Court Opinion

ID: 9881063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:01:04.624642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:01.935186
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        Nos.    21-50259
                                                         21-50261
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                     D.C. Nos.
    v.                                            3:20-cr-00435-
                                                       LAB
JUAN CARLOS CABRERA,                              3:20-cr-00435-
                                                      LAB-1
                 Defendant-Appellant.             3:15-cr-00353-
                                                      LAB-1

                                                     OPINION

         Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Southern District of California
          Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

              Argued and Submitted June 7, 2023
                    Pasadena, California

                   Filed September 29, 2023

    Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., DAVID F.
HAMILTON,* and DANIEL P. COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

*
 The Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
2                         USA V. CABRERA

            Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;
              Concurrence by Judge Hamilton;
               Concurrence by Judge Collins

                          SUMMARY**

                          Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed Juan Carlos Cabrera’s 2021 convictions
and sentence for attempted illegal entry and attempted illegal
reentry under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 and 1326, and the district
court’s judgment revoking supervised release arising from a
prior conviction.
    The panel held that the district court did not err in denying
Cabrera’s motion to suppress a statement he made to a Border
Patrol agent about coming to the United States to find work.
Cabrera argued that the statement, which he made while
between border fences, should have been suppressed because
he was “in custody” and was not given a Miranda warning
prior to his admission. Under United States v. Galindo-
Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 730 (9th Cir.), as amended, 255 F.3d
1154 (9th Cir. 2001), the panel needed to determine whether
Cabrera’s questioning was permissible pursuant to Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), rather than whether he was “in
custody” pursuant to Miranda. The panel held that the stop
here met the requirements of Terry, and the agent’s question

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                         USA V. CABRERA                          3

about Cabrera’s purpose for being in the United States did not
exceed the scope of allowable inquiry during such a stop.
     The panel held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403
the testimony of Cabrera’s only proposed witness, Tijuana
immigration attorney Erica Pinheiro, whom Cabrera intended
to call as a lay witness to testify about the “factual situation in
Tijuana in November 2019”—specifically, the “enormous
backlog of Central American migrants seeking asylum” due to
the “metering” and “Remain in Mexico” policies in place at the
time. Cabrera argued that the jury could have inferred from the
testimony that he did not want to wait in line with thousands of
other people seeking asylum at the port of entry. The panel
wrote that neither the record nor Pinheiro’s testimony could
establish that Cabrera knew of the long lines, and the district
court’s concern about distracting the jury was reasonable.
    The panel held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in formulating the jury instructions on the requisite
intent for a § 1326 conviction. Cabrera argued that “additional
verbiage” about “dual intent” confused and misled the jury, and
required a jury to convict despite legal innocence. The panel
wrote that Cabrera’s attempt to distinguish between a “fully
formed intent” and “part of his intent” is an attempt to
circumvent the rule in United States v. Argueta-Rosales, 819
F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2016), under which the government must
show that a defendant intended to “go at large” at the time he
physically crossed the border. The panel wrote that the
instructions clearly explained that intent was to be measured at
the point that Cabrera first entered into the United States, and
were not misleading or confusing.
    The panel held that the district court, at sentencing, did not
err in calculating Cabrera’s criminal history score. Two of
4                       USA V. CABRERA

Cabrera’s prior convictions were § 1326 convictions from
2015 and 2017. The parties disputed whether the 2015
conviction should have been assigned three criminal history
points, as the district court assigned, or two. Section 4A1.1(a)
of the Sentencing Guidelines instructs that three points be
added for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one
year and one month. The panel observed that to assign points
to the 2015 conviction, the district court must have added to the
original 12-month custodial sentence whatever length of time
Cabrera received as a term of imprisonment imposed at the
2018 revocation of supervised release in the 2015 case.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(1). The panel wrote that based on
information in the 2015 record, the district court reasonably
concluded that none of the parties were under the impression
that the time Cabrera served toward his 2017 sentence could
not also be included in his time-served sentence for violating
his supervised release. The panel therefore held that, in
determining whether the 2015 sentence was a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year and month, the district court
did not err by including 134 time-served days that overlapped
with the time Cabrera served on his 2017 sentence, and in
assigning three criminal history points to the 2015 sentence.
Because the district court lacked authority to apply—and in fact
did not apply—18 U.S.C. § 3585, the panel rejected Cabrera’s
argument that the district court misinterpreted it.
    The panel also held that because the 2021 convictions are
valid, the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking
Cabrera’s supervised release based on those convictions.
    Seventh Circuit Judge Hamilton concurred. He wrote
separately with an observation about the Sentencing Guidelines
dispute over how to count the length of Cabrera’s two “time-
served” sentences. He wrote that the answer under the
Guidelines has virtually nothing relevant to say to a sentencing
                         USA V. CABRERA                          5

