Court Opinion

ID: 9385866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 16:00:56.480155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:51.740420
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10283    Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023   Page: 1 of 28

                                                               [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                 No. 22-10283
                          ____________________

        ALBERT G. HILL, III,
                                                    Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                                 U.S. Tax Court
                               Agency No. 794-18
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023    Page: 2 of 28

        2                      Opinion of the Court               22-10283

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and HULL and MARCUS,
        Circuit Judges.
        HULL, Circuit Judge:
              This appeal concerns the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over a
        taxpayer’s motion to redetermine interest owed to the taxpayer.
                Albert Hill sent $10,263,750 to the United States Internal
        Revenue Service (“IRS”) as a “deposit” toward his expected gift tax
        liability. After an IRS audit examination and Hill’s tax deficiency
        proceeding in the Tax Court, Hill and the IRS settled the deficiency
        proceeding, stipulating that Hill owed a gift tax deficiency of
        $6,790,000 for 2011. The IRS applied the $10,263,750 to that 2011
        deficiency and issued Hill a check for the balance of $3,473,750.
               Post-judgment, the parties did not dispute that the IRS owes
        Hill interest on that $3,473,750. Rather, they disputed the interest
        rate. The IRS used the interest rate for deposits, which is the
        federal short-term rate. Hill wanted the interest rate for
        overpayments, which is the federal short-term rate plus three
        percentage points. In the Tax Court, Hill filed a petition to reopen
        his case to redetermine interest.
              The Tax Court has jurisdiction to redetermine interest due
        a taxpayer if the court previously found a remittance was an
        overpayment. So its jurisdiction turns on whether the Tax Court
        found that Hill made an overpayment of tax.
              After review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we
        conclude there is no Tax Court finding that Hill made an
USCA11 Case: 22-10283      Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 3 of 28

        22-10283               Opinion of the Court                         3

        overpayment of tax and thus the Tax Court did not have
        jurisdiction over Hill’s post-judgment motion to redetermine
        interest. Because the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over Hill’s
        motion, we affirm the Tax Court’s decision denying Hill’s motion
        to redetermine interest for lack of jurisdiction.
                                I.     BACKGROUND
        A.    The 2010 Settlement Agreement
               More than a decade ago, Hill became involved in litigation
        with his father and other family members in the U.S. District Court
        for the Northern District of Texas. This litigation concerned the
        distribution of assets derived from the Hunt Oil Company.
               In May 2010, the parties executed a settlement agreement.
        To effectuate the settlement, the district court’s order directed Hill
        to assign an installment agreement between Hill and his father to
        trusts for the benefit of Hill’s children. That agreement entitled
        Hill to receive $30,675,000 from 2011 to 2015. In May 2011, Hill
        executed documents necessary to complete this assignment to his
        children’s trusts.
        B.    Hill’s Deposit
               Anticipating that he would be liable for gift tax, Hill
        arranged to make a deposit under Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”)
        § 6603 toward his potential gift tax liability. Section 6603 allows a
        taxpayer to “make a cash deposit with the Secretary which may be
        used by the Secretary to pay any tax,” such as a gift tax, “which has
        not been assessed at the time of the deposit.” I.R.C. § 6603(a).
USCA11 Case: 22-10283      Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 4 of 28

        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10283

               On February 23, 2012, the district court registry in Texas
        issued a $10,263,750 check, in the care of Andrew Burnett, Hill’s
        representative. The check was payable to the U.S. Treasury.
               On February 28, 2012, one of Hill’s representatives delivered
        the check to an IRS office, and Burnett followed up with a letter,
        stating that Hill “intend[ed] for this deposit to satisfy the
        requirements of Section 6603(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.”
        Burnett identified the disputable tax as “the potential tax imposed
        under subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code,” which covers
        estate and gift taxes, for tax year 2011.
               On August 19, 2013, an IRS letter notified Hill that (1) it had
        credited $10,263,750 to his account for tax year 2011, but (2) it had
        not received his 2011 gift tax return. The IRS letter also informed
        Hill that, when he submitted his gift tax return, the IRS would
        “apply the credit to the tax [he] owe[d] and refund any
        overpayment.”
               On August 23, 2013, Hill responded that: (1) his
        representative had hand delivered to the IRS “a $10,263,750 deposit
        of tax,” (2) the $10,263,750 credit “should be applied to 2012 rather
        than 2011,” and (3) his potential gift tax was still “undetermined.”
        The IRS transferred the $10,263,750 deposit to Hill’s 2012 account.
        C.    Hill’s Gift Tax Return for Tax Year 2012
               On March 26, 2014, Hill filed a 2012 gift tax return, reporting
        that he owed no gift tax. Hill asserted that no completed gift had
        yet occurred because “matters [related to the 2010 settlement
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023    Page: 5 of 28

