Court Opinion

ID: 9780917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 08:13:50.081246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:32.522660
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-23-00035-CR

          JORDAN COLBY MEEK, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

        On Appeal from the County Court at Law
                Panola County, Texas
             Trial Court No. 2020-C-091

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

           The State filed a motion to revoke Jordan Colby Meek’s community supervision, alleging

that Meek had failed to report to community supervision. After a hearing, in which Meek

proceeded pro se, the County Court at Law of Panola County revoked Meek’s community

supervision and sentenced him to two years’ incarceration in state jail.

           On appeal, Meek contends that he did not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waive

his right to court-appointed counsel.

           We overrule this point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment because we find that

Meek invoked his right to self-representation and intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily

waived his right to counsel.

I.         Factual and Procedural Background

           In August 2020, Meek was charged with the state-jail-felony offense of possession of

methamphetamine in an amount less than one gram.1 On August 5, 2021, pursuant to an

agreement with the State, and with the advice of court-appointed counsel, Meek entered a plea of

guilty to the offense as charged in the indictment, was found guilty, and was sentenced to two

years’ incarceration in state jail, probated for two years, and a $10,000.00 fine, with $8,000.00 of

the fine probated.

           The State filed a motion to revoke Meek’s community supervision on December 1, 2021.

In its motion, the State alleged that Meek had “failed to report to [community supervision] as

directed for the months of September, October, and November 2021.” Meek was arrested on

1
    TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(b) (Supp.).
                                                      2
January 21, 2023. On January 23, 2023, while in jail, Meek signed and then crossed out his

signature on a form requesting appointed counsel and refused to sign a certificate of service. On

January 24, 2023, the State filed an amended motion to revoke community supervision, alleging

that Meek had failed to report to community supervision as directed for any of the months from

September 2021 through December 2022.

       On January 31, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to revoke

Meek’s community supervision. At the outset of the hearing, the court asked Meek if he planned

to hire an attorney, and Meek responded, “I was planning on just talking to [the court] myself.”

The court questioned Meek regarding the form requesting appointed counsel that he signed and

then scratched out his name. Meek stated that he scratched out his name because he did not

understand what he was signing.

       The court explained to Meek that he had three options: (1) he could hire a lawyer to

represent him at the revocation hearing; (2) if he was indigent, the court would appoint a lawyer

to represent him; or (3) “and by far the very worst option,” Meek could represent himself. Meek

then asked the court to appoint him an attorney. The court stated that it would appoint a lawyer

and reset the hearing to the following week, February 8, 2023. But Meek interjected, “If there

was any way, Your Honor, that we could just get this dealt with so there is no wait.” The court

informed Meek that he was facing two years in prison if he were found to have violated the terms

of his community supervision, and the court told him that that was “a very important moment in

[his] life.” The court continued, “And there is no way we can proceed with this case today

unless you represent yourself, and I sure do advise you against doing that.” The court reiterated,

                                                3
“[T]he only way to go forward today is with you representing yourself, and that’s a terrible

idea.” Meek responded, “I do wish to move forward, and represent myself, because I did violate.

I did.”

          The court warned Meek:

          Well, before you say anything further, I have to, the law requires that I admonish
          you concerning the -- first of all, whether you’re making this decision freely and
          voluntarily and knowingly. The law requires that I investigate that. The law also
          requires that I advise you of the consequences of whatever you may do here. And
          the law requires that I advise you of the problems, and why it’s such a bad idea
          for you to represent yourself.

The court then questioned Meek about his background, education, fitness, and knowledge of the

legal proceedings. Although Meek had represented himself before “in [his] earlier years,” Meek

denied suffering from any disabilities or handicaps. He admitted that he had no legal training

and that he had never questioned or cross-examined a witness or presented an argument to a

court. Meek denied having any familiarity with the Texas Penal Code, the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure, the Texas Rules of Evidence, or the relevant provisions of the Texas Health

and Safety Code, but he stated that he understood that, if he represented himself, he would be

held “to know every single thing” in them. The following colloquy occurred:

                  THE COURT: In other words, you’re held to the exact same standards
          that a courtroom lawyer would be held to if we go forward in this case today. Do
          you understand?

                 MR. MEEK: Yes, Your Honor.

                 THE COURT: Why is it you think you’d be better off representing
          yourself than having a lawyer?

                 MR MEEK: Because I’m not wasting the Court’s time, Your Honor.

                                                  4
              THE COURT: Well, the Court has got plenty of time, and the Court’s
       main consideration is making sure that this is done right. Do you understand?

               MR. MEEK: Yes, Your Honor.

       Under questioning from the court, Meek stated that he understood what he was charged

with, the available range of punishment, and that he had already agreed that he would go to jail

for two years if he was found to have violated the terms of his community supervision. Meek

understood that, as an incarcerated criminal defendant representing himself, he would be unable

to investigate the facts and research the law the way an attorney could, he would be unable to

negotiate effectively with the State, and he would be unable to raise a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Before proceeding further, the court asked Meek, “You understand I am

fully prepared to make sure you have a lawyer, to appoint you a lawyer, and to give that lawyer

adequate time to prepare. So you understand that?” Meek responded, “Yes, sir. Your Honor.”

       Meek explicitly denied (1) that he had been threatened or forced into making this

decision, (2) being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, (3) ever being treated for or

diagnosed with a mental illness, (4) ever being found incompetent to stand trial, and (5) being

under the influence of any prescription medications. Meek reiterated that, “[k]nowing all of

this,” he still wanted to proceed in representing himself. The court held:

       Mr. Meek, as reluctant as I am here, I don’t really have much choice. I find that
       you’re mentally competent. I find that you understand what you’re doing. I find
       that you understand the risks and problems of self-representation. I find that
       you’re mentally competent to make this decision, and you’re not being forced to
       make it. So as reluctant as I am, the law says I have to let you represent yourself
       in this case.

