Court Opinion

ID: 9418630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:34:23.336733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.607171
License: Public Domain

Me.'Justice Sutherland,
dissenting.
In respect of the prima facie presumption created by § 9-164 of the Kansas statute, I am unable to agree with the opinion of the Court insofar as that section affects the cases against Harris, Executor of the Will of Kramer, deceased. The evidence shows very clearly that, at the: time the deposits in question were made and for a long time prior thereto, Kramer was physically incapable of investigating and ascertaining the condition of the bank, Or of assenting to the reception of deposits by the bank, because of his serious illness which resulted in his death after undergoing a major surgical operation. It was substantially so found by-the jury in one of the cases and by the trial court in the others. Under these circumstances, *96thé application :of the statutory presumption was obviously injurious. ' Section 9-163 provides that it shall be unlawful for any president, director, etc., to assent .to the reception of deposits, etc., after he shall have had knowledge of the fact that the bank is insolvent. Section 9-164, which creates, the objectionable presumption, provides that “ the fact that such banking institution was so insolvént or in failing circumstances at the time, of the reception of- the deposit charged to have been so received . . .' shall be prima facie evidence of such . ... assent to such deposit . . ..on the part of such officer . . .” Of course,, the state may provide that proof of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of another; but this can. be done consistently with the due process of law clause, of the Fourteenth Amendment only where there is a rational relation between the two facts. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 238; McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U. S. 79, 86. In the latter case this Court said, quoting from Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 43:
“ It is ‘ essential -that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact pre-. sumed, and that thé inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be sq unreasonable.as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.’ ”•
To me it seems dear that there, is no rational relation between the fact of insolvency and the fact here presumed, namely,- assent to the reception of a. particular deposit. Rather, thé rational presumption is the other way, since •the law itself requires that an insolvent bank shall not receive deposits; and' the assent of the director thereto would be ah assent to a violation of law. I do not quarrel with the suggestion that it was within the constitutional power of the state to create ah -absolute liability against a director if, while insolvent, tlié bank of which he is a director receive a deposit. But this the state did not do. *97Instead, it adopted a statute creating a liability only in case the director assents to the deposit; and I should have supposed the liability of the director must be measured by what the state has enacted and not by what it had the power to enact. Under such a statute, without more, it is perfectly plain that' proof by the state of such assent' would be necessary. But'here the state by legislative fiat substituted for such proof on its part the prima facie presumption set forth. It was said that the bank was open and doing business and that it is a reasonable presumption from that fact that assent was given to the receipt of particular deposits. But we are dealing with a specific statutory provision and must take it as we find it; and by that provision the general transaction of business by the bank at the time it received the particular deposits is not made the basis of the statutory presumption. If it were, a different question would be presented. Under these circumstances, as it seems to me, the rule, requiring a rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact to be presumed therefrom, plainly applies; and consequently the .statutory provision in question is void.
Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Sanford concur in this opinion.