Court Opinion

ID: 9411119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 19:15:47.510384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:04.102822
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                      San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                         No. 04-22-00484-CV

                          ESTATE OF Glenn Edward TURPIN, Deceased

                         From the Probate Court No. 2, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2021-PC-0972
                           Honorable Veronica Vasquez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 19, 2023

REVERSED AND REMANDED

           Appellant, Glenda Gail Friesenhahn, appeals from an order granting appellee, Mary Louise

May’s motion to remove Friesenhahn as the independent executrix of their father’s estate. We

reverse the trial court’s order removing Friesenhahn as independent executrix and remand for

further proceedings.

                                           BACKGROUND

           Mary Allene and Glenn Edward Turpin were married from February 1961 until Mary’s

death on January 11, 2021. Glenn died six days after his wife, on January 17. Mary and Edward

had two children, daughters, who are the appellant (“Friesenhahn”) and appellee (“May”) in this

appeal.
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       In 2011, Mary and Edward executed wills leaving their estates first to each other and then

to their daughters in equal shares. These wills named Friesenhahn as alternate independent

executrix. On December 2, 2020, Mary executed a new will, which gave her estate to her two

daughters to hold “in trust for the benefit of [Glenn.]” This will gave Friesenhahn and May “as

Joint Trustees, full authority to carry into effect [Mary’s] intentions concerning the care,

maintenance, and upkeep of [Glenn] for and during the remainder of his life.” Upon Glenn’s death,

the estate would pass to Friesenhahn and May in equal shares. The will named Friesenhahn and

May as joint independent executrixes. Also on December 2, 2020, Mary and Glenn executed

powers-of-attorney naming their daughters as joint attorneys-in-fact. The powers-of-attorney gave

Friesenhahn and May all listed powers, including the power to act on behalf of their parents on

“Banking and other Financial Institution Transactions (including FirstMark Credit Union and

Wells Fargo Bank[.)]”

       Prior to Glenn’s death, various bank accounts—held by Mary and/or Glenn—were

liquidated and approximately $332,284.83 from those accounts was deposited into a new account

at Security State Bank & Trust (“SSB&T”), which was opened on December 18, 2020. Mary and

Friesenhahn each signed the SSB&T agreement as “account owner.” The checking account was a

“multiple-party account with right of survivorship.”

       On April 19, 2021, Glenn’s 2011 will was admitted to probate and Friesenhahn was

appointed independent executrix. On August 20, 2021, approximately eight months after the

SSB&T account was opened and almost four months after Friesenhahn was appointed independent

executrix, May filed a motion to remove Friesenhahn as independent executrix and for an order

directing Friesenhahn to deposit the SSB&T funds into the registry of the court. May later filed

an amended motion to remove. She later also filed suit against Friesenhahn alleging various causes

of action, including breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, breach of contract, undue

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influence, and unjust enrichment. These claims were all premised on the allegations regarding the

SSB&T account. On December 17, 2021, Friesenhahn filed an Inventory, Appraisement, and List

of Claims. The inventory listed, under “Cash in Banks,” Mary’s Wells Fargo IRA in the amount

of $2,671.01. No other cash assets were listed.

       Following a multi-day hearing on the motion to remove, the trial court signed an order

removing Friesenhahn as independent executrix pending the contest. The court also signed an

order appointing a temporary administrator pending the contest. In a single issue on appeal,

Friesenhahn asserts the trial court erred by removing her because May failed to prove a statutory

ground justifying removal.

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review an order removing an independent executor for an abuse of discretion. In re

Est. of Montemayor, No. 04-14-00391-CV, 2015 WL 1875978, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Apr. 22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under an abuse of discretion standard, “[o]ur review is not

limited to evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, ‘rather,

we make an independent inquiry of the entire record to determine if the court abused its

discretion[.]’” In re Est. of Perez–Muzza, 446 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014,

pet. denied) (citation omitted). “A court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably,

or without reference to guiding rules or principles.” Id. “The court does not abuse its discretion

if some evidence reasonably supports [its] decision.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198,

211 (Tex. 2002).

