Court Opinion

ID: 9833486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:45:26.0361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:03.450733
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Plaintiff in error in his motion for rehearing argues that he requested submission of the issue of conspiracy by his request for the submission of an issue reading as follows: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on or about August 8, 1933, defendants, or either of them, without warrant, caused or contributed towards the arrest of J. P. Miller, plaintiff herein?” It seems to us the mere statement of the requested issue is sufficient to show that it was not one miking inquiry as to the existence, or not, of a conspiracy.
As an alternative, it is insisted that if the requested issue was incorrect, it was sufficient to call the court’s attention to the omission, making it the duty of the court to submit a correct issue of conspiracy “and the action of the court in refusing such requested issue and in failing to submit a correct issue is reversible error.” In reply to this contention, eminent counsel for defendants in error say, “There is no controversy on the proposition that where the issue is suggested in a requested charge, although in itself erroneous, if there is a suggestion to call the court’s attention to the omission the court should submit a proper instruction on that issue.” In other words, defendants in error accept as correct the proposition contended for by plaintiff in error and rely alone upon the showing that the requested issue did not suggest the omitted issue of conspiracy. We agree that even if the law is as defendants in error concede it to be, the requested issue did not suggest the omission of the issue of conspiracy.
However, notwithstanding such concession on the part of the defendants in error, we cannot agree that it is at the present time a correct statement of tne law to say that the entire omission by the court to submit a special issue joined by the pleadings and supported by the evidence is reversible error at the instance of the party charged with establishing such issue in the absence of a timely request for its submission having been made by such party, including as a part of such request a correct statement of the issue. The proposition of plaintiff in error was, prior to the amendment in 1913 of R.S.1911, art. 1970, and certain other articles of the statutes (now R.S.1925, arts. 2184 to 2190, inclusive), undoubtedly correct. Freybe v. Tiernan, 76 Tex. 286, 13 S.W. 370; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cusenberry, 86 Tex. 525, 26 S.W. 43; Cleveland v. Empire Mills, 6 Tex.Civ.App, 479, 25 S.W. 1055; Carpenter v. Dowe (Tex.Civ.App.) 26 S.W. 1002; Thompson-Houston Electric Co. v. Berg, 10 Tex.Civ.App. 200, 30 S.W. 454; Leeds v. Reed (Tex.Civ.App.) *51336 S.W. 347; Sharrock v. Ritter (Tex.Civ.App.) 45 S.W. 156; Neville v. Mitchell, 28 Tex.Civ.App. 89, 66 S.W. 579; Johnston v. Johnston (Tex.Civ.App.) 67 S.W. 123; Gulf, C. & S. R Ry. Co. v. Mangham, 29 Tex.Civ.App. 486, 69 S.W. 80; Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Turner, 34 Tex.Civ.App. 397, 78 S.W. 712; Mc-Adams v. Hooks, 47 Tex.Civ.App. 79, 104 S.W.. 432; Dallas Consol. Electric St. Ry. Co. v. Pettit, 47 Tex.Civ.App. 354, 105 S. W. 42; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 49 Tex.Civ.App. 610, 108 S.W. 1195; Rushing v. Lanier, 51 Tex.Civ.App. 278, 111 S.W. 1089; Warren v. Kimmell (Tex.Civ.App.) 141 S.W. 159; Wichita Falls & W. Ry. Co. v. Wyrick (Tex.Civ.App.) 147 S.W. 694; Quanah, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Galloway (Tex.Civ.App.) 154 S.W. 653; Stirling v. Bettis Mfg. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 159 S.W. 915.
