Court Opinion

ID: 9652410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:23:28.893247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:51.139734
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
Like my colleagues in the majority, I am very troubled by the prosecutor’s introduction for the first time on rebuttal of the theory that Coreas was lying in wait for Perez and that the killing was the final act of a premeditated ambush. Nevertheless, because the manslaughter verdict is inconsistent with the notion that the jurors believed this improperly suggested scenario, and because in my view the remaining prosecutorial improprieties of which Coreas complains, if they constitute misconduct at all, fall short of what is required to establish plain error, I must respectfully dissent.
I
Contrary to the government’s argument, the prosecutor’s “lying in wait” theory was first presented in her rebuttal. It went far beyond anything that the prosecutor said in her initial closing. Whether or not the various inferences which the prosecutor drew from the medical testimony were reasonable, it was simply unfair to inject an ambush scenario into the case at a time when the defense would have no opportunity to respond. At the very least, the prosecutor should have requested leave of court in advance, rather than making such an argument in the presence of the jury.
Although Coreas was charged with second degree murder while armed, however, he was convicted only of manslaughter while armed. Malice is an element of second degree murder, District of Columbia Criminal Jury Instruction No. 4.23 (3d ed. 1978), but not of voluntary manslaughter, id. No. 4.25. If the jurors had believed that Coreas was lying in wait for Perez in order to kill him, then they would surely have found that he acted with malice. Accordingly, unless we assume that the jurors disregarded their sworn duty to follow the court’s instructions, and improperly reached a compromise verdict based on sympathy rather than a fair one based on the evidence, I do not see how Coreas could have been prejudiced by an argument which was demonstrably incompatible with the verdict of the jury.1
II
I am unable to agree with the majority that the remaining words and deeds of the prosecutor, individually or cumulatively, or when considered in conjunction with the “lying in wait” argument, justify reversal for plain error. As my colleagues acknowledge, Coreas must show, in the absence of timely objection, that any prosecutorial misconduct so clearly prejudiced his substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of his trial. Sherrod v. United States, 478 A.2d 644, 655 (D.C.1984). The Supreme Court has cautioned that reversal for plain error in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct should be confined to “particularly egregious” situations. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Where, as here, no objection was made, the question is whether the trial judge committed error by failing to intervene sua sponte. United States v. Jen*607kins, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 392, 397, 436 F.2d 140, 145 (1970).
In determining whether the prosecutor’s remarks constituted misconduct, we must bear in mind that closing arguments are seldom carefully constructed in toto in advance,2 that improvisation often brings about imperfect syntax and planning, and that courts should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends a remark to have the most damaging conceivable meaning or that the jury will so understand it. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1872-73, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); see also Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 79 (D.C.1989). Moreover, a criminal trial should not be converted into a “quest for error,” nor may convictions be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments, standing alone. Young, supra, 470 U.S. at 11, 16, 105 S.Ct. at 1044, 1046 (citations omitted). Context is all-important, id. at 11, and the assessment of events by the trial judge, as the person on the scene, must be given due weight. Sherrod, supra, 478 A.2d at 658 n. 17.
With these principles in mind, I briefly address the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, other than “lying in wait,” of which Coreas complains.

A. Commenting on Coreas’ veracity.

During the course of her argument, the prosecutor stated that a part of Coreas’ statement to the police was self-serving and untrue. In concluding that this constituted misconduct, my colleagues presumably believe that she was venturing a personal opinion of the defendant’s veracity, rather than suggesting inferences from the evidence. In my opinion, however, the context in which the prosecutor made these remarks demonstrates the contrary.
After explaining that Coreas was not disputing important parts of the government’s case, the prosecutor said:
Now I told you that parts of [his] statement would not be corroborated because parts are self-serving and not true. The medical reports, the autopsy reports, tell us that. You have heard the testimony of the doctor. You will have the opportunity to review the entire autopsy report yourself, to look at every detail.
Characterization of defense testimony as incredible is permissible “when it is a logical inference from the evidence, and not merely the prosecutor’s personal opinion as to appellant’s veracity.” Hammill v. United States, 498 A.2d 551, 557 (D.C.1983). A comment is within the acceptable range as long as it is in the nature of argument, and not an outright expression of opinion. Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C.1985). Since the prosecutor was comparing the defendant’s testimony with other evidence in the record, I do not think that her comment was improper. See generally Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 35 (D.C.1989).

