Court Opinion

ID: 9367030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 19:00:30.358965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.839938
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10527        Document: 00516627222             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-10527
                                    Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                                                               January 30, 2023
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
   In the Matter of Ray Douglas Griffith,                                            Clerk

                                                                                     Debtor,

   Ray Douglas Griffith,

                                                                                Appellant,

                                            versus

   Lone Star FLCA; Crystal Matulich,

                                                                                Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:21-CV-825

   Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         This appeal arises from a property dispute between Ray Griffith and
   Lone Star FLCA (“Lone Star”). Because Griffith waived exclusive use of the

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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   disputed property and Lone Star sent foreclosure notices to Griffith’s last
   known address before the foreclosure sale, we AFFIRM.
                                I.    Background
                 A.     Lone Star’s Foreclosure & Sale of the Property
          On December 8, 2005, Griffith borrowed $137,500 from Lone Star to
   purchase a property in Eastland County, Texas. The deed of trust that he
   signed provided:
              Unless otherwise required by law, any notice shall be
              given by delivering it or mailing it by first class mail to
              the appropriate party’s address on page 1 of this
              Security Instrument, or to any other address
              designated in writing. Notice to one grantor will be
              deemed notice to all grantors.
   Griffin gave the following address in accordance with this provision: 5112
   Geddes Avenue, Ft. Worth, Texas (“the Geddes address”).
          Griffith remarried in 2007 and moved into a house with his new wife
   at 2916 Sanguinet Street in Fort Worth, Texas (“the Sanguinet address”).
   By March 2014, he had officially changed his address in Lone Star’s system
   to reflect his move to the Sanguinet address. He made this request orally and
   Lone Star memorialized his request via an internal memo. In a 2016 letter, he
   communicated his desire to switch to online banking at Lone Star and noted
   that he wanted to continue receiving loan statements by mail; he signed the
   letter with the Sanguinet address.
          Beginning in 2017, Griffith made “sporadic and untimely” payments
   to Lone Star, with his final payment coming in November 2018. Shortly
   thereafter, Lone Star labeled his account “chronic[ally] delinquent” and sent
   him four notices of default and acceleration letters to the Sanguinet address.
   These notices were all mailed from May 2018 through March 2019. On April

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   3, 2019, Lone Star sent an additional notice of acceleration and informed
   Griffith of its intent to foreclose.
          Griffith ultimately separated from his wife in 2018 and moved back to
   the Geddes address. In 2018, he opened a PO Box in Fort Worth, Texas (“the
   PO Box”). He maintained the PO Box for business and personal affairs,
   including some correspondence with Lone Star. Following Lone Star’s note
   of foreclosure, he sent a text message to Lone Star, explaining that he is no
   longer receiving mail at the Sanguinet address. On the same day of his text
   exchange with Lone Star, he spoke to one of its representatives and
   “specifically requested that his notice address be changed to” the PO Box.
   Lone Star memorialized this change of address request through its usual
   business processes.
          From May 2019 to December 2019, Lone Star sent all correspondence
   to Griffith through the PO Box as he requested. This correspondence
   included numerous foreclosure notices in June 2019, November 2019, and
   December 2019. To avoid foreclosure on his property, Griffith filed for
   bankruptcy under Chapter 13, which cancelled Lone Star’s pending
   foreclosure sale. He subsequently failed to file necessary documents, so the
   bankruptcy court dismissed his case on December 4, 2019. Lone Star
   promptly sent additional notices regarding its efforts to sell the property to
   the PO Box via first class and certified mail. Lone Star sold the property on
   January 7, 2020, to Crystal Matulich.
                         B.      Bankruptcy Court Proceedings
          On May 18, 2020, Griffith sued Lone Star and Matulich on multiple
   grounds. Only his wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract claims
   survived summary judgment. Both claims relied on Griffith’s allegation that
   Lone Star’s foreclosure sale was wrongful because “proper notice of the sale

