Court Opinion

ID: 9745525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:07:22.07498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:30.168938
License: Public Domain

SIMS, Acting P. J., Concurring and Dissenting
 For reasons stated in Justice Hull’s opinion, I concur that defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the search and seizure. I respectfully dissent from the remainder of the lead opinion’s conclusions. I would hold that the officers’ conduct violated the knock-notice rule, the violation is not excused by “substantial compliance,” and no exception to the knock-notice rule permits the unlawfully seized evidence to come in. Therefore, this court should reverse and remand with directions to grant defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.
I
The lead opinion decides the case against defendant by invoking “substantial compliance.” In other words, granting that a knock-notice violation occurred, the lead opinion brands it a mere technicality which did not frustrate the purposes of the knock-notice rule. I cannot agree. The officers’ violation of knock-notice was not merely technical, and the lead opinion’s novel extension of the “substantial compliance” doctrine is bad law and bad policy.
The California Supreme Court held long ago that when evidence is illegally seized in violation of knock-notice and the violation is not excused by exigent circumstances, the evidence must be suppressed. (Duke v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 314, 325 [82 Cal.Rptr. 348, 461 P.2d 628] *1220(Duke).) That holding survived the adoption of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution. (People v. Neer (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 991, 997-1001 [223 Cal.Rptr. 555] (Neer).)1 The California Supreme Court has never abrogated Duke’s holding. Therefore, we are bound to follow it. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 457 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].)
The application of the “substantial compliance” doctrine to knock-notice does not mean that Duke’s rule of exclusion has been set aside. The courts that have made substantial-compliance findings in knock-notice cases have always been careful to explain that substantial compliance in this context means “ ‘actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the [knock-notice] statute,’ as distinguished from ‘mere technical imperfections of form.’ ” (People v. Jacobs (1987) 43 Cal.3d 472, 483 [233 Cal.Rptr. 323, 729 P.2d 757] (Jacobs), italics in original.) The lead opinion claims to be finding nothing different today. In actuality, as I explain in part I B., post, the lead opinion’s version of “substantial compliance” would excuse almost any conceivable violation of the letter and spirit of knock-notice, provided that it appeared in hindsight no tangible harm to persons or property resulted.
A
When we asked the parties to brief the question whether the trial court was correct to find a knock-notice violation, defendant cited Jeter v. Superior Court (1983) 138 Cal.App.3d 934 [188 Cal.Rptr. 351] (Jeter), among other authorities, to support the trial court’s finding. As I shall show, it is on point and controlling.
In Jeter, five police officers arrived at the defendant’s residence at 11:00 a.m. to serve a search warrant. The officers knocked on the front door and announced their presence and purpose. After waiting “a few seconds,” the lead officer knocked and yelled again. After another wait of “five or 10 seconds,” he turned the handle and pushed open the door. The officers found defendant and another person inside. (Jeter, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 936.)
The Court of Appeal held that the defendant’s motion to set aside the information should have been granted because the officers entered forcibly without first giving the occupants “an opportunity to surrender the premises voluntarily” and the defendant did not refuse the officers permission to enter. *1221(Jeter, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 937.) The court rejected the People’s argument that the officers “could have reasonably inferred a refusal from the failure of anyone to respond to their knock within 20 seconds.” (Ibid.) Distinguishing cases cited by the People for this proposition (People v. Gallo (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 828 [179 Cal.Rptr. 662]; People v. Elder (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 731 [134 Cal.Rptr. 212]), the court noted that in those cases “the police had first-hand concrete knowledge that someone was in the residence and was awake .... With such information it was not unreasonable for the officers in the Elder and Gallo situations to conclude that a failure to respond to their knocking and announcing of purpose was a refusal of permission to enter. Such situations bear no resemblance—except for the shortness of time —to the case at hand in which the officers had no information whatsoever upon which to base a belief that they were being refused entry.” (Jeter, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 937, italics added.)
Jeter is on all fours with our case. Here, as in Jeter, the officers knocked and announced, heard no response, waited a few seconds, repeated the knock and announcement, waited a few seconds more, then entered without permission—all without ever receiving any information on which to base a belief that they were being refused entry. Indeed, in this case the trial court expressly found, “Given the fact situation in this case, this court would make a finding; that there was no reasonable basis for the police to believe that anyone was present in this home.” I would hold that under the rule of Jeter the trial court correctly found that the officers’ conduct violated the knock-notice rule.2
*1222B
The lead opinion finds that the officers’ conduct, if technically in violation of knock-notice, is nevertheless excusable under the doctrine of “substantial compliance.” The lead opinion errs.