                        REMOVAL OF INDEPENDENT EXECUTRIX

       Section 404.0035 of the Texas Estates Code provides an independent executor may be

removed when “the independent executor becomes incapable of properly performing the

independent executor’s fiduciary duties due to a material conflict of interest.” TEX. ESTATES CODE

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§ 404.0035(b)(4). The executor-removal provision in section 404.0035 “gives interested parties a

means of challenging questionable actions so that the estate will not suffer at the hands of a self-

dealing, incapacitated, or incompetent executor.” Sklar v. Sklar, 598 S.W.3d 810, 830 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (Frost, C.J., dissenting). “To remove an executor, the

law does not require a showing of damage, just improper action or compelling circumstances that

would fall within the rubric of the statute.” Id. The party seeking to have an independent executor

removed has the burden of establishing a violation of the statute. Kappus v. Kappus, 284 S.W.3d

831, 835 (Tex. 2009). “Once a violation of one of [the statutory grounds] has been proven, the

trial court has discretion to decide whether the violation warrants removal.” Id.

A.      May’s Allegations & Testimony

        In her motion to remove, May alleged her mother, upon discovering Friesenhahn did not

include May as a co-party on the SSB&T account, contacted Friesenhahn and demanded that

Friesenhahn add May to the account to effectuate Mary’s testamentary intent that her daughters

share equally upon the death of Glenn. Friesenhahn did not do so. After Glenn’s death,

Friesenhahn closed the SSB&T account and took possession of the funds. May asserted that had

Friesenhahn done as asked by their mother, then the funds would have become an asset of Glenn’s

estate. May asserted Friesenhahn had a material conflict of interest and would not sue herself to

set aside her collection of the disputed cash asset that was on hand at SSB&T as of the date of

Mary’s death. May also asserted Friesenhahn had a material conflict of interest with May, Glenn’s

estate, and Mary’s estate “as evidenced by” the allegations made in May’s first amended original

petition. 1

1
  In her motion to remove, May also made various other allegations, including that Friesenhahn called the police to
recover a vehicle being driven by May, which May contended her mother gave her; Friesenhahn physically assaulted
May; Friesenhahn’s husband prevailed in a civil lawsuit he filed against May’s son; Friesenhahn’s mother-in-law did

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        At the hearing, May testified she moved in with her parents in 2009 to help care for them

and she continues to live rent-free in the house, which is an asset of the estate. She said that in

October 2020, she, her mother, and Friesenhahn discussed consolidating their parents’ funds held

at various financial institutions into a single account to make it easier for their mother to review

one account statement as opposed to several. May said her father did not take part in these

conversations because he had dementia. May explained, “[t]he whole discussion was to go and

find out exactly how much money my mother had in every account and then consolidating it into

one. Was it discussed on who was going to get what? No. My mom always said that we would

always split everything.” May said she tried unsuccessfully to set up two appointments to go to

the banks with Friesenhahn and her mother to consolidate the accounts, but Friesenhahn always

said she could not meet with them.

        Following an argument with her mother and Friesenhahn, May moved out of her parents’

home on December 14, 2020, but moved back in on December 26, 2020. She said that on

December 17th her mother told her that she and Friesenhahn were going to consolidate the

accounts, and on December 26th her mother told her about the SSB&T account. According to

May, her mother did not know how the SSB&T account was set up. May said her mother called

Friesenhahn the next day and told her, “Well, then the only thing I know to tell you to do is go

take your name off because next week we are going to be going. You can come with us or not, but

that will be your choice. [May] will be on the account.” A few days later, Mary died. No one ever

went to SSB&T to change the account.

not prevail in her civil lawsuit against May’s son; Friesenhahn’s daughter had May’s son arrested for trespass;
Friesenhahn’s son had May’s son arrested for assault; Friesenhahn filed an incomplete inventory; and although there
was an agreement that May select certain personal property before an auction, she was not notified about the date of
the auction.

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          May said that when Friesenhahn was first appointed executrix, May did not take any steps

to oppose the appointment because she did not know that she could, and she had not yet retained

an attorney.