        22-10283               Opinion of the Court                       5

        agreement] were still being litigated and appealed.” Hill also
        reported that he had prepaid the amount of $10,263,750, and he
        requested that that the IRS “refund” that “payment” of
        $10,263,750.
        D.    Hill Requests Return of the Deposit
               Over the next several years, Hill made multiple requests for
        the return of the $10,263,750 deposit. On June 11, 2014, Hill made
        a formal request to the IRS for the “immediate return of his deposit
        as authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 6603(c).” Section 6603(c) provides
        that, “[e]xcept in a case where the Secretary determines that
        collection of tax is in jeopardy, the Secretary shall return to the
        taxpayer any amount of the deposit (to the extent not used for a
        payment of tax) which the taxpayer requests in writing.” I.R.C.
        § 6603(c).
               On July 22, 2014, Hill made another request to the IRS for
        “the return of his deposit in the amount of $10,263,750.”
               On August 22, 2014, the IRS requested that Hill explain:
        (1) whether the check was “accompanied by a writing which
        identified it as a deposit as directed in Rev. Proc. 2005-18,” and
        (2) “the facts which caused [him] to suppose that gift tax of such
        magnitude might be owed for 2011 and/or 2012” so that the IRS
        could determine whether to examine his gift tax returns.
        Importantly, the IRS asked Hill if he agreed that the funds should
        be returned “to the District Court from which the payment
        originally came,” rather than to Hill himself.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283       Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023      Page: 6 of 28

        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10283

               On February 4, 2015, Hill replied, confirming that the
        $10,263,750 check was a § 6603 “deposit” toward his potential gift
        tax liability for 2011 and then redirected to 2012. Hill also
        submitted the writing identifying the check as a “deposit” and
        requested the IRS “immediately return to Mr. Hill his $10,263,750
        deposit.”
        E.     IRS Examination of 2012 Gift Tax Return
               On July 30, 2015, the IRS notified Hill that his 2012 gift tax
        return was selected for examination. From August 2015 to August
        2016, the IRS corresponded with Hill and received documents from
        Hill.
                On October 20, 2016, the IRS sent Hill a letter, recounting
        how the IRS’s attorney had advised Hill’s representative that the
        IRS’s final determination of Hill’s gift tax liability could differ from
        Hill’s reported gift tax of $0 for tax year 2012. The IRS letter also
        advised it could release the funds but requested that Hill “confirm
        that [he] would like to move forward with [his] request for return
        of funds.” The IRS observed that the parties to the 2010 settlement
        agreement had stipulated that “any refund of tax payments would
        be returned to the District Court’s account holding the other funds
        involved in the litigation.” Because “the District Court’s account
        authorized the payment originally,” the IRS asked if “the District
        Court should also send in a request for the return of funds in order
        to authorize the release [of the funds].” The record does not
        indicate that Hill ever responded to this question.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283      Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023      Page: 7 of 28

        22-10283                Opinion of the Court                         7

               On December 14, 2016, the IRS completed its examination
        of Hill’s gift tax return for 2012. The IRS advised Hill of its three
        alternative determinations: (1) the gift was completed in 2010
        when Hill settled the litigation, and the district court entered its
        final judgment; (2) the gift was completed in 2011 when Hill
        executed the assignment of the installment agreement to his
        children’s trusts; or (3) the gift was completed in 2015 when the
        funds were transferred into the trusts for Hill’s children.
               The IRS observed that, in his 2012 gift tax return, Hill
        “attribut[ed] the Section 6603 deposit to this gift tax year only.” As
        there was no gift tax liability for 2012, the IRS advised Hill to
        “request in writing that the funds be applied to a different tax year
        in accordance with Revenue Procedure 2005-18” to avoid liability
        in the relevant tax year. Otherwise, the § 6603 deposit would be
        returned to the district court.
        F.     Hill’s Protest
               On February 13, 2017, Hill filed a protest, disputing the IRS’s
        determination of his gift tax liability. This time, Hill requested that
        the IRS apply “his previous deposit of $10,263,750, made according
        to IRC § 6603, . . . to the disputed gift tax liability for 2010, 2011,
        and 2015.” The IRS then transferred Hill’s deposit designated for
        2012 to his account for 2010.
               Hill’s protest disputing his gift tax liability was not
        successful. On October 18, 2017, the IRS issued a notice of
        deficiency, which assessed: (1) a gift tax deficiency of $10,386,250
USCA11 Case: 22-10283       Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023      Page: 8 of 28

