Court Opinion

ID: 9447599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:38:35.120143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:06.422950
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
There was a question for the jury, it seems to me, as to whether there was sufficient highway lighting to make persons and vehicles clearly discernible at a distance of five hundred feet. If there was not sufficient lighting, then under section 192.31 of the Safety Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 C.F.R. § 192.31 (Supp.1960), the parked truck, which had been operated by appellee Andrew S. Broadus and which was owned by appellee R. E. Holland, Inc., should have had at least one white or amber light and one red light displayed as required in that regulation. No such lights were displayed. In this factual situation I think the jury should have been permitted to consider whether the failure to comply with the regulation —a failure which would constitute at least evidence of negligence — was the proximate cause of the accident, and that *376accordingly the court should not have directed a verdict in favor of appellees Broadus and R. E. Holland, Inc. The danger of truck trailers parking at night on our highways without complying with such an important safety regulation is obvious, as is the danger of drinking drivers. '
The court appears to reject this view primarily on the ground that the plaintiff, who was a passenger in the taxicab, was contributorily negligent because of the drinking he had engaged in with the driver of the taxicab. I have two difficulties with this basis for disposing of the case against the driver and owner of the truck. In the first place the trial court did not direct the verdict in their favor on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. If the question arising from the regulation had been submitted to the jury the jury might have found for the plaintiff, in which event I do not think this court would have been justified in reversing. Secondly, though I agree the evidence of drinking showed negligence on plaintiff’s part as matter of law, this negligence was not shown as matter of law to have been a proximate cause of the collision with the unlighted truck. As this court said in Peigh v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 92 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 202, 204 F.2d 391, 395,
It cannot “be said that the failure to see an unlighted object within the range of one’s headlights is negligence per se.”
If this is true as to the driver of the taxicab it is true as to plaintiff, who was a passenger. It seems to me the jury should have been permitted to decide whether the factual situation brought the regulation into play and, if so, whether the failure of the truck driver to comply with it was the proximate cause of the collision, or whether plaintiff’s negligence contributed to that collision as a proximate cause and, therefore, barred recovery by him.
As to the driver and owner of the automobile, appellees Jackson and Bowling,
I agree we should affirm on the ground that plaintiff assumed the risk of the consequences as of any negligence on their part.