Court Opinion

ID: 9546991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:39:19.073115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:07.314562
License: Public Domain

*504WILSON, J.—I dissent.
The findings of the eonrt relating to the method of computation of the amount due and owing to plaintiffs for removing and replacing brick are without foundation in the record.
The evidence, considered in its entirety, sustains plaintiffs’ contention as to the manner in which the measurements and computations should be made in determining the number of square feet of brick removed and replaced for which they should be but have not been paid.
The minuscule fragment of evidence quoted in the majority opinion does not sustain the conclusion reached therein nor does it, as declared by the majority, sustain the finding of the court that plaintiffs, in preparing their estimate and in submitting their bid for the work, based the same on the inner surface measurements and that they are not entitled to be paid for the work on any other basis of measurement.
The testimony that the “number of brick” was not changed by the fact that they were laid on an arch and that the difference caused by the curvature “was a matter of different thickness of the mortar” does not sustain the finding. Obviously plaintiffs did not compute the total square footage of the exposed ends of the brick alone without the mortar necessary to hold them in place.
The brick are 4 inches in width and were laid on edge; the radius of the perimeter of the top of the arch is therefore 4 inches greater than the radius of the bottom of the arch; the. number of square feet is found by multiplying the distance around the mean perimeter by the horizontal length of the work performed. If the measurement is made upon the perimeter of the top or outside surface of the arch plaintiffs would be paid more than they would be entitled to receive, and if measured along the bottom or inside line of the arch they would not be paid enough.
Plaintiffs offered expert evidence, of which there was no contradiction, to the effect that where the contract and specifications do not prescribe the method of measurement the customary practice is to use the method which would most accurately reflect the true quantities of work performed, and that the only method of ascertaining the true number of square feet of work performed in removing and replacing brick on an arch is to use the center or mean line of' the thickness of the arch, thus basing the computation on the average of the two areas, the upper and lower perimeters; thereby the *505result would be the same and the area of surface would be the same as if the arch had been flattened out.
The contract provided that plaintiffs were to be compensated on the basis of a specified sum “per square foot for removing and replacing brick.” All documents making up the contract were prepared by agents of defendant and are therefore to be construed most strongly in plaintiffs’ favor. The specifications provided that the contractors would be paid “on a price per square foot in place”; no specific method of measurement was provided in the contract.
The only engineer called by defendant to testify on this subject was the deputy city engineer who prepared the specifications. He testified that the only practical method of measuring the brick was to use the inner surface of the curve. This opinion was reached -by him because he could not physically put a tape measure around the upper surface. He was apparently not aware of the simple mathematical method, known to any schoolboy, of computing the number of square feet in any curved surface, either on a curve the perimeter of which is known and can be physically touched and measured or on one that is presented in an abstract problem. The inner surface being known, the outer surface, says the beginner’s textbook in mathematics, can be easily computed by adding 4 inches to the radius of the curve. Though the witness had prepared the specifications, he expressed his inability to answer a question as to the customary practice, where a contract is silent as to the method of measurement, to adopt the method which will reveal the most accurate measurement. He further testified that he had never been an engineer on a job where a similar question of computation had arisen and that he got his information from a bricklayer who was in the employ of the city. It is plain nonsense to accept the evidence of such a witness against that of expert engineers who had had years of experience in similar work involving many millions of dollars.
Not only does the evidence quoted in the majority opinion fail utterly to support the finding but other uncontradicted evidence of plaintiff Hoagland is directly contrary to the findings of the court as shown by his answers to questions asked by the city attorney on cross-examination:
“Q. As a matter of fact, when you bid this job, when you did the first job, and all through the progress of this job, you expected to be paid on the basis of the measurement of the face of the work done, did you not? A. No.
*506“Q. You did [bid] it on that basis, did you not? A. No; I bid it, when I computed this job, I computed it on the basis of a square foot of brick work, one square foot, four inches thick; in other words, a square foot of brick work laid out. ’ ’
In answer to questions by the court in seeking additional information with reference to the estimates which he made in preparation for his bid, he stated he figured the volume of material and “worked it out on the square foot basis for a ring of brick four inches thick. I worked it out on a square foot basis for cement, sand and brick work ... I just figured the square feet of brick work laid out.”
“Q. Per square foot of the inner surface or the outside surface? A. Per square foot of the average surf/xce, because I figured a per square foot of brick four inches thick in determining the volume of material, which would be estimated on the average surface rather than the inner and outer surfaces : . . And then I transferred those figures up into this sheet, which in turn were transferred to this sheet, and so I did not adjust for the lesser quantity which would be obtained by measuring only on the inside surface of the sewer. I would have had to adjust the figure and increase the per unit cost, and I did not do it. . . .
“Q. And your price per square foot was based on the assumption that the square feet had the same bottom dimension that it had at the top. A. It would be measured on the median line, that is correct.” (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing testimony is uncontradicted that in making their estimate plaintiffs used for computation the median line between the upper and lower surfaces of the arch, and if they had computed on the basis of the lower surface their “per unit” bid would have been increased proportionately. The only expert evidence in the case is that such is the correct method of computation. There was no evidence, expert or otherwise, to the contrary.
All efforts to obtain statements from the witness that his computations were made on a line other than the median line met with failure. Since the evidence stands without question or contradiction, such method should have been adopted by the trial court. The court’s finding has no support in the record and plaintiffs are entitled to the amount sued for.
There need not be a retrial since the court made findings of (1) the quantities if based upon the measurement of the inner or lower surface of each ring of brick removed and replaced and (2) the quantities if measured on the mean line between *507the upper and lower surfaces. The finding as to the quantities arrived at by the two respective methods of computation are not questioned by either party, hence it is only a matter of calculating the amount due by multiplying the number of square feet measured on the mean line by the price per square foot specified in the contract for each ring of brick.
The judgment should be modified by striking therefrom the words and figures “Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Sixteen and 28/100 Dollars ($7,916.28) ” and inserting in lieu thereof the words and figures 11 Twenty-one Thousand Seven Hundred Eleven and 60/100 Dollars ($21,711.60).”
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 7, 1951. Wilson, J., voted for a rehearing. Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 14, 1951.