Court Opinion

ID: 9570454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:23:19.419326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:46.439838
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
MARUMOTO, J.
I dissent. In issue here is the effect of the provision of HRS § 386-1, quoted below, on the right of an employee of a subcontractor, who has suffered work injury *587caused by general contractor’s negligence, to recover damages for the injury from the general contractor in a tort action.
The provision in question reads as follows:
“Whenever an independent contractor undertakes to perform work for another person pursuant to contract, express or implied, oral or written, the independent contractor shall be deemed the employer of all employees performing work in the execution of the contract, including employees of his subcontractors and their subcontractors. However, the liability of the direct employer of an employee who suffers a work injury shall be primary and that of the others secondary in their order. An employer secondarily liable who satisfies a liability under this chapter shall be entitled to indemnity against loss from the employer primarily liable.”
That provision is a part of the definition of “employee” in a comprehensive revision of the workmen’s compensation law of this State, embodied in Senate Bill No. 853, Senate Draft 5, of the Second State Legislature, and enacted into law as S.L.H. 1963, c. 116, by that legislature at its regular session of 1963. Senate Bill No. 853, as originally drafted and submitted to the legislature contained the recommendations of Professor Stefan Riesenfeld of the University of California Law School.
The literal meaning of the provision in question is clear. It is as follows:
(1) The provision refers to “an independent contractor” who undertakes to perform work for another person pursuant, to contract.
(2) In the context of the provision, the term independent contractor means (a) a contractor who does all of the work himself or by employees directly employed by him; (b) a contractor who *588does all, or a portion or portions, of the work through a subcontractor or subcontractors; (c) a subcontractor who does all of the subcontracted work himself or by employees directly employed by him; and (d) a subcontractor who does all, or a portion or portions, of the work through a subcontractor or subcontractors under him.
(3) All employees of a contractor who does all of the work himself or by employees directly employed by him are employees of the contractor.
(4) All employees of a subcontractor, in addition to being such, are deemed employees of the independent contractor under whom the subcontractor has his subcontract and all other independent contractors up the line.
(5) The independent contractor who is the direct employer of an employee who has suffered work injury is primarily liable for the payment of workmen’s compensation to the employee, and other independent contractors up the line are secondarily liable for such payment in ascending order.
(6) The independent contractor who satisfies his secondary liability to the injured employee is entitled to indemnity against loss from the employee’s direct employer.
Thus, under the clear language of the provision in question, an employee of a subcontractor, in addition to being such, is an employee of the general contractor under whom the subcontractor has his subcontract, although such employee has no contractual relationship with the general contractor as his employee. In the parlance of workmen’s compensation law, in that situation, the general contractor and the subcontractor’s employee are statutory employer and statutory employee in their relationship with each other.
*589A relationship of statutory employer and statutory employee, in which persons who have no contractual relationship as employer and employee are nevertheless treated as employer and employee, is a well-established concept in workmen’s compensation law.
Under the second sentence of the provision in question, the liability of the direct employer to his injured employee is primary and the liability of a statutory employer to the direct employer’s injured employee is secondary. That merely establishes a priority, as between the direct employer and a statutory employer, in discharging the employer’s liability to the injured employee. It does not affect the right which the injured employee has against the employer, which is the same against a statutory employer as against the direct employer.
HRS £ 386-5 limits the remedy of an employee against his employer for work injury to the relief provided in the workmen’s compensation law. A statutory employee, being an employee of a statutory employer under the provision in question, is subject to that limitation in obtaining relief for work injury from the statutory employer.
Consequently, the issue in this case should be decided against the injured employee.
In resolving the issue here, the function of this court is to give effect to the legislative intent in enacting the provision in question. Any view which this court may have regarding the desirability of a particular result as a matter of social policy is immaterial to the decision.
The legislative intent with regard to the provision in question is manifested in the plain and unambiguous language of the provision. If there should be any doubt despite such manifestation of intent, a review of the actions taken by the legislature which resulted in the incorporation of the provision in question in Senate Bill No. 853, Senate Draft 5, and its enactment in S.L.H. 1963, c. 116, should dispel such doubt.
*590I think that the reasoning in the opinion of the court in this case is an unwarranted exercise in judicial legislation. This court may judicially legislate, but it may do so only interstitially to fill some gap in the statutory language. Hayes v. Gill, 52 Haw. 251, 254, 473 P.2d 872, 875 (1970). Here, there is no gap to be filled in the statutory language.
The draft of Senate Bill No. 853, as originally presented to the legislature, did not contain the provision in question. The provision in the original draft read as follows:
“Where by reason of there being an independent contractor, or for any other reason, the’ owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there carried on is not the direct employer of persons there employed such persons shall nevertheless be deemed his employees within the meaning of this chapter, unless the direct employer has secured compensation to them as provided in section 97-120.”1
That provision was intended as a substitute for the pre-existing statutory employer provision, which was enacted in S.L.H. 1915, c. 221, § 60, compiled in RLH 1955, § 97-1, and reading:
“ ‘Employer’, unless otherwise stated, includes any body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, public or private, and the legal representative of a deceased employer. It includes the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor, or *591operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor, or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed. If the employer is insured it includes his insu'rer as far as applicable.”2
