Court Opinion

ID: 9848762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:26:49.022094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:44.144991
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
The question in change of custody cases between natural parents is whether the evidence proves “a material change [in condition] substantially affecting the welfare of the minor [child].” Bisno v. Bisno, 238 Ga. 328, 329 (232 SE2d 921) (1977). If it does not, then the wide discretion which the trial courts have in applying the legal standards in such cases cannot be exercised so as to change custody from the parent whom the court had earlier determined should have custody. As recognized in Bisno, supra, “there are limits to the trial court’s discretion . . . ,” Id. at 328, and one of them is whether the evidence supports the conclusion necessary to effect a change of custody. “As between natural parents, a change in custody of a minor child may be awarded only upon a showing of a change in material conditions or circumstances of the parties or the child . . . and that the change of custody would be in the best interests of the child. OCGA § 19-9-1 (b) . . . [cits.]” Blackburn v. Blackburn, 168 Ga. App. 66, 70 (1) (308 SE2d 193) (1983).
The finding that the mother’s deposition testimony was contradicted by her trial testimony is marginal at best. At deposition, she had answered “no” to whether she and her present husband had “stayed overnight at your house in the presence of your daughter.” Although she admitted at trial that he had stayed overnight before they were married, she insisted that the child had always been put to bed before they retired and that they rose before she did. Thus, “in her presence” lent an equivocal meaning to the question so that the answer given was not necessarily false. Even if the answer given at deposition were regarded factually as a false answer, it strains logic to relate the fact of its falsity to the legal standard for change of custody of the child, i.e., a detrimental “change in material conditions or circumstances.”
A second faulty finding upon which the trial court based the change was that the mother “has become uncooperative” in regard to the father’s visits with the child. The only evidence in the record bearing on visitation was the mother’s testimony in support of her motion for contempt, which was pending at the same time but was not ruled on by the same trial judge because he was totally unfamiliar *290with the prior divorce and custody proceedings and so did not take jurisdiction of the motion. Nevertheless, the mother testified that the father kept the child longer than allowed by the controlling custody order. Even if there was some bickering and quibbling between the two parents about precise adherence to the terms of the custody order, there was no showing that this adversely affected the child or that any adverse effect was attributable to the mother.
Decided September 13, 1985
Rehearing denied October 2, 1985
James W. Smith, for appellant.
Rodger E. Davison, for appellee.
Thus, the only factual basis left is the admitted occasional premarital cohabitation. While it is not condoned by our law and is, as the majority pointed out, a misdemeanor punishable by fine and/or imprisonment, the fact that the illegality of this activity had ceased some months before the hearing due to the parties’ marriage was undeniable. The law provides punishments for the criminal offense; deprivation of child custody is not one of them. If the custodial parent’s criminal activity interferes with the welfare of the child so that “the best interests of the child” indicate a change of custody, then of course it would provide a legal ground for making it. But here there was no showing whatsoever that these legally disapproved past incidents which had ended and would not resume, constituted “a material change substantially affecting the welfare of the minor [child].” Bisno, supra.
I would reverse.
I am authorized to state that Judge Benham joins in this dissent.