Court Opinion

ID: 9562381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:27:26.416303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:18.712538
License: Public Domain

Justice BEATTY.
I concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in the opinion of the majority that mandamus cannot issue to compel the Administrator to disclose attorney-client privileged information. However, my concurrence is limited to the facts of this case where Wilson admits that she would disclose the privileged information to the public at large. The privilege belongs to the Council, not Wilson.
In my view, an elected official by virtue of the office held has the inherent right of timely access to any and all information possessed by the governmental entity that he or she is duly elected to. To hold otherwise would condone the disenfranchisement of the people the elected official represents. The denial of information would clearly hinder, if not nullify, an elected official in the performance of his duties. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in the majority’s decision that mandamus cannot issue to compel the Administrator to disclose financial information to a member of county council.
Moreover, the Freedom of Information Act requires a governmental entity or other public body to disclose the type of financial information requested by Wilson. See S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-30(a) (2007) (providing that any person has the right to copy or inspect a public record); S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-50(A)(6) (2007) (defining as “public information” any “information in or taken from any account, voucher, or contract dealing with the receipt or expenditure of public or other funds by *362public bodies”). This statutory requirement removes any discretion on the part of the public body. In this instance, the lack of discretion whether to disclose the requested information makes the disclosure ministerial in nature and subject to mandamus, but for the injunctive remedy provided by section 30-4-100. Further, the county ordinance prioritizing the duties of the Administrator is unavailing in its attempt to delay responding to a request for financial information of the sort at issue here. Section 30-4-30 allows only 15 days for a response to a request for information. If the request is granted (in this case it must be) the information must be available for review.