Court Opinion

ID: 9844327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:00:58.8827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:32.856388
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, C. J.,
Specially Concurring.
Taking the medical testimony as a whole, I do not think that it can be reasonably construed to mean that the witnesses intended to say that the type of injury in question was more likely to occur as a result of the *346surgeon’s negligence than as a result of some other cause. The witnesses purported to say only that injury to the facial nerve does not ordinarily occur as a result of such an operation but that if it does occur, it is just as likely that it was the result of the inherent risk of that type of operation as it was the negligent conduct of the surgeon.
Drs. DeWeese and Holden, plaintiff’s expert witnesses, each testified that injury of the type suffered by plaintiff was an “inherent” risk of the type of surgery performed in this case. If the risk of injury is inherent in the operation, it is difficult to see how it would be more likely to occur as a result of the surgeon’s negligence than through the cause or causes which make such an injury an inherent risk of the operation.
I disagree with the analysis of the majority opinion in still another respect. The opinion limits the operation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the specific acts of negligence alleged in the complaint. I would agree that if the complaint does not apprise defendant of the plaintiff’s theory, defendant is entitled to limit plaintiff’s proof to the allegations in the complaint. But that involves merely a principle of pleading; it has nothing to do with the scope of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The proper rule is stated in 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 19.10, p. 1097 (1956):
“* * * Only in a case where defendant has been genuinely and justifiably misled by the pleadings so that he has actually failed to prepare a defense to a case based on the doctrine should its application be denied on the basis of the pleadings. This seems to be the general rule.”
In the present case it cannot seriously be contended that defendant was not aware of plaintiff’s intention *347to go beyond the proof of specific acts of negligence on the part of defendant and to rely upon the inference that could be drawn under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Plaintiff alleged that “under the procedures customarily followed for performance of a radical mastoidectomy revision for the removal of cholesteatoma, injury and paralysis to the facial nerve and interference with the balance and equilibrium will not occur ordinarily in the absence of negligence.”
The effect of specific pleading and proof in connection with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is thoroughly discussed in 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 19.10 (1956). What is said there clearly demonstrates the error of the reasoning used in the majority opinion.① To the extent that the eases relied upon by the majority are inconsistent with this analysis, they should be overruled.
I also concur with what is said in the dissenting opinion of Tongue, J.

 Cf., Waterway Terminals v. P. S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 474 P2d 309 (1970). We there held that our rule precluding general allegations of negligence when there are specific allegations of negligence in the same count did not apply to res ipsa loquitur cases. Quoting from Short v. D.B.B. Logging Co., 192 Or 383, 393, 232 P2d 70, 235 P2d 340 (1951), we approved the use of a general res ipsa loquitur instruction, even when there were specific allegations of negligence, if the general allegations of negligence were properly pleaded.