Court Opinion

ID: 9761839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:56:40.552896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:27.028708
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority but not its reasoning. I write separately to express my reasoning and to address issues raised by the separate opinions in this case.
I.
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the deadly weapon enhancement provision because he was not adversely affected by its application. The trial court was required to consider the guidelines, state its reasons for the sentence imposed, and explain on the record any deviation from the applicable standard minimum range. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b); 204 Pa.Code §§ 303.1(a, b & h), 303.3(2); see Commonwealth v. Stevens, 349 Pa.Super. 310, 503 A.2d 14 (1986); Commonwealth v. Royer, 328 Pa.Super. 60, 476 A.2d 453 (1984). Assuming arguendo that the provision was unconstitutional, I would find that the consideration of the less favorable enhanced guideline sentence and the failure to consider the more favorable unenhanced guideline sentence constitutes sufficient prejudice to give appellant standing to challenge the provision. I do not find that the prejudice is removed by the simple expedient of declaring that had the guidelines been calculated otherwise, the sentence would still have been the same. Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnakin, 348 Pa.Super. 432, 438, 502 A.2d 620, 623 (1985) (despite the sentencing court’s anticipatory statement explaining reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines if calculation of guidelines was found to be erroneous, the *290panel was not pursuaded that necessity of remand was precluded). I note that in Commonwealth v. Dickison, 334 Pa.Super. 549, 553, 483 A.2d 874, 876 (1984), a panel of this Court held that error in the application of guideline provisions was not rendered harmless by the fact that the same sentence could have been imposed had the guidelines been correctly applied. Finally, I note that in Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 Pa.Super. 128, 161-62, 511 A.2d 221, 238-39 (1986) (upon which the majority relies) a panel of this Court vacated sentence and remanded for resentencing when it found that the prior misdemeanor conviction enhancement provision was unconstitutional and that application of the provision prejudiced appellant by improperly increasing the guideline ranges from which the court determined the applicable guideline sentence. I find no material distinction between the prejudice alleged in the instant case and that previously recognized by this Court as being sufficient to give standing to challenge similar guideline provisions.
II.
Nonetheless, I am persuaded by President Judge Cirillo’s exhaustive review of the waiver doctrine that appellant’s challenges to the constitutionality of the deadly weapon enhancement provision were waived by appellant’s failure to raise and preserve the issues in the trial court. I, too, would disavow Commonwealth v. Cooke, 342 Pa.Super. 58, 492 A.2d 63 (1985). I agree that non-jurisdictional challenges to sentence are waivable. Thus, I would find appellant’s constitutional challenges to the deadly weapon enhancement to also have been waived by appellant’s failure to file a second motion to modify after the original sentence was vacated and a new sentence was imposed. See Commonwealth v. Cottman, 327 Pa.Super. 453, 476 A.2d 40 (1984).
I cannot agree, however, with President Judge Cirillo’s statement that:
The court, however, can reject the guidelines’ recommendation to apply the weapons enhancement just as it can *291reject any other guideline recommendation in the exercise of its sound discretion.
Concurring Opinion by Cirillo, P.J., supra, 367 Pa.Superior Ct. at 273, 532 A.2d at 1141. The sentencing court does not have discretion to disregard the deadly weapon enhancement provision in determining the applicable guideline sentence. See Commonwealth v. Pokorny, 360 Pa.Super. 384, 388-89, 520 A.2d 511, 513 (1987); Commonwealth v. Septak, 359 Pa.Super. 375, 380-81, 518 A.2d 1284, 1286 (1986); Commonwealth v. Johnakin, supra; Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, 341 Pa.Super. 468, 475, 491 A.2d 1352, 1355 (1985). In Commonwealth v. Johnakin, supra, a panel of this court explained:
While we may affirm a sentence that is outside the guidelines provided it is reasonable, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3), it is imperative that the sentencing court determine the correct starting point in the guidelines before sentencing outside of them.
502 A.2d at 603. See also Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, supra, 491 A.2d at 1355; Cf. Commonwealth v. Maleno, 348 Pa.Super. 426, 430-31, 502 A.2d 617 (1985) (prior record scores and offense gravity scores are not themselves modifiable at the discretion of the sentencing court). In determining the applicable guideline sentence, the sentencing court may not elect to disregard any of the provisions of the guidelines. It is only after the guideline sentence has been correctly determined and properly considered that a sentencing court may elect to deviate from the guidelines based upon reasonable grounds set forth on the records.
III.
Finally, I feel compelled to address one issue raised in Judge Tamilia’s dissenting opinion. The deadly weapon enhancement provision in effect at the date of sentencing in the instant case provided in pertinent part:
When the court determines that the defendant or an accomplice possessed a deadly weapon, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301 (relating to definitions), during the com*292mission of the current conviction offense; at least 12 months and up to 2b months shall be added to the guideline sentence which would otherwise have been imposed.
204 Pa.Code § 303.4(a). (Emphasis added). Seizing upon the emphasized portion of the statute above, the dissent reasons:
However, herein lies the crucial distinction between the provision in Wright and the provision before us; the mandatory sentence provision requires a minimum sentence within the term of imprisonment set by legislation, whereas the Guidelines Weapon Enhancement section adds to the guideline sentence and therefore may exceed the term of imprisonment mandated by the legislature. Taylor, supra. The fact that the guidelines, in some instances, go beyond the statutory maximum, and section 303. l(i) provides the sentence imposed should not exceed the maximum time permitted by statute in those cases, offers no relief. As indicated below, the enhancement is added to the sentence, which would have been imposed and, in many cases, mil result in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, even if the range is limited to the statutory period. The severity of consequences which could ensue from a weapons enhancement is precisely what constitutionally requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt and presents an issue of due process.
