Court Opinion

ID: 9643337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:26:19.659374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:59.581461
License: Public Domain

McDonald, judge.
Our prior opinions are withdrawn and the following is substituted.
The conviction is for the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug; the punishment, five years in the penitentiary.
The indictment charged that on or about the 12th day of September, 1962, the appellant “ * * * did * * * unlawfully sell to Mary Trahan, a narcotic drug, to-wit: Paregoric, in an unlawful amount.”
By motion to quash and exception to the indictment, appellant alleged that the indictment failed to charge an offense because (1) paregoric was not included within the definition of a narcotic drug as defined in Section 1, subdivision (14) of Art. 725b, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., and (2) the term “unlawful amount” used in the indictment was vague and indefinite and did not give him proper notice so that he could adequately prepare his defense.
Art. 725b, supra, provides in Section 1, subdivision (14), that ‘“Narcotic drugs’” means, among other things, “opium,” and in subdivision (12), that “ ‘Opium’ ” includes “morphine * * * and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of opium * *
While paregoric is not included within the statutory definition of a narcotic drug, the proof shows that it is, in fact, a narcotic drug known under the official drug name of “camphorated tinture of opium” and that it contains morphine, which comes from opium, a narcotic drug enumerated in the statute.
Recently, in Taylor v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 461, 358 S.W.2d 124, we upheld, as against a similar attack, an indictment alleging the unlawful possession of “a narcotic drug, to-wit: dolophine,” where the proof showed that dolophine, although not enumerated in the act, was a narcotic drug, registered under such trade name and of the same chemical substance and formula as “amidone,” which is" named in the statute. Under the Taylor case, we hold the indictment in the instant case sufficient to charge an offense.
The use of the term “unlawful amount” in the indictment can be treated as surplusage.
Prior to the 1963 amendment of Art. 725b, supra, it was provided in Section 9 of the statute “ * * * that any person may purchase at any time one (1) ounce of paregoric without a doctor’s prescription.” Such provision constituted an exception to the act, which, under the provision of Sec. 21, the state was not required to negative in the indictment. Torres v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 480, 278 S.W.2d 853; Bridges v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 556, 316 S.W.2d 757.
The state’s evidence shows that the appellant was a duly licensed pharmacist and operated a small pharmacy in the city of Port Arthur. On the day in question, he was under investigation and surveillance of certain officers in connection with the-sales and delivery of paregoric. At the instance of the officers, one Mary Trahan, a narcotic addict, called appellant on the telephone and told him she wanted to get a sixteen-ounce bottle of paregoric. Appellant replied: “All right,” and told her to go to the home of Aleñe Joseph and bring seventeen dollars. Mrs. Trahan was then equipped with a small radio transmitter under her clothing and given seventeen dollars in bills. The serial numbers on the bills were noted by the officers and the bills were treated with a chemical. Mrs. Trahan proceeded, alone, to the home of Aleñe Joseph. At the same time, Officers Mitchell, Clayton and Gilbert drove to the vicinity of the Joseph home in a panel truck and. parked about a block away from the house. In a short time appellant came to the house- and, some five minutes later, Mary Trahan; *879arrived upon the scene. When she entered the house appellant was leaving. Aleñe Joseph was inside and she asked appellant about the paregoric. Appellant inquired if she had the seventeen dollars and after she gave him the money he stated that “ ‘Aleñe has got the bottle.’ ” He then told Aleñe to give Mrs. Trahan the bottle. Appellant left and returned to his place of business. Aleñe said: “ ‘Here comes the law/ ” and then put the package in a drawer in her room. Thereupon, the three officers who were in the panel truck and had overheard the conversation between appellant and Mrs. Trahan by radio, entered and proceeded to search the house, under the authority of a search warrant.
In the search, a package containing a bottle was found by the officers in the dresser drawer in a bedroom.
It was shown by the testimony of Chemist Rolland E. Tullís, of the Department of Public Safety, that the bottle contained slightly over sixteen ounces of paregoric. Chemist Tullis testified that the official name of paregoric is “camphorated tincture of opium” and that paregoric is a narcotic ■drug in that it contains opium.
It was further shown that, following his arrest, appellant did have a trace of the chemical substance on his thumb, but none ■of the money delivered to him by Mrs. Trahan was found in his possession.
Testifying as a witness in his own behalf, appellant admitted going to the home of Aleñe Joseph on the day in question, but swore he only took with him a bundle of clothes to be laundered and nothing else. In this he was corroborated by the witness Aleñe Joseph, as will be shown later.
The jury by their verdict resolved the conflict in the testimony against appellant, and we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.
In addition to his attack upon the indictment, appellant urges three other grounds if or reversal of the conviction.
By both formal and informal bills of exception, appellant insists that the court erred in refusing to require the state to deliver to him a certain police offense report, made in connection with his arrest, to be used in cross-examination of two of the state’s witnesses, Officers Mitchell and Hunter.
The record reflects that the report was actually made by Officer Phillips in collaboration with Officers Mitchell and Hunter. Officers Mitchell and Hunter both stated that before testifying in the case they had read the report for the purpose of refreshing their memory, but the same was not exhibited before the jury or referred to by either witness in the jury’s presence.
The police report is before us for inspection, as part of the record on appeal.
While under the rule announced in Gaskin v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 7, 353 S.W.2d 467, and Pruitt v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 187, 355 S.W.2d 528, it appears that the appellant should have been furnished the report for the purpose of cross-examination of the witnesses, an examination of the report leads us to the conclusion that he was not injured thereby. The offense report does not vary materially from the two officers’ testimony given at the trial. Under such a record the court’s action does not present reversible error. Sewell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 367 S.W.2d 349.
Appellant also contends that the court erred in permitting the state to impeach its witness Aleñe Joseph.
The record reflects tha't on her direct examination the witness Joseph testified that while appellant did come to her home on the morning in question and brought some clothes to be laundered, he did not bring her a package for Mary Trahan. State’s counsel then proceeded to question her with reference to a written statement which she had made to the police. The witness admitted that she signed a statement but denied that she made statements therein which were contradictory to *880her testimony. The written statement referred to during her examination was not introduced in evidence nor was proof made of its contents. In the absence of such proof, the witness was not contradicted and no question of her impeachment is presented. Lopez v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 552, 352 S.W.2d 106.
Appellant’s last contention is that the search warrant was not produced by the State and exhibited to the Court as a valid search warrant. We agree with appellant’s contention that he would have had standing to urge this complaint, under the authority of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, had he been on the premises at the time of the search. However, the record in this case clearly shows that appellant was not present on Aleñe Joseph’s premises at the time the search was made (not even as an invitee) but was in fact back at his own place of business at such time. Under the record and the law he had no standing to complain of the search of Aleñe Joseph’s house or of the recovery of the evidence resulting from such search.
Finding 'no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.