Court Opinion

ID: 9741254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:52:23.113558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.167290
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). The majority errs in stating that the issue is whether the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act requires the American Motors Corporation to accommodate an employee’s work absences which are occasioned by the employee’s observance of religious holy days. Supra, pp. 340 and 344.1
*370This case does not involve the issue of accommodation. As the majority explains, an accommodation case is one in which the court is to determine “an employer’s obligation where arguably there is a conflict between an employee’s religious practices and the employer’s personnel and management procedures.” Supra, p. 348.
In this case there is no conflict between Bartell’s religious practices and AMC’s personnel and management procedures. Bartell requested days off so that he could observe certain holy days of his religion. AMC’s personnel and management procedure was to provide days off on principal Christian holy days, such as Christmas and Good Friday, and to provide days off to Jews and others on their obligatory holy days. Thus Bartell’s interest in the free exercise of his religion is within the terms of AMC’s established employment policies designed for the efficient operation of the business. When AMC refused to provide time off to Bartell AMC failed to follow its own established personnel and management procedures.
By comparison, the employee in an accommodation case is seeking an exception to the employer’s uniformly applied personnel and management procedures; the employee is asking for approval of a request not within the uniform policies to which other employees are subject in order to enable the employee to be a faithful adherent and remain employed. Bartell made no such request; he asked only that AMC treat him as it treats employees of other religious persuasions in similar jobs in AMC. Bartell asked AMC to apply its uniform policy to him.
The distinction between this case and one in which accommodation is an issue is apparent from reading the accommodation cases cited by the majority.2 The first *371step in an accommodation case is to determine the general personnel policy of the employer. The second step *372is to determine whether this general personnel policy was applied to the employee in question. If the general *373policy was applied uniformly and thus without overt discrimination, the court reaches the question of whether the statutory prohibition against discrimination requires the employer to permit exception to its general policy for this particular employee, that is whether the statutory prohibition against discrimination requires the employer to accommodate for the religious practices of the employee. AMC's general policy was to give employees time off on religious holidays. AMC refused to apply this policy to Bartell. If the refusal to apply a general policy to an employee is overt discrimination there is no reason to consider whether accommodation is required. Accordingly, the court must first determine whether this conduct constitutes overt discrimination because of creed.
An employer’s refusal to grant all employees regardless of creed the same terms or conditions of employment is discrimination. The requirement that an employer grant all employees regardless of creed the same terms or conditions of employment is a requirement of equal treatment, not accommodation. I conclude that AMC’s dismissal of Bartell because he requested time off for religious holidays constituted discrimination because of creed in violation of secs. 111.32(5) (a) and 111.325, *374Stats. 1979-80. I would therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
I further conclude that if I viewed this case as raising the issue whether refusal to accommodate constitutes discrimination because of creed in violation of secs. 111.32(5) (a), 111.325, Stats. 1979-80, I would agree with the reasoning of the circuit court and the court of appeals, not the majority opinion. I therefore dissent.
I.
The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of creed “with regard to hiring, tenure or term, condition or privilege of employment.” Secs. 111.32(5) (a) and 111.325, Stats. 1979-80.
In determining whether an employer’s conduct constitutes proscribed discrimination, the threshold issue is one of statutory construction: what did the legislature intend when it prohibited discrimination because of “creed” with regard to “hiring, tenure or term, condition or privilege of employment” ?
Absent a specific statutory definition, this court has defined terms in the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act in their commonly accepted dictionary sense. Accordingly, “creed” means “a system of religious beliefs.” A system of religious beliefs includes religious observances and practices, as well as articles of faith. Augustine v. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 75 Wis.2d 207, 249 N.W.2d 547 (1977).3 To “discriminate,” in common usage, means, inter alia, “to make a difference in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in disregard of individual merit.” Webster's Third New Inter*375national Dictionary p. 648. This definition is consistent with the definition of discrimination appearing in sec. 101.22 (lm) (b), Stats. 1979-80, which is also enforced by DILHR. Sec. 101.22 (lm) (b), which prohibits discrimination in housing, defines discrimination as follows:
“ ‘Discriminate’ and ‘discrimination’ mean to segregate, separate, exclude or treat any person unequally only because of sex, race, color, physical condition, developmental disability as defined in 51.01(5), religion, national origin or ancestry.”
