Court Opinion

ID: 9470095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:57:07.728898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:43.901252
License: Public Domain

HUG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I agree that the prosecution’s closing argument does not warrant a reversal and that there was no error in the refusal to authorize funds for an expert statistician. I also agree that it was appropriate under the facts of this case to give a Jewell instruction. I dissent because I believe the content of the Jewell instruction given by the district court was deficient.
The jury instructions given by the district court evidence an effort to simplify the language of instructions so as to be more understandable to the jury. This is commendable and should be strongly encouraged. In simplifying jury instructions, however, no element of an instruction may be omitted. The instruction given by the district court on deliberate ignorance, the so-called “Jewell instruction,” left out a crucial element and is therefore deficient.
The problem with the district court’s instruction is the same problem this court found in United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911 (1977). In Valle-Valdez, we held that knowledge cannot be imputed merely because the defendant “acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth;” the jury must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was “aware of the high probability” of the existence of the fact. Id. at 914.
The degree of that probability is important. It would not be enough if Suttiswad had a hunch that there might be contraband hidden in his suitcase or was worried that it might be there or was suspicious— there must be an awareness of a high probability that the contraband was in the suitcase. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir.1976). The instruction given here, as was the case in Valle-Valdez, failed to convey this important element.
The district court instructed the jury that “negligence or mistake alone is not sufficient to support a finding of ... knowledge” and that a finding that the defendant “deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him” was sufficient. The majority believes that this satisfies the “high probability” requirement. I disagree.
The instruction that “negligence or mistake alone is not sufficient,” although accurate, did not convey, as Valle-Valdez requires, that Suttiswad must have been aware of the high probability that contraband was hidden in his suitcase. The gap between “negligence or mistake” and awareness of a high probability is considerable.
Suttiswad would have been “negligent” if a reasonable person would have suspected that the suitcase contained contraband and checked further. This is an objective determination and is completely unlike the subjective awareness the defendant must have under Valle-Valdez.
A “mistake” would have been a belief that he was not carrying contraband. Suttiswad would have been mistaken if, for example, he believed that the heroin was talcum powder. This part of the instruction fails to cover the broad range of beliefs between believing he was not carrying contraband and being aware of the high probability that he was carrying contraband.
The “negligence or mistake” portion of the instruction provided no guidance in the situation where the defendant was suspi*654cious but his suspicions did not rise to the level of a high probability. It also provided no guidance in the situation where the defendant had no idea and no reason to believe that the item was in his possession at all. In short, this portion of the instruction fails to convey that the defendant must have been subjectively aware of the high probability that he was carrying contraband.
The part of the instruction stating that “the element of knowledge may be. satisfied by [finding] that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him” also fails to convey the requirement that the defendant must actually be aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact. He could have “deliberately closed his eyes” because he had a faint suspicion.
Another part of the' instruction states: “A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge.” This portion of the instruction is subject to exactly the same defect as the instruction in Valle-Valdez. We stated in Valle-Valdez:
Applying Jewell, we conclude that the instruction given in the present case was deficient. That instruction permitted conviction on proof “beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth of the contents of the vehicle.” As far as it goes, this instruction is correct. The error or deficiency lies in the instruction’s failure to add that the defendant’s “conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth” is culpable only if the jury also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware of the high probability that the vehicle carried contraband. A deliberate avoidance of knowledge is culpable only when coupled with a subjective awareness of high probability.
554 F.2d at 914. The instruction given in this case would permit conviction on deliberate avoidance of knowledge without a subjective awareness of high probability.
Because instructions approved on appeal tend to be instructions given in future cases, we have a particular responsibility to point out deficiencies. I am hopeful that the district courts will in the future make clear the “high probability” requirement of Valle-Valdez while continuing their endeav- or to simplify jury instructions.