Court Opinion

ID: 9931243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 18:02:47.242398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:36.623508
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G., B.B., and
                          H.B.

                             No. 1 CA-JV 23-0117
                              FILED 2-8-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
                        No. P1300JD202200002
                The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer PC, Anthem
By Florence M. Bruemmer
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Dawn Rachelle Williams
Counsel for Appellee

Myers & Associates PLLC, Scottsdale
By Jamie N. Myers
Counsel for Appellee Children
         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G. et al.
                       Decision of the Court

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1            Tiffany G. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination
of her parental rights to three children. Because Mother did not show good
cause for failing to appear at the initial termination hearing, sufficient
evidence supported termination, and termination was in the children’s best
interests, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             Mother is the biological parent of C.G. (born in March 2016),
B.B. (born in June 2021), and H.B. (born in July 2022) (collectively,
“Children”). After receiving reports that Mother was not providing proper
care for Children, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to
have C.G. and B.B. declared dependent. When Mother did not contest the
allegations, the juvenile court adjudicated C.G. and B.B. dependent. As a
newborn, H.B. was hospitalized with several congenital conditions
stemming from a shortened bowel. H.B.’s medical providers recommended
that she reside no more than an hour away from Phoenix due to her
anticipated medical needs. After H.B. was discharged from the hospital in
September 2022, DCS petitioned to have H.B. declared dependent. Mother
did not contest the petition’s allegations, and the juvenile court adjudicated
H.B. dependent.

¶3            Both before and after the dependency proceedings, Mother
struggled with substance abuse. In January 2022, she tested positive for
methamphetamine and THC. She failed to provide urine samples for
testing from the end of July 2022 until January 2023, despite claiming to be
sober. When she finally provided a sample in January 2023, she tested
positive for methamphetamine.

¶4            DCS also documented that Mother inconsistently participated
in services and consistently offered excuses for poor attendance, which
resulted in her being dropped from multiple services for non-attendance.

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         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G. et al.
                       Decision of the Court

DCS arranged transportation for Mother, but she either cancelled or refused
transportation when it arrived.

¶5            Initially, Mother’s housing did not have running water and
DCS expressed concern about sufficient heat because Mother could not
afford propane. DCS reported that Mother later found a residence that
could be suitable, but DCS had not been able to determine by the time of
termination if the residence could meet H.B.’s medical needs.

¶6           DCS also documented domestic violence between Mother
and B.B. and H.B.’s father (“Father”). Father was arrested and served time
in jail stemming from a domestic-violence incident with Mother. DCS
believed Father was residing with Mother after his release. He denied
living with Mother but did not confirm to DCS where he otherwise lived.

¶7             Mother inconsistently visited Children. She attended less
than half of her scheduled visits with C.G. and B.B. Mother spent
“minimal” time with H.B. in the hospital, either arriving late or ending
visits early. The medical staff struggled to contact her, and they described
Mother as being “covered in dirt and smelling of cigarettes” when she did
visit.

¶8           In March 2023, DCS moved for termination and sent a notice
to Mother about the initial hearing. The notice included the date and time
for the hearing and explained the potential consequences for failing to
appear, including termination of parental rights.

¶9           Mother did not attend the initial termination hearing on April
18, 2023. Mother’s attorney explained to the court that Mother sent
“numerous e-mails” that morning explaining that her car had broken
down. DCS informed the court that it had e-mailed Mother a week before
the hearing to confirm whether she needed transportation. Mother
responded yes, and “within minutes” DCS requested a location to pick her
up, but Mother never responded. DCS did not know where to pick Mother
up because she had been evicted from her last residence. The court found
Mother failed to appear without good cause, proceeded with an accelerated
termination hearing, and found that Mother’s non-appearance resulted in
her admitting the allegations in the termination motion.

¶10          The DCS case manager testified Children were dependent
because of substance abuse, lack of housing, and domestic violence. Then,
by mostly answering “yes” to a series of leading questions, the DCS case
manager explained the reason Mother’s parental rights should be
terminated. The case manager asserted that Mother continued to use drugs,

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

did not regularly participate in rehabilitative services, and failed to make
the necessary changes to ensure Children’s safety.

¶11          The DCS case manager testified that B.B. and C.G. were in
adoptive placement with family. H.B. was not in adoptive placement
because she needed to reside within one hour of Phoenix, but she had
family members who were actively involved and willing to adopt her once
the one-hour restriction was lifted. The DCS case manager testified that
continuing the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to Children
because of “the illegal substance used by [Mother] and because of the
domestic violence in the home.” The court also took judicial notice of prior
DCS court reports.

