Court Opinion

ID: 9585999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:06:09.91188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:18.517803
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
OCGA § 16-1-6 (Code Ann. § 26-505) purports to define “included offenses.” “[OCGA § 16-1-6 (1) (Code Ann. § 26-505)] sets out the rules for determining an included crime as a matter of fact or [2] as a matter of law,” State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 320 (206 SE2d 475) (1974).
It is now almost ten years since Estevez addressed what is a continuing difficulty — witness this very case. An answer should not continue to elude us, however, if we can but circumscribe the problem with logic and reason.
First, we should lay aside the idea that offenses may be “included” as a “matter of fact” and “as a matter of law.” Offenses are, by the nature of things, either included or not included, and that is determined as a matter of law.
Second, we must note what every beginning law student knows, that the General Assembly has the power to declare specified acts as crimes. A criminal offense is that which the General Assembly declares to be a criminal offense — nothing more, and nothing less. As example, a statute may describe a crime as follows:
“(a) Whoever shall do A and B and C commits the offense of Crime One.”
The statute might go on to say:
“(b) Whoever shall do A and B commits the offense of Crime Two.
“(c) Whoever shall do A and C commits the offense of Crime Three.
“(d) Whoever shall do A and D commits the offense of Crime Four.”
Now, obviously Crimes Two and Three are “included offenses” of Crime One — because each of the two “is established by proof of... less than all the facts... required to establish the commission of the crime charged,” i.e., Crime One in our example. OCGA § 16-1-6 (Code Ann. § 26-505). (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrariwise, Crime Four is not an “included offense” to Crime One because its essential elements contain one element — the “doing” of “D” — which is not an essential element of Crime One, and, because the “doing” of “A” alone is not defined as a crime. Falling without the definitional scope of Crime One, it cannot be included therein.
Third, an examination of our homicide statutes will disclose that *225the foregoing analysis, alone, cannot explain how voluntary manslaughter can be an “included offense” to murder, as voluntary manslaughter contains elements which are nowhere included within the statutory elements of murder, defined by OCGA § 16-5-1 (a) (Code Ann. § 26-1101) as follows: “A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.” Yet they are included offenses by virtue of OCGA § 16-1-6 (Code Ann. § 26-505), as they are established by proof of “... a less culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the crime charged.”
Fourth, the term “element of the crime,” as commonly used, must be understood to include the factual particulars charged in the indictment. Hence, if an indictment charges that a defendant did commit the offense of murder, on a day named, by shooting with a pistol and killing AB, a human being, with malice aforethought, proof that the same defendant did, on the same day, shoot with a pistol and kill CD, a human being, with malice aforethought, is not, of course, proof of an included crime to that murder charged in the indictment. While every element of the theoretical, or definitional, crime of murder is proved, every element of the crime charged in the indictment is not. Proof of the homicide of CD, of course, falls without the scope of the factual particulars of the indictment charging the homicide of AB, and is not proof of an “included crime.”
(Viewed in this light, it will be seen that the second portion of OCGA § 16-1-6 (Code Ann. § 26-505) seems to be a redundancy. And contrary to Estevez, loc. cit. supra, that code section does not divide itself, conveniently, into consideration of matters of law and matters of fact.)
In my opinion, the evidence in this case would support a conviction of simple assault as an included offense to armed robbery, and Hightower was entitled to the requested instruction relative to simple assault.
The indictment charged Hightower with the offense of armed robbery in that he did take money from Duddy “by use of offensive weapon, to wit: a knife.”
Hightower denied using a knife offensively against Duddy, and denied taking money. Duddy testified that Hightower and his accomplice took money. He said Hightower “... pushed me down on the floor, put the knife in my face. . . .”
A jury is free to pick and choose which witnesses, and which parts of the testimony of witnesses, are to be believed. A jury hearing the evidence in this case could believe that Hightower assaulted Duddy — that is, placed him in reasonable apprehension of *226immediately receiving a violent injury, but took no money from him. Hence, the jury could find from this evidence all the elements of the crime of simple assault — upon the same victim, and in the course of the same transaction as described in the indictment charging armed robbery. (Note the definition of aggravated assault: “A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults ... (2) with a deadly weapon.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (Code Ann. § 26-1302). “Simple assault” is defined by OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (Code Ann. § 26-1301): “A person commits the offense of simple assault when he either: (1) Attempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) Commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.”)
Because all of the elements of the offense of simple assault against Buddy are found in the indictment charging Hightower with the armed robbery of Buddy, it is therefore an “included offense,” and should have been charged on timely request.
The foregoing analysis is inapplicable to Hightower’s request for a charge on simple battery, for reason that essential elements of that offense (physical contact or physical harm) are not of necessity subsumed in the factual particulars set out in the indictment. See OCGA § 16-5-23 (Code Ann. § 26-1304). The language of the indictment, “by use of offensive weapon, to wit: a knife,” does not ipsis verbis allege either physical contact or physical harm, whereas it does so allege, of necessity, simple assault. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury relative to the offense of simple battery.
Our appellate courts do not pass upon disputed issues of fact. For that reason, in resolving the legal issues presented in this appeal, we must review Hightower’s testimony as though it might be accepted as true by a jury — even though, in reality, it is utterly incapable of being believed by a rational trier of fact. Thus I am drawn to the unhappy position of suggesting reversal of this conviction because of the failure of the trial judge to charge in a manner encompassing a “story” which no sensible juror in this state would ever believe! But that is the price of a system wherein the jury is the sole judge of factual issues. The truth of the matter is that such a failing is harmless — in fact — because no one would believe Hightower’s statement anyway!
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hill and Justice Clarke join in this dissent.