Court Opinion

ID: 9916424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 23:02:14.037392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:21.969352
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/9/24
                         CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION ONE

                             STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 JEANETTE SARMIENTO,                       D082443

          Petitioner,

          v.
                                           (San Diego County
                                           Super. Ct. No. SCD297592)
 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN
 DIEGO COUNTY,

          Respondent;

 THE PEOPLE,

          Real Party in Interest.

        PETITION for writ of mandate from an order of the Superior Court of
San Diego County, Dwayne K. Moring, Judge. Petition granted.
        Katherine Braner, Chief Deputy Public Defender and Emily Rose-
Weber, Deputy Public Defender for Petitioner.
        Summer Stephan, District Attorney, Linh Lam, Chief Deputy District
Attorney, Valerie Ryan and Sara Staninger, Deputy District Attorneys, for
Real Party in Interest.
        No appearance by Respondent.
      In this case, defendant Jeanette Sarmiento requested mental health

diversion (Pen. Code, § 1001.361) after she was charged with attempted
robbery arising from an incident in which she handed a liquor store clerk a
note written in lipstick on a napkin saying, “Let me get the money.” The
store employees did not give her any money. Instead, they called 911.
According to one of the employees, “[I]t looked like she wanted us to call the
police.”
      An unrebutted psychiatric evaluation submitted in support of
Sarmiento’s request for diversion diagnosed her as suffering from
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depressive disorder, and
stimulant use disorder specific to methamphetamine. The PTSD likely
resulted from years of sexual trauma she suffered as a child and adolescent.
The parties agree that Sarmiento never received treatment for her
foundational mental health diagnoses of PTSD and depression, and her
substance abuse largely served as a form of self-medication for those
underlying conditions. Although she successfully completed two substance
abuse treatment programs—one in 2013 resulted in years of sobriety—the
failure to address the foundational mental health issues ultimately led to
relapse and a resumption of criminal behavior.
      Although it found that Sarmiento met many of the requirements for
diversion, the trial court denied her request based on two principal concerns.
First and primarily, it found that “her inability to remain drug-free after
prior participation in [substance abuse] treatment” indicated “she would not
respond well to mental health treatment,” which accordingly would not “meet
[her] specialized mental health treatment needs.” Second, although the court

1     All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
                                       2
did not find that Sarmiento was likely to commit a super strike offense as
required by the statute’s definition of dangerousness, it nonetheless
concluded that Sarmiento “pose[d] an unreasonable risk of danger to the
public,” and this was an additional factor in the court’s decision to deny
diversion.
      By its terms, section 1001.36 was designed to encourage trial courts to
broadly authorize pretrial mental health diversion, providing treatment for
qualifying mental disorders that result in criminal behavior. As with any
principled exercise of discretion, the court must utilize the appropriate
criteria consistent with the principles and purposes of the governing law, only
drawing conclusions supported by substantial evidence. Applying these
principles, neither of the reasons relied on by the trial court provide a proper
basis to deny diversion. Accordingly, we issue the writ and direct the court to
grant the request for mental health diversion.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.   Mental Health History

      Sarmiento was raised by her mother and stepfather. Between the ages
of five and eight, along with a group of other children, she was sexually
abused by her 30-year-old stepbrother on a repeated basis. Sarmiento did not
report the abuse to anyone until she was an adult.
      Sarmiento’s stepfather, who she was close to, died of a heart attack
when she was 13. She was hospitalized and saw a psychologist after she
threatened to commit suicide by jumping off a bridge. At about the same
time, she began using methamphetamine, later selling it with her brother
Oscar. A few years later, while still in high school, she was gang raped at a
party.

                                       3
      In 2013, after being arrested for selling drugs, Sarmiento completed a
120-day residential substance abuse treatment program. She maintained her
sobriety for nearly six years, but relapsed in 2019 as a result of an unhealthy
romantic relationship with a meth addict who used in her presence and
encouraged her to join him. This led to four hospitalizations in that year and
two robbery convictions in 2020. While incarcerated she completed
additional courses on substance abuse, but received no treatment for her
primary mental health diagnoses. She appeared to relapse again shortly
before the attempted robbery charge in this case.
      Sarmiento’s parole agent supervised her before her latest arrest, and
was surprised that it occurred. She characterized Sarmiento as a “ ‘model
parolee’ ” who followed the rules and maintained contact as required. She
noted, however, that “drug use exacerbates [Sarmiento’s] mental health
issues.”
      Following her arrest, Sarmiento was the subject of a psychological
evaluation by Dr. Cynthia Boyd. Boyd’s diagnosis confirmed that Sarmiento
suffered from two mental disorders—major depressive disorder and PTSD.
Boyd noted that while these were consistent with prior diagnoses, in the past
“the underlaying cause of her mental illness was not explored.” She
concluded that Sarmiento would require, among other types of intervention,
“trauma-focused psychotherapy for symptoms of untreated, chronic PTSD.”
In Boyd’s opinion, Sarmiento could be safely treated in the community and
the “symptoms of [her] mental disorder motivating the criminal behavior
would respond to mental health treatment.”

B.   Request for Mental Health Diversion

      In advance of the preliminary hearing, Sarmiento filed a request for
mental health diversion under section 1001.36. In support, she attached Dr.

                                       4
Boyd’s evaluation and medical records, as well as the statements of various
witnesses including family members, her employer, and her parole agent.
Boyd offered specific opinions with supporting reasons that (1) the symptoms
of Sarmiento’s mental disorders motivating her criminal behavior would
respond to treatment, and (2) she would not pose an unreasonable risk to
public safety if treated in the community. Sarmiento also included a report
indicating she had been approved for a County-funded residential substance
abuse treatment program. She proposed linking substance abuse treatment
in a residential setting with County-funded outpatient mental health
treatment that would provide case management, medication management,
and individual therapy. The People opposed with argument but no additional
evidence.
      At the hearing on the motion in May 2023, Sarmiento’s counsel
emphasized the necessity and importance of providing mental health
treatment, specifically therapy and psychiatric medication, for her two
primary diagnoses—PTSD and major depressive disorder. He noted that her
past attempts at substance abuse treatment had achieved significant success,
but the focus on substance abuse was “the only thing that she has done.”
“The part that has been missing,” he said, “is seeing a psychotherapist and
taking medication” to address her mental health issues. Counsel also
provided additional specifics regarding the treatment plan, explaining that
the residential substance abuse treatment program would be for a minimum
of three months and that the outpatient mental health services would include

