Court Opinion

ID: 9703281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:49:55.735934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:02.391564
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
Defendant was jury convicted of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with the intent to commit larceny therein, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, and of being an habitual offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. He was sentenced to 10 to 15 years imprisonment and now appeals as of right.
*579We first reject defendant’s contention that the trial court committed reversible error in granting the people’s motion to consolidate his trial with that of his brother. There was no affirmative showing of prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant. People v Carroll, 396 Mich 408, 414; 240 NW2d 722 (1976).
We further find no abuse of discretion in the magistrate’s determination that probable cause to believe defendant committed the crime was established at the preliminary examination. People v Juniel, 62 Mich App 529, 535; 233 NW2d 635 (1975). That the corpus delicti of the offense was established is not in dispute.
Finally, we address the main issue raised by defendant on appeal. The question is whether the trial judge committed reversible error in finding defendant guilty as a fourth offender under the habitual offender statute, when one of the prior convictions relied upon had originated in juvenile court where defendant had waived jurisdiction to Recorder’s Court without benefit of counsel and then pled guilty to a reduced charge while assisted by counsel.
Defendant claims that the trial court was prohibited from using the aforementioned conviction to support guilt or enhance sentence for another offense. We disagree with defendant.
Defendant was previously convicted of attempted unarmed robbery on April 29, 1965. This is the conviction at issue here. At that time MCL 712A. 17; MSA 27.3178(598.17) did not require appointment of counsel at juvenile transfer hearings, but instead left such appointment to the discretion of the court. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court held that juveniles have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in all adjudicatory *580proceedings. Kent v United States, 383 US 541; 86 S Ct 1045; 16 L Ed 2d 84 (1966).
The question of the retroactive application vel non of Kent and its progeny has resulted in a split amongst the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal. The issue has not been squarely faced in Michigan. However, in a factual situation on all fours with the case sub judice, Judge Feikens of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that Kent, et al., need not be applied retroactively, adopting the reasoning and result of Harris v Procunier, 498 F2d 576 (CA 9, 1974), cert den 419 US 970; 95 S Ct 235; 42 L Ed 2d 186 (1974). See Trombley v Anderson, 439 F Supp 1250, 1251-1252 (ED Mich, 1977), aff’d 584 F2d 807 (CA 6, 1978).
We find the analysis in Harris as adopted in Trombley persuasive, and therefore hold that as a matter of both United States and Michigan constitutional law, the right to counsel at a juvenile proceeding does not apply retroactively to defendant’s transfer proceeding. Accordingly, we discern no basis for upholding defendant’s belated collateral attack on that conviction, or for disapproving the trial court’s reliance thereon in sentencing defendant under the habitual offender statute.
We find no error requiring reversal and therefore affirm.
Affirmed.