Court Opinion

ID: 9839582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 15:07:13.840821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:33.568341
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                      No. 22-0980
                               Filed September 13, 2023

ROBIN LYNN INMAN,
     Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie K. Vaudt

(motion) and David Nelmark (trial), Judges.

       Robin Inman appeals the denial of funds for an expert witness and denial

of her application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

       Lucas L. Asbury of Asbury Law, PLC, Des Moines (until withdrawal), and

Janice B. Binder, Martelle, for appellant.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Considered by Bower, C.J., and Ahlers and Chicchelly, JJ. Buller, J., takes

no part.
                                          2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

       Robin Inman appeals the district court’s denial of her application for funds

for an expert witness and her application for postconviction relief. We affirm both

of the district court’s rulings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

       In October 2017, a jury convicted Inman of burglary in the first degree. The

facts of the underlying conviction are as follows:

               Savu Cirligel is a Des Moines homeowner whose home was
       badly damaged in a fire. Cirligel and his family moved out of the
       home but left their possessions behind. Cirligel intended to repair
       the home and, ultimately, to move back. In April 2017, Cirligel
       noticed that his garage—where many of the family’s valuables were
       being stored—was being broken into and items were being stolen.
       Local police were unable to assist Cirligel, so he decided he would
       spend some nights in the home in an attempt to catch any
       perpetrators in the act.
               Cirligel stayed in the basement of the split-level home on
       April 10; he was armed with a handgun. He did not have a phone
       with him, and the home did not have electricity.
               According to his testimony, Cirligel was waiting in one of the
       downstairs bedrooms when he heard someone walking around on
       the floor above him. He estimated it lasted for about five minutes
       before the person opened the basement door. He did not hear
       anyone speaking or calling out as they walked around upstairs.
       When the door opened, he saw a woman—Inman—wearing a
       “strong headlamp.” Cirligel lifted the gun, and Inman began saying
       repeatedly, “Don’t shoot me.” Cirligel told the woman he was not
       going to shoot her and asked what she was doing in his home. She
       responded that she had a boyfriend with a gun who was out in the
       backyard. Cirligel grabbed her by the arm with the intention of
       removing her from the home. At one point in his testimony, Cirligel
       stated, “[They] fought up on the stairs,” but he also testified Inman
       did not struggle on the way outside.
               After they got outside in the yard, Cirligel yelled for his
       neighbor to call 911. Inman—in an apparent attempt to break free
       from him—then began to fight with Cirligel. She used the scarf he
       was wearing to choke him and pull him to the ground. According to
       Cirligel, it was during the scuffle that he fired the gun and shot Inman.
       Inman fled to a nearby friend’s home. Based on a separate 911 call,
       police and medical personnel were directed to the apartment of
                                         3

       Inman’s friend. They found Inman conscious and laying on her
       stomach; she had been shot in her lower back. She was transported
       to a local hospital, where she ultimately underwent surgery for the
       injury.
               Officer Dao Meunsaveng spoke to Inman at the hospital.
       Inman told him she had been out walking when she realized she was
       being followed by someone—a person she thought was her former
       boyfriend. She said he “gave her the look” so she decided to flee.
       She told the officer she ran until she found a house and then she
       jumped the fence and hid in the backyard of the home. While she
       was there hiding, she was confronted by a male. As she was
       climbing back over the fence to meet a friend who was picking her
       up in a vehicle, she heard a pop and felt a burning sensation.
               Detective Danny White spoke to Inman approximately ten
       days after the incident. Inman told him she walking from a friend’s
       house to a local convenience store to buy cigarettes when she
       noticed someone she believed to be her former boyfriend—who had
       been abusive—following her. After some discussion, Inman told
       Detective White that she was not sure the person had been the
       former boyfriend; “she thought it could be him in the way that he
       walked was like her ex-boyfriend but she was not positive that it was”
       him. She indicated she fled on foot and ultimately found a backyard
       with a shed that she hid behind. While hiding behind the shed, she
       saw an open window to the home and decided to enter. She climbed
       some barrels to get to a second-story deck and then entered the
       home through the window. Once she got inside, she walked around
       the house knocking on interior doors “to see if anybody is there” but
       also noted that the house appeared to be burnt. She then went
       downstairs, where she encountered Cirligel. According to Inman,
       she and Cirligel left the home, and while she was trying to flee from
       him, he shot her in the back. Crime scene investigators later
       recovered from Cirligel’s yard a stun gun, a makeshift headlamp, and
       two gloves—one black glove and one camouflage glove.

