Court Opinion

ID: 9931352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 20:02:22.624751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:28.738515
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/24 Sentance v. Brown CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

                                                              B324321, consolidated with
 RENEE SENTANCE,                                              B325614

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                 22PSRO01491)

 ROBIN BROWN,                                                 ORDER MODIFYING
                                                              OPINION AND DENYING
           Defendant and Appellant.                           REHEARING

                                                              NO CHANGE IN THE
                                                              JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 1, 2024, be
       modified as follows:
1. On page 3, after the last sentence in Section I.C. of Facts
   and Procedural Background that ends “to be used for the
   Bonita property,” add as footnote 3 the following footnote:

         3      In a petition for rehearing, Brown (through
         Sofris) argues that the facts set forth in this
         paragraph are inaccurate because (1) the settlor of
         the RJN Trust is Brown’s “former husband” (rather
         than father), and (2) the trial court never explicitly
         found that father was the RJN Trust’s “settlor.” We
         reject these arguments. Brown’s first point rests on a
         misreading of the reporter’s transcript where the
         trial court referred to “the husband’s trust.” When
         read in context, it is reasonable to conclude that “the
         husband” refers to father (who is mother’s husband);
         there is no mention anywhere in the record of
         Brown’s husband. Indeed, and as noted in the text,
         the notion that Brown’s former husband was in
         charge of the RJN Trust is wholly contradicted by
         Sofris’s own statements at the hearing, where Sofris
         repeatedly indicated that “the family wanted . . .
         money dispersed to them.” Even if the record were
         ambiguous on this point, we are entitled to construe
         that ambiguity in the light most favorable to the trial
         court’s ruling. Brown’s second point rests on a
         misunderstanding of our task on appeal, which is to
         determine whether substantial evidence supports the
         trial court’s factual findings—whether express or
         implicit; the absence of an express factual finding is
         of no moment.

2. On page 12, the footnote beginning “Brown makes passing
   reference” and previously numbered footnote 3 is deleted.

                              2
                           *     *     *

There is no change in the judgment.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

——————————————————————————————
LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J. HOFFSTADT, J.

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Filed 2/1/24 Sentance v. Brown CA2/2 (unmodified opinion)
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 RENEE SENTANCE,                                              B324321, consolidated with
                                                              B325614
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                              (Los Angeles County
           v.                                                 Super. Ct. No.
                                                              22PSRO01491)
 ROBIN BROWN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Geanene M. Yriarte, Judge. Affirmed.

     Action Legal Team and Michael N. Sofris for Defendant
and Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               ******
       In the litigation of a domestic violence restraining order, a
trial court entered a provisional restraining order and
disqualified the restrained person’s attorney at the hearing on
whether to extend the provisional order. The restrained person
(through her disqualified counsel) challenges the disqualification
order as well as two aspects of the provisional restraining order.
These challenges are largely based on facts and law not brought
to the trial court’s attention, and they otherwise lack merit.
Accordingly, we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Facts1
       A.     The family
       Robin Brown (Brown) and Renee Sentance (sister) are
adult sisters. Their parents are Robert Brown (father) and Grace
Brown (mother). Brown has a teenage daughter.
       B.     The family’s properties and Brown’s living
arrangements
       Through the 2014 Brown Family Trust (the 2014 Trust),
father and mother own two residential properties in La Verne,
California. One is located on Bonita Avenue (the Bonita
property); the other, on Winterhaven Drive (the Winterhaven
property). Father was the trustee of the 2014 Trust.2

1     Consistent with substantial evidence review, we set forth
the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.

