Court Opinion

ID: 9728336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:05:30.257684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:47.831972
License: Public Domain

LeGRAND, Justice
(dissenting).
This case is the latest chapter in the continuing saga concerning the constitutionality of section 321.494, The Code, commonly known as the guest statute.
It would serve no purpose to repeat the constitutional arguments which have been made, pro and con, almost since the statute was first enacted. Until now the law has withstood constitutional assault, although not easily. One must admire the tenacity of those who have finally convinced the majority that the court, rather than the legislature, is the proper forum to decide this public policy question.
I merely adopt what was said in the majority and concurring opinions in Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1974). However, I cannot forego one last comment. In Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, we today hold constitutional a statute which makes an almost identical classification as the one we find fatally bad in the present case. In Rudolph we permit discrimination against only one class of tort victims — the malpractice patient — and in favor of only one class of defendants — the negligent doctor, nurse, or hospital. The justification for this is that it will reduce insurance premiums for these health-care practitioners and permit them to acquire malpractice insurance coverage more easily, thereby indirectly benefiting all of society.
*586It is difficult for me to distinguish this statute from the guest statute. If, indeed, we are to base our constitutional conclusions upon the presence or absence of insurance coverage — in itself something which is quite indefensible — then the legislative desire to protect the health-care practitioner directly and society indirectly from high insurance premiums in the one case is the same as the legislative desire to protect the host motorist directly and the motoring public indirectly from high insurance premiums in the other. Each involves a proper legislative determination, and each is entitled to the same judicial deference.
I find it impossible to reconcile these two decisions reached, ironically enough, on the same day. I voted to uphold the statute in Rudolph. For the same general reasons, I would uphold the guest statute. I therefore dissent.
UHLENHOPP and HARRIS, JJ., join this dissent.