Court Opinion

ID: 9351960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 16:02:45.926454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:39.936676
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed January 4, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                    Nos. 3D21-1018 and 3D21-1019
             Lower Tribunal Nos. F17-20909 and F19-10464
                          ________________

                           The State of Florida,
                         Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                     vs.

                             Jeremy Rojas,
                         Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

     Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lody Jean,
Judge.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant/cross-appellee.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.

     EMAS, J.
      INTRODUCTION

      Jeremy Rojas and the State entered into a written plea agreement that

resolved two separate criminal cases: one arising out of an arrest in 2017,

and the other arising out of an arrest in 2019 (while Rojas was on probation

for his 2017 case). Under the terms of the agreement, and in exchange for

pleading guilty to the charges in the 2019 case and admitting he violated

probation, the State agreed Rojas would be sentenced to community control,

followed by probation.    The parties also expressly agreed that if Rojas

violated community control or probation, he would be sentenced to “no less

than ten (10) years state prison” on his 2017 case and “no less than. . . five

(5) years” on his 2019 case. Rojas further agreed that he could not file a

motion to mitigate those subsequent sentences. The trial court approved the

negotiated plea and sentenced Rojas accordingly.

      Three months later, Rojas was charged with violating the terms of his

community control.     Following a hearing, the trial court found Rojas in

violation, and initially imposed a sentence of ten years’ state prison (in the

2017 case) and five years’ state prison (in the 2019 case), as required by the

negotiated plea agreement. However, and over State objection, the trial

court then mitigated each of those sentences to three years’ imprisonment,

to run concurrently.

                                      2
      The State appeals the mitigated three-year sentences, contending the

trial court had no authority or discretion to deviate from the previously

approved and agreed-upon sentences, and further asserts that the mitigated

sentences constitute unauthorized downward departure sentences. Rojas

cross-appeals the trial court’s orders finding him in violation of his community

control. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s orders finding

Rojas violated his community control, but reverse the orders mitigating

Rojas’ sentences.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      These consolidated appeals involve two separate criminal cases filed

against Jeremy Rojas. In F17-20909, Rojas was charged with burglary with

assault or battery (a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment),

shooting/throwing a deadly missile (a second-degree felony punishable by

fifteen years’ imprisonment), corruption by threat against a public servant (a

third-degree felony punishable by five years’ imprisonment) and two

misdemeanors.

      In April 2018, pursuant to a negotiated plea, Rojas pled guilty, and the

court imposed a split sentence (on the first two felony counts) to 270 days in

                                       3
jail, followed by six years’ probation. 1 In May 2019, while on probation, Rojas

was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine (a third-degree felony)

in F19-10464. As a result of his arrest on this new charge, the State also

filed an affidavit alleging that Rojas violated his probation on the 2017 case.

      In July 2020, as a result of negotiations between the parties, Rojas and

the State entered into a written plea agreement to resolve both cases. In

exchange for pleading guilty to possession of cocaine (the 2019 case) and

admitting that he violated his probation on the 2017 case by committing a

new crime, the parties agreed the trial court would modify Rojas’ probation

and place him on two years of community control followed by three years of

probation.2

      The parties’ written agreement included the following terms:

      ●       “The Defendant acknowledges and agrees that should he be
              found in violation, the Defendant will be sentenced to no less
              than ten (10) years state prison in F17-20909 and to five (5)
              years state prison in F19-10646.”

      ●       “The defendant’s guidelines are 88.5 [months] at the bottom
              to a maximum sentence of LIFE in prison.”

      ●       “The Defendant shall not file a motion to set aside guilty plea,
              or motion to mitigate.”

1
  As to the third-degree felony, the court placed Rojas on a concurrent term
of five years’ probation.
2
   The three-year probationary term was in addition to the remaining,
unserved portion of his probation from the earlier sentence on his 2017 case.
                                       4
     ●    “The Defendant acknowledges that the State is entering this
          agreement based on the mitigation provided by the Defendant.
          The Defendant also acknowledges that this mitigation will not
          be available to assist him in his case in any subsequent
          violation of probation.”

(Emphasis added).

     Rojas and his attorney signed the written plea agreement and initialed

each page as well. In announcing the agreement to the trial court, the

prosecutor summarized:

     PROSECUTOR: So, the defendant has two cases presently, a
     probation violation as well as an open case, this will be closing
     out both, pursuant to this plea agreement. He will be released,
     and his probation will be modified. On the probation case he will
     be placed on two years community control, followed by two
     years’ probation. As far as the open case, he will be adjudicated
     guilty and placed on two years community control, followed by
     three years of reporting probation.

