Court Opinion

ID: 9759625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:22:31.825656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:03.530139
License: Public Domain

WEINER, District Judge.
This is an action brought by several hospitals, members of the Delaware Valley Hospital Council (hereinafter DVHC) for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, challenging the provisions of a Pennsylvania law, Act No. 94, 40 Pa.C.S. § 6124(c), effective August 2, 1975. Act No. 94 creates statutory requirements for the termination of contracts between hospitals and certain hospital plan corporations. Jurisdiction of this Court was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and a three-judge court was convened as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2284. The court *820has for its consideration cross motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs and defendants respectively.1
Since the facts are not in dispute, there remain solely questions of law. From our examination of the record, the following facts emerge: On August 15, 1974, the contract between defendant Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia and plaintiff hospitals expired. Run-out provisions of the contracts between Blue Cross and individual subscribers then began to take effect, and coverage expired on the anniversary dates of the subscription contracts. The last subscriber contracts were to run out on August 15, 1975. During the one-year following expiration of the above contract, negotiations toward a new contract proved to be unsuccessful. The effect of the run-out provisions would have been to limit most subscribers’ coverage to that afforded in non-Blue Cross member hospitals. Traditionally, an individual enters into a subscription contract with Blue Cross. In the majority of cases, the insurance plan will obtain hospital services in member hospitals. The coverage afforded is then either complete coverage, i. e., the full hospital service is provided, or the subscriber pays a relatively small portion of the hospital fee. In either event, Blue Cross makes direct payment to the hospital. If the subscriber is admitted to a hospital which is not a member hospital, the subscriber will be fully responsible for his hospital costs and Blue Cross will partially reimburse the subscriber directly. Typically, only a small portion of the total hospital bill is repaid to the subscriber.
In situations in which total coverage is provided subscribers, it is clearly necessary that there be a contractual relationship between Blue Cross and the hospitals. Hence, the term “member hospitals”. The contract between Blue Cross and its member hospitals operates on a cost reimbursement formula. Under such a formula, the retail price of hospital services is not paid by Blue Cross. Rather, Blue Cross reimburses hospitals for the cost to the hospitals of providing care to the subscriber, computed in a way that allows, inter alia, for consideration of depreciation and economic inflation factors.
It was the cost reimbursement formula that led to the breakdown of negotiations for new contracts between Blue Cross and the plaintiff hospitals who are represented by the DVHC.
During the one-year period of negotiations, increasing numbers of subscribers lost member hospital benefits in the plaintiff hospitals. On August 2, 1975, the Pennsylvania legislature passed, and the Governor signed, Act No. 94, 40 Pa. C.S. § 6124(c).
Chapter 61 of Title 40 establishes statutory control over hospital plan corporations. Defendant Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia is a hospital plan corporation within the meaning of the statute. The Hospital Plan Corporation Act generally provides for regulation of hospital plan corporations and specifically requires, inter alia, that all hospital plan corporations obtain certificates of authority from the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance (§ 6102(a)); that hospital plan corporations enter into contracts only with hospitals approved by the Department of Public Welfare. (§ 6121).
Section 6124 of the Hospital Plan Corporation Act, which section Act No. 94 amends, provides:
(a) The rates charged to subscribers by hospital plan corporations, all rates of payments to hospitals made by such *821corporations pursuant to the contracts provided for in this chapter, all acquisition costs in connection with the solicitation of subscribers to such hospital plans, the reserves to be maintained by such corporations, the certificates issued by such corporations representing their agreements with subscribers, and any and all contracts entered into by any such corporation with any hospital, shall, at all times, be subject to the prior approval of the department.
(b) Every application for such approval shall be made to the department in writing .
Act No. 94 which amends the above section, provides:
Section 1. Section 6124 of Title 40, . is amended by adding a subsection to read: 1
§ 6124. Rates and contracts
(c) Maintenance of contractual relationships — .
(1) Declaration of necessity. — It is hereby found that many subscribers to nonprofit hospital plans make payments over long periods of time prior to becoming entitled to benefits under such a plan and that it is important in the public interest that the reasonable expectations of such subscribers as to coverage should be fulfilled if possible. It is hereby declared to be essential for the maintenance of the health of the residents of this Commonwealth that subscribers to nonprofit hospital plans be assured receipt of the hospitalization and related health benefits prepaid by them through payments of the rates approved under this chapter and charged by a hospital plan corporation and that to accomplish this essential purpose termination of contracts between hospital plan corporations and hospitals entered into pursuant to section 6121 (relating to eligible hospitals) and this section be subject to prior approval by the department as provided in this subsection.
