Court Opinion

ID: 9829473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:20:37.272746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:01.469566
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee contends that we erred in modifying the judgment so as to make it bear only 6 per cent, interest. The cases relied on do not sustain the contention. In Railway Company v. Galveston, 96 Tex. 520, 74 S. W. 537, it is simply held that, when a statute provides for 8 per cent, interest on delinquent taxes, such interest may be recovered, but does not hold that the judgment for principal and interest will itself bear 8 per cent, interest. The case of Storrie v. Houston City Ry., 92 Tex. 129, 46 S. W. 796, 44 L. R. A. 716, simply holds that an 8 per cent, provision of a paving assessment law applied to the assessment against the street railway company, it having been held by this court only applicable to abutting owners. It was therefore held that 8 per cent, interest could be recovered, but the question whether the judgment should bear 8 per cent, interest was not raised. These cases therefore go no further than to hold, as we have, that a judgment can be rendered awarding a recovery of 8 per cent, interest to the time of rendition. They do not hold that the judgment itself will bear 8 per cent, interest.
In Missouri, as shown by eases cited by us, it is held that the general statute with respect to interest on judgments applies to judgments on paving certificates unless the statute relating to such certificates expressly provides that the judgment shall bear interest at the same rate as the certificate. Barber Asphalt Co. v. St. Joseph, 183 Mo. 451, 82 S. W. 64. These cases seem to be approved by the authors of Page & Jones on Taxation by Assessment. See section 1107.
*640In R. C. L. vol. 15, pp. 15 and 16, we find the following /Statement:
“At common law interest was as a rule not allowed on judgments, and the plaintiff could not levy interest on a judgment, unless it was on a penalty, and the amount ordered to be levied, including the interest, was within the penal sum. * * * xhe theory upon which interest on judgments is allowed is that it is a measure of damages fixed by the Legislature; it is not interest in its strict sense; nor is it based on any contract express or implied, as a judgment is not a contract save in a very recondite and remote sense of the term. For that reason it has been held that the Legislature may change the rate of interest on judgments to have a retroactive effect without impairing any obligation of contract.”
See, also, Cyc. vol. 22, p. 1516.
So.far as judgments on contracts are concerned, we call attention to the following excerpts from decisions of our Supreme Court:
“The right to recover interest upon interest after judgment at a conventional rate does not rest upon the ground that the defendant has agreed that interest shall be computed in this way. Hence the fact that there is no agreement that the attorneys’ fees shall bear interest at a greater rate than 8 per cent, cannot affect the question.” Washington v. Bank, 64 Tex. 4.
The case of Hagood v. Aikin, 57 Tex. 511, is cited, in which the court said:
“We understand this statute to mean that a judgment shall bear the same interest as the contract upon which it is founded, if such rate of interest does not exceed the highest rate of interest permitted by law at the time the contract was made, even though such rate may exceed the highest rate of interest which may be. contracted for since the adoption of the present constitution.”
If we are to hold that the Legislature in authorizing the exaction of interest, not exceeding 8 per cent, on deferred installments of the assessment certificate, created an exception to the statute relating to judgments, it would seem that we erred in holding in the case of City of San Antonio v. Alamo Bank, cited in our former opinion, that the special act incorporating the city did not create such an exception in providing that city warrants should bear no interest. That decision was approved by the Supreme Court.
We conclude that appellee’s motion for rehearing should also be overruled. The appellant’s motion has heretofore been overruled.