Court Opinion

ID: 9905227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 22:02:26.478454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:53.250201
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/28/23 P. v. Wellington CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B318724

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. BA492420)
           v.

 MICHAEL BLAIR WELLINGTON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Affirmed.

         Winston Kevin McKesson for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E.
Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan
Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                   __________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
        Defendant Michael Blair Wellington appeals from his
convictions for murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. He
makes several arguments: his murder conviction must be
reversed because there is insufficient evidence of premeditation
and deliberation; the court abused its discretion in taking one of
the prosecutor’s witnesses out of order; the trial was infected with
judicial misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective
assistance of counsel; and the court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a new trial. We affirm on all grounds.
          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.      The Murder
         Defendant (then 58 years old) and his brother, Jonathan
(then 70 years old), co-owned a house in Los Angeles. Defendant
used to live in the house with his brother but moved out four
months before the shooting when he married his wife. Since
then, Jonathan had been living in the house where defendant
also had been operating his floral business. On December 19,
2020, Jonathan’s friend Jackson (the victim) came over to the
house and parked his car partly on the lawn. This was not the
first time Jackson had parked on the lawn. Two weeks prior,
defendant and Jackson had argued about Jackson parking in the
same place.
         On December 19th, defendant’s wife came over to the
house with her sister and her friend (Lauren). She saw Jackson’s
car on the lawn and told Jackson to move the car. Jackson
refused. The wife telephoned defendant and told him a car was
on the grass.
        Defendant arrived shortly thereafter and entered the
house, where he found his wife, his sister-in-law, and Lauren in

                                 2
or near his bedroom. His brother Jonathan and victim Jackson
were in the dining room. Defendant argued with Jackson about
the car being parked on the grass.
       Everyone then went outside. Defendant got into his car,
accelerated up the driveway, and rammed it into Jackson’s with
enough force to leave skid marks on the ground. Next, defendant
got out of the car and resumed arguing with Jackson and pointed
a semiautomatic gun at Jackson. Jackson fled toward the house
with his hands up. Defendant fired the weapon, hitting another
car parked in the driveway.
       Defendant chased Jackson, who entered the front door of
the house. Defendant shot through the screen door, hitting
Jackson. He then followed Jackson inside. Witnesses heard two
to three gunshots fired inside the house, and subsequently
discovered Jackson’s body inside.
2.     Police Investigation
       The responding police officer encountered Jonathan, the
brother, who was “hysterical” and yelling. The officer found
Jackson’s body at the end of the hallway, next to a bookshelf.
Jonathan told the officer that defendant had killed Jackson. The
coroner subsequently found that Jackson suffered three fatal
gunshot wounds to the back of the head, right side, and back.
       The officer observed that the victim’s vehicle appeared to
have been pushed onto the front lawn, and a second vehicle
parked in the driveway had a bullet lodged in the left back panel.
Inside defendant’s bedroom, the officer discovered a bag
containing a gun lock but no gun. A search of the house also
revealed a gun in the brother’s locked bedroom. The police did
not find bullet casings at the scene; nor did they locate the
murder weapon.

                                3
3.     Information
       The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a
felony information charging defendant with murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), and possession of a firearm by a felon
(Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(l); count 2).1 As to count 1, the
information alleged that defendant personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). As to both counts, the information alleged
defendant had suffered one prior strike—a 2005 conviction for
assault with a deadly weapon (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd.
(b)).
4.     Trial and Sentencing
       Defendant’s murder trial commenced in late September
2021. The prosecutor elicited testimony from police officers who
responded to the scene, detectives who investigated the murder,
criminalists, the coroner, the wife’s sister, and Lauren. Due to
air travel delays, the coroner testified after defendant began his
case in chief, over defendant’s objection. Because Jonathan had
died in the interim, the prosecutor read Jonathan’s preliminary
hearing testimony into the record.
       Defendant testified on his own behalf, characterizing his
conduct as self-defense. Defendant had a contentious
relationship with his brother, Jonathan. Defendant stated
Jonathan had assaulted him with pistols several times and
threatened to have his “gang banging buddies beat [him] up and
stomp [him] out.” Defendant testified that Jonathan’s friend
Jackson had threatened him one to two months before the
murder when defendant asked Jackson to move his car off the
sidewalk in front of the house. Defendant explained he did not

