Court Opinion

ID: 9850027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:51:11.538435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.560003
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting. John L. Moore, during his lifetime, conveyed land to Mary W. Moore by a deed which provided that should Mary W. Moore predecease John L. Moore then "upon her death, all of the property and estates hereby granted and conveyed shall immediately revert to and vest in the party of the first part.”
*237Subsequent to the execution and delivery of the deed, Mary W. Moore killed John L. Moore. The appellees here are the sole heirs at law of John L. Moore, and they contended in the trial court that pursuant to Code Ann. § 113-909 they, the appellees, are the successors in title to the land described in the deed from John L. Moore to Mary W. Moore, because Mary W. Moore did, with malice aforethought, kill John L. Moore.
The trial court held that the appellees’ complaint below stated a claim, leaving a fact issue for determination in the trial court: whether the killing was "with malice aforethought” as alleged.
The appellants, with a certificate for immediate review, appealed.
The appellants have attacked the Georgia statute (Code Ann. § 113-909) as being unconstitutional on several grounds. This statute is not unconstitutional for any of the contended reasons.
The Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-203) says: "No conviction shall work . . . forfeiture of estate.” The contention of the appellants in this case is that the deed from John L. Moore to Mary W. Moore vested in Mary W. Moore a base or qualified defeasible fee in the subject property and that the Georgia statute requires a forfeiture of that vested interest.
The argument of the appellants misinterprets both the statute and the provision of the Georgia Constitution. The Georgia Constitution provides that "a conviction” shall not work a forfeiture of an estate. The statute (Code Ann. § 113-909) merely provides that a person killing another person with malice aforethought can not take an interest in property from the person killed by the rules of statutory inheritance, or by will, or by deed, or otherwise. "Conviction” of a crime is not mentioned in the statute as a necessary element that will prohibit the taking of an interest in property under such circumstances.
In short, the statute does not say that "conviction for murder” shall work a forfeiture. In the case of Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366 (127 SE2d 900), this court said that an acquittal for the crime of murder in a criminal case did not bar a civil action under the statute in which it might be proved that the party acquitted of murder still might be barred from inheriting from the deceased.
The thrust of the statute and the construction of the statute by this court is that a conviction for murder or an acquittal for murder will not bar a civil action against the party committing the homicide; the statute itself does not work a forfeiture or prohibit the party committing the homicide from taking by inheritance or *238otherwise; the statute merely says that a forfeiture can be. worked or the prohibition from taking by inheritance or otherwise can be effective if it can be proved in a civil action that the party committing the homicide did so "with malice aforethought.” It is thus readily seen that it is not a "conviction” that works a forfeiture under the statute, and the statute is therefore a constitutional statute.
In this case Mary W. Moore, during the lifetime of John L. Moore, did not have a fee simple interest in the subject property. She merely had a base or qualified fee subject to being defeated if Mary W. Moore predeceased John L. Moore. The only way that Mary W. Moore could acquire a fee simple interest in the subject property was for John L. Moore to predecease her. If Mary W. Moore actually killed John L. Moore "with malice aforethought” as alleged, then she precipitated and caused the only event by which she could take a fee simple interest in the property described in the deed from John L. Moore to her.
In Reynolds v. Rackley, 223 Ga. 586 (157 SE2d 283), this court said: "The defeasible fee is a present, possessory freehold estate of inheritance. It may endure forever, but may also be brought to an end by a stated event. It has the attributes of a fee interest, such as general inheritability, but is not a fee simple due to the fact that it may be defeased. The event may be the continuance or end of some situation, the happening or failure of happening of some occurrence, or the performance or nonperformance of some condition.”
If Mary W. Moore caused the homicide as alleged in this case, she, in legal contemplation of the statute, predeceased John L. Moore, and she therefore never took, or acquired, or became vested with a fee simple interest in the subject property which she and her successor in title are now claiming.
If the allegations of the appellees are true, I say that Mary W. Moore, because of the legal results imposed by this statute, predeceased John L. Moore, and because of this "legal predeceasing” she did not during her "legal lifetime” acquire fee simple title to the subject property, and she could not convey fee simple title to any successor in title to her.
I conclude that the Georgia statute did not work a forfeiture in this case; but even if the statute can be construed as providing for a forfeiture, it is not unconstitutional because the statute does not provide that "conviction” shall work a forfeiture; and the complaint of the appellees below stated a claim and raised an issue *239that can and should be tried in the trial court.
I would affirm the judgment below.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justices Jordan and Ingram concur in this dissent.