Court Opinion

ID: 9864867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:14:58.531769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:19.467777
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler,
dissenting.
On the subject of the jurisdiction of juvenile courts, I cannot bring my views into harmony with those of my brethren. The matter is of such great public importance and the results that are likely to follow the decision are so serious that I consider it a duty to state the reasons for dissenting.
Colias v. People, 60 Colo. 230, 153 Pac. 224, and In re Songer, 65 Colo. 460, 177 Pac. 141, do not, I submit, have the controlling effect attributed to them in the majority opinion. Both were decided under the act of 1907 (S. L. 1907, p. 324), the pertinent provisions of which are *517quoted in the majority opinion. As construed by the court in the Colias case, section 2 of that act conferred jurisdiction upon juvenile courts “in all criminal cases, or other actions or proceedings, in which the disposition, custody, or control of a minor, or any other person, is involved in either of two cases, ’ ’ to neither of which did the case then before the court belong. Section 19 provided : ‘ ‘ This Act shall be liberally construed so that the jurisdiction of the court, as defined by section two (2), shall be concurrent with the district court in any criminal case against a minor, and also any criminal case against an adult person for the violation of any criminal law of this State, where the offense shall be'against the person or involves the morals of a child or minor.” It was contended that this provision conferred the necessary jurisdiction; but the court held that, ‘ ‘ General jurisdiction in cases of criminal offenses against minors could hardly be given in a section which merely prescribes a liberal construction of a statute conferring jurisdiction in a specified class of cases.” The court did not hold that if the words commencing with “and also” and ending with “or minor” had occurred in section 2, jurisdiction to try the Colias case would not have existed, but held merely that, occurring, as they did, in the wrong-connection, those words did not have the effect of conferring such jurisdiction. The Colias case was decided in a department consisting of three justices. The Songer case was decided en banc, and the court, two justices dissenting, followed the Colias decision. The same justice wrote the opinions in both cases. In 1923, after those decisions were rendered, and because of them, the legislature, by amending- section 2, enlarged the jurisdiction of juvenile courts. As amended, section 2 provides that juvenile courts shall have coor'dinate jurisdiction with the district and county courts in the following, among- other, cases: “ * * * any criminal case of the people against or concerning- any adult person for the violation of any law of this state where the offense *518charged in the complaint, indictment or information shall be against the person or concerns the morals or the protection of a person under the age of twenty-one years ” S. L. 1923, p. 209. That statute was passed pursuant to section 1 of article 6 of the state Constitution, which provides that the legislature may confer upon such courts jurisdiction “in cases involving minors and persons whose offenses concern minor's. ’ It would seem that the present case comes strictly within the terms of the amended section. It is a “criminal case”; it is against an “adult person”; “the offense charged” was “against the person” and concerned “the morals” and “the protection” of “a person under the age of twenty-one years.” The crime charged was statutory rape. The statute under which Abbott was convicted provides, in substance, that a man over the age of eighteen years who has sexual intercourse with an unmarried girl under the age of eighteen years is guilty of rape. C. L. §6689. Unlike the crime charged in the Colias case (i.e., the crime against nature), this crime can be committed only against a child, as such; it cannot be committed against an adult. Such conduct was made a crime in order to safeguard girls under the age of consent against the arts of the seducer, and to save them from moral contamination. If such an offense does not come within the provision of amended section 2, quoted above, what offense does come within that provision? The. provision must be given some effect, of cour’se. If it is held not to cover such a case as the present one, what effect can be given to it? If, by the language used, the legislature has failed to accomplish its purpose, pray what language could it select in order to malee its will effective? The legislature used plain English words, each having a well-known meaning, incapable of being misunderstood. They are combined into a sentence that is free from ambiguity.
With the question whether or not it was wise to confer such jurisdiction upon juvenile courts, we need not, indeed we are not permitted to, concern ourselves; that *519question is solely for legislative determination. If at any time the legislature should conclude that it acted unwisely in passing the amendatory act of 1923, doubtless the legislature will correct the mistake by proper enactment. But until .that has been done, we should enforce the act according to its letter and spirit. This, I submit, has not been done in the present case.
I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the .court.