Court Opinion

ID: 9949217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-09 18:12:10.402218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:01.682316
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00248-CR

                                   COURT OF APPEALS

                       THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                          CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RANDY RAY GUTIERREZ,                                                                       Appellant,

                                                        v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                         Appellee.

                       On appeal from the 156th District Court
                              of Bee County, Texas.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and Peña
                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

        Appellant Randy Ray Gutierrez appeals his convictions for two counts of super

aggravated sexual assault of a child 1 (counts one and two) and one count of indecency

        1 Although the word “super” appears nowhere in the aggravated sexual assault statute, the term is

useful to help distinguish between several distinct alternative varieties of the offense in the statute. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021. In this memorandum opinion, this Court will use the term “super
aggravated sexual assault of a child” to refer to an offense under § 22.021(f), which imposes a statutory
minimum of twenty-five years’ imprisonment if an enumerated aggravating element is present. See id.
with a child (count three), a first-degree felony with a minimum sentence of twenty-five

years’ imprisonment and a second-degree felony, respectively. See TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.021(f)(2). 2 A jury found Gutierrez guilty on all three counts, and

the trial court sentenced him to seventy-five years’ imprisonment as to each of counts one

and two, and twenty years’ imprisonment as to count three, with all sentences to run

concurrently. In two issues, Gutierrez argues that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to object to improper jury argument, and that

the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for super aggravated sexual

assault of a child.

        We reverse the judgments of conviction on counts one and two and remand the

case to the trial court to reform the judgment to reflect convictions for aggravated sexual

assault of a child under penal code § 22.021(a)(2)(B), and to conduct a new punishment

hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand to the

trial court.

                                         I.      BACKGROUND

        A grand jury indicted Gutierrez with two counts of sexual assault of a child younger

than fourteen years of age alleged to have occurred on or about October 1, 2018: count

one based on the alleged contact of the complainant K.R.’s sexual organ by Gutierrez’s

§ 22.021(a)(2)(A). This contrasts with the term “aggravated sexual assault of a child,” which here will be
used to refer to an offense under § 22.021(a)(2)(B), which has the same elements as super aggravated
sexual assault of a child, absent a finding of any of the enumerated aggravating elements that would warrant
application of the statutory minimum. This usage is consistent with the indictment and jury charge in this
case, which both explicitly use the term “super aggravated sexual assault of a child.”

        2 The judgment of conviction for super aggravated sexual assault of a child erroneously states that

the statute is Texas Penal Code § 220.21(f), instead of § 22.021(f)(2). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.021(f)(2). Although we have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we are presented
with the necessary information to do so, see Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993),
we need not do so here as we modify the judgment on other grounds.

                                                     2
sexual organ, see id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), and count two based on the alleged contact

of K.R.’s mouth by Gutierrez’s sexual organ, see id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(v). The indictment

further alleged that during the commission of counts one and two, respectively,

“Defendant did then and there by acts or words threaten to cause, or place, the

complainant [K.R.] in fear that kidnapping would be imminently inflicted on Kelly Cruz,

and the acts or words occurred in the presence of” K.R. Gutierrez was also indicted for

indecency with a child by contact, alleged to have occurred on or about July 4, 2018. See

id. § 21.11(a)(1).

       The evidence presented at trial showed that Cruz is K.R.’s mother, and Gutierrez

met Cruz while Cruz was involved as a witness in the prosecution against her ex-

boyfriend, Cristobal Garcia, who was eventually convicted of sexually abusing K.R. Early

in their relationship, Cruz became aware that Gutierrez was a registered sex offender.

After Gutierrez and Cruz had been dating for a time, K.R. moved in with Gutierrez and

Cruz in a residence owned by Gutierrez’s parents. Gutierrez and Cruz would routinely

use crystal meth together in the family home, with Gutierrez being Cruz’s supplier. This

included, on at least one occasion, providing crystal meth to K.R.

