Court Opinion

ID: 9559571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:31:34.519511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:37.552602
License: Public Domain

Brown, J.
(dissenting) — The Spokane County Superior Court affirmed a hearing examiner’s decision to issue a certificate of compliance for a garage under Spokane Municipal Code (SMC) 11.02.0456 and denied the subsequent petition brought by the aggrieved neighbor under RCW 36.70C, the Land Use Petition Act. Two of three criteria for the certificate are challenged: (1) Written documentation establishes that all necessary permits were issued and inspections conducted, and (2) approval of the certificate of compliance will not adversely affect the neighboring property or the area. The necessity criterion is not challenged. Because substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s findings *824of fact, the facts support the conclusions of law, no erroneous interpretation or application of the law exists in this record, and the decision is not outside the authority or jurisdiction of the hearing officer, I would affirm.
ADDITIONAL FACTS
Paul and Suzanne Markham said (and the hearing examiner after examining the evidence apparently found) they mistakenly gave their contractor the wrong set of plans for the construction of a 1,200 square foot structure. The City did not object to the tardy initiation or continuation of construction and inspected the work in progress without reporting any code violations or objection to the larger structure.
The court’s April 10, 1997 letter affirmed the examiner’s decision and ruling that (1) all necessary permits were issued and all inspections conducted on the garage and (2) approval of the certificate of compliance will not adversely affect the neighboring property or the surrounding area. Further, the trial court agreed with the examiner that the issue “[wjhether Markhams had a valid building permit is an issue between them and the City. As a third party to the building permit process, [Elinore] Biermann cannot assert this jus tertii.”
ANALYSIS
A. Issues and Standards for Review. I agree the key issue is whether the trial court erred when it affirmed the examiner’s decision to issue the certificate of compliance. Ms. Biermann challenges just two of the three legal conclusions required in SMC 11.02.0456(A): (1) Written documentation established all necessary permits were issued and (2) approval of the certificate of compliance will not adversely affect her neighboring property or the area. Significantly, she does not contest the third criterion that approval of the certificate is necessary to relieve the Markhams of a substantial practical or economic hardship. Issues of law are reviewed de novo; issues of fact are reviewed under the *825substantial evidence test. Hilltop Terrace Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Island County, 126 Wn.2d 22, 29, 891 P.2d 29 (1995). Review of mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed as did the superior court in its appellate capacity. Id. Our concerns under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) are (1) erroneous interpretations of the law; (2) facts not supported by substantial evidence; (3) clearly erroneous applications of the law to facts; and (4) decisions outside the authority or jurisdiction of the examiner. RCW 36.70C.130(l)(b)-(e). Applying these standards to the record, there is no error.
B. Written Document Conclusion. Preliminarily, Ms. Biermann does not have standing to contest the issuance or validity of the Markhams’ June 1993 building permit in this proceeding because she is a third party to the issuance process. This does not mean, however, she is prevented from contesting the examiner’s conclusions because she claims to be an aggrieved person and adversely affected by the land use decision. RCW 36.70C.060. The City recognizes this point in its response brief at page 18. Regardless, the regularity of the City’s process for issuing or extending the June 1993 building permit is not a material issue before this court because irregularity and illicit construction are the very reasons for the compliance process. The examiner aptly observed at page 6 of his decision: “Of course, if everyone did know the law and complied with the law, a certificate of compliance would never be necessary. The reason for this request [for a certificate of compliance] is that mistakes were made on behalf of both the applicant and the City and, therefore, this application was necessary.” Also, a valid permit is not a necessity for an application for a certificate of compliance because of the disjunctive language of SMC 11.02.0360(C)(2)(d); a point next discussed.
SMC 11.02.0155 allows the issuance of a certificate of compliance for the purpose of rendering licit a building that would otherwise have code violations, if the criteria of SMC 11.02.0456 can be met. The first critical question is *826whether the trial court erred in affirming the examiner’s first legal conclusion that ££[w]ritten documentation establishes that all necessary permits were issued and inspections conducted” or in finding substantial evidence existed to support that conclusion. An application for a certificate of compliance must include:
A copy of the building permit or other approval and other data necessary to demonstrate that the building was erected in good faith and after all reasonable efforts to comply with the code.
SMC 11.02.0360(C)(2)(d) (emphasis added). The petitioner has the burden of proving that a certificate of compliance is appropriate. Douglass v. City of Spokane, 25 Wn. App. 823, 829, 609 P.2d 979, review denied, 94 Wn.2d 1006 (1980). A certificate may be issued when “there has been a good faith violation which does not substantially frustrate the spirit of the zoning ordinance.” Id. (emphasis added).
In view of the disjunctive language, it is evident from SMC 11.02.0360(C)(2)(d) and Douglass that the requirement of a valid building permit or any permit is not essential for an application for a certificate of compliance. Instead, the focus is (as categorically stated in Douglass) on the good faith of the applicant. Therefore, Ms. Biermann’s jurisdictional concerns relating to the initial validity of the permit are misplaced because the form of permit is but one factor bearing on whether the Markhams proceeded in good faith. The examiner did not err concluding the Markhams proceeded in good faith after considering the Markhams’ color of permit, the continued inspections, and the apparent blessing of the City. This would be true even if the City were mistaken in its policies or the Markhams’ permit was technically illicit. Thus, the portion of the land use decision concluding the purpose of the petition requirement was to show evidence of a good faith violation was not an erroneous interpretation or application of law and was within the jurisdiction of the examiner. It was also within the fact-finding function of the examiner to *827decide the predicate facts necessary to reach this conclusion. Our function is not to weigh the evidence or decide the facts or credibility of the witnesses, but to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the facts as found.
