Court Opinion

ID: 9573690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:57:46.851859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:42:20.267512
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
I would reverse and dismiss the conviction on the ground that the prosecution of Marshall under the second indictment placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and Virginia. U.S. Const., amend V; Va. Const., art. I, § 6. The former jeopardy provisions of both constitutions forbid trying an individual for an offense identical to one for which he has already been convicted. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 736, 740, 273 S.E.2d 784, 787, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 920 (1981); see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). For the purpose of applying this rule, offenses are “identical” if the facts required to convict of one would necessarily convict of the other. Rouzie v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 174, 176, 207 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1974).
On May 3, 1985, Marshall was tried under the first indictment, which alleged the following:
On or about March 3, 1985, in the City of Richmond, Robert Earl Marshall did feloniously and unlawfully rape . . . [the victim], age thirteen. Va. Code § 18.2-61.14
At that jury trial the Commonwealth proved that Marshall raped the victim on March 3, 1985, and on every other day (or every weekend) starting when the victim was age eight. The evidence established that the victim became thirteen in July of 1984. The jury returned with a verdict of “guilty of rape as charged in the indictment.”
If any person has sexual intercourse with a female or causes a female to engage in sexual intercourse with any person and such act is accomplished (i) against her will, by force, threat or intimidation, or (ii) through the use of the female’s mental incapacity or physical helplessness, or (iii) with a female child under the age thirteen as the victim, he or she shall, in the discretion of the court or jury, be punished with confinement in the penitentiary for life or for any term not less than five years.
*259The second indictment, dated April 1, 1985, under which Marshall was tried on July 16, 1985, charged as follows:
[W]ithin the last five and a half years prior to the date of this indictment Robert Earl Marshall did feloniously and unlawfully rape [the victim], age thirteen. Va. Code § 18.2-61.
In my opinion the trial under the second indictment was constitutionally prohibited by the former jeopardy principles because, by operation of the wording of the second indictment, proof by the Commonwealth of acts constituting the offense of rape on any day within the five and a half year period prior to April 1, 1985, would support Marshall’s conviction at the second trial. Obviously, this time span includes acts committed “on or about March 3, 1985,” for which Marshall had already been tried and convicted under the first indictment. Thus, to the extent that the second indictment charges an offense which includes a rape occurring on or about March 3, 1985, the facts required to convict Marshall under the first indictment would necessarily convict him under the second indictment. Because both the first and second indictments charge Marshall with rape in violation of Code § 18.2-61, and because the verdict in the first trial stated merely “guilty of rape as charged in the indictment,” it is immaterial to the former jeopardy analysis that the victim turned thirteen at some point during the period covered by the second indictment. Simply stated, Marshall was convicted of rape for his acts occurring on or about March 3, 1985 and then retried and convicted for the same offense stemming from the same acts. This is precisely the type of repeated prosecution condemned by the former jeopardy provisions.
If there was any doubt whether the offense for which Marshall was tried under the second indictment was identical to the offense for which Marshall was convicted in the first trial, both the evidence and the instructions by which the jury was charged in the first trial unequivocally dispose of that doubt.15 During the first *260trial, in which Marshall was charged with rape “[o]n or about March 3, 1985,” the Commonwealth introduced evidence tending to establish that Marshall had sexual intercourse with the victim as early as 1979 and continuing through April 1, 1985. Thus, the jury was presented with all of the acts that the Commonwealth later proved in gaining a second conviction.
At the first trial, the only attempt to limit the jury in considering the evidence of acts of sexual intercourse alleged to have taken place during the six year period occurred by giving the following confused instruction:
Instruction No. 8
Evidence of acts of sexual intercourse on March 3, 1985, for which the defendant is not being tried should be admitted, for only limited purposes. The jury should be permitted to consider such evidence, if it believes the evidence to be true, as showing the defendant’s inclination to commit the act with which he is charged and as tending to corroborate the testimony of the alleged victim with respect to the act with which the defendant is charged. The jury should not be permitted to consider such evidence as proof of the defendant’s guilt of any offense with which he is not charged, or as direct proof of the defendant’s guilt of the offense with which he is charged, (emphasis added)
