Court Opinion

ID: 9629395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:42:05.58201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:18.800275
License: Public Domain

Stafford, J.
I dissent. Appellant was found guilty of violating RCW 9A.88.070(l)(b), i.e., being one who "advances or profits from prostitution." The majority recognized, quite properly, that the statutory charge could not stand without further statutory definition and for this reason turned to RCW 9A.88.060(2) for a definition of "profits from prostitution." Unfortunately their search stopped short of a definition of the key word, "prostitution". A cursory reading of the applicable statutes and the briefs, *161including an amicus brief, discloses that the legislature defined "prostitution" in RCW 9A.88.030.
Absent a constitutionally sound statutory definition of "prostitution" the charge brought under RCW 9A.88-.070(1)(b) must fall as void for vagueness because we no longer have a common-law definition in this state. In short, the constitutionality of RCW 9A.88.070(l)(b) is wholly dependent, for its constitutionality, upon the constitutionality of the definition of "prostitution" in RCW 9A.88.030.
State v. Zuanich, 92 Wn.2d 61, 593 P.2d 1314 (1979) holds that RCW 9A.88.030 (defining "prostitution") meets the constitutional standards of adequate prior notice of that conduct which will subject one to criminal penalty. However, the issue was resolved incorrectly.
No useful purpose will be served by repeating the dissent in Zuanich at page 68. However, for the reasons set forth at length therein, I am compelled to dissent in this case as well.
Utter, C.J., concurs with Stafford, J.
Reconsideration denied July 11, 1979.