Court Opinion

ID: 9951323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 19:13:19.566525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:38:48.924799
License: Public Domain

03/15/2024
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT JACKSON
                              Assigned on Briefs January 10, 2024

                    KYUHWAN HWANG v. SANIA HOLT ET AL.

                      Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
                        No. CT-2449-22    Rhynette N. Hurd, Judge
                         ___________________________________

                               No. W2023-00627-COA-R3-CV
                           ___________________________________

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s lawsuit for failure to comply with discovery. Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 37.02(C) and 41.02(1). Because Appellant’s brief fails to comply with the
requirements of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of
Appeals Rule 6, we do not reach Appellant’s issues and dismiss the appeal.

                 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD,
P.J., W.S., and KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., joined.

Kyuhwan Hwang, Memphis, Tennessee, appellant, pro se.

Jeffrey E. Nicoson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Sania S. Holt and MGA.

                                 MEMORANADUM OPINION1

       On June 19, 2021, Appellant Kyuhwan Hwang and Appellee Sania Holt were
involved in a motor vehicle accident. On June 16, 2022, Mr. Hwang filed suit against Ms.
Holt and MGA, an insurance company.2 Asserting claims for negligence and intentional

        1
          Rule 10 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals Rules provides:
        This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
        or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
        would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall
        be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and shall not be
        cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
        2
           Mr. Hwang did not effectuate service on MGA, and the trial court dismissed MGA when
dismissing the lawsuit. MGA did not file a brief in this appeal, and no issue has been raised concerning the
dismissal of MGA.
torts, Mr. Hwang sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief.
On July 28, 2022, Ms. Holt filed an answer and, on the same day, moved for partial
judgment on the pleadings under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03. By order of
September 9, 2022, the trial court granted Ms. Holt’s motion and dismissed the causes of
action for intentional torts, punitive damages, and declaratory relief. On the same day, Ms.
Holt filed a motion to compel, wherein she averred that Mr. Hwang had failed to respond
to her first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents. On September
23, 2022, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to compel and requiring
responses from Mr. Hwang by October 17, 2022. Having received no responses by the due
date, on October 28, 2022, Ms. Holt filed a second motion to compel. The trial court
granted Ms. Holt’s motion and ordered Mr. Hwang to produce responses by November 21,
2022; Mr. Hwang was also ordered to pay Ms. Holt $500.00 in fees and costs for failing to
respond. On November 30, 2022, Mr. Hwang moved to recuse the trial court and asserted
the trial court’s impartiality was questionable due to her prior employment while practicing
as an attorney. Ms. Holt opposed this motion.

        Mr. Hwang did not respond to discovery by November 21, and Ms. Holt filed a third
motion to compel on December 9, 2022. On January 6, 2023, the trial court heard Ms.
Holt’s third motion to compel and Mr. Hwang’s motion for recusal. Following the hearing,
the trial court denied the motion to recuse. On January 9, 2023, Mr. Hwang filed a second
motion to recuse, which Ms. Holt also opposed. By order of January 23, 2023, the trial
court granted Ms. Holt’s third motion to compel, ordering Mr. Hwang to produce discovery
responses by February 6, 2023, and to pay Ms. Holt another $500.00 in fees and costs. The
January 23rd order also warned Mr. Hwang that his lawsuit would be dismissed with costs
if he failed to comply with the order.

       On March 1, 2023, Ms. Holt filed a motion for dismissal under Tennessee Rule of
Civil Procedure 37, which provides, in relevant part, that a court may punish a party’s
failure to comply with discovery by “dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.” Tenn. R. Civ.
P. 37.02(C). On March 23, 2023, Mr. Hwang filed his first set of responses to
interrogatories and document production requests. Therein, Mr. Hwang averred that he
responded to discovery but conceded that he did not do so by the deadline of February 6,
2023.

