Court Opinion

ID: 9402820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-17 06:10:15.516649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.796550
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed June 15, 2023

                                    In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                  __________

                              No. 11-21-00251-CR
                                  __________

                    ZADAN LOGAN HAYES, Appellant
                                       V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 385th District Court
                            Midland County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. CR54942

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
      This case involves the shooting death of a young man over a plastic sandwich
baggie, half full, of marihuana. Appellant was charged by indictment with capital
murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree
murder, a lesser-included offense. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (West
2019). Appellant elected to have a jury assess his punishment following his guilty
plea. The jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at 99 years in the Institutional
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and the trial court sentenced
Appellant consistent with the jury’s verdict. PENAL §§ 12.32(a), 19.02(c).
      Appellant asserts four issues on appeal. First, Appellant contends that the trial
court erred by denying his trial counsel’s request for a jury instruction on sudden
passion. Second, Appellant states that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted video recorded statements made by his codefendant to law enforcement
over his Confrontation Clause objections. Third, Appellant states that the trial court
erred in its assessment of court costs. Lastly, Appellant states that the trial court
erroneously assessed attorney’s fees against him, an indigent individual. Appellant
asks us to reverse and remand the case for a new punishment trial and modify the
bill of costs to delete any erroneous fees. We modify and affirm.
                                    Background
      Around midnight December 27, 2019, John Hayes (no relation to Appellant),
Robert Duncan (the victim), and Carlos Lara drove to an intersection south of
Interstate 20 in Midland County, Texas, to sell marihuana to Appellant and Larry
West. Appellant brought a .40 caliber handgun to the drug deal and West brought a
9mm handgun.
      As John Hayes drove up to the intersection, West, appearing alone,
approached the passenger’s side of the vehicle to speak with Duncan. West asked
Duncan if he could see “the weed” before he purchased it, and Duncan complied.
West then “snatched” the small bag of marihuana from Duncan and started running
away from the vehicle. In response, Duncan exited the vehicle and started running
after West. John Hayes turned off his vehicle to follow Duncan and heard several
gunshots. Frantic, John Hayes immediately restarted his vehicle and drove away
from the scene without Duncan.
      West ran toward a nearby RV park where Appellant was also located. While
running, West heard “a [gunshot] round go by him, like a ‘pew’ sound,” then heard
                                          2
two more gunshots. Appellant had fatally shot Duncan twice with the .40 caliber
handgun—once in the head and once in the chest. Appellant then fled the scene.
       Duncan was found dead in the RV park three days later. From the scene
premises, law enforcement recovered three identical Winchester .40 caliber Smith &
Wesson casings—two near Duncan’s body and one “closer to the entrance”
of the RV park. Law enforcement did not find any other shell casings at the scene.1
       Contrary to other accounts of the incident, Appellant testified at trial that he
and West entered John Hayes’ vehicle as it pulled up to the intersection that night.
Appellant testified that, once inside, Duncan asked, “where’s the money,” and in
response Appellant told the driver to drive up “ahead.” Appellant testified that he
kept $400 under a house in the RV park, and he exited the vehicle to retrieve it.
Appellant testified that, when he started walking back towards the vehicle, West
“comes running [and] tells me to run.” Appellant “heard shots fired” and ran toward
the RVs behind him. On this point, Appellant clarified that he never saw anyone
shooting and never saw anyone with a gun. However, Appellant testified that he had
heard a total of three gunshots, including the two that he fired from his own
.40 caliber handgun. Appellant testified that, while running, “I tripped over a pipe
or something . . . and I fell, things fell out of my pocket,” including “the gun, my
phone, [and] my wallet.” Appellant testified that, “I seen a glimpse of a person, so
I aimed, just scared, and I pulled the trigger . . . . [j]ust started shooting.” Appellant
explained that he “never [saw]” Duncan, rather, that he had “just seen a shadow.”
Appellant confirmed that he shot twice, striking Duncan once in the head and once
in the chest, and that he then fled the scene.

