Court Opinion

ID: 9385120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 21:04:12.575423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:58.905477
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                  2023 IL App (4th) 210729-U                     FILED
This Order was filed under                                                        April 5, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                      Carla Bender
                                           NO. 4-21-0729
not precedent except in the                                                   4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed                                                       Court, IL
                                   IN THE APPELLATE COURT
under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                            OF ILLINOIS

                                        FOURTH DISTRICT

 AHMAD H. AHMAD,                                               )      Appeal from the
           Petitioner-Appellant,                               )      Circuit Court of
           v.                                                  )      Macon County
 MOHAMMED QATTOUM,                                             )      No. 20OP710
           Respondent-Appellee.                                )
                                                               )      Honorable
                                                               )      Lindsey A. Shelton,
                                                               )      Judge Presiding.

                 JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court.
                 Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1      Held: (1) The trial court’s decision denying petitioner’s request for a plenary stalking no
              contact order against respondent was not legally inconsistent with its decision to
              grant a plenary order in another case.

                 (2) The trial court’s decision denying petitioner’s request for a plenary stalking no
                 contact order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2               Petitioner, Ahmad H. Ahmad, appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for a

plenary stalking no contact order against respondent, Mohammed Qattoum. Ahmad argues the

court’s decision was (1) inconsistent with its decision to grant Majeda Owaida a stalking no contact

order against Raida Qattoum and (2) against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

¶3                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶4               On December 29, 2020, Ahmad filed a verified petition for an emergency stalking

no contact order against Mohammed. In the petition, Ahmad stated he had known Mohammed and
his wife, Raida, for many years. Beginning in October 2020, Ahmad and his family began

receiving harassing calls and messages from unknown numbers. Ahmad alleged Mohammed and

Raida were responsible. On December 20, 2020, Ahmad told Mohammed to leave him and his

family alone and blocked Mohammed from calling or messaging him. Despite his request, the calls

and messages from unknown numbers continued. This conduct caused Ahmad significant distress,

and he feared for his safety. Based on these allegations, the trial court granted Ahmad’s petition

for an emergency stalking no contact order against Mohammed and set the matter for a plenary

hearing.

¶5             Prior to the plenary hearing, Ahmad’s close friend, Majeda, obtained an emergency

stalking no contact order against Raida (Macon County case No. 21-OP-549) and the matter was

set for a plenary hearing.

¶6             The trial court conducted contemporaneous plenary hearings in Ahmad’s and

Majeda’s cases over four days from August through November 2021. At the conclusion of the

hearings, the court granted Majeda a plenary stalking no contact order against Raida and included

Ahmad as protected person thereunder. (Majeda’s plenary stalking no contact order against Raida

was the subject of a separate appeal; this court affirmed the trial court’s decision. See Owaida v.

Qattoum, 2022 IL App (4th) 210715-U.) However, the court denied Ahmad’s petition for a plenary

stalking no contact order against Mohammed.

¶7                                     A. Plenary Hearings

¶8                                    1. Ahmad’s Testimony

¶9             Ahmad testified he had known Mohammed and Raida for approximately 17 to 18

years. In 2019, the relationship began to deteriorate after Ahmad declined two offers Mohammed

and Raida made to purchase his restaurant. At a friend’s request, in approximately November 2020,

                                                -2-
Ahmad visited an empty restaurant building that was for sale. Mohammed and Raida previously

planned to purchase this building; however, their deal fell through. While Ahmad viewed the

building, Mohammed and Raida’s relative confronted him. Shortly after this confrontation,

Ahmad’s mother and sister began receiving upsetting phone calls. Although the calls came from

unknown numbers, Ahmad’s mother sent him a message identifying Raida as the caller. Around

the same time, Ahmad began getting hundreds of harassing calls from unknown numbers.

¶ 10           On December 20, 2020, Ahmad received multiple calls and messages from

Mohammed. (Screenshots of these messages were admitted as Petitioner’s exhibit A.) In these

messages, Mohammed complained Ahmad’s mother and sister made “allegations” against Raida.

