Court Opinion

ID: 9635089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:35:59.628741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:17.781119
License: Public Domain

MARY K. HOFF, Judge.
Glen E. McGowan (Defendant) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury verdict convicting him of tampering with a motor vehicle, first degree, in violation of Section 569.080 RSMO 2000.1 The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of ten years’ imprisonment.
The record, as pertinent to the points on appeal, reveals the following. On March 20, 2003, at approximately 6:20 a.m., an individual going by the name, of Charles Brown2 (Brown) stole a red and white 1992 Chevrolet S10 truck (Chevy truck) belonging to Ocbai Tekla by breaking the steering column and bypassing the ignition.
On March 22, Brown used the stolen Chevy truck to pick up his girlfriend, Sharon Malone (Malone), and Barbara Bost (Bost). Brown, Malone, and Bost drove around for a few hours doing drugs and then proceeded to Defendant’s house around 8:00 a.m. After sleeping at Defendant’s residence, Brown, Malone, and Bost did more drugs. Defendant, Brown, Malone, and Bost then decided to drive the Chevy truck to Columbia, Missouri, to party. Defendant and Bost sat in the back of the Chevy truck, and Brown and Malone sat in the front. After the four individuals ate at White Castle, Brown, Malone, and Bost bought more drugs, and the three of them used the drugs during the trip to Columbia.
En route to Columbia, the four individuals stopped in Wentzville. Brown got into a black Ford F150 truck (Ford truck) that was parked at a lumber yard, and Malone joined him. Defendant and Bost then moved to the front seat of the Chevy truck, and Bost drove. Bost started nodding off so she asked Defendant to drive. Bost pulled over, and Defendant started driving the Chevy truck. Bost “figured” the Chevy truck was stolen because Brown always had different trucks.
Trooper Mark Broniec (Broniec) received a dispatch regarding a stolen black Ford truck. The dispatch provided Bro-niec with the Ford truck’s license plate number. Broniec proceeded to a crossover on Interstate 70 (interstate) just east of the Warrenton exit and parked there to watch for the Ford truck. Shortly thereafter, the Ford truck passed Broniec’s parked car. Broniec followed the Ford truck, activated his lights, and attempted to stop the Ford truck. The Ford truck exited the interstate, abruptly stopped approximately one-third of the way up the exit ramp, and Brown exited the vehicle. Broniec stopped his vehicle behind the Ford truck, got out of his vehicle, drew his pistol, and pointed .it at Brown and Malone. Brown ran across the median to the westbound lane of the interstate. Malone headed in the opposite direction for the service road. Broniec arrested Malone but lost sight of Brown.
Nicole Barnes (Barnes) was traveling oh the interstate on March 22. She exited at Truxton and observed a patrol car stopping behind a dark truck. As she watched, Broniec exited his vehicle and drew his gun. Barnes saw the driver and the passenger of the dark truck exit the truck. The driver and passenger began *609running in opposite directions. When Barnes realized Broniec was chasing the passenger, Barnes opened her door, stood on her car, and watched the driver run to the interstate where he proceeded to jump into the bed of a small red and white truck sitting on the left shoulder under the overpass. The truck then drove away.
After Broniec arrested the passenger, Barnes told him what she had observed. Broniec called in a description of the red and white truck to his headquarters and told the dispatcher that the truck was driving westbound on ‘ the interstate. When Broniec searched the Ford truck, he seized substances later identified as marijuana and cocaine.
Trooper Maddox (Maddox) parked at a cross-over point on the interstate to watch for the red and white Chevy truck. When Maddox spotted a vehicle fitting the truck’s description, he pulled out behind it and activated his fights. The Chevy truck exited at a ramp, and Maddox followed. The truck came to a complete stop at the top of the exit ramp. Maddox stepped out of his vehicle with his shotgun and directed Defendant, who was driving the truck, to turn off the Chevy truck’s engine and to throw the keys outside the truck. When Defendant did not immediately 'comply, Maddox repeated his order. Defendant opened the truck’s door and yelled that there were no keys. Bost and Brown were in the truck with Defendant.