                                                 5
Meek then reviewed and signed, in open court, a written waiver of his right to representation by

counsel. The hearing then proceeded with Meek representing himself.

            Meek entered a plea of true to the allegations in the State’s motion to revoke, specifically

admitting that he failed to report to community supervision for the months alleged. Amy

Holland, a community supervision officer, testified that she met with Meek and that he

understood the terms and conditions of his community supervision. However, other than a single

telephone call, she had neither seen nor heard from Meek since he had been placed on

community supervision. After being admonished regarding his Fifth Amendment privilege not

to incriminate himself, Meek explained:

            [T]he reason as to why I didn’t show up is because of me violating it more than
            just not showing up. I had, I had used substances, and I was scared to show up.
            And after that, me not showing up the first time, my fear of showing up grew,
            which is the reason why I didn’t show up. That’s what I have. That’s all I have.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Meek had violated the terms of his

community supervision, granted the State’s motion to revoke, and ordered Meek to serve two

years in state jail.2 Meek filed this appeal, arguing that he did not unequivocally, intelligently,

knowingly, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel.

II.         Meek’s Waiver of Counsel Was Intelligent, Knowing, and Voluntary

            “The Sixth Amendment guarantees that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.’” Williams v. State, 252

S.W.3d 353, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.

VI). As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained,

2
    The trial court suspended the entire fine.
                                                     6
       The right to counsel at trial is regarded as fundamental. The assistance of counsel
       protects a defendant’s right to a fair trial; counsel ensures that the prosecution’s
       case is subjected to meaningful adversarial testing and safeguards the defendant’s
       rights. An indigent defendant is therefore entitled to appointed counsel unless the
       defendant competently, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to counsel.

Id. (citations omitted). Although “the right to defend oneself at trial is ‘fundamental’ in nature, it

is clear that it is representation by counsel that is the standard, not the exception.” Martinez v.

Ct. of Appeal of Cal., Fourth App. Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (citation omitted). As a

result, “there is a strong presumption against waiver” of the right to counsel. Patterson v.

Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 307 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).        Such “a waiver may only be

accepted if made with full awareness of ‘the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’”

Id. (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). “The prosecution has a heavy

burden to demonstrate that a waiver of constitutional rights was made intelligently, knowingly,

and voluntarily, particularly when that right was the right to counsel.” Geeslin v. State, 600

S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).

       “In order competently and intelligently to invoke his Sixth Amendment right to represent

himself, an accused ‘should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-

representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is

made with eyes open.”’” Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)

(quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 1.051(g) (Supp.) (court

“shall advise the defendant of the nature of the charges . . . and, if the defendant is proceeding to

trial, the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation”). As explained by the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals,

                                                  7
       Generally, the record must be sufficient for the reviewing court to make an
       assessment that appellant knowingly exercised his right to defend himself.
       Admonishments of defendants who wish to proceed pro se should include an
       effort to ensure that the defendant is aware of the practical disadvantages of
       representing himself. The defendant should be aware that there are technical rules
       of evidence and procedure, and he will not be granted any special consideration
       solely because he asserted his pro se rights. Martin[ v. State, 630 S.W.2d 952
       (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)]; Burton v. State, 634 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. [Crim.] App.
       [Panel Op.] 1982). As Faretta . . . held, his eyes should be open to the fact that,
       while it is undoubtedly his right, he is about to embark on a risky course.

Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The trial court is not, however,

required to follow a “particular ‘script’” or engage in “formulaic questioning” in order “to assure

itself that an accused who has asserted his right to self-representation does so with eyes open.”

Burgess v. State, 816 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). “It is required only that the

record ‘contain proper admonishments concerning pro se representation and any necessary

inquiries of the defendant so that the trial court may make “an assessment of his knowing

exercise of the right to defend himself.”’” Id. (quoting Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578,

583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).

       We review de novo the issue of whether Meek validly waived his constitutional right to

counsel.   See United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 74 F. App’x 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2003)

(per curiam) (reviewing de novo defendant’s claim that waiver of Sixth Amendment right to

counsel was not valid because trial court failed to admonish him about dangers and

disadvantages of self-representation); Hernandez v. State, No. 03-19-00202-CR, 2020 WL

3526355 (Tex. App.—Austin June 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

       Meek unequivocally asserted numerous times that he wished to represent himself. The

trial court engaged Meek in a dialogue in an attempt to see if he was knowingly and intelligently
                                                8
waiving his right to be represented by counsel and, instead, choosing to represent himself.3 The

court addressed Meek’s understanding of (1) the revocation proceedings and the charge against

him, (2) the range of punishment, (3) his right to representation, (4) his right to appointment of

counsel if he were indigent, (5) his education, and (6) his lack of legal work experience. The

court also inquired into his understanding that he, as a non-lawyer, would nonetheless be held to

the same standards as a lawyer. Meek also admitted that he understood that having a lawyer

would have several practical advantages over representing himself.

           The trial court was able to observe Meek during the hearing, engage him in a dialogue

regarding the proceedings, and observe his definite and volitional behavior and consistent,

unequivocal insistence on self-representation. On this record, we a cannot conclude that the trial

court erred in finding Meek’s waiver of counsel knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

Accordingly, we overrule this point of error.

           We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                       Jeff Rambin
                                                       Justice

Date Submitted:              August 15, 2023
Date Decided:                August 28, 2023

Do Not Publish

3
    Meek admits that he “was admonished appropriately and extensively regarding his potential waiver of counsel.”
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