Court Opinion

ID: 9385281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 15:07:05.935625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.287866
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Parke, 2023-Ohio-1144.]
                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                             No. 111868
                 v.                               :

RICARDO PARKE,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 6, 2023

           Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
                              Case No. CR-20-654987-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Lisa J. Turoso, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Robert McCaleb, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

                   Defendant-appellant Ricardo Parke (“Parke”) appeals his convictions

and asks this court to reverse and vacate. We affirm his convictions.
I.    Procedural History

              After a jury trial, Parke was found guilty of one count of rape, a first-

degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); one count of kidnapping, a first-

degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4); one count of domestic violence, in

violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), first-degree misdemeanor; one count of disrupting

public services, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3); and

aggravated menacing, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2903.21(A).

              The trial court determined that all of the offenses were allied offenses

of similar import and merged them. Parke was sentenced to six to nine years’

imprisonment, pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law. Parke’s trial counsel noted his

objection to the imposition of Reagan Tokes as unconstitutional to preserve the issue

for appeal.

II.   Facts

              On December 4, 2020, K.K., Parke’s ex-girlfriend and mother of his

daughter, scheduled a ride from Uber to take her from her job to her daughter’s

babysitter’s home. On the way, Parke called K.K., and they agreed that K.K. would

reroute her Uber to Parke’s home to pick up K.K.’s packages that were delivered to

Parke’s home. Parke agreed to take K.K. to pick up their daughter from the

babysitter’s home.

              When K.K. arrived at Parke’s home, she called Parke and asked him

to come outside and bring the packages with him. K.K. testified that Parke told her
to come into the home because he was not dressed and ready to leave. K.K. walked

into the home and sat in Parke’s dining room. K.K. stated that Parke was sitting on

the couch, and they both were on their phone. Parke walked over to K.K. and began

kissing her and requested that K.K. go upstairs with him. K.K. told Parke that she

did not want to have sex. Parke left and went upstairs, and K.K. went to the living

room to look through the mail and open her packages.

               K.K. testified that Parke came back downstairs, and when she turned

around, Parke attacked her. K.K. stated that she started fighting him off, tried to get

to the front door, but Parke slung her across the room. Parke was hitting K.K. in the

head and choking her for about a minute or two. During the tussle, K.K.’s phone fell

out of her pocket, and Parke grabbed the phone, ordering K.K. to go upstairs. K.K.

went upstairs, and Parke followed her. Parke told K.K. to sit on the bed and ordered

her to unlock her phone. K.K. unlocked her phone.

               Once the phone was unlocked, Parke opened the Instagram app and

began looking through K.K.’s messages. Parke discovered that K.K. was following a

male friend and told her to call the male friend to tell him that K.K. would not talk

with him anymore. Parke handed the phone to K.K. and K.K. dialed 911. Parke

snatched the phone out of K.K.’s hand and hung up the phone. According to K.K.,

the police called back and left a voicemail. After taking the phone from K.K., Parke

sent a message to K.K.’s male friend. The friend called K.K.’s phone, and Parke

spoke with the friend.
              As Parke continued his conversation, K.K. ran down the stairs and out

of the house through the side door. When she got to the driveway, Parke caught up

with her and started pulling her into the house. K.K. began screaming and Parke

covered her mouth. Once Parke pulled K.K. into the home, he told her to “get

upstairs before I hurt you.” (Tr. 358.) K.K. testified that once they were back

upstairs, Parke pulled a gun out of a red container and told her “if the police come,

I’m gonna hurt you.” (Tr. 359.) Parke set the gun on the dresser along with K.K.’s

phone.

              Parke took K.K.’s socks and pants off and started kissing and rubbing

on her. He requested sexual favors. K.K. complied. Then Parke had sexual

intercourse with K.K. (Tr. 362.) Parke ejaculated on the bed. After K.K. went to the

bathroom, and came back to the bedroom to get dressed, Parke and K.K. went

downstairs, and K.K. retrieved her purse. Parke told K.K. to leave the purse, and

K.K. put it on the stairs. They went outside and got into the car. Parke drove K.K.

to the babysitter’s home.

