Court Opinion

ID: 9716287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:33:15.251976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.430564
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that resolving this appeal calls upon us to "balance the competing interest of this scope of discovery and the physician-patient privilege." Maj. op. at 1860. I also agree that a tough discovery order such as the one entered by the trial court in this case does much to limit the invasion of the physician-patient relationship.
Accepting the value of this effort to protect that relationship, I think one must still ask the question, "What goes on the other side of the balance?" That is, what benefit to the truth-finding process in the malpractice case is derived from our permitting this invasion of the confidentiality of patients? It is difficult to see how the redacted patient records are admissible during a trial on the merits of the malpractice claim. Indeed, how could the receipt of these records "lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"? Ind. Trial Rule 26(B)(1).
The majority mentions nothing about how forcing disclosure of these records might add to the truth-finding process, citing only the policy of liberal discovery, which we hold to be beneficial. True-blood's brief in this Court, on the. other hand, contains some suggestion about the use of these documents by virtue of its reliance on Ziegler v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 390, 656 P.2d 1251 (App.1982), and similar cases. Trueblood says she will use the information to prove that the hospital knew it had a doctor on its staff who was committing malpractice.
The parties do not suggest how redacted patient records will be used to do this, and the apparent methods seem unattractive. *1363First, presumably, someone will testify about these acts of malpractice on other patients. The patient will, of course, not be available. The treating physician would not seem like a good prospective witness on the subject, for he can hardly be subject to cross-examination without the necessity of talking about the patient at some length and probably with details not covered in the hospital records. The record keeper is unlikely to know anything about the actual treatment, and thus would not be a very useful witness on this issue.
Second, if the plaintiff is to have this use of the records, must not the hospital have at its disposal a way to investigate whether those patients really were the victims of malpractice? How are they to do that without resorting to the patients themselves? Or without having the benefit of other records of those patients not in the possession of the hospital?
Because all of this seems so unlikely, I am led to think that we will end up with a battle of experts based solely on whatever records the hospital possesses. Both sides call expert witnesses who offer up their own opinions about whether malpractice occurred in each of dozens of patients, none of whom they have ever seen, on the basis of redacted hospital records alone.
In short, if this material is to be used as evidence or if it is to lead to admissible evidence, either one must ultimately intrude further on the physician-patient relationships of persons who are strangers to this litigation or the evidence will ultimately be used in a "t'is-t'aint'" debate between experts who are by definition ill-informed.
The value of all this as evidence for finders of fact seems pretty marginal. For that reason, I would strike the balance in favor of the many patients who went to their doctor expecting confidentiality. Seeing this as an invasion of lots of patients for a purpose of little value to one patient, I dissent.
GIVAN, J., joins in this dissent.