        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10283

        for tax year 2010; (2) a statutory penalty of $2,336,906 under I.R.C.
        § 6651(a)(1) for failing to file a required gift tax return for tax year
        2010; and (3) a statutory penalty of $595,131 under I.R.C.
        § 6651(a)(2) for failing to pay that tax.
        G.     Hill’s Deficiency Proceeding in the Tax Court
               On January 16, 2018, Hill filed a petition in the Tax Court to
        redetermine the deficiency for tax year 2010. Hill’s petition
        asserted that: (1) the IRS erred in determining his 2010 assignment
        to his children’s trusts was a taxable gift, (2) he had “deposited
        $10,263,750 with the IRS while the legal effect of the [assignment]
        was being analyzed by [his] professional advisors,” and (3) the IRS
        “misclassifie[d] th[is] deposit as a payment.”
               Prior to trial, the parties settled the deficiency proceeding.
        On May 31, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation that provided:
        (1) Hill made a taxable gift of $24,400,000 in 2011; (2) no gift tax
        was due for 2010 and 2015; and (3) “[t]he deficiency in this case will
        be computed without reference to an advance payment of
        $10,263,750 that was made on February 28, 2012.” (Emphasis
        added).
              On June 26, 2019, the IRS sent a letter estimating the interest
        due to Hill. The IRS stated that its calculation was “only an
        estimate” and estimated that the interest was $1,069,230.12, using
        the interest rate for overpayments. The interest rate (1) for
        deposits is the federal short-term rate, and (2) for overpayments is
USCA11 Case: 22-10283      Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 9 of 28

        22-10283               Opinion of the Court                         9

        the federal short-term rate plus three percentage points. See I.R.C.
        §§ 6603(d)(4), 6621(a)(1).
        H.    Judge Gustafson’s Stipulated Decision
               On July 19, 2019, Tax Court Judge David Gustafson entered
        a stipulated decision. The first page of that final decision contained
        the parties’ stipulations that Judge Gustafson adopted as the order
        and decision of the Tax Court as follows:
                      Pursuant to the agreement of the parties in this
              case, it is
                     ORDERED AND DECIDED: That there is a
              deficiency in gift tax due from petitioner for the
              calendar year 2011 in the amount of $6,790,000.00;
                     That there are no deficiencies in gift tax due
               from, nor overpayments due to, petitioner for the
               calendar years 2010 and 2015;
                      That there is no addition to tax due from
               petitioner for the taxable year 2010, under the
               provisions of I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1); and
                      That there is no addition to tax due from
               petitioner for the taxable year 2010, under the
               provisions of I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2).
        Judge Gustafson’s electronic signature appeared at the end of this
        first page. By agreement of the parties, Judge Gustafson thus
        ordered and decided that a $6,790,000 deficiency existed for 2011,
        but no deficiency existed for 2010 and 2015.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023       Page: 10 of 28

        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10283

               A second page was part of the document. That second page
        was signed by the parties’ representatives, but not Judge Gustafson.
        It contained these stipulations by the parties:
                     It is hereby stipulated that the Court may enter
              the foregoing decision in this case.
                     It is further stipulated that interest will accrue
              and be assessed as provided by law on the deficiency
              due from petitioner.
                     It is further stipulated that, effective upon the
              entry of this decision by the Court, petitioner waives
              the restrictions contained in I.R.C. § 6213(a)
              prohibiting assessment and collection of the
              deficiency (plus statutory interest) until the decision
              of the Tax Court becomes final.
                      It is further stipulated that there is a
              prepayment credit in the amount of $10,263,750.00
              which payment was made on February 28, 2012 and
              was credited to petitioner’s tax year 2010 gift tax
              liability. It is stipulated that the prepayment credit in
              the amount of $10,263,750.00 will be reversed for
              petitioner’s tax year 2010 and applied to petitioner’s
              tax year 2011 gift tax liability. It is further stipulated
              that the deficiency for the taxable year 2011 is
              computed without considering the prepayment
              credit of $10,263,750.00.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283        Document: 43-1         Date Filed: 04/10/2023         Page: 11 of 28

        22-10283                   Opinion of the Court                               11

                       It is further stipulated that interest will be
                credited or paid as provided by law on any
                overpayment in tax due to petitioner.
        (Emphases added). The parties refer to these stipulations as
        “below-the-line stipulations” because they appear below Judge
        Gustafson’s signature.
               On October 17, 2019—ninety days after entry on the docket
        after no appeal was taken—the stipulated decision became final.
        See I.R.C. §§ 7481(a)(1), 7483. 1
               In January 2020, the IRS issued a check to Hill in the amount
        of $3,473,750, which was the difference between Hill’s $10,263,750
        deposit and the $6,790,000 deficiency for tax year 2011. It did not
        include interest.
        I.      Hill’s Motion to Redetermine Interest
               In August 2020, Hill filed a motion to redetermine interest
        in the Tax Court. Hill’s motion alleged that: (1) his $10,263,750
        remittance was designated as a § 6603 deposit, (2) the $3,473,750
        that the IRS returned to Hill was “the exact difference between the
        amount [Hill] deposited and the deficiency [the Tax] Court

        1 Generally,  § 6213(a) does not allow the IRS to collect a deficiency until the
        Tax Court’s decision becomes final. I.R.C. § 6213(a). Hill’s waiver of the
        restrictions in § 6213(a) allowed the $10,263,750 deposit to be applied instanter
        to the 2011 gift tax liability before the stipulated decision became final.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023    Page: 12 of 28

