Court Opinion

ID: 9398834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 14:08:26.242275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.853651
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Boucher v. Cleveland, 2023-Ohio-1818.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

MAUREEN BOUCHER,                                  :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                             No. 112079
                v.                                :

CITY OF CLEVELAND,                                :

                Defendant-Appellant.              :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 1, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-21-953310

                                           Appearances:

                The Henry Law Firm and Eric W. Henry, for appellee.

                Mark Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and Jerome A.
                Payne, Jr., Assistant Director of Law, for appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

               Defendant-appellant, the city of Cleveland (the “city”), appeals from the

trial court’s judgment denying its motion for summary judgment. The city raises the

following assignments of error for review:

        1. It was reversible error for the trial court to hold that there was a
        genuine issue of material fact as to when the city’s employee installed
      cones and tape at a certain location when the uncontradicted
      documentary evidence in the record reflected that the work at issue was
      completed on October 12, 2019.

      2. It was reversible error for the trial court to hold that the city’s
      employee’s failure to recall “whether he performed the work on the
      subject area on Saturday, October 12 or Sunday October 13” created a
      genuine issue of material fact when there also existed unambiguous
      and uncontradicted documentary evidence and testimony in the record
      establishing that the work at issue was completed on October 12, 2019.

      3. It was reversible error for the trial court to hold that a time stamp at
      the bottom of “Defendant’s Daily Log” documented that the area at
      issue was secured by cones and caution tape “at 1:44 p.m. on October
      13, 2019,” with no evidentiary support especially when there was a
      second, identical Daily Log in the record but with a different time stamp
      of 12/09/2020 at 10:22 a.m., and the copies of the Daily Log also each
      included a description of the work at issue in the box labeled “done”
      and clearly dated 10/12/2019.

      4. As a matter of law, under R.C. 2744.03, the city is immune from
      liability for injuries allegedly caused from the exercise of judgment or
      discretion in using personnel, equipment, and resources.

            After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                      I. Procedural and Factual History

            This matter stems from a personal injury lawsuit filed against the city

by plaintiff-appellee, Maureen Boucher (“Boucher”).

            Shortly before 12:00 p.m. on Sunday, October 13, 2019, Boucher and

her friend, Barbra McCoy (“McCoy”), were walking westbound on a sidewalk located

on West 3rd Street in Cleveland, Ohio. At some point, Boucher stepped onto a

utility-access port located on the sidewalk. The concrete block covering the access

port was damaged, causing Boucher’s foot to fall through the covering and into the
recessed access port. As a result of the incident, Boucher sustained injuries to her

leg and foot.

                According to Boucher and McCoy, “there was no caution tape, cones, or

any other markings or warnings indicating that the utility box cover was unsafe or

posed a hazard.” (McCoy affidavit a ¶ 6; Boucher depo. tr. at 33.) McCoy took

multiple photographs of the broken utility-port cover shortly after Boucher was

taken away in an ambulance. Collectively, the photographs depict the scene as it

existed at the time of Boucher’s fall and, subsequently, as it existed once the police

secured the utility-access port by “placing cones and caution tape around it.”

(McCoy affidavit at ¶ 8.) Danny Chalhoub (“Chalhoub”), an employee of a nearby

restaurant who assisted Boucher from the ground, similarly expressed that “at the

time [Boucher] fell, there was no caution tape, barricades, cones, or any other sign

warning of any hazardous condition or danger associated with the cement slab or

the utility hold.” (Chalhoub affidavit at ¶ 7.)

                On September 21, 2021, Boucher filed a civil complaint against the city,

alleging that she sustained “serious injuries and damages” as a direct and proximate

result of the city’s “failure to inspect, maintain, warn of, and/or repair the hazardous

condition presented by the broken concrete block prior to October 13, 2019.”

                On June 15, 2022, the city filed a motion for summary judgment,

arguing that it “is entitled to political subdivision immunity and the record is devoid

of evidence to establish that any of the exceptions to immunity apply.” Alternatively,

the city argued that even if one of the exceptions apply, “immunity is restored
because defendant made discretionary decisions regarding allocation of resources

and personnel.”

