Court Opinion

ID: 9491944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:28:24.785235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:01.723825
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur entirely with Judge Lynch’s excellent analysis of the issues in this case and in her opinion on those issues set out in Parts I, II and III, which reverse the decision of the district court. Furthermore, I concur in Part IVA of Judge Lynch’s analysis concerning whether the contract involved was an unenforceable, “unconscionable adhesion contract.” Rosenberg’s agreement to arbitrate was not invalid, and this case is not moot.
In general, I concur with the conclusion that Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), is still good law and applies to the issues in this controversy. The rationale of Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir.1998), is also persuasive on the claims presented by Rosenberg, as is Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir.1998). See also Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir.1997). I also agree with the rejection of Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 445, 142 L.Ed.2d 399 (1998), as unpersuasive. I would, in short, *22like Judge Lynch, reject the reasoning of the district court in this case.
I write separately, however, in respectful disagreement with the conclusions in Part IVB.1 The analysis concerning non-enforcement of the parties’ agreement, because not “appropriate and authorized by law” under CRA, is my point of departure in this difficult case.
There are a number of facts that cut against the result reached by Judge Lynch’s opinion. First, the district court found Rosenberg to be a mature, well-educated businesswoman when she began her career as a financial consultant with Merrill Lynch. Second, discovery in this case was not even completed before defendant moved to compel arbitration under the U-4 agreement and applicable exchange/securities rules. Third, in denying the motion, the district court found that Rosenberg signed the agreement, but allegedly did not receive any applicable exchange rules. She asserted that she was not advised of, and was ignorant about, the arbitration documents. The district court, however, makes no reference to Merrill Lynch’s position vis-a-vis furnishing advice, documentation, or information to Rosenberg at or before — or after — Rosenberg signed the agreement to arbitrate. Judge Lynch notes that Merrill Lynch “does not dispute” that Rosenberg was not given a copy of applicable rules of any organization referred to in Item 10 of U-4, but I do not conclude from the available record that Merrill Lynch concedes that a copy of the rules was not available to her at all pertinent times upon request. Nowhere in the record do I find a contention that Rosenberg asked about such rules or sought advice or information from Merrill Lynch about the meaning and effect of the U-4 agreement which she signed. We do not know what, if anything, Merrill Lynch’s representatives did, said or furnished Rosenberg in connection with the arbitration agreement, and/or in response to any inquiry or actions of Rosenberg regarding the said agreement.
I would find the arbitration clause in question not to be “inappropriate” as to the issues in this case. Congress, in using the expression “[wjhere [arbitration is] appropriate” may well have intended some threshold determination that the type of employee-employer dispute be amenable to resolution by arbitration. The Supreme Court in Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998), interpreted the “[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law” language of the Civil Rights Act as a single unit in deciding that a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by a union would not be enforced against an affected employee under the circumstances of that case. That situation was different from the private employee-employer agreement here involved. Wright limited its holding to the context where a labor union waived a member’s federal statutory rights.
The form signed by Rosenberg indicated an agreement to arbitrate and directed her to read the agreement carefully with specific reference to New York Stock Exchange Rules. Under all the circumstances, I would be inclined to remand to the district court to develop fully the facts as to whether Rosenberg was afforded a reasonable opportunity to appreciate the arbitration implications of her employment agreement. Did she have an opportunity to be familiar, or did she have a duty to familiarize herself, with the arbitration undertaking?
I do not consider Ramirez-De-Arellano v. American Airlines, Inc., 133 F.3d 89 (1st Cir.1997), to support the majority view. Ramirez was an action “brought primarily under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Puerto Rico law.” Id. at 89. It did not involve a civil rights claim, and the court upheld summary judgment for defendant in the discharge of plaintiff. The Ramirez court simply held that plaintiff could pursue his action in federal court because of the court’s dissatisfaction with aspects of American Airlines’ arbitration procedures not akin to those involved in the instant dispute.
More important, however, is my disagreement with Judge Lynch’s conclusion in part IVB that arbitration would not be “appropri*23ate” because, as 'plaintiff avers, Merrill Lynch did not furnish Rosenberg with a copy of the pertinent rules, and because Merrill Lynch falsely certified that Rosenberg was “familiar with” the rules.
I am reluctant to join a finding that Merrill Lynch, and/or its representative, John Wyl-lys, falsely certified Rosenberg’s qualifications, fitness, and knowledge as a financial representative and her familiarity with the rules. Even assuming, however, that the certification was incorrect, I disagree with the conclusion reached in Part IVB.
Unlike Judge Lynch, I would hold that Rosenberg was presumed to understand, and to be bound by, the plain terms of her U-4 agreement even if she were not furnished copies of the exchange rules at the time of signing. I believe the agreement was broad and plain and that it put Rosenberg on notice that she agreed to arbitrate at the outset “any dispute, claim- or controversy” with Merrill Lynch under exchange rules.2 If she “did not make herself aware of the existence or scope of [the arbitration] clause [in the U-4 agreement], she did so at her own peril.” Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assur. Co., 918 F.Supp. 1091, 1099 (E.D.Mich.1996). She is “presumed to know the contents of the signed agreement” as well as its reasonable import. Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, 957 F.Supp. 1460, 1477 (N.D.Ill.1997) (citing Beauchamp, 918 F.Supp. at 1097-98).
Ludwig v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S., 978 F.Supp. 1379, 1382 (D.Kan. 1997), puts it even more specifically under facts and contentions similar to those in this case: “regardless of whether plaintiff received the NASD Code, the potential breadth of the arbitration provision immediately put her on notice that any and all employment disputes were subject to mandatory arbitration.” Id. at 1382; see also Herko v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 978 F.Supp. 141, 147 (W.D.N.Y.1997).
All these district court cases cited herein involve agreements and contentions by plaintiffs similar to those made in this case by Rosenberg. I would hold to the presumption, in light of these authorities, that Rosenberg was put on notice and should have made prompt inquiry in connection with her executing the arbitration agreement as to the scope and nature of the exchange rules.
I would therefore REVERSE and grant the defendant’s motion for arbitration.

. However, I would agree with Judge Lynch’s finding in footnote 14 that the issue of arbitrability and the scope of the agreement is for this court and not the arbitrator.

. I would not add as a part of our inquiry in this case any heightened standard in determining whether or not Rosenberg’s agreement, under the circumstances, was a voluntary and knowing one. See Seus, 146 F.3d at 183-84 and n. 2, and also Patterson, 113 F.3d at 838.