Mohammed wanted to meet with Ahmad to resolve this issue. Ahmad responded to the calls and

messages by telling Mohammed to “ ‘Leave me alone. Leave my family alone. Leave my mother

alone. Leave my brother alone.’ ” He also blocked Mohammed’s phone number. Undeterred,

Mohammed used WhatsApp to contact Ahmad again.

¶ 11           That same day, Ahmad also received numerous calls from unknown or blocked

numbers. During one of those calls, the female caller said, “ ‘If anything bad happens to us, we’re

going to burn you.’ ” These calls and messages continued throughout 2021. Both Ahmad and

Majeda noticed the calls and messages would get “more intense” when Majeda was at Ahmad’s

house. He believed some of the insulting messages he received were referring to Majeda. Ahmad

was concerned for both his and Majeda’s safety because of the calls and messages. He alerted the

police to the situation and installed cameras at his home to “be safe from the Qattoums.”

¶ 12           During his testimony, Ahmad presented an audio file of a voicemail he received

from an unknown number in May 2021. (This audio file was admitted into evidence as Petitioner’s

exhibit D2.) The caller said, “I’m not going to leave her alone. Just wait on me.” Ahmad identified

                                                -3-
Raida’s voice on this voicemail. According to Ahmad, Raida left this voicemail in response to a

police report he made about Mohammed and Raida harassing him.

¶ 13           Numerous messages from “random numbers” were sent to Ahmad, and he claimed

they were from Mohammed and Raida because of details contained within the messages.

(Screenshots of these messages were admitted as Petitioner’s exhibits Q and R.) One message,

from July 2021, stated in part, “ ‘I cannot wait till you leave the country *** we will see what will

happen.’ ” Ahmad mentioned during a previous court hearing that he would be unavailable in late

July because he was traveling out of the country. He had not informed anyone else of his travel

plans. Another message, from August 2021, stated “ ‘A restaurant that is not worth [$]50,000, you

want to sell it for [$]80,000. You are money hungry and a thief.’ ” (In 2019, Ahmad wanted

Mohammed and Raida to pay $80,000 to purchase his restaurant, but they only wanted to pay

$50,000.) A third message from August 5, 2021, referenced “ ‘my son Ribhi.’ ” Mohammed and

Raida have a son named Ribhi.

¶ 14           On multiple occasions, Ahmad’s home security camera captured a vehicle passing

his home, which Ahmad contended was Raida and Mohammed conducting surveillance on him

and his home. On one occasion, around the same time the vehicle was captured by his camera, he

received a call in which the female caller said, “ ‘I see the w*** is here today.’ ” Another time,

Ahmad received a call in which the female caller said, “ ‘We’re watching your house.’ ”

(Screenshots from the camera footage were admitted into evidence as Petitioner’s exhibit O.)

¶ 15           Finally, Ahmad also testified Mohammed called him a “lowlife” outside the

courtroom on the first day of the plenary hearing. Ahmad noted calling someone a “lowlife” is a

“huge insult” in his culture and Ahmad believed a physical altercation would have occurred if he

had responded.

                                                -4-
¶ 16                                  2. Majeda’s Testimony

¶ 17           Majeda works for a nonprofit organization and worked at Ahmad’s restaurant.

Majeda described herself as Ahmad’s “close friend” and said she sometimes stayed with him at

his residence. She acknowledged Ahmad was married and his wife lived in Jordan. Majeda only

met Mohammed and Raida once, while she was working at Ahmad’s restaurant in the summer of

2020.

¶ 18           In November 2020, Majeda began receiving calls and messages containing “vulgar

language and harassment” from numbers she did not recognize. Although the calls were from

unknown numbers, Majeda recognized Raida’s voice on the calls. On two occasions when Majeda

did not answer, the female caller left a voicemail. The first voicemail from March 2021 said,

“ ‘We’re going to get you. We’re going to get you. I gonna get you. I will get you.’ ” Majeda

testified it was Raida’s voice on this voicemail. The other voicemail, from April 2021, said “ ‘Are

you going to put me in prison, you w***?’ ” Majeda recognized this voice as Raida’s as well.

