Court Opinion

ID: 9382537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 22:03:58.503956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.980498
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/23; Certified for Publication 3/27/23 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION THREE

LAKE LINDERO HOMEOWNERS                             B306164
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
                                                    Los Angeles County
        Plaintiffs and Respondents,                 Super. Ct. No.
                                                    20VECP00041
        v.

CHRISTOPHER T. BARONE,

        Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Shirley K. Watkins, Judge. Affirmed.

     Christopher T. Barone, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.

     Kulik Gottesman Siegel & Ware, Thomas M. Ware II
and Justin Nash for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                  _________________________
       Defendant Christopher T. Barone appeals an order
under Corporations Code section 7616 confirming the validity
of an election removing the former board of the Lake Lindero
Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association) and electing a
new board of directors. 1 Barone makes two principal contentions:
(1) the election was not valid because it contravened the
Association’s bylaws and statutory provision governing board
recall elections, and (2) section 7616 did not authorize plaintiffs’

1      Statutory references are to the Corporations Code, unless
otherwise designated.
       Barone noticed an appeal from a “Judgment after court
trial” entered on May 4, 2020. The record, including the register
of actions, does not reflect the entry of a judgment on May 4, 2020
or any other date. Rather, on May 4, 2020, the trial court entered
an order and final statement of decision confirming the validity
of the board election under section 7616. Although that order
disposed of only one of plaintiffs’ two causes of action, plaintiffs
subsequently dismissed their remaining claim on May 22, 2020.
Because the court’s May 4, 2020 order and plaintiffs’ voluntary
dismissal collectively have “all the earmarks of a final judgment,”
Barone properly took this appeal on May 28, 2020. (Estate of
Miramontes-Najera (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 750, 755; Sullivan
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 304 [a judgment
is final “ ‘ “when it terminates the litigation between the parties
on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined” ’ ”]; PV Little
Italy, LLC v. MetroWork Condominium Assn. (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 132, 144 (PV Little Italy) [order invalidating
corporate election under § 7616 appealable where “order appealed
from accomplished that goal, and neither party has indicated that
anything more of substance remains to be done in the litigation,
except entry of judgment”].)

                                 2
action or the trial court’s order validating the recall election. 2
We reject both contentions and affirm.

2       Barone commits several pages of his opening brief to
challenging the trial court’s credibility determinations. It is
settled that “ ‘[c]onflicts and even testimony [that] is subject
to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment,
for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to
determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity
of the facts upon which a determination depends.’ ” (People
v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142, italics added, quoting
People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) We thus
disregard all contentions challenging the trial court’s credibility
determinations as insufficient to support reversal of the order.
        Barone makes other contentions that do not warrant
meaningful discussion. These include that the trial court
refused to consider an earlier ruling in an unrelated case
involving an Association recall election; that the board election
violated procedures pertaining to the election of public officials
under the Elections Code; that the court refused to admit 500
pages of exhibits submitted after the pretrial deadline and after
plaintiffs rested their case; that the court refused to compel
testimony from the Association’s attorney after Barone failed
to make an offer of proof; that the Association’s attorney violated
the Rules of Professional Conduct by his presence at the election;
that the court disregarded conflicting evidence about which
parties sent and received election materials; and that several
procedural violations (such as the failure to sign a case
management form) occurred during pretrial proceedings. Among
other shortcomings, Barone fails to support these scattershot
claims with a reasoned argument or citation to relevant legal
authorities, and he categorically fails to address, let alone satisfy,
his burden to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice occurred.
(See Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069
[An appellant “must also show that the error was prejudicial
[citation] and resulted in a ‘miscarriage of justice’ ”—i.e., that

                                   3
             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      Consistent with our standard of review for factual
questions, we state the evidence in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s factual findings, indulging all reasonable
inference in support of the court’s order. 3 (Ryland Mews
Homeowners Assn. v. Munoz (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 705, 712.)
1.    The Recall and Full Board Election
      The Association is a California non-profit corporation
charged with operating the Lake Lindero development—a 459-lot
common interest development and golf community located in

