Court Opinion

ID: 9737956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:38:15.590458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:02.783725
License: Public Domain

FLEMING, J., Dissenting.
The court reverses the convictions of defendants, caught red-handed with large quantities of pure heroin held for purposes of sale in amounts said to have a retail value of one million dollars, on what appear to me formalistic grounds empty of real content. The convictions must be reversed, the court rules, because defendants were denied their opportunity to challenge the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant used to unearth the main supply of heroin.
I
The history of this matter falls into stages somewhat as follows:
1. On June 8, 1963, defendant Charlene Peterson was arrested while driving a Chevrolet automobile owned by defendant Dewey Wilson. On her arrest the Chevrolet automobile was searched, and 2 ounces of pure, undiluted heroin were found underneath the driver’s seat. This search was deemed to have been made without a warrant.
2. Immediately thereafter the police returned to the house of Charlene Peterson on West 113th Street and conducted a search of the premises under authority of a search warrant which they had previously obtained. Dewey Wilson was in the house. This search uncovered massive amounts of pure, undiluted heroin packaged for ready sale and delivery and a Smith and Wesson revolver. Wilson was arrested, and both defendants were taken to the police station.
3. On the filing of a complaint against Charlene Peterson and Dewey Wilson charging possession of heroin for sale, a preliminary hearing was held in the municipal court on July 2 and 3 before the Honorable 0. Benton Worley, during which the defense challenged the arrest of Charlene Peterson and the search of the Chevrolet as having been made without a warrant and without reasonable cause to believe she had committed a felony. A hearing was held on the issue of reasonable cause, and the arresting officer, James Grennan, was questioned at length as to what cause he had had to arrest *500Charlene Peterson and search the Chevrolet. He testified the arrest was based on information from two reliable informers, J. D. Walker and David Rogers, information from two untested informers whose names were not disclosed, and his observation of furtive conduct by Charlene Peterson immediately prior to her arrest. At the conclusion of the hearing the court ruled that reasonable cause existed for the arrest and that consequently evidence obtained in the search of the Chevrolet was admissible.
4. During the same preliminary hearing an oral motion was made by defendants to quash the search warrant used to make the search of the premises at West 113th Street, on the ground that the warrant had been issued without probable cause to believe the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued. The search warrant had been issued on the petition and affidavit of Officer Grennan, and a comparison of his affidavit with his testimony at the preliminary hearing indicates that the information on which he relied to obtain the search warrant was substantially identical with the information on which he relied to arrest Charlene Peterson without a warrant and search the Chevrolet. At the preliminary hearing the court refused to review the propriety of the issue of the search warrant, a refusal which the majority of this court holds proper, on the ground that the motion attacking the existence of probable cause for the search warrant should have been made before the magistrate who issued it.
5. On October 25, some four and a half months after their arrests, defendants brought a written motion attacking the validity of the search warrant before the Honorable James D. Tante, the municipal court judge who had originally issued the warrant. Judge Tante ruled that the motion was no longer timely, in that jurisdiction over the ease had passed to the superior court, to whose custody had also been delivered the evidence sought to be suppressed.
6. On November 5 a seven-day jury trial started in the superior court before the Honorable Kathleen Parker. Defendants again attacked the arrest of Charlene Peterson and the search of the Chevrolet as having been made without a warrant and without reasonable cause to believe she had committed a felony. Outside the presence of the jury the better part of a day was taken up with the examination of Officer Grennan on reasonable cause, during which he again testified the arrest was based on information from two reliable informers, Walker and Rogers, information from two untested informers, and on furtive conduct of Charlene Peterson at *501the time of her arrest. At the conclusion of Officer Grennan’s examination Judge Parker ruled that reasonable cause existed for the arrest without a warrant of Charlene Peterson and the search of the Chevrolet, and that evidence thereby obtained was admissible at the trial.
