Court Opinion

ID: 9838820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 13:07:25.740251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:02.009936
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kurt Phillip Hoerath,                         :
                   Appellant                  :
                                              :
       v.                                     : No. 946 C.D. 2022
                                              :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                 :
Department of Transportation,                 :
Bureau of Driver Licensing                    : Submitted: May 26, 2023

BEFORE:         HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
                HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE CEISLER                                                 FILED: September 8, 2023

       Kurt Phillip Hoerath (Licensee) appeals from the August 8, 2022 Order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County (Trial Court) dismissing his statutory
appeal from the one-year suspension of his operating privilege imposed by the
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT), pursuant to
Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i), commonly
known as the Implied Consent Law.1                  DOT imposed the suspension due to
Licensee’s refusal to submit to chemical testing following his arrest for violating

       1
           Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Implied Consent Law states:

       If any person placed under arrest for a violation of [S]ection 3802 [of the Vehicle
       Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or a
       controlled substance (DUI)),] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses
       to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer,
       [DOT] shall suspend the operating privilege of the person . . . for a period of 12
       months.

75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i).
Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802 (relating to DUI). We affirm
the Trial Court’s Order.
                                   Background
      On March 14, 2022, DOT notified Licensee that it was suspending his
operating privilege for a period of one year, effective April 18, 2022, due to his
refusal to submit to chemical testing on February 14, 2022, in violation of Section
1547(b)(1)(i) of the Implied Consent Law. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 49a.
      Licensee appealed to the Trial Court, which held an evidentiary hearing on
July 22, 2022. At the hearing, DOT presented the testimony of Pennsylvania State
Trooper Aaron Peterson. Licensee was present at the hearing but did not testify.
Both parties were represented by counsel.
      Trooper Peterson testified that he had seven and one-half years’ experience as
a State Trooper and had received training in both DUIs and field sobriety testing.
Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 7/22/22, at 4, 10. Trooper Peterson estimated that he
had made “dozens” of DUI arrests “throughout the years.” Id. at 10.
      Trooper Peterson testified that on February 14, 2022, he was dispatched to
respond to a 911 report of a hit-and-run accident. Id. at 5. At the scene, Trooper
Peterson met the 911 caller, Barbara Kick, who had advised dispatch that her vehicle
“was rear-ended in front of Sheetz on Portage Street,” that she followed the vehicle
to a house on Prospect Street in the Borough of Portage “while she was on the phone
with dispatch,” and that she observed the male driver going “into a house on that
street.” Id. Ms. Kick’s 911 call was received at 4:53 p.m., Trooper Peterson was
dispatched at 5:02 p.m., and Trooper Peterson arrived at the home on Prospect Street
at 5:17 p.m., “[t]wenty-four minutes from time of dispatch.” Id. at 5-6.

                                         2
      When Trooper Peterson arrived at the scene on Prospect Street, Ms. Kick was
standing outside of her vehicle, which was parked in front of the vehicle that had
rear-ended her. Id. at 6, 25. Trooper Peterson was able to identify Licensee’s vehicle
because Ms. Kick had “provided [dispatch] with a description of the vehicle and a
[license] plate number.” Id. at 6. Trooper Peterson testified that Licensee exited his
home “[s]hortly after” he arrived and “walked down to the street where [Trooper
Peterson] was speaking to [Ms.] Kick.” Id. at 6-7, 20. Licensee’s vehicle was parked
next to the curb “about [one] house down from his actual residence,” but the vehicle
was not running. Id. at 7.
      Trooper Peterson asked Licensee to provide his driver’s license, vehicle
registration, and proof of insurance. Id. Licensee opened the passenger door of his
vehicle and sat in the front passenger seat while “attempting to get the information.”
Id. Trooper Peterson testified that while he was speaking with Licensee, Licensee’s
“speech was slow, his eyes were watery,” and he “could smell alcohol coming from
[Licensee] at that time.” Id. Trooper Peterson testified that the smell of alcohol
emanating from Licensee was so strong that he could smell it while he was standing
outside Licensee’s vehicle. Id.
      When Trooper Peterson asked Licensee about the accident, “[Licensee]
related that . . . he did strike Ms. Kick, rear-ended her. But he explained that it
happened further [sic] up from where it actually happened. And he explained that
Ms. Kick flipped him off, and he was afraid for his safety and fled home.” Id. at 8.
Trooper Peterson estimated that the distance between the accident scene and
Licensee’s home is “about a mile.” Id.

