Court Opinion

ID: 9961875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-20 18:15:14.117648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:07.423450
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00008-CR

                               COURT OF APPEALS

                     THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                       CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

                      EX PARTE DEANDRE TIREON ENOCH

               ON APPEAL FROM THE 25TH DISTRICT COURT
                      OF LAVACA COUNTY, TEXAS

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

    Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Peña
              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

       Appellant Deandre Tireon Enoch appeals the trial court’s denial of his application

for pretrial writ of habeas corpus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.08. In one

issue, Enoch argues that the trial court erred in denying habeas relief because double

jeopardy and collateral estoppel bar any attempt by the State to retry him for murder

following the trial court’s grant of mistrial. We affirm.
                                    I.      BACKGROUND

      Enoch was charged with murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02. Trial

commenced for Enoch’s case on November 1, 2022. After the jury was sworn, Enoch

pleaded not guilty. After the State concluded its opening statements, Enoch’s counsel

approached the bench and informed the trial court that one of the prosecutors (Prosecutor

A) was not eligible to practice law in Texas and lodged a motion for mistrial. Outside the

presence of the jury, Enoch’s counsel explained that Prosecutor A was included in a list

of lawyers ineligible to practice law in Texas on the State Bar of Texas website.

Prosecutor A then requested she be permitted to contact the State Bar, which was

granted by the trial court. The following exchange occurred:

      [Enoch’s Counsel]:                 I think [Prosecutor A] probably needs to ask
                                         the State Bar how long she’s been ineligible
                                         because she’s signed almost every pleading
                                         in this case and presided over the grand jury
                                         proceedings.

      [Prosecutor A]:                    Your Honor, I have the State Bar on the
                                         phone. They said that I can make payment
                                         and that I’ll be—that I was suspended in [sic]
                                         September, 1st, but that I can make payment
                                         immediately and that they would reinstate
                                         me . . . immediately and that that would be
                                         backdated until September 1st, the
                                         suspension. They also said that since this is
                                         my first time I can have it expunged, but the
                                         expunction might take a couple of days. Is
                                         that correct, ma’am? Did I explain that
                                         correctly?

      [State Bar Representative]:        Yes.

      [Prosecutor A]:                    So as soon as I make payment it will be
                                         backdated to me being instated. I’m making
                                         payment right now, Your Honor.

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      The Court:                     Court’s in recess.

After a recess, the trial court heard arguments regarding Enoch’s motion for mistrial

outside the presence of the jury:

      [Enoch’s Counsel]:             Judge, at all times that—I guess, if it is, in
                                     fact, from September, which she was
                                     ineligible to practice law, she filed motions
                                     on behalf of the State. She entered an
                                     appearance here while she was ineligible.
                                     We would ask for a mistrial based on those
                                     grounds.

      The Court:                     [Prosecutor A].

      [Prosecutor A]:                Your Honor, the State Bar of Texas has sent
                                     me a letter saying that they have reinstated
                                     me. I was informed by the membership
                                     accounting manager . . . that as soon as I
                                     paid my dues I would be reinstated and that
                                     it would be backdated to the suspension
                                     date in September. She will be providing
                                     me—hopefully providing me a letter later
                                     today from her director saying that it will be
                                     backdated. The letter—I can present to you
                                     the letter. It was not done intentionally, Your
                                     Honor. I did not realize that I was
                                     suspended.

      [Enoch’s Counsel]:             The facts are in front of you, Judge. I mean,
                                     at the time that she began this case, at the
                                     time she was entering pleadings, at the time
                                     she was continuing to give us discovery, at
                                     least from that it appears that she was
                                     ineligible to practice law, so it’s certainly up
                                     to you, Judge, but those are the facts.

The trial court granted Enoch’s motion for mistrial without prejudice and subsequently

excused the jury. The trial court reset the trial to commence on January 6, 2023.