        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-10283

        determined,” and (3) he was owed interest of $1,267,322.80, using
        the interest rate for overpayments.
               In response to Hill’s motion, the IRS submitted that the Tax
        Court lacked jurisdiction to redetermine the interest owed to Hill.
        It pointed out that: (1) I.R.C. § 7481(c)(2)(B) gives the Tax Court
        jurisdiction over a motion to redetermine interest when the Tax
        Court “finds under section 6521(b) that the taxpayer has made an
        overpayment,” but (2) Judge Gustafson’s stipulated decision did
        not find that Hill made an overpayment of tax. The IRS asserted
        that, even if the Tax Court had jurisdiction over Hill’s motion, Hill
        was owed only $218,121.22 in interest, using the interest rate for
        deposits.
               With its response, the IRS submitted an “Activity
        Summary,” which listed (1) $6,790,000 as an “Advance Payment of
        Determined Deficiency”; (2) $3,473,750 as a “Refund of
        Overpayment”; and (3) $218,121.22 as “Overpayment Interest.”
        That interest, however, is calculated at the deposit rate of the
        federal short-term rate, not the overpayment rate of the federal
        short-term rate plus three percentage points. See I.R.C.
        §§ 6603(d)(4), 6621(a)(1).
               In a reply brief, Hill argued for the first time that his
        $10,263,750 remittance should be deemed a payment of tax, rather
        than a deposit. Hill contended that: (1) the stipulated decision
        determined that he made an overpayment of tax in 2011; (2) the
        IRS treated his $10,263,750 remittance as an “advance payment”;
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023    Page: 13 of 28

        22-10283               Opinion of the Court                       13

        and (3) his remittance lost its character as a deposit when the IRS
        refused to return it upon his requests.
        J.    Reassignment of Hill’s Motion to Redetermine Interest
               In July 2021, after briefing was completed, the Tax Court
        Chief Judge reassigned Hill’s case from Judge Gustafson to Judge
        Albert Lauber for disposition of Hill’s motion. In the Tax Court,
        Hill did not challenge this reassignment order.
        K.    Denial of Hill’s Motion to Redetermine Interest
                On October 25, 2021, the Tax Court denied Hill’s motion to
        redetermine interest for lack of statutory jurisdiction. Hill v.
        Comm’r, 122 T.C.M. (CCH) 252 (T.C. 2021). Although jurisdiction
        existed over motions to redetermine interest on overpayments, the
        Tax Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to redetermine
        Hill’s interest because Judge Gustafson’s stipulated decision (1) had
        found only that Hill had a gift tax deficiency of $6,790,000 in 2011
        and (2) had not found that Hill made an “overpayment.”
               Further, the below-the-line stipulations (1) evidenced only
        an agreement between the parties, not findings by the Tax Court,
        (2) did not refer to any “overpayment,” and (3) actually stated that
        the deficiency for tax year 2011 would be computed “without
        considering the prepayment credit of $10,263,750.”
               The Tax Court also concluded that the stipulated decision
        could not have found that Hill made an overpayment in 2011
        because he (1) had called the $10,263,750 check a “deposit,” and
        (2) had not made a payment of tax for any relevant year when the
USCA11 Case: 22-10283      Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 14 of 28

        14                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10283

        Court’s 2019 decision was entered. The Tax Court observed that:
        (1) Hill “initially designated the $10,263,750 check as a ‘deposit’” in
        February 2012; (2) Hill “consistently referred to it as a ‘deposit’” in
        his correspondence with the IRS and his filings with the Tax Court;
        and (3) Hill likely characterized the remittance as a deposit for his
        own benefit so that “[h]e could demand the immediate return of
        his deposit at any time.”
               The Tax Court also reasoned that the IRS had not converted
        Hill’s deposit into a payment of taxes because (1) there was no
        authority that the IRS could overrule Hill’s designation of his
        remittance as a deposit or any evidence that the IRS had done so,
        (2) the IRS never refused to return the remittance, and (3) Hill did
        not allege that he provided the information that the IRS requested
        to effectuate the return of the remittance to the district court. The
        Tax Court observed that, while the parties used the terms “advance
        payment” or “payment” when referring to the $10,263,750
        remittance, “the word ‘payment,’ when appearing in these
        contexts, was not being used in a technical sense” and “such
        statements cannot override [Hill’s] unambiguous designation of
        the remittance as a ‘deposit.’”
             Because the $10,263,750 was a deposit and Judge Gustafson
        had not found an overpayment, the Tax Court denied Hill’s
USCA11 Case: 22-10283        Document: 43-1        Date Filed: 04/10/2023        Page: 15 of 28

