Court Opinion

ID: 3679943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-06 06:25:34.568711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:51.190414
License: Public Domain

In so far as the principal opinion in this case speaks of facts which point to the necessity for reasonable protection to those entering into contracts for the purchase of certain classes of farm machinery to the end that they may enjoy the ordinary legal remedies for the breach of such contracts as are made, I do not disagree with the opinion and I express no constitutional objection to such legislation. The first statutes that were passed were designed to *Page 149 
give this protection. Chapters 218 and 219 of the Session Laws of 1913, which are §§ 5991, 5992, 5993 and 6002 of the Compiled Laws of 1913. These statutes did not seek to impose any warranty or other affirmative contract contrary to the real contract of the parties. They merely provided that a purchaser of personal property under written warranty should have a reasonable time in which to ascertain whether or not the property complied with the warranty and made the question of reasonable time in all cases one of fact for the jury. And they further provided that any notice of breach or of defects might be given either in writing or orally to the seller or to the seller's agent in this state who had negotiated the sale or delivered the property, or to his successor. They voided any provision in a written contract to the contrary and any provision purporting to waive any right of action arising out of the sale before the cause of action had accrued. These statutes obviated the effect of harsh contract stipulations prejudicial to the full enjoyment of ordinary legal remedies for breaches of warranties actually made. But some of them, §§ 5991 and 5992 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, were expressly repealed by § 77 of chapter 202, Session Laws of 1917, known as the Uniform Sales Act (this statement is based upon the enrolled bill but is not borne out by the legislative journals which show that these sections were not included in the repeal section of the original bill and that the bill was never amended so as to include them), and the following legislature passed the act in question.
To my mind there is a fundamental distinction between a statute designed to protect parties in the enjoyment of ordinary legal remedies for breaches of contracts actually made and statutes imposing contracts which both parties may be unwilling to make. A statute of the latter sort, in requiring or imposing a warranty and giving a remedy of rescission to one who may later be disappointed with a bargain he knowingly and understandingly made or even solicited, enables every buyer within the statute to repudiate his real contract and shift to the other party the entire burden of the transaction.
Of course, it may be said that in regulating transactions of the character referred to in the statute it is competent for the legislature to impose a contract reasonably designed to make its regulation effective, Wanberg v. National U.F. Ins. Co. 46 N.D. 369, 179 N.W. 666, *Page 150 260 U.S. 71, 67 L. ed. 136, 43 S. Ct. 32; Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W. 996; Palaniuk v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. 57 N.D. 199, 220 N.W. 638; Dwinnell v. Boehmer, 60 N.D. 302, 234 N.W. 655, and that parties must be held to have contracted with the statute in mind. The statute is read into the contract regardless of any stipulation to the contrary, and this court has properly and consistently so held in cases where no constitutional question was raised. But, where the constitutional right is relied upon, such a view cannot be followed to the logical conclusion of supporting every contract which may be imposed by legislation without examining the regulation thus made effective to determine whether or not it is consistent with the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. As applied to contracts made in the pursuit of a calling or a business, or in the advancement of the ordinary affairs of life, there is a field for regulation and a point beyond which regulation may not be carried without infringing the liberty which is guaranteed by the Constitution.
The statute supported in the Wanberg Case seems to me to be clearly distinguishable from the one here involved. In that case the insurance company was given a reasonable opportunity to determine whether to accept or reject the application. It required a degree of promptness and expedition appropriate to the nature of the business undertaken. Failure to perform the duty to accept or reject within such time was made tantamount to acceptance as a means of giving to the applicant the protection which he had taken the necessary steps to secure and which he would have reasonable grounds for thinking he had obtained. By this statute the legislature, in effect, said to an insurance company desiring to engage in the hail insurance business that it should make arrangements whereby those whose applications it should take would know within twenty-four hours whether or not they were protected.
The statute now before us is in no sense a regulation of the manner in which any given business is to be transacted so far as promptness, over-reaching or other element having to do with fair and just dealing, economic or social advantage is concerned. It is an assumption of legislative control over all sales of machinery of the kinds designated, despite the action of the parties; and, in effect, it says that no such contract shall be made unless accompanied by a warranty of fitness for the use for which the machine was purchased for the breach of which *Page 151 
rescission must be allowed. If it is competent to impose this element into every contract for the sale of machinery, whether new or secondhand, whether made by a manufacturer, a dealer, or by a casual owner making but one sale in a lifetime, I am unable to see where any line can be drawn within which the liberty of persons to deal with each other with respect to the ordinary transactions of life is to be enjoyed. Let it be remembered that we have celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the invention of harvesting machinery which is covered by this statute and that steam engines, likewise included, antedate the American Revolution.
It is true that this case and the Bratberg case, which is followed as controlling, were both cases involving sales of combine harvesters, a type of machinery which was not in use in this state when the statute in question was enacted. In view of its novelty and of the various elements and conditions upon which its successful operation here would depend, the contract in the Bratberg Case contained a warranty agreed to by the parties and stipulated against others. The warranty reads: "When properly adjusted and competently operated according to seller's instructions on land or grain in suitable condition it will be capable of doing as good or better work than any other machine of the same kind, size and rated capacity working under like conditions on the same job." This warranty is by the statute converted into a warranty of reasonable fitness for the purpose for which it was purchased. So, the statute, which dealt with types of machinery some of which was old and some comparatively new at the time of its enactment, has the effect, as to machines subsequently invented or coming into use, of preventing the parties to a sale from contracting with respect to the risk of operation and adaptability, although the novelty be known to both buyer and seller and the elements of uncertainty be equally appreciated and although there be no overreaching whatsoever.
In the opinion of the majority reference is made to the fact that there has been but little litigation under this statute. It may not be out of place to suggest that possibly this is due in some degree to the fact that it has but lately been invoked with regard to a type of machinery that was not in use here at the time of its enactment and for some five years thereafter. It might be further observed, too, by way of indicating that it is not designed or used merely as a means of protecting *Page 152 
those who might be thought to be unfamiliar with the terms of such contracts, that in the instant case the statute is invoked by a dealer in such machinery, in another by an experienced agent or salesman of such machinery, and in still another case by a stockholder in a corporation which was a dealer.
For the above reasons and for the reasons indicated in my dissenting opinion in the Bratberg Case, I think the judgment appealed from should be reversed.