Court Opinion

ID: 9961084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 20:00:43.086297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:12.774811
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                       File Name: 24a0091p.06

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                             ┐
 KEELEY HAMILTON,
                                                             │
                                   Plaintiff-Appellant,      │
                                                              >        No. 23-1466
                                                             │
        v.                                                   │
                                                             │
 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,                            │
                              Defendant-Appellee.            │
                                                             ┘

  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
                  No. 2:22-cv-10066—Mark A. Goldsmith, District Judge.

                               Decided and Filed: April 17, 2024

                Before: McKEAGUE, LARSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
                                _________________

                                            COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Paul Renzo, Dearborn, Michigan, for Appellant. David I. Blower, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
                                      _________________

                                             OPINION
                                      _________________

       PER CURIAM. An administrative law judge denied Keeley Hamilton’s applications for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income because, despite her physical
impairments, she could still work in two occupations. On appeal, Hamilton relies on Ninth
Circuit caselaw to seek a categorical rule that would treat her as disabled unless she could work
in at least three occupations. We disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s rule. So we affirm the district
court’s decision upholding the Social Security Administration’s denial of benefits to Hamilton.
 No. 23-1466                       Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                         Page 2

                                                I.

          After graduating from high school, Hamilton eventually took a job with Kohl’s. She
worked many years as a retail cashier or on the floor for this department store. On December 28,
2015, however, Hamilton’s physical ailments forced her to quit her job when she was 56 years
old.

          In March 2017, Hamilton sought disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income from the Social Security Administration (which we will call the “Administration” for
short).     In her applications, Hamilton asserted that she suffered from several physical
impairments: degenerative disc disease, left cubital tunnel syndrome, and obesity. Hamilton also
asserted that she had become disabled on the date of her last day of work.

          Hamilton’s applications progressed to an evidentiary hearing before an administrative
law judge (ALJ) within the Administration. Hamilton and a vocational expert testified at her
hearing.

          The ALJ denied Hamilton’s applications using the Administration’s five-step evaluation
sequence for determining whether an applicant qualifies as “disabled” under the Social Security
Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At the first two steps, the ALJ found that
Hamilton had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her disability
and that she had severe impairments that limited her ability to work. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–
(ii). At the third step, the ALJ found that she did not automatically qualify as disabled because
her impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). At the
fourth step, the ALJ found that Hamilton had the “residual functional capacity” to perform light
work with some restrictions that do not matter in this appeal. The ALJ added that this functional
capacity would not permit Hamilton to undertake her prior cashier position because that job had
required a “medium” level of exertion. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

          This case thus turned on the fifth step, which asks whether Hamilton could “make an
adjustment to other work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). At 56 years old, Hamilton qualified as a
“[p]erson of advanced age” at the alleged onset of her disability.           See id. § 404.1563(e).
Accordingly, § 202.00(c) of the Administration’s “Medical Vocational Guidelines” directed the
 No. 23-1466                      Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                          Page 3

ALJ to find Hamilton disabled unless she had “skills” that were “readily transferable to a
significant range of semi-skilled or skilled work” falling within her identified light-work
functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sub. pt. P, app. 2, § 202.00(c); see id. §§ 202.00(e),
202.06, 202.07. Relying on the vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that Hamilton’s
prior cashier position had given her transferrable work skills, including cashiering and payment
processing. The ALJ also determined that these skills permitted Hamilton to switch to two
semi-skilled sedentary occupations: food checker and auction clerk. Because jobs in these two
general fields existed “in significant numbers in the national economy,” the ALJ concluded that
Hamilton was not disabled and denied her applications. Id. § 404.1560(c).

       After exhausting her administrative remedies, Hamilton sought the district court’s review
of the ALJ’s decision. The district court concluded that substantial evidence did not support the
ALJ’s decision. The court reasoned that the ALJ mistakenly failed to ask the vocational expert
whether any conflicts existed between his testimony and the occupational information in the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. See S.S.R. 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4 (S.S.A. Dec. 4,
2000). The district court remanded the case to the Administration for further proceedings.

