Court Opinion

ID: 9760582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:01:21.492852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:13.348857
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
As Judge Dally demonstrated in Shipman v. State, 604 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980), almost one hundred years of precedent supports the rules there followed, viz:
“When a witness is cross-examined on a collateral matter, the cross-examining party may not then contradict the witness’ answer, [citations dating to 1889 omitted], A matter is collateral if the cross-examining party would not be entitled to prove that matter as a part of his case tending to establish his plea, [citations dating to 1883 omitted].”
Id., at 183-184.1 It is not that “by clever maneuvering” the prosecutor “procured the defendant’s denial of prior intoxication,” in Shipman, as Judge McCormick would have it in his concurring opinion in Ex parte Carter, 621 S.W.2d 786, at 789 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Application of the rules is not conditioned on whether a prosecutor is “clever,” on the one hand, or “innocent,” on the other. The Shipman Court found that “[t]he circumstances in Carter cannot be distinguished from those in the present case: in both cases, the misleading statement which the State sought to contradict was made on cross-examination.” Id., at 184 [emphasis added by Judge Dally], “The State may not rely on its own questioning on cross-examination to contradict the defendant and get in evidence collateral matters_which would otherwise be inadmissible.” Id., at 185.
Moreover, a long standing rule in this State binds the crossexaminer to answers given to questions on collateral matters, viz:
“When a witness is cross-examined on a matter collateral to the issue, his answer cannot be subsequently contradicted by the party putting the question.”
1 Branch’s Penal Code (2nd Ed.) 200, § 188; also at 221, § 200; Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Mauldin v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 405, 308 S.W.2d 36 (1958) (where deceased was shot with gun that accused on crossexamination by prosecutor testified he never carried a knife was immaterial matter not authorizing impeachment by further crossexamination showing that he had in the past), and other authorities cited and discussed in Grigsby v. State, 653 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Miller, J., dissenting).
To “distinguish” Shipman is to weaken the salutary rules it follows.2 In Mauldin, *363supra, accused also testified falsely that he had never carried a gun, still the Court held the trial court erred in permitting the State to show that he had. It followed a like holding in Driehs v. State, 164 Tex. Cr.R. 455, 301 S.W.2d 128 (1957), explicating the reason for the rule by quoting from 1 Branch’s Penal Code (2nd Ed.) 199, § 187, viz:
“Impeaching a material witness on an immaterial matter is reversible error, because, by discrediting the witness and showing the jury that upon an immaterial issue he testified falsely, it is calculated to make the jury believe that he may have testified falsely in regard to other matters which are material.”
A host of cases is cited in support of that proposition, none of which appear to have been overruled.
Accordingly, adhering to Shipman, I dissent.
TEAGUE, J., joins.

. All emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise indicated.

. In the instant cause the prosecutor ventured into collateral matters when she argumentatively asked, “If you were so concerned about cooperating with him, why didn’t you wait for law enforcement people to get there?” When appellant answered that he “got scared,” she pressed on with "Scared of what?” To that global question, she got an answer the State claims left "a false impression.”
A crossexaminer who broaches collateral matters runs a good risk of getting collateral answers, yet the crossexaminer "must ‘take the answer.’ ’’ See generally Bates v. State, supra, at 140 (Opinion on Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing), especially the "safeguarding rule” as stated by Professor McCormick at 141.