Court Opinion

ID: 9389734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 07:09:26.140384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.302072
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-23-00036-CR

        IN RE GREGORY DEWAYNE NEWSON

             Original Mandamus Proceeding

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
       Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Gregory Dewayne Newson has petitioned this Court for mandamus relief. Newson asks

us to grant a writ of mandamus directing the Honorable LeAnn Rafferty, judge of the 123rd

Judicial District Court of Panola County, to rescind her order denying Newson’s motion to

disqualify attorney pro tem April Sikes and to enter an order granting his motion. Because we

conclude that Judge Rafferty did not clearly abuse her discretion when she denied Newson’s

motion to disqualify, we deny his petition for a writ of mandamus.

I.      Background

        Law enforcement arrested Newson in Louisiana on December 31, 2019, for the offense of

capital murder of a peace officer, which was alleged to have occurred earlier that day in Panola

County, Texas. On January 8, 2020, the trial court granted Panola County District Attorney

Danny Buck Davidson’s motion to appoint April Sikes as a special prosecutor in Newson’s case.

At that time, Sikes was employed as the first assistant district attorney for Gregg County. On

February 27, Newson was extradited back to Texas, and at the request of the Panola County

Sheriff’s Office, he was held in custody in the Gregg County Jail.

        On March 2, Davidson filed a motion for recusal and appointment of attorney pro tem,

explaining to the trial court that there was a “potential conflict of interest” that had “arisen

during the investigation of [the] case that would possibly require [Davidson] and [his] staff

members . . . to be called as fact witnesses in the trial of [Newson’s] case.”1 (Emphasis added).

1
 The investigation was related to the forfeiture of $5,500.00, which the State maintained was held by Newson as
illegal contraband. On February 13, the State filed a motion to nonsuit its original notice of seizure and intended
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Davidson asked the court to “grant [the] motion and recuse Movant and Movant’s Office . . . .”

On March 6, the trial found that good cause existed to grant Davidson’s motion to “voluntarily

recuse[],” and the court appointed Gregg County District Attorney Tom B. Watson to act as

criminal district attorney pro tem in Newson’s case. The trial court did not refer to Sikes in the

order granting Davidson’s motion to recuse.

            Around that same time, Newson’s attorney notified the trial court, via email, that Newson

objected to Sikes’s continued involvement in his case. Counsel continued, “[T]he law requires

that if Mr. Davidson is disqualified . . . [Davidson’s] employees and staff, including Ms. Sikes,

would also be disqualified from participating in the prosecution(s) pending against

Mr. Newson.”2

            On July 27, the trial court, on its own motion, issued an order removing Watson as the

district attorney pro tem and disqualifying Sikes from serving as counsel in the case, because

they had been remiss in their obligations to present Newson’s case to the grand jury and because

they had not “provide[d] any excuse or reason as to why the grand jury presentation would not

forfeiture, asking the trial court to dismiss, without prejudice, the forfeiture proceeding against Newson. The trial
court granted the State’s motion the same day.
2
    In his email message to the court, Newson’s counsel explained,

            It is our understanding of the law that once the elected District Attorney is disqualified from
            participating in a case, that disqualification is imputed down the ranks of the employees and staff
            of the District Attorney’s office, to include any assistant district attorney and or special prosecutor
            employed or otherwise assisting the District Attorney.

            It has also been suggested that if the DA of Panola County is disqualified, then the primary
            employer of Ms. Sikes, the DA of Gregg County, Tom Watson, could be appointed as the
            Attorney Pro Tem for this case. While the disqualification of Ms. Sikes would not be imputed up
            to her employer, the elected District Attorney of Gregg County, Ms. Sikes’ continued participation
            in the prosecution of this case would, in our view, be prohibited. We take no position on the
            propriety of the appointment of Mr. Watson as the Attorney Pro Tem in this case, although we see
            it as potentially problematic.
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occur.” The court also noted that Sikes had been appointed as special counsel to the Panola

County District Attorney’s office when Davidson voluntarily recused himself from the case but

that “[t]he record [was] unclear as to whether Sikes sought to withdraw her appointment as

special counsel” at the time Davidson recused. Despite that, the trial court “removed” Watson as

district attorney pro tem and ordered that Sikes be “disqualified to serve as counsel in this

matter.” The trial court then appointed the Texas Attorney General’s Office (AG’s Office) as the

district attorney pro tem in Newson’s case.

