Court Opinion

ID: 9907565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 18:02:59.25263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:57.667353
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/6/23 P. v. Whitaker CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096980

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 19FE016486)

           v.

 DEANTE DESHAWN WHITAKER,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Deante DeShawn Whitaker guilty of first degree murder
and found true the allegation he personally used a deadly weapon. On appeal, defendant
contends the trial court committed prejudicial evidentiary error, the prosecutor committed
prejudicial error in closing argument, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for a new trial. Defendant also contends the cumulative error requires
reversal. Finding no prejudicial error, we will affirm the judgment.

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                                      BACKGROUND
       On August 24, 2019, defendant was driving by Capitol Casino in Sacramento with
his six-year-old son D.J. in the car. At the same time, George Kouklis, a white man, was
crossing the road outside the casino. Defendant had to stop his car to avoid hitting
Kouklis. Kouklis yelled curse words at defendant, an African-American man: “You’re
F-ing close”; “Motherfucker, fuck you[,] and things like that”; and “[Y]ou fucking
nigger.”1 Kouklis appeared angry; he “pulled out a hammer” and continued to curse at
defendant. Yelling, he walked around to the driver’s side, waving the hammer “like he
wanted to hit the vehicle.” According to surveillance videos played for the jury, the
incident lasted approximately 10 seconds.
       The incident occurred on a one-way street. After defendant drove past Kouklis, he
drove up the block, turned left (using his turn signal), then circled the block. The
0.6‑mile trip took approximately 1 minute 20 seconds, but Kouklis was still in the street,
near an intersection, and just beyond a stop sign. Defendant sped toward Kouklis without
slowing down, ran through the stop sign, and ran his car directly into Kouklis. The
impact knocked Kouklis off his feet and into the air; he fell to the street as defendant
drove away. Kouklis died in the hospital as a result of blunt force trauma to his head.
       Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with first degree murder (Pen.
Code,2 § 187, subd. (a)) and personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
       Prior to trial, the People moved to exclude evidence Kouklis previously used the
“N-word.” The court found the evidence was irrelevant and granted the People’s motion:
“Without more I’m going to exclude it. If you’ve got something more you want me to
hear about it, I’m happy to hear it, but at this point in time, I think it’s just comments

1 D.J.’s testimony was the only evidence that Kouklis used the “N-word.”

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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being made. I don’t know if this was a product of a 415 between several homeless
people. I have no idea what [the witness]’s basis is in indicating that he’s heard this
victim use that term before. I don’t know how many times. I don’t know where. I don’t
know when. I don’t know what the circumstances were. I don’t know if he was
mumbling to himself. I don’t know if he was in a fight with other people and they were
using the N-word as well. I don’t know any of that.”
       Defendant raised the issue again during trial. The court again refused to admit the
evidence finding it lacked foundation and was “substantially more prejudicial than
probative.” Defendant raised the issue a third time after D.J. testified; the court still
refused to admit the evidence.
       In closing, defense counsel argued the jury should find defendant guilty of the
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. He argued defendant “lost his cool.”
Kouklis was acting “irrationally and scary.” He cursed at defendant and D.J., and he
used the “N-word” in front of D.J. “Where I grew up, if a white guy had walked up to a
black guy and said something like that unprovoked, I would expect his face would get
smashed in by a foot or a fist, or if the person was holding a knife, they would stab the
guy who said it. If he was holding a gun, it wouldn’t surprise me if the guy got shot. The
word is filthy. And again, place the word in the context of everything going on.”
       The jury found defendant guilty as charged and found true the allegation defendant
personally used a deadly weapon. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing the
evidence established only voluntary manslaughter. The trial court found there was
insufficient provocation for voluntary manslaughter:
       “Using that degrading and disgusting word towards [defendant] must still be
judged by an objective standard, meaning a reasonable person’s standard. It’s not
[defendant]’s standard. It’s a reasonable person’s standard. Unfortunately, we know that
that word continues to be used in a derogatory, disrespectful and demeaning manner in
our society, but if every time that word was used it gave license to someone to strike out

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and kill somebody, there would be just complete and utter mayhem, . . . so I can see why
a jury would have rejected the voluntary manslaughter in this case.
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “Was it sufficient provocation? No. No. I just don’t believe it was. . . .
       “So I don’t think the jury got it wrong. I think the jury got it right.”
       The court also addressed the cooling off period, after defendant’s initial encounter
with Kouklis:
       “[W]hat I saw [defendant] do is make a number of turns, and I think we did have it
down to the second, [counsel]. And I could be wrong, but wasn’t it a little over a minute,
[counsel]?
       “[Counsel]: It was over a minute.
       “THE COURT: So if I were to just take time right now and let 60 seconds tick by,
I could do that and we could all understand really how long a minute is. Clearly, if you
have your son in the car, that is sufficient, as angry as you may have been, to cool down
and regain your senses. . . .”
       “This case should never have happened. [Defendant] should never have taken
those turns. He had time to think about it. . . . [¶] . . . [Defendant] took the opportunity
to go around the block, and when he was in his most vulnerable position, bent over, rev
up your car and run him over, with your son in the car.”
       The court denied defendant’s motion: “I reviewed my notes very, very clearly in
this case, and I just cannot in good conscience, following the oath that I took, find that the
jury got this wrong. I think they got this right. . . . [T]here were so many opportunities
for you not to do this, and now you sit here in front of me, convicted of a premeditated
first degree murder, where you did have the opportunity to reflect. . . . I think you
decided you were going to kill that man and you made a very quick decision to do so, and
it was the wrong decision. . . . [¶] . . . It’s the Court’s view there was substantial evidence
for first degree murder, and so I’m going to deny the motion.”

                                              4
       The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 26 years
to life in state prison.
       Defendant appeals.
                                        DISCUSSION
       “ ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.’
(§ 187, subd. (a).) ‘Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice.’ ([§ 192, subd. (a).) Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, and a
defendant who commits an intentional and unlawful killing but who lacks malice is guilty
of voluntary manslaughter. Heat of passion is one of the mental states that precludes the
formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter.”
(People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th at 513, 538 (Nelson); People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142, 153-154.)
       Our Supreme Court has explained: “A heat of passion theory of manslaughter has
both an objective and a subjective component. [Citations.] [¶] ‘ “To satisfy the
objective or ‘reasonable person’ element of this form of voluntary manslaughter, the
accused’s heat of passion must be due to ‘sufficient provocation.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Moye
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549.) Legally sufficient provocation is that which “ ‘causes a
person to act, not out of rational thought but out of unconsidered reaction to the
provocation.’ [Citation.] Further, the ‘proper standard focuses upon whether the person
of average disposition would be induced to react from passion and not from judgment.’ ”
(Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 539.)
       “For purposes of the heat of passion doctrine, ‘provocation is sufficient not
because it affects the quality of one’s thought processes, but because it eclipses
reflection. A person in this state simply reacts from emotion due to the provocation,
without deliberation or judgment.’ [Citation.] The standard requires more than evidence
that a defendant’s passions were aroused. The facts and circumstances must be

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‘ “sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable man.” ’ ” (Nelson, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 539.)
       As for the subjective element of voluntary manslaughter based on provocation, the
high court has explained that the defendant “must be shown to have killed while under
‘the actual influence of a strong passion’ induced by such provocation.” (People v.
Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 550; Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 539.) The court has
emphasized that “[i]t is not sufficient that a person ‘is provoked and [then] later kills.’ ”
(Nelson, at p. 539.) Rather, where “ ‘ “sufficient time has elapsed between the
provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is
not voluntary manslaughter.” ’ ” (Moye, at p. 550, quoting People v. Breverman, supra,
19 Cal.4th at p. 163.)
A.     Evidentiary Error
       Defendant contends the trial court’s exclusion of testimony that the victim said the
“N-word” prior to the day he was killed violated defendant’s right to due process and a
fair trial. We disagree.
       It is well settled that application of the ordinary rules of evidence does not
implicate due process and is reviewed under the standard of People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226-227.) “Although
completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense theoretically could rise to this
level, excluding defense evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an
accused’s due process right to present a defense.” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th
1075, 1103.)
       Here, the jury heard testimony that Kouklis called defendant the “N-word,” cussed
at him, and even wielded a hammer in his general direction. The jury thus heard
evidence in support of defendant’s claim that he killed Kouklis in a heat of passion.
Defendant’s right to present a defense was not impaired by the trial court’s decision to

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exclude evidence Kouklis previously used the “N-word.” Any error, therefore, is not
constitutional. (See People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1103.)
       Even assuming it was error to exclude evidence that Kouklis previously said the
“N-word,” such error was harmless because it is unlikely the jury would have reached a
more favorable verdict absent that error. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
First, defendant’s argument was that calling him the “N-word” provoked him into killing
Kouklis. Provocative and insulting words, however, are not objectively sufficient to
provoke a reasonable person to lose reason and judgment. (See People v. Najera (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 212, 216 [victim calling defendant a “faggot” insufficient for voluntary
manslaughter].)
       Moreover, assuming defendant could prove Kouklis’s conduct was objectively
sufficient to provoke a reasonable person, there was substantial evidence that, after his
initial encounter with Kouklis, defendant not only had time to cool off but was acting
with reason when he killed Kouklis. (See People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 951.)
The jury saw a video of defendant leaving the initial encounter, even using his turn signal
to make a left turn. Such evidence demonstrates defendant was not acting without
reason. Defendant then took nearly a minute and a half to drive 0.6 miles around the
block before running through a stop sign and into Kouklis.
       In short, on this record, it is unlikely the jury would have found defendant guilty
of voluntary manslaughter instead of murder had the court allowed in evidence that
Kouklis previously used the “N-word.”
B.     Prosecutorial Error
       Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial error during rebuttal
argument. Specifically, defendant argues the prosecutor misstated the law: “That’s it.
That’s 12 seconds. Does that lead to provocation such that an average person would
drive around the block .6 miles with or without a child in the car and murder someone?
Obscure their judgment to negate the malice? No. And you know that. You know that.”