In ascertaining the intent of the legislature with regard to the present provision from a review of the legislative history relating thereto, it is pertinent that the legislature had before it the recommendation of Professor Riesenfeld that the pre-existing provision “be qualified so as to place either the exclusive or the primary liability on the direct employer, if he has taken out compensation insurance and the wages of the employee figure in the premium base,” and his statement regarding the difference in legal consequences between making the direct employer exclusively liable and making him primarily liable.
Professor Riesenfeld’s statement regarding the difference in legal consequences which would follow from making the direct employer exclusively liable and making him primarily liable was as follows:
“The difference between placing the ‘exclusive’ liability on the employer rather than the ‘primary’ liability lies in the effect of this distinction on the tort liability of the owner and his employees. If it is desired to shield the owner and his other employees from third-party liability, then secondary liability must be left imposed upon the owner. Vice versa, if it is desired to give the victim in cases of negligence an action at law either against the owner or his negligent employees, the direct employer must be exclusively liable.”
The word “owner,” as used in the foregoing state*592ment, referred to a person who came within the category mentioned in the pre-existing provision as “the owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor, or operator of the business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor, or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed.”3
The pre-existing provision simply defined an employer, and included the owner within the definition as an employer, thereby making the owner a statutory employer, but did not establish an order of liability, as primary and secondary, between a direct employer and a statutory employer.
The draft provision differed from the pre-existing provision in that it was a part of the definition of employee, instead of being a definition of employer, and in containing the clause: “unless the direct employer has secured compensation to them as provided in section 97-120.”
The placement of the provision as a part of the definition of employee, rather than as a definition of employer, made no significant difference.
However, the quoted clause effected a material change. It imposed exclusive liability upon an insured direct employer. The imposition of exclusive liability upon an insured direct employer had the effect of denying the status of statutory employer to an owner, and rendering HRS § 386-5 inapplicable to him, in his relationship with the employees of such direct employer.
The clause did not affect the status of an owner as a statutory employer of the employees of an uninsured direct employer.
*593Thus, under the draft provision, an owner would have been a statutory employer only in his relationship to the employees of an uninsured direct employer.
If the legislature intended to eliminate an owner as a statutory employer of the employees of an insured direct employer, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature would have enacted the draft provision into law. That is so particularly in view of the fact that it had the statement of Professor Riesenfeld that “if it desired to give the victim in cases of negligence an action at law * * * against the owner * * * , the direct employer must be exclusively liable.”
The legislature did not enact the draft provision into law. The Senate originally passed Senate Bill No. 853 with the draft provision intact. When the bill was transmitted to the House of Representatives, the House deleted the draft provision and inserted the present provision in its place. Upon the bill being returned to the Senate, the Senate agreed to the change made by the House, and incorporated the present provision in Senate Draft 5 of the bill, which was eventually enacted into law.
The present provision differs from the draft provision, first, in according the status of statutory employer to a person who comes within a category consisting of an independent contractor under whom a direct employer has a subcontract and other independent contractors up the line, without regard to whether the direct employer is insured or uninsured, and, second, in making the liability of the direct employer primary and the liability of a statutory employer secondary.
The conclusion to be drawn from the first difference is that, in enacting the present provision, the legislature intended to accord the status of statutory employer to persons within the category of independent contractors described above, without regard to the insured status of the direct employer, and to deny that status only to owners who are not within the mentioned category of in*594dependent contractors, even in a situation in which the direct employer is uninsured.
With regard to the second difference, there can be no question that the legislature made the change «with full awareness of the legal implication of such change, as set forth in Professor Riesenfeld’s statement.
The decision of the court in this case is based on the reasoning that the object of the present provision is. to protect the special compensation fund mentioned in HRS § 386-56 and §§ 386-151 through 155, and not with granting third-party immunity to independent contractors other than the direct employer. I see nothing in the language of the present provision, its legislative history, or other provisions of the workmen’s compensation law to support that reasoning.

 Section 97-120 mentioned in the quoted provision is RLH 1955, § 97-120 (1965 Supplement) , and is presently compiled in HRS § 386-121. It requires an employer to secure compensation to his employees by: (1) obtaining woikmen's compensation insurance; (2) depositing and maintaining with the State director oi budget satisfactory security; or (3) furnishing to the director satisfactory proof of solvency and financial ability to pay the compensation. Hereafter, an employer who has secured compensation to his employees will be referred to as insured employer, inasmuch as the prevalent mode of securing compensation to employees is by obtaining workmen’s compensation insurance.

 Hereafter, the pre-existing statutory employer provision quoted above, the provision in the original draft of Senate Bill No. 853, and the provision of HRS § 386-1 in question here, will be referred to, respectively, as the pre-existing provision, the draft provision, and the present provision.

 Hereafter, the word “owner” will be used to refer to a person within the category described in the above quotation. At the time Professor Riesenfeld made his statement, the question whether a general contractor, who was not an owner or lessee of the work site, was included in that category had not been litigated. The question was subsequently decided in the negative in Lawrence v. Yamauchi, 50 Haw. 293, 439 P.2d 669 (1968) .