Court Opinion

ID: 9398429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 14:01:11.292708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.767155
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13862       Document: 41-1     Date Filed: 05/31/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                  United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eleventh Circuit

                              ____________________

                                    No. 22-13862
                              Non-Argument Calendar
                              ____________________

        REICHEN KUHL,
        as owner of the 2002 28-foot Four Winns
        280 Horizon motorboat, HIN
        GFNCE005F102,
                                  Petitioner-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
        versus
        UNKNOWN CLAIMANT(S), et al.,

                                                     Defendants-Claimants,

        SEVEN LXXVII, LLC,

                 Claimant-Counter Claimant-Third Party Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13862

        SUNTEX MARINA INVESTORS, LLC,

              Claimant-Third Party Defendant-Cross Defendant-Appellee,

        RAHN MARINA LLC, BAHIA MAR SMI OPCO SERIES,

                        Third Party Defendant-Cross Defendant-Appellee.
                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cv-60408-BB
                           ____________________

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                After trial, the facts of this maritime negligence and
        Limitation Act case are well known to the parties. We have a duty
        to separate out the arguments that Seven LXXVII, LLC made at
        trial and in its motion for reconsideration. We disregard the latter
        and only consider the former. Because our precedent establishes
        the relevant standard of care, we review only for clear error. There
        was no such error, and we affirm the lower court’s verdicts on
        negligence and gross negligence. And while we review two other
        issues—the meaning of a Coast Guard regulation, and the
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        22-13862               Opinion of the Court                         3

        applicability of res ipsa loquitor—de novo, neither changes our
        analysis.
                                          I.
               After taking on gasoline at a marina owned by Suntex
        Marina Investors, LLC, an explosion rocked Reichen Kuhl’s 2002
        powerboat about ten seconds after he started the engine—on the
        very morning he ﬁrst put it into the water after buying it used. He
        and his passengers all exited safely, but the ﬁery vessel burned
        through its moorings and collided with the next ship in line at the
        fueling dock: the yacht “W.” Kuhl petitioned the Southern District
        of Florida for limitation of (or exoneration from) liability, at which
        point Seven LXXVII, LLC (“Seven”)—the owner of the W—ﬁled
        claims against both Kuhl and Suntex.
               Several claims and crossclaims were disposed of through
        settlement and the district court’s pretrial orders, and are not
        appealed. Three claims went to a bench trial in the Southern
        District of Florida: 1) Kuhl’s Limitation Act petition for
        exoneration from or limitation of liability, 2) a simple negligence
        claim against Kuhl by Seven, and 3) a gross negligence claim by
        Seven against Suntex.
               Most relevant for this appeal is Seven’s argument that Kuhl
        ran the exhaust blowers in his engine compartment for only two-
        and-a-half minutes, which was an unreasonably short amount of
        time. As for gross negligence, Seven argued that Suntex should
        have followed through on policies contained in its safe fueling and
        staﬀ training manual to make Kuhl run his blowers for longer,
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13862

        among other acts. But the district court disagreed. It limited Kuhl’s
        liability to the value of the vessel ($0), and ruled against Seven
        regarding Kuhl’s negligence and Suntex’s gross negligence.
               The district court weighed the parties’ evidence on both
        sides before concluding that the blowers were run for an adequate
        amount of time. Seven focused on a Coast Guard regulation
        requiring that a placard be installed on every vessel with a gasoline
        engine and exhaust blowers—regardless of vessel size, age, or
        blower type and output—stating: “WARNING—GASOLINE
        VAPORS CAN EXPLODE. BEFORE STARTING ENGINE
        OPERATE BLOWER FOR 4 MINUTES AND CHECK ENGINE
        COMPARTMENT BILGE FOR GASOLINE VAPORS.” 33 C.F.R.
        § 183.610(f )(3). In its proposed ﬁndings of fact, Seven described the
        contents of this placard as one of several “recommendations” on
        how long to operate a blower. Suntex’s manual recommended that
        blowers be run for between three and ﬁve minutes—though its
        employees testiﬁed that in practice, they have conducted hundreds
        of successful refuelings without rigidly adhering to this guidance.
        The district court was most persuaded by testimony from Kuhl’s
        ﬁre safety expert that the new and powerful blowers installed on
        his vessel would have completely cleared the air in the engine
        compartment within one minute, so running them for any longer
        would have made no diﬀerence in this case.
                Additionally, the district court noted that Seven oﬀered
        insuﬃcient evidence at trial about the cause of the explosion to
        satisfy the causation prong of negligence. As for gross negligence,
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        22-13862               Opinion of the Court                        5

