Court Opinion

ID: 9904747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 19:03:31.955283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:19.161597
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 Woods v. Law Offices of Shahrokh Mokhtarzadeh CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

ALFREDO WOODS,                                                 B318790

    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BC707662
         v.

LAW OFFICES OF SHAHROKH
MOKHTARZADEH, PLC et al.,

    Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Affirmed.

         Alfredo Woods, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

     Michelman & Robinson and Steven S. Davis for Defendants
and Respondents.

                            _____________________________
                              SUMMARY
       Plaintiff Alfredo Woods tells us in the introduction to his
opening brief that he brought a claim for legal malpractice, and
his appeal arises from the trial court’s grant of defendants’
motion for nonsuit and the court’s subsequent denial of his
motion for a new trial. That is the last we hear about the motion
for nonsuit or the rulings until page 23, where plaintiff describes
defendants’ contentions, and on page 24, where plaintiff contends
the grant of nonsuit was “a grave error that overlooked the
overwhelming weight of evidence demonstrating intentional
disloyalty, negligence, and deficient legal advice by [defendants].”
       Plaintiff does not engage with the legal principle
underlying the court’s nonsuit ruling. Plaintiff was required to
establish more than defendants’ malpractice. The issue in the
case was not whether defendants were negligent; that element of
plaintiff’s case was presumed in the motion for nonsuit. The
issue was whether plaintiff proffered any evidence that in the
absence of the alleged malpractice, plaintiff would have achieved
a better result. The court concluded that, drawing all inferences
in favor of plaintiff, “there’s simply no evidence . . . that has been
offered that would prove [the] causation and damages
element . . . .”
       We see no error in that conclusion. Moreover, while
defendants have not raised the point, our review of plaintiff’s
opening brief and appendix reveals that plaintiff has failed to
comply with multiple rules of appellate procedure, a failure that
justifies a finding he has forfeited any argument that the motion
for nonsuit was erroneously granted. His statement of facts goes
on for 20 pages, often with no citations to the record, and the
citations that are included are to a string of exhibits, declarations
and other documents, without telling us where in his 3,267-page

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appendix any of the documents may be found. Plaintiff’s legal
argument contains no citations to the record at all. We have no
obligation to ferret out the facts on our own, and when we
nonetheless do so, we find evidence related to defendants’ alleged
malpractice, not to whether that malpractice caused the damages
plaintiff claims.
       We affirm the order granting defendants’ motion for
nonsuit and the ensuing judgment.
                               FACTS
       Plaintiff’s malpractice claim arose from an eminent domain
case in which the defendants – Law Offices of Shahrokh
Mokhtarzadeh, PLC and Shahrokh Mokhtarzadeh – represented
plaintiff. Plaintiff owned property he intended to use for solar
generation, its highest and best use. His malpractice lawsuit
alleged defendants failed to retain necessary qualified property
valuation experts before trial. The court issued an order
precluding plaintiff from reopening expert witness discovery so
that he could hire a new expert witness (who would supplement
the flawed opinion of the unqualified appraiser who had valued
the property at $75,000 (the Blaesi appraisal)). “[A]t that point”
plaintiff was forced to settle or go to trial with a flawed appraisal.
       Plaintiff filed his malpractice lawsuit on May 29, 2018, and
the operative second amended complaint on April 9, 2019. He
alleged causes of action for professional negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of contract, among others. (Defendants
filed a cross-complaint to which plaintiff did not respond, and
defendants requested a default judgment on the cross-complaint.)
       Plaintiff contended he was forced to settle out of court “with
a very bad and failed appraisal report,” and the City (Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power, LADWP) would have paid more
for his property than the settlement amount ($70,000), but for
defendants’ handling of the case. Plaintiff cited an appraisal

