Court Opinion

ID: 9614189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:23:20.607309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:45.834560
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully in affirmance of the judgment in Case Number S07A1606, since the clear and unambiguous terms of OCGA § 17-6-1 (g) preclude bail for anyone who is serving a sentence for commission of the crime of which, at least until today, Wilson stood convicted. In Case Number S07A1481, however, the majority demonstrates that its commitment to effectuating clear and unambiguous statutory language is wholly subjective and entirely selective. There, it employs the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment as a guise to extend the applicability of the 2006 amendment to OCGA § 16-6-4 retroactively, notwithstanding that doing so is in direct contravention of the express legislative intent of the General Assembly. Because I believe that the majority’s conclusion that Wilson’s felony sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment does violence to the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers and is contrary to the doctrine of stare decisis, I respectfully dissent to the judgment of affirmance in Case Number S07A1481.
It is important to note .at the outset that the factual basis for Wilson’s prosecution is not an act which is in any sense protected by the constitutional right of privacy. The evidence shows that
*534[a] group of teenagers rented adjacent rooms at a motel and held a raucous, unsupervised New Year’s Eve party. Among the participants were 17-year-old Genarlow Wilson, 17-year-old L. M., and 15-year-old T. C. The next morning, L. M. reported to her mother that she had been raped. Police were notified, and the motel rooms were searched. During the search, a videocamera and videocassette tape were found. The tape showed Wilson having sexual intercourse with an apparently semiconscious L. M. and T. C. performing oral sex on Wilson. As a result, Wilson was charged with the rape of L. M. and with the aggravated child molestation of T. C. Acquitted of the former offense and convicted of the latter, he was given a mandatory sentence of ten years imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Wilson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 459 (631 SE2d 391) (2006).
When Wilson engaged in the very public act of oral sodomy with a 15-year-old child, he committed the crime of aggravated child molestation and, as a result, he received the felony sentence mandated for that offense. Former OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1). Subsequently, the General Assembly did amend the statute so as to provide that the crime of aggravated child molestation committed under the factual circumstances which underlay Wilson’s prosecution would only be punishable as a misdemeanor. OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (2). However, the effective date of that change in the law was July 1, 2006, which is more than a year-and-a-half after Wilson committed the offense for which he was convicted. Ga. L. 2006, pp. 379, 413, § 30 (a). In amending the law to provide for misdemeanor punishment, the General Assembly not only provided generally that the change would become effective on July 1, 2006. It also specifically addressed the issue of retroactive application, expressing the legislative intent that
[t]he provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment. (Emphasis supplied.)
Ga. L. 2006, pp. 379, 413, § 30 (c). Obviously, the effect of this clear and unambiguous provision is to preclude giving retroactive effect to the 2006 amendment so as to “affect or abate” the status of Wilson’s crime as felony aggravated child molestation punishable in accordance with the sentence authorized at the time he committed that offense. The majority fails to acknowledge this provision of the *535statute, presumably because to do so would completely destroy the foundation upon which it bases its ultimate conclusion that Wilson’s felony sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
In connection with a claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the enactments of the General Assembly are the clearest and best evidence of a society’s evolving standards of decency and of how contemporary society views a particular punishment. Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. 57, 62 (5) (573 SE2d 362) (2002). The majority acknowledges this tenet and purports to invoke it. However, a faithful adherence to that principle would seem to require a consideration of the totality of the law in question, which in this case certainly includes § 30 (c) of the 2006 statute. This Court has not always chosen to ignore that relevant and controlling language of the applicable statute. When Wilson applied unsuccessfully for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of his conviction, Presiding Justice Hunstein concurred and took that occasion to note for the benefit of the bench and bar that,
[although the situation in this case would fall within the ambit of the current statute, which became effective July 1, 2006, while Wilson’s appeal from the affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals was pending before this Court, see Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 11/HB 1059, the Legislature expressly chose not to allow the provisions of the new amendments to affect persons convicted under the previous version of the statute. See id. at § 30 (c). Accordingly, while I am very sympathetic to Wilson’s argument regarding the injustice of sentencing this promising young man with good grades and no criminal history to ten years in prison without parole and a lifetime registration as a sexual offender because he engaged in consensual oral sex with a 15-year-old victim only two years his junior, this Court is bound by the Legislature’s determination that young persons in Wilson’s situation are not entitled to the misdemeanor treatment now accorded to identical behavior under OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (2). (Emphasis supplied.)
