Court Opinion

ID: 9529717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:53:37.380466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:54.102369
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.—I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that reclamation districts such as petitioner are unprotected under any circumstances by either of the separate tort immunities contained in Government Code section 831.8, subdivision (b), and Civil Code section 846. In my view, assuming that petitioner otherwise meets the conditions specified in those sections, it is immune from tort liability in this case.
1. Government Code Section 831.8, Subdivision (b)
This section provides that, subject to certain exceptions specified in subdivisions (c) and (d), “neither an irrigation district nor an employee thereof nor the State nor a state employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the condition of canals, conduits or drains used for the distribution of water if at the time of the injury the person injured was using the property for any purpose other than that for which the district or State intended it to be used.” (Italics added.)
*713The majority, without extended analysis, holds that because petitioner is a “reclamation district” organized under Water Code section 50000 et seq. rather than an “irrigation district” organized under Water Code section 20500 et seq., it may not invoke the foregoing immunity. The issue is not so simple. Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, a noted authority on government tort liability who assisted in drafting the Tort Claims Act, cogently observes that “The meaning of the statutory term ‘irrigation district, ’ as used in § 831.8(b), is not entirely clear. Many irrigation districts, to be sure, exist pursuant to and are governed by the Irrigation District Law. Wat C §§ 20500-29978. These districts are unquestionably covered by § 831.8(b). But there are also many districts formed for irrigation purposes that are governed by other statutory provisions and may not bear the technical title of ‘irrigation districts ’ although for most practical purposes they are indistinguishable. See, e.g., California Water District Law (Wat C §§ 34000-38501). In addition, numerous water districts of various kinds maintain and operate canals and conduits for distribution of water for both irrigation and nonirrigation purposes. See, e.g., County Waterworks District Law (Wat C § 55330). In Hibbs v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1967) 252 CA2d 166, 60 CR 364, Govt C § 831.8 was cited as relevant to the liability of a flood control district for the drowning of a seven-year-old boy in an unfenced flood channel running through a residential area. The section’s relevance, in the court’s opinion, lay in the obvious legislative intent, as shown by subdivisions (c) and (d) of Govt C § 831.8, to require governmental entities maintaining water conduits and ‘drains’ to take suitable precautions against injury to children foreseeably playing in the vicinity.” (Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) § 3.46, p. 263, italics added.)
While it is true that “reclamation districts” and “irrigation districts” are governed by separate statutory provisions, nevertheless we have insisted that “they are organized for the same general purposes to accomplish similar objects. There is no essential difference in these respects between an irrigation district and a reclamation district .... Irrigation districts are organized to reclaim land by supplying water thereto.” (Lindsay-Strathmore I. Dist. v. Superior Ct. (1920) 182 Cal. 315, 335-336 [187 P. 1056].) We have also observed that “Reclamation includes irrigation in its general, ordinary sense and ... the term is quite generally applied to the reclaiming of arid lands as well as the shutting out of overflow waters. The primary purpose in each case is to regulate or control waters to the extent that lands may be brought into a state suitable for cultivation. ” (Hershey v. Reclamation District No. 108 (1927) 200 Cal. 550, 568 [254 P. 542].)
Indeed, the Legislature itself in statutes governing reclamation districts has defined “reclamation works” as “such public works and equipment as are necessary for the unwatering, watering, or irrigation of district lands and other *714district operations.” (Wat. Code, § 50013, italics added.) In similar fashion, the Legislature has specifically empowered a reclamation district to maintain and operate “any irrigation system through which any lands in the district and lands contiguous thereto may be supplied with water for irrigation . . . .” (Id., § 50910.)
It seems to me reasonable to conclude that in drafting section 831.8, subdivision (b), of the Government Code, the Legislature used the term “irrigation” in its broad, generic sense. It is a fair assumption that the Legislature intended that the statutory immunity extend to any districts which are formed for irrigation purposes and which use canals, conduits or drains to accomplish those purposes. Certainly, there is nothing in the legislative history of the section which suggests that the Legislature intended to single out for immunity only those irrigation districts which were formally organized under section 20500 et seq. of the Water Code. Such a narrow grant of immunity appears wholly arbitrary and capricious. The majority fails to suggest any basis for fairly distinguishing between the districts in terms of either their purposes or functions.
I do not suggest that petitioner is necessarily entitled to immunity under section 831.8 under the facts of this case. Real parties’ complaint may have pleaded sufficient facts to invoke the exception to immunity contained in subdivision (c) of that section, an issue which the majority does not elect to reach.
2. Civil Code Section 846
Section 846, in relevant part, provides that “An owner of . . . real property . . . owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose . . .,” except as provided in the section. “Recreational purpose” is defined to include a variety of sports and outdoor activities specified in the section, including “water sports.” The foregoing limitation of liability does not apply to wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against dangerous conditions, or to injuries to invitees or to permitees who have paid some consideration to enter the premises.
Does section 846 shield public entities as well as private landowners? Several appellate cases have so suggested. (Moore v. City of Torrance (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 66, 72 [166 Cal.Rptr. 192]; Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 1022, 1026 [157 Cal.Rptr. 612]; English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 725, 728 [136 Cal.Rptr. 224]; but see Nelsen v. City of Gridley (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 87, 91-97 [169 Cal.Rptr. 757].) Although the Moore, Gerkin and English cases do not explicitly set forth their rationale for applying section 846 to public owners, the reason is quite simple: the term “owner” under every section of the Civil Code dealing with the ownership of property includes private and public owners.
*715It is significant that section 846 is contained in a chapter of the Civil Code entitled “Obligations of Owners.” (Italics added.) Not surprisingly, preceding sections of the Civil Code define “ownership” and “owner” as those terms are used throughout the code. “Ownership” is “the right of one or more persons to possess and use” property. (§ 654.) As to the term “owner,” section 669 provides as follows: “Owner. All property has an owner, whether that owner is the State, and the property public, or the owner an individual, and the property private. The State may also hold property as a private proprietor.” (Italics added.) Subsequent provisions, such as section 846, set forth the rights and obligations of an “owner” of property. It thus seems abundantly clear to me that “owner,” as that term is used in section 846, includes both private and public owners.
The majority relies primarily upon the existence of various statutory immunities contained in the Government Code (see §§ 831.2, 831.4, 831.8) which afford to public entities protection similar to that offered by Civil Code section 846. Unlike section 846, however, none of these Government Code provisions is specifically and exclusively directed to the subject of landowner liability to persons using the property for recreational purposes. In short, each of these Government Code immunities includes injuries resulting from non-recreational uses. Only Civil Code section 846 treats the subject of recreational use which is the specific problem before us.
Thus, contrary to the majority’s primary thesis, the limited liability afforded by Civil Code section 846 is not inconsistent with the immunities extended in the Government Code. In the present case, decedents drowned while wading in petitioner’s canal. Wading constitutes a “recreational” use of the canal under section 846, which includes “water sports” among its list of “recreational purposes.” (See Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 737, 747 [140 Cal.Rptr. 905] [diving].) Real parties failed to allege any wilful or malicious conduct by petitioner, or any other facts which might remove the protection afforded petitioner by that section. Accordingly, whether or not petitioner is also entitled to the immunity extended by section 831.8, subdivision (b), of the Government Code for “irrigation districts” (as previously discussed), petitioner clearly is protected as an “owner” by the provisions of Civil Code section 846.
In my view, it is wholly anomalous to construe section 846 as extending to private landowners greater protection than that afforded to the sovereign state or its political subdivisions. Indeed, the Tort Claims Act itself explicitly forbids such discrimination, providing that “The liability of a public entity ... is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.” (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (b), italics added.) It seems to me *716unquestionable that, were petitioner a private party, it would be shielded by the limited liability specified in Civil Code section 846.
I would grant a writ of mandate directing respondent court to sustain petitioner’s general demurrer.
Marler, J.,* concurred.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied May 26, 1983. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.

 Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.