Court Opinion

ID: 9860980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:38:43.556769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:57.178396
License: Public Domain

Dissent Upon Denial of Rehearing JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting upon denial of rehearing: I respectfully dissent from the court’s order denying rehearing in this case. I write separately in order to explain why I believe rehearing should be granted. Defendant’s position in this matter has been hampered by his procedural default of the issue regarding the prosecutor’s remarks. Defendant’s attorney did not properly preserve the issue because he neither objected to the comments at trial nor did he include the matter in the posttrial motion. Under our plain error rule, a defaulted issue will only be recognized if the evidence is closely balanced or the error is so serious that it erodes the integrity of the judicial process and undermines the fairness of the defendant’s trial. See People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 185-86 (2005). The court acknowledged in its opinion that the evidence in this case was close. Thus, defendant has satisfied the first prong of the plain error rule. I also believe that defendant has satisfied the second prong of the rule, as well. As the court itself states, “we feel strongly that the argument here, which implied that defendant might have proven his innocence by submitting to a breath test, is in conflict with the constitutional principle that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty.” (Emphasis added.) 218 Ill. 2d at 140-41. I remind my colleagues that the constitutional presumption of innocence “lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 39 L. Ed. 481, 491, 15 S. Ct. 394, 403 (1895). On this record, we do not, and cannot, know the effect the prosecutor’s remarks had on the jury’s deliberations. However, I submit that an argument that has the potential to confuse the jury about the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof strikes at the core of our criminal jurisprudence and serves to compromise any verdict of guilt rendered by that jury. In this case, it is difficult to have any confidence in the verdict because it was reached by a jury that was given mixed messages on the burden of proof, which in turn negatively impacted upon defendant’s constitutional right to the presumption of innocence. Given the critical importance of the presumption of innocence in our criminal justice system, I believe that it is questionable that this kind of error can ever be found harmless, even in a case where the evidence is overwhelming. However, this was not a case of overwhelming evidence. To the contrary, this was a closely balanced case, as the court recognized, and for that reason, it simply is impossible to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that “the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 711, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967). My colleagues’ continuing failure to recognize these principles establishes a troubling precedent that allows prosecutors to denigrate the constitutional presumption of innocence with impunity. For these reasons, I would grant rehearing in this case and respectfully dissent from the court’s order denying defendant’s petition. JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.