Court Opinion

ID: 9574307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:04:03.366035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:21.112489
License: Public Domain

Per curiam.
Appellant David Sanders was indicted on July 31, 1973, for the murder of Sheila Hunnicutt, the wife of his employer. The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a verdict of guilty, and appellant was sentenced to a life imprisonment term on August 17, 1973. The trial court overruled a motion for new trial and this appeal followed in due course, enumerating several errors.
Appellant’s contentions are that the trial court erred in overruling his challenge to the array of jurors; erred in overruling his motion to suppress certain physical evidence and erred in admitting such evidence at trial; erred in admitting into evidence the sheriffs testimony about an incriminating statement made to him by the appellant while in custody; erred in admitting opinion testimony by the sheriff as an expert; and, erred in overruling the motion for new trial.
I. Challenge to the Array
Prior to trial appellant filed a "Motion to Quash Indictments and Challenge to the Array of Grand and Traverse Jurors,” alleging that blacks, women and especially black women were purposefully and systematically excluded from the grand and traverse jury lists, resulting in a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Georgia Constitutions. After hearing evidence the trial court overruled the motion.
Appellant’s motion to quash the indictment and challenge to the array of the grand jurors was not timely filed. In order for such a motion to be entertained by the trial court, it must be made prior to the return of the *426indictment or the defendant must show that he had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, of such alleged illegal composition of the grand jury prior to the time the indictment was returned; otherwise, the objection is deemed to be waived. Estes v. State, 232 Ga. 703, 708 (208 SE2d 806) (1974). Accord, McHan v. State, 232 Ga. 470, 471 (2) (207 SE2d 457) (1974); Simmons v. State, 226 Ga. 110, 111 (172 SE2d 680) (1970); Williams v. State, 210 Ga. 665, 667 (82 SE2d 217) (1954). No such showing was made in this case, and it is clear that the motion, which was filed on August 6, 1973, was filed subsequent to the return of the indictment, which occurred on July 31, 1973. Furthermore, the evidence discloses that appellant was appointed an attorney on July 9, 1973. On the basis of Estes, McHan and Simmons, therefore, the ruling of the trial court denying appellant’s motion to quash the indictment and challenge to the array of grand jurors must be affirmed on its face. Appellant’s challenge to the array of the traverse jury, however, was timely filed and will be considered on its merits.
Appellant alleged in his motion that according to the 1970 federal census there are 6,249 persons living in Monroe County who are 21 years of age, or older. Of this group, 60 percent are white; 40 percent are black; 44 percent are male; 56 percent are female; and 22 percent are black females. Appellant averred that the traverse jury list was composed of 735 names of which 20.percent were black; 12 percent were females and 3 percent were black females.
The evidence adduced at the hearings on the motion established that the latest jury list revision prior to the trial occurred in April, 1972, and that the jury commission was then composed of three women, one of whom was black, and three men, one of whom was black. In addition, the clerk of the commission, who was present at all times during the selection process, was also a woman. The testimony of the commissioners, describing the method they used for compiling the jury list, was similar on all material points. The basic source of names for the jury list was the official registered voters’ list of the county. The commissioners, as a group, reviewed every name on the list to determine whether each individual *427thereon was qualified to serve on the jury list pursuant to Code Ann. § 59-106. In those instances where only one commissioner was familiar with an individual, the other commissioners generally would defer to that commissioner’s estimation of the individual’s qualifications.
When none of the commissioners was familiar with an individual whose name appeared on the voters’ list, that person’s name was placed on a separate list and a commissioner was selected to investigate that person’s qualifications for jury duty. A separate list was also made of women with young children who had not requested in writing to be exempted from jury service. Those women were then contacted to determine if they desired to have their names placed on the jury list.
In addition, the commissioners placed upon the traverse jury list persons whose names did not appear on the voters’ list. The names of such people came to the attention of the commission either as the result of a person contacting the commission or an individual commissioner and requesting that his or her name be placed on the jury list, or as the result of a commissioner proposing the name of a person with whom he was acquainted and who he knew was not on the voters’ list.
