Court Opinion

ID: 9622573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:20:02.699991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:18.573174
License: Public Domain

RAHMEYER, C.J.,
concurring.
I concur in the result as there was ample evidence that a modification in the custodial arrangements was warranted; however, I write separately to call attention to two matters. The first, and what appears to be a minor, point, is the trial court designation of “primary physical custody.” At some point, the courts will have to directly address the issue as to what amount of parenting time qualifies as sole *756physical custody and what amount qualifies as joint physical custody, if for no other reason than the difference in standards for modification of visitation versus modification of custody. In this case, although the court designated Father as the primary physical custodian, the court also granted legal and physical custody to both parents. Both parents were awarded significant periods of time with the child. § 452.375.1(3). Our recital in the principal opinion of the custodial designation does not indicate our approval of the designation of “primary physical custodian”. See Bell v. Bell, 125 S.W.3d 899, 902 n. 3 (Mo.App. W.D.2004) (“Confusingly, courts have often used the term ‘primary physical custodian’ to refer to both a sole physical custodian and a joint physical custodian who has more custody time than the other custodial parent.”)(internal citation omitted).
The second, and more important, matter concerns the imperative of complying with the statute as to the issue of notice. As set forth in the principal opinion, in this case, there was evidence that neither sufficient nor actual notice was given to Father; nevertheless, I write to set forth my disagreement with the line of cases cited in the principal opinion for the proposition that “actual notice” of a proposed relocation is sufficient to comply with Section 452.377.2. See Herigon v. Herigon, 121 S.W.3d 562, 566-67 (Mo.App. W.D.2003); Baxley v. Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192, 205 (Mo.App. W.D.2002). I disagree with the Baxley court’s disregard of the plain, clear language of Section 452.377.
The legislature set forth a specific procedure for a parent who seeks to relocate with a minor child. In pertinent part, Section 452.377.2 states: “Notice of a proposed relocation of the residence of the child, or any party entitled to custody or visitation of the child, shall be given in writing by certified mail, return receipt requested, to any party with custody or visitation rights.” (emphasis added). The requirement that the notice be by certified mail is restated in Section 452.377.11:
After August 28,1998, every court order establishing or modifying custody or visitation shall include the following language: ‘Absent exigent circumstances as determined by a court with jurisdiction, you, as a party to this action, are ordered to notify, in writing by certified mail, return receipt requested, and at least sixty days prior to the proposed relocation, each party to this action of any proposed relocation of the principal residence of the child, including the following information.’ (emphasis added).
The language continues, “your failure to notify a party of a relocation of a child may be considered in a proceeding to modify custody or visitation with the child.” § 452.377.11. Without citing to any authority, and with serious consequences to the parent who did not receive the authorized notice, the Baxley court waived the requirement that the notice be by certified mail. Baxley, 91 S.W.3d at 205. To compound the matter, after refusing to require the relocating parent to strictly comply with the statute, the Baxley court then inexplicitly required strict compliance by the non-relocating parent in the filing of an objection within thirty days of receiving notice. Id. at 206. Because the father did not file an objection with thirty days, the court reasoned that mother, as a matter of law, could move the child out of state and not even the court could challenge that decision. Id. That conclusion is simply not warranted by the plain language of the statute, nor by the intent of the statute,1 *757and leads us to the present case wherein a parent claims that any sort of “actual notice” waives the statutorily-mandated notice and allows relocation as a matter of law, a relocation that is essentially unre-viewable by the court. See In re Wright, 129 S.W.3d 882, slip op. (Mo.App. W.D.2004); see also Heslop v. Sanderson, 123 S.W.3d 214 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). I write separately to encourage, in the appropriate case, a thoughtful revisiting of Baxley and its progeny.

. Contrary to the conclusions reached in Jill S. Kingsbury, Mommy, Are We Moving? No *757... Maybe ... Yes....”-The Evolution of Missouri's Relocation Law, 60 J. Mo. Bar 83 (Mar.-Apr.2004), the statute was not enacted to make it easier for relocating parents with children, but rather to give stability and to increase both parents' input when one parent chooses to relocate. Prior to the statutory change, numerous newspaper articles appeared highlighting the dilemma a parent faces upon discovering during an attempted visitation that the children have moved without any notice at all. The purpose of the statute was to insure notice prior to any move and to provide consequences for the failure to provide notice. See Wright, 129 S.W.3d at 887-89.