Court Opinion

ID: 9366753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 20:06:47.419567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.906119
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Evans, 2023-Ohio-237.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                     RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
                                                Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
                                                Hon. John W. Wise, J.
 -vs-
                                                Case No. 2022 CA 0034
 RONALD E. EVANS

          Defendant-Appellant                   OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Richland County Court of
                                                Common Pleas, Case No. 2021 CR 863 N

 JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        January 27, 2023

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

 GARY BISHOP                                    DARIN AVERY
 Prosecuting Attorney                           105 Sturges Avenue
 Richland County, Ohio                          Mansfield, Ohio 44903
 38 South Park Street, Second Floor
 Mansfield, Ohio 44902
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                               2

Hoffman, J.
       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Ronald E. Evans appeals the judgment entered by the

Richland County Common Pleas Court convicting him of possession of cocaine (R.C.

2925.11(A),(C)(4)(a)),   possession     of   a   fentanyl   related    compound   (R.C.

2925.11(A),(C)(11)(a)), and possession of drugs (R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(2)(a)), and

sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of twenty-four months. Plaintiff-appellee is

the state of Ohio.

                          STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

       {¶2}   On September 24, 2021, Appellant approached the front door of the

residence of Renier Cameron. The door was equipped with a Ring Cam, which monitors

and captures a video of anyone who approaches the door, whether or not they ring the

doorbell. Cameron was alerted to Appellant’s presence by the Ring Cam. Because

Cameron did not know Appellant, he went to the door to investigate.

       {¶3}   Appellant gave Cameron a name and asked if the person lived at the

residence. Cameron responded negatively. Appellant then asked Cameron to give him

a ride. Although a car parked in front of the residence belonged to Cameron, Cameron

told Appellant the car did not belong to him because Cameron did not want to give

Appellant a ride.

       {¶4}   Cameron closed the front door and went upstairs. His doorbell started

“going crazy like soundwise.” Tr. 263. Cameron ran downstairs and saw Appellant inside

his car. When Cameron asked Appellant what he was doing, Appellant responded,

“[W]ell, you said it wasn’t your car.” Tr. 263. Cameron called the police.

       {¶5}   When police arrived, Appellant was still inside the car. Officer Raymond

Reedy of the Mansfield Police Department pulled Appellant out of the car and attempted
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                       3

to handcuff Appellant. Appellant began screaming for help. Appellant was placed in the

back of the patrol car.   When officers searched Appellant, they found Cameron’s Ring

Cam. Police also found a black case containing cocaine, fentanyl, and Clonazepam

(Klonopin) pills.

       {¶6}   Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury on three counts

of possession of drugs. Attorney Jack VanBibber was appointed as counsel for Appellant.

On February 9, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se motion for new appointed counsel, also

stating he was considering hiring private counsel. The motion was denied.

       {¶7}   On February 17, 2022, Attorney VanBibber filed a motion to withdraw, citing

irreconcilable differences and a breakdown of communication with Appellant. After a

hearing, the trial court overruled the motion, finding counsel diligently and zealously

represented Appellant, and Appellant invited the problem by refusing to cooperate with

VanBibber in an attempt to try to force the trial court to appoint new counsel.

       {¶8}   The case proceeded to jury trial in the Richland County Common Pleas

Court. Prior to the start of trial, the court met with Appellant, his trial counsel, and the

prosecutor after it came to the trial court’s attention Appellant did not want to participate

in the trial. Appellant asked for an extension, which the trial court denied. Appellant was

agitated and belligerent with the court, and continued yelling and swearing at the judge

despite twice being found in contempt and given 30 days in jail. Appellant indicated he

did not want to participate in the trial, and did not want to watch the trial from the basement

of the courthouse by video. Appellant was removed from the courtroom and returned to

the jail, and the trial proceeded in his absence.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                    4

      {¶9}     Following trial, Appellant was convicted of all three counts. The trial court

merged the charges of possession of cocaine and possession of a fentanyl related

compound, sentencing Appellant to twelve months incarceration for possession of

cocaine.     The trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve months incarceration for

possession of Clonazepam, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of

twenty-four months.

      {¶10} It is from the April 29, 2022 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes

his appeal, assigning as error:

               I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S

      MOTION FOR NEW COUNSEL AND APPELLANT’S COUNSEL’S

      MOTION TO WITHDRAW.

               II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S

      MOTION TO CONTINUE HIS JURY TRIAL.

               III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT HIS

      RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM BY PROHIBITING

      HIM FROM ATTENDING HIS JURY TRIAL.

               IV. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S RULE 29

      MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT 3.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                        5

                                                   I.

       {¶11} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

overruling his motion for new appointed counsel and his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw

as counsel.

