Court Opinion

ID: 9906052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:30.794923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.089705
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 County of Los Angeles v. Yakovi CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,                                    B311483, B313322

          Plaintiffs and Respondents,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
          v.                                                      20STCV40645)

 SHAUL YAKOVI et al.,

          Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
     Law Office of Mainak D’Attaray and Mainak D’Attaray for
Defendants and Appellants.
     Miller Barondess, Amnon Z. Siegel, Jason H. Tokoro,
Andrew L. Shrader, and Eleanor S. Ruth for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
       Defendants and appellants Shaul Yakovi (Yakovi), Ronit
Waizgen, and Ben and Reef Gardens Inc. own and operate
Gardens of Paradise, an events venue in Santa Clarita (the
venue). Plaintiffs and respondents County of Los Angeles and
Public Health Officer Muntu Davis, M.D. (collectively, the
County) filed a civil action against defendants for, among other
things, violating (1) the County of Los Angeles Fire Code (Fire
Code)1 and zoning laws and (2) the County of Los Angeles
COVID-19 Health Officer order that was then in force in 2020
(Health Order). At the County’s request, the trial court entered a
preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from hosting
events at the venue until they remedied the Fire Code violations
and complied with the then-existing mandates of the Health
Order. Defendants appeal from the order issuing the injunction
and from subsequent orders concerning the injunction, including
a modification of its terms. We consider (1) whether the orders
challenged on appeal are moot insofar as they are predicated on
aspects of County Health Officer orders that no longer exist in
light of changed public health conditions and (2) whether the
injunction is justified insofar as it is predicated on Fire Code
violations.

1
      “Except as changed, amended, added to, or removed, as
established by ordinance and reflected [within it],” the County of
Los Angeles Fire Code incorporates the California Fire Code,
located at Part 9 of California Code of Regulations Title 24, and
certain chapters of the International Fire Code. (Los Angeles
County Code, § 32.100.)

                                 2
                         I. BACKGROUND
       A.     Fire Code and Health Order Violations
       In August 2020, just months into the COVID-19 pandemic,
the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health received
complaints that there were large events taking place at the venue
in violation of the Health Order, which prohibited large
gatherings and required specific public health protocols for
smaller gatherings. In September and October 2020, Los Angeles
County officials from the Department of Public Health, the
Sherriff’s Department, and the Fire Department inspected the
venue on multiple occasions, each time finding violations of the
Fire Code and then-existing Health Order.
       Health Order violations included hosting an “unapproved
large event” of over 200 guests, not posting required COVID-19
protocols or signs, hosting live entertainment, providing valet
parking, attendees not wearing required face coverings, “wait
staff not wearing face shields,” and employees and attendees not
practicing social distancing. Fire Department personnel
identified three violations of the Fire Code during the first site
visit: a non-permitted tent structure, use of an office building and
two bathrooms without final occupancy approval, and failure to
install fire hydrants. The violations persisted unremedied on
four additional site visits, and County personnel issued violation
notices each time.

       B.    The County Sues and Seeks Injunctive Relief
       With the observed violations still unremedied, the County
sued defendants in October 2022 alleging violations of the then-
effective Health Order, the County Fire Code and zoning laws,

                                 3
and public nuisance laws (Code Civ. Proc., § 731).2 The County
prayed for injunctive relief and civil penalties.
       The same day it filed suit, the County applied ex parte for a
temporary restraining order and for issuance of an order to show
cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. The county
argued defendants’ repeated violations of the Health Order and
the Fire Code created a public nuisance, endangered the
community, and threatened irreparable harm because of the risk
of COVID-19 transmission and the risk of fire. An accompanying
declaration from Fire Department Battalion Chief Steven
Swiatek attested to the previously found Fire Code violations. A
declaration from Mark Como, an Environmental Health
Specialist with the County’s Department of Public Health,
averred defendants had continued to hold events at the venue
after the County’s lawsuit had been filed.
       The trial court granted the request for a temporary
restraining order (as to Ben and Reef Gardens Inc. and Yakovi
only) and ordered defendants to show cause why a preliminary
injunction should not issue.3 Yakovi opposed the County’s

2
      A first amended complaint was filed two months later
adding a claim under the Unfair Competition Law that relied on
the other identified violations of law in the complaint as the
predicate for an unlawful business practice.
3
      Before the court considered whether to issue a preliminary
injunction, the County obtained evidence defendants were
continuing to host events in violation of the terms of the
restraining order.