(2) Notification period. — No contract between a hospital plan corporation and any hospital providing for the rendering of hospitalization to subscribers to the hospital plan shall be terminated unless the party seeking such termination gives 90 days advance written notice to the other party to the contract and to the department of the proposed termination.
(3) Hearing period. — Whenever a termination subject to paragraph (2) involves contracts with hospitals having more than 5% of the beds in the area served by a hospital plan corporation, the department shall hold public hearings on at least 15 days notice for the purpose of investigating the reasons for the termination. Pending completion of said investigation by the department, termination of the hospital contracts shall be suspended for a period not to exceed six months from the expiration of the period provided for in paragraph (2). All terms and conditions of the contract between the hospital plan corporation and the hospital or hospitals shall continue in full force and effect during said investigation by the department. Based on the record made during the hearings, the department shall make specific findings as to the facts of the dispute and shall either approve termination of the contracts or recommend such terms for continuation of the contract as are in the public interest, based upon the facts, the right of a hospital to be paid its costs for hospitalization services to subscribers and the need of subscribers for efficient, reliable hospitalization at a reasonable cost.
(4) Negotiation period. — If the department recommends terms for continuation of the contract, the hospital plan corporation and the hospitals involved shall renew their negotiations in order to determine *822whether a new agreement can be reached substantially on the basis of the terms for continuation recommended by the department and pending such negotiations, the termination of hospital contracts shall be suspended for a further period not to exceed 90 days from the date of the decision of the department. If the hospital plan corporation and the hospitals are unable to consummate a new contract within said further period of 90 days, they shall so advise the department. The department shall in that event approve termination of the contracts effective at the end of a further period of 30 days and shall prescribe the form and extent of notice which the hospital plan corporation shall use in advising its subscribers that hospitalization in the hospitals involved is not covered by a contract between the hospital plan corporation and such hospitals.
(5) Retroactivity. — Upon the settlement of any dispute between a hospital plan corporation and any hospital pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (4), the terms and conditions of any new contract shall be retroactive to the date of expiration of the contract previously in effect between the parties.
Section 2. The procedures established by this act shall apply to:
(1) any termination of contracts between hospital plan corporations and hospitals hereafter occurring; and
(2) any contracts between hospital plan corporations and hospitals under which subscribers received prepaid benefits on or after June 30, 1974 . . Such contracts, if terminated, shall be reinstated as of their original termination and may be terminated hereafter only pursuant to the provisions of this act.
Section 3. This act shall take effect immediately and shall be retroactive to the extent provided in section 2 of this act.
The effect of Act No. 94 on the Plaintiff hospitals is to reinstate the most recent contract between the DVHC represented hospitals and Blue Cross as of its original termination date, namely, August 15, 1974. If the hospitals wish to terminate the contract, they must follow the provisions of the Act. If a new contract is negotiated by the parties and approved by the Insurance Department, that new contract will date back to the termination of the previous agreement. However, since August, 1974,2 the hospitals have been requiring Blue Cross subscribers to pay for hospital care as is the practice in non-member hospitals. The hospitals are now faced with the prospect of repaying those subscribers and receiving only cost reimbursement from Blue Cross under the 1971 Contract.3
The hospitals’ contention is that Act No. 94 violates their Constitutional rights. They claim that the retroactivity of the Act, which reinstates the contract which expired on August 15, 1974, is in violation of the Contract Clause and of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the hospitals claim that the Act effects an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation and also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Contract Clause, Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The plaintiff-hospitals’ contention is that Act No. 94 constitutes a “wholesale evisceration of plaintiffs’ contractual rights of termination”. We believe that this is not the case at all here.
The Contract Clause came into widespread use in litigation during the depression years when many States passed statutes designed to aid financially distressed citizens, unable to satisfy previously entered-into contractual obliga*823tions. The case of Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, et al., 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1933) sets forth the standards to be applied to state legislative enactments to determine whether or not such legislation offends the Contract Clause. At issue in that case was the 1933 Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law which provided relief from mortgage foreclosure during a declared emergency. In its opinion upholding the statute, the Supreme Court stated:
“Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while, — a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court.” Id. at 435, 54 S.Ct. at 239, 78 L.Ed. at 427.
The plaintiffs’ argument is, in essence, that the statutory extension period violates their contract right of termination on ninety days notice as to any contract entered into between the hospitals and Blue Cross. We are of the opinion that the public interest of preserving the health of the citizens of Pennsylvania adequately justifies such a measure.4 More than 50% of the citizens have health care insurance coverage through Blue Cross. Most, if not all, of these policyholders, it can be assumed, maintain Blue Cross insurance because of the virtually complete coverage offered by Blue Cross at member hospitals. The current contract dispute, with the resulting run-out of subscribers’ member hospital coverage eliminated many hospitals in the Philadelphia area from member hospital status.5 Therefore, numerous Pennsylvanians who had prepaid and expected member hospital subscriber coverage, found their coverage reduced to non-member coverage at many hospitals.
The maintenance of the health and general well-being of its citizens has been found to be a legitimate state concern and has formed the basis of numerous judicial decisions up-holding state legislative action.6 Likewise, in this case, it is precisely because the public interest is so substantial in the area of health care that legislation governing hospitals and hospital plan corporations has been enacted in Pennsylvania.7 Act No. 94 is a logical and reasonable extension of that legislation.
' We have carefully considered the cases cited by our brother Judge Luongo and find them to be distinguishable.8 The Supreme Court, in El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 85 S.Ct. 577, 13 L.Ed.2d 446 (1965), stated that it has long been rec*824ognized that state legislatures have the power to safeguard the vital interests of their citizenry.9 The distinction to be drawn is not solely between legislation of substantive and remedial contract provisions but, rather, between legislation which affects contractual rights and obligations in purely commercial enterprises and legislation which concerns the health and welfare of the people. The need of Pennsylvanians for medical insurance which enables them to receive hospital care during health crises is a need which will, unfortunately, touch most citizens during their lifetimes. The public interest underlying Act No. 94 clearly justifies any incursions it makes into the contract rights of the parties here.
In Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., et al., supra, the Court of Appeals found unconstitutional a Puerto Rican statute which provided that contracts between manufacturers and dealers, regardless of their terms, were, with certain exceptions, to be renewable at the option of the dealer and which imposed substantial damages on manufacturers who refused to accede. The court found that the new contractual obligations were excessive in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties. Here in contrast the contracts are still terminable at the end of approximately one year by the hospitals without penalty and their expectations, as a regulated industry are different from those of the commercial manufacturers in Fornaris.
Plaintiffs further contend that Act No. 94 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. Their argument is based in part on the theory that the cost reimbursement formula contained in the Blue Cross-hospital contracts does not include such items as indigent care, charity allowances, uncollectible amounts or research costs and thereby renders the contracts non-compensatory and constitutes a taking of property without just compensation. The validity of such clauses in Blue Cross-hospital contracts has already been upheld.
The case of Travelers Insurance Company v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, supra, upheld Blue Cross-hospital contracts against claims by a commercial insurer that the contractual arrangements between Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania and hospitals violated the antitrust laws. Specifically, Travelers contended that Blue Cross was a dominant competitor monopolizing the hospital insurance industry by pressuring hospitals to enter into contractual arrangements which favored Blue Cross over other commercial insurers. The favored treatment claim arose from the failure of Blue Cross-hospital contracts to include in the reimbursement formula such items as indigent care, and the resulting lower cost to Blue Cross for hospital services. The court, in its opinion, upholding the above-mentioned contract clauses stated that the Insurance Department had mandated a ceiling on cost reimbursement, and the exclusion from the reimbursement formula of the cost of free care and capital expansion. We see nothing in the challenge to the cost reimbursement formula in the instant case to distinguish it from the reimbursement terms found to be valid in Travelers.
We note that the court stated with reference to the Pennsylvania Hospital Plan Corporation Act (40 Pa.C.S.A. § 6101 ff.) in Travelers, supra, at page 86 of 481 F.2d:
