Court Opinion

ID: 9408296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 13:01:17.191606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.184759
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to revision before publication.

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
              FOR THE    ARMED FORCES
                    _______________

                  UNITED STATES
                      Appellee

                            v.

          Caleb A. C. SMITH, Airman
         United States Air Force, Appellant

                     No. 22-0237
                 Crim. App. No. 40013

 Argued January 25, 2023—Decided July 12, 2023

          Military Judge: Bryan D. Watson

For Appellant: Scott R. Hockenberry, Esq. (argued);
Major Heather M. Caine, Major Megan E. Hoffman,
and Brian Pristera, Esq. (on brief).

For Appellee: Captain Jocelyn Q. Wright (argued);
Colonel Naomi P. Dennis, Lieutenant Colonel Mat-
thew J. Neil, and Mary Ellen Payne, Esq. (on brief).

Judge JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Chief Judge OHLSON, Judge SPARKS,
Judge MAGGS, and Judge HARDY joined.
                _______________
           United States v. Smith, No. 22-0237/AF
                    Opinion of the Court

   Judge JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
    A panel of officer members convicted Airman (Amn)
Caleb A. C. Smith, contrary to his pleas, of one specification
of sexual assault by oral penetration against Senior Air-
man (SrA) HS, in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2018). The panel
acquitted Appellant of another specification alleging a sex-
ual assault by digital penetration, in violation of Article
120, UCMJ. The approved sentence consisted of a dishon-
orable discharge, confinement for sixty days, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1. The United
States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) af-
firmed the findings and the sentence, United States v.
Smith, No. ACM 40013, 2022 CCA LEXIS 308, at *2, 2022
WL 1667257, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 25, 2022) (un-
published), and Appellant filed a timely appeal with this
Court.
   We granted review in this case to determine two issues:
      I. Whether the military judge erred in admitting
      text messages and testimony as an excited utter-
      ance related to the alleged victim’s belief that she
      was raped where she had no memory of the events
      in question; and
      II. Whether the evidence was legally insufficient
      because the alleged victim was capable of consent-
      ing and where, even if she was not capable of con-
      senting, Appellant reasonably believed that she
      did consent.
United States v. Smith, 83 M.J. 76, 76 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (or-
der granting review).
    For the reasons stated below, we hold that the military
judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the victim’s
electronic messages as an excited utterance and did not
plainly err in admitting her testimony about the messages.
As to the second issue, we find that the evidence for Appel-
lant’s conviction was legally sufficient because the Govern-
ment introduced ample evidence for a rational trier of fact
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant commit-
ted a sexual act upon SrA HS when she was incapable of

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                    Opinion of the Court

consenting due to impairment by intoxication, and Appel-
lant knew or reasonably should have known of the impair-
ment. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the AFCCA.
                      I. Background
   Appellant and SrA HS became friends in the summer of
2018, when both were assigned to bay orderly duties at
Fort Gordon, Georgia. At the time, SrA HS was in a long-
distance relationship with a Marine. Although she and Ap-
pellant socialized regularly, they did not have a romantic
relationship.
   On November 16, 2018, Appellant and SrA HS drove
from Fort Gordon to Charlotte, North Carolina, to attend a
concert. They planned to spend the night in Charlotte and
reserved a single hotel room with two beds to save money.
When they arrived in Charlotte at around 6:30 p.m., they
went directly to the concert venue, where they ordered al-
coholic drinks and watched the opening band. They took
turns waiting in the long line to buy additional rounds of
drinks.
   At approximately 9:00 p.m., after the opening band per-
formed, Appellant and SrA HS went to talk with the open-
ing band and look at their merchandise. SrA HS testified
that “[t]hings sort of start[ed] getting hazy around that
point”; she was “pretty drunk” and dizzy, had consumed at
least three “very strong” drinks, and had not eaten any-
thing since she arrived at the concert venue. The last thing
she remembered from the concert was talking with the
opening band. The next thing she remembered was falling
onto a bed at the hotel. She chose the bed nearest to the
door and went to sleep fully clothed.
   SrA HS awoke the next morning in the other bed with
Appellant, with his arm draped around her. She was na-
ked. She had no memory of how her clothes were removed.
The AFCCA described her testimony:
      HS said that she “froze. [She] was freaking out.
      [She] just kind of panicked.” She then “got up and
      went to the bathroom very quickly.” She felt
      “[n]auseated, panicky . . . [and] was shaking.” In

