Court Opinion

ID: 9679029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:38:39.122525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:09.691083
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
The judgment of the district court must be reversed as a result of the provision in Article V, section 2, of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska which is as follows: “No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five judges.” The *727act in question is composed of sections 83-501 to 83-508, R. R. S. 1943.
The opinion of Carter, J. correctly points out that under our present statutes the only findings required by the board of examiners are: “(1) That the patient is mentally deficient, (2) that the patient is apparently capable of bearing or begetting offspring, and (3) that in its opinion such patient should be sterilized as a condition to parole or discharge.” (Emphasis supplied.) The former Nebraska statute which was held to be constitutional in In re Clayton, 120 Neb. 680, 234 N. W. 630, required one additional finding, namely that any children bom or begotten by such feeble-minded person would inherit a tendency to feeble-mindedness, insanity, or degeneracy, that such children would probably become a social menace, and that such procreation would be harmful to society. Both the present and the former acts constitute an exercise of the police power. In the case of Golden v. Bartholomew, 140 Neb. 65, 299 N. W. 356, this court stated: “ ‘The legislature cannot, under the guise of police regulation, arbitrarily invade private property or personal rights. The test when such regulations are called in question is whether they have some relation to the public health or public welfare, and whether such is, in fact, the end sought to be attained.’ ” The court also said: “ ‘In order that a statute may be sustained as an exercise of the police power, the courts must be able to see that the enactment has for its object the prevention of some offense or manifest evil or the preservation of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare; that there is some clear, real and substantial connection between the assumed purpose of the enactment and the actual provisions thereof; and that the latter do in some plain, appreciable and appropriate manner tend toward the accomplishment of the object for which the power is exercised. * * * Measures adopted by the legislature to protect the public health and secure the public safety and welfare must have some relation to *728those proposed ends. If it is. apparent that the statute, under the guise of a police regulation, does not tend to preserve the public health, safety or welfare, it is unconstitutional, * * ” See, also, Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N. W. 2d 227. Under the former Nebraska act, it is. obvious that the Legislature felt that feeble-mindedness was an inheritable condition which could be transmitted from generation to generation and that procreation by feeble-minded persons was detrimental to the public welfare. This provision has been deleted from our present statute and the statute fails to make clear in what manner, if any, the Legislature now considers procreation by a feeble-minded person to be detrimental to society and it clearly does not require the finding of any facts whatsoever that point in that direction. It may be noted that in the great majority of cases, and perhaps without exception, where other jurisdictions. have held sterilization statutes to be constitutional, the thinking of the Legislature on the question of public welfare was incorporated in the statute in the same manner as it may be found in the old Nebraska act now repealed. I know of no instance where a statute such as the present Nebraska statute has been upheld.
As a general rule: “Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete law—complete as to the time when it shall take effect anci as to whom, it shall be applicable—and to determine the expediency of its enactment.” (Emphasis supplied.) 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 242, p. 493. “The legislature may not delegate to administrative agencies the determination of what the law shall be, to whom it may be applied, or what acts are necessary to effectuate the law.’’ (Emphasis supplied.) 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 104, p. 902. “The exercise of undefined general power legislative in character must be denied to administrative officers whether that power is to be exercised in the making of general rules or the making of case-by-*729case determinations, and the legislature may offend against the Constitution when it confers unlimited discretion upon administrative agencies. A statute or ordinance which in effect reposes an absolute, unregulated, and undefined discretion in an administrative agency bestows arbitrary powers and is an unlawful delegation of legislative powers. The presumption that an officer will not act arbitrarily but will exercise sound judgment and good faith cannot sustain a delegation of unregulated discretion. The legislature cannot vest in an administrative agency the power, in its absolute or unguided discretion, to apply or withhold the application of the law or to say to whom a law shall or shall not be applicable.” 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 108, p. 907. “In order to avoid an unlawful delegation of power, the legislative authority must declare the policy or purpose of the law and, as a general rule, must also fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases by setting up standards or guides to indicate the extent, and prescribe the limits, of the discretion which may be exercised under the statute or ordinance by the administrative agency.” 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 113, pi. 913. “The standard or limit governing the authority and discretion of the agency in effecting the policy of the legislature must be found in the law itself, since only the legislature can create such standards and limits.” 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 116, p. 919. “The personal judgment of the agency, where unrestrained, is not a standard or a sufficient standard, and even where broad standards are laid down it has been held that such standards are not sufficient if the statute or ordinance expressly adds ‘in the opinion1 of the agency, or expressly confers policy-making power upon the agency.” (Emphasis supplied.) 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 122, p. 929.
