Court Opinion

ID: 9384712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 19:02:32.500511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.843873
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/4/23 Trinity Financial Services v. Svegliato CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  TRINITY FINANCIAL SERVICES                                          B313697
  LLC,
                                                                      (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  Super. Ct. No. 19LBCV00423)

           v.

  DANIEL SVEGLIATO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

  DANIEL SVEGLIATO,
                                                                      (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   Super. Ct. No. 19LBCV00433)

           v.

  U.S. BANK, N.A., et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.
      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Dismissed.
      Franklin Soto Leeds and Dean Kirby, for Plaintiff,
Defendant, and Appellant Daniel Svegliato.
      Frost Brown Todd, S. Christopher Yoo and Jacob Clark, for
Plaintiff, Defendant, and Respondent Trinity Financial Services,
LLC.
      Wright Finlay & Zak and Jonathan Fink, for Defendants
and Respondents U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee,
successor in interest to Bank of America, National Association, as
trustee, successor by merger to LaSalle National Bank, as trustee
for GSAMP TRUST 2005-HE6, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2005-HE6; Western Progressive, LLC; and
PHH Mortgage Corporation.
                     _________________________

                         INTRODUCTION
      This appeal arises from a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of
real property located in Long Beach, California.
      The foreclosure sale was scheduled for June 25, 2019, at
11:00 a.m. Prior to that date, the owner of the property, Trinity
Financial Services, LLC (Trinity), contacted the foreclosure
trustee and obtained a reinstatement quote to cure the default on
the mortgage loan. The foreclosure trustee instructed Trinity to
remit full payment of the reinstatement amount to the loan
servicer no later than the date of the scheduled foreclosure sale.
On June 24, the day before the sale, Trinity initiated a wire
transfer of the reinstatement funds, and the transfer of funds
occurred the next morning, at or around 8:07 a.m. Nevertheless,
the foreclosure sale proceeded at 12:01 p.m. Appellant Daniel

                                2
Svegliato submitted the highest bid. The next day, the
foreclosure trustee contacted Svegliato to inform him that the
sale should not have taken place because the loan had been
reinstated and was no longer in default. The trustee promptly
returned Svegliato’s funds with interest, and a trustee’s deed
upon sale was never issued to Svegliato.
       Litigation ensued. Trinity sued the lender, the foreclosure
trustee, the loan servicer (collectively the Bank defendants), and
Svegliato in one action, and Svegliato sued the Bank defendants
and Trinity in another action. The trial court consolidated the
actions and granted motions for summary judgment filed by the
Bank defendants and Trinity. The trial court ultimately entered
two judgments: a first judgment in favor of the Bank defendants,
and a second judgment in favor of Trinity. Svegliato filed a notice
of appeal as to the first judgment only.
       We dismiss the appeal as to the Bank defendants and
Trinity.
                  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      The following facts are not in dispute:
      In October 2018, Trinity became the owner of real property
located in Long Beach, California (the property) subject to a
mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust.1 U.S. Bank 2 was the

1     Trinity acquired title to the property through a properly
conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale and was issued a trustee’s
deed upon sale.
2     The actual name of the entity is U.S. Bank, N.A., as
Trustee, Successor in Interest to Bank of America, N.A., as
Trustee, Successor by Merger to LaSalle National Bank, as
Trustee for GSAMP Trust 2005-HE6, Mortgage Pass-Through

