Court Opinion

ID: 9514001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:43:06.400182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:07.824390
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 27] At the intersection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the majority follows the district court in making a wrong turn. I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 28] The district court suppressed the defendant’s statement because he was kept in handcuffs for fifteen minutes, including time after he had been frisked for weapons. I would reverse and remand because the actions of law enforcement were reasonable and the district court misapplied the law. There is no evidence that the handcuffs in any way coerced the defendant into incriminating himself. Even though the defendant testified at the suppression hearing, he offered no testimony of coercion. Indeed, after twice having been advised of his right to remain silent, that anything he said could and would be used against him in a court of law, and that he had the right to an attorney, the defendant made his incriminating statement in the nature of a taunt:
*418He stated that he used marijuana the previous day at his residence in New Town and that he smoked it using a joint. He stated that if he was to be UA’d that he would test positive for THC. He stated that it is not illegal to smoke the drugs and that there was nothing that we could do about it.
Unfortunately for the defendant, his taunt also reflected his apparent misunderstanding of the law.
[¶ 29] Law enforcement had received a tip of a drug transaction to happen in Williston, specifically that Ben Smith was supposed to be selling a half ounce of methamphetamine to an unknown male coming from New Town, possibly in a black car, and that the unknown male would meet Smith at Smith’s place of employment and they would go to a residence for the purchase. Smith’s probation officer had advised that he was on probation. Law enforcement “staked out” Smith’s place of employment. An unknown male met Smith at his place of employment. The unknown male arrived in a black vehicle registered to a person from New Town — a small North Dakota town. The unknown person and Smith traveled to the residence of Bryce Raad. Smith went into the residence and emerged after about twenty minutes. The officers apparently approached the vehicle with weapons drawn and removed and handcuffed the occupants, Smith and the unknown person. The unknown person was identified as the defendant, David Gay, from New Town. Both Gay and Smith were frisked. No weapons were found on either, but a large sum of cash was found on Smith. The occupant of the residence, Bryce Raad, emerged from the residence and was also outside at the scene of the stop. The stopping officers called for additional law enforcement assistance, apparently before Smith’s vehicle was searched. Officers also sought permission to search Raad’s pickup and his garage/shop at the location. The search of Smith’s vehicle found methamphetamine paraphernalia and a duffle bag containing a “Whizzinator” — a device used to defeat drug tests.
[¶ 30] Under similar situations, other courts have held that keeping vehicle occupants handcuffed for periods longer than fifteen minutes was reasonable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said keeping vehicle occupants handcuffed for 35 minutes or even an hour after they had been frisked was reasonable:
The investigative stop included several steps, all of them reasonably necessary to ensure the officers’ safety or to confirm or dispel their suspicions: pulling over the vehicle, forcing the suspects to exit the car, patting down the suspects, physically restraining then questioning them about the events at Chuck’s, confirming their identities by completing “field investigation cards,” thoroughly searching their car for weapons, and sending and receiving various communications to and from the officers at the crime scene. It is not surprising or disturbing that these steps would together last thirty-five minutes (as the defendants claim) or even an hour (as Houston and Perkins maintain). In either case, we conclude that the officers’ inquiries and safety precautions were reasonably related to the initial basis for stopping the car.
Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir.1999).
[¶ 31] ■ Despite the testimony that the officers continued the handcuffs for reasons of safety, the District Court held, apparently as a matter of law, that once a defendant had been frisked and no weapons found on his person, handcuffs were unreasonable.
*419So what we really have is a stop made on authority of a probation search of someone who is not the defendant, and the search of the defendant and others for officer safety. At that point, I can find nothing untoward about the activity of the officers. And had they found something in Mr. Smith’s pocket — or Mr. Gay’s pocket at that time, I see nothing which would potentially throw out any discovery.
Their basis of dealing with Mr. Gay, however, was protection of the officers. After that had been established that that was not a risk, Mr. Gay continued to be in handcuffs. Which triggers some use of authority that subjects Mr. Gay to certain rights. The mere fact that— well, he was in custody. He was under arrest in effect at that time. He was in handcuffs. And nothing he could do about that. After the basis for him being in handcuffs was eliminated, that is after the search showed he was not at risk, the police no longer had a[sie] unfettered basis for questioning.
