Court Opinion

ID: 9371436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 14:11:31.999774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:27.982917
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 8

                  SUPREME COURT             OF     WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2019AP1987

COMPLETE TITLE:               Lowe's Home Centers, LLC,
                                        Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
                                   v.
                              City of Delavan,
                                        Defendant-Respondent.

                              REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                              Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 542, 970 N.W.2d 568
                                          (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:                February 16, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:                September 28, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
    COURT:                    Circuit
    COUNTY:                   Walworth
    JUDGE:                    Daniel Steven Johnson

JUSTICES:
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the
Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.     REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Thomas R. Wilhelmy, Daniel P. Deveny and Fredrikson &
Byron, P.A., Minneapolis. There was an oral argument by Daniel
P. Deveny.

       For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Lori        M.    Lubinksy,     Danielle   Baudhuin   Tierney,   and   Axley
Brynelson, LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Danielle
Baudhuin Tierney.
      An    amicus   curiae     brief   was   filed     by   Jason    P.    Gehring,
Dustin      T.   Woehl,   and     Kasdorf,    Lewis      &    Swietlick,      S.C.,
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Village of Plover, Wisconsin.

      An amicus curiae brief was filed by Misha Tseytlin, Kevin
M. LeRoy, and Troutman, Pepper, Hamilton, Sanders LLP, Chicago,
on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America.

      An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott E. Rosenow and
the   WMC    Litigation   Center,       Madison,   on    behalf      of    Wisconsin
Manufacturers and Commerce, Inc.

      An amicus curiae brief was filed by Amy R. Seibel, Claire
Silverman, and Seibel Law Offices, LLC, Mequon, and the League
of Wisconsin Municipalities, Monona, on behalf of the League of
Wisconsin Municipalities. There was an oral argument by Amy R.
Seibel.

                                         2
                                                                      2023 WI 8
                                                             NOTICE
                                               This opinion is subject to further
                                               editing and modification.   The final
                                               version will appear in the bound
                                               volume of the official reports.
No.    2019AP1987
(L.C. No.   2016CV589 & 2017CV432)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                         :             IN SUPREME COURT

Lowe's Home Centers, LLC,

            Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
                                                                  FILED
      v.
                                                             FEB 16, 2023
City of Delavan,
                                                                Sheila T. Reiff
            Defendant-Respondent.                            Clerk of Supreme Court

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the
Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.     REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, J., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.             Affirmed.

      ¶1    ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.        The petitioner, Lowe's Home

Centers, LLC, seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision

of    the   court    of   appeals    affirming     the     circuit       court's

determination that the City of Delavan's assessments of Lowe's'
                                                                      No.       2019AP1987

property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years were not excessive.1

Lowe's    contends    that   the    City's       assessments       should       not    have

received a presumption of correctness and that the assessments

improperly excluded comparable properties for the sole reason

that those properties were unoccupied.

     ¶2     Specifically,          Lowe's        contends     that        the     City's

assessments     should       not     have        received    a     presumption           of

correctness because, it argues, they were conducted in violation

of the dictates of the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual (the

Manual).      Further, it asserts that the vacant big-box retail

locations it presented to the circuit court are comparable to

the subject property and thus should have been considered in the

City's assessments.

     ¶3     The City argues to the contrary, contending that the

presumption    of    correctness      was       appropriately      afforded       to    its

assessments.         It   additionally          asserts     that    the     unoccupied

properties     Lowe's     presented     as        comparable       properties          were

properly excluded from the analysis.
     ¶4     We determine that the assessments in this case were

properly afforded a presumption of correctness.                           Pursuant to

Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2) (2019-20),2 the presumption attaches upon

     1 Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of Delavan, No.
2019AP1987, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 2021)
(per curiam) (affirming the order of the circuit court for
Walworth County, Daniel Steven Johnson, Judge).
     2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                            2
                                                                     No.    2019AP1987

the     filing   of   the    assessment        along    with       the     assessor's

affidavit.

      ¶5     We further determine that Lowe's failed to demonstrate

that the City's assessments were excessive.                 Giving deference to

the circuit court's factual findings, including its credibility

determinations,       we    conclude      that     Lowe's     did     not     provide

significant      contrary     evidence        sufficient      to    overcome        the

presumption of correctness.

      ¶6     Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of

appeals.

                                          I

      ¶7     Lowe's   is    the   owner       of   property    in    the     City   of

Delavan.      The property consists of 14.525 acres on which sits a

134,574-square-foot Lowe's Home Improvement store.                       Construction

on the building was completed in 2005, and Lowe's has occupied

the building since that time.

      ¶8     In 2013, the City assessor conducted a revaluation of

the property, and arrived at an assessed value of $8,922,300.
No changes were made to this value for purposes of the 2016 and

2017 assessments.

      ¶9     Lowe's challenged the City's assessments for 2016 and

2017.      It sought a waiver of its hearing before the City's Board

of Review and the Board granted the waiver, thereby disallowing

                                          3
                                                           No.   2019AP1987

the claim.3        After its claim was disallowed, Lowe's filed this

action     under    Wis.   Stat.   § 74.37(3)(d),4   asserting   that   the

assessments of its property for the 2016 and 2017 tax years were

excessive and seeking to recover the excess amount it believed

it had paid.

     ¶10    The circuit court held a three-day bench trial on the

matter.     At trial, City Assessor Luke Mack testified, as did the

City's expert appraiser Scott Chapko.          Lowe's offered testimony

from two experts, Michael MaRous and Brett Harrington.5

     ¶11    Mack testified regarding the method he employed for

valuing the property for 2016 and 2017.              He described those

assessments as "maintenance" assessments, which means that the

property was not subject to a full revaluation.6            Mack further

     3 See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8m) ("The board may, at the request
of the taxpayer or assessor, or at its own discretion, waive the
hearing of an objection . . . .          For purposes of this
subsection, if the board waives the hearing, the waiver
disallows the taxpayer's claim on excessive assessment under s.
74.37(3)   and,  notwithstanding   the  time   period  under   s.
74.37(3)(d), the taxpayer has 60 days from the notice of the
hearing waiver in which to commence an action under s.
74.37(3)(d).").
     4 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d), "[i]f the taxation
district or county disallows the claim, the claimant may
commence an action in circuit court to recover the amount of the
claim not allowed."
     5 The circuit court's decision did not focus on Harrington's
testimony.     Accordingly, although we briefly describe the
testimony of the other witnesses, we do not recount that of
Harrington.
     6 See Wis. Stat. § 70.05(5)(b) ("Each taxation district
shall assess property at full value at least once in every 5-
year period.").

                                      4
                                                                          No.     2019AP1987

testified that the prior assessment of the property, completed

in 2013, was done using the cost approach,7 that replacement

costs were based on "Marshall and Swift cost data,"8 and that

market adjustments were applied for depreciation and additional

obsolescence.           He   also     compared    the     assessments           to    recent

revaluations in other communities.

