Court Opinion

ID: 9717456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:03:42.918495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:10:17.787160
License: Public Domain

HORNBY, Justice,
with whom ROBERTS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
As the Court recognizes, the issue is whether this case should have gone to the jury. I believe that it should have.
First, the evidence was conflicting on whether any portions of the handbook were part of the employment contract. The “Acknowledgment of Receipt” said, on the one hand, that the handbook itself was not a contract and, on the other hand, that the employee was “governed” by the personnel policies it contained and that it outlined the employee’s privileges as well as obligations. A letter from the Hospital president, contained in the handbook, informed the employee that the handbook explained “what you can expect from the hospital, as well as what the hospital will expect from you.” The handbook set forth how vacation pay accrued, when and how overtime was paid, and the like. Thus, there was certainly a jury question on whether any *1184portions of the handbook were part of the employment contract.
Second, if the jury found that the handbook’s personnel policies were part of the contract, the question remained whether those policies limited the Hospital to firing an employee only for cause. The section on “Termination of Service” appears on pages 18 to 20 of the handbook. The first subheading is “Resignation.” It states that employees “must” give notice of resignation and that failure to do so “will result” in the forfeiture of holiday and vacation pay. The next subsection is “Dismissal.” It discusses dismissal for “cause,” namely, “[i]mproper conduct and violation of hospital rules,” or “willful action ... that diminishes or adversely affects the quality of patient care_” It also specifies that there is a six-month probationary period for new employees during which the standard for dismissal is simply “unsatisfactory” performance. Finally, the third subsection is “Disciplinary Guidelines.” It states that employees with unsatisfactory work performance “will be counseled verbally” to help improve their performance, that a written warning “will be issued” if the performance does not improve, and that ultimately “a final written notice” “will be made” for necessary corrective action. Then, “[i]f subsequent to the second written warning the hospital determines that satisfactory improvement has not been made, the employee will be dismissed.” A number of grounds for immediate dismissal are set forth specifically.
It is difficult to conceive how much clearer the Hospital could have been in stating that after a probationary period it would discharge its employees only for “cause.” I see no reason to insist upon the precise language “employees will not be terminated except for cause” as a precondition to letting a jury find a meeting of the minds on that subject.
The Court relies on Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97 (Me.1984) for its conclusion that more is required. In Larrabee we held for the first time that employment contracts are not limited to the two categories of (1) terminable at will or (2) employment for a particular period; employers and employees are also free to enter into employment contracts of no particular duration but in which employees can be discharged only for “cause.” We stated that the parties could achieve such a contractual relationship “by clearly stating their intention to do so,” 486 A.2d at 99-100, although we did not explain why we should impose that extra verbal hurdle. The Court now elevates the word “clearly” to a specific holding in this case. Although it is not alone in imposing such a requirement, see, e.g., Henkel v. Educational Research Council of America, 45 Ohio St.2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis.2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967), I see no valid contemporary reason for doing so. Ordinary contract law principles should permit a fact-finder simply to determine what it is that the parties agreed upon. Indeed, the Court’s approach flies in the face of other principles commonly used in contract law. This handbook, for example, was obviously drafted by the employer and any ambiguity could, therefore, legitimately be construed against the employer. I expect the Court would take a quite different approach in construing a set of policies issued by a bank to its depositors in connection with the management of their deposits.
In short, I believe the jury should have been permitted to determine what it is that the parties agreed upon in this employment contract.