        22-10283                    Opinion of the Court                            15

        motion to redetermine interest for lack of jurisdiction. Hill timely
        appealed. 2
                              II.     GENERAL PRINCIPLES
                  “The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks
        general equitable powers.” Comm’r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7, 108
        S. Ct. 217, 219 (1987); see also I.R.C. § 7442 (“The Tax
        Court . . . shall have such jurisdiction as is conferred on [it] by this
        title . . . .”). We thus examine the relevant statutes granting the
        Tax Court jurisdiction.
        A.     Jurisdiction over a Petition to Redetermine a Deficiency
              I.R.C. § 6213(a) grants the Tax Court jurisdiction to
        redetermine a deficiency assessed by the IRS. I.R.C. § 6213(a). In
        general, a deficiency is the amount by which a tax imposed under
        the Code exceeds the amount reported by the taxpayer on his tax
        returns. See id. § 6211(a).
               When the IRS determines that a taxpayer owes a deficiency,
        the IRS is authorized to send notice to the taxpayer, specifying the
        deficiency amount and demanding payment. Id. §§ 6303(a),

        2In this appeal, Hill contends for the first time that the Tax Court erred in
        assigning his motion to redetermine interest to Judge Lauber after the
        underlying deficiency action was assigned to Judge Gustafson. Hill forfeited
        this issue by not raising it in the Tax Court. Stubbs v. Comm’r, 797 F.2d 936,
        938 (11th Cir. 1986) (concluding that an issue not presented to the Tax Court
        “although briefed by the parties, is not properly before this [C]ourt”). In any
        event, Hill’s contention lacks merit.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023       Page: 16 of 28

        16                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10283

        6212(a). Within a specific time period, “the taxpayer may file a
        petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the
        deficiency.” Id. § 6213(a).
               Hill started this case with his petition to redetermine the
        deficiency assessed by the IRS. When that deficiency proceeding
        was settled, the Tax Court entered the stipulated decision, which
        later became final.
               The issue here is whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction to
        reopen Hill’s case (post-judgment) to redetermine interest. As
        explained below, not all taxpayers can go back to the Tax Court to
        redetermine interest.
        B.    Jurisdiction over a Post-Judgment Motion to Redetermine
              Interest
              The Tax Court may reopen a final decision for the purpose
        of redetermining interest in limited circumstances. See I.R.C.
        § 7481(c)(1). Section 7481(c)(1) provides that:
              [I]f, within 1 year after the date the decision of the Tax
              Court becomes final . . . , the taxpayer files a motion
              in the Tax Court for a redetermination of the amount
              of interest involved, then the Tax Court may reopen
              the case solely to determine whether the taxpayer has
              made an overpayment of such interest or the
              Secretary has made an underpayment of such interest
              and the amount thereof.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283          Document: 43-1         Date Filed: 04/10/2023        Page: 17 of 28

        22-10283                     Opinion of the Court                              17

        Id. (emphasis added). 3
               There are two categories of deficiency cases that may be
        reopened (post-judgment) to redetermine interest. First, under
        § 7481(c)(2)(A), the Tax Court may reopen the case when the IRS
        has assessed a deficiency “which includes interest . . . , and . . . the
        taxpayer has paid the entire amount of the deficiency plus interest
        claimed by the Secretary.” Id. § 7481(c)(2)(A). Hill does not argue
        that the Tax Court had jurisdiction over his motion under
        § 7481(c)(2)(A).
               Second, the Tax Court may reopen a deficiency case
        (post-judgment) when it “finds under section 6512(b) that the
        taxpayer has made an overpayment.” Id. § 7481(c)(2)(B) (emphasis
        added). Section 6512(b) provides, in relevant part, that:
                  [I]f the Tax Court finds that there is no deficiency and
                  further finds that the taxpayer has made an
                  overpayment . . . of gift tax . . . in respect of which the
                  Secretary determined the deficiency, or finds that
                  there is a deficiency but that the taxpayer has made
                  an overpayment of such tax, the Tax Court shall have
                  jurisdiction to determine the amount of such
                  overpayment, and such amount shall, when the
                  decision of the Tax Court has become final, be
                  credited or refunded to the taxpayer.

        3 The   parties agree that Hill’s motion to redetermine interest was timely filed.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283      Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 18 of 28

