Court Opinion

ID: 9668029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:00:42.500274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:40.215645
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice.
This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals vacating the judgment of the Lee Circuit Court which affirmed a ruling by the Lee District Court finding that the definition of marijuana in KRS 218A.010(12) is unconstitutionally over-broad. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was taken from a nonfinal order.
The major issue is whether the decision of the Lee District Court which held that KRS 218A.010(12) was unconstitutional is correct. Other questions presented are whether the circuit court erred in affirming the judgment of the Lee District Court; whether the circuit court erred in affirming a finding that a viable economic benefit could be derived from the nonhallu-cinogenic parts of the marijuana; whether *544the entire matter should be dismissed for territorial procedural defects and whether the appeal was taken from a nonfinal order of the district court.
The facts of this matter are not in dispute. On June 1, 1996, Woodrow Harrel-son planted four hemp seeds on a tract of land in rural Lee County. He was cited and arrested for a violation of KRS 218A.1423(3), cultivation of marijuana, five or fewer plants, a Class A misdemeanor. The charge was later amended to possession of marijuana, KRS 218A.1422, also a Class A misdemeanor. He pled not guilty and moved to dismiss the charge contending that the hemp seeds did not come within a proper statutory definition of marijuana, or, if they did, that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.
Harrelson specifically challenged the constitutionality of the 1992 amendment to KRS 218A.010(12), now subsection (14). After a hearing on the question of constitutionality, the district judge rejected the argument by Harrelson that the statute was void for vagueness but agreed that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad by including the nonhallucinogenic parts of marijuana. The district court concluded that the statute violated Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution as an arbitrary exercise of state authority. He also found that an issue of fact remained concerning whether the seeds planted by Harrelson were capable of germination or producing plants that contain the hallucinogenic properties of marijuana. The matter was set for trial on that question. The Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal from the ruling of the district judge; the circuit court affirmed, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal reasoning that it was taken from a nonfinal order. This Court granted discretionary review.
By agreement of the parties, a hearing on the motion to dismiss was held in Ows-ley County where both the Commonwealth and the defendant presented three witnesses each. The first witness for the Commonwealth was Sgt. James Tipton, a 24 year member of the Kentucky State Police who currently works for Special Operations as a Special Project Coordinator and member of the Governor’s Marijuana Strike Force. It was not challenged that Sgt. Tipton had been involved in approximately one thousand drug investigations and that he had investigated all types of drug crimes, including marijuana. The witness held an undergraduate degree in police administration and was a graduate of the F.B.I. National Academy and the Southern Police Institute. He taught at the National Interagency Drug Institute in California as well as classes on drugs and crime at Eastern Kentucky University. He testified in hundreds of cases and had been permitted to give an expert opinion in both federal and state courts on marijuana and cocaine. He testified that his experience with countries in which hemp was legalized indicated that they were already having difficulties in the prosecution of marijuana cases because violators use hemp as a defense arguing that they thought they were growing lower-grade marijuana. He concluded that decriminalization of hemp would make it easy for the violators and difficult for law enforcement.
Next, the Commonwealth called an extension professor for the University of Kentucky who had been employed for 25 years, who had a B.S., M.S. and Ph.D. from Purdue University in plant breeding and genetics. He testified about a plant called kenaf, which is free of THC and which can be used for anything that wood is used for, including making paper. The witness testified that kenaf produced higher quality products than hemp because of its shorter fiber.
Finally, the prosecution called a professor and chairman of the Department of Agronomy at the University of Kentucky. This witness had received a bachelor and masters degree in biology and soil science from Cornell University and a Ph.D. in soil microbiology from Michigan State University. He had also authored a large portion *545of the report of the Governor’s Task Force on Hemp and Alternative Fiber Products. His testimony indicated that the opportunities for hemp as a crop in Kentucky were limited. He stated that at one time hemp was a major cash crop in central Kentucky but that its uses went by the wayside so it failed economically for market reasons.
The defendant, a television and motion picture actor, testified that he owned a company in California that produced textile products in clothing derived from hemp. He testified that the seeds planted were “French seeds” and that these were less than one percent THC. He stated that his company had sales of $1.5 million in the United States but that the hemp for their products had to be imported from Hungary and China and that the price of hemp would be lower if it could be grown domestically.
On cross-examination, Harrelson admitted that he knew he was breaking the law when he planted the seeds but that he was concerned about the cutting and replacement of trees as well as the sale of hemp. Harrelson, who presented no academic credentials, acknowledged that he had no experience in law enforcement and that the police sergeant would be better qualified to determine if law enforcement would be impeded from enforcing marijuana laws if hemp were legalized.