(Audio files of these voicemails were admitted as Petitioner’s exhibits M2 and J2, respectively.)

Majeda previously heard Raida’s voice at Ahmad’s restaurant and from “the message that had

been sent to [Ahmad’s] sister and mother.” Majeda also received vulgar messages stating she was

trash, a w***, and had no mother or father. (These messages were admitted into evidence as

Petitioner’s exhibits V, W, and X.) As a result of these messages, Majeda felt unstable, emotional,

frustrated, and intimidated.

¶ 19                                   3. Raida’s Testimony

¶ 20           Raida testified she only met Majeda once, for a few minutes, at Ahmad’s restaurant.

She denied calling, sending any of the messages at issue, and that it was her voice on the voicemail

                                                -5-
messages. Raida insisted she did not have Majeda’s number. As to the vehicle captured on the

camera footage outside Ahmad’s home, Raida denied that it was her vehicle.

¶ 21                              4. Mohammed’s Testimony

¶ 22          Mohammed testified he had known Ahmad for many years and initially, they were

friends. Over time, Mohammed also became friends with Ahmad’s brother. In October 2020,

Ahmad sent Mohammed a message telling Mohammed to leave Ahmad’s brother alone and to

“ ‘Leave us alone.’ ” Mohammed was busy with his son’s wedding and did not respond to the

message.

¶ 23          On December 20, 2020, Raida showed Mohammed messages from Ahmad’s

mother, which contained “all kinds of bad words.” Mohammed admitted he called Ahmad three or

four times that day to try and resolve the situation. Ahmad answered Mohammed’s last call and

told Mohammed to leave him and his family alone. When Mohammed asked to meet with Ahmad

to discuss the situation, Ahmad declined and hung up. He tried calling Ahmad again, but Ahmad

never answered. Using WhatsApp, Mohammed also sent Ahmad messages when Ahmad failed to

answer his other calls or messages. According to Mohammed, he only called and messaged Ahmad

so he could “solve the matter between me and him” and to “prove myself innocent and my wife.”

After December 20, 2020, Mohammed asserted he had not called or messaged Ahmad.

¶ 24          Mohammed’s son had previously attempted to purchase a vacant restaurant

building, but the deal ultimately fell through. Later, Mohammed’s nephew saw Ahmad and another

individual looking at the building and spoke with them. However, Mohammed denied any

problems or issues with Ahmad about the vacant restaurant building.

¶ 25          When asked about his attempts to communicate with Ahmad, Mohammed denied

making any calls or sending messages to Ahmad or Majeda from private numbers or numbers

                                              -6-
different than his own. Further, Mohammed suspected Ahmad was sending the messages himself

to make Mohammed and Raida look bad. Mohammed also testified the vehicle captured on

Ahmad’s camera was neither his nor Raida’s vehicle.

¶ 26                                  B. Trial Court’s Ruling

¶ 27           The trial court denied Ahmad’s petition for a plenary stalking no contact order

against Mohammed but granted Majeda’s petition for a plenary stalking no contact order against

Raida. The court explained its findings and credibility determinations as to each of the witnesses.

With respect to Mohammed, the court found “[a]ctual contact that the Court has heard that

Mohammed Qattoum has done, that the court finds he did commit himself, would be the insulting

comment that he had said to Dr. Ahmad on the phone and then also outside of the courtroom.” The

court continued:

                      “I do agree [Mohammed] admitted he had repeatedly called initially to try

               to work out the issues that they had. I didn’t hear testimony that he continued to do

               that after that initial—I understand the parties disagree as to the repeated calling,

               the purpose behind it. I don’t find that the other content or contact by [Mohammed]

               himself, I don’t find that the other text messages or phone calls have been shown

               that it was *** by [Mohammed].”

