Court Opinion

ID: 9373555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:49.840074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.034757
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ANTONIO LAMAR SINCLAIR,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          AT-0752-16-0376-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: July 22, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           David C. Jones, Warner Robins, Georgia, for the appellant.

           Biron Ross, Warner Robins, Georgia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     mitigated the appellant’s removal to a 5-day suspension.         Generally, we grant
     petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision
     contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
     the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge ’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review.    Therefore, we DENY the petition for review , and
     AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed as a GS-07 Production Support Technician at
     Robins Air Force Base (Robins AFB), Georgia. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6
     at 18. On August 7, 2015, the agency proposed to suspend him for 5 calendar
     days based on charges of failure to properly request leave (7 specifications),
     unauthorized absence (5 specifications), tardiness, and failure to report for
     scheduled overtime. Id. at 114-15. The agency subsequently rescinded the notice
     of proposed suspension and proposed the appellant’s removal based on the
     following six charges:     (1) misuse of a Government owned vehicle (GOV);
     (2) failure to follow instructions; (3) failure to properly request leave
     (10 specifications); (4) unauthorized absence (10 specifications); (5) tardiness;
     and (6) failure to report for scheduled overtime. Id. at 42-46, 113. The deciding
     official affirmed the proposed action and the appellant’s removal was effective
     January 29, 2016. Id. at 18, 22-23. The appellant timely filed a Board appeal in
     which he requested a hearing and alleged that he was denied due process. IAF,
     Tab 1.
                                                                                        3

¶3         After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     mitigating the removal action to a 5-day suspension.          IAF, Tab 33, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 1, 17. She found that the agency proved only three of its six
     charges. ID at 2-14. Regarding the charge of misuse of a GOV, she found that
     the agency failed to prove that the appellant willfully, deliberately, or negligently
     misused a GOV, and thus failed to prove the charge. ID at 2-7. In particular, she
     found that the appellant’s nonofficial use of the GOV to drive one mile to his
     home to change clothes he had soiled due to incontinence, with the intent to
     return to continue to perform his duties, fell within the minor personal use
     exception. ID at 6. She also found that the agency did not meet its burden of
     proving that the appellant failed to follow instructions to report that his driver’s
     license had been suspended because he established that he did not know of the
     suspension earlier than when it was reported to the agency.          ID at 7.    The
     administrative judge sustained the failure to properly request leave charge but
     found that the agency proved only 5 of the 10 specifications underlying the
     charge. ID at 8-10.     She also sustained the unauthorized absence charge , but
     sustained only two and a half of the specifications underlying the charge. ID
     at 10-13. The administrative judge did not sustain the tardiness charge but found
     that the agency proved the charge of failing to report for overtime. ID at 13-14.
     She further found that the appellant failed to prove that the agency denied him
     due process. ID at 14-15. Finally, she found that the agency failed to prove that
     the penalty of removal was within the bounds of reasonableness for the sustained
     charges, and she mitigated the penalty to a 5-day suspension. ID at 15-17. She
     ordered interim relief. ID at 18.
¶4         The agency has petitioned for review.       Petition for Review (PFR) Fi le,
     Tab 1. In its petition, the agency argues that it proved that the appellant willfully
     and negligently misused a GOV. Id. at 9-13. The agency asserts that, under the
     circumstances, the administrative judge erred in applying the minor personal use
     exception to the appellant’s use of a GOV. Id. Regarding the charge of failure to
                                                                                       4

     follow instructions, the agency asserts that the administrative judge erred in
     finding that the appellant credibly testified that he did not report the suspension
     of his driver’s license because he was unaware that it had been suspended. Id.
     at 13-15.   The agency also argues that the administrative judge applied an
     incorrect legal standard in assessing this charge. Id. Additionally, the agency
     contends that the administrative judge erred in finding that it did not prove some
     of the specifications under the charges of unauthorized absence and failure to
     properly request leave.   Id. at 16-24.   The agency argues, moreover, that the
     administrative judge misapplied the law in finding that the agency failed to prove
     its tardiness charge. Id. at 23-24. The appellant has filed what appears to be a
     request that the agency comply with the administrative judge’s interim relief
     order by issuing him a card that would give him access to his personal records
     and allow him to use base facilities such as the Child Development Center and the
     base exchange. PFR File, Tab 3.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge properly found that the agency failed to prove misuse of
     a GOV.
¶5        The agency provided the following specification in support of this charge:
           On 19 September 2015, your supervisor, [D.H.] was notified by a
           Warner Robins Police Officer that you had been apprehended due to
           an outstanding warrant for your arrest at an off base location. At the
           time you were apprehended you were driving government owned
           vehicle # AF06B00642. You did not have permission to drive the
           government owned vehicle off of Robins Air Force Base. This is a
           violation of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 24-301, Transportation,
           Vehicle Operations, dated 1 November 2008, Chapter 3,
           [paragraph] 3.1, and in violation of WR-ALC Operating Instruction
           24-2, Management and Use of Vehicles, dated 1 October 2015,
           Chapter 2, paragraph 2.6.5.
     IAF, Tab 6 at 42.
¶6        The administrative judge found that both regulatory provisions cited by the
     agency in its charge prohibit the use of GOVs for other than official use, and that
                                                                                        5