The lead opinion accurately cites the pre-Wilson standard for substantial compliance in knock-notice cases: “ ‘Substantial compliance means “ ‘actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the [knock-notice] statute,’ as distinguished from ‘mere technical imperfections of form.’ ” ’ (People v. Jacobs[, supra,] 43 Cal.3d 472, 483 . . . ; italics in original.) The essential inquiry is whether under the circumstances the policies underlying the knock-notice requirements were served.” (People v. Trujillo (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1219, 1227 [266 Cal.Rptr. 473] (Trujillo). See also People v. Tacy (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1402, 1415-1416 [241 Cal.Rptr. 400] (Tacy).) The lead opinion also correctly acknowledges that in light of Wilson the analysis must proceed under the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.
What the lead opinion does not do is to cite any decision of the California Supreme Court, either pre- or post-Wilson, that holds police officers substantially complied with the knock-notice rule by failing to wait a reasonable time after knocking and giving notice before making a forcible entry. Nor do the decisions of the Court of Appeal on which the lead opinion relies state such a proposition. The lead opinion thus stretches the “substantial compliance” doctrine to unprecedented lengths to fit the facts here. Furthermore, the lead opinion’s sweeping extension of the doctrine does not serve “the policies underlying the knock-notice requirement” (Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1227); it vitiates them.
*1223The lead opinion mainly relies on Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d 1219. Assuming that Trujillo is correctly decided, it is readily distinguishable. There was a key fact in Trujillo not present in our case; after knocking, the officers heard movement inside the residence. (Id. at p. 1224.) That distinction makes all the difference.
The court in Trujillo held on the facts presented there that the officers’ conduct adequately served the privacy-protection rationale of knock-notice, apparently because the movement the officers heard allowed them to conclude reasonably that the occupant had been made aware of their presence and purpose. Thus, “[w]hile the case is a close one, ... the police delayed entry long enough after knocking and announcing themselves and their purpose to protect defendant’s reduced expectation of personal privacy . . . .” (Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1228, italics added.)3 The court also held that the knock-notice purpose of preventing violence was served because that purpose is accomplished when the announcement is made. (Trujillo, at p. 1227.) (The court understandably did not consider the additional purpose behind the knock-notice rule articulated subsequently by the United States Supreme Court as part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness calculus; the law’s abhorrence of the unnecessary ‘“destruction or breaking of any house.’ ” (Wilson v. Arkansas, supra, 514 U.S. 927, 931 [115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916, 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 981] (Wilson).)
In our case, as in Jeter (but not as in Trujillo), the officers heard no response to their knocks and announcements. Therefore, Trujillo’s main ground for finding substantial compliance is inapposite here. Based on the silence from inside defendant’s residence, the officers could not properly conclude that any occupant had received due notice of their presence and purpose. Thus, unlike the officers in Trujillo, they did not “delay [] entry long enough” (Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1228) to protect the occupants’ reasonable expectation of privacy.4 In short, Trujillo does not stand for the lead opinion’s novel proposition that officers may substantially *1224comply with knock-notice by failing to wait a reasonable length of time under the circumstances before entering.
Tacy, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1402, the only other substantial-compliance case the lead opinion discusses in any detail, is even less helpful to its position. Tacy’s facts bear no resemblance to those of our case. Police officers arriving at an apartment to execute a search warrant found the front door open, saw an occupant of the residence through a screen door, and communicated their intent and their authority to search to that occupant before entering. (Id. at pp. 1406-1407.) On those facts, exact compliance with every element of the knock-notice statute was not necessary in order to avoid frustrating its underlying purposes. (Id. at p. 1421.) Here, the officers did not find the front door open, did not see any occupant inside before entering, and did not have any reason to believe that their knock and announcement had succeeded in communicating their presence and purpose to any occupant. Tacy is simply inapposite.
Turning to our case, the lead opinion finds substantial compliance as follows: “Under the facts of this case, none of these policy concerns is implicated. The officers approached the front door of the residence and knocked and announced their presence and purpose twice. They waited 15 to 20 seconds before proceeding further. They turned the handle on the unlocked door and opened it slightly before opening it all the way and entering. The officers did not rush the occupant or destroy property. There is nothing in the record to suggest either the occupant or the officers were ever at risk.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1211, italics added.) The lead opinion’s finding is unpersuasive. The only part of the quoted paragraph that hints at an argument is the last sentence. That sentence is remarkable for two things: its unexamined reliance on hindsight, and its failure to explain how knowledge gained through hindsight can excuse knock-notice violations.
“Substantial compliance,” like “exigent circumstances,” is a court-made doctrine applied in retrospect to decide whether, in a particular set of circumstances, police officers’ failure to observe knock-notice protocol is excusable. It does not follow, however, that the courts may rely on after-the-fact information to make this call. It is settled that we must review claims of exigent circumstances based on what the police knew or reasonably believed when they entered the suspect’s residence, not on what later investigation may disclose. (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 275 [127 Cal.Rptr. *1225629, 545 P.2d 1333]; accord, People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1138 [259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146].) The lead opinion gives no reason why a different rule should apply to the question whether police conduct served or frustrated the purposes behind the knock-notice requirement. Here, as in the typical exigent circumstances situation (though the People have never claimed that this is an exigent circumstances case), the police opened the door with no idea what might await them inside.
