Court Opinion

ID: 9672278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:51:51.258006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.183464
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
This appeal presents the question: What level of conduct by an officer will be examined to determine if the officer is entitled to official immunity because he acted in good faith?
The majority focuses on Officer Wadew-itz’s conduct at the intersection of Valley Mills Drive and Greer Drive, rather than his overall course of action, to find a fact issue about good faith. It relies on the assertion of an expert that “no reasonably prudent police officer, under the same or similar circumstances could have believed that entering the inside lane when he could not see any possible traffic, outweighed the clear risk of harm to the public in entering that lane when he did.”1 I believe that this inquiry is too narrow and, thus, violates the principles of City of Lancaster v. Chambers and frustrates the function of official immunity. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.1994).
Perhaps the “reasonably prudent officer” formulation of the Chambers good-faith test should be recharacterized.2 Id. at 656. It can appear to “necessarily implicate a consideration of negligence,” as the majority states while recognizing that official immunity is not waived just because one acts negligently. Perhaps the majority is saying that negligence does not conclusively establish bad faith but is evidence of bad faith. If so, I disagree, believing that the two are entirely different concepts. “Despite similarity between this [good faith] standard and a general negligence test, no equivalence should be implied.” Id. at 656 n. 5.
Official immunity is a policy doctrine that relieves government employees of liability for *246their negligence in some instances. Those injured during the performance of discretionary duties by a police officer mil almost always be able to point to some specific action that the officer took or failed to take. If we focus on whether the specific act, rather than the overall course of conduct, is the basis on which the officer’s good faith must be tested, official immunity will cease to be a meaningful public policy. The mere fact that something bad happened as a result of an officer’s conduct will be proof that the officer lacked good faith and is not entitled to official immunity.3
Examining the question of whether Officer Wadewitz acted in good faith when he determined to proceed on an emergency basis and then determined the route he would take in responding to the call that he had received, ie. his overall course of conduct, I agree with Appellants that the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that he did. As the majority notes, even the Appellees do not quarrel with those decisions by Officer Wadewitz.
I would sustain the Appellants’ points of error, vacate the trial court’s order denying the motion for summary judgment, and enter a summary judgment for Appellants on grounds of official immunity.4

. At a deposition the expert said that his criticism of Officer Wadewitz was that he was negligent in entering the third lane of Valley Mills Drive when he did.

. Good faith is a question of state of mind; the inquiry asks what a hypothetical officer could have believed. Negligence, on the other hand, focuses on conduct compared to the hypothetical "reasonable-man” standard.

. Qualified immunity acts to protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex.1994).

. Both the City of Waco and Officer Wadewitz are entitled to the benefit of the official immunity. DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex.1995).