Court Opinion

ID: 9579115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:51:39.993044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:23.418183
License: Public Domain

Head, Presiding Justice,
dissenting. Generally, questions as to diligence, negligence, and proximate cause are for the jury, and will not be decided by the courts as a matter of law except in cases where the facts alleged are such as to require it.
In the present case the opinion of the majority quotes from 65 C. J. S. 599, § 89, as follows: "... a person driving a golf ball must give notice or warning to those dangerously situated, . . .” The language following the comma in the same sentence is as follows: “although he is not bound to warn a person not standing in a place where danger from the ball may reasonably be anticipated, . . .”
From the petition it appears that the plaintiff was on number five fairway with his back toward number four fairway, and within range of the tee shot of the defendant from number four fairway. Since the object of the game of golf is to complete the course of nine or eighteen holes in the least possible number of strokes (see Webster’s Int. Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 976), a direct approach down the fairway is the object of the golfer as he drives his ball from the tee. The petition alleges that the defendant was an “inexpert golfer,” it not being unusual for him to either “slice” or “hook” the ball. However much a golfer may be a “duffer,” or inexpert player, he would not normally anticipate that his tee shot would strike a player standing on a fairway other than the one being played by him.
Games are played according to established rules, and whether the rules in force at the time the plaintiff was injured were those of the National Golf Association or those of the course where the plaintiff was injured, it is significant that the petition does not allege any violation of any rule of the game at the time he was injured, nor does he contend that, under the rules *691in force, the defendant was under any obligation to him at the time he was injured. On the contrary, he seeks, without regard to the rules of the game in force and effect at the time he was injured, to rest his case on his allegation that the defendant should have called the warning word “fore” after he saw the ball was headed in the direction of the plaintiff. The petition contains no allegation to indicate when, or how soon after the ball was hit, the defendant could reasonably have determined that it might strike the plaintiff, nor is any fact alleged to show that the plaintiff would have had time to do anything for his own protection if the defendant had called “fore” after he saw the ball approaching the plaintiff.
It is my opinion that under the “assumption-of-risk” rule the plaintiff could not recover from the defendant for the unfortunate injury received, and particularly is this true when no violation by the defendant of any applicable rule is alleged. I believe that the opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed, and I therefore dissent from the judgment of this court in the present case.