    ¶12     Lowe's' expert, MaRous, testified that the property

should have been valued at a much lower level than the City had

offered.     In MaRous's opinion, the subject property had a fair

market    value    of    $4.6    million——just         over   half    of        the   City's

assessed value.

    ¶13     To arrive at this valuation, MaRous used the sales

comparison       approach.       In    doing     so,    he    compared      the       Lowe's

property    to    six    other      recently-sold       properties        that        he   had

determined       to be "comparable" to the Lowe's property.

    ¶14     Three of the six comparable sites MaRous identified

(what    MaRous    termed     sales     one,    three,       and   six)    were       former

American    TV     locations.         Two   of    these       sites   were        sold      to
Steinhafel's furniture and one was sold and converted into a go-

    7  The "cost approach" to valuation "seeks to measure the
cost to replace the property."  Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v.
City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶35, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717
N.W.2d 803.
    8  Marshall and Swift "publishes materials used by appraisers
and state and local taxing authorities." Marshall & Swift v. BS
& A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952, 954 (W.D. Mich. 1994).        The
Marshall   and   Swift  handbook   has   been   described  as   a
"standardized publication in the field of real estate."     In Re
Thompson, 18 B.R. 67, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).

                                            5
                                                                        No.    2019AP1987

kart       racing   track,   bar,       and   restaurant.       All    three    were    in

receivership9 when they were sold.

       ¶15     MaRous's comparable sale number two was a former K-

Mart store that, by MaRous's testimony, had been vacant and

marketed for "2 to 3 years" prior to being sold.                              Comparable

sale number four was a former Lowe's store in Brown Deer.                              The

property had been built in 2006 and vacated by Lowe's just five

years later.          It sat vacant for two years before being purchased

by Walmart in 2013.             MaRous further advanced that the "exposure

time," or the length of time it takes a property to sell on the

open market, for properties similar to the subject property in

the same geographical area is two to three years.

       ¶16     Finally, MaRous offered comparable sale number five, a

vacant former Target store.                   This property was "vacant before

the purchase for about four years."                  It was ultimately purchased

by a developer who "broke it up into two [lots] . . . because

that's where the demand was."

       ¶17     The City countered Lowe's' expert with its own expert,
Scott       Chapko.      Chapko     valued     the   property     at   $9.2     million,

slightly       higher    than     the    assessed      value.     Like    MaRous,      he

arrived at this valuation using the sales comparison approach,

although Chapko used different properties as comparables than

MaRous used.

       ¶18     Chapko    testified        that    he    did     not    think    it     was

appropriate to use "dark" stores or "distressed" properties to

       9   See Wis. Stat. ch. 128.

                                              6
                                                                       No.     2019AP1987

compare to the occupied Lowe's property.10                    Accordingly, Chapko

did   not   use   any    such    properties       in    his   analysis.         All   of

Chapko's submitted comparable sales were occupied at the time of

sale and had market-rate leases in place.                     None was sold under

"duress,"    such       as   a   bankruptcy        or    foreclosure.            Chapko

additionally testified that the exposure time for a property

like the subject property is in the "overall range of 2 to 18

months."

      ¶19   The     circuit      court        ultimately      upheld     the     City's

assessments.        Specifically,        it    determined     that     "the    evidence

presented by Lowe's in this case is significantly less credible

than that presented by the City when it comes to a proper value

to be attached to this real estate for the years 2016 and 2017."

In discussing MaRous's appraisal, the circuit court discounted

       The Manual discourages the use of "dark" and "distressed"
      10

properties "as comparable sales unless the subject property is
similarly dark or distressed." 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment
Manual 9-12 (2016).   Pursuant to the Manual, "[a] vacant store
is considered dark when it is vacant beyond the normal time
period for that commercial real estate marketplace and can vary
from one municipality to another."     Id.  As such, "vacant" and
"dark" are not synonyms.        For further discussion on the
distinction between "vacant" and "dark," see infra, ¶¶45-46.
The Manual does not specifically define "distressed," but it
counsels   that  "[a]   recent   court   case  stated  distressed
properties are not seen as meaningfully comparable to operating
properties."    1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 9-12
(citing Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013 WI
App 131, ¶¶21, 22, 34, 35, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893).

     All references to the Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual
are to the 2016 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                          7
                                                                              No.   2019AP1987

MaRous's claimed comparables two and five in that they "were

both    vacant      beyond          the   2-3       year    window     that     Mr.     MaRous

apparently        identifies         as   the   normal       exposure     time        for   the

Delavan area," classifying those properties as "dark" for this

reason.      It further explained:

       In that these two properties are dark they have a
       major deficiency when compared with the Lowe's store
       in question.     Further, the fact that they were
       considered comparable sales at all is in apparent
       direct conflict with the [principles] outlined in the
       Manual   stating  not  to   use  dark   properties  in
       performing an appraisal unless the subject property is
       also dark.
       ¶20   The    circuit          court   also      found    unpersuasive          MaRous's

reliance     on    what       it    considered       "distressed"      properties.           It

observed:

       [H]alf of the comparable sales used by Mr. MaRous were
       in receivership. The Court might be able to overlook
       one comparable sale in receivership or under possible
       duress as an outlier if it was able to put that
       outlier in the context of five other properties
       without significant flaws, not in receivership, with
       similar adjusted values. However, the Court cannot do
       so here because of the number of properties in
       receivership   and  the   flaws  of  the   other  non-
       receivership comparable sales.
       ¶21   Due        to    the    "significant          deficiencies"       in     MaRous's

appraisal,        the    circuit      court     concluded       that    Lowe's        had   not

provided significant contrary evidence that the City's valuation

was excessive.               Accordingly, it denied Lowe's' request for a

refund of excessive taxes.

       ¶22   Lowe's appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the
circuit court's decision.                 Lowe's Home Centers, LLC v. City of

                                                8
                                                                       No.    2019AP1987

Delavan, No. 2019AP1987, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App.

July 28, 2021) (per curiam).               Emphasizing that the circuit court

"is the ultimate arbiter of credibility," the court of appeals

concluded     that     "Lowe's      has    not   overcome      the   presumption     of

correctness that attached to the City's assessments and that the

record      supports    the    circuit       court's    determinations        in   this

case."       Id.,    ¶¶43,    48.     Lowe's      petitioned     for   this    court's

review.

