Court Opinion

ID: 9567869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:30.514649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:52.925508
License: Public Domain

Smith, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
There are two equally important constitutional provisions that mandate affirmance of the trial court’s order and judgment. The first is found in Art. Ill, Sec. I, Par. I of the 1983 Constitution of the State of Georgia; it provides:
The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a General Assembly which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
“This court has repeatedly held that the quoted clause of the Constitution renders void any attempt to delegate legislative powers. [Cits.]” Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 74 (77 SE2d 723) (1953). When the Court reexamined its holding in Bennett v. City of Baxley, 149 Ga. 275 (99 SE 864) (1919), in Phillips, 210 Ga. at 75, it stated:
We wish at this time to put at rest any doubts resulting from that case. Obviously, incorporating additional territory in a municipality was legislative in character and in fact, and the Constitution clearly prohibited the exercise of legislative powers by other than the General Assembly. The act there was, for this reason, unconstitutional and this court should have so held. (Emphasis supplied.)
*706The Court in Phillips, id. at 77, issued this warning:
The demonstrated wisdom of our American system of representative government and public laws enacted by representatives freely chosen is enough to demand extreme caution and critical examination of any proposed departure therefrom. History warns us of tragedies endured by the individual under practically every other system.
If an act is “legislative in character and fact,” id. at 75, it cannot be delegated unless it complies with the standards set out in Phillips, id. at 74, which states that there are only
two types of legislation [that are] not repugnant to the Constitution: the first of such types being in cases where, after a legislative enactment has plainly set forth the purpose of the legislation and marked its limits, it then provided that designated administrative officers should have power to promulgate rules within the scope of the legislation, designed to fully administer and give effect to that law; and second, legislation to which a referendum is attached which provided that it would become a law only after having received a favorable vote of the people to be affected. . . . (Emphases supplied.)
This Court recently relied upon Phillips, supra, in Mitchell v. Wilkerson, 258 Ga. 608, 610 (372 SE2d 432) (1988), when it held that an election recall statute’s “attempt to transfer the selection of the reasons to the applicant amounts to an impermissible delegation of legislative authority.” Id. at 609. Similarly, the statutes at issue here, OCGA § 50-16-180 through 183, create an impermissible delegation of legislative authority because they do not comport with the Phillips, supra, standard. The purpose of the legislation, the condemnation of public property, has not been expressly set out, the limits of the commission are not marked, administrative officers have not been designated, and the officers designated have not had their power limited to the promulgation of rules within the scope of the legislation designed to only administer and give effect to the law. The act is legislative in character and fact, and it is an unconstitutional delegation of authority under Art. Ill, Sec. I, Par. I of the 1983 Constitution of the State of Georgia.
The statutes are also unconstitutional under a second constitutional provision, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. Ill of the 1983 Constitution of the State of Georgia, which provides:
The legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever *707remain separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the function of either of the others except as herein provided.
The first part of the strongly worded constitutional provision demands that the three branches of government “forever remain separate and distinct.” The second part forbids any person from discharging the duties of one branch of state government while exercising the functions of another branch.
This Court examined the above provision in McCutcheon v. Smith, 199 Ga. 685, 690-91 (35 SE2d 144) (1945), and it stated:
While the line of demarcation separating the legislative, judicial, and executive powers may sometimes be difficult to establish, and for this reason each of the three co-ordinate branches of government frequently invades the province of the others, it is nevertheless essential to the very foundation of our system of government that the mandate of the constitution be strictly enforced.
With regard to the second half of the constitutional prohibition, the Attorney General opined in 1988 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 88-11:
The parameters of this constitutional principle of “separation of powers” have been well defined by Georgia case law. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that members of the General Assembly could not sit on the governing body of the World Congress Center Authority because the authority was a public corporation which performed executive function. Greer et al. v. State of Georgia et al., 233 Ga. 667 (1975). In another case, the Georgia Supreme Court held that members of the General Assembly could not sit as members of the State Properties Commission because the commission was an agency within the executive branch of state government. Murphy et al. v. State of Georgia, 233 Ga. 681 (1975). Since the State Board of Postsecondary Vocational Education is likewise an agency within the executive branch of state government, a member of the General Assembly is precluded from performing functions of a member institution of the State Board of Postsecondary Vocational Education.
