Court Opinion

ID: 9378414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 15:04:36.405344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:20.904249
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2022-CA-1228-WC

JANE TODD CRAWFORD HOSPITAL                                        APPELLANT

                 PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
v.             OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
                       ACTION NO. WC-15-90532

MICHAEL BUSH; HONORABLE M.
CHRISTOPHER DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD                                                              APPELLEES

                                  OPINION
                                 AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND JONES, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: Jane Todd Crawford Hospital (“the Hospital”) petitions for

review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board (“the Board”) affirming

a decision by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) awarding benefits to Michael

Bush. We affirm.
                The underlying facts are straightforward. Bush worked as a third-shift

radiographer for the Hospital, which required him to transport a heavy X-ray

machine around the hospital and to move patients into positions where they could

be scanned. While helping a patient get off a table in February 2015, Bush felt

pain in his shoulder. Bush had rotator cuff surgery a few months later and has

never returned to work.

                In 2020, Bush filed an application for workers’ compensation

benefits. Eventually, the ALJ issued an opinion and award finding Bush to have a

5% whole-person impairment due to his work-related shoulder injury. The ALJ

enhanced Bush’s award by the three-multiplier found at KRS1 342.730(1)(c)1. after

concluding Bush lacked the ability to return to the type of work he performed

when he was injured.2 The ALJ also awarded temporary total disability benefits

(“TTD”) to Bush from shortly after his injury through May 10, 2018. The Hospital

appealed to the Board.

                The Hospital raised two issues before the Board. First, the Hospital

argued the ALJ should have found Bush had reached maximum medical

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
  KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. provides in relevant part that “[i]f, due to an injury, an employee does not
retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work that the employee performed at the time
of injury, the benefit for permanent partial disability shall be multiplied by three (3) times the
amount otherwise determined . . . .”

                                               -2-
improvement (“MMI”) in July 2016, not May 2018. The date when Bush reached

MMI is important because reaching MMI triggers the cessation of TTD benefits.

See, e.g., French v. Rev-A-Shelf, 641 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Ky. 2022) (“Under KRS

342.0011(11)(a)[3], TTD benefits must cease whenever the first of two things

occurs: either the claimant reaches MMI or the claimant reaches a level of

improvement that would permit a return to her customary employment.”).

              Second, the Hospital argued Bush had not shown an inability to return

to the work he performed on the date of his injury. The ALJ had to find Bush was

unable to return to the type of work he performed when he was injured to apply the

three-multiplier. See, e.g., Apple Valley Sanitation, Inc. v. Stambaugh, 645 S.W.3d

434, 438-39 (Ky. 2022).

              The Board affirmed the ALJ. The Hospital then filed this petition for

review. The Hospital raised the same two issues.

              The standards governing our review are familiar and settled. As the

claimant, Bush had the burden of “proving each essential element of his claim”

and, as the finder of fact, the ALJ had “the sole authority to judge the weight,

credibility, substance, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”

Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. Bartolomeo, 640 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Ky. App. 2022) (citations

3
  KRS 342.0011(11)(a) states that ‘“[t]emporary total disability’ means the condition of an
employee who has not reached maximum medical improvement from an injury and has not
reached a level of improvement that would permit a return to employment[.]”

                                              -3-
omitted). The ALJ also had “the sole authority to believe or disbelieve various

parts of the evidence, regardless of whether it comes from the same witness or the

same party’s total proof.” Id. Since Bush was successful before the ALJ, to

receive relief the Hospital must show the ALJ’s decision is not supported by

substantial evidence. Id. We may reverse the Board only if it “has overlooked or

misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent or committed an error in assessing

the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” Id. (citing Western Baptist

Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992)).

             The Hospital offers a one-paragraph argument the ALJ should have

found Bush reached MMI in July 2016, not May 2018. The Hospital stresses a

report of Dr. Frank Bonnarens, who performed two independent medical

examinations of Bush and issued three reports. But Dr. Bonnarens’ MMI

conclusions were inconsistent.

             In his first report, issued on May 10, 2018, Dr. Bonnarens did not give

a specific date when he believed Bush had reached MMI. Instead, Dr. Bonnarens

opined Bush “should be regarded at being at maximum medical improvement.”

Record (“R.”) at 89. In his later report, issued in September 2021, Dr. Bonnarens

changed course and opined Bush reached MMI in July 2016, one year after his

surgery. That conclusion is contrary to a report issued in August 2016 by Bush’s

treating surgeon, Dr. Sanjiv Mehta, in which he stated Bush had not then reached

                                         -4-
MMI. Moreover, Dr. Jules Barefoot, another physician who performed an

independent medical examination of Bush, opined Bush did not reach MMI until

January 2020. In short, the record contains divergent opinions as to when Bush

reached MMI.