                                            II

      ¶23     We are called upon to review the court of appeals'

determination on an excessive assessment claim brought pursuant

to   Wis.    Stat.     § 74.37(3)(d).            An   action   filed    pursuant     to

§ 74.37 seeks a trial before the circuit court, and is distinct

from a certiorari action.11               Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee,

2018 WI 4, ¶23, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784.                        Accordingly,

       Certiorari is a mechanism by which a court may test the
      11

validity   of   a    decision   rendered   by   a   municipality,
administrative agency, or other quasi-judicial tribunal.    State
ex rel. Anderson v. Town of Newbold, 2021 WI 6, ¶11, 395
Wis. 2d 351, 954 N.W.2d 323.    Such a proceeding is "limited to
the record before the board and addresses only whether the
board's actions were:        (1) within its jurisdiction; (2)
according to law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and
represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) supported by
evidence such that the board might reasonably make the order or
determination in question."    State ex rel. City of Waukesha v.
City of Waukesha Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 89, ¶19, 399 Wis. 2d 696,
967 N.W.2d 460.    In contrast, an excessive assessment action
under Wis. Stat. § 74.37 is not confined to the record before
the board and new evidence may be presented.            Trailwood
Ventures, LLC v. Village of Kronenwetter, 2009 WI App 18, ¶7,
315 Wis. 2d 791, 762 N.W.2d 841.

                                             9
                                                                            No.       2019AP1987

we review the circuit court's determination, not that of the

assessor or Board of Review.             Id.

      ¶24   In our review, we must interpret and apply Wis. Stat.

§§ 70.32 and 70.49 to determine whether the appraisals at issue

followed the statutory directives.                Statutory interpretation and

application       present       questions         of     law         that        we     review

independently      of   the     determinations         rendered        by    the        circuit

court and court of appeals.             Id., ¶24.

      ¶25   Factual findings made by the circuit court will not be

disturbed   unless      they    are     clearly    erroneous.           Id.,          ¶25.     A

finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the great

weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.                             Id., ¶62.        It

is within the province of the factfinder to make determinations

of the weight and credibility of evidence.                     Id., ¶25.

                                          III

      ¶26   We    begin       by      setting     forth        the     principles            and

methodology      that   guide      property     tax    assessment           in    Wisconsin.

Subsequently, we discuss the presumption of correctness to which
an   assessment    is   entitled.          Finally,       we    address           the   City's

assessments of Lowe's' property.

                                           A

      ¶27   Valuation of real estate for tax assessment purposes

is governed by Wis. Stat. § 70.32.                     State ex rel. Collison v.

City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 48, ¶23, 397 Wis. 2d 246,

960 N.W.2d 1.      Pursuant to § 70.32(1), property shall be valued

"in the manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment
manual."      Subsection        (1)    further     sets    forth        a    hierarchical
                                          10
                                                                        No.   2019AP1987

valuation methodology for arriving at a property's fair market

value.12       See State ex rel. Markarian v. City of Cudahy, 45

Wis. 2d 683, 685-86, 173 N.W.2d 627 (1970).

       ¶28     Wisconsin      Stat.       § 70.32(1)      lists     three   sources   of

information that inform tax assessments.                          The order in which

these       sources   are     listed      is     indicative    of    the    quality   of

information each source provides.                       Collison, 397 Wis. 2d 246,

¶24.        This methodology has been described as providing three

"tiers" of analysis.           Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶31.

       ¶29     An arm's-length sale of the subject property is the

best information of a property's fair market value, and is thus

the first source of information to which an assessor should look

in conducting an assessment.                   Collison, 397 Wis. 2d 246, ¶25.

Examination of a recent arm's-length sale is known as a tier 1

analysis.       Id.   If the property has not been recently sold, then

the    appraiser      moves    to     a   tier      2   analysis,    examining   recent

       12   In full, Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1) provides:

       Real property shall be valued by the assessor in the
       manner specified in the Wisconsin property assessment
       manual provided under s. 73.03(2a) from actual view or
       from the best information that the assessor can
       practicably obtain, at the full value which could
       ordinarily be obtained therefor at private sale.    In
       determining the value, the assessor shall consider
       recent arm's-length sales of the property to be
       assessed if according to professionally acceptable
       appraisal practices those sales conform to recent
       arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable property;
       recent arm's-length sales of reasonably comparable
       property;   and   all  factors   that,    according to
       professionally acceptable appraisal practices, affect
       the value of the property to be assessed.

                                               11
                                                                        No.    2019AP1987

arm's-length        sales     of    reasonably       comparable    properties       (the

"sales comparison" approach).                  Id.    It is this tier 2 analysis

that is before us in this case.

       ¶30    Finally, when both tier 1 and tier 2 are unavailable,

an    assessor      moves   to     tier   3,      under   which   the    assessor      may

consider all the factors collectively that have a bearing on the

value of the property.              Id., ¶26.         These factors include cost,

depreciation, replacement value, income, industrial conditions,

location      and    occupancy,      sales     of    like   property,     book   value,

amount of insurance carried, value asserted in a prospectus, and

appraisals produced by the owner.                    Id.; State ex rel. Mitchell

Aero, Inc. v. Bd. of Rev. of City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 268,

278, 246 N.W.2d 521 (1976).

       ¶31    Property owners who are dissatisfied with the assessed

value of their property may file an objection to the assessment

with the municipal board of review.                         Wis. Stat.    § 70.47(7);

State ex rel. Nudo Holdings, LLC v. Bd. of Rev. for City of

Kenosha, 2022 WI 17, ¶9, 401 Wis. 2d 27, 972 N.W.2d 544.                               The
board of review is a quasi-judicial body that hears evidence and

decides whether the assessor's valuation is correct.                           State ex

rel. City of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI

89,    ¶16,    399    Wis. 2d 696,        967       N.W.2d 460.     It    is     not    an

assessing body.         Id.        If a property owner remains dissatisfied

after the board's decision, the property owner may appeal the

                                             12
                                                                                   No.    2019AP1987

board's decision through one of three statutory avenues.13                                        Id.,

¶17.        As relevant here, Lowe's brought an excessive assessment

action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37.

                                                   B

       ¶32     With    this       background           in    hand,    we    next     clarify      the

operation of the presumption of correctness to which assessments

are entitled.              As a starting point to the examination of a

property owner's challenge to a tax assessment pursuant to Wis.

Stat.       § 74.37,       the     assessor's           valuation      is     presumed       to    be

correct.             Wis.        Stat.     § 70.49(2);               Metro.        Assocs.,        379

Wis. 2d 141, ¶50.                Such a presumption may be rebutted if the

assessor       did    not        correctly     apply          the    Manual        and    Wisconsin

statutes       or     if     a    challenger            presents      significant         contrary

evidence.            Metro.       Assocs.,         379      Wis. 2d 141,           ¶50;    Allright

Props., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, ¶12, 317

Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567.

