Court Opinion

ID: 9850296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:54:49.766951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:34.698168
License: Public Domain

LEVINSON, Judge
concurring.
I write separately to clarify why, in my view, the superior court order should be affirmed.
In her three-page argument, appellant contends that there are genuine issues of material fact as to “whether the [reaffirmation agreement] evidenced the full agreement between the parties” and “whether the parties agreed to release [appellant] in return for Michael Dockery’s agreement to reaffirm his liability on the debt.” Appellant essentially contends that as part of the consideration supporting the reaffirmation agreement, First Commerce Bank (hereinafter “bank”) agreed to release her from the $38,000 promissory note. I conclude that admission of evidence concerning appellant’s release from debt would impermissibly add to the clear and unambiguous terms of the written reaffirmation agreement, which represents a fully integrated contract.
Preliminarily, I observe that because it appears the reaffirmation agreement itself does not meet the requirements set forth in N.C.G.S. § 25-3-104 (2003) for negotiable instruments, and because neither party contends on appeal that the provisions of Article 3 of the UCC *302apply to this agreement, I resolve this matter by application of common law principles. With respect to the original $38,000 promissory note that is the subject of the current action against appellant, I agree with the majority that Article 3 of the UCC generally governs.
Appellant’s argument that the bank agreed not to seek recourse against her if Michael Dockery agreed to the reaffirmation depends entirely on the introduction of parol evidence. This is because there is nothing within the agreement whatsoever that purports to release her from the $38,000 obligation to the bank. Michael Dockery’s affidavit, which states that the bank “agreed to release [appellant] if I reaffirmed the debt[,]” was offered by appellant in opposition to the bank’s motion for summary judgment on the debt. In response, the bank tendered an affidavit from its executive which stated that the bank agreed not to “seek relief from [the bankruptcy] stay to repossess [the collateral, a Ford vehicle and recreational boat,]” and that “[a]t no time was any agreement reached concerning the balance of the debt as it relates to any other obligor or guarantor.” Indeed, as the record reveals, the reaffirmation agreement was entered as a consequence of a bankruptcy case involving only Michael Dockery (No. 03-32605 W.D.N.C.).
The affidavit appellant seeks to admit would violate the parol evidence rule, which “prohibits the consideration of evidence as to anything which happened prior to or simultaneously with the making of a contract which would vary the terms of the agreement.” Harrell v. First Union Nat Bank, 76 N.C. App. 666, 667, 334 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1985), affirmed, 316 N.C. 191, 340 S.E.2d 111 (1986). The parol evidence rule prohibits the admission of evidence “ ‘to vary, add to, or contradict [the terms of] a written instrument intended to be the final integration of the transaction.’ ” Godfrey v. Res-Care, Inc., 165 N.C. App. 68, 76, 598 S.E.2d 396, 402 (quoting Hall v. Hotel L’Europe, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 664, 666, 318 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1984)), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 67, 604 S.E.2d 310 (2004). Our Supreme Court has also described the parol evidence rule as follows:
It appears to be well settled in this jurisdiction that parol testimony of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations inconsistent with a written contract entered into between the parties, or which tends to substitute a new or different contract for the one evidenced by the writing, is incompetent. 2 Stansbury’s N.C. Evidence 253 (Brandis Rev. 1973). This rule applies where the writing totally integrates all the terms of a contract or supersedes all other agreements relating to the transac*303tion. The rule is otherwise where it is shown that the writing is not a full integration of the terms of the contract. The terms not included in the writing may then be shown by parol. Id., § 252.
Craig v. Kessing, 297 N.C. 32, 34-35, 253 S.E.2d 264, 265-66 (1979).
Appellant contends that, because the reaffirmation agreement does not contain a merger clause, it cannot constitute a complete integration. Appellant misstates the law in this regard.
