Court Opinion

ID: 9543538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:46:20.93858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:34.123495
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I cannot agree with the result or the analysis in the opinion of either Justice Durham, Justice Stewart, or Justice Zimmerman. I would not grant a new trial.
When the case was before us the first time, we remanded it to the trial court
to hold a hearing and make a factual determination as to whether the two-pronged test of McDonough has been met by the defendant. If the trial court determines that both prongs of the test have been met, a new trial is ordered; if not, the conviction must be and is affirmed.
State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 1989). Now, in the opinions of Justices Durham and Stewart, a new trial is ordered, although admittedly both prongs of the test have not been met. Justice Durham would now alter the second prong; Justice Stewart abandons the McDonough test and would now grant a new trial for a *251reason never advanced when the case was before us the first time. Both of their opinions violate the direction of the remand, which was to determine if the Mc-Donough test had been met. That is now the “law of the case,” and we cannot deviate from it. Justice Zimmerman stays with the McDonough test, but in my opinion misapplies it, as I shall demonstrate.
Proper application of the McDonough test proceeds as follows: First, did a juror fail to answer honestly a material question on voir dire? The trial judge asked on voir dire whether any juror or his or her close relative had been a victim of a “crime of violence.” Neither juror Wall nor juror Salaz responded.
As to Wall, the trial court’s finding that Wall answered truthfully must be sustained. Defendant has failed to carry his burden to show that the “sexual assault” on her son, of which Wall accused her husband, was a crime of violence. An assault can be a nonconsensual touching or fondling unaccompanied by violence. Many sexual assaults on children are just that. Defendant’s counsel did not inquire as to the nature of the act or the circumstances surrounding the incident. The record simply does not establish that the assault was violent, and the trial court’s finding that Wall answered truthfully is not clearly erroneous. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). Nor does the record establish that she should have responded to a second question, whether she or a close relative had been accused of a “similar type of offense” as the charges against defendant, which had previously been stated to be rape of an adult woman and kidnapping. An improper touching or fondling of a child by an adult bears limited similarity to the rape and kidnapping of an adult woman by a stranger. While lawyers and judges may recognize some similarity, we should not expect Wall to recognize the similarity.
As to Salaz, I agree that she was a victim of a crime of violence by her own description of the incident and that her forgetfulness cannot be overlooked. Her failure to answer cannot be excused because she thought it would not affect her judgment or impartiality. However, even though the first prong of the McDonough test appears to be satisfied, the second prong of that test has not been met. The second prong requires “that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Clearly here, a challenge for cause against Salaz would not have been sustained. Justices Durham and Stewart concede this. Salaz stated at the hearing held on remand, without being urged, that the incident had not affected her so that it would impair her ability to judge defendant’s guilt or innocence fairly on the evidence presented. Indeed, that was the very reason she gave for not disclosing the incident. We have held in many cases that a prospective juror is not subject to a challenge for cause because he or she may harbor preconceived notions, feelings, or ideas which will fairly yield to the evidence to be presented. Particularly is that true when the juror, without being “pushed” by the court, indicates his or her willingness to do so. That was certainly true in the instant case with Salaz. Her situation is quite unlike that presented in State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), where two jurors harbored anger, outrage, and deep feelings about being victims of earlier crimes. The jurors had to be extensively questioned, and only after the court “pushed” them were they able to say that they thought they could act fairly. See also State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984). Somewhat similarly in State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 1987), a juror who had attended a viewing of the body of the victim and who worked with one of the victim’s relatives was seated after expressing strong feelings about the crime. Nothing similar to those facts occurred here. I therefore disagree with Justice Zimmerman that there was a “valid basis” for a challenge for cause, even when the events which transpired during the jury’s deliberation are not considered.
In short, Salaz does not meet the second prong of the McDonough test, and she would not have been subject to a challenge for cause under our ease law. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that juror Glashie told the court on voir dire that his brother had been murdered by an unidenti*252fied assailant. He assured the court, however, that he could nevertheless act impartially. He was not challenged for cause by defendant and was allowed to remain on the panel by the court.
I do not agree with Justice Durham that the second prong of the McDonough test should be expanded to fit the facts of this case. When this case was earlier before us, we held that under rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court could examine the answers given by the prospective jurors on voir dire and apply the two-pronged McDonough test. However, we did not sanction the admission of affidavits of jurors as to discussions between them during their deliberation. In my view, that would violate rule 606(b) and is quite unnecessary to the disposition of this case. Justice Durham asserts that there was “a lack of clarity” on that point in our earlier opinion. Not so. Justice Zimmerman made it additionally clear in his concurring opinion:
First, as is clear from the majority’s statement of the McDonough rule, the actions of those jurors subsequent to voir dire is irrelevant to a determination of whether Thomas is entitled to a new trial; the sole question is whether a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge.
State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah 1989).
Application of the McDonough test properly and effectively disposes of this case. No court has sanctioned altering and expanding the test as Justice Durham advocates. The test as announced by the Supreme Court of the United States is eminently fair to both the prosecution and the defendant.
I would affirm. I would not grant a new trial and force the victim through another painful trial. We have accorded defendant two appeals, and no error can be found, let alone prejudicial error.
HALL, C.J., concurs.