Court Opinion

ID: 9958495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 15:09:55.095199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:26.953288
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Malloy and Edward C.    :
Malloy,                            :
                 Appellants        :
                                   :
      v.                           : No. 1027 C.D. 2022
                                   :
Nicole Aileen Feigenbaum, Barry C. :
Dozor, and Geoffrey Moulton        : Submitted: February 6, 2024

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM                                                      FILED: April 9, 2024

       In this appeal, Appellants Deborah R. Malloy and Edward C. Malloy
(collectively Appellants) challenge the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware
County’s (Common Pleas) December 28, 2021 order, through which Common Pleas
sustained Appellees Nicole Aileen Feigenbaum’s, Barry C. Dozor’s, and Geoffrey
Moulton’s (collectively Appellees)1 preliminary objections to Appellants’
“Amended (Sixth) Complaint” (Sixth Amended Complaint) and dismissed that
action with prejudice. Upon review, we affirm.

                                     I. Background
       On April 16, 2021, Appellants filed an abuse of process action against
Appellees in Common Pleas, to which Appellees responded by filing preliminary
objections. Thereafter, the parties engaged in a repetitious dance of sorts, whereby
Appellants would file a new, slightly revised version of their complaint, thereby
rendering moot Appellees’ existing preliminary objections, only to have Appellees
respond by submitting a new round of preliminary objections. Eventually,

       1
         As will be discussed infra, each appellee is, or was, employed by our Commonwealth’s
judiciary.
Appellants filed their Sixth Amended Complaint, which is the subject of this appeal,
on November 5, 2021. Therein, Appellants confusingly allege that Appellees have
abused the legal process by repeatedly challenging several other lawsuits filed by
Appellants in Common Pleas via preliminary objections;2 Appellants characterize
the arguments put forth by Appellees in those preliminary objections as being
entirely spurious and improper. R.R. at 4a-36a.
       On November 24, 2021, Appellees responded to the Sixth Amended
Complaint via preliminary objections. Specifically, Appellees argued that
Appellants’ action should be dismissed for several reasons. First, Appellants’ abuse
of process claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 64a-67a. Second, these
claims were also barred by judicial privilege. Id. at 67a-68a. Third, Appellants’
claims against Dozor were barred by judicial immunity. Id. at 68a-71a. Fourth,
Appellants had failed to state any legally viable claims for which relief could be
granted. Id. at 71a-75a. Fifth, Appellants’ claims were barred by the doctrine of lis

       2
         Those underlying lawsuits revolve around Appellants’ belief that Dozor, a Common Pleas
judge, has repeatedly failed to comply with the administrative case disposition reporting
requirements imposed upon him by Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 703, as well as
that Moulton, who was the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts’ (AOPC) Court
Administrator until his retirement on September 30, 2023, was statutorily required to report such
noncompliance to our Supreme Court and/or the Judicial Conduct Board (JCB). See Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 4a-21a, 25a-32a; Pennsylvania Supreme Court Announces Upcoming Retirement
of State Court Administrator Geoff Moulton, THE UNIFIED JUD. SYS. OF PA. (Apr. 25, 2023),
https://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/news/news-detail/1134/pennsylvania-supreme-
court-announces-upcoming-retirement-of-state-court-administrator-geoff-moulton; Pa. R.J.A. 703
(judges in this Commonwealth are required to submit biannual reports to the AOPC’s Court
Administrator, in which they must list all matters which have been assigned to them and have
remained undecided for 90 or more days, while the Court Administrator must notify the JCB in
the event a judge fails to file a timely report and, “where appropriate,” shall forward to the JCB
any reports that list “one or more matters which have remained undecided for one year or more”).
Feigenbaum is an attorney with the AOPC, who represented Dozor and Moulton in those lawsuits,
and is Appellees’ attorney of record in this appeal. See R.R. at 21a-24a, 33a-36a; Appellees’ Br.
at 33.

                                                2
pendens, due to the fact that they had preexisting, pending cases, through which they
were pursuing the same claims against Appellees as in this matter. Id. at 75a. Finally,
Appellants had failed to state a legally viable conspiracy claim. Id. at 76a-77a.
       On December 28, 2021, Common Pleas sustained Appellees’ preliminary
objections, dismissed Appellants’ Sixth Amended Complaint with prejudice, and
precluded Appellants from filing a seventh amended complaint.3 Id. at 97a.
Appellants appealed this ruling to our Court shortly thereafter.
                                        II. Discussion
       Appellants’ arguments are difficult to parse, as they are not coherently
articulated in their brief, but we interpret them as falling into two categories. First,
Common Pleas erred by concluding that Appellees were immune from Appellants’
abuse of process suit. Appellants’ Br. at 9-10, 13-15. Second, Common Pleas also
erred when it determined that Appellants had failed to state a viable abuse of process
claim against Appellees. Id. at 8-12.
       We need only address the second question in order to dispose of this appeal.4
“To prove a claim for abuse of process, the plaintiff must show that the defendant

       3
         On September 23, 2022, Common Pleas issued an opinion, in which it explained that it
had sustained Appellees’ preliminary objections on the bases of demurrer and immunity. See R.R.
at 111a-14a.

