Court Opinion

ID: 9746024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:51:37.530772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:07.937657
License: Public Domain

POLLAK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur fully in the conclusion that petitioner’s failure to develop viable parole plans in California, as well as in Mexico, cannot under the circumstances described in the majority opinion properly be regarded as a factor showing him to be unsuitable for parole. However, I disagree strongly with the conclusion that the finding of the Board of Prison Terms, now the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board), that petitioner is unsuitable for parole, can be sustained based solely on the circumstances of petitioner’s commitment offense. In my view, there is no evidence in this record tending rationally to show that petitioner “will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (a)),1 and there is overwhelming uncontradicted evidence to the contrary.
*820The Board has exceptionally broad discretion “to identify and weigh the factors relevant to predicting ‘by subjective analysis whether the inmate will be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts.’ ” {In re DeLuna (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 585, 591 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 643], quoting In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 655 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174] {Rosenkrantz).) In reviewing a decision of the Board finding an inmate unsuitable for parole, “the court may inquire only whether some evidence in the record before the Board supports the decision to deny parole, based upon the factors specified by statute and regulation.” {Rosenkrantz, supra, at p. 658.) The evidence relied on by the Board, however, must be “reliable” (Regs., §§ 2402, subd. (b), 2281, subd. (b)); it must have “ ‘ “some indicia of reliability.” ’ ” {In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 591 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 905].) Additionally, “ ‘the requirement of procedural due process embodied in the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)) places some limitations upon the broad discretionary authority of the Board.’ [Rosenkrantz, supra, at p. 655.] A prisoner is entitled to ‘an individualized consideration of all relevant factors.’ {Ibid.)” {In re DeLuna, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 591.) The Board’s decision “must reflect an individualized consideration of the specified criteria and cannot be arbitrary or capricious.” {Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.)
While “a prisoner may be deemed unsuitable for release on the basis of the commitment offense ‘alone’ . . . [citation], [this] proposition must be properly understood. The commitment offense is one of only two factors indicative of unsuitability a prisoner cannot change (the other being his ‘Previous Record of Violence’). Reliance on such an immutable factor ‘without regard to or consideration of subsequent circumstances’ may be unfair [citation], and ‘runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.’ [Citation.] The commitment offense can negate suitability only if circumstances of the crime reliably established by evidence in the record rationally indicate that the offender will present an unreasonable public safety risk if released from prison.” {In re Scott, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 594-595, fns. omitted, italics added.) “Thus, denial of release solely on the basis of the gravity of the commitment offense warrants especially close scrutiny.” {Id. at p. 595.)
In March 1990, petitioner was found by the Board to be suitable for parole and nothing in his subsequent exemplary behavior suggests any basis for changing this evaluation. While in prison he obtained a GED degree in 1988 *821and a high school diploma in 1995. As of the parole hearing that is now before us, he had been participating in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) for many years and had twice completed a self-confrontation program offered within the prison. He has been a volunteer tutor in a prison literacy program, an active participant in the Protestant Chapel Christian Ministries, and a “very reliable, hard working, and a productive individual... as assignment clerk.” According to one report on petitioner that appears in the record, petitioner has “demonstrated a quality (indiscernible) every effort to better himself. He is an active member of AA and attended numerous other self-help seminars such as Anger Management and Self-Confrontation. He is (inaudible) and to his positive attitude. At Life Experience he has been able to reach many of them and assist them in turning their lives around. H[is] work—and work ethics are outstanding and he accepts full responsibility for his actions. If he’s granted parole he would be a productive citizen and an asset to any community he resides in.”
