Court Opinion

ID: 9609418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:26:59.086832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:50.428987
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Justice.
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence based upon appellant’s conviction of first-degree sexual assault in violation of § 6-4-302, W.S.1977.1 The issue he raises *891on appeal is whether the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument constituted plain error.2
We will reverse.
On appeal, when presented with a challenge to the trier of fact’s findings, we are required to accept the evidence of the prevailing party — in this instance the prosecution — as true, and leave out of consideration. entirely the evidence of the appellant in conflict therewith. McCarty v. State, Wyo., 616 P.2d 782 (1980). But in this appeal no challenge is made to the sufficiency of the evidence; a reversal is sought because the evidence was close, and allegedly the improper comments contained in the prosecutor’s closing may have tipped the scales and denied appellant his right to a fair trial. Accordingly we must consider all the evidence in considering what harm was done and whether appellant was denied a fair trial. Ordinarily we do not examine the evidence as closely as we do here and are confined to consideration of just the State’s case; the exception being when substantial evidence is an issue. However, here the issue raised concerns whether, without the misconduct of the prosecutor, the jury would have arrived at a verdict of guilty. We do this as a prelude to considering plain error.
The incident underlying appellant’s conviction occurred on or about January 14, 1981 in Uinta County. The supposed victim, whom we shall refer to as “J,” was then living there in a trailer also occupied by a male friend. During the afternoon of the day in question the appellant, along with his companion Trenton Frith, knocked on the door of the trailer in which J resided. When J answered the door, appellant introduced himself and Frith, and asked J if she could help them find the trailer in which one “Zac” and his wife were living. J indicated that, though she knew Zac, she did not know where he resided. However, she offered to look his name up in the telephone directory; meanwhile she invited appellant and his companion into the trailer.
Once inside, the three individuals began conversing about themselves, explaining who they were and what they did. The men showed J their job I.D.’s and offered to try and help her get a job with their employer. Appellant, who had entered with a beer in his hand, finished it, and was offered another one by J. His companion noticed a guitar in the trailer and asked if he could play. J turned off the record player so that she and appellant could listen to Frith’s music.
Soon appellant asked if J was interested in going with them to the P.C.C. Man Camp, where the men lived and worked. The State’s evidence was that appellant said he needed to go there to pick something up, while the men claimed that the purpose of the trip was to get marijuana to smoke, and that J knew that. In any event, J agreed to go; and all three of them hopped into a station wagon driven by appellant.
During the drive to the camp, the three engaged in conversation while consuming beer. When they reached the camp’s entrance, J got into the backseat and hid beneath a coat. This was necessary because no women were supposed to be allowed past the guard station. Once inside the camp, appellant drove to the building in which Frith lived. The three exited the vehicle and went inside to Frith’s room where it was discovered that the room had been ransacked. A guard was summoned. He stepped into the room and told Frith he would need to make a list of what was missing. The guard then left saying he would go back to the front guard shack and report the incident. Though the guard and J both saw each other, nothing was said between them.
*892After the guard’s departure, marijuana cigarettes were smoked. J claimed she was pressured into smoking a little of one; appellant and Frith contended that she joined in smoking several quite readily. All three admitted to a continued consumption of beer.
Next, J asserted that appellant placed a hand on her crotch. With this, she became upset and asked to be taken home because she loved her boyfriend. J next testified that appellant told her to watch out or he would rape her right there, and that then Frith told him to shut up and took him away into the bathroom for awhile. Both appellant and Frith denied that appellant ever did or said anything along the lines of J’s claim.
Soon all three returned to the car and started back to the trailer in which J lived. Everyone agreed at trial that, during this ride, J got chummier with Frith. J explained this was because he promised to protect her from appellant. Back at her trailer, J either invited or allowed appellant and Frith back in, depending upon who was telling the story. She then went and started folding clothes which were in the dryer. Frith assisted her in this endeavor. According to the men’s testimony, this ended with Frith and J kissing.
Next, J announced she needed to take a shower. She claimed that she went into the bathroom and locked the door, and then took her shower. When she got out, she grabbed a towel and noticed the bathroom door ajar. Appellant and Frith testified that they understood her announcement, about taking a shower, to be an invitation. Frith walked to the bathroom and found the door unlocked. He undressed while appellant walked into the bathroom.
J testified that appellant grabbed her towel away from her and sat on the toilet while she screamed for him to get out and grabbed the towel back and covered herself. Appellant commented on how pretty J was, and then Frith walked into the bathroom and told appellant to leave J alone. The other version of the incident was that J was wrapped in a towel when appellant walked in and sat on the toilet. As Frith walked in, appellant told J how pretty she was and asked if she wanted to make it. When she declined, appellant left her alone with Frith.
What followed was, forced sex according to J, and consensual sex according to Frith. While it was going on, appellant testified that he was in the living room when someone knocked at the door looking for either J’s boyfriend — Roger—or her roommate— Benny — supposedly to buy some drugs. After this person left, appellant went back to the bathroom, took his clothes off, and watched. When Frith and J finished, Frith took a shower and appellant indicated that he was interested in having sex with J too. When she told him emphatically she wasn’t interested, he left. When the men were dressed, J suddenly slammed the bathroom door shut and told them to leave. According to their testimony, Frith tried to talk to J; but, when this failed, they left.
