Court Opinion

ID: 9926746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 17:02:29.692115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.779924
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                  SUMMARY
                                                            January 25, 2024

                                 2024COA9

No. 21CA0309, People v. Roper — Constitutional Law — Sixth
Amendment — Right to Public Trial — Partial Courtroom
Closure — Waller Test — Findings

     A division of the court of appeals resolves an open issue,

concluding that when a trial court’s findings under Waller v.

Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), are not sufficient to support a partial

courtroom closure, but a remand for further findings does not

appear to be futile, a limited remand is an appropriate remedy.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                         2024COA9

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0309
Boulder County District Court No. 19CR447
Honorable Thomas F. Mulvahill, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Zachary Orion Roper,

Defendant-Appellant.

                        ORDER OF LIMITED REMAND

                                 Division VII
                           Opinion by JUDGE TOW
                        Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

                         Announced January 25, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Taylor J. Hoy, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1    The COVID-19 pandemic had far-reaching effects on every

 aspect of life, and the criminal justice system was certainly no

 exception. Courts had to grapple with the difficult question of how

 to conduct a jury trial in a manner that simultaneously protected

 the defendant’s rights to a speedy and fair trial, while safeguarding

 the health of the participants and the public. In particular, the

 virus necessitated certain social distancing requirements, making

 the task of providing a public trial even more challenging.

¶2    One common method adopted by courts was to provide an

 audio and video livestream of the proceedings to the public. In

 many cases, this included permitting the public to view the

 proceedings while sitting, socially distanced, in a different

 courtroom in the courthouse.

¶3    The trial court invoked this procedure when defendant,

 Zachary Orion Roper, was tried for and convicted of sexual

 assault (victim helpless) and sexual assault (victim incapable of

 appraising the nature of their conduct). On appeal of his

 conviction, Roper contends, among other things, that this

 arrangement was a partial courtroom closure that was not

 supported by sufficient findings. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.

                                    1
 39, 48 (1984) (holding that a trial court “must make findings

 adequate to support the closure”). He further contends that the

 failure to make adequate findings to justify the partial courtroom

 closure constitutes structural error requiring automatic reversal of

 his convictions.

¶4    Roper’s challenge requires us to resolve a question that has

 often been mentioned but never conclusively resolved by a Colorado

 appellate court: Does the trial court’s failure to make sufficient

 findings at the time of the court closure amount to structural error

 or can that insufficiency be remedied by remanding to the trial

 court for further findings? We conclude that, where the trial court’s

 findings are incomplete, but it appears that a remand would not be

 futile, an appellate court is not precluded from remanding to the

 trial court for more findings. We further conclude that such a

 remand is appropriate here.

                           I.    Background

¶5    Roper’s trial was originally scheduled for April 2020, but he

 requested a continuance due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The

 People agreed, and the case was continued. After a second

 continuance, Roper’s trial was rescheduled for October 2020.

                                    2
 Roper asked for a third continuance because of the pandemic,

 stating that he would waive his speedy trial right. Roper also

 requested that four family members and four friends be permitted

 to attend his trial in person. He asserted that not allowing these

 people to be present in the courtroom during his trial would violate

 his right to a public trial.

¶6    At the pretrial hearing, the trial court denied Roper’s request

 for a third continuance. The trial court and parties then discussed

 the modified trial procedures in place as a result of the pandemic.

 The trial court noted that these procedures were “formulated with

 the input of the district attorney, the office of the public defender,

 probation, [and] security, and [were] ultimately vetted and approved

 by Boulder County Public Health.”

