Court Opinion

ID: 9466123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:06:08.017976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:33.455123
License: Public Domain

LIVELY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority on all issues except failure to observe the minimization requirements of the surveillance orders. The device which was installed in the Lincoln Continental was not a wiretap, but was a radio transmitter. With a wiretap the conversations are overheard only by authorized persons who are directly connected to the tapped line. The device used to eavesdrop on conversations in the Zalmanowski car had a range of approximately one-half mile and could have been picked up by anyone within that distance whose receiver was on the same frequency.
Each of the two orders authorizing the interception of communications in Zalmanowski’s automobile provided:
that this authorization to intercept wire and oral communications . . shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code .
PROVIDING FURTHER, that the oral devices . . . shall be activated only when [the suspects] are determined by physical surveillance or voice identification to be present inside this vehicle with any of these [suspects]. Once the oral devices are activated and conversations are intercepted, the interception shall continue only so long as [the suspects] are participants in those conversations.
These provisions were included in the orders in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976), which requires minimization in general terms.
In spite of these minimization requirements, the device which was installed in the Zalmanowski car had no shutoff capability. The bug was always “on” and every conversation was broadcast in full. The agents conducting the surveillance did not activate the device only when suspects were determined to be inside the automobile. Though the agents may have discontinued listening when it was not determined that the suspects were participants in intercepted conversations, they had no means of terminating the broadcasts and preventing interception of irrelevant conversations by others.
The constitutionally mandated requirements for electronic surveillance were adopted and elaborated by Congress in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See Senate Report No. 90 — 1097, Committee on Judiciary (April 29, 1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News, pp. 2112, 2153 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)).
Minimization of the scope of an electronic intrusion is a critical aspect of the statutory scheme and of constitutional compliance. The purpose of the minimization requirement is to avoid intrusions into private communications not reasonably related to the criminal investigation. Without limits, a warrant for a “search and seizure” of private communications becomes a “general search” equivalent to the “general warrants” which prompted the careful drafting *683of the Fourth Amendment and partly motivated the Declaration of Independence. Berger, 388 U.S. at 58, 87 S.Ct. 1873.
The means of conducting the interceptions of conversations in the Zalmanowski car did not comply with the plain and literal requirements of the court order. No search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if it is conducted in a way which violates the terms of the court order required to authorize it. The authority to conduct electronic surveillance accrues solely from the authorizing order of a judicial officer. This is an important feature of both the constitutional law of electronic searches and of the statutory scheme.
As the court stated in United States v. James, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 88, 102, 494 F.2d 1007, 1021 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Tantillo v. United States, 419 U.S. 1020, 95 S.Ct. 495, 42 L.Ed.2d 294 (1974), “The most striking feature of Title III is its reliance upon a judicial officer to supervise wiretap operations.” And the statute specifically provides that a ground for suppression of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance is that “the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(iii); see also United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432-34, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977). Moreover, the clear import of Berger, supra, is that such surveillance inherently is too broadly intrusive and thus is an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment without careful limitations prescribed by a judge.
It is true that the appellants produced no proof that conversations in the car were overheard by anyone other than monitoring agents. Nevertheless, it is hard to conceive of a more flagrant breach of the right of privacy than to have one’s conversations broadcast at large without his knowledge or consent. I find no basis in the record for the district court’s speculation that a more serious intrusion would have occurred if the agents had complied with the minimization requirements and installed a “bug” which could have been deactivated when conversations unrelated to the investigation were taking place.
The government’s argument that the detection and transmission of conversations was not an “interception” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) is not persuasive. The statute defines an interception as “the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” Id. In United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 74, 50 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976), the Fifth Circuit rejected an interpretation of “interception” which would require both acquisition of the contents of the communication by the device and actual contemporaneous hearing of the communication by the person conducting the monitoring. Rather, an intercept occurs when the device detects the communication and its contents are then transmitted, heard, or preserved by recordation for later listening. 526 F.2d at 658 and nn. 2 — 4.
In my view none of the circuit court cases cited in the majority opinion covers the issue in the present case. None involved the use of a device without cutoff capability which indiscriminately broadcast all conversations which took place in private property. Though the majority opinion correctly states the holding of Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), I do not believe that Scott supports the result which the majority reaches. A crucial requirement here was that the agents use a device which could be deactivated when irrelevant, personal conversations were detected. This was clearly required by the court orders. The result of their failure to follow the order was a serious, unauthorized intrusion.
I would reverse the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence obtained from “bugging” the Zalmanowski automobile.