              Parke and K.K. arrived at babysitter Delores King’s (“King”) home

and both walked to the house. King testified that she observed Parke pulling,

dragging, and hitting K.K. in her chest. K.K. walked upstairs to the door and opened

the door. Once inside the home, King testified that she locked the door behind K.K.

because Parke was trying to get into the home.
               K.K. asked King for her phone and called 911. The police arrived at

the babysitter’s home, and K.K. told them what happened. The police asked K.K. if

she needed to go to the hospital, and she stated yes. The ambulance came to the

home and transported K.K. to the hospital. At the hospital, K.K. was given a rape

kit, and the detective took pictures of K.K.’s injuries to her face, neck, arms, and legs.

               Parke was indicted in a five-count indictment for rape, kidnapping,

domestic violence, disrupting public services, and aggravated menacing. One- and

three-year firearm specifications were attached to the rape and kidnapping counts.

Parke was found guilty of the five counts, but not guilty of all firearm specifications.

Parke was sentenced to six to nine years’ imprisonment and filed this timely appeal,

assigning three errors for our review:

       I.     Parke’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the
              evidence;

       II.    Parke’s conviction on Count 4, alleging disruption of public
              services, in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), was obtained upon
              insufficient evidence; and

       III.   The sentence of the trial court imposing an indefinite term of
              incarceration pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act is
              unconstitutional.

III.   Manifest Weight of the Evidence

       A.     Standard of Review

               “The    manifest-weight-of-the-evidence       standard    concerns    ‘the

inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support
one side of the issue rather than the other.’” State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 111656, 2023-Ohio-810, ¶ 17, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328,

2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A reviewing court

      “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
      credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts
      in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost its way and created such a
      manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed
      and a new trial ordered.”

Id., citing Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175,

485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals

must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the trier of fact.” Id., citing

Eastley at ¶ 21.

      B.     Law and Analysis

               In Parke’s first assignment of error, he argues that his convictions

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Parke alleges that K.K.’s testimony

was inconsistent, specifically that K.K. did not tell the police dispatch she had been

sexually assaulted during the 911 call. Parke also states that K.K.’s description of the

sexual assault changed and that her description of the firearm Parke brandished also

changed. Parke further argues that King’s testimony was inconsistent with K.K.’s

testimony, because K.K. never testified that Parke pulled, dragged, or hit her in the

chest while in King’s driveway.
               “[A] defendant is not entitled to reversal on manifest weight grounds

merely because certain aspects of a witness’ testimony are inconsistent or

contradictory.” State v. Flores-Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108458, 2020-

Ohio-1274, ¶ 40. See, e.g., State v. Nitsche, 2016-Ohio-3170, 66 N.E.3d 135, ¶ 45

(8th Dist.); see also State v. Wade, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90029, 2008-Ohio-4574,

¶ 38 (“A conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence solely because

the [factfinder] heard inconsistent testimony.”), State v. Mann, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 10AP-1131, 2011-Ohio-5286, ¶ 37 (“‘While [a factfinder] may take note of the

inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly, * * * such inconsistencies

do not render defendant’s conviction against the manifest weight or sufficiency of

the evidence.’”).

               “It is well settled, however, that the credibility of witnesses is a matter

for the trier of fact to determine.” State v. Miller, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2019-CA-

00022, 2019-Ohio-5024, ¶ 21. “Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence based

upon instances of inconsistent testimony, memory defects, and the like are witness

credibility issues which are properly resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Nichols,

5th Dist. Richland No. 12-CA-102, 2013-Ohio-3898, ¶ 13.

      Although we consider the credibility of witnesses in a manifest weight
      challenge, we are mindful that the determination regarding witness
      credibility rests primarily with the trier of fact because the trier of fact
      is in the best position to view the witnesses and observe their
      demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections — observations that are
      critical to determining a witness’s credibility.
State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100125, 2014-Ohio-3583, ¶ 37, citing

State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94050, 2010-Ohio-4354, ¶ 17.

               The trier of fact is free to accept or reject any or all the testimony of

any witness. Id., citing State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93593, 2010-Ohio-

4006, ¶ 16.

               K.K.’s failure to disclose that she was raped to the police dispatcher

does not demonstrate that her testimony was inconsistent. K.K. testified that she

did not tell the dispatcher about the rape because “it was a touchy thing to say over

the phone.” (Tr. 381.) Instead, K.K. decided to wait until the police arrived. Also

K.K.’s description of the rape when she was in the hospital did not differ from her

initial testimony to the police. However, K.K. did not tell the detective that Parke

asked her for oral sex. When cross-examined about this alleged discrepancy, K.K.

stated, “Cause oral sex is a part of sex. I mean, I wasn’t being detailed about the sex.

