Court Opinion

ID: 9384666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:07:30.124587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.375767
License: Public Domain

J-S22017-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    SHALINE A. WEBB                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                :
                v.                              :
                                                :
                                                :
    SEAN SHORTER                                :
                                                :
                       Appellant                :   No. 2515 EDA 2021

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 9, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Domestic Relations
                            at No(s): 2111V7030

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                               FILED APRIL 4, 2023

        Sean Shorter (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the November 9 2021,

final order granting the petition for protection from abuse (PFA)1 filed by his

former paramour, Shaline A. Webb (Appellee), for a period of three years.2

As will be discussed below, Appellant and Appellee were involved in short-

term intimate relationship, which produced a child, G.W. Based on the record,

it appears that Appellee was still married at the time of the liaison, and she

returned to her husband after breaking up with Appellant.3          Nevertheless,

Appellant and Appellee were still in communication with each other because

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1   23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122.

2   Appellee did not file a responsive brief.

3   See N.T., 11/9/21, at 35.
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of their custody arrangement regarding G.W.       On appeal, Appellant raises

issues concerning: (1) the court erred by denying his constitutional right to

confront and cross-examine Appellee; (2) the court erred by denying his

request to admit certain evidence; (3) the court erred by allowing Appellee to

testify as to several statements her husband made to her; and (4) the court

erred by not finding that some of Appellee’s testimony was barred by the

statute of limitations. For the reasons below, we affirm.

      On November 2, 2021, Appellee filed a PFA petition against Appellant,

requesting   that he   be   prohibited   from abusing,      harassing,   stalking,

threatening, and contacting her, and be excluded from her home. After an

ex-parte hearing that same day, the Honorable Ida Chen issued a full

temporary order of protection against Appellant. The order also directed that

Appellant be prohibited from possessing weapons.

      The matter than proceeded to a hearing on November 9, 2021, before

the Honorable Viktoria Kristiansson. Both parties were present and testified.

The trial court summarized their testimony as follows:

      Appellee and Appellant were in an intimate relationship from
      August 2018 to approximately January 2019 and share a child,
      G.W., who was two years old as of the November 9[, 2021, PFA]
      hearing.

             Appellee testified that on October 30, 2021, she and her
      husband, Steven Webb, drove to Appellant’s home to drop off
      G.W. for a custody exchange. During this exchange in Appellant’s
      driveway, the child became upset. Appellee testified that “[G.W.]
      was screaming. She was terrified. She doesn’t really have an
      established relationship with [Appellant]. He has not been present
      in her life and she was extremely fearful.” Appellant testified G.W.

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     stopped crying and agreed to go with him when he reminded her
     of their time in the park during their previous visit. Appellant took
     G.W. out of the car and placed her on the ground to obtain her
     belongings from the car. Appellee testified she then picked up the
     child and returned her to the car because Appellant “would not
     calm down” and “he was screaming and it was making [G.W.]
     scream and cry even worse.” Appellant stated that G.W. had
     calmed down before he removed her from the car and did not
     begin crying again until the Appellee picked her up. Appellee and
     her husband suggested that everyone go to the park together.
     Appellant insisted he have his custody time alone because he
     wanted to explain to the child that he was her father. Appellee
     testified that her husband was “trying to explain to [Appellant]
     why [G.W.] was upset and try to come to some peaceful
     agreement.”

           Appellant went in and out of his house a few times and “on
     the second or third time he walked towards [Appellee’s] husband,
     slapped his hands down and said what the F are you talking
     about.” Appellant told Appellee that if she and her husband left
     with the child, he would call the police. Appellee put the child in
     the car, and when she and her husband got into the vehicle to
     leave, Appellant punched, but did not break, the rear passenger
     window where the child was sitting. Appellant screamed, “what is
     your address” and “I want your address.” Appellee testified that
     they left Appellant’s home and pulled into a police station nearby
     “to check the glass to make sure that it wasn’t broken.” Appellee
     stated she “was terrified because if he had shattered that glass[,
     and that the] glass could have went into the side of [G.W.’s] face
     [and] into her eyes.”

