Court Opinion

ID: 9724692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:08:50.636897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:04.678341
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur as to Issues Two, Four, and Five.
I.
As to Issue One, I concur in the refusal to strike down the Indiana statutory definition of obscenity as violative of the U.S. Constitution. In doing so, however, I state *365my belief that the position articulated by Fordyce concerning the implications of Pope v. Illinois (1986) 481 U.S. 497, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 LEd.2d 439, appears to have merit and is deserving of consideration by the Indiana Supreme Court. In this regard, I see no value in making a detailed analysis at the intermediate appellate stage but would observe that the Pope decision casts doubt upon that portion of the Indiana statute which implies that "the average person" is the determiner of all three components of the obscenity test. With reference to the third test, or "literary value" test, for obscenity, the majority opinion in Pope stated:
''The proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given community would find serious literary ... value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find such value...." 107 S.Ct. at 1921.
In applying the "prurient interest" component of the test for obscenity, the jury may view the material with reference to its appeal to a particularized "deviant sexual group." Mishkin v. New York (1966) 383 U.S. 502, 86 S.Ct. 958, 16 L.Ed.2d 56. That same narrow focus is not, however, permissible in determining community acceptance or community standards. The latter determinations must be made in terms of the "average" person. As stated in United States v. Womack (1974 D.C.Cir.) 509 F.2d 368, cert. denied 422 U.S. 1022, 95 S.Ct. 2644, 45 LEd.2d 681:
"The [contemporary community] standards of [an area in which there are a number of shops which deal in pornographic materials] are not the standards to be applied in this case, any more than the standards of the most straight-laced persons." 509 F.2d at 380.
As noted, Pope v. Illinois, supra, clearly states that the redeeming value component must be determined not by reference to community standards nor by the "average" or "ordinary" person but by whether a "reasonable" person would find such value. To the extent that "ordinary" equates with "average" as used in our statute, the matter is worthy of clarification, if not a declaration of unconstitutionality.
IL.
I concur as to Issue Three but upon the ground that the discretion of the trial court to admit or reject comparative evidence is virtually unrestrained. See Hamling v. United States (1974) 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2912, 41 LEd.2d 590. For this reason, exclusion of the book "My Secret Garden" was not reversible error, even though in my view, the trial court wrongly found that the book had not received sufficient community acceptance to be admitted as comparative evidence.
"Acceptance", as used in connection with the admissibility of comparison evidence in obscenity cases, is a relative term. In order to be admissible, the work need not be accepted by all, by a majority, or even by a substantial number. It is only necessary that the foundation disclose "a reasonable degree of community acceptance". Van Sant v. State (1988) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 523 N.E.2d 229, 239. What is, or is not, a reasonable degree is nebulous and without precise boundaries. United States v. Pinkus (1978) 9th Cir., 579 F.2d 1174, cert. dismissed 439 U.S. 999, 99 S.Ct. 605, 58 LEd.2d 674.
The community acceptance prong of the test is admittedly difficult to apply and the standards are ill-defined. The test requires a delicate balancing of the likelihood that the evidence will be of some assistance to the jury against the tendency of the proffered evidence to confuse the jury. See Federal Rules of Evidence 403.
Nevertheless, in my view, if error is to be made in this very elusive assessment, it should be made in favor of admitting the evidence so that it might be considered by the jury in its difficult task of determining obscenity in the light of the applicable community standards.
In its ruling as to admissibility, the trial court correctly stated that the purpose of comparison evidence in an obscenity case "is to assist the jury in trying to arrive at a community standard." - Record at 754. Huffman v. United States (1971) D.C.App., *366470 F.2d 886, reh. granted upon unrelated issues, 502 F.2d 419.
In Pierce v. State (1974) 292 Ala. 473, 296 So.2d 218, the Alabama Supreme Court discussed the foundational requirements for comparative evidence and by parenthetical comment suggested how the "community acceptance" prong of the admissibility test might be met. It is appropriate I believe to quote extensively from Chief Justice Heflin's majority opinion:
"In United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.1971) the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this problem:
'Evidence of mere availability of similar materials is not by itself sufficiently probative of community standards to be admissible in the absence of proof that the material enjoys a reasonable degree of community acceptance. Womack v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 8, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (1961), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 859, 81 S.Ct. 826, 5 LEd.2d 822 (1961). Such proof would normally be supplied by expert witnesses. No such proof was offered. In the absence of this foundation, the allegedly similar pornographic material was properly exelud-ed. Mere availability of similar material by itself means nothing more than that other persons are engaged in similar activities.
The underlying rationale of this position has been stated by the late Mr. Justice Harlan:
[The trier of an obscenity case must take into account "contemporary community standards," Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489, 77 S.Ct. 1304 [1311], 1 LEd.2d 1498. . . . The community cannot, where liberty of speech and press are at issue, condemn that which it generally tolerates. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 LEd.2d 205 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See also Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 182 A.2d 798 (1962) (Trier of fact has the 'right to read, or be informed of, the contents of comparable books that have been generally accepted or tolerated by the public.')
