Court Opinion

ID: 9760563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:00:35.051322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:13.667227
License: Public Domain

KELTNER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the result reached by the majority, that article 38.071, section 2 was applied in a constitutional manner in this case. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 38.071, sec. 2 (Vernon Supp.1987). However, I would hold that article 38.071, section 2 is constitutional and overrule this court’s holdings in two cases. Buckner v. State, 719 S.W.2d 644, 650-51 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1986, pet. pending); Romines v. State, 717 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex.App.— Port Worth 1986, pet. pending).
The majority of our court has previously held that section 2 is unconstitutional. Specifically, our court held that section 2 does not provide the accused with the right of confrontation and cross-examination, because the criminal defendant is required to either call the child-victim to testify, incurring the jury’s possible wrath, or forego his right to cross-examination of his accuser. Buckner, 719 S.W.2d at 650-51; Romines, 717 S.W.2d at 745. Our court also held that the statute violates a defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation by failure to allow cross-examination contemporaneous with the videotaped statement. Buckner, 719 S.W.2d at 650; Romines, 717 S.W.2d at 752-53. Both Buckner and Ro-mines were heard by en banc panels of our court.
The majority of this panel finds that Buckner and Romines presented distinguishing facts from the instant case. Specifically, the majority holds that article 38.-071, section 2 was not unconstitutionally applied in this case because unlike the facts in Buckner and Romines, the State called the complainant to the stand to testify after the videotape was shown. Thereafter, the complainant was subjected to cross-examination. These facts are clearly distinguishable from Buckner and Romines, which rule the statute denies the defendant due process of law because it compells him to “ ‘forego either his right of confrontation or his right to remain passive.’ ” Buckner, 719 S.W.2d at 650; Romines, 717 S.W.2d at 752.
However, I would go further and hold that the defendant’s right to confrontation and due process is not violated by article 38.071, section 2 regardless if the State calls the defendant to testify. Instead, I believe the statute is applied constitutionally regardless of whether the complainant is called to testify by the State. Instead, I would apply the logic reached by our sister courts which hold that if the defendant does not choose to call the complainant to the stand, he cannot complain on appeal that his constitutional right of confrontation by cross-examination was violated. Newman v. State, 700 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. granted); Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689, 695 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. granted). The statute requires that the child must be available to the defendant for live testimony.
Additionally, I would hold that the defendant’s right to confrontation is not violated by article 38.071, section 2 because the defendant is denied cross-examination contemporaneous with the taped statement.
I believe that the United States Supreme Court holding in California v. Green is controlling on this issue. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). In Green, Justice White in writing for the majority stated:
Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.
*488Id. 399 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. at 1935, 26 L.Ed.2d at 497.
Justice White’s opinion also addressed the right to cross-examination that arises after a declarant’s out-of-court statements were admitted. Justice White held:
[T]he inability to cross-examine the witness at the time he made his prior statement cannot easily be shown to be of crucial significance as long as the defendant is assured full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial_ We cannot share the California Supreme Court’s view that belated cross-examination can never serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute for cross-examination contemporaneous with the original statement.
Id. 399 U.S. at 159, 90 S.Ct. at 1935, 26 L.Ed.2d at 497. Justice Farris criticizes my reliance on Green. However, our sister courts in Austin, Houston (1st District), Beaumont and Texarkana have relied on Green in their decisions holding the statute constitutional. Pierce v. State, 724 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex.App. — Austin 1987, no pet.); Wkittemore v. State, 712 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1986, pet. pending); Mallory v. State, 699 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1985, pet. granted); Tolbert v. State, 697 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. granted).
I must note article 38.071 has a number of safeguards. A videotape is admissible only if no attorney for either party is present when the statement is made; leading questions are not asked; every voice on the recording is identified (presumably both on and off camera); the person conducting the interview is present at the trial and available to testify for cross-examination purposes; the defense attorney is afforded an opportunity to view the recording; and the child is available to testify at the trial of the proceeding. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC.ANN. art. 38.071, see. 2.
In short, the legislature recognized a need for this legislation.1 The child victim is often victimized again in our courtrooms.2 The legislature attempted to fashion a procedure in which a child victim is not required to undergo the intimidating experience of being confronted with an adult suspect.3 Section 2 represents an effort to balance the rights of the victim with the right of an accused to a fair trial. With the use of new technology, I believe the legislature has fashioned a fair process that respects the rights of those accused while protecting the rights of victims.
This is not to say that the application of article 38.071 will be trouble free. To the contrary, the application of the statute may, in some cases, violate due process where procedures do not adequately insure *489fundamental fairness.4 Tolbert, 697 S.W.2d at 799. However, I trust that the trial courts of Texas will intervene so that the procedures used in making the videotape may be reviewed to determine if the evidence is sufficiently reliable and fairly presented so as to assure a fair trial.
As a result, I concur with the majority’s opinion.
BURDOCK, J., concurs.

. Sexual abuse is a growing problem in our nation. Comment, Article 38.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure: A Legislative Response to the Needs of Children in the Courtroom, 18 ST. MARY’S LJ. 279, 281 (1986). In fact, one source contends that child abuse occurs every four minutes. Wenck, Sexual Child Abuse: An American Shame That Can Be Changed, 12 CAP.U.L.REV. 355, 356 (1983). Almost half of the instances of child abuse include sexual offenses. Id.

. The child victim's testimony is necessary to prosecute sexual offense crimes. However, our criminal justice system is not conducive to a child’s participation. The child must tell the story of abuse many times, sometimes in intimidating circumstances. Comment, Article 38.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure: A Legislative Response to the Needs of Children in the Courtroom, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 279, 295-300 (1986).
In fact, the American Bar Association has recommended that children be used in grand jury hearings and other preliminary hearings only if necessary because of the traumatic effects of the courthouse on the child. American Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection Recommendations for Improving Legal Intervention in Intra-Family Child Sex Abuse Cases, section 14.4 (1982).

.Article 38.071 is one of the first legislative efforts in the country to come to grips with the child victims' problems. Note: Televised Testimony vs. The Confrontation Clause ... The Use of Videotapes in the Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse, 23 HOUS.L.REV. 1215, 1217-18 (1986). Kentucky quickly followed suit, using the Texas statute as its model. KY.REV.STAT. sec. 421.-350 (Supp.1984). Currently, at least 17 states have enacted videotape statutes. Debate on Tex. S.B. 836, 68th Leg., tape 1 (May 11, 1983). Note: The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV.L.REV. 806, 813 (1985).

. For example, if it is discovered that the State made a number of videotapes of the child and chose to show only the best one, the defendant’s rights to a fair trial would be violated.