“ ‘ “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
the appealing party would have been reached in the absence
of the error.” ’ ”].) Because the opening brief fails to fulfill these
fundamental requirements of appellate process, we deem all
these contentions waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th
764, 793 [“ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with
citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished
on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass
it without consideration.’ ”].)
         We likewise deem forfeited arguments Barone makes
for the first time in his reply brief, including his claim (without
citation to the record) that the trial court purportedly interfered
with a contract Barone had with his legal counsel. (Varjabedian
v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11 [“Obvious
reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue
raised initially in the reply brief of an appellant.”].)
3     Barone filed a motion to augment the record with
documents that were not filed or lodged in the trial court.
The motion is denied. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest
Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“Augmentation
does not function to supplement the record with materials not
before the trial court.”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1).)

                                   4
Agoura Hills. The Association common areas include a golf
course, driving range, tennis courts, pool, restaurant, pro shop,
and a lake.
       Membership in the Association is appurtenant to
ownership of a lot within the development. The Association
is governed by a five-member uncompensated board of directors.
Since 2018, Lordon Management Company has provided
professional management services to the Association.
       Barone is a member of the Association and former member
of its board of directors. In December 2018, he resigned his
board position and accepted paid employment as the Association’s
chief executive officer (CEO).
       On September 5, 2019, board member Michael Allan was
served with a petition signed by more than five percent of the
Association’s members calling for a special meeting to recall
the entire board of directors and elect a new board if the recall
was successful. At the time, the other board members, including
Allan, were Michael Umann, Dave DiNapoli, Paul Bromley, and
Hal Siegel. Allan advised all the board members and Lordon
Management of the petition. He hand-delivered the original
petition to Lordon Management the next day.
       The board did not fix a time for the special meeting or give
notice of the meeting to the Association’s members within 20 days
of receiving the petition, as is required under section 7511,
subdivision (c). 4 When the 20-day statutory period expired,

4     Section 7511, subdivision (c) provides, “Upon request
in writing to the corporation . . . by any person (other than the
board) entitled to call a special meeting of members, the officer
forthwith shall cause notice to be given to the members entitled
to vote that a meeting will be held at a time fixed by the board

                                 5
Allan, in his capacity as one of the petitioners, sent notice of the
special meeting to the Association’s 459 members.
       The notice stated the purpose of the special meeting was
to hold a vote on the removal of the entire board and, in the event
of a recall, an election of the new board. Due to an error on the
email address listed for candidacy submissions, Allan sent a new
notice listing the date of the meeting as December 19, 2019.
       Due to the full board’s inaction, the petitioners also took it
upon themselves to conduct the election. 5 As part of that process,
Allan, on behalf of the petitioners, contracted with the League
of Women Voters (LWV), a non-partisan entity with no stake
in the outcome of the election, to retain an inspector of elections.
Judy Murphy of the LWV was ultimately appointed Inspector
of Elections for the December 2019 recall.
       In its customary role as an inspector of elections, the
LWV receives and tallies ballots, but does not mail out election
materials. Accordingly, the petitioners prepared the election
materials, stuffed the ballot envelopes, and mailed ballots out
to the homeowners at the petitioners’ individual expense.

not less than 35 nor more than 90 days after the receipt of the
request. . . . If the notice is not given within 20 days after receipt
of the request, the persons entitled to call the meeting may
give the notice or the superior court of the proper county shall
summarily order the giving of the notice, after notice to the
corporation giving it an opportunity to be heard.”
5     Evidence elicited at trial showed Barone, ostensibly
speaking for a majority of the board, had instructed Lordon
Management, which normally would have assisted with an
Association election, to “do nothing until legal counsel and/or
the board advises differently.”

                                  6
       The LWV conducted the election meeting on December 19,
2019. Murphy, in her role as Inspector of Elections, announced
a quorum was not present, as the LWV had not received in excess
of 50 percent of the votes of the membership (the minimum
participation required to constitute a quorum under the
Association’s bylaws). 6 Following Murphy’s announcement,
a majority of the members present at the meeting voted to
adjourn the meeting to December 23, 2019. 7
       At the December 23, 2019 meeting, Murphy determined
the required quorum of 25 percent of the membership (115 of the
459 members) had been met. (See fn. 7, ante.) Of the 190 ballots
received, Murphy counted 156 votes in favor of recalling the
entire board.
       Having determined the recall passed, the LWV proceeded
to certify the election of the new board: Allan; Harriet Cohen;
Siegel; Umann; and Bromley. Lordon Management mailed
notice of the election results to the membership.
       On December 31, 2019, the new board of directors
eliminated Barone’s CEO position.

