Court Opinion

ID: 9948078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 15:07:25.749573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:06.695009
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-790

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                  SEAN GIORGI.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       After a jury-waived trial, a District Court judge convicted

 the defendant of operating a motor vehicle under the influence

 of intoxicating liquor.        On appeal the defendant argues that the

 judge should have allowed his motion for a required finding of

 not guilty.     We affirm.

       The offense of operating under the influence of

 intoxicating liquor has three elements:            "(1) operation of a

 vehicle, (2) on a public way, (3) under the influence of

 alcohol."    Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 420 Mass. 630, 631 (1995).

 At trial the parties stipulated to the first two elements.

 Thus, the only issue before us is whether the evidence was

 sufficient to show that the defendant was under the influence of

 alcohol when he operated his vehicle.           To satisfy this element,

 the Commonwealth had to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant's consumption of alcohol diminished the

defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle safely"; it did

not need to "prove that the defendant actually drove in an

unsafe or erratic manner."   Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass.

169, 173 (1985).

     The evidence at trial showed that at approximately 11:50

P.M. on March 13, 2022, the defendant was involved in a single-

vehicle accident on Route 2 in Westminster.   A State trooper

responded to the scene and observed the defendant's vehicle

"overturned on its roof at rest in the median."    The vehicle had

crashed "through the center median," "rolled over multiple

times," and landed on its roof about fifty feet from where it

left the road.   There was "barely any traffic" on the road when

the trooper arrived.

     The defendant, who was ejected from the vehicle, sustained

critical injuries and was put in an ambulance.    The trooper

spoke briefly to him in the back of the ambulance and "right

away" noticed a "pretty substantial" odor of alcohol.    Right in

the "immediate vicinity" of the defendant's vehicle, the trooper

found an empty 1.75-liter bottle of rum, along with a few empty

"nips."

     This evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant

operated his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.      The

defendant was in a serious, single-vehicle accident when there

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was little other traffic on the road, he was emitting a strong

odor of alcohol, and there were multiple empty bottles of

alcohol next to his vehicle.   The judge could reasonably have

inferred from this that the defendant's consumption of alcohol

diminished his ability to operate his vehicle safely.    See

Commonwealth v. Hilton, 398 Mass. 63, 68 (1986) ("The manner in

which the automobile was parked, half on the street and half on

the sidewalk, was evidence that it may have been driven by a

driver under the influence of alcohol"); Commonwealth v. Proia,

98 Mass. App. Ct. 125, 127-129 (2020) (finding of impairment

supported by evidence that defendant was involved in serious

accident, smelled of alcohol, and had bloodshot eyes and slurred

speech).   Although the defendant offers alternative, innocent

interpretations of the evidence, "the weight of the evidence is

not the yardstick we use to test" sufficiency.   Commonwealth v.

Rarick, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 353 (2015).   Rather, we ask

whether the Commonwealth presented proof that was sufficient to

allow a rational trier of fact to convict.   See id.   The

evidence here and the inferences therefrom, viewed in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth, met that standard.    See

Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378 (2017), quoting

Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016) ("The

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inferences that support a conviction 'need only be reasonable

and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable'").

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Rubin, Blake &
                                        Shin, JJ. 1),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    March 6, 2024.

1   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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