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   was not given to” him. In response, Lone Star asserted that Griffith’s claims
   were “barred in whole or in part by estoppel and/or waiver.”
          Ultimately, the bankruptcy court held in Lone Star’s favor. It relied
   on the following as evidence of Griffith’s waiver: (1) he explicitly requested
   a change of address to the PO Box; (2) he never raised any concerns about
   Lone Star sending notices to the incorrect address; and (3) he had actual
   knowledge that Lone Star sent multiple business and legal notices to the PO
   Box. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court concluded that Griffith expressly and
   impliedly waived the initial loan agreement’s requirement that Lone Star
   only send correspondence to the Geddes address. It additionally concluded
   that Lone Star complied with Chapter 51 of the Texas Property Code by
   sending the foreclosure notice to Griffith’s last known address. Griffith
   timely appealed to the district court.
                          C.     District Court Proceedings
          In its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the district court weighed the
   parties’ arguments and concluded that Griffith did little more than argue that
   “his view of the evidence is correct and that the bankruptcy court’s view is
   incorrect.” Relying on the clearly erroneous standard of review, it explained
   that “because the bankruptcy court’s finding that Mr. Griffith waived his
   contractual right is reasonable and supported by the evidence, the [district
   court] will not overturn the bankruptcy court.”
          The district court also considered Griffith’s arguments that Lone Star
   failed to comply with Texas law when it sent foreclosure notices to the PO
   Box because that was not his “last known address.” First, Griffith asserted
   that his April 2019 texts with a Lone Star representative were a written
   request to change his last known address. The district court rejected this
   argument because Griffith “verbally and expressly” directed Lone Star to
   begin using the PO Box after the April 2019 texts. Second, Griffith argued

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   that the bankruptcy notice filed in his bankruptcy petition established the
   Geddes address as his last known address. The district court rejected this
   argument because it reasoned that the bankruptcy notice “could not be
   reasonably construed to be a notice of address change as contemplated by the
   Texas Property Code.” Moreover, it held that even it did qualify as notice,
   Griffith did not inform Lone Star of his desire to change his address “in a
   reasonable manner,” as the parties’ loan agreement and Texas law required.
   The district court then affirmed the bankruptcy court in full and issued its
   order in favor of Lone Star. Griffith timely appealed.
          On appeal, Griffith argues that the district court erred in: (1) adopting
   the bankruptcy court’s factual findings regarding his waiver; (2) affirming the
   bankruptcy court’s conclusion that he waived his right to receive any notice
   of foreclosure at the Geddes address; (3) adopting the bankruptcy court’s
   findings regarding his last known address; and (4) affirming the bankruptcy
   court’s conclusion regarding his last known address.
                           II.   Standard of Review
          “We review the decision of a district court sitting as an appellate court
   in a bankruptcy case by applying the same standards of review to the
   bankruptcy court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as applied by the
   district court.” In re Matter of Lopez, 897 F.3d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 2018). “We
   review a bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact
   for clear error.” Id.
          “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence
   to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a firm and
   definite conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Missionary
   Baptist Found. of Am., 712 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court
   has recognized that where “the district court’s account of the evidence is
   plausible in light of the record . . . [we] may not reverse it even though