The examiner carefully delineated substantial factual evidence that supports his legal conclusion the garage was erected in good faith. Before beginning construction the record shows the Markhams duly applied for and received a building permit. Further, inspections were called for and conducted by the City without mention of the lapsed permit. The building official testified that permits could be retroactively extended up to 180 days; though no code citation could be provided. This testimony it is additional evidence of the applicant’s good faith. Two more inspections occurred without incident relevant to the applicant’s good faith. The inspection reports showed the footings and progress were “O.K.” The record thus contains substantial facts to support the examiner’s finding of good faith even though other inferences could be drawn from the record as suggested by Ms. Biermann. These portions of the record support the conclusion that written documentation establishes that all necessary permits were issued and inspections conducted. Therefore, the trial court did not err affirming the examiner’s decision on the permit issue.
C. No Adverse Affect Conclusion. The examiner correctly noted most of the Markhams’ neighbors are in favor of the certificate. Eighty-six letters, more or less, are listed as exhibits in the record favoring the Markhams. Just seven letters, including two from Ms. Biermann, one from her attorney, and two from neighbor Smith, are listed as exhibits opposing the certificate. The examiner had ample evidence in the record to conclude the neighbors favoring the certificate did not note any adverse impacts on their properties. Moreover, the record demonstrates the favoring neighbors supported the proposition the garage, as designed, will become an asset to the neighborhood and will be aesthetically pleasing.
*828The examiner identified and addressed Ms. Biermann’s three primary concerns: (1) limitation on open space, light and air; (2) snow and rain draining off the garage; and (3) fire hazard due to proximity and lack of fire wall protection required by the Uniform Building Code. The examiner relied on evidence the second and third concerns could be mitigated by construction of a firewall on the north wall of the garage and a drain between the two garages. These findings are supported by Mr. Markham’s statement that he can still construct a firewall and that he had installed the necessary drain. Moreover, the examiner’s conditions for approval of the certificate of compliance included: (1) a new building permit; (2) a fire wall or other measures required by the Uniform Building Code and Uniform Fire Code on the north wall of the garage; and (3) submission of a report prepared by a licensed engineer demonstrating the adequacy of the drainage.
The examiner recognized “the primary unmitigated impact is the size of the garage and its impact upon [Ms. Biermann’s] open space, light, and air.” Additional to the exhibits and testimony, a site visit was conducted by the examiner prior to the issuance of the certificate of compliance. The examiner observed no feeling of enclosure, the offending garage was shielded somewhat by shrubs and Ms. Biermann’s garage and cast no apparent shadows on her yard. Further, the examiner observed the sun would be blocked by trees to the south before interference by the new Markham garage. Furthermore, the examiner found although the Markhams’ garage was described by the opposition as a two-story structure, “under the regulations of the Uniform Building Code as they apply to building height, a one-story garage with a pitched roof could be almost as tall as the current garage.” There is no evidence in the record showing reduced value or damage to Ms. Biermann’s property. The examiner properly concluded the adverse effect claimed by Ms. Biermann was personal to her. The examiner, based upon this record, concluded Ms. Biermann’s complaints were subjective as compared to objective in nature. The examiner found as fact, after consider*829ing the substantial evidence in the record and his personal observations, that the height was not a significant impact on Ms. Biermann’s property. Also, Ms. Biermann executed a side-yard waiver before the permit was issued and has now rejected it. Although not specifically mentioned by the examiner in his decision, the waiver is additional evidence bearing on both the Markhams’ good faith and lack of adverse effect.
The examiner also decided other potential claims or concerns of significant adverse impact apart from those of Ms. Biermann were unfounded. Ms. Biermann does not appear to argue these other potential impacts; however, they are mentioned for clarity. First, for example, are the potential adverse impacts noted by the Transportation Department which are addressed by the analysis of the planning services staff report, Exhibit 15, incorporated by the hearing officer. Next, the setback is consistent with the setbacks of other garages and residences. Ex. 1 of Ex. 31. Last dispensed with is the argument that approval may set a precedent for others to avoid the zoning laws. The examiner, apparently considering this to be unsupported argument, dismissed the contention reasoning others would be unlikely to engage in this costly, slow and risky process.
The findings of the examiner bearing on the adverse impact claim are thus supported by substantial evidence in the record. In my view, the facts support the legal conclusion that the certificate of compliance will not adversely affect the neighboring property or the area. The trial court did not err when affirming the examiner’s adverse effect ruling.
CONCLUSION
The superior court did not err in deciding Ms. Biermann failed to carry her burden of estabhshing that one or more standards under RCW 36.70C.130 were met. The examiner’s record contains substantial evidence supporting the findings of fact. The findings support the legal conclusions *830that the permit and adverse effect criteria of SMC 11.02.0456 were satisfied for the issuance of the Markhams’ certificate of compliance. Additionally, because Ms. Biermann concedes the remaining criteria, the approval of the certificate is necessary to relieve the Markhams of a substantial practical or economic hardship; all the criteria of SMC 11.02.0456 were met. The trial court and the decision of the hearing examiner should be affirmed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Reconsideration denied May 29, 1998.
Review denied at 137 Wn.2d 1004 (1999).