Court Opinion

ID: 9891694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 15:09:51.514564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:06.366228
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                          COURT OF APPEAL

                            FIRST CIRCUIT

                             2023 CA 0145

                        JOHNNIE STOCKTON, III
A
                                VERSUS

                         SANDRA STOCKTON

                                      JUDGMENT RENDERED:       OCT 1. 8 2M

         Appealed from The Twenty -First Judicial District Court
                  Parish of Livingston • State of Louisiana
                   Docket Number 165, 238 • Division K

           The Honorable Jeffery T. Oglesbee, Presiding Judge

Jenel Guidry Secrease                           COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Ponchatoula, Louisiana                          PLAINTnor— Johnnie Stockton, III

Sherman Q. Mack                                 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
C. Glenn Westmoreland                           DEFENDANT—    Sandra Stockton

Kimberly L. Resetar
Albany, Louisiana

         BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ.
WELCH, J.

       Johnnie Stockton,       III appeals a judgment partitioning the community of

acquets and gains previously existing between him and Sandra Stockton and

awarding Sandra Stockton final spousal support for a period of five years. Finding

neither manifest error in the trial court' s underlying factual findings nor an abuse of

the trial court' s vast discretion with regard to such matters, we affirm.

                                     BACKGROUND

       Mr. Stockton and Ms. Stockton were married on December 7, 1985,                   and

during their marriage, they had three children, all of whom are now majors.              The

parties physically separated around September 17, 2020, and on October 19, 2020,

Mr. Stockton filed a petition for divorce. On October 27, 2020, Ms. Stockton filed

an answer and reconventional demand, likewise seeking a divorce as well as other

incidental relief.

       On December 2, 2020, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment. Among

other things, this stipulated judgment terminated the parties' community property

regime,   and it awarded Ms. Stockton exclusive use of the former matrimonial

domicile,   subject   to the     reservation   of Mr. Stockton' s    right to   seek rental

reimbursement for Ms. Stockton' s exclusive use of the home.                The stipulated

judgment also provided that beginning December 15, 2020, Mr. Stockton would

 pay the mortgage, property tax, and [ homeowner' s] insurance on the former

matrimonial domicile[,]" that he would pay "[ Ms.] Stockton' s vehicle note and auto

insurance as interim spousal support[,]" and that he would " pay $ 500. 00 to [ Ms.]

Stockton as interim spousal [ support],"       with no retroactive support being owed.

       Mr. Stockton subsequently filed a petition to partition community property,

together with a detailed descriptive list of community assets, community liabilities,

and   reimbursement    claims.     Thereafter, on November 16, 2021, a judgment of

divorce was rendered and signed.           Ms.      Stockton subsequently filed a rule for

                                                2
contempt, claiming that Mr. Stockton had violated the terms of the December 2,

2020 stipulated judgment and was in contempt of court because he stopped paying

the mortgage, deeming it interim spousal support that was no longer owed, and a

rule seeking permanent spousal support.

      A trial to partition the community and on Ms. Stockton' s rule for contempt

and permanent spousal support was held on September 22, 2022, A joint detailed

descriptive list setting forth both parties lists of community assets, community

liabilities, and reimbursement claims, as well as their concurrences and traversals

was offered into evidence.   As evidenced by the joint detailed descriptive list, the

partition portion of the trial involved numerous claims between the parties.

However, of particular importance to this appeal were the following issues: ( 1)   the

value and allocation of the community enterprise, Stockton Paint Company; ( 2) the

value and allocation of community movables that were located in the matrimonial

domicile until it was sold and that were thereafter disposed of by Ms. Stockton; ( 3)

Ms. Stockton' s reimbursement claim for community funds used to purchase and

improve a camp that was Mr. Stockton' s separate property, which was destroyed by

Hurricane Ida ( but was insured); and ( 4) Mr. Stockton' s reimbursement claim for

one- half of the fair market rental value of the matrimonial domicile due to Ms.

Stockton' s exclusive use and occupancy of that home.

