Court Opinion

ID: 9955654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 21:02:43.714976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:10.580632
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 Kennedy v. Wardour Studios CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 MADELEINE KENNEDY,                                           B325983

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BC716848)
           v.

 WARDOUR STUDIOS INC. et
 al.,

      Defendants and
 Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Elaine Lu, Judge. Affirmed.

     Ardent Law Group and Brian P. Stewart for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
      Glen Broemer for Defendants and Respondents.

                              ******
      A trial court granted a motion for nonsuit against the
plaintiff when she—as the sole witness for her case—did not
appear for trial. The trial court had denied the plaintiff’s earlier
motions for a trial continuance and to allow her to testify
remotely from Australia. Because we conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s precursor
motions, we affirm the court’s subsequent judgment of nonsuit.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Facts1
      Madeleine Kennedy (plaintiff) “is an award-winning
actress, producer and writer” based in Australia.
      In August 2017, three companies “partnered together” to
develop a film called Qi: Spacetime Warriors for distribution in
China. Those partners were (1) The Genfilms Group (Genfilms),
a Chinese company that develops and finances films; (2) Wardour
Studios Inc. (Wardour Studios), an American company that
distributes international films; and (3) USA Hollywood Pictures
International, LLC (USA Hollywood Pictures), an American
company that facilitates financing among foreign and Chinese
investors.
      These companies approached plaintiff to be a producer and
co-writer of the film. She entered an employment contract in
October 2017, setting her compensation at $1,212,000 (to be paid

1    Because no evidence was presented at the trial in this case,
we draw the facts from the allegations in the operative complaint.

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in monthly installments) as well as a share of 3 percent of the
film’s profits (which ended up totaling more than $200 million).2
       Plaintiff “expended hundreds of hours” working on the film
from August 2017 to May 2018, when her contract was
terminated.
       Plaintiff received no payment for her work.
II.    Procedural Background
       A.    Complaint
       In August 2018, plaintiff sued Genfilms, Wardour Studios,
USA Hollywood Pictures, and their executives.3 In the operative
second amended complaint filed in July 2021, plaintiff asserted
12 causes of action4 and sought $2 million in compensatory

2     The purported employment agreement is not in the record.

3     Plaintiff sued the CEO of Genfilms, Jessie Kerry (Kerry);
the CEO and chief operating officer of Wardour Studios, Steven
Nia (Nia) and Angelina Leo (Leo), respectively; and the
chairperson of USA Hollywood Pictures, Rachel Wang (Wang).

4     Those causes of action were for (1) breach of contract
against Genfilms, Wardour Studios, and USA Hollywood
Pictures; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing against Genfilms, Wardour Studios, and USA Hollywood
Pictures; (3) promissory fraud against Genfilms and Kerry; (4)
intentional misrepresentation against Genfilms and Kerry; (5)
aiding and abetting fraud against Wardour Studios, USA
Hollywood Pictures, Nia, and Wang; (6) conspiracy to defraud
against Genfilms, Wardour Studios, USA Hollywood Pictures,
Kerry, Nia, and Wang; (7) negligent misrepresentation against
Genfilms and Kerry; (8) quantum meruit against Genfilms,
Wardour Studios, and USA Hollywood Pictures; (9) unjust
enrichment against Genfilms, Wardour Studios, and USA
Hollywood Pictures; (10) false light against Genfilms, Wardour

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damages, $2 million in civil penalties, punitive damages, and an
order correcting her title credits on the film.5
       B.    Pretrial proceedings
             1.    Trial setting
       On February 10, 2022, the trial court set a trial date of
August 29, 2022, with the final status conference to be held one
month prior.
             2.    Attempt to disqualify trial judge
       After Wardour Studios, USA Hollywood Pictures, and their
respective executives retained new counsel in late July and early
August 2022, the trial court issued disclosures indicating that the
judge and new counsel had been active in the same community
bar association but stating that the court “can remain fair and
impartial to all parties” and “has no basis to recuse itself.”
Nevertheless, the trial court set a deadline of August 10, 2022 for
any party to seek to disqualify the judge. As a result, the court
continued the final status conference to August 22, 2022, but
reaffirmed in two minute orders—on July 26, 2022 and August 5,
2022—that “[t]he trial remains firmly set for August 29, 2022.”