¶7    The trial court also mentioned Waller and stated that “[w]e are

 not going to be able to accommodate family members or friends in

 the actual courtroom during the trial.” Instead, the trial court

 advised the parties that, due to current COVID-19 health and safety

 regulations, jury selection would be done in one of two essentially

 identical courtrooms that could hold twenty-two potential jurors

 with appropriate social distancing, and the jury assembly room

                                    3
 could hold twenty-eight additional potential jurors who would

 observe the jury selection via Webex. The court informed the

 parties that the trial would be in a smaller courtroom, and that the

 public could observe the trial proceedings via Webex, either online

 or from the public viewing area located in another courtroom in the

 courthouse. The court said that during the trial, the twelve jurors

 would be seated in the gallery bench seats. The court also agreed

 — at Roper’s request — to advise each witness that the trial was

 being observed via Webex.1

¶8    Both during the pretrial hearing and at the start of trial, Roper

 objected to restricting the public’s access to the courtroom. In

 response to the latter objection, the trial court said, “With respect to

 your position about the public in the courtroom, the court facilities

 aren’t sufficiently large to allow the public to be in the physical

 courtroom where the trial is taking place. So public access to the

 courtroom is being provided through Webex.” The court also stated

 1 The trial court denied Roper’s request to notify the jury that his

 friends and family were watching the trial and to have a screen in
 the courtroom showing the participants who were watching. The
 court also denied Roper’s suggestion to display pictures of his
 family and supporters in the courtroom as a way of informing the
 jurors and witnesses of their presence on the livestream.

                                    4
  that Roper’s family could watch the livestream in the adjacent

  courtroom and could have contact with Roper during breaks.

¶9     After the trial, in a written and signed minute order describing

  the trial proceedings, the trial court noted that the trial

  “proceedings were held pursuant to the health and safety provisions

  of the 20th Judicial District Court’s Administrative Order 20-110 –

  Resumption of Jury Trials.” The trial court also noted the

  applicability of “the 20th Judicial District Court’s Plan for Resuming

  Jury Trials Safely During Covid-19 Health Emergency.” Neither of

  those documents is in the record.

                         II.   Courtroom Closure

¶ 10   Roper contends that the trial court’s exclusion of all members

  of the public from the courtroom, despite their being able to view

  the trial in a separate courtroom via a live audio and video stream,

  constituted a complete closure of the courtroom. Further, Roper

  contends that the closure, whether complete or partial, was not

  justified under Waller and thus violated his right to a public trial

  under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

  article II, section 16 of the Colorado Constitution, resulting in

  structural error requiring automatic reversal. We conclude —

                                      5
  consistent with other divisions of this court — that the separate

  courtroom livestream arrangement constituted a partial closure and

  further agree that the trial court’s findings were insufficient to

  support that partial closure. But we disagree that the mere

  inadequacy of the court’s findings rises to structural error.

                     A.    The Right to a Public Trial

¶ 11   The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee

  criminal defendants the right to a public trial. See U.S. Const.

  amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. “This right ‘is for the

  benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with

  and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested

  spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their

  responsibility and to the importance of their functions.’” People v.

  Jones, 2020 CO 45, ¶ 16 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 46).

¶ 12   Courtroom closures, whether total or partial, can violate a

  defendant’s right to a public trial. Id. at ¶ 27. But a defendant’s

  right to a public trial is not absolute, and at times it must yield to

  competing interests. People v. Lujan, 2020 CO 26, ¶ 15 (citing

  Waller, 467 U.S. at 45). As the United States Supreme Court

  articulated in Waller, for a courtroom closure to be justified,

                                     6
             the party seeking to close the hearing must
             advance an overriding interest that is likely to
             be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader
             than necessary to protect that interest, the
             trial court must consider reasonable
             alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it
             must make findings adequate to support the
             closure.

  467 U.S. at 48.

¶ 13   In some circumstances, even if the trial court fails to make the

  necessary Waller findings, “some closures are simply so trivial that

  they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Lujan,

  ¶ 16. In determining whether a closure was trivial, we “consider

  whether it implicated the protections and values of the public trial

  right.” Id. at ¶ 28. These values include ensuring a fair trial,

  reminding the prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the

  accused and the importance of their functions, encouraging

  witnesses to come forward, and discouraging perjury. Id. at ¶ 14.

  In analyzing whether a closure implicates the public trial right, the

  court must consider the duration of the closure, the substance of

  the proceedings that occurred during the closure, whether the

  proceedings were later memorialized in open court or placed on the

  record, whether the closure was intentional, and whether the

                                     7
  closure was total or partial. Id. at ¶ 19. This inquiry considers the

  totality of the circumstances, and no single factor is dispositive. Id.

