Court Opinion

ID: 9702694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:21:18.186516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:40.700794
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(concurring). In the instant case, plaintiff, a black female, asserts a racial and sexual discrimination claim under § 202 of the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2202; MSA 3.548(202). In essence, plaintiff claims that she should have been given a shift preference over Brian Krawczyk, a white male employee who, because he failed a *291welding test, should have lost his seniority, thereby giving plaintiff more seniority. However, defendant allowed Mr. Krawczyk to retake the test, which he later passed, and retain his seniority to the detriment of plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff brings this suit maintaining that defendant was motivated by discriminatory purposes, i.e., other black female employees failed the test, later retook the test and passed, yet still lost their seniority, whereas a white male who did the same was allowed to retain his seniority.
Defendant defends in part on the basis that this state-law claim is preempted by § 301 of the federal Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.1 Essentially, defendant contends that resolution of the instant claim requires interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement and thus preempts this claim. See Lingle v Norge Div of Magic Chef, Inc, 486 US 399; 108 S Ct 1877; 100 L Ed 2d 410 (1988). I disagree and accordingly join the majority’s finding of no preemption.
At the outset, I note that the development of United States Supreme Court precedent in this area has at times seemed contradictory. Indeed, before 1987, the Court seemed to resolve the question whether a state-law claim is independent of the collective-bargaining agreement for purposes of preemption by asking "whether evaluation of the [state-law] claim is inextricably intertwined with” or "substantially dependent” on the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers Corp v Lueck, 471 US 202, 213, 220; 105 S Ct 1904; 85 L Ed 2d 206 (1985). However, as demonstrated in Lingle, the Supreme Court seemed to have narrowed the gates of preemption by changing the focus to whether resolution of the state-law claim requires interpreting or construing *292the collective-bargaining agreement.2 Lingle, supra at 407.
Nonetheless, while the test has undergone some refinement, the general approach to making this inquiry has not. In Lueck, Lingle and, most recently, United Steelworkers of America v Rawson, 495 US 362; 110 S Ct 1904; 109 L Ed 2d 362 (1990), the Court found dispositive its analysis whether a prima facie case under state law requires a court to construe the collective-bargaining agreement, i.e., whether the elements of the underlying state-law claim necessitate construing the agreement. See Lueck, supra at 216-218; Lingle, supra at 406-407.
In Lueck, the Court considered the Wisconsin tort of bad-faith handling of an insurance claim. The Court determined that Wisconsin law
intrinsically relates to the nature and existence of the contract. Hilker v Western Automobile Ins Co, 204 Wis 1, 13-16; 235 NW 413, 414-415 (1931). Thus the tort exists for breach of a "duty devolved] upon the insurer by reasonable implication from the express terms of the contract,” the scope of which, crucially, is "ascertained from a consideration of the contract itself.” [Id. at 216.]
Moreover, the Court buttressed its conclusion by noting that under Wisconsin law "the tort duty was derived from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in every contract.” Id. at 217._
*293Similarly, in Rawson, the plaintiffs — survivors of four deceased miners — brought a state-law suit against the union for negligently inspecting a mine where plaintiffs’ decedents worked. In finding the claim preempted, the Court noted that "the Union’s representatives were participating in the inspection process pursuant to the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement” and under state law "the agreement determined the nature and scope of the Union’s duty. If the Union failed to perform a duty in connection with inspection, it was a duty arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement signed by the Union as the bargaining agent for the miners.” Id. at 371. Indeed, the Court noted that this duty owed to these deceased workers was separate and distinct from "a situation where the Union’s delegates are accused of acting in a way that might violate the duty of reasonable care owed to every person in society.” Id. In light of this basis in state law, the Court found the claim preempted.
On the other hand, in Lingle, the Court found that the Illinois tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s compensation claim does not require interpreting the collective-bargaining agreement. In examining the elements of the tort, the Court noted that plaintiff must show "(1) he was discharged or threatened with discharge and (2) the employer’s motive in discharging or threatening to discharge him was to deter him from exercising his rights under the Act or to interfere with his exercise of those rights.” Accordingly, to maintain this suit, plaintiff did not have to rely on any provision of the collective-bargaining agreement, express or implied. "Each of these purely factual questions pertains to the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer.” Id. at 407. Indeed, the Court held that *294any possible defense, i.e., having a nonretaliatory reason for the discharge, would likewise not require construing any provision of the agreement because this also is merely a factual inquiry with regard to defendant’s motivation.3
In the instant case, plaintiff’s racial and sexual discrimination claim is strikingly similar to the tort in Lingle. To establish unlawful racial and sexual discrimination, plaintiff would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination exists either by disparate treatment or intentional discrimination. See Ruppal v Treasury Dep’t, 163 Mich App 219, 226; 413 NW2d 751 (1987). To do so, plaintiff must prove that
she was a member of a class entitled to protection under the statute and that, for the same or similar conduct, she was treated differently than a man [for sexual discrimination or a nonblack employee for racial discrimination]. The crux of a sexfual or racial] discrimination action is that similarly situated persons have been accorded different treatment because of their sex [or race]. [Slayton v Michigan Host, Inc, 144 Mich App 535, 541; 376 NW2d 664 (1985) (citations omitted); Jenkins v Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785, 793-795; 369 NW2d 223 (1985).]
If plaintiff meets this burden, she has set forth a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Thus, the burden of production4 then shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimi*295natory reason for its actions. If the defendant is able to articulate such a reason, the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons but were mere pretext for the discrimination. [Slayton, supra at 541-542. Citation omitted.]
In reviewing these elements, it is clear that the court will not have to interpret any express or implied provision of the collective-bargaining agreement. Unlike both Lueck and Rawson, supra, the dispositive inquiry under state law is not what the collective-bargaining agreement provides, but, as in Lingle, what was the motivation of defendant, i.e., discrimination or no discrimination. Moreover, as in Lingle, merely because defendant might claim in defense that its conduct was compelled by some implied fairness gleaned from the collective-bargaining agreement as a whole would not make the instant claim preempted. This would only help answer the factual question whether defendant was motivated by discrimination,5 but would not require the court to determine the *296legality of the decision under the collective-bargaining agreement.6
*297Indeed, this conclusion is buttressed by the realization that defendant’s burden is only one of production rather than persuasion. After the plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case, Michigan courts place the burden of production on the defendant as a means of properly framing the dispositive issue, i.e., the motivation of the defendant, so that the plaintiff can then show that the purported defense was simply a pretext for discrimination.7 Once again, nothing in this inquiry would require an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement.
Accordingly, because I agree that plaintiff’s claim is not preempted under § 301, I join the majority’s opinion and would remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

