Court Opinion

ID: 9778482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:07:49.98951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:10.072395
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which MEYERS, J., joined.
I respectfully dissent. Appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated, enhanced by two prior convictions for involuntary manslaughter. See Tex. Pen.Code §§ 49.04 & 49.09. The two manslaughter convictions arose from the same incident involving Gibson’s operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals held that it was not error for appellant’s DWI charge to be enhanced by his two previous alcohol-related convictions, even though those convictions arose from the same DWI incident. Gibson v. State, 972 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. granted). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review on the ground that “[t]he Court of Appeals erred in holding that Penal Code Section 49.09(b)[’s] requirement that a person having been previously convicted two times of an offense relating to a motor vehicle while intoxicated includes a person who has two previous convictions for involuntary manslaughter based on two deaths arising out of a single illegal act of driving while intoxicated.” Today the majority affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Both the majority and the Court of Appeals reject appellant’s contention by selectively contrasting § 49.09(b) with Tex. Pen.Code § 12.42(d), which provides for enhanced penalties for repeat felony offenders. Both conclude that because § 12.42(d) requires that one of the two prior convictions must have occurred after the other prior conviction became final and because § 49.09(b) has no such requirement,1 the latter does not prohibit enhancement by two prior DWI-related convictions, even when those convictions arise from the same incident. Ante, at 695-696; Gibson v. State, 972 S.W.2d at 149.
However, in focusing on this issue, both the majority and the Court of Appeals have ignored the very different terminology employed in the two statutes, terminology which supports appellant’s claim. Tex. Pen.Code § 12.42(d) provides:
If it is shown on the trial of a felony offense other than a state jail felony punishable under Section 12.35(a) that the defendant has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final, on conviction he shall be *698punished by imprisonment in the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years.
Emphases added.) The emphasis is on repeated behavior; two convictions from one event do not invoke the enhancement penalties.
Tex. Pen.Code § 49.09(b) provides:
If it is shown on the trial of an offense under Section 49.04, 49.05, or 49.06 that the person has previously been convicted two times of an offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, an offense of operating an aircraft while intoxicated, or an offense of operating a watercraft while intoxicated, the offense is a felony of the third degree.
(Emphasis added.) While the legislature specified the use of previous “felony convictions” in § 12.42(d), it used the very different phrase “convicted two times of an offense relating ...” in § 49.09(b). In ignoring this difference, the majority has not simply interpreted the plain language of § 49.09(b) as it claims to have done. Ante, at 696-97. Instead, it has rewritten that statute to read:
If it is shown on the trial of an offense under Section 49.04, 49.05, or 49.06 that the person has previously been convicted two times of an offense of two offenses relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, an offense of operating an aircraft while intoxicated, or an offense of operating a watercraft while intoxicated, the offense is a felony of the third degree.
This is contrary to our approach to statutory interpretation. When the legislature has used different terms in such a manner, we presume that it intended those terms to have distinct meanings. See Tigner v. State, 928 S.W.2d 540, 544-545 (Tex.Crim. App.1996). Thus, in using the phrase “convicted two times of an offense relating ...,” the legislature presumably meant something different from “two offenses.” Taken in its natural context, the use of the word “times” supports appellant’s contention that § 49.09(b)’s focus is on a defendant’s previous DWI incidents or transactions through which he was convicted. See, e.g., Webster’s II New College DictionaRY 1154 (1995) (defining “time” as, inter alia, “an occasion”).
Even assuming, arguendo, that § 49.09(b) is ambiguous on this matter,2 its legislative history supports appellant’s claim. Section 49.09 is the current (and modified) version of Tex.Rev.Civ. Stats. art. 6701i-l(e), which similarly provided for increased punishment based on the same language, that a defendant has “previously been convicted two or more times of [driving while intoxicated.]” See Act of June 16,1988, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 303, § 3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 1574, 1576 (subsequently repealed). Bill analyses by the House Study Group on May 17, 1983, and May 27, 1983, indicate that the focus of the amendments to art. 6701Z-1 (including (e)) was on repeat DWI offenders. A section-by-section analysis shows that the various provisions for increased punishments were for “1st DWI,” “2 nd DWI,” and “3rd and Subsequent DWI.” Finally, both competing House and Senate versions of the amendments lists the increased punishments for “1st DWI,” “2 nd DWI,” and “3 rd DWI.”
Both the plain language and the legislative history indicate that the focus of § 49.09(b) is not upon the number of previous convictions related to DWI incidents, but on the number of previous DWI incidents resulting in conviction. This same philosophy is reflected in § 12.42(d), which speaks in terms of previous convictions, but requires a sequence of events such that enhancement provisions are invoked *699only by repeated incidents of bad behavior. In the instant case, appellant had one prior DWI incident on which his two previous convictions were based. Therefore, § 49.09(b) does not apply. Appellant falls under § 49.09(a), which provides for enhancement based on a defendant having “previously been convicted one time of an offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.” Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent.

. I agree that Chapter 49 does not require sequential convictions, but a discussion of sequential convictions does not address the issue presented for review.

. Under our approach to statutory interpretation, we look to the literal text for the meaning of the statute, and we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The only exceptions to this rule are if application of the statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, or if the plain language is ambiguous. Id.