Court Opinion

ID: 9737169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:18:02.411428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.920571
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I agree that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to present, during the penalty phase of the trial, the mitigating circumstance that appellant did not have a significant history of prior criminal convictions. However, I write separately to express what I believe the legislature intended regarding *535the specifically enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances involved in this case.
At the time of the penalty hearing, appellant had one prior conviction, which extraordinarily was a gunpoint robbery at the business of a previous employer of the appellant. It was counsel’s strategy to keep that information from the jury by offering other mitigating factors such as appellant’s age, his involvement in community work, and his relationship with his son.
Prior to the penalty hearing, counsel sought a ruling from the court regarding whether, by offering this evidence under section 9711(e)(8)1, the prosecutor would be barred from introducing appellant’s prior conviction. Counsel specifically stated that he was not proceeding under Section 9711(e)(1)2 so as not to mislead the jury into believing that appellant had no prior criminal convictions. Trial counsel argued that because he was introducing this evidence in mitigation to show that appellant was a good father and that in the past, he had been involved in some community activities on a volunteer basis, and not to portray appellant as an honest or nonviolent person, the Commonwealth should be prohibited from presenting the fact of appellant’s prior conviction since such bore no relationship to those traits which he sought to portray. The trial court ruled that the Commonwealth could not rebut this particular character testimony by introducing appellant’s prior conviction. The court, however, cautioned defense counsel that should the witness volunteer that appellant had never been in any trouble or had always been a model, law abiding citizen or “does anything that I [the trial judge] think unfairly portrays the defendant in a light that would allow *536this conviction,” the Commonwealth would then be permitted to rebut that evidence with evidence of appellant’s prior conviction.
Prior to announcing his ruling, the trial judge noted that proof of a single prior conviction would not be admissible to establish the aggravating circumstance of significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9).3 He also remarked that there was no case law on whether, given the parameters of the evidence the defense sought to introduce, the Commonwealth would be entitled to rebut that evidence with proof of a single prior conviction where the defense was not proceeding with the possible mitigating circumstance of lack of prior significant criminal violations.
The majority holds that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to utilize (e)(1) because a single prior criminal conviction is admissible to rebut the mitigating circumstance that the defendant does not have a significant history of prior criminal convictions. In support thereof, the majority relies upon footnote 4 of our decision in Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 506 Pa. 228, 484 A.2d 1365 (1984). I believe, however, that footnote 4 of Szuchon is dictum and, therefore, of no binding precendential value.
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Flaherty concludes that when a defendant attempts to establish the mitigating circumstance pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(1)4, the character of the defendant is made an issue necessarily and, therefore, cross-examination and/or rebuttal as to the defendant’s character is proper. I disagree.
As we noted in Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 *537L.Ed.2d 296 (1984), the purpose of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is to narrow the category of cases wherein the death penalty will be imposed and to provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the cases in which that penalty is appropriate from those in which it is not. It is my belief, therefore, that in enacting mitigating circumstance (e)(1), the legislature intended to provide a defendant the opportunity to argue to the jury that he or she has no significant criminal history. Similarly, as Mr. Justice Zappalla notes in his dissent, mitigating circumstance (e)(8) was intended to afford the defendant an opportunity to inform the jury of some “positive qualities” in his or her life that should be considered in the jury’s determination of whether a sentence of death is appropriate. While both sections technically deal with the character of the defendant, it is clear that the legislature intended each section in a “specific” manner and did not intend that, by presenting this type of evidence in mitigation, a defendant would be placing his or her character at issue, thereby opening the door for the Commonwealth to rebut on the issue of character.
The dissent, on the other hand, argues that our holding in Commonwealth v. Goins, 508 Pa. 270, 495 A.2d 527 (1985), is controlling. The issue in Goins was whether a single felony conviction for a crime involving the use or threat of violence to the person may suffice to establish aggravating circumstance (d)(9). We held therein that such conviction would not suffice; finding that the Legislature intentionally used the plural form “convictions” to exclude a single conviction. The dissent would have us find that based upon our holding in Goins, the plural term “convictions” as used in (e)(1) should be construed to mean that a single prior conviction alone could not be used in rebuttal where a defendant asserts that he has no significant history of criminal convictions. However, I do not believe that the legislature intended that the aggravating and the mitigating circumstance of “no significant history” be interpreted in the same manner.
