Court Opinion

ID: 9612668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:10:31.800655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:51.177836
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring. I write to emphasize that while Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2 prescribes time limits for postconviction relief that superseded our state statute dealing with illegal sentences [Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 (1987)], it does not and cannot supersede the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus guaranteed to our citizens under the Arkansas Constitution. Article 2, section 11, of the Arkansas Constitution provides: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except by the General Assembly, in case of rebellion, insurrection or invasion when the public safety may require it.” Rule 37 is a court-adopted rule that (1) was not enacted by the General Assembly, and (2) does not pertain to “rebellion, insurrection or invasion.” Accordingly, Rule 37 does not suspend in any way a citizen’s privilege to habeas corpus relief. We said as much in Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999). In addressing whether habeas corpus relief was subject to any time limits, we said: The question then becomes whether there are time limits on when a petition must file a writ of habeas corpus based on an illegal sentence. Certainly, a petitioner cannot waive a court’s lack óf subject-matter jurisdiction. And neither the Arkansas Constitution nor the state statutes place a time limit on pursuing a writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, to do so would contravene the proscription against suspending the right to habeas corpus. 337 Ark. at 499, 989 S.W.2d at 518. We further underscored in Renshaw that when the circuit court imposes an illegal sentence without authority to do so, that raises the question of whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter such a sentence. That is precisely the issue before us in this case. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed by Taylor beyond the time limits of postconviction relief. Regardless of that fact, the constitutional remedy of habeas corpus is not subject to those time constraints. To hold otherwise would be to suspend the privilege of habeas corpus which the constitution specifically directs we cannot do. For these reasons, I disagree with the concurring opinion that urges this court to subject the privilege of habeas corpus to the same time constraints this court placed on postconviction relief under Rule 37.2. To do that would be to overrule Renshaw v. Norris, supra, and suspend the writ for all petitions filed after the Rule 37.2 limits. It is clear we cannot do this without an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution. Moreover, to truncate the privilege of habeas corpus would be to perpetuate an injustice in cases where a circuit court sentenced a defendant to a term of years in excess of its statutory authority. Were we to hold that a defendant had no recourse after the Rule 37.2 times of 60 days (following an appeal) or 90 days (following a guilty plea or trial) had passed, the defendant would be left without a state remedy. That would be a horrendous state of affairs, especially when our state constitution guarantees and memorializes the time-honored remedy of habeas corpus for illegal detentions. For these reasons, I concur with the majority opinion. Imber, J., joins.