 29 USC 185(a).

 On remand from the United States Supreme Court for consideration in light of Lingle, the Supreme Court of Alabama noted:
It appears that the Lingle Court shifted its analysis from the "inextricably intertwined” test to the "interpreting the agreement” test and thereby restricted the application of preemption. [Reynolds Metals Co v Mays, 547 So 2d 518, 522 (Ala, 1989).]

 In contrast, the factual inquiry in Lueck, as mandated by state law, required a finding of preemption because the factual inquiry necessarily focused on the terms of the agreement. In Lingle, however, the factual inquiry only focused on defendant’s motivation.

 In 1 Larson, Employment Discrimination (2d ed), § 8.03[1], p 8-50, Professor Larson describes this not as a burden of persuasion, “but rather one of production of admissible evidence.” Indeed, in Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 254-255; 101 S Ct 1089; 67 L Ed 2d 207 (1981), the United States Supreme Court stated:
*295The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. ... It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.

 At oral argument defendant could not indicate what particular provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement require interpretation in resolving this discrimination suit. Indeed, defense counsel conceded that nothing in the letter of understanding or the collective-bargaining agreement addressed whether Mr. Krawczyk should be permitted to retake the test. Moreover, defendant agrees that the letter of understanding and other provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement are plain and unambiguous. Thus, defendant’s only argument linking this decision to the letter of understanding or the collective-bargaining agreement is some measure of fairness stem*296ming from the fact that Mr. Krawczyk was initially informed that he had passed, but after further destructive testing on the welds, was later determined to have failed. Admittedly, resolution of this issue would require interpreting the agreement since defendant is essentially contending that the agreement created some implied right to this conduct. See Lueck, supra at 215. However, as indicated above, the court need not decide this issue as a matter of law because the focus of this suit is simply the factual inquiry whether defendant harbored an illicit or discriminatory motive to the detriment of plaintiff.
If, however, this claim had implicated the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement as in both Lueck and Bawson, we would be without authority to simply conclude that neither the express nor the implied provisions of the contract provide for such conduct. If we did, we would be doing what we set out not to do, i.e., interpret the contract:
The assumption that the labor contract creates no implied rights is not one that state law may make. Rather, it is a question of federal contract interpretation whether there was an obligation under this labor contract to provide the payments in a timely manner, and, if so, whether Allis-Chalmers’ conduct breached that implied contract provision. [Lueck, supra at 215.]
In my view, the majority comes dangerously close to violating this principle when noting that "the agreement and the letter of understanding are completely silent with respect to the treatment to be accorded an employee in Mr. Krawczyk’s situation.” Ante at 287.

 "It is not necessary to decide at the outset whether or not [the defendant’s] interpretation of the agreement is correct as a matter of federal labor law.” Smolarek v Chrysler Corp, 879 F2d 1326, 1334 (CA 6, 1989). Indeed, in O’Shea v Detroit News, 887 F2d 683, 687 (CA 6, 1989), the court made the following observation:
[T]he question of whether or not the plaintiff was discriminated against was separate from any possible defense the employer might have under the contract. All the plaintiff has to allege is that an action was taken against him because of a motive impermissible under the Act. It is irrelevant to the preemption question whether or not the employer can defend by showing it had the right under the collective bargaining agreement to do what it did. . . . The plaintiff’s claim stands separate from this defense.
We hold that Lingle and Smolarek save the plaintiff’s claims from preemption. With respect to the discrimination claim, the right not to be discriminated against in employment decisions based on handicap or age is independent of the question of whether O’Shea was demoted or not. The plaintiff in this case *297may try to show, for example, that the midnight shift was undesirable and that older or handicapped employees were assigned to it more often than younger or non-handicapped ones. The defendant could then defend by arguing that it had the right to transfer its employees in order to improve its paper, just as the defendants in Lingle and Smolarék could argue that they had good cause to fire their employees there. The point is that Michigan employees have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of age or handicap without regard to the collective bargaining agreement’s language about an employee’s rights.
See also Hall v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 184 Mich App 277, 280-281; 457 NW2d 143 (1990); Welch v General Motors Corp, 922 F2d 287 (CA 6, 1990).

 See Burdine, n 4 supra at 255-256. See also Balwinski v Bay City, 168 Mich App 766, 768-769; 425 NW2d 218 (1988).