     AFI 24-301 provides that the penalty for negligent, willful misconduct, or
     deliberate unauthorized misuse, may result in “[s]uspension from duty . . .
     without pay, for not less than 1 month, suspension, or removal.” ID at 3; IAF,
     Tab 6 at 88. She further found that the agency’s regulation specifically refers to
     and, therefore, incorporates by reference 31 U.S.C. § 1344, to which 31 U.S.C.
     § 1349(b) relates.   ID at 4-5.    Section 1344 of title 31 sets forth certain
     circumstances under which GOVs are authorized, and section 1349(b) provides
     that those who violate section 1344 or willfully misuse a GOV for other than
     official purposes “shall be suspended without pay . . . for at least one month.”
     31 U.S.C. § 1349(b).    The administrative judge therefore found that, for the
     agency to impose the statutory mandatory 30-day punishment, the agency must
     prove the “willful” misuse of the GOV. ID at 4-5.
¶7        The administrative judge also acknowledged, however, that the agency’s
     regulation regarding misuse of a GOV is broader than section 1349(b) because in
     addition to the willful and deliberate elements, it makes negligent misuse a
     violation of the regulation.   ID at 5; IAF, Tab 6 at 88.     She interpreted the
     agency’s regulation to mean that in the case of negligent misuse of a GOV , the
     agency could impose a suspension of less than 30 days. ID at 5. On petition for
     review, the agency does not disagree with            the   administrative    judge’s
     interpretation of its regulations and we find no basis for doing so.        Thus, in
     determining whether the agency proved that the appellant misused a GOV , we
     have considered whether it proved either willful or negligent misuse.
¶8        To establish misuse of a GOV under section 1349(b) of title 31, the agency
     has to show that the appellant had actual knowledge that the use in question
     would be characterized as nonofficial or that he acted in reckless disregard as to
     whether the use was for nonofficial purposes. See Kimm v. Department of the
     Treasury, 61 F.3d 888, 891-92 (Fed. Cir. 1995). However, the Board will not
     sustain a charge of misuse of a GOV if the conduct at issue involved a minor
     personal use and if the vehicle was used primarily to further agency business.
                                                                                           6

      Fischer v. Department of the Treasury, 69 M.S.P.R. 614, 617 (1996); see D’Elia
      v. Department of the Treasury, 14 M.S.P.R. 54, 56 (1982) (finding that a stop at a
      disco on the return route to a motel while on temporary duty was minor personal
      use); Ferguson v. Department of the Army, 8 M.S.P.R. 615, 617-18 (1981)
      (finding that a stop at the employee’s residence with a GOV to pick up his own
      vehicle constituted minor personal use).
¶9          As the administrative judge found, the facts surrounding the appellant’s
      misuse of a GOV charge are largely undisputed.           The appellant’s supervisor
      authorized the appellant’s use of a GOV for transport to a different area of the
      base so that the appellant could check equipment for the agency’s annual
      inventory. IAF, Tab 6 at 78. However, when the appellant arrived at the site
      where he was to conduct the inventory, he encountered stomach pains related to
      his gastrointestinal conditions and experienced a bout of diarrhea. Id. at 84. He
      went to the bathroom and determined that he needed to go home to clean up. Id.
      The administrative judge noted that the appellant testified that he was
      embarrassed by his predicament and did not want to call attention to his situation.
      ID at 3. The appellant therefore drove the GOV home, a mile or less away, to
      clean up and change clothes. Id. He testified that, given the situation, he did not
      believe that his taking the vehicle a short distance to get cleaned up would be
      deemed an unauthorized use. ID at 4.
¶10         We   agree   with   the   administrative   judge    that,   under   the   unique
      circumstances of this case, the appellant’s nonofficial use of the GOV fell within
      the boundaries of the minor personal use exception. Even though the appellant
      left his official duty site to drive the short distance to his personal re sidence, he
      did so under difficult and distressing circumstances. The agency cannot have
      reasonably expected him to continue his duties in that particular state.          The
      evidence reflects that the appellant did not do anything other than clean himself
      and change his clothes while at his home so that he could return and resume his
      official duties, thus using the GOV to continue conducting the inventory, the
                                                                                       7