7. At the same stage of the trial defendants orally moved to quash the search warrant as having been issued without prohable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, their counsel stating that much the same evidence applicable to the hearing on the arrest would apply to the hearing on the search warrant, and asking that evidence on the arrest be received on the search warrant as well: “Much of the same evidence would, I think, appertain to the search warrant... I think we probably would go through about the same thing and I am wondering if the evidence that has been received here would be deemed related also to the search warrant, and all motions in respect to that would be deemed had in respect to the search warrant as well.” The motion to quash the search warrant was denied by Judge Parker on the ground that it could only have been made before the magistrate who issued the warrant.
Subsequent to these rulings both defendants were convicted of possession of narcotics for sale, their motions for a new trial were denied, they were sentenced to state prison, and they have appealed their convictions to this court.
The case is complicated by the fact that Charlene Peterson was driving Dewey Wilson’s Chevrolet at the time of her arrest and not her own Ford automobile. The police and the district attorney justified her arrest and search as one based on reasonable cause to make an arrest without a warrant, although the police had previously obtained a warrant to search the person of Charlene Peterson, her house, and her Ford automobile, for heroin, and later used this warrant to search the premises at West 113th Street. Factually, the reasonable cause to arrest Charlene Peterson without a warrant was dependent on the testimony of Officer Grennan, who was cross-examined at length both at the preliminary hearing and at the trial itself about his two reliable informers, Walker and Rogers, and his two confidential informers. His testimony is summarized in the Attorney General’s brief quoted below.1
*502Precisely the same information made up probable cause for the issue of the warrant to search the premises at West 113th Street. The search warrant was issued on the affidavit of Officer Grennan, which set forth information he had obtained from two reliable informers, Walker and Eogers, plus information from two untested informers. The affidavit in support of the search warrant, while not part of the original record before this court, is a record which we may judicially notice and is quoted in full below.2
*503The propriety of the ruling of Judge Parker declining to examine the question of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, thereby admitting in evidence the heroin *504found on the premises at West 113th Street, is the specific issue before this court. The ruling of Judge Tante on October 25 refusing to entertain a motion to quash the search warrant is not before us, and while there would appear to be considerable justification for his view that jurisdiction over the case had passed to the superior court (Quan Chick v. Coffey, 75 Cal. 371 [17 P. 427]) and that the delay of four and a half months had rendered the motion to suppress evidence untimely, on this appeal we are not directly concerned with the correctness of his ruling. (People v. Keener, 55 Cal.2d 714, 720 [12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587].)
In my view, Judge Parker should have ruled on the question of probable cause for the issue of the search warrant in determining the admissibility of evidence at the trial, but since the evidence in support of probable cause was before the court I have little doubt that her ruling would have upheld the validity of the warrant. The same information which gave reasonable cause to arrest Charlene Peterson and search the Chevrolet also gave probable cause to issue the search warrant for the premises at West 113th Street. The defect in trial procedure was the lack of a formal ruling on the validity of the search warrant. To meet this formal deficiency I would reverse the judgments without upsetting the verdicts and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate its order denying a new trial and entertain a motion for a new trial, at which time defendants should be given an opportunity to produce oral testimony in support of their attack on the search warrant. (People s. Tucker, 117 *505Cal. 229, 230 [49 P. 134]; People v. Morton, 41 Cal.2d 536 [261 P.2d 523].)
Unfortunately, the court reverses the judgments in their entirety and consigns the case to limbo to await some further action on the search warrant by Judge Tante, the issuing magistrate. Since Judge Tante is no longer a member of the municipal court the future prosecution of this case is clouded with uncertainty. The majority opinion apparently accepts the view that when a defendant moves to quash a search warrant all pending proceedings are brought to a halt, and the case must await action by the magistrate who issued the search warrant who is the only judicial officer who can examine the propriety of its issue.
II
It appears to me the vice in the majority opinion is its assumption that only the issuing magistrate in a proceeding to quash the search warrant under Penal Code, sections 1539, 1540, can determine whether or not the search warrant was issued with probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued. This view appears unduly restrictive. In my opinion both (1) California law outlining the methods of attacking search warrants, and (2) federal constitutional law, permit this issue to be raised in the trial court.