As the lead opinion notes, one of the main purposes of the knock-notice rule is to protect both occupants of the residence and the police from the danger to which an unannounced forcible entry might expose them. (See, e.g., Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 483.) Reasoning backward, the lead opinion asserts that the officers’ conduct in this case did not frustrate this objective because no one was actually harmed. But the officers could not possibly have had a reasonable belief that their forcible entry would lead to such a peaceful outcome. They had no way of knowing that the only person inside would turn out to be unarmed, unresisting, and unaware. of any criminal activity on the premises. This fortuity cannot turn the officers’ noncompliance with knock-notice into substantial compliance.
Worse yet, the lead opinion’s hindsight-makes-right rule would yield the same result if the police had simply battered down defendant’s door unannounced, provided no one was hurt. On the lead opinion’s reasoning, if no death or injury occurs, ipso facto whatever the police did substantially complied with the knock-notice objective of protecting police and occupant safety. A “substantial compliance” rule that sweeps so broadly would sweep knock-notice away.5
In the knock-notice context, “[substantial compliance means ‘ “actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective *1226of the statute” (Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 483, italics added and omitted, citations omitted.) Thus, at a minimum, substantial compliance must mean actual compliance with the objective of protecting officers’ and residents’ safety. The lead opinion’s analysis would excuse the most egregious and reckless knock-notice violation, however great its objective risk of endangering both officers and residents, provided that it does not actually result in death or injury. The lead opinion would thus turn the narrow “substantial compliance” knock-notice rule into an all-purpose exception to the knock-notice requirement. I cannot join the lead opinion in its evisceration of the knock-notice law.
Finally, the lead opinion’s analysis is unacceptable because it will send a confusing signal to police officers who must apply the knock-notice rules on the street. The lead opinion sends the following message to police officers: you are supposed to wait a reasonable amount of time after knocking and announcing your presence before you enter a residence. But if you do not wait a reasonable amount of time, you may still be okay. The police may therefore act unreasonably without sanction.
I would not inject this uncertain “fudge factor” into the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. I would tell the police that if they do not wait a reasonable amount of time before entering, they have acted unreasonably within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the evidence will be suppressed.
For these reasons, then, I cannot agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that the knock-notice violation in this case is saved by the doctrine of substantial compliance.
II
The learned concurring justice (with whom I have joined in many a prior opinion) proposes an additional ground for reaching the lead opinion’s result: assuming a knock-notice violation, he would treat it as ultimately trivial because the evidence comes in anyhow under the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule. He reasons that since the police had a valid search warrant, if they had executed the warrant without violating knock-notice they would “inevitably” have discovered the evidence they seized; therefore, because they could have obtained it by doing things right, it does not matter what they did wrong. The concurring justice opines that this result is not merely desirable, but compelled by article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution (hereafter article I, section 28(d)).
With respect, I cannot agree with this analysis. I shall first show that the concurring justice’s claim of constitutional compulsion lacks merit. I shall *1227then explain why the application of “inevitable discovery” to knock-notice would gut the knock-notice requirement as effectively as would the lead opinion’s overbroad “substantial compliance” rule.
A
Under article I, section 28(d), the California courts may exclude relevant evidence in criminal proceedings only if such exclusion is compelled by the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Article I, section 28(d) gives the holdings and dicta of lower federal courts no more binding authority over us in this context than they have in any other—that is to say, none. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 884-890 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744]; Neer, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1000-1001. Accord, Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1225; Tacy, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1410-1414.)
Although one would not know it from reading the concurrence, the last time the United States Supreme Court expressly spoke to the question of the appropriate remedy for a knock-notice violation it held that, if the violation is not excused by exigent circumstances, the illegally seized evidence must be excluded. (Miller v. United States (1958) 357 U.S. 301, 309, 314 [78 S.Ct. 1190, 1195-1196, 1198, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332, 1338, 1341] (Miller). Accord, Sabbath v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 585, 586, 591 & fn. 8 [88 S.Ct. 1755, 1756-1759, 20 L.Ed.2d 828, 834] (Sabbath).) In the 42 years since the high court decided Miller and the 32 years since it decided Sabbath, it has never expressly overruled or limited these holdings. The short answer to the concurring justice’s argument, therefore, is that article I, section 28(d) compels us to follow Miller and Sabbath until the high court tells us otherwise. (See In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 884-890; Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1225; Tacy, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1410-1414; Neer, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1000-1001.) That is also the correct answer.
