Court Opinion

ID: 9363450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-16 00:11:08.304313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:31.952579
License: Public Domain

Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Rendered in Part, and Memorandum Opinion
filed January 12, 2023.

                                      In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                              NO. 14-21-00483-CV

                  UCHENNA HELEN OKAFOR, Appellant
                                         V.
                     CHRISTOPHER OKAFOR, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 246th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 2017-72154

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Uchenna Helen Okafor challenges the trial court’s Agreed Final
Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, arguing that it is void for lack of jurisdiction.
We affirm in part and reverse and render in part.

                                  BACKGROUND

      Appellee Christopher Okafor filed an original petition for divorce in October
2017, and Uchenna filed an original counter-petition for divorce in May 2018.
Christopher filed an inventory and appraisement in September 2018; Uchenna filed
an inventory and appraisement as well as a proposed property division a week
later.    Christopher then filed another inventory and appraisement and a first
amended inventory and appraisement.

         On September 26, 2018, the trial court held a prove-up hearing on the
divorce. The trial court stated: “This morning off the Record the parties with the
assistance of their counsel have been discussing an agreement with regards to the
division of property in this divorce case. And I believe that the parties have
reached an agreement and so I’m going to have the . . . [Christopher]’s counsel
prove up the divorce and put on the Record what that agreement is.” Christopher’s
counsel elicited testimony from Christopher that he and his wife “have an
agreement that all property that is in the United States is to be divided 50/50” and
that the agreement “is a just and right division of the marital estate.” Uchenna also
testified that she agreed with her husband that “as far as the division of the
community estate . . . everything that is in the United States” should be divided
“50/50.” After the parties completed their testimony, the trial court made the
following statements:

               THE COURT: Okay. And to further clarify the parties’
         agreement on the Record the Court is declining to divided [sic] any
         property in Nigeria or any properties out of the United States. The
         Court is putting a stipulation on the Record a finding on the Record
         that any assets that were purchased during this marriage is [sic]
         considered to be community property in the State of Texas and as
         such should be divided 50/50. However[,] these properties are not
         subject to the jurisdiction of this court and shall be divided and
         handled in Nigeria.
                Okay. All right. There is a house that was purchased in
         Richmond, Texas. The Court declines jurisdiction to divide that asset
         in this divorce as well as that property is not titled or deeded to either
         one of the parties or in this divorce case. Any claim to that property

                                             2
can be brought probably in a separate action but based on the
documents provided from the owner of that property and the funds
used to wire transfer and purchase that property and the deed on that
property this Court is declining to divide that asset as part of this
divorce.
       There are vehicles that are listed in the proposed property
division. If the parties cannot agree as to which vehicle goes to which
party. They look all about the same value. They look pretty
equivalent in value. The Court will order all of them sold and the
proceeds to be divided 50/50.
       With regards to the property located at 8802 Pecan Place Drive
that real estate will be ordered to be sold and proceeds will be divided
50/50. And I’m ordering that based on your agreement and your
stipulation to divide the assets 50-50. I can’t take a chain saw and cut
it in half. So I’m clarifying your agreement and adding some terms
that will be enforceable regarding your agreement. The 401K and
IRAs, and bank accounts. We are discussing all financial accounts,
bank accounts, et cetera, part of this agreement, okay.
      If there is any question regarding the drafting of this agreement
the Court will set this matter for entry 3 weeks from today. Does that
give you guys enough time?
      [CHRISTOPHER’S COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor.
        THE COURT: October 17, 2018 at 8:30 a.m. The Court does
find that your marriage has become insupportable. I am granting your
divorce. I’m granting judgment on your agreements that were read
into the Record and adopting them as this Court’s rendition. I find
that those agreements are a just and right division of the estate, and
I’ll see y’all October 17, 2018.
      Anything else? We are off the Record.
      (Discussion had off the Record.)
      THE COURT: Back on the Record.
There are 8 medallions that are possessed or owned as part of a taxi
cab business that the husband has managing or running. The husband
is going to produce the documentation regarding those medallions at
least five days before the entry of this order. Any documentation
showing that the medallions were acquired prior to the date of the

                                   3
      parties’ marriage those medallions stipulated by agreement to be his
      separate property.
            Any of the medallions that were acquired or purchased after the
      date of marriage have been stipulated to be community property and
      divided 50/50. Half to each party.
             Anything else? Let’s go off the Record.