     There is also a pertinent provision in which the defendant
     understands and acknowledges that any violation subsequent
     that the State does [prove by] a preponderance of the evidence
     will result in a term of incarceration of no less than 10 years
     of State prison on the probation case-

                                     ***
     So, if he violates the terms of his probation and the State does
     prove that by a preponderance of the evidence he is
     acknowledging and understanding that he will be sentenced to
     no less than 10 years of State prison on the appropriate
     case, as well as 5 years of State prison on the open case.

                                    5
      Defense counsel then advised the trial court:

      DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, just for your edification, that
      hammer clause was put in as part of the bargaining process,
      and it was explained to Jeremy, and he is well aware.

(Emphasis added).

      The trial court conducted a plea colloquy with Rojas, addressing each

of the terms and conditions of the agreement. The trial court found Rojas

entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily, that he understood the nature

and consequences of his plea, and that he was represented by competent

counsel with whom he was satisfied. The trial court entered a written order

accepting, approving and ratifying the terms of the agreement, including

those set forth above, and imposed the agreed upon sentence of community

control followed by probation.

      Less than three months later, on October 28, 2020, an affidavit of

violation of community control was filed against Rojas, alleging that he

willfully violated the terms of his community control by deviating from his

schedule and approved travel routes without permission, leaving his GPS

tracking device behind, and failing to be at home by his established 10 p.m.

curfew.

      On March 31, 2021, following a community control violation hearing,

the trial court, after making factual findings and credibility determinations,

                                      6
concluded that the State had established Rojas violated the terms of

community control. The trial court inquired whether she had any discretion

in sentencing Rojas, given the mandatory prison sentences agreed to as part

of the plea agreement. 3 Defense counsel contended the court was not

required to impose the ten-year and five-year prison sentences (the so-called

“hammer clause”) but had discretion to impose a lesser sentence. The State

disagreed, contending that those sentences were mandatory under the

negotiated plea agreement and the court was without the discretion to

impose any sentence less than the ten-year and five-year prison terms as

agreed. The trial court reset the sentencing hearing for April 16, 2021

observing:

     These plea agreements are going to come in front of me many,
     many times. . . . But if a Judge is going to sign off on these plea
     agreements, you know, these judges have to say what they
     mean and mean what they say. . . . So I am inclined to impose
     what he signed on—signed up for, you know.

The trial court added:

     The only thing I would have discretion in, because I have been
     thinking about this. The only thing I would have discretion is,
     having heard the evidence now, is potentially a motion to mitigate
     after the court pronounces sentence. And that would be under
     Rule 3.800.

3
 The trial judge who conducted the community control violation hearing and
entered the sentencing orders on appeal was not the same judge who
accepted, approved and ratified the written plea agreement.
                                     7
      Shortly after that hearing, and a week before the April 16 sentencing,

Rojas filed two motions: a motion to mitigate and a motion for downward

departure sentence. He requested a reduction of his sentence to eighteen

months in prison followed by six years’ reporting probation. He relied, at least

in part, on a twelve-page psychological evaluation provided to the State in

2018 in support of the original plea negotiated between the parties.

      At the sentencing hearing, and consistent with the terms of the written

plea agreement, the trial court revoked Rojas’ community control and initially

sentenced Rojas to ten years in prison on the 2017 case, 4 and five years in

prison on the 2019 case. However, immediately after imposing these agreed-

upon sentences, the court announced it was mitigating Rojas’ sentences,

stating that it believed it could, on its own, mitigate the sentences pursuant

to Florida Rule of Procedure 3.800(c). The trial court then reduced Rojas’

sentences5 to three years’ state prison on each count of each case, all

sentences to run concurrently.

4
  More specifically, in F17-20909, the trial court sentenced Rojas to ten
years’ state prison on Count One, and five years’ state prison on Count Three
and Count Five (all sentences to run concurrently).
5
  Because the trial court announced these mitigated sentences immediately
after orally pronouncing the initial sentences, the record does not contain a
written sentencing order reflecting the ten-year (2017 case) and five-year
(2019 case) sentences initially imposed.
                                       8
      The State appeals the sentences as mitigated by the trial court. Rojas

cross-appeals the court’s ruling on the revocation of his probation,

contending it was not supported by competent substantial evidence.6

      ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

      “A plea agreement is a contract and the rules of contract law are

applicable to plea agreements.” Garcia v. State, 722 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla.

