Court Opinion

ID: 9624294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:57:19.67494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:42.842213
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Chief Justice.
Appellant appeals from an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant was sentenced in 1961 to twenty-five' years servitude in the state penitentiary following • conviction of the offense of rape, allegedly committed in Idaho County.
Appellant first filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in what is now the fourth judicial district of the State of Idaho, in and for Ada County; District Judge Charles R. Donaldson denied the petition. Following such denial appellant filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 7, 1965, again in the Ada County district court. A return to the petition was filed and Judge Merlin S. Young continued the matter to permit time to subpoena witnesses.
The district judge granted the State’s motion for change of venue to Grangeville in Idaho County, for the convenience of witnesses.
Hearings were held in Grangeville in late 1965, District Judge Paul W. Hyatt presiding. Prior to the district court’s final determination upon this second petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellant, on May 9, 1966, submitted a motion and demand that the proceeding be dismissed.
Appellant was due to be considered by the Idaho State Board of Corrections for possible reduction in his sentence and eligí*237bility for parole. He wrote several letters, prior to his request for dismissal, expressing concern over the delay in rendition of a decision in his habeas corpus proceeding, and expressing concern that the pending court action would interfere with his receiving objective consideration by the Board of Correction. Appellant’s belief, as he stated, was that the board’s policy was not to act on any application for a sentence reduction, as long as legal proceedings remained pending. On April 29, 1966, appellant wrote William Foster, his court-appointed attorney in the Idaho County proceedings, in pertinent part:
“I am going to try to explain why I am anxious to get this thing over with. I hope you can see my side of it also. I am about ready to go on the pardon board again and I do not have a chance if I still have anything in court. The policy with the board is not to act on any application for a time cut if there is any action in court at the time, and I only have until May 15th to decide which way I will go. There is only one thing for me to do, and that is to drop action on my writ at that time. * * * ”
Appellant wrote similar letters to District Judges Hyatt and Young, urging that action be taken upon his petition, copies of which letters he attached to his petition.
Judge Hyatt stated in his order of dismissal that he had conferred with counsel Foster and with the warden of the Idaho State Penitentiary on May 9, 1966, following appellant’s request for dismissal; and further stated that the warden advised that he had independently conferred with appellant, and that appellant repeated his desire for dismissal of the proceedings. Counsel Foster informed the court that appellant had requested him, Foster, to obtain a dismissal. Having thus satisfied himself that appellant’s motion to dismiss was his free and voluntary act, Judge Hyatt, on May 10, 1966, entered an order of dismissal with prejudice.
Appellant filed his third and present petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 21, 1966, in the district court of the fourth judicial district in Ada County. Therein he alleged several violations of his constitutional rights, among them being, (1) that the court failed to subpoena certain of appellant’s witnesses during the habeas corpus hearings in Idaho County; (2) that appellant’s plea of guilty to the offense charged was obtained by coercion and promises because the Idaho County sheriff persuaded appellant’s wife and daughter to quit writing letters to appellant; (3) that appellant entered his plea of guilty at a time when he was under the influence of drugs and not mentally competent to appreciate the nature of his acts; (4) that the judge who presided over the habeas corpus proceeding in Idaho County was prejudiced against appellant; (5) that appellant was denied a fair and impartial hearing in Idaho County because the community was impassioned against him; (6) that appellant’s motion for order of dismissal of the habeas corpus proceedings was not his voluntary act, because the policy of the State Board of Corrections was such as to compel his request for dismissal.
District Judge Young, having considered appellant’s third and present petition, denied it in a memorandum decision and order dated July 25, 1966. Appellant appeals from the order of denial.
Appellant’s present petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in large part, restates the allegations which were contained in his second petition, heard by Judge Hyatt.
Appellant is not, as a matter of right, entitled to a subsequent writ unless he can present some new issue of fact or law upon which he has not had a hearing. Starkey v. State, 91 Idaho 74, 415 P.2d 717 (1966); Applications of Oppenheimer, 95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696 (1964), cert. den. 377 U.S. 948, 84 S.Ct. 1359, 12 L.Ed.2d 311 (1964); Petition of McGrath, 143 Mont. 498, 392 P.2d 76 (1964); Nicolay v. Kill, 161 Kan. 667, 170 P.2d 823 (1946). Had appellant awaited a decision from Judge Hyatt, and had it been unfavorable he could have appealed to the Supreme Court of this state, *238which is the' proper tribunal to review habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal or other revisory remedy. Stokes v. State, 90 Idaho 339, 411 P.2d 392 (1966); Burge v. State, 90 Idaho 473, 413 P.2d 451 (1966); Wilson v. State, 90 Idaho 498, 414 P.2d 465 (1966); Cobas v. Clapp, 79 Idaho 419, 319 P.2d 475 (1957), cert. den. 356 U.S. 941, 78 S.Ct. 785, 2L.Ed.2d 816 (1958).
