Court Opinion

ID: 9958494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 15:09:54.286599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:26.515668
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward Charles Malloy and                   :
Deborah Rachel Malloy,                      :
                Appellants                  :
                                            :
       v.                                   : No. 1022 C.D. 2022
                                            :
G. Michael Green and                        :
Barry C. Dozor                              : Submitted: February 6, 2024

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM                                                         FILED: April 9, 2024

       Appellants Edward Charles Malloy and Deborah Rachel Malloy (collectively
Appellants) appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County’s
(Common Pleas) June 30, 2022 order, through which, in relevant part, Common
Pleas denied Appellants’ Petition to Disqualify Defense Counsel (Petition).1 Upon
review, we quash this appeal.

                                       I. Background
       On February 14, 2022, Appellants filed an abuse of process action against
Appellees G. Michael Green and Barry C. Dozor (collectively Appellees) in
Common Pleas, followed by an Amended Complaint on March 28, 2022. Appellants
confusingly allege that Appellees, who are both Common Pleas judges, have abused
the legal process by responding in opposition to a motion filed by Appellants in a

       1
         Via its June 30, 2022 order, Common Pleas also granted Appellees G. Michael Green and
Barry C. Dozor’s (Appellees) Motion for a Protective Order and Stay of Discovery; stated that all
outstanding preliminary objections had been rendered moot on account of Appellants’ filing of a
Third Amended Complaint, and barred Appellants from filing any additional amended complaints
in this matter without express leave of court to do so. Common Pleas Order, 6/30/22, at 1-2.
Appellants did not appeal those portions of this order.
separate, but related lawsuit in Common Pleas. See, e.g., Amended Compl., ¶¶8-36,
104-132. Through that motion, as well as the underlying lawsuit in that separate, but
related matter, Appellants sought a court order that would compel Appellees to
comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 703’s administrative case
disposition reporting requirements. Id., Ex. A (Appellees’ response to Appellants’
“Motion to Compel Compliance with Pa. R.J.A. NO. 703” (Response)); see also Pa.
R.J.A. 703 (judges in this Commonwealth are required to submit biannual reports to
the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts’ (AOPC) Court Administrator, in
which they must list all matters which have been assigned to them and have remained
undecided for 90 or more days).
         On March 30, 2022, Appellants filed their Petition in Common Pleas. Through
their Petition, Appellants requested that Common Pleas disqualify Nicole A.
Feigenbaum, Esquire (Feigenbaum), from representing Appellees in this matter due
to Feigenbaum’s purported violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct,2 and to report her behavior to the Supreme Court and/or the Judicial
Conduct Board.3 According to Appellants, Feigenbaum committed those violations
by filing preliminary objections to Appellants’ original Complaint, in which she
failed to admit that Appellees had violated Rule 703; provided no evidence that her
clients had actually complied with this Rule; and challenged Appellants’ standing to
pursue their abuse of process action. Petition, ¶¶2-24. On June 30, 2022, Common
Pleas denied Appellants’ Petition, whereupon Appellants appealed that ruling to our
Court.

         2
             Pa. R.P.C. 1.0-8.5.

         3
           Feigenbaum is an attorney with the AOPC, who not only represented Appellees in this
matter at the Common Pleas level, but is also Appellees’ attorney of record in this appeal. See,
e.g., Petition ¶¶2-4; Response at 5; Appellees’ Br. at 8, 35.

                                               2
                                     II. Discussion
      Under normal circumstances, we would now consider the substantive merits
of Appellants’ arguments. However, we cannot do so in this instance because we
lack jurisdiction over this matter. It is axiomatic that “[t]his court has jurisdiction to
hear appeals from final orders, interlocutory appeals as of right and interlocutory
appeals by permission.” Contact II, Inc. v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 664
A.2d 181, 183 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995); Pa. R.A.P. 311; 312; 341(a); 1311. A final order
is defined in pertinent part by the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure as one
that “disposes of all claims and of all parties” or one that disposes of fewer than all
claims and parties, but which the relevant trial court or governmental body has
expressly deemed final due to a determination “that an immediate appeal would
facilitate resolution of the entire case.” Pa. R.A.P. 341(b)(1), (b)(3). Additionally, a
party may appeal a non-final order by right in the event that order is collateral in
nature. Pa. R.A.P. 313(a). “A collateral order is an order separable from and
collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be
denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until
final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa. R.A.P. 313(b). “As
an exception to the rule of finality, the doctrine is to be interpreted narrowly, and
‘each prong of the collateral order doctrine must be clearly present before an order
may be considered collateral.’” Vaccone v. Syken, 899 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. 2006)
(superseded on other grounds by Pa. R.A.P. 1114(b)(7)) (quoting Melvin v. Doe,
836 A.2d 42, 47 (Pa. 2003)).
      In this instance, the challenged order is clearly not final and is not one that is
appealable by right on an interlocutory basis. See Pa. R.A.P. 311; 341(b)(1), (b)(3).
We also note that Appellants did not seek leave to appeal this order on an

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interlocutory basis by permission. See Pa. R.A.P. 1311. Thus, the only remaining
possibility that would allow review at this juncture is if we conclude that this order
was immediately appealable on a collateral basis. Pa. R.A.P. 313(b). We do not, for
three reasons. First, the substance of Common Pleas’ June 30, 2022 order is clearly
inseparable from Appellants’ cause of action; simply put, Appellants sought to have
Feigenbaum disqualified because she chose to file preliminary objections to the
Amended Complaint, instead of agreeing wholesale with all of the allegations
Appellants had made therein against Appellees. Next, it is entirely unclear what right
is present here that would be too important for us to deny immediate review of the
challenged order; indeed, this kind of garden-variety disagreement regarding
opposing counsel’s legal tactics falls far short of being a valid basis for invoking the
collateral order doctrine. Finally, Appellants will not suffer irreparable harm if we
decline to consider this appeal, as this refusal will not deprive them of their ability
to subsequently seek review of Common Pleas’ disposition of their Petition once a
final order has been issued in this matter.
                                   III. Conclusion
      Accordingly, we quash this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

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          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward Charles Malloy and        :
Deborah Rachel Malloy,           :
                Appellants       :
                                 :
     v.                          : No. 1022 C.D. 2022
                                 :
G. Michael Green and             :
Barry C. Dozor                   :

PER CURIAM
                               ORDER

     AND NOW, this 9th day of April, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED that this
appeal is QUASHED.