Court Opinion

ID: 9679201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:44:00.898426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:11.263113
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, P.J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in which KELLER, J., joined.
I respectfully dissent. I would either dismiss the petition for discretionary review as improvidently granted or affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the merits.
I believe the Court’s opinion reverses on an issue that is not fairly presented in appellant’s discretionary review petition and that was uncontested in the Court of Appeals and during the suppression hearing in the trial court. Although appellant’s claims are not very clearly set out in either his discretionary review petition or his brief, his essential complaint seems to be the police violated his Family Code rights not by failing to bring him to an “office or official designated by the juvenile court” but by taking his statement at a non-juvenile facility. Appellant seems to claim that any statement by a juvenile must always be obtained at a juvenile facility and that any statement obtained at a non-juvenile facility must be suppressed.
In other cases like this we have dismissed discretionary review petitions as improvidently granted. See, e.g., State v. Consaul, 982 S.W.2d 899 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998), and at 900-03 (Price, J., concurring) (state’s petition for discretionary review dismissed because, among other things, state never made argument it made in its petition for discretionary review in either the trial court or the Court of Appeals). And, unlike the situation in Consaulwhere the dismissed issue was fairly presented in the state’s discretionary review petition, the Court reverses this case on an issue not fairly presented in appellant’s discretionary review petition. See Consaul, 982 S.W.2d at 903-04 (Keller, J., dissenting) (having exercised its discretion to grant the discretionary review petition, the Court should have addressed the issue fairly presented in it). I would dismiss this discretionary review petition as improvidently granted.
The merits of this case also require a holding that the police and all the other state actors involved in the taking of appellant’s statement scrupulously honored appellant’s rights under the Family Code. After arresting appellant, the officer immediately, “without unnecessary delay” and “without first taking” appellant anywhere else brought appellant before the magistrate. The magistrate gave appellant the “required juvenile warnings.” After all this, the police obtained appellant’s voluntary statement at the homicide division. The police immediately brought appellant before another magistrate at which time appellant after having been warned again by the magistrate signed the statement with no police officers present. See Section 51.09(b)G), Texas Family Code.
The Court’s opinion decides appellant’s statement should have been suppressed *657because the officer did not bring him to an “office or official designated by the juvenile court”1 or to a “detention facility designated by the juvenile court”2 after the officer had taken appellant before the magistrate whom the juvenile court had designated as a “juvenile processing office” under Section 52.025(a), Texas Family Code. The Court decides the officer failed to comply with either Section 52.02(a)(2) or Section 52.02(a)(3).
However, there is evidence in the record to support a finding the magistrate was a “juvenile processing office” under Section 52.025(a) and an “official designated by the juvenile court” under Section 52.02(a)(2).3 Therefore, the officer complied with Section 52.02(a)(2) when he brought appellant before the magistrate.
The Court of Appeals’ opinion also states this magistrate was “a designated juvenile processing office for purposes of sections 52.02 and 52.025.” See Le v. State, Slip op. at 6, No. 14-94-01265-CR, 1997 WL 665902 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] October 23, 1997) (nonpublished). Appellant did not claim otherwise in the Court of Appeals. See id., slip op. at 5 (appellant contended Section 52.02(a), Texas Family Code, was violated “because, after being given his warnings by the magistrate, appellant was taken to and detained at the homicide division of the Harris County Sheriffs office, an undesignated area for juvenile processing purposes, rather than to the Sheriff’s designated juvenile processing office ”). (Emphasis Supplied).
Appellant also did not claim otherwise during the suppression hearing in the trial court.4 After the presentation of the uncontested facts relating to the taking of appellant’s statement, appellant’s essential claim to the trial court during the suppression hearing was that his statement should have been taken at a “juvenile processing center” instead of the homicide division.
“[APPELLANT]: Your Honor, as far as argument is concerned, your Honor, first of all, we would adopt each and every grounds that we state in our written motion to suppress but I think your (sic) my strongest ground which I would like or urge at this time has to do with the whole matter of what constitutes a juvenile processing center and where the statement was taken and I anticipate that the State is going to say that this procedure that was undertaken is okay because [appellant] was first taken to the municipal court where he was duly warned by a magistrate and then the written statement was taken and furthermore, that that was a sufficiently legal procedure because a magistrate’s office, specifically the Houston municipal court magistrate office, is a proper juvenile processing center for purposes of the statute.
