Court Opinion

ID: 9952710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 16:02:46.49839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:44.365339
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10005    Document: 57-1      Date Filed: 03/20/2024   Page: 1 of 17

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10005
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        QUWANDA CANNION PHILLIPS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC.,
        "Fed Ex" or the "Company",

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cv-02137-RBD-LHP
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                     23-10005

                               ____________________

        Before WILSON, JORDAN, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Quwanda Phillips, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
        court’s judgment against her, which was entered following a jury
        trial on her various race-based discrimination and retaliation claims
        against her former employer, FedEx Ground. Specifically, she as-
        serts that the district court should have remanded the case to state
        court following FedEx Ground’s improper removal, and that the
        district court erred in granting FedEx Ground’s judgment as a mat-
        ter of law as to her 42 U.S.C. § 1981 discrimination claim and in
        giving the jury a coercive Allen charge, see generally Allen v. United
        States, 164 U.S. 492, 501–02 (1896), during deliberations. Ms. Phil-
        lips also asserts that the jury’s verdict in favor of FedEx Ground on
        her Title VII claims was inconsistent and unsupported by the evi-
        dence, and thus the district court should have granted her motion
        to vacate the judgment and grant a new trial.
                                              I1
                Ms. Phillips worked as a part-time package handler for
        FedEx Ground in Cocoa, Florida, from March of 2013 through her
        official termination in July of 2017. Starting in October of 2013, Ms.

        1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history and

        set out only what is necessary to explain our decision. As to issues not dis-
        cussed, we summarily affirm.
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        23-10005               Opinion of the Court                        3

        Phillips began making internal complaints accusing her managers
        at the time (Ken Thompson and David Antun) of discriminatory
        conduct and remarks addressed to her and other Black employees.
        FedEx Ground investigated those complaints and found them to
        lack merit. Specifically, Ms. Phillips alleged that Mr. Thompson
        favored white employees in hiring and other employment deci-
        sions, and that he—along with Mr. Antun—would sabotage her
        work by writing her up for unwarranted misloads of her truck. Ms.
        Phillips believed this sabotage was an attempt to terminate her
        based on her race and she filed her first of four grievances with the
        EEOC in October of 2013. In that grievance, she also noted that
        Mr. Antun allegedly stated that “Blacks are not smart enough to
        load trucks.”
               At trial, neither Marquel Kimbrough (another employee)
        nor Ms. Phillips testified to having directly heard that statement
        and, in fact, testified that they had not directly heard Mr. Antun
        make that statement. Ms. Phillips and Mr. Kimbrough did, how-
        ever, testify that Mr. Antun asked them whether they were affili-
        ated with “the Bloods and Crips” gangs, which both perceived as
        an inappropriate stereotype based on their race. Mr. Thompson
        was transferred to another FedEx location in October of 2014
        (three years prior to Ms. Phillips’ termination), and Mr. Antun was
        transferred another location in May of 2016 (more than a year prior
        to her termination).
              In October of 2015, Ms. Phillips suffered a knee injury which
        required certain accommodations. At the time of the injury,
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10005

        Roberto Springer was Ms. Phillips’ sort manager and was responsi-
        ble for her accommodations. Following her injury, Ms. Phillips was
        out on medical leave for a period—about a year and a half, only
        coming into work “on and off”—but eventually returned at some
        (but not full) capacity, which included weight restrictions. Accord-
        ing to Ms. Phillips, Mr. Springer was not responsive to her accom-
        modation requests and would not accept her doctor’s notes regard-
        ing her absences. Though Ms. Phillips asserted that her doctor put
        her “out indefinitely” in 2016, she acknowledged that Mr. Springer
        never told her that she could stay out indefinitely.
                In June of 2017, Ms. Phillips gave FedEx Ground a physician
        assistant’s note stating that she should be excused from work “if
        the left knee bec[ame] ecchymotic.” This was the last time Ms. Phil-
        lips came into work and she never contacted FedEx Ground there-
        after regarding her return. According to FedEx Ground’s employ-
        ees, they made various attempts to contact Ms. Phillips via tele-
        phone and mail but never received a response. Accordingly, FedEx
        Ground determined that Ms. Phillips should be terminated for job
        abandonment. Ms. Phillips asserts that she did not know she was
        fired until February of 2019, when she received a letter from the
        EEOC regarding her termination.
               Ms. Phillips filed suit in state court and the case was removed
        to the district court in November of 2019. Relevant to this appeal,
        Ms. Phillips asserted claims for discrimination and retaliation under
        Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The case pro-
        ceeded to a jury trial. After the close of evidence, FedEx Ground
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        23-10005                Opinion of the Court                            5