       K.R. testified that on July 4, 2018, Gutierrez and Cruz got into an argument, and

Gutierrez tied Cruz up and placed her in the bathroom away from K.R. K.R. testified that

Gutierrez then proceeded to touch her over the clothes on her vagina, buttocks, and

chest. K.R. also testified that Gutierrez, on a later date, took off her clothes and tried to

insert his penis into her vagina and inserted his penis into her mouth. K.R. testified that,

unlike the July 4 incident, she did not know where Cruz was at the time of this second

instance of abuse. When asked if she was “worried” about Cruz at the time, she

                                             3
responded that she was because she “didn’t know where [Cruz] was.” She also agreed

with the State that that was “the only reason [she was] worried” about Cruz at the time.

       Outcry witness Dalia Resio, who is married to K.R.’s maternal uncle, testified that

when K.R. first spoke to her, “[s]he started telling me that [Gutierrez] would touch her

places that she wouldn’t want to be touched to a point where he would drug her, she woke

up, and he tied her to the bed and—and he had his hands on her.” Resio further testified

that K.R. had told her that Gutierrez had touched her on the chest and private parts. When

asked by the State if K.R. had told her about any allegations that went beyond touching,

she responded that K.R. “never mentioned” that to her.

       Resio testified that K.R. told her about Cruz being tied up in the restroom, but K.R.

did not provide any dates or details regarding that allegation:

       [State]:                    Did she say exactly—what else did she say
                                   about what was going on with the defendant?

       [Resio]:                    That she woke up and that he was touching her
                                   and that he also had pictures of her on his
                                   phone. She says that—I know she said her mom
                                   was in the restroom.

       [State]:                    What did she say about her mom being in the
                                   restroom?

       [Resio]:                    That she was locked in the restroom.

       [State]:                    And did she describe how she was locked in the
                                   restroom?

       [Resio]:                    No. She just told me that she was just locked in
                                   the restroom.

Later, the State and Resio had the following exchange:

       [State]:                    When [K.R.] was describing these incidents, I
                                   think you mentioned that she said that her mom
                                   was locked in the bathroom?

                                             4
      [Resio]:                    Yes.

      [State]:                    Did she mention how that happened or
                                  specifics?

      [Resio]:                    No.

      [State]:                    Did she say that happened one time or more
                                  than one time, if you can remember?

      [Resio]:                    I believe she only said one time, but this
                                  incident—it only happened once, but what he
                                  was doing to her happened more than once.

      Cruz testified that Gutierrez restrained her in the bathroom on two occasions,

although she could not recall the particular dates. Cruz recalled K.R. being tied up in the

bathroom as well, although K.R. could not recall such an incident. Cruz also

acknowledged that K.R. had a history of mental health issues, including stays in

behavioral hospitals, a history of self-harm, and several suicide attempts. After the State

rested, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State had failed to

present any evidence to prove that K.R. had a fear that kidnapping would be imminently

inflicted on Cruz during the alleged sexual assaults. The trial court denied Gutierrez’s

motion, and the jury returned a guilty verdict against Gutierrez on all counts. This appeal

followed.

                       II.    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

      By his first issue, Gutierrez argues that his defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the State’s improper jury arguments. In particular, he argues that the

State’s argument during closing was improper because: (1) the prosecutor injected his

personal opinions about K.R. into his argument, bolstering her credibility; (2) the

prosecutor introduced new and harmful facts to the jury; (3) the prosecutor improperly

                                            5
asked the members of the jury to abandon their objectivity; and (4) the prosecutor

misstated the State’s burden of proof.

      A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

      “The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the appellant by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Munoz v. State, 24 S.W.3d 427, 434 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2000, no pet.); see Herrera v. Stahl, 441 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (“The particular meaning of ‘preponderance of the

evidence’ in both civil and criminal cases means the greater weight and degree of credible

evidence that would create a reasonable belief in the truth of the claim.”). Claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-step analysis articulated in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and “an appellant’s failure to satisfy one

prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.” Garcia

v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

      The first step requires the appellant to demonstrate that defense counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To satisfy this step, the appellant must

identify the acts or omissions of counsel alleged to be ineffective assistance and

affirmatively prove that they fell below the professional norm of reasonableness.

McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Our review is highly

deferential and we must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. We

will not find ineffectiveness by isolating any portion of defense counsel’s representation

but will judge the claim based on the totality of the representation and the particular

                                            6
circumstances of each case. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.

       The second Strickland prong requires the appellant to affirmatively prove prejudice

from the deficient performance of his defense counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see

Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “This means that the

appellant must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Mitchell v. State, 68

S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

       To demonstrate ineffective assistance based on a failure to object, appellant must

show that the trial court would have committed harmful error by overruling the objection

had defense counsel objected. Donald v. State, 543 S.W.3d 466, 478 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Proper prosecutorial argument should generally fall

within one of the following categories: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable

deductions from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) pleas

for law enforcement. See Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);

Cantu v. State, 944 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1997, pet.

ref’d). “In examining challenges to jury argument, the Court considers the remark in the

context in which it appears. Counsel is allowed wide latitude without limitation in drawing

inferences from the evidence so long as the inferences drawn are reasonable, fair,

legitimate, and offered in good faith.” Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1988).

                                            7
       Improper jury arguments generally constitute non-constitutional error. See

Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (“[M]ost [jury

arguments] that fall outside the areas of permissible argument will be considered to be

error of the non[-]constitutional variety.”). A non-constitutional error “that does not affect

substantial rights must be disregarded.” Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 728 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011); see Brown, 270 S.W.3d at 570 (concluding that even when the State

makes an improper jury argument, it is error to deny a mistrial only if the argument is

“extreme or manifestly improper”).

       B.     Analysis

       First, Gutierrez argues that the State inappropriately bolstered K.R.’s testimony

during closing argument. Gutierrez points to the following two statements:

       [State]:                     [B]ecause if there is one thing I am dead sure
                                    of, it is that that girl has been sexually abused.

                                            ....

       [State]:                     I would 100 percent believe when she was up
                                    here she was truthful about what happened
                                    with . . . Gutierrez, and I believe she is
                                    minimizing the extent of what happened to her.

       In general, “[a] prosecutor may not inject his personal opinion of a witness’s

credibility during closing argument.” Mosley v. State, 666 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2023) (citing Menefee v. State, 614 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)); see

also Werdlow v. State, No. 13-04-004-CR, 2005 WL 2008423, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Aug. 22, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(finding it improper for a prosecutor to vouch for a law enforcement officer’s credibility

based on personal knowledge). However, a prosecutor may argue his opinion regarding

a witness’s credibility if the opinion is based on reasonable deductions from the evidence

                                              8
and does not constitute unsworn testimony. See McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23, 37 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1985); see also Gonzalez v. State, 337 S.W.3d 473, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). “In addition, a prosecutor may argue about the credibility of a

witness if such argument was invited by and is responsive to [the defendant’s]

arguments.” Thomas v. State, 445 S.W.3d 201, 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,

pet. ref’d) (citing Chapman v. State, 503 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)).

       None of the statements referenced by Gutierrez imply that the State in the case

had some unique personal insight into K.R.’s credibility, and each of the statements fit

within the categories of proper prosecutorial argument. When the State asserted that it

was “dead sure” that K.R. had been sexually abused, it was properly attacking the

defense’s theory of the case. Just prior to this statement, the State noted that defense

counsel “is going to share with you a lot of his defensive theories. That is what I expect,

and you have heard probably many of them throughout the trial, that this girl is

hallucinating, delusional, crazy, she is making this up, she is getting it confused with the

first incident [of abuse involving Garcia].” During closing, Gutierrez’s defense counsel

argued as follows:

       [K.R.] is a victim, but she is not a victim of sexual abuse from [Gutierrez].
       She is a victim of a story getting out of control and she [is] being forced to
       come here to testify, because that is the logical conclusion of this whole
       accusation. At what point can she stop the train?

Thus, the State’s statement during its rebuttal that it “would 100 percent believe when she

was up here she was truthful” was a permissible answer to argument by defense counsel.

See Brown, 270 S.W.3d at 571.

       Gutierrez also argues that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object

when the State allegedly injected new and harmful facts into the record during closing.

