Court Opinion

ID: 9928403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:10:58.917462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:07.388390
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                          In The Supreme Court

             The State, Respondent,

             v.

             Lance Antonio Brewton, Petitioner.

             Appellate Case No. 2022-001505

       ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

                         Appeal From Spartanburg County
                        J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

                               Opinion No. 28191
                  Submitted May 23, 2023 – Filed January 31, 2024

                           AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

             Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
             Columbia, for Petitioner.

             Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
             Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both
             of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of
             Spartanburg, for Respondent.

JUSTICE JAMES: Lance Antonio Brewton was convicted by a jury of murdering
Natalie Niematolo, Brewton's on-again, off-again girlfriend. He seeks a writ of
certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in State v. Brewton, 437 S.C.
44, 876 S.E.2d 141 (Ct. App. 2022). We grant the petition on the sole issue of the
trial court's admission of Brewton's 1999 strong-arm robbery conviction, dispense
with further briefing, and affirm as modified the opinion of the court of appeals.
                                           I.

        Brewton testified at trial, so his credibility as a witness was a jury issue. The
State sought to introduce evidence that Brewton was convicted of strong-arm
robbery (also known as common law robbery) in 1999 and 2008. After his 1999
conviction, Brewton was imprisoned and released from confinement in 2004. After
his 2008 conviction, Brewton was released from confinement in 2011. Brewton
testified in the instant case in August 2018, more than ten years after his 2004 release
from confinement for the 1999 conviction.
      Brewton did not object to the admissibility of the 2008 conviction. However,
Brewton objected to the admissibility of the 1999 conviction on remoteness grounds,
an obvious invocation of Rule 609(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule
609 as a whole governs the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment
purposes, and Rule 609(b) provides:
      Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible [for
      impeachment purposes] if a period of more than ten years has elapsed
      since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the
      confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date,
      unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative
      value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
      substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

Rule 609(b) creates a presumption against the admissibility of a remote conviction
for impeachment purposes. State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 18, 732 S.E.2d 880, 885
(2012). The proponent of the evidence must overcome this presumption by
establishing, as the rule provides, that the probative value of the conviction
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

       Before the trial court, Brewton argued evidence of his 1999 conviction was
not admissible because he was released from confinement for that conviction in
2004, more than ten years before his 2018 trial testimony. The trial court noted the
short period between Brewton's 2004 release and his 2008 conviction for his second
robbery conviction, and the trial court noted the seven-year span between Brewton's
2011 release for the second robbery and his testimony in this case. In overruling
Brewton's objection, the trial court ruled the probative value of both convictions
substantially outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice1 to Brewton. Brewton again
objected to the admission of the 1999 conviction on the ground of remoteness and
argued the probative value of that conviction was outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice to Brewton. The trial court again overruled the objection.

        Having lost the admissibility battle, Brewton asked the trial court if the two
prior convictions would, in front of the jury, be generically referred to as "robberies"
or "crimes of dishonesty." The State agreed to such a reference. The trial court
stated it would not require such a generic reference but suggested that would be the
better course. Brewton did not object further. He then testified on direct
examination that he had been convicted of two crimes of dishonesty. During its
closing argument, the State referred to the two prior convictions as crimes of
dishonesty, arguing the convictions "could be used to weigh [Brewton's] credibility
as a witness." The trial court charged the jury that some witnesses, "including the
defendant, [have] a prior conviction or convictions for certain types of criminal
offenses which have an element of dishonesty." 2 The trial court charged the jury
that it could consider a witness's convictions only as to the credibility of the witness
and for no other purpose. The court of appeals held Brewton waived his objection
to the admission of the 1999 conviction "because he acquiesced to referring to it as
a crime of dishonesty." 437 S.C. at 61, 876 S.E.2d at 150.

1
  Rule 609(b) uses the standard "prejudicial effect," not "danger of unfair prejudice."
The latter standard is used in Rule 403 and applies to convictions of a witness other
than the accused sought to be introduced under Rule 609(a)(1). The standard
"prejudicial effect" applies to convictions of the accused sought to be introduced
under Rule 609(a)(1) and to convictions of any witness sought to be introduced
under Rule 609(b). Perhaps the drafters of the rules did not intend there to be any
difference between the words "prejudicial effect" and "danger of unfair prejudice."
But in most instances, a party seeks to introduce evidence that would have a
"prejudicial effect" on the other side; however, the prejudicial effect might not be
"unfair." Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is largely the same as Rule 609,
SCRE.
2
    The propriety of such a specific reference to the defendant is not before us.
                                          II.

