilitation program. At sentencing on December 8, 2021, Samuel argued

probation was the appropriate resolution given the pre-sentence investigation

assessment of his needs and his desire for treatment. The court denied probation

and sentenced Samuel in accordance with the plea, and this belated appeal

followed. We will introduce additional facts as they become relevant.

                                   LEGAL ANALYSIS

                Samuel first asserts that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or

intelligently made, as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct.

1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), and RCr1 8.08, because he was deceived about the

possibility of probation.2 As proof that the possibility of probation was illusory,

Samuel cites the court’s statements during sentencing that he was “by far the worst

and most disconcerting perpetrator of domestic violence that [the court had] seen

in 15 years on the bench[,]” and that the court would not have granted him

probation even if the victim had supported the request, which she did not.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2
  Boykin challenges may be raised on direct appeal even when the defendant has entered an
unconditional guilty plea. Windsor v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 306, 307 (Ky. 2008).

                                             -2-
                The crux of Samuel’s claim is that he would not have pled guilty had

he known the court would deny probation. Importantly, probation was not a

condition of the plea; the Commonwealth merely stated it would not oppose

Samuel’s request, and the plea agreement stated in bold font that “[g]ranting

[p]robation . . . [is] at the pure discretion of the Judge[] and cannot be a basis to

withdraw your plea.” Samuel averred to the court during his plea colloquy that he

had reviewed the offer with counsel, that he was not impaired, that he had no

questions, and that he had read and signed the offer. After accepting the plea,

Samuel made no objection to the court’s statement that it would decide whether

Samuel would be incarcerated or probated at sentencing. From these facts, we

conclude Samuel was aware that his plea only guaranteed him the opportunity to

request probation without opposition, a benefit that he received; therefore, his plea

was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

                Next, Samuel argues that the court abused its discretion when it

disregarded evidence that the underlying cause of his issues was substance use that

would be best addressed via long-term treatment, not incarceration, and denied

probation. We are unconvinced.

                KRS3 533.010(2) provides that:

                [A]fter due consideration of the defendant’s risk and
                needs assessment, nature and circumstances of the crime,

3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -3-
             and the history, character, and condition of the defendant,
             probation . . . shall be granted, unless the court is of the
             opinion that imprisonment is necessary for protection of
             the public because[, as the court found herein, probation
             would] . . . unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
             defendant’s crime.

             We review a court’s decision on probation for an abuse of discretion.

Allee v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 336, 341-42 (Ky. 1970); see also Boone v.

Commonwealth, 155 S.W.3d 727 (Ky. App. 2004). A court abuses its discretion if

its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations

omitted).

             Here, the court heard evidence regarding Samuel’s risk and needs

assessment and demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the crime, as well as

Samuel’s history and character, from taking testimony in the underlying matter and

presiding over his prior felony case. The evidence was that Samuel had physically,

mentally, verbally, and sexually abused the victim repeatedly during their six-year

relationship. As a result of the abuse, the victim attempted to escape by moving to

Kentucky in 2015, but Samuel found her and followed her to the Commonwealth.

             In December 2018, Samuel made repeated threats to hunt, beat, and

kill the victim; sent her and her son harassing messages; attempted to enter her

vehicle at a drive-thru after blocking her escape; followed and tracked her to her

new residence; and repeatedly stalked her at that residence, threatening to break

                                         -4-
her door down. In fact, the next month – after an order of protection had been

entered – Samuel broke down the victim’s door, chased her through the house,

struck her, and took her cellphone. As a result, on February 19, 2020, Samuel pled

guilty to two counts of intimidating a participant in the legal process, third-degree

terroristic threatening, fourth-degree assault, domestic violence, second-degree

stalking, harassing communications, and four counts of violating a protection

order.

             In the underlying action, it was alleged that in December 2020, while

on probation and in contravention of a protection order, Samuel again stalked the

victim outside her home during the early hours of the morning, attempted to enter

her vehicle, and followed her when she fled to a public location to obtain

assistance. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion

in denying probation.

             Finally, Samuel contends that the court erred by not allowing him to

withdraw his plea when he testified at an evidentiary hearing – held almost a year

after sentencing – that counsel had ignored his instructions to seek withdrawal. It

is conceded that this claim was not preserved for review, but Samuel maintains

that, because it is a sentencing issue, preservation is not required pursuant to

Webster v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Ky. 2014). We, however, agree

with the Commonwealth that this matter is not properly before the Court.

                                          -5-
              Ordinarily, the failure to preserve an issue waives appellate review

“unless a request for palpable error review under RCr 10.26 is made and briefed by

the appellant.” Id. at 325 (citing Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309,

316 (Ky. 2008)). However, as the Court explained in Webster:

              there are certain exceptions where we will automatically
              treat an unpreserved sentencing issue as though it was
              preserved for appellate review notwithstanding an
              appellant’s failure to raise the issue before the trial
              court. . . . [T]o receive the benefit of appellate review
              without preservation, we require Appellant to raise a true
              “sentencing issue” on appeal. Jones v. Commonwealth,
              382 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Ky. 2011).

                     In Grigsby v. Commonwealth, we explained that
              “the phrase ‘sentencing issues’ does not refer to any issue
              that arguably affected the ultimate sentence imposed.
              Instead, it refers to a claim that a sentencing decision is
              contrary to statute[4] . . . or was made without fully
              considering what sentencing options were allowed by
              statute[.]”[5] 302 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Ky. 2010). . . . Notably,
              those sentencing issues that are automatically treated as
              preserved both involve sentencing decisions and do not
              involve any other aspect of the sentencing phase. See id.

438 S.W.3d at 325-26.

4
  As an example, in Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Ky. 1985), the court
reviewed an unpreserved claim that Defendant’s multiple sentences to life imprisonment, rather
than a single sentence of life imprisonment, contravened KRS 532.080(1).
5
  Such as when a court fails to consider probation as required by KRS 533.010. See Knox v.
Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 891 (Ky. 2012); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 99 (Ky.
1994).

                                              -6-
            Beyond a general assertion that the exception applies, Samuel has not

demonstrated how the court’s alleged failure to sua sponte withdraw his plea

qualifies as a sentencing issue as defined by Webster. Accordingly, the

preservation exception does not apply, and because Samuel has not requested

palpable error review, we do not reach the merits of this argument.

                                 CONCLUSION

            Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Christian

Circuit Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Robert C. Yang                            Daniel J. Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Joseph A. Beckett
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -7-