Court Opinion

ID: 9958808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 21:03:05.466607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:36.505239
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                2024 IL App (4th) 240003-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                    FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is             NO. 4-24-0003                             April 9, 2024
not precedent except in the
                                                                                   Carla Bender
                                IN THE APPELLATE COURT                         4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed
                                                                                     Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                         OF ILLINOIS

                                     FOURTH DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                      )   Appeal from the
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                             )   Circuit Court of
           v.                                              )   Peoria County
 CHRISTOPHER SHEA,                                         )   No. 23CF726
           Defendant-Appellant.                            )
                                                           )   Honorable
                                                           )   Paul P. Gilfillan,
                                                           )   Judge Presiding.

               PRESIDING JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
               Justices Steigmann and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER
¶1     Held: Because defendant continues using cocaine despite having undergone drug
             rehabilitation treatment, and because it is his drug addiction that causes him to
             persist in committing dangerous felonies (according to his mother and his defense
             counsel), the circuit court could reasonably find, by clear and convincing evidence,
             that no combination of pretrial release conditions would mitigate defendant’s
             dangerousness to the community; therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion
             by granting the State’s petition for the denial of pretrial release.

¶2             The State petitioned the circuit court of Peoria County to deny pretrial release to

defendant, Christopher Shea. The petition was pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public

Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See

Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v.

Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (setting the Act’s effective date as September 18, 2023). The court

granted the petition, finding the State had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that no
conditions of pretrial release would mitigate defendant’s dangerousness and likelihood of willful

flight. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022). Because we find no abuse of discretion in the

granting of the State’s petition, we affirm the judgment.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4             On September 11, 2023, the State filed an information charging defendant with the

Class 2 felony of failing to report an accident involving a personal injury (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b),

(d) (West 2022)). On October 2, 2023, the information was superseded by an indictment charging

defendant with the same offense.

¶5             Also on September 11, 2023, the circuit court set bail at $80,000. The court ordered

that, to be released from custody, defendant had to post 10% of that amount as security. He

remained in custody.

¶6             On December 14, 2023, pursuant to section 110-7.5(b) of the Code (725 ILCS

5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)), defendant moved for reconsideration of the conditions of pretrial

release.

¶7             On December 20, 2023, the State filed a verified petition for the denial of pretrial

release. In the petition, two boxes were checked. One box corresponded to preprinted language

asserting that (1) defendant was charged with a forcible felony listed in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of

the Code (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5)) or, alternatively, he was charged with a felony “involv[ing] the

threat of or infliction of great bodily harm o[r] permanent disability” and (2) allowing his pretrial

release would “pose[ ] a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community.” The other box had preprinted language asserting that defendant “ha[d] a high

likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution.” See id. § 110-6.1(a)(8).

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¶8             The same day the State filed its petition, the circuit court held a hearing on the

petition and on defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the conditions of pretrial release. At the

hearing, the court considered a pretrial services report, dated September 11, 2023, which disclosed

the following information. Defendant is 44 years old and homeless. If released, however, he would

live with his mother, Sandra Curry, in Dunlap, Illinois. Although he does not have a phone, he

could be reached at Curry’s phone number (which he provided). He has a history of cocaine use

and used cocaine a week before the pretrial services interview. He is single but has two children,

who are three and five years old, and he has another child on the way. He “[r]eports he provides

$1000 in support for the children” but that no court has ordered him to do so. He works full-time

as a union painter, earning $40 an hour, and he has an associate’s degree. He underwent “treatment

at the Crisis Center,” where he was “[d]etoxed.” He has three failures to appear and three prior

convictions, two of which are felony convictions. Specifically, in a Missouri case dating from

2011, he was convicted of robbery, for which he received a prison sentence of 10 years. In an

Illinois case from 2012, he was convicted of domestic battery, for which he received probation for

12 months. In an Illinois case from 2013, he was convicted of aggravated robbery, for which he

was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years.

¶9             The report read as follows under “Recommendation”:

                       “The Revised Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI-R)

               performed by Pretrial Services identifies the defendant’s risk of pretrial misconduct

               while on pretrial for this alleged offense. The defendant scored a 6 (Moderate Risk)

               out of possible score of 0-14.

                       Based on the defendant’s risk of misconduct and the nature of the offense,

               the defendant appears to be appropriate for Pretrial Release.

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                       Furthermore, based on statistical norms, this assessment would estimate the

               defendant has high probability to appear in court for all future court hearings and

               (95%) of no new offenses during the pendency of this case.”

