Court Opinion

ID: 9731031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:31:08.202403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:12.429472
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
I cannot agree that State’s Instruction No. 1 does not “disparage the defense of insanity.” The instruction reads:
“The court instructs you that the question of insanity should be carefully considered by the jury because a due regard for the ends of justice and the welfare of society demand that a party guilty of a crime be convicted.”
In Dupert v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 260, 286 N.E.2d 405, we considered an instruction on the defense of insanity which said:
“The defense of temporary insanity is one very frequently made in cases of this kind, and is one which, I may say to you, should be very carefully scrutinized by the jury. The evidence to this point should be carefully considered and weighed by the Jury for the reason that if the accused were in truth insane at the time of the commission of the alleged act, then he ought not to be punished for such act. The evidence on this question of insanity ought to be carefully considered by the Jury for another reason, and that is, because a due regard for the ends of justice and the peace and welfare of society demands it, to the end that parties charged with a crime may not make use of the plea of temporary insanity as a means to defeat the ends of justice and a shield to protect them from criminal responsibility in case of violation of law.” 259 Ind. at 263-64, 286 N.E.2d at 407.
*178This Court, in an opinion by Justice Arterburn, said of this instruction, “We hold that this instruction is unduly prejudicial since the court, by its statement, weakens a good faith defense of insanity.” 295 Ind. at 264, 286 N.E.2d at 407. Dipert quoted Aszman v. State, (1889) 123 Ind. 347, 24 N.E. 123, saying of the same instruction:
“ ‘It can hardly be said to contain the statement of any proposition of law, but is rather in the nature of a general disparagement of the defense of insanity which the accused had pleaded as provided by statute.... It is sufficient to say that as at present constituted, the court does not regard with favor any statements by the trial court which are designed to cast discredit or suspicion upon any defense which is recognized by the law as legitimate, and which an accused person is making in apparent good faith. In this respect we are unable to appreciate any well-grounded distinction between the defense of insanity, self-defense, or alibi.’ Aszman, supra, at 359-60, 24 N.E. at 127.” 259 Ind. at 264, 286 N.E.2d at 408.
Dipert went on to say:
“In our opinion, the damaging feature of this instruction ... is that it treats the defense of insanity as an unusual defense which should be particularly scrutinized. ... It follows that the particular defense being made may not be singled out, criticized, or commented on beyond a statement of the law applicable thereto.
[T]his instruction does not contain a statement of the law, but is rather a gratuitous comment of the court upon the character of the defense being made.” 259 Ind. at 265, 286 N.E.2d at 408.
I believe that State’s Instruction No. 1 singles out, criticizes, and weakens this appellant’s defense of insanity no less than the instruction condemned in Dipert and Aszman. It is difficult to conceive how the jurors could understand this instruction other than as saying that insanity is a defense of doubtful legitimacy, and that they should hesitate to allow the accused to escape punishment by invocation of this defense. Instructions defining insanity and setting out the burden of proof of the State do not remove the aura of judicial disfavor of the defense of insanity created by this instruction.
*179Insanity is a defense long recognized by our statutes and case law. A criminal defendant is entitled to be free of instructions by the court which suggest that a defense recognized by the law and raised by the evidence ought nonetheless to be applied only with caution lest “the ends of justice and the welfare of society” suffer.
For these reasons I dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case.
Note. — Reported at 361 N.E.2d 1193.