        18                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10283

        Id. § 6512(b)(1) (emphases added).
                The Code references overpayment, but it “does not contain
        a general definition of ‘overpayment.’” Gen. Elec. Co. &
        Subsidiaries v. United States, 384 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
        In interpreting the term “overpayment” in other tax provisions, the
        Supreme Court has “read the word ‘overpayment’ in its usual
        sense, as meaning any payment in excess of that which is properly
        due.” Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 531, 68 S. Ct. 229,
        233 (1947). The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he
        commonsense interpretation is that a tax is overpaid when a
        taxpayer pays more than is owed, for whatever reason or no reason
        at all.” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 609 n.6, 110 S. Ct. 1361,
        1368 n.6 (1990) (“The word encompasses ‘erroneously,’ ‘illegally,’
        or ‘wrongfully’ collected taxes . . . .” (citation omitted)).
               Similarly, our Court has observed that “[a]n overpayment
        occurs whenever a taxpayer has paid an amount over and above
        his true tax liability.” Glaze v. United States, 641 F.2d 339, 343 (5th
        Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see
        also Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. United States, 455 F.3d 1261, 1263
        (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A]ny payment is an overpayment when no
        payment was due.”).
        C.     Payments and Deposits
              As further background, it helps to understand why
        taxpayers, like Hill, will expressly designate a remittance as a
        “deposit,” as opposed to a payment. Whether the taxpayer makes
USCA11 Case: 22-10283        Document: 43-1        Date Filed: 04/10/2023        Page: 19 of 28

        22-10283                  Opinion of the Court                              19

        a deposit or a payment can affect whether the taxpayer can
        challenge the amount of a deficiency.
               Generally, when a taxpayer makes an undesignated
        remittance, the IRS treats that remittance as a payment and applies
        it “against any outstanding liability for taxes, penalties[,] or
        interest.” See Rev. Proc. 2005-18 § 4.01(2), 2005-13 I.R.B. 798, 799. 4
        “If an undesignated remittance is made in the full amount of a
        proposed liability,” it “will be treated as a payment of tax, a notice
        of deficiency will not be mailed[,] and the taxpayer will not have
        the right to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the
        deficiency.” Id. § 4.03, 2005-13 I.R.B. at 800.
                By contrast, a taxpayer who makes a “deposit” can challenge
        an alleged deficiency in the Tax Court without accruing
        underpayment interest on the disputed tax, up to the amount of
        the deposit. See I.R.C. §§ 6601(a), 6603(a)–(b), 6213(a). The
        Supreme Court has recognized that “the taxpayer will often desire
        treatment of the remittance as a deposit—even if this means
        forfeiting the right to interest on an overpayment—in order to
        preserve jurisdiction in the Tax Court, which depends on the
        existence of a deficiency,” which “would be wiped out” if the

        4 Throughout their briefs, both parties cited and relied upon Revenue
        Procedure 2005–18. No party raised a deference issue under Chevron, U.S.A.,
        Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778
        (1984), and thus we do not address Chevron.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283      Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023      Page: 20 of 28

        20                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10283

        remittance were treated as a payment. Baral v. United States, 528
        U.S. 431, 439 n.2, 120 S. Ct. 1006, 1011 n.2 (2000).
               Deposits are returnable on demand. If the taxpayer requests
        the return of his deposit in writing before the deposit is used to pay
        a tax, the IRS must return it to the taxpayer unless the IRS
        determines that the collection of tax is in jeopardy. I.R.C. § 6603(c).
               But once the deposit is applied to pay a tax, the taxpayer may
        submit “a claim for credit or refund as an overpayment.” Rev. Proc.
        2005-18 § 6.01, 2005-13 I.R.B. at 800 (“A deposit made pursuant to
        section 6603 is not subject to a claim for credit or refund as an
        overpayment until the deposit is applied by the [IRS] as payment
        of an assessed tax of the taxpayer.”).
               With this background, we turn to Hill’s arguments.
                                  III.   DISCUSSION

               The parties agree that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to
        reopen Hill’s case if the Tax Court “finds that there is a deficiency
        but that the taxpayer has made an overpayment of such tax.” I.R.C.
        § 6512(b)(1). Hill contends the Tax Court’s stipulated decision
        made the required finding of an overpayment. 5 We review Hill’s
        arguments in that regard.

        5This Court reviews de novo the Tax Court’s legal conclusions, including
        questions of subject-matter jurisdiction and statutory interpretation.
        Greenberg v. Comm’r, 10 F.4th 1136, 1155 (11th Cir. 2021).
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023    Page: 21 of 28

        22-10283               Opinion of the Court                       21

        A.    Tax Court’s Stipulated Decision
               Hill emphasizes that the Tax Court expressly found: (1) that
        he owed a $6,790,000 deficiency for tax year 2011; and (2) there
        were no deficiencies or overpayments for tax years 2010 or 2015.
        Hill argues that “the only tenable conclusion” from the two
        stipulated findings is that he made an overpayment of tax for 2011.
        We do not agree.
               It is obvious that the Tax Court did not make an express
        finding that Hill had made an overpayment of tax for 2011. And,
        contrary to Hill’s argument, the Tax Court did not implicitly, or in
        substance, find that he made an overpayment of tax. Indeed, the
        Tax Court’s findings on the first page are also consistent with a
        determination that Hill made a $10,263,750 deposit that had not yet
        been applied to the deficiency for tax year 2011.
               At most, the Tax Court was silent on whether Hill made an
        overpayment for tax year 2011. The Tax Court’s silence cannot be,
        and is not, a finding of an overpayment for § 6512(b)(1)
        jurisdictional purposes.
        B.    Below-the-Line Stipulations
                We now turn to the below-the-line stipulations on the
        second page. Hill argues that the below-the-line stipulations
        (1) also constituted findings by the Tax Court and (2) stated that he
        made an overpayment of tax.
               For several reasons, we conclude these below-the-line
        stipulations reflect an agreement between the parties and were not
USCA11 Case: 22-10283      Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 22 of 28

