Court Opinion

ID: 9962066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 16:12:16.24824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:47.368178
License: Public Domain

J-A27021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: ESTATE OF KATHY A.                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MACRAE, DECEASED                             :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: ALISON COVERT                     :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 549 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered March 9, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                                0620-1201

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                              FILED: APRIL 22, 2024

       Appellant Alison Covert appeals from the order denying her petition to

show cause for a breach of a post-nuptial agreement and compel an estate

accounting for the estate of Kathy A. MacRae (Wife). On appeal, Appellant

challenges the orphans’ court’s conclusions concerning the authenticity of an

alleged agreement. We affirm.

       The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties. See

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 5/12/23, at 5-12. Briefly, Harold Johnson, Esq., (Attorney

Johnson) prepared wills for Wife and Duncan MacRae, Sr. (Husband) in 2006.

Wife’s will provided that her estate would go to Husband but that, if Husband

predeceased Wife, 60% of the estate would go to the parties’ children

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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(Appellant, Duncan MacRae, Jr., (Mr. MacRae, Jr.), and Timothy MacRae),1

with the remaining 20% to Wife’s mother and Linda Friedrich (Appellee),

Wife’s sister. Likewise, Husband’s will provided that his estate would go to

Wife, but if Wife predeceased him, his estate would be distributed to the

parties’ children. Both wills were executed in the State of New York, where

the parties resided.      Following Husband’s death in 2014, Attorney Johnson

subsequently prepared a new will for Wife which provided that her estate,

minus some personal effects, would go to Appellee.

       After Wife died in 2020, the orphans’ court explained:

       [Appellee] placed a telephone call to [Appellant], to inform her of
       [Wife’s] death.      During the telephone conversation with
       [Appellee], upon learning of the death of [Wife, Appellant] asked
       [Appellee] what [Appellant] could anticipate receiving from
       [Wife’s] estate. In response to the question asked by [Appellant]
       as to what she could expect to receive from [Wife’s] estate,
       [Appellee] told [Appellant] she did not anticipate [Appellant]
       would receive anything from [Wife’s] estate. Upon being told she
       would not be receiving anything from [Wife’s] estate, [Appellant]
       got very angry with [Appellee].

       In addition to placing a telephone call to [Appellant], [Appellee]
       also placed a telephone call to [Mr. MacRae, Jr., Husband’s] son,
       to inform him of [Wife’s] death.          During the telephone
       conversation with [Appellee], upon learning of the death of [Wife,
       Mr. MacRae, Jr.] asked [Appellee] what he could anticipate
       receiving from [Wife’s] estate. In response to the question asked
       by [Mr. MacRae, Jr.] as to what he could expect to receive from
       [Wife’s] estate, [Appellee] told [Mr. MacRae, Jr.] she did not
       anticipate [he] would receive anything from [Wife’s] estate.

       Two (2) days after the death of [Wife] and the telephone
       conversation with [Appellee], [Appellant] contacted Attorney
____________________________________________

1 The record reflects that the children were Husband’s biological children and

Wife’s stepchildren.

                                           -2-
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     Johnson informing him that she possessed a document allegedly
     signed by [Husband] and [Wife] in which they agreed not to
     change their wills. The document produced by [Appellant] entitled
     “Agreement Contract” appears to be a photocopy and appears to
     contain the signature of Allan Greenstein, notarizing the
     document.

     [Appellant] subsequently went to see Attorney Johnson and
     showed him the agreement contract.             Upon review of the
     agreement contract, Attorney Johnson knew he had never seen it
     before, he had not prepared it, and he knew nothing about it.
     Further, he felt it did not look as if it was prepared by a lawyer.
     On November 2, 2022, Attorney Johnson sent an email to counsel
     for the parties in which he said, “[P]lease note that the ‘Agreement
     Contract’ dated January 22, 2007 was NOT prepared by me and
     was not in my files — I only learned of it when [Appellant] visited
     me on August 24, 2020. It appears to be a forgery (cut and paste
     of notary and signatures).”

     [Appellant] did not, and does not currently, possess an original of
     the alleged agreement contract. Further, she never saw an
     original of the agreement contract. She contends she was given
     a copy of the agreement contract by [Husband].

