Court Opinion

ID: 9663267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:33:44.055338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:47.267415
License: Public Domain

G. S. Allen, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that a disputed question of fact exists as to when Tammy Moss discovered or should have discovered a connection between her infertility and the iud. I also agree that Dennis Moss’ consortium claim is derivative and is not barred because Tammy and Dennis were unmarried when the alleged tortious injury occurred. Therefore, those two claims should be remanded for trial.
But I cannot agree that Tammy Moss’ claim of products liability against G. D. Searle & Co. should be remanded for trial. In my opinion the record at trial clearly discloses that as early as November or December, 1981, Tammy Moss knew or should have known of the connection between the Cu-7 intrauterine device and the problems for which she was given emergency treatment in November, 1981. Attached to defendant Searle’s motion for summary disposition was an eighty-page transcript of the deposition of Tammy Moss which discloses plaintiff knew something was wrong with the iud and wanted the iud removed.
Q. [.Defense Counsel:] Do you remember learning from whatever source, back in November or December of 1981, when you were having all these problems, that your infection was probably related to your iud?
A. [Tammy Moss:] I don’t think anyone told me that.
*585Q. Even though nobody specifically told you that, did you make that connection in your own mind?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. At some point in time, did you begin to experience some other complaints or problems that you, at least in your own mind, connected with the iud?
A. Yes.
Q. What were those?
A. It was in November of '81, I had severe pain and high fever.
Q. At that time, you knew that infections were one of the risks of iuds, correct?
A. I’m not sure, I may have.
Q. Were you shocked to learn you had an infection of your reproductive organs and that the iud might have been connected.
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Do you think there might have been something wrong with the iud to cause you to have infections of your reproductive organs?
A. Well, I learned there was something wrong with it.
Clearly, as early as late 1981 plaintiff was aware of both an injury (severe infection of her reproductive organs) and its connection with an alleged defective product (the iud). Therefore, as early as late 1981 plaintiff either did discover, or should have discovered, the existence of her cause of action against Searle. Because suit against Searle was not commenced until September 30, 1986, plaintiff’s action against Searle is barred by the three-year period of limitations following discovery.
The majority admit that although "there is evidence to support a finding that plaintiff knew that *586the infection she suffered in late 1981 was probably related to the iud,” the record is unclear as to "exactly” when she made that connection and whether she knew that the product was defective. I submit that, on the basis of her deposition testimony, plaintiff was well aware "something was wrong” with the iud. While she may not have known the "exact” date, she knew it was sometime in late 1981 or early 1982.
The majority further argues that although plaintiff associated her pelvic infection to the iud in late 1981, because plaintiff was unaware of her infertility until a much later date, the period of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff knew of the infertility and its connection to the iud. I agree that plaintiff did not become aware of her inability to conceive until sometime in 1985 or 1986. Obviously, she could not learn of this until after she had tried to have a child. Because, I find plaintiff’s deposition testimony on that question somewhat ambiguous and at places even conflicting, I agree plaintiff’s malpractice claim should be submitted to the jury.
But I cannot agree that because plaintiff was unaware of her infertility until a date yet to be determined by the jury, the statute of limitations did not commence to run on plaintiff’s claim of product liability against defendant Searle. One does not have to know the full extent of one’s injuries before the period of limitations begins to run. Connelly v Paul Ruddy’s Equipment Repair & Service Co, 388 Mich 146, 151; 200 NW2d 70 (1972). More damage may manifest itself later, but no new period of limitations arises. Grimm v Ford Motor Co, 157 Mich App 633, 638; 403 NW2d 482 (1986), lv den 428 Mich 902 (1987).
No Michigan case factually similar to the instant case is found. However, in Pennsylvania, *587whose applicable statute of limitations, like Michigan’s, begins to run when a complainant knows or should have reason to know of an alleged defect, a strikingly similar case is found.
In Caldwell v A H Robins Co, 577 F Supp 796 (WD Pa, 1984), cert den 469 US 862; 105 S Ct 197; 83 L Ed 2d 129 (1984), reh den 469 US 1029; 105 S Ct 450; 83 L Ed 2d 375 (1984), the plaintiff had a Daikon Shield inserted by her physician in December, 1972. In December, 1977, she was hospitalized with severe pelvic inflammatory disease. Her physician diagnosed the infection as related to the presence of the Daikon Shield and removed the device. The plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on January 7, 1978. In 1982 she suffered from early menopause and emotional distress and underwent a hysterectomy. On July 13, 1983, she filed suit in propria persona against the defendant manufacturer of the Daikon Shield. The defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that suit was barred by the two-year period of limitations was granted by the court. Id. at 797-798.
The plaintiff argued that while she may have been aware of a connection between her 1977 pelvic infection and the Daikon Shield, the subsequent onset of early menopause and her hysterectomy within the two-year period of limitations barred the statute of limitations from running. The court rejected this argument, stating:
However, the plaintiff is not entitled to a new limitations period to begin with the appearance of each new injury or complication. Shadle v Pearce, 287 Pa Super 436; 430 A2d 683 (1981); Staiano v Johns Manville Corp, 304 Pa Super 280; 450 A2d 681 (1983). The limitations period begins to run when damage is inflicted which is "physically objective and ascertainable.” Ragan v Steen, 229 Pa Super 515, 520; 331 A2d 724 (1974).
*588Although the limitations period is tolled until an injury is discoverable, once that occurs and a cause of action becomes a reality the injured party may not then sleep on that cause of action until further injuries appear. As the Court made clear in Shadle, an injured party "may not unduly postpone an action until the full extent of his damage is ascertained.” 287 Pa Super at 441; 430 A2d 683. Plaintiff here had sustained an injury in 1977, had known of the injury and its causal relationship to the Daikon Shield at least by June 1981, and had failed to bring a timely suit on this cause of action. Her later discovered injuries do not invoke either a new cause of action or a new limitations period. We conclude therefore that plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages are barred as not timely filed. [Caldwell, 577 F Supp 797-798.]
In my opinion there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether Tammy Moss knew as of late 1981 that the iud was defective and knew that it was connected with the infection in her reproductive organs. The fact that she subsequently "discovered” other injuries to her reproductive organs does not preclude the period of limitations from running on her claim against Searle.1_

 The Caldwell court, at 798, n 1, noted that a different result might be reached for a separate and distinct injury but then went on to say that the plaintiff’s earlier and later injuries "are sufficiently similar, all arising with plaintiff’s reproduction organs.”