Court Opinion

ID: 9819038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:04.807842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:28.943643
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, also dissenting: The majority today overrules Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d 504 (1992), in order to assume jurisdiction over the instant appeal. Now, every circuit court decision, irrespective of how limited in public importance or general applicability, may be appealed directly to this court under Rule 302(a)(1) or Rule 603, so long as the decision is couched in terms of holding a statute unconstitutional as applied. This result is fundamentally at odds with the language, purpose and history of Rule 302(a)(1) and Rule 603. Accordingly, I dissent. I Rule 302(a) and Rule 603 govern this court’s mandatory direct appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases. Both rules provide, in pertinent part, that appeals shall lie directly to this court from the circuit courts in cases “in which a statute of the United States or of this State has been held invalid.” 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 302(a)(1), 603. In Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill. 2d 504 (1992), this court examined the language of Rule 302(a)(1)2 and concluded that the rule granted direct appellate jurisdiction in this court only in those cases in which the circuit court held a statute unconstitutional “on its face.” According to Rehg, when a statute was held unconstitutional “as applied” it was not “held invalid” within the meaning of Rule 302(a)(1) and, hence, jurisdiction did not lie in this court. As the Rehg court explained, a circuit court order holding a statute unconstitutional as applied “does not declare a statute unconstitutional; it simply declares that application of that statute would violate a particular defendant’s constitutional rights. An appeal from such an order is properly brought in the appellate court pursuant to Rule 301 (134 Ill. 2d R. 301).” Rehg, 152 Ill. 2d at 508-09; see also 1 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 2.06 (5th ed. 1994) (when a statute is declared invalid as applied “it is only the implementing action which purports to apply the legislation and not the provision itself which is invalid”). The holding of Rehg was based on the language of Rule 302(a)(1), specifically, the meaning of the phrase “held invalid.” However, a brief review of the history of Rule 302(a), and the constitutional framework in which the rule arose, shows that the decision in Rehg also fully comported with the purpose behind Rule 302(a). Prior to 1971, this court’s mandatory direct appellate jurisdiction was governed by constitution, under the Judicial Article of 1964 (Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI (amended 1964)). The Judicial Article of 1964 provided for direct appeal from final judgments of the circuit courts in several different types Óf cases, including revenue cases, habeas corpus cases, capital cases, and cases involving a question arising under the federal or state constitution. Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, § 5 (amended 1964); see generally G. Braden & R. Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 339-43 (1969) (discussing the history of this court’s jurisdiction under the Illinois constitutions). With the adoption of the new constitution in 1970, this court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction was eliminated in all cases except those in which a sentence of death is imposed. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b). This delineation was done in a deliberate attempt to model this court’s jurisdiction along the lines of the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. The reasoning was explained by Chief Justice Underwood, whose remarks were noted during the 1970 constitutional convention: “The supreme court of Illinois is the state court of last resort. Its members ought to be able to concentrate their time and efforts upon those cases which are of major importance to the inhabitants of this state, upon cases which involve novel questions of law, or upon those questions or cases in which the appellate courts of this state are in disagreement. * * *** [0]nly by giving discretion to our court to select the cases which it must hear can our court function as effectively and efficiently as it should.” 2 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 691 (statements of Representative Fay). Notably, a proposal to require this court to accept direct appellate jurisdiction “ ‘in cases involving a question arising under the Constitution of United States or this state’ ” was defeated. (Emphasis added.) 2 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 753 (statement of Representative Friedrich). The 1970 Constitution grants this court the authority to provide by rule for appeals in cases other than those in which a sentence of death has been imposed. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b). Rule 302(a) and Rule 603 were promulgated under this authority. After the adoption of the 1970 Constitution, Rule 302(a) provided for mandatory direct appellate jurisdiction in cases holding a statute invalid and in proceedings to review orders of the Industrial Commission. 50 Ill. 2d R. 302(a). Direct appeals in Industrial Commission cases were eliminated in 1984. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Jones, 108 Ill. 2d 330 (1985). Today, direct appellate review is available under Rule 302(a) only when a statute has been held invalid, or in proceedings commenced under Rule 21(c).3 Rule 302(a), like the jurisdictional provisions of the constitution, “is based upon the principle that the Supreme Court of Illinois should have a role in the State judicial system similar to that of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Federal System; that is, the Supreme Court should be the forum for the decision of important questions which affect the public interest or are otherwise of importance and general applicability and should exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the State judicial system. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s mandatory direct appellate jurisdiction is reduced and its appellate jurisdiction is made largely discretionary.” (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a), Committee Comments, at 233. Viewed against the historical and constitutional background of Rule 302(a), the force and logic of Rehg becomes clear. Rule 302(a) is based on the premise that some types of cases are of such pressing importance that, upon review, they should bypass the normal appellate process and proceed directly to this court. Rehg determined that circuit court decisions holding a statute facially unconstitutional rise to this level of importance. Implicitly, Rehg recognized that holding a statute facially invalid attacks the power of the legislature to enact the statutory provision itself, and therefore, that as a general matter, such a holding will be of sufficient importance and general applicability to warrant direct review in this court. Rehg also recognized, however, that it is illogical to extend the reach of Rule 302(a)(1) to decisions of the circuit courts holding a statute unconstitutional as applied. This is because, generally speaking, whether a statute is unconstitutional as applied in a particular case is a matter of interest primarily to the litigants, and not to the public at large. See, e.g., First National Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Evanston, 30 Ill. 2d 479 (1964) (under the Judicial Article of 1964, a circuit court holding that a zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to a single parcel of property did not present a substantial constitutional question meriting direct review in the supreme court); see also Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 293-303, 66 L. Ed. 239, 245-50, 42 S. Ct. 106, 109-13 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The instant case aptly illustrates why Rehg was correct to draw a jurisdictional distinction between a circuit court order that holds a statute unconstitutional on its face and one that holds a statute unconstitutional as applied. The circuit court in the case at bar held that the false report of a vehicle theft statute (625 ILCS 5/4—103(a)(6) (West 1996)) was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant under the facts of this case. While this ruling was of obvious significance to the defendant, there is nothing about the decision which justifies forgoing the normal appellate process and invoking this court’s direct appellate review. No novel claims are raised by the circuit court’s decision, nor are any issues of pressing public importance presented. Indeed, the circuit court’s decision is one which has no “general applicability” at all. Because of the cursory nature of the circuit court’s ruling, the impact of the decision is limited strictly to the instant defendant. In light of these circumstances, there is no basis for this appeal to be before this court at this time. The appeal properly belongs in the appellate court. If Rehg had been followed in this case, that is where the appeal would be. Disregarding the wisdom and utility of the Rehg decision, the majority concludes that Rehg must be overruled in light of this court’s recent decision in In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414 (1997). The majority reasons that Lappe has “substantially undermined the logic and rationale of Rehg” to the extent that Rehg “no longer provides an effective means of determining this court’s jurisdiction under Rule 302(a) or Rule 603.” 187 Ill. 2d at 9-10. I do not find this reasoning persuasive. Lappe held that the jurisdictional rule of Rehg is not absolute, and that certain decisions of the circuit court holding a statute unconstitutional as applied may be appealed directly to this court. Specifically, Lappe held that when a circuit court “in effect” holds a statute unconstitutional not only as applied to a single litigant, but also as applied to an entire category of individuals, then jurisdiction could lie under Rule 302(a)(1). Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d at 420-22. Lappe was sharply criticized at the time it was adopted as being incompatible with Rehg and with creating an ill-defined and unworkable standard for determining jurisdiction. Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d at 439 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.). The majority agrees that Lappe is at odds with the “logic and rationale” of Rehg, but then draws the wrong conclusion from this fact. If Lappe “substantially undermined” the reasoning of Rehg then the proper course of action is to overrule Lappe, not Rehg. Moreover, even if one accepts that Lappe should, or must, remain the law, that fact would not justify overruling the general jurisdictional rule set forth in Rehg. Simply put, if the choice of interpretations of Rule 302(a)(1) is between an interpretation which requires all decisions holding a statute unconstitutional as applied to be directly appealed to this court regardless of the public importance of the decision (i.e, the majority’s position) or one which permits the court to decline to hear those rulings which have no general applicability (i.e., Rehg as modified by Lappe), the latter interpretation is the better choice. In addition to incorrectly providing for direct review of the instant appeal, the majority’s decision to overrule Rehg will also create future problems. Each year this court receives thousands of petitions for leave to appeal from decisions of the appellate court under Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). Because this court has a finite amount of time and resources, many of these petitions must be denied, despite the important issues they raise. Viewed in this context, providing mandatory direct appellate review to appeals brought under Rule 302(a)(1) or Rule 603 is justifiable when the cases ape of public importance, but it is clearly not justifiable when the issues are of significance to only a single litigant. Inevitably, as a result of the majority’s decision today, important appellate court decisions appealed under Rule 315 will not be reviewed by this court. There are also practical problems with the majority’s holding which relate to the difficulty in determining when a statute has been held unconstitutional as applied. For example, assume that in the instant case the defendant had not argued that the false report of a vehicle theft statute was unconstitutional as applied. Instead, assume that in her motion to dismiss, the defendant had