            Around seven days later, on August 3, Watson filed a motion for recusal and appointment

of attorney pro tem. Newson states that Watson’s motion for recusal was filed pursuant to an

agreement between the parties and the trial court. The trial court found that good cause existed

to grant Watson’s recusal motion and disqualified Watson from serving as the prosecutor in

Newson’s case.3 On that same day, the trial court entered a second order referring the case to the

AG’s Office to serve as district attorney pro tem in Newson’s case. The trial court assigned

Newson’s case to Assistant Attorney General Natalie Tise, and the State indicted Newson for

capital murder and aggravated assault on September 28.

            Around May 2022, Sikes, who had since left her employment with the Gregg County

DA’s office, was hired by the AG’s Office and reassigned as the criminal district attorney

pro tem in Newson’s case. On August 12, Newson filed a motion to disqualify Sikes as the

prosecutor in his case. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Newson’s motion to disqualify

Sikes. Newson’s petition for a writ of mandamus followed.

3
    On August 4, the trial court entered a separate order to vacate its July 27 “[r]emoval [o]rder.”
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II.    Standard of Review

       “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.” In re Good Shepherd Hosp., Inc., 572 S.W.3d

315, 319 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, orig. proceeding). The decision to deny a motion to

disqualify counsel is reviewable on a petition for a writ of mandamus. In re Cox, 481 S.W.3d

289, 295 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, orig. proceeding). In a criminal case, “[m]andamus

relief may be granted if a relator shows that: (1) the act sought to be compelled is purely

ministerial, and (2) there is no adequate remedy at law.” In re McCann, 422 S.W.3d 701, 704

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding). To meet his burden to establish entitlement to

mandamus relief, Newson is required to show that the trial court had a ministerial duty to grant

his motion to disqualify Sikes. See In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013) (orig. proceeding)). An act is considered ministerial if relator can show a clear right

to the relief sought. Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (orig.

proceeding). A clear right to the requested relief is shown when the facts and circumstances

require but “one rational decision ‘under unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory,

constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly controlling legal principles.’” In re. State ex rel.

Weeks, 391 S.W.3d at 122 (quoting Bowen, 343 S.W.3d at 810). “Mandamus is not available to

compel a discretionary act as distinguished from a ministerial act.” State ex rel. Holmes v.

Denson, 671 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (orig. proceeding).

III.   Discussion

       In his mandamus petition, Newson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it

denied his motion to disqualify Sikes because she had “twice before been disqualified.” Newson

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points out that Sikes was initially disqualified as a special prosecutor for the Panola County

District Attorney’s Office due to her status as a potential witness in the civil forfeiture case and

that she was disqualified a second time from serving as district attorney pro tem in Gregg County

due to her failure to fulfill her duties. Newson asks this Court to (1) grant his petition for a writ

of mandamus, (2) direct the trial court to rescind its order denying Newson’s motion to

disqualify Sikes as district attorney pro tem, and (3) direct the trial court to enter an order

granting Newson’s motion to disqualify Sikes.

            In regard to prosecutors, recusal and disqualification are not interchangeable words. In re

Guerra, 235 S.W.3d 392, 410 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2007, orig. proceeding).

“Legal disqualification refers to the ineligibility to act as the prosecutor in a particular case.”

In re Ligon, 408 S.W.3d 888, 891 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

“There are . . . a few instances in which the district attorney is legally disqualified from acting,”4

Coleman v. State, 246 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), and Newson fails to allege that

any of them applied to Sikes. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (“Each district attorney

4
    Article 2.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled “Disqualified,” states,

                      (a)      District and county attorneys shall not be of counsel adversely to the State in any
            case, in any court, nor shall they, after they cease to be such officers, be of counsel adversely to
            the State in any case in which they have been of counsel for the State.