                                              9
Gutierrez points to the following statement by the State: “I believe [K.R.] is minimizing the

extent of what happened to her.” This statement was a direct response to the defense’s

theory that inconsistencies in K.R.’s testimony implied that she was not credible: “The

problem with the child when they make a story up, ladies and gentlemen, is they have to

remember the story they made up, so we start getting multiple different variations of the

story. . . . The story was never consistent. It was never the same.”

       The State’s statement was a proper response to defense counsel’s argument in

that it attempted to explain away any alleged inconsistencies or gaps in K.R.’s testimony.

See id. Alternatively, the State’s statement could be construed as a reasonable deduction

from the evidence. See id.; De Leon v. State, 771 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 1989, pet. ref’d) (noting that it would be proper for a prosecutor to remind

the jury “of the common notion that children, not being as sophisticated as adults, often

have trouble lying consistently,” and “that this particular child was able to withstand cross-

examination and remain consistent in her story,” as such statements would have

amounted to reasonable deductions from the evidence).

       Next, Gutierrez argues that the State made a plea for abandonment of objectivity.

Gutierrez only references the following statements:

       [State]:                     [W]hen you add in the fact that you had your
                                    own mother and the defendant having you snort
                                    meth as an 11-year-old, how would you not want
                                    to kill yourself? How would you live with that?

                                            ....

       [State]:                     I agree with [defense counsel] that this process
                                    hurts, it does damage, and it’s going to do untold
                                    damage if justice isn’t done.

                                             10
       It is an improper plea for abandonment of objectivity for a prosecutor to ask jurors

to place themselves in the shoes of the victim of the charged offense, or in the shoes of

others affected by it. Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

Notwithstanding the State’s use of the second-person point of view, both statements were

proper responses to defense counsel’s theory of the case. See Linder v. State, 828

S.W.2d 290, 303 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. denied) (finding closing

argument proper even though the prosecutor repeatedly used the second person pronoun

“you” and asked the jury rhetorical questions). Each statement referred to by Gutierrez

was made after defense counsel put K.R.’s mental health at issue, which was crucial to

the defense’s theory of the case. According to defense counsel, K.R.’s mental health

issues were a cause of the false allegations against Gutierrez. It was appropriate for the

State to argue that her mental health issues were a symptom of the abuse, and not the

other way around.

       The State’s statements may also be construed as a proper plea for law

enforcement:

       [The State may] argue that juries should deter specific crimes by their
       verdict. The State may also argue the impact of the jury’s verdict on the
       community. The State may not, however, argue that the community or any
       particular segment of the community expects or demands either a guilty
       verdict or a particular punishment.

Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 55–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (internal citations omitted).

Reminding a jury of the impact of its verdict on a community differs from telling a jury that

the community expects or demands a particular verdict or form of punishment. Id. The

former is permissible, while the latter is not. Id. at 56.

                                               11
       Gutierrez points to no statement made by the State that implies that the community

expects or demands a particular verdict. Both statements merely remind the jury of the

potential impact of a not guilty verdict on K.R.’s mental health and the community in

general. Gutierrez cannot show that the “prosecutor directly urged the members of the

jury to imagine and focus on the events of the criminal act happening to them and their

children.” Linder, 828 S.W.2d at 302–03. Rather, as in Linder, both of the complained-of

statements are “far less insistent and more focused on the actions of the defendant and

the reactions of the victim.” Id.

       Finally, Gutierrez argues that the prosecutor misstated the State’s burden of proof.

During closing, the State argued to the jury that “there is no in between. There is no, well,

maybe she was a victim of sexual abuse but. She either was and [Gutierrez] is a child

predator, or she is a liar. Those are the only two choices. This either happened, or she is

a liar.” Gutierrez argues that this statement improperly implies that “reasonable doubt

necessarily equates to declaring a child witness a liar.” Like most of the other statements

referenced by Gutierrez, this statement was made during rebuttal closing argument and

was a direct response to defense counsel’s argument that K.R. was fabricating or

otherwise imagining her allegations. Defense counsel explicitly argued that the

allegations could have been the result of hallucinations, alluding to the fact that K.R. “has

talked to a dead relative or something like that.” Thus, it was a proper response to the

defense’s theory of the case, and a proper summation of K.R.’s testimony, that the sexual

abuse did in fact occur and that K.R. was not lying.