Applying these accepted definitions to the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, I conclude that the Act’s prohibition against discrimination because of creed means that an employer cannot lawfully differentiate in its treatment of employees on the basis of the religious beliefs and religious practices of the employees. The issue for the court is therefore whether on the basis of DILHR’s findings of fact and on the undisputed evidence in the record, it appears that when AMC dismissed Bartell it was differentiating in its treatment of employees on the basis of the employees’ religious beliefs and practices.
Generally the application of a legal standard to the facts is viewed as a legal question which this court may determine. We have often stated that the court is not bound by the agency’s determination of a question of law and may properly substitute its judicial judgment. Supra, p. 353; Nottelson v. ILHR Dept., 94 Wis.2d 106, 114-117, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. ILHR Dept., 90 Wis.2d 408, 417, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979).
To determine whether AMC discriminated, I look first to the findings of fact and the undisputed evidence.
The employee, Thomas Bartell, is a member of the Worldwide Church of God. Like other religions the Worldwide Church of God denominates certain days as religious holy days during which the adherent does not *376engage in secular work. Two such religious holy days are involved in this case: the Day of Atonement (Monday, September 18, 1972), and the Feast of Tabernacles (Friday, September 22 through Friday, September 29, 1972). On the first and last days of the Feast of Tabernacles, adherents are not to do secular work and during the feast week the adherents are required to attend a regional religious convention. In 1972 the regional religious convention which Bartell attended was held in Wisconsin Dells and was attended by 10,000. Bartell testified that his religious beliefs required his attendance at this convention. In accordance with his religious beliefs and practices Bartell, in August 1972, requested that he be excused from work on September 18, 22, and 25 to 29,1972. Bartell’s request was denied.
AMC’s refusal to excuse Bartell from work on his obligatory religious holy days is contrary to AMC’s policy to give employees days off for religious purposes. According to the testimony of AMC’s Director of Industrial Relations at the Milwaukee body plant: “When Jewish personnel require time off to celebrate their holidays, they are given the time off. They may or may not get paid for the time off depending on their plant or area. We allow them the time off. Whether they’re compensated for it or not is another matter. It is the company policy to allow a person a day off if they indicate that their religion requires them to take the day off.” The majority recognizes that AMC has a policy of allowing employees to take time off if required for religious purposes. The majority states: “There is also evidence in the record that it was the policy and the usual practice for American Motors to permit sincere believers to abstain from work on obligatory holy days. . . . The record in this case clearly would not warrant a conclusion that American Motors, as a matter of policy, disregarded the religious needs of its em*377ployees. The order of DILHR that American Motors ‘cease and desist from discharging employees on the basis of religion’ was unjustified and unsupported by the record.” Supra, p. 344.
The only conclusion that may be drawn from the record is that AMC treated Bartell differently than it treats employees of other religious persuasions. AMC would have released a person of the Jewish faith from work on Monday, September 18, 1972, Yom Kippur. Yet AMC refused to excuse Bartell, a member of the Worldwide Church of God, from work on the very same day, Monday, September 18, 1972, the Day of Atonement, to celebrate that holy day according to his religious beliefs.
The record reveals that Bartell does not differ from AMC’s other employees in any respect other than his creed.
AMC attempted to persuade DILHR that its refusal to grant Bartell the same terms, conditions or privileges of employment as it grants other employees of different religious persuasions was based not on Bartell’s creed but on Bartell’s deceptive conduct towards AMC. AMC attempted to show that Bartell was deceptive in not telling AMC of his need for days off when he began the program. DILHR concluded, however, that deception had not been proved. As the majority opinion correctly points out, the factual determination that Bartell was terminated for his insistence on observing his religious holy days and not for deception, “was for DILHR to make and would not be disturbed by the court.” Supra, p. 343.
