Court Opinion

ID: 9465716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:53:37.585015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:19.656951
License: Public Domain

*1224SKELTON, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with much of the reasoning of the majority nor with the result they reach in this case.
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Northeastern Division, entered on December 15,1977, denying the petition of James G. Davis for a writ of habeas corpus.
Davis, the petitioner herein, was convicted of first-degree murder in the Circuit Court of Cullman County, Alabama, on November 28,1973, for the murder of his wife. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for life. After exhausting his state remedies,1 Davis initiated the instant proceedings by filing this his third petition for a writ of habeas corpus.2 Adopting the report of the United States Magistrate and holding no evidentiary hearing, the Honorable C. W. Allgood, United States District Judge, dismissed the petition. Upon appeal of that dismissal, this court affirmed in part and remanded in part, directing the district court to determine if the denial of petitioner’s motion for continuance by the state trial court deprived petitioner of effective assistance of counsel. Davis v. Alabama, 545 F.2d 460 (5 Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Davis v. Alabama, 431 U.S. 957, 97 S.Ct. 2682, 53 L.Ed.2d 275 (1977).
On the prior appeal of this case, this court stated that there were two issues before the court, namely, (1) whether the trial court erred in dismissing that part of petitioner’s habeas petition that called into question his competency to stand trial, and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion of petitioner's counsel for a continuance to better prepare themselves to defend him at the trial. (545 F.2d 463).
As to the first issue relating to petitioner’s competency at the time of trial, this court found, concluded and held that he was competent when the trial was held. The court cited the factors listed by the Supreme Court in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S.Ct. 896, 907, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 118 (1975), that should be considered to determine competency if the issue is raised, saying:
“While the Supreme Court has not prescribed a general standard regarding the nature or quantum of evidence necessary to require resort to an adequate procedure, it has stated that three factors should be considered. These factors are: existence of a history of irrational behavior; defendant’s demeanor at trial, and prior medical opinion. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 907, 43 L.Ed.2d at 118. Examining the present case in light of the considerations discussed above, we note that the defense never raised the issue of competency either prior to or during the trial.” 545 F.2d 464.
Even though the petitioner did not raise the issue of his competency, the court, nevertheless, considered and disposed of the question, adversely to him, as shown by the following:
“Having determined that defendant did not raise the issue of competency, we look to the record to determine if, in light of the three factors listed in Drope, indicia suggesting a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competence existed at trial. First, we note that while domestic quarrels occasionally clouded defendant’s past, he had no history of irrational behavior such as that uncovered in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) or in Lee v. Alabama, 386 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc). While the record indicates that defendant had seen *1225a psychologist, the psychologist’s report, indicating that defendant was getting along better with his wife and no longer needed treatment, negates any suggestion of incompetency that one might infer from the fact of his treatment. In addition, lay witnesses, who testified at trial that defendant did not act irrationally or seem incoherent shortly after the crime and during his pre-trial confinement in jail, rebutted any suggestion of ‘bona fide doubt’ about defendant’s competence. Finally, defendant’s demeanor at the pretrial hearing on the § 42516 motion as
reflected through his ability to recite, with great particularity and understanding, facts concerning his family and his criminal record, indicated no incompetence on his part. See McCune v. Estelle, 534 F.2d 611, 612 (5th Cir. 1976) (no incompetence shown where defendant understood proceedings and able to coherently narrate what had happened in his life as a whole, as well as immediately before trial). Our examination of the trial record, therefore, convinces us that no Pate violation occurred through the trial court’s failure to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing.”
The court then stated that a defendant may still prevail if he can show at a post-conviction habeas hearing that he, nevertheless, was incompetent to stand trial. This question was disposed of by the holding of the court in this case that post-conviction evidence did not show that petitioner was incompetent at the time of trial, as follows:
“ ‘A determination that insufficient doubt [of competence] existed at the time of trial does not preclude a post-conviction inquiry into competence to stand trial.’ Nathaniel v. Estelle, 493 F.2d [794] at 798 [5th Cir.]. Although he cannot argue that the trial court’s failure to invoke appropriate procedures violates his rights to due process, the defendant still may prevail, if at habeas, he can show that he nevertheless was incompetent to stand trial. To determine this second question, the Nathaniel panel adopts the guideline articulated by Judge Gewin in Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1973):
‘Courts in habeas corpus proceedings should not consider claims of mental incompetence to stand trial where the facts are not sufficient to positively, unequivocally, and clearly generate a real, substantial, and legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the petitioner to meaningfully participate and cooperate with counsel during a criminal trial. . . . [T]he standard which should be met to sustain such a claim [is] a history of mental illness, substantial evidence of mental incompetence at or near the time of trial supported by the opinions of qualified physicians and the testimony of laymen. The burden is on the petitioner to prove his allegations; such proof should be clear and convincing.’
