Court Opinion

ID: 9675974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:11:22.167148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:41.992880
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
WALKER, Justice.
I am unable to agree with the holding that the second sentence of Article VIII, Section 1, of our Constitution leaves the Legislature free to tax or to exempt municipal property which is not used or held for a public purpose. When the authors of our fundamental law intended to allow property to escape taxation, they specifically provided that it should or might be exempt. In some instances the exemption is granted by the Constitution itself. See Article VIII, Sections 1 and 1-b; Article XI, Section 9. Under the provisions of the last mentioned section, “[t]he property of counties, cities and towns, owned and held only for public purposes" and “all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public” is automatically exempt. The Legislature is then authorized by Article VIII, Section 2, to exempt certain other property, but it is provided in unmistakable terms that “all laws exempting property from taxation other than the property above mentioned shall be null and void.” In the light of these provisions, it seems clear to me that it was intended that all property should be subject to taxation unless it is expressly exempted by the Constitution or by the Legislature pursuant to explicit constitutional authority.
It is generally held that where the constitution enumerates property which is or may be exempted, the legislature has no power to exempt property other than that enumerated. See Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th ed. 1924, § 661. The Texas Constitution has always been so construed by our courts. In City of Wichita Falls v. Cooper, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 777 (wr. ref.), the court said:
“It is clear to us that it was intended by the framers of our Constitution that all property should be subject to taxation, upon an equal and uniform basis for the purpose of defraying the governmental expense, with the exception only of such property as that document specifically exempts therefrom and such as the Legislature shall, under Constitutional restrictions, by explicit language, declare to be exempt.
“It is the universal rule in this state that the Constitution has definitely provided for every form of exemption of property from taxation; that if an exemption is so made it cannot be enlarged upon either by the Legislature or by the courts. Some courts have gone far enough to say that if there is a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the Constitution in matters of exemptions, the doubt will be resolved against the exemption, for exemptions from taxation are not favored by the Constitution nor by the Courts in their construction. City of Dallas v. Cochran, Tex.Civ.App., 166 S.W. 32, writ refused; Jones v. Williams, *914121 Tex. 94, 45 S.W.2d 130, 79 A.L.R. 983.”
We have already signified our unqualified approval of these conclusions, and in my opinion they are still sound. The idea that the exception in Article VIII, Section 1, might exempt all municipally owned property was advanced over 80 years ago.1 If there were any merit in the suggestion, it seems reasonable to suppose that the same would have been eagerly embraced by the courts in subsequent cases involving the taxation of property belonging to municipal corporations. They would thus have found it unnecessary ever to consider whether the property was being used or held for a public purpose. Instead of availing themselves of this easy solution, however, our courts have consistently proceeded on the theory that municipal property cannot escape taxation unless it is held or used for a public purpose. A. & M. Consolidated Independent School Dist. v. City of Bryan, 143 Tex. 348, 184 S.W.2d 914; Daugherty v. Thompson, 71 Tex. 192, 9 S.W. 99; State v. City of Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 140 S.W.2d 277 (wr. ref.); City of Dallas v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 28 S.W.2d 937 (wr. ref.); State v. City of Beaumont, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W.2d 344 (no writ); City of Abilene v. State, Tex. Civ.App., 113 S.W.2d 631 (wr. dis.).
In City of Abilene the state sought to tax land acquired by the city for a reservoir site. The property was leased for agricultural purposes pending the accumulation of sufficient funds to complete the project. After noting that municipal property was excepted from the second sentence of Article VIII, Section 1, the court pointed out that the land in question was undoubtedly covered by the statutory exemption found in Article 7150. It concluded, however, that the Legislature was without power to exempt municipally owned property which was not used for public purposes, and held that Article 7150, in so far as relevant here, is valid and operative only to the extent that it includes public property used for public purposes.
This is the background against which A. & M. Consolidated Independent School District was decided. The school district was there attempting to tax rural electrification lines owned by the city, and the property was held to be exempt because it was owned by a municipality and was used for a public purpose. In considering this question, the Court cited Daugherty, City of Abilene, and Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston, 63 Tex. 14. Although the opinion in each of these cases emphasizes the exception of municipal corporations in the second sentence of Article VIII, Section 1, we declared that the pertinent provisions of our Constitution are Section 2 of Article VIII and Section 9 of Article XI. Section 4 of Article 7150 was also given the construction adopted in City of Abilene, i. e. that the statute exempts only such municipal property as may be used for public purposes, and the case was made to turn upon whether the electric lines were so used.
The Court now takes the position, contrary to all that we have previously said, that Section 2 of Article VIII and Section 9 of Article XI are wholly irrelevant, and that Article 7150 effectually exempts all property owned by a municipality regardless of the purpose for which it is held or how the same may be used. According to the majority opinion, the Texas courts have been wasting their time all these years in considering whether municipal property was used or held for a public purpose, because there is simply no constitutional provision requiring that such property be taxed.
*915In my opinion the support and comfort which the majority seems to find in quoted excerpts from the opinions in Daugherty and Lower Colorado River Authority v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 144 Tex. 326, 190 S.W.2d 48, are illusory at best. The two decisions are not nearly as broad as they are now interpreted. In each case the Court was concerned with the meaning of '‘public property used for public purposes” in Section 2 of Article VIII. That is the provision which was said to apply to private property used for public purposes, and it is clear from the opinions that this is all the Court meant to say with reference to Section 2. The final clause of Section 2 was not even remotely involved, and no court has ever said, held or suggested that the same applies only to laws exempting privately owned property. It also seems to me that the Court’s present construction of that provision is patently unsound. The declaration that “all laws exempting property from taxation other than the property above mentioned shall be null and void” makes it quite plain that the Legislature shall have no power to exempt any property other than that previously mentioned.