               In support of its motion for summary judgment, the city attached (1)

the affidavit and deposition testimony of Assistant Commissioner of Cleveland

Public Power, Bernie Jackson (“Jackson”), (2) the deposition testimony of Joseph

Wilson (“Wilson”), a Trouble Department foreman, (3) the deposition testimony of

Boucher, (4) the deposition testimony of McCoy, (5) photographs of the damaged

utility port, and (6) a copy of Cleveland Public Power’s Dispatcher Daily Log, dated

October 12, 2019.

               Relevant to this appeal, Cleveland Public Power is a 300-person

division of the city of Cleveland. As part of its operations, Cleveland Public Power

employs a Trouble Department that is tasked with responding to emergency calls 24

hours a day.

                The evidence supporting the city’s motion for summary judgment

demonstrates that on Saturday, October 12, 2019, the Trouble Department received

a complaint, notifying it of the broken utility-port cover located on the sidewalk of

West 3rd Street. The call was received by Trouble Department dispatcher, Charles

Pankratz (“Pankratz”), at approximately 12:05 p.m. In accordance with his job

responsibilities, Pankratz notified foreman Wilson of the complaint and instructed

Wilson to investigate the damaged property and secure the area. Pankratz also

documented the reported issue in a Daily Log report. The Daily Log indicates that

Wilson’s crew “start[ed]” its work at approximately 12:06 p.m. and “stop[ped]” its
work at approximately 12:45 p.m. The “Work Done” section of the log states that

Wilson’s crew took the following actions: “coned off broken pole-box cover in side

walk [-] refer to replace ASAP.” The timestamp located on the subject daily log is

dated Sunday, October 13, 2019, at 1:44:28 p.m.

             With respect to the timestamp, Pankratz confirmed that the Trouble

Department’s data-entry system creates a timestamp once the dispatcher completes

the “work-done” section of the report and “closes out” the Daily Log. (Pankratz

depo. at tr. 28-29.) Nevertheless, when questioned about the timestamp located at

the bottom of the Daily Log report, Pankratz testified that he did not have a complete

understanding of “that particular aspect of the daily log.” (Id. at 30-31.) Pankratz

suggested, while acknowledging his uncertainty, that the timestamp may have

reflected when the document was printed by a member of the Trouble Department.

              Wilson testified that upon receiving the dispatch from Pankratz, he

arrived at West 3rd Street and identified the reported issue. Wilson stated that the

utility-port cover was sunken and not level with the sidewalk because the concrete

surrounding the cover was “severely uneven.” (Wilson depo. tr. at 25.) According

to Wilson, his crew did not attempt to permanently fix the damaged utility-port

cover because it required the services of an underground construction crew. Wilson

testified that he attempted to make the area safe “so nobody would get injured,”

stating,

      So I coned it off, some caution tape. I grabbed a couple of barrels that
      were in the area to make it more visible and more so that people
      couldn’t walk through it and that’s what I did for it. And then
      immediately I make my call to dispatch to get it into the hands of the
      right people that can fix it permanently.

(Wilson depo. tr. 26-27.)

              Pertinently, Wilson estimated that he and his crew were at the scene

for approximately 20 minutes. He testified that he could not recall whether he

received the dispatch on a Saturday or a Sunday. (Id. at 21.) However, Wilson

maintained that “if the dispatch came in on October 12,” he responded to the scene

of the damaged property “on that same day.” (Id. at 26.) In making this statement,

Wilson conceded that he was relying exclusively on the date set forth in the Daily

Log report and did not have an independent memory of the date or day of week he

secured the utility-port cover.

              Assistant Commissioner Jackson provided extensive testimony at his

deposition concerning the role of the Trouble Department and the nature of the

work performed by its staff members. Jackson testified that there is no formal policy

in place regarding the time in which the Trouble Department is required to respond

to an emergency. However, he expressed that emergencies are routinely addressed

by the Trouble Department on the same day they are reported, stating “once we’re

notified of [an emergency], we make sure someone goes out and addresses it.”

(Jackson depo. at tr. 22.)

              Jackson further described the role of the dispatchers and the Daily Log

report. Jackson explained that once a call comes into the Trouble Department, a

dispatcher creates a log and contacts a crew to respond to the scene of the reported
issue. Once the crew assesses the issue, it reports back to the dispatcher about the

actions they took and whether the issue needs to be referred to another department.