Wlson v. State, 281 Ga. 447 (642 SE2d 1) (2006). Despite this succinct and cogent observation, however, it now appears that this Court is willing to consider itself to be “bound by the Legislature’s determination” only so long as a majority of its members determines that it is expedient to give effect to the General Assembly’s express intent that the 2006 amendment to the statute “not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to” July 1, 2006.
*536The majority relies on Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687 (386 SE2d 339) (1989) as support for its holding. However, that case obviously is not relevant to the present context, since the statute in question there did not contain any provision comparable to § 30 (c) of the 2006 law clearly establishing the immutability of Wilson’s status as one who is guilty of felony aggravated child molestation. To the contrary, the relevant statute in Fleming merely provided that capital punishment would no longer be an available sentence for any defendant found “guilty but mentally retarded” in the trial of any capital case “ ‘which commences on or after July 1,1988.’ [Cit.]” Fleming v. Zant, supra at 688 (1). Thus, entirely unlike § 30 (c) of the 2006 statute which applies here, this Court was not presented in Fleming with a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent that the elimination of the death penalty for mentally retarded defendants would not affect the status of a previously convicted individual. Accordingly, there was nothing in the text of the statute addressed in Fleming which would preclude this Court from relying on that legislation as evidence that
this state’s elected representatives, voicing the will of the electorate, have spoken on the subject and have declared that if a defendant is found to be mentally retarded, “the death penalty shall not be imposed and the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life.” [Cit.] The legislative enactment reflects a decision by the people of Georgia that the execution of mentally retarded offenders makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.
Fleming v. Zant, supra at 690 (3). Applying that rationale of Fleming here, § 30 (c) of the 2006 statute plainly shows that the elected members of the General Assembly, expressing the will of the voters, have spoken and declared that, notwithstanding the appropriateness of misdemeanor punishment for defendants convicted of aggravated child molestation committed after July 1, 2006, for those, like Wilson, who committed the crime before that date, a felony sentence in accordance with former OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1) remains in effect. Thus, when Fleming is invoked for the principle for which it actually stands, that case supports a holding which is wholly contrary to that reached by the majority.
The majority also cites Dawson v. State, 274 Ga. 327 (554 SE2d 137) (2001) as support. However, unlike the 2006 law at issue here, the statutory amendment in question in Dawson did not relate to a legislative change in the magnitude of the sentence to be imposed for a given offense. Instead, the statute merely related to the manner in *537which a death sentence would be carried out in this state, substituting lethal injection for electrocution. More importantly, however, as was true in Fleming, there was no statutory counterpart to § 30 (c) at issue in Dawson. To the contrary, it was noted that the General Assembly had
recognized the possibility that this Court would find unconstitutional its retention of electrocution as the method of executing persons sentenced to death for capital offenses committed before [the] statute’s effective date. In anticipation of such a ruling and with full awareness of the disfavor into which death by electrocution has fallen, [cits.] the Legislature made express provisions in the uncodified section ofOCGA § 17-10-38. It specifically stated that “(i)t is the further intention of the General Assembly that persons sentenced to death for crimes committed prior to the effective date of this Act be executed by lethal injection if the Supreme Court of the United States declares that electrocution violates the Constitution of the United States or if the Supreme Court of Georgia declares that electrocution violates the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Georgia.” [Cits.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Dawson v. State, supra at 329-330 (2). Applying the rationale of Dawson here, when the General Assembly enacted the 2006 amendment, it did not anticipate today’s holding that this Court would declare a felony sentence imposed under former OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) to be cruel and unusual punishment and expressly provide that, in that event, one who had been convicted of felony aggravated child molestation prior to July 1,2006 should be resentenced for a misdemeanor. Instead, the General Assembly expressly stated that in no event was the 2006 amendment to affect or abate the status as a crime of any act or omission which occurred prior to its effective date. Giving the same effect to the legislative intent clearly expressed in § 30 (c) as this Court gave to the legislative intent expressed in the amendment construed in Dawson compels the conclusion that the status of the crime committed by Wilson remains a felony and is punishable as such.
“The General Assembly is presumed to enact laws with full knowledge of the condition of the law and with reference to it, (cit.) and the courts will not presume that the legislature intended to enact an unconstitutional law. (Cits.)” [Cit.]