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

                                 4
sleep at the house he co-owned with his brother mostly because
he feared Jackson, “the gunplay and all of that.” Defendant
stated he felt threatened on the day of the murder, when Jackson
reiterated that he would not move his car and told defendant not
to disrespect him.
       Defendant testified that he drove his car into Jackson’s car
in an attempt to move it, but was unsuccessful. When
defendant’s wife tried to diffuse the situation, Jackson responded:
“You don’t know who the F I am?” and said he was “gonna fuck
[defendant] up.” Meanwhile, defendant’s brother stood on the
porch, encouraging Jackson to “fuck [defendant] up” and to “[l]ay
him out.” Jackson also threatened to harm defendant’s wife if
she did not move.
       Defendant stated he did not have a weapon on him at the
start of the altercation. But the victim did. Defendant and
Jackson wrestled over the gun, and the gun fired twice.
Defendant got the gun away from Jackson. Defendant testified
that he was “terrified” and thought Jackson was going to kill him.
Jackson ran to the front door and defendant followed. When
Jackson was at the door, defendant had just reached the porch.
At that moment, defendant fired the gun at Jackson. Jonathan,
who was on the porch, told Jackson, “Go get my gun. It’s in the
bedroom.” Defendant saw Jackson move down the hallway
toward the bedrooms. Defendant fired two shots at a bookcase,
where Jackson was hiding.
       Defendant said he was scared during the encounter
because he knew that Jackson was a gang member. Defendant
got into his car, left the scene, and took the gun with him. He
later threw the gun in a dumpster. The violence lasted two

                                5
minutes from the time defendant reversed his car after hitting
Jackson’s vehicle.
       The defense also presented testimony from several of
defendant’s friends, defendant’s cousin, and defendant’s sister, all
of whom indicated defendant was honest, truthful, and
nonviolent. Defendant’s sister testified her brothers would argue
over issues regarding the house and that Jonathan bullied
defendant “for many years.” Three defense witnesses stated they
knew defendant and Jonathan, and that Jonathan had
threatened defendant with a gun on a number of occasions. The
defense also elicited testimony from criminalists that Jackson
had marijuana and alcohol in his system during the incident.
Defendant’s wife, who the defense called as a witness, refused to
testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment on the advice of her
attorney.
       On October 4, 2021, a jury convicted defendant of first
degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon, and found
the gun allegation true. Defendant filed a new trial motion based
on ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to retain gang and
mental health experts.2 The trial court denied the motion. The
court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 31 years to life
in state prison. The court imposed 29 years to life for count 1—
25 years to life for the substantive offense plus the mid-term of
four years for the gun enhancement. The court imposed a
determinate term of two years for count 2, to run consecutively.
       Defendant appealed.

2     After the conclusion of trial but before the new trial motion
was filed, defendant’s current appellate counsel substituted in as
defense counsel.

                                 6
                            DISCUSSION
       Defendant makes six arguments on appeal: (1) substantial
evidence does not support his first degree murder conviction,
(2) the court abused its discretion when it had defendant start his
case before the prosecutor examined her last witness, (3) the
court committed judicial misconduct and violated defendant’s
right to due process, (4) the prosecutor’s misconduct violated his
constitutional rights, (5) he suffered from ineffective assistance of
counsel, and (6) the court abused its discretion in denying a new
trial. We address each argument in turn.
1.     Substantial Evidence Supports Defendant’s First
       Degree Murder Conviction
       Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence of malice
aforethought, premeditation, and deliberation to support his first
degree murder conviction. He asserts he “felt fearful, threatened
and acted in self-defense. [Record cite] There was no intent to
kill [Jackson] at all.” Citing his own testimony, defendant
asserts there was no premeditation or deliberation, insisting he
acted in the moment. The opening brief spends little time
assessing the actual evidence at trial, resting instead on general
summaries of the proceedings.
       a.     Applicable Law
       “Review on appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the finding of premeditated and deliberate murder
involves consideration of the evidence presented and all logical
inferences from that evidence in light of the legal definition of
premeditation and deliberation. . . . Settled principles of
appellate review require us to review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is

