Court Opinion

ID: 9716193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:30:25.422573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:42.902654
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN, dissenting: The majority has chosen to address most1 of defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel under the plain error rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)) because it finds the facts of the case to be closely balanced. For this, it points to what it terms “inconclusive evidence,” i.e., the higher levels of lead, antimony and barium on the victim’s hands as well as the proximity of the “mystery cartridge casing” to the victim’s body. However, because the bulk of the remaining evidence adduced at trial conforms to the theory advanced by the State, I disagree that plain error may be used to sidestep the general rule of waiver as outlined in People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). In this case, substantial evidence was presented to show that the defendant did not act in self-defense in killing the victim. This includes the testimony of Kenneth Simmons, who stated that defendant instigated the argument with the victim regarding the $40 and that defendant first pulled his gun demanding the money in an “unfriendly” manner. Doanita Simmons heard this argument through open the open windows of her house and was able to corroborate Kenneth’s testimony. Both Kenneth and Doanita heard the defendant state that “everybody around here owes me money and they pay[,] and he’s gone [sic] to pay me too.” After the argument escalated, Kenneth stated that he tried to convince the defendant to leave the victim alone, and that the victim ran into the house through the back door. Kenneth asked the victim to come outside, and both Kenneth and Doanita heard the victim state that he did not want to leave the house because he was unarmed and the defendant was not. Kenneth’s testimony that he never saw the victim with a gun corroborated this statement. Both Kenneth and Doanita also heard the defendant ask the victim to come outside and promise not to shoot him. Upon exiting the house, the victim and the defendant became involved in a physical struggle. Kenneth stated that, at that point, a shot was fired and he saw defendant, with his arm extended, shoot the victim “five or six times.” The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence are determinations within the province of the jury. People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1992). It was within the jury’s province to believe Kenneth and Doanita’s version of the incident rather than the defendant’s version and it was within the jury’s province to believe that given the number and location of gunshot wounds the defendant inflicted, the defendant was -not acting in self-defense. Moreover, a “closely balanced” case is one where the outcome of the case would have to be different had the impropriety not occurred. People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 47 (1989). In concurring with the jury’s verdict, I also do not find that the evidence is so closely balanced factually that the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial error could have altered the outcome of this case. Accordingly, I find that the claims that were not properly preserved by objection at trial and in a written posttrial motion are waived. However, even assuming that the facts were close enough to require review of defendant’s claims, I do not believe that any of the alleged errors, whether taken individually or cumulatively, preserved or unpreserved, constitute reversible error. The majority holds that the cumulative effect of the prosecution’s improper questioning of the defense witnesses, its misstatement of the burden of proof, its improper vouching for certain witnesses, and its comments regarding the defendant’s postarrest silence and his prior criminal background deprived defendant of a fair trial. In addition, it finds defendant’s counsel ineffective for failing to make timely objections and for indicating “that he lacked the requisite expertise to appropriately cross-examine experts on their opinions,” thereby bolstering those opinions. 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1092. I respectfully disagree. Most of the errors of which defendant complains have been found by Illinois courts not to constitute reversible error when found to have as limited an impact on the proceedings as I believe these alleged errors have in the present case. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540, 557 (1989) (queries regarding why another witness testified as he did held to be proper); People v. Riley, 63 Ill. App. 3d 176, 184-85 (1978) (questioning of another witness’ veracity held improper, but generally not reversible error); People v. McKinley, 242 Ill. App. 3d 124, 131-32 (1992) (prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s failure to produce an expert held to be proper where prosecutor does not assert that defendant had an obligation to prove the expert wrong); People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1991) (comment that the jury’s disbelief in certain witnesses will lead to a not-guilty verdict held to be proper where the prosecution’s version of the incident varies substantially from the version given by the defense); People v. Bailey, 249 Ill. App. 3d 79, 82 (1993) (holding that it is not error per se for a prosecutor to use the first person in addressing the jury); People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 339 (2000) (holding that although the erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence ordinarily calls for reversal, the evidence must have been a material factor in the defendant’s conviction such that, without the evidence, the verdict likely would have been different); People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 245-46 (1999) (holding that counsel was not ineffective where defendant has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from his counsel’s failure to object to the portion of the argument at issue); People v. Steading, 308 Ill. App: 3d 934, 939 (1999) (holding that counsel is not ineffective where defendant has not demonstrated how any further investigation of the witness would have changed the outcome of the case); People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 158 (1998) (holding that defense counsel’s admission of his own ineffectiveness is not determinative of the issue). However, I was initially inclined to agree with the majority that the prosecution committed reversible error in questioning defendant about his postarrest silence, thereby violating the due process clause of the fifth amendment. U.S. Const., amend. V The case relied upon by the State in its motion to cite additional authority, People v. Colts, 269 Ill. App. 3d 679 (1993), has convinced me otherwise. There, the prosecutor asked defendant when he first told anyone about his alibi. On appeal, defendant contended that question drew attention to his postarrest silence, in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976). We held: “The prosecutor did not ask about defendant’s silence during police questioning; instead, the prosecutor’s question covered many conversations with private parties over an extended period of time. In the months prior to trial, defendant had ample opportunity to discuss his case with counsel and others, under circumstances in which a person would normally mention where he had been, if he had not been at the crime scene. The trial court properly overruled defendant’s objection to the question.” Colts, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 692. Because the prosecutor’s query in the present case, “[s]o the first time you are telling anybody about that [the self-defense theory] is today here,” is indistinguishable from that in Colts, I believe that controlling case law compels a finding that no Doyle violation occurred. Without this violation, I find that none of the other alleged errors, as previously discussed, rise to the level of grave, reversible error. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.