AMC also attempted to show that its refusal to grant Bartell the same terms, conditions or privileges of employment as it grants other employees of different religious persuasions was based not on Bartell’s creed *378but on the special nature of the training program in which Bartell was participating.4
This training program, then brand new at AMC, had a total of three enrolees, Bartell, Abdin and Johnson. The AMC supervisor in charge of the training program, testifying on direct examination, characterized the program’s schedule for these three employees as “ironclad.” However, on cross examination he stated that neither Abdin nor Johnson followed the schedule as planned. He further explained that Abdin was allowed to tack his days missed while on another assignment on to the end of the training schedule. He further testified that this “tacking” procedure could have been used for Bartell.
DILHR found that it was uncontroverted on the record that AMC could have released Bartell from work on his obligatory holy days “without any undue hardship on [AMC’s] business.” The circuit court reached the same conclusion, saying:
“While [the supervisor] stated that he would have had to ‘re-do the entire schedule’ to accommodate the claimant’s request for time off, he also admitted that he could have merely excused the claimant from one segment of his program and re-assigned him to that department at the end of the schedule. This procedure was followed with one of the other two trainees in the program for the convenience of the company. The record fails to show any reason why the complainant could not have been ac-*379eommodated in the same fashion. Although the claimant could have raised the problem earlier, it is clear that this delay in itself did not create any difficulties in accommodating the request for time off. The only ‘hardship’ which appears is the time it would have taken to alter the claimant’s schedule.”
Thus the record shows that AMC’s refusal to grant Bartell the same terms, conditions or privileges of employment as it granted other employees, namely time off for obligatory religious holy days, was not predicated on Bartell’s deception, or on the special nature of Bartell’s job, or on any other lawful reason. The record shows Bartell was fired because of his insistence on adhering to his creed.
This record shows no justification for AMC’s refusal to apply to Bartell its general policy of releasing employees on obligatory religious holy days. AMC’s refusal, without any justification, to accord Bartell, who was of a particular religious persuasion, the same terms, conditions or privileges of employment it accorded substantially similarly situated employees of other religious persuasions, constitutes discrimination under secs. 111.-32(5) (a) and 111.325, Stats. 1979-80. Having adopted a policy of releasing employees from work on obligatory religious holidays (when this release does not substantially interfere with job performance), AMC cannot apply this policy in a discriminatory manner which violates the Fair Employment Act. This court recognized this principle in Ray-O-Vac v. ILHR Depart., 70 Wis.2d 919, 931, 236 N.W.2d 209 (1975):
“The parties all agree that a private employer is not compelled by law to provide benefits in the case of temporary disability, and so do we. However, if he chooses to do so, it must be under a plan which does not discriminate on any basis prohibited by the fair employment law.”
*380An employer like. AMC who, without justification, denies members of one creed a privilege which it grants to members of other creeds, whether the denial arises from evil motive or bureaucratic error, violates the law. AMC’s conduct in this case cannot be characterized as a neutral, fair application of a neutral-on-its-face policy or practice. AMC directly, openly and without any business justification treated similarly situated employees of different religious persuasions differently.
The purpose of the Fair Employment Act is to prohibit employers from compelling an individual to choose between religious faith and economic survival. Sec. 111.31 (1), Stats. 1979-80. To accomplish this result the state has mandated that persons of different religious faiths as well as those of no religious faith receive fair treatment in the employment market. The Act assures employees that employment decisions will not be based on impermissible grounds such as creed. The Act is an empty guaranty unless it is invoked to halt discrimination of the kind involved here.
I conclude that AMC violated the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, and I would therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals. The majority reaches a contrary result because it has posed the wrong question.
