Court Opinion

ID: 9839530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 15:02:10.004549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:17.787841
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1613   Document: 15     Page: 1   Filed: 08/11/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                   CEDRIC GREENE,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2023-1613
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:22-cv-01754-TMD, Judge Thompson M. Dietz.
                  ______________________

                Decided: August 11, 2023
                 ______________________

    CEDRIC GREENE, Los Angeles, CA, pro se.

     KELLY GEDDES, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ERIC P. BRUSKIN, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                  ______________________

  Before LOURIE, PROST, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1613     Document: 15     Page: 2    Filed: 08/11/2023

 2                                               GREENE v. US

 PER CURIAM.
     Cedric Greene appeals from a decision of the United
 States Court of Federal Claims (the “Claims Court”) dis-
 missing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
 tion. See Greene v. United States, No. 22-1754, 2023 WL
 2134358 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 21, 2023) (“Decision”). For the rea-
 sons detailed below, we affirm the Claims Court’s decision.
                        BACKGROUND
      In 2019, Greene, a California resident, received a letter
 from the office of Senator Dianne Feinstein stating that her
 office was assigned “to address [Greene’s] subsidy housing
 concerns.” Greene v. United States, Fed. Cl. No. 22-1754,
 ECF No. 1 at 1 (“Complaint”). To assist Greene, the case-
 worker assigned to his case contacted an unspecified gov-
 ernment housing agency on his behalf. Id. According to
 Greene, Senator Feinstein’s staff promised that they
 “would do all they could to help him.” Id. However, after
 contacting the housing agency, they allegedly failed to re-
 spond to Greene’s numerous emails following up on the sta-
 tus of his case. Id. Greene allegedly did not receive a
 response from Senator Feinstein’s office until after he and
 his spouse had been evicted from their residence. Id. at 1–
 2.
      Greene then filed suit in the Claims Court alleging that
 the failure of Senator Feinstein’s staff to provide him with
 the housing agency’s response prevented him from ade-
 quately defending himself during his eviction proceedings.
 Id. Greene further argued that, in failing to provide him
 with the housing agency’s response, the caseworker com-
 mitted “[g]ross [n]eglect in the most careless fashion.” Id.
 at 3. Lastly, Greene argued that the government breached
 a contract between it and himself when the Senator’s office
 failed to provide Greene with a timely response. He sought
Case: 23-1613     Document: 15     Page: 3    Filed: 08/11/2023

 GREENE v. US                                                3

 money damages as well as the reinstatement of his housing
 subsidy benefits. Id.
     The Claims Court first held that it did not have juris-
 diction over a case where relief was being sought against a
 defendant other than the United States. Decision at *2.
 Therefore, it could not entertain Greene’s claims against
 Senator Feinstein’s individual caseworker. Id. The court
 then held that even if Greene had directed his claims at the
 United States itself, rather than the individual case-
 worker, his claims still fell outside the court’s jurisdiction
 because his claims were categorized as tort claims. Id. at
 *3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (stating that the Claims
 Court’s jurisdiction is limited to “any claim against the
 United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any
 Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive depart-
 ment, or upon any express or implied contract with the
 United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
 cases not sounding in tort.” (emphasis added))). The court
 went on to hold that it lacked jurisdiction over Greene’s
 Due Process claims that a government actor prevented him
 from adequately defending himself during his eviction pro-
 ceedings because these claims could not mandate payment
 of money by the government. Id.
      Lastly, regarding Greene’s breach of contract claim, the
 Claims Court found that Greene failed to sufficiently plead
 the existence of a contract and instead made only thread-
 bare conclusory statements that a contract existed, and
 that the government breached that contract. Id. Because
 Greene did not allege the elements of a contract, nor did he
 allege that the caseworker had the authority to bind the
 government in a contract, the court dismissed Greene’s
 complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing
 Perry v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 1, 12 (2020) (“A non-
 frivolous allegation that a contract exists between a plain-
 tiff and the United States is sufficient to invoke the subject
 matter jurisdiction of the Claims Court, but dismissal may
 be proper for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the claim
Case: 23-1613    Document: 15      Page: 4    Filed: 08/11/2023

