Court Opinion

ID: 9898510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:11.529755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:35.244227
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                           DIVISION ONE

 ELLEN KENDRICK,                                  No. 84318-4-I

                          Respondent,

                v.                                UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 JOSHUA DAVID SANDERSON,

                          Appellant.

      BOWMAN, J. — Joshua Sanderson appeals a one-year domestic violence

(DV) protection order (DVPO) protecting his ex-wife Ellen Kendrick and their two

children. We affirm.

                                       FACTS

      Kendrick and Sanderson divorced in June 2019 and share custody of their

two children. In May 2020, after a telephone communication issue with the

children, Sanderson came to Kendrick’s home and tried to force his way in,

injuring her. Because of that incident, Kendrick sought a DVPO. The King

County Superior Court issued a one-year DVPO. The order also protected the

children and limited Sanderson’s residential time to one four-hour professionally

supervised visit per week. In June 2021, Kendrick sought to renew the DVPO.

The parties then entered a series of agreed short-term orders extending the

DVPO until January 2022 when it expired.
No. 84318-4-I/2

       In February 2022, Kendrick sought another DVPO. She submitted an

affidavit with her petition and said that she accidentally let the first order expire.

Kendrick described the May 2020 DV incident and explained that she is still

afraid of Sanderson. Kendrick said that she believes the only reason she and the

children were safe was because there was a protection order in place. She

explained that the first DVPO mandated professionally supervised visits between

Sanderson and the children. And since it expired, so did that requirement.

Kendrick said she moved to modify her parenting plan to allow Sanderson only

professionally supervised visits with the children, but that action is pending.

       Kendrick stated that even though a professional supervises Sanderson’s

time with the children, the visits “have not been without issues.” She described a

visit on January 23, 2022 where Sanderson had “an inappropriate and angry

exchange with the supervisor in front of the children.” The incident prompted the

supervisor to pull Kendrick aside “to discuss the visit . . . because she was

concerned.” The supervisor explained that Sanderson confronted a waiter at a

restaurant because the waiter tried serving them an extra pizza, and when she

tried to intervene, he “snapped” at her. After the waiter left their table with the

extra pizza, Sanderson told the supervisor “not to intervene in his interactions

with others” because it “oversteps her place.” The supervisor described the

interaction as “uncomfortable” and resulted in the rest of the dinner having a

“quieter . . . mood.”

       Kendrick also attached to her declaration her victim impact statement

(VIS) from the criminal assault case that stemmed from the May 2020 incident.

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No. 84318-4-I/3

Her VIS describes a history of verbal abuse, including Sanderson berating her

and the children, sending her aggressive and threatening messages, and

engaging in “unprovoked verbal confrontations” with third parties, including

friends, colleagues, strangers, health care providers, and school administrators.

       Sanderson objected to the new DVPO. In his declaration, Sanderson said

that Kendrick’s description of the May 2020 incident was “false.” While he

recognized that there was an incident at Kendrick’s home in May 2020, he

explained that “no intentional assault occurred.” And he explained that he has

“done nothing in the past two years that could objectively inflict the fear of

imminent physical harm in a reasonable person in [Kendrick]’s circumstances.”

Sanderson also said that the supervisors' visit reports show that the children do

not need protection from him and that it would not be in their best interests to

continue supervised visits.

       In May 2022, a King County Superior Court commissioner held a hearing.

It granted Kendrick’s request and issued a new one-year DVPO.1 Sanderson

moved for revision, which a superior court judge denied. Sanderson appeals.

                                     ANALYSIS

       Sanderson argues the court erred by issuing a new DVPO because he

committed no new act of DV. We disagree.

       A court commissioner’s decision is subject to revision by the superior

court. RCW 2.24.050. On appeal, we review the superior court’s decision, not

       1
        The new DVPO was set to expire on May 12, 2023 while this appeal was
pending. But the parties agreed to extend the DVPO until June 16, 2023. Because the
DVPO is still in effect, the claim is not moot.

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No. 84318-4-I/4

the commissioner’s. In re Marriage of Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d

573 (2010).

       We review a superior court’s grant of a DVPO for an abuse of discretion.

Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017).2 A

court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on untenable grounds or for

untenable reasons. Id. A court’s decision “is based on untenable grounds if the

factual findings are unsupported by the record,” and it “is based on untenable

reasons” if the court applies an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the

requirements of the correct standard. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39,

47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

       We review a superior court's findings of fact for substantial evidence,

deferring to the trier of fact on questions of witness credibility, conflicting

testimony, and persuasiveness of the evidence. Knight v. Knight, 178 Wn. App.

929, 936-37, 317 P.3d 1068 (2014). “Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to

persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the declared premise.” Merriman v.

Cokeley, 168 Wn.2d 627, 631, 230 P.3d 162 (2010). We will not disturb a trial

court’s findings supported by substantial evidence, even if there is conflicting

evidence. Id.

       2
          Sanderson argues we should review his claim de novo. We apply de novo
review when the record is only written and “ ‘the trial court has not seen nor heard
testimony requiring it to assess the credibility or competency of witnesses, and to weigh
the evidence, nor reconcile conflicting evidence.’ ” Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v.
Univ. of Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243, 252, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (quoting Smith v. Skagit
County, 75 Wn.2d 715, 718, 453 P.2d 832 (1969)). But here, the court reconciled
conflicting factual declarations between Kendrick and Sanderson. So, we apply an
abuse of discretion standard.

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No. 84318-4-I/5

       The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), former chapter 26.50

RCW,3 authorizes a victim of DV to petition the court for an order of protection.