1. What are the limitations on an attack against a search warrant which seeks to go behind the face of the warrant and its supporting affidavit and show that in actual fact there was no probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued? Since the issuance of a warrant is the judicial act of a magistrate it carries a presumption of validity in its favor. (Code Civ. Proc., §§1909, 1963, subd. 15.) However this presumption is not conclusive, and under the Constitution a defendant has the right to look behind the supporting affidavit to inquire whether in fact there was probable cause to believe the existence of the allegations used to obtain the search warrant. Yet the exercise of constitutional rights may be regulated in the time, place, and manner of their exercise. Where a defendant wishes to attack the basis for the issuance of a search warrant by contesting the facts set forth in the supporting affidavit, it is reasonable to require him to do this in advance of trial. California has adopted such a policy in construing sections 1539 and 1540 of the Penal Code. A defendant must present a motion to *506quash the warrant under these sections before making a further attack against the validity of the underlying allegations used to obtain the search warrant. (People v. Prieto, 191 Cal.App.2d 62, 67 [12 Cal.Rptr. 577].) But, once a defendant has made such a motion, even though unsuccessfully, he may continue to raise the same question by way of objections to the admissibility of evidence at the preliminary hearing and at the trial itself.
This was the specific holding of People v. Keener, 55 Cal.2d 714, 720 [12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587]. In that case an attack under Penal Code, sections 1539, 1540, was made before the examining magistrate on the existence of probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant. The magistrate denied the motion to quash the search warrant. The defendants renewed their attack at the preliminary hearing, this time by way of objections to the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of the use of the search warrant. Their objections were overruled. Defendants then moved to set aside the information under Penal Code, section 995, on the ground that because there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant the evidence acquired in the search had been illegally obtained. The Supreme Court held the motion to have been properly made.
A defendant who seeks to attack the truth of statements in the supporting affidavit of a search warrant, said the court, must proceed under Penal Code, sections 1539, 1540, and if he does not do so will thereafter be foreclosed from going behind the face of the affidavit. But if he does so proceed, even though denied relief, he can thereafter raise the same issue at the preliminary hearing and at the trial itself. “Defendants, prior to the preliminary hearing, did all that could reasonably be expected of them to preserve their rights, and, under these circumstances, the adverse ruling upon the motion to quash the warrant did not preclude them from subsequently raising at the preliminary hearing their claim that the warrant was defective.” (People v. Keener, 55 Cal.2d 714, 720 [12 Cal.Rptr. 859, 361 P.2d 587]; Arata v. Superior Court, 153 Cal.App.2d 767 [315 P.2d 473]; People v. Perez, 189 Cal.App.2d 526, 531 [11 Cal.Rptr. 456].)
Much of the confusion in this case is attributable to defendants’ delay of four and a half months in making their motion under Penal Code, sections 1539, 1540, to quash the search warrant. The statute obviously contemplates a prompt, early motion to quash the search warrant, as, for example, occurred *507in Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal.2d 789 [13 Cal.Rptr. 415, 362 P.2d 47], where the search warrant was served on September 16 and the motion to quash was filed on September 19. Nevertheless, while defendants were dilatory I do not believe they were foreclosed by their delay from further attacking the search warrant. Since they finally made their motion, although late, they satisfied the prerequisite under California law for an attack on the search warrant at the trial itself.
Having met the prerequisite for challenging the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued defendants were entitled to raise this issue at the time of trial. Since defendants’ motion to quash had never been adjudicated on the merits, a sound exercise of discretion by the trial court required it to entertain objections to evidence which, it is claimed, had been secured through use of an invalid search warrant. (People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459, 463, 464 [282 P.2d 509].)