                         B.    Standard of Review

¶ 14   “Because a trial court’s decision to close the courtroom

  presents a mixed question of law and fact, we review the court’s

  legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.”

  People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50, ¶ 19 (citation omitted).

                                C.    Closure

¶ 15   The People argue that the livestream arrangement constitutes

  a fully public trial and, thus, is not a closure at all. Initially, we

  note that it is not clear that the People should be permitted to

  advance this argument, given that the prosecutor at trial

  characterized the arrangement as a partial closure. Regardless, we

  find no merit in the contention. If the livestreaming of a trial were

  not at least a partial closure, all future trials could be conducted in

  this fashion for any reason — or, indeed, for no reason whatsoever.

  While advancements in technology allow what is essentially a

  televised trial to serve — under proper circumstances — as an

  alternative to a complete closure, we do not believe the Sixth

                                      8
  Amendment permits an unfettered shift to televised, but otherwise

  closed, trial proceedings.

¶ 16   After briefing in this matter closed, a division of this court held

  that the exclusion “of the entire public . . . from the physical

  courtroom constituted a partial closure — despite the availability of

  a live video and audio stream of the proceedings.” People v. Bialas,

  2023 COA 50, ¶ 15.2 We acknowledge that in Bialas, some

  members of the public were permitted in the courtroom at the

  beginning of the trial but were later removed, id. at ¶¶ 3-4, where,

  here, the livestream arrangement was the only way any member of

  the public was permitted to view the proceedings from the outset.

  Thus, one might argue — as Roper does — that the closure here

  was a complete, not a partial, closure. We need not decide — and

  indeed express no opinion on — that issue, however, because we

  agree that, consistent with Bialas, there was at least a partial

  closure, and whether that closure was partial or complete does not

  alter our analysis.

  2 Roper referenced this opinion in a notice of supplemental

  authority filed pursuant to C.A.R. 28(i).

                                     9
¶ 17   Further, to the extent the People refer to this closure as trivial,

  we disagree. The closure was for the entire duration of the trial. It

  was also intentional and precluded in-person attendance by Roper’s

  family. As our supreme court held in Jones, ¶ 41, such an

  exclusion weighs against deeming a closure trivial because

  excluding the defendant’s family from the courtroom removes a

  reminder to the judge, the prosecutor, and the jury of their

  collective responsibility for treating the defendant fairly. Thus, even

  if we assume the closure was partial, and noting that the closure

  was placed on the record, every other factor points toward a

  nontrivial closure. See Bialas, ¶¶ 18-20. Therefore, we conclude

  that a closure occurred sufficient to implicate Roper’s right to a

  public trial.

                          D.    Waller Findings

¶ 18   We turn next to whether the trial court properly applied and

  made adequate findings on the Waller factors.

¶ 19   Regarding the first factor, although Roper contends that he

  does not know what the overriding interest for the closure was, the

  trial court found, with record support, that it was the protection of

  all trial participants and spectators from contracting or spreading

                                    10
  COVID-19. The court and both counsel referred to COVID-19 and

  the global pandemic while discussing the trial procedures. The

  court explained that the jury trial procedures had been adopted by

  the judicial district after input from all stakeholders and had been

  approved by county health officials. The court found that following

  these procedures was a reasonable plan that “provide[d] for a

  reasonable degree of safety for all of the trial participants, including

  the jurors.” Therefore, we conclude that the court made adequate

  findings on the first Waller factor. See Turner, ¶ 41 & n.4 (exclusion

  “to ensure . . . the safety of all trial participants” satisfied first

  Waller factor).

¶ 20    At least under the circumstances presented here, the second

  and third Waller factors — addressing, respectively, whether the

  closure was broader than necessary and whether the court

  considered reasonable alternatives to closure — overlap. For

  example, could the jury have been arranged in such a way as to

  permit a small number of spectators to sit in the back row of the

  courtroom, like in Bialas?3 Or, if not, could the trial have been

  3 We acknowledge that Bialas’s trial took place in a different judicial

  district.

