Court Opinion

ID: 9916002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 15:10:43.050729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:23:22.540380
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                      San Antonio, Texas
                                                 OPINION

                                          No. 04-22-00563-CV

                            Roberto VILLARREAL, Ramona Villarreal,
                         Viola Villarreal Garcia, and Gloria Villarreal Salinas,
                                              Appellants

                                                    v.

Javier RAMIREZ, as Co-Trustee of the Ramirez Mineral Trust; Sonia Rodriguez, as Co-Trustee
 of the Ramirez Mineral Trust; Victor M. Ramirez, as Co-Trustee of the Ramirez Mineral Trust;
       Santiago Ramirez Jr., as Co-Trustee of the Ramirez Mineral Trust; Sonia Rodriguez,
 Individually and as Heir to the Estate of Blas Garza Jr.; Blas Garza III, Individually and as Heir
 to the Estate of Blas Garza Jr.; Priscilla Garza Lozano, Individually and as Heir to the Estate of
   Blas Garza Jr.; All Unknown Heirs of the Estate of Blas Garza Jr.; Sonia Rodriguez, as Co-
   Executor of the Estate of Blas Garza Jr.; Blas Garza III, Individually as Co-Executor of the
 Estate of Blas Garza Jr.; Priscilla Garza Lozano, as Co-Executor of the Estate of Blas Garza Jr.;
                                         and Javier Ramirez,
                                              Appellees

                      From the 49th Judicial District Court, Zapata County, Texas
                                        Trial Court No. 5,937
                              Honorable José A. López, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 3, 2024

REVERSED AND REMANDED

           In this dispute involving proceeds from oil and gas leases, Appellants argue the trial court

erred by granting Appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the case. Appellants contend
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they have live claims, their claims are not barred by res judicata, and their quasi-admissions did

not negate the trial court’s jurisdiction.

         Appellees argue that the trial court’s Agreed Final Judgment was final, it disposed of all

parties and all claims, and the trial court could have granted their plea based on standing, mootness,

judicial admissions, or “finality of judgments.”

         Because Appellants met their burden to plead facts showing the trial court’s jurisdiction,

and none of the grounds in Appellees’ plea negated the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we

reverse the trial court’s order and remand this cause.

                                                     BACKGROUND

         The underlying dispute over the ownership of surface and mineral estates, leases, and

proceeds has involved multiple parties, suits, claims, and defenses. For purposes of this appeal,

we limit our recitation of facts to those that pertain to the issues now before us.

A.       Parties 1

         Appellants, who are now plaintiffs below, are members of the Villarreal family: Roberto

Villarreal, Ramona Villarreal, Viola Villarreal Garcia, and Gloria Villarreal Salinas (collectively

the Roberto Group).

         Appellees, who are now defendants below, include members of the Ramirez family,

primarily those who are co-trustees of the Ramirez Mineral Trust, and others (collectively the

Ramirezes).

         Earlier defendants included Chesapeake Zapata, L.P. and Chesapeake Operating, Inc.

(collectively Chesapeake).

1
  The pleadings below define the parties: plaintiffs, intervenors, and defendants. Over the course of the underlying
litigation, the parties in the suit have changed. Our description of the parties is for the reader’s benefit; it is not a legal
determination.

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B.     Original Suit (5937)

       In 2002, an oil and gas production company executed a lease with the Ramirez Mineral

Trust for about 734 acres, and that lease was later assigned to Chesapeake. Chesapeake drilled

two wells on property it understood it had leased, but the Villarreals claimed the wells were sited

on their property.

       In April 2005, members of the Villarreal family sued Chesapeake, the Ramirez Mineral

Trust, and members of the Ramirez family; the suit was assigned cause number 5937. Two of the

Villarreal plaintiffs were Gloria Villarreal Salinas and Viola Villarreal Garcia. In June 2007,

Roberto and Ramona Villarreal intervened.

       In a hearing on August 31, 2010, the plaintiffs and intervenors confirmed that “[w]e seek

not a penny from the Ramirezes . . . and it’s a stipulation on this case.”

       A few weeks later, the plaintiffs filed their seventh amended petition, and the intervenors

filed their second amended plea in intervention.        The pleadings identified Chesapeake, the

Ramirezes, and others as defendants; they included claims for trespass to try title, trespass to real

property, conversion, constructive trust, enhanced value damages, attorney’s fees, accounting, and

violation of the Natural Resources Code.

