Court Opinion

ID: 9667951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:58:39.076465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:41.807888
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, J.
(dissenting.) I respectfully dissent.
I feel that there was more than sufficient evi*442dence to support the trial judge’s finding of guilty of second-degree murder but mentally ill.
The court found that the defendant was not legally insane. This area of the law which interprets voluntary intoxication or drug abuse is a little thin and, therefore, much discretion should be given to the trial court, especially when hearing a case without a jury. Discretion is necessary because of the thorny and cobwebbed route the judge must take to explore the mental processes of a defendant before, during, and after a vicious type killing such as we have here.
A recent opinion of our Supreme Court has separated, to some extent, the mental processes a trier of fact must follow before reaching a verdict in this area of the law. People v Ramsey, 422 Mich 500; 375 NW2d 297 (1985).
The Court said:
"Our statutory scheme rcognizes a continuum of mental functioning. A person is mentally ill if suffering from 'a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.’ MCL 330.1400a; MSA 14.800(400a). A person is insane, however, only if that substantial impairment results in the lack of 'substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.’ MCL 768.21a; MSA 28.1044(1). Under these definitions, one must be mentally ill before he can be found insane, but the converse is not true. As stated by Justice Cavanagh in People v Fultz, 111 Mich App 587, 590; 314 NW2d 702 (1981):
"'Insanity by definition is an extreme of mental illness. When a person’s mental illness reaches that extreme, the law provides that criminal responsibility does not attach. To put it alternatively, the statutes *443provide that all insane people are mentally ill but not all mentally ill people are insane.’ ” 422 Mich 513-514.
MCL 768.36(1); MSA 28.1059(1) provides:
"If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a [MCL 768.20a; MSA 28.1043(1)], the defendant may be found 'guilty but mentally ill’ if, after trial, the trier of fact finds all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
"(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense.
"(b) That the defendant was mentally ill . at the time of the commission of that offense.
"(c) That the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of that offense.”
MCL 768.21a; MSA 28.1044(1) defines insanity:
"A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness * * * that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”
Finally, mental illness is defined in MCL 330.1400a; MSA 14.800(400a) as:
"[A] substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.”
I would find, from these facts, that the trial court’s decision was not clearly erroneous in finding that defendant was not legally insane.
I would affirm.