Court Opinion

ID: 9955447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:02:33.76814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:04.454921
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                        STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                         v.

                    NEAL DONNIE FERRARA, Appellant.

                              No. 1 CA-CR 23-0318
                               FILED 03-28-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
                         No. S8015CR202101252
            The Honorable Billy K. Sipe Jr., Judge Pro Tempore

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Rebecca Jones
Counsel for Appellee

DM Cantor, Phoenix
By Brian L. Borrelli, Courtney R. Sullivan
Counsel for Appellant
                           STATE v. FERRARA
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe
joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1            Neal Donnie Ferrara appeals his conviction and sentence for
sexual conduct with a minor. He argues the superior court erred by
allowing a detective to testify at trial that the victim lied during her
investigatory interview. Ferrara also asserts the court improperly restricted
his cross-examination of a witness. For the following reasons, Ferrara’s
conviction and sentence are affirmed.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             In 2021, Ferrara worked at a boat upholstery shop in Lake
Havasu City; he was 23 years old. On October 7, 2021, Jennifer, who
conducted business with the shop, walked in while Ferrara and another
employee, Heather, were working.1 Heather was 14 years old and was the
granddaughter of the owner’s friend. As Jennifer entered the shop to look
for keys to a vehicle she was borrowing from the shop’s owner, she saw
Ferrara and Heather having sexual intercourse. Jennifer immediately left
and later informed the shop’s owner of what she witnessed. When the
owner subsequently confronted Ferrara, Ferrara explained he had sex with
his ex-girlfriend at the shop—not Heather. He stated that Heather was
waiting in his vehicle for a ride home.

¶3            To verify Ferrara’s story, the shop owner viewed a
neighboring business’s surveillance video that depicted the front area
outside the shop around the time that Jennifer stated she observed Ferrara
and Heather together. But the video showed Jennifer walk into the shop
and leave quickly. It did not corroborate Ferrara’s story. Instead, the video
demonstrated that aside from the time Jennifer was looking for the keys,
Ferrara and Heather were alone in the shop.

1       To protect the witness’s and victim’s identities, pseudonyms are
used.

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                           STATE v. FERRARA
                           Decision of the Court

¶4             The owner then informed Heather’s grandfather, with whom
she lived, of the incident. When confronted about the incident, Heather told
her grandfather “nothing happened” with Ferrara. She explained that,
instead, Ferrara had sex with his ex-girlfriend at the shop. Subsequently,
Heather and her grandfather had a physical altercation over her use of a
laptop computer. Heather called 911, and when officers arrived, the topic
of the October 7th incident arose. Heather told the officers “nothing
happened” with Ferrara.

¶5            A detective from the Lake Havasu City Police Department
subsequently interviewed Heather, and she again denied having sex with
Ferrara. Heather explained, however, that she lied to her grandfather about
what happened. Heather admitted she and Ferrara were the last people in
the shop that day, and she denied talking to Ferrara afterwards.

¶6            The detective also interviewed Ferrara, who similarly
admitted to being alone in the shop with Heather at the end of the workday
on October 7, 2021, and he denied talking to her since then. Ferrara
admitted that he untruthfully told the owner of the shop that he had sex
with his ex-girlfriend, explaining he did not have sex at all in the shop.
When the detective inquired about the similarity in alibis both Heather and
Ferrara initially told before admitting the stories were not true, Ferrara
responded, “[That’s] odd.”

¶7             The State charged Ferrara with one count of sexual conduct
with a minor, a class 2 felony and dangerous crime against children. At trial,
Heather testified that she and Ferrara did indeed have sexual intercourse
on October 7 while they were alone at the shop in the afternoon. Heather
testified she told the detective she did not have sex with Ferrara because
she was afraid what others “would think and say.” Heather admitted that
Ferrara instructed her to tell others he had sex with his ex-girlfriend.

¶8             During the detective’s direct testimony, the prosecutor asked,
“Do you have any training and experience in regards to interviewing and
in relation to body language or how someone answers a question and that
type of thing?” The detective responded, “Yes[,]” and the prosecutor then
asked, “During your interview with [Heather], did it appear to you that she
was telling you the truth?” Without objection, the detective answered,
“No.”

¶9          The jury found Ferrara guilty as charged, and the superior
court imposed a 15-year mitigated prison sentence. See A.R.S. § 13-705(E).

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                             STATE v. FERRARA
                             Decision of the Court

Ferrara timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12–
120.21(A)(1) and A.R.S. §§ 13–4031, –4033(A)(1).

                                DISCUSSION

I. The Detective’s Testimony Did Not Result in Fundamental Error.

¶10            Ferrara argues the superior court fundamentally erred by
allowing the detective to testify that he believed Heather was untruthful
during her interview. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 12 (2018).
But Ferrara did not object to this testimony during trial. When a defendant
fails to object in the trial court, this Court reviews only for fundamental
error. To prevail under fundamental error review, Ferrara must first
establish error. Id. at 142, ¶ 21.

