Court Opinion

ID: 9959978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-13 06:12:50.426044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:02.639355
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed April 11, 2024

                                              In The

           Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                            __________

                                    No. 11-23-00258-CV
                                            __________

                     IN THE INTEREST OF J.N., A CHILD

                        On Appeal from the 326th District Court
                                 Taylor County, Texas
                           Trial Court Cause No. 10859-CX

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
       This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated
the parental rights of the mother and unknown father of J.N. 1 Only the mother has
appealed. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. We affirm the
trial court’s order of termination.

       1
        We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of children. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
                       I. Termination Findings and Standards
      The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2023). To terminate
one’s parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V), and
that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. at § 161.001(b)(2). Clear and
convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind
of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought
to be established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019).
      In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellant committed at least one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1)—specifically, that Appellant: (1) engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered
the physical or emotional well-being of the child; and (2) failed to comply with the
provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for
Appellant to obtain the return of the child who had been in the permanent or
temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective
Services (the Department) for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s
removal from Appellant under Chapter 262 because of Appellant’s abuse or neglect
of the child. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O). Appellant does not challenge these
findings.
      The trial court further found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that
termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2). It is this finding that Appellant challenges on appeal. Specifically,
Appellant contends that the trial court’s finding that termination is in J.N.’s best
interest is not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence.

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      In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required
appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed
facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266
(Tex. 2002) (then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). As such,
when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.
      In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied).
      With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict
the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). However, courts may use the non-exhaustive
Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72
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(Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals
to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these
individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts
or omissions of the parent. Id.
      To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove
each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one
factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one
or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative
evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
      The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that
the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and
well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest
analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. In re E.C.R., 638
S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479
S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).
      In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by her
past conduct and determine whether termination is in the child’s best interest. In re
E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); In re D.S.,
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333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer
that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child
may recur in the future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. In re
J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v.
May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ
denied). Further, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the
child’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent to
meet the child’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 S.W.3d at
118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
                        II. The Evidence Presented at Trial
      When J.N. was an infant, Appellant laid her in her bassinet, placed a bottle in
her mouth, and balanced the bottle in an inverted position against the side of the
bassinet. This caused J.N. to aspirate and stop breathing. J.N. was rushed to the
hospital and treated; she ultimately recovered.          Without the Department’s
intervention, Appellant’s mother, J.N.’s grandmother, became J.N.’s primary
caretaker until her death in 2018.
      After J.N.’s grandmother died, J.N. lived with a relative, then in two
subsequent placements before she began living with C.W. (Appellant’s niece) and
her husband, A.W. Appellant moved to Kansas in 2021 and C.W. became the sole
managing conservator of J.N. in June of 2022, when J.N. was ten years old.
Appellant was designated as a possessory conservator.
      According to C.W., parenting ten-year-old J.N. “was difficult.” J.N. revealed
to C.W. that she had been sexually assaulted by her uncle. J.N. was smoking
methamphetamine, sneaking out to have sex with older men, and “would become
very violent when she did not get things she wanted.”

