Court Opinion

ID: 9596530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:51:03.372122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:21.699619
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES
dissenting:
In 1974, the Court held that the General Assembly could not, consonant with the separation of powers doctrine, enact a statute in order to overturn the result in a case we had already decided. Lindsay v. Nat’l Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 621, 207 S.E.2d 75 (1974). In other words, the legislature cannot, by legislative enactment, overrule our interpretation of a statute. Boatwright v. McElmurray, 247 S.C. 199, 146 S.E.2d 716 (1966). Over the past several years, Lindsay has been construed as a limitation on the General Assembly’s authority to amend a statute, and to have that amendment *602apply retroactively.3 While I have joined several of these decisions, I have come to believe that this reading of Lindsay, which held only that the General Assembly could not legislatively reverse the Court’s decision, is overly broad. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994)(“Congress, of course, has the power to amend a statute that it believes we have misconstrued. It may even, within broad constitutional bounds, make such a change retroactive and thereby undo what it perceives to be the undesirable past consequences of a misinterpretation of its work product”).
Whether a statutory amendment applies retroactively is ordinarily a matter of statutory construction and interpretation, not of constitutional law. The General Assembly has the authority to amend statutes, and to determine whether the amended statute applies to matters occurring before its effective date. The general rule is that “statutory enactments are to be considered prospective rather than retroactive unless there is a specific provision in the enactment or clear legislative intent to the contrary, [citation omitted]. However, statutes which are remedial or procedural in nature are generally held to operate retrospectively.” South Carolina Dep’t of Rev. v. Rosemary Coin Machines, Inc., 339 S.C. 25, 528 S.E.2d 416 (2000). The only constitutional limit on retroactivity in a civil context4 derives from due process guarantees, and from S.C. Const, art. I, § 4, prohibiting the passage of a law that “has the effect of impairing the obligation of contract or divesting vested rights of property.” E.g., Schumacher v. Chapin, 228 S.C. 77, 88 S.E.2d 874 (1955).
Through a series of cases citing Lindsay, we have created two different rules regarding statutory retroactivity: If the Court never interpreted the prior statute, then the general *603rule recited above applies. If, however, the Court has issued an opinion interpreting a statute, any legislative change to that statute is deemed prospective only, lest the legislature invade the province of the Court. In my opinion, this “Lindsay rule,” premised on the separation of powers doctrine, has in fact led to its violation.
The separation of powers doctrine prevents one branch of government from usurping the power and authority of another. Knotts v. South Carolina Dep’t of Natural Resources, 348 S.C. 1, 558 S.E.2d 511 (2002). It is not the legislature’s amendment of a statute in response to a judicial interpretation which offends the doctrine, but rather our limitation on the General Assembly’s authority to decide whether that statutory change should be given retroactive effect. As we held in Boatwright, “the legislature has plenary power to amend statutes.”
In my opinion, we should use this opportunity to abandon our Lindsay retroactivity jurisprudence and return to the general rules of statutory construction. In this case, however, we need not decide whether the amendment to S.C.Code Ann. § 29-5-10 was procedural or remedial and thus should be given retroactive effect. In 1883, this Court established the rule that entitlement to costs is to be determined by the statute in effect at the time the suit is decided and the costs, if any, are to be awarded. Irwin v. Brooks, 19 S.C. 96 (1883). I would hold that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, entitlement to statutory attorneys fees should be determined pursuant to the statute in effect at the time the final judgment is entered. Id. I would therefore affirm the master’s award of attorney’s fees to respondent.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. See Simmons v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 355 S.C. 581, 586 S.E.2d 569 (2003); Williamson v. South Carolina Ins. Reserve Fund, 355 S.C. 420, 586 S.E.2d 115 (2003); Dykema v. Carolina Emerg. Physicians, P.C., 348 S.C. 549, 560 S.E.2d 894 (2002); Pike v. South Carolina Dep’t of Trans., 343 S.C. 224, 540 S.E.2d 87 (2000); Steinke v. South Carolina Dep’t of Labor, Licensing, and Reg., 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142 (1999); see also Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 585 S.E.2d 292 (2003).

. There are, of course, ex post facto concerns with criminal statutes.