Court Opinion

ID: 9479686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:25:44.011563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:12.372718
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in parts I, II and III of the affirming opinion which deal with the issues raised by appellant Trotter. However, because I believe that the portion of the affirming opinion dealing with the government’s cross-appeal is conceptually flawed, I respectfully dissent.
This is not a case in which the district court determined the particular account of the United States into which the seized money should flow. This is a situation in which the defendant, through the good offices of the district judge, has satisfied a criminal penalty, a fine amounting to $120,-000, with assets of the United States. Mr. Justice White, in United States v. Monsanto, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 2665, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989), makes the point:
[The forfeiture statute] states that “[a]ll right, title, and interest in [forfeitable] property ... vests in the United States *159upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Permitting a defendant to use assets for his private purposes that, under this provision, will become the property of the United States if a conviction occurs, cannot be sanctioned.
Mr. Justice White discusses the legal principles underlying this conclusion in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2653-54, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989).
It is abundantly clear that the seized assets belonged to the United States at the time „ the criminal penalty was imposed. And, neither a district judge nor a circuit judge has authority to expend the funds of the United States without statutory authority. Although the majority contends that the funds in question were under the “discretionary control” of the district court (without citing the source of this purported power), it cites no authority (and we have found none) that extends this alleged discretion to the payment of a fine imposed upon a criminal defendant with monies of the United States.
The attempted satisfaction of the $120,-000 fine with the seized assets was improper. Accordingly, I concur in the disposition of the appeal of Mr. Trotter and dissent to the holding of the majority in the cross-appeal of the United States.