Court Opinion

ID: 9948855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 05:07:28.221386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:10.682631
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 7, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 365009
                                                                     Kalamazoo Circuit Court
ROBERT LOUIS PRANGE III,                                             LC No. 2022-000033-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals by right his jury conviction of one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (victim under 13 years old and accused over 17 years old).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 to 40 years in prison. Defendant argues on appeal that
(1) the prosecution engaged in misconduct, denying defendant a fair trial; (2) defense counsel was
ineffective at trial; and (3) defendant’s due-process rights were violated by an inaccurate
presentence investigation report (PSIR), which included challenged claims that the trial court
agreed to not consider at trial. We affirm.

                                        I. BASIC FACTS

       This case arose when the victim disclosed an incident when defendant made her follow
him to his bedroom and eat liquid chocolate off his penis when she was having a sleepover with
the defendant’s son. The victim repeatedly stated that this abuse happened on two separate
occasions. The victim was approximately five years old when the abuse occurred.

        Initially, the prosecution filed two CSC-I charges against defendant, one for each allegation
of sexual abuse. However, at the beginning of trial, the prosecution requested that the second
charge, which concerned an incident of sexual abuse after the charged offense, be dismissed
because the victim seemed unsure as to whether the subsequent incident actually took place. The
second charge was dismissed, and the parties agreed that defense counsel would be permitted to
inquire into whether the victim originally disclosed two incidents of sexual misconduct or just one
incident.

                                                -1-
        According to witnesses, the first person to hear about the abuse was the victim’s
stepmother. About five years after the abuse occurred, the victim told her stepmother that
defendant made the victim suck chocolate off his penis. The victim then retracted her statement,
insisting that it had all been a dream. However, the victim later retracted her retraction and
confirmed that her initial disclosure was true. During the disclosure, the victim only mentioned
one incident of abuse. The stepmother spoke with the victim’s mother about the disclosure.

        The victim then disclosed the incident to her mother and father. She told them that the
incident occurred during a sleepover with defendant’s son, whom she was friends with. The victim
said that defendant came into his son’s room where she was sleeping, woke her up, told her to be
quiet, and led her upstairs to his bedroom. Defendant then put liquid chocolate on his genitals and
told the victim to suck it off. The victim admitted to her parents that she falsely recanted her
disclosure to her stepmother because she did not want defendant’s son to get into trouble. The
victim said that the same abuse occurred again on a later occasion.

         After the victim’s disclosure to her parents, her mother filed a police report. The mother
took the victim to the Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) for an interview. The CAC employee
who interviewed the victim testified that, during the interview, the victim told her about how
defendant woke her up and took her to his room. The victim stated that defendant pulled his pants
and underwear down and put Nutella on his penis, and told the victim to lick the Nutella off. The
victim told the employee about a second incident of sexual abuse, during which defendant again
lured the victim into his bedroom and told her to eat chocolate off his penis. However, unlike the
first incident, the victim refused to comply. The two incidents of abuse occurred during the same
summer. The victim also told the employee that, during both incidents, only she, defendant’s son,
and defendant were present in defendant’s home.

       Approximately one month after the victim’s interview, her mother took her to a medical
doctor. The doctor testified that, at the victim’s request, she examined the victim’s mouth for
sexually transmitted diseases. Despite the victim’s lack of diseases or injuries, the doctor
concluded that the victim had suffered sexual abuse.

        At trial, the victim confirmed that the first incident of abuse occurred when she was five
years old and in kindergarten. She confirmed that she had been sleeping at defendant’s house at
the time. She testified that defendant came into his son’s bedroom where she was sleeping, woke
her up, and brought her upstairs to his room. Defendant then pulled down his pants and underwear
and put chocolate from a jar on his genitals. Defendant made the victim suck the chocolate off his
genitals. The victim initially testified that defendant abused her in the exact same manner a second
time. However, the victim then admitted that she was unsure if the second incident actually
occurred.

        The victim further affirmed that, during the year before the trial, she went to a park with
her stepmother and accidentally disclosed the abuse during a conversation. The victim admitted
that she recanted her statement to her stepmother. The victim also confirmed that she subsequently
informed her mother about defendant’s sexual abuse. The victim could not explain why she waited
five years to disclose defendant’s abuse to anyone.