        Ms. Holt’s motion for dismissal was heard on March 24, 2023. On the same day,
the trial court entered an order denying Mr. Hwang’s second motion for recusal. On March
31, 2023, the trial court entered its order dismissing Mr. Hwang’s lawsuit with prejudice
pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 37.02(C) and 41.02(1), the latter of which
provides as follows: “For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules
or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim
against the defendant.” On April 3, 2023, Mr. Hwang filed a motion to vacate the order of
dismissal and/or for reconsideration. Concurrently, Mr. Hwang filed a third motion to
                                             -2-
recuse. Ms. Holt filed a response in opposition to the third recusal motion and also opposed
the motion to vacate and/or for reconsideration. On April 20, 2023, Mr. Hwang filed a
motion to alter or amend the judgment, which Ms. Holt opposed in her April 26, 2023
response. On April 28, 2023, Ms. Holt filed a show cause motion based on Mr. Hwang’s
failure to set a hearing on his post-judgment motions and third motion to recuse. On April
30, 2023, Mr. Hwang filed a notice of appeal to this Court. The pending motions were set
for hearing in the trial court on May 26, 2023. On May 26, 2023, the trial court entered
an order denying the third motion to recuse. On June 2, 2023, the trial court entered orders:
(1) granting Ms. Holt’s show cause motion; (2) denying Mr. Hwang’s motion to set aside
and/or vacate the dismissal order; (3) denying Mr. Hwang’s motion to reconsider; and (4)
denying Mr. Hwang’s motion to alter or amend the judgment.

       Mr. Hwang appeals and raises the following issues for review as set out in his brief:
       A. In terms of Supreme Court of Tennessee Rule 10B:

       Whether the Court can/could make further orders or take further action on
       the case after a motion to recuse the judge was filed, and/or when a/the
       motion to recuse was pending (without good cause stated in the order in
       which such action is taken)?

       B. In terms of Local Rule Six (6).[3]

       Whether the Court can/could dismiss a case when Defendant failed to comply
       with the Local Rule Six (6).

       C. In terms of a fair process of law. (a fair process of litigation / legal
       procceeding [sic] / due process / court of law).

       Whether Plaintiff had a fair process of litigation in this action?

       C. In terms of appellate process.

       Is it proper whether the Court of Appeal makes a decision when a criminal
       investigation in this action is pending and is not finished, and/or before the
       criminal investigation in this action is finalized?

       3
          “All motions for summary judgment and to dismiss shall be filed with the Clerk at least thirty
(30) days before the motion is heard . . . .” Shelby Co. Cir. Ct. Loc. R. 6(A). As discussed, infra, Ms.
Holt’s motion was brought under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 41.02(1) and 37.02(C) for Mr.
Hwang’s failure to comply with the trial court’s discovery orders. It was not a motion for summary
judgment or for dismissal under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.
                                                 -3-
       We do not reach the foregoing issues due to Mr. Hwang’s failure to comply with
the briefing requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of
this Court. Before addressing the specific problems with Mr. Hwang’s appellate brief, we
note that he is proceeding pro se in this appeal. Nonetheless, he “must comply with the
same standards to which lawyers must adhere.” Watson v. City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d
919, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). As this Court has explained,

      [p]arties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal
      treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro se
      litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial system.
      However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness
      to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary. Thus, the
      courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same
      substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to
      observe.

Id. at 926-27 (quoting Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL
3566978, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011)). Accordingly, notwithstanding his pro se
status, Appellant must comply with the procedural rules applicable to this Court. For the
reasons discussed below, we conclude that Appellant failed to comply with the
requirements of Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of
Appeals Rule 6 in his briefing.

       The Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an appellant’s brief shall
contain, among other things:

       (7) An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of argument, setting
      forth: (A) the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues
      presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the
      contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and
      appropriate references to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied
      on; and (B) for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard of
      review (which may appear in the discussion of the issue or under a separate
      heading placed before the discussion of the issues)

             ....

      (g) Reference in Briefs to the Record. Except as provided in Rule 28(c),
      reference in the briefs to the record shall be to the pages of the record
      involved. Intelligible abbreviations may be used. If reference is made to
      evidence, the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be
      made to the pages in the record at which the evidence was identified, offered,
      and received or rejected.
                                          -4-
Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7), (g) (emphases in italics added). Pursuant to Rule 27(a)(7)(A),
“[i]t must be clear that a party has constructed an argument regarding his or her position
on appeal; if not, the matter is subject to waiver.” Heflin v. Iberiabank Corp., 571 S.W.3d
727, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Newcomb v. Kohler Co., 222 S.W.3d 368, 401
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)). “[C]ompliance with the Rule has not been achieved” when this
Court “cannot ascertain that an issue is supported by adequate argument.” Id.

      In addition to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, Tennessee Court of
Appeals Rule 6 states:

      (a) Written argument in regard to each issue on appeal shall contain:

      (1) A statement by the appellant of the alleged erroneous action of the trial
      court which raises the issue and a statement by the appellee of any action of
      the trial court which is relied upon to correct the alleged error, with citation
      to the record where the erroneous or corrective action is recorded.

      (2) A statement showing how such alleged error was seasonably called to the
      attention of the trial judge with citation to that part of the record where
      appellant’s challenge of the alleged error is recorded.

      (3) A statement reciting wherein appellant was prejudiced by such alleged
      error, with citations to the record showing where the resultant prejudice is
      recorded.

      (4) A statement of each determinative fact relied upon with citation to the
      record where evidence of each such fact may be found.

      (b) No complaint of or reliance upon action by the trial court will be
      considered on appeal unless the argument contains a specific reference to the
      page or pages of the record where such action is recorded. No assertion of
      fact will be considered on appeal unless the argument contains a reference to
      the page or pages of the record where evidence of such fact is recorded.

Tenn. Ct. App. R. 6(a)-(b).

      Here, the “Argument” section of Appellant’s brief provides, in its entirety:

                                    VI. ARGUMENT

      PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT Hwang respectfully submits this ARGUMENT
      to the Honorable COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON.
                                    -5-
The more detailed argument and/or information is contained, mentioned,
explained, or described in the document whose name/title was Notice of
Plaintiffs Statement(s) which PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT filed on or about
March 25, 2023.

Part A.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT Hwang alleges or/and states the following in
terms of the hearing which occurred on or about March 24, 2023 in the
courtroom of Division V of the Honorable Court.

As soon as PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT began to mention ‘Local Rule(s)’,
especially Rule Five (5) and Rule Six (6), he was being and/or was disrupted
by the [trial court].

Rule Six(6) is conjunctly, jointly, or/and directly, interconnected or related
with the motion for involuntary dismissal. The motion for involuntary
dismissal is a DISPOSITIVE MOTION.

Regrettably, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT got the impression, or/and could
not and cannot exclude his reasonable suspicion(s) that the [trial court]
disrupted Plaintiff’s legal argument(s) ON PURPOSE INTENTIONALLY.

Because of the judge’s sudden, abrupt, and/or unexpected
disruption/interruption, Plaintiff could not continue to make his legal
arguments which he initiated. Plaintiff had to stop both legal and logical
development of his arguments.

And then, [the trial court] declared, suddenly, abruptly, and/or unexpectedly,
that [it] made a decision about the motion and/or the case.

Therefore, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT could not make or/and finish the
remaining argument(s) about the motion for involuntary dismissal.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT respectfully alleges that his legal claim(s) should
not have been dismissed this way.

Part B.

In terms of the motion for involuntary dismissal

(a) PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’s Legal Argument Point One (1).

                                    -6-
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’s claim was not dismissed on January 6, 2023.
Plaintiff filed his second motion to recuse the judge on or about January 9,
2023.

Supreme Court of Tennessee Rule 10B.

[The trial court] should not/could not have made any further orders, or/and
take any further action on the case.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S THIRD MOTION TO COMPEL
WRITTEN DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND PRODUCTION was filed on
or about January 23, 2023.

Legal Argument: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S THIRD MOTION
TO COMPEL WRITTEN DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND
PRODUCTION should not have been filed on January 23, 2023.

The oral decision by [the trial court] at the hearing on March 24, 2023 in
terms of the motion for involuntary dismissal was wrong and legally flawed.

(b) PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’s Legal Argument Point Two (2).

The court order has been filed on or about January 23, 2023 because there
was an orally granted order at the hearing on January 6, 2023. However,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT filed, on or about March 23, 2023,
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE(S) TO DEFENDANT SANIA S. HOLT’s
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION TO
PLAINTIFF.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S RESPONSE(S) was filed BEFORE the
hearing on or about March 24, 2023. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S
RESPONSE(S) complied with the court order. It complied with the court
order completely. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT answered to every question
without omitting or missing out any item of questions.

At least it complied fundamentally or/and substantially. PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT can submit additional documents when necessary as he
mentioned or explained in the document. What PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT’S RESPONSE(S) did not comply with the court order was the
timing (date). PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S RESPONSE(S) should have
been filed by no later than February 6, 2023. Plaintiff did not do that.
However, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT filed his response(s) on or about
March 23, 2023 BEFORE the hearing on March 24, 2023 when/where the
                                 -7-
motion for involuntary dismissal was orally granted.

Legal Argument: The motion for involuntary dismissal should not have been
orally granted at the hearing on March 24, because PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT filed his response(s) before the hearing and complied with the
court order.

The oral decision by [the trial court] at the hearing on March 24, 2023 in
terms of the motion for involuntary dismissal was wrong and legally flawed.

Additionally, and especially in terms of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
RULE 41. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS.

RULE 41. (3). “upon the merits.”
It is said, in a dictionary, that “merits” are the actual and intrinsic rights and
wrongs of an issue, especially in a law case, as distinct from extraneous
matters and technicalities.

(c) PLAINTIFF-APPELIANT’s Legal Argument: Point Three (3).

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT would like to point out the fundamental
INCONSISTENCY (discrepancy, discordance, difference) of the content
between the orally granted court order on January 6, 2023, and the court order
which was filed/made on January 23, 2023.

What does this INCONSISTENCY mean? PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
respectfully alleges that the parties involved about the court order did make
such inconsistency ON PURPOSE and/or INTENTIONALLY.

Legal Argument: The oral decision by [the trial court] at the hearing on
March 24, 2023 in terms of the motion for involuntary dismissal lacked the
judicial justification or/and legitimacy. The oral decision (on March 24,
2023) was based on and/or originated from the court order (on January 23,
2023) which contained INCONSISTENCY.

The court order (on January 23, 2023) was the result of manipulation. The
oral decision by [the trial court] at the hearing on March 24, 2023 was wrong
because it was based on/originated from the manipulated court order.

(d) PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’s Legal Argument Point Four (4).

The hearing on March 24, 2023 should not have dealt with the issues of the
motion for involuntary dismissal. Legal Ground: LOCAL RULE SIX.
                                 -8-
DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS (A).

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE SANIA S. HOLT’S MOTION FOR
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL was filed on or about March 1, 2023. The
hearing at these issues occurred on March 24, 2023.

Therefore, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE HOLT’S MOTION FOR
INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL was not filed with the Clerk AT LEAST
THIRTY (30) DAYS before the motion was heard.

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE HOLT’S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL should have been filed AT LEAST THIRTY (30) DAYS
before the motion was heard on March 24, 2023.

Legal Argument: LOCAL RULE SIX. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS (A), (B).
were violated by the opposing parties/counsel(s).

The motion for involuntary dismissal was not filed with the Clerk at least
thirty (30) days before the motion was heard. The hearing on March 24, 2023
for INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL should not have occurred.

The oral decision by [the trial court] at the hearing on March 24, 2023 in
terms of the motion for involuntary dismissal was wrong and legally flawed.

(e) PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’s Legal Argument Point Five (5).

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT sent an email to Mr. Scofield on or about March
2, 2023. Since then, Plaintiff did not agree to any hearing date with the
opposing parties/counsel(s) for DEFENDANT-APPELLEE HOLT’S
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL.

In terms of the hearing date on March 24, 2023, Plaintiff agreed to that date
with the opposing parties/counsel(s) for the MOTION TO RECUSE THE
JUDGE. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT did not say / has not said that he was
available on March 24, 2023 for DEFENDANT-APPELLEE HOLT’S
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL.

In terms of the CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE on DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE SANIA S. HOLT’S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL.

In terms of the issues of Rules 5(H) and 12(E), and “in a good faith effort”,
the CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE mentioned above did not note
                                     -9-
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’s opposition in the defendant’s Certificate of
Consultation. And it was not a good faith effort. It was a bad faith effort.
Because the opposing parties/counsel(s) were misleading or manipulating
what PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT said in the emails.