If the issue requires a referral to another department, the dispatcher is tasked with

contacting the supervisor of the appropriate department via email to notify him or

her of the work to be completed. Jackson testified that once the Trouble Department

finishes the required work or otherwise refers the matter to another department, the

Daily Log report generated by the dispatcher is closed out. (Jackson depo. at tr. 29.)

              Regarding the Daily Log report completed by Pankratz in this case,

Jackson expressed that it was his understanding that the log had to have been

completed on October 12, 2019, because the date is automatically generated by the

programming once the log is opened by the dispatcher. With that stated, however,

Jackson conceded that he did not have any firsthand knowledge of whether Wilson

placed cones around the damaged property on October 12, 2019, or whether the

cones were present at the time Boucher fell on October 13, 2019.

             Finally, Jackson averred that as a foreman, Wilson had “the discretion

in deciding when and how safety measures are implemented when responding to

department calls.” Jackson explained as follows:

      Trouble Department Foreman are expected to access the situation and
      based on their experience and training make the appropriate decision
      in securing the area. Placing caution tape and warning cones around a
      pole box until it can be repaired is consistent with our employee
      training. Pole box covers are considered a heavy item that the Trouble
      Department does not repair or replace.          Trouble Department
      employees do not carry replacement pole box covers in their vehicles.
      Pole box covers are repaired/replaced by an underground construction
      crew. Pole box repair/replacement calls that occur on the weekend are
      usually scheduled for repair/ replacement on the upcoming weekday.
      Trouble Department foreman have the discretion to request an
      immediate response from an underground construction crew for issues
      he/she deems to be an emergency situation that requires an immediate
      response. * * * Due to budgetary constraints and personnel shortfalls,
      CPP’s underground construction crews operate during the weekdays
      and are used on the weekends on an emergency basis.

(Jackson affidavit at ¶ 2-3.)

              Based on the foregoing evidence, the city maintained that although it

had notice of the hazardous condition on October 12, 2019, it was not negligent in

its performance of a proprietary function where the uncontroverted facts

demonstrate that “Wilson took the necessary steps to protect and warn others to

avoid the [utility-port] area by putting up cones and caution tape.” Alternatively,

the city asserted that it was entitled to immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5)

because the injury complained of resulted from Wilson’s exercise of judgment or

discretion in relation to how he “investigated, secured, and scheduled the utility port

repair” on October 12, 2019.

              On July 15, 2022, Boucher filed a brief in opposition to the city’s

motion for summary judgment, arguing the city “is not entitled to sovereign

immunity where [she] has shown significant evidence that she was injured due to

the negligence of a city employee engaged in a proprietary function.” Regarding the

application of the exception to immunity contained at R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), Boucher

maintained that “the evidence in this case creates, at a minimum, a factual issue as

to whether Joseph Wilson was negligent in failing to secure the [known hazard] in a

timely manner as was necessary for this emergency.” According to Boucher, “the
evidence shows Wilson did not secure the broken handhole cover on October 12,

2019.” Rather, Boucher maintained that the work was completed on October 13,

2019, stating:

       Importantly, Wilson was unsure of the date or time that he actually
       observed the scene. Wilson could not remember whether he got the
       call on a Saturday (October 12th) or Sunday (October 13th). Wilson
       does not recall what time he responded to the call. Wilson admitted
       that he did not know the exact date he claims to have put cones or tape
       up around the [utility port]. He stated it was possible he put cones and
       tape up after the Browns game on October 13th. Other witnesses
       testified plainly that the area had not been secured prior to Maureen
       Boucher’s fall before the Browns game on October 13th, 2019.

       ***

       [Additionally], the Daily Log itself shows a completion timestamp of
       October 13, 2019 at 1:44 p.m. — after [Boucher] had already fallen. The
       timestamp is automatically generated in the computer management
       system after the solution to the problem is documented and cannot be
       manually changed by employees.

