Court Opinion

ID: 9941288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:05.150795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:30.577182
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1214-MR

STEVE NOE                                                           APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE MICHAEL DEAN, JUDGE
           ACTION NOS. 11-CI-00286, 13-CI-00001, & 13-CI-00045

ESTATE OF ROBERT MCINTOSH;
CATIE MCINTOSH; AND CAYLA
MCINTOSH, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT MCINTOSH                                                      APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND KAREM, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Steve Noe appeals from a judgment ordering him to pay

Robert McIntosh $13,734.82 in damages for timber trespass. We affirm.

            Robert McIntosh filed an action against Noe, alleging Noe had

committed a timber trespass as defined in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)

364.130. McIntosh and Noe had life estates in separate parcels of land in an area
known as Tipton Ridge. For simplicity’s sake, we need not discuss the owners of

the remainder interests of either parcel, which we shall refer to as the McIntosh

tract and the Noe tract. The gist of McIntosh’s complaint was that a logger hired

by Noe, Harold Estes, had improperly removed timber from the McIntosh tract.1

McIntosh raised no claims against Estes, but Noe later asserted claims against

Estes for contribution, indemnity, and apportionment. However, Estes was

dismissed as a party prior to trial on statute of limitations grounds.

              After conducting a bench trial, the trial court issued an amended final

judgment which provided in relevant part that a timber trespass had occurred on

eleven acres, eight of which were part of the McIntosh tract. The court ordered

Noe to pay McIntosh 8/11ths of the total value of the improperly harvested timber,

plus 8/11ths of the total costs to remediate the land from which the timber had been

cut. However, the trial court apportioned 75% of the fault to Estes.

              Noe and McIntosh each appealed. Noe argued that the trial court

should have excluded the testimony of Mike Oliver, a surveyor hired by McIntosh.

We disagreed. Noe v. McIntosh, No. 2020-CA-1013-MR, 2022 WL 1592696, at

*4 (Ky. App. May 20, 2022). We also rejected Noe’s argument that the trial court

1
 Robbie McIntosh passed away during the pendency of this action, but his estate was timely
substituted as a party. We will refer to Robbie McIntosh and to his estate simply as McIntosh.

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had “erred by admitting or by giving too much weight to the testimony of the

timber expert, Gavin Wilson.” Id. at *5.

            However, we agreed with Noe that the trial court’s award of damages

was improper. Specifically, we held:

            Oliver testified that there were approximately 22 acres
            above the cliff and of the 22 acres, 16 acres were owned
            by the McIntoshes . . . . Oliver also testified that half of
            the 22 acres had been logged – 11 acres. Additionally,
            Wilson determined that 350 trees had been cut in the
            disputed area. So, the court’s findings that 11 acres had
            been logged and that 350 trees had been cut was
            supported by substantial evidence of a probative value.
            However, the circuit court’s finding that the McIntoshes
            owned 8 of the 11 acres logged is without any
            evidentiary support. Rather, it appears that the circuit
            court merely estimated that of the 11 acres logged above
            the cliff, 8 acres were owned by the McIntoshes. The
            court arrived at this estimation by taking the total number
            of acres owned by the McIntoshes above the cliff (16
            acres) and the total number of acres of real property
            above the cliff (22 acres) to arrive at a percentage of
            acres owned by the McIntoshes (16/22 or 73 percent).
            The court then extrapolated this percentage (73 percent
            or 16/22) to arrive at the estimation that 8 of the 11 acres
            logged were owned by the McIntoshes.

                    As there was no evidence to support the circuit
            court’s finding that the McIntoshes owned 8 of the 11
            acres actually logged, we are compelled to conclude that
            this finding of fact was clearly erroneous. The circuit
            court based its award of damages to the McIntoshes upon
            its erroneous finding of fact that they owned 8 of the 11
            acres logged. Again, we can find no evidence in the
            record to support this finding. We thus vacate the circuit
            court’s award of $6,867.41 to the McIntoshes against

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             Noe and remand for the circuit court to reconsider its
             award of damages to the McIntoshes.

Id. at *5-6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

             McIntosh’s cross-appeal focused on the trial court’s decision to

apportion fault to Estes. We agreed that the apportionment of fault to Estes was

erroneous. Id. at *7. We did not order a new trial; instead, we vacated the

damages award and remanded the matter “for proceedings consistent with this

Opinion.” Id. at *8.

