Court Opinion

ID: 9561054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:01:48.115014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:30.421176
License: Public Domain

Fatzer, J.,
dissenting: In my opinion the pleadings and findings of . the trial court do not support the judgment permanently enjoining the commission from proceeding with a vital highway improvement under the police power of the state pursuant to G. S. 1949, 68-404, 68-406 and 68-407, and the proposed restriction of plaintiffs’ right of access to and from the traveled portions of 75th street and U. S. Highway 69 is not unreasonable under all the circumstances. Of the 83.5 feet of plaintiffs’ east boundary abutting U. S. Highway 69, 60 feet is made available for ingress and egress to and from the street and highway by two entrances, and the corner curbing is reasonably necessary to make a proper place for and to guard the traffic signal at this dangerous intersection. Except for the curbing around the corner, plaintiffs’ northern boundary abutting 75th street is unaffected.
As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158:
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of tire diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts. The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power. . . .
“. . . As we already have said, this is a question of degree — and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. . . .” (pp. 413, 416.)
See, also, Creasy v. Stevens, 160 F. Supp., 404, 410.
Furthermore, courts may not substitute their judicial judgment for the judgment of the commission exercised under valid legisla*667tíve acts, rather courts are obliged to find facts which demonstrate that the commission’s conduct departs from the realm of the reasonable and passes over into the realm of the arbitrary and capricious (Spurgeon v. Board of Commissioners, 181 Kan. 1008, 1014, 317 P. 2d 798, and cases cited therein).
The right of access does not extend to all points of the boundary between plaintiffs’ property and the street and highway. The extent of that right is the real question here presented. Its measure, I think, is simply reasonable ingress and egress to and from the street and highway under all the circumstances. The extent of the right of access may be said to be that which is reasonably required, giving consideration to the purpose to which the property is adapted (64 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations, § 1703, p. 99).
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment for the defendant.