Court Opinion

ID: 9536418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:59:35.297559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:28.399990
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McWilliams
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with that part of the majority opinion which affirms the conviction of the defendant on the charge of escape after conviction. I dissent, however, from that part of the majority opinion which reverses the conviction of the defendant on the two charges of assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated robbery. In other words, I would affirm this case in its entirety.
As I understand it, the majority of this court have now held that the trial court erred and abused its discretion “in failing to sever at least count four from the first three counts, and in failing to order a separate trial on the charge of escape after conviction.” In other words, the majority of this court have decreed that the trial court should have tried the charges of assault with a deadly weapon, assault to murder, and aggravated robbery in one proceeding, and then in a separate and *295distinct proceeding tried the charge of escape after conviction. In my view there was no necessity for thus making two trials out of one and I find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in failing to so sever the four counts in the one information.
There is no contention that there is any misjoinder of counts, as it is at once obvious that all of the several counts in this information related and pertained to but one continuous and very interrelated transaction. The majority of this court are of the view that evidence as to the defendant’s prior conviction was “not admissible relative to the first three counts unless and until defendant should voluntarily take the stand and afford the prosecution an opportunity to attack his credibility.” Evidence of this prior conviction being in the eyes of the majority of this court inadmissible, as well as highly prejudicial, the majority then come to the conclusion that the trial court therefore abused its discretion in refusing to sever the first three counts in the information from the fourth count.
I disagree with the basic premise of the majority that this evidence of a prior conviction was under the circumstances inadmissible in connection with the trial of the defendant on the charges of assault to murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and aggravated robbery. On the contrary, in the view I take of it, such evidence was admissible and, if such be the case, then the trial court acted quite properly in denying defendant’s motion for separate trials of the several counts of the information.
The general test of admissibility of evidence in a criminal case is does it logically, naturally and by reasonable inference establish or tend to establish any fact material for the People and, if it does, it is admissible regardless of whether it embraces the commission of another crime and whether such other crime be similar in kind, or not, and whether it be part of a single transaction, or not.
*296The general rule is that in a criminal trial the People need not prove motive. At the same time, however, it is also the general rule that evidence as to the motive for the commission of a crime is nevertheless admissible and the mere fact that such evidence shows that the defendant has committed and indeed been convicted of some other crime does not in and of itself render inadmissible evidence which is otherwise admissible.
The defendant in the instant case had only a relatively short time before he escaped from custody been convicted of a felony and he was then apparently awaiting sentence to the state penitentiary. With this in mind, then, what motive did the defendant have for assaulting the guard and for them commandeering an automobile from a passing motorist at gunpoint? It would appear to me that it might with all propriety be said that it is at once a logical, natural and reasonable inference that the reason the defendant assaulted the guard and committed the crime of aggravated robbery was to avoid being incarcerated in the state penitentiary. This evidence of the prior conviction and the imminent sentence to the state penitentiary was indeed relevant as bearing upon the cause for all of the defendant’s subsequent activities, and without this evidence to explain his motivation these other and subsequent events become meaningless. Such evidence then being admissible not only as to the fourth count, but also as to the other counts as well, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to sever the several counts for purposes of trial.
Mr. Justice Moore and Mr. Justice Frantz have authorized me to state that they join in the foregoing.