       4
              “Our standard of review in [an] appeal arising from an order
              sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is de
              novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Raynor v. D’Annunzio,
              243 A.3d 41, 52 (Pa. 2020). A “demurrer is a preliminary objection
              to the legal sufficiency of a pleading and raises questions of law[.]”
              Raynor, 243 A.3d at 52. [A court can] sustain a demurrer only when
              the law undoubtedly precludes recovery; if doubt exists, [a court]
              should overrule the demurrer. Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The
              Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 2005). “When ruling
              on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to the complaint.”
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                3
used a legal process against them primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the
process was not designed.” Morley v. Farnese, 178 A.3d 910, 919 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2018).
              The common law tort of abuse of process involves the
              perversion of legal process after it has begun in order to
              achieve a result for which the process was not intended.
              Abuse of process has been described by the Supreme
              Court as the “use of legal process as a tactical weapon to
              coerce a desired result that is not the legitimate object of
              the process.” In order to state a cause of action for abuse
              of process it must be alleged that the defendant used a legal
              process to accomplish a purpose for which the process was
              not designed. The classic example is the initiation of a civil
              proceeding to coerce the payment of a claim completely
              unrelated to the cause of action sued upon. It is not enough
              that the defendant had bad or malicious intentions or that
              the defendant acted from spite or with an ulterior motive.
              Rather, there must be an act or threat not authorized by the
              process, or the process must be used for an illegitimate aim
              such as extortion, blackmail, or to coerce or compel the
              plaintiff to take some collateral action.

Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1024-25 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)
(quoting Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder, 644 A.2d 188, 191-92 (Pa. Super.
1994)). “There is no liability [for abuse of process] where the defendant has done
nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though

              Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “Thus,
              the court may determine only whether, on the basis of the plaintiff’s
              allegations, he or she possesses a cause of action recognized at law.”
              Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 by McNesby v. City of Phila.,
              267 A.3d 531, 541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).
RT Partners, LP v. Allegheny Cnty. Off. of Prop. Assessment, 307 A.3d 801, 805 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2023) (cleaned up).

                                                4
with bad intentions.” Di Sante v. Russ Financial Co., 380 A.2d 439, 441 (Pa. Super.
1977) (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, TORTS § 100, at 669 (2d ed.1955)) (cleaned up).5

       Given this framework, it is plainly evident that Appellants failed to articulate
a viable abuse of process claim in this matter against Dozor, Feigenbaum, or
Moulton. The gravamen of Appellants’ lawsuit is that Appellees have filed
preliminary objections in other, related proceedings that contain entirely spurious
arguments, including that Common Pleas could not exercise jurisdiction over those
matters; Appellees were immune from suit; Appellants lacked standing to pursue
their actions; and Appellants failed to state claims for which legal relief could be
granted. See R.R. at 4a-36a. Those arguments, however, are of the type which
defendants often raise at the preliminary objection stage, in order to short-circuit
pending litigation early on, and are regularly adjudicated at that point by trial courts.6
       5
         “In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer
persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues.” Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

       6
         Strictly speaking, immunity must be raised as an affirmative defense in new matter, rather
than by preliminary objection. Pa. R.Civ.P. 1030(a). This is not an ironclad rule, though.
               “Should a plaintiff wish to contest the defense on this procedural
               ground, the plaintiff must file a preliminary objection to the
               preliminary objection.” Orange Stones, 87 A.3d at 1022.
               When a party responds to the preliminary objections, instead of
               challenging the procedure by filing its own preliminary objections,
               the party has waived any challenge to the form of pleading the
               defense. See Feldman v. Hoffman, 107 A.3d 821 (Pa. Cmwlth.
               2014). Generally, however, when not objected to in preliminary
               objections, courts have been moving away from this strict
               interpretation and it is now currently accepted that immunity is a
               defense that may be raised by preliminary objection “when to delay
               a ruling thereon would serve no purpose.” Faust v. Dep’t of
               Revenue, 592 A.2d 835, 838 n.3 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1991). But see Rufo v.
               Bastian-Blessing Co., 207 A.2d 823 (Pa. 1965) (trial court may only
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                5
Where, as here, such arguments are made in the normal course of litigation and
carried to their “authorized conclusion,” they cannot form the basis for a viable abuse
of process claim, even if those arguments were put forth “with bad intentions.” Di
Sante, 380 A.2d at 441. Accordingly, we conclude that Common Pleas did not
commit an error of law by sustaining Appellees’ preliminary objections on the basis
of demurrer.
                                       III. Conclusion
       In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm Common Pleas’ December 28,
2021 order.

               consider immunity defense raised by preliminary objection if
               plaintiff does not object).
               Further, “Pennsylvania courts have long recognized a limited
               exception to this rule and have allowed parties to plead the
               affirmative defense of immunity as a preliminary objection where
               the defense is clearly applicable on the face of the complaint.”
               Feldman, 107 A.3d at 829-30 (emphasis added) (citing string of
               cases); see also Logan v. Lillie, 728 A.2d 995 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)
               (involving suit against judicial defendants and successful assertion
               of judicial immunity). In fact, “[w]here, however, the asserted
               affirmative defense is clearly applicable on the face of the
               complaint, the court will consider it unless the plaintiff advances
               some reason, ‘other than prolonging the matter,’ to defer
               consideration.” Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City of
               Harrisburg, 218 A.3d 497, 515 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting
               Feldman, 107 A.3d at 835) (when method of raising immunity
               defense challenged, upheld overruling of preliminary objection
               because immunity was not clear on face of complaint).
Chasan v. Platt, 244 A.3d 73, 80-81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (cleaned up).

                                                6
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Malloy and Edward C.    :
Malloy,                            :
                 Appellants        :
                                   :
      v.                           : No. 1027 C.D. 2022
                                   :
Nicole Aileen Feigenbaum, Barry C. :
Dozor, and Geoffrey Moulton        :

PER CURIAM
                                  ORDER

     AND NOW, this 9th day of April, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court
of Common Pleas of Delaware County’s December 28, 2021 order is AFFIRMED.