All of the commissioners, including the women and black commissioners, made an effort to go into the community in order to find people who were qualified for jury service but who did not appear on the voters’ list. The evidence shows that both black and white commissioners proposed the names of blacks for inclusion on the jury list. All persons, who were not listed on the voters’ list but who were proposed for inclusion on the jury list, were subjected to the same qualifications review as that accorded to persons who did appear on the voters’ list. The testimony of one commissioner indicates that approximately 200 names were added to the jury list in this manner.
The clerk of the commission and all of the commissioners including the black and woman commissioners testified that no particular mention was made of the race or sex of an individual during the selection process and that no one was excluded from the jury list because of his or her race or sex. They all testified *428that in their opinion the final jury list represented a fair cross-section of the county. However, they all also testified that they did not know, nor was a calculation ever made, of the number or proportions of blacks, whites, males, females, and black females on the voter list or the final traverse jury list.
The only evidence of the actual composition of the final traverse jury list is the testimony elicited from Mr. Paul James, a black jury commissioner. The list itself was not introduced into evidence. After reviewing the traverse jury list, Mr. James identified 163 persons, of the 735 appearing on the list, as being black and he further identified 30 of the 163 black persons as being black females. Mr. James also testified that although he was familiar with the black community, he may not have identified the names of all the blacks who were on the jury list.
Although appellant contended in the trial court and contends on appeal that females as a class were purposefully excluded from the traverse jury list, stating in his brief in this court that "[a] review of [the traverse jury list], identifying females by their names, revealed that of the 735 names appearing on the traverse jury list, only 90 (or 12%) were females,” nevertheless, these allegations are not supported in the record by any evidence or stipulation. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record regarding the number or percentage of females on the traverse jury list. This deficiency in the evidence is fatal to appellant’s claim that females as a class were the subject of discrimination in the jury selection procedures, for the burden was upon him to demonstrate that such discrimination occurred. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 205 (1965). Appellant has, consequently, failed to establish that females as a class are not adequately represented on the traverse jury list.
Appellant also introduced into evidence a statistical abstract of the official registered voters’ list for Monroe County, current through July 11, 1973. According to the abstract there is a total of 5,894 registered voters in the county, 517 (8.77 percent) of which are unidentified as to race or sex. Of the remaining 5,377 voters, 34.666 percent are black and 18.932 percent are black females. This *429information was obtained from voter registration cards kept on file by the county. The voters list itself, which is the only document relating to voters used by the jury commissioners, lists only names, unidentified as to address, race or sex.
A defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a venire or jury roll of any particular composition, but the 14th Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clause and the 6th Amendment Right to a Jury Trial do require that the state not deliberately and systematically exclude identifiable and distinct groups from their jury lists. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (95 SC 692, 42 LE2d 690) (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628 (1972); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 208, supra; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 478 (1954). The burden, however, is on the defendant to prove such purposeful discrimination. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, 550 (1967); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U. S. 519 (1903).
Appellant presented no evidence regarding the composition of any traverse jury list prior to the one from which the jury chosen to try him was selected. Consequently, the so-called "rule of exclusion” cases, exemplified by Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); and Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935), are not applicable. Rather, appellant sought to establish that the jury list, from which his jury was to be chosen, was compiled in an unconstitutional manner, apparently basing his claim on such cases as Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, and Whitus v. Georgia, supra, which held that statistical evidence establishing that blacks were underrepresented, together with evidence that the selection procedures were not racially neutral, established a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination thus shifting the burden of proof to the state.
Appellant contends that the evidence made out such a prima facie case of discrimination and the state failed to rebut his prima facie case. A threshold question raised by appellant’s challenge to the array is whether black females constitute an identifiable and distinct class for purposes of a jury challenge based on the 14th *430Amendment. Of course, a defendant may now complain of the exclusion from the jury of a distinct class to which he does not belong. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493, supra. However, appellant introduced no evidence which would tend to show that black females are considered a separate class in the community distinct from blacks or other females. Therefore, appellant’s failure to prove this factual predicate for a finding of distinctness is fatal to his claim of unconstitutional discrimination against black females. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, supra. There remains, however, the question of discrimination against blacks as a group.