“In view of our holding that, independent of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the antitrust laws were not violated, the state of Pennsylvania has not denied Travelers equal treatment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, even if McCarran-Ferguson Act protection were necessary to Blue Cross, the facts do not support the proposition that Pennsylvania’s regulation of the contract between Blue Cross and the hospitals was without rational purpose, see, e. g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972).”
*825In addition, plaintiffs claim that the loss sustained by virtue of the fact that the above-mentioned costs are not reimbursed is further exacerbated by the ceiling limitation on reinstatement of allowable costs. The question of the economic inability of hospitals as a result of the reinstatement of the previously-terminated contract is a matter for the legislative process as distinguished from judicial inquiry. Under the Hospital Plan Corporation Act, the Insurance Department is authorized to approve or disapprove proposed contracts pursuant to specific guidelines.10 Act No. 94 itself provides that during the suspension period, the Insurance Department shall either approve termination of the contract or shall “. . . recommend such
terms of continuation of the contract as are in the public interest, based upon the facts, the right of a hospital to be paid its costs for hospitalization services to subscribers and the need of subscribers for efficient, reliable hospitalization at a reasonable cost.”11 Plaintiff hospitals have filed a Notice of Intent to Terminate with the Insurance Department and have so notified Blue Cross. Therefore, the question of the non-compensatory nature of the reinstated contract is one to be determined by the Insurance Department.
Plaintiffs argue that Act No. 94 is subject to challenge on constitutional grounds predicated upon the theory that the retroactive application of the statute constitutes a taking of property without due process and plaintiffs further reiterate their previous argument of “impairment of contract.” Here, the plaintiffs focus upon the provisions of Act No. 94 which, in substance and effect, provide: (a) that contracts between the hospitals and Blue Cross which terminated in August 1974 be reinstated and (b) that, as a result, subscribers who paid in full for hospitalization during the eleven and a half month period preceding the passage of Act No. 94 be reimbursed for all charges which would have been reimbursed to subscribers under the 1971 Agreement. We find that the statutory reinstatement of terminated contracts and their cost reimbursement formulae and the resulting mandatory reimbursement of subscribers are not unconstitutional.
The unanticipated inability of Blue Cross and the hospitals to negotiate a new contract in 1974 created extreme financial hardship for Blue Cross subscribers hospitalized after the contractual run-out provisions had taken effect. Act No. 94 is designed to avoid the recurrence of such a situation in the future. As part of the remedial nature of the statute, hospitals with long-standing contracts with Blue Cross were required to reinstate the most recent contract provisions. This remedial measure is strikingly similar to remedial measures in other regulatory statutes regarding disputed rates charged by regulated corporations.12 In Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 67 S.Ct. 1140, 91 L.Ed. 1368 (1947), the Supreme Court held that rights previously acquired can be legislatively reinstated retroactively. Here, subscribers contracted with and prepaid Blue Cross for health care coverage. As part of that contract, hospitalization at member hospitals was to be provided at little or no cost to the subscriber. The crisis created by the failure of contract negotiations between Blue Cross and the hospitals placed a heavy burden on subscribers. Act No. 94, in its declaration of necessity, states that subscribers are entitled to receive benefits for which they have paid in advance. The subscribers hospitalized between August, 1974 and August, 1975 did not receive those health care benefits. Act No. 94 simply places them in the same position as subscribers hospitalized prior to Au*826gust, 1974 and subsequent to August, 1975.
The retroactive effect of statutes has been approved where they have filled gaps in the regulatory scheme. See Fleming v. Rhoades, supra; C. Hochman, “The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation,” 73 Harv.L.Rev. 692 (1960). The Supreme Court has recognized in the labor field that contractual arrangement may be “continued for a time while further efforts [are] made to settle the dispute.” See United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 41, 80 S.Ct. 1, 3, 4 L.Ed.2d 12, 15 (1959). Further, the Supreme Court has held that the taking of property under a program clearly in the public interest is not a denial of due process of law, using this language in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424-25, 72 S.Ct. 405, 408, 96 L.Ed. 469, 473 (1952):
“Of course many forms of regulation reduce the net return of the enterprise; yet that gives rise to no constitutional infirmity. [Citing cases.] Most regulations of business necessarily impose financial burdens on the enterprise for which no compensation is paid. Those are part of the costs of our civilization. . . . The public welfare is a broad and inclusive concept. The moral, social, economic, and physical well-being of the community is one part of it; the political well-being another. The police power which is adequate to fix the financial burden for one is adequate for the other. The judgment of the legislature that time out for voting should cost the employee nothing may be a debatable one. It is indeed conceded by the opposition to be such. But if our recent cases mean anything, they leave debatable issues as respects business, economic, and social affairs to legislative decision. We could strike down this law only if we returned to the philosophy of the Lochner [Lochner v. State of New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937] Coppage [Coppage v. State of Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441] and Adkins [Adkins v. Childrens Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785] cases.”