                 Boucher further argued that the city cannot establish any of the

defenses listed under R.C. 2744.03 because Wilson’s discretionary exercise of

judgment is not relevant where the evidence suggests that he “failed to act on the

emergency complaint reported on October 12th despite knowing that on October

13th that the same sidewalk would be crowded with pedestrians.”              Boucher

explained that her negligence claim “is not based on how the city chose to make the

hazard safe, but rather on the city’s failure to do anything to make the hazard safe

before she fell.”

                 In support of her brief in opposition, Boucher attached (1) a copy of

Cleveland Public Power’s Dispatcher Daily Log, dated October 12, 2019, (2) the
affidavit of Chalhoub, (3) the affidavit of McCoy, (4) photographs of the damaged

handhole cover, and (5) the deposition testimony of Boucher, Pankratz, Wilson, and

Jackson.

             On September 28, 2022, the trial court denied the city’s motion for

summary judgment, stating, in relevant part:

      In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant concedes that it
      was on notice of a dangerous condition. Nevertheless, the defendant
      argues that it was not negligent as its agent, Joseph Wilson, reasonably
      secured the area with cones and caution tape. Defendant claims that
      this was sufficient and appropriate until a more permanent repair could
      be effectuated. Defendant alternatively asserts that even if Mr.
      Wilson’s actions somehow fell below the standard of care (i.e. simply
      securing the area vs. implementing a permanent repair) immunity is
      reinstated as Mr. Wilson was exercising judgment and discretion in the
      use of the defendant’s resources.

      The problem with defendant’s arguments, both as to compliance with
      the standard of care and exercise of judgment, is they assume that the
      defendant actually did what it claims, and installed cones and caution
      tape prior to the plaintiff’s injury. Defendant’s motion for summary
      judgment must be denied in this case as the evidence before the court
      creates an issue of material fact as to when Mr. Wilson actually installed
      the cones and caution tape.

      Numerous witnesses, in addition to the plaintiff, have testified that at
      the time of the plaintiff’s injury there was no caution tape, barricades,
      cones, or any other sign or warning of a hazardous condition. It is
      certainly possible that someone removed the caution materials after
      Mr. Wilson’s placement at the scene. And while there is no evidence to
      support this supposition, this would potentially explain their absence
      at the time of plaintiff’s accident. However, according to Mr. Wilson’s
      own deposition he is unable to recall whether he performed the work
      on the subject area on Saturday, October 12th or Sunday, October 13th.
      He also cannot attest as to the time he completed his actions, before or
      after the plaintiff was injured. Finally, the defendant’s daily log
      documents the work as being completed by Mr. Wilson at 1:44 October
      13, 2019, after plaintiff’s injury occurred. For these reasons,
      defendant’s motion for summary judgment based upon the application
      of sovereign immunity must be denied.
              The city now appeals from the trial court’s judgment.

                              II. Law and Analysis

              Within its first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error, the city

argues that the trial court committed reversible error by denying its motion for

summary judgment. The city contends that the “unambiguous and uncontradicted

documentary evidence and testimony” demonstrates that city employees timely

responded to the reported hazard on October 12, 2019, and exercised reasonable

care in securing the area. Alternatively, the city contends that even if Boucher could

prove the necessary elements for a claim of negligence, the city is immune from

liability by operation of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). We address the city’s assignments of

error together because they are related.

                             A. Standard of Review

              An appellate court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment

de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

In a de novo review, this court affords no deference to the trial court’s decision and

we independently review the record to determine whether the denial of summary

judgment is appropriate. Hollins v. Shaffer, 182 Ohio App.3d 282, 2009-Ohio-2136,

912 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

              Summary judgment is appropriate if (1) no genuine issue of any

material fact remains; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion, and construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving
party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary

judgment is made. Grafton at 105, citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School

Dist. Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 631 N.E.2d 150 (1994).

              The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of

demonstrating that no material issues of fact exist for trial. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio

St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). The moving party has the initial

responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying

those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact on the essential elements of the nonmoving party’s claims. Id. After

the moving party has satisfied this initial burden, the nonmoving party has a

reciprocal duty to set forth specific facts by the means listed in Civ.R. 56(C) showing

that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

                                  B. Jurisdiction

              Typically, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a

final, appealable order. Ceasor v. E. Cleveland, 2018-Ohio-2741, 112 N.E.3d 496,

¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873

N.E.2d 878, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Overmeyer v. Walinski, 8 Ohio St.2d 23, 24, 222

N.E.2d 312 (1966). However, R.C. 2744.02(C) provides:

      An order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political
      subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as
      provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final
      order.

