Court Opinion

ID: 9530407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:37.158854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:06.074510
License: Public Domain

On Denial of Petition for Rehearing
SMITH, Justice.
Appellant in his petition for rehearing asserts that in view of the reversal of the judgment of conviction of the offense of negligent homicide in State v. Cox, 82 Idaho 150, 351 P.2d 472, this Court committed error in its refusal to reverse the judgment of conviction in the case at bar.
Appellant, claiming inconsistence in the two decisions, asserts that in the Cox case we held that instructing the jury on offenses included within that of negligent homicide was reversible error, whereas we did not in the case here; also, that in the Cox case, failure to instruct on the defendant’s theory of the case was held to be error, but not here.
In State v. Cox this Court refers to the giving of Instructions Nos. 22, 23 and 26 as relating to the separate offenses of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and reckless driving; then cites State v. Aims, 80 Idaho 146, 326 P.2d 998, as authority for the admissibility in evidence of the acts of the defendant constituting such offenses, as components or elements of the offense of negligent homicide. The Court then proceeds [82 Idaho 150, 351 P.2d 476] : “However, giving of instructions on criminal offenses not submitted to the jury as included offenses was error, since such instructions were not applicable to the issues submitted.” The Court did not hold that so instructing was reversible error, particularly in the light of the Court’s further holding, that “neither party requested instructions relating- to included offenses.” In the Anderson case, here, as shown in the original opinion, the instructions did not submit the matter of included offenses to the jury.
In State v. Cox reversible error occurred in the giving of Instruction No. 23 (set out in footnote 1, at 351 P.2d 475-476); the first paragraph, the giving of which constituted reversible error, reads:
“The statute just read to you makes it unlawful for one who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be in the actual physical control of any vehicle in this state. The prohibit*308ed act is not conditioned or dependent upon the ability to operate a vehicle safely or to control it properly, or upon the extent of the influence of the liquor upon the driver. All persons who are under the influence of intoxicating liquor — those who are able to drive safely as well as those unable so to drive— are prohibited from driving.”
No such or similar paragraph was contained in the corresponding Instruction No. 27, or any other instruction, given in the case here.
Moreover, Instruction No. 27 given herein lends weight to our view, expressed in the original opinion, that the matter of included offenses was not submitted to the jury (and appellant requested no instruction in the premises). For, under the instruction, whether appellant drove a vehicle in reckless disregard of the rights of others or was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the accident, constituted questions of fact to be determined by the jury, in determining whether appellant committed the offense of negligent homicide “by the use of different means,” I.C. § 19-1413, set out in the information.
Appellant attempts to raise the question of asserted different meanings of the term “reckless disregard” as used in the negligent homicide statute, I.C. § 49-1101, and in the “guest” statute, I.C. § 49-1401. Decision on that point is unnecessary to the disposition of this case.
In further review of the instructions given herein we continue the view that the trial court adequately instructed the jury on the theory of appellant’s case.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
TAYLOR, C. J., and KNUDSON and McQUADE, JJ., concur.
PORTER, C. J., did not participate.