Court Opinion

ID: 9706934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:55:52.36876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:26.046498
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones:
I concur in part and dissent in part from the views expressed in the majority opinion.
The factual background of this litigation is simple. On October 1, 1961, Gloria Sewell purchased from Wallace Preitz, a druggist, a vaporizer-humidifier which had been manufactured by Northern Electric Company and distributed by Rexall Drug Company. On January 27, 1962, Earl B. Coakley, the purchaser’s minor nephew and next door neighbor, became ill. The vaporizer-humidifier was being used for this child in accordance with its ordinary purpose of relieving nasal congestion when suddenly, the vaporizer-humidifier shot boiling water upon the child’s body causing injuries Avhieh resulted in his death three days later.
The personal representative of the child’s estate instituted an assumpsit action in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County1 for damages for an alleged breach of warranty of merchantability against the seller, the Avholesale distributor and the manufacturer of the product. The assumpsit complaint contained *399two counts; one count under the “wrongful death” statute2 and another count under the “survival” statute.3
Preliminary objections, in the nature of demurrers, were filed which averred, inter alia, that the deceased child lacked “privity of contract” with any of the defendants, the lack of which privity deprived the child or his representative of any right of action in assumpsit and, further, that an assumpsit action would not lie under the “wrongful death” and “survival” statutes. The court below entered judgments for the defendants from which this appeal was taken.
The court below, inter alia, sustained that portion of the preliminary objections which averred that an assumpsit action would not lie under the “wrongful death” statute but held that an assumpsit action would lie under the “survival” statute. With that portion of the majority opinion which sustains the action of the court below in this respect I am in accord.
The principal question raised upon this appeal presents this Court with a problem, long vexatious to the bench and bar in this and other jurisdictions, which, in my opinion, the majority opinion fails to solve in a satisfactory manner. This problem, highly important, which can and should be resolved once and for all, is the determination of who can sue and who can be sued in an assumpsit action based upon the breach of an implied warranty arising from the sale of an allegedly defective product. Must privity of contract, “vertical” and “horizontal”,4 between the party suing and the party sued be established?
*400The present action, bottomed upon an alleged breach of an implied warranty of merchantability arising from the sale of this vaporizer-humidifier, furnishes a most appropriate vehicle for the solution of this problem. This action is on behalf of the estate of a person who did not purchase the alleged defective product and whose status, although the purchaser’s nephew, was not that of a member of the family or the household or a house guest of the purchaser. In the posture in which this litigation is presented we assume that, by reason of the child’s relationship to and the proximity of his home to that of the purchaser, the deceased child could reasonably have been expected to have used or be affected by the product.
Does the warranty of merchantability of fitness of a product, implied from its sale, extend to a person, occupying the status of the deceased child, so as to enable such person’s personal representative to maintain an assumpsit action? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative and recognizing that the action is not only against the immediate seller but also the distributor and remote manufacturer of the product, is there such privity of contract present to permit maintenance of the action against the seller, distributor and the manufacturer? If the answers to both questions are in the negative, should it be necessary to establish any privity of contract whatsoever?
We have in our jurisprudence preserved the two forms of action, tort and assumpsit. In the field of product liability, resort for redress for injury arising from a defective product may be had either in tort or *401assumpsit. In Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A. 2d 24, we said “that a person who has effected the purchase of particular goods and sustains injury because of unfitness for an intended purpose may institute an action in assumpsit based upon a breach of implied warranty or an action in trespass based upon specific averments of negligence. In both instances, the elements of damage may be identical, viz., the damage naturally and proximately resulting from a breach of implied warranty or a breach of duty, [citing authorities]. An election of remedies in this regard has, however, never been held by this Court to authorize institution of a contract action based upon averments of negligence. Nor, conversely, has it authorized institution of a negligence action based upon averments of contract. Essential distinctions which exist have been recognized.” (at p. 162).5 Thus, while a person injured by a defective product has an election of remedies, however, each remedy has acquired distinct characteristics.
