Court Opinion

ID: 9896018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:07:07.967424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:20.627753
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 9, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0938-MR

JALIN HANCOCK                                                          APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE KAREN LYNN WILSON, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CR-00148

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: In 2022, Appellant, Jalin Hancock, was convicted by

Henderson County Circuit Court jury of first-degree trafficking in a controlled

substance (methamphetamine), first-degree possession of a controlled substance

(cocaine), possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a first-degree persistent

felony offender. He was sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment. Hancock

appeals to this Court as a matter of right. His sole issue on appeal is that he “was
entitled to a mistrial when the Commonwealth failed to disclose relevant

evidence.” For the following reason, we affirm.

             “Declaring a mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to

only when there appears in the record a manifest necessity for such an action or an

urgent or real necessity.” Lewis v. Commonwealth, 642 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Ky.

2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). A trial court’s decision to deny a

mistrial is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. (citation omitted).

Under that standard, the trial court’s decision will be disturbed only if it was

“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).            Intertwined within

his mistrial argument, Hancock also alleges a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963). Therein, the United States Supreme Court held that “suppression

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective

of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. In Bowling v.

Commonwealth, our Supreme Court elaborated as follows:

             As a general rule “[t]here is no general constitutional
             right to discovery in a criminal case and Brady did not
             create one . . . .” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,
             559, 97 S. Ct. 837, 846, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30, 42 (1977).
             Rather, Brady concerns those cases in which the
             government possesses information that the defense does
             not and the government’s failure to disclose the
             information deprives the defendant of a fair trial.

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              Therefore, reversal is required only where “there is a
              ‘reasonable probability’ that, had the evidence been
              disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
              would have been different. A reasonable probability is
              the probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in
              the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
              682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985).
              Moreover, Brady only applies to “the discovery, after
              trial, of information which had been known to the
              prosecution but unknown to the defense.” United States
              v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.
              Ed. 2d 342, 349 (1976) (emphasis added).

80 S.W.3d 405, 410 (Ky. 2002). With these standards in mind, we now return to

the record and argument on appeal.

              Hancock’s counsel requested a mistrial after it was determined that an

item of evidence was not disclosed by the Commonwealth. He identifies this item

of evidence as a CAD sheet, which apparently contains “[i]nformation about the

comings and goings of officers that were reported by dispatch . . . .”1 As to the

evidentiary value of the missing CAD sheet, Hancock speculates as follows:

              The CAD sheets would have been an invaluable tool to
              impeach each testifying officer as to their location during
              the arrest and search of Mr. Hancock’s car. These sheets
              would have also identified each officer on the scene,
              what agency they were associated with, and when each
              left the scene. Defense counsel needed to develop this
              timeline in order to argue to the jury that things did not
              occur as the officers said they did. If Mr. Hancock’s car

1
 It is unclear whether Hancock takes issue with the alleged failure to disclose one CAD sheet, or
multiple CAD sheets. The following quotations appear to indicate that he takes issue with one
such item in particular, CAD sheet 20-4611. In any event, our analysis applies equally to any
additional CAD sheet materials.

                                               -3-
             was searched prematurely as defense counsel theorized,
             this timeline would have established that fact.

He further alleges that:

             The heart of Mr. Hancock’s defense was the search of his
             car was done prematurely and the police acted
             improperly while on scene. To show this, his defense
             counsel relied on CAD sheet 20-4616 which was given to
             him by the Commonwealth’s Attorney.

             ...

             CAD sheet 20-4616 was not the original CAD sheet
             pertaining to Mr. Hancock’s case. The original CAD
             sheet was 20-4611.
             ...

             The Commonwealth’s Attorney countered that defense
             counsel specifically requested only CAD Sheet 20-4616
             and that was provided to him within 24 hours.
             Defense counsel requested the CAD sheet directly from
             the Commonwealth’s Attorney in lieu of filing a written
             motion.

(Citations omitted.) Based on the foregoing, it appears that the defense received

the document it requested, and that the Commonwealth was not aware of, or in

possession of, any other specific CAD materials that were not disclosed to the

defense. Moreover, Hancock does not sufficiently explain how this evidence was

exculpatory of the crimes for which he was convicted. And while there may have

been some evidentiary value to the contested item, we cannot conclude that the

circuit court abused its discretion. Therefore, we AFFIRM.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                        -4-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kayla Deatherage         Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky      Attorney General of Kentucky

                         Melissa Pile
                         Assistant Attorney General
                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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