Court Opinion

ID: 9691295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:23:40.597581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:16.061661
License: Public Domain

Yeager, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The dissent does not go to everything that is contained in the opinion. It does go however to the proposition which is basic in the determination of the action.
My objection is that the majority opinion upholds section 60-105, R. S. Supp., 1949, as a valid exercise of the policé power of the state whereas in Blixt v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 145 Neb. 717, 18 N. W. 2d 78, this court held that it was not, which holding I submit properly construed the provision.
The statutory provision to the extent necessary to quote it here is as follows: “No person * * * acquiring a motor vehicle * * * from the owner thereof * * * shall acquire any right, title, claim, or interest in or to such motor vehicle * * * until he shall have had issued to him a certificate of title to such motor vehicle * * * or delivered to him a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate for the same; nor shall.any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such person against a person having possession of such certificate of title or manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate for such motor vehicle * * * for a valuable consideration. No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim .or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle * * * sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evi*644denced by a certificate of title * •* * duly issued, in accordance with the provisions of this act.”
In Blixt v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., supra, it was said:
“This provision is part of an act the design of which is to control within fixed limits the use and operation of motor vehicles and to establish methods and means for conveyance of title in order that the provisions for control and use may be made effective. It is a regulatory act under the police power. As such, no doubt, it is a valid exercise of the police power.
“The provision goes far beyond a mere regulation under the police power. It amounts to an invasion of the right of contract, the impairment of rights of property and a restriction upon the right of the courts to weigh and consider evidence and to make determinations with regard to title and ownership of property and contractual rights and obligations.”
While it is true that in the opinion in Blixt v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., supra, no case was cited to support the conclusion arrived at it occurs to me that the case at bar classically demonstrates its validity and the fallacy of the conclusions arrived at in the majority opinion herein.
In order to make my point clear I shall restate the facts as. they are disclosed by the record. I do not suggest that the facts are incorrectly stated in the majority opinion. They are correctly stated but not in such manner as to present the focus which appears to me to be appropriate.
On April 29, 1947, one James B. Skipper as owner of the automobile in question here sold it to Lester L. Kornfeld, the intervener herein, for. $1,455. Two hours later it was delivered to him. He retained possession of it from that time until July 26; 1947. He never received a certificate of title to the automobile although he often demanded it from Skipper. He did however early in July receive a receipt for his payment. Skipper did not himself have a title certificate until May 6, 1947. The *645certificate was left with Mutual Credit Company which had a lien for $1,322.40.
On July 12, 1947, Skipper sold the automobile to the plaintiff and gave plaintiff a power of attorney authorizing one Sam Moskovitz, an employee of the plaintiff, to assign the certificate of title to the plaintiff. Possession was not at that time or later delivered to the plaintiff.
Pursuant to the authority of the power of attorney an assignment of certificate was executed and on the basis thereof plaintiff on July 25, 1947, secured a certificate of title to the automobile from the county clerk.
On July 26, 1947, at the behest of the plaintiff and without writ or process out of any court and without any other lawful authority the police department of the city of Omaha took the automobile from the possession of Lester L. Kornfeld, the intervener herein, without his consent. ■ •
Thereafter the plaintiff instituted this action in replevin against the chief of police and another police officer of the city of Omaha to recover possession of this automobile. It based, its right-of recovery on ownership evidenced by certificate of title. Kornfeld was not made a party to the action.
The police officers disclaimed any interest in the action and interposed no defense. Kornfeld intervened and claimed the right of possession ,by reason of ownership acquired by purchase of and payment for the automobile and delivery of possession to him as has been hereinbefore described.
The'majority opinion effectually concludes that under the authority of the statute quoted Kornfeld was debarred from asserting any right or claim of right to title or ownership in this automobile in this action or in any action at law or equity.-
The effect of this conclusion is to run afoul of well-established fundamental principles of law relating to property and rights therein and thereto.
*646It is well established in this jurisdiction that a person in the exclusive possession of personal property is prima facie presumed to be the owner thereof and that a stranger to the transaction by which the possession was obtained is charged with notice of the claims of the possessor. Booknau v. Clark, 58 Neb. 610, 79 N. W. 159; First Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 111 Neb. 441, 196 N. W. 691.
No wrong on the part of Kornfeld led the plaintiff into the purchase of this automobile, so therefore there is neither legal nor equitable basis upon which to base a conclusion that Kornfeld should be the victim of the fraud of Skipper rather than the plaintiff.
To the extent that section 60-105, R. S. Supp., 1949, declares that no person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner thereof shall acquire any right, title, claim, or interest in or to such motor vehicle until he shall have had issued to him a certificate of title to such motor vehicle or delivered to him a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate for the same for a valuable consideration and to the extent that it declares that no court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of aiiy person in or to any motor vehicle sold or disposed of or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced by a certificate of title duly issued, in accordance with the provisions of this act, it amounts in my opinion to an invalid, unlawful, and unconstitutional invasion of the right of contract, the impairment of rights of property, and a restriction upon the rights of the courts to weigh and consider evidence and to make determinations with regard to title and ownership of property and contractual rights and obligations.
In the majority opinion, referring to the statutory provision in question, it is said: “As such it is not violative of any part of the organic law of either the State of Nebraska or the United States especially with reference to the right of contract, the delegation or restriction of judicial powers, and due process of law.”
*647With this statement I cannot agree. Its effect is to impair the obligation of a contract and in the case at bar under the majority opinion it has not only impaired the obligation but it has utterly destroyed the fully executed and consummated contract of Kornfeld and has denied him access to either law or equity in regard to it.
I submit that what was said in Blixt v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., supra, represented a proper attitude toward the statutory provision in question and that it should be adhered to here. The fact that in other jurisdictions legislative enactments like or similar to this one have been sustained as valid and constitutional should not be regarded as an obstacle in the path of proper legal and constitutional interpretation by this court.
This provision was once stricken down and it should be permitted to remain so stricken, and the intervener herein should be permitted in this replevin action to have his rights under law to this automobile determined, the effect of which, on the record, would be to say that he was entitled in the district court to a directed verdict in his favor and a judgment thereon for possession.