¶12           The court found there was clear and convincing evidence to
terminate Mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) because her
“continued drug use has prevented her from adequately parenting the
[C]hildren in a safe home environment.” The court also found termination
was appropriate as to H.B. under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b) because she had
been in out-of-home placement for six months, and as to C.G. and B.B.
under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) because they had been in out-of-home
placement for fifteen months. The court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that termination was in Children’s best interests because adoption
would provide permanency and stability, and continuing the parent-child
relationship would be detrimental because of Mother’s substance abuse and
her ongoing relationship with Father.

¶13            Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §
8-235(A).

                               DISCUSSION

¶14           Mother argues she had good cause for failing to appear at the
initial termination hearing and that she is not required to show she had a
meritorious defense. If she is required to show a meritorious defense, she
says she had two—there was insufficient evidence for termination and
termination was not in Children’s best interests.

¶15            “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children as
they see fit, but that right is not without limitation.” Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79 ¶ 14 (App. 2001). We will affirm a juvenile
court’s termination order unless it is clearly erroneous. Alma S. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151 ¶ 18 (2018).

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         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G. et al.
                       Decision of the Court

I.     Mother’s Required Showing

¶16            Mother first argues that she need only show good cause for
her failure to appear and is not required to demonstrate a meritorious
defense. Mother cites our supreme court’s decision in Trisha A. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 84 (2019), for the proposition that a meritorious
defense is not required “because the good cause inquiry centers on the
justification for nonappearance at a hearing and necessarily precedes a final
severance judgment.”

¶17             Mother misconstrues Trisha A. and the rules of procedure
underlying its analysis. The supreme court held in Trisha A. that “a parent
seeking to set aside a severance judgment entered after failing to appear at
the final severance hearing . . . must show ‘good cause’ for the
nonappearance and a meritorious defense.” Id. at 89 ¶ 19. The court
explained that the juvenile court’s inquiry into the reasons for non-
appearance prior to, or during, a hearing is centered exclusively around
“good cause.” Id. at 89 ¶ 21. “Thus, parents who appear before the end of
a hearing . . . are not required to show a meritorious defense because they
are not seeking to set aside a judgment but rather to establish good cause
for their late appearance.” Id. But once the juvenile court finds that a parent
does not have good cause for non-appearance and enters judgment, the
parent must provide “good cause” and a meritorious defense to have the
judgment set aside. Id. at 89 ¶ 22. “At this procedural stage, a parent must
provide ‘good cause’ for their nonappearance and prove a meritorious
defense.” See id.

¶18          During the termination hearing itself, Mother did not have to
demonstrate a meritorious defense to show good cause for her non-
appearance. See id. at 89 ¶ 19. But because the juvenile court found that
Mother did not have good cause for her non-appearance and then entered
judgment terminating her parental rights, Mother is now required to show
good cause and a meritorious defense. Id. at 89 ¶ 22.

II.    Good Cause

¶19           Mother asserts she had good cause for her absence. She
argues DCS was aware that she was evicted, did not have a cell phone, and
was unable to pay for transportation to attend the hearing. We review the
juvenile court’s finding that a parent failed to appear without good cause
for an abuse of discretion and will reverse only if “the juvenile court’s
exercise of that discretion was ‘manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on

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         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G. et al.
                       Decision of the Court

untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.’” Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 101 ¶ 15 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

¶20           Good cause requires “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect[.]” Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 304
¶ 16 (App. 2007). Excusable neglect is viewed according to how a
reasonably prudent person would act in the same circumstances. Ulibarri
v. Gerstenberger, 178 Ariz. 151, 163 (App. 1993). Because accelerating a
termination hearing is discretionary, the juvenile court should “consider a
parent’s willingness to participate in the case, including availing
themselves of services . . . and the stage of the process.” Trisha A., 247 Ariz.
at 88 ¶ 14.

¶21            The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding
Mother was absent without good cause. Mother argues that transportation
issues prevented her from attending the hearing. This, however, was not
Mother’s first time with transportation issues. Rather, Mother experienced
transportation issues throughout the proceedings. DCS, therefore, offered
Mother transportation services. On several occasions, DCS arranged for
transportation, but Mother was not present for pickup or declined
transportation. Other times, Mother claimed her vehicle had broken down,
preventing her from making it to the transportation provider’s pickup spot
to attend certain services. On a few occasions, Mother was able to find
alternative transportation for visitation.

