Court Opinion

ID: 9762129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:11:32.182602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:30.430239
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would agree with the court below that the term “handle” was intended to be a “word of administration” rather than a “word of disposition” and, therefore, that appellant was not given a general power of appointment. Initially, I note that:
“It is, of course, a cardinal rule that a will, is to be construed according to the intent of the testator.” To ascertain this intent, a court examines the words of the instrument and, if necessary, the scheme of distribution, the circumstances surrounding execution of the will and other facts bearing on the question. Should the testator’s intent remain uncertain, a court resorts to canons of construction to supply the testator’s likely intent. The intent of a testator must appear with reasonable certainty, such that there can be little doubt of his intent. If, *553from the language of the document, the scheme of distribution, and the relevant facts and circumstances, a court cannot determine a testator’s intent with reasonable certainty, it must resort to canons of construction.
Estate of Sykes, 477 Pa. 254, 257, 383 A.2d 920, 921 (1978) (citations and footnote omitted).
The words in the will which gives rise to the issue in controversy concerning the disposition of the residuary estate are as follows:
Mrs. Hibbert has taking [sic] care of my business for four years and knows all about my estate so she can handle my estate as she sees fit.
s/ Arthur Stewart
Appellant first contends that the meaning of this clause is made ambiguous by the word “handle” and, thus, that we must resort to canons of construction. Alternatively, she argues that the clause indicates the testator’s actual intent to confer upon her a power of appointment of the residuary estate.
In support of the latter contention, appellant cites the case of Estate of Seifert, 22 Lehigh County Law Journal 425 (1947). There, the testatrix devised her estate to one Susan Hudson, “to be disposed of as she sees fit.” The court concluded that Hudson had been given a power of appointment and that she had effectively exercised it in favor of herself.
Instantly, the court below determined that “handle” is not an ambiguous term, but means “to manage or operate” and is a word of administration; while dispose means “to get rid of” and is a word of disposition. It therefore concluded that the present will conferred on appellant only the power to administer or manage the estate, while in Seifert, the testatrix conferred the power to determine the individuals entitled to receive.
I agree with this determination by the court below and find that it is reinforced by other language in the will. As noted by the majority, we must consider every feature and all of the words of the will in order to give effect to the *554testator’s intention. In re Estate of Kohler, 463 Pa. 150, 344 A.2d 469 (1975). In so doing, I note that in the clause immediately preceding the one in question, the testator stated that appellant was to take and keep whatever she wanted from the house and farm and then sell the rest at her convenience. Clearly, the testator understood quite well the meaning of the words “take, keep and sell.” If the will gave appellant a general power of appointment, she certainly had the power to take and keep whatever she wanted from the house and farm regardless of the language that specifically enabled her to do this. If the testator had intended that appellant have the power to take all of the residuary estate, there would have been no reason to include the language1 in the last sentence.
Thus, if we were to conclude that appellant did have the power to dispose of the residuary estate, we would be rendering the immediately preceding language nugatory. “It is fundamental that the construction of a will which renders portions of it nugatory is not to be preferred to one which makes every word operative.” Wright Estate, 391 Pa. 405, 410, 138 A.2d 102, 108 (1958). Therefore, I would conclude that the testator’s intent was to give her something of the estate but not all of it.
I thus agree with the court below that it can be determined from examination of the language of the will that the testator did not intend to confer the power to dispose of the estate on appellant, only the power to administer it and, accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order.

. Appellant suggests that this clause was probably the result of a layman’s misconception that an executor must liquidate everything in order to settle an estate and that he simply wanted her to be able to take property in kind. While this may be a plausible explanation, for purposes of construction of this will, we can regard it as no more than mere speculation. "In expounding a will, it is not what the Testator may have meant, but what is the meaning of his words. It does not extend to a consideration of what Testator might have said but did not say...." Swope Estate, 383 Pa. 494, 496, 119 A.2d 57, 58 (1956).