       None of the complained-of statements were improper, and thus Gutierrez cannot

show “that the trial court would have committed harmful error by overruling the objection

                                             12
had trial counsel objected.” Donald, 543 S.W.3d at 478. Even if we were to presume

deficiency, we would conclude that Gutierrez was not prejudiced by his defense counsel’s

failure to object. Gutierrez has not shown that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the

jury would have reached a more favorable verdict. We do not believe that any of the

complained-of statements to the jury undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial in

this case. See Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“[U]nder

Strickland: to show prejudice, there must be a reasonable probability, sufficient to

undermine our confidence in the outcome, that the result of the proceeding would have

been different had counsel performed reasonably.”). The State’s arguments to the jury

were consistent with its prosecution of the case. The State did not express any opinion

about K.R.’s credibility derived from unique personal familiarity, and a jury could not have

been surprised to learn that the State generally believed K.R.’s testimony and thought her

credible. Cf. Menefee, 614 S.W.2d at 168 (finding improper witness bolstering where the

prosecutor stated that “he had never seen anyone he thought was more honest than” a

certain witness); see also Werdlow, 2005 WL 2008423, at *6 (finding that a prosecutor’s

attempt at bolstering the credibility of a law enforcement witness had no substantial effect

on the jury’s guilty verdict because the “jury could not have been surprised to learn that

the State believed the arresting officer,” and that “if the State did not find [its witness]

credible, it would not have brought the case”).

                           III.   SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       By his second issue, Gutierrez argues that there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction for super aggravated sexual assault of a child because there was

                                            13
no evidence that K.R. feared that kidnapping would be imminently inflicted on Cruz during

the commission of the sexual assault.

        A.    Standard of Review

        “Under the Due Process Clause, a criminal conviction must be based on legally

sufficient evidence.” Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing

Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). Evidence is legally

sufficient if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Joe v. State, 663 S.W.3d 728, 731–32 (Tex. Crim. App.

2022) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Under a legal sufficiency

review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, while recognizing

that “[t]he trier of fact is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the

evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id.

        We measure the evidence produced at trial against the essential elements of the

offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. David v. State, 663 S.W.3d

673, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997)). “A hypothetically correct jury charge ‘accurately sets out the law, is

authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof

or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at

240).

        B.    Analysis

        Gutierrez was charged by indictment with two counts of super aggravated sexual

assault of a child under the age of fourteen years old: count one based on contact of

                                              14
K.R.’s sexual organ by Gutierrez’s sexual organ, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), and count two based on contact of K.R.’s mouth by Gutierrez’s

sexual organ, see id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(v). Gutierrez’s insufficiency argument is based on

the super aggravating element which imposes a mandatory minimum on his sentence.

See id. § 22.021(f)(2) (imposing a 25-year minimum term of confinement where “the

victim of the offense is younger than 14 years of age at the time the offense is committed

and the actor commits the offense in a manner described by Subsection (a)(2)(A)”).

Therefore, we narrow our review to whether there was sufficient evidence to find that

Gutierrez satisfied the super aggravating element under subsection (a)(2), which is

applicable to both counts. See Moreno v. State, 413 S.W.3d 119, 129 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2013, no pet.) (noting that the substantive acts set out in § 22.021(a)(1) define

the “actus reus or gravamen of the offense,” while § 22.021(a)(2) sets out “alternative

aggravating factors or ‘manners and means’ . . . of committing the offense of aggravated

sexual assault of a child”). The relevant language in both counts of the indictment is as

follows:

       Defendant . . . did then and there intentionally and knowingly [commit
       sexual assault], and the Defendant did then and there by acts or words
       threaten to cause, or place, [K.R.] in fear that kidnapping would be
       imminently inflicted on Kelly Cruz, and the acts or words occurred in the
       presence of [K.R.].

