Court Opinion

ID: 9488205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:39:01.291146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:45.235214
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in Part I.B:
I am unable to join Part I.B of this court’s opinion ruling that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the parole commission calculated his parole eligibility date based on the dismissed counts of his federal indictment. Purporting to analyze evidence, this court restates Petitioner’s argument and concludes that a mere inference that the parole commission considered the dismissed counts of his federal indictment constitutes a preponderance of the evidence. Because I conclude that Petitioner has failed to support his argument that the parole commission considered the dismissed counts of his federal indictment with a preponderance of the evidence, I respectfully dissent.
The party who asserts the breach of a plea agreement has the burden of proving the underlying facts that establish a breach by a preponderance of the evidence. Martin, 25 F.3d at 217; Hernandez, 17 F.3d at 81; Calabrese, 645 F.2d at 1390. In order to obtain relief in the instant case, therefore, Petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the parole commission relied on the dismissed counts of his federal indictment when it determined he was eligible for parole in sixty months.
As the district court recognized, the parole commission did not mention Petitioner’s dismissed counts in its 1991 Notice of Action setting his sixty-month parole eligibility. At the September 4, 1992 evidentiary hearing, Petitioner failed to present evidence demonstrating that the parole commission relied on the dismissed counts of his federal indictment when it calculated his parole eligibility date. Instead, Petitioner argues that via a reverse deduction inquiry the parole commission could not have reached the sixty-month determination unless it did in fact rely on the dismissed counts.
Although the parole commission did not expressly mention the dismissed counts, Petitioner contends it implicitly based its sixty month parole determination on the 34,000 pounds of marijuana involved in the dismissed counts. Petitioner pled guilty to drug offenses involving 3300 pounds of marijuana. Under parole commission guidelines then in effect, Petitioner’s offense characteristic classification was category five based on the 3300 pounds of marijuana. See Parole Commission Rules 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.65 (1989). With the salient factor score of 10 assigned by the parole commission, and addition of an unrelated escape conviction, Petitioner argues his parole guideline range was thirty-two to forty-eight months. In its March 1991 Notice of Action, however, the parole commission stated that Petitioner was eligible for parole in sixty months under the guidelines.
Petitioner contends that the parole commission determined he was eligible for parole in sixty months because it considered the 34,000 pounds of marijuana referenced in the dismissed counts of the federal indictment. Petitioner maintains that 34,000 pounds of marijuana yields an offense characteristic classification of category six, and when combined with his unrelated escape conviction and salient factor score of 10, the guideline range is forty-eight to sixty-two months. See id. Thus, Petitioner alleges the parole commission reached a parole eligibility determination of sixty months by calculating the guideline range for the 34,000 pounds of marijuana involved in the dismissed counts.
This court concludes that Petitioner’s reverse deduction argument creates a strong inference that the government utilized the dismissed counts of his federal indictment to determine his parole eligibility. Further, this court holds that Petitioner’s allegations satisfy his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the government breached the plea agreement. I disagree. Naked allegations do not constitute eviden-tiary facts. Petitioner’s argument that consideration of the dismissed counts results in parole eligibility in forty-eight to sixty-two *1544months in itself does not constitute sufficient evidence to demonstrate a breach. Rather, his argument amounts to mere allegations that are not premised upon a factual preponderance.
While I agree that Petitioner has made a persuasive argument that the government used his dismissed counts to calculate his parole eligibility date, the record reveals he has failed to introduce any evidence showing the underlying facts that establish a breach by a preponderance. At most, Petitioner has shown that the parole commission incorrectly calculated his parole eligibility date. Although it is unclear how the parole commission calculated Petitioner’s parole eligibility, an erroneous parole eligibility calculation in itself does not breach the plea agreement. Petitioner may initiate a separate action for a correct parole calculation under the applicable parole guidelines in the appropriate forum. An action alleging breach of the plea agreement, however, is not the proper action to challenge the parole determination unless Petitioner proves the calculation itself was based upon his dismissed counts. Because Petitioner has failed to make such a showing, I respectfully dissent from this court’s ruling that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the parole commission breached the plea agreement when it determined he was eligible for parole in sixty months. I would, therefore, affirm the district court in Part I.B.