Court Opinion

ID: 9682335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:09:32.433278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.792622
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN F. PRESLAR, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent on the basis that there were not sufficient distinguishing characteristics common to both the primary offense and the extraneous offense to authorize the admission of the extraneous offense under the principles of law enunciated in Collazo v. State, 623 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) and Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). In Dickey v. State, relied on by the majority, there were a number of similarities between the primary offense and the extraneous offense. In the case before us the only truly distinguishing characteristic is the telephone calls and they are not truly similar because in one instance a victim was called thirty-eight months after the incident and in the other it was two days after the incident. Except for the telephone calls, the primary offense of sexual abuse and the extraneous offense of rape are similar to any other sexual abuse or rape case and lack distinguishing characteristics. The general rule that the accused can be convicted, if at all, only by evidence that shows he is guilty of the offense charged, should not be ignored because of the one distinguishing characteristic of the telephone calls.
I would sustain the ground of error and reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.