        moved for judgment as a matter of law as to all claims, which the
        district court granted as to Ms. Phillips’ § 1981 claim and denied as
        to her Title VII claims. Following deliberations, the jury entered a
        verdict against Ms. Phillips and in favor of FedEx Ground as to
        those remaining claims. Based on that verdict, the district court
        entered judgment against Ms. Phillips, who then moved to set aside
        or vacate the judgment and for a new trial. That motion was de-
        nied, and the instant appeal followed.
                                            II
               Ms. Phillips first asserts that the district court erred by failing
        to grant her motion to remand. Because she did not list the district
        court’s order denying that motion in her notice of appeal, FedEx
        Ground argues that we lack jurisdiction to address the issue. We
        disagree.
               A notice of appeal must “designate the judgment, order, or
        part thereof being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). Our prior
        caselaw explained that we generally have jurisdiction to review
        “only those judgments, orders, or portions thereof” that are desig-
        nated in an appellant’s notice of appeal. See, e.g., Osterneck v. E.T.
        Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). But Rule
        3 was amended in 2021, so that now a notice of appeal encompasses
        all orders that merge into the appealable order. See Fed. R. App. P.
        3(c)(4).
                 Ms. Phillips’ notice of appeal, filed by since-withdrawn coun-
        sel, lists the district court’s order granting judgment as a matter of
        law, the final judgment, and the order on plaintiff’s motion to set
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                    23-10005

        aside judgment. The notice of appeal did not list Ms. Phillips’ mo-
        tion to remand, but it did not have to. Under Federal Rule of Ap-
        pellate Procedure 3(c)(4), the district court’s interlocutory remand
        order merged into its final judgment on appeal, such that it is re-
        viewable on appeal along with that final judgment. See Fed. R.
        App. P. 3(c)(4); Fed. R. App. P. 3 advisory committee’s note to 2021
        amendment. Moreover, Ms. Phillips, now proceeding pro se, ex-
        plicitly stated in her initial brief that is appealing the district court’s
        failure to remand and there is no indication that her notice of ap-
        peal prejudiced or misled FedEx Ground, as FedEx Ground also
        fully briefed the remand issue. See Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
        181–82 (1962). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review her ap-
        peal of the district court’s remand order.
                 We review the denial of a motion to remand to state court
        de novo. Moore v. N. Am. Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir.
        2010). A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State
        court of which district courts . . . have original jurisdiction.” 28
        U.S.C. § 1441. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over
        cases brought under the “[United States] Constitution, laws, or
        treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A defendant may
        remove an action from state court “within 30 days after the receipt
        by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the
        initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such
        action or proceeding is based.” Id. § 1446(b)(1). “A removing de-
        fendant bears the burden of proving proper federal jurisdiction,”
        Leonard v. Enter. Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002), and
        a plaintiff may seek remand back to state court based on two
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        23-10005                Opinion of the Court                          7

        grounds—a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a procedural de-
        fect in the removal of the case. See Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur.
        Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1043–44 (11th Cir. 2001).
                The Supreme Court has unanimously held that “a district
        court’s error in failing to remand a case improperly removed is not
        fatal to the ensuing adjudication if the federal jurisdictional require-
        ments are met at the time judgment is entered.” Caterpillar v. Lewis,
        519 U.S. 61, 64 (1996). It cannot be disputed that Ms. Phillips’ com-
        plaint—which asserted claims under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e)
        and 42 U.S.C. § 1981—established federal question jurisdiction. As
        such, because “timeliness of removal is a procedural defect—not a
        jurisdictional one,” any untimeliness in the filing of the notice of
        removal would be an insufficient basis to vacate the judgment and
        remand for a new trial. See Moore, 623 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Pretka
        v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 751–52 (11th Cir. 2010)).
                                          III
               Ms. Phillips next asserts that the district court erred in grant-
        ing FedEx Ground’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on her
        § 1981 discrimination claim.
               Rule 50(a) permits a party to move, during trial, for judg-
        ment as a matter of law before a verdict has been returned. See Fed.
        R. Civ. Pro. 50(a). A district court may grant the motion before
        submitting the case to the jury if a party has been fully heard on an
        issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury
        would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the
        party on that issue. See id.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10005

