Court Opinion

ID: 9965340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 14:02:39.460681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:55.952509
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10409    Document: 47-1     Date Filed: 05/02/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10409
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       RODERICK CHESTER,
       a.k.a. C-Rod,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cr-00020-MTT-CHW-2
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10409

                            ____________________

       Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Roderick Chester appeals his convictions for possession of a
       firearm by a convicted felon, conspiracy to possess with intent to
       distribute      methamphetamine,          and    distribution      of
       methamphetamine. We denied his appointed counsel’s Anders
       motion and ordered briefing on two issues: (1) whether the
       evidence was sufficient to support Chester’s conviction for
       possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and (2) whether the
       district court abused its discretion by denying Chester’s motion for
       a mistrial based on a witness’s statement that Chester had a
       pending murder charge in state court. We now address the merits
       of his appeal and, finding no error, affirm Chester’s convictions.
                                        I.
              We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
       supporting a conviction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light
       most favorable to the government. United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d
       1018, 1035 (11th Cir. 2015). We will affirm a conviction “unless
       there is no reasonable construction of the evidence from which the
       jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
       doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted).
            To prove a violation of § 922(g)(1), the government must
       show that (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or
       ammunition, (2) the defendant was a felon, (3) the defendant knew
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       22-10409                Opinion of the Court                          3

       that he was a felon, and (4) the firearm or ammunition was in or
       affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846,
       852 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Elysee, 993 F.3d 1309, 1345 (11th
       Cir. 2021). On appeal, Chester challenges only the first element—
       knowing possession.
              Possession of a firearm can be either actual or constructive.
       United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 576 (11th Cir. 2011). The
       government proves constructive possession by showing “that the
       defendant (1) was aware or knew of the firearm’s presence and
       (2) had the ability and intent to later exercise dominion and control
       over that firearm.” Id. Constructive possession can be proved
       through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.
               After a lawful traffic stop and search, police discovered a
       handgun and some loose marijuana on the front bench seat of
       Chester’s truck, under a folded-down center armrest. Chester was
       driving the truck at the time, with his wife in the front passenger
       seat. Chester argues that the government introduced no evidence
       at trial showing either that he knew of the firearm’s presence or
       that he intended to exercise control over it.
               These arguments are unsuccessful. Constructive possession
       of a firearm can be proved through circumstantial evidence. We
       have repeatedly held that a defendant’s ownership of or control
       over a vehicle is sufficient evidence for a rational juror to infer both
       a defendant’s knowledge of a firearm found within the vehicle and
       his intent to exercise control over it. See, e.g., United States v.
       Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wright,
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10409

       392 F.3d 1269, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gunn, 369
       F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). The jury was permitted to make
       the same inferences here—Chester was driving the vehicle when
       the police found the handgun next to the driver’s seat. And the fact
       that Chester’s wife was also present does not change our calculus—
       a defendant’s possession can be either exclusive or “in association
       with others.” United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 596
       (11th Cir. 2020).
                                          II.
              We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial
       for abuse of discretion. Wright, 392 F.3d at 1274. “It has long been
       the settled rule in this Circuit that error in the admission of
       evidence under most circumstances may be cured by withdrawing
       the evidence from the jury’s consideration and instructing the jury
       to disregard it.” United States v. Troise, 483 F.2d 615, 618 (5th Cir.
       1973); see also United States v. Gallardo, 977 F.3d 1126, 1138 (11th Cir.
       2020) (“When the district court gives a curative instruction, we
       presume that the jury followed it.”). Therefore, if the district court
       gives a curative instruction in response to a prejudicial statement
       made to the jury, we will reverse “only if the evidence is so highly
       prejudicial as to be incurable by the trial court’s admonition.”
       United States v. Delgado, 321 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2003)
       (quotation omitted). This requires “a reasonable probability that,
       but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been
       different.” United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir.
       2007).
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       22-10409               Opinion of the Court                          5

              At Chester’s trial, in response to an unrelated question from
       the prosecution, one of the government’s witnesses mentioned
       that she saw online that Chester “was booked for murder in Bibb
       County.” After a brief sidebar, both parties and the district court
       agreed that “instead of dwelling on” the statement then, they
       would move on to avoid drawing further attention to it by the jury.
       Then, after the close of evidence, the district court gave the jury a
       curative instruction, telling them that the witness was “mistaken,”
       that there was “no evidence or contention here that Mr. Chester
       was involved in anything like that,” and that they “must
       completely disregard” the statement.
               The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
       Chester’s motion for a mistrial. United States v. Newsome is
       instructive. There, the government itself told the jury in its
       opening statement that the defendant—charged only with
       possessing a firearm as a convicted felon—had allegedly shot his
       wife. 475 F.3d at 1223. The district court instructed the jury that
       the lawyer’s statement was not evidence and denied the
       defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Id. This Court affirmed,
       reasoning that after the curative instruction, “the prosecutor’s
       single statement did not inflict the kind of prejudice necessary to
       warrant a mistrial” and that the defendant could not “show a
       reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different
       absent the prosecutor’s statement.” Id. at 1227; see also United States
       v. Smith, 517 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming denial of a
       mistrial after the district court instructed the jury to ignore a
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                22-10409

       witness’s hearsay statement that the defendant’s co-conspirator
       “had shot a man”).
               Here, the offending statement was made a single time in
       passing and, when the record is viewed as a whole, was clearly not
       a significant or material part of the overall trial. There was also
       significant independent evidence supporting Chester’s three
       convictions. Therefore, after the district court properly instructed
       the jury to disregard the witness’s statement, we are confident that
       it did not carry a substantial prejudicial effect and that Chester
       cannot show a reasonable probability that the outcome would
       have been any different even if it had not been made.
                                 *      *      *
             AFFIRMED.