Court Opinion

ID: 9408012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 14:05:57.990015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.157778
License: Public Domain

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
                        (Memorandum Web Opinion)

                                       PEKAREK V. PEKAREK

  NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
 AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

                                RACHAEL A. PEKAREK, APPELLANT,
                                                  V.

                                  SHAUN M. PEKAREK, APPELLEE.

                               Filed July 11, 2023.    No. A-22-735.

       Appeal from the District Court for Nemaha County: JULIE D. SMITH, Judge. Affirmed.
       Angelo M. Ligouri, of Ligouri Law Office, for appellant.
       Ryan K. McIntosh, of Brandt, Horan, Hallstrom & Stilmock, for appellee.

       RIEDMANN, BISHOP, and WELCH, Judges.
       RIEDMANN, Judge.
                                         INTRODUCTION
        Rachael A. Pekarek appeals from the order of the Nemaha County District Court that found
her in contempt. On appeal, she assigns error to various factual findings of the district court, to the
finding that the parties share legal custody of the children, as well as to the finding that she was in
contempt. After reviewing the record, we affirm the order of the district court.
                                          BACKGROUND
        Rachael and Shaun M. Pekarek were married in 2011, and the marriage was dissolved by
a decree issued in 2014; the parties have two children. The parties entered into a stipulated
parenting plan that awarded Rachael sole legal and physical custody of the children with parenting
time set forth for Shaun. The dissolution decree, however, states
        The parties agree that it would be in the best interest of the minor children of the parties,
        [], that [Rachael] and [Shaun] have joint legal custody, and [Rachael] have sole physical

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       custody of said minor children, subject to visitation with [Shaun] as set forth in the
       Parenting Plan attached hereto as Exhibit “1”.

Therefore, the agreement as to joint legal custody referenced in the decree differs from the
agreement as to legal custody in the parenting plan.
        Since the 2014 entry of the decree, it has been modified, but no issue was raised with
respect to legal custody of the parties’ children. Pursuant to the parenting plan, Shaun had
parenting time on alternating weekends and on every Wednesday evening; a holiday schedule was
also provided. In June 2022, Shaun filed an application for contempt, alleging that Rachael had
refused him parenting time with the children. Specifically, Shaun alleged that beginning in March,
Rachael had severed contact between Shaun and the children. An order to show cause was issued.
Rachael filed a denial of the allegations of contempt, as well as a complaint to modify which asked
for a change in parenting time and any other relief the court deemed just and equitable.
        The district court ordered mediation and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. At the
evidentiary hearing both Shaun and Rachael testified, as did the parties’ children, who testified
outside the presence of the parties and whose testimony was sealed; Shaun’s wife and older stepson
also testified. At the time of trial, the parties’ daughter was 14 years old, and the parties’ son was
10 years old.
        Evidence presented at the hearing showed that in September 2021 Rachael found letters
written by the parties’ daughter which led Rachael to believe there was inappropriate contact
between the daughter and Shaun’s older stepson. Rachael contacted Shaun, and he looked through
the daughter’s room at his home but could not find anything related to this issue. Shaun spoke with
his wife, and they spoke with Shaun’s stepson, who told them nothing was going on; Shaun also
looked through his stepson’s phone. Shaun believed he had fully investigated the matter and he
did not believe that any inappropriate relationship had occurred. There was no interruption of
Shaun’s parenting time after the incident in September. Shaun’s stepson testified that he and the
parties’ daughter had never had any inappropriate contact. Shaun testified that he rarely leaves the
children by themselves except when everyone was going to sleep.
        Shaun was to have parenting time the weekend of March 18, 2022, but when he messaged
Rachael about it, she told him the children were on spring break and he could not have his parenting
time. He was able to exercise his parenting time on the weekend of April 2, but that was the last
time he had had parenting time until the hearing. Rachael testified that when she looked through
the daughter’s belongings after the children returned from Shaun’s parenting time the weekend of
April 2, she found additional items that made her believe that the daughter and Shaun’s older
stepson were involved in an inappropriate relationship. Rachael decided to contact her lawyer to
see what her options were.
        A text message shows that Shaun asked to see the children in April 2022 but was told that
Easter was Rachael’s weekend pursuant to the parenting plan, and that the weekend after was also
her weekend. On April 29 Shaun sent a text message to Rachael asking about plans for exchanging
the children that weekend and Rachael informed him that the children had plans. In May, Racheal’s
attorney contacted Shaun and asked him to attend mediation. The letter the attorney sent to Shaun
also notified him that Rachael had suspended visitation for the safety and welfare of the children.
Later in May, Rachael informed Shaun in a text message that she had full legal and physical