                                       11
  moved to a courtroom large enough to accommodate some members

  of the public once the jury was selected — perhaps one of the two

  courtrooms that were large enough to accommodate the jury

  selection process? If the answer to either question is yes, then it

  could be said either that the closure was too broad or that there

  were reasonable alternatives that were not considered. Similarly, if

  a continuance of the trial, which Roper requested, would have

  removed the impediments to conducting a trial with the public’s

  attendance, that might also have been a reasonable alternative.

¶ 21   True, the trial court considered at least some of these issues.

  The trial court began by considering and rejecting Roper’s request

  for another continuance. The court noted that the offense was a

  sex offense (and thus the victim had the right to object to further

  delay) and that the case was “getting on to be two years old.” Thus,

  the court found that another continuance was not appropriate.

  Under the circumstances, based on the court’s specific findings, we

  agree with the trial court in this regard.

¶ 22   The court then acknowledged Roper’s request to have four

  family members and four friends attend the trial, but said, “We are

  not going to be able to accommodate family members or friends in

                                     12
  the actual courtroom during the trial.” The court also stated that

  “the court facilities aren’t sufficiently large to allow the public to be

  in the physical courtroom where the trial is taking place.” To the

  extent these statements could be construed as findings, they are

  conclusory and the record lacks sufficient detail for us to review

  them. For example, we do not know if using a different seating

  arrangement within the courtroom or using a different courtroom

  with a higher seating capacity could have safely accommodated

  some spectators.

¶ 23   Indeed, though there was a mention that one of the two larger

  courtrooms the court had referenced when discussing where jury

  selection would be conducted might be unavailable because of a

  homicide trial going on at the same time, there is no explanation for

  why Roper’s trial could not have been conducted in the other such

  courtroom. As noted, those larger courtrooms could accommodate

  twenty-two prospective jurors, with some seated in the jury box and

  others seated in the gallery; thus, once a twelve-person jury was

  seated, and even assuming two alternates, there would still have

  been room for eight spectators. While the record shows that the

  trial court gave a reason for using the smaller courtroom —

                                      13
  permitting the jurors to be “in much closer proximity to the witness

  stand” — the court did not explain, for instance, whether a different

  seating arrangement in the larger courtroom could have allowed the

  jurors to sit similarly close to the witness stand while also allowing

  some spectators to be seated toward the back of the room.

¶ 24   In short, the court’s statements do not provide us with an

  adequate picture of whether the closure could have been narrower

  or whether other reasonable alternatives existed. And the record is

  devoid of other evidence describing the physical layout of the trial

  courtroom or availability of other courtrooms.

¶ 25   The People’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. The

  People assert that the second Waller factor was satisfied: due to the

  public health interest, courtroom size, and need to reduce the risk

  of transmission, limiting access to the courtroom was required,

  even for Roper’s family. But the portions of the record to which the

  People cite do not provide support for this claim. Nor do the People

  cite record support for their conclusory assertion that “allowing

  Roper’s family members to be in the courtroom was not a

  reasonable alternative.”

                                    14
¶ 26   As to the fourth Waller factor — whether the court made

  adequate findings — our review of the record suggests that,

  although the trial court mentioned Waller, it ultimately deferred to

  the jury trial procedures adopted for the judicial district, without

  articulating how the Waller factors applied to the specific trial it was

  about to conduct. As a result, the court did not make adequate

  findings that the closure was no broader than necessary and that

  there were no reasonable alternatives to the steps taken. See

  Waller, 467 U.S. at 48.

                               E.   Remedy

¶ 27   The question then arises what the proper remedy is. Roper

  contends that the insufficiency of the trial court’s findings

  constitutes structural error and that a remand would be an exercise

  in futility because the trial court did not make contemporaneous

  Waller findings. The People contend that we should not reverse

  Roper’s conviction but, rather, remand to the trial court to make

  additional Waller findings. We agree with the People.