In the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, Judge (later Justice) Cardozo eliminated the privity requirement in a tort action, stating: “We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.” (111 N.E. at p. 1053). In MacPherson, Judge Cardozo illustrated the frailty of the nexus in negligence law between the duty of care of the actor and the idea of contractual privity, and he placed the *402test of responsibility on whether the actor could reasonably foresee that, in the absence of the actor’s due care, a person in the plaintiff’s position might suffer injury. In Pennsylvania, we have followed MacPherson and have eliminated any requirement of privity in tort actions for damages resulting from defective products. As Justice, later Chief Justice, Maxey said in Henderson v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 611, 23 A. 2d 743: “It is, of course, not necessary to plead a warranty in cases like this, for the action is based upon a breach of duty imposed by law.” Today, a manufacturer, a distributor or immediate seller may be held liable in a tort action based on negligence to a consumer or a third party notwithstanding the absence of any contractual privity.6 Privity of contract is no longer a problem in the product liability field in a tort action based upon negligence in this jurisdiction. Proof of negligence in such action is still essential.
When we turn to an assumpsit action based upon the sale of a defective product, we are confronted with *403an entirely different situation. Our case law requires both “vertical” and “horizontal” privity. Viewed in such light, initially, in the case at bar, we must determine whether the deceased child’s status was such as to enable his representative to maintain this action. I agree with the view in the majority opinion that so long as privity remains a requirement in assumpsit action, we must look to the Uniform Commercial Code7 to determine to whom the implied warranties from the sale of a product extend. I disagree with the interpretation of §2-318 of the Code by the majority of this Court under which the deceased child would be embraced within the word “family”. It is evident under the rationale of the majority in this respect that the determination of whether a particular person is within the “family” of the product purchaser is on an ad hoc basis; such a method of determination is unnecessary, impractical and unsound.
Section 2-314 of the Code, supra, provides that “unless excluded or modified [under §2-316 presently not pertinent], a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind” and sets forth six minimum requirements to constitute merchantability. Section 2-315, supra (12AP.S. §2-315), provides that where “the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is [unless excluded or modified under §2-316 presently not pertinent] an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.” Section 2-318 extends both warranties 8 beyond *404the immediate purchaser of the product “to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of, the warranty.” “Under this section, the class of protected persons are treated as ‘third party beneficiaries’ of the buyer’s warranty and may enforce it against the seller as if they were the immediate purchasers.” 9
A strict interpretation of the statutory language of §2-318 — which would view §2-318 as setting forth the extreme to which warranties would be extended — might well compel the conclusion that this deceased child does not fall within the named class of beneficiaries of the implied warranties. Twice we have construed §2-318: in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A. 2d 575, where an employee of the purchaser of a bottle of carbonated soda sued the manufacturer in assumpsit, we denied recovery because “in no case in Pennsylvania has recovery against the manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty been extended beyond a purchaser in the distributive chain” (at p. 615) and, even though §2-318 provides an exception to the general rule, an employee of the purchaser “fits into none of the stipulated classifications” (at p. 615, n. 3) :10 in Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A. 2d 463, we allowed, under very similar facts, recovery to an employee who had actually purchased on *405behalf of Ms employer an allegedly defective wine bottle. The distinction drawn between Yentzer and Hochgertel was that in Yentzer the person suing was the purchaser of the product.
In my view, the majority opinion ignores the comment of the drafters of §2-318: “This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other pérsons in the distributive chain.” (Emphasis supplied). Section 2-318 “does not uniformly codify, but rather incorporates the law of the enacting state on this matter.” 11 In my view, §2-318 does not provide the ultimate extent to which the warranties may go; on the contrary, it permits the developing case-law in each jurisdiction to determine how far the extension of the warranties may go or whether any privity requirement should be retained.
Generally, in Pennsylvania the right to sue the manufacturer of a product in assumpsit on the basis of a breach of warranty for damages for injuries resulting from a defect in such product lies only in the immediate buyer of the product or in those persons specifically described in §2-318 and that, unless privity of contract, either factually or Oodewise, be established no right of recovery exists: Hochgertel, supra, p. 614. To this rule are several exceptions: (a) in food products for human consumption (Caskie v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A. 2d 901; Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburgh, 102 Pa. Superior Ct. 515, 156 A. 537; Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 147 Pa. Superior Ct. 39, 23 A. 2d 342; Hochgertel, supra) and (b) where *406“the representation of quality or fitness for particular use was conveyed or intended to he conveyed by the manufacturer or original vendor to the dealer’s customer (subpurchaser) by catalogue, manual, tags affixed to shipment, legend upon container, or by negotiation with the subpurchaser”: Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 428, 100 A. 2d 715.