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   convinced that had [we] been sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have
   weighed the evidence differently.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
   564, 574 (1985). The Court has similarly held that “[w]here there are two
   permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them
   cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id.
                              III.        Discussion
                                     A.     Waiver
          Texas law provides that the elements of waiver include: “‘(1) an
   existing right, benefit, or advantage held by a party; (2) the party’s actual
   knowledge of its existence; and (3) the party’s actual intent to relinquish the
   right, or intentional conduct inconsistent with the right.’” Thompson v. Bank
   of Am. Nat. Ass’n, 783 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ulico Cas. Co.
   v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008)). Waiver may also be
   evidenced by a party’s conduct if they purposely mislead “the opposite party
   into an honest belief that the waiver was intended or assented to.” Alford,
   Meroney & Co. v. Rower, 619 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1981);
   see also Tenneco Inv. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. 1996)
   (“Silence or inaction, for so long a period as to show an intention to yield the
   known right, is . . . enough to prove waiver.”).
          Griffith argues that the bankruptcy court erroneously held that he,
   expressly and/or impliedly, waived his right to receive Lone Star’s
   foreclosure notice at the Geddes address. He asserts that the bankruptcy
   court’s conclusion lacked a sufficient basis in the record, which amounts to
   clear error. He also contends that the district court similarly erred in
   affirming the bankruptcy court’s conclusions for the same reason. We
   disagree.
          Here, the district court did not clearly err in adopting the
   bankruptcy’s court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law because they

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   were plausible in light of the record. Ultimately, Griffith makes the same
   request on appeal as he did at the district court: that a reviewing court
   construe the evidence in his favor instead of Lone Star’s. Put another way,
   he requests a third look at the underlying factual findings in search of a
   different result. Indeed, Griffith concedes that he has not appealed any legal
   conclusions reached within the bankruptcy and district court opinions. Our
   task then, is to discern what facts the district court adopted from the
   bankruptcy court and to evaluate whether those facts permit the conclusions
   drawn by the district court.
          The bankruptcy court benefitted from observing the proceedings
   during the initial bench trial and weighing the precise facts that Griffith brings
   before this court now. It concluded that Griffith expressly and impliedly
   waived usage of the Geddes address for Lone Star’s foreclosure notices. The
   district court adopted the bankruptcy court’s findings, satisfied that the
   record supported them and that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err.
   Specifically, the district court noted that Griffith:
              (1) “twice made an express change-of-address request
              to Lone Star verbally over the phone”; (2) “verbally
              and expressly asked [Lone Star] to send notices to Mr.
              Griffith’s [PO Box] rather than to the Geddes
              Address”; (3) “received the June 2019 Foreclosure
              Sale Notice at the [PO Box] and never raised any
              concerns to Lone Star that such notices should be sent
              to the Geddes Address instead”; (4) “received the
              November 2019 Foreclosure Sale Notice at the [PO
              Box] and never raised any concerns to Lone Star that
              such notices should be sent to the Geddes Address
              instead”; and (5) “never raised any concerns to Lone
              Star that [his monthly bank statements] should be sent
              to the Geddes Address instead [of his PO Box]).

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   The district court also considered and rejected Griffith’s arguments that
   Lone Star proffered no facts to support its contention that he had actual
   knowledge that Lone Star sent foreclosure correspondence to the PO Box.
   On that point, the record indicates that Griffith regularly checked the PO Box
   and that Lone Star sent, by certified and first class mail, correspondence to
   that address both before and after the foreclosure sale was completed.
          As the district court recognized, the record is replete with facts
   supporting that Griffith explicitly and impliedly waived exclusive use of the
   Geddes address. At best, he creates another plausible take on the evidence—
   that, however, is not enough to demonstrate that the bankruptcy or district
   courts clearly erred. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. Because these courts did
   not clearly err in finding or adopting the facts and conclusions of law that
   support Griffith’s express or implicit waiver of the Geddes address, we
   affirm. In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am., 712 F.2d at 209.
                        B.     Griffith’s Last Known Address
          Texas Property Code § 51.0021 covers debtors’ changes of address. It
   provides that “a debtor shall inform the mortgage servicer of the debt in a
   reasonable manner of any change of address of the debtor for purposes of
   providing notice to the debtor under [§] 51.002.” Section 51.0001 defines
   “last known address” and explains that:
              the debtor’s last known address means . . . the
              debtor’s last known address as shown by the records
              of the mortgage servicer of the security instrument
              unless the debtor provided the current mortgage
              servicer a written change of address before the date the
              mortgage servicer mailed a notice required by [§]
              51.002.
          In its dealings with Griffith, Lone Star had to “give notice of
   sale . . . as required by the applicable law in effect at the time of the proposed

