Court Opinion

ID: 9710085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:01:42.547755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.109223
License: Public Domain

Spencer, J.,
dissenting.
I am in total disagreement with the majority opinion in these two cases. I do not agree that the court abused its discretion in its ruling on objections to the scope of *35the cross-examination of character witnesses. I do not agree that the jury was not instructed that intent was a material element of the offense charged. Contrary to the conclusion in the majority opinion, the jury was instructed that intent was a material element of the offense charged in both cases. I further disagree that the instruction given was confusing in any particular.
To properly understand these cases some of the facts should be given. At approximately 8 p.m., on January 15, 1973, a police officer in Alliance observed Casados, who had been under observation, and Arbuckle purchasing gasoline for a 5-gallon gasoline container. Approximately 30 minutes later the Alliance police learned that a school in Scottsbluff had been firebombed. They then communicated the information on the purchase of the gasoline by the defendants to the Scottsbluff authorities. About 9:40 p.m., the same officer observed the parties in Casados’ Volkswagen van leave Alliance on the highway leading to Scottsbluff. The Scottsbluff authorities were notified. The van was stopped after it entered the Scottsbluff city limits.
While one of the officers was checking Casados’ license and vehicle registration, another officer observed the butt end of a pearl-handled pistol sticking out of a bag in the rear of the van. The defendant Casados and his passengers, who were members of the American Indian Movement, were arrested. A search of the van at the scene of the arrest, in addition to the pistol observed in the bag, revealed two other weapons; ammunition holders for the two automatic weapons; a leather shoulder strap holster; a poker with a taped handle; a 5-gallon gasoline can; four empty gallon jugs; a 50-foot length of clothesline rope; and some items that appeared to be marijuana. Search of the occupants produced several diaper-type cloth strip sections which were observed hanging from the pockets of three of them, one of whom was Arbuckle. A knife was strapped to the side of one *36of the occupants, and a small box of candles was taken from defendant Casados’ left front shirt pocket.
■ An explosives, enforcement officer of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the United States Treasury Department was called as an expert witness. He testified that the jugs, gasoline, diaper strips, rope, and candles were a combination of parts from which a destructive device could readily be assembled. He also testified that the components were all that were required to form such destructive device and in combination they only could be used to cause damage or destruction. There was no other purpose for which they could be used as a unit.
I agree, intent is irrelevant when an assembled device falls within subdivision (7) (a) of section 28-1011.22, R. S. Supp., 1972. As set out in United States v. Tankersley (1974), 492 F. 2d 962, intent is irrelevant: “* * * when an assembled device falls ‘within (1) or (2),’ because: the parts are clearly ‘designed’ to convert the device into a destructive device. When it is equally clear that the end product does not fall within one of those categories, the same is true. When, however, the components are capable of conversion into both such a device and another object not covered by the statute, intention to convert the components into the ‘destructive device’ may be important.” Here, however, the components were not capable of conversion into any object except a destructive device, as the testimony set out above clearly indicates.
I have difficulty with the statement in the majority opinion that the word “designed” was improperly included in the instruction. In the first place, the instruction said designed o?' intended. To me, the parts in combination are designed to create a destructive device. The record is clear that while the items in defendants’ possession had social utility individually, they had none in combination. The majority opinion quotes from United States v. Posnjak (2d Cir., 1972), 457 F. 2d 1110. The *37following from that case' is instructive: “One source of confusion which possibly misled the trial court in this case is the use of ‘intended’ in the phrase in subparagraph (3), ‘any combination of parts designed or intend-, ed for use in converting any device into a destructive device * * It appears that in some instances this intention to convert a device into an article listed in the statute will be relevant. When it is clear that the assembled device created by combining the components falls within (1) or (2), intent is irrelevant, for the parts are clearly ‘designed’ to convert the device into a destructive device.” (Italics supplied.)
Here, the parts in combination could be converted into a destructive device and nothing else. Consequently, as the term is used in the statute, they could be clearly designed for that purpose. It is obvious to me that thé parts found in the possession of the defendants were both designed and intended to create a Molotov cocktail, ■Which is covered by our statute. The words of the statute given in the instructions herein are designed or intended. A Molotov cocktail has one purpose, and one purpose only: Use as a destructive device against person or property.
