Court Opinion

ID: 9951519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 10:10:29.070269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:21.972386
License: Public Domain

In the
         Court of Appeals
 Second Appellate District of Texas
          at Fort Worth
       ___________________________

            No. 02-23-00049-CR
            No. 02-23-00050-CR
            No. 02-23-00051-CR
       ___________________________

       BRONSON KIBLER, Appellant

                     V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS

     On Appeal from the 396th District Court
             Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 1660116D, 1684037D, 1684040D

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Bronson Kibler appeals his convictions and sentences for assault

causing bodily injury against a person with whom he had a dating relationship by

impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood (occlusion assault),

intoxication manslaughter, manslaughter, two counts of aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon, and two counts of intoxication assault. Kibler raises five points on

appeal. We will affirm in part and vacate in part.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

      Kibler pleaded guilty to all the aforementioned offenses.         He does not

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, nor does he raise

any error requiring a harm analysis. Therefore, only a brief summary of the facts is

necessary.

      In March 2021, Kibler pleaded guilty to occlusion assault, and the trial court

deferred finding him guilty of the offense and placed him on five years’ deferred

adjudication community supervision. Approximately two months later, Arlington

Police were dispatched to a two-car accident.        Kibler had been driving a silver

Hyundai Elantra and had collided with a black BMW.            His girlfriend, Jamayiah

Sargent, who was a passenger in the Hyundai, was pronounced dead at the scene.

Kibler and the couple’s two-month-old daughter were injured in the collision and

transported to a nearby hospital. The occupants of the BMW, driver Andrea Manns

and passenger Benjamin Davenport, were also transported to the hospital.

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      Police interviewed Kibler and Manns at the emergency room. Immediately

upon making contact with Kibler, police detected a strong odor of alcohol on his

breath and noticed that his speech was slurred. After Kibler admitted he had been

drinking alcohol prior to the accident, police subjected him to three field sobriety

tests, all of which he failed. Thereafter, Kibler consented to giving a specimen of his

blood for analysis.1

      In her interview, Manns said she was driving on Matlock Road when she

observed a vehicle driving toward Davenport and her that ultimately struck their

vehicle. As a result, Manns had sustained several broken ribs and a broken jaw.2

      The State filed a Petition to Proceed to Adjudication, alleging that Kibler had

violated the terms of his deferred adjudication community supervision by committing

the offenses of intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault. 3 In July 2021,

Kibler was charged by indictments with the intoxication manslaughter and

manslaughter of Sargent and with two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon and two counts of intoxication assault for injuring Manns and Davenport.

      1
         After collecting and securing the specimen, an officer spoke with Sargent’s
sister, who told him that Kibler had consumed “a lot” of alcohol that night.
      2
       Davenport was sedated and unable to speak, but medical personnel attending
to him reported that he had sustained a broken right ankle and severe hemorrhaging.
      3
       The State later amended its petition to add that Kibler had committed the
offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and had tampered with, bypassed,
or allowed another person to activate his mobile alcohol monitoring device. Kibler
pleaded true to all of the paragraphs contained in the State’s First Amended Petition.

                                          3
Kibler pleaded guilty to all counts in the indictments, and the trial court sentenced

him to 10 years’ imprisonment in the occlusion assault case and to 17 years’

imprisonment on each count in the other two cases. 4 Kibler timely filed a notice of

appeal in all three cases.

                                     II. ANALYSIS

       Kibler does not allege any error in the occlusion assault case (Trial Court Cause

No. 1660116D), and we therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment in that case in all

respects.

       Kibler raises five points on appeal. The double jeopardy implications of his

multiple convictions and sentences in the two remaining cases form the crux of his

appeal. In his first three points, he complains that his protection against double

jeopardy was infringed upon because he was convicted of and punished for (1) both

the intoxication manslaughter and manslaughter of Sargent; (2) both the aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon and intoxication assault of Manns; and (3) both the

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and intoxication assault of Davenport. In his

two remaining points, Kibler claims (4) that his 17-year sentences for intoxication

assault are illegal and (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The State

       The trial court pronounced sentence by stating, “On your plea of true in Cause
       4

No. 1660116 I will find you guilty and sentence you to the ten years in the
penitentiary. In Cause Nos. 1684037 and 1684040 I find you guilty and sentence you
to 17 years confinement in the Texas penitentiary.” The judgments in Cause Nos.
1684037 and 1684040 reflect sentences of 17 years for each count. The trial court
also ordered that Kibler’s sentences would run concurrently.

                                           4
concedes that Kibler is entitled to relief on the first three points, and we agree.5 As

discussed below, our resolution of these first three points will moot Kibler’s

remaining two points.