                                          3
       Trooper Peterson asked Licensee if he had been drinking, and Licensee replied
that he had attended a funeral earlier and “when he arrived home, . . . he drank a few
beers and a few shots to calm his nerves.” Id. at 9.
       Trooper Peterson asked Licensee to perform field sobriety testing, but
Licensee replied that “he wasn’t taking any tests, and that he wasn’t getting out of
his car in the seated position.” Id. at 8. When Trooper Peterson asked Licensee a
second time to exit his vehicle, Licensee complied and gave the trooper his driver’s
license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Id. at 9, 17. Trooper Peterson
then testified:

       Based on my training and experience, typically when somebody flees
       the scene of a crash, it’s . . . for only a couple of reasons. One, typically
       intoxication or usually [his or her] license is suspended . . . . And being
       that I was able to hear [Licensee’s] slow speech and his eyes were
       watery, and he admitted to drinking even at home, based on my
       experience, [he] was probably under the influence during the crash.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
       Trooper Peterson testified that after Licensee refused field sobriety testing,
the following exchange took place:

       At that time [Licensee] was in a standing position in front of me, and
       he continued to put his hands in his vest. He was wearing like a
       motorcycle-style leather vest. It was very cold that day, . . . about 14
       degrees. . . . He said his hands were cold. I asked him to remove his
       hands from his pocket just for officer safety. I was going to allow him
       to put his hands in his pockets based on the weather, but he relayed
       [that] he had a revolver in his right pocket. So at that time I placed him
       into custody to remove the revolver from his pocket.

       ....

       After I took him into custody, I placed him in handcuffs. I asked his
       wife to remove the revolver from his pocket and she did. She took the

                                            4
      revolver, and I believe she placed it in the house at that time. And I
      placed [Licensee] inside of my patrol vehicle because of the weather.

Id. at 10-11.2 Trooper Peterson observed that after he placed Licensee inside the
patrol vehicle, the smell of alcohol emanating from Licensee “made the entire patrol
car interior smell like alcohol.” Id. at 23.
      After consulting with the District Attorney’s Office by telephone, Trooper
Peterson read the implied consent warnings from DOT’s DL-26B Form3 to Licensee
while they were seated inside the patrol vehicle. Id. at 11-12; see R.R. at 53a.
Trooper Peterson testified that Licensee refused to sign the DL-26B Form, telling
the trooper that “he wasn’t signing anything.” N.T., 7/22/22, at 12; see R.R. at 53a.
Licensee refused to sign the form again after he stepped out of the patrol vehicle,
stating “that he was not signing that paper.” N.T., 7/22/22, at 13. Licensee also
refused to submit to a blood test. Id.
      On cross-examination, Trooper Peterson testified that Licensee told him that
he had fled the accident scene because he felt threatened by Ms. Kick. Id. at 17.
Trooper Peterson also admitted that he had no evidence to dispute Licensee’s claim
that Ms. Kick had threatened him. Id. Trooper Peterson testified that he did not
charge Licensee with DUI. Id. at 18. Trooper Peterson reiterated that Licensee’s
“speech was slow and his eyes were watery” and further testified that Licensee “was
slow walking,” but he was not staggering. Id. at 19.
      On re-direct examination, Trooper Peterson testified that “Ms. Kick is a short,
petite woman[] . . . in her late 60[]s to early 70[]s in age,” who probably weighs

      2
          Licensee had a license to carry a firearm. N.T., 7/22/22, at 18.

      3
         The DL-26B Form contains the implied consent warnings required to be given when a
police officer requests a chemical test of a licensee’s blood.

