Court Opinion

ID: 9735535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:21:43.786506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:59.665438
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority that the statute of limitations was tolled on November *29328, 1958, by the signing and filing of the district attorney’s bill.
The majority states that the most important purpose of the statute of limitations is to protect the accused from the burden of defending himself against charges of long-completed misconduct. The statute assures that an accused will be informed of the nature of the charges against him while the facts are still fresh in his memory and he is in an ideal position to prepare his defense. In this I entirely concur. Yet, the majority’s opinion today fails to fulfil this stated purpose.
The lower court found that appellant did not intelligently waive his constitutional right to counsel when he pleaded guilty in 1958. Our Court further assumes that he did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to indictment by a grand jury and, therefore, his waiver was invalid. In short, his signing of the district attorney’s bill was a mechanical act, performed without comprehension.
With this background in mind, I cannot understand how the majority can realistically argue that defendant was “informed” of the nature of the crime charged. To be “informed” presupposes an understanding which was concededly absent here. It was surely of no value to defendant that “the facts were still fresh in his memory and he was in an ideal position to prepare his defense,” if he was not aware of his right or opportunity to prepare such a defense.
It is apparent to me that the district attorney’s bill could not toll the statute, because its signing and filing did not, in any meaningful way, inform defendant of the charges against him or of the need of opportunity to prepare a defense. The avowed purpose of the statute, which is so carefully stated by the majority, was. in fact, never fulfilled.
*294What the majority is deciding today, in effect, is that the statute of limitations was tolled by defendant, because he unwittingly signed an invalid document which he did not understand in 1958.
The majority is apparently troubled by this result. To justify its conclusion, therefore, it seeks to shift the responsibility back to defendant. The court states: “This defendant, however, elected to speed up the disposition of his case by invoicing the Act of June 15, 1939, P. L. 400, §1, 19 P.S. 241. This provides that when any person is willing to waive an indictment by a grand jury and notifies the district attorney to that effect. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court thus suggests that the statute should be tolled, because defendant wilfully “elected” this waiver; he “invoked” this procedure; he was “willing” to waive indictment by the grand jury. Such language cannot be reconciled, however, with the earlier statement in the opinion that “we must assume that the appellant did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to indictment by a grand jury.” One who acted without knowledge or intelligence cannot be held to have “elected” or “invoked” the procedure which was followed.
This case must be distinguished from Commonwealth v. Phillips, 208 Pa. Superior Ct. 121, 220 A. 2d 345 (1966), aff’d, 424 Pa. 641, 226 A. 2d 863 (1967), in which our Court carefully pointed out that there were sufficient facts on the record to support a finding that the accused had knowingly and intelligently waived presentment. In that case, therefore, the court did not reach the issue of whether an invalid waiver could toll the statute.
In summary, the legislature has provided a statutory scheme whereby an accused must be informed of the charge against him within a specified period of *295time, depending on the nature of the offense charged. In this case, the period was two years. ■ The legislature has also provided that this statute of limitations may be tolled either by the grand jury’s return of a true bill or by an accused’s knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to have the bill presented.
In the instant case, neither of these statutory requirements were met. The majority,, .howeyer, relies on the fact that the accused did sign a waiver in 1958, although he did not _ understand what he was doing, and holds that this act aloné served to toll the statute. In my opinion, to determine that an unwitting act performed nine years ago denies defendant the protection of the statute of limitations today effectively subverts the purpose of that statute and. substitutes our judgment for that of the legislature.
I would reverse the lower court and discharge the defendant.