II.
Even if I were to conclude that the case at bar raises the question whether refusal to accommodate constitutes discrimination, I would conclude, as did the circuit court and court of appeals, that in enacting secs. 111.31, 111.-32(5) (a), 111.325, Stats. 1979-80, the legislature intended to include within the phrase “discrimination because of creed” an employer’s refusal, without business justification, to take reasonable steps not amounting to an undue burden to accommodate an employee’s free *381exercise of religion. I view, for the reasons set forth by the court of appeals, that the statute is constitutional as so construed.
The centrality of religious freedom in the history of this country is a matter of general knowledge. Americans are a religious people. The United States of America was founded by persons seeking freedom to worship as they pleased or not to worship if they pleased. American citizens have a continuing and abiding interest in protection from religious discrimination. The Wisconsin legislature has responded to this interest by mandating that employment opportunities not be denied any person because of creed. Secs. 111.32(5) (a), 111.325, Stats. 1979-80. To accomplish this end the Wisconsin legislature has instructed the courts to construe the fair employment practices act “liberally” to accomplish the declared public policy of the state which is “to encourage and foster to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified persons regardless of their age, race, creed, color, handicap, sex, national origin or ancestry.” Sec. 111.31(3), Stats. 1979-80.
The majority concludes that this legislative direction of liberal construction does not authorize a court “to import into the act specific provisions that the legislature omitted.” Supra,, p. 350. I agree. But I do not think that interpreting “discrimination because of creed” to include the duty to accommodate is importing into the Act specific provisions that the legislature omitted. Taking the opposite view, the majority apparently concludes that characterizing an employer’s refusal to accommodate as falling within the meaning of the statutory phrase “discrimination because of creed” is error, because such a characterization would import into the statute a specific provision, namely the duty to accommodate, that the legislature omitted. The majority does not say how it knows that the Wisconsin legislature omitted this spe*382cific provision from the meaning of the phrase “discrimination because of creed,” a legal standard which is capable of bearing several meanings and which must be applied to a multitude of fact situations. The legislature has not stated in the Act whether discrimination does or does not include the duty to or refusal to accommodate. As the majority admits, the most that can be gleaned from the legislative history is that the legislature has not enacted any bill which proposed incorporating an accommodation provision into the statute. And the majority correctly concludes that it does not believe “it would be logical or reasonable to assert that the failure of this bill to be enacted constitutes a legislative rejection of the duty to accommodate.” Supra, p. 349.
To support its conclusion the majority looks to extrinsic aids to determine the intent of the Wisconsin legislature. Thus, the majority looks to, but refuses to give weight to, DILHR’s long-standing (as of the date of this opinion) but noncontemporaneous construction of the Act. The majority reviews several federal and state court decisions in which the court had to decide whether a statutory provision similar to Wisconsin’s statute prohibiting “discrimination because of creed” encompassed a duty to accommodate. Some courts concluded the statutory phrase included the concept of accommodation and other courts reached the opposite conclusion; the result depended on which factors indicative of legislative intent that court found most persuasive. I conclude from these cases, in particular the TW A-Hardison case and the federal cases prior to the 1972 federal statutory amendment, that reasonable courts can reach different conclusions as to whether a particular legislative body intended “discrimination because of creed” to encompass a duty to accommodate.