      A. Waiver issue
       We agree with Brewton that the court of appeals erred in holding he waived
his objection to the admissibility of his 1999 conviction by agreeing the conviction
could be referred to as "a crime of dishonesty." Rule 18(a) of the South Carolina
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides "[c]ounsel shall not attempt to further argue
any matter after he has been heard and the ruling of the court has been pronounced."
Here, Brewton twice objected to the admissibility of his 1999 conviction on the
ground of remoteness, and the trial court twice overruled the objection. Brewton's
attempt to lessen the impact of the two prior convictions by requesting they be
referred to as crimes of dishonesty was not a waiver of his objection. Finally, when
the State argued during closing that the jury could consider the convictions when
determining Brewton's credibility as a witness, Brewton had no further right to
object. The trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the 1999 conviction was final,
and the State confined its closing argument to the trial court's ruling. We will
therefore consider the merits of Brewton's admissibility argument.
      B. Admissibility of the 1999 conviction

      Rule 402, SCRE, provides,

      All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
      the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of
      South Carolina, statutes, these rules, or by other rules promulgated by
      the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Evidence which is not relevant
      is not admissible.

       Rule 401, SCRE, provides "'[r]elevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence." When a witness testifies, the witness's credibility obviously becomes
relevant, and a prior criminal conviction of a witness can be probative of that
witness's credibility. Allowing the conviction into evidence certainly results in
prejudice to the party relying upon the witness's testimony. That prejudice obviously
materializes when it is the testifying criminal defendant who has a prior conviction.
       Rule 609 sets boundaries on the admissibility of the conviction by requiring
the court to balance the probative value of the conviction against its prejudicial
effect. The specific balancing test to be conducted depends upon the type of
conviction, whether the witness is the accused in a criminal case, and whether the
conviction is remote. As noted above, Rule 609(b) provides that a remote conviction
is not admissible "unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect."

       Brewton presents two basic arguments under Rule 609. First, Brewton argues
strong-arm robbery is not a crime involving dishonesty and should not have been
generically labeled as such during the trial court's jury instructions or by the State
during its closing argument. "Crime of dishonesty or false statement" is a term of
art used in Rule 609(a)(2), and, indeed, in State v. Broadnax, 3 this Court held "armed
robbery is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement for purposes of impeachment
under Rule 609(a)(2)." 414 S.C. 468, 476, 779 S.E.2d 789, 793 (2015). This logic
necessarily extends to strong-arm robbery. However, Brewton did not argue at trial
that strong-arm robbery is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement. In fact, it
was Brewton who, after failing to convince the trial court that the 1999 conviction
was too remote to be introduced, initially suggested labeling the strong-arm robbery
convictions as crimes of dishonesty. While Brewton did not acquiesce to the
threshold admissibility of the 1999 conviction, he did acquiesce to the labeling to
which he now objects; thus, Brewton cannot now complain about that labeling.
      Brewton next argues the trial court did not conduct the admissibility analysis
required by State v. Colf, 337 S.C. 622, 525 S.E.2d 246 (2000). In Colf, this Court
adopted the five-factor analysis employed by federal courts when weighing the
probative value of a prior conviction against its prejudicial effect. 337 S.C. at 627,
525 S.E.2d at 248. These factors include:
      (1) The impeachment value of the prior crime,

      (2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness's subsequent
          history,

      (3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime,

      (4) The importance of the defendant's testimony, and

3
  Strong-arm robbery, also known as common law robbery, "is essentially the
commission of larceny with force." State v. Brown, 274 S.C. 48, 49, 260 S.E.2d 719,
720 (1979). "Larceny involves the felonious taking and carrying away the goods of
another." Id. (citations omitted).
      (5) The centrality of the credibility issue.

Id. We explained in Colf, "These factors are not exclusive; trial courts should
exercise their discretion in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular
case." Id.4 We held in Colf that the evaluation of the five nonexclusive factors must
be conducted by the trial court, not the appellate court, because "[i]t is difficult, if
not impossible, for an appellate court to balance the interests at stake when the record
does not contain the specific facts and circumstances necessary to a decision." Id.
at 628-29, 525 S.E.2d at 249 (emphasis added). Thus, an appellate court may
evaluate a Colf factor on its own only when the record clearly reflects the "specific
facts and circumstances necessary" to evaluate that factor.

        In this case, the trial court evaluated only two of the Colf factors. As for the
first factor, the trial court obviously considered the impeachment value of a strong-
arm robbery conviction, as it charged the jury that the defendant (and other
witnesses) had prior convictions for crimes "which have an element of dishonesty."
While we held in Broadnax that robbery is not a crime "involving dishonesty or false
statement" as contemplated in Rule 609(a)(2), we have held a conviction for strong-
arm robbery has some impeachment value. State v. Robinson, 426 S.C. 579, 600,
828 S.E.2d 203, 214 (2019). "Impeachment value refers to how strongly the nature
of the conviction bears on the veracity, or credibility, of the witness." Black, 400
S.C. at 21-22, 732 S.E.2d at 887. Under Rule 609, evidence of a conviction of a
testifying witness may be introduced only to impeach the credibility of that
witness. Therefore, under Rule 609, the impeachment value of a conviction is
the only probative value of that conviction. The larceny component of a strong-arm
robbery conviction enhances that probative value. The trial court's finding on
this Colf factor is well-supported by the record and our case law.
       The second Colf factor requires evaluation of "[t]he point in time of"
Brewton's 1999 conviction, his 2004 release from confinement, and his subsequent
history. 337 S.C. at 627, 525 S.E.2d at 248. Here, the trial court noted the relatively
short time between Brewton's 2004 release from confinement after the 1999
conviction and Brewton's next robbery conviction in 2008. The trial court also

