Court Opinion

ID: 9724666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:07:26.473037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:20.297309
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The defendant was convicted by a jury of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree for an act committed on October 25, 1981.1 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.2 We would affirm.
Standifer, Charles W. Burchette, Jr., and another inmate of the Monroe County jail had oral sex with Thomas Hart, another inmate. The disputed factual question was whether Hart volunta*562rily engaged in the sexual acts or, as the people contended and the jury found, was forced or coerced to do so.
The Court of Appeals reversed Standifer’s conviction on the authority of this Court’s decision in People v Lytal, 415 Mich 603, 605, 612; 329 NW2d 738 (1982), where this Court held that it was error to allow introduction of evidence that an accomplice was convicted for his role in the criminal enterprise.
In Lytal, this Court said that "[i]t is an established rule of law that the conviction of another person involved in the criminal enterprise is not admissible at defendant’s separate trial.” The prosecutor had sought to defend the admission of the evidence on the ground that under the rule of People v Atkins, 397 Mich 163; 243 NW2d 292 (1976), he was obligated to show the nature of any consideration offered for the testimony of an accomplice. This Court responded that "no promises were made to [Lytal’s alleged accomplices] — there was no consideration.” The Court continued: "The prosecutor is not obliged to show that no consideration was offered for a witness’s testimony or, indeed, whether the witness, if charged and if an accomplice, was convicted or acquitted. The prosecutor is only obliged to disclose any consideration offered to or received by the witness. That can be done without adverting to whether the witness was, if charged, convicted.”
The prosecutor contends that the instant case is different because here consideration was offered to and accepted by Burchette, who the prosecutor claimed forced Hart to engage in a sexual act with Standifer.
i
Burchette pled guilty on March 29, 1982, to a *563charge of esc hi, committed against Hart on November 8, 1981, and to a charge of breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling, on the understanding that he would give truthful testimony in the instant case charging Standifer with esc i committed on October 25, 1981, that the charge that he had participated with Standifer in committing the October 25 oifense would be dismissed, and that the prosecutor would recommend minimum sentences of three years.
Standifer’s trial began on June 7, 1982. On direct examination, Burchette responded affirmatively to questions by the prosecutor whether he had entered a plea of guilty to a charge of "criminal sexual conduct in the third degree” "involving Thomas Hart,” reduced from first degree, and was currently serving a sentence of three and one-half to fifteen years. There was no objection by Standi-fer’s lawyer.
The prosecutor did not bring out that Bur-chette’s plea of guilty was for an act of criminal sexual conduct that occurred about two weeks after the act for which Standifer was standing trial.
Burchette testified that he did not see Standifer and Hart engage in a sexual act. The prosecutor was permitted to impeach Burchette’s testimony by evidence of prior statements made by him to a police officer. On redirect, Burchette again acknowledged that he had pled guilty to having forced Hart to perform a sexual act.
The prosecutor thus was able to paint a picture of Standifer’s guilt by association with Burchette, who in fact had pled guilty of having committed a sexual act other than the one with which Standi-fer was charged.
*564II
The disclosure was incomplete and misleading and therefore cannot be justified on the basis that the prosecutor was seeking to discharge his obligations under Atkins.
It is a familiar principle that preservation of error does not require reversal when the error is harmless. Neither does the failure to object preclude reversal.3
The Court of Appeals did not err in ordering a new trial in the instant case under the circumstances that the disclosure was incomplete and misleading.
