Court Opinion

ID: 9493404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:07:03.387401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:49.265927
License: Public Domain

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, the district court held Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) and U.S. v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir.1993) were inapplicable to the question of whether the police were justified in detaining and subsequently frisking James Bohannon. Rather, the district court believed the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct was properly judged by the standards set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). I agree.
The Supreme Court decision in Summers held that the police have the authority to detain occupants of a premises while a proper search is being conducted. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587. We extended the holding in Summers to allow officers to detain all persons who are present at the site when the search warrant is being executed, regardless of whether they be occupants of the premises or merely visitors. See Fountain, 2 F.3d at 663-64. Read together, Summers and Fountain allow-the authorities to detain all persons who are on the premises to be searched when the police execute a search warrant. As the Supreme Court explained in Summers, the intrusion upon the personal liberty of those found on the premises at the time the police seek to execute a search warrant is justified by legitimate government interests. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-703, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (noting various law enforcement interests, e.g., preventing flight in the event incriminating evidence is found, minimizing the risk of harm to the officers by allowing officers to exercise unquestioned command of the situation, and facilitating the orderly completion of the search).
However, those state interests are not present when, as in this case, those coming to the scene were not on the premises when the police executed the search warrant, but rather arrived after the search had been substantially completed. In this case, there was no concern that the Bohan-nons would remove contraband from the premises, because the search was over. Similarly, the police knew the Bohannons were not the owners of the trailer; thus, the police weren’t concerned that the men would flee. And, while the safety of the officers is always of paramount concern, the Bohannons’ arrival, without evidence of something more, posed no more of a threat than any other passerby who might have wandered into the area surrounding the trailer. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the policy justifications of Summers and Fountain apply to this case.
Moreover, I believe the majority’s reliance on the Third Circuit’s decision in Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186 (3d. Cir.1995) is misplaced. In that case, the Baker family brought a § 1983 action against Munroe Township and one of its *619officers alleging their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. While paying a visit to Mrs. Baker’s son, the Baker had family arrived at the son’s home just as the police were initiating a drug raid. While most of the officers began to execute the “no knock” warrant on the son’s house, some officers ordered the Baker family to “get down,” forced them to the ground, pointed guns at them, handcuffed them, searched one of the Baker children, and emptied Mrs. Baker’s purse on the ground. After approximately 25 minutes, the visitors were released.
In Baker, the Third Circuit justified the detention of the Baker family by extending Summers to apply to people coming to or going from the house if the police need to ascertain whether those people live there. See id. at 1192. But the Baker case is factually distinguishable from this case. In Baker, the Baker family arrived as the drug raid was commencing. As police officers raced to the building, the situation had serious potential to erupt into violence. The Third Circuit concluded that under those circumstances, the officers were justified, both for the Baker’s protection and their own, to sequester the Bakers until they could be identified. While the Court found that the amount of force used was excessive, it concluded that the police were justified in taking some action to detain the Bakers until the area could be secured.
The facts of this case, however, are entirely different. Here, the police search of the methamphetamine lab had been completed, the police had complete control of the situation, many of the officers had already left the scene, and all that remained was the final paperwork. There is no question that the police had every right to ask the Bohannons to identify themselves and explain their presence on the property. In fact, it would have been irresponsible for them not to inquire. But, because the search was all but complete when the Bohannons arrived, there were no circumstances such as those presented in Baker, that might have justified a brief detention until order could be achieved.
In my mind, the district court was correct in holding that the only question presented by this case is whether the police detention of James can be justified as a Terry stop. Like the district court, I believe that it cannot. When Officer Thompson ordered James to put down his beer and take his hand out of his pocket, the officer was at that moment subjecting James to an investigatory stop. See U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”); U.S. v. Thompson, 106 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir.1997) (“‘[T]he law is well established that if the officer asks rather than commands, the person accosted is not seized ...’”.); U.S. v. Steele, 782 F.Supp. 1301, 1309 (S.D.Ind.1992), aff'd, 989 F.2d 502 (7th Cir.1993) (“A police officer’s verbal command — if heeded — is often sufficient to seize a person.”); see also U.S. v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212, 214, 216 (6th Cir.1990). In my view, a reasonable person standing in James’ position would not have felt free to leave, and, therefore, Officer Thompson’s actions must pass constitutional muster.
The police have limited authority to stop individuals suspected of wrongdoing, but only if the officer has an articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot or that the individual is armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-3, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). In this case, the district court, after hearing the testimony of both Officers Lee and Thompson, held that “[tjhe Terry stop was made without any articulated or articulable [ ] suspicion, other than the mere fact that these people stopped in the middle of five or six cars and a bunch of police officers.” The record fully supports this conclusion, and I cannot see any basis upon which to *620reject the lower court’s finding that the police did not have an articulable suspicion.
I believe that Officer Thompson had every right to ask James for identification and inquire into his purpose for coming to the scene. Such exchanges, entered into with the person’s consent, do not even present a Fourth Amendment question. In this case, however, Officer Thompson did not make such an inquiry, as Officer Lee did of Johnny Bohannon, but rather chose to detain James based upon nothing more than James’ presence at a crime scene. It is well settled that mere proximity to criminal activity is not an adequate basis for the police to make such an investigatory stop. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct. 338; see also U.S. v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e do not believe that the Terry requirement of reasonable suspicion under the circumstances, has been eroded to the point that an individual may be frisked based upon nothing more than an unfortunate choice of associates.”) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, I would hold that Officer Thompson’s immediate detention of James, based upon nothing more than James’ mere presence at a location where police were investigating drug activity, violated James’ right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
By affirming the reasonableness of Officer Thompson’s detention of James, the majority opinion creates the opportunity for the police to stop and detain based upon nothing more than a person’s being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Surely, this type of police conduct is precisely the type of state action the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against. Therefore, because I believe the majority has improperly extended the holdings of Summers and Fountain under the facts presented by this case, I respectfully dissent.