Court Opinion

ID: 9649917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:14:00.974158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:45.602732
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot join the opinion of the majority in this matter. Instead, I stand firmly behind the determination of the lower courts that Appellee had made a valid challenge to the striking of prospective juror Savage, under the principles announced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and that the Commonwealth’s attempt to explain away the challenge was flawed.
*329As was succinctly noted by the trial court in reversing its denial of Appellee’s claim:
In the instant case there was only one black person on the venire. Following the lead of United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.1987), and Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.1987), we hold that the prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge to eliminate the only member of the defendant’s race raises inference [sic] of discrimination and entitles the defendant to an explanation. Moreover, we believe that the explanation offered by the Commonwealth is evidence of racial motivation since it challenged the black, but not the white, venireperson from Farrell.
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The Commonwealth’s reasons for striking Ms. Savage from the jury suffer two infirmities. First, the danger envisioned by the prosecution seems pretty remote. Second, the challenge of a black woman because she lives in a certain city and the acceptance of a white man who lives in the same city raises the specter of racial discrimination.
The prosecution’s concern that Ms. Savage or one of her children might know Ferguson is remote because Ferguson was not a party or a witness in this case ... In the instant case we have only an alibi witness from a companion case who would not be called to testify. Moreover, the individual for whom Ms. Ferguson gave alibi evidence was himself a witness for the prosecution against Defendant Jones. We do not see how Ms. Savage’s or her children’s knowledge of Ms. Ferguson could therefor be prejudicial to the Commonwealth’s case.
Even if it were relevant if a prospective juror knew Ferguson, however, we are troubled by the fact that the prosecution struck Ms. Savage but not Mr. Kauffman, the white man who lived in the same area as Ms. Savage and Ms. Ferguson. The only difference between the two that we can see are their respective races and the fact that Ms. Savage has children but that Mr. Kauffman does not. The Commonwealth also stated at side bar that Mr. *330Kauffman does not live as close to Ms. Ferguson but the Defendant stated during oral; argument of the post-trial motions that Mr. Kauffman actually lived closer and the prosecution did not dispute it.
There is no reason which we can see which would indicate that Savage is more likely to know Ferguson than is Kauffman. And as for the children, the Court counsels the jurors not to speak to anyone about the case before its conclusion. We are reticent to find that jurors would disregard this instruction when we have no evidence to suggest that they would. Consequently, we believe that their [sic] is no articulable difference between prospective jurors Savage and Kauffman but race. We, therefore, reverse our former ruling and grant Defendant’s request for a new trial.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 374 Pa.Super. 493, 499-501, 543 A.2d 579, 582 (1988), quoting trial court opinion at pp. 12-13.
It is of great concern to me that the majority takes little note and fails to acknowledge ¡the careful analysis of the trial court in reversing its decision. Nowhere in the majority opinion is there ever mentioned the existence of a white male prospective juror who appears to have the same infirmity, living in proximity to a witness, as did the black female prospective juror. Without reference to this critical factor, it would be easy to embrace the reasoning of the majority writer, for it would appear that the Commonwealth’s explanation, while somewhat out of the ordinary, could overcome a prima facia showing of discrimination. Viewing in context all the facts together with the inferences drawn by the trial and Superior Courts, however, leads one to the unmistakable conclusion that the analysis of the majority is patently one-sided, myopic and in error. Where it is inescapable, as here, that the original determination is based upon cogent reasoning derived from the facts of record, I see no reason for this court to interefere with that decision.
*331Here it is unequivocally evident that the trial court found all the requirements necessary to make out a claim of discrimination under Batson and so stated for the record. I emphatically concur with that reasoned determination and would not disturb it on appeal.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
NIX, C.J., and CAPPY, J., join.