*538Hamilton v. Renewed Hope, 277 Ga. 465, 467 (589 SE2d 81) (2003). In accordance with this principle, this Court should presume that the General Assembly enacted the 2006 amendment with full knowledge of the decisions in Fleming and Dawson, and that the language of § 30 (c) was included for the express purpose of distinguishing those cases and thereby eliminating the possibility of reliance on them by the judiciary as the basis for holding that the newly enacted provision authorizing misdemeanor sentencing was evidence that the felony sentencing being replaced was cruel and unusual punishment. Today, however, a majority of this Court simply ignores that express legislative intent, and actually cites Fleming and Dawson for the very purpose which the General Assembly presumptively foreclosed judicial reliance. However, § 30 (c) cannot be ignored and it clearly distinguishes Fleming and Dawson, Without those cases, the majority is left with absolutely nothing to support its conclusion that the felony sentence which was authorized when Wilson committed the offense of aggravated child molestation became cruel and unusual punishment when, more than a year later, the General Assembly lessened the penalty for that offense and mandated only a prospective application for that change.
Once the fallacy of the majority’s reliance on Fleming and Dawson is demonstrated, the error in the conclusion built upon that misplaced reliance becomes readily apparent. The General Assembly formerly provided for felony sentencing for aggravated child molestation involving sodomy with a child.
The State’s “interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling and beyond the need for elaboration.” [Cit.] As this Court noted in Powell, “many believe that acts of sodomy . . . are morally reprehensible.” Powell [v. State, 270 Ga. 327,] 335 [(3) (510 SE2d 18) (1998)]. . .. [T]he General Assembly could reasonably conclude that the psychological well-being of minors is more damaged by acts of sodomy than by acts of intercourse, and that such acts warrant a greater punishment for child molestation by sodomy....
Odett v. State, 273 Ga. 353, 355 (2) (541 SE2d 29) (2001). When, in 2006, the General Assembly determined that misdemeanor sentencing was the more appropriate sentence in certain circumstances, it expressly stated that that lesser sentence would only apply after the effective date of July 1 and that the status of previous convictions for aggravated child molestation would not be affected by that change. Compare Dawson v. State, supra; Fleming v. Zant, supra. Accordingly, the proper question in this case is certainly not whether former *539OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Instead, the only appropriate inquiry is whether the General Assembly violated the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment when it expressly determined that the 2006 amendment would not be applied retroactively so as to reduce Wilson’s sentence from a felony to a misdemeanor. It is clear that this Court previously answered that precise question when, in Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 675, 677 (2) (631 SE2d 675) (2006), it unanimously held that, because the 2006 amendment
did not become effective until after [the defendant] was sentenced,... it cannot be applied to his case. “(I)t has long been the law in this State that, in general, a crime is to be construed and punished according to the provisions of the law existing at the time of its commission.” [Cit.] “(M)aking (a) lesser penalty applicable to offenses committed prior to the enactment of the legislation (creating the lesser penalty) is contrary to the judicial interpretation of the (laws) of this State under which the penalty for a criminal offense relates only to those offenses committed when and after such legislation becomes effective.” [Cit.]
The majority attempts to distinguish Widner by asserting that the 2006 amendment did not apply there in any event because the defendant, at the age of eighteen-and-a-half, was more than four years older than the victim and, thus, he was ineligible for misdemeanor punishment. However, this disparity in age does not appear in Widner. To the contrary, the opinion plainly states that “Widner contends that his crime should be given special treatment and excepted from the mandated punishment because he was eighteen at the time of the act and the victim was only four years younger.” (Emphasis supplied.) Widner v. State, supra at 676 (1). More importantly, however, even assuming that there may have been a disqualifying disparity between the ages of the defendant and victim in Widner, the incontestable fact remains that this Court did not cite that as a factor in its holding that the statute was inapplicable. Instead, we predicated our holding on the power of the General Assembly to limit the applicability of the 2006 amendment to offenses of aggravated child molestation occurring after July 1, 2006. The majority does not cite any authority for holding that the constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is a curb on the exercise of the legislative power of the General Assembly, clearly recognized in Widner, to enact an express proscription against retroactive application of its statutes which lessen the punishment for crimes committed in this state.
*540The majority does not demonstrate that an unqualified felony sentence for aggravated child molestation constituted cruel and unusual punishment at the time that Wilson committed that crime. Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (30 SC 544, 54 LE 793) (1910) (which the majority cites, but which actually involved appellate review of a holding on direct appeal that the sentence then authorized by statute was not cruel and unusual). Indeed, it cannot so demonstrate, since the law which was then in effect “provide [d] no such exception [to mandatory felony sentencing based upon the age of the defendant and victim], and, because the required punishment does not unconstitutionally shock the conscience, [such a] sentence must stand.” Widner v. State, supra. Wilson’s sentence does not become cruel and unusual simply because the General Assembly made the express decision that he cannot benefit from the subsequent legislative determination to reduce the sentence for commission of that crime from felony to misdemeanor status. To the contrary, it is because the General Assembly made that express determination that his felony sentence cannot be deemed cruel and unusual. “It is for the legislature to ‘determine to what extent certain criminal conduct has demonstrated more serious criminal interest and damaged society and to what extent it should be punished.’ [Cits.]” State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383-384 (1) (589 SE2d 69) (2003).
