Court Opinion

ID: 9428331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:27.253986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:12.890426
License: Public Domain

Justice Stewart,
concurring.
It seems to me extremely doubtful that the property loss here, even though presumably caused by the negligence of state agents, is the kind of deprivation of property to which the Fourteenth Amendment is addressed. If it is, then so too would be damages to a person’s automobile resulting from *545a collision with a vehicle negligently operated by a state official. To hold that this kind of loss is a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment seems not only to trivialize, but grossly to distort the meaning and intent of the Constitution.
But even if Nebraska has deprived the respondent of his property in the constitutional sense, it has not deprived him of it without due process of law. By making available to the respondent a reparations remedy, Nebraska has done all that the Fourteenth Amendment requires in this context.
On this understanding, I join the opinion of the Court.
Justice White,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but with the reservations stated by my Brother Blackmun in his concurring opinion.
Justice Blackmun,
concurring.
While I join the Court’s opinion in this case, I write separately to emphasize my understanding of its narrow reach. This suit concerns the deprivation only of property and was brought only against supervisory personnel, whose simple “negligence” was assumed but, on this record, not actually proved. I do not read the Court’s opinion as applicable to a case concerning deprivation of life or of liberty. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977). I also do not understand the Court to intimate that the sole content of the Due Process Clause is procedural regularity. I continue to believe that there are certain governmental actions that, even if undertaken with a full panoply of procedural protection, are, in and of themselves, antithetical to fundamental notions of due process. See, e. g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973).
Most importantly, I do not understand the Court to suggest that the provision of “postdeprivation remedies,” ante, at 538, within a state system would cure the unconstitutional *546nature of a state official’s intentional act that deprives a person of property. While the “random and unauthorized” nature of negligent acts by state employees makes it difficult for the State to “provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place,” ante, at 541, it is rare that the same can be said of intentional acts by state employees. When it is possible for a State to institute procedures to contain and direct the intentional actions of its officials, it should be required, as a matter of due process, to do so. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970). In the majority of such cases, the failure to provide adequate process prior to inflicting the harm would violate the Due Process Clause. The mere availability of a subsequent tort remedy before tribunals of the same authority that, through its employees, deliberately inflicted the harm complained of, might well not provide the due process of which the Fourteenth Amendment speaks.
Justice Powell,
concurring in the result.
This case presents the question whether a state prisoner may sue to recover damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment occurred when two shipments mailed to him were lost due to the negligence of the prison’s warden and “hobby manager.” Unlike the Court, I do not believe that such negligent acts by state officials constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of whatever subsequent procedure a State may or may not provide. I therefore concur only in the result.
The Court’s approach begins with three “unquestionable” facts concerning respondent’s due process claim: “the petitioners acted under color of state law; the hobby kit falls within the definition of property; and the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation.” *547Ante, at 536-537. It then goes on to reject respondent’s claim on the theory that procedural due process is satisfied in such a case where a State provides a “postdeprivation” procedure for seeking redress — here a tort claims procedure. I would not decide this case on that ground for two reasons. First, the Court passes over a threshold question — whether a negligent act by a state official that results in loss of or damage to property constitutes a deprivation of property for due process purposes.1 Second, in doing so, the Court suggests a narrow, wholly procedural view of the limitation imposed on the States by the Due Process Clause.
The central question in this case is whether unintentional but negligent acts by state officials, causing respondent’s loss of property, are actionable under the Due Process Clause. In my view, this question requires the Court to determine whether intent is an essential element of a due process claim, just as we have done in cases applying the Equal Protection Clause2 and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” 3 The intent question cannot be *548given “a uniform answer across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional violations which might be the subject of a § 1983 action,” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 139-140 (1979). Rather, we must give close attention to the nature of the particular constitutional violation asserted, in determining whether intent is a necessary element of such a violation.