¶ 10           The prosecutor made substantially the following proffer. Zachary England was the

manager of Firestone on North Knoxville Avenue in Peoria, Illinois. On September 9, 2023,

defendant entered the shop, purportedly to pay for repairs he had ordered on a car. The bill was

over $2000. While at the counter, he grabbed the car keys. He “jumped in the car to take off without

paying for the repairs.” While “pursuing [defendant] to try to get him to stop and pay,” England

“was struck and injured in the roadway and left in the roadway.” Defendant drove away, “leaving

*** England lying in the middle of Knoxville” Avenue, “bleeding from the head,” suffering from

(as it turned out) a “traumatic brain injury.” Other motorists “had to put cars in the way to keep

[England] from being run over.” The police found defendant in the bathroom of a rented house. In

a laundry hamper in the house, they found the keys to the car, which, it was later learned, had been

reported stolen.

¶ 11           The prosecutor continued:

                       “We would indicate if you look at the defendant’s pretrial services report

               he indicates he’s homeless, does not have a phone, indicates he would live with his

               mother if he was released. He does have a prior history of failure to appears [sic]

               which I know can’t be the only consideration. He also has a no-bond hold at the

               Peoria County Jail from the City of Peoria Police Department [for theft of a motor

               vehicle]. ***

                       I would indicate as well he has a lengthy criminal history. He had an armed

               robbery, 2013, which he was sentenced to 20 years in the department of corrections.

                                               -4-
               So, he’s not been out very long. He had a prior robbery out of St. Louis, Missouri,

               in 2001 for which he was sentenced to 10 years, and he has a domestic battery

               conviction.”

(Later in the hearing, the prosecutor corrected herself by informing the circuit court that the 2013

conviction was for aggravated robbery instead of armed robbery.)

¶ 12           For the following reasons, the prosecutor argued that defendant was “a flight risk”:

               “The inherent nature of this offense is a flight risk. He fled the scene of an injury

               with great bodily harm and was located in a house. He did not ever turn himself in

               or come forward to indicate what he had done. He was also involved in possessing

               a stolen motor vehicle as a part of this offense. He was charged with reckless driving

               as well for his driving to leave the scene of that accident.”

¶ 13           The circuit court asked the prosecutor:

                       “THE COURT: How many prior failures to appear did you say?

                       [THE PROSECUTOR]: It says in his pretrial services report three. When I

               look at the jail screen, it actually shows four. But I was going with—the pretrial

               services report has three failures to appears [sic].

                       THE COURT: Does it show the most recent one of those?

                       [THE PROSECUTOR]: *** It was in January of 2023.”

¶ 14           The defense called Sandra Curry, who testified essentially as follows. She was

defendant’s mother, and she lived in Dunlap. If defendant were released, he “[a]bsolutely would”

be able to live with her. She “would indeed” “make sure” he abided by any court-ordered

conditions of pretrial release, including wearing an ankle monitor, abstaining from drugs and

alcohol, and attending meetings and work. Defendant was a “painter with the local union.” The

                                                -5-
union hall had urged her that, “as soon as he got out and got adjusted[,] to let them know, and they

would have him back at work.” She acknowledged that defendant had “had scrapes with the law.”

She “believe[d] his entire record ha[d] been related to addiction issues.” She “would do whatever

[she] needed to do to support him and his recovery.”

¶ 15           On cross-examination, Curry testified that she had lived at her address in Dunlap

for 22 years. She was unsure where defendant resided at the time of the incident—she thought he

had been living with some friends “[s]omewhere in Peoria.” Defendant had not lived with her since

“near the end of summer” 2023. The prosecutor asked her:

                       “Q. So, why did he move out? Did he move out on his own or did you kick

               him out?

                       A. Well, it was a mutual thing where he was not doing what I asked him to

               do as far as like allowing the tracker on his phone. I wanted to have that on his

               phone so I could keep track of where he was, and he was having a difficult time

               accepting that, so I told him it needed to be on or he had to get out.

                                               ***

                       Q. And was he back to using drugs?

                       A. He had been using drugs, yes.

                       Q. Where do his children live?

                       A. He doesn’t have any children. He’s not married or anything.

                       Q. So, if he reported that he had two children, a three and a five year old

               and one on the way, you know nothing about them?

                       A. I do not.”

¶ 16           The prosecutor asked:

                                                -6-
                       “Q. So, when he paroled out after his last—that 20-year prison sentence, did

               he come live with you?

                       A. He did.

                       Q. Okay. And then that didn’t last long or?

                       A. It lasted a while[,] actually. He was working. He was doing everything

               perfect and just made a bad decision one day to do drugs again.”