                                                -2-
        The jury convicted defendant of one count of CSC-I. During sentencing, defense counsel
objected to the information in the PSIR that referred to the uncharged incident of sexual abuse.
The trial court stated that it had crossed out this information in the PSIR, and noted that no evidence
of a subsequent sexual-abuse incident had been admitted at trial. Defendant now appeals.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

                             A. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

       Defendant argues that the prosecution engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting
testimony concerning the uncharged incident of sexual abuse. We disagree.

        “In order to preserve an issue of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must
contemporaneously object and request a curative instruction.” People v Bennett, 290 Mich App
465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). Defense counsel never objected to the prosecution’s questions
regarding the uncharged incident of sexual abuse and never proposed a curative instruction.
Therefore, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. We review unpreserved constitutional
errors for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Gibbs, 299 Mich App 473, 482; 830
NW2d 821 (2013). An unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct will not warrant relief
unless the prejudicial effect was so great that it could not have been cured by a curative instruction.
See People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).

        A prosecutor must “refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction.” Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88; 55 S Ct 629; 79 L Ed 1314 (1935). It remains
a prosecutor’s duty to use every legitimate means to bring about a just outcome. See id. The test
of prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied his or her constitutional right to a
fair and impartial trial. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 134; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). “The
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that such an error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
Id. A prosecutor violates a defendant’s right to a fair trial when he or she injects issues into a case
broader than a defendant’s guilt or innocence. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 284; 531 NW2d
659 (1995). However, a prosecutor may introduce evidence that he or she legitimately believes
will be accepted by the trial court. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660-661; 608 NW2d 123
(1999). Therefore, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct cannot be predicated on a prosecutor’s
good-faith effort to admit evidence. Id. at 661.

        When a case’s outcome hinges upon a minor witness’s credibility, it may be proper for a
prosecutor to inquire into additional uncharged offenses committed by the defendant, particularly
in the context of sexual abuse. See People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410, 414-415; 213 NW2d 97
(1973). In DerMartzex, id. at 412, the defendant was on trial for assault with intent to rape the
victim, a minor girl. The Michigan Supreme Court stated that, in most statutory rape cases, the
central issue is the victim’s credibility. Id. at 414. Typically, sexual intercourse is the culmination
of prior acts of abuse. Id. at 415. Limiting a victim’s testimony to the charged offense would
seriously undermine the victim’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. Id. at 414-415. The Court also
stated that, whether the testimony’s probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect should be left to the trial court’s discretion. Id. at 415. A court may bar evidence of other
crimes when it has determined that the evidence’s probative value “is outweighed by the
disadvantage of diverting the trier of fact from an objective appraisal of the defendant’s guilt or

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innocence.” Id. at 413. The evidence’s probative value outweighs this disadvantage when the
“crime charged is a sexual offense and the other acts tend to show similar familiarity between the
defendant and the person with whom he allegedly committed the charged offense.” Id. In light of
these facts, and the fact that the defendant never asked the trial court to exercise its discretion in
such a manner, the Court held that the victim’s testimony was permissible. Id. at 415,

        However, in People v Jones, 417 Mich 285, 285-286, 288; 335 NW2d 465 (1983), the
Michigan Supreme Court limited the scope of DerMartzex to uncharged offenses committed
against the same victim. The Court concluded that “[p]rior sexual acts between the defendant and
persons other than the complainant are not part of the principal transaction.” Id. at 289-290.
Therefore, courts should not permit evidence of other incidences of sexual abuse committed by a
defendant when the additional offenses were committed against different victims. See id. at 290.
However, an exception to the Jones limitation applies when the prosecution attempts to admit
additional instances of sexual abuse as other-acts evidence. See MCL 768.27a; MRE 404(b);
People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 467-477; 818 NW2d 296 (2012). Because the prosecution in
this matter did not admit the subsequent abuse testimony as other-acts evidence, we decline to
address whether the testimony would have been admissible as other-acts evidence. However, the
prosecution elicited evidence of the uncharged sexual-abuse incident for a proper purpose, namely,
to bolster the victim’s credibility. See DerMartzex, 390 Mich at 414-415.

