Court Opinion

ID: 9556059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 22:04:07.953628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:08.856610
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/15/23 In re A.F. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re A.F.,                                                    B322139

 a Person Coming Under the                                      (Los Angeles County
 Juvenile Court Law.                                             Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00215)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 ANTHONY F.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tamara Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
      Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      _____________________

      Appellant Anthony F. (Father) challenges the juvenile
court’s assertion of jurisdiction over his child, A.F., under Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 300, and its order removing A.F.
from his custody under section 361. The primary basis for both
the jurisdiction finding and removal order was a series of
incidents where Father perpetrated domestic violence against
A.F.’s mother, Alicia F. (Mother).2 We find that substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction
under one of the two grounds relied upon by the juvenile court,
and thus affirm that order. We further conclude that the juvenile
court’s order removing A.F. from Father’s custody was supported
by substantial evidence.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Before marrying Father, Mother was married to Lawrence
C.; they married in 2005, had a daughter named Lauren C. in
2007, and divorced in 2016 or 2017. Father and Mother married
in 2018, and their daughter A.F. was born in September 2019. As
Lawrence was incarcerated from the time of Lauren’s birth
through September 2021, Lauren lived with Mother, Father, and
A.F.

      1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
      2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

                                 2
      On December 24, 2020, Mother filed for divorce from
Father. In the family court proceedings, Mother requested full
physical custody of A.F. and joint legal custody with Father.
Mother had not finalized the divorce by the time the juvenile
court issued the jurisdiction and disposition orders which are the
subject of this appeal.
A.     DCFS Investigation
       On December 10, 2021, respondent Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a
referral alleging Father emotionally and physically abused A.F.
The reporting party stated that on August 26, 2021, Father got
upset with Mother because A.F. was making a mess, and threw a
vase at Mother. The vase broke and cut Mother’s thigh,
requiring 19 stitches. The reporting party indicated there had
been two other incidents of domestic violence between Father and
Mother.
       On December 14, 2021, a social worker spoke with the
manager of the apartment building where A.F. reportedly lived.
The building manager believed that both Mother and Father
lived there with two children, a two-year-old and a 14-year-old.
She indicated that Father smoked marijuana in the home, and
the neighbors complained that Mother and Father fight.
       On December 16, 2021, the social worker went to the family
home and interviewed Mother and Lauren separately. Mother
indicated that Father did not live at the apartment but came to
see A.F., and A.F. was with Father at the time of the interview.
The social worker asked for Father’s address, but Mother said
she did not know where he was staying. Mother denied any
domestic violence and stated that the August 2021 incident
involving the vase was an isolated event. Regarding that

                                3
incident, Mother indicated that she and Father argued after she
told him that she was going to finalize the divorce because he had
been cheating on her. Father got upset, said “whatever,” and
swung his arm. Father’s arm accidently hit the vase, which was
on the dining table. Mother explained that Father is very tall3
and very strong, so the vase broke and she was cut on her left
thigh, requiring her to get stitches. Mother stated that the
children were upstairs in their room and did not witness the
incident. Mother went to the police station the day after the
incident and filed a complaint against Father. When the social
worker told Mother DCFS had been informed about two other
domestic violence incidents between Mother and Father, Mother
denied any such other incidents.
       Lauren told the social worker that she had had thoughts of
harming herself a few weeks earlier; she indicated she was under
a lot of pressure at school and, after talking with her counselor
and Mother, she was doing much better. Lauren denied being
abused, and stated that while Mother and Father argued
sometimes, the arguments never turned physical. Lauren denied
seeing or hearing the August 2021 incident where Mother was
cut by the vase. Lauren indicated that Father lived at the home.
       The social worker returned to the family home on a
different day and met with A.F., Mother, and Father. The social
worker did not observe any marks or bruises on A.F.’s body and
observed that A.F. wanted to be held by Father. When
interviewed privately, Father denied any domestic violence with
Mother. Father stated that he and Mother were in the middle of

      3 Mother reported that Father is six feet, eight inches tall;
police reports list his height as six feet, four or five inches.

                                   4
a divorce; the plan was for Mother to get full physical custody of
A.F. and for Mother and Father to share legal custody. Father
indicated that he had moved out of the home about six months
earlier and was staying with a friend; he declined to divulge the
friend’s name or address. Describing the August 2021 incident,
Father said he and Mother started talking about the divorce. As
he was speaking, he was using his hands a lot and he
accidentally hit a vase on the table where Mother and Father
were sitting, causing it to break and fall on Mother. As Mother
was picking up the pieces, she cut her leg. Father took Mother to
the hospital, where she received stitches. According to Father,
the children were upstairs at the time and did not see the
incident.
       DCFS obtained the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
report regarding the August 26, 2021 incident. Mother went to
the police station on August 28, 2021 to file a report; Mother told
officers that she feared Father and had gone to the police station
as soon as she felt safe doing so. Mother told officers that the
incident began when Father became upset because A.F. had
made a mess, and Mother and Father began to argue. During the
argument, a glass vase came flying at Mother and, when she
raised her left arm to protect herself, the vase shattered and
caused a small cut on her arm and a larger laceration on her
thigh. Mother told the officers she was unsure whether Father
had picked up and thrown the vase, or whether he had swept his
arm across the table and struck the vase, propelling it towards
Mother. Father immediately became remorseful and stated that
it was an accident. He took Mother to the hospital, where she
received 19 sutures. Mother indicated that, because she was in
fear of Father, she did not tell hospital staff what had actually

