Court Opinion

ID: 9918377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 19:02:53.475106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:05.263967
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 231111
             NOTICE
 Decision filed 01/12/24. The
 text of this decision may be                 NO. 5-23-1111
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of   a Petition for                    IN THE
 Rehearing or the disposition of
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     St. Clair County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 23-CF-705
                                                )
JAMES O’NEAL JR.,                               )     Honorable
                                                )     Robert B. Haida,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
         Justices Welch and Cates concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                              OPINION

¶1       The defendant, James O’Neal Jr., appeals the St. Clair County circuit court’s order

regarding his pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1,

2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act

(Act). 1 See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1,

2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September

18, 2023).

         1
          The Act has also sometimes been referred to in the press as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Neither name
is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public act. Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248,
¶ 4 n.1.
                                                      1
¶2                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶3     On May 24, 2023, the State charged the defendant by information with murder/other

forcible felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2022)) and aggravated battery/discharge of firearm

(id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)), which occurred on August 13, 2017. Bond was set at $1 million, requiring

the deposit of 10%. The defendant hired private counsel. The bond was later reduced to $500,000,

requiring the deposit of 10%, along with a no-contact order.

¶4     On October 26, 2023, the court held a hearing on defendant’s prior request to the circuit

court pursuant to sections 110-7.5 and 110-5(e) of the Code seeking a hearing and asking the circuit

court to order his release without the condition of depositing security or to reconsider his pretrial

release conditions. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(e), 110-7.5 (West 2022). The State also filed a verified

petition for the defendant’s pretrial detention on September 12, 2023.

¶5     At the hearing, the State proffered that the police responded to an apartment building in

East St. Louis, Illinois, where they discovered the deceased victim with seven gunshot wounds to

the head and chest in the driver’s seat of a car. A second victim had already been transported to a

nearby hospital. When police later spoke to the second victim, he was unable to identify the shooter

and stated that he and the deceased victim had been sleeping in a car outside the apartment

building. A codefendant, Shavon Brownlee, told detectives that he and the defendant were

committing an armed robbery of two men sleeping inside a car. While they were attempting to

retrieve property, the backseat passenger awoke, and both the men in the vehicle were shot.

Brownlee told police that he shot the driver of the vehicle and the defendant shot the backseat

passenger. There was surveillance video from an adjacent convenience store that showed both

defendants together right before the shooting. Brownlee pleaded guilty to murder/other forcible

felony. The State also proffered the defendant’s criminal history, which included convictions for

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residential burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and aggravated battery. The

defendant was on probation for the aggravated battery when this shooting took place. Defense

counsel emphasized a previous bond reduction and informed the circuit court that the defendant

had suffered a stroke while in custody.

¶6     The circuit court found that the proof was evident and the presumption great that the

defendant committed the detainable offenses and that the defendant posed a threat to a person or

persons in the community. The court also found that there were not any conditions or any

combination of conditions that could mitigate the real and present danger posed by the defendant.

The court entered its order that the defendant should remain detained, from which the defendant

timely appealed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023).

¶7                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶8     On appeal, the defendant contends that, because he was previously detained on an inability

to make cash bond and the State did not timely file its verified petition, the Code does not allow

the State to seek his pretrial detention. The defendant asks this court to reverse the circuit court’s

order denying his pretrial release. In response, the State argues that section 110-6(g) of the Code

(725 ILCS 5/110-6(g) (West 2022)) authorizes its petition to deny the defendant’s pretrial release.

¶9     The defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it granted the State’s petition to

detain because the Code does not allow the State to file a petition to detain defendants who remain

in custody after having been ordered released on the condition of depositing security. Specifically,

the defendant argues that the State was not permitted to file a petition to detain him due to the

timing requirements of section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code (id. § 110-6.1(c)(1)).

¶ 10   The defendant acknowledges that his attorney did not move to strike the State’s petition.

Additionally, the defendant’s attorney did not include these errors in his notice of appeal. The

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defendant seeks review of this issue under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine. Under the

second prong of plain-error review, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error when the error

is so serious that it deprives the defendant of a substantial right. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167,

178-79 (2005). In the alternative, the defendant contends that his counsel’s failure to object to the

State’s petition constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Before we determine if plain-error

review is appropriate, we briefly review the applicable sections of the Code.

