Court Opinion

ID: 9730025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:57:34.281098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:03.258018
License: Public Domain

Grant, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not feel that George P. Rose, Sr., has any standing in this case and that the action of the trial court in dismissing the case was proper and should be affirmed.
Plaintiffs, George P. Rose, Jr., and George P. Rose, Sr., brought this action in replevin and for damages on May 29, 1981. The petition alleged that George junior had purchased a pickup truck in July 1979; that George junior was the certificate of title holder as to the truck but that George senior had made all the payments on the truck; and that the defendant bank had a recorded lien on the certificate of title to the truck. Defendant bank had used self-help to recover the vehicle, without replevin action, on April 22, 1981. After the initial hearing, the district court on June 11, 1981, ordered this truck returned to plaintiffs. The truck was returned apparently to its owner of record, George P. Rose, Jr., who took no further part in the case.
The case proceeded to trial on February 7, 1983, with plaintiff George P. Rose, Sr., seeking damages for the loss of use of the truck during the time the truck was wrongfully taken by the defendant bank — apparently from April 22 to June 11, 1981. George junior did not appear at the trial, nor was any evidence submitted on his behalf. The evidence at the trial showed that the monthly payments on the truck had been made by checks written on check blanks entitled “George P. Rose Sodding & Grading Co.” and drawn on Ashland State Bank. The title of the account at the Ashland State Bank was “George Rose Sod Grading Co.” There was no evidence as to whether these entities were corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships, or otherwise, or what George senior’s connections with those entities were.
George senior testified the truck was used in the sodding company business, but did not specify what the terms of that use were. No contract, oral or written, was testified to. George *102junior also worked in the business. This evidence was apparently the basis for George senior’s allegation that he had a “special interest” in the truck. The “special interest” allegedly entitled George senior to seek damages.
I am unable to discover the meaning of the term “special interest” in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), in 1 Nebraska Digest, Descriptive-Word Index (1939, Cum. Supp. 1980, and Supp. 1983), or in 12 Nebraska Digest, Words and Phrases (1940, Cum. Supp. 1971, and Supp. 1983). The term is vaguely pled in the petition and haphazardly attacked in the answer, and, in my judgment, is incapable of conveying enough meaning to give George senior standing to seek damages.
The majority indicates recognition of this difficulty, but says the evidence would support a finding that George senior was in the position of a bailee. Bailments are all based on contracts, express or implied. See, e.g., Simpkins v. Ritter, 189 Neb. 644, 204 N.W.2d 383 (1973), and Peck v. Masonic Manor Apartment Hotel, 203 Neb. 308, 278 N.W.2d 589 (1979). The testimony does not disclose any contract between George junior and George senior, and I fail to see how we can determine there was any bailment between those parties.
There is the further problem that we are here dealing with a motor vehicle. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-105(1) (Reissue 1978) provides in part: “No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle . . . sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless there is compliance with this section.” George senior is trying to establish an “interest” in this motor vehicle by some sort of an encumbrance on that vehicle arising out of some alleged transaction with the owner of the vehicle. This transaction is not noted on the certificate of title. As stated in The Cornhusker Bank of Omaha v. McNamara, 205 Neb. 504, 508, 288 N.W.2d 287, 290 (1980):
The Legislature has mandated that no court shall recognize the right, title, claim, or any interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle unless there is compliance with section 60-105, R.R.S. 1943. It is clear to this court that the plaintiff has made no good faith effort *103to comply with the statutory requirements. This court, therefore, refuses to recognize any claim of lien or any claim of legal title by the plaintiff and holds that the plaintiff may not be successful against the defendant upon an action in replevin.
In my judgment, George senior has failed to prove that he has any interest in the truck in question. He is in no privity of contract with the defendant bank, and whatever duty was owed by the bank was owed to its debtor, George junior, owner of the truck, and not to George junior’s father.
I would affirm.