Court Opinion

ID: 9905346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 07:08:23.842993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:01.633444
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 21, 2023

                                      In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00780-CV

                 ROBERT LANSING WAKEFIELD, Appellant
                                 V.
                 RUBIO DIGITAL FORENSICS, LLC, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court
                              Collin County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 219-02783-2020

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith
                            Opinion by Justice Molberg
      Appellant Wakefield was a party to a family law dispute and engaged Tadlock

to be his attorney. Tadlock then engaged Appellee Rubio Digital Forensics, LLC

(Rubio), a computer forensics expert, via a written contract to provide expert

services to benefit Wakefield. After a bench trial between Rubio and Wakefield

concerning an unpaid balance under the contract, the trial court entered judgment in

Rubio’s favor.

      In four issues, Wakefield challenges the trial court’s judgment based on: (1)

the sufficiency of the evidence to prove there was a contract between Wakefield and

Rubio; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to prove Tadlock acted as an agent for
Wakefield; (3) the availability of relief under quantum meruit where there was an

express contract; and (4) the non-segregation of Rubio’s attorney’s fees. We affirm.

                            I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
      Tadlock believed Wakefield needed an expert to strengthen his family law

case, had previously retained Rubio on another case, and engaged Rubio on

Wakefield’s behalf. The contract stated it was between Rubio and “Law Office of

Gerald Tadlock, a(n) attorney for R.L. Wakefield (‘Client’).” The contract was

executed by Tadlock and Graciela Rubio, the owner of Rubio.

      Wakefield then delivered an Apple watch, previously belonging to his ex-

wife, to Rubio for the purpose of extracting from it certain information and data

relevant to issues in Wakefield’s family law case. Graciela Rubio testified that

during this meeting, Wakefield instructed her “just to do whatever his attorney said”

and she performed the work requested. No estimate for this work was ever requested

or provided, but the contract did state Rubio’s hourly rate.

      Wakefield testified that Tadlock told him the watch was important to his case,

that if he gave the watch to Rubio the court would admit it, “that it was a lot of

money but it will get in,” and that Wakefield agreed with Tadlock’s counsel.

Wakefield also testified that he learned Rubio’s bill was approaching $10,000 as he

was arriving to court for his hearing in the underlying litigation. Wakefield

nonetheless proceeded with the hearing, Tadlock called Rubio to testify in

Wakefield’s case as planned, and Wakefield prevailed.

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                             II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
      After Rubio prevailed at the bench trial at issue here, Wakefield did not

request findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the absence of any findings of

fact and conclusions of law, it is Wakefield’s burden as the appellant to show the

trial court’s judgment was not supported by any legal theory raised by the evidence.

Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. 1987). “When the

trial court does not make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a bench trial, the

judgment implies all necessary fact findings to support it.” N.Y. Underwriters Ins.

Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d 194, 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1993, no writ). We uphold the judgment on any applicable theory that finds support

in the record. Id. Because Wakefield did not have the burden of proof at trial, his

burden on appeal was to demonstrate “that no evidence exists to support the adverse

finding[s].” BBQ Blues Tex., Ltd. v. Affiliated Bus. Brokers, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 543,

545 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied). “If more than a scintilla of evidence

exists to support the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge fails.” Brockie v. Webb,

244 S.W.3d 905, 909–10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).

                                   III. ANALYSIS
      We first dispose of Wakefield’s second issue and his arguments that Rubio

failed to introduce any evidence of agency between Wakefield and Tadlock.

Tadlock testified he was Wakefield’s lawyer in the litigation for which Rubio was

engaged, and Wakefield never disputed that fact in his testimony. This is more than

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a scintilla of evidence that Tadlock was Wakefield’s agent regarding the contract

with Rubio. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Benton, 357 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. 1962) (“The

attorney-client relationship is one of principal and agent.”); see also Boozer v.

Fischer, 674 S.W.3d 314, 326 (Tex. 2023) (“Ordinarily . . . an attorney owes

fiduciary duties to—and serves as an agent for—his own client, not an adverse

party.”) (emphasis in original). We overrule Wakefield’s second issue.

      Wakefield expresses his first issue as: “The trial court erred in entering

judgment for damages and attorney’s fees against Mr. Wakefield because there was

no evidence or insufficient evidence of a contract between Wakefield and Rubio.”

We are bound, however, to uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is correct on any theory

applicable to the case. See Gulf Land Co. v. Atl. Ref. Co., 131 S.W.2d 73, 84 (Tex.

1939). Here, a controlling theory at issue is ratification, not the existence of a

contract between Wakefield and Rubio.

      Under principles of agency, Wakefield is responsible for the acts of Tadlock

if Wakefield ratified Tadlock’s acts. See Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Trinity Structural

Towers, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (“A principal

is liable for the acts of another acting as its agent only when the agent has actual or

apparent authority to do those acts or when the principal ratifies those acts.”);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26(3) (“A lawyer’s act

is considered to be that of a client in proceedings before a tribunal or in dealings

with third persons when: . . . (3) the client ratifies the act.”). “Ratification may

                                          –4–
occur when a principal, though he had no knowledge originally of the unauthorized

act of his agent, retains the benefits of the transaction after acquiring full

knowledge.” Land Title Co. of Dall. v. F. M. Stigler, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 754, 756

(Tex. 1980).