       On remand, the ALJ held another evidentiary hearing. The vocational expert repeated his
conclusions that Hamilton’s past job as a retail cashier was a semi-skilled position that had given
her transferable skills.   He also explained any differences between his testimony and the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles. He next reiterated that Hamilton’s light-work functional
capacity allowed her to transition to the food-checker and auction-clerk fields. He estimated that
there were around 64,000 of these jobs in the national economy. He added that Hamilton could
perform the food-checker position in a range of work settings, from hospital and office cafeterias
to small restaurants. He also noted that auction clerks could work in both retail and wholesale.

       In post-hearing briefing, Hamilton argued that § 202.00(c) of the Medical Vocational
Guidelines required the ALJ to find that her skills would transfer to at least three skilled or
semi-skilled occupations before the ALJ could conclude that she was not disabled. Hamilton
based this interpretation of § 202.00(c) on two out-of-circuit cases, Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468
F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2006), and Maxwell v. Saul, 971 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2020).               If this
categorical rule applied, Hamilton also argued, she was disabled. Even though she had the
 No. 23-1466                       Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                          Page 4

residual functional capacity to undertake some 64,000 jobs in the national economy, she
reasoned that those thousands of jobs did not extend beyond just two occupations: food checker
and auction clerk.

       The ALJ denied Hamilton’s applications a second time.             He concluded again that
Hamilton’s skills permitted her to perform the food-checker and auction-clerk positions and that
these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy. In the process, he rejected
Hamilton’s argument that “a significant range of . . . work” under § 202.00(c) required more than
two occupations.     The ALJ explained that the Administration had not accepted the Ninth
Circuit’s decisions in Lounsburry and Maxwell. He also found as a fact that the food-checker
and auction-clerk occupations represent “a significant range of work” because Hamilton could
perform the work in diverse settings.

       Hamilton did not object to the ALJ’s opinion with the Administration’s Appeals Council.
The Appeals Council also did not assume jurisdiction over Hamilton’s case within 60 days. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.984, 416.1484. The ALJ’s opinion thus became the Administration’s final
decision after the 60-day period expired. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.984(a), 416.1484(a).

       Hamilton returned to the district court. She renewed her interpretation of § 202.00(c) of
the Medical Vocational Guidelines. That is, she argued that the ALJ should have found her
disabled because his findings showed that her skills did not transfer to at least three occupations.

       The district court rejected Hamilton’s reading of § 202.00(c). Among other things, the
court explained that it need not follow the Ninth Circuit’s nonbinding decisions in Lounsburry
and Maxwell. It also noted that, according to the Administration’s Program Operations Manual
System, “fewer than three occupations” may suffice for a “not disabled” finding when “it is clear
that jobs exist in significant numbers within” those occupations.

       Hamilton appealed. We review the district court’s decision de novo. See Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405–06 (6th Cir. 2009). When reviewing the ALJ’s
decision, by comparison, we ask whether he applied the correct legal standards and supported his
factual findings with substantial evidence. See Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 F.3d 902,
903 (6th Cir. 2016). We thus review the ALJ’s legal rulings (including his interpretation of the
 No. 23-1466                      Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                           Page 5

relevant laws and regulations) de novo. See Cardew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 896 F.3d 742, 746
(6th Cir. 2018); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2007).

                                                II.

       On appeal, Hamilton primarily argues that the ALJ could find that she lacked a disability
under § 202.00(c) of the Medical Vocational Guidelines only if she had skills that transferred to
at least three “occupations.” And because the ALJ identified only two occupations that she could
still perform, she claims that he legally erred by finding her not disabled. We disagree.

                                                A.

