Court Opinion

ID: 9649248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:46:28.035958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:43.348117
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
dissenting.
After studying the substantial record in this case, including the transcript and tapes of the movant’s lengthy interrogation by the police, the report of his examination at Fulton State Hospital, the transcript of the competency hearing, the petition to enter plea of guilty, the transcript of the hearing at which the plea was received, the postcon-viction transcript, and the findings and conclusions of the postconviction judge, I am left with “the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made” in not allowing the movant to withdraw his plea of guilty and stand trial. Day v. State, 770 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied sub. nom., Walker v. Missouri, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 186, 107 L.Ed.2d 141 (1989); Sanders v. State, 738 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Mo. banc 1987). My conclusion is based on the documents detailed above. I do not suggest that we should substitute our judgment for that of either the sentencing judge or the postconviction judge as to any question of credibility, or on their evaluation of the expert testimony about the movant’s mental condition. The documentary record is such, however, that I would reverse the judgment and remand the case to allow him to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial. We must bear in mind that all the movant is asking for is a trial. The law may not favor new trials, but in the criminal context it does favor trials.
I. Was the Guilty Plea Voluntary and Intelligent?
An accused person may of course waive his right to a trial by pleading guilty. This *844waiver meets constitutional standards only if it is voluntarily and intelligently made.1 The proceedings attending the entry of this guilty plea do not persuade me that these requirements have been met.
Our Rule 24.02 was adopted in deference to constitutional standards. It spells out the minimum scope of the interrogation which must precede the entry of the plea and requires the court to determine whether there is “a factual basis for the plea.” Rule 24.02(e). The trial judge’s responsibility is not fully discharged, however, simply by proceeding through the litany of the rule, or one of the more elaborate litanies that some trial judges use. These serve a purpose, but the overriding obligation is to determine whether the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made.
Before this plea was received, the sentencing judge conducted a comprehensive hearing on the movant’s capacity to stand trial. The determination that he had this capacity is a permissible finding from the record, even though the evidence showed, and both the sentencing and the postconviction courts expressly found, that the mov-ant has a “mental defect.” I agree that the presence of a mental defect does not necessarily disable a person from standing trial and would accept the general proposition that a person who has the capacity to stand trial has the capacity to enter a plea of guilty. Wilkins v. State, 802 S.W.2d 491, 502 (Mo. banc 1991). But it still must be shown that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made.
According to Dr. Jayaratna, a staff psychiatrist at Fulton State Hospital:
[t]he results of verbal portions of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised place Mr. Wilson at the upper limits of the mild mental retardation range, while the results of the performance portions of that test placed him in the dull-normal range, with a full-scale I.Q. in the borderline range of intellectual functioning.
Dr. Logan, a psychiatrist and one of Wilson’s expert witnesses, diagnosed Wilson as afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder, a concept recognized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d Ed., revised 1987), published by the American Psychiatric Association as an analytical and diagnostic aid to practitioners. The DSM-III describes this personality disorder as follows:
The essential feature of this disorder is a pervasive pattern of dependent and submissive behavior beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts.
People with this disorder are unable to make everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice and reassurance from others, and will even allow others to make most of their important decisions....
This excessive dependence on others leads to difficulty in initiating projects or doing things on one’s own. People with this disorder tend to feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone, and will go to great lengths to avoid being alone. They are devastated when close relationships end, and tend to be preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
These people are easily hurt by criticism and disapproval, and tend to subordinate themselves to others, agreeing with people even when they believe them to be wrong, for fear of being rejected. They will volunteer to do things that are unpleasant or demeaning in order to get others to like them.
The evidence of the particular mental defect described by Dr. Logan imposed a special obligation on the trial court to make sure that the movant understood what he was getting into and voluntarily entered his plea with this understanding. I find no indication that the sentencing judge rejected Dr. Logan’s diagnosis, as distinguished from his conclusion on movant’s capacity to stand trial. The court’s finding of mental defect, indeed, seems to confirm the diag*845nosis. The diagnosis is all the more important because the movant denied commission of the offense when speaking with a psychologist who gave expert testimony, and vacillated from admission to denial in his interview with Dr. Logan. He had also denied guilt in an interview with the psychiatrist at Fulton, and in response to the “I regret” blank on a writing ability test, wrote “confessing to something i did’t (sic) do.”
In determining whether there was a factual basis for the plea the trial court was obliged to consider the movant’s taped statement to the police which, in transcribed form, covers more than 100 double-spaced pages. A voluntary admission of the crime, of course, would be the strongest possible demonstration of factual basis for a plea of guilty. The movant was subject to a skillful and aggressive interrogation by a professional investigator. He initially denied any connection with the offense. The interrogator then led him into first admitting that he was outside the house while companions entered, and that they told him what they had done. He then confirmed the interrogator’s suggestion that he was with them in the house, watching them as they abused the victim, stole money and jewelry, and then set her on fire. Next the interrogator confronted him with incongruities in his statement and drew the admission that he was the sole criminal actor.