Therefore, once the proper predicate has been laid by demonstrating to the trial court's satisfaction that the matter offered as evidence of contemporary standards enjoys a reasonable degree of acceptance or tolerance (either by way of expert testimony, volume of sales, or other means) the matter should be admitted. (Emphasis supplied.)
This is not to hold, however, that every book or photograph proffered must be admitted. The admission of a large number of different items alleged to be comparable to the matter in question might make the trial unmanageably complex and lengthy and would amount to no more than cumulative evidence. Therefore, while the trial court must admit evidence of community standards after a proper predicate has been established, the volume of such evidence must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court will not review the trial court's decision on this issue except for an abuse of discretion." 296 So.2d 218.
Similarly, in Flynt v. State (1980) 153 Ga.App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, cert. denied 449 U.S. 888, 101 S.Ct. 245, 66 L.Ed.2d 114, the court held:
"'The rationale behind the admission of 'comparative' evidence is to allow the defendant in an obscenity case the opportunity to attempt to persuade the trier of fact that the challenged material does not exceed contemporary community standards, as represented by the comparable material and against which the challenged material is judged. The comparative material is tangible evidence of contemporary community standards.
* a * * * La
Such evidence ... would show 'community acceptance' of material 'similar' to that distributed by the defendant and thus would have bearing on the issue before the jury-whether the defendant knowingly distributed obscene material." 264 S.E.2d at 674.
This court's Van Sant decision, supra, follows the conventional wisdom that avail*367ability of comparative material does not equate with community acceptance. In the same vein, Saliba v. State (1985) 2d Dist. Ind. App., 475 N.E.2d 1181, somewhat more specifically states that "distribution data must be viewed with caution" because it is difficult to fix the precise point at which sales of a publication denote a relative degree of public acceptance. 475 N.E.2d at 1191.
In making its ruling as to "My Secret Garden," the trial court said:
"... the only figure we have is from one bookstore of about twenty copies ... I don't think twenty copies in nineteen months, again, establishes a reasonable acceptance in the Madison County community." - Record at 773.
The court disregarded for acceptance purposes the comparative sales of several books considered as "classics" because they were not of the same type, le., sexually explicit. The court erred in its reasoning. The "reasonable degree of acceptance" test is separate and distinct from the similarity test. Application of the test for admissibility consists of two steps. If materials are not similar in content, the analysis proceeds no further. If the similarity prong of the test is met, only then does the trial court proceed to determine whether the comparison publication has received a reasonable degree of community acceptance. At this stage, the similarity of content is not a factor. The trial court merely determines whether the comparison material has attained the requisite degree of acceptance. In doing so, comparison with dissimilar material is permissible.
Although it would be improper to find a comparison publication accepted in the community merely because it has received greater sales than some other kind of publication, if the latter publication is known to be commonly accepted, such comparison may be made. If the comparison material has received greater sales in the community than the commonly accepted publication it certainly would seem to dictate a conclusion that it has received the requisite degree of community acceptance. For example, if a comparison publication were to have sold more copies in a community during a brief current period than a popular weekly or monthly publication such as Sports Illustrated or Reader's Digest, it stands to reason that the comparison publication has achieved a reasonable degree of community acceptance.
Nevertheless, comparison of sales between the books here involved and the "classics" set forth in footnote 10 of the majority opinion is not helpful. This is so because literary works which are clearly and unmistakably accepted may have received such wide acceptance over a period of time as to be already found in a substantial number of private libraries. Possessors of the work have no need to purchase another copy of it. Sales figures for a given recent time period therefore may not be truly reflective of the degree of community acceptance. It was not error for the trial court to reject defendant's argument that because sales of "My Secret Garden" exceeded sales of the classics for a relatively brief period, the former had received community acceptance in the same or greater degree than the six classic works enumerated.
A different analysis must be given to the comparative sales figures of "My Secret Garden" in the Madison County area as opposed to national sales of the same book.
In Flynt, supra, 153 Ga.App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, as in Pierce, supra, it was acknowledged that sales figures may be used to demonstrate community acceptance. In Flynt, however, the court held that community acceptance had not been shown because the figures reflected mere distribution to retail establishments not consumer sales. Such distribution figures might suffice if coupled with the number of books returned from the retailer to the distributor but in Flynt that evidence was not offered. The Flynt court reasoned, therefore, that the defendants had established, at best, mere availability. The sales figures in evidence here are decidedly different than those considered by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Flynt, supra.
Here, the sales figures for "My Secret Garden" reflected total sales (books distrib*368uted less returns) during the nineteen month period in a single store in Madison County. Total per capita national sales were shown to be two. and one-half times less. In my estimation, such comparative figures lead to the inescapable conclusion that the community of Madison County and perhaps the immediate environs had "accepted" the book at least to a degree which exceeded the nation's acceptance. That degree of acceptance should have prompted the court to find that "My Secret Garden" had received the reasonable degree of acceptance necessary for admission into evidence. Even so, I am unable to say that the foundational evidence was so compelling or conclusive as to require the court, as a matter of law, to admit the Exhibit. Commonwealth v. Dane Entertainment Services (1983) 389 Mass. 902, 452 N.E.2d 1126. In any event, the error if any in excluding "My Secret Garden" was harmless because a book, even more similar in content, was admitted into evidence for comparative purposes.
