Court Opinion

ID: 9943408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 16:01:21.429217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:58.502208
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2945
JEFFREY BRUNO,
                                               Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

CHASITY WELLS-ARMSTRONG, JAMES ELLEXSON,
and CITY OF KANKAKEE, ILLINOIS,
                                Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                    Central District of Illinois.
            No. 2:20-cv-02052 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.
                     ____________________

 ARGUED SEPTEMBER 19, 2023 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 23, 2024
                ____________________

   Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
   KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey Bruno, a veteran firefighter
with the Kankakee Fire Department (KFD), suffered a severe
cardiac event in September 2017. After he recuperated and re-
turned to work, Mayor Chasity Wells-Armstrong promoted
him to Deputy Chief. But in the summer of 2019, after Bruno
had worked in that position for over a year, Wells-Armstrong
denied him a raise and then presented him with an
2                                                 No. 22-2945

employment contract that conditioned additional compensa-
tion on his enrollment in college courses. Bruno asked James
Ellexson, the Human Resources Director for the City of
Kankakee, to remove this education condition as an accom-
modation under the Americans with Disabilities Act because
his heart condition prevented him from attending classes. But
Ellexson refused. Bruno signed the contract nonetheless and
retired soon thereafter.
    Bruno then sued Wells-Armstrong, Ellexson, and the City
of Kankakee, alleging, among other claims irrelevant on ap-
peal, discrimination and retaliation under the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), 775
ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendants. Bruno’s discrimination claim fails
because his request to waive the education condition was not
a request for a reasonable accommodation and he has failed
to show that the defendants’ reason for denying him a raise
was pretextual. His retaliation claim fails because he did not
engage in protected activity under the ADA. Thus, we affirm.
                               I
                              A
    Jeffrey Bruno, a firefighter with the KFD for over two dec-
ades, was a line captain in the summer of 2017. After the KFD
Chief advised him that returning to college could improve his
chances of being promoted to Assistant Chief, Bruno enrolled
in college courses in August 2017. But in September 2017 he
suffered an aortic dissection which prevented him from con-
tinuing classes.
   After recovering, he returned to work in December 2017
and applied to be Assistant Chief later that month. Despite
No. 22-2945                                                   3

knowing that Bruno lacked a bachelor’s degree, in early 2018,
Mayor Chasity Wells-Armstrong selected Bruno to be the As-
sistant Chief (the title was later changed to Deputy Chief)
over candidates with bachelor’s and master’s degrees. After
his promotion, Bruno reenrolled in college courses for the
2018 spring semester but did not continue beyond that semes-
ter because his doctor advised him to stop attending.
    Bruno worked as Deputy Chief for the entirety of 2018
without a contract. In January 2019, Wells-Armstrong and El-
lexson presented him with a contract covering February 6,
2018, to April 30, 2019, that required him to enroll in college
courses to keep his position. Bruno asked that the provision
be removed. Ellexson agreed, and Bruno was permitted to re-
main Deputy Chief without enrolling if he obtained a doctor’s
note excusing him from taking classes, which he did.
    Months later, in the summer of 2019, Wells-Armstrong de-
cided to deny Bruno a raise because of his perceived insubor-
dination—a failure to “separate from the ranks.” This
stemmed from concerns that Bruno had leaked information
from a confidential management discussion and criticized El-
lexson’s management decisions to rank-and-file firefighters.
In July 2019, Ellexson directed Bruno to cease speaking with
a KFD firefighter who had sued the City for sex discrimina-
tion. But Bruno defied that directive and continued to speak
with her. Ellexson and Wells-Armstrong believed that Bruno
had shared information with the firefighter because her law-
suit included information known only to Ellexson, Bruno, and
the KFD Chief. Bruno claimed he was unaware of any issue
of trust until August 2019. But before that date, he had partic-
ipated in a counseling session with Ellexson to discuss
4                                                 No. 22-2945

leadership and the expectations for the position which cov-
ered the importance of confidentiality.
    Though she decided to not give Bruno a raise, Wells-Arm-
strong (and Ellexson) still offered Bruno a new contract on
July 31, 2019, covering May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020, that
would entitle him to additional compensation if he returned
to college. Bruno again requested that the education condition
be removed as an accommodation under the ADA. This time,
Ellexson refused to waive the provision, asserting that its re-
moval was not a reasonable accommodation. Bruno signed
the contract anyway, but soon after submitted his retirement
paperwork and ceased his employment with the KFD.
                              B
    Bruno sued Wells-Armstrong, Ellexson, and the City of
Kankakee, raising a number of state and federal claims, in-
cluding: (1) disability discrimination under the ADA, 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a), and IHRA, 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A); (2) retalia-
tion under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), and IHRA, 775 ILCS
5/6-101(A); and (3) indemniﬁcation under Illinois law, only
against the City, 745 ILCS 10/9-102.
    Bruno pursued two theories of disability discrimination:
(1) failure to accommodate premised on the rejection of his re-
quest to waive the education condition; and (2) disparate
treatment based on the decision to deny him a raise. See
Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting
that the ADA deﬁnes disability discrimination “to include
disparate treatment and failure to accommodate”). In grant-
ing summary judgment for the defendants on the failure to
accommodate theory, the district court focused on whether
the defendants’ refusal to waive the education condition was
No. 22-2945                                                     5