      At the conclusion of trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement,

and thereafter, on October 17, 2022, issued written reasons for judgment partitioning

the community, adjudicating the reimbursement claims of the parties, and awarding

Ms. Stockton permanent spousal support.       With regard to the community property

partition issues pertinent to this appeal, the trial court valued Stockton Paint

Company at $ 202, 000.00, which was based on the testimony of Michelle Avery, an

expert witness, and it allocated that asset to Mr. Stockton. Further, the trial court,

noting the " inherent lack of evidence" regarding the value of the community

                                          3
movables that were previously located in the matrimonial domicile, determined that

those community movables had no inherent value, as those items were donated or

disposed of by Ms. Stockton following the sale of the matrimonial domicile and

neither Mr. Stockton nor Ms. Stockton made arrangements to preserve those items.

Therefore, the trial court did not place a value or allocate any of those movables.

The trial court granted Ms. Stockton' s reimbursement claim for one- half of the

community funds that were used to acquire and improve the camp that was Mr.

Stockton' s separate property in the amount of $45, 000. 00.      The trial court also

granted Mr. Stockton' s claim for reimbursement for one- half the fair market rental

value of the matrimonial domicile due to Ms. Stockton' s exclusive use, set the fair

market rental value at $   722.00, which was the amount of the monthly mortgage note

on the home, and awarded him reimbursement in the total amount of $7, 581. 00.

With regard to permanent spousal support, the trial court found that Ms. Stockton

was free from fault in the termination of the marriage, that Ms. Stockton was in need

of support, and that Mr. Stockton had the ability to pay support. Therefore, based

on the evidence, the trial court awarded Ms. Stockton permanent spousal support in

the amount of $300. 00 per month for a period of five years from the termination of

her interim spousal support on May 15, 2022.

      A judgment in accordance with the trial court' s written reasons for judgment

was signed on November 15, 2022.       Mr. Stockton now appeals, challenging the trial

court' s ruling with regard to the value and allocation of Stockton Paint Company;

the value of and failure to allocate to Ms. Stockton the community movables that

were in the matrimonial domicile until it was sold; Ms. Stockton' s reimbursement

claim for community funds that were used to purchase and improve the camp that

was Mr. Stockton' s separate property; the fair market rental value placed on the

former matrimonial domicile by the trial court in adjudicating his reimbursement

claim in that regard; and its award of permanent spousal support to Ms. Stockton.

                                            4
                       COMMUNITY PROPERTY PARTITION

       When the spouses are unable to agree on a partition of community property

or on the settlement of the claims between the spouses arising either from the

matrimonial     regime,
                          or from the co -ownership of former community property

following termination of the matrimonial regime, either spouse, as an incident of the

action that would result in a termination of the matrimonial regime or upon

termination of the matrimonial regime or thereafter, may institute a community

property partition. La. R. S. 9: 2801( A).

       The court shall partition the community by valuing the assets as of the time of

trial on the merits, determining the liabilities, and adjudicating the claims of the

parties.   La. R.S. 9: 2801( A)(4)( a).    The court shall divide the community assets and

liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value.                  La. R.S.

9: 2801( A)(4)( b). The court shall allocate or assign to the respective spouses all of

the community assets and liabilities. La. R. S. 9: 280 1 ( A)(4)( c). In deciding to whom

an asset or liability shall be allocated, the court shall consider the nature and source

of the asset or liability, the economic condition of each spouse, and any other

circumstances the court deems relevant. La. R. S. 9: 2801( A)(4)( c).

       A trial court' s factual findings and credibility determinations made in the

course of valuing and allocating assets and liabilities in the partition of community

property may not be set aside absent manifest error or unless clearly wrong.

Berthelot v. Berthelot, 2017- 1055 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 7118118), 254 So. 3d 800, 806.