                                5
happened, and instead stated she had dropped the vase
accidentally. The officers helped Mother obtain an emergency
protective order, which had a September 4, 2021 expiration date.
Mother told the officers that she had previously reported another
incident of domestic violence on May 10, 2020 involving Father,4
and that there were three or four other incidents of domestic
violence involving Father which she had not reported.
       On December 29, 2021, the social worker interviewed
Lauren’s father, Lawrence. Lawrence stated that he had been
seeing Lauren every other weekend and he took her out during
visits, but she did not stay overnight with him. Lawrence said
Mother informed him that Lauren had made an attempt to cut
herself, but when he asked Lauren about it, she did not provide
any details. Lawrence stated that Lauren told him that Mother
and Father argued a lot and Father would throw things around.
Lauren further told Lawrence she had taken videos of Mother
and Father arguing and screaming, but she did not show the
videos to him. Lawrence believed that Father was living with
Mother.
       On December 30, 2021, DCFS obtained LAPD logs of calls
for service Mother had made to police on May 10, 2020 and
January 23, 2021. The entry for the May 10, 2020 incident
indicated Mother had made a 911 call claiming Father assaulted
her. The log regarding the January 23, 2021 call did not have
any apparent references to Father, and stated an unknown male

     4 The date of this incident was not stated in the report,
although the report did include the number of the prior report.
DCFS later obtained an arrest report bearing this number, which
related to an incident that occurred on May 10, 2020.

                                6
was blocking a residential driveway, refusing to move, and
possibly under the influence.
      On January 3, 2022, the social worker asked Father about
the May 10, 2020 incident.5 Father stated he and Mother had
gotten into an argument, but there had been no physical
altercation. The social worker also asked Father to drug test;
Father later tested and the results came back negative as to all
substances.
      On January 11, 2022, Lawrence contacted the social worker
to ask about the status of DCFS’s investigation. Lawrence stated
that Lauren had sent him audio recordings of Mother and Father
arguing and things breaking. Lawrence believed that Lauren
was going through something as she would not otherwise have
thoughts of hurting herself.
      The social worker spoke with Lauren the next day. Lauren
denied that Father and Mother had been involved in any recent
incidents of domestic violence, and denied that she had any
recent suicidal ideation. Lauren indicated that Father was living
in the home with Mother but said everything was fine.
B.    DCFS Obtains a Protective Custody Warrant for A.F.
      After these January 2022 discussions with Lawrence and
Lauren, DCFS applied under section 340, subdivision (b) for a
protective custody warrant removing A.F. from Father’s custody.
DCFS alleged that “there [was] probable cause to believe there
[was] a substantial danger to the safety or to the physical or

     5 In her report, the social worker indicated that she “asked
about the incident [sic] on 5/10/20 and 5/10/21.” Father
responded regarding one incident which, given the context,
appears to be the May 10, 2020 incident.

                               7
emotional health of [A.F.].” In support, DCFS submitted a
declaration from the social worker who had conducted the
investigation described above setting forth the facts gathered
during that investigation. The social worker averred that she
was “seeking removal of [A.F.] from [F]ather’s custody due to his
engaging in domestic violence with [Mother] which negatively
impacts the minor.” The social worker also included a criminal
history report for Father showing incidents of domestic violence
on four dates—March 26, 2004, October 6, 2012, February 14,
2013, and May 10, 2020—among several other incidents. The
social worker averred that a police call log obtained by DCFS
“indicated the following: [¶] [On May 10, 2020,] Mother
contacted the police due to [F]ather assaulting her in the
bedroom. [¶] [On January 23, 2021,] Mother contacted the police
due [sic] domestic argument with [F]ather.”6 The social worker
also provided information from the police report regarding the
August 2021 incident, including that Mother told the officers she
was afraid of Father, that she had not disclosed to the hospital
staff what had actually happened because of her fear, that she
had previously reported an incident of domestic violence

      6 The description in the police call log of Mother’s 911 call
on May 10, 2020 can be interpreted to state that the alleged
assault took place “in the bedroom.” However, DCFS later
obtained a police report regarding the incident which disclosed
that the alleged assault occurred in the driveway of paternal
grandmother’s house, while Mother was sitting in a car; the
statement “in the bedroom” likely refers to where Father was at
the time Mother made the 911 call.
      As is noted above, the call log regarding Mother’s 911 call
on January 23, 2021 makes no apparent reference to Father.

