Court Opinion

ID: 9897431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:28.76115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:26.031275
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Apr 10 2023, 8:29 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark K. Leeman                                              Theodore E. Rokita
Leeman Law Office                                           Attorney General of Indiana
Logansport, Indiana                                         Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                            George P. Sherman
                                                            Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                            General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Rachel W. Baker,                                            April 10, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CR-998
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Cass Superior
                                                            Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable Lisa Swaim, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            09D02-2102-F5-5

                                   Opinion by Judge May
                            Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023                                    Page 1 of 30
[1]   Rachel W. Baker appeals her conviction of Level 5 felony possession of

      methamphetamine at a penal facility. 1 She presents three arguments, which we

      consolidate and restate as:

              1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
              into evidence the methamphetamine found on Baker during a
              search incident to arrest; and

              2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence Baker was
              voluntarily in the Cass County Jail as required to elevate her
              conviction of possession of methamphetamine from a Level 6
              felony to a Level 5 felony.

      We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History                                 2

[2]   At approximately 3:17 a.m. on February 3, 2021, Indiana State Police Trooper

      Chad Babbs initiated a traffic stop of a “Ford pickup truck, brown or reddish in

      color,” after he observed the driver of the truck was not wearing a seatbelt. (Tr.

      Vol. II at 64.) The driver, later identified as Luther Baker (“Luther”), provided

      Trooper Babbs with his license and registration. Luther admitted he was

      driving without a seatbelt. Luther also told Trooper Babbs “the vehicle was not

      1
        Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1 (possession of methamphetamine); Ind. Code § 35-48-1-16.5(7)(A) (enhancement
      for possession of illegal substance in a penal facility).
      2
        We held oral argument on this case on February 14, 2023, at Indiana State University. We thank counsel
      for their presentations and David Bolk, his students, and other ISU faculty for their hospitality.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023                             Page 2 of 30
      properly registered” because Luther “had purchased [it] approximately two

      weeks prior.” (Id. at 66.)

[1]   Trooper Babbs observed two women sitting on the bench seat next to Luther.

      He obtained the VIN number for the vehicle and asked the women for

      identification. The first woman told Trooper Babbs her name was Taylor Hall

      and gave her date of birth. The second woman told Trooper Babbs her name

      was Julie Johnson and provided a date of birth. Trooper Babbs returned to his

      car to run computer checks on the VIN number and all of the occupants. He

      found out Hall had a warrant for her arrest, but he was unable to find

      information on Julie Johnson using the date of birth given to him by the second

      woman. Trooper Babbs contacted the Cass County Sheriff’s Department and

      spoke with Deputy Jacqueline Beebout, who told him the woman may be

      Baker. Trooper Babbs entered the information Deputy Beebout gave him about

      Baker into his computer. The computer search provided a BMV picture of

      Baker that matched the second woman in the truck. The computer search also

      indicated there was an active arrest warrant for Baker for a probation violation.

[2]   Trooper Babbs spoke again with Deputy Beebout and asked her to come to the

      scene for back up. Trooper Babbs returned to the truck and explained the seat

      belt citation to Luther. He then asked Luther, Hall, and Baker to exit the

      vehicle. When Deputy Beebout arrived on the scene, she searched Hall and

      Baker. Trooper Babbs arrested Hall and Baker on their outstanding warrants

      and told them he would be transporting them to the Cass County Jail. Trooper

      Babbs told Hall and Baker “that if they had anything else on their person going

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023        Page 3 of 30
      into the Cass County Jail, that they would catch an additional charge for

      trafficking.” (App. Vol. II at 22.) Both women indicated “they did not have

      anything on their person.” (Id.)

[3]   Deputy Beebout transported Hall and Baker to the Cass County Jail. When

      they arrived, there were “posters or signs . . . on the sliding doors inside the

      garage” indicating that bringing illegal substances or paraphernalia into the jail

      would result in a Level 5 felony charge. (Tr. Vol. II at 217.) Correctional

      Officer Kayla Kennedy completed the intake process with Baker. Before she

      searched Baker, Officer Kennedy asked Baker if she currently possessed any

      illegal substances. Baker indicated she did not. Officer Kennedy performed a

      “[p]retty intensive pat down” and discovered a small bag containing what

      Officer Kennedy suspected to be methamphetamine in Baker’s pocket. (Id.)

      Subsequent laboratory testing confirmed the substance was methamphetamine.

[4]   Based thereon, on February 3, 2021, the State charged Baker with Level 5

      felony possession of methamphetamine at a penal facility. On November 23,

      2021, the State charged Baker with the lesser-included offense of Level 6 felony

      possession of methamphetamine. 3 On December 12, 2021, Baker filed a

      motion to dismiss the Level 5 felony possession charge because she “was not

      voluntarily at the Cass County Jail, and her conduct was, therefore, neither

      knowing or [sic] intentional.” (App. Vol. II at 66.) She further asserted that,

      3
          Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023          Page 4 of 30
      “[e]ven if she was aware of the presence of methamphetamine, the Defendant

      had the right to remain silent, and was not required to incriminate herself by

      volunteering that there was a baggie of Methamphetamine.” (Id.)

[5]   On December 16, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Baker’s motion to

      dismiss. Baker argued, in part:

              Knowing or intentional is a, an element of the offense that she’s
              charged with and so the question is at the point that she had the
              ability to act voluntarily, which was when she put that baggie in
              her pocket at some point, did she [do so] knowing or intending
              that that baggie would be in the jail.