     Additionally, [Mr.] MacRae, Jr. did not, and does not currently,
     possess an original of the alleged agreement contract. He also
     never saw an original of the agreement contract. [Mr. MacRae,
     Jr.] contends he was given a copy of the agreement contract by
     [Husband], but says he no longer possesses the document
     allegedly given to him by [Husband] in that it was lost or
     destroyed.

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 5/12/23, at 9-12 (formatting altered).

     In March of 2022, Appellant filed a petition to show cause for breach of

a post-nuptial agreement and to compel an estate accounting.          Therein,

Appellant raised three claims, including breach of post-nuptial agreement,

breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing constructive trust, and

accounting of administration by executrix. In support, Appellant argued that

Wife and Husband had signed an agreement contract in 2007 which stated

                                    -3-
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that neither party would alter the terms of their will in the event of the other

party’s death.

      In light of the dispute concerning the existence of the agreement

contract, the orphans’ court scheduled a bifurcated hearing.        At the first

hearing, the parties were to present evidence as to “whether the agreement

contract identified in the petition is authentic and binding on the parties, the

scope of the agreement contract, and whether there was a breach.” Id. at 2.

Ultimately, the orphans’ court concluded that Appellant had failed to

demonstrate that there was an agreement contract and issued an order

denying Appellant’s petition to show cause for breach of a post-nuptial

agreement and compel an estate account. See Orphans’ Ct. Order, 3/9/23.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and both Appellant and the

orphans’ court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Did the [orphans’ court] err by misapplying the Best Evidence
         Rule set forth at Pa.R.E. 1003 [and] 1004 by disregarding the
         photocopy of the contract to will [(agreement contract)]
         offered by Appellant because, as a third-party beneficiary, she
         was not required to offer the original, which was either lost or
         in possession of the opposing party?

      2. Did the [orphans’ court] err as a matter of law by failing to
         impose the burden of proof upon [Appellee] to prove the copy
         offered of the contract to will was a forgery, and because she
         presented no evidence of forgery, she failed to meet her
         burden?

      3. Did the [orphans’ court] err as a matter of law by misapplying
         New York law regarding the standard of proof applicable in
         proving a contract to will by imposing a clear and unambiguous
         standard although the document in question, on its face, was

                                     -4-
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          clearly a contract entered into by a husband and wife to restrict
          their rights to amend their mutual wills?

       4. Did the [orphans’ court] err as a matter of law or abuse its
          discretion by failing to properly apply New York law that all
          contracts to will have an implied duty of good faith, which, as
          here, is breached when one of the contracting parties dilutes
          their estates by transferring assets from it so that the purpose
          of the contract is defeated?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.2

                                 Best Evidence Rule

       Appellant’s first issue relates to the orphans’ court’s application of the

best evidence rule. Appellant’s Brief at 15-21. Specifically, Appellant argues

that the orphans’ court erred when it applied the best evidence rule and

concluded that “a copy of the agreement offered into evidence was not

sufficient to establish the agreement existed for want of an original.” Id. at

17-18, 21 (some formatting altered).

       We review an orphans’ court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. In re Estate of Boardman, 80 A.3d 820, 822 (Pa. Super. 2013);

____________________________________________

2 We note that Mr. MacRae, Jr. filed a pro se brief with this Court.    Because
Mr. MacRae, Jr. is not a party to the instant appeal, we shall treat his brief as
an amicus curiae brief, which is governed by Rule 531 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mr. MacRae, Jr.’s amicus brief does not address
the issues raised by Appellant. See Amicus Brief at 13-20. Instead, the
amicus brief raises issues that were not raised by Appellant; therefore, those
issues are not properly before this Court, and we cannot consider them. See
In re Scheidmantel, 868 A.2d 464, 478 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating that “[a]n
amicus curiae is not a party and cannot raise issues which have not been
preserved and raised by the parties themselves” (citation omitted)); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 531(a). Moreover, Mr. MacRae, Jr.’s amicus brief was not timely
filed, as it was due on or before the date of filing for Appellant’s brief.
Pa.R.A.P. 531(b)(4).

                                           -5-
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see also Hutchinson v. Verstraeten, 304 A.3d 1268, 1274 (Pa. Super.

2023) (defining abuse of discretion).

