Court Opinion

ID: 9902230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:06:12.349362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:48.001676
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                       CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                           NOVEMBER 24, 2023
                                                                        STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 223

State of North Dakota,                                  Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Danial Ray Curtis,                                  Defendant and Appellant

                                No. 20230182

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District,
the Honorable Constance L. Cleveland, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.

Brianna K. Kraft, Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and
appellee; submitted on brief.

Laura C. Ringsak, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant; submitted on
brief.
                               State v. Curtis
                                No. 20230182

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] Danial Ray Curtis appeals from a criminal judgment convicting him of
unauthorized use of personal identifying information. Curtis argues there was
insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We affirm.

                                       I

[¶2] On June 15, 2022, Curtis was charged with unauthorized use of personal
identifying information. A bench trial was held on May 30, 2023, at which
Curtis represented himself.

[¶3] At trial, a bank teller testified Curtis entered the bank where she worked
and produced a check for cashing. The teller testified she noticed the following
“red flags” on the check: the amount was exactly $10,000, when over that
amount required additional paperwork; Curtis’s name was misspelled “Daniel”
instead of “Danial”; the signor—Krystal Foster—did not match the names of
the account holders and was not authorized on the account; the account had
been closed for at least a year; the check number was low; and the check was
dated March 2022, but Curtis presented it in May 2022. The teller testified she
called the bank manager to verify the check. The bank manager testified to
noticing the same red flags, and contacted J.H., the account holder, to see if
she had authorized the check. He further testified that he asked Curtis where
he got the check, and Curtis told him it was a pre-payment of rent and repair
from some of his tenants, but did not give any names of the tenants. Both the
teller and the bank manager testified that they informed Curtis of the bank’s
policy that prohibited verifying funds of a check and told Curtis they would not
proceed with his request to verify or cash the check.

[¶4] J.H. testified she received a call from the bank manager asking if she
knew Curtis or Foster and informing her that a check from her closed account
was attempting to be cashed. J.H. recounted her conversation with the bank
manager, stating she did not know Curtis or Foster and would not have given

                                       1
either of them authorization to use her account. J.H. testified that she had
thrown away the checks after closing the account. When presented with the
check at trial, she recognized it as associated with her old account and
confirmed the account had been closed approximately five years ago.

[¶5] In his defense, Curtis called his friend, Jolanda Anderson, as a witness.
She testified she drove Curtis to the bank to verify the check because neither
she nor Curtis believed the check was valid. At trial, she recalled Curtis telling
her he was not going to deposit the check into his account because he did not
want to be charged an overdraft fee as he believed the check was bad. She
testified generally that Curtis was not attempting to cash the check, but was
only attempting to see if the check was valid.

[¶6] Based on the evidence presented, the district court found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Curtis willfully presented a check in the amount of
$10,000 to cash. The court found Curtis guilty of unauthorized use of personal
identifying information “to obtain money without the authorization or consent
of the holder of the account, and the value of the money exceeded $1,000.”
Criminal judgment was entered on May 30, 2023, and later amended to correct
a clerical error. Curtis timely appeals.

                                       II

[¶7] Curtis argues there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction.

[¶8] “A court asked to consider whether the conviction rests upon insufficient
evidence must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict.” State
v. Ismail, 2022 ND 199, ¶ 11, 981 N.W.2d 896 (citing State v. Yineman,
2002 ND 145, ¶ 8, 651 N.W.2d 648). “The conviction rests on insufficient
evidence if no rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Yineman, at ¶ 8). We review a criminal trial
before the district court without a jury under the same standard as a criminal
trial with a jury. State v. Rufus, 2015 ND 212, ¶ 6, 868 N.W.2d 534.

                                        2
      This Court merely reviews the record to determine if there is
      competent evidence allowing the jury to draw an inference
      reasonably tending to prove guilt and fairly warranting a
      conviction. The defendant bears the burden of showing the
      evidence reveals no reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in
      the light most favorable to the verdict. When considering
      insufficiency of the evidence, we will not reweigh conflicting
      evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses.

State v. Doll, 2012 ND 32, ¶ 21, 812 N.W.2d 381 (cleaned up). In a bench trial,
the defendant is not required to make a motion for acquittal under
N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 to preserve a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Ismail, at ¶ 12
(citing Yineman, at ¶ 7).