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must demonstrate that there exists a substantial disparity between the proportion of blacks chosen for jury duty and the proportion of blacks in the eligible population and that the selection procedures themselves are not racially neutral. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 630, supra; and Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 360 (1970). In determining whether a particular discrepancy is substantial or significant, some allowance may be made for the imprecision of the jury selection process and the operation of constitutionally inoffensive factors such as exemptions from jury duty based on occupation. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 208, supra.
The evidence discloses that the figures relied upon by appellant to establish the discrepancy are imprecise. Only one person was called upon to identify blacks on the jury list. This witness was the black jury commissioner who testified that he may not have recognized the names of all of the blacks on the list. The evidence of underrepresentation is, therefore, inconclusive. This is especially true in light of the testimony of the two black jury commissioners that no person was excluded from the list because of his or her race. The evidence in this case does not present a persuasive basis for finding there was purposeful discrimination in making the jury list of Monroe County. Therefore, we affirm the trial court on this issue.
II. Motion to Suppress
During the trial the state introduced into evidence *431appellant’s palm and fingerprints, his rubber boots, his trousers, hairs removed from his body, and tires removed from his brother’s car. Testimony adduced by the state disclosed that the murdér occurred on the morning of July 6,1973, between 7:21 and about 8:30 a.m.; that the victim had been raped; that appellant drove his brother’s car that morning between approximately 6:30 and 8:00 a.m.; that tire tracks in the victim’s driveway were similar in wear and tread design to tracks made by that automobile; that the tread of appellant’s boots matched "cleats of mud” found in the victim’s home; that appellant’s palmprint matched a palmprint found on a table which was located next to the bed where the victim’s body was discovered; and that several hairs found in the zipper of appellant’s trousers matched the victim’s pubic hairs. Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress this physical evidence was denied by the trial court.
Appellant argues that these items of physical evidence (prints, boots, trousers, hair and tires) were obtained from him while he was being illegally detained by the police from July 6 to July 9, 1973, without a warrant. In particular, appellant contends that his warrantless arrest was illegal, because it was in violation of the Fourth Amendment in that it was not based upon probable cause, and also because it was in violation, of Code §§ 27-207,27-212. He also contends that the sheriff’s testimony as to his incriminating statement was inadmissible.
The murder occurred on Friday morning, July 6, 1973, and appellant was taken into custody on that day. The warrant was issued on Monday, July 9, and appellant appeared before a magistrate on that day. A formal commitment hearing was held on July 19, the motion to suppress was heard August 8 and 9, and the trial commenced on August 15.
At the outset we should determine whether, in considering appellant’s motion to suppress, we are limited to the pre-trial testimony adduced at the August 8-9 hearing on that motion, or may we also consider the July 19 commitment hearing testimony as well as any testimony adduced at trial pertinent to this inquiry. In Morales v. New York, 396 U. S. 102, 105 (90 SC 291, 24 *432LE2d 299) (1969), the case was remanded for evidentiary hearing to develop the circumstances leading to arrest. If testimony adduced at a post-conviction hearing can be utilized to show whether or not there was probable cause for arrest, then it follows that testimony adduced at a commitment hearing and at trial may be utilized for the same purpose. See also Brown v. Illinois, -U. S. -(95 SC 2254, 45 LE2d 416).
We therefore will consider the pre-trial testimony as supplemented by the trial transcript.
The evidence shows the following circumstances relative to appellant’s arrest and detention. The victim’s housekeeper arrived at work the morning of July 6 at about 8:30 and soon thereafter found the body. She telephoned a neighbor, Wallace Smarr, who, wearing slippers, went with his wife to the victim’s home. He checked the victim’s pulse and telephoned the sheriff’s office. At 9:05 a.m., the sheriff received a telephone call informing him that there had been a murder at Johnny Hunnicutt’s house. When he arrived at the Hunnicutt home at about 9:20 the sheriff met Wallace Hunnicutt (the victim’s brother-in-law) and appellant David Sanders on the road at the end of the driveway. The sheriff (who had been in the tire business for 20 years) asked them to block the driveway in order to prevent tire tracks from being disturbed. Wallace Hunnicutt, David Sanders and also David’s brother, Clarence Sanders, were employed on a dairy farm by the victim’s husband, Johnny Hunnicutt.
