Court Opinion

ID: 9744629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:10:47.872557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.608418
License: Public Domain

FOURT, J.
I dissent.
It is my opinion that the trial judge in this case properly disposed of the matter.
It is to be remembered that all of those who were em*697ployed at the Los Angeles plant of the respondent (insofar as this ease is concerned) were members of the same local union, consisting of three units: namely, the office and clerical workers, the engineers, and the production and maintenance workers. Bach member of each unit took the same oath upon becoming a member, paid the same dues, had the same right to participate in the election of and was governed by the common local officers of the union. The three contracts for the units which were made by the union with the company were substantially the same. The contract with reference to the production and maintenance workers did not prohibit the calling of a strike over rates of production.
The executive board of the local union recommended that a strike vote be taken by the production workers unit. The board was made up principally of the officers of the union who had been elected by all of the members of the union. After approval was secured from the International Union the strike was called and as an inevitable result of the strike which was called, the applicants in this case (office and clerical workers) were laid off.
The by-laws and the constitution of the union provide in effect that the union is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all of the members. The union acts irrevocably as the agent of each member and has the sole power to bind such members in the prosecution of all disputes with reference to the relationship between the members and the company.
The trial judge found in part as follows: (1) claimants were laid off as a direct consequence of the strike, (2) the resultant lay-off was reasonably foreseeable, (3) the claimants were directly interested in the trade dispute which gave rise to the strike, (4) the members of the union, including the applicants, acquiesced in all acts of the union in connection with the trade dispute, (5) the members, including the applicants, acceded to and were bound by the actions of their representatives in the union, (6) the claimants were voluntarily unemployed, and (7) that all of the allegations of the respondents’ amended petition were true.
As I view it no one of the three groups of the union was insulated from the other. They worked together, each received the same benefits from the union and I believe each should share the responsibilities of the union. In other words, a member of the union, under the circumstances of this case, *698ought to he bound by the course which is taken by his duly constituted and elected agents, namely the officers of the union.
If the officers of a union call a strike, by the very nature of events all of the members of the union are affected thereby in some way, whether they actually participate in picket lines or do otherwise. It was inevitable that all of the members of the union in question would ultimately be laid off if those who produced the product were out on strike. Each member of the union contributed to the strike fund and each had a vital interest in the strike and the outcome thereof. The contributions were made to the strike fund by the applicants in part with the hope or expectation that the company would ultimately be compelled in the case of a strike to comply with the demands of the union.
It would seem a fact of life that where, as here, there is a single union in a single plant of a company, and the union is successful in one division of its activities, ordinarily it becomes easier for the union to settle and dispose of some other or similar problem or problems in another division of its activity in the same plant. The success or failure of a union is not necessarily based upon an immediate acceptance of all of its demands upon all fronts simultaneously.
There was nothing to stop the claimants in this case from participating in the moves of the union preliminary to the calling of the strike. Indeed they were very active in such endeavors.
It is clear that it was a part of the union strategy in its dealings with the company to proceed as it did. The union undoubtedly felt that if it could deal with one segment of the company’s business and get all that it demanded, it would be simple to apply the same procedure regarding other matters such as wages, to other segments of the same business.
In this case the claimants were part and parcel of the union which called the strike. The union deliberately maneuvered the situation to the point where the work had to stop. The act of the union shut down the plant. It was the union which wanted to and did change the status quo. Can it reasonably be said that the applicants here were unemployed through no fault of their ownt
The applicants knew when they joined the union that the union would thereafter speak for them in any contract negotiations and otherwise—they knew that the union could and might call the very strike which it did call and that if such a *699strike were called they would he out of work; further the applicants agreed to and did voluntarily contribute to the strike fund of the union. The agents (the union representatives) of the applicants themselves in effect put the applicants out of work. There was no intervening cause. There can be no doubt that the applicants in a very real sense had a financial interest in the strike and in the outcome of the strike in more ways than one.
Section 1262 of the Unemployment Insurance Code reads as follows:
“§ 1262. [Strike; ineligibility.] An individual is not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, and no such benefit shall be payable to him,, if he left his work because of a trade dispute. Such individual shall remain ineligible for the period during which he continues out of work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is still in active progress in the establishment in which he was employed.”
A literal reading of the statute in question presents little if any problem. What has created a very serious problem, however, is the interpretation put upon the words of the statute by courts which have determined in effect to make or establish social policy. Courts little by little have added to or subtracted from the definitions of the words contained in the statute until now it is difficult to recognize the plain simple language of the statute from the decisions.
The applicants in this case are not in any sense the innocent victims of a trade dispute between a union and an employer. The applicants and each of them had a free choice in their determination as to whether or not they would go to work for Chrysler—they (each) also had the right in the first instance to decide their own fate but they transferred that right to the union, and the union called the strike.
I cannot attribute to the Legislature that it intended to adopt a statute which in effect (as interpreted by the majority of this court) would provide that strikes should in any part be financed out of unemployment insurance compensation funds —particularly so when the real reason for the statute in the first instance was to alleviate economic insecurity resulting from involuntary employment. (See 28 A.L.R.2d 287.)
My reading of the history of the unemployment insurance statute leads me to believe that it was never contemplated that industry and the public would be required to finance large numbers of workers who were out of work because their union *700was out on strike. The bargaining strength of the union is greatly strengthened by the majority opinion in this case and in my view places the state and the court in a position which is anything but neutral. If it is anticipated ultimately to abolish for all intents and purposes the disqualification provisions of the statute then this case is indeed a long step in that direction.
In short this court now holds that a company can be compelled to finance in part a strike against itself. The company has incurred a further loss through added payroll taxes as its rating falls and the fund itself is reduced for those who are honestly entitled to participate in benefits.
The majority opinion completely disregards the evidence in this ease and the rule of law to the effect that if there is substantial evidence to support the findings of fact of the trial court an appellate court will not interfere.
It is easily apparent from the facts of this case that the union determined the entire strategy for the whole strike in this case far in advance of the calling of such strike. The officers who made the determination to strike were in the position of power in part because of the applicants. The officers in their action were acting for and in behalf of the members, the applicants.
It has been argued from time to time that the labor dispute disqualification provisions of the statute should be abolished. If the argument is sound then it should be done by the Legislature and not by court decisions.
The majority opinion opens the doors wide for the “key man” strike and for all other employees of a plant so struck to receive unemployment insurance.
A thorough reading of Prentice v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 161 Pa. Super. 630 [56 A.2d 295], will disclose that the court interpreted a Pennsylvania statute very similar to the statute in question. The result in the Pennsylvania case was exactly the opposite to the result reached by the majority here.
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 21, 1962. Fourt, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 28, 1962. MeComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.