Court Opinion

ID: 9575712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:16:09.264029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:49.989364
License: Public Domain

*367Souris, J.
Since 1927 (PA 1927, No 162) onr workmen’s compensation law has provided (first, for injured employees between the ages of 16 and 18 and then, by PA 1929, No 113, for those under 18' years of age):
“That any minor under 18 years of age whose employment at the time of injury shall be shown to be illegal shall, in the absence of fraudulent use of permits or certificates of age, in which case only single compensation shall be paid, receive compensation double that provided elsewhere in this act.” CLS 1956, § 411.7 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.147).
CL 1948, §408.60 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev §17.20),. prohibits employment of minors in certain occupations. It also provides for the issuance of permits, without which no minor under the age of 18 years legally may be employed in certain occupations and for certificates by which a minor can establish his age conclusively for employment purposes. In 1927, at the time of enactment of the statutory provision quoted above, CL 1948, § 408.60 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.20), read, as it reads now, in its presently relevant parts as follows:
“Sec. 10. No child under 15 years of age shall be employed, permitted or suffered to work in or in connection with any mercantile institution, store, office, hotel, laundry, manufacturing establishment, mine, bowling alley, billiard or pool room conducted for profit, theater, passenger or freight elevator, factory or workshop, quarry, telegraph or messenger service within this State during school hours: Provided, This section shall not apply to any child of the age of 14 years or over, working on Saturdays or other days during the school year, outside of school hours or during the established vacation period in preserving perishable goods in fruit or vegetable canning establishments or in any mercantile institutions, store, office, hotel, laundry, manufacturing *368establishments, factory or workshop, quarry, telegraph or messenger service within this State * * *
“(a) It shall be the duty of every mercantile institution, store, hotel, office, laundry, manufacturing establishment, mine, bowling alley, workshop, quarry, telegraph or messenger service or any person coming within the provisions of this act to keep a register in which will be recorded the name, birthplace, age and place of residence of every person employed under the age of 18 years and it shall be unlawful for any such establishment or person to hire or employ or permit to be hired or employed or suffer to work, any child under the age of 18 years without there is first provided and placed on file in the business office thereof a permit or certificate. Such permit or certificate shall be issued by the superintendent of schools of the school district in which such child resides, or the county commissioner of schools, or some one duly authorized by him in writing, any of whom shall have power to administer oaths in relation thereto. Such permit or certificates shall be returned immediately to the issuing officer by the employer when such child leaves such employment prior to reaching the age of 18 years. A child shall be considered as having withdrawn from his employment when he or she shall have absented himself or herself from work for 5 full working days without explanation. Every limited vacation permit, hereinafter to be described, shall, upon its expiration, be void and of no effect. The said register and permit or certificate shall be produced for inspection on demand of any authorized representative of the commission. No fee shall be charged for such permit or certificate or other record required by this act by any officer by whom it shall be issued. Every employer complying with the provisions of this section shall be at liberty to employ the person so presenting the permit or certificate hereinbefore referred to, and is justified in considering and treating such person as of the age shown in such permit or certificate and shall not be liable, *369if it transpire that such person is under the age represented in such permit or certificate, to any greater extent than such employer would he liable if such person were of the age represented.
“(b) The person authorized and required to issue such permit or certificate shall not issue the same until he has received, examined, approved and filed the following papers duly executed:
“First: The school report of said child properly filled out and which shall be signed by the principal or chief executive officer of the school which such child has attended shall be furnished on demand of a child entitled thereto. It shall contain a statement that the child has attended the public school, or schools equivalent thereto, or parochial schools, previous to applying for such school record, and is able to read intelligently and write legibly simple sentences in the English language, and in the ease of the public schools, has passed satisfactorily the work of the school up to and including the work of the sixth grade, as provided in the course of study of the public schools, or in the case of schools other than public, the equivalent thereto. Such school record shall also give the age and residence of the child as shown on the records of the school and the name of its parents or guardians or custodians: Provided, That in the case of limited vacation permits or in the case of persons over 16 years of age requirements relating to educational qualifications shall be waived. Limited vacation permits referred to in this act shall be construed to mean permits issued for working during vacation periods and on Saturdays or other days during the school year outside of school hours and all such permits shall expire upon the first Monday in September commonly called Labor day; shall contain a conspicuous statement of the time at which they shall expire and shall be of a special color distinct from the regular permit or certificate.