      (Tr. Vol. II at 42.) Baker also argued requiring her to disclose her possession of

      the methamphetamine before it was found in her pocket was a violation of her

      Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial court denied the

      motion to dismiss and stated from the bench:

              I think that there is a real element of public policy and safety
              concern regarding people who bring items of contraband into a
              jail facility. A facility where people are being held against their
              will because they are, they have charges or whatnot or they’re
              serving a sentence and I think there is a, a real, at least in my
              mind, a real element of concern about making sure that someone
              doesn’t bring drugs into the jail or a knife into the jail or other
              items into the jail that could pose a danger to those people that
              are being held in the jail. And I think that that public policy
              argument is, is paramount in determining whether or not
              someone’s going to be held accountable for bringing items into
              the jail. I think that’s a very important element of this. But I also
              think that if there’s an individual who knows that they’re
              entering a facility, they know that they have drugs on their

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023           Page 5 of 30
        person and I think that the law in many instances and in most
        instances, indicates that if a person is actually carrying an item
        on their person, whether it be drugs or a weapon, a gun or, you
        know, whatever, and that it’s actually being carried on their
        person, that they have actual knowledge that it is on their person,
        then I think the law in most instances will indicate that, that the
        person if they are carrying something in their clothing or on their
        person, and they have, that’s a pretty good indication that they
        have knowledge that it is there. And if they are entering a facility
        with the knowledge that they have some piece of contraband on
        their person then I think that they’re in a situation where they are
        taking a, a risk of bringing something into a facility that would
        qualify them for the enhancing circumstance of carrying
        contraband of some kind into a penal facility that would increase
        or enhance the possible penalty for a regular possession, whether
        it be drugs or whatnot. In this case it’s drugs. So the fact that
        you have a person, and in this case, Ms. Baker, who has been
        arrested and is being taken to the facility and you have a person
        that is the arresting officer or the receiving officer in the jail in the
        facility asking this individual if they have any items of
        contraband or any drugs on their person, that, that they, they
        could tell them, they could tell the individual that is working
        there before they step over a threshold that would be considering
        actually inside the facility, and I think in this case is happens in
        Sally Port [at the Cass County Jail] or somewhere outside of the
        Sally Port, they have the opportunity to bring that to light before
        they are taken into the facility, I see that as opportunity that that
        arresting officer or receiving officer is giving to the arrested
        individual to remind them if they have anything that would be
        considered contraband on their person that it would be better for
        them to, to produce that prior to walking into the jail. Do they
        have to produce it? No they do not. They have the choice. They
        absolutely have the right against self-incrimination. They do not
        have to, to tell the officer that they in fact have a, a bag of
        narcotics or a gun on their person or any, a knife, or any other
        thing that they have on their person. They have no duty to tell
        the officer. But the officer is giving them, I believe, an

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023              Page 6 of 30
        opportunity to bring that fact to light before they step over the
        threshold of the jail and the, I think the officer is telling them that
        for two reasons. Number one, for the safety and security of the
        jail and, number two, because they’re letting them know that
        there is this enhancing circumstance that it will be worse if you
        don’t tell us and we find these, some, some item on you when
        you step over the threshold. The, there is an enhancing
        circumstance, and it will mean that you would be facing a
        potential higher penalty and I find that to be a, a piece of very
        helpful information to an individual just in case they don’t know
        that part of the law. I think that the receiving individual or the
        arresting individual is doing, is telling them this for two reasons.
        Number one, keep the jail safe and secure. Number two, don’t
        charge someone with some, with, with the enhancing
        circumstance if you can save them that, that trouble if they would
        like to be forthcoming in regard to, or if they would like to,
        maybe even suggest that the officer search them again. I suppose
        there’s even that possibility that the person might say, “I don’t
        want to incriminate myself, but you, you could search me again,
        officer, if, you know, just to make sure I don’t have any kind of,
        any other contraband on my person.” There, there would be
        some possibility to, to indicate that they should search a second
        time just to make sure for everyone’s wellbeing. In this case Ms.
        Baker did not have to admit that she had contraband on her and
        according to the Probable Cause in the case she, she may not
        have done so and, and then later when items were allegedly
        found on her person, they did result in a, in an enhanced charge.
        Because of that I am going to deny the defendant’s Motion to
        Dismiss Count 1 [Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine
        in a penal facility] in this matter. We do have – just a moment. I
        don’t believe, also I don’t believe that the enhancing
        circumstance would only come into play if an individual was
        brought or if an individual walks into the jail or their own free
        will. I think that that enhancing circumstance should still apply
        to any individual that enters the jail. I believe that, and that was
        kind of a, a second issue in regard to this because the defendant
        was brought into the jail against her will because she was in fact

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023            Page 7 of 30
                 being arrested for an alleged offense. But I don’t believe that the
                 enhancing circumstance in this case should be relegated to only
                 those individuals who are entering the jail of, not under arrest
                 because the purpose, I believe, of the enhancing circumstance is
                 to maintain the safety and integrity and the security of the jail
                 and I don’t believe that this, the fact that she was under arrest
                 would change my opinion of this, of this request[.]

      (Id. at 46-8) (errors in original).

[6]   On February 13, 2022, Baker filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine

      seized from her pocket at the jail. The trial court held a hearing on the motion

      on February 18, 2021. Baker argued, based on the Indiana Seatbelt

      Enforcement Act (“the ISEA”), 4 that Trooper Babbs was not authorized to ask

      Baker to identify herself during the traffic stop. Therefore, she contended, the

      methamphetamine found during the subsequent search at the Cass County Jail

      should be suppressed. The trial court denied Baker’s motion to suppress.

