Court Opinion

ID: 9779812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:48:01.157342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:41.651196
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: Illinois first adopted the UCC in 1961. 1961 Ill. Laws 2101. In 1991, the legislature adopted the 1990 amendments to article 4, including the statute of limitations at issue in this case. Pub. Act 87 — 582 (eff. Jan. 1, 1992) (adding 810 ILCS 5/4 — 111); 810 ILCS 5/4 — 111 (West 2006). The 1990 amendments to article 4 of the UCC have been adopted by every state except New York and South Carolina (I spared you a string cite to the 48 state codes; they can be found at the following: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a4 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011)). The majority acknowledges that the relevant statute of limitations is section 4 — 111 of the UCC. 406 Ill. App. 3d at 1050. There is no question that section 4 — 111, on its face, does not envision a discovery rule. Neither our legislature nor the drafters of the UCC were unfamiliar with the discovery rule. For example, article 4 of the UCC provides that a cause of action for breach of a transfer warranty “accrues when the claimant has reason to know of the breach.” 810 ILCS 5/4 — 207(e) (West 2006). Likewise, a cause of action for breach of a presentment warranty “accrues when the claimant has reason to know the breach.” 810 ILCS 5/4 — 208(f) (West 2006). Had the drafters intended the discovery rule to apply to all article 4 claims, they would have included this discovery rule language in section 4 — 111. If, as the majority suggests, the language is hidden there somewhere, then the language cited in sections 4 — 207(e) and 4 — 208(f) is superfluous. I believe that the more reasonable construction is that the drafters and the legislature intended the discovery rule to apply only to breach of transfer warranties and presentment warranties. Otherwise, the legislature would have incorporated the discovery rule in section 4 — 111, as it did in sections 4 — 207 and 4 — 208. Neither plaintiff nor the majority cites to a single decision applying the discovery rule to section 4 — 111 absent allegations of fraudulent concealment. My research has disclosed none. As far as I can tell, this court is the first in the nation to judicially modify section 4 — 111 with a discovery rule. Rather than rewrite the UCC, I would exercise some judicial restraint. It seems clear that the majority is troubled by the effect enforcement of the statute has on what might be a valid claim. However, the enforcement of a statute of limitations, by its very nature, always has harsh consequences: it terminates the prosecution of a claim regardless of the underlying merits. There are reasons for statutes of limitations. The legislature adopted this statute of limitations. The job of this court, absent unconstitutionality, is to enforce the Code as written. I would affirm the trial court. I therefore dissent.