Court Opinion

ID: 9743948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:50:54.555001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:45.891919
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Arterburn, C.J.
I beg to disagree with the majority opinion which is based upon Burns Indiana Statute, sec. 2-1714, which makes privileged, among other things, confidential communications between attorney and client, physician and patient and husband and wife. As stated in the majority opinion this is not a question of competency but one of privilege which is granted for a social and public purpose. We should therefore keep in mind that the objective of the privilege in such cases is namely to inspire full and complete disclosure of knowledge pertinent and necessary to a trustful and proper relationship in such cases. Where that objective is not served and the privilege is used to conceal the commission of a crime, it has no social value and serves no public purpose but in fact is turned into a shield to the criminal and the commission of the crime. We have held that a physician may testify to being consulted and even aiding in the performance of an illegal abortion in this state. Seifert v. State (1903), 160 Ind. 464, 67 N. E. 100. It has been stated as a general proposition that professional communications are not privileged when made for an unlawful purpose having for their objective the commission of a crime. Seifert v. State, supra.
It is likewise held that attorney and client may not conspire to commit a crime and then contend that the communications between them as to the conspiracy is privileged. Clark v. U. S. (1932), 289 U. S. 1, 77 L. Ed. 993, 53 S. Ct. 465. A fraudulent intent as well as criminality of purpose may well remove the veil of secrecy from communications between attorney and *236client; where an attorney is consulted for the purpose of obtaining advice as to the preparation of a fraud, or in aid or in furtherance thereof. The communications made to him by one having such purpose in view are not, according to most authorities, privileged. United States v. Bob (1939), 106 F. 2d 37, writ of certiorari denied in 308 U. S. 589, 84 L. Ed. 493, 60 S. Ct. 115.
Although the privilege between husband and wife is stated in absolute terms in the Indiana statute this court has said it does not apply in all cases, namely in an assault and battery between husband and wife. Doolittle v. State (1883), 93 Ind. 272. This statute makes no exception in divorce cases between a husband and a wife, yet this court has engrafted such an exception on the statute and been realistic in doing so.
For the same reason it seems that there can be no valid ground for granting a privilege to a husband and wife to conspire to commit a crime or act as an accomplice with the other in the commission of a crime as in this case.
The evidence shows that they were engaged as co-criminals before their marriage. The marriage ought not give them an added shield or advantage. It would serve no social interest.
I would not go so far as to say if one spouse alone committed a crime that the other spouse could be compelled to testify, that spouse having not participated in the crime, but only having evidence revealed as a result of the marriage relationship. However in this case both parties participated actively and willingly in what they knew was a crime and no shield of non-disclosure should be thrown about them on the pretense that it would effect the marriage relationship in such instances. The statute on privileged communication should have a uniform and sensible interpretation in all cases.
NOTE. — Reported in 277 N. E. 2d 165.