[7]   On February 23, 2022, the trial court held a jury trial in the case. During trial

      Baker objected to the admission of the methamphetamine found in her pocket,

      and the trial court overruled that objection. The jury returned a guilty verdict

      on both charges against Baker. The trial court entered a conviction of only the

      Level 5 felony to avoid double jeopardy concerns and imposed a four-year

      4
          Ind. Code § 9-19-10-3.1(a).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023                Page 8 of 30
      sentence, with two years to be served in community corrections if Baker

      qualified and was accepted into that placement.

      Discussion and Decision
      1. Admission of Evidence
[8]   Baker argues she was not required to identify herself under the ISEA and, thus,

      the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the methamphetamine

      found in her pocket during a subsequent search. Our standard of review

      following admission of evidence after the denial of a motion to suppress is well-

      settled:

              When ruling on the admission of evidence at trial following
              denial of a motion to suppress, a trial court must consider the
              foundational evidence presented at trial. It also considers
              evidence from the suppression hearing that is favorable to the
              defendant only to the extent it is uncontradicted at trial. A trial
              court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess
              witness credibility, and we review its rulings on admissibility for
              an abuse of discretion and reverse only if a ruling is clearly
              against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the
              error affects a party’s substantial rights. However, the ultimate
              determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a
              question of law that we review de novo.

      Gerth v. State, 51 N.E.3d 368, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations and

      quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up).

[9]   The ISEA states, in relevant part, “a vehicle may be stopped to determine

      compliance with this chapter. However, a vehicle, the contents of a vehicle, the
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023         Page 9 of 30
       driver of a vehicle, or a passenger in a vehicle may not be inspected, searched,

       or detained solely because of a violation of this chapter.” Ind. Code § 9-19-10-

       3.1(a). Law enforcement officers can initiate a traffic stop pursuant to the ISEA

       “only where they [have] reasonable suspicion that a seat belt violation [has]

       occurred.” State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. 2010). The plain

       language of the statute requires “‘that when a stop to determine seat belt

       compliance is made, the police are strictly prohibited from determining

       anything else, even if other law would permit.’” Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Reagan,

       715 N.E.2d 332, 339 (Ind. 1999)). However, we have held,

               when circumstances arise after the initial stop that create
               reasonable suspicion of other crimes, further reasonable
               inspection, search, or detention is no longer “solely” because of a
               seatbelt violation and does not contravene the plain language of
               the statute. The officer may only expand his or her investigation
               subsequent to the stop if other circumstances arise after the stop,
               which independently provide the officer with reasonable
               suspicion of other crimes.

       State v. Morris, 732 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[10]   Baker argues “when Trooper Babbs approached the vehicle, there was no

       indication of any criminal activity inside the vehicle beyond the seatbelt

       violation.” (Br. of Appellant at 23) (emphasis in original omitted). She further

       asserts:

               There was no furtive movement by the driver or his passengers,
               no concerns about weapons and bulges, or even nervous behavior
               by anyone. And the women’s responses to Trooper Babbs’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023        Page 10 of 30
               questioning did not raise any independent reasonable suspicion
               of criminal activity. There was no reason to question, inspect,
               detain, or search the passengers.

       (Id.) Thus, she contends, Trooper Babbs’s search of the vehicle violated the

       ISEA. However, we disagree with Baker based on the holdings of Trigg v. State,

       725 N.E.2d 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), and Richardson.

[11]   In Trigg, a panel of this Court held an officer, Detective Stone, had reasonable

       suspicion to investigate further after initiating a traffic stop based on an alleged

       violation of the ISEA. 725 N.E.2d at 449. In that case, Detective Stone

       initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Trigg was riding after observing

       Trigg and the other occupants of the vehicle not wearing their seatbelts. Id. at

       448. Upon approaching the passenger side of the vehicle, where Trigg was

       sitting, Detective Stone noted “Trigg appeared nervous and [was] ‘fidgeting

       down in his seat as if he may be attempting to hide something[.]’” Id. (citation

       to the record omitted). Detective Stone testified he feared Trigg was hiding a

       weapon and asked Trigg to exit the vehicle. Id. When Trigg exited, Detective

       Stone observed a “pipe used to smoke crack cocaine, lying on the seat of the car

       where Trigg had been sitting.” Id. Based thereon, Detective Stone searched the

       passenger area of the vehicle and found another crack pipe. Id. The State

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023         Page 11 of 30
       subsequently charged Trigg with Class D felony possession of paraphernalia. 5

       Id.

[12]   Prior to his trial, Trigg filed a motion to suppress the crack pipes, which the trial

       court denied. Id. On appeal, Trigg argued the “police may not initiate a traffic

       stop to determine if the occupants are wearing seatbelts and, thus, evidence

       obtained as a result of such a stop must be suppressed.” Id. Our court rejected

       that argument based on the ISEA. 6 Id. Noting waiver of any argument

       regarding “the validity of the subsequent searches” as part of the traffic stop,

       our court addressed the issue waiver notwithstanding in an effort to clarify the

       ISEA:

                  A limited search for weapons after an investigative stop is not a
                  search “solely because of a violation” of the seatbelt law. Rather,
                  such a search is the result of actions or behavior on the part of the
                  defendant after the initial stop that lead a police officer to fear for
                  his safety. For this reason, a limited search for weapons does not
                  raise concerns about pretextual stops, where police stop motorists
                  under the guise of enforcing seatbelt laws when the police are
                  actually seeking to search and detain motorists for other reasons.
                  The impetus for a limited weapons search arises after the stop has
                  been made, and the purpose for the search “is not to discover
                  evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
                  investigation without fear for his safety or the safety of others.”
                  State v. Joe, 693 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans.
                  denied. Thus, [the earlier version of Indiana Code section 9-19-10-

       5
           Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3 (1998).
       6
        Trigg examined a previous version of the ISEA. The language in the current statute relevant to the issues
       before us is almost identical to the earlier version.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023                              Page 12 of 30
        3.1] cannot reasonably be interpreted to prohibit police officers
        from conducting limited weapons searches to ensure their safety
        so long as circumstances exist over and above the seatbelt
        violation itself.

