Court Opinion

ID: 9760943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:24:55.49124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:18.960023
License: Public Domain

LAGARDE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority hold that Rosalind Alexander unequivocally stated she “ha[d] a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant.” Tex. Code CRIM.PROC.Ann. art. 35.16(a)(9) (Vernon 1989). Thus, they conclude that she was disqualified as a matter of law. The majority rely on Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982), for the rule of law that, when a prospective juror is shown to be biased as a matter of law, the juror must be excused when challenged. They ignore, however, the further teaching of that case that “it is left to the discretion of the trial court to first determine whether or not bias exists.” Anderson, 633 S.W.2d at 854. I conclude that the rule set out in Swap Shop v. Fortune, 365 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.1963), and cited by the court in Anderson, applies here — i.e., whether a juror is biased or prejudiced may be a factual determination to be made by the court. I do not agree that the facts of this case establish bias or prejudice as a matter of law.
I disagree with the majority that Alexander unequivocally stated that she was biased or prejudiced for or against Vaughn under the facts of this case. Thus, it was left to the discretion of the trial court to first determine whether bias or prejudice existed. Anderson, 633 S.W.2d at 854. In my view, the trial court had discretion to determine whether bias or prejudice actually existed to such a degree that Alexander was disqualified. Anderson, 633 S.W.2d at 853-54.
The standard of review for this Court is abuse of discretion. Anderson, 633 S.W.2d at 854. Reviewing the record in light of all of the juror’s answers, as we must, I am not convinced that the trial court abused its discretion. See Williams v. State, 773 S.W.2d 525, 537 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 900, 110 S.Ct. 257, 107 L.Ed.2d 207 (1989).
Following voir dire and the striking of the jury lists, the trial judge swore in the jury and discharged the remainder of the venire. The jury was then excused for lunch. After lunch, the following questioning of Alexander occurred:
THE COURT: And after voir dire and being sworn in you contacted the bailiff and advised them [sic] that you think you know the defendant or are you sure now that do you know him from high school; is that correct?
VENIREMAN: Yes.
*187THE COURT: And having that knowledge of him, do you advise the Court that you can still be fair and impartial in this case?
VENIREMAN: No.
THE COURT: You cannot. All right. So the only thing I can do is just quash the panel and we’ll have to start voir dire all over again.
MR. JOHNSON [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, if the Court would like to make a call to the briefing attorneys, we’ll be amenable to any reasonable alternative we’ve got.
THE COURT: I may try this. Do you know the defendant personally?
VENIREMAN: No, I don’t.
THE COURT: Do you know anything about his reputation in the community—
■VENIREMAN: No.
THE COURT: (cont.) — at school or have any kind of socialization that would cause you to be biased towards him?
VENIREMAN: No.
THE COURT: You’re on the jury....
(Emphasis added.) I do not read the above record excerpt as an unambiguous or unequivocal statement of bias or prejudice. A fair reading is that Alexander said she was not telling the trial judge that she could be fair and impartial in this case. She did not unequivocally say that she was biased or prejudiced for or against the defendant. Thereafter, the judge, through further questioning, established that the juror had no actual factual basis for bias or prejudice for or against Vaughn. She responded that she did not know him personally, by reputation, or through any kind of socialization. She offered no factual basis whatsoever for bias or prejudice for or against Vaughn. In my view, this exchange indicates an ambiguous answer on the part of Alexander. The trial judge reviewing answers of an equivocating venireman has the opportunity to observe the tone and demeanor of the prospective juror in determining the precise meaning intended, while we have only the “cold record.” Mowbray v. State, 788 S.W.2d 658, 666 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 999, 112 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1991); see Briddle v. State, 742 S.W.2d 379, 384 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986, 109 S.Ct. 543, 102 L.Ed.2d 573 (1988); Stanton v. State, 678 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Tex.App—Fort Worth 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 743 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Under the facts of this case, I cannot say that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse Alexander. See Stanton, 678 S.W.2d at 307.
The majority state that, if subsequent to trial but prior to the jury’s verdict, it is discovered that a biased or prejudiced juror was selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of defense counsel, then it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to grant a motion for new trial. See Herrera v. State, 665 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Tex.App.Amarillo 1983, pet. ref’d). The majority conclude that, because the jury was already impaneled, Vaughn was deprived of his right to peremptorily challenge Alexander. They further state that, when the trial court told Alexander that she was still on the panel, it impliedly overruled Vaughn’s motion to quash the panel and forced him to accept an objectionable juror. Thus, the majority conclude that, because Vaughn went to trial with an objectionable juror, he was harmed and his conviction must be reversed.
Without citing any authority, the majority continue their analysis, stating that “Vaughn’s motion to quash in this situation is equivalent to asking for a mistrial.” After characterizing Vaughn’s motion to quash as a motion for mistrial, the majority conclude that “the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Vaughn to go to trial with an objectionable juror....” A review of the record discloses that the trial court never expressly ruled on Vaughn’s motion to quash the panel.1
MR. JOHNSON: I’d ask the Court to quash the panel.
THE COURT: We will see what the character of this woman is. We will see *188if she can do the right thing. So anyhow, let’s take a two minute break and let’s get started....
In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present to the trial court a timely motion and obtain an adverse ruling. Tex.R.App.P. 52(a). When no adverse ruling is obtained, nothing is presented for review. Gaines v. State, 789 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.). Vaughn never obtained an adverse ruling. Error, if any, was not preserved. Nevertheless, for the reasons heretofore stated, I conclude that, based on the facts of this case, neither bias nor prejudice was established as a matter of law, but was a factual determination to be made by the court. Anderson, 633 S.W.2d at 854. Because the record reflects no basis for the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion, I would affirm.

. Presumably, Vaughn referred to the jury because the remainder of the panel had already been excused and the actual jury had been impaneled and sworn.