Court Opinion

ID: 9514498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:58.326421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.367602
License: Public Domain

*143SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 25.] I dissent as to Issue 1. Neither the majority opinion nor Woelz is able to muster a single case where any court has held that a person already punished once could be punished again under the probate code.5 If the Legislature intended such a result, it would have so provided.
[¶ 26.] The majority opinion purports to rely on some heretofore unannounced “public policy.” This reliance is misplaced in the absence of a statute. See Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 1997 SD 97, ¶ 20, 567 N.W.2d 220, 224:
[I]n this state the courts need only look to the statutes themselves to discern public policy. As noted in Isaac n State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 522 N.W.2d 752, 756 n.l (SD 1994), the Legislature is the final arbiter of public poliey[.]
See also Green v. Siegel, Barnett & Schutz, 1996 SD 146, ¶¶ 31-32, 557 N.W.2d 396, 405 (“[S]uch arguments should be presented to the Legislature for its consideration as to what is the appropriate public policy for this State .... we sympathize with those who find the statute unjust, but we are bound to exercise judicial restraint ... and not substitute our judgment and wisdom for that of the legislature.”) (citations omitted).
[¶ 27.] The majority opinion’s reliance on SDCL 29A-1-106 is misplaced:
If fraud has been perpetrated in connection with any proceeding or in any statement filed under this code or if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes of this code, any person injured thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from any person (other than a bona fide purchaser) benefitting from the fraud, whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be commenced within two years after the discovery of the fraud, but no proceeding may be brought against one not a perpetrator of the fraud later than five years after the time of commission of the fraud. This section does not limit remedies relating to fraud perpetrated on a decedent during the decedent’s lifetime which affect the succession of the decedent’s estate.
(Emphasis added). As we noted in Ward v. Lange, 1996 SD 113, ¶ 23, 553 N.W.2d 246, 252, “[m]uch of the misfeasance took place before Gail or Loren could have inherited under the wills.” The fraud for which Lang-es were already punished was not “perpetrated in connection -with any proceeding or in any statement filed under this code or ... used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes of this code” and therefore SDCL 29A-1-106 does not apply in this case.
[¶ 28.] The majority opinion cites De Zotell v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 60 S.D. 532, 245 N.W. 58 (1932), where this court held, before the enactment of our “slayer” statute, that a killer could not profit from his crime. That case is clearly distinguishable. There, the court did not “establish” a public policy as asserted by the majority opinion in ¶ 14; the court stated that the public policy preventing a killer from taking under the decedent’s life insurance policy was found in RC 1919 § 49: “No one can take advantage of his own wrong.” De Zo-tell, 60 S.D. at 534, 245 N.W. at 59. Additionally, the court noted, “when the profit is to accrue by virtue of a contract, as upon an insurance policy, no legal difficulty is encountered which prevents barring the wrongdoer from recovery.” Id. at 545, 245 N.W. at 64. Section 49 was omitted in the revised SDC 1939. Today the only analogous provision is found in the “slayer” statute. See SDCL 29A-2-803(f):
A wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not covered by this section must be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from the killer’s wrong.
[¶ 29.] Langes committed many wrongs but they did not kill anyone. Their wrongs resulted in a judgment. They paid the judgment. The Estate accepted it. They have been punished. Therefore, this matter was over and done with — it was already res judi-*144cata — and the trial court erred by reactivating it. There is no authority to punish them again. The majority opinion is simply judicial legislation at its worst.6
[¶ 30.] The majority opinion attempts to characterize the punitive damages as “fruit of [Langes’] wrongdoing.” See supra ¶ 14. This is an inaccurate characterization; here, the “fruit of their wrongdoing” amounted to $75,000, which Langes paid back. The majority opinion relies upon Spitzer v. Spitzer, 84 S.D. 147, 168 N.W.2d 718 (1969), for the proposition that “fraud is one of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ that would call for the circuit court to provide equitable relief in probate matters.” See supra ¶ 11. Spitzer does not support the trial court’s action in this case.7 “Fraud suffices as a ground for annulling a will only where it affected the testator at the moment the will was executed[.]” 79 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 412, at 565 (1975) (emphasis added); see SDCL 29A-3-407 8 (will contests limited to questions of testamentary capacity, construction or validity of the will itself, and circumstances surrounding the execution thereof); see also In re Estate of Lien, 270 Mont. 295, 892 P.2d 530, 532 (1995) (holding that petitioners must show a statutory basis for a will contest and are limited to the statutory grounds listed in its identical statute).
[¶ 31.] In Ward, 1996 SD at ¶23, 553 N.W.2d at 252, Langes argued the trial court erred in excluding evidence of O’Keefe’s will; they claimed they should have been allowed to argue to the jury that stealing from O’Keefe amounted to stealing from themselves since they were beneficiaries. We concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the will:
The trial court reasoned that while a portion of the damage award may eventually go to Gail and Loren, it was not relevant to the amount of Estate damages. The only issue for the jury was the loss the Estate suffered, if any, due to Gail’s and Loren’s actions.
[¶ 32.] Likewise, the only real issue here is whether the Estate was fully compensated for the loss it suffered and it is undisputed that Langes satisfied the judgment. The majority opinion states that Woelz brought this action, not on behalf of the Estate, but for her own benefit. See supra ¶ 20. Since the judgment was satisfied, she is not deprived of any intended bequest — in fact, her interest increased by one-third of the punitive damages award. Cf. 80 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 892, at 79 (1975):
The mere circumstance that a person may be interested in the administration, distribution, or partition of an estate is not sufficient [to support a will contest] if he will not suffer any detriment from the will. A grievance to the feelings or sense of justice, or a sentimental interest not coupled with a pecuniary interest, is not a sufficient interest to support a will contest.
[¶ 33.] We should reverse the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.

. The lone exception is provided in SDCL 29A-2-803(b), our "slayer” statute, which causes an individual "who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent" to forfeit all benefits with respect to the decedent's estate.

. Where will it end? Consider for a moment all of the opportunities the majority opinion creates for trial judges to attempt to rectify or punish a perceived wrong. For example, under the guise of its probate authority and jurisdiction, a trial court can attempt to rectify or punish the same wrong twice. Note that here, the same circuit court judge presided over Ward v. Lange and this case.

. In fact, the court found no fraud in Spitzer. The Spitzer court cited Welsh v. Krause, 38 S.D. 264, 161 N.W. 189 (1917), for the statement that equitable relief is available in probate matters. In Welsh, the only issue was whether the county courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over probate matters or concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts' equity jurisdiction. The court held that in the absence of fraud, waste, or great lapse of time since the death of the decedent, the county court could proceed with the probate of a will. Obviously, these cases do not support the majority opinion.

.SDCL 29A-3-407 provides in part:
Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake, or revocation.