Court Opinion

ID: 9537193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:14:00.885297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:11.330266
License: Public Domain

*136Thompson, J.
(dissenting)—I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority's conclusion the expert's affidavit was insufficient to meet Children's Orthopedic Hospital's (COH) burden at summary judgment.
The burden is on the moving party to show no genuine issue of material fact. Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wn.2d 491, 519 P.2d 7 (1974). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot show there was a genuine issue of fact by its pleadings alone, where the motion for summary judgment is properly supported by the moving party. Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc., 88. Wn.2d 473, 564 P.2d 1131 (1977). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
Under CR 56(e), affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein". See Meadows v. Grant's Auto Brokers, Inc., 71 Wn.2d 874, 431 P.2d 216 (1967); Klossner v. San Juan Cy., 21 Wn. App. 689, 586 P.2d 899 (1978), aff'd, 93 Wn.2d 42, 605 P.2d 330 (1980). Also, it is generally true that the affidavit must contain a recitation of facts upon which knowledge and ultimate conclusions are based. Guntheroth v. Rodaway, 107 Wn.2d 170, 178, 727 P.2d 982 (1986); Sea Farms, Inc. v. Foster & Marshall Realty, Inc., 42 Wn. App. 308, 311, 711 P.2d 1049 (1985).
Nevertheless, an expert medical witness is not restricted by the usual rule requiring a witness to testify from firsthand knowledge, and may base an opinion on hearsay, such as reports, observation of others, and statements of the patient herself. ER 703; 5A K. Tegland, Wash. Prac., Evidence § 304 (2d ed. 1982); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence IF 703[02] (1985). Also, a medical expert may render an admissible opinion without prior disclosure of the basis for that opinion. ER 705; Group Health Coop. of *137Puget Sound, Inc. v. Department of Rev., 106 Wn.2d 391, 399, 722 P.2d 787 (1986). The combined effect of ER 703 and ER 705 is to give considerable flexibility in presenting expert medical opinion testimony. A party may do so by eliciting the expert's opinion immediately after her qualifications are established, without any recitation of the expert's factual data, hypothetically or otherwise. 5A K. Tegland § 310, at 89. It is up to the other side to bring out the expert's supporting data, and to impeach its validity or the conclusions drawn. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980) (construing Fed. R. Civ. P. 703 and 705, identical to ER 703 and 705); Fed. R. Evid. 705 advisory committee note. Because the expert's data and opinions may be explored during discovery, there is less need to use the court's time in requiring an elaboration of the factual basis for the opinion prior to cross examination. 5A K. Tegland § 311, at 91. Thus, I would conclude an expert may give an opinion by affidavit on summary judgment that is not based on personal knowledge and does not disclose the underlying data as long as some reasonable foundation is given for the opinion and the opinion is more than a bare conclusion the defendants were not negligent. See Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1980). In addition, an expert witness may give an opinion on the ultimate issue, even if somewhat conclusory. ER 704; Schoening v. Grays Harbor Comm'ty Hosp., 40 Wn. App. 331, 335 n.3, 698 P.2d 593, review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1008 (1985).
Here, the two affidavits considered by the trial court recited an opinion based upon: (1) Dr. Wallace's expertise as a pediatric rheumatologist familiar with the standard of medical practice in the State of Washington at the time of the incident giving rise to this lawsuit; (2) an examination of the child; (3) a medical history obtained from the child's mother. Dr. Wallace was of the opinion a vigorous physical therapy program presented for a patient, such as this child, conforms to sound medical practice and to the standard of reasonable prudent care. She concluded the program pre*138scribed and administered to Joanne Hash at COH met the standard of care. Both parties agree there was full discovery in this case and there is no allegation the plaintiff did not have an opportunity to depose COH's expert. Under the rules discussed above, this expert opinion would be admissible at trial. Thus, an affidavit containing such an opinion may be considered on summary judgment and should be sufficient to meet the moving party's burden.
The majority concludes that while ER 705 allows an expert witness to testify at trial to an opinion without first stating the factual basis for that opinion, the different setting of summary judgment makes it unfair to allow such a rule when deciding a summary judgment motion. Without facts as to how the injury occurred, the majority concludes, the court cannot evaluate the merits of the expert's opinion. But the court is not to decide whether the opinion is to be believed. It is to decide whether there is a sufficient dispute to send the case to the jury. Once the moving party has set forth an expert opinion on the standard of care, plaintiff must respond. The plaintiff, as at trial, has the burden to develop the underlying facts, not the defendant. This is the method of "cross-examining" Dr. Wallace's affidavit sought by the majority in a summary judgment context.
In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, prove the applicable standard of care and its violation; without expert medical testimony establishing these elements, plaintiffs normally cannot prove negligence. Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wn.2d 476, 479, 438 P.2d 829 (1968); Hayes v. Hulswit, 73 Wn.2d 796, 440 P.2d 849 (1968). The appellant Hash chose instead to argue in her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied here. Before res ipsa loquitur can be found applicable in a medical malpractice case, the trier of fact must be in a position, on the basis of *139required1 and admissible evidence, to make an inference of negligence, if it wishes to do so. If the trier of fact could not make the inference, because there is no such testimony, the doctrine is inapplicable. Shoberg v. Kelly, 1 Wn. App. 673, 678, 463 P.2d 280 (1969), review denied, 78 Wn.2d 992 (1970).
The appellant Hash failed to provide the trial court with any evidence raising an inference of res ipsa loquitur, other than argument in her memorandum.2 Nor did she counter COH's affidavits with one of her own showing the applicable standard of care was violated. Once there has been an initial showing of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must respond with more than conclusory allegations, speculative statements, or argumentative assertions of the existence of unresolved factual issues. LaPlante v. State, 85 Wn.2d 154, 531 P.2d 299 (1975); Estate of Kepl v. State, 34 Wn. App. 5, 11-12, 659 P.2d 1108 (1983). The appellant Hash failed to meet this burden. As such, I would hold summary judgment was properly granted.
After modification, further reconsideration denied October 14, 1987.
Review granted by Supreme Court February 1, 1988.

Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine allowing the trier of fact to draw an inference that the defendant was negligent when certain circumstances are present. They are (1) the agency or instrumentality causing injury was in the control of defendant, and (2) injury is of a type which would not ordinarily result if the defendant were not negligent. Miller v. Kennedy, 91 Wn.2d 155, 159-60, 588 P.2d 734 (1978).

The depositions referred to in the appellant's brief were not listed as considered by the trial court in its order and may not be considered by this court. Harris v. Kuhn, 80 Wn.2d 630, 632, 497 P.2d 164 (1972); Alexander v. Gonser, 42 Wn. App. 234, 237, 711 P.2d 347 (1985); RAP 9.12.