       {¶12} The decision whether to remove court-appointed counsel and allow

substitution of new counsel is within the sound discretion of the trial court; its decision will

not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d

516, 523, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001).            An abuse of discretion implies an arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unconscionable attitude on the part of the court. State v. Adams, 62

Ohio St.2d 151, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).

       {¶13} An indigent defendant does not have a right to choose a particular attorney;

rather, such a defendant “has the right to professionally competent, effective

representation.” State v. Evans, 153 Ohio App.3d 226, 2003-Ohio-3475, 792 N.E.2d 757,

¶ 30 (7th Dist. Jefferson), citing State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 523, 747 N.E.2d 765

(2001). “Competent representation does not include the right to develop and share a

‘meaningful attorney-client relationship’ with one's attorney.” State v. Gordon, 149 Ohio

App.3d 237, 2002-Ohio-2761, 776 N.E.2d 1135, ¶ 12 (1st Dist. Hamilton).

       {¶14} In order for the court to discharge a court-appointed attorney, “the defendant

must show a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to

jeopardize the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Henness, 79

Ohio St.3d 53, 65, 679 N.E.2d 686 (1997), quoting State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286,

525 N.E.2d 792 (1988), paragraph four of the syllabus. However, the right to counsel

must be balanced against the court's authority to control its docket, as well as its
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                         6

awareness a “demand for counsel may be utilized as a way to delay the proceedings or

trifle with the court.” United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1017 (C.A.6 1988); see,

also, Murphy, supra.

       {¶15} In the instant case, it appears prior to the motions filed by Appellant and

Attorney VanBibber in February, Appellant’s desire for a new attorney had come to the

trial court’s attention via a jail “kite,” and was discussed off the record at a pretrial hearing

on January 4, 2022. At the March hearing on the motion to withdraw as counsel, the trial

court noted it had earlier informed Appellant his decision not to talk to Mr. VanBibber was

a detriment to himself, but counsel was nevertheless doing his job in representing

Appellant. Tr. 3/7/22, p. 5. The trial court also indicated Appellant was told at the January

pretrial he could retain counsel to represent him; however, several months later at the

March 7, 2022 hearing on the motion to withdraw, retained counsel had not entered an

appearance.

       {¶16} The trial court overruled counsel’s motion to withdraw, stating on the record:

              THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Evans, we are done as of today.

              Mr. VanBibber, I am finding that your motion is not well taken. Your

       client has chosen not to cooperate with you. That is on your client. Mr.

       Evans could do this with every counsel we provide to him, and this Court is

       not going to drag this on forever. Mr. Evans has every opportunity to

       cooperate with you, to talk with you, to allow you to do your job. You have

       been doing it. He has decided not to go forward. That’s his decision. He

       has indicated that he has been working on getting counsel, and that is back
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                   7

       clear as of at least January the 4th, so we are now two months, and nobody

       has come forward on Mr. Evans’ behalf to enter an appearance.

              Mr. VanBibber has been working this case. He has attempted to talk

       with you, Mr. Evans. You have chosen not to. That is your decision.

              MR. EVANS: After I filed my motion.

              THE COURT: At this point –

              MR. EVANS: After I filed my motion –

              THE COURT: -- the Court is not going to grant withdrawal. This

       matter will continue on for trial, which is set for March 22 nd. So I would

       suggest, Mr. Evans, you start cooperating with Mr. VanBibber so he can

       give you a valid and thorough defense in this matter.

              MR. EVANS: No, I’m not.

       {¶17} Tr. 3/7/22, p. 8-9.

       {¶18} From the record of the hearing on Attorney VanBibber’s motion to withdraw,

we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling counsel’s motion to

withdraw, nor did it abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant’s motion for new counsel.

It is apparent from Appellant’s conduct throughout the proceedings he intended to refuse

to cooperate with counsel in order to delay the proceedings and to interfere with the trial

court’s ability to try the case, and not due to a true breakdown of the relationship with

counsel. The trial court noted throughout the case counsel was effectively representing

Appellant despite Appellant’s refusal to cooperate, and Appellant points to nothing in the

record demonstrating counsel was unable to effectively represent him at trial.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                       8

       {¶19} The first assignment of error is overruled.

                                                  II.

       {¶20} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

overruling his motion for a continuance of the jury trial, made orally on the morning of trial.

       {¶21} We note at the outset the motion was not made by counsel for Appellant,

but rather was a pro se verbal request made while Appellant was represented by counsel.

Although Appellant has the right either to appear pro se or to have counsel, he has no

corresponding right to act as co-counsel on his own behalf. State v. Thompson, 33 Ohio

St.3d 1, 6–7, 514 N.E.2d 407 (1987). Therefore, we find the trial court could have

overruled his motion solely on the basis the request was not made by counsel.

       {¶22} Further, the grant or denial of a continuance is a matter entrusted to the

discretion of the trial court. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St. 2d 65, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981).