Id. at 448-9. Because Detective Stone testified he believed Trigg possessed a

weapon, we then considered whether the search was reasonable:

        Once a vehicle has been properly stopped for investigative
        purposes, an officer may conduct a search for weapons without
        obtaining a search warrant if the officer reasonably believes that
        he or others may be in danger. [State v. Joe, 693 N.E.2d 573, 575
        (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.] The test for determining the
        reasonableness of the search as enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392
        U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-81, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), is
        whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
        search would warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing
        that the action taken was appropriate. Joe, 693 N.E.2d at 575.
        An officer may only conduct a limited search for weapons when
        he has a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and
        dangerous. Id. The police officer need not be absolutely certain
        that the individual is armed. Id. In determining whether the
        police officer acted reasonably under the circumstances, due
        weight must be given, not to the officer’s inchoate and
        unparticularized suspicions, but to the specific reasonable
        inferences that the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in
        light of his experience. Id.

Id. at 449. Our court held that, because Detective Stone reasonably believed

Trigg possessed a weapon, he could ask Trigg to exit the vehicle. Id. Then,

because the crack pipe was located in plain sight in Trigg’s seat, Detective Stone

could seize it under the plain view doctrine. Id. We therefore concluded the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023       Page 13 of 30
       trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Trigg’s motion to suppress

       the crack pipes. Id.

[13]   Conversely, in Richardson, our Indiana Supreme Court held Officer Tanya

       Eastwood did not have reasonable suspicion to investigate further after

       initiating a traffic stop based on an alleged seatbelt violation. 927 N.E.2d at

       384. Officer Eastwood initiated a traffic stop of Richardson’s car after she

       noticed Richardson was not wearing a seatbelt. Id. at 381. Richardson was

       cooperative with Officer Eastwood and admitted he had not been wearing his

       seatbelt. Id. Officer Eastwood noticed “a very large, unusual bulge” in

       Richardson’s pocket. Id. Officer Eastwood asked Richardson what was in his

       pocket, and Richardson told her it was his handgun. Id.

[14]   Officer Eastwood requested Richardson’s handgun permit and asked him to

       exit the vehicle. Id. Richardson complied, and Officer Eastwood performed a

       background check on Richardson after she noticed the expiration date on the

       handgun license was illegible. Id. Officer Eastwood discovered Richardson

       had prior convictions of possession of cocaine and public intoxication but the

       sentence for the conviction of possession of cocaine made her question whether

       it was truly a conviction. Id. Officer Eastwood did not investigate the matter

       further and arrested Richardson for “having a firearm with a prior felony

       conviction within the last fifteen years.” Id. (citation to the record omitted).

       Richardson resisted arrest but was eventually subdued. Id. at 382. The bulge in

       Richardson’s pocket was later determined to be cocaine he had stashed in his

       underwear. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023         Page 14 of 30
[15]   Richardson filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in connection with

       the seat belt violation. Id. The trial court granted Richardson’s motion to

       suppress, and the State appealed. Id. On appeal, the State contended Officer

       Eastwood’s inquiry regarding the bulge in Richardson’s pants was proper based

       on our Indiana Supreme Court’s earlier opinion in Washington v. State, 898

       N.E.2d 1200, 1207-8 (Ind. 2008), which held law enforcement’s inquiry

       regarding whether a motorist has a weapon during a traffic stop did not violate

       that motorist’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure under Article I,

       Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d at 383. The

       Richardson Court determined Washington did not control because Washington

       had not involved a seat belt stop. Id.

[16]   The Richardson court discussed Trigg, noting Trigg held “[a]n officer may

       conduct a limited search of inquiry concerning weapons without obtaining a

       search warrant if the officer reasonably believes that he or others are in danger.”

       Id. at 383-4. Our Indiana Supreme Court stated, based on Baldwin, that the

       ISEA “simply does not permit investigatory behavior based solely on a seat belt

       violation unless circumstances arise after the stop that independently provide

       the officer with reasonable suspicion of other crimes.” Id. at 383. “Reasonable

       suspicion exists where the facts known to the officer, together with the

       reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent

       person to believe that criminal activity has or is about to occur.” Id. at 384

       (quoting Baldwin, 715 N.E.2d at 337) (emphasis added in Richardson).

       Ultimately our Indiana Supreme Court held:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023          Page 15 of 30
               While Officer Eastwood did observe an “unusual bulge,” this fact
               standing alone did not provide the independent basis of
               reasonable suspicion that Baldwin requires, especially in light of
               Richardson’s immediate compliance and Officer Eastwood’s
               prior peaceful exchanges with Richardson. On these facts, we
               agree with the trial court that Officer Eastwood’s questioning
               about the “unusual bulge” contravened the [Indiana Seatbelt
               Enforcement] Act.

