Court Opinion

ID: 9847407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:59:05.062818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:09.826612
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting) :
Being convinced that there was prejudicial error entitling defendant to, a new trial, I most respectfully dissent. In the case of State v. Sharpe, 239 S. C. 258, 122 S. E. (2d) 622, Chief Justice Moss, then Associate Justice, quite aptly and accurately stated the principles which should govern the disposition of this appeal, as follows:
“The general rule is that evidence that the accused has committed another crime independent of and unconnected with the one on trial is inadmissible. To this rule there are certain exceptions. However, the general rule should be *410strictly enforced in all cases where applicable because of the prejudicial effect amd injustice of such evidence, and should not be departed from except under conditions which clearly justify such departure(Emphasis added.)
One well recognized exception, of course, is that when a defendant takes the stand, evidence of previous crimes committed by him, involving moral turpitude may be adduced as bearing upon his credibility. Crimes not involving moral turpitude have no bearing upon one’s credibility. Here, when the defendant decided to take the stand, his counsel knew that he would be subject to cross-examination as to his guilt of prior crimes involving moral turpitude. Obviously with the intent and purpose of softening the impact of what was otherwise certain to follow, counsel, in the course of introductory questions, promptly brought out from the defendant that he was serving sentences for larceny, assault with intent to kill and armed robbery, all offenses involving moral turpitude and relevant upon his credibility as a witness. We have twice recently recognized the propriety of such trial strategy. Taylor v. State, 258 S. C. 369, 188 S. E. (2d) 850; State v. Smalls, S. C., 194 S. E. (2d) 188 (1973). Omitted was any reference to the totally irrelevant crime of carrying a concealed weapon, which had no bearing on his credibility.
I don’t think it can be soundly held that by offering evidence of one’s record which is relevant one thereby “opens the door” to the introduction of a past record, or part thereof, which is totally irrelevant. When the time came for cross-examination of the defendant, his credibility was already as fully impeached as it could possibly be by evidence of crimes on his part involving moral turpitude. An obvious, if not the only, purpose of the solicitor in cross-examining him further about his record was to bring out the irrelevant fact of his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon and thereby improperly promote the probability that the jury would infer his guilt in the present case from the fact that he had been convicted of a similar offense in the past. State v. Lyle, 125 *411S. C. 406, 118 S. E. 803. He was allowed to pursue this improper line of cross-examination over strenuous objection and, moreover, erroneously portrayed the defendant to the jury as having improperly withheld or concealed from it evidence to which it was properly entitled.
At one point early in the cross-examination of the defendant, in the course of a colloquy between counsel and the court, a motion for a mistrial was made. Whether or not such mistrial was in order was probably within the discretion of the trial judge, but at the very least he should have promptly sustained the objection, admonished the solicitor for his improper cross-examination; and appropriately instructed the jury.
In view of all the evidence, one might well speculate as to whether or not this error, as a matter of fact, had any effect upon the verdict of the jury. There can be no doubt, however, as to the “prejudicial effect and injustice of such evidence” and that as a result thereof the defendant has not been accorded a fair trial.