2. Had California not provided an easily accessible method for contesting the admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to a questioned search warrant, the constitutionality of its procedure in this field might be subject to challenge. Subsequent to the ruling in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513], in which California held that illegally obtained evidence could not be used, the United States Supreme Court has held that the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and that evidence obtained by means of unreasonable searches and seizures must be excluded from state courts as a matter of federal constitutional law. (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933]; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 [83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726].) In criminal cases defendants are permitted to raise federal constitutional objections in any proper manner without being too closely governed by state procedure. (Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 [85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408]; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 [83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892]; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 [76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d 1055].) Even if defendants had not filed a motion under Penal Code, sections 1539, 1540, and thereby met the condition laid down in California law as a prerequisite to a challenge to the validity of the warrant, I believe the federal Constitution would fairly generously excuse compliance with conditions precedent arising out of pro*508cedural complexities and permit defendants to question the admissibility of the evidence at the trial on the ground of an illegal search. (Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723].)
It appears to me the appropriate rule of procedure the United States Supreme Court will follow in considering such constitutional questions, is that outlined in rule 41(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (rules, incidentally, which have been promulgated by the Supreme Court itself), which, on the timing of a motion to suppress evidence, provides: “The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing.” As in the ease of California procedure, a sound exercise of discretion by a trial court in passing on constitutional rights would require the court to formally entertain the motion to suppress, since it had not previously been ruled upon on its merits. (Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-532 [84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887].)
Under this analysis, both California law and the federal Constitution would impel the trial court to exercise its discretion and allow a formal attack at the time of trial on the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant and thereby resolve the question of the admissibility of evidence claimed to have been seized under an invalid search warrant.
Ill
However, this failure of the trial court to rule on the validity of the search warrant was a purely formal error lacking in substantive effect. What was the narrow question with which the court should have dealt? Simply and solely, whether Officer Grennan had probable cause to believe the truth of the statements he set down in his affidavit. Accordingly, when we talk about testing the validity of the issuance of the search warrant we are talking about an opportunity to question Officer Grennan under oath on the contents of his affidavit, on his sources of information, and on his belief at the time in the truth of the matters contained therein. If after cross-examination it appears that Officer Grennan had probable cause at the time to believe in the truth of the statements he made in his affidavit, and if the statements on their face provide justification for the issue of a warrant, then the *509legality of the search warrant has been fully tested, and all constitutional and statutory requirements for its issuance have been satisfied. (People v. Acosta, 142 Cal.App.2d 59, 62-63 [298 P.2d 29].)
In point of fact all this has taken place, not once but twice. At the preliminary hearing and again at the trial itself, Officer Grennan was examined fully on what cause he had to arrest Charlene Peterson without a warrant and search the Chevrolet. His testimony referred to precisely the same information he had set forth in his affidavit to obtain the search warrant. At the conclusion of each hearing the court overruled objections to the admissibility of the evidence and thereby determined that Officer Grennan had had reasonable cause to arrest Charlene Peterson without a warrant. Such an arrest without a warrant had to pass a more stringent test than that required to issue a search warrant. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Goldberg in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-111 [84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723], we give more leeway to the disinterested determination of a magistrate to issue a search warrant than to the hurried action of officers who happen to make arrests, and the reasonable cause which will justify an arrest and search without a warrant must satisfy a more rigorous standard than the probable cause needed to issue a search warrant. “Thus, when a search is based upon a magistrate’s, rather than a police officer’s, determination of probable cause, the reviewing courts will accept evidence of a less ‘judicially competent or persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his own without a warrant,’ ibid., and will sustain the judicial determination so long as ‘there was substantial basis for [the magistrate] to conclude that narcotics were probably present. . . ”
Nothing remains to be done to test the validity of the search warrant which has not already been done. Officer Grennan has been grilled to a fare-thee-well on probable cause, both at preliminary hearing and at trial. Defendants have had two opportunities to present whatever additional evidence they desired on this issue. The only thing lacking was a formal ruling by the court saying, in effect, “Yes, the testimony relating to probable cause for the arrest shall be deemed applicable to the search warrant. No, the evidence obtained by the search warrant will not be suppressed because I find the warrant to have been issued on probable cause.”
