Court Opinion

ID: 9751816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:07:09.921396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:59.979687
License: Public Domain

WISEMAN, Acting P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
The majority opinion affirms Anthony Wilson’s conviction of violating Penal Code1 section 422, concluding that Wilson’s threat “convey[ed]” the “immediate prospect of execution” required by the statute even though the victim understood that the threat could not be carried out for 10 months. The majority also holds that the requirement of an immediate prospect of execution imposes no time limit during which the threat must be carried out. I respectfully dissent from this conclusion because (1) it conflicts with the plain meaning of section 422; (2) no case has held that a prospect of execution 10 months away is an *824immediate prospect of execution; and (3) there is no support for the majority’s view that the Legislature did not intend to create any time limitation when it determined that a punishable threat must convey an immediate prospect of execution to the victim. I concur in the remainder of the majority opinion, including the holding that Wilson’s conviction of violating section 76, and the life sentence for that offense, must be affirmed.
I begin with the many points regarding section 422, upon which I agree with the majority, as I take issue with only one. The majority opinion goes into great depth and cites cases at length in support of a number of other issues. For example, it points out that a threat can satisfy the specificity requirement of section 422 even though it does not state precisely when or where it will be carried out. (People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 752 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269].) It says section 422 does not require an intent to actually carry out the threat. (People v. Martinez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1220 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 303].) (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 806.) It observes that the statute requires no actual ability to carry out the threat. (People v. Lopez (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 675, 679 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 252]; In re David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1660 [286 Cal.Rptr. 398].) (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 807, 808.) It also says the statute’s requirement of unequivocality must be applied with reference to the context of the threat. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 635 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007].) (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 807.) I agree with all of these propositions. None of these points, however, shed light on the meaning of the requirement that the threat convey to the victim an immediate prospect of execution—the only real point in contention.
I have no doubt that Officer Thomberry’s fear was reasonable. Simply stated, what happened was that Wilson told the officer he had killed correctional officers before and would find him and blast him after his release on parole 10 months later. Wilson was angry and agitated and repeated these statements a number of times during his single negative encounter with Officer Thomberry. He also made hand gestures mimicking pulling a trigger. Thomberry had never had an unusual encounter with Wilson before. Thomberry testified that he understood Wilson’s threat to mean that Wilson would assault or kill him after Wilson’s release in 10 months. Further, it turned out that Wilson did have a prior conviction for assaulting a correctional officer, a fact Officer Thomberry verified later.
These facts do not prove, however, that the threat conveyed an immediate prospect of execution, as required by section 422. The prospect of carrying out a threat in 10 months is not consistent with the plain meaning of the word “immediate.” Immediate is defined as “not separated in time; acting or happening at once; without delay; instant.” (Webster’s New World Dict. (2d college ed. 1982) p. 701.)
*825I believe the court in People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1023-1024 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 464], correctly defined the elements of section 422: “(1) the defendant willfully threatens to kill or seriously injure another person; (2) the defendant has the specific intent that the listener understands the statement to be a threat; (3) the threat and the circumstances under which it was made lead the listener to believe the defendant would immediately carry through on the threat, and (4) the threat causes the listener to suffer sustained fear based upon a reasonable belief the threat would be carried out.” (Italics added.) This list is consistent with the Supreme Court’s list in People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051], which the majority quotes. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 805.) A threat the listener understands to mean that the defendant will assault him in 10 months is not one that, as required under section 422, leads the listener to believe the defendant will immediately carry through on it.
Unlike other decisions addressing threats made by incarcerated prisoners, there was no evidence that Wilson said or that Officer Thomberry believed Wilson could carry out an immediate attack while in prison; could direct others outside the prison to carry out an immediate attack; or would be released within a few days and carry out an attack. The only “prospect of execution” at issue was the prospect of Wilson being released from prison in 10 months as scheduled, and at that time obtaining means to carry out an assault, finding Thomberry, and assaulting him.