The concurring justice appears to conclude, however, that the high court has impliedly overruled Miller and Sabbath as to the required remedy for knock-notice violations by subsequently adopting the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule, which Miller and Sabbath supposedly could not have considered. (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 440-448 [104 S.Ct. 2501, 2507-2511, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 385-390] (Nix).)6 There are *1228three problems with this conclusion. First, the concurring justice cites no authority saying that article I, section 28(d) entitles us to hold that a high court decision directly on point has been overruled sub silentio. Second, Nix does not say a word about knock-notice, Miller, or Sabbath; thus it is not authority either for the proposition that “inevitable discovery” applies to knock-notice or for the proposition that Miller and Sabbath no longer state the law. (Hart v. Burnett (1860) 15 Cal. 530, 598.) 7 Third, the high court has allowed 16 years to elapse since it decided Nix without ever applying Nix‘s holding to knock-notice—a silence which is inexplicable from the concurring justice’s perspective.
The concurring justice cites (but does not quote) footnote 4 of Wilson, supra, 514 U.S. 927 [115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976], where the high court for the first time mentioned Nix and knock-notice in the same breath, as support for his position. If anything, it is the opposite. There, the high court said: “Respondent and its amici also ask us to affirm the denial of petitioner’s suppression motion on an alternative ground: that exclusion is not a constitutionally compelled remedy where the unreasonableness of a search stems from the failure of announcement. Analogizing to the ‘independent source’ doctrine applied in Segura[, supra], 468 U.S. 796, 805, 813-816 [104 S.Ct. at pp. 3385-3386, 3389-3391, 82 L.Ed.2d 599] . . . , and the ‘inevitable discovery’ rule adopted in Nix[, supra], 467 U.S. 431, 440-448 [104 S.Ct. at pp. 2507-2511, 81 L.Ed.2d 377] . . . , respondent and its amici argue that any evidence seized after an unreasonable, unannounced entry is causally disconnected from the constitutional violation and that exclusion goes beyond the goal of precluding any benefit to the government flowing from the constitutional violation. Because this remedial issue was not addressed by the court below and is not within the narrow question on which we granted certiorari, we decline to address these arguments.” (Wilson, *1229supra, 514 U.S. at p. 937, fn. 4 [115 S.Ct. at p. 1919, 131 L.Ed.2d at p. 984], italics added.)8 Thus, the high court flatly refused to take the opportunity offered by the state to overrule Miller and Sabbath. Moreover, in its paraphrase of the state’s argument, the high court characterized it as reasoning by “analog[y],” not as an assertion that Nix was on point and controlling. Nothing in footnote 4 of Wilson even implies that premise, let alone the conclusion, that article I, section 28(d) forces us to read Nix as impliedly overruling Miller and Sabbath.
In short, unlike the concurring justice, I conclude that article I, section 28(d) does not permit us, let alone compel us, to declare on-point decisions of the United States Supreme Court no longer the law until and unless that court says so. It has not said so as to Miller and Sabbath. Therefore, I would follow those decisions under compulsion of the California Constitution.
B
Assuming arguendo, however—despite the compulsion of Miller, Sabbath, and article I, section 28(d)—that this court may consider the concurring justice’s “inevitable discovery” argument on the merits, I shall now demonstrate why it should be rejected. Like the lead opinion’s version of “substantial compliance,” its effect would be to kill the knock-notice rule, at least in every case where the police have a valid search warrant before entering a suspect’s residence.
As I have noted in part I ante, it has been generally undisputed until now in California that evidence seized in violation of knock-notice must be suppressed. (Duke, supra, 1 Cal.3d atp. 325; Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1225; Tacy, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 1410; People v, Neer, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at pp. 997-1001; but see People v. Lamas (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 560 [282 Cal.Rptr. 296].)9 However, courts of other jurisdictions (not constrained by any rule analogous to art. I, § 28(d)) have often considered claims that the “independent source” doctrine, the “inevitable *1230discovery” doctrine, or both, should permit the admission of evidence seized after entries in violation of knock-notice. Most jurisdictions have rejected these claims. (U.S. v. Marts (8th Cir. 1993) 986 F.2d 1216, 1219; U.S. v. Shugart (E.D.Tex. 1995) 889 F.Supp. 963, 976-977, affd. 117 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. den. 522 U.S. 976 [139 L.Ed.2d 333] (Shugart); State v. Martinez (Minn.Ct.App. 1998) 579 N.W.2d 144, 148; Com. v. Rudisill (1993) 424 Pa.Super. 313, 316-318 [622 A.2d 397]; Com. v. Gomes (1990) 408 Mass. 43, 44-47 [556 N.E.2d 100, 101-103]; but see U.S. v. Hidalgo (D.Mass. 1990) 747 F.Supp. 818; People v. Stevens (1999) 460 Mich. 626 [597 N.W.2d 53] (Stevens).) The latest sister state court to reject these arguments is the Arkansas Supreme Court in Mazepink v. State (1999) 336 Ark. 171 [987 S.W.2d 648], certiorari denied sub nom. Arkansas v. Mazepink (1999) 528 U.S. 927 [120 S.Ct. 321, 145 L.Ed.2d 250] (Mazepink), as follows:
“The State urges us to adopt a remedy other than suppression of the evidence pursuant to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The State asserts that because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, it would be inappropriate to exclude the evidence in this case because the decision to act illegally (not to knock and announce before forcing entry) was not motivated by a desire to gather evidence by any means other than a search warrant issued upon probable cause. We agree with Appellants, however, that exclusion is the only practical remedy for such police misconduct.” (Mazepink, supra, 987 S.W.2d at p. 656.)