Dissenting Opinion, infra, 367 Pa.Superior Ct. at 307, 532 A.2d at 1159. (Emphasis supplied).
If I were to agree that application of the deadly weapon enhancement provision could result in a guideline sentence which exceeds the statutory limit, I would not hesitate to join the dissent in declaring the deadly weapon enhancement provision unconstitutional. The Sentencing Commission’s enabling act clearly required the Commission to “adopt guidelines within the limits established by law.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2154; Commonwealth v. Washington, 357 Pa. Super. 548, 563, 516 A.2d 397, 405 (1986) (Kelly, J., dissenting). However, I find that the dissent errs in two material *293respects, and that application of the deadly weapon enhancement provision cannot result in a guideline sentence in excess of the statutory limit.
First, the dissent errs in stating that the deadly weapon enhancement provision “adds to the guideline sentence.” {See above). To the contrary, 204 Pa.Code § 303.2 provides:
The procedure for determining the guideline sentence shall be as follows:
1) Determine the prior record and offense gravity scores____
2) Refer to the Sentence Range Chart____
3) Determine if aggravating or mitigating circumstances apply....
4) Select a sentence from the Sentence Range Chart:...
5) Determine if a deadly weapon was used in the offense and apply the provisions of § 3034 (relating to deadly weapon enhancement).
(Emphasis added). Thus, while the deadly weapon enhancement provision does add to the guideline sentence “which would otherwise have been imposed,” it does not add to the final guideline sentence as determined pursuant to 204 Pa.Code § 303.2.1 Rather, the application of the enhancement provision is a required step in the determination of the guideline sentence. 204 Pa.Code § 303.2(5). Thus, the twelve (12) to twenty-four (24) month enhancement of the sentence selected in step four of the guideline sentence determination process is a component of, rather than an addition to, the guideline sentence.2
*294Second, the dissent erroneously contends that while the guidelines may limit the guideline ranges to the statutory limits, the guidelines do not prevent the guideline sentence from exceeding the statutory limit when the deadly weapon enhancement is added to the guideline ranges. However, 204 Pa.Code § 303.1(i) provides:
When the guideline sentence exceeds that permitted by 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 1103 and 1104 (relating to sentence of imprisonment for felony and misdemeanors) and 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9755(b) and 9756(b) (relating to sentence of partial or total confinement) or other applicable statute setting maximum term of confinement, then the statutory limit is the guideline sentence.
(Emphasis added). This section applies to limit the guideline sentence, not merely the guideline ranges.
In order to reach the result obtained by the dissent (see Dissenting Opinion, infra, 367 Pa.Superior Ct. at 309 & n. 15, 532 A.2d at 1153 & n. 15, the sentencing court would have to apply the provisions of 204 Pa.Code § 303.1(i) after the fourth step in the guideline sentence determination process (selection of a sentence from the Sentencing Range Chart, 204 Pa.Code § 303.2(4)), but before the fifth step (application of the deadly weapon enhancement provision, 204 Pa.Code § 303.2(5)). Such a construction of the guideline provisions fails to construe the provisions in pari materia and construe the provisions so as to give full effect to each (1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932), violates the presumption against constructions which yield absurd, impossible or unreasonable results (1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1)), violates the presumption against constructions which violate the state or federal constitution (1 Pa.C.S.A. §. 1922(3)), fails to construe the words of the statute in accordance with their plain meaning (1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1903, 1921(b)), and fails to effectu*295ate the intent of the legislature (1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1901). Consequently, such a construction must be rejected.
Instead, I find that the plain meaning, intent, and effect of 204 Pa.Code § 303.1(i) is to automatically reduce any guideline sentence determined pursuant to 204 Pa.Code § 303.2 to the statutory limit when the guideline sentence would otherwise have exceeded the statutory limit. See Pa.C.Sent.2d at 43 (September 1, 1986). Thus, 204 Pa.Code § 303.1(i) provides an absolute limitation upon guideline sentences which ensures compliance with the legislative mandate and the constitutional imperative that the guidelines be “within the limits established by law.” 42 Pa.C. S.A. § 2154. Consequently, I reject the conclusion reached by the dissent.

. Under 204 Pa.Code § 303.2, and 204 Pa.Code § 303.4 as they existed at the time of sentencing in the instant case, if the deadly weapon enhancement provision did not apply, then the guideline sentence was the sentence selected in step four of the guideline sentence determining process. If the provision applied, the enhancement was added directly to the sentence selected in step four; thus, the enhancement was "added to the guideline sentence which would otherwise have been imposed.” 204 Pa.Code § 303.4.

. As the dissent notes, the deadly weapon enhancement provision was amended to provide that, "... at least 12 months and up to 24 months of confinement shall be added to the guideline sentence range which would otherwise have been applicable.” See 204 Pa.Code § 303.4(a) *294(Amended, effective January 2, 1986). The effect of the amendment to 204 Pa.Code § 303.4 is to reverse the order of the guideline sentence determining process in 204 Pa.Code § 303.2. When the provision applies, the enhancement is added to the range selected in step three and then a guideline sentence is selected. It does not affect the fact that the deadly weapon enhancement provision is a component of, and not an addition to, the guideline sentence.