¶ 17           On redirect examination, Curry testified that defendant “did have a girlfriend.” This

girlfriend “was unsure if he was the father or not, but it was suspected that he was the father, and

she had a miscarriage in—around October.” Defense counsel asked:

                       “Q. She also had the two children to your knowledge?

                       A. You know, I don’t really get involved in all of his girlfriend’s history

               so—

                       Q. Fair enough.

                       A. —I am not aware of that.

                       Q. Okay.

                       A. I think I heard some hearsay that she did have two children but that’s it.”

¶ 18           At the conclusion of Curry’s testimony, defense counsel remarked to the circuit

court, “It’s not very often you have somebody who is as honest and blunt testifying in court as one

of [sic] my client’s mother.” The court responded, “I agree.” Characterizing Curry as a “no

nonsense type of person,” defense counsel argued that if defendant did not “do what he [was]

supposed to do,” Curry would be “willing to take the necessary steps.” In defense counsel’s

assessment, Curry was just the sort of “person who would” “inform probation.”

                                                -7-
¶ 19           Next, defense counsel sought to dispel what he regarded as a misleading suggestion

that was made in the State’s proffer:

               “I would disagree, respectfully, with [the prosecutor’s] characterization as mowed

               him down. This is a person who jumped on a car, and that’s what Mr. England did.

               And according to the proffer, did my client drive off? Yes. He didn’t stop. I’m not

               going to argue with that. But it’s not as though he ran in—over somebody who was

               standing in the roadway or crossing the road.”

¶ 20           Acknowledging that defendant had “a significant history,” defense counsel pointed

out that “all of [these prior offenses] *** [were] of the type and nature that it would be involving

someone with addiction issues.”

¶ 21           Defense counsel concluded:

                       “And as far as safety to the public, I think the Court can assure itself that if

               he’s wearing a monitor, that if he’s being tested regularly, he is a person that can

               go out. He’s got a place to stay. He’s got somebody that’s going to monitor him,

               and he’s got the ability to work. I think he’s safe to be released.”

¶ 22           After defense counsel made his argument, the circuit court found that the “hurdle”

in section 110-6.1(e)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)) “ha[d] been crossed

fairly easily here by the State.” In other words, the State had carried its “heavy burden of proving

by clear and convincing evidence that the proof [was] evident or presumption great that the

defendant [had] committed the offense listed in the indictment.” In his “terribly reckless act” at

Firestone, defendant had shown a “call[o]us disregard for the safety of others.”

                                                -8-
¶ 23           The circuit court further found that the State had proven, by clear and convincing

evidence, the proposition in section 110-6.1(e)(2): that defendant “pose[d] a real and present threat

to the safety of *** the community.” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(2).

¶ 24           The final proposition that the State had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,

was that

               “no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section

               110-10 of this Article [(id. § 110-10(b))] can mitigate (i) the real and present threat

               to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific

               articulable facts of the case *** or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight.” Id. § 110-

               6.1(e)(3).

The court found that this final proposition was proven as well. The court gave eight reasons for so

finding.

¶ 25           First, defendant “does not have a phone,” and “[p]retrial services was uneasy about

that.”

¶ 26           Second, “[e]ven when [defendant] had a phone, [he] rebuffed his mother’s efforts

to track him wherever he would go, and this was just recently.” The circuit court reasoned, “His

mother as recently as August of this year tried to get control over him, and he simply refused.

What’s to say that he’s going to change his mind a few months later?”

¶ 27           Third, defendant had an “unstable relationship life” in that he lacked a “long time

partner” who might “provide some stability.” The court commented, “And what a shocking

revelation to hear that this good mother was not aware of whether she has any grand kids or not

through her son, unstable.”

                                                -9-
¶ 28           Fourth, defendant had “failed to show up for court.” The circuit court added, “I

don’t care if it was a traffic ticket or any other type of charge. That does not bode well.”

¶ 29           Fifth, defendant had “another case pending something to do with motor vehicle

theft.” That pending charge was “not a factor in his favor.”

¶ 30           Sixth, defendant had “a lengthy criminal history,” including “a history of violent

acts and being a threat to the safety of others.”

¶ 31           Seventh, defendant “drove off” from Firestone, “evading authorities, parking a car

in an alley before he was finally tracked down.”

¶ 32           Eighth, defendant “admitted to pretrial services that his last use of cocaine was just

a week before that interview.” The circuit court added:

               “I appreciate the scourge of addiction and the harm it causes to individuals let alone

               society, but I don’t know that that’s a positive supported detail for the defendant

               here. He’s had addiction for a long time that is not under control whether through

               his own devices or through seeking help of others. And I don’t think this is the time

               to experiment and see if his addiction can get under control so close in time to the

               incident we’re here for today.”