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        On November 28, 2022, Enoch filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus,

arguing that the State was barred under “the protections against ‘Double Jeopardy,’ and

collateral estoppel” from retrying Enoch because the trial court granted his motion for

mistrial after jeopardy had attached. Specifically, Enoch stated:

        All of the circumstances prompting the mistrial were attributable to the State
        of Texas not adhering to the rules in which the practice of law in the State
        of Texas has simply set forth to assure the system can be accountable for
        those who have sworn to uphold the law before it. In this case, like in others,
        there is no judicial admonishment to the jury which can cure an ineligible
        lawyer litigating a murder trial on behalf of the State of Texas, and the
        ensuing motion for mistrial by the [sic] DEANDRE TIREON ENOCH cannot
        fairly be described as the result of his free election but leaving him with a
        ‘Hobson’s choice’ between giving up his first jury and continuing a trial
        tainted by prosecutorial error. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600,
        609 (1976). It is clear that the tenets of Double Jeopardy bar any further
        prosecution under the indictment in this case.

        On January 6, 2023, the State filed its response to Enoch’s writ application, arguing

among other things that it had no intent to “goad” Enoch into moving for a mistrial. On the

same day, the trial court held a hearing on Enoch’s writ application and heard arguments

from the parties. No additional evidence was admitted at the hearing. At the conclusion

of the hearing, the trial court pronounced its ruling:

        In this case no witnesses were called. The only thing that happened was
        that there was an opening statement. If nothing, it paints a picture for the
        defense on where the State intends to go. They have that knowledge going
        forward, but there’s no prejudice to Mr. Enoch under this scenario, so the
        writ is denied.

The trial court subsequently signed and entered its written order denying Enoch’s habeas

writ application on January 10, 2023. 1 This appeal ensued. See Greenwell v. Ct. of

       1 The trial court did not issue any findings of facts or conclusions of law in its order denying Enoch’s

habeas writ application, and the parties did not request any.

                                                      4
Appeals for the Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 159 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (orig.

proceeding) (“An order denying relief on the merits is a final judgment in the habeas

corpus proceeding.”).

                                     II.     DOUBLE JEOPARDY

        In his sole issue, Enoch argues that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial

habeas writ application because double jeopardy barred the State from retrying his case. 2

A.      Standard of Review and Applicable Law

        “A defendant may use a pretrial writ of habeas corpus only in very limited

circumstances.” Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A pretrial

writ application is improper when resolution of the question presented, even if resolved in

defendant’s favor, would not result in immediate release. Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617,

619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). A defendant may use a pretrial habeas application to assert

his constitutional protections with respect to double jeopardy. Ex parte Ingram, 533

S.W.3d 887, at 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619.

        We generally review a trial court’s ruling on an application for writ of habeas corpus

using an abuse-of-discretion standard, and we view any evidence in the light most

favorable to that ruling and defer to implied factual findings supported by the record. Ex

parte Fusselman, 621 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d).

         2 Enoch also argues that collateral estoppel barred the State from retrying his case. However,

Enoch has presented no argument, case citations, or record citations related to this sub-issue. Therefore,
Enoch has waived this sub-issue through inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Wolfe v. State,
509 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“An appellate court has no obligation to construct and
compose an appellant’s issues, facts, and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and to the
record.” (cleaned up)); Briceno v. State, 675 S.W.3d 87, 96 (Tex. App.—Waco 2023, no pet.) (finding waiver
where appellant “inadequately briefed” an issue).
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A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or without reference

to any guiding rules or principles. Ex parte Allen, 619 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). We must uphold the trial court’s judgment if it is

correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Ex parte K.W., 650 S.W.3d 862, 868

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022, no pet.).

       In a habeas corpus proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of alleging and

proving specific facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief. See Druery v. State, 412

S.W.3d 523, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Our review of the habeas court’s ruling may

include the evidence adduced at the habeas hearing and the record as it existed before

the habeas court at the time of the hearing. Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d 681, 695 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio, 2018 pet ref’d) (citing Ex parte Coleman, 350 S.W.3d 155, 160 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio, 2011 no pet.)).