J’s version of what occurred differed from the men’s. She stated that after Frith was finished, appellant also forced her to submit to him sexually. While this was occurring, she heard someone knock on the door and Frith answer it and talk with a visitor for a short time. J claimed she screamed for help, but none came. Finally appellant finished and left the bathroom. She got up, shut the door, locked it, and then screamed for them to leave, which they did.
Other evidence was introduced that appellant went around bragging about having forced some girl to have sex with him. However, some damaging impeachment was done. It was alleged that most of the witnesses against appellant and Frith were involved in a lot of drug dealings and that they thought Frith had stolen some drugs from them. Also, it was suggested that these witnesses were not too happy with appellant and Frith for making so many allegations about who was involved in dealing in drugs during the course of their defense. It should also be noted that no one succeeded in finding who had knocked on J’s door while the men were there.
*893Some evidence was admitted to demonstrate that a forced entry may have, at some point in time, been made into the bathroom, but the evidence was not particularly overwhelming. Moreover, no fingerprints were taken; and thus, there was nothing but J’s testimony indicating that it was appellant and Frith who forced open the bathroom door.
Clearly the evidence was close; it would have been easy for a jury to go either way. With that in mind, we must consider appellant’s argument that the prosecutor’s closing statements constituted plain error.
Closing arguments are meant to be just that, arguments premised upon the evidence already submitted to the jury. Prosecutors are no more limited in their closing than defense counsel. They may review the evidence and suggest to the jury inferences based thereon. The purpose of closing arguments is to allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79, 145 (1981); Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 P. 924 (1899). However, there are limits, not only on prosecutors, but on all attorneys.
These limits are designed to insure the fairness of trial. Prosecutors, as well as defense counsel, must be held to abide by these rules or else the whole judicial system fails. Granted, courts have moved to protect the defendant and thus have made the prosecutor’s job a difficult one. Convictions are hard to come by; however, we should not forget that the aim of the system is the attainment of justice. We must not allow the occasional prosecutor who becomes overzealous in his job to forget, either. The role of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case “differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.” ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-13 (1980). It is up to the jury to decide what is just. But to insure that the jury’s decision is correct, the attorneys must abide by the rules established to aid the jury in its quest for justice.
Appellant calls to our attention rules he contends that the prosecutor failed to abide by. First, it is well established that it is impermissible for prosecutors to assert their own credibility as a basis for conviction of defendants. United States v. Herrera, 531 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir. 1976). And second, “[i]t is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence of the guilt of the defendant.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.8 (1980). Prosecutors, as well as attorneys in general, acting as counsel in particular cases, are prohibited from attesting to facts or asserting as fact their personal beliefs relating to matters in issue. Ross v. State, supra, 8 Wyo. at 372, 57 P. 924. They are not to be witnesses testifying through their closing. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935).
In the case now before us the prosecuting attorney repeatedly overstepped and ignored these rules in his pursuit of victory. During his closing-in-chief, he argued:
“The story began January 14, 1981, in Uinta County. What happened on that day around three thirty in the afternoon? Two men showed up at the trailer home that [J] was living in. Those two men, Cecil Browder and Trenton Frith — and I tell you Ladies and Gentlemen, that that was not an accident. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
“ * * * I tell you that [J] was a target from the minute that they walked into that door. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
“ * * * There was Trenton Frith and Cecil Browder with a beer in their hands because they weren’t there for drinks. They were there for another purpose and don’t believe it if they tell you it was anything else, because it’s not so. They had targetted [sic] [J] and they knew what was going to happen. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
“ * * * Do you know what happened in the bathroom? More plan. More discussion. More firming up about what was going on. That’s what happened in the bathroom. That’s exactly what happened *894in the bathroom.” (No evidence had been introduced showing what happened in the bathroom. The prosecutor’s comment in essence is manufacturing facts.)
“ * * * Is that the kind of coy, little girl that’s going to walk by with her towel and smile? No. They haven’t done a good job of coming up with their story because that’s not what [J] is.”
“ * * * They want you to believe that [J] came in, fondled Trenton, because Trenton says that’s what happened, took the towel down, laid it on the bathroom floor and laid down and had sex with him right there. That’s what they want you to believe. It’s not so and that’s not the way it happened.” (Emphasis added.) “Now, I’m going to tell you the way it really happened. This is the way it really happened. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
“ * * * Now, they want you to believe, ‘Yeah. We found one at the bar and I had to drag her out by the hair.’ Ha, Ha, Ha, Ha. It’s not what happened. What happened is the way that [J] told the story and that’s what happened, the way [J] told the story.” (Emphasis added.)