                                 4
request for a preliminary injunction.4 He argued the County was
unlikely to succeed on the merits of its Health Order-related
claims because the venue was hosting “religious weddings and
other religious events” in compliance with the County’s rules for
providers of religious and cultural ceremonies. He further argued
the County was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its Fire Code-
related claims because the tent structure was not subject to
regulation (he argued it was not a permanent structure and not a
“tent” because it was a canopy open on all sides) and because
there were other areas of the venue used to host events separate
from the areas where violations were found. Yakovi also argued
the balance of harms tipped in his favor.

      C.     The Trial Court Issues a Preliminary Injunction,
             Which Is Later Modified After Defendants’ Continued
             Noncompliance
      After hearing argument from the parties over the course of
two hearings in December 2020, the trial court granted the
County’s requested preliminary injunction.
      As to the claimed violation of the Health Order, the court
found the County had shown a likelihood of success on the merits
because defendants hosted large gatherings four times in October
2020 (after receiving multiple County citations and even after the
court’s restraining order prohibited such events) without
complying with the Health Order’s requirements. The court also
rejected Yakovi’s argument that the Health Order violated his or

4
      Defendant Ben and Reef Gardens Inc. did not file an
opposition because it was a suspended corporation and could not
participate in the litigation.

                                5
his customers’ constitutional rights under the Free Exercise
Clause.
       Regarding the Fire Code violations, the court rejected
Yakovi’s contention that a permit for the tent (or canopy) was not
required under the terms of Fire Code section 105.6.47 [current
section 105.5.49].5 The court also found defendants had not
contested the other asserted violations of the Fire Code
(structures without final occupancy approval and lack of fire
hydrants), which the court characterized as a “fatal” concession
because it demonstrated the County necessarily had shown a
likelihood of success on the merits as to at least those Fire Code-
related claims.
       The trial court also analyzed the balance of relative harms
asserted by the County and defendants. The court found there
was a risk of irreparable harm to the public because “[t]he
Venue’s violation of the . . . Fire Code represent[s] significant
community risk” and the County was in any event entitled to a
presumption of public harm because it had demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits. By contrast, the court found
defendants’ asserted harms were overstated because they were

5
        The Fire Code was repealed and replaced effective March 2,
2023, and some of the pertinent section numbers of the code
changed as a result. We refer in this opinion to the section
numbers in existence at the time of the preliminary injunction,
with parenthetical or marginal references to the current code as
necessary. Fire Code section 105.6.47 [current section 105.5.49]
provided “[a]n operational permit is required to operate an air-
supported temporary membrane structure, a temporary special
event structure or a tent having an area in excess of 400 square
feet . . . .” The same section allows an exception for “[t]ents open
on all sides” if such a tent has a maximum size of 700 square feet.

                                 6
partly self-inflicted: defendants would be financially harmed by
having to close the venue, but that was because they chose not to
comply with the Fire Code requirements. Balancing the two
showings, the court concluded the “overall risk to the community”
was greater and “the harm of not imposing the injunction
outweighs the harm . . . that will be suffered by Defendant
Yakovi and his customers.”
       The trial court thereafter entered an injunction on January
6, 2021, prohibiting defendants from: “1. Conducting,
participating in, or hosting events at [the venue] until
Defendants comply with the Fire Code, including the permitting
requirements of . . . Fire Code [sections] 105.3.3, 105.6.37 and
105.6.47 [current section 150.5.49], as well as the fire-
suppression equipment requirements of . . . Fire Code [section]
903.2.1; and [¶] 2. Once Defendants have complied with the Fire
Code, conducting, participating in, or hosting events at the
Property which violate the operative provisions of the Revised
Temporary Targeted Safer At Home Health Officer Order For
Control Of COVID-19, most recently amended on December 19,
[2020,] or any superseding Health Officer Order (the “County
Health Order”) that may be in effect at that time.”
       Three weeks later, Yakovi filed an ex parte application to
clarify or modify the preliminary injunction. As to the
injunction’s first clause prohibiting events at the venue until the
Fire Code violations were remedied, Yakovi argued the Fire Code
provisions did not apply to the venue’s four outdoor event sites
and the court should accordingly “clarify that the [preliminary
injunction] does not reach activity or conduct that is not illegal or
a violation of the Fire Code . . . .”