In valuing assets, the trial court is not required to accept, at face value, the valuation

placed on assets by either spouse. If the trial court' s valuations are reasonably

supported by the        record and        do   not       constitute   an   abuse of discretion,   its

determinations should be affirmed. Berthelot, 254 So. 3d at 816; Rao v. Rao, 2005-

0059 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 4105), 927 So. 2d 356, 360- 361, writ denied, 2005- 2453

 La. 3/ 24/ 06), 925 So. 2d 1232.   Furthermore, the trial court' s allocation or assigning

                                                     5
of assets and liabilities in the partition of community property is reviewed under the
abuse    of discretion   standard.    Berthelot,   254   So. 3d   at   808.      Likewise,

reimbursements are factual determinations and absent manifest error or an abuse of

discretion, the trial court' s decision should not be disturbed on appeal. Pierce v.

Pierce, 2019- 0689 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 2/ 21/ 2020), 298 So -3d 902, 911

        On appeal, Mr. Stockton contends that the trial court erred in valuing Stockton

Paint Company at $ 202, 000. 00 and in allocating it to him. According to the record,

during the parties'   marriage, Mr.   Stockton re -started Stockton Paint Company,

which was a company that Mr. Stockton and his father had started.             Mr. Stockton

testified that the business does approximately 90% commercial painting, that it

employs himself and the parties' major son, and that it consists of four ladders, two

spray rigs, and Mr. Stockton' s personal cell phone number.            According to Mr.

Stockton, Stockton Paint Company had a value of $53, 000.00 and he was willing to

have it valued at $ 50, 000. 00 and allocated to Ms. Stockton in the partition.

        On the other hand, Ms. Stockton offered the testimony of Michelle Avery, a

Certified Public Accountant who is also certified in business evaluations. Ms. Avery

was retained by Ms. Stockton for the purpose of valuing Stockton Paint Company.

In connection with Ms.      Avery' s testimony, a report by Ms. Avery was also

introduced, which explained Ms. Avery' s methodology in determining the value of

Stockton Paint Company. According to Ms. Avery' s testimony and report, she

considered two approaches to valuing Stockton Paint Company: the income -based

approach, which yielded a value of $390, 000. 00     and the market- based approach,

which yielded a value of $182, 000. 00.   Ms. Avery explained that the income -based

approach is the value of the company with goodwill, whereas the market-based

approach excludes goodwill.    According to Ms. Avery' s report, as of December 21,

2021,   Stockton Paint Company had a value of approximately $ 202, 000. 00.           Ms.

Avery explained that this number was based on the value from the market-based

                                           rn
            of $ 182, 000. 00 (
approach
                                  the value of the company without Mr. Stockton' s

goodwill)   plus the sum of $20,000.00,     which was the amount of excess working

capital that was in the company' s bank account.

       In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court found that Ms. Avery " had

completed a comprehensive review of the company[,] which included her review of

similar   situated   companies,    the bank statements and tax information for the

company, including the revenue history for the last five years."       The trial court also

found Ms. Avery' s testimony " very [ informative] and enlightening regarding the

methodology and analysis regarding her valuation" of Stockton Paint Company. The

trial court further found that, despite Mr. Stockton' s testimony that the " company

was a one-man show with only his son as a consistent employee, the evidence

suggest[ ed] otherwise."    Therefore, based on the testimony of Ms. Avery and the

other evidence, the trial court found that Stockton Paint Company had a fair market

value of $202, 000. 00, and it allocated that asset to Mr. Stockton.

      Based on our review of the record and the evidence at trial, we find the trial

court' s factual finding that Stockton Paint Company had a value of $202, 000. 00 to

be reasonably supported by the record, particularly the testimony of Ms. Avery and,

as such, it is not manifestly erroneous. While Mr. Stockton obviously disagreed with

Ms. Avery' s opinion and the method that she used to place a value on the business,

the trial court' s decision to credit the testimony of Ms. Avery over that of Mr.

Stockton was not manifestly erroneous. Indeed, the trier of fact is free to accept or

reject the testimony of any witness, and further, its reasonable evaluations of

credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on review.

Berthelot, 254 So.3d at 806- 507 and 509. Likewise, considering all of the evidence

regarding the nature of Stockton Paint Company, how it was run during the marriage

by Mr. Stockton, and the circumstances of the parties, we cannot say that the trial

                                            7
court' s decision to allocate that asset to Mr. Stockton was an abuse of its vast

discretion.

