Court Opinion

ID: 9538052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:29:06.350828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:24.598255
License: Public Domain

BLACKBIRD, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot concur in the majority opinion. It recognizes the proper rule governing the interpretation or construction of verdicts, but applies it incorrectly, with the result that an injustice is done. That rule, as stated in the California Case of Brokaw v. *858Black-Foxe Military Institute, cited therein, is reflected in the following excerpt from that Court’s opinion:
“It may occur, as it did here, that in an action against several defendants, including a master and his servant, the jury may return a verdict against the master and remain silent as to the servant. In such a case the failure to find as to the servant is not an exoneration of him, thus relieving the master of liability where the cause of action is based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is merely an incomplete verdict in that it fails to dispose of the liability of all of the parties defendant. * * (Emphasis mine).
As intimated in the majority opinion, the quoted case recognizes that uncertainty in a verdict may be resolved by the pleadings, evidence and instructions in a given case, but the Majority upholds what I consider to be an unfounded and extra-judicial interpretation of the verdict in this case, based on its view that the verdict was “responsive” to two instructions (numbered 12 and 13), one of which it says may have been erroneous. To me it is reasonable to assume that the jury thought, upon reading instruction No. 12, that even though they believed and determined in their own minds, that the acts of negligence described in plaintiff’s petition occurred, and that all of such acts were the acts of the employee-defendants, as alleged in said petition and shown by the evidence, they decided it was not necessary, because of said instruction, to go on record as so finding, in order to return a proper verdict against the defendant corporation. In view of the evidence, the verdict in question could have been arrived at only after a finding that one or both of the employee-defendants were negligent, because that was the only negligence alleged and proved. There was not an iota of evidence introduced from which any reasonable and legally-cognizable inference could have been drawn that the defendant corporation was guilty of any negligence, aside from, and independent of, the acts of the defendant employees. In view of the foregoing, the rule of construction which -the Majority attempts to apply to the verdict in this case cannot be exactly applied, and therefore, under the California cases, and the better-reasoned' decisions, such should not be attempted. This' is borne out by the opinion of the California Supreme Court in Irelan-Yuba Gold Quartz Min. Co. v. Pacific G. & Elec. Co., 18 Cal.2d 557, 116 P.2d 611, pp. 619-620, in which it was said:
“ * * * As stated in the case of Keller v. Smith, 130 Cal.App. 128, 132, 19 P.2d 541, 543, in passing upon a similar situation: ‘The rule of construction suggested in the case of Crain v. Sumida [supra], could not be exactly applied here, since nowhere did the jury in this case express any finding in favor of the petitioners. To-hold that they so found requires an inference that they intended to do' something they have not expressly done. Even though the court instructed the jury that it might find against one and at the same time in favor of the other defendants, while such an instruction strengthens the inference suggested, it is by no means conclusive in the absence of some expression showing the intention of the jury. There is a wide difference between drawing the only possible conclusion, where there is an expressed finding against one defendant and another in favor of the only other defendant although the name of the other is not inserted, and drawing an inference, probable though it may be, as to the intention of a jury in regard to a matter that has been entirely omitted from its verdict.
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“ ‘In this particular case an inference or presumption could be drawn either zvay. While it may be true that the greater probability lies with the view *859that this jury intended to find in favor of these petitioners, if the question of the intention of the jury could be left to inference or presumption, the established rule seems to be that the intention of the jury must not be left to inference or presumption, that it must be expressly declared, and that where it is not expressly declared in reference to any one of several defendants who have separately answered, it must be taken that the jury has failed to pass upon that particular issue! ”
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“If all the issues are not determined by the verdict, but no objection is made thereto, then the verdict stands as to the issues included therein, but as to the remaining issues the matter is set at large and further proceedings should be had in the trial court to adjudicate those issues. * * (Emphasis mine).