[¶9] Section 12.1-23-11(2), N.D.C.C., governs the unauthorized use of
personal identifying information, stating:

             An individual is guilty of an offense if the individual obtains
      or attempts to obtain, transfers, records, or uses or attempts to use
      any personal identifying information of another individual, living
      or deceased, to obtain credit, money, goods, services, or anything
      else of value without the authorization or consent of the other
      individual. The offense is a class B felony if the credit, money,
      goods, services, or anything else of value exceeds one thousand
      dollars in value, otherwise the offense is a class C felony.

Personal identifying information includes “[a]n individual’s financial
institution account number, credit card number, or debit card number.”
N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-11(1)(i).

[¶10] “If a statute or regulation thereunder defining a crime does not specify
any culpability and does not provide explicitly that a person may be guilty
without culpability, the culpability that is required is willfully.” N.D.C.C.
§ 12.1-02-02(2). Willful conduct is when the person “engages in the conduct
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.” N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(1)(e). Section
12.1-02-02(1), N.D.C.C., further defines these culpability levels:

                                        3
      a. “Intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his
      purpose to do so.

      b. “Knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he knows or has
      a firm belief, unaccompanied by substantial doubt, that he is doing
      so, whether or not it is his purpose to do so.

      c. “Recklessly” if he engages in the conduct in conscious and clearly
      unjustifiable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence
      of the relevant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross
      deviation from acceptable standards of conduct, except that, as
      provided in section 12.1-04-02, awareness of the risk is not
      required where its absence is due to self-induced intoxication.

                                       A

[¶11] Curtis argues there was insufficient evidence presented on the source of
the check, that he intended to endorse the check, that he knew the signor was
not authorized on the account, and that he willfully presented the check for
cashing.

[¶12] The district court made several findings of fact, ultimately finding Curtis
intentionally presented the check to obtain money without the authorization
or consent of the account holder and violated N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-11. The court
was not required to make findings of fact, it only needed to find the defendant
guilty or not guilty. Rufus, 2015 ND 212, ¶ 9 (relying on State v. Berger,
235 N.W.2d 254, 263 (N.D. 1975)). This Court is not limited to the reasons
given by the trial court for a finding of guilt, rather we consider the entire
record to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the
conviction. Id. The evidence presented addressed each element of the
unauthorized use of personal identifying information under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-
23-11. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented
at trial showed Curtis entered the bank with the purpose of obtaining money
through the use of J.H.’s personal information—the check with her name and
account number associated with her bank account—without her authorization
or consent. Although Anderson’s testimony conflicts with the State’s witnesses
regarding Curtis’s intent to cash the check, this Court does not reweigh

                                       4
conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Doll, 2012 ND
32, ¶ 21.

[¶13] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational
factfinder could have found Curtis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, sufficient evidence existed to convict Curtis of unauthorized use of
personal identifying information.

                                         B

[¶14] Curtis also argues his conviction should be reversed because his
prosecution in this case is contrary to the legislative intent of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-
23-11. He argues the legislature only intended to criminalize and combat
identity theft, rather than prosecuting individuals who are provided with a bad
check. The State argues this issue should not be addressed on appeal because
it was not raised to the district court.

[¶15] This issue is properly before this Court. See State v. Castleman, 2022 ND
7, ¶ 5, 969 N.W.2d 169 (citing State v. O’Toole, 2009 ND 174, ¶¶ 10-12,
773 N.W.2d 201) (“Where a claim of insufficient evidence is preserved for
appeal, related issues of statutory interpretation are also preserved for
appeal.”). Curtis points to no language of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-11 that is
ambiguous. Section 1-02-05, N.D.C.C., provides: “When the wording of a
statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” See State v. Houkom, 2021 ND 223,
¶ 8, 967 N.W.2d 801 (concluding that to consider legislative history, this Court
must first find the statute ambiguous). Because Curtis has not shown the
statute is ambiguous, we decline to consider the legislative history.

                                        III

[¶16] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational
factfinder could find Curtis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unauthorized
use of personal identifying information. We conclude sufficient evidence
existed to support the conviction.

                                         5
[¶17] We affirm the criminal judgment.

[¶18] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                    6