Court Opinion

ID: 9452910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:56:20.279713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:24.888912
License: Public Domain

LAY,
Circuit Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This suit arose from the plaintiff’s use of a drug manufactured by defendant. The case was submitted to the jury solely on the issue of negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the trial court granted defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. v. on the ground that the plaintiff’s proof was insufficient to sustain any finding of actionable negligence. The plaintiff appealed to this court and we affirmed the trial judge’s order denying plaintiff-appellant relief.
In regard to appellant’s petition for rehearing, I concur with the majority in overruling the petition for rehearing as to the claimed error of this court in our original opinion. This court does not feel that appellant has raised any overlooked point of merit affecting those issues thoroughly considered in the original appeal as set forth in Judge Matthes’ excellent opinion.
However, filed with appellant’s petition for rehearing and incorporated therein is a motion to this court to grant appellant a new trial on the ground that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on implied or express warranty. Appellant contends that warranty counts were pleaded and that a request was made to the trial court to make such instruction. Admittedly, the record on appeal is incomplete with regard to the request for the instruction and as to claimed abortive attempt to amend. However it does appear that the complaint alleges that “the defendant falsely and fraudulently represented” that the drug was harmless. Such an allegation under the liberal concepts of federal pleading can be said to state a claim for relief on an implied or express warranty. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). See also Prosser Law of Torts, § 97 at 678-81 (3d ed. 1964). Again, there is ambiguity in the record as to whether appellant’s counsel, in his colloquy with the trial judge, waived his claim of implied warranty. However, an intentional waiver seems doubtful in the light of his request for an instruction on implied warranty.
Under these circumstances, I feel the case should be remanded to the district court so that the trial judge with a complete record before him, can review for the first time the grounds for new trial.1 Before this court rules upon such issues, now initially raised before us, the trial court ordinarily should have an opportunity to pass upon the question. It is for obvious reasons that the trial court is the preferred forum in which to urge a new trial. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 215-216, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849 (1946) ; Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571, 573-574, 68 S.Ct. 246, 92 L.Ed. 177 (1948); Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801, 69 S.Ct. 1326, 93 L.Ed. 1704 (1949). This is particularly true where the record before the appellate court is incomplete.
I feel it is incumbent upon this court to remand to the district court so that the trial judge might entertain appellant’s motion in view of the complete record. At the very least, it would be salutary to allow both parties an opportunity to be heard in this court on their respective contentions in light of appellant’s motion for new trial.
In Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317 at 329-330, 87 S.Ct. *2941072, at 1080, 18 L.Ed.2d 75 (1967), the Supreme Court stated after the Court of Appeals had granted a judgment n. o. v., and although a motion for new trial was not presented by the verdict-holder on appeal nor by a petition for rehearing, that “It was, of course, incumbent on the Court of Appeals to consider the new trial question in the light of its own experience with the case. But we will not assume that the court ignored its duty in this respect, although it would have been better had its opinion expressly dealt with the new trial question.” (Emphasis mine)
The appellant in his motion for rehearing prays as follows:
“If the application of the law of implied warranty was and is essential to the determination of justice in this matter, plantiff respectfully requests a rehearing on this issue, or that this Court upon its own motion vacate its judgment and remand this case for a new trial to be submitted to the jury on the basis of the theory of warranty as originally pleaded by the appellant.”
While it is true that this motion is entitled only a “petition for rehearing,” we are required to treat the pleading broadly and look for matters of substance rather than matters of form. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f). There should be little doubt that appellant has moved not only for reconsideration of the court’s previous rulings but also for the first time, for a new trial. The denial of rehearing can only relate to matters upon which appellant has already had a hearing. See Rule 15, U.S.Ct.App. (8 Cir.). The problems presented by appellant on his motion for new trial, however, are original at this point.
It may be argued that appellant has waived his motion for new trial by failing to move, before the trial court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(c) (2).2 However, the Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 50(c) (2) explains as follows:
“Even if the verdict-winner makes no motion for a new trial, he is entitled upon his appeal from the judgment n. o. v. not only to urge that the judgment should be reversed and judgment entered upon the verdict, but that errors were committed during the trial which at the least entitle him to a new trial.” 31 F.R.D. 646 (1962). (Emphasis mine)
The Supreme Court gives approval to this viewpoint in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., supra, 386 U.S. at 328, 87 S.Ct. at 1079, when it states:
“Likewise, if the plaintiff’s verdict is set aside by the trial court on defendant’s n. o. v. motion, plaintiff may bring these very grounds directly to the court of appeals without moving for a new trial in the district court.”
Therefore, it is clear that appellant has not waived any rights by failing to make his motion for new trial in the court below. There are practical and cogent reasons for this rule of non-waiver, in that a verdict-winner appealing from a judgment n. o. v. primarily desires a review of that judgment and a reinstatement of the verdict. He is generally not interested in pursuing an immediate new trial order, which, if granted by the trial court, could supersede the appealable judgment. If a new trial would be granted the verdict-winner is left with no opportunity to obtain review of his original judgment. Of course, the trial court could enter a conditional order of a new trial as well as granting the n. o. v., under Fed.R.Civ. P. 50(b) and (c), but even under these circumstances the plaintiff may be reluctant to move for a new trial because of the uncertainty that the order will be conditional.
The only serious question is whether the appellant in this case was required to *295raise the issue of a new trial in his original appellate brief or whether he could wait for our ruling on the judgment n. o. v. before moving for a new trial along with his petition for rehearing. Again, I feel this is answered by Mr. Justice White in the Eby opinion:
“Moreover the appellee can choose for his own convenience when to make his case for a mew trial: he may bring his grounds for new trial to the trial judge’s attention when defendant first makes an n. o. v. motion, he may argue this question in his appellee’s brief to the court of appeals, or he may in suitable situations seek rehearing from the court of appeals after his judgment has been reversed. * *
“ * * * If appellee presents no new trial issues in his brief or in a petition for rehearing, the court of appeals may, in any event, order a new trial on its own motio nor refer the question to the district court, based on factors encountered in its own review of the case.” 386 U.S. at 328-329, 87 S.Ct. at 1080 (Emphasis mine)
The above discussion relates to the situation under Rule 50(d) where the verdict-holder was the appellee, but there exists no apparent reason why the same statement is not applicable where the verdict-holder is the appellant.
In Smith v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 368 F.2d 511, 514 (8 Cir. 1966), we emphasized our rule that matters not raised upon appeal in brief or argument will ordinarily not be passed upon by an appellate court. However, the policy of this rule is not contravened by allowing a verdict-winner to move for new trial for the first time on petition for rehearing. Here we are not necessarily faced with new substantive problems.3 We are faced for the first time with a request by appellant for a new remedy. It is my singular opinion, disagreeing with the majority, that whenever the motion presents arguable grounds, even though raised for the first time with a petition for rehearing, we should allow the trial court to pass upon the motion for new trial, unless upon its face it should be granted or denied. Cf. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp and Paper Co., supra.
I emphasize this is only the viewpoint of one judge on the panel. The majority ruling herein, should make every verdietholder-appellant cautious to assert the grounds for a new trial in his main brief. I simply feel that this ruling, although perhaps more orderly and traditional, is contrary to the liberal spirit of the rules and the pragmatic development of procedural fair play.4 I feel it likewise contrary to the logic and spirit of the Neely case, as well as Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., supra.5
*296Until the court of appeals has finally ruled on the granting of defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. v., the verdict-holder’s single purpose is to reinstate the verdict he obtained below from the jury. Until he sees finality in the judgment invalidating that verdict, again, he is not interested in even suggesting a new trial. In fact, in the court of appeals in many instances his argument that the jury verdict was proper under the record could be vitiated by his simultaneous emphasis on errors in the trial. Inconsistent pleas and alternative motions in his original briefs would add to his already heavy burden of persuasion. This would, of course, not always be true since frequently similar grounds could underlie both his appeal and his motion for new trial.
In the instant case plaintiff’s complaint was broad enough to include a claim for relief for breach of either an express or implied warranty. Based upon Exhibit 8, there would appear to be evidence sufficient to sustain the submission of implied or express warranty.
The case should be remanded to the trial court so that the record can be made complete, and the trial judge can review the motion. We cannot adequately pass on the motion ourselves when the record is incomplete as to the error claimed. At the very least, I feel both parties should have an opportunity in this court to argue and prepare briefs on the matters now raised by appellant for the first time on his motion for new trial. The majority order denies the appellant the opportunity to be heard. In this phase of the order I respectfully dissent.