              While we are authorized to review the trial court’s decision, the scope

of that review is limited. Id. at ¶ 14. We may only examine “alleged errors in the
portion of the trial court’s decision that denied the benefit of immunity.” Id., citing

Reinhold v. Univ. Hts., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100270, 2014-Ohio-1837, ¶ 21, citing

Riscatti v. Prime Properties Ltd. Partnership, 137 Ohio St.3d 123, 2013-Ohio-4530,

998 N.E.2d 437, ¶ 20.

                      C. Political Subdivision Immunity

              A determination of whether a political subdivision has immunity

involves a three-step analysis. Smith v. McBride, 130 Ohio St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-

4674, 955 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 13, citing Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003-

Ohio-3319, 790 N.E.2d 781; Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-

1483, 927 N.E.2d 585.

              R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) divides the functions of a political subdivision into

two types, governmental functions and proprietary functions. Under the first tier, if

a defendant is determined to be a political subdivision, it is immune from liability

for its governmental and proprietary functions “in a civil action for injury, death, or

loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political

subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision * * *.” R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).

              Political-subdivision immunity, however, is not absolute. As a result,

the second step of the analysis focuses on the five exceptions to immunity listed in

R.C. 2744.02(B), which can expose the political subdivision to liability. Colbert at

¶ 8, citing Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 24, 697 N.E.2d 610 (1998). Relevant

to this appeal, R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) provides as follows:

      Except as otherwise provided in sections 3314.07 and 3746.24 of the
      Revised Code, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss
      to person or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by
      their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political
      subdivisions.

               If any of the exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply, and if no defense in

that section protects the political subdivision from liability, then the third step of the

analysis requires an assessment of whether any defenses in R.C. 2744.03 apply to

reinstate immunity. Id. at ¶ 9. If none of the R.C. 2744.02(B) exceptions to

immunity apply, however, R.C. 2744.03’s defenses need no consideration.

               As relevant here, R.C. 2744.03 provides, in pertinent part:

      In a civil action brought against a political subdivision or an employee
      of a political subdivision to recover damages for injury, death, or loss
      to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission in
      connection with a governmental or proprietary function, the following
      defenses or immunities may be asserted to establish nonliability:

      ***

      (5) The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury,
      death, or loss to person or property resulted from the exercise of
      judgment or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to
      use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other
      resources unless the judgment or discretion was exercised with
      malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.

R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).

                  1. General Immunity — R.C. 2744.02(A)(1)

               In this case, there is no dispute that the city is a political subdivision.

Thus, the pertinent issues before this court are whether there remain triable issues

of material fact concerning (1) whether the city, through the act of its employee,

negligently performed an act related to a proprietary function, and, if so, (2) whether

Boucher’s injury “resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion in
determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials,

personnel, facilities, and other resources[.]”          See R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) and

2744.03(A)(5).

               2. Exception to Immunity — R.C. 2744.02(B)(2)

               In the second tier of the immunity analysis, we determine whether one

of the five exceptions to immunity outlined in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies to hold the

political subdivision liable for damages. As previously mentioned, the exception to

immunity contained in R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) provides that “a political subdivision is

liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to persons or property

caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or any of its employees in

connection with the performance of a proprietary function.” Hill v. Urbana, 79 Ohio

St.3d 130, 679 N.E.2d 1109 (1997), paragraph one of the syllabus. A proprietary

function is defined, in relevant part, as a function that “promotes or preserves the

public peace, health, safety, or welfare and that involves activities that are

customarily engaged in by nongovernmental persons.” R.C. 2744.01(G)(1)(b). A

proprietary function includes “[t]he establishment, maintenance, and operation of

a utility, including, but not limited to, a light, gas, power, or heat plant, a railroad, a

busline or other transit company, an airport, and a municipal corporation water

supply system.” R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(c).

