Court Opinion

ID: 9884736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:10:09.865746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:40.447349
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, concurring: Although I concur in the result reached by the court for reasons to be stated later, I do not agree with the reasoning of the court in reaching its conclusion and I do not approve of the perpetuation by this opinion of the misconception as to the authority of a State to legislate with regard to the United States Flag. The interest of a State in enacting legislation concerning the flag of the United States is not solely for the purpose of preventing breaches of the peace. The opinion of the court comes to this erroneous conclusion by following the decision of this court in People v. Von Rosen, 13 Ill.2d 68, which in turn arrived at this mistaken conception by concluding that Congress had enacted legislation concerning the flag. Therefore, being a field in which the interest of the Federal government is dominant, Von Rosen concluded that a State could only enact flag legislation in the exercise of its police powers for the purpose of preventing breaches of the peace. The legislation of Congress which Von Rosen held precluded a State from acting in this area is found in Title 36 U.S.C.A. sections 173 through 178. However, these sections do nothing more than codify and standardize customs and usages of long standing with regard to the use and display of the flag and the method of showing respect therefor. These sections do not proscribe any conduct relating to the flag nor provide a penalty for not conforming to the customs set forth therein. Ruhstrat v. People (1900), 185 Ill. 133, also erroneously held that the State had no authority to legislate with regard to the use or display of a flag, holding that only Congress had such authority. However, in 1907 the Supreme Court in Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 51 L.Ed. 696, held that a State could legislate concerning the use of the United States flag. The court recognized that State governments as well as the Federal government had the constitutional power to enact appropriate flag legislation, and, in the absence of Federal legislation exercising exclusive control, a State in the interest of its own people could appropriately legislate. This right of the State is not based on the necessity of such legislation to prevent breaches of the peace but on the interest of a State in fostering respect for the flag and thus the Union. Contrary to the conclusion reached in Von Rosen, Congress has not legislated in this field to the exclusion of the States. Thus, the right of a State to enact flag legislation, not solely for the purpose of preventing breaches of the peace, but also, as held in Halter, for the purpose of fostering respect for the flag and the Union, still remains. As pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in his dissenting opinion in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, at 598, 22 L.Ed.2d 572, at 588. 89 S.Ct. 1354, in commenting on the applicability of a New York statute concerning the United States flag stated: “At the time of appellant’s trial the federal prohibition of flag desecration, which in all material particulars was identical to New York’s applied only to the District of Columbia and could therefore not have pre-empted state legislation on the same subject.” The Federal act referred to is contained in Title 4 U.S.C., section 3. In 1968 Congress enacted further legislation concerning flag desecration applying generally throughout the nation. This act is found in Title 18 U.S.C., section 700. As stated in a footnote on the page above referred to in Mr. Chief Justice Warren’s dissent, this legislation specifically does not preempt State flag statutes. See also: Annot., 22 L.Ed.2d 972 (1962). Hence the status of a State’s authority has not been changed since Halter, and a State flag statute is authorized not only as an exercise of its police power to prevent a breach of the peace but also for the purpose of fostering respect for the flag and the Union. The validity of the application of such a statute must be tested as is a Federal statute on the same subject, that is, against the constitutionally protected rights of the persons affected thereby. If the application of the State statute does not violate an individual’s constitutionally protected right it is not necessary to test the validity of the act by considering its necessity to prevent breaches of the peace. Regardless of the above, as I indicated at the outset, I must concur in the result reached by the opinion of the court. The charge against the defendants was not made under the section of the act which relates to casting contempt upon the flag but was made under the section of the statute which proscribes exposing or causing to be exposed any flag to which has been “attached, appended, affixed or annexed, any word, figure, mark, picture, design or drawing or any advertisement of any nature.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is the State’s contention that the chain on the art exhibit constituted a “figure” and thus violated this provision of the act. Clearly a chain does not fall within the meaning of the word “figure” as that word is used in the context of this prohibition. Word, figure, mark, picture, design or drawing all relate to similar representations and not to objects. If we accept the State’s position that an object (a chain) comes within the ambit of these terms we must also bring within the meaning of these terms all objects. Thus, an exhibit showing the Holy Bible attached to the flag in some manner signifying the motto “For God and Country” would constitute a violation of the statute. The same would be true if the object “attached, appended, affixed or annexed” were an olive branch or the scales of justice. The proscriptions of the statute are broad with the many enumerations contained therein. Therefore each word used in these enumerations must be strictly construed so that the prohibitions of the statute may be precisely understood. For these reasons I do not believe that the defendants had been proved guilty of a violation of the statute involved. MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI joins in this concurring opinion.