Court Opinion

ID: 9369259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 16:01:30.444261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.833834
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10606   Document: 16-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2023    Page: 1 of 3

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                                No. 22-10606
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       PATRICIA VALENCIA-TORRES,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                         ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A088-690-762
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10606     Document: 16-1     Date Filed: 02/08/2023    Page: 2 of 3

       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10606

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Patricia Valencia-Torres petitions for review of the Board of
       Immigration Appeals’ denial of her motion to reopen and
       terminate her removal proceedings. Her motion is time barred
       because it was filed more than ninety days after the final
       administrative removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R.
       § 1003.2(c)(2). Her motion is also number barred because it is her
       second motion to reopen her removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C.
       § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
              Nonetheless, Valencia-Torres argues that her motion should
       be granted because the notice to appear she received was defective.
       After she entered the United States in 1994, the government served
       her with a notice to appear on September 29, 2007. That notice did
       not specify the date and time for her initial removal hearing.
       Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of the
       stop-time rule, a notice to appear must include all statutorily
       required information, including the time and place of the initial
       hearing, in a single document. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105,
       2110 (2018); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480, 1486
       (2021). We note, however, that the stop-time rule had no bearing
       on the denial of her motion for cancellation of removal because the
       immigration judge found that she had satisfied the physical-
       presence requirement.
USCA11 Case: 22-10606     Document: 16-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2023    Page: 3 of 3

       22-10606               Opinion of the Court                        3

              Valencia-Torres’s argument in this Court is not entirely
       clear. To the extent that this is a jurisdictional argument, it is
       foreclosed by our precedent. We’ve explained that a defect in a
       notice to appear does not deprive the immigration judge of
       jurisdiction over a removal proceeding. Perez-Sanchez v. U.S.
       Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir. 2019). Instead, the
       statutory and regulatory requirements for the filing of a notice to
       appear set forth claim processing rules. Id. The Supreme Court’s
       later decision in Niz-Chavez, relied upon by Valencia-Torres, does
       not undermine this holding. There, the Supreme Court decided
       only that the notice to appear needed to come in one document,
       not two. Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1480, 1486. Nothing in the
       decision purported to create a jurisdictional requirement.
       Accordingly, the defective notice to appear Valencia-Torres
       received does not deprive the immigration judge of jurisdiction.
              Valencia-Torres instead may be contending that reopening
       is warranted because her notice to appear violated mandatory
       (though non-jurisdictional) claim processing rules. If so, this claim
       is subject to the time and number limitations on her motion to
       reopen. Valencia-Torres does not argue that these limitations
       should be equitably tolled or that a statutory exception applies. See
       Ruiz-Turcios v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 717 F.3d 847, 849–50 (11th Cir.
       2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). Accordingly, the Board of
       Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying her
       motion to reopen.
             PETITION DENIED.