       ¶33     However, Lowe's contends that the assessments in this

case    are     not        entitled      to    the          presumption       of     correctness.
Pointing to this court's statement that "[n]o presumption of

correctness may be accorded to an assessment that does not apply

the principles in the Property Assessment Manual," Walgreen Co.

v.   City     of     Madison,       2008      WI    80,      ¶17,     311   Wis. 2d 158,           752

       The three options for property owners who wish to appeal
       13

a board decision are:    (1) certiorari review pursuant to Wis.
Stat. § 70.47(13), (2) a written complaint with the Department
of Revenue to revalue the property under Wis. Stat. § 70.85, and
(3) an excessive assessment action pursuant to Wis. Stat.
§ 74.37. City of Waukesha, 399 Wis. 2d 696, ¶17.

                                                   13
                                                                   No.    2019AP1987

N.W.2d 687,    Lowe's      asserts   that    because    the   assessments       here

deviated from the Manual (an assertion which we will address

below), the presumption does not attach in the first instance.

    ¶34    Lowe's       misapprehends         the      application       of      the

presumption.        Its argument is incorrect as a matter of both

statutory law and logic.

    ¶35    The statutory basis for the presumption, Wis. Stat.

§ 70.49(2), provides:

    The value of all real and personal property entered
    into the assessment roll to which such affidavit is
    attached by the assessor shall, in all actions and
    proceedings involving such values, be presumptive
    evidence that all such properties have been justly and
    equitably assessed in proper relationship to each
    other.
For our purposes, the key passage from the statute sets forth

that the assessment becomes "presumptive evidence" when it is

"entered     into     the    assessment       roll"     and      includes       "such

affidavit . . . attached        by   the     assessor."       § 70.49(2).        The

plain   language      of    this     provision      thus   compels       only    one

conclusion:    that the presumption of correctness attaches at the

filing of the assessment by the assessor along with the required

affidavit.     See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty.,

2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (setting forth

that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the

statute, and if the meaning is plain, "we ordinarily stop the

inquiry").

    ¶36    Further,        Lowe's'    proffered       analysis     suffers      from
backward logic.         Rather than apply the presumption and then

                                        14
                                                                    No.     2019AP1987

determine    if     significant        contrary       evidence     overcomes       the

presumption, Lowe's would have us endorse an analysis that would

first    examine    the    evidence     and    make    a   determination      as   to

whether the assessment complied with the Manual and only then

determine whether the presumption applies.

      ¶37   This is not how a presumption works.                 If an assessment

is conducted contrary to the dictates of the Manual, this does

not merely mean that the presumption does not initially attach.

If, in the context of a Wis. Stat. § 74.37 action, the failure

to follow the Manual results in an excessive assessment, then

the   presumption     is   overcome     and    the    assessment     must    be    set

aside.

      ¶38   We acknowledge that this court's cases have indicated

that "[n]o presumption of correctness may be accorded to an

assessment that does not apply the principles in the Property

Assessment Manual."          See Walgreen Co., 311 Wis. 2d 158, ¶17;

Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104,

¶56, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803.                 However, Walgreen Co. did
not cite Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2) and thus provides no insight into

its application.       Although § 70.49(2) was cited in Adams Outdoor

Advertising, it was referenced only for the premise that the

court "must give presumptive weight to the City's assessment."

Adams Outdoor Advert., 294 Wis. 2d 441, ¶25.                      Given the plain

language    of     § 70.49(2),    we    take    the     court's    statements      in

Walgreen Co. and Adams Outdoor Advertising to mean not that the

presumption does not initially attach to an assessment that does
not follow the Manual's directives, but that the presumption is
                                         15
                                                                           No.    2019AP1987

overcome in such a situation.                   Indeed, it is apparent from the

plain text of § 70.49(2) that the presumption attaches when the

assessment is filed along with the proper affidavit.

      ¶39     We thus conclude that the assessments in this case

were properly afforded a presumption of correctness.                               Pursuant

to   Wis.    Stat.    § 70.49(2),         the      presumption     attaches       upon      the

filing of the assessment along with the assessor's affidavit.

                                               C

      ¶40     Having established that the presumption of correctness

attaches to the assessments, we turn next to address whether

Lowe's      presented      significant      contrary          evidence   sufficient          to

overcome      the     presumption        and       demonstrate      that     the       City's

assessments were excessive.

      ¶41     Although Lowe's conceded at oral argument that "all

the [proposed comparable] stores were vacant at the time they

sold," it contends that the assessor deviated from the Manual by

categorically excluding "vacant" and "dark" stores from a tier 2

sales     comparison         analysis.          It      further    contends        that     it
presented significant contrary evidence sufficient to overcome

the presumption in the form of MaRous's appraisal.

      ¶42     In evaluating Lowe's' arguments, we examine first the

relevant portions of the Manual.                     This case revolves around the

question     of     what   constitutes         a   "comparable"      property          in   the

context     of    a   tier    2   sales    comparison          analysis.         The    sales

comparison        approach     is   "based         on   the    premise     that     similar

properties will sell for similar prices on the open market."                                  1
Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 7-24.
                                            16
                                                                     No.   2019AP1987

      ¶43    The    Manual     "does    not   leave     the    determination         of

whether     properties       are   reasonably      comparable    wholly       to    the

discretion of an appraiser."             Regency W. Apartments LLC v. City

of Racine, 2016 WI 99, ¶61, 372 Wis. 2d 282, 888 N.W.2d 611.

Accordingly, it provides some guidance as to how assessors are

to    evaluate       whether       property       is    indeed       "comparable."

Specifically, the Manual states:                  "Comparable sales refer to

properties that are similar to the subject property in age,

condition, use, type of construction, location, design, physical

features and economic characteristics."                  1 Wisconsin Property

Assessment Manual 7-24.            "The more similar the sold property is

to   the    subject,    the   more     reliable    is   the   sale    price    as    an

indicator of the value of the subject property."                 Id.

      ¶44    Providing further specific guidance in the valuation

of commercial properties through the sales comparison approach,

the Manual states that "[w]hen valuing properties, the assessor

should choose comparable sales exhibiting a similar highest and

best use and similar placement in the commercial real estate
marketplace."       Id. at 9-12.        The Manual additionally sets forth

language that is critical to the issue presented in this case

regarding     the      use    of   "vacant"       and   "dark"   properties         in

commercial valuation:

      The assessor should avoid using sales of improved
      properties that are vacant ("dark") or distressed as
      comparable sales unless the subject property is
      similarly dark or distressed.     A vacant store is
      considered dark when it is vacant beyond the normal
      time   period  for   that  commercial   real  estate
      marketplace and can vary from one municipality to

                                         17
                                                                        No.       2019AP1987

       another.    A recent court case stated distressed
       properties are not seen as meaningfully comparable to
       operating properties.
Id. (citing Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013

WI App 131, ¶¶21, 22, 34, 35, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893).