                                1. THE VICTIM’S CREDIBILITY

        Evidence of uncharged offenses may be admissible if the evidence’s “probative value
outweighs the disadvantage where [the] crime charged is a sexual offense and the other acts tend
to show similar familiarity between the defendant and the person with whom he allegedly
committed the charged offense.” Id. at 413. In this case, the uncharged offense was a sexual
offense and occurred under circumstances identical with those surrounding the charged offense.
Both offenses involved the same victim, meaning that the Jones limitation did not apply. See
Jones, 417 Mich at 289-290. By inquiring into the uncharged incident of sexual abuse, the
prosecution’s purpose had been to establish a pattern of consistency between the victim’s in-court
and out-of-court disclosures of the abuse. The victim’s credibility remained vital to this case’s
outcome because she was the only firsthand witness of the abuse other than defendant. Rather
than diverting the jury from “an objective appraisal of the defendant’s guilt or innocence,” the
prosecution’s inquiries focused the jury’s attention on evidence essential to determining
defendant’s guilt or innocence. DerMartzex, 390 Mich at 413. Moreover, prosecutors may elicit
testimony of subsequent acts of sexual abuse between a defendant and a victim to bolster a victim’s
credibility. See People v Puroll, 195 Mich App 170, 171; 489 NW2d 159 (1992). Therefore,
defendant has failed to show that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct when it
elicited testimony of the uncharged offense at trial.

                            2. PREJUDICE AGAINST DEFENDANT

        Defendant also contends that he never had the opportunity to inquire into whether the
victim initially disclosed one or two incidents of sexual abuse. He then opines that, by injecting
questions of the uncharged abuse at trial, the prosecution improperly prejudiced the jury against
him. Defendant has provided no legal authorities to support his argument.

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         At the trial’s outset, defendant faced two charges of CSC-I, which the prosecution and the
trial court reduced to one charge because of the uncertainty surrounding the uncharged offense. In
other words, defendant had forewarning that the topic of the second incident of abuse could arise
at trial. Additionally, the defense opened the door to these questions at trial when it asked the
victim’s mother if the victim mentioned a subsequent incident of sexual abuse during her
conversation with the victim. The defense again opened the door when it asked the victim’s
stepmother on cross-examination what the victim disclosed to her regarding the abuse. This open-
ended question enabled the prosecution to ask the stepmother on redirect how many times
defendant abused the victim. Besides opening the door for the prosecution’s allegedly prejudicial
questions, the defense’s questions indicate that it had been fully prepared to address the uncharged
abuse at trial and that it had adequate notice of the uncharged abuse beforehand. Lastly, given the
victim’s uncertainty surrounding the uncharged abuse, it stands to reason that this evidence could
have strengthened or weakened the victim’s credibility in the minds of the jurors. In other words,
the uncharged-offense testimony was not necessarily prejudicial. In any event, a party “may not
merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). By failing to
provide any legal authorities to support his argument concerning prejudice on appeal, this is
precisely what defendant has done.

         Thus, defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct appears to be erroneously predicated
on the prosecution’s good-faith effort to admit proper evidence at trial. See Noble, 238 Mich App
at 660-661. Consequently, defendant has failed to show that the prosecution denied him his right
to a fair and impartial trial. See Brown, 279 Mich App at 134.

                        B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

        Defendant also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel,
entitling him to a new trial. We disagree.

         To preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, a defendant “must move
in the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing to preserve the defendant’s claim that his
or her counsel was ineffective.” People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012).
Defendant failed to move for a new trial or request an evidentiary hearing or raise the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel before the trial court. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for
appellate review. Ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed issue of fact and constitutional law.
People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 600; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). Because defendant failed to
raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel before the trial court, this Court’s “review of
this issue is limited to mistakes apparent on the record.” Id.

        “There is no question that a criminal defendant has a state and federal constitutional right
to present a defense.” People v Hayes, 421 Mich 271, 278; 364 NW2d 635 (1984). The right to
assistance of counsel for a defense is “fundamental to our system of justice [and] is meant to assure
fairness in the adversary criminal process.” United States v Morrison, 449 US 361, 364; 101 S Ct
665; 66 L Ed 2d 564 (1981). “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show
(1) that defense counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, a different outcome would have resulted.” Jackson, 292 Mich App at 600-601. Effective

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assistance of counsel is strongly presumed and the party claiming ineffectiveness must overcome
this presumption. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 37 n 2; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). When
examining the effectiveness of counsel, reviewing courts must apply “a heavy measure of
deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 691; 104 S Ct 2052;
80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).

