Court Opinion

ID: 9394700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:03:23.510611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:01.981249
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: May 16, 2023

                          S23A0084. JONES v. THE STATE.

        PINSON, Justice.

        Bryan Jones was convicted of felony murder and other offenses

in connection with a shooting that killed Dorian Drewery and

injured Joshua Childs. 1 Jones now appeals, contending that (1) the

trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on other-acts evidence

        Jones was indicted in June 2018 by a DeKalb County grand jury for
        1

malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault (one count as
to Drewery and one count as to Childs), and one count of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony. At the conclusion of a jury trial held
September 23 to 27, 2019, Jones was acquitted of malice murder but found
guilty on all remaining counts. Jones was sentenced on October 3, 2019 to life
in prison without the possibility of parole for the felony murder count, plus a
consecutive 20-year term for the aggravated assault of Childs and a
consecutive 5-year term for the firearm-possession count. The remaining
aggravated assault count merged into the felony murder count for sentencing
purposes. Through new counsel, Jones filed a timely motion for new trial on
November 1, 2019, which was amended on April 1, 2022. Following a hearing,
the trial court denied the motion on June 8, 2022. Jones filed a timely notice of
appeal on July 6, 2022. The appeal was docketed to the term of this Court
beginning in December 2022 and was thereafter submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) when no such evidence was admitted at

trial; and (2) trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective

assistance in (a) agreeing to a stipulation that prejudiced Jones’s

defense and (b) failing to request a jury instruction on voluntary

manslaughter. But the trial court’s error in giving the other-acts

jury instruction was harmless: among other things, the court

omitted that oral instruction from the written instructions sent back

with the jury; it properly instructed that other acts could be

considered only if it was more likely than not that Jones had

committed them, and because there was no evidence of such other

acts, the jury could not have made that finding; and in any event,

the instruction had little relevance to the central question of

whether Jones’s use of deadly force was justified under the

circumstances. As for the ineffective-assistance claims, the record

shows that trial counsel’s decision to agree to the stipulation was the

product of a reasonable strategic effort to prevent the State from

offering potentially “devastating” rebuttal evidence. Similarly,

counsel’s decision not to request a jury instruction on voluntary

                                  2
manslaughter was reasonable given Jones’s desire to present an “all

or nothing” justification defense and the fact that the evidence

supporting voluntary manslaughter was thin. So Jones has failed to

establish trial error or ineffective assistance, and we therefore

affirm his convictions and sentences.

     1. Drewery was shot and killed on the evening of March 17,

2018, at a gas station in Lithonia. It is undisputed that Jones was

the shooter, and the central question in the case was whether the

shooting was a justifiable act of self-defense.

     The evidence at trial showed that Jones and Drewery were

both bikers who frequented that particular gas station, which was a

popular hangout for bikers and the site of two past altercations

between the two men. The first happened around two weeks before

the shooting: the men argued and shouted obscenities at each other,

and as Jones prepared to drive away, Drewery smacked Jones. A

witness to that incident testified that he heard Jones say to

Drewery, “[I]f I do something to you, I’m going to make sure that

you’re never seen again.”

                                   3
     The second incident happened on the afternoon of the shooting,

when the men again got into an argument. A witness to that incident

testified that he saw Jones and Drewery arguing with each other

and then, as Jones walked away from Drewery, Jones said, “let me

go cover myself. I’m going to go shoot this n****.”

     Afterwards, Jones and Drewery approached the gas station

security officer—off-duty DeKalb County police officer Marcus

Brooks—about their altercation. Drewery told Officer Brooks that

Jones had threatened to kill him, while Jones reported that he and

Drewery had been having “an ongoing problem” related to

“motorcycle rage” and that Drewery had recently slapped and

threatened him. Officer Brooks wrote up a police report for both men

for terroristic threats and told them to leave. Jones asked Officer

Brooks to escort him to his bike because he was scared, but Officer

Brooks declined.

     The shooting happened around 8:30 p.m. that night. A group of

bikers had gathered at the gas station, and Jones and Drewery both

showed up. At some point, the men began arguing, and the

                                  4
argument ended with Jones shooting Drewery. Drewery was shot

four times: once in the back of his head, twice in his back, and once

in his buttocks. Childs, a bystander, was shot once in the leg.

