Court Opinion

ID: 9402576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 06:00:21.547903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.908953
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JOSE E. ROSARIO-FABREGAS,                       DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                       NY-1221-18-0073-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: June 15, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Jose E. Rosario-Fabregas, San Juan, Puerto Rico, pro se.

           E. Christopher Lambert and Elizabeth Moseley, Jacksonville, Florida, for
              the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was a GS-12 Biologist with the agency’s Army Corps of
     Engineers. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1. He filed a complaint with the
     Office of Special Counsel (OSC) in August 2017, alleging that the agency
     retaliated against him for his whistleblowing activities and disclosures by failing
     to inform him about a job vacancy announcement. IAF, Tab 4 at 13-19. After
     OSC completed its investigation, the appellant filed the instant IRA appeal with
     the Board. IAF, Tab 1 at 4-8, Tab 5 at 5. The administrative judge informed the
     appellant of his burden of proof on jurisdiction and directed him to su bmit
     evidence and argument on that issue. IAF, Tab 3. In response, the appellant
     provided additional argument and documentation, such as his correspondence
     with OSC. IAF, Tabs 4-5.
¶3         The administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction . IAF,
     Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 2.     Specifically, she found that the appellant
     failed to nonfrivolously allege that anyone in the agency took a personnel action
     against him. ID at 6.
                                                                                             3

¶4         The appellant has timely filed a petition for review. Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response to the petition, to which the
     appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 4, 6.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection
     Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).          To establish jurisdiction in an IRA
     appeal, an appellant generally must show by preponderant evidence that he
     exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and make nonfrivolous
     allegations 2 that (1) he made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)
     or engaged in a protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
     (B), (C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contri buting
     factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined
     by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).        Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security,
     123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016). 3

     2
       A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
     issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
     3
       The appellant submits documents for the first time on review. PFR File, Tab 6
     at 15-27. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board will not consider evidence submitted
     for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable
     before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). The appellant has made no showing here. All of
     the documents that the appellant submits on review predate the November 14, 2018
     close of the record below and the appellant has not shown that they were unava ilable
     before the close of the record despite his due diligence. IAF, Tab 8 at 5. The appellant
     also appears to allege as a new personnel action that the agency failed to develop
     individual development plans under its Total Army Performance Evaluation Sy stem
     (TAPES). PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5, 11-13. However, the appellant did not raise this
     claim below. In fact, his only references to the TAPES program below suggested either
     that his office was exempt or that it was in compliance with the program. IAF, Tab 4
     at 8. Because the appellant did not prove he exhausted this claim with OSC or raised it
     below, we decline to consider it further. The Board may only consider those personnel
     actions that the appellant raised before OSC. Mason v. Department of Homeland
     Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8 (2011).
                                                                                      4

     The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to
     nonfrivolously allege that the agency took or failed to take a personnel action
     against him.
¶6        In order to prevail in his IRA appeal, the appellant must nonfrivolously
     allege that the agency threatened to take or failed to take, or took or failed to
     take, a “personnel action,” as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).      5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8), (b)(9); Rebstock Consolidation v. Department of Homeland
     Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 9 (2015). As relevant here, “personnel actions”
     include a promotion or appointment. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii); ID at 3.
¶7        In the initial decision, the administrative judge stated that the appellant
     alleged that the retaliatory personnel action that resulted from his protected
     disclosures was the agency’s failure to personally notify him about a job vacancy
     announcement for the GS-13 position of Senior Biologist. ID at 3-4. Although
     this action was not specifically listed among the personnel actions in 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(a)(2)(A), the administrative judge considered whether the agency’s failure
     to notify the appellant of a job vacancy could fall under an appointment. ID at 5.
     However, the administrative judge found that the agency advertised the GS-13
     position nationally and that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation
     that anyone involved in the recruitment for the GS-13 position took any steps to
     prevent him from applying. ID at 6. She further observed that, even assuming
     management knew he had lost his computer as he claimed, he could have utilized
     a different computer to access the vacancy announcement.          Id.   Thus, the
     administrative judge found that the alleged personnel action w as not a “personnel
     action” as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). ID at 6. We agree.
¶8        On review, the appellant reiterates his contention that, in reprisal for his
     whistleblowing activities, the agency subjected him to a personnel action by
     failing to personally notify him of the job vacancy announcement in an effort to
                                                                                         5

intentionally exclude him from competition for the position. 4 PFR File, Tab 1
at 4, 8-9, Tab 6 at 6. He argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that
he did not allege which management officials prohibited him from applying to the
position and maintains that it is the positions involved—“supervisors, Human
Resources Chief, Commanding EEO and labor counsels”—not the names of the
officials involved that are important. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10, Tab 6 at 7. These
arguments concern whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that his protected
disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s alleged action. See Bradley
v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 16 (2016) (explaining
that when the personnel action at issue is a nonselection, an appellant can meet
his burden to nonfrivolously allege contributing factor without specifically
identifying the management officials responsible for the reprisal). Because the
administrative judge did not dismiss the appeal for failure to nonfrivolously