3d DCA 1998). See also State v. Gutierrez, 10 So. 3d 158 (Fla. 3d DCA

2009); State v. Frazier, 697 So. 2d 944, 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Madrigal v.

State, 545 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).             We reaffirmed this well-

established principle in Garcia, 722 So. 2d at 907, holding: “A defendant will

6
  As an initial matter, we reject Rojas’ argument that the State had no right
to appeal (and that this court is without jurisdiction to review) the trial court’s
order mitigating his sentence. In support of this proposition, Rojas cites State
v. LaFave, 149 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 2014), which held the State had no statutory
right to appeal an order granting defendant’s motion for early termination of
probation, even though such early termination expressly violated the terms
of the underlying plea agreement between the State and defendant.
However, the State correctly points out the mitigated sentences of three
years’ imprisonment not only violate the express terms of the previously
approved plea agreement between the State and defendant, but also fall
below the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code.
As a result, the State is authorized to appeal pursuant to section 924.07(1)(i),
Florida Statutes (2021), which specifically provides that “[t]he state may
appeal from: . . . [a] sentence imposed below the lowest permissible
sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921.”
See also State v. Brooks, 890 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding
appellate court has jurisdiction where mitigated sentence constituted a
downward departure from the minimum permissible sentence); State v.
Swett, 772 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
                                        9
not be relieved of an obligation that was included as a specific component of

a plea agreement that was bargained for and voluntarily entered into by the

defendant.”

      In State v. Swett, 772 So. 2d 48, 52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), the parties

entered into a plea agreement under which the State agreed to reduce the

original charge of first-degree murder to second-degree murder and

recommend a sentencing range of 34-55 years’ imprisonment in exchange

for the defendant’s plea of nolo contendere to the reduced charge. The trial

court accepted the plea as negotiated between the parties and, following a

sentencing hearing, sentenced Swett to 38.5 years in prison.           Shortly

thereafter, Swett filed a motion to mitigate under rule 3.800(c). 7 Following a

hearing, the trial court reduced the sentence to twenty-one years in prison,

which constituted a downward departure from the sentencing range (34 to

55 years) under the sentencing guideline scoresheet. Id. at 51. Our sister

court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in mitigating and reducing

the incarcerative portion of the sentence, because the original sentence

imposed was part of a negotiated plea between the parties, approved by the

court at the time it imposed the sentence. Id. at 52. The Fifth DCA noted:

7
  Unlike the instant case, the plea agreement in Swett did not prohibit
defendant from filing a motion to mitigate his sentence.
                                      10
“The sentence was part of a quid pro quo and the defendant cannot accept

the benefit of the bargain without accepting its burden.” Id.

      Rojas contends the instant case is distinguishable because the trial

court mitigated the sentence on its own, rather than pursuant to a motion

filed by the defendant. While it is true that a trial court is authorized—under

appropriate circumstances and pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.800(c) 8—to impose a downward departure sentence, “the

court's authority to impose such a sentence in a plea context is

circumscribed.” Swett, 772 So. 2d at 51. The trial court, under the facts and

circumstances presented here, was without discretion to mitigate Rojas’

sentence.

      As an initial matter, we are dubious of Rojas’ premise that the trial court

mitigated the sentence “on its own,” given the record of what actually

transpired below. At the conclusion of the violation hearing, having

determined that Rojas violated his community control, the trial court was

“thinking out loud” about its sentencing discretion, given the mandatory

prison sentences expressly agreed to by the parties. The trial court said it

thought it might have the discretion to mitigate the sentences on its own

8
 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c) provides in pertinent part that
a “court may reduce or modify. . . a legal sentence imposed by it, sua sponte,
or upon motion filed, within 60 days after the imposition. . . .”
                                       11
under rule 3.800, but postponed the sentencing hearing for two weeks. One

week later, Rojas filed a motion to mitigate his sentence and a motion for a

downward departure. In each of these motions, Rojas set forth a variety of

reasons why the court should reduce his sentence from the agreed-upon ten-

year and five-year prison terms. Rojas’ motion also proffered substantial

mitigating circumstances, including a twelve-page psychological evaluation

report prepared in 2018, which he had previously relied upon as part of the

mitigation package in negotiating the original plea agreement. One week

later, at the rescheduled sentencing hearing, the trial court announced the

five-year and ten-year sentences and then “on its own” mitigated the

sentences to concurrent three-year terms.

