Court Opinion

ID: 9725159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:33:08.554603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:11.442281
License: Public Domain

*118POCHÉ, J.
I respectfully dissent.
Appellant was allowed to make a 36-word motion which set forth his view:
(a) that he was being inadequately defended,
(b) that he was not getting a proper defense, and
(c) therefore that he wanted to be represented by an attorney of his choice. That motion was immediately answered with an even more succinct denial of four words.
As happened in People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44], the trial judge viewed the motion as a complaint relating to the quality of defense counsel’s courtroom defense. The problem is that the defendant’s complaints (i.e., “being inadequately defended . . . not getting a proper defense”) are susceptible not only of the interpretation that what was going on in the presence of the judge amounted to an inadequate defense but that there were matters outside the knowledge of the trial court that gave rise to this motion. In that regard, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Marsden (at pp. 123-124) more than suggests that there is a duty of inquiry: “A trial judge is unable to intelligently deal with a defendant’s request for substitution of attorneys unless he is cognizant of the grounds which prompted the request. The defendant may have knowledge of conduct and events relevant to the diligence and competence of his attorney which are not apparent to the trial judge from observations within the four corners of the courtroom. Indeed, ‘when inadequate representation is alleged, the critical factual inquiry ordinarily relates to matters outside the trial record: whether the defendant had a defense which was not presented; whether trial counsel consulted sufficiently with the accused, and adequately investigated the facts and the law; whether the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choice of trial tactics and strategy’ [citations]. Thus a judge who denies a motion for substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his courtroom observations, despite a defendant’s offer to relate specific instances of misconduct, abuses the exercise of his discretion to determine the competency of the attorney. A judicial decision made without giving a party an opportunity to present argument or evidence in support of his contention ‘is lacking in all the attributes of a judicial determination.’ [Citations.]” (Italics added.)
*119The language to which emphasis has been added in the above quotation constitutes the legitimate area of disagreement. The question is whether the rule in Marsden is simply: don’t “cut off” a defendant’s attempt to explain his reasons for wanting new counsel or whether that decision’s rationale imposes a duty on the trial judge to carefully inquire into the reasons a defendant has for making his motion. If the former equation is the proper rule then the judgment should be affirmed; if the latter, then the judgment must be reversed because Marsden error is prejudicial per se. (People v. Lewis (1978) 20 Cal.3d 496 at p. 499 [143 Cal.Rptr. 138, 573 P.2d 40].) I adopt the view stated in People v. Munoz (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 62 at p.66 [115 Cal.Rptr. 726]:“The Marsden court was presented with an extreme situation. However, the mandate of that decision is not limited necessarily to a case where the trial judge refuses to give the defendant the opportunity to be heard as the Attorney General suggests. On the contraiy, the ratio decidendi of the high court’s opinion tells us that the judge’s obligation to listen to an indigent defendant’s reasons for claiming inadequate representation by court-appointed counsel is not a pro forma function. It tells us also that under some circumstances a court’s ruling denying the request for a substitution of attorneys without a careful inquiry into the defendant’s reasons for requesting the substitution ‘is lacking in all the attributes of a judicial determination.’ (See People v. Groce, 18 Cal.App.3d 292, 296-297 . . . ; People v. Green, 15 Cal.App.3d 524, 527....)”
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 4, 1979, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 14, 1979. Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Newman, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.