Court Opinion

ID: 9667658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:51:38.685539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:39.573149
License: Public Domain

Spencer, J.,
dissenting.
I am unable to see how we can distinguish this case from State v. Brewer, 190 Neb. 667, 212 N. W. 2d 90.
The bill of exceptions and the journal entry do not reflect the same facts. The bill of exceptions reflects that on Monday, November 13, 1972, after visiting with the defendant, the court said: “No, the Court doesn’t see anything either in your record or your background, or in your attitude, that would justify anything else other than what the Court intends to sentence you.
“So it will be the judgment of the Court that for the crime of forgery you be sentenced in the Nebraska Penal Complex, in accordance with law, for a period of one to two years, and to pay a dollar finé.
“On the conviction for being an habitual criminal it is the judgment of the Court that you be sentenced in the Nebraska Penal Complex, pursuant to law, for a period of twenty to thirty years, and to pay the costs of this action.”
The journal entry appearing in the transcript, so far as material herein, is as follows: “IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Court, that the defendant Larry J. Gaston be taken hence to the Douglas County Jail and that thence within thirty (30) days and as early as practicable, he be delivered by the Sheriff of Douglas County to the NE*125BRÁSKA PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX, in Lancaster County, Nebraska, for imprisonment at hard labor, for an indeterminate period of not less than Twenty (20) years nor more than Thirty (30) years, from and after this 13th day of November A. D. 1972, on the charge of Forgery and being an habitual criminal, * *
We have therefore a journal entry filed after sentence" was pronounced, which does not reflect the sentencing proceedings. Neither do they reflect in any way that defendant was present or was advised that the court had changed its mind and was now imposing only one’ sentence. We therefore are not dealing with nn erroneous sentence. On this record the sentence as an habitual criminal was void.
In Gamron v. Jones (1947), 148 Neb. 645, 28 N. W. 2d 403, we said: “We see no reasonable basis for construing the judgment of the court to be other than one imposing two sentences — one for chicken stealing, and-one as an habitual criminal. * * * The district court, for Washington County was without authority to render a distinct separate judgment and sentence as was done for 10 years as an habitual criminal. That portion of the sentence is .void.”
In State v. Solano (1967), 181 Neb. 716, 150 N. W. 2d 585, this court stated: “In this case, the court found the defendant guilty of being an habitual criminal and separately sentenced him upon this count. This- was error. * * * the sentence in this case for being an habitual criminal is void, but the principal sentence upon the charge of breaking and entering is valid. * * * Consequently, we hold that the sentence of the court for 10 years upon the habitual criminal charge is void but that the sentence for a period of 5 years for burglary is a valid sentence and should be affirmed.”
In State v. Tyndall (1971), 187 Neb. 48, 187 N. W. 2d 298, we said: “Defendant’s third assignment of error *126must be sustained. The habitual criminal act, section 29-2221, R. S. Supp., 1969, does not create a new and separate offense for which a person may be separately sentenced * * *. We accordingly vacate the separate sentence in Count III, the habitual criminal charge.”
There can be no question that a separate sentence as an habitual criminal is void. Likewise, our rule has always been that a sentence imposed on the main offense, if within the statutory limits, is valid. In this case, the court imposed two sentences: One much too lenient on the main offense; and then a 20 to 30 year sentence as an habitual criminal. The first sentence is valid (section 28-601, R. S. Supp., 1972), and in my judgment the second one is void. While the defendant deserved a more severe sentence, we cannot correct that situation without ignoring past precedent. In any event, if we deal with the question of whether the first sentence for the main offense was invalid, we must remember that the defendant is not questioning that sentence. It is not involved in the appeal. Assume that it was valid, ór in the alternative, assume that its invalidity cannot be reached herein. How do we then handle the question of double jeopardy?
I am in total disagreement with the statement in the majority opinion that: “Our recent decision in State v. Brewer, 190 Neb. 667, 212 N. W. 2d 90, is not contrary to our present holding.” It is premised upon the fact that the sentence pronounced on the forgery conviction herein was not a valid sentence. This is erroneous.
The sentence pronounced, while minimal, was within the limits of the sentence provided for the offense, so this case is in no different posture than those heretofore cited in this dissent.