Court Opinion

ID: 9387468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 00:03:38.927527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:13.541002
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/17/23 Jeter v. Callahan CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 GWENDOLYN JETER,                                                             D080518

            Plaintiff and Appellant,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. PROPS0900100)

 ANNIE CALLAHAN, as Trustee, etc.,
 et al.,

            Defendants and Respondents.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Stanford E. Reichert, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
          Michelle D. Strickland, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
          No appearances for Defendants and Respondents.

          Gwendolyn Jeter appeals the probate court’s order determining the
identities and distributional shares of the beneficiaries of a trust originally
set up by her grandmother. She contends an amendment of the trust made
after her grandmother died that changed the beneficiaries is void, and the
court erroneously construed the amendment in identifying the beneficiaries
and their shares. We modify the order to correct the identification and
distributional share of each beneficiary and affirm the order as modified.
                                        I.
                                BACKGROUND
A.    The Trust
      Alberta Lewis had six children: Annie, Lillie, Rosie, Artice, Bertha,
and John. Through a series of deeds recorded between 1985 and 1994,
Alberta and Lillie took title as joint tenants to a multi-unit dwelling and an
adjacent vacant lot in the City of Redlands (the Redlands property). In 1996,
Alberta set up a living trust in her name and put into the trust her interest

in the Redlands property,1 three parcels of real property in Texas, and
various items of personal property. She designated her six children as co-
trustees and beneficiaries. The trust instrument provided Alberta would
receive all income and profits of the trust property during her lifetime, and
upon her death “the co-trustees shall distribute the trust property outright to
the beneficiaries,” with the real property to be “divided equally among [the]
beneficiaries” and the personal property to be divided as stated in the trust
instrument. Alberta died in 1999.
B.    The Prior Litigation
      In 2008, John filed a civil action for partition and sale of the Redlands
property. By that time, Rosie and Bertha had died. Lillie filed an answer in
John’s action and also filed in the probate court a petition regarding the
internal affairs of a trust and a petition to establish another’s claim of
ownership to property. John filed objections to Lillie’s petitions. The

1     This transfer severed the joint tenancy between Alberta and Lillie and
made Lillie a tenant in common with the co-trustees of Alberta’s trust. (Civ.
Code, § 683.2, subd. (a)(2); Reiss v. Reiss (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 740, 746-747.)
                                        2
partition action and probate proceedings were consolidated in the probate
court. After multiple hearings and settlement conferences, a settlement was
reached on December 10, 2009, and recited on the record. The probate court
stated it would not dismiss the proceedings “until notice of proposed action
goes through and settlement agreement is signed.” No transcript reciting the
terms of the settlement or settlement agreement is in the record. On
February 8, 2010, Annie and Bertha’s daughter each filed a consent.
According to Gwendolyn, one of Rosie’s sons was “present at one time or
another during the proceedings but did not [want to] participate.”
      To implement the settlement, Lillie filed a petition to amend Alberta’s
trust on February 10, 2010. According to the petition, under the settlement
John would be paid $45,000 for his interest in the Redlands property, and the
portion of the property Alberta had put in trust would be put back in trust
with Lillie, Artice, and Annie as co-trustees and beneficiaries until the last of
them died, when the property would be liquidated and the proceeds
distributed to Alberta’s then-living grandchildren. Lillie prayed for an order
amending Alberta’s trust to include these changes and an order confirming
her ownership of one-half of the Redlands property as a tenant in common
with the co-trustees of the trust. Lillie agreed to pay the trust rent to occupy
the property and one-half of the property expenses. Artice joined in Lillie’s
petition. Annie filed objections to Lillie’s petition and her own petition for
injunctive relief.
      The probate court held multiple hearings on Lillie’s petition to amend
Alberta’s trust and Annie’s petition for injunctive relief, at some or all of
which Lillie, John, Artice, one of Artice’s daughters, Annie, two of Annie’s
daughters, and Bertha’s daughter appeared. The court ultimately denied
Annie’s petition for injunctive relief, dismissed her objections to Lillie’s

