Court Opinion

ID: 9943509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 18:01:00.338835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:09.855404
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         FEB 23 2024

                                FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                   MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

HARBANS SINGH,                                     No. 21-859
                                                       22-1800
                  Petitioner,
                                                   Agency No. A208-426-600
    v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney                       MEMORANDUM*
General,
                  Respondent.

                       On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                           Board of Immigration Appeals
                       Argued and Submitted September 13, 2023
                                 Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER, R. NELSON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

         Harbans Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of a

decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from

a decision of an Immigration Judge denying his applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. He

also petitions for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. We have

jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
for substantial evidence. Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020).

Under the latter standard, “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petitions.

      1. Under the INA, an alien is ineligible for asylum or withholding of

removal if there are “serious reasons” to believe that that the alien “committed a

serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States” prior to arriving in the United

States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii). “The ‘serious reasons’

standard is ‘tantamount to probable cause.’” Guan v. Barr, 925 F.3d 1022, 1031

(9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). If the Government carries its “initial burden of

introducing evidence that th[is] bar may apply,” the alien then “has the burden to

rebut the bar by a preponderance of the evidence.” Villalobos Sura v. Garland,

8 F.4th 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021). In challenging the Government’s initial

showing, Singh argues that the declaration submitted by an agent of the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) lacked sufficient indicia of reliability

and should not have been considered. We disagree.

      The agency properly concluded that the declaration’s reliability as to the

relevant facts was adequately supported by “the remainder of the record,”

including specifically an official certificate of conviction from the United

Kingdom’s Crown Court and a then-pending federal indictment. The Crown Court

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certificate states that Singh was convicted in May 2015 of one count of “Sexual

Assault on a female” and two counts of “Sexual Assault on a female child under

13.” Although the certificate does not say so, all parties agree that these

convictions were rendered in absentia after Singh had left the United Kingdom for

the United States. The federal indictment, which alleges false statements by Singh

in connection with his visa and asylum applications, expressly alleges that Singh

was “arrested twice in the United Kingdom for sexual assault prior to November

24, 2014.” Cf. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1958) (noting that

an indictment reflects a grand jury’s finding of probable cause). Even without the

declaration’s further details about the specific alleged conduct underlying the two

sexual assaults of children, the Government carried its initial burden to present

evidence supporting probable cause to believe that Singh committed two “Sexual

Assault[s] on a female child under 13” in the United Kingdom before November

24, 2014. And, unless rebutted, that evidence alone suffices to establish “serious

reasons” to believe that Singh committed a serious nonpolitical crime prior to his

arrival in the United States in January 2015.

      Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh failed to

carry his ultimate burden to establish that the serious-nonpolitical-crime bar did not

apply. The only evidence Singh offered in rebuttal was his own testimony denying

the sexual assaults, and the agency permissibly concluded that Singh was not a

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credible witness. Singh conceded that he had been arrested in the United Kingdom

in 2014, and the agency found, based on the records concerning Singh’s visa

application and asylum interview, that Singh attempted to mislead immigration

authorities by falsely denying having been arrested. The agency also concluded

that Singh’s testimony about alleged persecution in India was implausible and

internally inconsistent. The record does not compel a contrary conclusion as to

any of these findings, which provide proper and sufficient grounds for rejecting

Singh’s testimony as lacking in credibility. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 960

(9th Cir. 2021). The agency also properly held that Singh’s willingness to lie cast

sufficient doubt on the authenticity of his proffered documentary evidence and that

this evidence therefore did not rehabilitate his credibility or independently carry his

burden of proof. See Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014).

      Accordingly, the agency correctly concluded that, under the bar for serious

nonpolitical crimes, Singh was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.

      2. Because we have upheld the agency’s adverse credibility determination

and its discounting of Singh’s documentary evidence, it likewise follows that the

agency properly concluded that Singh failed to carry his burden to establish any

substantive basis for relief, including relief under the Convention Against Torture.

Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2004).

      3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to

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reopen. Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2008).

      Because the motion was filed more than 90 days after the BIA upheld

Singh’s removal order, the motion was time-barred unless (1) it relied on an

asylum or withholding-of-removal claim that was “based on changed country

conditions arising” in India; and (2) the evidence of such changed conditions was

“material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented

at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Where, as here, “the

persecution claim was previously denied based on an adverse credibility finding in

the underlying proceedings, the [applicant] must either overcome the prior

determination or show that the new claim is independent of the evidence that was

found to be not credible.” Greenwood v. Garland, 36 F.4th 1232, 1235 (9th Cir.

2022) (citation omitted).

      The BIA acted within its discretion in concluding that the newly proffered

evidence claiming that Indian police beat Singh’s brother while asking about

Singh’s whereabouts did not overcome the prior adverse credibility determination.

As the BIA noted, the credibility of this new evidence was itself suspect, given that

Singh failed to explain why Indian police would still be interested in Singh nearly

eight years after he had left India. And given that the asserted materiality of the

new evidence was “contingent, in part or in whole, on factors that were determined

to lack credibility and ha[d] not been rehabilitated,” id. (citation omitted), the BIA

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properly held that this new evidence was not qualitatively different from Singh’s

prior non-credible claims. Lastly, the BIA reasonably concluded that the new

evidence of general country conditions was not materially different from the

evidence at the time of Singh’s hearing.

      PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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