psychiatric medication.2

2     Counsel added, “The only thing I don’t know is where the [psychiatric]
services will occur.” The court acknowledged that counsel had described the
planned services “in a more elaborate and detailed manner than what your
paperwork shows.”
                                      5
      In response, the People questioned Sarmiento’s eligibility for diversion,
taking issue with the court’s tentative conclusion that her mental disorders
played a significant role in the commission of the charged crime. (See
§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) As to her suitability for the program, the People
expressly conceded that Sarmiento met two of the four requirements: (1) she
had presented the opinion of a qualified mental health expert (Dr. Boyd)
indicating that the symptoms of her mental health disorders would respond
to treatment, and (2) she had agreed to waive her speedy trial rights. (See
id., subd. (c)(1) & (2).) Instead, they argued that notwithstanding Dr. Boyd’s
evaluation, Sarmiento had failed to establish her symptoms would respond to

treatment.3 They also contended the mental health treatment plan proposed
for Sarmiento was insufficiently specific to demonstrate that it would meet
her specialized needs. (See § 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).) Lastly, they
maintained she would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in
the community. (See id., subd. (c)(4).)
      Ruling from the bench, the court denied the request for diversion.
Referring to the statutory criteria, it began by expressly finding that
Sarmiento met both of the eligibility standards. She “suffers from a
qualifying mental disorder” and “her mental disorders were significant
factors in the commission of the offense.” As for suitability, the judge
accepted that she had consented to diversion and agreed to comply with her
treatment plan.
      But the court nonetheless found Sarmiento was not suitable for
diversion due to several factors. First, it concluded that Sarmiento’s

3     Admittedly, there is some inconsistency between the People’s
opposition papers and their statement at the hearing that they “do not
dispute . . . that her mental disorder would respond to treatment.”
                                          6
“inability to remain drug-free after prior participation in treatment”
indicated “she would not respond well to mental health treatment.” The
judge believed her past failures in drug treatment predicted more of the same
if diversion were authorized. In the judge’s view, “past performance is the
best indicator of future performance and success.”
      On a related point, the court expressed doubt that the proposed
treatment program “will meet the specialized treatment needs of the
defendant.” Its reasoning sounded a familiar refrain: “If she didn’t have the
prior history of committing this conduct, I think we’d be in a different boat.
Having previously received treatment for the substance abuse, and having
been punished criminally for these offenses and then to continue with this
conduct, I don’t see the mental health diversion as appropriate.”
      Finally, the trial court acknowledged that section 1001.36 expressly
defines “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” by reference to section
1170.18, subdivision (c). Such a risk exists only if the evidence indicates it is
likely the defendant will commit a so-called “super strike” violent felony.
(See § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv); see, e.g., People v. Williams (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 990, 1001 (Williams).) Although the court did not make such a
finding, the judge referenced his “residual” discretion under the statute in
concluding that diversion should be denied because Sarmiento “pose[d] an
unreasonable risk of danger to the public.”
      On Sarmiento’s petition for writ of mandate, we issued an order to
show cause.
                                  DISCUSSION

      In 2018, the Legislature enacted section 1001.36 to create a program of
pretrial diversion for criminal defendants with diagnosed mental health
disorders. (Stats. 2018, ch. 34 (Assem. Bill No. 1810); Stats. 2018, ch. 1005

                                         7
(Sen. Bill No. 215).) Diversion allows for the suspension of criminal
proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of
mental health treatment. (See People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 631.)
The express purpose of this legislation was to “[i]ncrease[ ] diversion of [such]
individuals” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a)) based on concerns that “incarceration only
serves to aggravate [their] preexisting conditions and does little to deter
future lawlessness.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 3, 2018, p. 5.) Successful
mental health treatment, in contrast, both helps the individual and makes
the community safer. More recent amendments have only confirmed the
Legislature’s desire to expand mental health treatment through diversion.
(See Stats. 2022, ch. 735 (Sen. Bill No. 1223); People v. Whitmill (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149 (Whitmill) [“The Legislature intended the mental
health diversion program to apply as broadly as possible.”].)

A.    The Mental Health Diversion Process: An Overview

      Effective January 1, 2023, mental health diversion requires trial court
findings that the defendant is both eligible for diversion and suitable for the
program. The criteria for each are specified in the statute. (§ 1001.36, subds.
(b) & (c).) Defendants are eligible if they have been diagnosed with a
recognized mental disorder that was a significant factor in the commission of
the criminal offense with which they are charged. (Id., subd. (b).) They are
suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the
defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant
agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply
with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an
“unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as defined in sections 1170.18
and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)

                                        8
      In successive versions of section 1001.36, the Legislature has provided
increasingly detailed guidance for deciding whether a defendant qualifies for
diversion. Initially, the statute listed six criteria that the defendant had to
meet. The first two were phrased as requiring the court to be “satisfied” that
(1) the defendant suffered from a recognized mental disorder, and (2) the
disorder was a “significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.”
(Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (B); Stats. 2018, ch. 1005, § 1.)
Effective January 1, 2023, however, these first two requirements were
recharacterized as “eligibility” criteria. More substantively, a defendant’s
eligibility no longer turned on findings to the court’s “satisfaction.” Rather,
defendants are generally eligible if they “ha[ve] been diagnosed” with a
recognized mental disorder. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) Beyond that, the
amended statute creates a presumption that the defendant’s diagnosed
mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged
crime. The court is directed to find a causal connection “unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that [the mental disorder] was not a motivating
factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in
the alleged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
      The amended statute groups the remaining four criteria in section
1001.36, subdivision (c) to assess the defendant’s “suitability” for diversion.
As with the “diagnosis” eligibility requirement, the first of these relies on
input from a medical professional, in this instance “the opinion of a qualified
mental health expert,” that the symptoms of defendant’s mental disorder
“would respond to mental health treatment.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) The second
and third requirements are satisfied if the defendant agrees to waive his or
her speedy trial rights and to comply with treatment as a condition of
diversion. (Id., subd. (c)(2)–(3).) Only the fourth requirement necessitates