       Generally, a criminal defendant may not be put in jeopardy by the State twice for

the same offense. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Pierson v. State, 426 S.W.3d 763, 769 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014). In cases tried by a jury, a defendant is placed in jeopardy when the jury

is empaneled and sworn. Pierson, 426 S.W.3d at 769 (quoting Arizona v. Washington,

434 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)). When a defendant requests a mistrial, as occurred in this

case, the defendant has elected to terminate the proceedings against him and the double-

jeopardy clause generally does not bar retrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672–

73 (1982); Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (adopting the

standard articulated in Kennedy for determining when to grant double jeopardy relief after

a defense-requested mistrial). However, when the prosecutor’s actions giving rise to the

                                              6
motion for mistrial were done “to goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial,” the

Double Jeopardy Clause will bar retrial. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672–73 (quoting United

States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)); see Ex parte Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d 494,

507–508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting that Kennedy cited with approval several cases

in which retrial had been barred when the prosecution deliberately engaged in conduct

with the specific intent to avoid an acquittal).

       Thus, in Texas, when a defendant moves for a mistrial and subsequently claims

retrial is barred by double jeopardy, the habeas court, and all subsequent reviewing

courts, must determine whether: (1) the prosecutor engaged in conduct to goad or

provoke the defense into requesting a mistrial; or (2) the prosecutor deliberately engaged

in the conduct at issue with the intent to avoid an acquittal. Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 697

(first citing Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507–08; then citing Lewis, 219 S.W.3d at 336;

and then citing Coleman, 350 S.W.3d at 160).

       The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006), set out the following non-exclusive factors to assist the trial court when

assessing whether a prosecutor’s misconduct goaded or provoked the defendant into

requesting a mistrial:

       (1) Was the misconduct a reaction to abort a trial that was “going badly for
           the State?” In other words, at the time the prosecutor acted, did it
           reasonably appear that the defendant would likely obtain an acquittal?

       (2) Was the misconduct repeated despite the trial court’s admonitions?

       (3) Did the prosecutor provide a reasonable, “good faith” explanation for the
           conduct?

       (4) Was the conduct “clearly erroneous”?

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       (5) Was there a legally or factually plausible basis for the conduct despite
           its impropriety?

       (6) Were the prosecutor’s actions leading up to the mistrial consistent with
           inadvertence, lack of judgment, or negligence, or were they
           intentional . . . misconduct?

Id. at 323–24 (modified to delete “reckless misconduct” from the sixth factor per Lewis,

219 S.W.3d at 337–371); see also Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 697 n.8 (citing cases

modifying the sixth Wheeler factor in light of Lewis).

B.     Discussion

       In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Enoch’s

habeas writ application, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s denial using the Wheeler factors. See Fusselman, 621 S.W.3d at 116; Martinez,

560 S.W.3d at 697.

       Before addressing the Wheeler factors, we note that “[w]ithin ten days of being

admitted to practice law in Texas, a [State Bar] member must file with the clerk the

enrollment form prescribed by the State Bar and pay all required fees.” TEX. STATE BAR

R. art. III, § 2, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A. “All membership

fees are payable at the time of enrollment as a member of the State Bar and annually on

the first day of the State Bar’s fiscal year.” Id. § 4. The State Bar Rules also provide for

the automatic suspension from the practice of law of any member who is in default of

payment of membership fees. See id. § 6. Article III, § 6, specifically provides:

       If a member is in default of payment of membership fees or any assessment
       levied by the Court on the 30th day after the due date, the clerk will promptly
       notify the member of the default. If the fees and assessments are not paid
       within 60 days after the notice of default is mailed, the defaulting member

                                              8
       will automatically be suspended from the practice of law. Practicing law
       while suspended is professional misconduct and grounds for discipline.

Id. This point is reiterated under Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct

8.04(11), which states that a lawyer shall not

       engage in the practice of law when the lawyer is on inactive status, except
       as permitted by section 81.053 of the Government Code and Article XIII of
       the State Bar Rules, or when the lawyer’s right to practice has been
       suspended or terminated including, but not limited to, situations where a
       lawyer’s right to practice has been administratively suspended for failure to
       timely pay required fees or assessments or for failure to comply with Article
       XII of the State Bar Rules relating to Mandatory Continuing Legal
       Education . . . .

TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.04(a)(11), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE

ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app., app. A (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9). The State Bar Rules

also provides a method for a member suspended for nonpayment of fees to be restored

to active status:

       When a member who has been suspended for nonpayment of fees or
       assessments removes the default by payment of fees or assessments then
       owing plus an additional amount equivalent to one-half the delinquency, the
       suspension will automatically be lifted and the member restored to former
       status. Return to former status is retroactive to the inception of the
       suspension, but does not affect any proceeding for discipline of the member
       for professional misconduct.

