Court Opinion

ID: 9653200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:40:57.178128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.982001
License: Public Domain

LETTS, District Judge
(dissenting).
Being unable to concur in full with the decision of the court, I shall briefly state the grounds of my dissent. These relate only to that part of the opinion and decision dealing with the sufficiency of the plea in bar as raised by the defendant’s request No. 4 for rulings by Judge Hale. The court here agrees that the burden is upon the government to establish the fact that the defendant was “fleeing from justice” during the interim, or a sufficient part thereof, between October 10, 1929, and February 15,1933, so as to toll the running of the statute of limitations.
The indictment does not allege, nor is there evidence of, any fixed or usual place of abode. The record suggests that the defendant was an itinerant, both before and after the commission of the offense. It does not, *297however, disclose that this practice was any different after October 10, 1929, than prior thereto. During the whole three-vcar period in question there was outstanding no warrant of arrest, no pending indictment, no notice lof complaint or intended prosecution. So-far as the record discloses, the defendant was fleeing from nothing and not even absent from a usual place of abode, as nono was alleged or established. There is no evidence that during the time the defendant was at New Orleans, Hot Springs, Estes Park, Colo., the Hotel Palmer, Chicago, or other places, he concealed Ms identity or cloaked his movements with any secrecy.
Judge Hale in overruling the plea in abatement does not disclose tho grounds or findings upon which that action was predicated. Granting, however, that his action -of necessity involved a finding of fact that the defendant moved about for the purpose and with the intent of avoiding arrest, still, unless there be some evidence upon which to base such a finding, it remains for this court an unmixed question of law.
The cases cited in the majority opinion do not, as I view them, support the conclusion reached in this ease. In the ease of United States v. O’Brian, Fed. Cas. No. 15,908, the jury found for the defendant on the ground that the offense was barred.
In Streep v. United States, 160 U. S. 128, 16 S. Ct. 244, 40 L. Ed. 365, there was ample evidence of a fleeing from justice of the state of New York. The only issue involved was whether a fleeing from justice by a defendant in order to toll the statute of limitations must he a fleeing from the justice of tho United States. The court held that it is not necessary that there be an intent to avoid the justice of the United States if there is established an intent to avoid the justice of the state having criminal jurisdiction over the same territory and the same act.
In the ease of Greene v. United States (C. C. A.) 154 F. 401, it appears that instructions had been issued to the deputy marshals of the district wherein the defendants resided, and that the defendants could not there be found, that they were found in the Southern district of New York, that they there resisted proceedings to remove them to Georgia for trial, and later fled to Canada. The indictment itself charged that the defendants were persons fleeing from justice, and, supported by tbe aforementioned evidence, the question of fact was submitted to the jury and found adversely to the defendants.
In tho case of Ferebee v. United States (C. C. A.) 295 F. 850, the court had before it the question only as to whether one may within the meaning of the statute flee from justice without leaving the district wherein he resided. The defendant’s usual place of abode was clearly established, and there was evidence of the defendant’s departure therefrom and purposeful concealment.
The case of United States v. Hewecker (C. C.) 79 F. 59, so far as it deals with the question of what constitutes a fleeing from justice, sustained the plea in abatement holding that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the period that the defendant, although outside the country, was there being held imprisoned under a charge and conviction for a crime there committed.
It seems to me that the effect of the majority opinion, in view of the state of the record, is virtually to set aside the statute of limitations here applicable. Granting in this case that tho defendant is deserving of punishment, the remedy to avoid miscarriage of justice in such eases is for complaining witnesses and prosecuting officials not to delay action on their part until after tho statutory period has run.
The judgment of the District Court in overruling the plea in abatement should be reversed.