Court Opinion

ID: 9518884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:04:15.728811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:47.518051
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Schaefer, dissenting: The earlier action, for wrongful death, was prosecuted for the benefit of this plaintiff and in her interest. The administrator, as nominal plaintiff, had no interest in the claim asserted, either personally or on behalf of the estates of the decedents. He represented only the right of this plaintiff and her minor son, who were the beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act. In legal effect, the administrator was no more than an attorney in fact for the prosecution of this plaintiff’s claim. Whether the defendants were at fault in the identical respects charged in the complaint in this case has already been, fully litigated and adjudged in a suit brought on this plaintiff’s behalf. She should not now be permitted to relitigate the matters there decided. The aspect of privity discussed in Sweeting v. Campbell, 2 Ill.2d 491, 496, was the aspect of that concept which was relevant to the facts of that case. By now applying the limited aspect of privity which was there involved as a comprehensive definition, the majority confines the effect of a judgment to those persons formally named as parties and to others who either succeed to the interests adjudged or occupy some mutual relationship with the formal parties. The effect of the incomplete definition is to write out of the law the entire doctrine of virtual representation. Plainly, a person is bound by the result of litigation fairly conducted in his behalf by an authorized representative. Whether the representative is a trustee, guardian, conservator, executor, administrator, or representative of a class, the judgment binds those beneficially interested. Hale v. Hale, 146 Ill. 227, 256-57; White v. Macqueen, 360 Ill. 236, 243; Willett Co. v. Carpentier, 4 Ill.2d 407, 411. This fundamental principle is an essential ingredient in any inclusive definition of privity. “Privity is a word which expresses the idea that as to certain matters and in certain circumstances persons who are not parties to an action but who are connected with it in their interests are affected by the judgment with reference to interests involved in the action, as if they were parties. The word ‘privy’ includes those who control an action although not parties to it; those whose interests are represented by a party to the action; successors in interest to those having derivative claims.” Restatement of Judgments, § 83, Comment a. (Emphasis added.) It has long been settled that in determining the existence of privity it is identity of interest that controls, and not the nominal identity of parties. (Hanna v. Read, 102 Ill. 596, 605.) As the Supreme Court of the United States said in holding that a State court’s determination of an issue was controlling in a subsequent action in a Federal court, “The fact that the party impleaded, under the state law, was the widow, and, under the Federal law, was the personal representative, does not settle the question of identity of parties. That must be determined as a matter of substance and not of mere form.” Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 618. Here the present plaintiff was concededly represented in the prior suit. As the mother of the decedents and the only lineal survivor, she was the principal beneficiary under the Wrongful Death Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 70, par. 2.) The extent of the interest of a beneficiary is demonstrated by that fact that a sole beneficiary may settle a wrongful death claim without the concurrence of the administrator. {Strong v. Hodges, 344 Ill. App. 306; In re Trost’s Estate, 292 Ill. App. 60; Mattoon Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Dolan, 105 Ill. App. 1.) It is the prevailing view that a person does not avoid the effect of a prior adjudication because he appears as a formal party in his individual capacity in one suit and is represented as the wrongful death beneficiary in the other. Voorhees v. Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. 208 Ill. App. 86; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611; Gibson v. Solomon (1939), 136 Ohio St. 101, 23 N.E.2d 996; Vaughn’s Administrator v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. (1944), 297 Ky. 309, 179 S.W.2d 441; Keith v. Willers Truck Service, Inc. (1936), 64 S. Dak. 274, 266 N.W. 256; St. Louis-San Francisco Railway v. Stuckwish (1929), 137 Okla. 251, 279 Pac. 683; Chamberlain v. Mo-Ark Coach Lines, Inc. (1945), 354 Mo. 461, 189 S.W.2d 538. In several of these cases, it was pointed out that the beneficiary who was barred was the sole beneficiary. In the present case both the plaintiff and her infant son were beneficiaries in the wrongful death action. While the Supreme Court of the United States was not called upon to pass on the question in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, the tenor of its opinion made it clear that it was disposed to hold that the presence of additional beneficiaries would not affect the result. It was so held in Brinkman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. (Ohio App. 1960) 172 N.E.2d 154, 157. In the absence of any suggestion of a difference among the beneficiaries with respect to control of the action brought by their representative, I see no reason why the presence of multiple beneficiaries should affect the result. (Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32.) In this case there is no suggestion of such a controversy, and the doctrine of estoppel by verdict, or collateral estoppel, should be applied. Under that doctrine the plaintiff, as a privy, should be estopped from relitigating issues of fact decided in the prior suit. There is no doubt, it sems to me, concerning what the defendants’ verdict there decided. It is common ground between the parties that as a matter of law, neither the two deceased daughters nor the surviving son could have been guilty of contributory negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct. Of course the plaintiff can gain- no advantage from the possibility that her own misconduct caused the accident, and, in any case, under the Wrongful Death Act as amended in 1955, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 70, par. 2) the contributory negligence of this one beneficiary would have afforded only a partial defense. It could not have barred recovery altogether. It must have been determined, therefore, that the husband was not guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct and that the owner and operator of the truck were not guilty of negligence. These are the defendants in the present case, and this is the misconduct with which they are charged. The plaintiff also seeks to avoid the jury’s verdict in favor of the defendants on the possibility that it may have rested upon a finding that because one of the deceased children was five months old and the other less than four years old, their deaths could have resulted in no financial loss to the beneficiaries. This theory, however, runs counter to the instructions under which the jury reached its verdict. As to each of the defendants, the jury was instructed that if they- found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, they would have no occasion to consider the extent of damages. And on the issue of damages the jury was instructed: “If you find from the greater weight of the evidence, and under the instructions of the Court, that the plaintiff, Glenn H. Gordon, as the administrator of the estate of Barbara Smith, deceased, is entitled to recover for the death of said decedent, then you may allow damages in such sum as you believe from the greater weight of the evidence and under the instructions of the Court,- to be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting to the mother and brother of such deceased person from such death, but not exceeding the sum of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,-000.00). The measure of such damages is the amount which you find such deceased person would in all probability have added to her estate had she not been killed in the occurrence in question.” It was stipulated at the trial that the two decedents had life expectancies of about 70 years each. It seems to me that the last sentence of this instruction, taken in conjuction with the stipulation, negatives the plaintiff’s contention that the jury’s verdict might have been based upon the theory that no pecuniary loss resulted from the death of the two daughters. Moreover, the plaintiff as mother of the decedents is presumed to have suffered damages from the death, and would be entitled to a substantial recovery without proof of actual pecuniary loss. In any event, nominal damages would follow upon a finding of liability. Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571; Dodson v. Richter, 34 Ill. App. 2d 22. In my opinion the trial court and the Appellate Court correctly decided this case, and I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.