Court Opinion

ID: 9929117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 19:03:39.906406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:14:12.749275
License: Public Domain

Court of Appeals
of the State of Georgia

                                        ATLANTA,____________________
                                                 February 01, 2024

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A24A0893. DAVID EDWARD ROBERTS v. THE STATE.

      In 1998, a jury found David Roberts guilty of aggravated assault, armed robbery,
and two firearm offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of life in prison for the
armed robbery conviction, to be followed by a total of 15 years in prison and 15 years
on probation for the remaining convictions. This Court affirmed Roberts’s judgment
of conviction in 2003. Roberts v. State, 262 Ga. App. 629 (585 SE2d 920) (2003).
      In 2023, Roberts filed a motion to vacate void sentences, arguing that: (i) the
trial court erred by (a) imposing a sentence of life in prison followed by probation —
which, Roberts claims, violates constitutional separation-of-powers principles — and
(b) using a 1978 armed robbery conviction — which, Roberts claims, the court
impermissibly deemed a “capital offense” — for impeachment purposes and in
aggravation of his current sentence; and (ii) his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to understand Georgia sentencing law. The trial court summarily
denied Roberts’s motion, and he filed this direct appeal. We lack jurisdiction.
      Under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence during the year after
its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal, whichever
is later. Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346, 348 (691 SE2d 247) (2010). Once, as here,
this statutory period expires, a trial court may modify only a void sentence. Id. “A
sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.” Jones
v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004) (citation and punctuation omitted).
When a sentence falls within the statutory range of punishment, it is not void and is
not subject to modification beyond the time provided in OCGA § 17-10-1 (f). See id.
Moreover, a direct appeal does not lie from the denial of a motion to modify a
sentence filed outside the statutory time period unless the motion raises a colorable
claim that the sentence is, in fact, void. Frazier, 302 Ga. App. at 348.
      Armed robbery is punishable by, inter alia, “imprisonment for life or by
imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years.” OCGA § 16-8-41 (b).
Roberts’s sentence of life in prison for his armed robbery conviction thus is not void,
because it falls within the statutory range of punishment for that offense, regardless
of whether the trial court deemed it or a prior armed robbery conviction a “capital
offense.”1
      The only authority Roberts cites in support of his claim that imposing a term
of life in prison followed by a term of probation violates separation-of-powers
principles and renders his total sentence void — Brown v. State, 246 Ga. 251 (271
SE2d 163) (1980) — does not support his argument. In Brown, the Supreme Court
held that a court could not impose a term of probation following a sentence of life in
prison for a murder conviction because offenses that are punishable by death or life
imprisonment are ineligible for probation. Id. at 252-253 (5). Here, however, the trial
court did not impose a probationary sentence for Roberts’s armed robbery conviction.
It rather imposed a term of probation for Roberts’s convictions for aggravated assault
and two firearm offenses, to be served consecutively to his sentence of life in prison
for armed robbery. The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown thus does not render
Roberts’s sentence here void.
      Roberts’s claims regarding improper impeachment and aggravation of sentence
pertain only to his underlying convictions and the trial court’s discretion in imposing

      1
       Roberts does not contend that the individual sentences entered for his non-
armed robbery convictions are outside the statutory ranges of punishment.
sentence, and have no bearing on whether the sentence imposed falls within the
statutory limits. Moreover, absent any colorable claim that his sentence is outside the
statutory time period, Roberts’s contention that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance is irrelevant to his void-sentence claim. And absent a colorable void-
sentence claim, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.
See Frazier, 302 Ga. App. at 349.

                                        Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
                                          Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________
                                                                      02/01/2024
                                                   I certify that the above is a true extract from
                                        the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
                                                  Witness my signature and the seal of said court
                                        hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

                                                                                          , Clerk.