       Id. at 384 (internal citation omitted).

[17]   The facts here are similar to those in Trigg and do not cross the limit set by

       Richardson. In the case before us, Trooper Babbs testified Luther was

       cooperative when Trooper Babbs approached the car and asked for Luther’s

       identification, Luther admitted he was not wearing his seatbelt, Luther did not

       seem to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and there was no indication

       of criminal activity inside the vehicle “on first approach.” (Tr. Vol. II at 191.)

       However, Trooper Babbs also testified Luther told him “the vehicle was not

       properly registered. It was something that he had purchased approximately two

       weeks prior.” (Id. at 66.)

[18]   Indiana law requires a vehicle owner to register a vehicle on the “date the

       vehicle is acquired[.]” Ind. Code § 9-18.1-11-4. The Code provides a few

       exceptions to the immediate registration requirement, allowing a person to

       operate an unregistered vehicle on the highway for the length of a temporary

       permit or forty-five days after the person acquires a vehicle provided the license

       plate on the vehicle indicates the person owns the vehicle on which the

       unexpired license plates are affixed. Ind. Code § 9-18.1-2-8. Pursuant to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023         Page 16 of 30
       Indiana Code section 9-18.1-11-2(c), a person who owns or operates an

       unregistered vehicle that is required to be registered commits a Class C

       infraction. Thus, Trooper Babbs had reasonable suspicion to believe Luther

       committed a Class C infraction based on Luther’s statement that the vehicle

       was not properly registered. 7

[19]   Infractions are civil and not criminal, Byrd v. State, 6 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2014). However, “repetitive violations [of traffic law] can result in long

       term civil and potentially criminal consequences.” Id. Further, we have upheld

       multiple auto theft convictions based in part on a vehicle’s lack of proper

       registration. See, e.g., Muse v. State, 419 N.E.2d 1302 (Ind. 1981) (lack of proper

       registration supported conviction of Class D felony auto theft); Donovan v. State,

       937 N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (lack of proper registration

       supported conviction of Class D auto theft), trans. denied. We have also held

       lack of proper registration creates reasonable suspicion a vehicle is stolen. See

       Browder v. State, 77 N.E.3d 1209, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (the fact that the

       registration in the vehicle did not match the vehicle and did not have Browder’s

       name on it gave officer reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen), trans.

       denied.

       7
         Baker asserts the State has waived any argument regarding Luther’s possible violation of Ind. Code § 9-
       18.1-2-8 because the State did not make that argument during trial. See Leatherman v. State, 101 N.E.3d 879,
       885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (party cannot assert an argument for the first time on appeal). However, we
       exercise our discretion to consider the issue waiver notwithstanding. See Sharp v. State, 42 N.E.3d 512, 515
       (Ind. 2015) (appellate court has discretion to consider issues waived by a party).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023                               Page 17 of 30
[20]   Like the officer in Trigg, Trooper Babbs had information to suggest criminal

       activity was afoot – specifically, a registration that did not match the vehicle.

       While Trooper Babbs would have violated the ISEA if he asked for the

       registration without reasonable suspicion, see Richardson, 927 N.E.2d at 383,

       Luther’s comment that he purchased the vehicle two weeks prior and had not

       properly registered the vehicle gave Officer Babbs reasonable suspicion to

       investigate whether Luther may have committed auto theft or a related crime.

       See, e.g., Browder, 77 N.E.3d at 1216. Therefore, Officer Babbs’s request that

       Luther’s passengers, including Baker, provide identifying information did not

       run afoul of the restrictions on investigation set forth in the ISEA. 8 See, e.g.,

       Morris, 732 N.E.2d at 228 (officer can extend stop for alleged violation of the

       ISEA if he has a reasonable suspicion criminal activity is afoot).

[21]   Baker’s argument for a contrary finding is premised on a faulty interpretation of

       Trooper Babbs’s testimony on cross-examination at the suppression hearing and

       at trial. At the hearing, Trooper Babbs testified:

                [Baker]:           You mentioned that the, you noted that the license
                                   plate on the vehicle returned to a different vehicle.
                                   Is that correct?

                [Babbs]:           It was definitely a different color.

       8
         Given the narrow application of the ISEA, Baker seems to be seeking a blanket prohibition against
       obtaining seatbelt-wearing passengers’ identification absent independent reasonable suspicion or probable
       cause. Though we can find no Indiana cases addressing whether an officer may request passenger
       identification in this scenario, this is not the case presented to us. Here, the officer had a legitimate reason to
       further investigate given the inconsistent vehicle registration.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023                                     Page 18 of 30
        [Baker]:          Different color?

        [Babbs]:          Yes.

        [Baker]:          And, and did, Trooper, did the driver make some
                          statement to you about the manner in which he’d
                          acquired the vehicle that it was on at that point?

        [Babbs]:          I don’t recall that, he just recently got it two weeks
                          prior to the traffic stop.

        [Baker]:          That was what I was getting to.

        [Babbs]:          Yes. Yes.

        [Baker]:          So, he had said he’d purchases, purchased it two
                          weeks ahead?

        [Babbs]:          That’s correct.

        [Baker]:          And you, you testified you’re familiar with traffic
                          law generally, is that correct?

        [Babbs]:          Yes.

        [Baker]:          And you’re aware that when you trade in a vehicle
                          or, or get a newly acquired vehicle that you have 45
                          days that you can still use the license plate from the
                          prior vehicle. Is that correct?