                                3
successor in interest to the original lender and the beneficiary of
the deed of trust. U.S. Bank assigned Western Progressive, LLC
(Western) to act as the foreclosure trustee of the deed of trust.
PHH Mortgage Corporation (PHH) serviced the mortgage loan.
       At the time Trinity acquired the property, the underlying
mortgage loan was in default. The loan remained in default and
as a result, a notice of trustee’s sale was recorded, setting the
foreclosure sale date for June 25, 2019 at 11:00 a.m.
       Trinity sought to reinstate the loan and requested a
mortgage reinstatement quote, which Western sent, via email, to
Trinity on June 21, 2019. The letter containing the quote stated
that the reinstatement amount of $43,060.61 “must be remitted
no later than 06/25/2019.” The letter further instructed that wire
transfers should be sent to M&T Bank with “Credit to: PHH
Mortgage Services” and listed the bank’s routing number and
PHH’s account number.
       On June 25, 2019, Trinity transferred to PHH the full
amount via a wire from JP Morgan Chase Bank at or around 8:07
a.m. On that same date, the foreclosure sale took place at 12:01
p.m. and Svegliato submitted the highest bid. He tendered two
cashier’s checks to cover the purchase price. Western received
postponement instructions only after the foreclosure sale took
place.
       The following day, Western contacted Svegliato to inform
him to “walk away from the sale.” On July 11, 2019, Western
returned Svegliato’s funds and informed him that it would not be
issuing a trustee’s deed upon sale. On July 31, 2019, Western

Certificates, Series 2005-HE6. For brevity, we will refer to the
entity as U.S. Bank.

                                 4
sent additional funds to Svegliato to cover interest from the sale
date to the date the cashier’s checks were returned to Svegliato.
      A trustee’s deed upon sale in favor of Svegliato was never
issued or recorded.
                   PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.    Proceedings in the trial court
      A.    The two complaints
       On June 28, 2019, Trinity sued the Bank defendants and
Does 1 through 25 in case No. 19LBCV00423, alleging three
causes of action: (1) to quiet title to the property; (2) to void the
trustee’s sale; and (3) for declaratory relief in the form of a
judicial determination that Trinity possessed title to the property
in fee simple. Trinity subsequently amended the complaint to
name Svegliato as a Doe defendant.
       On August 14, 2019, Svegliato filed a first amended
complaint against Western Progressive, PHH, Trinity, and Does
1 through 503 in case No. 19LBVC00433, alleging three causes of
action: (1) declaratory relief against Western and PHH in the
form of a judicial determination that PHH’s acceptance of the
reinstatement funds was improper and that Svegliato was the
“record owner” of the property; (2) breach of contract against

3     Although U.S. Bank was not named in Svegliato’s first
amended complaint, U.S. Bank filed an answer to that pleading
on behalf of itself, Western, and PHH. The answer constituted a
general appearance in the action by U.S. Bank. (Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135,
1145 [“Filing an answer on the merits constitutes a general
appearance.”].)

                                  5
Western and PHH; and (3) to quiet title to the property as to
Western, PHH, and Trinity.
       The parties stipulated to consolidate the two complaints.
On February 15, 2020, the trial court accepted the stipulation,
ordered the two actions consolidated, and designated the first
case (case No. 19LBCV00423) as the lead case.
      B.    The summary judgment motions
       The Bank defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
as to all causes of action alleged by Svegliato. Trinity also filed a
motion for summary judgment as to all of its causes of action
against the Bank defendants and Svegliato, and as to Svegliato’s
cause of action to quiet title. Svegliato filed separate oppositions
to each motion for summary judgment.
       On November 16, 2020, after a hearing during which both
motions for summary judgment were argued, the trial court
issued a written ruling granting both motions for summary
judgment and denying Svegliato’s request for a continuance.
      C.    The December 3, 2020 judgment for the Bank
            defendants
      The Bank defendants submitted a proposed judgment,
which the court adopted and entered on December 3, 2020 (the
December 3 judgment). The December 3 judgment stated that:
judgment was entered in favor of the Bank defendants and
against Svegliato; the Bank defendants were deemed the
prevailing parties; and the Bank defendants were entitled to
recover their costs incurred in the matter. The trial court’s
written ruling granting summary judgment was attached to the
December 3 judgment and “incorporated by reference.” Notice of

