Court Opinion

ID: 9697716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:27:35.920705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:34.842917
License: Public Domain

*87Justice CASTILLE,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion with the sole exception of the first sentence in footnote 3. In that sentence, the majority states that a petitioner can “avoid” the PCRA’s proscription on waived claims if he makes an “adequate and properly layered claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at his first opportunity to do so.” The majority then rejects the ineffectiveness claim made here, which purports to apply to all of appellant’s underlying waived claims of trial error, because it is undeveloped.
Although our cases have occasionally, and somewhat imprecisely, suggested that a claim of counsel ineffectiveness “avoids” or “excuses” waiver, in fact that is not the manner in which the PCRA operates and, to provide guidance to the bench and bar, I would be more precise in my analysis of the question. Waived claims, such as the claims of trial error which appellant here could have raised on direct appeal but did not, are waived without qualification under the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 212 (Pa.2001). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, on the other hand, is a distinct claim of constitutional dimension, which is itself specifically deemed cognizable under the PCRA — provided, of course, that the ineffectiveness claim itself was not waived at an earlier stage of the proceedings. Id.
As a practical matter, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are often “derivative” of claims of trial error which have been waived; i.e., trial counsel is alleged to have been ineffective for failing to raise a claim which is now perceived by subsequent counsel upon review of the record. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 525 & n. 5 (Pa.2001). That is, indeed, what appellant has alleged here as to his waived claims, albeit he does so in boilerplate fashion. Such a claim of ineffectiveness, if successful, could be said to “excuse” the waiver of the underlying claim in the limited sense that the event at trial will now be subject to some review, albeit through the guise of the standards governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. But it is essential to realize that it *88is only the ineffectiveness version of the claim which is cognizable under the PCRA. See Pierce, supra. This recognition is important because the Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness standard is distinct from the standards that govern the myriad of underlying claims that might have been waived. As I noted in my concurring opinion in Williams:
The underlying non-cognizable claim, which often is not itself even of constitutional dimension (for example, many evidentiary claims or claims regarding jury instructions), is relevant only as it bears upon the Sixth Amendment analysis. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586-87, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (constitutional ineffectiveness standard under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) “differs significantly from the elements of proof applicable to” Fourth Amendment claim; thus, while meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is essential to Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness arising from failure to pursue Fourth Amendment issue, meritorious Fourth Amendment claim alone does not prove ineffectiveness; Strickland “gross incompetence” test must be met to prevail on Sixth Amendment claim); Commonwealth v. Green, 551 Pa. 88, 92 n. 4, 709 A.2d 382, 383, n. 4 (1998) (analysis of abandoned claim “is undertaken solely for the purpose of resolving questions of ineffective representation”), quoting Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 278, 372 A.2d 687, 696 (1977); Senk v. Zimmerman, 886 F.2d 611, 614 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 756, 107 L.Ed.2d 772 (1990) (ineffectiveness claims are concerned with defense attorney’s performance; underlying issue is only “indirectly implicate[d]”).
782 A.2d at 535 (Castille, J., concurring).
In this case, the majority unquestionably is correct that appellant’s claims of trial court error, which he develops at length in his brief, are waived under the PCRA. Appellant’s overarching and constitutionally distinct claim of ineffective assistance of counsel — which is raised at the end of his brief, and in which he faults prior counsel “to the extent .... *89counsel failed to litigate” the claims developed elsewhere in the brief, Initial Brief of Appellant, 97 — is not waived under the PCRA, since the PCRA stage was appellant’s first opportunity to challenge the stewardship of trial/direct appeal counsel. Nevertheless, in my opinion, that claim fails on the merits because appellant has failed to even attempt to meet the substantive Strickland standard. Boilerplate allegations, such as appellant makes here, have never been sufficient to discharge the affirmative burden to rebut the presumption that counsel was effective. Pierce, supra, 786 A.2d at 221; Commonwealth v. Pettus, 492 Pa. 558, 424 A.2d 1332, 1335 (1981) (court will not consider boilerplate claims of ineffective assistance). See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 546 Pa. 296, 684 A.2d 1037, 1045 (1996) (speculative claim of ineffectiveness summarily rejected; ineffectiveness claims cannot be raised in vacuum) (citing cases); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 521 Pa. 482, 556 A.2d 370, 372 (1989) (defendant bears burden of proving allegations of ineffective assistance by submission of relevant proofs); Commonwealth v. Hentosh, 520 Pa. 325, 554 A.2d 20, 24 (1989) (same). Accord Commonwealth v. Rivers, 776 A.2d 1009 (Pa.2001) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court). Commonwealth v. Ragan, 645 A.2d 811, 829 (Pa.1994) (boilerplate allegation is no basis for relief in capital PCRA appeal).
Subject to the foregoing qualification, I join the majority opinion.