     Eyewitnesses gave mostly similar accounts of the shooting, but

they varied in certain respects. Witness Maurice Bonner testified

that on the night of the shooting, he was at the gas station talking

to Drewery when he saw Jones. Drewery said, “[T]here’s that b***h

mother f**ker right there, he’s always running his mouth.” Witness

Titus Rumph, who was standing with Bonner at the time, testified

that Jones made an obscene gesture to Drewery. Both Bonner and

Rumph testified that Drewery turned to Jones, and they began

“trash talking.”

     Bonner testified that Drewery called Jones “a punk” and “a

b***h,” taunting that Jones was scared. Jones responded, “[D]o I

look like I’m scared?” while raising his arms, revealing a gun in his

waist belt. Jones, who had been headed toward the gas station’s

convenience store, turned and started walking back toward his bike.

Drewery continued the taunts, saying “[Y]ou’re scared, that’s why

                                  5
you’re way over there. And if you ain’t scared, we can do something

now.” Drewery started walking quickly toward Jones, still calling

him names. Bonner did not see a gun on Drewery, but he “figured

[Drewery] was going to try to hurt [Jones].” Jones turned toward

Drewery, and then Bonner heard the gunshots. He estimated the

men were 10 to 15 feet apart at the time.

     Bonner    also   testified,   on   cross-examination,   about   a

confrontation he saw at the same gas station in May 2017 between

Drewery and a man named Joshua Booth, which began with “trash

talking” and escalated into pushing. Booth pulled out a knife, and

Drewery either pulled out or was handed a gun. Ultimately the

situation was diffused. Bonner also testified that Drewery was

“known to get violent.”

     Witness Cornell Keith testified that he too was at the gas

station and heard someone say, “I have these hands for you,” which

got his attention. Keith turned to see Jones backing up, as if

retreating, and Drewery walking toward him “in a boxing stance.”

Keith saw Jones stop and pull out his gun; Jones did not rack the

                                   6
gun, fire warning shots, or tell Drewery to back up before firing.

     Witness James Grimsley testified that he saw Drewery

walking toward Jones at a normal pace, with his hands open, and

then saw Jones pull the gun out when the men were about five feet

from one another. Drewery turned around to run, and then Jones

began firing the gun. Afterward, Jones walked calmly to his bike.

     Childs testified that he saw Jones arrive and make eye contact

with Drewery. At some point, Childs saw the men “coming towards

each other” and then heard gunshots. He was knocked to the ground

by others who were diving down to avoid the shots, and then realized

he had been shot in the leg.

     Officer Brooks testified that he was inside the gas station when

the shooting happened. He ran outside and approached Jones, who

said, “[H]e charged at me.” Officer Brooks arrested Jones and took

his gun; Jones was calm and compliant. Video footage from Officer

Brooks’s body camera showed that, as Jones was being detained and

handcuffed, Jones said Drewery had threatened him and “assaulted”

him in the past. Officer Brooks testified that no weapons were found

                                  7
on Drewery’s body.

     The GBI firearms examiner testified that all the cartridge

casings, bullets, and metal jacket fragments collected at the scene

had been shot from Jones’s gun. The medical examiner testified that

no soot or stippling appeared on Drewery’s clothes, meaning that the

gun had been fired from an “intermediate or distant range.”

     After the State rested, Jones’s counsel read to the jury a

stipulation, prepared by the defense and agreed to by the

prosecution, about the May 2017 incident between Drewery and

Booth. The stipulation stated:

     One: Zachary Wallace is a person who was involved in the
     motorcycle scene and knew both Bryan Jones and Dorian
     Drewery prior to March 17th, 2018.

     Two: Zachary Wallace did not witness the incident at
     issue where Dorian Drewery was shot on March 17th,
     2018.

     Three: Zachary Wallace did witness an incident on May
     29th, 2017 involving Joshua Booth and Dorian Drewery
     via Facebook live. Zachary Wallace saw the two parties
     arguing back and forth. He witnessed Joshua Booth with
     a knife. He witnessed Dorian Drewery with a gun. Dorian
     Drewery was making verbal threats to Joshua Booth.