            The following day on October 31, 2021, Appellant went to
     Appellee’s home with the Upper Moreland Township police to
     execute a custody exchange on a day that Appellee testified was
     not agreed to. Appellee told police that they would not be doing
     the custody exchange and that she was filing for a PFA against
     Appellant. Appellee told the officer to “ask [Appellant] to not come
     back to our residence.” After speaking with the officer, Appellee
     left her residence, and Appellant requested and received a police
     report number from the officer on the scene. Appellee testified,
     “I don’t want him to have my address and I don’t want him to be
     able to have access to come to my address because that’s not
     where we agreed to do any custody drop offs and he should not
     be coming to my address. I feel very uncomfortable with him

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     doing so.” Appellant testified he knew of the general apartment
     building where Appellee lived because in April 2021, he drove her
     home from the hospital when she asked him to do so.

           Appellee also testified about two events that occurred prior
     to October 2021. First, when she was [six] months pregnant,
     Appellant threatened to throw her out of a moving vehicle when
     she told him he was driving too fast. Appellee said she “didn’t say
     anything else” because she “was fearful that he could do that and
     I didn’t want to be in harms way.” Appellant testified “that
     incident simply didn’t happen.” Second, Appellee testified that in
     January 2019, Appellant “shoved” her, threw keys at her, “said F-
     U,” and “slammed [the] door as he was leaving.”

            When asked by the court why she needed an order, Appellee
     testified that “based on his previous behavior towards me and
     what happened [on October 30th], I don’t feel safe being around
     [Appellant] or him having access to being around me.”
     Additionally, Appellee expressed concern because she believed
     Appellant was licensed to carry weapons and “I don’t feel confident
     that [Appellant] is stable emotionally or otherwise to not have an
     order in place for my safety. I just don’t.”

Trial Ct. Op., 2/3/22, at 3-5 (record citations omitted & some paragraph

breaks added). “Appellant [also] entered additional evidence into the record,

including test messages, call logs, and medical records.” Id. at 1.

     After considering both sides, the trial court found Appellant had violated

the PFA Act. See Order, 11/9/21; see also Trial Ct. Op. at 1. The court

further determined:

     Appellee was entitled to continued protection for a three-year
     period. The final did not grant Appellee the full protection she
     requested, but granted [her] three years of limited protection,
     stating that Appellant shall not abuse, harass, stalk, threaten, or
     attempt or threaten to use physical force against Appellee.
     Appellant was permitted to communicate with Appellee, and he
     was not excluded from Appellee’s home.           The order . . .
     prohibit[ed] Appellant from possessing weapons.

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Id. at 1-2.

      Appellant filed the present appeal on December 7, 2021, and attached

what the trial court described as “a convoluted two-page discussion of

complaints about the November 9[, 2021,] ruling.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Because

it “was unable to deduce Appellant’s actual complained of errors[,]” the court

directed to him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement no later than

January 6, 2022.    Id.   On December 28, 2021, the trial court received

Appellant’s response, dated December 24th.      “Appellant sent his response

directly to the undersigned judge but did not file the same [Rule] 1925(b)

statement with the Philadelphia Clerk of Courts.” Id.

      On January 11, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause why

Appellant had not responded to the trial court’s December 16th order. See

Order, 1/11/22. The order directed Appellant to show cause within ten days

as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for waiver of all issues. See

id., citing Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); J.P. v. S.P., 991 A.2d 904 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Appellant filed a response on January 18, 2022. On January 21, 2022, this

Court discharged the rule to show cause, indicating that the trial court’s Rule

1925(b) order did not clearly direct where Appellant was to send his concise

statement, which was in contravention of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See Order, 1/21/22; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(ii)-(iii) (the

judge may enter an order directing the appellant to file of record in the trial

court and serve on the judge a concise statement of the errors complained of

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on appeal). Before we may address the merits of Appellant’s appeal, we must

determine whether Appellant has waived his claims for failing to properly file

a concise statement.

