Court Opinion

ID: 9862991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:46:55.742566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:45:59.320611
License: Public Domain

RICKHOFF, Justice,
dissenting.
Both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Duncan set forth the simple facts of this case and the dilemma presented in comparing the pattern jury charge instruction submitted in this case with Tex.R. Civ. P. 277. In my view, however, this case primarily presents an opportunity for the Texas Supreme Court to revisit the very basic question of whether juries should be advised of the effect of their answers in civil cases.
Since law school, I have viewed this prohibition an odd dichotomy in the only jurisdiction that allows complete jury sentencing in criminal cases. Thus, we ask jurors to resolve life’s most difficult issues in criminal eases, but in civil cases, we shield them from knowing the effect of their answers to the submitted issues, apparently distrusting then-integrity and demeaning their intelligence.
It should be evident from the substantial damage award given in the instant case that ten members of the jury meant to compensate Bilotto. Presently, our rules and case law thwart this intent; however, it is not for an intermediate court to alter this consistently applied precedent. Such an alteration would require an in-depth analysis and resolution of the implications of such a change beyond this case. Therefore, in spite of my personal view that this trial judge presented the issues rationally and in the manner I would advocate that the issues be presented, I join the dissent in holding that we cannot overrule the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Grasso v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, 125 Tex. 154, 81 S.W.2d 482, 487 (1935), and, therefore, would find the trial court abused its discretion in submitting the instruction at issue.