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report he obtained (the Connolly appraisal), dated February 6,
2018, valuing the property at $218,800 as of May 3, 2016.
       Plaintiff made his opening statement to the above effect on
December 8, 2021. Virtually all of his opening statement
concerned the evidence of defendants’ negligence.
       On December 9, 2021, defendants made an oral motion for
nonsuit, pointing out plaintiff offered no evidence the City would
have settled for more and no expert testimony that plaintiff
would have achieved a better result at trial. Counsel also pointed
out, among other things, that plaintiff’s legal malpractice expert
specifically stated he had no opinions on causation or damages.
       The trial court told plaintiff that defense counsel had raised
“very compelling and valid points about what the evidence is,”
and advised plaintiff to discuss in his response any additional
evidence not previously discussed. Plaintiff then argued about
the Connolly appraisal report, defendants’ negligence that forced
him to settle, the flawed Blaesi appraisal he had to use, and
another property owner in the same eminent domain proceeding
who received a settlement of over $180,000 for a smaller
property.
       The trial court concluded there was no evidence offered to
show the City would have agreed to pay more than $70,000, and
no expert testimony that would support causation and damages if
plaintiff had gone to trial instead of settling: “[A]ssuming all
other facts alleged are true and drawing all inferences in favor of
[p]laintiff], as I must, there’s simply no evidence . . . that has
been offered that would prove the causation and damages
element . . . for the reasons [defense counsel] stated.” (Among
other things, defense counsel again pointed out that while the
joint witness list states that plaintiff’s expert witness on legal
malpractice would testify to subjects including causation and

                                 4
damages, at his deposition the expert explicitly disclaimed
offering any opinions on causation or damages.)
       On February 9, 2022, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from
the court’s December 9, 2021 ruling on the nonsuit motion. At
the time of the December 9, 2021 hearing, there had been no
hearing on the default judgment on defendants’ cross-complaint,
and the court scheduled that hearing for January 27, 2022. The
court indicated it would enter “one single judgment” on the
complaint and the cross-complaint. That judgment was entered
on May 12, 2022.
       Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial based on error of law,
which the trial court denied in an eight-page ruling on
October 21, 2022.
                            DISCUSSION
       Plaintiff’s opening brief disregards many principles
governing appellate review. While plaintiff is representing
himself, that does not excuse his failure to follow basic rules and
principles. (See, e.g., Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
570, 574 [“Although [the appellant] is representing himself in
propria persona, he is not exempt from the rules governing
appeals. A self-represented party is to be treated like any other
party and is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration
than other litigants having attorneys.”].)
       “It is axiomatic that an appellant must support all
statements of fact in his briefs with citations to the record
[citation] and must confine his statement ‘to matters in the
record on appeal.’ ” (Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17,
29.) We have already observed that plaintiff has violated this
principle throughout his brief, and that where there are record
citations, most of them are to exhibits with no indication where
the exhibit may be found. (The index to plaintiff’s appendix has

                                  5
an entry entitled “Plaintiff’s Exhibit List” which, as it turns out,
includes almost 3,000 pages.) This violates court rules requiring
the appendix to contain, at the beginning, indexes “listing each
document and the volume, where applicable, and page where it
first appears.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.144(b)(5)(A) &
8.124(d)(1).) It also violates the rule that a brief must support
any reference to a matter in the record “by a citation to the
volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears.” (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
       “ ‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of
correctness.’ [Citation.] Nor are we ‘required to search the
record on [our] own seeking error.’ ” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 616, 620 (L.O.).) “ ‘ “[I]f a party fails to support an
argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the
argument [will be] deemed to have been waived.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see
ibid. [“[The appellant’s] briefs do not properly cite the record and
are replete with unsupported legal and factual assertions.
Because [the appellant] failed to appropriately cite the record, he
forfeited any argument that the challenged orders were
erroneously issued.”].)
       The failure to cite the record is not the only deficiency in
plaintiff’s briefing. As we also observed at the outset, plaintiff’s
discursive arguments fail to address the pertinent legal point:
whether the facts plaintiff alleged demonstrate that, but for
defendants’ malpractice, plaintiff’s eminent domain case “would
have settled for more or gone to trial and resulted in a larger
recovery.” (Barnard v. Langer (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1462
(Barnard).) Without evidence that the LADWP “would have
settled for more or that a trier of fact would have awarded more”

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(ibid.) than the $70,000 settlement, plaintiff’s arguments about
defendants’ professional negligence take us nowhere.
       Plaintiff’s failure to offer reasoned argument on the
pertinent legal point, like his failure to cite support in the record,
waives the argument. (L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620
[“ ‘[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails
to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority,
we treat the point as waived’ ”].)
       But even if we ignore all the deficiencies in plaintiff’s
briefing and his presentation of the record, his appeal would
nonetheless fail on the merits because the trial court correctly
found that plaintiff proffered no evidence sufficient to allow a fact
finder to conclude that, but for defendants’ negligence, he would
have recovered more in settlement or at trial.
       We state first the standard of review, which plaintiff also
fails to describe in his briefing. The standard of review for a
nonsuit after the plaintiff’s opening statement is de novo: “ ‘ “It
can only be upheld on appeal if, after accepting all the asserted
facts as true and indulging every legitimate inference in favor of
plaintiff, it can be said those facts and inferences lead inexorably
to the conclusion plaintiff cannot establish an essential element
of [his] cause of action . . . .” ’ ” (Carachure v. Scott (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 16, 25.)
       In a legal malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that but for the attorney’s
negligent acts or omissions, he would have obtained a more
favorable judgment or settlement in the action in which the
malpractice allegedly occurred. (Namikas v. Miller (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1582 (Namikas).)