The sheriff met the housekeeper and Mr. and Mrs. Smarr in the yard. He entered the house and found the victim’s body, tied hand and foot with the telephone cord and a sash, on a bed in the bedroom at the back of the house. A .25 caliber pistol and a spent cartridge were located at the head of the bed. (The sheriff did not learn until that afternoon that the victim had been shot, the bullet entering her head up in the hairline.) The sheriff also noticed several "Z” shaped cleats of mud on the floors of the hallway, middle bedroom and back bedroom. A palmprint was discovered on the table next to the victim’s bed. This evidence was sent to the crime lab in Atlanta.
The sheriff then went out to the driveway and began *433examining the tire tracks. As heretofore noted, he had been in the tire business for 20 years and had been in the recapping business for 18 years. He testified that he was able to identify all the tracks but two in the driveway as being made either by the victim’s car, her husband’s pick-up truck, Wallace Hunnicutt’s car, or Wallace Smarr’s car. (He determined on the following day that one of the unidentified tracks was made by the car which brought the housekeeper.) As the sheriff was making a plaster cast of one unidentified tire track, a car drove down the dirt road in front of the Hunnicutt driveway and stopped nearby at Clarence Sanders’ house. The sheriff noted that the tracks of that car matched unidentified tracks in the driveway. The sheriff spoke with Mrs. Clarence Sanders who had been driving her husband’s car and learned that appellant had borrowed the car earlier that morning between about 6:30 and 8:00 a.m.
The sheriff talked to the victim’s husband, Johnny Hunnicutt. He learned that three men owned rubber boots with treads capable of making the mud tracks found in the victim’s home: appellant, Wallace Hunnicutt and Johnny Hunnicutt. All three men had been at the dairy barn, located not far from the victim’s house, at some time in the early morning. Clarence Sanders, who wore a different type of boot, had also been working at the barn that morning. The sheriff learned that all four men were at the barn around 5:30 a.m., that Johnny Hunnicutt had only been at the barn for a few minutes before he left to work at the post office, and that both Wallace Hunnicutt and appellant had left the barn at various times. Appellant left the barn at about 6:00 a.m. to go get his brother’s car, telling his brother that he was going for cigarettes. As heretofore noted, appellant had that car from about 6:30 to 8:00. Wallace Hunnicutt left the barn once shortly after 6:00 a.m. to go to his house to go to the bathroom. He was gone about 15 to 30 minutes. His mother confirmed that he came home on this occasion. He left again after 8:00 a.m. (after appellant returned) to go home for breakfast. His mother was not at home at this time. Mrs. Smarr saw Wallace Hunnicutt and Clarence Sanders at the barn at about 7:30. She fixed the calves milk, which took about 30 minutes, before she saw appellant.
*434Wallace Hunnicutt drove appellant to the victim’s home about 9:00 a.m. En route, appellant told Wallace that during his absence from the barn he had gone to Hamm’s store for cigarettes. Appellant did not enter the house at this time. Wallace, however, did.
During the day, the sheriff learned that the victim had received and accepted a collect telephone call at about 7:30 a.m. (It was learned the next day from the telephone company that the exact time of the call was 7:21 a.m. and that it lasted 47 seconds). The caller worked under the victim’s supervision at the telephone company and was able to identify her voice. The caller told the victim her father had had a heart attack and she would not be at work.