                                         9
a trial court finding—that the defendant “will not pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety . . . if treated in the community.” (Id., subd. (c)(4).)
Even here, however, the Legislature has narrowly defined the applicable
standard. Borrowing from sections 1170.18, subdivision (c) and 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), an “ ‘unreasonable risk . . . to public safety’ ” means
a likelihood that the defendant will commit one of the violent felonies

specifically enumerated in the statute.4 (Williams, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1001; People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450 (Moine) [“risk of
danger is narrowly confined to the likelihood the defendant will commit a
limited subset of violent felonies”].)
      Assuming the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court
must also be satisfied “that the recommended inpatient or outpatient
program of mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental health
treatment needs of the defendant.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); see People v.
Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079 (Gerson).) This is not an additional
eligibility or suitability requirement the defendant must meet. Rather,
subdivision (f)(1) of section 1001.36 read as a whole appears to contemplate
an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive appropriate

treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion program.5

4      As listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), these felonies include
several sex offenses, any homicide offense, solicitation to commit murder,
assault with a machinegun on a police officer or firefighter, possession of a
weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or violent felony punishable by
life imprisonment or death.
5       Subdivision (f)(1)(A)(ii) of section 1001.36 requires agreement of the
proposed treatment entity to accept responsibility for treating the defendant.
Subdivision (f)(1)(A)(iii) allows a county mental health agency that believes it
is unable to provide proper services to submit a written declaration to that
effect.
                                         10
      Finally, even where defendants make a prima facie showing that they
meet all the express statutory requirements, the court may still exercise its
discretion to deny diversion. (Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079; see
also People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888 (Qualkinbush).)
But this “residual” discretion must be exercised “ ‘consistent with the
principles and purpose of the governing law.’ ” (Qualkinbush, at p. 891,
quoting Wade v. Superior Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 694, 710; Williams,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001 [“ ‘scope of discretion always resides in the
particular law being applied’ ”].) That purpose includes a strong legislative
preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of
such treatment to both the offending individual and the community. Where
the court chooses to exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its
statement of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes
of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.
(Qualkinbush, at pp. 891–892.)

B.   Because Sarmiento never previously received treatment for her
     underlying mental disorders, there was insufficient evidence to show that
     her symptoms would not respond to treatment.

      The trial court’s principal reason for denying diversion was its
assessment that Sarmiento had failed in two prior attempts at drug
treatment, as evidenced by the fact that she relapsed and thereafter resumed
her criminal behavior. The court believed this indicated her condition would
not likely respond successfully to a third attempt at treatment. In the judge’s
opinion, her “past performance”—specifically her “inability to remain drug
free”—did not justify another try.
      Initially we note that relapse following drug treatment does not
necessarily mean that the participant “failed” or that treatment was
“unsuccessful.” Scientific research on brain function has now discredited the
                                       11
once common misconception that people suffering from a substance abuse
disorder simply lack sufficient willpower or moral principles. According to
the National Institute on Drug Addiction (NIDA), part of the National
Institute of Health (NIH), drug addiction is a complex disease like many

other chronic health conditions and progress is rarely linear.6 Significantly,
“people in recovery from drug use disorders are at increased risk for
returning to drug use even after years of not taking the drug. [¶]
It’s common for a person to relapse, but relapse doesn’t mean that treatment

doesn’t work” (italics added).7
      More importantly, the undisputed evidence in this case indicates
Sarmiento never received any coordinated treatment for her two primary

mental health diagnoses—PTSD and major depressive disorder.8 It appears
the trial court failed to appreciate the distinction between different types of
treatment, conflating substance abuse recovery with therapy and medication
directed at PTSD and depression. Even if her prior attempts at substance
abuse treatment could be characterized as unsuccessful, Dr. Boyd’s report

6     NIDA/NIH, Understanding Drug Use and Addiction DrugFacts,
<https://nida.nih.gov/publications/drugfacts/understanding-drug-use-
addiction> (as of Jan. 9, 2024), archived at <https://perma.cc/67A9-YNP2>
(hereafter NIDA/NIH fact sheet).
7     The NIDA/NIH fact sheet explains that like other chronic health
conditions, treatment for substance abuse disorders “should be ongoing and
should be adjusted based on how the patient responds.”
8     We have accepted Dr. Boyd’s conclusion that Sarmiento’s PTSD is
“chronic” and “untreated,” as well as the People’s express concession that “the
record does not contain evidence that Petitioner received prior sustained
treatment for [PTSD] or depression.” We do not view references in Dr. Boyd’s
report to prior mental health diagnoses or her current medications as in any
way inconsistent with this conclusion or concession. Nor can we speculate on
why Sarmiento was prescribed any medications she is currently taking.
                                       12
makes clear that Sarmiento was unable to maintain her sobriety because her
underlying mental health conditions—the ones that drove her substance
abuse as a means of self-medication—were never addressed.
      This point was emphasized by defense counsel in oral argument on the
motion. The treatment regimen that diversion would make possible
expressly linked residential substance abuse treatment with psychiatric
medication and psychotherapy addressing the untreated PTSD and
depression. Boyd offered her conclusion that the symptoms of Sarmiento’s
mental health disorders would respond to the proposed treatment plan; the
People offered no contrary expert opinion. On this record, where her mental
health disorders were never treated comprehensively, there is insufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Sarmiento’s symptoms
would not respond to treatment.

C.   The court’s concern with Sarmiento’s lack of success in past attempts at
     substance abuse treatment does not support a finding that the
     recommended treatment would not meet her “specialized needs.”