Studios, USA Hollywood Pictures, Kerry, Nia, and Wang; (11)
violation of Labor Code section 203 against Genfilms, Wardour,
USA Hollywood Pictures, Kerry, Nia, Leo, and Wang; and (12)
violation of California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200 et seq.) against Genfilms, Wardour, USA
Hollywood Pictures, Kerry, Nia, Leo, and Wang.
       Plaintiff dismissed the unfair competition law claim on the
eve of trial.

5    Some parties filed cross-complaints, but those cross-
complaints were eventually dismissed.

                                 4
       Plaintiff filed a statement of disqualification against the
judge on the deadline set by the court, and the trial court issued
an order the next day striking the statement because, “on its
face,” the statement “disclose[d] no . . . grounds for
disqualification” beyond the judge’s professional relationships,
which are not “prescribed as legal grounds for disqualification.”
Plaintiff did not file a writ petition challenging the order.
       On August 12, 2022, the trial court issued a minute order
directing the parties to file several trial documents and
reaffirming that “[t]he jury trial remains set for August 29,
2022.”
             3.      Mandatory settlement conference
        At the final status conference on August 22, 2022, the
parties requested a mandatory settlement conference. The trial
court responded that it would “attempt to locate a judge” to
conduct it, but that the August 29, 2022 “trial date stands firm”
and the “[t]rial will commence on the current trial date even if
the [c]ourt is unable to locate” a judge to conduct a mandatory
settlement conference “before the current trial date.”
             4.      Request to continue trial
       On August 24, 2022, plaintiff filed an ex parte application
requesting a continuance of the trial for “no more than 90 days.”
Specifically, plaintiff explained that (1) she “misunderstood that
the trial would be continued” from the August 29, 2022 date
because her lawyer had sent her an email on August 5, 2022
explaining the possibility that trial might be continued and
asking her availability for potential new trial dates (italics
added); and (2) plaintiff had accordingly accepted a job as the
“Producer, Writer and Lead Actress” in a new film that
committed her to work in Australia from August 22, 2022 until at

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least November 13, 2022, and thus precluded her from traveling
to California for the current August 29, 2022 trial date.6
       Following further briefing and a hearing, the trial court
denied plaintiff’s request. The court found no “good cause” to
continue the trial because plaintiff’s conduct in unilaterally
committing to work abroad without a court order continuing the
trial date was not “excusable.” The court nevertheless continued
the trial date two days to August 31, 2022.
              5.    Request to allow plaintiff to testify remotely
       Following up on the trial court’s suggestion that the parties
might stipulate to allow plaintiff to testify remotely or, failing a
stipulation, might litigate the issue, plaintiff filed an ex parte
application on August 29, 2022 requesting that she be allowed to
testify at trial remotely.
       Following further briefing and a hearing, the trial court on
August 30, 2022 denied plaintiff’s request. As a threshold
matter, the court noted that plaintiff’s request was untimely.
Turning to the merits, the court denied the request after finding
that plaintiff’s “in[-]person testimony will materially assist the
jury’s assessment.” The court explained that (1) plaintiff’s
“credibility” was “critical to the jury’s determination” of the
dispute, which turned on the resolution of factual conflicts
between plaintiff’s account and those of competing defense
witnesses; (2) plaintiff had offered no “effective and efficient way”
for defense counsel to confront her with exhibits that would

6      We draw these facts from plaintiff’s subsequent filings
because she failed to file her counsel’s email until later in the
proceedings and because she failed to include in the record on
appeal her own declaration filed in connection with the request
for a trial continuance.

                                  6
impeach her on cross-examination because (a) the “effectiveness
of cross-examination” would be “dampen[ed]” if defense counsel
had to identify those exhibits in advance or had to email them to
plaintiff one at a time during her examination, thereby forcing
the jury to wait as she re-read them, and (b) the jury would not
be able to gauge plaintiff’s “facial reaction or any change in her
body language” in response to those exhibits from the screen in
the courtroom; and (3) plaintiff’s underlying reasons for seeking
to testify remotely did not mitigate any of these considerations,
as the need for remote testimony was caused by plaintiff herself.
       The court nevertheless granted plaintiff permission to
appear remotely for all phases of the trial except her own
testimony.
       C.     Trial
       The matter proceeded to trial the next day against
Wardour Studios and its two named executives (collectively,
defendants).7
       After the jury was impaneled, plaintiff filed an ex parte
application asking the trial court to reconsider its denial of her
requests for a continuance and to testify remotely. The trial
court denied reconsideration the next day, ruling that (1) the
commencement of trial rendered moot any discussion of whether
to continue the trial, and (2) nothing plaintiff argued “alter[ed]”
the court’s earlier finding that “the jury’s ability to assess
[p]laintiff’s credibility will be hampered if [she] does not testify in
person.”