However, there is case-law in our jurisdiction which seems contrary to the general rule. In Conestoga Cigar Co. v. Finke, 144 Pa. 159, 173, 22 A. 868, this Court, in an assumpsit action, permitted a recovery by the purchaser of certain tobacco against a remote tobacco “sampler” without any privity of contract save as might arise from a sample tag attached to the tobacco containers. In Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Superior Ct. 422, 156 A. 2d 568, the Superior Court said: “Moreover, a manufacturer who by means of advertising extols his product, in the effort to persuade the public to buy, may thereby incur liability to a purchaser notwithstanding privity between the purchaser and the manufacturer is wholly lacking. . . .” (191 Pa. Superior Ct. at pp. 429, 430) and that a “person, who after the purchase of a thing, has been damaged because of its unfitness for the intended purpose may bring an action in assumpsit against the manufacturer based on a breach of implied warranty of fitness; and proof of a contractual relationship or privity between the manufacturer and the purchaser is not necessary to impose liability for the damage.” (191 Pa. Superior Ct. at p. 430). In Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co. (C.A. 3), 155 F. 2d 445 (purporting to apply Pennsylvania law), where a person had purchased a wire rope from a supply company to use to support a scaffold upon which such person was working and, the rope having broken, such person fell and was killed, the court recognized a right of action in the widow of the purchaser against not only the supplier but the manufacturer of the rope.
*407Despite tlie implications in Conestoga, the direct ruling in Jarnot and the construction of Pennsylvania law in Mannsz, the rule generally applied is that in an assumpsit action for damages arising from a breach of warranty in the product liability field both “horizontal” and “vertical” privity must be shown.
The instant litigation poses for us the question whether we shall continue to require the establishment of privity in an assumpsit action in this field. Thirty-five years ago in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445, Judge (later Justice) Cardozo prophetically said: “The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.” :12 Many of the leading scholars in the field13 as well as courts in other jurisdictions 14 have with great logic and persuasion illustrated the unsoundness and illogic of retaining the concept of privity in the field of products liability. Dissatisfaction with the requirement of privity *408“(. . . stems from the recognition that it is completely unrealistic ... to limit a manufacturer’s breach of warranty liability to his immediate vendee, who is most often himself a vendor who intends not to use, but merely to serve as a commercial conduit for, the product, or to limit a retailer’s breach of warranty liability to his immediate vendee when . . . both the retailer and his vendee are well aware at the time of the sale of the product that others than the vendee will use or come in contact with it)”: 75 A.L.R. 2d 45.
If we are to retain in assumpsit actions the requirement of privity, I perceive no sound reason why the right of recovery should be limited to the persons occupying the statutes designated in §2-318 of the Code. The framers of that section by their comment have invited its enlargement. If privity is so important to retain, then we should logically limit the right to recover in assumpsit, based upon implied warranty, to the parties who actually were participants in the sale of the product out of which the warranty impliedly arose and allow only the actual purchaser to sue the actual seller. However, §2-318 permits nonparticipants in the sale — family members, household members and houseguests of the purchaser — to sue the actual seller. Section 2-318 departs from the conception of privity as based upon contract since certainly none of the persons in the class were participants in the contract of sale: instead, §2-318 creates a fictitious privity of contract and then engrafts thereon such fictitious privity a concept of negligence, i.e., that the persons who occupy the specified statuses must be of a class which the seller of the product could reasonably foresee would use, consume or be affected by the product. While I believe that the retention of the concept of privity is unsound, at least, if we are to retain the requirement of privity,— actual or fictitious, — then I would eliminate any requirement that the suing party must occupy any spe*409cial status and would hold that the warranties extend to any person or persons whom the seller could have reasonably foreseen would use, consume or be affected by the product. In the case at bar, the deceased child would certainly then be included.
When we come to the question of who can be sued —only the actual seller or the seller, distributor and manufacturer — we have several alternatives: (a)' retain what I believe to be the unrealistic concept of privity in assumpsit actions of this nature; (b) abolish the defense of lack of privity in such actions;15 (c) relegate all actions in the products liability field to trespass, adopt §402A of the Restatement 2d, Torts, and eliminate “both privity of contract and negligence as essential conditions to recovery and establishes independent standards for the judicial imposition of strict products liability in tort.”16
Section 402A (approved May, 1964) provides:
“402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
“ (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the *410business of selling sucb a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
“(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.”
The underlying purpose of §402A is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.17 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J. concurring) ; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P. 2d 168 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P. 2d 897 (1962). The courts of many jurisdictions have adopted §402A, supra. Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, Tenn. , 398 S.W. 2d 240 (1966); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A. 2d 189 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E. 2d 182 (1965) ; Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A. 2d 769 (1965) ; Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 300, 405 P. 2d 624 (1965); Journal of American Trial Lawyers Association, Vol. 31, p. 248 et seq. and cases cited therein; Traynor, “The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability”, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363.
*411In my opinion, the requirement of privity is illogical both when applied to the immediate purchaser or restricted to the immediate seller. A review of the case law in this and other jurisdictions reveals almost ludicrous attempts by the courts to fashion the concept of privity to individual cases. I would favor the abolition of the requirement of privity in assumpsit actions in this field. The remote manufacturer of a product shown to be defective should be held liable to any person or persons who might be reasonably foreseen to use, consume or be affected by the defective product.18
Moreover, I believe that in this class of case the preferable approach would be to adopt §402A, supra, apply the rule of absolute liability and confine assumpsit actions to those cases where the damages claimed are solely commercial in nature. Absolute liability is not novel in Pennsylvania: Federoff v. Harrison Construction Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A. 2d 817; Kopka v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 371 Pa. 444, 91 A. 2d 232; Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 109 A. 2d 310. Even the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and exclusive control, which we restrictively recognize, are not a far cry from what would result from the adoption of §402A.
Basically, the adoption of §402A would be sound and practical. Those who make and market products which are to be used and consumed by the public must be held to a special responsibility to any member of the using or consuming public who may be injured by the use and consumption of the product. The public, with justification, expects that, in the case of products of which it has a need and for which it must rely upon those who make and market the product, such manufacturers and sellers, be they proximate or remote, will stand behind their products; the burden of injuries *412caused by defects in such products should fall upon those who make and market the products and the consuming public is entitled to the maximum of protection. Only through the imposition of liability under the provisions of §402A can this be accomplished.
The majority opinion holds: First — that, while an assumpsit action for breach of warranty will lie under the “survival” statute, supra, such action will not lie under the “wrongful death” statute, supra. With that holding I agree.. Second — §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code alone determines the status necessary to “horizontal privity” and that the deceased child under the instant factual situation was a member of the “family” of the product purchaser. With such a restrictive interpretation of §2-318 I disagree. Moreover, the ad hoc method employed by the majority to determine whether this deceased child was a member of the “family” of the purchaser is both unsound and unsatisfactory. I would find “horizontal” privity is not commanded by §2-318; even if it were, I would find this child’s representative could sue because this child was a person whom the seller could reasonably have foreseen would use this product. Third — that, because the case law in this Commonwealth requires that, in nonfood' cases, there must be privity of contract in assumpsit actions between those entitled to sue under §2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code and those sued, the instant action against the “remote seller”, i.e., the distributor and manufacturer of the product cannot be maintained. In my opinion the case law in this Commonwealth which requires such privity of contract should no longer be considered authoritative, the requirement of privity in assumpsit should be abolished and the instant action against the “remote sellers” should be permitted.
I believe that §402A, supra, furnishes the appropriate vehicle for the recovery of damages for injuries to *413the person or property arising from defective products while actions for the recovery of damages for “economic loss” arising from defective products should be maintained under the Uniform Commercial Code.19
I would reverse with a procedendo the judgments entered in the court below in favor of all three defendants.