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custody and that he “had visitation rights only. And those have been suspended. By me.” At the
hearing, Rachael confirmed her belief that as the custodial parent, she had the right to make
decisions that were in the best interests of the children, and that if Shaun’s “input is not in the best
favor of the children, then regardless of [Shaun’s input],” it was her job to make those decisions.
        Rachael stated that she did not sever Shaun’s parenting time, but that she only suspended
it so they could work out safety issues. Rachael stated that suspending meant she was not taking
away Shaun’s visitation or trying to take the children from their father, but she was making sure
that the children would be in a safe space. She confirmed her belief that as the legal custodian, she
had the authority and responsibility to make fundamental decisions regarding the children’s
welfare, including exerting continuous parenting time for sufficient periods of time. She confirmed
her belief that the children’s health and welfare were in jeopardy during their visits.
        Rachael testified that in September 2021, when Shaun told her he would take care of it she
hoped he would, but when she found the information in April 2022, she was concerned that things
had not been addressed. She said that she had attempted to work things out with Shaun but that he
kept “blowing [her] off.” Rachael claimed she thought suspending visitation so that the parties
could go to mediation would resolve things without court intervention.
        Information regarding other issues was also presented. There was evidence that in early
2021, Shaun “slam[med]” the parties’ son’s head into a wall. Shaun denied that he had slammed
his son’s head into a wall but acknowledged that his son did not want to see him after an incident
that occurred at his house. The children missed their next scheduled parenting time with Shaun
after the incident, but then parenting time resumed as it had been. Rachael alleged that the children
were allowed to drink alcohol at Shaun’s home. Shaun testified that on New Year’s Eve, the
parties’ daughter started to take a drink of his wife’s drink and he told her to put it down and walk
away, which she did. Shaun stated that he does not allow the children to drink alcohol in his home
or outside of his home.
        Additionally, there was evidence that Shaun had, while communicating with the parties’
daughter, referred to Rachael as the daughter’s “egg donor.” There was also testimony that on
previous occasions, Shaun would drink alcohol in the vehicle while driving with the children in
the vehicle.
        In its order following the hearing, the district court noted there was “ambiguity” between
the parenting plan and the divorce decree with regard to legal custody. Before analyzing whether
Rachael would be held in contempt, the district court observed that the parenting plan was not
signed by the district court judge who presided over the parties’ divorce, but the divorce decree
was. It, therefore, determined that the parties had joint legal custody. As it related to the issue of
contempt, the district court noted that even a parent with sole legal custody did not have the
unfettered right to suspend the other parent’s parenting time unilaterally and without any effort to
seek court approval of the deviation of court ordered parenting time.
        The district court found the delay of time between Rachael first approaching Shaun about
her concerns regarding the parties’ daughter and Shaun’s older stepson and her decision to suspend
parenting time to be concerning. The district court also found that any allegations that the parties’
daughter and Shaun’s older stepson engaged in sexual contact were unsubstantiated. It noted that
Rachael acted on her own without leave of court, and that she could have requested an ex parte
order from the district court to determine temporary custody and to place restrictions on parenting

