Court Opinion

ID: 9849633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:43:29.303639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.425058
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the holding that defendant Kmart was entitled to summary judgment, but not in all that is written to that end.
1. The first issue is whether there is evidence that Kmart had actual or constructive knowledge of the liquid and broken glass on the floor. This should be the first inquiry because, as repeated in Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 736 (1) (493 SE2d 403) (1997), plaintiff is charging defendant with breach of the statutory duty of owners and occupiers of land “to keep the premises safe (OCGA § 51-3-1), and the fundamental basis for an owner or operator’s liability [is] that party’s superior knowledge of the hazard encountered by the plaintiff.” Since, as the majority concluded in Division 2, Kmart has established by undisputed evidence that Hopkins cannot show that the inspection procedure a short time before her fall was deficient in failing to discover (and remove) the hazard because she could not say it was there before the recent inspection, no further analysis is necessary. No issue of fact remains as to whether there was a reasonable inspection procedure timewise. And no issue of fact is raised by conflicting evidence which, on one side, tends to show the hazard was on the floor before the inspection and, on the other side, tends to show the hazard was created thereafter. The only evidence is that of Kmart, which creates a reasonable inference that the hazard was created after the inspection. As a result, a jury could not find that Kmart had constructive knowledge of the hazard. Summary judgment is compelled on that basis alone. There is no need for attention to whether plaintiff Hopkins knew or should have known of the *520danger and avoided it. I do not join in Division 1.
Decided May 11, 1998.
Anthony G. Knowles, for appellant.
Chamhless, Higdon & Carson, Marc T Treadwell, John J. Makowski, for appellee.
2. In Division 2 the majority opinion states, as relevant, the principle that “ ‘in the absence of evidence [that] a reasonable inspection would have discovered the foreign substance, no inference can arise that defendant’s failure to discover the defect was the result of its failure to inspect.’ ” This does not apply in this case because, considering the nature of the hazard, it being a larger-than-dinner-plate size pool of iced tea and broken glass, a jury could find that a reasonably alert inspection would have discovered it. More to the point is that there was a reasonable inspection timewise, as a matter of law, and no evidence the substances were then present for the inspector to see.
3. Finally, the majority opinion concludes in Division 2 that “Hopkins has failed to prove Kmart had actual or constructive knowledge of the spill.” In order to avert summary judgment, Hopkins as plaintiff was not obligated to prove her case. She was only saddled with the necessity to produce some evidence, so as to create an issue of fact, that Kmart had constructive knowledge of the hazard. Deloach v. Food Lion, 228 Ga. App. 393, 395 (491 SE2d 845) (1997).