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                     Opinion of the Court

       the bathroom, she noticed that her vaginal area
       was sore and bleeding, but “just shrugged [this
       feeling] off.” As she got dressed, she noticed that
       her underwear was missing. She eventually found
       them shoved underneath the covers of the oppo-
       site bed from the one in which she woke up, the
       bed she originally planned to sleep in. When she
       found them, her underwear “were completely
       ripped through on one side, at the hip.”
Smith, 2022 CCA LEXIS 308, at *5, 2022 WL 1667257, at
*2 (alterations in original).
    Appellant and SrA HS had taken a taxi from the concert
venue to the hotel because they both were too intoxicated
to drive, so in the morning she took an Uber to retrieve her
car. She found it parked across the street from the concert
venue, and then she drove back to the hotel to change her
clothes and check out. SrA HS and Appellant had breakfast
and stopped at a cafe before starting their drive back to
Fort Gordon. She asked him why her underwear was torn.
He said he did not know.
    On their way out of town, Appellant and SrA HS
stopped at a gas station, where she used the restroom.
While looking in the mirror, she noticed a hickey or bruise
on her neck and another on her collarbone. Upon further
investigation, she discovered bruises on her chest and
arms. She testified, “I sort of freaked out. . . . I panicked. I
didn’t cry, but I felt nauseated and started shaking again.
And I messaged my friend [Amn MH], and I told him that
I thought that [Appellant] had raped me.” She explained:
       I was sort of putting together everything I noticed
       at the hotel room, and I just sort of came to the
       realization that I shouldn’t have brushed every-
       thing off at the hotel room, because initially I
       thought that it was impossible, but I just felt like
       it was obvious proof and I couldn’t really deny it
       anymore at that point.
As she sent the message, she experienced “[h]ands shaking,
nausea, [and] sweating.” By the time she exited the bath-
room several minutes later, she “had calmed down enough”

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                    Opinion of the Court

that her hands were no longer shaking and she was not
sweating.
    SrA HS returned to the car, and she and Appellant
drove back to Fort Gordon. She testified that the ride home
was awkward. In response to her queries, he told her secu-
rity guards had asked them to leave the concert when they
found her sitting on the floor, too drunk to stand, and the
taxi driver had to help Appellant carry her into the hotel.
She asked Appellant why they were in bed together. He
told her she had urinated on the other bed.
    Back at Fort Gordon, SrA HS dropped Appellant off at
his barracks, and then, on the advice of a friend, went to
the emergency room and obtained a Sexual Assault Foren-
sic Exam (SAFE). She initially made a restricted report of
sexual assault, but unrestricted it several months later.
   Appellant was interviewed by Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (AFOSI) agents on two occasions, in March
and April 2019. In the first interview, he agreed to provide
DNA samples for comparison with SrA HS’s SAFE evi-
dence. He initially claimed he could not remember much of
the evening, but he then admitted that was untrue and
acknowledged having sexual contact with SrA HS. Over
the course of the two interviews, both of which were vide-
otaped and played for the members, he disclosed details
about her intoxicated state and their interactions.
    Appellant told AFOSI that security guards kicked them
out of the concert because SrA HS was so intoxicated she
could not stand up, and they had to take a taxi to the hotel
because they were both too drunk to drive. He had con-
sumed four or five double shots. He did not know how much
SrA HS drank, but he thought she probably had as many
drinks as he had. She was “literally falling over” and slur-
ring her speech by the time they were asked to leave. Ap-
pellant had to help her unlock her phone to find the address
for their hotel. He had never seen her so intoxicated. On
the ride to the hotel, she seemed “drunk” and “wobbly.” He
told AFOSI that the taxi driver had to help them into the
hotel.

