Court Opinion

ID: 9489890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:26:59.186564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:46.631824
License: Public Domain

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
In my view there was enough evidence to support the verdict on Count 4 and I would therefore affirm Harrison’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). As charged, *993this count required the government to prove that Harrison used or carried a .357 caliber pistol “during and in relation’,’ to the crime of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine “on or about October 20,1992.”
The drugs were found in Dominga Montivero’s apartment, No. 507, under the kitchen sink. The police entered the apartment at 7:30 p.m. About 10 to 15 minutes later, Harrison arrived carrying a .357 caliber pistol under his shirt, tucked in his waistband. The police immediately arrested him. The majority assumes that Harrison was not at that moment violating § 924(c)(1). By then, his offense of constructive possession had ended because, at 7:30 p.m., the police had seized the drugs. To make out a § 924(c)(1) violation, the government therefore had to prove that Harrison was carrying the pistol sometime before 7:30 p.m., that is, “during” his constructive possession of the drugs.
How long did Harrison possess the crack cocaine seized in the apartment? Two days, the jury could have found. Montivero testified that she saw him cooking a “pancake” of crack in another apartment in the building (No. 408) a “couple” of days before his arrest. The indictment charged him with possession with intent to distribute “on or about October 20, 1992.” If Harrison was carrying the .357 caliber pistol at any time between October 18 and October 20 at 7:30 p.m., he was carrying the gun “during” the commission of the predicate drug offense.
The jury also could have found that the only gun Harrison had at hand from October 18 to October 20 was the .357 caliber pistol mentioned in Count 4. There was evidence that from 1991 until his arrest in this case, Harrison used seven different guns to ply his drug trade. In 1991, the Maryland police confiscated two of these guns; later in the year, the D.C. police seized another. That left four: two 9 mm. semi-automatics; a silver pistol with black tape on its handle; and the .357 caliber pistol. Both semi-automatics were seized by the police when Harrison shot a young man in the spring of 1992. As to the silver pistol, Harrison had stashed it in Montivero’s apartment in early October 1992, a few weeks before his arrest in this case. Montivero’s 16-month-old granddaughter found the gun and accidentally shot herself in the leg. Before the police arrived, someone named “Charlene” came to the apartment and took the gun away. On October 20, 1992, the date of Harrison’s arrest, the police searched the only other place he was known to occupy (apartment No. 408 in the same building) and.his car. No .guns were found.
The jury therefore had ample evidence that the .357 pistol was the only gun Harrison carried around as his personal weapon on October 20, 1992, and shortly before. Did Harrison carry this pistol “during” his possession of the crack cocaine? Here the evidence is circumstantial, but in my view sufficient.
For one thing, Harrison always had guns at hand. Nearly every time he went to Montivero’s apartment, he carried guns. His usual practice was to have one in his waistband. When he prepared crack cocaine, as he did in apartment No. 408 on October 18, 1992, he had a gun with him. Each time the police arrested him — twice in 1991, once in the spring of 1992, and again in October — he was carrying a gun. Add to this the fact that when Harrison dropped the crack off at Montivero’s apartment on October 20, before 7:30 p.m., he told her that he was getting ready to leave for Florida. After his arrest, the police found his Buiek Riviera with Florida plates parked in front of the apartment building. The car was packed with men’s clothing. In the trunk, in garment- bags, the police found $1309 in cash. In apartment No. 408, where Harrison had been staying, he had left behind nothing but old personal papers.
The evidence thus indicated that Harrison was about to leave town, that he gave Montivero his drugs, while he packed his car and made other arrangements for his trip, and that he returned to Montivero’s apartment, with a gun stuffed in his pants, to pick up the crack he had cooked two days before. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that during the time Harrison possessed these drugs — from October 18 until October 20 at 7:30 p.m. — he carried his gun, the .357 caliber pistol. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). To conclude otherwise *994one would have to believe that as Harrison loaded his clothes and money into his car, he left his gun behind; that as he walked to Montivero’s apartment to drop off the drugs, he left his gun elsewhere; that although he was carrying the gun at 7:40 p.m., he was not carrying it at 7:30 p.m. These are possibilities, to be sure, but highly unlikely.
One further point. If, as the jury found, Harrison did carry the gun at some time in the hours leading up to his arrest, there is no doubt that he carried it “in relation to” his possession of the drugs, as § 924(c)(1) requires for conviction. Drugs were Harrison’s line of work. He frequently used violence in his business. Guns were his preferred method of operation. He used guns to protect himself and his drugs, to intimidate neighbors, and to keep his subordinates in line.' So if Harrison was engaged in drug-related activities shortly before his arrest, as he surely was, he had the .357 pistol with him “in relation to” those activities. No other reason is plausible.
That other inferences are possible from the evidence just discussed is of no moment. When we review criminal convictions for sufficiency of the evidence, our function is not to eliminate all other possibilities, . United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 94 (D.C.Cir.1990); United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C.Cir.1993); United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 923 (D.C.Cir.1995). What matters is whether the inferences the jury drew are supported, whether drawing them would enable a rational person to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence against Harrison on Count 4 was not overwhelming. It was largely circumstantial. But under the test we must apply, it was sufficient. I therefore dissent from this portion of the majority’s decision.