Court Opinion

ID: 9744103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:53:34.399906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.743688
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
At the time of appellant's plea of guilty on November 4, 1981, the court receiving the plea was governed by a statute which required the court to personally address eriminal defendants and to inform them "of any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of prior conviction or convie-tions, ..". IC. 85-4.1-1-3(d) [amended and recodified at Ind.Code 85-35-1-2, effective September 1, 1982] The trial court was commanded in simple and unequivocal language not to accept a plea of guilty until that chore was accomplished.
On March 19, 1984, appellant filed his post-conviction petition seeking to withdraw his plea of guilty. The post-conviction court found specifically as a matter of fact that the court had not advised petitioner as required by the above quoted provision, and that the information was not within the written plea agreement. The post-conviction court nevertheless denied post-conviction relief because the right to receive information about the manner in which prior convictions impact the sentencing decision was a statutory right and not a constitutional right,. The governing statute in clear and unambiguous fashion mandates that a ".. court shall not accept .." a plea of guilty like this one. Such a plea is not acceptable and shall not be received by a court of law. The mischief aimed at is the plea in ignorance of pertinent considerations. The remedy is legal inefficacy of the plea. The intent of the legislature and the statute require no construction. It extends protection for basic liberties. It is not unconstitutional nor is it a procedural statute in conflict with a rule of this court. It extends a benefit to those accused of crime. There is no room for judicial reticence in the enforcement of such statutes. To affirm this post-conviction judgment is *209to simply override the clear legislative will without determining that such will is contrary to our constitutions or is procedural in nature and contrary to an existing rule of this court. This court has no such authority.