Court Opinion

ID: 9711694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:36:51.899439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:06.769409
License: Public Domain

Wennerstrum, J.
(dissenting) — I cannot concur in the majority opinion as I do not believe the confessions were inadmissible as a matter of law or that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. Nor do I find support in the record for the harsh terms — “inquisition”, “inquisitioners”, “badgering”, “sweating”, and a “second platoon”- — indulged in by the majority. It was, I think, for the jury to determine whether there was any undue pressure put upon defendant in obtaining his confessions.
I. The majority holds the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions were violated in obtaining the confessions. With this conclusion I am not in accord. In fact *1062the majority indicates it is not sure of its conclusion for its opinion states :
“It seems to the majority of this court that the record of what was done to the defendant in this case brings the definite conclusion that his rights were flagrantly violated, <md the most serious doubts the confessions were in any sense voluntary (Italics supplied.)
In State v. Thomas, 193 Iowa 1004, 1021, 188 N.W. 689, 696, from which the majority quotes extensively, this general rule relative to the voluntary character of a confession is set forth: “* * * but it is settled in this state that, where the free and voluntary character of the statements relied upon as a confession is the subject of dispute or conflict in the evidence, the question may properly be submitted to the jury. State v. Storms, supra; State v. Bennett, 143 Iowa 214. If, however, it clearly appears from the record that the alleged confession was not freely and voluntarily made, or if the State, by its own evidence, negatives these essentials to its use in evidence, it is the duty of the court to sustain the objection and refuse its submission to the jury. State v. Chambers, 39 Iowa 179; State v. Jay, 116 Iowa 264.”
There was a much stronger showing as to the involuntary character of the confession in the Thomas case, supra, than we have here. The Thomas confession was made under fear of violence from a mob assembled in the immediate vicinity after defendant’s attorney had asked and been refused entrance to the house where the interrogation was in progress.
We can advisedly apply the facts in this case to the rule quoted from the Thomas case. In State’s Exhibit 15 the appellant stated: “* * * no promises have been made to me by any police officer or anyone else or have I been threatened with any personal injury. I make this statement of my own free will and accord, knowing that I do not have to make any statement.” This same statement was incorporated in Exhibit 16 which the appellant wrote in his own handwriting. The fact that this second confession was written by the appellant does not indicate he was so devoid of mentality he could be and was easily in-*1063fhienced by bis interrogators. It appears to the writer of this dissent that the writing of his own confession is a circumstance that could be considered by the jury as bearing upon the voluntary character of the confession. The jury could also consider this fact in its determination of the appellant’s mentality.
In further support of the conclusion that the jury should determine the character of the confessions, we find the following testimony of the appellant in his cross-examination: “Q. Is there any time you were being questioned out there that you were threatened? A. By Mr. Long, no. Q. And by anyone else out there? A. No. Q. Was there any time out there, Jack, that anyone out there made you any promises ? A. No. Q. Now, Jack, you state that these statements were suggested to you? A. More or less, in a way. Q. By the officers ? A. By the questioning. Q. What?-A. By their questioning. Q. But they were finally voluntarily made by you, is that true ? A. I signed the things to get some peace and rest, that is why. Q. You signed them, voluntarily? A. Yes.” (Italics supplied.)
Further facts are disclosed in the cross-examination of the appellant: “Q. Jack, do you remember when we were sitting in the train coming out of Wyoming? A. I remember. Q. You and I were sitting in a seat together? A. Yes. Q. What did you say ? A. I said a lot of things; what are you pertaining to ? Q. I am pertaining to when you said, ‘I want to go into court and get this over with as quick as 1 can/ A. I said that. Q. And when we were coming up after you re-enacted the crime, you were sitting with Ted Long in the back of the car with Mr. Strand? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember you talked to Ted, what did you say ? A. I don’t remember but you seem to know it, so-Q. Didn’t you tell Ted, ‘Can I'get into court tomorrow and get this over with?’ A. No, I didn’t say that. Q. That isn’t true ? A. No. Q. But you told me that on the train coming out of Wyoming? A. If I said it I don’t remember it. Q. You just got through telling me yon did? A. All right, I said it.” (Italics supplied.)