                                                 5
“120-30 pounds.” Id. at 21.4 Trooper Peterson also reiterated the reasons why he
believed Licensee had driven his vehicle while under the influence, as follows:

       I believe that based on the totality of the circumstances that he was
       under the influence based on his fleeing from a scene. As I explained
       earlier, typically people only flee for certain reasons and typically
       intoxication is one of them based on my training and experience. There
       are other reasons as well, but that was . . . my reasoning for thinking
       that he was under the influence at that time.

       ....

       As well as the smell of his breath, his actions, his eyes, and his speech.

Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added).
       Finally, Trooper Peterson testified that, with regard to Licensee’s assertion
that he fled because he was threatened, “[b]ased on [Ms.] Kick’s size and stature,
and [the fact] that [Licensee] was carrying a firearm, I don’t believe there would be
any other reason to be threatened by a small female.” Id. at 24-25. Trooper Peterson
also testified that, had Licensee felt threatened, “he could have pulled off into
multiple businesses at that time to exchange information.” Id. at 25.
       Following the hearing, on August 8, 2022, the Trial Court entered an Order
dismissing Licensee’s statutory appeal. In its Order, The Trial Court explained:

       In reaching this determination, the [Trial] Court relies upon the case
       law cited within [DOT’s] brief, supportive of the following
       propositions: 1) that the trooper is permitted to rely upon third-party
       witness testimony to develop reasonable grounds that [Licensee] was
       the operator of the vehicle at issue; and 2) that the trooper can utilize
       his own observations and experience to form reasonable grounds for
       suspecting that [Licensee] was driving while intoxicated.

       4
          Licensee was born on January 25, 1964, see R.R. at 49a, so he was 58 years old at the
time of the hit-and-run accident.

                                              6
Trial Ct. Order, 8/8/22, at 1.5 Licensee now appeals to this Court.6
                                            Analysis
       First, Licensee asserts that the Trial Court erred in concluding that DOT
satisfied its burden of proving a violation of the Implied Consent Law. According
to Licensee, DOT “presented no first-hand testimony relative to [Licensee’s]
condition . . . at the time of the operation of his motor vehicle” and “no evidence . .
. as to whether [Licensee] had indulged in alcohol prior to, or during, his operation
of the vehicle.” Licensee Br. at 10.
       To support the suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege under the
Implied Consent Law, DOT must prove that the licensee: (1) was arrested by an
officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that he or she was driving, operating,
or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle while in violation of
Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3)
refused to do so; and (4) was warned that a refusal would result in the suspension of
his or her operating privilege. Garlick v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 176 A.3d 1030, 1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc).
       The only element at issue in this case is whether DOT met its burden of
proving that Trooper Peterson had reasonable grounds to believe that Licensee
operated his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.
Our Supreme Court has explained that “[r]easonable grounds exist when a person in
the position of the police officer, viewing the facts and circumstances as they

       5
         On October 5, 2022, the Trial Court issued a one-page Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, in
which it merely reaffirmed its August 8, 2022 Order.

       6
        Our review is limited to determining whether the Trial Court committed an error of law
or abused its discretion or whether the Trial Court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence. Reinhart v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 954 A.2d 761, 765 n.3 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2008).

                                                7
appeared at the time, could have concluded that the motorist was operating the
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” Banner v. Dep’t of
Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 737 A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. 1999) (emphasis
added). Furthermore:

       [A]n officer need not witness the licensee operating a vehicle to place
       him under arrest for driving under the influence. Additionally, an
       officer’s reasonable belief that the licensee was driving while under the
       influence will justify a request to submit to chemical testing if “one
       reasonable interpretation of the circumstances” as they appeared at
       the time supports the officer’s belief. Further, courts appropriately
       defer to an investigating officer’s experience and observations where
       reasonable grounds exist to support the officer’s belief based on the
       totality of the circumstances.

