Court Opinion

ID: 9961473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 20:08:10.940991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:48.526135
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                IN THE MATTER OF D.C., JR., DATE                     No. 84563
                OF BIRTH 01/19/2007, A MINOR 15
                YEARS OF AGE.

                D.C., JR.,
                                                                                LE'D
                Appellant,                                                APR 18 2024
                vs.
                                                                        EL       H A. BROWN
                THE STATE OF NEVADA,                                 CLE

                Respondent.                                          BY
                                                                          C IEF DEPUTY CLERK

                           Appeal from a district court order certifying a juvenile for
                criminal proceedings as an adult. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family
                Division, Clark County; William O. Voy, Judge.
                           Vacated and remanded with instructions.

                Darin Imlay, Public Defender, P. David Westbrook, Chief Deputy Public
                Defender, and Haylee M. Kolkoski, Deputy Public Defender, Clark County,
                for Appellant.

                Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
                Attorney, and Alexander G. Chen and Jonathan E. VanBoskerck, Chief
                Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County,
                for Respondent.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

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                                                  OPINION

                By the Court, PICKERING, J.:
                            The juvenile court certified D.C., Jr., for prosecution as an adult
                on charges of murder, attempted murder, and robbery. D.C. has an IQ of

                66 and was 14 years old when the events giving rise to the charges occurred.
                Through counsel, D.C. requested a competency determination before
                proceeding to the certification hearing.         After an initial finding of
                incompetency followed by competency-restoration sessions, the juvenile
                court declared D.C. competent to proceed. In declaring D.C. competent, the
                juvenile court did not expressly address the conflicting and equivocal expert
                testimony as to D.C.'s understanding of the proceedings and ability to assist
                counsel. It also appears to have applied juvenile-court-specific competency
                standards, emphasizing, for example, that there is no right to a jury trial in
                a juvenile delinquency adjudication.

                            This was error.       A juvenile who faces the possibility of
                prosecution as an adult on serious criminal charges as a result of a
                certification proceeding must meet the adult criminal court standard for
                competence.      Because the juvenile court appears to have applied an
                incorrect standard and did not support its determination with adequate
                findings,   we   vacate   the   certification   order   and   the   competency
                determination and remand for the juvenile court to reassess D.C.'s
                competency.
                                                       I.
                            This case grows out of a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
                Department investigation into three separate incidents during which an
                assailant or assailants robbed victims at gunpoint, fatally shooting two of
                them and wounding the third. Detectives determined that bullets used in

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                     each of those three incidents were fired from the same handgun. All three
                     incidents occurred within a quarter mile of each other and within the
                     timespan of just over a week. The third victim had messaged an unknown
                     individual to set up a meeting about three minutes before the shooting.
                     •Detectives traced the IP address of the person on the other end of that
                     conversation to the address of the apartment where D.C. lived with his
                     father. Eyewitness descriptions of the assailant(s) varied, but in serving a
                     search warrant for that address, detectives saw D.C. and concluded that he
                     matched at least one witness's description. In D.C.'s bedroom, detectives
                     found a watch matching the watch stolen from a victim, as well as a hoodie
                     resembling one seen in a surveillance video near the time of the first
                     incident. Following the search, detectives arrested D.C.
                                 The State filed a delinquency petition against D.C. and, on the
                     same day, petitioned the juvenile court to certify D.C. for criminal
                     proceedings as an adult.       D.C.'s attorney requested a competency
                     evaluation. The next month, Dr. Lisa Foerster determined that D.C. did
                     not meet all of the competency criteria but opined that competency
                     restoration sessions likely would restore him to competence. D.C. attended
                     three competency restoration sessions with Dr. Bonnie Brown, who reported
                     at the conclusion of the sessions that D.C. had "demonstrated significant
                     improvement related to competence and would be considered appropriate to
                     proceed with adjudication at this time." But Dr. Brown also noted that
                     D.C.'s comprehension level was consistent with his cognitive abilities—he
                     had a documented comprehension level of second to third grade—and was
                     "not [ ] expected to significantly improve." She also cautioned that without
                     "frequent rehearsal, [D.C. was] at risk to again become not competent." Dr.

