Court Opinion

ID: 9853973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:58:37.761121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:26.042097
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
dissenting.
Under the declaratory judgment act, OCGA § 9-4-2, the City of Columbus has an adequate remedy at law to proceed against Expedia, Inc. for any back taxes owed in this case. Because this remedy remains available, the trial court erred by imposing a permanent injunction against Expedia. For this reason, I must respectfully dissent.
As a general rule, “equitable relief is improper if the complainant has a remedy at law which is ‘adequate,’ i.e., ‘as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Sherrer v. Hale, 248 Ga. 793, 797-798 (2) (285 SE2d 714) (1982). The grant of an injunction is such a form of equitable relief. On the other hand, a petition for declaratory judgment is an action at law. VATACS Group, Inc. v. HomeSide Lending, Inc., 281 Ga. 50 (635 SE2d 758) (2006).
In this case, although the City requested both a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the City proceeded on and the trial court only ruled on the request for permanent injunctive relief. It is a matter of record, therefore, that the trial court granted equitable relief despite the fact that a motion for a declaratory judgment, an adequate remedy at law, was pending at the same time. By longstanding principles, the grant of equitable relief in this situation was improper. See, e.g., Levinson v. Pendley, 209 Ga. 335 (72 SE2d 306) (1952).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Hines join in this dissent.