Court Opinion

ID: 9709048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:38:56.271364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:45.600897
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: I dissent from the decision reached by the majority of the court which, in my opinion, is founded upon errors of law and a refusal to take account of facts which are important to Gulley’s defense. The principal error rests in the majority’s assertion that a jury’s finding of no entrapment can be reversed only if there were entrapment as a matter of law. Four cases are cited for the proposition: People v. Kadlec, 21 Ill. App. 3d 289, 313 N.E.2d 522; People v. Cooper, 17 Ill. App. 3d 934, 308 N.E.2d 815; People v. Nahas, 9 Ill. App. 3d 570, 292 N.E.2d 466, and People v. Abbott, 110 Ill. App. 2d 462, 249 N.E.2d 675. Of these cases, only People v. Nahas suggests such a rule. The opinion in People v. Nahas is wrong. No other Illinois decision contains a similar statement. On the contrary, the Illinois Supreme Court said in People v. Dollen, 53 Ill. 2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879, that entrapment is an affirmative defense within the meaning of section 3 — 2 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 3 — 2) which the prosecution must prove to be false beyond a reasonable doubt after the defendant offers evidence of entrapment. As with other affirmative defenses, if the evidence introduced at trial permits a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of entrapment, the jury’s verdict of guilty must be reversed. People v. Anderson, 30 Ill. 2d 413, 197 N.E.2d 24; People v. Adams, 113 Ill. App. 2d 205, 252 N.E.2d 35. By saying that a reversal is in order only if there were entrapment as a matter of law, the majority has placed a serious misconception at the center of its reasoning. This, I believe, negates all else that the majority says in its opinion. Did the evidence in this case justify a reasonable doubt on the issue of Gulley’s entrapment by the State’s informer? The defendant, Gulley, and the informer, Jack Cantrell, related different versions of their encounter. The differences in their testimony are important because the answer to the question whether Gulley was entrapped depends on whose testimony is believed. The jury apparently believed Cantrell, whose testimony indicated that Gulley was not entrapped. Although a jury’s decision on the credibility of witnesses ordinarily will not be disturbed, an appellate court may reverse a conviction on the ground that an essential witness for the prosecution was not credible. (See People v. Bazemore, 25 Ill. 2d 74, 182 N.E.2d 649.) Thus it is permissible to evaluate Cantrell’s credibility. Cantrell was unworthy of belief. His casual willingness to lie from the witness stand was demonstrated by his response to the question whether he had ever used or been addicted to drugs. Cantrell stated that he had not used drugs and that he had not been addicted to drags. The testimony of William Mitchell for the defense, however, was that Cantrell had used drags continuously during his two week’s stay at Mitchell’s house in April, 1973. John Whitehead testified that he had seen Cantrell use a syringe to inject drags into his vein. Richard Cooper said that he had seen Cantrell take cocaine. These witnesses showed, contrary to Cantrell’s testimony, that Cantrell was a habitual drag user. The evidence of Cantrell’s habitual use of drags was also significant for its tendency to show his lack of veracity. (People v. Smith, 38 Ill. 2d 237, 231 N.E.2d 185; People v. Bazemore; People v. Hamby, 6 Ill. 2d 559, 129 N.E.2d 746; People v. Crump, 5 Ill. 2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615.) Moreover, Cantrell’s role as an informer was enough to require scrutiny of his testimony because an informer, especially an addict informer, like an accomplice, is considered to be susceptible to pressures from the law enforcement officials with whom he cooperates. People v. Smith; People v. Hamby. Because Cantrell did not merit belief, Gulley’s testimony alone remained as an explanation of what happened between Gulley and Cantrell. This testimony revealed that Cantrell initiated the conversation about drugs on March 19, 1973, in Fuzzy’s Pool Room in Harrisburg, Illinois. Cantrell begged Gulley to take him to Carterville, Illinois, so that he could purchase a quantity of drugs. Cantrell did not suggest immediately that Gulley become involved in the purchase and délivery of the drugs. What Gulley agreed to do was to drive Cantrell to Carter-ville. Only when Gulley and Cantrell had traveled 25 miles from Harrisburg to Carterville on March 20, 1973, did Cantrell explain to Gulley that he wanted Gulley to purchase the drugs. Cantrell begged Gulley to go to the apartment of Thomas Behnke and to buy the drugs so that Cantrell would not have to pay any debts before making a purchase. Thus Gulley’s testimony established that Cantrell coaxed him step by step into making an unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Cantrell overcame Gulley’s hesitancy even to go to Carterville by falsely saying that he intended to buy the drugs himself, implying that Gulley would not be involved in the purchase or delivery of the drugs. It is important to note that by taking Cantrell to Carterville so that Cantrell could purchase drugs, Gulley committed no crime. After Gulley had expended the effort necessary to drive himself and Cantrell 25 miles from Harrisburg to Carterville, Cantrell said for the first time that he could not buy the drugs and that Gulley had to buy the drugs for him at Behnke’s apartment. With some pleading, Cantrell overcame Gulley’s reluctance to make the purchase and delivery of the drugs. The likelihood seems great that if Cantrell had told Gulley in Harrisburg that he actually wanted Gulley to buy the drugs in Carter-ville, Gulley would. have refused to become involved in Cantrell’s scheme. The mildest word that can be used to describe this step-by-step cajoling of a citizen to perform the elements of a crime, so that the citizen can later be prosecuted and jailed, is “reprehensible.” It is permissible for a public officer or employee merely to afford an opportunity to an individual to commit an offense in furtherance of a criminal purpose which the individual has originated. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 7 — 12.) But to stay within the bounds of what is permissible, the public officer or employee should present the opportunity in one piece; that is, the individual should be made aware, at an early moment in his dealing with the public officer or employee, of exactly what he is being tempted to do. This is desirable so that the individual’s ordinary strength of character will be as effective as possible in helping him resist the temptation that is laid before him. By presenting an opportunity to an individual in several pieces or steps, with the intention of minimizing his resistance to the temptation to commit an offense, a public officer or employee does much more than present an opportunity; he also attempts to destroy the individual’s ability to reject the opportunity. When this happens, it cannot be said that a criminal purpose has originated in the mind of the individual. Rather, the criminal purpose in such cases arises in the mind of the public officer or employee, and this constitutes entrapment. See People v. Wells, 25 Ill. 2d 146, 148, 182 N.E.2d 689, 690; People v. Steig, 258 Ill. App. 447. Because Gulley’s testimony contained the only credible version of the encounter between him and Cantrell, and the testimony established that Cantrell coaxed Gulley step by step into committing the offense, the evidence in this case justified at least a reasonable doubt on the issue of entrapment. Gulley’s conviction, therefore, should be reversed. The record discloses that the defendant had been in trouble in the past, but had found a job and was in the process of rehabilitating himself when he was induced to commit a crime by his government. Thus his chances for becoming a useful citizen have been considerably lessened by an affirmative act of his government. This is a tragedy not only for him but also for the people.