In the present case, since the Majority recognizes error in the court’s only instruction, under which the jury might have reached its verdict, and, quite properly, there was no instruction specifically informing the jury that it might find for the employee-defendants, while, at the same time, finding against the corporation defendant (as there was in Keller v. Smith, supra), to give any basis for construing the questioned verdict, as such a finding, how can we assume that such was what the jury intended, especially since such an assumption would be squarely opposed to both the pleadings and the evidence? This question, in my opinion, can only be answered in the negative. We must assume that the jury did its duty, as it was informed of it; and I am sure that it did. But, here, it was never informed that it must return a verdict against the employee-defendants in order to hold against the corporation defendant; nor was it told that omitting the employee defendants from its verdict, might, in the view of legal theorists, be regarded as exonerating them. Under the particular circumstances of this case, I do not see how, in the interest of justice, we can do anything but apply the rule for construing verdicts, in the manner indicated above. This will obviate speculation, prevent injustice, and enable a search for the truth. I think the author of the annotation beginning at 56 A.L.R.2d 213, states, in brief, the proper view of amending verdicts, when he says : (p. 220)
“While the practice of amending verdicts in matters of form is one of long standing, based on principles of the soundest public policy in the furtherance of justice, it is strictly limited to cases where the jury have expressed their meaning in an informal manner. The court has no power to supply substantial omissions, and the amendment in all cases must be such as to make the verdict conform to the real intent of the jury. The judge cannot, under the guise of amending the verdict, invade the province of the jury or substitute his verdict for theirs. After the amendment the verdict must be not what the judge thinks it ought to have been, but what the jury intended it to be. Their actual intent, and not his notion of what they ought to have intended, is the thing to be expressed and worked out by the amendment.” (Emphasis mine).
In Smith v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 25 Okl. 404, 108 P. 626, 627, it was said:
“The court should have ordered judgment entered in conformity with the verdict. ‘A judgment must be supported by the verdict or findings in the case, and a judgment which goes beyond the verdict is erroneous. There is no principle of law more firmly established than that the judgment must follow and conform to the verdict or findings.’ ”
As the trial court’s judgment went beyond the verdict, in purporting to exonerate the employee-defendants, and, in this respect, was in excess of said court’s jurisdiction, *860said judgment can only be vacated. (In this connection, notice the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice McAlister in Rosenzweig & Sons v. Jones, 50 Ariz. 302, 72 P.2d 417, 422, 423). For this reason, the trial court should have sustained the employer-defendant’s motion for a new trial. As the judgment was joint and not severable, nothing but a new trial, as to all the parties, could erase the error, even though the employer-defendant is the only party that has appealed from it (and said defendant, by withholding any complaint about the void aspect of said judgment, apparently recognizes that such a complaint would be incompatible with the legal doctrine, or theory, upon which it seeks reversal). To approach the point from a little different angle — since the court, in the majority opinion, has recognized (by the respondeat superior rule applied) that the liability of the defendant corporation is dependent upon a determination (which in this case can only be made by the trier of facts, the jury) as to the liability, if any, of the employee-defendants — a subject upon which there is no express statement from any jury — this cause must be remanded for a new trial as to all parties.
One of the Majority’s conclusions is that, since plaintiff did not “protect herself” by cross-appeal from that “portion” of the trial court’s judgment exonerating the employee-defendants from liability, that part has become final, and therefore this appellate court can only reverse the other “portion” of said judgment — the part against the defendant railroad company, the only appellant. This conclusion is erroneous. As above indicated, the judgment was a joint, and non-severable one, and cannot be seperated into portions, or parts. For a case dealing with joint cmd several judgments and distinguishing between them, and those of a joint and inseverable nature, see Davis v. Mimey, 60 Okl. 244, 159 P. 1112; L.R.A.1917A, 187. In the cited case, the court “puts its finger” on the characteristic of the appealed judgment, which the majority opinion has specifically recognized, and used, in wiping out plaintiff’s recovery against the employer-defendant, but has failed to follow through ivith, in its decretal part. There (in Davis v. Mimey) this court quoted from Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 565, 11 S.W. 548, in part, as follows:
“ ‘ * * * where the rights of one party are dependent in any manner upon those of another, it (this court) will treat the judgment as an entirety, and where a reversal is required as to one it will reverse the judgment as a whole.’ (Citing cases).”
