Court Opinion

ID: 2964419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:25:25.641139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:55.955879
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1378

                             DOUGLAS T. WIGHTMAN, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                         SPRINGFIELD TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY
                           AND UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Harold A. Ross with  whom Ross & Kraushaar Co., L.P.A., Shelley B.
            ______________            ____________________________  __________
        Kroll, and Segal, Roitman & Coleman were on brief for appellants.
        _____      ________________________
            John R. Nadolny  for appellee Springfield Terminal Railway Co. and
            _______________
        Norton N.  Newborn with whom Norton  N. Newborn Co., L.P.A.,  James F.
        __________________           ______________________________   ________
        Freeley, Jr. and Freeley  & Freeley were on brief for  appellee United
        ____________     __________________
        Transportation Union.

                                 ____________________

                                  November 19, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.   Appellants, Brotherhood  of
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            Locomotive  Engineers and several  of its  individual members

            ("BLE") sought to  enjoin enactment  of a clause  in a  newly

            negotiated collective bargaining agreement  between Appellees

            United Transportation Union ("UTU") and  Springfield Terminal

            Railway Co. ("ST"), as  a violation of the Railway  Labor Act

            ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C.    151-188.  The district court denied the

            injunction  and granted summary  judgment for  UTU and  ST on

            BLE's complaint.   Wightman v. Springfield  Terminal Ry. Co.,
                               ________    _____________________________

            915 F. Supp. 503, 507 (D. Mass. 1996).  BLE now appeals.

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                      The  RLA governs  labor  and collective  bargaining

            arrangements between carriers, or  employers, and unions.  ST

            is a railroad operator located in Springfield, Massachusetts,

            and a carrier for  purposes of the RLA.  BLE  and UTU are two

            of  several  trade  unions  who  have  collective  bargaining

            agreements with ST.  The  individual plaintiffs in this  case

            belong to BLE.      The RLA authorizes carriers and unions to

            establish union shops.  A union shop in the railroad industry

            simply means that in order to remain employed with a railroad

            company, employees  must belong to  one of the  national, RLA

            recognized  railroad   unions.     See  45  U.S.C.       152,
                                               ___

            Eleventh(a)  and (c).1    ST and  the  unions with  which  it

                                
            ____________________

            1.  45 U.S.C.    152 has  been drafted  in subsections  First
            through Eleventh.  Section 152, Eleventh contains subsections
            a through d.  We note the unusual numbering scheme to explain

                                         -2-
                                          2

            maintains collective bargaining agreements have established a

            union shop.  

                      Employment in the railroad industry revolves around

            crafts or classes of work, each of which is represented  by a

            different  union.    Train   service  and  engineer   service

            constitute  two   such  crafts.     The   former  encompasses

            conductors, brakemen,  trainmen and  yardmen, and  the latter

            includes primarily locomotive engineers.   UTU represents the

            train service  craft and BLE represents  the engineer service

            craft.      

                      By  practice,  junior  engineers  advance  from the

            ranks of the train service employees.  Over the course of any

            given  year,  however,  the   amount  of  engineer  work  may

            fluctuate.   During periods of reduced  engineer work, junior

            engineers may have to return temporarily to train  service in

            order to remain employed.2  Junior engineers, therefore, have

            an  economic  interest  in  maintaining  their  train service

            seniority.  

                      Prior  to  1995, the  UTU-ST  collective bargaining

            agreement  allowed non-UTU  member engineers  to continue  to

            accrue  train  service  seniority.   In  1995,  however,  UTU

            negotiated a  provision known  as Article 21,  which requires

                                
            ____________________

            our citation.  

            2.  In its reply brief, BLE appears to hint that the  ebb and
            flow  of train service employees to and from engineer service
            occurs with less regularity today than in prior eras.   

                                         -3-
                                          3

            that employees moving from  train service to engineer service

            pay dues to UTU in  order to maintain and continue  to accrue

            their train service seniority.   When BLE objected to Article

            21,  ST offered  it a similar  provision which  BLE rejected,

            apparently  believing  it  to  be  of  little  value  to  its

            membership.  

                      BLE then challenged  Article 21 on RLA grounds.  It

            sought preliminary injunctive relief which the district court

            denied.   Subsequently, on cross motions,  the district court

            granted summary judgment in favor of UTU and ST.  This appeal

            followed. 