Inexplicably, the instruction cautioned the jury that acts of sexual intercourse occurring on the very day mentioned in the indictment *261were admitted for limited purposes. Not only is it apparent that the instruction was ill-conceived, it is also inconceivable that the jury charged with this instruction did not consider as direct proof of Marshall’s guilt under the first indictment all the acts alleged to have occurred during the six year period.
An examination of other instructions given to the jury at the first trial leads inexorably to the conclusion that the jury was not limited in its consideration of the evidence and was instructed as to the elements necessary to convict Marshall of either forcible rape or statutory rape.* 123************16 Although the first indictment was written in terms that suggested that Marshall was being charged with *262committing a rape on a specific date during a time when the victim was thirteen years of age, the jury apparently was instructed upon the theory (1) that the Commonwealth was not bound by the allegation of “on or about” in the indictment as to the date of the commission of the offense and (2) that the jury could convict Marshall of rape upon either proof of forcible rape or proof of sexual intercourse with the victim without force at any time when she was less than thirteen years of age, i.e. prior to July of 1984. Cf. Pasanello v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 640, 647, 145 S.E.2d 200, 205 (1965); Lear v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 187, 193, 77 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1953); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 329, 336, 57 S.E.2d 89, 92 (1950); Harris v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 26, 34, 37 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1946); Shaver v. Commonwealth, 151 Va. 545, 547-551, 145 S.E. 377, 378 (1928); Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 362, 365, 349 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1986).
Because the Commonwealth introduced evidence to establish acts of rape occurring between 1979 and April 1, 1985, the jury was given the option to convict Marshall of either forcible rape or statutory rape. Marshall was subject to punishment for either forcible rape or statutory rape based on any act which was proved during that period. Thus, the jury’s finding in the first trial that Marshall was. “guilty of rape as charged in the indictment” bars a subsequent prosecution under the second indictment which charges:
*263“within the last five and a half years prior to the date of this indictment Robert Earl Marshall did feloniously and unlawfully rape [the victim], age thirteen.”
I would therefore reverse the decision of the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the second prosecution as constitutionally barred.
Even if I were to subscribe to the majority’s position that the second prosecution was not constitutionally barred, I do not believe that evidence relating the events which occurred on March 3, 1985, should have been admitted at the second trial. Although such evidence may have been relevant insofar as it tended to prove the relationship between the defendant and his victim, see, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970), it is a well established maxim that relevant evidence, otherwise admissible, must be excluded where its probative value is outweighed by the prejudice which it engenders against the accused in the minds of the jurors. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 837, 840-41, 127 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1962).
The second indictment alleges that “within the last five and a half years prior to the date of this indictment . . . Marshall did . . . rape . . . [the victim], age thirteen.” The time span of the offense charged under the second indictment included March 3, 1985, the date of the acts for which the majority opinion apparently concludes that Marshall had been convicted under the first indictment. The evidence concerning the incidents which occurred on March 3, 1985, if offered at the trial under the second indictment, would be sufficient to warrant a conviction under the second indictment because it proved an act of rape which occurred during the time alleged in the indictment. That such evidence is prejudicial in the highest degree is blatantly apparent. Although the Commonwealth asserts that such evidence is admissible only to show the disposition of Marshall to molest the victim, it is obvious that the evidence would weigh prominently in the jury’s guilt deliberations. Furthermore, insofar as the victim testified at the second trial as to multiple incidents of intercourse that occurred during the “five and a half years prior to the date of [the] indictment,” such testimony relating the events of March 3 was merely cumulative and therefore of little evidentiary value in establishing the relationship between Marshall and the victim. *264Based on these factors, I believe if the Commonwealth could pursue a second prosecution, evidence of acts occurring on March 3 should have been excluded. Finally, I believe that it defies logic to suggest under the circumstances of this case that the jury could heed a cautionary instruction requiring it to ignore evidence of a rape which occurred during the time period covered by the indictment in determining whether Marshall committed another act of rape during the same time period.
Thus, even if I believed that Marshall could be tried under the indictment which charged that he raped the victim within the last five and a half years prior to the date of the indictment, I would nonetheless hold that evidence relating to acts occurring on March 3, 1985, was inadmissible at the second trial.