Law fails to meet requirements of due process clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves public uncertain as to conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and *730jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 86 S. Ct. 518, 15 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1966). See, also, State v. Cota, 99 Ariz. 233, 408 P. 2d 23; People v. Grubb, 63 Cal. 2d 614, 47 Cal. Rptr. 772, 408 P. 2d 100.
The present statute authorizes the board of examiners to order sterilization as a condition to the release of the patient when required or proper “in the opinion of the board of examiners.” As noted above, the personal judgment of the executive agency where unrestrained, as in the present instance, does not comprise a sufficient standard. See, Abelson’s, Inc. v. New Jersey State Board of Optometrists, 5 N. J. 412, 75 A. 2d 867, 22 A. L. R. 2d 929; Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579, 71 A. L. R. 604; State ex rel. Makris v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 296, 193 P. 845, 12 A. L. R. 1428. In the present case, the standard set by the Legislature as the basis for sterilization of an inmate of the Beatrice State Home is so general in nature that there is no way to determine in what particular situation or under what set of facts the Legislature intended to authorize sterilization. In substance, the act simply leaves it up to the board of examiners to determine in any given case whether the act should or should not be enforced and no mies whatsoever are laid down as a guideline for such determination. It is obvious: that the board may arbitrarily, depending upon the particular thinking or philosophy of its individual members, exercise such authority as to one inmate and not as to another. The act may not be uniformly applied because as membership on the board of examiners changes through the years and new individuals with varying philosophies become members thereof, the circumstances under which the act is enforced may well vary with the change'in thinking occurring with the change in membership. The fact that provision is made for an appeal to the district court does not remedy this situation as judges also change and one *731judge may interpret the statute one way and another in a different manner.
“An unconstitutional delegation of power is not brought within the limits of permissible delegation by the establishment of procedural safeguards, the right to judicial review, or by the assumption that the officer acts and will act for the public good.” (Emphasis sup>plied.) 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 101, p. 898. “Apart from certain exceptions, it is almost universally held that arbitrary powers may not be conferred on administrative agencies, even though the courts are authorized to review the exercise of such power." (Emphasis supplied.) 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 108, p. 907.
The broad powers conferred by the present act upon the board of examiners due to the lack of incorporation of adequate standards in the act are beyond the power of the Legislature to confer. In Golden v. Bartholomew, supra, this court stated: “ ‘Due process of law, as a limitation upon the police power, requires that it be exercised in such a manner that it is not arbitrary and unreasonable.’ ” In McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., Inc., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N. W. 2d 608, it was said: “The Legislature may not constitutionally, under the guise of public interest, grant power without control or check, which may be exercised at will, with or without reason, arbitrarily or capriciously.” The same general theme was followed' in the case of Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, supra, wherein the court stated: “The limitations of the power granted and the standards by which the granted powers are to be administered must, however, be clearly and definitely stated in the authorizing act.” Finally, in the case of State ex rel. Woolridge v. Morehead, 100 Neb. 864, 161 N. W. 569, L. R. A. 1917D 310, the following language may be found: “Police regulations with no other guide than the uncontrolled discretion of a board are discriminatory, and when so applied *732that all persons may not engage in legitimate callings upon equal terms, are void.”
In Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 108 N. W. 2d 365, it is stated: “A purely fact-finding authority may be vested in a nonlegislative body, but a discretionary power involving matters of policy is legislative in nature and may not be delegated.” In O’Brien v. State Highway Commissioner, 375 Mich. 545, 134 N. W. 2d 700, it is stated: “Provisions of statute conferring upon a highway commissioner having jurisdiction of a highway power to approve or remove unauthorized roadside signs and advertising devices at will without having declared them a nuisance and without prescribing reasonably precise standards for guidance are constitutionally invalid.” In Lewis v. Florida State Board of Health (Fla.), 143 So. 2d 867, it was said: “Legislature may not delegate power to enact law, to declare what law shall be, or to exercise unrestricted discretion in applying the law.” That Nebraska subscribes to the principles set forth in the foregoing cases is apparent. The following language may be found in De Jonge v. School Dist. of Bloomington, 179 Neb. 539, 139 N. W. 2d 296: “The fixing of boundaries of school districts is: exclusively a legislative function, but it may properly be delegated provided the Legislature prescribes the manner and the standards under which the power may be exercised.” In Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 290 N. W. 451, it was stated: “The legislature cannot delegate its powers to make a law, but it can make a law to become operative on the happening of a certain contingency or on an ascertainment of a fact upon which the law intends to make its own action depend.”
The following language may be found in Smithberger v. Banning, 129 Neb. 651, 262 N. W. 492, 100 A. L. R. 686: “ ‘Plaintiff earnestly contends that the above sections of the statute are void because they vest in an administrative board absolute, unregulated, and undefined discre*733tion to grant or withhold its certificate of approval under general statutory language, which fixes no standards or tests to which an applicant may knowingly conform, and from which it can be determined whether corporations, transacting precisely the same kind and character of business, have been or may be dealt with equally; that the statute attempts to vest in an administrative board absolute and arbitrary power to say which, if any, of two or more companies, proposing to transact the same kind of business in the same manner and under like conditions, may be permitted so to do in the state of Nebraska.
“ ‘If the statutes, when properly construed, grant or attempt to grant to an administrative board such unrestricted and arbitrary discretion as plaintiff contends they do, then we will be compelled to hold that they are void because violative of both state and federal constitutional provisions. They would deny the equal protection of the law and violate the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
“Clearly, in the case at bar, the purposes, for which the fund of $4,000,000 was to be expended, were to be determined by the state assistance committee and the board of educational lands and funds. * * *
“In the Nebraska acts, there are no limitations, standards, rules of guidance or criterion for the guidance of the state assistance committee and the board of educational lands and funds in allocating funds for old age assistance, unemployment relief, mothers’ health, unemployment insurance, and other forms of relief therein enumerated. There is no requirement that the administrators of the acts find certain facts in determining for which of the various purposes allocations should be made and no basis for determining the amount to be allocated to each or any of the purposes therein set forth. This is all left to the discretion of the state assistance committee. Under the authorities hereinbefore cited, this con-*734statutes a delegation of legislative functions to an administrative board.”
In School District No. 39 v. Decker, 159 Neb. 693, 68 N. W. 2d 354, may be found the following: “ Tt is a fundamental principle of our system of government that' the rights of men are to be determined by the law itself, and not by the let or leave of administrative officers or bureaus. This principle ought not to be surrendered for convenience, or in effect nullified for the sake of expediency. However, it is impossible for the legislature to deal directly with the host of details in the complex conditions on which it legislates, and when the legislature states the purpose of the law and sets up standards to guide the agency which is to administer it, there is no constitutional objection to vesting discretion as to its execution in the administrators. * * * A statute which in effect reposes an absolute, unregulated, and undefined discretion in an administrative body bestows arbitrary powers and is an unlawful delegation of legislative powers. The presumption that an officer will not act arbitrarily but will exercise sound judgment and good faith cannot sustain a delegation of unregulated discretion.’ * * *
“ * * the method and manner of enforcing a law must of necessity be left to the reasonable discretion of administrative officers, but an act of the Legislature which vests in such officers the discretion to determine what the law is, or to apply it to one and refuse its application to another in like circumstances, is void as an unwarranted delegation of legislative authority.’ ”
As heretofore pointed out, the policy of the Legislature has not been made clear in the act in question. It appears that it is left for the board of examiners to adopt some kind of policy for the administration of this act. In other words, the board must decide as a matter of policy in what particular type of cases the act shall or shall not be applied. In so doing, it is acting in a legislative capacity not as a mere fact-finding board and it *735again becomes apparent that the Legislature has failed to set out adequate standards for the administration of the act.
It is contended that a constitutional statute along the lines mentioned cannot be adopted. This is not correct. Indeed, it would appear that if some of the major findings found by the board of examiners in this case were to be incorporated in the act as standards for guidance of the board, a different picture would be presented.
The act in question is unconstitutional and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.