      Rule 1002 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence states that “[a]n

original writing . . . is required in order to prove its content unless these rules,

other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court [of Pennsylvania], or a statute

provides otherwise.” Pa.R.E. 1002. The comment to Rule 1002 states that

the best evidence rule “inhibits fraud because it allows the parties to examine

the original documents to detect alterations and erroneous testimony about

the contents of the document[,]” and “[t]he appearance of the original may

furnish information as to its authenticity.”        Pa.R.E. 1002 cmt. (citation

omitted). “A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless

a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or the

circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” Pa.R.E. 1003 (emphasis

added).

      In the instant case, the record reflects that the orphans’ court

“conditionally” admitted the agreement contract into evidence during the

evidentiary hearing, but noted that there remained “a genuine question as to

the authenticity of the original.” See N.T. Hr’g, 2/21/23, at 67-68.

      Thereafter, the orphans’ court issued an order which stated:

      Although Rule 1003 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence
      provides a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an
      original, it is permitted if there is not a genuine question raised
      about the original’s authenticity or circumstances that would make
      it unfair to admit the duplicate. Pa.R.E. 1003. In this case, the
      [orphans’ court] finds serious questions have been raised about
      the authenticity of the original, if any. Further, the [orphans’

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     court] finds the comment to Rule 1002 of the Pennsylvania Rules
     of Evidence very persuasive in that an original will help determine
     whether there is fraud and address authenticity. Therefore, in the
     absence of an original, the [orphans’ court] will give the duplicate
     no weight.

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 3/9/23, at 14.

     In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court explained that it did not

treat the agreement contract “as an admissibility issue” and instead “dealt

with it as an issue of weight.” See Orphans’ Ct. Op., 5/12/23, at 19.

     With respect to the authenticity of the agreement, the orphans’ court

explained:

     [Appellant] contends (i) when the agreement contract was
     presented to Attorney Johnson, he acknowledged he was aware of
     its existence; (ii) he admitted he made a mistake by allowing
     [Wife] to change her will; and (iii) Attorney Johnson later lied
     under oath for the purposes of concealing his own wrongdoing.

     On the other hand, Attorney Johnson provides a less complex
     explanation. Attorney Johnson testified that he did not prepare
     the agreement contract and was unaware of its existence.
     Attorney Johnson further opined that the agreement contract may
     be fraudulent.

     A review of the uncontradicted documentary evidence that was
     prepared prior to anybody to have a motive to be dishonest,
     supports the conclusion that Attorney Johnson was telling the
     truth. Specifically, Attorney Johnson’s handwritten notes from his
     September 18, 2006 meeting with [Husband] and [Wife], the
     letter of October 12, 2006, the statement of services rendered
     dated January 23, 2007[,] and the transmittal letter dated
     January 23, 2007 are all silent regarding an agreement contract.
     This leads the [orphans’ court] to find Attorney Johnson’s
     testimony that he did not prepare the agreement contract and he
     was unaware of its alleged existence was credible. It also leads
     the [orphans’ court] to find [Appellant’s] testimony . . . of Attorney
     Johnson’s alleged admissions to the contrary not credible.

                                     -7-
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     The [orphans’ court] finds the simple explanation presented by
     Attorney Johnson is more plausible and credible than the more
     complex explanation presented by [Appellant]. Therefore, the
     [orphans’ court] is accepting the testimony of Attorney Johnson
     as credible and is rejecting the testimony of [Appellant] because
     it is not credible.

     Having found Attorney Johnson’s description of the meeting with
     [Appellant] to be credible and supported by related documentary
     evidence, leads to the inescapable conclusion that [Appellant’s]
     description was false.     Regardless of whether [Appellant’s]
     inaccurate description of the interchange was a mere failure of
     memory or an intentional falsehood, it seriously taints the balance
     of her testimony.

     A further issue that weighs heavily against [Appellant] is her
     failure to produce Allan Greenstein as a witness. If the agreement
     contract is authentic, it appears on its face to have been notarized
     by the same person who notarized [Wife’s] will and [Husband’s]
     will on the same day. If the agreement contract is authentic and
     valid, the one disinterested party in the best position to establish
     its authenticity is Allan Greenstein. The failure to produce Mr.
     Greenstein, without explanation, weakens [Appellant’s] case.

