Court Opinion

ID: 9380188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 16:08:50.068434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.330688
License: Public Domain

J-S05018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 IN RE: W.A.S., A MINOR              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: A.G., FATHER             :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 1172 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the Decree Entered September 6, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Orphans' Court at
                         No(s): 23A-2022 O.C.

 IN RE: J.L.S., A MINOR              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: A.G.                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 1173 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the Decree Entered October 6, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Orphans' Court at
                         No(s): 22A-2022 O.C.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                  FILED: March 17, 2023
J-S05018-23

       A.G. (Father) appeals1 from the decrees,2 entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Jefferson County, Orphans’ Court Division, involuntarily

terminating his parental rights to his minor twin sons, W.A.S. and J.L.S.

(Children) (born Oct. 2020). Counsel has filed an application and Anders3

brief seeking to withdraw. After careful review, we grant counsel’s application

and affirm the decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to

Children.    Father is still incapable of parenting Children despite receiving

services over the past 18 months, during which time Children have been in

placement.

       On February 8, 2021, Jefferson County Children and Youth Services

(CYS) caseworker, Rebecca Sallack, received a report that Children’s mother,

A.S.,4 presented to the emergency room at the Punxsutawney Hospital with

then-three-and-a-half-month-old J.L.S., who had bruises on his arm and leg.5
____________________________________________

1 Father has complied with the dictates of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185
A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), by filing a separate notice of appeal for each Orphans’
Court docket number. See In re: M.P., 204 A.3d 976 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(applying Walker holding in termination of parental rights context).

2 On November 1, 2022, our Court sua sponte consolidated these appeals, as
they involve related parties and issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.

3 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.
McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).
4The trial court also involuntarily terminated A.S.’s parental rights to Children.
A.S. has also filed an appeal that we address in a separate decision. See In
Re: W.A.S. & J.L.S., Nos. 1170 & 1171 WDA 2022.

5Police found a wood clamp in maternal grandparents’ home that had a shape
which was consistent with the shape and size of the bruise on J.L.S.’s arm.
N.T. Termination Hearing, 8/30/22, at 60.

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While Mother at first denied hurting J.L.S.,6 she ultimately admitted to having

caused some of the bruising by squeezing J.L.S.’s arm and leg.7 Children were

living with Mother at their maternal grandparents’ home at the time of the

incident.   Maternal grandparents’ home was determined to not be a safe

environment for Children and an emergency protective custody order was

entered. W.A.S. and J.L.S. were immediately removed from the home and

placed in kinship care.

       Children were adjudicated dependent on February 23, 2021.           CYS

initially attempted to reunite Children with Father.    However, Father first

denied paternity and then, ultimately, refused to take custody of Children

without Mother present. On April 13, 2021, Children were placed in a pre-

adoptive foster home, where they remain to date.         CYS established the

following family service plan for Father: undergo drug and alcohol evaluation

and follow all recommendations; obtain a psychological evaluation8 and follow

____________________________________________

6Mother, in fact, first accused maternal grandfather of hurting J.L.S. Id. at
58.

7Mother was immediately arrested and incarcerated. On August 30, 2022,
Mother entered the ARD program on third-degree felony charges after
entering a guilty plea for endangering the welfare of a child, simple assault,
and harassment. Mother was still on probation at the time of the termination
hearing.

8Father was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
and personality disorder (unspecified). N.T. Termination Hearing, 8/30/22, at
26. The psychological evaluation noted that Father “has a significant mental
health history, [] has been participating in both therapy and medication
management[, and] should continue to participate in these services on an
ongoing basis.” Id.

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all recommendations; participate in anger management classes; notify CYS

within 7 days of any address or telephone changes; participate in and

complete nurturing parent classes; engage in supervised visits with Children

and confirm attendance at visits at least 24-hours in advance; and provide

diapers, wipes, formula, and baby food for visits. Id. at 6.9 Child permanency

plans, which were instituted in March 2012 and revised throughout October

2021, were implemented and included:             participation in early head start

programs; weekly one-hour visits10 with Father at CYS; age-appropriate

stimulation and activities for Children; early intervention evaluations; and

participation in physical therapy. Id. at 10-13.

       Permanency review hearings were held in May and August 2021 and

February and May 2022. At the 2021 review hearings, Father’s compliance

with his family service plan was considered minimal/substantial and his

progress was considered none/moderate, respectively.            N.T. Termination

Hearing, 8/30/22, at 4. At the 2022 review hearings, Father’s compliance was

noted as moderate/substantial and his progress minimal. Id. at 5. In May
____________________________________________

9 The service plan was revised in September 2021, after Father had completed
his drug and alcohol evaluation, anger management class, and nurturing
parent class. Id. at 7. The new plan recommended that Father obtain mental
health counseling and follow recommendations and notify CYS within seven
days of any employment or employment schedule changes. Id. at 7, 9.
Father was also told to obtain stable housing free of any safety concerns,
maintain a healthy living environment for Children, and keep CYS caseworker
informed of any new addresses. Id. at 7-8. The service plan was again
revised in April 2022 to add the following: a weekly ten-minute phone call
with Children. Id. at 9-10.
10In October 2021, Father’s visits were increased to two-hours once a week.
Id. at 12.
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2022, visitation ceased and the permanency goal was changed from

reunification to adoption. On July 8, 2022, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily

terminate Father’s rights to Children.

        On August 30, 2022, the court held a termination hearing that

incorporated the record in the underlying dependency proceeding. At the time

of the termination hearing, Children had been in placement for 18 months.

CYS caseworker Sallack and Erin Landeni-Rogan, Father’s therapist through

the Erie County Probation Department,11 testified at the hearing.12           On

September 6, 2022, the trial court granted CYS’ petition and terminated

Father’s parental rights pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the

Adoption Act.13      Father filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered

____________________________________________

11 Father was on probation after pleading guilty to simple assault and other
offenses unrelated to this matter. Ms. Landeni-Rogan began working as
Father’s therapist in December 2021, having had approximately 7 sessions
with him at the time at the termination hearing. N.T. Termination Hearing,
8/30/22, at 68. Ms. Landeni-Rogan, however, testified that she was not
comfortable opining with regard to Father’s ability to parent, id. at 70, or
Father’s “cognitive process [with regard to] his ability to care for [C]hildren.”
Id. at 72.

12 Children were represented by guardian ad litem, Greg Sobol, Esquire, and
attorney, Danielle Melillo, Esquire, at the termination hearing. See 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) (children have statutory right to counsel in contested
involuntary termination proceedings); but see In re K.R., 200 A.3d 969 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (en banc) (separate counsel for children’s legal interests need
not be appointed, under section 2313(a), where children were able to express
preferences to counsel, counsel expressed children’s preferences and
children's best interests to orphans’ court, and there was no conflict in
positions).

13   23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.

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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On

December 9, 2022, counsel filed an application to withdraw.

      In In re Adoption of V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992), our Court

stated:

      Counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first
      appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her parental
      rights, may, after a conscientious and thorough review of the
      record, petition this [C]ourt for leave to withdraw [from]
      representation if he or she can find no issues of arguable merit on
      which to base the appeal. Given the less stringent standard of
      proof required and the quasi-adversarial nature of a termination
      proceeding[,] in which a parent is not guaranteed the same
      procedural and evidentiary rights as a criminal defendant, the
      [C]ourt holds that appointed counsel seeking to withdraw [from]
      representation must submit an Anders brief.

Id. at 1275.     Moreover, we held that “any motion to withdraw [from]

representation, submitted by appointed counsel, must be accompanied by an

advocate’s    brief,   and   not   the    amicus   curiae   brief   delineated   in

[Commonwealth v.] McClendon, [434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981)]. Id. See

also In re Adoption of R.I., 312 A.3d 601, 602 (Pa. 1973) (“[T]he logic

behind . . . an individual in a criminal case being entitled to representation by

counsel at any proceeding that may lead to ‘the deprivation of substantial

rights’ . . . is equally applicable to a case involving an indigent parent faced

with the loss of her child.”).

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       In his Anders brief, counsel raises the following issue for our review:

“Whether the [trial] court erred in terminating Father’s parental rights under

23 Pa.C.S.A. §[§] 2511(a)(2) [and (b)].”14 Father’s Brief, at 4.

       Before reaching the merits of Father’s appeal, we must first address

counsel’s petition to withdraw. To withdraw under Anders, counsel must:

       1) petition the Court for leave to withdraw[,] stating that, after making
       a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined
       that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the [Anders]
       brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the [appellant] that he or she
       has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional arguments
       that the [appellant] deems worthy of the [C]ourt’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super.

2009)). With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform

the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court

has held that counsel must “attach to [his or her] petition to withdraw a copy

of the letter sent to the[] client advising him or her of their rights.”

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

       An Anders brief must also comply with the following requirements:

       (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
       citations to the record;

____________________________________________

14 Although counsel’s “Statement of Questions Involved” only states that the
court erred in terminating Father’s parental rights under subsection
2511(a)(2), Father’s Rule 1925(b) statement and the summary of the
argument and argument sections of the Anders brief also discuss that
termination was improper under subsection 2511(b). Thus, we will also
address that subsection in this decision.
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      (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
      supports the appeal;

      (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

      (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
      frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
      controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
      conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Finally, this

Court must “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there

are   any   additional,   non-frivolous     issues   overlooked   by   counsel.”

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 1133 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(footnote omitted).

      Instantly, Father’s counsel has filed an application to withdraw,

certifying that he has made a conscientious examination of the record and any

applicable law and determined that Father’s appeal is wholly frivolous.

Counsel has also filed a brief, which includes a summary of the history and

facts of the case, potential issues that could be raised by Father, and counsel’s

assessment of why those issues are wholly frivolous, with citations to relevant

legal authority. Counsel has also supplied Father with a copy of the Anders

brief and application, together with a letter advising Father of his right to

proceed pro se, or with new privately-retained counsel, to raise any other

issues Father believes might have merit. Accordingly, we find that counsel

has substantially complied with the requirements of Anders, Santiago, and

V.E., and, thus, may review the issues raised by counsel and also conduct our

independent review of the record.

                                      -8-
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      In cases involving termination of parental rights, “our standard of review

is limited to determining whether the order of the trial court is supported by

competent evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration

to the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., 994

A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.

Super. 2009)). “Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In

re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (internal citations

omitted). On review, “we employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record

in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by

competent evidence.” Id.

      Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where any one
      subsection of [s]ection 2511(a) is satisfied, along with
      consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions. Initially, the
      focus is on the conduct of the parent.         The party seeking
      termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
      parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
      delineated in [s]ection 2511(a). Only if the court determines that
      the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his . . . parental
      rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis
      pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b): determination of the needs and
      welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
      child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

                                     -9-
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        Instantly, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under

subsection 2511(a)(2)15 and (b).16 To satisfy the requirements of subsection

2511(a)(2), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence

regarding the following elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity,

abuse, neglect, or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence

____________________________________________

15   Subsection 2511(a)(2) states:

     (a)   General rule. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be
           terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

           (2)   The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
                 neglect[,] or refusal of the parent has caused the child
                 to be without essential parental care, control or
                 subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
                 being and the conditions and causes of the
                 incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal cannot or
                 will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) (emphasis added).
16   Subsection 2511(b) states:

     (b)   Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights
           of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
           developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs and welfare of
           the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely
           on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
           housing, furnishings, income, clothing[,] and medical care if
           found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to
           any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the
           court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
           conditions described therein which are first initiated
           subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

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necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(emphasis added).    The grounds for termination of parental rights under

subsection 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied,

are not limited to affirmative misconduct; the grounds may also include acts

of refusal, as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In the Interest

of A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).

     The trial court noted the following in its Rule 1925(a) opinion:

     As Ms. Sallack detailed in her testimony, Mother and Father are
     profoundly deficient when it comes to recognizing, understanding,
     and responding to [C]hildren’s needs. Between Justice Works and
     Ms. Sallack, they received ample instruction on how to care for
     [Children] both physically and emotionally. Little to none of it has
     taken root, though, which has left Mother and Father in a position
     where they are unable to parent these twin boys. Their inattention
     alone has put [C]hildren in physical danger that easily could have
     resulted in actual injury had Ms. Sallack not intervened. More
     than merely inattentive, they struggle to recognize such basic
     things as when [Children] are hungry or have had enough to eat,
     and they require continual prompting to check [Children’s]
     diapers, to actively monitor their movements, and even to interact
     with them instead of watching from the sidelines or directing their
     attention to other matters. In short, Mother and Father have
     shown that they are incapable of meeting [Children’s] physical and
     emotional needs outside of a closely[-]supervised environment[.]