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This statement, which defendant argues was the cornerstone of the prosecution, wrongly
advised the jurors that the standard for voluntary manslaughter was whether a reasonable
person, given the circumstances, would murder someone. Defendant asserts the correct
standard is whether the provocation would “ ‘render ordinary men of average disposition
liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.’ ”
       Trial counsel, however, did not object. Defendant thus forfeits this contention on
appeal. (See People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 577 [preservation of prosecutorial
misconduct claim on appeal requires timely objection and request for admonition].)
Anticipating forfeiture, defendant alternately contends trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object. We are not persuaded.
       To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms, and that the deficient performance was prejudicial. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 693-694; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d
171, 216-218.)
       To establish prejudice, “[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors
had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” (Strickland v.
Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 693; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 217.)
The defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
(Strickland, at p. 694; Ledesma, at pp. 217-218.) A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (Strickland, at p. 694; Ledesma, at
p. 218.)
       “ ‘[T]he decision facing counsel in the midst of trial over whether to object to
comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument is a highly tactical one . . .’
[citation], and ‘a mere failure to object to evidence or argument seldom establishes
counsel’s incompetence.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 675.)

                                              8
       First, the jury was properly instructed on the elements of provocation (CALCRIM
No. 522) and voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 570). To the extent the
prosecutor’s statement conflicted with these instructions, the jurors also were instructed
that if the attorneys’ comments on the law conflicted with the court’s instructions, they
must follow the instructions. We presume they did so, and defendant was not prejudiced
by the prosecutor’s comments. (See People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.)
       Second, any misstatement of law regarding provocation was harmless because
“[i]n returning a verdict of first-degree murder, the jury expressly found that appellant
premeditated and deliberated the killing . . . . And the evidence strongly supported the
jury’s conclusion. But such a ‘state of mind, involving planning and deliberate action is
manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passion – even if that state of
mind was achieved after a considerable period of provocatory conduct – and clearly
demonstrates that defendant was not prejudiced’ by any misstatements of law by the
prosecutor. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 572.)” (People v. Forrest (2017)
7 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1086.)
C.     Motion for a New Trial
       After the verdict, defendant moved for a new trial under section 1181, case (6),
arguing the evidence “clearly shows” his offense was voluntary manslaughter, not first
degree murder. On appeal, he argues denying his motion was contrary to the law and
evidence. We disagree.
       “In deciding a motion [for a new trial under section 1181, case 6], the trial court’s
function is to ‘see that the jury intelligently and justly perform[ed] its duty and, in the
exercise of a proper legal discretion, to determine whether there is sufficient credible
evidence to sustain the verdict.’ [Citation.] The trial court’s duty is to review the
evidence independently and satisfy itself that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to
sustain the verdict.” (People v. Dickens (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1251.) “The trial
court has broad discretion in determining whether the evidence has sufficient probative

                                               9
value to sustain the verdict [citation], and its order will not be reversed on appeal ‘absent
a manifest and unmistakable abuse of that discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 1252.)
       Where, as here, the trial court understood the scope of its discretion under
section 1181, case 6, we are required to consider “the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it contains substantial evidence --
that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- from which a rational
trier of fact could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Mendoza
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1068-1069; People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1018-
1020.) We conclude substantial evidence supports the conviction of first degree murder,
not voluntary manslaughter, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding the verdict was supported by the evidence.
       Here, the only evidence of provocation was that Kouklis cussed at defendant and
called him the “N-word,” while waving a hammer in the direction of defendant’s car.
Whether that was sufficient provocation to cause defendant to act without reflection,
there is substantial evidence he had sufficient time to, and indeed did, cool off. As
discussed above, defendant drove 0.6 miles, used his turn signal, made several turns, and
over a minute after the initial interaction, defendant drove his car through a stop sign and
into Kouklis, killing him. Such evidence does not compel a verdict of voluntary
manslaughter as a matter of law and does not require us to set aside the jury’s verdict or
the trial court’s ruling on the motion for a new trial.
D.     Cumulative Error
       Defendant also urges us to apply the cumulative error doctrine on the ground that
the alleged trial errors had the cumulative effect of denying his right to a fair trial. Based
on our review of the record, we conclude there was no error warranting reversal, whether
considered separately or cumulatively. (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 531.)
The premise behind the cumulative error doctrine is that, while a number of errors may
be harmless taken individually, their cumulative effect requires reversal. (People v.

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Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1236; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926,
1009.) Even when evaluated collectively, any errors that occurred in this case were
harmless. Defendant was entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. (Cunningham, at
p. 1009.)
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                   /s/
                                                  Wiseman, J.*

We concur:

 /s/
Robie, Acting P. J.

 /s/
Krause, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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