Court Opinion

ID: 9655001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:57:30.574551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:15.401593
License: Public Domain

M. F. Cavanagh, P.J.
(dissenting). I must dissent from the holding of the majority which affirms the Tax Tribunal’s determination that the term "finance charge” and the term "interest” are mutually exclusive terms of art.
The term "interest” is not defined in the SBTA. However, § 2 of the act provides in part the following:
"(2) A term used in this act and not defined differently shall have the same meaning as when used in comparable context in the laws of the United States relating to federal income taxes in effect for the tax year unless a different meaning is clearly required. A reference in this act to the internal revenue code includes other provisions of the laws of the United States relating to federal income taxes.” MCL 208.2(2); MSA 7.558(2)(2).
The Tax Tribunal relied on the definition of "interest” in 26 USC 6049(b):
"(b) Interest deñned.—
”(1) General rule. — For purposes of subsections (a)(1) and (2), the term 'interest’ means—
"(A) interest on evidences of indebtedness (including bonds, debentures, notes, and certificates) issued by a corporation in registered form, and, to the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, inter*791est on other evidences of indebtedness issued by a corporation of a type offered by corporations to the public;
"(B) interest on deposits with persons carrying on the banking business;
"(C) amounts (whether or not designated as interest) paid by a mutual savings bank, savings and loan association, building and loan association, cooperative bank, homestead association, credit union, or similar organization, in respect of deposits, investment certificates, or withdrawable or repurchasable shares;
"(D) interest on amounts held by an insurance company under an agreement to pay interest thereon; and
"(E) interest on deposits with stockbrokers and dealers in securities.”
I am persuaded that reliance on the above-quoted definition for purposes of defining interest under the SBTA is improper. Section 6049 of the Internal Revenue Code requires any individual who makes "payments of interest” to make a return naming the person to whom the interest was paid. The statute specifically provides that the definition of interest contained therein only operates for purposes of applying that section. Since the definition contained in § 6049(b) only applies for purposes of determining the applicability of the reporting requirements of that section and with regard to interest expense, as opposed to interest income, the term "interest” as used therein is not used in a context comparable to the term "interest” as used in § 9 of the SBTA. MCL 208.9; MSA 7.558(9).
Because § 9 of the SBTA permits a deduction of earned interest only to the extent that the taxpayer included that amount in arriving at his or her federal taxable income, it is necessary to determine whether the amount of the "finance charge” would have been considered "interest” for *792purposes of determining the petitioner’s gross income for federal income tax purposes had the petitioners not discounted the notes. The Internal Revenue Code, 26 USC 61, provides in part the following:
"(a) General definition. Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:
"(4) Interest;”
The term "interest” is not defined in §61. However, the Supreme Court has defined it as compensation for the use or forbearance of money paid with respect to a genuine indebtedness. Deputy v du Pont, 308 US 488, 498; 60 S Ct 363; 84 L Ed 416 (1940). In determining whether amounts received by the taxpayers constituted interest within the meaning of § 61, the federal courts have generally looked to the substance of the transaction, rather than to its form. See Berry v Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 372 F2d 476 (CA 6, 1967), cert den 389 US 834; 88 S Ct 38; 19 L Ed 2d 94 (1967).
The transfer in Berry, supra, occurred prior to the enactment of the chapter in the Internal Revenue Code relating to installment sales, 26 USC 483, which provides:
"(a) Amount constituting interest. For purposes of this title, in the case of any contract for the sale or exchange of property there shall be treated as interest that part of a payment to which this section applied which bears the same ratio to the amount of such payment as the total unstated interest under such contract bears to the total of the payments to which this section applies which are due under such contract.
"(b) Total unstated interest. For purposes of this *793section, the term 'total unstated interest’ means, with respect to a contract for the sale or exchange of property, an amount equal to the excess of—
"(1) the sum of the payments to which this section applies which are due under the contract, over
"(2) the sum of the present values of such payments and the present values of any interest payments due under the contract.
"For purposes of paragraph (2), the present value of a payment shall be determined, as of the date of the sale or exchange, by discounting such payment at the rate, and in the manner, provided in regulations perceived by the Secretary. Such regulations shall provide for discounting on the basis of 6-month brackets and shall provide that the present value of any interest payment due not more than 6 months after the date of the sale or exchange is an amount equal to 100 percent of such payment.
"(C) Payments to which section applies—
"(1) In general. — Except as provided in subsection (f), this section shall apply to any payment on account of the sale or exchange of property which constitutes part or all of the sales price and which is due more than 6 months after the date of such sale or exchange under a contract—
"(A) under which some or all of the payments are due more than one year after the date of such sale or exchange, and
"(B) under which, using a rate provided by regulations prescribed by the Secretary for purposes of this subparagraph, there is total unstated interest.”
