Court Opinion

ID: 9857079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:14:53.332794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:58.584358
License: Public Domain

SCHROEDER, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the decision of the Court for the reasons that the basis of the decision is different from the issue decided in the district court; the decision is made upon facts different from those assumed by the parties in the district court; and, the decision does not.give guidance to the trial courts on the important issue that was decided by the district court and the Court of Appeals and was presented to this Court.
The issue as it was addressed in the district court was whether uncounselled guilty pleas could be used for enhancement purposes. The district court outlined the facts as follows in its Memorandum Decision and Order:
In each of cases number C-5653 and C-5725-A, defendant Coby was charged with one count of Driving Under the Influence (DUI), Idaho Code § 18-8004, and one count of Driving Without Privileges (DWP), Idaho Code § 18-8001(5). Each of those cases are felony charges under I.C. § 18-8005 and rely for prior convictions on previous guilty pleas to D.U.I. on April 9, 1990, and on August 10, 1990. Defendant now asserts that the prior pleas as uneoun-selled, cannot be used for enhancement purposes. At each prior arraignment, Coby waived his right to legal representation.
This statement of the record was the basis of the appeal that was assigned to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals correctly analyzed this issue:
The district court relied heavily on United States v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.1987). In Balough, the defendant had initially pled guilty. Later, the defendant, wishing to withdraw his guilty plea, sought to remove his court-appointed counsel and to proceed pro se. The federal district court allowed the defendant to proceed pro se but failed to warn him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was then denied.
In Balough, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated,
In order to waive the right to counsel knowingly and intelligently, a criminal defendant “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Accordingly, we have held that “[a] waiver of counsel cannot be knowing and intelligent unless the accused appreciates the possible consequences of mishandling these core functions and the lawyer’s superior ability to perform them.”
Balough, 820 F.2d at 1487 (citations omitted).
Although the district court followed the reasoning as outlined in Balough and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806[, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] (1975), it did not have the benefit of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Maxey, 125 Idaho 505, 873 P.2d 150 (1994), which directly addressed the necessity of warning misdemeanor defendants of the dangers of self-representation when they seek to enter guilty pleas pro se. In Maxey, our Supreme Court stated:
The dangers of self-representation at trial are obvious. The intricacies of the procedures, the rules of evidence, and the law are sufficient to justify extra care in making sure the defendant appreciates the difficulties in conducting a trial without the assistance of a lawyer. Certainly a guilty plea is an important part of a criminal proceeding. We are not convinced, however, that the judgments that confront a defendant who pleads guilty in a misdemeanor case are sufficiently difficult to warrant a requirement that the trial court must advise the defendant of the problems inherent in entering a plea without counsel.
*94Maxey, 125 Idaho at 509, 873 P.2d at 154 (citations omitted).
Thus, a failure to warn a pro se defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation will not render a subsequent guilty plea constitutionally invalid for enhancement purposes. This being the case, the question then becomes whether the state otherwise properly established the validity of the prior convictions.
State v. Coby, 128 Idaho 99, 910 P.2d 771 (Ct.App.1994).
The Court of Appeals then affirmed the district court on the alternative basis that the State failed to make a prima facie showing of the validity of at least one of the driving under the influence and driving without privileges charges. This Court addresses the same issue, although that was not the basis of the district court decision.
Two things should happen in this case. First, this Court should decide the issue decided by the district court. Second, this Court should not decide the issue that it has decided. That question should be remanded to the district court to decide based upon the complete record, argument, and the guidance of a decision on the question of the effect of the failure to warn a pro se defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation when the prosecution seeks to enhance the charges based upon prior convictions. The district court could then focus its analysis within a proper legal framework.