       1
        Law enforcement recovered a magazine with “live” 9mm rounds in it, however, no 9mm casings
were found at the scene or in the surrounding area. West stated that he lost this 9mm magazine “when
running from” Duncan, and Appellant confirmed that he did not see West or anyone else shooting that
night.
                                                 3
                                       Discussion
      I. Issue One: Sudden Passion
      In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to
provide an instruction on sudden passion, a mitigating circumstance that reduces a
first-degree murder offense to a second-degree murder if the issue is raised and
proved by the defendant. PENAL § 19.02(d); McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565,
569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).         Appellant contends that the harm suffered by
Appellant “is apparent in this case based upon the sentence imposed by the jury”
since the maximum prison time would have been twenty years for a second-degree
murder. PENAL §§ 12.33(a); 19.02(d). The State responds that the trial court did not
err in denying Appellant’s request because the “evidence presented at the
punishment hearing did not support an instruction on sudden passion.”
             A. Standard of Review
      The Penal Code defines “sudden passion” as “passion directly caused by and
arising out of provocation by the individual killed . . . [that] arises at the time of the
offense and is not solely the result of former provocation.” PENAL § 19.02(a)(2).
The Penal Code defines “adequate cause” as “cause that would commonly produce
a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper,
sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.” PENAL § 19.02(a)(1).
      The Court of Criminal Appeals directs that, “before a defendant is allowed a
jury instruction on sudden passion, he must prove” the following:
      (1) An adequate provocation by the victim occurred;
      (2) a passion or emotion, such as terror or rage, existed;
      (3) the murder occurred while such a passion still existed;
      (4) the murder occurred “before there was a reasonable opportunity for the
          passion to cool”; and

                                            4
      (5) “a causal connection [existed] between the [victim’s] provocation, the
          [defendant’s] passion, and the homicide.”
McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 569. A sudden passion instruction is warranted in the
punishment phase if “it is raised by the evidence, even if that evidence is weak,
impeached, contradicted, or unbelievable.” Id. (citing Trevino v. State, 100 S.W.3d
232, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “However, the evidence cannot be so weak,
contested, or incredible that it could not support such a finding by a rational jury.”
Id.
      We first determine whether the trial court erred in excluding the requested
instruction, and if no error occurred, our analysis is complete. Deere v. State, 631
S.W.3d 762, 774 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Kirsch v. State, 357
S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). If there was an error, we determine
whether the error was preserved. If the error was preserved, we will reverse if the
trial court’s error resulted in “some harm” to the defendant. Wooten v. State, 400
S.W.3d 601, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). During our analysis, we focus on “the evidence supporting [the
sudden passion] charge, not on the evidence refuting it.” Trevino, 100 S.W.3d at
238–39. If no evidence exists in the record to support an instruction on sudden
passion in the trial court’s charge, the reviewing court should affirm the trial court’s
denial of such an instruction. See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 571.
             B. Analysis
      In order to determine whether the trial court erred, we must determine whether
Appellant was entitled to an instruction on sudden passion. Accordingly, we
examine whether there was evidence that met all of the McKinney factors:
(1) adequate provocation by Duncan; (2) Appellant experienced a passion or
emotion; (3) Appellant murdered Duncan while that passion or emotion still existed;
(4) Appellant murdered Duncan “before there was a reasonable opportunity” for