C.     Settlement Agreement

       After some negotiations, the plaintiffs and intervenors who controlled more than 98% of

the mineral interests reached an agreement with Chesapeake. On January 26, 2011, in open court,

the parties advised the trial court they had reached an agreement, and it was read into the record.

       Under the settlement agreement, Chesapeake was to lease about 1,600 acres from the

Villarreals for a period of ten years with a 22.5% royalty and a bonus of about $2.5 million. The

agreement would resolve competing property ownership claims between the Villarreals and the

Ramirezes. The Villarreals would execute quit claim deeds to the Ramirezes for a particular sixty-

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seven-acre tract, and for another approximately 3,718 acres. In turn, the Ramirezes would execute

quit claim deeds to the Villarreals for the surface and mineral estates for about 2,024 acres.

D.     Actions on Settlement Agreement

       In March 2011, Chesapeake sent the Roberto Group proposed leases for the approximately

238 acres the Roberto Group believed it owned. After the Roberto Group learned that they did not

own all of the mineral interest in the 238 acres, they advised Chesapeake, and it sent them revised

leases covering about 223 acres.

       Some of the parties disagreed on how to implement the settlement agreement, but in

September 2011, they agreed to mediate, and the court ordered mediation.

E.     Status Hearing on Settlement Agreement

       On October 4, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the parties’ progress on finalizing the

settlement agreement.

       The parties proposed some modifications to the settlement agreement. For example, the

parties would not execute quit claim deeds; instead, the conveyances would be included in the

judgment. The Roberto Group explained that they had conveyed some interest in the 223 acres to

another party, their mineral interest was reduced by those conveyances, and their bonus should be

reduced accordingly. Chesapeake agreed that the “leases and the consideration would be adjusted

proportionately.”

       After additional colloquy, in concluding the hearing, the trial court noted that the judgment

would incorporate “the terms of the announcement made on January 2011 and modified only by

what was announced here today and agreed to by the parties.”

F.     Severance Order

       After the status hearing, several of the Villarreals, not including those in the Roberto

Group, moved to sever their claims against Chesapeake and the Ramirezes. In December 2011,

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the trial court granted the motion, and the claims for the “Certain Villarreal Plaintiffs-Intervenors”

were severed into cause 5937-A.

G.     Agreed Final Judgment

       On January 18, 2012, the trial court signed a fifty-three-page Agreed Final Judgment.

       One of its provisions was that “[t]he settlement agreement will require the signature of all

the parties.” The Agreed Final Judgment had signature blocks for the Ramirez Mineral Trust

trustees, the Ramirez surface owners, and the remaining Villarreal Plaintiffs-Intervenors. It did

not have signature blocks for the Roberto Group members, and none of them signed it.

       Another provision stated that “the non-signing parties to this Agreed Final Judgment will

be severed into a new cause upon entry of said Agreed Final Judgment and the Court will then

proceed to hear and determine the summary judgment motions affecting the non-signing parties.”

       But the record does not show that the Roberto Group’s claims were severed.

H.     Post-Judgment Actions

       The Roberto Group criticized the Agreed Final Judgment because it had substantive defects

in their property descriptions. It required them to convey interests they did not own, and they did

not sign it. But they insist they worked diligently to determine their ownership interests in the

acreage to be leased to Chesapeake.

       In August 2014, the Roberto Group advised Chesapeake that they had executed a mineral

partition deed which finally resolved the mineral interest ownership for their acreage. Their total

acreage available to be leased by Chesapeake was now 189.68 acres. The Roberto Group asked

Chesapeake “to start preparing the final deeds and lease agreement the Parties agreed upon,” but

Chesapeake did not.

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I.     Roberto Group Sues Chesapeake (8848)

       In November 2014, the Roberto Group sent Chesapeake a “Presentment of Claim” letter.

Without mentioning the Agreed Final Judgment, the letter asserted that the settlement agreement

that was read into the record on January 26, 2011, was still in effect, it was a binding contract

requiring Chesapeake to lease the Roberto Group’s acreage, and Chesapeake’s failure to do so

would be a breach of contract.

       The next month, after Chesapeake refused to execute a lease, the Roberto Group sued

Chesapeake; the suit was assigned cause number 8848. The Roberto Group’s claims included

breach of contract, promissory estoppel, specific performance, and attorney’s fees.

       In October 2018, the trial court granted Chesapeake’s no-evidence motion for summary

judgment against the Roberto Group’s claims, and the Roberto Group’s attempted appeal was

dismissed as untimely. See Villarreal v. Chesapeake Zapata, L.P., No. 04-19-00071-CV, 2019

WL 1370170, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam).