       Next, with respect to the valuation and/ or allocation of community movables

that were in the matrimonial domicile prior to it being sold, Mr. Stockton contends

that the trial court should have assessed Ms. Stockton with the value of those

movables since she unilaterally disposed of them. The community movables that

Mr. Stockton claims that the trial court should have included were approximately

fifty items, which were essentially household and personal items such as workout

equipment, dishes, pots and pans, used television sets and other appliances. The trial

court noted, in its reasons for judgment, that the parties disagreed about the value of

the household items, furniture and movables, and that the majority of the values that

the parties placed on their detailed descriptive list were " their own guess as to the

value of the respective items." The trial court noted that "[ i] n addition to the inherent

lack of evidence regarding the valu[ e] of these items," the evidence revealed that

following the sale of the matrimonial domicile, Ms. Stockton knew that they had

approximately thirty days in which to vacate the home and to allocate the household

items acquired during the parties' marriage.       The trial court further noted that Ms.

Stockton testified that she sent Mr. Stockton a proposal regarding the division of the

movables and she also provided him with several dates and times wherein he could

retrieve any items from the home. Mr. Stockton testified that he did not agree with

Ms. Stockton' s allocation of the community movables or her demands as to when he

could access the former matrimonial domicile.          Therefore, he never went to the

matrimonial domicile to retrieve any items. According to Ms. Stockton, because she

had to vacate the matrimonial domicile and had nowhere to store items remaining in

the home, she had to donate the items.        The trial court, noting that Mr. Stockton

failed to make arrangements to remove any of the community movables, but was

claiming, at trial, that those movables had significant value, declined to value those

                                             EVu
items, finding that had Mr. Stockton or Ms. Stockton believed those items had any
inherent value, they would have made arrangements to preserve those items prior to

the sale of the matrimonial domicile.

       Based on our review of the record, including the lack of evidence establishing

any value of those community movables, household items, or personal items, we

find no error in the trial court' s factual finding that those movable had no value nor

in its decision not to allocate those items.

       Next, with respect to reimbursement claims, Mr. Stockton challenges the trial

court' s decision to award Ms. Stockton reimbursement for community funds that

were used to acquire and improve a camp that was Mr. Stockton' s separate property,

which, although destroyed by Hurricane Ida, was insured. Mr. Stockton' s testimony

revealed that he used $ 70,000. 00 in community funds to acquire this camp and that

he spent an additional " 15, 20 thousand" in community funds to improve that camp.

Based on this testimony, the trial court awarded Ms. Stockton reimbursement in the

amount of $45, 000. 00 or one- half of $90, 000. 00 ($ 70, 000. 00 + $ 20, 000. 00).

       On appeal, Mr. Stockton, noting that the court is required to value the assets

as of the time of trial on the merits, argues that since the camp was destroyed by

Hurricane Ida, it had no value.        Therefore, Mr. Stockton contends that it was

inequitable for Mr. Stockton to owe reimbursement in the amount of $45, 000. 00 for

something that he no longer has. However, we find no merit to this argument.

       First, and foremost, we note that La. R. S. 9: 2801( A)(4)( a) provides that the

court shall partition the community by valuing the assets as of the time of trial on

the merits, determining the liabilities, and adjudicating the claims of the parties.

Notably, the camp was not a community asset to be valued at trial and partitioned in

the community— it was Mr. Stockton' s separate property. Further, Mrs. Stockton

made a reimbursement claim, which was a claim to be adjudicated by the trial court.

Ms. Stockton' s reimbursement claim was based on La. C. C.               art.   2366,   which

                                               9
provides that "   Ji] f community property has been used during the existence of the

community property regime ... for the acquisition, use, improvement, or benefit of

the separate property of a spouse, the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for

one-half of the amount or value that the community property had at the time it

was used." ( Emphasis    added).

      Therefore, based on the clear and unambiguous language of this article, Ms.