¶11             To support his claim of error, Ferrara relies on State v. Reimer,
189 Ariz. 239 (App. 1997). There, the victim testified at trial that the
defendant “showed her the shotgun,” but denied that he threatened to kill
her or that he hit her with the weapon. Reimer, 189 Ariz. at 240. The officer
who responded to the victim’s 911 call, however, testified the victim told
him upon his arrival at the scene that the defendant pointed the shotgun at
her, threatened to kill her, and hit her with the butt of the weapon. Id. After
describing his experience in evaluating a person’s credibility, the officer
testified—over defendant’s objection—that he believed the victim’s pre-
trial statement was “the truth.” Id. This Court determined the trial court
abused its discretion under Arizona Rules of Evidence 701 and 702 by
permitting the officer to testify he was experienced in evaluating someone’s
credibility, and in his opinion, the victim was truthful. Id. at 240–41; see also
Ariz. R. Evid. 701, 702 (respectively limiting the permissible testimony of
lay and expert witnesses). “Such opinions are rejected[,]” this Court
reasoned, “because they are ‘nothing more than advice to jurors on how to
decide the case.’” Reimer, 189 Ariz. at 241 (quoting State v. Moran, 151 Ariz.
378, 383 (1986)); see also State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 475 (1986) (“[E]xperts
should not be allowed to give their opinion of the accuracy, reliability or
credibility of a particular witness in the case being tried [because] . . . [t]he
law does not permit expert testimony on how the jury should decide the
case. . . . We believe that such testimony is inadmissible.”).

¶12           Here, Heather denied Ferrara’s guilt during her pre-trial
interview, yet implicated him at trial. Thus, the detective’s opinion that she
untruthfully denied the allegation against Ferrara in the interview logically
meant he found her trial testimony implicating Ferrara credible. The
detective’s opinion testimony was therefore inadmissible.

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                             STATE v. FERRARA
                             Decision of the Court

¶13            Having shown admission of the detective’s opinion was error,
Ferrara must also establish that the error was so egregious as to deny him a
fair trial or that it otherwise prejudiced him and either went to the
foundation of the case or denied him a right essential to his defense.
Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21. To satisfy that burden, Ferrara argues that,
absent the detective’s improper opinion testimony, the jury “likely would
have acquitted” because the “weight . . . [of] the Detective’s ‘expertise’”
ensured that the jury would not doubt Heather’s trial testimony.

¶14             Ferrara’s argument improperly requires this Court to
speculate about the weight the jury afforded not only the detective’s
opinion regarding the credibility of Heather’s trial testimony, but also other
inculpatory evidence. This Court does not weigh evidence; that is the jury’s
function. State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). It is sufficient
to note that, absent the detective’s improper opinion testimony, the jury had
before it other evidence by which to evaluate Heather’s credibility and
ultimately determine Ferrara’s guilt. Most importantly, Heather admitted
at trial that she lied during her interview with the detective. The jurors were
properly instructed that they were to “decide the credibility and weight to
be given to any evidence presented in the case” and in making such
determinations should use factors such as whether the witness
“contradicted [ ] anything the witness said or wrote before trial,” including
Heather’s admission. This Court presumes the jury follows its instructions.
State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 68 (2006). Additionally, a video and
audio recording of Heather’s interview was admitted into evidence; thus,
the jurors could independently determine her credibility when she denied
having sex with Ferrara versus her testimony at trial.

¶15            Moreover, Heather’s trial testimony was not the only
evidence indicating Ferrara’s guilt. See State v. Ramos, 235 Ariz. 230, 237,
¶ 20 (App. 2014) (“Given the strength of the State’s evidence . . . we hold
that even without the prosecutor’s impermissible statements . . . no
reasonable jury could have acquitted Ramos . . . .”). The shop owner
testified about Jennifer’s report of the sexual activity that took place at the
shop, and Jennifer’s trial testimony was consistent with the owner’s.
Significantly, Ferrara himself made incriminating statements. His initial
false admission to having sex with his ex-girlfriend, followed by his denial
of having sex in the shop at all, could reasonably be viewed by the jury as
consciousness of guilt on Ferrara’s part. See State v. Cotton, 197 Ariz. 584,
590, ¶ 22 (App. 2000) (a defendant’s changing story to deceive police
“reflects a consciousness of guilt”). As a result, Ferrara fails to affirmatively
show that, absent the detective’s improper opinion testimony, “a
reasonable [fact finder] . . . could have reached a different [verdict].”

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                            STATE v. FERRARA
                            Decision of the Court

Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 144, ¶ 29 (quoting State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561,
569, ¶ 27 (2005)); see State v. Dickinson, 233 Ariz. 527, 531, ¶ 13 (App. 2013)
(“[A defendant] must affirmatively ‘prove prejudice’ and may not rely
upon ‘speculation’ to carry his burden [of establishing reversible
fundamental error].”).

II. Limiting Ferrara’s Cross-Examination of Jennifer Was Within the
Court’s Discretion.

¶16            Ferrara next challenges the superior court’s decision
restricting his cross-examination of Jennifer. According to Ferrara, he
should have been permitted to probe Jennifer’s character for truthfulness
by questioning her about her employment termination. This Court reviews
this issue for an abuse of discretion. State v. Duarte, 246 Ariz. 338, 344–45,
¶ 20 (App. 2018).