      The trial court employed similar reasoning in support of its conclusion
that the recommended treatment plan would not meet Sarmiento’s
“specialized mental health treatment needs.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).)
Reprising his principal criticism of Sarmiento, the judge focused on her
inability to remain law-abiding after receiving substance abuse treatment.
“[W]e’d be in a different boat,” he candidly acknowledged, if Sarmiento “didn’t
have the prior history of committing this conduct,” of “having previously
received treatment for the substance abuse,” “of having been punished
criminally for these offenses,” and then reoffending.
      To the extent these criticisms merely reiterate the trial court’s concern
that Sarmiento was not appropriate for diversion because her prior attempts
at substance abuse treatment were unsuccessful, they are subject to the same
                                      13
objection as the court’s conclusion that her symptoms would not respond to
treatment. Sarmiento’s supposed lack of success in drug treatment does not
rationally support a conclusion that a comprehensive program of treatment
for her underlying mental health diagnoses of PTSD and depression, coupled
with substance abuse treatment, would not yield different (and more positive)
results.
      But there is an additional flaw in the court’s analysis. As we have
already explained, subdivision (f)(1) of section 1001.36 does not create an
additional eligibility or suitability requirement for the defendant. The focus
of this provision is on the program of treatment, providing reasonable
assurance that it will address the defendant’s particular mental health
needs. Under this provision, a court might reject diversion if it concluded
that the proposed treatment services did not target or could not effectively

address the defendant’s particular diagnosis.9 Here, the alleged failure of
prior drug treatment programs says nothing about any inadequacy of the
proposed plan to address Sarmiento’s mental health needs. Indeed,
Dr. Boyd’s evaluation specifically explains why the current proposal is
significantly different from Sarmiento’s prior substance abuse-only treatment
efforts that were not linked to monitored psychiatric medication and therapy
addressing her PTSD and depression. Again, we conclude there is no
substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion that the recommended
treatment program will not meet Sarmiento’s specialized mental health
treatment needs.

9     For instance, the court might be legitimately concerned if the
evaluation of the defendant suggested the need for psychiatric medication
and the recommended program did not provide psychiatric services.
                                      14
D.   The trial court misapplied the statutory criteria in deciding that residual
     concerns for public safety not amounting to a likelihood that Sarmiento
     will commit a super strike offense can justify the denial of diversion.

      Apart from concerns with what it believed were her failures following
drug treatment, the court also relied on its residual discretion under the
diversion statute to conclude that Sarmiento “pose[d] an unreasonable risk to
public safety.” It acknowledged that an “unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety” is expressly defined in the statute to mean a likelihood that if
the defendant is granted diversion, she will commit one of the “super strike”
violent felonies enumerated in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). Yet it
made no finding of such a likelihood, impliedly acknowledging there was
none. Rather, the judge referenced his “residual” discretion under the
statute: “But this is a statute that is discretionary and is up to the discretion
of the court.” On that basis and without any further analysis, he concluded
that “this behavior does pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public.”
      As we explained in Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 879, even after
a defendant makes a prima facie case that she meets all the qualifications to
be considered for diversion—as Sarmiento did here—the court “may still
exercise its discretion to deny mental health diversion.” (Id. at p. 888;
Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.) Necessarily, however, this
residual discretion must still be exercised consistent with express statutory
requirements and the underlying purposes of mental health diversion, as well
as an understanding of the findings that prompted the Legislature to create
the diversion program. So while it is clear a trial court retains “residual”
discretion to deny diversion even if all the threshold requirements are met,
that does not mean, as the court suggested here, that it could reject a request
for diversion based on an alternative meaning of “public safety” inconsistent
with the specific statutory definition in section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4).

                                       15
In the guise of exercising its “residual” discretion, a court is not permitted to
redefine public safety in a manner inconsistent with the Legislature’s
expressed intent. (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450 [“the risk of danger
is narrowly confined to the likelihood the defendant will commit a limited
subset of violent felonies”].)
      In Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138 (Whitmill), our colleagues in
the Second Appellate District, Division Eight recently reached a conclusion
fully consistent with this principle. Indeed, the background facts of Whitmill
are quite similar. The defendant was diagnosed with military sexual trauma
and PTSD. (86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144.) A psychological evaluation
concluded that he had “ ‘severe mental illlness’ further complicated by
substance abuse.” (Ibid.) The evaluating psychologist proposed a dual-
diagnosis treatment program that included antidepressant medication,
psychological therapy, and substance abuse treatment. (Id. at p. 1145.)
In the psychologist’s opinion, this treatment plan would allow the defendant
to be safely treated in the community. (Ibid.) The prosecution opposed the
request but submitted no contrary expert testimony. (Ibid.)
      On this record, the trial court in Whitmill denied the defendant’s
request for mental health diversion, relying on evidence that in conjunction
with the current charges, the defendant threatened to kill his girlfriend after
firing a gun in the air. Although he then threw the gun away and
immediately surrendered to a deputy without incident, the court nonetheless
concluded that defendant’s conduct created an unacceptable risk of
dangerousness. (86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1146.)
      The Court of Appeal disagreed and reversed with directions to grant
diversion. Acknowledging that the decision to offer diversion was committed
to the trial court’s sound discretion and noting this discretion applied even

                                        16
where the defendant facially met all the threshold statutory requirements
(86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149), Whitmill emphasized the need for the court to
consider “the primary purposes of the mental health diversion statute,” which
included “keep[ing] people with mental disorders from entering and
reentering the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.” (Ibid.)
It further noted the Legislature’s intent that the diversion program “apply as
broadly as possible.” (Ibid.)
      The sole issue in the case was whether the defendant would pose “an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety . . . if treated in the community.”
(Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1150.) In other words, diversion was
properly denied only if the defendant was “too dangerous to be treated in the
community because he would commit a new violent super strike.” (Ibid.)
Considering the defendant’s lack of a prior record of violence and the totality
of circumstances in the case, the appellate court concluded there was “no
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that appellant posed
an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike if treated in the
community.” (Id. at p. 1156.) The trial judge likewise applied an incorrect
standard by “fail[ing] to consider the primary purposes of mental health
diversion as set forth in section 1001.35.” (Whitmill, at p. 1156.) As a
concurring justice added, granting diversion was “the result the legislature
intends courts to reach under these circumstances.” (Id. at p. 1156, conc. opn.
of Harutunian, J.)
      Similarly here, there is no substantial evidence to support a conclusion
that Sarmiento was likely to commit a super strike offense. Indeed, the
charged offense in this case involved no evidence of a weapon or threat of
violence. Nor could the court invoke its “residual” discretion to create a
definition of “risk to public safety” inconsistent with the statutory definition.

