Court Opinion

ID: 9884309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:52:11.8714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.610199
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DAVIS, also dissenting. I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it reverses the conviction for deviate sexual assault. The initial question is whether the facts outlined in the majority opinion, under the law, constitute “force or threat of force” under section 11 — 3(a) of the Criminal Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 11 — 3(a). I do not view the use of the word “force” in the statute to necessarily mean that there must be actual or physical violence. Rather, “force” includes the compulsion of any other person to perform or submit to any act of deviate sexual conduct where the person submitting is incapable of consenting thereto; it denotes lack of consent. Whether such force is present must be determined in each case by the nature of the particular facts involved. (People v. Smith (1965), 32 Ill.2d 88, 92.) In this case the victim was a seven-year-old child; she was awakened from sleep by a young man, 18 years of age, whom she knew as a neighbor and baby-sitter. The tender age of the victim, coupled with the fact that the defendant had been associated with the victim and her family as a neighbor and baby-sitter, and had exercised a type of parental control over her, was sufficient to establish force by intimidation and the legal incapacity of the victim to consent. In People v. Riley (1967), 84 Ill. App. 2d 296, a seven-year-old girl had been raped by a man who was a friend of the family. The evidence indicated that the defendant had been playing cards with the prosecutrix, her sister and brother. The defendant then asked the prosecutrix to go to the store with him. Instead, he took her to another house, asked her to lie down, and then had intercourse with her. Later, she tried to run away and the defendant caught her and hit her. In answer to defendant’s challenge that the evidence did not establish the use of force, the court, on page 300, stated: “To affirm a finding of forcible rape there must be evidence that the act of intercourse was performed forcibly and against the will of the prosecutrix. People v. Faulisi, 25 Ill.2d 457, 185 N.E.2d 211, or otherwise stated, without the consent of the prosecutrix. People v. Fryman, 4 Ill.2d 223, 122 N.E.2d 573. The girl was seven years old, much below the age of consent, and is conclusively presumed to be unable to legally consent to an act of carnal knowledge. Addison v. People, 193 Ill. 405, 62 N.E. 235. A seven-year-old girl cannot be expected to understand the nature of the act, let alone possess the will to resist against a friend of her parents. Force is always present in an act of intercourse between a seven-year-old female, incapable of consenting or resisting, and a thirty-one-year-old male.” I believe that People v. Riley is indistinguishable and correctly interprets the meaning of the word “force” under the factual background of both that, and this, case. The fact that here the defendant committed a deviate sexual assault, as opposed to the intercourse in the Riley case, does not make the rationale of Riley any less persuasive or dispositive. The defendant contends that the quoted language from Riley is unnecessary to the decision in that actual force was present in Riley. That is not true. The force in Riley, i.e., hitting the prosecutrix, occurred after the rape had taken place. The State should properly have brought the charges under section 11 — 4 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 11 — 4), entitled “Indecent Liberties with a Child.” Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 1961 deals with sex offenses. The Committee Comments indicate that the legislature specifically sought to protect the young and immature from sexual advances of older persons by the language found in sections 11 — 4 and 11 — 5. Section 11 — 4 provides in part: “(a) Any person of the age of 17 years and upwards who performs or submits to any of the following acts with a child under the age of 16 commits indecent liberties with a child: * * * (2) Any act of deviate sexual conduct; or ***” As pointed out by the majority, there are certain affirmative defenses available under section 11 — 4, which are not available under section 11 — 3. They are: “(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to indecent liberties with a child that: (1) The accused reasonably believed the child was of the age of 16 or upwards at the time of the act giving rise to the charge; or (2) The child is a prostitute; or (3) The child has previously been married.” It is conceded that the defendant in this case was over the age of 17 years and the complaining witness under the age of 16 years, namely 7. Not one of the affirmative defenses available under section 11 — 4 has any possible application to this case. The penalty which may be imposed under section 11 — 3, the section under which the charge was brought, is less than that which may be imposed under section 11 — 4. Under these circumstances the failure of the State to prosecute under the more appropriate statute would not be prejudicial error. Were the age requirements for “statutory” force not present, or were there any possibility that the affirmative defenses under section 11 — 4 were available, I would not then uphold a conviction without a showing of force under the standards referred to in People v. Faulisi (1962), 25 Ill.2d 457, 461. I do not agree with the majority that the present statutory scheme and committee comments thereto command that actual or threatened force must mean something greater than the “statutory” force as described in People v. Riley. Section 11 — 1, relating to rape, requires that the act be “by force and against her will.” Section 11 — 3, relating to deviate sexual assault, requires that the act be “by force or threat of force.” The committee comments to section 11 — 3 state that the section “is intended to state generally the equivalent of the force requirement in rape.” The statute relating to rape specifically provides that the phrase “by force and against her will” includes: “(1) Where the female is unconscious; or (2) Where the female is so mentally deranged or deficient that she cannot give effective consent to intercourse.” I do not find in the foregoing statutory examples the suggestion of actual or violent force which the majority seems to find necessary. Rather, the statutory examples seem to me to be in accord with the “statutory” force found in People v. Riley, wherein it was said, “A seven-year-old girl cannot be expected to understand the nature of the act, let alone possess the will to resist against a friend of her parents. Force is always present in an act of intercourse between a seven-year-old female, incapable of consenting or resisting, and a thirty-one-year-old male.” Likewise, I believe that force was present under the circumstances of this case. I would affirm the conviction for deviate sexual assault.