The court first noted federal and state authorities that had found exclusion required where knock-notice was violated and no exigent circumstances excused compliance, including Miller, supra, 347 U.S. 310 [78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332]; U.S. v. Moore (10th Cir. 1996) 91 F.3d 96; U.S. v. Bates (6th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 790; U.S. v. Becker (9th Cir. 1994) 23 F.3d 1537; U.S. v. Knapp (10th Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 1026; and People v. Polidori (1991) 190 Mich.App. 673 [476 N.W.2d 482], certiorari denied (1992) 506 U.S. 905 [113 S.Ct. 298, 121 L.Ed.2d 222]. After finding that no exigent circumstances excusing noncompliance with knock-notice existed in the case at bench, the court turned to the state’s “independent grounds” and “inevitable discovery” arguments:
“We reject the State’s argument that exclusion of the evidence is not appropriate because the evidence would have been inevitably discovered by legal means (the search warrant) despite the illegal entry. We also reject the State’s argument that there was an independent source for the evidence, namely the previously procured search warrant. These same arguments were *1231offered by the government in Marts, [supra,] 986 F.2d 1216, and were rejected by the Eighth Circuit.
“In Marts, the government argued that even if the officers had waited an additional period of time (longer than five seconds), the exact same search would have been conducted and the exact same evidence would have been seized. Nonetheless, the court concluded that suppression of the evidence was mandated, stating that ‘[longstanding constitutional principles regarding unlawful search and seizure bar the government’s use of the fruits of an unlawful search simply because the officers “would have found it anyway.” ’ Id. at 1219 (footnote omitted). The Marts court also rejected the theory advanced by the dissent that the evidence should be admissible under the independent-source rule. The dissenting judge relied on Segura v. United States, [supra,] 468 U.S. 796 . . . , as does the State in this case. Although the court initially rejected application of the independent-source rule on the ground that it was not raised below, it addressed the merits of the theory: ‘Under the dissent’s application of the independent source rule, the knock and announce rule codified under [18 U.S.C.] § 3109 would be meaningless since an officer could obviate illegal entry in every instance simply by looking to the information used to obtain the warrant. Under the dissent’s reasoning, officers, in executing a valid search warrant, could break in doors of private homes without sanction.’ Marts, 986 F.2d at 1220. The court then distinguished the facts of Segura, where the police entered the apartment without a warrant in order to secure it until a warrant could be obtained with previously known information. Although the initial entry was invalid, the search itself, pursuant to the subsequently obtained warrant, was determined to be reasonable because it was based on an independent source that provided probable cause for issuance of the warrant. The Eighth Circuit concluded: ‘The significant factor in Segura is that the search warrant and the evidence seized under it were totally unrelated to the illegal entry. In the present case the search warrant, although legally obtained, was executed in violation of [18 U.S.C.] § 3109, and its execution was directly connected to the illegal entry.’ Id. .. . We find that reasoning sound and directly applicable to the facts of this case, where the search warrant, although based on probable cause and otherwise legally obtained, was executed in violation of the Fourth Amendment ‘knock and announce’ rule, and its execution was directly connected to the illegal entry. We thus conclude that exclusion of the evidence is the appropriate remedy for the officers’ misconduct in this case. We concur with the Eighth Circuit that were we to hold otherwise, the ‘knock and announce’ rule would be rendered meaningless. . . .” (Mazepink, supra, 987 S.W.2d at pp. 657-658, italics added and omitted.)
In a decision focusing more squarely on “inevitable discovery,” a federal court explained even more compellingly why importing that doctrine (like *1232the “independent source” doctrine) into the knock-notice context would effectively kill the knock-notice rule as to cases involving valid search warrants: “[I]t must be noted that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence seized after a clear violation of the [federal] ‘knock and announce’ statute would completely viscerate the fundamental privacy and safety interests the statute seeks to secure. If the exception were to apply, officers could obviate their obligation to provide notice of their authority and purpose prior to entering a person’s household whenever they had a valid warrant authorizing the search of the home. In those situations, officers would know their misconduct would have no unfavorable consequences, and simply stated, the exception would swallow the rule. Thus, [the federal statute], in effect, would be an empty vessel, as violations of the statute would not result in any sanction. [Citation.] Such a result is untenable, especially in light of the ‘knock and announce’ rule’s perdurance.” (Shugart; supra, 889 F.Supp. at p. 977, italics added.)