B.        Consolidation of Bank Accounts

          At the hearing, several older bank account agreements were admitted into evidence. One

was a November 15, 2001, payable-on-death account agreement signed by Mary and Glenn as

account owners and naming Friesenhahn as beneficiary. The bank agreement for this account

shows the bank’s name as First National Bank; however, at the hearing, the parties refer to this

bank as South Trust Bank. On April 20, 2021, Friesenhahn, as “beneficiary,” withdrew from South

Trust Bank the following amounts: $59,413.67 payable to herself and $10,000 payable to Glenn’s

estate.

          Several FirstMark Credit Union account agreements, which appear to have been signed

between 2005 and 2013, were also admitted into evidence. Two FirstMark account agreements

show Mary and Glenn as joint owners and Friesenhahn as the payable-on-death beneficiary.

Another FirstMark account was owned only by Glenn, and the agreement listed Mary as the

payable-on-death beneficiary. Another FirstMark account agreement listed Mary, Glenn, and

Friesenhahn as joint owners with right of survivorship and no payable-on-death beneficiary.

Finally, another FirstMark account agreement listed Mary and Glenn as joint owners with right of

survivorship and did not list a payable-on-death beneficiary.

          The SSB&T account was opened on December 18, 2020. The account agreement indicates

its “ownership type” as “multiple-party with right of survivorship.” No one was named as a

payable-on-death beneficiary. However, both Mary and Friesenhahn checked the box next to the

following provision in the agreement:

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           MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNT WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP. The
           parties to the account own the account in proportion to the parties’ net contributions
           to the account. The financial institution may pay any sum in [illegible] at any time.
           On the death of the party, the party’s ownership of the account passes to the
           surviving parties.

           A December 31, 2020, SSB&T account statement showed four deposits for a total of

$332,284.83: three on December 18th for $571.78, $99,957.93, and $181,755.12; and one deposit

on December 23rd for $50,000. The $181,755.12 deposited into the SSB&T account came from

one of the FirstMark joint accounts owned by Mary and Glenn. Friesenhahn agreed that the

$50,000 deposited into the SSB&T account came from her parents’ joint account at South Trust

and the $99,957.93 came from her parents’ joint account at Wells Fargo.

C.         Friesenhahn’s Testimony

           Friesenhahn testified her mother closed the accounts held at the other banks; she was

merely her mother’s driver; she did not open the SSB&T account; she did not make any of the

deposits into the SSB&T account; she did not act as her mother’s agent; and her mother asked the

bankers questions as well as gave the bankers instructions. Friesenhahn said that although her

mother was not well-educated, Friesenhahn had no concerns about her mother’s ability to conduct

financial transactions in December 2020. She denied the alleged telephone call from her mother

regarding changing the SSB&T account, saying the call “never took place.” She also said she had

no conversations with her mother after December 18th or with May about the accounts.

           Friesenhahn said she did not know where the money came from that was deposited into the

SSB&T account because her mother withdrew the money from the other accounts. Although

Friesenhahn claimed she did not know where the money came from, she acknowledged her parents

were joint owners with right of survivorship on certain accounts held at FirstMark Credit Union. 2

2
    May later testified that Friesenhahn was with her parents when the FirstMark accounts were opened.

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        Friesenhahn testified she did not realize she was the payable-on-death beneficiary on the

SSB&T account until after both her parents had died and she called the bank to freeze the account.

She also did not know, until recently, that she was named on the accounts at the other financial

institutions.

D.      Other Witnesses

        Bonnie Blakemore testified she had known Mary and Glenn since 1971, and she talked to

Mary about once a week. She spoke to Mary about three days before Mary died, and she said

Mary was upset about certain paperwork she had signed, stating:

            Okay. I asked her how she was, and she said that she was a little upset, that she
        had been in town with [Friesenhahn] and had signed some papers at an attorney’s
        office. And she said: Jackie, I didn’t realize when I signed them what they were
        really saying, and I have now read them.
            And she says: And I think I need to have it changed, so on Monday, I’m going
        to go to the attorney’s office and have this changed.
            And I says: Well, Allene – I says: you understand what you signed?
            And she says: I did not at the time. She says: But I do now.
            She says: And I’m really upset that [Friesenhahn] would have done this.
            And that is all she said.

        When asked what Mary meant, Bonnie said the conversation “had to do with doing her will

and [Friesenhahn] being on her checking account and not both [Friesenhahn and May].” Bonnie

testified that Mary wanted both daughters on the account.