In the due process area, the question is whether intent is required before there can be a “deprivation” of life, liberty, or property. In this case, for example, the negligence of the prison -officials caused respondent to lose his property. Nevertheless, I would not hold that such a negligent act, causing unintended loss of or injury to property, works a deprivation in the constitutional sense. Thus, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.
A “deprivation” connotes an intentional act denying something to someone, or, at the very least, a deliberate decision not to act to prevent a loss.4 The most reasonable interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would limit due process claims to such active deprivations.5 This is the view *549adopted by an overwhelming number of lower courts, which have rejected due process claims premised on negligent acts without inquiring into the existence or sufficiency of the subsequent procedures provided by the States.6 In addition, such a rule would avoid trivializing the right of action provided in § 1983. That provision was enacted to deter real abuses by state officials in the exercise of governmental powers. It would make no sense to open the federal courts to lawsuits where there has been no affirmative abuse of power, merely a negligent deed by one who happens to be acting under color of state law. See n. 12, infra.7
*550The Court appears unconcerned about this prospect, probably because of an implicit belief in the availability of state tort remedies in most cases. In its view, such remedies will satisfy procedural due process, and relegate cases of official negligence to nonfederal forums. But the fact is that this rule would “make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law,” Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976), whenever a State has failed to provide a remedy for negligent invasions of liberty or property interests.8 Moreover, despite *551the breadth of state tort remedies, such claims will be more numerous than might at first be supposed. In Kent v. Prasse, 385 F. 2d 406 (CA3 1967) (per curiam), for example, a state prisoner was forced to work on a faulty machine, sustained an injury, and brought suit against prison officials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that the State, unfortunately, did not provide compensation for this injury, but stated:
“Nor are we able to perceive that a tort committed by a state official acting under color of law is, in and of itself, sufficient to show an invasion of a person’s right under [§ 1983]. While not dispositive, we note that there is no allegation that defendants violated any state criminal law or acted out of bad motive. Nor [is it] alleged that any state law was not enforced by the defendants.” Id., at 407.9
Rather than reject this reasoning, I would adopt the view that negligent official acts do not provide any basis for in*552quiries by federal courts into the existence, or procedural adequacy, of applicable state tort remedies.
Such an approach has another advantage; it avoids a somewhat disturbing implication in the Court’s opinion concerning the scope of due process guarantees. The Court analyzes this case solely in terms of the procedural rights created by the Due Process Clause. Finding state procedures adequate, it suggests that no further analysis is required of more substantive limitations on state action located in this Clause. Cf. Paul v. Davis, supra, at 712-714 (assessing the claim presented in terms of the “substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 679, n. 47 (1977) (leaving open the question whether “corporal punishment of a public school child may give rise to an independent federal cause of action to vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause”).
The Due Process Clause imposes substantive limitations on state action, and under proper circumstances10 these limi*553tations may extend to intentional and malicious deprivations of liberty11 and property,12 even where compensation is available under state law. The Court, however, fails altogether to discuss the possibility that the kind of state action alleged here constitutes a violation of the substantive guarantees of the Due Process Clause. As I do. not consider a negligent act the kind of deprivation that implicates the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause, I certainly would not view negligent acts as violative of these substantive guarantees. But the Court concludes that there has been such a deprivation. And yet it avoids entirely the question whether the Due Process Clause may place substantive limitations on this form of governmental conduct.
In sum, it seems evident'that the reasoning and decision of the Court today, even if viewed as compatible with our precedents, create new uncertainties as well as invitations to *554litigate under a statute that already has burst its historical bounds.13

