Court Opinion

ID: 9897376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:48.573999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.695065
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              Jun 09 2023, 8:57 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                              Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                 Court of Appeals
                                                                                   and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kevin L. Moyer                                             Adam S. Willfond
Moyer Law Firm, P.C.                                       Francis A. Veltri
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Travelers Staff Counsel Indiana
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Erie Insurance Exchange,                                   June 9, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CT-2699
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Montgomery
                                                           Superior Court
Myron Corporation,                                         The Honorable Heather L. Barajas,
Appellee-Defendant.                                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           54D01-1907-CT-812

                                 Opinion by Judge Riley
                         Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023                            Page 1 of 16
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Plaintiff, Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie Insurance), appeals the trial

      court’s denial of its motion to consider Appellee-Defendant, Myron

      Corporation (Myron), as the manufacturer of a power bank charger in order to

      apply strict liability pursuant to the Indiana Product Liability Act’s domestic

      distributor exception, Ind. Code § 34-20-2-4, and the trial court’s grant of

      Myron’s motion to dismiss Erie Insurance’s strict liability claim.

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUE
[3]   Erie Insurance presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as:

      Whether the trial court erred when it denied Erie Insurance’s motion to

      consider Myron to be the domestic distributor of a power bank charger pursuant

      to the Indiana Product Liability Act (IPLA).

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   On May 22, 2018, a fire occurred at the residence of Kevin and Heather

      Roberts (collectively, Roberts), located in Crawfordsville, Indiana. At the time

      of the fire, the Roberts’ home was insured under a homeowners insurance

      policy held by Erie Insurance. After tendering insurance benefits of more than

      $248,000 to Roberts for fire-related property damage, Erie Insurance filed a

      subrogation suit in July 2019 against Myron, alleging that the fire loss resulted

      from a defect in a power bank charger which was “manufactured and sold” by

      Myron. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 19). Specifically, in its Complaint, Erie
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023          Page 2 of 16
      Insurance advanced two claims: (1) a negligence claim, contending that Myron

      was negligent for failing to warn, inspect, or test the power bank charger; and

      (2) a claim under the IPLA, contending that Myron was strictly liable pursuant

      to the domestic distributor exception, I.C. § 34-20-2-4.

[5]   Myron is a family-owned promotional products company located in Maywood,

      New Jersey. It purchases products from suppliers, which it then resells with a

      focus on personalized business products. Myron’s customers order from its

      online catalogue, after which Myron personalizes the product with a business

      name, logo, or other customer-requested customization. Myron does not alter

      the products during this personalization process. After receiving Erie

      Insurance’s Complaint, Myron timely filed its Answer. In its Answer, Myron

      denied that it had manufactured the power bank charger and named, among its

      affirmative defenses, Shenzhen C-Star Electric Technology Company, Ltd.

      (Shenzhen), as the manufacturer of the power bank charger and as a non-party

      liable for Erie Insurance’s damages. Myron included two separate addresses in

      China for Shenzhen, along with a company website. During discovery, Myron

      clarified that it had purchased the lot of power bank chargers from NINGBO C-

      Star Import & Export (NINGBO), located in China, and provided an address in

      China. Erie Insurance did not amend its Complaint to add Shenzhen or

      NINGBO as party-defendants.

[6]   On September 15, 2021, Erie Insurance moved the trial court for an order

      requesting it to consider Myron to be the manufacturer of the power bank

      charger under Indiana Code section 34-20-1-4 of the IPLA. In support of its

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023         Page 3 of 16
      motion, Erie Insurance designated an affidavit by a senior subrogation specialist

      with Erie Insurance. The affidavit alleged that no records could be found of

      Shenzhen being registered to do business in Indiana, nor were there any records

      of the company seeking qualifications to do business in Indiana. The affidavit

      further averred that there was no evidence of Shenzhen maintaining a bank

      account, mailing address, post office box, or a telephone number in Indiana;

      purchasing goods or materials in Indiana; maintaining an office, warehouse, or

      place of business in Indiana; having any employees, officers, business agents,

      directors, or representatives residing in or assigned to Indiana; being a party to

      litigation in Indiana; or selling goods directly to any party in Indiana.

