Court Opinion

ID: 9468066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:03:28.206962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:39.969155
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent, but not because the Court’s opinion incorrectly states the current law of Georgia. Rather, I do so because we do not take advantage of the opportunity by available certification1 to get firsthand authoritative word from the Supreme Court of Georgia, not on what the decided precedents reveal, but on what Georgia would now hold on this new and appealing situation.
The Court’s opinion proceeds expressly on the assumption “that the sole reason for Phillips’ termination was that he gave truthful testimony harmful to Goodyear’s interests or that he refused to pérjure himself” (p. 1054). Considering that the testimony was in a Federal case in a Federal Court and the alleged retaliatory action by Goodyear was in violation of the express prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 as well as Texas Penal Code § 36.06(a) (in which state part of the testimony was given)2 I cannot believe that, in these enlightened times, the Supreme Court of Georgia would consider that the Georgia code (§ 66-101) or its prior decisions would close the book for all time on this new but stark, shocking claim.
I think fairness to the parties, indeed fairness to Georgia, requires that Georgia now determine whether it would adopt an “emerging exception” and thus join the “— small but ever increasing minority of the States”, (p. 1055).
*1058Although at one time our Erie quest might have been satisfied by ascertaining, as the Court puts it “that there is no reported case — which stands on all fours with this one” and an absence of “squarely controlling precedent” (p. 1055) we no longer need depend on predictability or our prediction. See, Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 1974, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215.
We have the answer at hand. We have it by the simple certification, and an authoritative answer would be forthcoming either by the Supreme Courts answer, pro or con, or by it declining to accept certification.
The need for a fresh, not “arguably outmoded” answer cannot be better said than in this Court’s own words:
“We are mindful of the strong public policy in favor of protecting those who fulfill their duty to testify truthfully in court proceedings. Moreover, we are cognizant of the possibility that these facts present a more compelling case for recognition of the “public policy” exception than those which the Georgia ... courts have confronted. However we also realize that the at will rule is itself grounded in important, although arguably outmoded, considerations of public policy.” (emphasis added).
I would certify this important question to the Supreme Court of Georgia. To this Court’s failure to use this remarkable device I dissent.3

. The utility of this remarkable device has often been extolled and the Georgia Supreme Court has willingly accepted and answered a number of certifications from this Court. See generally In re McClintock [McClintock v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.], 558 F.2d 732, 733 nn.2, 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1977); Wansor v. Hant-scho Co, Inc., 570 F.2d 1202, 1208 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1978) certification answer, 580 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1978); McClintock v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 571 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1978) (certification answer); Miree v. United States, 565 F.2d 1354 certification answer, 588 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1978); Ins. Co. of North America v. Meyer, 431 F.2d 209; Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Pearce, 607 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1979) certification answer, 625 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1980); Aretz v. United States, 635 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1981).

. See note 5 Court’s opinion.

. Since of all the six States of the Fifth Circuit, Texas alone has no certification procedure, I concur in the Court’s opinion as to the Texas claim.