People v. Mosley (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 313 [65 Cal.Rptr.3d 856] (Mosley) and People v. Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 924] (Gaut)—cases the majority cites because they involved incarcerated defendants (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 812, 813-814)—do not support the majority’s view. In both Mosley and Gaut, the threats conveyed a prospect that they could be carried out right away, even though the defendants were incarcerated. Mosley and Gaut both claimed an ability to direct persons outside the jail to carry out the threats. Mosley also claimed he could carry out his threats himself inside the jail, using weapons that evidence showed he could obtain there. Gaut’s threats included a claim that he would be released and could carry them out in three days. Nothing that could similarly show an immediate prospect of execution was present in this case. There was no evidence that Wilson could gain or had ever gained access to a weapon in the prison, that he was able or claimed to be able to direct an attack by someone outside the prison, or that his release was imminent. There was no evidence that the threat conveyed any information of this kind to Officer Thomberry.
People v. Franz (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 773] comes a little closer to supporting the majority’s opinion, but still does not carry the day. As the majority opinion explains (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 810-811), Franz broke *826into a house and assaulted the victims. The police were called and when they arrived—but before they took Franz into custody—he told the victims to shush and drew his finger across his throat to express a threat to kill them if they told the police what happened. The court held that this threat conveyed an immediate prospect of execution to the victims because the victims did not know when they would see Franz again. In fact, Franz had not even been arrested yet. From the victims’ point of view, Franz might not be arrested at all and might carry out the threat as soon as the police left, or he might be arrested and quickly released. The facts in Wilson’s case are not similar. It is undisputed that the threat Wilson made to Officer Thomberry was the prospect of harming the officer when Wilson got out of prison in 10 months—not anytime sooner.
Section 422 proscribes threats which are “so . . . unconditional ... as to convey to the person threatened ... an immediate prospect of execution of the threat . . . .” Cases interpreting the “so . . . unconditional” element of the offense do not solve our problem in interpreting whether a threat conveys an immediate prospect of execution. True, as the majority points out, the modifier “so” in section 422 governs the first occurrence of “immediate,” as well as “unconditional” (and also “unequivocal” and “specific”), and the Supreme Court relied on “so” to support its conclusion that a threat need not be absolutely unconditional to fall within the statute’s proscription. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 340 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374] (Bolin).) (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 818.) The word “so” does not, however, modify “immediate prospect of execution.” The entire phrase reads, “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat. . . .” (§ 422.)
In fact, in Bolin, which is the leading case on the issue of conditional threats, the Supreme Court expressly refrained from stating any conclusion on the immediate-prospect-of-execution requirement. (Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 340.) Though it relies on Bolin heavily and quotes it at length, the majority opinion mentions only in passing the fact that the opinion avoided expressing a view on the issue now before us.2 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 818.) Other cases the majority cites in its discussion of conditional threats are no more helpful.
*827Section 422, like any other criminal threat statute, cannot help embracing some degree of future contemplated action. The very idea of a threat necessarily implies future action. Further, section 422 contains other words implying that future events are contemplated: A “prospect”—even a prospect of immediate execution—is a view or a conception of what will happen; and “sustained” fear is fear that will continue on for some time into the future after the threat is made but before it is carried out.
Still, the words “immediate prospect of execution” must impose some time limitation on the prospect of execution; otherwise, there would have been no need to include them. (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1010 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 136 P.3d 168] [“interpretations that render statutory terms meaningless as surplusage are to be avoided”].) The fact that the very nature of threats means some passage of time must be contemplated by the statute does not make the immediate-prospect-of-execution requirement compatible with a 10-month delay in the possibility of the threat being carried out, where knowledge of that delay was conveyed to the victim. None of the cases the majority cites come even close to holding that an expectation that a threat will be carried out in 10 months is an immediate prospect of execution.
One cannot help but ask, would the conveyance to a victim of any delay in the possibility of carrying out a threat be incompatible with the majority’s reading of the statute? Would five years be too long? Ten years? Twenty years? The majority opinion expressly rejects the view that the requirement of an immediate prospect of execution imposes a time limit of any kind. It says the “historical background” of section 422 “suggests” that the language including the immediate-prospect-of-execution requirement “was not intended to impose a specific time limitation upon the speaker’s intent to execute the threat, but instead to avoid First Amendment challenges . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 804.) It also says, “There is no evidence the phrase was intended to place a limited timeline on when a specific and unconditional threat would be executed.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 816.)