While Appellant claimed they were not prepared for trial, it is also apparent from the record

throughout the case he refused to speak with his attorney. Therefore, it is unclear on

what basis he formed an opinion counsel was unprepared for trial. Counsel did not claim

to be unprepared for trial, and did not ask for a continuance. We find the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant’s request for a continuance.

                                                 III.

       {¶23} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues he was denied his

constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him when the trial court removed him

from the courtroom during his trial. While he concedes his behavior was disruptive, he

argues the trial court did not specifically ask him if he would conduct himself with decorum

and respect were he to remain in the courtroom, and did not offer him an opportunity to
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                     9

return, save for offering a right to testify. He argues his only alternative was to watch the

proceedings on video.

       {¶24} A defendant has a fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of

his criminal trial. Article I, Section 10, Ohio Constitution; Crim.R. 43(A). A defendant's

absence, however, does not necessarily result in prejudicial or constitutional error. State

v. Grate, 164 Ohio St.3d 9, 2020-Ohio-5584, 172 N.E.3d 8, ¶83. “[T]he presence of a

defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be

thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” Id., quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,

291 U.S. 97, 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d

139, 2007-Ohio-5048, 873 N.E.2d 1263, at ¶ 139.

       {¶25} Crim. R. 43(B) provides for the exclusion of a defendant from the courtroom

for disruptive behavior:

              (B) Defendant Excluded Because of Disruptive Conduct. Where

       a defendant's conduct in the courtroom is so disruptive that the hearing or

       trial cannot reasonably be conducted with the defendant's continued

       physical presence, the hearing or trial may proceed in the defendant's

       absence or by remote contemporaneous video, and judgment and sentence

       may be pronounced as if the defendant were present. Where the court

       determines that it may be essential to the preservation of the constitutional

       rights of the defendant, it may take such steps as are required for the

       communication of the courtroom proceedings to the defendant.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                       10

       {¶26} Nothing in Crim.R. 43(B) requires a trial court to offer the defendant's return.

State v. Powell, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2018-11-130, 2019-Ohio-4398, ¶ 23. Instead,

and as stated by the United States Supreme Court, once lost, the right to be present for

trial “can” be reclaimed if the defendant is willing to conduct himself or herself “consistently

with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.”

Id., citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1970). However, the

language used in Allen is permissive, not mandatory, and the ability of the defendant to

return is within the trial court's discretion. State v. Dumas, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12 MA

31, 2015-Ohio-2683, ¶ 26.

       {¶27} The matter of Appellant’s attendance at trial came to the court’s attention

based on Appellant’s desire to not be physically present. The following proceedings took

place outside the presence of the jury on the morning of trial:

              THE COURT: Well, I want to know if you are going to participate

       today. Are you going to be in this courtroom or not?

              MR. EVANS: For?

              THE COURT: The trial.

              MR. EVANS: I am trying to get an extension, like I said.

              THE COURT: Mr. Evans, you –

              MR. EVANS: You still haven’t given me time. I am still looking for

       an attorney.

              THE COURT: Mr. Evans –
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                  11

              MR. EVANS: I haven’t – I’m two, three, four counties away from my

       parents, man. I can’t contact them. Nobody gives a shit. I am here and I

       need some fucking help

              THE COURT: Mr. Evans –

              MR. EVANS: You are sitting here trying to shit on me.

              THE COURT: Mr. Evans, stop.

              MR. EVANS: Fuck you right now.

              THE COURT: Mr. Evans, stop. I’m going to hold you –

              MR. EVANS: Fuck you.

       {¶28} Tr. 8.

       {¶29} The trial court at this point held Appellant in direct contempt of court.

Discussion about Appellant’s participation at trial continued:

              THE COURT: Well, Mr. Evans, the court has asked you, are you

       going to participate today or not?

              MR. EVANS: No.

       {¶30} Tr. 9.

       {¶31} Appellant continued to maintain he needed another attorney, and the trial

court was forcing him to proceed with trial while unprepared. After continued discussion

wherein Appellant repeatedly interrupted the judge by stating, “Black lives matter,” the

trial judge returned to the question of whether Appellant would participate in trial:
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                  12

              THE COURT: Mr. Evans, I am going to ask you again, one more

       time, for your benefit, are you going to participate or are you not?

              MR. EVANS: I’m not prepared to go forward with this trial. I am

       asking for a continuance.

              THE COURT: All right. The court is going to inquire then, Mr. Evans,

       are you at this time wishing or desirous of watching the trial by video?

              MR. EVANS: I’m not going to watch the trial. I am not ready to go

       forward with the trial.

       {¶32} Tr. 15-16.

