Court Opinion

ID: 7811197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:13:02.624752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:27.513543
License: Public Domain

Hart, J., (dissenting). Judge Humphreys and myself think that the learned trial judge had the right idea of the law when he at first announced that the jury would not be permitted to go to the scene of the killing and experiment by shooting loaded shells in the shotgun charged to have been the one used by the defendant in the commission of the homicide, and that reversible error was committed by afterwards allowing them to make such experiments in the absence of the presiding judge. Our Constitution guarantees that- every person accused of' a crime shall have a speedy and public trial and shall not be deprived of liberty or life without due process of law. These provisions imply that the trial shall be conducted in Open court and under the protection of the court. The only power that gives efficacy to these constitutional guarantees is the trial court. The trial judge is not only an essential part of the court but he is the controlling part of the court. This court has never before announced a principle of law from which it could be deduced that the trial judge could be absent during tbe taking of evidence in a case where the life of a human being depends upon the issue. It has been well said that his immediate presence tends to preserve the legal solemnity and security of the trial and upholds the majesty of the law. The guilty as well as the innocent are entitled to be tried according to law in the immediate presence of the trial court, and this cannot be done where evidence is taken by the jury in the absence of the court and at another place than where the court is authorized by law to be held. Heretofore the court has gone no further than to hold that the defendant might waive his constitutional right to be confronted by the State’s witnesses and his statutory right to be present at the trial during the whole of its progress. In Davidson v. State, 108 Ark. 191, the court held that the defendant might waive his personal presence when the verdict was returned. It is true that in McVay v. State, 104 Ark. 629, the court held that the defendant might waive the fact that the trial judge, during the argument of counsel in a capital case, absented himself from the court for a few minutes where it was affirmatively shown that no misconduct occurred during such absence. The court, however, assigned as a reason for so holding that the argument of counsel might be waived altogether, and that, if the parties had the right to waive argument of the case, they might waive the presence of the court during the portion of the argument where it was affirmatively shown that no prejudice resulted to the defendant from such course. No such reason exists for the presiding judge being absent while testimony was being taken. The defendant was indicted and tried for murder in the first degree. The jury returned a' verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree and fixed the punishment of the defendant at life imprisonment in the State penitentiary. Our statute provides that the jury shall, in all cases of murder on conviction of the accused, find by their verdict whether he be guilty.of murder in the first or second degree; and that if the accused confesses guilt the court shall empanel the jury and the degree of the crime shall be found by such jury. In construing this statute this court has held that where a defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment for murder in the first degree it is reversible error to sentence him without ordering a jury to be impaneled to find the degree of murder. Lancaster v. State, 71 Ark. 100. It will be noted that the statute provided that the jury shall find by their verdict whether the accused is guilty of murder in the first or second degree. In Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. p. 1, Mr. Justice Gray who delivered the opinion óf the court, said: “ ‘Trial by jury,’ in the primary and usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial by a jury of twelve men before an officer vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and impaneled, to administer oaths to them and to the constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue execution on their verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or' the evidence. This proposition has been so generally admitted, and so seldom contested, that there has been little occasion for its distinct assertion. Yet there are unequivocal statements of it to be found in the books.” It has been well said that one of the excellencies of a trial by jury is that the judge is always present at the time of the evidence given in it. Therefore, under' our Constitution and laws, we think that the trial judge cannot be absent while evidence is being taken during the trial of an accused indicted for murder in the first degree. The defendant charged with murder in the first degree must be tried in open court before the court, and not before the jury sent out by the judge to gather evidence while away from the court and away from the accused. In Ellerbee v. State of Mississippi, 41 L. R. A. 569, Judge Whitfield, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: “If this error were merely a' technical one, not vital in its nature, we would not, for’that alone, reverse the judgment. But the error here is of the gravest character. It goes to the very organization and constitution of the court trying the appellant on a charge of murder. So far as the lawful power of this court can be exerted, in affirming convictions for violations of the law of the land, it shall be exerted. And mere technical errors, without intrinsic merit, when we can, after a careful and thorough examination of the whole case, confidently say that the right result has been reached, that substantial justice has been done, and that, on a new trial, no other result could reasonably be arrived at, will not avail here for reversal, in civil or criminal cases. But when the defendant has been, as here, denied a right secured to him by the Constitution and the laws of the land, in a matter going to the very constitution of the court trying him, we are compelled to reverse the case. In cases the interests of society, the stability of the laws, the due administration of justice, demand a reversal. Disregard of fundamental right in the case of the guiltiest defendant, his conviction in violation of settled constitutional and legal safeguards, intended for the protection of all, are not things which affect the particular defendant in a given case alone, but, in their disastrous and far-reaching consequences, involve, in future trials, the innocent and guilty alike, subvert justice, and disorganize society. Guilt should be punished certainly, and condignly, most assuredly; but guilt must be manifested in accordance with the law of the land. Else some day the innocent, who are sometimes called to answer at the bar of their country, may come to find themselves involved in a common ruin, deprived of the legal trial necessary to the vindication of their innocence.” The constitutional provision that the accused must be confronted by the State’s witnesses and the statutory provision that the defendant must be present at the trial are provisions for the benefit of the accused and we have held that he may waive them. On the other hand, the provision of the Constitution that the accused is not to be deprived .of his life or liberty without due process of law involves the whole public, and neither he nor the State may waive it. The difference is vital. One is for the benefit of the accused, and the other is for the benefit of society. A jury may not convict an accused unless the law and the evidence warrants the conviction. The jury is the judge of the evidence, and the court is the judge of the law. Therefore, it is necessary that both the presiding judge and the jury be present whenever any evidence in the case is taken.