               We review the grant of a judgment as a matter of law de
        novo, applying the same legal standards as used by the district court.
        See Bishop v. City of Birmingham Police Dep’t, 361 F.3d 607, 609 (11th
        Cir. 2004). Those standards require us to consider “whether the
        evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission
        to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
        as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–
        52 (1986). We consider all evidence, and the inferences drawn
        therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See
        Bishop, 361 F.3d at 609. “If the facts and inferences point over-
        whelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people
        could not arrive at a contrary verdict, then the motion was
        properly granted.” Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th
        Cir. 1989).
               Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws employment
        discrimination because of “race, color, religion, sex, or national
        origin.” 42 U.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Likewise, § 1981 prohibits employ-
        ers from intentionally discriminating based on race in employment
        contracts. See Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 88 F.4th 939, 944
        (11th Cir. 2023). To prove a claim under either statute, a plaintiff
        can use direct evidence, circumstance evidence, or both. See id.
        Nonetheless, “[u]nlike a Title VII discrimination claim—where a
        lesser ‘motivating factor’ standard sometimes applies—a § 1981
        claim requires proof that race was a but-for cause of [the] termina-
        tion.” Ossmann v. Meredith Corp., 82 F.4th 1007, 1014 (11th Cir.
        2023) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media,
        140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013, 1017 (2020)). This does not require a plaintiff
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        23-10005                   Opinion of the Court                                  9

        to prove that race was the exclusive cause of his or her termination,
        but it does require a plaintiff to prove that but for his or her race,
        the plaintiff would not have been terminated. See Ossmann, 82 F.4th
        at 1014.
               Thus, to survive FedEx Ground’s motion for judgment as a
        matter of law as to her § 1981 claim, Ms. Phillips needed to have
        produced enough evidence during trial to permit a reasonable jury
        to find that, had she not been Black, she would not have been ter-
        minated. See id. Both below and on appeal, Ms. Phillips offers the
        alleged statement made by Mr. Antun that “Black workers are not
        smart enough to load trucks” as “direct evidence” of intentional
        discrimination. See Appellant’s Br. at 6. 2
               Even if we were to consider this direct evidence—we would
        likely not, see Fernandez v. Trees, Inc., 961 F.3d 1148, 1156 (11th Cir.
        2020)—this was not part of the record evidence at trial. Ms. Phillips
        admitted that she never heard Mr. Antun make this comment, and
        Mr. Kimbrough also testified that the only direct statement he
        heard Mr. Antun make was the “Bloods and Crips” statement made
        years before Ms. Phillips’ termination. See D.E. 147 at 160–61; D.E.
        148 at 116–19, 148.
              Ms. Phillips did not produce adequate circumstantial evi-
        dence from which a reasonable jury could infer that intentional

        2 Ms. Phillips’ initial brief seems to focus on her Title VII claim with respect to

        the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, but the district court did not
        grant FedEx Ground’s motion on those claims. We read her pro se argument
        liberally.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10005

        discrimination was the but-for cause of her termination. Nor did
        she prove that FedEx Ground’s non-discriminatory reason for her
        termination—job abandonment—was pretextual. The statements
        referred to above, as well as the purported sabotage regarding the
        written-up misloads, all occurred years before her termination by
        managers that were transferred to other facilities by the time she
        was ultimately terminated. She admitted that she never returned
        to work for nearly two years, nor did she reach out once to FedEx
        Ground once that time period.
               Liberally construed, Ms. Phillips also asserts that because the
        jury ultimately found that, under her Title VII discrimination
        claim, race was a “motivating factor” in FedEx Ground’s adverse
        employment action, it was therefore error for the district court to
        not have allowed the § 1981 claim to proceed to the jury. But the
        Supreme Court has explained that Title VII’s statutory “motivating
        factor” standard is inapposite to § 1981 claims. See Comcast Corp.,
        140 S. Ct. at 1017. Indeed, it is a lower burden. And here, the fact
        that the jury ultimately found that FedEx Ground would have fired
        her even had it not considered her race as a motivating factor, ac-
        tually cuts against her but-for causation argument.
                In sum, because Ms. Phillips failed to establish evidence at
        trial from which a reasonable jury could infer that her race was the
        but-for cause of her termination, the district court did not err in
        granting FedEx Ground’s motion for judgment as a matter of law
        as to that claim.
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        23-10005               Opinion of the Court                         11

