Court Opinion

ID: 9903701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:00:28.089636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:36.859120
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                     NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                     FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                     DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

RUSSEL VESSELS, JR AND COAST
TO COAST TERRAZZO, LLC,

             Appellants,

v.                                           Case No.    5D22-879
                                             LT Case No. 2021-CA-048410

DR. TERRAZZO OF FLORIDA,
LLC D/B/A DR. TERRAZZO,

             Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed December 22, 2022

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit
Court for Brevard County,
David Dugan, Judge.

Adrienne E. Trent, of Adrienne E.
Trent, P.A., Rockledge, for Appellant.

Joe M. Mitchell, III, of Mitchell Law
Firm, P.A., Indialantic, for Appellee.

WALLIS, J.

      Russell Vessels, Jr., individually, and Coast to Coast Terrazzo, LLC

(collectively Appellants) appeal the preliminary injunction entered by the trial
court in favor of Dr. Terrazzo of Florida, LLC (Appellee), enforcing a non-

compete agreement (the Agreement). 1 Although Appellants argue that the

trial court erred in several respects in enforcing the Agreement, the central

issue in this appeal is whether Appellee proved that the injunction enforcing

the restrictive covenants contained in the agreement was necessary to

protect a legitimate business interest. Appellants argue that the knowledge

that Vessels gained while employed by Appellee is neither extraordinary nor

specialized, not worthy of protection by the covenant, and merely an attempt

to prevent ordinary competition. We agree that Appellee did not prove the

existence of a legitimate business interest; and, therefore, we reverse the

injunction.

       Vessels began working for Appellee on August 28, 2019, performing

terrazzo restoration in Central Florida. Prior to his employment with Appellee,

Vessels had no experience in the process of terrazzo restoration. Vessels

began his employment as a laborer/trainee receiving general instructions

from one of Appellee's employees, who initially was Vessels’s supervisor

(Supervisor), on the basics of terrazzo restoration. Vessels was promoted to

the position of general foreman within one year of working there. During the

course of this employment, the parties entered into the Agreement, which

       1
           We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B).

                                        2
prohibited Vessels from working for a competing company for a period of

three years after Vessels’s employment with Appellee terminated. In late

December 2020, Vessels left his employment with Appellee; and, in April

2021, he opened Coast to Coast, LLC, which also provides terrazzo

restoration in Central Florida.

      Ultimately, Appellee filed a two-count complaint against Appellants for

temporary injunctive relief and breach of contract. Included in the request

for injunctive relief were allegations that terrazzo servicing is a “specialized

business which requires specialized tools, knowledge, and marketing” and

that employees “learn specialized knowledge” when trained by Appellee that

is not otherwise known to the general public.

      During the injunction hearing, there was testimony establishing that

Vessels chose to sharpen his terrazzo restoration skills and processes by

conducting his own research on YouTube, which helped him enhance the

restoration process and properly grind the floors prior to polishing them. In

addition, the parties agreed that, during Vessels’s employment, Appellee

neither paid for additional training nor provided written materials instructing

Vessels on how to perform terrazzo restoration. Instead, Vessels learned

the basics of terrazzo restoration from Supervisor; and, when he had

questions about a job, he was able to talk to Appellee’s owner, who had been

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in the terrazzo restoration business for many years. Additionally, the parties

agreed that all of the equipment and materials needed to perform the

restoration work are available for purchase commercially. Finally, the parties

admitted that Appellee never developed any proprietary processes to

perform restorations.

      The trial court entered the preliminary injunction in favor of Appellee

and against Appellants. The court found that terrazzo restoration requires

specialized skill and training and that Vessels acquired a great deal of

knowledge regarding the repair and restoration of terrazzo floors during his

employment with Appellee. It further found that Appellee proved a legitimate

business interest worthy of being protected by the injunction, without an

adequate remedy being available at law for Appellee.

