Court Opinion

ID: 9585504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:01:13.561976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:32.356241
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
I join in the dissent of Judge Barrow concerning the sufficiency of the objection, but I do not join in the footnote in his opinion. For the reason stated in Judge Barrow’s dissenting opinion, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. In addition, however, I would also hold that because Rodriguez was only indicted for the drugs he possessed on August 15, 1991, the trial judge erred in admitting evidence that Rodriguez was present during drug transactions on August 2, 1991, and August 5, 1991.
By a motion in limine, Rodriguez sought to bar the Commonwealth from proving that on August 2 and August 5 he was present during a transaction in which an undercover police officer purchased cocaine. The Commonwealth opposed the motion on the ground that those prior criminal events proved that Rodriguez was “involved in the commercial venture of selling illicit narcotics.” The Commonwealth sought to establish from proof that Rodriguez distributed cocaine at those times the inference that Rodriguez intended to distribute the cocaine that was seized from *290his apartment on August 15. The trial judge ruled that the prior offenses were admissible to prove intent to distribute.
The evidence at trial proved that on August 15, 1991, the police entered an apartment with a search warrant. Rodriguez opened the door to admit the police. During the search, the police seized several packages of cocaine and a weighing scale. Following the seizure on August 15, Rodriguez made oral statements to a police officer concerning the seized cocaine. The officer testified:
[Rodriguez] told me that he had been selling cocaine for Edwardo ... for approximately three months; that he had traveled and has traveled up to New York and usually goes up there once every week or so and bought cocaine on, . . . August 14th, purchased 4.5 ounces for $2600 from a friend.
Rodriguez further stated that when he returned to Virginia after making the purchase on August 14 he helped Edwardo weigh the cocaine and add Inositol to downgrade the purity of the cocaine.
Over Rodriguez’s objection, a police officer testified concerning the prior drug transactions. The police officer stated that she arranged to purchase drugs through an informer. On August 2, the informer arrived at a parking lot in an automobile driven by Rodriguez. The informer left Rodriguez’s automobile, entered the officer’s automobile, gave the officer cocaine, received money from the officer, and returned to Rodriguez’s automobile. The same type transaction occurred on August 5.
Rodriguez was not being tried for offenses that arose from those incidents. Moreover, the evidence proved that the cocaine the police seized on August 15 was purchased on August 14. Thus, whatever may have been Rodriguez’s intent on August 2 and August 5, it had no nexus to his intent on August 15. The Commonwealth offered the evidence of the two prior incidents to prove that because Rodriguez assisted in the distribution of drugs on those earlier occasions, the drugs Rodriguez possessed on August 15, 1991, were possessed with the intent to distribute. That inference is not permitted. See Donahue v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 145, 154-56, 300 S.E.2d 768, 773-74 (1983); Eccles v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 20, 22-23, 197 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1973); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 52, 53, 189 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1972).
*291In total disregard of Donahue, Eccles, and Boyd, the Commonwealth’s brief fails to discuss their significance. Indeed, the Commonwealth does not deign to cite them in any manner. These three cases are the Supreme Court of Virginia’s seminal exposition of the rules governing the admissibility of prior drug offenses to prove intent. Indeed, this Court has applied those cases in refusing to allow evidence of prior drug distributions under circumstances similar to the facts in this case. See, e.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 213, 429 S.E.2d 229, aff'd en banc, 17 Va. App. 248, 436 S.E.2d 193 (1993); Rider v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 595, 383 S.E.2d 25 (1989).
The majority opinion recites statements that the police officer said were made by Rodriguez after his arrest. Those statements proved that Rodriguez purchased the cocaine that was seized from him on August 15 and that Rodriguez purchased it with the intent to distribute it. The majority opinion acknowledges that Rodriguez admitted to the police that on August 14, the day before the police searched the apartment and seized the drugs, he had gone to New York and purchased the drugs for resale. Rodriguez also admitted that following his return from New York, he assisted in adding Inositol to the cocaine to downgrade its purity. He further admitted that the scales were his and that the cocaine that he had obtained from New York was to be distributed.
The evidence concerning prior sales merely proved propensity to commit the criminal offense. The theory that the two prior sales are admissible as evidence of an “ongoing enterprise” merely creates an exception that heretofore never existed and swallows the rules established in Donahue, Eccles, and Boyd. No rational basis exists to bar evidence “of a general scheme, of which the crime charged is a part,” Boyd, 213 Va. at 53, 189 S.E.2d at 360, and, yet, allow such evidence to prove an “ongoing enterprise.” Moreover, in view of Rodriguez’s admissions, the probative value, if any, of the prior offenses is slight and is clearly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. This case is a factual clone of Donahue and ought to be controlled by its holding.
Furthermore, the majority decides this issue upon a matter that was not raised at the trial court and not presented on appeal. No issue was raised in the trial court concerning a “singular scheme or plan.” Rodriguez moved the trial judge to bar testimony con*292cerning the specific instances of “two prior allegations of drug distribution.” The Commonwealth argued at the pretrial hearing that those two prior events proved “intent to distribute” the cocaine seized on August 15, 1991. The trial judge ruled that the Commonwealth could prove the two separate distributions that occurred on August 2 and August 5, respectively, as evidence of Rodriguez’s intent to distribute the drugs seized on August 15, 1991. That ruling is the issue raised on this appeal. That ruling was error.
For these reasons, I dissent.