     In addition to the foregoing, the [orphans’ court] finds Attorney
     Johnson’s opinion that the agreement contract was not prepared
     by a lawyer to be compelling. The [orphans’ court] compared the
     wills that Attorney Johnson admitted preparing with the
     agreement contract that he denies preparing. In the opinion of
     the [orphans’ court], the wills and the agreement contract were
     not prepared by the same person. Whereas the wills appear to
     have been drafted by a person with legal training and expertise,
     the agreement contract appears to have been [inartfully] taken
     from a form book. The [orphans’ court] is unable to find the wills
     prepared by Attorney Johnson and the agreement contract were
     drafted by the same person, signed on the same day, and
     notarized by the same person.        This strongly supports the
     conclusion that the wills were authentic and the agreement
     contract is not.

                                 *    *    *

     In this case, the [orphans’ court] finds it would naturally be in the
     interest of [Husband] to produce the original of the agreement
     contract, to the extent it existed, to his daughter, [Appellant].
     Further, to the extent it existed, it would be in the interest of

                                     -8-
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      [Appellant] to produce. The [orphans’ court] does not find the
      explanation for its non-production to be satisfactory.          The
      [orphans’ court] is not going to find an adverse inference that the
      original would be unfavorable, but does find its lack of production
      weighs against the credibility of [Appellant] and her brother, [Mr.]
      MacRae, Jr.

                                  *    *    *

      In sum, having fully weighed and considered all of the evidence
      presented, the [orphans’ court] finds the credible evidence
      presented does not support the conclusion that [Wife] agreed to
      renunciate her right to alter, modify or revoke her will signed on
      January 22, 2007.

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 3/9/23, at 11-13, 15 (footnote omitted and some formatting

altered).

      Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the orphans’ court. See Boardman, 80 A.3d at 822. Although the orphans’

court conditionally admitted the copy of the agreement contract, the orphans’

court ultimately determined that there were serious questions about the

authenticity of the original, if one existed, and declined to give the duplicate

any weight.   See Orphans’ Ct. Op., 3/9/23, at 11-15; Orphans’ Ct. Op.,

5/12/23, at 19.   We will not re-weigh the orphans’ court’s conclusions on

appeal. See In re Estate of Warden, 2 A.3d 565, 575 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Further, we discern no error by the orphans’ court in concluding that an

original was necessary under the circumstances of this case.       See Pa.R.E.

1002; 1003. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                                      -9-
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                              Burden of Proof

      Appellant also argues that the orphans’ court erred as a matter of law

by failing to require Appellee to prove that the copy of the agreement contract

was a forgery and contends that “because Appellee presented no evidence of

forgery, she failed to meet her burden.” Appellant’s Brief at 21.

      In response, Appellee argues that the orphans’ court did not find that

the agreement contract was a fraud or forgery and that, even if the orphans’

court had impliedly reached that conclusion, there is no claim against

Appellant for fraud or forgery. Appellee’s Brief at 24. Therefore, Appellee

contends that it was Appellant’s burden to prove the existence of the

agreement contract by clear and convincing evidence, which Appellant failed

to do. Id. at 24-25.

      In reviewing an orphans’ court’s order, our standard of review is as

follows:

      this Court must determine whether the record is free from legal
      error and the court’s factual findings are supported by the
      evidence. Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the fact-finder, it
      determines the credibility of the witnesses, and on review, we will
      not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that
      discretion.

In re Estate of Presutti, 783 A.2d 803, 805 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation

omitted).

      “When the issue of a forgery is raised, the claimant or contestant of the

will has the burden of proving the existence of a forgery by clear and

convincing evidence.”   Id. at 806 (citations omitted); see also De Lage

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Landen Servs., Inc. v. Urban Partnership, LLC, 903 A.2d 586, 590 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (applying clear and convincing burden of proof to parties alleging

forgery in other civil cases). Additionally, this Court has stated that “because

forgery presents an issue of fact, the resolution of the issue necessarily turns

on the court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility.” Presutti, 783 A.2d

at 806 (citation omitted).

      Here, the orphans’ court reached the following conclusion with respect

to the existence of an agreement contract:

      The issue in dispute in this case is whether [Wife] surrendered her
      right to change her will. The affirmative, i.e., that she did enter
      into an agreement not to change her will, must be proven by the
      party alleging she did enter such an agreement. Therefore, the
      burden to prove [Wife] entered such an agreement was on []
      Appellant.