        Glenn Faulkner testified that he was Mary’s second cousin and he helped May take care of

her father. He said that on December 31st, he was at the house with Mary and May, and Mary was

“very upset” with Friesenhahn about things other than the SSB&T bank account. On January 5th,

he was at the house with Mary and

           . . . Glenn was in the bed laying there, and [Mary] was calling [Friesenhahn]
        because [Mary] had found out some deals that went through with the checking
        accounts and bank accounts. And she was upset that [Friesenhahn] had put her
        name on the accounts, and she was telling her she wanted it changed as soon as she
        could.

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           And they were planning on going to get it changed the following week. That
        would have been, I think, on a Friday when that happened.

        He said Mary was surprised because she did not know what was happening at the time. He

said he was present when Mary spoke to Friesenhahn on the telephone and told Friesenhahn she

wanted to change the account. He said Mary wanted her daughters to both be on the account and

to share equally in everything.

E.      Analysis

        In this appeal, we must decide whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering

Friesenhahn’s removal as executrix pursuant to subsection (4) of Estates Code section

404.0035(b), which allows for removal when “the independent executor becomes incapable of

properly performing the independent executor’s fiduciary duties due to a material conflict of

interest.” TEX. ESTATES CODE § 404.0035(b)(4). The “material conflict of interest” ground for

removal was not added to section 404.0035’s predecessor statute (Probate Code 149C) until 2011,

and the Estates Code does not define “material conflict of interest.” However, “material” has been

defined as “having real importance or great consequences,” or “of such a nature that knowledge of

the item would affect a person’s decision-making process; significant; essential.” Wolf Hollow I,

L.P. v. El Paso Mktg., L.P., 472 S.W.3d 325, 335-36 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet.

denied) (citations omitted). Regarding “fiduciary duties, “[a]n executor of an estate is a fiduciary

of the estate’s property and ‘has a duty to protect the beneficiaries’ interest by fair dealing in good

faith with fidelity and integrity.’” Montemayor, 2015 WL 1875978, at *3 (citations omitted). “In

addition, an executor’s ‘personal interests may not conflict with [her] fiduciary obligations to the

estate.’” Id. (citation omitted).

        There are few cases interpreting subsection (4); however, two cases—one pre-amendment

and one post-amendment—discuss a conflict of interest in the context of an executor’s removal

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based on gross misconduct or gross mismanagement in the performance of the executor’s duties.3

In Kappus, one of the beneficiaries (“Sandra”) claimed that by being a co-owner of an estate asset,

the executor (“John”) had a conflict of interest, and when John attempted to sell certain land and

split the proceeds evenly, despite the estate being owed more than half the proceeds, that potential

conflict became an actual conflict and harmed the estate. 284 S.W.3d at 835. Although Probate

Code section 149C, in effect at the time, did not specifically include “conflict of interest” in those

express terms, Sandra argued such a conflict could justify removal under subsections (2), (5), and

(6) of section 149C. 4 The Supreme Court stated the appeal concerned “whether an independent

executor’s alleged conflict of interest—here, a good-faith dispute over the executor’s percentage

ownership of estate assets—requires his removal as a matter of law.” Id. at 833. The Court noted

that “Probate Code section 149C list[ed] several grounds for removing an executor, but ‘conflict

of interest’ (either actual or potential) [was] not among them, and [the Court] refuse[d] to engraft

such a test onto the statute.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court considered the question of “whether a

potential conflict of interest constitutes gross misconduct or gross mismanagement.” Id. at 836.

        In considering Sandra’s “gross misconduct or gross mismanagement” allegations, the

Court held that a “good-faith disagreement over the executor’s ownership share in the estate is not

enough, standing alone, to require removal under section 149C.” Id. at 837. “The statute speaks

of affirmative malfeasance, and an executor’s mere assertion of a claim to estate property, or

3
  Former Probate Code section 149C and current Estates Code section 404.0035(b) contain the following same ground
for removal: “the independent executor is proved to have been guilty of gross misconduct or gross mismanagement in
the performance of the independent executor’s duties.”
4
  Former section 149C provided for removal if “(2) sufficient grounds appear to support belief that the independent
executor has misapplied or embezzled, or that the independent executor is about to misapply or embezzle, all or any
part of the property committed to the independent executor’s care”; “(5) the independent executor is proved to have
been guilty of gross misconduct or gross mismanagement in the performance of the independent executor’s duties”;
or “(6) the independent executor becomes an incapacitated person, or is sentenced to the penitentiary, or from any
other cause becomes legally incapacitated from properly performing the independent executor’s fiduciary duties.”

