Court Opinion

ID: 9570686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:25:13.784659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:51.517849
License: Public Domain

Lewis, Chief Justice
(dissenting) :
I think that the complaint states a cause of action and I, therefore, dissent.
The allegations of the complaint, admitted for the purposes of demurrer, show that appellant (plaintiff) entered into a contract with the respondent Sales Consultants, an employment agency, under which Sales Consultants agreed to attempt to find employment for appellant. Pursuant to a newspaper advertisement by Sales Consultants and in furtherance of the contract between it and appellant, appellant was informed of a job opening with respondent Holt, Rine-hart and Winston, Inc. (HRW); and respondent Crabb, an *451employee of Sales Consultants, was assigned by the latter to handle negotiations between appellant and respondent HRW. Thereafter, appellant had a series of job interviews with HRW and, at one of these interviews, was told that she virtually had the job at an annual salary of $12,000.00, but would be notified of the outcome after an interview with another prospect. Sometime later, appellant learned that the other prospect was respondent Crabb, who was handling negotiations for her, and that he had been given the job which she had been seeking and which he and his company had agreed to assist her in securing.
Appellant was never told that respondent Crabb, an employee of respondent Sales Consultants, had applied, and was being'considered, for the position in question, but the negotiations between respondents were held in secret “at the very time they were interviewing the plaintiff [appellant] for the position.” The actions of respondent Crabb were approved by his employer, Sales Consultants, which accepted a fee from respondent HRW, knowing that they were breaching a contract with appellant.
The complaint alleges that the actions of the respondents constituted a course of double-dealing and wilful, deceitful and malicious conduct which deprived appellant of the prospective advantage she had in the likelihood of lucrative and permanent employment with respondent HRW. Damages are sought against all respondents for the alleged interference by them with appellant’s right to procure employment.
The question to be decided is whether the foregoing facts are actionable.
We have long recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with contract. Chitwood v. McMillan, 189 S. C. 262, 1 S. E. (2d) 162; Parker v. Brown, 195 S. C. 35, 10 S. E. (2d) 625; Keels v. Powell, 207 S. C. 97, 34 S. E. (2d) 482; Meadors v. S. C. Medical Assn., 266 S. C. 391, 223 S. E. (2d) 600.
*452There is no sound distinction between wrongfully interfering with a contractual relationship and wrongfully interfering with the right to contract. There is no material difference between the loss of employment and the inability to secure employment when each is caused by the malicious interference of a third person. In both, the intent and the injury are the same.
The decisions point out that an individual has a right to have business relations with anyone with whom he can contract, including the right to work or to contract to work; and the malicious interference with such right constitutes an actional infringement of a property right. It follows that, if a person is wrongfully prevented from securing a particular employment he is entitled to recover, provided it is shown that the failure to secure the employment was a direct and natural consequence of the wrongful act. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed., Section 130; 45 Am. Jur. (2d), Interference, Sections 50-51; Anno: 99 A. L. R. 12.
Under the allegations of the complaint, respondent Sales Consultants, and its employee, respondent Crabb, owed a duty to appellant to assist her in finding employment. While ostensibly engaged in so doing, respondent Crabb, with the approval of his employer, respondent Sales Consultants, violated this duty and obligation by secretly procuring the job for himself. Respondent HRW knew of the contractual relationship between appellant and the other respondents and, with such knowledge, aided the other respondents in destroying any right of appellant to the job by giving it to respondent Crabb who had bound himself to protect appellant’s interests.
Respondent Crabb forfeited any competitive right to seek the position in question to the detriment of appellant when he and his employer contracted to assist her in procuring the same job.
The complaint alleges that the actions of respondents were done maliciously, “malice having the meaning in this con*453nection of the intentional doing of a wrongful act without justification or excuse.” Keels v. Powell, supra.
The complaint alleges a cause of action for the malicious interference with appellant’s right to secure employment and the demurrer should have been overruled.
I would reverse the judgment and remand for trial.
Gregory, J., concurs.