Legal Argument: The hearing on March 24, 2023 for DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE SANIA S. HOLT’S MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY
DISMISSAL should not have occurred. The oral decision by [the trial court]
at the hearing on March 24, 2023 in terms of the motion for involuntary
dismissal was wrong and legally flawed.

(f) PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’s Legal Argument Point Five (6).

There are issues about disruption of litigation in this case. There was the
failure of the delivery of the Court’s Order in this case. PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT received, saw, and/or ended up reading the written court order
in the attached file (“EXHIBIT A”) in the email (“Hwang v. Holt - Motion
to Dismiss Filed”) which Mr. Scofield sent Plaintiff on or about March 2,
2023.

Mr. Scofield sent PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT an email, on or about January
7, 2023, whose title was “Proposed Order Granting Third MTC”. Plaintiff
received the proposed order from Mr. Scofield, but alleges that he did not
receive the ‘official written court order’.

Legal Argument: It is suspected that the disruption of litigation existed in this
case. Plaintiff was not served on timely manner. Especially the official
written court order was not delivered to PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’s P.O.
Box, or it was not found in his P.O. Box until this day. The copy of official
written court order was sent or/and delivered by Mr. Scofield to Plaintiff’s
email box on or about March 2, 2023.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’s argument is about the fair process of litigation.

The motion for involuntary dismissal should not have been orally granted at
the hearing on March 24, 2023 because PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT did not
and/or could not have a fair opportunity to respond on timely manner against
the opposing parties/counsels.

The oral decision by [the trial court] at the hearing on March 24, 2023 in
terms of the motion for involuntary dismissal was made under the UNFAIR
process of litigation. Or it was influenced by such environment of unfair
process of litigation.
                                    - 10 -
(emphases in original).

       In neither the “Argument” section, nor in a separate section of his brief, does
Appellant provide “a concise statement of the applicable standard of review.” Tenn. R.
App. P. 27(a)(7)(B); State v. Franklin, No. M2018-01958-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL
4280692, at *28 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2020) (waiving appellant’s issue for, among
other things, failure to provide a statement of the applicable standard of review as required
by Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(B)). However, the lack of a statement of the applicable
standard of review is the least of the omissions in Appellant’s brief. More pressing are
Appellant’s failures to: (1) cite to the record, Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(A), (g), Tenn. Ct.
App. R. 6(a)-(b); (2) cite to legal authority, Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(A); and (3) make
arguments setting forth his contentions “with respect to the issues presented, and the
reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief.” Tenn.
R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(A).

        As set out in context above, the “Argument” section of Appellant’s brief contains
no citations to the record. For example, Appellant asserts that the trial court disrupted him
such that he “could not continue to make his legal arguments,” but he fails to include
citation to the record where this occurred. Appellant further asserts that, “The oral decision
by [the trial court] at the hearing on March 24, 2023 in terms of the motion for involuntary
dismissal lacked the judicial justification or/and legitimacy. The oral decision (on March
24, 2023) was based on and/or originated from the court order (on January 23, 2023) which
contained INCONSISTENCY.” (emphases in original) However, Appellant fails to cite
to the portion of the record that contains the trial court’s oral decision, much less to the
specific parts of that ruling that give rise to his argument. Likewise, Appellant fails to point
out the specific areas of the record that support his statement that the trial court’s oral
decision was “inconsisten[t]” with its written order. These are just a few examples of how
the omission of record citations precludes our review of these arguments. As this Court has
explained, “[w]ithout citation to the record to show where the alleged erroneous actions of
the trial court are recorded, where Plaintiffs’ challenge to the error is recorded, where
Plaintiffs’ prejudice is recorded . . . and where evidence of each determinative fact may be
found, . . . this court is left to speculate on exactly what relief [appellants] are seeking.”
Little v. City of Chattanooga, 650 S.W.3d 326, 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022), perm. app.
denied (Tenn. June 14, 2022); Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(“Courts have routinely held that the failure to make appropriate references to the record. .
. in the argument section of the brief as required by Rule 27(a)(7) constitutes a waiver of
the issue.”).