¶ 28   We begin, however, by acknowledging that the guidance from

  our supreme court on this point is not entirely clear. In its first

  opportunity to directly apply Waller, our supreme court

                                    15
  characterized the opinion’s holding as creating a four-part test: “In

  Waller, the Court articulated four requirements that a trial court

  must meet in order to validly close the courtroom.” People v. Hassen,

  2015 CO 49, ¶ 9 (emphasis added). The fourth requirement was

  that the trial court “must make findings adequate to support the

  closure.” Id. (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48).

¶ 29   In the Colorado Supreme Court’s next opportunity to address

  a Waller issue, the court said, in relatively sweeping fashion, “Under

  Waller, the public trial right is violated when a defendant objects to

  a closure and the court does not satisfy the four factors of the Waller

  test.” Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48, ¶ 7 (emphasis added).

  The supreme court went on to unequivocally say that “[s]uch a

  violation is structural error that requires automatic reversal without

  individualized prejudice analysis.” Id.

¶ 30   These early authorities appear to establish a hard and fast

  rule: because the requirement of sufficient supporting findings is a

  prong of the Waller test, inadequate findings mean the test is failed

  — and a failed test results in automatic reversal.

¶ 31   But more recent case law suggests that the supreme court did

  not intend such a strict reading of its earlier pronouncements.

                                    16
¶ 32   In Jones, ¶ 36, the supreme court concluded that the trial

  court’s exclusion of the defendant’s parents from the courtroom

  “without first making any Waller findings” was an unjustified partial

  closure. But rather than immediately concluding that reversal was

  required, the supreme court acknowledged that “some courts have

  chosen to remand cases where the trial court violated the

  defendant’s right to a public trial to allow the trial court to make the

  required findings.” Id. at ¶ 45. The court declined to do so in that

  case, however, because remand would have been futile — both

  because the judge who had presided over the trial could not make

  further findings because he had died and because the information

  from a related dependency and neglect case the People argued

  would support the closure would not satisfy the second and third

  Waller factors. Id. at ¶ 46.

¶ 33   Most recently, in Turner, ¶ 1, the trial court excluded the

  defendant’s friend (who was also his codefendant’s wife) from the

  courtroom for the remainder of the trial after the friend had a

  confrontation with the victim advocate and a prosecution witness

  just outside the courtroom. In doing so, the trial court did not

  apply the Waller test at all. The supreme court reiterated the Waller

                                    17
  test as it had been stated in Jones and Hassen. Id. at ¶ 19. The

  court further concluded that excluding the individual was a

  nontrivial partial courtroom closure. Id. at ¶ 32. And it

  acknowledged that an unjustified closure is structural error. Id. at

  ¶ 34.

¶ 34      But the supreme court went on to say that “structural error

  doesn’t flow simply from the trial court’s failure to employ the

  precise language found in Waller.” Id. at ¶ 35. It explained that

  nothing in Waller requires a reviewing court “to evaluate the trial

  judge’s closure order solely on the basis of the explicit factual

  findings.” Id. at ¶ 36 (quoting Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 172 (4th

  Cir. 2000)). And it cited cases concluding that the Waller test was

  satisfied where the record supported the closure despite the lack of

  comprehensive findings on each factor. Id. (first citing Tinsley v.

  United States, 868 A.2d 867, 877-80 (D.C. 2005); and then citing

  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶ 86). Ultimately, the court concluded

  that the findings the trial court had made — albeit not specifically

  in reference to Waller — combined with what could be gleaned from

  the record as a whole justified the closure. Id. at ¶ 47. The court

  expressly referenced the possibility of remanding for further

                                     18
  findings, but because the existing findings and record justified the

  closure, it determined that a remand was unnecessary. Id. at ¶ 40.

¶ 35   In the wake of Jones and Turner, then, it is less clear that the

  mere fact that the findings were inadequate necessitates reversal.4

  And a deeper analysis of the development of the Waller test, along

  with reference to how other jurisdictions have resolved the question,

  strongly suggests that a remand for further findings is not

  categorically prohibited.