       ¶45    Before continuing in our analysis, we take a brief

detour       to   discuss    the     terminology         that    we   employ.          Some

confusion has arisen due to inconsistent usage of the terms

"vacant" and "dark."            Although the court of appeals in this case

seemingly used the terms interchangeably, they have different
meanings.

       ¶46    We acknowledge that the Manual may not be a model of

clarity on the subject, but its language does indicate that

"vacant" and "dark" are not synonymous.                     The Manual states that

"[a] vacant store is considered dark when it is vacant beyond

the    normal      time     period     for        that    commercial       real     estate

marketplace and can vary from one municipality to another."                             Id.

Thus, "dark," as used by the Manual, is a subset of "vacant."

In other words, all dark stores are vacant, but not all vacant

stores are dark.
       ¶47    After this brief detour, we return to the parties'

arguments.        Lowe's' main argument before this court is that the

circuit court erred in rejecting MaRous's proffered "comparable"

properties for purposes of a tier 2 sales comparison analysis.

Specifically,       it    contends    that        the    property's    vacancy      status

should not be considered, and that the property must be valued

with   respect      to    the   owner's      fee    simple      interest      only.      To

                                             18
                                                                           No.    2019AP1987

support     this     argument,        Lowe's      looks     to       Walgreen    Co.,     311

Wis. 2d 158.

     ¶48     In    Walgreen      Co.,      the    business      at    issue,     Walgreens,

operated     pursuant       to   a    business      model       under    which    it    would

contract with a real estate developer to construct properties at

Walgreens' direction.            Id., ¶6.         In return, Walgreens leased the

properties        from     the       developer      at     above-market          rates     to

compensate for the developer's costs.                     Id.

     ¶49     When assessing property values, the City of Madison

appraised the "leased fee interest," i.e., it considered the

actual above-market contract rents in its analysis.                              Id., ¶10.

In contrast, Walgreens advanced an appraisal that "appraised the

fee simple interest in the two properties without consideration

of the lease."        Id.     The court addressed the issue of "whether a

property     tax    assessment        of    retail       property       leased    at    above

market rent values should be based on market rents (as Walgreens

argue[d]) or if such assessments should be based on the above

market     rent    terms    of    Walgreens'        actual       leases    (as    the    City
argue[d])."        Id., ¶2.

     ¶50     This    court       agreed     with    Walgreens.            It    determined,

"consistent with the nationally recognized principle that '[a]

lease never increases the market value of real property rights

to   the    fee      simple      estate,'"         that     Wis.      Stat.      § 70.32(1)

"proscribes assessing real property in excess of market value."

Id., ¶3.     The Walgreen Co. court also concluded that "an income

approach assessment of a leased retail property's fair market
value of the fee simple interest [must] be based on market lease
                                             19
                                                                     No.    2019AP1987

rates, not actual contract rates, as long as encumbrances to the

property do not cause its leased fee value to fall below a

market rate value."        Id.

       ¶51    Lowe's    argues     that      consideration     of   the     occupancy

status of a store in a valuation necessarily means that the

value of the business is being taken into account rather than

just   the    fee    simple     value   of    the     land.   It    highlights     the

Walgreen Co. court's statement that "the valuation of the fair

market value of property for purposes of property taxes is by

its nature different from business, or income tax assessment."

Id., ¶65.       "[A]n assessor's task is to value the real estate,

not the business concern which may be using the property."                         Id.

(quoting Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. Kenosha Cnty. Bd. of Rev.,

184    Wis. 2d 541,      565,    516    N.W.2d 695       (1994)).     Pointing     to

language in Walgreen Co. indicating that "a property assessor's

task is to identify the market value of a fee simple interest,"

id., ¶20, Lowe's argues that consideration of vacancy status

takes the assessor outside of these confines.
       ¶52    Walgreen Co. does not compel the outcome Lowe's seeks,

and its holding is not as broad as Lowe's claims.                     The court in

Walgreen Co. made a narrow determination regarding how above-

market rent is to be treated for tax assessment purposes.                           As

the    City   here     argues,    Walgreen      Co.    does   not   stand    for   the

blanket proposition that occupancy or vacancy has no role to

play in valuation.

       ¶53    Lowe's' argument misses the mark when it advances that
accounting for the vacant nature of a store necessarily values
                                          20
                                                            No.    2019AP1987

the business concern and not just the fee simple interest in the

land.     Many factors inform the value of land, including the

land's    viability   to   house   a   business.   Saying   that   land   is

suitable for a successful business, or that the land has a track

record of housing a successful business, and assigning a value

to that fact is not the same as valuing the business itself.

Generally, a site that can sustain a business is more valuable

than one that cannot.14      See also 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment

     14 This conclusion is echoed by a position paper published
by the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO),
an organization whose standards are incorporated into the
Manual.     See 1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 1-3
("Whether or not the IAAO Standards appear in the [Manual], the
most current version in effect on January 1 of a given
assessment year is incorporated by reference in the manual.");
State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI
48, ¶41, 397 Wis. 2d 246, 960 N.W.2d 1.

     The IAAO states:

     If the subject property is occupied, that fact
     supports the premise that there is demand for the use
     for which the property was originally designed.
     Highest and best use is likely for the continued use
     of the property in its current use.

        . . .

     For retail properties, value is affected by size, age,
     condition, access, traffic counts, proximity to major
     employment centers, the concentration of surrounding
     properties, population size, and household purchasing
     power, to name just a few considerations.           The
     competitive advantage of a property determines its
     relative position within the market. A property that
     has significant advantages over other properties of
     the same use because of location, demographics, and
     economic forces will command a higher price and rent.

Int'l Ass'n of Assessing Officers, Commercial Big-Box Retail:              A
Guide to Market-Based Valuation at 16 (Sept. 2017).
                                       21
                                                                      No.     2019AP1987

Manual    7-24    ("Comparable        sales    refer   to    properties       that     are

similar to the subject property in age, condition, use, type of

construction, location, design, physical features and economic

characteristics.") (emphasis added); id. at 7-1 ("[T]he assessor

must not consider only the physical attributes of the land and

improvements      but   the    intangible      benefits      that    are     associated

with them.").

    ¶54     Further,      a    dark    property    is       more    likely       to   have

characteristics that would make it less valuable than a property

that was on the market for a shorter period of time.                                  For

example, if a building has been unoccupied for a long period of

time, it is more likely to be in some kind of disrepair and in

turn more likely to require significant investment to make it

usable again.

    ¶55     The assessments in this case were consistent with the

above provisions of the Manual and thus the circuit court was

not obligated to reject the assessments.                       The circuit court

determined that multiple properties on which Lowe's relied were
not just vacant, but were dark.                 As to the dark properties on

which    Lowe's   relies,      the    Manual    counsels      against       using     such

properties as comparables to properties that are not similarly

dark.     Specifically, the Manual states:                   "The assessor should

avoid    using    sales       of   improved     properties         that    are    vacant

('dark') or distressed as comparable sales unless the subject

property is similarly dark or distressed."                   Id. at 9-12.

