Court Opinion

ID: 9379373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 15:04:08.717181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.030716
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                                 FOURTH DISTRICT

               JONATHAN STIRBERG and JESSICA STIRBERG,
                             Appellants,

                                         v.

        HENRY H. FEIN, in his capacity as Successor Co-Trustee of the
         Nat Stirberg Revocable Residence Trust; BERNARD KRUGER,
     in his capacity as Successor Co-Trustee of the Nat Stirberg Revocable
  Residence Trust; VALERIE STIRBERG, as Surviving Spouse of Nat Stirberg
  and Lifetime Beneficiary of the Nat Stirberg Revocable Residence Trust; and
   ALEXIS CALI JEDZINIAK, as Remainder Beneficiary of the Nat Stirberg
     Revocable Residence Trust, on behalf of herself and her descendants,
                                   Appellees.

                                   No. 4D22-854

                                 [March 15, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach
County, Laura C. Burkhart, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2020-CP-005378.

   Peter J. Forman and Jonathan A. Galler of Gutter Chaves Josepher Rubin
Forman Fleisher Miller P.A., Boca Raton, for appellants.

  Linda L. Snelling of Bankier, Arlen & Snelling Law Group, PLLC, Delray
Beach, Jay A. Schwartz of Law Office of Jay A. Schwartz, P.A., Delray Beach, and
Daniel A. Seigel of Law Offices of Daniel A. Seigel, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellees.

FORST, J.

    Appellants Jonathan and Jessica Stirberg appeal the trial court’s order
denying their motion to vacate the final judgment in a trust reformation action.
They contend that the court erred in requiring them to show they were prejudiced
by fraud in the reformation action and in refusing to allow evidence of their
asserted homestead interest in the trust property. We conclude that the trial
court correctly required a showing of prejudice. However, we agree with
Appellants that their homestead interest, if established, is dispositive of their
motion to vacate the underlying trust reformation. We accordingly reverse the
trial court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                   Background

                                         1
   Appellants’ father, Nat Stirberg (“Decedent”), conveyed his apartment in
Delray Beach to a trust (the “Residence Trust”) during his life. The apartment
was the sole trust asset. The Residence Trust did not name Appellants as
beneficiaries, instead designating Appellee Valerie Stirberg, Decedent’s surviving
spouse, as beneficiary upon Decedent’s death. Valerie is not Appellants’ mother.
Appellant Jonathan Stirberg and Decedent’s Attorney, Appellee Henry Fein—who
prepared the Residence Trust—originally served as co-trustees.

   Pursuant to the Resident Trust’s terms, the apartment transferred to Valerie
at the Decedent’s death. But she did not receive the residence in fee simple
absolute. Instead, she received a life estate with the power to appoint the
remainder to her granddaughter. During the administration of Decedent’s
estate, Jonathan Stirberg, acting in his capacity as the estate’s personal
representative, filed a “Petition to Determine Homestead Status of Real Property”
(“Homestead Petition”) as to the apartment. The Homestead Petition alleged that
because Valerie had not received a fee simple interest in the residence, that
conveyance failed under the Florida Constitution and statutory homestead law.
As a result, Appellants asserted a vested remainder interest in the apartment as
Decedent’s lineal descendants.

    Henry Fein then removed Jonathan Stirberg as co-trustee through a valid
removal document which Appellants do not contest. After seeking an extension
of time to respond to the Homestead Petition, Fein and his new co-trustee filed
their own petition to reform the Residence Trust such that it would give Valerie
the residence in fee simple and free of trust, retroactive to the date of Decedent’s
death. Appellants were not parties to this action and did not receive notice of it.
Nor did Appellees notify the trial court of the pending Homestead Petition. The
trial court then entered final judgment, granting the reformation (“Reformation
Judgment”). When Appellants learned of the Reformation Judgment, they filed
a motion to vacate under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(3), alleging
extrinsic fraud and a violation of Appellants’ due process rights.

   The parties proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The trial court
received extensive evidence as to Decedent’s intent regarding the apartment,
including the trust documents and testimony from Valerie, Jonathan, and Fein.
However, the trial court denied Appellants’ motion to consolidate the Homestead
Petition with the motion on appeal here. The adjudication of the Homestead
Petition remains pending below.

