Court Opinion

ID: 9784831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:55:31.686452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:59.988788
License: Public Domain

HARRELL, J.,
in which BATTAGLIA and MURPHY, JJ., join.
I dissent. The verbal guile exhibited by Detective McLaughlin in his thirty-minute questioning of Hill, which followed Hill’s recorded telephone conversation with the victim, did not cross the line into the prohibited territory of promises, threats, or inducements, such as would render Hill’s interview statements involuntary under Maryland common law principles. The suppression judge and the Court of Special Appeals got it right.
During cross-examination of Hill at the suppression hearing, Hill1 acknowledged that he apologized to the victim in the recorded telephone call, a fact that he was reminded of, with no surprise, by the Detective at the inception of the face-to-face interview. Hill admitted that McLaughlin never said “This [apology] will end it [the police investigation],” and conceded that he understood that persons who commit sex crimes against children usually get arrested and charged criminally.
During oral argument at the suppression hearing, defense trial counsel emphasized as the improper inducement McLaughlin’s statement to Hill that “Randy and his mother did not want to see [Hill] get into trouble; they only wanted an apology.” Predicated on this, the defense asserted that Hill believed that “all he needed to do was make an apology and that would end the case.”2 The hearing judge saw it otherwise, as revealed in the following exchange with defense counsel:
*84[The Court]: Suppose the officer said, “I’ll make sure this case ends if you apologize.” What do you think of that?
[Defense Counsel]: I think that would be the same, and just stronger, for Mr. Hill.
[The Court]: You don’t see it as more of a dividing line? I mean, suppose the officer tells him, “You know, I’m sure that you’d want to reconcile with your God. It may help you in terms of your relationships [sic] with your God if you apologized,” and at that point the gentleman says, “You’re right, I want to apologize.” Is that an improper inducement?
[Defense Counsel]: No, that is different because—
[The Court]: Okay. How is that different from say, “If you apologize, you’ll make the world well between you and your God, and if you apologize, you’ll make the world well between you and the victim”? Where is the promise that the detective is making him that with the apology will come the inducement which is, no prosecution, dismissal of the charges, or something like that?
The court noted further that “the detective is not saying, T will make sure you don’t get in trouble.’ ” Moreover, it was made clear to Hill by McLaughlin, in the course of the interview, that only the State’s Attorney would or could make any charging decision.3
“A mere exhortation to tell the truth is not enough to make a statement involuntary.” Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, *85507, 610 A.2d 782, 788 (1992); see also Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 174, 176, 699 A.2d 1170, 1178-79 (1997) (finding no improper inducement when officer told suspect that it would be “much better” if he told his story in his own words, by writing a letter of explanation to victim’s family); Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 486-87, 174 A.2d 163, 166-67 (1961). In Knight v. State, 381 Md. 517, 525, 535, 850 A.2d 1179, 1183, 1190 (2004), the officer told the accused, in the course of administering Miranda advisements, that the “prosecutor would be made aware of his cooperation.” This was found by us to be “not a promise of help or special consideration.... ” Knight, 381 Md. at 535, 850 A.2d at 1190.
I would conclude that Detective McLaughlin’s relevant statement to Hill fell on the continuum leading to improper inducements well short of the point of no return. Rather, a mere exhortation appealing to a suspect’s shame, such that he or she should apologize to a victim (and his/her family), amounts to no more than the mere exhortation to tell the truth found by our cases not to be improper. The tension between the true “coercive barnacles” described in Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 150, 406 A.2d 415, 418 (1979), and the permissive appeals to a suspect approved in Reynolds, Ball, Ralph, and Knight is maintained best by affirming here the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.
Judge BATTAGLIA (pronounced Ba-tal-ia) and Judge MURPHY authorize me to state that they join the views expressed in this dissent.

. Hill acknowledged that he had graduated from a “bible college in Tennessee” and was a “minister.”

. This is the response of a “reasonable lay person,” as claimed by the Majority opinion? Please!

. The Majority opinion (at 79 n. 4, 12 A.3d at 1203 n.4) suggests that McLaughlin advised Hill about the State's Attorney’s role "only after Petitioner had provided the inculpatory statements.” The record, I think, is not so clear as the Majority maintains. McLaughlin, during cross-examination at the suppression hearing, stated: "I told him at the end of the interview that our State’s Attorney’s Office reviews all of our cases.” In the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in this case, however, the panel stated that ”[t]he questioning ended with [Hill], at the detective’s request, writing the following "apology” letter:
Hi Randy [the victim]:
I am very sorry for everything that happened between us.
*85God knows! I wish this had never happened and it will never happen again. God is blessing both of us greatly and since we have forgiven each other, I know God has forgiven us to[o].
Rev. Enoch Hill /s/
Thus, one reasonable interpretation of the record is that McLaughlin advised Hill of the State's Attorney's role before Hill wrote out the inculpatory written statement. Whatever interpretation of this point one adopts is not so material as would change my view of the proper disposition of this case.