                                  6
entry of the December 3 judgment was served on the same date,
December 3, 2020.4
      Svegliato filed a motion to vacate the judgment on
December 18, 2020. The hearing on Svegliato’s motion to vacate
took place on May 6, 2021. The trial court issued a written ruling
denying the motion on the same date. Notice of the ruling was
served on the parties on May 10, 2021.
      D.    The April 28, 2021 judgment for Trinity
       On December 4, 2020, Trinity filed an “Application for
Entry of Default Judgment in Favor of Trinity Financial Services,
LLC Against ‘All Persons’.” The application requested that the
trial court enter “default judgment” in favor of Trinity against
“all persons” claiming a right or interest in the property adverse
to Trinity, and also judgment in favor of Trinity and against the
Bank defendants and Svegliato pursuant to the trial court’s
ruling on Trinity’s motion for summary judgment. On the same
date, Trinity served a proposed judgment on Svegliato and the
Bank defendants.
       The hearing on Trinity’s application for entry of judgment
took place on January 13, 2021. After hearing testimony, the
trial court granted the application and directed Trinity to
electronically file a proposed judgment for the court’s approval
and entry.
       On April 28, 2021, the trial court entered judgment in favor
of Trinity and against the Bank defendants, Svegliato, and “all

4      The proof of service for the notice of entry of judgment
reflects a date of December 3, 2013, a clear typographical error.
All parties agree that service of notice of entry took place on
December 3, 2020.

                                 7
persons” claiming a right or interest in the property (the April 28
judgment). The final judgment mirrored the proposed judgment
Trinity had previously served on all parties. Trinity served
notice of entry of the April 28 judgment on the same date.5
      The April 28 judgment stated that: judgment was entered
in favor of Trinity and against the Bank defendants and
Svegliato on all causes of action alleged in Trinity’s complaint,
and in favor of Trinity and against Svegliato on his third cause of
action to quiet title; title to the property was quieted in favor of
Trinity effective October 25, 2018; Trinity held title to the
property in fee simple subject only to the senior lien interest held
by U.S. Bank; defendants had no legal or equitable right, title, or
interest in the property adverse to Trinity; the trustee’s sale that
occurred on June 25, 2019 was null and void, and Svegliato took
no interest in the property; and Trinity was the prevailing party.
The judgment attached a copy of the November 16, 2020
summary judgment ruling and incorporated the ruling by
reference.
II.   The notice of appeal and subsequent proceedings
      A.     Notice of appeal
      Svegliato filed a notice of appeal on June 1, 2021. The
notice of appeal specified that Svegliato was appealing from the
judgment entered on “December 3, 2020” and checked the box:

5      We note that neither the appellant’s appendix nor the
respondent’s appendix (filed by Trinity) contain a copy of the
notice of entry of the April 28th judgment. In response to this
court’s request, the Bank defendants and Trinity each provided a
copy of said notice and its accompanying proof of service. We
take judicial notice of this document on our own motion. (Evid.
Code, §§ 451, 459.)

                                 8
“Judgment after an order granting summary judgment.” The
certificate of service attached to the notice of appeal indicates
that Svegliato served only the Bank defendants with the notice of
appeal. In the Civil Case Information Sheet filed with this court,
Svegliato indicated that he was appealing from the judgment
entered on December 3, 2020, and that service of notice of entry
of the judgment occurred on that same date. Svegliato
additionally attached a copy of the December 3 judgment.
       B.     Trinity’s motion to dismiss
       In its respondent’s brief, Trinity argued that because the
April 28 judgment was the only judgment that fully adjudicated
Trinity’s claims, and because Svegliato failed to appeal from that
judgment, the instant appeal should be dismissed as to Trinity
for lack of jurisdiction. Trinity subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the instant appeal and raised the same argument.
Svegliato opposed the motion.6 The Bank defendants took no
position on Trinity’s motion to dismiss. This court deferred
ruling on Trinity’s motion to dismiss pending a decision on the
merits of the appeal.
       C.     Supplemental briefing
       Because no party addressed the issue of whether the notice
of appeal was timely filed as to the December 3 judgment, this
court requested supplemental briefing on that issue. (See Drum
v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 845, 849 [“[B]ecause the
timeliness of an appeal poses a jurisdictional issue, we must raise
the point sua sponte”].) Specifically, this court invited parties to
address the following questions: First, is the notice of appeal

6     Svegliato’s request for judicial notice filed in conjunction
with his opposition to the motion to dismiss is hereby granted.