The amendment of said statutes in 1913 worked important changes in procedural law, as recognized and declared in many decisions, such, for instance, as Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 113 Tex. 472, 260 S.W. 561, 32 A.L.R. 1183; Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., Ill Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517; Robertson & Mueller v. Plolden (Tex.Com.App.) 1 S.W. (2d) 570. Not all of these changes have up to the present time been clearly named or defined. Before and after some of the changes were declared by the Supreme Court, a number of other decisions rendered since 1913 upon the point in question have been to the same effect as the prior decisions. American Glycerin Co. v. Kenridge Oil Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 295 S.W. 633; Olds Motor Works v. Churchill (Tex.Civ.App.) 175 S. W. 785; Brady v McCuistion (Tex.Civ.App.) 210 S.W. 815, 816; Roberts v. Houston Motor Car Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 188 S.W. 257; Texas Refining Co. v. Alexander (Tex.Civ.App.) 202 S.W. 131; McNabb v. McNabb (Tex.Civ.App.) 207 S. W. 129; Rounds v. Coleman (Tex.Civ. App.) 214 S.W. 496; Graves v. Haynes (Tex.Com.App.) 231 S.W. 383; Davis v. Morris (Tex.Civ.App.) 257 S.W. 328; Quanah, A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hogland (Tex.Civ.App.) 297 S.W. 761; St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v. Houze (Tex.Civ.App.) 28 S.W(2d) 865; Southwestern Sewer Co. v. Morris (Tex.Civ.App.) 26 S. W.(2d) 311; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Hill Bros. (Tex.Civ.App.) 58 S.W. (2d) 861; Meinen v. Muesse (Tex.Civ.App.) 72 S.W. (2d) 931. In none of the cases just cited was application made for writ of error. In two other such cases, applications for writ- of error were dismissed. Alamo Iron Works v. Prado (Tex.Civ.App.) 220 S.W. 282; Wright v. State (Tex.Civ.App.) 80 S.W. (2d) 1015. In two more such cases applications for writ of error were refused. Speed v. Gilliland (Tex.Civ.App.) 18 S.W. (2d) 762; Traders’ & General Ins. Co. v. Low (Tex.Civ.App.) 74 S.W. (2d) 122. One such decision by the Commission of Appeals was approved by the Supreme Court. Texas Power & Light Co. v. Culwell (Tex.Com.App.) 34 S.W.(2d) 820, 822. Discussion of the Culwell Case will be omitted here to be taken up later.
Unless the decision in the Culwell Case requires a holding to the contrary, we regard the following propositions as now established by the decisions construing R.S. 1925, arts. 2184 to 2190, inclusive, in their present form.
(I) A party not charged with the burden of establishing an issue in the trial of a case is, in the absence of. its submission, under no duty to request its submission and waives no right because of a failure to do so. The authorities supporting this proposition are cited in the original opinion beginning with Citizens’ National Bank of Brownwood v. Texas Compress Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 294 S.W. 331, and ending with Tripplehorn v. Ladd-Hannon Oil Corporation (Tex.Civ.App.) 8 S.W. (2d) 217, to which may be added Southern Surety Co. v. Solomon (Tex.Civ.App.) 4 S.W. (2d) 599; Austin Gaslight Co. v. Anderson (Tex.Civ.App.) 262 S.W. 136; Osceola Oil Co. v. Stewart Drilling Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 258 S.W. 806, 809. The correctness of the proposition is also just as certainly and necessarily implied as though it were expressly declared, in Dallas Hotel Co. v. Davison (Tex.Com.App.) 23 S.W. (2d) 708, and the cases following it.
(2) In a case submitted to a jury upon special issues wherein the court attempts to submit an issue joined by the pleadings and raised by the evidence, but submits it improperly, it is necessary for the party legally charged with the burden of establishing such issue, in order that he may complain of error in such submission, to make timely objection, in writing. R.S. 1925, art. 2185.
(3) When under the preceding proposition an objection is required as *514support for an assignment of error complaining of an improper submission of an issue which the court has attempted to submit, a requested correct issue and the refusal of the court to give it will not dispense with the necessity of proper objection. Isbell v. Lennox, 116 Tex. 522, 295 S.W. 920.
(4) In a case submitted upon special issues, .an issue joined by the pleadings and raised by the evidence, but not submitted to the jury, will be waived as support for the judgment to be rendered, unless the submission of such issue be timely requested in writing by the party having the burden of establishing it. R. S.1925, art. 2190.