State v. Inman, No. 17-1795, 2019 WL 156585, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9,

2019). This court affirmed her conviction in early 2019. See id. at *3.

       In September and November 2019, Inman filed applications for

postconviction relief (PCR) claiming trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in

several ways. The applications were consolidated in February 2020, and Inman

later amended her claims to assert eight instances of ineffective assistance of

counsel.
                                          4

        Inman filed a motion to employ an expert at state expense, claiming she

needed a forensic gunshot expert to challenge the State’s proof at trial and address

her defenses. After a contested hearing, the court ruled Inman did not meet her

burden of demonstrating a reasonable need to retain an expert and denied her

request for funds.

        At the PCR trial, the court received testimony from Inman. Depositions of

Inman’s trial attorney, Tomas Rodriguez; Cirligel; and Cirligel’s neighbor, Tiffany

Lo, were submitted as evidence, as were the detective’s report and transcripts from

the trial.

        The district court examined and dismissed each of Inman’s claims of

ineffective assistance, finding counsel performed adequately and the proposed

actions would not have changed the result of the trial.

        Inman appeals the court’s denial of funds for an expert witness and its ruling

on two of her ineffective-assistance claims: failure to consult an expert witness and

failure to challenge whether the house met the statutory definition of an “occupied

structure.”

II. Standard of Review.

        “We review decisions on [the] appointment of an expert for abuse of

discretion.” Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019).

        Because PCR applications alleging ineffective assistance of counsel raise

a constitutional claim, our review is de novo. Id. at 730. We presume counsel

acted competently. Id. at 731. “To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states under the Fourteenth

Amendment, a claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
                                          5

(1) trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) this failure resulted in

prejudice.” Id. at 730. For the second prong, the claimant must show “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 731 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis.

       Funds for expert witness. Inman sought state funds to retain a forensic

gunshot expert for the purpose of evaluating the trajectory of the gunshot injuring

her. Inman argued, “the evidence, had it been fully developed, investigated and

presented to a jury, would show that the injury alleged by [Cirligel] was not possible

given how he described it happening, given that he described it happening at the

time of the gunshot and given the location of the gunshot.”

       “An indigent criminal defendant is not entitled to appointment of expert

services at state expense unless there is a finding that the services are necessary

in the interest of justice.” State v. Leutfaimany, 585 N.W.2d 200, 208 (Iowa 1998).

The defendant “bears the burden to demonstrate a reasonable need for the

appointment of an expert” rather than “embarking on a ‘random fishing expedition.’”

Id. (citation omitted); see Linn, 929 N.W.2d at 749.

       That Cirligel shot Inman in the back was not disputed at trial. Cirligel

admitted shooting her, though he was convinced he shot her in the side rather than

the back. Testimony from a crime scene investigator, a responding officer, and

the investigating detective all stated Cirligel shot Inman in the back. Thus, the jury

already knew the events could not have occurred in the order and manner

described by Cirligel but still found Inman committed all the elements of burglary
                                          6

in the first degree—including an intentional or reckless infliction of bodily injury. 1

Testimony about trajectory from an expert witness would not change the proof

supporting any of the elements of the offense at trial. The PCR court found Inman

“failed to prove a reasonable need to retain an expert in this matter,” and we agree.

       Ineffective assistance of counsel—expert witness. Inman asserts her trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to consult an expert witness to develop a

possible defense. In a deposition submitted to the PCR court as evidence, Inman’s

trial counsel explained his reasoning:

               Because I believed that the physical evidence that the State
       had showed that she had to have been shot when she was not facing
       the alleged victim, because she was shot in the back. The injury she
       received was clearly to her back area and that the jury would have
       been able to see that she had been shot in the back and that it would
       be impossible for her to be shot while she was facing the alleged
       shooter. I don’t know that an expert would have added anything else
       to that other than to confirm the physical evidence.