     Even if we accept Rojas’ proposition that the trial court acted without

consideration of the motion to mitigate and motion for downward departure,

along with the accompanying mitigation evidence, we reject the conclusion

that the trial court had the authority or discretion to impose a mitigated or

reduced sentence in light of the express terms of the original plea agreement.

     We first observe that Rojas violated (or sought to violate) the express

terms of the plea agreement in at least three material respects:

                                     12
     1) By filing a motion to mitigate despite his express agreement

     he “shall not file a motion to set aside guilty plea, or a motion to

     mitigate;”

     2) By requesting the trial court impose a reduced sentence of

     eighteen months in prison, even though Rojas expressly agreed

     that, “should he be found in violation, the Defendant will be

     sentenced to no less than ten (10) years state prison in F17-

     20909 and to five (5) years state prison in F19-10646;” and

     3) By seeking a mitigated sentence or downward departure, in

     which Rojas relied upon mitigating circumstances previously

     utilized in support of the original plea, even though he expressly

     agreed that “this mitigation will not be available to assist him in

     his case in any subsequent violation of probation.”

     These terms were a material part of the consideration which Rojas

offered (and the State accepted) in exchange for the State’s offer of

community control and probation (which Rojas accepted).                A plea

agreement, like other contracts in Florida, is made “when three elements are

present: offer, acceptance, and consideration.” SGC Harbourwood, LLC v.

Hanyan, 93 So. 3d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). There is no question

the parties entered into a binding contract. Of course, the one difference—

                                     13
procedurally—between a plea agreement and other contracts, is that the

plea agreement is not considered binding on the parties (or on the trial court)

until it is approved and accepted formally by the trial court. Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.172 provides in relevant part:

      (a) Voluntariness; Factual Basis. Before accepting a plea of guilty
      or nolo contendere, the trial judge shall determine that the plea
      is voluntarily entered and that a factual basis for the plea exists.

      (g) Withdrawal of Plea Offer or Negotiation. No plea offer or
      negotiation is binding until it is accepted by the trial judge formally
      after making all the inquiries, advisements, and determinations
      required by this rule. Until that time, it may be withdrawn by either
      party without any necessary justification.

      (h) Withdrawal of Plea When Judge Does Not Concur. If the trial
      judge does not concur in a tendered plea of guilty or nolo
      contendere arising from negotiations, the plea may be
      withdrawn.

      In the instant case, the plea agreement was approved and accepted

formally by the trial court. The trial court conducted the appropriate plea

colloquy, formally accepted the negotiated plea and its terms and conditions

(including the mandatory sentence upon a subsequent violation), and

imposed the sentence bargained for between the parties. The trial court’s

order ratifying the agreement provided inter alia that “the Court, by this Order,

expresses its intention to sentence the Defendant in the manner and to the

extent stipulated in the said plea agreement.”

                                        14
         Having received the benefit of that bargain— community control and

probation (instead of the maximum possible sentence of life in prison), Rojas

cannot now disavow the consideration he gave (mandatory sentences of at

least ten years and five years and a waiver of any right to seek mitigation if

he violated that community control and probation) in exchange for the State’s

offer.

         Further, the trial court cannot circumvent or otherwise thwart the

obvious and express intent of the agreement by doing, on its own, the very

thing the defendant is himself prohibited from seeking or asking the trial court

to do. Were it otherwise, such agreements would be virtually unenforceable

and, as we have previously observed: “permitting defendant to evade his

negotiated plea by filing a motion to mitigate would discourage the State from

entering into future plea bargains with other defendants.” Gutierrez, 10 So.

3d at 159 (citing Swett, 772 So. 2d at 52).

         Even if we accept the distinction Rojas proposes here, under the facts

and circumstances of this case, it is a distinction without a difference. The

mere fact that it was the trial judge, rather than the defendant, who initiated

the mitigation is irrelevant. If the trial court believed that the sentence, as

originally negotiated between the parties, was improper or inequitable, it was

at the point when the negotiated plea agreement was presented for

                                       15
acceptance that the trial court should have rejected it and given the party or

parties the opportunity to withdraw from it. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(h) (“If

the trial judge does not concur in a tendered plea of guilty or nolo contendere

arising from negotiations, the plea may be withdrawn.”) See also Goins v.

