Court Opinion

ID: 9779006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:32:30.715244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:19.480865
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear
This case is again before us on petition to rehear by Edgar Allen Lee, Sr., complaining that the Court erred in denying certiorari. The insistence is renewed that the decree of sale of the property was void, and being void Code Section 1611 had no application. The petitioner does not complain that Chapter 28, Section 3 of the Public Acts of 1947, is erroneously applied, but insists that the Court was without jurisdiction and authority to consider it, due to the fact that the respondents had failed to file a counter-petition for certiorari seeking a review of the Court of Appeals ’ refusal to apply it.
Preliminary to the citation of cases to support the insistence that the decree of sale of the property for collection of delinquent taxes, it is argued at length that error was committed in holding that the Chancellor and Court of Appeals concurred in finding that the property referred to in the decree was the same property that is involved in this litigation. There is no merit in this insistence since the record clearly shows that both courts treated it as being the same. Moreover the original bill charges that the alleged void decree of sale “is a cloud upon complainant’s title”. The Court of Appeals in taking note of this contention was prompted to say: “ It seems to us that complainant admits, by implication at least, that the property described in the hill is the same property held by defendants under the tax title which he attacks. Otherwise, there would be no need to remove it *616as a cloud upon his title.” (Emphasis onrs.) The foregoing statement is so very true that a further discussion of the complaint is unnecessary.
Turning now to the petitioner’s contention that the decree of sale was void for lack of description of the property and that the tax deeds of defendants are void, we find that the petition and supporting brief are a re-argument of the question. It should be denied for that reason .alone as not conforming to Rule 32. But we are pleased to make a response for the purpose of distinguishing the cases from the instant case, and to assure the counsel for petitioner that we have not intended to announce a rule which runs counter to the general principle that a tax assessment is “void for vital irregularities and insufficiency, ’ ’ and a tax sale thereunder is void. Dunn v. Dunn, 99 Tenn. 598, 42 S. W. 259, 263; Mayor and Aldermen of Morristown v. King, 79 Tenn. 669; and cases cited. In the Dunn case the only question decided was whether the State’s lien for taxes was superior to that of the mortgagee. In Mayor and Aldermen of Morristown v. King there was an inadequate description of the property. Several lots, that were not contiguous, were assessed as a whole. The complainant became the purchaser at a sale which was confirmed. Following this the complainant undertook to enforce his lien against one of the lots which had been sold to one O. C. King, but conveyed title to his wife for life and remainder to his children who were all minors. It plainly appears that the assessment in the latter case, being invalid because of “vital irregularities”, was highly prejudicial to the purchaser of the property. No question was made as to the application of Code Section 1611, referred to by us in the original opinion. Moreover the *617owners of the property in the case at bar, .at the time it was sold for taxes, were not prejudiced by any alleged inadequacy of descriptions. Nor does it appear that prospective buyers were misled. Moreover no complaint was made as to the right of the State to enforce a sale of the property, or any irregularity in the proceeding, except that one Boy Bose, a defendant in the tax suit, was not made a party by publication, and there was no service of process upon him. This complaint was fully discussed in the original opinion and need not again be reviewed. There is no merit in the contention that he, Bose, was not given notice of the confirmation of the sale, and hence the chamber’s decree of Chancellor Stewart was void. It suffices to say that the decree of sale, as well as the chamber’s decree, is presumed to be valid in all respects. The burden of impeachment of a judicial sale of land rests upon him who assails it. See authorities cited in the original opinion. There is no duty devolving upon the present holder of the deed herein assailed, to wit Tennessee-Cumberland Corporation, to prove that the assessment was valid, although the petitioner seems to be of opinion that it does. “The presumption that an assessment of taxes is valid, regular and correct will stand until overcome by satisfactory evidence to the contrary. ’ ’ State ex rel. v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 23 S. W. (2d) 897.