                                 7
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find that the defendant premeditated and
deliberated beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Perez (1992)
2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124.) “We determine whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In so doing, a
reviewing court presumes in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.” (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88 [internal
quotation marks omitted] (Morales).)
       “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) If the murder is “willful,
deliberate, and premeditated,” it is first degree murder. (Id.,
§ 189, subd. (a).) “An intentional killing is premeditated and
deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and
reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. The true
test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the
reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity
and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.”
(Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 88 [citations and internal
quotation marks omitted].)
       Three categories of evidence are considered in determining
the existence of premeditation and deliberation: (1) planning
activity—“facts about how and what defendant did prior to the
actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in
activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in,
the killing”; (2) motive—“facts about the defendant’s prior
relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury
could reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill the victim”; and

                                 8
(3) manner of killing—“facts about the nature of the killing from
which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so
particular and exacting that the defendant must have
intentionally killed according to a ‘preconceived design’ to take
his victim’s life in a particular way for a ‘reason’. . . .” (People v.
Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27 (Anderson).) These three
categories provide a framework for appellate review. They are
not exhaustive, nor is evidence in each category required to
support a first degree murder conviction. (Morales, supra,
10 Cal.5th at pp. 88–89.)
       b.       Substantial Evidence Supports the First Degree
                Murder Conviction
       Defendant asserts there is insufficient evidence of
planning, motive, and manner of killing to support his first
degree murder conviction. The record discloses otherwise.
       Planning. “ ‘In the context of first degree murder,
premeditation means “considered beforehand” ’ (People v.
Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767) and deliberation means a
‘ “careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of
action. . . .” ’ (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812). ‘The
process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any
extended period of time.’ (Mayfield, at p. 767 [the true test of
premeditation is the extent of the reflection, not the length of
time].)” (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 245 [parallel
citations omitted].)
       The jury could reasonably have inferred that before
engaging in the confrontation with Jackson, defendant armed
himself. The wife’s friend and Jonathan testified that defendant
chased and shot at the victim. Neither indicated the gun was
Jackson’s or that defendant wrestled the gun from Jackson as

                                  9
defendant testified. The jury could also infer from the gunlock
that was found in defendant’s room that the murder weapon was
defendant’s, not Jackson’s.
       Defendant’s decision to bring a loaded weapon into a
confrontation with a purported gang member shows defendant
anticipated a violent encounter. Wielding a loaded firearm
demonstrated preparation and supported the jury’s inference of
planning. (See, e.g., People v. Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 245
[“defendant brought a loaded gun with him to the Beef Bowl,
demonstrating preparation”].)
       The jury could also have inferred that defendant weighed
and considered his course of action before killing the victim
because defendant followed the already-injured, retreating, and
unarmed victim into the house, and then shot him two more
times, once in the back of the head. The subsequent gunshots
illustrated that defendant had an objective to kill – he was not
merely acting in self-defense. (People v. Romero (2008)
44 Cal.4th 386, 401 [jury could infer planning from evidence that
defendant brought a gun to the store and shot victim in the back
of the head].)
       Citing his own testimony, defendant argues he had
insufficient time to plan because the confrontation lasted two
minutes. Again, defendant asks this court to second guess the
jury’s findings and weighing of the evidence, which we do not do
on appeal.
       Motive. “ ‘Motive is the emotional urge that induces a
particular act.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[T]he law does not require that a first
degree murderer have a ‘rational’ motive for killing.” ’ [Citation.]
‘Anger at the way the victim talked to [the defendant] [citation] or
any motive, shallow and distorted but, to the perpetrator,

                                 10
genuine[,]’ may be sufficient.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he
incomprehensibility of the motive does not mean that the jury
could not reasonably infer that the defendant entertained and
acted on it.’ ” (People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477, 495.)
       Two weeks before the shooting, defendant became very upset
when Jackson parked on the grass in front of his house. On the
day of the murder, Jackson again parked on the grass, enraging
defendant. Lauren testified that when defendant arrived, he was
very angry to see Jackson’s car on the lawn. She said she had
never seen him so angry before: “It was almost as if he was the
devil himself.” Defendant then rammed Jackson’s car in an
attempt to move it before he shot at Jackson. The jury could
reasonably infer that defendant’s motive to kill Jackson was
founded on the ongoing dispute between the two men.
       Manner of killing. A particular and exacting manner of
killing supports the inference “that the defendant must have
intentionally killed according to a ‘preconceived design’ to take
his victim’s life.” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081.)
At issue is whether there was “a calculated design to ensure
death rather than an unconsidered explosion of violence.” (People
v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 902–903.)
       Here, defendant continued to pursue the retreating, injured
victim until defendant killed him. The jury could infer from
defendant’s persistence and pursuit that his actions went beyond
impulse and that he was acting out a plan or design, albeit a
short one, to kill. (See People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547 [the
manner of killing supported a finding of premeditation and
deliberation because the defendant shot the victim three times,
including in the back as the victim was retreating, to ensure the
victim died].)

