Court Opinion

ID: 9583790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:42:07.35717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:17.921453
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(concurring).
This appeal challenges the granting of the defendant’s motion to vacate the writ of attachment on real property, which was issued for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendants, to sue for a tort, the alleged wrongful death of Plaintiff’s husband, committed in Colorado. I realize the difficulties that may ramify if a plaintiff, by simply alleging a tort claim of any kind, spurious or otherwise, and the issuing of an attachment upon any property, e. g., a car, a trailer home of one traveling through the forum state, can thus obtain jurisdiction over a resident of another state. I therefore desire to limit my concurrence to the particular fact situation in this case.
It is unquestionable that the courts of this State can issue writs of attachment upon the grounds and under the procedure prescribed in rule 64C(a) and that by doing so, the real property is taken within the present jurisdiction of the court, which then can be dealt with according to the rights the litigants assert in that property. Notwithstanding the fact that the allegation is that the tort was committed in the state of Colorado, there is an additional aspect of this case which I think is of some significance. There is also involved in this action the allegation that the real property in Utah has been the subject of an illusory conveyance to the defendant’s parents for the purpose of hindering, and defrauding the plaintiff in pursuing her remedy. In view of the dual aspects of the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff involving this real property I concur with the conclusion that the attachment should not have been vacated, and that the action is maintainable in our courts as one in rem against that property.1
In regard to the question whether the judgment in the federal court is res judi-cata, I think it is pertinent to observe that under our law any case may be commenced again within one year after a dismissal for any reason not on the merits.2
HENRIOD, C. J., dissents.
ELLETT, J., dissents.

. See State ex rel. Boyer v. Superior Court, etc., 115 Wash. 359, 197 P. 321 (1921).

. Sec. 78-12-40, U.C.A.1953.