Court Opinion

ID: 9376561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 06:05:01.538961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.677803
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 2, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 354279
                                                                     Macomb Circuit Court
DAVID MAURICE LYONS,                                                 LC No. 2013-000809-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RICK, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant, David Lyons (also known as David Lyons-Bey), was convicted of four offenses
in 2013. He appealed to this Court, which affirmed his convictions.1 Defendant later filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, challenging the validity of his convictions, which the court denied.2 Defendant
appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Before a
decision was reached, the parties stipulated that one of defendant’s convictions would be vacated
and that he would be resentenced in state court on the remaining convictions. As a result of that
agreement, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals entered an order dismissing the case. 3 Thereafter,
the trial court resentenced defendant on his convictions of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder, MCL 750.84(1)(a), armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and conspiracy to
commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a and MCL 750.529. This appeal by right follows. We

1
 People v Lyons, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 22,
2015 (Docket No. 319252).
2
 Lyons-Bey v Campbell, opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, issued February 14, 2018 (Case No. 5:16-cv-13797).
3
 Lyons-Bey v Sprader, order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, entered
July 2, 2020 (Case No. 18-1429).

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affirm for the reasons stated in this opinion, but remand for the ministerial task of correcting the
presentence investigation report (PSIR).

                                        I. RESENTENCING

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Defendant contends that he is entitled to resentencing because the PSIR was “stale” and
did not include an updated interview with him. He also argues that the PSIR used at his
resentencing contained false and inaccurate information. “[T]he use of inaccurate information at
sentencing may violate [a] defendant’s constitutional right to due process.” People v Hoyt, 185
Mich App 531, 533; 462 NW2d 793 (1990). We review de novo issues of constitutional law.
People v Kennedy, 502 Mich 206, 213; 917 NW2d 355 (2018).

                                           B. ANALYSIS

         Presentence reports are required for every felony case in Michigan. MCL 771.14(1). Such
reports must include the information listed in MCL 771.14(2)(a)-(h) and MCR 6.425(A)(1). If a
defendant is resentenced, a reasonably updated PSIR may be required. People v Hemphill, 439
Mich 576, 580-581; 487 NW2d 152 (1992). For example, updated PSIRs have been required in
cases where several years elapsed prior to resentencing, when the original PSIR was prepared in
connection with an unrelated offense, and when the defendant’s circumstances had substantially
changed. Id. Although a defendant may not waive a presentence report, a defendant may waive
the right to a reasonably updated PSIR so long as the prior PSIR does not contain “information
that [is] manifestly stale.” Id. at 581-582. An updated report, like an original report, “must be
complete, accurate, and reliable.” See People v Triplett, 407 Mich 510, 515; 287 NW2d 165
(1981).

        It is presumed “that the information contained in the PSIR is accurate unless the defendant
raises an effective challenge.” People v Lloyd, 284 Mich App 703, 705; 774 NW2d 347 (2009).
The defendant bears the burden of effectively challenging the information in the PSIR when he or
she challenges the accuracy of his or her PSIR. Id. The trial court must respond if a defendant
challenges the accuracy of the PSIR. Id.

        In this case, an updated report was prepared for defendant’s resentencing. The updated
report included information related to the 2019 legal proceedings in the federal courts that led to
defendant’s resentencing on the three remaining convictions. The resentencing hearing was held
over two days. On the first day of the resentencing hearing, defendant’s lawyer stated that he had
reviewed the updated PSIR with defendant. He then identified specific portions of the report that
defendant believed to be inaccurate. For example, he challenged the accuracy of statements
relating to the number of prior felonies that defendant had, to defendant’s substance-use history
and reluctance to discuss it, to references to defendant being at a juvenile detention facility, and to
the use of “Lyons” as opposed to “Lyons-Bey” to identify defendant. He also noted that, at the
time of the offense, defendant had been employed by his cousin, not his nephew. In response to
each challenge, the trial court determined whether the information was accurate, whether it needed
to be corrected, or whether further information and discussion would be helpful. The court then

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adjourned the hearing to allow for additional disputes involving the accuracy of the PSIR to be
discussed among defense, the prosecution, and the probation department.