                                       17
“By requiring an assessment of whether the defendant ‘will commit a new
violent felony’ within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), a
trial court necessarily must find the defendant is ‘likely to commit a super-
strike offense.’ ” (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450, quoting People v.
Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1310.) There is no basis for such a
conclusion here.
      Expanding the reasons to deny diversion would also be inconsistent
with the legislative purposes sought to be achieved in enacting sections
1001.35 and 1001.36. In both the original legislation and subsequent
amendments, the Legislature has made it abundantly clear that for persons
with diagnosed disorders, mental health treatment provides the best strategy
for breaking the cycle of criminal recidivism. (Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 1149 [“stated purpose of this legislation is to keep people
with mental disorders from entering and reentering the criminal justice
system while protecting public safety”].) Reducing crime makes our
communities safer, to be sure, but successful treatment also improves our
society in a myriad of other ways by helping those with mental disorders
become more productive citizens, to the benefit of their families, their
employers, and the community at large. The trial court’s decision here failed
to follow the Legislature’s direction to focus less on the flaws in Sarmiento’s
past and more on the promise of her future and that of her community.
      We are sensitive to and respect the concerns of our dissenting colleague
regarding the importance of trial court discretion. Collectively we served on
the superior court for more than 30 years. But where to draw the line
between the proper and improper exercise of discretion is always a matter of
degree and context. And while the majority and dissenting opinions here
surely reflect philosophical differences regarding mental health diversion, the

                                       18
respective views of appellate judges on the topic are not the determining
factor. Rather, the scope of trial court discretion in applying the statute must
be informed by an appreciation for the crucial role of the Legislature in
setting criminal justice policy.
      Relying on advances in psychology and neuroscience, the Legislature
has made it abundantly clear that for defendants whose criminal behavior is
a function of their diagnosed mental health disorders, treatment is the much
preferred option so that diversion should “apply as broadly as possible.”
(Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149.) And we cannot ignore that from
the legislative perspective, a defendant like Sarmiento is the poster child for
mental health diversion. Although she plainly never asked for the
psychological conditions that challenge her, the question is not whether
Sarmiento “deserved” the opportunity for treatment. The Legislature has
determined that in most cases, the community will be safer if defendants like
Sarmiento receive mental health treatment so that they will pose fewer risks
to the community both now and in the future. The trial court’s role is to
determine whether a narrow range of factors warrant making this specific
case an exception. None of the court’s specified reasons here justify the
decision to deny Sarmiento mental health diversion.

                                       19
                                DISPOSITION

      A peremptory writ of mandate shall issue directing the superior court
to vacate its order denying mental health diversion and enter a new order
granting her request. The stay issued August 22, 2023 is vacated on the date
this opinion becomes final as to this court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.264(b).)

                                                                      DATO, J.

I CONCUR:

KELETY, J.

                                       20
Irion, J., Dissenting.

      I disagree with the majority’s resolution of this case. In my view, in
granting writ relief the majority neglects principles of writ review, disregards
the applicable standard of review, ignores facts that refute its premises and
conclusions, and misconstrues the mental health diversion statute. I cannot
join such a decision.
                                        I
                    No Basis for Extraordinary Writ Review
      No order to show cause should have been issued in this case. Except
when it is the only form of appellate review available, writ review of an
interlocutory order should be confined to two categories of cases. One
category includes cases presenting an issue of “public or jurisprudential
significance,” such as “a novel or constitutional question,” an issue “of
widespread interest,” or an issue that has produced “conflicting trial court
interpretations [that] need resolution.” (Science Applications Internat. Corp.
v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1100.) The other includes
cases where “the lower court’s determination imposes unusually harsh and
unfair results for which ordinary appellate review is inadequate.” (Id. at
pp. 1100–1101.) This case fits into neither category.
                                        A
                           No Significant Legal Issue
      Jeanette Sarmiento raised no significant legal question in her petition.
She merely complained that in denying her request for mental health
diversion, the trial court applied incorrect legal standards and reached
conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence. That is a routine challenge
to the court’s assessment of the evidence and exercise of discretion in
applying the governing statute to the evidence. Prerogative writs should be
used to review discretionary pretrial rulings only when they involve
“questions of first impression that are of general importance to the trial
courts and to the profession, and where general guidelines can be laid down
for future cases.” (Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 58
Cal.2d 180, 185, fn. 4; accord, Langhorne v. Superior Court (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 225, 234; see Conway v. Municipal Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d
1009, 1016 (Conway) [writ of mandate “will not lie to force an exercise of
discretion in a particular manner”].) That is not the situation here.
                                       B
                             No Irreparable Injury
      Sarmiento also has not shown she will suffer harm that cannot be
adequately redressed on appeal. The order denying mental health diversion
could have been reviewed on appeal of the judgment finally entered in her

case. (Pen. Code, §§ 1237, subd. (a), 1259;1 People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 879, 887–888 (Qualkinbush).) Appeal is a presumptively
adequate remedy, and Sarmiento has the burden to show it is not. (Phelan v.
Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 366 (Phelan); People v. Jahansson
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 202, 213; Provencher v. Municipal Court (1978) 83
Cal.App.3d 132, 133–134 (Provencher).) She has not met that burden.
      Sarmiento’s allegation she “has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at
law other than the relief sought in this petition,” made “without reference to
any facts, [is] not sufficient to sustain [her] burden of showing that the
remedy of appeal would be inadequate.” (Phelan, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 370.)
Neither is her allegation she “w[ould] be irreparably injured” without writ
review by being “deprived of critical mental health treatment and her lawful

1     Subsequent undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
                                        2
opportunity to earn a dismissal of her criminal charge” and by being
“unjustly expose[d] . . . to a term in state prison” through continued
prosecution. She has not explained why she cannot obtain necessary mental
health treatment while the criminal case proceeds against her, nor identified
any specific injury she will suffer without treatment. Any prison term
imposed on Sarmiento could be vacated, and her opportunity to obtain
dismissal of the attempted robbery charge could be restored, by a successful
attack on the order denying mental health diversion in an appeal of the
judgment entered in the case. What Sarmiento is really complaining about is
having to go through a trial, and if necessary, an appeal. “A trial does not
generally meet the definition of ‘irreparable injury,’ being at most an
irreparable inconvenience.” (Ordway v. Superior Court (1988) 198
Cal.App.3d 98, 101, fn. 1 (Ordway).) And the remedy by appeal “ ‘is not
inadequate merely because more time would be consumed by pursuing it
through the ordinary course of law than would be required in the use of an
extraordinary writ.’ ” (Provencher, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 134.)
                                        C
                   Disruption of Orderly Processing of Cases
      There is simply nothing unusual about this case that warrants
extraordinary writ review. It is a routine matter that should have been
handled in the routine way, i.e., by a trial followed, if necessary, by an
appeal. Because review of an interlocutory order on appeal from the final
judgment is an adequate remedy in the usual case, reviewing courts should
not delay trials and vex parties with multiple proceedings by regularly
intervening by writ whenever a party claims the trial court ruled wrongly on
a motion. (Provencher, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 134.) “Also, it is not fair to
parties on appeal who have often waited years for the final resolution of their