Another defense witness was a professor of biology who testified about the economic uses of hemp at the present time and the differences in appearance of hemp and marijuana to the naked eye. He stated that if legalized, it would greatly reduce the cutting of trees and be a tremendous asset to the agricultural base of Kentucky. He admitted on cross-examination that he did not have any training in agricultural economics. The defense also presented a professor of pharmacology and toxicology at the University of Louisville who testified that hemp was less potent than marijuana in its THC level.
Upon the conclusion of the hearing and the filing of briefs by both parties, the trial judge determined that the statute was constitutionally defective because of its overbroad application by including non-hallucinogenic plant parts. The trial judge further determined that the amendment to KRS 218A.010(9) had no rational basis for including the nonhallucinogenic parts of the marijuana plants in the definition. The trial judge determined that the statute violated Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution and that the defendant had established a viable economic benefit of nonhallucinogenic parts of marijuana. He further held that the statute was an intrusion into the economic benefit of the product without a rational basis by the government. The Court severed the statute in question as it related to the issue of including nonhallucinogenic plant parts of marijuana as a controlled substance.
I. Appealable Order
The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the appeal to the circuit court was taken from a nonfinal order. CR 54.01 states in part that a “final or appealable judgment is a final order adjudicating all the rights of all the parties in an action or proceeding ...” As noted in Commonwealth v. Taylor, Ky., 945 S.W.2d 420 (1997): “The fundamental rule is that for an order to be final and appealable, it must adjudicate all claims of the parties at the time the order was entered.” Here, the principal question is a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. The issue was fully adjudicated and subject to appeal.
The factual issue which the district court reserved on was spurious. The district court had no authority to add words to the statute and thereby create a question of fact as to whether the marijuana possessed “was capable of germination or producing plants which contained hallucinogenic properties of marijuana.”
In this case, the district court impermissibly added new wording to the offense of the possession of marijuana be*546cause it indicated that it must now be proven that not only did the defendant possess marijuana but that he possessed marijuana which was capable of germination or producing plants which contained hallucinogenic properties of marijuana. Existing Kentucky law does not require that a sample of marijuana be produced at trial. Howard v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 787 S.W.2d 264 (1990). Consequently, by remanding this question for trial, the defendant would be required to be tried under a statute which had been declared unconstitutional in part and to be tried under a statute with additional language supplied by the district court and not by the General Assembly. The judiciary lacks the authority to add new phrases to a statute to provide a new meaning necessary to render the statute constitutional. Musselman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 705 S.W.2d 476 (1986). The same is true when the judiciary attempts to declare a statute unconstitutional. Where a statute is intelligible on its face, the courts are not at liberty to supply words or insert something or make additions which amount, as sometimes stated, to providing for a casus omissus, or cure an omission. Cf. Taylor at 423.
In cases involving statutory interpretations, the duty of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. We are not at liberty to add or subtract from the legislative enactment or discover meanings not reasonably ascertainable from the language used. Cf. Commonwealth v. Frodge, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 864 (1998).
The fact that the district court reserved certain questions of law as to whether any part of the seeds planted by Harrelson contained THG was never raised by the parties and the action by the district court of severing the statute in this manner was beyond its authority. Estes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 701 (1997), held that the statute must be tested “on the basis of what is said rather than what might have been said.”
Therefore the district court improperly added language to a statute which it found unconstitutional. The district court did not have such authority and its order in this regard was subject to appeal. The question here is a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. The rights of the parties were fully adjudicated and thus subject to appeal.
II. Circuit Court Error
The circuit court erred in affirming the decision of the district court which held that KRS 218A.010(12) was unconstitutional in part because the presumption of constitutionality which applies to every statute was ignored by the trial court and the circuit court. Harrelson did not overcome this presumption.
Originally, Harrelson challenged the constitutionality of the statute for vagueness and overbreadth. At the Court of Appeals, based on the facts developed in this case, Harrelson conceded that the statute is not vague as applied to him. He continues to argue that the statute is too broad and that it is so arbitrary as to be unconstitutional in violation of Section Two of the Kentucky Constitution.
In 1992, the General Assembly amended KRS 218A.010(12) so as to eliminate the following language from the definition of marijuana:
It does not include mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture or preparation of the mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination.
The remaining language of the statute provides a definition of marijuana in what is now (14), as follows:
“Marijuana” means all parts of the plant cannabis sp., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every *547compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds or resin or any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of these substances.
The legislature was well within its authority to designate and define all parts of the plant cannabis sp. as a controlled substance.
It is obvious that the legislative intent was to eliminate the previous exemptions. The literal language of the statute is both plain and unambiguous and must be given effect as written. The words used in the statute are to be given their ordinary meaning. Cf. Lynch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 902 S.W.2d 813 (1995), which cited Griffin v. City of Bowling Green, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 456 (1970).