Procedure is a good servant but a bad master. By reversing the judgments and suspending proceedings pending a hearing *510by the magistrate who initially issued the search warrant, we entangle the ease in procedure like a fly in flypaper and make its further prosecution speculative. In my view the problem can be readily solved by sending the ease back to the trial court with instructions to entertain a motion for a new trial and give defendants an opportunity to attack the search warrant. If the warrant was issued on probable cause, the trial court should so indicate. If not, the motion for a new trial should be granted.
Such a procedure is comparable to that followed by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908], a case in which the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of a confession was found inadequate under federal constitutional standards. Prior to submission of the voluntariness of a confession to a jury, the Supreme Court said, due process required the trial judge to make a preliminary finding that the confession was voluntary. The Supreme Court, however, did not set aside the judgment of conviction. It merely required New York to grant petitioner a hearing in order that a judge might determine the voluntariness of his confession. “It does not follow, however, that Jackson is automatically entitled to a complete new trial including a retrial of the issue of guilt or innocence. Jackson’s position before the District Court, and here, is that the issue of his confession should not have been decided by the convicting jury but should have been determined in a proceeding separate and apart from the body trying guilt or innocence. So far we agree and hold that he is now entitled to such a hearing in the state court. But if at the conclusion of such an evidentiary hearing in the state court on the coercion issue, it is determined that Jackson’s confession was voluntarily given, admissible in evidence, and properly to be considered by the jury, we see no constitutional necessity at that point for proceeding with a new trial, for Jackson has already been tried by a jury with the confession placed before it and has been found guilty.” (P. 394.) (See also Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 [85 S.Ct. 174, 13 L.Ed.2d 109]; United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 233 [78 S.Ct. 245, 2 L.Ed.2d 234]; Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 [81 S.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428].)
We should use the same procedure to advantage here, and direct the trial court to pass on the validity of the search warrant in determining the admissibility of evidence obtained through its use.
*511Penal Code, section 1260,3 gives us all the authority we need to carry out the constitutional command not to set aside judgments solely because of technical errors in procedure. (Art. VI, § 4½.)4 I see no reason why we should overturn a properly conducted jury trial on the supposition that a search warrant might have been issued without probable cause when the record itself tells us the exact opposite.
From the judgment of the majority, I respectfully dissent.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 27, 1965, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 2, 1965.

“The evidence upon probable cause was heard without the jury. It shows that the officers were acting upon information they had received from two reliable informants, J. B. Walker and David Rogers, together with additional information received from two confidential informants. The two named informants had been found to be previously reliable. *502Arrests had resulted from information given by them. The two other informants were untested at the time of trial. The reliable informant Walker had informed the officers that the appellant Charlene Peterson was a nurse and was delivering heroin to a woman named Louise Brown. Further that the appellant Peterson received her supply of heroin from a person who worked on a ship and brought her a supply of heroin every three or four months. The informant Walker told the officers that he thought appellant Charlene Peterson was a nurse because she always wore a white uniform; that the heroin she handled was pure; it was white, not brown like the stuff that came from Mexico. Informant Walker had observed that the appellant Peterson came to the residence of Louise Brown. Further, this informant learned through visits to the residence of Louise Brown that appellant Peterson supplied her with heroin. The informant Walker remained in communication with the officers from December 19G2 to the date of arrest, June 8, 1963. The informant Walker had been known to the police over a period of several years.
“The other named informant, David Bogers, was living at the address of Louise Brown. He described the appellant Charlene Peterson as a tall, light-eomplexioned colored girl. This informant Bogers also gave the officers appellant Peterson’s phone number. He knew appellant Peterson by the name of ‘ ‘ Charlene ’ ’ and he knew of her delivery of heroin to Louise Brown by automobile. This informant also knew appellant Peterson received her heroin by ship from a person who arrived from the Orient every three or four months.”

“In the Municipal Court op Los Angeles Judicial District
County op Los Angeles, State op California

“Personally appeared before me this 31st day of May, 1963, James Grennan, Los Angeles Police Department who, on oath, makes complaint, and deposes and says that he has and there is just, probable and reasonable cause to believe, and that he does believe, that there is now in the possession of Charline Peterson, aka, Charline Merritt
“ on the premises located at and described as 240 West 113th Street, Los Angeles, California, a one story white frame single family residence with a garage in rear of residence.
