Court Opinion

ID: 9685896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:08:00.784556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:11.083833
License: Public Domain

JON E WILCOX, J.
¶ 17. 0dissenting). I am concerned that the timing of this petition for reinstatement — that it arose during the transition between the old and the new lawyer regulation systems— has not allowed us to make an adequate consideration of the facts in this case. Most notably, I think there has been an insufficient inquiry into the circumstances of Hyndman's felony conviction. Without more information, the court's decision to reinstate Hyndman's license to practice law could set an inappropriate precedent for future cases. Under the circumstances of this particular case, I would find it more appropriate to assign the case to a referee for further investigation. For that reason, I dissent.
¶ 18. As the court points out, the timing of this petition was unusual. Per curiam op. at ¶ 3 n.l. The initial public hearing was held before a subcommittee of *663the District 2 Professional Responsibility Committee ("the Committee") on August 2, 2000. The report of the Committee was received by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) on October 2, 2000. Changes in the lawyer regulation system had dissolved the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) on October 1, 2000. Because there had already been a public hearing, the case was not assigned to a referee, as would have been required under the present rules. See SCR 21.08 (2000). Instead, the case was sent to the OLR, and the director submitted to this court a report, which recommended reinstatement of Hyndman's license. However, because no referee was appointed, I think that some significant factors regarding Hyndman's fitness to practice law have not been adequately considered.
¶ 19. Most serious among these factors is Hyndman's felony conviction for solicitation to commit a felony, delivery of cocaine. The incident that gave rise to the conviction occurred in 1988 while Hyndman was a licensed attorney and involved a conspiracy to purchase approximately $17,000 worth of cocaine through one of his own clients. Hyndman was charged in 1988, but a judgment of conviction was not entered until March 26, 1991. Because the conviction was not yet final at the time of Hyndman's original disciplinary hearing, the charge, rightly, was not considered for the purposes of discipline. However, this court explicitly stated that the conviction could be considered at future disciplinary proceedings or when Hyndman sought reinstatement. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hyndman, 149 Wis. 2d 487, 495-96, 439, N.W.2d 129 (1989).
¶ 20. Now that Hyndman has applied for reinstatement, it seems that our consideration of his felony conviction has slipped through the cracks. In the OLR Director's report, the only mention made of the convic*664tion is that "Petitioner showed sincere remorse for the totality of his behavior which led to his revocation and the subsequent criminal conviction" and that "Petitioner's . .. criminal behavior prior to his revocation was reprehensible. However Petitioner has demonstrated that he has addressed the problems (primarily alcoholism) that were present in his life at that time. . . ." The court, in my view, gives equally short shrift to the issue. In its opinion, the court notes its "grave concern about Hyndman's criminal activities and his felony drug conviction" and that a petitioner for reinstatement does not enjoy a "presumption of rehabilitation." Per curiam op. at ¶ 4. However, the court says no more about the conviction and goes on to conclude that Hyndman is a suitable candidate for reinstatement.
¶ 21. Nowhere does the court address the concerns raised by Milwaukee County Assistant District Attorney Jack Stoiber in his letter to the Committee. Specifically, Mr. Stoiber noted that because Hyndman's criminal activity involved a client, Hyndman may have violated his duty to avoid conflicts of interest under SCR 20:1.7, violated his duty to refrain from inappropriate business relationships with clients under SCR 20:1.8, and engaged in conduct that reflected poorly on his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer under SCR 20:8.4. I have similar concerns about these potential violations, and I think that a full inquiry into the issues is necessary before we issue a decision on whether or not to reinstate Hyndman's license. Thus, I would find that further investigation of the matters is warranted.
¶ 22. With that said, I recognize that Hyndman has made great strides in his personal life. He has paid all of his restitution, maintained productive employ*665ment, reestablished ties with his family and his community, and brought his substance abuse problems under control. When we have dealt with lawyers impaired by substance abuse problems in the past, we have recognized that substance abuse is a treatable problem that, with diligence and help, can be controlled.
¶ 23. My concern with this case, however, goes deeper than mere impairment. The crime that the court glosses over is not a minor one. Such a felony drug conviction would prevent Hyndman from joining the Armed Forces,7 from becoming a police officer or a sheriffs deputy,8 from owning a firearm,9 and even from becoming a notary public.10 The fact that the crime involved one of Hyndman's own clients adds to the seriousness of the offense. Still, the court holds today that he is fit to practice law and serve as an officer of the court. Without more to justify this court's lack of consideration of Hyndman's felony conviction, I am concerned that the court is setting a troubling precedent. For this reason, I think a further investigation is warranted, and that this petition should be assigned to a referee for careful consideration in accordance with the present rules.
¶ 24. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
*666¶ 25. I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS joins in this dissent.

 10 U.S.C. § 504 (1994); Dep't of Defense Directive 1304.26, § E1.2.7.2 (Mar. 4, 1994).

 Wis. Admin. Code § LES 2.01 (1) (c) (Aug. 2001).

 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994 & Supp. 2000); Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1)(a) (1999-2000).

 63 Op. Atty. Gen. Wis. 74, 75 (1974).