               Before R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) will remove a political subdivision’s

immunity, a plaintiff must establish the elements required to sustain a negligence

action. Puffenberger v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99660, 2013-Ohio-4479,
¶ 8. A plaintiff alleging negligence must demonstrate the existence of a duty, a

breach of that duty, proximate cause, and damages. See, e.g., Menifee v. Ohio

Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984). If negligence is

not proven, the city is not liable.

               Liability for damages against the city cannot arise as a matter of law

except on proof that the city created a faulty or defective condition, or it had actual

or constructive notice of the hazardous condition. Cleveland v. Amato, 123 Ohio St.

575, 176 N.E. 227 (1931); Wilke v. Brook Park, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74636, 1999

Ohio App. LEXIS 6055 (Dec. 16, 1999). “‘[W]here negligence revolves around the

question of the existence of a hazard or defect, the legal princi[ple] prevails that

notice, either actual or constructive, of such hazard or defect is a prerequisite to the

duty of reasonable care.’” Vasquez-Cromer v. Toledo, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-

1266, 2019-Ohio-5149, ¶ 17, quoting Heckert v. Patrick, 15 Ohio St.3d 402, 405, 473

N.E.2d 1204 (1984).

               In this case, there is no dispute that Boucher’s negligence claim

directly relates to the city’s performance of a proprietary function.        It is also

undisputed that the city received actual notice of the hazardous utility-port cover on

October 12, 2019. Nevertheless, the city argues that the evidence supporting its

motion for summary judgment demonstrates that its agent, Wilson, responded to

the reported hazard in a timely fashion and “secured the area for repair in a

reasonable manner consistent with his training.” The city contends that in the

absence of any evidence to suggest that “Wilson’s methods and decisions fell below
an established standard of care, there is no evidence of negligent performance by a

city employee with respect to a proprietary function.”

              In contrast, Boucher reiterates her position that there remain genuine

issues of fact regarding whether Wilson secured the reported hazard on October 12,

2019, as the city suggests. According to Boucher, “the evidence in this case strongly

supports the conclusion that the city did not secure the hazardous broken [utility-

port cover] until after [she] fell on October 13, 2019.” Boucher notes that (1) “three

witnesses testified that the area had not been secured on October 13, 2019, when

[she] fell,” (2) Wilson testified that he may have secured the area on a Sunday, and

(3) the timestamp located on the city’s Daily Log suggests that the work was not

performed until after she fell on Sunday, October 13, 2019.

              Construing the available evidence in favor of Boucher, we agree with

the trial court’s determination that there remain genuine issues of material fact

regarding whether the city secured the utility-port cover before or after Boucher’s

fall. In this case, city employees Wilson, Pankratz, and Jackson each estimated that

members of the Trouble Department responded to West 3rd Street on October 12,

2019, to secure the damaged utility-port cover. However, in each instance, Wilson,

Pankratz, and Jackson did not have an independent memory of the date the

hazardous condition was reported and could not recall the specific day of the week

the work was performed. Rather, each employee assumed that the work was

completed on October 12, 2019, based on the date reflected at the top of the Daily

Log report. Because the employees’ recollection of the completed work depends
exclusively on their interpretation of the information contained in the documentary

evidence, a careful examination of the Daily Log report is necessary.

               As previously discussed, the subject Daily Log conclusively sets forth

the date the hazardous condition was reported to the Trouble Department, i.e.,

October 12, 2019. However, on its face, the log’s reference to the date, October 12,

2019, does not unambiguously confirm that the work was completed that same day.

In this regard, Jackson testified that the date reflected in the log is automatically

generated once the dispatcher receives notice of the reported condition and creates

a Daily Log sheet. (Jackson depo. tr. at 43.) The “work done” section of the log is

left blank and is only completed once the dispatcher is notified by other members of

the Trouble Department that the condition has been repaired or requires a referral

to another department. Significantly, Pankratz testified that the log is not closed out

until the work done section is completed and the matter is resolved. (Pankratz depo.

at tr. 28.) Pankratz further explained that the system puts a timestamp on the Daily

Log once the work is completed and the complaint is closed out by the dispatcher.

(Id. at tr. 28-29.)

