Court Opinion

ID: 9443184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:13:25.784664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:24.073958
License: Public Domain

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Where a resident of New York comes to the District of Columbia on a military as*566signment in time of war, drives with New York plates while in the District, renews those plates during his stay, and returns to New York before suit is brought in respect of an accident occurring here, I think he must make a very strong showing indeed that he was in fact a resident of the District if he asks our courts to quash substituted service made on him after he has returned to New York. Appellee’s affidavits in the District Court say little about the nature of his employment here,1 or the circumstances under which he lived while in the District. They allege simply that he was “residing in Washington, D. C. and living at 3135 Adams Mill Road, N.W., that city * * Nothing is said about whether he owned the premises, rented them, or was simply a guest or roomer. Nothing is said about his payment of taxes — whether to> New York or to the District — and nothing about the other indicia of residence, such as voting, bank deposits, mailing addresses, phone listings, and the like.
We are concerned here with a statutory provision passed for a particular purpose: that of assuring ready availability for suits arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. Its criterion of “residence” must be viewed in that context. Appellee tells us little bearing on his availability in the District. He says simply that for a time he worked and maintained some sort of living quarters here. But we also know that, for the purposes of registering his car, he listed his New York address with the New York Bureau of Motor Vehicles and told the New York authorities that he resided in that city.2 Since it is not shown whether appellee gave a District of Columbia address to appellant after the accident occurred, or even whether he was listed in any of the Washington directories, it may well be that appellant’s only means of locating him was through his New York registration.
The conclusion alleged in appellee’s affidavit that he was “residing in Washington” is impotent to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the known facts. Briggs v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.App.2d 240, 183 P.2d 758. See also State of Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 425, 426, 59 S.Ct. 563, 830, 83 L.Ed. 817. The burden of showing local residence must be on appellee. It is he who would move the court to quash its process, and only he knows the circumstances of his sojourn in the District which would justify the court in doing so. Cf. District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 455, 62 S.Ct. 303, 86 L.Ed. 329.
When appellee chose to continue to operate his car under New York registration, he avoided the burdens, such as motor vehicle inspection, attendant upon local registry. Now he seeks to escape as well the burden imposed on foreign motorists by the Financial Responsibility Law. The requirements of that statute are designed to enable persons injured in the District to enforce more readily their right of legal redress. The decision of the court, on the other hand, makes it easier for transients here to force resort to foreign courts.
In cases like the present one, responsible state courts have not hesitated to allow substituted service under statutes akin to ours. See, for example, Briggs v. Superior Court, supra; Wagner v. Scurlock, 166 Md. 284, 170 A. 539; United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Harman, Tex.Civ.App., 151 S.W.2d 609, certiorari denied 315 U.S. 807, 62 S.Ct. 640, 86 L.Ed. 1206. I cannot find it conclusive that a Federal judge, interpreting Maryland law, reached a different result — on different facts — in Suit v. Shailer, D.C.Md., 18 F.Supp. 568. Expressions of that court’s conclusions as to Maryland law and policy are not persuasive, especially in view of the peculiar problem which the temporary sojourner presents in this jurisdiction. I think it is our duty to enforce the policy and purpose of our own statute, according to its terms.

. Appellee says that he came to Washington “in a military capacity to accept an assignment with the Office of Strategic Services, War Department * *

. He apparently made a similar statement to the District of Columbia traffic authorities. He says that he inquired as to the necessity of taking out District plates and was told be need not do so. This must have been the result of an understanding on the part of the District authorities that he was not a resident here. See D. C.Code 1940, §§ 40-102, 40-104, 40-303.