Court Opinion

ID: 9684648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:07:11.218169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:13.525574
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-124

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                               SCOTT T. CARNEY.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a trial in the District Court, a jury convicted

 the defendant, Scott T. Carney, of assault. 1           Because the trial

 judge failed to provide a jury instruction defining reasonable

 doubt, we vacate the judgment. 2

       Background.     On March 18, 2021, Norton police dispatch

 received a call for a "well-being check" at a residence in

 Norton.    The caller reported that an individual at that address

 1 The defendant was convicted of "simple assault" as a lesser
 included offense of assault and battery on a police officer. He
 was also charged with one count of assault and battery and found
 not guilty.

 2 The result we reach obviates any need to address the
 defendant's other claims on appeal that (1) the judge provided
 an erroneous instruction on intoxication and mental impairment,
 (2) the Commonwealth's closing argument constituted reversible
 error, and (3) there was no evidence warranting the judge's
 lesser included offense instruction.
had threatened suicide.   Three Norton police officers,

accompanied by emergency medical technicians (EMTs) responded

and were met at the door by the defendant's mother.    She led

them into the basement to check on the defendant who was found

lying on a bed and appeared intoxicated to the officers.

     On examination of the defendant's phone, the police

discovered text messages indicating that the defendant planned

to overdose.   Concerned for the defendant's well-being, the

officers attempted to take him to a hospital.   The defendant

initially agreed to go and started walking toward the door.

Officers informed the defendant that they would need to conduct

a patfrisk for weapons before allowing him into the ambulance.

As the officers began the frisk, the defendant became agitated,

and "started yelling" and swearing, and pulled away.    The

defendant clenched his fists and stiffened his posture as he

walked toward the door, which prompted one of the officers to

grab him and inform him that they had to finish the frisk.     As

the encounter escalated, the defendant flailed his feet, kicked

toward the officers, thrashed around for five to ten minutes,

swore at the officers, and attempted to gather saliva in his

mouth to spit toward them.   The defendant was eventually subdued

and brought to the hospital in the ambulance.

     Discussion.   The present case suffers from a glaring

infirmity:   the judge did not provide an instruction defining

                                 2
reasonable doubt.   In Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464,

477 (2015), the Supreme Judicial Court exercised its "inherent

supervisory power to require a uniform instruction on proof

beyond a reasonable doubt" pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. 3   In

3 In Russell, 470 Mass. at 477-478, the court specified that
going forward, Massachusetts judges sitting on criminal trials
must instruct the jury as follows:

     "The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a
     reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the
     charge(s) made against him (her).

     "What is proof beyond a reasonable doubt? The term is
     often used and probably pretty well understood, though it
     is not easily defined. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
     does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt, for
     everything in the lives of human beings is open to some
     possible or imaginary doubt. A charge is proved beyond a
     reasonable doubt if, after you have compared and considered
     all of the evidence, you have in your minds an abiding
     conviction, to a moral certainty, that the charge is true.
     When we refer to moral certainty, we mean the highest
     degree of certainty possible in matters relating to human
     affairs -- based solely on the evidence that has been put
     before you in this case.

     "I have told you that every person is presumed to be
     innocent until he or she is proved guilty, and that the
     burden of proof is on the prosecutor. If you evaluate all
     the evidence and you still have a reasonable doubt
     remaining, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of that
     doubt and must be acquitted.

     "It is not enough for the Commonwealth to establish a
     probability, even a strong probability, that the defendant
     is more likely to be guilty than not guilty. That is not
     enough. Instead, the evidence must convince you of the
     defendant's guilt to a reasonable and moral certainty; a
     certainty that convinces your understanding and satisfies
     your reason and judgment as jurors who are sworn to act
     conscientiously on the evidence.

                                 3
the present case, it is beyond dispute that the judge did not

provide the instruction required by Russell, supra at 477-478.

We are aware of cases in which we have held that a deviation

from the language required by Russell was nonetheless not

constitutionally deficient.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Whitson,

97 Mass. App. Ct. 798, 799 (2020) (judge's omission of portion

of Russell instruction defining "moral certainty" did not

mandate reversal).   In the present case, however, the judge

provided no definition or explanation whatsoever of "reasonable

doubt."   We are unaware of any published appellate case or other

binding authority in Massachusetts upholding a conviction where

the jury charge contained such an omission. 4   Indeed,

     "This is what we mean by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."

4 The judge referenced the term "moral certainty" in his
instructions, but only in the context of explaining
circumstantial evidence. He stated:

     "If the Commonwealth's case is based solely on its
     circumstantial evidence, you may find the defendant guilty
     only if those circumstances are conclusive enough to leave
     you with a moral certainty, a clear and settled belief, the
     defendant is guilty and that there is no other reasonable
     explanation of the facts as proven."

Viewing the instructions as a whole, this brief mention of moral
certainty did not convey to the jury the meaning of reasonable
doubt within the requirements of Russell, 470 Mass. at 477-478,
or other precedent. Contrast Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass.
472, 490 (2017) (judge's omission of language defining moral
certainty did not create risk that jury did not understand
reasonable doubt standard where he otherwise adhered to language
defining reasonable doubt).

                                 4
Massachusetts courts have found a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice in cases where the instructions defined

reasonable doubt, but inadequately so.   See, e.g., Commonwealth

v. Rembiszewski, 391 Mass. 123, 133-134 (1984) (where jury

instructed to "treat proof beyond a reasonable doubt, proof to a

moral certainty, and proof to a degree of certainty that the

jurors would want in making decisions about their futures as

equivalent concepts," judge repeatedly stating that Commonwealth

had burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt made no difference

because "jury's knowledge of which party had the burden did not

inform them with respect to the extent of that burden");

Commonwealth v. Wood, 380 Mass. 545, 547 (1980) (judge's

erroneous instruction that reasonable doubt is "that doubt which

amounts to a moral certainty" amounted to substantial risk of

miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Viera, 42 Mass. App.

Ct. 916, 916-917 (1997) (despite instruction that "beyond a

reasonable doubt mean[s]" that "[t]he evidence taken in its

totality must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable

and moral certainty . . . [a] certainty which convinces and

directs the understanding, satisfies the reason and judgment of

those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it," substantial

risk of miscarriage of justice existed because judge's "cursory

words to the jurors regarding reasonable doubt were, at best,

ambiguous.   In her apparent attempt to paraphrase a part of the

                                 5
model jury instructions, the judge neither elaborated on the

meaning of reasonable doubt nor linked 'moral certainty' with

other explanatory words").   Accordingly, we conclude that the

failure to provide an instruction explaining reasonable doubt

created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 5   See

generally Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116, 128 (1977)

("no part of the usual instructions to juries in criminal cases

is of more significance than the discussion of reasonable

doubt").

5 Our holding is limited to the unique facts and posture of this
case.

                                 6
       The judgment is vacated, and the verdict is set aside. 6

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                        Blake, Neyman, Shin &
                                        Smyth, JJ. 7),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    August 24, 2023.

6   We note that:

       "We are acutely aware of the [potential] hardship imposed
       on all those involved by the need to conduct a [possible]
       second trial in this case. Either party, however, could
       have prevented the need for reversal here by pointing out
       to the judge at trial the obvious error contained in his
       charge."

Wood, 380 Mass. at 550. We remind judges and counsel in future
cases to provide the Russell instruction verbatim. See Russell,
470 Mass. at 477-478.

7   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  7