The 1992 amendment is a specific response to a serious and growing concern of the public and the legislature regarding illegal drug activities in Kentucky. The section was amended to assist law enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecution of illegal drugs at all levels. It cannot be seriously contended that the elimination of illegal drug trade is not a beneficial or worthwhile goal of the law.
Harrelson complains that the action of the General Assembly in amending the statute does not have a reasonable basis.
It is uncontroverted that a statute is presumed to be constitutional unless it clearly offends the limitations and prohibitions of the Constitution. “The one who questions the validity of an act bears the burden to sustain such a contention.” Stephens v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., Ky., 894 S.W.2d 624 (1995).
The valid public interest in controlling marijuana is a public issue involving health, safety and criminal activity. Kentucky Milk Marketing & Antimonopoly Comn. v. Kroger Co., Ky., 691 S.W.2d 898 (1985) and Commonwealth v. Foley, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 947 (1990), state as follows:
Whatever is contrary to democratic ideals, customs, and maxims is arbitrary. Likewise, whatever is essentially unjust and unequal or exceeds the reasonable and legitimate interests of the people is arbitrary. No board or officer vested with governmental authority may exercise it arbitrarily. If the action taken rests upon reasons so unsubstantial, or the consequences are so unjust as to work a hardship, judicial power may be interposed to protect the rights of persons adversely affected.
It cannot reasonably be argued that the inclusion of nonhallucinogenic plant parts in the definition of marijuana is in any way “essentially unjust and unequal,” nor does it “exceed the reasonable and legitimate interests of the people.”
Here, there is sufficient testimony from law enforcement that there would be serious difficulties for law enforcement in controlling marijuana trafficking if hemp were legalized. There is no evidence of any kind in the record that the commercial business interest of Harrelson has been compromised simply by the necessity of having to import hemp from other countries. Harrelson admitted under oath that he was not qualified to contradict the testimony of the police expert. This statute does not “clearly offend” the limitations and prohibitions of the Constitution as outlined in Stephens, supra.
Reliance by Harrelson on his reference to great moral issues of the current times is unpersuasive. The alleged moral concerns expressed in Commonwealth v. Wasson, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 487 (1992) and Commonwealth v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 50, 117 S.W. 383 (1909), are not evident here in view of the fact that the statute applies to the health, safety and well-being of the citizens of Kentucky without reference to so-called “moral” issues.
We note with interest that the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in New Hampshire Hemp Council, Inc. v. Marshall, 203 F.3d 1, (1st Cir. *548N.H.), decided on January 28, 2000, that industrial hemp plants were marijuana as defined by the federal drug statute. The principal argument in that case was that the plants produced for industrial products contain very little THC. The federal appeals court concluded that the literal language of the federal law and enforcement concerns supported the application of the federal statute.
III. Clearly Erroneous
The circuit court erred in affirming the judgment of the district court because the district court made a clearly erroneous finding that the Commonwealth had failed to show a rational basis by the government for including hemp in the definition of marijuana.
Initially, we must observe that the ruling here was in connection with a motion to dismiss and not a bench or jury trial. The defense called no witnesses who could be considered to be law enforcement officials. The prosecution’s police witness testified about the problems that hemp would create for law enforcement. Defense witnesses Harrelson and Dr. Pierce both admitted that the police officer would be better qualified to determine if law enforcement would be impeded in enforcing marijuana laws if hemp were legalized. The other defense witness never answered as to who would be better qualified but did admit that he was involved in only a couple of criminal investigations. Notwithstanding the testimony of the police official, the district court found and the circuit court affirmed that no rational basis had been shown for the legislature to include hemp in the definition of marijuana. We disagree.
The test of the constitutionality of any statute is whether it is unreasonable or arbitrary. Moore v. Ward, Ky., 377 S.W.2d 881 (1964). A statute is constitutional if a reasonable and legitimate public purpose for it exists. The rational basis argument can be paraphrased as “Is there a good reason to adopt a law?” The answer is a stunningly simple “Yes.” The legislature has broad discretion to determine what is harmful to the public health and welfare. See Walters v. Bindner, Ky., 435 S.W.2d 464 (1968). As noted in Buford v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 942 S.W.2d 909 (1997) a succinct analysis of the problems with the illegal drug culture can be found in People v. Shephard, 169 Cal.App.2d 283, 337 P.2d 214 (1959), which stated:
Anything which gives sustenance, solace, comfort or encouragement in the selling of narcotics or in the agreeing to sell narcotics, can be condemned and properly so, by the legislature. It is clear that the statute in question was aimed at discouraging any traffic in narcotics and is therefore within the police power of the state.
