Court Opinion

ID: 9858115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:14:54.186582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:39.102033
License: Public Domain

Larson, J.
(dissenting) — I find myself unable to agree with the majority in the determination that the “doctrine” of res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Otherwise, I find no fault with the announced rules of law nor with the authorities cited, but feel they are not properly applied to the facts in this case.
The degree of care one must exercise is commensurate with the duty upon one to exercise due care. Negligence is the failure to exercise such care. Negligence of the defendant, of course, can be proved by circumstantial evidence, but under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur proof of certain facts supply the inference of negligence necessary for recovery. See 35 Iowa Law Review 393; Shinofield v. Curtis, 245 Iowa 1352, 66 N.W.2d 465, and citations. The rules applicable require (a) that the accident be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) that it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (c) the elimination of any possible contributing conduct which would make plaintiff responsible. Prosser on Torts, Hornbook Series, page 291. It is true some authorities, including Iowa, suggest also that the evidence as to the explanation of the accident must be more readily accessible to the defendant than to the' plaintiff, but the better view is that so long as the circumstances give rise to a reasonable inference of negligence, the latter showing is not essential. If required, even this element is found herein.
Circumstances here, I believe, clearly reveal facts or sets of facts which permit, though they do not compel, a finding that the defendant was in fact negligent. Eaves v. City of Ottumwa, 240 Iowa 956, 38 N.W.2d 761, 11 A. L. R.2d 1164. Of course *958the mere fact that an. accident occurred, with nothing more is not evidence of negligence. Perhaps this is the place the majority falls into error. This accident was not unavoidable. It was not an occurrence that defied explanation. The actual condition of the marquee could and should have been discovered. A duty of the management appears to have been neglected. Defendant was charged with a duty to keep the marquee extending over the public sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition. In the light of ordinary experience, such structures are dangerous unless kept in good repair. Bust and wear make it imperative that regular and complete inspections be made of all parts, hidden as well as visible. Visible evidence of such rust and weather-wear, discovered in á hasty inspection by the management, gave mute warning of disintegrating parts. Was this not sufficient warning to alert the management that other parts, though hidden from view, were likewise affected? It must be said that all that is required here is that reasonable men shall be able to say that on the whole it is more likely that there was negligence associated with the cause than that there was not. Failure of structural parts not inspected or carefully maintained, especially after due warning, must give rise to an inference of negligence. The jury thought so, and I agree. It is interesting also to note the fact that the offending marquee has now been completely removed.
The duty to keep the marquee in a reasonably safe condition was commensurate with the hazard involved to those invited to use it — above as well as below. That it extended to plaintiff, an invited workman who went thereon to repair a visible defect, there can be no doubt. He was not an unforeseeable victim of a failure of other defective structural parts. There was a duty to him as well as to the public generally to maintain the structure in a reasonably safe condition. The condition of a welded and riveted joint, concealed within the facing of the structure a short distance from the apparent defect, could have been found upon further examination. It was not discovered, and it did fail. Do not such facts give rise to an inference of negligence by defendant? Such a degree of care toward a person permitted to submit himself to the hazard involved seems to me as not calling for an unreasonable burden upon the defendant.
*959The majority confound me further by saying there is an entire lack of evidence to show there was such exclusive control by the defendant-company to charge it with superior knowledge or means of information as to the cause of the accident. Who did have control of this structure? Who found a defective knuckle and asked to have it repaired? Who could and should inspect the entire structure to prevent injury to this workman or the general public passing beneath the same ? Who else could or should obtain the knowledge of the structure’s safety? Was it not incumbent upon the company to inspect and find the defects ?
Plaintiff’s employer was shown the portion defendant wished repaired, and the method of repair was left to-the contractor. The entire structure could have and perhaps should have been turned over to him for repairs, but it was not. Only a small part was referred to the repairman. Was it not defendant’s obligation to know the structure’s condition and keep it safe? Were not all persons properly using it entitled to assume that duty was performed? Plaintiff and his employer were carefully performing the task assigned to them, and that small sector dicl not fail. The failure came in another part in the exclusive control of defendant, and defendant alone. Could it be that it was not charged with a superior knowledge of the structural condition of that marquee? Could it thereby escape all inferences of negligence by merely stating it was unaware of the hidden defect? I think not.
The cases are many holding public utilities and others for structural failures of hidden underground pipes that are defective and cause damage to others. I fail to distinguish them from the case at bar. Res ipsa loquitur has been held to apply in Carmody v. Boston Gas Light Co., 162 Mass. 539, 39 N.E. 184; Gould v. Winona Gas Co., 100 Minn. 258, 111 N.W. 254, 10 L. R. A., N. S., 889; Buffums’ v. City of Long Beach, 111 Cal. App. 327, 295 P. 540; Frenkil v. Johnson, 175 Md. 592, 3 A.2d 479; Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., 150 Minn. 515, 186 N.W. 123, 23 A. L. R. 479. Also see annotation at 11 A. L.R.2d 1179; Eaves v. Ottumwa, 240 Iowa 956, 38 N.W.2d 761, 11 A. L. R.2d 1164, and eases cited therein; and many others. In the Eaves *960case this court, speaking through Justice Garfield, said at page 969 of 240 Iowa:
“Under this doctrine, where injury occurs by instrumentalities under the exclusive control and management of defendant and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used, the happening of the injury permits but does not compel an inference that defendant was negligent.” (Citing cases.) Also see 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, section 295.
I feel res ipsa loquitur is clearly applicable here where there was a general obligation to exercise due care, a special knowledge due to the visible condition, and a clear inference, if proper inspection had been made, that general and not specific repairs would have been necessary to make the marquee safe for all those expected or invited to use it.
Would the determination have been any different had the plaintiff been a sidewalk pedestrian crushed by the falling marquee ? Surely res ipsa loquitur would then apply. As to similar cases pertaining to falling awnings, see annotation, 34 A. L. R.2d 486; Potter v. Rorabaugh-Wiley Dry Goods Co., 83 Kan. 712, 112 P. 613, 32 L. R. A., N. S., 45; McCrorey v. Thomas, 109 Va. 373, 63 S.E. 1011, 17 Ann. Cas. 373; Schnur v. State, 35 N. Y. S.2d 499; S. H. Kress & Co. v. Barratt, 226 Ala. 455, 147 So. 386.
I would affirm.
Oliver, J., joins in this dissent.