                     (b)       A judge of a court in which a district or county attorney represents the State
            shall declare the district or county attorney disqualified for purposes of Article 2.07 on a showing
            that the attorney is the subject of a criminal investigation by a law enforcement agency if that
            investigation is based on credible evidence of criminal misconduct for an offense that is within the
            attorney’s authority to prosecute. A disqualification under this subsection applies only to the
            attorney’s access to the criminal investigation pending against the attorney and to any prosecution
            of a criminal charge resulting from that investigation.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.08(a), (b) (Supp.).
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shall represent the State in all criminal cases in the district courts of his district and in appeals

therefrom, except in cases where he has been, before his election, employed adversely.”).

       If there is a basis for legal disqualification for a district attorney, for example, if “an

elected prosecuting attorney has previously represented a defendant in a particular proceeding,”

the disqualification “is imputed to those assistants ‘who serve[] at his will and pleasure.’”

Scarborough v. State, 54 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. ref’d) (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. May, 270 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1954, no writ)).

In other words, “if an elected prosecuting attorney ha[d] previously represented a defendant in a

particular proceeding, then article 2.01 disqualifies him from representing the State in the matter

and that disqualification is imputed to those assistants ‘who serve[] at his will and pleasure.’” Id.

(alteration in original). On the other hand, “if an assistant district or county attorney has

previously represented a defendant in a particular proceeding, then that particular attorney is

disqualified from assisting in the prosecution of the case, but the elected prosecutor and his other

assistants are not.” Id. (citing State ex rel. Edison v. Edwards, 793 S.W.2d 1, 5–6 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1990) (orig. proceeding).

       In relation to a voluntary recusal, like the two recusals in this case, “[a] district attorney

who is not legally disqualified may request that the district court permit him to recuse himself in

a particular case for good cause.” Coleman, 246 S.W.3d at 81. This procedure, which is

specified in Article 2.07(b-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, “allows the district

attorney to avoid conflicts of interest and even the appearance of impropriety by deciding not to

participate in certain cases.” Id. “Once the trial court approves his voluntary recusal, the district

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attorney is deemed ‘disqualified.’” Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.07(b-1)

(Supp.)).

       The distinction between a legal disqualification and a voluntary recusal is critical. Had

Davidson or Watson represented Newson previously, the knowledge that either of them gained

through that representation would be imputed to Sikes, and the disqualification would follow her

after she left the DA’s office. But that is not the case here, and Newson has cited no legal

authority showing that a deemed disqualification, following a voluntary recusal, would follow

Sikes to her future employment. In fact, “the notion of ‘once deemed disqualified, always

disqualified,’” has been expressly rejected. O’Neal v. State, No. 07-15-00273-CR, 2016 WL

3136039, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 31, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (citing Coleman, 246 S.W.3d at 85).

       Recently, we addressed a similar issue in In re Rider, No. 06-22-00129-CR, 2022 WL

7208629 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 13, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). In that case, Rider filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking this Court to

order “the 124th Judicial District Court of Gregg County, Texas, to enter an order disqualifying

the prosecutor pro tem.” Id. at *1. We denied Rider’s petition for mandamus relief.

       Rider was indicted for capital murder, and the trial court appointed John Moore to

represent him. At that time, Sikes was the first assistant to Greg County DA Tom Watson, and

she made multiple appearances on behalf of the State in Rider’s case. “On January 21, 2022, . . .

Watson . . . informed the trial court that he [would not be] seeking re-election” and that he did

not have sufficient time in office to prosecute Rider’s case. He further informed the court that

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John Moore would be running for Greg County DA “unopposed and would be sworn in as the

next criminal district attorney on January 1, 2023.” Id. Watson asked the trial court to grant his

motion to voluntarily recuse his office “‘[a]s a result of the upcoming changes in the’ DA’s

Office” and because “a conflict ar[ose] in that John Moore w[ould] not be able to prosecute the

case against the Defendant due to their previous attorney-client relationship.” Id. “The recusal

request expressly contemplated a future conflict of interest and not one existing at that time.” Id.