        [Babbs]:          Correct.

        [Baker]:          Okay. And you didn’t cite him for false and
                          fictitious registration or anything like that?

        [Babbs]:          I did not.

        [Baker]:          Okay. At that point did you have any indication of
                          any criminal activity inside the cab of the vehicle?

        [Babbs]:          No. Just the infraction on Mr. Baker.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023                  Page 19 of 30
       (Tr. Vol. II at 73-4.) Trooper Babbs testified at trial that he lacked any

       reasonable suspicion of criminal activity “inside the vehicle.” (Id. at 191.)

[22]   Baker views Trooper Babbs’s testimony as indicating that he lacked reasonable

       suspicion of any criminal activity before asking for her identification. But

       Trooper Babbs’s testimony is more aptly construed as statements that he had no

       reasonable suspicion that the three occupants were actively engaging in

       criminal activity within the truck (such as drug possession or use) when he

       requested Baker’s identification.

[23]   Trooper Babb already had obtained the VIN number with the intent to run the

       check of the vehicle, whose plate belonged to another vehicle. Obtaining the

       VIN number and running the computer check on it would have served no

       purpose absent Trooper Babbs’s reasonable suspicion about potential criminal

       activity associated with the registration. As the State notes, “An officer is not

       required to accept at face value a motorist’s claim about how he came into

       possession of a vehicle for which he does not have proper registration.” (Br. of

       Appellee at 12.) See also State v. Bouye, 118 N.E.3d 22, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)

       (officer had “an objective, reasonable suspicion that Bouye had violated a traffic

       law or ordinance” when the vehicle had an incorrect license plate); Smith v.

       State, 713 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling that when a license plate

       check reveals a mismatched plate, the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe

       theft has occurred), trans. denied. Therefore, given our reading of the record and

       the holdings of Trigg and Richardson, we disagree with Baker that Trooper

       Babbs’ request for Baker’s identification was improper under the ISEA.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023        Page 20 of 30
[24]   As this is the only basis on which Baker challenges the trial court’s admission of

       the methamphetamine, we conclude it did not abuse its discretion when it

       admitted into evidence the methamphetamine found on Baker during Officer

       Kennedy’s search at the Cass County Jail.

       2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[25]   Baker also argues the State did not prove she committed Level 5 felony

       possession of methamphetamine in a penal facility because the State did not

       present evidence she was in the Cass County Jail voluntarily. It is well-settled

       that claims of insufficient evidence

               warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the
               evidence nor judge witness credibility. Rather, we consider only
               the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable
               inferences drawn from that evidence. We will affirm a
               conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that
               would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the
               defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020) (internal citations omitted).

[26]   Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6.1 states, in relevant part:

               (a) A person who, without a valid prescription or order of a
               practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner's professional
               practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses methamphetamine
               (pure or adulterated) commits possession of methamphetamine, a
               Level 6 felony, except as provided in subsections (b) through (d).

               (b) The offense is a Level 5 felony if:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023         Page 21 of 30
                        (1) the amount of the drug involved is at least five (5) but
                        less than ten (10) grams; or

                        (2) the amount of the drug involved is less than five (5)
                        grams and an enhancing circumstance applies.

       An “enhancing circumstance” occurs when, among other things, the person

       commits the relevant offense while on penal facility property. Ind. Code § 35-

       48-1-16.5(7)(A).

[27]   Baker contends the State did not prove she was in the Cass County jail

       voluntarily. Indiana Code section 35-41-2-1 states, in relevant part:

               (a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in
               conduct in violation of the statute defining the offense.

                                                       *****

               (b) If possession of property constitutes any part of the prohibited
               conduct, it is a defense that the person who possessed the
               property was not aware of his possession for a time sufficient for
               him to have terminated his possession.

       “The voluntary act statute codified the axiom that voluntariness is a ‘general

       element of criminal behavior’ and reflected the premise that criminal

       responsibility ‘postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing

       right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong.’” McClain v. State, 678

       N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Ind. Crim. Law Study Comm’n, Indiana

       Penal Code Proposed Final Draft 11 (1974)). “Once evidence in the record

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023               Page 22 of 30
       raises the issue of voluntariness, the State must prove beyond a reasonable

       doubt that the defendant acted voluntarily. If the State fails to prove that a

       defendant’s conduct was voluntary, it has not proved every element of the

       offense.” O’Connell v. State, 970 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal

       citations omitted).

[28]   Baker asserts the issue of voluntariness is relevant here because “she did not

       choose to possess methamphetamine at the penal facility[;]” instead, when

       Trooper Babbs discovered there was a warrant for Baker’s arrest, she was

       “immediately handcuffed” and was “no longer free to go.” (Br. of Appellant at

       29) (quoting Tr. Vol. II at 194-5). Further, Baker argues, “Trooper Babbs’s

       custodial statements to [Baker] did not render her possession of

       methamphetamine at the jail a voluntary act.” (Id. at 30.) Trooper Babbs

       testified that, when he arrested Baker, he told her “if [she] had anything else on

       [her] person going into the Cass County Jail that [she] would catch an

       additional charge for trafficking.” (Tr. Vol. II at 76-7.) Baker contends she had

       two choices: “confessing to possessing methamphetamine or being charged

       with trafficking” and “[a]ny alleged choice that [she] had was illusory.” (Br. of

       Appellant at 30.)