I look to the language of and the objective to be accomplished by the Fair Employment Act to determine the legislature’s intent as to the meaning of “discrimination because of creed.” The Wisconsin legislature, un*383like Congress or other state legislatures, has set forth the objective of the Act and has given the court guidance to determine the meaning of and application of the Act. The Wisconsin legislature has directed that where there may be more than one reasonable way to interpret or apply the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, this court is to interpret and apply the Act in the way that will “encourage and foster to the fullest extent possible the employment of all properly qualified persons regardless of their . . . creed . . . .” Sec. 111.31(3), Stats. 1979-80. Recognizing this statement of legislative policy, purpose and intent as an interpretive aid, this court has in prior cases declined to give the Fair Employment Act a “too constrictive” reading, saying:
“The Wisconsin Fair Employment Code was promulgated so as to encourage and foster to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified persons. To accomplish this goal, the code restricted the employer’s right to discriminate against those individuals who, though female, old, handicapped or whatever, could function efficiently on the job. If the individual can function efficiently on the job, then the mere fact that he is different from the average employee as to those statutorily proscribed bases may not be used as a basis for discrimination. To effectuate this purpose, the code is to be liberally construed. Sec. 111.31(3), Stats.” Chicago, M., St. P. & P. RR. Co. v. DILHR, 62 Wis.2d 392, 397, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974).
Giving “the terms actually used by the legislature . . . the fullest application within proper definitional guidelines that are consistent with the spirit of the legislation” (Supra, p. 351), I conclude that an employer’s refusal to make reasonable accommodation for a member of a minority faith when there is no undue hardship on the employer falls within the language of the statute barring discrimination.
This court said in Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. DILHR, 68 Wis.2d 345, 368, 228 N.W.2d 649 (1975), that “the broad purpose of the Fair Employment Act is to eliminate practices that have a discriminatory impact as well as prac*384tices which on their face amount to invidious discrimination.” I am persuaded that an employer’s refusal to make a reasonable accommodation for a member of a minority faith when there is no undue hardship on the employer has a discriminatory impact on the employment opportunity of members of minority faiths substantially similar to that resulting from overt invidious discrimination of the kind illustrated by a sign saying: “No person who obeys the tenets of a minority religion need apply.” In both situations the employer forces the employee to choose between job and creed when the creed does not adversely affect job performance. Both practices have significant discriminatory impact. Both practices violate the Act.
Perhaps the point is better illustrated by anticipating the practical effect of the majority decision. After reading the majority opinion, I tried to put myself into the position of an attorney whose client has requested her to draft a notice to be given to job applicants explaining the company’s now legalized “no accommodation” personnel policy. I drafted the following notice:
WE WANT TO EXPLAIN — WE DO NOT ACCOMMODATE
“It is our strict and unbending policy not to give employees days off for religious holy day observances. Our employees need not work on the afternoon of December 24, the day of December 25, and the afternoon of Good Friday. We know these times off coincide with the religious holy days of the majority religions in this country. We give these days off because it is customary in the United States for businesses to do so, not because it is the policy of this company to give employees days off for religious holy day observances.
“It would not be very difficult for us to allow an employee who is a member of a non-majority religious faith to take off up to 10 days a year without pay to observe their obligatory religious holy days; we would have to make adjustments in our record keeping systems, but neither our business nor our other employees would be *385seriously inconvenienced. You need not explain these facts to us. We are aware of them. Nevertheless it is our strict and unbending policy not to give employees days off for religious holy day observances.
“We do not view our policy of giving everyone time off on December 24, December 25 and Good Friday as favoring the majority religions. We do not view our policy of denying time off without pay to employees of non-majority religious faiths for their obligatory religious holy days as disfavoring minority religions. We view our ‘no accommodation policy’ as a neutral policy, neither favoring nor disfavoring persons of particular religious persuasions or of no religious persuasion.
“We support your right to the free exercise of your religion. Your right is guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and Wisconsin. We support the constitutions. But if you want time off to observe your obligatory religious holy days you cannot work here. Don’t ask us to make an exception for you. Our answer will be no. We hope you understand our position. We do not accommodate.”
The substance of this notice would not violate the majority’s interpretation of the state legislative proscription against discrimination because of creed. The substance of this notice is that the employer’s condition for employing members of a minority religion is that they give up their creed even though allowing them to observe their religious beliefs and practices would not cause undue burden on the employer and would not interfere with their ability to perform the job satisfactorily for the employer; the employer does not impose the same condition for employing members of a majority religion.