      Government’s business that he was charged with performing.              Given the
      appellant’s harrowing situation, and the fact that his deviation from the base in
      the GOV was short in distance and duration, and expedited Government business,
      we agree with the administrative judge that the minor personal use exception
      applies, and that the willful or deliberate misuse charge cannot be sustained. See
      Fischer, 69 M.S.P.R. at 617.
¶11         Next, to prove negligent misuse, the agency must show a failure to exercise
      the degree of care required under the particular circumstances, which a person of
      ordinary prudence in the same situation and with equal experience would not
      commit. See, e.g., Mendez v. Department of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 596, ¶ 26
      (2001). We agree with the administrative judge that, for the same reasons that the
      agency failed to prove willful misuse of a GOV, it also faile d to prove negligent
      misuse. We find that the appellant exercised the degree of care required under
      the particular circumstances of this case. He used the GOV to go to his nearby
      home to change his soiled clothing so that he could quickly continue with his duty
      of conducting an inventory. We find that the appellant’s actions are not outside
      the degree of care expected of a person of ordinary prudence in the same situation
      with equal experience. Under the circumstances, we find that the appellant could
      reasonably have determined that his GOV use would promote the successful
      operation of the agency’s mission by saving considerable time in completing the
      inventory. We therefore agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the
      agency failed to prove its charge of misuse of a GOV.

      The administrative judge correctly found that the agency did not establish that the
      appellant failed to follow instructions.
¶12         In support of this second charge, the agency provided the following
      specification:
            On 19 September 2015, [D.H.] became aware that during
            March 2015, your state driver’s license had been suspended. You
            failed to notify [your] supervisor of your suspended state driver’s
            license and to turn in Air Force Form 2293. This is in violation of
                                                                                       8

            WR-ALC Operating Instruction 24-2, Management and Use of
            Vehicles, dated 1 October 2015, Chapter 2, [paragraph] 2.6.4.
      IAF, Tab 6 at 42-43.
¶13        The administrative judge found that the appellant credibly testified that he
      did not inform his supervisor of the suspension because he did not know his
      license had been suspended. ID at 7. She similarly found credible his testimony
      that he had appeared in court for traffic violations, had completed all the
      court-mandated requirements, and that no one had ever informed him that his
      license had been suspended. Id.
¶14        The agency offered no evidence to refute the appellant ’s claim.          The
      administrative judge noted the agency’s argument that whether the appellant
      knew his license was suspended is irrelevant because a charge of failure to follow
      instructions does not require proof of intent. Id. The administrative judge agreed
      with the agency’s statement of the law, citing Hamilton v. U.S. Postal Service,
      71 M.S.P.R. 547, 555 (1996). She found, however, that although the failure-to-
      report charge can be sustained without the agency proving the appellant
      intentionally failed to follow instructions, the agenc y must nevertheless prove
      that he appellant was aware that the act that would trigger the reporting
      requirement had occurred. ID at 7.
¶15        As the administrative judge properly found, the agency has failed to rebut
      the appellant’s credible testimony that he was not aware that his license had been
      revoked.    The Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe
      v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . The agency has
      not proven a sufficiently sound reason to overturn the administrative judge ’s
      finding that the appellant testified credibly that he did not know that his license
      had been revoked. Id.
                                                                                          9

¶16        Moreover, we agree with the administrative judge that, if it is true that the
      appellant did not know his license had been revoked, he could not reasonably
      have been expected to report the matter.        The agency’s argument that the
      administrative judge improperly incorporated an intent requirement into the
      applicable legal standard, PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-14, constitutes mere
      disagreement with her well-reasoned findings on this issue, and therefore does not
      provide a basis for review, see Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106
      (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she
      considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made
      reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services,
      33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).