        22                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10283

        judicial findings by the Tax Court. Furthermore, these stipulations
        do not even state that Hill made an overpayment.
               For starters, the below-the-line stipulations were separate
        and distinct from the Tax Court’s findings on the first page of the
        stipulated decision. These stipulations were memorialized below
        Judge Gustafson’s signature on a page signed only by the parties’
        representatives. Under the Tax Court Rules, a stipulation for trial
        is treated as a “conclusive admission by the parties to the
        stipulation.” Tax Ct. R. 91(e); accord G.I.C. Corp. v. United States,
        121 F.3d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[P]arties are bound by their
        stipulations and a pretrial stipulation frames the issues for trial.”).
        There is no reason to treat stipulations for settlement differently.
        While the below-the-line stipulations may be binding against the
        IRS, these stipulations were not findings by the Tax Court.
               Second, we reject Hill’s argument that the first sentence in
        the below-the-line stipulations—“[i]t is hereby stipulated that the
        Court may enter the foregoing decision in this case”—was a finding
        of fact necessary for the Tax Court to enter judgment. (Emphasis
        added). To the contrary, this stipulation indicates that only the
        foregoing stipulations on the first page of the stipulated decision
        constitute the decision of the Tax Court.
               Third, Hill misreads how far the below-the-line stipulations
        go. Nothing in them constitutes a stipulation, even by the parties,
        that the $3,473,750 was an overpayment of tax. We explain why.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283         Document: 43-1          Date Filed: 04/10/2023          Page: 23 of 28

        22-10283                    Opinion of the Court                                 23

              Hill relies on two below-the-line stipulations that reference
        “prepayment credit” and “payment” as follows: (1) “there is a
        prepayment credit in the amount of $10,263,750.00 which payment
        was made on February 28, 2012 and was credited to petitioner’s tax
        year 2010 gift tax liability”; and (2) “the prepayment credit in the
        amount of $10,263,750.00 will be reversed for petitioner’s tax year
        2010 and applied to petitioner’s tax year 2011 gift tax liability.” 6
        (Emphases added).
                These two stipulations do not identify or treat Hill’s original
        $10,263,750 remittance as a payment toward his 2011 gift tax
        liability. Read properly, the stipulations state that the $10,263,750
        initially was credited to Hill’s 2010 gift tax liability and now will be
        applied as a payment toward his 2011 gift tax liability.
               In fact, the very next below-the-line stipulation states that
        “the deficiency for the taxable year 2011 is computed without
        considering the prepayment credit of $10,263,750.00.” (Emphasis
        added). Had the parties agreed to treat the $10,263,750 as a
        payment of tax for 2011, it would not have been disregarded in the
        deficiency computation of $6,790,000.

        6 Hill also directs our attention to this below-the-line stipulation: “It is further
        stipulated that interest will be credited or paid as provided by law on any
        overpayment in tax due to petitioner.” (Emphasis added). However, this is a
        general stipulation that tracks the Internal Revenue Manual’s (“I.R.M.”)
        recommended form language about interest accrual. See I.R.M. § 35.8.2.5(3)
        (Aug. 11, 2004). It does not in any way identify the $3,473,750 excess
        remittance as an overpayment.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1     Date Filed: 04/10/2023    Page: 24 of 28

        24                     Opinion of the Court                22-10283

               Fourth, we reject Hill’s claim that the Tax Court required a
        finding of an exact amount of overpayment in order to satisfy the
        jurisdictional requirement of § 7481(c)(2)(B). This claim is belied
        by the record. The Tax Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction
        because Judge Gustafson’s stipulated decision “did not find that
        [Hill] had made an overpayment,” not because the stipulated
        decision failed to identify the exact amount of an overpayment.
               In sum, because Judge Gustafson’s stipulated decision did
        not find that Hill made an overpayment of tax, the Tax Court did
        not err in denying Hill’s motion to redetermine interest for lack of
        jurisdiction.
                        IV.   HILL’S OTHER ARGUMENTS
        A.    Intent of the Parties
              Hill also argues that, to the extent the stipulated decision
        was ambiguous, we may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’
        communications, such as: (1) the IRS’s “estimate of the
        overpayment interest,” calculated using the overpayment interest
        rate, and (2) the “Activity Summary” that characterized the
        $3,473,750 excess remittance as a “Refund of Overpayment.” Hill
        argues that this evidence removes any doubt that the parties
        intended to treat the $3,473,750 excess remittance as an
        overpayment.
              We disagree. The intent of the parties has no bearing on the
        ultimate issue in this case—whether the Tax Court found that Hill
        made an overpayment of tax.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023    Page: 25 of 28

