Court Opinion

ID: 9905029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 18:03:29.72239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:24.385072
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/28/23 Tchejeyan v. Los Angeles SMSA Limited Partnership CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 GREGORY TCHEJEYAN,                                           2d Civil No. B329264
                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 56-2022-
      Plaintiff and Appellant,                              00570848-CU-MC-VTA)
                                                               (Ventura County)
 v.

 LOS ANGELES SMSA
 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP et
 al.,

   Defendants and
 Respondents.

      Gregory Tchejeyan appeals the judgment after the trial
court sustained the respondents’ demurrer to the first amended
complaint without leave to amend. We affirm.
           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                   Special use permit approval
      In August 2019, the Planning Commission of the City of
Thousand Oaks (Planning Commission) approved Los Angeles
SMSA Limited Partnership dba Verizon Wireless (Verizon)’s
special use permit to install a wireless telecommunications
facility on property owned by the California Water Service
Company. Tchejeyan appealed the Planning Commission’s
decision to the City Council of the City of Thousand Oaks (the
City Council).
       In January 2020, the City Council denied the appeal and
adopted Resolution 2020-002 (the Resolution), which approved
Verizon’s special use permit allowing the installation of the
facility. The Resolution included several conditions for approval
of the special use permit. As relevant here, condition 7 requires
that fencing be “installed at a distance from the face of the
antennas as determined by Condition No. 8d” to comply with
FCC guidelines. Condition 7 further states that “[p]rior to the
issuance of a building permit, the applicant shall provide details
on the . . . fencing subject to review and approval by the
Community Development Department.”
      Condition 8 pertains to facility emissions testing1 to
“determine the exact location of the safety fencing/barriers for
each antenna sector.” Condition 8d requires the permittee, based
on the results of the testing, to “place and thereafter maintain
permanent fencing . . . to exclude all members of the General
Population from entering any portion of the property surrounding
the project site that exceeds” the radiofrequency exposure
guidelines set forth by the FCC. Condition 21 addresses
modifications to the facility. It states: “Any expansion or
modification of the facility shall unless otherwise preempted by
Federal or State regulation, . . . require the filing of the

      1 Facility emissions testing measures radiofrequency
emission levels to ensure compliance with FCC public safety
guidelines.

                                 2
appropriate application and approval of such application by the
City.”
                          The 2020 writ petition
       In July 2020, Tchejeyan petitioned for a writ of
administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) seeking to set
aside the Resolution, prevent the construction of the facility, and
obtain a declaratory judgment that Verizon’s permit application
was null and void. He alleged the construction of the wireless
communications facility violated federal, state, and local laws.
       The City Council moved to dismiss the writ petition with
prejudice on the ground that Tchejeyan served the petition
outside the 90-day statute of limitations (Gov. Code, § 65009,
subd. (c)(1)(E)). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed
the petition. We affirmed the judgment of dismissal. (Tchejeyan
v. City Council of Thousand Oaks (July 7, 2021, B309108)
[nonpub. opn.].)
                             The 2022 lawsuit
       In October 2022, Tchejeyan filed a lawsuit against Verizon,
the Planning Commission, the City Council, the City of Thousand
Oaks (the City), and the California Water Service Company
(collectively Respondents). In the first amended complaint, he
sought to enjoin Respondents from “unlawfully constructing
(and/or allowing the construction of) a wireless communications
facility . . . that violates and/or materially exceeds the scope of
[the Resolution].” He alleged that Verizon changed the type of
antennas to be installed, requiring an increase in mitigation
fencing from the face of the antennas (from three to seven feet to
15 to 20 feet) to accommodate the new antennas’ greater
radiofrequency emissions. He argued Verizon’s modification of
increased fencing under the same special use permit constituted

                                3
a “bait and switch” and exceeded the scope of the express
conditions of approval for the special use permit, since the
Planning Commission, the City, and the City Council did not
consider the visual impact of the increased mitigation fencing.
He alleged a modification application was required under
condition 21.
       Tchejeyan alleged three causes of action: declaratory relief
and two causes of action for a “[c]ivil [a]ction under [Government
Code section] 36900” for violations of city ordinances. Tchejeyan
sought a judicial declaration that the telecommunications facility,
featuring the new antennas and increased mitigation fencing,
violated and exceeded the scope of the Resolution. He sought a
restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing
construction of the facility.
       Respondents demurred to the first amended complaint.
They argued, among other things, that the amended complaint
did not identify any permit conditions requiring a “specific type of
antenna or equipment for the wireless telecommunications
facility at issue.” They submitted judicially noticed records in
support of their demurrer, including the Resolution and the
conditions for approval of the permit.
       After taking judicial notice of the special use permit, the
Resolution, and the conditions of approval, the trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The court found
“there [was] no demonstrated ‘bait and switch.’ ” To the extent
Tchejeyan claimed the new antennas and mitigation fencing were
inconsistent with the special use permit, the trial court found he
“failed to allege how they [were] inconsistent with or violate[d]
any special provision of the [special use permit]. If there is no
violation of the [special use permit] by Verizon’s intended