                                11
       Based on the record and each of these factors, we conclude
substantial evidence of malice aforethought, premeditation, and
deliberation support defendant’s first degree murder conviction.
       c.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding
             that Defendant Did Not Act in Self-Defense
       Defendant next argues the evidence fails to support a
finding of malice because he “felt fearful, threatened, and acted in
self-defense. [citation deleted.] There was no intent to kill
[Jackson] at all.” The People bear the burden of proof on the
absence of self-defense in order to establish the murder element
of malice. (People v. Winkler (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1167.)
Yet, the evidence produced by the prosecution painted a different
picture: defendant rammed his car into Jackson’s and then shot
at Jackson as he ran away with his hands up, showing he was
unarmed. A jury could reasonably conclude that the prosecution
had disproved defendant’s claim of self defense. That defendant
shot multiple times at an unarmed Jackson, even after Jackson
retreated into the house, showed defendant acted intentionally in
recognition of the danger to human life and did not act of fear.
       At trial, the court instructed on defendant’s self-defense
theory, and the jury rejected it. Defendant essentially asks us to
second-guess the jury’s factual determination. That is not our
role. “ ‘A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor
reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890.)
2.     The Trial Court Properly Allowed the Prosecution’s
       Witness to be Taken Out of Order
       Defendant asserts the court abused its discretion “when it
forced [him] to begin his case in chief prior to the closing of the
People’s case.” We disagree.

                                12
       Applicable Law. In general, the “district attorney, or
other counsel for the people shall . . . offer the evidence in support
of the charge. The defendant or his or her counsel may then offer
his or her evidence in support of the defense.” (§ 1093.)
Nonetheless, this order of proof rule is not mandatory. (See
People v. Moore (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 158, 162 (Moore).) “ ‘A
court is warranted in departing from the order of proof prescribed
by section 1093 of the Penal Code under proper circumstances.’ ”
(Ibid.) The order of proof lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court. (Pen. Code, § 1094; Evid. Code, § 320 [“court in its
discretion shall regulate order of proof”]; Evid. Code, § 772,
subd (b) [for good cause, the court can disrupt the ordinary flow of
trial testimony]; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 511.) We
only reverse if “the discretion appears to have been grossly
abused, and this abuse must affirmatively appear.” (Moore, at
p. 162.)
       Proceedings at Issue. On the second day of trial, the
prosecutor informed the trial court that she had a travel-related
issue with one of her witnesses. The coroner was supposed to fly
in from Texas that morning so he could testify that day, but due
to weather and the plane’s mechanical problems, his flight was
cancelled, and all other flights were all booked. The coroner
would likely arrive the next day. The prosecutor informed the
court that she had three other witnesses ready to testify that day,
but their testimony would not take more than 45 minutes.
       The court stated it did not want down time and would take
the coroner’s testimony out of order. The court informed
defendant that he would begin his case that day and the coroner
could testify when he finally arrived. Defense counsel stated “I
don’t agree to it. But if that’s what you want to do, fine.”

                                 13
       Later, at the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial,
the court explained its decision to allow the coroner to testify
after the defense had started calling witnesses. The court stated:
              “As to the order of the testimony, this trial
       occurred during the pandemic, 9/20/2021. We had
       trouble with trying to keep jurors, with witnesses,
       with the coordination of the order of the trial; people
       calling sick, people calling in positive, people not well.
              “In order [to] preserve the jurors on this case
       and keep the trial moving forward, the court
       permitted witnesses [to] be taken out of order. And
       pursuant to all the statutory provisions, the Rules of
       Court, the Evidence Code, the Penal Code, . . . the
       court took the witnesses out of order as the court is
       authorized to do.
              “. . . Defense still called all its witnesses
       intended and still had every right to call others as
       needed based on any change of order. The reality is
       the change in the order of the trial did not make any
       impact on the overwhelming evidence the jurors and
       the court heard.”
       No Abuse of Discretion. Defendant argues that having
the coroner testify after defendant testified “fundamentally
crippled” his defense. Defendant asserts he “had just presented
his strongest witness, himself, and the next day the People
present a coroner discussing how the victim died and how the
bullets led to his death. There is no way Appellant could get a
fair trial after that.”
       Defendant cites People v. Rodriquez (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d
415, 419 (Rodriquez) for support. There, the Court of Appeal held