   While examining Valerie in the instant case, Appellants began to lay the
foundation for testimony as to the homestead interest asserted in the Homestead
Petition. Appellees objected as to relevance and the trial court sustained, ruling
that, in light of the denial of the motion to consolidate, the homestead issues
were not relevant to resolving the motion to vacate. The court allowed no further
evidence on the merits of the homestead challenge.

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    After the hearing, the trial court issued its order denying Appellants’ rule
1.540(b) motion. Therein, the trial court found that Appellants had standing to
bring the motion through their asserted homestead rights in the apartment. The
court also found that Appellees had committed extrinsic fraud on the court by
failing to give Appellants notice of the reformation action and failing to state in
their petition that the Homestead Petition was still pending before the court.
Ultimately, however, the trial court concluded that even if Appellants had
participated in the reformation litigation, the court would have nevertheless
granted the reformation “to carry out the testamentary intent of the decedent.”
The court thus found that Appellants had not made the requisite showing that
Appellees’ fraud had prejudiced the outcome of the case, and the motion to
vacate was denied. This appeal followed.

                                    Analysis

   A trial court’s decision regarding the proper application of rule 1.540(b) is
reviewed de novo. See Casteel v. Maddalena, 109 So. 3d 1252, 1255 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2013). Where the rule is properly applied, “the standard of review of an
order denying a Rule 1.540(b) motion for relief from judgment is abuse of
discretion.” Fla. Philharmonic Orchestra, Inc. v. Bradford, 145 So. 3d 892, 894
(Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

   Appellants argue that because the trial court found Appellees had committed
extrinsic fraud on the court, Appellants had carried their burden on the motion
to vacate. They further contend that the trial court erred in requiring them to
show that their participation in the reformation action would have changed its
outcome.

    “To entitle a movant to an evidentiary hearing, a rule 1.540(b)(3) motion must
specify the fraud. In addition to specifying the fraud, the motion should explain
why the fraud, if it exists, would entitle the movant to have the judgment set
aside.” Flemenbaum v. Flemenbaum, 636 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(citations omitted). This two-prong test applies in cases of intrinsic as well as
extrinsic fraud. See Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.,
20 So. 3d 952, 957–59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

   Appellants correctly note that in Flemenbaum, we only expressly addressed a
rule 1.540(b) movant’s burden for entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. 636 So.
2d at 580. But we disagree that the two-prong Flemenbaum test should not
apply equally as the standard for setting aside a judgment after an evidentiary
hearing. Indeed, the Third District Court of Appeal has already extended our
holding in Flemenbaum to this same procedural context. See Fed. Home Loan
Mortg. Corp. v De Souza, 85 So. 3d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (requiring
specific allegations of fraud and the fraud’s prejudicial effect on the outcome of
the case for relief under rule 1.540(b) after an evidentiary hearing). This

                                        3
approach “is more consistent with Florida policy considerations favoring the
finality of judgments and with Florida law requiring a prejudicial effect on the
outcome of a case.” Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc., 20 So. 3d at 958. These
policy considerations are not lessened when a party seeks to set aside a judgment
at an evidentiary hearing. Thus, a party seeking relief under rule 1.540(b)(3)
must satisfy each of the two Flemenbaum prongs to merit an evidentiary hearing
and to ultimately set aside the judgment.

    To therefore prevail on their motion, Appellants needed to show they were
entitled to have the judgment set aside by showing their participation in the trust
reformation action would have changed its outcome. A party seeking trust
reformation must establish “that the trust, as written, does not reflect the
settlor’s intent.” Reid v. Estate of Sonder, 63 So. 3d 7, 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011);
see also Baldwin v. Estate of Winters, 944 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
(“[T]he polestar to will interpretation is the intent of the testator.”). It follows
that, generally, a party seeking to vacate a trust reformation judgment for fraud
would need to establish that the reformation contradicted the decedent’s intent.