“Id. at 1043 (emphasis added). Examining the state court record and pleadings before the district court on habeas, petitioner’s allegations do not meet this threshold requirement. The facts before the trial court that were potentially relevant to competency18 clearly do not satis-
fy the Bruce standard. Petitioner’s only other factual allegation to the district court was the existence of a report by a clinical psychologist, Dr. Verna Wool, presumably made during the first months of petitioner’s sentence on this conviction. Introduced as Petitioner’s Exhibit E, the report merely records the essence of an interview with petitioner concerning his history of domestic problems. Dr. Wool never addresses the issue of petitioner’s present or past competency or insanity and none of her comments, even if accepted as true, raise a ‘real, substantial, and legitimate doubt’ as to defendant’s competency. Given petitioner’s failure to present allegations that, even if accepted as correct, meet the Bruce requirement, *1226the district court did not err in dismissing without an evidentiary hearing,21 petitioner’s habeas petition, at least as that petition calls into question petitioner’s competency.
Finally, on the competency question, we held on the prior appeal that the trial court acted properly in denying the Section 425 motion of petitioner’s counsel that he be given a mental examination.3 In this connection, we held:
“. . . in order to receive habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the petitioner must establish that the state court violated a federal constitutional right. Yet, while appellant’s counsel discusses at great length the constitutional requirement that a defendant be competent to assist in his defense, he cites us to no relevant authority that requires, as constitutionally mandated, any procedure to determine criminal responsibility similar to that provided for in § 425. Instead, he concentrates on the impropriety of the § 425 denial in terms of Alabama law. The Alabama Criminal Court of Appeals, however, determined that the trial court’s denial of that motion accorded with relevant state law; we accept their determination.” 545 F.2d 466.
Thus, it is clear that a previous panel of this court found and concluded that the petitioner was competent just before his trial, during his trial, and after his trial was held. This is binding on us. United States v. Hernandez, 580 F.2d 188 (5 Cir. 1978), affirmed and remanded for resentencing, 591 F.2d 1019 (5 Cir., en banc, 1979). I have dwelt at length on this competency question to dispel once and for all time any notion or speculation that the petitioner was not competent at the time of his trial.
This brings me to a discussion of the second issue that was before this court on the previous appeal, namely, whether the court erred in denying the motion of petitioner’s counsel for a continuance to better enable them to prepare his defense. The district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on this question. We held that the contention of the petitioner in this regard raised a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but it was tied to the action of the trial judge in denying the motion for continuance as shown by the remand order. We did not decide this issue, but remanded the case to the district court by issuing the following order:
“Accordingly, we remand this part of the complaint to the district court to determine if denial of the continuance deprived petitioner of effective assistance of his counsel.
“Affirmed in part, reversed in part.” 545 F.2d 467.
Much of the difficulty and confusion in the district court on remand, and now in this court in the present appeal, was and is due to the bifurcated wording of the above remand order. As can be seen from the order, it is divided into two queries, namely, (1) the correctness of the denial of the motion for continuance, and (2) the relation of the denial to effective assistance of counsel. The two queries are interrelated and it is difficult to dispose of one without at the *1227same time taking care of the other. No doubt, that is why the district court on remand considered and disposed of both questions when he made the following finding and conclusion after an evidentiary hearing;
“The record as a whole shows that the petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of his counsel either from the denial of the motion for continuance by the trial judge or from the representation he received from his attorneys at the trial.”
As to the denial of the motion for continuance, the facts show that it was a general motion with no mention of the existence of any specific evidence which was known to exist, and which counsel might develop if given more time, nor the name of any material witness who might testify for the petitioner if time was allowed for counsel to locate him and procure his testimony. Neither did the motion allege what prejudice, if any, would likely result to the petitioner if the motion was denied.4 A motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the exercise of that discretion will not be deemed improper without a clear showing that such discretion has been abused. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S.Ct. 321, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1944); United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281 (5 Cir. 1976); Jackson v. United States, 330 F.2d 445 (5 Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 821, 85 S.Ct. 42,13 L.Ed.2d 32 (1964); United States v. Sahley, 526 F.2d 913 (5 Cir. 1976). Furthermore, when such an abuse has been alleged, it must be decided on a case by case basis. As the Supreme Court held in Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964):
“There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 77 S.Ct. 431, 1 L.Ed.2d 415; Torres v. United States, 270 F.2d 252 (CA 9th Cir.); cf. United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491 (CA 2d Cir.). (376 U.S. 589-90, 84 S.Ct. at 850).” (Emphasis supplied).
This court, in United States v. Uptain, supra, stated that a “particularly common claim is that a continuance was necessary to interview and subpoena potential witnesses,” and listed the criteria the court has specifically considered with regard to such cases as follows:
