Court Opinion

ID: 9411787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 21:00:51.932175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:13.056317
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1890

        MARK GLAGOLA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        TRANSWESTERN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; TDC                                  LOGISTICS
        COMPANY, LLC, f/k/a Ridge Development Company, LLC,

                             Defendants - Appellants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J.
        Mark Coulson, Magistrate Judge. (1:21-cv-01230-JMC)

        Submitted: May 5, 2023                                            Decided: July 26, 2023

        Before GREGORY, THACKER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Devin M. Misour, REED SMITH LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for
        Appellants. N. Tucker Meneely, Susan Stobbart Shapiro, COUNCIL, BARADEL,
        KOSMERL & NOLAN, P.A., Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1890      Doc: 25          Filed: 07/26/2023     Pg: 2 of 5

        PER CURIAM:

               Transwestern Development Company and TDC Logistics Company, LLC

        (collectively, Transwestern), appeal the magistrate judge’s * order denying their motion for

        summary judgment and granting Mark Glagola (Appellee)’s summary judgment motion in

        this breach-of-contract action. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

               We “review[] de novo the district court’s order granting summary judgment.”

        Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 565 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). “A district

        court ‘shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

        as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at

        568 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material

        fact exists, “we ‘view the facts and all justifiable inferences arising therefrom in the light

        most favorable to’ . . . the nonmoving party.” Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 565 n.1 (internal

        quotation marks omitted). However, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than

        conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or

        the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v.

        Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dash v. Mayweather, 731

        F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013)). When a “district court’s grant of summary judgment

        disposed of cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider each motion separately on

               *
                 The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.
        § 636(c).

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        its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of

        law.” Defs. of Wildlife v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 762 F.3d 374, 392 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               The parties agree that Maryland law applies. Under Maryland law, “the primary

        goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the parties in entering the

        agreement and to interpret the contract in a manner consistent with that intent.” Credible

        Behav. Health, Inc. v. Johnson, 220 A.3d 303, 310 (Md. 2019) (brackets and internal

        quotation marks omitted). Contracts are construed as a whole, “interpret[ing] their separate

        provisions harmoniously, so that, if possible, all of them may be given effect.” Walker v.

        Dep’t of Hum. Res., 842 A.2d 53, 61 (Md. 2004).            When a contract’s language is

        unambiguous, that interpretation “is based on what a reasonable person in the position of

        the parties would have understood the language to mean and not ‘the subjective intent of

        the parties at the time of formation.’” Credible Behav. Health, 220 A.3d at 310 (quoting

        Ocean Petroleum, Co. v. Yanek, 5 A.3d 683, 690 (Md. 2010)). When a contract is

        ambiguous, we may “consider extrinsic or parol evidence to ascertain the parties’

        intentions.” Credible Behav. Health, 220 A.3d at 311.

               “A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties do not agree as to its

        meaning.” Phx. Servs. Ltd. P’ship v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 892 A.2d 1185, 1223 (Md. Ct.

        Spec. App. 2006). Instead, “a written contract is ambiguous if, when read by a reasonably

        prudent person, it is susceptible of more than one meaning,” based on “a consideration of

        the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at

        the time of execution.” Calomiris v. Woods, 727 A.2d 358, 363 (Md. 1999) (internal

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        quotation marks omitted). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Credible

        Behav. Health, 220 A.3d at 309.

                 Transwestern does not point to any ambiguity in the contract language itself.

        Instead, it asks us to read into the agreement an implied term requiring Appellee’s

        continued employment to receive a profit-sharing payment. “A contract’s silence on a

        particular issue does not, by itself, create ambiguity as a matter of law, even though silence

        creates ambiguity when it involves a matter naturally within the scope of the contract.”

        Azat v. Farruggio, 875 A.2d 778, 785 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). The contract in question

        concerned the amount of profits Appellee would receive, not whether he would receive

        them all. A contract “need not address every conceivable issue or potential outcome to

        avoid being ambiguous; it need only provide a clear answer for the matter in dispute.”

        Dumbarton Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co., 73 A.3d 224, 235 (Md.

        2013).

                 Here, Transwestern does not identify any ambiguous language in the agreement.

        And the Supreme Court of Maryland has cautioned that it is “improper for the court to

        rewrite the terms of a contract, or draw a new contract for the parties, when the terms

        thereof are clear and unambiguous, simply to avoid hardships.” Canaras v. Lift Truck

        Servs., Inc., 322 A.2d 866, 873 (Md. 1974). Thus, we conclude that the magistrate judge

        correctly interpreted the contract.

                 Transwestern relies on Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 783 A.2d

        667 (Md. 2001), to establish that its promise was nonbinding. At issue before the Whiting-

        Turner court was whether a profit-sharing payment constituted a wage under the Maryland

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        Wage Payment Collection Act (“MWPCA”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-501 to

        3-509 (LexisNexis 2022). 783 A.2d at 669-70. The court held that it did not, explaining

        that “what is due an employee who terminates employment with an employer are wages

        for work performed before termination, or all compensation due to the employee as a result

        of employment including any remuneration, other than salary, that is promised in exchange

        for the employee’s work.” Id. at 671. The employee in that case was entitled to a bonus

        payment only after two years of employment and thus was not entitled to it because he left

        his employment before the two years; “[h]ad the [employee] been with the [employer] for

        two years when the decision was made to offer him a bonus and had the financial condition

        of the [employer] justified it, there would be no doubt of the [employee]’s entitlement” to

        the bonus payment. Id. at 673.

               The magistrate judge appropriately rejected Transwestern’s reliance on Whiting-

        Turner. First, Appellee did not bring a claim for payment of wages under the MWPCA.

        Second, even if Whiting-Turner were to apply outside of a claim under the MWPCA, it

        does not support Transwestern’s decision not to pay Appellee the amounts provided by the

        May 29 agreement. There is no explicit continued employment condition in any of the

        emails Appellee and Transwestern exchanged during the negotiation of the agreement in

        this case.

               Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s order.       We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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