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difference of opinion over the value of such property, does not warrant removal.” Id. “A potential

conflict does not equal actual misconduct.” Id.

         The Court recognized “there may be scenarios where an executor’s conflict of interest is

so absolute as to constitute what the statute terms ‘gross misconduct or gross mismanagement.’”

Id. The Court then listed the following factors a trial court should consider when deciding whether

an executor’s conflict amounts to “gross misconduct or gross mismanagement”: the size of the

estate, the degree of actual harm to the estate, the executor’s good faith in asserting a claim for

estate property, the testator’s knowledge of the conflict, and the executor’s disclosure of the

conflict. Id. at 837-38.

         This court later applied these factors in Montemayor, wherein the trial court removed an

executor based on evidence he lived in the house that was the primary estate asset, did not make

good faith efforts to sell the house, did not make necessary repairs, and prevented the other

beneficiaries from accessing the house. 2015 WL 1875978, *1-2. The executor also stated that

he would live in the house until the day he died. The trial court determined he was guilty of gross

mismanagement and was incapable of performing his fiduciary duties due to a material conflict of

interest and thus removal was authorized under subsections (3) and (5) 5 of Estates Code section

404.0035(b). Id. at *2. 6

         On appeal, this court applied the Kappus factors and held that, based on the evidence, the

probate court could have taken into consideration the following in deciding whether the executor

had a conflict of interest amounting to gross misconduct or gross mismanagement: (1) the property

was the sole asset of the estate; (2) the executor’s actions were harming the estate by his continuing

5
 At the time Montemayor was decided, current subsection (4) was numbered subsection (5).
6
  Although this court discussed whether the executor had a conflict of interest, it did not do so under subsection (4).
Instead, it considered whether the executor should be removed for gross misconduct or gross mismanagement under
subsection (3). See id, at *4 n.3.

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to live on the property rent-free and his allowing the property’s condition to deteriorate; (3) given

the terms of the decedent’s will, the executor’s statements that he was “going to keep the house”

and live there until he died, and his actions consistent with those statements, were not in good

faith; and (4) the decedent could not have known that the executor would create this conflict. Id.

at *4 (citing Kappus, 284 S.W.3d at 837-38). Accordingly, this court concluded the record

supported the probate court’s conclusion that the executor “engaged in gross misconduct or gross

mismanagement because he breached his fiduciary duty to protect the beneficiaries’ interest and

allowed his personal interest to conflict with his fiduciary obligations.” Id.

       Unlike the appeal before us, neither Kappus nor Montemayor considered “material conflict

of interest” as an independent ground for removal.           Also, unlike here, both Kappus and

Montemayor involved alleged wrongdoing by an executor that occurred after the executor’s

appointment. “[T]he grounds to remove an independent executor post-appointment are different

from those to disqualify an executor pre-appointment.” Kappus, 284 S.W.3d at 835 (emphasis in

original); see TEX. ESTATES CODE § 304.003(5) (“A person is not qualified to serve as an executor

or administrator if the person is . . . a person whom the court finds unsuitable.”). In contrast to the

“catch-all standard” of “a person whom the court finds unsuitable” contained in Estates Code

section 304.003 “that confers broad trial-court discretion,” section 404.0035 lists seven specific

grounds for removal, “none quite as expansive as unsuitability.” Kappus, 284 S.W.3d at 835.

       Here, May’s motion to remove is premised on her allegations regarding the SSB&T

account and various other allegations, many of which amount to family dysfunction. Most of these

complaints center on actions taken before Friesenhahn was appointed independent executrix.

Based on these allegations, May had the burden to show Friesenhahn became “incapable of

properly performing [her] fiduciary duties due to a material conflict of interest.” TEX. ESTATES

CODE § 404.0035(b)(4).

