Court Opinion

ID: 9671841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:43:52.082216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:12.415505
License: Public Domain

JON E WILCOX, J.
¶ 59. {concurring). I reluctantly agree with the majority's holding in this case. I write separately, however, to address the serious concerns raised by the broad language in Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6) (2001-02),1 and I strongly urge the legislature to take a hard look at the practical consequences of this subsection. Although I am personally troubled with the end result, the plain language of § 974.07(6) gives Moran the right to access the "bloody brick" for DNA testing if, on remand, the circuit court determines that Moran meets all of the statutory prerequisites.
¶ 60. First, the plain language of § 974.07(6)(a)2. requires the district attorney to make available to the defendant "[pjhysical evidence that is in the actual or constructive possession of a government agency and that contains biological material or on which there is biological material." Contrary to the State's position, nothing in subsection (6) requires the district attorney to make available only materials that have already been tested. In contrast, § 974.07(6)(a)l., explicitly contains language specifying that the district attorney must release "[f]ind-ings based on testing of biological materials." (Emphasis added.) Thus, while subdivision 1. is expressly limited to material that has been tested, I fully agree with the majority that "[t]he second subdivision contains no such qualification, and it is not this court's role to supply such language." Majority op., ¶ 40.
¶ 61. Second, the plain language of § 974.07(6) states that "[t]his subsection does not apply unless the *53information being disclosed or the material being made available is relevant to the movant's claim at issue in the motion made under sub. (2)." Wis. Stat. § 974.07(6)(d). Subsection (2), in turn, requires that the evidence "has not previously been subjected to forensic [DNA] testing or, if the evidence has previously been tested, it may now be subjected to another test. .. ." Wis. Stat. § 974.07(2)(c). Thus, § 974.07(2)(a) further demonstrates that subsection (6) is not limited to material previously tested.
¶ 62. Therefore, based on the plain language of the relevant statutes, I am compelled to conclude that § 974.07(6) requires the district attorney to make available for DNA testing all physical evidence containing biological material, regardless of whether it was previously tested, if the requirements of § 974.07(2) are satisfied.
¶ 63. I fully acknowledge the value and importance of DNA evidence and testing to the criminal justice system. However, in light of this court's holding that recently-discovered DNA evidence not available during trial results in the real controversy not being tried and warrants a reversal of a conviction, see State v. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, 283 Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98, the majority opinion in this case will have far-reaching consequences for the finality of convictions. While I am sensitive to the problem of false convictions, Armstrong and today's majority opinion have the potential to overburden our justice system and work great mischief for numerous legitimate convictions.
¶ 64. In Armstrong, this court held that the defend.ant was entitled to a new trial based on newly-discovered DNA evidence because it concluded that such DNA evidence proved "the real controversy was not fully tried," id., ¶ 2, despite the "mountain of other *54evidence incriminating Armstrong that [was] not affected in any way by the DNA test results at issue." Id., ¶ 174 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). Essentially, the Armstrong majority, "equate[d] the idea of the 'matter not being fully tried' with new scientific identification procedures in a way that threatens to reopen convictions statewide every time a scientific improvement occurs, regardless of the lack of a probable effect on the issues underlying the jury's verdict." Id., ¶ 180 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). Thus, the combined result of Armstrong and the present case is that convicted criminals now have easy access to biological material for DNA testing and a lower threshold to meet to overturn their conviction based on the results of that testing, even if there is a mountain of evidence supporting their conviction.
¶ 65. I note that the legislative history of § 974.07(6) indicates that the provision was added by a Legislative Reference Bureau attorney who suggested that a "discovery provision for postconviction DNA testing" was necessary. Letter from Robin Ryan and Michael Dsida, Legislative Attorneys, to Scott Walker, Waukesha Representative in the Wisconsin State Assembly (Dec. 8, 2000) (on file with the Legislative Reference Bureau). However, the drafting records contain very little commentary on this new provision. It seems that no one involved considered this provision as an additional means of obtaining material for testing; rather, the provision was viewed merely as a discovery provision of material that had already been tested. The drafters apparently assumed there were two possible ways that postconviction DNA testing could happen: mandatory court-ordered testing and discretionary court-ordered testing.
*55¶ 66. Also, I note that the majority opinion seems to open up § 974.07(6) to an attack on equal protection grounds. The majority states that under subsection (6) "the movant must conduct any testing of the evidence at his or her own expense." Majority op., ¶ 3. It would seem that there is no reason why someone who cannot afford to pay for such testing would not be equally entitled to such evidence.
¶ 67. In sum, the plain language of § 974.07(6) leads me to reluctantly join the majority opinion. As such, I respectfully concur.
¶ 68. I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence.