Court Opinion

ID: 9692259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:49:02.837541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.717554
License: Public Domain

Garfield, C. J.
(dissenting) — I cannot concur in the foregoing opinion. I think the case was properly for the jury.
I. Appellee told us in oral argument the main precedent on which the trial court relied in directing the verdict is Atherton v. Hoenig’s Grocery, 249 Iowa 50, 86 N.W.2d 252. It is defendant’s and the majority’s principal reliance here. The cited decision is correct under the facts there. The evidence in the present case bears no fair analogy to that in Mrs. Atherton’s. For the majority to hold “The same situation exists in the case at bar” is to extend the cited decision out of all reasonable proportions.
The defect of which Mrs. Atherton complained was a worn threshold at the entrance to defendant’s grocery. It would be difficult to look at the threshold without seeing its worn condition. But plaintiff’s own testimony plainly showed she had full knowledge of the alleged defect for an extended period. She testified “she had previously been m the store approximately twenty-five times, and that she had noticed the condition of the alleged defective threshold upon previous occasions. * # * she had been going to the store for ‘six months or a year or maybe several years’ prior to the time of the accident.
“ ‘* # * the step always looked treacherous and I was always careful. I would say that it looked each and every time I would go in and out that it was a bad step. * * * It has always been badly worn. * * * Well, it always looked treacherous; * * *’ ” *1174(emphasis added) (page 53 of 249 Iowa, page 254 of 86 N.W.2d).
After quoting the above and other like testimony of plaintiff the Atherton opinion proceeds: “III. The plaintiff’s knowledge of the prevailing condition and of the defect which she claims caused her injury cannot be doubted, in view of her * * * testimony. The burden was upon the defendants to show her knowledge of these things, and ordinarily it cannot be said as a matter of law that the one who carries the burden of proof has done so. But here we have the plaintiff herself testifying * * * to the very fact which the defendants were required to establish to bring themselves within the rule which we shall later discuss.” (Emphasis added.)
An explanation of Atherton v. Hoenig’s Grocery, supra, similar to what is just set out, appears in Corkery v. Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 850, 114 N.W.2d 327, 329, 330, after repeating, from Corrigan v. Younker Brothers, Inc., 252 Iowa 1169, 1173, 110 N.W.2d 246, 248, the familiar admonition, “The facts of each particular case of this kind are controlling on the question of negligence.” The same statement appears in Stafford v. Gowing, 236 Iowa 171, 177, 18 N.W.2d 156, 159, and Holmes v. Gross, 250 Iowa 238, 242, 93 N.W.2d 714, 718.
The Holmes opinion also observes the obvious truth: “While we occasionally find similarities as precedents, the fact remains that in nearly all cases there are some differences which make consideration of the facts of each particular case a matter of importance.”
The facts in Schleisman v. Dolezal, 254 Iowa 1114, 1119, 120 N.W.2d 398, 400, are fairly comparable to those in Mrs. Atherton’s case and it supports the late decision. The Schleisman opinion says Mrs. Atherton “by her own evidence, as in the [Schleisman] case at bar, showed knowledge of the dangerous condition prior to injury.”
There are no facts in the present case that make the Atherton decision or the two or three which follow it applicable here. There is no evidence this plaintiff was fully aware of the dangerous condition that caused her fall. True she knew an air hose lay across the two driveways leading motorists to the gasoline *1175pumps. But the particular condition which created the hazard and eaused plaintiff serious injury was the position of the hose at the entrance to the station and the vertical space between it and the surface of the outer concrete ledge or step at the place where she fell. The majority’s fundamental error is in assuming that because plaintiff saw the air hose on some of the many occasions when she remained in her car while it was being serviced she was fully aware of the alleged defect which eaused her injury.
At the outset of its opinion the majority tells us, “Plaintiff had been in the station building and was familiar with the premises.” If more than lip service were paid to the familiar rule “In considering the propriety of a directed verdict for defendant the court gives plaintiff’s evidence the most favorable construction it will reasonably bear” the majority would have told us at the outset, as plaintiff testifies, “I had been in the station before this morning, but it had teen years ago. I have never used the rest room facilities there. I would usually drive in, stay in the car, tell them to charge the merchandise and drive off.” (Emphasis added.) Whether the air hose was installed “years ago”, when plaintiff had been in the station before, does not appear. Defendant’s manager says the hose had been in use, although not in the same condition, at least six years. The station attendant fixes this time at about five years.
The majority might also have told us defendant’s manager testifies, “I can’t recall her being in the station and I wouldn’t swear she had been but I think she did some but I don’t know.” And the station attendant for about ten years prior to .the trial says, “I don’t remember her being in there [the station].”
On these prior trips to defendant’s station when plaintiff drove in for service and remained in her car she had no occasion to observe the manner in which the air hose was draped over the ledge at the station entrance where she fell. The ordinary person, under like circumstances, would not do so. The situation is in no way analogous to the view a person would and admittedly did get of a threshold she had walked over for an extended time. Seasonable minds, viewing the case fairly, could readily find the dangerous condition here was neither obvious, *1176reasonably apparent to one in the exercise of ordinary care, nor as well known to plaintiff as to defendant’s manager who says he cheeked the signal hose at least every day.
Corkery v. Greenberg, supra, 253 Iowa 846, 848, 114 N.W.2d 327, 328, says of a claim similar to that on which the trial court directed this verdict: “The first complaint requires a determination of whether the condition of the parking lot was obvious, reasonably apparent, and as well known to plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable care as it was to defendants as a matter of law.”
The majority makes the sweeping pronouncement, “Nowhere in the evidence is there anything indicating a hidden danger or a condition which the defendant knew or should have known was dangerous or of a condition with which the plaintiff was not fully aware.” This follows the assertion, “Just how far, if at all, the hose was above the level of the step at the time plaintiff fell is purely speculative. The only observations made were after the fall. The position of the hose after the fall, according to the testimony, reflected what plaintiff had done to it.”
I completely disagree with the first of these quoted statements. The second overlooks important testimony and fails to view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
This signal cord appears from the exhibits to have been about % inch thick — the precise thickness of the “large, thick mat” on the lobby floor of the theater involved in Wood v. Tri-States Theater Corporation, 237 Iowa 799, 23 N.W.2d 843. The majority attempts to distinguish the cited case on the untenable ground “The factual situation was not the same as in the ease at bar. The installation [of the floor mat] was not only unusual, but unnecessary.”
The floor mat in the entrance to the Flynn building, involved in Chenoweth v. Flynn, 251 Iowa 11, 14, 99 N.W.2d 310, 312, was also % inch thick and was 16 feet long. The majority tries to distinguish this precedent on the ground others had caught their heels in the mat but had not fallen and this had been reported to defendants. However, nothing of the kind appears in Mrs. Wood’s case. Mrs. Chenoweth was an employee *1177in the building and had been using the mat daily since it was installed.
I think this plaintiff’s case is fully as strong as Mrs. Wood’s or Mrs. Chenoweth’s, each of which unanimously reversed a judgment on directed verdict for defendants. The present case is like Mrs. Wood’s in that placing this hose to enter the building on the side of the entrance door where the lock is and to extend across the front step or ledge at that point was entirely unnecessary. There are four windows in the front of the building. The hose could just as well have entered the building at the bottom of one of these windows or, preferably, through a small opening in the wall of the building at the floor level. Or the part of the hose which lay on the step or ledge could easily have been covered with “a nose” of inverted V-shape, made of linoleum or similar material, to minimize the danger of contact with it by invitees. It is common knowledge telephone and other cords strung along walking surfaces are customarily covered in such fashion. In short, this plaintiff was unnecessarily subjected to a hazard which could readily have been entirely avoided.
There is substantial evidence, which cannot fairly be discarded as purely speculative, that at the time plaintiff fell the bottom of the hose at the place where she caught her heel was from one-fourth inch to one inch above the surface of the outer part of the step or ledge on which it was supposed to lie.
Plaintiff testifies, “As I left the station and went out across the step I caught my heel in the loop of the hose that was loose arid I fell.” The height of plaintiff’s heel had little if anything to do with her fall. A medium or low heel would as easily have caught in the hose. Doctor York officed across the street from defendant’s station and arrived within five minutes. Plaintiff says and it is not disputed, “No one else came in or out of the station after I did.” So no other motorist disturbed the position of the hose. Plaintiff also testifies, “While I waited for the doctor I looked at the hose over which I had tripped and observed it was looped up at the edge of the ledge.”
Doctor York says, “When I observed it the hose was elevated above the step. There was approximately a one-inch gap *1178between the top of the step and the bottom of the hose.” The doctor’s statement, “Evidently she had kicked it over” is a pure conclusion that should not prevail over his statement of the fact. Defendant’s manager, who would naturally minimize the space between the ledge and hose, fixes it at “a pencil-width or something like that, a quarter of an inch.” This witness’ opinion that the gap was very minute should not prevail over his factual statement.
As indicated, the majority tells us this gap of a quarter inch to an inch between the ledge and hose reflects what plaintiff did to the hose when she fell. There is substantial evidence to the contrary.
Defendant’s manager testifies, “She was there possibly 15 minutes before she left by ambulance. Following Mrs. Wend-ling’s departure I had occasion to make observations * * * concerning the step and hose leading out from the door. We were trying to figure out how it happened. * * * There was nothing different about the hose than there had been for several years. * # * I did not observe anything different about the position of the hose after Mrs. Wendling had been gotten up than it had been previously. * * * There was nothing unusual about the signal hose that morning after the accident.” (Emphasis added.)