J.     Eighth Amended Petition

       In September 2019, in cause number 5937, the Roberto Group filed their eighth amended

petition against only Chesapeake. The petition included these claims: trespass to try title, trespass

to real property, conversion, constructive trust, enhanced value damages, attorney’s fees,

accounting, violation of the Natural Resources Code, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment.

K.     Chesapeake Bankruptcy

       In June 2020, Chesapeake Energy Corporation filed for bankruptcy. In re Chesapeake

Energy Corp., 622 B.R. 274, 276 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020). In February 2021, Chesapeake was

discharged in bankruptcy.

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L.      Ninth Amended Petition

        In June 2021, the Roberto Group filed their Ninth Amended Petition. It nonsuited

Chesapeake, and it added the Ramirezes as defendants. The amended claims include the following:

trespass to try title, trespass to real property, constructive trust, attorney’s fees, accounting,

declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and in the alternative, promissory

estoppel.

M.      Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Dismiss

        In April 2022, the Ramirezes filed a plea to the jurisdiction. Their plea challenged the

existence of jurisdictional facts, and it argued the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

the Roberto Group’s suit based on five grounds: (1) the Roberto Group lacks standing because

there is no live controversy, (2) their claims are moot, (3) they previously judicially admitted they

were not seeking damages against the Ramirezes, (4) the summary judgment against the Roberto

Group’s claims in cause 8848 barred those same claims in this suit, and (5) the January 18, 2012

Agreed Final Judgment deprived the trial court of jurisdiction “under principles of ‘finality of

judgments.’”

N.      Plea Granted, Motion for New Trial, Notice of Appeal

        The trial court held a hearing on the plea, but no witnesses testified, and no additional

evidence was offered. The parties presented their arguments, and the trial court decided the plea

on the pleadings and the records for cause 5937 and “the other cases filed in this Court as

referenced in the Plea.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court announced its decision:

“This Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the controversy, because the case is moot.” In its written

order, without stating the reason for its decision, 2 the trial court granted the Ramirezes’ plea and

2
  See In re A.S.G., 345 S.W.3d 443, 448 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (“[A] written order controls over a
trial court’s oral pronouncement when there is an inconsistency.”).

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dismissed the case. The Roberto Group moved for a new trial, the motion was not granted, and

the Roberto Group now appeals.

                                        APPELLATE ISSUES

A.      Roberto Group’s Arguments

        On appeal, the Roberto Group argues the trial court’s order improperly granted the

Ramirezes’ plea, and they present three issues to challenge it.

        First, the plea could not be granted on standing or mootness because their Ninth Amended

Petition pled facts alleging that the Agreed Final Judgment did not dispose of their then-pending

claims, they now have additional claims against the Ramirezes, and their claims are a live

controversy which invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction.

        Second, a plea to the jurisdiction cannot be granted based on res judicata because it is an

affirmative defense.

        Third, their challenged statements were not conclusive and did not deprive the trial court

of jurisdiction.

B.      Ramirezes’ Arguments

        The Ramirezes argue that the trial court properly granted their plea because the Roberto

Group had no remaining live controversy or justiciable interest and their requested declaratory

judgment claims were moot. To support their argument, they note that the Agreed Final Judgment

(1) does not require them to pay the Roberto Group anything, (2) decreed that the Roberto Group

take nothing from them, and (3) discharged them from the case. They add that the Roberto Group’s

statements that their claims were against Chesapeake and they “seek not a penny from the

Ramirezes” were stipulations that required the trial court to (1) conclude that no justiciable

controversy existed at that time and (2) grant their plea. Finally, they note that the order does not

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state that it was granted on res judicata, and it could have been granted for lack of a justiciable

controversy or mootness.

C.      Initial Question

        The parties dispute whether the Agreed Final Judgment was a final judgment that disposed

of all claims and all parties and was appealable. We begin with that question.

                                    AGREED FINAL JUDGMENT

        Before we recite the Agreed Final Judgment’s provisions that relate to its intended finality,

we briefly review the applicable law.

A.      Discerning Intent for Finality

        “Although no ‘magic language’ is required, a trial court may express its intent to render a

final judgment by describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and

(3) appealable.” Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (citing

In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 543 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam)); accord Patel v. Nations Renovations,

LLC, 661 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam).

        “‘Clear and unequivocal’ language that reflects an intent to dispose of the entire case is

given effect, but when there is doubt about finality, the record resolves the issue.” Bella Palma,

601 S.W.3d at 801–02 (quoting In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 541 (emphasis added)).

B.      Judgment Language

        The fifty-three-page Agreed Final Judgment contains the following provisions that pertain

to its intent for finality:

        IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT Villarreal
        Plaintiffs-Intervenors take nothing on their claims and causes of action in this cause,
        and that Chesapeake, the Ramirez Defendants and the Ramirez Mineral Trust be in
        all things discharged.
        ....

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              IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the Court
          shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the Parties and this Agreed Final Judgment
          for any and all purposes related to this settlement, including all rights, duties and
          obligations arising herein.
              IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the
          Parties and their respective attorneys cooperate fully and use their best efforts to
          effectuate the terms and conditions of this Agreed Final Judgment, including the
          execution of all necessary documents, such as, by example only and not by
          limitation, deeds, assignments, and leases, whether expressly identified in this
          Agreed Final Judgment or not, as soon as possible after the signing of this Agreed
          Final Judgment.
          ....
              This Agreed Final Judgment is final and disposes of all claims by and between
          the Parties, except as expressly ordered otherwise in this Agreed Final Judgment.
              This is a Final Judgment. All relief requested not hereby granted is denied. The
          Parties are hereby granted all writs necessary to the enforcement of this Final
          Judgment.
              Each party shall pay their own attorney’s fees and court costs are taxed against
          the party incurring same.

C.        Intent for Action to be Final

          The first indicator of a trial court’s “intent to render a final judgment [is by it] describing

its action as . . . final.” Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155; Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 801.

          The Agreed Final Judgment unquestionably establishes this first indicator: it expressly

states “This is a Final Judgment,” its title is “Agreed Final Judgment,” and it repeatedly refers to

itself as “this Agreed Final Judgment.” See Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155; Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d

at 801.

D.        Intent to Dispose of All Claims and Parties

          The second indicator of a trial court’s “intent to render a final judgment [is by it] describing

its action as . . . a disposition of all claims and parties.” Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155; Bella Palma,

601 S.W.3d at 801.

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       1.      Language Addressing All Claims and Parties

       The Agreed Final Judgment orders that the “Villarreal Plaintiffs-Intervenors take nothing

on their claims and causes of action in this cause, and that Chesapeake, the Ramirez Defendants

and the Ramirez Mineral Trust be in all things discharged.” It also states that it “is final and

disposes of all claims by and between the Parties.” And it adds the following: “All relief requested

not hereby granted is denied. The Parties are hereby granted all writs necessary to the enforcement

of this Final Judgment. Each party shall pay their own attorney’s fees and court costs are taxed

against the party incurring same.”

       But “[a]n order does not dispose of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled

‘final’, or because the word ‘final’ appears elsewhere in the order, or even because it awards

costs.” Farm Bureau Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 455 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam)

(quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001), superseded in part by

statute on other grounds as recognized by Indus. Specialists, LLC v. Blanchard Ref. Co. LLC, 652

S.W.3d 11, 14 (Tex. 2022)). As the supreme court has repeatedly required, “there must be some

other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire

case.” Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155 (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205); Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at

163; accord Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 802.

       2.      Express Exception to All Claims and Parties

       The Ramirezes emphasize the Agreed Final Judgment’s statement that it “is final and

disposes of all claims by and between the Parties.” But the full statement reads as follows: “This

Agreed Final Judgment is final and disposes of all claims by and between the Parties except as

expressly ordered otherwise in this Agreed Final Judgment.” (Emphasis added).

       The Agreed Final Judgment’s express exception to a final disposition of all claims and all

parties shows that it does not “clearly and unequivocally state[] that it finally disposes of all claims

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and parties.” See Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 154; Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at 163 (noting that to express its

intent to be final, a judgment must “state[] with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as

to all claims and all parties”).

        3.      Remaining Claims and Parties

        The Agreed Final Judgment does not expressly dispose of the claims of Viola Villarreal

Garcia and Gloria Villarreal Salinas. They are plaintiffs in the Seventh Amended Petition, the

then-live pleading when the Agreed Final Judgment was signed. It decreed that the “Villarreal

Plaintiffs-Intervenors take nothing on their claims and causes of action in this cause,” but Viola

and Gloria are not included in the Villarreal Plaintiffs-Intervenors group, and their claims are not

expressly disposed of elsewhere.

        The Agreed Final Judgment states that “[a]ll relief requested not hereby granted is denied,”

but a “Mother Hubbard clause is not conclusive of finality when other aspects of the order render

the meaning of the clause uncertain.” See In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 541. In this case, the Agreed

Final Judgment’s express exception to its own finality, and its continuing jurisdiction provision,

which we discuss next, are “other aspects of the order [which] render the meaning of the clause

uncertain.”   See id.    Thus, the Agreed Final Judgment’s Mother Hubbard clause does not

conclusively establish that the trial court intended the Agreed Final Judgment to be final. See id.

        4.      Continuing Jurisdiction Provision

        The Agreed Final Judgment also orders that “the Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction

over the Parties and this Agreed Final Judgment for any and all purposes related to this settlement,

including all rights, duties and obligations arising herein.” We examine the provision’s intent in

light of the applicable law.

        A trial court retains power to enforce its judgment after its plenary power over the judgment

ends. Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., L.P., 540

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S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. 2018); Custom Corps., Inc. v. Sec. Storage, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 835, 839

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 308).

       But the Agreed Final Judgment’s continuing jurisdiction provision is much broader. It

does not merely state that the trial court retains power over the Agreed Final Judgment for the

purpose of enforcing it, which would just acknowledge the applicable law. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

308; Alexander Dubose, 540 S.W.3d at 581.

       Instead, it “retain[s] continuing jurisdiction over the Parties . . . for any and all purposes

related to this settlement, including all rights, duties and obligations arising herein.” (emphasis

added). This language shows an intent to continue the trial court’s jurisdiction to decide matters

that relate to the settlement and questions that may arise which were not decided by the Agreed

Final Judgment.

       The parties could agree to litigate their future disputes regarding their claims in the same

trial court, but neither they nor the trial court had the authority to extend the court’s jurisdiction

beyond the periods established for a final judgment in the applicable statutes and rules. See, e.g.,

TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a, 329b; In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex. 2014) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam) (confirming that if a “trial court’s plenary power ha[s] expired, a party

[can] not ‘reinvest the trial court that dismissed the case with jurisdiction to enforce the settlement

agreement’ by filing a post-judgment motion to enforce the agreement” (quoting Univ. Gen. Hosp.,

LP v. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc., No. 01-12-00174-CV, 2013 WL 772951, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.))).

       Given “a trial court can render only one judgment in a case,” In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442

S.W.3d at 260 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 301), and parties may not agree to extend a trial court’s

jurisdiction beyond the prescribed periods, id., the provision that the trial court “shall retain

continuing jurisdiction over the Parties . . . for any and all purposes related to this settlement,

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including all rights, duties and obligations arising herein” indicates that the trial court understood

that the Agreed Final Judgment was not yet final as to all claims and all parties, and its jurisdiction

over the parties for even related matters would continue, as the judgment states, until all the

“purposes related to this settlement” have been accomplished. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a; In

re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d at 260.

       5.      Insights from the Record

       The Agreed Final Judgment’s express exception to a final disposition of all claims and all

parties, the remaining claims and parties, and the judgment’s continuing jurisdiction provision

raise doubts about the trial court’s intent to render a final judgment; accordingly, “we [will]

examine the record to determine the trial court’s intent.” See In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 543; see

also Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 801–02 (“[W]hen there is doubt about finality, the record resolves

the issue.” (quoting In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 541 (emphasis added))).

       The Agreed Final Judgment “require[s] the signatures of all the parties,” but the record

confirms that the Roberto Group members did not sign the Agreed Final Judgment.

       It also states that “the non-signing parties to this Agreed Final Judgment will be severed

into a new cause upon entry of said Agreed Final Judgment and the Court will then proceed to hear

and determine the summary judgment motions affecting the non-signing parties,” but the record

does not show that the Roberto Group members’ claims were severed.

       6.      Disposition Intent

       Having read it in its entirety, we conclude the Agreed Final Judgment does not clearly and

unequivocally express “an intent to dispose of the entire case.” See Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at

801–02; see also Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155; Rogers, 455 S.W.3d at 163.

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E.      Intent for Action to be Appealable

        The third indicator of the trial court’s “intent to render a final judgment [is by it] describing

its action as . . . appealable.” Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155; Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 801. The

Agreed Final Judgment does not state that it is appealable or otherwise mention or address its

appealability.

F.      Agreed Final Judgment Not Final

        The Agreed Final Judgment’s indicia of the trial court’s intent are mixed. The first

established the trial court’s intent to be “final,” but the second did not “clearly and unequivocally

state[] that it finally disposes of all claims and parties,” and the third did not identify its action as

appealable. Cf. Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155; Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 801; Rogers, 455 S.W.3d

at 163. We conclude the Agreed Final Judgment is not a final, appealable judgment.

        Having made that determination, we recite the standard of review for the trial court’s

decision granting a plea to the jurisdiction that challenged the existence of jurisdictional facts.

                                       STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “[I]f a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider

relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues

raised, as the trial court is required to do.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

217, 227 (Tex. 2004); accord Univ. of Tex. v. Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2009, no pet.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228).

        “Where the jurisdictional issue or facts do not implicate the merits of the case, and . . . the

facts relevant to jurisdiction are undisputed, the court should make the jurisdictional determination

as a matter of law based solely on those undisputed facts.” Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d at 806 (citing

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228).

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       We review a trial court’s determination of its subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Id. (citing

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226).

                                       LIVE CONTROVERSY

       In their first issue, the Roberto Group argues the trial court erred in granting the Ramirezes’

plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing their suit because the Agreed Final Judgment did not dispose

of all their claims and their Ninth Amended Petition presents new, cognizable claims against the

Ramirezes. Therefore, according to the Roberto Group, they have standing to sue because their

claims present justiciable interests which are not moot.

       The Ramirezes argue the trial court could have granted their plea and dismissed the case

based on the grounds in their plea, including standing, mootness, and “finality of judgments.”

       Before we address these arguments, we repeat some of the background information.

A.     Live Pleading’s Claims

       When the Ramirezes filed their plea to the jurisdiction, the live pleading they challenged

was the Roberto Group’s Ninth Amended Petition. The petition realleged five claims that were

pending before the Agreed Final Judgment was signed: trespass to try title, trespass to real

property, constructive trust, attorney’s fees, and accounting. It also included four claims that were

added after the Agreed Final Judgment was signed: declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment,

breach of contract, and in the alternative, promissory estoppel.

B.     Standing Ground

       The Ramirezes’ plea asserted the Roberto Group lacked standing to bring any of their

claims, but it did not explain why; it did not identify any specific elements or jurisdictional facts

that the pleading lacked.

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       1.      Standing Requirements

       “A defendant may challenge a plaintiff’s standing by filing a plea to the jurisdiction.”

Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2020); accord Miranda,

133 S.W.3d at 226.

       “To establish standing in Texas, a plaintiff must allege ‘a concrete injury . . . and a real

controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.’” Beasley, 598 S.W.3d at 241

(quoting Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012)). “The burden is on the

plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150

(citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226).

       “In determining whether a plaintiff has alleged a concrete injury sufficient to meet the

standing requirement, courts look to the plaintiff’s pleadings.” Beasley, 598 S.W.3d at 241; accord

Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. “We construe the plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, taking all factual

assertions as true, and look to the plaintiff’s intent.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150 (citing Miranda,

133 S.W.3d at 226).

       “[T]he mere fact that a plaintiff may ultimately not prevail on the merits of the lawsuit does

not deprive the plaintiff of standing.” Beasley, 598 S.W.3d at 241.

       2.      Meeting Standing Requirements

       The Roberto Group’s live pleading asserted claims for trespass to try title, trespass to real

property, constructive trust, attorney’s fees, accounting, declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment,

breach of contract, and in the alternative, promissory estoppel. See Beasley, 598 S.W.3d at 241

(concrete injury, justiciable controversy). For each claim, the Roberto Group alleged facts that

identified their personal injury, traced it to the Ramirezes’ conduct, and sought damages to

compensate them for their alleged injury.       Cf. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155–56 (standing

elements).

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       Construing their pleading liberally, taking its factual assertions as true, and without regard

to the claims’ merits, we conclude the Roberto Group met its burden to plead facts demonstrating

standing. See id. at 150 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226); see also Beasley, 598 S.W.3d at 241

(distinguishing standing from a suit’s merits). Accordingly, the trial court could not have properly

granted the Ramirezes’ plea based on the Roberto Group’s alleged lack of standing.

C.     Mootness Ground

       The Ramirezes’ plea also asserted that the Roberto Group’s cause was moot “because there

has ceased to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties.”

       1.      Assessing Mootness

       “Mootness occurs when events make it impossible for the court to grant the relief requested

or otherwise ‘affect the parties’ rights or interests.’” State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6

(Tex. 2018) (quoting Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162). “When a case becomes moot, the court loses

jurisdiction and cannot hear the case, because any decision would constitute an advisory opinion

that is ‘outside the jurisdiction conferred by Texas Constitution article II, section 1.’” Id. (quoting

Matthews, on behalf of M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2016)).