 Prior to a 1986 amendment and at all times relevant to the issues in this appeal Code § 18.2-61 provided as follows:

 Although the Commonwealth asserted in its brief that “the circuit court made the record of the first trial part of the record in this case,” the majority has determined that the trial judge’s failure to enter a timely order precludes consideration of the record of the first trial on this appeal. I disagree.
Two days prior to the second trial, defense counsel filed a written plea of former jeopardy in which the “defendant further move[d] to make a part of the record in this matter *260the entire record of the trial proceedings against him on May 3, 1985 ... for the purpose of his special plea of former jeopardy. . . .” The trial judge who signed the order incorporating the record of the first trial as a part of the record of the second trial presided at both trials and was familiar with the record. Furthermore, the assistant commonwealth’s attorney who prosecuted both cases endorsed the order “seen” and, thus, expressed no objection to its entry. Assuming that the trial judge failed to enter a timely order on the record, I would grant leave to correct this oversight pursuant to Code § 8.01-428(B) and, accordingly, would deem the trial judge’s order dated “1/6/85” (sic) sufficient to do so. See Lamb v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 161, 279 S.E.2d 389 (1981); Dorn v. Dorn, 222 Va. 288, 279 S.E.2d 393 (1981); Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220 Va. 638, 261 S.E.2d 52 (1979); Council v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 288, 94 S.E.2d 245 (1956).
Moreover, because the error that occurred in this case was so egregious and correction of the trial judge’s oversight will not prejudice the Commonwealth, consideration of appellant’s constitutional claim is warranted in order to attain the ends of justice. Rule 5A:18.

 Instructions 5, 7, and 9 charged the jury as follows:
Instruction No. 5
In this case, the age of [the victim] at the time of the alleged sexual intercourse is an essential element of the offense, as to statutory rape. In your consideration of this, the actual date of birth is controlling.
Instruction No. 7
The element of force, threat or intimidation required as to forcible rape must be sufficient to overcome any unwillingness on the part of [the victim] to have sexual intercourse.
Instruction No. 9
The defendant is charged with the crime of rape. The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of that crime:
(1) That the defendant had sexual intercourse with [the victim]; and
(2) That it was against her will; and
(3) That it was by force, threat or intimidation.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth had proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the offense as charged, then you shall find the defendant guilty and fix his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for life or for any term no less than five (5) years.
If you find the Commonwealth has failed to prove any one or more of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the defendant not guilty of rape.

You may find the defendant guilty of statutory rape. The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of that crime:

(1) That the defendant had sexual intercourse with [the victim]; and
(2) That at the time of the sexual intercourse she was less than thirteen years of age.
If you find the Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the offense, then you shall find the defendant guilty and fix his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for life or for a term not less than five (5) years.
*262If you find the Commonwealth has failed to prove element (2) of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the defendant not guilty of statutory rape of [the victim] being less than thirteen years of age. You may find the defendant guilty of statutory rape of [the victim] being less than fifteen years of age. The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of that crime:
(1) That the defendant had sexual intercourse with [the victim], and
(2) That at the time of the sexual intercourse she had not yet reached fifteen (15) years of age.
If you find the Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the above elements of the offense, then you shall find the defendant guilty and fix his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of not less than two (2) years nor more than (10) years.
If you find the Commonwealth has failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the defendant not guilty. (Emphasis added).