¶17           In relevant part, Arizona Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides:

       [E]xtrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific
       instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support
       the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on
       cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are
       probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
       of . . . the witness[.]

Ariz. R. Evid. 608(b) (emphasis added). But Rule 608(b) has three
requirements for admitting such testimony: (1) the conduct may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence, (2) the conduct must be probative of the
character of the witness for truthfulness, and (3) the trial court must exercise
discretion to determine whether the probative value of the conduct is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or
waste of time. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 30 (1995); see also Ariz. R. Evid.
403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).

¶18            Before Jennifer testified at trial, the prosecutor informed the
court that Jennifer was fired allegedly for stealing from her employer. The
prosecutor explained that she called the employer, who confirmed Jennifer
was fired for alcoholism, lying, and theft. The prosecutor then explained
she subsequently talked with Jennifer, who described the employer’s cited
reasons for firing her as “just accusations[.]” Jennifer claimed she quit that

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                            STATE v. FERRARA
                            Decision of the Court

job after the “owners had boxed up all her belongings and accused her of
stealing about $700 from the business.”

¶19            Noting that the accusations were “just really a boss’[s]
suspicions” that were not “reported to law enforcement, [and Jennifer]
doesn’t have any convictions associated with that[,]” the State requested the
court preclude Ferrara’s impeachment of Jennifer with the employer’s
reasons for firing her. See Ariz. R. Evid. 608(b). Ferrara objected, arguing he
should be allowed to cross-examine Jennifer “as to the character of her
truthfulness.” Ferrara clarified that he was not seeking “to bring in extrinsic
evidence” in the form of the employer’s testimony regarding the grounds
for Jennifer’s firing, but he argued he should be allowed to directly impeach
Jennifer’s credibility with her employer’s reasons for firing her.2

¶20           The court precluded Ferrara from impeaching Jennifer with
the specific instance of her employment termination, but noted Ferrara
could impeach her reputation for truthfulness through another’s testimony.
See Ariz. R. Evid. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or
supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of
an opinion about that character.”). The court also found that the reason for
Jennifer’s termination was “not relevant to any issue in this case.”

¶21           Ferrara correctly observes that Rule 608(b) does not prohibit
a witness from testifying about specific instances of her conduct that
demonstrate her character for truthfulness. See State v. Woods, 141 Ariz. 446,
450 (1984) (“[U]nder Rule 608(b) the trial court has discretion to allow cross-
examination of a witness about his specific acts of misconduct, if they are
probative of truthfulness, even though the witness has not been convicted
of any crime in connection with those acts.”). But his argument fails to
consider the duty given to the superior court in determining the probative
value. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

2      Ferrara also cited Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) as a basis for
questioning Jennifer about her employment termination. See Ariz. R. Evid.
404(b) (subject to exceptions, “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, is
not admissible to prove the character of person in order to show action in
conformity therewith”). On appeal, Ferrara does not argue the trial court
erred under Rule 404(b). He has therefore waived that argument. See State
v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (holding that the failure to argue a claim
usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of such claim).

                                      7
                            STATE v. FERRARA
                            Decision of the Court

¶22             The superior court found that Jennifer’s employment was not
probative as to any issue in this case, which includes Jennifer’s credibility
both at the time she reported Ferrara’s sexual intercourse with Heather and
when she testified consistently with her report at trial. By finding the
proposed testimony would be wholly irrelevant to evaluating Jennifer’s
credibility in this case, the trial court was not required to weigh the
relevancy of the evidence against its potential “dangers.” Irrelevant
evidence simply is not admissible. Ariz. R. Evid. 402; compare with Ariz. R.
Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of [prejudice].”) (emphasis added).
Despite Ferrara’s assertion to the contrary, the trial court’s determination
that the reason for Jennifer’s firing was irrelevant indicates the court
sufficiently exercised its discretion under Rule 608(b). Seef Woods, 141 Ariz.
at 450 (trial judge’s ruling that witness’s specific act was not probative of
truthfulness “was properly within the discretion of the trial judge” in
precluding the witness under Rule 608(b) from testifying about the act).

¶23           Moreover, given that Jennifer’s employment was terminated
more than one year after she reported the sexual incident at the shop,
Ferrara does not explain how Jennifer’s alleged improper conduct was
relevant to her credibility in this case. Ferrara does not contend, for
example, that he informed Jennifer’s former boss of her stealing, and thus
provided a motive for her to falsely report the sex Ferrara had with Heather.
See, e.g., Amburgey v. Holan Div. of Ohio Brass Co., 124 Ariz. 531, 533 (1980)
(“Nor do we believe that the discharge of [the witness for falsifying a time
record] establishes a motive for him to testify against appellant.”). The court
acted within its discretion by precluding Jennifer’s own testimony on that
collateral subject. See State v. Prince, 160 Ariz. 268, 273 (1989) (trial court
acted within its discretion under Rule 608(b) by precluding witness from
testifying about his purported untruthfulness during pre-trial interview).

                               CONCLUSION

¶24           Ferrara’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: TM

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