                                         3
petition to amend the trust, and granted Lillie’s petition. By order filed
August 4, 2011 (the 2011 Order), the probate court ruled: (1) the interests of
John and his heirs, beneficiaries, or assigns in the trust were terminated; (2)
Lillie, Annie, and Artice were named co-trustees and beneficiaries; (3) Lillie’s
one-half ownership interest in the Redlands property was confirmed; (4) Lillie
must pay reasonable rent for occupancy of the portion of the Redlands
property held in trust and one-half of the property expenses; (5) upon the
death of the last to die of Lillie, Artice, and Annie, the trust assets shall be
liquidated and the proceeds distributed to Alberta’s then-living grandchildren
except the children of John, who were excluded from any distribution; (6)
upon sale of the Redlands property, a $45,000 lien held by Artice and her
husband must be paid in full before any distributions are made to
beneficiaries, heirs, or successors in interest; (7) Lillie and Artice were
entitled to reimbursement from the trust for the attorney fees incurred in
prosecuting the petition to amend the trust; and (8) to sell the property,
Lillie, Annie, and Artice would have to agree and file a petition to reform the
trust.
C.       The Current Litigation
         In 2019, after Artice and Lillie had died, Lillie’s daughter Gwendolyn
filed in the probate court a petition to terminate Alberta’s trust. In the
operative amended petition, Gwendolyn alleged her mother had died
intestate and left her and her brother as heirs. She asked the probate court
to terminate the trust, order the Redlands property sold, and distribute the
proceeds of the sale of the trust portion of the property per stirpes in one-

third portions to the children of Annie, Artice, and Lillie.2 Annie filed an

2    Gwendolyn named as adverse parties Annie in her capacity as the
remaining trustee of the amended trust; Annie’s daughter as a trustee de son
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objection to the petition. One of Artice’s daughters appeared at a hearing and
made an objection to the petition. The court instructed her to serve and file a
written objection, but she did not.
      The probate court set an issues conference. Gwendolyn filed a
statement in which she raised, among other issues, whether the 2011 Order
validly amended Alberta’s trust after it became irrevocable upon her death
and, if it did, who were the beneficiaries under that order. At the issues
conference, the court ruled the 2011 Order was valid and would be enforced.
The court set a briefing schedule on the issues of the identities of
beneficiaries and their respective interests. In her brief, Annie contended all
of Alberta’s grandchildren except the children of John were contingent
beneficiaries. In her brief, Gwendolyn contended: (1) only the children of
Annie, Artice, and Lillie were entitled to inherit, and each set of children
should receive a per stirpes share of one-third; or, alternatively, (2) all of
Alberta’s grandchildren except the children of John were entitled to inherit,
and each set of grandchildren should receive a per stirpes share of one-fifth.
      The probate court issued an amended tentative ruling on its
interpretation of the 2011 Order. The court tentatively ruled the Redlands
property must be sold when Annie, Artice, and Lillie have all died; and after
the priority payments specified in the 2011 Order are made, the remaining
proceeds of the sale of the trust portion of the property must be paid in equal
shares to all of Alberta’s then-living grandchildren except John’s children. In
response, Gwendolyn filed a brief objecting to distribution of proceeds to the

