Court Opinion

ID: 9737845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:35:30.869012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:01.776801
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Responding to our decision in Matter of T.J.E., reported at 426 N.W.2d 23 (S.D.1988), the State Legislature reevaluated SDCL 22-32-8. Likewise, the State Legislature reviewed this state’s first degree burglary statute, SDCL 22-32-1, and the second degree burglary statute, SDCL 22-32-3. In Matter of T.J.E., this Court would not countenance terming an 11-year-old child a “burglar” who impulsively took candy, after entering a retail store with her aunt during business hours (no intent upon entering the building). We reasoned that she could not have evinced an intent at the time of her entry, to commit second degree burglary per SDCL 22-32-3. Taking the chocolate Easter egg was — impulse. It was a taking of a de minimus character.
*514The 1989 Legislature revised SDCL 22-32-8 as follows:
Any person who enters an unoccupied structure, with intent to commit any crime other than the act of shoplifting or retail theft as described in chapter 22-30A constituting a misdemeanor, or remains in an unoccupied structure after forming the intent to commit any crime other than shoplifting as described in chapter 22-30A constituting a misdemeanor, is guilty of third degree burglary. Third degree burglary is a Class 4 felony, (emphasis added mine).
Derby committed third degree burglary under the terms of the above-quoted statute. He formulated an intent, outside of the structure, to steal personal property. He forcibly removed a window to gain entry. This is a classic case of third degree burglary and not shoplifting or retail theft. In shoplifting or retail theft, the formulation of the intent is after the offending party is in the structure, per my statutory construction.
For purposes of disposition to this case and appellate posterity, I set forth SDCL 22-30A-19, as that statute existed, before 1989:
Any person who intentionally conceals property owned, or held by and offered or displayed for sale, by any store or mercantile establishment, whether such concealment be on his own person or otherwise and whether on or off the premises of the store or mercantile establishment, may be detained in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time by the merchant or the merchant’s employee until the arrival of a law enforcement officer who shall have been promptly notified of the fact of such detention. Such detention shall not render the merchant or merchant’s employee criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment or unlawful detention; provided, that this exemption shall not apply if the merchant or merchant’s employee refuses to sign a formal complaint and testify at any legal proceedings, if requested to do so by the prosecuting attorney, in any prosecutions thereafter arising out of the matter.
However, this statute was repealed by the 1989 Legislature and replaced by SDCL 22-30A-19.1 which provides:
An adult or emancipated minor as defined in §§ 25-5-17 to 25-5-22, inclusive, or the parents or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor who takes possession of any goods, wares or merchandise displayed or offered for sale by any store or with the intention of converting the goods to his own use without having paid the purchase price is liable to the owner or seller for the retail value of the merchandise, regardless of whether the merchandise has been recovered in undamaged condition by the merchant. In addition, the merchant is entitled to a penalty of three times the retail value of the merchandise, or fifty dollars, whichever is greater.
Derby would have us believe that the facts, before us, fit into the latter statute. Academically, it will not wash. First, Rau-ville Bar was closed to the public and locked to protect the owners’ possessions (beer included) and the bar was not open to the public — to sell beer — when Derby and his friends became (apparently) exceedingly thirsty and conceived that they must quench their thirst in the early morning hours, after the bar was closed. Let us remember that Derby admittedly stole this property. His advocacy is, essentially, I am a shoplifter or a retail thief, but I am not a burglar. The bar was unoccupied and Derby’s entry was totally illegal. Read the precise wording of SDCL 22-30A-19.1. Derby never had an opportunity to pay the purchase price of the beer he stole because the owners of the bar had closed all business operations for the night. Also, Derby had to go behind the bar to steal the beer which was stored in a cooler. Yes, this was beer offered for sale but not after business hours and Derby can certainly not say that he was a customer of the bar for most customers, if indeed not all, enter a bar through the front door and not through a window opening in the early morning hours. By his own admissions, Derby possessed the requisite intent to *515commit the crime of third degree burglary at the time he entered the Rauville Bar.
When we, on this Court, construe a statute, we must consider its intent and, in doing so, we should review the entire statute, as well as recent enactments relating to that statute and other enactments on the same subject. State v. Wolff, 438 N.W.2d 199, 201 (S.D.1989); In re Appeal of AT & T Information Systems, 405 N.W.2d 24, 27 (S.D.1987).
I talked about using common sense in the law, and its application, in T.J.E. It would not make common sense to interpret our Legislature’s new law by holding that, under this set of facts, Derby was either a shoplifter or a retail thief. Shoplifters or retail thieves do not break into a building in the early morning hours, when the building is unoccupied, and spirit away 8 cases of beer, a quart of whiskey, and 5 packs of cigarettes. This was a sizeable theft and was not merchandise stolen in the middle of the day when people would normally be in attendance making lawful purchases.