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                    Opinion of the Court

   Once inside the hotel room, according to Appellant, SrA
HS urinated on both beds and stumbled around the room
mumbling. He said that she stripped down to her under-
wear and helped him remove her bra because he was hav-
ing difficulty getting it off. Despite initially denying
knowledge of how her underwear was torn, he eventually
admitted he ripped it off her. And despite initially denying
any memory of sexual contact, he eventually told AFOSI,
“We didn’t have sex, but we made out.” He told AFOSI that
he performed oral sex on SrA HS, “and then I decided when
she was rubbing up on me, I decided that it was a wrong
idea to have sex with her since she was drunk, and I was
scared that I would get in trouble for it.” He insisted she
was “grinding on [him],” and when he stopped her, she was
“pissed” and “mopey” and said she “want[ed] to keep going.”
    In his second interview, Appellant said that SrA HS
was kissing him, biting his lip, and rubbing his penis while
they were “making out.” He said that she urinated on the
second bed while they were so engaged. He disengaged af-
ter a “sober moment[],” when he thought, “We were too
drunk, and she has a boyfriend . . . .” In his written state-
ment, Appellant apologized for not being truthful with
AFOSI initially, explaining that he was afraid he would get
in trouble.
    At trial, portions of the Snapchat messages between
SrA HS and Amn MH were admitted into evidence, as were
Appellant’s written and videotaped statements. The Gov-
ernment also introduced expert testimony from a forensic
biologist who testified that Appellant’s DNA was found on
swabs taken of SrA HS’s pubic mound and the inside crotch
of her underwear and opined that this evidence was con-
sistent with Appellant performing oral sex on her.
                       II. Discussion
                   A. Excited Utterance
   The military judge admitted, over defense objection, a
screenshot of SrA HS’s Snapchat message to Amn MH that
said, “I think he raped me.” Before making this evidentiary
ruling, the military judge required the Government to

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           United States v. Smith, No. 22-0237/AF
                    Opinion of the Court

present evidence so that he could determine whether the
message was an exited utterance under Military Rule of
Evidence (M.R.E.) 803. The Government called SrA HS,
who testified in an Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 839(a)
(2018), session about the circumstances under which the
message was sent. Following her testimony, the military
judge stated: “I do believe that the Government has laid the
appropriate foundation for an exited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule.” The military judge did not place further
analysis on the record. The AFCCA found that the military
judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the Snap-
chat message as an excited utterance, and therefore, he did
not plainly err in admitting SrA HS’s testimony describing
the message. Smith, 2022 CCA LEXIS 308, at *29-30, 2022
WL 1667257 at *11. For the reasons provided below, we af-
firm the decision of the AFCCA.
                      1. Applicable Law
   This Court reviews “a ‘military judge’s ruling admitting
or excluding an excited utterance [for] an abuse of discre-
tion.’ ” United States v. Henry, 81 M.J. 91, 95 (C.A.A.F.
2021) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Feltham, 58 M.J. 470, 474-75 (C.A.A.F. 2003)). “An abuse
of discretion occurs when a military judge either errone-
ously applies the law or clearly errs in making his or her
findings of fact.” United States v. Donaldson, 58 M.J. 477,
482 (C.A.A.F. 2003). “[T]he abuse of discretion standard of
review recognizes that a judge has a range of choices and
will not be reversed so long as the decision remains within
that range.” United States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 187
(C.A.A.F. 2004) (citation omitted). “[W]here the military
judge places on the record his analysis and application of
the law to the facts, deference is clearly warranted. On the
contrary, [i]f a military judge fails to place his findings and
analysis on the record, less deference will be accorded.”
United States v. Finch, 79 M.J. 389, 397 (C.A.A.F. 2020)
(second alteration in the original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citations omitted).
   “When reviewing a decision of a Court of Criminal Ap-
peals on a military judge’s discretionary ruling, ‘we

