Court Opinion

ID: 9752526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:13:14.581045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:17.211060
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I join the opinion of the majority yet would like to write separately to stress one point. I believe the proper focus of our inquiry should be first on whether or not a finding of guilty but mentally ill is inconsistent with a finding of guilt as to murder in the first degree. I believe considerations of legislative intent should arise only to the extent necessary to answer that inquiry, if at all, and consequently, I believe we should refrain from such a discussion.
The majority quite aptly demonstrates that there is nothing to indicate the legislature’s belief that a guilty but mentally ill verdict cannot be returned on a first degree murder charge. However, the fact remains that the finding in this case, by virtue of the legislature’s definition, is tantamount to a finding that appellant lacked a substantial capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. If by making this finding we would have to conclude that a necessary element of first degree murder was negated, we would be duty bound to vacate that conviction regardless of legislative intent. However, as also demon*571strated by the majority, it appears that a finding of guilty but mentally ill does not necessarily negate an element necessary for first degree murder. Our Supreme Court described the elements of that crime in the following manner:
Section 2502(a) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) states that “[a] criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an ntentional killing ” (emphasis added). The phrase “intentional killing” is defined as a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d). This Court has held that a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing” is one where the actor has a specific intent to bring about the death of the victim.
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 523 A.2d 728 (1987).
Although, the finding in the present case would indicate that appellant either lacked a substantial capacity to understand that stabbing the victim was wrong or, perhaps, knowing that this was wrong, lacked a substantial capacity to refrain from stabbing the victim regardless of that understanding, it would not necessarily mean that he was incapable of developing a specific intent to kill the victim. As such, and as noted in the majority opinion, the finding that appellant was guilty but mentally ill of first degree murder is not necessarily inconsistent.