Court Opinion

ID: 9955651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 21:02:42.315254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:09.871286
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Baltrip CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081430

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCD294912)

JUSTIN ALLEN BALTRIP,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eugenia A. Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed.
         Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher B. Beesley and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION
         A jury found Justin Allen Baltrip guilty of making a criminal threat.
Baltrip’s sentencing memorandum claimed that “he suffers from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD]” as a result of a prison term he served in
his youth and that this “trauma was a contributing factor to the commission
of this offense” such that the lower term presumptively applied under Penal
Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A). No one—not Baltrip, the People, nor
the trial court—expressly referenced subdivision (b)(6)(A) during the
sentencing hearing. After “consider[ing] the possible circumstances in
mitigation as well as the possible circumstances in aggravation,” the court
sentenced Baltrip to the middle term of two years in state prison for the
offense.
      On appeal, Baltrip claims that, as the low term presumptively applied,
the court abused its discretion by imposing the middle term absent pled and
proven aggravating factors outweighing the substantial mitigating factors.
We resolve this matter by memorandum opinion (see generally People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847) and affirm.
      Under recent amendments to section 1170, “the court shall order
imposition of the lower term” if one or more specified mitigating
circumstances was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense,”
unless the court finds the low term “would be contrary to the interests of
justice” because aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
      Here, Baltrip claims he “experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma,” one of the specified mitigating circumstances. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6)(A).) According to Baltrip, the word shall in subdivision (b)(6)
required the trial court to impose the lower term; in failing to do so, the court
abused its discretion. We perceive two flaws in this argument.
      First, section 1170(b)(6) requires the court to “ma[k]e” “additional
factual findings” for the defendant to “qualif[y]” for a presumptive lower

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term. (People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 203-205 (Hilburn).)
Baltrip asserts subdivision (b)(6)(A) applies here due to trauma arising from
a previous prison term he served in his early twenties. However, Baltrip
failed to provide the trial court with any facts or evidence beyond the bare
fact of his time in prison as a young adult to support a finding that he in fact
experienced trauma. For example, he provided no medical records or
affidavits to corroborate his unsubstantiated claim of PTSD. And, in an
interview with a probation officer, Baltrip “[d]enied” having any psychological
or medical concerns or needs. We agree with the People that Baltrip
essentially asked the trial court to conclude as a matter of law that all
persons incarcerated in their youth are traumatized by that experience. Had
the Legislature intended subdivision (b)(6)(A) to have this broad reach, the
wording of the statute would reflect as much. On this record, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in failing to make a finding that Baltrip
experienced qualifying trauma.
      Second, even assuming Baltrip satisfactorily evidenced trauma for
purposes of section 1170(b)(6)(A), such a finding alone would not qualify him
for the lower term presumption. For the presumption to arise, Baltrip’s
trauma also must have been “a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Thus, the mere fact of Baltrip’s trauma is
insufficient for the presumptive lower term to apply without evidence linking
that trauma to Baltrip’s criminal threat offense. (People v. Banner (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241.) Again, we agree with the People that Baltrip
presented no such evidence. Instead, his sentencing memorandum simply
argued without support that Baltrip’s trauma was a contributing factor
because “Baltrip’s desire to project a certain persona and keep people at bay
comes from [his] experience” of “living in that environment as a young man.”

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There was thus an “[in]sufficient factual basis” to support this necessary
finding. (Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 205.) Rather, as the People
note, Baltrip’s argument that his trauma induces him to “keep people at bay”
is inconsistent with the facts of the offense: Baltrip, unprovoked, threatened
three people, including an elderly woman and a child, with a switchblade and
pursued them. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to make a finding that Baltrip’s purported trauma was a “contributing
factor in the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
      While Baltrip “disagrees” with Hilburn’s reasoning, we reaffirm its
interpretation of section 1170(b)(6). Because Baltrip failed to show he
qualified for the presumptive lower term under section 1170(b)(6)(A), the
standard middle term presumptively applied instead. (Hilburn, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204-205.) In sentencing Baltrip to the middle term, we
conclude the trial court did not apply any aggravating circumstances in a
manner that violates Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466. (Hilburn,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204-205.)
                                DISPOSITION
      We affirm.
                                                                    CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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