                                14
it was improper to permit the prosecution to withhold the
defendant’s confession (a material part of the prosecution’s case)
until rebuttal of the defense evidence. (Ibid.)
       We conclude there was no abuse of discretion. The trial
took place during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the trial court
stated several times that proceedings were being handled
differently because jurors were not appearing in court due to
COVID. Given this circumstance, as well as ambiguity about
exactly when the coroner would arrive, the court’s decision to
keep the trial moving and have defendant begin his presentation
of evidence was reasonable.
       Defendant also does not explain why the order of the
witnesses’ testimony prejudiced defendant. For example, there is
nothing in the record that suggests the coroner had advance
knowledge of defendant’s testimony and couched his own
testimony to take into account what defendant had told the jury.
Nor do we see any other obvious signs of prejudice. Defendant’s
theory of the case was that he acted in self-defense. He did not
deny shooting and killing the victim. The coroner testified that
the victim was shot three times and died from his wounds. The
prosecution’s evidence was not used in rebuttal or to ambush
defendant, as it was in Rodriquez.
3.     Defendant Forfeited Claims of Judicial Misconduct
       Defendant argues that the court prioritized a fast trial over
a fair one, and that he was prejudiced as a result. Defendant
identifies two occasions of alleged misconduct by the court.3 We

3     Defendant asserts there were five occasions of misconduct
and then lists only four events. In doing so, defendant reiterates
his argument that the court erred in taking the prosecution’s

                                15
conclude defendant forfeited his contentions by failing to raise
them below, and even assuming these issues were preserved for
review, his argument lacks merit.
       The Alleged Misconduct. The first occasion defendant
points to was when the court allowed the defense to cross-
examine a police officer before the prosecutor finished her direct
examination. The court permitted this because defense counsel
agreed to cross while the prosecutor queued up a video of the
officer’s body camera footage. After defense counsel completed
his questioning, he objected to the prosecution offering the video
into evidence based on relevance (Evid. Code, § 352), stating that
the video was cumulative and not useful for impeachment. The
court overruled the objection, explaining that the video was not
being offered for impeachment but rather the prosecutor “was
going to conclude with this. We let you do your cross-
examination while her computer was booting up. So this is still
part of her case in chief. [¶] Court is going to permit it.” Defense
counsel responded: “I understand that, but I still under
[Evidence Code section] 352 I don’t believe it’s relevant.” The
court overruled that objection. Defense counsel was permitted to
cross-examine the witness again after the prosecutor completed
her direct examination, but he declined.

witness out of order. We have thoroughly addressed that issue in
the preceding section and therefore do not rehash it.
      Of the remaining three alleged incidents of misconduct, two
deal with the same event: defendant’s cross-examination of a
police officer before the prosecutor completed her direct
examination. As such, there are only two instances of alleged
misconduct to be addressed.

                                16
        Second, defendant takes issue with a comment the court
made when it required the prosecutor to reveal her impeachment
evidence in advance of questioning defendant. The court
explained to defense counsel: “I am trying to move this along a
little bit more efficiently for the jurors, and that’s why I am
having her [the prosecutor] tell us initially what the area of
impeachment is going to be so that we’re not having to stop every
single time and have you review and say ‘I don’t think it’s
relevant.’ Thus far this is relevant.”
        Forfeiture. We first observe defendant failed to object to
any alleged misconduct and thus forfeited the arguments on
appeal. “As a general rule, judicial misconduct claims are not
preserved for appellate review if no objections were made on
those grounds at trial.” (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218,
1237.) A defendant’s failure to object, however, does not preclude
review “ ‘when an objection and an admonition could not cure the
prejudice caused by’ such misconduct, or when objecting would be
futile.” (Ibid., citations omitted.)
        Defense counsel’s only objection was to admission of the
video under Evidence Code section 352. Defense counsel never
objected to cross-examining the police officer before the
prosecutor finished direct examination. Nor did defense counsel
object to the court asking the prosecutor for a preview of her
impeachment evidence. In his reply brief, defendant asserts
objection would have been futile because the court favored the
prosecutor, and he would have been prejudiced by his counsel
saying “ ‘I object to your misconduct.’ ”
        We disagree with defendant’s characterization of the
record. We see nothing that suggests the court’s rulings were
biased or tended improperly to favor one side over the other.