tort; Artice’s daughter as a trustee de son tort; and the estates of Artice,
Bertha, and Rosie. As additional relief against Annie, Annie’s daughter,
Artice’s estate, and Artice’s daughter, Gwendolyn sought an accounting,
damages and imposition of a constructive trust for breach of fiduciary duty,
and imposition of a surcharge for mismanagement of trust property. These
additional claims are not at issue on this appeal.
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grandchildren in equal shares rather than per stirpes shares, objecting to the
postponement of the sale of the Redlands property until Annie dies as an
unlawful restraint on alienation, and asking the court to allow her to sell the
property. Artice’s daughter filed a brief agreeing with the amended tentative
ruling.
      The probate court held a hearing on October 4, 2021, at which
Gwendolyn, Annie, Artice’s daughter, and Rosie’s three children appeared
through their attorneys. Annie had no opinion on the court’s amended
tentative ruling, and Artice’s daughter and Rosie’s children agreed with it.
Gwendolyn disagreed, again objecting to equal distributions to Alberta’s
grandchildren and insisting on per stirpes distributions. After hearing
argument, the court stated it would issue a written decision and did so on
October 12, 2021 (the 2021 Order). The court determined: (1) the 2011 Order
was “clear on its face” and “the basis for res judicata and collateral estoppel”;
(2) under the 2011 Order, the Redlands property “must be sold when Annie,
Artice, and Lillie have ALL DIED”; (3) when the property is sold, after the
priority payments specified in the 2011 Order are made, “the remaining trust
proceeds go to all Alberta’s then living grandchildren except to the
descendants of [John]”; (4) there are 18 grandchildren who are beneficiaries,
whom the court listed by name; and (5) the grandchildren are to “receive
their distributions (inheritance) in kind, that is, 18 equal shares.”

      Gwendolyn appealed the 2021 Order.3

3     The 2021 Order, which interprets amendments made to Alberta’s trust
by the 2011 Order, is appealable as a final order “[d]etermining questions of
construction of a trust instrument” (Prob. Code, § 17200, subd. (b)(1); see id.,
§ 1304, subd. (a) [final order under § 17200 is appealable]), even though it did
not entirely dispose of Gwendolyn’s amended petition (Gridley v. Gridley
                                        6
                                       II.
                                DISCUSSION
      Gwendolyn contends the 2011 Order on which the probate court based
its rulings in the 2021 Order is void because it violated the due process rights
of Alberta’s grandchildren. Gwendolyn also contends the 2011 Order has no
preclusive effect. She contends the 2021 Order unreasonably restrains her
right to partition and sell the Redlands property. Gwendolyn also contends
the 2021 Order erroneously directs the proceeds of the eventual sale of the
trust portion of the property be paid per capita rather than per stirpes to
Alberta’s then-living grandchildren except those fathered by John. She asks
us to void the 2011 and 2021 Orders, to fashion a remedy for the buyout of
John’s interest in the Redlands property, and to order the property sold and
the proceeds distributed according to the original trust instrument.
A.    Validity of the 2011 Order

      We first consider Gwendolyn’s attack on the 2011 Order.4 Gwendolyn
claims the order violated the due process rights of Alberta’s 18 grandchildren

(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1586 [order deciding issue that could be subject
of separate appealable probate order is appealable]).

4     In her opening brief, Gwendolyn identifies the 2011 Order as one of the
orders she is appealing. That order was appealable as a final order
“[a]pproving or directing the modification . . . of [Alberta’s] trust.” (Prob.
Code, § 17200, subd. (b)(13); see id., § 1304, subd. (a) [final order under
§ 17200 is appealable]; Boys & Girls Club of Petaluma v. Walsh (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1057 [order modifying trust is appealable].) But no
appeal was taken, and the time to appeal expired more than a decade ago
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a), (e) [appeal must be taken no later than
180 days after entry of appealable order]). It is thus too late for Gwendolyn
to attack the 2011 Order directly by appeal. She may collaterally attack the
order in the current litigation, however, on the ground the order is void
because it violated her due process rights and its enforcement would injure
her property rights. (See Paterra v. Hansen (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 507, 527-
                                       7
(whom Gwendolyn calls “contingent beneficiaries” of Alberta’s trust) because
they were not given notice and opportunity to be heard before their property
rights were affected. (See U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1 [“nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”];
Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a) [“person may not be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law”]; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313 (Mullane) [proceeding that may deprive
trust beneficiaries of property must “be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”]; Estate of Reed (1968)
259 Cal.App.2d 14, 21 [“when the rights of beneficiaries to a trust are
inevitably affected, they are entitled to notice”].) We reject this claim.
      Gwendolyn has not adequately preserved the due process claim for
appeal. She asserted in a reply brief she filed in the probate court that the
grandchildren were not noticed and served, but nowhere in that brief or in
any other she filed in the probate court did she set out a factually and legally
supported due process argument based on lack of notice and opportunity to be
heard. Although Gwendolyn states in her opening brief that she “attempted”
to address the due process issues in her issues conference statement, the
portion of the statement she cites questions the probate court’s jurisdiction to
amend the trust after Alberta’s death but does not mention due process,
notice, or opportunity to be heard. Nor did Gwendolyn press those issues at
either of the hearings in the probate court before it issued the 2021 Order.
She may not raise for the first time in this court issues she did not