II. The majority lays particular stress on several pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. For a distinction between the federal rule expressed in the McNabb *1064case, 318 U. S. 332, 346, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819, and other supreme court opinions and the rule followed in many states, see annotation in 19 A. L. R.2d 1336-1347 and cases therein cited. In this annotation at page 1336 it is stated:
“With few exceptions, the state courts have refused to apply the strict rule established by the McNabb Case, although the decision has been discussed in the majority of subsequent cases involving the question of the admissibility of confessions obtained during a period of delay in arraignment.
“In a number of cases, the state courts have continued to hold admissible confessions made by an accused whose arraignment was delayed in contravention of statute, and, on the ground that the McNabb decision is not binding upon state courts, have expressly refused to apply the doctrine laid down in that case.”
It should be kept in mind that in the McNabb case a federal statute was applied. It is apparent the majority has ignored the many state decisions referred to in the annotation previously cited wherein it has been held the federal rule is not applicable.
It is appellant’s contention that the repeated questioning of him prevented his obtaining necessary rest. We believe there is a definite conflict in the testimony whether the appellant’s confessions were improperly procured. Under our prior holdings it was proper to admit them in evidence and to submit the question of their voluntary character to the jury. State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 829, 28 N.W.2d 475, 480; State v. Thomas, 193 Iowa 1004, 1021, 1024, 188 N.W. 689. See also 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, section 533. The confessions themselves show they were voluntarily given.
The fact that the appellant was fatigued when a confession was given does not necessarily render it inadmissible. State v. Hofer, supra, at page 828. And in the McNabb case, supra, it is held that the mere fact a confession was made while in the custody of the police does not render it inadmissible. See also State v. Hofer, supra, at page 827. And we have also held that the fact a confession was given while one was under unlawful arrest does not make it involuntary. State v. Westcott, 130 Iowa 1, 6, 104 N.W. 341. Appellant’s testimony upon this point neces*1065sarily creates a conflict for tbe jury to decide and does not require the exclusion of the exhibit. State v. Kress, 204 Iowa 828, 832, 216 N.W. 31; 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, section 838, page 1470.
III. The majority also comments on the admission of evidence relative to the re-enactment of the crime. In connection with this claimed error attention is called to the fact that shortly after the appellant returned from Wyoming he was asked if he would point out certain locations in Clinton that he had mentioned in the confessions given in Casper. According to a State witness the appellant said he would be glad to do so. A review of his testimony does not disclose a denial of this statement. There is nothing in his testimony to indicate he was taken against his will to the places connected with the alleged crime. However, it is contended by the appellant’s counsel he was denied his constitutional rights by the admission of evidence relative to this trip and the statements made by the appellant at that time, that his actions during the trip to the place of the alleged crime were involuntary and that this evidence should have been stricken. There is no evidence to show that his actions were in any manner the result of compulsion.
In State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 1173, 300 N.W. 275, 277, we commented on the admissibility of evidence relative to the conduct and demeanor of a defendant and stated: “It is proper to show the defendant’s conduct, demeanor and statements (not merely self-serving), whether oral or written, his attitude and relations toward the crime, if there was one. These are circumstances that may be shown. Their weight is for the jury to determine.
See also State v. Bryant, 208 Iowa 816, 818, 225 N.W. 854. And in 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, section 647, it is stated: “Any statement made by a defendant, even though not admitting the commission of the crime charged, is competent against the party making it if it throws any light on the issue being tried and elucidates the subject-matter of the trial.”
