Court Opinion

ID: 9703593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:01:28.983888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:50.494299
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’MALLEY, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision on this case. I agree with defendants that Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984), is directly on point and that the issue presented here should be decided in conformance with that holding. In response to defendants’ interrogatories, plaintiff listed her attorney as a witness because she apparently called him immediately after her fall at Brak Realty. He then took her to the emergency room. Pursuant to defendants’ motion, the attorney was disqualified. As acknowledged by the majority, although the motion was predicated upon Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (134 Ill. 2d R. 3.7) (attorney as potential witness), it is unclear whether the court based its decision on Rule 3.7 or some other reason. There was no record of any kind presented to this court which illuminated the basis for the decision. It is well settled that it is the appellant’s burden to provide this court with an adequate record on which to base its review. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92; see also Sapp v. Industrial Comm’n, 222 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1070 (1991). The reasons for plaintiffs failure to provide such a record is as much a mystery as the reasons for the trial court’s ruling. It may be that there was no court reporter, as defendants state, but that circumstance is easily addressed in a number of ways. A bystanders report is permitted by Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(c)) or an agreed statement of facts authorized under Rule 323(d) (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(d)) could have been filed. Either might have provided the reasons for the disqualification at issue. I agree with the majority that the trial court should state its reasons for the disqualification at issue. I agree with the majority that the trial court should state its reasons for any ruling; nonetheless the primary responsibility for providing a complete record falls squarely on the appellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. Contrary to the majority’s holding, I would not shift the burden to the trial court. Nor do I see the disqualification of plaintiffs counsel of choice in this case as a serious infringement of her right to pursue her case. If the case has merit, there will be numerous lawyers willing to represent her. Here, plaintiff has wholly failed to provide an adequate record. I see no reason under these facts to ignore the long-established rule enunciated in Foutch, that any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record are to be resolved against the appellant and the trial judge is presumed to have correctly followed the law. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. This rule has been consistently followed in numerous cases. See, e.g., Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 546-47 (1996); Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp. v. Heber, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1080 (2005); In re K.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 830, 832 (2000); In re Marriage of Drewitch, 263 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1096 (1994); Leggett v. Kumar, 212 Ill. App. 3d 255, 274 (1991). I therefore would affirm the trial court.