7     Only these parties remained at the time of the trial because
Genfilms defaulted, Genfilms’s executive had been dismissed,
and plaintiff had settled with USA Hollywood Pictures and its
named executive.

                                   7
       Following the parties’ waiver of introductory instructions
and opening statements, plaintiff rested her case without
presenting any evidence. Defendants then moved for nonsuit.
The court granted the motion and discharged the jury.
       D.     Appeal
       After judgment of nonsuit was entered for defendants,
plaintiff filed this timely appeal.
                            DISCUSSION
       Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s grant of a nonsuit in
defendants’ favor. Because it is undisputed that plaintiff rested
her case without presenting any evidence, and because a nonsuit
may be granted whenever a plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient as a
matter of law to support a verdict in her favor (Code Civ. Proc., §
581c; Stonegate Homeowners Assn. v. Staben (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 740, 745), plaintiff’s attack on the nonsuit in this
case boils down to an attack on the trial court’s prior rulings (1)
denying a continuance of the trial date, and (2) denying her
request to testify remotely; had either of those rulings been
different, plaintiff would have presented some evidence and
nonsuit may not have been justified. While we review the grant
of a nonsuit de novo (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47
Cal.3d 278, 291), we review orders denying a trial continuance
and to testify remotely for an abuse of discretion (In re Marriage
of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 823 [continuance]
Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 527 [“broad
discretion” in ruling on continuance]; In re Richard E. (1978) 21
Cal.3d 349, 353-354 [use of “may” in statute grants discretion]).
I.     Denial of Trial Continuance
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff’s request to continue the trial date. Trial dates are

                                8
presumptively “firm” and continuances “are disfavored.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a), (c).) Consequently, a trial
continuance is warranted only if (1) the party seeking the
continuance makes an “affirmative showing of good cause”; and
(2) the court determines that “all the facts and circumstances”—
and the pertinent rule of court enumerates 11 such
circumstances—weigh in favor of a continuance. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1332(c), (d).) The rule of court explicitly defines
“good cause,” and the sole definition pertinent to plaintiff’s
request is “[t]he unavailability of a party because of death,
illness, or other excusable circumstances.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1332(c)(2), italics added; accord, Whalen v. Superior Court
(1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 598, 600 [a party’s absence, without more,
“does not necessarily compel the court to grant a continuance”].)8
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that plaintiff’s unilateral decision to treat the possibility of a
continuance as a certainty was inexcusable. Indeed, plaintiff did
not accept her new employment until August 19, 2022—one week
after the trial court’s minute order reaffirmed the firmness of the
August 29, 2022 trial date following the court’s striking of
plaintiff’s statement of disqualification. Thus, plaintiff
voluntarily gambled on a continuance being granted without any
assurance it would be; that she bet wrong is not “excusable” and

8      Plaintiff also cites another definition—namely, “[a]
significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case as a
result of which the case is not ready for trial” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1332(c)(7))—but there is no indication that the case
was not “ready for trial” or that plaintiff’s unavailability was a
“change in the status of the case.” We certainly do not read this
provision as abrogating the requirement that a continuance due
to a party’s unavailability result from “excusable circumstances.”

