Court Opinion

ID: 8028320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 02:54:00.689756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:36:53.169312
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WEBER
concurs and dissents as follows:
I agree with the majority opinion in its holding that the Youth Court abused its discretion by ordering J.KC.’s case transferred to District Court. As a result I concur in the reversal of the order of the Youth Court which transferred jurisdiction to the adult District Court. My dissent from the majority opinion is at this point. I would remand the case to Youth Court for a further hearing and a redetermination of the issue of the transfer to adult District Court.
The majority opinion refers to Matter of J.D.W. (1994), [267 Mont. 87], 881 P.2d 1324. In Matter ofJ.D.W. this Court concluded that the order of the youth court transferring the matter to district court was vacated, and the cause was remanded to the youth court for a further hearing and redetermination. I believe the same procedure should be followed here.
In Matter of J.D.W., this Court pointed out that the critical determination was whether the seriousness of the offense and the protection of the community required treatment of the youth beyond that afforded by the juvenile facilities. That is the identical issue which is *348before us in our present case. In Matter of J.D.W., the judge took judicial notice of the limited type of commitment he could make — he could only commit to the Department of Family Services and that commitment had to be indefinite. In addition the judge pointed out that the average length of time that youths were kept at Pine Hills was three to four months which was not an adequate time for a youth charged with a serious crime. This Court pointed out in its opinion that there was an absence of any recommendation from staff or other persons to demonstrate that J.D.W. could not be properly treated in a youth court facility. As a result, this Court concluded there was an improper waiver of jurisdiction, and reversed the decision of the district court and remanded the case to the same court for a further hearing and redetermination of the issue.
In contrast to Matter of J.D.W., in the present case there was considerable evidence presented by three different parole and probation officers as to the treatment available in the system and as to their opinions as to the adequacy and inadequacy of the system. The majority has concluded that evidence was not adequate and I agree with that conclusion. However, in the same manner as in Matter of J.D.W., I conclude that it is essential in fairness to all involved that the case be remanded to the Youth Court for a further hearing and a redetermination of the issue of transfer. In reaching this conclusion, I note that the defendant does not contest the Youth Court finding that his crime of attempted deliberate homicide was committed in an aggressive, violent, or premeditated manner. The testimony presented to the District Court established that J.K.C. initially demonstrated his aggressive and violent behavior when he attempted with a handgun to rob an 87 year old woman whom he knew from his paper route. Next, after that unsuccessful robbery, J.K.C. suggested robbing the Gas-A-Matt and devised the plan. After pumping gas, J.K.C. entered the store, said to the clerk, “Doesn’t it suck working nights?” and then shot the clerk twice with a 9mm pistol in a clear attempt at deliberate homicide.
I would therefore remand this cause to the Youth Court for a further hearing, following an examination by a qualified mental health expert, and a redetermination of the issue with specific findings and conclusions on the statutory requirements.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE concurs in the foregoing special concurrence and dissent.