                               17
Defendant’s opening brief begins with the argument that the trial
court abused its discretion by taking a witness out of order solely
out of a desire to move the case along. From there, every
procedural ruling becomes a claim of judicial misconduct on
appeal without an objection raised in the trial court even though
the record discloses none. Defendant could have objected to
commencing cross examination before the prosecutor completed
direct. Defendant could have objected to the trial court assessing
admissibility of the impeachment evidence in advance of
impeachment. Defendant did not, nor did he assert judicial
misconduct in the trial court.
       No Misconduct. Even if these issues had been preserved
for review, we conclude there was no misconduct individually or
cumulatively. Judicial misconduct occurs when “ ‘ “the judge’s
behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [defendant] a fair, as
opposed to a perfect, trial.” ’ ” (People v. Woodruff (2018)
5 Cal.5th 697, 768.)
       Defendant asserts that the judge “showed bias, prejudice,
and partial [sic] against [defendant] before, throughout, and at
the conclusion of the cases. Judge Escobedo [sic] actions of
prioritizing the speed of the trial irrespective of [defend]ant’s
rights clearly show distain [sic] for [defendant]. Viewing all
events cumulatively Judge Escobedo did not act impartially or
carry out the duties of his job. Based on Judge Escobedo’s
misconduct and its prejudicial effect on Appellant’s case and
rights the Court must reverse said conviction and dismiss.”
       Defendant’s generalized statements do not come with any
explanation as to what aspect of the court’s conduct
demonstrated bias or prejudice. Nothing in the record indicates
the judge moved trial along because it was biased against

                                18
defendant. To the contrary, when controlling the pace of trial,
the court stated it was focused on the potential loss of jurors due
to illness and exposure to COVID-19. A “trial court’s numerous
rulings against a party—even when erroneous—do not establish
a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to
review.” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112,
overruled on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008)
43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) Nor does the record show the outcome of this
case would have been different had the judge ruled as defendant
suggests.
4.     Defendant Forfeited His Claim of Prosecutorial
       Misconduct Regarding Charges to be Filed Against
       Defendant’s Wife
       Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by
allegedly implying she would file charges against defendant’s
wife as an accessory after the fact if she testified.4 A “claim of
prosecutorial misconduct is forfeited when there was neither a

4      During trial, defense counsel indicated the wife would
testify that she saw Jackson threaten and attack defendant on
December 19, 2020. The wife also intended to testify that she
had witnessed Jonathan threaten defendant with guns within the
previous year. The prosecutor responded that she intended to
impeach the wife with her statements from previous interviews,
during which she had made statements to the contrary. Based on
recorded jail calls, the prosecutor believed the wife intended to lie
on the stand. The prosecutor also commented that the wife was
involved as an accessory after the fact, but that she did not
intend to file charges against the wife. The trial court appointed
counsel to represent the wife. When defense counsel called her to
testify, the bar panel attorney informed the trial court that the
wife did not want to testify and would invoke her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

                                 19
timely and specific objection nor a request for admonition.”
(People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 182.) Here, defendant did
not object to the prosecutor’s conduct and thus forfeited the issue
on appeal.
       In his reply brief, defendant asserts “For the same reason
stated in the previous section Appellant believes this claim falls
under one of the exceptions to forfeiture.” Defendant’s previous
section declares that the objection would be futile because the
court was biased in favor of the prosecutor and objections would
prejudice defendant. We are unpersuaded by defendant’s
cursory, undeveloped assertions. (See People v. Stanley (1995)
10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [“[E]very brief should contain a legal
argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none
is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration.”].)
5.     The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Are
       Meritless
       Defendant argues his appointed counsel violated his right
to effective assistance of counsel by failing to retain a gang expert
and a mental health expert. Defendant asserts the gang expert
could have bolstered his self-defense theory because the expert
“would have talked about the fear individuals have for gang
members.” Defendant contends a mental health expert would
have examined defendant’s fight-or-flight response, sanity, self-
defense belief, mental state during the murder, and altered
personality during the murder. Defendant asserts: “If trial
counsel had hired the proper experts to discuss Appellant’s mens
rea it could have had a reasonable probability to alter the jurors
mind on what actually caused the accident, as well as the
Appellant’s state of mind. This all could have changed the