¶ 28           The trial court then addressed conduct it attributed to Raida. The court began by

stating,

               “I do find that there has been sufficient proof that shows a course of conduct to both

               Ahmad Ahmad, as well as Majeda Owaida.

                      ***

                                                -7-
                       *** I do find that those messages that I’m about to go through, text

               messages, as well as voicemails, were sent with the intent for it to get back to

               Majeda Owaida, even if it was on Ahmad Ahmad’s phone.”

¶ 29           In reaching its decisions, the trial court relied on Ahmad and Majeda’s

identification of Raida’s voice on the voicemails and surveillance footage from Ahmad’s home

showing a vehicle identified by Ahmad as belonging to Mohammed and Raida at the same time

Ahmad received harassing messages indicating the sender was watching his home and Majeda’s

movements. The court found “that is [Raida] placing both [Ahmad and Majeda] under surveillance,

as well as making threatening and harassing statements.”

¶ 30           The trial court allowed Ahmad to be added as a protected party under Majeda’s

plenary stalking no contact order against Raida.

¶ 31           This appeal followed.

¶ 32                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 33           On appeal, Ahmad argues the trial court erred in denying his petition for a plenary

stalking no contact order against Mohammed. He contends the court’s decision was both against

the manifest weight of the evidence and inconsistent with its decision to grant Majeda’s petition

for a plenary stalking no contact order against Raida. We disagree.

¶ 34           The Stalking No Contact Order Act (Act) provides a civil remedy for victims of

stalking. 740 ILCS 21/5 (West 2020). Under the Act, “ ‘[s]talking’ means engaging in a course of

conduct directed at a specific person” when the actor “knows or should know that this course of

conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety *** or the safety of a third

person or suffer emotional distress.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2020). “ ‘Course of conduct’ means

[two] or more acts, including but not limited to acts in which a respondent directly, indirectly, or

                                                -8-
through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes,

surveils, or threatens a person.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2020). “A course of conduct may include

contact via electronic communications.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2020). Contact is defined as

              “any contact with the victim *** including but not limited to being in the physical

              presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or

              confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the

              workplace or residence of the victim; entering onto or remaining on property owned,

              leased, or occupied by the victim; placing an object on, or delivering an object to,

              property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; electronic communication as

              defined in Section 26.5-0.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012; and appearing at the

              prohibited workplace, school, or place of worship.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2020).

¶ 35           In proceedings under the Act, a petitioner must prove stalking by a preponderance

of the evidence. 740 ILCS 21/30(a) (West 2020). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means

that the fact at issue *** is rendered more likely than not.” People v. Houar, 365 Ill. App. 3d 682,

686, 850 N.E.2d 327, 331 (2006).

¶ 36                 A. Agency Relationship and Consistency of Judgments

¶ 37           First, Ahmad argues the trial court’s denial of his petition for a plenary stalking no

contact order against Mohammed was inconsistent with its decision to grant Majeda’s petition for

a plenary stalking no contact order against Raida. Ahmad contends the court found an agency

relationship existed between Mohammed and Raida, and this factual finding required the court to

grant Ahmad’s petition in order to avoid creating an inconsistent judgment with its order granting

Majeda’s petition against Raida. We disagree.

                                                -9-
¶ 38           Ahmad claims the judgments between his case and Majeda’s are legally

inconsistent and cites Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill. 2d 622, 837 N.E.2d 883 (2005), which delineates

the standard of review for legally inconsistent verdicts. He attempts to analogize a case involving

inconsistent verdicts to this case, which involves inconsistent judgments. However, a verdict is

specific to a jury trial. See Verdict, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2009). In this case, there was

no jury and therefore no verdict, so any argument the trial court’s judgments should be reviewed

under the standard of review for inconsistent verdicts is misplaced.

