Court Opinion

ID: 4421635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2019-07-31 18:50:22.991983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:59.831163
License: Public Domain

Hopper v Burgos (2019 NY Slip Op 05962)

Hopper v Burgos

2019 NY Slip Op 05962

Decided on July 31, 2019

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on July 31, 2019
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON
LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

2017-06983
 (Index No. 61216/14)

[*1]Justin Hopper, appellant, 
vBrittany N. Burgos, et al., respondents.

Rosenberg & Gluck, LLP, Holtsville, NY (Megan M. Mackenzie of counsel), for appellant.
Russo & Tambasco, Melville, NY (Susan J. Mitola of counsel), for respondents.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Daniel M. Martin, J.), dated May 19, 2017. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in October 2011. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of his spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219).
As the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, a lack of causation, the burden did not shift to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact regarding causation or to explain any gap in treatment (see Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 577-578; Lambropoulos v Gomez, 166 AD3d 952).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for [*2]summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
DILLON, J.P., LEVENTHAL, BRATHWAITE NELSON and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court