Court Opinion

ID: 9505396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:04:16.669386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:25.553296
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent, believing that the Court of Appeals was correct. See Tankersley v. Parkview Hospital, Inc., 761 N.E.2d 886, 890-91 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).
The majority opinion today acknowledges that “[a]n unambiguous statute must be held to mean what it plainly expresses, and its plain and obvious meaning may not be enlarged or restricted.” Maj. opin. at 204. That is precisely what the Court of Appeals did.
The Hospital Lien Act applicable to this case provided that the filing of a lien by a hospital:
is notice to all persons, firms, limited liability companies, or corporations who may be liable because of the illness or injury if those persons, firms, limited liability companies, or corporations:
(1) receive notice under subsection (b);
(2) reside or have offices in a county where the lien was perfected or in a county where the lien was filed in the recorder’s office as notice under this subsection; or
(3) are insurance companies authorized to do business in Indiana under IC 27-1-3-20.
Ind.Code § 32-8-26-4(c) (1998) (current version at I.C. § 32-33-4-4(c)(Supp.2002)). But Parkview did not send any notice to Tankersley, and he did not receive any notice. Tankersley and his firm are located in Pulaski County, not Allen County where the lien was filed, and Tankersley is not an insurance company. As a result, Parkview’s lien did not constitute notice to Tankersley who had no actual knowledge of the lien. Applying the plain language of the statute, Parkview’s lien was not effective as to Tankersley.
Because Parkview failed to perfect its lien as to Tankersley, I believe that Park-view is not entitled to summary judgment.
RUCKER, J., concurs.