State, 672 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. 1996) (pursuant to a negotiated plea,

defendant pled guilty in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence of five and

one-half years prison followed by three years’ probation; trial court rejected

the agreed-upon sentence and, without offering defendant the opportunity to

withdraw his plea, sentenced him to nine years’ prison followed by three

years’ probation.   The Court held that where the parties reach a firm

agreement for a specified sentence and the trial judge determines to impose

a greater sentence, the “judge must affirmatively offer the defendant the right

to withdraw the plea”).

      However, once the trial court formally accepts and ratifies a negotiated

plea agreement and imposes sentence pursuant to the terms of that

agreement, the trial court is obligated to abide by those terms and, if

necessary, to enforce the terms agreed to by the parties. See, e.g., Devoid

v. State, 987 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (observing trial court had

authority to enforce plea agreement in order to effectuate its terms and

prevent the actions of the Department of Corrections which would have

                                      16
thwarted the terms of the plea).        See also Williams v. Department of

Corrections, 734 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Davis v. Singletary, 659

So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Spencer v. State, 623 So. 2d 1211 (Fla.

4th DCA 1993).

      In this respect, Rojas’ reliance on the case of Rollman v. State, 887

So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 2004) is misplaced. While it is true that the Rollman

Court held a trial court is not bound by the terms of a plea agreement entered

into between the parties, the statement must be considered in its proper

context—the trial court’s authority before a sentence is formally accepted

and imposed:

      [W]hen a judge who has participated in or tentatively approved a
      plea bargain decides not to include the concessions
      contemplated therein in his final disposition of the case and
      affirmatively offers the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his
      guilty plea, may the defendant refuse to withdraw his plea on the
      ground that the plea bargain is a specifically enforceable
      contract? We think not. It is our view that, even if the trial judge's
      indication of leniency is the only inducement a defendant has in
      pleading guilty, the court is not bound by it.

Id. at 1235 (quoting Davis v. State, 308 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1975)).

      Reaffirming its holding in Davis, the Rollman Court said:

      We continue to agree that a trial court retains the authority to
      alter a prior plea arrangement up until the time sentence is
      imposed, so long as the trial court provides the defendant an
      opportunity to withdraw any plea that was entered in reliance on
      the promised sentence. It does not matter whether the judge

                                       17
      simply changed his         mind,    or   whether    there   was    a
      misunderstanding.

Id. (emphasis added).

      Thus, although a trial court has the authority to reject a negotiated plea

between the parties before it is formally accepted by the court, upon the trial

court’s acceptance of the negotiated plea and imposition of a sentence

consistent with the agreed terms, the trial court no longer retains its authority

to “alter a prior plea arrangement.” 9 Id. The trial court was bound to abide

by, enforce, and ensure compliance with the agreed-upon terms of the plea,

and was without discretion to reduce or mitigate the sentence below the

mandatory term agreed to by the parties.

      In this respect, we find our opinion in State v. Gutierrez, 10 So. 3d 158

(Fla. 3d DCA 2009) controlling. In Gutierrez, the defendant entered into a

negotiated plea agreement with the State, which was approved by the trial

court. Under the terms of the agreement, defendant was sentenced to 364

9
  For this same reason, Rojas’ reliance on a statement by the Florida
Supreme Court in Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla.1996) is equally
unavailing and taken out of context: “Even though the plea has been
accepted and regardless of whether the judge participated in the
negotiations, the judge is never bound to honor the agreement.” Goins, like
Rollman, involved the trial court’s rejection of the terms of a negotiated plea
before sentence was imposed, not (as here) an after-the-fact disavowal and
alteration of the terms of a negotiated plea that the trial court had already
accepted, approved and ratified, and upon which the trial court had
previously imposed the agreed-upon sentence.
                                       18
days in county jail, followed by one year of community control and three

years’ probation. After serving less than thirty days, the defendant moved to

mitigate his sentence, and the trial court, relying on rule 3.800(c), granted

the motion and mitigated the sentence to community control and probation

only.