¶ 39           Ahmad asserts that, in a bench trial, inconsistent findings in different cases which

affect the ultimate issue require reversal and remand. See Regan v. Joseph P., 286 Ill. App. 3d 889,

677 N.E.2d 434 (1997). Ahmad argues that because the trial court made the factual finding that

there was an agency relationship between Mohammed and Raida, the court’s decision to deny his

request for a plenary stalking no contact order against Mohammed is inconsistent with its order

granting a plenary stalking no contact order for Majeda against Raida. His argument relies solely

on the court’s statement that Raida and Mohammed are “agents of each other.”

¶ 40           The Act, for the purpose of determining accountability for the actions of others,

invokes the accountability section of the Criminal Code of 2012, which states:

               “A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:

                       (a) having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or

                       she causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or

                       by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state;

                       (b) the statute defining the offense makes him or her so accountable; or

                       (c) either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent

               to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or

                                                -10-
                attempts to aid that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” 720

                ILCS 5/5-2 (West 2010).

Here, the record does not support Ahmad’s contention that the trial court made an agency finding

sufficient to invoke the accountability statute. The record is devoid of any discussion of the

elements required to establish accountability under the statute or even any reference to the

accountability statute itself. In fact, the sole reference to any agency relationship occurs when the

court stated,

                       “There was another text message that was sent after that, that was, ‘File as

                many cases against us if you want,’ but, again, the Court shows context as to who

                is sending the messages. Whether that was specifically from [Mohammed] or

                [Raida], I do consider that as from [Raida]. I believe they’re agents of each other.

                They’re working for the same goal. So I do find that whether that was [Mohammed]

                or [Raida], it does further [Raida’s] intent to harass both [Majeda and Ahmad].”

                (Emphasis added.)

This comment appears to be a mere observation by the court that Mohammed and Raida are

working toward the same goal. This single observation is not the equivalent of the court making a

finding that the two are legally accountable for the other’s actions under the accountability statute.

Without any type of accountability finding, Ahmad cannot argue that there was an agency

relationship established between Mohammed and Raida, such that Raida’s actions would be

attributable to Mohammed.

¶ 41            As we have concluded that the trial court did not find an agency relationship existed

between Mohammed and Raida that would invoke the accountability statute, there is no basis to

support Ahmad’s inconsistent judgments argument. Therefore, the court’s decision denying

                                                -11-
Ahmad’s request for a plenary stalking no contact order against Mohammed was not inconsistent

with its judgment granting a plenary order for Majeda against Raida.

¶ 42                            B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

¶ 43           Ahmad next argues the trial court’s decision to deny his request for a plenary

stalking no contact order against Mohammed was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

According to Ahmad, although the court “discounted a substantial amount of circumstantial

evidence,” he presented sufficient proof of Mohammed’s conduct to support the entry of a plenary

stalking no contact order against Mohammed. We disagree.

¶ 44           This court will not overturn a trial court’s denial of a petition for a stalking no

contact order unless the ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See McNally v.

Bredemann, 2015 IL App (1st) 134048, ¶ 12, 30 N.E.3d 557; see also Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342,

349-50, 860 N.E.2d 240, 244-45 (2006) (findings based on the presence of a preponderance of the

evidence are reviewed under the manifest weight standard of review). A court’s ruling is against

the manifest weight of the evidence only if “ ‘the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or if the

finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.’ ” McNally, 2015

IL App (1st) 134048, ¶ 12 (quoting Nicholson v. Wilson, 2013 IL App (3d) 110517, ¶ 22, 993

N.E.2d 594). When this court reviews a case under the manifest weight standard, “we give

deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the

conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses and has a degree of familiarity with the

evidence that a reviewing court cannot possibly obtain.” In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99, 777

N.E.2d 930, 943 (2002). “A reviewing court, therefore, must not substitute its judgment for that of

the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, or the

inferences to be drawn.” D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 499.

                                                -12-
¶ 45           Ahmad argues the uncontradicted evidence showed Mohammed did more than

make “just a phone call [from Mohammed to Ahmad] to straighten things out.” Ahmad

misconstrues the trial court’s findings. The court clearly considered more than just a single phone

call from Mohammed to Ahmad.