The majority characterizes its opinion a “rare case,” claiming on p. 532 that,
[a]s in Fleming and Dawson, in which this Court did not apply the legislative amendments retroactively, we are not applying the 2006 Amendment retroactively in this case. Instead, as in Fleming and Dawson, we merely factor the 2006 Amendment into the evaluation of whether Wilson’s punishment is cruel and unusual.
In actuality, however, today’s decision is rare because of its unprecedented disregard for the General Assembly’s constitutional authority to make express provision against the giving of any retroactive effect to its legislative lessening of the punishment for criminal offenses. If, notwithstanding a provision such as § 30 (c), the judiciary is permitted to determine that a formerly authorized harsher sentence nevertheless constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, then it necessarily follows that there are no circumstances in which the General Assembly can insulate its subsequent reduction of a criminal sentence from possible retroactive application by courts. Wilson is certainly not the only defendant convicted of aggravated child molestation who benefits at the expense of today’s judicial reduction of the General Assembly’s power to legislate. At present, any and all *541defendants who were ever convicted of aggravated child molestation and sentenced for a felony under circumstances similar to Wilson are, as a matter of law, entitled to be completely discharged from lawful custody even though the General Assembly expressly provided that their status as convicted felons would not be affected by the very statute upon which the majority relies to free them. Compare Weems v. United States, supra (a narrow holding that the sentence then in effect was cruel and unusual). Moreover, nothing in today’s decision limits its application to cases involving minors who engage in voluntary sexual acts. Any defendant who was ever convicted in this state for the commission of any crime for which the sentence was subsequently reduced is now entitled to claim that his harsher sentence, though authorized under the statute in effect at the time it was imposed, has since become cruel and unusual and that, as a consequence, he is not only entitled to the benefit of the more lenient sentence, but should be released entirely from incarceration. See generally Dennard v. State, 243 Ga. App. 868, 875 (1) (e) (534 SE2d 182) (2000) (no retroactive application of 1999 enactment making certain sexual offenses involving children a high and aggravated misdemeanor rather than felony); Lockhart v. State, 227 Ga. App. 481 (489 SE2d 594) (1997) (no retroactive application of reduction in minimum sentence for rape from ten years to one year). Compare Weems v. United States, supra (which did not hold that the sentence that was statutorily authorized at the time it was imposed became cruel and unusual pursuant to retroactive application of a newly enacted statute). Accordingly, as a result of this “rare case,” the superior courts should be prepared for a flood of habeas corpus petitions filed by prisoners who seek to be freed from imprisonment because of a subsequent reduction in the applicable sentences for the crimes for which they were convicted. Compare Weems v. United States, supra.
The courts of this state must give due regard to the authority of the legislative branch of government.
The constitutional principle of separation of powers is intended to protect the citizens of this state from the tyranny of the judiciary, insuring that the authority to enact the laws will be exercised only by those representatives duly elected to serve as legislators. The General Assembly “being the sovereign power in the State, while acting with the pale of its constitutional competency, it is the province of the Courts to interpret its mandates, and their duty to obey them, however absurd and unreasonable they may appear.” [Cit.]
*542Decided October 26, 2007.

Case No. S07A1481

Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Brenda J. Bernstein, Rodney S. Zell, Franklin J. Hogue, for appellee.
McKenna, Long & Aldridge, David Balser, CleveL. Molette, amici curiae.

Case No. S07A1606

Brenda J. Bernstein, Rodney S. Zell, for appellant.
J. David McDade, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellee.
Fullwood v. Sivley, 271 Ga. 248, 254 (517 SE2d 511) (1999). The General Assembly’s express determination that the 2006 amendment not affect or abate the status of Wilson’s crime as felony aggravated child molestation may appear to some of the citizens of this State as absurd or unreasonable. However, this Court has the obligation to effectuate that legislative determination unless there is a constitutional impediment to the General Assembly’s power to limit its statutes lessening the sentences for criminal offenses to prospective application only. In Widner, we unanimously held that the General Assembly was authorized to limit application of the 2006 amendment to acts of aggravated child molestation committed after July 1, 2006. Because today’s opinion violates the principle of separation of powers and is contrary to the doctrine of stare decisis, I dissent to affirmance of the grant of Wilson’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines and Justice Melton join in this opinion.