Court Opinion

ID: 9863713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:53:16.887011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:10.333828
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent to the majority’s holding that “the district court correctly ruled that the portion of appellant’s civil service benefits representing his years of service in the military are divisible military retirement benefits under I.C. § 32-713A.” Ante at 108. The language of I.C. § 32-713A clearly indicates that it was intended to apply only to a division of military retirement benefits.
Idaho case law has firmly established that the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect, and rules of statutory construction are not applicable when the language of a statute is unambiguous. Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452 (1991); Ottesen ex rel. Edwards v. Board of Comm’rs of Madison County, 107 Idaho 1099, 695 P.2d 1238 (1985). When construing a statute, this Court must give its words their plain, usual and ordinary meaning. Sherwood v. Carter, supra; Walker v. Hensley Trucking, 107 Idaho 572, 691 P.2d 1187 (1984).
*251I.C. § 32-713A provided a means for modifying a judgment and decree of divorce so as to divide “military retirement benefits payable on or after February 1, 1983.” Because this statutory language is not ambiguous, we should give the language its plain, usual and ordinary meaning and limit application of the statute to a subsequent division of “military retirement benefits.” Sherwood v. Carter, supra.
Accordingly, application of I.C. § 32-713A is inappropriate under the facts of this case. The record clearly demonstrates that Mr. Leatherman surrendered his entire military retirement benefit in September, 1982, and as a result he became ineligible to receive military pension benefits at any time in the future. Mr. Leatherman had no military pension benefits payable after February 1, 1983. Thus, any military retirement benefits to which he might have been entitled in the past were not available for division in a modification proceeding.
Furthermore, Mr. Leatherman’s existing civil service annuity clearly does not come within the terms of I.C. § 32-713A. I.C. § 32-713A is expressly limited to military retirement benefits and makes no mention of veteran disability benefits, civil service or other pensions or annuities. Similarly, I.C. § 32-713A does not address credit for time served in the military for purposes of determining a civil service annuity, nor does it provide for tracing of transferred military retirement benefits to other retirement plans. To the contrary, the statute is expressly limited to “military retirement benefits payable on or after February 1, 1983.” Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it would not have included in I.C. § 32-713A such narrow language referring only to military retirement benefits.
Accordingly, I.C. § 32-713A is inapplicable to this case, as it provides no basis for dividing Mr. Leatherman’s present civil service annuity. The majority errs by holding otherwise.