Court Opinion

ID: 9371985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 15:04:21.302315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:31.648726
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 10, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals

                     NO. 2021-CA-0448-MR

ALEXANDER MUNIZ                                      APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM LEE CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE MICHAEL DEAN, JUDGE
                    ACTION NO. 20-CI-00050

RANDY WHITE, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; DANIEL AKERS,
WARDEN OF THE LEE
ADJUSTMENT CENTER; AND
JAMES STAMPER, ADJUSTMENT
OFFICER OF THE LEE
ADJUSTMENT CENTER                                    APPELLEES

                          OPINION
                         AFFIRMING

                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CETRULO, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Alexander Muniz, pro se, brings this appeal from a February

23, 2021, order of the Lee Circuit Court dismissing Muniz’s declaration of rights

action. We affirm.

                Muniz was an inmate at Lee Adjustment Center in Beattyville,

Kentucky, where he was serving a fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment for first-

degree manslaughter. On April 21, 2019, correction officers at Lee Adjustment

Center responded to an altercation in a dormitory involving multiple inmates.

Following a review of the security camera footage, it was determined that Muniz

was one of fourteen inmates involved in the altercation.

                On May 17, 2019, a Disciplinary Report Write-Up and Investigation

(Disciplinary Write-Up) was prepared regarding Muniz’s involvement in the April

21, 2019, altercation. Then, on May 20, 2019, the Disciplinary Write-Up was

delivered to Muniz charging him with violating Kentucky Corrections Policies and

Procedures (CPP) 15.2 (II)(VII)(7), inciting to riot or rioting.1 Upon delivery, the

Disciplinary Write-Up was read to Muniz at 11:18 p.m. on May 20, 2019. Muniz

pleaded not guilty to the charged offense, waived the 24-hour notice requirement,

and requested a hearing.

1
 Kentucky Corrections Policy and Procedures 15.2 (I) defines “riot” as “incites, instigates,
organizes, plans, causes, aids, abets, assists or takes part in any disorder, disturbance, strike, or
other organized disobedience to the rules of the institution.”

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             The next morning, May 21, 2019, a prison disciplinary hearing was

conducted before the Adjustment Committee at 9:24 a.m. Pursuant to a

Disciplinary Report Hearing/Appeal (Disciplinary Report), Muniz was found

guilty of violating CPP 15.2 (II)(VII)(7), inciting to riot or rioting. Muniz was

sentenced to thirty-days’ segregation and forfeiture of 1,460 days of non-restorable

good-time credit. Muniz filed a timely appeal to Warden Daniel Akers. Warden

Akers reviewed the matter and concurred with the findings and penalties assessed

by the Adjustment Committee.

             On May 15, 2020, Muniz filed a Petition for Declaration of Rights in

the Lee Circuit Court challenging the disciplinary proceeding. Therein, Muniz

generally asserted that the Department of Corrections violated his procedural due

process rights as protected by Sections 11 and 13 of the Kentucky Constitution, the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, and the CPP. The circuit court disagreed with Muniz and dismissed

his Petition for Declaration of Rights deciding that Muniz had “waived the 24 hour

notice requirement, and there was no due process violation.” February 23, 2021,

Order Dismissing at 3. This appeal follows.

             Muniz contends the circuit court erred by dismissing his Petition for

Declaration of Rights without addressing the merits of his alleged due process

violations. Muniz asserts the circuit court summarily dismissed the Petition for

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Declaration of Rights solely upon the basis that Muniz had waived his right to

receive 24-hour notice of the prison disciplinary hearing as provided by CPP 15.2.

Muniz acknowledges that he waived the 24-hour notice but asserts that such

waiver did not extinguish his other due process rights related to the prison

disciplinary hearing.

             It is generally agreed that due process rights applicable to a prison

disciplinary hearing can be waived by an inmate. See Yates v. Fletcher, 120

S.W.3d 728, 730 (Ky. App. 2003). To validly waive such a right, an inmate must

do so knowingly and intelligently. See Simms v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 141,

143 (Ky. App. 2011); see also 2 Michael B. Mushlin, Rights of Prisoners §10.2

(5th ed. 2020).

             In this case, it is undisputed that Muniz signed the Disciplinary Write-

Up, and therein, Muniz agreed to waive the 24-hour notice requirement. It is

equally uncontroverted that Muniz did not waive any other due process rights in

the Disciplinary Write-Up. In fact, the Disciplinary Write-Up contained a

provision that allowed Muniz to waive his due process right to be present at the

disciplinary hearing; however, Muniz refused to waive the right. In light of the

clear facts, we conclude that Muniz only waived his right to 24-hour notice of the

disciplinary hearing and did not waive the other due process rights applicable to a

disciplinary hearing.