             On remand, Noe asked the trial court to conduct a new trial, but

instead the trial court issued a new judgment without first receiving new evidence.

The judgment on remand states in pertinent part:

             Steven Noe admitted in his testimony that between 3 and
             5 acres were cut from the McIntosh tract. This
             constitutes a judicial admission and is conclusive as to
             [Noe’s] logging of between 3 to 5 acres of [McIntosh’s]
             land . . . .

                    Accepting the midpoint of Noe’s admission as to
             the number of acres of McIntosh’s timber that Noe had
             logged, the Court finds from a preponderance of the
             evidence and with a reasonable certainty that 4 acres . . .
             out of the 11 acres timbered . . . came from the land of
             [McIntosh]. As a result, [McIntosh] is entitled to
             judgment for 4/11th of the $17,780.80 in timber removed
             from the operation, as well as judgment for 4/11th of the
             $20,000.00 associated reclamation costs . . . .

                  Judgment is hereby entered in favor of . . .
             McIntosh against . . . Noe in the amount of $13,734.82,
             which includes $6,462.10 for the value of 4/11th of the

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              timber taken from the logging operation; and $7,272.72
              for 4/11th of the reclamation costs.

Record (R.) at 377-78. Noe then filed this appeal.

              The scope of our review of a judgment issued pursuant to a bench trial

is settled. We review a trial court’s findings of fact deferentially, meaning we may

only disturb them if they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., McClendon v. Hodges,

272 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Ky. 2008). “That is, we examine whether the findings are

supported by substantial evidence.” Id. However, “appellate review of legal

determinations and conclusions from a bench trial is de novo.” Barber v. Bradley,

505 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Ky. 2016).

              Here, in light of our previous opinion, it is accepted that eleven acres

were timbered. Noe, 2022 WL 1592696, at *5. The main question thus becomes

what portion of those eleven acres belonged to McIntosh since it would not have

been improper for Noe to have timber cut from his own property.

              Noe argues, as he did in the first appeal, that there is no evidence to

support the trial court’s finding that four acres of timber were improperly harvested

from the McIntosh tract. We disagree because Noe’s own testimony supports the

trial court’s finding.

              Much of the testimony about how much timber was removed from the

McIntosh tract was hazy, with various witnesses giving various assessments on

                                          -5-
that point. But Noe himself provided adequate testimony to support the trial

court’s finding.

             Noe testified first that it was his understanding, based on discussions

he had with Oliver, that “two to three acres . . . possibly five acres at the most” of

timber had been removed from the McIntosh tract. Video, 11/8/2019, 1:45:00 et

seq. Noe voiced no disagreement with Oliver’s assessment of the acreage timbered

from the McIntosh tract. Noe later testified that about three acres of timber were

taken from the McIntosh tract, though he was uncertain if Estes had been the one

to remove that timber because, according to Noe, multiple people had logged the

McIntosh tract. Id. at 2:20:10-2:22:30 et seq. Finally, when asked whether it

would have been better practice for McIntosh to have instructed Oliver to indicate

on his survey where the stumps of the cut timber were located, Noe’s somewhat

nonresponsive, lengthy answer included a comment that the trial would not have

occurred if McIntosh had hired a “timber guy” to survey the “three or four acres”

of the McIntosh tract which Estes had logged. Id. at 2:27:40 et seq.

             The trial court, as the finder of fact, had the exclusive ability to weigh

the evidence and determine witness credibility. See, e.g., C. W. Hoskins Heirs v.

Wells, 560 S.W.3d 852, 856 (Ky. 2018). Thus, the trial court was permitted to

place determinative weight on Noe’s testimony that between three and five acres of

timber had been improperly removed from the McIntosh tract, even though other

                                          -6-
witnesses testified differently. Despite his arguments to the contrary, Noe’s

testimony was not merely a repetition of what others had told him about how much

timber had been cut from the McIntosh tract. The trial court’s finding that four

acres of timber were improperly removed from the McIntosh tract is within the

range of Noe’s testimony and thus is a permissible factual inference rationally

based upon evidence of record, not mere speculation. Dingus v. FADA Service

Co., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Ky. App. 1993) (holding that facts inferred from

evidence in the record “have the same dignity as evidentiary facts. Unless clearly

erroneous, we cannot disturb them on appeal.”). Similarly, the court was permitted

to reject Noe’s speculative testimony that someone besides the logger he hired,

Estes, may have improperly removed the timber from the McIntosh tract.