       2.      Avoiding Mootness

       In the hearing on the Ramirezes’ plea to the jurisdiction, as the parties were addressing the

Ninth Amended Petition’s first five claims, the trial court stated “I granted the summary judgment

with regard to the causes of action that were—that were going on back then . . . [s]o, you would

have to argue your Plea to the Jurisdiction now with these four causes of action [i.e., declaratory

judgment, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel].”

       The record shows the trial court granted motions for summary judgment against other

plaintiffs in two of the severed causes, i.e., 5937-A and 5937-B, but the record does not contain an

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order or a docket entry showing the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment against the

Roberto Group’s claims in cause number 5937.

       The Agreed Final Judgment is not a final, appealable judgment; it did not finally dispose

of the Roberto Group’s then-pending claims, and it did not negate as a matter of law the trial

court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Roberto Group’s four subsequent causes of action.

Accordingly, the trial court could not have properly granted the Ramirezes’ plea based on

mootness.

D.     “Finality of Judgments” Ground

       The Ramirezes’ plea also asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

because the Agreed Final Judgment “unambiguously contains finality language.”

       The Agreed Final Judgment was not a final, appealable judgment that disposed of all claims

and all parties, and the trial court could not have properly granted the Ramirezes’ plea on that

ground.

E.     First Issue Summary

       The trial court could not have properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction based on

standing, mootness, or “finality of judgments.”

                                           RES JUDICATA

       In their second issue, the Roberto Group argues the trial court could not have granted the

plea to the jurisdiction on res judicata because it is an affirmative defense which cannot properly

be considered in a plea to the jurisdiction.

       The Ramirezes’ plea asserted res judicata, but on appeal, they do not argue that it was a

proper basis to grant their plea.

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A.     Affirmative Defense

       An assertion of res judicata is not a plea to the jurisdiction; it is an affirmative defense that

seeks to avoid liability. Tex. Highway Dep’t v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967); see TEX.

R. CIV. P. 94.

       “[I]mmunity from liability is an affirmative defense that cannot be raised by a plea to the

jurisdiction.” State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v.

Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (“Immunity from liability does not affect a

court’s jurisdiction to hear a case.”)). “An ‘affirmative defense’ like res judicata ‘should be raised

through a motion for summary judgment or proven at trial.’” Town Park Ctr., LLC v. City of Sealy,

639 S.W.3d 170, 182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (quoting Reyes v. Thrifty

Motors, Inc., No. 01-15-00699-CV, 2016 WL 3571101, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

June 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)); accord In re D.K.M., 242 S.W.3d 863, 865 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2007, no pet.) (“[A]n affirmative defense . . . should be raised through a motion for

summary judgment, not through a motion to dismiss or a plea to the jurisdiction.”).

B.     Invalid Ground

       The Ramirezes’ plea to the jurisdiction asserted res judicata as a ground to grant its plea.

But res judicata “is an affirmative defense that cannot be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction,” and

the trial court could not have properly granted the Ramirezes’ plea on that ground. See Lueck, 290

S.W.3d at 880; Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638; Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d at 488.

                              JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS, STIPULATIONS

       In their third issue, the Roberto Group argues the trial court could not have granted the

Villarreals’ plea to the jurisdiction based on their former statements because they were merely

quasi-admissions and did not satisfy the requirements for conclusive judicial admissions.

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        The Ramirezes counter that the Roberto Group’s repeated statements that (1) they were not

seeking any monetary recovery against the Ramirezes and (2) they always waived any recovery

against the Ramirezes were agreed-to stipulations. These stipulations required the trial court to

dismiss the case because there was no longer a justiciable controversy and therefore the cause was

moot.

        Before we address the parties’ arguments, we relate some additional background.

A.      Additional Background

        1.      Statements in Cause 5937

        On August 31, 2010, in cause number 5937, the trial court held a hearing on the plaintiffs’

and defendants’ motions. The Roberto Group’s then-live pleadings included claims against the

Ramirezes for trespass to try title, trespass to real property, conversion, constructive trust,

enhanced value damages, attorney’s fees, accounting, and violations of the natural resources code.

        In the hearing, the Roberto Group explained that their suit was against Chesapeake; they

were not seeking monetary damages from the Ramirezes, but because one of their claims was for

trespass to try title, the Ramirezes were necessary parties: “[W]e seek nothing against the

Ramirezes. . . . We seek not a penny from the Ramirezes, and I’ll state it again, and it’s a

stipulation on this case. . . . I’ve stipulated we don’t seek any, any recovery, but I have to have

them in this lawsuit as a trespass-to-try-title.”

