Court Opinion

ID: 9369217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 07:09:38.433102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.484120
License: Public Domain

AFFIRM AS MODIFIED; Opinion Filed February 3, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-21-00974-CR
                               No. 05-21-00975-CR
                               No. 05-21-00976-CR
                  DERICK TOBAR-GONZALEZ, Appellant
                                V.
                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

             On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court
                           Collin County, Texas
  Trial Court Cause Nos. 219-80103-2020, 219-80104-2020, 219-80105-2020

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
              Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Kennedy
                           Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      Derick Tobar-Gonzalez appeals his convictions for aggravated assault family

violence with a deadly weapon, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated

kidnapping. In a single issue, appellant argues the sentences imposed were grossly

disproportionate to the charged offenses in consideration of the totality of the

circumstances. In a single cross-issue, the State urges the judgments be modified to

delete special findings, regarding whether appellant waived his right to appeal his

punishment. We affirm the judgments as modified. Because all issues are settled in

law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
                                  BACKGROUND

      In the middle of April of 2019, appellant began working at a restaurant as a

busboy where he met A.R. who was working at the restaurant as a waitress. By mid-

July of 2019, they entered into a dating relationship. While they dated, appellant

told A.R. that he was jealous of any person who sent her any messages, especially if

they were men, and that by going out with her male friends she “was disrespecting

him.” Appellant also acted controlling towards A.R., wanting to know what she was

wearing, who she went out with, and where she was going to be “at all times.”

      In late September of 2019, when A.R. returned from a trip, she discovered

appellant lying in her bed with his cousin after having used a key to her apartment

she did not know he had. About that same time, she learned that appellant had taken

her car without her permission, drove it to a party, and damaged the car’s rear view

mirror, doors, and rear bumper. At that point, A.R. decided she no longer wanted to

be in a relationship with appellant because he did not trust her and he insulted her

by stealing and damaging her car. A.R. told appellant she did not want to see him

anymore and he and his cousin needed to leave her apartment.

      After their relationship ended, appellant continued to send messages to A.R.,

asking her to forgive him. He also visited her work and apartment, even after A.R.

told him she was not interested in resuming their relationship. A.R. began working

at a different restaurant, and appellant would go eat at the restaurant, even though

A.R. would ignore him. On or about October 18, 2019, A.R. called the police to her

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apartment because appellant wanted her to return a pair of his shoes and a necklace

he had left at her apartment. A.R. was willing to give the items back, but his

behavior—screaming and “not acting like a normal person that would want to

talk”—made her uncomfortable. When the police arrived, A.R. returned appellant’s

shoes and necklace. The police instructed appellant not to contact A.R. or visit her

home or workplace. They also instructed A.R. that if he did, she had the right to call

the police and have appellant detained.

      On October 21, 2019, A.R.’s day proceeded like many others, including

dropping off and picking up her daughters from school and working two shifts at a

restaurant. She had recently begun dating J.S., a man she later married. That night

after she finished working her second shift, she kissed J.S. good-bye and drove to

her apartment. A.R. talked with J.S. on her phone while she drove and ended the

call when she got to her apartment. She got out of her car and began walking towards

her apartment when she heard a voice telling her, “if I was not going to be his, that

I was not going to be anybody else’s . . . .”

      On that same day, appellant had borrowed a car from a friend, and that night

he drove to and parked at the restaurant where he knew A.R. worked. He watched

her get into her car and followed her home to her apartment. At approximately 10

p.m., appellant grabbed A.R., strangled her to the point of losing consciousness, and

carried her to the back of the borrowed car. Appellant then drove to the trailer park

where he lived, moved A.R. to his own car, returned the borrowed car, and then

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drove his own car with A.R. in it to the trailer where he lived with several other

people. Appellant carried A.R. into a bedroom in the trailer. Thereafter, A.R.

regained consciousness and began yelling. Appellant again strangled her to the point

of losing consciousness. While A.R. was unconscious, appellant sexually assaulted

her. Early in the morning of October 22, A.R. regained consciousness and began

vomiting. Appellant took one of his roommates to see A.R., told him she had taken

drugs, and instructed him and another roommate not to call the police because she

would recover. At approximately 6:30 a.m., appellant packed a bag of his clothes

and other belongings, left the trailer, and drove to a friend’s apartment where he was

later arrested. One of appellant’s roommates called the police at approximately 7:00

a.m.

       On January 16, 2020, a grand jury indicted appellant with the offenses of

aggravated assault family violence with a deadly weapon, aggravated sexual assault,

and aggravated kidnapping. Appellant entered an open plea of guilty in each case.

After accepting his plea, finding him guilty of the charged offenses, and conducting

a hearing on punishment, the trial judge sentenced appellant to sixty-five years’

imprisonment in each case, to run concurrently.

                                    DISCUSSION

       In his sole issue, appellant urges that the trial court erred by imposing

sentences on him that are a grossly disproportionate to the charged offenses in

consideration of the totality of the circumstances. The State urges appellant failed

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to preserve his issue for appellate review. We agree. In order to preserve his

complaint regarding the sentences imposed, appellant needed to make a timely

objection at the time the sentences were imposed or in a post-trial motion. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). Appellant did not object at the time he was sentenced, and his

motion for new trial only alleged the verdict was “contrary to the law and the

evidence,” which is insufficient to preserve a complaint that the sentence is

excessive. See Neal v. State, No. 05-19-00699-CR, 2020 WL 3958192, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Dallas July 13, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Further, although appellant urges he brought the issue to the trial court’s attention

before he was sentenced, he does not show that the trial court ruled on his objection

or that he objected to the trial court’s failure to rule. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2).

But, even if appellant had preserved his issue, we could not conclude the sentences

assessed were excessive or constitutionally disproportionate to the offenses for

which appellant was convicted.

      An allegation of disproportionate punishment is a valid legal claim. State v.

Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).                   The concept of

proportionality is embodied in the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual

punishment and requires that punishment be graduated and proportioned to the

offense. See U.S. CONST. amend VIII. But, this is a narrow principle that does not

require strict proportionality between the crime and the sentence. See Simpson, 488

S.W.3d at 322 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy,

                                          –5–
J., concurring)).   Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly

disproportionate” to the crime. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003)

(plurality opinion). While the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the

lack of clarity in its precedent regarding what factors may indicate gross

disproportionality, it has nevertheless emphasized that a sentence is grossly

disproportionate to the crime only in the exceedingly rare or extreme case. See

Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)).

      To determine whether a sentence for a term of years is grossly

disproportionate for a particular defendant’s crime, a court must judge the severity

of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim, the culpability

of the offender, and the offender’s prior adjudicated and unadjudicated offenses. See

Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010). In

the rare case in which this threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross

disproportionality, the court should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the

sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences

imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. See id. If this comparative

analysis validates an initial judgment that the sentence is grossly disproportionate,

the sentence is cruel and unusual. See id.

      Appellant’s sentence fell within the statutory range punishment for the

convicted offenses, five to ninety-nine years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PEN. CODE

ANN. §§ 12.32(a) (first-degree felony punishment), 20.04(c) (aggravated

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kidnapping), 22.02(b) (aggravated assault with deadly weapon), 22.021(e)

(aggravated sexual assault). And, the court of criminal appeals has traditionally held

that punishment assessed within the statutory limits is not excessive, cruel, or

unusual. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323 (citing Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320,

323–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

      Appellant urges us to consider that he had no prior criminal record, cooperated

with authorities, pleaded guilty to the offenses, and requested a sentence of fifty

years or fewer. Although he argues that he has accepted responsibility for his

actions, when addressing the harm caused or threatened to A.R., he cites only his

testimony that he asked for A.R.’s forgiveness and avers he was “very confused.”

The record contains much more evidence of the harm to A.R. When the police found

her at appellant’s trailer, she was covered in bruises, had difficulty speaking, and

required emergency medical attention. She testified at the punishment hearing that

she spent so long recovering in the hospital and a rehabilitation center that it was

about one month before she felt she could see her daughters: “I wasn’t in a way that

they should see me that way.” A.R. required therapy to walk, to speak, and to use

her hands and her “entire body.” Even when A.R. moved back to her apartment, she

was dependent upon family to assist in her recovery. At the time of the punishment

hearing, A.R. was still unable to move the way she used to before the offenses and

consequentially cannot participate in activities with her daughters as she did before.

Additionally, her vision was permanently impaired as a result of the brain damage

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she sustained when appellant strangled her, so that she cannot see more than the

general shape or colors of a person or even the expressions on her children’s faces.

In sum, as a result of appellant’s offenses, she has been permanently and

substantially harmed physically and emotionally by an individual she dated for

approximately three months and who professed to love her.

      Even considering appellant’s arguments that the record contains “countless

times Appellant took responsibility for his actions” and that he lacked prior

convictions or arrests, we cannot conclude this is one of the “rare” cases that leads

to the inference that appellant’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to the

offenses he admitted to committing. Consequently, we see no need to compare his

sentences to the sentences imposed on others. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323.

      We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

                         MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENTS

      In its cross-issue, the State asks this Court to modify appellant’s three

judgments by deleting the special findings, which provide: “Appeal Waived. No

Permission to Appeal Granted.” The records in all three cases contain appellant’s

waiver of rights and judicial confession with notations that appellant waived his right

of appeal as to guilt-innocence, as well as the trial court’s certification of defendant’s

right to appeal, which is annotated to read appellant has the right of appeal “as to

punishment.”

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      We may modify a trial court’s written judgment if the necessary information

to do so is contained in the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865

S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–

30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). We have concluded that there is a sufficient

basis in the record to support the modifications of all three judgments requested by

the State. Accordingly, we modify all three judgments to strike the special findings,

which provide: “Appeal Waived. No Permission to Appeal Granted.”

                                   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the judgments as modified.

                                           /Nancy Kennedy/
                                           NANCY KENNEDY
                                           JUSTICE

DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
210974F.U05

                                        –9–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

DERICK TOBAR-GONZALEZ,                       On Appeal from the 219th Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. 219-80103-
No. 05-21-00974-CR          V.               2020.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Kennedy. Justices Partida-Kipness
                                             and Nowell participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      to strike the special findings, which provide: “Appeal Waived. No
      Permission to Appeal Granted.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 3rd day of February, 2023.

                                      –10–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

DERICK TOBAR-GONZALEZ,                       On Appeal from the 219th Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. 219-80104-
No. 05-21-00975-CR          V.               2020.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Kennedy. Justices Partida-Kipness
                                             and Nowell participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      to strike the special findings, which provide: “Appeal Waived. No
      Permission to Appeal Granted.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 3rd day of February, 2023.

                                      –11–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

DERICK TOBAR-GONZALEZ,                       On Appeal from the 219th Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. 219-80105-
No. 05-21-00976-CR          V.               2020.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Kennedy. Justices Partida-Kipness
                                             and Nowell participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      to strike the special findings, which provide: “Appeal Waived. No
      Permission to Appeal Granted.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 3rd day of February, 2023.

                                      –12–