      When ordered to do so by the trial court, an appellant must file a timely

Rule 1925(b) statement to preserve issues for appellate review. See Greater

Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). It is well-settled that any issues not raised in a

timely Rule 1925(b) statement are waived on appeal. See Commonwealth

v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

Moreover, “[i]n determining whether an appellant has waived his issues on

appeal based on non-compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, it is the trial court’s

order that triggers an appellant’s obligation . . . therefore, we look first to the

language of that order.”     Rahn v. CONRAIL, 254 A.3d 738, 745-46 (Pa.

Super. 2021) (citations omitted).      Accordingly, when the court’s order “is

inconsistent with the requirements of Rule 1925(b)(3)(iii), . . . the waiver

provisions of subsection (b)(4)(vii) do not apply.”         Id. at 746 (citation

omitted). Here, because the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order was not explicitly

clear where Appellant was to send his concise statement, we decline to find

waiver. Accordingly, we continue with this appeal.

      Appellant raises the following issues in his pro se brief:

      [1.] Did the trial court error in law, by allowing testimonial
      evidence on the court[’]s record that was outside the statute of
      limitations?

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      [2.] Did the trial court error in law, by not allowing the submission
      of evidence to the court’s record, and stating it was [h]earsay?

      [3.] Did the trial court error in law and its discretion when allowing
      testimony (with weight), by [A]ppellee about the accusations of
      abuse on October 30, 2021, that did not meet the PFA rules or
      statute[?]

      [4.] Did the trial court error in law and in its discretion, when
      ending the hearing abruptly while [A]ppellant was recross
      examining [A]ppellee, on a just given testimony (by [A]ppellee)?
      When plead by [A]ppellant why, the trial court gave the response
      “It’s just not relevant”; then refusing to allow the cross
      examination, and ending the trial.

      [5.] Did the trial court error in law or in its discretion, when
      showing an overall manifest abuse of discretion, by its actions
      during the hearing?

Appellant’s Brief at 13 (some emphasis & spacing omitted; grammatical errors

in original).

      We review PFA orders pursuant to the following standard of review: “In

the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions for an

error of law or abuse of discretion.” C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272, 1276

(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      Preliminary, we note “[a]lthough this Court is willing to liberally construe

materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit

upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself

in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of

expertise and legal training will be his undoing.”      Norman for Estate of

Shearlds v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., 208 A.3d 1115, 1118-19 (Pa. Super.

                                      -7-
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2019) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 223 A.3d 668 (Pa. 2020), cert.

denied, 141 S. Ct. 301 (U.S. 2020).

        In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court initially determined that the

issues “[a]s written in” Appellant’s pro se concise statement “[were]

underdeveloped and ambiguous[;]” thereby, failing to conform to the

requirements of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. Trial Ct. Op.

at 2.     The court opined Appellant’s claims “should be waived.”             Id.

Nevertheless, in “an abundance of caution,” the court addressed three issues

it “surmised Appellant attempted to raise” in his concise statement.4 Id. at

2-3.

        We note a Rule 1925(b) concise statement must be detailed enough for

the trial court to identify and address the issues the appellant wishes to

advance on appeal. Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super.

2006). Rule 1925 provides that a concise statement “shall concisely identify

each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify

the issue to be raised for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii).5 “Issues not

included in the [s]tatement and/or not raised in accordance with the

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). It

____________________________________________

4 The trial court identified issues concerning the sufficiency and admissibility
of evidence, and the court’s purported denial of his “rights” when it stopped
his cross-examination of Appellee. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5.

5 We refer to Rule 1925’s language that was applicable at the time of this
proceeding. Rule 1925 was later amended, effective April 1, 2022.

                                           -8-
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is well-settled that “[w]hen a court has to guess what issues an appellant is

appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review. A [c]oncise [s]tatement

which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is

the functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all.” In the Interest

A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 350 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

      Indeed, a review of Appellant’s “concise” statement reveals that it is

three pages in length, fails to present any legal issues cogently, and is

scattershot. See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement, 12/28/21, at

1-3 (unpaginated). For example, Appellant states the following: “MY FIRST

COMPLAINT IS; the verdict ruled by the [trial] court, being that there was no

evidence brought forth from the plaintiff.” Id. at 1. In that same “complaint,”

Appellant alluded to assertions that the charges at issue fell outside the statute

of limitations and the court demonstrated “a biased view towards” him. Id.