                                 8
involving Father, and that there were four other incidents of
domestic violence involving Father which she had not reported.
       On January 13, 2022, the court issued a protective custody
warrant removing A.F. from Father’s custody. The court found
probable cause to believe there was a substantial danger to A.F.’s
safety or physical or emotional health, and that continuance in
the home of Father was contrary to A.F.’s welfare. The court also
found that there were no reasonable means to protect A.F.
without temporary removal from Father’s physical custody and
that DCFS made reasonable efforts to prevent removal.
       On January 13, 2022, the social worker contacted both
Mother and Father to notify them of the removal order. The
social worker informed both Mother and Father that, as a result
of the order, Father was not allowed to be at the family home or
to reside there.
C.    Petition and Detention
      On January 18, 2022, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on
behalf of A.F. and Lauren,7 based on allegations that Mother and
Father “have a history of engaging in violent verbal and physical
altercations in the children’s home” and that “[s]uch violent
conduct on the part of . . . [F]ather endangers the children’s
physical health and safety and places the children at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, and danger.” DCFS asserted a
claim under section 300, subdivision (a) based on the allegations
that Father’s violence against Mother created risk of “serious

      7 The juvenile court’s orders regarding Lauren are not at
issue in this appeal, and thus we include details regarding the
dependency proceedings regarding Lauren only to the extent they
are relevant to the proceedings regarding A.F.

                                9
physical harm” to the children, and a claim under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) for Mother’s alleged failure to protect the
children from Father’s violent conduct.
      On January 21, 2022, the juvenile court held a detention
hearing at which it found a prima facie case that A.F. was a child
described under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), and
vested DCFS with temporary placement and custody. The court
found Father to be the presumed father of A.F. and that it had no
reason to know that A.F. was an “Indian child” as defined in the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). The
court ordered A.F. detained from Father and released to Mother’s
home, with Father to have monitored visits at least three times a
week for three hours; Mother was not allowed to be the monitor
for Father’s visits. The court ordered family maintenance
services for A.F., Mother, and Father. Mother and Father denied
the allegations of the petition.
D.     Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
       In a jurisdiction/disposition report filed on March 23, 2022,
DCFS indicated it had obtained a police report regarding the
May 10, 2020 incident between Father and Mother, and attached
a copy of it. The report showed LAPD officers responded to the
family home in response to a call for assistance from Mother.
The officers interviewed Mother and Father separately. Mother
reported that, while she and Father were at paternal
grandmother’s house in Palmdale for a Mother’s Day party, they
began to argue after she indicated she wanted to go to a Mother’s
Day party at Lawrence’s family’s house, which was also in
Palmdale. The argument took place while Mother was sitting in
a car in the driveway of paternal grandmother’s house, and
suddenly Father swung his hand at Mother’s face. Mother pulled

                                10
her head back but Father’s hand struck her mouth. Mother
called the police after they arrived back at the family home.
Father agreed that he and Mother had argued because she
wanted to go to Lawrence’s family’s Mother’s Day gathering, but
denied striking Mother and indicated that there had been no
physical altercation between them.
       According to the police report, officers observed
“approximately two small lacerations to [Mother’s] bottom inner
lip along with redness and swelling.” Father claimed the injury
was self-inflicted and Mother probably bit her own lip to have
him arrested. Father also stated that Mother had dentures and
suffered from gingivitis, which would explain the redness and
swelling on her gums. Mother told the officers that, on a prior
occasion, Father had grabbed her arm but she pulled away and
was able to get out of his grip; she did not report this incident.
The officers arrested Father.
       The jurisdiction/disposition report also summarized various
interviews a dependency investigator had conducted on March 16
and 18, 2022. Lawrence stated that Mother had stopped allowing
him to visit with Lauren since the dependency proceedings had
been initiated, and he had not seen Lauren in two months.
According to Lawrence, Lauren stated that she had witnessed the
August 2021 incident involving the vase and that the incident
took place as alleged in DCFS’s petition. In addition, Lawrence
stated that Lauren had sent him videos which had sounds of
Mother and Father fighting. Lawrence indicated he had lost the
recordings, and Lauren refused to send them to him again,
stating she did not want A.F. to be taken away. Lawrence stated
that Lauren’s mood would sometimes be low, and she would ask
him to “come get her” so that she could “take a vacation from