At about 11:30 a.m., the sheriff sent his deputy to interview Clarence Sanders as to appellant’s whereabouts earlier that morning and to take appellant to the sheriffs office for questioning. When asked whether he had some reason for this action the sheriff answered: "The mud on the floor inside the house, the tire tracks inside the driveway, and his absence from the dairy barn for an hour and a half period when Mrs. Hunnicutt had to have been killed.” The sheriff testified further concerning the progress of the investigation as of 11:30 a.m. as follows: "Q. Now, is it not a fact, Sheriff, that you did not have a warrant for David Sanders’ arrest at that time? A. No, sir. Q. As a matter of fact, you did not have sufficient evidence even to obtain an arrest warrant; isn’t that true, at the time? A. I didn’t feel like I did at that time.”
Pursuant to the sheriffs instructions, Deputy Jack Pitts interviewed Clarence Sanders as to appellant’s whereabouts earlier that day and took appellant to the sheriffs office for questioning. Upon delivering appellant to the office, the deputy went to Hamm’s store to learn whether appellant had gone there that morning between 6:30 and 8:00 to buy cigarettes. He learned that appellant had not.
Appellant spent the afternoon and early evening at the sheriffs office, watching television in one of the downstairs rooms.
The sheriff was present at the funeral home when the autopsy was performed on the afternoon of July 6. He *435learned the medical examiner’s findings. Although appellant was at the sheriffs office, the sheriff testified that he was not in custody during this time. In fact the sheriff testified that before appellant was given Miranda warnings and questioned, he (the sheriff) "did not think that David Sanders had committed the crime” but "thought he could help me in the investigation of the case.”
During the day the sheriff verified that the victim’s husband had been at work at the post office that morning.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the sheriff testified that as of the evening of July 6, 1973, he suspected anybody who had rubber boots which would leave the tracks he had found and anybody who could have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed (between about 7:30 and 8:30 a.m. insofar as he then knew), namely the victim’s husband (Johnny Hunnicutt), Wallace Hunnicutt and the appellant, except that he had determined that Johnny Hunnicutt was at work at the post office.
At about 8:30 p.m. appellant’s brother, Clarence Sanders, was brought to the sheriffs office by Deputy Pitts. Clarence Sanders talked with his brother for 15 or 20 minutes. Then the sheriff asked Clarence who had driven his car that day and whether he (Clarence) had driven it in the victim’s driveway. The sheriff previously had learned that Clarence Sanders’ wife had not driven the car into the driveway. The sheriff also asked Clarence Sanders if he could identify a sash (the one used to tie the victim).
That evening, before the sheriff arrived at his office, Deputy Pitts read to appellant a document which contained the Miranda warnings and a waiver of counsel. Appellant placed his mark on it, notwithstanding the fact that the document stated that he could read and write. The sheriff had another copy of the document read to appellant, with the words "I can read and write the English language” crossed out. Appellant executed it with an "X.”
After being given the Miranda warning and waiving his right to counsel, appellant told the sheriff that he had *436gone to Hamm’s store for cigarettes. When advised that this account had been found to be untrue, he said that he drove to town and rode around. The route he described was away from the victim’s house. Upon request he tied knots which the sheriff recognized as being like the knots used to tie the victim.
The interrogation of appellant that Friday night lasted about an hour. After the interrogation, the sheriff took appellant’s fingerprints. The sheriff testified that he did not remember having asked for appellant’s permission to do so, but that appellant did not object to the procedure. At about the same time, the sheriff asked appellant for his boots and trousers. The fingerprints and the clothing were sent to the crime lab for examination.
The sheriff testified as follows: "Q. Now, isn’t it a fact that at the time you took those clothes you had not had an arrest warrant? A. I did not have a warrant. Q. You did not have a search warrant? A. I did not have a search warrant. Q. And, isn’t it a fact that you had not at that time felt that you had sufficient evidence to get an arrest warrant? A. I did not get an arrest warrant for him ... I had mixed feelings about whether I had enough evidence at that time. I did not want to take out a warrant for him until I had heard from the evidence from the crime lab on the fingerprints and the gun and I had not heard from them at that time.” The sheriff testified further: "Q. Is it not true, Sheriff, that on Friday until Monday you did not feel that you had sufficient evidence to get an arrest warrant? A. I didn’t know whether I had enough evidence or not. I wanted to wait until I got the crime lab report.”
