Court Opinion

ID: 9634937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:29:40.269792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:07.194905
License: Public Domain

Cole, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Levine, J.,
dissents and filed a dissenting opinion at page 403 infra.
This appeal seeks to restore life to a cause of action pronounced dead by the Court of Special Appeals which invoked the sanctions of Maryland Rule 530. That rule provides that a proceeding in which there has been no activity of record for eighteen months may be dismissed for lack of prosecution, unless the court for good cause shown suspends the operation of the rule. We are asked to examine the body of facts surrounding this controversy to determine if any vital signs still remain.
This action was instituted by the appellant accounting firm of Langrall, Muir and Noppinger (Langrall) against appellees Harry L. Gladding and Virginia L- Gladding (Gladding) to recover the balance of a contingent fee ($30,639) for professional services rendered Gladding in successfully protesting an Internal Revenue Service assessment of approximately $1,300,000. The dispute arose because Gladding contended that Langrall had not rendered its very best efforts pursuant to the contract, forcing Gladding to hire additional accounting assistance in the tax case.
The significant docket entries reveal that Gladding entered his general issue plea and answer to Langrall’s declaration and motion for summary judgment and also filed a counterclaim seeking return of the $10,000 retainer. Langrall answered the counterclaim on August 26, 1973. No further activity is reflected on the record until August 26,1975 when the clerk mailed to all counsel notice of contemplated *399dismissal under Rule 530 for lack of prosecution. Langrall filed a timely motion to suspend the Rule before Judge Jones, which motion was granted by ex parte order on the same day, suspending the Rule for ninety days. Pour days later, Gladding filed his answer opposing Langrall’s motion to suspend, his own motion to suspend the Rule as to his counterclaim and a motion to strike the ex parte order. On November 26, 1975, Judge James W. Murphy conducted a hearing on all pending motions. No stenographic record was made of this hearing. On December 15,1975, Judge Murphy ordered that Judge Jones’ ex parte order be stricken and that Langrall’s declaration and Gladding’s counterclaim “be not dismissed ... for a period of six (6) months from the date hereof.” No further reasons for the rulings were stated.
On May 11, 1976, the action was tried before Judge Basil A. Thomas, without a jury. On July 30, 1976, the court rendered a decision in favor of Langrall. Gladding appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which reversed Judge Murphy’s order suspending Rule 530 for six months, and directed the Superior Court of Baltimore City to dismiss the case including Gladding’s counterclaim in accordance with Rule 530. The court, therefore, had no necessity to reach the merits of the issue. Gladding v. Langrall, Muir & Nopp’r., 36 Md. App. 225, 373 A. 2d 958 (1977).
We granted certiorari.
The parties briefed and argued two questions:
1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the discretionary order of the trial court in the absence óf a showing of clear abuse.
2. Whether the motion to dismiss the appeal from the order of December 15,1975, suspending the operation of Maryland Rule 530 should have been granted.
Because our consideration of the first question is dispositive of the matter before us, we shall not address the second.
The Court of Special Appeals followed the law of this Court in holding below that a prerequisite to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in suspending the automatic dismissal *400of Rule 530 is a showing of good cause; that this good cause must be evidenced by a display of diligence to prosecute the case during the period of alleged inaction; and that the trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be set aside on appeal except in extreme cases of clear abuse, Stanford v. District Title Ins. Co., 260 Md. 550, 273 A. 2d 190 (1971). The court then held that there was no record of the proceeding before Judge Murphy and thus it could not determine a showing of good cause, some cause, or any cause on the part of Langrall. The court concluded that the responsibility for production of this record was upon Langrall and because the record was bare, the case must be reversed.
In so holding, the Court of Special Appeals proceeded on the wrong premise. The burden of producing the record of any proceeding is upon him who would attack its sufficiency. By so holding, we do not retreat from our holding in Stanford; we reaffirm it. Judge Digges in delivering the opinion in that case said:
“This Court is totally committed to the proposition that ‘justice delayed is justice denied.’ Rule 530 is the device by which the most intolerable delays ... can be ultimately eliminated.... [T]hat rule permits the trial judge to allow a brief reprieve where it is affirmatively demonstrated [to him] that total inaction has been justified.... Th[e] decision, whatever it may be, rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge and we will only invade his province on appeal in extreme cases of clear abuse.” 260 Md. at 554-55.
We placed the responsibility on the trial judge to weigh and balance the rights, interests, and reasons of the parties in light of the public demand for prompt resolution of litigation when inactivity characterized a cause of action. We suggested that the trial judge, on the scene, will have a perception and understanding of the legal environment in which the case is temporarily mired. Therefore, he was vested with the discretion to be exercised consistent with the spirit of the law *401while subserving the ends of justice and fairness to the parties.
The Court of Special Appeals noted with particularity that the trial judge made no stenographic record nor did he outline his reasons for his action. Without question, the better practice for any trial judge when exercising his discretion under Rule 530 is to set forth the basis for his ruling on the record, with unmistakable clarity, orally or by memorandum opinion. However, it is the responsibility of the aggrieved 'party, the party claiming abuse, to preserve his objection for review.
To reach any other conclusion would reduce the exercise of a court’s discretion to a meaningless gesture. This we cannot allow to happen. Discretion is the warp and woof of judicial fiber. It is the antithesis of arbitrariness and by its nature connotes the absence of capricious disposition. This is the reason we have held that the exercise of a court’s discretion is presumed to be correct1 until the attacking party has overcome such presumption by clear and convincing proof of an abuse. Gladding offers no such proof but contends that, since the trial court granted the motion to suspend Rule 530, the ruling was not final and appealable — that he could not require the court to state its reasons in compliance with Maryland Rule 18 b.2 However, he can extract no comfort from this argument. He was the most knowledgeable party as to the ultimate effect of the court’s ruling on his defense. If he felt abused, he had only to preserve the basis for his *402contention by requesting the court to record its reasons for review. However, he made no such request and now, instead, invites the appellate court to rule in a vacuum. No court can perceive the subtlety of a trial court’s judgment or understand the balancing factors employed by it from a silent record. However, in the instant case we do know that Judge Murphy examined the record, heard counsel in chambers, exercised judgment by striking Judge Jones’ order3 and passed his own order to be operative for a period of six (6) months. In light of the obvious attention Judge Murphy accorded this issue, we assume he was familiar with Rule 530 and acted within the scope of his authority.
We hold that absent a showing of a lack of good cause on the record before us, Judge Murphy is presumed to have exercised his discretion correctly. It follows, therefore, that on the record before it, the Court of Special Appeals was in error in reversing Judge Murphy’s order suspending dismissal under Maryland Rule 530 and we reverse.
Since the Court of Special Appeals did not reach the merits of the cause before it, we will remand for that purpose.

Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; costs to abide the result.

. In I. W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 19-20, 344 A. 2d 65, 76 (1975), a case dealing with prejudgment interest, the late Judge O’Donnell, speaking for the Court, said:
“There is, of course, a presumption that the discretion vested in the trial court ‘was not abused but was exercised with just regard to the rights and interest of both the plaintiff and the defendants,’ (citation omitted). [T]hus the burden is upon the appellant of establishing that ... the trial court abused its discretion and worked an injustice to the appellant by its award of interest.” (Emphasis added)

. Maryland Rule 18 b reads as follows:
“Before or within fifteen days after entry of an appealable final judgment in a contested action tried upon the merits without a jury, the court shall dictate to the court stenographer or reporter, or prepare and file in the action, a brief statement of the grounds for its decision and the basis of determining the damages, if any.”

. Judge Murphy’s striking of Judge Jones’ order causes this Court no pause since he was obliged to do so if he concluded that it had been unprovidently issued. The language used by the Court of Appeals in Insurance Co. v. Thrall, 181 Md. 19, 23, 27 A. 2d 353, 355 (1942), best describes our long standing position in this regard:
“Trial courts are bound by the decisions of the Court of Appeals, until they may be overruled. Until then they are precedents to be followed and obeyed. There is no decision or statute which requires one nisiprius judge to accept as final and conclusive the decisions on the law before trial of another judge or court. There seems to be some sense, however, in the idea that the trial judge, who occupies a position of greater responsibility, should have the right to reject a prior decision of a judge of equal jurisdiction in the same case which he may believe to be erroneous.”