Court Opinion

ID: 9745572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:10:41.280974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:32.001734
License: Public Domain

O’Connor, J.
In this case, we hold that a man’s promise to support a woman made in consideration of the woman’s abandonment of her marriage, or promise to abandon her marriage, to another man violates public policy and is unenforceable.
The complaint is in five counts. Count I alleges that on an unknown date in September, 1970, “the parties entered into an oral agreement whereby the Defendant agreed to support and care for the Plaintiff and her children for the remainder of her life,” and “[i]n consideration of . . . the Defendant’s promise . . . Plaintiff, on her part, agreed to and did in fact give up her marriage, her marital rights, and refrained from *159naming Defendant and protected Defendant in her pending divorce action.” Count II alleges that “[o]n or about September, 1970, the parties commenced a life style whereby the Defendant, pursuant to his promise to the Plaintiff to support her for the remainder of her life, supported the Plaintiff and her children [for a substantial period of time and then ceased doing so], and the Plaintiff, at the instance and request of Defendant, and in reliance upon Defendant’s promise and the Plaintiff’s expectations that Defendant would care and support the Plaintiff for the remainder of her life, gave up her marriage, to care for Defendant.” Count II further alleges that “[b]y reason of the breach by the Defendant of his promises made to Plaintiff on or about September, 1970, and divers other occasions, the Plaintiff has sustained serious and substantial damages.” In Count III, the plaintiff says that “on or about September, 1970, and on divers other occasions thereafter, the Defendant promised that he would care and support the Plaintiff for the remainder of her life. In consideration of the foregoing, the Plaintiff relinquished all her marital rights, provided companionship to the Defendant, altered her mode of living and in all respects acted as a loyal and dutiful friend and companion.” Counts I and II are for breach of contract. Count III seeks recovery on a quantum meruit theory. Counts IV and V, respectively, allege the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence based on the defendant’s breach of “the agreement” to which the earlier counts refer.
The complaint asserts the plaintiff’s right to damages based on the defendant’s failure to fulfil his promise of support, made in September, 1970, and “on divers other occasions.” We read every count in the complaint as asserting that an integral part of the consideration for the undertaking was the plaintiff’s promise, thereafter fulfilled, that she would abandon her existing marriage to another man.1
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and a judge of *160the Superior Court allowed the motion. The plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Court and, on our own motion, we transferred the appeal to this court. We conclude that the judge correctly allowed the defendant’s motion. Nevertheless, we vacate the judgment of dismissal in order that the plaintiff may have an opportunity to move in the Superior Court for leave to amend her complaint.
We apply the principle that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Nevertheless, we conclude that the complaint was properly dismissed. We declare, as an expression of public policy, that a contract, containing as an essential provision the requirement that one of the contracting parties will abandon that party’s marriage to a third person, is unenforceable in this Commonwealth on a contract, quantum meruit, or any other theory. Because, as we construe it, the plaintiff’s undertaking to abandon her marriage is an integral part of the contract on which she relies, “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which [will] entitle [her] to relief.” Nader v. Citron, supra at 98.2
Our declaration of policy is consistent with other expressions of this court and the Legislature. The Legislature has declared that “the policy of this commonwealth [is] to direct its efforts ... to the strengthening and encouragement of family life.” G. L. c. 119, § 1 (1984 ed.). This court has said that “[marriage] is the foundation of the family. It is a social institution of the highest importance. The Commonwealth has a deep interest that its integrity is not jeopardized.” French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 546 (1935). See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175 (1983) (“The Commonwealth has extensively exercised [its] power to regulate numerous aspects of *161the marriage relationship. See generally G. L. c. 207. Given this broad concern with the institution of marriage, the State has a legitimate interest in prohibiting conduct which may threaten that institution”); Osborne v. Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 599 (1981) (“[W]e recognize that certain contracts may so unreasonably encourage divorce as to be unenforceable on grounds of public policy. See Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 190 [1981]”); Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 51 (1975) (“Massachusetts has a strong public interest in ensuring that its rules governing marriage are not subverted”).
The plaintiff’s reliance on our decision in Green v. Richmond, supra, as support for the proposition that her complaint is adequate to survive a motion to dismiss is misplaced. We need not discuss that case except to point out that the female plaintiff, who sought to recover on the basis of an agreement, performed by her, that she would live with the defendant’s decedent and render services to him in return for his promise to compensate her by will, did not rely, as does the plaintiff here, on an agreement containing as an essential provision the requirement that she abandon her marriage. To the contrary, the evidence in that case showed that the plaintiff had been divorced before she met the defendant’s decedent. Id. at 49.
We conclude that the trial judge properly dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. We recognize that the plaintiff has not requested leave to amend her complaint in the event of our affirming the trial judge’s order, and we also recognize that nothing in the complaint suggests that the plaintiff’s abandonment of her marriage was not a significant part of the consideration for the defendant’s alleged promise. However, in view of the strong policy of our rules of civil procedure in favor of allowing the amendment of pleadings, we vacate the judgment of dismissal. The plaintiff is to have thirty days from the receipt in the Superior Court of the rescript herein to move in that court for leave to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

So ordered.

 In her brief, the plaintiff’s arguments are premised on the construction we give to the complaint.

 It is unnecessary, therefore, for us to consider other arguments of the defendant challenging the enforceability of the alleged contract.