Despite the court’s statement that agreements were read into the record, this did
not occur.

      The trial court signed a Final Decree of Divorce on December 13, 2018 (the
“Original Decree”). Among other things, the decree provides that (1) the parties
each get 50% of “all property located in Nigeria” including buildings, bank
accounts and investments; (2) the parties each get 50% of all cash and cash in bank
accounts in both parties’ name; (3) Christopher gets all sums of cash in his
possession or subject to his control; (4) the parties each get 50% of all IRA bank
accounts “in parties’ names” and of Uchenna’s 401k; (5) each party gets four of
the eight taxi medallions valued at $45,000 “together with all the vehicles
associated with the Medallions”; (6) the parties each get 50% of the sale proceeds
of their home located at 8802 Pecan Place Drive (the “Pecan Property”) to be sold
under terms and conditions specified in the decree; (7) Uchenna gets retirement
accounts, pensions, annuities, and annuity life insurance benefits in her name; and
(8) “[a]ll sums . . . and any other rights related to any profit-sharing plan,
retirement plan, Keogh plan, pension plan, employee stock option plan, 401(k)
plan, employee savings plan, accrued unpaid bonuses, disability plan, or other
benefits existing by reason of [Uchenna]’s past, present, or future employment.”

      Christopher filed a motion for new trial on January 11, 2019. Three days
later, he filed a Motion for New Trial and in the alternative Reform the Judgment
to Conform to the Rendition. The court signed a Reformed Final Decree of

                                         4
Divorce on December 23, 2019. In January 2020, Uchenna filed a Motion to set
aside the Reformed Final Decree of Divorce and Declare the Reformed Final
Decree of Divorce Void. Christopher filed a response to Uchenna’s motion and,
alternatively, a motion for a final decree of divorce nunc pro tunc. On March 10,
2020, the trial court signed an order granting Uchenna’s motion and declaring the
Reformed Final Decree of Divorce to be void.

      Christopher filed an Amended Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc in
November 2020. A few weeks later, Uchenna filed a response. The trial court
held a hearing on Christopher’s motion on January 27, 2021.           However, the
hearing was not held before the same judge who presided over the prove-up
hearing, rendered judgment, and signed the Original Decree. At the hearing,
Christopher argued that his proposed final decree of divorce nunc pro tunc
properly corrects clerical errors because the Original Decree incorrectly included in
its “50/50 division” community property in Nigeria and failed to include “all the
community properties in the United States” contrary to the trial court’s rendition.
He argued that “it was specifically stated by the Judge and rendered by the Judge
that no property outside — specifically Nigeria, should be provided because there
was no jurisdiction” and the court also “stated that all properties, community
properties in this country should be divided 50/50.”

      The trial court took a short recess and instructed the parties to review the
Original Decree and Christopher’s proposed nunc pro tunc decree “and figure out
what the points of contention are that you need the Court to make a determination
on, okay, keeping in mind the prevailing case law regarding judicial and clerical
errors.” The court asked the parties “to make a good-faith effort in discussing this
and reaching a resolution.” The parties could not reach a resolution. Uchenna
continued to “contest the entry of a nunc pro tunc other than the provision dealing

                                         5
with the Nigerian property.” The trial court attempted to go through the proposed
nunc pro tunc order line by line but then stated, “I’m going to stop this hearing
right now and you-all are going to have to come back.” The docket sheet states:
“Court finds the divorce decree contains clerical errors, not judicial errors, and
therefore, the motion judgment nunc pro tunc is granted.”

      On March 10, 2021, Christopher filed another proposed divorce decree nunc
pro tunc. Twenty days later, Uchenna filed a proposed nunc pro tunc decree. On
May 7, 2021, Christopher filed another proposed divorce decree nunc pro tunc.
That same day, the trial court held a hearing “on a contested entry” because the
trial court previously had “granted the request for a nunc pro tunc, but [the parties]
have a disagreement as to what should be done in the nunc pro tunc. So, [there
are] competing orders.” Each party argued in favor of the trial court signing their
respective proposed decree, especially focusing on whether the nunc pro tunc
decree should include a $45,000 value for the parties’ taxi medallions as provided
in the Original Decree when the trial court in its rendition did not specify a value.
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court stated:

