Court Opinion

ID: 9706492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:44:55.383268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.181714
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. An infelicitous choice of words in the articulation of its reasoning lays the lead opinion open to criticism on peripheral points of dispute while obscuring the controlling issue.
The question in this case is whether the Appellees are eligible for general assistance benefits as chronically needy persons under 62 Pa.S. § 432(3)(i)(H). That section of the *172Public Assistance Law defines as a chronically needy person
Any person who has previously been employed full time for at least forty-eight months out of the previous eight years and has exhausted his or her unemployment compensation benefits prior to applying for assistance.
The Department of Public Welfare denied the Appellees’ claims for general assistance benefits as chronically needy persons because for various reasons the Appellees either did not qualify for or were ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits. According to the Department such persons had not “exhausted [their] unemployment compensation benefits” and therefore did not come within the definition of “chronically needy person” set forth in 62 Pa.S. § 432(3)(i)(H).
In the appeal to Commonwealth Court challenging the Appellees’ classification as transitionally needy persons, argument focused on the meaning of the word “exhausted”. The Appellees argued, and Commonwealth Court held, that unemployment compensation benefits need not have been received and depleted in order for the exhaustion requirement to be met. Rather, the claimant need only have pursued whatever unemployment compensation benefits were available to him. If none were available, whether because of the claimant’s failure to qualify for such benefits or because of a determination that he was ineligible for benefits, the exhaustion requirement would be satisfied.
Assuming that the meaning of the term “exhausted his or her unemployment compensation benefits” is sufficiently unclear as to require the court to engage in an inquiry to discern the intention of the General Assembly1, the interpretation argued for by the Appellees and accepted by the *173court below does not bear up under scrutiny. Initially, the Commonwealth Court attempts to reason by analogy. Thus it is said that “[i]n conjunction with administrative law, i.e. exhaustion of administrative remedies, the term exhaustion does not require that a party have an administrative remedy as a precondition to access to the courts, but merely means that if an administrative remedy exists, the party must first use it.” 82 Pa.Cmwlth. at 120, 475 A.2d at 875. The parallel to be drawn in the present case is that in order to exhaust unemployment compensation benefits for purposes of this section, a claimant need not have been entitled to benefits, but merely have first used them if he were entitled to them. This is a false analogy.
Whereas a person who has not received unemployment benefits seeks to come within the definition of the word “exhaust”, a party for whom there is no administrative remedy does not argue that he has “exhausted his administrative remedies” and therefore may proceed in court. He belongs in court in the first instance; “administrative remedies” and “exhaustion” are simply irrelevant to his case. Where no administrative remedies exist, it is absurd to say that a party may proceed in court because he has “exhausted his administrative remedies.” The concept of exhaustion is utterly meaningless in such a context. The correct statement of the premise in the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning is that “the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not require that a party have an administrative remedy as a precondition to access to the courts, but merely means that if an administrative remedy exists, the party must first use it.” As thus corrected, however, the premise offers no support for the argued meaning of the term “exhausted”.
The Commonwealth Court further errs by setting up the general statement of the purpose of the Public Assistance Law as controlling in specific determinations of eligibility. Describing the statement of purpose contained in Section 401 of the Law, 62 Pa.S. § 401, as establishing a “worthy man” concept, the court concludes that the Appellees have *174each in one way or another demonstrated that they are not “unworthy”. Whether the Appellees or any other claimant might marshal evidence to convince this or any tribunal that in the abstract or by comparison they are “worthy” to receive benefits as chronically needy persons is of no legal significance. The legislature has done more than state that assistance is to be granted to “worthy” people, it has specifically defined those people whom it considers to be worthy. The court engages in this discussion of “worthiness” ostensibly in aid of ascertaining the proper interpretation of “exhausted”, but the result is even further error. The court notes that each of the Appellees had by his work experience demonstrated “self-dependency and the desire to be a good citizen and useful to society.” Subsection (H), under which the Appellees seek to qualify themselves as chronically needy, requires not only work experience of at least 48 months out of the last eight years, but also exhaustion of unemployment benefits. If the Appellees could demonstrate “worthiness” and therefore eligibility merely by producing evidence of a sufficient work record, the exhaustion language would be surplusage. “Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). See also Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 191 A.2d 835 (1963).
In this connection, the court also makes oblique reference to the rule of statutory construction that it may be presumed that “the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd ... or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Having previously acknowledged that the Department’s interpretation of the term “exhaust” serves to further the general purpose of the statute, however, the court cannot rationally conclude that the results of that interpretation, however harsh or distasteful to the court, are absurd or unreasonable.
Finally, the court errs in asserting that the Department’s interpretation is tantamount to adding words which the Legislature could have, but did not use. Thus the court dismisses the department’s argument, which it frames as *175“that by use of the term ‘exhausted’ the Legislature meant ‘received and exhausted’ ”, by stating that “[i]f that is what the Legislature intended it is certainly familiar with the verb ‘receive’ and could easily have utilized it.” In effect, the court has lured the Department into defining a word which the Department was satisfied was clear on its face, and then sprung the trap when the Department uses other words to convey the same meaning. It does not require acute discernment to recognize the same “fault” in the court’s conclusion that the Legislature intended “exhaust” to mean “exhaust if benefits should be available”.