      It would be counterintuitive to require that, unless [] Appellee
      proves [Wife] never agreed not to change her will, then the
      [orphans’ court] must find she did agree to change her will.
      Making such a finding would result in a very personal right of a
      testator being stripped away in favor of a presumption they had
      given it up. Finding [] Appellant’s argument on [this] issue to be
      wholly lacking in merit, it cannot be relied upon to afford her relief.

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 5/12/23, at 25.

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion or

error of law by the orphans’ court. See Boardman, 80 A.3d at 822. Appellee

did not dispute the validity of Wife’s will or argue that it was a forgery.

Indeed, it was Appellant who took issue with the contents of Wife’s will and

attempted to prove that a separate writing evidenced the parties’ agreement

not to revoke their previous wills.     Therefore, we agree with the orphans’

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court’s conclusion that Appellee was not required to prove that the copy of the

agreement contract was a forgery. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

                        Applicability of New York Law

      Appellant next contends that the orphans’ court misapplied New York

law “regarding the standard of proof applicable in proving a contract to will by

imposing a clear and unambiguous standard through the document in

question, on its face, was clearly a contract entered into by a husband and

wife to restrict their rights to revoke their mutual wills.” Appellant’s Brief at

25.   Specifically, Appellant contends that the orphans’ court improperly

“tasked [Appellant] with proving by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that [Wife]

‘actually made’ such an agreement.” Id. at 27 (some formatting altered).

Appellant further argues that New York law does not require that the existence

or authenticity of a contract to will be established by clear and convincing

evidence. Id. Rather, “the ‘clear and convincing’ standard is a question of

interpretation—that is, whether the language employed clearly shows the

intent to give up the right to make a new will.” Id.

      “In contract disputes, Pennsylvania courts generally honor the parties’

choice of law provisions.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. West, 807 A.2d 916,

920 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted).      In the instant case, the record

reflects that Husband and Wife executed their wills in New York, were

residents of New York at the time that they executed their wills, and there is

no dispute that they were residents of New York at the time the agreement

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contract was allegedly executed.     See Orphans’ Ct. Op., 5/12/23, at 16.

Accordingly, substantive New York law would apply. Nationwide Mut. Ins.

Co., 807 A.2d at 920.

      However, as noted by the orphans’ court, there is no dispute that, on

its face, the alleged agreement contract “was clearly a contract entered into

by a husband and wife to restrict their rights to amend their mutual wills.”

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 5/12/23, at 14. While the substantive law concerning the

contents of the agreement contract would be governed by the laws of the

State of New York, the procedural law is governed by the laws of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the evidentiary law of Pennsylvania

controls. See Greenwood v. Hildebrand, 515 A.2d 963, 967 (Pa. Super.

1986) (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 138 (1971); 16 Am.

Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 131 (1979)); see also Commonwealth v. Dennis,

618 A.2d 972, 980 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating that the “law of evidence,

including the admissibility of specifically offered evidence, has traditionally

been characterized as procedural law” (citing, inter alia, Leflar, American

Conflicts Law, 4th Ed., § 116 (1977))).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 provides in relevant part that, “to

satisfy the requirement of authenticating . . . an item of evidence, the

proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

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item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a) (emphasis added).3

An en banc panel of this Court explained:

       A document may be authenticated by direct proof and/or by
       circumstantial evidence. Proof of any circumstances which will
       support a finding that the writing is genuine will suffice to
       authenticate the writing.

       Where there is a question as to any writing, the opinion of any
       person acquainted with the handwriting of the supposed writer is
       relevant for that purpose. Rule 901(b) provides that “[a] non[-
       ]expert’s opinion that handwriting is genuine, based on a
       familiarity with it that was not acquired for the current litigation,”
       is competent evidence.

       In addition, circumstantial         evidence   may   be   sufficient   to
       authenticate a document.

       A proponent of a document need only present a prima facie case
       of some evidence of genuineness in order to put the issue of
       authenticity before the factfinder. The trial court makes the
       preliminary determination of whether or not a prima facie case
       exists to warrant its submission to the finder of fact. If that
       threshold is met, the [factfinder] considers the evidence and
       weighs it against that offered by the opposing party.

Gregury v. Greguras, 196 A.3d 619, 633-34 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc)

(citations omitted and some formatting altered).