        Seven had likewise failed to identify facts about Suntex’s
        involvement that “alone or collectively contributed to the
        explosion and ﬁre.” All of the parties’ experts could not agree on
        a cause of the explosion, Kuhl’s boat was a total loss, and Seven
        itself had presented alternate theories about causation that it no
        longer argues. For example, it argued below that Kuhl’s boat was
        unseaworthy, but has not renewed these assertions on appeal,
        instead suggesting that Kuhl’s vessel was working properly.
        Because the cause of the accident was uncertain—and because
        Seven had not met its burden to show how the actions of Kuhl or
        Suntex contributed to it—the district court held that Kuhl was not
        negligent and that Suntex was not grossly negligent. It also rejected
        Seven’s res ipsa loquitor argument that the mere fact an explosion
        occurred meant Kuhl was negligent.
               Seven moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 59(e) and advanced several arguments for the ﬁrst time,
        including two that it reiterates on appeal: 1) that the notice and
        comment history of the Coast Guard regulation from the 1970s
        includes the word “requirement” when discussing running the
        blowers for four minutes, and 2) that per se negligence was an
        alternate basis for ruling against Kuhl. The district court denied
        the motion for reconsideration. Seven appeals this denial, and the
        three adverse rulings at trial.
                                         II.
              “We review a district court’s factual findings when sitting
        without a jury in admiralty under the clearly erroneous standard.”
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13862

        Venus Lines Agency, Inc. v. CVG Int’l Am., Inc., 234 F.3d 1225, 1228
        (11th Cir. 2000). A district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed
        de novo. Id. In negligence suits, we have long held that questions
        “as to contributory negligence and as to proximate cause” are fact
        questions, as are determinations about whether a party has
        breached a duty owed to another. Safe Harbor Enters., Inc. v. Hill,
        301 F.2d 139, 139 (5th Cir. 1962); Chavez v. Noble Drilling Corp., 567
        F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1978). 1
                                             III.
               Both the district court’s decision on limitation and Seven’s
        claims against Kuhl stand or fall with its determination that he was
        not negligent. See Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Florida,
        Dep’t of Transp., 768 F.2d 1558, 1563–64 (11th Cir. 1985) (claimant
        bears the burden of proving shipowner’s negligence for Limitation
        Act purposes). But before addressing the merits of Seven’s
        arguments about negligence, we explain two types of arguments
        that we will not consider.
              First, while Seven’s briefs do not distinguish between
        arguments made at trial and those raised for the first time in its
        reconsideration motion, it is vital that we do. It is too late to
        introduce new legal arguments in a reconsideration motion if they
        could have been raised earlier. See, e.g., Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d

        1 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
        (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed
        down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).
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        22-13862                Opinion of the Court                          7

        1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007); Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington,
        408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005). Seven first argued that
        negligence per se (the so-called “Pennsylvania Rule”) should apply
        on reconsideration. And Seven’s motion also recharacterized the
        Coast Guard regulation as a substantive requirement (based on its
        notice and comment history) that Kuhl run his blowers for at least
        four minutes rather than a recommendation. Seven could have
        made both of these arguments at trial and chose not to, so we
        disregard them. And because Seven advances no arguments that
        the district court erred in denying its reconsideration motion, those
        claims are abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d
        678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014).
               Second, most of Seven’s brief asks us to diminish the weight
        that the district court placed on testimony from Kuhl’s fire-safety
        expert. But disputing how much to weigh evidence is a “garden-
        variety abuse of discretion argument.” Fynn v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 752
        F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). The district
        court’s decision to weigh one piece of evidence above others is not
        clear error. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74
        (1985).
              That leaves only a few arguments for us to review—and
        none can defeat the district court’s ultimate determinations that
        Kuhl was not negligent and that Suntex was not grossly negligent.
               First, Seven argues that we review the relevant standard of
        care in a negligence case de novo, and that we should apply a
        heightened standard to Kuhl. Seven is correct that our review of
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        8                        Opinion of the Court                    22-13862

        the appropriate standard of care for a shipowner’s conduct is not
        bound by clear error review. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867
        F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1989). But it is clear from our precedent
        that the proper standard is “ordinary reasonable care under the
        circumstances.” Id. at 1322; see also Fischer v. S/Y NERAIDA, 508
        F.3d 586, 594–95 (11th Cir. 2007). There is no indication that the
        district court deviated from this standard when weighing the
        evidence to determine what behavior could have amounted to a
        breach of a duty given the circumstances here. 2
                Second, because we review a court’s interpretation of
        regulations de novo, Seven asks that we revisit the district court’s
        reading of the Coast Guard regulation. See Freixa v. Prestige Cruise
        Servs., LLC, 853 F.3d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2017). But we agree with
        the district court—and Seven’s proposed findings of fact—that the
        regulation requires owners to install the placard. Nothing in the
        text mandates that operators actually follow the contents of the
        placard in every instance that they start the engine. And the same
        warning must be affixed regardless of the air flow capacity of the
        blowers. See 33 C.F.R. § 183.610(b), (f).