judge about an appropriate sentence for Cabrera under the
statutory purposes of sentencing: reflecting the seriousness of
the offense, promoting respect for the law, providing just
punishment for the offense, affording adequate deterrence of
criminal conduct, protecting the public from further crimes by
Cabrera, and providing him with needed correctional
treatment.
    Judge Collins concurred. He noted his general agreement
with Judge Bybee’s separate opinion in Argueta-Rosales
explaining why this court’s jurisprudence concerning the intent
element of a § 1326 prosecution warrants re-examination by
the en banc court. Judge Collins also noted his disagreement
with the sentiments expressed in Judge Hamilton’s
concurrence. He wrote that this court’s caselaw ensures that
the Guidelines retain their critical role, even after United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in selecting the appropriate
sentence.

                          COUNSEL

Kara Hartzler (argued), Federal Public Defender, Federal
Defenders of San Diego Inc., San Diego, California, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Zachary J. Howe (argued) and Colin M. McDonald, Assistant
United States Attorneys; Daniel E. Zipp, Assistant United
States Attorney, Appellate Section Chief, Criminal Division;
Randy S. Grossman, United States Attorney; United States
Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, San
Diego, California; Amanda T. Muskat, Fitzgerald Knaier LLP,
San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
6                          USA V. CABRERA

                             OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
    Defendant-Appellant Juan Cabrera was found guilty of
attempted illegal entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1325 and
attempted illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326. On
appeal, he argues that the district court violated his rights to
a fair trial and sentence. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
          FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
    Juan Cabrera is a native and citizen of El Salvador. In
the early 1990s, Cabrera left El Salvador to live in the United
States.1 Cabrera never held legal status in the United States.
After committing a string of various offenses, he was
deported in 2001.
    Over the years, Cabrera tried to return to the United
States several times but was unsuccessful. He has previously
been convicted of illegally entering the United States in 2015
and 2017. In 2018, Cabrera was caught reentering the
country and applied for asylum based on his fear of gang
violence in El Salvador. Cabrera’s application was denied,
and he was again deported to El Salvador.
    In 2019, Cabrera went to Tijuana and climbed one of two
fences separating Mexico from the United States. Cabrera
did not attempt to climb the second fence. Instead, he simply
sat down. After about seven minutes, Border Patrol Agent
Joseph Cisneros drove up to Cabrera. In Spanish, Agent
Cisneros asked Cabrera what he later testified were three

1
  The record does not indicate exactly how or when Cabrera first entered
the United States, but it does show that he lived in Boston from 1994 to
2001.
                       USA V. CABRERA                       7

“standard” questions typically asked by border patrol,
namely: (1) what his citizenship was, (2) if he had any
immigration documents authorizing entry into the United
States, and (3) how and when he entered the United States.
Agent Cisneros then asked Cabrera “what [] his purpose
[was] for crossing into the United States.” According to
Agent Cisneros, Cabrera answered that he entered the
country “just for work” and said nothing else.
    The government charged Cabrera with attempted illegal
entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1325 and attempted illegal
reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326. To prove guilt pursuant
to these statutes, the government must have shown that
Cabrera had the “specific intent to []enter free from official
restraint,” which means intent to “go at large within the
United States” and “mix with the population.” United States
v. Castillo-Mendez, 868 F.3d 830, 836 (9th Cir. 2017); see
also United States v. Rizo-Rizo, 16 F.4th 1292, 1295 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 120 (2022). In addition,
the government must have shown that Cabrera intended to
“go at large” at the time he physically crossed the border.
See United States v. Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d 1149, 1161
(9th Cir. 2016).
    Cabrera’s intent was the only issue in dispute when the
case went to trial. At trial, the government asserted that
Cabrera climbed the fence to enter the United States
undetected and find work. Claiming that it is “[im]possible
to convict a previously deported alien for attempted illegal
reentry . . . when he crosses the border with the intent only
to be [arrested],” id. at 1151, Cabrera’s counsel argued he
climbed the fence solely to get arrested so he could reapply
for asylum—and only thereafter find work. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.7(a)(1) (“[A]n applicant for asylum who is not an
aggravated felon shall be eligible . . . to request employment
8                      USA V. CABRERA

