Court Opinion

ID: 9456542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:56:14.933485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:01.156253
License: Public Domain

PECK, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority opinion, which is based upon the well established law in slip-and-fall cases holding that a business invitor is liable only for his negligence in failing to correct an improper floor condition of which he had actual or constructive knowledge. That this rule of law has been adopted by Kentucky is clearly established by the cases cited in 'the majority opinion.
Unlike the situation presented by the present record, however, each of those cases dealt with circumstances involving the presence on the floor of some foreign substance. In Wiggins v. Scruggs, 442 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Ky.Ct.App.1969), the foreign substance on the floor was of an unidentified nature, but “was variously described as ‘cloudy, pale yellow,’ ‘yellowish,’ ‘grayish yellow,’ and looking like the white of an egg.” In Jones v. Jarvis, 437 S.W.2d 189 (Ky.Ct.App.1969), the injury complained of resulted from the presence on the floor of a banana peel. In Otto v. Phillips, 299 S.W.2d 100 (Ky.Ct.App.1957), the “foreign object” tripped over by the 83 year old plaintiff was the foot of a small boy who was sitting on the floor in the aisle of a drug store. In Kroger Grocery Co. v. Spillman, 279 Ky. 366, 130 S.W.2d 786 (Ky.Ct.App.1939), plaintiff’s fall resulted from the presence on the floor of either grapes or water, depending on which testimony was accepted.
While the thesis is not articulated in these opinions, they necessarily proceed upon an assumption that at some point in history (presumably when the store opened its doors for business the morning of the occurrence) the floors were in a proper condition but that thereafter an unsafe condition was created by the introduction of a “ ‘cloudy, pale yellow’ substance”, a banana peel, or whatever. That situation does not prevail here. For present purposes we are of course required to accept the interpretation of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff-appellant, and as recognized in the majority opinion, we consider a situation in which “gobs” of toys were piled in a “helter-skelter” manner, on tiers of shelves bordering a three foot aisle. A toy phonograph equipped with a tone arm that swiveled 360° and equipped with a pin-type needle was on the bottom row of shelves and the arm “must have been out in the aisle” because otherwise appellant’s foot could not have come into contact with it, the needle could not have pricked her skin, and she would not have fallen.
*659Unlike the situations which developed from the presence of a foreign substance, there is no basis for an assumption that the phonograph had ever been properly positioned on a shelf or, in fact that at any moment in history a safe condition prevailed. Thus instead of being confronted with a situation similar to that in the cases cited in the majority opinion in which liability was defeated as a matter of law, we have a circumstance more closely comparable to that in which a woman who fell backwards over a vegetable crate in an aisle of a store was permitted to have her case go to the jury, and to that in which a verdict in favor of a woman who fell after accidentally stepping into a cardboard box on the store floor was affirmed. These latter situations prevailed in two other cases cited in the majority opinion: Arens v. McHale, 453 S.W.2d 754 (Ky.Ct.App.1970); Winn-Dixie Louisville, Inc. v. Smith, 372 S.W.2d 789 (Ky.Ct.App.1963). The following statement from Arens seems pertinent (453 S.W.2d at 756):
“It is our opinion that when aisleways provided for the use of the customers are so narrow that it is difficult for them to pass or move about without physical contact [with one another] a jury could reasonably conclude that the kind of incident that occurred on this occasion should be anticipated by the merchant, who owes his customers the duty of protecting them from foreseeable dangers on his store premises.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I am of the opinion that placing upon the evidence produced by the appellant the construction most favorable to her we have before us a record requiring a determination that the burden of next proceeding had passed to the defendant-appellee. It is entirely possible that thereafter, with all of the evidence in, a condition could (as for instance perhaps if unrebutted evidence established that at the beginning of the business day the aisle was free of hazard) exist where a verdict might properly be directed for the defendant. I am forced to the con-elusion, however, that such action on the present record was error.
In view of its finding that the appellant did not sustain her burden of proof of the appellee’s negligence, the majority opinion expressly refrains from reaching the remaining issues on appeal. I similarly refrain from a discussion of the additional issues other than to express the opinion that I do not think that the record establishes such contributory negligence on the part of the appellant as would defeat her recovery as a matter of law. I would hold the direction of a verdict to have been error and would remand for a new trial.