6     As of December 19, 2019, the LWV had received a total of
182 sealed ballot envelopes of a possible 459 (39.6 percent).
7      As we will discuss, the Association’s bylaws provide that
if a quorum is not present, “the members present either in person
or by proxy, may without notice other than announcement at
the meeting, adjourn the meeting to a time not less than forty-
eight (48) hours nor more than thirty (30) days from the time
the original meeting was called, at which meeting twenty-five
percent (25%) of the votes of the membership shall constitute
a quorum.”

                                7
2.     The Complaint
       On January 21, 2020, plaintiffs (the Association, Allan,
and Cohen) filed this action against Barone and current and
former board members Umann, Bromley, and DiNapoli, asserting
two causes of action for declaratory relief under section 7616
and common law nuisance.
       The complaint alleged defendants had refused to “recognize
the validity of the recall” and continued to assert that “the prior
Board remains in power and that Defendant Barone remains the
putative ‘CEO’ of the Association.” It further alleged defendants
were “engaged in extensive efforts to hinder the new Board of
Directors from conducting the affairs of the Association.”
       As relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs prayed for a
declaration under section 7616 that the December 2019 election
recalling the Association’s board of directors was valid; that
the Association’s board of directors consists of Allan, Bromley,
Cohen, Siegel, and Umann; and that “Barone is not the CEO
of the Association and not its authorized agent.”
3.     The Statement of Decision
       On May 4, 2020, after an 11-day bench trial, the court filed
a final statement of decision and order declaring, among other
things: The December 23, 2019 full board recall election was
valid; Allan, Bromley, Cohen, Siegel, and Umann “are (and
have been since [December 23, 2019])” the Association’s directors;
and the “former CEO Christopher Barone has no authority
(and has had no authority since the date of his termination)
to act on behalf of the [Association] . . . unless granted by the
current board.”
       The court found: The petitioners properly presented the
petition for full board recall to the former board; the former board

                                 8
unreasonably violated its duties under the Association’s bylaws
and governing statutory law to set a special meeting on the
recall election after receipt of the petition; the petitioners
properly conducted the recall election when the former board
failed to do so; the LWV properly executed its duties as Inspector
of Elections and did not prejudice or demonstrate bias against
any interested party; and the election was conducted in
accordance with the Association’s bylaws and governing statutory
law, including provisions prescribing a majority vote and quorum
requirements. In making these findings, the court determined
defense witnesses testifying to alleged bias or improprieties in
the petition and voting process were “not credible.”
       As relevant to this appeal, the trial court determined,
as a legal matter, that a provision in the Association’s bylaws
requiring a “vote of the majority of the votes held by the entire
membership” to remove the entire board or an individual director
was legally invalid and “unenforceable.” The court concluded
this provision conflicted with and was displaced by statutes
specifying that, for a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation of
50 or more members (like the Association), only the majority
of the votes represented and voting at a duly held meeting
at which a quorum is present was needed to remove a director.
(See §§ 7222, subd. (a)(2), 5034, 7151, subd. (e).)
       On May 22, 2020, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
remaining cause of action for nuisance. On May 28, 2020,
Barone filed this appeal. 8