      Appellant’s second “complaint” is “the [trial] court’s decision not to

accept two pieces of evidence from the defense[.]” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

Concise Statement at 1 (unpaginated).        The first is a copy of the current

custody agreement, which he alleges would show that he has a right to be at

Appellee’s residence. Id. Appellant appears to contend the court erroneously

determined the agreement “was already implied” with “no other explanation[

] given[,]” and therefore, the court’s decision is “vague” and “leaves open

interpretation to what the court’s meaning is.” Id. at 1-2. The second piece

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of evidence is the “Domestic Standby Police Report,” which he states the court

denied based on hearsay reasons, but he “feels in this case when trying to

establish credibility between [Appellee and Appellant], the exception to the

“‘[h]earsay’ law could have been used.” Id. at 2. Appellant then refers to the

“present sense impression” exception6 to the hearsay rule, which he states:

        This rule needs an independent corroborating piece of evidence to
        state that the recorder of the evidence was there. This could have
        been the already given testimony from [Appellee and Appellant]
        who both had stated the [o]fficers [were] present[ ]. The defense
        feels that once again this was a vague reason for the “[h]earsay”
        rule which has many layers and exceptions to this rule. This could
        have been a chance to establish credibility once again by exposing
        the contradiction given by [Appellee]’s testimony.

Id. at 2.

        Appellant’s third “complaint” is the following:

        The most [egregious] complaint made in this appeal. This is
        because [Appellant]’s rights were taken away during the hearing
        with no explanation given but [p]ertinence. This did not explain
        the interruption by the court during cross examination
        questioning, or giving the order that [Appellee] not answer any
        more questions from the defense, and when pressed by the
        defense it was stated by the court, [“]Your questioning is not
        [p]ertinent.”

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement at 2 (unpaginated). Appellant

also alleges the court’s ruling was “unjust[,] and not supported by any

evidence at all. The only evidence offered throughout the proceedings was by

the defense.” Id. at 3.

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6   See Pa.R.E. 803(1).

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      We agree with the trial court’s determination that in his court-ordered

concise statement, Appellant’s allegations are vague, and consequently, he

fails to “concisely identify each error that [he] intends to assert with sufficient

detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge.”                Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(ii). Accordingly, we find Appellant waived all his issues on appeal.

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); see also Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778

A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Super. 2001) (finding waiver where concise statement was

too vague to allow trial court to determine specifics of appellate claim).

      Furthermore, even if Appellant’s claims were not waived for the above-

mentioned reasons, we note with disapproval that his brief is deficient as it

does not comply with several Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Specifically, it fails to include a statement of jurisdiction, a statement of the

scope and standard of review, and a summary of the arguments.                 See

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1), (3), (6). Moreover, the argument section of his brief is

not “divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued[,]” and

contains longwinded, repetitive, and occasionally incoherent arguments in

support of his challenges. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). “[I]t is an appellant’s duty

to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for appellate review.”

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007).                    We

reiterate that appellate courts “will not become the counsel for an appellant,”

and develop arguments for a pro se party. Commonwealth v. Gould, 912

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A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006). As such, we also would conclude that the

deficiencies in Appellant’s argument encumbers meaningful appellate review.

      In any event, even if we were to reach the merits of Appellant’s claims,

we would conclude they warrant no relief, and adopt the February 3, 2022,

opinion of the trial court as our own. See Trial Ct. Op. at 8-19.

      For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s November 9,

2021, final PFA order.    We further direct that a copy of the trial court’s

February 3, 2022, Rule 1925(a) opinion be attached to any future filings in

this case.

      Order affirmed.

      Judge Sullivan joins the memorandum.

      Judge Bowes concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

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