                                 8
     Four: On a telephone conversation, Zachary Wallace told
     Bryan Jones what Zachary Wallace witnessed via
     Facebook Live. Joshua Booth with a knife and Dorian
     Drewery with a gun. Dorian Drewery was making verbal
     threats to Joshua Booth.

     Five: During the same telephone conversation between
     Bryan Jones and Zachary Wallace, Bryan Jones told
     Zachary Wallace a) I’m not fixing to let nobody just be
     punking me and slapping me; b) if he approaches me,
     threatens me, if he comes to me again like he is going to
     try and fight me, slap me, or whatever, then I’m going to
     shoot. I am going to protect myself.

The defense presented no other evidence.

     2. Jones contends that the trial court erred by instructing the

jury on evidence of “other acts” admitted under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)

(“Rule 404 (b)”)2. Before trial, the State served notice of its intent to

offer Rule 404 (b) evidence in the form of pending criminal charges

against Jones arising out of an alleged “road rage” incident. The trial

court later ruled that the State could offer this evidence solely for

the purpose of showing intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake.

     2 Under that Code section, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
                                      9
At trial, the State did not present the Rule 404 (b) evidence during

its case-in-chief but considered presenting it during rebuttal, and

during the charge conference, the Rule 404 (b) language was

tentatively agreed to. Ultimately, the State did not present any

rebuttal evidence, but the 404 (b) language was not removed from

the jury charge. Thus, the trial court’s instructions to the jury

included that instruction, which began by saying, “[T]he State has

offered evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by the accused

. . .”3 Although Jones’s counsel objected after the court gave the

     3   The relevant portion of the charge reads as follows:

     In order to prove its case in Counts One through Five, the State
     must show knowledge and intent and must negate or disprove
     mistake. To do this, the State has offered evidence of other crimes
     allegedly committed by the accused. You are permitted to consider
     that evidence only insofar as it may relate to those issues and not
     for any other purpose. You may not infer from such evidence that
     the defendant is of character that would commit such crimes. The
     evidence may be considered only to the extent that it may show the
     elements of [sic] the State is required to prove of the crimes
     charged in the case now on trial. Such evidence, if any, may not be
     considered by you for any other purpose.

     The defendant is on trial for the offense charged in this bill of
     indictment only and not for any other acts. Before you may
     consider any other alleged acts for the limited purpose stated, you
     must first determine whether it is more likely than not that the

                                       10
instructions and asked for a curative instruction—and the State

agreed—the trial court declined to give one, instead opting to delete

the erroneous instruction from the written instructions sent back

with the jury.

     There is no question that the Rule 404 (b) portion of this

instruction should not have been given, because the State did not

present any evidence of alleged other crimes committed by Jones.

See Rammage v. State, 307 Ga. 763, 767 (4) (838 SE2d 249) (2020)

(“‘There must be at least slight evidence produced at trial to

authorize a jury instruction.’”) (citation omitted). The question is

whether this undisputed error was harmless or not.

     “Even when we find error in a jury charge, we will not reverse

     accused committed the other alleged acts. If so, you must then
     determine whether the acts shed any light on the elements of the
     offense for which the act was admitted in the crimes charged in the
     indictment in this trial.

     Remember to keep in mind the limited use and the prohibited use
     of this evidence about other acts of the defendant.

     By giving this instruction, the Court in no way suggest [sic] to you
     that the defendant has or has not committed any other acts, nor
     whether any such acts, if committed, prove anything. This is solely
     a matter for your determination.
                                     11
when the error is harmless, that is, when it is highly probable that

the instruction did not contribute to the verdict.” Jones v. State, 302

Ga. 892, 897 (3) (810 SE2d 140) (2018) (citation and punctuation

omitted). Accord Middleton v. State, 310 Ga. 365, 370 (3) (850 SE2d

126) (2020). To figure out whether an instructional error was

harmless, we assess it in the context of the instructions as a whole.