an adverse employment action. It observed that our cases
have held that denial of a raise is an adverse employment ac-
tion, but a denial of a bonus is not. It then concluded that be-
cause the pay bump was a bonus, the denial of the pay bump
via the refusal to waive the education condition was not an
adverse action and thereby could not serve as the basis for a
failure to accommodate. But an adverse employment action is
not required to prevail on a failure to accommodate theory.
E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 630 F.3d 635, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2010).
Nonetheless, Bruno’s failure to accommodate theory still fails
because, as explained below, his request was not for a reason-
able accommodation.
   The court also rejected Bruno’s disparate treatment the-
ory. The defendants conceded that their decision to not raise
Bruno’s salary in the second contract was an adverse employ-
ment action that could support a claim of discrimination un-
der a disparate treatment theory. But they argued that Bruno
could not prevail because they had a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the decision which he could not show was
pretextual. The district court agreed and found for the de-
fendants on Bruno’s ADA discrimination claim.
    Finally, the district court rejected Bruno’s retaliation claim
because he did not engage in any activity protected by the
ADA. And because his state law claims under the IHRA and
for indemniﬁcation rise or fall with his ADA claims, the dis-
trict court also granted judgment for the defendants on those
claims.
                                II
  Bruno appeals the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment on his ADA discrimination and retaliation claims,
6                                                   No. 22-2945

identical IHRA claims, and claim for indemniﬁcation. We re-
view a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. E.E.O.C. v. Charter Commc'ns,
LLC, 75 F.4th 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2023).
                               A
    Bruno ﬁrst challenges the district court’s conclusion that
the refusal to waive the education condition could not sup-
port recovery for failure to accommodate under the ADA. The
ADA bars discrimination against a qualiﬁed person “on the
basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The failure to accom-
modate theory of recovery arises out of the language of 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5), which deﬁnes discrimination to include
“not making reasonable accommodations.” Recovery under a
failure to accommodate theory requires proof that (1) the
plaintiﬀ was a qualiﬁed individual with a disability; (2) the
defendant was aware of the plaintiﬀ’s disability; and (3) the
defendant failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiﬀ’s
disability. Scheidler, 914 F.3d at 541. A reasonable accommo-
dation is a measure that enables the employee to “perform the
essential functions of the employment position.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8); see also Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872
F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2017) (Reasonable accommodation “is
expressly limited to those measures that will enable the em-
ployee to work.”); Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of Admin.,
44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The duty of reasonable ac-
commodation is satisﬁed when the employer does what is
necessary to enable the disabled worker to work in reasonable
comfort.”).
    An adverse employment action is not needed to prevail on
a failure to accommodate theory. AutoZone, 630 F.3d at 638
No. 22-2945                                                    7

n.1. Thus, the district court did not need to determine whether
the defendants’ refusal to waive the education condition was
a denial of a bonus or a raise. That determination was only
relevant to whether there was an adverse employment action
and thus irrelevant to the failure to accommodate inquiry.
     Bruno’s request to waive the education condition was not
a request for a measure that would enable him to do his es-
sential job functions and thus not a request for reasonable ac-
commodation. Rather, it was just a request for an increase in
pay that was not earned. The pay bump provision in the con-
tract was structured as an if/then: “If the Deputy Fire Chief
maintains enrollment in an accredited college program lead-
ing to the achievement of a Bachelor’s Degree, then the Em-
ployer will add a total of 2% ($2024.63) of annual salary to
Deputy Fire Chief’s base sum per annum.” Bruno claims his
aortic dissection rendered him unable to satisfy the “if” con-
dition because attending college courses would have wors-
ened his health, and thus the condition should have been
waived. But the pay bump was not something Bruno was en-
titled to as of right just because he performed his essential job
tasks. Bruno would have needed to go beyond his duties to
obtain the pay bump. The defendants did not need to provide
accommodations to allow Bruno to go beyond his essential
job functions and thus attain the pay bump, let alone allow
him to obtain the pay bump without satisfying the education
condition.
    Our decision in Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d
1109 (7th Cir. 2001), reﬂects this point. There, we held that an
employer who accommodated a disabled employee with a
modiﬁed job position did not violate the ADA by failing to
also provide that employee with higher wages because the job
8                                                   No. 22-2945