See also 143 A.L.R. 7, 39. In the present case, I agree with the Majority that (under the respondeat superior rule) plaintiff’s right to recovery against the employer-defendant was dependent upon her right to recovery against the employee-defendants, but I say that, this being true, all we can do is to reverse the judgment, as a whole, or entirety, and remand the case for a new trial. We cannot; and should not, wipe out plaintiff’s judgment against the employer-defendant on the legalistic theory of its dependency upon her recovery against the employee-defendants, without giving her an enlightened opportunity to obtain specific expression from the jury as to her rights against those same employee-defendants. By “enlightened opportunity” I mean a new trial, at which' — not just she, and her attorneys — but more importantly — the jury —will be informed and understand, that she cannot recover against the railroad, or employer-defendant, without also recovering against its employee, or employees, whose negligence, if any, caused the accident. This is the only disposition of this appeal that will insure complete and certain justice, and discover the whole truth. Such procedure would follow Oklahoma precedent (instead of the Washington Case of Doremus v. Root, cited in the Majority), and the modern trend of decisions in other states, as the only way to do complete and certain justice under circumstances like those existing in this case. See Consolidated Gas Utilities Co. v. Beatie, 167 Okl. 71, 27 P.2d 813, and other cases cited, and dis*861cussed iii the Annotation beginning at 16 A.L.R.2d 969. Notice also Ralston Purina Co. v. Kennedy (Springfield Ct. of Appeals, Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 462, 467, and the authorities cited at SB C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1915, p. 406, Note 83, and 3 Am.Jur., p. 697, Note 8. There is a statutory reason for a difference between Washington and Oklahoma in disposing of appeals like this. See Shreeder v. Davis, 43 Wash. 129, 86 P. 198, and the Annotation at 143 A.L.R. 7, 20ff. In Scott v. Amis, 136 Okl. 72, 276 P. 215, it was said:
“ * * *: First. Is the Devonian Oil Company a necessary party to this appeal? * * *
“The first proposition is answered affirmatively in a number of cases decided by this court as follows: Humphrey v. Hunt, 9 Okl. 196, 59 P. 971; Kansas City, M. & O. R. Co. v. Williams, 33 Okl. 202, 124 P. 63; Ft. Smith & W. R. Co. v. Wilson, 33 Okl. 280, 124 P. 948; Denny v. Ostrander, 33 Okl. 622, 127 P. 390; Chickasha Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Bezdicheck, 33 Okl. 688, 126 P. 821; Gwinnup v. Griffins, 34 Okl. 117, 124 P. 1091; C. R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Austin, 63 Okl. 169, 163 P. 517, L.R.A.1917D, 666; City of Lawton v. Burnett, 72 Okl. 205, 179 P. 752.
“In the case of City of Lawton v. Burnett, supra, this court announced the following rule: ‘ * * * One whose rights may be affected by a reversal or modification of a judgment appealed from is a necessary party in the appellate court.’
“In the case of C., R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Austin, supra, the court announced the rule as follows: ‘Plaintiff brought suit against defendant railway company and members of its train crew for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received because of negligence in the operation of one of defendant company’s trains by the individual defendants composing the train crew. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff and against defendant company and in favor of the individual defendants. The defendant railway company appealed to the Supreme Court, * * *. The judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to the trial court to grant plaintiff a new trial as to all defendants. After remand plaintiff dismissed as to all defendants except the railway company and the conductor. A second trial resulted in judgment for plaintiff against both defendants, who join in the present appeal and plead the judgment at the first trial in favor of the conductor as a bar to plaintiff’s right to recovery. Held: * * *; (2) that the judgment rendered at the first trial was a joint judgment and the Supreme Court obtained jurisdiction to reverse, vacate, or modify the same or direct that such be done by the trial court as to all parties; (3) upon the reversal of said judgment plaintiff was entitled to a new trial as against all the defendants in the action.’
