Court Opinion

ID: 9767210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:12:53.483037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:29.041356
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. This was a complicated case, tried over a period of several days, involving four plaintiffs who suffered damages from fires alleged to have been caused by Missouri Pacific Railroad Company. The plaintiffs, appellees here, originally sued Missouri Pacific and some of its employees, not only for compensatory damages but also for punitive damages. Before proceeding to trial, the appellees deleted their request for punitive damages against all employees, claiming punitive damages only against the appellant, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company. This was clearly prejudicial error and requires us to reverse the decision because of our decision in Curtis v. Partain, Judge, 272 Ark. 400, 614 S.W.2d 671 (1981). That decision is exactly in point; all or none of the defendants must be sued for punitive damages. I do not agree that the trial court committed error in any other way. The appellees’ lawsuit can best be characterized as one more for punitive damages than for compensatory damages. The four appellees who filed the lawsuit suffered damages as a result of four separate fires; their claims for reimburement for damages were not significant as the verdict indicates. The four were compensated together less than $6,000 for their damages; but each was awarded $200,000 in punitive damages. The appellees alleged that Missouri Pacific had on numerous occasions over the last three years negligently and carelessly started fires, was made aware of these fires and took no action to prevent further damage; that the conduct of Missouri Pacific in allowing its trains to consistently, continuously, negligently and carelessly start fires manifested a complete and utter indifference for the safety of the appellees’ property. Missouri Pacific was made aware that its trains were destroying the appellees’ property and continued to operate them knowing that the operation of those trains, in the manner in which they had been operated, would damage the appellees’ property. There was evidence submitted that Missouri Pacific was placed on notice of the condition of its right of way in previous lawsuits and was aware that there had been fifty fires in the preceding eighteen months along this section of the track in Independence County, Arkansas — all but one being started on the right of way. An employee of appellant testified that the employees were directed that fusees be thrown to the side of the track rather than between the rails, to avoid damage to the ties. There was evidence that there were more fires on this section of the track than in any other section in the district. The appellees offered evidence in detail from landowners, including the appellees themselves, as to the frequence of the fires in this area. Reports of the local forest ranger were introduced about the fires. This evidence in my judgment was sufficient to support the award for punitive damages which is one of the questions presented to us and will undoubtedly arise again on a retrial. The majority is simply substituting its judgment for that of the trial court on the question of consolidation. The rule clearly allows consolidation where common questions of law or fact are involved. Here both are involved. ARCP, Rule 42. Now, instead of one trial — a considerable saving to the State — there will be four separate trials in which exactly the same evidence will be admitted: evidence of all the fires along this stretch of the right of way and evidence of the other three claims, which will be the subject of separate lawsuits. The justification for this rigid and unreasonable position is that it is more likely that a jury will more harshly penalize a defendant where there are multiple claims than if there were only one. This court does not have a history of favoring punitive damages and never hesitates to strike or reduce punitive damages. That is what the majority ought to do if it fears an excessive award rather than nullifying the rule. It is true that the statement made by Ron Glover, a claims representative for Missouri Pacific, was admitted to impeach rather than to directly prove that Missouri Pacific had a policy for paying claims rather than preventing the continuation of a dangerous situation, and, the statement was made during negotiations for settlement of the claim. Ordinarily such a statement is inadmissible to prove the validity of a claim. But that does not mean that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-1001, Rule 408 (Repl. 1977), requires that the statement be excluded, if it was admissible for any other purpose. I think the statement went directly to the plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages, to show that Missouri Pacific had a complete utter indifference and conscious disregard for the safety of the appellees’ property. What better proof could there be than the statement? Furthermore, the statement did not go to the compromise or settlement of the claim that was being settled at the time the statement was made. It was an offhand remark that to me was irrelevant as to that particular claim. But it was certainly relevant as to the cause of action expressed by the appellees herein. It is true that the pleadings do not state explicitly that Missouri Pacific ought to be punished because it has a policy of paying claims rather than preventing fires. But when the pleadings are taken in a liberal context, as we should take them, that is, in effect, what the pleadings say, and that is the reason the railroad company had punitive damages adjudged against them. In the case of Brown v. Missouri Pacific, decided by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals April 1, 1983 (Slip Opinion No. 82-1946), the court held that a statement made by an employee of the railroad about policies of the railroad was admissible on the question of punitive damages. Punitive damages were claimed in the Brown case because it was alleged that the railroad knew, or had reason to know, that its course of conduct was about to inflict injury, but nonetheless continued a course of conduct with a conscious indifference to the consequences. I think the claim in the Brown case for punitive damages was substantially like the one made in this case, and the only difference would be that the statement made in the Brown case was made at a civic club meeting, and in this case it was made by a claims agent during negotiations. Rule 408 does not preclude such a statement from being admitted where there is a direct cause of action for punitive damages because a company continues a course of conduct that amounts to willful and wanton indifference, for which penalties should be imposed. The landowners were able to prove that it is, indeed, cheaper to pay claims than to prevent a dangerous act. I must emphasize for the benefit of the parties that this is a concurring opinion expressing only my views. .