                               11
home, from the madness.” Lawrence also alleged that Mother
had allowed Father to have unlimited access to the children and
that Father took a trip with Mother and the children to Las
Vegas.
      Lauren again denied that she had ever seen Mother and
Father get into any physical altercation. Lauren denied that
Mother had allowed Father to see the children outside of
monitored visits. She stated that she had gone with Mother and
A.F. to Las Vegas, but that Father had not accompanied them.
      Father denied any history of domestic violence between
himself and Mother and stated that any incidents were “just
verbal arguments.” Father reiterated that during the August
2021 incident, he had been “talking with his hands” and
accidentally hit the vase; contrary to his prior explanation that
Mother cut herself cleaning up the shards after the vase
shattered, Father now stated that the vase cut Mother when she
had tried to catch or block it. Father suggested that Mother may
have made false allegations of abuse against him because she
was upset with him due to his infidelity.
      Mother stated in regard to the August 2021 incident that
she and Father were arguing because A.F. had made a mess with
ranch dressing; she explained that she had her head turned and
did not see exactly how the vase came to fly at her, but she
denied that Father swung at her during the incident.8 Mother

     8 DCFS noted in the jurisdiction/disposition report that,
when initially interviewed in December 2021, Mother had
described the August 2021 incident differently, in that she had
stated she and Father were arguing because she was going to
finalize the divorce and Father swung his arm and knocked the
vase towards her.

                               12
denied any prior domestic violence between herself and Father,
and stated that any prior incident was “[j]ust arguing.” Mother
indicated that she called police in January 2021 because someone
was parked in front of the gate at her home. Mother denied that
she told police officers on May 10, 2020 that Father had hit her in
the face.
       DCFS concluded in the jurisdiction/disposition report, “The
children’s safety in the home cannot be ensured at this time
without DCFS and [c]ourt oversight. There is an extensive
history of [F]ather physically abusing [M]other in the presence of
the children and of [M]other failing to protect the children from
exposure to this abuse.” DCFS recommended that the court
sustain the allegations of the section 300 petition, declare the
children dependents of the court, issue a stay away order barring
Father from having contact with A.F., Lauren and Mother
outside of court-ordered monitored visits, and issue an order
under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) removing A.F. from Father’s
custody.
       In support of its recommendations, DCFS asserted that
there were four documented domestic abuse incidents, but it
mistakenly counted the Mother’s Day incident twice (once
characterizing it as an assault in Mother’s bedroom) and included
Mother’s call to police on January 23, 2021, despite the fact that
call had no apparent connection to Father. DCFS also asserted
that “[M]other maintained a relationship with . . . [F]ather and
allowed him to have unlimited access to the children, putting
them at risk of further exposure to domestic violence.”
E.    Adjudication
      Before the adjudication hearing took place, the court
instructed DCFS to consider potential supervision of A.F. under

                                13
sections 301 or 360, subdivision (b). As relevant here, section 301
allows DCFS “subsequent to dismissal of a [section 300] petition
already filed, and with consent of the child’s parent or guardian,
[to] undertake a program of supervision of the child.” (Id., subd.
(a).) Section 360, subdivision (b), provides that a court may
dispose of a dependency proceeding without adjudicating the
child a dependent child of the court by “order[ing] that services be
provided to keep the family together and place the child and the
child’s parent or guardian under the supervision of the social
worker.” (Ibid.)
       On May 2, 2022, DCFS filed a last minute information in
which it recommended against utilizing sections 301 or 360,
subdivision (b) because “Mother and . . . [F]ather continue to deny
any domestic violence in the home” despite evidence to the
contrary, and “[M]other and . . . [F]ather are already in violation
of [c]ourt orders, including the order that . . . states that [F]ather
is not to have any unmonitored contact with the children.”
       At the adjudication hearing on May 10, 2022, Mother’s
counsel clarified Mother’s position about the August 2021
incident, saying Mother “does not deny that . . . [F]ather threw
the vase.” Father’s counsel requested the court dismiss the
petition, arguing that while Father and Mother had a history of
arguments they were not “physical.” Counsel also argued that,
according to the police report, Mother was not sure whether
Father had thrown the vase or knocked it accidentally, and she
did not state to any of the social workers that Father had thrown
the vase. Father’s counsel argued that Lauren had not told social
workers that she witnessed the August 2021 incident, and
Lawrence’s claim that Lauren had told him she did witness it
was not credible, in part because Lawrence was biased. Father’s

                                 14
counsel requested that if the court did not dismiss the petition, it
consider ordering DCFS to provide services and supervise A.F.,
Mother, and Father under section 360, subdivision (b), without
adjudicating A.F. a dependent child of the court.
       Counsel for the children requested the court dismiss the
allegation under section 300, subdivision (a), but sustain the
allegation under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), because both
Father and Mother “minimize[d] and downplay[ed] any violence
that occurred in the home.”
       The juvenile court sustained the counts in the petition
against Father and Mother as pled. The court found that A.F.
was a child described in section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b),
declared her a dependent of the court, and placed her in Mother’s
home under DCFS supervision. The court found by clear and
convincing evidence that it was reasonable and necessary to
remove A.F. from Father’s custody, and it would be detrimental
to A.F. if she were to be returned to Father. The court also found
that DCFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. The
court ordered monitored visitation for Father, to take place at
least three times a week in a neutral setting.
       As to Mother, the court found there were reasonable
services available to prevent removal, and the release of A.F. to
Mother would not be detrimental to A.F.’s safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being.
       The court articulated the basis for its jurisdiction and
disposition rulings, stating, “The court finds Lauren’s statements
to her father to be extremely credible and not double hearsay.
She looks at her father as a child would as the protector of her.
She has no reason to hold back as she might may [sic] have a
reason to hold back with the social worker. The court notes and