8      The other defendants did not appeal and are not parties
to this appeal.

                                9
                             DISCUSSION
1.     The Appeal Is Not Moot: Material Questions Remain
       Regarding the Construction of the Bylaws and
       Statutes Governing the Vote Required to Remove
       the Association’s Board of Directors
       As a threshold matter, plaintiffs contend this appeal
should be dismissed as moot because reversal of the challenged
order will not grant Barone effective relief now that subsequent
board elections have taken place since the trial court’s order.
We disagree.
       Because the duty of every judicial tribunal is “ ‘ “ ‘to decide
actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into
effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions . . . [,] [i]t
necessarily follows that when . . . an event occurs which renders
it impossible for [the] court, if it should decide the case in favor
of [the appellant], to grant him any effectual relief whatever,
the court will not proceed to a formal judgment . . . .’ [Citations.]”
[Citation.] The pivotal question in determining if a case is moot
is therefore whether the court can grant the [appellant] any
effectual relief. [Citations.] If events have made such relief
impracticable, the controversy has become “overripe” and
is therefore moot. [Citations.] [¶] . . . When events render
a case moot, the court, whether trial or appellate, should
generally dismiss it.’ ” (Parkford Owners for a Better Community
v. County of Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722.)
       Plaintiffs did not file a written motion to dismiss with
supporting affidavits and evidence establishing subsequent
elections have in fact occurred that render this appeal moot.
(See, e.g., American Alternative Energy Partners II v. Windridge,
Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 551, 557 [respondent should “have

                                 10
made a formal, written motion for dismissal of the appeal, which,
because it would have been based on matters not appearing
in the appellate record, would have required the submission of
affidavits or other supporting evidence”].) 9 Be that as it may,
even if we assume there have been subsequent board elections
since December 2019—as seems practically certain given the
requirement for annual elections in the Association’s bylaws—
we still cannot consider this appeal moot. The challenged
order grants declaratory relief embracing a disputed judicial
construction of the bylaws and statutes governing the vote
required to remove a director from the Association’s board.
Under these circumstances, “the general rule governing mootness
becomes subject to the case-recognized qualification that an
appeal will not be dismissed where, despite the happening
of the subsequent event, there remain material questions for
the court’s determination.” (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board
of Guide Dogs (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 (Eye Dog Foundation).)

9      Plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice of a grant deed
showing Uhlmann conveyed his interest in one lot in the
development on July 30, 2020. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c),
459, subd. (a); see Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 182, 194.) While we grant that request, we
cannot accept, as plaintiffs assert, that the grant deed proves
Uhlmann could not have maintained his position on the board
after the conveyance. Significantly, the Association’s bylaws
contemplate that a member may own multiple lots, such that
a member is “entitled to one vote for each Lot in which they hold
the interest required for membership.” (Italics added.) Because
we have no evidence to establish how many lots Uhlmann owned
when he conveyed the subject lot, the grant deed is insufficient
to prove he is no longer a member of the Association entitled to
serve on its board of directors.

                                 11
       Eye Dog Foundation is instructive. In that case, the
plaintiff sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment
to invalidate provisions of the Business and Professions
Code covering “the subject ‘Guide Dogs for the Blind,’ ” the
enforcement of which had led to the suspension of the plaintiff’s
business license to train seeing eye dogs. (Eye Dog Foundation,
supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 540.) Several months after the trial
court entered a judgment upholding all but one section of the
challenged provisions, the regulatory state board formally
reinstated the plaintiff’s license after the plaintiff took action
to comply with the challenged statutes. (Id. at pp. 540–541.)
Recognizing that the pending appeal could no longer result in
effective relief enjoining enforcement of the challenged statutes,
our Supreme Court nonetheless held the appeal was not moot
because the plaintiff “not only sought injunctive but declaratory
relief, to wit, a declaratory judgment that the subject legislation
is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to plaintiff’s
operation,” such that there “remain[ed] material questions
for the court’s determination” on appeal. (Id. at p. 541.) As
our high court explained, an exception to the general mootness
doctrine “has been applied to actions for declaratory relief”
in such circumstances “upon the ground that the court must
do complete justice once jurisdiction has been assumed [citation],
and the relief thus granted may encompass future and contingent
legal rights.” (Ibid.)
       Even if we accept plaintiffs’ contention that we can
neither reinstate the former board, nor restore Barone to his
CEO position, this does not render the appeal moot. Regardless
of the board’s current composition, Barone’s appeal presents a
material question for this court’s determination encompassing