(5) When under the preceding proposition a request for the submission of ah issue is required-as support for an assignment of error complaining of the failure or refusal of the court to submit an issue not attempted to be submitted, an objection to the failure or refusal of the court to submit it will not dispense with the necessity that the party charged with establishing such issue shall make due and timely request for such submission.. R.S. 1925, art. 2190; F. C. Pennington Produce Co. v. Browning (Tex.Civ.App.) 293 S.W. 935 (holding a mere objection to the charge of the court on the ground that it fails to' submit a particular issue does not meet the requirement of the statute); Frick v. International & G. N. Ry. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 207 S.W. 198; Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., supra; City of Houston v. Scanlan (Tex.Civ.App.) 16 S.W.(2d) 550; Olympia Towel Supply Co. v. Prade (Tex.Civ.App.) 22 S.W.(2d) 680; Wallace v. Johnson (Tex.Civ.App.) 39 S.W.(2d) 140; Donham v. Rugel (Tex.Civ.App.) 39 S.W. (2d) 627; Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Bradford (Tex.Civ.App.) 62 S. W.(2d) 158; Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Burt (Tex.Civ.App.) 71 S.W.(2d) 390.
Other propositions corollary to the foregoing are:
(6) Upon the failure or refusal of the court to submit an issue joined by the pleadings and raised by the évidence, and in the absence of any request for the submission of such issue by the party legally charged with the burden of establishing it as a basis for the judgment to be rendered, the adverse party is under no duty to object to such omission or refusal to submit, and therefore cannot be prejudiced by any failure to do so. Hence he is free to contend upon appeal that a judgment against him is erroneous in that the verdict included no finding in favor of the other party upon an issue necessary to- support the judgment, and, further, that a judgment in his favor is correct on the ground that it was the only one the court could properly render after the omitted issue essential to support a judgment for the other party had been legally waived as a basis for the court’s judgment. Dallas Hotel Co. v. Davison (Tex.Com.App.) 23 S.W.(2d) 708; Federal Surety Co. v. Smith (Tex.Com.App.) 41 S.W. (2d) 210; International-Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Casey (Tex.Com.App.) 46 S.W.(2d) 669.
It would appear to be wholly unreasonable to hold that a party not having the burden of establishing an issue (such burden being upon the other party) and therefore not being under any duty to request submission of the issue, should nevertheless be required to object to the failure or refusal of the court to submit it. He would be under no more duty to object to the failure or refusal of the court to submit an issue, the burden, of establishing which was upon the adverse party, than he would be to request the submission of such an issue. In neither case could he suffer any prejudice. If the judgment was in his favor, he could defend it against the contention that there should have been a finding upon an issue which the court failed or refused to submit, on the ground that the appealing party, by his failure to request the submission of such issue, waived it as a basis for the judgment to be rendered. If the judgment be against him, he can have it reversed on the ground that an issue necessary to support the judgment was not submitted and a finding thereon embraced in the verdict. This is but a reasonable construction of the law that it places certain responsibilities upon the respective parties; that is, to object to improper submission of issues when the court attempts to submit them, and when interested to request the submission of issues which the court wholly fails or refuses to submit.
In the instant case we are dealing, not with an issue improperly submitted, and therefore one which the law requires that an objection be made as the basis of an assignment of error complaining of the action of the court in submitting it, but with an entirely omitted issue, and therefore one which as the basis of an assignment of error complaining of such omission the *515law requires the plaintiff in error to request its submission.
The law requires one who, because of the failure or refusal of the court to submit an issue, is under duty of requesting its submission upon penalty of a waiver thereof, to prepare the issue to be given so that the judge’s action upon such request may be manifested of record by his writing thereon over his signature the words “given” or “refused.” R.S.1925, arts. 2186 and 2188.