The prosecutor reinforced the implication of guilt by association during further questioning of Burchette on redirect whether he had pled guilty to forcing Hart to engage in a sexual act, and argument to the jury:
The only testimony that we have are [sic] Mr. Burchette’s, which I would ask you to totally disregard — you saw him on the stand. A person who has pled guilty to forcing Mr. Hart to give him a head job, he comes before you and says it never happened, I never forced him. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is apparent that the prosecutor did not seek merely to impeach Burchette’s credibility by showing that he had a prior felony conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
The omission that Burchette’s plea of guilty was of an offense other than the one with which Stan-difer was charged left the inaccurate impression *565that Burchette had pled guilty of forcing Hart to commit a sexual act with Standifer, contrary to Burchette’s testimony at the trial that he had not participated with Standifer in committing a sexual act with Hart or observed them in a sexual act.
hi
The argument in the opinion for reversal that a prosecutor may impeach the credibility of a witness charged as an accomplice when he fails to give anticipated testimony by showing "consideration given” by the prosecutor to the witness in the form of charge reductions was not made by the trial prosecutor or by the people in this Court, and, thus, there has been no adversary briefing or argument by the parties.
The opinion for reversal does not explain how "consideration given” by the prosecutor to Bur-chette tended to discredit Burchette’s testimony.4
*566IV
The fundamental question adumbrated by state*567ments in the opinion for reversal is whether the rule of law that bars evidence of an alleged accomplice’s conviction on the issue of the guilt of a defendant separately tried will be enforced or undermined.
A
In People v Lytal, supra, p 612, this Court said that "[i]t is an established rule of law that the conviction of another person involved in the criminal enterprise is not admissible at defendant’s separate trial.” Lytal cited People v Crawl, 401 Mich 1, 33; 257 NW2d 86 (1977) (opinion of Levin, J.), which relied on a number of decisions of other state courts and of United States Courts of Appeals as support for the statement that "an accomplice’s plea of guilty or conviction following a trial is not admissible against another person.” That statement finds further support in 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th ed), § 439, p 215, where it is stated that "as a general rule, the fact that a confederate or co-conspirator of the defendant pleaded guilty, or has been found guilty, is inadmissible on the issue of the guilt of the defendant who is separately tried.”
The rule is well-supported in cases decided since Crawl and Lytal were decided. In Kwallek v State, 596 P2d 1372, 1375-1376 (Wy, 1979), the Supreme Court of Wyoming said that such evidence is inadmissible "because it suggests that since the confederate is guilty, the defendant must also be guilty, and this inference violates the defendant’s right to have his trial on its own merits.”5
*568We find no authority to the contrary. All courts agree that an accomplice’s plea of guilty or conviction following a trial is not admissible against another person as substantive evidence of the other person’s guilt. The only question in this regard that has occupied the courts in deciding particular cases is whether a violation of the rule is reversible error.6
Judge Goodrich, speaking for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, said that, although a fellow conspirator’s plea of guilty "is highly relevant upon the question of the guilt of another alleged conspirator,” "[t]his is one of the cases, therefore, where evidence logically probative is to be excluded because of some countervailing policy. There are many such instances in the law. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1171 et seq. (3d ed, 1940).” United States v Toner, 173 F2d 140, 142 (CA 3, 1949). Judge Goodrich continued:
The foundation of the countervailing policy is the right of every defendant to stand or fall with the proof of the charge made against him, not against somebody else. Acquittal of an alleged fellow conspirator is not evidence for a man being tried for conspiracy. So, likewise, conviction of an alleged fellow conspirator after a trial is not admissible as against one now being charged. The defendant had a right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the evidence presented against him, not by what has happened with regard to a criminal prosecution against someone else. [Emphasis supplied.]
