Court Opinion

ID: 9709733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:44.507869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.924338
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that this record shows that Mr. Levinson’s representation of the Union violates D.R. 9-101(B) of our Code of Professional Responsibility. How*511ever, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to review the uncertified interlocutory order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia denying the City’s motion to disqualify Mr. Levinson. The majority’s decision serves only to further delay the resolution of the merits of this already longstanding dispute between the City and its employees over the meaning of the labor contract they entered into. It does so, moreover, without the benefit of a full explication in the trial court of the effect this conflict may have on the fairness of the litigation. Such delay is particularly objectionable in disputes involving the meaning of collective bargaining agreements. In such a posture, I would refer this matter to our disciplinary procedure and let resolution of the main dispute go forward as promptly as possible.
The City of Philadelphia has not alleged that it is prejudiced in any way by Mr. Levinson’s representation of the Union in this litigation. The City’s sole basis for its motion to disqualify Mr. Levinson is that his representation violates Canon 9 and D.R. 9-101(B) of our Code of Professional Responsibility. Therefore, this case is factually distinct from American Dredging Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 480 Pa. 177, 389 A.2d 568 (1978). In American Dredging Co. the City moved to disqualify counsel for American’s subcontractor, a party in interest in American’s suit, because he was an officer and Board member of the Port Corporation. The City claimed, inter alia, that counsel had acquired confidential information regarding the facts of the litigation commenced by American. We held that counsel’s representation of the sub-contractor violated Canon 4’s admonition that a lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client. Moreover, in American Dredging Co., counsel’s representation violated Canon 5 of the Code which requires a lawyer to refuse employment when the interests of the lawyer may impair his independent professional judgment. Disqualification pursuant to an interlocutory appeal may be required in such cases because of the manifest actual prejudice to a party or parties to the litigation.
*512. However, a violation of Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) does not necessarily result in actual prejudice to a party. Moreover, in the present case the City does not even allege that it does.
In a dictum in American Dredging this Court did suggest that a violation of Canon 9’s admonition that “[a] Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety” and D.R. 9-101(B)’s prohibition of acceptance of private employment in any matter in which an attorney had substantial responsibility while a public employee require disqualification. I disagree with that dictum and the majority adherence to it here.1
This Court has established disciplinary rules governing the conduct of lawyers and a system of sanctions to enforce those rules. In the absence of a showing that a violation of those rules is prejudicial to an adverse party I would not impose disqualification as a sanction.
This Court has adopted a comprehensive set of rules for enforcing the Code of Professional Responsibility. See Pa.R.D.E. 101-219. Those rules provide for investigation and hearings by the Disciplinary Board to determine if a violation of the Code exists and, if so, the appropriate sanction. That procedure is well adapted to the resolution of disputed factual questions. Our review of a cold record on an uncertified interlocutory appeal where the trial court has not spoken to those issues is not so adapted.
In some cases the trial court must, initially, regulate the conduct of attorneys practicing before it. See American Dredging Co., supra. A trial court’s responsibility for enforcing the Disciplinary Code, however, should be limited to violations which have a demonstrable effect on the conduct of the litigation and are likely to be so prejudicial to *513one or more parties to the litigation that appellate review would be ineffective.
I do not believe that this Court should, as a general rule, review interlocutory orders denying a party’s motion to disqualify counsel. In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981) the United States Supreme Court held that denial of a motion to disqualify is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment” and as such was not appropriate for interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. In Firestone the United States Supreme Court stated:
Under § 1291, the courts of appeals are vested with “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” We have consistently interpreted this language as indicating that a party may not take an appeal under this section until there has been “a decision by the District Court that 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ” ____ This rule, that a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits, serves a number of important purposes. It emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system. In addition, the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of “avoiding] the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment.”
Id. at 374, 101 S.Ct. at 673 (citations and footnotes omitted).
While I agree that this Court has the power under Pa.R. A.P. 1311 to review interlocutory orders by permission, I *514believe that rule limits our power to review such orders to matters which the lower court has certified pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702. The trial court refused to do so in this case. Moreover, I find the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Firestone persuasive. Finally, assumption of plenary jurisdiction here would directly conflict with the disciplinary procedure we have wisely prescribed. Therefore, I do not believe it should serve as a basis for our hearing this case at this time.
I would dismiss this appeal as improvidently granted.

. Likewise, I would decline to follow Justice O’Brien’s opinion in support of affirmance in Commonwealth v. Eastern Dawn Mobile Home Park, 486 Pa. 326, 405 A.2d 1232 (1979) holding that the trial court properly disqualified counsel because of a violation of D.R. 9-101(B).