Court Opinion

ID: 9610826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:47:50.76416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:05.159903
License: Public Domain

TANZER, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that Aqua-Foods manufactures fish. I cannot concur.
*176The legislature enacted ORS 307.330, in the words of the majority, “to provide industrial tax exemptions in order to promote the economy of Oregon” or, stated otherwise, “to encourage industry of all types to come to Oregon by allowing a limited property tax exemption for new construction undertaken ‘in furtherance of the production of income.’ ” 293 Or at 174-75. In pursuance of that statutory objective, two distinct classes of new construction were given tax advantages. The statute gave a one-year tax exemption for structures used for “nonmanufacturing” purposes and a two-year exemption for others.
Aqua-Foods built a fish hatchery. It is a technologically advanced fish hatchery, but it is still a fish hatchery. Like many other fish hatchers, Aqua-Foods hatches eggs, provides water and food, and catches fish. Although Aqua-Foods does this in a sophisticated manner, the essential process is the same.
As the majority holds, Aqua-Foods’ operation appears to be the sort of new industry which ORS 307.330 is intended to promote and the structures qualify for tax exemption under the statute. The next question, however, is whether it qualifies for the standard two-year exemption or only for the one-year exemption accorded to “nonmanufac-turing” industries. On this question, the majority goes awry.
I cannot agree that the legislature intended that we regard fish hatching and catching as manufacturing. That conclusion is contrary to the common understanding that “manufacturing” refers to making things by hand or, in more advanced times, to fabrication, possibly aided by division of labor and use of machines. See Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed 1940). Someday, civilization’s progress in genetic and biochemical engineering may enable humans to handmake or fabricate fish, but as yet Aqua-Foods claims no such power. Aqua-Foods does not claim to actually manufacture fish; it merely provides optimum conditions for nature to take its course.
Nobody argues that the legislature intended “non-manufacturing” as a term of art in tax law different from ordinary understanding, although the majority strains to *177do so. The majority asserts that the term “nonmanufactur-ing” is “inexact” and, pursuant to Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 621 P2d 547 (1980), looks to the legislative policy behind the term. Some processes may present a difficult definitional problem (e.g., brewing beer and cultivating vaccines), but hatching and catching fish is not on the inexact definitional edges of the term. There is no need here to resort to extrinsic definitional aids.
The majority classifies Aqua-Foods’ hatchery as manufacturing because its “use of highly complex equipment and processes such as the mechanical, chemical and electronic processes employed here” is consistent with the legislative objective “to encourage and promote industry in Oregon.” 293 Or at 173. The fallacy in this is that technology is no evidence as to which .classification applies because both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing facilities may employ advanced technology. To demonstrate, we may look to the majority’s list of “commerce, agriculture, mining, finance, insurance, real estate and services” as examples of nonmanufacturing. 293 Or at 171-72. Application of advanced technology to the growing and harvesting of tomatoes, for example, would not convert that agricultural enterprise from nonmanufacturing to manufacturing. Israeli tomatoes, although the product of intensely technological cultivation unheard of in 1961 when ORS 307.330 was enacted are no more handmade or fabricated than are primitively cultivated tomatoes or, for that matter, Aqua-Foods’ fish. Similarly, the finance industry hás undergone an electronic revolution since 1961, but it is nevertheless still a nonmanufacturing industry just as if it was operated from vest-pockets and strongboxes. The essentially nonmanufacturing nature of these industries is unchanged by increased application of technology, and so it is with fish hatching and catching. This distinction by the majority is erroneous.
I mention technological changes since 1961 because the majority reasons:
“* * * Given the state of the art, or science, of agriculture in 1961, it is doubtful that the legislature which amended ORS 307.330 to include the ‘nonmanufacturing’ *178language would have considered Aqua-Foods’ activities to be agriculture, or any other nonmanufacturing use. * * *” 293 Or at 172.
Unanticipated technological advances do not convert non-manufacturing industries into manufacturing. Were it otherwise, then the majority should be prepared to determine at what degree of technological development fish farming becomes fish manufacturing. Of course, they cannot, because the basic logic is flawed. The distinction depends on the nature of the enterprise, not, as the majority holds, on the devices with which it is carried out.
With all respect, I believe the majority opinion reflects the fact that innovative jurisprudence satisfies the judicial need for creativity in a way that straightforward decision-making often does not. That may also account for the chicken cases from elsewhere upon which the majority relies. I would reject them and accept the reasoning quoted by the majority from Charles River, etc. v. State Tax Com’n., 374 Mass 333, 372 NE2d 768 (1978). The straightforward course may not be as good for the judicial'soul, but it reflects a higher regard for the will of the legislature and generally makes for better law.