[29]   Baker also argues the posters or signs outside the jail intake area indicating

       possession of illegal substances inside the jail would enhance the offense did not

       render her conduct voluntary because “[a]t the time that [she] could have read

       the signs she was already inside the jail garage” and “the record shows that

       officers pulled [Baker] from Deputy Beebout’s car and led her in handcuffs

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023        Page 23 of 30
       directly past the signs and into the custody of [a] correction officer inside the

       jail.” (Br. of Appellant at 30) (citing Tr. Vol. II at 216-7). Baker contends that,

       should we determine she voluntarily entered the Cass County Jail while

       possessing methamphetamine, such a holding “creates an illogical incentive for

       officers not to conduct searches at arrest but to search suspects at the jail to

       arbitrarily make defendants eligible for a higher-level felony.” (Id.)

[30]   Indiana appellate courts have considered voluntariness in other situations. See,

       e.g., Schlatter v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1139, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting

       argument Schlatter did not voluntarily commit Class B felony sexual

       misconduct with a minor because Schlatter was intoxicated at the time of the

       crime), and Pierson v. State, 73 N.E.3d 737, 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (rejecting

       Pierson’s claim that he did not voluntarily commit Class A felony neglect of a

       dependent causing death because his mental disability prevented him from

       maintaining the standard of care of a reasonable parent), trans. denied.

       However, Indiana appellate courts have not considered this particular issue,

       that is, whether a person who possesses an illegal drug and is subsequently

       transported to a penal facility is in the penal facility voluntarily as to support a

       conviction of possession of the illegal drug in the penal facility. Thus, this is an

       issue of first impression in Indiana.

[31]   Because this is an issue of first impression, “decisions from other jurisdictions

       can be instructive.” Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 587 (Ind. 2022). The facts

       in Herron v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d 901 (Va. Ct. App. 2010), are virtually

       identical to those in the case before us. In Herron, police arrested Herron

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023          Page 24 of 30
       following an incident at an apartment complex. Id. at 902. During a search

       incident to arrest, the officer asked Herron “if he had anything in his buttocks

       or crotch area.” Id. at 903. The officer was unable to complete the search

       because when the officer “touched the backside of [Herron’s] legs, [Herron]

       immediately spun around.” Id.

[32]   The officer transported Herron to jail. The officer asked Herron “if he had any

       contraband on his person” and told Herron “there were additional charges for

       taking any illegal substance inside the jail.” Id. Herron indicated he “did not

       have any drugs.” Id. Upon arrival at the jail, the officer told deputies at the jail

       that Herron was uncooperative during the search incident to arrest and would

       need to be searched further. Id. After performing a pat down search and a strip

       search, deputies found “a plastic baggy between [Herron’s] buttocks.” Id.

       Herron “pulled the bag from his buttocks, ripped it open, and began shoving

       small packets of an off-white substance into his mouth.” Id. The substance was

       later determined to be cocaine. Id.

[33]   The Commonwealth of Virginia alleged Herron violated Va. Code § 53.1-

       203(5), which states, in relevant part, “[i]t shall be unlawful for a prisoner in a

       state, local or community correctional facility or in the custody of an employee

       thereof to . . . 5. Procure, sell, secret or have in his possession any chemical

       compound which he has not lawfully received.” During his trial, Herron

       moved to strike the evidence recovered during the search at the jail. Herron, 688

       S.E.2d at 903. He argued “he did not have the requisite intent to bring cocaine

       into the jail and that forcing him to confess to possession of the drugs violated

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023          Page 25 of 30
       his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.” Id. The trial court

       denied Herron’s motion to strike and found Herron guilty as charged. Id.

[34]   On appeal, Herron argued the Commonwealth did not present sufficient

       evidence to support his conviction because, in part, the Commonwealth did not

       prove he took the cocaine into the jail voluntarily. Id. at 699. Noting the issue

       was one of first impression in Virginia, the court cited cases that followed the

       majority view of the issue - that knowingly possessing an illegal substance is

       sufficient to prove voluntary possession of that substance in a penal facility:

               [T]he majority of other jurisdictions find “no more than entry
               into jail knowing that one is carrying contraband is required by
               the plain terms of the governing statutes.” See State v. Alvarado,
               219 Ariz. 540, 200 P.3d 1037, 1041, 1043 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008)
               (“[Defendant’s] possession of a controlled substance was
               voluntary in that, after being advised of the consequences of
               bringing drugs into the jail, [the defendant] consciously chose to
               ignore the officers’ warnings, choosing instead to enter the jail in
               possession of cocaine.”); People v. Ross, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1184,
               76 Cal.Rptr.3d 477, 479-82 (2008) (finding voluntary act does not
               require the defendant’s presence in jail be voluntary as that
               would controvert settled public policy); State v. Winsor, 110
               S.W.3d 882, 886-88 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming the
               defendant’s conviction for possessing a controlled substance in
               jail, reasoning that voluntary presence in jail was not an element
               of the offense, and to hold otherwise would lead to an absurd
               result); Brown v. State, 89 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. Crim. App.
               2002) (en banc ) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that he did not
               voluntarily bring marijuana into jail, the court reasoned that
               under Texas law, the term “‘voluntarily’” means simply the
               “‘absence of an accidental act, omission or possession’” (quoting
               Alford v. State, 866 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)));
               State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 496-97 (Iowa 1999) (rejecting the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023         Page 26 of 30
               defendant’s claim that he did not voluntarily bring marijuana
               into jail, the court reasoned that the defendant had the option of
               disclosing the drugs before he entered the jail and chose not to do
               so), abrogated in part on other grounds, State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d
               601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).

       Id. at 699-700.

