Court Opinion

ID: 9517609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:23:42.324718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:35:46.295892
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Whether the warranty deed from Cass Co. to FNBL was intended as a conveyance of title in satisfaction of debt or merely as a security device is a question of fact. See Moore v. Linville (1976) 1st Dist., 170 Ind. App. 429, 852 N.E.2d 846; Silverstein v. Central Furniture Co. (1959) 181 Ind. App. 170, 162 N.E.2d 690. Although the facts recited by the majority might warrant a conclusion as reached both by the trial court and by my colleagues, a reasonable trier of fact might conclude to the contrary. For this reason, I believe it was improper for the trial court to render partial summary judgment in favor of FNBL upon the issue.1 I necessarily conclude, also, that the trial court's denial of Brenneman's motion for partial summary judgment upon the issue was proper.
I do not agree with the position of the mechanics, however, that the issue presented by Brenneman's motion was not the same determined by the partial summary judgment. When the court determined *245that the deed was a security device it determined that it did not convey fee simple title. The issue determined was clearly the issue presented by the motion for partial summary judgment and were it not for being a question of fact, I would hold it a proper subject for summary judgment in favor of the non-moving party as contemplated by Trial Rule 56(B).
I deem it appropriate to mention one additional area of disagreement with the majority opinion. It affirms the trial court's determination that notwithstanding failure of Ameo to foreclose its lien within the one year prescribed by I.C. 32-8-3-6 (Burns Code Ed. 1980), Trial Rule 13(J) preserves it. The Rule purports to protect only counterclaims which would otherwise be barred. Trial Rule 18(J) has no relevance to Amco's claim. Ameo's lien does not diminish or defeat the claim of FNBL. As FNBL argues, the issue is one of priority of claims-a matter not covered or contemplated by the rule.2 The fact that there may not be sufficient assets to satisfy all claims is not equivalent to a diminution or defeat of a claim. Whether or not Ameo's lien is given parity or priority, FNBL's claim remains undiminished and valid even though it may not be fully satisfied.
Even were I to construe Trial Rule 18(J) in the context of I.C. 32-8-8-6, I would feel compelled to indulge the rubric of construction which states that the specific provision controls over the general. The statute deals very specifically with enforcement of liens such as that of Ameo. The rule deals very generally with a sweep of counterclaims unlimited as to subject matter.
For the reasons set forth, I would reverse the partial summary judgment giving Ameo's lien parity with that of FNBL.
I would remand with directions to conduct further proceedings consistent with this dissent, including, but not restricted to, a trial upon the merits of the basic issue.

. Even if a trier of fact were to conclude that when the deed was executed on August 11, 1982, it was intended as a security device, it could nevertheless conclude that when the deed was received out of escrow, accepted by FNBL and recorded, it was the equivalent of a self-help foreclosure of the security or a satisfaction or partial satisfaction of the underlying debt.

. FNBL admits that Amco has a lien against Logan Square but argues that the lien is inferior to all FNBL's mortgage liens. Appellee's Brief at 62.