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                    Brown therefore recommended periodic reassessment and, if needed,
                    additional restoration sessions.
                                   Following the restoration sessions with Dr. Brown, Dr. Foerster
                    again evaluated D.C. Her report was inconclusive about whether D.C. was
                    competent, as she suspected that D.C. had "put forth less than optimal

                    effort."   She agreed with Dr. Brown that D.C. might benefit from
                    educational classes to maintain his knowledge. At D.C.'s counsel's request,
                    Dr. Sharon Jones-Forrester conducted a neuropsychological evaluation.
                    She concluded that D.C. was not competent to proceed and that he was
                    unlikely to becorne competent because of his intellectual disability and
                    neurocognitive deficits.
                                   All three experts testified at the competency hearing.     Dr.
                    Jones-Forrester testified that D.C. had an intellectual disability, as well as
                    unspecified neurocognitive disorder—possibly consistent with fetal alcohol
                    syndrome—"over and above what would be expected from his intellectual
                    disability."    In Dr. Jones-Forrester's opinion, D.C. was incompetent to
                    proceed. Dr. Foerster did not dispute that D.C. had an IQ of 66, and both
                    Dr. Foerster and Dr. Brown agreed that D.C. had "cognitive deficits." As
                    with her second evaluation, Dr. Foerster's testimony was inconclusive about
                    D.C.'s competence; she suspected he was malingering and left it to the
                    juvenile court to determine whether D.C. was competent.           Dr. Brown

                    concluded that D.C. was still competent to proceed, stating that she stood
                    by her report's conclusion that D.C. should have frequent rehearsal. She
                    criticized Dr. Jones-Forrester for measuring D.C.'s competence by an adult
                    standard, instead of a more relaxed juvenile court standard. Addressing
                    D.C.'s poor test results, Dr. Brown suggested that that D.C. may have
                    realized that it was "to his benefit to not be competent." Dr. Jones-Forrester

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disagreed that D.C. was trying to appear lower functioning than he was,
noting that she based her opinion on recognized validity measures. Unlike

Dr. Jones-Forrester, Dr. Foerster chose not to use validity measures,
concluding that because of D.C.'s IQ of 66, "the validity of the results would

be difficult to stand by."
             The juvenile court deemed D.C. competent. It did so orally, not
in writing. Before announcing its ruling, the juvenile court described the

differences between juvenile court and adult criminal court. In part, the
juvenile court focused on plea deals, stating that "the plea bargain really is
a nomenclature that comes from the adult criminal side" and suggested that
plea bargaining was often something that children in juvenile court struggle
to understand. As part of that discussion, the court noted that in juvenile
court, whether the alleged offense was a misdemeanor or a felony was
usually "not that important" to the outcome. And because juvenile court
does not have jury trials, the court was unsure why a competency evaluator
would even ask a child about jury trials. The court's discussion suggests
that the court doubted whether D.C. understood jury trials—it stated that
"if we were in a criminal proceeding, you would really want to make sure
the individual understands what the role of the jury is and how that
works . . . . But we don't have juries down here."

            Following this discussion, the juvenile court considered NRS
62D.140's three competency prongs and orally pronounced D.C. "competent
to proceed at the present time."     As noted, it did not memorialize its
competency determination in writing. The certification hearing took place
the next month. At the certification hearing, the juvenile court considered
the factors established for discretionary certification in In re Seven Minors,
99 Nev. 427, 664 P.2d 947 (1983), disapproved on other grounds by In re

                                      5
William S., 122 Nev. 432, 442 n.23, 132 P.3d 1015, 1021 n.23 (2006). It
found prosecutive merit on all counts and certified D.C. for criminal

proceedings as an adult.
                                    11.

            D.C. appeals both the certification order and the competency
determination.   An order certifying a juvenile for proceedings in adult
criminal court is a final appealable judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1).

