Court Opinion

ID: 9746598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:29:11.884476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:51.868001
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I cannot agree with the Majority that an insured party has no remedy when an insurance carrier fails to comply with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”)1 requiring it to provide customers with a notice setting forth the annual premiums for coverage under the limited and full tort options. In support of its position, the Majority cites this Court’s decision in Salazar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 Pa. 658, 702 A.2d 1038 (Pa.1997). In Salazar, the insured party, Mrs. Brown, waived uninsured motorist coverage when she first applied for automobile insurance. However, when the insurer renewed her policy, it neglected to send her a disclosure of premium charges and tort options form as required by Section *6121791.1. While Mrs. Brown’s daughter Rita Salazar was driving her mother’s car, accompanied by Celitia Salazar, a hit- and-run driver struck them. The Salazars brought an action against the insurance company seeking uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to Mrs. Brown’s policy. They argued that because the insurer did not provide Mrs. Brown with the notice required by Section 1791.1, that they were entitled to such benefits. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurer, and the Superior Court affirmed. This Court recognized that the insurer breached its statutory duty to provide the appropriate renewal notice to the insured party, but held that the lack of an enforcement mechanism for this requirement in the MVFRL meant that the Salazars did not have a remedy.
In a dissenting opinion, which Mr. Justice Nigro joined, I agreed with the majority that Section 1791 should be read in pari materia with Section 1731(c.1), which provides that where an insurer fails to produce a valid form by which an insurer rejects uninsured motorist coverage, “coverage ... under that policy shall be equal to the bodily injury limits.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1731(d). The majority in Salazar held that the presence of a statutorily created remedy in Section 1731 implied that the lack of such a remedy in Section 1791 indicated that the appellants were not entitled to relief. I disagreed, noting that noncompliance with Section 1791 is as contrary to the MVFRL’s goal of advising insured individuals of the benefits and limits under the Law as is noncompliance with Section 1731. In the instant matter, Section 1705(a)(3) provides that if an individual who is renewing a policy does not respond to two notices informing him or her of the tort options, “the named insured and those he is empowered by this section to bind by his choice are conclusively presumed to have chosen the full tort option alternative.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(a)(3). Consistent with the position I expressed in Salazar, I believe that the failure to provide a first-time purchaser of insurance with a cost comparison of the limited and full tort options is inimical to the aims of the MVFRL.
*613The majority states that its decision “is also supported by the policy behind the enactment of the MVFRL and its amendments, to stem the rising cost of insurance in the Commonwealth.” Majority Opinion at 454. However, as I noted in the dissenting opinion in Salazar:
The MVFRL does not contain a statement of findings and purpose. Prior to the 1990 amendments that rendered UM and UIM coverages optional, this Court stated that the legislature enacted the MVFRL to reduce the rising cost of automobile insurance and the resultant increase in uninsured motorists. Baylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 536 Pa. 583, 640 A.2d 1234 (1994). Since the 1990 amendments, the Superior Court has held that one of the objects of the MVFRL is to afford the injured claimant the broadest possible coverage. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Emig, 444 Pa.Super. 524, 664 A.2d 559 (1995). In this way, the MVFRL is to be liberally construed.
Id. at 1048. Furthermore, as Judge Del Sole noted in his dissenting opinion in the instant matter, in which Judges Beck and Ford Elliott joined:
It is apparent from the legislative discussions surrounding the passage of Act 6 that it was important to allow informed consumers to make choices about the insurance which would best suit their needs.... To protect consumers by providing them with information about their options necessitates that they be informed about the costs associated with each choice. The goal of providing for an informed consumer is not in conflict with the equally important goal of making automobile insurance more affordable and available. Both concerns were at work in the passage of Act 6.
Donnelly v. Bauer, 453 Pa.Super. 396, 683 A.2d 1242, 1251 (Pa.Super.1996) (Del Sole, J. dissenting).
The purposes of the MVFRL include “protecting] the consumer by providing him or her with sufficient information to intelligently and knowingly elect options or reject coverage upon the initial application and upon renewal,” Salazar, 702 A.2d at 1049 (Newman, J. dissenting), and “providing] the broadest possible coverage to injured parties,” Salazar, 702 *614A.2d at 1050 (Newman, J. dissenting). Accordingly, I would hold that where an insurer fails to provide a consumer with the rate information required by Section 1791, that the insured party should be deemed to have selected the full tort option. For these reasons, I would reverse the order of the Superior Court and reinstate the trial court’s order granting the Appellants’ motion in limine.
NIGRO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq.