Court Opinion

ID: 9855405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:24:25.131855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:14.978701
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE CASTLES
dissenting:
First of all, the problem arises from an insurance policy, which it is agreed, contains a $250 deductible provision, and the Coverage D — Comprehensive loss which specifically excepts loss caused by collision or upset. This coverage was not purchased by plaintiff. The next provision is Coverage E for which a premium was paid. That provision provides for loss by collision of the automobile with another object.
I believe R.C.M.1947, §§ 40-3702 and 40-3725, are applicable.
Section 40-3702 provides:
“ ‘Policy’ defined. ‘Policy’ moans the written contract of or written agreement for or effecting insurance, by whatever name called, and includes all clauses, riders, endorsements and papers attached thereto and a part thereof.”
Section 40-3725 provides:
■ • “Construction of policies. Every insurance contract shall be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy and as amplified, extended, or modi*447fied by any rider, endorsement, or application which is a part of the policy.”
These sections are in the Insurance Code and bring forth the familiar “four corners” doctrine as set forth in R.C.M.1947, § 13-707. It is not unreasonable to assume that one who buys an insurance policy reads all of its provisions. Coverage D, Comprehensive, specifically excepts collisions and specifically covers falling objects such as the log here. I believe the entire context of the agreement determines the intent of the parties. Plaintiff did not intend to pay for, and defendant did not intend to assume the risk of insurance against damage caused by a falling object, to-wit, a log.
I believe the district court was correct and I would affirm.
MR. JUSTICE DOYLE
dissenting:
I am of the opinion that an insurance policy contract must be read under the same rules of grammatical construction as all other contracts, eschewing dictionary semantics.
In plain language, the appellant here contends that the insurance contract must be construed from its four corners, but his major contention is that the four corners of the contract consist wholly, and without exception, of the terms of the particular coverage he actually purchased.
It is evident on the face of the policy that various types of coverage are available and here appellant refused to purchase the coverage which would have granted to him the protection he now claims.
As Mr. Chief Justice Harrison said in Steen v. Rustad, 132 Mont. 96, 102, 313 P.2d 1014, 1018, “It is well established that a court, in interpreting a written instrument, will not isolate certain phrases of that instrument in order to garner the intent of the parties, but will grasp the instrument by its four corners and in the light of the entire instrument, ascertain the paramount and guiding intention of the parties. Mere isolated tracts, clauses and words will not be allowed to prevail over the general language utilized in the instrument.”
This cause should be affirmed.