Stockton' s reimbursement claim is based on the value the community property had

at the time it was used. Further, she is entitled to reimbursement for the value of the

community property at the time it was used, regardless of the value of the separate

property at the time of trial.     Therefore, based on the applicable law and the

testimony of Mr. Stockton that he utilized $70, 000.00 in community funds to acquire

the camp and that he used an additional $ 15, 000. 00-$ 20,000.00 in community funds

on improvements ( for     a total sum of approximately $$ 5, 000. 00-$ 90, 000. 00 in

community funds on his separate property), we find no manifest error or abuse of

discretion in the trial court' s award of reimbursement to Ms. Stockton in the amount

of $45, 000. 00, which sum represents one-half of the value of community funds used.

      Mr. Stockton also challenges the amount of reimbursement he was granted for

one- half the fair market rental value of the family home due to Ms. Stockton' s

exclusive use of that home. Mr. Stockton' s right to reimbursement in this regard is

governed by La. R.S. 9: 374, and it provides, in relevant part:

      B. When the family residence is community property ..., after or in
      conjunction with the filing of a petition for divorce, either spouse may
      petition for, and a court may award to one of the spouses,         after   a

      contradictory hearing, the use and occupancy of the family residence

      C. A spouse who, in accordance with the provisions of Subsection A or
      B of this Section, uses and occupies or is awarded by the court the use
      and occupancy of the family residence, ... shall not be liable to the other
      spouse for rental for the use and occupancy, except as hereafter
      provided.

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            D. In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, a spouse may move for an
            award of rent at any time. After a contradictory hearing, the court may
            award rent to be paid by a spouse exercising exclusive use and
            occupancy of a residence whether by judgment or in fact.               The award
            shall be retroactive to the date of filing of the motion, but rent shall be
            awarded only for the period of exclusive occupancy. The adjudication
            of the issue of rent and the amount thereof may be deferred to a later
            date by the court or by agreement of the parties.....

            As previously set forth, pursuant the December 2, 2020 stipulated judgment,

Ms. Stockton was awarded exclusive use of the former matrimonial domicile,

subject to the reservation of Mr. Stockton' s right to seek rental reimbursement for

Ms. Stockton' s exclusive use of the home. There is no dispute that Ms. Stockton

had the exclusive use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile for

approximately 21 months.

            At trial, in support of Mr. Stockton' s reimbursement claim, he offered into

evidence an email from a realtor, which set forth that the home ( the former

matrimonial domicile) should "rent for a [ m] inimum of $2, 000 a month." Therefore,

he sought reimbursement in the amount of $21, 000. 00.'                    However, Mr. Stockton' s

testimony also revealed that the mortgage on the former matrimonial domicile was

approximately $ 721. 00 per month. Ms. Stockton posited that the fair market rental

value of the former matrimonial domicile should be set at $ 722. 00 ( the approximate

amount of the monthly mortgage note),                          such   that Mr. Stockton' s   right to

reimbursement for one- half the fair market value should be set at $ 7, 581. 00.2

            The trial court, in its reasons for judgment, stated that "[ b] ased upon the

testimony and evidence presented, the court accepts the value of [Ms. Stockton] and

awards [ Mr. Stockton' s] rental reimbursement claim in the amount of $7, 581 [. 00]."

On appeal, Mr. Stockton contends that the fair market rental value should have been

assessed at the rate of $2, 000. 00 per month rather than $ 722. 00 per month. However,

1 1/
       2 of (21 months x $ 2, 000.00/ month) _ $ 21, 000.00.
2 1h of (21 months x $ 722. 00/ month) = $ 7, 581. 00. 00.

                                                      11
given the great discretion afforded to a trial court in community property partitions,

the trial court is not required to accept at face value a spouse' s valuation of a claim

against the community. Berthelot, 254 So. 3d at 816. Based on our review of the

record and the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court manifestly erred or abused

its discretion in setting the fair market rental value of the former matrimonial

domicile at $ 722.00 per month instead of $2, 000. 00 per month or in its total award

of reimbursement to Mr. Stockton in the amount of $7, 581. 00.