¶ 11   Here, the defendant was charged on May 24, 2023, before the Act took effect. Bond was

set at $1 million, and the defendant was eligible to be released on bail if he had posted 10% of that

amount. He was apparently not able to post the 10% and remained in jail when the Act took effect.

¶ 12   The Code separates those persons who were arrested before the Act took effect into three

categories. See 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5 (West 2022). The defendant belongs to the second category—

persons who remain in pretrial detention after being ordered released with pretrial conditions. Id.

§ 110-7.5(b). Section 110-7.5(b) provides that “any person who remains in pretrial detention after

having been ordered released with pretrial conditions, including the condition of depositing

security, shall be entitled to a hearing under subsection (e) of Section 110-5.” Id. Section 110-5(e)

provides:

       “If a person remains in pretrial detention 48 hours after having been ordered released with

       pretrial conditions, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the reason for continued

       detention. *** The inability of the defendant to pay for a condition of release or any other

       ineligibility for a condition of pretrial release shall not be used as a justification for the

       pretrial detention of that defendant.” Id. § 110-5(e).

¶ 13   As discussed in this court’s People v. Rios opinion, defendants who were arrested before

the Act took effect have two options:

                                                  4
        “Under sections 110-7.5(b) and 110-5(e), a defendant may file a motion seeking a hearing

        to have [his or her] pretrial conditions reviewed anew. Alternatively, a defendant may elect

        to stay in detention until such time as the previously set monetary security may be paid. A

        defendant may elect this option so that [he or she] may be released under the terms of the

        original bail.” People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 16.

When the defendant asks the court for pretrial release pursuant to the Code, the defendant is asking

the trial court to review appropriate pretrial conditions again. Id. At that point, “ ‘the matter returns

to the proverbial square one, where the defendant may argue for the most lenient pretrial release

conditions, and the State may make competing arguments.’ ” People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d)

230435, ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 23). On October 26, 2023,

the circuit court held a hearing on the State’s petition to detain; however, the circuit court and

defense counsel also had the following exchange:

                “THE COURT: There is a petition to detain on file. And I believe at the last setting,

        counsel, you had requested this hearing.

                MR. SIMS: That’s correct.

                THE COURT: And you’re ready to proceed today?

                MR. SIMS: Yes, Your Honor.”

The record indicates that the defendant elected to proceed to a hearing under section 110-5(e) of

the Code, although the report of proceedings does not include the transcript from that court

appearance. The record is also unclear which motion the circuit court was hearing, the State’s

petition to detain or the defendant’s request under section 110-5(e) of the Code. Nonetheless, the

defendant argues that the State’s petition was untimely and that the circuit court did not have the

authority to detain him under section 110-6.1 of the Code.

                                                   5
¶ 14   Section 110-6.1 addresses the subject of “[d]enial of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1

(West 2022). Section 110-6.1(c)(1) discusses the timing of the State’s petition asking the court to

deny pretrial release and also references section 110-6 as an exception to these timing

requirements:

       “A petition may be filed without prior notice to the defendant at the first appearance before

       a judge, or within the 21 calendar days, except as provided in Section 110-6, after arrest

       and release of the defendant upon reasonable notice to defendant; provided that while such

       petition is pending before the court, the defendant if previously released shall not be

       detained.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 110-6.1(c)(1).

¶ 15   The defendant contends that the State’s verified petition asking the court to hold him in

pretrial detention was not timely pursuant to section 110-6.1(c)(1), as the State’s petition was filed

after his first appearance before a judge. Id. However, as emphasized in the preceding paragraph,

section 110-6.1 provides an exception to these time requirements “as provided in Section 110-6.”

Id.

¶ 16   The State contends that its petition was filed pursuant to section 110-6(g) in response to

the defendant’s motion for release. Section 110-6 addresses the subjects of “[r]evocation of pretrial

release, modification of conditions of pretrial release, and sanctions for violations of conditions of

pretrial release.” Id. § 110-6. More specifically, section 110-6(g) provides: “The court may, at any

time, after motion by either party or on its own motion, remove previously set conditions of pretrial

release ***.” Id. § 110-6(g). “The court may only add or increase conditions of pretrial release at

a hearing under this Section.” Id.