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           United States v. Smith, No. 22-0237/AF
                    Opinion of the Court

typically have pierced through that intermediate level’ and
examined the military judge’s ruling.” Feltham, 58 M.J. at
474-75 (quoting United States v. Siroky, 44 M.J. 394, 399
(C.A.A.F. 1996)). “We then decide whether the Court of
Criminal Appeals was correct in its examination of the mil-
itary judge’s ruling.” Id. at 475.
    Unpreserved evidentiary errors are forfeited in the ab-
sence of plain error. United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33, 36
(C.A.A.F. 2014). Under this standard, the appellant bears
the “burden of establishing (1) error that is (2) clear or ob-
vious and (3) results in material prejudice to his substan-
tial rights.” Id. (citing United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325,
328 (C.A.A.F. 2007)).
    “As a general rule, hearsay, defined as an out of court
statement offered into evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, is not admissible in courts-martial.”
United States v. Ayala, 81 M.J. 25, 28 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (cit-
ing M.R.E. 801(c) and M.R.E. 802). However, “[a] state-
ment relating to a startling event or condition, made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it
caused,” is admissible as an exception to the general prohi-
bition on hearsay as an excited utterance. M.R.E. 803(2).
“The implicit premise [of the exception] is that a person
who reacts to a startling event or condition while under the
stress of excitement caused thereby will speak truthfully
because of a lack of opportunity to fabricate.” United States
v. Jones, 30 M.J. 127, 129 (C.M.A. 1990) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357
(1992) (explaining that “a statement that qualifies for ad-
mission under a ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception is so
trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add
little to its reliability” (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 820-21 (1990))).
   For hearsay to be admitted as an excited utterance: (1)
“the statement must be spontaneous, excited or impulsive
rather than the product of reflection and deliberation”; (2)
“the event [that prompts the utterance] must be startling”;
and (3) “the declarant must be under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the event.” United States v. Arnold, 25 M.J.

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                     Opinion of the Court

129, 132 (C.M.A. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citations omitted). “The proponent of the excited utterance
has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that each element is met.” Henry, 81 M.J. at 96.
                   2. Additional Background
   SrA HS testified on direct examination that when she
was in the bathroom and saw bruises on her chest and
arms, she panicked and messaged her friend via Snapchat
that she thought she had been raped by Appellant. She ex-
plained that in that moment, she pieced together every-
thing she had observed at the hotel and realized that she
should not have brushed off those observations. The de-
fense did not object to this testimony. 1
   The Government then handed SrA HS a screenshot of
the Snapchat message that included the following ex-
change:
   [SrA HS:]      I think he raped me.
   [Amn MH:]      Wait what
                  What happened?
                  Are you okay?
   [SrA HS:]      No
                  I noticed a hickey on my neck
                  and then saw handprints on my
                  boobs.
When the Government asked SrA HS where she was when
she sent the message, the defense objected on the basis of

   1   Although the granted issue asks whether the military
judged erred in admitting text messages and testimony regard-
ing the victim’s belief that she was raped, the briefs to this Court
focus on the admissibility of one line of a Snapchat message from
SrA HS to Amn MH: “I think he raped me.” The defense did not
object to SrA HS’s testimony that she sent the message, and the
briefs do not provide any distinct argument for the inadmissibil-
ity of the testimony apart from the admissibility of the message
itself. Accordingly, we review the admission of the testimony for
plain error, in light of our resolution of the admissibility of the
message.

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            United States v. Smith, No. 22-0237/AF
                     Opinion of the Court

hearsay, arguing that the Snapchat message did not meet
the foundational elements of an excited utterance because
SrA HS was “texting him. She[ was] not still looking at a
startling event or condition” at the time she sent the mes-
sage. 2
    The Government countered that a proper foundation
was established where the message was “sent while she’s
still in the bathroom under the stress of the idea of having
now just seen all these bruises and piecing together that
she believed that she had been sexually assaulted.” 3
    The military judge convened an Article 39(a), UCMJ,
session to hear evidence and arguments on the hearsay ob-
jection to the Snapchat message. In the Article 39(a),
UCMJ, session, SrA HS elaborated on her prior testimony
that she freaked out and panicked when she saw the
bruises, testifying that her hands were shaking and she
was sweating and nauseated as she messaged Amn MH
from the gas station bathroom, where she discovered the
bruises. She was in the bathroom for approximately three
minutes.
   After hearing testimony and arguments, the military
judge overruled the objection, concluding that the Govern-
ment laid an appropriate foundation for admission under
the excited utterance exception to the general prohibition

