Court Opinion

ID: 9641116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:23:31.326826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:35.146618
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

Although I agree with the majority that the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission does not fall within the classification of a “municipality or other political subdivision of the State,” I cannot agree with the conclusion that the informations in this case are defective merely *501because the legal status of the Commission is erroneously characterized.
The bribery statute, Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 23, expressly includes within the class of potential bribees “any officer or employee of the State, or of any county, municipality or other political subdivision of the State . . . .” In light of the sweeping language employed in describing the types of public employees enumerated therein, I believe that the Legislature clearly intended to encompass all Maryland governmental employees, including employees of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission. The erroneous legal characterization of the Commission as a “municipality or other political subdivision” should have been disregarded as surplusage, and the informations, which fully set forth all of the essential elements of bribery, should not have been dismissed.
Bribery, as the majority notes, ultimately developed at common law from a limited offense to a rather broad offense embracing “the giving of any valuable consideration or benefit... to a person performing a public duty .. . with the corrupt intention that he be influenced thereby in the discharge of his legal duty.” R. M. Perkins, Criminal Law 469 (2d ed. 1969). The gist of the crime at common law is the “corrupt payment ... of a private price for official action.” Ibid. Chief Judge Murphy in Blondes v. State, 16 Md. App. 165, 182, 184, 294 A. 2d 661 (1972), pointed out that Art. 27, § 23, passed in compliance with the mandate of Art. Ill, § 50 of the Maryland Constitution, is declaratory of the common law. It is clear that at common law the payment of valuable consideration to a public employee performing a public duty, such as an employee of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, to influence his performance of that duty, would constitute the offense of bribery.
Moreover, even if Art. 27, § 23, were not interpreted to include as potential bribees all Maryland public employees, but rather only to include certain limited categories of public employees, the alleged acts here would still constitute the *502crime of bribery. The Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, created by the General Assembly by a public general law and not a public local law, to perform governmental functions in more than one county, is, in my view, a State agency within the meaning of the bribery statute. Cf Pr. George’s Co. v. Md.-Nat’l Cap., 269 Md. 202, 306 A. 2d 223, cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1068 (1973). Employees of a State agency are a class expressly enumerated in the bribery statute. Thus, employees of the Commission are clearly a potential class of bribees within the statute.
In Lank v. State, 219 Md. 433, 149 A. 2d 367 (1959), this Court, in considering the adequacy of an allegedly defective indictment, explained the purpose of a charging document as follows (219 Md. at 436):
“[T]he purpose of a criminal charge — be it a state warrant, an information or an indictment — is twofold, that is, the charge must so characterize the crime and describe the particular offense ‘as to put the accused on notice of what he is called upon to defend and to prevent a future prosecution for the same offense.’ Gray v. State, supra [216 Md. 410]. ... As was pointed out in State v. Wheatley, 192 Md. 44, 63 A. 2d 644 (1949), modern courts disregard extremely technical rules and require only that an indictment shall fully allege the essential elements of the offense charged. See also Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 84 A. 2d 76 (1951).”
And as stated in State v. Lassotovitch, 162 Md. 147, 150, cited by the majority, the charging document must allege “such ... facts as would enable the accused to prepare his defense.” The critical issue is whether the informations in the instant case sufficiently characterize the crime of bribery and allege such facts so as to put Canova on notice of the offenses with which he is charged and to prevent a future prosecution for the same offenses. I believe that they do.
The informations charge Joseph Canova with both attempted bribery and bribery of two employees of the *503Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission. More specifically, the informations allege that on specified dates Canova either gave or offered named employees of the Commission forty dollars “in order to influence said employee[s] of said Commission in the performance of ... [their] official duties in violation of Article 27, Section 23.” Under the tests set forth in Lank v. State, supra, and State v. Lassotovitch, supra, these informations are clearly sufficient. They allege all the essential elements of the crimes, namely giving or offering an employee of a public agency valuable consideration to influence that employee in the performance of his official duties. And the informations set forth such facts in sufficient detail to put the accused on notice of the precise offenses with which he is charged and to prevent a second prosecution for the offenses.
The majority states that “[i]t may be that by the very breadth of the classes of bribees specified the Legislature intended to include all public officers and all public employees so that, under the statute, no public officer and no public employee is excluded as a bribee with respect to the performance of his official duties.” The Court’s opinion goes on to state, however, that it is unnecessary to reach this issue because Canova is charged with bribing an employee of “a municipality or other political subdivision of the State.” The majority concludes that because this is an improper characterization of the government agency involved, the informations are defective, as “an accurate designation of the class of bribee” was required.
If Art. 27, § 23, does include all Maryland public employees as I believe, and as the majority assumes, the informations are sufficient. The erroneous legal characterization of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission as a “municipality or other political subdivision of the State” is an unnecessary averment and should be treated as surplusage. Where an indictment contains unnecessary language which does not mislead the accused, that language may be treated as surplusage. If, disregarding the surplusage, the indictment otherwise states sufficient facts so as to allege an offense and prevent a second *504prosecution for the same offense, the indictment will not be rendered defective by the inclusion of the surplusage. Archer v. State, 145 Md. 128, 144, 147-148, 125 A. 744 (1924) (holding that the recital of an erroneous legal characterization of facts did not render an indictment defective). See also Marks v. State, 230 Md. 108, 185 A. 2d 909 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U. S. 918 (1963); Wharton, Criminal Procedure § 265 (12th ed. 1975).
The majority holds that without a proper categorization of the legal status of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, the informations failed to put Canova on notice of the charge which he was to defend. I cannot believe that informations which alleged that the accused, on a specific date, offered or gave to an employee of a governmental agency a sum of money to influence that employee in his official duties failed to adequately inform Canova that he was charged with bribing a public employee, an offense punishable under Art. 27, § 23. These allegations are clearly “sufficient to meet the practical needs which an indictment is intended to supply .. ..” State v. Coblentz, 167 Md. 523, 529, 175 A. 340 (1934).
Affirmance of the order dismissing the informations constitutes an adherence to the “extremely technical rules” regarding indictments which this Court long ago abandoned. State v. Wheatley, 192 Md. 44, 63 A. 2d 644 (1949). I would reverse.
Chief Judge Murphy has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed in this dissent.