528 [stranger to action that led to void order may collaterally attack order if
enforcement would injure her]; Sindler v. Brennan (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th
1350, 1353 [void order may be collaterally attacked at any time]; Brown v.
Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 182, 186, fn. 4 [order entered in violation of
due process rights to notice and opportunity to be heard is void].)
                                         8
adequately raise in the probate court; such issues are forfeited. (Foxcroft
Productions, Inc. v. Universal City Studios LLC (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1119,
1133; In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481,
510.)
        Gwendolyn also has not supplied us with a record sufficient to establish
the alleged due process violations. In the 2011 Order, the probate court
found that “all Notices of said Hearing have been given in a manner and form
according to law or that all Notices can be waived and dispensed with.” That
finding is presumed correct and Gwendolyn, as the appellant, has the burden
affirmatively to establish by an adequate record that the finding is erroneous.
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Trenk v. Soheili (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 1033, 1046.) The register of actions included in the record on
appeal contains several entries for proofs of service of summons and orders
for service by publication in the consolidated proceedings that led to the 2011
Order. Gwendolyn, however, has not included in the record any of those
documents or any others that might show who was given notice. Her failure
to provide a proper record on this issue requires us to resolve it against her.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609; Maria P. v. Riles (1987)
43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296.)
        Even if Gwendolyn had not procedurally defaulted on the due process
claim, it would fail because she has no standing to assert it. A party
generally may assert only her own legal rights and not those of others. (In re
Q.R. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 696, 702-703; Brenner v. Universal Health
Services of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 589, 605; Quail Lakes
Owners Assn. v. Kozina (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1137.) The due process
right to notice and opportunity to be heard at issue here belonged to those
persons who, at the time of the consolidated proceedings resolved by the 2011

                                        9
Order, had interests in the portion of the Redlands property that had been
the subject of Alberta’s trust. (See Roth v. Jelley (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 655,
670 (Roth) [“If a proceeding will ‘adversely affect’ a person’s property interest,
due process requires that the person be given notice . . . and an opportunity to
be heard”].) Gwendolyn was not such a person.
      When Alberta put her portion of the Redlands property in trust, she
reserved the right to income from the property for life, designated her six
children as co-trustees and beneficiaries, and provided that upon her death
the property would be distributed “outright” and “divided equally” among the
children. Alberta’s death terminated the trust (Prob. Code, § 15407, subd.
(a)(1), (2); Salvation Army v. Price (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1619, 1624), and
made her six children, who were then all still alive, tenants in common in the
property (Civ. Code, § 686; Wilson v. S.L. Rey, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 234,
242). The trust instrument made no mention of Alberta’s grandchildren.
Under her trust, they held no interest in the Redlands property, either
present or future, vested or contingent. The grandchildren had at most an
expectation they would one day succeed to their parents’ rights in the
property. “A mere possibility, such as the expectancy of an heir apparent, is
not to be deemed an interest of any kind.” (Civ. Code, § 700.)
      Gwendolyn did not acquire any interest in the Redlands property until
the 2011 Order amended Alberta’s trust. The 2011 Order put the portion of
the property previously held in trust back in trust, and provided that on the
death of the last to die of Lillie, Artice, and Annie, the property “shall be
liquidated and the proceeds distributed to the then living grandchildren of
[Alberta] except for the heirs and beneficiaries of her son [John].” The
provision created a future interest (specifically, a contingent remainder) in
the specified grandchildren that is conditioned on their surviving the three