   2  The defense also objected on grounds of relevance and cu-
mulativeness and objected to the witness reading from an ex-
hibit that had not yet been admitted. The military judge over-
ruled objections on the first two grounds and sustained the
objection on the latter. The military judge’s rulings on these ob-
jections are not at issue on this appeal.
   3 In addition to arguing that the “I think he raped me” mes-
sage was an excited utterance under M.R.E. 803(2), the Govern-
ment also argued that a number of the messages were admissi-
ble “as descriptions of then-existing physical state and of
moments where she is making plans” under M.R.E. 803(3). The
military judge admitted portions of the Snapchat thread under
M.R.E. 803(3), but did not decide whether the statement, “I
think he raped me,” was admissible under this rule, having al-
ready found it admissible as an excited utterance.

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                    Opinion of the Court

against hearsay. Before concluding the Article 39(a),
UCMJ, session, the military judge granted the defense’s re-
quest to restate the objection for the record, in which the
defense focused on the first and third prongs of the excited
utterance test. As to the first prong, the defense argued
that the statement “I think he raped me” was the product
of reflection and deliberation, and not spontaneous, ex-
cited, or impulsive, because “she is taking a series of obser-
vations, she’s adding them together, and then she’s draw-
ing a conclusion as to an event that she did not observe, the
‘I was raped.’ ” As to the third prong, the defense argued
that, although seeing the bruises may have been startling,
her statement was not about the bruises; her statement
was about being raped, but because she did not have any
memory of being raped, she was “not under the stress or
excitement of the event for which she has no memory.”
    The AFCCA affirmed the ruling, finding sufficient evi-
dence to support the military judge’s conclusion that SrA
HS’s Snapchat message was an excited utterance: SrA HS
first noticed the bruises while she was in the gas station
bathroom; noticing the bruises caused her to think about
what had happened the previous night; and putting to-
gether the bruising, her observations of blood and her torn
underwear caused her to start shaking, sweating, and be-
come nauseated. Smith, 2022 CCA LEXIS 308, at *28, 2022
WL 1667257, at *10. “It was while she was feeling those
things, and experiencing those physical manifestations,
that she contemporaneously sent a message to her friend
that she thought she was raped.” Id., 2022 WL 1667257, at
*10.
   Applying the three-prong test for an excited utterance,
the AFCCA determined that:
      the military judge could conclude that the cause of
      HS’s stress was not thinking about the previous
      night in a pensive manner, or that the statements
      were made after reflection and deliberation. In-
      stead, the evidence shows that seeing hickeys and
      bruises—and having no explanation for them—as
      well as putting all the pieces together in her
      mind—the torn underwear and blood coupled with

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                    Opinion of the Court

      bruising—sent HS into distress, and she was un-
      der that stress when she sent the messages.
Id. at *29, 2022 WL 1667257, at *10. Based on that analy-
sis, the AFCCA concluded that SrA HS need not have had
any memory of the actual sexual encounter for the excited
utterance exception to apply. Id. at *28-29, 2022 WL
1667257, at *10-11.
                         3. Analysis
    In Arnold, we identified three elements that must be
satisfied in order to admit hearsay as an excited utterance:
(1) “the statement must be spontaneous, excited or impul-
sive rather than the product of reflection and deliberation”;
(2) “the event [that prompts the utterance] must be star-
tling”; and (3) “the declarant must be under the stress of
excitement caused by the event.” Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Alt-
hough the military judge is entitled to little deference be-
cause his ruling was supported by only bare-boned findings
of fact and analysis on the record, we conclude that he did
not abuse his discretion in admitting SrA HS’s Snapchat
message, “I think he raped me,” as an excited utterance.
   First, the evidence supports the conclusion that the
statement was “spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather
than the product of reflection and deliberation.” Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). The mes-
sage was a spontaneous outburst prompted by SrA HS’s
thought, upon looking in the mirror and noticing the
bruises for the first time, that she might have been the vic-
tim of a sexual assault.
   The compact time line between SrA HS’s discovery of
the bruises and her statement supports the determination
that the statement was spontaneous. As she testified, she
was only in the bathroom for about three minutes. The
statement, “I think he raped me,” was the first message she
sent to Amn MH after seeing the bruises for the first time
while in the bathroom. The medium through which she
made the statement and the subsequent questions and an-
swers do not detract from the spontaneous nature of the