               As set forth in the evidence attached to Boucher’s brief in opposition

to summary judgment, the time stamp located on the bottom left portion of the Daily

Log states “10/13/2019 — 1:44:28 p.m.” Considering the time and date of Boucher’s

fall, i.e., just before noon on October 13, 2019, a reasonable person may conclude

that the Daily Log report relating to the hazardous utility-port cover was not closed

out until 1:44 p.m. on October 13, 2019. It follows that the same reasonable person
may also conclude that the log was not closed out until October 13, 2019, because

the area was not secured until after Boucher’s fall.

              We reiterate that summary judgment is not appropriate where the

facts, which must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion, are subject to reasonable dispute. Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Assn. of Mid-

Ohio, 142 Ohio St.3d 425, 2014-Ohio-4531, 32 N.E.3d 413, ¶ 33. Under the foregoing

circumstances, we reject the city’s contention that the evidence unequivocally

establishes that the Trouble Division exercised reasonable care by “plac[ing] cones

and tape over the utility port on October 12, 2019.” Contrary to the city’s assertion

on appeal, the trial court’s decision is not “patently absurd,” but is premised on the

ambiguity contained in the documentary evidence and testimony. Accordingly, we

find Boucher has produced evidence of specific facts that establish the existence of

an issue of material fact concerning whether the city failed to exercise reasonable

care after receiving notice of a hazardous condition relating to its maintenance or

operation of a proprietary function.

                            3. R.C. 2744.03 Defenses

              Alternatively, the city asserts that “assuming arguendo that Boucher

could prove negligence,” immunity is restored “where the property damage at issue

is alleged to have resulted from a city employee’s negligent exercise of judgment and

discretion in determining how to use equipment, supplies, materials, personnel,

facilities, and other resources in responding to an incident.”
              Under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), political subdivisions are not liable for

injuries resulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining how to

use personnel and resources. Franks v. Lopez, 69 Ohio St.3d 345, 347-348, 632

N.E.2d 504 (1994). This court has recognized that routine decisions requiring little

judgment or discretion are not covered by R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). Ohio Quay 55 L.L.C.

v. Cleveland, 2018-Ohio-752, 107 N.E.3d 194, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), citing Ohio Bell Tel.

Co. v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98683, 2013-Ohio-270, ¶ 13. Likewise,

R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) does not protect decisions that involve inadvertence,

inattention, or unobservance. Id. Rather, “some positive exercise of judgment that

portrays a considered adoption of a particular course of conduct in relation to an

object to be achieved” is required to demonstrate an exercise of discretion for which

R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) confers immunity. Id.

              The provision

      operates to protect political subdivisions from liability based upon
      discretionary judgments concerning the allocation of scarce resources;
      it is not intended to protect conduct which requires very little discretion
      or independent judgment. The law of immunity is designed to foster
      freedom and discretion in the development of public policy while still
      ensuring that implementation of political subdivision responsibilities
      is conducted in a reasonable manner.

Hall v. Ft. Frye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio App.3d 690, 699, 676 N.E.2d

1241 (4th Dist.1996), citing Marcum v. Adkins, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 93CA17, 1994

Ohio App. LEXIS 1456 (Mar. 28, 1994).

              On appeal, the city asserts that the Trouble Department’s decision to

postpone repairs until the work could be completed by the appropriate construction
crew constituted a discretionary allocation of the city’s limited resources. According

to the city,

       [t]he city of Cleveland Public Power Department’s policies and
       practices demonstrated a positive exercise of judgment by
       management personnel, which portrayed a considered adoption of a
       particular repair course of conduct in relation to an object to be
       achieved.

                Based on the evidence set forth in this record, we find the remaining

genuine issues of material fact render the city’s reliance on R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) to be

unpersuasive.     As stated by the trial court, the city’s arguments under R.C.

2744.03(A)(5) rely on the presumption that members of the Trouble Department

did, in fact, render a discretionary judgment at the scene of the hazardous condition

on October 12, 2019. Consistent with our prior discussion, we find there exist

genuine triable issues that must be resolved before it can be determined whether

R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) is applicable in this instance.

                                  III. Conclusion

                Viewing the facts in the case in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and resolving any doubt in favor of the nonmoving party, we

cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the city was not entitled to

immunity from liability at the summary judgment phase of the proceedings. The

city’s first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

       It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

       The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry

this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR