Court Opinion

ID: 9636777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:42:33.165994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:49.320165
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I agree that we must reverse for the reasons stated by my colleagues. I would, however, also hold that, even in the absence of the errors which they hold reversible, we should reverse because of (1) the needless use of the alias,1 and (2) the three instances of testimony, by victims, the admission of which my colleagues describe as improper2 but which they regard as harmless. Whether any one of those errors standing alone would be enough to require reversal need not be considered. But combined, I think they deprived defendant of a fair trial; they come within the recent *871rulings of the Supreme Court defining prejudicial as distinguished from harmless error.3 The able and conscientious trial judge, patently troubled by this unfairness, once severly criticized government counsel out of the presence of the jury, regularly directed the improper testimony to be stricken, and gave disregarding instructions. I think, however, he should have gone further and declared a mistrial. For the objectionable answers, once given, had such a character that no one can say that the judge’s warnings effectively removed their poisonous consequences.4 Indeed, as experienced trial lawyers have often observed, merely to raise an objection to such testimony — and more, to have the judge tell the jury to ignore it — often serves but to rub it in. I believe that a prosecutor ought not deliberately and repeatedly, as here, put defendant’s lawyer in such an awkward dilemma — where his client will suffer if the lawyer does not object or if he does. If, without attaching any practical consequences to such tactics of the prosecutor, we simply express disapproval of them, we do nothing to prevent their repetition at the new trial of this case or in trials of other cases.

See United States v. Monroe, 2 Cir., 164 F.2d 471, 477.

In United States v. Brown, 2 Cir., 79 F.2d 321, 324, tMs court said: “But we have never held that the witnesses should be allowed to go to such lengths as here, and plainly they should not. For example, the prosecution succeeded in getting before the jury that in consequence of their losses some buyers bad lost tbeir bornes and tbeir business, and gone hopelessly into debt; that they bad lost everything including tbeir friends, and were destitute; that tbeir losses went into millions; that one unfortunate bad committed suicide. Were the guilt of the accused not so irrefragi-bly shown, we could not affirm the judgment in the face of this, and we wish to make it dear that we have never given warrant to any such abuse. All we sanction is evidence that the property bought turned out to be worthless, or that it greatly fell in value.”

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557; Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633, 66 S. Ct. 1172, 90 L.Ed. 1485; Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350; Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 65 S.Ct. 548, 89 L.Ed. 495, 156 A.L.R. 496; Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 293, 60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L.Ed. 257.

See, e. g., Judge Sanborn in Skuy v. United States, 8 Cir., 261 F. 316, 319; Towbin v. United States, 10 Cir., 93 F.2d 861, 868; Latham v. United States, 5 Cir., 226 F.420, 425; Pharr v. United States, 6 Cir., 48 F.2d 767, 770, 771; Volkmor v. United States, 6 Cir., 13 F.2d 594, 595; Lockhart v. United States, 9 Cir., 35 F.2d 905, 906, 907; Middleton v. United States, 8 Cir., 49 F.2d 538, *872540; Maytag v. Cummins, 8 Cir., 260 F.74, 82, 83; Pierce v. United States, 6 Cir., 86 F.2d 949, 952, 953; Robinson v. United States, 8 Cir., 32 F.2d 505, 508; Beck v. Wings Field, Inc., 3 Cir., 122 F.2d 114, 117; Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361, 383, 15 S.Ct. 383, 39 L.Ed. 453; People v. Levan, 295 N.Y. 26, 34-36, 64 N.E.2d 341, 345; People v. Fielding, 158 N.Y. 542, 53 N.E. 497, 46 L.R.A. 641, 70 Am.St.Rep. 495; People v. Ah Len, 92 Cal. 282, 28 P. 286, 27 Am.St.Rep. 103; Lickliter v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 206, 60 S.W.2d 355, 357; Cassemus v. State, 16 Ala.App. 61, 75 So. 267, 268; People v. White, 365 Ill. 499, 6 N.E.2d 1015, 1021. See also dissenting opinion in United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 2 Cir., 155 F.2d 631 at pages 655, 656.