       The record reflects that Appellant, as the proponent of the agreement

contract, provided prima facie evidence as to its genuineness through both

____________________________________________

3 We also note that even if New York’s evidentiary law were to apply to the

instant case, New York case law holds that, “[a] private document offered to
prove the existence of a valid contract cannot be admitted into evidence unless
its authenticity and genuineness are first properly established.” Young v.
Crescent Coffee, Inc., 201 N.Y.S.3d 169, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023) (citation
omitted); see also Guide to N.Y. Evid rule 9.01(1), Authenticating or
Identifying Evidence; In General.

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Appellant’s own testimony and that of her brother, Mr. MacRae, Jr., that

Husband provided each of them with a copy of the agreement contract.

Accordingly, Appellant’s submission of the agreement contract to the orphans’

court and the orphans’ court’s conditional admission of the document into

evidence consistent with Rule 104(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence,

and without objection of counsel, met the threshold for the orphans’ court as

factfinder to consider the authenticity of the document and its weight. The

orphans’ court within its discretion determined to give the proffered

agreement no weight. See Gregury, 196 A.3d at 633-34; Pa.R.E. 104(b);

see also N.T. Hr’g, 2/21/23, at 14, 18, 39. It is axiomatic that the fact finder

has the sole province of weighing the evidence and determining the credibility

of all witnesses. See Gregury, 196 A.3d at 633-34; see also Ferraro v.

Temple Univ., 185 A.3d 396, 404 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      Instantly, on this record, the orphans’ court acted properly within its

discretion in concluding that the testimony of Mr. MacRae, Jr. and Appellant

was not credible.    See Hutchinson, 304 A.3d at 1274.           As factfinder,

credibility and weight of evidence determinations are exclusively within the

province of the orphans’ court and we cannot substitute our judgment in that

its findings are supported by the record and within its discretion.        See

Ferraro, 185 A.3d at 404; see also Dubose v. Quinlan, 125 A.3d 1231,

1238 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that “[t]his Court will not substitute its

judgment based upon a cold record for that of the factfinder where issues of

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credibility and weight are concerned” (citations omitted and formatting

altered)). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                             Duty of Good Faith

      In her final issue, Appellant alleges that the orphans’ court erred when

it failed to “properly apply New York law that all contracts to will have an

implied duty of good faith, which as here, is breached when one of the

contracting parties dilutes their estate by transferring assets from it so that

the purpose of the contract is defeated.” Appellant’s Brief at 28. Specifically,

Appellant argues that Wife breached the contract at issue when she executed

her March 5, 2014 will. Id. at 29. Appellant also alleges that Wife changed

the beneficiary designations on various accounts with Prudential and Wells

Fargo.   Id. at 30.   Further, Appellant argues that in return for Husband

contributing a majority of the marital assets, Wife agreed to leave sixty

percent of her estate to Husband’s biological children. Id. at 31. “[Wife’s]

diversion of those assets after [Husband’s] death denied [Husband, Appellant,

Mr. MacRae, Jr.], and Timothy the benefits of that bargain.” Id. Appellant

concludes that, “[t]o remedy this breach, the [orphans’] court should have

invalidated [the] January 18, 2014 beneficiary designations, and any other

beneficiary designations made for those accounts after January 22, 2007,

reinstate the beneficiary designations to [Wife’s] estate, effective as of

January 22, 2007.” Id. at 31-32.

      The orphans’ court reached the following conclusion:

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      Although it is clear all contracts, if entered, impose a duty of good
      faith and fair dealing, the [orphans’ court] cannot impose that
      duty if the court does not find the existence of a contract. In this
      case, the [orphans’ court] did not find [Wife] entered into an
      agreement surrendering the power to change her will. In the
      absence of such an agreement, the duty of good faith and fair
      dealing is immaterial to the decision in this case.

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 5/12/23, at 26.

      On this record, the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion or err as

a matter of law in rejecting Appellant’s claim concerning the existence of the

agreement contract. Therefore, we agree with the orphans’ court that “the

duty of good faith and fair dealing is immaterial to the decision in this case.”

See id. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief. See Hutchinson, 304

A.3d at 1274; Ferraro, 185 A.3d at 404; In re Estate of Schumacher, 133

A.3d 45, 49-50 (Pa. Super. 2016). For these reasons, we affirm.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/22/2024

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