        2.      Statements in Cause 8848

        On November 9, 2015, in cause number 8848, the trial court held a hearing on the Roberto

Group’s motion to compel discovery.

        In the hearing, the parties and the court agreed that the Roberto Group had not sued the

Ramirezes in cause number 8848. The trial court observed that that was correct “[b]ecause the

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money was supposed to come from Chesapeake.” The Roberto Group responded “Right. We

always waived [money damages] from the Ramirezes.”

        3.     Plea to the Jurisdiction

        On April 2, 2022, in cause number 5937, the Ramirezes filed their plea to the jurisdiction.

It argued the trial court could grant the plea because the Roberto Group members “have judicially

admitted and stipulated that they do not seek monetary damages against the Defendants.” The plea

also argued that “[t]he Rule 11 Agreement made the basis of [the Roberto Group’s] Ninth

Amended Petition, and as judicially admitted by [the Roberto Group], was made with

[Chesapeake] and not with [the Ramirezes].” It added that “Chesapeake filed for Chapter 11

bankruptcy and has been discharged of all liability in [cause 5937] and . . . [t]he Roberto Group

did not sue the Ramirez[es] in the 8848 Case and therefore the Roberto Group is barred.”

        We address each argument in turn.

B.      Waiver of Liability Only

        The parties dispute whether the Roberto Group’s statements were quasi-admissions or

stipulations, but that is not the controlling question. Even if we assume the statements were

stipulations, which we do not decide, the remaining question is what effect such stipulations would

have.

        The Roberto Group’s statements waived recovery of monetary damages against the

Ramirezes, but that is a waiver of liability. Cf. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134

(Tex. 2011) (recognizing that “immunity from liability shields the state from money judgments

even when the [state is not immune from suit]”). “[I]mmunity from liability constitutes an

affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar,” id., and it “does not affect a court’s jurisdiction to

hear a case,” Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638.

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C.     Settlement Agreement with Chesapeake

       The Ramirezes’ plea also argued that the Roberto Group judicially admitted that the

settlement agreement was made with Chesapeake and not with the Ramirezes.

       But the record for the hearing on the settlement agreement shows that the Ramirezes were

to execute quit claim deeds “to the Villarreal plaintiffs and intervenors.”

       The Ramirezes do not further explain how the Roberto Group’s statements acknowledging

that their claims against Chesapeake were based on the settlement agreement negate the trial

court’s jurisdiction. Without more, we conclude that they do not deprive the trial court of subject

matter jurisdiction.

D.     Cause Number 8848

       Finally, the Ramirezes’ plea asserted that Chesapeake’s liability was discharged in

bankruptcy, and because the Roberto Group did not join the Ramirezes in cause number 8848, the

Roberto Group’s claims are barred. The plea did not explain or provide authorities to show how

Chesapeake’s bankruptcy and the Roberto Group’s decision not to join the Ramirezes in cause

number 8848 negated the trial court’s jurisdiction.

       On appeal, the Ramirezes argue that “the record is replete with the [Roberto Group’s]

stipulations,” including that “the [settlement] agreement was with Chesapeake,” but they do not

further explain or provide authorities to show how these statements negate the trial court’s subject

matter jurisdiction. Without more, we conclude that they do not.

E.     Judicial Admissions Ground

       The Roberto Group’s statements that they were not seeking any monetary recovery against

the Ramirezes were statements waiving liability, but “immunity from liability is an affirmative

defense that cannot be raised by a plea to the jurisdiction,” see Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 880 (citing

Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638).

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        Further, the Roberto Group’s statements waiving recovery, acknowledging that their then-

live claims were against Chesapeake and not the Ramirezes, and acknowledging that they did not

join the Ramirezes in cause number 8848 did not conclusively negate any jurisdictional facts that

would deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227;

Poindexter, 306 S.W.3d at 806.

        Accordingly, the trial court could not have properly granted the Ramirezes’ plea to the

jurisdiction based on the Roberto Group’s statements. See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 880; Jones, 8

S.W.3d at 638; Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d at 488.

                                             CONCLUSION

        The Ramirezes’ plea to the jurisdiction challenged the existence of jurisdictional facts, and

it argued the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction based on standing, mootness, judicial

admissions, res judicata, and finality of judgments. None of these were proper grounds on which

to grant the plea, and the trial court erred by granting it.

        We reverse the trial court’s June 6, 2022 order granting the Ramirezes’ plea to the

jurisdiction, and we remand this cause.

                                                     Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

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