¶ 36   First, we note that we are aware of no other multi-prong test

  that includes as a prong of the test the requirement that there be

  adequate findings. Rather, adequate findings are usually required

  for an appellate court to properly review a claim of error. See

  Turner, ¶ 36 (“Ultimately, a trial court need only make ‘findings

  specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the

  4 Interestingly, in one case, the Colorado Supreme Court granted

  certiorari on the question of “[w]hether a remand is an appropriate
  remedy when the trial court fails to make findings consistent with
  Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).” People v. Lujan, No.
  18SC582, 2019 WL 189366 (Colo. Jan. 19, 2019) (unpublished
  order). But the court never actually resolved the question,
  concluding instead that the closure in that case was trivial and
  thus the Waller test did not need to be satisfied. People v. Lujan,
  2020 CO 26, ¶ 37 & n.4.

                                    19
  closure order was properly entered.’” (quoting Davis v. Reynolds,

  890 F.2d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 1989), in turn quoting Waller, 467

  U.S. at 45)).

¶ 37   For example, in challenges involving suspected racial

  motivation in the exercise of peremptory challenges, a trial court is

  required to conduct a three-part inquiry that culminates in the trial

  court making a finding of fact regarding the prosecutor’s motivation

  in exercising the strike. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 &

  n.21 (1986). Yet, with fair regularity, appellate courts remedy a

  trial court’s insufficient findings during a Batson analysis by

  remanding for further findings. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 2015

  CO 55, ¶ 21. The mere inadequacy of the finding does not, by itself,

  establish the constitutional violation.

¶ 38   Second, although the United States Supreme Court in Waller

  included the adequate findings requirement in a single sentence

  that also included the other three components of what has become

  known as the Waller test, see Turner, ¶ 9, it is noteworthy that

  Waller did not explicitly refer to a “four-prong” test. Indeed, the

  language in Waller was presented as a reiteration of the test from

  Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). See

                                    20
Waller, 467 U.S. at 45, 48. In Press-Enterprise, the Supreme Court

had held,

            The presumption of openness [of criminal
            proceedings] may be overcome only by an
            overriding interest based on findings that a
            closure is essential to preserve higher values
            and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
            The interest is to be articulated along with
            findings specific enough that a reviewing court
            can determine whether the closure order was
            properly entered.

Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510. It does not appear, then, that

the Waller Court intended for the adequacy of the findings to be a

prong of the test itself.5 Indeed, our supreme court’s reiteration of

this language in Turner, ¶ 36, suggests a recognition of this.

5 True, in Waller, the Supreme Court rejected what it called the

Georgia Supreme Court’s “post hoc assertion” that the trial court
had conducted the proper balancing. 467 U.S. at 48-49, 49 n.8.
Some have suggested that this is an admonition against remedying
inadequate findings. See People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50, ¶ 69
(Gabriel, J., dissenting). But in context, the Supreme Court at least
arguably only rejected that post hoc rationalization because it found
no support in the record and was insufficient in any case. Waller,
467 U.S. at 48-49, 49 n.8. We do not read this language as
proscribing any effort to remedy inadequate findings, particularly
where that remedy would come not from an appellate court
reviewing a cold record but, rather, from the judicial officer who has
direct knowledge of all of the circumstances leading to the closure.

                                   21
¶ 39   And we note that several jurisdictions have concluded that a

  remand for further findings may be an appropriate remedy.6 For

  example, the Tenth Circuit has opined that

            [t]he lack of findings prevents us from
            determining whether the defendant’s right to a
            public trial was outweighed by the interest
            asserted by the government in protecting the
            complaining witness. But to grant appellant a
            new trial under these circumstances without
            making that determination would constitute a
            windfall and would not be in the public
            interest.

  United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542, 547 (10th Cir. 1991); see

  also State v. Rolfe, 2013 SD 2, ¶ 26 (remanding for the trial court to

  “supplement the record with specific findings and reasoning”); State

  v. Rollins, 729 S.E.2d 73, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“Given the

  limited closure in the present case and the fact that the trial court

  did not utilize the Waller four-part test, we hold that the proper

  6 We acknowledge that the remedy in Waller was itself a remand.

  But that is a red herring. In Waller, the proceeding that was closed
  was not the trial but, rather, a hearing on a motion to suppress.
  Thus, the remedy — which the United States Supreme Court said
  “should be appropriate to the violation,” Waller, 467 U.S. at 50 —
  was a remand not to supplement the findings justifying the closure
  but, rather, to redo the hearing that was improperly closed. Thus,
  the remand in Waller provides no support for the People’s request
  for remand here.