It should require no citation of authorities to support the proposition that it is never error for the court to refuse to submit a requested special issue which is so stated that if the court had given it in the first place his action in doing so would have been error. But see Freeman v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 285 S.W. 607; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Shieder, 88 Tex. 152, 30 S.W. 902, 28 L.R.A. 538; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Minter, 42 Tex.Civ.App. 235, 93 S.W. 516, and authorities cited; Landrum v. Thomas (Tex.Civ.App.) 149 S.W. 813; Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Lacy (Tex.Civ.App.) 153 S.W. 414; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Dunn (Tex.Civ.App.) 157 S.W. 434; Gulf Production Co. v. Gibson (Tex.Civ.App.) 234 S. W. 906. So far as we know, in no well-considered case has it ever been held that it was error to do so. A consideration of the many decisions listed above in which it has been held that a requested special charge or issue, though incorrect, was sufficient to call attention of the court to a material omission and thereby impose the duty of giving a correct special issue or charge discloses that the error was not in refusing the requested charge or issue,-but in the failure to give a correct one. It has been accordingly held that ail assignment of error necessary to present such question for review was required to complain, not of the action of the court in refusing to give the requested incorrect charge or issue, but of the failure to give a correct charge or issue. Gulf Production Co. v. Gibson, supra; Olds Motor Works v. Churchill, supra.
Another thing which a careful reading of said decisions discloses is that the reason for the rule was that the request, though incorrect, served as an objection to a defect in the court’s charge, consisting of the omission, or, in other words, an implied objection. The question at issue was therefore determined by the Supreme Court in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Conley, supra.
In the Conley Case it was held that the former rule to the effect that defects in charges and instructions consisting of omissions rather than affirmative error were reviewable only when request had been made for the giving of a special charge had been changed by the 1913 amendment of the statutes. The amended statutes were interpreted to require that defects in charges^ or special issues given by the court, whether such defects consisted of omissions or appeared affirmatively, were required, upon penalty of a waiver of such defects, to be objected to. The Court of Civil Appeals (236 S.W. 521, 526) had held that “The charge here complained of was not affirmatively erroneous, and therefore not reversible error, in the absence of a requested instruction by appellant more fully explaining the degree of care required by appellant as a carrier of passengers.” Said the Supreme Court (113 Tex. 472, 260 S.W. 561, 32 A. L.R. 1183) : “This was once the rule with reference to charges not affirmatively erroneous. Due, however, to statutory enactments, it is no longer so.” (Italics ours.)
What was the new rule required by the amended statutes ? Simply that whether a general or special charge or instruction, or a special issue was involved, defects therein, whether consisting merely of omissions or affirmatively appearing error, were required to be objected to upon penalty of a waiver of the defects. As requisites “objections” were substituted for the former requests for a submission of special charges or issues. The opinion distinguishes between issues attempted to be submitted whether by a general charge or the giving of a special issue and issues not attempted to be submitted. As to the former, the rule was declared to be changed as above stated, and as to the latter the court said: “We think a failure to submit any particular issue under either statute can be reviewed on appeal only where the record shows a special charge was tendered on that issue.” This opinion plainly declared the conditions under which objections to charges or issues were required and those under which requested charges or issues were required and made clear that when “objections” were required “requested charges or issues” could not with the same effect be substituted *516therefor and vice versa. This important change in procedure has, it seems, been difficult of assimilation into our practice. It was found to be necessary to reassert it in Robertson & Mueller v. Holden (Tex.Com.App.) 1 S.W. (2d) 570 and many other cases, some of which are hereinbe-fore cited.
If the reason upon which was founded the former rule was as before stated, that the request of even an improper charge or issue was at any rate an implied objection to the charge or issues because of omissions therein, how can it be logically contended that such former rule still applies in a case where even an express and specific objection would be wholly ineffective to prevent a waiver. If, as held in Isbell v. Lennox, supra, where an objection be required, a requested issue, though correct, cannot meet the requirement, with what consistency can it be said that in a case like this, where under plain statutory mandate a request for the submission of a special issue is required, a merely implied objection to the failure of the court to give a correct issue could serve as substitute for a properly requested issue?