       {¶33} The trial proceeded in Appellant’s absence. Later the same day at the

conclusion of the presentation of the State’s case in chief, discussion ensued outside the

presence of the jury regarding how to handle Appellant’s desire to testify without a

allowing him to disrupt the proceedings. The trial court took sworn testimony from Officer

Charles Pennywhitt, who testified when he went to get Appellant for trial that morning,

Appellant initially refused to come, stating if he didn’t come, they couldn’t have a trial.

The officer testified he convinced Appellant to come and talk to the judge outside the

jury’s presence. After Appellant was removed from the courtroom, Appellant told Ofcr.

Pennywhitt, “[T]hey’re not having a trial. If he takes me back in there, I’m just going to

yell and scream and cuss everybody out, and basically you and his defense attorney, until

I get a mistrial.” Tr. 322. Appellant indicated unless he could get a deal of probation, he

was going to make the trial “impossible to get through.” Tr. 322. Upon advice from

counsel, Appellant chose not to testify the next day. Tr. 339.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                     13

       {¶34} While the trial court did not advise Appellant he could return if he could

conduct himself appropriately, we find the record demonstrates Appellant intended to

disrupt the proceedings in order to cause a mistrial, and also appeared to falsely believe

they could not conduct the trial if he refused to participate. Further, pursuant to Crim. R.

43(B), Appellant did not have an absolute right to watch the proceedings by video, and

had affirmatively indicated to the trial court he did not wish to watch the trial by video. We

find the trial court did not err in excluding Appellant from the courtroom based on his

disruptive behavior and his repeated refusal to participate. The trial court was not required

to inform him he could return to the courtroom if he conducted himself properly, and it is

apparent from the record Appellant was intent on stopping the trial, whether by his

deliberate absence or his disruptive behavior.

       {¶35} The third assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 IV.

       {¶36} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

overruling his Crim. R. 29 motion to dismiss the charge of possession of Clonazepam

because the State failed to provide sufficient evidence by way of scientific testing

demonstrating the tablets found in Appellant’s possession were in fact Clonazepam.

       {¶37} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492,

paragraph two of the syllabus (1991).
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                       14

       {¶38} In Count 3, Appellant was charged with possession of drugs in violation of

R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(2)(a), which provides:

              (A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled

           substance or a controlled substance analog.

              (C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one of the

           following:

              (2) If the drug involved in the violation is a compound, mixture,

       preparation, or substance included in schedule III, IV, or V, whoever violates

       division (A) of this section is guilty of possession of drugs. The penalty for

       the offense shall be determined as follows:

              (a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(2)(b), (c), or (d) of

       this section, possession of drugs is a misdemeanor of the first degree or, if

       the offender previously has been convicted of a drug abuse offense, a

       felony of the fifth degree.

       {¶39} Anthony Tambasco, an employee with the Mansfield Police Department

Crime Lab, was found without objection to be an expert by the trial court in this case. Tr.

303. Regarding his identification of the drug Clonazepam, he testified he did not test the

drugs, but rather looked up the tablets in a reference book and confirmed the color,

scores, and markings were all in place to positively identify the pills as Clonazepam. He

testified this is standard practice within the field. He testified they had started to encounter

counterfeit Alprazolam tablets in the field, and so he now could not take for granted that
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                 15

particular drug was not fake and had to test Alprazolam rather than identifying it by the

markings. Because of this, he “got really curious” about Clonazepam a while ago, and

had conducted testing on some tablets to determine if they were counterfeit, but he

discovered no indication in the industry of an issue with counterfeit Clonazepam. Until he

sees a fake tablet come through the lab, he continues to identify Clonazepam using the

reference book, as the lab does for most pharmaceutical drugs not known to be actively

counterfeited. Tr. 310-11.

      {¶40} The Ohio Supreme Court has held scientific analysis is not required for the

identification of a controlled substance, and a drug may be identified by circumstantial

evidence. State v. McKee, 91 Ohio St.3d 292, 294, 744 N.E.2d 737, 739 (2001), citing

State v. Maupin, 42 Ohio St.2d 473, 479, 330 N.E.2d 708 (1975). Therefore, testimony

identifying a prescription drug by its distinct markings is sufficient, without chemical

testing, to prove the identity of the drug as a controlled substance. See., e.g., State v.

Bailey, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22773, 2006-Ohio-2042, ¶ 11; State v. Vaughn, 2nd Dist.

Clark No. 2018-CA-31, 2019-Ohio-1026, 133 N.E.3d 997, ¶ 30; State v. Volpe, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 06AP-1153, 2008-Ohio-1678, ¶ 36.
Richland County, Case No. 2022 CA 0034                                                     16

       {¶41} Based on the case law from the Ohio Supreme Court holding scientific

analysis is not required, we find the testimony of the expert witness in this case identifying

the tablets found in Appellant’s possession to be a controlled substance known as

Clonazepam to be sufficient evidence Appellant was in possession of drugs in violation

of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(2)(a). The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶42} The judgment of the Richland County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Wise, John, J. concur