                                 15
has reviewed the reports and noted her statements she gave to
the social worker compared to the one she gave to her father. To
the social worker she realizes that there are ramifications. She
was very brief in her descriptions. She went as far as to say she
didn’t witness the [domestic violence], but she was in her room
and she heard it. [H]owever, with her father, [Lawrence], who
she goes to as a protector, she gave a very detailed statement to
him stating that . . . [Father] and . . . [M]other, they argue quite
often. She has videos of them arguing. This is consistent with
today’s times and people, especially, adolescents videotaping
everything as evidence. She comes to his house in a down mood
and asks to escape the madness. That shows this is not an
isolated incident. That shows this is domestic violence between
. . . [F]ather and . . . [M]other, as [counsel for the children] has
argued is ongoing and the issues have been unresolved for the
child to characterize her house as the madness—to escape the
madness. She articulated to her father the madness. Mother’s
statements are very telling with respect to showing that she
states she is afraid of . . . [F]ather, that he would kill her. Albeit,
he took her—in the most recent incident, he took her to the
hospital for 19 stitches, but she did get an emergency protective
order. . . . [F]ather has a history of domestic violence arrests.
Clearly, this shows his propensity for violence. Mother has
indicated that he has hit her in the past. Mother’s Day . . .
[M]other admitted to the police that . . . [F]ather punched her in
her face. She made that statement when there was no time to
reflect of [sic] the consequences of making that statement. The
court finds that statement to be more credible than [M]other’s
subsequent statements of downplaying. With respect to the vase,
the court does not find the explanations of [M]other nor [F]ather

                                  16
to be credible that in an animated manner he hit the vase, it
shattered and caused 19 stitches. It was very purposeful based
on the statements that he threw the vase at . . . [M]other with the
intent of injuring . . . [M]other, in which he did. She had to
receive 19 stitches. [M]other, yes, proceeded to call the police
because . . . [F]ather is violent, but [M]other has done so in the
past. But the evidence is clear that . . . [M]other then takes . . .
[F]ather back. And according to the child Lauren, the madness
starts over and over. So it’s very clear with the call logs, the
police have come to this house on several occasions for domestic
violence. Mother is mitigating . . . [F]ather’s violence towards
her. . . . [T]he danger that she’s placed her children in by
continuing to take him back, by violating the [c]ourt’s orders. It’s
very clear the children are not to be in his care. He is to have no
access to the children. She has allowed . . . [F]ather back into the
house and allowed him to have access to both Lauren and [A.F.].
It clearly shows she lacks the protective capacity.” The court also
stated it “believes Lauren’s statements to her father that she was
present when that incident occurred with respect to the vase.
And she could very well have been hurt—injured like her
mother.”
       On July 11, 2022, Father filed a timely appeal of the
juvenile court’s May 10, 2022 order.
                          DISCUSSION
A.    Standard of Review
      We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
findings for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
766, 773.) Under this standard, “ ‘we determine if substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports [the findings].
“In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences

                                17
from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the
dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.”
[Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ”
(Ibid.) We will affirm a judgment if it is supported by substantial
evidence “even though substantial evidence to the contrary also
exists and the trial court might have reached a different result
had it believed other evidence.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) “However, ‘[s]ubstantial evidence is not
synonymous with any evidence. [Citation.] To be substantial,
the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance and must be
reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’ [Citations.]”
(In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.)
       Given that the dispositional finding must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence, “when there is a substantial
evidence challenge, the reviewing court must determine whether
the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the existence of that fact to be highly
probable.” (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 149; see
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996 [“when
reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is
whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from
which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true”].)