The latest psychological evaluation of petitioner assessing his dangerousness that appears in the record is similarly positive: “Low factors include no prior juvenile/adult criminal record, no prior felony convictions or prior misdemeanor convictions, no record of aggression or violence in prison. He has maintained a long-term presence in AA. Overall adaptation to prison life has been positive and constructive. The offense was not committed during the commission of another crime. The inmate acknowledged he committed the offense. He fully acknowledges the wrongfulness of [his] actions. He takes full responsibility for the offense and does not appear to rationalize or minimize his role. He appeared to fully express remorse for his actions. When asked, he shared extensive expressions of guilt to remorse . . . and can [empathize] his emotional level with the harm done to the victim and victim[’s] family. The inmate has demonstrated a good awareness of the circumstances resulting in his committing a serious offense. The inmate is not diagnosed an antisocial personality disorder. The criminal-mindedness and criminality did not appear to be primary elements of the inmate’s offense. Circumstantial, institutional factors appeared to play a significant role in the offense.” The psychologist noted that “[a]lcohol played a significant role” in petitioner’s offense. Further, petitioner “has been able to demonstrate a consistency since his last psychological report of April 25th of ’03. He has managed to remain disciplinary-free, continues to participate in self-help group, and program in a positive manner. The inmate also continues to verbally express psychological insight into the nature of his crime and the role ... his alcohol abuse contributed to this distorted pattern of thinking. *822Mr. Andrade is aware of the dangers of alcohol and realizes the importance of total abstinence from alcohol and participation in AA meetings in an ongoing basis. There are no barriers (indiscernible) from a mental health standpoint, and prognosis for maintaining his level of functioning is good. Within a controlled setting it appears that the inmate’s propensity for violence is less than that of an average inmate and within the community it would also be less than that of the average citizen.”
In addition to all of these unqualified personal factors, petitioner has family and realistic employment opportunities awaiting him upon his return to Mexico—all of which under the Board’s regulations tends to show petitioner’s suitability for parole. (Regs., § 2402, subds. (c), (d).) What then is it about the nature of his offense that indicates that despite all of these positive indicators, petitioner will pose an unreasonable threat to public safety if released? While in a rage and under the influence of alcohol, petitioner committed a one-time offense, for which he has now served 25 years in prison. He has taken the appropriate steps to eliminate his alcoholism and to curb his anger which, rather than any pattern of criminality, were at the root of his offense. The professionals who have examined him have found no reason to believe he is likely to reoffend and in fact consider him less likely to engage in violence than “the average citizen.” There is in the record no evidence to the contrary, and the Board has provided no explanation as to how or why the circumstances of petitioner’s offense support an inference that he is likely to endanger others in the future.2
*823This record, like that in numerous recent cases, strongly suggests that California parole authorities are losing sight of the fact that “release on parole is the rule, rather than the exception.” (In re Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 351.) “[A] grant of parole is an integral part of the penological system intended to help those convicted of crime to integrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as possible and alleviate the cost of maintaining them in custodial facilities.” (People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458, 455 [105 Cal.Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313]; see also Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, All [33 L.Ed.2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593].) If he will pose no unreasonable risk to public safety, petitioner is entitled to be paroled and in fact is well beyond the point at which he became entitled to have a parole date set. (Pen. Code, § 3041, subd. (a); In re Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079.) The rote repetition year after year in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary that an inmate is considered too dangerous for parole because he committed a callous crime does not satisfy the mandates of California law. “An administrative policy of rejecting parole applications solely on the basis of the type of offense with the result that the term of imprisonment is automatically fixed at maximum, although the Authority action includes a pro forma hearing and review of the cumulative case summary, does not satisfy the requirements of individualized treatment and ‘due consideration.’ ” (In re Minnis (1972) 7 Cal.3d 639, 647 [102 Cal.Rptr. 749, 498 P.2d 997].) The decision to uphold the denial of parole in this case cannot be reconciled with other recent decisions that have found similarly vacuous references to the callousness of a crime insufficient to satisfy even the minimal requirements of the “some evidence” standard. (In re Scott, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 594-595; In re Scott (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 871, 891 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 32]; In re Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 366-367.)3
I do agree with the majority that it would be pointless to remand this matter to the Board despite our unanimous rejection of one of the two factors on which the Board relied in denying parole in 2004. The Board’s subsequent denial of parole in May 2006 based solely on the commitment offense makes unmistakably clear that the Board would do so again upon a remand of its earlier parole denial. But comparison of the record of proceedings before the Board in 2004 with the record of the 2006 proceedings underscores the disingenuousness of what is occurring and reoccurring year after year in these proceedings. It is but slight exaggeration to say that the transcript of the 2006 *824proceedings is a virtual carbon copy of the 2004 proceedings. The district attorney appearing before the Board in 2004 felt that petitioner’s commendable progress was “fairly recent in terms of his threat to the community and we feel a little more . . . observation should be had in order to determine whether or not these gains will abide and will persist.” The Board commended petitioner for the “positive aspects of his behavior,” but without explanation concluded that they did “not outweigh the factors of unsuitability,” namely, “[t]he commitment offense was carried out in a violent and brutal manner.” Tellingly, the Board did not request a new clinical evaluation for the next parole hearing because “the current one is adequate.” Two years later, in 2006, the same district attorney again acknowledged that petitioner “has made progress” but repeated that “it is recent. And we feel that he needs further observation to make sure that his admitted gains, which he has made, can be sustained.” And the Board once again commended petitioner for “obtaining your GED; participating in Anger Management, the Men’s Advisory Council, the Biblical Studies Program, and the Literacy Program; for being a literacy tutor; your vocations of: shoe repair; basic electronics; and four years worth of automotive service repair, that’s quite a record; working as a clerk with above average work reports; and participating in AA since 1988; and also participation in your Chapel Services Program.” But again, the Board reiterated that petitioner is “not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety” because “[t]he offense was carried out in an especially callous manner.”