Maddox subsequently learned the Chevy truck had been reported as stolen. Maddox, with the assistance of other law enforcement officers, arrested Defendant, Bost, and Brown. The officers searched the Chevy truck and recovered items that appeared to be contraband. Among these items were substances later identified as codeine and cocaine. While searching the Chevy truck, Maddox noticed the steering column of the truck had been broken so the mechanism could be manipulated to bypass the ignition. When one of the other officers asked Defendant where he was going, Defendant told him that he had just met Bost and that he and the others were going to Columbia for a party. Defendant indicated to the officer that Brown had provided him with the Chevy truck. Brown subsequently showed Maddox how to start and stop the Chevy truck using a screw driver.
The State charged Defendant with two counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of tampering in the first degree. Bost testified at Defendant’s trial. During Bost’s testimony, the State elicited from her that she had pleaded guilty to all of the crimes for which Defendant was being tried.
Malone also testified at Defendant’s trial. During her testimony, the State elicited that Malone had pleaded guilty to tampering in connection with the Ford truck and to possession of heroin and cocaine. Malone knew the Chevy truck was stolen but had not told Defendant that it was.
During Maddox’s testimony before the jury, Defendant interjected, “He’s lying.” At that point the State addressed Defendant and asked, “[Defendant], did you want to take the stand?” Defense counsel asked to approach the bench and requested a mistrial based on the State’s reference to Defendant’s election not to testify. The court denied the request and indicated that it would rather not highlight the remark to the jury by referring to it again. Defense counsel stated, “I’d rather it not be highlighted to the jury.” The court warned the State regarding its behavior, and the State replied, “... This is the second time today [Defendant] has spoken up in the middle of the trial. If he needs to speak in this trial then he needs to take the stand. It’s not appropriate for him to make comments, questions, answers or *610anything else from the seat over here.... ” The court agreed and told defense counsel to speak to Defendant about making comments. Defendant did not testify.
At the close of evidence, Defendant proffered a verdict director for tampering in the first degree, which included a elaim-of-right defense. The trial court refused the instruction. The jury acquitted Defendant of both drug charges but returned a guilty verdict on the tampering charge. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of ten years’ imprisonment. This appeal follows.
Defendant raises three points on appeal. In his first point, Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his motion for a mistrial after the State asked Defendant in front of the jury, “[Defendant], did you want to take the stand?” because this question improperly commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right not to testify. We find this dis-positive point requires reversal. Defendant’s second and third points relate to the trial court’s refusal to give Defendant’s proffered instruction regarding the offense of tampering in the first degree, which included Defendant’s elaim-of-right defense, and the trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial or to instruct the jury sua sponte to disregard the State’s elicitation from Defendant’s codefendants evidence of their plea dispositions and its later reminder to the jury of these pleas during closing argument. As these issues may not arise on retrial, we decline to address them.
Turning to Defendant’s disposi-tive claim of error, our standard of review for a trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial is abuse of discretion. State v. Clark, 112 S.W.3d 95, 100 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). This is because the trial court has observed the complained of incident and is in a better position than an appellate court to determine what prejudicial effect, if any, the alleged error had on the jury. Id. We will find that a trial court abused its discretion when its ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances before it and when the ruling is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock our sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration. Id.
Defendant argues that the State’s question improperly commented on Defendant’s exercise of his right not to testify. In order to keep from the jury any reference to a defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination, Section 546.270 provides that:
If the accused shall not avail himself ... of his ... right to testify ... it shall not be construed to affect the innocence or guilt of the accused, nor shall the same raise any presumption of guilt, nor be referred to by any attorney in the case, nor be considered by the court or jury before whom the trial takes place.
When considering a defendant’s claim of an improper comment on his right against self-incrimination, we must consider the comment in the context in which it appears. State v. Neff, 978 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Mo. banc 1998).
