Court Opinion

ID: 9949918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 20:00:45.364742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:22.112685
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 24a0114n.06

                                          No. 23-3573

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                                Mar 12, 2024
ELIODORO N. GARRIDO RODRIGUEZ;                         )
                                                                         KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
DAMARIS L. GARRIDO RAMIREZ,                            )
                                                       )
       Petitioners,
                                                       )   ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
                                                       )   FROM THE UNITED STATES
v.
                                                       )   BOARD   OF  IMMIGRATION
                                                       )   APPEALS
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
                                                       )
       Respondent.                                     )                               OPINION
                                                       )

Before: GRIFFIN, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

       PER CURIAM. Eliodoro N. Garrido Rodriguez and his minor daughter, Damaris L.

Garrido Ramirez, petition this court for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) dismissing their appeal from the denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). As set forth below, we

DENY the petition for review.

                                               I.

       The petitioners, both natives and citizens of Honduras, applied for admission to the United

States in July 2015. An asylum officer found that the petitioners had demonstrated a credible fear

of persecution or torture in Honduras. After that, the Department of Homeland Security served

them with notices to appear in removal proceedings, charging them with removability as

immigrants who, at the time of application for admission, were not in possession of valid entry

documents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Appearing before an immigration judge (IJ), the

petitioners admitted the factual allegations set forth in the notices to appear and conceded
No. 23-3573, Garrido Rodriguez v. Garland

removability as charged. Garrido Rodriguez applied for relief from removal in the form of asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Garrido Rodriguez’s application included his

daughter as a derivative beneficiary, but she also filed her own application seeking relief on the

same grounds.

       At the hearing on the petitioners’ applications, Garrido Rodriguez asserted that he would

be harmed in Honduras on account of his membership in a particular social group. According to

Garrido Rodriguez, that particular social group consisted of persons who have worked for Oscar

Ramos in a private security firm. Garrido Rodriguez began working for Ramos as a security guard

in March 2015.      Garrido Rodriguez testified that Ramos worked closely with local law

enforcement and performed “dirty jobs” for the police. In his application, Garrido Rodriguez

asserted that he “became stuck in the middle of a war between gang members and the police” and

that both sides attempted to obtain information from him and threatened him.

       Garrido Rodriguez asserted that, in April 2015, a group of local youths became associated

with the Mara 18 gang and began to kill people connected to Ramos because of Ramos’s

connection with the local police. In May 2015, gang members fired 35 gunshots at Roger Marquez,

Garrido Rodriguez’s friend who also worked as a security guard for Ramos, and left him for dead.

One of the shooters “said what a shame that fool [Garrido Rodriquez] did not come” with Marquez.

Garrido Rodriguez further asserted that one of the shooters called him and told him “to watch out

because . . . they were going to finish off everyone that worked for” Ramos.

       Garrido Rodriguez left Honduras because “both sides” began to threaten him and “both

sides are murderers.” According to Garrido Rodriguez, gang members wanted him to hand over

Ramos, while Ramos wanted him to hand over gang members. After Garrido Rodriguez left

Honduras, another friend and co-worker, Anael Pineda, was killed by Ramos because he refused

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to provide information about gang members. A year later, gang members assassinated Ramos.

Garrido Rodriguez testified that he is afraid to return to Honduras because Ramos’s employees

will kill him and because gang members will retaliate against him for working for Ramos.

       After the hearing, the IJ issued a written decision denying the petitioners’ applications and

ordering their removal to Honduras. The IJ found that Garrido Rodriguez was credible and had a

subjective fear of returning to Honduras. But the IJ concluded that Garrido Rodriguez failed to

establish a nexus between any past or feared harm and a cognizable protected ground, determining

that his particular social group lacked immutability, particularity, and social distinction. The IJ

also found that Garrido Rodriguez did not suffer past harm rising to the level of persecution and

that he could safely relocate to a different part of Honduras. Having failed to establish eligibility

for asylum, the IJ concluded, Garrido Rodriguez had necessarily failed to satisfy the more stringent

standard required for withholding of removal. As for Garrido Rodriguez’s request for CAT

protection, the IJ determined that he had failed to establish that any potential harm would more

likely than not occur or rise to the level of torture or that the Honduran government would be

willfully blind to any such harm.

