Court Opinion

ID: 9526195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:14:02.355561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:15.172619
License: Public Domain

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice
(dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent in part from the result of the majority opinion and would affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ petition in its entirety.
I. The main issue in division II of the majority opinion involves whether plaintiff George Huffey should be able to maintain the present action for tortious interference with a bequest. For the reasons that follow, I believe he should be precluded from doing so.
As an initial matter, Huffey’s petition essentially asserts that defendants tor-tiously interfered with Huffey’s expectancy of a bequest or devise from Margaret Olson.
We recognized the common law claim of tortious interference with a bequest or devise in Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1978). We noted in Frohwein that the plaintiff therein was precluded from instituting a will contest in probate court due to the running of the applicable limitations period. 264 N.W.2d at 793 (citing Iowa Code § 633.309 (1975), as amended). We nevertheless held that the plaintiff was not precluded from pursuing a law action against certain defendants for their alleged wrongful interference with a bequest. Id. at 795. Huffey contends that, because of our conclusion in Frohwein, he should not be precluded from pursuing his present law action despite the fact that he has already concluded a successful will contest in probate. I believe this argument misconstrues our conclusion in Frohwein and the rationale underlying the doctrine of claim preclusion.
*524There are two main reasons that support the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff George Huffey’s petition.
A. An adequate remedy has already been provided. The Huffeys succeeded in their will contest to have Margaret Olson’s July 1986 will set aside and her June 1986 will probated. Under the June will, George Huffey would receive most of Margaret’s estate, including several hundred acres of farm land. As the Huffeys succeeded in having this will probated, George evidently then received everything to which he was entitled under the will. This is the most he could have received if the June will had been probated in the first place. Therefore, I believe this is all the remedy to which George Huffey is entitled.
The vast majority of courts require a plaintiff to first institute a will contest in probate before plaintiff is allowed to pursue a claim for tortious interference with a bequest. E.g., McGregor v. McGregor, 101 F.Supp. 848 (D.Colo.1951); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216 (Fla.1981); Estate of Jeziorski, 162 Ill.App.3d 1057, 114 Ill.Dec. 267, 516 N.E.2d 422 (1987); Robinson v. First State Bank, 97 Ill.2d 174, 73 Ill.Dec. 428, 454 N.E.2d 288 (1983); Smith v. Chatfield, 797 S.W.2d 508 (Mo.Ct.App.1990); Johnson v. Stevenson, 269 N.C. 200, 152 S.E.2d 214 (1967). Our Frohwein case, 264 N.W.2d 792, puts Iowa in a distinctly minority position of not requiring a plaintiff to first bring a will contest.
Most courts hold that a plaintiff who succeeds in a will contest is thereafter not entitled to pursue a claim for tortious interference with a bequest because plaintiff received in the will contest his or her full expectancy under the will and thus suffered no actual damages. E.g., DeWitt, 408 So.2d at 220; In re Estate of Hoover, 160 Ill.App.3d 964, 112 Ill.Dec. 382, 513 N.E.2d 991, 992 (1987); McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Johnson, 152 S.E.2d at 217.
Additionally, the majority of courts then allow plaintiff to pursue a claim for tor-tious interference with a bequest only if there are special circumstances making the will contest remedy inadequate. E.g., McGregor, 101 F.Supp. at 850 (plaintiff may pursue tort claim if will contest is impossible); DeWitt, 408 So.2d at 219 (plaintiff may bring tort action if unable to discover fraud until after probate period had run, or if defendant tortiously induced inter-vivos transfer of estate assets, or if plaintiff unable to establish a maliciously destroyed will); Jeziorski, 114 Ill.Dec. at 271, 516 N.E.2d at 426 (plaintiff may pursue tort action if defendant induced inter-vivos transfers of estate assets and most probate assets were outside of estate); Johnson, 152 S.E.2d at 217-18 (plaintiff may pursue tort claim if fraud was practiced directly on plaintiff or on probate court regarding the probate of a will); King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Tex.Ct.App.1987) (plaintiff may pursue tort claim if expended extraordinary fees, such as administrator’s fees, in pursuing will contest).
In this case, Huffeys succeeded in their will contest and had the June will probated. Therefore, George Huffey received everything he would have received under the June will. He does not allege any special circumstances indicating his remedy in probate was in any way inadequate or that he did not receive everything to which he was entitled under the June will. Because all of his expectations under the June will have thus been fulfilled, I would hold that George Huffey has suffered no damages and thus should be precluded from obtaining further remedies through a tort action. He should not be allowed two bites at the same apple.