      The administrative judge properly found that the agency failed to prove its charge
      of tardiness.
¶17        In support of this charge, the agency provided the following specifica tion:
            On 8 July 2015, from 0700 to 0900, you were absent, without
            authorization, from 559 AMXS, Robins AFB, your required duty
            station; you [did] not request leave for that period. Your absence
            was not authorized nor did you request leave for that period. You
            reported for duty at approximately 0830. You had no annual or sick
            leave available and you were carried in an [Absence Without Leave]
            (AWOL) status for 1.5 hours on 8 July 2015.
      IAF, Tab 6 at 45.
¶18        The agency’s contention, that the administrative judge misapplied
      applicable law when she found that it failed to prove that the appellant was tardy ,
      is unavailing.      The administrative judge determined that the appellant’s
      supervisor carried the appellant in an AWOL status on July 8, 2015, solely
      because he had no available sick or annual leave. ID at 13. We find that the
      administrative judge properly found that the supervisor abused his discretion in
      automatically carrying the appellant in an AWOL status without weighing other
      factors that might have warranted a grant of leave without pay. See White v.
      Department of Housing & Urban Development, 95 M.S.P.R. 299, ¶ 17 (2003)
                                                                                         10

      (stating that, even when the employee lacks sufficient leave to cover his absence s,
      an AWOL charge based on those absences cannot be sustained if the agency
      abused its discretion in denying the employee’s request for leave without pay);
      Murray v. Department of the Navy, 41 M.S.P.R. 260, 263-65 (1989) (finding an
      abuse of discretion when an agency denied leave without pay for 69 hours of
      absence for which the employee did not have sufficient sick and annual leave
      because the agency knew that his absence stemmed from an on-the-job injury).

      We need not address the agency’s assertions that the administrative judge erred in
      failing to sustain some of the specifications underlying the unauthorized absence
      and failure to properly request leave charges.
¶19         When more than one event or factual specification supports a charge, proof
      of one or more, but not all, of the supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain
      the charge. Burroughs v. Department of the Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir.
      1990). Here, each of the charges of unauthorized absence and failure to properly
      request leave had more than one factual specification, and the administrative
      judge found that the agency proved one or more of those specifications for each
      charge.   IAF, Tab 6 at 42-45; ID at 8-13.          Because proof of at least one
      specification is sufficient to sustain each of these charges, we do not address
      whether the administrative judge erred in not sustaining certain specifications.

      A 5-day suspension is a reasonable penalty for the sustained misconduct.
¶20         When the Board sustains fewer than all of the agency’s charges, it may
      mitigate the agency’s penalty to the maximum reasonable penalty, so long as the
      agency has not indicated in either its final decision or in proceedings before the
      Board that it desires that a lesser penalty be imposed on fewer charges. Lachance
      v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Edwards v. U.S. Postal Service,
      116 M.S.P.R. 173, ¶ 7 (2010).       Here, the administrative judge found that the
      agency did not indicate that it desired a lesser penalty be imposed if all the
      charges were not sustained. ID at 16.
                                                                                        11

¶21        The deciding official may not have indicated whether he would have
      imposed a lesser penalty if fewer than all the charges were sustained. Yet, it is
      nonetheless significant for purposes of our penalty analysis that, prior to issuing
      the notice of proposed removal, the agency issued a notice of proposed 5-day
      suspension based only on the charges of failure to properly request leave,
      unauthorized absence, tardiness, and failure to report for unscheduled overtime.
      IAF, Tab 6 at 114-15. Subsequently, the agency added additional specifications
      of misconduct to the failure to properly request leave and unauthorized absence
      charges when proposing the appellant’s removal. Notably, though, three of the
      charges that formed the basis of the proposed 5-day suspension are exactly the
      same charges that the administrative judge sustained.         Thus, the fact that the
      agency previously proposed the appellant’s suspension based on these same
      sustained charges weighs in favor of mitigation.
¶22        Moreover, as the administrative judge indicated, there are compelling
      factors in this case that warrant strong mitigating weight.         Three of the six
      charges, including the serious charges of misuse of a GOV and failure to follow
      instructions, were not sustained. Undoubtedly, the sustained charges of failure to
      properly request leave, unauthorized absence, and failure to report for
      unscheduled overtime are also serious. See Wilkinson v. Department of the Air
      Force, 68 M.S.P.R. 4, 7 (1995) (sustaining the appellant’s removal when he failed
      to follow leave-requesting procedures).            However,    we   agree with the
      administrative judge’s finding that the agency had information in its possession
      that should have put it on notice that the appellant was suffering f rom serious
      medical conditions that might have entitled him to leave under the Family and
      Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). ID at 16. The administrative judge noted
      that the appellant testified that he was suffering from depression, and that the
      appellant’s first-line supervisor acknowledged that the appellant had discussed
      medical issues with him. ID at 9, 16. In addition, the record reflects that this
                                                                                       12