The tax suit, assailed in this cause, was a proceeding against the land, i. e. an action in rem. The State did not seek a personal judgment or decree against any delinquent taxpayer. Speaking to the question of the importance of notice and service of process upon the delinquent taxpayer, it is said in the Collier case, supra, 160 Tenn. at page 436, 23 S. W. (2d) at page 908:
“In an action in rem the court acquires jurisdic*618tion. of the property by its seizure and all those haying an interest in the property are deemed to have constructive notice of its seizure .and are considered parties to the suit. State ex. rel. Revenue Agent v. Patterson, supra, [155 Tenn. 169, 290 S. W. 973] citing The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126, 3 L.Ed. 678, and Freeman on Judgments, (5th Ed.), Sec. 1543. See, also, Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 1517, et seq., and Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N. E. 812, 51 L. R. A., 433.
“Whether or not seizure of the property alone, without further notice, authorizes the court to proceed to judgment is a question upon which there is .a conflict of authority. See cases collected in a note 50 L.R.A., 597.
* * * * *
“Our tax laws appear to be based on the views of the Supreme Court of the United States just quoted. The notification or monition provided by chapter 115, Sec. 2, of the Acts of 1921, is that ‘said suit shall be conducted in accordance with the practice in Courts of Chancery in this State.’ That is, a summons shall issue as to those named as defendants or publication shall be made for them, as the circumstances indicate. Those interested, however, are not made parties by the service of process or by publication. They are parties before either of these things are done — made such by the seizure of property in which they had an interest. The function of process in cases like the one before us is fundamentally different from that of process essential to jurisdiction in an action in personam. Thompson v. The Julius D. Morton, 2 Ohio St., [26] 30, 59 Am. Dec. 658.” (Em*619phasis supplied.) Pages 437, 438 of 160 Tenn., page 908 of 23 S. W. (2d) of Collier case, supra.
The petitioner makes no claim that the owner at the time of sale did not know of this suit in the Chancery Court, hut is content to insist that there was no service of process, actual or constructive. We think under our authorities the doctrine of lis penclens applies to property owners who are delinquent in the payment of taxes, and the action is against their property. In the present case the defense of laches in bringing the suit is not raised. The record discloses that Koy Bose made no claim, of lack of notice of the proceedings in the Chancery Court, including the chamber’s decree confirming the sale, notwithstanding he was available to testify in the instant case and failed to do so. His vendee, the petitioner herein, stands on no higher ground.
The contention made in support of petitioner’s case that the sale of the property by the State to W. F. Seals, and the latter’s deed of conveyance to the defendant Tennessee-Cumberland Corporation, is champertous is wholly without merit. Our champerty laws have no application to judicial sales of property, or deeds of conveyance, wherein the State is the vendor.
The original owner of these lands paid no taxes for more than twenty years. The petitioner, like his predecessor in title, Boy Bose, has paid no taxes, and filed this suit without tendering the amount of taxes due as required by Code Section 1611. The case of Tennessee Marble & Brick Co. v. Young, 179 Tenn. 116, 163 S.W. (2d) 71, relied on by petitioner was considered and distinguished in the original opinion from the case at bar. Complainant in that case tendered into court the total amount of taxes due.
*620Finally tlie petitioner insists that we committed error in citing and quoting Section 3 of Chapter 28 of the Public Acts of 1947, as supporting the opinion of the Court of Appeals. The counsel say in urging the foregoing assignment: “The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to correct or even consider an error of the Court of Appeals, either of omission or commission and cannot review the action of the Court of Appeals, or lack of action, except by a petition for certiorari.” We pretermit consideration of Chapter 20 of the Public Acts of 1947, which expressly provides that a respondent may assign errors without filing a petition for certiorari. But aside from this statute we hold the assignment to be without merit because we have not undertaken to correct any error in the final decree of the Court of Appeals, or modify it in any particular. We know of no decision, or rule of Court, which precludes us from citing authorities which support the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals and which had been overlooked by that court. The cases cited by counsel have no application whatever.
The petition to rehear is denied.