Court Opinion

ID: 9596212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:47:13.659969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:33.327597
License: Public Domain

JOHNSTONE, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I do not believe that probable cause existed to arrest Appellant, I respectfully dissent. Simply put, the majority’s opinion flatly contradicts a principle that lies at the heart of the Fourth Amendment: an arrest must be for an offense and not as a pretext to search for incriminating evidence. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932).
I agree with the majority opinion with respect to the validity of the initial stop of Appellant. Based on the informant’s tip, there existed a reasonable and articulable suspicion to perform a Terry stop on Appellant. However, there was no probable cause to arrest Appellant and, therefore, the search of Appellant’s person was unlawful.
*11Detective Thomas received a confidential tip from a reliable informant that a black male named Jermaine would arrive at Burdette’s apartment in a blue El Cami-no with gray primer spots. The tipster went on to advise that Appellant would be carrying a large quantity of crack cocaine in his buttocks. While surveilling the apartment, Detective Thomas observed Burdette leave his apartment and exit the premises in a white Toyota. Burdette was arrested a short distance away and consented to a search of his apartment. Upon their return to the apartment parking lot, Detective Thomas and his fellow officers noticed Appellant in the blue El Camino with gray primer spots. The three officers surrounded the car and ordered Appellant to exit the vehicle. After informing Appellant that he was under investigation for trafficking in cocaine, he confirmed that his name was Jermaine and he was at the location to visit Burdette. Appellant consented to a search of his car; no drugs or weapons were found in the car. At that point, Appellant was read his rights, handcuffed, and taken into Burdette’s apartment. The three officers first commenced a search of Burdette’s apartment, finding a partially consumed marijuana cigarette, but no cocaine. The officers then began questioning Appellant, who again denied having any contraband on his person. The officers replied that they were aware the cocaine was in his buttocks; Appellant continued to deny possessing any drags. The officers then took Appellant into a small bathroom; due to its size, two officers were in the bathroom with Appellant while a third watched from the doorway. The officers pulled back the waistband of Appellant’s sweatpants and underwear, and saw a plastic bag protruding from Appellant’s buttocks. Appellant then agreed to retrieve the drags himself, which he did. He was formally placed under arrest.
In determining whether a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred, an objective standard is used. The reviewing court must look at the totality of the circumstances and analyze whether the behavior of the police would communicate to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2387, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 400 (1991). The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Mendenhall, enumerated certain circumstances that indicate a seizure has occurred, including “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980).
The facts of record unequivocally support a finding that Appellant was under arrest before being taken up to Burdette’s apartment. According to the testimony of Detective Thomas, Appellant’s car was blocked in so that he was unable to leave by vehicle. Three officers surrounded Appellant, who was alone. He was informed that he was under investigation for drag trafficking, was read his Miranda rights, and was handcuffed. Even more persuasive to a finding that Appellant was under arrest is the testimony of Detective Thomas himself. During the suppression hearing, Detective Thomas plainly conceded that Appellant was not free to go. In my opinion, any reasonable person in Appellant’s circumstances, especially one that has been read his Miranda rights and handcuffed, would believe that he was not at liberty to leave.
Probable cause must exist at the time of the arrest. Whether probable cause existed at the time Appellant was arrested — i.e. *12outside of Burdette’s apartment building— depends “upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, ... the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio. 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 145 (1964). In other words, the existence of probable cause must be determined by an examination of the totality of the circumstances.
Returning to the case at bar, the facts as known by the officers at the time they arrested Appellant were insufficient to establish probable cause. The officers’ suspicion that Appellant was carrying narcotics was based entirely on the information provided by the confidential informant. “[T]he sufficiency of probable cause for a search and an arrest without a warrant may be based upon information received through an informant so long as the informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s knowledge.” Waugh v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 605 S.W.2d 43, 45 (1980). Here, Detective Thomas had known the confidential informant for approximately five years and this informant had provided accurate information in the past. However, other factors severely undermine the reliability of the tip. First, the tip is extremely basic. While one portion of the tip predicted the location of Appellant’s contraband, the remaining portions of the tip were completely innocuous: the make and color of Appellant’s car and the fact that he would visit a certain friend later in the evening. The richness of detail provided by an informant increases the reliability of the information. United States v. Sonagere, 30 F.3d 51, 53 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1009, 115 S.Ct. 531, 130 L.Ed.2d 434 (1994). Nor did the informant state his or her basis of knowledge, which further undercuts the reliability of the tip. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2326, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 541 (1983). Of course, in examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest, any deficiency in a tip’s reliability can be supplemented by sufficient police corroboration. United States v. Padro, 52 F.3d 120, 123 (6th Cir.1995). However, that did not occur in this case. The tip was so barren of predictive facts that the police had little information to corroborate. That Appellant in fact arrived at a given location in a certain car is simply not sufficient police corroboration upon which to root probable cause for an arrest and invasive body search. Furthermore, it must be noted that the only behavior corroborated by the police was completely lawful behavior that in no way evidenced drug possession. Though the facts must be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, courts are traditionally reluctant to ascribe criminal intent to otherwise lawful behavior. United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir.1997). Having corroborated nothing other than the make and color of Appellant’s car and his presence at the predicted location, and further having found no contraband after Appellant consented to a search of his vehicle, the officers simply did not have enough information upon which to establish probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest. Accordingly, I believe Appellant was arrested in contravention of his Fourth Amendment rights and the fruits of that illegal arrest should have been suppressed.
The officers here did not make a general investigation of Appellant’s person; rather, they conducted a targeted and extremely humiliating search. Having absolutely no independent indication of contraband or unlawful activity prior to the *13search or the arrest, the officers’ conduct cannot be accurately described as anything other than an exploratory search for incriminating evidence. Appellant was arrested in violation of his Fourth Amendment protections because his warrantless arrest was based on less than probable cause. We cannot retrospectively adjudge this search lawful simply because illegal contraband was eventually found. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must extend to offenders as well as the law abiding.
STUMBO, J., joins this dissenting opinion.