Court Opinion

ID: 9673165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:07:32.527411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:54.657561
License: Public Domain

STERNBERG, Justice,
dissenting.
This appeal is from an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Board awarding an attorney’s fee and providing for commuting sufficient of the final payments of compensation to a lump sum for payment.
So much of KRS 342.320(2) as is pertinent to the issue provides as follows:
“* * * The entire attorney’s fee in a lump sum shall be paid directly to the attorney of record, and the board in allowing or approving an attorney’s fee, as provided in this section, shall order the payment of same directly to the attorney, commuting sufficient of the final payments of compensation payable under the award to a lump sum for that purpose.”
The movant, Livingston County Farm Supply, Inc., was the employer of the respondent William. H. Spencer, and the respondent William F. McGee was Spencer’s attorney.
In Wakenva Coal Co. v. Deaton, 233 Ky. 393, 25 S.W.2d 1024 (1930), we discussed the commutation and lump sum payment of an award. In the course of the opinion we said:
“* * * We are therefore of the opinion that the Legislature regarded the commutation of future payments of compensation to a lump sum purely as an administrative feature of the act, and lodged the final determination of that question in the board. It follows that the board’s action was not reviewable on appeal, and that the lower court erred in not sustaining the special demurrer and dismissing the petition on appeal.”
In Black Mountain Corporation v. Davenport, Ky., 133 S.W.2d 102 (1939), we again discussed the commutation of an award to a lump sum payment. In doing so, we quoted with approval the Wakenva Coal Co. case, supra.
In Commonwealth v. Combs, Ky., 357 S.W.2d 316 (1962), we discussed the commutation of an award and the payment of a lump sum attorney’s fee. Therein, we stated:
“The statute authorizes the Board to fix the fee and the statute makes it mandatory that sufficient payments of the award be commuted for the purpose of paying the attorney’s fee in a lump sum.
The employee and the attorney are the only parties who may object to the amount of a fee fixed by the Board. Certainly the employer has no right to question it.”
In Hicks v. General Refractories Company, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 734 (1966), we again discussed the commutation of an award so as to fix the attorney’s fee in a lump sum payment. We cited with approval Commonwealth v. Combs, supra. In addition thereto, we stated:
“Our only criticism is that the Board did not compute the discount to be credited against the award but permitted General Refractories to do it. The statute requires the Board to make the commutation. Thus, if there were any objection *80by Hicks or his attorney it could be resolved before the Board. * * * However, the mathematical computation is not questioned in this appeal.”
The order complained of is the result of purely an administrative procedure, from which no appeal lies. I would dismiss the appeal that was taken to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. I would therefore cause the action to be returned to the Workmen’s Compensation Board with directions that it make the mathematical computation necessary to effectuate and carry out its order of August 15,1977, which constitutes the basis for this appeal. If I was not so thoroughly convinced, I would concur in the majority opinion.
For the reasons herein set out, I must dissent in James R. Yocom, Commissioner of Labor etc. v. William H. Spencer, et a 1., and James R. Yocom, Commissioner of Labor etc. v. Comer Stevenson, et al.