Court Opinion

ID: 9505584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:06:52.93717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:37.532420
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
This Court observes repeatedly that a trial judge should give instructions relevant to the issues raised by the parties, and our state’s trial practice features scores of instructions about particular aspects of various causes of action, given regularly by trial judges and regularly approved on appeal.
Against this relatively liberal backdrop, I find little justification for putting flight instructions on the extremely short list of those which are completely prohibited.
A reasonably comprehensive survey reveals that hardly any other state supreme courts share my colleagues’ anxiety about such instructions. See, e.g., Ex parte Clark, 728 So.2d 1126 (Ala.1998) (flight instruction proper); State v. Thornton, 187 Ariz. 325, 929 P.2d 676 (1996) (same); State v. Cox, 251 Conn. 54, 738 A.2d 652 (1999) (evidence adequate to warrant flight instruction); Tavares v. State, 725 So.2d 803, 806 (Miss.1998) (“this Court held that a flight instruction was appropriate in cases where the flight was unexplained and in cases where the flight has considerable probative value”); Walker v. State, 113 Nev. 853, 944 P.2d 762 (1997) (flight instruction does not create presumption of guilt); State v. Warren, 348 N.C. 80, 499 S.E.2d 431 (1998) (flight instruction does not violate constitutional rights); State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 676 N.E.2d 82 (1997) (instruction on flight neither arbitrary nor unreasonable); Commonwealth v. Rios, 554 Pa. 419, 721 A.2d 1049 (1998) (complaint about flight instruction held meritless); State v. Correia, 707 A.2d 1245 (R.I.1998) (flight instructions warranted if evidence about flight suggests consciousness of guilt as to charged crime); State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn.1998) (in*1235struction that flight was question of fact for jury and flight alone not proof of guilt held proper); Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263 (1996) (flight instruction approved); Germany v. State, 999 P.2d 68 (Wyo.2000) (flight instruction proper even where identity of perpetrator is a central issue).
The Montana Supreme Court does share the view taken today by our Court. State v. Davis, 5 P.3d 547, 553 (Mont.2000) (flight instruction “may be an unnecessary comment on the evidence” and “should no longer be given”).
Moreover, while the U.S. Supreme Court found error in certain flight instructions late in the nineteenth century,1 modern federal authority overwhelmingly upholds properly worded flight instructions supported by sufficient factual predicates. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123 (3rd Cir.1999) (evidence warranted flight instruction); United States v. Martinez, 190 F.3d 673 (5th Cir.1999) (flight instruction is proper when evidence supports certain inferences;2 harmless error applies); United States v. Clark, 45 F.3d 1247, 1250 (8th Cir.1995) (“we have squarely held that these instructions may be given when warranted by the evidence”); United States v. Martinez, 83 F.3d 371 (11th Cir.1996) (flight instruction proper).
The Seventh Circuit shares the majority’s concern that an instruction may unduly emphasize flight, and it has discouraged the use of such instructions, as we did in Bellmore. United States v. Williams, 33 F.3d 876 (7th Cir.1994); Bellmore v. State, 602 N.E.2d 111 (Ind.1992). It has not banned such instructions entirely. See United States v. Rodriguez, 53 F.3d 1439, 1451 (7th Cir.1995) (“we ... reassert our position that flight instructions should be given with caution, if at all.”)
I think the republic will still stand even without the flight instructions sometimes tendered by the State, but I would not be surprised to see defense counsel now begin to tender their own instructions on flight as a way to safeguard their clients against the possibility that the prosecutor might oversell the matter during final argument. Sorting out the equities of that should prove challenging.
All in all, I would prefer to leave us wher/we were in Bellmore.

. Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 16 S.Ct. 864, 40 L.Ed. 1051 (1896); Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 16 S.Ct. 327, 40 L.Ed. 474 (1896)

. Referring to a typical formulation requiring evidence that "1) the defendant's conduct constituted flight; 2) the defendant’s flight was the result of consciousness of guilt; 3)the defendant's guilt related to the crime with which he was charged; and, 4) the defendant felt guilty about the crime charged because he, in fact, committed the crime.” Id. at 678.