Petitioner was found to be suitable for parole in 1990. Other than a change in personalities and political climate, there is nothing in the record that explains why the Board rescinded this determination in 1995 or why petitioner is not even more suitable for parole 16 years later. There simply is no evidentiary or rational explanation in the record for the formulaic conclusion repeated at every hearing to deny petitioner parole. If the present record is sufficient to uphold a finding of unsuitability, there is no reason why this vacuous litany cannot be repeated for years to come. (See In re Scott, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 595, fn. 8; cf. In re Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 372 [“if Smith’s past use of drugs did invariably establish his unsuitability, then the Governor could deny parole for the rest of Smith’s life based on this immutable factor, without regard to or consideration of subsequent circumstances”].) I believe it is the responsibility of the courts to insist that more than lip service be paid to the statutory and regulatory provisions governing an inmate’s entitlement to parole. And, if California law is deemed to sanction such transparently perfunctory proceedings, petitioner is being denied due process of law. (See, e.g., Biggs v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F.3d *825910, 916-917; Irons v. Warden of California State Prison-Solano (E.D.Cal. 2005) 358 F.Supp.2d 936, app. pending sub nom. Irons v. Carey (9th Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 1165; In re Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1104 (dis. opn. of Moreáo, J.).) I would reverse and order the Board to set a date for petitioner to be released on parole.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 8, 2006, and petitioner’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 1, 2006, S146051. Kennard, J., and Moreno, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 In In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1091 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417, 104 P.3d 783], the Supreme Court equated the term “suitable” with safety: “The regulations specify numerous factors the Board is to consider in determining whether the prisoner is suitable—i.e., safe—for parole.” “[A] determination of unsuitability is simply shorthand for a finding that a prisoner currently would pose an unreasonable risk of danger if released at this time.” (In re Smith (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 343, 370 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 655].)
All further references to regulations are to title 15 of the California Code of Regulations.

 Moreover, the circumstances of petitioner’s crime are significantly less egregious than those in other cases in which the nature of the offense was found to support a finding of unsuitability. Our Supreme Court has upheld the denial of parole based on the circumstances of the commitment offense when the parole authority has “pointed to circumstances of the inmate’s offense suggesting viciousness beyond the minimum elements of second degree murder.” (In re Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) In Rosenkrantz the inmate had “ ‘brutally murdered’ ” the victim after “ ‘a full week of careful preparation, rehearsal and execution,’ ” firing 10 shots at close range from an assault weapon and at least three or four shots into the victim’s-head as he lay on the pavement. (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 678.) In In re Dannenberg the inmate had reacted “with extreme and sustained violence,” striking “multiple blows to his wife’s head with a pipe wrench” and, it was inferred, while she was helpless from her injuries, placing her head into a bathtub full of water or at least leaving it there without assisting her until she was dead. (In re Dannenberg, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) In In re Van Houten (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 339, 351 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 406], the inmate participated in the premeditated, “gratuitous mutilation” of a married couple in which the wife was stabbed a total of 42 times and “struggled for her life while hearing her husband meet his gruesome fate.” In In re DeLuna, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at page 593, the inmate had a physical confrontation with the victim outside of a bar, retrieved a rifle, shot the victim in the mouth and then “deliberate[ly] stalk[ed the] defenseless victim” through the parking lot firing at him until he died. In In re Lowe (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1414 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 1], the inmate, who had a special relationship of trust and confidence with the victim, purchased a gun shortly before the murder, entered the victim’s bedroom while the victim slept “ ‘and shot him five times in the head and chest, execution style.’ ”

 The recent decisions in this area admittedly are not all in harmony. The differences in approach which conflicting decisions reflect may indicate the need for Supreme Court intervention and clarification, but they do not justify automatic acceptance of every parole denial simply because the Board repeats the incantation that the commitment offense was a callous crime.