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                    Opinion of the Court

statement. See M.R.E. 801(a)(2) (defining “statement” for
purposes of hearsay rules to include a “written assertion”);
see also United States v. Gortzig, No. NMCCA 202100064,
2022 CCA LEXIS 515, at *15, 2022 WL 3907762, at *6 (N-
M. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2022) (per curiam) (un-
published) (holding that the military judge did not abuse
discretion in admitting text messages as excited utter-
ance); United States v. Dias, No. NMCCA 201500177, 2017
CCA LEXIS 583, at *6-7, 2017 WL 3762141, at *2 (N-M.
Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished)
(same). Therefore, it was within the military judge’s discre-
tion to conclude that the message was “spontaneous, ex-
cited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and
deliberation.” Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citation omitted).
    Turning to the second prong of the excited utterance
test, the record supports the conclusion that SrA HS’s dis-
covery of visible bruising was “startling.” Id. (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Having no recol-
lection of how she got these unexplained, extensive
injuries, her immediate reaction was to “freak[] out.” She
explained that this meant that she started shaking and felt
nauseated. In the midst of this physical and emotional re-
sponse, the significance of her morning discoveries of blood
and vaginal soreness, which she had brushed off at the
time, sprung to her mind. In her distress, she reached out
via Snapchat to her friend, essentially blurting out, “I think
he raped me.” As she sent the message, her hands were
shaking, she felt nauseated, and she was sweating.
    Appellant’s arguments that the statement is not an ex-
cited utterance are contingent on concluding that the “star-
tling event or condition” in this case was the sexual encoun-
ter between Appellant and SrA HS. Having concluded that
the startling event or condition was SrA HS’s discovery of
the bruising on her body, we reject Appellant’s argument
that the Snapchat message fails to meet the foundational
requirement for an excited utterance because it refers to an
alleged rape that the victim does not remember. The plain
language of M.R.E. 803(2) provides for admission of “[a]

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                     Opinion of the Court

statement relating to a startling event or condition.” (Em-
phasis added.) There is no requirement that the excited ut-
terance directly mention the startling event or condition,
or that the startling event or condition must be the under-
lying offense. The Government cites an unpublished
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit case
for a proposition that goes to the heart of this issue: “ ‘[t]he
basis of the excited utterance exception rests with the spon-
taneity and impulsiveness of the statement; thus, the star-
tling event does not have to be the actual crime itself, but
rather may be a related occurrence that causes such a re-
action.’ ” United States v. Lossiah, 129 F. App’x 434, 438
(10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (alteration in original)
(quoting Esser v. Commonwealth, 566 S.E.2d 876, 879 (Va.
Ct. App. 2002)). We agree and decide that it was within the
military judge’s discretion to conclude that the statement
“I think he raped me,” viewed in context, related to the
startling event of discovering the bruises and articulated
SrA HS’s belief that they may have been caused by the al-
leged sexual assault.
   Third, the record supports the conclusion that SrA HS
was “under the stress of excitement caused by the event”
when she uttered the message. Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). “Rele-
vant to the third prong of this inquiry are ‘the physical and
mental condition of the declarant’ and ‘the lapse of time be-
tween the startling event and the statement.’ ” Henry, 81
M.J. at 96 (quoting Donaldson, 58 M.J. at 483). As dis-
cussed above, SrA HS testified that at the time she sent the
message, immediately after the startling event, her hands
were shaking, she was nauseated, and she was sweating.
It was within the military judge’s discretion to conclude
that she was “under the stress of excitement caused by the
event.” Arnold, 25 M.J. at 132 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted).
   As the AFCCA noted: “The record supports the conclu-
sion that HS’s statement, ‘I think he raped me,’ was not a
statement of fact, but instead a spontaneous belief or opin-
ion, under physical and emotional stress of shaking,