In Lytal, this Court implemented that principle *569in rejecting a prosecutor’s attempt to defend the admission of evidence of the conviction of alleged accomplices on the ground that he was obliged under the rule of People v Atkins, supra, to show the nature of any consideration offered for their testimony. Because the accomplices had testified that no promises were made to them and, thus, there was no consideration, Atkins did not justify admission of evidence of the accomplices’ convictions. We said:
The prosecutor is not obliged to show that no consideration was offered for a witness’s testimony or, indeed, whether the witness, if charged and if an accomplice, was convicted or acquitted. The prosecutor is only obliged to disclose any consideration offered to or received by the witness. That can be done without adverting to whether the witness was, if charged, convicted. [Lytal, supra, p 612.]
B
Although disposition of this appeal does not require the Court to say more, it is apparent that there is need to address recurrent problems that arise when a prosecutor, in asserted discharge of his obligations under Atkins, introduces evidence of the conviction of an alleged accomplice.
These problems would be largely avoided if this Court were to adopt a rule concerning the manner in which any consideration for a witness’ testimony may be shown that would require a prosecutor to refrain from disclosing the nature of the charges originally lodged against an alleged accomplice or the nature of the convictions ulti*570mately obtained unless, perhaps,7 the defendant were to insist on their disclosure. If such a rule had been in force when the trial in this case began, the prosecutor would, consistent with such rule, have disclosed only that Burchette (i) had been charged with three felonies, (ii) faced, on conviction of one, a maximum sentence of ten years,8 and, on conviction of the other two, maximum sentences of life in prison,9 (iii) as part of a plea bargain, pled guilty to the ten-year maximum offense, one of the life sentence offenses was dismissed, and, in lieu of the other life sentence offense, pled guilty to a lesser offense with a maximum sentence of fifteen years, and (iv) was serving a sentence of three years to ten years on one offense and SVi to fifteen years on another.
The rule requiring the prosecutor to disclose any consideration given for courtroom testimony should not be turned into a sword to be used against the defendant by allowing the admission of evidence that but for the consideration offered would not be admissible. The prosecutor’s obligation to disclose any consideration could in the manner described be fully discharged without undermining the rule that a defendant’s guilt or innocence should not be determined on the basis of "what has happened with regard to a criminal prosecution against someone else.”
It will ordinarily be of no advantage to the defendant to disclose to the jury whether the original charge against the witness was for com*571mitting the offense of x, y, or z. The important information to be disclosed to the jury is that the witness received a benefit, and the extent of the benefit. The benefit is the reduced charge or sentence, not the nature of the originally charged or reduced offenses.
If such a rule had been in force when the trial in this case began, the prosecutor could not have questioned Burchette with regard to whether he had pled guilty to a "criminal sexual conduct” charge "involving Thomas Hart,” and thus there would have been no opportunity to fail to disclose to the jury that the criminal sexual conduct offense of which Burchette pled guilty was for an act of criminal sexual conduct that occurred about two weeks after the act for which Standifer was standing trial.
We would adopt such a rule for cases tried after the announcement of the decision in this case so as to reduce the risk that a defendant will be convicted on the basis of "what has happened with regard to a criminal prosecution against someone else.”10
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.
Archer, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 MCL 750.520b(l)(d); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(d).