                                        10
named aunts. (See Civ. Code, §§ 690 [defining “future interest”], 769
[defining “remainder”], 778 [defining “remainder upon a contingency”]; Estate
of Washburn (1909) 11 Cal.App. 735, 742 [trust provision that children of
lifetime beneficiary living at time of her death would take trust property
created contingent remainder in children].) “ ‘[A] contingent remainder is an
estate and not a mere expectancy.’ ” (Roth, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 669.)
Since the 2011 Order conferred an interest in the Redlands property on
Gwendolyn for the first time and did not deprive her of a pre-existing interest
in the property, the proceedings that led to the order did not implicate her
due process rights. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7,
subd. (a); Mullane, supra, 339 U.S. at p. 313; cf. Roth, at pp. 669, 672
[grandson who had contingent remainder under grandfather’s trust was
entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard in proceeding that eliminated

that interest].)5
B.    Interpretation of the 2011 Order
      We next consider Gwendolyn’s attack on the probate court’s
construction of the 2011 Order in its 2021 Order. Gwendolyn complains the
court’s ruling the trust portion of the Redlands property must be sold when
Annie dies improperly restrains her statutory right, as an owner of the

5     The only grandchildren of Alberta who apparently were owners of
interests in the Redlands property at the time of the proceedings, and
therefore would have been entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard,
were those descended through Bertha or Rosie, the only children of Alberta
who had died by then. Upon their deaths, the interests of Bertha and Rosie
in the property passed to their respective devisees or heirs. (Prob. Code,
§ 7000; Olson v. Toy (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 818, 825.) Bertha’s only child
appeared and filed a consent to the settlement that led to the 2011 Order.
Rosie’s children were given notice, but only one appeared and chose not to
participate. It thus appears the grandchildren entitled to notice and
opportunity to be heard received them.
                                       11
undivided one-half interest of the property not held in trust, to partition and
sell the entire property now. Gwendolyn further complains the court
frustrated Alberta’s intent by directing the proceeds of the eventual sale of
the property be paid in equal shares to each of Alberta’s then-living
grandchildren, except the children of John, rather than in one-fifth shares to
each set of such grandchildren. Neither complaint has merit.
      Gwendolyn has no right to partition the Redlands property before
Annie dies because Lillie had no such right. When Lillie died intestate,
Gwendolyn and her brother inherited the one-half interest in the property
Lillie owned as a tenant in common with the co-trustees of the trust. (Prob.
Code, §§ 6400, 6402, subd. (a).) “They hold the property inherited from
[Lillie] precisely as [she] held it, subject to the same conditions and equities
that attached to it in [her] hands.” (Carlson v. Carlson (1932) 124 Cal.App.
207, 210; see Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 320,
324 (Argonaut Ins. Co.) [“The heir . . . ‘stands in the shoes’ of the decedent.”].)
As a tenant in common, Lillie would have had an absolute right to partition
the Redlands property (Code Civ. Proc., § 872.210, subd. (a)(2); Formosa
Corp. v. Rogers (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 397, 409), “unless barred by a valid
waiver” (Code Civ. Proc., § 872.710, subd. (b)). Tenants in common impliedly
waive the right to partition when they acquire property for a specific use for a
definite period and partition would defeat the purpose. (American Medical
International, Inc. v. Feller (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1015-1017; Pine v.
Tiedt (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 733, 737-740.) There was such a waiver here.
      In the consolidated proceedings resolved by the 2011 Order, Lillie
prevented the partition and sale of the Redlands property John had sought
and impliedly waived her own right to partition by agreeing with the other
tenants in common: (1) to buy out John’s interest; (2) to put the portion of