4
  On review, the appellant also presents several arguments pertaining to prior appea ls
already disposed of by the Board. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2 -7. For example, he argues that
the instant appeal is “intrinsically interrelated and intertwined” with his 10-year history
of employment with the agency and its prior attempts to remove him. Id. at 5-8.
However, the Board has already issued final decisions on two of his prior removals.
Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-13-0142-I-
2, Final Order, ¶¶ 3-4 (July 1, 2016); Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of the Army,
MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-10-0127-I-1, Final Order (Nov. 30, 2011). He also
references his alleged constructive suspension and the agency’s third attempt to remove
him effective August 2018. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-9, Tab 6 at 5; see Rosario-Fabregas v.
Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. NY-3443-18-0091-I-1, Initial Appeal File,
Tab 1 at 4-5, 12, 14, Tab 11 at 68-69; Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of the Army,
MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-18-0221-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 1 at 5-6, Tab 6
at 8-9. These arguments have no relevance to the instant appeal and we have not
addressed them.        See generally Jennings v. Social Security Administration,
123 M.S.P.R. 577, ¶ 25 (2016) (reflecting that under the doctrine of res judicata, a
valid, final judgment on the merits of an action bars a second action involving the same
parties or their privies based on the same cause of action ); Bean v. U.S. Postal Service,
120 M.S.P.R. 447, ¶ 5 (2013) (explaining that when an appellant files an appeal that
raises claims raised in an earlier appeal after the initial decision in the earlier appeal
has been issued, but before the full Board has acted on the appellant ’s petition for
review, it is appropriate to dismiss the subsequent appeal on the grounds of
adjudicatory efficiency).
                                                                                       6

     allege contributing factor, these arguments are not material to the issue presented
     on review.
¶9         In previous cases in which the Board has considered whether a failure to
     promote was a personnel action under whistleblower protection statutes, the
     agency had announced a vacancy, the appellant had applied for the position, and
     the agency filled it with another individual or canceled the vacancy
     announcement.     Ruggieri v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 454 F.3d 1323,
     1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that, in the context of an appointment, the
     agency’s decision to terminate the hiring process by cancelling the vacancy
     announcement was sufficient under the plain language of the statute to constitute
     a “fail[ure] to take . . . a personnel action”).    In essence, an appellant can
     establish he suffered a personnel action by nonfrivolously alleging that the
     agency intentionally used a particular hiring process as a scheme to deny a
     whistleblower an opportunity to seek the appointment. Weed v. Social Security
     Administration, 113 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 17 (2010). The appellant observes that he
     was in a nonduty status and speculates that the agency was aware that he had no
     computer and internet access and argues that the administrative judge presumed
     he had an “intelligent phone” that could alert him to the vacancy announcement.
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. Even assuming the appellant’s allegations are true, the
     agency’s failure to call him personally is not a failure t o take a personnel action
     “with respect to” him, as required by the whistleblower reprisal statutes.
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2), (b)(8)-(9).     Rather, it is a failure to treat him more
     favorably than other candidates.     See Carr v. Social Security Administration,
     185 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that the Whistleblower Protection
     Act of 1989 (WPA) is not meant to protect employees from their own
     misconduct). We decline to find under the circumstances here that the appellant
     was entitled to the better treatment he seeks.
                                                                                             7

      Absent a personnel action, the Board lacks jurisdiction to revi ew the appellant’s
      claims that the agency violated the law.
¶10            On review, the appellant reasserts that he made protected disclosures.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3. However, absent a “personnel action,” the Board lacks
      jurisdiction over the appellant’s IRA appeal. See Shivaee v. Department of the
      Navy, 74 M.S.P.R. 383, 387 (1997) (finding that, in order for a right of appeal to
      accrue under the WPA, a predecessor to the Whistleblower Protection
      Enhancement Act of 2012, the appellant must establish that he was subject to a
      threatened personnel action); see also Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that, to establish Board jurisdiction
      over an IRA appeal, an appellant must establish both that he made a protected
      disclosure and that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the decision to take
      or fail to take a personnel action). Therefore, once the administrative judge found
      that the appellant failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency took or
      failed to take a personnel action against him, she was not required to address
      whether the appellant had a reasonable belief that the agency was violating the
      law. 5    See Shivaee, 74 M.S.P.R. at 387-89 (dismissing an IRA appeal on the
      ground that the appellant failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation of a personnel
      action, without addressing whether he had a reasonable belief that the agency
      violated the law). 6

      5
       We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
      6
        Because the Board lacks jurisdiction over the underlying action in this appeal, we also
      lack jurisdiction over the appellant’s discrimination and due process claims. See Rivera
      v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 429, ¶ 16 (2011) (finding that
      allegations that an agency failed to provide due process and discriminated against the
      appellant do not confer an independent basis for the Board to review matters outside of
      its jurisdiction); PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 12-13, Tab 6 at 10-11.
                                                                                           8

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
       You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.                 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
       Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

       (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                  5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
       If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must    submit    your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

7
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   9

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                10

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     11

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       12

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.