. In Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 329, 87 S.Ct. 1072, 1080, 18 L.Ed.2d 75 (1967), the Court implies that remand is appropriate to make the record sufficient so that the trial court can make an informed ruling on the motion for new trial.

. “The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(c) (2).

. Neither the Smith case nor any of the authorities relied upon, pertain to motions for new remedies. Each authority is referring to the failure to raise a specific question or questions of law.

. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting said:
“This issue of whether a new trial is justified after a verdict is set aside either by a trial or an appellate court is a new issue which it was not necessary to decide in the original trial. It is a factual issue and that the trial court is the more appropriate tribunal to determine it has been almost universally accepted by both federal and state courts throughout the years.” (My emphasis) Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. at 337, 87 S.Ct. at 1084.

. Mr. Justice Black in dissent urged a remand for a hearing on a new trial before the District Court in Neely. The Supreme Court denied the remand because it had not been raised in the Court of Appeals, even on rehearing. We now foreclose the right to raise the motion on rehearing. Mr. Justice Black in his dissent, reflects the summary of Weade, apropos here:
“There we ordered the case remanded to the trial court to pass on petitioner’s motion for new trial because petitioner suggested to this Court that there was an alternative theory presented by the *296complaint and evidence. However, nowhere in the record in that case was it indicated that petitioner had argued this alternative theory in the Court of Appeals, and nothing in our opinon indicates any such requirement. The Court correctly summarizes Weade as holding that ‘an appellate court may not order judgment n. o. v. where * * * the record reveals a new trial issue which has not been resolved.’ (Emphasis added.)” Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. at 343, 87 S.Ct. at 1087.