Defendant’s manager contended that to fasten or bracket the hose at the far edge of the ledge or step tended to raise it at that edge. He said, “I couldn’t tell if there was a bracket there on March 28, 1958 [date of the fall].” Asked if the hose “would be kind of like a snare” if there was a gap between it and the step and the hose were taut, the manager replied “That is right.” A jury could find the hose was in such position when plaintiff fell.
It cannot be held as a matter of law that plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary care was bound to see the raised position of the hose at the place where she caught her heel. This was convincingly demonstrated by able counsel for defendant who produced at the trial a “mock-up” of the doorway, ledge and hose. He asked his manager to measure the gap between the hose and top of the ledge but admonished the witness, “You will have *1179to get down on your knees to look parallel.” The witness’ reply was, “Between %ths and an inch.”
Plaintiff testifies without dispute, “I entered the station by going to the rear of my ear and more or less paralleled the hose. At no time was I further away from the hose than I was where I fell, to be able to look at it. I was too close to it to see light under it until after I fell. * * *
“Q. What direction were you in relative to the hose as it was on that step as you walked in, as you recall? A. I was above it.
“Q. Directly above it? A. That is right. * * *
“Q. In other words, looking down on that thing, should there have been even a two-inch loop, looking from this direction, what could you observe? A. Could not see.”
The station attendant says “I did not make any observations during the time I worked at the station concerning the gap or rise of the hose. * * * We paid no attention to the hose except to repair it or move it to clean or sweep.” Certainly plaintiff should not be compelled as a matter of law to make observations the station attendant did not make during his ten years of service. Nor did the exercise of ordinary care under the circumstances, as a matter of law, compel plaintiff to get down on her knees or stoop down to see if the hose was raised from the surface of the ledge. The extraordinary precaution that would have discovered this situation was not required of her.
That plaintiff admitted on cross-examination she could have seen the hose as she left the building, if she had looked for it, is relatively unimportant in view of the nature of the defect in it which was at best difficult for one standing near it to see.
Of course defendant is not an insurer of invitees. No one contends it is. But neither is plaintiff-invitee a self-insurer.
II. Before resting her ease plaintiff offered in evidence four photographs of the front of defendant’s station taken about three and one-half years after plaintiff fell. The photographs show the hose had been moved away from the entrance to the building and bracketed or fastened into the concrete drive below the ledge or step. Defendant objected to the offer on the ground the only material things are conditions on the date of *1180the accident and changes made since then would be immaterial, prejudicial and not proper evidence. When the court sustained the objection plaintiff made an offer of proof of facts shown by the pictures. A like objection to this offer was sustained. I think the photographs or the important facts shown by them were admissible under the record here.
Plaintiff evidently felt it was necessary to use defendant’s manager as her witness. On cross-examination defendant brought out three matters not covered in the witness’ direct examination.
1 quote from the record:
“The type of signalling device in use at our station is the common type used in approximately 90 per cent of the stations in this area.” It is to be noted this is not confined to the type of signalling device in use at defendant’s station prior to the time plaintiff fell.
“Q. Now, in the time you have had such a signal device at your station have you ever known of anyone tripping or falling over that hose?” Plaintiff’s objection was overruled and the witness answered “Not to my knowledge.” It is important to note this testimony is also not confined to the time before plaintiff fell. It includes the three and one-half years between the time of the fall and the trial.
“I don’t believe in the customary method of installation they [signal hoses] would be fastened at more than one point. There would be several reasons for this, one of the most important would be that if anybody were coming along and with their toe, or something other, if it were fastened, would have a tendency to trip on it. If it weren’t fastened, the hose would give and you would just go right along * *
The manager gave as another reason that it would be difficult to bracket or fasten the hose in concrete.
Defendant and the majority make much of the quoted testimony.
Since plaintiff called the manager as her witness she probably could not impeach him but she had a right to show the facts to be different from those testified to by him. This is not impeachment. Burch Mfg. Co. v. McKee, 231 Iowa 730, 733, 2 N.W.2d 98, 100; White v. Zell, 224 Iowa 359, 363, 276 N.W. *118176; Royer v. Erb, 219 Iowa 705, 706, 707, 259 N.W. 584; State ex rel. Bar Assn. v. Jensen, 171 Neb. 1, 105 N.W.2d 459, 474, and citations; 98 C. J. S., Witnesses, section 630 (b), page 648; 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, section 797, page 443.
The matters shown by these photographs are inconsistent with the quoted testimony, cast doubt upon it or are explanatory thereof. If defendant is permitted to show that no one except plaintiff fell over the hose certainly she should be allowed to show that during part of the time testified to the hose did not extend out from in front of the entrance door but had been moved. The photographs showing the hose fastened into the concrete — not merely at the sill — cast doubt on defendant’s claim it is safer for invitees not to fasten the hose but to leave it loose.
LaSell v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 233 Iowa 929, 960-962, 11 N.W.2d 36, 52, amply supports the view these photographs were admissible.
I would reverse.
Peterson and Thornton, JJ., join in this dissent.