The following observation from United States v. Ross (5th Cir., 1972), 458 F. 2d 1144, is instructive: “A Molotov cocktail has no purpose apart from criminal activities. It is not a' device that is commonly created for legitimate purposes but' the use of which may be' perverted from that intended, ordinary purpose to an illegitimate end.”
Instruction No. 10 in both cases itemized the material elements which it was necessary for' the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Thosé instructions read: “The material elements which the state must prove by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of the crime charged in Count II are:
“Count II
. “1. That the defendant * * * did unlawfully have in *38his possession a destructive device, to-wit, a combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into a Molotov Cocktail and from which such Molotov Cocktail may be readily assembled.
“2. That he did so on January 15, 1973.
“3. That he did so in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska.
“The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the foregoing material elements necessary for conviction.
“If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that each of the foregoing material elements is true, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you find the state has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the foregoing material elements, it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty.
“The burden of proof is always on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the material elements of the crime charged, and' this burden never shifts.” (Italics supplied.)
Regardless of the understanding of the attorneys involved, the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendants only if they unlawfully had a destructive device in their possession, which destructive device in this instance was the combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into a Molotov cocktail, and from which such Molotov cocktail could be readily assembled. Designed or intended were material elements, and the jury was required to find one or the other in order to convict the defendants.
The majority opinion does not specify the basis on which it predicates its ruling that the cross-examination of defendant Arbuckle’s character witnesses was prejudicial. If, as I assume, it is relying on the general rule that such misconduct must have occurred prior to and not after the commission of the crime, it is not error in this case. The defendant Arbuckle’s direct examination *39of the character witnesses was not so limited. As Ar-buckle concedes in his brief: “Usually it is not permissible to cross-examine as to acts committed after the date of the crime charged, but when the defendant’s evidence, as in the instant case, is not confined to the reputation prior to the date of the alleged offense but rather is intended to cover the whole period of acquaintance up to the time of trial, it would appear the State would not be restricted and should be allowed to cross-examine as to the same span of time.” This is an exception to the rule relied on by the majority and is clearly applicable in this case, because the defendant Ar-buckle intentionally covered the period with his witnesses between the commission of the offense and the time of the trial. Consequently, it could not be prejudicial.
This case is clearly within the ambit of State v. Newte (1972), 188 Neb. 412, 197 N. W. 2d 403, in which we said: “ ‘While particular facts are inadmissible in evidence upon direct examination for the purpose of sustaining or overthrowing character, yet this doctrine does not extend to cross-examination. It is firmly settled by the adjudications in this country that upon cross-examination of a witness who has testified to general reputation questions may be propounded for the purpose of eliciting the source of the witness’ information and particular facts may be called to his attention, and asked whether he ever heard them. This is permissible not for the purpose of establishing the truth of such facts, but to test the witness’ credibility, and to enable the jury to ascertain the weight to be given to his testimony. The extent of the cross-examination of a witness must be left to the discretion of the trial court. The questions put to the several witnesses were within the scope of a legitimate cross-examination, and there was no abuse of discretion in permitting them to be answered/ (Emphasis supplied.)”
The concurring opinion of Judge McCown, in an attempt to bolster the majority opinion, suggests that de*40fendants’ constitutional argument may be unanswerable, and cites Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57, and Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 90 S. Ct. 642, 24 L. Ed. 2d 610. These cases are reviewed in the later case of Barnes v. United States (1973), 412 U. S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed. 2d 380.
In Barnes, the federal district court jury had been instructed'that possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which one may reasonably draw the inference and find in the light of surrounding circumstances shown that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen. The Barnes court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Powell, held the instruction comports with due process in the following language: “The evidence established that petitioner possessed recently stolen Treasury checks payable to persons he did not know, and it provided no plausible explanation for such possession consistent with innocence. On the basis of this evidence alone common sense and experience tells us that petitioner must have known or been aware of the high probability that the checks were stolen. Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U. S., at 417; Leary v. United States, 395 U. S., at 46. Such evidence was clearly sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner knew the checks were stolen. Since the inference thus satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard, the most stringent standard the Court has applied in judging permissive criminal law inferences, we conclude that it satisfies the requirements of due process.”
I find no prejudicial error in either case, and believe that the judgments in each should be affirmed.