Court Opinion

ID: 9701185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:09:20.708886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:20.642704
License: Public Domain

*472LESLIE B. YATES, Justice,
concurring.
In a case such as this, the invitor’s duty to an invitee is to either warn of the dangerous condition or to make the premises reasonably safe. See Bill’s Dollar Store, Inc. v. Bean, 77 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). I agree with the majority that Braeburn did not meet its duty to make safe merely by contacting the service company. I write separately to address Brae-burn’s duty to warn.
Braeburn acknowledges that it gave no warnings but argues that its duty to warn “was discharged by Ms. Wilson’s own knowledge and appreciation of an open and obvious danger.” In Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex.1978), the Texas Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that an invitee’s knowledge of a dangerous condition can alleviate the invitor’s duty to warn. Rather, the invitee’s knowledge is an issue of contributory negligence that does not affect the duty to warn. See id.; Grey Wolf Drilling Co. v. Boutte, 154 S.W.3d 725, 734-35 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, vac. by agr.); Flint v. Mickelsen, 781 S.W.2d 409, 410 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ). This court has clearly held that an invitor satisfied its duty when it warned an invitee of a dangerous condition, even though the invitee was already aware of it. See Bill’s Dollar Store, 77 S.W.3d at 369-70; June v. Dan Kirby Assocs., No. 14-94-00561-CV, 1995 WL 506012, at ⅝1-3 (TexApp.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 24, 1995, writ denied). Braeburn could have similarly discharged its duty here, but it did not. Admittedly, it may seem awkward to require an invitor who has not made a condition safe to warn an invitee of that danger even if the invitee is already aware. However, that result is dictated by Parker, which unequivocally holds that an invitee’s knowledge of a dangerous condition cannot alleviate the duty to warn.1 See Furr’s, Inc. v. Logan, 893 S.W.2d 187, 192 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no writ) (rejecting defendant’s argument that it owed no duty to plaintiff who knew of danger because “a warning would have been superfluous to one who already knew and appreciated the danger,” stating that such a theory “is an evocation of the old ‘no duty’ doctrine” that the supreme court “has long since abolished”).
I agree with the majority that there is a fact issue on the question of Braeburn’s control of the dangerous area. If Brae-burn had the requisite right to control and thus a duty to warn or make safe, it did not discharge that duty here. Thus, I respectfully concur.

. Braeburn relies on Summers v. Fort Crockett Hotel, Ltd., 902 S.W.2d 20, 28 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied), in which the First Court of Appeals held that "if there are dangers that are open and obvious of which an invitee knows or of which it is charged with knowledge, then the occupier owes the invitee no duly to warn or protect the invitee.” However, the Summers court relied on Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.1963), which the Parker court explicitly overruled. See Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 516-17. Thus, we decline to follow Summers.