2     Although the parties did not introduce documentation
corroborating that the Bonita property was held by the 2014
Trust, that finding may be reasonably inferred by the parties’

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       For many years, Brown and her daughter lived in the
Bonita property.
       C.    The role of attorney Michael Sofris (Sofris) as
trustee for a different family trust
       Sofris is an attorney licensed in California. He is the
trustee of the RJN Family Trust (RJN Trust), which is controlled
by “the [Brown] family.” During or before the summer of 2022,
“the family asked” Sofris to disburse money from the RJN Trust
to be used for the Bonita property.
       D.    Brown’s care of parents, recent thefts and
vandalism of the properties, and “violent” outbursts
       In 2021 and 2022, Brown was expected to care for father
and mother, who lived in the Winterhaven property. Brown did a
poor job, as both parents were filthy and covered in feces; Brown
also used methamphetamine in the home. When sister learned of
this mistreatment, she moved father and mother into a “24/7”
assisted care facility.
       During this time period, Brown stole guns, cash, and
jewelry from the Bonita and Winterhaven properties. On one
occasion, Brown turned on the gas line in the kitchen of the
Winterhaven home so it flooded with natural gas, and then left
the home.
       When sister confronted Brown about these incidents,
Brown got “violent” and started “screaming at [sister] and
pushing [her].” Brown also caused a scene at the assisted living
facility while visiting mother and father.

reference to both properties being held by the parents and having
the same status.

                                3
      E.     Powers of attorney
      In April 2022, father executed a durable power of attorney
granting sister the authority to “manage[] or maintain[] any real
property” in which he had an interest. He also resigned as
trustee of the 2014 Trust, and named sister as the trustee.
      F.     Earlier petitions
      In July and August 2022, sister filed two petitions for
restraining orders to protect father, sister, and sister’s family.
Both were filed in San Bernardino County Superior Court, and
both were denied on the ground that they were filed in the wrong
venue.
II.   Procedural Background
      A.     Petition
      On August 9, 2022, sister filed a petition for a restraining
order in Los Angeles County Superior Court that would require
Brown (1) to stay away from father, sister, and sister’s family; (2)
to vacate the Bonita property; and (3) to stay away from the
Bonita and Winterhaven properties. In support, sister submitted
a declaration detailing the elder abuse outlined above as well as
the theft and vandalism occurring at the properties.
      B.     Temporary restraining order (TRO)
      On August 10, 2022, the trial court issued a TRO that
ordered Brown (1) to stay away from father, sister, and sister’s
family; (2) to vacate the Bonita property, although her daughter
could continue to live there with another adult; and (3) to stay
away from the Bonita and Winterhaven properties.
      Brown moved out, and her daughter continued to live in the
Bonita property with another adult.

                                 4
       C.    Hearing on restraining order
       After Brown—with Sofris as her attorney—filed an
opposition to sister’s petition as well as a petition seeking a new
TRO to dissolve the prior TRO, the trial court convened a hearing
on October 6, 2022 to consider the competing petitions (the
October 2022 hearing).
       Sofris acted as Brown’s attorney at the hearing.
             1.     Sofris is disqualified as Brown’s counsel
       During pre-hearing settlement talks, Sofris demanded
that—as part of settling the dispute—sister and father repay the
funds he, as trustee of the RJN trust, had disbursed to them from
the trust. Sister brought the issue to the trial court’s attention,
and noted that it appeared that Sofris had a conflict of interest.
The court agreed that “there is a conflict” and disqualified Sofris
from continuing to represent Brown.
       The court granted Brown time to find new counsel, and
continued the hearing on the permanent restraining order to
November 1, 2022.
             2.     TRO is modified
       Sister agreed that Brown could move back into the Bonita
property, but only if a third party could first conduct a walk-
through of the property to assess its then-current condition.
Sister also wanted to be able to check the Bonita property
periodically, to ensure that it was not being damaged. The court
issued an amended TRO with the same terms as the August 2022
TRO, except that this new TRO (1) did not require Brown to move
out of the Bonita property; (2) authorized either a third party or
Sofris, “as a friend of the court,” to video and document the
condition of the Bonita property before Brown could move back
in; and (3) authorized sister to have a “real estate representative”

