Court Opinion

ID: 9637479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:07:31.718719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:56.440589
License: Public Domain

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting)-
I find myself in disagreement with the majority insofar as it is stated in the opinion that the circumstances under which the deceased and his associates were on appellant’s premises at the time of the homicide have no bearing on the degree of the guilt of appellant. While a mere trespass against property does not justify the taking of human life and is not of itself sufficient to reduce the homicide to manslaughter, yet if there be evidence in the record from which a jury may infer that the killing was the result of a sudden, violent impulse of passion provoked by the trespass or by the unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty, acted on before the - passion had time to cool, the jury may conclude that the trespass or the • unlawful restraint of liberty might amount to such a reasonable provocation as in law would justify the excitement of passion and thus operate to reduce the offense from first degree murder to a lesser offense.
The hostile mind is essential to the crime of murder, and therefore unless the matters which are in evidence convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the malignancy of the mind, the crime is not made out. although other degrees of homicide may be established by the evidence. The fact is the same in all, the death of the person is the imputed crime but the intention makes all the difference and he who kills is pronounced a murderer in the first degree or the second degree or manslaughter, voluntary or involuntary, as the circumstances by which his mind is interpreted by the jury, show it to have been cankered by deliberate wickedness or stirred up by sudden passion, or some excusable conduct shown by the evidence. The intentions of men are inferences of reason from their actions. Proof of their actions is undoubtedly most convincing proof of their intentions, but there are actions which by circumstances may be qualified from their original prima facie character or appearance. This qualification is the foundation of all defense against imputed crime. A mortal wound without adequate provocation is a just foundation of an indictment for murder, but the accused may reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter or excusable homicide depending on the circumstances.
In the case at bar, there is evidence in the record that appellant committed the crime of murder in the first degree. Proof of appellant’s threats before the killing was established by some of the witnesses and others testified that the still which was destroyed belonged to appellant. The jury could have concluded from these facts that his act was with malice aforethought. There is likewise evidence in the record from which the jury could have concluded that appellant was laboring under such mental disturbance caused by a reasonable and adequate provocation as would ordinarily so overcome and dominate or suspend the exercise of judgment as to make appellant incapable of forming and executing that distinct intent to take human life essential to murder in the first degree, and to cause him to act from the impelling force of the disturbing cause rather than from real wickedness of heart or from cruelty and recklessness of disposition.
The uncontradicted evidence shows that the deceased and his associates went to appellant’s dwelling house without a warrant of arrest or one to search the premises and neither the deceased nor any other officer advised appellant of the purpose of their visit. After they were admitted to the premises, they confronted appellant with what they believed to be incriminating evidence of his connection with the still and commenced a general search of his premises. At no time did the agents notify appellant he was under arrest or that they intended to arrest him nor did they advise him they wished to search his house.
*1013The sanctity of a person’s dwelling place has been always, and justly, a favored tenet of our people. They have looked at its invasion with disfavor. However, the law has removed the sacred shield from the dwelling if it becomes a refuge for the lawless, and our lawmakers have wisely provided that the officer may invade such dwelling for the purpose of making arrests or for searching it for instruments of crime or for evidence which establishes crime when he acts on probable cause or with a warrant. When public officers come to the house armed with specific authority to arrest or search, it is the duty of the dweller to yield immediately to the voice of authority, but when the attempted arrest is without probable cause or without a warrant of arrest or the search has no connection with an arrest or is without a search warrant, the abhorrent and unreasonable nature of the invasion is such that if the circumstances show the person whose dwelling place is invaded was laboring under such mental disturbance by reason thereof as to suspend the exercise of judgment, the killing of the intruder may reduce the degree of the offense lower than murder in the first degree.
The facts concerning the killing of the deceased were such that the jury under appropriate instructions might have found there were such mitigating circumstances as to relieve appellant of the severe sentence of death.
Out of the law’s jealous anxiety for the security of personal freedom, the crime of murder does not always arise from the taking of the life of an officer. When an officer, with the power of arrest or the right of investigation of crime, acts in the execution of his duty, the law casts a peculiar protection around him and consequently if he is killed in the performance of his duty, it is murder in the first degree, even though there is such a want of premeditation as in ordinary cases would reduce the crime to manslaughter, but when such officer is acting without warrant and is searching the premises of the accused in violation of his constitutional rights, the officer is not entitled to this peculiar protection and consequently the crime of taking his life may be reduced to voluntary manslaughter when the evidence shows the offense is committed in sudden heat and passion or is attended by circumstances affording reasonable provocation. Wharton’s Criminal Law, Book Two, Section 414, 8th Ed.; John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 538, 20 S.Ct. 729, 44 L.Ed. 874; Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 621, 14 S.Ct. 919, 38 L.Ed. 841; Brown v. United States, 159 U.S. 100, 102, 16 S.Ct. 29, 40 L.Ed. 90; Brown v. United States, 5 Cir., 47 F.2d 681.
In my opinion the court should have submitted to the jury the question of the legality of the authority of the deceased officer to be on appellant’s premises and also the legality of the manner in which he was executing that authority at the time of the homicide and if the jury believed from the evidence that the deceased officer was acting illegally and as a direct and proximate result thereof, appellant killed the deceased, the jury could, in its discretion, fix appellant’s punishment at either death or life imprisonment.