Court Opinion

ID: 9592961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:18:15.274955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:17.813395
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice
(dissenting).
I would affirm.
It appears to me that the majority opinion complicates otherwise simple issues by straining to avoid a definitive answer as to which version of SDCL 30-5A-3 was in effect and applicable to the facts of this case.
At the time of Geneve’s death, 30-5A-3 provided that Floyd’s right to an elective share abated upon his death. Under the 1986 amendment to 30-5A-3, his right to an elective share would have inured to the benefit of his estate.
The majority holds that under SDCL 30-5A-6, the elective share does not “vest” until publication of the first notice to creditors. I disagree. In my opinion, 30-5A-6, entitled “Proceeding for elective share,— Time limit” is a procedural statute which merely implements the rights which had “vested” under the prior sections, and specifically 30-5A-3.
Under the majority holding, 30-5A-6 is read in isolation and totally ignores the language and significance of the language of 30-5A-3. We must read both 30-5A-3 and 30-5A-6 together in determining the legislative intent and in deciding this case. State v. Hoxeng, 315 N.W.2d 308 (S.D.1982); Hot Springs Independent Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Fall River Landowners Ass’n., 262 N.W.2d 33 (S.D.1978).
The majority’s holding ignores and reverses earlier language in its opinion, specifically that no retroactive application can be given to 30-5A-3 (see page 515, footnote 1), by in reality giving it retroactive application through its interpretation of 30-5A-6.
The 1986 amendment to 30-5A-3 cannot be given retroactive application, under the authority cited by the majority. See footnote 1 citing First Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. Kehn Ranch, 394 N.W.2d 709 *517(S.D.1986); Matter of Adams, 329 N.W.2d 882 (S.D.1983); see also Johnson v. Kusel, 298 N.W.2d 91 (S.D.1980); In re Scott’s Estate, 81 S.D. 231, 133 N.W.2d 1 (1965); Duster v. Gregory County, 63 S.D. 20, 256 N.W. 145 (1934) (Supreme Court cannot give retroactive effect to a statute under the guise of interpreting prior law amended thereby).
Thus, Floyd’s right to an elective share abated on his death irrespective of the lack of compliance, or ability to comply, with the procedural guidelines of 30-5A-6. To hold otherwise would necessarily give a retroactive application to the 1986 amendment of 30-5A-3. Further, had the estate been commenced appropriately and timely (which was certainly within Floyd’s ability, since he held the will and neglected or refused to offer it for probate) and had the probate proceeded in the typical, timely manner, there would be no question for us to resolve. The majority has improperly rewarded Floyd’s estate for Floyd’s inaction.