Court Opinion

ID: 9786069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:46:27.145336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:41.332618
License: Public Domain

BUSTAMANTE, Judge (specially concurring). {21} I agree that the aggravation issue is controlled by this Court’s decision in State v. Wilson, 2001-NMCA-032, 130 N.M. 319, 24 P.3d 351. I also agree that the EMDA violent offense finding is not subject to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). I disagree, however, with the path taken by the majority to reach this result. I would affirm on the much narrower basis that the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi refused to overrule McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), a case which, in my view, presents an issue substantively indistinguishable from ours. Apprendi 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13, 120 S.Ct. 2348. {22} McMillan involved a challenge to a statute which imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment if the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accused “visibly possessed a firearm” in the course of committing one of certain specified felonies. 477 U.S. at 81-82, 106 S.Ct. 2411. Each of the specified felonies carried maximum sentences in excess of five years. In upholding the Pennsylvania statute against a due process challenge, the Supreme Court noted that the statute did not alter the “maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty.” Thus, in the Supreme. Court’s view it simply limited the court’s “discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm.” Id., 477 U.S. at 87-88, 106 S.Ct. 2411. {23} As I have noted before, the core principle of Apprendi is that any fact-finding which affects the length of a defendant’s sentence must be made by the jury applying the normal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. 530 U.S. at 483-84, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Recognizing the potential impact of the decision’s core principle on McMillan, the dissent in Apprendi accused the majority of overruling McMillan. The Apprendi majority was careful to note that it was not overruling McMillan, but it also made clear that McMillan would be limited to “cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict.” Apprendi 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The majority also noted that it was reserving the question whether the rule of McMillan was subject to challenge under the principles laid down in Apprendi {24} The EMDA has a similar effect as the firearm mandatory minimum sentence statute on a defendant’s sentence. Absent a finding that a crime is a serious violent offense, a person convicted and sentenced for a crime in New Mexico is eligible to receive meritorious deductions equal to thirty days per month while in prison. NMSA 1978 § 33-2-34(A)(2) (1999). If the crime is a serious violent offense, meritorious deductions are limited to a maximum of four days per month. The practical effect of this is that the real time a defendant can expect to be incarcerated is increased by a significant factor. Despite the increase in real incarceration time, a defendant’s nominal sentence is not increased. The practical net effect of the EMDA is to impose a mandatory increased minimum sentence. The EMDA and Pennsylvania statutes are not precisely the same, but their effect is substantively identical. {25} Given that the United States Supreme Court believes that the McMillan mandatory minimum sentence statute still passes muster under Apprendi the EMDA limitation on merit deductions must also. {26} I disagree also with the majority’s reliance on People v. Garry, 323 Ill.App.3d 292, 257 Ill.Dec. 64, 752 N.E.2d 1244 (2001). The portion of the Garry opinion quoted by the majority is simply unrealistic when it asserts that limitation of merit deductions does not trigger any penalty for a crime. Id. 257 Ill.Dec. 64, 752 N.E.2d at 1250. More importantly, however, the entire discussion concerning the constitutionality of the Illinois statute in Garry is dicta. In Garry, the finding required to trigger Illinois’ truth-in-sentencing provision was in fact made by a jury under a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Thus, there was no need for the court in Garry to undertake the constitutional analysis. {27} The approach taken by the New Jersey court in State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523, 766 A.2d 1126 (2001), to the extent that it recognizes the real and practical consequences of imposing limitations on merit deductions on sentences, is preferable to the Garry analysis, though I fully recognize that the holding in Johnson does not control our decision because of statutory differences.