Court Opinion

ID: 9639706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:45:41.850731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:21.162001
License: Public Domain

MANFORD, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent.
The majority opinion herein, in one fell swoop, attempts to prescribe a definition to Rule 23.08 which this writer feels is not supported by the wording of that Rule.
The pertinent part of Rule 23.08 reads:
Any information may be amended or substituted for an indictment at anytime before verdict or finding if no additional *54or different offense is charged and if a defendant’s substantial rights are not thereby prejudiced, (emphasis added)
To this writer, the rule is in the conjunctive. It prohibits amendment if a different and/or additional offense is charged and as a result thereof, the accused is prejudiced by such amendment.
The majority opinion concludes that an amendment charging an additional or different offense is inherently prejudicial. It seems to this writer that if that were correct, Rule 23.08 would have simply declared that to be the case. It does not, and that suggests to this writer that more is required; to wit, that the accused suffered some prejudice as a result of the amendment over and above the mere revision of the charge.
Take the case at hand. The majority opinion merely references the fact that an amended information was sought by the prosecution and that request was approved by the trial court. The majority opinion then merely references the claim of substantial prejudice by Greathouse.
The record herein reveals that a plea agreement had been attempted, which apparently failed. The prosecution notified Greathouse through his counsel that an amendment would be requested the week prior to trial. In other words, Greathouse knew of the charge (subject to approval by the trial court) against him not on the morning of trial but actually the week before. Where is the prejudice? This writer submits that there was none and the majority opinion simply ignores that inquiry by its declaration of inherent prejudice.
The prior notice alerted Greathouse in ample time to prepare a defense or to request additional time to prepare a defense prior to trial. He requested no additional time. Again, where is the prejudice? Again, this writer submits that there was none.
In this writer’s judgment, the phrase “substantial rights” in relation to this Rule means two things: first, that an accused has been informed, by an information, of the charges against him and is given ample opportunity to defend against those charges; and second, that if acquitted, the accused can never be charged and convicted of the offense ever again. See State v. Henderson, 750 S.W.2d 507 (Mo.App.1988).
This writer submits that Greathouse’s substantial rights were not violated. As noted previously, he was notified through counsel of the charge upon which the state intended to proceed. Even the majority would have to concede that had he been acquitted, the state would have been forever barred from subsequent prosecution upon the charge.
This writer does not share the majority’s analysis of a separate and distinct offense under this statute and simply feels that the rule set forth in State v. Garms, supra, relied upon the majority, is an improper analysis of the statute. The rule adopted in State v. Mace, supra, is not only a more appropriate interpretation of statutory law, but it prevents the shunted approach to interpretation of the rules as is provided for in the majority opinion herein.
Again, this writer asks where, short of the inappropriate conclusion of inherent prejudice declared by the majority opinion herein, is the prejudice suffered by Great-house? His substantial rights to know the charge, with opportunity to defend, coupled with the safeguard against a second or multiple prosecution for the same charge, have not been violated.
The majority opinion has nullified the conjunctive, and the most important aspect of this rule, by its declaration of inherent prejudice.
The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.