        On appeal, we reversed, holding that the trial court “erroneously

granted the motion to mitigate and improperly eliminated the incarcerative

portion” of Gutierrez’s sentence. Id. at 159. We explained:

        Because the plea agreement here imposed upon defendant a
        specific sentence, defendant cannot circumvent the plea bargain
        by filing a motion to mitigate. State v. Swett, 772 So. 2d 48, 52
        (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (stating that a defendant's sentence
        negotiated pursuant to a plea agreement was part of a quid pro
        quo and, therefore, a defendant “cannot accept the benefit of [a
        plea] bargain without accepting its burden”); see also Garcia, 722
        So.2d at 907 (“A defendant will not be relieved of an obligation
        that was included as a specific component of a plea agreement
        that was bargained for and voluntarily entered into by
        defendant.”) (citing Allen v. State, 642 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 1st
        DCA 1994)).
                                         ***
        Moreover, the trial court, pursuant to the plea agreement, did not
        have discretion over defendant's sentence and, therefore, should
        have denied defendant's motion to mitigate.

Id. See also Arango v. State, 891 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)

(holding trial court was “without the discretion to reduce the agreed sentence”

where “the plea bargain contained a specific agreement on the specific

sentence that would be imposed on the defendant, namely, ten years
                                       19
incarceration followed by seven years of probation”); State v. Brooks, 890

So. 2d 503, 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding trial court erred in mitigating

defendant’s original sentence of three years’ imprisonment, which was part

of a negotiated plea agreement between the parties and which was approved

by the trial court when imposing the original sentence; reversing and

remanding for the trial court to reinstate the original sentence). 10

      CONCLUSION

      On the State’s appeal, we reverse and remand to the trial court with

instructions to vacate the orders mitigating Rojas’ sentences and to reinstate

the sentences originally imposed by the trial court. On Rojas’ cross-appeal,

we affirm the trial court’s orders finding Rojas in violation of his community

control.

      Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

10
    We affirm Rojas’ cross-appeal of the trial court’s order finding Rojas in
violation of his community control and revoking supervision. We review the
trial court’s determination for an abuse of discretion, Correa v. State, 43 So.
3d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) and conclude that there was competent
substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that Rojas willfully and
substantially violated the terms of his community control.
                                       20
                                        The State of Florida v. Jeremy Rojas
                                                         Case No. 3D21-1018
GORDO, J., specially concurring.

      I fully concur in my colleague’s well-written analysis regarding the trial

court’s ability to mitigate in this situation. I write separately to highlight that

the trial court relied on Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c), titled

“Reduction and Modification,” which includes the following language:

            This subdivision shall not be applicable to those
            cases in which the death sentence is imposed or
            those cases in which the trial judge has imposed
            the minimum mandatory sentence or has no
            sentencing discretion.

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(c) (emphasis added).

      Looking to the plain language of the rule itself—taking into account that

we ought not render any provision of the rule meaningless—the rule clearly

provides that it does not apply to those cases in which the trial judge has no

sentencing discretion. See Scherer v. Volusia Cnty. Dept. of Corr., 171 So.

3d 135, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“No part of a statute [or rule], not even a

single word, should be ignored, read out of the text, or rendered

meaningless, in construing the provision.”); Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n,

Inc. v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla. 2006) (“It is an

elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect

                                        21
must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if

possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere

surplusage.” (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993,

996 (Fla. 2003))).

      As Judge Emas aptly points out, written plea agreements with such

unambiguous language ratified by the trial court are examples in which the

trial court no longer has sentencing discretion. Here, the plea agreement

unambiguously stated that Rojas would be sentenced to no less than ten

years on the 2017 case and five years in state prison on the 2019 case if he

violated community control and was precluded from filing a motion to

mitigate. The plea agreement was formally approved and accepted by the

trial court.   The trial court did not have any discretion to deviate from the

terms of the plea agreement under these factual circumstances. See State

v. Hall, 2022 WL 17331643, at *2 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov. 30, 2022) (“Because

the trial court could not undo [the Defendant’s] negotiated sentences, the

mitigated sentences are illegal. In other words, the trial court could not

unilaterally modify a contract to which it was not a party.”); State v. Howell,

59 So. 3d 301, 302 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“[T]he trial court lacked the

discretion to modify the sentence previously imposed pursuant to the plea

agreement [between the State and the defendant].”); Arango v. State, 891
                                      22
So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“Since the plea bargain here did not

give the trial court any discretion over the length of the sentence, it follows

that the trial court would be without the discretion to reduce the agreed

sentence.”). Therefore, as the plain language of rule clearly establishes it is

inapplicable where a trial court has no sentencing discretion, it was error for

the trial court to rely on rule 3.800(c) to mitigate Rojas’ sentence.

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