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       As already described, most of the evidence plaintiff offered
concerned defendants’ negligence that forced him to settle. Other
than that, there was the Connolly appraisal report valuing the
property at $218,800; the flaws in the Blaesi appraisal report
plaintiff had to use; and the settlement of another property owner
in the same eminent domain proceeding who received over
$180,000 for a smaller property. What is absent is the same
thing that was absent in Barnard: any evidence that LADWP
would have settled for more, or expert evidence that a trier of fact
would have awarded more. As the trial court put it, plaintiff
“makes no claim that [Mr. Connolly] would have been able to
proffer an expert opinion that either (1) the City would have paid
more to settle or that (2) Plaintiff would have done better at trial
if Plaintiff had submitted an . . . appraisal other than Mr. Blaesi’s
appraisal in the underlying case.” As the Barnard court
observed, “None of [the plaintiff’s] evidence does more than
suggest speculative harm . . . .” (Barnard, supra,
109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1462; ibid. [“[The plaintiff] offered no
evidence that the City would have settled for more or that a trier
of fact would have awarded more . . . , leaving the harm caused
by the [defendant’s] negligence as ‘only a subject of surmise,
given the myriad of variables that affect [trials] of [inverse
condemnation] actions. “[T]he mere probability that a certain
event would have happened, upon which a claim for damages is
predicated, will not support the claim or furnish the foundation of
an action for such damages. . . .” ’ ”].)
       We have one further observation on this subject.
Defendants repeatedly emphasize language from Namikas and
other cases to the effect that, in a legal malpractice case,
“ ‘ “Damage to be subject to a proper award must be such as

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follows the fact complained of as a legal certainty.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.] In other words, the plaintiff must show that ‘[he]
would certainly have received more money [or had to pay less] in
settlement or at trial.’ ” (Namikas, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1582.) Plaintiff responds that this is “an attempt to confuse
and sway the Court to the position that there is a higher burden
of proof, i.e. ‘legal certainty.’ ” (Capitalization omitted.) Plaintiff
cites Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 1077 (Masellis).
       We are not confused. Indeed, Namikas expressly states
that the plaintiff must prove, “by a preponderance of the
evidence,” that he or she would have obtained a more favorable
judgment or settlement but for the defendant’s negligence.
(Namikas, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1582.) Masellis rejected a
claim that the legal certainty standard imposes a higher
standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence by
“interpreting the statement that a plaintiff must present
‘evidence showing to a legal certainty that’ the alleged breach of
duty caused an injury [citation] as simply referring to the degree
of certainty inherent in the applicable burden of proof. For ‘settle
and sue’ legal malpractice actions, we conclude the applicable
burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.” (Masellis,
supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1083.)
       The trial court considered and addressed the Masellis case
in denying plaintiff a new trial: “Masellis simply uses different
language to describe the same analysis: a trial court must weed
out speculative claims by looking to whether the evidence
supports a finding that in the absence of the alleged malpractice,
a plaintiff would have achieved a better result. [Citation.] In the
instant case, Plaintiff did not make an offer of proof that

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admissible, nonspeculative evidence would support a finding that
the use of another expert would have resulted in a higher
settlement.” We agree.
        To the extent plaintiff argues his claims for breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty are distinct from his
professional negligence claim, the distinction fails. As the trial
court observed, all causes of action “are directed at exactly the
same conduct,” and “[t]he speculative nature of Plaintiff’s
purported evidence of causation is a common defect that crosses
all of Plaintiff’s claims.”
       Finally, on pages 47 and 48 of his opening brief, plaintiff
“requests the dismissal of the defendants’ counterclaim and the
unfair default judgment, as he was denied an opportunity to
respond.” That is all plaintiff says on the subject, and the
assertion provides no basis for reversal of the default judgment.
                            DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on
appeal.

                        GRIMES, J.
      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        VIRAMONTES, J.

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