       Here, the indictment includes language from both subsections (a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii),

rendering it indeterminate as to which aggravating element is being alleged. The

indictment in this case fails to follow the grammatical structure of either subsection (ii) or

(iii). The main verb of the relevant clause in the indictment is the verb phrase “threaten to

cause,” tracking the language of subsection (iii). However, the indictment continues by

                                             15
using the verb “to place” set off by commas, as follows: “the Defendant did then and there

by acts or words threaten to cause, or place, the complainant in fear that kidnapping

would be imminently inflicted.” The phrase “or place,” set off by commas, is functioning

as a nonrestrictive clause, and thus we should be able to omit the phrase and retain the

meaning of the rest of the sentence. See United States v. Nishiie, 996 F.3d 1013, 1021–

22 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that “[a] clause is said to be nonrestrictive (or nondefining or

parenthetical) if it could be omitted without obscuring the identity of the noun to which it

refers or otherwise changing the intended meaning of the rest of the sentence,” and

“[n]onrestrictive relative clauses . . . are set off from the rest of the sentence by commas”)

(citation omitted). However, this cannot be done, as it would make no sense to say that

Gutierrez “did then and there by acts or words threaten to cause . . . [K.R.] in fear that

kidnapping would be imminently inflicted.” The prepositional phrase beginning with “in

fear” makes no sense without the corresponding verb “to place” contained in the

nonrestrictive clause.

       The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recently clarified the approach under

Malik when faced with a problematically worded indictment in Delarosa v. State, 677

S.W.3d 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). In Delarosa, the appellant challenged the sufficiency

of the evidence for his conviction of three counts of sexual assault of a child where “the

indictment and jury charges were a mishmash of non-consensual sexual assault and

sexual assault of a child.” Id. at 671; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (classifying

offenses as (1) those based on lack of consent, § 22.011(a)(1), and (2) those where lack

of consent is not relevant because of the “child” status of the complainant, § 22.011(a)(2)).

In Delarosa, the indictment at issue was problematic because “the indictment’s heading

                                             16
referenced sexual assault of a child, and the jury charges’ application paragraphs

authorized convictions for sexual assault of a child. The body of the indictment, however,

charged [a]ppellant with non-consensual sexual assault, and the abstract portion of the

jury charges defined the charged offenses as non-consensual sexual assault.” 677

S.W.3d at 672.

         Focusing on the body of the indictment and what was actually alleged therein, the

Delarosa court concluded that a hypothetically correct jury charge would include only an

allegation of non-consensual sexual assault. Id. at 676. And because the State had failed

to present sufficient evidence that the child complainant did not provide consent, acquittal

was required. Id. The dissenting justices in Delarosa would have concluded, by looking

at the indictment “as a whole,” that the hypothetically correct jury charge alleged sexual

assault of a child. Id. at 677 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d

894, 899–900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). The Delarosa court made clear that, when

determining the offense alleged in an indictment under a sufficiency review, our focus

should be on the specific elements in the body of the indictment to see if they constitute

a “facially complete” offense under Thomason v. State, 892 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tex. Crim. App.

1994):

         The Presiding Judge’s dissent argues that since the caption indicated that
         the victim was a child, this omission of “child” from the body of the charging
         instrument “made the indictment ambiguous, meaning that it was
         defective[,]” and so Appellant’s “failure to object forfeited his right to claim
         that he was not charged with sexual assault of a child.” . . . The body of this
         indictment, however, completely alleged non-consensual sexual assault,
         omitting no element. It was not defective. It was facially complete. . . . In
         such a situation, there is no indictment error, and the sufficiency of the
         evidence must be measured against the indictment’s allegations. “[W]here
         an indictment facially charges a complete offense, the State is held to the
         offense charged in the indictment, regardless of whether the State intended
         to charge that offense.” [Thomason, 892 S.W.2d at 11.]

