Court Opinion

ID: 9538003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:28:30.328465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:17.676208
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, P. J.,
dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s treatment of the first assignment, but not the maltreatment of the second. Because the majority holds that the trial court correctly rejected defendant’s affirmative defense and affirms the conviction, I dissent.
On March 3, 1986, the Motor Vehicles Division issued a notice of suspension of defendant’s driving privileges. It provided, in material part:
“On January 13, 1986, you were convicted of driving uninsured. As a result of this conviction, you were required to file proof of future financial responsibility with the Motor Vehicles Division (DMV) in Salem. Because you have not filed this proof of future financial responsibility, your driving privilege *394will be suspended by the Motor Vehicles Division (DMV) beginning at 12:01AM on the morning of April 02,1986.”
DMV mailed the notice on March 3,1986, by certified mail to the address on defendant’s Oregon driver’s license. However, before that date, defendant had permanently moved to Washington and had not notified DMV of his move out of state. He did not receive the notice and, as the court found, had no actual knowledge of the suspension. On April 6,1987, he was issued the citation in this case.
At trial, defendant asserted the affirmative defense under ORS 811.180(l)(b) that he had not received notice of the suspension. That defense is not available if
“[t]he notice of suspension or revocation could not be delivered to the defendant because the defendant failed to comply with the requirements under ORS 807.560 to notify the division of a change of address or residence.” ORS 811.180(2)(b). (Emphasis supplied.)
ORS 807.560, so far as relevant, provides:
“(1) A person to whom a license or driver permit is issued commits the offense of failure to notify upon change of driver address or name if the person does not notify the division in the manner described in subsection (2) of this section upon any change of the person’s:
“ (a) Residence from that noted on the person’s license or driver permit as issued:
M* * * * *
“(2) Notice required under this section:
“(a) Must be given within 30 days of change.”
The court, even though it found that defendant had not received the notice, denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that, because he had not notified DMV of his new residence, he was foreclosed from the affirmative defense under ORS 811.180.
Defendant argues, citing Pelay v. Ploog, 281 Or 59, 573 P2d 1229 (1978), that, because he had permanently moved from Oregon, he was not required to notify DMV of his change of residence and was not prevented from using the defense of *395“no notice.” What the relevant statute says is that the affirmative defense is not available if the notice could not be delivered, because the defendant “failed to comply with the requirements under ORS 807.560.” The “requirements” of ORS 807.560 are that certain persons, not including persons in the situation of defendant, must notify DMV of a change of residence. Defendant did not fail to comply with ORS 807.560; consequently, the interdiction of ORS 811.180(2) (b) simply does not apply. That is what the statute says, and that is what it means.
The majority distinguishes Pelay on the basis of factual differences and amendments of the statutes involved. I agree that there are factual differences. Defendant, in this case, did not attend the Baptist Seminary in Oregon and did not return to Minnesota to become a minister; otherwise, the two defendants are in the same position regarding the statute. That Reverend Ploog’s sojourn in Oregon from 1969 until 1972 may be characterized as “temporary” is not material. Oregon does not recognize temporary licenses or provide that such residency is the factor that immunizes a person from reporting a change of address. Defendant in this case is in the same status as the defendant in Pelay: He had an Oregon license and moved permanently from the state. Neither person was required to give DMV notice of a change of residence.
I will not rescue ORS 807.560, ORS 807.160 and ORS 811.180(2) from the torture inflicted by the majority’s statutory construction. Suffice it to say that the statutory scheme, despite renumbering, is in substance the same now as that applied by the court in Pelay.
I conclude that the defense was available to defendant and, because the court found that he had proven it, we should reverse the conviction. My colleagues in the present majority can then tender the problem that they perceive because of my interpretation to the legislature for it to adopt something similar to former ORS 15.190.