“ . . [T]he diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. A general rule recently has emerged:
‘A movant must show that due diligence has been exercised to obtain the attendance of the witness, that substantial favorable testimony would be tendered by the witness, that the witness is available and willing to testify, and that the denial of a continuance would materially prejudice the defendant.’
United States v. Miller, 513 F.2d 791, 793 (5 Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Cawley, 481 F.2d 702, 705 (5 Cir. 1973).” 531 F.2d at 1287.
It is clear that petitioner’s motion for continuance did not contain any of the necessary criteria required by the above cases. Under these circumstances, the trial judge did the only thing he could do when he overruled the motion. All of the members of the panel on this appeal agree that the trial judge is not to be faulted for denying the motion, and his action in that regard *1228was proper. Accordingly, since the denial of the motion was proper, it could not and did not, as a matter of law, deprive the petitioner of the effective assistance of counsel. That was the only question remanded to the district court. It has been answered by that court in the negative. The finding and conclusion of the district court, together with our view that the denial of the motion was proper, should end the matter. Obviously, trial counsel could have been effective before the motion was denied, or afterwards, or both. In my opinion, they were effective in both instances under the circumstances of this case, and the finding and conclusion of the district court, on this question is not plainly erroneous, but is supported by substantial evidence, as shown below.
Now, the majority is reversing the decision of the district court by holding that trial counsel did not discharge their duty to their client in connection with his trial. I cannot agree.
At the end of the trial, the petitioner, whom we have held to be competent, did not claim that his trial attorneys did not discharge their duty to him. In fact, just the opposite appears to be true, as he expressed satisfaction with their services. At that time he asked the trial judge to appoint them to appeal his case, all as shown by the following proceedings.
When the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder and fixed petitioner's punishment at life imprisonment, the petitioner told the court that he wanted to appeal the case, but that he did not have the money to hire an attorney for the appeal. Whereupon, the court told him that attorneys would be appointed for him. The court asked petitioner twice if his trial counsel would be satisfactory with him if they were appointed to appeal his case, and both times petitioner answered that he was satisfied with them and that their appointment for the appeal would be satisfactory with him. At that time the following colloquy took place between the court and the petitioner:
“The Court: The court is going to at this time if it is agreeable with you appoint the two attorneys who have represented you thus far in this case. Mr. Tom Drake and Mr. John Chapman. Now, are these attorneys agreeable with you? Are you satisfied with them to perfect this appeal for you?
“The defendant: Yes, sir.
“The Court: Of course, I have appointed these attorneys for you — Mr. Drake and Mr. Chapman — and you have indicated to the court that you are satisfied with them to perfect this appeal for you?
“The defendant: Yes.”
There is no question but what petitioner’s counsel were competent attorneys. His present attorney in this appeal admits and concedes that they were and are competent attorneys.
The present contention of petitioner that his trial counsel did not discharge their duty to him in connection with his trial is a complete reversal of his expressed satisfaction with their services at the end of the trial. It is obvious to me that such an argument is nothing but a hindsight maneuver on his part to get out of prison.
I assume that in remanding the case for a hearing on whether the attorneys' conduct prejudiced the petitioner, the majority has in mind the efforts of trial counsel with reference to petitioner’s insanity plea. I would point out that at no stage of the proceedings up to the present time has the petitioner named any witness who would testify that he was insane at the time of the offense, nor what the testimony would be, nor that any such witness is available and willing to testify and could be produced at a hearing. He has not alleged that his trial attorneys failed to investigate a single lead that he gave them relating to his insanity plea. Thus, it is clear that none of the basic and rudimentary requirements set forth in United States v. Uptain, supra, and other decided cases are present.
*1229Furthermore, petitioner has not shown any prejudice because of the services of his attorneys. We held in United States v. Phillips, 585 F.2d 745, 747 (5 Cir. 1978) that a showing of prejudice is required for the reversal of a conviction, saying:
“[W]e cannot reverse appellant’s conviction in the absence of a showing of prejudice. See United States v. James, 495 F.2d 434 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899, 95 S.Ct. 181, 42 L.Ed.2d 144 (1974); United States v. Saitta, 443 F.2d 830, 831 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938, 92 S.Ct. 269, 30 L.Ed.2d 250 (1971).”
The record shows that petitioner’s trial counsel were active in his defense. Besides filing the motion for continuance, they filed a motion for a mental examination of petitioner under Title 15, § 425, of the Alabama Code, and various other motions. They filed a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, which had to be filed as a special plea under Alabama law. During the trial they introduced the report of the psychologist, Dr. Dean, who had treated petitioner in California.5 They examined and cross-examined various witnesses on the insanity issue, including the sheriff, Olin Buzbee, the sheriff’s special investigator, G. 0. Bucke-lew, and the petitioner’s relatives. At the conclusion of the evidence, his attorneys made arguments to the jury in his behalf on the insanity issue. They also requested in writing a special charge on insanity and another on intoxication, both of which were denied by the court. However, the court did give the jury a full and complete charge on insanity as a defense. The court also furnished the jury with a special form prepared by counsel on which they could find Davis not guilty by reason of insanity. The court also charged the jury on the law as to first-degree murder and all lesser offenses, including murder by reason of insanity. They fully investigated the only lead given to them on the insanity issue by the petitioner, namely the treatment by Dr. Dean and his report. Nothing more could reasonably have been expected of trial counsel, especially in view of the fact they were appointed by the court and were representing a defendant who was competent both before and during the trial. In my opinion, petitioner’s trial counsel complied with the requirement of this circuit by rendering reasonably effective assistance to petitioner under the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, in my opinion, the representation which petitioner’s appointed trial counsel furnished to Davis fully discharged their duty to him.