                                 5
conduct weekly walk-throughs of the Bonita property with 24
hours’ advance notice and while Brown’s daughter was at school
(the amended TRO).
       D.    Post-ruling orders
       After the October 2022 hearing, Sofris and Brown filed
declarations unattached to any request for relief that set out facts
not presented at the hearing.
       At the continued hearing on November 1, 2022, the court
again continued the matter until January 11, 2023. The court
kept the amended TRO in force.
       E.    Appeals
       On October 21, 2022, Brown filed a notice of appeal
challenging the trial court’s disqualification order.
       On December 1, 2022, Brown filed a notice of appeal
challenging the amended TRO. The trial court took the January
2023 hearing on the permanent restraining order off calendar.
       We consolidated the two appeals.
                           DISCUSSION
       Brown challenges the trial court’s order disqualifying Sofris
as well as two provisions of the amended TRO. We review
disqualification orders and restraining orders solely for an abuse
of discretion. (City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra
Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839, 848 (Cobra Solutions)
[disqualification order]; In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 926, 933 [restraining order].) In so doing, we review
any subsidiary factual findings for substantial evidence (Cobra
Solutions, at p. 848) and independently review any subsidiary
legal questions (such as whether a party has standing to seek
disqualification of another party’s attorney) as well as the
application of law to undisputed facts (A.F. v. Jeffrey F. (2022) 79

                                 6
Cal.App.5th 737, 745 (A.F.) [standing is a legal question]; Great
Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347,
1357 (Great Lakes) [same]; Cobra Solutions, at p. 848 [application
of the law to undisputed facts]).
I.     Order Disqualifying Sofris as Brown’s Attorney
       A trial court has inherent as well as statutory power to
disqualify counsel as part of its authority to control court
proceedings. (Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 846; Code
Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(5).) An attorney owes his client a duty
of loyalty. (People ex rel. Department of Corporations v. SpeeDee
Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1146-1147
(SpeeDee Oil).) An attorney who “[j]oint[ly] represent[s] . . .
parties with conflicting interests impairs each client’s legitimate
expectation of loyalty,” and thereby breaches that duty. (Great
Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.) This is why our
Supreme Court has held that a “more stringent per se rule of
disqualification applies” “if an attorney . . . simultaneously
represents clients who have conflicting interests.” (SpeeDee Oil,
at p. 1147; Cobra Solutions, at p. 846.)
       Although a trial court may disqualify counsel on its own
initiative (Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry (1990) 219
Cal.App.3d 9, 27, fn. 6 (Berry) [“a trial court has the power to
disqualify an attorney on its own motion”]), a motion to disqualify
may only be brought by someone with “standing”—that is, by
someone with a “legally protected” or otherwise “sufficient”
interest that would be adversely affected if the attorney at issue
was not disqualified (Great Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p.
1356; Jarvis v. Jarvis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 113, 132). A movant
may establish standing by showing that she is (1) a current client
of the attorney (Great Lakes, at p. 1356); (2) a prior client of the

                                 7
attorney (ibid.); (3) a person with whom the attorney still owes a
duty of confidentiality (DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 829, 832 (DCH Health); Moreci v. Scaffold
Solutions, Inc. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 425, 432-433; Dino v. Pelayo
(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 347, 353); or (4) a person with some other
“personal stake” in the attorney’s continued representation of his
client in the ongoing litigation (A.F., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p.
746 [father has a “personal stake” in his child’s best interests,
which conferred standing to move to disqualify attorney
representing child and other parent]; Jarvis, at pp. 131-133
[partner in partnership has a “stake” in whether attorney is too
conflicted to act on the partnership’s behalf]).
       Although Brown did not raise the issue of standing before
the trial court, we conclude that sister—as a person acting on
father’s behalf—had standing to object to Sofris’s continued
representation of Brown in litigating the restraining order.
Sofris was representing Brown in the current proceedings. Sofris
was also the person who, as trustee of the RJN Trust, had
disbursed money from that trust based on orders from “the
family,” which meant Sofris owed father—as one of the settlors of
that trust—fiduciary duties. (Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55
Cal.4th 1058, 1062 [“[w]hen the trustee of a revocable trust is
someone other than the settlor, that trustee owes a fiduciary duty
to the settlor . . .”].) Father was the person who, due to his need
for 24/7 assisted care and the durable power of attorney, had
charged sister with seeking to have him named as a protected
person in this case. (Accord, Riehl v. Hauck (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 695, 701 [parent may seek restraining order on
behalf of a child].) Father’s relationship with Sofris through the
RJN Trust meant that Sofris owes him a duty of confidentiality

