Court Opinion

ID: 9956503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 15:00:33.397983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:34.161976
License: Public Domain

21-1215-cr (L)
    United States v. Ahmed

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

                 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
    in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of April, two thousand twenty-four.

    PRESENT:
               EUNICE C. LEE,
               SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
               MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    United States of America,

                             Appellee,

                    v.                                      21-1215 (L), 22-2943
                                                            (Con)

    Maroof Ahmed, Shahzad Ahmed,

                     Defendants-Appellants.
    _____________________________________
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS:                  Shahzad Ahmed, pro se, Oxford,
                                            WI.

                                            Maroof Ahmed, pro se, Danbury,
                                            CT.

FOR APPELLEE:                               David R. Felton, Olga I. Zverovich,
                                            Assistant United States Attorneys,
                                            for Damian Williams, United States
                                            Attorney for the Southern District
                                            of New York, New York, NY.

      Appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Karas, J.).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,       IT   IS   HEREBY     ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the orders denying compassionate release

are AFFIRMED.

      In early 2019, Appellants Maroof and Shahzad Ahmed, who are brothers,

pleaded guilty to conspiring to import and distribute heroin. In October 2019,

the district court sentenced Maroof to 180 months’ imprisonment and Shahzad

to 135 months’ imprisonment, along with terms of supervised release. Neither

brother appealed.

      Just over a year later, both brothers filed motions for compassionate
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release arguing, among other things, that their medical conditions along with the

prison’s inadequate medical care during the COVID-19 pandemic, constituted

grounds for release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). The district court denied the

brothers’ original applications and subsequent motions for reconsideration in a

series of orders. Now, before the Court are Shahzad’s and Maroof’s appeals

from the district court’s latest orders denying reconsideration. We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, procedural history, and issues on

appeal.

      We review both the denial of compassionate release and the denial of

reconsideration of such a decision for abuse of discretion.          United States v.

Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam); United States v. Moreno, 789

F.3d 72, 78 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015). A district court abuses its discretion if its ruling is

based “on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of

the evidence,” or if the ruling “cannot be located within the range of permissible

decisions.” United States v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting In

re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)).

      We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not

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abuse its discretion. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) provides that a district court “may”

reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment “after considering the factors set

forth in section 3553(a)” and if the court finds “extraordinary and compelling

reasons warrant such a reduction.”      18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see Halvon, 26

F.4th at 571.

      Here, the district court’s initial denials held that even if the Ahmeds’

medical conditions established extraordinary and compelling reasons for release,

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, nevertheless, cut “strongly” against granting early

release. Memo Endorsement at 1, United States v. Ahmed, No. 7:17-CR-00575

(KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2021), ECF No. 111 (denying Maroof Ahmed’s motion);

Memo Endorsement at 1, United States v. Ahmed, No. 7:17-CR-00575 (KMK)

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2021), ECF No. 109 (denying Shahzad Ahmed’s motion). In

reaching this conclusion, the district court properly analyzed the § 3553(a)

factors, including the Ahmeds’ criminal histories and the seriousness of their

offense conduct, and reasoned that granting early release would undermine both

respect for the law and the deterrent purposes of the original sentences. See 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(B) (establishing that the sentence imposed must

                                          4
“promote respect for the law” and “afford adequate deterrence to criminal

conduct”). In response, the brothers filed motions for reconsideration, largely

based on the district court’s purported failure to consider their medical

conditions.   The district court denied these motions, explaining that the

Ahmeds’ health conditions, which pertain to whether they have extraordinary

and compelling reasons for release, do not address the court’s independent

ground for denial—the § 3553(a) factors.

      On appeal, the Ahmeds argue that the district court failed to account for

both their rehabilitation and the inadequate medical care they received in prison.

But a district court may deny motions for compassionate release in “sole

reliance” on the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67,

73 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam). Moreover, on appellate review, we presume that

the district court has considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors “in the absence of

record evidence suggesting otherwise,” United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122,

129 (2d Cir. 2008), and leave “the weight to be afforded any § 3553(a) factor”

firmly within the discretion of the sentencing judge, id. at 131. Here, there is

nothing in the record to indicate that the district court did not properly consider

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the § 3553(a) factors, and the Ahmeds’ “disagreement with how the district court

balanced the § 3553(a) factors . . . is not a sufficient ground for finding an abuse

of discretion.” Halvon, 26 F.4th at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      We have considered the Ahmeds’ remaining arguments and find them to

be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the orders of the district court

denying compassionate release.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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