Court Opinion

ID: 9383367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 15:08:18.25762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.133430
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Sullivan, 2023-Ohio-1036.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                              Nos. 111621 and 111917
                 v.                                  :

DONALD SULLIVAN,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
                           AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 30, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                   Case Nos. CR-19-639981-A and CR-19-642705-A

                                               Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Eamonn McDermott, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Anna Markovich, for appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

                Appellant Donald Sullivan (“appellant”) appeals his conviction and

sentence from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that his plea

was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered because the trial court
failed to comply with Crim.R. 11 and that the trial court failed to provide all of the

required notifications under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) when he was sentenced. After a

thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm in part, reverse in part,

and remand this matter for further proceedings.

                      I. Factual and Procedural History

             This appeal arises from appellant’s convictions in two separate cases.

             In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-639981, appellant was indicted on two

counts of felonious assault with notice of prior conviction and repeat violent

offender specifications.   In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-642705, appellant was

indicted on one count of attempted murder and two counts of felonious assault,

along with notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender specifications.

             Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, appellant pled guilty in CR-

19-639981 to attempted felonious assault, a felony of the third degree, in violation

of R.C. 2923.012 and 2903.11(A)(1). The repeat violent offender and notice of prior

conviction specifications were nolled. In CR-19-642705, appellant pled guilty to

felonious assault, a felony of the second degree, with notice of prior conviction and

repeat violent offender specifications.

            During the plea hearing, the court informed appellant that following the

completion of his prison term, he would be subject to a mandatory term of

postrelease control and advised him as follows:

      THE COURT: While on post-release control, if you violate terms and
      conditions or fail to report to a parole officer, you could face additional
      sanctions. Those sanctions could include a prison term. You could be
      returned to prison for up to half of the original prison term or one year,
      whichever is greater.

      In addition to that if you are convicted of a new felony offense while
      on post-release control, that sanction for violating post-release control
      could be — it could be imposed consecutive to any sentence that you
      got on a new felony conviction.

      Do you understand that?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes.

              The court asked if counsel were satisfied that it had complied with

Crim.R. 11, and both counsel for the state and appellant’s trial counsel indicated that

they were.

              The court then stated that appellant understood the nature of the

charges and understood the terms of the plea agreement, his constitutional rights,

and the maximum penalties that could be imposed. The court therefore found that

“any pleas entered by [appellant] will be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently

done.”

              Appellant entered his plea to both cases, and the court proceeded

directly to sentencing. Appellant was sentenced to a prison term of five to seven and

one-half years under the Reagan Tokes Law for CR-19-642705. Appellant was

sentenced to 18 months in prison on CR-19-639981, to run concurrently with the

sentence in the other case.

              Appellant filed the instant appeal, raising two assignments of error for

our review:
      1. Appellant’s guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and
      voluntarily entered because the trial court failed to comply with
      Criminal Rule 11 before accepting appellant’s guilty [plea].

      2. Because the trial court failed to provide the notifications required by
      R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) in Case No. CR-19-642705, it must be remanded.

                              II. Law and Analysis

              In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court

failed to inform him prior to accepting his guilty plea that a sentence for a

postrelease-control violation must be served consecutively to the original sentence.

              Crim.R. 11(C) requires that a trial court ensure that a defendant

pleading guilty to a felony case do so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and

prescribes the process a court must follow to ensure this occurs. State v. Bishop, 156

Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 10, 11. We review de novo

whether a plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Allen, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 105757, 2018-Ohio-586, ¶ 8.

              Pertinent to appellant’s first assignment of error, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)

requires the trial court to

      [d]etermin[e] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
      understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
      penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
      for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at
      the sentencing hearing.

               A trial court must substantially comply with the Crim.R. 11 right to be

notified of the maximum penalty and other nonconstitutional rights. State v. Veney,

120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 8-10, ¶ 14; State v. Austin,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105981, 2019-Ohio-1983, ¶ 15-16. “Under this standard, a

slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible; so long as the totality of the

circumstances indicates that ‘the defendant subjectively understands the

implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving,’ the plea may be upheld.” State

v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31, quoting State

v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).

              This court has noted that postrelease control is part of the “maximum

penalty involved” in instances where the trial court imposes a prison term. Austin

at ¶ 16, citing State v. Griffin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83724, 2004-Ohio-4344, ¶ 13.

Accordingly, substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(A)(2) requires that at the time

of the plea, a trial court advise the defendant of any mandatory postrelease-control

term. Id., citing State v. Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96446, 2011-Ohio-5667, ¶ 10.

              This court will not invalidate a guilty plea based on a trial court’s

failure to advise the defendant with regard to a nonconstitutional right where the

defendant fails to show prejudice, i.e., by demonstrating that the defendant would

not have otherwise made the plea. Id.

              In the instant matter, the court advised appellant of the period of

postrelease control and explained the nature of postrelease control before asking

appellant whether he understood. Appellant responded that he did. Moreover, the

court inquired of the state as well as appellant’s trial counsel as to whether it had

complied with Crim.R. 11 and both confirmed that it did.
              Appellant takes issue with the court’s statement that if appellant were

to be convicted of a new felony offense while on postrelease control, the sanction for

violating postrelease control could be imposed consecutively to any sentence that he

received for the new felony conviction. Appellant argues that this statement was

erroneous because R.C. 2967.28 requires that the sentence imposed for a violation

of postrelease control be served consecutively to the sentence for the new felony.