                                 A. Double Jeopardy

                               1. Preservation of Error

      Although Kibler made no objection on double jeopardy grounds in the trial

court, a defendant may raise this complaint for the first time on appeal if two

conditions are met: (1) the undisputed facts show that the double jeopardy violation

is clearly apparent on the face of the record; and (2) enforcement of the usual rules of

procedural default would serve no legitimate state interest.6 Garfias v. State, 424

S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Langs, 183 S.W.3d at 687; Gonzalez v. State, 8

S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see, e.g., Ex parte Knipp, 236 S.W.3d 214, 217

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (granting habeas relief on a meritorious double jeopardy

      5
       Because the State’s confession of error is not dispositive, we still look at the
merits. See Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Additionally,
we note that a double jeopardy violation can occur even when sentences are
concurrent and the impermissible conviction does not result in a greater sentence.
Evans v. State, 299 S.W.3d 138, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Ball v. United States,
470 U.S. 856, 864–65, 105 S. Ct. 1668, 1673 (1985)).
      6
        Because error preservation is a systemic requirement, we have an independent
duty to ensure that Kibler’s double jeopardy claim is properly preserved in the trial
court before we address its merits. Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2020). A defendant may forfeit a potential double jeopardy violation by not
asserting it in the trial court. Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680, 687, 689 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).

                                            5
claim). Because both conditions are met here, we will address the merits of Kibler’s

double jeopardy points. See Wolfe v. State, No. 02-22-00132-CR, 2023 WL 4359788, at

*11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication).

          2. Double Jeopardy Implications of Kibler’s Multiple Convictions 7

a. Manslaughter and Intoxication Manslaughter

      Manslaughter and intoxication manslaughter are the same offense for double

jeopardy purposes when they involve the same victim, and imposing convictions for

both in this situation violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d

      7
        The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall have life or limb twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. Const.
amend. V. Generally, this provision—the Double Jeopardy Clause—protects against
(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same
offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (1977); Ramos v. State,
636 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

       Impermissible multiple punishments occur when the same criminal act is
punished twice under two distinct statutory provisions and the legislature intended
that the conduct be punished only once. Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). A multiple-punishments double jeopardy violation may arise in
two situations: (1) the lesser-included-offense context, when the same conduct is
punished twice (once for the basic conduct, and a second time for that same conduct
plus more); and (2) when multiple punishments are imposed for the same criminal act
under two distinct statutes but the legislature intended that the conduct be punished
only once. Langs, 183 S.W.3d at 685. The ultimate question is whether the legislature
intended to allow for multiple punishments. Id. at 688; see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.
359, 366, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678 (1983) (“With respect to cumulative sentences imposed
in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the
sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.”).

                                           6
804, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We therefore hold that Kibler’s dual convictions

and sentences for both manslaughter and intoxication manslaughter in Trial Court

Cause No. 1684037D violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. We sustain Kibler’s first

point.

b. Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon and Intoxication Assault

         Both Kibler and the State cite Shelby v. State, 448 S.W.3d 431 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014), in support of their contention that Kibler’s convictions for both aggravated

assault and intoxication assault of Manns and Davenport violate double jeopardy

because the bodily injuries they suffered resulted from only one instance of assaultive

conduct. In Shelby, the court of criminal appeals concluded that the legislature did not

intend to authorize separate punishments for the offenses of aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon against a public servant and intoxication assault when the convictions

for those offenses are based upon the same assaultive conduct against a single person.

448 S.W.3d at 434.       In that case, the court of criminal appeals held that dual

convictions for both offenses based upon the same assaultive conduct against a single

person violated double jeopardy. Id.

         Although Manns and Davenport were not public servants at the time of the

offenses, that is immaterial to the analysis. Therefore, we see no reason to distinguish

Shelby from Kibler’s case. We hold that Kibler’s dual convictions and sentences for

both aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and intoxication assault based upon the

same assaultive conduct against Manns violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, see id. at

                                            7
440, and we sustain Kibler’s second point.

       Likewise, we hold that Kibler’s dual convictions and sentences for both

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and intoxication assault based upon the same

assaultive conduct against Davenport violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. We

sustain Kibler’s third point.

                                3. Remedies for Violations

       When, in violation of double jeopardy protections, a defendant has been

prosecuted and convicted in a single criminal action of two or more offenses that

constitute the same offense, the remedy is to apply the “most serious offense test”;

generally, the “most serious” offense is the one for which the greatest sentence was

assessed. Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (overruling

Landers v. State, 957 S.W.2d 558, 559–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), which held that other

factors—such as the degree of the felony, range of punishment, and rules governing

parole eligibility and awarding of good-conduct time—should be used in that

determination); see also Evans, 299 S.W.3d at 141; Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 373.

       But when, as here, the punishment for each conviction is identical,8 we cannot

       8
        The State counters that, as between manslaughter and intoxication
manslaughter, the “most serious” offense would be the intoxication manslaughter
conviction because, even though both offenses are second-degree felonies and the
trial court assessed identical 17-year sentences, “the intoxication manslaughter
conviction includes a $100 fine, $290 in court costs, and a $65 reimbursement fee.”
Court costs and fees “are compensatory and non-punitive,” Armstrong v. State, 340
S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), and therefore they are not a part of Kibler’s
punishment. On the other hand, a fine “is part of the punishment.” Anastassov v.

                                             8
look to only the sentences imposed to determine the most serious offense. See Bigon,

252 S.W.3d at 373. Instead, we have to look to other criteria, including the degree of

felony for each offense, to determine which offense is the most serious. Id.; White v.

State, 395 S.W.3d 828, 832 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.).

      In Trial Court Cause No. 1684037D, Kibler was convicted of both

manslaughter and intoxication manslaughter.        Both offenses are second-degree

felonies, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.04(b), 49.08(b), and the trial court made an

affirmative deadly weapon finding on both counts. Kibler and the State both cite

Cavazos to suggest that, because intoxication manslaughter is “the offense described in

Count I of the indictment,” it is the most serious offense of the two. 203 S.W.3d at

339 n.8. Although that language from Cavazos is dicta, because (1) Kibler has been

prosecuted and convicted in a single criminal action of two or more offenses that

constitute the same offense in violation of double jeopardy protections and (2) both

offenses carry the same punishment, we may strike either conviction. See Martinez v.

State, 225 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We therefore accept the parties’

invitation to treat Kibler’s intoxication manslaughter conviction as the “most serious”

State, 664 S.W.3d 815, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Here, however, the judge did not
orally pronounce a fine when he sentenced Kibler, so the $100 fine reflected in the
trial court’s judgment of the intoxication manslaughter conviction is not a part of
Kibler’s punishment either. See Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004) (holding that when a variation exists between the oral pronouncement of
sentence and the written memorialization of the sentence, “the oral pronouncement
controls”).

                                          9
offense for double jeopardy purposes, and we vacate his manslaughter conviction.

         In Trial Court Cause No. 1684040D, Kibler received identical 17-year

sentences for his aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Manns (Count I); the

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Davenport (Count II); the intoxication

assault of Manns (Count III); and the intoxication assault of Davenport (Count IV).

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a second-degree felony, see Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 22.02(b), while intoxication assault is a third-degree felony, see id.

§ 49.07(c). Accordingly, we vacate Kibler’s convictions and sentences for intoxication

assault, the less serious offense.

                                     B. Illegal Sentences

         In his fourth point, Kibler argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to

greater than the maximum punishment on two separate counts of intoxication assault.

Although Kibler is correct on this point, our vacatur of his convictions and sentences

for intoxication assault render this point moot. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Martinez v.

State, No. 02–08–112–CR, 2008 WL 5194307, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 11,

2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We dismiss Kibler’s fourth

point.

                          C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

         In his fifth point, Kibler argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object to two

sentence terms that were greater than the maximum allowed by law and failed to

                                             10
object to Kibler’s being subjected to multiple punishments for the same misconduct

in violation of double jeopardy. The State counters that we need not address this

claim’s merits because we can remedy any deficient conduct on his trial counsel’s part

by setting aside Kibler’s manslaughter conviction and his two intoxication assault

convictions for the violation of his double jeopardy protections. We agree. Because

Kibler’s fifth point is not “necessary to final disposition” of his appeal, we dismiss it

as moot. See Tex. R. App P. 47.1.

                                III. CONCLUSION

      Having sustained Kibler’s first, second, and third points and having dismissed

his fourth and fifth points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in Cause No.

1660116D in all respects. We vacate the trial court’s judgment of conviction for

manslaughter in Cause No. 1684037D and, consistent with our authority to modify a

judgment “to make the record speak the truth when the matter has been called to

[our] attention by any source,” see French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1992), we modify the judgment of conviction for intoxication manslaughter to

delete the $100 fine9 and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified, see Tex. R.

      9
       Kibler’s failure to complain on appeal about the fine does not vitiate our
authority to modify the judgment. See Portis v. State, No. 02-19-00228-CR, 2019 WL
6905026, at *3 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Cummings v. State, No. 02-18-00042-CR, 2018 WL
4020013, at *2 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Demerson v. State, No. 02-18-00003-CR, 2018 WL 3580893,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).

                                           11
App. P. 43.2(b).    We vacate the trial court’s two judgments of conviction for

intoxication assault in Cause No. 1684040D and affirm the two judgments of

conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

                                                  /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                    Bonnie Sudderth
                                                    Chief Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 14, 2024

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