B. The charge of “setting up" defense witnesses.

The prosecutor’s comments about defense witnesses Gomez and Ayala, while more troubling, do not strike me as being (or even measurably contributing to) the stuff of which reversals for plain error are made. The prosecutor commented that
Mr. Gomez is a friend. Mr. Gomez is a set-up. He is here to convince you of something that there is no other evidence of.
There can be no quarrel with the first and third sentences of this commentary; they were based on the evidence or lack thereof. In using the word “set-up”, however, the prosecutor missed a golden opportunity to remain silent. The entire second sentence would have better been left unsaid. The prosecutor could have made her entire legitimate point — the lack of corroboration— without resorting to pejorative terminology-
The prosecutor also said of Officer Ayala that he was “no hero,” that he “got taken,” that he was “set-up” and that he received *608his information from Coreas. In context, these remarks were in response to defense counsel’s description of the Officer as “a hero” as well as a “good police officer and a nice man.” I see nothing wrong with defense counsel’s drawing that inference from the circumstances, or with the prosecutor’s drawing a different one.3 Adversaries may properly argue opposing inferences from the same evidence. Once again, however, the word “set-up” inappropriately introduced a characterization that went well beyond the facts.
The use, twice, of the ill-advised word “set-up”, however, appears to me to be a weak reed on which to base, in whole or in substantial part, the reversal of a conviction following a long and hard-fought homicide trial. It did not undermine the integrity or fairness of the trial. If counsel had objected even at the conclusion of argument, the judge could have taken corrective action. In McGowan v. United States, 458 A.2d 1191, 1196-99 (D.C.1983), reversal for plain error was found inappropriate where the prosecutor’s improper statements were far more serious. I would apply McCowan here.

C. Drawing an adverse inference from the exercise of a constitutional right.

The prosecutor argued that Coreas changed his story after having heard the prosecution’s medical testimony. She said:
The defendant, he heard that testimony too, Polo Perez, after that last shot, wasn’t going anywhere. So now we [meaning Coreas] say, “He got up and struggled and then I shot him.”
This, according to the majority, was an attempt to persuade the jury to draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s exercise of his right to confront witnesses.
In Jenkins v. United States, 374 A.2d 581 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 894, 98 S.Ct. 274, 54 L.Ed.2d 182 (1977), one of the cases on which my colleagues rely,4 the prosecutor said:
Defendant was the one and only witness who sat for all the testimony during trial ... He had an advantage over everybody. He already knew what the evidence was, and he knew exactly what he had to explain away and did everything he could to explain it.
Id. at 584. The court questioned the propriety of these remarks and directed trial courts not to countenance such conduct in the future. Id. Nevertheless, the court affirmed Jenkins’ conviction, noting among other things that the trial judge’s view was “entitled to some reliance because only he had the opportunity to appraise the effect of the remarks in their setting.”
In Fornah v. United States, 460 A.2d 556 (D.C.1983), on which my colleagues also rely, the prosecutor had suggested that Fornah’s presence during the prosecution testimony enabled him to tailor his own testimony to present the most plausible defense available. There was no objection, but, on appeal, Fornah asserted plain error. This court disagreed. In the words of Judge Kern, writing for a unanimous court:
[w]e have held that it is impermissible to attempt to cause the jury to draw adverse inferences from appellant’s exercise of his constitutional right to confront *609witnesses against him. Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 131 (D.C.1980). Perhaps, from certain of the prosecutor’s closing remarks in this case, in isolation, that intent could be ascribed to her. The sorts of remarks we have held objectionable, however, have been far more explicit comments. See, e.g., Jenkins [supra ].
460 A.2d at 560-61. The court noted that the remarks in question were “buried in a lengthy closing,” id. at 561, and that the prosecutor’s comments were part of an attempt to supply an explanation of the pertinent events which was different from For-nah’s exculpatory account. Under these circumstances, and relying on the passage from Donnelly v. DeChristoforo discussed supra at p. 607, the court concluded that the prosecutor’s remarks “simply do not rise to the level of ‘plain error’ affecting substantial rights.” Id.
In my opinion, this case is much like Fomah. The prosecutor’s allusion to Co-reas’ exercise of his rights, if that is what the remark was, consisted of the words “he heard that testimony too.” As in Fornah, the remark was “buried” in a long argument. It was a far more restrained and isolated comment than the remarks in Jenkins which this court found to be improper.
Moreover, the prosecutor’s alleged impropriety occurred in the midst of a discussion of what she described as a major change in the defendant’s story. I think it permissible for counsel, in discussing the defendant’s veracity, to highlight any contrast between the defendant’s account before he has been apprised of the government’s evidence and his version thereafter. Here, the allusion to Coreas’ presence in court was incidental to the prosecutor’s main theme of exposing the alleged inconsistency between his two accounts. She simply explained the circumstances under which, in the government’s view, the defendant’s story had changed.
In my opinion, the prosecutor’s remarks, in this particular context, were not improper. They would not have been understood by a reasonable juror as an attempt to penalize or discredit Coreas for exercising his right to confront the witnesses against him. Even if her comments were inappropriate, I do not think they would provide any significant support for reversal of this conviction for plain error.

