Court Opinion

ID: 9657898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:40:46.132145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:49.131515
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.,
(dissenting). Defendants Lengyel, Lee, and Phillips were together when arrested in the eárly morning of May 30,1966. The arresting officer testified that at the time of the arrest certain writings were on the bodies of each man. He stated further that defendant Lengyel had a torn brassiere around his neck and that defendants Lee and Phillips had prophylactics hanging from their clothing. Shortly after their arrival at the police station, the three were photographed nude from the waist up in both front and rear positions, the latter admittedly being nnusual police proce'duré. The photographs do not depict the brassiere, or the prophylactics but show that written on the backs of .defendants Lengyel, Lee, and Phillips, respectively, were ihe words *113“fuck you”, “let’s fuck”, and “blow —”,'the last word being indistinguishable, but presumably being “me”.
At trial,, the prosecutor offered the photographs into evidence pursuant to MCLA § 768.27 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1050), which provides: .
“In aiiy criminal case -where the defendant’s motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant’s scheme, plan or system'in doing an áct, is material, any like acts or other acts of the defendant which may tend to show his motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant’s scheme, plan or system in doing the act, in question, may be proved, whether they are contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto; notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another or prior or subsequent crime by the defendant.”
It was the people’s contention that the photographs were relevant to show the intent of defendants at the time of the alleged offense, some 10 to 12 hours earlier. The trial court at first rejected this argument but stated-that the photographs may be admissible to portray the- circumstances • of the arrest.
In concert, defense counsel strongly objected on the ground that the evidence concerning defendants’ appearance at the time of their arrest was inadmissible under either theory. They began by pointing out that the writing in the photographs was- not defendants’ own, handiwork. In fact, the only explanation of the writing was a reference made dur7 ing cross-examination of defendant Lengyel that Dennis Woodward had written on the three defendants during a time after the alleged offense while they slept. Objecting-as well to the testimony of the arresting- 'officer, {-defense counsel noted the absence of any testimony- showing that the writing *114was present at the time of the alleged offense, or that any prophylactics had been used.
They contended further that intent was not a material element of the offense charged, that defendants’ appearance 10 to 12 hours after the offense allegedly took place was totally irrelevant to the issues in the case, and that the photographs were offered solely for the purpose of inflaming the minds of the jurors.
After extensive debate, the trial court ruled as follows:
“It would appear to me that either as evidence of the circumstances and what the conditions were of these defendants at the time of the arrest, they would be admissible there. On the question of 28-.1050, while it is tenuous, * * * it says: Any acts or other acts of the defendant which may tend to show his motive, intent and etc., in committing-such a crime may be admissible. It would appear to me here that we have the circumstances, we have the pictures. They may be offered in evidence for what the jury believes to be attributable to these defendants, and if it turns out that all the evidence would indicate that none of this writing is attributable to them, then, of course, the jury can make that finding and not use it against them. But their credibility is on the line here, the pictures were taken at the time of the arrest. This defendant has admitted that those writings were there and that this is an actual representation of what the defendants’ pictures looked like at the time.”
In response to the objections of counsel for defendants Pallone and Fields regarding the attendant prejudice to their clients from the admission of the photographs, the trial court stated,
“In answer to Mr. D’Avanzo, that there is nothing in evidence regarding his client — and this also applies to Mr. Zitzelberger and Mr. Fields- — -there is *115evidence of a concert of action between all these dedefendants in the testimony. The fact that even if these writings were pnt on these defendants subsequent to the time of the actual occurrence of the event that we are concerned with here today, if it does show a concert of action or intent or tendency to act on the part of these three — and the evidence further indicates that these three acted with the other three at the time that we are actually concerned with — it would appear to me that on that basis, the court will receive exhibits 6 through 11 inclusive in evidence.”
In so ruling, I believe the trial court erred. The statute provides that “like acts or other acts of the defendant which may tend to show his * * * intent” are admissible if intent is material. In a prosecution for rape, intent is not material. To the extent that the photographs were offered to show intent, the statute, being invoked to sanction their introduction into evidence, was misapplied. See People v. Askar (1967), 8 Mich App 95.
The second evidentiary rule on which the trial court relied in permitting the photographs to be introduced into evidence is stated as follows:
“It is always proper to prove the facts and circumstances attendant upon the arrest of a defendant for the crime for which he is being tried, where such facts and circumstances logically tend in any degree to connect him with the perpetration of the crime.” People v. Pierce (1944), 387 Ill 608, 614 (57 NE2d 345, 348).
See, also, People v. Tomaszewski (1950), 406 Ill 346 (94 NE2d 154), and Gardner v. Commonwealth (1954), 195 Va 945 (81 SE2d 614). Since the operative effect of the rule is to permit an inference from guilty conduct to the commission of the wrong*116ful deed,1 the integrity of the rule depends on’the degree of adherence to the requirement that “the circumstance relied upon, whatever it may be, must tend to connect the accused with the specific, offense for which he is on trial.” People v. Reingold (1948), 87 Cal App 2d 382 (197 P2d 175, 188).2
