Court Opinion

ID: 9473083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:18:58.042688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:18.694766
License: Public Domain

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge,
with whom HEANEY, Circuit Judge, joins dissenting.
Relying on the reasoning set forth in the panel opinion, I dissent. See Premachan-dra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717, 723-30 (8th Cir.1984). I write simply to highlight what I perceive to be the weaknesses in the majority opinion. The majority reaches its conclusion first by treating the language of the statute as clear. The language of the statute is far from clear. The cases cited by the majority, see supra at 636-37, which represent the varying conclusions reached by other courts, are evidence of the difficulty that the language of the statute presents. When a statute is ambiguous it clearly is appropriate for a court to look to the legislative history in order to discern the Congressional intent behind the statute. See Lambur v. Yates, 148 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir.1945). Indeed, a court may be obligated to do so. See Ashley Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1365 (8th Cir.1980). Not only is the majority opinion inconsistent with the Congressional intent behind the Equal Access to Justice Act, but the major*643ity could reach its conclusion only by completely disregarding the legislative history.
Second, the majority argues that Prema-chandra’s interpretation of § 2412(b) could “render nugatory the ‘substantially justified’ and ‘special circumstances’ limits in section 2412(d),”1 even though the majority concedes that not every violation of a federal statute will support a § 1983 action. See infra at 638. As noted in the panel opinion § 2412(d) was designed primarily to encourage small businesses to contest the unreasonable exercise of federal agency action. See H.R.Rep. No. 1418 at 9, 10; 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 4988. Accordingly, § 2412(d) was envisioned as a catchall provision, encompassing a broad range of federal regulatory litigation not already covered by existing fee shifting statutes. Id. at 18; 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 4997.
Instead of adopting an interpretation of § 2412(b) which would leave it and § 2412(d) intact, the majority adopts an interpretation of § 2412(b) that, in effect, reads out of the statute the language at issue here. The statute provides as follows:
The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.
28 U.S.C. § 2312(b). Under the majority’s interpretation the United States is not liable to the “same extent that any other party would be liable under ... any statute which specifically provides for such an award,” because the federal government does not share the same liability that local governments bear under § 1983 and § 1988 for the unconstitutional acts of their officials. Under the majority’s interpretation of § 2412(b), the only time the federal government would be liable for the unconstitutional acts of its officers is when those officers act in concert with a state official and thus meet the state action requirement of § 1983. This circumstance is one so rare as to be virtually non-existent. It is true, as the majority opinion notes, that a waiver of sovereign immunity should be construed strictly. A court should not, however, construe a remedial statute so strictly that, as a practical matter, recovery under the statute becomes unduly restrictive.
Finally, the majority goes to some length to explain why the Derfner testimony and thé amendment of the statute subsequent to that testimony were irrelevant. Derf-ner’s remarks centered around the liability of other governmental bodies in civil rights cases, and he suggested a change in the wording of the statute in order to put the federal government “completely on a par as far as the enforcement of important constitutional and statutory rights.” Award of Attorneys’ Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1980). The fact is that the statute was amended following Derfner’s testimony, and it was amended in substantial accordance with his suggestion. Thus, it is a mischaracterization to say that there was Congressional silence regarding Derfner’s testimony. While true literally, the amendment itself must be seen as a significant response to Derfner’s suggestion. If that suggestion was in fact consistent with the intent behind the statute, then one would not suspect the amendment to be surrounded by a great deal of discussion. Indeed, one would expect discussion to have ensued if *644the amendment had been inconsistent with Congressional intent.
Further, the entire thrust of the legislative history lends significance to Derfner’s testimony because his suggestions were consistent with the result Congress was trying to reach. At this point it cannot be disputed that the EAJA was intended to put the federal government and civil litigants on equal footing. See Premachan-dra, 727 F.2d at 727-28, 729. It is also clear that Congress intended this parity to exist with regard to civil rights actions. See id. at 729. That is, Congress sought to guarantee that citizens would not be deterred from vindicating their rights simply because of the enormous costs involved in civil rights litigation. Yet the majority opinion disregards this intent2 and federal officials are as free under the majority opinion to violate the constitutional rights of citizens as they were before the EAJA was enacted. What then, could have been the purpose of enacting this waiver of sovereign immunity?
It is clear that the majority has made a policy decision regardless of Congressional intent, which is precisely what the federal government has been asking this court to do all along. From the perspective of public policy, the decision may or may not be a good one. That is beside the point, however, because courts of law are not supposed to be in the business of enacting public policy. This is true particularly where the Congress has, as a matter of public policy, decided to enact a law which would deter unconstitutional acts by federal officials and would serve as a basis of recovery for the victims of unconstitutional acts by federal officials acting in their official capacities.
I therefore, would affirm the district court and do respectfully dissent from the majority view in this opinion.

. The majority also voices the concern that litigants barred from recovery under § 2412(d) would be able to recover fees against the government under the panel’s interpretation of § 2412(b). However, this court’s experience with the overwhelming number of social security appeals in the last few years is evidence of the extent to which individuals’ statutory rights may be violated without running afoul of the Constitution or § 1983. See generally Heaney, "Why the High Rate of Reversals in Social Security Disability Cases,” 7 Hamline L.Rev. 1 (1984).

. The majority argues that "the legislative history demonstrates a congressional reluctance to assign expansive liability for attorneys’ fees to the government.” Supra at 640-41. However, the authority relied on by the majority simply does not support this proposition. Indeed, a contrary interpretation could be gleaned easily from this authority.
[T]he bill ensures that the United States will be subject to the common law and statutory exceptions to the American rule regarding attorney fees. This change will allow a court in its discretion to award fees against the United States to the same extent it may presently award such fees against other parties.
H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4984 (emphasis added).