Court Opinion

ID: 9844396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:02:15.654445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:34.405700
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
It does not sufficiently appear that the Court fully comprehends the appellant’s theory — which I thought well laid out at oral argument and in the briefs submitted, and accordingly believe to be deserving of mention.
The factual background, although somewhat complex, is sufficiently stated in the Court’s opinion. The unpaid subcontractors filed liens against the owners of the property for the respective amounts owed them— not by the owners — but by the prime contractor. The law allows them this remedy. In pursuit of it they filed their foreclosure action and asked for attorney’s fees, as the law provides. At the same time, however, and in the same action, they sought a monetary judgment against the contractor for the monies not paid, the nonpayment of which was also the basis of their claim of lien and lien foreclosure action. This they could do, but it is at least unusual, as in the ordinary case the owner generally is the ultimate target when the contractor has not paid his materialmen and subcontractors. In the ordinary ease, if the contractor has not absconded or is insolvent, the filing of the lien results in the owner paying the amounts due and deducting it, or pressuring the contractor into making payment. From time to time it has been suggested that the statutory lien is a harsh remedy because it makes an owner, who is often unaware and unsuspecting, responsible for unpaid bills that the contractor should have paid — this often • being so notwithstanding that the owner may have advanced to the contractor the full amount of the contract price. On the other hand, it has been recognized that the policy of the statutory remedy is to place some onus on an owner to make his financial arrangements with his contractor in such a manner that assures payment being made to the subcontractors and materialmen.
Setting this controversy apart from most cases and making it complex, confusing, and unique was the employment of the summary judgment procedures. While in any lien foreclosure action the amounts due the lienholders will have to be ascertained, much as in a mortgage foreclosure action, wherein in both a final decree of foreclosure and order of sale of the property will be entered, no monetary judgment can be entered against the owner. This is an important point. Here, however, within the confines of the lien foreclosure action a judgment was taken, not against the owner, *604but against the contractor. I do not see that as improper because the contractor does owe the money and the lien-claimants are entitled to such a judgment. For one thing, in the event the lien was untimely or imperfectly filed, the subcontractor will not be able to gain any relief from the owners, and will have no resort but to pursue the contractor for the unpaid debt. The statute, I.C. § 45-515, clearly contemplates this result and allows the lien-claimant to pursue the contractor.
In the ordinary case the claimant would maintain his foreclosure against the owner on the equity side of the court, and pursue his claim for a monetary judgment against the owner at law — in which action he would even be entitled to a jury trial. In this case, I have no problem with the fact that the two courses were followed in the one action naming both the contractor and the owner. However, prior to any lien foreclosure decree being entered against the owner, judgment was taken against the contractor, executions issued on that judgment, and the full amount of the judgments tendered and accepted. As I say, this does not seem to be the ordinary case.
Now, had there been the two independent actions, and had a monetary judgment been entered against the contractor, and satisfied, could the unpaid subcontractors continue with their lien foreclosure action? I would incline to think it highly doubtful, and at the least a close question. The statute declares that the right to lien against the property, and bring a foreclosure action, does not impair an in personam action “to recover such debt” from the contractor. Once the debt is recovered it would seem to follow that the filing of the lien and the ensuing foreclosure action would properly be respectively released and dismissed, having served the purpose of providing security for the debt and a stand-by for further processing in the event the in personam action for recovery of the debt was not successful.
Until I read the Court’s opinion I entertained the thought that such had been and is the appellants’ theory. On page six of their brief appellants quote from a letter which was sent to the trial court to resolve any question in the court’s mind as to whether the deposited money could be released without all issues having been decided in this multi-issue, multi-party lawsuit:
“ ‘We realize the Court may not find an election by the Plaintiffs which discharge their claims of lien, but may find the deposit will satisfy the amounts due under the execution lien. We therefore have no objection to the Court’s acceptance of our deposit in payment to the Plaintiffs’ without discharging the Plaintiffs’ claims of lien.’ ”
Contrary to the view expressed in the Court’s opinion, it would seem to follow that appellants were not at all obstructionists, but more than passively cooperative in getting the unpaid judgment paid. Otherwise they would not have volunteered that they were willing to agree that acceptance of the deposited money would not discharge any other remaining issues which might later be pursued.
The letter itself clearly demonstrates the theory upon which the appellants proceeded in paying the judgment, an “election” as they put it, and as it seemingly was. Yet, the appellants will not see the Court’s opinion as understanding or meeting the thrust of their theory. Although case law holds that a contractor can be held liable for attorney’s fees assessed to the owner in a foreclosure action on the owner’s land, that principle hardly applies to determining the legal effect of a satisfied judgment taken against the contractor for the unpaid amounts which precipitated the filing of the lien against the owner.
While I incline to the belief that, when, as in this case, the lien was justifiably filed as was the suit filed for its foreclosure, and hence some attorney’s fees for the action taken should be recoverable, it is doubtful that the amount involved should be a factor when the debt was recovered from the contractor — thereby ceasing all necessity for future action pointed toward collecting the debt. However, a onesided dissertation upon that issue, with no other member of *605the Court interested therein would tend to be an exercise in futility. We were presented with an interesting question of law which in my opinion goes unsatisfactorily answered. The trial court had no trouble in grasping the problem presented, and dealt with it carefully in a written Memorandum Decision, stating its view that there was no presentation of authority or reason “to conclude that the attempted enforcement of the personal judgment would preclude any further action on the lien.” (Emphasis added.) I would agree as to attempted enforcement. And, I am not surprised at the lack of any case involving the rather elementary proposition that, although relief may be sought against two or more obligors, and judgment taken against two or more obligors, there can only be one recovery — double recovery being prohibited. The fact here is that the monetary judgment was entered, execution did issue, there were garnishment proceedings, and the judgment was extinguished by satisfaction. Perhaps it was not a situation in which the lien claimants were put to an “election,” as the term is used, or in which they necessarily made an “election,” but they did opt to push for collection of the monetary judgment, did collect it, and therefore no longer could foreclose a lien for that same amount.
I am unable to agree with the Court’s proposition that I.C. § 12-121 can be so interpreted and applied so as to allow the granting of attorney’s fees on appeal in a mechanic’s and materialmen’s lien foreclosure action. As the Court itself notes, the legislature has, separate from I.C. § 12-121, addressed the question over and above that, the reasoning of the dissents of Donaldson, J., and Bistline, J., in Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078 (1979), is rather persuasive that I.C. § 12-121 was not directed toward awarding attorney’s fees at the appellate level.