                                        12
the property that had been in trust back in trust for the lifetime benefit of
Annie, Artice, and Lillie; (3) to sell the property and distribute the proceeds
to the grandchildren of Alberta (except John’s children) who were then living
at the time of the death of the last lifetime beneficiary to die; and (4) not to
sell the property earlier unless Annie, Artice, and Lillie agreed. Gwendolyn,
who stands in Lillie’s shoes (Argonaut Ins. Co., supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at
p. 324), may not partition and sell the Redlands property before Annie dies,
because to allow her to do so would frustrate the plan of Lillie and her co-
owners to keep a portion of the property in trust for Annie’s lifetime benefit
and not sell it until she dies. (See Rowland v. Clark (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d
880, 882 [co-owners’ agreement that one would have life estate in property
defeated other’s right to partition before death of one with life estate].) The
probate court thus did not err by ruling the property “must be sold when
Annie, Artice, and Lillie have ALL DIED.”
      The probate court also did not err by ruling the grandchildren of
Alberta who are alive when Annie dies, except any of John’s children who
may then be alive, will be entitled to an equal share of the proceeds of the
sale of the portion of Redlands property that was put back in trust in 2011.
As amended by the 2011 Order, the trust instrument provides that upon the
death of the last to die of Annie, Artice, and Lillie, “all Trust assets shall be
liquidated and the proceeds distributed to the then living grandchildren of
[Alberta] except for the heirs and beneficiaries of [John].” This provision does
not specify whether the distribution is to be per capita (i.e., in equal shares to
each eligible grandchild), as the probate court ruled, or per stirpes (i.e., in
one-fifth shares to each set of eligible grandchildren for equal division of the
share among them), as Gwendolyn urges. (See Estate of Edwards (1988)
203 Cal.App.3d 1366, 1372 [defining “per capita” and “per stirpes”

                                        13
distributions].) Where, as here, a trust instrument “provides for issue or
descendants to take without specifying the manner, the property to be
distributed shall be distributed in the manner provided in Section 240.”
(Prob. Code, § 245, subd. (a).) As pertinent to this case, under that section
“the property shall be divided into as many equal shares as there are living
members of the nearest generation of issue then living.” (Id., § 240.) Hence,
each grandchild of Alberta alive when Annie dies, except the then-living
children of John, will be entitled to an equal share of the proceeds of the sale
of the trust portion of the Redlands property.
      The probate court, however, prematurely determined there would be 18
shares because there were that many grandchildren of Alberta (excluding
John’s children) alive when the court issued the 2021 Order. “When a gift to
a class is to vest in the members of such class at some future time, during the
period of postponement the class possesses the ability to increase and
decrease. . . . The gift to the class must therefore be distributed among those
who qualify at the time specified.” (Estate of Haney (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 1,
13, italics added.) Because the remainder interest in Alberta’s grandchildren
is contingent on their surviving Lillie, Artice, and Annie, the number of
grandchildren who will be entitled to a share of the proceeds of the sale of the
trust portion of the Redlands property will not be known until Annie, Artice,
and Lillie have all died. Although Artice and Lillie were dead when the court
issued the 2021 Order, Annie was not. The court therefore erred by
determining the number of shares to be 18, and we shall modify the 2021
Order to correct the error.
C.    Other Issues
      Gwendolyn contends the probate court erroneously ruled the 2011
Order had res judicata and collateral estoppel effect in the current litigation.

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The only specific portion of the 2011 Order to which the court gave preclusive
effect was the “find[ing] that all Notices of said Hearing have been given in a
manner and form according to law or that all Notices can be waived and
dispensed with,” which in the court’s view rendered the 2011 Order valid and
enforceable. Although that finding may be relevant to the due process claim
Gwendolyn raises, we have already determined she procedurally defaulted on
that claim and has no standing to assert it. (See pt. II.A., ante.) We thus
need not and do not decide whether the 2011 Order bars the claim under
preclusion principles.
      We also need not consider Gwendolyn’s request that in the event we
void the 2011 Order, we fashion “some alternate remedy . . . to deal with the
buyout” of John’s interest in the Redlands property. We are not voiding the
2011 Order. The buyout stands.

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                                      III.
                                DISPOSITION
      The 2021 Order is modified by striking the sentence on lines 25 and 26
of page 10 that states, “The court concludes that the grandchildren receive
their distributions (inheritance) in kind, that is, 18 equal shares,” and
replacing it with, “Each grandchild of Alberta who is alive when Lillie, Artice,
and Annie have all died, except the then-living children of John, shall receive
an equal share.” As so modified, the order is affirmed.

                                                                       IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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