                                    22
  remedy is to remand this case for a hearing on the propriety of the

  closure.”); State v. Cote, 725 A.2d 652, 660 (N.H. 1999) (remanding

  for findings to determine whether the defendant’s right to a public

  trial was violated); Kendrick v. State, 661 N.E.2d 1242, 1244-45

  (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (remanding for findings to determine whether

  defendant’s right to a public trial was violated). But see State v.

  Cox, 304 P.3d 327, 335 (Kan. 2013) (declining to consider remand

  for further findings).

¶ 40   Most recently, in State v. Bell, 993 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 2023),

  the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a very similar fact pattern

  to the one before us. To permit proper social distancing during the

  pandemic, the trial court “excluded all spectators from the

  courtroom but included a one-way video feed that would broadcast

  [the] trial in an adjacent courtroom.” Id. at 420. The Minnesota

  Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s findings were

  insufficient to show that it considered reasonable alternatives. Id.

  at 427. But instead of reversing the conviction, the Minnesota

  Supreme Court held that a remand for the trial court to remedy the

  inadequate findings was the appropriate remedy under Waller. Id.

  at 428.

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¶ 41   As noted, in Jones our supreme court at least suggested that a

  remand would be appropriate if it would not be futile. See Jones,

  ¶ 48. There, the court concluded that a remand would not be

  helpful because the judicial officer had subsequently died. Id. at

  ¶ 46. Moreover, the court concluded that, as to the second and

  third factors, it was clear from the record that other options had not

  been “explored contemporaneously.” Id. at ¶¶ 48-49. Finally, the

  court concluded that “even if findings by another judge based on

  records from the dependency and neglect case and other

  reconstruction methods were an option, supplemental findings

  would still fail to adequately address the second and third factors.”

  Id. at ¶ 50.

¶ 42   In contrast, the trial court judge in this case is still a district

  court judge, and it would be possible for the same judge to make

  more detailed findings about his reasoning at the time he closed the

  courtroom. Cf. Jones, ¶¶ 46, 50. Further, although the local policy

  regarding the conduct of trials during the pandemic is absent from

  our record, the record does reflect that the policy was developed

  with the input of stakeholders such as the offices of both the

  district attorney and the public defender. Thus, it is entirely likely

                                     24
  that a record could be made about what options were considered

  contemporaneously when developing the policy. See id. at ¶¶ 48-

  50. Moreover, other necessary supplemental findings — such as

  the size, shape, configuration (e.g., the number of rows and number

  of seats per row in the gallery), and availability of the courtrooms at

  the time of Roper’s trial — involve objective, easily verifiable

  information that is largely not subject to shifting recollections or

  interpretation. These supplemental findings could satisfy the

  second and third factors.

¶ 43   In sum, the trial court’s findings supporting the closure are

  insufficient. But this defect alone does not amount to structural

  error. And because a remand for further findings would not be

  futile, we conclude such a remand is appropriate in this case.7

                          III.   Order for Remand

¶ 44   The case is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose

  of making supplemental Waller findings, including, without

  limitation, what alternatives to excluding all members of the public

  from the courtroom were considered, the basis for its determination

  7 We do not address the merits of Roper’s remaining contentions at

  this time.

                                     25
  that no members of the public could be accommodated in the

  courtroom, and whether any larger courtroom was available at the

  time of Roper’s trial.

¶ 45   Within seven days of the entry of the trial court’s order making

  further findings, Roper must forward a copy of the court’s order to

  this court, and the case shall be recertified. Upon recertification, a

  supplemental record consisting of the trial court’s order, any

  pleadings filed on remand, and transcripts of any hearing held on

  remand shall be ordered.

¶ 46   The court further orders Roper to notify this court in writing of

  the status of the court proceedings in the event this matter is not

  concluded within twenty-eight days from the date of this order, and

  that Roper must do so every twenty-eight days thereafter until the

  trial court issues its order on remand.

       JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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