    ¶56     Further buttressing the application of this directive
is the court of appeals' decision in Bonstores Realty One, LLC
                                          22
                                                                         No.        2019AP1987

v. City of Wauwatosa, 351 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶20-22.                          In Bonstores,

the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's determination

that   an    expert's    opinion       was    unreliable       because      the      opinion

disregarded      differences         in    the     vacancy     status    of     proffered

comparable properties.               Id., ¶22.          Here, the circuit court's

decision was similar to and consistent with that in Bonstores.

       ¶57    The Manual's directive that assessors "should avoid"

use    of    vacant     and    dark        properties     in    assessing           occupied

properties is consistent with general principles of real estate

assessment.       Specifically, real estate must be valued at its

highest and best use.                Collison, 397 Wis. 2d 246, ¶37.                       The

highest and best use of a store in an area that is conducive to

business (and is in fact operating as a business) is different

from the highest and best use of a property that contains a

failed big-box store.           Lowe's' argument treats these different

things alike, which is not the "apples to apples" comparison

contemplated      in    a     tier     2     analysis.         See    Bonstores,           351

Wis. 2d 439, ¶21.
       ¶58    In examining the distressed "comparable properties" in

receivership on which Lowe's relies, Lowe's fares no better.

Again, the Manual counsels against the use of such properties as

comparable, and with good reason.                       See 1 Wisconsin Property

Assessment Manual 9-12.               A property in receivership is often

sold under vastly different economic conditions and subject to

vastly      different   incentives          from    a   property     that      is    not    in

receivership.

                                             23
                                                                      No.   2019AP1987

       ¶59   To   explain,     "[a]    Wis.     Stat.    ch.    128    receivership

provides a way to liquidate the assets of a business debtor in

an orderly and controlled manner."                Kristin K. Beilke et al.,

Collections and Bankruptcy in Wisconsin § 2.16 (3d ed. 2022).

"The object and purpose of assignment law is to afford an equal

distribution      of    the   assignor's      estate     to    all    creditors    in

proportion to their claims."            Linton v. Schmidt, 88 Wis. 2d 183,

198, 277 N.W.2d 136 (1979).

       ¶60   This court has stated that the assignee, or receiver,

is "the trustee for both the debtor and the creditors; with the

duty    to   administer       the   trust     property    so     as    to   pay   the

creditors, as far as possible, their just claims, and then to

account to the debtor for the surplus."                        Id.    However, the

receiver is "bound to look primarily to the interests of the

creditors."            Id.     Given     this     responsibility,           differing

incentives come into play and a sale of receivership property

may not reflect the same price as a similar property not in

receivership would receive on the open market.                       For example, a
receiver may be motivated to sell the property more quickly so

as to secure timely payment of creditors and avoid the building

falling into disrepair.

       ¶61   Receivership can thus result in a "distressed" sale.

Although the mere fact of a receivership does not automatically

affect a property's market value, a claim that a distressed

property is comparable to an operating one should be subjected

to a court's keen scrutiny.            The circuit court was therefore not

                                        24
                                                                               No.       2019AP1987

obligated     to    accept      MaRous's       analysis         that    was    based        on    an

equivalency between distressed and operating properties.

       ¶62    Given      the    above    analysis         and     the    circuit          court's

evaluation of the evidence presented, Lowe's' contention that it

presented significant contrary evidence sufficient to overcome

the    presumption       of     correctness         in    this     case       is     ultimately

unpersuasive.         In evaluating comparable properties two and five,

the former K-Mart and Target stores, the circuit court made a

factual determination that both of these properties were "vacant

beyond the 2-3 year window that Mr. MaRous apparently identifies

as the normal exposure time for the Delevan area."                              Accordingly,

it concluded that these properties were "dark" and determined

that   neither      of    these       stores    was      comparable       to       the    subject

property.         It observed that "[b]oth of these stores appear to

fall   within      the    category       of    'dark'      properties          based      on     the

extensive period of time during which they stood empty and were

unable to be sold" given that they were "on the market for sale

for a period of time beyond the normal exposure time needed to
obtain market value."             Thus, the circuit court concluded that

these properties "have a major deficiency when compared with the

Lowe's    store     in    question."           This       "deficiency"         was,       in     the

circuit court's view, "significant," and "call[ed] into question

the value of [MaRous's] appraisal as a whole."

       ¶63    Likewise,        with    regard       to    the    distressed          properties

under receivership (comparables one, three, and six, the former

American     TV    properties),         the    circuit      court       similarly         made     a
factual      determination,           reaching      the    "inescapable            conclusion"
                                               25
                                                                        No.     2019AP1987

that   "American       TV   was    going    out     of     business,    subject       to   a

receivership, and needed to liquidate their assets."                          Under such

conditions, the circuit court determined that these properties

were not comparable to the subject property as MaRous advanced.

       ¶64    Lowe's    contends       that      MaRous     "exercised    exceptional

diligence in investigating the circumstances surrounding each

sale" of properties in receivership, asserting that "each of the

properties were sufficiently exposed to the market with high

demand from numerous potential buyers, and that each of the

consummated     sales       was   an   arm's      length    transaction       reflecting

full fee simple market value."                    However, after evaluating the

evidence, the circuit court determined that MaRous's analysis

was deficient.

       ¶65    The circuit court observed that "there is no testimony

that    any    of    [the     distressed         properties]     were    put     on    the

traditional real estate market for sale for the normal exposure

time before they were placed as an asset into a receivership."

Without an explanation from MaRous, the circuit court stated
that it "simply does not know whether the amount obtained on the

traditional     non-receivership           open    market     would    have     been   the

same or different if no receivership was in place and Mr. MaRous

did not adequately explain why the receivership itself doesn't

matter or is irrelevant as it relates to that concern."                                The

circuit court further did not accept MaRous's valuation because

of   the     sheer   amount       of   weight     his     analysis     placed    on    the

distressed sales:

                                            26
                                                                            No.   2019AP1987

      The Court might be able to overlook one comparable
      sale in receivership or under possible duress as an
      outlier if it was able to put that outlier in the
      context of five other properties without significant
      flaws, not in receivership, with similar adjusted
      values. However, the Court cannot do so here because
      of the number of properties in receivership and the
      flaws of the other non-receivership comparable sales.
      ¶66    In contrast, the comparable properties presented by

the   City's      appraiser,     Chapko,    were        not   dark    or     distressed.15

Instead, all of these properties were occupied at the time of

sale.      Additionally, Chapko testified that there was no duress

involved     in    any    of   the    sales,     none     were    bank-owned         or     in

bankruptcy,       and    all   were   exposed      to     the    open       market    for    a

sufficient period of time.