“Second: A passport, or duly attested transcript of the record of birth, as kept by any duly authorized *370public authority, or a record of baptism or other religious record, showing the date and place of birth of such young person;
“Third: A statement from a physician connected officially with the board or department of health, which shall be required, however, only in case the above mentioned official or religious record cannot be produced, which statement shall certify that in the opinion of the physician issuing said statement, the young person is of the age stated therein, is in sound health and physically able to perform the work which it intends to do. Such statements shall also certify to the correct weight and height of said young person, and shall be kept on file by the person issuing working* permits or certificates; such person may in his discretion require also an affidavit from the parents or guardian of the young person concerned or other evidence as additional proof of age.
“(c) On the permit or certificate shall appear a statement by the issuing officer that he has examined said child; that in his opinion the child can read intelligently and write legibly simple sentences in the English language; that in his opinion the young-person is of the age represented and has reached the normal development of a child of its age and is in sound health and physically able to perform the work which it intends to do, and that, in his opinion, the services of the child are essential to the support of itself or its parents: Provided, That permits or certificates for young persons 16 years or more of age and permits for vacation periods and Saturdays or other days during the school year outside of school hours shall not certify that the wages of the child are essential to the support of the family. In doubtful cases, physical fitness for such work shall be determined by a medical officer of the board or department of health. Every such permit or certificate shall be signed in the presence of the officer issuing the same by the child in whose name it is issued; and shall state the date and place of birth of the child, and describe the color of the hair *371and eyes, the height and weight and any distinguishing facial marks of such child, and that the paper required by the preceding sections has been duly received, examined, approved and filed, and that the child named in such permit or certificate has appeared before the issuing official and been examined ;
“(d) Any person who shall make a false statement, transcript, passport, school certificate, certificate of physical fitness, school record or any other writing required to be made or filed by the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than 10 or more than 100 dollars or imprisonment for not less than 10 days nor more than 90 days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court;
“(e) Any child under 17 years of age living or worldng in a school district maintaining a continuation school under Act No. 421 of the Public Acts of 1919, as amended, shall be subject to that act.” *
The appeal board of the workmen’s compensation department (by a 2-to-l vote) affirmed a referee’s award to claimant of double compensation for injuries incurred while illegally employed as a minor, claimant not having made fraudulent use of permits or certificates of age. Defendants’ appeal is based upon the claim that Halfacre misrepresented his age to defendant employer when applying for employment, having deliberately misstated his age to be 21 when, in fact, he was still only 17. They claim that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the employer in hiring Halfacre and that, consequently, Halfacre should be estopped by his wilful misrepresentation of age from claiming the double compensation benefits provided by CLS 1956, *372§411.7 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev §17.147). Defendants rely upon Boshaw v. J. J. Newberry Co., 259 Mich 333 (83 ALR 412), followed in Blanton v. Clay Products Co., 310 Mich 635; and Walker v. Ridley Cleaners, Inc., 311 Mich 4, which plaintiff urges we overrule.
In Boshaw v. J. J. Newberry Co., supra, in 1932r this Court said (p 341):
“The workmen’s compensation act is an entire departure from the common law insofar as it pertains to the rights and duties of employer and employee. Oleszek v. Ford Motor Co., 217 Mich 318. And what is more important, the rights and duties of the respective parties under the compensation act arise out of and are incident to the contract of employment. Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich 218 (18 ALR 285, 20 NCCA 621); Wood v. Vroman, 215 Mich 449. In other words, they are contractual in nature, and plaintiff is here asserting her right for double compensation because of her contract of employment with defendant. Hence, if the other essential elements of estoppel are present there is no reason why one of the parties to the contract should not be estopped from taking advantage of a fraud perpetrated on the other party incident to procuring the contractual relation.”
One reason the doctrine of estoppel should not have been applied in Boshaw and in its progeny of Blanton and Walker, and why in my view it should not apply now, is that the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law first above quoted from their inception expressly required the payment of double compensation in cases such as these in the absence of fraudulent use of statutory working permits or certificates of age. The legislature so decreed in clear, concise language lacking any suggestion that this Court was free to add further restrictions upon the statutory right of a minor, *373injured while illegally employed, to receive double ■compensation.
The statutes quoted in the forepart of this opinion demonstrate to me a clear legislative purpose to assure by every reasonable means known that minors would not be employed in occupations injurious to health or morals or unduly hazardous. The provision in CLS 1956, § 411.7, for double compensation to illegally employed injured minors, in practical effect, was well calculated to deter such illegal employment except in those cases where fraudulent use was made of statutory working permits or certificates of age. The single statutory exception for the protection of employers should not have been judicially enlarged by Boshato’s decision to permit escape from such deterrent, on a contract theory of estoppel or otherwise, where the employer was not duped into hiring the minor claimant by the fraudulent use of such statutory permits or certificates.
I find no authority in any other State with comparable statutory provisions for what this Court did in Boshaw, Blanton, and Walker. In fact, the courts of other States with comparable statutes have ruled otherwise.
In Sackolwitz v. Charles Hamburg & Co., Inc., 295 NY 264 (67 NE2d 152), the New York court of appeals had before it a claim for double workmen’s compensation benefits by an injured minor who had used his older brother’s identification and social security card as evidence of age in seeking employment. The New York court, specifically rejecting an estoppel theory, allowed double compensation for claimant’s injuries by holding that (1) recovery of workmen’s compensation was wholly statutory, not dependent upon the equities of any given case, (2) historically, misrepresentation of age did not bar a minor’s common-law recovery against an employer *374who hired him contrary to State labor laws (historically true in Michigan as well; see Syneszewski v. Schmidt, 153 Mich 438), and (3) one purpose of' allowing double compensation to such injured minors is to recompense them in an amount closer to what they might have obtained in a common-law action.
The Wisconsin supreme court, in Bloomer Brewery v. Industrial Commission, 239 Wis 605 (2 NW2d 226, 142 ALR 1015), specifically rejected the estoppel theory of our Boshaw decision and ordered an award of treble compensation. The court said the right sought to be asserted did not depend upon the contractual relationship of employment such that estoppel could be asserted in bar, but depended instead upon legislative grant of right.
See, also, McGuckin v. Keystone Dye & Metal Works, 29 Pa D & C Rep 556; Landrum v. Empire Carriers Corp., 2 App Div 2d 912 (156 NYS2d 448), Braiter v. Addie Co., Inc., 256 App Div 882 (9 NYS2d 280), affirmed 282 NY 326 (26 NE 2d 277).
In Michigan, however, as Chief Justice Carr’s quotation from Boshaw’s opinion discloses, this Court simply could not believe the legislature really intended to place the risk of a minor’s illegal employment upon the employer, and to impose upon the employer the burden of paying double compensation to such minor if injured, under any circumstance except the employer’s own knowing participation in such illegal employment. The legislature said that any minor injured while illegally employed shall be paid double compensation, “in the absence of fraudulent use of permits or certificates of age.” This is the language which the Court in Boshaw said “clearly indicates an intent on the part of the legislature to protect an employer from a double award of compensation, if, without his fault, he is deceived by the minor applicant as to his age.” Boshaw v. J. J. Newberry Co., supra, at pp 336, 337,
*375I fail to read such clear intent in the statutory language. Had the legislature so intended, the minor’s disqualifying fraud would not have been limited to his misuse of statutory working permits or certificates of age. But the fact remains the legislature, in clear and unequivocal language, did so limit the fraud which would disqualify an illegally employed injured minor from receiving double compensation. The legislature did not apply estoppel concepts of contract law to this purely statutory legal conflict between employer and his illegally employed injured minor; instead, it sought to invoke the employer’s economic self-interest in the elimination of just such injurious or hazardous employment of minors as led to the amputation of Halfaere’s left index finger and part of his left thumb. We may concede that an employer innocently may be deceived as to a minor applicant’s age .and thereby forego demand for the working permit or age certificate required by the statute. We may ■also concede, for the sake of argument, that re•quiring the employer to pay double compensation to such an injured minor is “at variance with basic principles of legal fairness” (Chief Justice Carr’s ■opinion, pp 390, 396), if by that we mean “fairness” as it is generally applied at common law in resolution of disputes which require judicial imposition of fault. But in the context of the case before us, where the injured minor’s right to common-law damages has been superseded by his right to workmen’s compensation benefits measured by the legislature’s grace, fault is not an issue except to the extent the legislature alone provides. What this means to me is that this Court erred in its opinion in Boshaw by reading into the statute what was not there to be read, — by importing concepts of fault and estoppel where they have no legitimate place except by .legislative action. In Boshaw, we twisted legis*376lative language designed for the protection of minors-injured while illegally employed into language-“to protect an employer from a double award of compensation” (Boshaw, p 337).