                                           5
Appellant’s “passion to cool”; and (5) “a causal connection [that existed] between”
Duncan’s provocation, Appellant’s passion, and the murder. See McKinney, 179
S.W.3d at 569; Walker v. State, 557 S.W.3d 678, 688 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018,
pet. ref’d) (“The record must show some evidence of all of the elements of
Section 19.02(d)” to raise sudden passion.). As stated above, we focus on “the
evidence supporting [the] charge, not on the evidence refuting it.” Trevino, 100
S.W.3d at 238–39.
      According to Appellant’s testimony, he wanted to buy some marihuana and
asked West to “find some.” West texted Duncan to facilitate the transaction. West
brought a 9mm handgun and Appellant brought a .40 caliber handgun to the meeting.
Appellant testified that, after he retrieved money for the drug transaction from
underneath a house in the RV park, Appellant saw West running toward him, telling
him to “run.” Appellant testified that he heard a shot and that he ran. After that,
Appellant stated that he ran behind a parked RV. While running, Appellant “tripped
over a pipe or something,” and when he started getting up, he turned and saw “a
shadow.” Although he never actually saw Duncan, Appellant then fired at and struck
Duncan twice. Accordingly, Appellant had heard one shot, ran behind an RV, and,
instead of continuing to disengage himself from the situation, Appellant killed
Duncan by shooting him twice because he was afraid when he saw a shadow.
                    1. No evidence of a high level of fear or terror
      While there is testimony by Appellant of fear, we search his testimony and
find no emotion or descriptive testimony constituting terror, rage, anger, or
resentment. “Evidence of fear alone, or self-defense, is not sufficient to raise sudden
passion.” Walker, 557 S.W.3d at 688; see also Pham v. State, 595 S.W.3d 769, 781
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019), aff’d, 639 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. Crim. App.
2022) (“Viewed in the light most favorable to appellant, his testimony establishes,
at most, that he feared that the complainant would draw his pistol. However, ‘a bare
                                          6
claim of fear’ does not establish ‘sudden passion arising from adequate cause.”
(internal citations omitted)).
      A “high level of terror or fear” is required before a defendant can meet the
second McKinney factor (a passion or emotion such as terror existed). McKinney,
179 S.W.3d at 571; see also Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 606–07 (“a bare claim of” fear
will not necessarily support a claim of sudden passion, but that fear that “rises to the
level of ‘terror’” will suffice (if the cause is adequate) to invoke an instruction on
the issue.” (quoting Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983));
Gonzales, 717 S.W.2d at 357–58 (“appellant’s claim that he was scared of the
deceased was insufficient to raise the [sudden passion] issue”). The only casings
found at the scene were .40 caliber, the same as Appellant’s handgun; and identical
to Appellant’s Winchester .40 caliber Smith & Wesson rounds.
      Appellant’s testimony is without detail or description that might lead to a
possible conclusion that Appellant experienced a high level of fear or terror.
Appellant uses the word “scared” twice and “afraid” once, on a mere two pages of
his trial testimony, but he clearly does not convey terror. Appellant testified as
follows:
           Q. So you’re there. You trip. You fall. You’re getting up, what
      happens?
             A. I seen a glimpse of a person, and I was scared because I heard
      shots, so I shot with my gun.
             Q. How did you do it? You described it to me very visually.
             A. I was on the ground, and I was getting up, and I turned and I
      seen a glimpse of a person, so I aimed, just scared, and I pulled the
      trigger.
             ....
             Q. When you heard the gunshots, were you afraid?
             A. Yes, sir.

                                           7
      On the issue of imminent lethal harm, the only known guns were carried by
Appellant and his accomplice, West. The casings found at the scene were consistent
with having come from the gun of Appellant (a .40 caliber handgun) and the bullets
within the magazine lost and left behind at the scene were consistent with having
come from the gun of West (a 9mm handgun)—who Appellant had no reason to fear.
Appellant testified that he did not know of any others having guns and that he never
saw the sellers of the marihuana with guns. The only guns, bullets, and casings
evidenced in the record were those of Appellant and West. Appellant testified as
follows:
            Q. So you heard one shot prior to you shooting. That’s what
      you’ve told the jury; is that right?
            A. Yes, sir.
            ....
            Q. So you heard one gunshot, and then you took off running, and
      then you turned around and shot at the very first person you saw,
      correct?
            A. I fell.
            Q. You shot at the first person you saw, didn’t you?
            A: Yes.
      Appellant’s bare claim of fear is insufficient to entitle him to an instruction
on sudden passion. See Walker, 557 S.W.3d at 688; Pham, 595 S.W.3d at 781; see
also Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 607.
                   2. No evidence of sufficient provocation by Duncan
      Additionally, there is no evidence that Duncan provoked Appellant. See
McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 571 (“[E]vidence of provocation by the decedent is
required for a sudden-passion charge.”). It is undisputed that Duncan, without a
firearm, ran after West after West stole marihuana from him. While doing so,