I acknowledge that a majority of the Michigan Supreme Court, in a decision even more recent than Mazepink, held that “inevitable discovery” applies to knock-notice cases. (Stevens, supra, 597 N.W.2d 53 (maj. opn. of Brickley, J.).)10 The concurring justice finds the majority opinion in Stevens persuasive. I do not. After discussing the inevitable-discovery doctrine in the abstract, the majority merely asserts that the evidence in the case before it would inevitably have been discovered because the police had a valid search warrant. (Id. at pp. 57-64.) The majority does not consider the logical consequence of this line of reasoning, as explained in Mazepink, supra, 987 S.W.2d at pages 657-658, and Shugart, supra, 889 F.Supp. at page 977: the vitiation of the knock-notice rule in any case where a valid search warrant existed (or could have been obtained).11
There is yet another reason to reject the concurring justice’s argument: it would violate a clear mandate of the United States Supreme Court. In a *1233decision rendered after Wilson, supra, 514 U.S. 927, the high court held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit blanket exceptions to knock-notice for any category of cases because the courts must perform the constitutionally mandated reasonableness inquiry on the particular facts of each case. (Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 U.S. 385, 390-395 [117 S.Ct. 1416, 1419-1422, 137 L.Ed.2d 615, 622-624] (Richards) [no blanket exception for entries into suspected drug dealers’ residences, despite claim that such cases always present exigent circumstances].) To admit evidence obtained illegally in violation of knock-notice in any case where the police had a valid search warrant, on the premise that such evidence would always “inevitably” have been discovered by executing the warrant, would in effect create a blanket exception to knock-notice for all cases involving valid search warrants (as Shugart anticipated). This is exactly what the high court has said we may not do. (See Richards, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 390-395 [117 S.Ct. at pp. 1419-1422, 137 L.Ed.2d at pp. 622-624]; Stevens, supra, 597 N.W.2d at pp. 70-71 (dis. opn. of Cavanagh, J.); Mazepink, supra, 987 S.W.2d at pp. 657-658.)
The concurring justice fails to address Richards directly. However, in response to the argument outlined above—that applying “inevitable discovery” to knock-notice would destroy the knock-notice rule in all cases involving valid search warrants—the concurring justice asserts: “The rule stands; only the remedy differs.” (Conc. opn., ante, at p. 1214.) To the extent this observation is meant to answer the high court’s concerns in Richards, it fails. The concurring justice ignores the reality that an unenforceable rule—one whose violation has no adverse consequences for the violator—is in effect no rule at all.
The concurring justice may mean to imply that knock-notice violations in search warrant cases would still have adverse consequences for the state, despite the automatic admission of the illegally seized evidence in every such case as “inevitably discovered.” If so, he fails to spell out what these consequences would be, or how any “remedy” other than exclusion could be sufficiently onerous to deter the evil—the illegal seizure of evidence in *1234violation of knock-notice—that the exclusionary rule guards against. (Of course, the concurring justice goes on to assert that he is not required to spell out the alternatives to exclusion because article I, section 28(d) prevents us from “favor[ing] the exclusionary remedy over other remedies.” (Conc. opn., ante, at p. 1214.) As I have explained in part IIA. ante, of this dissent, in the knock-notice context article I, section 28(d) does no such thing.)12
“The exclusionary rule serves several salutary purposes, but the United States Supreme Court ‘has stressed that the “prime purpose” of the exclusionary rule “is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” ’ . . .” (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 89 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519], citations omitted.) It might be suggested, as do the concurring justice and the majority in Stevens, that the exclusionary rule is not needed to deter the unlawful police conduct at issue because the police know that they may face other adverse consequences. (Stevens, supra, 597 N.W.2d at pp. 61-62. See Nix, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 446 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2510, 81 L.Ed.2d at p. 389].) But neither the Stevens majority nor the concurring justice offers evidence that any hypothetical alternatives to exclusion have actually deterred police misconduct, or any scenario for how they might do so in practice. I am unwilling to rest the continued vitality of Fourth Amendment safeguards on such a speculative basis.
Conclusion
For all the reasons stated above, I cannot join in the lead opinion’s result on any theory proposed by either the lead opinion or the concurring justice.
*1235I would reverse and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to grant defendant’s motion to suppress the illegally seized evidence.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 17, 2001. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 So far as the concurring justice concludes otherwise, I explain in part II A., post, why that conclusion is untenable.

 The lead opinion asserts that my reliance on Jeter is “misplaced.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1209, fn. 7.) I cannot agree.