                                    *    *    *

     As well as being warranted under subsection (a), terminating both
     parents’ rights is the outcome best able to ensure [Children’s]
     developmental, physical, and emotional needs, see [23 Pa.C.S.A.]
     § 2511(b), as it will allow them to be adopted and become
     permanent members of the family they have known most of their
     lives. It will allow them to remain in the same environment and
     with the same people who have consistently loved them and met

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      their varying needs for the last 17 months and will not adversely
      destroy a bond, beneficial or otherwise, between them and their
      natural parents. As indicated above, it is their foster parents, not
      Mother and Father, with whom [C]hildren have established
      parent-child bonds. The [c]ourt[,] thus[,] has no reservations
      about severing existing and beneficial emotional ties by
      terminating Mother[’s] and Father’s parental rights.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 4. The record substantiates the trial court’s

conclusions   and,    therefore,   supports   termination   under   subsections

2511(a)(2) and (b).

      Although Father completed parenting classes as part of his family

service plan, CYS caseworker Sallack testified that parents only do well “if

you’re sitting there telling them every step of the way . . . what to do.” N.T.

Termination Hearing, 8/30/22, at 22. See id. at 16, 18 (caseworker testifying

after she instructed Father to make sure Children were safe during visit, Father

continued to pay no attention to Children, left W.A.S. on high dining table

chair instead of taking him off of it, and seemed to be “worrying more about

what [the caseworker] was doing behind [a one-way] mirror”); id. at 18

(Father standing in corner of room during visit “not paying attention to what

was going on with the boys”); id. (Father sitting in chair during visit “picking

his nose and . . . flicking the boogers around the visit room”); id. at 19-20

(Father putting J.L.S. on his lap and being “stiff as a board, like he was in

trouble, staring off”); id. at 20 (neither parent checking diaper 45 minutes

into visit); id. at 17 (neither parent could tell if Children ready to eat); id.

(when Children were being fed, parents could not tell if Children had finished

eating); id. at 21 (caseworker taking Father to kitchen to show him how to

heat up Children’s food).
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      Caseworker Sallack also testified that during visits, Father “struggle[d]

to interact with the kids and play with them [and, instead,] would just sit and

look at them [and e]very now and then would engage with them.” Id.; see

also id. at 56 (as Children got more mobile, parents really “seemed to

struggle” employing parenting skill). In fact, when W.A.S. tried to grab a toy

that Father was playing with, Father “pulled back” and told W.A.S. “daddy’s

playing with it.” Id.; see also id. (parents “missed opportunities to sit and

interact with [Children] . . . and play with them”); id. at 22 (caseworker

testifying parents had to be “redirect[ed during] visits frequently”).

      In the 18 months since Children have been removed from Father’s care,

Father has been incapable of properly supervising, caring for, and tending to

the needs of Children during visits without the constant intervention and

instruction of CYS caseworkers.       See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) (“the

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied”); see also In re M.E.P., supra at 1272.            Notably,

Father’s visits have never progressed beyond supervised due to safety

concerns. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 8/30/22, at 54-55, 66 (CYS never

felt comfortable lessening visit restrictions based on safety concerns posed to

Children); id. at 65 (caseworker testifying Children could never be left

unsupervised with parents where conditions that led to their removal from

parents still exist).   In fact, caseworker Sallack testified that Father’s

parenting skills have “[been getting] progressively worse.” Id.

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      Even with consistent “hands-on” parenting instruction for over one year,

Father has been unable to prove that he can put those lessons into practice

and carry out parenting responsibilities. Without more, Children are at risk

physically and emotionally. Accordingly, Father’s inability to utilize the skills

he learned during the parenting classes and apply them to parenting Children

justifies termination under subsection 2511(a)(2).

      With regard to subsection 2511(b), CYS caseworker Sallack noted that

while Children were “friendly” and “familiar” with Mother and Father during

visits, when Children would return to their foster home, the Children would be

“so excited” to see their foster parents, “run[ning,] giggling[,] and laughing.”

Id.   CYS caseworker Sallack further testified that Children “appear very

bonded” with foster parents and the entire foster family, that Children “are

starting to say [and refer to foster parents as] dadda and mama,” and that

foster parents are providing for Children’s needs. Id. at 28-29.

      Here, the record supports the conclusion that Children do not have an

established bond with Father.      Instead, the evidence demonstrates that

Children have a parent-child bond with their foster parents, who are an

adoptive resource.    See Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 3 (“The [foster

parents] are the people they love, the people they greet with excitement, and

the people with whom they have developed family-like bonds.”). See also

Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2015) (in determining

whether termination proper under section 2511(b), trial court “can equally

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the

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intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might

have with the foster parent,” in addition to examination of any parent-child

bond).   Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in determining that termination of Father’s parental rights would

best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of

Children. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

      Decrees affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/17/2023

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