      In an action to enforce an agreement that restricts or prohibits

competition during or after the term of restrictive covenants, such as the one

before us:

             (b) The person seeking enforcement of a restrictive
             covenant shall plead and prove the existence of one
             or more legitimate business interests justifying the
             restrictive covenant. The term “legitimate business
             interest” includes, but is not limited to:

             1. Trade secrets, as defined in s. 688.002(4).

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            2. Valuable confidential business or professional
            information that otherwise does not qualify as trade
            secrets.

            3. Substantial relationships with specific prospective
            or existing customers, patients, or clients.

            4. Customer, patient, or client goodwill associated
            with:

                  a. An ongoing business or professional
                  practice, by way of trade name, trademark,
                  service mark, or “trade dress”;

                  b. A specific geographic location; or

                  c. A specific marketing or trade area.

            5. Extraordinary or specialized training.

            Any restrictive covenant not supported by a
            legitimate business interest is unlawful and is void
            and unenforceable.

§ 542.335(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021).

      Although the trial court here did not specifically identify the legitimate

business interest under this statute on which it based or issued its preliminary

injunction, the allegations in the complaint, the language used by the court

when making its factual findings, and counsels’ arguments in this appeal

suggest that Appellee’s legitimate business interest being protected was that

Vessels received extraordinary or specialized training.

                                       5
      “In order for training to be a protectible business interest, it must be

extraordinary.” Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc., 667 So. 2d 961, 964 (Fla. 2d

DCA 1996). Extraordinary training has been described as

            that which goes beyond what is usual, regular,
            common, or customary in the industry in which the
            employee is employed. The rationale is that if an
            employer dedicates time and money to the
            extraordinary training and education of an employee,
            whereby the employee attains a unique skill or an
            enhanced degree of sophistication in an existing skill,
            then it is unfair to permit that employee to use those
            skills to the benefit of a competitor when the
            employee has contracted not to do so. The precise
            degree of training or education which rises to the
            level of a protectible interest will vary from industry to
            industry and is a factual determination to be made by
            the trial court. Needless to say, skills which may be
            acquired by following the directions in the box or
            learned by a person of ordinary education by reading
            a manual do not meet the test.

Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991),

disapproved of on other grounds by Gupton v. Vill. Key & Saw Shop, Inc.,

656 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1995). Based on the above definition, the Hapney court

concluded that Hapney did not receive extraordinary training because the

training provided for him merely “extended his air-conditioning installation

and repair skills to include cruise control units and cellular telephones.” Id.

      Similarly, in Dyer, the Second District Court concluded that an

employer did not have a protectible business interest due to specialized

                                        6
training where the evidence showed that Dyer received training in stripping

floors and the use of equipment leased to grocery stores. 667 So. 2d at 964.

Dyer was also trained by attending seminars on development of

interpersonal skills, hiring and firing techniques, and repairing equipment. Id.

The Dyer court concluded that this type of training was not extraordinary for

purposes of section 542.335 and, therefore, the employer did not have a

legitimate business interest to protect. Id.

      In this case, Vessels learned the basics of terrazzo restoration through

Supervisor. And while the evidence below shows that Appellee’s owner has

a great deal of knowledge about terrazzo restoration, the evidence, even

when construed in a light most favorable to Appellee, established that

Vessels received on-the-job training that was “usual, regular, common or

customary in the industry,” which does not qualify as extraordinary or

specialized training under section 542.335(1)(b)5. See Dyer, 667 So. 2d at

964; Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 132. Therefore, because the evidence did not

support that Appellee provided Vessels with specialized or extraordinary

training, it was error for the trial court to conclude that Appellee had a

legitimate business interest and that the Agreement was enforceable. See

                                       7
§ 542.335(1)(b), Fla. Stat.; Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 964–65; Hapney, 579 So. 2d

at 134. Accordingly, we reverse the preliminary injunction.2

     REVERSED.

LAMBERT, C.J., and EVANDER, J., concur.

     2
       Because Appellee failed to prove the existence of a legitimate
business interest, we do not reach the merits of Appellants’ other arguments
on appeal.

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