• On the following Saturday, the sheriff learned from telephone company records that the victim had received the collect call at 7:21 a.m., Friday, and he interviewed the caller. He talked with appellant briefly on that day. He talked again with Clarence Sanders, asking him about Wallace Hunnicutt. Clarence Sanders talked with appellant on that Saturday and again on Sunday around noon.
On Sunday the sheriff told appellant about the tire tracks he had found. Appellant then told the sheriff he had driven by the victim’s house on Friday morning, turning around in the driveway. Appellant was taken to *437Macon Sunday evening for a polygraph test. The sheriff testified that he could not use the lie detector test to take out a warrant. Sometime that weekend, the sheriff learned that appellant’s mother was undertaking to retain an attorney.
On Monday morning, July 9, the sheriff went to appellant’s cell and asked appellant for samples of hair from his head and pubic area. Appellant complied without objection, plucking out the hair himself and placing it in a vial. The sheriff then took these specimens to the crime lab in Atlanta. While there the sheriff was told that appellant’s prints matched the palmprint found on the table next to the victim’s bed, and that several pubic hairs similar to the victim’s were found in the zipper of appellant’s trousers. The sheriff phoned his deputy and instructed him to obtain a warrant for appellant’s arrest and to ask the judge to appoint counsel. At that time appellant had been in continuous custody since the previous Friday without being taken before a magistrate.
Upon arriving back at his office, the sheriff was informed by his deputy that a warrant had been obtained, that appellant had been before a magistrate, and that the judge had appointed appellant an attorney. The sheriff then went to appellant, told him that the warrant had been issued and that he had been appointed an attorney. He also told appellant that he could wait until the attorney came before he talked to him further but that he had something he wanted to tell appellant. The sheriff then informed appellant of the crime lab report regarding appellant’s palmprint and the victim’s pubic hair and asked appellant if he would like to make a statement. Appellant answered that he would, but the sheriff said that he would let him think about it and then left for about 15 minutes. When the sheriff returned, he again asked appellant if he would like to make a statement. Appellant said "Yes” and gave a statement to the sheriff incriminating himself in the crime.
Appellant said that he went to the victim’s house about 6:45 a.m., that the victim came to the door and let him in, that he grabbed her, that they had intercourse, that the telephone rang, that he held her while she talked on the phone, that the call was somebody saying she *438wouldn’t be at work because her father was sick, that he tied the victim using the telephone cord to tie her hands and a sash removed from her closet to tie her feet and neck and that he left her in that position. Based on this statement, the sheriff was able to identify the dress from which the sash was taken.
At the hearing on the motion to supress, the sheriff was asked by defense counsel whether he told appellant about the crime lab report for the purpose of getting him to change his story and admit the crime. The sheriff replied: "[P]artially. I told him that if there was somebody else with him that I didn’t want him to take the whole rap by himself, that I wanted him to tell me the truth, that we had this much evidence on him and if there was somebody else with him, I wanted to know it.” Appellant did not implicate anyone else.
Appellant contends that he was arrested without probable cause and that his fingerprints, boots, trousers and hair, and the tires from his brother’s car, should have been suppressed, as well as the sheriffs testimony as to appellant’s incriminating statement. In support of this argument appellant argues both federal and state grounds. He relies heavily on the fact that he was arrested without a warrant, that he was held from Friday until Monday, and that the sheriff testified that he did not get a warrant until Monday because he was uncertain as to whether he had sufficient evidence to obtain one.
We must first determine at what point appellant was arrested, and then determine whether probable cause existed for his arrest at that time.
We conclude that the appellant was legally arrested without a warrant about 11:30 a.m. Friday, July 6, when the deputy sheriff, at the direction of the sheriff, took the appellant to the sheriffs office for questioning. At that time he was restrained of his liberty. Although the sheriff states he did not arrest the appellant until later he states he had his deputy take him into custody. The appellant never left the sheriffs office, he was given the Miranda warnings, was interrogated, fingerprinted, his clothing taken, and he was placed in a cell that evening. The sheriff did not order the appellant arrested under a warrant until Monday, July 9. It appears that the sheriff *439equates an arrest with a formal arrest under a warrant. In fact the evidence supports the trial court’s refusal to suppress the evidence seized because there was an arrest when the deputy sheriff took the appellant to the sheriff’s office Friday morning, July 6. As stated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968), ". . . whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized’ that person.” Also Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 341 (211 SE2d 294) (1974).
