Court Opinion

ID: 9721038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:47:01.715043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.052253
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
Pursuant to the charge in Count I, conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine, the prosecution was required to prove that an agreement existed between appellant, De-Kemper, and Sechrest. Pursuant to the charge in Count II, dealing in cocaine, the prosecution was required to prove an actual delivery of cocaine to DeKemper in an amount greater than three grams.
Regarding Count I, the jury was instructed:
An agreement may be implied from the conduct of the parties although they acted separately or by different means and did not come together or enter into an express agreement.
This instruction is erroneous because it operates so as to relieve the prosecution of proving an element of the crime of conspiracy, namely, an agreement. There can be no rational implication of an agreement between two persons from their separate conduct toward a common objective where they have not at some point “come together,” either physically or through an intermediary. For this reason, I too would reverse the conviction for conspiracy.
I would, in addition, reverse the conviction under Count II. Pursuant to the allegation in Count II, the prosecution was bound to prove that appellant delivered to DeKemper cocaine in an amount greater than three grams. The evidence of an actual delivery of this amount of cocaine is that DeKemper entered appellant’s car and handed appellant $250. The police then closed in and arrested the two as they sat in the car. A third of a gram was found on appellant’s person. One and one-half grams was found in the console of appellant’s car, and there were four and six tenths grams under the front seat where DeKemper was sitting. No rational trier of fact could conclude from this evidence to a moral certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that an actual delivery to DeKemper of more than three ounces of cocaine had as yet taken place. While there was ample evidence that appellant possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver it, that offense was not charged. The evidence of guilt on this count was insufficient, and for this reason the conviction under it should be reversed.
DICKSON, J., concurs.