      supervisor was concerned about the appellant’s well-being and had referred him
      to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). IAF, Tab 6 at 76.
¶23         The record also contains a memorandum from another agency supervisor
      stating that in July 2015, he received a call from the appellant during which the
      appellant stated he was experiencing stress and felt the need to consume alcohol,
      but had not. Id. at 71. This supervisor explained that he was aware that the
      appellant was a recovering alcoholic, and that he later called back the appellant to
      express concern about his situation. Id. The following day, this supervisor met
      with the appellant’s first and second-line supervisors to discuss the call. Id. In
      addition, the record also reflects that the appellant’s second-line supervisor
      suggested to the appellant that he contact the EAP. Id. at 73. In light of the
      testimonial and record evidence indicating that the appellant’s supervisors were
      aware that he was suffering from medical conditions, we agree with the
      administrative judge’s finding that the agency’s failure to provide the appellant
      with information on how he could request leave under the FMLA constituted a
      mitigating factor in this case.
¶24         In addition, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s depression
      likely contributed to some or all of the misconduct in this case. In reaching this
      finding, the administrative judge considered the appellant’s testimony that he did
      not report for work because of his depression. ID at 9. The appellant’s testimony
      that he was suffering from depression is corroborated by the record.            For
      example, the appellant submitted records from the EAP indicating that he had
      reported suffering from depression.     IAF, Tab 10 at 5.      The appellant also
      furnished medical documentation reflecting that he was initially prescribed
      medication for depression in June 2015. Id. at 26. Evidence that an employee’s
      medical condition or mental impairment played a part in the char ged misconduct
      is entitled to considerable weight as a mitigating factor.     See Malloy v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 578 F.3d 1351, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
                                                                                      13

¶25         In balancing the seriousness of the sustained misconduct against the
      mitigating factors and circumstances in this case, we              agree with the
      administrative judge’s determination that mitigating the agency-imposed penalty
      is warranted.

      The appellant’s challenge to the agency’s certification of compliance with the
      interim relief order
¶26         With its petition for review, the agency submitted a statement that, in
      accordance with the instructions in the Board’s initial decision, it placed the
      appellant on an interim appointment, effective the date of the initial decision was
      issued, pending resolution of the petition for review.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 29.
      Accompanying the agency’s statement is a Standard Form 50 giving the appellant
      an interim appointment. Id. at 26. After the agency submitted its certification of
      compliance with the interim relief order, the appellant submitted a pleading
      alleging that the agency has not provided him with a card by which he can gain
      access to certain of his records and to base facilities. PFR File, Tab 3.
¶27         We have considered the appellant’s pleading as a challenge to the agency’s
      certification of compliance.     5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(b).      Ordinarily, when an
      appellant challenges the agency’s certification of compliance with an interim
      relief order, the Board will issue an order affording the agency the opportunity to
      submit evidence of compliance. Id. If the agency fails to provide evidence of
      compliance in response to such an order, the Board may, at its discretion, dismiss
      the agency’s petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e). In this case, however,
      we find that the agency’s petition does not meet the criteria for review in any
      event, and issuing our final decision renders moot any dispute concerning the
      agency’s compliance with the interim relief order. See Elder v. Department of the
      Air Force, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 20 (2016). If the appellant believes that the agency
      is in noncompliance with the Board’s final order, he may file a petition for
      enforcement in accordance with the instructions provided below. Id.
                                                                                        14

                                            ORDER
¶28         We ORDER the agency to cancel the removal and substitute a 5 -day
      suspension. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed.
      Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the
      date of this decision.
¶29         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency ’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶30         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶31         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶32         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
                                                                                     15

are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                 NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                       YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                      ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall w ithin their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

2
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      16

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                  17

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases   involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).            If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     18

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Boar d’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 3 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

3
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                19

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit ou r website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                       20

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
   describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.