Furthermore, the Iowa court will stand virtually alone in allowing a plaintiff, after a successful will contest, to sue for tortious interference with a bequest when plaintiff has not shown that the will contest remedy was inadequate. Only one other court has allowed a plaintiff to pursue, with no allegation of receiving an inadequate probate remedy, a claim for tortious interference with a bequest after successfully contesting a will in probate court. See Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.1975). The majority seems to base its holding on that one case.
*525In any event, it appears George Huffey would be unable to recover many, if any, of the damages he seeks in his claim for tor-tious interference with a bequest. I have found no case that allows a plaintiff claiming tortious interference with a bequest to receive damages for lost work time or mental anguish and embarrassment, for which George Huffey asks in his petition. Most other courts do not allow plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in claims for tor-tious interference with a bequest because plaintiff is only allowed to recover what he or she expected to receive under the will, and plaintiff does not expect to receive punitive damages under a will. DeWitt, 408 So.2d at 220; Hoover, 513 N.E.2d at 992; Smith, 797 S.W.2d at 510; McMullin, 761 S.W.2d at 720.
At most, Huffey could recover attorney fees. One court that did allow plaintiffs to receive punitive damages specifically noted the jury there had been instructed it could consider attorney fees when considering punitive damages, and that the punitive damages awarded happened to be the exact amount of plaintiff’s attorney fees. King, 725 S.W.2d at 756-57. In Peffer, the court allowed plaintiffs to pursue their tortious interference claim only to recover damages which the probate court could not have provided, which in that case were attorney fees. 523 F.2d 1323.
I believe Huffey received an adequate remedy in probate because he received everything to which he was entitled under Margaret’s June will. Because all of his expectations under the June will have thus been fulfilled, I would hold George Huffey is not entitled to any further reward and is thus precluded from pursuing a claim for tortious interference with a bequest, which is substantially the same claim made in the will contest action.
B. Claim preclusion bars the present action. I furthermore believe res judicata, specifically claim preclusion, precludes Huffey from pursuing a claim for tortious interference with a bequest because those tort elements are virtually identical to those for undue influence, the claim upon which he contested the July will.
As a general rule, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars further litigation on the same “claim” or cause of action. See Leuchtenmacher v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Iowa 1990). Under this doctrine, an adjudication in a former suit between the same parties on the same claim “is final as to all matters which could have been presented to the court for determination, and a party must litigate all matters growing out of its claim at one time rather than in separate actions.” Id. at 860; see also Gail v. Western Convenience Stores, 434 N.W.2d 862, 863 (Iowa 1989) (final judgment on merits of action precludes relitigation of issues which were or could have been raised).
Claim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata is based on the principle that a party may not split or try his claim piecemeal, but must put in issue and try his entire claim or put forth his entire defense in the case on trial.
[[Image here]]
[To make that determination, it] is necessary to determine whether plaintiff’s first and second actions were the same claim or cause of action within the meaning of this principle.
Leuchtenmacher, 460 N.W.2d at 860 (emphasis added) (quoting B & B Asphalt Co. v. T.S. McShane Co., 242 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Iowa 1976)).
A second claim is likely to be considered the same as a first claim, and therefore precluded, “if the acts complained of, and the recovery demanded, are the same, or when the same evidence will support both actions.” Id. More specifically, when a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff’s claim, “the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, at 196 (1982)).
I believe Huffey’s action for tortious interference with a bequest constitutes basically the same “claim” as the undue influence claim upon which his prior will contest
*526was based. An examination of the elements of each claim reveals that they are in substance the same. We have said that the elements necessary to sustain a finding of undue influence in the execution of a will in a will contest in probate include: (1) the testator’s susceptibility to undue influence; (2) opportunity to exercise such influence and effect the wrongful purpose; (3) disposition to influence unduly for the purpose of procuring an improper favor; and (4) a result clearly the effect of undue influence. See In re Estate of Dankbar, 430 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1988). Similarly, an action for intentional interference with a bequest or devise may be maintained where “[o]ne who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received_” See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B, at 58 (1965).
Although the legal elements of each claim do not parallel one another with mathematical precision, it is apparent from the general nature of each, and from review of the pleaded facts in this case, that a law action for tortious interference with a bequest necessarily must be supported by the same facts and evidence supporting a will contest in probate based on undue influence. The Restatement specifically provides that a law action for tortious interference applies “when a testator has been induced by tortious means to make his first will or not to make it; and it applies also when he has been induced to change or revoke his will or not to change or revoke it.” See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B comment b, at 58 (1965) (emphasis added).
