Court Opinion

ID: 9603714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:09:12.644394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:58.426893
License: Public Domain

*288ANDREWS, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because I conclude there was no reversible error in the trial court’s failure to give the “equal access” charge, I respectfully dissent.
1. The trial court did not err in refusing Johnson’s request to give the “equal access” charge. First, Johnson’s defense was that he had no knowledge the drugs were in his SUV and therefore he did not intend to possess the drugs. The jury was instructed on burden of proof, intent, actual and constructive possession, and whether the defendant knowingly had actual or constructive possession. Therefore, the jury was adequately instructed on Johnson’s theory of defense and the charge adequately covered the principles contained in the equal access charge. Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 519, 521 (408 SE2d 823) (1991). See also Render v. State, 240 Ga. App. 762 (525 SE2d 134) (1999); Mitchell v. State, 222 Ga. App. 453,454 (474 SE2d 306) (1996).
Next, this Court has consistently held that where the jury is not charged that a presumption or inference of possession of the contraband arises from proof of ownership or control of the premises or the vehicle, the equal access instruction is not required. Jones, supra at 520-521. In this case, the presumption or inference of possession was not charged.
Pittman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 211, 215 (430 SE2d 141) (1993), is also helpful. In that case, this Court held:
Finally, we are persuaded by the State’s argument that in this case equal access is not a “sole defense,” in the sense in which Pittman argues. “The equal access rule, as it applies in the automobile context, is merely that evidence showing that a person or persons other than the owner or driver of the automobile had equal access to contraband found in the automobile may or will, depending upon the strength of the evidence, overcome the presumption that the contraband was in the exclusive possession of the owner or driver.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lombardo v. State, 187 Ga. App. 440, 442 (5) (370 SE2d 503) (1988). This court in Jones v. State, 205 Ga. App. 711, 713 (4) (423 SE2d 393) (1992) was presented with a similar situation to the case at bar. In Jones, the defendant argued that the trial court’s failure to charge his sole defense of mere presence was reversible error. In rejecting that argument, this court stated “(I)f an affirmative defense is raised by the evidence the trial court must present the affirmative defense to the jury as part of the case in its charge, even absent a request. . . . Defendant’s contention that he was merely present at the scene is not an affirmative defense; rather the rule that mere presence without more is insufficient to convict is really a *289corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 713; see generally OCGA § 16-3-28.
Pittman, supra at 215. See also Jones v. State, 205 Ga. App. 711, 713 (423 SE2d 393) (1992).
Lastly, the law is that it is error to refuse to give the equal access charge only where the sole evidence of guilt is defendant’s ownership or possession of the vehicle. Wright v. State, 194 Ga. App. 739, 741 (391 SE2d 791) (1990). In this case, there was the evidence from the reliable confidential informant (Cl), Johnson’s quick trips during his work breaks to the house of a known drug dealer, and the large amount of cash in small bills found in his possession at the time of arrest.
Therefore, for all the reasons set out above, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the equal access charge. Johnson’s conviction should not be reversed on these grounds.
2. I agree with Division 1 of the majority’s opinion that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. I also agree with Division 3 of the opinion; but, in light of my conclusion that failure to charge “equal access” was not reversible error, I disagree with the disposition in Division 3.
This case is similar to Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 (231 SE2d 729) (1977), cited by the majority. In that case, the defendant claimed that the Cl was part of a conspiracy to frame him. Id. at 162. The Supreme Court held that the trial court should have conducted a hearing and if it found the evidence material under Brady, weighed it against the State’s privilege under Roviaro. Id. at 165. Likewise, in this case, the trial court failed to conduct a hearing to determine if the evidence was exculpatory under Brady and should have been admitted. Therefore, the majority states that the trial court may or may not have erred in not forcing the State to reveal the identity of the Cl and on retrial the court must conduct an in camera hearing to determine if the Cl is Cedric Bridges. If it is, his identity must be revealed.
Unlike the disposition reached by the majority, I would follow the disposition in Thornton and remand the case to the trial court for a post-trial hearing. Id. at 165. If the court determines that disclosure is required, a new trial must be ordered. If not, Johnson has leave to file a new appeal within 30 days of the trial court’s decision. Id. at 165-166.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn and Judge Mikell join in this dissent.
*290Decided July 11, 2005
Stacy D. Barnett, for appellant.
Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, Scott T Poole, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.