   But this is not the general case. Here, Appellants contend that their alleged
homestead interest in the apartment vested upon the Decedent’s death and
made the trust reformation impossible, regardless of whether it effectuated the
Decedent’s intent. Further, Appellants argue that the trial court effectively
prevented them from showing prejudice on the outcome of the reformation action
when it ruled their homestead interest was irrelevant. To prohibit testimony on
this issue, Appellants insist, was an abuse of discretion. We agree.

   Section 732.401, Florida Statutes (2022), titled “Descent of homestead,”
provides that “if the decedent is survived by a spouse and one or more
descendants, the surviving spouse shall take a life estate in the homestead, with
a vested remainder to the descendants in being at the time of the decedent’s
death per stirpes.” § 732.401(1), Fla. Stat. (2022). To that end, the Florida
Supreme Court has held that even the settlor’s express intent must be
subordinate to Florida’s constitutional and statutory homestead law
requirements:

          Petitioner contends that the intent of the testator was to provide
      his wife with a life estate and the daughter of his choosing with a
      vested fee simple remainder interest, and that neither the statutes
      nor the constitution should frustrate this expressed intent.
      Furthermore, petitioner argues that neither the Florida
      Constitution, article X, section 4(c), nor section 732.4015, Florida
      Statutes, requires that the devise to the surviving spouse must be
      in fee simple absolute. We disagree with both contentions and adopt
      the position of the district court as our own. We hold, therefore:

                                         4
          [W]here a testator dies leaving a surviving spouse and adult
          children, the property may not be devised by leaving less than
          a fee simple interest to the surviving spouse . . . . This
          exception is exclusive and prohibits the testator from devising
          less than a fee simple interest to his surviving spouse under
          the circumstances presented herein. Since the devise here
          was not a permitted one under the Constitution, the property
          passed in accordance with section 732.401(1), Florida
          Statutes (1977).

In re Finch’s Estate, 401 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla. 1981) (first alteration in original)
(quoting In re Finch’s Estate, 383 So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)). Thus,
any devise of homestead property that does not grant a fee simple interest to a
surviving spouse fails, regardless of intent.

    Homestead property rights vest immediately upon the death of a testator or
settlor. See Aronson v. Aronson, 81 So. 3d 515, 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“At the
moment of Hillard’s death, his homestead property passed outside of probate.”
(citations omitted)); § 736.1109(1), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“If a devise of homestead
under a trust violates the limitations on the devise of homestead in s. 4(c), Art.
X of the State Constitution, title shall pass as provided in s. 732.401 at the
moment of death.”).

    Not even a retroactive action can validly cure a devise violating the homestead
laws. See Gotshall v. Taylor, 196 So. 2d 479, 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) (“If the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutes are not complied with in
alienating homestead real estate, the attempt is a nullity . . . and is void ab initio,
and subsequent events will not breathe life into it[.]”). A trust reformation is
such a retroactive action and therefore cannot cure a devise violating the
homestead laws. See Providence Square Ass’n, Inc. v. Biancardi, 507 So. 2d
1366, 1371 (Fla. 1987) (“A reformation relates back to the time the instrument
was originally executed and simply corrects the document’s language to read as
it should have read all along.”).

   The Residence Trust conveyed to Valerie a life estate in the apartment with a
power to appoint the remainder. Appellants have alleged that this conveyance
violates constitutional and statutory homestead law. If they are correct, the
Apartment would have passed as provided by section 732.401(1), Florida
Statutes (2022)—a life estate to Valerie and a remainder to Appellants as the
Decedent’s descendants. The underlying trust reformation would be ineffective,
incapable of curing the illegal devise. Appellants’ asserted homestead interest in
the property is thus not only relevant to the motion to vacate the trust
reformation, but potentially dispositive of it. We accordingly conclude that to
resolve the motion to vacate at issue here, the trial court was required to first

                                          5
address Appellants’ asserted homestead interest. The court’s failure to do so
was error.

                                  Conclusion

    Appellants’ asserted homestead interest in the apartment is inextricably
intertwined with the Reformation Judgment. The trial court erred in failing to
address that interest before ruling on the Motion to Vacate. We thus reverse the
trial court’s order denying that motion. On remand, the trial court must
consolidate the Motion to Vacate with the Homestead Petition so that both
matters may be resolved together.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

WARNER and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

                              *         *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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