Court Opinion

ID: 9901164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 15:08:15.071236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:27.706678
License: Public Domain

State of New York                                                   MEMORANDUM
Court of Appeals                                            This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to
                                                          revision before publication in the New York Reports.

 No. 64
 The People &c.,
         Respondent,
      v.
 Jose M. Rivera,
         Appellant.

 Guy Talia, for appellant.
 Lisa Gray, for respondent.
 Hon. Letitia James, New York State Attorney General, intervenor.

 MEMORANDUM:

        The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

        Defendant Jose M. Rivera argues that the sentencing court failed to exercise its

 discretion pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 720.10 to determine whether qualifying

                                             -1-
                                            -2-                                      No. 64

mitigating circumstances existed that would make him eligible for youthful offender

adjudication. We hold that the court did exercise its discretion in making the required

eligibility determination. Defendant also advances, for the first time in this Court, several

arguments for youthful offender eligibility based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn.,

Inc. v Bruen, 142 S Ct 2111 (2022). These arguments are unpreserved, and for the reasons

set forth in People v Cabrera (decided today), we do not reach them.

       The conviction underlying defendant’s sentence stems from his display of a loaded

gun during an argument over a parking space in 2010, when he was 17 years old.

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and was

sentenced as a second felony offender based on a 2007 felony conviction, which rendered

him ineligible for youthful offender treatment (see CPL 720.10 [2] [b]). The 2007 felony

conviction was vacated in 2016, leaving no predicate felony to support his 2011 second

felony offender sentence. The 2011 sentence was accordingly vacated, and defendant was

scheduled for resentencing.

       At resentencing, defendant was no longer precluded from arguing eligibility for

youthful offender treatment (see CPL 720.10 [2]), but the court denied his application upon

finding that he was not an eligible youth. The court first acknowledged that CPL 720.10

“requires in essence the Court to determine whether the defendant is now at resentence an

eligible youth based on his earlier age, and consider the presence or absence of factors set

forth in the statute.” The court found that although defendant “was not the sole participant

in the crime,” “his participation was not relatively minor by his admission that it was his

weapon and that he illegally possessed it.” Moreover, the court identified no “mitigating

                                            -2-
                                           -3-                                      No. 64

circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed,

namely mitigating factors to be concluded as requiring youthful offender adjudication.”

Additionally, the court expressly acknowledged an Appellate Division ruling, People v

Dukes, which had remitted a different case because the court had not considered those

factors (147 AD3d 1534 [2017]), and made clear that it was “now placing on the record as

required by statute” the “required criteria.” Finally, the court stated that “this was, of

course, an armed felony, Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, and as

such there are aggravating factors as opposed to mitigating factors in light of the

defendant’s participation which negate against a finding of youthful offender

adjudication.” Accordingly, the court determined “that the presence of the relevant factors

that must be decided do not appear applicable in the case at bar.” The court ultimately

imposed the same sentence that the defendant had previously negotiated: ten years of

imprisonment, followed by five years of post-release supervision. Defendant appealed his

resentence.

       The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, holding that the sentencing court

“did not err in concluding that defendant was not eligible to be adjudicated a youthful

offender,” given “defendant’s display of the weapon and his implicit threat to use it” (202

AD3d 1480, 1480-1481 [2022]).

       Criminal Procedure Law § 720.10 governs adjudication of youthful offender status.

Subdivisions (1) and (2) define an “eligible youth” to include “every” “person charged with

a crime alleged to have been committed when he was at least sixteen years old and less

than nineteen years old,” “unless,” in relevant part, “the conviction to be replaced by a

                                           -3-
                                            -4-                                       No. 64

youthful offender finding is for . . . an armed felony” (CPL § 720.10 [1]; [2]). Subdivision

(3) allows a youth convicted of an armed felony offense to nonetheless be treated as eligible

if the court finds: “(i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which

the crime was committed; or (ii) where the defendant was not the sole participant in the

crime, the defendant’s participation was relatively minor although not so minor as to

constitute a defense to the prosecution” (CPL 720.10 [3]).

       Defendant’s contention that the sentencing court failed to exercise its discretion to

determine whether mitigating circumstances existed relies upon two lines from his

resentencing proceedings. First, the court stated that “this was, of course, an armed felony,

Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, and as such there are aggravating

factors as opposed to mitigating factors in light of the defendant’s participation which

negate against a finding of youthful offender adjudication” (emphasis added). According

to defendant, this statement reflects a mistaken view that the mere designation of an offense

as an armed felony precludes a finding of mitigating circumstances. Second, the court

stated that it did not find any mitigating factors present that “require[ed] youthful offender

adjudication,” and defendant argues that mitigating circumstances need only permit, not

require, youthful adjudication.

       While neither of these isolated statements was the most artful articulation of the

relevant standards, the record indicates that the sentencing court applied the correct

statutory framework and exercised its discretion pursuant to the statute. The judge quoted

directly from CPL 720.10 (3) and explicitly referenced his “discretion” to determine

whether the statutory factors were present, specifically including “mitigating

                                            -4-
                                            -5-                                      No. 64

circumstances.” As required, the court expressly found that mitigating circumstances did

not exist. In any event, the Appellate Division correctly held that there were insufficient

mitigating circumstances to support youthful offender adjudication, given the threatening

manner in which defendant used the gun.