The lead opinion appears to assert first that Jeter has been superseded by later developments in the law, but the lead opinion cites no such developments. The lead opinion says: “The court [in Jeter) applied the pre-Wilson California rule that a violation of Penal Code section 1531 alone renders the search unreasonable.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1209, fn. 7.) This assertion seems to imply that Wilson has somehow abrogated this rule, but the lead opinion fails to explain how Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) 514 U.S. 927 [115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976] did so or could have done so. In fact, that “pre-Wilson California rule” rested on the established California view that knock-notice issues were subject to Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis—a point on which the California courts long anticipated Wilson, as the lead opinion notes in part I of its opinion. (Duke, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 325; Greven v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 287, 290 [78 Cal.Rptr. 504, 455 P.2d 432]; People v. Rosales (1968) 68 Cal.2d 299, 304-305 [66 Cal.Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489]; People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586, 588-589 [63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706].) Police officers’ violation of a state knock-notice statute is prima facie grounds to find that the officers’ conduct was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing in Wilson purports to hold otherwise. Thus, the lead opinion’s insinuation that Jeter no longer states the law because it applied this “pre-Wilson California rule” is unsupported.
The lead opinion also appears to assert that Jeter is inapposite or simply wrong because it does not discuss substantial compliance; however, the lead opinion does not explain how *1222substantial compliance could apply to the facts of Jeter, and I see no reason why a court must expressly reject every legal theory that is patently inapplicable to the facts. The court was clearly aware of the substantial-compliance doctrine, since both of the decisions it distinguished had relied on that doctrine. (People v. Gallo, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 840; People v. Elder, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 739.) The court merely found impliedly that the facts before it were not close enough to raise a substantial-compliance question. So far as the lead opinion suggests that Jeter erred in that respect, it offers no analysis to support this proposition.
The lead opinion asserts that the Jeter court “did not consider any . . . factors in assessing reasonableness of the search” other than its finding of a Penal Code section 1531 violation. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1209, fn. 7.) However, the lead opinion does not say what other factors the court should have considered. Thus this assertion, like those above, does not explain why my reliance on Jeter is “misplaced.”
The lead opinion also asserts that my approach consists of “lining up the prior cases and deciding which one is closest factually” and that this reveals my “unwillingness to confront the legal principles at issue.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1209, fn. 7.) To the assertion that I have found a case that is factually indistinguishable from this one, and that I rely on it, I say without hesitation: mea culpa.

 The court’s reasoning is not altogether clear on this point. The court acknowledges that the officers could not be sure the movement they heard was that of a human being rather than, say, a dog. (Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1226-1227.) Nor could they reasonably interpret the fact that the movement was not followed by anything further as an implicit refusal of entry. (Ibid.; see Jeter, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 937.)
The court distinguishes Jeter on the ground that its facts are not “identical” to those of the case before the court. (Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1226.) However, the court does not explain why a case cannot be apposite to another case unless the two cases’ facts are identical. Nor does the court explain which different fact or facts in Jeter make it inapposite.

 It is unclear whether the lead opinion deems it significant that the officers in Trujillo and in our case waited about the same length of time before entering: the lead opinion cites the officers’ 15-to-20-second delay in this case as though it were a material fact, but without explaining why the exact length of time matters. (See lead opn., ante, at p. 1207.) In any *1224event, the court in Trujillo refused to hold that any particular length of time was sufficient to wait for purposes of compliance with knock-notice as a matter of law, reasoning that to adopt such a bright-line rule would “trivialize the policies behind the knock-notice rules.” (Trujillo, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 1225.)

 This flaw gapes just as widely in the concurrence’s “inevitable discovery” analysis, at least as to all cases where the police have a valid search warrant. (See pt. II, post.)
The lead opinion protests that my characterization of its rule as post hoc analysis and “ ‘hindsight-makes-right’ ” is “simply untrue.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1212, fn. 8.) The lead opinion then proceeds to prove it true. Reciting the facts once more, the lead opinion adds the refinement that “the officers’ conduct leading up to the entry . . . was not threatening . . . .” (Ibid.) In other words, the lead opinion persists in assessing the facts either from the supposed viewpoint of some hypothetical occupant of the residence about whose supposed presence, character, and knowledge of the officers’ actions they could have known nothing during the time “leading up to the entry,” or else from the viewpoint of a trier of fact who knew in hindsight that the actual occupant did not appear to have felt threatened once the officers entered. The lead opinion offers no reasoned response to my point that this sort of hindsight cannot be the standard for determining whether the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable (i.e., substantially complied with knock-notice). Nor does the lead opinion explain why its analysis would not logically lead to the conclusion that even conduct grossly in violation of knock-notice would display “actual compliance” (Jacobs, supra, 43 Cal.Sd at p. 843) with the objectives of knock-notice, provided this conduct did not result in tangible harm to persons or property.

 It is difficult to tell whether the concurring justice has actually so concluded, since he does not mention Miller or Sabbath.
