Court Opinion

ID: 9893471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 13:08:51.442191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:14.191290
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Goomi v. H&E Ent., L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-3901.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                            HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 NIV GOOMAI,                                     :     APPEAL NO. C-230099
                                                       TRIAL NO. A-1902101
   and                                           :
                                                          O P I N I O N.
 BAR HAJBI,                                      :

         Plaintiffs-Appellants,                  :

    vs.                                          :

 H&E ENTERPRISE, LLC,                            :

   and                                           :

 AVI OHAD,                                       :

         Defendants-Appellees.                   :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 27, 2023

Manley Burke, LPA, Ilana L. Linder and Emily Cooney Couch, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants,

Gary F. Franke Co., LPA, Michael D. O’Neill and Gary F. Franke, for Defendants-
Appellees.
                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Judge.

       {¶1}     This case calls upon us to clarify the meaning of the term “prevailing

party” in a section of the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) that permits

awards of attorney fees. For the reasons we describe in this opinion, we hold that a

party prevails on a DTPA claim when the finder of fact determines the statute has been

violated, regardless of whether a damages amount is awarded to remedy the violation.

       {¶2}     This question arises because a jury found in favor of plaintiffs-

appellants Niv Goomai and Bar Hajbi (collectively “Goomai”) on their claim that

defendants-appellees H&E Enterprise, LLC, and Avi Ohad (collectively “H&E”)

violated the DTPA, but the trial court denied statutorily-available attorney fees on the

basis that Goomai did not prevail on the claim. At trial, the jury considered three

claims against H&E: (1) breach of contract, (2) fraudulent misrepresentation, and (3)

a DTPA violation. The jury found in Goomai’s favor on the breach of contract and

DTPA claims, but only awarded damages on the breach of contract claim. Since there

were no damages awarded on the DTPA claim, the trial court held Goomai did not

prevail and denied attorney fees as a result.

       {¶3}     In a single assignment of error, Goomai argues that the trial court erred

by failing to properly interpret and apply the DTPA attorney fees provision found in

R.C. 4165.03(B). We agree with Goomai, reverse the decision of the trial court, and

remand the matter to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees Goomai

is owed.

           I.   Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶4}     In October 2017, with the help of Ohad, Goomai purchased a property

in the Camp Washington neighborhood of Cincinnati. The two entered into an

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

agreement that Ohad and H&E would renovate the Camp Washington property for

$50,000. The project was to be completed by January 2018. But numerous problems

prohibited Ohad and H&E from delivering on their promises. Ohad initially failed to

disclose that he had not obtained the necessary license to conduct the renovation.

Ohad also failed to obtain the proper work permits from the city before the renovation

work began, and this caused further delay to the project.

         {¶5}   In January 2019, approximately a year after the renovation should have

been completed, Ohad told Goomai that he had only now obtained the necessary

permits and that the renovation could continue. But this was untrue. Ultimately, the

renovation project never materialized, and H&E did not deliver on the promised

property upgrades.

         {¶6}   In May 2019, Goomai sold the property for $50,000 at a loss on his

investment. He then sued H&E.

         {¶7}   Goomai initially raised nine claims against H&E, but by the time of trial,

his   claims    had   been   reduced    to   three:   breach   of   contract,    fraudulent

misrepresentation, and violation of the DTPA. H&E also counterclaimed against

Goomai for breach of contract. Only the DTPA claim permitted the recovery of

statutory attorney fees if Goomai prevailed. See R.C. 4165.03(B). But the jury received

no instructions about the applicability of the attorney fees provision, nor the

implications of its allocation of damages should it award no damage on the DTPA

claim.

         {¶8}   Following trial, the jury found that H&E breached its contract with

Goomai and that H&E violated the DTPA. It found against Goomai on his fraudulent

misrepresentation claim and against H&E on its counterclaim.                    It awarded

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

$30,604.09 in damages on the breach of contract claim and no damages on the DTPA

claim.

          {¶9}   Goomai then moved for an award of attorney fees under R.C.

4165.03(B), the DTPA’s fee-shifting provision. The trial court held an evidentiary

hearing on the motion, at which both sides put forth expert testimony regarding the

reasonableness of Goomai’s requested fees. Following the hearing, the trial court

denied the motion for attorney fees in its entirety on the basis that Goomai was not a

prevailing party within the meaning of the DTPA, because the jury did not award

damages on that claim.

          {¶10} Goomai timely appealed.

          II.    DTPA Attorney Fees

          {¶11} In a single assignment of error, Goomai challenges the trial court’s

denial of his motion for attorney fees under R.C. 4165.03(B). He argues that he was a

prevailing party under the DTPA by virtue of the jury’s verdict finding that H&E

violated the DTPA. Consistent with the trial court’s determination, H&E argues that,

to be a prevailing party under R.C. 4165.03(B), a party must obtain not only a

judgment in its favor, but also a remedy. This is a question of first impression in Ohio

courts.