       The petitioners appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. Dismissing their appeal, the BIA

agreed with the IJ that Garrido Rodriguez’s particular social group was not cognizable because it

lacked social distinction. The BIA also noted that the petitioners had failed to raise a meaningful

challenge to the IJ’s finding that Garrido Rodriguez’s proposed group lacked particularity and had

therefore waived that issue. Because the petitioners had failed to show that Garrido Rodriguez’s

particular social group was cognizable and had therefore failed to establish eligibility for asylum,

the BIA declined to address their other arguments about that form of relief. The BIA noted that,

after the IJ’s decision, this court held that applicants for withholding of removal must demonstrate

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that a protected ground is “at least one reason,” rather than “one central reason,” for their

persecution. See Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, 959 F.3d 253, 274 (6th Cir. 2020). Nonetheless, the

BIA concluded, the petitioners had failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal

because Garrido Rodriguez’s particular social group was not cognizable. According to the BIA,

the petitioners had failed to raise a meaningful challenge to the IJ’s denial of CAT protection and

had therefore waived that claim. This timely petition for review followed.

                                                II.

       “Where, as here, the BIA issues its own decision rather than summarily affirming the IJ,

the BIA decision is reviewed as the final agency decision, but the IJ’s decision is also reviewed to

the extent that the BIA adopted it.” Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 2014). We

review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, reversing only if “any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see

Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009).

       To establish eligibility for asylum, the petitioners must show that they meet the definition

of a “refugee,” meaning a person unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because

of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground,

including membership in a particular social group. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);

Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1136 (6th Cir. 2010). As for withholding of removal,

the petitioners must demonstrate a clear probability that, if removed to Honduras, their “life or

freedom would be threatened in that country because of” a protected ground, such as membership

in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d

491, 498 (6th Cir. 2015). “This standard is more demanding than the standard required to establish

asylum.” Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1138.

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No. 23-3573, Garrido Rodriguez v. Garland

       The petitioners based their claims for asylum and withholding of removal on Garrido

Rodriguez’s membership in a particular social group of persons who have worked for Ramos in a

private security firm. “A ‘particular social group’ must meet three criteria: (1) immutability

(members must share an immutable characteristic), (2) particularity (the group has discrete and

definable boundaries), and (3) social distinction (society actually perceives the purported group as

a distinct class of persons).” Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033, 1036 (6th Cir. 2019). “Though

the determination of whether a proposed particular social group is cognizable is a legal

determination, decisions as to the underlying elements are factual determinations subject to the

substantial evidence standard.” Turcios-Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2023)

(internal citations omitted).

       The BIA agreed with the IJ that Garrido Rodriguez’s particular social group was not

cognizable because it lacked social distinction. “To have the ‘social distinction’ necessary to

establish a particular social group, there must be evidence showing that society in general

perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group.”

Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A. 2014). The petitioners argue that this group

is “identifiable to would-be persecutors” given that Garrido Rodriguez received multiple, specific

threats expressly based on his prior employment with Ramos. But a group’s social distinction “is

determined by the perception of the society in question, rather than by the perception of the

persecutor.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (B.I.A. 2014). The petitioners did not

present any evidence that persons who have worked for Ramos’s private security firm are

perceived as a distinct segment of the Honduran population. See Umana-Ramos v. Holder,

724 F.3d 667, 674 (6th Cir. 2013).       Accordingly, the agency’s determination that Garrido

Rodriguez’s proposed group lacked social distinction is supported by substantial evidence.

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No. 23-3573, Garrido Rodriguez v. Garland

         The BIA also determined that the petitioners had failed to raise a meaningful challenge to

the IJ’s finding that Garrido Rodriguez’s proposed group lacked particularity and had therefore

waived that issue. The petitioners argue that the IJ gave no explanation as to why Garrido

Rodriguez’s proposed group could not “accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct

that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons.” Al-

Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 994 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matter of S-E-G-, I. & N. Dec.

579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008)). But as the government points out, the petitioners failed to raise this

argument—or any other argument—about particularity before the BIA. Because the petitioners

failed to exhaust their particularity argument before the BIA, we decline to consider it. See Santos-

Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417-19 (2013) (holding that the exhaustion requirement under

8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not a jurisdictional requirement but is still a mandatory claims-processing

rule).

         Because the petitioners failed to establish Garrido Rodriguez’s membership in a cognizable

particular social group, their claims for asylum and withholding of removal fail. See Umana-

Ramos, 724 F.3d at 674. The petitioners’ arguments about immutability, past persecution, and

internal relocation are misplaced because the BIA declined to address those arguments after

determining that petitioners failed to establish their membership in a cognizable particular social

group. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts

and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to

the results they reach.”).

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         The petitioners do not address their claims for CAT protection, thereby waiving any

challenge to the denial of those claims. See Shkabari v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 324, 327 n.1 (6th Cir.

2005).

                                               III.

         For these reasons, we DENY the petition for review.

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