The People have also argued for the applicability of the “independent source” exception to the exclusionary rule, as adopted in Segura v. United States (1984) 468 U.S. 796 [104 S.Ct. *12283380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599]. Since the concurring justice does not discuss this doctrine, I also will not do so. However, I note that its application to knock-notice is impermissible in California under Miller and Sabbath for the reasons stated above.

The argument might be made that the high court had no occasion to discuss knock-notice in Nix because it was addressing constitutional issues and it had not yet held that knock-notice is such an issue. (Nix, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 440-448 [104 S.Ct. at pp. 2507-2511, 81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 385-390]; see Wilson, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 934, fn. 3 [115 S.Ct. at p. 1918,131 L.Ed.2d at p. 982].) The argument would fail. If exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply even where the rule protects interests that rise to the level of constitutional dignity, a fortiori they must apply in contexts where the interests to be protected do not rise to that level.
Moreover, the high court in Nix did not address only the constitutional issue directly before it, which implicated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: it also pointed out that its analysis applied equally to issues arising under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. (Nix, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 441-442 [104 S.Ct. at pp. 2507-2508, 81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 385-386].) This renders Nix’s silence as to knock-notice, Miller, and Sabbath all the more baffling, if the high court truly intended Nix to sweep as broadly as the concurring justice would have it do.

 Although I do not presume to read between the lines of high court decisions, I note that it was within the high court’s discretion as to how it chose to word its grant of certiorari, and the high court is free to request briefing from the parties on purely legal issues even if they were not addressed below.

 In People v. Lamas, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 560, the court held that inevitable discovery applied where evidence had been seized in a warrantless search that violated knock-notice and the officers later obtained a valid search warrant. (Id. at pp. 563-565, 568-570.) The court noted, however, that it was not considering the situation where a knock-notice violation occurs in the execution of a warrant. {Id. at p. 570, fn. 1.) The court did not discuss or even cite the California authority holding suppression mandatory in knock-notice violation cases. (Duke, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 325; Neer, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at pp. 999-1001.)

 The fact, noted by the concurring justice, that the Michigan court has continued to follow its own holding in Stevens is neither surprising nor persuasive. State courts do not often reverse themselves in short order on constitutional issues if not compelled to do so by a higher authority (or if their membership is not radically changed by the outcome of an election).

 Though acknowledging the federal precedents to the contrary, the majority finds more persuasive the first half of the following “dicta” from a recent Seventh Circuit decision: “. . . . It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but ‘inevitable’ once the police arrive with a warrant; an occupant would hardly be allowed to contend that, had the officers announced their presence and waited longer to enter, he would have had time to destroy the evidence. . . .” (U.S. v. Jones (7th Cir. 1998) 149 F.3d 715, 716-717 (Jones) [admitted dictum because unlawful entry causally unrelated to seizure of evidence], quoted in part in Stevens, supra, 597 N.W.2d at p. 62, fn. 6.1 italicize the part of the dictum quoted by the majority.) I am not so impressed by this dictum. In any case where the police reasonably believe that a suspect could destroy evidence if not immediately forestalled, they can enter without a warrant due to exigent circumstances. Thus there is no *1233need to resort to “inevitable discovery” to foreclose the sort of defense argument posited in Jones. (Stevens, supra, 597 N.W.2d at p. 67, fn. 12 (dis. opn. of Cavanagh, J.).)
In the later-decided case, U.S. v. Stefonek (7th Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 1030, cited by the concurring justice (conc. opn., ante, at p. 1216), a panel of the Seventh Circuit which included the author of Jones, supra, expounded at greater length—also in dictum—on the Jones dictum. (179 F.3d at p. 1035.) Thus, these decisions demonstrate only that a small group of justices on one federal circuit agrees with itself in dictum on this issue. (Of course, even if these dicta were holdings, they would have no binding authority on us. (Neer, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1000-1001.))

 Our Supreme Court has recently held that “inevitable discovery” did not justify the admission into evidence of a stolen car seized by the police after a warrantless entry into a garage attached to a residence, even though the police had already seen the car in plain view from outside the garage and identified it as stolen. (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793-794, 800-801 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311] (Robles).) The court also noted that the People had conceded “inevitable discovery” would not justify the warrantless entry of a residence to seize contraband already seen in plain view from outside; the court did not suggest that the People’s concession was improvident. (Id. at p. 801.)
The court in Robles had no occasion to consider the application of “inevitable discovery” to knock-notice or to entries made pursuant to search warrants. However, the court’s holding at the least shows a prudent wariness about the doctrine’s potential breadth, far different from the expansive approach of my concurring colleague. The court instead could have speculated counterfactually that if the police had not chosen to enter the garage without a warrant (or exigent circumstances) they would “inevitably” have decided to get a warrant, “inevitably” entered with the warrant, and “inevitably” seized the evidence lawfully. Each of these “inevitabilities” is as “inevitable” as any of the others, once one starts down that road.