[7]   On September 24, 2021, Myron filed a response in opposition to Erie

      Insurance’s motion, together with a motion to dismiss Erie Insurance’s strict

      liability claim based on Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), contending that Erie

      Insurance had failed to establish that the trial court was unable to obtain

      personal jurisdiction over Shenzhen or that Myron was Shenzhen’s principal

      distributor or seller of the power bank chargers pursuant to Indiana Code

      section 34-20-1-4. On September 30, 2021, Erie Insurance responded to

      Myron’s motion, emphasizing that even though Myron was not the

      manufacturer of the power bank charger, it was still a seller of the product. Erie

      Insurance also noted that Myron had not contradicted Erie Insurance’s affidavit

      elaborating on the difficulties in obtaining service on Shenzhen. On February

      8, 2022, Myron filed a supplement to respond to Erie Insurance’s reply, which

      included an affidavit by Steve Kjekstad (Kjekstad), Myron’s vice president of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023            Page 4 of 16
       supply chain. The affidavit alleged that Myron had purchased the power bank

       charger from NINGBO, who, in turn, appeared to have purchased the power

       bank charger from the manufacturer, Shenzhen. The affidavit also averred that

       Myron’s purchase did not comprise a significant percentage of Myron’s overall

       business, nor did it comprise a significant percentage of the import of the

       product overall from Shenzhen.

[8]    On February 24, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the competing

       motions. After hearing arguments, the trial court granted Erie Insurance’s

       motion to strike certain statements from Kjekstad’s affidavit. On April 24,

       2022, the trial court denied Erie Insurance’s motion to declare Myron to be the

       manufacturer of the power bank charger under the IPLA and granted Myron’s

       motion to dismiss Erie Insurance’s strict liability claim. On October 12 through

       October 13, 2022, the trial court conducted a jury trial on the remaining

       negligence claim. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in

       favor of Myron.

[9]    Erie Insurance now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Standard of Review

[10]   Myron filed, and the trial court granted, a motion pursuant to Trial Rule

       12(B)(6), which allows for the dismissal of a cause for “[f]ailure to state a claim

       upon which relief can be granted[.]” If, while making a 12(B)(6) motion,

       “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023          Page 5 of 16
       the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as

       provided in Rule 56.” See T.R. 12(B). Here, both parties agree that the trial

       court, in its decision to dismiss Erie Insurance’s strict liability claim, considered

       evidence and material outside the pleading. As such, Myron’s motion to

       dismiss should be converted to a motion for summary judgment under Indiana

       Trial Rule 56. See Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 989 N.E.2d 791, 795

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[11]   When reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, we apply the same

       test as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only if the designated

       evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party

       is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Sedam v. 2JR

       Pizza Enters., LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1176 (Ind. 2017). “A fact is ‘material’ if its

       resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a

       trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if

       the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.”

       Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). The moving party bears the

       initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to

       a determinative issue. Id.

[12]   Our review is limited to those facts designated to the trial court, and we

       construe all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in favor of

       the non-moving party. T.R. 56(H); Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218

       (Ind. 2013). Because we review a summary judgment ruling de novo, a trial

       court’s findings and conclusions offer insight into the rationale for the court’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023              Page 6 of 16
       judgment and facilitate appellate review but are not binding on this court.

       Denson v. Estate of Dillard, 116 N.E.3d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

       Additionally, we are not constrained by the claims and arguments presented to

       the trial court, and we may affirm a summary judgment ruling on any theory

       supported by the designated evidence. Id.

       II. Indiana’s Product Liability Act

[13]   Product liability actions in Indiana are governed by the IPLA, Indiana Code

       section 34-20-2-1, et. seq., which provides, in pertinent part:

               a person who sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of
               commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably
               dangerous to any user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s
               property is subject to liability for physical harm caused by that
               product to the user or consumer if:

               (1) that user or consumer is in the class of persons that the seller
               should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by
               the defective condition;

               (2) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product; and

               (3) the product is expected to and does reach the user or
               consumer without substantial alteration in the condition in which
               the product is sold by the person sought to be held liable under
               this article.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023            Page 7 of 16
       I.C. § 34-20-2-1. Actions for strict liability in tort are restricted to

       manufacturers of defective products. Indeed, the statute states the restriction

       rather bluntly:

               A product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability
               in tort may not be commenced or maintained against a seller of a
               product that is alleged to contain or possess a defective condition
               unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer unless the seller
               is a manufacturer of the product or of the part of the product
               alleged to be defective.