      ¶67    Although it recognized that "Chapko's analysis also

has flaws," such as his "less than ideal" use of multi-tenant

shopping     centers,      the   circuit        court    found       that    Chapko    made

adjustments that "are reasonable, sufficient, and credible" to

account for differences in the comparable properties and the

       These properties were all occupied and included Shopko
      15

stores in Madison, Monona, and West Bend; a multi-tenant big-box
building in Grand Chute; a big-box building in Milwaukee divided
into two units, one leased to Pick 'n Save and the other to
Kohl's; a multi-tenant shopping center in Racine anchored by
Hobby Lobby, DSW, Bed Bath & Beyond, and T.J. Maxx; and a Mills
Fleet Farm store in Hudson.

     Chapko did not use all of the same properties as
comparables for his 2017 appraisal as he used for the 2016
appraisal, instead updating the 2017 appraisal with two new
sales that occurred in 2016 and discarding the two oldest sales
from the 2016 appraisal. This list reflects the properties used
in both the 2016 and 2017 appraisals without differentiating
between the two.

                                           27
                                                                             No.    2019AP1987

subject property.             Foremost in the circuit court's determination

of the credibility of the dueling appraisals was the experts'

differing       methodologies            and     specifically          their        differing

reliance       on    dark      and     distressed       properties:           "Maybe     most

importantly, [Chapko] did not use any properties, much less half

of his properties that were subject to a receivership or could

otherwise be argued as being distressed.                          Nor did he use any

'dark' properties."              Thus, the circuit court found "[Chapko's]

opinion credible under the circumstances."

      ¶68      It is in the province of the circuit court as the

trier     of    fact      to     make       determinations       of    the     weight     and

credibility of evidence.                Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶61;

Lessor v. Wangelin, 221 Wis. 2d 659, 665, 586 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App.

1998) ("When the trial court acts as the finder of fact, it is

the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and of

the   weight        to   be    given    to    each    witness's       testimony.").        On

review, such a determination will only be overturned if it is

clearly erroneous.             Metro. Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶62.                    Here,
the   circuit        court      made    a    determination        that      "the     evidence

presented by Lowe's in this case is significantly less credible

than that presented by the City when it comes to a proper value

to be attached to this real estate for the years 2016 and 2017."

      ¶69      On this record, we cannot conclude that the circuit

court's        factual          findings,            including        its      credibility

determinations,          were     clearly      erroneous.          The      circuit     court

examined       MaRous's        conclusions      and    methodology       and       ultimately
determined       that     the    City's       proffered    testimony         and    proposed
                                               28
                                                                              No.        2019AP1987

valuation were more credible.                       Such a determination was not

"against     the       great        weight   and     clear    preponderance               of   the

evidence."       See id.            Rather, the circuit court's determination

has support in the record as explained above.

      ¶70   We emphasize that our determination is based on the

facts and circumstances presented to the circuit court, and the

circuit court's evaluation of those facts and circumstances.                                    At

oral argument before this court, the parties agreed that the

Manual does not create a categorical bright-line rule against

the   use   of     vacant        properties     in    the    assessment        of        occupied

properties.           Indeed, counsel for the City advanced:                             "I don't

think   there         is     this    bright-line      categorical         exclusion"           and

"[t]here    is     no       bright-line      rule    that    says       vacant      properties

cannot be used."

      ¶71   Consistent with the parties' agreement, we do not read

the Manual to strictly prohibit the use of vacant properties as

comparable       to     occupied      properties.           The    language         of    "should

avoid" is not mandatory.                   Cf. Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka,
2013 WI 54, ¶23, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 832 N.W.2d 121 (explaining

that the word "shall" is presumed mandatory).                              We acknowledge

that the Manual does not provide specific guidance on when a

vacant,     dark,          or    distressed     property          may    be    meaningfully

comparable       to     an      occupied     property.        However,        we     take      the

"should avoid" language to mean that the comparability of vacant

properties       to        occupied    properties      exists       along      a     continuum

depending upon how long the property has been vacant as compared
to the normal exposure time for a property of that type in the
                                              29
                                                                        No.       2019AP1987

same   geographic      area.         We    emphasize     that    the    Manual       urges

assessors to use caution in utilizing such comparables, as the

economics underlying a vacancy may be indicative of a meaningful

difference in the circumstances of the properties.

       ¶72    Accordingly,      we        determine     that    Lowe's        failed     to

demonstrate that the City's assessments were excessive.                             Giving

deference to the circuit court's factual findings, including its

credibility        determinations,         we    conclude    that     Lowe's      did    not

provide significant contrary evidence sufficient to overcome the

presumption of correctness.

                                            IV

       ¶73    In sum, we determine that the assessments in this case

were properly afforded a presumption of correctness.                              Pursuant

to   Wis.    Stat.    § 70.49(2),         the    presumption    attaches          upon   the

filing of the assessment along with the assessor's affidavit.

       ¶74    We further determine that Lowe's failed to demonstrate

that the City's assessments were excessive.                     Giving deference to

the circuit court's factual findings, including its credibility
determinations,        we     conclude          that   Lowe's    did        not    provide

significant        contrary     evidence          sufficient     to     overcome         the

presumption of correctness.

       ¶75    Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of

appeals.

       By    the   Court.—The    decision         of   the   court     of     appeals     is

affirmed.

                                            30
                                                                               No.    2019AP1987.rgb

       ¶76    REBECCA       GRASSL        BRADLEY,            J.        (concurring).                 The

circuit court properly afforded the City of Delavan's 2016 and

2017   property       assessments         a   presumption               of    correctness         under

Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2), and Lowe's did not demonstrate the City's

assessments          were     excessive             under          Wis.        Stat.           § 74.37.

Accordingly, the court correctly affirms the decision of the

court of appeals.           I write separately because the majority melds

the circuit court's conclusions of law and findings of fact into

nothing      more    than     a     credibility           determination              to    which      it

accords      deference.            The   standard         of       review      instead          demands

independent        review     of    circuit     courts'            conclusions            of    law   in

cases concerning property tax assessments.

       ¶77    In     challenging          the       City       of        Delavan's             property

assessments,         Lowe's       submitted         an    alternative            tier-2          sales-

comparison         assessment       conducted            by    Michael          MaRous.           That

assessment identified six properties MaRous deemed comparable to

the    Lowe's      store    in      Delavan.             The       circuit      court          rejected
MaRous's     assessment,          determining        none          of   the     properties        were

comparable      to    the   subject        property.               Of    the    six,      the    court

deemed       three     distressed,            two        dark,          and     one        generally

noncomparable to the subject property.                                  The court ultimately

concluded Lowe's did not present "significant contrary evidence"

to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded the City's

assessment.