D. Patriotism gone awry.

My colleagues fault the prosecutor for urging the jury to “tell”5 Coreas that “in this country the jury decides guilt or innocence,” and that “here,” a victim or relative of a victim may not take the law into his own hands and seek retribution. They say that this comment “was clearly calculated to arouse the national bias and sympathy of the jury and was improper.”
Both Coreas and the decedent, Perez, came to this country from El Salvador. If, contrary to Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, supra, the prosecutor’s comment was to be construed as implicitly chauvinistic and prejudiced against foreigners or persons of Hispanic origin, any belittling of the defendant in this manner would apply equally to the decedent. I think it most unlikely that the prosecutor intended by her remarks to convey disrespect towards people from El Salvador. In a homicide case, it would surely be self-defeating to suggest to the jury that the victim was a person of little worth.
I think the prosecutor’s remark about this country is more readily explained, as are many things, by the context in which it was made. Counsel for Coreas described his client as “a husband and a father and a carpenter” who “came to the United States because of the freedoms that we have in the United States, because of the United States Constitution which guarantees these freedoms.” She also depicted him as a law-abiding man who went to the police when his brother was killed.
*610I do not suggest that what the defense attorney said was improper. I agree with the government, however, that the challenged part of the prosecutor’s rebuttal
was a fair response to defense counsel’s emotional appeal to the jury to find that appellant was merely a law-abiding lover of freedom, who now found himself defending against an unjust charge that he had murdered Apoliano Perez.
Ill
In sum, this appeal is based on one serious impropriety which, in my view, did not significantly prejudice Coreas, and several less serious alleged transgressions which, to the extent that they were improper at all, had relatively little potential for prejudice. This, to me, is insufficient to reverse Coreas’ conviction, especially for plain error.6
I repeat, however, that the presentation of the “lying in wait” theory to the jury, at a time when the defense would have no opportunity to respond, was most unfortunate. When the government seeks to take unfair advantage, our freedoms are less secure. In conclusion, I suggest that the following words by a distinguished Australian prosecutor merit consideration by his counterparts everywhere:
A prosecutor performs a function which calls for detachment approaching that of a judge.... [Tjhere is much to know, and much scope for skill and judgment. But in all his doings, his rule of conduct should be that as one of the Queen’s men[7] it behooves him—
[njeither to indict, nor on trial to speak for conviction except upon credible evidence of guilt; nor to do even a little wrong for the sake of expediency, or to pique any person or please any power; not to be either gullible or suspicious, intolerant or over-pliant: in the firm and abiding mind to do right to all manner of people, to seek justice with care, understanding and good countenance.
This is a high note to sound, and often hard to hear in the noise of battle. Fear, the lure of fame, or his own conceit, may lead a man away from this high ideal. But if he could always follow it, a dull fellow whose light was dim in the hurly-burly might prove of more worth than a brilliant brother touched with the vices of his profession.
F. Gaffy, The Role Of The Prosecution In The Autralian Legal System 20 (World Peace Through Law Center 1981).

. It is also worth noting that when defense counsel made her belated motion for a mistrial more than a day after the jury began its deliberations, she based it on a plethora of grounds but never mentioned the "lying in wait” theory. After all of the arguments had been completed, the trial judge twice complimented the attorneys on their performance. The trial judge is in a far better position than we are to assess the impact of alleged misconduct in the context of the trial as a whole. See Smith v. United States, 315 A.2d 163, 167 (D.C.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896, 95 S.Ct. 174, 42 L.Ed.2d 139 (1974).

. Rebuttal arguments, in particular, have to be improvised in the light of what defense counsel has said in his or her closing.

. I am, however, concerned by what seems to me to be a misleading rendition of the testimony in the government’s brief in this court. The government says that Officer Ayala "essentially acknowledged that he could not be certain that he had not been used by appellant as a set up with [his superiors].” The relevant questions and answers were as follows:
Q You don’t know that the defendant [was] using you as a set-up with your supervisors, do you?
A No, I don’t.
Q And you don’t know if he was trying to befriend you and use you later as, “Hey, I got a cop on my side and this will make me look good later."
A No, I don’t know that either.
Basically, Officer Ayala was saying that "I don’t know any such thing.” He was not acknowledging what the government says he was acknowledging.

. Two of the cases cited by the majority, Villacres v. United States, 357 A.2d 423, 426 n. 4 (D.C.1976), and Hyman v. United States, 342 A.2d 43, 45 (D.C.1975), deal with comments on the defendant’s demeanor and do not address the issue here under discussion at all.

. I agree that a prosecutor should not ask the jury to send anyone a message, but this particular message in the context discussed below, was, if anything, a "distasteful cliche-type argument” or a "boring irrelevancy.” (Duane) Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432, 438 (D.C.1982), quoting from Harris v. United States, 131 U.S. App.D.C. 105, 108, 402 F.2d 656, 659 (1968) (Burger, J.).

. I agree with the government both that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, and that the conviction should not be reversed because self-defense was omitted from the supplemental instruction which the judge gave in response to a note from the jury. Davis v. United States, 510 A.2d 1051, 1052-53 (D.C.1986) (per curiam ). I agree with the majority, however, that a more balanced response to such a request is preferable.

. It is unfortunate that in voicing these noble sentiments, the author apparently presumed that all prosecutors are men. Fortunately, this is completely untrue in the context of Washington, D.C. See also Winchester Van Buren Tenants Ass'n v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Comm., 550 A.2d 51, 55 n. 10 (D.C.1988), noting similar unenlightened phraseology on the part of Justice Cardozo.