Court Opinion

ID: 9561743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:15:09.93338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:19.455388
License: Public Domain

Cureton, Judge
(dissenting):
I disagree with the majority that the wife has sustained her burden of showing the marital residence was a gift from her father-in-law (respondent) to her and her ex-husband (Frank). As a preliminary matter, I note this is not a case where the wife’s evidence conflicts with the respondent’s evidence, because the wife presented the respondent’s testimony in her case in chief.1 Therefore, she may not at this point impeach his testimony or disavow it. White v. Southern Oil Stores, Inc., 198 S.C. 173, 17 S.E. (2d) 150 (1941). It is also worth observing that the wife testified about an open adulterous relationship she carried on during the marriage and that she exposed the parties’ minor children to her paramour. This evidence may well have adversely impacted her credibility in the mind of the trial judge.
The majority opinion does not make it clear when the gift from the respondent to the marriage took place. As noted by the majority, a parol gift of land must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and possession must be taken pursuant to the gift. In other words, a gift of land cannot be made to take effect in the future. Knight v. Stroud, 214 S.C. 437, 53 S.E. (2d) 72 (1949). A parol gift of land stands on the same footing as a parol sale of land. Id. It is settled law that a parol gift of land does not transfer title to the land. Brevard v. Fortune, 221 S.C. 117, 124, 69 S.E. (2d) 355, 358-359 (952). However, a donee may seek specific performance of a promise to convey land if he an show sufficient partial performance, such *561as exercising possession of the property and making valuable improvements thereto so as to take the case out of the statute of frauds. Id. Nevertheless, the improvements must be both valuable and of a permanent character and the donee must have been “induced thereto by the promise to give the land.” Knight v. Stroud, 214 S.C. at 441-42, 53 S.E. (2d) at 73-74.
It appears that the majority premises its finding that the parties made substantial improvements to the land on the wife’s testimony regarding several improvements to the marital residence, including: adding a deck and above-ground swimming pool; reroofing the house; replacing central air conditioning; landscaping the lot; repainting the house; replacing carpet in the den; replacing boards; wallpapering a bathroom; replacing some light fixtures; and laying a brick walk. The wife never testified as to: when these improvements were made (except for the pool which was installed in 1987 or 1988); their value (except for the pool which cost $1,500); the permanency of their affixation; or that they were made in reliance upon the respondent’s promise to make a gift of the house to the marriage. It is clear from the wife’s testimony that many of the items she characterized as improvements to the land were simply efforts to maintain the marital residence.
Although the wife stated the respondent told her several times the house belonged to her and Frank, she explained that when she and Frank attempted to get a loan, and discovered they could not, they approached the respondent for advice. The respondent told them that he “would like to give us the money — forty thousand dollars ($40,000) to build the house and have it in the company.” (Emphasis added). When asked what arrangements were made to repay the $40,000 to the respondent, the wife stated, “I think initially we paid him maybe sixty dollars ($60.00) a month to help with taxes, or what it was supposed to help with but it was to help with the house.”
The record reflects that in 1972 and 1973 the respondent corporation paid for the house and lot and titled the lot in its name, and afterwards paid both the real estate taxes and fire insurance on the house.2 Thereafter, according to the wife, the fact the house was not in her and Frank’s name “was a con*562stant source of irritation for us, for both of us.” She then testified that after the respondent “realized that it bothered us quite a bit... he started the director’s fees or whatever so that we could have it put in our names. It was something to do with there would be a large tax or something.”
As to the 1982 transaction whereby the corporation began to pay Frank a director’s fee, the wife seems to suggest that the purpose of that arrangement was to permit her and Frank to buy the house. The respondent testified that prior to 1982, his corporation has depreciated the home, but he was informed by his tax advisor that the IRS would not permit the depreciation unless the property generated income. As a result, the respondent and his tax advisor arranged to pay Frank a director’s fee which would be retuned to the corporation as rent from Frank so as to legitimate the depreciation of the house. I will make no judgment as to the appropriateness of such an arrangement, but the respondent’s testimony fully explains the reason for the arrangement, which I do not find to be incredible. Moreover, the wife acquiesced in the arrangement. Finally, the fact the house has doubled in value over more than twenty years supplies no proof of the value of the improvements. As to the pool, the respondent disputes it is a permanent improvement. Furthermore, it was installed at least 15 years after the alleged 1972 gift of the lot.
Rather than support the wife’s claim of a gift, the 1982 transaction militates against a gift. If the wife and Frank seriously thought the respondent had given them the house in 1973, then she has shown no good reason why they would have acquiesced in an arrangement in 1982 to obtain title to the house rather than insisting that title be conveyed to them. Certainly, the wife and Frank did not go into possession of the property in 1982 in pursuance of a promise of a gift by the respondent to them. Thus, the wife has utterly failed to demonstrate a gift of the property to the marriage in 1982. Finally, it is incredible that the wife and Frank would agonize for ten years over the fact that the house was not in their names, then enter into the 1982 agreement to obtain title without obtaining something in writing from the respondent. In the final analysis, it is always a question of fact to be determined under under all the circumstances whether a gift was intended or not. McCluney v. Lockhart, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 251 (1827).
*563As a final note, the circumstances here do not involve the situation one might envision of an ex-husband and his father teaming up to deprive the wife of her rightful interest in marital property. First, the house has always been owned by the respondent corporation and the wife has not shown the respondent satisfied the legal requirements of giving corporate property away. Secondly, the respondent testified the corporation’s stock is in an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his wife who is a patient in a nursing home at the cost of over $3,000 per month. There is no indication of when the stock was placed in the trust or that it was placed there to avoid the consequences of the alleged gift. The respondent further testified that the trust provides that upon his wife’s death, the remainder would go jointly to his daughter and the wife’s and Frank’s children. I would thus conclude the wife’s evidence is neither clear nor convincing that the respondent ever intended to make a gift of the house to the marriage or that the improvements made were substantial, permanent and in pursuance of the gift. I would affirm the order of the trial court.

 After the wife testified and presented the testimony of the respondent, she rested her case. The respondent then moved for a nonsuit which was granted.

 While the wife testified she and Frank paid the respondent $60.00 per month for several years, the respondent denied such payments. Also, the wife did not know why the payments were stopped.