Court Opinion

ID: 9488216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:39:13.891944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:45.481258
License: Public Domain

CHURCHILL, District Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
There is substantial evidence to support a finding that Henley was not disabled as of March 31,1986, the date his insurability ended. The record, however, clearly establishes that Henley was disabled at the time of his termination hearing in 1988.
In Difford v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 910 F.2d 1316 (6th Cir.1990), the court, construing 42 U.S.C. § 423(f), ruled that in a termination case disability must be determined as of the time of the hearing.
The majority in this case holds that Dif-ford has no application if the individual’s insured status .has expired prior to the hearing. There is nothing in Difford to suggest that the date insured status expired was a significant factor. I would, therefore, treat Difford as a binding precedent in this case.
Even if Difford is not a binding precedent in this ease, it is my opinion that the language of § 423(f), which is carefully analyzed in Difford, requires that Henley’s disability determination be based upon his physical condition at the time of the hearing.
*214Section 423(a), upon which the majority relies, governs the establishment of entitlement to disability benefits, not the continuation thereof once established.1 Continued insured status is not a statutory prerequisite to entitlement to continue receiving disability benefits.
There is no fair or logical reason for the court to create an exception to § 423(f) just because insured status is a prerequisite to establishing entitlement to benefits.
For the foregoing reasons I would remand for entry of an order mandating the reinstatement of benefits as of the effective date of cessation.

. The majority, in response to this dissent, reiterates that it is legally significant that the plaintiff's benefits were terminated in July 1983. (See footnote 5). Herein lies the root of the error of the Commissioner’s position which the majority adopts. The effect of Samuels was to put the plaintiff back into the position he would have been in had an illegal standard not been used to terminate his benefits. Thus, the focus of the subsequent termination hearing under § 423(f) was not on whether he was eligible for benefits for disability arising after his insured status expired but, rather, on whether there had been such a medical improvement in the plaintiffs physical or mental impairment, or combination thereof, that he could now engage in substantial gainful activity. The statute, the applicable regulations and this court’s decision in Difford required that this determination be made with all evidence available at the time of the termination hearing.