Court Opinion

ID: 9860171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:13:10.339847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:39.034386
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent only as to the majority’s denial of punitive damages to Crace because she could not demonstrate compen-*102sable damages. To make Crace’s punitive damages contingent upon suffering an actual loss is inconsistent with the polygraph statute and the purpose behind punitive damages.
While, as a general rule, punitive damages will not be awarded in the absence of actual loss, Potter v. LaSalle Court Sports & Health Club, 384 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn.1986), the purpose behind punitive damages, to punish and deter wrongful actions, Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 n. 1 (Minn.1982), requires, on occasion, an exception to that rule. In the case before us, an employer violates the polygraph statute simply by asking an employee to take a polygraph test. Minn.Stat. § 181.75, subd. 1 (1990). Under the statute, however, an employer is subject to criminal penalties only for administering a test, which leaves the civil remedies contained in section 181.-75, subd. 4 as the only means of deterring an employer’s unlawful polygraph request. As a result, denial of punitive damages absent proof of actual loss would leave a large number of statutory violations1 undeterred since it presumably would be a rare individual who will suffer actual damages based solely on an employer’s polygraph request. Moreover, as the trial court recognized, it is unlikely that private actions to enforce the statute will be brought unless plaintiffs have a reasonable expectation of recovering damages, which, at least in Crace’s ease, would be limited to punitive damages.
This result is consistent with the reasoning employed in Loftsgaarden v. Reiling, 267 Minn. 181, 183-84, 126 N.W.2d 154, 155-56, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845, 85 S.Ct. 31, 13 L.Ed.2d 50 (1964), where this court held that recovery of punitive damages in a libel per se action was not dependent upon the existence of actual damages, primarily because of the “need for discouraging such conduct in the interests of social harmony.” In Loftsgaarden, the court recognized that if recovery of punitive damages was contingent upon actual loss, the libelous defendant would benefit where “the plaintiff’s character is so well established * * * as to preclude proof of specific loss springing from communication of the libel.” 267 Minn, at 183, 126 N.W.2d at 155. Accordingly, society’s interest in discouraging libelous conduct in all cases justified the imposition of punitive damages even though the plaintiff could not prove any actual loss. Id.
The court has also allowed recovery of punitive damages without proof of actual damages in a discrimination action. We did so, we said, because “[l]ike defamation, the harm caused by discrimination can be intangible yet disruptive of social harmony.” Potter, 384 N.W.2d at 876.
The polygraph statute requires a similar approach. Society has several interests at stake in discouraging employer polygraph requests including:
encouraging the maintenance of a harmonious atmosphere in employment relationships which may be disturbed by the coercion to take a polygraph or similar examination; * * * discouraging practices which demean or appear to demean the dignity of an individual employee in a significant way; protecting employees from adverse inferences drawn if they refuse to take these tests; and avoiding the coercive impact present in the solicitation.
State by Spannaus v. Century Camera, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 735, 743 (Minn.1981). Therefore, since these interests are as compelling in the absence of actual damages as when actual damages are present, punitive damages are justified, even absent actual loss, in order to advance society’s interest in discouraging unlawful polygraph requests. Here, too, the harm caused is “intangible yet disruptive of social harmony.” I would affirm the court of appeals on this issue, leaving untouched the jury’s award of punitive damages to Crace.

. While investigating several monetary losses in 1983, the defendant bank in this case asked at least fourteen employees, not counting the plaintiffs in the case, if they would agree to take a polygraph test. Appellant’s Exhibits # # 87-90. Although no polygraph tests were ever administered to these employees, nonetheless, the bank’s actions violated the polygraph statute.