Court Opinion

ID: 9401439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 10:09:08.737555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:52.560776
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-22-00097-CV

                                Marvin-Levoid Goss, Appellant

                                                 v.

                                Joseph A. Alvesteffer, Appellee

             FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF BELL COUNTY
        NO. 21CCV91490, THE HONORABLE JEANNE PARKER, JUDGE PRESIDING

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Marvin-Levoid Goss appeals from the county court’s judgment in a forcible entry

and detainer suit awarding possession of real property and back rent to Joseph A. Alvesteffer.

See generally Tex. Prop. Code §§ 24.001–.011 (addressing cause of action for forcible entry and

detainer). We affirm.

                                        BACKGROUND

               Alvesteffer owns a rental property in Killeen.       In April of 2021, Goss and

Alvesteffer executed a residential lease agreement under which Goss agreed to pay $1,300 per

month. The lease provided that rent was due on the first day of each month and that failure to

pay rent by the seventh day could result in eviction.

               When Goss failed to pay the monthly rent by October 7, 2021, Alvesteffer sent

Goss a notice of eviction. On October 26, 2021, Alvesteffer filed a forcible detainer action in the
justice court seeking to evict Goss. The justice court awarded Alvesteffer possession of the

property, $1,300 in back rent, and court costs. Goss appealed the justice court’s judgment to the

county court at law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 509.8(a) (governing de novo appeal to county court).

                The county court signed a default judgment in favor of Alvesteffer but

subsequently withdrew it and set the case for a bench trial. Both parties appeared at the trial and

represented themselves. The county court heard testimony from Alvesteffer’s wife, Gina, and

admitted documentary evidence from both parties. The county court subsequently rendered

judgment in favor of Alvesteffer, awarding him possession of the property, back rent of $5,200,

and court costs. This appeal ensued. 1

                                            DISCUSSION

                Goss has filed a pro se brief challenging the county court’s judgment in fifteen

issues. 2 The arguments are difficult to discern, and he generally fails to present substantive

       1   Alvesteffer has not filed a brief in this Court.
       2  The record reflects that Goss vacated the property ahead of the execution of a writ of
possession on January 20, 2022. That raises the question of whether the possession portion of
this dispute has become moot. See Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162
(Tex. 2012) (explaining that Texas courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases). “In a
forcible-detainer case, the issue of possession becomes moot when the appellant ceases to have
actual possession of the property, unless the appellant asserts a potentially meritorious claim
of right to current, actual possession of the premises.” Allen-Mercer v. Roscoe Props.,
No. 03-15-00674-CV, 2016 WL 4506294, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 25, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 786–87
(Tex. 2006)). Even if the issue of possession has become moot, there is still a live controversy
with respect to the trial court’s award of damages. See id. (concluding that while issue of
possession was moot, live controversy remained regarding appellant’s challenge to award of
damages and attorney’s fees); Daftary v. Prestonwood Mkt. Square, Ltd., 399 S.W.3d 708, 711
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (same).
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arguments or cite to relevant authorities. 3 See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief

to contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record”). Although pro se litigants must comply with all rules applicable to

licensed attorneys, Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005), we construe pro se

filings “liberally and with patience ‘so as to obtain a just, fair and equitable adjudication of the

parties’ rights,’” Housing Auth. of City of Austin v. Elbendary, 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (quoting Veigel v. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc.,

549 S.W.3d 193, 195 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.)). In the interest of justice, we will

address Goss’s issues to the extent we are able to ascertain his arguments. See Onkst v. Onkst,

No. 03-15-00636-CV, 2017 WL 2628245, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 16, 2017, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (deciding to address “‘pro se issues as best we can’ in the interest of justice” (citing

Forbes v. Forbes, Nos. 03-15-00130-CV, 03-15-00337-CV, 2016 WL 612175, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Austin Feb. 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.))).

               Reading Goss’s brief liberally, he asserts that (1) Alvesteffer failed to give Goss

seven days to respond to the notice to vacate before filing suit, (2) Alvesteffer evicted him for

unpaid rent even though Alvesteffer had agreed to accept less rent that month, (3) Alvesteffer

       3    For example, Goss argues in his first and eleventh issues that the trial judge
participated in ex parte communications in violation of 28 C.F.R. § 76.15 (2023). That
regulation applies in a proceeding under federal law to assess a civil penalty relating to the
possession of controlled substances. See generally id. § 76.3 (2023). Goss does not explain the
relevance of that regulation here. His third issues asks: “Does Court allow affidavit of
government agent as witness? 10 U.S. Code 1044a(B)(d) Authority to act as notary.” That
statute pertains to legal assistance that the Secretary of Defense may provide to certain military
personnel. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 1044 (2022).
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defamed him by calling him a sovereign citizen, and (4) the county court’s default judgment

was defective. 4

               Goss argues in his first issue that he was statutorily entitled to seven days “to

respond to [the] notice to vacate.” He cites Section 92.0561 of the Property Code, which

addresses the circumstances under which a tenant may repair or remedy a condition after giving

notice to the landlord. As relevant here, a tenant may repair or remedy a condition that would

affect the ordinary tenant’s health if the landlord does not respond to the notice in seven days.

See Tex. Prop. Code § 92.0561(a), (e)(4). The statute does not address notices to vacate. See

generally id. § 92.0561. We overrule Goss’s first issue.

               Next, Goss argues Alvesteffer could not evict him for unpaid rent because they

had agreed that Alvesteffer would accept less than the full amount of rent due for September

because of delays in fixing the air conditioning in the residence. The county court admitted a

document titled “Remediation” reflecting that the parties agreed that $750 in rent was due for

September 2021. The notice to vacate, however, states that Goss failed to pay the rent due for

October and then states that Goss violated other terms of the lease, including by allowing others

to live on the property without permission. Goss does not dispute the nonpayment of rent or the

other alleged lease violations in his brief. We reject Goss’s argument that Alvesteffer violated

the lease and overrule Goss’s second issue.

               Goss argues in his third issue that Alvesteffer defamed him by asserting at trial

that Goss is a “sovereign citizen.” Whether Alvesteffer defamed Goss by characterizing him as a

       4  As recompense for these harms, Goss asks us to order appellees to pay him “One
Million dollars by postal money order or silver troy ounce per the going rate per ounce and
kilogram.”
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sovereign citizen is not relevant because Goss did not bring a defamation claim in this case. We

overrule Goss’s third issue.

               Goss argues in his final issue that the county court erred by signing a

default judgment when he was not present. The county court signed a default judgment on

December 9, 2021 and vacated it by order on December 16, 2021. Goss subsequently appeared

at the bench trial, where he argued and presented evidence. Goss has not explained how the

issuance of the vacated default judgment warrants reversal of the judgment rendered after a

subsequent trial in which Goss participated. See Vaclavik v. Addison, No. 03-19-00528-CV,

2021 WL 1704249, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem op.) (“The appellant

usually bears the burden of presenting a trial court record that is sufficient to show reversible

error.” (citing Dominguez v. Gilbert, 48 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.))).

We overrule Goss’s fourth issue.

                                        CONCLUSION

               We affirm the county court’s judgment.

                                             __________________________________________
                                             Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Theofanis, and Jones*

Affirmed

Filed: June 8, 2023

* Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).

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