Court Opinion

ID: 9825834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:07:32.555145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:10:41.136144
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 25, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                              Court of Appeals
                               NO. 2022-CA-1394-MR

BRIAN PERRY                                                         APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM BATH CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE DAVID A. BARBER, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CR-00012

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Brian Perry appeals the order of the Bath Circuit Court, entered

on November 14, 2022, revoking his probation. After careful review of the record,

briefs, and law, we affirm.

          BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On February 20, 2020, Perry was indicted for first-degree possession

of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), first offense, and possession of drug

paraphernalia. On July 2, 2020, Perry agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge
of second-degree possession of a controlled substance and the drug paraphernalia

charge in return for a sentence of 12 months, which the Commonwealth ultimately

agreed would be probated. Perry waived a separate sentencing hearing due to the

probation of his sentence. On July 7, 2020, the trial court entered a written

judgment and sentence pursuant to these terms and imposed $165.00 in court costs

to be paid within 90 days.

                On September 28, 2022, Perry was arrested on a bench warrant issued

on November 5, 2020, following a reported probation violation. On October 6,

2022, the trial court subsequently appointed the Department of Public Advocacy to

represent Perry at the probation revocation hearing. After an evidentiary hearing

on November 3, 2022, the trial court revoked Perry’s probation and ordered he

serve his original sentence. This appeal followed.

                                 LEGAL ANALYSIS

                On appeal, Perry argues he qualifies as a “poor person” under KRS1

453.190(2), and as a result, the trial court erred by imposing court costs against

him. Perry concedes this issue is unpreserved but asserts it constitutes a sentencing

matter which may be raised for the first time on appeal. Alternatively, he requests

review for palpable error. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 664 S.W.3d 582, 590

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                          -2-
(Ky. 2023) (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he trial court and appellate court have inherent

authority to correct an unlawful sentence at any time, [and] a defendant may raise a

sentencing issue through any of the following relief mechanisms: direct appeal,

with the standard of review being abuse of discretion even when the sentencing

issue is not preserved; RCr[2] 11.42; CR[3] 60.02; or a writ of habeas corpus.”).

                In response to Perry’s arguments, the Commonwealth first contends

that Perry’s notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s November 14, 2022, order

revoking probation is silent concerning court costs and, therefore, cannot provide

relief from payment of these costs. Moreover, the Commonwealth notes that it was

the trial court’s order of judgment and sentence entered on July 7, 2020, which

imposed court costs, and maintains that Perry’s argument is unpreserved for

appellate review due to his failure to timely appeal that order. Finally, the

Commonwealth argues that Perry’s claim does not involve a sentencing issue

because the trial court never entered a finding relating to “poor person” status. See

Spicer v. Commonwealth, 442 S.W.3d 26, 34-35 (Ky. 2014). We agree with the

Commonwealth on all three arguments.

                “When an issue has not been addressed in the order on appeal, there is

nothing for us to review.” Owens v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Ky. App.

2
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -3-
2017) (footnote and citations omitted). Thus, a reversal of the November 14, 2022,

revocation order will not grant the relief requested since it contains no provision

concerning court costs.

                In the alternative, Perry’s brief specifically “requests that this Court

reverse the court costs portion of the final judgment.” (Emphasis added.) In Ready

v. Jamison, 705 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Ky. 1986), the Kentucky Supreme Court held

that the doctrine of substantial compliance applies when a notice of appeal

misidentifies the order appealed from, and “the judgment appealed from can be

ascertained within reasonable certainty from a complete review of the record on

appeal and no substantial harm or prejudice has resulted to the opponent.” To the

extent we can construe this appeal as intending to challenge the July 7, 2020,

judgment and sentence, Perry’s notice of appeal was filed over two years after

entry of that order in violation of the 30-day filing requirement set forth by RAP4

2(A)(3), and substantial compliance will not cure an untimely filed appeal. See

Excel Energy, Inc. v. Commonwealth Institutional Sec., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 713, 716-

17 (Ky. 2000); Demoss v. Commonwealth, 765 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Ky. App. 1989)

(“The appellate court lacks jurisdiction unless the notice is seasonably filed.”).

While the courts of the Commonwealth have inherent authority to cure an unlawful

sentence at any time, that authority can only be exercised once its jurisdiction has

4
    Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.

                                             -4-
been established. See Smothers v. Lewis, 672 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Ky. 1984) (emphasis

added) (“[A] court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as

incidental to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably

necessary to the administration of justice in the case before it . . . .”).

              Even if Perry’s claim was properly preserved for review, we would

nevertheless find no error. “Under KRS 23A.205(2), the imposition of court costs

is mandatory ‘unless the court finds that the defendant is a poor person as defined

by KRS 453.190(2) and that he or she is unable to pay court costs and will be

unable to pay the court costs in the foreseeable future.’” Constant v.

Commonwealth, 603 S.W.3d 654, 662 (Ky. App. 2020). “If a trial judge was not

asked at sentencing to determine the defendant’s poverty status and did not

otherwise presume the defendant to be an indigent or poor person before imposing

court costs, then there is no error to correct on appeal.” Spicer, 442 S.W.3d at 35.

“A sentencing error only occurs when a defendant’s poverty status is clearly

established and the trial judge imposes costs contrary to that finding.” Roe v.

Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814, 831 (Ky. 2015), as modified (May 5, 2016), as

corrected (Nov. 14, 2016).

              On July 2, 2020, during Perry’s sentencing, no request was made of

the trial court to determine his poverty status for purposes relating to court costs.

Despite this, the trial court inquired on its own accord as to Perry’s previous and

                                            -5-
current employment and education status, and Perry informed he was unemployed,

never had a job, and dropped out of high school. However, the trial court did not

enter an express finding as to Perry’s “poor person” status based on this

information. Regardless, it does not clearly establish such status because the

record is silent regarding his capacity to pay court costs within the foreseeable

future. See KRS 23A.205(2); Maynes v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 922, 929

(Ky. 2012) (emphasis added) (“[T]he KRS 23A.205 directive to consider not only

the defendant’s present ability to pay court costs but also his ability ‘in the

foreseeable future’ cannot be overlooked.”). At that time, Perry was a 21-year-old

individual whose sentence was probated. There was nothing to indicate he could

not secure income to cover the nominal costs within the required deadline imposed,

and further, the fact he was appointed an attorney based on indigent status does not

automatically preclude imposition of court costs. See Maynes, 361 S.W.3d at 929-

30, 933 (“[W]e conclude that the trial court was authorized under Kentucky law to

impose court costs despite [Appellant’s] status as an indigent defendant entitled to

the services of a public defender. . . . [Appellant] was to be released from custody

pursuant to his diversion agreement, and so . . . he could reasonably be expected in

the near future to acquire the means to pay the relatively modest court costs of

$130.00. . . . The restoration of . . . freedom [is] also the restoration of [the] ability

to work, and so justified the trial court’s order that [the Appellant] pay the

                                           -6-
statutorily mandated court costs pursuant to KRS 23A.205.”). Thus, we find no

error in the trial court’s imposition of court costs, and this appeal does not present

a sentencing issue or any other issue otherwise properly preserved for appellate

review.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the reasons discussed above, the order of the Bath Circuit Court is

hereby AFFIRMED.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Jennifer Wade                              Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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