                                  Standard of Review
                                  Standard of Review
                                  __________________

                      We review  the award  of summary judgment  de novo.
                                                                 __ ____

            Ortiz-Pinero v. Rivera-Arroyo, 84 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1996).
            ____________    _____________

            Summary  judgment is appropriate in the  absence of a genuine

            issue  of material fact, when the moving party is entitled to

            judgment as  a matter of  law.   See Fed. R.  Civ. P.  56(c).
                                             ___

            Neither   party  may   rely  on  conclusory   allegations  or

            unsubstantiated  denials,  but must  identify  specific facts

            deriving   from  the   pleadings,  depositions,   answers  to

            interrogatories,  admissions  and  affidavits to  demonstrate

            either the  existence or absence  of an  issue of fact.   See
                                                                      ___

            Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and (e).

                      Cross  motions for  summary judgment  neither alter

            the  basic Rule 56 standard, nor warrant the grant of summary

                                         -4-
                                          4

            judgment per se. See  Wiley v. American Greetings  Corp., 762
                     ___ __  ___  _____    _________________________

            F.2d  139, 141 (1st Cir. 1985).  Cross motions simply require

            us  to  determine  whether  either of  the  parties  deserves

            judgment as  a matter of law on  facts that are not disputed.

            Id.    As always,  we resolve  all  factual disputes  and any
            ___

            competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable to

            the party  against whom  summary judgment  has entered.   Den
                                                                      ___

            Norske Bank v.  First Nat'l  Bank of Boston,  75 F.3d 49,  53
            ___________     ___________________________

            (1st Cir. 1996).  

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                      BLE raises  three basic  arguments,  each of  which

            involves a different statutory provision  of the RLA.  First,

            BLE contends, Article 21 violates the prohibition of mandated

            dual unionism  under 45 U.S.C.    152, Eleventh(c).   Second,

            BLE   urges,  Article   21   impermissibly  interferes   with

            employees' rights to organize and choose their own collective

            bargaining representative  under 45 U.S.C.     152, Third and

            Fourth.   Finally,  BLE asserts,  the RLA,  45 U.S.C.    156,

            required  UTU  and ST  to provide  BLE, an  interested party,

            notice of  their contract negotiations and  an opportunity to

            participate in  them.   We conclude  that the  district court

            ably analyzed each of BLE's arguments and properly found them

            lacking in substance.  We affirm.

                      A.  45 U.S.C.   152, Eleventh(c)
                      ________________________________

                                         -5-
                                          5

                      According to  BLE, Article 21 violates  45 U.S.C.  

            152,  Eleventh(c), part of  the union shop  provisions of the

            RLA.  Analysis of BLE's argument requires a brief detour into

            the background  of the  union shop provisions  generally, and

            how   152, Eleventh(c) fits into the union shop scheme.  

                      Under 45  U.S.C.    152, Eleventh(a),  carriers and

            unions may  establish union shops.   Section 152, Eleventh(a)

            specifically  provides  that carriers  and  unions  may "make

            agreements, requiring as a condition of continued employment,

            that  . . . all  employees shall become  members of the labor

            organization  representing their  craft or  class."   Read in

            isolation, the  plain language of this  provision would allow

            carriers and unions to require employees to belong not to the

            union  of their  choice, but  to the  union certified  as the

            representative of their craft or class.

                      Organized labor petitioned  Congress for the  union

            shop  option  in  order  to eradicate  the  problem  of "free

            riders,"  railroad employees who do not pay dues to any union

            but  receive whatever benefits collective bargaining confers.

            See generally Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 480,
            ___ _________ _____________________    _______

            489-94  (1957).   In  acceding to  labor's request,  however,

            Congress recognized that the intercraft mobility not uncommon

            in the railroad  industry could pose a  problem for employees

            in  a  union shop.   Under     152, Eleventh(a),  an employee

            shuttling  between train  service and engineer  service could

                                         -6-
                                          6

            either  be forced to change unions  or to belong and pay dues

            to  two unions until reaching a level of seniority sufficient

            to  stabilize him  as  an engineer.    As the  Supreme  Court

            pointed out,  "[t]he former alternative would,  of course, be

            expensive and sometimes impossible, while the latter would be

            complicated and  might mean the  loss of seniority  and union

            benefits."  Id. at 490.       Congress  attempted  to  tailor
                        ___

            union shops to accommodate intercraft mobility through   152,

            Eleventh(c).  That subsection provides, "[t]he requirement of

            membership in a labor organization in [a union shop] shall be

            satisfied  . .  .  if said  employee  shall hold  or  acquire

            membership in any one of the labor organizations, national in

            scope, organized in accordance with this chapter."  45 U.S.C.

