Court Opinion

ID: 9903904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:09:27.070091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.356564
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                   FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                   DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

MARISOL ROSA,

            Appellant,

v.                                        Case No. 5D21-3005
                                          LT Case No. 2019-CA-014520-O

SAFEPOINT INSURANCE COMPANY,

          Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed November 14, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Orange County,
Donald A. Myers, Jr., Judge.

Mark A. Nation, of The Nation
Law Firm, Longwood, for Appellant.

Patrick M. Chidnese and Frieda C.
Lindroth, of Bickford & Chidnese, LLP,
Tampa, for Appellee.

Mark D. Tinker, of Cole, Scott &
Kissane, P.A., Amicus Curiae for the
Florida Property & Casualty Association

WOZNIAK, J.
      In this insurance coverage dispute, Marisol Rosa (“Rosa”) appeals a

final summary judgment entered in favor of Safepoint Insurance Company

(“Safepoint”). For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that an

exclusion contained in an endorsement to the policy applied to the loss at

issue, precluding coverage. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Safepoint insured Rosa’s dwelling pursuant to a homeowners

insurance policy. The dwelling was damaged by the overflow of water from

the plumbing system. The parties agree that the loss resulted from the

deterioration of cast iron pipes that was caused by “rust or other corrosion.”

After investigating the damage, Safepoint determined the loss was excluded

from coverage under the policy’s Water Damage Exclusion Endorsement.

Rosa then filed suit, seeking to enforce the policy and to recover the costs

she incurred in repairing her dwelling due to the water damage.

      The issue in this appeal is whether the policy covers the subject loss,

and the answer depends on the meaning of the term “act of nature” in the

policy. The introductory paragraph of the policy’s Exclusions section states

that the policy does “not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of

the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event

contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss. . . .” The definition

of “Water Damage” following that introductory language was replaced by an

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endorsement to the policy, the Water Damage Exclusion Endorsement,

which defines “Water Damage” as including:

            d. Accidental or intentional discharge or overflow of
            water or steam from within a plumbing, heating, air
            conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler
            system or from within a household appliance; . . . .

                  ....

            Caused by or resulting from human or animal, forces
            or any act of nature.

Thus, if the rust or other corrosion that caused this loss was an act of nature,

Safepoint correctly denied coverage. But, if the rust or other corrosion was

not an act of nature, the Water Damage Exclusion Endorsement did not

preclude coverage.

      The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law reviewed

de novo. Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Halstead, as Tr. of Rebecca D. McIntosh

Revocable Living Tr., 310 So. 3d 500, 502 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020). The guiding

principle for insurance policy interpretation is that the policy must be read as

a whole, affording words their plain meaning as bargained for by the

parties. See § 627.419(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (requiring every insurance

contract “be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions

as set forth in the policy and as amplified, extended, or modified by any

application therefor or any rider or endorsement thereto”); see also Auto-

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Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000) (“Florida law

provides that insurance contracts are construed in accordance with the plain

language of the policies as bargained for by the parties.”).

      The Fourth District Court of Appeal aptly applied these principles when

it interpreted the phrase “act of nature” in the context of a nearly identical

insurance policy. In Dodge v. People’s Trust Insurance Co., 321 So. 3d 831

(Fla. 4th DCA 2021), the insureds argued, as does Rosa here, that “act of

nature” is synonymous with “act of God” and only occurs when a singular act

or external force occurs, finding solace in Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition

of “act of God.” Act of God, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (stating

phrase is “[a]lso termed act of nature”). Our sister court rejected this

argument. Citing two out-of-state cases, 1 the Fourth District Court held that

“the everyday interpretation of the phrase ‘act of nature’ is not as narrow or

technical as the [insureds] propose” but rather is to be given its ordinary

meaning as “something that naturally occurs.” Dodge, 321 So. 3d at 834. We

      1
         Holben v. GC Acquisition Corp., No. 1996CA00261, 1997 WL
115843, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1997) (“The natural accumulation of ice
and snow is one which accumulates as a result of an act of nature as
opposed to an unnatural accumulation that results from an act of a person.”);
Coyle v. City of Waterbury, No. 096884, 1991 WL 270291, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1991) (refusing to hold that growth of a tree root planted
on land abutting the sidewalk is an affirmative act of the landowner because
“[t]he growth of the tree, root and all, is an act of nature over which the
landowner has no control”).

                                      4
find the Fourth District Court’s reasoning persuasive and agree that in the

context of this policy

              the phrase “act of nature” does not require an
              uncontrollable or unpreventable event. . . . Here, the
              loss was caused by rust or corrosion. Corrosion, the
              chemical reaction between iron and moist air, is an
              act of nature or a naturally occurring force. Thus, the
              rust or corrosion occurred because of a natural act.
              As a result, the Water Damage Exclusion
              endorsement applied to this loss.

Id. at 835.

      We also find persuasive the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine’s

decision in Bibeau v. Concord General Mutual Insurance Co., wherein the

homeowner sought policy coverage after his home was damaged as the

result of earth moving under the foundation of the home. 244 A.3d 712, 714

(Me. 2021). The policy excluded losses caused by, inter alia, “[a]ny other

earth movement including earth sinking, rising or shifting; caused by or

resulting from human or animal forces or any act of nature.” Id. at 715. The

evidence was conflicting whether the movement was caused by a water line

leak that compromised the integrity of the foundation or by the settling of

unprepared or uncontrolled fill underlying the foundation. The Maine court

concluded that the cause was irrelevant because the policy’s earth

movement exclusion clearly applied to any earth movement, not just natural

disasters, and included earth movement resulting from human or natural

                                        5
forces: “Such losses are excluded even if they were caused concurrently by

a covered peril.” Id. at 718 (citation omitted). What we take from Bibeau is

that, in context, “any act of nature” is not limited to natural disasters, i.e., an

act of God.

      We also note additional contextual clues present in the policy that

further support our conclusion that any “act of nature” is an act that occurs

naturally and encompasses rust or other corrosion. The policy at issue

references “an Act of God” more than once in its Cancellation and

Nonrenewal sections. “[W]here the document has used one term in one

place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the

different term denotes a different idea.” Ahearn v. Mayo Clinic, 180 So. 3d

165, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 25, at 170 (2012)); see also Kel Homes,

LLC v. Burris, 933 So. 2d 699, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“As a general

proposition, the use of different language in different contractual provisions

strongly implies that a different meaning was intended.”). In light of the entire

policy, the use of “an Act of God” and “any act of nature” separately indicates

each phrase has a different meaning for the purpose of this homeowners

insurance policy. Relatedly, the choice of the drafters to capitalize “an Act of

God” stands in contradiction to the uncapitalized use of “any act of nature” in

                                        6
the exclusion. This distinction further undermines Rosa’s argument that the

terms “any act of nature” and “an Act of God” are interchangeable within the

policy. Because the phrase “any act of nature” is made expressly applicable

to the Water Damage Exclusion Endorsement, and based on our conclusion

that the phrase is to be given its ordinary meaning, we need not delve further

into the meaning of the phrase “an Act of God.”

      In sum, the rust or other corrosion that occurred in the pipes in Rosa’s

dwelling, regardless of whether it was perhaps preventable or controllable,

was a naturally occurring force and thus an act of nature. As an act of nature,

the loss came within the policy exclusion for “any act of nature.”

Consequently, Safepoint correctly denied coverage.

      AFFIRMED.

SASSO and NARDELLA, JJ., concur.

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