And when you have someone in handcuffs, that is intimidating enough so that merely saying the Miranda warnings did not clear the taint. There was no probable cause for his continued arrest at the time that the questioning occurred.
I am going to grant the motion on that ground.
The district court’s reasoning has been thoroughly rejected by state and federal courts. See U.S. v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1992) (“[A] police officer’s use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop.”); U.S. v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir.1982) (Initial handcuffing of suspects did not convert investigatory stop into complete arrest where initial handcuffing was not excessive, it was not unreasonable for officer to take adequate protective measures before remaining with two men suspected of unarmed bank robbery, there may have been third robber in the vicinity, and handcuffs eliminated possibility of assault or escape attempt during questioning.); U.S. v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir.1983) (Handcuffing and frisk of codefendant who was in defendant’s truck which was subject of investigatory stop was justified after codefendant had disobeyed order to raise his hands and had made furtive movements inside truck where his hands could not be seen and, further, having codefen-dant lie down and be handcuffed during frisk did not convert it into an arrest necessitating probable cause.); U.S. v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 791 (11th Cir.1985) (Neither handcuffing nor other restraints will automatically convert a Terry stop into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause, for just as probable cause to arrest will not justify using excessive force to detain a suspect, use of a particular method to restrain person’s freedom of movement does not necessarily make police action tantamount to an arrest; inquiry in either context is reasonableness.); U.S. v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir.1989) (Fact that burglary suspect was handcuffed during frisk did not turn encounter into arrest; officer could anticipate that he might be required to go to aid of fellow officers and that suspect, like his companion, might attempt to flee.); State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn.1999) (“[Bjriefly handcuffing a suspect while the police sort out the scene of an investigation does not per se transform an investigatory detention into an arrest.”); People v. Soun, 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 831-33 (1995) (Initial seizure of defendant which occurred when police officers stopped car in which defendant was riding was detention, not de facto arrest, for purposes of determining whether warrantless seizure of defendant was constitutional, *420even though defendant was removed from car at gunpoint by large number of police officers, forced to lie on the ground, handcuffed, and placed in patrol car; since police officer who initiated detention was aware defendant and others in car were suspects in homicide and were probably armed, police officers were authorized to make “felony stop” of car in order to protect officers’ personal safety.); Thomas v. Com., 16 Va.App. 851, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1993) (Brief, complete deprivations of suspect’s liberty, including handcuffing, do not convert stop and frisk into arrest so long as methods of restraint used are reasonable to the circumstances.).
[¶ 32] The evidence reflects that law enforcement proceeded reasonably. The detailed tip was borne out in detail. An individual in a black vehicle from New Town arrived at Smith’s place of work. Smith and the person then traveled to a residence in Williston. Smith then went inside for twenty minutes. A large sum of money was found on Smith. Initially, there were two unsearched vehicles in immediate proximity, as well as a garage/shop and a residence. Another individual, the occupant of the residence, was then outside. Other officers were called to the scene. The search of Smith’s vehicle yielded drug paraphernalia. All this happened in about fifteen minutes. The officer testified that they were concerned about their safety while they tried to sort things out. The district court held that as soon as they frisked the defendant, there was no basis to keep him handcuffed. Whether the officers acted reasonably is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Higgins, 2004 ND 115, ¶ 7, 680 N.W.2d 645. The actions of law enforcement in keeping the defendant handcuffed were wholly reasonable under the circumstances. That he was not armed does not mean the defendant posed no danger. He could have had access to a weapon in either Smith’s or Raad’s vehicle or in Raad’s shop/garage. Further search discoveries could have led to physical action by the defendant.
[¶ 33] Because the district court was mistaken as to the law, the officers acted reasonably, and the principle advanced by the district court and the majority unreasonably imperils officer safety, I would reverse and remand for trial.
[¶ 34] DALE V. SANDSTROM, MARY MUEHLEN MARING.