              152, Eleventh(c).   On its face,   152  Eleventh(c) appears

            to contradict   152, Eleventh(a) by allowing any  employee in

            any  union  shop  to belong  to  any  of  the RLA  recognized

            railroad unions. 

                      The  purpose   of     152,   Eleventh(c),  however,

            significantly circumscribes its language.   See Rychlik,  352
                                                        ___ _______

            U.S.  at 488, 492; see  also Landers v.  Nat'l R.R. Passenger
                               ___  ____ _______     ____________________

            Corp.,  814  F.2d  41,  44-45 (1st  Cir.  1987)  (recognizing
            _____

            limited applicability of   152, Eleventh(c)), aff'd, 485 U.S.
                                                          _____

            652 (1988).  Despite its broad language, "the only purpose of

            Section  2, Eleventh(c)  was  a very  narrow one:  to prevent

            compulsory dual  unionism or  the necessity of  changing from

                                         -7-
                                          7

            one  union to  another when  an employee  temporarily changes

            crafts."   Landers v.  Nat'l R.R. Passenger  Corp., 485  U.S.
                       _______     ___________________________

            652, 657-58  (1988); Rychlik, 352  U.S. at 492.  Section 152,
                                 _______

            Eleventh(c) does  not exist  to benefit unions  by permitting

            them to recruit  members from the ranks  of other established

            unions, or to provide railroad employees with a general right

            to  join   unions  other   than  the   designated  bargaining

            representative  of their  craft,  except to  meet the  narrow

            problem of intercraft mobility in a union shop.  Rychlik, 352
                                                             _______

            U.S. at 493.    

                      Bearing  in mind the  context and purpose  of   152

            Eleventh(c), we turn to  BLE's challenge to Article 21.   BLE

            essentially attacks  Article 21 from two angles.   First, BLE

            contends, Article 21 constitutes  either a   152, Eleventh(a)

            union  shop agreement that violates    152, Eleventh(c) or an

            amendment to  the existing  ST-UTU agreement that  violates  

            152, Eleventh(c).  Second, BLE argues, Article  21 will upset

            "the cost  sharing scheme which was continued and fostered by

            the 1951 union shop amendments."  We disagree.  

                      On its  face, Article  21 can neither  constitute a

            union shop agreement by  itself, nor an amendment to  the ST-

            UTU  agreement that  violates  Eleventh(c).   Nothing in  the

            language  of Article  21 requires  membership in  UTU or  any

            other union as a condition of employment.  See Brotherhood of
                                                       ___ ______________

            Locomotive Eng'rs v.  Kansas City  S. Ry., 26  F.3d 787,  793
            _________________     ___________________

                                         -8-
                                          8

            (8th  Cir.)  (  152,  Eleventh(c) applies  only  to a    152,

            Eleventh(a) union  shop agreement), cert. denied,  115 S. Ct.
                                                _____ ______

            320 (1994); Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
                        _______    _____________________________________

            16 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 115  S. Ct.
                                                _____ ______

            82 (1994).  Article 21 does not require an engineer to choose

            between  dual union  membership or  unemployment; Article  21

            simply  requires an engineer to  choose whether to retain and

            continue  to accrue  seniority  in the  train service  craft.

            Wightman, 915 F. Supp. at 506.  
            ________

                      In  Dempsey v.  Atchison, Topeka  and Santa  Fe Ry.
                          _______     ___________________________________

            Co.,  16 F.3d 832, 838  (7th Cir. 1994),  the Seventh Circuit
            ___

            faced  a BLE  challenge  to a  provision requiring  engineers

            desirous of accumulating  additional train service  seniority

            to  pay dues  to UTU.   Failure  to pay,  however, would  not

            affect accrued seniority.  In examining whether the provision

            constituted  a  union  shop  agreement,  the Seventh  Circuit

            relied in part on the fact that it did not require payment of

            dues to  UTU in order  to retain accrued  seniority, implying

            that  such   a  provision  might  constitute   a  union  shop

            provision.   Id. at 838 (citing NLRB v. Manitowoc Engineering
                         ___                ____    _____________________

            Co.,  909 F.2d  963, 969-71  (7th Cir.  1990), cert.  denied,
            ___                                            _____  ______

            Clipper  City Lodge No. 516  v. NLRB, 498  U.S. 1083 (1991)).
            ___________________________     ____

            Ultimately, the  court concluded that the  provision at issue

            did not  create any  conditions of continued  employment, and

                                         -9-
                                          9

            therefore, did not constitute a   152, Eleventh(a) union shop

            agreement.  Id.  
                        ___

                      In our view,  the extra step Article  21 takes with

            respect to  accrued seniority does not  create any conditions

            on employment  different from the  provision in Dempsey.   As
                                                            _______

            indicated,  nothing  on  the  face  of  Article  21  requires

            employees  to  belong to  UTU  in order  to  remain employed.