                                12
his future and contingent legal rights under the Association’s
bylaws and the statutes governing the recall of its board of
directors. As in Eye Dog Foundation, our reversal of the trial
court’s declaratory relief order would grant Barone effective
relief by embracing his construction of the relevant bylaws and
statutory provisions, which remain enforceable against him
and the rest of the Association’s current membership for future
recall elections. (Eye Dog Foundation, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 541,
fn. 2 [“ ‘while it has been said that the declaratory judgment
acts necessarily deal with the present rights, the “present right”
contemplated is the right to have immediate judicial assurance
that advantages will be enjoyed or liabilities escaped in the
future’ ”].) This material question warrants disposition on
the merits.
2.     The Trial Court Correctly Determined the Former
       Board Was Validly Recalled Under the Association’s
       Bylaws and Statutory Law
       Barone contends the trial court improperly disregarded a
provision of the Association’s bylaws requiring a majority vote
of the “entire membership” to remove the board or an individual
director from office. In the alternative, he argues the recall was
not valid because the relevant special meeting did not achieve
a quorum. We conclude the trial court correctly construed the
bylaws and governing statutes.
       Barone’s contentions challenge the trial court’s application
of the bylaws and statutes to essentially undisputed facts.
The contentions are therefore subject to our de novo review.
(Roybal v. Governing Bd. of Salinas City Elementary School
Dist. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1148.) Likewise, insofar
as the contentions concern the trial court’s construction of the

                                13
Association’s bylaws and our state’s governing statutes, these
issues too are subject to our de novo review. (See ibid.; PV Little
Italy, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 144–145.)
       It is undisputed that the recall election was approved by a
vote of 156 in favor of recalling the entire board, with 190 ballots
received out of 459 total membership votes. Barone contends this
was insufficient to approve the recall under Article VI, Section 3
of the Association’s bylaws, which provides: “The entire Board
of Directors or any individual Director may be removed from
office with or without cause at any time by a vote of the majority
of the votes held by the entire membership of record at any regular
or special meeting of members.” (Italics added.) Because a
majority of the 459 votes held by the entire membership of record
is 230 votes, Barone contends the trial court erred in declaring
the recall election valid.
       The trial court rejected this contention based on a collection
of interconnected statutes that effectively prohibit a nonprofit
mutual benefit corporation with 50 or more members from
requiring more than “a majority of the votes represented and
voting at a duly held meeting at which a quorum is present”
to remove a director from the corporation’s board. (§§ 5034,
7222, subd. (a)(2), 7151, subd. (e).)
       Section 7222 expressly governs the recall of directors
serving on the board of a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation.
The statute provides, in relevant part: “[A]ny or all directors
may be removed without cause if: [¶] (1) In a corporation with
fewer than 50 members, the removal is approved by a majority
of all members (Section 5033). [¶] (2) In a corporation with 50
or more members, the removal is approved by the members
(Section 5034).” (§ 7222, subd. (a).) Under its plain terms, the

                                 14
statute permits a corporation with fewer than 50 members to
require the approval of “a majority of all members” (as specified
in the Association’s bylaws); however, for a corporation with 50
or more members (like the Association), the statute dictates that
the removal need only be “approved by the members” as that
phrase is defined in section 5034.
       Section 5034 provides: “ ‘Approval by (or approval of)
the members’ means approved or ratified by the affirmative vote
of a majority of the votes represented and voting at a duly held
meeting at which a quorum is present (which affirmative votes
also constitute a majority of the required quorum) or written
ballot . . . or by the affirmative vote or written ballot of such
greater proportion, including all of the votes of the memberships
of any class, unit, or grouping of members as may be provided
in the bylaws (subdivision (e) of Section 5151, subdivision (e)
of Section 7151, or subdivision (e) of Section 9151) or in Part 2,
Part 3, Part 4 or Part 5 for all or any specified member action.”
(Italics added.) The statute’s reference to subdivision (e) of
section 7151 is critical because, while section 5034 permits
a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation to require a greater
proportion of votes in its bylaws, section 7151, subdivision (e)
expressly withdraws this authorization for a vote to remove
a director from the corporation’s board.
       Section 7151, subdivision (e) provides: “The bylaws
may require, for any or all corporate actions (except as provided
in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 7222 . . .)
the vote of a larger proportion of, or all of, the members or
the members of any class, unit, or grouping of members or
the vote of a larger proportion of, or all of, the directors, than
is otherwise required by this part.”

