Court Opinion

ID: 9642753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:08:16.969285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:52.055810
License: Public Domain

SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice,
dissenting.
It is uncontroverted that the trial court’s charge on disorderly conduct omitted the public place element. But it is also incontrovertible that if McKnight committed the offense of disorderly conduct, he did so in a public place. The error in the disorderly conduct charge was thus not remotely harmful. Nor was this error the subject of an objection. Accordingly, the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s order granting McKnight’s motion for a new trial rests solely upon its conclusion that “the record is not required to establish reversible error under either the ‘some harm’ or ‘egregibus harm’ standard set forth in Al-manza in order for the trial court to exercise its discretion in granting a new trial.”
*603I recognize that a trial court may grant a new trial in the interest of justice. State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). But it did not even purport to do so here. Rather, the trial judge granted a new trial in this case “[d]ue to error in the portion of [the] jury charge related to Class C lesser included offense of Disorderly Conduct.” Since that error was unobjected-to and unquestionably harmless, I fail to see how a new trial serves the interest of justice. Nor can I see how it was anything other than an abuse of discretion, ie., “arbitrary or unreasonable” and “without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” I would therefore reverse the trial court’s order. Because the majority instead affirms, I must respectfully dissent.