¶ 17   Here, the circuit court held a detention hearing, and pursuant to section 110-6(g), the State

petitioned the court to increase the conditions by modifying the defendant’s original bond

                                                  6
conditions set on May 24, 2023, and later modified—authorizing his pretrial release on payment

of 10% of the $500,000 bond. During the detention hearing, the court noted the violent nature of

the charges and that they were statutory detainable offenses. The court then found by clear and

convincing evidence, based upon the alleged facts in the State’s proffer and argument of defense

counsel, that “proof is evident or presumption great” that the defendant committed a qualifying

offense. The court also found that the defendant posed a real and present danger to the safety of

the victims and potentially to others in the community. The court stated that there were currently

no conditions or combination of conditions that could mitigate the real and present danger posed

by the defendant. The court further stated that it did not then believe that less restrictive conditions

would ensure the community’s safety or ensure the defendant’s appearance in court.

¶ 18   Pursuant to section 110-6(g) of the Code, the State exercised its right to ask the court to

modify the original conditions of pretrial release. Without the applicability and availability of

section 110-6(g), the State would have limited ability to modify release conditions to maintain

pretrial detention in cases where the State had safety or flight risk concerns. The timeliness

requirements of section 110-6.1(c) could bar the State’s efforts. Our legislature provided the

“exception” language in section 110-6.1(c) allowing the State to proceed under section 110-6(g)

when necessary.

¶ 19   Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of plain-error review because we find that the

State’s petition to detain was properly filed pursuant to section 110-6(g). We further conclude that

the circuit court’s order maintaining the defendant’s pretrial detention in this case was not an abuse

of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order.

¶ 20   The defendant alternatively argues that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to or

moving to strike the State’s verified petition seeking to have him held in pretrial detention.

                                                   7
Constitutionally competent assistance is measured by a test of whether the defendant received

“reasonably effective assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Overall, to

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[the] defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” People v. Lefler, 294 Ill. App. 3d 305, 311 (1998) (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694). The term “reasonable probability” has been defined to mean a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d

125, 135 (2007); Lefler, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 311-12 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

¶ 21      With a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-prong Strickland test,

adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27 (1984). Under

this test, the defendant must prove that (1) defense counsel’s performance was deficient or fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the defendant suffered prejudice because of

defense counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. If the defendant fails to

establish either prong of the Strickland test, the ineffective assistance claim fails. People v. Theis,

2011 IL App (2d) 091080, ¶ 39. If the defendant does not raise his or her ineffective assistance of

counsel claim in the circuit court, our review on appeal is de novo. People v. Berrier, 362 Ill. App.

3d 1153, 1166-67 (2006). The reviewing court is not required to analyze both Strickland prongs

and may conclude that the defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance because he was not

prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 342

(2007).

¶ 22      Although the defendant’s attorney did not specifically argue his petition seeking pretrial

release, we consider the State’s verified petition for pretrial detention as responsive to the

defendant’s petition. Moreover, the Code did not bar the State from seeking the defendant’s pretrial

                                                  8
detention. While the State’s petition may have been untimely with respect to section 110-6.1(c)(1)

of the Code (725 ILCS 110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022)), the State’s petition was appropriate and timely

filed pursuant to section 110-6(g) of the Code (id. § 110-6(g)). Thus, we conclude that, because

the State’s petition was valid under section 110-6(g) of the Code, defense counsel did not provide

ineffective assistance for failing to file a pleading asking the court to strike the State’s verified

petition. See id.

¶ 23                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the detention order entered by the St. Clair County

circuit court.

¶ 25    Affirmed.

                                                 9
                    People v. O’Neal, 2024 IL App (5th) 231111

Decision Under Review:    Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, No. 23-CF-
                          705; the Hon. Robert B. Haida, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                 James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Jessica Wynne
for                       Arizo, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for
Appellant:                appellant.

Attorneys                 Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State’s Attorneys
for                       Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Springfield, for the People.
Appellee:

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