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time to ensure the children’s safety. While the district court acknowledged that Rachael attempted
to mediate the matter, the children had not seen their father all summer without any court order in
place to allow for suspension of Shaun’s parenting time.
         The district court found Shaun had met his burden by clear and convincing evidence to
show that Rachael was in willful contempt of court for failing to allow him to exercise his weekend
parenting time between March 2022 and the date the contempt action was filed in June 2022. (We
note, however, that Shaun exercised parenting time the weekend of April 2.) Rachael was ordered
to serve 30 days in jail beginning on January 5, 2023. She was ordered to pay Shaun’s attorney
fees in the amount of $1,500, by November 15, 2022, as well as accrued interest. The district court
stated that Rachael could purge herself of the contempt by ensuring the children attended all
parenting time with Shaun between the date of the order and January 5, 2023. It also temporarily
ordered certain conditions during parenting time, including conditions related to alcohol
consumption and the supervision required of the parties’ daughter around her stepbrothers. Rachael
appeals.
                                   ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
         Rachael assigns several errors on appeal. She alleges the district court erred (1) in finding
that the parties’ daughter’s testimony about Shaun’s younger stepson was not relevant for the
contempt action; (2) in determining that the parties had joint legal custody and terminating her sole
legal custody; (3) in determining that Rachael made an “unfettered” suspension of Shaun’s
visitation (4) in determining that a several months’ elapse was too long for Rachael to be truly
concerned about the safety and welfare of the minor children while on visits; (5) in determining
Rachael was in willful contempt within the same order in which the district court modified the
parenting plan on visitation to address the same issues/concerns that Rachael tried to address with
Shaun individually and through mediation, which he refused, thus creating Shaun’s allegations for
contempt against her; (6) in sanctioning her to serve 30 days in jail beginning January 5, 2023,
without stating the facts on which she was determined to be in contempt of the parenting plan
adopted by the court; (7) in sanctioning her to pay $1,500 in attorney fees in full by November 15,
2022, with interest accruing immediately, without allowing her to purge herself of the contempt;
and (8) that the district court’s order violates public policy and the fundamental rights of the
custodial parent pursuant to the parties’ agreed upon parenting plan, constituting an abuse of
discretion.
                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
        In a civil contempt proceeding where a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation
of a court order, an appellate court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) the trial
court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) the trial court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error, and (3) the trial court’s determinations of whether a party is in contempt
and of the sanction to be imposed are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Kitsmiller v. Kitsmiller, 31
Neb. App. 473, 983 N.W.2d 147 (2022).
        A trial court’s determination of requests for sanctions and for attorney fees are both
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.

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                                            ANALYSIS
Evidence Regarding Shaun’s Younger Stepson.
         Rachael argues the district court erred in finding that allegations against Shaun’s younger
stepson were not relevant for the contempt action. Because these allegations were made in the
privacy of the court’s chambers and are contained in the sealed transcripts, we will not repeat them
here. The district court found that there was no evidence that either party was aware of these
allegations and that they were not relevant for the contempt action, although they may be relevant
for the purpose of a temporary order.
         Rachael argues that Nebraska law does not require her to know the exact person causing
harm to her children, and that the evidence clearly established that she knew harm was occurring.
She argues that the evidence was relevant because it supported her decision to suspend Shaun’s
parenting time.
         We note that the information related to this issue was not excluded from evidence; rather,
the district court found it not relevant for purposes of determining whether Rachael was in
contempt. The issue before this court on appeal, therefore, is whether the district court erred in
finding it not relevant to its contempt analysis.
         Because there was no evidence that Rachael was aware of these allegations, it could not
have been a basis for her decision to suspend Shaun’s parenting time. Furthermore, as will be
discussed later in this opinion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Rachael in
contempt for unilaterally suspending Shaun’s parenting time. Even if the allegations related to
Shaun’s younger stepson had been considered by the district court, Rachael did not have the
authority to suspend Shaun’s court approved parenting time without seeking approval from the
district court.
Legal Custody.
        Rachael assigns the district court erred in determining the parties had joint legal custody
thereby terminating her sole legal custody. She argues that the parties agreed that she would have
sole legal and physical custody in their signed parenting agreement and that the agreement was
“adopted and incorporated ‘in total’ within the Court’s decree by the [judge] on the record at the
final hearing of dissolution of marriage on June 11, 2014.” Brief for appellant at 18. While we
agree that the parenting plan attached to the 2014 decree provides for Rachael’s sole legal and
physical custody, the divorce decree states
        The parties agree that it would be in the best interest of the minor children of the parties,
        [], that [Rachael] and [Shaun] have joint legal custody, and [Rachael] have sole physical
        custody of said minor children, subject to visitation with [Shaun] as set forth in the
        Parenting Plan attached hereto as Exhibit “1”.

