Court Opinion

ID: 9353562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 02:01:25.868134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:08:03.189991
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, dissenting. ¶23 Section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c), C.R.S., (2017), requires a court to sentence a defendant who has been adjudicated a habitual sex offender against children under section 18-3-412, C.R.S. (2017), to an indeterminate term of “at least three times the upper limit” of the presumptive sentencing range for the offense. Section 18-3-412(2) similarly requires such an offender to be sentenced to “not less than three times the upper‘limit of the presumptive range” for the offense. The question before us is whether Colorado’s sentencing statutes impose a cap on the minimum end of the indeterminate sentence for suph offenders. Maj. op. ¶¶ 1, 6. Relying on this court’s decision in Vensor v. People, 161 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007), the majority concludes that section 18-1.3-401(6), C.R.S. (2017), provides such a cap. Specifically, the majority reasons, although the court must triple the maximum of the presumptive range for the offense, in accordance with section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c), it may then double that resulting figure under section 18-1.3-401(6) — if the court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances. Maj. op. ,¶ 18. Absent a finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances,, the majority further holds that the trial court must set the lower end of the term at exactly three times the maximum of the presumptive range for the offense, see id.; that is, the “floor” established by section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) and section 18-2-412(2), In so doing, the majority fails to give effect to the words “at least” in section 18-l,3-1004(l)(c), and arrives at the very result we expressly rejected in Vensor, Id. at ¶ 13; Vensor, 161 P.3d at 1278. ¶24 To be sure, the policy concerns x’aised by the majority are legitimate. Absent' a cap on the lower term of the indeterminate sentence, a sentencing court could theoretically set that lower term anywhere from three times the maximum presumptive range sentence all the way up to the defendant’s natural life, or a sentence of “life to life.” Maj. op. ¶ 17. But, however legitimate the majority’s concerns with such sentencing discretion, our role is to apply the text of the statute. For better or worse, Colorado’s sentencing statutes presently provide no cap on the lower term of the indeterminate sentence for habitual child sex offenders. The General Assembly certainly could establish one, but it has not done so, and in my view, the majority errs in construing section 18-1.3-401(6) to create one to fill a gap in legislation. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. ¶25 When construing a sentencing statute, “[o]ur job is to effectuate the General Assembly’s intent.” See People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 73 (Colo. 2006), To that end, we begin with the plain text of a statute because the “statutory text [is] the best indication of the General Assembly’s intent.” Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1091 (Colo. 2011). “If [the} statutory language is clear, we apply its plain and ordinary meaning.” Hunsaker v. People, 2015 CO 46, ¶ 11, 351 P.3d 388, 391; see also People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 621, 624. ¶26 Importantly, “[w]e do not add words to the statute or subtract words from it.” Diaz, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d at 624 (quoting Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563, 567 (Colo. 2007)). And we do not “imply words that simply are not there.” Id. at ¶ 15, 347 P.3d at 625. For “[i]t is the General Assembly’s prerogative to define crimes and prescribe punishments,” not the court’s. People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146, 148 (Colo. 1981). When we rewrite a sentencing statute enacted by the General Assembly, “[t]he result is an invasion of the legislature’s exclusive province to set punishments.” People v. Hinchman, 196 Colo. 626, 589 P.2d 917, 920 (1978). ¶27 Accordingly, I begin with the relevant text. Isom was sentenced under section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c), which provides: If the sex offender committed a sex offense that makes him or her eligible for sentencing as an habitual sex offender against children pursuant to section 18-3-412, the district court shall sentence the sex offender to the custody of the department for an indeterminate term of at least three times the upper limit of the presumptive range for the level of offense committed and a maximum of the sex offender’s natural life, (emphasis added). Standing alone, section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) is susceptible of only one interpretation: habitual child sex offenders must be sentenced for an indeterminate term of “at least” three times the upper limit of the presumptive range; there is no cap on the lower term of the indeterminate sentence. Section 18-3-412(2) similarly provides that a court shall sentence an habitual sex offender against children to a term of “not less than three times the upper limit of the presumptive range” for such an offender’s second or subsequent felony sexual offense. ¶28 According to the majority, to read section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) to mean what it says “would be contrary to the legislative scheme” because it would permit a sentencing court to impose a sentence of “life to life,” which operates- as a determinate sentence. Maj. op. ¶ 17. Consequently, the majority turns to the broader sentencing framework for guidance, id., as this court .did in Vensor. But in my view, Vensor does not support the result the majority reaches here. ¶29 In Vensor, the defendant’s sentences for sexual assault on a child were governed by section 18-l,3-1004(l)(a), C.R.S. (2017), which requires an indeterminate term of “at least the minimum of the presumptive range” for the offense. Vensor, 161 P.3d at 1276-77 (quoting § 18-1.3-1004(l)(a)). Like section 1004(l)(c) at issue here, section 1004(l)(a) provides no cap on the minimum term of the defendant’s indeterminate sentence. Id. at 1277-78. As the majority correctly observes, we reasoned in Vensor that the indeterminate sentences required by section 18-1.3-1004 remain subject to the broader statutory framework governing sentencing, and so we turned to the general sentencing provisions for additional guidance. We reasoned that the lower term of a sex offender’s indetenninate sentence must be fixed according to the provisions of the determinate sentencing scheme of section 18-1.3-401. Maj. op. ¶ 14 (discussing Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1279-80). Observing that section 18-1.3-401 does not authorize sentencing to more than twice the maximum term of the presumptive range, we concluded that a sex offender whose sentence fell under section 18-1.3-1004(l)(a) must be given an indeterminate sentence consisting of a lower term of “at least the minimum of the presumptive range” (the floor provided in section 18-1.3-1004(l)(a)) but not more than twice the maximum of the presumptive range authorized for the offense (the upper limit set by section 18-1.3-401). Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1279. In short, for the sex offender sentencing scenario under section 18-1.3-1004(l)(a) at issue in Vensor, the' general sentencing provisions provided a cap for the lower term of the defendant’s indeterminate sentence. ¶30 Purporting to apply the logic of Vensor here, the majority again turns to section 18-1.3-401 for guidance. Maj. op. ¶ 18. Specifically, the majority focuses on section 18-1.3-401(6), which provides that where the court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances, “in no case shall the term of sentence be greater than twice the maximum” of the presumptive range sentence authorized for the offense. Id. (quoting § 18-1.3-401(6)). But unlike in Vensor,, the “twice the maximum presumptive range” limit in section 18-1.3-401(6) logically cannot provide a cap for the lower term of Isom’s indeterminate sentence because it is necessarily below the “floor” set by section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) (requiring the sentencing court to impose a lower term of “at least three times the flp'per limit of the presumptive range” for a habitual child sex offender). ,¶31 The majority nevertheless blends secr tion 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) with section 18-1.3-401(6), -concluding that section 18-1.3-401(6) “limits the minimum end of a sex offender’s indeterminate sentence to twice the presumptive maximum as already enhanced by the habitual sex offender statute, section 1004(l)(c),” Maj op. ¶ 18 (emphasis added). By reading the words “as already enhanced by the habitual sex offender statute” into section 18-1.3-401(6), the-majority essentially creates a new cap of six times the presumptive maximum sentence. Id. But that is not what section 18-1.3-401(6) says. ¶32 Instead, section 18-1.3-401(6) provides simply that, if a court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances, the court may impose a sentence greater than the presumptive range, but “in no case shall the term of sentence be greater than twice the maximum ... authorized in the presumptive range” for the offense. § 18-1.3-401(6) (emphasis added). However, the only authorized “presumptive range” sentences in Colorado’s sentencing statutes are found in section 18-1.3-401— not the indeterminate sentencing provisions in section 18-1.3-1004 for sex offenders. Indeed, section 18-1.3-1004 itself refers back to the “presumptive range” sentences “specified in section 18-1.3-401.” § 18-1.3-1004(l)(a). In short, the majority apparently reads section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) to establish the “presumptive range” sentence that can be doubled under section 18-1.3-401(6). But such an approach runs afoul of the plain text of both provisions, and adds words to section 18-1.3-401(6) that are not there. See Diaz, ¶ 15, 347 P.3d at 625 (“[I]n interpreting a statute, we must accept the General Assembly’s choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not there.”) ¶33 Nor is it necessary here to try to reconcile the three-times-the-presumptive-maximum floor set by section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) with the two-times-the-presumptive-maximum limit established in section 18-1.3-401(6). To the extent these two sentencing provisions conflict, section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) controls in this ease, as it is both the more specific provision of the two, and the more recently enacted.1 See § 2-4-206, C.R.S. (2017) (if a conflict between statutory provisions is irreconcilable, the more specific provision governs); § 2-4-206, C.R.S. (2017) (“If statutes enacted at ... different sessions of the general assembly are irreconcilable, the statute prevails which is latest in its effective date.”); Jenkins v. Panama Canal Ry. Co.. 208 P.3d 238, 241-42 (Colo. 2009). ¶34 The majority acknowledges that its new cap applies only upon the court’s finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances. Maj. op. ¶ 18. It then summarily concludes that “without a finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances, the trial court must set the lower end of the sentence at triple the presumptive maximum only.” Id. In my view, this approach fails to give any effect to the words “at least” in section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c), and in depriving the court of any sentencing discretion, it arrives at the very result we expressly rejected in Vensor, as the majority’s own discussion of Vensor appears to acknowledge. Id. at ¶ 13; Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1278 (“[T]he words ‘at least’ [in section 18-1.3-1004(l)(a) ] cannot be construed, consistent with other indicators of legislative intent, to require a lower term fixed precisely at the [floor established by section 18-1.3-1004(l)(a) ]” because “[s]ueh an interpretation would effectively deprive sentencing courts of any discretion whatsoever”). ¶35 The majority raises several valid reasons to amend, or at least to clarify, sentencing laws regarding habitual child sex offenders. But such concerns are “appropriately directed at the legislature, which has primary responsibility for making the difficult policy choices that underlie any criminal sentencing scheme,” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). In the meantime, I believe we must apply section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) as written. ¶36 In Isom’s case, this means his class four felony resulted in a presumptive range sentence of two to six years. Isom was adjudicated a habitual sex offender against children under section 18-3-412. Therefore, under section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c), the sentencing court was required to impose an indeterminate term of “at least three times the upper limit of the presumptive range” (here, eighteen years) up to his natural life. Although admittedly harsh, Isom’s indeterminate sentence of forty years to life was lawful under Colorado’s current sentencing scheme, Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  . The General Assembly amended 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) to add the "three times” language in 2000. Ch. 78, sec. 1, §§ 18-3-412(2), 16-13-804(1 )(c), 2000 Colo. Sess. Laws 249-50. The current version of section 18-1.3-401(6) dates back to 1979. Ch. 157, sec. 16, § 18-1-105(6), 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 664, 669, Thus, section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) controls.