                       1. IRRELEVANT OR IMMATERIAL EVIDENCE

        Defendant maintains that the prosecution’s questions regarding the uncharged incident of
sexual abuse were irrelevant and immaterial, and that defense counsel should have objected to
these questions at trial. Witness testimony concerning the dismissed CSC-I charge was not
irrelevant or immaterial. It spoke directly to a topic that was essential for determining defendant’s
guilt or innocence, namely, the victim’s reliability. The prosecution’s uncharged-abuse questions
supplied the jury with the information necessary to render an informed verdict at trial. The
questions did not prevent the jury from engaging in “an objective appraisal of the defendant’s guilt
or innocence.” DerMartzex, 390 Mich at 413. Therefore, the evidence’s probative value
outweighed any risk of prejudice to defendant. See id. Consequently, defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object to this testimony at trial.

                                  2. HEARSAY TESTIMONY

        Defendant contends that testimony elicited from three different witnesses—the victim’s
mother, the medical doctor, and the CAC employee—constituted hearsay that defense counsel
should have objected to. At the time of these proceedings, MRE 801(c) defined hearsay as a
statement “other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”1

        At trial, defense counsel asked the victim’s mother what the victim told her about what
happened with the defendant on cross-examination. The victim’s mother stated, “She told me
everything that had happened. Would you like me to go into detail?” and defense counsel
responded, “Yes.” The victim’s mother then stated that the victim told her that defendant woke
the victim up, brought her to his room, and made her suck chocolate off his genitals. Although
defense counsel initiated this line of questioning, defendant argues that defense counsel should
have objected on hearsay grounds. A defendant “opens the door” to the admission of typically
inadmissible evidence when it inquires into or makes reference to such evidence. People v
Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 399-400; 547 NW2d 673 (1996). Moreover, a defendant “cannot
complain of [the] admission of testimony which [the] defendant invited or instigated.” People v
Whetstone, 119 Mich App 546, 544; 326 NW2d 552 (1982). Although this statement was clearly
made out of court, defendant mistakenly argues that the prosecution elicited this testimony when
it was in fact elicited by defense counsel. It would be highly unusual for defense counsel to object

1
  MRE 801(c) was amended effective January 1, 2024, and maintains the same definition of
hearsay in an updated format. All citations to the Michigan Court Rules herein will be to the
version in effect at the time of defendant’s trial.

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to his own conduct in court, and defendant cannot now claim error where defense counsel opened
the door to potentially inadmissible evidence. See id.

         As for the CAC employee’s testimony, defense counsel asked the employee to tell the court
what the victim disclosed about defendant’s sexual abuse. The employee responded that,
according to the victim, defendant made the victim go up to his room and suck Nutella chocolate
off his genitals on two different occasions. Like the mother’s testimony, the employee’s testimony
clearly entailed a statement made out of court. Nevertheless, defendant has failed to show that
defense counsel offered the statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that sexual abuse
occurred. In his closing argument, defense counsel indicated that his purpose for eliciting the CAC
employee’s testimony had been to undermine the victim’s credibility in the minds of the jury, not
to prove that the stated abuse did not occur. Such a strategy is permissible under MRE 607, which
states that “[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
the witness.” Moreover, defendant has again ignored the fact that it was his own counsel who
called the employee to testify, not the prosecution, and it was defense counsel who specifically
elicited this testimony on direct examination. Defendant opened the door to this testimony, and
cannot now complain of its error. See Whetstone, 119 Mich App at 544.

         Lastly, the doctor testified that the victim told her that she wanted to have her mouth tested
for sexually transmitted diseases. Although this statement was made out of court, the purpose for
which it was offered at trial remains unclear. The doctor made this statement in response to a very
open-ended question from the prosecution. The uncertainty underlying the testimony’s purpose
means that defendant cannot definitively overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s conduct
at trial was ineffective. See Horn, 279 Mich App at 37 n 2.