But, I mean, that’s sex; right? I mean, I didn’t — It was sex.” (Tr. 392.)

               Parke also argues that K.K.’s testimony about the firearm was

inconsistent. However, K.K. explained her confusion and stated, “I thought that he

[the police] was asking like where did he [Parke] buy it from, or get the gun from.”

I didn’t know that he was asking where in the room did he get it from. You just asked

me where did he get it from.” (Tr. 396.) This does not demonstrate that K.K.’s

testimony was inconsistent or contradictory, but rather she did not understand the

officer’s question.
               Next, Parke contends that King’s testimony should be completely

dismissed because she testified that she observed Parke physically assaulting K.K.

in King’s driveway, and K.K. did not mention this in her testimony. Again, this does

not demonstrate that the testimonies were inconsistent or contradictory. K.K. did

not state that the physical assault did not happen. This testimony regarding Parke’s

assault on K.K. at King’s home is based on King’s recollection.

               At the end of the trial, the jury found Parke guilty of all counts, but

not guilty of the firearm specifications. The jury’s verdict demonstrates that it

considered all the evidence, weighed the testimony of all the witnesses, and

discounted or accepted testimony where the jury determined was appropriate.

Accordingly, based on the record before us, we cannot say that this is the exceptional

case where the jury clearly lost its way in finding Parke guilty.

               Therefore, Parke’s first assignment of error is overruled.

IV.   Sufficiency of the Evidence

      A.     Standard of Review

               “‘An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Bradley, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108983, 2020-Ohio-3460, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Driggins, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98073, 2012-Ohio-5287, ¶ 101, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

              “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at ¶ 7, citing

State v. Vickers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97365, 2013-Ohio-1337, citing State v.

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991).

      B.     Law and Analysis

              In Parke’s second assignment of error, he contends there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of disruption of public services in violation of

R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) because he did not purposely keep K.K. from calling 911. Parke

argues that he did not know that K.K. called 911 when he hung up the phone and

took it from her.

              R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) states:

      No person, purposely by any means or knowingly by damaging or
      tampering with any property, shall do any of the following:
      Substantially impair the ability of law enforcement officers,
      firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency medical services personnel,
      or emergency facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to
      protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical
      harm.

              “‘[T]he deciding factor in these cases is whether the defendant’s

conduct caused the victim to be unable to use that telephone.’” State v. Tajblik, 6th

Dist. Wood No. WD-14-064, 2016-Ohio-977, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Hill, 7th Dist.
Mahoning No. 09MO3, 2010-Ohio-4871, ¶ 25. In State v. Galindo, 5th Dist. Stark

No. 2011CA00258, 2012-Ohio-3626, ¶17, the court held that “[t]he statute is aimed

at conduct which prevents a victim from using public services to seek emergency

assistance.” Id.

               K.K. testified that Parke discovered that she was following a male

friend and told her to call the male friend to tell him that K.K. would not talk with

him anymore. Parke handed the phone to K.K., and K.K. dialed 911. Parke snatched

the phone out of K.K.’s hand and hung up the phone. According to K.K., the police

called back and left a voicemail. K.K. also testified that after Parke dragged her back

into the home, once they were back upstairs, Parke pulled a gun out of a red

container and told her “if the police come, I’m gonna hurt you.” (Tr. 359.) By taking

K.K.’s phone, it demonstrates that Parke purposely prevented K.K. from using her

cell phone.

               Therefore, Parke’s second assignment of error is overruled.

V.    Reagan Tokes Law

               In Parke’s third assignment of error, he argues that the trial court’s

imposing an indefinite term pursuant to Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional

because it violates his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.

               Parke’s assignment of error is overruled pursuant to this court’s en

banc decision in State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.).

               Judgment affirmed.
      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR

N.B. Administrative Judge Anita Laster Mays is constrained to apply Delvallie’s
en banc decision. For a full explanation of her analysis, see State v. Delvallie,
2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536 (8th Dist.) (Laster Mays, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

Judge Emanuella D. Groves concurred with the opinions of Judge Lisa B. Forbes
(dissenting) and Administrative Judge Anita Laster Mays (concurring in part and
dissenting in part) in Delvallie and would have found the Reagan Tokes Law
unconstitutional.