I have the distinct impression that the confession would be subject to challenge because of the inadequacy of the warnings and the suggestion of benefits from “telling the truth.”2 These infirmities, con-cededly, are of no consequence if the defendant later enters an understanding and voluntary plea of guilty,3 but'the confession does not put an end to the duty of the trial judge to determine that there is factual basis for the plea. The audio tapes of the confession reveal that the interrogator was firm and aggressive; the movant’s answers were in a halting voice, brief, and for the most part in response to leading questions. Nothing in his prior history suggested any possible motive for the crime to which he admitted. The attempts to develop a history of sexual obsession are inconclusive. The prosecutor during his recitation of the evidence against Wilson made no assertion that the victim had been sexually abused, and the autopsy showed no indication of sexual abuse. In the final portions of his statement, the movant said that the jewelry he had taken from the victim’s house was hidden in a barbecue pit in his yard, but it was not found there. The record shows little or no corroboration of the confession.
The plea hearing documents included a four-page “petition to enter plea of guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford,” 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and a “memorandum of plea bargain,” both signed by the movant.4 These prolix documents, full of legalisms, should be read in the light of the movant’s answer to an inquiry about his reading ability made during his interrogation. With reference to the top line of witness Gary Wall’s statement, shown to the movant by the *846interrogator, the following exchange took place:
INTERROGATOR: Do you read and write English without the aid of glasses?
JOHNNY: Yeah.
INTERROGATOR: Read that top line for me.
JOHNNY: I don’t. I don’t know those big words. That’s “statement” “under” and “arrest.”
INTERROGATOR: OK. Voluntary statement not under arrest. Right? ...
In view of this demonstration of a very limited reading ability,5 the petition and memorandum do not go very far toward demonstrating that the plea of guilty was voluntarily and intelligently made. I doubt that the movant had any idea what the petition was all about.
The transcript of the guilty plea hearing covers 31 pages. In examining this transcript we are providing the initial appellate review of the performance of the sentencing judge in determining whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered. We are fully as able as the postconviction hearing judge to evaluate the adequacy of the plea hearing. The principal opinion describes the inquiry as “punctilious.”6 I do not sense the “painstaking efforts of the trial court to ensure Wilson understood the plea agreement and was offering it voluntarily and knowingly,” which the principal opinion finds. I have three primary criticisms of the plea hearing.
First, the transcript raises substantial questions about whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. When asked why he was pleading guilty, the mov-ant twice replied, “I don’t know.” When the judge responded at some length that these responses were not adequate the movant replied, “I don’t understand what you’re saying.” At this point many judges would have suggested that the proceedings be suspended so that the movant could consult with counsel. This judge, however, kept the movant on the carpet and asked a long series of questions, almost all calling for yes or no answers. I do not find support for the statement in the principal opinion that the movant “varied his answers from affirmative responses to negative responses and from short observations to lengthy comments,” or that he “corrected the prosecution’s version of the facts underlying his guilty plea.” The factual statements in the hearing came almost entirely from the trial judge and from the prosecutor, with very little input from the movant or his counsel. The only “correction,” and the most lengthy response, came because the prosecutor reported that the movant had stopped by the police station to pick up his billfold, whereupon the movant advised the judge that he had been taken to the station by a police officer.
Second, the trial judge should have persisted in his efforts to get the movant to expound the details of the crime in his own words. This is especially so because of the expert testimony indicating that the mov-ant was peculiarly subject to suggestion, and because of his denials of guilt to the medical examiners. Early in the proceeding the judge asked the movant, after telling him that he had to make sure that he understood what he was doing:
Why don’t you tell me in your own words, just talk to me a little bit. Tell me what happened here, and, and what you did and why you want to plead guilty, why you’re wanting to avoid the death penalty? Just tell me everything you can about this.
*847The only response was, “I don’t understand what you’re saying.” After this response the judge completely abandoned any further effort to get the movant to tell him anything about the offense in his own words. Because of the infirmities already detailed, the trial judge, in determining whether the plea was made with understanding and factual basis, was absolutely obliged to make further efforts to get the defendant to provide his own description of the offense, rather than relying solely on the prosecutor’s statement and then simply asking the movant to confirm it.
Third, the trial judge seemed to dwell on the spectre of the death sentence, mentioning the death penalty at least 16 times in his interrogation. It is perfectly proper for the prosecution and the defense to negotiate a plea bargain in a first degree murder case in which the death penalty is waived in consideration of the plea. The possibility of a death sentence is not inherently coercive,7 but the movant might well have gathered from the tone of the questioning that the trial judge believed that a death sentence would be a virtual certainty if he stood trial. The spectre was reinforced by the movant’s counsel, whose sole part in the proceedings consisted of reporting to the court that he had advised the movant that a death sentence was, in his opinion, a probability. The threat of execution permeates the entire proceeding.8
There are other troubling circumstances. The Miranda warnings, as shown by the transcribed tapes, were quick and formal. The officers relied primarily on the mov-ant’s reading ability in establishing the waiver of these rights, even though, as shown above, this ability was seriously limited. During the final portion of his interrogation, after he had admitted that he was the sole criminal actor, the respondent asked, “When am I getting out of here?” This indicates that he had little comprehension of the gravity of his admissions. None of these circumstances would have great weight if the movant had been convicted following a trial, but they cast further doubt on this case, in which the substantial indications of an understanding plea are not abundant. I am also troubled by the movant’s thought that he might be sentenced to the state hospital at Fulton, perhaps induced by the investigating officer's having told him that he would not necessarily go to the penitentiary. Nor am I satisfied that the sentencing judge made it perfectly clear that the sentence was “without probation or parole.” The mov-ant might have gathered from the judge’s advice that action by the governor might not be too long delayed.
