Court Opinion

ID: 9929156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 21:02:18.190553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:17:42.067521
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/1/24 P. v. Todd CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B321848

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. NA101096)
           v.

 GWENDOLYN TODD,

      Defendant and
 Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.

     Michele A. Douglass, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ******
       Gwendolyn Ann Todd (defendant) appeals the trial court’s
summary denial of her petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.1.1 The People concede that a remand is
necessary. We agree, and reverse the order denying relief and
remand for a new hearing that complies with the procedural
steps set forth in a law enacted after the trial court’s ruling.
             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Facts
       In 2015, defendant used lighter fluid to set ablaze a tree
and a sprinkler control box located on a street corner in Long
Beach, California. She later explained that she set the tree on
fire because she did not “like that god damn tree” and set the box
on fire to “burn” the “asses” of the “roaches” that “come out at
night.” Defendant was 55 years old at the time.
       The People charged defendant with arson of the property of
another (§ 451, subd. (d)). The People further alleged that
defendant had six prior convictions that qualified as “strikes”
under our “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)), and four prior serious felony convictions (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)).

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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       Defendant pled no contest to the arson count, admitted one
prior strike conviction, and admitted the four prior serious felony
convictions.
       In 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to a prison
sentence of 24 years, comprised of four years on the base count (a
mid-range sentence of two years, doubled due to the prior strike),
plus 20 years for the four consecutive five-year sentences for the
four prior serious felony convictions.
II.    Procedural Background
       In January 2021, the Secretary of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Secretary)
filed a petition recommending that defendant be resentenced
under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). The Secretary urged the
court to consider resentencing defendant to a lower sentence
because (1) she had no disciplinary infractions during the last
four years in prison, (2) she was 61 at the time of the petition and
would not be released until April 2030, (3) she had finished
serving the four-year base term, and (4) she was susceptible to
COVID-19 complications.2
       The trial court appointed counsel for defendant, and
obtained further briefs from the People and defendant. Without
holding a hearing, the court on July 30, 2021 summarily denied
the petition with an order stating: “After review of the court file
including the defendant’s history, the court declines to exercise
its jurisdiction to resentence the defendant.”
       Defendant filed this appeal.

2     The Secretary also noted that the trial court now had
discretion not to impose the four, five-year sentences for her prior
serious felony convictions, but the court in 2019 had already
considered and elected not to use its newly granted discretion.

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                            DISCUSSION
       Five months after the trial court summarily denied
defendant’s petition, a new statute took effect that renumbered
and substantially revamped the statute the Secretary had
invoked in its petition. Enacted as Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.), this new statute enacted what is now section
1172.1 and sets forth a number of procedural steps that must be
followed whenever the Secretary (or other official listed in section
1172.1) files a petition asking the trial court to consider
resentencing a defendant. (§ 1172.1; Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 3.1;
Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.) Specifically, when a petition is filed, a
trial court:
       ●     Must appoint counsel for the defendant (§ 1172.1,
subd. (b)(1));
       ●     Must set a status conference within 30 days of
receiving the Secretary’s request (ibid.);
       ●     Must conduct a hearing (id., subds. (a)(8) & (a)(9));
       ●     Must consider, in deciding whether to recall and
resentence a defendant, whether the defendant “has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,” whether the
defendant was “a victim of intimate partner violence or human
trafficking,” or if the defendant was under 26—and whether any
of these facts was “a contributing factor” in the commission of the
offense. (Id., subd. (a)(5).) The court may consider three other
“postconviction factors”—namely, (1) the defendant’s
“disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation . . . while
incarcerated”; (2) “whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence”; and (3) any other “evidence that reflects that
circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that

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continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”
(Ibid.)
       ●      Must apply a presumption in favor of recalling and
resentencing that is rebutted only if the court “finds the
defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety” because she poses an “unreasonable risk” of
“commit[ting] a new” so-called “super strike” offense (such as
murder, various sex crimes, or possessing weapons of mass
destruction). (Id., subd. (b)(2); §§ 1170.18, subd. (c), 667, subd.
(e)(2)(C)(iv).)
       ●      Must “state on the record the reasons for its decision
to grant or deny recall and resentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd.
(a)(7).)
       It is undisputed that the trial court in this case did not
adhere to any of these procedural requirements except the first—
because they did not exist at the time of its July 2021 ruling.
       The sole question that remains is whether defendant is
entitled to the benefit of these later-enacted procedural
protections. Both of the parties agree she is, but for different
reasons. Defendant urges that Assembly Bill No. 1540 applies to
her retroactively under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, while
the People assert that Estrada does not apply but that defendant
is nonetheless entitled to take advantage of the new procedural
requirements because Assembly Bill No. 1540 was meant to
clarify rather than change the law. Several decisions have opted
not to address the Estrada question because, in their view,
Assembly Bill No. 1540 was enacted to clarify the procedures
applicable to these types of postconviction petitions, as the bill
was enacted at a time when the appellate courts in California
were in disarray about which procedures applied. (People v.

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Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1078-1079 [so holding]; People
v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1038-1042 [same];
accord, People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1089-1090
[same].) We agree with these decisions.
       Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand
for further proceedings consistent with the current version of
section 1172.1. Nothing in this opinion is meant to suggest what
outcome is appropriate on remand.
                          DISPOSITION
       The order is reversed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings consistent with section 1172.1.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                    ______________________, J.
                                    HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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