Court Opinion

ID: 9592179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:11:17.012625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:18.100740
License: Public Domain

Gehl, J.
(dissenting). I consider that sec. 100.30, Stats., is unconstitutional. Statutes similar in context and effect were adopted by a considerable number of states during the 1930s, when the country was much concerned over the fact that prices were generally and constantly declining. It is too late to argue that economic conditions and the threat of their effect upon the public did or did not warrant the adop*389tion of these statutes and justify or require the courts to determine that the legislative bodies in the exercise of their police power properly enacted them. Despite all that is said in the judicial pronouncements to the effect that the purpose of such legislation was to prevent the development and growth of monopoly, the fact is, and it is generally known, that its real purpose was to halt the then continuing drop in prices. It was thought by the legislatures that an economic emergency existed and, recognizing that fact, the courts quite generally sanctioned their enactments as a proper exercise of the police power as emergency measures.
These statutes were approved by the courts as emergency measures, acts whose prime purpose was to effect a healthier economic condition and thereby relieve the public from a then existing exigency. In fact, it is so stated in the California and Montana statutes which declare the act “to be an urgency measure for the immediate preservation of the public peace, etc.”
The threat of serious consequences arising from a decline in prices has long since disappeared. It requires no citation of authorities or the opinions of economic experts to demonstrate that fact. The emergency which called for the legislation and induced the courts to sustain it has dis-' appeared. There has appeared in its stead an enormous rise . in the cost of all commodities, recognized by all those concerned with the economic affairs as a threat just as serious to the welfare of our people as was that of the 1930s.
If, as so often has been said, the constitution is a living thing and that it must be construed in the light of change, it does not follow that once construed to meet the changed conditions we must continue to accept such construction when a later change appears. If the constitution is an elastic instrument, after it has been once stretched it must be permitted to restore or adjust itself to a new condition.
In discussing the police power of the state it is often said that what was at one time regarded as an improper exercise *390of the police power may now, because of changed living conditions, be recognized as a legitimate exercise of that power. If that be true it is also true that what might at one time have been regarded as a proper exercise of the police power must now, because of living and economic conditions changed again, be recognized as an improper exercise of that power. To be consistent the application of the police power and the extent to which it is to be exercised must be measured by present-day conditions.
If it is true as we said in Hanauer v. Republic Building Co. 216 Wis. 49, 255 N. W. 136, 256 N. W. 784, that a law enacted as an emergency measure should not be interpreted as surviving the emergency, and the law is sustained as an emergency measure, certainly we should not prolong its life to extend beyond the period of the emergency. If we may sustain a law because of changed conditions, must we refuse to recognize a subsequent change ? If declining prices in the 1930s were properly held to warrant the sanction of laws designed primarily to protect those who suffered most as a result of the trend, those engaged in commerce who were threatened with bankruptcy and ruin, then should we not recognize that the present rise in prices seriously affects all persons, the consumers, and declare that the public welfare no longer requires legislation to maintain prices ?
“The constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon airy substantial group of the people.” Nebbia v. Nezv York (1934), 291 U. S. 502, 538, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Hughes concurs in this dissent.