The affidavits of plaintiff are far too generalized to justify the grant of summary judgment in their favor. Although the dissenting opinion alleges that plaintiff-hospitals “are compelled to operate at charges they contend are below the level of operating expenses and that are . . . confiscatory,” the affidavit of Mr. Armstrong in support of plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at paragraph 6, objects to the failure of defendant to pay “the expenses incurred by the hospital in providing care to indigents, in writing off uncollectible accounts other than those of Blue Cross subscribers, in providing charity allowances, and in undertaking certain educational and research activities.” Cf. paragraph 61 of supplemental affidavit of Bruce Taylor dated October 14, 1975. Defendant does not require plaintiffs to undertake such expenses, so that plaintiffs have failed to show that the expenses incurred by plaintiffs under Act No. 94 are the cause of the anticipated confiscatory effect of continuing operations under the Delaware Valley Agreement. The affidavits filed by plaintiffs fail to show with any specificity that the cause of their anticipated losses is Act No. 94, as opposed to their desire to provide service for their communities in accordance with the standards of the American Hospital Association (see, for example, page 18 of Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, referring to the cost of “educational and research programs, credit losses, and the care of [indigent] patients . . . ”, and paragraph 15 of Mr. Armstrong’s affidavit referring to “health care services required to maintain its accreditation” without making specific such generalities).
Plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments are founded on the claim that Act No. 94 imposes burdens only on member hospitals, leaving non-member hospitals unregulated. It is true that neither Act No. 94 nor the Hospital Plan Corporation *827Act regulates non-member hospitals. The obvious reason seems to be that the Hospital Plan Corporation Act regulates hospital plan corporations and those hospitals with whom they contract. As a result of the agreements between hospitals and hospital plan corporations, members of the general public enter into contractual agreements with the hospital plan corporation for the provision of health care benefits at member hospitals. Hospital plan corporations are required to receive certification from the Pennsylvania Insurance Department.13 Hospitals which enter into agreements with hospital plan corporations likewise must be approved by the Department of Public Welfare.14
And, finally, contracts between hospital plan corporations and hospitals must receive Insurance Department approval.15 Whereas member hospitals provide virtually total coverage for hospitalization and health care, and are reimbursed under the approved contract formula by Blue Cross, non-member hospitals receive full payment from subscribers, who are then only partially reimbursed by Blue Cross.
The determination of the legislature to regulate only member hospitals by Act No. 94 is not violative of equal protection. Under the equal protection clause, the test applied to any classification scheme set up by a state legislative body is whether the scheme has a rational basis.16 The burden is on plaintiffs to show that the classification scheme has no rational basis. Since non-member hospitals, by definition, have no contractual arrangement with Blue Cross, they were not included in a statute which regulates hospital plan corporations and, as incident to that regulation, hospitals with whom the corporations contract. In Nebbia v. New York, supra, appellant claimed that a New York statute authorizing establishment of minimum resale 'dees of milk for stores denied him equal protection because it enabled door-to-door distributors to provide additional services at an almost identical price. Specifically, the Milk Control Board had fixed the minimum price to be charged by a store and by a distributor for a quart of milk at nine and ten cents respectively. In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated: “But if it were shown that the appellant is compelled to buy [from a wholesale distributor and not directly from a farmer] the difference in the retail price he is required to charge his customers, from that prescribed for sales by distributors, is not on its face arbitrary or unreasonable, for there are obvious distinctions between the two sorts of merchants which may well justify a difference of treatment, if the legislature possesses the power to control the prices to be charged for fluid milk.” Id., 291 U.S. at 521, 54 S.Ct. at 509, 78 L.Ed. at 947. Because of the substantial difference in subscriber benefits provided by member and non-member hospitals here, it cannot be gainsaid that the statutory distinction has no reasonable basis.
The foregoing shall constitute the findings and conclusions of the court on the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, and such motion will be denied. The joint motions of defendants Blue Cross, Fitzpatrick, Kane and the Insurance Department for summary judgment will be granted, and the motions of plaintiffs for summary judgment will be denied.