                                         8
Duncan ran to the same RV park where Appellant was located. Within the RV park,
Appellant was the one who had a loaded .40 caliber handgun on his person, and
Appellant testified that he did not see anyone else shooting. Cf. Moncivais v. State,
425 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (jury’s
finding of no sudden passion supported by evidence that defendant’s weapon was
the only one seen or displayed during altercation); see also McKinney, 179 S.W.3d
at 569 (“the evidence cannot be so weak, contested, or incredible that it could not
support such a finding by a rational jury”). The medical examiner’s autopsy report
confirmed that Duncan was shot at a “distant range.” Therefore, Duncan was not
close to or otherwise physically threatening Appellant at the time of the murder.
Even taking as true Appellant’s testimony that he was afraid, Duncan did not act in
a manner that “would commonly produce a degree of . . . terror in a person of
ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.” PENAL
§ 19.02(a); McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570. Duncan did not, verbally or otherwise,
threaten or provoke Appellant when he ran into the RV park after West.
Accordingly, Appellant did not submit any evidence to the trial court to meet this
McKinney factor. See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570–71. Proving this factor was
essential for Appellant to be entitled to an instruction on sudden passion. Id. at 571.
                    3. Appellant anticipated use of his handgun
      The fact that Appellant brought a .40 caliber handgun that night “for
protection” weighs against a finding that the trial court erred in excluding the
instruction. See McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570. Specifically, Appellant bringing a
firearm to the drug transaction indicates that Appellant “prepar[ed] himself to
respond to the altercation he was anticipating.” Id.; see also Gonzales v. State, 717
S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“There is nothing in the record which
indicates that appellant acted under the immediate influence of sudden passion. To
the contrary, appellant anticipated the event and prepared himself to respond to the
                                          9
occasion.”) (quoting Gonzales v. State, 679 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1984) (Cantu, J., dissenting), rev’d, 717 S.W.2d at 358); Walker, 557 S.W.3d at 689
(defendant getting a loaded gun in anticipation of event weighed against a finding of
sudden passion); cf. Moncivais, 425 S.W.3d at 408 ([T]he “[a]nticipation of and
preparation for the fight constitutes some evidence that [the defendant] had time to
deliberate regarding his actions.”).      Such evidence indicates that Appellant
anticipated an altercation and deliberately prepared himself for the altercation, rather
than Appellant’s mind being rendered “incapable of cool reflection.”            PENAL
§ 19.02(a)(1); McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 570.
                    4. A jury argument encompassing sudden passion was made
      Finally, we note that trial counsel argued sudden passion as “our explanation
of self-defense.” Even though the trial court denied trial counsel’s request for an
instruction thereon, trial counsel implied sudden passion during his closing
statements. In appealing to the jury for a twenty-year sentence, trial counsel argued:

             I would submit to you, based on everything you heard -- and you
      get to take into account our issue, our explanation of self-defense,
      imperfect as it is, you get to consider that. You get to consider
      [Duncan], his friends, and what did they do. Now, I’m not here to say
      it was all [Duncan’s] fault, but I think he had fault in it.
      The trial court did not err when it denied trial counsel’s request for a sudden
passion instruction. The jury heard all of the evidence that Appellant claims would
have supported the instruction, which if heeded, could have reduced the maximum
sentence to twenty years. Yet, when the jury was permitted to assess a punishment
of as few as five years on the charge before them, significantly, they did not merely
assess twenty years as they could have even without the instruction. Instead, the jury
assessed Appellant’s punishment at ninety-nine years. While this fact does not enter
into our analysis of whether Appellant was entitled to a sudden passion instruction,
the jury’s punishment verdict is some evidence that the jury did not accept
                                          10
Appellant’s “explanation of self-defense” or the casting of those events as adequate
cause, meriting a lesser punishment.
      Considering the foregoing, we conclude that there is no evidence in the record
to support an instruction on sudden passion in the trial court’s charge.           See
McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 571. Without evidence that “sudden passion” existed and
without evidence of an “adequate cause,” as defined by the Penal Code, Appellant
cannot show that he was entitled to such an instruction. PENAL § 19.02(a), (d);
McKinney, 179 S.W.3d at 569, 571; see also Walker, 557 S.W.3d at 688.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it denied trial counsel’s
request for a sudden passion instruction. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
      II. Issue Two: The Admission of the Codefendant’s Testimonial Statement
      In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
when it admitted, over Appellant’s Confrontation Clause objections, excerpts of a
recorded statement made by Appellant’s codefendant during a police interrogation.
The State concedes error on this issue but asserts that the error was harmless. After
careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did commit error, but
we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 44.2(a).
             A. Standard of Review
      The Sixth Amendment provides an accused with the right “to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In this regard, when a
witness makes an out-of-court “testimonial” statement against the accused, such a
statement is inadmissible unless (1) the declarant is unavailable, and (2) the accused
has had a prior opportunity to cross examine the declarant. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); De La Paz v. State, 273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a constitutional issue.

