Court Opinion

ID: 9853301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:46:04.83998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:45.209012
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In regard to the opinion written by Justice Bakes, Part I and II thereof require no answer as they are merely factual statements. I concur in Part III of the opinion.
However, I disagree with Part IV for the reasons stated by Justice Smith in Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 392 P.2d 552 (1964), wherein he concluded that in the absence of specific statutory enactment a court is without authority to impose jail sentences or fines incident to a probation order. I joined in that opinion, and while I recognize that portion of the plurality opinion is considered as a dissent, I am convinced that the *283views expressed were and still are correct. Here the majority opinion faults that opinion as being limited to a consideration of only I.C. § 19-2601, rather than considering I.C. §§ 19-101 and 18-109. However, in my view these latter statutes are inapplicable to a case in which a withheld judgment is being used as a rehabilitative measure. If punishment is the goal, then I.C. § 19-101 is appropriate and a jail sentence or fine may be imposed; but an accused should not be enticed with the prospect of a withheld judgment, and then immediately sentenced and obligated to serve jail time or to pay a fine. In my view the two, i. e., a sentence (imprisonment or fine) and a withheld judgment, are totally incompatible, conceptually and legally, and their combined use is without statutory authority.
I also concur with Part V dismissing the action against DeVoe.