responsibilities of that modiﬁed position did not entitle the
employee to that higher wage. Id. at 1113, 1116. Here, because
the pay bump did not depend on Bruno performing his essen-
tial duties, the defendants did not have to provide an accom-
modation that enabled him to obtain it because doing so
would have been awarding him compensation he did not
earn—that was not a measure that enabled Bruno to work.
    Moreover, while the waiver would have entitled Bruno to
more compensation without him having to jeopardize his
health, it would not have impacted his ability to perform his
job. Bruno conceded multiple times that—so long as he did
not have to attend classes—he could perform the essential du-
ties of his position without undermining his health and
stressed that he had been performing satisfactorily without
the pay bump. Attending college was not a requirement of his
job. Bruno’s request that he be compensated more for per-
forming his essential duties because his health prevented him
from attending and obtaining the pay bump was not a request
for reasonable accommodation.
                               B
    Bruno next argues that the district court erred in rejecting
his disparate treatment theory premised on the defendants’
decision to deny him a raise—which they concede suﬃces as
the adverse employment action needed for recovery under
this theory. Because the parties proceeded under the burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), for disability discrimination claims, we do too.
Under this approach, a plaintiﬀ must ﬁrst establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing that he is a qualiﬁed
person with a disability and suﬀered an adverse employment
action because of his disability. See Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th
No. 22-2945                                                      9

424, 434 (7th Cir. 2022). If the prima facie case is made, the
burden shifts to the employer to proﬀer a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. If the employer
meets its burden, the plaintiﬀ must show that reason is pre-
textual. Id. In doing so, the plaintiﬀ must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s reason is
a lie. Id. at 435. It is insuﬃcient to merely prove that the reason
was unfair, unethical, or mistaken; rather, the plaintiﬀ must
show that the employer’s reason was not an honestly held be-
lief. Id. at 435–36.
    Because the parties contest only the district court’s evalu-
ation of pretext, we assume without deciding that Bruno es-
tablished his prima facie case. The defendants’ stated reason
for not raising Bruno’s salary is, in eﬀect, that Bruno had been
insubordinate. They assert he had failed to “separate from the
ranks” because he undermined the Mayor and City leader-
ship by, among other things, leaking conﬁdential discussions
with City leadership and criticizing City management deci-
sions to rank-and-ﬁle ﬁreﬁghters. Bruno argues that this rea-
son is pretextual because there is no written evidence of this
failure to separate from the ranks and that he ﬁrst heard of
this speciﬁc concern during depositions in this litigation (and
he notes that he had not heard of any trust issues the Mayor
had until an August 2019 phone call with Ellexson).
    Bruno’s pretext argument is belied by the record and in-
adequate to show that the defendants’ reason for not raising
his salary was insincere. True, there was no written evidence
of the insubordination concern. But Bruno admitted that El-
lexson believed he had leaked information from a conﬁdential
discussion and that he had a counseling session with Ellexson
covering the importance of keeping such discussions
10                                                No. 22-2945

conﬁdential that predated the choice to not raise his salary.
He also conceded that he contravened Ellexson’s order to not
speak with a KFD ﬁreﬁghter who had sued the City before he
was presented with the second contract. Bruno eﬀectively ad-
mits not only that he engaged in insubordination but also that
the defendants genuinely believed that he had done so; this
dooms his claim of pretext. See Everroad v. Scott Truck Sys.,
Inc., 604 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2010).
                              C
    We next turn to Bruno’s retaliation claim. To defeat sum-
mary judgment on a claim of retaliation under the ADA, a
plaintiﬀ must show: (1) statutorily protected activity; (2) an
adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection be-
tween the protected activity and the adverse action. Trahanas
v. Northwestern. Univ., 64 F.4th 842, 856 (7th Cir. 2023). Pro-
tected activity under the ADA includes opposition to “any act
or practice made unlawful by this chapter” or participating in
“an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). In other words, the ADA protects from
retaliation those who have “engaged in activities protected by
the ADA,” Rowlands v. United Parcel Serv. - Fort Wayne, 901
F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2018), not activities protected only by
other antidiscrimination laws.
    On appeal, Bruno identiﬁes as protected activity only his
continued contact with a KFD ﬁreﬁghter who had ﬁled sex
discrimination claims against the City. He expressly disclaims
reliance on his January and August 2019 requests that the ed-
ucation condition be removed as his protected activity. The
former ﬁreﬁghter did not raise any claims under the ADA, so
Bruno’s meetings with the former ﬁreﬁghter could not have
been protected activity under the ADA. Accordingly, the
No. 22-2945                                                  11

district court properly granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants on Bruno’s retaliation claim.
                               D
    The parties agree that Bruno’s IHRA and indemnification
claims rise or fall with his ADA claims. Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th
789, 793 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Illinois courts analyze IHRA claims
under a framework that is practically indistinguishable from
the ADA framework.”). And as to indemnification, because
the City need only indemnify its employees if those employ-
ees are found liable, the indemnification claim fails if the em-
ployees are not liable. See Ybarra v. City of Chicago, 946 F.3d
975, 981 (7th Cir. 2020). Therefore, because we conclude that
the district court properly granted summary judgment to the
defendants on Bruno’s ADA claims, it also did not err in
granting summary judgment for the defendants on Bruno’s
IHRA claims for the same conduct and his indemnification
claim against the City.
                                                     AFFIRMED