      THE COURT: What I’m going to have you-all do because I don’t
      have all day. I have four cases waiting on me right now. Each side
      will review the proposed order of the other side. On the submission
      docket, submit to the Court your reasoning for objecting to whatever
      the language is in that order. I’m going to review both orders. I will
      if I have to make some corrections to one or just reject both of them
      and do it all myself, I will, but I need that submitted. I need — you’ll
      get a week. So, you’ll have a week to submit this information to the
      Court. If you have arguments that you want to submit as well[,] you
      can do that. I’ll give you ten days. So, that will give you some time
      to submit your argument against the other side as well.
On May 13, 2021, Uchenna filed a Response to Christopher Okafor’s Request to
Enter Final Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc filed 5-7-2021 and per the Court’s
Instruction, Opposition to Entry of Same and Request in Support of Respondent’s
                                           6
Proposed Final Decree of Divorce filed 3-30-2021. Three days later, Christopher
filed a Proposed Agreed Final Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc and a Motion to
Sign a Proposed Petitioner’s Order Granting Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment
Nunc Pro Tunc and Petitioner’s Agreed Final Decree Nunc Pro Tunc filed May 14,
2021.

        On July 26, 2021, the trial court signed an order granting Christopher’s
Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc. On August 15, 2021, the trial court signed
an Agreed Final Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc (the “Nunc Pro Tunc Decree”).
Among other things, the decree (1) does not contain any provision dividing the
parties’ property in Nigeria; (2) does not contain a value for the taxi medallions;
(3) does not contain the terms and conditions specified for the sale of the Pecan
Property; and (4) divides the parties’ property 50/50, including property that was
given only to one party in the Original Decree, i.e., as of the date of divorce the
parties each get 50% of (a) all sums of cash in Christopher’s possession or subject
to his control and all sums of cash in Uchenna’s possession or subject to her
control, (b) all IRA bank accounts “in parties’ names”, (c) retirement accounts,
pensions, annuities, annuity life insurance benefits in Uchenna’s or Christopher’s
name, (d) all cash and cash in bank accounts in both parties’ names, and (e) “[a]ll
sums . . . and any other rights related to any profit-sharing plan, retirement plan,
Keogh plan, pension plan, employee stock option plan, 401(k) plan, employee
savings plan, accrued unpaid bonuses, disability plan, or other benefits accrued
during the marriage and existing by reason of [Uchenna’s and Christoper’s]
employment.”

        Uchenna filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                      ANALYSIS

        Uchenna presents one issue on appeal contending that “the nunc pro tunc
                                          7
order signed August 15, 2021 is void for lack of jurisdiction” because it “makes
substantive changes to correct a judicial error and was entered after the court lost
plenary power.”

I.     Governing Law and Standard of Review

       We begin our analysis by setting out the governing law and standard of
review.

       Plenary Power

       A trial court has “plenary power to . . . vacate, modify, correct, or reform
[its] judgment within thirty days after the judgment is signed.” Tex. R. Civ. P.
329b(d); In re A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016,
no pet.). Once plenary power has expired, a trial court’s jurisdiction cannot be
vested by agreement or waiver. In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d 451, 454
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); see also In re Vaishangi, Inc.,
442 S.W.3d 256, 260-61 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

       After the trial court’s plenary power expires, it may not set aside its
judgment except by timely bill of review. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f); In re Marriage
of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 454; see also King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d
742, 751 (Tex. 2003). However, a nunc pro tunc judgment permits the trial court
to “at any time correct a clerical error in the record of a judgment.” Tex. R. Civ. P.
329b(f) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 316 (“Clerical mistakes in the record of any
judgment may be corrected by the judge in open court according to the truth or
justice of the case . . . .”)).

       Clerical Errors versus Judicial Errors

       A clerical error is a discrepancy between the entry of a judgment in the
record and the judgment that was actually rendered. See Escobar v. Escobar, 711

                                          8
S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Tex. 1986); In re A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d at 67. A clerical error
does not result from judicial reasoning or determination. Andrews v. Koch, 702
S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d
at 455. If the same trial judge who signed the original judgment also signed an
order granting the subsequent nunc pro tunc motion, we presume that the judge’s
recollection supports the finding of a clerical error. In re A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d at
67. Because the same judge did not sign the subsequent nunc pro tunc orders, the
presumption does not apply to our analysis.

