Court Opinion

ID: 9634852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:26:09.426486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:11.351333
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I find no reasons, however, to define a “canine sniff” as a search. I agree with the majority of the United States Supreme Court that such a sniff is “so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and the content of the information revealed ...” that it does not constitute a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). As I have previously stated, I fail to see why a different standard should be established undér Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983) (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). There are no significant textual differences between these two constitutional provisions. Compare U.S. Const. amend. IV with Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 8. See also Commonwealth v. Baker, 513 Pa. 23, 518 A.2d 802 (1986) (applying Gates federal standard for probable cause for search warrant to Pennsylvania law). I am unpersuaded by the majority’s policy reasons for establishing a different standard under our state constitution in this case.1

. This Court has previously held that Article 1, § 8 of our State Constitution imposes standards for searches and seizures higher than those required by the Federal Constitution. Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983) (Nix, C.J., for the majority); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979), cert. denied, DeJohn v. Pennsylvania, 444 U.S. 1032, 100 S.Ct. 704, 62 L.Ed.2d 668 *473(1980). I find the reasons for this different standard to be equally unpersuasive in these opinions.