Court Opinion

ID: 9592582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:15:26.614334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:38.120873
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice, Retired,
dissenting.
This is a case in which the State knowingly made false representations of fact in argument to the jury which were of such import as would assuredly affect the final verdict. The problem is that this kind of transgression occurs too often in the prosecution of these cases. For the court to continue to affirm is to condone — even encourage — the practice. I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Therefore, I dissent.
James’ defense was that the victim had made up the allegations which were the basis for prosecution to retaliate against James for refusing the victim’s sexual advances. In order to show motive to fabricate, James sought to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sexual history and conduct, his reputation and that he had undergone counseling and treatment for deviant sexual conduct. The State presented a motion in limine to prohibit the introduction of this evidence and evidence that the alleged victim was a practicing homosexual long before he ever met this defendant. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine prohibiting James from introducing any of the victim’s homosexuality, carefully keeping such evidence from the jury, “directly or indirectly.”
Having been denied presentation of his theory of the case, the trial proceeded. With the testimony concluded, the parties having rested their case, and jury having been instructed on the law, final arguments were presented. It was in rebuttal then that the prosecution, knowing of the victim’s prior homosexual history and activity, and having obtained exclusion of it by limine motion, stated to the jury that the victim was a homosexual because the defendant had had four years to make the victim that way. Thus, the prosecutor stated to the jury:
Don’t forget one thing, that young man is the product of this man sitting right over here. He is that way because this man made him that way, and he has four years to do it, four years.
[Defense attorney]: Objection, your Honor. That is misstating the evidence.
THE COURT: There is no evidence of that, counsel.
*209[Prosecutor]: I get a little carried away. Excuse me.
The court deals here not with plain error, but with a proper objection which was sustained as a misstatement of the evidence. First, the comment was not a misstatement of the evidence; it was a false statement, and the jury should have been informed of the falsity, counsel reprimanded before the jury, the jury informed of the true facts or, in the alternative, a mistrial declared.
Somewhere, sometime, someplace, this type of practice must stop. It will not stop as long as it is permitted. As we have often stated:
It must be kept in mind that the prosecuting attorney is a representative of the State whose obligation is to govern impartially, whose aim is not that it win a case but that justice be done. It is his mission that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He is duty bound to prosecute with earnestness and vigor. While he may strike hard blows, he is not free to strike foul ones.
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 166 (Wyo.1981); see also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37, 85 S.Ct. 783, 791,13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 87, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935).
There is a second reason for reversal of this case. The evidence of the victim’s past sexual history and conduct should have been admitted because: (1) it was not within the purview of the rape shield statute, W.S. 6-2-312 (1988); (2) it was relevant and material to the defense; and (3) it was admissible under W.R.E. 404 and 608.
Wyoming’s rape shield statute provides:
Evidence of victim’s prior sexual conduct or reputation; procedure for introduction.
(a)In any prosecution under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-305 or for any lesser included offense, if evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the victim, reputation evidence or opinion evidence as to the character of the victim is to be offered the following procedure shall be used:
(i) A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court at least ten (10) days prior to the trial stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evidence of the sexual conduct of the victim and its relevancy to the defense;
(11) The written motion shall be accompanied by affidavits in which the offer of proof is stated;
(iii) If the court finds the offer of proof sufficient, the court shall order a hearing in chambers, and at the hearing allow the questioning of the victim regarding the offer of proof made by the defendant and other pertinent evidence;
(iv) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the probability that its admission will create prejudice, the evidence shall be admissible pursuant to this section. The court may make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the defendant, which order may include the nature of the questions to be permitted.
(b) This section does not limit the introduction of evidence as to prior sexual conduct of the victim with the actor.
(c) Any motion or affidavit submitted pursuant to this section is privileged information and shall not be released or made available for public use or scrutiny in any manner, including posttrial proceedings.
W.S. 6-2-312 (1988) (emphasis added). The rape shield statute, by its terms, applies to the crimes enumerated at W.S. 6-2-302 (first degree sexual assault), W.S. 6-2-303 (second degree sexual assault), W.S. 6-2-304 (third degree sexual assault), W.S. 6-2-305 (fourth degree sexual assault) and any crime that is a lesser included of those.
James was charged and convicted on two counts of immoral or indecent acts, W.S. 14-3-105 (1994). That crime is not one of the four specifically listed in the rape shield statute; therefore, in order for the rape shield statute to be applicable, 14-3-105 must be a lesser included of one of the four degrees of sexual assault. It is not. See Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo.1992) (first degree sexual assault); Derksen v. State, 845 P.2d 1383 (Wyo.1993) (second degree sexual as*210sault); McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1985) (third degree sexual assault); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo.1988) (fourth degree sexual assault). The rape shield statute is inapplicable to prosecutions for immoral or indecent acts.
Granted, James’ theory of the defense seems particularly weak, especially given the testimony provided by his girlfriend. However, a defendant has the right to present a defense along with supporting witnesses and evidence. United States Constitution, Amend. VI; Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1 § 10; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The trial court’s ruling effectively eviscerated James’ defense.
I dissent and would reverse and remand for new trial.