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       A case similar to the one before us is Matter of Estate of Collins, 638 S.W.3d 814 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 2021, no pet.), which involved alleged wrongdoing by an executor that occurred

before his appointment and involved withdrawals from a joint bank account. In Collins, a

beneficiary (“Bailey”), alleged the executor (“Hobbs”) in his individual capacity had

misappropriated funds from a joint bank account at Southside Bank that Hobbs owned with the

decedent when he withdrew substantially more than his net contributions to the account. Id. at

816. Bailey contended the withdrawals from this joint account were paid to Hobbs and his sole

proprietorship after the decedent had suffered a major stroke and her husband had died. Bailey

alleged Hobbs deposited the funds from the joint account into a separate checking account that

was solely in Hobbs’s name even though the joint account belonged to the parties in proportion to

their net contributions. Bailey also alleged Hobbs contributed only $36,500 to the Southside Bank

joint account, so “over $750,000 of the money taken from [d]ecedent’s [Southside Bank] account

by Hobbs legally belonged” only to decedent. Id. On appeal, Bailey asserted the trial court

properly removed Hobbs as executor because Hobbs would not pursue any claim the decedent’s

estate might have against him, and because Hobbs was guilty of “gross misconduct and/or gross

mismanagement.”

       On the other hand, Hobbs contended the decedent opened the Southside Bank multi-party

account with right of survivorship with him on October 3, 1995, and that under the account’s terms,

upon the death of a party, the deceased party’s ownership of the account passed to the surviving

party. Id. Hobbs argued that although Bailey was named as the beneficiary of the joint account,

the account “was not designated as a payable on death account.” Id. According to Hobbs, the

joint account was “non-testamentary and not subject to being probated.” Hobbs further asserted

that the probate assets of the estate had been disbursed, and “[n]o complaint or allegation has been

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made with regard to any acts and/or omissions on the part of Hobbs in his capacity as the

independent executor.” Id.

       The Southside Bank records indicated the account was a multiple-party account with right

of survivorship, owned by the decedent and Hobbs, and Bailey was listed as the beneficiary. Id.

at 816-17. The account terms and conditions stated that “[o]n the death of a party, the party’s

ownership of the account passe[d] to the surviving parties.” The account did not have a payable

on death designation. The terms and conditions also provided that with respect to a multiple-party

account with right of survivorship, “[t]he parties to the account own the account in proportion to

the parties’ net contributions to the account[,]” and the bank “may pay any sum in the account to

a party at any time.” Id. at 817.

       On appeal, the court noted that “[o]wnership of funds held in a multiple[-]party account

after the death of a party is determined by statute.” Id. at 819 (quoting Hare v. Longstreet, 531

S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.)). Under Estates Code section 113.151, “[s]ums

remaining on deposit on the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or

parties against the estate of the deceased party if the interest of the deceased party is made to

survive to the surviving party or parties by a written agreement signed by the party who dies.”

TEX. ESTATES CODE § 113.151(a). The Estates Code provides that transfers resulting from the

application of section 113.151 “are effective by reason of the account contracts involved and . . .

are not to be considered testamentary transfers or subject to the testamentary provisions of this

title.” TEX. ESTATES CODE § 113.158.

       The court held that, “[a]ll of Bailey’s contentions involve the multiple-party account with

right of survivorship.” 638 S.W.3d at 820. “The signature card and terms and conditions of the

account indicate that the account was created as a multiple-party account with right of

survivorship, and that upon the death of one party, the deceased party’s ownership of the account

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would pass to the other party.” Id. The court concluded that, “under the Texas Estates Code, the

account was non-testamentary, and the funds passed to Hobbs pursuant to the account contract.”

Id. (citing TEX. ESTATES CODE § 113.158).          “Furthermore, because the account was non-

testamentary and Hobbs and the decedent had equal rights to the funds in the account during

decedent’s lifetime, there was no evidence that Hobbs either (1) engaged in gross misconduct or

gross mismanagement in the performance of his duties as executor or (2) was incapable of properly

performing his fiduciary duties due to a material conflict of interest.” Id. (citing TEX. ESTATES

CODE § 404.0035(b)(2), (4)). The court concluded Bailey failed to meet his burden of establishing

a violation of the statute, and the trial court therefore abused its discretion by removing Hobbs. Id.