authorization.”). Ultimately, a jury found Cabrera guilty of
both counts. The district court sentenced Cabrera to 51
months in custody. It also revoked Cabrera’s term of
supervised release. Cabrera timely appealed.
                        ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Cabrera challenges the district court’s
(1) admission of his un-Mirandized statement at the border;
(2) exclusion of testimony by Erica Pinheiro pertaining to
conditions at the border; (3) “dual-intent” jury instructions;
and (4) calculation of his sentence.
I.     Motion to Suppress
    Prior to trial, the district court denied Cabrera’s motion
to suppress the statement he made to Agent Cisneros about
coming to the United States to find work based on Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). On appeal, Cabrera argues
the statement should have been suppressed because he was
“in custody” and was not given a Miranda warning prior to
his admission.
    We review the district court’s admission of an un-
Mirandized statement de novo. See United States v. Zapien,
861 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Ordinarily,
we assess whether someone is “in custody” for Miranda
purposes by determining “whether a reasonable innocent
person in such circumstances would conclude that after brief
questioning he or she would not be free to leave.” United
States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 520 (9th Cir. 2009), as
amended (June 23, 2009) (quoting United States v. Booth,
669 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981)). However, “[t]he case
books are full of scenarios in which a person is detained by
law enforcement officers, is not free to go, but is not ‘in
                            USA V. CABRERA                               9

custody’ for Miranda purposes.” United States v. Butler,
249 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing cases).
    For instance, in Berkemer v. McCarty, the Supreme
Court held that a person subject to a traffic stop is not “in
custody” for purposes of Miranda. 468 U.S. 420, 440
(1984). Analogizing the relatively unintrusive nature of
traffic stops to stops made pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968),2 the Berkemer Court stated that “[t]he
similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the purposes
of Miranda.” Id. at 439–440; see also United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975) (citing Terry
and noting that Border Patrol may stop vehicles at the border
when the facts “reasonably warrant suspicion that the
vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country”).
Indeed, one of our sister circuits has explained that courts’
“task post-Berkemer is to determine whether the facts of a
specific case indicate a situation more akin to a routine
traffic stop, at which Miranda warnings are not required, or
indicate that a suspect has been ‘subjected to restraints
comparable to those associated with a formal arrest, at which
point Miranda warnings are required.’” United States v.
Campbell, 741 F.3d 251, 266 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441).
    We applied Berkemer’s reasoning to stops at the border
in United States v. Galindo-Gallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 730 (9th
Cir.), as amended, 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). In
Galindo-Gallegos, two border patrol officers apprehended a

2
  A Terry stop is an officer’s brief detention of a person when the officer
reasonably suspects that the person has committed or is about to commit
a crime. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
10                     USA V. CABRERA

group of fifteen to twenty individuals running from the
border in an isolated location, told them to sit on the ground,
and asked them questions regarding their citizenship and
immigration status. Id. at 729. The panel held that “[w]here
officers apprehend a substantial number of suspects and
question them in the open prior to arrest, this is ordinarily a
Terry stop, not custodial questioning, under Berkemer.” Id.
at 732.
     Since Galindo-Gallegos, our court has consistently
addressed Miranda challenges at the border by asking
whether the detention constituted a permissible Terry stop,
or something more. For example, in Medina-Villa, the panel
held that “when border patrol agents stop a car based on
reasonable suspicion that individuals are illegally present in
the country and question the occupants regarding their
citizenship and immigration status, the occupants are not in
custody for Miranda purposes.” 567 F.3d at 520. Similarly,
in United States v. Cervantes-Flores, the court construed the
stopping of a car “40 miles north of the United States border”
as a Terry stop, and found the stop to be permissible because
the border patrol officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the
car, and the stop was not overly intrusive. 421 F.3d 825,
829–30 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
Cervantes-Flores also explained that certain standard
questions, such as a migrant’s “place of birth,” “his
citizenship,” and “whether he had permission to be in the
United States and how he had crossed into the United
States,” were permissible aspects of a Terry stop because
they were “reasonably limited in scope to determining
whether [the migrant] had crossed the border illegally.” Id.
at 830.
                      USA V. CABRERA                      11

