Court Opinion

ID: 9738505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:55:00.806556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:06.547929
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I Write separately to clarify two issues: (1) what circumstances trigger a suspect's waiver of federal constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and (2) under what circumstances does a juvenile suspect have a statutory right to counsel.
In State v. Walkowiak, 183 Wis. 2d 478, 515 N.W.2d 863 (1994), the court ruled that when a suspect subject to custodial interrogation makes an ambiguous request for a lawyer the law enforcement officers must stop their questioning and clarify whether the suspect is requesting counsel under the Fifth Amendment. One !month later, the United States Supreme Court, faced with the same issue of deciding the obligations of law enforcement officers when a suspect ambiguously requests counsel, decided the issue differently. In Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994), the Court determined that a suspect's federal constitu*111tional right to counsel is triggered only by "an unambiguous request for a lawyer." The Supremacy Clause dictates that the Davis interpretation of the federal constitution is binding on all courts of this state. Thus, although the majority neglects to acknowledge it, Walkowiak has been superseded by Davis.1
The effect under the Wisconsin constitution of a suspect's ambiguous request for counsel has not been determined by this court. The state constitutional issue was not raised or addressed in Walkowiak and is not raised or addressed in the present case.
While the majority addresses the issue of whether Jones made an ambiguous request for an attorney, this issue is of no significance under Davis, and the majority's discussion blurs the real question before the court. The majority should focus on whether Jones made an unambiguous request for an attorney. Adhering to Davis, I conclude that by no stretch of the English language or the circumstances of this case can it be said that Jones unambiguously requested an attorney. I therefore conclude that Jones' federal constitutional right to counsel was not violated.
Nonetheless, the court must look further to determine whether Jones, a juvenile, had a right to counsel under the Wisconsin statutes. Section 48.23(l)(a), Stats. 1991-92, requires that counsel be provided for juveniles in certain proceedings.2
*112The following are the relevant facts needed to determine Jones' statutory right to counsel. A juvenile intake worker at the jail notified the public defender's office at about 10:50 a.m. that Jones would be subject to a juvenile detention hearing scheduled for 1:00 p.m. that day.3
An attorney appointed by the state public defender's office to represent Jones telephoned the jail to instruct that Jones not be interviewed. The police captain, aware of the attorney's request, nevertheless questioned Jones. During the interview, both Jones' counsel appointed by the public defender's office and a staff attorney from the public defender's office arrived at the jail to speak with Jones. The police captain, informed of the attorneys' presence, did not tell Jones that two attorneys appointed by the state to represent him were waiting to assist him.4 Instead, the captain resumed his questioning of Jones until he elicited a confession at about 12:07 p.m.5 Directly after Jones *113signed the confession that the captain drafted, the captain asked Jones if he would like to see an attorney. Jones indicated that he would and the captain allowed him to confer with counsel moments later.
The Wisconsin legislature has determined that juveniles taken into custody shall be released as soon as possible. Section 48.20(1). The legislature has also resolved that juveniles facing detention hearings shall be represented by counsel. Sections 48.21, 48.23(1)(a), Stats. 1991 — 92; State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 736, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984) overruled sub nom., Woods v. Clusen, 794 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1986); majority opinion at 104-105. The numerous subsections of sec. 48.23 requiring counsel and limiting waiver thereof evidence the legislature's intent that juveniles be represented. The rule of State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701,345 N.W.2d 457 (1984), that sec. 48.23 does not grant a juvenile the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, does not govern this case. Woods did not involve attempts by the juvenile's attorney to contact him during the custodial interrogation.
The majority also relies on State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 401 N.W.2d 771 (1987), to ignore counsels' request to cease the interrogation and to consult with Jones. In Hanson, the court determined that police officers are not obligated to inform an adult suspect when an attorney is present to lend assistance. Hanson, in turn, echoes the rule established in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). Although the Moran Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not *114require police officers to inform an adult suspect of an attorney's attempted contacts, the Court invited states to adopt different standards for police conduct as a matter of state law. A number of states have opted to do so.6 Despite Wisconsin's failure to alter the Moran rule, nothing in Woods, Hanson, or Moran authorizes police to ignore an attorney's request to confer with a juvenile suspect who is subject to a detention hearing.
I conclude that in keeping with the statute granting a juvenile the right to counsel during a detention hearing, this court should require law enforcement officers to inform a juvenile in custody when an attor*114aney is immediately available to consult with the juvenile before the detention hearing. See Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 219 (Abrahamson, J. dissenting) (adult suspect).
While I am aware of and give considerable weight to the needs of law enforcement officers, criminal investigations and public safety, I conclude that this court demeans the juvenile's statutory right to counsel by giving its seal of approval to conduct that prevents a juvenile suspect from conferring with counsel before a detention hearing, when counsel is at the jail requesting to see the suspect.
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice NATHAN S. Heffernan joins in this opinion.
The following memorandum was filed June 29, 1995.
PER CURIAM
(on motion for reconsideration). On motion for reconsideration our attention has been called to an erroneous statement of law in the decision and for that reason the references to the State's burden of proof on the issue of waiver of Miranda rights as "beyond a reasonable doubt" is stricken. In lieu thereof the burden of proof approved by the United States Supreme Court in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986), "by a preponderance of the evidence" is substituted. See also State v. Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 959, 966-67, 512 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 362-64, 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Esser, 166 Wis. 2d 897, 904-06, 480 N.W.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1992).
*114bIir^iddition, the following is stricken from page 21 of the slip opinion:
While a juvenile's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel would be violated if he were forced to proceed with a sec. 48.21 hearing without having adequate time to consult with his attorney, this does not mean tiiat police must cease their investigation immediaMy when the attorney arrives.
In lieu thereof the following is inserted:
While a juvenile's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel would be violated if a juvenile petition had been filed prior to the sec. 48.21 hearing and he were forced to proceed with the hearing without having adequate tiihe to consult with his attorney, this does not mean that police must cease their investigation immediately when the attorney arrives.
Finally a factual error appears at page 12 of the slip opinion. Jones and the juvenile intake worker were discussing Jones' statutory right pursuant to sec. 48.23(1), Stats., to have an attorney at his detention hearing, not his Sixth Amendment rights. v
The motion for reconsideration is denied without costs.
In addition, the following is stricken from page 21 of the slip opinion:
While a juvenile's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel would be violated if he were forced to proceed with a sec. 48.21 hearing without having adequate time to consult with his attorney, this does not mean that police must cëas&thëfrinvesti.. gation immediately when the attorney arrives.
In lieu thereof the following is inserted:
`Wbile a juvenile's sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel would be violated if a juvenile petition had been filed prior to the sec. 48.21 hearing and he were forced to proceed with the hearing without having adequate time to consult with his attorney, this does not mean that police must cease their interrogation immediately when the attorney arrives.
Finally a factual error appears at page 12 of the slip opinion. Jones and the juvenik intake worker were discussing Jones' statutory right pursuant to sec. 48.23(1), Stats., to have an attorney at his detention hearing, not his Sixth. Amendment rights.
The motion for reconsideration is denied without costs.