 Assuming that there was a “deprivation” of the hobby Mt under color of state law in this case, I would agree with the Court’s conclusion that state tort remedies provide adequate procedural protection. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674-682 (1977) (common-law remedies are adequate to afford procedural due process in cases of corporal punishment of students).

 Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977) (invidious discriminatory purpose required for claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).

 In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 105 (1976), we held that “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” on the part of prison officials is sufficient to constitute an “infliction” of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. We also stated that an “accident, although it may produce added anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.” Ibid. Estelle v. Gamble thus supports my view of the Due Process Clause— which requires consideration not only of the effect of an injury or loss on *548a citizen but also of the intent of the state official whose actions caused the injury or loss.

 According to Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed. 1945), to “deprive” is to “dispossess; bereave; divest; to hinder from possessing; debar; shut out.”

 In analogous contexts, we have held that the intent of state officials is a relevant factor to consider in determining whether an individual has suffered a denial of due process. In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 790 (1977), involving preindictment prosecutorial delay, we held that “proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and . . . the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.”
Similarly, in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137 (1979), the Court reviewed a claimed violation of due process occurring when a sheriff arrested the individual named in an arrest warrant and failed for a time to realize that the warrant itself had named the wrong person. The Court there noted that “the state of mind of the defendant may be relevant on *549the issue of whether a constitutional violation has occurred in the first place,” id., at 140, n. 1, and went on to hold that there had been no deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The Court reasoned that there is no duty to investigate “every claim of innocence,” id., at 146, and no constitutional requirement of an “error-free investigation of such a claim,” ibid. It relied on the fact that the sheriff had acted reasonably in relying on a facially valid arrest warrant, thus implicitly distinguishing a case involving an intentional deprivation of liberty without cause.
To be sure, even where there has been an intentional deprivation of property, due process claims also must satisfy the requirement that the act be sufficiently linked to an official’s state-created duties or powers to constitute “state action.” See n. 10, infra.

 See, e. g., Williams v. Kelley, 624 F. 2d 695 (CA5 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-6165; Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F. 2d 565 (CA7 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978); Harper v. Cserr, 544 F. 2d 1121, 1124 (CA1 1976); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F. 2d 541, 546 (CA2 1974); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F. 2d 1228, 1232 (CA4 1970); Kent v. Prasse, 385 F. 2d 406 (CA3 1967) (per curiam). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 698 (1976) (suggesting that there should not be a § 1983 action in favor of “the survivors of an innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle”).
There is no occasion here to express any view as to the possibility of negligent violations of other, more particular constitutional guarantees.

 We have previously expressed concerns about the prospect that the Due Process Clause may become a vehicle for federal litigation of state torts. In Paul v. Davis, supra, we held that an official action damaging the reputation of a private citizen, although an actionable tort under state law, did not constitute a deprivation of “liberty” within the meaning of *550the Fourteenth Amendment. In so holding we relied principally on the fact that the individual’s interest in his reputation was not accorded a “legal guarantee of present enjoyment” under state law, since it was “simply one of a number [of interests] which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law.” Id., at 711-712.
Attention to the “guarantees” provided by state law is at least as appropriate in a case involving an alleged deprivation of “property.” It is clear that the hobby kit was respondent’s “property.” But it also is clear that under state law no remedy other than tort law protects property from interferences caused by the negligence of others. The reasoning of Paul v. Davis would suggest, therefore, that the enjoyment of property free of negligent interference is not sufficiently “guaranteed” by state law to justify a due process claim based on official negligence.
A State perhaps could constitutionalize certain negligent actions by state officials by criminalizing negligence, thus extending its guarantee to this kind of interference. Instead, the States merely have created systems for civil compensation of tort victims. In this sense, state law draws a clear distinction between negligently caused injuries and intentional thefts or assaults.

 One additional problem with the Court’s purely procedural approach is worth noting. In Kent v. Prasse, supra, the Third Circuit faced a claimed deprivation of procedural due process by prison officials based on the failure of a State to provide a tort remedy for official negligence — the exact claim validated by the Court today. The court noted that “[i]n any event, such a deprivation would be the work of the state, not these defendants.” 385 F. 2d, at 407. Arguably, if the absence of a tort remedy is the heart of one’s constitutional claim, the defendant in the § 1983 suit must be the State itself, or its lawmakers, both of whom are immune from suit. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951) (legislators); *551Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 662-663 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against States in federal court). If so, the only remedy available to plaintiffs would be a more substantive due process claim — where grounds for such a claim exist. The Court does not discuss this possibility.

 Another example is presented in the case of Hamilton v. Stover, cert. pending, No. 80-1419 (filed Feb. 20, 1981), involving a collision between a police car and another car. In an unpublished order,- the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a resulting § 1983 action against the policeman, reasoning that negligent driving cannot constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights. Hamilton v. Stover, No. 79-3562 (Nov. 24, 1980). In his brief in this Court, however, the policeman points out that he and the employing municipality possess absolute immunity under Ohio law, Ohio Rev. Code §701.02 (1976), for acts while responding to an emergency call. If this immunity has the effect of cutting off all state-law remedies, under the Court’s reasoning there appears to be a deprivation of procedural due process, actionable in federal court.