¶22            DCS informed the court that one week prior to the
termination hearing, DCS contacted Mother to ask whether she needed
transportation to the hearing. Mother responded that she needed
transportation. DCS was aware that Mother had been evicted and,
therefore, it did not know where she was living. So DCS repeatedly asked
Mother for an address where she could be picked up. Mother never
responded. Yet, on the morning of the hearing, Mother sent her counsel
numerous emails claiming that her car had broken down and her phone
was not in service. Mother has never adequately explained why she was
able to contact counsel by email but did not respond to DCS’s repeated
requests for an address. Mother has also not explained why she did not
arrange for alternative transportation given the unreliability of her vehicle.
Even when it became apparent that Mother would not be able to attend the
hearing, she did not seek a continuance. The superior court did not abuse
its discretion in finding that Mother’s absence was without good cause. See
Adrian E., 215 Ariz. at 101 ¶ 15.

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

III.   Meritorious Defense

¶23            Mother argues she has a meritorious defense because there
was insufficient evidence supporting termination and termination was not
in Children’s best interests. To terminate a parent’s rights, the juvenile
court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the
grounds in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) exists and must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M.,
210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz.
246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). We will “affirm a termination order unless the juvenile
court abuses its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported by
reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474
¶ 14 (2022). We will accept the juvenile court’s factual findings if supported
by reasonable evidence and inferences. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, ___ ¶ 30 (2023). We will not disturb the juvenile court’s
conclusions for insufficient evidence unless no one could reasonably find
the evidence to be sufficient. Id. at ___ ¶ 31.

       A.      Statutory Grounds for Termination

¶24            Mother argues that the DCS case manager’s testimony, which
mostly consisted of “yes” answers to leading questions, did not provide
enough specificity for the court to justify termination. Mother, however,
did not object to the form of questioning. But even without that testimony,
the record sufficiently supports the court’s findings. See Alice M. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 70, 74 ¶ 13 (App. 2015).

¶25           The court found the evidence satisfied A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) as
one ground for termination. That statute permits termination if “the parent
is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of
chronic abuse of dangerous drugs [or] controlled substances . . . and there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a
prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The record
reflected Mother’s positive drug tests for methamphetamine and THC in
January 2022 and methamphetamine in January 2023, along with her
avoidance of testing and inconsistent participation in services, including
substance-abuse treatment. See Raymond F. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 224 Ariz.
373, 379 ¶¶ 27, 29 (App. 2010) (noting parent’s history of drug use, positive
drug tests, and “a two-month period in which he did not submit to testing”
as “evidence [the parent] has not overcome his dependence on drugs” and
that drug use was chronic and would continue). Not only does Mother not
dispute any of these facts, but the court also found Mother’s failure to
appear constituted an admission to the allegations in the motion for

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

termination. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 351(c)(2)(A). One could reasonably find
those admissions and the other evidence presented during the termination
hearing sufficient to satisfy A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) by clear and convincing
evidence. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at ___ ¶ 31. We, therefore, need not
address whether Mother has a meritorious defense to the other statutory
grounds for termination. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 376 ¶ 14.

       B.      Children’s Best Interests

¶26           Mother also argues termination was not in Children’s best
interests because C.G. and B.B. were in adoptive placements with family
members, and H.B. was not officially in adoptive placement because of her
medical restrictions. Termination is in a child’s best interests if DCS proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the child will benefit from
termination, or (2) the child will be harmed without termination. Alma S.,
245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13. The juvenile court must consider the totality of
circumstances at the time of termination. Id.

¶27            The court found termination was in Children’s best interests
because adoption would provide permanency and stability, and continuing
a relationship with Mother would be detrimental because of her drug use
and ongoing relationship with Father. Mother’s argument focuses on
Children’s placement—C.G. and B.B. with family and H.B. in a group
home—stating they “received no benefit” from terminating her parental
rights. While not the only fact to consider, “[i]t is well established in state-
initiated cases that the child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can
support a best-interests finding.” Id. (quoting Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F.,
239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016)). Two of the three children were in adoptive
placement with family and the other can be when medical restrictions are
lifted. Adoption will provide Children with the benefit of permanency and
stability in their relationship with adoptive placements.

¶28           Mother also challenges the court’s finding of continued
harm—she argues the testimony did not include sufficient details about her
use of illegal substances or involvement in domestic violence. But the
record includes evidence about Mother’s substance abuse and lack of
participation in services, and a domestic violence incident between Mother
and Father in January 2023, that resulted in Father's incarceration.
Moreover, DCS believed Father was residing with Mother following his
release and at the time of termination. We find no error in the court’s
conclusion that Children would be harmed if termination was denied.

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        IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G. et al.
                      Decision of the Court

                          CONCLUSION

¶29           We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s
parental rights.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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