   Thus, in considering Cabrera’s case, we must determine
whether his being questioned in between the border fences
was permissible pursuant to Terry, rather than whether he
was “in custody” pursuant to Miranda. Galindo-Gallegos,
244 F.3d at 732.
    The stop here meets the requirements of Terry. First,
Cabrera’s location between border fences would give any
agent reasonable suspicion to believe he may have been
entering the country illegally. Second, “[t]he detention
[here] was brief and the limited restraint was reasonable
under the circumstances.” 244 F.3d 728 at 735 (Paez, J.,
concurring). The stop here lasted approximately ten
minutes. Moreover, any “restraint” to which Cabrera was
subjected was limited and reasonable. Agent Cisneros stood
approximately three feet away from Cabrera the entire time
he questioned him. He did not handcuff Cabrera, threaten or
yell at him, or brandish his weapon. We have affirmed
convictions based on Terry stops involving significantly
more force than was involved in this case. See, e.g., Medina-
Villa, 567 F.3d at 509 (holding that agents did not “venture
beyond the restraints of . . . Terry or Berkemer” where
defendant was “seen by a border patrol agent running from
the fence between the United States and Mexico along with
two other individuals,” “[got] into the passenger seat of a
parked car,” and then were physically blocked from leaving
the parking lot and ordered out of the vehicle by an agent
with a drawn gun); Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 828
(approving Terry stop where an agent “subdued and
handcuffed [defendant]” near the border); cf. Galindo-
Gallegos, 244 F.3d at 735 (Paez, J., concurring) (approving
Terry stop where defendant “tried to run away from the
officers, was chased and caught, and was brought back,
made to sit in a circle, and questioned.”)
12                             USA V. CABRERA

     Finally, Agent Cisneros’s question about Cabrera’s
purpose for being in the United States did not “exceed the
scope of allowable inquiry during such a stop,” because it
was “reasonably related in scope to the justification” for it,
i.e., Agent Cisneros’s suspicion that Cabrera might have
been entering illegally. Gallegos, 244 F.3d at 735 (quoting
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881). We therefore conclude
that the district court did not err in denying Cabrera’s motion
to suppress.
II.         Witness Testimony
     Cabrera next contends that the district court abused its
discretion by excluding the testimony of his only proposed
witness.3 Prior to trial, Cabrera indicated that he intended to
call Tijuana resident Erica Pinheiro as a witness. Although
Pinheiro was an immigration attorney, Cabrera intended to
call her as a lay witness to testify about “the factual situation
in Tijuana in November of 2019.” Specifically, Cabrera
proffered that Pinheiro would testify about the “enormous
backlog of Central American migrants seeking asylum” due
to the “metering” and “Remain in Mexico” policies in place
at the time.4
    Initially, Cabrera offered Pinheiro’s testimony to show
that, due to the backlog, “the word was that you could climb
over the fence and try to get your asylum application that
way.” After the district court expressed concern that such
testimony would amount to “collective hearsay,” Cabrera

3
    Cabrera chose not to testify at trial.
4
  Cabrera states that under the “metering” policy, border officials began
limiting the number of people who could apply daily at the port of entry.
He states that, under the Remain in Mexico policy, asylum seekers
“could not remain in the U.S. while their case was pending.”
                        USA V. CABRERA                        13

offered to narrow the testimony to “the long wait [at the
border], the reasons for the wait and the fact that there w[ere]
thousands of people waiting.” Cabrera argues the testimony
would have supported his theory that he crossed the border
with the intent to be apprehended because the jury could
have inferred from the testimony that Cabrera did not want
to wait in line with thousands of other people seeking asylum
at the port of entry.
     The district court determined that the evidence was of
little to no relevance pursuant to Federal Rule 401. It also
determined under Rule 403 that, to the extent the testimony
was relevant, its probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of diverting the jury’s attention
away from Cabrera’s state of mind and into a mini trial about
conditions at the border.
    We review “[a] district court’s admission of evidence,
including its Rule 403 balancing” for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Jayavarman, 871 F.3d 1050, 1063 (9th Cir.
2017). Rule 403 determinations are “subject to great
deference,” because “the considerations arising under Rule
403 are susceptible only to case-by-case determinations,
requiring examination of the surrounding facts,
circumstances, and issues.” United States v. Hinkson, 585
F.3d 1247, 1267 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding Pinheiro’s testimony. First, even if Pinheiro could
testify about long lines at the port of entry, neither the record
nor her testimony could establish that Cabrera knew of these
long lines. Absent that evidentiary link, any facts about the
number of people waiting in line at the port of entry would
carry little weight. See, e.g., United States v. Trudeau, 812
14                     USA V. CABRERA

F.3d 578, 591 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When a defendant offers
nothing but speculation to link a piece of evidence to his
state of mind, the evidence is properly excluded.”).
     Second, the district court’s concern about distracting the
jury was reasonable. Absent the link connecting Cabrera’s
knowledge to conditions at the border, the jury would be
invited to speculate about what Cabrera did or did not know
at the time he crossed the border. In addition, the fact that a
Border Patrol agent who did testify at trial stated that he was
unaware of the existence of a long wait at the border justifies
the district court’s concern that the trial could have devolved
into one about border conditions rather than one about
Cabrera’s state of mind.
III.   Jury Instructions
    Cabrera next challenges the district court’s jury
instructions. We review the formulation of jury instructions
for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rodriguez, 971
F.3d 1005, 1017 (9th Cir. 2020). “[T]he question on appeal
is whether the instructions as a whole are misleading or
inadequate to guide the jury’s deliberation.” United States v.
Tuan Ngoc Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 986 (9th Cir. 2020)
(cleaned up).
    Cabrera contends that the district court erred by
including in the standard instruction for § 1326 language
about “dual intent,” i.e., language indicating that the
government need not prove a defendant’s intent to evade
authorities was his sole intent in entering the United States.
Specifically, Cabrera challenges the bolded portions of the
instruction below, which were read to the jury:

