Court Opinion

ID: 9670592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:22:59.742611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:05.445264
License: Public Domain

Roberds, J.,
dissenting.
The controlling opinion largely nullifies the effect of the judgment enrollment statute upon the property of the judgment-debtor. It holds that one coming into possession of such property takes it free of such enrolled judgment unless the property has been seized under execution. If a transferee, or tranferees, regardless of number, of such property from the original owner, can maneuver to dispose of the property, or hide it out, so that levy thereon cannot be made under execution, then there is no liability whatever on such transferees. The entire right of the judgment creditor being dependent alone upon seizure under execution, enrollment of the judgment is useless, for execution can issue on an unenrolled judgment as effectually as upon one enrolled. As stated in the majority opinion, the Dozier case was decided before adoption of the statute, and, therefore, has no application thereto. The Simpson case is authority for the majority holding’. However, in my view, that case is wrong. It makes the right of the creditor dependent upon a special lien. There is, as to effect, no difference between the two. Both simply entitle the creditor to proceed against the property to enforce his lien and subject the property to payment of the debt. A general judgment creditor can resort to execution or, ip proper case, to chancery. A vendor, having a special -lien for the purchase price, can resort to equity. A landlord, having a special lien, enforces it by the method set out in the statutes. In all cases of liens, whether general or special, the lienor can simply proceed to en*95force the lien and make his money out of the property. Bnt in both cases the property is burdened with the lien. Section 1555, Code of 1942, imposing the general lien, provides, “A judgment so enrolled shall be a lien upon and bind all the property of the defendant within the county where so enrolled, from the rendition thereof.” Incidentally, no claim is made here that the transfer of the property did not take place in the county where the judgment was enrolled.
In my opinion this case is controlled by Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Ellett, 145 Miss. 60, 111 So. 92. In that case Gerlach had an enrolled judgment against Ellett. Execution issued on that judgment and an automobile in the possession of Ellett was seized. However, the execution was released and withdrawn by written authority of the judgment-creditor. That left nothing against the automobile except the lien under the enrolled judgment. In that situation Ellett sold the automobile to Standard Automobile Company. Gerlach then had another execution issued and the car was seized in the possession of the Standard Automobile Company. The court held that the claim of Gerlach was superior to that of Standard. Of course, the rights of the parties were determined by the conditions existing at the time Standard got the car. At that time Gerlach had nothing whatever except its lien under the enrolled judgment. The first execution had been effectually withdrawn and the second had not been issued. The court stated the contention of Standard to be that Gerlach “waived and surrendered its judgment lien against the car when it authorized the sheriff to release the car from the first execution issued by the judgment creditor and the lower court so held, seemingly upon the idea that no lien attached against personal property under an enrolled judgment, unless and until the property was seized under the writ of execution”. This Court then said “This act of releasing the levy of the judgment creditor could in no way impair or defeat the judgment lien on the car *96given under the statute.” The Court further said the parties were “hound to take notice of our statutory law on judgment liens, and he (the purchaser of the car) was charged with knowledge of the lien of the judgment creditor when he purchased the car from Ellett.” Again, it is proper to emphasize that at the time of the purchase by Standard the only lien against the car was that of an enrolled judgment and the rights of Standard and of Gerlach, between whom the contest existed, were determined as of the time Standard purchased the car. The subsequent execution had no effect upon such rights; it was simply the means and occasion of bringing the issues to decision.