Yencha v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 187 A.3d 1038, 1044-45
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
       Here, the evidence of record established that: (1) Licensee admitted to Trooper
Peterson that he had rear-ended Ms. Kick’s vehicle and left the scene;7 (2) Trooper
Peterson arrived at Licensee’s home 24 minutes after Ms. Kick’s 911 call and met
Licensee shortly thereafter; (3) Trooper Peterson observed that although Licensee
was not staggering, his gait was slow, his eyes were glassy, and his speech was slow;
(4) Licensee admitted to Trooper Peterson that he had been drinking; (5) during their
interaction, Trooper Peterson smelled a strong odor of alcohol emanating from
Licensee, both while standing outside Licensee’s vehicle and while Licensee was
sitting inside the patrol vehicle; and (6) Licensee refused field sobriety testing.8

       7
         In his appellate brief, Licensee admits that “[t]here is no dispute that he was the operator
of the vehicle in question.” Licensee Br. at 10 n.1.

       8
           In his brief, Licensee asserts:

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                 8
Trooper Peterson also discredited Licensee’s statement that he fled the accident
scene because he felt threatened by Ms. Kick, given her appearance and the fact that
Licensee was carrying a concealed weapon. N.T., 7/22/22, at 24-25. Based on his
training and experience, Trooper Peterson believed that Licensee fled the scene
because he was intoxicated. Id. at 9, 22.
       Considering the totality of the circumstances known by Trooper Peterson at
the time he took Licensee into custody, coupled with the trooper’s training and
experience with DUI arrests, we conclude that Trooper Peterson had reasonable
grounds to believe that Licensee operated his vehicle while under the influence. See
Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Doyle, 520 A.2d 917, 919 (Pa. Cmwlth.

       Upon smelling the odor of alcohol, the [t]rooper asked [Licensee] to perform field
       sobriety tests, which [Licensee] initially refused to do. The [t]rooper then asked
       him again and [Licensee] complied with his request.

Licensee Br. at 5 (emphasis added). The record, however, directly refutes this claim. Trooper
Peterson clearly testified that Licensee refused all field sobriety testing, as follows:

       Q[.] . . . [Did] you ask him to take a field sobriety test[] . . . ?

       A[.] Yes.

       Q[.] And what test did you ask him to take, do you recall?

       A[.] I had asked him to do a[] [horizontal gaze nystagmus test], which is checking
       his eyes, as well as standardized field sobriety tests.

       Q[.] Did he let you do that?

       A[.] He did not.

       Q[.] Did he let you do any field sobriety test?

       A[.] He did not.

N.T., 7/22/22, at 10 (emphasis added); see id. at 8 (Trooper Peterson testified that Licensee told
him that “he wasn’t taking any tests”) (emphasis added).

                                                    9
1987) (“We agree with [DOT] that [the licensee’s] involvement in an accident,
combined with the strong odor of alcohol on his breath, are circumstances under
which a reasonable person could conclude that [the licensee] was operating the
vehicle under the influence of alcohol.”) (emphasis added).
      Licensee also asserts that because Trooper Peterson arrived at his home 24
minutes after Ms. Kick’s 911 call, DOT failed to prove that Licensee had been
drinking before operating his vehicle, rather than after he arrived home. We
disagree.
      At the hearing, Trooper Peterson testified: “Alcohol was emanating from
[Licensee’s] breath as we were speaking, and I was outdoors at the time and I could
smell it. When I placed him in the patrol car, it made the entire patrol car interior
smell like alcohol.” N.T., 7/22/22, at 23. Trooper Peterson also observed other
visible signs of intoxication, including Licensee’s slow gait, glassy eyes, and slowed
speech. Id. at 7, 19, 23-24. On re-direct examination, Trooper Peterson was asked
about the strong odor of alcohol emanating from Licensee during their interaction,
as follows: “[I]f somebody was drinking . . . within a 15-minute period from that,
based on your experience, would they have that strong of an odor?” N.T., 7/22/22,
at 23. Trooper Peterson replied, “I don’t believe so. There would be no signs of
intoxication in that short of [a] timeframe.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Com. v.
MacPherson, 752 A.2d 384, 387 n.3 (Pa. 2000) (“Alcohol does not have intoxicating
effects until it is absorbed into the bloodstream. Once alcohol is imbibed, however,
it is not absorbed by the body immediately. Absorption occurs within thirty to ninety
minutes after consumption.”) (emphasis added); Hasson v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau
of Driver Licensing, 866 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (“Case law in DUI
criminal cases teaches that alcohol is not intoxicating until absorbed into the

                                         10
bloodstream and that absorption takes place thirty to ninety minutes after
consumption.”). Given the 24-minute timeframe between Ms. Kick’s 911 call and
Trooper Peterson’s arrival at Licensee’s home, as well as the indicia of intoxication
exhibited by Licensee, we conclude that Trooper Peterson had reasonable grounds
to believe that Licensee had been drinking before operating his vehicle.
      Next, Licensee asserts that DOT failed to prove an Implied Consent Law
violation because Trooper Peterson never arrested him for DUI. Licensee Br. at 7.
Licensee contends that Trooper Peterson placed him into custody for possessing a
firearm, not for suspicion of DUI, and, thus, the trooper had no authority to request
that he submit to a blood test. Id. at 12-13.
      “The question of whether or not a driver has been ‘placed under arrest’ for
purposes of Section 1547(b) of the [Implied Consent Law] is a factual, rather than a
legal determination, and all that is necessary is that the driver be under the custody
and control of the person effecting the arrest.” Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
Licensing v. McGlynn, 611 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (emphasis added).
Contrary to Licensee’s assertion, “[a] formal declaration of arrest is not required.”
Id. Rather, “the relevant inquiry is whether the driver, at the time he was asked to
submit to the chemical test, should have inferred from the totality of the
circumstances that he was under the control and custody of the officer.” Id.
(emphasis added); see also McCrorey v. Dep’t of Transp., 619 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1992) (“Even though a suspect taken into custody for an offense other than
DUI or those under the Vehicle Code may not believe [he or she is] being arrested
for DUI, this does not preclude a finding that the circumstances surrounding the
arrest, coupled with subsequent events occurring while the suspect is in police

                                          11
custody, would put a reasonable person on notice that [he or she is] also being held
in custody for DUI.”) (emphasis added).
      The record shows that after handcuffing Licensee and placing him inside the
patrol vehicle, Trooper Peterson read the implied consent warnings from the DL-
26B Form to Licensee. N.T., 7/22/22, at 11-12. The first warning on the DL-26B
Form informed Licensee: “You are under arrest for driving under the influence of
alcohol or a controlled substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code.”
R.R. at 53a (emphasis added). The third warning on the DL-26B Form informed
Licensee that his operating privilege would be suspended for at least 12 months if
he refused a blood test. See id. After Trooper Peterson read these warnings,
Licensee repeatedly refused to sign the form and refused to submit to a blood test.
N.T., 7/22/22, at 13. While Trooper Peterson testified that he initially placed
Licensee into custody for possessing a firearm, the totality of the circumstances,
including the events that subsequently occurred inside the patrol vehicle, should
have placed Licensee on notice that he was being held in custody for DUI. See
McCrorey, 619 A.2d at 799. Therefore, we conclude that DOT established, through
Trooper Peterson’s credible testimony, that Licensee was in his custody and control,
and thus “under arrest” for DUI, when he requested the blood test as required by the
Implied Consent Law.
                                   Conclusion
      We conclude that the Trial Court correctly determined, based on the evidence
of record, that DOT satisfied its burden of proving that Trooper Peterson had
reasonable grounds to believe that Licensee operated his vehicle while under the

                                          12
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Accordingly, we affirm the Trial
Court’s Order.

                                       ____________________________
                                       ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                      13
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kurt Phillip Hoerath,               :
                   Appellant        :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 946 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,       :
Department of Transportation,       :
Bureau of Driver Licensing          :

                                 ORDER

      AND NOW, this 8th day of September, 2023, the August 8, 2022 Order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                      ____________________________
                                      ELLEN CEISLER, Judge