Court Opinion

ID: 9631502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:40:37.227642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:55.503055
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J.—
I concur in the judgment, for the reasons that follow.
In response to petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the judgment and sentence in his capital case on grounds, inter alia, of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court issued an order to show cause limited to the question whether petitioner received constitutionally ineffective assistance by trial counsel at the penalty phase of the trial. The majority concludes counsel’s representation was inadequate and likely prejudicial, thus requiring reversal of the penalty verdict. I agree the death penalty imposed on petitioner cannot stand. Because, however, I believe the attorney who represented petitioner suffered from impermissible conflicts of interest in his preparation for and presentation of petitioner’s penalty phase case, I find it unnecessary to consider petitioner’s other claims of inadequate representation or the question of prejudice.
A criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions, includes the right to representation free from conflicts of interest. To establish a violation of this right under the state Constitution, a defendant need only show the record supports an “informed speculation” that counsel’s representation was adversely affected *832by the claimed conflict of interest. (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 45 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129]; People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1009 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248].) Here, the evidence shows trial counsel failed in his duty of diligent and loyal representation, placing his own interests before his client’s, thereby affording petitioner substandard assistance in his trial on penalty.
As the referee found and the majority opinion explains, petitioner’s trial attorney, Daye Shinn, substituted in for the public defender as retained counsel and eventually obtained his court appointment by lying first to petitioner and then to the court about payment of his fees. He was aided in this scheme by psychologist Marcus McBroom and, in apparent return for that assistance, retained McBroom’s associate, psychiatrist Fred Weaver, as his principal penalty phase witness. Dr. Weaver, in turn, employed McBroom—who was not licensed in California—to perform psychological testing on petitioner, as he had previously done in other criminal cases. As the majority states, this set of transactions, which included fraud on both the client and the court, amounted to a type of unethical capping arrangement. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 781, 794-796, 828.)
Why did Shinn expend such effort, and cross the borders of honesty and ethics, to obtain appointment in this case? Was it because he believed petitioner deserved the best prepared, most vigorous defense possible, and believed himself, together with Dr. Weaver, especially able to provide such a defense? Unfortunately, we know that was not the reason. Shinn’s own planning and preparation for the penalty trial were slight, and, consistent therewith, he instructed Dr. Weaver to undertake only a routine evaluation of petitioner, conveying to Weaver his view the death penalty was a foregone conclusion. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 796-800, 807-813, 817-821.) I thus can infer only that Shinn sought appointment in this case to meet his own personal needs, presumably financial, and that he intended to—and did— exploit the appointment to meet those personal needs, rather than to represent his client as well as possible.
My conclusion as to Shinn’s self-serving intent and motive is reinforced by the fact that, at the time he was representing petitioner, Shinn labored under another conflict of interest, one raising criminal liability and professional, as well as financial, concerns. The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office, the office that was prosecuting petitioner, was at the same time also actively investigating a complaint from one of Shinn’s civil clients that Shinn had misappropriated about $180,000 from a recovery obtained for' the client. During this period, therefore, Shinn was under pressure not only of criminal and State Bar disciplinary action (eventually, he was disbarred *833for his misappropriation and other violations concerning this civil client), but was also faced with the likelihood he would have to make large-scale restitution to the client (as he, in fact, later did). Indeed, Shinn’s own pending criminal investigation may help explain why he was so anxious to cooperate with the district attorney that he induced petitioner to confess to several robberies—robberies used in aggravation of penalty—without demanding or receiving any assurances the admissions would not be used against petitioner. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 791-793.)
I recognize that a court-appointed defense attorney’s interest in compensation does not, per se or in general, conflict with the attorney’s duty to represent his or her client loyally and diligently. (See, e.g., People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1009-1010.) Here, however, the appointed attorney had previously misappropriated large amounts of money from another client and, as a result, was under threat of losing his livelihood, suffering criminal prosecution, and having to repay the money. Against this background, the attorney engineered his appointment in a capital case, doing so by extraordinary, dishonest means, and for the apparent purpose of quickly obtaining a fee while expending as little time and effort on the case as possible. The attorney carried out his plan by strictly limiting the amount of background investigation and psychological evaluation he authorized his expert to consider or undertake, and generally by preparing and presenting only a rudimentary case in mitigation. This case is not an ordinary one.
In deceitfully obtaining appointment simply for the purpose of making money, Shinn placed his own interests ahead of petitioner’s, for under these circumstances petitioner would likely have been better off had he continued to be represented by the public defender’s office; certainly he had an interest in making that choice free of misrepresentation by his prospective appointed attorney. In short, these circumstances provide grounds, at the least, for “informed speculation” (People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1009) that counsel’s conflicts of interest adversely affected his penalty phase performance on petitioner’s behalf. Cruel and inexcusable as was petitioner’s crime, he was entitled to an attorney who would try to serve, first and foremost, the interests of his client at the penalty phase, instead of the attorney’s own. Whether petitioner would have been sentenced to death even with a loyal and dedicated defense attorney we cannot know, nor need we try to decide. Regardless of whether, as the majority concludes, the penalty trial’s outcome was likely altered by counsel’s deficient performance, to *834execute a death judgment tainted by such conflicted representation would undermine, rather than advance, society’s quest for the just punishment of crime.
Kennard, J., concurred.