Court Opinion

ID: 9739394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:14:22.990974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.027085
License: Public Domain

Jansen, J.
(concurring). Reluctantly, I must concur in Judge Holbrook’s resolution of this case. It is apparent that double jeopardy principles preclude a retrial in this matter. I write separately because the trial court’s remarks and conduct led to a miscarriage of justice. Those remarks are highlighted to avoid such a result in the future.
This case arises from the sexual assault of the complainant on August 31, 1993. Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l)(f); MSA 28.788(2) (l)(f). The information alleged that defendant penetrated the complainant’s vagina with his penis (count i) and sexually penetrated the complainant’s vagina with a vibrator (count ii).
*365Defendant and the complainant had dated off and on for approximately 2Vz years. At the time of the incident, defendant and the complainant were friends, but were no longer involved in a romantic relationship. According to Ken Wheeler, an acquaintance of defendant and the complainant, defendant told him that the complainant was the "woman of his dreams” and that he was upset that she would not enter into a permanent relationship with him.
On the evening of August 30, 1993, defendant called and offered to fix the complainant’s stove. This was a ruse. Defendant had been drinking alcoholic beverages before he arrived at her house. Defendant, the complainant, and other guests were drinking alcoholic beverages and smoking marijuana. Because defendant was too intoxicated to drive home, the complainant agreed that defendant could spend the night on her couch, as he had done several times in the past. Defendant and the complainant then went to a local tavern and had a few more drinks. Defendant drove them back to the complainant’s house at approximately 2:30 a.m.
While the complainant started undressing in her bedroom, defendant entered and wanted to put lotion on her back. The complainant told defendant that he could not, but he ignored her and started rubbing it on her back. The complainant pushed defendant away, but he came at her saying that he knew that she wanted it. A fight ensued and defendant threw the complainant down onto the bed. He grabbed a vibrator and began jamming it inside her vagina. The complainant screamed at defendant to stop and let her go and she was able to grab his hair and get away from him. The complainant then called 911, but defendant took the telephone out of her hands and hung it up. *366Defendant then threw the complainant down onto the couch and penetrated her with his penis. The complainant called for her ten-year-old son to call 911, which he was able to do.
One of the police officers who arrived at the complainant’s house testified that she was crying and hysterical and had a welt on her forehead. A volunteer fire fighter who also responded testified that the complainant had a small bump on her forehead, but that she was physically fine. A police officer testified that a vibrator had been seized as evidence. A semen stain was found on the couch and in the crotch of the complainant’s jeans. A forensic serologist testified that the semen stains could have been contributed by defendant. Hair samples taken from the bed sheet matched the known samples from defendant.
The complainant was taken to a hospital for an examination. An emergency room nurse testified that, because the complainant was intoxicated, she was difficult to arouse. The nurse testified that the complainant stated that she was not sure whether defendant actually penetrated her with his penis because she was trying to fight him off. The complainant did tell the nurse that defendant penetrated her with the vibrator. The complainant complained of pain in her wrists, rectal and lower abdominal areas, and nose (a hematoma), and of a headache. A vaginal swab did not detect the presence of any semen. A vaginal examination revealed no abrasions, lacerations, or contusions, but the complainant complained of tenderness during the examination.
At the close of the prosecutor’s proofs, defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the "evidence is just overwhelming that the witness [the complainant] is unbelievable.” The trial court, presided over by visiting Washtenaw Circuit Court *367Judge Thomas Roumell, expressed doubt, stating that there was "a very, very strong breaking down of the elements of proof as far as the elements for the establishment of the crime is concerned,” and suggested a plea bargain. The prosecutor stated that the complainant’s testimony did not have to be corroborated, yet the trial court responded:
That could be—as far as I’m concerned, that would be why I think you are entitled to a plea by him on some count. I don’t think it’s i, esc i. I don’t think it’s esc i. You may go ahead and get it down to xv. If you go to iv, I think you got a deal, and I think that’s not a bad deal.
This case does not deserve the punishment that esc i deserves—merits—or is warranted under the statute. The punishment is excessive for what has happened here. The state of this lady’s condition was beyond anything to say that this was all his fault.
Perhaps a more enlightened day will come when rape victims are no longer blamed for being assaulted. No matter what the "state of this lady’s condition” was, it does not allow, excuse, or exonerate the defendant’s act of raping her.