                                          11
See Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Confrontation
Clause issue); Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (same).
      A finding of Confrontation Clause error requires the reviewing court to
undertake a constitutional harm analysis. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); Langham, 305
S.W.3d at 582. During this analysis we consider the Scott factors—a non-exclusive
list of relevant considerations: such as (1) the importance of the statement to the
State’s case, (2) whether the statement was cumulative of other evidence admitted
by the trial court, (3) “the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the out-of-court statement on material points,” and (4) the strength of
the State’s case. See Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 (quoting Scott v. State, 227
S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)). We
may also consider the nature of the error, whether the State emphasized the error,
and “how weighty the jury may have found the erroneously admitted evidence to be
compared to the balance of the evidence with respect to the element or defensive
issue to which it is relevant.” Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690. Following our review, we
must be “satisfied, to a level of confidence beyond a reasonable doubt” that the error
did not contribute to Appellant’s punishment. Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 (quoting
Scott, 227 S.W. 3d at 691); see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); see also Clay v. State, 240
S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
             B. Analysis
                   1. The trial court’s admission of West’s recorded statements
                   (State’s Exhibit No. 55)
      At trial, the State offered excerpts of a videotaped statement made by
Appellant’s codefendant, Larry West, to law enforcement as a statement against
interest. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(24). Trial counsel for Appellant objected based on
Crawford, stating that he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine West

                                         12
regarding the statement. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The State responded that
the statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the statements in the
exhibit were restricted to West’s own actions. As to West’s unavailability to testify,
the State indicated that “[West] obviously has a Fifth Amendment right, and he is
currently charged with capital murder and is pending trial on that charge, and so
there is no way to compel [West] to come and testify.” See TEX. R. EVID. 804(a).
The trial court overruled trial counsel’s objections and admitted the recorded
statement as State’s Exhibit No. 55.
       The exhibit is one minute and eleven seconds in duration and depicts West
admitting that he himself planned to “snatch” the marihuana and run during the drug
transaction. In the statement, West describes his own actions as he made contact
with Duncan on the passenger’s side of the vehicle on the night of the incident.
Specifically, West states that he only had $10, so he planned to “snatch [the
marihuana] and run, which I did actually” 2 West states that when he made contact
with Duncan on the passenger’s side of the vehicle, he asked Duncan if he could see
and smell the marihuana to “see if it’s like real or whatever.” West stated: “I smelled
it, and I was like, oh yeah, that’s grass. Then [Duncan] put it down and he looked
down, and I just snatched it, and I ran.” West then stated: “I knew I had no money
and I knew he [ostensibly Appellant] had no money, so like, I just was like, just take
it and run.” The statement then ends with West admitting: “I set somebody up [and]
took his weed . . . .”
       On appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court’s admission of State’s Exhibit
No. 55 violated the Confrontation Clause because West’s statements within the
exhibit were testimonial, the State did not prove that West was unavailable to testify,
and trial counsel did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine West. Appellant

       2
        Investigator Wilson clarified that, when West said “it,” he was referring to marihuana.
                                                   13
does not brief whether the trial court’s error harmed Appellant. The State concedes
error but asserts that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
                   2. The admission of State’s Exhibit No. 55 did violate
                   Appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause
      We conclude that the trial court erred when it admitted State’s Exhibit No. 55
into evidence over trial counsel’s Confrontation Clause objections.           West’s
statements were made during a police interrogation and related to his actions on the
night of the murder. Accordingly, West’s statements were testimonial in nature. See
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4 (a “recorded statement, knowingly given in response
to structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition” of
“testimonial”); Del Carmen Hernandez v. State, 273 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008) (A codefendant’s custodial interrogation is testimonial for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment and Crawford). In addition, even if West was unavailable to
testify for purposes of Rule 804(a)(1), trial counsel did not have a prior opportunity
to cross-examine West regarding his statements. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. As
a result, the trial court’s admission of State’s Exhibit No. 55 violated Appellant’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause. See id.
                   3. The trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable
                   doubt
      We next consider whether the trial court’s constitutional error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the Scott factors: the importance of the
statement to the State’s case, whether the statement was cumulative of other
evidence, whether the statement’s material points are corroborated or contradicted,
and the strength of the State’s case. See Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582. Here, we
also consider the nature of the error, whether the State emphasized the error, and
“how weighty the jury may have found the erroneously admitted evidence to be