The foregoing efforts on the part of trial counsel show that they rendered reasonably effective assistance of counsel on the insanity issue, which seems to be the only issue troubling the majority. This is especially true in view of the holding of another panel of this court in the prior appeal, as quoted above, which is binding on us, that:
(1) Petitioner had no history of irrational behavior.
(2) Dr. Dean’s report negated any suggestion of incompetency.
(3) Lay witnesses testified he did not act irrationally or seem incoherent shortly after the crime and while confined in jail.
(4) Petitioner’s demeanor when he testified at the hearing on the § 425 motion showed he was able to recite with great particularity and understanding facts concerning his family and his criminal record. There was no indication of incompetency.
(5) There was no evidence that he acted incompetently at his trial.
(6) The trial court did not err in dismissing petitioner’s habeas petition which called into question his competency.
545 F.2d 464, 465.
The majority opinion unnecessarily expands and enlarges the doctrine of “effective trial counsel.” A defendant is not entitled to “errorless counsel”, but only to coun*1230sel “reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.” 6
The “effective assistance of counsel” cases relied on by the majority are distinguishable on the facts from the instant case. Those cases, without discussing them in detail, have, for the most part, a common characteristic or thread running through them, namely, the fact that trial counsel conducted no investigation at all, or, more commonly, failed to investigate specific leads furnished by their clients that were germane to their defenses. That is not the situation here. In our case, the trial attorneys conducted an investigation on their own, and they fully investigated the only lead furnished to them by petitioner bearing on his insanity defense, namely, the treatment by Dr. Dean and his report. But I gather from the majority opinion that they would require trial counsel to do more, such as travel from Alabama to California, presumably at their own expense, and conduct an investigation of petitioner’s life from the time he was 10 years of age to the time he murdered his wife, without any leads furnished to them by their competent client, to try to discover by their own efforts in a widespread “fishing expedition”, a witness somewhere, some place, somehow, who might possibly testify on petitioner’s insanity defense. I think this is an unwarranted extension of the doctrine of what is required of an attorney “rendering reasonably effective assistance of counsel.”
In the instant case, if there was any deficiency in counsel’s investigation of petitioner’s case, it was caused by the failure of their competent client to furnish leads, and not by negligence on the part of counsel.
By hindsight, petitioner now suggests for the first time certain other “leads” which might, or might not, have revealed information favorable to his defense had they been fully investigated. And whereas, the majority finds defense counsel ineffective: (1) for failure to search petitioner’s past and uncover these leads for themselves, and (2) for then not fully developing these leads, I would require a competent defendant, such as the petitioner, and indeed, find it his duty, to assist his counsel by revealing instances of his past helpful to his own defense.
And lastly, should it be asserted that defense counsel failed to ask the right questions, which I candidly agree may or may not have been the case under the present state of the record, it must be remembered that the burden of proving ineffectiveness of counsel is upon the petitioner. And with regard to the record now before us, if there is any evidence at all establishing ineffectiveness in this regard, it is clearly not sufficient in my opinion to allow this court to overturn the finding of the district court made after hearing the witnesses and evaluating the evidence at the plenary hearing.
Finally, I would point out that petitioner has already had practically every kind of hearing and trial known to the state and federal courts. His case has been in litigation for seven years. He has practically made a career of it. He has had trials and hearings in all the Alabama state courts, including a trial and a coram nobis hearing in the district court, then appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Supreme Court. His hearings in the federal courts include three habeas corpus appearances in the district court, two appeals to this court, and an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. He has had his day in court many times over. In my opinion, instead of starting the proceedings all over again, it is time petitioner’s case is brought to a conclusion and he is made to pay the penalty assessed against him by the jury and the trial court for the heinous crime he committed. This is especially true *1231in view of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, which the majority admits.
It could be argued that the majority opinion, considered as a whole, along with the wording of the remand order, virtually predicts the outcome of the new hearing on prejudice it requires in the district court. Prejudice must be shown by the facts, and the district judge should have a free hand and be uninfluenced by anything we might say in determining it¡
I would affirm the judgment of the district court denying the writ.

. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama affirmed Davis’ conviction on October 1, 1974, Davis v. State, 53 Ala.App. 598, 302 So.2d 571 (1975). On November 8, 1974, the trial court denied a petition for writ of error, coram nobis; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this judgment on February 18, 1975. Finally, on April 24, 1975, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Davis’ petition for a writ of certiorari.

. Davis’ first petition was dismissed on December 20, 1974. His second petition was dismissed on June 11, 1975.

 “Defendant did not testify at trial, although the record indicates no evidence that he acted incompetently at that proceeding.” 545 F.2d 464, 465. (Emphasis supplied).

 “Dr. Dean’s report, defendant’s demeanor at trial, testimony of lay witnesses.”

 . . With respect to the Pate requirement that the trial court hold a competency hearing whenever defendant raises a bona fide doubt as to his competency to stand trial, our examination focuses on the facts known to the trial court at the time of trial. These facts are not in dispute; only the inferences to be drawn from those facts are contested. Those inferences being constitutionally guided by Pate and its progeny, no state evidentiary hearing was required. Likewise with regard to the substantive issue of competency, we have determined that the factual allegations contained in appellant’s petition, even if accepted as true, do not meet any test that this circuit has established as a threshold requirement that a claim of incompetency must satisfy; neither the ‘substantial allegations’ language of Lee, 386 F.2d at 97, the ‘bona fide’ doubt test of Pate and progeny —e. g. Grissom v. Wainwright, 494 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1974); Jordan v. Wainwright, 457 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1972); or the ‘real, substantial and legitimate doubt’ standard of Bruce, 483 F.2d at 1043.” 545 F.2d 465-466. (Emphasis supplied).

. Petitioner’s counsel were appointed by the court and could hardly have been expected to have such a mental examination made at their own expense after the trial judge refused to order it.

. At the evidentiary hearing, Judge Fred Folsom, Circuit Judge of the 32nd Judicial Circuit, State of Alabama, Cullman County, Alabama, who tried the case, testified as follows:
“ . . they made no showing as to what could be gained from a continuance, and their motion was general, in that they stated they wanted more time to prepare the defense.”

. See a discussion of the contents of this report in our prior opinion (545 F.2d 465) as quoted above.

. See MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5 Cir. 1960), modified 289 F.2d 928 (5 Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877, 82 S.Ct. 121, 7 L.Ed.2d 78 (1961), wherein the court held:
“We interpret the right to counsel as the right to effective counsel. We interpret counsel to mean not errorless counsel and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.” Also, see Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 127 (5 Cir. 1974); and Haggard v. Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5 Cir., 1977).