¶ 33           The circuit court concluded:

                       “Also, the option of supervising him in a safe manner, in a less restrictive

               manner than detainment, to me, I think [it] would be in a twist of phrases a little bit

               reckless of the Court to let him go out in society under these dire circumstances that

               he’s facing right now and with his history. So, motion of the State’s respectfully

               granted.”

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¶ 34           In the written pretrial detention order, the circuit court found the propositions in

section 110-6.1(e)(1) to (3) (id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3)) to be proven. In addition, the court found the

willful flight standard in section 110-6.1(a)(8) (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)) to be proven. For its written

findings, the court referred the reader to its remarks in the transcript of the pretrial detention

hearing. Also, the court wrote:

               “[T]he risk of flight does not fall in the defendant’s favor and the defendant’s

               likelihood of having a stable environment when released is minimal. Further details

               and specifics are stated on the record.

                       numerous reasons: facts of case; flight; addiction; crim. hx.; refusal to

               follow mother’s rules; unstable life relshps; attitude, etc.”

¶ 35                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 36           The only issue that defendant raises in the memorandum that he filed in support of

his appeal is whether the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, the proposition in section

110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code (id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)). That section reads as follows:

                       “(e) Eligibility: All defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial

               release, and the State shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing

               evidence that:

                                                 ***

                       (3) no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of

               Section 110-10 of this Article [(id. § 110-10(b))] can mitigate (i) the real and

               present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the

               specific articulable facts of the case, for offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through

               (7) of subsection (a) [(id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7))] , or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight

                                                - 11 -
               for offenses listed in paragraph (8) of subsection (a) [(id. § 110-6.1(a)(8))].” Id.

               § 110-6.1(e)(3).

¶ 37           Defendant challenges the circuit court’s logic that, just because he refused to allow

his mother to install tracking software on his cell phone, court-ordered conditions of pretrial

release, such as “GPS monitoring, combined with curfew or strict home detention at [his] mother’s

house,” would have no mitigative effect on his dangerousness to the community or his likelihood

of willful flight. He argues that there is a significant difference between the (unaided) coercive

power of his mother and that of a court of law. He points out that the court, “unlike [his] mother,

has authority to instruct law enforcement officers to lay hands on 44-year-old men, at least those

who are facing criminal charges before it.”

¶ 38           It is true that the circuit court has sanction powers that Curry lacks. See id. § 110-

6(f). If defendant violated a condition of pretrial release, the court could sanction him with—on

the more severe end—“imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding 30 days.” Id.

§ 110-6(f)(2). In the past, however, the prospect of decades of imprisonment did not deter

defendant from repeatedly committing robbery. Arguably, then, the prospect of a month in the

county jail would be a relatively trivial deterrent. The reason why defendant has been undeterred,

one might understand from the record, is that he has a drug craving that will not be denied.

According to Curry and defense counsel, all of defendant’s criminal wrongdoing over the years

has been owing to his drug problem. Given the choice between homelessness and allowing his

mother to install tracking software on his phone so she could make sure he was not going out for

drugs, defendant chose homelessness. Therefore, a reasonable trier of fact would have some basis

in the record for perceiving the futility of GPS monitoring and confinement to Curry’s house.

Given defendant’s unwillingness to accept a tracker on his cell phone, there arguably is little reason

                                                - 12 -
to expect he would submit to a more intrusive GPS ankle bracelet, despite defense counsel’s

assurances. If defendant contemplated going out and committing a wrong that might get someone

else hurt, a GPS monitor would suggest to him that he should stop, and the commands in a pretrial

release order would suggest to him that he should stop. But defendant does not stop, not even when

a justly aggrieved shopkeeper jumps on the stolen car that defendant is speeding away in. A fair-

minded, reasonable trier of fact, accepting the explanations of defendant’s mother and defense

counsel, could see defendant as someone who is ruled and constrained by a drug addiction that has

proven resistant to treatment—an addiction that would sweep away any conditions of pretrial

release, just as it has swept away other important considerations, such as other people’s safety.

¶ 39           So, we are unable to say that, by granting the State’s petition for the denial of

pretrial release, the circuit court abused its discretion. See People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th)

230864, ¶ 10. That is, we are unable to characterize this ruling as arbitrary, fanciful, or

unreasonable. See id.

¶ 40                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 42           Affirmed.

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