Court Opinion

ID: 9819499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:26:34.842654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:06.558736
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the Board has no attorney-client relationship with the Attorney General in this case that justifies its refusal to turn over its requests for Attorney General’s opinions. Although the Board has voluntarily turned over the requests in this case that resulted in opinions, it takes the position that it is not required to do so. The question presented is accordingly a broad one: whether a public body which requests an opinion from the Attorney General may ever be forced to disclose that request under the FOIA. Perhaps there is some reason why the Attorney General should be able to decline requests for opinions. In this case, however, it is not the Attorney General, but the public body, which refuses the request. The reason for refusal has nothing to do with the process of issuing Attorney General opinions. Instead, the refusal is based on the standard attorney-client privilege enjoyed by every citizen. It seems a real stretch to say that the same attorney-client relationship that exists between a lawyer and his client in traffic court also exists when a public body asks the Attorney General for an opinion. I have no doubt that public bodies may in some cases assert that the Attorney General is their lawyer and that an attorney-client privilege exists. After the Attorney General entered his appearance for the Board in this case, for example, I am confident that his discussions with the Board about the pending case were covered by the privilege. Where there is no pending case, however, and only a request for an opinion, the situation seems much different. The body making a request for an opinion may have no adversarial position and may seek only an understanding of an issue of law. There is a difference between the published opinions of the Attorney General and the private advice he gives litigants whom he is representing in a court proceeding. The FOIA imposes a broad requirement that the public body involved here, the Board, make available its public records. The FOIA does not require a showing of cause for such records, but there does seem to be a reason for the disclosure of requests such as those in this case. Attorney General opinions can be read with more understanding if the requests to which those opinions respond are examined. Given the breadth of the language of the FOIA requiring disclosure, we should be hesitant to read the attorney-client privilege so as to swallow up the duty to disclose. Is the Attorney General just representing his client when he issues an opinion? The Board (or perhaps the Attorney General) attempts to have it both ways. It argues that Attorney General opinions are not binding on the courts, and seems to dispute the proposition that Attorney General opinions are given great weight by the courts. The Board/Attorney General then argues: “This is not to say that the Attorney General’s opinion should be anything less than a full and objective assessment of the law. The Attorney General in issuing formal opinions endeavors to correctly determine the law and does not just provide opinions to agency officials that are convenient, popular, or agreeable.” The Attorney General does occupy a unique role when he publishes his opinions. He is not just another lawyer advising his client. We should not stretch the attorney-client privilege to the breaking point in order to justify a refusal to apply the FOIA in this case.