Court Opinion

ID: 9793823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:53:32.897844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:27.491446
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON
specially concurring:
While I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case, I believe a further word is required as to the nature of the constitutional defect in this case. The objectionable language in the theft by receiving statute, section 18-4-410(1), C.R.S. 1973, is “believing or having reasonable cause to believe.” In People v. Prante, 177 Colo. 243, 493 P.2d 1083 (1972), we approved language in an “assault on a police officer” statute which required that a defendant “knew or reasonably should have known that the person assaulted was a peace officer engaged in the *202performance of his duties.” There we articulated a general rule:
“[T]he fact that a penal statute is framed in a way such as to require a jury to determine a question of reasonableness does not make it too vague to afford a practical guide to acceptable behavior.”
A similar analysis was recently employed in People v. McCauley, 192 Colo. 545, 561 P.2d 335 (1977) (upholding language “if reasonable notice is given to the public” in wiretapping statute).
The majority opinion does not discuss People v. Prante, supra, and People v. McCauley, supra, and does not analyze standards of “reasonableness” in criminal statutes. In People v. Prante, supra, we qualified the general rule by stating:
“It must be noted that the inclusion of a requirement of knowledge that the victim was a peace officer is not constitutionally required and the legislature could have made the commission of the act as such a crime without regard to the knowledge of the doer that the victim was a peace officer. ... If the statute is consitutionally firm without the element of knowledge, it is certainly valid to include the necessity to prove knowledge or circumstances which should reasonably lead one to know that the victim is a peace officer and this inclusion serves as a beneficial inurement to anyone charged under the statute.”
Likewise, in People v. McCauley, supra, we approved a “reasonableness” standard in an affirmative defense, noting that “this case involves an attack upon a provision which was not constitutionally required and which provided a ‘beneficial inurement to anyone charged under the statute,’ if a condition was met.” Id., quoting People v. Prante, supra.
The principle which emerges from these cases is that use of a “reasonableness” standard in a criminal statute is not overly vague when confined to elements which are not constitutionally required. The theft by receiving statute in this case employs a “reasonable cause to believe” standard as part of a constitutionally mandated mens rea element in the crime. Certainly mere receipt of stolen goods without any culpable mental state could not be criminally proscribed as a strict liability crime. See People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975) (where “statute is being applied to conduct which a citizen could not reasonably have known was forbidden,” definitive statement of requisite criminal intent is necessary). Accordingly, the statute in this case falls outside the permissible range of employing a “reasonableness” test.
ADDENDUM
Following the announcement of this opinion the trial judge reviewed the transcript of the record, heard the arguments of counsel and made a finding that the defendant believed that the rifles were stolen. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction is affirmed.