Court Opinion

ID: 9353286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 16:11:43.448261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:13.168611
License: Public Domain

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                                                             FILED
CHRISTOPHER BARBOT,                                                      January 10, 2023
Respondent Below, Petitioner                                              EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                        INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

vs.) No. 22-ICA-13 (Fam. Ct. Jefferson Cnty. No. FC-19-2020-D-357)            OF WEST VIRGINIA

CLAUDIA BARBOT,
Petitioner Below, Respondent

                             MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Christopher Barbot appeals the Family Court of Jefferson County’s July
14, 2022, Order Denying Reconsideration of the Final Divorce Order entered December
20, 2021. Mr. Barbot asserts that the family court erroneously awarded all of the parties’
assets to Respondent Claudia Barbot and abused its discretion by awarding spousal support
without conducting the required statutory analysis. Ms. Barbot filed a response in support
of the family court’s orders. Mr. Barbot filed a reply. 1

        This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2022). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds that there is error in the lower tribunal’s decision but no
substantial question of law. This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of
Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for disposition in a memorandum decision.
For the reasons set forth below, the family court’s final order is vacated, in part, and this
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

       The parties were married on November 25, 1995, in Laurel, Maryland. The parties
have two adult children. Ms. Barbot filed her petition for divorce on December 2, 2020,
alleging irreconcilable differences. On January 26, 2021, Mr. Barbot filed his answer
admitting irreconcilable differences.

        The final hearing was held on November 16, 2021. Ms. Barbot appeared at the
hearing with her counsel. Mr. Barbot, who was not represented by counsel at that time,
failed to appear. A special commissioner appeared telephonically for the hearing. At the
hearing, Ms. Barbot testified as to when the parties married; where she resides; whether
the parties were incarcerated, incompetent, or in the armed services; and the reason the
parties were divorcing. Ms. Barbot further testified that the parties had a state tax debt in

       1
        Mr. Barbot is represented by Brendan Doneghy, Esq. Ms. Barbot is represented by
Christopher D. Janelle, Esq.

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the amount of $12,000, homeowner’s association debt in the amount of $5,000, a bass
fishing boat titled to both parties, a wrecked BMW automobile titled to Mr. Barbot, a
Toyota RAV4 in her possession, a camper trailer that Mr. Barbot lived in, and a timeshare
that was in arrears. Ms. Barbot’s counsel proffered that Mr. Barbot had a retirement account
with a value of $140,992 as of December 2020, with a loan taken out against it in the
amount of $37,000. Ms. Barbot’s counsel also proffered that the estimated value of the
marital home was approximately $350,000 to $400,000, with about a $293,000 mortgage
on the home.

        On December 20, 2021, the family court entered the final divorce order. In that
order, the family court awarded Ms. Barbot sole ownership of the marital home; the entire
balance of Mr. Barbot’s retirement account, less any outstanding loan balance; the camper
Mr. Barbot was living in; the parties’ automobiles; the parties’ boat; and $5,250 per month
in spousal support. The final order made Mr. Barbot responsible for the parties’ state and
federal tax debt; any outstanding loan balance on his retirement account; the parties’
timeshare; Ms. Barbot’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,500; and payment of the special
commissioner’s fee in the amount of $2,000.

       On January 10, 2022, Mr. Barbot, through counsel, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the final divorce order in family court. After more than thirty days had
passed without the family court ruling on the motion for reconsideration, Mr. Barbot,
through counsel, filed an appeal of the final divorce order in circuit court on February 3,
2022. On June 8, 2022, the circuit court entered an order concluding that the appeal was
not ripe due to the pending motion for reconsideration in family court. The circuit court
remanded the matter to family court for a ruling on the motion for reconsideration. On July
14, 2022, the family court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. Mr.
Barbot now appeals.

              “In reviewing . . . a final order of a family court judge, we review the
       findings of fact made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous
       standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion
       standard. We review questions of law de novo.” Syl. Pt., [in part,] Carr v.
       Hancock, 216 W. Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004).

Amanda C. v. Christopher P., No. 22-ICA-2, __ W. Va. __, __ S.E.2d __, 2022 WL
17098574, *3 (Ct. App. 2022); accord W. Va. Code § 51-2A-14(c) (2005) (specifying
standards for appellate court review of family court order).

