Court Opinion

ID: 9913337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 19:02:19.273243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:33.787749
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/27/23 In re A.C. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        DIVISION FIVE
In re A.C., a Person Coming                                   B321960 c/w B326226
Under Juvenile Court Law.
_______________________________                               (Los Angeles County Super.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                             Ct. No. 22CCJP00122B)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

J.H.,

         Defendant and Appellant;

A.C.,

         Respondent.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
      Michelle D. Pena, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Respondent.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       _____________________

                       INTRODUCTION
      Father appeals from the juvenile court’s order removing
daughter (A.C.) from his custody and the court’s exit order
granting him monitored visitation. Respondents Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) and mother contend
that father does not have standing to appeal the custody order.
Mother also argues that father’s appeal is moot. Finally, mother
contends the juvenile court’s exit order was within its
discretion.1
       We conclude the appeal is not moot. As to father’s
standing we will assume, but not decide, that he may pursue the
appeal, but we hold that father suffered no prejudice from the
custody order. We also hold that the visitation order was not an
abuse of discretion. We affirm both orders.

1      The Department takes no position on the propriety of the
exit order.

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                          DISCUSSION2
       On January 10, 2022, the Department filed a section 300
petition asking the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over A.C.
based on allegations that mental problems and aggressive
behavior of A.C.’s half-brother limited mother’s ability to care for
A.C. and her two other half siblings.3
       On May 19, 2022, the juvenile court sustained an amended
petition. At the June 30, 2022, dispositional hearing, the juvenile
court ordered A.C., then 12 years old, “removed” from father’s
custody. On January 4, 2023, the juvenile court terminated its
jurisdiction over A.C. and issued an exit order with sole legal and
physical custody to mother and monitored visits to father. Father
appeals both orders.
1.     Removal Order
       Father contends the June 30, 2022, removal order was
unnecessary and not supported by substantial evidence.
       A.    Standing and Mootness
       As a threshold matter, the Department and mother urge
that father lacks standing to appeal the removal order because
(1) he did not have custody at the time of the order and (2) he is
merely the biological, not the presumed, father and, therefore,
not entitled to custody. We will assume for the purposes of

2     The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and this opinion does not meet the criteria for publication
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c)). We therefore resolve this
appeal by memorandum opinion under Standard 8.1 of the
Standards of Judicial Administration.

3    The half-brother is mother’s son and was born in 2009.
None of A.C.’s half siblings is a party to this appeal.

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further discussion that father has standing. As for mother’s
argument that the appeal is moot, we find mother has failed to
demonstrate that the appeal itself is moot as no intervening
events have occurred to render the appeal moot. (See Committee
for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 389, 405 [moot cases are those in which an actual
controversy did exist but, by the passage of time or a change in
circumstances, ceased to exist].)
       B.    Any Error in the Court’s Removal Order Was
             Harmless
       Father contests the juvenile court order removing A.C. from
his custody. We conclude that, if the juvenile court erred (a point
we do not decide), any error was harmless under father’s own
theory of the case. Father urges that the juvenile court erred in
removing A.C. from his custody because father “was noncustodial,
making the removal order unnecessary.” The Department
concedes the point. Instead, the Department argues that, by
father’s own words, the error is harmless because, when the
proceedings started, he did not have custody and, therefore, no
error in purporting to remove custody from father could have
prejudiced him. We agree. Father’s custody status was not
changed by the court’s order. On the unique facts of this case,
before the order father did not have custody of A.C., and after the
order he did not have custody of A.C. An error in state law
“ ‘generally does not warrant reversal unless there is a
reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result
more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached.’ ” (In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1073.)
Here, father’s status as a noncustodial parent was unchanged,
and father suffered no prejudice.