         At the continued resentencing hearing, defendant’s lawyer indicated that there were
additional clerical errors in the updated PSIR that he had requested the probation department to
correct. The court inquired as to the status of those requested changes and the probation officer
stated that those clerical errors—which included inaccuracies in defendant’s marital status,
religion, and family history—would be corrected in the final report. The only requested alteration
that the probation officer questioned was whether to include a statement that defendant had
indicated that his current legal name was “Lyons-Bey” as opposed to “Lyons.” She agreed that
“Lyons-Bey” was not an alias and that the report referred to defendant as “Lyons” so that the report
would be consistent with the court records, all of which referred to defendant as “Lyons.” With
regard to the substance-abuse history, the court agreed that the information appeared to be accurate,
and defendant’s lawyer agreed with the court’s assessment. The parties also discussed whether
defendant was represented by a lawyer for a prior offense. The court found that the documentation
supported that defendant did have a lawyer. Finally, they discussed the computation of jail credit
and agreed upon a total number of days. Thereafter, the court asked defendant’s lawyer if “those
are all the corrections that” the lawyer and defendant wanted to make on the PSIR. Defendant’s
lawyer affirmed that those were the only corrections requested.

        After being resentenced, defendant filed a motion to correct an invalid sentence. In the
motion, he identified a number of alleged inaccuracies in the updated PSIR. On appeal, defendant
contends that the inaccuracies identified in that motion entitle him to resentencing. He offers no
further analysis in support of his position. “An appellant may not merely announce his position
and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only
cursory treatment [of an issue] with little or no citation of supporting authority.” People v Kelly,
231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). Accordingly, we conclude that his argument
is abandoned.

        Nevertheless, we have reviewed the alleged inaccuracies identified in defendant’s motion
to correct an invalid sentence. Based on the resentencing hearings, many of the errors were
supposed to be corrected, either as the result of agreement between the defense and the probation
department or as a result of the court resolving a factual dispute and directing that certain language
be included in the report. The “corrected copy” of the PSIR that has been provided to this Court,
however, does not reflect that all of those changes were in fact made. “If the courts finds on the
record that the challenged information is inaccurate or irrelevant, that finding shall be made a part
of the record, the presentence investigation report shall be amended, and the inaccurate or
irrelevant information shall be stricken accordingly before the report is transmitted to the
department of corrections.” MCL 771.14(6). Likewise, it is axiomatic that if the probation
department represents to the court that certain changes will be made to the PSIR per an agreement
between the defense and the probation department, those changes must, in fact, be made before
the report is transmitted to the department of corrections. “[I]t is imperative that the PSIR
accurately reflect the sentencing judge’s determination regarding the information contained in the
report” because “[t]he Department of Corrections “relies on the information contained in the PSIR
to make critical decisions regarding a defendant’s status.” Lloyd, 284 Mich App at 705-706. As
a result, remand for the ministerial task of correcting the PSIR is, therefore, required.

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        Defendant next contends that the PSIR was not “reasonably” updated because the PSIR did
not include an updated interview with him. He cites no authority for the proposition that an
updated PSIR must include an updated interview, nor does he explain what additional information
would have been divulged during an updated interview. Instead, the entirety of his argument
relating to the lack of an update interview is to note that a reasonably updated PSIR can be required
for resentencing and to note that the “PSI report used during the resentencing did not have an
updated interview with [defendant]” and that the interview included in the PSIR was “over 7 years
old.” Because defendant has not offered any meaningful analysis of the relevant facts and law,
this Court will treat the claim as abandoned on appeal. See id.

                          II. DENIAL OF BOND PENDING APPEAL

        Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for bond pending
appeal. We decline to address this issue because it is moot. “An issue is moot when an event
occurs that renders it impossible for the reviewing court to fashion a remedy to the controversy.”
People v Cathey, 261 Mich App 506, 510; 681 NW2d 661 (2004). The Michigan Department of
Corrections’ Offender Tracking Information Service website indicates that defendant was paroled
on August 9, 2022.4 Because defendant has been paroled, this Court cannot fashion any relief,
even if there was error.