It is apparent from the foregoing that to the full extent the finance charge exceeds the cash purchase price of the automobile, it is interest income for federal income tax purposes. In substance, financing by the dealer is a loan of money to the purchaser to enable him to purchase an automobile. The dealer’s capital is tied up to the same extent that it would be if it had actually made a cash advance to its customer. Therefore, the *794amount of the finance charge is compensation for the use or forbearance of money. Deputy v du Pont, supra. Consequently, it appears that the finance charge that petitioners include in their installment contract is "interest”, as that term is used in the Internal Revenue Code. 26 USC 61. Since the term "interest” as used in § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code appears to be used in a context comparable to the use of that term in § 9(7) of the SBTA, the finance charge received by dealers who directly finance the purchase of automobiles by their customers should be determined to be interest within the meaning of § 9(7).
This conclusion is supported by the SBTA itself. The SBTA is designed to tax what a business has added to the economy, in contrast to an income tax which taxes what one has derived from the economy. Stockler v Dep’t of Treasury, 75 Mich App 640; 255 NW2d 718 (1977), lv den 402 Mich 802, app dis 435 US 963; 98 S Ct 1598; 56 L Ed 2d 54 (1978). Therefore, the act requires that in computing its tax base for SBTA purposes, the taxpayer must add to his federal taxable income the value of the labor it employs, § 9(5), and the value of the capital it uses, § 9(3)(4). The SBTA is in essence a value-added tax, Stockier, supra. It taxes the use of capital, and, because dividends, interest, and royalties are paid for the use of capital, the payer of the interest, not the receiver, is taxed. Consequently, while § 9(4) requires the inclusion of expenses related to those items in computing an individual’s tax base, § 9(7) requires that income relating to receipt of the same be excluded. When an automobile dealer provides for the financing of an automobile, it is the customer who is the user of the capital, not the dealer. To tax the dealer for the amount of the finance charge would be incon*795sistent with the concept of the SBTA as a value-added tax. It would constitute a tax on the value of what the owner has derived from the economy, i.e., an income tax, rather than a tax on what has been ádded to the economy. Stockler, supra.
Respondent argues that even if finance charges received by the dealers constitute interest, when the commercial paper is discounted to a financial institution the amount receiVed in excess of the principal amount of the note is in the nature of a finder’s fee or rebate, rather than interest. Respondent cites no authority in support of its position.
As noted earlier, the SBTA requires the court to examine the Internal Revenue Code in determining the meaning of the terms contained therein. In Dixon v United States, 333 F2d 1016 (CA 2, 1964), aff'd 381 US 68; 85 S Ct 1301; 14 L Ed 2d 223 (1965), the Court affirmed the proposition that gains realized from the sale of commercial paper are treated as interest income for federal income tax purposes. Although not entirely clear, it appears that the respondent is arguing that even if treated as interest for federal tax purposes, the amount of the discount which exceeds the purchase price of the automobile should not be treated as interest for SBTA purposes because of the ongoing and continuous nature of the relationship between the petitioners and the financial institutions. It argues that the petitioners are not engaged in financing at all. In reality they are merely acting as agents for the financial institutions. It is argued that the proceeds realized by the petitioners, although in the form of discounts on the transfer of commercial paper, are in reality a finder’s fee or rebate to the petitioners for procuring business for the institutions.
I would first note that if I were to accept the *796respondent’s contention, it would be necessary to remand the case to the Tax Tribunal for further findings of fact. The nature and the extent of the relationship between the petitioners and the lending institutions is not at all clear from the record. However, a remand is not necessary because I would reject the respondent’s contention. If we were to hold that businesses which are able to hold their commercial paper are not subject to SBTA taxation on the finance charges received on the paper while at the same time holding that businesses which discount their paper are required to include the finance charge portion of the amount thus received in their tax base in computing SBTA liability, a substantial competitive advantage to large businesses would result.
The legislative history of the SBTA indicates that the Legislature did not intend such a result. The predecessors of the SBTA were the Michigan Business Activities Tax Act, 1953 PA 150 (repealed 1967), and the Income Tax Act of 1967, MCL 206.1 et seq.; MSA 7.557(101) et seq. As they related to the taxation of business, both of those tax statutes resulted in special treatment being given to certain businesses and resulted in a poor business climate. The SBTA was intended to avoid the problems that had surrounded its predecessors. See Constitutionality of the Michigan Single Business Tax; 25 Wayne L Rev 1309, 1311 (1979). The Legislature desired to establish a neutral tax system with each business paying taxes in proportion to its economic size without interference from the nature of the tax in internal business decisions. See The Economic Logic of the Single Business Tax, 22 Wayne L Rev 1017, 1021 (1976). To accept the respondent’s contention would defeat that purpose. Businesses would be required either to hold *797their commercial paper to avoid payment of the tax and thereby forego the opportunity to recapitalize their investments, or, if their operations were too small to enable them to hold their own paper, they would be required to discount the paper and be subjected to harsher tax treatment than if they were engaged in a larger operation. Therefore, to avoid that result petitioners should be entitled to an interest deduction pursuant to § 9 of the SBTA regardless of whether they decide to hold their paper or to discount it.
I am in agreement with the majority’s declination to address the other issues raised. However, for the reasons stated, I would hold that the Tax Tribunal committed a clear error of law and would reverse.