                                  9
timely? Second, if the notice of appeal is not timely and the
appeal is dismissed as to the December 3 judgment, what impact,
if any, does the dismissal have on the pending motion to dismiss
by Trinity? Third, was notice of entry of the April 28 judgment
served, and if so, when?
      In his supplemental briefing, Svegliato did not directly
address the court’s question regarding the timeliness of the notice
of appeal from the December 3 judgment. Rather, he argued that
the notice of appeal should be liberally construed to embrace the
April 28 judgment and that this court should deny Trinity’s
motion to dismiss. Trinity argued in its supplemental briefing
that the appeal from the December 3 judgment was untimely,
and thus this court should dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. The Bank defendants argued that the appeal from
the December 3 judgment was untimely and thus they should be
dismissed from the appeal; they took no position on the
timeliness of Svegliato’s appeal with respect to Trinity’s
judgment.
                           DISCUSSION
I.    The appeal is dismissed as to the Bank defendants
      A.    Rules regarding time to appeal
       “ ‘[T]he timely filing of an appropriate notice of appeal or its
legal equivalent is an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.’ ” (K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 881 (K.J.)) “It is also well settled an
appellate court cannot relieve a party from a default occasioned
by the failure to file a timely appeal.” (Grant v. List & Lathrop
(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 993, 997.)
       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1), “[t]o
appeal from a superior court judgment or an appealable order of

                                  10
a superior court . . . an appellant must serve and file a notice of
appeal in that superior court.”
       Subject to any applicable extension of time, the time for
filing a notice of appeal is governed by California Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(a), which provides, in relevant part, that a notice of
appeal must be filed “on or before the earliest of” the following:
(1) “60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party
filing the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of
judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the
date either was served”; (2) “60 days after the party filing the
notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document
entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of
the judgment, accompanied by proof of service”; or (3) “180 days
after entry of judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.104(a)(1)(A), (B), & (C).)
       When a party files a “valid notice of intention to move – or
a valid motion – to vacate a judgment, the time to appeal from
the judgment is extended for all parties until the earliest of: [¶]
(1) 30 days after the superior court clerk, or a party serves an
order denying the motion or a notice of entry of that order; [¶] (2)
90 days after the first notice of intention to move – or motion – is
filed; or [¶]180 days after entry of judgment.”7 (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.108(c)(1), (2), & (3).)

7      The advisory committee comments to California Rules of
Court, rule 8.108 provide that the “motion to vacate” referenced
in this rule includes a motion made under Code of Civil
Procedure section 663a for claimed judicial error and a motion
made under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b)
because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (Advisory
Com. com., rule 8.108.)

                                 11
      B.      The appeal is untimely as to the December 3
              judgment
       Here, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Bank
defendants, and against Svegliato, on December 3, 2020. Notice
of entry of the judgment was served on all parties on the same
date, December 3, 2020. Thus, pursuant to California Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B), the last day for any party to appeal
from that judgment would have been February 1, 2021 (60 days
after service of notice of entry of judgment), subject to any
applicable extension of time.
       Svegliato filed a timely motion to vacate the judgment
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 on December 18,
2020. Thus, the time to appeal from the judgment was extended
for all parties until March 18, 2021 (90 days after the motion to
vacate was filed), which is the earliest of the three dates specified
in California Rules of Court, rule 8.108(c). The other two
applicable dates are June 9, 2021 (30 days after service of notice
of the ruling denying the motion was served) and June 1, 2021
(180 days after entry of judgment), both of which are later than
March 18, 2021. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.108(c).)
       Because Svegliato did not file his notice of appeal until
June 1, 2021, the notice of appeal was untimely as to the
December 3 judgment.8 Svegliato does not contend otherwise in