                                18
B.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
       Assertion of Jurisdiction
       Father contends that there is insufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings. As explained
below, we conclude the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding
under section 300, subdivision (a) is not supported by substantial
evidence because there is no evidence that A.F. is at substantial
risk that Father will injure her nonaccidentally. However,
substantial evidence does support the court’s finding of
jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1)(A) of section 300 based on
Mother’s failure to protect A.F. from incidents of domestic
violence between herself and Father. As a result, we affirm the
juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction because “a jurisdictional
finding good against one parent is good against both. More
accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either
parent bring [the minor] within one of the statutory definitions of
a dependent. [Citations.]” (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th
393, 397; accord, In re D.P. (2013) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283 [“[T]he
principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a child, not to
his or her parent’ [citation], means that ‘ “[a]s long as there is one
unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another
might be inappropriate” ’ ”].)
      1.    The Applicable Law
      At the jurisdictional stage, the juvenile court must
determine by a preponderance of the evidence if a child is
described by section 300. (§ 355, subd. (a); Cynthia D. v. Superior
Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) The juvenile court here
asserted jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) and

                                 19
(b)(1)(A).9 Subdivision (a) authorizes juvenile court jurisdiction
in situations where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or
guardian.” (Id., subd. (a).) “ ‘Nonaccidental’ generally means a
parent or guardian ‘acted intentionally or willfully.’ ” (In re Cole
L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting In re R.T. (2017) 3
Cal.5th 622, 629.) The statute provides that “a court may find
there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on the
manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of
repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s siblings,
or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or
guardian that indicate the child is at risk of serious physical
harm.” (§ 300, subd. (a).)
       Subdivision (b)(1)(A) of section 300 authorizes dependency
jurisdiction where the child has suffered, or there is a substantial
risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm as a result of
the failure of their parent to adequately supervise or protect the
child.
       “Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to
the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing
[citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously
abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary
to protect the child. [Citations.] The court may consider past
events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s

      9 Section 300 was amended effective January 1, 2023.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1.) The amendments are immaterial to
the issues presented in this case, and we will refer to the current
version of the statute. Current subdivision (b)(1)(A) was formerly
set forth in subdivision (b)(1).

                                 20
protection. [Citations.] A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be
probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that
the conduct will continue.’ [Citations.]” (In re Cole L., supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at pp. 601-602.)
      2.    Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the
            Jurisdictional Finding under Section 300,
            Subdivision (a)
       Section 300, subdivision (a) concerns injury inflicted on a
child “nonaccidentally.” Here, there is no evidence of any injury,
nonaccidental or otherwise, inflicted on A.F. Nor is there
substantial evidence, based on Father’s past conduct, that there
is a substantial risk he will injure her nonaccidentally in the
future. Our colleagues in Division Seven recently concluded that
a juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under subdivision (a) of
section 300 based on past incidents of domestic violence was not
supported by substantial evidence where “there was no evidence
any violence took place in the presence of [the children], let alone
under circumstances that could support a finding of a substantial
risk that either child would suffer serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally.” (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 604.)
Here, there is no evidence A.F. witnessed the August 26, 2021
incident, and there is no evidence that the circumstances of that
incident (or any other incident) posed a risk that A.F. would be
injured nonaccidentally. Thus, the evidence of past domestic
violence perpetrated by Father against Mother cannot support
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300,
subdivision (a).

                                 21
      3.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional
            Finding under Section 300, Subdivision (b)(1)(A)
       Substantial evidence does support the juvenile court’s
finding that A.F. was a child described in subdivision (b)(1)(A) of
section 300. A current risk of harm can be shown by evidence of
past conduct where there is a reason to believe the conduct will
recur. (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; In re S.O.
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461.) That is the situation here, as
Father and Mother have a history of domestic violence which was
likely to recur, absent juvenile court intervention, thereby
exposing A.F. to a substantial risk of accidental physical injury.
(In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 [substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under former
§ 300, subd. (b)(1) where past violence between the parents “was
likely to continue, further exposing [the child] to the risk of
serious physical harm”]; In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th
183, 194 [substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional finding under former § 300, subd. (b)(1) based on
the parents’ pattern of domestic violence because “domestic
violence in the same household where children are living . . . is a
failure to protect [the children] from the substantial risk of
encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or
illness from it”].)
       First, the evidence showed a history of domestic violence
perpetrated by Father against Mother. Father points to his
statements denying any such domestic violence, as well as to
those times that Mother denied or minimized the incidents, to
argue against the juvenile court’s finding. He also asserts the
juvenile court should not have credited Lawrence’s statements
because of his purported bias. But in reviewing for substantial

                                22
evidence, we “ ‘ “ ‘ordinarily look[ ] only at the evidence supporting
the successful party, and disregard[ ] the contrary showing.’ ” ’ ”
(In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527, disapproved on
another ground in Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 1010, fn. 7.) As the juvenile court noted, ample evidence
(including Mother’s contemporaneous and more unguarded
statements) supports the conclusion Father perpetrated multiple
incidents of domestic violence against Mother. Lawrence’s
credibility was an issue for the juvenile court, and we must defer
to the court’s finding that his statements were credible. (In re
I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
       Second, there was substantial evidence that domestic
violence between Father and Mother would continue absent
juvenile court intervention. Mother sought police assistance after
being physically abused by Father on May 10, 2020 and on
August 26, 2021, and obtained an emergency protective order
after the August 26, 2021 incident, but on both occasions she
eventually took Father back into the family home. Although
Mother had filed for divorce, no evidence showed she had followed
through; when Father was interviewed in March 2022, he
indicated that he and Mother were still in a relationship and
were working on their marriage. Finally, there was evidence that
Mother was allowing Father access to A.F. in violation of court
orders restricting his visitation.
       Furthermore, both Father and Mother consistently failed to
acknowledge the severity of the physical altercations between
them, repeatedly denying any history of domestic violence and
characterizing incidents as “just arguments.” This creates a
significant risk that Mother and Father will not feel compelled to
make the changes necessary to avoid future altercations. “A