                    FINAL PERIODIC SPOUSAL SUPPORT

      Louisiana Civil Code article 112( A) provides that when a spouse has not been

at fault prior to the filing of a petition for divorce and is in need of support, based on

the needs of that party and the ability of the other party to pay, that spouse may be

awarded final periodic spousal support.      The party alleging a right to permanent

spousal support carries the burden of proving that he or she is free from fault.

Cauthron v. Cauthron, 2012- 0913 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 2115113), 113 So. 3d 232, 233.

A spouse who petitions for permanent spousal support need not be totally blameless.

Ennis v. Ennis, 2016- 0423 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 8/ 17) (     unpublished),   2017 WL

1900328 * 2;   see also Schmitt v. Schmitt, 2009- 0415 ( La. App. 4'      Cir. 12/ 16/ 09),

28 So. 3d 537, 540. To constitute fault sufficient to deprive a spouse of final periodic

spousal support, the spouse' s misconduct must not only be of a serious nature, but it

must also be an independent, contributory, or proximate cause of the separation.

Ennis, 2017 WL 1900328 at * 4; Schmitt, 28 So. 3d at 540. Fault consists of those

same actions that would have previously resulted in a for -cause divorce or marital

separation: adultery, conviction of a felony, habitual intemperance or excesses, cruel

treatment or outrages, public defamation, abandonment, an attempt on the other' s

life, status as a fugitive, and intentional non- support. Ennis, 2017 WL 1900328 at

 4; Cauthron, 113 So. 3d at 233- 234.       The trial court' s determination of fault is

entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed except in the case of manifest error.

                                            12
Ennis, 2017 WL 1900328 at * 5; Almon v. Almon, 97- 2004 ( La. App. 1"                   Cir.

9/ 25198), 718 So. 2d 1073, 1077.

        Once freedom from fault is established, the basic tests for the amount of

spousal support are the needs of that spouse and the ability of the other spouse to

pay.   Politz v, Politz, 2005- 2568 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 8/ 1/ 07) ( unpublished), 2007 WL

2193547 * 3, writ denied, 2007- 2137 ( La. 1/ 7{ 0$), 973 So. 2d 728; Noto v. Nota,

2009- 1100 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 5111 / 10), 41 So. 3d 1175, 1180.         The award for final

periodic spousal support is governed by La. C. C. art. 112( B), which requires the

court to consider all relevant factors including: ( 1) the income and means of the

parties; ( 2)   the financial obligations of the parties; ( 3) the earning capacity of the

parties; (
             4) the effect of custody of children upon a party' s earning capacity; ( 5) the

time necessary for the claimant to acquire appropriate education, training, or

employment; ( 6)       the health and age of the parties; ( 7) the duration of the marriage;

 8) the tax consequences to the parties; and ( 9) the existence, effect, and duration of

any act of domestic abuse committed by the other spouse upon the claimant or a

child of one of the spouses. Further, under La. C. C. art. 112( D), the amount of final

periodic spousal support shall not exceed one- third of the paying spouse' s net

income.

       The goal of a final periodic spousal support award is limited to the amount

sufficient for maintenance as opposed to continuing an accustomed style of living.

Ennis, 2017 WL1900329 at * 3; see also La. C. C. art. 111.           in an action for final

periodic spousal support, the claimant spouse has the burden of proving insufficient

means of support.        Ennis, 2017 WL 1900328 at * 3. Support means a sum sufficient

for the claimant spouse' s maintenance, which includes the allowable expenses for

food, shelter, clothing, transportation expenses, medical and drug expenses, utilities,

household maintenance, and the income tax liability generated" by such support

payments.       Id.   Generally, expenditures for newspapers, gifts, recreation, vacation,

                                               13
and church tithes are not to be considered in awarding final spousal support;

similarly, expenses attributable to entertainment are not necessary for a spouse' s

maintenance and should not be considered in fixing final spousal support. Id.

       As with the determination of fault, the trial court' s award of final periodic

spousal support is given great weight, and an appellate court should only disturb a

trial court' s award of final periodic spousal support when there has been a clear

abuse of that discretion or when the amount exceeds the statutory limit of one- third

of the net income of the payor' s income. Ennis, 2017 WL 190032$ at * 3; see also

La. C. C. art. 112( D).