8      California Rules of Court, rule 8.108 “operates only to
extend the time to appeal otherwise prescribed in rule 8.104(a); it
does not shorten the time to appeal. If the normal time to appeal
stated in rule 8.104(a) is longer than the time provided in this
rule, the time to appeal stated in rule 8.104(a) governs.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.108(a).) Here, the time to appeal as stated
in California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a) was 60 days after
service of notice of entry of judgment, or February 1, 2021. The

                                 12
his supplemental briefing submitted to the court. Accordingly,
we have no jurisdiction to consider Svegliato’s challenge to the
December 3 judgment. (See K.J., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 881
[timely notice of appeal “ ‘is an absolute prerequisite to the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction’ ”]; Fritz v. Foote (1958) 162
Cal.App.2d 622, 624 [“[t]imely filing of the notice of appeal is
jurisdictional (citation) and a late filing requires the court, of its
own motion, to dismiss the appeal”]; In re Del Campo (1961) 55
Cal.2d 816, 817 [“the time requirements for taking an appeal are
mandatory, and appellate courts are without jurisdiction to
consider a late appeal”].) We therefore dismiss the appeal from
the December 3, 2020 judgment entered in favor of the Bank
defendants.
II.    The appeal is dismissed as to Trinity
       A.    The notice of appeal does not reference or
             identify the April 28 judgment
       As noted above, in order “[t]o appeal from a superior court
judgment or an appealable order of a superior court . . . an
appellant must serve and file a notice of appeal in that superior
court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1); see also K.J., supra,
8 Cal.5th at p. 881 [“timely filing of an appropriate notice of
appeal or its legal equivalent is an absolute prerequisite to the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction”].) “The purpose of this
requirement is to promote the finality of judgments by forcing the
losing party to take an appeal expeditiously or not at all.”
(Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 113.)

motion to vacate therefore extended the time to appeal to March
16, 2021.

                                 13
       On its face, the notice of appeal filed by Svegliato on June
1, 2021 did not reference the April 28 judgment, which is the only
judgment that pertained to Trinity. And Svegliato has filed no
additional notice of appeal referencing the April 28 judgment.
Because the time to appeal from the April 28 judgment has long
since expired, this court has no jurisdiction over Trinity.
(Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 113
[“the filing of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional
prerequisite”]; see also Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 154, 173 [“ ‘[W]here several judgments and/or orders
occurring close in time are separately appealable . . . each
appealable judgment and order must be expressly specified—in
either a single notice of appeal or multiple notices of appeal—in
order to be reviewable on appeal.’ ”].)
       In opposition to Trinity’s motion to dismiss, Svegliato
argued the following: (1) “Trinity’s rights as to Svegliato were
fully adjudicated by the 12/3/20 judgment,” and thus it was
unnecessary for Svegliato to appeal from the April 28 judgment
because he timely appealed from the December 3 judgment; (2)
because “the 4/28/21 judgment was subsumed within the 12/3/20
judgment,” this court has jurisdiction over Trinity based on
Svegliato’s timely appeal from the December 3 judgment; and (3)
“Svegliato has timely appealed from the 12/3/20 [j]udgment” and
therefore this court should hear the appeal from both judgments
to promote judicial economy and avoid the possibility of future
conflicting judgments. All of these arguments necessarily fail
because they are premised on the mistaken notion that Svegliato
timely appealed from the December 3 judgment.
       Svegliato’s remaining argument in opposition to Trinity’s
motion to dismiss—that the notice of appeal from the December 3