“Now, I believe the control provisions in this case, your Honor, is Article 52.02 of the Texas Family Code which relates to release or delivery to the Court of requiring that the child first be brought before an office or official designated by a juvenile court if there is probable cause to believe what (sic) the child engaged in conduct indicating a need for supervision. Similarly, Article 3 provides that without unnecessary delay without first taking the child to any other place other than a juvenile processing office, provision 3 of 52.02(a) says that they must bring the child to a detention facility designated by the juvenile court.
“Now, I think, your Honor, that that particular statute, 52.02, must be read in conjunction with, the next statute, namely 52.025 which is called designation of juvenile processing office. Specifically *658that provision, subsection specifically B of 52.025 provides that one of the purposes in bringing a juvenile to a juvenile processing office is for purposes of a, says the receipt of a statement by the child under section 51.09(b) of this Code. I suppose, your Honor, the dearest way that I can express our complaint is in the fact that [appellant’s] statement was taken at the homicide division at 601 Lockwood which is not a juvenile processing center. I think, your Honor, the record is clear that he was first taken to a magistrate for his warnings. In fact, if that had not been done I think the State would be in further trouble. However, there is a case called Comer (spelled phonetically) versus State which I have a copy right here, if I can approach the Bench, which Mr. Owmby is more than aware of because he has been talking about it with the interns continuously throughout the morning, probably have his own comments about it, but our position, your Honor, is that this case supports our position that the procedure used in this case contradicts the relevant provisions of the Texas Family Code, and you know, I would just ask for the Court to have an opportunity to read that particular case, your Honor, and grant the motion to suppress, the written statement, juvenile statement. “[COURT]: Mr. Owmby.
“[STATE]: What the Code says is that without any unnecessary delay and without first taking the child to any other place other than a juvenile processing office designated under 52.025. They did that, your Honor. They took him to a place designated under 52.025 for juvenile processing facility. They did that first. They also took him before the office or official designated by the juvenile court if there is probable cause to believe [pursuant to section 52.02(a)(2)]. They took him to that magistrate that is also designated and under 52.05(sic). They couldn’t have done anything other than what the law prescribes, which they did. There are strong indications that he was in custody but it is a determination to be made by the Court under all the circumstances not just the defendant’s subjectively but the officer, whether they had probable cause, whether he was the focus, but even if he was in custody they followed all of the requirements of the juvenile court and the officer has stated he had reasonable cause to believe he engaged in delinquent conduct and stated those reasons. There is no reason why this confession is not admissible. They could not have done a better, more good faith job, however, precisely following what the law sets out for them to do. “[APPELLANT]: Judge, the specific provisions of the Comer a case; in fact, the specific language in, in on page 196 near the end, particular decision where the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically says in our view the Legislature intended that the officer designated by the juvenile court making the initial decision whether to subject the child to custodial — I don’t have to read it to the Court, your Honor. I know the Court can read and I’m not here to insult the Court’s intelligence; however, I don’t want to waste the time in quoting the language in this. However, I do believe, quite earnestly believe that this is a substantial issue and there is very strong language in this opinion which supports our position that the statement of the juvenile, respondent and accused that was taken of the accused in this case should have been taken not at the homicide division. I have no quarrel with a homicide detective or anybody else taking a statement from any juvenile accused. That can be, you know, it’s not our position that no statement can ever been taken by a juvenile. Our position is that the specific provisions of law which are required to be followed were not followed in this case. I think the whole statutory provisions basically giving more protection to juveniles is one that was recognized by the Legislature *659and in this particular context this is part and parcel of giving more protection to a juvenile respondent who at that young age, however, 14, 15, 16 years old, is perhaps more likely to suffer the kind of intimidation and nervousness and apprehension that perhaps a more mature person, 21, 25 or 28 might feel. So, your Honor, it, in all earnestness I think this is a very strong and substantial issue, non-frivolous, and I think there is specific language in this decision which supports our position.
“[STATE]: Your Honor, we would like to know note though what the Comer case actually holds is you can’t take a juvenile to a magistrate’s house unless it’s designated. That’s not the case here, about what the Legislature may have intended is there. What the officers have to do is follow what is written in the law and as interpreted by the Court and that’s what the Court said in Comer and that’s what they did.
“[APPELLANT]: 601 Lockwood [the homicide division] is not designated here. That’s the point.
“[COURT]: The Court has heard enough. The motion to suppress is denied.” (Emphasis Supplied).