Counsel further testified,

               Q. All right. And then there was also some discussion about
       this gunshot wound to the applicant’s—that the applicant sustained
       in this case. Do you recall that discussion? A. Yes.
               Q. And you believed that it wasn’t necessary to have an expert
       witness talk about the location of the gunshot wound; is that right?
       A. Yes.
               Q. And that was just because, as a matter of common sense,
       the jury would be able to draw their own conclusions; right? A. Yes.
               Q. Would you agree that in a criminal case, the State bears
       the burden of proof? A. Yes.
               Q. And the defendant doesn’t have to prove anything; right?
       A. Correct.
               Q. Sometimes going out and trying to get an expert witness,
       well, that might not end up being helpful to your client; right?
       A. Correct. Sometimes the witness—expert witnesses don’t help.
               Q. And this was a case where you felt that it just wouldn’t be—
       there was no upside to calling an expert. Is that fair to say? A. Yes.

1 Cirligel had red marks on his neck, which a crime scene investigator testified

were consistent with Cirligel’s complaint.
                                           7

             Q. Would you agree that the defendant in this case was
      charged with burglary in the first degree? A. Yes.
             Q. And that it was under a theory that she entered the house
      with the intent to commit a theft? A. That’s correct.
             Q. The gunshot wasn’t one of the elements of the case; right?
      A. No.

      In its ruling, the PCR court noted Cirligel denied shooting Inman in the back

at trial and contrasted that claim with multiple law enforcement personnel stating

Inman’s injury was to her back. The court was not persuaded Inman’s counsel

was deficient on this question and explained it “does not see how additional

evidence confirming the location would have made any difference.” The jury

apparently either concluded the victim was simply mistaken or that, even if the

victim was not truthful on this point, the elements of the charge had still been

proven.”

      Counsel’s testimony clearly indicated it was a strategic decision to not use

an expert witness, noting sometimes expert witnesses do not help and here “there

was no upside.” “Miscalculated trial strategies and mere mistakes in judgment

normally do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ledezma v.

State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 2001). Trial counsel was able to establish

through clear evidence—including testimony by investigating law enforcement and

a photograph of the injury—Inman was shot in the back, discrediting Cirligel’s

testimony of how he and Inman were situated at the time of the shot. Counsel’s

actions were reasonable under the circumstances, and Inman did not establish

counsel provided ineffective assistance.

      Ineffective assistance of counsel—occupied structure definition.         The

supreme court has examined what constitutes an occupied structure for purposes
                                             8

of the burglary statute and concluded “the State must produce substantial evidence

to support two independent elements . . . , one related to place and the second

related to activity, purpose, or use.” State v. Rooney, 862 N.W.2d 367, 376 (Iowa

2015). Inman argues trial counsel should have challenged whether the house met

the “activity, purpose, or use” element.

       Trial counsel explained why he did not challenge whether the damaged

house was an occupied structure:

       I believed it fit the definition of an occupied structure. . . . I don’t think
       it matters whether anybody lives there or not at the time. The owner
       still had access to the property. The owner would be present at the
       property. And, further, the owner was present at the property when
       this occurred. So clearly there was someone occupying this
       property.

       Iowa Code section 720.12 provides three alternative ways for a structure to

meet the second prong, that it is “adapted for overnight accommodation of

persons, or occupied by persons for the purpose of carrying on business or other

activity therein, or for the storage or safekeeping of anything of value.” The district

court found Cirligel’s house “was clearly ‘adapted for overnight accommodation of

persons’” despite its condemnation, and the structure was occupied by Cirligel “for

the purpose of carrying on business or other activity therein.” 2

       The test for “adapted for overnight accommodation” looks at the time of the

burglary, and can “turn on the subjective intent of the property owner, an objective

2 The jury’s instructions at trial included the statutory alternatives of an occupied

structure, and the marshalling instruction included as an element the State was
required to prove, “The residence was an occupied structure as defined in [the
relevant] instruction”.
                                          9

analysis of the condition of the property, or perhaps upon actual use of the

property.” Id. at 377.

       Even if it was not presently fit for accommodation, the State could establish

an alternative basis for the residence as an occupied structure because it was

adapted “for the storage or safekeeping of anything of value.” Cirligel testified his

belongings—“[p]retty much everything”—were secured in his house and garage;

he had locked the house and boarded the door to secure his property. Based on

frequent visits by Cirligel and his storage of all his personal property in the house,

it met the statutory definition of occupied structure.

       Because the house qualified as an occupied structure, trial counsel did not

fail an essential duty by not challenging the status of the residence as an occupied

structure. Inman’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail.

       AFFIRMED.