                                        3
disputes to have litigants in the pretrial stage elbow their way into the line at
our door.” (Ordway, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 101, fn. 1.) By taking “ ‘ “too
lax a view of the ‘extraordinary’ nature of prerogative writs” ’ ” in issuing the
order to show cause in this case, the majority delayed resolution of appeals
pending in this court to issue an opinion of no precedential value. (Omaha
Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1272.) I
disagree with that decision.
                                        II
                    No Basis for Extraordinary Writ Relief
      No writ relief should be granted in this case. The majority’s contrary
decision flows from its foundational error in not clearly articulating and
applying the applicable standard of review: abuse of discretion. An opinion
“that fails to apply the appropriate standard of review is of questionable
value because it is little more than untethered personal opinion. In such a
case, principles of law are discussed with no point of reference. They are not
circumscribed by proper deference to the appellate standard of review.”
(People v. Foss (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 113, 125.) As I explain below, when
the trial court’s order is reviewed for abuse of discretion, it must be upheld.
                                        A
                               Standard of Review
      The mental health diversion statute provides the trial court “may, in its
discretion,” grant a defendant’s pretrial request for diversion. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (a).) An order denying such a request is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080 (Gerson);
Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 887.) That standard is
“deferential,” but “the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a
trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are

                                        4
reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 709,
711–712, fns. omitted.) “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an
arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard
[citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that
are not supported by substantial evidence [citation].” (People v. Moine (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.) A decision that “exceed[s] the bounds of reason”
(Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478 (Shamblin)) or “is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it” (People
v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony)) constitutes an abuse of
discretion. A party attacking a decision as an abuse of discretion must show
such prejudicial abuse. (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 869; People
v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 213 (Pacheco).)
                                        B
             No Prejudicial Error in Trial Court’s Determinations
      Sarmiento challenges the trial court’s determinations she would not
respond to mental health treatment, posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, and had not presented a satisfactory treatment plan to meet
her specialized mental health needs. The majority concludes errors in each of
those determinations require the trial court to vacate its order denying her
request for mental health diversion and to enter a new order granting the
request. I shall address each alleged error and explain why, in my view, none
justifies the relief granted by the majority.

                                        5
                                        1
       No Abuse of Discretion in Response to Treatment Determination
      The majority faults the trial court for relying on Sarmiento’s relapses
into substance abuse and criminal behavior after having twice undergone
treatment for substance abuse to conclude she would not respond to mental
health treatment. According to the majority, those relapses do not indicate
any failure on the part of Sarmiento or any lack of success of the prior
treatment because substance abusers commonly relapse. (Maj. opn., ante, at
pp. 11–12.) The majority faults the trial court for “conflating substance abuse
recovery with therapy and medication directed at PTSD [posttraumatic stress
disorder] and depression,” conditions the majority says “were never treated
comprehensively.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12–13.) The majority is wrong on
the facts and the law.
      The trial court properly considered Sarmiento’s relapses into substance
abuse and criminality after treatment in determining whether she would
respond to mental health treatment. One suitability requirement for pretrial
diversion is that “[i]n the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the
defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or
motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1).) Cynthia Boyd, Ph.D., a forensic neuropsychologist
who interviewed Sarmiento once at the jail, diagnosed her with “[PTSD],
Chronic,” “Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent,” and “Stimulant Use
Disorder-Methamphetamine (in institutional remission)”; and attributed her
criminal behavior to the “pursuit of methamphetamine” and “need[ ] to obtain
money to buy drugs for herself and likely her boyfriend.” In the section of her
report on section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(1), Boyd stated depression and
PTSD can be treated with medication and psychotherapy, but said nothing

                                        6
about substance abuse treatment. She noted earlier in the report, however,
that Sarmiento started using methamphetamine 26 years ago, completed a
residential substance abuse treatment program in 2013, had multiple
hospitalizations for substance abuse in 2019, and completed courses on
substance abuse and relapse prevention in prison in 2021, but relapsed into
methamphetamine abuse and committed robbery or attempted robbery after
those interventions. Of the three mental health disorders with which Boyd
diagnosed Sarmiento, the substance abuse disorder was the one most
immediately related to her criminal behavior. The trial court therefore
reasonably focused on that disorder and how Sarmiento had responded to
treatment of that disorder. As the court stated, “past performance is the best

indicator of future performance and success.”2
      Sarmiento’s past poor performance, as documented in Boyd’s report,
constitutes substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that is “ ‘reasonable, credible,

2      The Legislature has recognized past performance is relevant to
predicting future performance by expressly authorizing a trial court to
“consider previous records of participation in diversion” “when determining
whether to exercise its discretion to grant diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (k).)
Courts have similarly recognized the predictive value of past performance in
this and other contexts. (See, e.g., In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 219
[“Past criminal conduct and current attitudes toward that conduct may both
be significant predictors of an inmate’s future behavior should parole be
granted.”]; Loder v. City of Glendale (1997) 14 Cal.4th 846, 908 (conc. & dis.
opn. of Mosk, J.) [“a current employee’s actual safety record is in all
likelihood a much better predictor of future safety performance than is the
off-the-job drug use tested by urinalysis”]; People v. Whitmill (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1138, 1152 (Whitmill) [past benefit from mental health
treatment indicated likelihood defendant would respond to treatment if
diverted]; In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 238 [“ ‘ “ ‘[P]ast violent
behavior in a relationship is “the best predictor of future violence.” ’ ” ’ ”];
In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“A parent’s past conduct is a good
predictor of future behavior.”].)
                                        7
and of solid value’ ” (Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079), supporting
the trial court’s conclusion that Sarmiento would not respond to mental
health treatment. (See Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 214 [defendant’s
14-year history of abusing methamphetamine and prior related arrests made
“his resolve to stop using the drug . . . dubious”].) The court did not “exceed[ ]
the bounds of reason” by drawing that conclusion and denying the request for
diversion. (Shamblin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 478; Pacheco, at p. 213.)
      The majority suggests, however, relapse is so common in persons with
substance abuse disorders that a trial court ruling on a motion for pretrial
diversion cannot consider relapse as a failure of treatment and deny diversion
on that basis. For this proposition, the majority cites an online publication by
the National Institute on Drug Abuse entitled “Understanding Drug Use and
Addiction DrugFacts,” which states that “relapse doesn’t mean that
treatment doesn’t work.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12.) The publication also
states, “Relapse indicates the need for more or different treatment.” Such
treatment, of course, can help only someone who desires and obtains it. The
trial court reasonably could conclude based on Sarmiento’s multiple relapses
that she is not committed to sobriety and would not respond to treatment.
(See Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 214 [defendant’s 14-year history of
abusing methamphetamine and prior related arrests made “his resolve to
stop using the drug . . . dubious”]; People v. Watts (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 830,
837 (Watts) [defendant’s history of noncompliance with treatment justified
denial of pretrial diversion].) In any event, the NIDA publication is of little
value in predicting whether Sarmiento would respond favorably to additional
treatment and avoid criminal behavior, because it says nothing about the
causes or likelihood of relapse in any particular case or the connection
between relapse and criminality.