                                 20
verdict or at least lessened the charges to second-degree murder
or manslaughter.”
      Attached to defendant’s motion for a new trial were
declarations from a gang expert and a clinical trauma specialist.
Both attested to reading all or part of defendant’s testimony, but
not the testimony from other witnesses. The gang expert wrote
that most people in Los Angeles do not have any idea how violent
gang members are, and it was his “expert opinion a gang expert
should have been called to give expert testimony on defendant’s
gang fear.” The trauma specialist attested that based on
defendant’s testimony, he believed defendant suffered from an
extreme fight-flight reaction, meaning he acted based on survival
reflexes and not from thoughtful consideration during the
shooting.
      Applicable Law. To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish (1) that his
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, i.e., that counsel’s performance did not meet the
standard to be expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and
(2) that, but for counsel’s error, a different result would have
been reasonably probable, thus resulting in prejudice.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688, 694;
People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216–218.) “If the
defendant makes an insufficient showing on either one of these
components, the ineffective assistance claim fails.” (People v.
Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1126.)
      It is well established that “decisions . . . whether to put on
witnesses are matters of trial tactics and strategy which a
reviewing court generally may not second-guess.” (People v.
Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1059.) “If the record on appeal

                                21
sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and
failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.” (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211.)
       No Ineffective Assistance. Defendant does not identify
anywhere in the record that counsel had no rational tactical
purpose for not calling these experts. Defendant does not
indicate that counsel was asked for a reason behind his tactic and
failed to provide one. (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116,
1165.) Nor is there any evidence that there can be no satisfactory
explanation for choosing not to call these experts. (Ibid.) For
example, defendant does not identify any evidence indicating
trial counsel did not consult with a gang or mental health expert.
We do not know if counsel did so and concluded the experts would
not provide helpful testimony.
6.     The Motion for a New Trial Was Properly Denied
       Finally, defendant argues the court abused its discretion in
denying his new trial motion. “We review the trial court’s denial
of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Watts (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 102, 115.)
       In the motion, defendant raised the same claims that
counsel afforded him ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
retain gang and mental health experts. The trial court denied
the motion, finding that the evidence “overwhelmingly . . .
show[ed] that defendant’s acts were premeditated and
deliberate.” The court found that the “appointment of experts
would not have given a more favorable outcome as the jurors
clearly considered all aspects of the trial and the witness’
testimony.” The court explained that the evidence of defendant’s

                                22
behavior was “so incredibly overwhelming that gang and mental
health evidence was minimized. It did not play a part in the
incident itself.”
      We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s new trial motion. As explained in the
preceding section, defendant’s arguments about ineffective
assistance of counsel are unpersuasive. We agree with the trial
court that the evidence of defendant’s guilt was great, and
defendant could not have achieved a better outcome even with
testimony from such expert witnesses.
                         DISPOSITION
      We affirm the judgment.

                                                RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                  BAKER, J.

                  KIM, J.

                                23
The People v. Michael Blair Wellington
B318724

BAKER, J., Concurring

       I join the opinion for the court in full. I write separately
only to express the further view that defendant Michael
Wellington’s (defendant’s) claim of prosecutorial misconduct is
substantively meritless as well as forfeited. Defendant has not
shown the prosecution improperly threatened a witness with
prosecution to prevent the witness from testifying. (See, e.g.,
People v. Harbolt (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 140, 155.) The
prosecution expressly disclaimed any intent to file charges
against the witness and, at most, advised the court (not the
witness) of theoretical criminal exposure. The court did its duty
under the circumstances by appointing separate counsel for the
witness. (People v. Warren (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 961, 972
[“when a trial court has reason to believe that a witness may be
charged with a crime arising out of events to which he might
testify, it has a duty to [e]nsure that the witness is fully advised
of his privilege against self-incrimination”].)

                             BAKER, J.

I concur:

            KIM, J.