                                8
and also gives father a “personal stake” in not having Sofris
violate that duty. What is more, because Sofris as trustee
effectively represents the settlor vis-à-vis the trust, Sofris was
simultaneously representing both Brown and father in the same
proceeding where the latter was seeking a protective order
against the former. Such dual “representation of clients whose
interests are directly adverse in the same litigation” is, as our
Supreme Court has said, “[t]he most egregious conflict of
interest.” (SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1147.)
       Brown resists this conclusion with a plethora of seemingly
self-proliferating arguments, which we have nevertheless
wrestled into six different buckets.
       First, Brown argues that Sofris was not going to be a
witness and did not have a financial stake in the outcome of the
case. This argument partly contradicts Brown’s own declaration
before the trial court, in which she indicated that Sofris “may” be
a witness. Putting that aside, this argument is also beside the
point. What makes Sofris proverbially radioactive are his
simultaneous duties to two parties on opposite sides of the “v.” in
this case; whether or not there are additional grounds to
disqualify him is neither here nor there.
       Second, Brown contends that there is no conflict. To begin,
Brown points out that she asserted in her post-order declaration
that Sofris disbursed the RJN Trust money at her behest, and
that she was the beneficiary of that trust. Thus, Brown
concludes, Sofris was not taking orders from father. But that
assertion contradicts what Sofris told the trial court at the
October 2022 hearing, where he said “the family asked” him to
disburse the funds. Sofris’s assertion also does not alter the
existence of the fiduciary duties Sofris owes father by virtue of

                                 9
their trustee-settlor relationship. Next, Brown argues that the
conflict is irrelevant because what mattered to this restraining
order case was who occupies the property at issue, not who owns
it. We reject this argument because the disqualifying interest
stems from simultaneous and contradictory duties, which exist
regardless of the nature of the dispute. Further, Brown posits
that the conflict is too speculative. Although “hypothetical” and
“speculative” conflicts will not justify disqualification (Great
Lakes, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358-1359; DCH Health,
supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 833; In re Cody R. (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 381, 390), the conflict here is neither hypothetical
nor speculative: Substantial evidence supports the explicit and
implicit findings by the trial court that Sofris was the trustee of
the RJN Trust, that he disbursed money on orders from “the
family,” that father was a settlor of the RJN Trust, that Sofris
owes father fiduciary duties, that father was—through sister—
suing Brown, and that Sofris was representing Brown in that
lawsuit.
       Third, Brown contends that she was entitled to advance
notice and an evidentiary hearing on the issue of disqualification.
She is wrong. Sister raised the issue of disqualification
immediately after the possible conflict came to her attention,
which was during settlement talks immediately prior to the
October 2022 hearing. Brown did not complain of lack of notice
at that time. There was also no need for an evidentiary hearing,
as no facts were disputed during the hearing (although Brown
inserted additional, contradictory facts into the record after the
hearing). More to the point, Brown never asked to call any
witnesses or to introduce any documents; as a result, she has
forfeited her objection. (In re Marriage of Cohen (2023) 89