        Regardless, even if defendant could establish this testimony as hearsay, the statement
would fall into the exception in MRE 803(4) for “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical
treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and treatment.” In
People v Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85, 95; 854 NW2d 531 (2014), this Court stated that the purpose
underlying MRE 803(4) is the “existence of (1) the self-interested motivation to speak the truth to
treating physicians in order to receive proper medical care, and (2) the reasonable necessity of the
statement to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.” In cases involving suspected child abuse,
statements made by the child are admissible under this exception when the statements are deemed
trustworthy on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. Id. Factors that may be considered
in a trustworthiness analysis include:

       (1) the age and maturity of the declarant, (2) the manner in which the statements
       are elicited (leading questions may undermine the trustworthiness of a statement),
       (3) the manner in which the statements are phrased (childlike terminology may be
       evidence of genuineness), (4) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar
       age, (5) who initiated the examination (prosecutorial initiation may indicate that the
       examination was not intended for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment),
       (6) the timing of the examination in relation to the assault (the child is still suffering
       pain and distress), (7) the timing of the examination in relation to the trial (involving
       the purpose of the examination), (8) the type of examination (statements made in

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       the course of treatment for psychological disorders may not be as reliable), (9) the
       relation of the declarant to the person identified (evidence that the child did not
       mistake the identity), and (10) the existence of or lack of motive to fabricate. [Id.
       at 95-96 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

        In this case, the victim was 10 years old when she made the statement. Because this Court
has recognized statements made by children younger than 10 years old to be reliable, the victim’s
maturity is not an issue. Id. at 96. The prosecution elicited this statement by means of an open-
ended question. Also, it appears that the victim initiated the examination, which occurred only
one year before the trial. The doctor testified that she issued her diagnosis of child sexual abuse
on the basis of the victim’s behavior and physical symptoms. Although the doctor did not specify
what these physical symptoms were, her testimony does suggest that the victim was still suffering
from some kind of emotional pain or distress during the examination. Id. at 95. The record does
not make it clear whether the victim implicated defendant as the perpetrator or described
defendant’s abuse to the doctor during the examination. See id. at 97. The disputed portion of the
doctor’s testimony did not implicate defendant as the perpetrator. Overall, the disputed testimony
constituted a mere request for a medical examination from the victim. On the basis of the totality
of the circumstances, there is nothing to indicate that the victim’s out-of-court statement was
unnecessary, untrustworthy, or that it did not fall within the MRE 803(4) exception to hearsay.
See id. at 95-97.

        For these reasons, defendant has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel based
on the failure to object to the testimony of these witnesses.

                              3. LIMITING JURY INSTRUCTION

        Defendant also argues that defense counsel erred by failing to request a limiting jury
instruction in light of the dismissed CSC-I charge.

        A defense counsel’s failure to object to current cautionary jury instructions or to request
new instructions can establish ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App
297, 311-312; 642 NW2d 417 (2001). However, to prove that defense counsel was ineffective,
defendant must show that “but for defense counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 311. Specifically, defendant argues
that defense counsel should have requested M Crim JI 4.11—Evidence of Other Offenses-
Relevance Limited to Particular Issue—as a limiting instruction, which states:

             (1) You have heard evidence that was introduced to show that the defendant
       committed [a crime / crimes / improper acts] for which [he / she] is not on trial.

                                              * * *

               (3) You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose. For
       example, you must not decide that it shows that the defendant is a bad person or
       that [he / she] is likely to commit crimes. You must not convict the defendant here
       because you think [he / she] is guilty of other bad conduct. All the evidence must

                                                -8-
       convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the alleged
       crime, or you must find [him / her] not guilty.

        Defendant has failed to show that the inclusion of this limiting instruction at trial would
have changed the outcome. It remains unclear whether the testimony concerning the uncharged
incident of sexual abuse impacted the jury’s verdict. On the one hand, the evidence could have
proven favorable to the victim by strengthening her credibility with the jury. On the other hand,
the testimony could have had the opposite effect, prejudicing the victim’s credibility because of
her uncertainty regarding the uncharged offense. Because defendant has failed to establish that
the limiting instruction would have favored defendant or changed the outcome, defendant has
failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. See DerMartzex, 390 Mich
at 417.