TEX. STATE BAR R. art. III, § 10(a). Here, the parties do not dispute that Prosecutor A’s

engagement in the practice of law while suspended by the State Bar for nonpayment of

fees constituted misconduct.

       Regarding the first Wheeler factor, there is no evidence that Prosecutor A’s

misconduct was a reaction to abort a trial that was “going badly for the State.” At the time

Enoch sought a mistrial—after the State’s opening statements—no evidence had yet

                                             9
been presented to the jury. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Enoch would

have likely obtained an acquittal but for Prosecutor A’s misconduct. See Wheeler, 203

S.W.3d at 324; see also State v. Rushing, No. 09-16-00423-CR, 2017 WL 4182316, at *8

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 20, 2017, pet. ref’d) (“The fact that the mistrial occurred at

a very early stage in the proceedings further supports our view that double jeopardy does

not bar Rushing from being retried.”).

        Regarding the second Wheeler factor, there is no evidence demonstrating that

Prosecutor A continued to commit misconduct despite admonitions from the trial court.

Instead, the evidence demonstrates that mistrial was granted shortly after Enoch lodged

his request for mistrial, and the trial court made no admonitions to Prosecutor A. In

addition, before mistrial was granted, Prosecutor A informed the trial court that she had

paid her outstanding State Bar fees and received a letter from the State Bar indicating

that her eligibility to practice law was reinstated retroactive to the date of suspension. 3

See TEX. STATE BAR R. art. III, § 10(a).

        Regarding the third, fourth, and fifth Wheeler factors, Prosecutor A explained that

her nonpayment of State Bar fees was not intentional and that she had not realized she

was suspended. Prosecutor A’s actions in engaging in the practice of law while

suspended for nonpayment of fees was clearly erroneous. See TEX. STATE BAR R. art. III,

§ 6 (“Practicing law while suspended is professional misconduct and grounds for

discipline.”); see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.04(a)(11). However,

          3 We note that, in its response to Enoch’s habeas writ application, the State attached a letter from

the State Bar, dated November 1, 2022, indicating that Prosecutor A was “currently on active status and
eligible to practice law in Texas.”

                                                     10
the trial court could have found Prosecutor A’s explanation that she was unaware of her

suspension to be a reasonable and good faith explanation for her misconduct and a

factually plausible basis for her actions despite their impropriety. More importantly,

regarding these factors, we have found no evidence establishing that Prosecutor A

deliberately engaged in misconduct with the specific intent to avoid an acquittal or to goad

Enoch into requesting a mistrial. See Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507–508; Lewis, 219

S.W.3d at 336; Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 697.

        Regarding the sixth Wheeler factor, Prosecutor A explained to the trial court that

she was unaware of her suspension by the State Bar. 4 The record also shows that upon

learning of her suspension, Prosecutor A paid her outstanding fees, was reinstated by the

State Bar, and became eligible to practice law that same day. Given the evidence of the

actions taken by Prosecutor A and her testimony relating thereto, the trial court could

have found that Prosecutor A’s misconduct was the result of negligence, and inconsistent

with intentional misconduct. Such negligence does not bar retrial. See Masonheimer, 220

S.W.3d at 507–508; Lewis, 219 S.W.3d at 336; Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 697.

        Based on an examination of the evidence under the appropriate standard of

review, and considering the Wheeler factors, we hold the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Enoch habeas relief. See Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507–08;

         4 Enoch argues that Prosecutor A’s statement during the mistrial hearing that the only thing she

could think of regarding her suspension was that she forgot to pay her bar dues “strongly suggests” that
she was “already aware of her [suspended] status with the State Bar.” As the trier of fact, the trial court was
free to reject that view of the prosecutor’s testimony. See Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012) (“The factfinder exclusively determines the weight and credibility of evidence.”). In addition, we
are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we defer to implied
factual findings supported by the record. See Fusselman, 621 S.W.3d at 116.
                                                       11
Lewis, 219 S.W.3d at 336; Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 697. Accordingly, we overrule

Enoch’s sole issue.

                                   III.   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                       NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                       Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
18th day of April, 2024.

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