Court Opinion

ID: 9683646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:34:29.349064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.451086
License: Public Domain

*239JANE BLAND, Justice,
concurring.
I join the court’s opinion and write separately to add two observations.1
First, our holding that the motion to recuse must be referred to another judge for review is not an opinion as to the timeliness or the merit of the motion, nor should it be read as a criticism of the character of the trial judge. See In re Union Pacific Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex.1998) (Hecht, J., concurring) (“While no judge likes to think of being perceived as partial, a hearing on a motion to recuse is simply not a trial of the judge’s character and should not be treated as such.”). Although the motion ultimately may prevail or fail, the method by which our court system handles such motions is fundamental to public confidence in the judiciary. See Johnson v. Pumjani, 56 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (holding that procedurally insufficient motions to recuse must be referred so as to avoid even the appearance of impropriety; court system’s handling of motions to recuse “goes to the very heart of the promise of impartiality.”). Thus, “[t]he less a judge is involved in recusal proceedings, voluntarily or involuntarily, the better.” Union Pacific, 969 S.W.2d at 429 (Hecht, J., concurring).
Second, our own court — as well as other courts of appeals — has taken divergent positions as to whether the sitting judge may deny a recusal motion as procedurally deficient and thus be excused from referring it to another judge for a hearing.2 These opinions differ in result depending upon the circumstances. Such inconsistent decisions create uncertainty for a trial court faced with an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective motion to recuse — sometimes the trial judge may be found to have the authority to deny the recusal motion without referring it, but sometimes not. If a trial judge cannot determine timeliness (and Rule 18a does not provide that he can), then we should say so consistently— so that referral of recusal motions becomes automatic, no matter the circumstance.3 See Tex.R. Civ. P. 18a.
TERRY JENNINGS, Justice, dissenting from the denial of en banc consideration.
TERRY JENNINGS, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the denial of en banc consideration of this case. Appel*240lant filed an inadequate motion to recuse the trial judge and waived her right to complain about this issue on appeal. The panel’s holding that the trial judge was required either to “recuse himself or refer [appellant’s motion to recuse] for determination by another judge” is in error and contrary to this Court’s precedent, and extraordinary circumstances require en banc consideration. See Tex.R.App. P. 41.2(c).
Here, appellant, in her motion to recuse, asserts that the trial judge “made a factual finding that Sun was in ‘significant pain.’ ” Appellant alleges that “[s]uch a view could cause prejudice and bias and impartiality” because the judge was “likely [to] feel inclined to decide to make a ruling that would remove Sun from life support in order to relieve him of the pain.” From this, appellant concludes that the trial judge had “a preconceived factual opinion that creates bias and prejudice that prevents [him] from making a fair decision.”
A party in a hearing or trial in a statutory probate court may file a motion stating grounds for the recusal or disqualification of a judge. Tex. Gov’t Cobe Ann. § 25.00255(a) (Vernon 2004); Tex.R. Civ. P. 18a(a). Such a motion “must” be verified and “state with particularity” the “grounds” for recusal or disqualification of the judge. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.00255(b) (Vernon 2004); Tex.R. Civ. P. 18a(a). The allegations in the motion must be based on “personal knowledge” or “specifically state” the grounds for the party’s belief of the allegations. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.00255(b)(3) (Vernon 2004); Tex.R. Civ. P. 18a(a). Once such a motion is filed in statutory probate court, the trial judge must either (1) recuse himself or (2) request that the presiding judge of the statutory probate courts assign a judge to hear the motion. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.00255(f) (Vernon 2004); Tex.R. Civ. P. 18a(c).
However, when a recusal motion is filed, the trial judge against whom the motion is directed may properly make an initial decision of whether the motion conforms with Rule 18a. Barron v. State, 108 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.). We have previously held that if a party does not comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 18a, she waives her right to complain of a judge’s refusal to recuse himself. Gill v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 3 S.W.3d 576, 579 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In construing a previous version of Rule 18a, which provided that a trial judge was required to request that the presiding judge assign another judge to hear a motion to recuse, this Court noted that:
While rule 18a does mandate a hearing on a motion to recuse, such requirement is not triggered unless the recusal motion states valid grounds for disqualification.
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 855 (Tex.App-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We. held that “Texaco’s rule 18a motion was inadequate” and “no additional hearing was mandated.” Id. at 856. To support our holding we cited Gaines v. Gaines, 677 S.W.2d 727, 731 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ), wherein the court held that the contentions raised in a motion to disqualify were “without merit” because the appellant did “not establish enough information to warrant referral of the motion to the presiding judge.”
Likewise, here, appellant’s cursory and conclusory motion to recuse the trial judge was inadequate because appellant did not state with particularity enough information to warrant referral of the motion to the presiding judge of the statutory probate courts. She simply did not “specifically *241state” grounds for her belief that the trial judge was biased or prejudiced. The fact that the trial judge expressed, in the context of expediting the case, concern that Sun was experiencing “significant pain,” in no way supports an inference that the trial judge had “a preconceived factual opinion that creates bias and prejudice.”
Because appellant’s motion to recuse the trial judge did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Government Code section 25.00255 and Rule 18a, I would hold that appellant has waived her right to complain of the trial judge’s refusal to request that the presiding judge of the statutory probate courts assign a judge to hear the motion. The panel’s holding that the trial judge was required either to “re-cuse himself or refer [appellant’s motion to recuse] for determination by another judge” is in error and contrary to our previous holdings in Texaco and Gill.1 Accordingly, I would overrule appellant’s first issue and reach the merits of the appeal.

. See In re Union Pacific Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex.1998) (Hecht, J., concurring).

. Compare, e.g., Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 49 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that trial judge must refer issue of timeliness), with Petitt v. Laware, 715 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that trial judge excused from referring untimely motion); Leon County v. Grayson, No. 10-03-101-CV, 2003 WL 21780961, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-Waco July 30, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.) (majority holding that trial judge must refer motion; dissent contending that motion was untimely and thus judge could deny it), with Spigener v. Wallis, 80 S.W.3d 174, 181 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, no pet.) (holding that trial judge excused from referring recusal motion because it was not timely filed or verified); In re Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 987 S.W.2d 167, 178-79 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (holding that referral is mandatory, regardless of sufficiency of motion), with Wright v. Wright, 867 S.W.2d 807, 811 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied) (holding that trial judge need not refer untimely motion), and Lamberti v. Tschoepe, 776 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied) (holding that “regardless of the ‘procedural sufficiency' of the motion, [judge] has only the option to act in one of two ways: to recuse himself, or refer the case to the presiding judge.").

.This is not to disagree that, at minimum, the motion must be in writing. See Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex.1982).

. The panel goes to great lengths to distinguish both Gill and Texaco. Their distinctions are without a difference. A party can either waive their right to complain of the issue of recusal or they cannot; this Court has already held that the recusal issue can be waived.