 A trespass action was also instituted and is still pending.

 Acts of April 15, 1851, P. D. 669, §19, 12 P.S. §1601, and of April 26, 1855, P. D. 309, §1, as amended, 12 P.S. §1602.

 Acts of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, §§601, 602, 20 P.S. §§320.601, 320.602.

 “Vertical privity exists where the actual purchaser proceeds against his remote vendor. His direction of suit is upward, *400through the series of sales which culminated in his purchase. Horizontal privity, on the other hand, begins with the user of the product and ends with the ultimate purchaser. The user’s movement is across as he attempts to reach the legal position occupied by the purchaser.”: “Products Liability: Employees and the Uniform Commercial Code”, Swartzkopf, 68 Dick. L. Rev. 444, 446.

 In the assumpsit action considered in Loch, supra, the Court held that, in the absence of a pleaded sale of the product, no warranty arose. See also: Gardiner v. Phila. Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 419, 197 A. 2d 612 and Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1, 176 A. 2d 648, on the distinction between the two forms of action.

 In Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A. 2d 573, holding that an elevator company, which undertook by contractual undertaking with an elevator owner to inspect its elevator at regular intervals, would be liable to third persons, regardless of any privity of contract, who might be injured by the failure of the elevator company to properly perform its contractual undertaking of inspection, we said: “However, a party to a contract by the very nature of his contractual undertaking may place himself in such a position that the law will impose upon him a duty to perform his contractual undertaking in such manner that third persons — strangers to the contract — will not be injured thereby: [citing an authority]. It is not the contract per se which creates the duty; it is the law which imposes the duty because of the nature of the undertaking in the contract.” (at p. 18). See also: Court v. Pitt. & Lake Erie R. R., 410 Pa. 520, 190 A. 2d 139; Prost v. Caldwell Store, Inc., 409 Pa. 421, 425, 187 A. 2d 273; Topelski v. Universal So. Side Autos, Inc., 407 Pa. 339, 180 A. 2d 414; Thomas v. Ribble, 404 Pa. 296, 172 A. 2d 280; Fisher v. Sheppard, 366 Pa. 347, 77 A. 2d 417.

 Act of April 6, 1953, P. L. 3, §2-318, as amended by tbe Act of October 2, 1959, P. L. 1023, §2, 12A P.S. §2-318 (Supp. 1965).

 Warranty of fitness of purpose and warranty of merchantability. See: Pritchard v. Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co., (CA 3) *404295 F. 2d 292, 296; Frantz Equipment Co. v. The Leo Butler Co., 370 Pa. 459, 88 A. 2d 702.

 “The Virginia ‘Anti-Privity’ Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code”, Speidel, 51 Va. L. Rev. 804, 815.

 See: 25 Pitt. L. Rev. 217, 365; 26 Pitt. L. Rev. 283, 395; 27 Pitt. L. Rev. 334, 353; 51 Va. L. Rev. 815. “[Hochgertel] appears to arrest the recent trend toward abrogation of the privity defense”: 25 Pitt. L. Rev. 217.

 “Commercial Code Litigation; Conflicts of Law, Sales”, Del Duca, 65 Dick. L. Rev. 287, 307.

 Prosser, “The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)”, 69 Yale L.J. 1099.

 Jaeger, “Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?”, 1 Duquesne L. Rev. 1; Keeton, “Products Liability, — Liability With Fault and The Requirement of a Defect”, 41 Texas L. Rev. 855; Prosser, “The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)”, 69 Tale L.J. 1099; “Strict Products Liability and the Bystander”, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 916; Jaeger, “Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty”, 39 Notre Dame Law R. 501; Speidel, “The Virginia ‘Anti-Privity’ Statute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code”, 51 Va. L. Rev. 804.

 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W. 2d 873 (1958) ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960) ; Simpson v. Powered Products of Mich., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A. 2d 555 (1963) ; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E. 2d 313 (1964) ; Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., (C.A. 7), 344 F. 2d 245 (1965) ; Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W. 2d 730 (1965) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963) ; Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E. 2d 92 (1965) ; Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F. 2d 124 (C.A. 2) (1963).

 In Virginia, this result has been obtained by legislation: “When lack of privity no defense in action against manufacturer or seller of goods. Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action brought against the' manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods Code, 1965, Vol. 2A, §8.2-318, p. 61. See: Brockett v. Harrell Bros., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E. 2d 897. See: Speidel, supra, 51 Va. L. Rev. p. 804 et seq.

 Speidel, supra.

 2 Harper and James, Torts, §§28.15-28.16, pp. 1569-1574; Prosser, “The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)”, 69 Yale L.J. 1099. In Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F. 2d 911, 919 (C.A. 5) (1964) the court said: “Since 1958, almost every court that has considered the question has expanded the doctrine of strict liability to cover all defective products regardless of lack of proof of negligence.” In Putman, a long list of such authorities is set forth.

 For an enlightening discussion of the benefits of this approach to those under §402A, see: Speidel, supra, pp. 838 et seq.

 “ ‘Economic loss’ is defined as the diminution in the value oi' the product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold.”: “Manufacturers’ Liability To Remote Purchasers Eor ‘Economic Loss’ Damages — Tort or Contract”: 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 539, 541 (1966).