                 A. Standard of Review

          {¶12} To begin, we resolve a dispute between the parties about the standard

of review. Goomai argues that the trial court’s application of the prevailing party

standard in R.C. 4165.03(B) presents a question of statutory construction that we

review de novo. See, e.g., State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 584,

651 N.E.2d 995 (1995). H&E argues that decisions regarding attorney fees are within

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the discretion of the trial court and that our review is limited to whether the court

below abused its discretion. See, e.g., Bittner v. Tri Cty. Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d

143, 146, 569 N.E.2d 464 (1991).

       {¶13} We agree with Goomai. The question presented in this case does not

concern the amount of attorney fees imposed by the trial court, but rather the

applicability of a statutory fee-shifting provision. Were the former at issue, we would

defer to the trial court and review its decision only for an abuse of discretion. But given

the need to interpret whether the statute applies at all, and if so why, we believe this

case triggers the more robust investigation of a statute’s intent that de novo review

requires. See, e.g., Elliot v. Durrani, 171 Ohio St.3d 213, 2022-Ohio-4190, ___ N.E.3d

___, ¶ 8. We therefore apply de novo review in answering the question of whether

Goomai is a prevailing party under R.C. 4165.03(B).

               B. Prevailing Party Status under R.C. 4165.03(B)

       {¶14} The DTPA, codified at R.C. 4165.03(B), contains the following attorney

fees provision:

       The court may award in accordance with this division reasonable

       attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in either type of civil action

       authorized by division (A) of this section. An award of attorney’s fees

       may be assessed against a plaintiff if the court finds that the plaintiff

       knew the action to be groundless. An award of attorney’s fees may be

       assessed against a defendant if the court finds that the defendant has

       willfully engaged in a trade practice listed in division (A) of section

       4165.02 of the Revised Code knowing it to be deceptive.

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶15} Under this provision, a plaintiff who loses a DTPA claim can be forced

to pay attorney fees if the party knowingly pursued a groundless DTPA claim against

the defendant. Conversely, a defendant can be forced to pay attorney fees if the

defendant willfully engaged in a defined trade practice knowing that it was deceptive.

In either scenario, fees can be awarded for DTPA claims for injunctive or monetary

relief brought under R.C. 4165.03(A). The linchpin of whether a party may receive

attorney fees under the DTPA is therefore not party identity or claim type, but whether

the party seeking fees prevailed.

       {¶16} What does it mean to be a “prevailing party” under R.C. 4165.03(B)? No

court to date has answered that specific question. But we do not approach it on a clean

slate. We use ordinary principles of statutory interpretation to guide our resolution of

this important issue.

       {¶17} According to those principles, the primary goal when courts interpret

statutes is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Ayers v. City of

Cleveland, 160 Ohio St.3d 288, 2020-Ohio-1047, 156 N.E.3d 848, ¶ 17. To accomplish

this objective, courts look first to the plain meaning of terms in a statute, construing

words and phrases according to their common usage. See Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio

St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 11; Knollman-Wade Holdings, LLC v.

Platinum Ridge Properties, LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-595, 2015-Ohio-1619,

¶ 14. In assessing the plain meaning of undefined terms in a statute, courts frequently

look to the dictionary and other sources of the ordinary understanding of language to

determine exactly what is meant by specific words and phrases. See, e.g., State v.

Bertram, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1456, ¶ 13 (using the Merriam-Webster

Dictionary to define the term “stealth” in a criminal statute that did not otherwise

define its meaning).

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

          {¶18} Turning to R.C. 4165.03(B), the term “prevailing party” is not defined

by the statute. Thus, we seek guidance from common sources as to its ordinary

meaning and usage. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the term “prevail” as

“to gain ascendancy through strength or superiority: triumph.”             See Merriam-

Webster.com           Dictionary,       https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

prevail#:~:text=1,or%20become%20effective%20or%20effectual (last accessed Oct.

23, 2023). Similarly, Webster’s Dictionary defines “prevail” as “to overcome; to gain

the victory or superiority; to gain the advantage.” See Webster’s Dictionary 1828,

https://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/prevail (last accessed Oct. 23,

2023).      These understandings of the term focus on the position of one side to the

other, with one being superior or in a winning posture and the other being inferior or

in a losing posture. They imply that the prevailing party is the one that has come out

on top.

          {¶19} While these resources give us deeper insight on what it means for a party

to prevail, they fail to resolve the ambiguity that Goomai’s case presents. Is a jury

verdict in a party’s favor sufficiently prevailing to trigger the statue, or does the party

have to win something in order to have prevailed? There are degrees of winning a legal

dispute, and the dictionary definitions of “prevail” do not distinguish between them.