                                 23
parent’s denial of domestic violence increases the risk of it
recurring. [Citations.]” (In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at
p. 156.)
       Father argues that there is no substantial evidence that
A.F. witnessed the August 26, 2021 incident or any other incident
of domestic violence. A.F.’s lack of presence during a past
incident of domestic violence does not negate the possibility that,
in the future, A.F. might be present, which would subject her to a
risk of physical harm. (See In re Heather A., supra, 52
Cal.App.4th at p. 194, fn. omitted [“Obviously the children were
put in a position of physical danger from this violence
[perpetrated by the father against the mother], since, for
example, they could wander into the room where it was occurring
and be accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or
leg, or by [the mother] falling against them”].) Nothing in the
record suggests that the past incidents of domestic violence took
place where the children could not be present; on the contrary,
the August 26, 2021 incident occurred in the family home, and
the May 10, 2020 incident occurred at a family gathering for
Mother’s Day.
       Father argues that this case is factually similar to In re
Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, disapproved on another
ground in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 278, and In re M.W.
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, where the courts found substantial
evidence did not support jurisdictional findings under former
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) based on allegations of domestic
violence. Both cases are distinguishable because the juvenile
courts in those cases asserted jurisdiction based on isolated
incidents of domestic violence that had occurred years before the
dependency case was initiated, and there was no evidence the

                                24
parents had ongoing relationships. (See In re M.W., supra, 238
Cal.App.4th at p. 1454; In re Daisy H., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at
p. 717.) The domestic violence perpetrated by Father in this case
is more recent, more substantial in terms of the number of
incidents, and as discussed above there is evidence that Mother
and Father were still involved with one another. Thus, In re
Daisy H. and In re M.W. are inapposite.
      In conclusion, there was substantial evidence that Father
and Mother had a history of domestic violence, and that it would
continue absent intervention by the juvenile court. Under these
circumstances, the juvenile court could properly find a
substantial risk that A.F. would accidentally suffer serious
physical harm as the result of future domestic violence by Father
against Mother.
C.    The Juvenile Court’s Removal Order Was Supported
      by Substantial Evidence and Father Forfeited His
      Argument that the Court Should Have Considered
      Granting Him Custody in Paternal Grandmother’s
      Home
      Father challenges the juvenile court’s order removing A.F.
from his custody. We conclude that substantial evidence
supports the removal order and that Father has forfeited the
alternative challenge he raises to the removal order.10

      10 We also reject Father’s contention that the court did not
apply the proper standard—clear and convincing evidence—in
making its removal order. The court’s minute order states that
its findings regarding the removal order were based on clear and
convincing evidence. Father cites to the transcript of the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing, but nothing in the court’s

                                25
      1.    The Applicable Law
       To remove a child from parental custody, the juvenile court
must find by clear and convincing evidence that specified
circumstances are present justifying such a disposition. (§ 361,
subds. (c)(1) & (d).) The circumstances that can justify removal
depend on whether the child was living with the parent at the
time the dependency case was initiated. Subdivision (c) of section
361 applies when the child was living with the parent at that
time, and it lists five circumstances that justify removal (id.,
subd. (c)(1)-(5)); subdivision (c)(1) sets forth the only circumstance
that potentially applies here: “There is or would be a substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned
home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s
physical health can be protected without removing the minor
from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.”
       Subdivision (d) of section 361 applies when the child was
not living with the parent at the time the dependency proceeding
was filed, and it provides only one circumstance that justifies
removal. Specifically, as applicable here, subdivision (d) of
section 361 applies when the juvenile court finds “there would be
a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child for the parent . . . to
live with the child or otherwise exercise the parent’s . . . right to
physical custody, and there are no reasonable means by which
the child’s physical and emotional health can be protected

statements on the record shows that it applied an incorrect
standard of proof.