“ * * * What you’re hearing today is rare because the State usually doesn’t have this good a case to present to you. We don’t have the fortunate circumstances we now have, the corroboration. * * * ”
“ * * * So the idea is that from now on, if you’re going to commit a rape, take a friend with you because then you’ll be able to come in and the two of you will say you didn’t do it. If you’re going to commit rape, commit gang rape. That would be the moral of the story, if we were to let it be that way. * * * ”
No objections to any of these statements were recorded. However, defense counsel, during his closing, pointed out to the jury that the prosecutor had failed to present it with evidence to support his bald assertions. Presumably this would have cured any plain error up to that point. It should further be noted that a reading of defense counsel’s closing shows no improprieties which could be an invitation to statements which were forthcoming from the prosecutor during his rebuttal closing. Were we to consider only the prosecutor’s closing to this point, plain error would probably not have been present.
But, in his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor clearly went over the boundary in making the assertions italicized:
“ * * * But the officers have told you why they didn’t do it and they are the epxerts [experts]. I was satisfied with their explanations and I brought this before you, so you look at it yourselves.” (Emphasis added.)
“I prefer not to do this in rebuttal, but I feel, again that I have to and I feel in a certain sense that not only the State’s witnesses but I, myself, our credibility has been brought into question. There is an inference that Joe Phillips sells drugs. There is an inference that Joe Phillips had a reason to come up here and say this, that the Prosecution had some kind of deal. That’s not so. That’s absolutely not so. Now, if you believe that, then you have to throw me out as a liar because I said it then and he said it and it’s not so. Not so. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
“ * * * Again, don’t only throw Joe’s story out the window, but throw mine out because that’s what happened. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
“ * * * I believe they knew that [J] was there and I draw upon my own personal inferences to say that, reasonable inferences, because of what I see happening. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
“ * * * gu£ that'g what I think, that’s what I believe. But I also believe [J] when she said it happened because I believe [J’s] story. I believed [J’s] story from the instant that they came to the door. I thoroughly believe her story.” (Emphasis added.)
“ * * * I believe they had in mind that they were going to have intercourse with her and I believe that they didn’t care whether it was by rape or by consent, but they did have that in mind. But that’s what I believe. * * * ” (Emphasis added.)
*895“ * * * When you look at all the evidence, you will conclude as I have, that the two Defendants, Cecil Browder and Trenton Frith, did commit a first degree sexual assault on [J] on January 14, 1981.” (Emphasis added.)
Again, no objections were recorded to these comments. However, that is not necessary where the error constitutes plain error. As provided in Rule 7.05, W.R.A.P., “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
In order to invoke the plain-error doctrine, several elements must first be established. First, the record must clearly show what occurred at the trial without resort to speculation. Second, the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been violated in an obvious way. And finally, this violation must have adversely affected some substantial right of the accused. Hampton v. State, Wyo., 558 P.2d 504 (1977).
Clearly the first two elements are present here. The question we must resolve is whether the. continuous disregard of the rules by the prosecutor was so great as to adversely affect the defendant’s substantial right to a fair trial. We hold the answer is yes.
In determining whether plain error has occurred, the facts of the case must be viewed in light of the trial record as a whole and not as to whether any one single incident standing alone would be reversible. United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (2nd Cir. 1970). This cumulative-effect approach has been applied in numerous cases. In particular, it was used by the United States Supreme Court in Berger, supra.
Reviewing the entire record in this case, it is clear that the fairness of appellant’s trial was called into question by the prosecutor’s conduct. It was a close case. The evidence of guilt is far from overwhelming. After making some marginally impermissible comments during his closing-in-chief, the prosecutor was perceptibly upset by defense counsel’s astute observation during his closing that the prosecutor’s comments were unsupported by the evidence amongst other telling observations about the State’s case. So, in his rebuttal, he in essence told the jury that if you don’t convict these people you are calling “me” a liar. While the occasional inclusion of phrases like “I believe” or “I think” in an argument is not prejudicial, United States v. Murphy, 374 F.2d 651 (2nd Cir. 1967); United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 281 (2nd Cir. 1964), the prosecutor here went overboard. His conduct was more extreme than that occurring in Mayer v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 127 (1980), and in Six Feathers v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 857 (1980).
Since prosecutors are very respected members of our society, it is impossible to know whether the conviction resulted from the jury’s independent evaluation of the evidence or from the jury’s desire not to call the prosecutor a liar. Since the case was so close and the prosecutor’s improper comments so numerous, most particularly in rebuttal, and because there was no invitation to error from the defense counsel, we must hold that plain error was present.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

. Section 6 — 4-302, W.S.1977 provides:
“(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:
“(i) The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible confinement; or
“(U) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats; or
“(iii) The victim is physically helpless, and the actor knows or should reasonably know the victim is physically helpless and the victim has not consented; [or]
“(iv) The actor knows or should reasonably know that the victim through a mental illness, mental deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim’s conduct.”

. It is interesting to note that the trial judge sentenced appellant to a minimum of five years and a maximum of five years and four months in prison, and then suspended four years on both the minimum and maximum of that sen-fence as well as giving appellant credit on both the minimum and maximum sentences for time spent in county jail during the pendency of the case.