       [The government] must prove that at the
       point that he first entered into the United
                           USA V. CABRERA                              15

         States, [Cabrera] specifically intended to
         enter free from official restraint or at least
         that that was part of his intention and
         motivation and that he specifically planned
         that, not that it was his only purpose, but at
         least it was part of his purpose.5

Notably, Cabrera does not dispute that the above statements
of law are correct. He acknowledges that, in Argueta-
Rosales, we expressly stated that “the government need not
prove that entry free from official restraint was the
defendant’s sole intent” and that “[t]he government must
prove only that [the defendant] had a specific intent to enter
the United States free from official restraint, not that this was
his only purpose.” 819 F.3d at 1157 (emphasis in original).
    Instead, Cabrera argues that the district court’s
“additional verbiage” to the standard instruction “confused
and misled the jury.” In his view, the “mens rea element
require[s] [] Cabrera to have a ‘fully formed intent’ to go at
large—not a desire that was ‘part of his intention.’” But as
the district court noted, Cabrera’s attempt to distinguish
between a “fully formed intent” and “part of his intent[]” is
simply an attempt to circumvent the Argueta-Rosales rule.
    Cabrera insists that the additional verbiage in the
instruction would “require [a] jury to convict [a person]
despite his legal innocence,” because it would require a

5
  Cabrera seems to also be challenging other portions of the jury
instructions by inserting them into a chart in his brief, which chart
compares the trial court instructions “as written” vs. “as read.” However,
he never explained what is wrong with the bolded portions of these other
“as read” instructions and therefore waives any arguments about them.
See Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2019)
(noting that arguments lacking “meaningful briefing” are waived).
16                     USA V. CABRERA

finding of guilt for “a person who intends to work after first
going into custody to apply for asylum.” But because intent
is measured “from the moment of crossing,” United States v.
Lombera-Valdovinos, 429 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 2005),
such a person cannot be found guilty, because his intention
upon crossing the border was to be apprehended. Logically,
it is impossible to cross the border simultaneously intending
(1) to “cross[] the border with the intent only to be
imprisoned” and (2) to “enter the country free from official
restraint.” Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d at 1155–56 (citations
omitted); id. (“[I]f [a defendant] actually intended to sneak
into the country, and changed his plans only when he was
spotted by the border patrol, he again would be guilty.”
(internal quotation marks omitted))
    The instructions clearly explained that intent was to be
measured “at the point that [Cabrera] first entered into the
United States.” Jury instructions must be judged “as a
whole,” United States v. Hofus, 598 F.3d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir.
2010), and, when read with the timing requirement, the
instructions here were not misleading or confusing. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the
intent instruction.
IV.    Sentencing
    Finally, Cabrera argues that the district court incorrectly
calculated the Guidelines range during sentencing.
Specifically, he argues that the district court incorrectly
calculated his criminal history score. We “review the district
court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, the district
court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of the case
for abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual
findings for clear error.” United States v. Perez, 962 F.3d
420, 447 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
                            USA V. CABRERA                              17

    Under the Sentencing Guidelines, criminal history points
are assigned based on the length of a prior “sentence of
imprisonment.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4A1.1
(U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2015) (Guidelines or U.S.S.G). The
term “sentence of imprisonment” means “a sentence of
incarceration and refers to the maximum sentence imposed.”
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(b)(1). As a result, “criminal history points
are based on the sentence pronounced, not the length of time
actually served.” United States v. Mendoza-Morales, 347
F.3d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2,
cmt. n. 2). However, a defendant “must have actually
served” some time in custody for his sentence to qualify as a
“sentence of imprisonment.” Id.
    Time served sentences present a unique situation when
calculating the length of a “sentence of imprisonment.” That
is because the “sentence pronounced” is simply “time
served,” i.e., such sentences typically do not refer to a
number of days. Instead, “when courts sentence defendants
in pre-conviction detention to ‘time served,’ it is generally
understood that the pre-conviction custody thereby becomes
the term of imprisonment imposed by the judgment.”
Arreguin-Moreno v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.
2008) (quoting Spina v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 470 F.3d
116, 128 (2d Cir. 2006)).6
    Thus, in United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, we rejected
the defendant’s contention that “the district court incorrectly
included a prior section 1326 conviction in the calculation of
his criminal history category because he was sentenced to

