Court Opinion

ID: 9743412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:32:42.773169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.125823
License: Public Domain

PAUL H. ANDERSON, J.
(concurring).
I concur with the majority’s holding that Nelson’s conviction should be affirmed. However, I write separately to express my concern about'the last issue — the admission of other crimes evidence against Nelson. While there is substantial evidence of Nelson’s participation in Johnson’s murder such that the admission of the other crimes evidence is harmless, the aggravated robberies were not sufficiently similar to Johnson’s murder to justify the admission.
Evidence of participation in other crimes, or Spreigl evidence, is not admissible for the purpose of showing that the defendant acted in conformity with character and thus, such evidence is only admissible if the other crime is “sufficiently or substantially similar to the charged offense — determined by time, place or mo-dus operandi.” State v. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d 75, 80-81 (Minn.1999). Looking at the time, place, and modus operandi of the aggravated robberies as compared to Johnson’s murder illustrates that there is almost no similarity between the crimes and certainly not enough to classify the crimes as “substantially similar.” Pecause of this lack of similarity, the robberies should not have been used in an attempt to establish that Nelson and Carter had a cooperative criminal relationship or worked closely to coordinate their criminal activity.
Johnson’s murder took place seven months before the first aggravated robbery. Neither of the aggravated robberies occurred in Park Rapids or the Paul Bunyan State Forest, where the murder took place, and the second robbery did not even occur in Minnesota. The modus operandi of the Spreigl crimes bears no similarity to the murder, except in the fact that a weapon was used. The testimony presented establishes that only Carter and Nelson participated in Johnson’s murder, while Carter, Nelson, and Rossbach all participated in the robberies. The robberies were carefully planned, involving walkie-talkies, duct tape to tie store employees, and a get-away vehicle. In contrast, according to both Carter and Nelson, the murder did not involve any advanced coordination between the two men or any coordination during the killing itself. Both Carter and Nelson also testified to the other’s inability to dispose of Johnson’s torso (either through burning or burying), suggesting that the disposal of the body had not been well-planned. The close proximity of the hunters and the failure of Carter and Nelson to plan for this contingency, as they did with the police scanner in the robberies, also suggests different levels of preparation and modus operandi.
The danger of the admission of Spreigl evidence is that the jury will “convict [the defendant] ba,sed on their assessment of him as a person or based on what he has done in the past.” State v. King, 622 N.W.2d 800, 810-11 n. 6 (Minn.2001) (quoting United States v. Bahe, 40 F.Supp.2d 1802, 1312 (D.N.M.1998)). To avoid this possibility, the benefit of the doubt on the admissibility of Spreigl evidence is given to the defendant and the evidence is excluded. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d at 80. Therefore, I conclude that the district court committed an error, albeit a harmless error, when it admitted the evidence of the aggravated robberies at Nelson’s trial.