Appellant, however, raises one potentially significant new issue in his present petition. He alleges that he was informed, and firmly believed, that if he had legal proceedings pending in court, he would not be objectively considered for a reduction in sentence by the State Board of Corrections. He thus argues by implication that he was compelled under duress to dismiss his Idaho County habeas corpus proceeding in order to obtain fair consideration for a reduction in sentence, and that his constitutional rights were thus violated.
Reasonable access to the courts is a right guaranteed as against state action by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This includes, specifically, right of accéss by state prisoners to state courts, and a deprivation of this right is therefore actionable under the Civil Rights Act. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1961); Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir.1967). Moreover, the United States Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 2, squarely prohibits suspending “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.” See also United States Constitution, Art. Ill and Amendments I and XIV. Constitutional rights may not be diminished or restrained by the denial of a privilege granted by law or regulation. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961).
The question thus specifically presented is whether appellant was effectually denied access to the state courts in his habeas corpus proceeding, by what he believed to be the policy of the State Board of Corrections. In other words, was he compelled' to dismiss his Idaho County proceeding because of the alleged policy of such board, so that the dismissal was involuntary and not of his own free will? In considering this-question, we are ever mindful that “the limitations upon the remedy afforded by habeas corpus should be flexible and readily available to prevent manifest injustice, for, as Mr. Justice Black has expressed it, the principles judicially established for the delimitation of the habeas corpus action ‘must be construed and applied so as to preserve— not destroy — constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty.’ ” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938); Council v. Clemmer, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 42, 165 F.2d 249 (1947); Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 (1964); Johnson v. State, 85 Idaho 123, 128-129, 376 P.2d 704 (1962).
Determination of the voluntariness', of a guilty plea, which is analogous in effect to appellant’s request for an order of dismissal of the habeas corpus proceedings,, must by definition depend on the court’s view of defendant’s subjective state of mind at the time of plea. United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F.Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y.1967); United States v. Miller, 243 F.Supp. 61 (E.D.Pa.1965), aff’d 356 F.2d 515 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. den. 384 U.S. 981, 86 S.Ct. 1882, 16 L.Ed.2d 691 (1966). The court must consider the cumulative, impact upon the defendant of “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances.” United States v. Miller, supra; United. States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, supra; Andrews v. Hand, 190 Kan. 109, 372 P.2d. 559 (1962), cert. den. 371 U.S. 880, 83 S.Ct. 152, 9 L.Ed.2d 117 (1962).
In the situation at bar, appellant was. well aware of the nature and consequences-of his action. His letters to Judges Young- and Hyatt and Attorney Foster, reflect a precise understanding of the significance of his request for dismissal. He had the advice- and counsel of an attorney, who communicated the request to Judge Hyatt. JudgeHyatt’s order of dismissal states that the-.. *239court conscientiously attempted to determine the voluntariness of appellant’s request, and that being fully advised, it satisfied itself in the premises before granting the order. Appellant was notified prior to the entry of the order that such order would be with prejudice, and he made no objection thereto.
The reasoned, calculated decision of appellant, appraised of all the factors involved, constrains us to the view that his request for dismissal was voluntary and the product of his own free will. Whatever may have been the influence of his belief as to the policy of the Board of Corrections, he made a free and open choice to rely upon the clemency of that board instead of his claimed illegal conviction. He is now bound by that choice.
Appellant cites the case of Smartt v. Avery, supra, which he claims closely parallels the situation herein. In that case a state prisoner who filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus was subject to an amendment to the regulations of the Tennessee parole board which in effect assessed an additional year of incarceration prior to consideration for parole, upon any state prisoner who had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and which was denied. We think the factual situation of Smartt v. Avery, supra, to be too clearly distinguishable from the case at bar to be relevant herein.
Order affirmed.
TAYLOR, McFADDEN, and SPEAR, JJ., concur.