   III. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RESENTENCING ON THE BASIS OF THE
               SUBSEQUENT ABUSE INFORMATION IN THE PSIR

         Lastly, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing given the information regarding
the uncharged incident of sexual abuse in the PSIR. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by
failing to strike this information. We disagree.

        “For an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, addressed, and decided
by the lower court.” People v Anderson, 341 Mich App 272, 279; 989 NW2d 832 (2022)
(quotation marks and citation and omitted). Defendant objected to the inclusion of the second
incident of sexual abuse in the PSIR. The trial court subsequently made a note in the PSIR,
indicating that there was no evidence of a second incident of sexual abuse presented at trial.
Therefore, this issue is preserved for appellate review. We review a trial court’s actions regarding
a defendant’s challenge to the accuracy of information in a PSIR for an abuse of discretion. People
v Maben, 313 Mich App 545, 552; 884 NW2d 314 (2015). “A trial court abuses its discretion
when it selects an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v
Uphaus (On Remand), 278 Mich App 174, 181; 748 NW2d 899 (2008).

        A defendant has a due-process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information.
US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; People v Zinn, 217 Mich App 340, 347-348; 551
NW2d 704 (1996). The PSIR is an information-gathering tool for the sentencing court’s use and
is intended to ensure that a defendant’s punishment is tailored to the offense and the offender.
People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 120; 933 NW2d 314 (2019). The PSIR “follows the
defendant to prison” and “can have ramifications related to security classification or parole.” Id.
(quotation marks and citations omitted). The MDOC makes “[c]ritical decisions . . . regarding a
defendant’s status based on the information contained in the [PSIR].” Uphaus, 278 Mich App
at 182 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, “the PSIR should accurately reflect any
determination the sentencing judge has made concerning the accuracy or relevancy of the
information contained in the report.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, a PSIR
must include a “complete description of the offense and the circumstances surrounding it.”
MCR 6.425(A)(b).

                                                -9-
        A sentencing court must respond to challenges to a PSIR’s information. People v Spanke,
254 Mich App 642, 648; 658 NW2d 504 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds People v
Barrera, 500 Mich 14; 892 NW2d 789 (2017). Nevertheless, the sentencing court has “wide
latitude” with responding to such challenges. Spanke, 254 Mich App at 648. “The court may
determine the accuracy of the information, accept the defendant’s version, or simply disregard the
challenged information.” Id. “Should the court choose the last option, it must clearly indicate that
it did not consider the alleged inaccuracy in determining the sentence.” Id. at 649.

       If the trial court finds the challenged information in the PSIR inaccurate or irrelevant, “it
must strike that information from the PSIR before sending the report to the Department of
Corrections.” Id. The court’s finding must be made part of the record as well. People v
Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 690; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). However, a court’s failure to strike
disregarded information from the record can be harmless error. Id. A trial court’s failure to correct
inaccurate information in a PSIR constitutes harmless error when the disputed information “would
have no determinative effect on the [defendant’s] sentence.” People v McAllister, 241 Mich App
466, 473; 616 NW2d 203 (2000).

        Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to strike the information regarding
defendant’s second offense from the felony record. Although the trial court dismissed the second
CSC-I charge, testimony regarding the second incident of sexual assault was relevant insofar as it
related to the victim’s credibility. See MRE 401, 402, 403. Although the testimony concerning
the uncharged abuse was relevant to the jury’s verdict, the trial court found the information
irrelevant with respect to defendant’s sentence. This is evident by the fact that the trial court added
a note in the PSIR, which stated that no evidence of a second incident had been introduced at trial.
This note indicates that the trial court did not consider the uncharged incident of abuse when it
sentenced defendant. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to strike the second incident information
constituted, at most, harmless error. See McAllister, 241 Mich App at 473.

        Defendant also asserts that this note was inaccurate, given the abundance of trial testimony
regarding the uncharged incident, and as such, the trial court abused its discretion when it added
this inaccurate information to the PSIR. However, defendant’s assertion ignores the fact that both
the prosecution and the defense elicited this testimony, not for the sake of proving that the
uncharged offense occurred, but to bolster or weaken the victim’s credibility with the jury.
Overall, defendant is not entitled to resentencing.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                               /s/ Kathleen Jansen

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