            Despite  the fact  that Article  21 takes  the extra  step of

            conditioning  seniority retention  and  accrual on  continued

            dues payment, an engineer who chooses  BLE over UTU satisfies

            either of the UTU-ST  or BLE-ST union shop requirements.   To

            the extent, therefore, that  Dempsey implies that a provision
                                         _______

            such as Article 21 might constitute a union shop agreement or

            amendment, we respectfully disagree.   

                      BLE, however, asserts that engineers who choose BLE

            over UTU run the  risk of unemployment when shuttled  back to

            train  service,  since  they   will  have  no  train  service

            seniority.   According to BLE, this  effectively forces those

            engineers at the  lower end  of the  engineer seniority  list

            either to belong to UTU and BLE, or to UTU instead of BLE, as

            a  condition of continued employment at ST.  BLE asserts that

              152, Eleventh(c) allows a railroad employee in a union shop

            to  change  membership to  any  other  RLA recognized  union,

            "without  putting   himself  out  of   compliance  with   the

            membership requirement  of a  valid union shop  agreement and

                                         -10-
                                          10

            thereby  cause a  loss of  seniority and  employment rights."

            BLE's argument  requires  us to  determine  whether      152,

            Eleventh(c), in protecting  against compulsory dual unionism,

            elevates  seniority  into   a  statutorily  protected   right

            employees may take with them as they move from craft to craft

            and union to union.      

                      By  its own  language,  the  RLA governs  relations

            between   carriers,   unions  and   employees,  and      152,

            Eleventh(c)  dictates  the  limits  of  what carriers  and/or

            unions can demand of employees in a union shop.  Within those

            parameters,  which include  a prohibition on  compulsory dual

            unionism, the RLA makes no  mention of seniority, and notably

            fails to designate seniority as a protected employment right.

                      In the absence  of a  legislative pronouncement  to

            the contrary, union contracts  typically define the scope and

            significance of seniority rights.  Aeronautical Indus.  Dist.
                                               __________________________

            Lodge v.  Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 526 (1949); Trailmobile Co.
            _____     ________                            _______________

            v.  Whirls,  331  U.S.  40,  53   n.21  (1947).    Seniority,
                ______

            therefore,  does   not   stem  from   the   employer-employee

            relationship and by extension become an employment right, but

            rather  from  either  a statute  or  the  four  corners of  a

            collective bargaining agreement, in this case between a union

            and  a carrier.  National Labor Relations Bd. v. Whiting Milk
                             ____________________________    ____________

            Corp., 342 F.2d  8, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1965).  It is by now well
            _____

                                         -11-
                                          11

            established  that  in  the  absence of  a  contract  creating

            seniority rights, they do not exist.  See Dempsey, 16 F.3d at
                                                  ___ _______

            839;  United Food  & Commercial  Workers Union  v. Gold  Star
                  ________________________________________     __________

            Sausage  Co., 897 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990); Cooper v.
            ____________                                        ______

            General  Motors Corp.,  651  F.2d 249,  250  (5th Cir.  1981)
            _____________________

            (citing  cases);  Local 1251  Int'l  Union  of United  Auto.,
                              ___________________________________________

            Aircraft and Agric. Workers of Am. UAW v. Robertshaw Controls
            ______________________________________    ___________________

            Co.,  405  F.2d  29,  32-33  (2d  Cir. 1968)  (citing  cases)
            ___

            (overruling prior circuit precedent to the contrary).