One of the major reasons for CR 52.01 is to have the record show the basis of the decision of the trial court so that on appellate review, the appellate court may understand more completely the entire controversy. Reichle v. Reichle, Ky., 719 S.W.2d 442 (1986). The reviewing court may test the accuracy of the findings and conclusions and determine whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues so as to provide a basis for a decision. The clearly erroneous standard is sufficiently broad to permit a reviewing court to adopt a method of review which best fits the questions involved and the particular facts in a specific case. The appellate court should review each case according to what is most appropriate under the specific circumstances.
Although due deference is given to the findings of the trial court, the evidence may be examined and the judgment may be reversed when the reviewing court is convinced that the trial judge has committed error. Ken-Tex Exploration Co. v. Conner, Ky., 251 S.W.2d 280 (1952). Mere doubt as to the correctness of a finding would not justify reversal, and the appellate court does not consider and *549weigh evidence de novo. However, if a finding is without adequate evidentiary support or occasioned by an erroneous application of the law, the reviewing court may regard it as clearly erroneous. Cf. Byerly Motors, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 762, 765 (1961).
A reviewing court is always reluctant to disturb the findings of a trial court. See Allen v. Arnett, Ky., 525 S.W.2d 748 (1975). When the trial court makes findings of fact, a reviewing court will not disturb such findings unless clearly erroneous. However, if the trial court predicates its findings on erroneous construction and application of statutes, the clearly erroneous standard does not apply. Commonwealth v. Kentucky Products, Inc., Ky., 616 S.W.2d 496 (1981).
Consequently, upon our review of the testimonial evidence presented in this case, we must conclude that the district court was clearly erroneous when it determined that there was no rational basis for the action of the General Assembly in including hemp in the definition of marijuana.
An examination of the testimony of the police officer and the defense witnesses does not amount to the resolution of a conflict. This is not a case where there was sufficiently credible evidence on both sides of the issue. The findings of the district court were not supported by substantial evidence.
IV. Economic Benefit
The circuit court erred in affirming the clearly erroneous finding of the district court that a viable economic benefit could be derived from the nonhallueinogenic plant parts of marijuana, otherwise known as hemp. A careful examination of the record indicates that there was sufficient evidence that all hemp has some THC in it. The district court ruled that Harrelson had established a viable economic benefit from the nonhallucinogemc plant parts of hemp and yet the ruling does not allow the planting of hemp because the testimony of Harrelson’s witnesses stated that all hemp has some form of THC. We must conclude that the decision by the district court that Harrelson has shown that a viable economic benefit exists with hemp was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence that hemp would ever be a successful domestic crop. In any event the economic benefits to be realized from hemp are not relevant to the constitutionality of the statute in question as admitted by Harrelson in his brief.
V. Jurisdiction
The territorial jurisdictional argument raised is without merit. This case can be factually distinguished from Wolfenbarger v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 936 S.W.2d 770 (1997). Here, the Lee District Judge who presided over the motion was, unlike the judge in Wolfenbarger, supra, within his own district because he presides over Lee, Owsley and Estill Counties. The same situation applies to the oral argument heard in Estill County by the circuit judge because he is circuit judge for Estill County as well as for Lee and Owsley. Thus, the district judge conducted the agreed upon proceedings on the motion within his own district and the circuit judge presided over the case in his own circuit.
The General Assembly has criminalized the possession of marijuana because it contains THC. Both marijuana and hemp are members of the cannabis sp. of plants and hemp also contains THC, although arguably substantially lesser amounts than marijuana. The legislature has properly classified THC as a Schedule I controlled substance, KRS 218A.050(3), and has defined marijuana broadly enough to include hemp within that definition. KRS 218A.010(14). The mere fact that hemp may contain less THC than marijuana is of no consequence. Commonwealth v. Shivley, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 572 (1991), holds that the quantity of the controlled substance possessed is immaterial to the criminality of the act and that “any *550amount” suffices. The statutory system which criminalizes the possession of marijuana and includes hemp does not violate Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution.
In this matter a review of the testimonial evidence presented by both sides convinces this Court that the decision of the district court was clearly erroneous and that there was no substantial evidence to support that ruling. The Commonwealth was able to demonstrate a rational basis for the inclusion of hemp with marijuana as a prohibited substance under the statute.
The arguments of the defendant regarding the legalization of hemp are matters more properly for the General Assembly and not the judicial branch of government.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals, the circuit court and the district court are reversed and this matter is remanded to the district court for trial or other appropriate action.
LAMBERT, C.J., GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
COOPER, J., concurs by separate opinion in which STUMBO, J., joins.
KELLER, J., concurs by separate opinion.