Having concluded that we erred in Boshaw and in the cases which followed, this appeal now presents for me the recurring and troublesome problem of deciding what we should, or can, do about it. Shall we candidly overrule Boshaw and Blanton and Walker, having stated our conviction that they erred in their construction of our workmen’s compensation law, or shall we adhere to our acknowledged error on strength of the policy of stare decisis and its result — related doctrines of legislative acquiescence and exhaustion of judicial power ? My choice in this case is the first course, — a forthright overruling of all 3 cases. This is not a situation in which rights of property have been affected by a prior decision found to be erroneous, nor is it one-in which reliance has been placed upon a prior decision such that overruling it will result in injustice-to anyone. Were we to overrule those cases, our confession of error would mean only that we belatedly recognize that the legislature can grant, and has granted, double compensation to minor employees injured while illegally employed conditioned only upon the absence of fraudulent use of statutory working permits or certificates of age. Were we-to do so, full effect would at long last be given the-legislature’s commendable purpose in limiting injurious or hazardous employment of minors. I do not conceive the policy of stare decisis so inflexible-that it must necessarily bar what is here proposed. In recent years members of this Court have had frequent occasion to acknowledge the circumstances in which they would feel bound by the policy of stare decisis to adhere to precedent, even erroneous precedent, and to declare the circumstances in which they *377would feel free to re-examine the basis of prior decisions as I have attempted to do here. For views on this subject which reflect my own, see Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich 577, 596-603; Park v. Employment Security Commission, 355 Mich 103, 138-140 and 141-151; and Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1, 10.
Sheppard and Park demonstrate our right and duty to re-examine and re-examine again, if need be, statutory enactments already judicially construed. We are not plagued in this State, any more than is the United States supreme court (Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 US 64 [58 S Ct 817, 82 L ed 1188, 114 ALR 1487]), by such stultifying notions of judicial infallibility or, if you wish, impotence, that once having spoken we can speak no more. But this is not precisely accurate, we are told. It is said that when the legislature accepts our interpretation of its language, we should be bound to it thereafter until the legislature enacts again. With this “doctrine of legislative acceptance” we can all agree, provided, however, we first understand what is meant by “legislative acceptance.” Were we in Michigan blessed with adequate records of legislative proceedings from which we could discern accurately “legislative intent,” and were such records available to demonstrate the legislature’s actual awareness and acceptance of our interpretation of legislative language re-enacted without change, then indeed I would consider such re-enacted language carried with it our prior interpretation, originally right or originally wrong. In some circumstances, even in the absence of detailed legislative history, perhaps such legislative acceptance can be established satisfactorily.
However, the re-enactment of the language here pertinent in what is now CLS 1956, § 411.7 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.147) 8 times in 30 years since *378Boshaw, is no more persuasive to me of the legislature’s acceptance of Boshaw’s interpretation than the re-enactment of the statutory language (CLS-1956, §421.29 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev §17.531]) involved in Park v. Employment Security Commission, supra, 7 times in the 18 years following its original judicial interpretation in Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich 438 (135 ALR 900), was persuasive-to Mr. Justice Black and the other members of this Court’s majority in Park. The fact is that, like-the legislative amendments of section 421.29, the amendments of section 411.7 were specifically aimed at revision of, and additions to, other provisions in the lengthy section of which the language with which we are concerned is a part only. Section 411.7 consists of 2 separately numbered subparagraphs. We-are concerned only with a proviso clause appearing in the second subparagraph. Six times sinceBoshaw, the legislature amended only the first sub-paragraph, but on each occasion, as a matter of' constitutional mandate (article 5, § 21, Const 1908), the entire section (both subparagraphs) Avas set forth at length. PA 1937, No 204; PA 1939, No 107; PA 1942 (1st Ex Sess), No 6; PA 1943, No 245; PA 1952, No 77; PA 1955, No 122. On the 2 remaining occasions when section 411.7 was amended, the second subparagraph was altered, but the proviso clause thereof, with which we are concerned, remained unchanged. PA 1949, No 284 and PA 1953, No 53. From the fact that the proviso clause, unchanged, was republished as required by our Constitution in the acts amending other provisions of the section in which it appears, we are told we must-find a legislative purpose to adopt our intervening interpretation of that proviso clause. For me; the-evidence of “legislative acceptance” is not enough.. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 US 426, 431 (75 S Ct 473, 99 L ed 483), *379where Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the court,, expressed its views on this subject as follows:
“It is urged that re-enactment of section 22(a) * without change since the board of tax appeals held punitive damages nontaxable * * * indicates congressional satisfaction with that holding. Reenactment — particularly without the slightest affirmative indication that congress ever had the [prior] decision before it — is an unreliable indicium at best.”