I do not believe that the legislature intended this court to interpret the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act in a way that would permit employers to adopt the kind of employment practice my notice sets forth. I do not think this kind of employment practice is what the legislature had in its collective mind when it said that “it is declared to be the public policy of the state to encourage and foster to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified persons regardless of *386their age, race, creed, color, handicap, sex, national origin or ancestry. This subchapter shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of this purpose.”5
I dissent because I think the position taken by the majority is inconsistent with the Act and its statement of *387this state’s strong and long-standing public policy fostering religious equality and diversity in our pluralistic society. Fortunately the Wisconsin legislature has the opportunity to set the record straight.

 I recognize that AMC and DILHR also treat this case as an accommodation case. It is to their mutual advantage to take this position. AMC has a better chance of winning if it casts the issue as discrimination by failure to accommodate rather than as discrimination by another means. Bartell apparently is no longer really interested in the case and DILHR’s real interest in pursuing this case is to get a definitive court decision on the issue of accommodation.
For a discussion of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, see Comment, Wisconsin Fair Employment Act: Coverage, Procedures, Substance and Remedies, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 696, 718-721.

 The Connecticut Supreme Court made this point stating:
“Since the basic claim of the plaintiff was that her employment was terminated because of discrimination against her because of *371her religion, evidence was offered as to the treatment of people of other religious faiths who were employees of the company. Those Jewish employees of Avco who were members of the bargaining unit were not generally permitted to take time off to observe Rosh Hashanah because the bargaining agreement sets forth only specific holidays. Some of these employees may be given the time off without pay, but this is a decision within the discretion of individual departmental supervisors. Yom Kippur is not a listed holiday for employees in the bargaining unit. From time to time employees of various religious beliefs requested time off for religious holidays and Avco acceded to certain of such requests on occasion, but the requests were very irregular and not for the same day for a period of sixteen weeks [as plaintiff requested].
“Article XIII, sec. 3 of the agreement between Avco and the union provides as follows: ‘Neither the Company nor the Union shall discriminate against any employee on account of race, creed, sex or national origin.’ The board of arbitration after a full hearing reached the conclusion that there was no discrimination against the plaintiff because of her religion. The language of the arbitrators is significant. ‘To put it another way, since the Company does not intend to accommodate itself to individuals schedules, as indeed it could not if it desires to continue to maintain an efficient industrial operation, it cannot accede to grievant’s request in this instance without itself being in violation of the . . . Collective Bargaining Agreement proviso. The grievant has no right or entitlement to request the Company so to act.” Corey v. Avco Lycoming Div., Avco Corp., 163 Conn. 309, 307 A.2d 155, 158, 159 (1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 1116 (1973) (cited by the majority at p. 368, n. 13).
In Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 513, 522 (6th Cir. 1975), 468 F.2d 346, 348-349 (6th Cir. 1972) (cited by the majority at pp. 360, 362), the employer required employees to be available for work on Saturdays and “never employed a copy-reader with the understanding that he would be relieved from working on a particular day.” A Seventh Day Adventist was denied a job because he refused to agree to work on Saturday. There was no discrimination. The issue was whether the law required the employer to accommodate.
*372In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (cited by the majority at p. 361), the Reynolds Metals Company’s collective bargaining agreement required employees to perform all straight time and overtime required of them by the company; Reynolds Metals required work on Saturdays and Sundays but permitted employees assigned to work on the weekends to be relieved from the assignment by making arrangements for a qualified replacement. Dewey, a member of the Faith Reformed Church, refused to work on Sunday and refused to arrange for a replacement. The court held that Reynolds Metals Company had provided a fair, equitable method of distributing the workload among its employees which did not discriminate against any of them. The issue in the case was then whether the law required Reynolds Metals to accommodate.
In Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, reh. and reh. en banc den. (5th Cir. 1972) (cited by majority at pp. 362, 363), the court found that the general company policies, the company rules and the company working conditions provided for fixed work schedules without deviation for religious practices and further found that these policies, rules and working conditions were applied uniformly and fairly with respect to all employees. The issue was then whether the law required Bendix Corporation to accommodate.
In Olin Corp. v. Fair Employment Practices, 67 Ill.2d 466, 367 N.E.2d 1267 (1977) (cited by majority at p. 368, n. 13) and in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (cited by majority at p. 363), the burdens of weekend work were a matter for collective bargaining and there was no complaint that the rules set forth in the bargaining agreement were not fairly or uniformly applied. The complainants in both cases wanted to be treated as exceptions to the generally established work rules applicable to all employees. The issue in the cases was did the law require the corporations to accommodate.
In Maine Human Rts. Comm. v. Local 1361, United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 383 A.2d 369 (Maine 1978) (cited by the majority at p 365) and in Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Products, Inc., 583 P.2d 860 (Alaska 1978) (cited by the majority at p 364), it is clear that the unions permitted no exceptions to the payment of monthly union dues and that a Seventh Day Adventist was asking *373for special dispensation to refrain from payment. The issue in these cases was whether the law required the unions to accommodate.
Implicit in Rankins v. Comm’n on Prof. Comp. of Ducor, 24 Cal.3d 167, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907, 593 P.2d 852 (1979), app. dism’d, 444 U.S. 986 (1979) (cited by the majority at p. 365) and in Dept. of Civil Rts. ex rel. Mary Parks v. General Motors Corp., 93 Mich. App. 366 (1979), 287 N.W.2d 240, app. docketed, 408 Mich. 929 (1980) (cited by the majority at p. 366), is that the employer allowed no other person to be present for religious reasons during the regular scheduled work period to the extent demanded by these employees. The issue in these cases was whether the law required the unions to accommodate.

 Creed is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 533, as “a formulation or epitome of principles, rules, opinions, and precepts formally expressed and seriously adhered to and maintained.”

 The testimony of an AMC supervisor can be read to mean that although AMC’s policy was to allow time off for observance of obligatory religious holidays this policy did not apply if it was “critical” for the job that the employee not be released. The AMC supervisor said: “Some people work on seven-day operations. If we had somebody who had to be off every Saturday and every Sunday, we’d terminate him. We could transfer him to a department where the particular days off would not be critical. A person could be transferred. It would be difficult if he were a specialist.”

 The full Declaration of Policy (sec. 111.31, Stats. 1979-80) is as follows:
“111.31 Declaration of policy. (1) The practice of denying employment and other opportunities to, and discriminating against, properly qualified persons by reason of their age, race, creed, color, handicap, sex, national origin, ancestry, arrest record or conviction record, is likely to foment domestic strife and unrest, and substantially and adversely affect the general welfare of a state by depriving it of the fullest utilization of its capacities for production. The denial by some employers, licensing agencies and labor unions of employment opportunities to such persons solely because of their age, race, creed, color, handicap, sex, national origin, ancestry, arrest record or conviction record, and discrimination against them in employment, tends to deprive the victims of the earnings which are necessary to maintain a just and decent standard of living, thereby committing grave injury to them.
“(2) It is believed by many students of the problem that protection by law of the rights of all people to obtain gainful employment, and other privileges free from discrimination because of age, race, creed, color, handicap, sex, national origin or ancestry, would remove certain recognized sources of strife and unrest, and encourage the full utilization of the productive resources of the state to the benefit of the state, the family and to all the people of the state.
“(3) In the interpretation and application of this subchapter, and otherwise, it is declared to be the public policy of the state to encourage and foster to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified persons regardless of their age, race, creed, color, handicap, sex, national origin or ancestry. This sub-chapter shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of this purpose.
“(4) The practice of requiring employes or prospective employes to submit to honesty tests without providing safeguards for the test subjects is unfair, and the use of improper tests and testing procedures causes injury to the employes and prospective employes.”