                      Seniority,   like   any   other  benefit   deriving

            exclusively  from collective bargaining  agreements, does not

            vest  in employees.  Robertshaw, 405 F.2d at 33; McMullans v.
                                 __________                  _________

            Kansas, Okla. & Gulf Ry.,  229 F.2d 50, 53 (10th  Cir. 1956).
            ________________________

            Instead,  seniority rights  are subject  to revision  or even

            abrogation  with  the  termination  or renegotiation  of  the

            collective bargaining  agreement.3  Dempsey, 16  F.3d at 839;
                                                _______

            Robertshaw, 405 F.2d at  33; McMullans, 229 F.2d at 54.   Any
            __________                   _________

            rights employees  have  in  seniority,  therefore,  are  tied

            directly  to  the terms  of the  labor agreement  between the

            carrier and the  union representing their craft.   Nothing in

                                
            ____________________

            3.  The Dempsey opinion ultimately  views seniority as we do,
                    _______
            despite  that court's  implication that  a provision  such as
            Article 21 might constitute  a union shop agreement.   See 16
                                                                   ___
            F.3d at 838-39.   Dempsey concludes  that seniority, born  of
                              _______
            the collective  bargaining agreement, is subject  to revision
            or abrogation.  16 F.3d at 839.  We do not interpret Dempsey,
                                                                 _______
            therefore, as supporting BLE's argument.  

                                         -12-
                                          12

            the  RLA  changes  this  fundamental  tenet  of  labor  law.4

            Dempsey, 16 F.3d at 840; McMullans, 229 F.2d at 53. 
            _______                  _________

                      We recognize that Article 21 may make it attractive

            for at least some engineers to choose UTU over BLE.   We stop

            short, however,  of equating a union's successful negotiation

            of a potential competitive  advantage over another union with

            the  kind  of compulsory  dual  unionism    152,  Eleventh(c)

            exists  to prevent.    See  Whiting  Milk,  342  F.2d  at  11
                                   ___  _____________

            ("Obtaining a benefit for employees may well encourage others

            to join  a union but  that side effect  does not violate  the

            [NLRB], for 'The truth is that  the union is a service agency

            that probably encourages membership  whenever it does its job

            well.'") (quoting Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB,
                              __________________________________________

            365  U.S. 667,  675-76  (1961)).   We  conclude that     152,

            Eleventh(c)  does not  provide  the statutory  basis to  vest

            railroad employees with their accrued seniority.  

                      Finally, BLE  asserts that Article  21 "upsets  the

            sharing  of  costs of  representation  promoted  by the  1951

            amendments" in violation of   152, Eleventh(c).

                                
            ____________________

            4.  BLE relies on  three cases in  support of its  contention
            that Article 21 constitutes  an illegal union shop agreement:
            Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959), Birkholz v.
            ___________________________                       ___________
            Dirks, 391 F.2d  289 (7th  Cir. 1968), vacated  as moot,  395
            _____                                  ________________
            U.S. 210  (1969) and O'Connell  v. Erie Lackawanna  R.R., 391
                                 ___________________________________
            F.2d  156 (2d  Cir.  1968), vacated  as  moot, 395  U.S.  210
                                        _________________
            (1969).    BLE asserted  these  cases  unsuccessfully to  the
            Seventh Circuit  in support  of a nearly  identical argument.
            See Dempsey, 16 F.3d at  838 n.6.  We concur in  that court's
            ___ _______
            conclusion that these cases are inapposite. 

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      Section  152, Eleventh(c)  limits  employees  in  a

            union shop  to membership  in those unions  which qualify  as

            electors  of  the  union  representatives  on  the   National

            Railroad  Adjustment  Board ("NRAB").    The  NRAB exists  to

            settle   disputes   arising   under   collective   bargaining

            agreements.  See  Rychlik, 352 U.S. at  487.  As the  Seventh
                         ___  _______

            Circuit  pointed  out,  this requirement  limits  union  shop

            participation  to  those  unions  which share  the  costs  of

            administering  the NRAB,  and which  "join together  in other

            respects  in  the  negotiating  and  policing  of  collective

            bargaining agreements  under the  dispute  mechanisms of  the

            RLA."   Dempsey, 16 F.3d at  840.  BLE appears  to argue that
                    _______

            Article 21  has the effect of depriving it of dues that would

            offset its obligations to NRAB.  See id.  Nothing in the RLA,
                                             ___ ___

            however, guarantees BLE a particular level of dues  to offset

            its obligations to NRAB.   Stated more broadly, the  RLA does

            not protect any one union from competition  with another over

            membership and dues.  

                      B.  45 U.S.C.    152, Third and Fourth
                      ______________________________________

                      Section  152,  Third,   entitled  "Designation   of

            representatives," provides  that neither unions  nor carriers

            "shall in any  way interfere with,  influence, or coerce  the

            other  in  its  choice  of representatives."    Section  152,

            Fourth,   dealing  with   organization  and   the  collective

            bargaining  process, grants  employees the right  to organize

                                         -14-
                                          14

            and bargain collectively through representatives of their own

            choosing,  and  provides that  no  carrier  may influence  or

            coerce   employees   regarding    their   choice   of   labor

            organization,  nor   deduct  dues  or  other   fees  of  such

            organizations from employee wages.  BLE contends that Article

            21 violates the employee freedom of choice embodied  in Third

            and Fourth, and  also the prohibition  on wage deductions  in

            Fourth.  Again, we disagree.