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the claim appellant asserted there and in the trial court when it decided that although “section 52.025(b)(5)[5] allows a child to be kept at a juvenile processing office for the receipt of a statement under section 51.09(b),[6] it does not require it.” Le, No. 14-94-01265-CR., Slip op. at 6 (emphasis in original); see also Le, — S.W.2d at-(“a statement may be obtained at a juvenile processing office, but there is no requirement that this occur”) (emphasis in original). As this Court recognized in Comer, the clear legislative intent of the Family Code’s statutory scheme is “to restrict involvement of law enforcement officers to the initial seizure and prompt release or commitment of juvenile offenders”. See Comer, 776 S.W.2d at 194. That was done here.
Finally, I do not understand the Court’s opinion to preclude the Court of Appeals from considering on remand the custody issue. The State did not necessarily concede the custody issue during the suppression hearing in the trial court. The Court of Appeals did not decide the custody issue. And, since appellant lost in the trial court with no findings of fact made by the trial court, the Court of Appeals must presume the trial court resolved adversely to appellant any disputed fact issues on the custody issue. See State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821-22 (Tex.Cr.App.1999); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Cr.App.1997).
I respectfully dissent.
KELLER, J.,
delivered a dissenting opinion.
I agree with Presiding Judge McCormick and join his dissenting opinion: the issue on which the majority opinion rests was not the issue debated in the trial court or the Court of Appeals. There are a couple more matters, though, that are worth mentioning.
The reason the record is ambiguous about whether the magistrate was a designated official under § 52.02(a)(2) is that appellant did not argue that he wasn’t. The State established unequivocally that the statement met the admissibility requirements of § 51.095, and the State established compliance with § 52.025. The State had no reason, and no burden, to establish compliance with § 52.02(a)(2) because appellant argued a different basis for exclusion. So, it is not surprising that the record is less than satisfactory regarding compliance with that statute.
Nevertheless, there are indications in the record that police complied with *660§ 52.02(a)(2). Aside from the prosecutor’s unchallenged statement that the magistrate was designated under that statute, there is testimony that, while undeniably ambiguous, could support a conclusion that the magistrate was designated under § 52.02(a)(2):
Q: Is your office designated by the Board of Juvenile Courts as a place where juveniles are first to be taken if they were taken into custody?
A: Yes, it is.
Although the question could have — even probably — referred to designation under § 52.025, that is not the only possible meaning of the testimony. Because the trial court ruled against appellant, we defer to implied findings that support that ruling. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
I disagree with the majority that the legislative history of § 52.025 indicates an intent that one place cannot be designated under both statutes. “Another facility” is spoken of by Senator Dickson in the context of being a place other than the parents’ home, the custodian, and the detention center, which, of course, it would be. There is, though, nothing in his statement that addresses whether a place that is designated under subsection (2) of § 52.02(a) could also be designated under § 52.025. And it seems logical that it could. Moreover, § 52.02(a)(2) authorizes designation not just of places, but of people. There is nothing in the legislative history that would lead me to conclude that a magistrate who had been designated under § 52.02(a)(2) could not perform his duties at a place designated under § 52.025.
Another reason I would dismiss the petition or affirm the judgment below is appellant’s failure to articulate rebanee on Art. 38.23, Tex.Code Crina. Proc. Ann. Appellant’s statement was admissible under the statute that expressly provides the conditions for admissibility of a child’s statement (§ 51.095 Admissibility of a Statement of a Child). Absent the mechanism of our statutory exclusionary rule, noncompliance with § 52.02(a)(2) would not cause a statement to become inadmissible. Though one could imply reliance on Art. 38.23, appebant did not actually or expbeitly argue that statute. Since the trial court resolved the admissibibty issue contrary to appebant, we should not reverse that decision on the basis of a claim that was, at best, only impliedly made.
And finally, the Court of Appeals has not determined the issue of custody. Though the majority finds that the State, at trial, essentially conceded custody, it appears to me that they did not. The prosecutor conceded that there were strong indications of custody, but he explicitly left the determination of the matter to the trial court. Several pages of the State’s briefs in both the Court of Appeals and in our Court are spent arguing that appebant was not in custody. More important, the Court of Appeals assumed but expressly did not decide the custody issue. Since the majority determines that the Court of Appeals erred in its resolution of the issue the court did decide the case on, we ought to remand the case to them to decide the custody issue.
I respectfuhy dissent.

. See Section 52.02(a)(2), Texas Family Code.

. See Section 52.02(a)(3), Texas Family Code.

. See State’s Exhibit 3 from the suppression hearing.

. See Tr. at 237; S.F., Vol. 4 at 88-93.

. See Section 52.025(b)(5), Texas Family Code.

. See Section 51.09(b), Texas Family Code.