The inclusion of a merger clause does not conclusively determine whether a contract is fully integrated. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 216 (1981) (“a [merger and integration] does not control the question whether the writing was assented to as an integrated agreement. . . .”); see also Zinn v. Walker, 87 N.C. App. 325, 333, 361 S.E.2d 314, 318 (1987). The words of a merger clause do not categorically determine whether a contract is fully integrated, but only “create a rebuttable presumption that the writing represents the final agreement between the parties.” Zinn, 87 N.C. App. at 333, 361 S.E.2d at 318. A merger clause “is evidence of the intention of the parties to the [contract] that it constitute their entire agreement^]” Drug Stores v. Mayfair, 50 N.C. App. 442, 449, 274 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1981).
Further, a contract may be fully integrated even though the drafters omit the merger clause:
[W]here the parties have deliberately put their engagements in writing in such terms as import a legal obligation free of uncertainty, it is presumed the writing was intended by the parties to represent all their engagements as to the elements dealt with in the writing. Accordingly, all prior and contemporaneous negotiations in respect to those elements are deemed merged in the written agreement.
Neal v. Marrone, 239 N.C. 73, 77, 79 S.E.2d 239, 242 (1953) (emphasis added); see also Weiss v. Woody, 80 N.C. App. 86, 91, 341 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1986).
Appellant does not cite any authority to support its contention that, in the absence of a merger clause, an agreement cannot constitute a complete integration, and we find none. Nor does appellant cite any North Carolina or other authority illustrating or suggesting that the Dockery affidavit is admissible. Our common law, in fact, suggests the contrary result. See id.; see also Craig, 297 N.C. at 34-35, 253 S.E.2d at 265-66. In sum, appellant’s conclusory argument that the *304reaffirmation agreement was not intended as a complete integration is unconvincing. In my view, the record unequivocally demonstrates that the reaffirmation agreement was intended as a fully integrated memorialization of a negotiated settlement between Michael Dockery and the bank, and that allowing parol evidence of a purported agreement by the bank to forego its remedies on the $38,000 note against appellant would impermissibly add to the agreement, or “tend[] to substitute a new or different contract for the one evidenced by the writing” in violation of Craig.
Since the record suggests only that the agreement was intended to be fully integrated, the admission of parol evidence for reasons other than certain exceptions would be error:
[P]arol evidence of a failure of consideration may be admissible to elucidate the terms of a contract. However, in . . . cases wherein parol evidence was admitted to show lack of consideration, the evidence pertained to a condition precedent that was not stated on the face of the contract, but which was a condition on which the validity of the contract depended. Therefore, the parol evidence did not contradict the contract, but merely set out the full understanding between the parties. In [these cases], the parol evidence was necessary to explain the terms of the contract. However, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract.
Thompson v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 151 N.C. App. 704, 709, 567 S.E.2d 184, 189 (2002) (citations omitted).
Appellant contends neither that parol evidence is necessary to establish, e.g., fraud, mistake or undue influence, nor that parol evidence is necessary to help clarify or understand the express terms of the reaffirmation agreement. And appellant does not suggest that there was a condition precedent to the obligations contained in the reaffirmation agreement, or that Michael Dockery’s affidavit is admissible to demonstrate á failure of consideration and an elucidation of the contractual terms. Instead, appellant acknowledges that the bank’s agreement to forego its remedies against appellant would constitute an “additional term” which will “supplement” the agreement. Again, as discussed above, the parol evidence rule bars such evidence on the facts of this case.
Even assuming, arguendo, the bank agreed not to collect on appellant’s obligation as part of its reaffirmation with Michael *305Dockery, appellant does not articulate — and this Court therefore need not address — whether or how she could utilize the same as an intended third party beneficiary and/or as a legal defense in the bank’s direct action against her on the $38,000 note.
I conclude that any evidence that the bank agreed not to pursue its remedies against appellant on the $38,000 note would impermis-sibly allow an addition to the clear and unambiguous terms of the written reaffirmation agreement, which represents a fully integrated contract. Consequently, Michael Dockery’s affidavit does not help appellant defeat the bank’s motion for summary judgment, and appellant’s generalized contention that the affidavit raises a genuine issue of material fact fails. Finally, appellant has not articulated how this would, in any event, provide a bar to the present action.
Like the majority, I conclude summary judgment was properly granted in favor of plaintiff.