        Rachael provided this court with the record of the dissolution hearing to support her
position that the court adopted and incorporated the parenting plan into the decree and that she was
awarded sole legal custody. The Nebraska Supreme Court has stated “once the court adopts the
agreement and sets it forth as a judgment of the court with corresponding ordering language, the

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contractual character of the property settlement agreement is subsumed into the court-ordered
judgment.” Rice v. Webb, 287 Neb. 712, 723, 844 N.W.2d 290, 298 (2014).
         Here, the decree makes no reference to the parenting plan being adopted and incorporated;
rather, the language of the decree references the parenting plan only in conjunction with Shaun’s
visitation schedule. A decree is a judgment, and once a decree for dissolution becomes final, its
meaning, including a settlement agreement incorporated therein, is determined as a matter of law
from the four corners of the decree itself. Vyhlidal v. Vyhlidal, 311 Neb. 495, 973 N.W.2d 171
(2022). It is inherent to a judgment’s finality that all are bound by the original language used, and
all ought to interpret the language the same way. Bayne v. Bayne, 302 Neb. 858, 925 N.W.2d 687
(2019). See also Neujahr v. Neujahr, 223 Neb. 722, 393 N.W.2d 47 (1986) (even when
“interpretation” of decree is necessary interpretation will be based upon language of decree and
not based upon what parties believed court meant but did not say).
         Therefore, although the parenting plan is attached to the decree, it was not adopted and
incorporated into the decree and the plain language of the decree awards the parties joint legal
custody. Consequently, the district court did not err in determining the parties’ shared joint legal
custody.
Suspension of Visitation.
         Rachael argues the district court erred in determining she made an “unfettered” suspension
of Shaun’s visitation at his residence. She argues that prior caselaw lends support to the idea that
if a custodial parent has concerns about the child’s mental, emotional, or physical wellbeing, they
need not force the child to visit with the other parent just because a parenting plan is in place and
that the courts must look at the custodial parent’s conduct. Rachael is essentially arguing the
district court erred in finding her in willful contempt. We disagree. When a party to an action fails
to comply with a court order made for the benefit of the opposing party, such act is ordinary civil
contempt, which requires willful disobedience as an essential element. Kitsmiller v. Kitsmiller, 31
Neb. App. 473, 983 N.W.2d 147 (2022). Outside of statutory procedures imposing a different
standard, it is the complainant’s burden to prove civil contempt by clear and convincing evidence.
Id.
         Here, Shaun showed that Rachael made the decision to stop his parental visitation with
their children. While Rachael sought mediation, she did not seek a court order or ask the court to
intervene. The letter Shaun received from her attorney stated that Rachael had suspended visitation
for the safety and welfare of the children, and that Rachael was willing to go to mediation. Rachael
informed Shaun that he had only visitation rights and that she was suspending those rights. This
shows she was aware that Shaun was entitled to court ordered visitation, and that she was not going
to allow him to exercise those rights. But Rachael did not have the authority to unilaterally
determine if Shaun could exercise his parental visitation.
         It is understandable that a parent, believing her child to be in an unsafe environment, would
wish to take steps to protect that child. But here, Rachael chose to take steps without regard to the
parental visitation schedule ordered by the court. Rachael’s belief that her child was in an unsafe
environment when she attended parenting time with Shaun, regardless of whether she believed she
had sole custody, did not give her the ability to “suspend” Shaun’s court ordered parenting time