                                 15
       Because section 7151, subdivision (e) expressly prohibits
a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation with 50 or more members
(like the Association) from requiring a greater proportion of
votes than is specified in section 7222, subdivision (a)(2) for
the removal of a director, the trial court correctly concluded
Article VI, Section 3 of the Association’s bylaws could not
be enforced to invalidate the recall election. And, because
section 7222, subdivision (a)(2) requires only “approv[al] by
the members” as defined in section 5034 to remove a director
(§ 7222, subd. (a)(2)), the trial court correctly concluded the
recall was valid if approved “by the affirmative vote of a majority
of the votes represented and voting at a duly held meeting at
which a quorum is present.” (§ 5034.)
       Notwithstanding the foregoing, Barone contends there were
insufficient votes cast in the recall election to represent a quorum
under the Association’s bylaws. The relevant bylaws provision
states:
             “The presence at any meeting, in person
             or by proxy, of members entitled to cast in
             excess of 50 percent (50%) of the votes of the
             membership, shall constitute a quorum for any
             action . . . . If, however, such quorum shall not
             be present or represented at any meeting, the
             members present either in person or by proxy,
             may without notice other than announcement
             at the meeting, adjourn the meeting to a time
             not less than forty-eight (48) hours nor more
             than thirty (30) days from the time the original
             meeting was called, at which meeting twenty-

                                16
              five percent (25%) of the votes of the
              membership shall constitute a quorum.”
      The evidence at trial proved that, following the Inspector
of Election’s announcement that a quorum was not present at the
December 19, 2019 meeting, a majority of the members present
voted to adjourn the meeting to December 23, 2019 in accordance
with the foregoing provision of the bylaws. The evidence further
proved that, at the December 23, 2019 meeting, the Inspector
of Elections had received 190 ballots, exceeding the required
25 percent of the votes of the membership (115 of the total
459 votes) needed to constitute a quorum at that meeting.
      Barone does not dispute the foregoing facts. Rather,
he argues the 25 percent quorum provision in the Association’s
bylaws “conflict[s]” with sections 7222 and 5034, which, he
emphasizes, “contain[ ] no language about a ‘reduced quorum.’ ”
Contrary to Barone’s premise, neither section 5034 nor section
7222 governs minimum quorum requirements for a nonprofit
mutual benefit corporation. The relevant statute is section 7512.
      Section 7512, subdivision (a) provides: “One-third of the
voting power, represented in person or by proxy, shall constitute
a quorum at a meeting of members, but, subject to subdivisions
(b) and (c), a bylaw may set a different quorum.” (Italics added.)
Subdivision (b) stipulates that “[w]here a bylaw authorizes
a corporation to conduct a meeting with a quorum of less than
one-third of the voting power, then the only matters that may
be voted upon . . . by less than one-third of the voting power
are matters notice of the general nature of which was given.” 10

10    Section 7512, subdivision (c) authorizes members
to “continue to transact business until adjournment
notwithstanding the withdrawal of enough members to leave

                                17
       Consistent with section 7512, the Association’s bylaws
authorized a quorum of 25 percent of the voting power after
an adjournment. (See § 7512, subd. (a).) 11 And, the record
proves the matter voted upon at the meeting—the recall of
the board and election of a new board in the event the recall
was successful—was disclosed in the original meeting notice.
(Id., subd. (b)). The trial court correctly determined the
December 2019 vote validly recalled the former board under
the Association’s bylaws and governing statutory law.
3.     Section 7616 Authorized the Order Validating
       the December 2019 Recall Election
       Barone contends section 7616 authorizes a claim to validate
an election only—“not a recall.” He emphasizes there is “nothing”
in the statute expressly addressing “a recall or removal of
directors,” and he argues it is a “decisive issue” that “there
cannot be an election absent a successful recall” under the

less than a quorum, if any action taken (other than adjournment)
is approved by at least a majority of the members required to
constitute a quorum.”
11     The Association’s bylaws also comply with regulations
pertaining to quorum requirements promulgated by the
Department of Real Estate for common interest developments
like Lake Lindero. In particular, section 2792.17, subdivision
(e)(2) of title 10 of the California Code of Regulations provides:
“In the absence of a quorum at a members’ meeting a majority
of those present in person or by proxy may adjourn the meeting
to another time, but may not transact any other business. . . .
The quorum for an adjourned meeting may be set by the
governing instruments at a percentage less than that prescribed
for the regular meeting, but it shall not be less than 25 percent
of the total voting power of the Association.” (Italics added.)

                                18
Association’s bylaws. Additionally, Barone argues he is not
a proper defendant under the statute.
       Barone’s arguments raise questions of statutory
interpretation subject to our independent de novo review.
(Committee to Save the Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. v. Beverly
Highlands Homes Assn. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1261.)
“In the construction of statutes, the primary goal of the court
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
[Citations.] The court looks first to the language of the statute;
if clear and unambiguous, the court will give effect to its plain
meaning.” (Id. at p. 1265.) “The words used should be given
their usual, ordinary meanings and, if possible, each word and
phrase should be given significance. [Citations.] The words used
‘must be construed in context, and statutes must be harmonized,
both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.’ ”
(Ibid.)
       Contrary to Barone’s narrow reading of section 7616,
we find the statutory text evidences a clear legislative intent
to confer broad authority on the trial court in determining the
validity of a board election. Under section 7616, subdivision (a),
“[u]pon the filing of an action therefor by any director or member
or by any person who had the right to vote in the election at
issue, the superior court of the proper county shall determine
the validity of any election or appointment of any director of any
corporation.” Critically, while this directive does not expressly
refer to a recall election (as Barone emphasizes), subdivision (d)
of the statute authorizes “[t]he court, consistent with the
provisions of [the statutes governing nonprofit mutual benefit
corporations] and in conformity with the articles and bylaws
to the extent feasible, [to] determine the person entitled to

                               19
the office of director . . . and [to] direct such other relief as may
be just and proper.” (§ 7616, subd. (d), italics added.)
       In Kaplan v. Fairway Oaks Homeowners Assn. (2002)
98 Cal.App.4th 715 (Kaplan), the reviewing court considered
whether an action under section 7616 properly encompassed
the plaintiffs’ claim that the challenged election violated their
right to vote by proxy, such that the plaintiffs were entitled
to prevailing party attorney fees under former Civil Code
section 1354 for enforcing the association’s bylaws. 12 (Kaplan,
at pp. 717–718.) The Kaplan court acknowledged that section
7616 “does not create any substantive rights . . . to vote by proxy,”
but recognized the statute was nonetheless broad enough to
provide a “procedural vehicle” to adjudicate an action “to enforce
the members’ proxy and cumulative voting rights under the
bylaws.” (Kaplan, at pp. 719–720.)
       We similarly conclude the language of section 7616 is
broad enough to provide a procedural vehicle for vindicating
plaintiffs’ recall rights under the Association’s bylaws, even
absent an express reference to recall elections in the statute’s
text. Article VI, Section 3 of the bylaws authorizes a recall of
the entire board of directors and makes the election of a new
board part and parcel of the recall process: “The entire Board
of Directors or any individual Director may be removed from
office with or without cause at any time by a vote . . . at any
regular or special meeting of members duly called, and a
successor or successors may then and there be elected to fill

12    Former Civil Code section 1354, subdivision (f) then
provided for an award of prevailing party attorney fees in an
action “ ‘to enforce the governing documents.’ ” (Kaplan, supra,
98 Cal.App.4th at p. 718, italics omitted.)

                                 20
the vacancy or vacancies thus created.” 13 (Italics added.) In
adjudicating plaintiffs’ claim under section 7616 to enforce this
provision of the bylaws, the statute not only unambiguously
directed the trial court to “determine the validity of [the new
board’s] election” (§ 7616, subd. (a)), but also authorized the
court, “in conformity with the [recall provision of the] bylaws . . . ,
[to] determine the person entitled to the office of director . . .
and [to] direct such other relief as may be just and proper” (id.,
subd. (d)). Because the trial court could not determine the
validity of the election or “the person entitled to the office of
director” without adjudicating the validity of the underlying
recall election, it was “just and proper” for the court to enter an
order under section 7616 confirming the recall election was valid.
(§ 7616, subd. (d); see Kaplan, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 721.)
       For much the same reason, we reject Barone’s argument
that he was not a proper defendant in this action. Section 7616,
subdivision (c) directs the superior court, “[u]pon the filing of
the complaint, and before any further proceedings are had” to
“enter an order fixing a date for the hearing . . . and requiring
notice of the date for the hearing and a copy of the complaint
to be served upon the corporation and upon the person whose
purported election or appointment is questioned and upon any
person (other than the plaintiff) whom the plaintiff alleges