                                     III. SCOPE OF APPEAL

        None of defendant’s remaining claims, which concern issues related to defendant’s
arraignment and trial, are properly before this Court on appeal because they are outside the scope
of the parties’ stipulated agreement in the federal court. The stipulated agreement provides:

              1. [Defendant’s] conviction for Conspiracy to Commit Assault with Intent
       to Do Great Bodily Harm Less Than Murder will be vacated and reversed.

               2. [Defendant’s] three other convictions (Armed Robbery, Conspiracy to
       Commit Armed Robbery, and Assault with Intent to Do Great Bodily Harm Less
       Than Murder) shall remain in place, but the agreement to resolve the Sixth Circuit
       appeal will not limit [defendant’s] right to raise any issues or arguments with
       respect to those three other convictions at resentencing before this Court.

              3. This Court will resentence [defendant] with respect to his remaining
       convictions.

              4. After resentencing is complete, [defendant] will move in the U.S. Court
       of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to dismiss his federal habeas appeal, Lyons-Bey v.
       Sprader, No. 18-1429 (6th Cir.).

4
  Michigan Department of Corrections, Michigan Offender Tracking Information System, <
https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=231703>        (accessed
February 7, 2023).

                                                -4-
                5. [Defendant] further agrees that he will not file any additional appeals,
         motions, or habeas corpus petitions in any state or federal court that raise the clams
         he has already raised on appeal and in federal habeas petition. However, this
         agreement does not preclude [defendant] from raising any claim, issue, or
         argument, regardless of whether previously raised, in connection with this
         resentencing proceeding, or to challenge the resulting sentence, or to file any
         appeals, postconviction proceedings, or habeas petitions relating to this
         resentencing proceedings of the resulting sentence.

                 6. This agreement does not prejudice [defendant’s] ability to file new
         actions, appeal, motion, or habeas petition that raise new claims, or new actions,
         appeals, motions, or habeas petitions based on newly discovered evidence, although
         the People do not, by this agreement, waive any defenses they may have to such
         claims, including but not limited to any defenses under MCR 6.502(G) or MCR
         6.508(D)(3). [Emphasis added.]

Based on the plain language of this agreement, defendant agreed that the remaining convictions
“shall remain in place,” but that he was not precluded from raising arguments related to the
resentencing of those convictions or from raising issues related to those convictions on the basis
of newly-discovered evidence.5

        Because the clear intent of the agreement concerned only the trial court’s resentencing on
the remaining convictions, the agreement limited any arguments to potential claims arising from
resentencing or newly-discovered evidence. Defendant’s challenges to the validity of his
convictions is not based on newly-discovered evidence, nor are they related to issues arising from
the sentencing process. Thus, defendant’s remaining claims, which are outside the scope of the
resentencing proceeding, were not properly before the trial court and we decline to review them.
See, e.g., People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 435; 231 NW2d 649 (1975) (indicating that an appeal
from a resentencing is limited to the resentencing proceedings). Defendant has not offered an
explanation or supporting authority for how, contrary to the parties’ stipulated agreement, this
Court could properly consider issues that are unrelated to his resentencing (and not based on
newly-discovered evidence). We conclude that, because the parties stipulated to resentencing, the
scope of defendant’s appeal is limited to issues arising from his resentencing or to claims arising
from newly-discovered evidence. Accordingly, we decline to review defendant’s remaining
claims because they are outside the scope of the resentencing proceedings as limited by the parties
stipulated agreement.

        Moreover, even if—as defendant asserts on appeal—the parties had agreed that defendant
could challenge any aspect of his conviction during the resentencing proceeding, we would not
review defendant’s challenge to his convictions. The fact that a defendant has a second appeal as
of right from a resentencing order, Jones, 394 Mich at 436, does not mean that any challenge to
the defendant’s conviction can then be argued in such an appeal. Rather, the issues on appeal
following a resentencing hearing are limited to the issues arising from resentencing. Here, the

5
    Defendant does not raise any claim based on newly-discovered evidence.

                                                  -5-
issues that defendant seeks to raise to challenge his appeal could have been raised in his first appeal
as of right. Thus, even if the parties agreement could fairly be interpreted to allow defendant to
raise any conceivable challenge to his original convictions, we will not indulge defendant’s
untimely appellate challenges.

        Affirmed, but remanded for the ministerial task of correcting the PSIR. We do not retain
jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                               /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                               /s/ Michael J. Riordan

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