Court Opinion

ID: 9863428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:14:55.977462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:49.464177
License: Public Domain

HURWITZ, Justice,
concurring in all but Section IV(D) of the Court’s opinion and concurring in the result.
¶ 48 The Court today neatly describes the proper judicial role in reviewing decisions of the Independent Redistricting Commission. When the Commission adjusts the grid map “as necessary to accommodate” the six constitutional goals in Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(14) of the Arizona Constitution, it acts, as the Court concludes, in a quintessentially legislative fashion. The Constitution requires that four potentially conflicting goals be balanced against each other “to the extent practicable.” Ariz. Const, art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)(C)-(F).16 This directive will almost inevitably lead to a final product in which none of these goals is achieved to the maximum possible extent. Our substantive review of the final Commission legislative maps for compliance with goals (C) through (F) therefore should be, as the Court teaches, quite deferential. Under that standard of review, I cannot conclude that the end result in this case violates the Constitution.
¶ 49 I also agree with the Court that, in adopting legislative maps, the Commission must follow the procedures mandated in *601subsections 1(14) and (16). Indeed, our substantive deference in review of the end product is, in my mind, a corollary of the Commission’s adherence to the Constitution’s procedural mandates. In transferring responsibility for decennial redistricting from the Legislature to a bipartisan Commission, the people necessarily recognized that the process involved a series of value judgments; they left those judgments to the Commission, but required that they be made through a specific process, so as to optimize consideration of the listed constitutional goals and minimize the partisan concerns that traditionally dominate redistricting efforts.
¶ 50 I part company with the Court’s well-reasoned opinion only on one point. In my view, the Constitution does not allow the Commission to advertise a draft map without first making adjustments for all six of the goals specified in subsections 1(14)(A) through (F). I do not believe the Constitution countenances the procedure used by the Commission here — first adjusting the grid only for goals (A) through (E), advertising a draft map, and then only after receiving public comments, turning to the goal of competitiveness.
I.
¶ 51 The Constitution, as the Coui't recognizes, identifies four phases in the redistricting process. See ¶ 29, supra- After adopting an initial grid-like map of districts of equal population in phase one, the Commission undertakes phase two, in which “[a]d-justments to the grid shall then be made as necessary to accommodate the [sixj goals as set forth” in subsections (A) through (F). Ariz. Const, art. 4, pt. 2, § (1)14. In phase three, the Commission advertises the draft map resulting from the phase two adjustments and receives comment. Id. § (1)16. In phase four, final district boundaries are adopted. Id.
¶ 52 The Commission did not follow the constitutional roadmap here. Rather, in phase two it adjusted only for goals (A) through (E). The Commission then advertised the draft map, and only after receiving-comments considered further adjustments for competitiveness. The Court concludes that no constitutional violation occurred because after adjusting for competitiveness, the Commission advertised the adjusted map anew before final adoption.
¶ 58 The sequential requirements of subsections 1(14) and (16), however, are clear— after propounding the initial grid in phase one, the Commission is required in phase two to make necessary adjustments to serve all six constitutional goals. The Constitution plainly states that in phase two “[ajdjustments to the grid shall then be made as necessary to accommodate” goals (A) through (F). Ariz. Const, art 4, pt. 2, § 1(14) (emphasis added). The Constitution thus requires that the adjustments be made before the phase three advertisement of the draft maps and does not contemplate that consideration of any of the goals be deferred.17
¶ 54 The Court suggests that such a constitutional construction is “overly technical.” See ¶ 40, supra. But I would strictly construe the Constitution because its plain language serves an important purpose. Each of the five goals in subsections (B) through (F) must be accommodated “to the extent practicable.” Ariz. Const, art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)(B)-(F). If the Commission adjusts only for goals (B) through (E) in a truncated phase two and then adopts a draft map for advertisement, it will necessarily already have concluded that the draft map does the best job practicable of meeting those five goals. It will thus be quite difficult thereafter for the Commission to conclude that further adjustments to the map can be made to serve competitiveness, which is only “favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals.” Ariz. Const, art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F). Such a process inevitably threatens to relegate the competitiveness goal to precisely the “secondary *602role” that the Court correctly abjures. See ¶ 35 & n. 10, supra.
¶ 55 The current Commission has wisely recommended that its successor adjust the draft map to reflect all constitutional goals before advertising it for public comment. See ¶ 43 n. 15, supra. But such a recommendation has no binding effect. I would make clear that this procedure is not simply preferred, but rather mandated by the Constitution, and therefore cannot join Section IV(D) of the Court’s opinion.
II.
¶ 56 I nonetheless concur with the Court’s ultimate disposition of this case. Only one cycle of legislative elections remains under the plan now at issue. As a practical matter, it makes no sense to require a lame-duck Commission to begin the process anew for only one set of elections. I doubt that the constitutional procedures could be completed — and review by the Department of Justice finished — in time for the 2010 elections. Even ignoring time pressures, the product of such a process would necessarily be based on now well-outdated census data, resulting in districts malapportioned at birth.
¶ 57 In addition, as the Court notes, after the Department of Justice found that the Commission’s initial plan did not pass Voting Rights Act muster, the Commission effectively was required to begin anew. See ¶ 10, supra. After an interim plan was adopted to meet the Department’s concerns, the Commission adjusted the interim map, at least considering during that process all six constitutional goals. Id. The effect of the rejection of the initial plan was therefore to return the Commission to phase two, and the Commission’s ostensible consideration of all six goals in the renewed process seems to satisfy the constitutional procedural framework. I therefore concur in the result.
CONCURRING: GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Judge.*

. As the Court notes, goals (A) and (B) either expressly or implicitly mirror the requirements of the United States Constitution or federal statutory law, and compliance with these goals can be decided as a matter of objective law. See V 32, supra.

. If die phase three advertising and comment lead to significant adjustments to the map, nothing in the Constitution prevents the Commission from advertising the map anew. My concern today is not that the Commission undertook steps in addition to those mandated by the Constitution, but rather that it did not complete phase two before undertaking phase three.