       The trial court granted Watson’s motion on February 2, allowing him to recuse pursuant

to Article 2.07(b-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court also appointed the

Texas AG’s office to prosecute Rider’s case as DA pro tem. Five months later, Sikes left the

Gregg County DA’s office and was employed as an assistant attorney general. At her new

position, Sikes was assigned to represent the State against Rider. “Rider moved to disqualify

Sikes based solely on the argument that, because the DA’s Office [previously] recused, Sikes

was disqualified” from prosecuting Rider as an AAG. Id. The trial court rejected Rider’s

reasoning, found that there was no “evidence of a due process violation or issue,” and denied

Rider’s motion. Id.

       Rider filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court, maintaining that the trial

court’s denial of his motion to disqualify Sikes was an abuse of discretion. Id. In denying

Rider’s petition, we first noted the difference between a legal disqualification and a voluntary

recusal and then explained, “Had Watson previously represented Rider, the knowledge he gained

through such a representation would be imputed to Sikes and the disqualification could follow

her after she left the DA’s Office. But those are not the facts . . . .” Id. at *3 (emphasis added).

                                                  9
       Newson maintains that the facts in the present case are critically different from those in

Rider. Newson argues that, in Rider, “neither Ms. Sikes nor her supervisor Mr. Watson (nor

anyone else in the Gregg County District Attorney’s Office for that matter) ever labored under

any kind of conflict in the case. Mr. Watson sought voluntary recusal prospectively based on the

eventual legal disqualification of his successor.” With respect to this case, Newson contends,

“Davidson sought a recusal based on his own existing conflict, then Mr. Watson was removed

and later voluntarily recused based on his failure to fulfill his duties as attorney pro tem. In both

circumstances, Ms. Sikes was not simply an unwitting bystander.” (Emphasis added). He

continues, “[Instead,] she was an active participant. And she was disqualified based, not only on

the imputed taint from her supervisors, but also on her own status and conduct.” We disagree.

       Similar to what Watson did in the Rider case, Davidson filed a motion to voluntarily

recuse from Newson’s case based on the possibility that he, or one of his staff members, might

be a potential witness in a civil forfeiture proceeding against Newson. The trial court had the

discretion to grant or deny Davidson’s motion. Not unexpectedly, the court chose to grant

Davidson’s motion and appointed Watson as the attorney pro tem.              Regardless, Newson’s

forfeiture case, which was the sole basis for Watson’s motion to voluntarily recuse, was

dismissed pursuant to the State’s own motion. But even if the forfeiture case were to be refiled

by the State, the trial court would have the discretion to determine whether Sikes had a conflict

of interest regarding the forfeiture proceeding. The fact that the trial court has the discretion to

determine whether Sikes has a conflict of interest refutes Newson’s assertion that the trial court

had a ministerial duty to grant his motion to disqualify Sikes.

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       Newson also argues that Sikes was disqualified from prosecuting his case based on

Watson’s and Sikes’s prior legal disqualifications. It is true that the trial court entered an order

disqualifying Watson and Sikes based on their failure to participate in grand jury proceedings.

However, the trial court used its discretion when it chose to vacate its order disqualifying Watson

and Sikes and, then again, when it entered its order granting Watson’s motion to voluntarily

recuse. Neither of those rulings were ministerial in nature, and Newson has not met his burden

of showing that the trial court had a ministerial duty to grant his motion to disqualify Sikes based

on any of the prior recusal orders.

IV.    Conclusion

       Because Sikes’s appointment as attorney pro tem was consistent with the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to allow Sikes to continue to

prosecute Newson lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.

       For this reason, we deny Newson’s petition for a writ of mandamus.

                                              Charles van Cleef
                                              Justice

Date Submitted:        April 20, 2023
Date Decided:          April 21, 2023

Do Not Publish

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