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2.     The Exit Order Granting Father Monitored Visitation
       Was Within the Court’s Discretion
       On January 4, 2023, the juvenile court terminated its
jurisdiction over A.C. with an exit order granting sole legal and
physical custody to mother and monitored visits to father. The
order set the duration and frequency of the visits. Father argues
that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not providing a
way to “ensure enforceability” of father’s right to monitored
visitation with A.C. and by not specifying in the exit order how
father could request unmonitored visits from the family court.
       A.    Enforceability of Visitation Orders
       When a juvenile court terminates jurisdiction, it has broad
discretion to make exit orders concerning visitation. (§ 362.4; In
re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112-113 (J.M.).) These orders
remain in effect until modified or terminated by order of the
family court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b); J.M., at p. 112.) When a
juvenile court makes an exit order, the juvenile court must look
to the best interests of the child and consider the totality of the
circumstances. (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251,
268; In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201.) We review the
juvenile court’s exit orders for abuse of discretion (In re J.P.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1119; In re Alexandria M. (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1095 (Alexandria M.)), and thus determine
whether the juvenile court’s order “ ‘ “exceeded the bounds of
reason.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318;
Alexandria M., at pp. 1095-1096.)
       Father contends the court erred in not including some kind
of enforcement mechanism in its exit order granting father
visitation. Father’s stated concern was that A.C. had steadfastly
refused to speak with father, even in the face of prior visitation

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orders. At the outset, father has forfeited the argument. Father
did not request an enforcement mechanism in the juvenile court;
he asked for and received a visitation order. “Absent a request, it
is not the court’s burden to sua sponte come up with a solution to
the intractable problem of a child’s steadfast refusal to visit a
parent.” (In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046.)
“ ‘[D]ependency courts “simply do not have the time and
resources to constantly fine tune an order in response to the
progress or lack thereof in the visitation arrangement, or in
reaction to physical or psychological conduct which may threaten
the child’s well-being.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting In re Julie M. (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 41, 51.)
       Nor does father identify on appeal any particular
enforcement mechanism the juvenile court should have included
in its exit order. Father’s failure to raise the point below and his
failure to develop it on appeal forfeits his argument.
       If we were to consider the merits of father’s argument, he
would fare no better. The juvenile court does not have the
authority or discretion to impose a condition on the family court’s
ability to modify an exit order. (In re Cole Y. (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1456; but see In re D.B. (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 613, 627.) On the contrary, parties may seek the
assistance of the family court to enforce dependency visitation
orders. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 208 [“courts are
often placed in the position of enforcing orders of other courts,
even though the enforcing court could not have made the order in
the first instance”].)
       B.     Adequacy of Information in the Exit Orders
       Father argues that the juvenile court was required to, but
did not, “explain the circumstances” that led to its exit order

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providing father only with monitored visitation. Observing that a
family court must find “there has been a significant change of
circumstances” before modifying a juvenile court’s visitation
order (§ 302, subd. (d)), father urges that this lack of information
is prejudicial insofar as it may preclude him from proving “a
substantial change of circumstances to obtain expanded
visitation rights at a later time.” Accordingly, father argues that
the exit order must be reversed “with directions to order joint
custody or at least clarify that [f]ather was nonoffending and
provide directions for [f]ather and family court with specificity as
to how he can prove a substantial change in circumstances.” We
disagree.
       Although the juvenile court might not have expressly
stated why it was ordering monitored visitation for father, we see
no error in its failure to do so. Father again cites no authority for
this proposition, instead relying on cases in which the juvenile
court gave too much discretion to third persons to change
visitation orders. The juvenile court at least implicitly found that
the visitation it awarded was in A.C.’s best interests, and “the
record is clear as to the circumstances” that warranted this
finding. (See In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th
1238, 1248 [in the absence of a request for specific trial court
findings “appellate courts . . . must presume the trial court made
all factual findings necessary to support the judgment for which
there is substantial evidence”]; In re Jennifer R. (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 704, 714 [no prejudice from lack of specificity of
exit order given that the record showed the circumstances
warranting it].)
       The record shows that father lacked any significant
relationship with A.C. and A.C. had continuously expressed her

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desire to avoid contact with father. From this record, a family
court will be able to discern whether there has been any future
change in circumstances that warrants a modification of the
visitation order.4
                           DISPOSITION
       The June 30, 2022, and the January 4, 2023, orders are
affirmed.

                                          RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                  BAKER, J.

                  KIM, J.

4     Father cites In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870 in
passing, but the case is distinguishable. The juvenile court in
that case declined to enter a proper exit order and instead
purported to “revert[] to [an] original family law order,” with
some modifications as stated in a minute order. (Id. at pp. 874-
875.) Here, the juvenile court issued a proper exit order.

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