Court Opinion

ID: 8125115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 15:05:14.314877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:11.492980
License: Public Domain

After a lengthy argument of counsel, the following opinion of the court was rendered by Judge Butler, Judge McKennan concurring:
Butler, J.,
(charging jury.) The plaintiff put in evidence the policy of insurance and proofs of dedth, and there rested. The defendants, charging that the policy was fraudulently obtained, by means of a paper which, while it purported to be the application of Mary McCaffrey, the assured, was not, but was made and executed in her name by another in her absence, called witnesses to sustain the charge. Among these witnesses was the plaintiff in the suit, who testified that the signature was not Mary McCaffrey’s. When the case had reached this situation, the plaintiff’s counsel arose and admitted that the paper purporting to be the application of the assured was not signed by her, nor in her presence; stating at the same time that the person who signed it had been told by her that if an application for an insurance was brought to the house in her absence he should sign it for her. Here the case rested. In this state of the evidence the plaintiff, in our judgment, cannot recover. The policy and by-laws of the company require the written application of the assured, embracing answers to various interrogatories, made and executed by her in person. The paper before us, purporting to be her application, was presented to the company, and the policy thus obtained. This (whether designed or not) was a fraud. Upon its face, the policy shows that it was issued in the belief that the paper was *233the application of Mary McCaffrey, executed by her in person, containing her answers, over her signature, to the various questions therein propounded; and that such an application is the foundation of the contract between the parties. The company was left in ignorance of the true character of the paper. There is no evidence whatever that either the company or its agent had knowledge of the fact that the paper was other than what it purported to he. Had it been informed of the circumstances, — that Mary McCaffrey had not answered the questions, but that the paper was executed throughout by another in her name, — it may safely be concluded that the policy would not have been issued. The concealment of these circumstances must therefore be regarded as a fraud, rendering the policy void.
It was urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the admission of the paper, here called an “application,” is prohibited by the Pennsylvania statute cited, and that it cannot therefore he considered in this connection. If this were true, it is probable the plaintiff’s admission above referred to would of itself sufficiently establish the fact of imposition, on which the defendant relies. It is not true, however. The legislature did not contemplate such a case as this, and the statute is clearly inapplicable. The paper here, as we have already indicated, is not an application within the meaning of the statute any more than it is within that of the policy. It is not the application of the assured, except in appearance. It is a deceptive pretense.
While we have admitted the paper in evidence, it is not for the purpose of opening its contents to contestation, but simply as a means of proving that no application, within the meaning of the policy, was made; and that the defendant was fraudulently induced to enter into a contract of insurance without any reciprocal obligation on the part of the assured, as is plainly contemplated in the policy itself.