Court Opinion

ID: 9624992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:24:17.986578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:58.649256
License: Public Domain

HOLOHAN, Justice,
dissenting.
When judgment of guilt is pronounced it would seem basic that an accused be advised of the offense of which he was convicted. Today’s decision by the majority indicates that this is not necessary. The majority indicate that the determination of the quality of the offense as felony or misdemeanor may be deferred to some indefinite date.
It is basic due process that an accused be informed of the crime which forms the basis for the punitive action by the court. The nature of the offense as a felony or a misdemeanor is an essential element of the offense. The determination of guilt is incomplete until the specific offense is determined, and the designation of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor vitally affects the nature of the offense and the consequences attached to it.
The majority ignore the clear mandate of Rule 26.10, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., which requires that the trial court in pronouncing judgment set forth the offense of which the defendant was convicted. Designating an offense as aggravated battery is an incomplete judgment because it may be a felony or a misdemeanor — a so-called “open-end” offense. This type of offense is somewhat analogous to the theft statute in that there must be a further designation of the specific nature of the crime such as grand or petty. In the so-called “open-end” offenses the specific nature of the offense occurs when the court designates the matter as a felony or as a misdemeanor. Without such designation the judgment is incomplete because the specific crime has never been determined.
The majority conclude that the length of the term of probation does not serve to designate the offense as a felony. The majority’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 13-1657 contorts what is the obvious intent of the statute that a person not be required to endure probation for a longer period than the period of confinement prescribed for the offense of which he was convicted. The majority’s reasoning serves to impose a felony period of probation on the promise of a misdemeanor conviction at the end of the felony term.
The majority point out that a conviction on an “open-end” offense is a felony conviction unless the trial court imposes a sentence of imprisonment in the county jail. State v. Vineyard, supra. I assume that the majority translate this holding in Fine-yard to mean that an accused has been convicted of a felony until the trial court designates otherwise. This dubious conclusion serves to further obfuscate the status of a person convicted of an “open-end” offense. It appears that such an individual has been convicted of a felony until the court designates otherwise at some indefinite date.
The mischief of today’s ruling is that it takes a rather straightforward statutory system and contorts it to accommodate the vacillation and doubts of a few trial judges.
I believe that the decision of the Court of Appeals was correct, and it should have been affirmed.