Court Opinion

ID: 9538968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:44:43.069776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:21.413057
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J.
I dissent. The majority opinion extends the provisions of article I, section 14, of the California Constitution to a degree previously unrecognized in this state, thereby substantially affecting future eminent domain proceedings. This case alters long-standing California law to conform with the rule in the “majority” of American jurisdictions on the issue of compensability of a “taking” of building restrictions in eminent domain proceedings. However, in doing so, the majority discards the conceptual bases supporting the prior California position without submitting persuasive reasons justifying the change.
*176It has been stated “a determination that ‘property’ has been ‘taken’ is merely descriptive of the end result, the conclusion reached, rather than of the reasons that impelled the conclusion. The very question to be decided in a case of this character [eminent domain proceedings involving a violation of a building restriction] is whether, after all relevant factors are weighed, it can be said that a property right does exist as between the condemner and the person claiming compensation.” (Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept (1954) 42 Cal.L.Rev. 596, 630; italics added.)
Today’s majority opinion is founded upon the tenuous proposition that a building restriction is substantially equivalent to an easement. Since an easement is a compensable property interest, and since both easements and building restrictions bear some similar characteristics, the majority concludes that a violation of a building restriction in a condemnation action is a taking of a property interest, and is likewise compensable. Yet an easement is an affirmative right of use, whereas a building restriction is wholly negative in character, amounting to no more than a promise not to use property in a particular manner. Although the majority characterizes the distinction between compensability for easements and noncompensability for building restrictions as “inequitable and rationally indefensible,” a number of jurisdictions have found the policies underlying the distinction to be reasonable and persuasive.1
The California doctrine denying compensation for a “taking” of building restrictions was first announced in Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524 [288 P. 1080], which the majority now overrules. The reasons espoused in support of the holding in Friesen appear equally as cogent today as when that case was decided. In Friesen the court held a building restriction amounted to no more than a contract right, enforceable in equity as between the parties or their successors with notice, and did not attain the status of a compensable property interest.2 Other courts have concluded similarly. (Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842 [63 App.D.C. 104, 98 A.L.R. 386]; City of Houston v. Wynne (Tex.Civ.App.) 279 S.W. 916; Board of Public Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor I. (Fla.) 81 So.2d 637; Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154 [3 S.E.2d 85, 122 A.L.R. 1456]; Doan v. Cleveland Short Line R. Co., 92 Ohio St. 461 [112 N.E. 505].) The majority fail to explain what reasons now compel a contrary rule.
*177The conceptual premises underlying- eminent domain proceedings add further support to the holding in Friesen. In Smith v. Clifton Sanitation District, 134 Colo. 116, 120 [300 P.2d 548], the court remarked “We think it is fundamental tha,t where a company, corporation or agency of the state is vested with the right of eminent domain and has acquired property through eminent domain proceedings and is using the property for public purposes, no claim for damages arises by virtue of such a covenant as in the instant case, in favor of the owners of other property on account of such use by the condemner. Were the rule otherwise the right of eminent domain could be defeated if the condemning authority had to respond in damages. . . The above remarks focus on the added expense which a damages award would impose in future eminent domain actions. Such an award could “defeat” the right of eminent domain in at least two ways. Initially, an award of damages to land owners benefitted by a building restriction may be so prohibitive as to require termination of the contemplated condemnation action. Secondly, although the public entity might be able to pay the damage awards and proceed with the public use of the condemned property, the financial burdens involved may outweigh the expected benefit to the public. Each of these is an equally unacceptable alternative which the majority’s decision imposes on those entities possessing powers of eminent domain.3
Additionally, damage awards in future eminent domain actions may present complex procedural entanglements. If each parcel in a residential subdivision is mutually benefitted and burdened by a building restriction, then upon violation of the restriction by condemnation' proceedings and inconsistent use, the problem is raised as to which persons have compensable property interests requiring joinder in the action. The owner of every benefitted parcel should be joined if, as the majority concludes, each has suffered a taking of “property.”4 Also, since lienholders and mortgagees *178maintain a present proprietary interest in the benefitted property, they too may possess a right to have that interest considered and protected.5 These are substantial procedural hurdles which, because of the majority’s refusal to consider, may return to haunt us in the near future.
I would affirm the trial court judgment denying compensation for the violation of the restriction on the basis of the Friesen case and Lombardy v. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 266 Cal.App.2d 599 [72 Cal.Rptr. 240]. The following commentary places the problem in true perspective; “Decision on the scope of compensation in eminent domain is simply a question of policy. [Citation.] If we are at all correct in concluding that fundamental fairness requires compensation for consequential loss if feasible, the policy decision becomes one simply of the practicalities. The answer lies in the economic information which will be revealed by inquiries beyond the reach of the courts, which are largely confined to information presently available or collected by litigants. Therefore, these questions may be explored more satisfactorily by legislatures.” (Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain (1962) 48 Va.L.Rev. 437, 457-458.)
McComb, J., concurred.

By reason of this decision California conforms with the rule followed by the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. However, the number of jurisdictions adhering to the minority view is substantial. (See cases collected in 4 A.L.R.3d 1137; 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed. 1970) § 5.73[2].)

See 5 Powell on Real Property (1971) section 671, page 144, where a promise respecting the use of land is recognized as a type of contract between the parties which did not constitute property at common law.

Since only a small number of parties conceivably have been injured by the violation of the building restriction in this case the increased condemnation costs caused by damage awards may be insubstantial. However, the factual circumstances presented by this action should not blind the majority from recognizing that in similar situations the number of injured parties claiming damage may be so numerous as to make the use of eminent domain prohibitive.

The majority cites Stoebuck, Condemnation of Rights the Condemnee Holds in Lands of Another (1970) 56 Iowa L.Rev. 293, 307-308. There the author states that individuals suffering a “technical” injury may be compensated by a settlement aggreement. He also proposes a highly questionable procedure to dispose of the claims of such persons who have a compensable property interest taken: “A major safety valve for the condemnor is that holders of the smaller claims cannot, practically, afford to press their claims very hard. . . . Perhaps the condemnor would even be justified in failing to join those with nominal claims, putting the burden on them to join the action or later to bring an inverse condemnation action. Neither of *178these responses would be likely to occur unless property owners’ losses were more substantial than expected.”

See 17 Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, section 95; 154 A.L.R. 1110, Rights of Mortgagee in Award in Eminent Domain Proceedings.