      In a nunc pro tunc judgment, the trial court only can correct the entry of a
final written judgment that incorrectly states the judgment actually rendered.
Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231-32; In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 456.
Even if the court renders judgment incorrectly, it cannot via judgment nunc pro
tunc alter a written judgment that precisely reflects the incorrect rendition.
Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232; In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 456. That
is, a nunc pro tunc judgment may not be used to correct judicial errors. Escobar,
711 S.W.2d at 231. A judicial error occurs in the rendering, rather than the
entering, of a judgment and arises from a mistake of law or fact that requires
judicial reasoning to fix. Id.; In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 456.

      “Substantive changes to an order are judicial errors that cannot be remedied
through a nunc pro tunc judgment.” In re Marriage of Bowe & Perry, No. 14-16-
00551-CV, 2017 WL 6102779, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 7,
2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex.
1978) (a nunc pro tunc judgment that changed the party entitled to possession of
certain property “materially altered the substance” of the prior order and “[t]hat
change constituted the correction of a judicial error which cannot be validly
accomplished by a judgment nunc pro tunc”); Whitmire v. Lilly, No. 14-07-00993-

                                         9
CV, 2008 WL 4308557, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 28, 2008, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (nunc pro tunc judgment that “delete[d] several portions of the
court’s first judgment” impermissibly corrected judicial errors)).

      Void Judgments

      An attempted nunc pro tunc judgment rendered to correct a judicial error
after plenary power has expired is void for lack of jurisdiction. In re Marriage of
Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 457 (citing Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.
1973)). A litigant may attack a void judgment directly or collaterally. Id. (citing
PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2012)). After plenary
power expires, a trial court still may sign an order declaring a prior judgment or
order to be void because the trial court signed the prior judgment or order after
expiration of the court’s plenary power. Id. (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f)). Even
though it is unnecessary to appeal from a void judgment, an appeal may be taken
and the appellate court may declare the judgment void. Id. (citing State ex. rel
Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam)).

      Standard of Review

      Whether the trial court previously rendered judgment and the contents of the
judgment are fact questions for the trial court, but whether an error in the judgment
is judicial or clerical is a question of law we review de novo. Id.; see also Escobar,
711 S.W.2d at 232. In deciding whether a correction is a judicial or a clerical
error, we look to the judgment actually rendered and not the judgment that should
or might have been rendered. In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 457; see
also Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231. When, as in this case, no findings of fact or
conclusions of law were filed, the trial court’s judgment implies all findings of fact
necessary to support it. Pharo v. Chambers Cnty., 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.
1996); In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 457. We must defer to the trial
                                         10
court’s factual determinations that a judgment has been rendered and its contents if
some probative evidence supports them, but we are not bound by the trial court’s
legal determination regarding the nature of any error in the original judgment.
Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232; In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 457.
Evidence supporting the trial court’s fact finding may be in the form of oral
testimony of witnesses, written documents, the court’s docket, and the judge’s
personal recollection. In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 457-58; In re
A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d at 67.

II.   Application

      Uchenna contends that the Nunc Pro Tunc Decree signed over two and a half
years after the Original Decree and outside of the court’s plenary power is void for
lack of jurisdiction. In that regard, she states that “[t]he nunc pro tunc order as
entered [o]n August 15, 2021 varies from the rendition in that it seeks to 1) divide
property that was not divisible by the court and in a different manner than the
agreement the parties had reached and 2) avoid following the rendered order with
regard to sale of the Pecan Place house.”

      Uchenna does not provide any argument, citations to the record, or
authorities for her first statement that the Nunc Pro Tunc Decree is void because it
“varies from the rendition in that it seeks to [] divide property that was not
divisible by the court and in a different manner than the agreement the parties had
reached.” Uchenna neither explains what she means by her statement nor does she
point to the record or any sections in the Nunc Pro Tunc Decree she claims divided
property that was not divisible or divided property differently from the trial court’s
rendition so that such sections could not have been corrected as clerical errors in
the Nunc Pro Tunc Decree. Uchenna’s statement fails to comply with Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requiring that an appellant’s “brief must contain a

                                            11
clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to
authorities and to the record.” See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).