Castillo u. State, 106 Nev. 349, 351, 792 P.2d 1133, 1134 (1990). In this
case, the appeal of the certification order brings with it the antecedent
competency determination since, if D.C. was incompetent, the juvenile court
could not proceed to the certification hearing. In re Two Minor Children, 95
Nev. 225, 231, 592 P.2d 166, 169 (1979) (holding that if a minor was not
competent, the court "could go no further with the proceedings"); see NRS
62D.190.
                                    A.
            On appeal, D.C. argues that a finding of competency in juvenile
court requires competency to stand trial. And because the juvenile court
did not assess his competency to stand trial but instead only found him
competent to participate in juvenile court proceedings, D.C. continues, the
juvenile court improperly created a lower competency standard. The State
responds that the juvenile court appropriately found D.C. competent using
the standard from Dusky v. United States and that the competency finding
was supported by substantial evidence.      D.C. replies that the juvenile
court's cornpetency determination was not based on substantial evidence.
This court reviews a district court's competency determination for abuse of
discretion. See Calvin u. State, 122 Nev. 1178, 1182, 147 P.3d 1097, 1099
(2006). But we owe no deference to legal error, to a determination that is
unsupported   by substantial evidence,      cf. id.   (explaining that   the

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                determination will stand if supported by substantial evidence), or "to
                findings so conclusory they may mask legal error," Davis v. Ewalefo, 131
                Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015).

                                                       1.
                             Under Dusky, the test for determining competence is whether
                the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
                a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a

                rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
                Du.sky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (internal quotation marks
                omitted). Nevada's adult competency statute, NRS 178.400(2), conforms to
                the Dusky standard and satisfies constitutional due process requirements.
                See Calvin, 122 Nev. at 1182-83, 147 P.3d at 1100 (interpreting NRS
                178.400 (1995)).    Nevada's juvenile competency statute, NRS 62D.140,
                largely tracks NRS 178.400(2), incorporating its three-pronged test. Both
                statutes require that individuals understand the nature of the delinquency
                allegations or criminal charges. NRS 62D.140(1); NRS 178.400(2)(a). Both
                require individuals to "[u]nderstand the nature and purpose of the court
                proceedings."    NRS 62D.140(2); NRS 178.400(2)(b).          And both require
                individuals to be able to lalid and assist . . . counsel . . . with a reasonable
                degree of rational understanding."      NRS 62D.140(3); NRS 178.400(2)(c).
                Proceedings may not go forward while the child in delinquency proceedings
                or the defendant in criminal court is incompetent.            NRS 62D.190(1)
                ("[D]uring the period that the child remains incompetent, the child may not
                be . . . [a]djudicated a delinquent child[,] . . . [p]laced under the supervision
                of the juvenile court[, or c]ommitted to the custody of a correctional
                facility."); NRS 178.400(1) ("A person may not be tried or adjudged to
                punishment for a public offense while incompetent.").

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                            Although Dusky addresses competency in the context of
                standing trial, the standard of competency that it announced has broader
                application. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402; In re Two Minor Children, 95 Nev.
                at 230-31, 592 P.2d at 169.         And NRS 62D.140 references "court
                proceedings" rather than trial specifically. Under NRS 62D.140, a child is
                incompetent when the child does not have the "present ability" to meet the
                three competency prongs. We read NRS 62D.140 to require the juvenile
                court to assess the child's competency to proceed under the circumstances
                of the particular case, rather than to always require the juvenile court to
                assess the child's competency to stand trial in adult court, as D.C. argues.
                            A question remains, however, as to the level of ability or
                comprehension the child must have to be found competent to proceed. Some
                courts evaluate a child's competency using "juvenile norms." E.g., In re
                Carey, 615 N.W.2d 742, 747-48 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re J.M., 769 A.2d
                656, 662 (Vt. 2001). These courts emphasize that juvenile proceedings treat
                juveniles "more gently" than criminal proceedings treat adults, In re SWM
                v. State, 299 P.3d 673, 683 (Wyo. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted),
                and that children's "limited life experience" may prevent them from
                understanding proceedings with an adult level of comprehension, In re J.M.,
                769 A.2d at 662; see also In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d at 748. Other courts have
                determined that "the level of competence required to permit a child's
                participation in juvenile court proceedings can be no less than the
                competence demanded for trial or sentencing of an adult." In re Welfare of
                D.D.N., 582 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Commonwealth v. B.H.,
                548 S.W.3d 238, 248 (Ky. 2018) (holding that the level of competence
                required by due process to permit a child's participation in juvenile transfer

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                proceedings is no less than that required of an adult to proceed in criminal
                court).

