Court Opinion

ID: 9736347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:53:17.112297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:06.104681
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy:
The record in this case does not show that appellant was indigent at the conclusion of his 1930 trial; in his present PCHA petition appellant did not allege post-trial indigency, nor did he undertake to prove at the PCI-IA hearing that he could not afford appellate counsel. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in my opinion in Commonwealth v. Norman, 447 Pa. 217, 285 A. 2d 523 (1971) (concurring and dissenting opinion), I believe that appellant is not protected by the constitutional mandate of Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963) and that it should be his burden to prove that he did not knowingly waive his right to appeal.
Moreover, the majority’s reliance on United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417 F. 2d 648 (2nd Cir. 1969) and Williams v. Coiner, 392 F. 2d 210 (4th Cir. 1968) appears to be misplaced. In neither case did those federal courts of appeals give Douglas the unwar*241rantedly broad reading which this Court now proclaims ; indeed, both opinions, like that of the Fifth Circuit in Pate v. Holman, 341 F. 2d 764 (5th Cir. 1965), and that of the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. O’Brien v. Maroney, 423 F. 2d 865 (3d Cir. 1970) clearly link “Douglas rights” to a defendant’s post-trial indigency.
I respectfully dissent.