Court Opinion

ID: 9577189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:32:35.937797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:05.285895
License: Public Domain

TOAL, Justice:
The majority holds that Toyota of Florence, Inc. v. Lynch, 314 S.C. 257, 442 S.E.2d 611 (1994) excuses the failure to make a contemporaneous objection only where the challenged argument constitutes abuse of a party or witness. Such a holding is not supported by our case precedent. Accordingly, I dissent.
A reading of Toyota and its predecessor cases reveals that they address prejudicial arguments by counsel generally, and not just those, arguments that concern witnesses or litigants. The cases cited by the majority support this analysis. In Edwards v. Union Buffalo Mills Co., 162 S.C. 17, 29, 159 S.E. 818, 822 (1931), we found that “the language complained of in the case under review was highly prejudicial, calculated to *261arouse the prejudices of the jurors, and did undoubtedly contribute to induce the verdict which was rendered.” In Major v. Alverson, 183 S.C. 123, 126, 190 S.E. 449, 451 (1937), it was held:
[Wjhere counsel, as in this case, uses improper and abusive language in his argument to the jury, to the clear hurt and prejudice of the complaining party, we feel that it is our duty to remand the case for trial in accordance with correct and proper rules of procedure and conduct.
In fact, Major clearly distinguished between improper arguments and abuse of witnesses: “Such a statement was not only highly improper as an argument, but amounted to an abuse of the witness and tended to greatly prejudice defendant’s case in the eyes of the jury.” Id. at 125, 190 S.E. at 450 (emphasis added).
The majority also cites South Carolina State Highway Department v. Nasim, 255 S.C. 406, 179 S.E.2d 211 (1971). The clear holding of Nasim is that objection to improper argument is required, except in flagrant cases and where prejudice appears. The Nasim Court quoted Johnson v. Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Company, 234 S.C. 448,108 S.E.2d 777 (1959) for the following proposition:
It has been settled by many decisions of this court that, except in flagrant cases and where prejudice clearly appears, objection to improper argument of counsel should be made then and there, and comes too late if not made until after the verdict has been rendered.
Nasim, 255 S.C. at 410,179 S.E.2d at 212.
Nasim then declared: “We adhere to that rule. We reverse the case before us because the argument falls within the exception.” This holding was again confirmed in the case:
While it is true that the trial judge has very broad discretion in the conduct of trial, the rule does make exception for “flagrant cases and where prejudice clearly appears.” In light of the vicious inflammatory nature of the remarks made we conclude that this case presents the exception allowed by our rule in Johnson, supra.
Nasim, 255 S.C. at 411,179 S.E.2d at 213. Further,
It is a general rule of law that inflammatory remarks made by counsel in argument which are calculated to appeal to the *262passions or prejudices of a jury should be affirmatively condemned by the trial court....
In the final analysis, whether or not the particular arguments are so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error depends upon the nature of the utterances and the circumstances under which they were made. Here the remarks were so vicious and the likelihood of prejudice so strong that we are persuaded that the highway department did not receive a fair and impartial trial which is the inherent right of every litigant.
Nasim, 255 S.C. at 411-12, 179 S.E.2d at 213. Nowhere is there any mention in Nasim that its rule is confined to abuse of witnesses and litigants.
Most significantly, there is no indication in Toyota that it is restricted to arguments abusive to a party or witness. Toyota ’s explicit holding is as follows:
The general rule is that the lack of a contemporaneous objection to an improper argument acts as a waiver. This Court has held, however, that even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, a new trial motion should be granted in flagrant cases where a vicious, inflammatory argument results in clear prejudice. We can hardly conceive of a more outrageous argument than that made here.
Toyota, 314 S.C. at 263, 442 S.E.2d at 615 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The focus of the opinion is on the improper closing argument. To suggest that Toyota applies only to arguments that abuse witnesses or litigants is to add to the case a restriction it does not contain. The Court of Appeals has also recognized the clear holding of Toyota: “We realize the Supreme Court has held, even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, a new trial should be granted in flagrant cases where a vicious, inflammatory argument results in clear prejudice.” State v. Peay, 321 S.C. 405, 412-13, 468 S.E.2d 669, 673 (Ct.App.1996).
The Toyota rule seeks to prevent “vicious, inflammatory” arguments. This rule protects witnesses and litigants; however, its principal purpose is to ensure a fair trial by discouraging attorneys from making outrageous and highly prejudicial arguments. It is not analytically convincing to suggest that this rule should apply only to abusive comments about *263witnesses and litigants, but not to other equally inappropriate comments that do not directly concern witnesses and litigants. For example, under the majority’s rule, if during closing argument, an attorney referred to opposing counsel (or even the judge) as “one who makes Adolf Hitler look like Mother Teresa,” then Toyota would be inapplicable, despite the grossly inflammatory and prejudicial nature of the comment. However, if the very same statement were made about an expert witness in the case, then the Toyota rule would be applicable. There is no reasoned justification for the distinction between the two. Perhaps it is for this reason that our case law has never restricted the Toyota rule to abusive comments about witnesses and litigants.
It is understandable that in most situations the prejudicial comments of counsel would probably concern litigants or witnesses; however, simply .because this may be the typical situation does not mean that Toyota is confined to such situations. Attorneys are clever enough to find other objects for their inflammatory comments in order to improperly influence the jury. The facts of the instant case are illustrative. Here, although counsel’s comments did not constitute abuse of a witness or litigant, they were nevertheless inflammatory and intended to prejudice the jury by “playing the race card.” Counsel, in the course of his argument, deliberately painted the image of Niggel’s driver, Freddie George, being railroaded. The word “railroaded” was repeatedly mentioned in the course of the argument. Counsel stated George is “on a set of tracks” to prison because a police officer had died. He then said:
Now, if you’re drunk and you’re driving, you know you’re guilty of D.U.I. and you’ve got a dead cop and there ain’t no evidence that you can put your hands on that’s going to help you, what else you going to do? You’re a black man and there’s a white police officer dead in the car over there.
Counsel set up the “railroaded” argument to ultimately play on the racial feelings of the jury. His evident purpose was to plant in the jury’s mind the idea that defendant George’s guilty plea to felony driving under the influence was somehow the product of a racially discriminatory prosecution. There is absolutely nothing in the record to support counsel’s veiled charge of racism. This sort of unjustifiable attack on the *264integrity of a previous, legitimate court proceeding, in order to gain advantage in another court proceeding, undermines the very foundation of the American jury trial system. This Court should not countenance or reward such conduct. I find this to be entirely improper and would grant a new trial under Toyota.
FINNEY, C.J., concurs.