                      In   TWA,  Inc.  v.   Independent  Fed.  of  Flight
                           __________       _____________________________

            Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 441 (1989), the Supreme Court noted
            __________

            that     152,  Third and  Fourth  operate primarily  in  pre-

            certification contexts,  where unorganized employees  seek to

            designate representatives and commence  collective bargaining

            with employers.  The Court reasoned that the RLA contemplates

            dispute resolution through private mechanisms, the success of

            which depends on the independence of the employees' "putative

            representative" and  on neither party's access  to the courts

            to further their own  partisan ends.  Id. (quoting  Switchmen
                                                  ___           _________

            v.  National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297,  300 (1943)).  In a
                ______________________

            post-certification context, by contrast, the  parties already

            have  certified representatives  and a  collective bargaining

            record in place.  In  post-certification disputes, therefore,

            we  must  limit  our  intervention  to  cases  in  which  the

            aggrieved union has no other remedy "to enforce the statutory

            commands which Congress had written into the [RLA]."  Id.  
                                                                  ___

                                         -15-
                                          15

                      We  have  concluded that  intervention  in  a post-

            certification  dispute under     152,  Third and  Fourth will

            occur in extremely limited  circumstances.  See National R.R.
                                                        ___ _____________

            Passenger  Corp.  v. International  Ass'n  of Machinists  and
            ________________     ________________________________________

            Aerospace  Workers,   915  F.2d  43,  51   (1st  Cir.  1990).
            __________________

            Specifically, we will intervene upon demonstration of carrier

            conduct reflecting anti-union animus, an attempt to interfere

            with employee choice of collective bargaining representative,

            discrimination,  or coercion.    Id.   In  addition, we  will
                                             ___

            intervene when  a carrier  commits acts of  intimidation that

            cannot  be remedied  by  administrative means,  or commits  a

            fundamental attack  on the  collective bargaining process  or

            makes a direct attempt to destroy a union.  Id.  
                                                        ___

                      BLE  purports  to  establish  a  genuine  issue  of

            material  fact   by  listing  15  "facts"   which  it  claims

            demonstrate  anti-BLE  animus  sufficient  to  justify  post-

            certification judicial intervention.   We need not recite all

            of them here.   We agree with  the district court that  BLE's

            facts, even if all true, at best demonstrate sharp bargaining

            practices  between unions  in an  effort to  gain competitive

            advantage.  Wightman, 915 F. Supp. at 507.  While BLE's facts
                        ________

            evince competitive jockeying between it and UTU, they notably

            fail to  demonstrate anti-BLE animus or  a fundamental attack

                                         -16-
                                          16

            on the bargaining process by ST.5   Accordingly, the District

            Court   correctly  declined  to   intervene  in   this  post-

            certification matter.

                      BLE also contends that  Article 21 violates    152,

            Third and Fourth as a matter  of law.6  BLE offers  precedent

            under  the National  Labor Relations  Act ("NLRA"),  which it

            seeks to apply  analogically to this railroad dispute.  While

            the NLRA may provide analogies that bear on interpretation of

            the RLA,  the Supreme  Court has  emphasized  that "the  NLRA

            'cannot be imported wholesale into the railway labor arena.'"

            TWA,  489  U.S.  at  439 (quoting  Trainmen  v.  Jacksonville
            ___                                ________      ____________

            Terminal, 394 U.S. 369, 383  (1969)).  We especially hesitate
            ________

            to  employ   NLRA  precedent  in  light  of   the  clear  and

            unequivocal  RLA  precedent  from  the  Supreme  Court,  this

            circuit  and  others,  which  underscores the  limited  post-

            certification  application of    152,  Third and Fourth.  See
                                                                      ___

            TWA, 489 U.S. at  441 (limiting application of     152, Third
            ___

            and  Fourth   to  pre-certification  contexts);   Nat'l  R.R.
                                                              ___________

                                
            ____________________

            5.  To  be  sure, it  does not  appear  that ST  was entirely
            candid with BLE  regarding its negotiations with UTU  and the
            substance of the  ST-UTU agreement.   The RLA, however,  does
            not  compel ST to inform BLE of the substance of negotiations
            with a third union, and we do not identify anti-BLE animus in
            ST's actions.  