       On appeal, Mr. Stockton contends that the trial court erred in awarding Ms.

Stockton permanent spousal support because she failed to prove that she was free

from fault and that she had insufficient means for supporta                    According to Mr.

Stockton' s testimony at trial, the reason for the dissolution of the parties' marriage

was a lack of affection and intimacy. He explained that Ms. Stockton " stopped

wanting to do anything with [him,]" she "[ w] ould' t go to the camp anymore," and

she " didn' t sleep with [ him]" but rather "[ s] he slept on [ an] afghan, not even [ under]

the same covers as [ he] did, for the last six months." She also continued to go to the

gym on Friday evenings, despite his request that she not do so.                After Mr. Stockton

told her that he wanted to talk to her, she responded that they had " nothing else to

talk about,"     so he left.

       According to Ms. Stockton, she slept under a little blanket because she was

going through menopause and she not want to sleep under the comforter.                       Ms.

Stockton also explained that she had gone to the gym on Fridays for many years, and

that she would go to the camp on Fridays after the gym, which Mr. Stockton did not

like, because " it was just not on his time frame." Ms. Stockton also explained that

3 Mr. Stockton does not argue on appeal that he was unable to pay the amount awarded by the trial
court ($   340. 00) or that the award exceeded one- third of his net income.

                                                   14
they were planning a wedding for her daughter that was at the home, and so for

several months before Mr. Stockton left, she did not go to the camp because she was

preparing her house and yard for the wedding. Ms. Stockton believed that the cause

of the break up of their marriage was attributable to Mr. Stockton' s drinking, and

she agreed that they both played a part in the lack of intimacy. Ms. Stockton also

testified that she did not file for divorce from Mr. Stockton, that he left her, and that

she was trying to make their marriage work.

       Ms. Stockton, in support of her claim for permanent spousal support, testified

as to her specific monthly expenses, and she also offered her monthly income and

expense   affidavit.   According to this evidence, her net monthly income was

 1, 739.00 per month, her expenses totaled approximately $ 2, 194. 00 per month, and

that she was in need of approximately $ 455. 00 per month to meet her needs of basic

support. According to Mr. Stockton' s testimony, his net income was approximately
 4, 600. 00 per month.     Mr.   Stockton also testified as to his specific monthly

expenses, which totaled approximately $ 4,300. 00 per month, and that his ability to

pay spousal support was approximately $ 300. 00 per month.

       Based on the testimony of the parties, the trial court found that Ms. Stockton

was free from fault in the dissolution of the marriage, and we find no manifest error

in this determination.   With respect to need, the trial court specifically considered

the income and expenses of the parties, and it further noted that the parties had been

married for more than thirty-five years and that during this time, Mr. Stockton had

been " the primary ` breadwinner'      for the family."     Therefore,   after   a   careful

consideration of the factors set forth in La. C. C. art. 112( B), the trial court awarded

Ms. Stockton the sum of $300. 00 per month for a period of five years, Considering

the testimony of the parties and the evidence in the record, we find that the trial

court' s award was reasonable and supported by the record, and thus, we cannot say

that the trial court abused its vast discretion.

                                            15
                                  CONCLUSION

      For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the November 15, 2022 judgment

of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant,

Johnnie Stockton, III.

AFFIRMED.

                                          16
                               STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                COURT OF APPEAL

                                  FIRST CIRCUIT

                                DOCKET NUMBER

                                   2023 CA 0145

                              JOHNNIE STOCKTON, III

                                      VERSUS

                               SANDRA STOCKTON

HOLDRIDGE, J., dissenting in part.

      I dissent in part for not giving any value to Ms. Stockton' s movables, which

total approximately $ 2, 150. 00. Ms. Stockton filed a joint detailed descriptive list,

wherein she judicially admitted to having certain movables which had a value of

approximately $ 2, 150. 00.    I further dissent and find that the trial court was

manifestly erroneous in finding the rental value for the former matrimonial domicile

was $ 722. 00   a month.   The rental value, at minimum, should have been set at

 1, 500. 00 a month.