Court Opinion

ID: 9520510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:41:28.938226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:21.033972
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring: Defendant, Alvaro Blanco, is one of Saul Garcia’s codefendants in the criminal proceedings arising out of the February 1, 2000, attack on and robbery of Gwen Flores. See People v. Garcia, 199 Ill. 2d 401 (2002). As was the case with Garcia, Blanco was charged by information with armed robbery in violation of section 18— 2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/18 — 2(a) (West 2000)) and with three other offenses. Prior to trial, Blanco’s attorney filed a motion seeking to have the armed robbery statute declared unconstitutional. Although his motion cited subsection (a) of the statute, which sets forth the substantive elements of the offense, Blanco’s challenge was actually directed solely against subsection (b) (720 ILCS 5/18 — 2(b) (West 2000)), which contains the law’s penalty provisions. Blanco’s motion was argued in a consolidated hearing together with similar motions filed by Garcia and by a third defendant, Pashalis Mitridis. Following that hearing, the circuit court entered an order identical to the one it issued in Garcia’s case, ruling that subsection (b) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). As in Garcia’s case, the State then appealed under Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) on the theory that the substantive effect of the trial court’s ruling was to dismiss the armed robbery charge. Because the court’s ruling involved a declaration that a portion of the armed robbery statute was unconstitutional, the appeal was taken directly to our court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. The State’s appeal in this case suffers from the same jurisdictional impediment present in Garcia’s case. People v. Garcia, 199 Ill. 2d at 405-06 (Harrison, C.J., specially concurring). In addition, as in Garcia’s case, all charges against Blanco remain pending, including the armed robbery charge, and he has yet to stand trial. His challenge to the sentencing provisions of the armed robbery statute is therefore premature, and his motion to have those provisions declared unconstitutional should have been denied by the circuit court. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in my special concurrence in People v. Garcia, 199 Ill. 2d at 403, the armed robbery charges against Blanco are no longer viable. In the wake of this court’s rulings in People v. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392 (2002), and People v. Devenny, 199 Ill. 2d 398 (2002), and in the exercise of this court’s supervisory authority, the matter should therefore be remanded to the circuit court with directions that the portion of the information charging Blanco with armed robbery be dismissed. JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this special concurrence.