The holdings in Greer, supra, and Murphy, supra, clearly stand for the proposition that a member of the General Assembly cannot discharge the duties or exercise the functions of an agency within the executive branch of state govern*708ment.
Likewise, the clear and mandatory doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the converse; a member of the executive branch may not exercise the functions of the legislative branch.
The powers and duties granted to the members of the commission (all members of the executive branch) are legislative powers which include: “the power and duty to approve the acquisition of public property by condemnation and the power of eminent domain[,]” OCGA § 50-16-182, and the power and final authority to determine whether “the acquisition of the public property by condemnation is reasonable, necessary, and in the public interest^]” OCGA § 50-16-183 (b). The trial court specifically found that “[b]oth the Intervenors and the DOT agree that the Commission’s decision to approve or disapprove the condemnation of public property is a legislative determination^]” (Trial Court order at 10), and the majority opinion acknowledges that the decisions are legislative decisions. (Majority opinion at 701, fn. 3.) This delegation is impermissible under our constitution. Any attempt by the members of the executive branch of government to exercise the function of the legislative branch is unconstitutional and a criminal offense.
The general assembly strengthened its intention to forever uphold the constitutional provisions when it enacted OCGA § 16-10-9 which states, in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for:
(3) Officers or employees of the executive branch of the state government to accept or hold office or employment in the legislative or judicial branches of the state government.
(b) A person who knowingly disburses or receives any compensation or money in violation of this Code section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The members of the commission are officers of the executive branch of state government who have been appointed to hold office as members and officers of the State Commission on the Condemnation of Public Property. OCGA § 50-16-181 (a) & (b). These officers are to be compensated for their “traveling and other actual expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties as commission members.” OCGA § 50-16-183 (e). The conflict is obvious; the function of the executive branch is the enforcement of laws duly passed upon by the General Assembly. The separation of these governmental functions is the bedrock that our democratic government rests upon. It is the heart of our system of checks and balances.
*709The conflict in this case is far greater than other conflicts that have been seen by this Court. When Ms. Mary Jane Galer, tenured associate professor and librarian at Columbus College, was elected to represent the 97th District in the Georgia House of Representatives, this Court, relying on the separation of powers provision, held that Ms. Galer could hold either her position at Columbus College8 or serve in the General Assembly, but “she may not hold them at the same time.” Galer v. Board of Regents, 239 Ga. 268, 271 (236 SE2d 617) (1977). The rationale for the decision, id. at 270, was as follows:
[T]his doctrine is the means by which “democracy undertakes to preserve the liberties of the people from excessive concentrations of authority.” [Cit.] Common sense suggests that this doctrine as applied through [OCGA § 16-10-9] is an attempt by the General Assembly to prevent the obvious conflicts of interest inherent in situations where an individual serves concurrently in two of the branches of state government.
More recently the inherent evil of allowing persons to discharge the duties of one branch of government while exercising the functions of another was discussed in Fowler v. Mitcham, 249 Ga. 400, 402 (291 SE2d 515) (1982) as follows:
This is analogous to the effect of [OCGA § 16-10-9], which enforces the separation-of-powers provision of our State Constitution as to state offices. See Galer v. Board of Regents, [supra]. If permitted to serve in their dual capacities as aldermen (legislative) and policemen (executive), the appellants could not only vote to set their own salaries, but also enforce ordinances which they had participated in enacting.
The above constitutional provisions mandate this Court’s affirmance of the trial court’s order and judgment. Members of the executive branch of state government are constitutionally prohibited from making final legislative decisions regarding the condemnation of pub-*710lie property. Legislative acts can only be delegated to administrative officers after the requirements established by our previous decisions have been accomplished.
Decided December 5, 1990 —
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1990.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Roland F. Matson, Charles M. Richards, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Remar & Graettinger, Robert B. Remar, Susan M. Garrett, Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Johnson & Williams, Richard N. Hu*711bert, Kendric E. Smith, for appellees.

 “Columbus College, a member institution of the University System, is an agency of the executive branch of the state government. . . .” Galer, 239 Ga. at 269. How can this Court allow the top executive officers of the State to serve in a legislative function while performing their executive duties when it forbid Ms. Galer? Either, 1) this Court viewed a librarian who wished to serve in the House of Representatives as more of a threat to the “excessive concentrations of authority” and as creating an “obvious conflict!] of interest” than the top executive officers of the State functioning as legislators while deciding what public property should be condemned, or 2) this Court has just expunged two constitutional provisions by judicial fiat. Either way, the majority is wrong.