       To explain our reasons, we start with the legal backdrop. The Social Security Act defines
“disability” to mean the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” because of an
impairment that will likely last for at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see id.
§ 416(i)(1)(A). It further clarifies that applicants qualify as disabled only if they cannot do both
their past work and “any other kind” of work that exists in the national economy:

       An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or
       mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable
       to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
       experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
       the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
       area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
       whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Act also defines “work which exists in the national economy” to
“mean[] work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual
lives or in several regions of the country.” Id. (emphasis added).

       The Act gives the Administration (technically, the Social Security Commissioner) the
authority to issue “regulations” to “carry out” these provisions.        Id. § 405(a); Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 465–66 (1983). Exercising this authority, the Administration has
adopted its “five-step” process to evaluate disability claims. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20,
24 (2003); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If applicants make it to step five, they qualify as disabled
unless the Administration proves that they can “make an adjustment to other work” when
 No. 23-1466                      Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                          Page 6

considering their “residual functional capacity” (which measures the activities they can still do)
along with their “age, education, and work experience[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); see id.
§ 404.1560(c)(2).

       Historically, the Administration used “vocational experts” to decide whether applicants
could perform other work on a case-by-case basis. Heckler, 461 U.S. at 461. In 1978, however,
it adopted the Medical Vocational Guidelines to set uniform rules that applied to different
combinations of work capacities, ages, educations, and work experiences. See id. at 461–62; see
also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569. In that respect, § 202.00(c) of these guidelines sets a uniform rule for
individuals of “advanced age” who have the capacity to perform light work. It provides:

       [F]or individuals of advanced age who can no longer perform vocationally
       relevant past work and who have a history of unskilled work experience, or who
       have only skills that are not readily transferable to a significant range of semi-
       skilled or skilled work that is within the individual’s functional capacity, or who
       have no work experience, the limitations in vocational adaptability represented by
       functional restriction to light work warrant a finding of disabled.

Id. pt. 404, sub. pt. P, app. 2, § 202.00(c) (emphasis added). Other regulations define “advanced
age” as 55 or older and describe the way that the Administration will decide whether these
individuals have transferable skills. Id. §§ 404.1563(e), 404.1568(d)(1)–(4).

                                                B.

       The parties share much common ground about how § 202.00(c) operates here. They
agree that Hamilton qualifies as an individual of “advanced age” and that she can no longer
perform her past cashier work. Further, they accept the ALJ’s findings that Hamilton has a
residual functional capacity that allows her to perform light work (with restrictions that do not
matter now) and that her past cashier work qualified as “semi-skilled.” The parties also do not
dispute the ALJ’s finding that Hamilton’s cashier skills were “readily transferrable” to the food-
checker and auction-clerk occupations. And Hamilton does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that
64,000 of these jobs exist in the United States or that this number shows that the jobs “exist in
significant numbers in the national economy[.]” Id. § 404.1560(c)(1); see Moats v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 42 F.4th 558, 563 (6th Cir. 2022) (32,000 jobs); Taskila, 819 F.3d at 905 (6,000 jobs).
 No. 23-1466                       Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                             Page 7

       This case thus hinges on a narrow question: What does § 202.00(c) mean when it states
that an ALJ must find applicants like Hamilton disabled unless they have skills that are “readily
transferable to a significant range of semi-skilled or skilled work that is within [their] functional
capacity”? 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sub. pt. P, app. 2, § 202.00(c). Hamilton interprets the word
“work” in this phrase to mean “occupation.” She then suggests that three occupations represent
the minimum number that an ordinary English speaker would describe as a “significant range” of
occupations. See Maxwell, 971 F.3d at 1131–32. The Administration counters that a single
occupation with many different types of jobs itself can encompass a “significant range of work.”

       We agree with the Administration. Courts must determine a regulation’s meaning by
starting with its text. See Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Mich., 32 F.4th 548, 557 (6th Cir. 2022). We thus must ask what § 202.00(c) conveys by its use
of the word “work.” We see three possibilities with slightly different connotations.