The Court is now holding for the first time that the Legislature may exempt municipal property devoted to private use. Section 1-a of Article VIII provides that “the several counties of the State are authorized to levy ad valorem taxes upon all property within their respective boundaries for county purposes.” Each county is thus granted the power to tax all property not exempted by the Constitution or by the Legislature under constitutional authority, and there is no provision exempting or authorizing the exemption of municipal property which is not held or used for a public purpose. How then may property be exempted by legislative act when the several counties are expressly empowered by the Constitution to tax the same?
Under the majority holding in this case, municipal property used for private purposes will not be subject to taxation on the same basis as privately owned property used for a similar purpose. If the lease is for a term of less than three years, the property as well as the leasehold will be exempt. When the lease is for a term of three years or more, Article 7173 would seem to require that the lessee pay taxes based upon the full taxable value of the property. It is well settled, however, that the lessee is taxed not “upon the value of the lands leased, but only on the value of the leasehold.” State v. Taylor, 72 Tex. 297, 12 S.W. 176. This is the effect of Article 7174, which declares that “[tjaxable leasehold estates shall be valued at such price as they would bring at a fair voluntary sale for cash.” Daugherty v. Thompson, supra.
The taxable value of the leasehold must be determined, therefore, substantially in accordance with the rules that govern its valuation in condemnation proceedings. In other words the value of the leasehold is the amount for which it can be sold for cash burdened with the covenant to pay rent and the other obligations imposed upon the lessee by the terms of the lease. See Urban Renewal Agency v. Trammel, Tex. Sup., 407 S.W.2d 773, and authorities there cited. If municipal property is leased at a rental that is reasonable for the period and under the various provisions of the lease, the taxable value of the leasehold will be zero. Both the property and the leasehold will thus escape taxation entirely. It is true that this may place the lessor-municipality in position to exact more rent than might be charged by a private owner for the same lease, but other taxing agencies will be deprived of revenues guaranteed to them by our Constitution and statutes. The amount of privately used property that will be exempted by means of the leasing device, which the Court now sanctions, is limited only by the discretion of and the funds available to the municipal authorities.
I would hold that the property involved in this case is subject to taxation by all taxing agencies except the lessor-municipality. See comment under Article XI, Section 9, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Constitution. *916If that is the effect of the Constitution, as our courts have always reasoned, then the lessor-municipality can be expected either to charge enough rent to reimburse itself for the taxes it must pay and those it could collect if the property were privately owned, or include in the lease a stipulation obligating the lessee to pay the taxes. That is what the private landowner does when he leases his property. That is what the City of Beaumont did in this instance. When the interests of the municipality can be so easily protected by contract, it is my opinion that the property should not escape taxation either wholly or in substantial part ■ as it will under the majority holding. As I read the Constitution and statutes, the leasehold in this case is not taxable and the 1935 amendment to the lease is valid and binding on the parties.
I also disagree with the Court’s interpretation of Paragraph 9 of the lease and the 1935 amendment. Respondent agreed in the original lease to pay each year “an amount equal to all taxes that would be assessable by Lessor against said property if same were taxable.” The 1935 amendment obligated it to pay $2,000.00 annually in lieu of the payments provided in Paragraph 9 of the lease. According to the reasoning of the majority, these provisions deal only with taxes assessable against the property as such and not those that might be assessed against the leasehold. The leasehold is undoubtedly an interest in the property. It was pointed out in Daugherty that if a situation should arise in which both the property and the leasehold were subject to taxation, the value of the leasehold should be deducted in assessing the property to the owner. “[F]or otherwise there would be double taxation, which, if permissible, will not be presumed to have been intended, in the absence of a law that will not bear any other reasonable construction.” Daugherty v. Thompson, supra.
It seems to me that the same can be said of the original lease and the 1935 amendment in this case. Since the value of the leasehold would be deducted in valuing the property for taxation against the owner, the taxes on the leasehold are essentially part of the taxes on the property. The parties obviously did not intend for the lessee to pay an amount equal to the taxes that would be assessable against the property if the same were taxable, or $2,000.00 in lieu thereof, and then be further obligated to pay taxes on the leasehold. In my opinion Paragraph 9 of the lease, as well as the 1935 amendment, covers and includes taxes that might be assessed against the lessee.
I do not understand the second reason advanced in support of the holding that the 1935 amendment does not involve the commutation of taxes assessable against the lessee. The Court says that respondent’s agreement to pay taxes on the leasehold furnished no part of the consideration for the 1928 contract, but that is not our problem. We are concerned with the 1935 amendment which, as the Court assumes at this point, covered taxes which the lessee would otherwise be obligated to pay on the leasehold. Respondent there agreed to pay $2,000.00 annually in lieu of such taxes and certain other obligations imposed upon it by the lease. This agreement is clearly supported by consideration on both sides unless the city’s implied promise to accept $2,000.00 in payment of taxes that might be assessed against the lessee is an unlawful attempt to abdicate its power of taxation. That is our problem. That is the question which should be faced by the Court. If the majority is correct in holding that the property is exempt as to the city, it is my opinion that the 1935 amendment is invalid in so far as the $2,000.00 annual payment is concerned.
GREENHILL and STEAKLEY, JJ., join in this dissent.

. In Galveston Wharf Go. v. Galveston, 63 Tex. 14, Justice Stayton said in passing that “Section 1, article 8, of the constitution in providing for taxation seems to exempt all property belonging to municipal corporations from taxation; but * * Again in Daugherty v. Thompson, 71 Tex. 192, 9 S.W. 99, the same writer observed that this section “does not require property belonging to municipal corporations to be taxed.”