      Additionally, we note that Uchenna asked the trial court to sign her proposed
final decree of divorce nunc pro tunc which contained 50/50 division of property
sections that were substantially similarly worded as the sections in the Nunc Pro
Tunc Decree the trial court signed.        Although the numerous 50/50 property
division sections in Uchenna’s proposed decree were not listed in the same order as
the corresponding ones in the Nunc Pro Tunc Decree, they nonetheless use very
similar language in dividing the property.

      We overrule Uchenna’s issue with respect to her assertion that the Nunc Pro
Tunc Decree is void because it “varies from the rendition in that it seeks to []
divide property that was not divisible by the court and in a different manner than
the agreement the parties had reached.” See id.

      We next turn to Uchenna’s contention that the Nunc Pro Tunc Decree is void
because it “varies from the rendition in that it seeks to . . . avoid following the
rendered order with regard to sale of the Pecan Place house.” Uchenna argues that
“[t]here is no error in the house-sale provisions of the December 13, 2018 order,
merely an amplification of the rendition. The time frame for the sale was not
specified but clearly was to happen in the immediate aftermath of the order.
Appellee has, so far, delayed for three years.”

      At the trial court’s rendition of judgment, it specifically stated:

      With regards to the property located at 8802 Pecan Place Drive that
      real estate will be ordered to be sold and proceeds will be divided
      50/50. And I’m ordering that based on your agreement and your
      stipulation to divide the assets 50-50. I can’t take a chain saw and cut
      it in half. So I’m clarifying your agreement and adding some terms
      that will be enforceable regarding your agreement.

                                          12
The Original Decree contains the following terms and conditions regarding the
Pecan Property’s sale to accomplish the 50/50 division of that property:

                   Provisions Dealing with Sale of Residence
            IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that the
      property and all improvements located thereon at lot 22, block 1,
      WEST PLACE subdivision, according to the map, plat, or deed
      records of Harris County, Texas, and more commonly known as 8802
      PECAN PLACE DR, HOUSTON TX 77071, HARRIS County,
      Texas, shall be sold under the following terms and conditions:
             1.    The parties shall list the property with a duly licensed
      real estate broker having sales experience in the area where the
      property is located within thirty days (30) of this order, provided
      further that the real estate broker shall be an active member in the
      Multiple Listing Service Board of Realtors.
            2.     The property shall be sold for a price that is mutually
      agreeable to Petitioner and Respondent.
            3.     Petitioner shall continue to make all payments of
      principal, interest, taxes, and insurance on the property during the
      pendency of the sale, and Petitioner shall have the exclusive right to
      enjoy the use and possession of the premises until closing. All
      maintenance and repairs necessary to keep the property in its present
      condition shall be paid by Petitioner.
The Nunc Pro Tunc Decree deleted these terms and does not contain any terms or
conditions regarding the sale of the Pecan Property to complete the 50/50 division
of that property. Considering that the trial court at the September 26, 2018 hearing
rendered judgment specifically stating that it would add terms for the Pecan
Property’s sale and then signed the Original Decree containing terms and
conditions regarding how to carry out the sale, deletion of these terms would
constitute a substantive change and not the correction of a clerical error. See
Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231-32; In re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 455,
460. There is no discrepancy between the trial court’s rendition and the signed
Original Decree and, thus, no clerical error regarding the sale of the Pecan Property

                                         13
was corrected by nunc pro tunc judgment. See Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231-32; In
re Marriage of Russell, 556 S.W.3d at 455, 460; In re A.M.C., 491 S.W.3d at 67.

       Accordingly, we sustain Uchenna’s issue with respect to her contention that
(1) the Original Decree “accurately state[s] the judgment that was rendered on
September 26, 2018” regarding the Pecan Property sale; and (2) the Nunc Pro Tunc
Decree improperly changes “the rendition in that it seeks to . . . avoid following the
rendered order with regard to [the] sale of the Pecan Place house” and does not
correct a clerical error.

                                   CONCLUSION

       Having sustained Uchenna’s sole issue in part, we reverse that part of the
trial court’s Agreed Final Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc that (1) omits the
terms and conditions regarding the Pecan Property’s sale to complete the 50/50
division of that property as contained in the Original Decree; and (2) orders the
sale without terms and conditions. We render judgment reinstating the Original
Decree’s terms and conditions for the Pecan Property’s sale.          We affirm the
remainder of the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc as challenged.

                                       /s/    Meagan Hassan
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Wilson.

                                         14