Court Opinion

ID: 9681296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:47:42.467299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:33.150454
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
COLEMAN, Justice.
In support of application for rehearing, plaintiff says that even if § 173, Title 48, is merely a procedural statute requiring the defendant railroad to produce evidence, nevertheless, we should “hold that it is not reversible error merely to read the statute but that defendant is entitled to an explanatory charge if it so desires.”
Plaintiff invokes the rule that, generally, the giving of a charge containing a correct proposition of law, though the charge be misleading, is not reversible error, the remedy being for the opposite party to request an explanatory charge. United Insurance Co. of America v. Ray, 275 Ala. *322411, 416, 155 So.2d 514; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502, 507, 53 S.Ct. 249, 77 L.Ed. 457.
The question is thus presented: When the last clause of § 173 is read to the jury as an instruction, is the instruction an incorrect statement of the law or merely misleading? Stripped of nonessential words, the last clause recites:
“ . when any person .... is killed .... by the locomotive . . . . of any railroad, the burden of proof, in any suit brought therefor, is on the railroad company to show .... that there was no negligence on the part of the company or its agents.”
As we understand the opinions in the Henderson case, and other cases cited in the original opinion, when the evidence will reasonably support a finding that defendant railroad was not guilty of actionable negligence, then the defendant railroad is denied due process of law when the jury is instructed that the burden of proof is on the defendant railroad to show that it was not guilty of negligence. We are of opinion that reading the last clause of § 173 to the jury does that which the rule of Henderson forbids, to wit, tells the jury that the burden of proof is on the defendant railroad to acquit itself of negligence. In so doing, the last clause of § 173, as we understand it, is an incorrect statement of the law because the law is that the burden of proof is not on the defendant railroad to acquit itself of negligence, the burden on the railroad, after plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, being merely “to rebut or overcome said prima facie case by introducing evidence sufficient to dispute or overcome the said prima facie case of the plaintiff.” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Green, 222 Ala. 557, 558, 133 So. 294, 295. Since the last clause of § 173 is not merely a misleading instruction but is an incorrect statement of the law in a case where defendant has supported the statutory burden of rebutting plaintiff’s prima facie case, an explanatory charge would not eliminate the error. See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Cuevas, 162 Miss. 521, 139 So. 397.
The South Carolina statute considered in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, supra, substantially differs from our § 173. South Carolina’s Section 4925 provided that “If a person is injured .... by collision with the engines .... of a railroad corporation at a crossing, and it appears that the corporation neglected to give the signals required .... and that such neglect contributed to the injury, the corporation shall be liable for all damages caused by the collision .... unless it is shown that .... the person injured .... was .... guilty of gross or wilful negligence, or was acting in violation of the law, and that such . . . . negligence or unlawful act contributed to the injury.”
The statute had been construed by the South Carolina court to effect that, on proof of injury at a crossing and “neglect to give the prescribed signals,” and that “the failure to give the signals contributed to the said injuries as a proximate cause thereof,” then the failure to give the signals raises a prima facie presumption that such failure, contributing to the injury, was the proximate cause thereof. Ford v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 169 S.C. 41, 103, 104, 168 S.E. 143.
In holding the proximate cause presumption permissible, the United States Supreme Court said:
“ . . . . But the rational connection between the fact proved and the fact inferred is plain enough when the proposition is put conversely, namely, that proof of failure on the part of the railroad to give the statutory signals raises a presumption that such failure is the proximate cause of the injury.
“It follows that the statutory presumption as construed by the court below is free from constitutional infirmity under the due process clause.” (287 U. S., at pages 508 and 509, 53 S.Ct., at page 251.)
*323The presumption of proximate cause in Ford is substantially different from the presumption created by the last clause of our § 173, which is, that on proof of plaintiff’s injury, the negligence of defendant railroad is presumed so that defendant has the burden of proof to show that it was not guilty. We are not persuaded that Ford requires us to change our original opinion.
Plaintiff cites St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Norwood, 222 Ala. 464, 133 So. 27, where this court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff in an action for personal injury caused by collision with defendant’s train at a crossing. In Norwood, this court held that the court did not err in giving plaintiff’s requested charges which recited as follows:
“ T charge you that the burden of proof, so far as the railroad company defendants be concerned, is on the railroad company to show to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury from the evidence that there was no negligence on the part of the company or its agents acting within the line and scope of their employment as such which proximately contributed to the Plaintiff’s injuries and damages, if the jury be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the Plaintiff did receive injuries and damages as claimed in Count B of the complaint as amended.’
“ T charge you that, the burden of proof, so far as the railroad company, defendant, is concerned in this case, is on the Defendant railroad company to show to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury from the evidence that there was no negligence on the part of the railroad company defendant, or its agents or one of its agents in charge of the train which came in contact with the automobile in which Plaintiff was riding, which proximately contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries.’ ” (222 Ala. at page 465, 133 So. at pages 27-28)
This court said that the quoted charges were given without error and cited Section 9955, Code 1923; now § 173, Title 48, Code 1940.
We have no copy of appellant’s brief in Norwood and do not know precisely what was the objection raised against the quoted charges. The reporter did set out a short abstract of appellant’s brief at 222 Ala. 465, 133 So. 27. The abstract contains four sentences, each followed by citations.
The first sentence appears to be in support of the fourth assignment which is that the court erred in giving to the jury a charge in which the words, “slightest degree of negligence,” appear. The second paragraph of the opinion supports the conclusion.
The second sentence appears to support the first assignment of error which is that the court erred in a part of the oral charge in which the words, “any negligence,” were used.
The third sentence supports either the first or seventeenth assignment, or both. It does not appear to relate to the second or third assignment.
The fourth sentence does appear to be in support of the second and third assignments. It recites that the burden of proof that a railroad defendant, in a crossing case; was guilty of subsequent negligence rests on the plaintiff, citing Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith, 196 Ala. 77, 71 So. 455, in which plaintiff’s intestate, in circumstances under which he must have known the train was approaching, ran or walked upon the track at the crossing and was killed. The engineer had testified that he saw intestate when the engine was 800 feet from the crossing. On the issue of subsequent negligence on the part of the engineer, this court said: “On this issue the burden of proof was on the plaintiff.” Referring to intestate’s action in going on the track, this court said: “He was in no better case than a trespasser whose presence and peril have been discovered, and the statute no more applied to'him than it does to a trespasser.”
*324In Norwood, in the fifth paragraph of the opinion, this court said there was no specific charge in the complaint that defendant’s agents were guilty of negligence after discovery of plaintiff’s peril, that the trial court could not be put in error for failure to instruct the jury as to subsequent negligence, and that defendant should have called the court’s attention to it by special instruction. The best conclusion we can make is that, in Norwood, defendant was saying that the two charges, made the subject of the second and third assignments, were erroneously given because the charges failed to state that the burden of proof was on plaintiff to prove subsequent negligence of defendant and that the statute, now § 173, did not apply to negligence by defendant after discovery of plaintiff’s position of peril. This court held that the objection raised by defendant against the two charges did not show that giving the two charges was error.
We think it is clear that the objection raised, in the instant case, against reading the last clause of § 173 to the jury, was not considered in the Norwood case. Since the question considered in the instant case was not considered in the Norwood case, that case is neither authority on, nor decisive of, the question presented in the instant case.
Plaintiff says in supplemental brief that one important contention of plaintiff is that the members of this court “take actual knowledge that .... the circuit judges of this State have from time immemorial read this statute (§ 173) to the jury, and that the effect of this opinion would be essentially the same as if the statute had been held unconstitutional. Theory is one thing and actuality is another. The statute is worthless if the defendant can call one captive witness and have him say that the crew of the train was free from negligent conduct.” (Par. Added)
We do not agree. While the trial court cannot correctly read the statute to the jury in a case where plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and defendant has discharged its statutory duty “to rebut or overcome said prima facie case by introducing evidence sufficient to dispute or overcome the said prima facie case of the plaintiff,” the burden will still remain on defendant to introduce evidence sufficient to dispute or overcome plaintiff’s prima facie case. If “the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case and in doing so does not acquit the defendant of negligence or does not also show sufficient evidence to take the negligence to the jury, and this was all, the plaintiff would be entitled to the general charge.” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Green, supra.
As stated in the original opinion in the instant case, the trial court, in Green, did not read the predecessor of § 173 to the jury. We do not think the court should have read the last clause of § 173 to the jury in the case at bar.
In original brief filed by plaintiff on rehearing, with respect to our holding in original opinion in the instant case, we understand that plaintiff concedes that the cases cited in our original opinion support our holding, but plaintiff says “there is sound authority to the contrary,” citing 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 133, page 137, notes 3 and 4. One case only is cited in note 3, namely, Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 4 Cir., 79 F.2d 724, 103 A.L.R. 171, wherein the court considered the nature of the presumption against suicide and held for the defendant “that it was error to refuse the prayer for a directed verdict, for the undisputed evidence tending to show suicide was clear and convincing, and left no other reasonable explanation of Clemmer’s (insured’s) death.” (Par. Added) Note 4 recites merely: “Ibid.”
The presumption against suicide is based on human experience and the abnormality of self-destruction. The fact presumed does follow as a reasonable and probable inference from proof of death by violence. The presumption of negligence of a defendant railroad arising under § 173, *325upon proof of injury in a collision, does not follow as a reasonable and probable inference from the mere proof of such an injury, but is a presumption based on the necessities of the case and the ability to produce evidence. Whatever the nature of these presumptions may be, we do not think Clemmer is authority contrary to our holding in the instant case.
We recognize that this decision is important, not only to the parties in this case but also as precedent in other cases. Counsel for plaintiff has diligently and earnestly presented argument in support of her contentions. After full and meticulous consideration of the argument and the authorities cited, we are of opinion that the original decision should stand.
Opinion extended.
Application for rehearing overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.