                                         14
compared to the balance of the evidence with respect to the element or defensive
issue to which it is relevant.” See id.
                           a. West’s statements and the relevant evidence admitted
                           at trial
      West’s statements in State’s Exhibit No. 55 pertain to West making contact
with Duncan and stealing the marihuana from him on the night of the murder.
West’s statements are corroborated in significant detail by the testimony of the
driver, John Hayes. John Hayes testified that he and Duncan were “going to sell
weed” that night to a “guy” he had seen at school that matched West’s description.
John Hayes testified that a lone person approached Duncan at the passenger’s side
door and asked Duncan if he could see the marihuana. John Hayes testified that “the
one guy [he] had seen walked up and he wanted to see the stuff. Well, Robbie
showed him, and then he reached in and grabbed it and ran off.” John Hayes testified
that, prior to West snatching the marihuana, the bag was “in [Duncan’s] lap in his
hand.” Appellant corroborated John Hayes’s testimony that a drug transaction was
to occur and that he saw West running.
      The recorded statements also convey that the plan to snatch the marihuana and
run was concocted by West. On this point, West’s statements restrict to himself the
decision making and actions taken confessing: “I was going to snatch it and run,
which I did actually,” and “I set somebody up.” West further stated: “I knew I had
no money, and I knew he had no money, so like, I just was like, just take it and run.”
West did not make any statements regarding Appellant’s actions or indicate that
Appellant had any preview of West’s plan to grab and run rather than pay for the
goods. The admission of the statement into evidence actually provided support to
Appellant’s argument that he had stumbled into the drug deal gone bad.             In
Appellant’s police interview, Appellant stated that West’s intentions were to rob
Duncan, however, Appellant states that, at the time, “I thought we were just getting

                                          15
some weed, so I was going to-fixin’ to buy some”—denying knowledge that West
was going to rob Duncan that night. On cross-examination, Appellant denied
“enter[ing] [into] an agreement” with West “to rob Robert or his friends from the
marijuana.”    Appellant’s trial counsel conducted a voir dire examination of
Investigator Wilson regarding whether she knew who West was referring to when
he stated: “I knew he had no money.” Investigator Wilson stated multiple times that
she did not have personal knowledge regarding which person West was referring to
in that particular statement. Appellant’s trial counsel then asked Investigator Wilson
to speculate as to who West was referring to, and she stated that she “would assume
it was” Appellant. Within the presence of the jury, however, apparently neither party
thought it necessary to question Investigator Wilson regarding who she believed
West was referring to when he said: “I knew he had no money.”
                          b. The Scott factors
      After thorough review, we conclude that the Scott factors weigh against a
finding of harm. See Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 (quoting Scott, 227 S.W.3d at
690–91). Accordingly, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial
court’s constitutional error did not contribute to Appellant’s punishment. See Clay,
240 S.W.3d at 904.
                                 i. In light of Appellant’s guilty plea, the impact at
                                 trial of West’s statements was diminished

      First, we conclude that West’s statements on State’s Exhibit No. 55 were not
particularly important to the State’s case. They did not include testimony of the
shooting by Appellant or use of firearms by West or others. On this issue, it is
significant that Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense. Appellant admitted in front
of the jury that he intentionally killed Duncan, and the elements of murder were met.
The State additionally presented the testimony of ten witnesses and admitted sixty-
nine exhibits into evidence during the three-day trial. State’s Exhibit No. 55 was

                                         16
slightly over one minute in duration. The majority of West’s statements in State’s
Exhibit No. 55 were about his own snatching of the marihuana from Duncan, which
was undisputed therefore not a central issue in the State’s punishment case.
      We turn to whether West’s statement that he “knew he had no money” was
important to the State’s case. As discussed above, Investigator Wilson was never
asked, within the presence of the jury, to clarify who “he” referred to in this
particular statement. As a result, the jury did not have any evidence that West was
referring to Appellant. Even if the jury speculated that West was referring to
Appellant, then, at most, the statement went to West’s thoughts prior to the snatching
and to West’s intent, not to whether Appellant actually had money to pay for the
marihuana that night. Under the circumstances, it is a minor issue. The vague,
ambiguous statement had minimal probative value as presented. We conclude that
West’s statements in State’s Exhibit No. 55 were not particularly important to the
State’s punishment case, and in fact were, on balance, favorable to Appellant.
                                 ii. Cumulative of other evidence admitted
      Next, we conclude that West’s statements were cumulative of other evidence
at the punishment trial.    As discussed above, the matters asserted in West’s
statements on State’s Exhibit No. 55 were cumulative of evidence from John
Hayes’s testimony, Appellant’s testimony, and Appellant’s statement to law
enforcement. Specifically, this cumulative evidence showed that (1) West intended
to steal the marihuana from Duncan, (2) West made contact with Duncan, (3) West
stole the marihuana from Duncan, and (4) West ran after stealing the marihuana.
The material points at issue in West’s statements were cumulative of this other
evidence. See Davis, 203 S.W.3d at 853–56.
      Similarly, we conclude that the material points in the statement were
corroborated by other evidence, as the matters asserted within the statements were
largely undisputed at the punishment trial. See Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582. In
                                         17
addition, as discussed above, we note that the statement that West “knew he had no
money”—if indeed referring to Appellant—was neither corroborated nor
contradicted by other evidence. There is no evidence, in State’s Exhibit No. 55 or
otherwise, that contradicts Appellant’s statement that he actually had money to pay
for the marihuana that night. 3 Likewise, there is no evidence, in State’s Exhibit
No. 55 or otherwise, that Appellant himself knew on the night of the incident that
West intended to steal the marihuana. We conclude that the material points in the
statement were corroborated by other evidence. We also conclude that the “material
point” in the statement that West “knew he had no money” was neither corroborated
nor contradicted by other evidence. Accordingly, this factor, on balance, weighs
against a finding that the error contributed to Appellant’s punishment.
                                          iii. A strong punishment case presented by the
                                          State; harm minimized
        The State’s punishment case against Appellant was strong. See id. We will
describe the State’s case at length not to state that the “jury verdict was supported
by the evidence,” but in an effort to fully consider “the likelihood that the
constitutional error was actually a contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations in
arriving” at their punishment verdict. See Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690 (“[T]he question
for the reviewing court is not whether the jury verdict was supported by the evidence.
Instead, the question is the likelihood that the constitutional error was actually a
contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations in arriving at that verdict.”).
        The State presented numerous witnesses and exhibits for the jury to assess the
appropriate punishment for Appellant. The State presented evidence that Appellant
brought a loaded .40 caliber handgun to the meeting place of a drug transaction. The
evidence showed that Appellant was thus prepared to fire and injure or kill another