13     As discussed in part 2, ante, while this provision of the
bylaws requires “a vote of the majority of the votes held by the
entire membership of record,” that part of the provision violates
section 7151, subdivision (e) and thus is displaced by the vote
requirement in section 7222, subdivision (a)(2) for the removal
of directors from a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation with
50 or more members.

                                  21
to have been elected or appointed.” (Italics added.) Barone
contends this provision establishes the parties who may be
named as defendants under section 7616, and, because he was
neither elected nor appointed in the December 2019 election,
he argues he could not be sued under the statute. 14 We disagree.
       As we have said and as the trial court correctly recognized,
section 7616, subdivision (d) authorizes the court to “direct
such other relief as may be just and proper” in connection with
confirming the validity of a board election. Here, the complaint
alleged Barone, in his role as CEO and with the sanction of
a majority of the former board, was engaged in frustrating the
new board’s efforts to fulfill its duties under the Association’s
bylaws. Having confirmed the validity of the new board’s
election, the statute plainly authorized the trial court to enter
an order confirming Barone had no authority to act on behalf of
the Association, as was “just and proper” under the Association’s

14    Barone also suggests the Association is not a proper
plaintiff in this action, emphasizing that section 7616,
subdivision (c) requires service of the complaint upon “the
corporation.” However, as plaintiffs correctly argue, Barone fails
to demonstrate how this purported error resulted in prejudice,
given that Cohen and Allan (each a “member” and “person who
had the right to vote in the election”) undisputedly had standing
under the statute. (§ 7616, subd. (a).)

                                22
bylaws. (§ 7616, subd. (d).) Plaintiffs properly named Barone
as a defendant in their section 7616 claim. 15

15    Barone has moved for sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel
and the trial court. With respect to the lower court, he appears
to argue the court reporter failed to provide him with electronic
transcripts of the reported proceedings. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.23 [authorizing sanctions for failure of a court reporter to
perform a duty imposed by statute or these rules].) Barone relies
upon rule 8.144, which specifies the format requirements that
apply “to clerks’ and reporters’ transcripts delivered in electronic
form and in paper form.” (Id., rule 8.144(b)(1), italics added.) As
the rule’s reference to “paper form” suggests, there is no mandate
that the reporter deliver an electronic transcript—a paper form is
also acceptable. (Ibid.; see also id., rule 8.130 [specifying general
requirements for delivery of reporter’s transcript].) Thus, Barone
has not demonstrated sanctions are warranted under rule 8.23.
      Barone’s motion for sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel
appears to relate largely to events that occurred before the
underlying action or in connection with plaintiffs’ efforts to
enforce the terms of the challenged order, neither of which is
properly before this court on a motion for appellate sanctions.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a) [specifying grounds for
appellate sanctions].) To the extent his motion raises issues
relevant to the appeal, it simply repeats arguments that Barone
made in his principal briefs, which we have rejected. Moreover,
as plaintiffs correctly argue, nothing in the relevant rule
authorizes appellate sanctions against a respondent for defending
an appeal. (See ibid.) The motion for sanctions is denied.

                                 23
                           DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. Plaintiffs the Lake Lindero
Homeowners Association, Inc., Michael Allan, and Harriet Cohen
are entitled to their costs.

                                   EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

                              24
Filed 3/27/23
                     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                              DIVISION THREE

LAKE LINDERO HOMEOWNERS                      B306164
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
                                             Los Angeles County
       Plaintiffs and Respondents,           Super. Ct. No.
                                             20VECP00041
       v.
                                           ORDER CERTIFYING
CHRISTOPHER T. BARONE,                     FOR PUBLICATION
                                           [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
       Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:
     The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed on February 28, 2023,
was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it
now appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports.
     There is no change in the judgment.

________________________________________________________________________
EGERTON, J.                  EDMON, P. J.                     LAVIN, J.