We therefore require additional inputs to ascertain the legislature’s intent in utilizing

the term “prevailing party” to define eligibility for attorney fees in R.C. 4165.03(B).

          {¶20} Black’s Law Dictionary, another source of meaning for common legal

terms, helps us distinguish between types of “prevailing.” As the United Supreme

Court noted in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. West Virginia Dept. of Health &

Human Serv., 532 U.S. 598, 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2002), citing Black’s

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Law Dictionary 1145 (7th Ed.1999),1 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “prevailing

party” as “[a] party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount

of damages awarded.” Under this definition, the relief obtained is immaterial to a

party’s status; what matters is whether the party obtained judgment in its favor.

       {¶21} Our review of R.C. 4165.03 supports this conclusion. In construing

statutory terms, courts read statutes as a whole and do not dissociate words and

phrases from their context. See Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Ohio Dept. of

Edn., 154 Ohio St.3d 584, 2018-Ohio-3126, 118 N.E.3d 907, ¶ 11. Looking at the

language of R.C. 4165.03 as a whole, we are persuaded that “prevailing” in the context

of the DTPA means that the party obtained a judgment in its favor, regardless of

whether the party obtained a remedy in furtherance of that judgment. Several features

of the statute compel this result.

       {¶22} For one, the DTPA permits recovery of attorney fees from a plaintiff who

knowingly pursues a groundless DTPA claim. In such circumstances, a prevailing

defendant would obtain no relief other than a judgment in its favor, but that defendant

would still be entitled to attorney fees from the plaintiff under R.C. 4165.03(B). If we

were to read the statute as requiring a party to obtain a remedy in order to prevail, we

would effectively eliminate the ability of prevailing defendants to obtain attorney fees

and undermine the intent of the legislature in the process. And courts do not read

language out of statutes. D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio

St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 26.

       {¶23} For another, R.C. 4165.03(B) allows the recovery of attorney fees in

DTPA suits for either monetary or injunctive relief. This underscores that a finding of

1 Black’s Law Dictionary has now released its 11th Edition.   The definition of “prevailing party”
remains unchanged.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

money damages is not a necessary prerequisite for the transfer of attorney fees to the

prevailing party. But there is an even broader point embodied in the statutory

language. Subsection (B), which provides for attorney fees, makes specific reference

to subsection (A), which outlines the types of suits that can be filed in the event of

alleged deceptive trade practices.     It specifies that:   “The court may award in

accordance with this division reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in

either type of civil action authorized by division (A) of this section.” (Emphasis

added.) R.C. 4165.03(B). This clear statutory language defines attorney fees eligibility

by the type of action, not by the type of remedy. If the legislature intended to make

prevailing party status dependent upon obtaining one of the remedies outlined in R.C.

4165.03(A), it could easily have said so. Its decision not to do so is indicative of its

intent to untangle attorney fees from any other type of remedy recovered in a DTPA

case.

        {¶24} The plain meaning of the term “prevailing party” in R.C. 4165.03(B)

therefore supports the conclusion that obtaining a judgment, even one without an

award of damages, entitles a party to seek attorney fees.

        {¶25} But, to the extent there is any confusion on the matter, our case law has

also interpreted the term “prevailing party” consistent with this meaning in other

contexts. See, e.g., Keal v. Day, 164 Ohio App.3d 21, 2005-Ohio-5551, 840 N.E.2d

1139, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.) (interpreting the phrase “prevailing party” in contract to mean the

party in whose favor the verdict is rendered). Divorced from its usage in the DTPA,

the phrase “prevailing party” has been commonly understood to mean obtaining a

favorable verdict, absent any focus on what in particular the party has won.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶26} This reading of R.C. 4165.03(B) also squares with our understanding of

the DTPA’s history and purpose.         The DTPA targets false advertising, unfair

competition, and other deceptive commercial practices that create an unbalanced

competitive commercial marketplace. See Dawson v. Blockbuster, Inc., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 86451, 2006-Ohio-1240, ¶ 23. Its purpose is exclusively to protect the

interests of a purely commercial class, rather than individual consumers, against

unscrupulous commercial conduct. Id. at ¶ 24. Permitting an award of attorney fees

upon a finding that the DTPA was knowingly violated furthers these purposes by

discouraging anticompetitive trade practices.

       {¶27} Case law construing the DTPA solidifies this outcome even more.

Because the DTPA operates to protect a fair competitive marketplace, economic

damages for deceptive trade practices may be hard to quantify. See, e.g., Heartland

of Urbana OH, LLC v. McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC, 2d Dist. Champaign No.

2016-CA-3, 2016-Ohio-6959, ¶ 44. And requests for injunctive relief may become

moot when an offending party merely removes the allegedly deceptive advertising.