        3
         Deputy Strahan testified that he did not remember if Appellant had “any cash on him” when he
was arrested several days later, because he did not transport Appellant. This fact does not pertain to whether
Appellant had money on the night of the murder.
                                                     18
person during the drug deal. The evidence showed that Appellant did not attempt to
assist Duncan after shooting him, neither checking if Duncan had been shot nor
calling for emergency assistance. The State presented evidence that Appellant fled
the scene and did not tell law enforcement about Duncan until after Appellant’s
arrest and after law enforcement found the murder weapon half-buried in a friend’s
backyard.
      The State additionally presented evidence of Appellant’s demeanor and
public-facing persona a month prior to the murder, and testimony regarding John
Hayes’s fear of Appellant. The State introduced, and the trial court admitted,
photographic evidence from Appellant’s Instagram page depicting Appellant
pointing two firearms, one appearing to have an extended magazine, toward the
camera with a stern expression on his face. Underneath the photograph, a large
amount of money is seen on Appellant’s previous social media post. In addition,
John Hayes testified that he was anxious about testifying because he “kn[e]w
[Appellant] could have his family come after [him] or [his] family because of this
and that worrie[d] [him].”
      The State presented evidence of Appellant’s prior dealings with the criminal
justice system. The State presented, and the trial court admitted, evidence that
Appellant (1) while a juvenile, received deferred adjudication probation for theft of
a firearm in 2017, violated such probation, and received an extension of his
delinquent probation until his eighteenth birthday, (2) was convicted of possession
of marijuana in 2020, and (3) at the time of the murder was on deferred adjudication
for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
       The State’s case also included emotional and impactful evidence from
Duncan’s mother, sister, and grandfather regarding the tragic loss of Duncan, their
son, brother, and grandson. The State presented evidence of Duncan’s short but

