Court Opinion

ID: 9580672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:07:25.589195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:26.260878
License: Public Domain

BRYSON, J.,
specially concurring.
The majority opinion approves the use of the "per diem” argument when addressing the jury on the issue of damages for future pain and suffering. This case is not an aggravated use of the "mathematical computation method.” Here, plaintiffs counsel referred to plaintiffs life expectancy and suggested to the jury a yearly mathematical computation for arriving at pain and suffering, "I think if you average upward $3,000 a year * * *” (for pain and suffering).
The decisions from other courts are in disagreement as to the propriety of the use of mathematical formulas in estimating, for the jury, the amount to be awarded for pain and suffering. Annot. 60 ALR2d 1347. One of the leading cases is Botta v. Brunner, 26 NJ 82, 138 A2d 713, 60 ALR2d 1331 (1958).1 The New *32Jersey court, after confronting the problem on several occasions, stated:
"After granting certification to study the entire matter, we requested supplemental briefs in order to deal more fully with a problem which is currently vexing the trial courts, i.e., the right of plaintiff’s counsel in personal injury damage suits to suggest monetary mathematical formulas to a jury for the computation of compensation for pain and suffering.” 26 NJ at 87.
The court then concluded that the procedure should not be allowed and held that to do so was reversible error.
There is no similarity between damages for loss of future earning capacity and those for pain and suffering. See Rich v. Tite-Knot Pine Mill, 245 Or 185, 421 P2d 370 (1966). In the former there is evidence of the plaintiff’s earning capacity, which is subject to mathematical computations. In the latter it is universally held that compensation for pain and suffering is not subject to mathematical computation and is not capable of being exactly and accurately determined in dollar amounts.
"* * * There is and there can be no fixed basis, table, standard, or mathematical rule which will serve as an accurate index and guide to the establishment of damage awards for personal injuries. And it is equally plain that there is no measure by which the amount of pain and suffering endured by a particular human can be calculated. No market place exists at which such malaise is bought and sold. * * *” Botta v. Brunner, supra at 92-93.
In Oregon, the measure of damages for pain and suffering as a result of a personal injury has always been "fair and reasonable compensation.” See Uniform Jury Instruction No. 30.02(1). To allow "per diem” argument for pain and suffering is to encourage speculation and confusion in trial procedure.2 In order *33to avoid future confusion, the practice, herein complained of, should not be encouraged to the point of allowing the use of prepared charts, blackboard displays or similar techniques—none of which are received in evidence.
Because this is the first time this court has confronted the problem and because the infraction in this case is one of minor departure, this case should not be reversed on this ground. The rule here proposed should be prospective in application.

In Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 NJ 22, 227 A2d 689, 704 (1967), the court repeated the observation that pain and suffering has "no dimensions, mathematical or financial * * Mileski v. Long Island Railroad Company, 499 F2d 1169, 1173 n 3 (2d Cir 1974), cites Botta v. Brunner, 26 NJ 82, 138 A2d 713, 60 ALR2d 1331 (1958), for the proposition that counsel may not use the "per diem” argument.

Counsel’s Per Diem Argument to Jury, 1962 Ill L Forum 269; King v. Railway Express Agency, 107 NW2d 509 (ND 1961); Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill 2d 390, 182 NE2d 206 (1962); Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. R, 244 Minn 1, 68 NW2d 873 (1955); Stassun v. Chapin, 324 Pa 125, 188 A 111 (1936); Henne v. Balick, 51 Del 369, 146 A2d 394 (1958).