                                               17
Delarosa, 677 S.W.3d at 677; see also Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997) (noting that an indictment is defective where it fails “to include one or more

allegations necessary to give notice of the statutory offense with which the defendant was

charged”). 3

        Here, the indictment charges the facially complete offense of aggravated sexual

assault of a child in counts one and two, properly alleging the actus reus or gravamen of

the offense. See Moreno, 413 S.W.3d at 129. However, as to each of counts one and

two, the indictment does not properly allege one of “the alternative aggravating factors”

set out in the statute necessary to establish super aggravated sexual assault of a child.

See id. The indictment’s failure to accurately track the language from either subsection

(a)(2)(A)(ii) or (iii) means that neither was alleged at all. For example, in Delarosa, Judge

Yeary’s dissenting opinion argued that the caption in the indictment properly charged and

accused appellant of sexual assault of a child. 677 S.W.3d at 678. As the Majority opinion

noted, however,

        [T]he caption made no allegation. It said, “Charge: Count [I/II/III] - SEXUAL
        ASSAULT OF A CHILD” and “22.-11(a)(2)” without making any claims.
        There was no sentence in the caption. There was not even a sentence
        fragment. Cf. Jenkins, 592 S.W.3d at 903 (Keller, P.J., concurring) (noting

         3 The Delarosa court also addressed a concern raised by one member of this Court who noted that

an appellant “is seemingly permitted to collaterally attack the indictment for the first time on appeal through
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,” even though appellant did not object to a defect in the
indictment. Barajas v. State, No. 13-22-00256-CR, 2023 WL 4499907, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
Edinburg July 13, 2023, pet. filed) (Silva, J., dissenting) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (further
noting that “it is incumbent on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to further clarify the interplay between
waiver of defect in the indictment and a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence”). The Delarosa court
concluded that, for purposes of sufficiency review, a defendant has no obligation to object to an indictment,
nor could failing to object to an indictment under such circumstances form the basis of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Delarosa v. State, 677 S.W.3d 668, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). “It is the State’s
duty to prepare the ‘indictment found by the grand jury,’” and as such, “[i]t would be perverse to rescue the
State from its inattention to that duty by requiring an arguably deficient performance by defense counsel.”
Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 20A.302).

                                                     18
       that “a poorly worded sentence fragment” did not allege commission of an
       offense).

Id.; see also Allegation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “allegation” as

a “declaration that something is true,” “a statement,” and “[s]omething declared or

asserted”).

       Here, the indictment facially charged the complete offense of aggravated sexual

assault of a child as to both counts one and two, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B),

even though it intended to charge both as super aggravated sexual assault of a child, id.

§ 22.021(f)(2). “[W]here an indictment facially charges a complete offense, the State is

held to the offense charged in the indictment, regardless of whether the State intended to

charge that offense.” Thomason, 892 S.W.2d at 11. Accordingly for all the reasons stated

herein, we find that the State did not properly allege super aggravated sexual assault of

a child as to either of counts one or two, and that our sufficiency review must measure

the State’s evidence for both counts against the elements of aggravated sexual assault

of a child under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B).

       C.     Modification

       Gutierrez was convicted of super aggravated sexual assault of a child younger

than fourteen years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(f). Because the

indictment failed to properly allege the commission of super aggravating sexual assault

of a child as to both counts one and two, we cannot sustain Gutierrez’s convictions. See

Thomason, 892 S.W.2d at 11. However, even absent a finding of super aggravating

conduct listed in subsection (a)(2)(A), a defendant may still be guilty of aggravated sexual

assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age. See id. § 22.021(a)(2)(B). Appellant

concedes, and we agree, that the evidence is legally sufficient to support such a

                                            19
conviction as to each of counts one and two. Thus, the judgment should be reformed to

reflect convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, each a first-

degree felony with a sentencing range of life or for any term of not more than 99 years or

less than five years. See id. §§ 12.32, 22.021(e).

                                    IV.    CONCLUSION

       We reverse the trial court’s judgment as to counts one and two. We remand the

case to the trial court with instructions to reform the judgment to reflect a conviction for

aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years of age under penal code

§ 22.021(a)(2)(B) as to both counts one and two, and to conduct a new punishment

hearing. The judgment as to count three is affirmed. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court.

                                                                L. ARON PEÑA JR.
                                                                Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
7th day of March, 2024.

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