My agreement with the result reached in the lead opinion, though, is not simply based on confuting the rationale of the lower court. There are several strong reasons in support of the Department’s interpretation of subsection (H).
Preliminarily, it must be made clear that the factors to be considered in ascertaining legislative intent, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(C), are to be applied in this case to provisions of the Welfare Reform Act, Act of April 8, 1982, P.L. 231, No. 75, § 10, which amended the Public Assistance Law, Act of June 24, 1937, P.L. 2051, § 4. Although both of these statutes are among those to be “liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice”, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c)2, it cannot be ignored that the Reform Act significantly altered the eligibility requirements for general assistance payments. As described by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
Under the previously applicable provision, all persons eligible to receive general assistance relief were entitled to payments for twelve months a year. Section 10, in contrast, establishes two categories of needy persons: the chronically needy and the transitionally needy. Only those deemed to be in the former group are eligible for year-round general assistance relief. Those classified as *176transitionally needy are limited to three months’ general assistance payments in any twelve month period.
Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 89 (3rd Cir.1983) (classifications not violative of equal protection). Considering the Reform Act in light of “the occasion and necessity” for it, “the circumstances under which it was enacted”, “the mischief to be remedied”, “the object to be attained”, and “the former law ... upon the same or similar subjects”, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(1)-(5), subsecjtion (H) must be construed as a limitation on eligibility for year-round benefits. I do not understand the lead opinion to be doing any more than this, although the language employed (“we read our statute and the legislative history behind it to impose stricter standards”, “[t]he whole flavor of the Act is to tighten the reigns of spending by imposing strict requirements”, at 620) readily gives rise to the misperception of Justice Larsen’s dissent that the Act is being “strictly construed”. In the case of a statute generally granting benefits, it might well be that in a doubtful case “liberal construction” of the statute would result in a decision in favor of coverage rather than denial of all benefits. In the case of an amendatory statute whose purpose is to limit full benefits to certain categories of recipients while allowing partial benefits to others, “liberal construction” does not mandate that doubtful cases be construed in favor of full coverage. Rather “liberal construction to effect the purpose of the statute ...” requires that limitations be construed as limitations, no more, no less.
Examining subsection (H) in the context of the entire list of limitations imposed on eligibility for year-round benefits, it is readily apparent that the General Assembly distinguished among several types of persons who were not receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Subsection (G) defines as chronically needy “[a]ny person who is ineligible for unemployment compensation and whose income falls below the assistance allowance level as a result of a natural disaster as determined by the department.” 62 Pa.S. § 432(3)(i)(G) (emphasis added). Subsection (I), a transitional provision maintaining persons on the general assist*177anee rolls for a period of approximately six months after the effective date of the amendments, contains a clause prohibiting persons dropped from the rolls during those six months from requalifying under the transitional provision “except when such person has been terminated from employment through no fault of his own and has not met the minimum credit week qualifications of the ... Unemployment Compensation Law.” 62 Pa.S. § 432(3)(i)(I) (emphasis added). It is unmistakeable that the General Assembly recognizes as distinct categories those who are ineligible for unemployment benefits, those who have exhausted unemployment benefits, and those who do not meet the statutory qualifications for unemployment benefits. In the face of these clear distinctions, it borders on linguistic anarchy to assert that those who are ineligible to receive or do not qualify for unemployment compensation benefits can nevertheless be considered as having exhausted their benefits.
If further indication of the reasoning ascribed to the term “exhausted” by the Legislature were necessary, reference to the Unemployment Compensation Law itself should suffice to quell any lingering doubts. For purposes of the Extended Benefits Program, Act of Feb. 9, 1971, P.L. 1, No. 1 § 2, an “exhaustee” means “an individual who, with respect to any week of unemployment in his eligibility period: (1) has received, prior to such week, all of the regular benefits that were available to him ...” 43 P.S. § 811(h) (emphasis added).
Giving the Department’s interpretation of the statute appropriate weight, reading the statute in conjunction with the related unemployment compensation law, examining the subsection in context of the entire statute, and finding the arguments in support of a contrary interpretation to be built on a series of demonstrably faulty premises, I cannot but conclude that this Court is correct in reversing the Order of the Commonwealth Court.

. It is often futile to pursue the point that the meaning of a phrase is clear and unambiguous and therefore in no need of resort to legislative interpretation. Unless the alternative meaning offered is wholly irrational, the mere fact that an alternative meaning has been put forward moves the argument beyond this point. Intellectual energies are then best spent in demonstrating why the meaning which the proponent considered "clear and unambiguous" is the meaning that best comports with the legislative intent.

. Justice Larsen’s dissent paraphrases this rule of construction as “the courts are required to construe its provisions liberally in favor of coverage", Dissenting Opinion at 6 (emphasis in original), belying a “fundamental philosophy” as "misguided” as that of which he accuses the plurality, See id., at 181.