Court Opinion

ID: 9524224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:50:46.732254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:06.935344
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’MALLEY, specially concurring: While I concur in the judgment of the court, I write separately to explore the trial court’s conclusion that it lost jurisdiction over the matter after 30 days had elapsed and before it had entered a judgment on respondent’s motion for an extension of time to file a motion to reconsider. The trial court held that it lost jurisdiction over the case because no proper postjudgment motion had been filed within 30 days of the final order. In Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), our supreme court considered the nature of subject matter jurisdiction and the legislature’s ability to limit subject matter jurisdiction by statute. The court held that “ ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 334. Our supreme court held that, other than administrative review, “a circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state constitution,” and its subject matter jurisdiction “extends to all ‘justiciable matters.’ ” Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 334. Our supreme court defined “justiciable matter” as “a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335. Thus, the question arises as to the effect of section 2 — 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1203 (West 2004)) on the trial court’s jurisdiction over the cause after the expiration of the 30-day time period. Is it in the nature of a limitations period? Or is it something else entirely? One reasonable position is that it is a time limit, which may be the subject of an objection if it is not observed, but does not by itself divest the circuit court of jurisdiction. See DHR International, Inc. v. Winston & Strawn, 347 Ill. App. 3d 642, 649 (2004) (while Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2004)) created new justiciable matter, a failure to comply with a jurisdictional limit in the Uniform Arbitration Act may be the subject of an objection but does not by itself divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction). In other words, if the trial court ruled (erroneously) on the motion after the 30-day time limit of section 2 — 1203 of the Code had elapsed, the order would be voidable, not void. The circuit court would have jurisdiction over the matter beyond the 30-day limit of section 2 — 1203 of the Code, but it would be error, pursuant to section 2 — 1203 of the Code, to enter an order. The situation is muddied, because the expiration of the 30-day period has immemorially been termed “jurisdictional,” even after Belleville Toyota. On the other hand, the trial court’s statement that it lost jurisdiction is also reasonable. Once the final order was entered, arguably there was no longer “a controversy appropriate for review by the [trial] court, *** touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335. That had all been resolved by the final order. Under such a view, the 30-day limit of section 2 — 1203 of the Code is in fact jurisdictional, because after its expiration, the trial court cannot affect its judgment and loses all contact with the matter before it. In other words, the matter is no longer a justiciable matter over which the trial court would otherwise have jurisdiction. Thus, with the passing of the 30-day period, the trial court’s jurisdiction also lapses. Of course, if a losing party were to forgo filing a motion to reconsider and instead simply file a new action raising exactly the same issues, we would not say that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule that the matter was res judicata. I write separately because there appear to be two reasonable ways of looking at the issue. If we were to adopt the first view, then the trial court did not lose its subject matter jurisdiction over the cause, but it would have been error under section 2 — 1203 of the Code to grant respondent’s motion for an extension. Under the second view, the trial court did in fact lose jurisdiction. The difference in the two positions is significant. In the first view, the issue is waivable and an erroneous order entered by the trial court is voidable. In the second view, the issue cannot be waived and an order entered by the trial court on the motion would be void and subject to attack at any time, even years hence. Whether the trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction or not, its decision was in accord with the Code. Hence, I concur.