Court Opinion

ID: 9742956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:23:17.923794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:38.060052
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting: Were there in the complaint or proceedings in this case an allegation that these plaintiffs were aware that the validity of the retirement ordinance, pursuant to which they were discharged, was being challenged in the Sibley litigation and that they had been advised by counsel to await its outcome, or had independently reached that conclusion, I would join the court’s opinion. There is no such allegation, nor is there even an allegation that these plaintiffs knew the Sibley suit was pending. Plaintiffs have made no attempt to excuse their nearly two-year delay in seeking reinstatement, and under our case law as it has heretofore existed, the motion to strike and dismiss their complaint because “not timely brought” should have been allowed. The majority opinion does not refer to what I had considered to be the existing rule, established by numerous cases in this and the appellate court, that discharged public employees seeking review of their discharges must file their complaints for review within six months of the time of discharge or explain in the complaints the reasons why it was not filed within that six-month period. E.g., Carroll v. Houston, 341 Ill. 531, 537; People ex rel. Macauley v. Burdette, 285 Ill. 48, 50-51; Schultheis v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill. 167, 170; Clark v. City of Chicago, 233 Ill. 113, 114-15; People ex rel. Sullivan v. Smith, 133 Ill. App. 2d 218, 220; People ex rel. Cronin v. Cahill, 118 Ill. App. 2d 18; Kadon v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 45 Ill. App. 2d 425; People ex rel. Ballinger v. O’Connor, 13 Ill. App. 2d 317. Illustrative of the cases stating the reasons for and applying the six-months laches rule is Kadon, where it was said: “Delay in prosecuting a cause of action is one of the elements of laches and its importance is relative to the action involved. In some types of action it is the most important element. *** And in civil service cases, where prolonged delay may easily prejudice governmental bodies, impair orderly procedures and work to the disadvantage of third parties, time is an essential factor. The most stringent requirement timewise is in those cases brought by civil service employees to compel reinstatement and payment of back salaries after discharges alleged to be illegal. A rule has been established that if these actions are not brought within six months of the discharge they will be barred on the ground of laches, unless a reasonable explanation can be given for the delay. People ex rel. Cifaldi v. Wilson, 38 Ill. App. 2d 302, 187 N.E.2d 353; People ex rel. Ballinger v. O’Connor, 13 Ill. App. 2d 317, 142 N.E.2d 144.” 45 Ill. App. 2d 425, 430. In People ex rel. Macauley v. Burdette, 285 Ill. 48, 51, the court stated with reference to a discharged clerk in the State grain inspection office who delayed filing for 10 months and 13 days after his discharge: “There was nothing stated in this petition showing why the petition was not filed within six months. We see no escape, under the above authorities, from holding that the relator was guilty of laches in not filing his petition within six months after his discharge.” This language was quoted with approval in Carroll v. Houston, 341 Ill. 531, 537. Because the complaints in this case refer to Sibley as deciding plaintiffs were wrongfully discharged, the majority opinion states that “it is a reasonable and logical inference that all relators at bar were awaiting the outcome of the prior, controlling litigation” and finds this a sufficient excuse for their delay of nearly two years in filing their action. But this is not the only “reasonable and logical inference” to be drawn from their failure to act sooner. At least equally so, in my judgment, is the allegation in these proceedings that plaintiffs in fact knew nothing of the Sibley litigation until after it had been concluded and the results publicized. That allegation would seem to be corroborated by the fact that plaintiffs did not even file with the Commission a notice of their desire for reinstatement until nearly three months after the appellate court filed its Sibley opinion. There is simply nothing I have been able to find in this record which supports the majority’s statement that “all parties understood that Sibley was a test case which directly controlled relators’ claims and that relators intended to await the outcome of that litigation before bringing their actions.” The majority opinion also holds the Commission failed to raise the defense of laches because its motion to strike and dismiss did not “point out specifically the defects complained of.” That motion was based solely on the assertion that “plaintiffs’ suit is not timely brought.” It was accompanied by a memorandum of law referring to the six-months rule and citing some of the cases included in this dissenting opinion, as well as others. For the majority of this court to now hold it failed to specifically point out the defect in plaintiffs’ complaint is, in my judgment, simply unsupportable. Were this only an opinion involving two years back pay for three employees, it would, perhaps, not merit the time and effort involved in writing a dissenting opinion. But it has, in my judgment, substantially greater impact. A discharged public employee need no longer promptly notify his employer that he seeks reinstatement; instead, he may wait at least as long as two years to do so if he can point to litigation pending during that interval which in some way affected his rights even though he may have been unaware of that litigation until after its conclusion. Public bodies operate on limited budgets, and should be able to predict their financial needs with reasonable certainty. They must hire replacements for discharged employees. Those replacements acquire employment and seniority rights. These problems are not readily resolved when the discharged employees are reinstated with years (now approaching five in this case) of back pay. It is, in my judgment, not at all unreasonable in these circumstances to require, as have our previous decisions, that the discharged employee demand reinstatement and file his complaint within the six-months period following discharge or explain in a later complaint his reasons for not doing so. I would reverse the trial court and allow the motion to dismiss. MR. JUSTICE RYAN joins in this dissent.