Court Opinion

ID: 9858404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:22:21.918794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:08.623526
License: Public Domain

Millwee, J. (Dissenting). I cannot concur in the conclusion of the majority that the landowners’ answer was sufficient to invoke equitable relief. Apparently this conclusion was reached on the authority of the quoted statement from the case of Selle v. Fayetteville, 207 Ark. 966, 184 S. W. 2d 58. While the majority dismisses the case of St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Fort Smith & Van Buren Railway Co., 104 Ark. 344, 148 S. W. 531, because it only involved the matter of trackage of one railroad line across another, it will be noted that this case is the only Arkansas authority cited in support of the statement in the Selle case, which the majority so fondly embraces. Although many allegations of fraud are detailed on pages 349 and 350 of the opinion in that case, the court in reference thereto said: “They were too vague and indefinite, and amounted to only statements of conclusions which were not sufficient to warrant a restraint of appellee’s right to exercise its charter powers.” The question of the amount of land taken was not an issue in the case. In 14 A. L. R. 1431, which is the other authority cited in the Selle case, the annotator states the following rule laid down by the authorities: “ It is a general principle that the Legislature cannot authorize the taking of property in excess of that required for the public use, such excess to be sold or devoted to private use. ” As an abstract proposition of law the statement in the Selle case is correct although it is obiter dictum and the sufficiency of pleadings was in no manner involved therein. The statement that an excessive taking is sufficient to warrant equitable relief is, of course, based on the assumption that a proper pleading has been filed setting forth facts sufficient to warrant a 'conclusion that the taking is actually excessive. Can it be said that it is any less a conclusion to say that the taking is “excessive,” than to say that it is “arbitrary,” “capricious,” “discriminatory” or “wantonly injurious”? Al] the cases cited in the first paragraph of the opinion of the majority are authority for the well established rule that the answer must state facts from which a court can draw conclusions; and that the mere statement of a conclusion is not sufficient to invoke equitable relief. In the case of Niemeyer and Darragh v. Little Rock Junction Railway, 43 Ark. 120, relied on by the landowners, this court upheld the action of the chancellor in refusing to enjoin the taking where the pleadings contained a more detailed statement of facts than is set forth in the instant case. See, also, St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Faisst, 99 Ark. 61, 137 S. W. 815. Since the allegations of the answer do not set forth sufficient facts to invoke equitable relief, the chancellor was correct in declining to assume jurisdiction and in remanding the case to the circuit court for trial. The school district’s petition for mandamus to the circuit court should, therefore, be granted. Judge George Rose Smith concurs in this dissent.