Court Opinion

ID: 9603467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:06:35.120922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:11.851064
License: Public Domain

*999THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court in this instance. For that reason, I must dissent from the decision represented by the opinion of the majority. In my judgment, the decree entered by the district court fits well within the range of discretion suggested by the pertinent language of § 20-2-114, W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl.), which is:
“ * * * The court may decree to either party reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other’s ability and may order so much of the other’s real estate or the rents and profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either party.”
The four acres of land are addressed and disposed of in paragraph ten of the divorce decree which is the alimony paragraph. The wife is awarded alimony in the sum of $250 per month or ten percent of the plaintiff’s net income, whichever is greater, but the award is limited to five years and ends upon the husband’s death, the wife’s remarriage, or upon the event of her cohabitation with another man. At the rate of $250 per month for five years, the maximum alimony that the wife could receive would be $15,000. She could receive more according to the court’s definition of net income which is found in the same paragraph of the decree. The trial court then proceeded to award the four acres of land to the wife, subject to a proviso that the husband could purchase the land from her for $8,000. If he should exercise that option, the full $8,000 is credited against the alimony payments. If the husband chooses not to purchase the four acres for $8,000, the land is awarded to the wife with a proviso that the husband receive a credit of $3,000 against the alimony payments. It is obvious that the court was endeavoring to provide a cash advance to the wife for her needs which the alimony award addressed. Under the circumstances, I do not agree that the value of the four acres is as material as the majority perceives it to be, treating it as a division of property. The husband asserted the value to be greater than the court believed, and he is afforded the opportunity to capture the larger value. If his opinion is correct, he should pay the $8,000 to the wife and obtain title to the four acres. In fact, if the land is worth anything at all, he should pay the $8,000, receive credit against the alimony that he owes, and retain whatever value is attributable to the property.
While I do not quarrel with the fact that land value is not an adjudicative fact of which a trial court can take judicial notice, I do not perceive that using the property in the way that the court did for purposes of inducing the payment of alimony or as part payment for alimony results in an abuse of discretion simply because the court made an indiscrete comment in its decision letter. The comment in the decision letter is not repeated in the divorce decree, nor are the decision letters adopted by reference in the decree of divorce. Consequently, the matter which the majority treats as dispositive does not seem to be relevant with respect to operation of the decree.
As I have indicated, I would affirm the judgment of the district court in this regard even though I do not approve of the utilization of judicial notice with respect to land values, particularly if premised upon the personal knowledge of the judge. I see absolutely no purpose in reversing this judgment and remanding it for a further hearing. The parties will have to employ an expert to provide an opinion with respect to the value of the property and will have to absorb the further expenses of litigation. That determination of value will probably have no substantial impact upon the approach taken by the trial court in endeavoring to secure the payment of the alimony. The expense seems an unwarranted price for the parties to absorb in order for this court to discipline the trial judge for this indiscretion.
In retrospect, it is clear that we should have granted the appellee’s motion to strike the reply brief in this case. I think we permitted it simply because of an assumption that it really would not make any difference in our consideration of the case. *1000Now we have made the point raised in the appellant’s reply brief case dispositive without affording the appellee an opportunity to respond by oral argument or otherwise. I question the fundamental fairness of that approach.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.