¶ 46           The evidence showed Mohammed called and messaged Ahmad several times on

December 20, 2020, before Ahmad blocked Mohammed. Mohammed admitted to these repeated

attempts to contact Ahmad to try to resolve the issues between them, including continuing to

contact Ahmad after Ahmad told Mohammed to leave him alone. However, Mohammed denied

calling or messaging Ahmad after December 20, 2020, either from his number or from any phone

numbers that were not his own. The trial court specifically noted it found Mohammed repeatedly

contacted Ahmad to “try to work out the issues that they had had.”

¶ 47           Ahmad asserts the trial court “discounted a substantial amount of circumstantial

evidence,” including “the flood of calls and messages to [his] phone that contained information

suggesting they came from [Mohammed and Raida]” and Mohammed’s “surveillance of his

restaurant.” “ ‘Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts and circumstances from which a [fact

finder] may infer other connected facts which usually and reasonably follow, according to the

common experience of mankind.’ ” Olson v. Williams All Seasons Co., 2012 IL App (2d) 110818

¶ 26, 974 N.E.2d 914 (quoting Housh v. Swanson, 203 Ill. App. 3d 377, 381, 561 N.E.2d 321, 323

(1990)). In the context of civil actions, our supreme court has emphasized “the use of

circumstantial evidence is not limited to those instances in which the circumstances support only

one logical conclusion. Instead, circumstantial evidence will suffice whenever an inference may

reasonably be drawn therefrom ***.” Mort v. Walter, 98 Ill. 2d 391, 396, 457 N.E.2d 18, 21 (1983).

                                               -13-
Accordingly, “[c]ircumstantial evidence does not need to exclude all other possible inferences or

support only one logical conclusion.” Olson, 2012 IL App (2d) 110818, ¶ 26.

¶ 48           The trial court, after hearing all the evidence presented and after weighing the

credibility of the witnesses and their testimony, determined there was not sufficient evidence

presented by Ahmad to prove stalking by Mohammed. The court concluded Ahmad did not prove

Mohammed made any calls or sent any messages to Ahmad from unknown numbers. Thus, it is

clear the court considered the circumstantial evidence; however, it was not sufficient to infer

Mohammed was the caller. Therefore, the court denied Ahmad’s request for a plenary stalking no

contact order. The record is devoid of evidence suggesting the opposite conclusion is readily

apparent or that the court’s judgment was not based on the evidence presented. Ahmad points to

evidence not specifically discussed in the court’s ruling to support his argument the court’s

decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the existence of some evidence

supporting Ahmad’s claim against Mohammed does not mean the court’s finding was against the

manifest weight of the evidence. See Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. 151 Interstate

Road Corp., 209 Ill. 2d 471, 488, 810 N.E.2d 1, 11 (2004) (finding it is insufficient for a reversal

under the manifest weight standard to simply show the record could support a contrary decision).

¶ 49           In this case, based on the evidence presented, the trial court, as the finder of fact,

determined Ahmad failed to establish Mohammed made additional contact with Ahmad outside

the initial repeated contact on December 20, 2020. Thus, the court did not find Ahmad established

a course of conduct by Mohammed, which is a necessary element to prove stalking by a

preponderance of the evidence. 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2020). As discussed above, to establish a

course of conduct, a petitioner must show “[two] or more acts, including but not limited to acts in

which a respondent directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or

                                               -14-
means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, or threatens a person.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2020).

Here, other than the initial attempts to contact Ahmad, the court found Ahmad failed to prove any

additional acts which were attributable to Mohammed. Moreover, the court indicated it ultimately

found a majority of the conduct to have been committed by Raida, and not Mohammed, for the

purpose of harassing Majeda and Ahmad. Accordingly, we find the court’s denial of Ahmad’s

request for a plenary stalking no contact order was supported by the record and not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 50                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 51          For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 52          Affirmed.

                                              -15-