Court Opinion

ID: 9584959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:54:17.83281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:29.110349
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Justice,
concurring specially. 1. I concur in this order and judgment solely because this court is bound by the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States. I want the record to show that I do not consider the death penalty in all cases to be such cruel and unusual punishment as is proscribed by constitutional provisions. The State’s brief in these cases has outlined in detail the heinous character of the crimes committed by the defendants in these cases. To have exacted the death penalty from them, after proper trial and conviction, could not be more cruel and inhumane than the cruel and inhumane treatment which they inflicted upon their victims and their families.
The purpose of this special concurrence is merely to add my view to that already expressed on many occasions by the members of this court to the effect that capital punishment is not cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution. See Lee v. State, 226 Ga. 162 (173 SE2d 209); Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253 (167 SE2d 628); Williams v. State, 226 Ga. 140 (173 SE2d 182); Manor v. State, *733223 Ga. 594 (157 SE2d 431); and Massey v. State, 222 Ga. 143 (149 SE2d 118).
2. While my colleagues are content with the language of the order as set forth, it is my opinion that the order should clearly and expressly specify that the life sentence now to be imposed under said order shall be subject to all laws and regulations applicable to such sentence as if it had been rendered on the date of the original sentence. See Code Ann. § 27-2505; Code Ann. § 27-2530; and Code Ann. §77-525.