       I.C. § 34-20-2-3. In this regard, the statute defines a manufacturer, for purposes

       of Indiana Chapter 34-20, as “a person or an entity who designs, assembles,

       fabricates, produces, constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or a

       component part of a product before the sale of the product to a user or

       consumer.” I.C. § 34-6-2-77(a). Pursuant to subsection (b), “a seller who

       discloses the name of the actual manufacturer of a product is not a

       manufacturer merely because the seller places or has placed a private label on a

       product.” I.C. § 34-6-2-77(b).

       A. Indiana Code section 34-6-2-77(b)

[14]   In support of its motion to dismiss, which was converted to a summary

       judgment motion, Myron, as seller of the power bank charger, contends—for

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023           Page 8 of 16
       the first time on appeal 1—that it was not the manufacturer of the power bank

       charger because—as conceded by both parties—Myron personalized the power

       bank charger with a private label for promotional purposes without

       manipulating the product and named Shenzhen as the actual manufacturer in

       its Answer and Affirmative Defenses. See I.C. § 34-6-2-77(b).

[15]   Notwithstanding that Myron personalized the power bank charger and

       provided Shenzhen’s contact information, in order to be exempt from the

       IPLA’s application, the statute quantified that Myron must “merely”

       personalize the product to remain characterized as a seller, and not be

       considered a manufacturer. See I.C. § 34-6-2-77(b). We note that “[t]he goal of

       statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent

       of the General Assembly.” Sanders v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Brown Cnty., 892 N.E.2d

       1249, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “When construing a statute, the

       legislature’s definition of a word binds us.” United Rural Elec. Membership Corp.

       v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 716 N.E.2d 1007, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans.

       denied. Where, as here, the legislature has not defined a word, we give the word

       its common and ordinary meaning, and, in doing so, may consult English

       language dictionaries. Id. at 1013-14. Turning to the dictionary definition,

       “mere” has been defined as “nothing more,” which appears to imply that the

       1
        As conceded by Myron, Myron failed to make this claim before the trial court. However, within the
       parameters of our summary judgment review, we evaluate the parties’ claims de novo and may affirm under
       any legal theory supported by the designated evidence.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023                             Page 9 of 16
       only act a seller can make to the product to remain within the limited

       parameters of being defined a seller pursuant to the IPLA and not be considered

       to fall within the perceived liability-laden status of a manufacturer, is placing a

       private label on the product. See Mere, Merriam-Webster,

       https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mere (last visited May 24,

       2023). At first glance, Myron fits this description.

[16]   However, this limiting statute must be read in conjunction with the more

       expansive definition of seller comprised in Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4,

       which is relied upon by Erie Insurance to bring Myron within the purview of

       the ‘manufacturer’ definition of the IPLA. See Rural Elec., 716 N.E.2d at 1014

       (In seeking to give effect to the legislature’s intent, we read an act’s sections as a

       whole and strive to give effect to all of the provisions so that no part is held

       meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute). Indiana Code

       34-20-2-4 provides

               If a court is unable to hold jurisdiction over a particular
               manufacturer of a product or part of a product alleged to be
               defective, then that manufacturer’s principal distributor or seller
               over whom a court may hold jurisdiction is considered the
               manufacturer of the product.

[17]   As “[s]tatutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and

       should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme,”

       a combined reading of Indiana code sections 34-6-2-77(b) and 34-20-2-4

       indicates that even though Myron solely placed a personalization on the power

       bank charger, Myron’s status as seller may morph into the statutory

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023           Page 10 of 16
       manufacturer’s status by virtue of doing more than “merely” placing a private

       label on a product. Sanders, 892 N.E.2d at 1252. A high volume of sale or

       import of a product may quantitatively be acknowledged as doing more than

       ‘merely’ personalizing a product. As such, the “principal distributor or seller”

       of the product who “places a private label on a product” can be considered a

       manufacturer under the IPLA. See I.C. §§ 34-6-2-77; -20-2-4. Accordingly, we

       must analyze whether Myron may be the principal distributor or seller of the

       power bank charger.