       Here, May asserted Friesenhahn should be removed under subsection (4) of Estates Code

section 404.0035(b) because Friesenhahn had a material conflict of interest for two reasons: (1)

Friesenhahn would not sue herself to set aside her collection of the disputed cash asset that was on

hand at SSB&T as of the date of Mary’s death, and (2) Friesenhahn had a material conflict of

interest with May, Glenn’s estate, and Mary’s estate “as evidenced by” the allegations made in

May’s first amended original petition. We conclude, on this record, that the trial court erred by

removing Friesenhahn as independent executrix for either reason.

       Friesenhahn withdrew the money from the SSB&T account, which under the Estates Code

was non-testamentary and the funds passed to her pursuant to the account contract. Furthermore,

Friesenhahn’s alleged wrongdoing with regard to the SSB&T account occurred before her

appointment as independent executrix and there is no evidence that, after her appointment, she was

incapable of properly performing her fiduciary duties due to a material conflict of interest. As to

May’s argument that Friesenhahn had a material conflict of interest and would not sue herself to

set aside her collection of the disputed cash asset that was on hand at SSB&T as of the date of

Mary’s death, the Kappus Court noted that “[t]he Legislature has provided that creditors of the

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deceased can be granted letters of administration.” 284 S.W.3d at 837; see TEX. ESTATES CODE

§ 304.001(a)(6) (“The court shall grant letters testamentary or of administration to persons

qualified to act, in the following order . . . (6) a creditor of the decedent . . ..”).

        The Court held that “[s]uch creditors, by their very nature, have a conflict of interest by

virtue of a claim against estate assets.” 284 S.W.3d at 837. “Similarly, it is common for testators

in Texas to name spouses (or business partners) [or their children] as independent executors.” Id.

“If we judicially amended [former] section 149C by declaring a per se removal rule for ‘conflict

of interest’ whenever spouse-executors have a shared interest in community property, and issues

arise over the separate or community character of estate assets, the surviving spouse could be

ousted.” Id. The Court noted that, although Sandra argued removal would only be justified when

the executor actually asserted a claim adverse to the estate, “it seems under her theory that once a

beneficiary objects to an executor’s proposed valuation and distribution of property, the executor’s

defense would constitute a conflict of interest that mandates removal.” Id. “Such a rule, besides

having no statutory anchor in the text of [former] section 149C, would undermine the ability of

Texas testators to name their own independent executor and also weaken the ability of an executor

‘free of judicial supervision, to effect the distribution of an estate with a minimum of cost and

delay.’” Id. “And it would impose this extra-statutory restriction even if the testator was fully

aware of the potential conflict when the executor was chosen.” Id.

        Similarly here, the evidence established that Mary and Glenn named Friesenhahn as the

sole payable-on-death beneficiary on some of their accounts as early as 2005, and there is no

evidence in this record that they were not fully aware of a potential conflict when they named

Friesenhahn as an independent executrix in their wills. Furthermore, we decline to declare a per

se removal rule for “conflict of interest” that whenever a decedent and his child-executor have a

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shared interest in property, and issues arise over the character of estate assets, the child named as

executor could be ousted. See id.

          Regarding May’s allegation that Friesenhahn had a material conflict of interest with May,

Glenn’s estate, and Mary’s estate “as evidenced by” the allegations made in May’s first amended

original petition, Friesenhahn’s defenses to these allegations do not—on this record—constitute a

material conflict of interest that mandates removal under section 404.0035(b)(4). Finally, although

the record reveals family dysfunction, we cannot say this record supports a “material” conflict of

interest on Friesenhahn’s part that would prevent her from properly performing her fiduciary

duties.

                                           CONCLUSION

          On this record, we conclude May did not carry her burden of establishing a violation of the

statute governing removal of an independent executrix. Therefore, the trial court erred by ordering

Friesenhahn’s removal. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s July 15, 2022 “Order Granting

Removal of Independent Executor Pending Contest,” and remand this cause to the trial court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                    Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

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