       Defendant’s remaining challenges based on the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision

in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen, 142 S Ct 2111 (2022), are unpreserved

and thus unreviewable for the reasons stated in People v Cabrera (decided today). Nor is

the preservation exception “permitting appellate review when a sentence’s illegality is

readily discernible from the trial record” applicable (People v Santiago, 22 NY3d 900, 903

[2013]). As we note in Cabrera, Bruen alone does not compel the conclusion that New

York’s criminal possession of a weapon statutes are unconstitutional, particularly absent

the development of a record in the trial court. We therefore do not reach defendant’s

contention that the Second Amendment bars classification of unlicensed public possession

as a violent armed felony such that he should have been eligible for youthful offender status

without regard to the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances.1

1
  Defendant appears to contend that the Second Amendment requires that possession of a
firearm for self-defense be treated as a mitigating circumstance for purposes of youthful
offender adjudication. “[O]nce considered [by the sentencing court], a youthful offender
adjudication is a matter left to the sound discretion of the sentencing court and therefore
any review is limited” (People v Pacherille, 25 NY3d 1021, 1023 [2015]). This constraint
only compounds the obstacles to reviewing defendant’s otherwise unpreserved Second
Amendment argument regarding mitigating circumstances.
                                            -5-
RIVERA, J. (concurring):

       Defendant Jose M. Rivera raises several challenges to his criminal weapons

conviction on a guilty plea to possessing a loaded unlicensed handgun. I agree with the

majority that defendant’s statutory claim regarding his eligibility for youthful offender

status is without merit (see majority op at 5). However, for the reasons I discuss in People

v Garcia, decided today, I disagree with the majority that defendant’s Second Amendment

claims are unpreserved. Nevertheless, those claims fail because defendant was under the

age of 18 at the time he committed the crimes and, as a minor, he had no unrestricted

Second Amendment right to possess an unlicensed weapon in public.

                                           -1-
                                             -2-                                       No. 64

       It is well-settled that minors have limited constitutional rights (Bellotti v Baird, 443

US 622, 634 [1979]). “[T]hree reasons justify[] the conclusion that the constitutional rights

of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children;

their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance

of the parental role in child rearing” (id. at 637). Minors cannot vote, hold public office,

serve on a jury or engage in certain types of employment (US Const, 26th Amend [age

requirement for voting], NY Const, art III § 7 [age requirement for holding certain public

office], Labor Law §§ 2, 133 [child labor laws]).

       This is not to say that minors are without any legal protections, and even for those

rights guaranteed to minors, in some cases a parent, legally recognized guardian, or the

State in its parens patriae role must act on behalf—and in the best interest—of the child

(Matter of Sayeh R., 91 NY2d 306, 313 [1997] [“In its role as parens patriae, New York is

under a powerful duty to protect its domiciliaries from harm”], citing NY Const, art XVII,

§ 3; Family Ct Act § 1013 [establishing Family Court jurisdiction for the protection of

minors]; Thompson v Oklahoma, 487 US 815, 825 n 23 [1988] [noting that children are not

yet “fully rational, choosing agent(s)”]; see also Parham v J.R., 442 US 584, 602 [1979]

[“The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child

lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult

decisions”]; Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166 [1944] [“(i)t is cardinal with us that

the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents”]; see also Miller v

Alabama, 567 US 460, 471 [2012] [discussing and relying on research about brain

                                             -2-
                                            -3-                                      No. 64

development]). Indeed, minors generally require an adult’s consent or a judicial order to

engage in certain adult conduct (Bellotti, 443 US at 634).*

       Unsurprisingly, and quite rationally, federal and state law restrict gun possession by

minors. These legislative restrictions do not run afoul of the Second Amendment. As

Justice Alito approvingly noted in his New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen

concurrence, “federal law generally forbids the possession of a handgun by a person who

is under the age of 18” (142 S Ct 2111, 2157-2158 [2022], citing 18 USC §§ 922 [x] [2]-

[5]). New York State similarly has historically barred nonmilitary personnel under 21 years

old from obtaining a gun license (Penal Law § 400.00 [1]).

       Therefore, because defendant at 17 years of age had no legal right to possess the

unlicensed guns in his possession—a prohibition on minors recognized under laws that he

does not challenge on this appeal—he has no standing to assert a Second Amendment

violation.

*
  The Bruen majority’s public carry rights analogy to First Amendment rights does not
assist defendant here (New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen (142 S Ct 2111,
2131 [2022]). As noted by Justice Stewart in Ginsberg v State of NY (390 US 629, 649-650
[1968]), which limited First Amendment rights in the case of minors:
              “[At] least in some precisely delineated areas, a child—like
              someone in a captive audience—is not possessed of that full
              capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of
              First Amendment guarantees. It is only upon such a premise, I
              should suppose, that a State may deprive children of other
              rights—the right to marry, for example, or the right to vote—
              deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for
              adults.”

                                            -3-
                                         -4-                                     No. 64

Order affirmed, in a memorandum. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Garcia, Singas,
Cannataro, Troutman and Halligan concur. Judge Rivera concurs in result in an opinion.

Decided November 21, 2023

                                         -4-