       B. Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4

[18]   Our supreme court has named Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4 “the domestic

       distributor exception,” and has explained that an action in strict liability can be

       maintained against a nonmanufacturer defendant only if two conditions are

       met: (1) the defendant must be a principal distributor or seller over whom the

       court can hold jurisdiction; and (2) the court must be unable to hold jurisdiction

       over the actual manufacturer. Kennedy v. Guess, 806 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ind.

       2004). If either condition is absent, then the plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of

       law. Warriner v. D.C. Marshall Jeep, 962 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2012), trans. denied.

[19]   Thus, to defeat summary judgment in favor of Myron, Erie Insurance had the

       burden, as the nonmovant plaintiff, to demonstrate that a genuine issue of

       material fact existed as to whether Myron can be considered a manufacturer

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023           Page 11 of 16
       under the domestic distributor exception. 2 Finding it dispositive here, we need

       only look to the second condition of the domestic distributor exception, i.e.,

       Erie Insurance needed to come forth with some evidence from which the trial

       court could reasonably infer that it would be unable to hold jurisdiction over the

       actual manufacturer, Shenzhen. Erie Insurance failed to do so.

[20]   Erie Insurance never named Shenzhen as a party in its lawsuit, and it conceded

       that it never attempted to obtain service of process on Shenzhen. It appears that

       Erie Insurance did nothing other than to unilaterally decide that simply because

       Shenzhen is based in China, no Indiana trial court could exercise personal

       jurisdiction. The only evidence designated by Erie Insurance on this issue is the

       affidavit of a “senior subrogation specialist,” who baldly stated that based upon

       “a diligent search” of the “records of the Indiana Secretary of State,” it was

       discovered that Shenzhen was not registered in the State of Indiana and had no

       contact with this state. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 34-35). This was wholly

       inadequate.

[21]   Our supreme court’s opinion in Kennedy is instructive on this point. The

       defendants in that case moved for summary judgment asserting that they were

       not manufacturers of the allegedly defective product as defined by the IPLA. In

       2
         See, e.g., Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 781 (noting that it was the nonmovant plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate
       genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether defendants were manufacturers under the domestic
       distributor exception); see also Kesling v. Kesling, 83 N.E.3d 111, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (in summary
       judgment context, regardless of which party is the movant, the plaintiff who wishes to circumvent a general
       rule has the burden to demonstrate the applicability of an exception), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023                               Page 12 of 16
response, the plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to hold the defendants in

the lawsuit on a strict liability theory based upon the domestic distributor

exception. Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 780-81. In support of their contention that

the exception applied, the plaintiffs designated evidence demonstrating that

they had unsuccessfully attempted service on the Hong Kong manufacturer. Id.

at 781. They designated their receipt of an “affirmation of non-service”

indicating that the named foreign corporation was not at the address provided

by the plaintiffs and “therefore service was not effected.” Id. Based on this

evidence, the plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer was “no longer in

business and [wa]s not subject to the jurisdiction of this court leaving [the

defendant] as principal distributor or seller.” Id. In additional support of their

argument that there was no basis for an Indiana court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over the Hong Kong manufacturer, the Kennedy plaintiffs also

pointed to affidavits designated by the defendants, indicating that there was no

evidence that the foreign manufacturer had any contacts with Indiana or had

any knowledge that its product was to be sold in Indiana. Id. Our supreme

court determined that while this evidence, as a whole, was not “especially

impressive,” it did create a reasonable inference that jurisdiction could not be

obtained and it was “potent enough” to demonstrate a genuine issue of material

fact on the question of whether the defendants could be considered

manufacturers under the domestic distributor exception, and therefore

summary judgment for the defendants was inappropriate. Id. See also, Kucik v.

Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 2010 WL 2694962, *8 (N.D. Ind. July 2, 2010) (in

which the Northern District Court of Indiana granted summary judgment to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023         Page 13 of 16
       defendant in part because Kucik “presented [no] evidence that would support a

       claim that this [c]ourt does not have jurisdiction over Yamaha Motor Co.

       Ltd.,” a Japanese company. “For example, [Kucik] has not pointed to any

       attempt to serve Yamaha Motor Co. or otherwise bring them into this suit that

       proved unsuccessful. Thus, the Plaintiff has not produced evidence that is

       sufficient to create a triable issue of fact on this element of his case.”); Motorists

       Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mega Lion, Inc., 2019 WL 2451086, *3 (N.D. Ind. June 12, 2019)

       (“Plaintiff asserts that the manufacturer is Chinese, but that is hardly a

       definitive bar to personal jurisdiction.”); Sandlin v. Bell Sports, Inc., 2022 WL

       2967714, *5 (S.D. Ind. July 27, 2022) (“Sandlin alleges that, because Ningbo

       Detai is based in China and has ‘no business presence in the United States,’ its

       ‘sole link to Indiana is the mere fact that Bell Sports unilaterally distributed its

       products throughout Indiana’ and thus the company ‘lacks the prerequisite

       minimum contacts with the State of Indiana’ required for this [c]ourt to exercise

       personal jurisdiction over it. This conclusory statement falls short of satisfying

       her burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of fact exists on this issue.”).

[22]   Accordingly, based on Kennedy, Erie Insurance needed to designate evidence to

       support a reasonable inference that the trial court would not be able to hold

       personal jurisdiction over Shenzhen in order to demonstrate a genuine issue of

       material fact as to whether Myron could be considered a manufacturer under

       the domestic distributor exception. See Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 782. Erie

       Insurance failed to do so. A mere affidavit averring that, in its own opinion, the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023            Page 14 of 16
trial court could not obtain jurisdiction is simply not enough.3 Summary

judgment in favor of Myron on Erie Insurance’s strict liability claim was

therefore appropriate. 4

3
  The jurisdiction of an Indiana court over a nonresident entity is predicated on Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A),
which grants jurisdiction over an entity doing any business in Indiana. The purpose of the trial rule is to
extend jurisdiction to the boundaries permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal Constitution. North Texas Steel Co., Inc. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 679 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Ind. Ct.
App 1997), trans. denied, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1106 (1998). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that before a state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have
“certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.
95 (1945). Unlike here, if the defendant’s contacts with the state are so “continuous and systematic” that the
defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into the courts of that state for any matter, then the
defendant is subject to general jurisdiction, even in causes of action unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum state. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80
L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). But if the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are not “continuous and
systematic,” like in the instant case, specific jurisdiction may be asserted if the controversy is related to or
arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 967
(Ind. 2006). Specific jurisdiction requires that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state so that the defendant reasonably anticipates being haled into
court there. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). A
single contact with the forum state may be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over a defendant, if it
creates a “substantial connection” with the forum state and the suit is related to that connection.
LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967. But a defendant cannot be brought into a jurisdiction “solely as a result of
random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.”
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Finally, if the defendant has contacts with the forum state
sufficient for general or specific jurisdiction, due process requires that the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant is reasonable. Id. at 477. As the substantial connection of a single act with the forum
state is a factual matter, the question as to whether a court can hold jurisdiction over a party is a mixed
question of fact and law, which cannot be left to a party’s unilateral decision by way of an affidavit. See
Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 782.
4
  Because we hold that no genuine issue of material fact exists under the first prong of I.C. § 34-20-2-4, we do
not need to address Erie Insurance’s claim under the second prong, i.e., whether Myron is the principal seller
or distributor of the power bank charger. See Warriner, 962 N.E.2d at 1267 (If either condition is absent, then
the plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023                                    Page 15 of 16
       CONCLUSION
[23]   Based on the evidence before us, we conclude that Erie Insurance failed to

       establish a genuine issue of material fact that Myron is to be considered the

       domestic distributor of a power bank charger pursuant to the IPLA.

[24]   Affirmed.

[25]   Altice, C.J. and Pyle, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2699 | June 9, 2023        Page 16 of 16