■As a result, the rule is properly invoked, only where the evidence sought to be introduced is of words or conduct at the time of arrest which manifest a consciousness of guilt. Offers of bribes, attempts to flee, threats, lies, inconsistent or contradictory statements or the giving of false information or identification exemplify such guilty conduct. In the present case, defendants Lengyel, Lee, and Phillips, at the time of their arrest, neither said nor did anything which manifested a consciousness of guilt. Reliance was placed solely on their appearance from which, for the reasons noted by defense counsel, no 'inference of guilt may reasonably be drawn.
If an inference of guilt may reasonably be drawn from the circumstances of an arrest, then such evidence is admissible. The weight of such evidence, as indicated by the trial court, is then for the ’jury to determine, and the defendant is entitled to offer evidence to explain his suspicious conduct. But where, as here, no such inference is reasonable, then the evidence is not admissible. Spencer v. State (1957), 95 Ga App 454 (98 SE2d 94).
The majority opinion assumes arguendo the inadmissibility of the photographs, but concludes that they were not so prejudicial or inflammatory in nature, as to constitute reversible error. After a careful review of that portion of the lengthy transcript *117dealing with the admission of the photographs, I cannot agree.
At trial, the prosecuting attorney took the position that “insofar as the aspect of inflammatoriness is concerned, if this is a true and accurate description of the circumstances, the inflammatoriness is incidental.”
This -approach was clearly rejected in People v. Turner (1969), 17 Mich App 123, where this Court held that even photographs having obvious probative value are inadmissible if such probative value is outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Thus, even if the photographs in the present case had had probative value, they might still have been inadmissible because of the inflammatory nature of their content.
More prejudicial than their content, however, was the way,in which they were misused at trial In the first-place, the jury observed much of the lengthy and heated argtiment of counsel regarding the admissibility of the photographs. Secondly, the prosecutor was permitted to make numerous improper references to the contents of the photographs before they were offered into evidence. In addition, the trial court permitted further discussion of the phótógraphs based upon MCLA § 768.27, supra, only to subsequently rule that the statute was being improperly invoked.3
Most serious, however, was the prosecutor’s-open avowal of the true purpose for which he sought to utilize the photographs. On the record, he stated, “If this individual is the kind of individual that allows these things on his body, he also, it would tend to show, would be the kind of individual who would forcibly rape.” What followed was a persistent and repeated emphasis on evidence which served to divert the attention of the jury from the principal *118issues in the case. The culmination came during the people’s closing argument to the jury:
“The significance * * * is the type of things that yon can deduce from the photographs. Do we have individuals here who will stop at anything in this instance? Not one bit. What kind of an individual would allow, let alone if it were put on, such writings, so soon, a few hours after the incident, on their bodies. And in that instance, it is the theory of the people that the acts and conduct of the defendants, before or after the incident, reflects what the intent may be at the time where the intent is the issue, where there is a question of the matter of the innocence or where there is the question of motive or the malice in terms of wrongful doing, where it becomes a material issue of fact, and here feloniously and did carnally know, then such evidence, it is the theory of the people, is admissible. There is no other reason. We didn’t put them in this particular dress that night. They, early in the morning, after they kept drinking, they drove over there. Just to consider the unadulterated — for want of another word — guts. To parade, and while we are at it, on his shoulder, Lengyel says, and I asked him: ‘Well, do you know how it got there ?’
“ ‘I put it there.’
“‘You put it there?’
“ ‘Yes.’
“ ‘How?’
“ ‘I thought it was a joke.’
“It is a joke! Now, here again by me, we are attacking the attitude, the demeanor that evidences the intent that was required here.”
The obvious import was that defendants, for reasons other than those based upon legitimate evidence, were more likely to have committed the offense for which they were on trial. Cf. State v. McCarthy (1943), 130 Conn 101 (31 A2d 921); People v. Gougas (1951), 410 Ill 235 (102 NE2d 152).
*119As stated in People v. Bartlett (1967), 256 Cal App 2d 787, 794 (64 Cal Rptr 503, 509):
“Sncli evidence should have been excluded because its tenuous probative value to show [intent] was far outweighed by its tendency to incite a jury to resolve the issue of guilt or innocence on defendant’s character rather than on proof of the essential elements of the crime.”
In light of the fact that the photographs were virtually elevated to the level of substantive evidence of the offense, the likelihood that the jury relied on them in their deliberation of defendants’ guilt is too great to conclude that defendants’ right to a fair trial has not been seriously and substantially impaired. The error is too plain and too egregious not to warrant a new trial. I cannot, therefore, under the guise of “harmless error”, endorse what appears to me to be a calculated and studied shortcut to conviction.
The people advanced the theory at trial that the alleged offense was perpetrated jointly by all defendants. In its ruling permitting the photographs into evidence, the trial court stated that “there is evidence of a concert of action between all these defendants in the testimony.” The defendants who were not photographed thereby became so inextricably linked with those who were that the attendant prejudice from the introduction of the photographs applied equally to all.
I would reverse the convictions of all five defendants and remand for a new trial.

 2 Wigmore on Evidence, § 273, p 106.

 Evidence introduced under MCLA § 768.27, supra, is subject-to the same requirement. People v. Lundberg (1961), 364 Mich 596; People v. Charles Williams (1969) 15 Mich App 683.

 As noted above, the trial court later ruled differently!