Court Opinion

ID: 9569507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:30.633634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:22.201720
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that this case should be reversed, but I perceive no purpose to be served by a new trial generally.
The trial court prepared and filed a comprehensive, written memorandum decision, in which the following statements are contained:
*385“On July 14, 1960 the parties to this action signed a written lease for a generally understood part of the projected building and Richard J. Gunn promised an opening date in late October, 1960. Under the prior oral understanding, an opening date of September 1 had been agreed upon and the July and August shoe deliveries were contracted for an opening on that date.”
“. . . The defendants breached their agreement to so construct and lease a part of the new building on Main Street.”
It is clear from these statements and from other language throughout the memorandum decision that the trial court found both that the lease agreements had been made as alleged and that the defendants had breached them. Those findings are unmistakably supported by solid and substantial evidence.
As I understand the trial court’s decision, judgment was entered in defendants’ favor solely on the basis that the damages claimed by plaintiff for breach of the lease were just not recoverable under the surrounding circumstances. In so deciding, the trial court misconceived the proper measure of damages. The correct rule to be applied is pointed out in this court’s majority opinion.
The question as to the defendants’ liability, having already been resolved by the trial court, tihis case in my judgment comes within the purview of G. S. 1949, 60-3004, which was in effect at all times material herein. The final sentence of this statute provides substantially that where issues are separable, a new trial shall be had only as to the issues wherein the decision is wrong. This point is plainly illustrated in Carlgren v. Saindon, 129 Kan. 475, 283 Pac. 620, where the court said:
“When specific controverted issues have been once determined in a trial, either before the court, or the court and the jury, and some points at issue have not been determined, or have been improperly determined, where the points determined and those not determined are sufficiently distinct from each other that there is no necessity of retrying all issues in order to determine those which had not been determined, there is no occasion for retrying the issues determined. A retrial, if necessary, should be of the issues only which have not been determined. . . .” (pp. 479, 480.)
See also Hukle v. Kimble, 172 Kan. 630, 638, 243 P. 2d 225, and the cases therein cited.
For the reasons above stated, I respectfully submit that a new trial should be had on the issue of damages only.
Wertz, J., joins in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.