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           United States v. Smith, No. 22-0237/AF
                    Opinion of the Court

sweating, and feeling nausea.” Smith, 2022 CCA LEXIS
308, at *28, 2022 WL 1667257, at *10. A statement of belief
or opinion can constitute an excited utterance as long as it
is related to the startling event that prompted it. Wood-
ward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (ad-
mitting the statement that “ ‘He is going to kill me’ ” as an
excited utterance despite the “non-factual character” of the
statement). Here, the statement “I think he raped me” re-
lated to the startling event—discovery of the bruises—by
explaining SrA HS’s belief about how she got the bruises.
Although the military judge’s ruling contains very little in
the way of findings of facts or legal analysis, in light of the
evidence supporting his ruling the AFCCA properly held
that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in ad-
mitting the exhibit and therefore did not plainly err in ad-
mitting SrA HS’s testimony about the Snapchat message
as well.
                    B. Legal Sufficiency
                      1. Applicable Law
    This Court reviews questions of legal sufficiency de
novo. United States v. Robinson, 77 M.J. 294, 297 (C.A.A.F.
2018). “ ‘The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the pros-
ecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the es-
sential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
Id. at 297-98 (quoting United States v. Rosario, 76 M.J.
114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). In reviewing legal sufficiency,
this Court “draw[s] every reasonable inference from the ev-
idence of record in favor of the prosecution.” Id. at 298 (al-
teration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (ci-
tation omitted). “As such, ‘[t]he standard for legal
sufficiency involves a very low threshold to sustain a con-
viction.’ ” United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F.
2019) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Navrestad, 66 M.J. 262, 269 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (Effron, C.J.,
joined by Stucky, J., dissenting)).

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           United States v. Smith, No. 22-0237/AF
                    Opinion of the Court

   As instructed by the military judge, to obtain a convic-
tion in this case, the Government was required to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt:
      (1) That at or near Charlotte, North Carolina, on
      or about 16 November 2018, [Appellant] commit-
      ted a sexual act upon [SrA HS], by causing pene-
      tration, however slight, of [SrA HS]’s vulva by
      [Appellant]’s tongue;
      (2) That [Appellant] did so when [SrA HS] was in-
      capable of consenting to the sexual act due to im-
      pairment by alcohol;
      (3) That [Appellant] knew or reasonably should
      have known [SrA HS] was incapable of consenting
      to the sexual act due to impairment by alcohol;
      and
      (4) That [Appellant] did so with an intent to grat-
      ify his sexual desire.
See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV, para.
45.b(4)(f) (2016 ed.) (MCM).
    “The term ‘consent’ means a freely given agreement to
the conduct at issue by a competent person.” MCM pt. IV,
para. 45.a.(g)(8)(A) (2016 ed.). “A sleeping, unconscious, or
incompetent person cannot consent.” MCM pt. IV, para.
45.a.(g)(8)(B) (2016 ed.). “Incapable of consenting” means
lacking the cognitive ability to appreciate the sexual con-
duct in question or lacking the mental or physical ability to
make or communicate a decision about whether the alleged
victim agrees to the conduct. United States v. Pease, 75
M.J. 180, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
                         2. Analysis
    Appellant contends the evidence was legally insufficient
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the second and third
elements of the charged sexual assault: that SrA HS was
incapable of consenting and that Appellant knew or rea-
sonably should have known she could not consent. In Ap-
pellant’s view, the evidence demonstrated that SrA HS
could consent, did consent, and Appellant reasonably be-
lieved she consented.

