Court Opinion

ID: 9682290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:09:01.510176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.637592
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MURPHY, Justice.
In his Motion for Rehearing, appellee contends that the majority used the incorrect test for an “insufficiency of the evidence” point of error, failed to consider the proper test for the “foreseeability” element of proximate cause, held that appellant driver must foresee the particular danger of which complaint is made, and erred in holding that the jury’s finding that the appellant’s speed was a proximate cause of the collision was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
In his supplemental brief in support of his Motion for Rehearing appellee cites us to the recent Supreme Court case of Dyson *695v. The Olin Corporation, 692 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.1985), particularly the language in the concurring opinion by Justice Robertson. In that opinion e.q., Justice Robertson states:
“The question is whether we will continue to adhere to a prior interpretation of article V, section 6 which has allowed appellate courts to usurp the jury’s function.” Id. at 514.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has substituted its findings and conclusions for that of a jury on the issue of proximate cause. See Missouri Pacific Railroad v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.1977); Clark v. Waggoner, 452 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.1970); Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 163 Tex. 632, 358 S.W.2d 543 (1962); Houston Lighting & Power Company v. Brooks, 161 Tex. 32, 336 S.W.2d 603 (1960).
In Biggers v. Continental Bus System, 157 Tex. 351, 303 S.W.2d 359, 369 (1957), the Supreme Court stated its position regarding the action to be taken by the then Courts of Civil Appeals in ruling on the issue of factual insufficiency points, quoting from Barker v. Coastal Builders, Inc., 153 Tex. 540, 271 S.W.2d 798, 812 (1954) as follows:
“If in the light of our analysis of the evidence and its mature consideration thereof the Court of Civil Appeals should conclude that the jury verdict is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, it should have no hesitancy in reversing the judgment and remanding the case for retrial. If it should reach the opposite conclusion, it should affirm. In either event what we have said on the law question of ‘no evidence’ should be no impediment and no source of embarrassment to the Court of Civil Appeals’ own proper evaluation of the evidence on the fact question of ‘insufficient evidence’ because that court and that court alone is made the final arbiter of that question.”
To our knowledge, the position of the Supreme Court has not changed.
Where jury findings are challenged as being contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence, we are mindful of the rule that requires us to consider all of the evidence in the case, and set aside the verdict and remand for a new trial if we conclude that the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965). The evidence supporting the verdict is to be weighed along with other evidence in the case, including that which is contrary to the verdict. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951). Although not specifically stated in our original opinion, the above tests were utilized and applied.
We understand the proper test for the “foreseeability” element of proximate cause to be whether Johnson, as a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence, should have anticipated the danger to others created by his operation of the truck at the speed he was traveling at the time and place in question. Granted that the rule of foreseeability does not require that he anticipate just how the injuries might grow out of his conduct, nevertheless the test is “whether he ought reasonably to have foreseen that the event in question, or some similar event, would occur.” Clark v. Waggoner, 452 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex.1970). We also recognize that Johnson was not required to anticipate negligent conduct on the part of Lofton. DeWinne v. Allen, 154 Tex. 316, 277 S.W.2d 95, 98 (1955); Blackburn v. Cooner, 509 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1974, no writ); Day v. McFarland, 474 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Holland v. Collins, 457 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.). On the other hand Johnson could not close his eyes to that which was plainly visible and which would have been observed by a person of ordinary prudence similarly situated. Lynch v. Ricketts, 158 Tex. 487, 314 S.W.2d 273, 275 (1958).
Johnson was traveling on a through highway and had the right-of-way. Lofton, who was in his vehicle on the shoulder of the highway approximately 300 feet from *696the nearest intersection, had the duty to yield the right-of-way to the vehicle being operated by Johnson. We acknowledge that Lofton’s duty to yield the right-of-way to Johnson’s truck was not absolute, but relative. McWilliams v. Muse, 157 Tex. 109, 300 S.W.2d 643, 645 (1957). The jury found that Lofton failed to keep a proper lookout which was a proximate cause of the occurrence. The jury also found that Lofton was negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way which was a proximate cause of the occurrence. Until the very moment when it became evident that Lofton would not yield the right-of-way to the vehicle being driven by Johnson, Johnson was not required to anticipate negligent or unlawful conduct on the part of Lofton. DeWinne v. Allen, 154 Tex. 316, 277 S.W.2d 95, 98 (1955).
It has long been the rule that in determining what an ordinarily prudent man would do under given circumstances, the time available for realization and reaction is of extreme importance. Barnes v. General Motors Corp., 653 S.W.2d 85, 91 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Caughman v. Glaze, 412 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Again recognizing the rules governing our review of insufficient evidence points, and mindful of the rule enunciated in Liberty Film Lines, Inc., v. Porter, 136 Tex. 49, 146 S.W.2d 982 (1941) and Enloe v. Barfield, 422 S.W.2d 905 (Tex.1967), and after another careful review of the record as a whole, and consideration of the time available to Johnson for realization and reaction, we are still of the opinion that the evidence is extremely weak upon the element of foreseeability and upon the element of “cause in fact.” Kehlenbrink v. Pickens, 656 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.App.—Waco 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Golleher v. Herrera, 651 S.W.2d 329 (Texas App.—Amarillo 1983, no writ); Hailes v. Gentry, 520 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1975, no writ); Blackburn v. Cooner, 509 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1974, no writ); Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. Bergeron, 470 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Farnie v. Fair Store, 304 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Motion for Rehearing overruled.