 The opinion was not reported.

 See People v Holmes, 292 Mich 212, 215; 290 NW 384 (1940); People v Kelsey, 303 Mich 715, 719; 7 NW2d 120 (1942); People v Steeneck, 247 Mich 583, 586; 226 NW 231 (1929); People v Kelly, 423 Mich 261; 378 NW2d 365 (1985).

 The argument in the opinion for reversal begins with an incorrect premise. The prosecutor "inquired] into the consideration” for Burchette’s pleas of guilty before Burchette testified favorably to Standifer, and thus before Burchette became a "recanting witness.” The prosecutor did not "inquir[e] into the consideration” in an effort to impeach a recanting witness.
Nor did the trial prosecutor claim, nor in their brief in this Court did the people argue, that a recanting witness may be impeached on the basis of the "consideration given” by the prosecutor. There thus has been no adversary briefing in respect to the arguments made in this regard in the opinion for reversal.
The prosecutor sought to impeach Burchette by showing his prior inconsistent statement to the police, and, as expressed in the people’s brief in this Court, by referring "to Burchette’s plea of guilty as being another prior inconsistent statement. . . .”
While prior statements are admissible to impeach a witness’ credibility when he testifies inconsistently, it is questionable whether a prosecutor’s expectation of favorable testimony from a witness or his belief in the defendant’s guilt becomes admissible evidence on the basis of "consideration given” in such expectation or belief when the witness testifies unfavorably and the prosecutor asserts "we got burned.”
The issue raised and dealt with in the opinion for reversal is obscured because the evidence of "consideration given” was admitted *566to show, not what might induce Burchette to testify favorably for Standifer, but, rather, what might induce him to provide testimony anticipated to be favorable to the people.
The issue raised and dealt with in the opinion for reversal would be clearer if Burchette had, before the trial, advised the prosecutor that he would testify, contrary to his prior statement, favorably to the defense, and the defense, aware of "consideration given” to Burchette, had stated that it would not inquire into the consideration and had moved the trial court for an order in limine directing the prosecutor not to inquire into the consideration given. The opinion for reversal does not explain on what basis the trial judge could have concluded that the consideration given by the prosecutor to Burchette would have induced Burchette to testify favorably for Standifer, or on what other basis the "consideration given” by the prosecutor tended to discredit Burchette’s testimony. Surely the prosecutor did not expect that the consideration given to Burchette would or might induce him to testify favorably for Standifer. That being the prosecutor’s evaluation, it does not appear on what basis the trial judge could properly have concluded or the opinion for reversal can properly argue that the jury should have been permitted to conclude that Burchette’s testimony for Standifer was discredited by the prosecutor giving Burchette consideration in exchange for testimony against Standifer.
The opinion for reversal states:
We conclude that neither Lytal nor Atkins precludes the showing of consideration to, and conviction of, an "accomplice” witness where a favorable plea bargain creates the possibility of witness bias .... [Ante, pp 559-560.]
Burchette was not "an accomplice witness.” He was, indeed, charged as an accomplice, but the charge was dismissed as part of "a favorable plea bargain.” That the prosecutor charged Burchette as an accomplice to the commission of the offense with which Standifer was charged, and agreed to the dismissal of the charge that he aided or abetted Standifer in committing the offense charged against Standi-fer, is of no probative value and not admissible.
The rule is well-established (see Part rv) that the conviction of an accomplice would not be admissible at the trial of the person he was convicted of aiding and abetting; all the more clearly, a charge that the witness was an accomplice and that the charge was dismissed as part of a plea bargain may not be admitted as evidence that the witness did in fact aid or abet commission of the offense.
Nor did the prosecutor show that Burchette was charged as an accomplice to the offense charged against Standifer or that consideration was given to Burchette as an accomplice. Burchette, again, was not convicted as an accomplice of the offense charged against Standi-fer; the charge that he was an accomplice (which could not be shown) was dismissed.

 Similarly, see State v Robertson, 219 Neb 782; 366 NW2d 429 (1985); Tipton v Commonwealth, 640 SW2d 818 (Ky, 1982); People v Sullivan, 72 Ill 2d 36; 377 NE2d 17 (1978); United States v Miranda, 593 F2d 590 (CA 5, 1979). See also Ivy v State, 301 So 2d 292 (Miss, *5681974); State v Kerley, 246 NC 157; 97 SE2d 876 (1957); State v Underwood, 248 Iowa 443; 80 NW2d 730 (1957).

 The cases are collected in Anno: Prejudicial effect of prosecuting attorney’s argument or disclosure during trial that another defendant has been convicted or has pleaded guilty. 48 ALR2d 1016.

 It might be asserted that a rule barring disclosure of the nature of the charges or of the offenses of which the alleged accomplice was convicted might in particular circumstances violate the defendant’s rights under the Due Process and Confrontation Clauses.

 Burchette was charged with breaking and entering an unoccupied building. MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305.

 Burchette was charged with two offenses of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2).

 Evidence inadmissible on one basis might indeed be admissible on another. It is beyond the scope of this opinion to consider whether evidence of an alleged accomplice’s conviction of the same criminal act charged against the defendant might be admissible in a particular case to impeach the witness’ credibility under MRE 609. In order to enforce rather than undermine the rule stated in Crawl and adopted in Lytal, it might be appropriate to exclude reference to the specific charge of which the witness has been convicted (MRE 403, 609[a][2]), even when the judge decides that the evidence of the conviction should otherwise be admitted pursuant to MRE 609.
In the instant case, the evidence of the consideration was not offered for impeachment purposes under MRE 609, but rather in purported compliance with the prosecutor’s obligation under Atkins to disclose any consideration.