                                 26
without removing the child from the child’s parent’s . . . physical
custody.”
      The court’s removal order references both subdivisions (c)
and (d) of section 361. The court did not make a factual finding
about whether A.F. was residing with Father, and the evidence
on that point was conflicting. However, we need not decide
whether our review should focus on subdivision (c)(1) or (d) of
section 361 because the two subdivisions set forth essentially
equivalent standards in the context of this case, as both are
triggered when there “would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-
being of the child” were the child to live with the parent.11 (Id.,
subds. (c)(1) & (d).)
       “Actual harm to a child is not necessary before a child can
be removed.” (In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) This is
because the focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.
(In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328; In re T.V., supra, 217
Cal.App.4th at pp. 135-136.) In determining whether a child may
be safely maintained in the parent’s physical custody, “the
[juvenile] court may consider the parent’s past conduct as well as

      11 Subdivision (c)(1) of section 361 lists two specific
alternatives which the juvenile court “shall consider” before
removing a child from a parent’s custody: “(A) The option of
removing an offending parent . . . from the home. [¶]
(B) Allowing a nonoffending parent, guardian, or Indian
custodian to retain physical custody as long as that parent,
guardian, or Indian custodian presents a plan acceptable to the
court demonstrating that he or she will be able to protect the
child from future harm.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(A) & (B).) Subdivision
(d) does not require the court to consider any specific
alternatives. (Id., subd. (d).)

                                 27
present circumstances.” (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
900, 917.)
      2.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
            Removal Order
       Father contends, “The record simply lacks substantial
evidence for the court’s determination why placement of [A.F.] in
the home of parents [M]other and [F]ather would pose ‘a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were
returned home,’ and that even with the provision of services,
there is no other reasonable way to protect her.”
       We disagree. Father had a history of perpetrating domestic
violence against Mother, which included him throwing a heavy
object. In addition, at least two of the domestic violence incidents
occurred in family settings, the most recent in the family home
and the earlier one at a Mother’s Day party. There was also
ample evidence that the conduct would recur. Father and Mother
were in denial about their history of domestic violence. Mother
had reported Father’s domestic violence to the police on two
occasions (and did not on others), but each time had accepted
Father back into the family home. Given these facts, the court
could reasonably conclude there was a substantial danger
Father’s conduct placing A.F. at risk would recur, justifying
removal to ensure A.F.’s safety. (In re V.L., supra, 54
Cal.App.5th at p. 158.)
       Father argues that the August 2021 incident was an
“isolated event of the past,” and incorporates the arguments he
makes in challenging the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.
We reject these arguments for the same reasons we find them
meritless in affirming the jurisdictional finding. In short, there is

                                 28
substantial evidence that the August 2021 incident was not
isolated but part of a pattern of abuse, and that Father’s violence
against Mother on that occasion was not accidental.
       In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, upon which
Father relies, is distinguishable because the only evidence that
the child in that case faced an ongoing risk of harm was one prior
incident of abuse. (Id. at p. 529.) Furthermore, it was apparent
that the juvenile court in that case issued its removal order to
facilitate the child receiving services, including a bonding study;
the appellate court concluded this was error, as the services could
have been provided while the child was in his mother’s custody.
(Ibid.) Here, in contrast, the juvenile court issued its removal
order based on its concern, supported by substantial evidence of a
pattern of behavior, that A.F. faced a substantial risk of harm
were she to live conjointly with Father and Mother.
      3.    Father Forfeited His Argument He Should Have Been
            Allowed to Have Custody of A.F. at Paternal
            Grandmother’s House
       Father additionally faults the juvenile court for not
considering the alternative of placing A.F. in the shared custody
of Father in the home of paternal grandmother along with
unannounced DCFS visits. As DCFS points out, Father never
suggested this alternative to the juvenile court. Instead, Father
asked the court to consider something different: “a home of
parent [F]ather and [M]other order as to [A.F.]” and,
alternatively, “unmonitored [visits] in a neutral setting.” In
other words, Father faults the court for not adopting an
alternative that was never suggested. “A party forfeits the right
to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she
fails to raise the objection in the trial court. [Citations.]

                                29
Forfeiture, also referred to as ‘waiver,’ applies in juvenile
dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from
standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings.” (In
re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 221-222.)
       Had Father suggested the alternative he now proposes,
“the court could have considered [his] claim.” (In re Dakota H.,
supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 222.) We cannot evaluate Father’s
suggestion made for the first time on appeal, because it involves
factual issues not developed below. Father never raised with
DCFS the possibility that A.F. could stay with him in paternal
grandmother’s home or anywhere else. The record does not
disclose whether Father was residing with paternal grandmother,
and, if not, whether paternal grandmother would permit Father
to do so. We do not know who else resided in paternal
grandmother’s home, or if it was otherwise appropriate for A.F. to
spend overnights there. Nor do we know if paternal grandmother
would consent to unannounced visits to her home by DCFS.
Without knowing the answers to these questions, we cannot
evaluate whether the proposal Father advances for the first time
on appeal was potentially even possible. It is for such reasons
that “[a] party may not assert theories on appeal which were not
raised in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 222.)

                               30
                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders are
affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                           WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             CHANEY, J.

                                31