The majority states that an action for undue influence focuses on the testator’s intent. However, I point out that the second and third elements of undue influence (iopportunity to exercise undue influence and effect a wrongful purpose, and disposition to unduly influence) specifically address the wrongdoer’s intent, rather than the testator’s intent. The wrongdoer’s disposition (intent) to unduly influence the testator in undue influence is necessarily the same intent exhibited in a claim involving tortious interference with a bequest or a devise. Thus, both actions involve the ' same “claim” for purposes of applying the doctrine of claim preclusion.
This conclusion is not altered by the mere fact that Huffey is presently seeking a remedy (damages) different from the remedy sought in the will contest (the setting aside of the will). This is because the rule barring subsequent actions on the same claim applies even though the plaintiff in a subsequent action is prepared to “present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the first action” or to “seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action.” See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25, at 209 (1982).
Where the plaintiff may in one action claim two or more remedies cumulatively rather than alternatively, all arising from the same transaction, but seeks fewer than all of these remedies, and a judgment is entered that extinguishes the claim under the rules of merger or bar, he is precluded from maintaining another action for the other remedies.
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25 comments c and j, at 211, 221 (1982). Attorney fees are simply one additional remedy Huffey could have sought at the same time he sought to have the July will set aside.
Furthermore, this conclusion is in no way inconsistent with our holding in Frohwein. As stated above, we allowed the plaintiff in Frohwein to proceed with his law action for tortious interference with a bequest despite being precluded by the applicable limitations period from bringing a probate action contesting the validity of the will. 264 N.W.2d at 795. However, this result in Frohwein does not foreclose my conclusion that a subsequent tort action may not be maintained if the tort claimant has already concluded a will contest in probate. We specifically acknowledged in Frohwein that the “plaintiff’s petition in the law action could have been presented in a will contest.” 264 N.W.2d at 795 (emphasis added).
*527Finally, there is nothing in our probate code that would have precluded Huffey from pursuing his law action in conjunction with his will contest. See Iowa Code § 633.33 (“Actions to ... contest wills ... shall be triable in probate as law ac-tions_”); Iowa Code § 633.311 (same); see also Cleghorn v. Benjamin, 239 Iowa 455, 459, 31 N.W.2d 887, 889 (1948) (probate court has same jurisdiction as it would have in either law or equity). Therefore, the district court would have had jurisdiction of both claims had they both been brought at the same time.
Thus, I would hold that will contestants such as George Huffey must join with his probate action any claim against alleged wrongdoers for tortious interference with a bequest if he seeks a remedy beyond the mere setting aside of the will. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 22; Iowa Code § 633.312.
This view is supported by authority from other jurisdictions. For example, in Jezior-ski, the court held that successful will contestants properly asserted their tortious interference claim in the probate proceeding because subsequent actions for malicious interference with an expectancy would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on the order admitting the will to probate since the claim could have been asserted with the will contest in the probate proceedings. 516 N.E.2d at 424-25 (citing Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 125 Ill.App.3d 938, 81 Ill.Dec. 175, 188, 466 N.E.2d 977, 990 (1984)). Other courts have endorsed a general policy of requiring probate claimants to join in a will contest any claims for tortious interference with a bequest or inheritance. See, e.g., Nemeth, 81 Ill.Dec. 175, 466 N.E.2d 977 (tortious interference claim properly brought in probate with will contest); DeWitt, 408 So.2d 216 (plaintiffs could not pursue tortious interference claim after failing to contest will in probate); Johnson, 152 S.E.2d 214 (grounds for tortious interference were same as for will contest, thus tort not available after probate proceedings concluded); In re Estate of Legeas, 210 Cal.App.3d 385, 258 Cal.Rptr. 858 (1989) (judicial economy and practicality demand tortious interference claim be brought in probate with will contest).
Because the same facts and evidence may be used to prove both undue influence and tortious interference with a bequest by an alleged wrongdoer, judicial economy policies and claim preclusion rules require that both claims be brought and heard together.
II. I would agree with the result in division III of the majority opinion that affirms the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff Jean Huffey’s claim.
Additional analogous authority that Jean Huffey is not a real party in interest is Estate of Pearson, 319 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1982) (testator’s daughter-in-law was not an interested party with standing to contest his will merely because there was pending a dissolution action commenced after the testator’s death giving the daughter-in-law a beneficial interest in the contest because she would have received pecuniary benefits by way of property, alimony, and child support if her husband received a share of the testator’s estate).
III. For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority. The court of appeals was correct in affirming the district court’s dismissal of counts I and II of plaintiffs’ petition.
NEUMAN, J., joins this dissent.