See Jones, 302 Ga. at 897 (3) (assessing effect of arguably misleading

instruction by reference to jury instructions in their totality). See

also Johnson v. State, 312 Ga. 481, 490 (3) (863 SE2d 137) (2021)

(noting that, in determining the impact of a challenged instruction,

“we do not evaluate jury charges in isolation, but rather consider

them as a whole”) (citation and punctuation omitted). And as with

other trial errors, in assessing harm “we review the record de novo,

and we weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to

have done so.” Middleton, 310 Ga. at 370 (3).

     Under these standards, the instructional error here was

harmless. First, the oral instructions told the jury it could consider

evidence of other alleged crimes only if it found it more likely than

                                  12
not that Jones committed such other crimes. Given that the State

actually presented no evidence of other crimes, the jury could not

have made the finding necessary to permit its consideration of any

other alleged crimes. Nor is there any indication from the record that

the jury was confused, either by the difference between the oral and

written instructions or by the language of the other-acts instruction

itself.

      Further, the other-acts instruction had little to do with the

case’s central question, which was whether the shooting was a

justifiable act of self-defense. The jury was correctly instructed that

it could find that Jones was justified in using deadly force only if he

“reasonably believe[d] that such force [was] necessary to prevent

death or great bodily injury to himself or a third person, or to

prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” See OCGA § 16-3-21

(a). It is not at all clear how a suggestion from the mistaken oral

instruction that Jones had committed some undefined past crimes

would have had any bearing on whether, at the time of the shooting,

Jones reasonably believed that it was necessary to shoot Drewery in

                                  13
order to protect himself from grave or mortal harm. See Lewis v.

State, 291 Ga. 273, 278-279 (4) (731 SE2d 51) (2012) (giving of

improper jury charge on reliability of eyewitness testimony was

harmless given that eyewitness identification “did not play a

significant role in the State’s case”).

     Finally, the evidence against Jones was quite strong: it was

undisputed that he shot the unarmed Drewery, without warning,

from a distance of several feet, in the back. So any confusion over

the oral instruction’s possible implication that Jones had committed

some unknown past crimes was unlikely to have affected the jury’s

determination on Jones’s guilt of the crimes against Drewery. See

Jones, 302 Ga. at 897-898 (3) (any error in particular instruction was

harmless within context of jury charge as a whole and in light of

“very strong” evidence of defendant’s guilt).

     For all of these reasons, we conclude that it is highly probable

that the instructional error here did not contribute to the verdicts.

     3. Jones next contends that his trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance in two respects. To succeed on

                                   14
a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must establish both

that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was

prejudiced as a result of that deficient performance. See Washington

v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022) (citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d

674) (1984)).

     To prove deficient performance, a defendant must establish

that counsel “performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable

way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3) (citation and

punctuation omitted). To overcome the “strong presumption” that

counsel performed reasonably, the defendant must show that “no

reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would

have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted). To prove prejudice, a defendant must

establish that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been

different.” Id. A reasonable probability is a probability “sufficient to

                                  15
undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Neal v. State, 313

Ga. 746, 751 (3) (873 SE2d 209) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). An ineffective-assistance claim fails if the defendant fails

to establish either deficient performance or prejudice. See

Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3).

       In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on an ineffective-assistance

claim, we accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility

determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we

independently apply the relevant legal principles to the facts. See

Sullivan v. State, 301 Ga. 37, 40 (2) (799 SE2d 163) (2017).

       (a) Jones first contends that his counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by agreeing to the stipulation about Zachary Wallace’s

account of Drewery’s encounter with Joshua Booth. Jones contends

that by stipulating that Jones told Wallace he “was going to shoot”

if Drewery approached, threatened, or tried to fight him, trial

counsel needlessly put forth evidence that undercut his defense by

suggesting he was primed to shoot Drewery, whether justified or

not.