      The elements of ratification are (1) approval by act, word, or conduct, (2) with

full knowledge of the facts of the earlier act, and (3) with the intent to validate the

earlier act. Neese v. Lyon, 479 S.W.3d 368, 384 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).

A party ratifies an agreement when—after learning all of the material facts—he

confirms or adopts an earlier act that did not then legally bind him and that he could

have repudiated. Id.

      The record reveals that after learning the cost of Rubio’s services, Wakefield

accepted Rubio’s testimony according to the contract. See Land Title Co. of Dall.,

609 S.W.2d at 756 (“The critical factor in determining whether a principal has

ratified an unauthorized act by his agent is the principal's knowledge of the

transaction and his actions in light of such knowledge.”). This is more than a scintilla

of evidence supporting the trial court’s implied finding that Wakefield knowingly

approved of Tadlock’s conduct, intended to validate Tadlock’s conduct, and

accepted the benefits of Rubio’s testimony after (1) learning Tadlock engaged Rubio

to perform expert services with respect to his case, (2) understanding how important

the admissibility of evidence from the watch was, (3) personally delivering the watch

to Rubio, (4) instructing Rubio to do as his attorney instructed, and (5) learning upon

                                          –5–
his arrival at the courthouse for his hearing that Rubio’s bill was approaching

$10,000. This continued acquisition and retention of benefits supports the trial

court’s implied findings that Wakefield approved, validated, and ratified Tadlock’s

unauthorized contract by (1) retaining its benefits; (2) continuing to actively seek

those benefits after learning all material facts; and (3) acting in a manner that is

inconsistent with his intention to avoid the burdens of Tadlock’s contract with

Rubio. See Neese, 479 S.W.3d at 384; Land Title Co. of Dall., 609 S.W.2d at 756;

see also 3 Tex. Jur. 3d Agency § 134 (“[A] party claiming that a principal ratified an

unauthorized act of its agent is required to demonstrate that the principal performed

an intentional act that was inconsistent with any intention to avoid the unauthorized

act of the agent.”). We overrule Wakefield’s first issue.

      In his third issue, Wakefield challenges the trial court’s judgment to the extent

it is based upon the absence of an express contract and is rooted in quantum meruit.

Because there was an express contract between Rubio and Tadlock and we have

overruled Wakefield’s challenge to the judgment on breach of that contract, we need

not address quantum meruit. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

      In his fourth issue, Wakefield challenges the trial court’s judgment on the

basis that Rubio did not segregate its attorney’s fees. Wakefield argues that when a

plaintiff sues multiple defendants and some of those defendants settle, that plaintiff

must segregate attorney’s fees. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d

1, 10–11 (Tex. 1991). Stewart Title, however, “does not extend as far as [Wakefield]

                                         –6–
would have it—i.e., that, in all cases with multiple defendants, fees must be

segregated.” See In re Estate of Bean, 206 S.W.3d 749, 765 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2006, pet. denied) (emphasis in original). Wakefield fails to identify any manner in

which his interests diverge from Tadlock’s such that the judgment for fees rendered

against one would be unattributable against the other. See id.

      Instead, Rubio sued Tadlock and Wakefield for breach of contract and

quantum meruit, and the underlying contract involved the same parties, the same

signatories, the same facts, and the same issues. Rubio and Tadlock settled their

differences on the eve of trial. Under the circumstances, we conclude the claims at

issue arose out of the same transaction involving the same contract and that the

prosecution of Rubio’s claims against Wakefield and Tadlock involved essentially

the same facts such that segregation was not required. See Stewart Title Guar. Co.,

822 S.W.2d at 10–11; In re Estate of Bean, 206 S.W.3d at 765; Flint & Assocs. v.

Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 624–25 (Tex. App.—Dallas

1987, writ denied); LSC Towers, LLC v. LG Preston Campbell, LLC, No. 05-20-

00433-CV, 2022 WL 3754541, at *21 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2022) (mem.

op.), judgment set aside, opinion not vacated, 2022 WL 4298724 (Sept. 19, 2022,

no pet.) (supp. mem. op.). We overrule Wakefield’s fourth issue.

                                        –7–
                               IV. CONCLUSION
      Having overruled all four of Wakefield’s challenges on appeal, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                                         /Ken Molberg/
220780f.p05                              KEN MOLBERG
                                         JUSTICE

                                      –8–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

ROBERT LANSING WAKEFIELD,                      On Appeal from the 219th Judicial
Appellant                                      District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. 219-02783-
No. 05-22-00780-CV           V.                2020.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice
RUBIO DIGITAL FORENSICS,                       Molberg. Justices Carlyle and Smith
LLC, Appellee                                  participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee RUBIO DIGITAL FORENSICS, LLC
recover its costs of this appeal from appellant ROBERT LANSING WAKEFIELD.

Judgment entered this 21st day of November, 2023.

                                         –9–