Court Opinion

ID: 9756962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:11:01.422312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:33.813271
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Appellant contends that he was arrested illegally and that evidence seized pursuant to that arrest should have been suppressed.
In the early morning hours of August 19, 1971, a resident of Bensalem Township, Bucks County, heard someone start her new Cadillac. She arrived at an open window in time to see the car being driven away and notified the Bensalem Township police immediately.
Shortly thereafter, at 1:20 a.m., Officer William Thompson received a radio alert that a 1971 Cadillac had been stolen from an apartment complex less than one mile from where he was situated. In order to proceed to the complainant’s address, the officer crossed the Philadelphia line, and travelled east on Grant Avenue. While so doing, he observed a yellow Cadillac in the westbound lane of Grant Avenue. Thompson made a U-turn to investigate further. He also observed a Lincoln Continental, operated by appellant, “directly behind the Cadillac” — “the Lincoln seemed to be tailgating the Cadillac . . . making [it] impossible for me to get behind the Cadillac and to get the registration.” Thompson pulled alongside the Cadillac when the car was stopped at a traffic light at the corner of Grant and Frankford Avenues. He noticed that the lock cylinder on the left front door had been removed. The officer immediately placed the operator, Thomas DiCicco, Jr., under arrest.
*277Prior to the arrest, Officer Hughes of the Philadelphia Police Department, had observed Thompson’s cruiser travelling on Grant Avenue. He followed Thompson when Thompson made the U-turn and arrived next to the Lincoln, also stopped at the light, as Thompson was arresting DiCicco. When Hughes alighted from his cruiser, Thompson told him to cover appellant. Hughes, with his service revolver drawn, told appellant to exit the Lincoln. At that time, Hughes observed a tote bag and a vise grip wrench on the front seat of the Lincoln. Apparently, a “bunch” of General Motors car key blanks were protruding from the tote bag. After the officers handcuffed appellant, they discovered additional car keys, a pair of cutting pliers, a key-making device, a lock punch, and a flashlight. A body search incident to appellant’s arrest produced two automobile lock cylinders.
Appellant and DiCicco were held on charges of larceny and possession of burglary tools. Pursuant to an October 7, 1971 preliminary hearing, the Grand Jury approved bills of indictment, number 1924, charging appellant with larceny,1 and 1924-1, charging appellant with possession of burglary tools.2 On August 9, 1972, appellant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized on August 19, 1971.3 After denial of that motion, appellant was tried and found guilty on both bills by the court without jury on November 8, 1972. Post-trial motions were denied on September 12, 1974. On November 1, 1974, appellant was sentenced to serve three to six months in the Bucks County Prison. This appeal followed.
Our Supreme Court has held that “when a police officer stops a vehicle he has ‘seized’ the vehicle and its *278occupants and thus, the protections of the Fourth Amendment must be considered.” Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 111, 307 A.2d 875 (1973). The Court stated that “. . . before the government may single out one automobile to stop, there must be specific facts justifying this intrusion. To hold otherwise would be to give the police absolute, unreviewable discretion and authority to intrude into an individual’s life for no cause whatsoever.” Id. at 112, 307 A.2d at 878. Accord, Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53, 331 A.2d 414 (1975) ; Commonwealth v. Boyer, 455 Pa. 283, 314 A.2d 317 (1975) ; Commonwealth v. Nastari, 232 Pa. Superior Ct. 405, 335 A.2d 468 (1975).
Swanger suggested that an officer must have probable cause prior to a stop: “We, therefore, hold before a police officer may stop a single vehicle to determine whether or not the vehicle is being operated in compliance with The Vehicle Code, he must have probable cause based on specific facts which indicate to him either the vehicle or the driver is in violation of the code.” 453 Pa. at 115, 307 A.2d at 879. (Emphasis added.) In Commonwealth v. Nastari, supra, this Court extended a “Terry”4 rationale to automobile stops; that is, in order to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily, a brief stop may be reasonable despite a level of suspicion less than probable cause. Nonetheless, “. . . it is . . . clear that an investigative stop of a moving vehicle to be valid must be based upon objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the detained motorist is presently involved in criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. at 61, 331 A.2d at 418. (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, the officers did not stop appellant for tailgating, despite the fact that tailgating is a vio*279lation of The Vehicle Code.5 The lower court’s opinion and the Commonwealth’s brief recite the violation of the Code as a justification for the stop of appellant’s vehicle. It is clear, however, that Officer Thompson did not stop appellant for tailgating — he stopped appellant solely because he believed that the driver of the Lincoln was involved in the theft of the Cadillac.6 Thus, the critical issue is whether tailgating another vehicle which was reasonably believed to be stolen amounts to “objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion” that the driver of *280the second automobile was also engaged in criminal activity. I think not. One, tailgating is an extremely common, if inconsiderate and even dangerous, practice of myriad motorists who are otherwise not criminals. Two, the officers in the instant case did not follow appellant long enough to determine whether appellant’s action was a strategic effort to obscure the license plate of the Cadillac.7 Three, at least for part of their observed travel, the two automobiles were approaching a red traffic signal, thereby explaining the proximity of the Lincoln to the Cadillac. Under such circumstances, the possibility of criminal activity was too remote to amount to a “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity was afoot.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. The Penal Code, 1939, June 24, P.L. 872, §807, 18 P.S. §4807; superseded by Crimes Code, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, §1, 18 Pa. C.S. §101 et seq.

. The Penal Code, supra; 18 P.S. §4904.

. Appellant successfully moved to suppress an incriminatory statement during the same proceeding.

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

. 1959, April 29, P.L. 58, §1010; 1968, July 15, P.L. 332, No. 162, §5, effective July 1, 1968 ; 75 P.S. §1010.

. Officer Hughes’s testimony at the preliminary hearing was as follows:
“A. . . . Let me say the Continental was rear bumper of Cadillac and I then assumed the Continental might he involved.
“Q. Did you think this before Thompson yelled to you?
“A. No, after Thompson yelled to me.”
Officer Thompson testified as follows:
“Q. Did you ever signal the Continental that you wanted to get in back of the Cadillac?
“A. No, I was only glancing at the Cadillac. I was in the east bound lane I made a U turn and went left lane in back of the Continental. I was in back of the Continental in the left lane ....
“Q. You did not actually stop the Continental?
“A. No, he stopped voluntarily (Emphasis added).
If appellant stopped voluntarily, according to Thompson, then clearly Thompson did not stop appellant pursuant to The Vehicle Code, supra.
At the suppression hearing, Thompson testified as follows:
“Q. When you pulled alongside of the Continental, did you in any way signal the driver or operator of the Continental to back off or to do anything?
“A. No, I didn’t.
“Q. Is it true that you were concerned mostly with checking the registration of the Cadillac?
“A. Yes.
“Q. So your concentration at this point was not on the Continental, is that correct?
“A. That is correct.”

. Thompson testified at the suppression hearing that he followed the Cadillac and the Lincoln for only about 200 yards before he stopped the Cadillac. At that time, neither automobile was being operated in excess of the speed limit of 35 miles per hour.