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   sale.” In giving notice of the foreclosure sale, Texas law required that Lone
   Star direct its notice to Griffith’s “last known address.” Tex. Prop.
   Code § 51.002(e). The bankruptcy court determined that Lone Star
   complied with Texas law in delivering Griffith’s notice to the PO Box
   because the record demonstrated that it was his last known address. The
   district court considered and adopted these facts and reached the same
   conclusion. Griffith contends that the district court erred in adopting the
   bankruptcy court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding his last
   known address. We disagree.
           In support of his contentions, Griffith maintains the same theories as
   he did at the district court: (1) that Bauder v. Alegria, 480 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex.
   App.—Houston 2015) supports his position that his April 23, 2019 text
   message exchange with a Lone Star representative sufficed as notice of a
   change to the Geddes address under § 51.0021; and (2) that the bankruptcy
   notice in his bankruptcy petition establishes the Geddes address as his last
   known address. On the latter point, he argues that even if his April 2019
   phone call overrides his text messages from earlier that day, his bankruptcy
   notice came long after both events and established the Geddes address as his
   last known address.
           Here, Griffith’s arguments fail because he misapplies Bauder and the
   bankruptcy petition is not a notice of address change under § 51.0021. First,
   Griffith relies on a footnote in Bauder to argue that he followed Texas change-
   of-address law when he changed to the Geddes address during his April 2019
   text with a Lone Star representative. 1 However, as the district court

   1
    See 480 S.W.3d at 97 n.7 (providing that “if [the debtor] had provided [the lender] a
   written change of address before the notices were sent, then the notices should have been
   sent to the address provided in writing, even if it differed from [the debtor’s] last known
   address as shown by [the lender’s] records”).

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   explained, this “footnote supports the proposition that a debtor’s written
   instruction overrides any competing information in the mortgage servicer’s
   record at the time the written instruction was made. It does not, however,
   support the proposition that a written instruction also overrides a subsequent
   change of address.” On April 23, 2019, Griffith texted Lone Star at 5:04 a.m.
   and requested to use the Geddes address for all correspondence moving
   forward. A few hours later, however, he called Lone Star and requested all
   correspondence be directed to the PO Box. Lone Star then circulated an
   internal memorandum reflecting Griffith’s second request and mailed
   relevant documents thereafter accordingly.
          Second, Griffith argues that Lone Star had a “duty” to inspect his
   2019 bankruptcy notice and update its records to reflect the address on the
   notice as his last known address. However, Griffith cites to no authority that
   supports his argument. Texas law explains that a debtor’s last known address
   comes from two sources: (1) “the debtor’s last known address as shown by
   the records of the mortgage servicer,” or (2) the debtor’s subsequent written
   request for the mortgage servicer to change the original address. Tex.
   Prop. Code § 51.0001. As previously discussed, Lone Star had the PO Box
   in its records, so the first option is foreclosed. So, that means that Griffith
   argues that the bankruptcy notice qualifies as a written request for Lone Star
   to change the original address. That position is untenable. As Texas law
   explains, change of address requests must be reasonably communicated and
   express in nature. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 51.0021, 51.0001. The
   bankruptcy notice was not sufficient to reasonably communicate his request
   for a change of address; nor did it evince Griffith’s intent for Lone Star to
   view the document in that light. As the record demonstrates, Griffith
   provided the bankruptcy notice to prevent Lone Star from selling the
   property. Nothing suggests that he used the bankruptcy notice to alert Lone
   Star about a new address. He argues that Lone Star should have made some

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   inference regarding his address from the bankruptcy petition, but that
   situation is precisely what the Texas Property Code seeks to prevent in
   requiring debtors to submit change of address requests in writing. See id.
   Because the bankruptcy notice does not qualify as a written change of address
   request, we affirm.
                             IV.    Conclusion
            For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
   court.

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