              While appellant cites R.C. 2967.28 in support of his argument, that

statute does not contain any provision regarding the imposition of a consecutive

sentence for a postrelease-control violation. Rather, the pertinent provisions are

found in R.C. 2929.141. “Within the parameters of R.C. 2929.141, a trial court has

discretion to impose additional prison time for a violation of postrelease control, but

once the court decides to impose a prison sentence, that sentence must be imposed

consecutive to other sentences.” State v. Nix, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106894, 2019-

Ohio-1640, ¶ 11.

              Nevertheless, any advisement that a sentence for the violation of

postrelease control arising from the commission of a new felony will be served

consecutively to the sentence for the new felony offense is only required during the

plea hearing for the new felony offense. See State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156,

2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 21 (holding that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires a

trial court to advise a criminal defendant on postrelease control for a prior felony,

during his plea hearing in a new felony case, that the court could terminate the
defendant’s existing postrelease control and impose a consecutive prison sentence

for the postrelease-control violation).

              The court’s statement that a consecutive sentence “could be” imposed

following a new felony offense while on postrelease control had no effect on

appellant’s plea in this matter. For appellant’s plea to be knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent, the court was only required to advise appellant of the period of

postrelease control that would be imposed as part of the “maximum penalty

involved” in his plea, which it did. Accordingly, we find no merit to appellant’s first

assignment of error and it is overruled.

              Appellant’s second assignment of error argues that this matter must

be remanded for resentencing because the court did not notify him of all the

requirements of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) at the sentencing hearing in CR-19-642705.

              When a trial court imposes a nonlife felony indefinite sentence

pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) requires that the trial

court notify the offender of the following:

      (i) That it is rebuttably presumed that the offender will be released from
      service of the sentence on the expiration of the minimum prison term
      imposed as part of the sentence or on the offender’s presumptive
      earned early release date, as defined in section 2967.271 of the Revised
      Code, whichever is earlier;

      (ii) That the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut the
      presumption described in division (B)(2)(c)(i) of this section if, at a
      hearing held under section 2967.271 of the Revised Code, the
      department makes specified determinations regarding the offender’s
      conduct while confined, the offender’s rehabilitation, the offender’s
      threat to society, the offender’s restrictive housing, if any, while
      confined, and the offender’s security classification;
      (iii) That if, as described in division (B)(2)(c)(ii) of this section, the
      department at the hearing makes the specified determinations and
      rebuts the presumption, the department may maintain the offender’s
      incarceration after the expiration of that minimum term or after that
      presumptive earned early release date for the length of time the
      department determines to be reasonable, subject to the limitation
      specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;

      (iv) That the department may make the specified determinations and
      maintain the offender’s incarceration under the provisions described in
      divisions (B)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of this section more than one time, subject
      to the limitation specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;

      (v) That if the offender has not been released prior to the expiration of
      the offender’s maximum prison term imposed as part of the sentence,
      the offender must be released upon the expiration of that term.

              While the court must give these notices at the time of sentencing, no

specific language is required. State v. Gates, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110616, 2022-

Ohio-1666, ¶ 25.

              Here, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court notified appellant by

stating,

      And I did explain to you during your plea that Case Number 642705,
      the felonious assault plea of two to eight years is an indefinite sentence
      and that is pursuant to Reagan Tokes.

      What that means is that the sentence that the Court imposes on there
      is the presumption that you will be released at the end of that sentence.

      However. [sic] The Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections can
      impose and keep you for longer depending on your conduct while in
      prison. And that is for up to half of your sentence. An additional half.
      So, I just wanted to make sure that I am clear about that with you.

      So on Case Number 642705, the Court is going to impose a term of
      incarceration of five years.
      This is a mandatory prison term on that case because of the repeat
      violent offender specification. I’m sorry. The notice of prior conviction
      specification.

      The Court is not going to elect to impose an additional consecutive
      sentence based on the repeat violent offender specification. What that
      means is the term of incarceration is five years.

      However, you could be held for up to seven and a half years which is
      two and a half years more than the stated prison term depending on
      your conduct in prison.

      ***

      That presumption can be rebutted in an administrative hearing that
      would be held at the prison or through the Department of Correction.

             Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), the trial court notified appellant

(1) of the rebuttable presumption that he would be released upon expiration of the

five-year prison term; (2) that “depending on [his] conduct while in prison,” the

presumption is rebuttable by the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

(“DRC”); and (3) that, if rebutted, appellant may remain in prison up to the

maximum term of seven and a half years. However, the trial court’s reference to

appellant’s “conduct while in prison” does not include all of the “specified

determinations” the DRC may make to rebut the presumption, or that the

presumption may be rebutted more than once up to the maximum term, or that

appellant must be released upon expiration of the maximum term. Therefore, the

trial court did not fully notify appellant of the required advisements under R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c).
              We agree with appellant that the trial court’s failure to fully notify

appellant of the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) advisements requires remanding this matter

for resentencing. See State v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110882, 2022-Ohio-

2954, ¶ 13; Gates, 2022-Ohio-1666, at ¶ 27; State v. Whitehead, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 109599, 2021-Ohio-847, ¶ 46.

              Appellant’s second assignment of error is sustained.

                                 III. Conclusion

              The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11, and appellant’s plea was

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. However, because the trial court failed to fully

notify appellant of the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) advisements, the case is remanded for

resentencing solely to provide the proper advisements.

              Accordingly, judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

remanded for resentencing solely to provide all the advisements required by R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c).

      Costs in this matter shall be divided equally between the parties.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR