Court Opinion

ID: 9528881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:44:57.273676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:26.428591
License: Public Domain

McINTYRE, Justice
(dissenting).
It seems to me the majority opinion entirely overlooks the controlling language in § IS.1-338, W.S.19S7, C. 1965, together with the fact that the legal owners of record of *300more than one-half of the area of the property subject to assessment protested against making of “the improvements” within the only “assessment district” involved. This section clearly provides that, when such protests are filed, the proposed improvements “within that district” shall be abandoned.
Section 15.1-338, after providing that the owners of property situated within the proposed assessment district may file with the city clerk their written objections to the proposed improvement, then states :
“If protests against the making of the improvements are filed by the legal owners of record of more than one half of the area of the property subject to assessment therefor, within an assessment district, then the proposed improvements within that district shall be abandoned.” [Emphasis supplied.]
Without getting hung up on a lot of argument about whether the amended ordinance here involved constituted an amendment of what had been previously initiated, or an entirely new beginning, it cannot be denied that the amendment has to do with “the [same] improvements.” Also, it has to do with identically the same “assessment district.”
It is agreed in this case that the principal change in the amended ordinance is the change of estimated cost from $991,509.30 to $1,119,073.00. It stands to reason that those opposed to the improvements at a cost of $991,509.30 would be all the more opposed to “the improvements” at a cost of $1,119,073.00.
If there be any doubt about references being made to substantially the same improvements and to the same assessment district, we need to look only to the amended ordinance itself. In the title these words are used: “AN AMENDED ORDINANCE CONCERNING THE CREATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF * * * LOCAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 12 * * *.” It is apparent, and important to note, that references in the first ordinance and in the amended ordinance are to the same improvements and to the same improvement district — Local Improvement District No. 12.
Parties agree that protests against the making of “the improvements” were filed by the legal owners of record of more than one-half of the area of the property subject to assessment therefor, within Local Improvement District No. 12, if all protests filed against making of “the improvements”, within Local Improvement District No. 12, are counted. If proper interpretation and meaning is given to the language used in § 15.1-338, I certainly know of no reason why all such protests should not be counted. If so counted, then the proposed improvements within that district (District No. 12) must be abandoned.
As stated in 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 412, p. 454, where an amendatory ordinance is enacted which re-enacts some of the provisions of the former ordinance, such portions of the old ordinance as are repeated or retained, either literally or substantially, are to be regarded as continuations of the old ordinance and not as the enactment of a new ordinance on the subject or as a repeal of the former ordinance.1 That would be especially applicable in the situation we are dealing with, where our consideration is merely whether we are talking about substantially the same improvements and the same local improvement district.
It is obvious that the city council in this case maintains and believes the second ordinance to be an amended ordinance. It was denominated “an amended ordinance.” It was based on an “amended resolution declaring the intention of the City.” It retained the same number (No. 12) for the improvement district. As pointed out by the district court, it changed the first ordi*301nance only slightly. If the second ordinance did not amend and thus replace the first ordinance, then two inconsistent ordinances remain in the ordinance book.
In State v. Holly Sugar Corporation, 57 Wyo. 272, 116 P.2d 847, 851, the Supreme Court of Wyoming recognized the principle that whether an act is an amendment of a prior act is to be determined by a comparison of their provisions, and although the amendment purports to be complete in itself, if it intermingles different provisions with the old ones or adds new provisions, then the new one is amendato-ry. Also, if a subsequent statute does in fact modify and change the proceedings to be had under a former act, the latter act is an amendment of the earlier act and must be so regarded and treated.
It is a bit difficult for me to understand how the lower court and this court can resolve the controversy here involved on the basis of res judicata. The present lawsuit attacks rights and relations resulting from the amended enactment. The doctrine of res judicata generally extends only to facts and conditions as they existed at the time the former judgment was rendered and does not apply where there are new facts which did not exist at the time of the prior judgment. Johnson v. Flemming, 10 Cir., 264 F.2d 322, 324.
I have emphasized the language used in § 15.1-338, suggesting that all protests filed against “the improvements” which are involved, within Local Improvement District No. 12, should be counted. This question could not possibly have been dealt with or resolved at the time of the original judgment. Therefore, for purposes of a consideration of the points I am raising in this opinion, res judicata has no application.
In my opinion, the case should be reversed and the city council should be ordered to abandon the proposed improvements within District No. 12.