Court Opinion

ID: 9712789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:00:10.742891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.413999
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: The statutes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 91½, par. 120.1, et seq.) defining eligibility for treatment for drug abuse “instead of prosecution or probation" (par. 120.8), and authorizing drug treatment for persons charged with a crime (par. 120.9), or convicted of a crime (par. 120.10), do not appear to deal with the revocation of probation which has been granted. It seems clear that the legislature did not purport to deal with revocation of probation in the provisions of the noted statutes for the reason that a person properly within the terms of the statute should originally seek probation for treatment rather than probation in the ordinary context. Here defendant was placed on probation on December 6, 1971, following the effective date of the provisions noted. Probation was revoked in February, 1973. So far as the record shows defendant made application for and procured probation without stating to the court that he was an addict, or introducing evidence in connection with probation which would give the court “reason to believe” that defendant was an addict within the statute defining “an addict” and “addiction.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 91½, pars. 120.3 — 3 and 120.3 — 4.) Nothing of record suggests that at the time of the initial grant of probation the court was called upon to exercise any discretion as to drug treatment in connection with the sentence for the burglary then considered. So far as can be ascertained defendant sought probation free from any obligation to complete treatment. Upon revocation, however, defendant then presented at the sentence hearing evidence in a context showing that he was “an addict” at the time of the burglary for which probation was granted. In People v. Williams, 4 Ill.App.3d 362, 364, 280 N.E.2d 798, defendant denied addiction at the time of seeking probation, but upon revocation of probation granted sought to obtain treatment under the Act. The court said: “The question then arises, may he accept probation on that basis, violate his probation by further thefts, and when he is advised that his probation is going to be revoked that he may then say he is an addict and elect to be treated under the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act. This court does not believe that the drafters of this legislation ever contemplated that the use of this Act would ever be strained to the point here sought by the defendant. The Act itself is a laudatory measure but not one designed as a means of escaping confinement by those who deny that they use “hard drugs’ and then attempt to recant.” Here the defendant would obtain the same result by concealing the addiction now asserted. In People v. Clinkscale, 14 Ill.App.3d 226, 302 N.E.2d 181, the court concluded that upon the chronology of events defendant had not had an opportunity to seek treatment at the time of the initial grant of probation. Upon such premise, the trial court was reversed and the cause remanded. Such exception does not appear' in this case. The principal opinion rehes upon People v. Dill, 23 Ill.App.3d 503, 319 N.E.2d 240. It does not appear, however, that the issue was presented to the court in terms of whether the statute authorized further probation for purposes of treatment foHowing revocation of probation. For such reasons I would affirm the trial court.