                                   16
      At the motion for new trial hearing, Jones’s trial counsel

testified that entering into the stipulation was a strategic decision

intended to avoid putting up any witnesses. That prevented the

State from offering rebuttal evidence of the road rage incident,

which counsel believed would have been “devastating” to the

defense.4 Counsel testified that he and his co-counsel drafted the

stipulation to include what they believed their witnesses would

otherwise testify to. As to the part of the stipulation about Jones’s

“I’m going to shoot” statement, counsel testified that he believed

“that was the language we expected to come out, whether we called

a live witness or . . . did it through a stipulation.” He also testified

that at the time he believed the impact of that evidence would have

been mitigated to some degree by the fact that Jones’s statement

was made almost a year before the shooting. In denying Jones’s

      4 The gist of this evidence was that, around seven months before
Drewery’s shooting, Jones intentionally rammed his truck into the back of
another vehicle and tried to run it off the road while brandishing a gun,
ultimately causing an accident. According to the prosecutor, “at least” five
witnesses would testify that Jones was “the aggressor” in the incident. At the
time of the crimes here, Jones had been indicted for aggravated assault in
connection with the road rage incident and had been released on bond.
                                     17
motion for new trial, the trial court credited counsel’s testimony and

concluded that the decision to enter into the stipulation was

reasonable trial strategy.

     We see no clear error in the trial court’s crediting of counsel’s

testimony, and we conclude, as the trial court did, that agreeing to

the stipulation was an objectively reasonable strategic decision by

counsel. Counsel determined that it was important to highlight for

the jury both that Drewery had brandished a gun in a past dispute

related to “the motorcycle scene” and that Jones was aware of that

incident. 5 Counsel determined that it would help Jones to do this

through a stipulation rather than live testimony, because it would

prevent the State from offering its “devastating” rebuttal evidence,

and he surmised that to get the State to agree, the stipulation would

have to include Wallace’s expected testimony in its entirety. We

cannot say that no reasonable attorney would have made these

determinations, and thus the decision to agree to the stipulation did

     5 While Jones contends that Wallace’s testimony was unnecessary
because Bonner had already testified about Drewery’s altercation with Booth,
Bonner did not testify that Jones knew about the incident.
                                    18
not amount to deficient performance. See, e.g., Broxton v. State, 306

Ga. 127, 135 (2) (829 SE2d 333) (2019) (trial counsel’s agreement to

stipulation that defendant was a gang member, intended to bolster

defendant’s credibility and prevent jury from focusing on issues not

relevant to defense theory, was reasonable trial strategy); Norman

v. State, 303 Ga. 635, 639 (2) (814 SE2d 401) (2018) (trial counsel’s

agreement to stipulation, intended to prevent State from presenting

same evidence through multiple witnesses, was “eminently

reasonable” and did not offer a basis for an ineffective assistance

claim). So this claim of ineffective assistance fails.

     (b) Jones also contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in failing to ask for a jury instruction on voluntary

manslaughter.

     Trial counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that,

although he had considered requesting a voluntary manslaughter

instruction, Jones “always made it very clear” that he had acted in

self-defense and without any criminal intent. So counsel deferred to

Jones’s preference to pursue an “all or nothing” approach. The trial

                                   19
court credited counsel’s testimony and concluded that this decision

amounted to reasonable trial strategy.

     We agree. Some evidence supported Jones’s self-defense claim,

including testimony that Drewery advanced on Jones after the

“trash-talking” began, as well as evidence of the parties’ past

altercations and Jones’s expression of fear earlier that day after his

run-in with Drewery. By contrast, it is questionable whether the

evidence supported an instruction on voluntary manslaughter,

because “words alone, regardless of whether they are highly

insulting, will not justify the excitement of such passion so as to

reduce the crime of murder to the lesser offense of voluntary

manslaughter.” Barron v. State, 297 Ga. 706, 708 (2) (777 SE2d 435)

(2015). And even assuming there was the “slight” evidence necessary

to support a voluntary-manslaughter instruction, see Hatney v.

State, 308 Ga. 438, 441 (2) (841 SE2d 702) (2020), it was not

objectively unreasonable for counsel to conclude that presenting

that theory would undermine Jones’s self-defense claim. See Velasco

v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 893-894 (3) (b) (834 SE2d 21) (2019) (holding

                                 20
that “[t]rial counsel did not act unreasonably in deciding to pursue

only a defense that was consistent with Appellant’s claim of self-

defense,” noting not only “the lack of evidence supporting a

voluntary manslaughter charge” but also “the general inconsistency

between    self-defense   and    voluntary   manslaughter   claims”).

Counsel’s choice was reasonable, see id., and so this claim of

ineffective assistance fails, too.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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