        Perhaps more problematic is Appellant’s failure to cite any legal authority in support
of his arguments. Under similar circumstances, we have deemed issues waived. See, e.g.,
Masserano v. Masserano, No. W2018-01592-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2207476, at *4-5
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2019) (holding that husband waived issues on appeal by failing
                                          - 11 -
to cite supporting legal authorities); Bean, 40 S.W.3d at 55 (“Courts have routinely held
that the failure to . . . cite relevant authority in the argument section of the brief as required
by Rule 27(a)(7) constitutes a waiver of the issue.”). Although he cites no caselaw in
support of his arguments, we concede that Mr. Hwang does reference Tennessee Supreme
Court Rule 10B, Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41, and certain of the Shelby County
Circuit Court Local Rules of Practice. However, in mentioning the foregoing rules, Mr.
Hwang fails to make cogent arguments as to how these rules allegedly were violated. For
example, Mr. Hwang states that, “The hearing on March 24, 2023 should not have dealt
with the issues of the motion for involuntary dismissal. Legal Ground: LOCAL RULE SIX.
DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS (A).” Although cited as “legal ground,” Mr. Hwang does not
develop an argument as to why or how Local Rule Six precluded the trial court’s
consideration of the motion for involuntary dismissal during the March 24 hearing.
Similarly, Mr. Hwang asserts that, “Supreme Court of Tennessee Rule 10B. [The trial
court] should not/could not have made any further orders, or/and take any further action on
the case.” Yet, he does not develop an argument concerning why or how Supreme Court
Rule 10 negated the trial court’s ability to enter “further orders,” or what those “further
orders” decided. Based on the lack of coherency in Appellant’s arguments, and his utter
failure to develop arguments that set out his contentions with respect to the issues
presented, including why the contentions require appellate relief, Tenn. R. App. P.
27(a)(7)(A), we are left to wonder as to the exact nature of the errors asserted in his brief.
As we have often reiterated, “‘[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research
or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her, and where a party fails to develop
an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument,
the issue is waived.’” Little, 650 S.W.3d at 353 (quoting Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. of
Supreme Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010)).

        Because Appellant’s argument contains no citations to the record, contains no
citations to applicable legal authority explaining the trial court’s purported error, and is
severely underdeveloped, it can only be characterized as “skeletal.” Little, 650 S.W.3d at
353; see also Heflin, 571 S.W.3d at 734. Consequently, we are left to speculate as to the
precise error Appellant complains of, as well as how any purported error warrants relief in
Appellant’s favor pursuant to legal authority; as such, “compliance with [Rule 27] has not
been achieved.” Heflin, 571 S.W.3d at 734. As we have explained:

       Courts have routinely held that the failure to make appropriate references to
       the record and to cite relevant authority in the argument section of the brief
       as required by Rule 27(a)(7) constitutes a waiver of the issue. See State v.
       Schaller, 975 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Rampy v. ICI
       Acrylics, Inc. 898 S.W.2d 196, 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
       Dickerson, 885 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Moreover, an issue
       is waived where it is simply raised without any argument regarding its merits.
       See Blair v. Badenhope, 940 S.W.2d 575, 576-577 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996);
       Bank of Crockett v. Cullipher, 752 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
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              ....

       This Court is under no duty to verify unsupported allegations in a party’s
       brief, or for that matter consider issues raised but not argued in the brief.
       Duchow v. Whalen, 872 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing
       Airline Const. Inc., v. Barr, 807 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990)).

Bean, 40 S.W.3d at 55-56.

       Although we again acknowledge Appellant’s pro se status, his failure to comply
with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6 is
so substantial that it cannot be overlooked. In short, this Court cannot write the brief for
him or “create arguments or issues where none otherwise are set forth.” Murray v. Miracle,
457 S.W.3d 399, 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). Rather, this Court may properly decline to
consider an issue that has not been briefed in accordance with applicable rules, Clayton v.
Herron, No. M2014-01497-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 757240, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb.
20, 2015), and we have previously held that a party’s “failure to comply with the Rules of
Appellate Procedure and the rules of this Court waives the issues for review.” Bean, 40
S.W.3d at 55.

       For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s issues are waived, and the appeal is
dismissed. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the Appellant, Kyuhwan Hwang. Execution
for costs may issue if necessary.

                                                       s/ Arnold B. Goldin
                                                    ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE

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