Court Opinion

ID: 9719011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:40:22.664963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.049914
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: The record in this case discloses that the coroner’s pathologist serving pursuant to section 10.1 of the coroner’s act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 31, par. 10.1), was directed by the coroner to perform an autopsy upon the deceased driver in addition to forwarding a sample of blood to the Department of Public Health. Parker, the driver, apparently died at the scene of the collision. The pathologist testified that the autopsy disclosed an alcohol level of .262 per milligram, that such level would impair the driver’s judgment and reaction, that that impairment “would be severe,” and that in the opinion of the witness, Parker was intoxicated. The docket entry of the trial judge reflects that the motion in limine was allowed as to: “[T]he test performed by the Department of Public Health under the Coroner’s Act. The motion is denied as to the results of the Coroner’s pathologist.” The evidence of intoxication disclosed by reason of such discretionary autopsy is competent, material, relevant, and probative upon the issue of proximate cause for the injuries sustained by plaintiff. (French v. City of Springfield (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 368, 283 N.E.2d 18.) Defendant argues that the evidence is admissible for such purpose. Section 10 of the coroner’s act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 31, par. 10) provides: “Every coroner, whenever, as soon as he knows or is informed that the dead body of any person is found, or lying within his county, whose death is suspected of being: (a) A sudden or violent death, whether apparently suicidal, homicidal or accidental, including but not limited to death apparently caused or contributed to by thermal, traumatic, chemical, electrical or radiational injury, ° ° °; # # # (e) A death where the decedent was not attended by a licensed physician; shall go to the place where the dead body is, and take charge of the same and shall make a preliminary investigation into the circumstances of the death. In the case of death without attendance by a licensed physician the body may be moved with the coroner’s consent from the place of death to a mortuary in the same county. Coroners in their discretion shall notify such physician as is designated in accordance with Section 10.1 to attempt to ascertain the cause of death, either by autopsy or otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied.) In this portion of the act the coroner is granted a discretion to direct an autopsy or other examination of the decedent. The provisions of the act concerning tests in an accidental death by a motor vehicle quoted in the principal opinion follows such language. We note that such provision for tests by the Department of Public Health is equally directed to pedestrians 16 years or older. We note the language of the portion of the act at issue: “The results of the statistical examinations referred to in this paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in any action of any kind in any court or before any tribunal, board, agency or person, but shall be used only for statistical purposes. ° (Emphasis supplied.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 31, par. 10. In the light of such language we examine the legislative history of the coroner’s act. Section 10 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 31, par. 10) limited the coroner’s use of autopsy to those instances where the death was believed to result from a criminal agency. In 1957 the statute was amended to provide for the discretionary autopsy as presently stated in the statute. In 1965 the Act provided for the statistical blood test program of the Department of Public Health in the period of January 1,1966, to January 1,1967. No change was made in the provisions for a coroner’s autopsy. In 1967 the statute made no provision for the statistical blood test by the Department of Public Health. In 1969 there was likewise no provision for tests by the Department of Public Health, but the discretionary autopsy by the coroner was retained. In 1971 the statute retained the discretionary autopsy and added a paragraph for statistical tests by the Department of Public Health for the period of July 1,1971, to July 1,1973. The statute, in 1973, retained the present form of discretionary autopsy and continued the program of the statistical blood test by the Department without limitation as to a period of years. It seems proper to conclude that the statutory history indicates that the discretionary autopsy of the coroner is an independent provision of the statute continuing without change since 1957, whereas the statistical test program of the Department of Public Health was the subject of some legislative experiment until retained without limitation. In Swank v. Bertuca (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 229, 353 N.E.2d 415, the issue was whether the report of a departmental test of blood alcohol could be introduced into evidence in a dramshop action. This court concluded that the legislature had determined that the records of the Department of Public Health were authorized and maintained for statistical purposes only, and that as a matter of legislative determination of public policy the records of the Department of Public Health should not be admitted into evidence. An examination of the language of the statute discloses no legislative determination of public policy directed to the use of an autopsy report prepared under the authority of the coroner’s act. The principal opinion adopts the argument of plaintiff that People v. Todd (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 534, 322 N.E.2d 447, is the source for determining the public policy under the coroner’s act. Todd considered only the provisions of section 11—501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 95½, par. 11—501.1). Such provisions concerned only the concept of “implied consent” of an operator of an automobile for analysis of breath or blood for alcoholic content. As noted in Todd, the provision for such tests are applicable only following a lawful arrest and such provisions are directed to prosecutions for a misdemeanor and revocation of an operator’s license. In Todd, the supreme court noted the amendment of the statute in 1967 in correlation with the decision in Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826, which held that a taking of blood without consent for the analysis of alcohol content did not violate any constitutional right of the individual. The opinion in Todd then concluded that absent a limiting statute, consent was not required for the taking of a blood sample. 59 Ill. 2d 534-45, 322 N.E.2d 447-53. It appears that in Todd the court deemed that the 1967 amendment to section 11 — 501 to be a legislative response to the decision in Schmerber which was designed to preserve the privilege of an individual driver prosecuted or subject to action for driving while intoxicated. The Todd opinion termed the provisions limiting the use of the tests so provided under the “implied consent” law “an unfortunate result and a cruel anomaly.” (59 Ill. 2d 534, 544, 322 N.E.2d 447, 453.) This opinion projects the result and the anomaly into civil actions where no claim of privilege against self-incrimination is relevant. It is not apparent how the provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code should become the source in construing the antecedent provisions of the coroner’s act. I would affirm the trial court.