       Mr. Barbot raises two assignments of error on appeal. First, that the family court
erred in awarding essentially all the parties’ assets to Ms. Barbot instead of conducting
equitable distribution. Second, that the family court abused its discretion by awarding
spousal support without considering the statutory factors outlined in West Virginia Code §
48-6-301 (2018). In response, Ms. Barbot argues that any perceived inequity arising from

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the family court’s order, or any evidentiary insufficiency, is the result of Mr. Barbot’s
failure to participate in the underlying proceedings.

      In regard to the family court’s division of the parties’ assets, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia has explained that

              “‘[e]quitable distribution . . . is a three-step process. The first step is
       to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is
       to value the marital assets. The third step is to divide the marital estate
       between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in . . . [West
       Virginia Code § 48-7-103].’ Syllabus Point 1, Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.
       Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990).” Syl. Pt. 2, Stuck v. Stuck, 218 W. Va. 605,
       625 S.E.2d 367 (2005).

Syl. Pt. 3, Mulugeta v. Misailidis, 239 W. Va. 404, 801 S.E.2d 282 (2017).

         Here, the family court’s final divorce order does not address the steps outlined in
Whiting. Of the eight findings of fact in the family court’s Final Divorce Order, none
concern marital or separate property, the value of assets, or the principles contained in West
Virginia Code § 48-7-103 (2001). Furthermore, a family court has a duty to ensure that
the division of marital assets is equitably accomplished. Donna S. v. Travis S., 246 W. Va.
634, __, 874 S.E.2d 746, 756 (2022). There is nothing in the family court’s orders
indicating that the family court attempted to equitably divide the parties’ assets and
liabilities. To the contrary, the family court inequitably divided the parties’ assets and
liabilities, seemingly to punish Mr. Barbot for his failure to obey court orders and
participate in the proceedings.

       Turning to the issue of spousal support, the Supreme Court of Appeals has explained
that as long as the family court fully considers the mandatory statutory factors contained
in West Virginia Code § 48-6-301, and the award of spousal support is within the
parameters of reasonableness, a reviewing court should not disturb the award on appeal.
Mulugeta, 239 W. Va. at 410, 801 S.E.2d at 288. Here, the family court’s final divorce
order does not reflect that the family court considered any of the mandatory factors
contained in West Virginia Code § 48-6-301.

       Both the family court in its order denying the motion for reconsideration, and Ms.
Barbot on appeal, cite to Syllabus Point 2 of Robinson v. Robinson, 169 W. Va. 425, 288
S.E.2d 161 (1982), for the proposition that evidentiary insufficiency arriving exclusively
from the failure of one party to appear and offer evidence is not a “judicially cognizable
and harmful circumstance” to permit a collateral attack on a judgment. However, nothing
in Robinson authorizes a family court to completely disregard its duty to equitably divide
marital assets and to consider mandatory statutory factors. Further, Robinson is
distinguishable from the present case in that evidentiary insufficiency in this matter was

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not exclusively the result of Mr. Barbot’s failure to appear. Rather, the evidence that was
adduced from Ms. Barbot at the final hearing was insufficient for the family court to
adequately address the statutory factors contained in West Virginia Code §§ 48-6-301 and
48-7-103.

       Accordingly, the family court abused its discretion by denying the motion for
reconsideration of the final divorce order. We vacate the December 20, 2021, final divorce
order only as it pertains to equitable distribution and spousal support and remand to the
Family Court of Jefferson County with directions to hold a new hearing on the issues of
equitable distribution and spousal support and issue an order consistent with this
decision. 2 The Clerk is hereby directed to issue the mandate contemporaneously with this
memorandum decision.

                                           Vacated, in Part, and Remanded with Directions.

ISSUED: January 10, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Thomas E. Scarr
Judge Charles O. Lorensen

       2
         This decision does not relieve Mr. Barbot of his attorney fee obligations as outlined
in the family court’s orders. Mr. Barbot did not appeal the family court’s award of attorney
fees. Moreover, the record reflects that Mr. Barbot failed to follow family court orders, and
he did not attend the final hearing. As a result, the family court did not abuse its discretion
when it ordered Mr. Barbot to pay Ms. Barbot’s attorney fees of $8,500 (at an annual rate
of 4% interest) and the special commissioner’s attorney fees incurred (at an annual rate of
4% interest).

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