. Due to a stipulation filed 9/25/75, stating that defendants Fitzpatrick and Kane agree not to seek criminal sanctions while Act No. 94 remains subject to constitutional challenge but apparently reserving their right to proceed against plaintiffs after final determination of this suit, there is a case or controversy continuing insofar as plaintiffs seek final injunctive relief. The absence of any demand for damages requires that the Pennsylvania defendants’ claims for immunity under the Eleventh Amendment be rejected. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1356, 39 L.Ed.2d 662, 673 (1974).

. This date is, of course, variable because of the run-out provisions of subscribers’ contracts.

. The contract which expired on August 15, 1974 was entered into in 1971 and amended in 1972.

. The case of Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pa., 361 F.Supp. 774 (W.D. Pa.1972), aff'd 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1974), sustained the general provisions of Blue Cross-hospital contracts against charges of violation of the antitrust laws. In that case, it was stated that a study of the health care problem in Pennsylvania by the Pennsylvania Economy League showed that “. it was common for people to forego needed hospitalization because they lacked money to pay the bills.” 361 F.Supp. 774, 776.

. Thirty-seven (37) hospitals in the Philadelphia area are represented by the DVHC. Nonmember hospital coverage for subscribers is approximately 25% of hospital costs.

. See e. g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934) in which regulation of the sale price of milk authorized by a New York statute was upheld as being reasonably related to the goal of protecting the welfare of the citizens of New York. In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that support for this statute could be found from the fact that the milk industry in general was heavily regulated in New York.

. 40 Pa.C.S. § 6101 et seq.

. Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., et al., 423 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1970), rev’d. on other grounds, 400 U.S. 41, 91 S.Ct. 156, 27 L.Ed.2d 174 (1971); Superior Motors, Inc. v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 773 (D.S.C.1973).

. Id at 508, 85 S.Ct. at 583, 13 L.Ed.2d at 454.

. 40 Pa.C.S. § 6124(a) & (b).

. 40 Pa.C.S. § 6124(c)(3).

. For example, the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) authorizes the ICC to require that carriers refund, with interest, increased rates found to be not justified. And, in Nebbia v. New York, supra, a New York statute authorizing the Milk Control Board to fix milk prices in the state was upheld.

. 40 Pa.C.S. § 6102.

. 40 Pa.C.S. § 6121.

. 40 Pa.C.S. § 6124.

. See e. g., German Alliance Insurance Company v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307, 31 S.Ct. 246, 55 L.Ed. 229 (1911).