       Possibility One: The word “work” can refer to “[p]hysical or mental effort or activity
directed toward the production or accomplishment of something”—that is, the actual “labor”
employees must undertake on the job. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
1474 (1976). Take the activities of carpenters. Depending on the job, their work might require
them to “[i]nstall structures and fixtures” or “[m]easure, cut, and shape wood, plastic, and other
materials.”    Bur. of Lab. Stats., Carpenters, Occupational Outlook Handbook, available at
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/construction-and-extraction/carpenters.htm#tab-2.           Or    take     the
activities of lawyers. Again depending on the job, their work might require them to “represent
clients in criminal or civil proceedings” or “[p]repare” “legal documents” like “contracts” or
“wills.”      Bur. of Lab. Stats., Lawyers, Occupational Outlook Handbook, available at
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm#tab-2. The Administration sometimes uses “work”
in this “activities” sense. One regulation, for example, relies on the word to catalogue different
levels of labor, ranging from least strenuous (“[s]edentary work”) to most (“[v]ery heavy work”).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. This regulation defines “[l]ight work” to mean, among other things,
“frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds” and a “good deal of walking
or standing[.]” Id. § 404.1567(b). And it says that applicants can perform a “full or wide range
of light work” if they can “do substantially all of these activities.” Id. (emphasis added).
 No. 23-1466                      Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                          Page 8

       Possibility Two: The word “work” can also refer to one’s “[e]mployment”—that is, the
specific “job” that an employee holds. American Heritage, supra, at 1474. The Administration
generally uses the word in this “job” sense at the fifth step of its evaluation sequence when
deciding whether applicants can “make an adjustment to other work.”                    20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). As we have explained, this step requires the Administration to prove “that
other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that [an applicant] can do,
given [the applicant’s] residual functional capacity and vocational factors” (age, education, and
work experience). Id. § 404.1560(c)(2). Regulations discussing this fifth step repeatedly equate
this use of “work” with “jobs” rather than “activities.” One notes that “[a]ny other work (jobs)
that you can adjust to must exist in significant numbers in the national economy[.]”            Id.
§ 404.1560(c)(1) (emphasis added). Another notes that “[w]ork exists in the national economy
when there is a significant number of jobs (in one or more occupations) having requirements
which you are able to meet with your physical or mental abilities and vocational qualifications.”
Id. § 404.1566(b) (emphasis added).

       Possibility Three: The word “work” can lastly refer to “[t]he means by which one earns
one’s livelihood”—that is, an employee’s general occupation or profession. American Heritage,
supra, at 1474. When used at this higher level of generality, the word encompasses not just an
employee’s specific job but also similar jobs with “variations” in their duties. S.S.R. 96-9p,
1996 WL 374185, at *3 n.4 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). As the Administration has noted, “[e]ach
occupation represents numerous jobs.” S.S.R. 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2. The occupation
of “lawyer,” for example, can include many legal positions, ranging from a criminal-defense
lawyer to a transactional attorney. See Lawyer, Occupational Outlook Handbook, supra. And
the occupation of “carpenter” can include the job of “rough carpenter,” among others. S.S.R. 96-
9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *3 n.4.

       Which meaning does the text of § 202.00(c) signal?            Again, it asks whether an
individual’s work “skills” are “readily transferable to a significant range of semi-skilled or
skilled work that is within the individual’s functional capacity[.]” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sub. pt. P,
app. 2, § 202.00(c). Given this language, neither party argues for the first possible meaning of
work (“[p]hysical or mental effort or activity”).     We agree that this meaning does not fit
 No. 23-1466                       Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                          Page 9

§ 202.00(c)’s context.    American Heritage, supra, at 1474.        The section seeks to evaluate
whether applicants of advanced age can use their skills to seek other “employment”—not
whether they can use their skills to conduct various “activities” in the abstract. Id.

       That conclusion leaves us with a choice between “jobs” and “occupations.” In our view,
the regulatory context leaves no doubt that § 202.00(c) refers to “jobs.” Recall that the Medical
Vocational Guidelines help the Administration decide whether applicants can perform other
work at step five of its evaluation sequence. See Heckler, 461 U.S. at 460–62. At that step, the
regulatory scheme consistently equates “work” with “jobs”—not “occupations.” The scheme
expressly uses the word “jobs” as a synonym for the word “work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1).
And it makes clear that “[w]ork exists in the national economy” as long as a “significant number
of jobs” exist—even if all those jobs fall into “one” occupation. Id. § 404.1566(b) (emphasis
added). Since the Administration uses “work” to mean “jobs” in all other regulations discussing
step five, the Medical Vocational Guidelines are most naturally read to contain the same
meaning.

       Other parts of the Medical Vocational Guidelines likewise suggest that the inquiry
focuses on the jobs—not the occupations—that applicants can undertake. One subsection, for
example, notes that the Administration will not treat as disabled younger applicants who can
perform light unskilled work because these applicants can adjust to “substantial numbers of
unskilled jobs[.]” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, sub. pt. P, app. 2, § 202.00(b) (emphasis added). Another
suggests that “illiterate” “younger individuals” who can perform light work are not disabled
because they have “the capability for substantial numbers of such jobs.”             Id. § 202.00(g)
(emphasis added). It would be strange for other subsections within the Medical Vocational
Guidelines to turn on an applicant’s ability to undertake a substantial number of other jobs but
for § 202.00(c) to turn on the applicant’s ability to undertake a substantial number of other
occupations.

       A broader statutory point reinforces this conclusion. If we required proof that applicants
could switch to three occupations even if millions of jobs existed in just one of them, we would
risk putting this regulation on a collision course with the “plain language of the governing
statute[.]” Salamalekis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 221 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2000). The Social
 No. 23-1466                       Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                      Page 10

Security Act makes clear that applicants do not qualify as disabled simply because they cannot
engage in their “previous work[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). To qualify as disabled, applicants
instead must be unable to “engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy[.]” Id. (emphasis added). Hamilton’s proposed rule—that ALJs should
treat applicants as disabled unless they can work across three occupations—likely conflicts with
this text. After all, it is hard to see how someone eligible to work at 64,000 jobs across two
fields could not engage in “any other kind” of work. Id. (emphasis added).

       Our (admittedly, unpublished) precedent also supports our conclusion. See Geiger v.
Apfel, No. 99-5590, 2000 WL 1257184, at *2 (6th Cir. July 10, 2000). Geiger considered
whether a commercial airline pilot who had been injured on the job had skills that could transfer
“to a ‘significant range’ of work.” Id. A vocational expert had testified that the pilot could
transition to “general dispatcher-type positions” and that about 75,000 of these positions existed
in the national economy. Id. at *1. We upheld the Administration’s denial of benefits based on
these opinions—even though a “dispatcher” likely represented just one occupation. See id. at *2.

       A contextual factor points the same way. If we interpret “work” to mean “job,” we
would set an objective marker tied to the employment positions that exist in this country. If, by
contrast, we interpret “work” to mean “occupation,” we would set a subjective benchmark that
requires an inquiry into which jobs fall into which occupations. That view could necessitate
difficult line-drawing problems.    Indeed, the Department of Labor’s Occupational Outlook
Handbook (a source on which the Administration relies) defines some occupations broadly and
others narrowly. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(5). It, for example, lumps all “lawyers” together
into a single occupation. See Lawyers, Occupational Outlook Handbook, supra. But it divides
“clerks” into many occupations, including general office clerk, information clerk, and material
recording clerk.     See Bur. of Lab. Stats., Information Clerks, Occupational Outlook
Handbook, available at https://www.bls.gov/ooh/office-and-administrative-support/information-
clerks.htm#tab-8. No reasonable reader of the word “work” in § 202.00(c) would conclude that a
disability finding should rest on the level of generality at which an ALJ defines an “occupation.”
That view might force ALJs to treat applicants as disabled because they could switch to only one
occupation—even if the occupation contained millions of available positions. And that view
 No. 23-1466                      Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                         Page 11

might force ALJs to treat other applicants as not disabled because they could switch to three
occupations—even when the occupations contained only a few thousand jobs each.

       Having read “work” to refer to “jobs,” we next must confront what § 202.00(c) means by
“significant range.” The Administration’s other step-five regulations (and the Social Security
Act) use a different phrase by evaluating whether a “significant number of jobs” exist in the
national economy.     20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Perhaps § 202.00(c) adopted the same approach, and the Administration chose the phrase
“significant range” rather than “significant number” to respect basic rules of grammar. If the
Administration sought to keep the word “work” (a statutory term), it would have made no sense
to say “significant number of work.” Or perhaps the Administration meant to depart from this
numbers inquiry altogether by asking whether an applicant’s skills would transfer to jobs with
enough “variation” in their duties. American Heritage, supra, at 1080 (defining “range”). That
view, though, might treat an applicant as “not disabled” if the applicant could engage in a variety
of jobs—even if none of the jobs existed in large numbers in the economy. Cf. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
sub. pt. P, app. 2, § 202.00(e). Regardless, we need not resolve this quandary here. Hamilton’s
challenge to the ALJ’s decision in this case rests on her legal argument that the word “work” in
§ 202.00(c) means “occupation.” She does not raise a factual (substantial-evidence) challenge to
the ALJ’s conclusion that a “significant range” of jobs existed across the food-checker and
auction-clerk occupations. So we can save the meaning of this phrase for another day.

       Hamilton’s contrary arguments do not convince us otherwise. She primarily relies on
two Ninth Circuit decisions that have interpreted the phrase “significant range of . . . work” in
§ 202.00(c). See Maxwell, 971 F.3d at 1131–32; Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1117. In Lounsburry,
the Ninth Circuit decided that an applicant’s ability to perform one other occupation did not
suffice to show that the applicant could perform a “significant range of work.” See 468 F.3d
at 1117. The court interpreted the word “work” to mean “occupation” based on interpretive
guidance (Social Security Ruling 83-10) issued by the Administration in 1983.             Id.   This
guidance defined the phrase “Range of Work” in the Medical Vocational Guidelines to mean
“Occupations existing at an exertional level” (such as the “light work” level relevant here), and it
defined “Full Range of Work” to mean “All or substantially all occupations existing at an
 No. 23-1466                      Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                        Page 12

exertional level.” Id. (quoting S.S.R. 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *7 (S.S.A. Jan. 1, 1983)).
Having defined the word “work” to mean “occupation,” the court next turned to the phrase
“significant range.” Id. According to the court, nobody would describe someone who could
perform one occupation as having the ability to perform a “significant range” of occupations. Id.
And while the Administration argued that this phrase could be met if an applicant could perform
one occupation that has a “significant number of jobs” in the national economy, the court
reasoned that the regulation did not use that phrase. Id.

       The Ninth Circuit doubled down on this approach in Maxwell. The applicant there had
the ability to perform two occupations. See Maxwell, 971 F.3d at 1131–32. But the court held
that this fact did not show that she could perform a “significant range of work.” It reasoned that
a “range” of “occupations” required at least two. Id. at 1131. And because § 202.00(c) used the
phrase significant range, the section “must require more than two” occupations. Id. The court
again rejected the Administration’s argument that the ability to perform two occupations could
suffice if the occupations included many jobs. Id. at 1131–32. Like Lounsburry, it noted that
§ 202.00(c) used the phrase “significant range of work,” not “significant number of jobs.”

       We respectfully disagree with this approach. For starters, § 202.00(c) does not use the
word “occupation.” It uses the word “work.” And the Ninth Circuit did not attempt to determine
what this word meant by invoking the “traditional tools” of interpretation. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139
S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (citation omitted). Instead, the court reflexively deferred to the Social
Security Ruling that read “work” as “occupation.” See Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1117. That
reasoning deviates from the Supreme Court’s command that we attempt to determine what a
regulation means on our own before adopting administrative guidance on the issue. See Kisor,
139 S. Ct. at 2414–18.