The principal opinion reminds us of our obligation to “look at the whole record that was before the motion court" and not to “limit the review of Wilson’s responses to a few questions and answers taken out of context from the other inquiry that occurred.” The portion of the interrogation set out in the principal opinion shows that my analysis is soundly grounded in the record. The trial judge seemed much more interested in providing a good paper record than in communicating effectively with the movant. It appears that he and the mov-ant’s counsel were satisfied that the mov-ant was guilty, and considered that the life sentence without trial was the easiest option. The judge expected the case to be disposed of by guilty plea and carefully guided the proceedings toward that end.
The communication with the movant was inadequate to demonstrate factual basis for the plea, or that it was made voluntarily and intelligently. The plea is infirm as a matter of law and the movant should be allowed to withdraw it so that he may have a trial.
II. Newly Discovered Evidence
After the plea proceedings had been completed one Chris Brownfield, an inmate in the Kansas State Penitentiary at Lansing, came forth with a statement in which he *848said that he had been a participant in the crime, and that the movant was not involved. Brownfield made several statements to the press and wrote letters to Missouri officials, but refused to provide sworn testimony at the 24.035 hearing. The hearing judge concluded that Brownfield’s statements were incredible, pointing to inconsistencies and contradictions in his story.
The principal opinion now holds that a claim of newly discovered evidence may not be raised in 24.035 proceedings, and suggests other alternatives such as a motion to withdraw guilty plea under Rule 29.07(d), which must be filed in the sentencing court, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which the proper venue under Rule 91.02 is the circuit court in the place of confinement. Thus, under the principal opinion, possible forums are available for the mov-ant’s claims of newly discovered evidence, in which he can present the evidence offered at the postconviction hearing and also the additional evidence consisting of tapes of conversations with Brownfield which were tendered to us before oral argument. By the holding of the principal opinion the postconviction court’s findings on the issue of newly discovered evidence are of no effect because the issue was beyond the court’s 24.035 jurisdiction.9
I will not question this procedural ruling further. It is supported by paragraph (a) of Rule 24.035, although the certificate required by paragraph (d), that the motion “shall include every ground known to the movant for vacating, setting aside, or correcting the judgment or sentence,” and the similar certificate required by counsel under paragraph (e), would support a broader construction of the rule. It would be efficient to modify the rule to require claims of this kind to be included in a 24.035 motion if known at the time of filing. I believe that the state is obliged to provide some procedure to hear and dispose of claims relating to newly-discovered evidence which might exonerate the movant.10
We should take a lesson from the English courts, which share our dedication to the cause of justice. Six alleged terrorists (the “Birmingham Six”) were jury convicted of a murder committed in 1974. The conviction was affirmed by the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal. It survived two later inquiries in the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal. Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands, 3 All E.R. 727 (1981). Then troubling charges of fabrication of evidence and corruption in the local police force appeared. The Court of Appeal again reviewed the case, under a procedure authorized by governing law, and concluded that the convictions were “unsafe and unsatisfactory,” so that they should be quashed. R. v. Mcllkenny, — All E.R. —, 14 N.L.J. 456 (1991). This case is a stronger one for relief than the English case, because here there was no jury trial.
The alternative of application for executive clemency, suggested in the principal opinion, is not a viable one. The governor may commute a sentence, release a prisoner, or grant a full pardon, but he has no authority whatsoever to grant a trial to one who has pleaded guilty. Mo. Const. 1945, art. IV, § 7. See also § 565.020.2, RSMo *8491986. All this movant is seeking is a trial and, under the record, he is entitled to no more.
The result of this case, unfortunately, is a further demonstration of the reluctance of this Court to afford trials in civil or criminal cases which have been disposed of without trial, even though there are substantial indications that a trial would serve the interests of justice. In Barney v. Suggs, 688 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. banc 1985), this Court denied a right of appeal from a default judgment even though clear statutory language indicated that there was an ap-pealable order. In Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. banc 1989), the court left a final judgment rendered under manifestly inequitable circumstances in place even though there was minimal fault on the part of the defendant and a prompt request for consideration after the error was discovered. In Wilkins v. State, 802 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. banc 1991), the Court refused to allow a defendant who was a juvenile certified as an adult to stand trial for his life because he had expressed a present intention to forego legal representation, to plead guilty, and to be put to death.11 We rather upheld the trial court’s action in carrying the expressed death wish into effect, after a hearing which was essentially nonadversary. Finality is important but should not be a fetish. The interest of finality is minimal when there has been no trial, and when a request for trial has been made without undue delay. The number of meritorious cases is not large enough to impose serious burdens.
There is a time to affirm and a time to reverse, a time to defer and a time to superintend. The cause of justice and the integrity of our procedures would be best served by our exercising our powers of review to grant relief in this case, in which there are so many flaws in the record. The movant’s denial of guilt at the postconviction hearing and on other occasions, and the clearly admissible evidence of commission of the offense by another, are additional circumstances supporting the granting of relief.
I would reverse and remand with directions to allow the movant to withdraw the guilty plea.