                                        8
      More concerning is the logical implication of the majority’s suggestion.
If the commonness of relapse after treatment in defendants with substance
abuse disorders prohibits a trial court from considering relapse as a basis for
concluding a defendant would not respond to treatment, then whenever a
defendant with a qualifying substance abuse disorder relapses and commits a
crime to which the disorder contributed, the court could not deny pretrial
diversion on the basis of relapse no matter how many times the defendant had
been treated and relapsed. I cannot subscribe to an approach to the mental
health diversion statute that would lead to such an absurd result. (See, e.g.,
People v. Bullard (2020) 9 Cal.5th 94, 107; People v. Elias (1990) 218
Cal.App.3d 1161, 1164.)
      Nor can I assent to the majority’s conclusion the trial court erred in
denying pretrial diversion by failing to consider Sarmiento’s lack of prior
treatment for PTSD and depression, conditions Boyd reported led Sarmiento
to “self-medicat[e]” with methamphetamine and to commit robbery and
attempted robbery to get money to buy the drug. A careful review of the
documents Sarmiento submitted in support of her request for pretrial
diversion refutes the majority’s factual premise that “Sarmiento never
received any coordinated treatment” for PTSD and depression. (Maj. opn.,
ante, at p. 12.)
      Boyd reported Sarmiento had been prescribed antidepressant
medication when she was 13 years old, had been diagnosed with PTSD in
2019, and was currently taking Trazodone (which Boyd described as an
“antidepressant and sedative”) and Remeron (which Boyd described as an

                                       9
“antidepressant”).3 In an interview with Sarmiento’s counsel, Sarmiento’s
mother reported Sarmiento was diagnosed with depression and anxiety in
childhood and was prescribed and took medication. Sarmiento’s former
employer told her counsel he had offered in April 2022 to move her to a
different location so that she could get treatment, but she declined.
Sarmiento’s parole officer told her counsel that Sarmiento “attended all of her
Behavioral/Mental Health appointments . . . from July through December of
2022.” Records from hospitalizations for acute methamphetamine
intoxication and an anxiety attack in 2019 state Sarmiento was given
information and resources to follow up with her primary care physician and a
psychiatrist as an outpatient and declined to meet with a social worker about
follow-up care.
      The record thus shows Sarmiento for many years has been under the
care of a psychiatrist or other physician and has been treated for PTSD and
depression or has been offered such treatment, and despite such treatment or
offers she continued to abuse methamphetamine and to commit crimes.
A reasonable inference from this record is that Sarmiento would not respond
to mental health treatment for depression and PTSD if she were diverted
because she has not responded in the past. (See fn. 2, ante.) Since that
inference supports the trial court’s decision to deny the request for pretrial
diversion, we must draw that inference. (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th

3     Trazodone and Remeron (a brand name for mirtazapine) are used to
treat depression, methamphetamine use disorders, and anxiety disorders,
including PTSD.
(<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK470560/#:~:text=Trazodone%20re
duces%20levels%20of%20neurotransmitters,alpha%2D1%2Dadrenergic%20r
eceptors> [as of Jan. 9, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/SA35-VCX7>;
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3907331/> [as of Jan. 9,
2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/42S5-TDNM>.)
                                       10
371, 411; Shamblin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 478–479; Gerson, supra, 80
Cal.App.5th at p. 1079; Watts, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 837.)
      The majority refuses to draw that inference and instead relies on the
People’s concession “the record does not contain evidence that [Sarmiento]
received prior sustained treatment for [PTSD] or depression.” This court is
not bound to accept a party’s concession. (People v. Kim (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 836, 847; Bell v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d
438, 448–449; People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1021.) “In
[my] view, the [People’s] erroneous concession cannot and should not prevent
this court from applying sound legal principles to the objective facts disclosed
by the record.” (Bell, at p. 449.) Application of such principles to the actual
facts requires us to uphold the trial court’s decision to deny diversion.
                                        2
    No Abuse of Discretion in Satisfactory Treatment Plan Determination
      I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion insufficient evidence
supports the trial court’s determination the proposed treatment program
would not meet Sarmiento’s particular needs. One condition pretrial
diversion is “subject to” is that “[t]he court is satisfied that the recommended
inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the
specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); see People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627 [court may
grant pretrial diversion if it “is satisfied that the recommended program of
mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment
needs of the defendant”]; Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 886–887
[describing court’s satisfaction with recommended mental health treatment
program as one of the “statutory requirements” for pretrial diversion].) The
trial court was not satisfied with the treatment plan described at the hearing,

                                       11
based in part on Sarmiento’s commission of crimes related to her substance
abuse even after she had received treatment and been incarcerated. The
majority faults the trial court for relying on her recidivism, because, the
majority says, her “supposed lack of success in drug treatment does not
rationally support a conclusion that a comprehensive program of treatment
for her underlying mental health diagnoses of PTSD and depression, coupled
with substance abuse treatment, would not yield different (and more positive)
results.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 14.) This criticism of the trial court’s
determination is unpersuasive because the majority again relies on the
premise Sarmiento has not previously been treated for PTSD and depression.
As explained above, that premise is false. (See pp. 9–11, ante.)
      Furthermore, Sarmiento’s relapse-related recidivism was not the only
reason the trial court was dissatisfied with the proposed treatment program,
despite the majority’s contrary suggestion. At the hearing on the request for
pretrial diversion, the court identified as a “sticking point” whether “a
program that would address her needs . . . has been identified and properly
presented.” It was Sarmiento’s burden to present a satisfactory plan to the
court. (§ 1001.36, subd. (e); Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1078–1079.)
She did not do so.
      In her written filing, Sarmiento stated that based on an evaluation by a
licensed mental health clinician who works for the public defender, the plan
was for her to attend a County-funded residential treatment program for
substance abuse; get connected to resources that target her specific mental
health needs while in the program; and then receive medication management
services, case management, and individual therapy through the County-
funded outpatient mental health clinic. Sarmiento identified no treatment
provider, no duration of treatment, and no specific treatment she would