                                14
judgment should be considered a “premature notice of appeal”
from the April 28 judgment —likewise fails. The cases cited by
Svegliato in support of his argument are inapposite. In Avila v.
Standard Oil Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 441, 445, the plaintiffs
appealed from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment
before the court entered judgment in favor of defendants.
Similarly, in Bellah v. Greenson (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 614, 618,
fn. 1, the plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order sustaining
the demurrer filed by the defendants, and not the judgment of
dismissal itself. In both cases, the appellate court, in the
interests of justice and to avoid delay, construed the notices of
appeal to be premature appeals from the ensuing judgments.
(Avila v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at p. 445;
Bellah v. Greenson, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 618, fn. 1.)
       In stark contrast to the plaintiffs in the foregoing cases,
Svegliato did not appeal before either of the judgments were
entered in this case. Rather, he appealed after he was served
with notice of entry of both the December 3 and April 28
judgments. (And his notice of appeal from the December 3
judgment was untimely at that.) There is simply no basis from
which we could construe the notice of appeal filed on June 1, 2021
as a “premature appeal” from a judgment that had already been
entered for at least a month.
       B.     The notice of appeal cannot reasonably be
              construed to embrace the April 28 judgment
       Despite the untimeliness of his notice of appeal as to the
December 3 judgment, Svegliato argues in his supplemental
briefing that we should liberally construe his notice of appeal to

                                 15
embrace the April 28 judgment.9 If construed to include the April
28 judgment, then the notice of appeal would be, according to
Svegliato, timely.
       A “notice of appeal must be liberally construed,” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.100(a)), and “the law favors the preservation of
the right of appeal and the hearing of appeals on their merits”
(Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Board (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 785, 790). The
“liberal construction requirement compels a reviewing court to
evaluate whether the notice, despite any technical defect,
nonetheless served its basic function—to provide notice of who is
seeking review of what order or judgment—so as to properly
invoke appellate jurisdiction.” (K.J., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 883.)
       Here, the notice of appeal filed by Svegliato failed to serve
its basic function of providing notice that he was seeking review
of the April 28 judgment. The notice of appeal did not make any
reference to the April 28 judgment. Further, Svegliato did not

9     In his supplemental briefing, Svegliato refers to the April
28 judgment as a “stealth judgment” because he was purportedly
not served with either the proposed judgment or notice of entry of
the judgment. The record belies Svegliato’s contention and
clearly demonstrates there was no “stealth judgment.” Trinity
served Svegliato with its proposed judgment on December 4,
2020, and notice of entry of that judgment on April 28, 2021.
Furthermore, at the hearing on Svegliato’s motion to vacate the
December 3 judgment, counsel for Trinity stated on the record in
the presence of Svegliato’s counsel that “Trinity’s judgment was
entered on April 26th of 2021.” While counsel got the date wrong
by a couple of days, his statement in open court clearly
demonstrated that he was not hiding the fact that judgment had
recently been entered on behalf of his client.

                                16
serve Trinity with the notice of appeal that he filed. Thus, the
notice of appeal was wholly inadequate in providing notice to
Trinity that Svegliato was seeking to appeal the April 28
judgment. The doctrine of liberal construction cannot be used to
resuscitate an inadequate notice of appeal in the manner urged
by Svegliato. (See Shiver, McGrane & Martin v. Littell (1990)
217 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1045 [“[d]espite the rule favoring liberal
interpretation of notices of appeal, a notice of appeal will not be
considered adequate if it completely omits any reference to the
judgment being appealed”].)
       Furthermore, the “rule favoring appealability in cases of
ambiguity cannot apply where there is a clear intention to appeal
from only part of the judgment or one of two separate appealable
judgments or orders.” (Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments,
Inc. v. Praszker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 35, 47.) Svegliato’s
intention to appeal from the December 3 judgment, and only that
judgment, is evident from the record. The notice of appeal listed
only the December 3 judgment, and Svegliato served only the
Bank defendants (i.e., the prevailing parties with respect to that
judgment) with the notice of appeal. Additionally, he attached
only a copy of the December 3 judgment to the Civil Case
Information Sheet filed with this court. (See Russell v. Foglio
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 653, 661 [court declined to apply doctrine
of liberal construction to include a subsequent appealable order
where appellant specified the date of another judgment and
attached a copy of said judgment; doctrine of liberal construction
“applies primarily . . . where the notice of appeal has
misdescribed the judgment or order sought to be appealed
from”].) Indeed, in his opening brief, Svegliato makes no
reference to the April 28 judgment, and he omits a copy of the