Former RCW 26.50.030 (2005). The petition must “allege the existence of [DV]”

and must include “an affidavit made under oath stating the specific facts and

circumstances from which relief is sought.” Former RCW 26.50.030(1). “DV”

means:

       (a) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of
       imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, sexual assault, or
       stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of one intimate partner by
       another intimate partner; or (b) physical harm, bodily injury, assault,
       or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or
       assault, sexual assault, or stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of
       one family or household member by another family or household
       member.

Former RCW 26.50.010(3) (2019). “The harm caused by [DV] can be physical or

psychological.” Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 596, 398 P.3d 1071

(2017).

       A petitioner must support their request for a DVPO by a preponderance of

the evidence. City of Tacoma v. State, 117 Wn.2d 348, 351-52, 816 P.2d 7

(1991); Reese v. Stroh, 128 Wn.2d 300, 312, 907 P.2d 282 (1995) (Johnson, J.,

concurring). So, the court must find that it was more likely than not that DV

occurred. See In re Marriage of Freeman, 169 Wn.2d 664, 672-73, 239 P.3d 557

(2010).

       Here, the trial court determined that Kendrick met her burden for issuance

of a DVPO by showing she had a “current fear based on actions of [Sanderson]

       3
       The legislature repealed chapter 26.50 RCW in 2021, effective July 1, 2022.
LAWS OF 2021, ch. 215, § 170.

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No. 84318-4-I/6

since entry of the [first] DVPO . . . , including continued denial of the [DV] incident

in 05/2022 and behaviors exhibited during visitation.” The court explained that

when “these factors are considered along with the circumstances that led to the

[first] DVPO, the court finds the current fear reasonable.”

       Sanderson argues that the trial court erred because he committed no

recent acts of physical violence.4 But nothing in the DVPA requires a recent act

of DV to issue a DVPO. Spence v. Kaminski, 103 Wn. App. 325, 333-34, 12

P.3d 1030 (2000). Sanderson also suggests that res judicata5 precludes the

court from considering his past act of DV because that incident supported the

first DVPO. But we rejected Sanderson’s res judicata argument in Muma v.

Muma, 115 Wn. App. 1, 6, 60 P.3d 592 (2002).

       In Muma, the petitioner sought a new DVPO protecting her and her

children from her ex-husband after an earlier protection order expired. 115 Wn.

App. at 4. The trial court granted the new DVPO based on the couple’s history of

DV and the petitioner’s assertion that she still feared the respondent. Id. at 4, 6.

On appeal, we rejected the ex-husband’s argument that the doctrine of res

judicata barred the new order. Id. at 6. We explained that the purpose of res

       4
         Sanderson also says the court confused the standard for issuance of a DVPO
with the standard for renewal of a DVPO when it focused on Kendrick’s “current fear.”
He is incorrect. Under the DVPA, the court “shall grant the petition for renewal unless
the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent will not
resume acts of [DV] against the petitioner or the petitioner’s children or family or
household members when the order expires.” Former RCW 26.50.060(3) (2020).
Nothing in that statute requires a showing of “current fear.”
       5
           The doctrine of res judicata ensures the finality of decisions by barring
relitigation of the same claim where a subsequent claim involves the same subject
matter, cause of action, persons and parties, and quality of persons for or against the
claim made. See Pederson v. Potter, 103 Wn. App. 62, 67, 11 P.3d 833 (2000).

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No. 84318-4-I/7

judicata is to ensure the finality of judgments. Id. And because the petitioner

showed she still feared her ex-husband, the DV issues had “not been fully

litigated to their finality.” Id. at 6-7. We explained that the legislative intent of the

DVPA is to prevent acts of DV and “refuse[d] to construe the law so as to require

that [the petitioner] wait until [the respondent] commits further acts of violence

against her or their children in order to seek an order for protection.” Id. at 7.

       Here, the trial court found that Kendrick demonstrated “a current

reasonable fear” that when coupled with Sanderson’s previous act of DV

warranted issuance of a new DVPO. Like the parties in Muma, the DV issues

between Kendrick and Sanderson had not been fully litigated. As a result, res

judicata did not preclude the court from issuing the new DVPO.

       Sanderson contends that Muma is distinguishable because it involved an

“extensive list of horrific acts of [DV],” which “provided sufficient context for the

fear.” He suggests that substantial evidence does not support finding that

Kendrick’s assertion of fear was “objectively reasonable.” But Kendrick’s petition

supports the trial court’s finding that she still fears Sanderson. Kendrick’s

declaration describes Sanderson forcing his way into her home and injuring her.

It also describes a history of verbal abuse toward her and others. And it

describes a recent confrontation during a supervised visit consistent with the

prior verbal abuse. Together, the evidence is enough to persuade a fair-minded,

rational person that Kendrick had a “current reasonable fear” of Sanderson. And

as much as Sanderson’s declaration contradicts Kendrick’s assertions of DV, we

defer to the superior court’s determinations on the persuasiveness of the

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No. 84318-4-I/8

evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting evidence. Snyder v. Haynes, 152

Wn. App. 774, 779, 217 P.3d 787 (2009). The court did not abuse its discretion

in issuing the DVPO.

       Kendrick seeks attorney fees and costs under former RCW

26.50.060(1)(g) (2020) for responding to this appeal. We may award attorney

fees where allowed by statute, rule, or contract. Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491,

506, 387 P.3d 680 (2017). And if attorney fees are allowable below, the

prevailing party may recover those fees on appeal. Id. (citing RAP 18.1). Under

former RCW 26.50.060(1)(g), a court may “[r]equire the respondent to pay the

administrative court costs and service fees . . . and to reimburse the petitioner for

costs incurred in bringing the action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.” We

grant Kendrick’s request subject to compliance with RAP 18.1.6

       We affirm the DVPO.

WE CONCUR:

       6
         Sanderson also seeks costs under RAP 14.2. Because he does not
substantially prevail in this appeal, we deny his request.

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