Court Opinion

ID: 9697538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:20:25.868517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.538677
License: Public Domain

*406Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Price, J.:
On June 28, 1974, appellant John A. Kulp pleaded guilty to charges of possession1 and delivery2 of a controlled substance and of criminal conspiracy.3 The lower court sentenced him to a fine of $200.00 plus the cost of prosecution and to a term of imprisonment of not less than six months nor more than two years. On this appeal, appellant contends that his guilty plea was invalid because the colloquy conducted by the lower court did not adequately reveal that appellant understood the charges against him. Alternatively, appellant argues that the plea was invalid because the colloquy did not reveal that appellant was aware of the essential ingredients of a jury trial. Finally, appellant contests the propriety of the information considered by the trial judge in imposing sentence.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the record clearly reveals that appellant understood the nature of the charges against him. In addition, I find appellant’s alternative argument to be without merit. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974), requires, before the court can accept a plea of guilty, that a colloquy appear on the record demonstrating “ ‘that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences.’ ” 455 Pa. at 201, 316 A.2d at 79, quoting from Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 106, 237 A.2d 196, 198 (1968). Without these details in the record, an appellate court cannot conclude that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered.
*407Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 812 A.2d 597 (1973), requires, before the court can accept the waiver of a jury trial, that a colloquy appear on the record demonstrating that the defendant was aware of the essential ingredients of a jury trial — the members of a jury must be chosen from members of the community, the verdict must be unanimous and the accused must be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel. The appearance of these facts in the record insures that the waiver was knowing and intelligent.
The colloquy required by Ingram has not been held to encompass the colloquy required by Williams, nor is there any reason to so require: The waiver of a jury trial, where the defendant proceeds to a determination of his (still denied) guilt by a judge, is qualitatively different than the waiver involved in a plea of guilty, where no such determination will be made. When a defendant waives a jury trial, the trial process changes only in that the facts are found by the court instead of by a jury. When a defendant pleads guilty, he is, effectively, waiving his right to trial. Of course, the defendant must understand these facts. However, extending appellant’s argument to its logical conclusion would require, before a guilty plea could be accepted, that a defendant understand every procedural aspect of a criminal trial, and that that understanding be determined by inquiry appearing on the record. Our supreme court has not yet so dictated. Thus, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the requirements of Ingram, supra, were satisfied.
However, I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the lower court judge considered improper information in determining sentence. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.
The following colloquy took place at the sentencing hearing:
“By Mr. Felix (attorney for the appellant):
. . . but I think even more significant is the fact there *408is no reason, I believe, to doubt that the sale took place pretty, as such took place pretty much as Mr. Kulp described it.
By The Court:
This particular sale did, but he was dealing in traffic, which I must keep in mind.
By Mr. Felix:
I don’t think there is any indication of that.
By The Court:
Except he did make a sale and there is no indication it is the only sale he ever made.
By Mr. Felix:
There is no indication there was any others.
By The Court:
The Court takes a different look at Possession than it does Sale.
[T]his Court, will make it much more serious for Sales than Possession. We feel that these young men that for their own gain, if it is only once, it was only once, we must look at these differently. I will be happy to hear anything you have to say.” [NT 7-8].
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in sentencing appellant while assuming that he had made other sales. While, as a general proposition, I agree that it would be error for a lower court to assume that a defendant has committed undiscovered offenses in the past, for the reasons that follow, I am unconvinced that that is what transpired in the case before us.
Preliminarily, however, I feel compelled to reiterate that broad discretion is vested in the trial judge to impose sentence. Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa. Superior Ct. 32, 332 A.2d 521 (1974). Pennsylvania trial judges may consider information in imposing sentence which would not be admissible in determining guilt. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 235 Pa. Superior Ct. 185, 340 A.2d 515 (1975). “[T]he sentence imposed . . . will not be *409reviewed by an appellate court, unless it exceeds the statutorily prescribed limits or is so manifestly excessive as to constitute too severe a punishment.” Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 206, 275 A.2d 78, 80-81 (1971); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 235 Pa. Superior Ct. 185, 190, 340 A.2d 515, 518 (1975); Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 203, 214, 313 A.2d 342, 348 (1973), aff’d, 462 Pa. 354, 341 A.2d 111 (1975).4