        22-10283               Opinion of the Court                       25

               Moreover, the evidence of the parties’ intent is decidedly
        mixed. Hill argues that his remittance became a payment on
        August 23, 2013, when he requested that the remittance “be
        applied to 2012 rather than 2011.” Yet Hill’s August 23, 2013 letter
        referred to the remittance as a “deposit” and noted that the
        potential gift tax for 2012 was still “undetermined.” Hill again
        referred to the $10,263,750 remittance as a “deposit” in later
        communications with the IRS and even in his motion to
        redetermine interest. Tellingly, Hill only began to refer to the
        remittance as an overpayment in his reply brief in those interest
        proceedings after the IRS pointed out that the Tax Court lacked
        jurisdiction to redetermine interest with respect to a deposit.
        B.    Advance Payment
               Next, Hill emphasizes that, before the settlement, the IRS
        sent him an estimate of the interest he was owed and classified his
        remittance as an “Advance Payment of Determined Deficiency.”
        The parties’ joint stipulations, before the settlement, also referred
        to the remittance as an “advance payment.”
               As the IRS points out, the I.R.M. states that, when the IRS
        processes a § 6603 deposit, this deposit should be classified as an
        “Advance Payment of Determined Deficiency.” See I.R.M.
        § 20.2.4.8.2.1(1) (Mar. 5, 2015). Thus, the term “advance payment”
        could refer to a deposit, which is submitted to the IRS and then can
        be applied to pay a tax. See I.R.C. § 6603(a). In any event, the
        parties’ use of the term “advance payment” before the stipulated
USCA11 Case: 22-10283      Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023     Page: 26 of 28

        26                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10283

        decision was entered does not show that Judge Gustafson found
        that Hill made an overpayment in the stipulated decision.
        C.     Return of Deposit
              Hill also argues that the $10,263,750 remittance lost its
        character as a deposit because the IRS did not return it on demand.
        We agree with the Tax Court that the IRS did not convert Hill’s
        remittance into a payment of taxes for 2011.
               As the Tax Court indicated, the IRS never refused to return
        his deposit. Hill did request, in writing, the return of his deposit at
        least four times. However, early on in August 2014, the IRS
        pointed out the $10,263,750 check was issued by the district court
        and asked if those funds should be sent to the district court, rather
        than Hill himself. Later, Hill did not provide information that the
        IRS requested to effectuate the return of his deposit. On October
        20, 2016, the IRS sent Hill a letter, requesting that Hill “confirm
        that [he] would like to move forward with [his] request for return
        of funds” and asking if “the District Court should also send in a
        request for the return of funds in order to authorize the release [of
        the funds].” Hill does not allege that he ever responded to this
        question.
              Additionally, Hill has cited no authority stating that a
        designated deposit becomes a payment merely because the IRS
        does not return it on demand. Cf. Dillon Tr. Co. v. United States,
        162 Fed. Cl. 708, 720 (2022) (“[Section] 6603(c) does not enumerate
        the number of days or months in which the IRS
USCA11 Case: 22-10283     Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023    Page: 27 of 28

        22-10283               Opinion of the Court                       27

        must return the deposits, nor does it use time-sensitive phrases
        such as ‘immediately’ or ‘within a reasonable time.’”). Nothing in
        § 6603 imposes the on-demand time constraint Hill suggests. See
        I.R.C. § 6603(c).
        D.    Post-Decision Issuance of $3,473,750 Check
               Hill also asserts that “[t]he ultimate test of whether the Tax
        Court had found an overpayment under section 6512(b) would
        inhere in the consequences that flowed from the entry of its
        decision document.” Hill contends that, because he received a
        check for $3,473,750 on January 6, 2020, after his original
        $10,263,750 remittance was applied to the $6,790,000 deficiency,
        the Tax Court must have found an overpayment under
        § 6512(b)(1).
               Hill’s argument again ignores that the Tax Court must
        “find[]”an overpayment before the court can exercise jurisdiction
        over a motion to redetermine interest. I.R.C. § 7481(c)(2)(B).
        Here, the Tax Court’s findings, not the parties’ subsequent
        conduct, control whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction over Hill’s
        motion to redetermine interest. How the $10,263,750 was applied
        after the Tax Court’s stipulated decision was entered has no
        bearing on whether the Tax Court found that Hill made an
        overpayment.
USCA11 Case: 22-10283    Document: 43-1    Date Filed: 04/10/2023   Page: 28 of 28

        28                    Opinion of the Court              22-10283

                               V.    CONCLUSION
               Because the Tax Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on
        Hill’s motion to redetermine interest, we affirm the Tax Court’s
        dismissal of Hill’s motion for lack of jurisdiction.
              AFFIRMED.