Court Opinion

ID: 9804461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 16:49:13.703812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:13:45.207197
License: Public Domain

COMBS, J.,
with whom WINCHESTER and TAYLOR, JJ., join, dissenting:
1 For reasons expressed originally in my dissenting opinion in Murray County v. Homesales, Inc., 2014 OK 52, 330 P.3d 519, I must respectfully dissent. In this cause, Appellants assert that 1) Appellee lacks standing to bring this action; and 2) the district court erred by certifying this cause as a class action. Relying on this Court's decision in Murray County, the majority determines that even though Appellee lacks standing to sue to enforce the Documentary Stamp Tax Act (DSTA), 68 0.8.2011 § 38201 et seq., it possess standing to seek equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment or an injunction. Having reached that determination, the majority proceeds to determine that the district court's certification order, based upon 12 O.S. Supp.2018 § 2023(B)B), was improper because Appellee does not have standing to seek monetary damages pursuant to the DSTA.
2 The majority also determines that certification of the class pursuant to 12 O.S. Supp.2018 § 2028(B)(2) would be premature because Appellee must first show that it can satisfy the commonality requirements of 12 O.S. Supp.2018 § 2023(A). The majority concludes that Appellee is required to affirmatively demonstrate compliance with the class action statute by being prepared to prove that commonality as to taxability does in fact exist, and further concludes that the deeds relied upon. by Appellee do not satisfy the required showing. Accordingly, the majority reverses the trial court's certification order but remands this cause for further development of the record and further consideration of the class certification question.
T3 Because I do not believe Appellee possesses standing to sue in this cause-either to enforce the DSTA or to pursue equitable relief the question of standing is dispositive and reaching the issue of the class certification order is unnecessary. Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, ¶ 9, 890 P.2d 906 ("Only if standing exists must the case proceed to the merits for the reason only one whose substantial rights are injuriously affected may appeal from a decision, however erroneous.") (Internal citations omitted). Essentially, Appellee is unable to meet one of the three central requirements this Court has set out for standing: a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable court decision. Murray County, 2014 OK 52, ¶ 2, 330 P.3d 519 (Combs, J., dissenting); J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Assoc. v. Eldridge, 2012 OK 24, ¶ 7, 273 P.3d 62. Neither a declaratory judgment nor an injunction will result in Appellee obtaining the lost revenue they claim that they are due under the DSTA. A declaratory judgment that the DSTA was violated is nothing more than a stepping stone to eventual enforcement of the DSTA, which this Court has already declared plaintiffs in Appellee's position cannot do.
T 4 Appellee's attempts to secure equitable relief represent nothing more than an attempt to cireamvent their lack of standing to sue to directly enforce the provisions of the DSTA. As I previously emphasized in Murray County, 2014 OK 52, ¶ 13, 330 P.3d 519 (Combs, J., dissenting):
[t]his Court has long relied upon the axiom that what may not be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly. In Re Oklahoma Capitol Imp. Authority, 2012 OK 99, ¶ 12, 289 P.3d 1277; Large v. Acme Engineering and Mfg. Corp., 1990 OK 34, ¶ 8, 790 P.2d 1086; Reherman v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 1984 OK 12, ¶ 15, 679 P.2d 1296. A determination by this Court that the plaintiffs can seek a *887declaratory judgment that documentary stamp taxes are due from the defendants pursuant to 68 O.S. § 8201 and that the exemptions claimed by the defendants were unlawful is nothing more than an end-run around the basic determination that the plaintiffs are not permitted to sue to enforce the DSTA. Having determined that the plaintiffs cannot enforce the DSTA, it does not make sense to allow them to seek declaratory relief that could lead to nothing else but subsequent action by the plaintiffs to enforce the DSTA.
15 Appellee is not the proper party to seek adjudication of the asserted issues. Leavitt, 1994 OK 148, ¶ 9, 890 P.2d 906. The proper party is the Oklahoma Tax Commission, which unlike Appellee, possesses an-thority to enforce the provisions of the DSTA. Murray County, 2014 OK 52, ¶ 9-15, 330 P.3d 519. Because Appellee lacks standing, consideration of the class certification order is unnecessary. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.