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joyous life and the impact that his absence has had on his family and the community.
We conclude that the State’s punishment case was strong.
                                 iv. The three permissive factors weigh against
                                 harm
      Next, we consider the three permissive factors put forth by Scott. See
Langham, 305 S.W.3d at 582 (the reviewing court may consider the source and
nature of the error, whether the State emphasized the error, and how weighty the jury
would find the evidence on balance). First, the source and nature of the evidence
was a brief, one-minute redacted video of West’s statements regarding his own
actions. Second, the State did not mention West’s statements in State’s Exhibit
No. 55 or repeat his rendition of the events, nor did the State reiterate West’s plan to
steal from Duncan or West’s actions that night. Instead, in closing arguments, the
State emphasized Appellant’s actions on the night of the murder. The State asserted
that Appellant “didn’t premeditate the death of Robert Duncan. But what he did do
was bring this gun out to that weed deal.” The State further emphasized that
Appellant “went in there to buy weed, [and] he had that gun.” Third, in light of all
the discussed factors herein, the jury likely did not find the one-minute erroneously
admitted and cumulative statement “weighty” as “compared to the balance” of the
other evidence presented at Appellant’s punishment trial. We conclude that the three
permissive factors also weigh against a finding that the trial court’s error contributed
to Appellant’s punishment. See id.
                           c. Beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court’s error did
                           not contribute to Appellant’s punishment
      After carefully reviewing the foregoing considerations, we conclude there is
little to no “likelihood that the [trial court’s] constitutional error was actually a
contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations in arriving” at their verdict. Id. As a
result, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error in
admitting State’s Exhibit No. 55 did not contribute to Appellant’s punishment. See
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Scott, 227 S.W.3d at 690–91; Clay, 240 S.W.3d at 905–06 (“The erroneously
admitted evidence established little, if anything, negative about appellant that was
not also well established by the properly admitted evidence.”). We therefore
overrule Appellant’s second issue.
      III. Issues Three and Four: Assessing Court Costs and Court-Appointed
      Attorney’s Fees
      In his third and fourth issues, Appellant states that the trial court erred in its
assessment of court costs and court-appointed attorney’s fees against Appellant. The
State concedes both points. We conclude that the trial court erred in its assessment
of court-appointed attorney’s fees, however we hold that the assessment of court
costs was proper. We therefore modify the trial court’s judgment and the district
clerk’s third amended bill of costs to remove the court-appointed attorney’s fees.
             A. Applicable Law
      We review an assessment of court costs to determine if there is a basis for the
cost, not to determine if there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to prove each
cost. Smith v. State, 631 S.W.3d 484, 500–01 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.)
(citing Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). “An
appellant may generally challenge the imposition of even mandatory court costs for
the first time on direct appeal when those costs are not imposed in open court and
the judgment does not contain an itemization of the imposed court costs.” London v.
State, 490 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at
390–91).
      An indigent defendant cannot be taxed the cost of his court-appointed attorney
unless the trial court finds that the defendant has the financial resources to repay
those costs in whole or in part. Id. at 501 (citing Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552,
556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g) (West
Supp. 2022). A defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay are explicit

                                          21
elements that the trial court must consider in its determination of whether to order
the reimbursement of such costs and fees. Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 251 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013). A defendant who has been determined by the trial court to be
indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings in the
case unless a material change in the defendant’s financial resources is found to have
occurred. CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04(p); Cates, 402 S.W.3d at 251.
             B. Analysis
      Here, the trial court assessed Appellant’s state court costs at $185. These
amounts for “[c]ourt costs apply to convictions on or after January 1, 2020, no matter
the offense date.”     See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 51.608; District Clerk’s Felony
Conviction Court Cost Chart, https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1445512/district-
clerks-felony-conviction-court-cost-chart.pdf; see also TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 133.102 (West 2021). Appellant was convicted by the jury on October 27, 2021.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its assessment of Appellant’s court costs.
      However, the trial court did commit error when it assessed court-appointed
attorney’s fees against Appellant, an indigent individual. The trial court found
Appellant indigent during the proceedings and Appellant remained indigent at the
time of this appeal. Initially, the trial court appointed trial counsel to represent
Appellant throughout the proceedings because it determined that Appellant was
indigent. In the judgment, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay “all costs in this
proceeding incurred[,]” but it waived the court costs and any applicable fines
because it found that Appellant “does not have the sufficient resources or income”
to pay such costs. Moreover, the trial court ordered the district clerk to prepare the
clerk’s record for this appeal without cost to Appellant because the trial court had
previously found him to be indigent. On November 15, 2021, the district clerk
certified that Appellant could not afford the cost of a transcript of the clerk’s record
and confirmed that it would be provided at no cost to him. On April 11, 2022,
                                          22
however, the district clerk assessed attorney’s fees at $21,660.97 against Appellant
its third amended bill of costs.
      We hold that the court-appointed attorney’s fees were improperly assessed
against Appellant because there is nothing in the record to indicate that Appellant is
no longer indigent—in fact, the trial court found, and the district clerk confirmed,
that Appellant remained indigent while preparing this appeal. See Cates, 402
S.W.3d at 252; Smith, 631 S.W.3d at 501. Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s
judgment to clarify that “all costs” does not include court-appointed attorney’s fees,
and the district clerk’s third amended bill of costs to delete the court-appointed
attorney’s fees assessed against Appellant.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                JUSTICE

June 15, 2023
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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