6
  See also Sentenced to Time Served, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019) (“A sentencing disposition whereby a criminal defendant is
sentenced to the same jail time that the defendant is credited with serving
while in custody awaiting trial.”).
18                     USA V. CABRERA

‘time served’ as opposed to a specific period of time.” 170
F.3d 1244, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999). We explained that “[t]his
contention lacks merit because at the time he was sentenced
to ‘time served,’ he had served sixty-two days between his
arrest and sentence,” thus warranting the addition of points
to his criminal history score. Id.
     A. Cabrera’s Prior Convictions
    In this case, two of Cabrera’s prior convictions are
relevant to the district court’s calculation of his criminal
history score. One is a prior § 1326 conviction from 2015
(the 2015 case). The other is another § 1326 conviction from
2017 (the 2017 case).
    In the 2015 case, Cabrera was sentenced to 12 months in
custody and two years of supervised release. About a year
and seven months into his supervised release term, Cabrera
reentered the United States, for which he was arrested and
charged in a new § 1326 case—the 2017 case.
    About a month after Cabrera’s arrest in the 2017 case,
the Probation Department filed a petition seeking to revoke
supervised release in his original 2015 case. In total, Cabrera
had been in custody for approximately five and a half months
before he was sentenced in either case.
    The sentencing hearings for the two cases occurred only
four days apart from one another. First, on January 25, 2018,
Cabrera was sentenced to time served for the 2017 case.
Cabrera was still in custody when, on January 29, 2018,
Judge Lorenz imposed a separate sentence of time served,
plus two years of supervised release, for Cabrera’s violation
of his supervised release in the 2015 case.
                       USA V. CABRERA                       19

   B. Current Conviction
    To calculate the Guidelines range for the instant
conviction, the district court had to assign points to each of
the two convictions above. In relevant part, the Guidelines
instruct:

       (a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of
       imprisonment exceeding one year and one
       month.
       (b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of
       imprisonment of at least sixty days not
       counted in (a).

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. At sentencing, neither party disputed that
only two points should be assigned to the 2017 conviction,
which involved a term of imprisonment of 168 days—a term
“of at least sixty days” not exceeding thirteen months.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b).
    However, the parties did dispute whether the 2015
conviction should have been assigned two or three points.
The one-point difference was significant because assigning
three points to the 2015 conviction moved Cabrera’s
criminal history category up from IV (21-27 months) to V
(27-33 months).
    To assign points to the 2015 conviction, the district court
must have added whatever length of time Cabrera received
as a “term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation” to the
original, 12-month custodial sentence.               U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(k)(1). The parties dispute the length of this “term
of imprisonment.”
    The government argues that the time served sentence in
the 2015 case included the 134 days that overlapped with the
20                      USA V. CABRERA

time Cabrera served on his 2017 sentence. For support, it
points to the sentencing record—judicially noticed by the
district court below—in the 2015 case, showing that Judge
Lorenz intended for Cabrera’s “time served” sentence to
encompass more than four days.
    The record shows that, when asked at the violation
hearing about how much time Cabrera had already served
until that point, defense counsel stated: “So it will be five --
it will be six months in a week or two.” Counsel also
explained that the guidelines range for the 2015 violation
would be “four to ten months,” and Judge Lorenz did not
express an interest in departing or varying from that range.
To the contrary, that range informed his ultimate decision:

       All right. This is, based on the change to [the
       instant charge,] 1325, a Grade C violation,
       Category II, four to ten months. He’s
       apparently coming up on six months
       already. He was given time served in the
       underlying case. I’m going to give him time
       served in this case also.

    Based on information in the 2015 record, the district
court below reasonably concluded that none of the parties
were under the impression that the time Cabrera served
toward the 2017 sentence could not also be included in his
time-served sentence for violating his supervised release.
The district court therefore did not err in adding the 134 days
to Cabrera’s 2015 sentence for purposes of calculating his
criminal history score.
   To resist this conclusion, Cabrera argues that the district
court “misinterpreted” the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3585.
That statute states: “A defendant shall be given credit toward
                       USA V. CABRERA                       21