See, e.g., id. at ¶ 40. As a result, at least one Ohio court has held that a claim for

attorney fees under the DTPA survives even after a plaintiff’s DTPA lawsuit is mooted

by the cessation of the offending deceptive trade practice. See id. at ¶ 48-49 (holding

that a claim for attorney fees under R.C. 4165.03(B) based on previous willful violation

of the DTPA survived moot request for injunctive relief and that “it was not necessary

for [the plaintiff] to establish actual damages in order to recover attorney fees”).

Under this view of the statute, awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party becomes

the remedy for the action filed under R.C. 4165.03(A). Id. So long as an allegation

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

persists that a defendant knowingly violated the DTPA, a claim for attorney fees under

R.C. 4165.03(B) survives.

       {¶28} Heartland of Urbana is one of the few cases in Ohio to construe the

contours of the DTPA’s fee-shifting provision. Perhaps owing to this lack of judicial

opinions addressing the DTPA, both parties cite to the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices

Act (“CSPA”) and case law construing it to support their respective interpretations of

the statute at issue here. We initially note a difference in the class of persons who are

protected by each statute that precludes our reliance upon the CSPA as a point of

comparison for the DTPA. The CSPA protects individual consumers, whereas the

DTPA protects the commercial class.         See R.C. 1345.01(A); Dawson, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 86451, 2006-Ohio-1240, at ¶ 23. This difference in purpose is enough

for us to question the usefulness of comparing the two statutes’ fee-shifting provisions.

But even if we found the CSPA analogy compelling, there is no authority that either

requires a remedy in CSPA cases for the prevailing party to collect attorney fees or

permits attorney fees in those cases based upon a mere judgment alone. And so the

CSPA simply does not answer the question posed in this case.

       {¶29} For his part, Goomai argues that Einhorn v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Ohio

St.3d 27, 548 N.E.2d 943 (1990), requires us to interpret the DTPA to permit an award

of attorney fees based solely upon a favorable verdict. In Einhorn, the Ohio Supreme

Court resolved a dispute as to the level of knowledge required for an offending party

to be liable for attorney fees under the CSPA. Id. at 29. Under the CSPA, a prevailing

party may be awarded attorney fees when a supplier knowingly commits an act or

practice that violates the law. Id. at 29, fn.5. The Einhorn court determined that the

supplier must merely commit the act or practice knowingly, but need not have the

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

additional knowledge that the act violated the CSPA at the time it was committed. Id.

at 30. This holding did not resolve the question of what level of prevailing is required

to trigger prevailing party status under the CSPA, much less the DTPA, which is an

entirely different statute. Thus, Einhorn is of little utility here, and we decline

Goomai’s invitation to rely on it in construing the meaning of the term “prevailing

party” in R.C. 4165.03(B).

       {¶30} Also analogizing to the CSPA, H&E calls our attention to Parker v. I&F

Insulation Co., 89 Ohio St.3d 261, 730 N.E.2d 972 (2000), also a CSPA case,

claiming that it adopted a definition of “prevailing party” that requires either

rescission of the transaction or damages in order for a party to prevail for attorney fees

purposes. But Parker held no such thing. To be fair, Parker cites Brenner Marine v.

Goudreau, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-93-077, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 62 (Jan. 13, 1995),

which held that a party is prevailing under the CSPA if it obtains either of the two

statutory remedies available in the statute and that monetary damages were not a

prerequisite to obtaining attorney fees. See Parker at 265. But Brenner did not

answer the question before us–whether a party prevails if it obtains only a judgment

and no remedy at all–and Parker did not adopt the holding set forth in Brenner,

expressly noting that Brenner focused on trial-level requests for attorney fees, not the

appeal-level request that was at issue in Parker. See id.; Brenner at 12-13. We

therefore read both Parker and Brenner as having little to do with the dispute before

us.

       {¶31} As such, no authority–not Parker, not Brenner, not Einhorn–explicitly

compels the result H&E seeks that a party must obtain a remedy in order to seek

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

attorney fees under the CSPA, much less the DTPA. And no authority prohibits the

conclusion we reach here.

       {¶32} We accordingly base our decision solely on the plain meaning of the

term “prevailing party” as it is used in R.C. 4165.03(B). We are aided in understanding

that meaning by looking to commonly-used dictionaries and Black’s Law Dictionary

and by reading the statute in its full context. We consider the history, purpose, and

policy behind the DTPA only to the extent that doing so confirms our interpretation of

the statute and reveals no unanticipated ambiguity or confusion.

       {¶33} The plain meaning of the term “prevailing party” in R.C. 4165.03(B) is

the party that obtains a judgment, verdict, or decision in its favor, without regard to

the existence or nature of any remedy awarded pursuant to the judgment, verdict, or

decision.

       {¶34} Goomai’s assignment of error is accordingly sustained. This matter is

remanded to the trial court to consider the amount of attorney fees to which Goomai

is entitled under R.C. 4165.03(B).

                                               Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

WINKLER, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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