                            Rather than categorically hold that juvenile norms or an adult
                level of competence applies to a competency determination made by a
                juvenile court, in our view, the application of the Dusky standard is context-

                specific. The facts and circumstances of a case affect the level of ability that
                a child must have to be competent under Dusky and NRS 62D.140. On one
                hand, if a case in juvenile court "raises no complex legal or evidentiary
                issues and if the possible dispositions and consequences of adjudication are
                not similar to those of a criminal conviction," then "a juvenile with more
                limited decisionrnaking capacity than would be required in a criminal
                proceeding" could be competent to proceed in juvenile court. Restatement
                of Children and the Law § 15.30 cmts. c & d (Am. L. Inst., Tentative Draft
                No. 2, 2019). So, in some cases, what other courts refer to as evaluating
                competency according to juvenile norms may be appropriate. On the other
                hand, "[t]he rationale for applying Dusky according to juvenile norms does
                not apply if the charges are serious, or if potentially serious consequences
                can follow adjudication." Restatement of Children and the Law § 15.30
                cmt. c (Am. L. Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019). Where the punishment
                stakes are equal to those facing adult criminal defendants and the objective
                is punitive, a finding that the juvenile is competent at the level of an adult
                criminal defendant is required. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso,
                Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83
                N.C. L. Rev. 793, 798 (2005) ("The adoption of a less demanding competence
                standard can be constitutionally justified only if the punishment stakes in
                delinquency proceedings are lower than those facing criminal defendants
                and the objectives of juvenile justice policy are broader than punishment.").

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                              To be competent, a child facing a certification proceeding must
                 understand the right to a jury trial in adult criminal court and be able to

                 make trial-related decisions, such as whether to accept a plea deal.         Cf.
                 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398-99 (1993) (stating that an adult

                 defendant must meet the Dusky standard of competency before pleading
                 guilty).   If the consequences of a child accepting a plea deal involve
                 "presumed placement in a correctional facility," then the child "must

                 demonstrate the same level of decisionmaking capacity as an adult making
                 a similar decision in a criminal proceeding." Restatement of Children and
                 the Law § 15.30 cmt. d (Am. L. Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019). This is
                 because the child must understand the long-term consequences of accepting
                 the plea deal to be able to rationally choose between the available options.
                 Id. And in adult criminal court, "plea bargains have become so central to
                 the administration of the criminal justice system" that plea bargaining "is
                 the criminal justice system." Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143-44 (2012)
                 (second passage quoting Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
                 Yale L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
                             Along with potential trial-related decisions that a juvenile
                 would need to make if certified for criminal proceedings as an adult, the
                 certification hearing itself is a critical part of the process. See Anthony Lee
                 R. v. State, 113 Nev. 1406, 1410 n.1, 952 P.2d 1, 4 n.1 (1997) ("The juvenile
                 court's decision to retain jurisdiction or certify for criminal proceedings is a
                 much more momentous and life-changing event for a juvenile than is an

                 adjudication of delinquency . . . ."). When considering whether to certify a
                 juvenile for criminal proceedings as an adult, the juvenile court must
                 consider a number of complex and nuanced factors. See Seven Minors, 99
                 Nev. at 434-35, 664 P.2d at 952; Restatement of Children and the Law

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                § 13.10 (Am. L. Inst., Tentative Draft No. 6, calendared for discussion before
                the ALI membership in May 2024). To comply with the Due Process Clause
                of the Fourteenth Amendment, a certification proceeding must be fair to the
                juvenile.   See id. crnt. c.   One aspect of fairness is that the juvenile be

                competent at the certification hearing.
                             The Dusky standard applies in both juvenile court and adult
                criminal court under each court's respective competency statutes, but the
                application of the Dusky standard will vary depending on the facts and
                circumstances of each case in juvenile court. Cf. Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d
                576, 579 (7th Cir. 2007) (addressing competency in the capital habeas

                context and noting that "Mlle test is unitary but its application will depend
                on the circumstances. They include not only the litigant's particular mental
                condition but also the nature of the decision that he must be competent to

                make"). Here, on the same day that the State filed the petition of juvenile
                delinquency against D.C. in juvenile court, it also filed a petition to certify
                him for criminal proceedings as an adult. The delinquency petition included
                counts for multiple offenses that would be felonies if tried in adult criminal
                court, including murder, attempted murder, and robbery, each with a
                deadly weapon. In defending the proceedings to certify him to adult court,
                D.C. faced a high-stakes criminal prosecution with the possibility of severe
                punishment.      No rationale exists for assessing D.C.'s competency by
                considering only what he would face in juvenile court rather than
                considering the consequences that he would face and the decisions that he
                would need to make if certified to proceed in adult criminal court.        See