       Next, the Ninth Circuit’s approach also deviates from the Administration’s current
reading of the relevant regulations. Despite Hamilton’s repeated reliance on Social Security
Ruling 83-10, the Administration did not bother to cite that ruling’s definition of “range of work”
on appeal. To the contrary, its briefing affirmatively contradicted the ruling’s definition. The
Administration explained that § 202.00(c) “does not even contain the word ‘occupation[.]’”
Appellee’s Br. 21.
 No. 23-1466                       Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                     Page 13

       Lastly, the Ninth Circuit suggested that “Congress might have drafted [§] 202.00(c) to
require only a ‘significant number of jobs’” but that “it chose not to do so.” Lounsburry, 468
F.3d at 1117 (emphasis added). Yet the Administration—not Congress—drafted the Medical
Vocational Guidelines. So the Ninth Circuit mistook an administrative agency for our legislative
branch. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s claim, moreover, Congress did bar a disability finding if
an applicant could perform “any” type of “work” that existed “in significant numbers” in the
country. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Hamilton does not dispute that she could
perform work as a food checker and auction clerk or that this work exists in significant numbers
in the national economy. Our reading of § 202.00(c) thus best respects Congress’s choices.

       In sum, the ALJ did not err by ruling that Hamilton was not disabled under the
regulations because she had skills that transferred to a significant range of work.

                                                III.

       We can quickly dispose of Hamilton’s two other arguments on procedural grounds.
First, Hamilton argues that the Administration failed to adequately explain its view about the
proper interpretation of § 202.00(c). This failure, she alleged, violated her Fifth Amendment
right to due process and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). But she did not raise her due-
process or APA claims in the district court. She has thus forfeited the claims, and we decline to
address them for the first time on appeal. See Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 513
(6th Cir. 2010).

       Second, Hamilton contends that the ALJ erred on a different ground: by considering
whether her transferrable skills gave her a “competitive edge” over younger individuals seeking
employment. This argument rests on some regulatory history that begins with our decision in
Preslar v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 14 F.3d 1107 (6th Cir. 1994). Under an
earlier version of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d), the Administration treated applicants who were
“close to retirement age” and who had a severe impairment as unable to adjust to light or
sedentary work unless they had “highly marketable” skills. In Preslar, we interpreted “highly
marketable skills” to require applicants to “enjoy[] a significant advantage or edge over others
competing for employment.” 14 F.3d at 1112. In “Acquiescence Ruling” or “AR” 95-1(6), the
 No. 23-1466                     Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.                       Page 14

Administration found Preslar contrary to the regulation and decided that it would apply only to
applicants in the Sixth Circuit. See Acquiescence Ruling (AR) 95-1(6), 1995 WL 259486, at *3–
4 (S.S.A. May 4, 1995).     But the Commissioner rescinded that Acquiescence Ruling after
amending the regulation to eliminate the “highly marketable skills” reference. See Rescission of
Social Security Acquiescence Rulings 95-1(6), 99-2(8) and 99-3(5), 65 Fed. Reg. 18144, 18144–
45 (Apr. 6, 2000).

        Hamilton now argues that the ALJ wrongly relied on the outdated Acquiescence Ruling.
At first, the ALJ asked the vocational expert whether Hamilton’s cashiering skills were highly
marketable and gave her a competitive edge over younger individuals. The ALJ later withdrew
the question, though, when he realized that the question mattered only for the rescinded AR 95-
1(6).   Nevertheless, the ALJ’s written opinion then extraneously noted that Hamilton’s
experience as a cashier gave her a “competitive edge” over younger workers.

        Even if the ALJ erred with this reference, however, we find the error harmless. The ALJ
independently concluded that Hamilton’s skills transfer to a significant number of semi-skilled
jobs. That conclusion meant that she did not qualify as disabled. So any separate consideration
about whether those skills also gave her a competitive edge could not have affected the outcome.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004).

        For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.