‘ ‘ and in a vehicle described as 1962 Ford Fairlane, yellow sedan, 1963 California license No. QLH 952
‘ ‘ and on the person (s) of Charline Peterson, aka, Charline Merritt
“the following personal property, to wit; heroin
*503“Facts in support of issuance of search warrant:
“Your affiant has been a police officer for 17 years and for the past 5 years has been assigned to the Narcotics Division of the Los Angeles Police Department with a primary duty of investigating narcotics activity. In his experience, he has made and assisted in making several hundred arrests for narcotics activity. Your affiant has received formal academic and informal on the job training from the Los Angeles Police Department in narcotics and has testified as an expert in the Municipal and Superior Courts of Los Angeles County regarding narcotics charges, usage and traffic several hundred times. Your affiant is the investigator in charge of this case.
“On December 26, 1962 John D. Walker who had given prior information which resulted in the recovery of heroin told your affiant that Louise Brown was selling heroin from her residence at 2033 Hareourt Street, Los Angeles, California; that said Louise Brown purchased her heroin from a female known as Charline who would deliver the heroin by automobile to the above-mentioned location; that Charline was a nurse who imported heroin by ship from the Orient every three or four months.
‘ ‘ On January 8, 1963 your affiant arrested said Louise Brown at the above-mentioned address and recovered heroin there; that at the time of said arrest, David Rogers was in the house; that David Rogers told your affiant that Louise Brown was buying heroin in large quantities from a girl named Charline who was a nurse; that Charline would deliver the heroin to Louise Brown by automobile to the above-mentioned location; that Charline received her heroin from a ship arriving from the Orient every three or four months; that Charline’s telephone number was PL 6-0983; on January 8, 1963 said David Rogers also gave reliable information that led to the arrest of one Prank Brown on January 9, 1963 for possession of narcotics at which time narcotics were recovered.
“On March 4, 1963 an untested informant told your affiant that Louise Brown was buying heroin in large quantities from a nurse known as Charline who lived in the south part of Los Angeles and who would deliver the heroin to Louise Brown at the above-mentioned location; that Charline received her heroin by ship from the Orient every three or four months.
“On May 31, 1963 another untested informant told your affiant that this informant was buying heroin in lots of one ounce and more from Charline Peterson who would deliver the heroin by automobile; that Charline can be reached by telephone number PL 6-0983; that Charline keeps her heroin in her residence located at 240 West 113th Street, Los Angeles, California; that Charline received her heroin by ship from the Orient every three or four months and just recently received such shipment.
“Investigation by your affiant revealed that the telephone Number PL 6-0983 is registered to Charline Peterson at 240 West 113th Street, Los Angeles, California.
“Investigation by your affiant revealed that the utilities at 240 West 113th Street, Los Angeles, California are registered to Charline * ( (Peterson.)) Merritt. JDT
“Investigation by your affiant revealed that a 1962 Ford Fairlane yellow sedan, 1963 California license No. QLH 952 is registered to Charline Peterson at 240 West 113th Street, Los Angeles, California. On several occasions, the last of which was during the latter half of May, *5041963, your affiant saw the above-described car in the driveway of 240 West 113th Street, Los Angeles, California.
“That based upon the aforementioned information, facts and circumstances, your affiant has reasonable cause to believe that grounds for the issuance of a search warrant, as set forth in Section 1524 of the Penal Code, exist.
“That based upon the above facts, your affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the seizure of said property, or any part thereof, *((in the day time)) (at any time of the day or night, good cause being shown therefor) and that the same be brought before this magistrate or retained subject to the order of this court pursuant to Section 1536 of the Penal Code.
[Signed] James Grennan
Affiant
‘ ‘ Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of May, 1963
[Signed] James D. Tanto
Judge of the Municipal Court Los Angeles Judicial District”

Matter in double parentheses stricken out in original.

Penal Code, section 1260: "The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial. ’ ’

Article VI, section 4½: "No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any ease, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. ’ ’