Court Opinion

ID: 9638275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:39:23.113726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:05.218392
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing'
Perhaps what we have said in the last paragraph of the opinion could he misconstrued. Of course, if there is any evidence of probative force or value raising the affirmative of a material issue in a trial, such evidence supports the submission of a special issue thereupon in the charge of the court, even though an answer in the affirmative made thereto by the jury would have to be set aside and a new trial granted because against the great weight and preponderance of the other evidence thereupon.
In other words, and as applied to the facts in this case — had the jury answered all or any of the issues of negligence and proximate cause against the defendant in the trial court — then the test would be applied to the evidence applicable to the issue or issues so answered and if such evidence and attending circumstances so strongly negated such affirmative findings as to lead to the conclusion that the jury was laboring under some misapprehension or improper motive or influence in arriving at its answers so made, then it would be the duty of a trial or appellate court to see that there was another trial. This would be the circumstance should there be some evidence of probative force raising the affirmative of the issue. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wilson, Tex.Civ.App.1900, 59 S.W. 589, 60 S.W. 438, error dismissed; King v. King, 1952, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660.
Not so in a case where there was no evidence raising the issue, or no evidence of probative force or value raising the issue. In such instances there would be “no evidence raising the issue” or “insufficient evidence to raise the issue”. In such an instance no issue should have been submitted by way of a special issue in the charge in the first instance. And .in a case where such a special issue was erroneously submitted to- the jury and answered erroneously, then the answer should be ignored. City of San Antonio v. Lane, 1869, 32 Tex. 405; 17 Tex.Jur., p. 925, sec. 417. Indeed it should, actually be ignored whether the answer made was- erroneous or not, because it is actually answered as a matter of law without any action by a jury. This is at least the case in a suit where the issue is truly one incumbent upon a plaintiff to raise by proof as to primary negligence of a defendant which was plead ,as a ground of recovery.
Re-examination of the appellee’s counterpoint reveals that his contention is that no issue was raised as to his primary negligence — inquired about in special issues relating to his speed and lookout. In other words, he contends that there was either no evidence whatever that he was driving at an excessive speed or was derelict in his duty to keep a proper lookout, or that there was no evidence of sufficient probative force or value to warrant the submission of the questions to the jury. If he is correct then he may still have won his case, but if not he will be exposed to the hazard of another trial.
Nowhere in the transcript is it made to appear that the appellee, as defendant in the trial court, ever moved for an instructed verdict on any ground. Neither was there any objection or exception taken by him to any issue submitted in the charge. T.R.C.P. 279 provides that a claim that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the submission of any issue may be made for the first time after verdict. This is what appellee does for the first time on his appeal. It was presented as a counterpoint in his orginal .brief. As we understand the law, a defendant who wins his case in the trial court, but whose victory would be taken away from him on appeal because of some error committed upon the trial — such as in the case of prejudicial ar*321gument — is nevertheless secured if he can demonstrate that the plaintiff never introduced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case. This is true even though he makes the assertion for the first time on appeal.
Since the collision occurred at a point where the lawful speed limit was 30 miles per hour, and there is evidence in the record .to. the effect that the appellee himself admitted to the investigating authorities immediately after the occurrence that he was driving about 35 miles per hour upon the occasion in question, we' believe there was evidence of probative force and value raising this question at least and the appellant made out a prima facie case for the jury.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.