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without seeking approval from the district court. The district court did not err in finding Rachael
to be in contempt of the parenting plan.
Delay in Suspending Visits.
         Rachael argues the district court erred in determining she waited too long a period of time
to truly be concerned about the children’s safety on visitation. At issue here is Rachael’s discovery
of the information in September 2021, after which she did not suspend visits, and her discovery in
April 2022, after which she suspended visits. But even assuming, solely for the sake of argument,
that Rachael did not wait an unreasonable amount of time, or that waiting to take action until
finding additional information in April was reasonable, this does not change the outcome of this
case. It is the steps Rachael took to address the issues that caused her to be in contempt, not her
reasons or the timeframe she chose for taking the action. The length of time involved does not
change the fact that Rachael did not have the authority to suspend visits without seeking
intervention from the district court.
Contempt Finding and Temporary Order.
         Rachael argues the district court erred in finding her in willful contempt of the parenting
plan and in the same order amending the parenting plan to disallow the very conduct she was
refusing to allow for the best interest, safety, and welfare of the minor children. She argues she
stopped visitation specifically to mediate the very concerns outlined within the district court’s
temporary order which amended the parenting plan; she argues she should not be held in willful
contempt of the parenting plan for seeking the same safety and protection for her children that the
district court adopted within its order of contempt.
         Again, Rachael focuses on the reasons behind her conduct, rather than her conduct. It was
not the reason she took her actions, nor the outcome she desired due to her actions, but the actions
themselves that placed her in contempt of the district court’s parental visitation order. We see no
issue with the district court finding Rachael to be in contempt of the parenting plan, and at the
same time entering a temporary order placing restrictions on visits to address issues that had been
raised in the contempt proceedings. A court’s continuing jurisdiction over a dissolution decree
includes the power to provide equitable relief in a contempt proceeding. Martin v. Martin, 294
Neb. 106, 881 N.W.2d 174 (2016). Where a situation exists that is contrary to the principles of
equity and which can be redressed within the scope of judicial action, a court of equity will devise
a remedy to meet the situation. Id. The contempt proceedings alerted the court to situations which
it chose to remedy through the temporary order and it had the authority to do so. See Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 42-364.15 (Reissue 2016). This assigned error fails.
Factual Findings.
        Rachael argues the district court erred in sanctioning her to serve 30 days in jail without
stating the facts on which she was determined to be in contempt of the parenting plan adopted by
the district court. But the district court did make factual findings in its order. It stated that Rachael
“unilaterally suspended [Shaun’s] parenting time without approval of the court.” The district court
analyzed the evidence presented at trial, organized it into a statement of facts, and then determined
that, based on those facts, Rachael refused to follow the district court’s order regarding parenting

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time. The order of contempt makes clear what conduct constituted contempt in this matter, and it
is clear to Rachael what conduct she must change in order to avoid future findings of contempt.
Attorney Fees.
         Rachael argues the district court erred in sanctioning her to pay $1,500 in attorney fees in
full by November 15, 2022, with interest accruing immediately, without allowing her to purge
herself of the contempt. She interprets the order to pay attorney fees as part of the sanction for
contempt of which she may purge herself, rather than an award of attorney fees. She bases this
interpretation on its inclusion in the portion of the order entitled “Sanction.” While we understand
her argument, we interpret the order as imposing a jail sentence for contempt while also making a
separate award of attorney fees to Shaun.
         Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-370 (Reissue 2016) provides that costs, including a reasonable
attorney fee, may be taxed against a party found to be in contempt. Here, although the award of
attorney fees is in the portion of the order that lays out the sanction for contempt, along with how
Rachael may purge herself of the contempt, they are separate. In the sentence immediately
following the imposition of the jail sentence to begin January 5, 2023, the district court states, “She
is also ordered to pay [Shaun’s] attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,500.00. Said attorney’s fees
shall be paid in full by November 15, 2022[,] and shall accrue interest at the rate of 4.567% per
annum, beginning immediately.” In the next paragraph, the district court provides that Rachael
may purge herself of contempt by ensuring that the minor children attend all parenting time with
Shaun as outlined in the parenting plan between the entry of the order of contempt and the start of
the jail sentence, including additional make up parenting time over Thanksgiving and Christmas.
         We believe the order is clear that Rachael was sentenced to 30 days’ jail as a sanction for
being in contempt, and she may purge herself of such contempt by following the parenting time
scheduled. The order also orders her to pay an award of attorney fees. This is separate from the
sanction for contempt. The district court had the authority to award attorney fees, and it did not
abuse its discretion in doing so.
Public Policy.
         Rachael argues the district court’s order violates public policy and the fundamental rights
of the custodial parent pursuant to the parties’ agreed upon parenting plan, constituting an abuse
of discretion. She argues she suspended parenting time not to “simply harm Shaun’s visitation, but
specifically to correct the negative environment that her children were being subjected to on
visitation.” Brief for appellant at 35. As stated above, the issue is not the reasoning behind
Rachael’s conduct. The issue on which she was found to be in contempt was in her decision to
simply ignore the court ordered parental visitation given to Shaun. Rachael had other options
available to her to address the harm she believed was being caused to her children that would not
have been in violation of the court order. She chose not to exercise those options. She made the
decision to unilaterally suspend visitation, and the district court correctly determined that such
action was a willful violation of a court order.

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                                         CONCLUSION
       We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s order finding Rachael in contempt and
in awarding attorney fees to Shaun. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
                                                                                         AFFIRMED.

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