Court Opinion

ID: 9392402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 19:00:19.801741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.665225
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 22-3182
                                       __________

                            GREGORY IFESINACHI EZEANI,
                                                   Appellant

                                             v.

JIMENEZ, DHS/ICE Arresting Officer; JANNELLE MALONEY, DHS/ICE Arresting Officer;
               MARK RAMOTOWSKI, DHS/ICE Arresting Officer;
                JOHN TSOUKARIS, DHS/ICE Field Office Director
                       ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the District of New Jersey
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-05165)
                      District Judge: Honorable Brian R. Martinotti
                      ____________________________________

                   Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                   May 2, 2023
               Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

                               (Opinion filed: May 4, 2023)
                                      ___________

                                       OPINION*
                                      ___________

PER CURIAM

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
       Gregory Ifesinachi Ezeani filed a pro se civil rights complaint in the United States

District Court for the District of New Jersey, raising claims stemming from his arrest by

immigration officers and his subsequent 10-month detention. (ECF 1.) He named as

defendants the officers who arrested him and a DHS/ICE field office director, suing them

in their official capacities only. As relief, Ezeani sought $10 million and return of his

passports. Ezeani also applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (ECF 1, at 7-8.)

       The District Court denied the IFP application, explaining that Ezeani “name[d]

defendants that are immune from suit.” See Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660-61 (3d

Cir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that “a court has the discretion to consider the merits of a

case and evaluate an IFP application in either order or even simultaneously”). The

District Court further ordered the clerk to close the case file, but explained that Ezeani

“may, within 14 days from the date of this order, file an amended complaint and IFP

application or, to reopen the case without further action from the Court, submit payment

in the amount of $402.” (ECF 3.) Ezeani appealed.1 (ECF 4.)

       In his brief, which we liberally construe, Ezeani challenges the District Court’s

conclusion that the defendants were immune from suit and its rejection of his request that

the defendants return his “permanently confiscated” passports. Appellant’s Br., 9-13.

Immunity is an affirmative defense, but a District Court may dismiss a complaint sua

sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) when a party’s immunity is clear on the face

1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532
F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d
848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir 1992).
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of the complaint. See Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002).

Whether a defendant is entitled to immunity is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.

See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).

       Because Ezeani sued the defendants, all of whom are employees of DHS/ICE,

only in their official capacities, sovereign immunity shields them to the extent that Ezeani

sought monetary damages. See Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 684 F.3d

382, 395 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Clark v. Libr. of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 103 (D.C. Cir.

1984) (stating that “[s]overeign immunity … bar[s] suits for money damages against

officials in their official capacity absent a specific waiver by the government”). But

claims requesting injunctive relief from federal officials are not barred by sovereign

immunity. See Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir. 2005);

cf. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326-27 (2015) (stating that

“we have long held that federal courts may in some circumstances grant injunctive relief

against ... violations of federal law by federal officials”). In his complaint, Ezeani

asserted that the defendants used “falsification of charges” to, among other things, seize

his passports. In addition to monetary relief, Ezeani sought “return of his international

travelling passports.” Compl., 5. Ezeani’s request for the return of his allegedly

unconstitutionally seized passports is not barred by sovereign immunity. See United

States v. 1461 W. 42nd St., Hialeah, Fla., 251 F.3d 1329, 1340 (11th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that “claims for equitable relief, such as the return of property …, do not

impinge upon sovereign immunity”); see also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647

(1962) (stating “that the action of a federal officer affecting property claimed by a

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plaintiff can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief against the officer as an

individual only if the officer’s action is ‘not within the officer’s statutory powers or, if

within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are

constitutionally void’”) (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S.

682, 702 (1949)). Therefore, because a portion of Ezeani’s complaint did not “seek[]

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief,” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)

(emphasis added), the District Court’s rejection of the entire action based on the

defendants’ immunity was improper.2

       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3

2
  We note that the District Court’s denial of Ezeani’s IFP application was not based on
his economic eligibility. Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 19 (3d Cir. 1976). If necessary,
that eligibility determination should be made by the District Court on remand.
3
 Ezeani’s “Motion for Default Judgement under Rule 55 and Motion for Summary
Judgement under Rule 56” is denied.
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