Court Opinion

ID: 9565393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:20:03.445349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:36.399110
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the court. I also agree with the court’s conclusion that the taking of a breath sample should be treated as a fourth amendment search. However, I am not convinced that the narrow reading given by the court to Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1983), is appropriate. I am not certain that the court’s interpretation of Elson accurately reflects the intent of the supreme court in that case. Nor do I believe that a narrow reading of Elson is necessary to a correct disposition of Burnett’s claim on appeal. I think that a proper reconciliation of our holding in Svedlund v. Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378 (Alaska App.1983), with the supreme court’s holding in Elson depends more upon the validity of the implied consent doctrine than it does upon a restrictive reading of Elson.
In Elson, the supreme court’s primary concern was with the typical situation encountered in search and seizure cases, where an individual’s consent will independently validate a warrantless search. It was in this context that the supreme court emphasized the dilemma created by a rule permitting comment on an individual’s refusal to consent to a lawful search:
[T]he legality of a search is often determined long after the fact, and thus a person who is asked to consent to a search would not know whether he is protecting or prejudicing himself by choosing not to consent. If the person consents, the fruits of the search would *1371be admissible regardless of whether the police had a right to search without consent.
Elson, 659 P.2d at 1198-99 (footnote omitted). By precluding comment on the exercise of the right to withhold consent to a search, the court in Elson sought to assure that individuals could preserve their right to challenge the validity of warrantless searches, without fear of suffering prejudice.
By contrast, when an individual is asked to submit to a breathalyzer examination, a different situation arises; consent to take a breathalyzer cannot realistically be equated with other cases in which consent to a warrantless search is given. The obligation to submit to a breathalyzer examination arises only after an arrest, based on probable cause, for driving while intoxicated. In such cases, police officers must inform arrestees that they are required by law to submit to a breathalyzer examination. Because the implied consent warning states that submission to a breathalyzer test is required by law, a person who “consents” to take the test does not forfeit the right to challenge the admissibility of his test results; where probable cause for arrest does not exist, suppression of the test results will be required. Conversely, in the event of a refusal, lack of probable cause for arrest would be a complete defense to a criminal charge for refusing to submit to the test.
These differences between implied consent eases and other types of cases involving consent to warrantless searches reflect the need to consider carefully the function performed by the implied consent law.
The purpose of implied consent is not, as Burnett contends, to compel a waiver of fourth amendment rights or to penalize the refusal to give such a waiver. Because the implied consent statute requires a lawful arrest for driving while intoxicated before a person can be requested to submit a sample of his breath, the warrantless seizure of a person’s breath will be justified as a search incident to arrest in every case where police properly request a breathalyzer test. Where a police request for a breath sample is improper because probable cause to arrest does not exist, consent to take the test would not constitute a waiver of fourth amendment rights, since evidence of the test results would be subject to subsequent challenge and suppression. Thus, the implied consent statute simply does not compel individuals to waive their fourth amendment rights. Rather, the statute requires persons who have been arrested for driving while intoxicated to cooperate in providing police with information that they are legally entitled to obtain. In each case, the authority to obtain the information sought derives not from the implied consent law, but from the probable cause that justified the arrest for driving while intoxicated.
Even if the Elson court intended to hold that comment on the exercise of fourth amendment rights was constitutionally prohibited, that holding would be inapposite here, because a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test is not an exercise of fourth amendment rights. Nor do I think that imposition of penalties for a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer tends to chill the legitimate exercise of fourth amendment rights. As previously indicated, persons arrested for driving while intoxicated must be given express notice that they are required to submit to a breathalyzer test. If a person does not believe that a warrant-less seizure of his breath is justified, he does not forfeit the right to assert this claim by submitting to a breathalyzer test. And if a person correctly believes that probable cause for his arrest was lacking, he cannot be subjected to penalties for his refusal to take the breathalyzer test.
Accordingly, I do not think that the pivotal issue in this case is whether the exercise of fourth amendment rights may properly be penalized. Instead, the issue is whether criminal sanctions may constitutionally be imposed for violation of a law *1372that requires citizens to cooperate with law enforcement officers who seek evidence that they have a right to obtain. The validity of criminal sanctions under these circumstances, I believe, depends largely upon the validity of the substantive provisions of the implied consent law. Because of the high level of public interest in assuring traffic safety, our implied consent statute has withstood constitutional challenge, as have similar statutes in numerous other jurisdictions. If the implied consent law is to be taken seriously then I see no more reason to prohibit imposition of criminal penalties for violation of that law than for violation of any other valid law.