                                  7
      The County opposed the application and supported its
opposition with a declaration from a deputy sheriff who attested
to responding to a noise complaint at the venue on January 17,
2021, and observing “a Hummer stretch limo as well as dozens of
other cars parked inside the Property” while hearing loud music
and many people partying.
      The trial court denied the application and found Yakovi
had “failed to meet his burden of demonstrating entitlement to a
modification or clarification of the preliminary injunction. The
preliminary injunction requires Defendants to comply with the
Fire Code before hosting any events at the venue—something
required of any space in the County without the need for a
preliminary injunction. There is no evidence before the court
that suggests Defendants have, in fact, complied with the Fire
Code” and “no evidence [that] suggests [the existence of] a
dispute between the County and Defendants concerning Fire
Code compliance.” Defendants thereafter noticed an appeal from
this ruling and the earlier decision granting the preliminary
injunction.
      In April 2021, the County applied ex parte to modify the
preliminary injunction. The County advised the court, via a
declaration from a sergeant at Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department, that defendants had again violated the terms of the
preliminary injunction in place by holding an event at the venue.
The County asked the court to add enforcement provisions to the
existing injunction that would direct the venue’s utility service
provider to shut off service and authorize the County to erect
barricades preventing access to the venue and to enter the venue
and remove any individuals present in violation of the
preliminary injunction. Yakovi opposed the application and

                                8
contended, with regard to the Fire Code compliance clause of the
injunction, that the injunction did not apply to the four outdoor
event sites at the venue that were in compliance with the Fire
Code.
      The trial court granted the County’s motion to modify the
preliminary injunction as requested. The court also denied
defendants’ oral motion to stay the additional provisions of the
modified preliminary injunction from taking effect while the
appeal of the preliminary injunction was pending. Defendants
noticed an appeal from this order modifying the preliminary
injunction too, and this court consolidated the appeals (from the
preliminary injunction and the subsequent clarification and
modification orders) for decision.

                         II. DISCUSSION
       The bulk of this appeal is now moot. As the County
concedes, no health officer order exists at present that limits
defendants’ operations. Defendants acknowledge this means
their challenge to the injunction requiring compliance with
previously issued health officer orders “should be moot.”6 The
County, however, asks that we nevertheless rule on the moot
issue as one “of substantial and continuing interest for the
parties and the public that may well recur.” We decline. The
County’s request is admittedly and impermissibly speculative
(“that may well recur”; “to the extent a future Health Order is in

6
       Also moot is defendants’ purported appeal of the trial
court’s refusal to stay the modified injunction while appellate
proceedings were pending. Defendants never sought supersedeas
relief in this court, and we can grant no effective relief on that
score at this stage of the appellate proceedings.

                                 9
place”) and amounts to an invitation to issue an advisory opinion
on the nature and extent of the County’s emergency powers—
something we do not do. (See, e.g., Verdugo v. Target Corp.
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 312, 316, fn. 1 [“we do not resolve abstract
questions of law”]; Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129,
132 [“It is settled that ‘the duty of this court, as of every other
judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case
before it’”].)
       What is left for decision, then, is only the propriety of the
trial court’s operative preliminary injunction that prohibits
operations at the venue until the Fire Code deficiencies are
remedied. We hold the trial court correctly concluded that an
injunction should issue to that effect: the County is likely to
succeed on the merits (no matter whether the structure is
characterized as a tent or a canopy it still falls within the scope of
the relevant Fire Code provision and when outdoor event spaces
are used, other unapproved structures—most prominently,
bathrooms—are also necessarily used) and the trial court
correctly concluded the balance of harms tips in the County’s
favor.

       A.    Preliminary Injunction Standards
       “In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a
trial court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (i) the
likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will ultimately
prevail on the merits of his [or her] claim, and (ii) the balance of
harm presented, i.e., the comparative consequences of the

                                 10
issuance and nonissuance of the injunction. On appeal, questions
underlying the preliminary injunction are reviewed under the
appropriate standard of review. Thus, for example, issues of fact
are subject to review under the substantial evidence standard;
issues of pure law are subject to independent review.” (People ex
rel. Feuer v. Nestdrop, LLC (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 664, 672
[cleaned up].)

      B.     The Trial Court Was Correct to Preliminarily Enjoin
             Use of the Venue Until the Identified Fire Code
             Violations Were Cured
             1.    Likelihood of success on the merits
       The trial court correctly found that the County is likely to
prevail on the merits of its Fire Code violation claim. The Fire
Code requires proof, in the form of permits and inspections, that
“applicable provisions of [the] code have been met” before
buildings and structures may be occupied. (§ 105.3.3.) The Fire
Code also requires operational permits when operating “an air-
supported temporary membrane structure, a temporary special
event structure or a tent having an area in excess of 400 square
feet.” (§ 105.6.47, italics added.)
       A permit was obviously required for defendant’s tent, which
is a 10,000 square foot, circular, fabric covered structure. As
defined in the Fire Code, a “temporary special event structure” is
“[a]ny temporary ground-supported structure, platform, stage,
stage scaffolding or rigging, canopy, tower supporting audio or
visual effects equipment or similar structures not regulated
within the scope of the California Building Code.” (Fire Code,
§ 202, italics added.) To the same end, a “tent” is defined as “[a]
structure, enclosure, umbrella structure or shelter, with or

                                11
without sidewalls or drops, constructed of fabric or pliable
material supported in any manner except by air or the contents it
protects.” (Fire Code, § 202, italics added.) Defendants’ tent falls
within both definitions, so it does not matter whether the tent is
permanent or whether it is open on all sides. The exception for
tents 700 square feet or smaller that we previously mentioned in
the margin also does not apply.
      In addition, and as in the trial court, defendants have no
valid rejoinder to the other identified Fire Code violations upon
which the injunction is predicated. All defendants assert is that
Fire Code requirements do not apply to “purely outdoor” event
spaces. That, however, is unpersuasive for two reasons. First,
defendants never adduced adequate evidence below that there
are such purely outdoor event spaces; when the trial court
specifically invited Yakovi to come forward with such evidence,
he did not. Second, even fully outdoor event spaces require
ancillary use of, or support from, at least some of the structures
at the venue that lack final approval; as the trial court put it, “it
strains credulity that there would be an event there where
there’s no working bathroom.”

             2.    Interim harms
       “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily
is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or
interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued
pending an adjudication of the merits.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30
Cal.4th 528, 554.) However, “[w]here a governmental entity
seeking to enjoin the alleged violation of an ordinance which
specifically provides for injunctive relief establishes that it is
reasonably probable it will prevail on the merits, a rebuttable

                                 12
presumption arises that the potential harm to the public
outweighs the potential harm to the defendant. If the defendant
shows that it would suffer grave or irreparable harm from the
issuance of the preliminary injunction, the court must then
examine the relative actual harms to the parties.” (IT Corp. v.
County of Imperial, 35 Cal.3d 63, 72, footnote omitted.)
      Even putting aside the presumption of public harm that
arises when county counsel of any county brings an action to
abate a public nuisance (Code Civ. Proc., § 731), the trial court’s
finding that the harm of not issuing the injunction outweighed
any harm that would arise from issuing it is still well-supported.
The trial court based its determination on “the significant
community risk” posed by the Fire Code violations. In addition,
while the trial court acknowledged defendants’ potential
economic harm from having to shutter the venue, it also properly
recognized the harm was self-inflicted and accordingly entitled to
lesser weight.

      3.     The preliminary injunction is not impermissibly
             vague or overbroad
       “‘An injunction must be narrowly drawn to give the party
enjoined reasonable notice of what conduct is prohibited.’
[Citation.]” (Midway Venture LLC v. County of San Diego (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 58, 92.) Preliminary injunctions must also “‘be
sufficiently precise to provide a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that her contemplated conduct is forbidden.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       The trial court’s injunction does not run afoul of these
requirements. It clearly requires the correction of defendants’
Fire Code violations as a threshold step before they can hold

                                13
events in conformity with current County health officer orders,
and it explicitly provides the sections of the Fire Code with which
defendants must comply. Thus, while defendants contend they
do not “know whether they are or are not complying with the law
or the injunction[,]” their argument is essentially the same as the
arguments we have already rejected in assessing the likelihood of
success on the merits. All the Fire Code violations must be
remedied no matter how defendants try to partition the various
spaces (outdoor or not) at the venue.

                           DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s orders are affirmed. The County shall
recover its costs on appeal.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                            BAKER, J.

We concur:

      RUBIN, P. J.

      MOOR, J.

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