Court Opinion

ID: 9365904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 16:03:01.391178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:47.674965
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed January 25, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-644
                      Lower Tribunal No. F01-25909
                          ________________

               Robert Jackson, a/k/a Eldwin Gelin,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

      An appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(3) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Teresa Pooler, Judge.

      O’Brien Hatfield Reese P.A., and Rachael E. Reese (Tampa), for
appellant.

    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Linda Katz, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Affirmed. See Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (“[I]n

order to provide relief, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature

that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”); Jones v. State, 709

So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (“[T]he trial court should initially consider whether

the evidence would have been admissible at trial or whether there would

have been any evidentiary bars to its admissibility.”); Blanco v. State, 702

So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1984)) (“As long as the trial

court’s findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, ‘this Court

will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact,

likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given

to the evidence by the trial court.’”); Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 995 (Fla.

2009) (holding declarant’s statement not so far contrary to his pecuniary or

proprietary interest when made many years after trial and statute of

limitations had run); § 90.804(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021) (“‘Unavailability as a

witness’ means that the declarant: . . . Persists in refusing to testify

concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement despite an order

of the court to do so . . . .”); § 90.804(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (“A statement tending

to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the

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accused is inadmissible, unless corroborating circumstances show the

trustworthiness of the statement.”).

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