            6.  BLE essentially  argues that  by making it  so attractive
            for  engineers  to join  UTU, Article  21  has the  effect of
            impermissibly interfering  with their  free choice  of union,
            and  coercing them to join UTU, in violation of    152, Third
            and Fourth.

                                         -17-
                                          17

            Passenger, 915 F.2d at 51 (same); see also Kansas City S., 26
            _________                         ___ ____ ______________

            F.3d at 795; Dempsey, 16 F.3d at 841.  Finally,   BLE  argues
                         _______

            somewhat opaquely that a wage deduction provision only passes

            RLA muster if  it comprises  part of a  union shop  agreement

            under   152, Eleventh.  At the outset we note that Article 21

            by itself  does  not  refer  to wage  deductions,  much  less

            mandate  them.    Assuming  such  a  wage  deduction  exists,

            however,  we disagree  with BLE's  interpretation of     152,

            Fourth and Eleventh(b).  

                      As indicated,   152, Fourth provides that  carriers

            may  not  deduct union  dues  or  fees  from employee  wages.

            Section 152, Eleventh(b), however, provides that carriers and

            labor  organizations may  make agreements  providing for  the

            deduction  of  "any  periodic   dues,  initiation  fees,  and

            assessments" from employee wages as long as the  employee has

            given  the  carrier written  permission.   45  U.S.C.    152,

            Eleventh(b).   Section 152,  Eleventh(b), unlike Eleventh(c),

            does  not limit  its applicability  to Eleventh(a),  or union

            shop agreement situations.   See Kansas City S., 26  F.3d. at
                                         ___ ______________

            794.  Read  together,    152, Fourth and  Eleventh(b) provide

            that carriers may not  unilaterally deduct dues from employee

            wages,  but may  do  so upon  the  agreement of  all  parties

            involved.  See id.  Thus, even in the absence of a union shop
                       ___ ___

            agreement,  employees  and  carriers  may  agree  to  a  dues

            deduction schedule under   152, Eleventh(b).  

                                         -18-
                                          18

                      C.  45 U.S.C.   156, Bargainable Interest
                      _________________________________________

                      BLE contends  that the District Court  erred in not

            setting Article 21 aside on the  basis that UTU and ST failed

            to  notify  BLE of  their  negotiations, and  afford  BLE the

            opportunity to participate in them.  

                      The    RLA    mandates    that   "[c]arriers    and

            representatives of  the employees shall give  at least thirty

            days'  written notice  of  an intended  change in  agreements

            affecting  rates of  pay,  rules, or  working conditions"  to

            interested  parties.  45 U.S.C.   156.  BLE identifies itself

            as an interested  party, and contends that ST or  UTU owed it

            notice.   BLE also  contends that  it has  joint jurisdiction

            over collective bargaining between ST and UTU, at least  with

            respect to  train service seniority,  by dint of  the routine

            shuttling of employees between the train service and engineer

            service crafts.   According  to BLE, that  joint jurisdiction

            shouldhavegivenitanopportunitytoparticipateinthenegotiations.

                      The  Eighth Circuit  recently faced  BLE's argument

            and  concluded  that  neither the  carrier  nor  UTU had  any

            statutory  obligation  to  provide  BLE with  notice  or  the

            opportunity to participate in negotiations, a conclusion with

            which we substantially agree.  See Kansas City S., 26 F.3d at
                                           ___ ______________

            792.  45 U.S.C.    156 exists to prevent either a  carrier or

            union from  unilaterally changing the terms  of the operative

            collective bargaining agreement.  Order of Railway Conductors
                                              ___________________________

                                         -19-
                                          19

            and  Brakemen v. Switchmen's Union  of N. Am.,  269 F.2d 726,
            _____________    ____________________________

            733 (5th Cir.), cert.  denied, 361 U.S. 899 (1959).   Section
                            _____  ______

            156, therefore,  furthers the overall  purpose of the  RLA to

            permit   employees   to    choose   their   own    bargaining

            representative  freely, and  to ensure  a procedure  for "the

            commencement  of conferences  between representatives  of the

            two  parties  if changes  are to  be  made in  the contract."

            McMullans, 229 F.2d  at 56.   Section 156  does not exist  to
            _________

            open collective bargaining negotiations between a carrier and

            a union to any other union claiming an interest.  