If the parties need to be reminded, a court assesses the merits of a motion for a directed verdict "through consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution in a light most favorable to the prosecution, to determine whether a rational trier of fact could [have found] that the elements of [the] crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993) (emphasis in original). Credibility determinations are left for the trier of fact, here the jury. People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 16; 472 NW2d 289 (1991). "Inherent in the task of considering the proofs in the light most *368favorable to the prosecution is the necessity to avoid a weighing of the proofs or a determination whether testimony favorable to the prosecution is to be believed. All such concerns are to be resolved in favor of the prosecution.” People v Herbert, 444 Mich 466, 474; 511 NW2d 654 (1993). Therefore, it is not permissible for a trial court to determine the credibility of the witnesses when deciding a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Id.
The trial court initially denied the motion for a directed verdict. Defendant then rested without presenting any testimony. The following day, the jury declared itself deadlocked. The trial court declared a mistrial. When the jury declared itself deadlocked, the trial court should have instructed it to deliberate further, especially where the jury had deliberated for only about five hours. See MCR 6.420(C); People v Booker (After Remand), 208 Mich App 163, 168; 527 NW2d 42 (1994) (if, when a jury is polled, one juror expresses disagreement with the verdict, the jury must be sent out to deliberate further); People v Rutherford, 208 Mich App 198, 202; 526 NW2d 620 (1994) (a trial court should avoid declaring a mistrial sua sponte without first holding a hearing on the record and making explicit findings that no reasonable alternative exists). After declaring the mistrial, defendant renewed his motion for a directed verdict, but the trial court declined to address it and told defendant to renew the motion with the judge to whom the case was next assigned (Judge Donald Shelton).
Approximately three weeks later, defendant renewed his motion for a directed verdict. Judge Shelton declined to hear the motion, agreeing with the prosecutor that such an issue should be before the judge who heard the case. Over two months later, Judge Roumell again heard defendant’s mo*369tion for a directed verdict. At the hearing, the trial court ruled that it was denying the motion conditionally, but that defendant could present the matter at the time of the pretrial conference with Judge Shelton if defendant found authority for his position. A week later, at a pretrial conference before Judge Shelton, defendant cited the staff comments to MCR 6.419(B) as authority for granting a directed verdict when the jury is unable to reach a verdict and has been discharged. Judge Shelton sent the matter back to Judge Roumell. Eleven days later, Judge Roumell granted the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the basis of the insufficiency of the evidence regarding both counts in the information.
I agree with Judge Holbrook that MCR 6.419(A) permits trial courts to direct a verdict of acquittal after a mistrial based on a hung jury has been declared. However, such action should be disfavored. Trial courts should not be in the habit of taking motions for directed verdicts under advisement. Such a motion should be either granted or denied at the time that it is raised. MCR 6.419(A) specifically states that the court may not reserve decision on the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict unless the motion is made after the defendant’s proofs.
I further agree with Judge Holbrook that Judge Roumell’s decision to grant the motion for a directed verdict was erroneous because he found that the complainant was not credible. Not only is this clearly the incorrect standard in deciding a motion for a directed verdict, but Judge Roumell’s comments regarding the complainant were highly inappropriate. Judge Roumell stated that the prosecution did not establish the charges beyond a. reasonable doubt because the complainant’s testimony that she was penetrated by defendant with *370the vibrator or his penis was a "possible figment of the complaining witness’s alcohol-soaked mind.”
Unfortunately, even though Judge Roumell’s actions were erroneous and resulted in what I believe is a miscarriage of justice, double jeopardy principles bar retrial of this case. As this Court has recently stated, once a court enters a final judgment of acquittal based on a directed verdict, even if granted on an erroneous foundation, the defendant’s double jeopardy protections prohibit appeal or retrial. People v Nix (After Remand), 208 Mich App 648, 649-650; 528 NW2d 208 (1995). The trial court in the present case decided defendant’s case on the merits because it granted the motion on the basis of the insufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, an appeal is not available to the prosecutor. Id., p 651.
Accordingly, I concur in Judge Holbrook’s resolution of this case because retrial of the matter would impermissibly place defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The prosecutor’s appeal must be dismissed.