 4                                               GREENE v. US

 is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”) (quoting Ibrahim v.
 United States, 799 F. App’x 865, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2020))).
 Greene then timely appealed the Claims Court’s decision
 to this court.
                         DISCUSSION
     On appeal, Greene argues that he alleged “a contract
 breach that could have invoked the [Claims Court’s] juris-
 diction.” Appellant’s Informal Br. at 1. He adds that even
 if his complaint contained jurisdictional defects, these
 could have been cured by amendment. Id. at 1–2.
     The government responds that the Claims Court fully
 considered Greene’s breach of contract claim and correctly
 held that Greene failed to sufficiently plead the existence
 of a contract. Appellee’s Informal Br. at 4. Regarding the
 possibility of amendment, the government points out that
 Greene never moved to amend his complaint, and even if
 he had moved to amend, it would have been futile due to
 the lack of an express or implied contract. Id. at 5–6.
      Because jurisdictional issues are questions of law, we
 review them de novo. See Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United
 States, 161 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation omit-
 ted). In doing so, we review any underlying findings of fact
 for clear error. See Banks v. United States, 314 F.3d 1304,
 1307–08 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). In addition,
 where the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is placed
 into issue, the nonmoving party bears the burden of estab-
 lishing jurisdiction. See Alder Terrace, 161 F.3d at 1377
 (citation omitted).
      Although pro se plaintiffs are given some latitude in
 their pleadings and are not held to rigid standards or for-
 malities imposed upon parties represented by counsel, Es-
 telle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citation omitted),
 a pro se plaintiff must still “comply with the applicable
 rules of procedural and substantive law.” Walsh v. United
 States, 3 Cl. Ct. 539, 541 (1983) (citing Faretta v.
Case: 23-1613    Document: 15     Page: 5   Filed: 08/11/2023

 GREENE v. US                                             5

 California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975)). Thus, the leni-
 ency afforded to pro se litigants with respect to mere for-
 malities does not relieve them of jurisdictional
 requirements. See Kelley v. Sec’y, United States Dep’t of
 Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
     We agree with the government that the Claims Court
 lacked jurisdiction to hear Greene’s case and properly dis-
 missed his breach of contract claim. The requirements for
 a valid contract with the United States are “mutual intent
 to contract including an offer and acceptance, considera-
 tion, and a [g]overnment representative who had actual au-
 thority to bind the [g]overnment.” Silver State Land LLC
 v. United States, 148 Fed. Cl. 217, 234 (2020) (quoting
 Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1326
 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Here, Greene made no direct mention of
 a contract in his complaint and made only conclusory state-
 ments that a contract existed in his pleadings. Further-
 more, Greene did not allege that the caseworker assigned
 to help him had the actual authority to enter a contract on
 behalf of the government. Lastly, there could not have
 been a contract because there was no consideration. We
 therefore conclude that the Claims Court properly held
 that Greene failed to plead the existence of a contract.
     To the extent that Greene requested a remand of his
 case so that he can amend his complaint, we reject such a
 request. Greene never moved to amend his complaint be-
 fore the Claims Court, and even if he had requested to
 amend his complaint, such amendment would have been
 futile due to the nature of Greene’s allegations. Greene
 never claimed that there was an agreement with the case-
 worker that would satisfy the elements of a contract. Thus,
 an amendment would still not place Greene’s complaint
 within the Claims Court’s jurisdiction.
Case: 23-1613   Document: 15      Page: 6   Filed: 08/11/2023

 6                                            GREENE v. US

                      CONCLUSION
     We have considered Greene’s remaining arguments,
 but we find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the decision
 of the Claims Court is affirmed.
                      AFFIRMED
                          COSTS
 No costs.