the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has
spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence
commences . . . that has not been credited against another
sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585 (emphasis added). Cabrera
argues that the district court erred in including the 134 days
in the 2015 sentence in the points calculation because that
amount of time was already “credited against another
sentence”—the 2017 sentence, which was imposed just a
few days before.
    As a threshold matter, however, Section 3585 is not a
mechanism by which a district court credits time against a
sentence it imposes; in fact, we have held that “district
court[s] lack[] authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) to grant
[a defendant] credit for the time he had served after his
arrest.” United States v. Peters, 470 F.3d 907, 909 (9th Cir.
2006). Instead, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)—rather than
the sentencing court—calculates the defendant’s entitlement
to sentencing credit under § 3585(b) in the first instance. See
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992). “A
defendant may then challenge BOP’s calculation—in other
words, the execution of the sentence—by filing a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Zavala v.
Ives, 785 F.3d 367, 370 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015).
    Because the district court lacked the authority to apply—
and in fact did not apply—§ 3585, it could not have
exceeded its authority in “misinterpreting” it. See Peters,
470 F.3d at 909 (“Because the district court lacked authority
to grant credit under § 3585(b) in the first place, it did not
exceed its authority.”) The district court therefore did not
abuse its discretion in rejecting this argument. Nor did it
abuse its discretion by revoking Cabrera’s supervised release
“based on the conviction of Mr. Cabrera by the jury” because
that conviction, for the reasons stated above, is valid. See 18
22                     USA V. CABRERA

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (stating that a district court may revoke
a term of supervised release only if it “finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a
condition of supervised release”).
                      CONCLUSION
     For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I join the court’s opinion in full. I write separately with
an observation about the Sentencing Guidelines dispute over
how to count the lengths of Cabrera’s two “time-served”
sentences imposed in 2017. Judge Smith’s opinion for the
court correctly analyzes and applies the relevant statutes and
guideline provisions. I submit, however, that the answer to
this esoteric question under the Guidelines has virtually
nothing relevant to say to a sentencing judge about an
appropriate sentence for Mr. Cabrera under the statutory
purposes of sentencing: reflecting the seriousness of the
offense, promoting respect for the law, providing just
punishment for the offense, affording adequate deterrence of
criminal conduct, protecting the public from further crimes
by Mr. Cabrera, and providing him with needed correctional
treatment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
    The judge who sentenced Mr. Cabrera to the two time-
served sentences in 2017 almost certainly was not worrying
about how they might be scored under the Guidelines if Mr.
Cabrera were to be convicted in a future United States
prosecution. In response to the parties’ debate here over
exactly what the sentencing judge in 2017 said about the
time-served sentences, it would have been appropriate for
the sentencing judge to ask, “Why should I care?” See
                       USA V. CABRERA                      23

United States v. Marks, 864 F.3d 575, 576 (7th Cir. 2017)
(encouraging district courts to ask this question when
confronting “arcane and arbitrary” issues under the
Guidelines).
    Long before the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), made the Guidelines
advisory, the Sentencing Commission itself recognized that
wooden application of the Guidelines could sometimes
produce arbitrary results. That is especially true in criminal
history calculations, where the complex details can produce
arbitrary cliffs and cutoffs. Even as first adopted in 1987,
the Guidelines encouraged sentencing departures for over-
or under-representative criminal history. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.3 (1987). That encouragement remains in place in
§ 4A1.3 in effect today.
    This circuit’s precedents show district judges that it is
not easy to establish that an arguable guideline mistake has
not affected a sentence, so that any error would be harmless.
E.g., United States v. Dominguez-Caicedo, 40 F.4th 938,
963–64 (9th Cir. 2022) (district court’s discussion of
alternative guideline ranges at end of sentencing hearing not
sufficient to show it would have reached same result if it had
started with alternative range and kept it in mind throughout
process); United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028,
1030–31 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (district court can show
arguable guideline error did not affect sentence by, for
example, performing sentencing analysis twice, beginning
with both correct and incorrect ranges); United States v.
Williams, 5 F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2021) (declining to find
guideline error harmless where district court did not explain
sentence sufficiently under alternative guideline
calculation). The treatment of the two time-served sentences
here presents an issue where it would be worth a district
24                         USA V. CABRERA

judge’s extra effort to establish such a clear record that any
arguable guideline error would have been harmless. If an
executive agency based an important decision on such a
narrow technicality so divorced from the relevant statutory
purposes, I suspect we could easily find it arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2).1