As to Exhibit "F' which was admitted into evidence,1 the foundation witness, an adult book distributor, testified before the jury that in a typical month approximately sixteen copies of books of that type and fifteen per month of a different type but almost identical in content were sold. In nine months in 1988, in Madison County 878 total copies of that type book were sold. This was the only evidence, other than the exhibit itself which was offered as foundation for admission. The exhibit was admitted and the jury read. the exhibit.
Admission of comparative evidence to show community standards is not determinative. The trier of fact may disregard that evidence insofar as it is offered to establish the standard. City of Miami v. Florida Literary Distributing Co. (1986) Fla., 486 So.2d 569; United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102 (1983 2d Cir.) 709 F.2d 132. It may well be that a particular jury might determine that even though the books are similar in content, one is obscene and the other is not. Or, they might decide, despite a threshold determination by the trial court that the comparison evidence has a degree of community acceptance, both publications are obscene.
I find no requirement in the law that dictates acquittal of an obscenity defendant merely because a comparable publication has been deemed, for admissibility purposes, to have a degree of acceptance. In applying contemporary community standards in their ultimate determination as to obscenity, the jury is not bound by the trial judge's view that with regard to admissibility, the comparison evidence has received a reasonable degree of acceptance. At least they are not so bound with regard to their assessment of the material alleged to be obscene. See Saliba v. State, supra, 475 N.E.2d 1181 (Sullivan J., concurring at 1192).
The community acceptance determination necessarily made by the trial court in admitting the comparative evidence is not binding upon the jury. It may be argued that the jury should not even be made aware of the admissibility test. But in some way the jury must be advised of the manner in which they are to make the comparison and what permissible conclusions may flow from that comparison.
In none of the instructions given here was the jury told of their function or duty in reading and comparing Exhibit F with the books covered by the charges. The jury did have before it the definition of *369obscenity which called for assessment of the subject material by "the average person, applying contemporary community standards." Record at 129. The jury was also instructed that the subject material must depict sexual conduct "in a patently offensive way ... that offends the contemporary standards." Record at 180. The jury was instructed that "contemporary community standards are determined by what the community as a whole in fact finds acceptable" (Record at 181) and the jury was told that "the value of a work [does not] vary from community to community based on the degree of local acceptance...." Record at 188. This instruction deals with the redeeming literary, artistic, political or scientific value of a work not with the definition of contemporary standards. It in effect instructs that the work may be protected even though it is patently offensive and contrary to contemporary community standards ZF taken as a whole, it has serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
At no time, however, except during closing argument was the jury told or was there an implication that the comparison book had achieved a reasonable degree of community acceptance. More importantly, however, the jury was not instructed for what purpose or in what way the comparison was to be drawn and with what consequences or results.
The comparison reading done by the jury was done in a virtual vacuum. Without some guidelines or assistance, it would seem that merely being given a comparison novel, strikingly similar to the book alleged to be obscene and told to read it, aids the jury not at all. It would appear to merely invite the jury to read two books instead of one and to speculate about what purpose was served by reading the comparative book. Without guidance from the court, the jury is left to wonder: if they must find both books obscene before they may con-viet on the one involved in the charge; how similar the comparative book must be to be of value in their deliberations; and how to react if they determine that one book is obscene and the other is not.
In the final analysis, if comparison evidence has been admitted, the jury should in some manner be instructed as to its purpose or place in the guilt determining process.
III.
The majority decision affirms the judgment in all respects. In this regard I must dissent and voice disapproval of those portions of the judgment which provide for charitable contributions of Five Thousand Dollars in lieu of the Five Thousand Dollar fines imposed upon both defendants. Such alternatives are improper and might well constitute a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Advisory Opinion of the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualification (December 16, 1986). See Campbell v. State (1990) 4th Dist., Ind App., 551 N.E.2d 1164 (Sullivan, J. dissenting at 1170-1172). They should be discouraged whether or not challenged upon appeal.

. - In admitting Defendant's Exhibit F for comparative purposes, the trial court erroneously interpreted the community acceptance test for admissibility to relate "not to the entire community, but to the community that reads this type of a book." Record at 755.
The "community" for such purpose is not necessarily identical to the "community" by which are gauged contemporary standards for obscenity. However, for both purposes admissibility of comparison evidence and the ultimate determination of obscenity, the "community" is not so narrow as to embrace only areas in which pornography abounds or persons who purchase and read such materials.
Acceptance by the community of certain material or establishment of a standard for materials within a community include persons who do not purchase or read such materials but who "accept" such material within the community for persons who may wish to do so.