The fact of republication, standing alone, tells us-nothing about the legislature’s intention. Was the legislature really aware of our prior interpretation ?' If so, did it really agree with it as a true expression of its original or current intention? If not, was it practically possible legislatively to correct our egregious error ? Were political pressures, perfectly honorable to be sure, too overwhelming to effect legislative correction? Perhaps other factors were-involved; there are too many to list them all.
The argument for legislative acceptance of our prior interpretation, bottomed as it is upon the frequent re-enactments of the section in which the interpreted language appears, is only 1 step removed' from the same argument not infrequently made when no legislative action whatever has been taken. I see very little more logic to its invocation in the one instance than in the other, and for reasons common to both. The former Mr. Justice Talbot Smith paid his respects to this weird doctrine of legislative action by inaction, in Sheppard, supra, 599-601, by quoting the following from Mr. Justice-Rutledge’s concurring opinion in Cleveland v. United States, 329 US 14, 22-24 (67 S Ct 13, 91 L ed 12):.
“ ‘Notwithstanding recent tendency, the idea cannot always be accepted that congress, by remaining *380silent and taking no affirmative action in repudiation, gives approval to judicial misconstruction of its enactments. See Girouard v. United States, 328 US 61, 69 (68 S Ct 826, 90 L ed 1084). It is perhaps too late now to deny that, legislatively speaking as in ordinary life, silence in some instances may give consent. But it would be going even farther beyond reason and common experience to maintain, as there are signs we may be by way of doing, that in legislation any more than in other affairs silence or non-action always is acquiescence equivalent to action.
“ ‘There are vast differences between legislating by doing nothing and legislating by positive enactment, both in the processes by which the will of congress is derived and stated and in the clarity and certainty of the expression of its will. And there are many reasons, other than to indicate approval of what the courts have done, why congress may fail to take affirmative action to repudiate their misconstruction of its duly-adopted laws. Among them may be the sheer pressure of other and more important business. See Moore v. Cleveland R. Co. (CCA 6), 108 F2d 656, 660. At times political considerations may work to forbid taking corrective action. And in such cases, as well as others, there may be a strong and proper tendency to trust to the courts to correct their own errors, see Girouard v. United States, supra, at 69, as they ought to do when experience has confirmed or demonstrated the errors’ existence.
“ ‘The danger of imputing to congress, as a result of its failure to take positive or affirmative action through normal legislative processes, ideas entertained by the court concerning congress’ will, is illustrated most dramatically perhaps by the vacillating and contradictory courses pursued in the long line of decisions imputing to “the silence of congress” varied effects in commerce clause cases. That danger may be and often is equally present in others. More often than not, the only safe assumption to make from congress’ inaction is simply that congress *381does not intend to act at all. Cf., United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 US 534, 550 (60 S Ct 1059, 84 L ed 1345). At best the contrary view can be only an inference, altogether lacking in the normal evidences of legislative intent and often subject to varying views of that intent. In short, although recognizing that by silence congress at times may be taken to acquiesce and thus approve, we should be very sure that, under all the circumstances of a given situation, it has done so before we so rule and thus at once relieve ourselves from and shift to it the burden of correcting what we have done wrongly. The matter is particular, not general, notwithstanding earlier exceptional treatment and more recent tendency. Just as dubious legislative history is at times much overridden, so also is silence or inaction often mistaken for legislation.’ ”
I cannot agree that republication of an interpreted statutory provision, once, twice, or 7 or 8 times in 18 years or 30 years, without more evidence of legislative intent to accept our admittedly erroneous interpretation, can bar this Court from correcting its own error. Rather than to rely upon such uncertain ground with the result that judicial error is judicially perpetuated, I would overrule Boshaw, Blanton, and Walker, confident that the legislature is likewise empowered to speak again if we err.
I would affirm, with costs to appellee.
Kavanagh, Otis M. Smith, and Adams, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.

 PA 1919, No 421, referred to, was repealed by PA 1927, No 319, and its provisions, incorporated in CL 1948, § 373.1, which was in turn repealed by PA 1955, No 269. See, currently, CLS 1956, §§ 340-.821-340.828 (Stat Ann 1959 Rev §§ 15.3821-15.3838). — Reporter.

 Internal revenue act of 1939. — Reporter.