Court Opinion

ID: 9713990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:28:14.798815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.551758
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: In 1986, the legislature enacted Public Act 84 — 1450 (Pub. Act 84 — 1450, eff. July 1, 1987 (1986 111. Laws 4222)), which renamed the offense of murder to first degree murder, abolished the offense of voluntary manslaughter, and replaced it with second degree murder. As the supreme court explained in People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 111, 646 N.E.2d 587, 590 (1995), “[t]he intent of the legislature in enacting Public Act 84 — 1450 was to remedy the confusion and inconsistency that had developed in regard to the murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes.” Part of that confusion and inconsistency dealt with the relationship of voluntary manslaughter to murder when a defendant was charged under the felony murder provision of the former murder statute. In Williams, this court struggled with that relationship, noting that in most instances in which a defendant is charged with murder under the former statute, “the reduction in culpability [that is, a reduction to a voluntary manslaughter conviction] due to passion should not be available as a partial defense to a felony murder charge.” Williams, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 108, 517 N.E.2d at 751. However, the court then noted that “under the unusual fact situation presented by defendant’s testimony in the instant case, the jury should have been given the provocation-voluntary manslaughter instruction in conjunction with the felony murder charge.” Williams, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 108, 517 N.E.2d at 751. In support, the Williams court cited Viser, in which — according to the Williams court — the supreme court stated that it would have been error for the trial court to refuse to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction in a case involving a charge of felony murder. However, Williams provides no support for the majority’s holding here because (1) the legislature changed the voluntary manslaughter statute upon which Williams is based when it created the offense of second degree murder; and (2) part of the reason the legislature did so was specifically to reject the position the majority now adopts. In other words, as Viser and Williams demonstrate, confusion existed under the “old law” regarding whether a voluntary manslaughter conviction could result when the defendant was charged only with felony murder. Note that in defining voluntary manslaughter, section 9 — 2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) stated simply that “[a] person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter” if at the time of the killing, he acted under serious provocation or an imperfect self-defense. 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2(a). On the other hand, second degree murder as now defined in section 9 — 2(a) of the Code provides, in relevant part, that a person commits that offense “when he commits the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9 — 1 of this Code” and either mitigating factor is present. (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/9 — 2(a) (West 1994). First degree murder can be committed in either of the following separate and distinct ways: (1) “knowing or intentional” murder (sections 9 — 1(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Code), or (2) felony murder (section 9 — 1(a)(3) of the Code). By specifically referring to subsections 9 — 1(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Code in defining second degree murder, the legislature made clear that second degree murder can be committed only when a defendant commits “knowing or intentional” murder. This is no oversight. If the legislature had intended to include felony murder as a possible basis (when either section 9 — 2(a) mitigating factor is present) for second degree murder, all it needed to say in defining second degree murder is that a person commits that offense when he commits the offense of first degree murder and either of the mitigating factors is present — the same language, in other words, that the legislature had used to describe (under the “old law”) when a charge of murder could serve as a possible basis for voluntary manslaughter. Other than to change the name of the offense, Public Act 84— 1450 left section 9 — 1 of the Code (defining murder) the same in all particulars. Under Public Act 84 — 1450, the primary change to section 9 — 2 of the Code (besides the change of name) was to place the burden of proof on a defendant who asserts the presence of mitigating factors. (Note that the statutory definition of mitigating factors was not changed from the old section 9 — 2 to the new statute.) In fact, other than shifting the burden of proof, the single biggest change between voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder is the new definition of second degree murder which — on its face — omits the possibility that second degree murder can be based upon felony murder. The question that the majority should address is this: other than the result I claim was intended when the legislature enacted the statute — namely, to achieve the specific result of ensuring that second degree murder could never be based upon felony murder — what possible explanation can the majority provide for this change in the language of section 9 — 2(a)? Assuming, for the moment, that the legislature did not wish to permit felony murder to serve as a predicate for second degree murder, how could it possibly have made its views more clear? I suggest the only way it could have done so is by using a legislative device that it heretofore has never used — namely, by adding the following sentence to section 9 — 2 of the Code (perhaps as a new subsection (b)): “The omission of any reference to paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of section 9 — 1 of this Code within the definition of second degree murder was intentional to ensure that felony murder may not constitute the predicate for a second degree murder conviction.” Defining criminal offenses — and providing for mitigated homicides, if that is the legislature’s wish — lies entirely within the legislature’s province. It was not compelled to provide that the presence of mitigating factors would reduce a defendant’s commission of first degree murder to second degree murder, a lesser mitigated offense. See Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 122, 646 N.E.2d at 595. Nor, once the legislature decided to make some first degree murders (the “intentional or knowing” murders) capable of being mitigated into second degree murders, was it compelled to make all first degree murders (including felony murders) capable of being mitigated into second degree murders. (For a comprehensive discussion of the changes in Illinois’ murder statute and the policies underlying those changes, see D. Shanes, Murder Plus Mitigation: The “Lesser Mitigated Offense” Arrives in Illinois, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 61 (1993).) The majority simply disapproves of how the legislature has chosen to define second degree murder and thinks it should be defined broadly enough so that second degree murder could result when a defendant is charged only with felony murder. The majority’s holding is inconsistent with the words of the supreme court in Jeffries, when that court spoke of the deference due the legislature in enacting statutes — indeed, the very statutes at issue in this case: “[W]e recognize that the judicial role in construing statutes is to ascertain legislative intent and give it effect. To accomplish this goal, a court will seek to determine the objective the legislature sought to accomplish and the evils it desired to remedy.” Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 110, 646 N.E.2d at 590. Regarding the Pliakos .case — which holds that a court should avoid an interpretation under which a statute is explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory — the essential point is that section 9 — 2 of the Code in defining second degree murder neither requires nor permits an interpretation-, that statute is clear on its face in that it refers only to knowing and intentional murder under section 9 — 1(a)(1) or (a)(2) of the Code — not 9 — 1(a)(3), defining felony murder. The majority’s concern that, under my view, second degree murder would no longer exist is not supported by experience. Ten years have now passed since the enactment of the first and second degree murder statute, and there has been no shortage of juries either being instructed upon — or finding defendants guilty of — second degree murder. The Code was enacted in 1961 (at which time the modern versions of murder and voluntary manslaughter were enacted), which means that 25 years passed before an appellate court (Williams) held that — under limited circumstances — voluntary manslaughter could be premised upon a felony murder count. And during the 10 years that have passed since Williams was decided, not a single case has similarly held that second degree murder can be based upon a felony murder count.