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            United States v. Smith, No. 22-0237/AF
                     Opinion of the Court

    We conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to
establish that SrA HS was incapable of consenting and that
Appellant knew or reasonably should have known she was
incapable of consenting. First, SrA HS testified that she
felt dizzy and drunk when she was in the merchandise area
after the opening band finished playing; she had consumed
at least three strong mixed drinks without eating anything
at the concert venue. She had no memory of what tran-
spired after that point, except for falling into bed at the ho-
tel fully clothed, until she awoke to find Appellant’s arm
draped around her unclothed body.
    Second, Appellant’s statements to SrA HS and to
AFOSI filled in many of the gaps in SrA HS’s recollection
and supported a finding that he knew or reasonably should
have known she was incapable of consenting due to intoxi-
cation. He did not know how many drinks she consumed,
but he described her demeanor at the concert venue as the
most intoxicated he had ever seen her, literally falling over
and slurring her speech and causing her to be kicked out of
the venue for being drunk. He described how she was too
drunk to unlock her phone to find the address for their ho-
tel, and she had to be helped into the hotel by Appellant
and the taxi driver, where she stumbled around the room
mumbling and urinated on both beds. And although Appel-
lant told AFOSI that SrA HS was an active, willing partic-
ipant in the sexual activity, grinding on him and making
out with him until he pulled away, he also admitted that
he knew it was wrong to engage in sexual activity with her
because she was drunk. 4

   4 Intoxication, standing alone, does not indicate one is suffi-
ciently impaired to be incapable of consenting to sexual activity.
See United States v. Bodoh, 78 M.J. 231, 237 (C.A.A.F. 2019)
(noting that it is a “false premise that a person who is intoxicated
is inherently incapable of consenting to sexual acts”); United
States v. Rogers, 75 M.J. 270, 274 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (correcting the
erroneous “belief that if someone was too drunk to remember
that they had sex, then they were too drunk to consent to having
sex”). However, as we note in the following paragraph, the mem-
bers as the triers of fact were entitled to give weight to

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           United States v. Smith, No. 22-0237/AF
                    Opinion of the Court

    The panel was obligated to determine how much weight
to give to the evidence in this case in deciding whether SrA
HS was too intoxicated to consent and whether Appellant
knew or reasonably should have known that she was too
intoxicated to consent. A reasonable panel could have given
greater weight to evidence concerning the extent of her in-
toxication than to Appellant’s self-serving statements to
AFOSI about her active, willing participation in the con-
duct at issue.
    Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution under the low threshold for sustaining a con-
viction on the issue of legal sufficiency, the Government
presented sufficient evidence to establish that SrA HS was
incapable of consenting to the charged sexual act due to her
impairment by intoxication and that Appellant knew or
reasonably should have known that she was incapable of
consenting. Therefore, Appellant's conviction for sexual as-
sault is legally sufficient.
    Finally, Appellant argues that the AFCCA erroneously
found the defense of mistake of fact as to consent was not
in issue because the third element of the charged sexual
assault offense required the Government to prove that Ap-
pellant should have known SrA HS was incapable of con-
senting. At trial, the military judge found that the evidence
raised the defense of mistake of fact as to consent and in-
structed the members accordingly. We conclude that the
Government introduced sufficient evidence for a reasona-
ble trier of fact to conclude that any such mistake of fact
was not “reasonable under all the circumstances.” Rule for
Courts-Martial 916(j)(1). We therefore hold that Appel-
lant’s conviction was legally sufficient and need not ad-
dress whether the AFCCA erred.

Appellant’s statements. The members could have reasonably
viewed Appellant’s statement as relevant evidence on the key
issue of whether Appellant knew or reasonably should have
known that SrA HS was intoxicated to the point of being incapa-
ble of consenting. See Pease, 75 M.J. at 185.

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          United States v. Smith, No. 22-0237/AF
                   Opinion of the Court

                    III. Conclusion
   We answer the assigned issues in the negative and af-
firm the decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals.

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