The majority says the statute does not impose a specific time limitation, as opposed to merely a time limitation. The majority does not explain what it means by this qualification. A specific time limitation as opposed to what—a general one? The discussion in footnote 3 of the majority opinion does not clarify the point. Although the majority says it “fully appreciate^] the importance of the time element,” it goes on to discuss the “sense of urgency and foreboding” the threat conveyed, not an amount of time to its execution. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 817.)
The majority’s view that there are no time limitations is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it conflicts with the plain meaning of the words the *828Legislature chose to use. If an immediate prospect of execution is not a prospect of execution within a limited time, it is not clear what other meaning the phrase might have. The Legislature’s words themselves are the “evidence” of its intent.
Second, the majority’s analysis poses a false dilemma. It suggests that the Legislature’s purpose was either to impose a time limitation or avoid constitutional problems. Wouldn’t a much easier analysis be that the Legislature intended to do both? It intended to avoid constitutional problems by limiting the types of threats to be prohibited, and one means it chose for doing so was to impose a time limit on the prospect of execution that a threat conveyed.
Third, the majority seems to conclude that if a court can identify the Legislature’s motivation for including language in a statute, for example, a desire to address constitutional concerns arising from a previous version of the statute, then the court need not apply the words the Legislature actually selected as its preferred means of satisfying those objectives. Whether it intends to or not, the majority opinion essentially has written the immediate-prospect-of-execution requirement out of the statute. Depending on your perspective, this may be a good or a bad result. Either way, in my view, it is a decision for the Legislature.3
In summary, the majority’s conclusion is inconsistent with the statutory language of section 422 and is unsupported by case authority. Since the evidence does not support the conclusion that Wilson’s threat conveyed to Officer Thomberry an immediate prospect of execution, I would reverse the section 422 conviction. I agree with the majority’s reasoning regarding the *829section 76 conviction, its conclusion that that conviction and the life sentence for it must be affirmed, and its holding on the corrections to the abstract of judgment.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 20, 2010, SI84769. Kennard, J., and Werdegar, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

 Contrary to the majority’s contention, I have said nothing suggesting that the Bolin court erred. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 818.) Bolin held that the phrase “so . . . unconditional” does not exclude some degree of conditionality, because “so” implies degrees. (Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 340.) I agree with that analysis. The phrase “immediate prospect of execution” is not governed by the word “so” occurring earlier in the sentence, however, so the analysis does not apply, as the Supreme Court itself implicitly acknowledged when it declined to address the issue we now face. (Ibid.) Even if the analysis did apply, it would not support the majority’s interpretation of the statute, which is that the prospect of execution conveyed by the threat need not be immediate in any degree, since there is no temporal limitation at all.

 I do not “maintainQ that the term ‘immediate prospect of execution’ is so clear that any attempt to define it represents lack of deference to the Legislature,” as the majority opinion mistakenly asserts. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 818.) The majority opinion does not “define” the term. Instead, it declines to apply the term at all, holding that the statute has the same effect with the term as it would have without it. In my opinion, that constitutes a lack of deference to the Legislature. What is “so clear" is that a prospect of execution in 10 months is not an immediate prospect of execution.
The majority opinion states that an “immediate prospect of execution” has a meaning different from a “prospect of immediate execution,” and that the Legislature chose the former phrase. This distinction cannot bear the weight the majority places on it. A threat conveying a prospect of immediate execution conveys that it will be carried out right away, as the majority seems to concede. In the majority’s view, however, a threat conveying an immediate prospect of execution can convey that it will not be carried out until a point in the distant future—no matter how far. If the Legislature had intended this result, it is hard to understand why it would have expressed its intent through a subtle choice of word order when simply omitting the immediate-prospect requirement would have had the same effect.