Court Opinion

ID: 9446080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:45:27.049469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:30.802488
License: Public Domain

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act has placed a heavy liability upon railroads in suits for personal injuries1brought by employees. However, I do not feel that that act, as construed by the United States Supreme Court, is meant to deprive a railroad defendant of a fair trial. The record before us in this case-affirmatively shows that defendant did not receive such a trial.
With obvious deliberation, plaintiff’s, attorney at the outset of the case told the-jury in his opening statement that “the plaintiff is * * * married, has five-youngsters * * *That was a blatant appeal to the jurors for sympathy for the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s attorney was probably not surprised when an> objection was made and sustained, followed by a motion for a mistrial. He-may have been surprised that a mistrial was denied. The seed which he intended' to ripen into sympathy for his client was. planted and nothing which the court, thereafter said could uproot the seed; which was planted with calculation.
The prejudice created in favor of plaintiff was not lessened by the court’s instruction to the jurors to disregard it-As Justice Jackson said in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 S.Ct-716, 723, 93 L.Ed. 790:
“ * * * The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539, 559, 68 S.Ct. 248, 257, [92 LEd. 154], all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”
It is similar to the situation which Justice Frankfurter was considering in Del-li Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247, 77 S.Ct. 294, 302, 1 L.Ed.2d 278, where he said:
“ * * * The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. *253The admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants against whom such a declaration should not tell. * * * ”
He referred to Judge Learned Hand’s comment:1
«* -» * the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody else’s.”
Moreover, the court, to whom the jurors rightfully looked for a statement of the guiding principles of law, said in instruction 9, requested by plaintiff, that “it was the duty of defendant to furnish plaintiff with reasonably safe appliances and equipment with which to work.” This is not the law and the majority opinion implicitly concedes that the instruction was in error in omitting the words “to ‘use reasonable care’ ” before the words “to furnish”. No one contends that the instruction was correct with these words omitted. It is doubly important that this instruction should have been correct as a matter of law, because it concludes with a direction to “find the defendant guilty.” It was not a mere cautionary instruction.
Not only does this instruction not require plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the defendant in the furnishing of reasonably safe appliances and equipment, but in the second sentence it aggravates the effect of the omission by stating that, if the jury should find from the evidence and under instructions of the court “that plaintiff’s fellow employees were negligent in the moving or handling of said salamander * * *, then you should find the defendant guilty” (emphasis supplied). In other words the instruction indicated the necessity of proving negligence in the latter situation but erroneously omitted such requirement in the furnishing of appliances and equipment.
To overcome the error committed by the giving of this instruction, the majority opinion calls attention to instruction J which reads
“You are instructed that not every occurrence which results in injuries to an employee of a railroad company renders it liable. If the occurrence is not caused in whole or in part by any negligence on the part of the agents or employees of the railroad, or negligence in furnishing appliances and equipment, then no liability is incurred, even though the employee is injured while at work and on the premises of the railroad company.”
It is true that J refers to negligence on the part of agents or employees of the railroad, which was, roughly speaking, referred to in instruction 9 by the words “plaintiff’s fellow employees”. It is also true that J referred to “negligence in furnishing appliance and equipment”, but at no place in the instructions was the pronouncement in 9 that it was “the duty of the defendant to furnish plaintiff with reasonably safe appliances and equipment” limited to the exercise of due care in the performance of that duty. Hence it could be only a matter of conjecture as to what the oblique reference to “negligence in furnishing appliances and equipment” in J meant. In stating the very simple principles of law which applied to this case, the trial court submitted twenty-seven instructions, and the two instructions above referred to appear in widely separated parts of the series. The most that can be said of the alleged curative instruction 9 is that it confused the jury. It did not direct a verdict of not guilty to offset instruction J which directed a guilty verdict. A jury which is confused as to the law by conflicting instructions is not equipped to give a fair trial to either party.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
On Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing.
I adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion. However, a majori*254ty of the court has voted to deny the petition for rehearing. From my examination of that petition, I conclude that the following rule, stated in 5 C.J.S. Appeal ■& Error § 1411, p. 540, is applicable thereto:
“If no omissions or new authorities or points of law or fact are shown, the appellate court will seldom permit a rehearing simply for the purpose of obtaining a reargument on, and a reconsideration of, points, authorities, and matters which have already been fully considered by the court, on the assertion of counsel that, notwithstanding the court fully considered everything wished to be urged on the rehearing, it reached the wrong conclusion. * * * ”
For that reason I believe that no good would be served in granting a rehearing .and I vote against it.

. Nash v. United States, 2 Cir., 54 F.2d 1006,1007.