maintained “that the state acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and in violation of due process, by charging defendant with this offense.” Assume too that the circuit court had summarily granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. “based on due process grounds.” In such a factual setting jurisdiction would not lie in this court under Rule 603 because, technically, the circuit court did not declare a statute unconstitutional. Yet, if the defendant’s due process argument had been framed in terms of the statute being unconstitutional as applied, then, under the majority’s holding, this court would have to accept the appeal. In other words, under the majority’s holding today, the availability of a mandatory direct appeal may depend not on the substantive importance of the issues presented in the case, but on the ability of a defendant to describe her complaint as a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute as applied. This court’s jurisdiction should not turn on such artful distinctions. Looking at the circuit court’s decision in this case, I am frankly puzzled by the majority’s decision to assume jurisdiction. Why is this case here? What is it about this case that merits mandatory appellate review in this court? Why is the first substantive review of the issues taking place in this court, which is supposed to be the court of final review? Can this case possibly be considered more important than, for example, People v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306 (1998), a case which raised a constitutional issue of national concern regarding search and seizures, a case in which certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court (Illinois v. Wardlow, 526 U.S. 1097, 143 L. Ed. 2d 669, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999)), and a case which was initially reviewed in our appellate court? The majority’s decision to overrule Rehg is clearly in error. That opinion has served as a necessary limit on this court’s mandatory direct appellate jurisdiction, ensuring that cases such as the instant appeal would properly be taken to the appellate court.4 The majority’s conclusion that jurisdiction lies in this court from all decisions of the circuit court holding a statute unconstitutional as applied is too broad and is plainly contrary to the purpose of Rule 302(a) and Rule 603. For these reasons, I dissent. II I wish to address an additional point which, though not strictly necessary for my dissent, nevertheless deserves mention. Rule 302(a)(1) is patterned after section 1252 and section 1257 of the United States Code. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a), Committee Comments, at 234. At one time, section 1252 provided for mandatory direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court from decisions of the lower federal courts holding acts of Congress unconstitutional in proceedings in which the United States was a party. Similarly, section 1257 provided, in pertinent part, for mandatory direct appeal from decisions of the highest state court in which a decision could be had in which a federal law was held invalid, or from decisions in which a state statute was upheld against a federal challenge. In 1988, the mandatory appellate provisions of section 1252 and section 1257 were repealed by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 100—352 § 1, 102 Stat. 662 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 100—352 § 3, 102 Stat. 662 (1988). A complete discussion of the history of sections 1252 and 1257 and the reasons for their repeal is beyond the scope of this dissent.5 However, two points should be noted with respect to the repeal of section 1252. First, one of the reasons section 1252 was repealed is that the premise on which the statute was based was no longer considered valid: “The presumption that underlay the statute, giving direct and mandatory access to the Supreme Court, was the great importance of the issue. The trouble was that the presumption amounted to a conclusive one, with the Supreme Court virtually obliged to hear the case on its merits without the power to rebut the presumption and spare itself the burden. And however important the issue might have seemed on its face, measured only against itself and with no other cases to compete with, it was, far more often than not, a much less important one when set in competition with the other huddled masses seeking the attention of the Supreme Court. How important it was would have to be judged in context, and under § 1252 the Supreme Court was denied the power to make that judgment. The repeal of § 1252 confers that power. The Court will now determine for itself whether a case in the repealed category is important enough to merit its attention.” D. Siegel, Commentary on the Repeal of Section 1252, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252, at 20 (West 1993). See also 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4037.1, at 101-02 (1988). The same point can, of course, be made about the premise underlying Rule 302(a)(1) and Rule 603. A second reason for the repeal of section 1252 was that, after decades of case law interpreting that provision, the doctrine of mandatory direct review had become “unwieldy and confusing.” H.R. Rep. No. 100—660, at 9-10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766, 774-75. In recent years, our case law interpreting Rule 302(a)(1) has begun to travel down the same path. Indeed, many of the issues addressed in the federal cases are identical to issues which have caused disagreement in this court under Rule 302(a)(1). See, e.g., Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 102-04, 91 L. Ed. 1368, 1371-72, 67 S. Ct. 1140, 1142-43 (1947) (the statutory language of the predecessor to section 1252 required the Supreme Court to accept direct appeals where a statute had been held unconstitutional as applied); also compare United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 91 n.8, 85 L. Ed. 2d 64, 74 n.8, 105 S. Ct. 1785, 1791 n.8 (1985) (where a federal district court decided a case on both constitutional and statutory grounds, jurisdiction under section 1252 was not affected; “as long as the unconstitutionality of an Act of Congress is one of the grounds of decision below in a civil suit to which the United States is a party, appeal lies directly to this Court”), with Trent v. Winningham, 172 Ill. 2d 420 (1996) (where a circuit court decided a case both on statutory grounds and by declaring a statute unconstitutional, the appeal could not be taken directly to this court under Rule 302(a)(1)). Other difficult issues faced by the Supreme Court when interpreting section 1252 will undoubtedly arise at some point under Rule 302(a)(1). See, e.g., Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 79 L. Ed. 2d 878, 104 S. Ct. 1532 (1984); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Allstate Insurance Co., 467 U.S. 1232, 82 L. Ed. 2d 810, 104 S. Ct. 3499 (1984). A strong argument can be made that Rule 302(a)(1), like its federal counterparts, should be rescinded. The appellate court can, and does, decide important constitutional questions on a regular basis. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 277 Ill. App. 3d 101 (1995), aff'd sub nom. City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440 (1997), aff'd, No. 97—1121 (U.S. June 10, 1999). If a case requires expedited review, it can be brought directly to this court under Rule 302(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)). In light of these facts, and given that the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution intentionally modeled this court’s jurisdiction parallel to the United States Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, I submit that it may be time to reconsider the necessity of Rule 302(a)(1). I express no opinion on the ultimate issue of whether Rule 302(a)(1) should be rescinded or retained. I emphatically reiterate, however, that review of the issues in the case at bar belongs in the appellate court. CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.   I agree with the majority that the case law interpreting Rule 302(a)(1) should be read in conjunction with Rule 603. See People v. Selby, 298 Ill. App. 3d 605, 609-11 (1998).    Rule 21(c) concerns proceedings to compel compliance with administrative orders of a chief circuit judge. 134 Ill. 2d R. 21(c). There are no published decisions addressing this provision.    Since Rehg was filed in October of 1992, this court has decided approximately 58 cases in which jurisdiction was expressly premised on the provisions of Rule 302 and Rule 603, which authorize direct appeal to this court when the circuit court holds a statute “invalid.” None of these decisions involved a circuit court ruling as limited in general applicability as the ruling in the present case. See In re Estate of Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188 (1999); People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441 (1998); People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 (1998); People v. Koppa, 184 Ill. 2d 159 (1998); People v. Espinoza, 184 Ill. 2d 252 (1998); McLean v. Department of Revenue, 184 Ill. 2d 341 (1998); People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117 (1998); Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434 (1998); People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16 (1998); People v. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d 524 (1998); Graham v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 182 Ill. 2d 287 (1998); In re Application of the County Collector of Du Page County for Judgment for Delinquent Taxes for the Year 1992, 181 Ill. 2d 237 (1998); R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153 (1998); Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 181 Ill. 2d 65 (1998); In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32 (1998); Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519 (1997); Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997); Richardson v. Rock Island County Officers Electoral Board, 179 Ill. 2d 252 (1997); Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 225 (1997); People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495 (1997); East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399 (1997); Murneigh v. Gainer, 177 Ill. 2d 287 (1997); In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414 (1997); Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499 (1997); People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412 (1996); In re Estate of Hicks, 174 Ill. 2d 433 (1996); People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996); Fink v. Ryan, 174 Ill. 2d 302 (1996); McNamee v. State of Illinois, 173 Ill. 2d 433 (1996); People v. Nash, 173 Ill. 2d 423 (1996); People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348 (1996); Brown's Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410 (1996); Desnick v. Department of Professional Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d 510 (1996); Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297 (1996); People v. Miller, 171 Ill. 2d 330 (1996); Wilson v. Department of Revenue, 169 Ill. 2d 306 (1996); In re Application for Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161 (1995); First of America Bank, Rockford, N.A. v. Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d 165 (1995); People v. Farmer, 165 Ill. 2d 194 (1995); Barger v. Peters, 163 Ill. 2d 357 (1994); Fields Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 163 Ill. 2d 462 (1994); People v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231 (1994); People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250 (1994); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 163 Ill. 2d 290 (1994); Doe v. Gainer, 162 Ill. 2d 15 (1994); In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200 (1994); Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409 (1994); People v. Fate, 159 Ill. 2d 267 (1994); People v. R.L., 158 Ill. 2d 432 (1994); People ex rel. Waller v. 1990 Ford Bronco, 158 Ill. 2d 460 (1994); People v. Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill. 2d 360 (1994); People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36 (1994); People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46 (1994); Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116 (1993); Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162 (1993); People v. Johns, 153 Ill. 2d 436 (1992); King v. Ryan, 153 Ill. 2d 449 (1992); People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489 (1992).    For a full discussion see H. R. Rep. No. 100-660 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766.