Court Opinion

ID: 9463291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:02:26.583334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:01.033167
License: Public Domain

SEITZ, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
The majority hold that the Board lacked authority to apply comity principles in determining the appropriate bargaining unit. I believe that this result is not mandated by the statute, and infringes upon the proper scope of Board discretion.
The Board, of course, was required to make a determination as to the appropriate bargaining unit. The issue here is whether it could fulfill that obligation by according comity to the findings of the PLRB, assuming that the PLRB’s procedures were fair, that it decided the same issue as was before the Board, and that the state policies do not conflict with those embodied in the NLRA.
Comity persuades rather than commands. It declares not how a case should be decided, but rather how it may with propriety be decided. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Manufacturing Co., 177 U.S. 485, 20 S.Ct. 708, 44 L.Ed. 856 (1900). The Board’s opinion makes its grasp of these principles apparent. Before according comity, it reviewed the PLRB proceedings and satisfied itself that they were in accord with due process standards and the policies embodied in the NLRA. It specifically found that nothing in the PLRB’s unit determination clashed with federal determinations in this area.
In denying that the Board has power to extend comity, the majority rely primarily upon the language of § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970), especially the following: “the Board shall decide in each case whether . . the unit appropriate . *363shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.” However, it is clear that statutory language directing the Board to determine a particular issue does not necessarily preclude the Board from relying on other processes of law, as long as it can assert a sound policy for doing so. For example, although the Board has jurisdiction to consider charges of unfair labor practices, § 10(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), (b), it may, in its discretion, defer to the resolution of the underlying dispute by arbitration, since this method for settling differences is encouraged by the NLRA. E.g., Local 2188, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 168, 494 F.2d 1087 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835, 95 S.Ct. 61, 42 L.Ed.2d 61 (1974). See Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 84 S.Ct. 401, 11 L.Ed.2d 320 (1964).
The Board’s interest in determining how it will allocate its resources so as best to effectuate federal labor policy cannot be gainsaid. Associated Press v. NLRB, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 492 F.2d 662, 668 (1974). Faced with the need to implement a national policy in an area hitherto left to state regulation, the Board could reasonably conclude that according comity to those state labor board decisions which are congruent with federal policy would best serve the purposes of the NLRA. Furthermore, I can find no policy basis for concluding that Congress intended to preclude the Board from exercising discretion in extending comity to the decisions of state labor boards. I therefore cannot agree with the majority that the Board lacked discretion to rely on the PLRB’s unit determination.
In view of the disposition of the case, it would not be helpful to discuss the other contentions raised by Petitioner. Having considered them, however, I would deny the review petition and enforce the Board’s order.