Here, when Defendant blurted, “He’s lying,” while Maddox was testifying, the State asked Defendant, “[Defendant], did you want to take the stand?” Defendant asked to approach the bench, where he promptly requested a mistrial. The trial court denied the request and indicated that it would not tell the jury to disregard the State’s remark. Where an objection is made and overruled, a direct reference to a defendant’s failure to testify will almost invariably require reversal. Id. at 344; State v. Jackson, 792 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo.App. E.D.1990) (State’s objection, “They’re his shoes. If he wants to testify concerning the size of his shoes, he *611can,” found to be a direct infringement upon the defendant’s right against self-incrimination that mandated a new trial). A prosecutor’s use of words such as “defendant,” “accused,” “testify,” or equivalent words constitutes a direct reference to a defendant’s failure to testify. Neff, 978 S.W.2d at 344. We find the State’s question to Defendant was a direct reference to Defendant’s failure to testify.
We recognize that the accused may waive his statutory right to no reference to his failure to testify. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7, 18 (Mo.1957). However, such a waiver usually occurs when a defendant voluntarily elects to testify under oath or when a defendant testifies though not under oath. State v. Clark, 759 S.W.2d 372, 373-74 (Mo.App. E.D.1988) (defendant stated in presence of the jury that he was in police custody on an unrelated matter when the crime for which he was being tried was committed; defendant’s statement constituted a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and any comment as to defendant’s failure to testify in support of this statement was permissible); Stidham, 305 S.W.2d at 18 (defendant took stand in his defense; thus, his failure to deny incriminating facts was legitimate subject for state’s comment in closing argument); State v. Brannson, 679 S.W.2d 246 (Mo. banc 1984) (defendant undertook own defense and effectively injected himself into the mainstream of the evidence; court did not reach question whether such conduct waived privilege because prosecutor’s objections did not constitute direct reference). Although the State claims the Defendant’s outburst was an attempt to discredit Maddox’s testimony without Defendant taking the stand and argues Defendant thus waived his right to be free from the State’s commenting on this failure to testify, we find that Defendant’s two-word statement did not open the door to the State’s direct reference.
Furthermore, considering the context of the State’s question, we conclude it was improper. Although the State’s comment purported to respond to Defendant’s allegation of false testimony by a State witness, the State had other means available to it to curtail further unsworn comments by Defendant, including the State saying something out of the presence of the jury and requesting the court to admonish and to warn Defendant against future outbursts.
Additionally, we find the State’s question here was not a fair response. “Where ... the [State’s] reference to the defendant’s opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made by defendant ..., there is no violation of the privilege [against compulsory self-incrimination].” United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988). We note many cases conclude that a reference by the State to a defendant’s failure to testify was a fair response invited by the defendant’s comment or argument because the reference was found to be indirect, see e.g., State v. Elam, 89 S.W.3d 517, 525 (Mo.App. W.D.2002) (finding no intent to magnify defendant’s failure to testify in single, ambiguous comment, which responded to defendant’s allegation of inconsistent testimony); or to be not addressing the defendant’s silence, see United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir.2003) (prosecutor’s comments, considered in context, were not referencing defendant’s silence and were merely in response to defendant’s argument that the government failed to turn over intercepted conversations); United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1565, 1567 (11th Cir.1991) (examined in the context in which it was made, prosecutor’s statement that defendant did not “have the guts to tell it about the Colombi*612ans and get on that stand” was not manifestly intended to be a comment on defendant’s failure to testify but rather intended to rebut defendant’s accusation that government witnesses were liars); People v. Kevorkian, 248 Mich.App. 373, 639 N.W.2d 291, 329 (2002) (prosecutor’s objections and comments did not constitute direct and unequivocal references to defendant’s failure to testify but merely amounted to objections to defendant’s repeated and improper attempts to inject facts not in evidence in to his closing statement). In contrast, we find the State’s question, considered in the context in which it was made here, constituted a direct and unequivocal reference made to the jury intending to draw attention to Defendant’s failure to testify. Cf. Brannson, 679 S.W.2d at 250.
Given Defendant’s objection and the trial court’s failure to take any remedial action to cure any harm the State’s remark may have inflicted upon Defendant, we conclude the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. See Neff, 978 S.W.2d at 345, 347.
In light of our holding, we decline to address the remaining points raised by Defendant on direct appeal. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, P.J., concurs.
KENNETH M. ROMINES, J., dissents in separate opinion.

. All subsequent statutory citations are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated.

. Brown uses several aliases, including "Red,” "Charlie Brown,” “James Gillespie,” and "Moody.” He will be referred to in this opinion as "Brown.”