1
  This circuit demands more of an effort by a district court than other
circuits do to show that an arguable guideline error was harmless. See,
e.g., United States v. Ahmed, 51 F.4th 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2022) (arguable
error was harmless where district court made clear that choice of
sentence did not depend on issue); United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 68
(2d Cir. 2009) (arguable error was harmless where district court said
unequivocally that it would impose same sentence either way); United
States v. Mills, 917 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2019) (arguable error was
harmless where district court said it would impose same sentence
regardless and sentence would be reasonable under either guideline
calculation); United States v. Reyna-Aragon, 992 F.3d 381, 388–89 (5th
Cir. 2021) (arguable error was harmless where court made “firm, plain,
and clear” statement that issue did not affect sentence); United States v.
Smith, 75 F.4th 659, 665–66 (6th Cir. 2023) (government showed
arguable error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt where court said
sentence was appropriate regardless of starting guideline range for
calculating departure); United States v. Ihediwa, 66 F.4th 1079, 1082
(7th Cir. 2023) (boilerplate disclaimer is not enough to show arguable
error was harmless, but court’s credible and thorough explanation was
sufficient); United States v. Neri, 73 F.4th 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2023)
(arguable error was harmless where court indicated it would have
imposed same sentence under different guideline range); United States
v. Gieswein, 887 F.3d 1054, 1062–63 (10th Cir. 2018) (simple statement
by court would not be enough, but arguable error was harmless where
court thoroughly explained sentence independent of guideline
calculations); United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir.
2020) (arguable error was harmless where court indicated sentence
would be same either way and sentence is substantively reasonable).
                      USA V. CABRERA                     25

COLLINS, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I concur in Judge M. Smith’s opinion, which faithfully
applies our binding precedent, including United States v.
Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2016). At the
same time, I wish to note my general agreement with Judge
Bybee’s separate opinion in that case, which cogently
explained why, in an appropriate case, our jurisprudence
concerning the intent element of a prosecution under
8 U.S.C. § 1326 warrants re-examination by the en banc
court. See id. at 1162–71 (Bybee, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
    I also wish to note my vigorous disagreement with the
sentiments expressed in Judge Hamilton’s concurrence. In
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme
Court held that, in order to avoid a Sixth Amendment
problem under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
the statutory mandate to impose a sentence within the
Sentencing Guidelines range (absent grounds for departure
within the Guidelines) must be “sever[ed] and excise[d],”
with the result that the Guidelines were rendered advisory.
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. But even after Booker, the
applicable Guidelines range, the Guidelines’ policy
statements, and the “need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities” among similarly situated defendants (which is a
central objective of the Guidelines system), all remain
crucial factors that a court explicitly must consider in
imposing any sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)–(6). Judge
Hamilton may think that these considerations are “divorced
from the relevant statutory purposes,” see J. Hamilton
26                     USA V. CABRERA

Concurrence at 24, but the statutory text says otherwise. So
does this circuit’s settled caselaw. As we recently explained:

           “A mistake in calculating the
       recommended Guidelines sentencing range is
       a significant procedural error that requires us
       to remand for resentencing.” United States v.
       Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th
       Cir. 2011). “When a defendant is sentenced
       under an incorrect Guidelines range—
       whether or not the defendant’s ultimate
       sentence falls within the correct range—the
       error itself can, and most often will, be
       sufficient to show a reasonable probability of
       a different outcome absent the error.”
       Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S.
       189, 198 (2016). . . . At the same time, a
       sentencing error can be harmless. See
       Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d at 1030 n.5. To
       establish harmlessness, the Government must
       show that “it is more probable than not” that
       the error did not affect the sentence. United
       States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th
       Cir. 1997) (en banc); see also United States
       v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
           A “district court’s mere statement that it
       would impose the same . . . sentence no
       matter what the correct calculation cannot,
       without more, insulate the sentence from
       remand.” Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d at
       1031; see also United States v. Williams, 5
       F.4th 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2021). This is
       because a district court’s analysis must “flow
                      USA V. CABRERA                      27

       from an initial determination of the correct
       Guidelines range,” id. at 1031, and the
       district court must keep that range “in mind
       throughout the process,” id. at 1030 (quoting
       United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 991 (9th
       Cir. 2008)). At the same time, a sentencing
       error may be harmless if the district court
       “acknowledges that the correct Guidelines
       range is in dispute and performs [its]
       sentencing analysis twice, beginning with
       both the correct and incorrect range.” Id. at
       1030 n.5.

United States v. Dominguez-Caicedo, 40 F.4th 938 (9th Cir.
2022).
    Judge Hamilton thinks it wrong that this circuit
“demands more of an effort by a district court than other
circuits do to show that an arguable guideline error was
harmless,” see J. Hamilton Concurrence at 24 n.1, but I
disagree. Our caselaw ensures that the Guidelines retain
their critical role, even after Booker, in selecting the
appropriate sentence. A system in which a district court
dismisses the Guidelines calculations as “narrow
technicalit[ies]” or “arcane and arbitrary” distinctions that
judges should not “care” about, see id. at 22–23, resembles
more the free-wheeling regime that preceded the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 than the post-Booker regime that the
Supreme Court has bequeathed us.