Court Opinion

ID: 9750266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:43:33.126267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:05.634644
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J., Concurring.
While I initially planned to dissent in this case, my colleagues’ opinion persuaded me the prevailing standard of review for claims involving ineffective assistance of counsel requires a “reasonable *1012probability” of a different outcome, even when that ineffective assistance results in the deprivation of defendant’s federal constitutional rights. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1008-1010.) I write separately, nonetheless, to register my concern this approach is not sufficiently protective of vital constitutional rights, such as a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to testify. In my view, when a lawyer’s ineffective assistance costs a defendant such a right only application of the Chapman standard1 will afford the essential protection. That is, when, as here, a defense counsel’s failure to object deprives a defendant not just of his constitutional right to effective representation but to another constitutional right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the conviction should be reversed unless the court can make a finding “beyond a reasonable doubt” the error did not affect the outcome.2
The threshold issue, in my view, is what would have happened if that objection had been made instead of omitted. If the answer is there is a reasonable doubt whether the outcome would have remained the same because the enforcement of the constitutional right would have made that degree of difference, then the logic behind Chapman suggests the conviction should be reversed. It seems contrary to the principle that federal constitutional rights warrant the higher standard of protection afforded by Chapman to do otherwise. It undermines enforcement of the federal constitutional right to say, no, despite the fact there is a “reasonable doubt” the conviction would have happened if the objection had been made we refuse to reverse because the defendant has failed to establish a “reasonable probability” a different outcome would have resulted had the objection been made.
On the other hand, under this more protective standard the converse would be true, too. If the appellate court applies Chapman and finds beyond a reasonable doubt an objection, if made, would not have made a difference, it necessarily follows the defense counsel’s failure to object to that constitutional error did not represent ineffective assistance of counsel—for the simple reason the lawyer’s mistake could not have affected the outcome.
It is revealing to note a recent death penalty case, People v. Huggins,3 in which the California Supreme Court did exactly what the above paragraph argues would be a preferable approach. Our high court engaged in this two-step process—first applying Chapman when determining whether a defense counsel’s objection to constitutionally inadmissible evidence, had it *1013been made, would have affected the outcome. Then having found beyond a reasonable doubt the evidence whether admitted or excluded could not have affected the outcome, our high court applied Strickland to find the lawyer’s mistake therefore was not prejudicial and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Huggins, the constitutional right at stake was the defendant’s constitutional right to exclude statements he made during a psychiatric competency examination. His counsel failed to raise the constitutional ground (although he raised other grounds) when objecting to the use of a certain statement from the appellant’s competency interview during the prosecution’s cross-examination of the psychiatrist. The trial court rejected the other grounds the defense counsel asserted in support of his objection and permitted the prosecutor to bring out the content of the appellant’s statement.4
As the majority does in this case, rather than determine whether the defense counsel was deficient in failing to register a constitutional ground for his objection, the Supreme Court in Huggins moved directly to the prejudice prong. After briefly rehearsing why the erroneously admitted statement was inconsequential compared to the other evidence relevant to the issue at hand, the court applied the Chapman standard to the defense counsel’s failure to properly object. “If defendant had preserved his Sixth Amendment claim for review [by lodging the objection on constitutional grounds], we would conclude that any error in admitting the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Satterwhite v. Texas [(1988)] 486 U.S. 249, 256, 258 [100 L.Ed.2d 284, 108 S.Ct. 1792] [applying the Chapman standard]; [citation]), and reversal of the judgment would not be required. Because we find no reasonable probability of a different outcome [because no reversal would be required by Chapman] absent the admission of the evidence, we conclude that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel.”5
What we do not know from Huggins, however, is what our Supreme Court would have done had it found a reasonable doubt whether the outcome would have been the same if the defense counsel indeed had lodged a proper objection to the constitutionally inadmissible evidence. Except for some of the prior opinions from both the California and United States Supreme Courts *1014cited in the majority opinion,6 it would seem doubtful our high court in such an instance would have then gone on to hold “nevertheless there was no ineffective assistance of counsel” in the lawyer’s failure to lodge the objection. In my view, the two are linked inextricably. If the constitutional error the defense counsel’s failure to object allowed to occur led to consequences that raised a reasonable doubt about the trial’s outcome then that mistake ought to satisfy the prejudice prong, at least, of the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.
I would like to think the fact the California Supreme Court followed the two-step process it did in reasoning through the “failure to object to federal constitutional error” issue in Huggins suggests it also would do so when the first step results in a finding of reasonable doubt whether the objection, if made, would have led to a different result. And furthermore, I would hope the latter finding would lead to the opposite conclusion in the second stage of the reasoning process than the one reached in Huggins. That is, because the defense counsel’s error allowed a federal constitutional error that, in turn, raised a reasonáble doubt about the outcome, it cannot be said the error was not prejudicial and thus reversal is required. To put it another way, this is not solely or even primarily a Sixth Amendment “ineffective assistance of counsel” violation to be tested under the standard of review applicable to that constitutional provision. No, in this case it is a Fifth Amendment violation combined with a Sixth Amendment violation—and more the former than the latter. As such the error should have to pass muster under both standards, not just the easier one, before being deemed harmless.
Unfortunately, there is little hope other than the California Supreme Court’s reasoning process in the Huggins opinion to suggest it will adopt the above analysis when the defense counsel’s failure to object to federal constitutional error raises a “reasonable doubt” about the trial’s outcome but not a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome. As well documented in the majority opinion the Strickland “reasonable probability of a different *1015outcome” language7 has evolved into a veritable mantra whenever courts confront a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, the mantra is repeated and that standard of review applied even in the relatively rare situation when the defense counsel’s error deprived a defendant of a federal constitutional right.8 Accordingly, I reluctantly concur in the judgment, but respectfully ask some higher court to revisit the standard of review applicable when a counsel’s serious miscue wipes out a defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 28, 2006, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 21, 2007, S148991.

 Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824].

 Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24.

 People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593, 131 P.3d 995].

 People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pages 247-248.

 People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at page 249, italics added.

 See, e.g., California Supreme Court decisions in People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 208-209, 217 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839], People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1032, footnote 16 [245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342], and In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721-722, 731 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017]. Also, see United States Supreme Court decision in Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 382, footnote 7 [91 L.Ed.2d 305, 106 S.Ct. 2574].

 Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686-687 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052].

 See, e.g., cases cited in footnote 6 above.