Court Opinion

ID: 9638185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:37:01.365167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:04.681853
License: Public Domain

*518BLACKMAR, Judge,
dissenting.
The record adequately demonstrates that Wanda Standridge received AFDC benefits solely because the children of her marriage to the defendant were with her. Under these circumstances we should hold that the defendant had an enforceable obligation to repay those sums into the public treasury. The judgment, therefore, should be affirmed.
I agree with much of the principal opinion. The opinion properly holds that the defendant’s present inability to pay, if established, does not preclude a judgment for child support. Defendant’s duty to support exists without regard to his means. He should restore support monies properly chargeable to him when he is able to do so. If that time never comes the judgment against him will be worthless, but this is not an unusual state of affairs in the world of judgments. I also agree that this case should be decided as a matter of common law without reference to § 454.465, RSMo 1983 Cum.Supp., adopted in 1982, which was apparently enacted to enlarge the state’s right of recoupment.
My disagreement with the principal opinion arises from its characterization of the payments to Wanda. Wanda was entitled to nothing in her own right. The payments were made to her solely because she had the custody of the defendant’s child at the time she left him, and gave birth to another child of his while she was living apart from him. § 208.040, RSMo 1978.
AFDC benefits are calculated on the basis of the minimum income required to support children. This minimum income figure is not a product of speculation or conjecture, but is instead based on a uniform state formula. The “poverty income guidelines” published by the Office of Community Services set forth income figures, below which a family is considered impoverished. The latest figures specify $5,690 for a family of two and $7,070 for a family of three. The amounts here involved, being less than half of the federal figures, may surely be found to be required for the support of the children, with only marginal support for the homemaker, without which she would be unable to maintain the children in her home. The amounts are so modest that it is difficult to imagine that Wanda used any substantial portion for purposes of her own not related to the support of the children.
The principal opinion recognizes the duty of a father to support his child even though the child is not in his physical custody. This father allowed the state of Missouri to perform his duty. He was not powerless when his wife left him and moved to Missouri. He could have sought custody of the children for himself, or could have placed the mother in funds so that she would not have to seek public assistance. He received inquiries from the Missouri public assistance authorities regarding his means for providing support, but made no response. When he made no attempt at further solution, he demonstrated his satisfaction with the existing state of affairs.
The cases cited in the principal opinion, as well as those cited in Judge Manford’s dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, did not involve AFDC benefits. If a mother who has abstracted the children is claiming support money for herself, it is reasonable to require her to show that she was justified in leaving her husband. A storekeeper who extends credit to a deserting wife is not without means of protection. The equities of the government are greater. I would hold that the defendant father is required to reimburse the public treasury, even though he might be found to be without fault so that his wife’s action in leaving him was quite unjustified. This point has not been covered by any existing case.
This defendant, it is true, was living in Arkansas when his wife left him and traveled to Missouri. This circumstance is not significant. Arkansas law, just as Missouri law, recognizes the common law duty of a father to support his children. Aaron v. Aaron, 228 Ark. 27, 305 S.W.2d 550 (1957). If there are any holdings in Arkansas law which are more favorable to the defendant, he should point to these. Otherwise it is proper to assume that the common law of *519Arkansas is the same as Missouri’s, and that Arkansas would make the same adaptations that Missouri would. 1 Conflict of Laws Restatement, § 136, Comment h.
The principal opinion would effectively require the state to try and to establish an old-fashioned divorce case in order to recover from a father who has suffered his children to be supported out of the public treasury. Such a requirement is neither necessary nor desirable. The common law should recognize the right of a state to recoup monies which are payable by law only to a person who has custody of dependent children, from the person required by law to support those children.
I would affirm the judgment.