“In that case at the former trial the court sustained a demurrer to the evidence as to the defendants composing the train crew, and in each of the cases cited above the judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against some of the defendants and in favor of others, and in each case this court held that the defendant in whose favor judgment was rendered was a necessary party to the appeal, and the reasons given therein are applicable to the facts in this case, and present a reason why the defendant Devonian Oil Company is a necessary party to this cause on appeal. The judgment rendered in this case being a joint judgment, reversal of the cause and the granting of a new trial would reopen the entire judgment and require the defendant Devonian Oil Company to again defend.
“In the case of Wade v. Hope & Killingsworth, 65 Okl. 69, 162 P. 742, this court announced the following *862rule: ‘The reversal of a joint judgment on appeal by one of the defendants against whom such judgment has been duly rendered of necessity opens up such joint judgment which other-tvise, as to them, would become final by the failure of such parties to appeal, or by a failure on the part of those appealing to duly and properly bring such parties into the appellate proceedings.’ * * *» (Emphasis mine).
Notice also Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 72 Okl. 208, 179 P. 924, 927. Many years ago, this Court indicated that in this jurisdiction the Washington case of Dorem-us v. Root (cited by the Majority) was not to be followed in such procedural matters as are involved in the manner of finally disposing of a case of this character. In City of Tulsa v. Copp, 127 Okl. 128, 260 P. 16, 17, 18, this Court said:
“Under this head the defendant urges and says that, since this court in the former appeal in this cause held, in view of the pleadings and evidence, that there was no liability upon the defendant except that as respondeat superior, and that since the verdict and judgment in the first trial was for the contractors, then there was no liability on the city, and that when the cause was reversed the trial court should have dismissed the action of the plaintiff, and in support of such contentions cites a number of decisions from this court and others, among such being the case of Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63 P. 572, 54 L.R.A. 649, which opinion would sustain the contention of the defendant here were it not for the fact that this court has heretofore held contrary to the Washington court as to necessary parties to an appeal.
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“It is asserted in brief of plaintiff, defendant in error here, that when this cause, the case at bar, was before this court on the former appeal, the question was raised on such appeal as to whether the contractors, Comstock & Hansen, defendants originally, were parties in such appeal, and that it was asserted by the defendant, plaintiff in error, in response to a motion to dismiss such appeal for want of proper parties, that the contractors were parties to the appeal. Such issue does not appear to have been mentioned in the former opinion, but it appears that the contractors were necessary parties in such appeal under the holding of this court in the following cases: Humphrey et al. v. Hunt, 9 Okl. 196, 59 P. 971; Chickasha L. H. & P. Co. v. Bezdicheck, 33 Okl. 688, 126 P. 821; C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Austin, 63 Okl. 169, 163 P. 517, L.R.A.1917D, 666, and from a reading of the opinion in the .former appeal it appears the court considered that the defendants, the contractors, were parties to such appeal, and that it was within its power and jurisdiction to set aside and that it did set aside the judgment of the trial court in its entirety, both as to the city and as to the contractors.” (Emphasis mine).
Notice also 3 Am.Jur., “Appeal and Error”, secs. 1185, 1187, 1190, and the 1961 Cumulative Supplement thereto at page 162.
In this case, we should follow the foregoing authorities, or should explain why not. (See Rippee v. Rippee, Okl., 279 P.2d 944, for example).
Because, in accord with the foregoing, I think the Honorable Trial Judge erred in rendering judgment for the two employee-defendants, without an expression from the jury (trier of facts) as to their liability, and because I think this error can properly, and in justice to all, be cured only by ordering reversal of the only ruling directly appealed from (viz., the trial court’s overruling of the motion for a new trial filed by the railroad company appellant, or employer-defendant) I respectfully dissent. Such reversal would sustain, instead of overruling, said defendant’s motion, with the result that a new trial cf the cause would be ordered, rather than directing the trial court to *863vacate only part of an inseverable judgment, and to convert the previous judgment for plaintiff into a judgment for all defendants, as the Majority has erroneously assumed the prerogative of doing.
I am authorized to state that BERRY, J., concurs in the foregoing views
Rehearing denied; BLACKBIRD, V. C. J. and BERRY, J., dissent.