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       In October of 2022, the Department filed its original petition in which it
sought to terminate Appellant’s parental rights, and permit C.W. to adopt J.N. The
Department also assisted C.W. with her efforts to manage and redirect J.N.’s harmful
behaviors, and to understand J.N.’s ADHD and autism diagnoses.
       Although notified, Appellant failed to appear for the final hearing that was
scheduled on October 13, 2023.           She had been arrested for possession of
methamphetamine while this case was pending and was transferred to the Johnson
County jail in Kansas for “several DUIs”; she was still confined in Kansas at the
time of the final hearing.
       Belinda Baysinger, the 2INgage permanency case manager, testified that
Appellant only participated by Zoom or telephonic means in one preliminary
hearing. She also discussed with Appellant the requirements of her Family Plan of
Service. However, Appellant ceased communicating with the Department in March
of 2023. T.N., Appellant’s sister, disclosed that she has maintained consistent
contact with Appellant, and spoke to her over the phone as recently as the day before
the hearing.
       The     trial   court    terminated       Appellant’s   parental   rights   under
Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (O) and found termination to be in the best interest of
the child. This appeal followed.
                   III. The Best Interest of the Child Determination
       In Appellant’s sole issue, she challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights
is in the best interest of the child.
       First, we reiterate that evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support
a best interest finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at
*11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Put differently, the
                                             6
absence of evidence on some of these factors does not preclude a best interest
finding, “particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.). Indeed, “evidence relating to one single factor may be adequate in a
particular situation to support a finding that termination is in the best interests of the
child.” In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.).
“‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-
circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee,
411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013).
      The trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at liberty to disturb the
determinations of the trier of fact so long as those determinations are not
unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving
due deference to the trial court, as we must, we hold that, based on the evidence in
the record and the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have
reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s
parental rights was in the best interest of the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–
72.
      As we have said, in its best interest determination, a trial court, as the
factfinder, may infer that a parent’s past endangering conduct may recur if the child
is returned to the parent. See In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118; see also In re T.B.,
No. 09-20-00172-CV, 2020 WL 6787523, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 19,
2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“factfinder may consider prior CPS history of neglect,
drug abuse, or lack of care for the children”).          Evidence that is relevant to
Section 161.001(b)(1) termination grounds may also be relevant to the determination
of the child’s best interest. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 753 (Tex. App.—Dallas
                                            7
2019, pet. denied). And evidence that supports termination under the grounds listed
in Section 161.001(b)(1) can be considered in the best-interest analysis. See C.H.,
89 S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. Thus, the trial court could properly
consider Appellant’s failure to comply with the conditions of her family service plan,
her arrests for drug use and other criminal conduct, and other evidence of
endangerment in determining whether the termination of her parental rights was in
the child’s best interest. See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
      The record shows that J.N. expressed the desire “to be adopted by [C.W.] and
[A.W.].” According to Baysinger, J.N. “wants a level of permanency,” and “doesn’t
want to be tossed around” in the foster care system. C.W. and A.W. hope to adopt
J.N. and are participating in parenting classes and family counseling to ensure that
they can provide “a healthy and stable life” for her. C.W. testified that J.N.’s
behavior has greatly improved, and their dynamic “has become a wonderful parent
and child relationship.” J.N. no longer acts out sexually, rarely throws things out of
anger, is doing better in school, and has not engaged in self-harm.
      By contrast, there is no evidence that Appellant has any plans or intention to
provide for J.N.’s physical or emotional needs. In fact, since the incident whereby
J.N., as an infant, choked on a bottle which caused her to stop breathing, Appellant’s
mother became J.N.’s sole caregiver. After Appellant’s mother died, Appellant
moved to Kansas, and essentially left J.N. to the mercy of C.W. and the Department.
J.N. revealed that she was sexually assaulted by her uncle, and began using drugs,
engaging in sexual conduct, drinking alcohol, and “displaying very sexualized
behaviors.” The uncontroverted evidence thus shows that Appellant was unwilling
or unable to provide a safe and stable home for J.N., which supports the trial court’s
best-interest finding. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
      The Department endeavored to work with Appellant, but her participation in
her required services was “[s]everely lacking.” Appellant did not submit to drug
                                          8
testing when such tests were requested by the Department, provided no proof of
stable housing or employment, did not engage in counseling or parenting classes,
and did not attend scheduled visitations with J.N. Appellant’s failure to comply with
her family service plan requirements and to meaningfully participate in judicial
proceedings further support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See E.C.R., 638
S.W.3d at 769 (“A trial court is permitted to consider a parent’s . . . failure to comply
with a family plan of service in its best interest determination.”); In re S.B., 207
S.W.3d 877, 887–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“A parent’s drug use,
inability to provide a stable home, and failure to comply with [her] family service
plan support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.”).
      Moreover, Appellant ignored the Department’s repeated attempts to contact
her in the months preceding the final hearing, and she and her sister, T.N., did not
discuss the pending termination proceedings when they spoke the day before
the final hearing.     Appellant’s clear parental indifference supports the trial
court’s finding that terminating her parental rights is in J.N.’s best interest. See In
re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.)
(“[S]ignificant evidence of parental indifference weighs heavily in favor of a
factfinder’s finding that termination is in a child’s best interest.”).
      For the last decade, Appellant has made no effort to regain custody of J.N.
She has likewise showed no interest in even maintaining her status as a possessory
conservator. Appellant’s apathy and heedlessness strongly suggest that the existing
parent-child relationship is not a proper one. See id. Put simply, the evidence shows
that Appellant has declined to participate in J.N.’s childrearing due to her lack of
interest. Therefore, this parent-child bond is fundamentally broken. Based on this
record, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that clear and
convincing evidence establishes that the termination of Appellant’s parental rights
is in the best interest of J.N. See id. at 823–24.
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      Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
                               IV. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                W. STACY TROTTER
                                                JUSTICE

April 11, 2024
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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