Court Opinion

ID: 9829540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:25:02.653248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:02.760960
License: Public Domain

On Motion 'for Rehearing.
In view of the vigorous motion for a rehearing filed by appellee we call attention to the fact that appellee answered the suit admitting the execution of the note and mortgage on which the suit was brought, and in order to avoid payment, pleaded specifically that it had gone out of the retail business “and no longer was in need of such cash register so bought”, and that “its situation was disclosed to the plaintiff and it was then and there agreed by and between the parties that if the defendant would surrender to the plaintiff said cash register that plaintiff would accept the same and cancel the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, retaining the sums theretofore paid”.
All through this defensive pleading the allegations are made that “the plaintiff” made the agreement and consummated the settlement. At no place was there any pleading that the plaintiff acted through an agent that had actual or implied authority, or through an agent who was acting within the scope or apparent scope of his authority.
The plaintiff was entitled to a specific pleading and urged well taken exceptions to the broad and general allegations so made by the defendant, all of which were overruled by the trial court and exceptions reserved to such rulings.
It is true that the appellant has not urged these actions by the trial court as errors on this appeal, but viewing the record as we do, we do not believe that we should simply reverse and remand the cause for the purpose of permitting the defendant to replead. Under its broad and general allegations, the defendant was permitted to prove everything that was available to it.
We are not to be understood as holding that, under such a broad and general pleading, the defendant could not have established the fact that the agreement relied upon was made by some officer or agent who had the actual authority to do so, but we do hold that the burden was upon the defendant to establish such necessary facts *789in order to defeat the plaintiff’s right to recover.
In 2 Texas Jurisprudence, par. 40, pp. 427-428, wherein the subject of corporation agents is discussed, it is said: “But it should be noted that if there is an actual absence of authority in the agent to do the thing charged, liability must necessarily be predicated on estoppel; if the elements of estoppel do not exist there is no liability.”
This record is devoid of any evidence tending to show actual authority on the part of this local agent to make the contract relied upon by the defendant.
The only dealing that the defendant ever had with the plaintiff’s local agency was to purchase through it the cash register in controversy.
The defendant learned from the contract of purchase that this local agency could not consummate the sale; that it could only take the order and transfer it to the home office of the seller, there to be accepted and filled.
After these steps were taken, the defendant was put upon notice and learned that the purchase price, to be paid in instalments, could not be paid to such local agency but that all payments had to be made to another agency not situated in Wichita Falls, but situated in Fort Worth.
The actual authority of the local agency. was thus made known to the defendant and was shown to be limited.
These facts are obvious and cannot be successfully denied.
The above cited text, at page 461, par. 64, states the general rule that mere authority to sell chattels gives an agent-no power to exchange them for other property or to take anything other than money in payment therefor, or to deliver a new chattel to replace a defective one, even where the agent has authority to sell with a warranty.
And at page 462, par. 67, this text states the rule to be that mere authority to collect debts does not imply authority to release debtors without payment.
As we view the record before us the defendant is relegated to the defense of estoppel and before this can be invoked two important facts must be clearly established: First, the principal must have held the agent out in other instances or in the particular transaction as possessing authority sufficient to embrace the particular .act in question, or must have knowingly acquiesced in the agent’s assertion of the requisite authority; and, second, the person dealing with the agent must have relied upon the conduct of the principal to his prejudice.
Neither of these important facts was established by the defendant in the instant suit.
The defendant here has not changed his position to his injury. He delivered- the cash register to the local office of the plaintiff, when its agent was not present, and he has been notified that the machine is being held for him.
Even though it be assumed that the defendant’s pleadings were sufficient to enable him to stand upon the actual or implied authority of the local agent, or upon estoppel because of the agent’s act being done within the apparent scope of his authority, the evidence does not establish either defense.
The motion for a rehearing is overruled.