                                17
judgment from his appellant’s appendix, further underscoring the
point that he intended to appeal only from that December 3
judgment.
       Furthermore, “it is well ‘beyond liberal construction’ to
view an appeal from one order as an appeal from a ‘further and
different order.’ ” (Baker v. Castaldi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 218,
225.) While the December 3 and April 28 judgments stem from
consolidated actions arising out of the same judicial foreclosure
sale, they are different in two significant respects: First, as
Svegliato concedes in his supplemental briefing, the April 28
judgment is “the only judgment which expressly disposed of
Trinity’s quiet title claim.” Second, the April 28 judgment
provides for declaratory relief in the form of a judicial
determination that Trinity owns the property in fee simple. The
December 3 judgment provides no such relief to Trinity. Because
of these differences, the April 28 judgment is a “further and
different” judgment as compared to the December 3 judgment,
which weighs against applying the doctrine of liberal
construction. (Ibid.)
       In support of his argument that this court should construe
his notice of appeal as embracing the April 28 judgment,
Svegliato cites K.J., supra, 8 Cal.5th 875, a case that is
distinguishable on its facts. In K.J., our high court considered
the “narrow question of procedural law” of whether an appellate
court has “jurisdiction to review an order directing an attorney to
pay sanctions when the notice of appeal identifies the attorney’s
client as the appealing party, but other indicia make clear that
the attorney was the party seeking review.” (Id. at p. 878.) The
court held that appellate jurisdiction did exist in that case
because the record demonstrated clear indicia that the attorney

                                18
was the intended appellant of the sanctions order. (Id. at p. 889.)
Here, for all the reasons cited above, the record contains no
indicia that Svegliato intended to appeal from the April 28
judgment. To the contrary: all indicia, including those found in
the notice of appeal, civil case information sheet, appellant’s
opening brief, and appellant’s appendix, all make clear that
Svegliato intended to appeal from the December 3 judgment only.
       Finally, in both his supplemental briefing and opposition to
the motion to dismiss, Svegliato argues that Trinity has suffered
no prejudice as a result of his failure to reference the April 28
judgment in his notice of appeal, and thus, we should construe
the notice to embrace the April 28 judgment. The issue of
prejudice to Trinity, however, arises only if Svegliato can
establish that it is “reasonably clear” that he was trying to appeal
from the April 28 judgment. (See K.J., supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 882
[“[r]ule 8.100(a)(2)’s liberal construction requirement reflects the
long-standing ‘ “law of this state that notices of appeal are to be
liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is
reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from,
and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or
prejudiced” ’ ”]; see also Walker v. Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 22
[“a reviewing court should construe a notice of appeal from an
order denying a new trial to be an appeal from the underlying
judgment when it is reasonably clear the appellant intended to
appeal from the judgment and the respondent would not be
misled or prejudiced”].) For the reasons cited above, Svegliato
has failed to establish that it is “reasonably clear” he intended to
appeal from the April 28 judgment. Therefore, we need not reach
his claim that Trinity has suffered no prejudice.

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                         DISPOSITION

      The notice of appeal filed by Daniel Svegliato on June 1,
2021, is untimely. The motion to dismiss filed by Trinity is
granted. The appeal from the December 3, 2020 judgment and
purported appeal from the April 28, 2021 judgment are
dismissed. Respondents U.S. Bank, Western, PHH, and Trinity
are entitled to their costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           NGUYEN (KIM), J.*

We concur:

                        EDMON, P. J.

                        LAVIN, J.

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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