Court Opinion

ID: 9729105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:26:35.677015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.415110
License: Public Domain

Josephine Linker Hart, Judge, concurring. I concur in the J disposition of this case, but write separately because I believe that Jackie Ivy’s employer, Huntco, should have been made a party, as required by Rule 19 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 19 provides in pertinent part: (a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or, (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, or, (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. I cannot ignore the fact that no matter whether we affirmed or reversed, the losing party was going to get less than they contracted for because of Huntco’s failure to perform. Accordingly, under the plain language of Rule 19, Huntco must be a necessary party. This is quintessentially the case of “the persons already parties [being] subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.” Id. It is less clear to me, however, whether we are obligated to raise this issue on our own motion. My research has uncovered at least three cases, Koonce v. Mitchell, 341 Ark. 716, 19 S.W.3d 605 (2005), Yamauchi v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 309 Ark. 532, 832 S.W.2d 241 (1992), and Harrison v. Knott, 219 Ark. 565, 243 S.W.2d 642 (1951), where our supreme court did just that, and reversed and remanded the case with instructions to join the necessary party. However, I am also aware that the supreme court accepted certification of McAdams v. McAdams, 353 Ark. 494, 109 S.W.3d 649 (2003), for the purpose of conclusively stating whether an appellate court must sua sponte address whether all necessary parties have been joined in an action and subsequently decided that certification of this issue was improvidently granted. Given the unsettled nature of the law in this area, I am reluctant to seek a different disposition of this case, and therefore, I join the majority.