The questions then are whether, at this time, 11:30 a.m. Friday, July 6, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause and a finding that a failure of justice might occur for want of a warrant. In my opinion there was ample evidence to support both.
When the deputy sheriff took the appellant into custody the following facts were known: 1. The victim was probably alive about 6:00 a.m. July 6, the morning of her death. 2. The victim was found dead by the maid when she came to work at 8:30 a.m. that morning. 3. Appellant was employed on a dairy farm by the victim’s husband, Johnny Hunnicutt. 4. Appellant had borrowed his brother’s car between 6:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. that morning. 5. The tire tracks of that car matched the tire tracks in the driveway of the victim’s house. 6. Appellant owned boots with treads which were capable of making mud tracks found in the victim’s house. 7. Johnny Hunnicutt and one Wallace Hunnicutt also owned such boots. 8. Johnny Hunnicutt’s and Wallace Hunnicutt’s whereabouts were substantially accounted for during the probable time of the murder. 9. Appellant’s whereabouts was not accounted for between approximately 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. the morning of the murder.
The sheriff stated he sent his deputy for the appellant because of, "The mud on the floor inside the house, the tire tracks in the driveway, and his absence for an hour and a half period when Mrs. Hunnicutt had to have been killed.”
As stated in Peters v. State, 114 Ga. App. 595, 596 (152 SE2d 647) (1966), "Under Code § 27-207 an officer of this state may arrest without a warrant 'if the offense is committed in his presence, or the offender is endeavoring to escape, or for other cause there is likely to be a failure of *440justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant.’ Whether or not the arrest violated this statute, the constitutional validity of the arrest without a warrant depends 'upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it — whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.’ Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 91 (85 SC 223, 13 LE2d 142). 'In dealing with probable cause ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. They are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175 (69 SC 1302, 93 LE 1879). There is also a great 'difference between what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or search.’ Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 311-312 (79 SC 329, 3 LE2d 327). As Judge Learned Hand said in United States v. Heitner, 149 F2d 105, 106 (C. A. 2d Cir.): 'It is well settled that an arrest may be made upon hearsay evidence; and indeed, the "reasonable cause” necessary to support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused’s guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers are to be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their duties.’ ” Accord, Strauss v. Stynchcombe, 224 Ga. 859 (165 SE2d 302) (1968); McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 376 (211 SE2d 577) (1974).
The failure to hold a commitment hearing within 48 hours as required by Code Ann. § 27-212 does not render a conviction invalid nor require the exclusion of evidence. Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253 (5) (167 SE2d 628) (1969).
III. Expert Testimony
Appellant enumerates as error the ruling of the trial court permitting the sheriff to give an expert opinion regarding tire track comparison. This contention is without merit. The evidence of the sheriffs experience in the tire recapping business for 18 years formed a sufficient basis for the trial court to exercise its discretion *441in permitting the sheriff to give his expert opinion. Carter v. Marble Products, 179 Ga. 122 (1) (175 SE 480) (1934); Braswell v. Owen of Georgia, 128 Ga. App. 528 (5) (197 SE2d 463) (1973). We find no error here.
Argued June 9, 1975
Decided October 28, 1975.
Thomas M. Jackson, for appellant.
Edward E. McGarity, District Attorney, Phillip Benson Ham, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Kirby G. Atkinson, for appellee.
IV. Motion for New Trial
Appellant enumerates as error the overruling of his motion for new trial which asserted the general grounds. A review of the evidence shows that there was sufficient evidence to authorize the verdict of guilty. Therefore, the trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial on the general grounds.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Gunter, Ingram and Hill, JJ., who dissent.