             As Noe stresses, there was inconsistent testimony about how many

acres of the McIntosh tract were logged. But that does not entitle Noe to relief.

When evidence conflicts, the finder of fact is inherently required to accept some

evidence and to reject some evidence. As long as a court’s findings are supported

by substantial evidence, which the findings at issue are, they may not be disturbed

by an appellate court simply because there was contradictory evidence.

             We do agree with Noe that his testimony was too indefinite to

constitute a judicial admission. “[E]stimation or guesswork” is insufficient to rise

to the level of a judicial admission. City of Lexington v. Clarke, 290 Ky. 290, 160

                                         -7-
S.W.2d 653, 654 (1942). Instead, a party’s testimony may constitute a judicial

admission only if it contains “no probability of error . . . .” Moore v. Roberts By

and Through Roberts, 684 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1982). Noe testified somewhat

inconsistently about how many acres of timber were removed from the McIntosh

tract. Such imprecise testimony carries a “probability of error” and thus lacks the

definitiveness necessary to constitute a judicial admission, especially since other

witnesses testified differently as to how many acres had been improperly timbered.

               Nonetheless, the trial court’s improper classification of Noe’s

testimony as a judicial admission makes no practical difference under these facts.

A judicial admission can be a sufficient basis for a directed verdict. Witten v.

Pack, 237 S.W.3d 133, 136 (Ky. 2007). But the trial court did not direct a verdict

based on Noe’s testimony, nor did the court prevent Noe or McIntosh from

presenting whatever other admissible, relevant testimony each wished to present.

Indeed, the court did not originally deem Noe’s testimony to be a judicial

admission; instead, the court did not classify the testimony as a judicial admission

until receiving the matter anew on remand from this Court.2 In short, the trial court

used improper nomenclature when it found Noe’s testimony to be a judicial

2
  In fact, the trial court seemingly rejected Noe’s testimony in the original opinion because the
court concluded eight acres of the McIntosh tract had been improperly logged, an amount well
above the five-acre maximum to which Noe testified. Although the practice is facially unusual,
Noe does not argue, nor cite to authority so holding, that the trial court was barred from
reassessing and reweighing the evidence on remand.

                                               -8-
admission, but that terminology error is harmless since Noe’s testimony supports

the court’s finding that four acres of the McIntosh tract were improperly logged.

             Finally, we also reject Noe’s very closely related argument that the

damages awarded by the trial court are speculative. We previously affirmed the

court’s finding that eleven acres had been logged. Noe, 2022 WL 1592696, at *5.

And we noted that “Wilson estimated that the cut timber had a total value of

$17,770.80. Wilson also estimated that damage remediation cost for the land

would be $20,000.” Id. Noe attacks Wilson’s testimony because he did not state

precisely where the cut stumps were vis-à-vis the property lines. But the trial

court, as the finder of fact, was permitted to accept Wilson’s testimony regardless

of any inconsistencies or deficiencies therein.

             We also have affirmed herein the trial court’s finding that four acres

of improper harvesting occurred on the McIntosh tract. Thus, determining

damages requires only applying mathematics to those facts as Noe cites no

authority to support his argument that the court was required to determine the

specific number, quality, and species of the trees cut on the McIntosh tract or the

exact four acres on that tract where the timber trespass occurred.

             Since four of the eleven timbered acres were part of the McIntosh

tract, McIntosh was entitled to damages for 4/11ths of the total value of the

removed timber and the total remediation costs. In decimal form, 4/11ths equals

                                         -9-
0.36 (repeating). And 0.36 x $17,770.80 (total value of the timber) = $6,462.10

(without rounding up); 0.36 x $20,000.00 (total remediation cost) = $7,272.72

(without rounding up); $6,462.10 + $7,272.72 = $13,734.82. The trial court’s

damages award exactly matches that sum.

             We have carefully considered all of the arguments in Noe’s brief but

perceive no error in either the trial court’s finding that a timber trespass occurred

on four acres of the McIntosh tract or the court’s award of damages to McIntosh.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Estill Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

 Rodney G. Davis                            Brooks Stumbo
 Richmond, Kentucky                         Richmond, Kentucky

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