                Restatement of Children and the Law § 15.30 cmt. c (Am. L. Inst., Tentative
                Draft No. 2, 2019) ("A juvenile who faces the possibility of criminal
                prosecution as a result of a transfer proceeding is competent only if he or

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                she satisfies the criminal-court standard."). Given the seriousness of the
                charges in the delinquency petition and the possibility of life-altering
                consequences should D.C. be certified to adult criminal court, D.C. was only
                competent to proceed to the certification hearing if he met the NRS 62D.140
                prongs at the level of a competent adult defendant.
                                                      2.
                            We next turn to whether the juvenile court correctly considered
                the facts and circumstances of the case when it found D.C. competent, and,
                if so, whether substantial evidence supported that finding. In the absence
                of a clear statement from the juvenile court about the level of ability that it
                was using to consider whether D.C. was competent to proceed, it is difficult
                to discern whether the juvenile court found that D.C. was competent
                according to juvenile norms or if it determined that he was competent at the
                level of ability and understanding required to proceed in adult criminal
                court. In its ruling, the juvenile court emphasized the differences between
                juvenile court and criminal court, seemingly acknowledging that
                competency to be adjudicated in criminal court would require a higher
                ability or comprehension level.      Focusing on NRS 62D.140(2), which
                requires understanding of "the nature and purpose of the court
                proceedings," the court "found [the second prong] to be a problem" and
                explained that arguments on this prong often stem from the fact that there
                are different procedures and consequences in criminal court than in juvenile
                court. The court distinguished competency requirements in juvenile court
                from criminal court by stating that "[o]bviously if we were in a criminal
                proceeding, you would really want to make sure the individual understands
                what the role of the jury is and how that works."

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                             Of note, the juvenile court made no finding on whether D.C.
                understood the concept of plea bargaining—it asked, "[D]oes he really

                understand the plea bargain?"         But instead of reaching a definitive
                conclusion, the court stated that "the plea bargain really is a nomenclature
                that comes from the adult criminal side." To be competent to proceed to a

                certification hearing in this case, D.C. must understand what the stakes are
                should the juvenile court certify him for proceedings in adult criminal court.
                See Frye, 566 U.S. at 143 (explaining that the adult criminal justice system
                   for the niost part a system of pleas, not a system of trials") (quoting Lafler
                v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012)). This suggests that the court viewed
                competency through the lens of juvenile proceedings without considering
                the full context of D.C.'s case.
                             The expert testimony sheds additional light. First, although
                Dr. Brown educated D.C. on certain concepts that are only present in adult
                criminal court, such as a jury trial, she concluded that D.C. "could assist his
                attorney at the level expected froni a minor child." And at the competency
                hearing, Dr. Brown stated that she felt that Dr. Jones-Forrester was
                evaluating D.C.'s competency at a level that was "more consistent with an
                adult in criminal court than with a juvenile" and opined that the degree of
                ability required for competency is lower in juvenile court.           Next, Dr.
                Foerster, in evaluating D.C.'s competency, noted Dr. Jones-Forrester's
                conclusion that D.C. struggled with the concept of a jury trial. Dr. Foerster
                included in her report some of D.C.'s comments regarding jury trials, which
                are a component of adult criminal trials.           She also included D.C.'s

                statements recognizing the possible consequences of a conviction, including
                a life sentence, again something that would only occur in criminal court.
                But her testimony indicated that she used the "juvenile adjudicated

