Court Opinion

ID: 9868483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:37:19.003611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:50.827330
License: Public Domain

On Petition To' Reheae.
The defendants have filed their petition to rehear complaining: (1) “The Court failed to qualify its statement *293that the will of E. Pile, deceased, gives to the widow Lucinda Pile a life estate in the land in controversy by adding to such finding 'subject to be defeated by the re-, marriage of the widow.’ This is believed to be an oversight.”'' (2) “The effect of the above decision is to deprive the widow of her right of redemption from the sheriff’s sale, because she could not reasonably exercise her right, or be expected to do so, until there was a record of the sheriff’s sale, and there was no such recording of said deed, which was done only twelve days before the bill was filed.” (3) “The effect of the Court’s decision is to hold that the recitals in a sheriff’s deed' are not contradicted by the introduction of the record behind the deed where that record contains no supporting statements, or, in other words, that a sheriff, or even a successor sheriff, may, by recitals in his deed, supply a missing record so long as his recitals do not actually contradict the record.” (4) “The Court erred in holding or implying that it was incumbent upon the defendants to attack by proper pleading the recitations in the sheriff’s deed for fraud, because in an ejectment suit every instrument offered as a muniment of title is subject to attack under the general election of ownership of the land on the one hand and a general recital on the other.”
Besponding to these contentions, we find no merit in the first, which refers to the construction of the will of E. Pile. ¡Suffice it to say that we held that the Chancellor was correct in his construction of said will and the learned Court of Appeals was in error, as shown by the opinion filed with the record, which was noted “not for publication”.
The second ground of complaint is that under the Court’s decision the lifé tenant, Lucinda Pile, is denied her right to redeem the land. We think the respondent in *294answering- this petition has clearly pointed out the fallacy of petitioners’ insistence as to her right to redeem, the land, as follows: ...
‘■This point was made by these petitioners in their written argument filed in this Honorable Court on January 9, 1945 (p. 13), and was therefore before the Court at the time it rendered its opinion. Its weakness is self-admitted in the suppositious expression in that argument, to-wit: ‘Suppose the widow, during the first two years after the date of the alleged sale, had desired to redeem as he had the legal right to do.’ Furthermore, the return bn the execution issued from this Honorable Court affirmatively shows that Sindia Pile was given notice of the levy of the execution under which the land was sold and also was served with the original copy of the report of the commissioners who were duly appointed and who set apart her homestead, a copy of this report being made a part of the return on the execution. (R. 35, 36) ”
We think from an examination of the record that the life tenant was fully informed of the proceedings involving the sale of the land in question and she had ample opportunity to redeem, had she so desired.
Responding to the third and fourth grounds of the petition, the Court gave full consideration to the .matters complained of in holding that the essential elements necessary to support complainant’s title appeared in the execution, the return thereon, and the sheriff’s deed. It is true the Court made some comment upon the failure of the defendants to attack the deed for fraud, but this was-not necessary for a correct determination of the validity of the complainant’s deed. While the defendants could properly attack the deed and complainant’s right to possession in ah ejectment suit, it does not follow that they could not make a direct attack upon it for fraud and thus *295destroy any claim of alleged title. Moreover, the decision of the Court cannot in any way affect “the safety and security of land titles”, as contended by petitioners, any more than former decisions of this Court, which were cited as authority for our decision in the instant case. Much of the argument of counsel could be easily construed as an attack upon the wisdom of the Legislature in enacting the statute, Code, section 8915, which provides that statements and recitals in deeds of successor sheriffs shall be taken as prima facie evidence of their truth. This is the contention made by respondent’s counsel in answering the petition and upon a careful review of the matter we think it is sound and that the petition in this regard is without merit.
Petition to rehear is denied.