 Even intentional injuries inflicted by state officials must be “state action” to implicate the due process guarantees, and must be “under color of” state law in order to be actionable under § 1983. In this area we have drawn a distinction between mere “torts of state officials” and “acts done 'under color’ of law . . . which deprived a person of some right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion of Douglas, J.) (discussing the criminal analogue of § 1983 — now codified as 18 U. S. C. §242). Actionable deprivations must be based on “‘[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’ ” Ibid, (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 326 (1941)). See also Screws, supra, at 134 (Rutledge, J., concurring in result) (the Constitution protects the “right not to be deprived of life or liberty by a state officer who takes it by abuse of his office and its power”) (emphasis added). Where state officials cause injuries in ways that are equally available to private citizens, constitutional issues are not necessarily raised. As Justice Douglas put it in Screws: “The fact that a prisoner is assaulted, injured, or even murdered by state officials does not necessarily mean that *553he is deprived of any right protected or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 325 U. S., at 108.

 See, e. g., Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F. 2d 607, 613 (CA4 1980) (corporal punishment of students may have violated due process if it “amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience”); Bellows v. Dainack, 555 F. 2d 1105, 1106, n. 1 (CA2 1977) (use of excessive force by policeman during the course of an arrest constitutes a deprivation of “liberty” without due process).

 See, e. g., Kimbrough v. O’Neil, 545 F. 2d 1059, 1061 (CA7 1976) (en banc) (“a taking with intent (or reckless disregard) of á claimant’s property by a State agent violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is actionable under Section 1983”); Carter v. Estelle, 519 F. 2d 1136, 1136-1137 (CA5 1975) (per curiam) (same). See also San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 656, n. 23 (1981) (BrennaN, J., dissenting) (when property is taken by the government but not in furtherance of a “public use,” “the government entity may not be forced to pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, [but] the landowner may nevertheless have a damages cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation”).

 Section 1983 was enacted in 1871 as one of the statutes intended to implement the Fourteenth Amendment. For many years it remained a little-used, little-known section of the Code. In the past two decades, however, resourceful counsel and receptive courts have extended its reach vastly. This statute with a clearly understood and commendable purpose no longer is confined to deprivations of individual rights as intended in 1871. As a result, § 1983 has become a major vehicle for general litigation in the federal courts by individuals and corporations.
Professor Christina Whitman recently has addressed this expansion of § 1983 with a comprehensive assessment of arguable pluses and minuses. See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5 (1980). There will be no pluses, however, if the striking escalation of suits under § 1983 against state and local officials is augmented by suits based on negligent conduct. Professor Whitman noted, for example, that civil rights petitions by state prisoners in federal court increased from 218 cases in 1966 to 11,195 in 1979. Id., at 6. See also the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 62 (1980), reporting a further increase in this number to 12,397 in 1980. The societal costs of using this statute for a purpose never contemplated are high indeed:
“First, the existence of the statutory cause of action means that every expansion of constitutional rights [through § 1983] will increase the caseload of already overburdened federal courts. This increase dilutes the ability of federal courts to defend our most significant rights. Second, every [such] expansion . . . displaces state lawmaking authority by diverting decision-making to the federal courts.” Whitman, supra, at 25.
The present case, involving a $23 loss, illustrates the extent to which constitutional law has been trivialized, and federal courts often have been converted into small-claims tribunals. There is little justification for making such a claim a federal case, requiring a decision by a district court, an appeal as a matter of right to a court of appeals, and potentially, consideration of a petition for certiorari in this Court. It is not in the interest of claimants or of society for disputes of this kind to be resolved by litigation that may take years, particularly in an over*555burdened federal system that never was designed to be utilized in this way. Congress, recognizing the problem with respect to prisoner petitions, enacted last year the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349, authorizing federal courts to continue § 1983 prisoner cases for up to 90 days to allow recourse to administrative remedies. The grievance procedures, however, must be certified by the Attorney General or determined by the court to be in compliance with not insubstantial procedural requirements. Id., § 7, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As a result, the Act continues to allow resort to the federal courts in many cases of this kind. In view of increasing damages-suit litigation under § 1983, and the inability of courts to identify principles that can be applied consistently, perhaps the time has come for a revision of this century-old statute — a revision that would clarify its scope while preserving its historical function of protecting individual rights from unlawful state action.