                      BLE relies  chiefly on two cases,  neither of which

            compel the conclusion  BLE seeks.  The  first, Brotherhood of
                                                           ______________

            Locomotive Eng'rs v. National Mediation Board, 410 F.2d 1025,
            __________________   ________________________

            1030 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 878 (1969), involved
                              _____ ______

            a dispute between BLE and the firemen's union over apprentice

            engineers,  a new  class of  railroad employees.    The court

            determined that in the  absence of a certified representative

            for  the  new  class,  any  union  that  could  fairly  claim

            representation  over  the   apprentices  could   legitimately

            bargain  with the carrier  about the terms  and conditions of

            the apprentices'  employment.  Id.   By demonstrating  a fair
                                           ___

            claim  of  representation, therefore,  a union  established a

            right to notice and the  opportunity to participate under the

            RLA.  Id.      This  case,  by contrast,  involves collective
                  ___

            bargaining between a represented class of employees and their

                                         -20-
                                          20

            carrier.  BLE  does not  assert any  claim of  representation

            over UTU members, nor could it.  Train service employees have

            already  certified UTU  as  their bargaining  representative.

            National Mediation Board,  therefore, does not  support BLE's
            ________________________

            asserted interest in the  negotiations that produced  Article

            21.

                      BLE  also  relies on  Illinois  Cent.  R.R. Co.  v.
                                            _________________________

            Brotherhood  of Locomotive  Eng'rs, 443  F.2d 136,  138, (7th
            __________________________________

            Cir.  1971).   The  dispute in  Illinois  Central involved  a
                                            _________________

            tripartite  agreement  between  the  carrier,  BLE  and   UTU

            governing the  list of  train service employees  eligible for

            engineer work.  UTU  filed suit when BLE sought  to negotiate

            revisions to  the rules governing the  list without providing

            UTU notice  and an  opportunity to  participate.   The court,

            noting the tripartite agreement,  determined that UTU and BLE

            shared  joint  negotiating  interests  over  the   list,  and

            therefore,  that BLE  could  not unilaterally  negotiate rule

            revisions with the carrier.  Id. at 141.
                                         ___

                      Obviously  no formal tripartite agreement exists in

            this  case.   BLE, however,  points  to language  in Illinois
                                                                 ________

            Central  indicating  that even  in  the  absence of  such  an
            _______

            agreement, the  ebb and  flow  of employees  between the  two

            crafts would give the firemen an "important economic stake in

            the  rules regulating  the  extra list"  which in  turn would

            establish a bargainable interest  in UTU over rules governing

                                         -21-
                                          21

            the list.  Id. at 141-42.   BLE argues that the same ebb  and
                       ___

            flow  vests it with a bargainable interest in the negotiation

            of train service seniority.  

                      We disagree with  BLE's interpretation of  Illinois
                                                                 ________

            Central.   First, that case revolved around a list outside of
            _______

            either UTU's  or BLE's collective bargaining  agreements with

            the  carrier.  The rules  governing the extra list, moreover,

            placed direct  conditions on  a fireman's employment  -- they

            dictated which of the  firemen could also engage in  engineer

            work.   BLE's assumption of  sole negotiating  responsibility

            over rules governing the  list placed BLE in the  position of

            representing firemen  even though  the firemen had  certified

            UTU as their collective bargaining agent.  

                      In this  case, by  contrast, UTU  does not  seek to

            unilaterally govern  the ebb and  flow itself.   UTU, through

            Article  21,  has simply  negotiated  with  ST the  mechanism

            through which  train service employees  accrue seniority,  as

            part of  negotiations over  a  general collective  bargaining

            agreement.   BLE and UTU have no tripartite agreement, nor is

            UTU  attempting  to unilaterally  negotiate  a  set of  rules

            governing movement between the two crafts.  

                      As the Eighth Circuit concluded, 

                      "[t]he  distinctive division  of railroad
                      employees  under the  RLA into  crafts or
                      classes,  and  the  regular  movement  of
                      employees  among  the   crafts  that   is
                      characteristic of  the industry, portends
                      overlapping 'interests'  among bargaining

                                         -22-
                                          22

                      units  in the  composition of  the crafts
                      and in their labor agreements.  That sort
                      of  interest,  however,  does not  confer
                      upon all  unions the right to  notice and
                      participation in the arbitrations  of all
                      other unions."

            Kansas City S., 26 F.3d at  791-92.  We conclude that the RLA
            ______________

            does not provide BLE  with a bargainable interest  in Article

            21 such that ST and UTU owed BLE notice and an opportunity to

            participate in the negotiations.  

                      Affirmed.
                      Affirmed
                      ________

                                         -23-
                                          23