                                10
Cal.App.5th 574, 582.) Because Brown had notice and an
opportunity to be heard, her due process rights were also not
violated.
       Fourth, Brown argues that the evidentiary foundation for
the conflict was inadmissible because sister first learned of
Sofris’s role as trustee of the RJN Trust during settlement talks
protected by Evidence Code sections 1152 and 1154. To begin,
these sections do not create a privilege; instead, they create a bar
to admissibility, one that can be forfeited if there is no objection
(Evid. Code, § 353). There was no objection here. Moreover,
Sofris freely admitted the very same facts during the October
2022 hearing.
       Fifth, Brown argues that she expressed—again, after the
October 2022 hearing—that she consented to any conflict. Where
there is a conflict due to simultaneous representation or duties
between opposing parties, however, a waiver is needed from both
parties. (Berry, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at pp. 26-27 [so noting].)
Here, there is no waiver from father.
       Sixth and finally, Brown urges that the trial court erred by
not considering the panoply of factors used to evaluate the
hardship that disqualification imposes on her—namely, (1) her
right to her counsel of choice, (2) Sofris’s interest in representing
his client, (3) the financial burden Brown faces in finding
replacement counsel, and (4) the possibility that sister and father
are disqualifying Sofris for tactical reasons. (SpeeDee Oil, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 1145 [enumerating these factors].) Brown
ignores that a court must balance these client-focused factors
against “the need to maintain ethical standards of professional
responsibility,” and further ignores that “preserv[ing] public trust
in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of

                                 11
the bar” is “[t]he paramount concern.” (Ibid.; Cobra Solutions,
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 846.) In this case, allowing the same
lawyer who simultaneously owes duties to a person seeking a
restraining order and the person to be restrained rides roughshod
over the “duty to maintain undivided loyalty” and thereby
“undermin[es] public confidence in the legal profession and the
judicial process.” (SpeeDee Oil, at p. 1146.) Thus, the trial court
here did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the balance of
factors favored disqualification.3
II.    Substantive Terms of the Amended TRO
       Brown attacks two terms of the amended TRO—namely, (1)
the provision granting sister the right to conduct weekly
inspections of the Bonita property, and (2) the provision ordering
Brown to stay away from the Winterhaven property.
       A.     Right to inspect the Bonita property
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
sister a right to inspect the Bonita property on a weekly basis
with 24 hours’ advance notice. Substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s implicit finding that the 2014 Trust owns the Bonita
property, that the trust grants the power to a trustee to maintain
the Bonita property, and that sister is now the trustee of the 2014
Trust. Thus, sister is effectively the landlord of the property.
The Civil Code grants landlords the power to enter premises
pursuant to a “court order” as long as they give reasonable,

3      Brown makes passing reference to the fact that father
passed away at some point after the October 2022 hearing.
Father’s subsequent death does not affect the propriety of the
trial court’s disqualification order at the time it was made. The
impact of his death, if any, on the disqualification analysis may
be raised—along with other evidence bearing on the issue—in
further proceedings, if any, before the trial court.

                                12
advance notice. (Civ. Code, § 1954, subds. (a)(4), (b) & (d)(1).)
Here, the amended TRO is a court order and it also requires 24
hours’ advance notice.
       Brown offers two arguments in response. First, she argues
that she has a competing power of attorney that gives her power
over the Bonita property through mother. But sister disputed the
existence of that grant of authority, and Brown was given the
chance to produce evidence of that authority but did not do so;
the trial court accordingly found that the authority did not exist
due to a lack of proof. That factual finding is supported by
substantial evidence. Second, Brown urges that allowing sister
to conduct inspections violates the Fourth Amendment as well as
her constitutional right to privacy. She is wrong. Where, as
here, inspections comply with the Civil Code, we decline to
overwrite the Code by constitutional fiat.
       B.     Stay away from Winterhaven property
       The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in ordering
Brown to stay away from the Winterhaven property.
       Brown does not argue that this order was inappropriate
based on the evidence before the trial court in October 2022.
Instead, she argues that it is no longer appropriate because,
subsequent to that hearing, she learned that sister had sold the
property to a third party in September 2022 and that third party
thereafter sold it to a fourth party. Although we took judicial
notice of all of these documents, we leave it to the parties to ask
the trial court to assess whether—in light of this change in
ownership—there is still a need for an order restraining Brown to
stay away from property in which, based on the evidence she
presents to this court for the first time, neither she nor her family
have any interest whatsoever.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The orders are affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

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