[35]   The court in Herron also cited cases supporting the minority view - that while a

       person voluntarily possessed an illegal drug outside of jail, being involuntarily

       taken into a jail renders improper a finding that the person voluntarily

       possessed the illegal drug inside the jail.

               Courts in the minority of jurisdictions hold that in order for the
               involuntary act of entering the jail with drugs to supply the basis
               for a conviction of bringing drugs into jail, “the involuntary act
               must, at a minimum, be a reasonably foreseeable or likely
               consequence of the voluntary act on which the state seeks to base
               criminal liability.” State v. Tippetts, 180 Or. App. 350, 43 P.3d
               455, 459-60 (2002) (“[Police officer’s] act of arresting [the]
               defendant and transporting him to jail was an intervening cause
               [that alleviated the] defendant’s criminal liability.”). Accord State
               v. Eaton, 143 Wash. App. 155, 177 P.3d 157, 161-62 (2008). See
               also State v. Cole, 142 N.M. 325, 164 P.3d 1024, 1026-27 (N.M.
               Ct. App. 2007) (finding the defendant must enter the jail
               voluntarily in order to be convicted under the statute); State v.
               Sowry, 155 Ohio App. 3d 742, 803 N.E.2d 867, 870-71 (2004)
               (holding the defendant could not be held liable for conveying
               drugs into the detention facility because he had no control over
               his person once he was arrested).

       Id. at 700.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023          Page 27 of 30
[36]   Based thereon, the Herron court decided to follow the majority view, “because

       these opinions are generally more logically related to the language of our statute

       and Virginia case law and because these opinions more accurately reflect the

       intent of our legislature in creating Code § 53.1-203(5).” Id. at 700-1. It held:

               Any analysis of Code § 53.1-203(5) directing the focus to the
               “voluntariness” of appellant’s entry into the correctional facility
               would lead to absurd results because it can be reasonably
               assumed that virtually no one goes to jail voluntarily.
               Accordingly, we hold appellant’s criminal action in this case was
               failing to dispose and/or reveal the presence of the drugs on his
               person prior to his transport into the jail facility. Appellant had
               ample opportunity to reveal the concealed drugs before he was
               taken inside the jail. The evidence at trial showed that appellant
               was inside an apartment for ten to fifteen seconds before Officer
               Thomas entered. Further, after appellant was arrested, [Officer]
               Thomas asked appellant if he had any drugs on his person, to
               which appellant responded that he did not. Before entering the
               jail, [Officer] Thomas again asked appellant if he had any drugs
               on his person and advised appellant that there were additional
               charges for bringing contraband into the jail. However, appellant
               chose to conceal drugs on his person and then failed to disclose
               the drugs after being advised of the consequences of bringing
               drugs into the jail. Under these circumstances, we hold
               appellant’s act of taking drugs into the jail was voluntary.

       Id. at 701.

[37]   The Herron court’s analysis is applicable here. Virginia’s statute governing the

       possession of illegal drugs in a penal facility is similar to Indiana’s possession

       statute and related enhancement. Compare VA Code § 53.1-203(5) (it is

       unlawful for a person to be in jail while possessing an illegal substance) and Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023         Page 28 of 30
Code §§ 35-48-4-6.1 and 35-48-1-16.5(7)(A) (Level 6 felony possession of

methamphetamine is enhanced to a Level 5 felony when the methamphetamine

is possessed while in a penal facility). While we cannot know what our Indiana

legislature’s exact intent was when enacting the enhancement statute, we

presume “the General Assembly does not intend unreasonable or absurd

results.” Smith v. State, 194 NE.3d 118, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We

acknowledge someone is not voluntarily visiting the jail after being arrested.

However, like the defendant in Herron, Baker was arrested for a reason

unrelated to her possession of methamphetamine and informed any felony

possession of an illegal substance would be enhanced if she possessed it in the

Cass County Jail. Baker chose to ignore that warning. 9 Based on Herron, and

the majority of cases outside Indiana, we conclude the State presented sufficient

evidence Baker knowingly or intentionally committed Level 5 felony possession

of methamphetamine in a penal facility because she voluntarily possessed

methamphetamine inside the Cass County Jail.

Conclusion

9
 Baker also argues she was entrapped by police. However, “[e]ntrapment exists where an otherwise law-
abiding citizen is induced through police involvement to commit the charged crime.” Lahr v. State, 640
N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied. Baker ceased being a law-abiding citizen as soon as she
knowingly and intentionally placed the methamphetamine in her pocket. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a) (“A
person who, without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner’s
professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses methamphetamine (pure or adulterated) commits
possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony.”). Moreover, Trooper Babbs’s warning was an attempt to
discourage Baker from committing the enhanced crime, which negates any possible inference that he was
“induc[ing]” her to commit the enhanced crime. Lahr, 640 N.E.2d at 760. Thus, Baker cannot successfully
assert an entrapment defense.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023                               Page 29 of 30
[38]   Luther’s admission that the vehicle he was driving was not properly registered

       gave Trooper Babbs reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to allow him to

       inquire about the identities of Luther’s passengers, including Baker. Therefore,

       the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the

       methamphetamine found on Baker. Additionally, Baker voluntarily committed

       Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine in a penal facility when she

       chose not to heed Trooper Babbs’s warning that any felony related to

       possession of any illegal substances would be enhanced when she took those

       substances into a penal facility. Accordingly, we affirm.

[39]   Affirmed.

       Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-998 | April 10, 2023      Page 30 of 30