             Given this conflicting evidence, the Hospital’s argument must fail.

The ALJ had the sole discretion to decide which opinion to utilize to determine

when Bush reached MMI. Indeed, when there is conflicting evidence, an ALJ

must choose to accept some and reject some. The Hospital’s argument to the

contrary notwithstanding, the ALJ was not required to rely on Dr. Bonnarens’

second report. And, since there is nothing in Dr. Bonnarens’ first report opining

Bush had reached MMI on a specific prior date, the ALJ did not err by construing

the May 10, 2018, report as indicating Bush reached MMI on the day the report

was issued. The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and thus may

not be disturbed.

             Next, the Hospital argues the ALJ erred by applying the three-

multiplier. This issue revolves around whether there was evidence to support the

conclusion Bush lacked the ability to return to “the type of work” he performed at

the time of the injury. KRS 342.730(1)(c)1. Our Supreme Court has held the

“type of work that the employee performed” language in that statute “was most

likely intended by the legislature to refer to the actual jobs that the individual

                                          -5-
performed[,]” not merely the worker’s job classification. Ford Motor Co. v.

Forman, 142 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Ky. 2004). An “ALJ’s determination of an injured

employee’s retained capacity and application of a multiplier to that employee’s

benefits award is a question of fact” so “[i]n a case, like the present one, in which

the party with the burden of proof was successful before the ALJ, the only issue we

consider on appeal is whether the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial

evidence.” Apple Valley Sanitation, Inc., 645 S.W.3d at 438.

             The evidence regarding Bush’s ability to return to the type of work he

performed when he was injured was, again, conflicting. Dr. Bonnarens believed

Bush could return to his pre-injury work, but others disagreed. For example, Bush

unequivocally testified he lacked the ability to perform all his former duties, such

as moving patients on and off tables. “A worker’s testimony is competent

evidence of his physical condition and of his ability to perform various activities

both before and after being injured.” Ira A. Watson Dept. Store v. Hamilton, 34

S.W.3d 48, 52 (Ky. 2000). Also, a vocational rehabilitation counselor opined in

May 2020 Bush “does not retain the physical capacities to return to work as

described in the job description per the lifting limits the employer required.” R. at

292. Moreover, in April 2019, Dr. Mehta wrote in his notes that he gave Bush a

note keeping him off work “because he cannot return to his regular job.” R. at 238.

And Dr. Barefoot opined: “It does not appear [Bush] would be able to return to his

                                          -6-
prior position as an x-ray tech/CT tech due to his right shoulder

limitations/restrictions.” R. at 430.

              Finally, even Dr. Bonnarens qualified his conclusion Bush could

return to his former work. Specifically, Dr. Bonnarens wrote Bush “could return to

work if the reasonable accommodation of having someone help him move large

people was made.” R. at 443. In practical terms, Dr. Bonnarens admitted Bush

would need help to lift heavy patients. Since lifting patients on and off tables was

a major part of Bush’s duties, Dr. Bonnarens has admitted Bush cannot, by

himself, perform the same tasks he was required to perform at the time of his

injury.

              A worker who can no longer perform all his required job tasks lacks

the ability to return to the “type of work” performed at the time of injury. See,

e.g., Miller v. Square D Co., 254 S.W.3d 810, 813-814 (Ky. 2008) (holding “it

seems more likely that the legislature intended for the phrase ‘the type of work that

the employee performed at the time of injury’ to refer broadly to the various jobs

or tasks that the worker performed for the employer at the time of injury rather

than to refer narrowly to the job or task being performed when the injury

occurred”).

                                         -7-
             In addition, Bush testified in a deposition that the Hospital “would not

accommodate my restrictions. I was hired for third shift to work alone and to work

with patients . . . .” R. at 264. At the final hearing, Bush similarly testified he

usually had worked alone “and everybody is shorthanded anymore so it’s hard to

get help, anybody to help you because they are all busy too.” R. at 465.

             In sum, the ALJ’s conclusion Bush lacks the ability to return to the

type of work he performed when he was injured is supported by substantial

evidence and thus may not be disturbed. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by

applying the three-multiplier.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Workers’ Compensation Board is

affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Marcel Smith                               Stephanie N. Wolfinbarger
 Lexington, Kentucky                        Louisville, Kentucky

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