Court Opinion

ID: 9572425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:35.584614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:54.932502
License: Public Domain

*333STEELMAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s decision affirming the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of defendants in this matter.
The majority correctly holds it is appropriate to apply a standard for criminal malpractice rather than for civil malpractice because this action arises out of a criminal proceeding. However, it specifically declines to adopt a “bright-line” rule for criminal malpractice cases. The majority concludes that the burden of proof required to show proximate cause in a criminal malpractice case is “necessarily a high one” and that plaintiff failed to meet this burden in the instant case.
Our Supreme Court’s previous decisions have addressed legal malpractice only in a civil context. In Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985), the Court set forth a “but for” causation standard to govern legal malpractice cases. Specifically, the standard requires a legal malpractice plaintiff to demonstrate his or her loss would not have occurred but for the attorney’s conduct by showing: 1) the original claim was valid; 2) the claim would have resulted in a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor; and 3) the judgment would have been collectible. Rorrer, 313 N.C. at 361, 329 S.E.2d at 369. The Rorrer test is expressed in terms of a civil action, under which the case arose.
Applying the Rorrer standard to a criminal context, the legal malpractice plaintiff must demonstrate that the attorney’s conduct was the proximate cause of his conviction. However, it would hardly be possible to prove that the loss would not have occurred but for the attorney’s negligence if the plaintiff could not establish his actual innocence of the actions underlying the criminal charges.
The vast majority of jurisdictions addressing the question of the standard for criminal malpractice cases have adopted an “actual innocence” standard. In Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordan, P.A., 727 A.2d 996 (N.H. 1999), the New Hampshire Supreme Court explained this standard as follows:
Public policy... dictates an augmented standard in criminal malpractice actions. While such an action requires all the proof essential to a civil malpractice claim, a criminal malpractice action will fail if the claimant does not allege and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, actual innocence. It is not sufficient for a claimant to allege and prove that if counsel had acted differently, legal guilt would not have been established. As a matter *334of law, the gateway to damages will remain closed unless a claimant can establish that he or she is, in fact, innocent of the conduct underlying the criminal charge.
Mahoney, 727 A.2d at 998-99 (citation omitted).
The public policy concerns set forth by the majority dictate a more stringent standard for criminal malpractice cases than for civil cases. The actual innocence standard provides a clear, simple rule for our lower courts to follow and is consistent with our Supreme Court’s holding in Rorrer. Therefore, I would adopt the actual innocence standard for criminal malpractice cases arising under North Carolina law.