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             Muniz next asserts that the adjustment committee violated his due

process rights by not providing him advance notice of the disciplinary hearing and

an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence.

             It is well established that prison disciplinary proceedings are not the

equivalent of a criminal prosecution, and inmates are not entitled to “the full

panoply of rights” that a criminal defendant possesses. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Rather, an inmate detained in lawful custody is only entitled

to minimal due process in a prison disciplinary proceeding where loss of good time

credit is at issue. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,

454 (1985) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974); McMillen v.

Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 233 S.W.3d 203, 205 (Ky. App. 2007)). The minimal due

process rights afforded an inmate in a prison disciplinary proceeding include –

advance written notice of the disciplinary charges and an opportunity to call

witnesses and present evidence if consistent with institutional safety/correctional

goals. Walpole, 472 U.S. at 454 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67).

             Regarding the right to receive advance notice, Muniz elected to waive

the right to receive 24-hour notice of the disciplinary proceeding. By waiving the

24-hour notice, Muniz, likewise, waived the advanced notice provided for in

Walpole. Walpole, 472 U.S. at 454; Yates, 120 S.W.3d at 730.

                                         -5-
             Regarding an inmate’s right to have the opportunity to call witnesses

and present evidence, Muniz asserts that due to the short notice, he was essentially

deprived of the opportunity to do so. However, as Muniz waived the right to

advance notice of the hearing, he cannot complain of the lack of preparation time.

Additionally, Muniz failed to request the opportunity to present evidence or to call

witnesses at the hearing. As such, we do not believe Muniz’s minimal due process

right to present evidence or call witnesses as identified in Walpole was violated.

See Walpole, 472 U.S. at 454.

             Muniz further maintains there was insufficient evidence to support the

Adjustment Committee’s finding that he was guilty of inciting to riot or rioting. In

particular, Muniz alleges there did not exist “some evidence” to support the finding

that Muniz committed the charged offense.

             It is well settled that in a prison disciplinary proceeding, due process

is satisfied if “some evidence” of guilt is present in the record. Walpole, 472 U.S.

at 454. As to the some evidence requirement, the Kentucky Supreme Court held:

             [I]f “the findings of the prison disciplinary board are
             supported by some evidence in the record[,]” due process
             is satisfied. And determining whether “some evidence”
             is present in the record does not “require examination of
             the entire record, independent assessment of the
             credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.”
             Even “meager” evidence will suffice. The primary
             inquiry is “whether there is any evidence in the record
             that could support the conclusion reached by the
             disciplinary board.” If “some evidence” is satisfied, the

                                         -6-
             fear of arbitrary government action is removed and no
             due-process violation is found.

Ramirez v. Nietzel, 424 S.W.3d 911, 916-17 (Ky. 2014) (citations and footnotes

omitted). Thus, the relevant inquiry is essentially whether there exists “any

evidence in the record to support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary

board.” Walpole, 472 U.S. at 455-56.

             The record reveals that there was certainly some evidence to support

the finding that Muniz was guilty of inciting to riot or rioting. Of particular

import, the Disciplinary Write-Up provided that upon review of the security

camera footage, the investigating officer “found that Inmate Alexander Muniz

#253372 was one of the 14 inmates involved in the altercation.” May 15, 2019,

Disciplinary Write-Up at 1. The Disciplinary Report also provided that the

Adjustment Committee’s decision was based upon the fact that “Muniz can be seen

plainly on camera being active in the disturbance which did involve 14 other

inmates.” May 21, 2019, Disciplinary Report at 1. Although the evidence

presented at the hearing was not very detailed regarding the specific action of

Muniz, meager evidence will suffice in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Id. As

Muniz was plainly visible on the security camera footage as being active in the

disturbance, we believe that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the requirement

of some evidence to support the Adjustment Committee’s finding that Muniz was

                                          -7-
guilty of inciting to riot or rioting. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s

dismissal of Muniz’s Petition for Declarations of Rights.

             For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Lee Circuit Court is

affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE RANDY
                                            WHITE:
 Alexander Muniz, Pro Se
 Sandy Hook, Kentucky                       Angela T. Dunham
                                            Kentucky Justice & Public Safety
                                            Cabinet
                                            Office of Legal Services
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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