Court Opinion

ID: 9749066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:22:54.842048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:43.486839
License: Public Domain

JONES, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in part II.A. of the majority opinion. I entirely agree that experience and logic dictate a reexamination of the notion of appointing “advisory” and “standby” counsel in Faretta cases (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562]). However, I part company from my colleagues when they follow the Ligda decision (Ligda v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 811 [85 Cal.Rptr. 744]) over Littlefield v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 856 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 659], which I consider more persuasive. I do not believe the appointment of a public defender as advisory or standby counsel is authorized by Government Code section 27706.1 I therefore respectfully dissent from part II.B. of the majority opinion.
In my view, Littlefield correctly interpreted section 27706. In that case the Los Angeles Public Defender, over objection, was appointed standby counsel for a former client granted self-representation. The Littlefield majority held that a standby counsel appointment was beyond the scope of the statutory authority of the public defender. “The office of the county public defender is authorized to provide representation only in those classes of cases specified in Government Code section 27706. [Citations.]” (Littlefield v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 856, 858-859, fn. omitted.)2 The majority construed “defense” as active representation, to the exclusion of the status of standby counsel. As in the present case, the public defender in Littlefield “. . . was given no concrete task to perform. . . . Her sole assignment . . . was literally to stand by against the circumstance that it became necessary to revoke [the defendant’s] propria persona status. . . .” (Id. at p. 859.)
“We conclude that the court is not empowered to appoint [the public defender’s] office to serve as ‘standby’ counsel. The court’s authority in appointing the public defender is limited to appointments to defend a person charged with a crime, or at least to assist in the defense of such person. [Citation.] A standby counsel represents no one. Like an understudy in a *1400play, his or her task is to wait in readiness to play a role should the occasion arise. Standing by is not defending.” (Littlefield v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) Thus, the trial court “lacked statutory authority” and “acted in excess of its powers in ordering the public defender to act as ‘standby’ counsel for a defendant not represented by that officer.” (Ibid.)
I respectfully submit that the Ligda court’s interpretation of the word “defense” in section 27706 is too broad. In adopting the Ligda analysis, the majority fails to apply its own logic in adopting its theatrical analogy to the “helpful director” (see maj. opn., ante, p. 1398). A standby counsel clearly is an understudy; she plays no role in the “defense” of the case unless and until the defendant, like an actor taken ill, cannot continue to perform. An advisory counsel, in the theatrical analogy adopted by the majority, is hardly a director—at most, she is a prompter helping the actor with her lines, with no control over the quality of the performance. In reality, she provides no advice. She most often is doing nothing but taking notes, in the prayerful hope that she will not be thrust back into the role of advocate and defender, and later branded “ineffective” by an unhappy appellant. If she is thrust onto the defense stage, her props, sets and supporting cast must be assembled long after the curtain rises, and in full view of the audience.
I respectfully disagree with Ligda’s “ministerial officer” analysis. While it is true that a public defender is such an officer, and of course that attorneys generally are officers of the court, there are limits to the scope of the trial court’s power over its officers. The authority of a military commander over her officers is awesome but not absolute—it is limited by the written laws and codes of conduct that govern the military organization. So too, the awesome power of the trial court over its ministerial officers is limited, by at least the canons of judicial conduct and by applicable statutes. Numerous cases proscribe the trial court’s power to appoint the public defender in contravention of statutory law. (See, e.g., Littlefield v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 652, 654-655 [160 Cal.Rptr. 175] [trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in appointing public defender in civil paternity action, since section 27706 did not authorize such an appointment]; Mowrer v. Appellate Department (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 264, 268 [276 Cal.Rptr. 38] [trial court exceeded its authority by appointing public defender to represent indigent misdemeanant on appeal]; Brown v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 189 [173 Cal.Rptr. 803] [superior court exceeded its jurisdiction by appointing the public defender to represent a nonindigent conservatee].)
I am not alone in my disenchantment with Ligda. That case was diplomatically questioned in Chaleff v. Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 721, 725, footnote 2 [138 Cal.Rptr. 735], with the court indicating “neither *1401agreement nor disagreement” with Ligda’s holding that a public defender may be appointed a standby counsel “despite the absence of authority for such an appointment in Government Code section 27706 which defines the authority of the public defender without mentioning or implying that the authority includes service as an adviser to a person conducting his own defense.”
I would grant the petition for writ of mandate and relieve petitioner of his appointment as “advisory” and “standby” counsel.
Petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 26, 1998. Kennard, J., and Brown, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.

Unless otherwise indicated, all further references are to the Government Code.

The dissent in Littlefield followed Ligda. (18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 861-862 (dis. opn. of Woods (A. M.). P. J.).)