                                 9
thus is not “good cause” justifying a continuance. (Cf. Whalen, at
pp. 600-601 [reversing denial of continuance where party failed to
inform counsel of “unavoidable” military deployment].)
       Plaintiff resists this conclusion with what boils down to
three arguments.
       First, she suggests that her decision to make herself
unavailable for trial was “reasonable” (and hence an “excusable
circumstance[]”) because the trial court had previously granted
defendants’ prior requests for a continuance, because she could
not anticipate what the trial court would do because she is “not a
Superior Court judge,” and because it is unfair to deny a
continuance based on a “failure of communication between the
[trial c]ourt and [c]ounsel and [c]ounsel and [her].” These
arguments lack merit. A trial court’s prior grant of a trial
continuance premised on good cause does not obligate the court to
grant a continuance lacking good cause; plaintiff’s contention
that her gamble was reasonable because she is “not a Superior
Court judge” is both flippant and would effectively entitle
everyone to any continuance they want as long as they, too, are
not Superior Court judges; and plaintiff’s misunderstanding was
based on her own mistaken guess about what the trial court
might do rather than any miscommunication by the court.
       Second, plaintiff contends that the trial court did not
balance “all the facts and circumstances” and ignored the “‘strong
public policy favoring disposition on the merits.’” (Oliveros v.
County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1395;
Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246;
Link v. Cater (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325-1326.) This
contention ignores that the balancing of facts and circumstances
and the strong policy favoring disposition on the merits only come

                               10
into play after a party has made an affirmative showing of good
cause. (Cf. Oliveros, at pp. 1396-1397 [noting that good cause
existed]; Hernandez, at pp. 1247-1248 [same]; Link, at pp. 1321-
1322 [same].) Because plaintiff never made that required
threshold showing of good cause, the court had no reason to
consider factors only relevant after that showing has been made.
       Third and lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court had an
ulterior motive for denying her continuance request—namely,
bias due to the judge’s professional involvement with some of
defense counsel. This argument is frivolous. It is procedurally
unfounded because the sole mechanism for challenging a trial
court’s order striking a statement of disqualification is through
writ review (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d)); plaintiff opted
not to pursue that review, and cannot now collaterally attack the
final determination. Even if we were to reach the merits, the
trial court properly struck plaintiff’s statement because that
statement’s sole basis for disqualification—namely, the judge’s
involvement in the same bar group as some defense counsel—is
not a basis for disqualification. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.4, subd.
(b).) Plaintiff invites us to infer bias from the mere fact that the
court made rulings against her, but that is not a basis for
inferring bias—even if those rulings had ended up being
incorrect. (E.g., Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014)
224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674.)
II.    Denial of Remote Testimony
       The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in denying
plaintiff’s request to testify remotely. Code of Civil Procedure
section 367.75 governs the use of remote proceedings in civil
cases. At the time of the trial court’s ruling, that statute
provided, in pertinent part, that a trial court “may require a

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party . . . to appear in person” at a trial “if . . . [t]he court
determines on a hearing-by-hearing basis that an in-person
appearance would materially assist in the determination of the
[trial] or in the effective management or resolution of the
particular case.” (Former Code Civ. Proc., § 367.75, subds. (b)(3),
(d)(1); Stats. 2021, ch. 214, § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.)9 The rule of
court promulgated to implement this statute reaffirms the trial
court’s discretion in this regard. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.672(d)(1).) Here, the trial court found that plaintiff’s “in-person
appearance” would “materially assist in the determination” of the
trial because (1) plaintiff herself was the essential witness for her
case; (2) plaintiff’s credibility would end up being central to
resolution of the dispute at trial, which turned on each witness’s
testimony; and (3) the jury’s ability to assess plaintiff’s credibility
during her testimony by observing her demeanor would be
hampered by her appearance on a video screen and by the
absence of a viable way to capture the drama of confronting her
with impeachment exhibits on cross-examination. Courts have
the discretion to insist that a critical party-witness be present in
person for precisely these purposes. (Rycz v. Superior Court
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 841-842 [“one operating assumption of
our system of justice has long been that the opportunity to
observe witnesses ‘upon the stand and the manner in which they
gave their testimony . . . in no small degree aid[s] in the
determination of the truth and correctness of testimony’”]; Pacific
Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Land Title Ins. Co. (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d
829, 834 [same]; Nelson v. Grahamenos (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 79,

9     Our Legislature thereafter amended the statute, but the
amendments did not alter the provisions relevant to this appeal.
(Stats. 2023, ch. 34, § 3, eff. June 30, 2023.)

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81 [same]; accord, People v. Coulthard (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 743,
772 [noting how in-person testimony enables jurors to “‘“‘look at
[witnesses] and judge by [their] demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which [they give their] testimony whether [they are]
worthy of belief’”’”]; cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 367.75, subd. (c)
[requiring greater showing of “good cause” before a court may
compel the in-person testimony of an “expert witness”].)
                            DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to their
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

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