The above rules are not unreasonable maxims designed to prevent appellate review of an unfairly imposed sentence. On the contrary, appellate courts must have a standard by which to review an exercise of discretion by a lower court. The above rules provide us with such a standard. The standard is, undoubtedly, weighted in favor of upholding the trial judge’s action. This, too, is based in reason, for the trial judge “sees the defendant and hears the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Downer, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 339, 344, 53 A.2d 897, 900 (1947). In addition, the trial judge is far more likely to be familiar with the community, its problems and its needs, than is an appellate court. Finally, appellate courts are inclined to place great reliance on trial judges because the day-today workings of the judicial system inevitably depend on their competence. Trial court judges provide the basis on which the judicial structure stands. When in doubt, a presumption that their actions are correct must be indulged; any other attitude invites judicial chaos.
In a slightly different context, Judge Woodside eloquently observed that, “[jjudges are human, but they are also specially trained to decide cases on the evidence. They are conscious of the dangers of irrelevant facts and zealously guard themselves against being influenced by any facts not obtained from the evidence. Furthermore, *410just as it is impossible in some notorious cases to obtain jurors who know nothing of the defendant and the crime, so is it impossible for a judge to be free of all knowledge concerning notorious crimes and defendants. We are satisfied that the trial judge decided the case on the evidence, that he zealously protected the defendant’s interests and that he was not prejudiced or influenced in his decision. . . .” Commonwealth v. Berkery, 200 Pa. Superior Ct. 626, 629-30, 190 A.2d 572, 574 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 966 (1964).
In this case, I am convinced that the lower court did not consider improper evidence in imposing sentence. Initially, I consider the sentence itself: appellant was sentenced to a term of six months to two years imprisonment. The permissible sentence is up to five years imprisonment on the conviction for delivery of a controlled substance.5 The permissible sentence is up to seven years imprisonment on the conviction for criminal conspiracy.6 The sentence was well within the statutory limits, and was not so excessive dr severe as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Secondly, my consideration of the record leads me to conclude that the isolated remark of the trial judge does not indicate that the judge considered improper information. An overall review of the record reveals that the trial judge was concerned with two aspects of the case in determining sentence. First, he felt that the sale of a controlled substance was a more culpable offense then mere *411possession. This is a reasonable consideration in light of the legislature’s authorization of greater penalties for a sale than for possession. Second, the judge felt that the situs of the sale was relevant to the determination of sentence. The judge knew, from other cases before him at the time, that the place where the sale occurred, a gasoline station, was a local marketplace for drug sellers and purchasers. Though this evidence may not be admissible to prove guilt, it would be admissible for determining sentence. Furthermore, I believe that it is a relevant consideration. A sale that occurs at a known market can indicate a greater criminal involvement than does a sale that takes place elsewhere. And a judge, with the welfare of his community in mind, may and should consider such factors in sentencing, as well as in other matters.
It is true that the judge stated that appellant was “dealing in traffic,” and when told that there was no evidence of any other sales made by appellant, the judge stated that, “he did make a sale and there is no indication it is the only sale he ever made.” However, I do not believe that this isolated comment necessarily indicates that the judge sentenced appellant with the belief in mind that he made other sales. Appellant’s counsel rebutted the judge’s statement, pointing out that there was no indication that appellant had ever made other sales. The judge apparently accepted this rebuttal, stating, “if it is only once, it was only once. . . .” However, the judge went on to repeat his belief that a sale is a more serious offense than possession. Appellant’s father then stated to the court that he had never had any other indications that his son was connected with drugs. Thus, appellant was able to rebut the judge’s statement. Cf. Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, supra.
Considering the entire record, together with the actual sentence imposed, I do not conclude that the trial judge erred in his consideration and imposition of sentence.
I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.

. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, §13 (35 P.S. §780-113(a) (16)), as amended (Supp. 1975-76).

. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, §13 (35 P.S. §780-113 (a) (30)), as amended (Supp. 1975-76).

. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1 (18 Pa.C.S. §903).

. Shoemaker was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania because the appellant had failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. Thus, the court never reached the appeal on the merits.

. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, §13 (f) (2), as amended (35 P.S. §780-113 (f) (2)) (Supp. 1975-76).

. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1 (18 Pa.C.S. §905 (b)), places conspiracy in the same grade as the most serious offense which is the object of the conspiracy. 18 Pa.C.S. §106(b) (5) states that “ [a] crime declared to be a felony, without specification of degree is of the third degree.” Thus, conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance is a felony of the third degree. 18 Pa.C.S. §1103(3) imposes a sentence of not more than seven years on convictions of felonies of the third degree.