 State v. Long, 190 Wis. 2d 387, 526 N.W.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1994) (relying on Davis).

 Section 48.13(l)(a), Stats. 1993-94, provides:
"Right to counsel. (1) Right of children to legal representation. Children subject to proceedings under this chapter shall be afforded legal representation as follows:
(a) Any child alleged to be delinquent under s. 48.12 or held in a secure detention facility shall be represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings, but a child 15 years of age or older may *112waive counsel if the court is satisfied that the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made and the court accepts the waiver. If the waiver is accepted, the court may not transfer legal custody of the child to the department for placement in a secured correctional facility or transfer jurisdiction over the child to adult court."

At about 11:00 a.m., the district attorney spoke with the juvenile intake worker and indicated that he would need to postpone the detention hearing. The district attorney asked the intake worker to delay advising the public defender's office of the schedule change until 12:55 p.m.

 Nor was the juvenile intake worker, who attempted to reach Jones at about this time, able to see Jones.

 When the captain was informed that an attorney instructed jail personnel not to interview Jones, he telephoned a district attorney. (20:48, 22:107) The district attorney apparently informed the captain that he was under no obligation to heed the attorney's request because Jones had not specifically *113requested counsel nor had the court appointed counsel. The captain testified that he failed to determine if the attorney who had made the request was acting as Jones' counsel and he later refused to inform Jones of the attorneys' presence because of his conversation with the district attorney. (22:107)

 Several states have determined that a suspect should be informed of an attorney's attempted communications with the suspect and that the failure to do so is considered in determining whether the suspect made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987) (concluding that a suspect's state constitutional right to due process was violated when police refused to permit an attorney hired by the suspect's sister to confer with the suspect) cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991); State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446 (Conn. 1988); Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170 (Del. 1990); People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923 (Ill. 1994), reh'g denied; West v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1994);People v. Wright, 490 N.W.2d 351 (Mich. 1992);State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630 (N.J. 1993); Roeder v. State, 768 S.W.2d 745 (Ct. App. Tex. 1988).
Jurisdictions adhering to Burbine include Aultman v. State, 621 So. 2d 353 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 407 (1993); Mitchell v. State, 816 S.W.2d 566 (Ark. 1991); People v. Page, 1995 WL 82952 (Ct. App. Colo. 1995) (not yet released for publication in the permanent law reports); Harvey v. State, 529 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 1988) (distinguishing Haliburton on the grounds that the lawyer who was refused access to the suspect was not specifically summoned) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040 (1989); State v. Earls, 805 P.2d 211 (Wash. 1991).