Court Opinion

ID: 9855026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:18:25.334662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.843820
License: Public Domain

Benham, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Hampton, who was convicted of two counts of selling cocaine, served a portion of the sentences, then was released to serve the remaining twenty-three years of the sentences on probation. After Hampton violated a special condition of his probation (failing to make payments on an assessed fine and supervision fee) and committed felony theft by taking, the trial court ordered the balance of Hampton’s probation revoked. On habeas corpus, the court *861reversed, and the majority holds that the habeas court incorrectly ruled that the revocation of the full balance of Hampton’s probation violated the provisions of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c). I disagree.
OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c) provides that if the violation of probation is the commission of a felony offense or the violation of a special condition, the court may revoke no more than the lesser of the balance of probation or the maximum penalty allowed by law for the felony. The majority holds that under this Court’s opinion in Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 170 (465 SE2d 440) (1996), the trial court was authorized to revoke the full balance of Hampton’s probation upon finding that he had violated both a special condition of probation and had committed a felony. However, Gearinger is inapplicable here because the basis for revocation in Gearinger solely involved the violation of a special condition rather than both the violation of a special condition and the commission of a felony.
Applying the literal wording of the statute means that the trial court in the instant case was only authorized to revoke Hampton’s probation for the lesser of the remaining length of the probated term (twenty-three years) or the maximum penalty for felony theft by taking (ten years). Concededly, if Hampton had solely failed to pay his fine, the trial court would have been authorized to revoke the remaining length of his probated term, 23 years. Although we may disagree with this result, there do exist rational reasons for the legislature’s enactment of such a statute. In revoking the amount of the maximum penalty for the felony offense committed, the state effectively “convicts” the defendant of the felony offense without going through the time and expense of a trial. See Sellers v. State, 107 Ga. App. 516, 518 (130 SE2d 790) (1963). The state also has a lesser burden of proof: it must only show that the defendant committed the offense by a preponderance of the evidence versus the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable at trial. OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (a); State v. Jones, 196 Ga. App. 896 (397 SE2d 209) (1990). Further, the defendant in a revocation proceeding, unlike at trial, is not entitled to appointed counsel. Mercer v. Hopper, 233 Ga. 620 (212 SE2d 799) (1975).
In revoking the remaining term of probation for violation of a special condition, the legislature may have viewed the contractual obligation between the state and the defendant as one of utmost importance: the obligation that the state would “grace” the defendant with the opportunity to serve the remaining portion of his sentence on probation and the defendant would, in return, serve probation in adherence to the special conditions, which by their nature have been tailored specifically to the defendant. The legislature could have viewed the special conditions important enough that if they are violated and the contract between the state and the defendant is thereby broken, *862the trial court would be authorized to take away entirely the privilege of probation (see Scott v. State, 131 Ga. App. 504 (206 SE2d 137) (1974)), and to revoke the entire remaining portion.
Decided July 1, 1996.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paige R. Whitaker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Norman Hampton, pro se.
This Court’s duty is to interpret the laws enacted by the legislature. The majority opinion does not interpret the challenged statute; it changes it. It is not this Court’s domain to change or alter the laws to effect what we view as a more desirable result, which may not be the result intended by the legislature. Although we may disagree with the result obtained from applying the statute, this Court may not question the wisdom of the legislature in enacting the statute. See Gaines v. Wolcott, 119 Ga. App. 313 (167 SE2d 366) (1969). There are rational reasons for its enactment, and the result, although perhaps not desirable, is not absurd.
The result may not be what we would prefer, but there are reasons, such as those enumerated above, which do present a rational basis for the legislature’s doing so. If the legislature did not intend this result, it of course has the authority to rewrite the statute to effect its intent. See Kneip v. Southern Engineering Co., 260 Ga. 409, 411 (395 SE2d 809) (1990). District attorneys may also change their probation revocation procedures to effect their intent. If the state chooses to bring a single revocation proceeding for two separate acts, then the revocation court is constrained to follow the statute. In a case such as this one, the state could avoid the limiting effect of the statute by initiating a revocation action based solely on the violation of the special condition, and subsequently prosecuting the felony offense. Of course, the state is then subjected to the expense of trial and all the other factors not associated with a revocation proceeding which were enumerated above.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.