Court Opinion

ID: 9407646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 19:07:10.08226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.362144
License: Public Domain

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. William Francis Trezevant, AG No. 12,
September Term, 2022, Opinion by Booth, J.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION

Respondent William Francis Trezevant violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) 1.16(a) (Declining or Terminating Representation),
3.3(a) (Candor to the Tribunal), 4.1(a) (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 5.5(a)
(Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-jurisdictional Practice of Law), 8.1(a) (Bar
Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct).

Mr. Trezevant, an attorney who lives in Washington, D.C., is not admitted to the Maryland
Bar. Beginning in March 2021, Mr. Trezevant represented his great-niece in her child’s
custody case in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Mr. Trezevant did not inform the
attorney that he replaced that he was not barred in Maryland. Mr. Trezevant appeared at a
hearing without advising the court that he was not licensed to practice law in Maryland,
and without seeking admission pro hac vice. In subsequent communications with opposing
counsel and in a later circuit court proceeding, Mr. Trezevant knowingly and intentionally
claimed, falsely, that he had orally moved for admission pro hac vice at the prior hearing,
and that his motion had been granted. He then falsely told Bar Counsel that he had never
practiced law in Maryland and that he had made his role clear to the court in the child
custody case.

The Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that an indefinite suspension with the right to
petition for reinstatement in 90 days was the appropriate sanction.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No.: C-03-CV-22-003427
Oral Argument waived/submitted on papers

                                                                         IN THE SUPREME COURT
                                                                             OF MARYLAND

                                                                                  AG No. 12

                                                                            September Term, 2022

                                                                 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
                                                                         OF MARYLAND

                                                                                      v.

                                                                     WILLIAM FRANCIS TREZEVANT

                                                                             Fader, C.J.,
                                                                             Watts,
                                                                             Hotten,
                                                                             Booth,
                                                                             Biran,
                                                                             Gould,
                                                                             Eaves,

                                                                                    JJ.

                                                                             Opinion by Booth, J.

                                                                             Filed: July 7, 2023

                                                                * At the November 8, 2022 general election, the
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials     voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this
document is authentic.
                                                                amendment changing the name of the Court of
                 2023-07-07 14:27-04:00
                                                                Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of
                                                                Maryland. The name change took effect on
                                                                December 14, 2022.

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
      The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“the Commission”), acting

through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“the Petition”)

against Respondent, William Francis Trezevant, an attorney not licensed to practice law in

Maryland, alleging that he represented his great-niece in child custody hearings in the

Circuit Court for Baltimore County without moving for admission pro hac vice, and that

he knowingly and intentionally misrepresented his admission status on multiple occasions.

The Commission asserted that Mr. Trezevant violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of

Professional Conduct (“MARPC”)1 1.16(a) (Declining or Terminating Representation),

3.3(a) (Candor to the Tribunal), 4.1(a) (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 5.5(a)

(Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-jurisdictional Practice of Law), 8.1(a) (Bar

Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct).2

      The hearing judge assigned to this matter found by clear and convincing evidence

that Mr. Trezevant committed all of the violations alleged by the Commission. The hearing

judge also found the presence of six aggravating factors and one mitigating factor. Bar

Counsel recommends a sanction of indefinite suspension with the right to petition for

reinstatement in 90 days. Mr. Trezevant never answered the Petition, did not appear at the

      1
        Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,
which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules,
were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19,
Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. For ease of reference and comparison with our prior
opinions and those of other courts, we will refer to the MARPC rules using the numbering
of the model rules, as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22).
      2
         The Petition also charged Mr. Trezevant with violating Rules 1.1 (Competence)
and 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney), but those charges were withdrawn.
evidentiary hearing, did not file exceptions to the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, and waived oral argument before this Court. After considering the

matter on the papers, for the reasons stated below, we treat the hearing judge’s findings of

fact as established, concur with the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, and impose a

sanction of indefinite suspension with the right to petition for reinstatement in 90 days.

                                              I

                                 Procedural Background

       The Commission filed the Petition on August 10, 2022. Mr. Trezevant was served

with the Petition in September and with interrogatories and a request for production of

documents in October. He did not file an answer and did not respond to Bar Counsel’s

discovery requests. Bar Counsel moved for an order of default, which the hearing judge

granted. Mr. Trezevant did not move to vacate the order of default.

       An evidentiary hearing was held on December 9, 2022. Mr. Trezevant did not

appear. The hearing judge deemed the allegations in the Petition admitted pursuant to

Maryland Rules 2-613(f) and 19-727(a) and admitted into evidence Bar Counsel’s

Exhibits 1–35. Those exhibits included, among other things, the transcripts for two remote

hearings attended by Mr. Trezevant in connection with a custody case pending in the

Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and communications between Mr. Trezevant and his

great-niece’s prior attorney, opposing counsel, and Bar Counsel. The hearing judge

considered the evidence admitted at the hearing and issued Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law. Neither party filed exceptions.

                                             2
       Where no exceptions have been filed, this Court may accept the hearing judge’s

findings of fact as established. Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). We choose to do so here.

Accordingly, we treat as established the following facts, which the hearing judge found to

be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

                                             II

                                     Findings of Fact

       This case centers on Mr. Trezevant’s unauthorized representation of his great-niece,

C.A., in her child’s custody case in Baltimore County and his communications to Bar

Counsel regarding that representation.      Mr. Trezevant is an attorney who lives in

Washington, D.C. He is not a member of the Maryland Bar. He was admitted to the New

York Bar in 1994 and the Washington, D.C. Bar in 1996. At the time of the hearing, his

D.C. bar license was administratively suspended for non-payment of bar dues.

       Representation of C.A.

       C.A., then fourteen-years old, gave birth to D.S. on October 1, 2019. In January

2020, the Baltimore County Department of Social Services (“the Department”) filed a child

in need of assistance (“CINA”) petition on behalf of D.S. in the Circuit Court for Baltimore

County. The Department asserted that neither C.A.’s family members nor the family

members of D.S.’s father were suitable resources “due to ongoing family conflict and

violence.” The same day the Department filed its petition, the Office of the Public

Defender appointed a panel attorney, Shannon Stern, to represent C.A. The next day, the

circuit court placed D.S. in the Department’s custody, and the Department placed the baby

in foster care.

                                             3
       Over the course of the next year, C.A. sought to regain custody of D.S. However,

after an October 2020 emergency hearing, a November 2020 review hearing, and various

meetings with the Department related to those proceedings, a magistrate recommended that

D.S. remain in the Department’s custody and, in January 2021, a circuit court judge

adopted that recommendation. In March 2021, the circuit court scheduled a hearing for

April 1, 2021 to craft a permanent placement plan for D.S. Around that time, C.A.’s mother

asked Mr. Trezevant “to intervene on behalf of C.A.” in D.S.’s CINA case. On or about

March 1, C.A. informed her panel attorney, Ms. Stern, that she had retained Mr. Trezevant.

       On or about March 2, Ms. Stern called Mr. Trezevant to confirm that he now

represented C.A. The hearing judge found that, during the conversation, Mr. Trezevant

“did not disclose that he was not a Maryland attorney or that he was related to C.A.” The

same day, Ms. Stern sent Mr. Trezevant her case files and moved to strike her appearance

in D.S.’s CINA case. The circuit court entered an order stating that the motion to strike

“would be granted when C.A.’s new attorney entered an appearance in the case.”

       Mr. Trezevant appeared on behalf of C.A. at the remote April 1 permanency

planning review hearing before Magistrate Dilip Paliath. The hearing judge found that Mr.

Trezevant “had not sought special admission as an out of state attorney in the case or filed

any entry of appearance” and “failed to advise Magistrate Paliath that he was not admitted

to practice law in Maryland.” Mr. Trezevant advocated for adopting a plan to ultimately

place D.S. with C.A. at C.A.’s mother’s home, rather than a plan that called for

reunification with either parent. Magistrate Paliath adopted the plan proposed by the

                                             4
Department to reunify D.S. with either parent pending further information and efforts by

the parents to establish a home consistent with D.S.’s welfare.

       Later that month, Mr. Trezevant traded emails with two county employees. On

April 14, a social worker at the Department, Sabrina Jackson, emailed Mr. Trezevant to

ask if C.A. intended to attend a virtual visit with D.S. that afternoon. In his response, Mr.

Trezevant twice referred to C.A. as his client and demanded that Ms. Jackson call him

immediately to arrange a visitation schedule.       Ms. Jackson then requested that Mr.

Trezevant contact Assistant County Attorney Deborah Hermann, who represented the

Department. After he did so, Ms. Hermann “asked if [Mr. Trezevant’s] appearance was

entered in the case and advised that she could not speak with [him] unless his appearance

was entered.” The hearing judge found that Mr. Trezevant falsely replied that he “filed an

oral appearance at the last hearing” and was “received and accepted by the [magistrate], on

the record.”3 He also offered to file a written appearance. Ms. Hermann asked Mr.

Trezevant to do so and to confirm that he was licensed to practice law in Maryland. In

response, Mr. Trezevant accused Ms. Hermann of using an “administrative” issue to avoid

the merits of the case and also asserted that he was “not worried about [his] standing[,]”

reiterating that the circuit court had already “approved [his] standing and [his] appearance.”

       After being alerted to Mr. Trezevant’s apparent unauthorized practice of law by

Ms. Hermann, Judge Sherrie R. Bailey held a remote hearing on May 3 regarding Mr.

       3
        Based upon our review of the record, it is clear that Mr. Trezevant’s references to
the “judge” in the April proceeding are references to Magistrate Dilip Paliath. To avoid
confusion, we substitute the word “magistrate” for “judge” where appropriate.
                                              5
Trezevant’s representation of C.A. At that hearing, in response to questioning by Judge

Bailey, Mr. Trezevant admitted that he was not licensed to practice law in Maryland. When

Judge Bailey questioned Mr. Trezevant about the fact that he had not filed a written notice

of appearance and had not moved to appear pro hac vice, he stated to Judge Bailey that “I

thought that the last appearance that I made, I made the oral motion for my appearance. I

thought the [magistrate] granted that but I can certainly cure that with a written letter.”

And he stated, “I filed that, I thought orally, with the [magistrate], your colleague, pro hac

vice. And the [magistrate] granted that, I thought, at the time.” The hearing judge found

that these statements were “knowingly false and intended to deceive the Court regarding

[Mr. Trezevant’s] unauthorized practice of law.” The hearing judge determined Mr.

Trezevant “intentionally concealed” from Magistrate Paliath “that he was not authorized

to practice law in Maryland and misrepresented by omission that he was licensed to

practice law in Maryland.” At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Bailey vacated the

previous order that conditionally struck the appearance of C.A.’s panel attorney, Ms. Stern.

       Bar Counsel Investigation

       That same month, Bar Counsel initiated an investigation in response to a complaint

submitted by Judge Bailey. In a May 19 letter, Bar Counsel asked Mr. Trezevant to respond

to Judge Bailey’s allegations. Mr. Trezevant replied and asserted that he had not practiced

law in Maryland at all. He stated that he “ha[d] not engage[d] in the Practice of Law in the

state of Maryland[,]” “appeared in the hearings making clear [his] role[,]” and “never held

forth, sought, advertised, or represented [him]self as an attorney barred in Maryland.” The

hearing judge found that these statements were “knowingly false.”

                                              6
                                             III

                    Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct

       Based upon the record and the above-summarized findings of fact, the hearing judge

concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Trezevant violated MARPC 1.16(a)

(Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.3(a) (Candor to the Tribunal),

4.1(a) (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 5.5(a) (Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multi-

jurisdictional Practice of Law), 8.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and

8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct). We review the hearing judge’s conclusions of law without

deference, see Rule 19-740(b)(1), and independently determine whether Bar Counsel

established a violation of the rules by clear and convincing evidence, Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Silbiger, 478 Md. 607, 617, 624 (2022). Based upon our independent review

of these conclusions, we agree that the Commission established by clear and convincing

evidence that Mr. Trezevant violated each of these rules. We begin with the central

violation, Rule 5.5(a).

       Unauthorized Practice of Law (Rule 5.5(a))

       Under Rule 5.5(a), “[a]n attorney shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation

of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction[.]” In other words, “[a]n

attorney may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the attorney is authorized to

practice.” MARPC 5.5, Comment 1. However, “[a]n attorney admitted in another United

States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may

provide legal services on a temporary basis” in Maryland in certain circumstances,

including where the services “are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential

                                              7
proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the attorney . . . is authorized

by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized[.]”

MARPC 5.5(c)(2). A tribunal may authorize temporary admission “pursuant to formal

rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal[.]”

MARPC 5.5, Comment 9; see also Md. Rule 19-217 (describing formal rules for admission

pro hac vice); Md. Code, Bus. Occup. & Prof. Article (“BOP”) § 10-215 (incorporating

the same).

       We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Trezevant violated

Rule 5.5(a). Although it is impossible to “craft an all-encompassing definition” for the

practice of law, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jackson, 477 Md. 174, 200–01, 200 n.11

(2022) (cleaned up), there can be little doubt that an attorney does so where an attorney

agrees to provide legal representation to a client, and then appears in court and

communicates with opposing counsel and advocates on the client’s behalf. Making

arguments on behalf of a client in open court requires legal knowledge and skill and is the

quintessential practice of law. Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zhang, 440 Md. 128,

167 (2014) (concluding that “preparing for hearings [is an] action[] routinely taken by

lawyers in the practice of law”). Mr. Trezevant, who is not admitted to practice in

Maryland, did just that. He agreed to represent C.A. in her child’s CINA case. In fulfilling

that role, he coordinated with C.A.’s prior attorney and negotiated with the Department on

C.A.’s behalf. Most importantly, he attended a permanency planning review hearing

before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County in the CINA case. During the hearing, he

argued in favor of reuniting C.A. with her child. He did not take steps to obtain court

                                               8
authorization to appear in the custody case, as required by Rule 5.5(c), before, during, or

after the April hearing. Mr. Trezevant practiced law without authorization in Maryland.

       Declining Representation (Rule 1.16(a))

       Rule 1.16(a) states that “an attorney shall not represent a client or, where

representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the

representation will result in violation of the [MARPC] or other law[.]” The hearing judge

found that Mr. Trezevant violated Rule 1.16(a)(1) because Rule 5.5(a), as discussed above,

and BOP § 10-601, discussed infra, barred him from representing C.A. without

authorization from the court. Nevertheless, he represented C.A. in the CINA case by

coordinating with her prior attorney to take on the case and appearing at the April hearing

without making any effort to gain admission pro hac vice. For the same reasons that we

conclude that Mr. Trezevant violated Rules 5.5(a) and BOP § 10-601, we conclude that he

violated Rule 1.16(a)(1).

       Candor to the Tribunal (Rule 3.3(a))

       Rule 3.3(a) provides that “an attorney shall not knowingly: (1) make a false

statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or

law previously made to the tribunal by the attorney[.]” Rule 3.3 commands that “‘[a]n

attorney must be candid at all times with a tribunal or inquiry board.’” Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Wemple, 479 Md. 167, 196 (2022) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Ambe, 466 Md. 270, 295 (2019)). This duty applies just as forcefully to omissions of

material facts as it does to false assertions of fact. See Wemple, 479 Md. at 197 (omitting

fact that attorney’s bar license was suspended); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kane, 465

                                              9
Md. 667, 717 (2019) (omitting existence of another proceeding); MARPC 3.3, Comment

3 (“There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an

affirmative misrepresentation.”). We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that

Mr. Trezevant twice violated Rule 3.3(a)(1). First, “he appeared at the April 1[ ] hearing

on behalf of C.A. and intentionally omitted, with the intent to deceive, the fact that he was

not licensed to practice law in Maryland.” Second, he appeared at the May 3 hearing and

“knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Judge Bailey that Magistrate Paliath

granted his oral motion to appear pro hac vice during the April 1[ ] hearing.” As should

be clear by now, Mr. Trezevant was not admitted to the Maryland Bar and was not specially

admitted during the April hearing.

       Truthfulness in Statements to Others (Rule 4.1(a))

       Rule 4.1(a) states that “[i]n the course of representing a client an attorney shall not

knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person[.]” As in

Rule 3.3, “[m]isrepresentations can [] occur by partially true but misleading statements or

omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements.”            MARPC 4.1,

Comment 1; see also Zhang, 440 Md. at 166 (same). We agree with the hearing judge’s

conclusion that Mr. Trezevant twice violated Rule 4.1(a)(1). First, he communicated with

C.A.’s prior attorney, Ms. Stern; the social worker, Ms. Jackson; and the Assistant County

Attorney, Ms. Hermann, and “misrepresented by omission the fact that he was not licensed

to practice law in Maryland.” Second, he knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to

Ms. Hermann, in two separate emails, that he had been “received and accepted” by the

magistrate, who had “approved [his] standing” at the April 1 hearing, and that his motion

                                             10
for admission was granted. All these representations were misleading and the equivalent

of affirmative false statements.

       General Misconduct (Rule 8.4(a)–(d))

       Rule 8.4(a) provides that an attorney commits professional misconduct if the

attorney “violate[s] or attempt[s] to violate the [MARPC], knowingly assist[s] or induce[s]

another to do so, or do[es] so through the acts of another.” As a result of Mr. Trezevant’s

violations of other disciplinary rules, the hearing judge found, and we agree, that he

violated Rule 8.4(a).

       Under Rule 8.4(b), it is professional misconduct for an attorney to “commit a

criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as

an attorney in other respects[.]” An attorney may be disciplined for criminal conduct for

which he is neither charged nor convicted if Bar Counsel proves by clear and convincing

evidence that (1) the attorney committed a crime, and (2) the criminal act reflects adversely

on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as an attorney. Silbiger, 478 Md. at 629; Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Yates, 467 Md. 287, 301 (2020); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Collins, 477 Md. 482, 508 (2022).

       We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Trezevant violated

Rule 8.4(b) because Bar Counsel proved that he violated BOP § 10-601(a), which states

that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a person may not practice, attempt to practice,

or offer to practice law in the State unless admitted to the Bar.” “A person who violates

BOP § 10-601 is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not

exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both.” BOP § 10-606(a)(3).

                                             11
We have previously determined that a violation of Rule 5.5 “supports the conclusion, by

clear and convincing evidence, that [an attorney] also violated the unauthorized practice

provisions of the Business Occupations and Professions Article[,]” which includes § 10-

601(a). Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gerace, 433 Md. 632, 645–46 (2013) (citation

omitted). In addition, the “unauthorized practice of law is unquestionably a criminal act

that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness” and violates Rule

8.4(b). Id. at 646 (cleaned up). For the same reasons that we conclude that Mr. Trezevant

violated Rule 5.5, we conclude that he violated BOP § 10-601(a) and Rule 8.4(b).

       Under Rule 8.4(c), it is professional misconduct to “engage in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” The hearing judge concluded that the

misrepresentations made by Mr. Trezevant that violated Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 4.1(a)(1),

discussed above, also violated Rule 8.4(c). The hearing judge also concluded that the

misrepresentations made by Mr. Trezevant to Bar Counsel that form the basis for a

violation of Rule 8.1(a), discussed infra, constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(c). For the same

reasons that we conclude that Mr. Trezevant violated Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.1(a)(1), and 8.1(a),

we conclude that he violated Rule 8.4(c).

       Under Rule 8.4(d), it is professional misconduct to “engage in conduct that is

prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” We have held that both practicing law

without authorization and making misrepresentations to Bar Counsel violate Rule 8.4(d).

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hecht, 459 Md. 133, 154–55 (2018). As already discussed,

Mr. Trezevant did both. We therefore conclude that he violated Rule 8.4(d).

                                             12
       Impeding Bar Counsel’s Investigation (Rule 8.1(a))

       Rule 8.1(a) states that “[a]n applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or

an attorney in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a

disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact[.]” We

agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Trezevant violated Rule 8.1(a) when he

“knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel” that he: (1) “did not engage

in the practice of law in the State of Maryland”; (2) “made his ‘role clear’ when he appeared

at the hearings on C.A.’s behalf”; and (3) “never ‘held forth, sought, advertised, or

represented [himself] as an attorney barred in Maryland.’”

                                              IV

                                          Sanction

       “When selecting a sanction in an attorney discipline case, we do so keeping in mind

that our goal is to protect the public and deter future misconduct rather than to punish the

attorney.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Davenport, 472 Md. 20, 35 (2021) (citation

omitted). “The sanction should be ‘commensurate with the nature and gravity of the

violations and the intent with which they were committed.’” Jackson, 477 Md. at 215

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 537 (2003)). To determine

the appropriate sanction, we consider the facts of the particular case, as well as the presence

of any aggravating and mitigating factors. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477

Md. 576, 607 (2022).

                                              13
       Aggravating Factors

       Aggravating factors “militate in favor of a more severe sanction.”           Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 233 (2020) (cleaned up).                 Consulting

Standard 9.22 of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standards for Imposing

Sanctions, we have recognized a broad set of potential aggravating factors. See, e.g.,

Bonner, 477 Md. at 608 and n.16 (listing the recognized aggravating factors). In this case,

the hearing judge found that Bar Counsel had proven the existence of six aggravating

factors: (1) a dishonest motive; (2) a pattern of misconduct; (3) multiple offenses; (4) bad

faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding; (5) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful

nature of one’s conduct; and (6) substantial experience in the practice of law.

       We conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the

hearing judge’s findings on all six factors.      Mr. Trezevant’s dishonest motive was

demonstrated by his intentional concealment of his inability to practice law in Maryland

and misrepresentation that he had been allowed to appear in C.A.’s case by the magistrate

at the April hearing. He engaged in a pattern of misconduct by practicing law without

authorization and making numerous misrepresentations about that fact to, among others,

the court, opposing counsel, and Bar Counsel. He committed multiple offenses for the

reasons provided above. His misrepresentations to Bar Counsel amounted to bad faith

obstruction of this disciplinary proceeding. Mr. Trezevant has not acknowledged the

wrongful nature of his conduct, let alone participated in this proceeding. Lastly, Mr.

Trezevant is an experienced attorney, having first been admitted to the New York Bar

nearly thirty years ago.

                                            14
      Mitigating Factors

      Mitigating factors militate in favor of a less severe sanction. We look to ABA

Standard 9.32 for guidance on potential mitigating factors. Bonner, 477 Md. at 609 & n.17

(listing the recognized mitigating factors). Mr. Trezevant did not participate in the

evidentiary hearing in this matter, and therefore did not present any evidence concerning

mitigating factors. Bar Counsel represented to the hearing judge that Mr. Trezevant had

no prior disciplinary complaints. Based upon Bar Counsel’s representation, the hearing

judge found the presence of one mitigating factor: the absence of a prior disciplinary

record. We agree with the hearing judge’s finding.

      Indefinite Suspension Is the Appropriate Sanction

      Bar Counsel recommends that Mr. Trezevant be indefinitely suspended from the

practice of law in Maryland with the right to petition for reinstatement in 90 days. In

support of that sanction, Bar Counsel directs us to cases involving instances of the

unauthorized practice of law: Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hunt, 447 Md. 275

(2016); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Harris-Smith, 356 Md. 72 (1999); and Attorney

Grievance Commission v. Barneys, 370 Md. 566 (2002).

      In Hunt, this Court analyzed the spectrum of cases involving the unauthorized

practice of law and imposed a 60-day suspension for an out-of-state attorney who

represented a defendant pro bono in a criminal case in the District Court and then made a

false statement to Bar Counsel claiming that he had been admitted pro hac vice to the

Maryland Bar. 447 Md. at 289–96. We stated that the attorney’s limited, albeit deliberate

and willful appearance in the District Court warranted a 60-day suspension. Id. at 294–96.

                                           15
In reaching the sanction, we analyzed cases ranging from a 30-day suspension to

disbarment. Id. at 289–94. The low end was Harris-Smith, where we imposed a 30-day

suspension on an attorney who engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but did not

represent clients in court and made some effort to conduct her practice within the

jurisdictional limits associated with her admission to the United States District Court for

the District of Maryland. 356 Md. at 74–78, 92. The high end was Barneys, where we

disbarred a non-Maryland attorney who established a law office in Maryland and

represented multiple clients in state court. 370 Md. at 571–74, 589–92.

       Bar Counsel asserts, and we agree, that Mr. Trezevant’s conduct is more egregious

than the misconduct in Harris-Smith and Hunt. In addition to his improper representation

of C.A. in the circuit court and subsequent misrepresentations to Bar Counsel,

Mr. Trezevant made misrepresentations by omission and intentional misrepresentations to

the court, opposing counsel, and Bar Counsel on multiple occasions. Nevertheless, Mr.

Trezevant’s conduct is less egregious than that in Barneys, where the attorney established

an office in Maryland, represented multiple clients in state court, and engaged in repeated

dishonest and deceitful conduct.

       Knowing where Mr. Trezevant’s conduct falls on the spectrum of unauthorized-

practice cases, we find it helpful to turn for additional guidance to our dishonest-conduct

cases, in which we have held that dishonesty and knowingly false statements are assessed

on an individual basis and a sanction less than disbarment may be imposed “where the

dishonest conduct does not involve theft, fraud, harm to a client or third party, or the

intentional misappropriation of funds.” Collins, 477 Md. at 530. Bar Counsel points us to

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Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mooney, where we indefinitely suspended an attorney,

with the right to petition for reinstatement after 90 days, who, in addition to incompetently

handling several client matters, made knowing misrepresentations to his client’s mother

with the intent to mislead her and the client regarding the action he had taken in the case.

359 Md. 56, 85–86, 87–88 (2000).

       With Harris-Smith, Hunt, and Mooney in mind, we conclude that Mr. Trezevant’s

unauthorized practice of law, misrepresentations to the court, opposing counsel, and Bar

Counsel, together with the presence of the aggravating factors described above, warrant an

indefinite suspension with the right to petition for reinstatement after 90 days.

                                           IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
                                           SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
                                           THE    CLERK   OF   THIS   COURT,
                                           PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19-
                                           709, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
                                           ENTERED    IN   FAVOR    OF  THE
                                           ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
                                           AGAINST      WILLIAM      FRANCIS
                                           TREZEVANT.

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