                                        12
receive; nor did she explain how any treatment would address the symptoms
that contributed to her commission of crimes. Her counsel tried to supply
some of the missing information at the hearing by referencing Boyd’s
recommendations of psychotherapy for PTSD, a psychiatric consult for
medication for PTSD, and substance abuse education and treatment. But
Boyd stated in her report “she would not be treating [Sarmiento], or finding
others to treat her,” and her recommendations were merely “offered for
consideration.” Counsel admitted at the hearing there was no “specific plan”
for Sarmiento, but assured the court that before she completed the
residential substance abuse treatment program, “we will apply to the
different places and we will figure out the best fit, and she will have a place
where she can go and see somebody and talk to somebody about her issues
and get medication.”
      I cannot agree that what was so vaguely presented to the trial court
was “a comprehensive program of treatment,” as the majority asserts. (Maj.
opn., ante, at p. 14.) The uncertainty about whether Sarmiento would be
treated at all and, if so, the lack of specificity in how, how long, where, and by
whom she would be treated—serious defects the majority ignores—support
the trial court’s conclusion Sarmiento did not meet her burden to present a
plan that would meet her specialized mental health treatment needs.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); Gerson, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1079–1080;
Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 886–887.) Its decision to deny
diversion on that ground was not “so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 377; see Watts, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 837 [insufficient case plan
justifies denial of pretrial diversion].)

                                            13
                                        3
            No Prejudicial Error in Dangerousness Determination
      The majority also sets aside the trial court’s determination that
Sarmiento is not suitable for diversion because she poses an unreasonable

risk of danger to public safety.4 (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15–18.) I disagree
with the majority’s treatment of this issue as well.
      Had the majority not erred in concluding insufficient evidence
supported the trial court’s determinations Sarmiento would not respond to
mental health treatment and had not presented an adequate treatment plan,
it would not need to address the dangerousness issue. A trial court’s denial of
a request for mental health diversion must be upheld if at least one of the
grounds for denial is sufficient. (Watts, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 837;
People v. Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 593.) “Since the trial court gave
multiple grounds for denying diversion, any one of which was an
independently permissible basis for concluding the requirements of section
1001.36 had not been met, it [would be] harmless error [if] one of the multiple
grounds [were] invalid.” (Watts, at p. 837.) Thus, even had the court erred by
relying on Sarmiento’s dangerousness to deny her request for pretrial
diversion, we still must uphold the denial because, as I have explained, the
two other “grounds for denying diversion cited by the court reflected an

4      One of the suitability requirements for pretrial diversion is that “[t]he
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as
defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd.
(c)(4).) Section 1170.18, subdivision (c) defines “unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety” as “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a
new violent felony within the meaning of [section 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv)].” Such felonies, known colloquially as “super strikes,” include
violent sex crimes, homicides, and felonies punishable by life imprisonment
or death. (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351 & fn. 3.)
                                       14
independent assessment by the court and were supported by substantial
evidence that brought the court’s decision well within its discretion.” (Ibid.)
      Having decided to overturn the trial court’s determinations on those
other grounds, however, the majority must address the court’s dangerousness
ruling. The majority relies primarily on Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th
1138, where the only statutory ground at issue was dangerousness, to
conclude a court may not deny a pretrial diversion request on that ground
unless the court finds, based on substantial evidence, that the defendant
would pose an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike if treated in
the community. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 16–18.) The majority asserts
allowing a court to deny diversion based on dangerousness without such a
finding would be inconsistent with the statutory purpose to provide
treatment to a defendant with a qualifying mental health disorder as “the
best strategy for breaking the cycle of criminal recidivism.” (Maj. opn., ante,
at p. 18.) I am not persuaded.
      I agree that if substantial evidence supports a finding a defendant
would pose an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike if treated in
the community, the defendant is not suitable for pretrial mental health
diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) But I do not agree that if the defendant
does not pose such a risk, but does pose an unreasonable risk of committing
some other violent crime if treated in the community, the trial court may not
rely on that risk in combination with other factors to deny pretrial diversion.
After all, the statute gives the court discretion to grant a request for
diversion, and it may deny such a request if it determines the defendant or
the crime is not suitable. (Id., subds. (a), (e); People v. Bunas (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 840, 861–862.) Indeed, a court has discretion to deny a request
for pretrial diversion even if the defendant meets all the eligibility and

                                       15
suitability criteria. (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149; Gerson,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1080.) A trial court thus must consider and
weigh all relevant statutory factors in exercising its discretion, including the
express statutory purpose to “[i]ncrease[ ] diversion of individuals with
mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the
criminal justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a),
italics added.) I disagree with the majority’s broad pronouncements to the
extent they would prohibit a court from taking into consideration a
defendant’s risk of committing a violent crime that does not constitute a
super strike when exercising its discretion on a request for pretrial diversion.
                                         III
                                    Conclusion
      We never should have taken this case up on writ review. A writ of
mandate “will not lie to force an exercise of discretion in a particular
manner.” (Conway, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016.) Where, as here, the
trial court is given discretion in a matter, “ ‘ “ ‘[a]n appellate tribunal is
neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the
judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
“The discretion was the trial judge’s, not ours; and we can only interfere if we
find that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial
court’s action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he did.’ ”
(Newbauer v. Newbauer (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 36, 40.) The majority violates
these rules to overturn an order with which it disagrees but was within the
trial court’s discretion to make, and it does so based on an assumed set of
facts contradicted by the record.

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      I dissent. I would discharge the order to show cause as having been
improvidently issued, summarily deny Sarmiento’s petition, and dissolve the
stay of trial court proceedings.

                                                         IRION, Acting P. J.

                                     17