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                competency    instrument,"    which    is   used for   juvenile   competency
                assessments. And regarding Dr. Jones-Forrester's evaluation, Dr. Foerster
                posited that Dr. Jones-Forrester's "bar for acceptable competence is pretty
                high." That the juvenile court sided with the experts who testified in favor
                of determining competency under a lower ability level further suggests that
                the juvenile court measured D.C.'s competency against juvenile norms
                rather than against the adult criminal context D.C. would face if certified.
                From this record, it appears that the district court applied an incorrect
                juvenile court standard to determine D.C.'s competence.
                             Even had the juvenile court appropriately considered the
                context of this case and found that D.C.'s competency was commensurate
                with that of a competent adult criminal defendant, such a finding is not
                supported by substantial evidence. No expert established that D.C. was
                competent to proceed in adult criminal court as to the second and third of
                NRS 62D.140's three prongs. Compounding this problem, the juvenile court
                failed to make findings on the conflicting evidence of competency. When
                experts give conflicting psychiatric testimony as to competency, the
                factfinder resolves that conflict, and those findings will be sustained so long
                as they are supported by substantial evidence. Ogden v. State, 96 Nev. 697,
                698, 615 P.2d 251, 252 (1980). Here, the experts disagreed as to D.C.'s
                competency and, seemingly, as to whether a more relaxed juvenile court
                level of ability applied. The experts who determined that he was or could
                be competent did so based on suspicions that D.C. was malingering. In
                contrast, Dr. Jones-Forrester, who concluded that D.C. was not competent,
                also concluded after performing validity tests that he was not malingering.
                Dr. Foerster was uncertain about D.C.'s competency but did not use validity
                measures when concluding that D.C. was malingering. Instead, she stated

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                that she "believed that [D.C.] put forth less than optimal effort" and
                concluded that the court could find hirn competent if it believed that D.C.
                had "greater knowledge than         what   he demonstrated during [the]
                evaluation." And the record does not indicate that Dr. Brown, who also
                concluded that D.C. was malingering, did any testing for validity. As the
                State conceded during oral argurnent, the juvenile court did not make
                written or oral findings on D.C.'s effort or malingering during the
                competency evaluations. Nor did the court state that it was relying on the
                testimony or conclusions of a particular expert or experts or resolve the
                conflicts between the experts' opinions. The court's failure to make findings
                resolving these uncertainties and conflicts prevents us from engaging in

                meaningful review or from concluding that its decision was based on
                substantial evidence. Cf. Somee u. State, 124 Nev. 434, 443, 187 P.3d 152,
                158 (2008) (holding that a district court's failure to make findings prevented
                appellate review).
                            We are also concerned that the juvenile court failed to address
                or follow the conditions of frequent rehearsal, periodic reevaluation, and if
                necessary, additional restoration sessions set by those experts to sustain a
                competency determination. The only expert—Dr. Brown—to conclude that
                D.C. was competent under all three prongs testified that for individuals
                such as D.C. "who have cognitive deficits . . . competency is a fluid state"
                and can be lost. She recommended that D.C.'s competency be periodically
                reassessed so that additional competency restoration sessions could be
                scheduled if he needed them to maintain competency. And Dr. Foerster—
                who was unsure whether D.C. was competent—agreed that continued
                education "might be beneficial for [D.C.] . . . to, at minimum, maintain his
                present knowledge base until the charges are resolved." In concluding that

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                    D.C. was competent, the juvenile court neglected to address these experts'
                    recommendation for additional education to ensure continued cornpetency,
                    further mandating vacatur and remand here. See In re J.M.. 769 A.2d at
                    663-64 (remanding for a new competency determination because the family

                    court failed to address the needs established by the expert for the child to
                    be competent).
                                                         B.
                                The State argues that even if the juvenile court erred by finding
                    D.C. competent, that error is harmless because D.C. was properly certified
                    to adult court and may raise competency again in adult criminal court. We
                    disagree. The juvenile court did not properly resolve D.C.'s competency
                    challenge before proceeding to the certification hearing.       If D.C. was
                    incompetent, the court "could go no further with the proceedings." In re Two
                    Minor Children, 95 Nev. at 231, 592 P.2d at 169.         Without a proper
                    competency determination, it was error to proceed to certification.
                                                        111.
                                For these reasons, we vacate the juvenile court's competency
                    determination and remand for a new competency determination, supported
                    by appropriate findings. The stakes here are high, and the record does not
                    show the juvenile court correctly assessed D.C.'s competency to proceed.
                    And because we vacate the competency determination, we necessarily
                    vacate the order certifying D.C. for criminal proceedings as an adult that
                    followed the competency determination.      On remand, the juvenile court

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                should order further evaluations as necessary to appropriately weigh D.C.'s
                competency and take care to make sufficient findings on the evidence.

                We concur:

                                            , C.J.
                Cadish

                                                J.
                Stiglich

                                                J.
                Herndon

                                            ,   J.
                Lee

                Parragui e

                                                J.
                Bell

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(0)   •,47A