*538In construing the relevant statutes, and in ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly, we presume that the legislature did not intend a result that is either absurd or unreasonable. Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1). See also, Goodman v. Kennedy, 459 Pa. 313, 329 A.2d 224 (1974); Lehigh Valley Co-op. Farmers v. Commonwealth, Bureau of Employment, Secretary, Department of Labor and Industry, 498 Pa. 521, 447 A.2d 948 (1982). To extend our rationale in Goins to the facts of the instant case would clearly lead to an absurd result. Initially, I would note that the language employed in these two sections differs significantly. Aggravating circumstance (d)(9) employs the terms “felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person,” while mitigating circumstance (e)(1) employs the terms “prior criminal convictions.”
Additionally, under the Sentencing Code, aggravating circumstances must be proved by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas mitigating circumstances must be proved by the defendant by only a preponderance of the evidence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (c)(l)(iii). The verdict must be a sentence of death, however, if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(l)(iv). Thus, because one aggravating circumstance alone may mandate the imposition of the death penalty, the legislature in its wisdom, placed a higher burden on the Commonwealth to prove that the imposition of the most severe penalty possible is appropriate. In my view, therefore, our holding in Goins was correct; albeit not for the technical reason of its use of the plural “convictions,” but because it is in keeping with the intended meaning of the statute and the legislative desire to ensure that a person with only one violent act in his past not be subjected to aggravating circumstance (d)(9).
Clearly, (e)(1) was designed for a wholly different purpose. It was created in order to provide the defendant with a potential life saving argument. But it would be absurd to conclude that in so doing, the legislature intended to deceive *539or distort the true facts and thereby mislead the jury. The legislature could not have intended to afford a defendant who has a single prior conviction for rape, attempted murder or kidnapping for example, the opportunity to stand before the jury and inform them that he has “no significant history of criminal convictions” and thus, imply that he has a crime free past when, in fact, his prior history includes a single heinous crime. It would neither be reasonable to conclude that a defendant with two, three or five minor, non-violent convictions, be precluded from arguing to the jury that he or she has “no significant history of criminal convictions” based on the number of convictions alone. Rather, it is more reasonable to conclude that what the legislature intended was for the jury to determine what is and what is not “significant” when being offered a mitigating circumstance for its consideration. Because (e)(1) is not limited to prior convictions involving violence or threat to the person as is (d)(9), it is only reasonable to conclude that it was intended to provide a defendant who has a prior record the opportunity to argue in mitigation that he or she has no significant criminal history. However, in so doing, a defendant must bear the natural and reasonable consequence of his or her decision. Section (e)(1) could not have been designed to defraud the jury where a defendant in fact has a prior conviction. Therefore, the Commonwealth should be permitted to rebut with proof of the defendant’s prior convictions, irrespective of whether the defendant’s criminal history includes only a single conviction or more than one.
In Commonwealth v. Lesko, 502 Pa. 511, 467 A.2d 307 (1983), we reiterated the test for determining ineffectiveness of trial counsel as first stated by our Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). In Lesko, we stated:
“Initially, trial counsel is presumed to be competent, and hie alleged ineffective actions must be evaluated to determine whether the strategy chosen is founded upon a reasonable basis designed to further his client’s inter*540ests. (emphasis in original). We recently reaffirmed this test for determining ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
“The test of constitutional effective assistance of counsel is whether a particular course chosen by counsel has some reasonable basis designed to effectuate its client’s interest. (Citations omitted) (Emphasis in original). The initial factor that is considered in applying this standard is whether the matters counsel is charged with failing to pursue had arguable merit. (Citations omitted).”
Commonwealth v. Wade, 501 Pa. 331, 461 A.2d 613 (1983). See also, Commonwealth v. Upsher, 497 Pa. 621, 444 A.2d 90 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977).5
This rule is founded upon the inequity of finding trial counsel ineffective for pursuing a strategy which at the time appeared to be in his client’s best interest____ Therefore, in reviewing trial counsel’s strategy, we must place ourselves in the position of trial counsel at the time the strategy was formulated to determine if the alternatives chosen were reasonable.”
Applying this standard, it'is clear that counsel’s decision not to pursue the mitigating factor of “no significant history of prior criminal convictions” pursuant to (e)(1) was reasonable and designed to protect appellant’s interests. As discussed above, had counsel proceeded under (e)(1), the Commonwealth would have been permitted to rebut with proof of appellant’s prior conviction. By employing the strategy he did, however, counsel succeeded in keeping from the jury, the fact of appellant’s prior conviction which quite clearly would have prejudiced appellant. Counsel’s actions cannot, therefore, be deemed to be ineffective. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987); Commonwealth v. Lesko, supra.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 provides:
(e) Mitigating circumstances. — Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:
(8) Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(1) provides:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.

. 42 Pa.S.C. § 9711(d) provides:
(d) Aggravating circumstances. — Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(9) The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.

. While Mr. Justice Flaherty does not explicitly state that the mitigating circumstance to which he is referring is, indeed, (e)(1), it appears to this writer to be the only logical inference.

. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977) was reversed and remanded on other grounds. See, Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 485 Pa. 353, 402 A.2d 999 (1979).