. Rule 24.02(c); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and cases cited therein.

.Officer Kahre testified at the postconviction hearing as follows:
[MOVANTS ATTORNEY]
Q During the course of your interview with the Defendant, uh, was anything said by either yourself or Officer Merritt, uh, to the effect of just wanting to help the Defendant? Uh, were there any offers made to him during the course of the interview as far as just wanting to get him help?
[OFFICER KAHRE]
A Yes.
Q Okay. What was the nature of those offers, and what was the context of that, those offers of help?
A I don’t know whether I can tell it to you word for word or not, uh, but basically, uh, uh, just generally offered him, offered him help — the best thing he could do was just, you know, tell us what happened, and we’d get him some help one way or another, somehow.

. Kunkel v. State, 501 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Mo.1973).

. I do not regard as insignificant the switch from the "Alford plea,” which does not admit guilt but focuses on difficulty of defense, to an admission of guilt when the plea was taken. I am confident that the movant did not have the least understanding of the meaning of an Alford plea. Yet he might have been "softened up" by signing a statement in which he did not admit guilt, so that he responded to the sentencing judge’s lead during the guilty plea hearing.

. The psychological test results of Fulton State Hospital indicated movant reads at the 6.0 grade level. Dr. Foster, movant’s expert, testified at the competency hearing that movant’s verbal comprehension scores ranked in the first percentile. This score indicates that 99% of the general population has verbal comprehension superior to the movant’s. Further, the movant has no driver’s license because he was unable to pass the written test. These test results were presented to Judge Elliston at the competency hearing, prior to movant's entering his guilty plea.

. Punctilious is defined as: "attentive to punctil-ios: marked by precise exact accordance with the details of codes or conventions." A "punctilio” is "a nice detail of conduct in a ceremony, a procedure, or in the observance of a social or moral code: a point of behavior about which one is fastidious.” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 1843 (unabridged 1981).

. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1470, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Accord Samuels v. State, 770 S.W.2d 717, 722 (Mo.App.1989).

. Movant testified at the 24.035 hearing that he believed if he received the death penalty he would be executed the day after he arrived at the penitentiary.

. I commend the postconviction judge for making findings and conclusions on the issue, which could then be used on appellate review, even though he too concluded that newly discovered evidence could not be considered as a ground for 24.035 relief.

. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) stating:
‘“[i]n appropriate cases’ the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice ‘must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.’” Accordingly, "where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”
Id. at 537, 106 S.Ct. at 2668 (citations omitted) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). In Jones v. State of Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375 (8th Cir.1991), the Eighth Circuit adopted this standard stating:
If one is ‘actually innocent' of the sentence imposed, a federal habeas court can excuse the procedural default to correct a fundamentally unjust incarceration.
Id. at 381 (citations omitted).

. Wilkins’ understanding and desires were probed by the trial judge in much greater depth than was the case here, and with responses which were much more eloquent and understanding than this movant's.