       ¶78    The     majority           characterizes              the        circuit          court's
conclusion as a "credibility determination."                                  Majority op., ¶5.

                                                1
                                                                          No.       2019AP1987.rgb

As a result, the majority gives the circuit court's conclusion

blanket deference.            The majority's characterization is incorrect

and   its    deference        therefore         misplaced.         The    circuit           court's

conclusion        that    Lowe's     did       not    overcome     the     presumption           of

correctness        is     grounded        in     law,     rather    than        a    fact-bound

credibility determination.                 To reach that conclusion, the court

deemed      the    properties        in        MaRous's      assessment         to     be    dark,

distressed, or generally noncomparable.                          Whether a property is

dark, distressed, or generally noncomparable presents a question

of law subject to independent review, and the circuit court's

conclusions of law are not entitled to deference on appeal.                                      If

appellate courts defer to circuit courts' legal conclusions in

property tax assessment cases, taxpayers will lose any avenue

for meaningful appeal.

      ¶79    "When the question on appeal is whether a statutory

concept embraces a particular set of factual circumstances, the

reviewing court is generally presented with a mixed question of

fact and law."            Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 125
Wis. 2d 437,           444,   373    N.W.2d 680           (Ct.     App.    1985)            (citing

Nottelson         v.     DILHR, 94 Wis.2d             106,    115–16,       287 N.W.2d 763

(1980)); see also Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. Loc.

1901 v. Brown Cnty., 146 Wis. 2d 728, 739–40, 432 N.W.2d 571

(1988).      Questions of fact address "who did what, when or where,

how or why."           U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt.

LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 538 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966

(2018).      Questions of law ask whether the facts found satisfy
the relevant legal standard.                    Id.     We "uphold a circuit court's

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findings      of    fact        unless    they        are   clearly       erroneous,"              but

independently         review      questions         of    law.         Langlade           County    v.

D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶¶24–25, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277;

see also Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 236,

517 N.W.2d 658 (1994) (explaining when reviewing mixed questions

this   court       will    not    upset     findings        of    fact    unless           they    are

clearly       erroneous          but     will       review         conclusions              of     law

independently).

       ¶80    Property         assessment       cases       like       this     one        typically

involve      competing         valuations      accompanied         by    testimony           of    the

assessors in support of their own.                        "Where there is conflicting

testimony      the        fact      finder       is       the     ultimate           arbiter        of

credibility," and this court will therefore defer to the circuit

court's      findings      of    fact     unless         they    are    clearly           erroneous.

Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104,

¶27,   294     Wis.       2d    441,     717    N.W.2d          803.      Whether           property

valuations comport with the law, however, is a question of law,

not fact.          Wisconsin Statute § 70.32(1) provides that "[r]eal
property shall be valued by the assessor in the manner specified

in the Wisconsin property assessment manual. . . ."                                      Whether the

city complied with Wis. Stat. § 70.32 "in making its assessment

is a question of statutory interpretation that                                      we    review de

novo."        Adams       Outdoor      Advert.,       Ltd.,       294    Wis. 2d 441,             ¶26.

Appellate      courts          "independently         review       whether           a     valuation

complied with the statutes and the Wisconsin Property Assessment

Manual."      Bonstores Realty One, LLC v. City of Wauwatosa, 2013
WI App 131, ¶6, 351 Wis. 2d 439, 839 N.W.2d 893.                                     Accordingly,

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whether an assessor properly deemed a property "dark" within the

meaning of the Manual presents a mixed question of fact and law.

       ¶81    To decide whether a property is dark, a circuit court

must make findings of fact regarding how long properties similar

to the subject property typically sit vacant and how long the

assessed      property           had     been    vacant.           1    Wisconsin     Property

Assessment Manual 9-12 (2016).                       After making such findings, the

court must determine whether the property has sat vacant beyond

the period of time similar properties remained vacant.                                 Id.     If

it has, the relevant property is dark and therefore not likely

to be comparable to the subject property.                                See id.       Because

factual findings underlie the legal determination of whether a

property is "dark," the question is neither purely legal nor

purely factual.            It presents a mixed question of fact and law.

       ¶82    How         long     the     assessed         property        and     comparable

properties have sat vacant are questions of fact because they

address what has happened.                     We therefore reverse those findings

only if clearly erroneous.                      Whether the period of vacancy for
the assessed property renders it "dark" presents a question of

law    because       it    entails       application        of    the    law   to   the    facts

surrounding the vacancy of comparable properties compared with

the vacancy of the assessed property.                             In this case, applying

the law to the facts yielded an obvious answer.                                   The circuit

court needed to decide only whether four years, the length of

time    two        comparable          properties      in    MaRous's       assessment       sat

vacant,       is     longer       than     three      years,       the    length      of     time
properties         similar        to     the    assessed         property      typically     sit

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vacant.      However simple that analysis might be in this case, it

should be reviewed independently.

      ¶83     The majority defers to the circuit court's conclusion

that certain properties used by MaRous are dark, even though

that conclusion involves the application of law to the facts.

Majority op., ¶¶68–69.             While having no effect on the outcome of

this case——the circuit court was correct that                                four years       is

longer than three years——such unfettered deference may deprive a

taxpayer of the opportunity for meaningful appeal in a closer or

more complex case.

      ¶84     A more complex case is bound to arise.                              According to

the   Manual,      comparable         properties       are     those    "similar       to    the

subject property in age, condition, use, type of construction,

location,          design,           physical          features             and       economic

characteristics."             1 Wisconsin Property Assessment Manual 7-24

(2016).          Even    in   this      relatively      straightforward             case,    the

circuit     court       deemed    one    of    the    properties        on    which     MaRous

relied      (a    former       Lowe's        store     in     Brown     Deer)        generally
noncomparable.           To    reach     that       conclusion,       the    circuit     court

analyzed      that      store's       sale    price,        financial       condition,       and

contracts with the City of Brown Deer.                       In doing so, the circuit

court found "financial abnormalities," based on which it deemed

the   store      generally       noncomparable         with    the     subject       property.

Similar     to    deciding       whether      a     property    is     dark,       determining

whether     a     property       is     generally       noncomparable             presents    a

question of law entailing the application of law to the facts.
Such questions of law may be more challenging than deeming a

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property    dark.     Appellate         courts     must    not    defer    to   circuit

courts' determinations on such questions.

     ¶85    Given    the        rigor   of    general-comparability          analyses,

circuit courts might err in performing them.                      Nevertheless, the

majority     gives        the     circuit        court's    general-comparability

analysis deference, misconstruing its conclusions of law to be

findings of fact.           In cases like this, appellate courts must

review such questions of law independently.                   If the power to tax

is   the   power     to    destroy,1         taxpayers     must    have    access    to

meaningful appeal when challenging property tax assessments.

     ¶86    I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE

ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence.

     1   McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).

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