                                 4
development, there can be no violation of any City ordinance or
[Gov.] Code section 36900.”
                             DISCUSSION
       Tchejeyan contends the trial court erred in sustaining the
demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend.
We disagree.
       We review the order sustaining the demurrer de novo,
accepting the truth of material facts properly pleaded but not
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Yvanova v.
New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.) “The
courts, however, will not close their eyes to situations where a
complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with attached
documents, or allegations contrary to facts which are judicially
noticed. [Citations.] Thus, a pleading valid on its face may
nevertheless be subject to demurrer when matters judicially
noticed by the court render the complaint meritless.” (Del E.
Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d
593, 604.)
       A demurrer should be sustained where the complaint fails
to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Balikov v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (2001)
94 Cal.App.4th 816, 819-820.) “A judgment of dismissal after a
demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend will be
affirmed if proper on any grounds stated in the demurrer,
whether or not the court acted on that ground.” (Carman v.
Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 324.)
       Here, the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer
because Tchejeyan’s amended complaint failed to plead facts
sufficient to state a cause of action. Tchejeyan alleged
Respondents exceeded the scope of the special use permit and the

                                5
Resolution by continuing construction of the wireless
telecommunications facility despite an increase in mitigation
fencing to accommodate a new type of antenna. Because the
Planning Commission only considered three to seven feet of
mitigation fencing before approving the special use permit,
Tchejeyan alleged Respondents were required to submit a
modification permit under condition 21. However, the special use
permit application, the Resolution, and the conditions for
approval do not specify the measurements of the mitigation
fencing or the type of antenna to be installed.2
       When the City defendants approved the special use permit
and adopted the Resolution, the location and measurements of
the mitigation fencing to accommodate the radiofrequency
emissions from the facility’s antennas had yet to be determined.
Conditions 7 and 8 require that to “comply with FCC guidelines,”
the fencing “shall be installed at a distance from the face of the
antennas as determined by” facility emission testing. Such
testing will determine “the exact location of the safety
fencing/barriers for each antenna sector” to exclude the public
from entering areas that exceed the public radiofrequency
exposure limits as set forth by the FCC. Tchejeyan does not
challenge the increased radiofrequency emissions from the new
antennas.
       Here, it was determined after further testing that 15 to 20
feet of fencing was necessary to comply with FCC safety

      2 Condition 3 does not specify an antenna type, but instead
states that the maximum height of the antenna shall be “at the
maximum staggered tip height of 14’ and 12’ from the existing
finished grade.” Tchejeyan did not allege that the antennas
exceeded these height limitations.

                                6
guidelines because “emissions testing dictate the fence
placement,” as required by conditions 7 and 8. And condition 21
provides that modification permits are not required if
modification of the wireless communications facility is
“preempted by Federal or State regulation,” such as the FCC
guidelines. Here, modification of the barrier fencing to
accommodate radiofrequency emissions from the facility is not
subject to condition 21 because it is preempted by FCC guidelines
governing radiofrequency emissions. (See Cohen v. Apple, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2022) 46 F.4th 1012, 1029-1031.)
       We therefore conclude Tchejeyan failed to plead facts to
show Respondents exceeded the scope of the Resolution and the
special use permit. The judicially noticed documents here
contradict the allegations in his amended complaint. (Del E.
Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at
p. 604.) Because we affirm the trial court’s order sustaining the
demurrer on these grounds, we do not consider the alternative
grounds in Respondents’ brief.
       To the extent Tchejeyan contends the trial court erred
when it did not grant him leave to amend his first amended
complaint, we conclude there was no error. We review the court’s
order for abuse of discretion, which Tchejeyan can show “if there
is a reasonable possibility that the pleading could be cured by
amendment.” (Ochs v. PacifiCare of California (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th at 782, 796.) Here, Tchejeyan has not carried his
burden to show a reasonable possibility the pleading could be
cured by an amendment. He has not proposed any additional
facts demonstrating that Respondents violated a specific
condition of approval. Thus, he has not demonstrated the court
abused its discretion in denying leave to amend.

                                7
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             YEGAN, J.

                               8
                    Henry J. Walsh, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

      Kirtland & Packard, Michael Louis Kelly and Connor M.
Karen for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Tracy Noonan, City Attorney, David S. Womack, Assistant
City Attorney; Gatzke Dillon & Ballance, Kevin P. Sullivan and
Yana L. Ridge for Defendants and Respondents City of Thousand
Oaks, City Council of the City of Thousand Oaks and Planning
Commission of the City of Thousand Oaks.
      Gatzke Dillon & Ballance, Kevin P. Sullivan and Yana L.
Ridge for Defendants and Respondents Los Angeles SMSA
Limited Partnership and California Water Service Company.