Court Opinion

ID: 9477925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:34:55.357287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:07.652878
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s opinion insofar as it affirms the district court’s *1311order granting summary judgment to the parole board on Fuller’s equal protection challenge to his denial of parole. Through discovery, Fuller compiled statistics demonstrating a great disparity between the number of convicted white rapists and convicted black rapists who were granted parole by the parole board. I believe that these statistics provided sufficient evidence to allow Fuller to survive a motion for summary judgment.
Fuller’s evidence demonstrates that, from 1971 to 1986, almost two and one-half times more blacks than whites were incarcerated for rape. Yet, during the same period, twice as many convicted white rapists received parole on their initial consideration than did convicted black rapists. Fuller also compiled evidence that (1) during 1976 and 1977, eight white convicted rapists were paroled on their initial parole consideration whereas no blacks were paroled on their initial consideration, and (2) from 1981 to 1982, four convicted white rapists were paroled on their initial consideration while no black rapists were paroled on their third consideration for parole.1
The majority, while noting that this Circuit has recognized that an inmate may challenge the denial of parole on equal protection grounds, Osborne v. Folmar, 735 F.2d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir.1984); Damiano v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 933 (11th Cir.1986), rejects Fuller’s claim. In doing so, the majority relies on McCleskey v. Kemp, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987).
In McCleskey, the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the Georgia capital sentencing process. The Court held that the Baldus study, which indicated that black defendants who killed white victims were more likely to receive the death penalty, was not sufficient evidence on which “to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCles-key’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.” Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1769. However, McCleskey left open the possibility of an equal protection challenge directed to the decision-making of an individual entity, such as the parole board in this case. See id. 107 S.Ct. at 1768 n. 15 (unexplained statistical discrepancy in the decisions of a single entity can raise on inference of an equal protection violation). This is precisely the type of challenge Fuller brings here.
McCleskey emphasized that each jury that decides to impose the death penalty is “unique in its composition.” Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1767. Therefore, statistics that purport to depict general tendencies in the imposition of the death penalty by many different juries in many different cases have no relation to a particular jury’s decision in a specific case. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1767-68. Conversely, Fuller’s statistics focus on the decision-making of the parole board over time. In McCleskey, the Supreme Court emphasized that it accepted statistics as proof of discriminatory intent in equal protection challenges to the selection of a jury venire and in statutory claims under Title VII. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1767. The inference drawn from general statistics to a specific parole decision by a parole board is comparable to the inference drawn from general statistics to a specific venire-selection or a Title VII case. Thus, McCleskey does not preclude Fuller’s claim.
In McCleskey, the Supreme Court stated that there was a second reason that general statistics concerning the capital sentencing process were not sufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory purpose whereas general statistics regarding the venire-selection and Title VII contexts were sufficient to raise such an inference. McCles-key states that the decision-maker in the capital sentencing context (i.e., the jury) could not be required to explain the statistical disparities raised by the Baldus study because public policy protects jurors’ verdicts from being scrutinized. Id., 107 S.Ct. at 1768. In contrast, a prosecutor in a venire-selection case or an employer in a *1312Title VII case can be required to explain any statistical disparity in its decision-making. Like the prosecutor or the employer, the parole board can be called upon to explain the great disparity demonstrated by the statistics Fuller has compiled. No public policy dictates that parole board members, as opposed to jurors, should be shielded from having to explain their decisions. In fact, public policy and the constitutional requirement of equal protection demand that the parole board be required to explain the statistical disparity which suggests disparate treatment of black and white convicted rapists.
Finally, the majority states that Fuller has failed to provide “exceptionally clear proof” of discrimination as required by McCleskey because he did not demonstrate that he was similarly situated to white inmates who were paroled. I do not quarrel with the fact that McCleskey requires Fuller to prove that he was a victim of purposeful discrimination, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S.Ct. 643, 646-47 (1967), or that Fuller’s statistical evidence must be “exceptionally clear,” see McCleskey, 107 S.Ct. at 1769, before this Court is entitled to infer that the parole board discriminated against him on the basis of race. Nonetheless, it is significant that this case came before the district court on the parole board’s motion for summary judgment. Fuller has not yet had a chance to prove that the parole board purposefully discriminated against him. Because I believe that the statistical evidence which Fuller has presented raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the parole board’s actions, I would allow this case to proceed to trial. Accordingly, I dissent.

. Additional evidence compiled by Fuller demonstrates that, from 1976 to 1986, more than seven times as many whites convicted of murder were paroled on their initial parole consideration as were blacks convicted of rape. However, the relevance of this statistic is questionable, and I do not rely on it as a basis for my dissent.