In connection with the matters heretofore' stated we have this testimony of G. M. Strand, a special agent of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation:
*1066“During this time no one suggested to the defendant where to go. After arriving on the north side of 12th Avenue South, we proceeded west on foot across the intersection of 12th Avenue South and 5th Street and on west of the intersection until we came to a location between two houses. •The defendant hesitated and said he would like to walk on west so we walked west two or three houses and he stopped and stated, ‘that was too far’, and then returned to the location next to 518 Twelfth Avenue South and said, ‘this is the place.’ ¥e then proceeded between the two houses to the rear property line of this residence at which point he pointed to the ground and stated that was the location that he had assaulted the deceased and the position in which he had left the body. He said he was. frightened and saw a lantern, and the question was asked, ‘where did you see the lantern f And he said, ‘down there’, and pointed to the west. That was a straight alley to the west. The defendant then proceeded back to the street the same route he had used coming to the alley. He then went west to the end of the street, cut diagonally across the street and headed toward the railroad yards, and in so doing, he skirted a bulk station there and pointed to the ground near the fqnee separating the bulk station from the street and said, ‘that is where I threw the brake shoe key’, and that he proceeded on into the railroad yards and left town. # * # »
Inasmuch as the majority states that except for the confessions “there is no syllable of evidence to connect him with the crime unless it be that he had been in Clinton and had departed from there on the night it was committed”, it is significant that we have this testimony of Mr. Strand: “He said he was frightened and saw a lantern, and the question was asked, ‘where did you see the lantern?’ And he said, ‘down there’, and pointed to the west.” This incident had not been referred to in the confession and it is apparent that none of the officers knew of this fact at the time the appellant was questioned in Casper. The statement attributed to the appellant was not denied by him in his testimony. It is also significant that there is testimony there were men near the end of the alley on the night of the crime with flashlights looking for night crawlers. It is apparent *1067therefore that there is undenied evidence other than the confessions connecting appellant with the crime.
The jury also had a right to appraise the credibility of appellant’s explanation that his knowledge of the area which he identified as the alleged scene of the crime was obtained merely from a diagram and pictures shown him several days earlier in Casper, Wyoming. The jury might easily find such intelligence and memory quite inconsistent with his claimed lack' of intelligence in other ways.
IV. The majority refers to the State’s appeal in connection with the offer of the wire recording confession. With the conclusion that the State has no right to appeal, I have no quarrel. However, I feel this confession should have been admitted in evidence. It was another circumstance which the jury could have considered as bearing' upon the voluntary character of all the confessions. In this confession it is disclosed that the appellant was asked if he wished an attorney and he replied he did not. It should be kept in mind that in the case of State v. Benson, supra, which is referred to in Division III of this dissent, we held that facts bearing upon a defendant’s demeanor and conduct could be properly considered by a jury. This holding has application in connection with the admission of the wire recording.
If the wire recording was erroneously excluded it is óur duty to consider it in passing on the sufficiency of the evidence. Iowa Electric Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 235 Iowa 672, 676, 677, 17 N.W.2d 414, 416, and citations; Sjulin v. Clifton Furniture Co., 241 Iowa 761, 768, 41 N.W.2d 721, 726.
V. The majority gives particular weight to the testimony of a doctor of psychiatry and neurology. I believe courts should endeavor to benefit from the sciences in the 'administration of justice, however, in doing so we should not discard established principles of law. If the defense of insanity had been raised it would have been left to the jury to determine the appellant’s mentality. State v. Berry, 241 Iowa 211, 40 N.W.2d 480. How then can we say that in this ease the testimony of the psychiatrist should not have been for the consideration of the jury in determining whether the appellant was easily influenced? The ques*1068tion of mental competency bas generally been beld to be for tbe jury if there is a material conflict in the evidence. State v. Berry, supra. Surely it cannot be said there was no such conflict in the instant case.
YI. It would appear the majority has failed to keep, in mind our accepted rule that in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to take a criminal case to the jury the testimony must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution and only the evidence tending to support the conviction need be considered. State v. Rutledge, 243 Iowa 179, 184, 47 N.W.2d 251, 255, and citations; State v. Hill, 239 Iowa 675, 32 N.W.2d 398, and citations. It is my considered opinion there is sufficient evidence to justify the submission of this case to the jury. By a reversal the majority has substituted itself for the jury.
I would affirm.
SMITH, C. J., and Garfield, J., join in this dissent.