On the question at issue we would have deemed a citation of the statute (R.S. 1925, art. 2190) and the Conley Case, supra, as conclusive and sufficient, but for the problem of what authority to regard as controlling presented by the case of Texas Power & Light Co. v. Culwell, supra. If the facts would permit, it would do no great violence to certainly established rules to< construe the last-named decision as going no further than to affirm in effect that where under the principles hereinabove discussed, it is necessary to make an objection as distinguished from a request to give a special charge or submit a special issue, a request to give such charge or submit such issue, though in improper form, may yet under the old rule be regarded as an implied objection. It would appear to be a little difficult to reconcile even this -view with the requisites of an objection as to specificness and the purpose thereof as declared in, for instance, Isbell v. Lennox, supra. But it seems an omitted issue, and not a merely defective issue, was involved. It was a case in which under the authorities we have cited an objection alone was not available to prevent a waiver of error in the failure or refusal of the court to give it. The requested special issue was admittedly incorrect. It was not the duty of the court to give it, and it was not so held. What effect then is to be given to the language of the opinion as follows: “We think, however, the special issue requested, though defective in form, was sufficient to call the trial court’s attention to a defensive matter properly pleaded and raised by the evidence; hence that court erred in not giving a proper special issue submitting such defense.” Is it to be construed as an interpretation of R.S. 1925, art. 2190, later than and different from the interpretation given in Ormsby v. Rat-cliffe, 117 Tex. 242, 1 S.W. (2d) 1084, and Dallas Hotel Co. v. Davison, supra, to the effect that an independent issue not submitted and not requested to be submitted shall be deemed to be waived ? Or, was it intended to hold that the requirement that in case of the failure or refusal of the court to submit a special issue, the party who had the burden of establishing such issue must request its submission in writing does not impose the duty to submit a correct issue as part of such request, as R. S.1925, arts. 2186 and 2188, seem plainly to declare, and which was so held in Texas Co. v. Ramsower (Tex.Com.App.) 7 S.W. (2d) 872, and other cases ? The opinion itself indicates the contrary, for it is said: “The party desiring a specific charge must request a correct instruction before he can complain on appeal.” (Italics ours.) The succeeding paragraph to that above quoted, although unenlightening, is interesting. It is: “From the authorities the rule is deducible that if an issue has been submitted generally, the party desiring a specific charge must request a correct instruction before he can complain on appeal. If, however, an issue made by the pleadings and the evidence has not been submitted at all, a requested instruction, though defective in form, if it is so nearly correct as to be sufficient to' call the court’s attention to the matter, requires a proper submission of such issue by • the court.” The following authorities were cited: Freybe v. Tiernan, 76 Tex. 286, 13 S.W. 370; Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex. 565, 10 S.W. 683; Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Thompson (Tex.Civ.App) 222 S.W. 289; Graves v. Haynes (Tex.Com.App.) 231 S.W. 383; 3 Tex.Jur. § 136, p. 202. Can it be doubted that this was any other than the very rule which it was declared in the Conley Case was “once the rule,” but which, due to statutory enactments, “It is no longer so?”
*517If the requested improper issue cannot be given by the court, then just what function does it perform? What is the principle upon which it was said to have the effect of imposing- the duty upon the court to prepare and submit a correctly stated special issue? We can see no answer to the proposition that if it has such effect it is only because it constitutes an implied objection to the failure of the court to submit an issue. But, as we have already seen, even an express and explicit objection in that case would be without' effect. Is this decision to be construed as overruling those which so hold? We cannot bring ourselves to believe that this opinion should be construed as having the effect of unsettling so many well-considered opinions of the Supreme Court without mention or discussion, as would be the effect if it be construed to mean that in a case submitted on special issues wherein an issue is not submitted, the failure of the court to submit it may be complained of and the case reversed at the instance of the party charged by law with establishing such issue, upon the sole showing that he requested the court to submit an issue which, because it was incorrect, the court could not properly give, and therefore refused it.
The other contentions set forth in the motion for rehearing are believed to have been sufficiently discussed in the original opinion. We therefore conclude that the motion for rehearing should be denied, and it is accordingly so ordered.