Court Opinion

ID: 9582219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:23:59.07391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:32.567958
License: Public Domain

RICHARD M. DAVIS, Judge
Pro Tern., concurring:
I. concur in the opinion by Judge Corcoran. I write to address one aspect of appellees’ argument which I deem salient.
Appellees’ argument is grounded upon comment (i) under § 402A. One portion of this comment states:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases [uses] it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
This sentence was quoted by the court in Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976). In holding that an issue of fact was presented as to whether there was an unreasonably dangerous design defect, the court in Byrns stated that “[t]he ‘bottoming out’ defect might be of a type that a reasonable consumer would not contemplate.” 113 Ariz. at 268, 550 P.2d at 1069.
The appellees here argue, in substance, that the passage quoted from comment (i) states a requirement which exists independent of the balancing process set forth in Byrns and which survives that decision’s disapproval of the use of the patent-latent distinction in products liability cases. They further argue on the basis of the evidence adduced here that the critical movement of the machine was exactly as contemplated by its purchasers and users, including the plaintiff. They assert in essence that based upon the qualification quoted above from comment (i) the machine was as a matter of law not unreasonably dangerous.
It is not clear to me just how wide a swath the “dangerous beyond contemplation” language of comment (i) was intended to cut. The examples which appear in comment (i) seem to suggest a narrower application than would be pertinent here. We are told, for example, that even “castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture.”
Given Byrns' careful rejection of the rule excluding liability for patent defects and its inclusion of obviousness as a factor to be considered in the balancing process, as well as the reasons given by our Supreme Court for adopting § 402A as set forth in authorities such as Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936 (1972), I cannot see how the passage quoted from comment (i) can be applied to foreclose a cause of action for lack of a guard installable at “nominal” cost to cover a shear point this close to a necessary human activity. Cf. Moorer v. Clayton Mfg. Corp., 128 Ariz. 565, 627 P.2d 716, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866, 102 S.Ct. 328, 70 L.Ed.2d 167 (App.1981). As Judge Corcoran’s opinion notes, appellees’ argument here to the contrary boils down in the final analysis to an argument for non-liability for obvious defects.1 This Byrns clearly rejects.
Since liability for obvious defects has obviously won the day across the land and since “contemplation” may arguably at least be viewed as poaching semantically in this domain, it would seem that the American Law Institute might profitably attempt further articulation of what the concept of “contemplation” means as it is used in comments (g) and (i) under § 402A.
JACOBSON, C.J., concurs in the result
NOTE: The Honorable RICHARD M. DAVIS was authorized to participate in this case by the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to Ariz. Const, art. VI, § 20.

. It must be borne in mind that only an assumption of known risks, as opposed to conventional contributory negligence, is a defense to § 402A claims. See Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 23 Ariz.App. 409, 533 P.2d 717 (1975).