        2 Seven also argues that, under Florida law, negligence is a question of law
        subject to de novo review when there are no disputed facts and the evidence
        “ultimately leads to but one conclusion.” See Cooper Hotel Servs., Inc. v.
        MacFarland, 662 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). We think the
        uncertainty surrounding the cause of the accident here is enough to suggest
        that a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
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        22-13862               Opinion of the Court                         9

                Of course, the contents of the placard are evidence that a
        court should consider when assessing the factual question of how
        long a reasonable operator in Kuhl’s position would have run his
        blowers. But the district court did that here. Rather than this
        general regulation, it was more persuaded by evidence about the
        specific blowers installed on Kuhl’s vessel (which could clear the air
        in about a minute according to expert testimony) when assessing
        whether Kuhl acted reasonably in the circumstances. Though we
        can review what the regulation means, we cannot review the
        weight that the district court placed on it except for clear error.
        There was no such error here.
               The district court also correctly refused to apply the doctrine
        of res ipsa loquitor. Even if we applied this doctrine, here it only
        aids “a plaintiff in proving a breach of duty.” Tesoriero v. Carnival
        Corp., 965 F.3d 1170, 1182 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). It
        cannot establish that “a breach of that duty was a substantial factor
        in causing plaintiff harm.” Id. (quotation omitted). And in our
        Circuit, it “is well-settled that the mere occurrence of a mishap
        does not prove that the mishap resulted from tortious conduct.”
        Ins. Co. of the W. v. Island Dream Homes, Inc., 679 F.3d 1295, 1299
        (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). Instead, “the plaintiff bears
        the burden of proving that the defendant’s negligence more likely
        than not caused the injury.” Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 769
        F.3d 1063, 1069 (11th Cir. 2014). In the admiralty context, res ipsa
        loquitor does not relieve Seven from that burden—specifically, that
        “the acts of negligence” were “a contributory and proximate cause
        of the accident.” See Hercules Carriers, 768 F.2d at 1566. And there
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                       22-13862

        is still no factual consensus on what caused the explosion. 3 Once
        again, this inquiry collapses into assessing whether Seven
        presented enough facts for the district court to rule that it had met
        its burden—this time on causation. The court did not clearly err
        by acknowledging that it had not.
               The gross negligence arguments regarding Suntex run afoul
        of these same causation problems. Because Seven did not present
        enough evidence to show that any amount of blower usage would
        have prevented an explosion, there is no evidence that Suntex’s
        practices deviating from its manual proximately caused the
        explosion, either. Regardless, a party’s “failure to apply certain
        safety standards” alone does not constitute gross negligence. See
        Flood v. Young Woman’s Christian Ass’n of Brunswick, Georgia, Inc.,
        398 F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005). 4 The district court did not
        clearly err in concluding that Suntex’s practices did not create gross
        negligence in this instance.

        3 Seven often discusses a similarly located explosion on Kuhl’s boat when it
        was owned by someone else. But correlation does not equal causation. And
        the two instances are not even comparable. The previous owner identified
        and replaced the defective part, and never had issues with the vessel again.
        And the old owner installed the new blowers that Kuhl used after this accident.
        4 To the extent that Seven bases its gross negligence claim on Suntex’s
        employees’ decision not to fight the fire and to await the fire department, that
        practice was consistent with Suntex’s manual, which encouraged prompt
        evacuation at the “slightest doubt about your ability to fight a fire.” And
        Seven’s own boating safety expert did not testify that there was any statute,
        rule, or regulation requiring Kuhl or Suntex staff to fight the fire themselves.
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        22-13862              Opinion of the Court                       11

                In sum, most of Seven’s arguments are attempts to avoid the
        natural result of our clear-error review. But none succeed, and
        Seven has identified no clear error. We have no basis to disturb the
        district court’s conclusions that Suntex was not grossly negligent,
        and that Kuhl was not negligent, which defeated Seven’s claims and
        entitled Kuhl to limitation of liability in any event.
                                  *      *      *
              We AFFIRM the district court’s trial judgment.