4
 The Colf factors (and any other relevant factors) must also be evaluated by the trial
court under Rule 609(a)(1) when the State seeks to impeach the accused with a
nonremote prior conviction of a crime carrying possible punishment in excess of one
year. However, the State's burden is somewhat lessened, as it must establish "the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused." Rule 609(a)(1), SCRE.
considered the span of only seven years from Brewton's 2011 release from
confinement for the second robbery conviction to the date he testified in this case.
These circumstances enhance the probative value of the 1999 conviction. The trial
court's finding on this Colf factor is amply supported by the record.

       The trial court did not consider the third Colf factor, which requires evaluation
of the similarities, if any, between the charged crime and the conviction sought to be
introduced. The more similarities there are, the greater the prejudicial effect and the
less likely the prior conviction should be admitted. 5 See Colf, 337 S.C. at 628, 525
S.E.2d at 249. In this case, the specific facts and circumstances in the record clearly
establish Brewton's 1999 strong-arm robbery conviction bore no similarity to the
facts surrounding Brewton's shooting of Ms. Niematolo. The State contends
Brewton shot and killed Ms. Niematolo with malice aforethought after an argument.
Brewton maintains he did not intentionally fire the gun. Strong-arm robbery is "the
commission of larceny with force." Brown, 274 S.C. at 49, 260 S.E.2d at 720.
Strong-arm robbery does not involve the use of a deadly weapon. There is no
similarity between strong-arm robbery and the fact pattern surrounding the shooting
in this case. The complete absence of similarities lessens the prejudicial effect of
the 1999 conviction and, in this case, weighs only in favor of allowing the conviction
into evidence. A remand of this issue to the trial court would serve no purpose.

      The trial court also did not address the fourth Colf factor, the importance of
the defendant's testimony. The weight to be given to this factor is not clearly
apparent from the record, so we will not undertake the analysis ourselves.
        The trial court also did not address the fifth Colf factor, which requires
evaluation of the "centrality of the credibility issue." It is patently apparent from the
record that Brewton's credibility was central to the jury's determination of whether
the shooting was unintentional or with malice aforethought. While the prejudicial
effect of the conviction is apparent, Brewton was the only defense witness, and no
State's witness supported his account that the shooting was unintentional. These
facts and circumstances magnify the issue of Brewton's credibility and significantly
heighten the probative value of the remote conviction. A remand of this issue to the
trial court would serve no purpose.

5
  If the prior conviction is not remote and was for a crime involving dishonesty or
false statement, the conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes, regardless
of the probative value or prejudicial effect of the evidence. See Robinson, 426 S.C.
at 593, 828 S.E.2d at 210 (citing State v. Bryant, 369 S.C. 511, 517, 633 S.E.2d 152,
155 (2006)).
      The evidence in the record supports the trial court's determination that the
probative value of the remote strong-arm robbery conviction substantially
outweighed the prejudicial effect to Brewton.
                                          III.

        We noted in Colf that the trial court must evaluate the Colf factors on its own
and that a remand to the trial court for that undertaking will be necessary "when the
record does not contain the specific facts and circumstances necessary to a decision."
337 S.C. at 628-29, 525 S.E.2d at 249 (emphasis added). While the trial court did
not evaluate the third and fifth factors, the facts and circumstances pertinent to these
two factors are clearly apparent from the record and support only the conclusion that
these two factors significantly weighed in favor of admissibility of the 1999
conviction. A remand of these two issues is therefore not necessary. Because the
first, second, third, and fifth Colf factors so clearly support the trial court's ruling,
there is no need to consider the fourth factor in this case. We therefore affirm the
court of appeals as modified. 6 However, we remind the trial bench and the bar of
the importance of an on-the-record evaluation of the weight to be given each Colf
factor (and any other relevant factor). Such an evaluation allows the appellate court
to fully consider the degree of discretion exercised by the trial judge in admitting,
excluding, or limiting the evidence.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, and FEW, JJ., concur. HILL, J., not
participating.

6
  The State argues the lack of trial-court analysis of some Colf factors was harmless
because the jury heard evidence Brewton was convicted of another crime which had
"an element of dishonesty." The State contends evidence of the second conviction—
to which Brewton did not object—removed any prejudicial taint of the remote
conviction. We need not address this argument. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding the
appellate court need not address the remaining issues when disposition of a prior
issue is dispositive).