                                          IV
                After about three hours of deliberations, the jury in Ms. Phil-
        lips’ trial indicated that they were deadlocked. The district court
        then gave an Allen charge, see Allen, 164 U.S. at 501–02, instructing
        the jury to keep deliberating until a verdict was reached. As her
        final argument, Ms. Phillips asserts that this Allen charge was coer-
        cive, and therefore, an abuse of discretion. See Rubinstein v. Yehuda,
        38 F.4th 982, 992 (11th Cir. 2022).
                While sometimes controversial, see id. at 996, our precedent
        condones the practice of giving an Allen charge as long as the dis-
        trict court does not “coerce any juror to give up an honest belief.”
        United States v. Anderson, 1 F.4th 1244, 1269 (11th Cir. 2021) (inter-
        nal quotations omitted). Whether an Allen charge is coercive de-
        pends on two things: “the language of the charge and the totality
        of the circumstances under which it was delivered.” Id.
                We reject Ms. Phillips’ argument that the language used by
        the district court was coercive, as it was nearly identical to the pat-
        tern Eleventh Circuit jury instruction. See Rubenstein, 38 F.4th at
        996. To the extent Ms. Phillips takes issue with the pattern lan-
        guage indicating that jurors in the minority should consider
        whether their beliefs are reasonable, we have approved of such lan-
        guage on multiple occasions and find no error here today. See id.
        See also Burkhart v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F.3d 1068, 1085 n.5
        (11th Cir. 2018).
               In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, five are par-
        ticularly (but not exclusively) relevant to the coerciveness analysis:
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10005

        (1) the total length of deliberations; (2) the number of times the
        jury reported being deadlocked and was instructed to resume de-
        liberations; (3) whether the judge knew of the jury’s numerical split
        when he instructed the jury to continue deliberating; (4) whether
        any of the instructions implied that the jurors were violating their
        oaths or acting improperly by failing to reach a verdict; and (5) the
        time between the final supplemental instruction and the jury’s ver-
        dict. See Brewster v. Hetzel, 913 F.3d 1042, 1053 (11th Cir. 2019). We
        have held that fifteen minutes of deliberation between an Allen
        charge and the verdict did not indicate coercion. See Rubinstein, 38
        F.4th at 997.
                Upon review, the circumstances here do not raise any spec-
        tre of coercion. The jury deliberated for an additional two hours
        after receiving the Allen charge and only reported being deadlocked
        once. There is also no indication that the district court knew of the
        jury’s numerical split when it gave the charge, nor was there any
        implication from the instructions that the jurors were violating
        their oaths or otherwise acting improperly. The district court,
        therefore, did not abuse its discretion.
                                          V
               Following the jury’s verdict in favor of FedEx Ground, Ms.
        Phillips moved to vacate the judgment and for a new jury trial.
        Specifically, Ms. Phillips asserted that the jury’s verdict as to her
        Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims was inconsistent and
        against the weight of the evidence produced at trial.
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        23-10005                Opinion of the Court                         13

                Under Rule 59(e), a district court may “alter or amend a
        judgment” that is based on “manifest errors of law or fact.” Metlife
        Life & Annuity Co. of Conn. v. Akpele, 886 F.3d 998, 1008 (11th Cir.
        2018); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Additionally, under Rule 59(a), a dis-
        trict court may grant a motion for a new trial if it believes that the
        verdict rendered was contrary to the great weight of the evidence
        or will result in a miscarriage of justice. See Rosenfield v. Wellington
        Leisure Prods., Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987). We review
        a district court’s denial of either motion for an abuse of discretion.
        See McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 901 F.3d 1282, 1288
        (11th Cir. 2018); Akpele, 886 F.3d at 1003.
               We disagree with Ms. Phillips’ contention that the jury ver-
        dict as to her Title VII claims was inconsistent for two reasons.
        First, Ms. Phillips (through counsel) did not timely raise the pur-
        ported inconsistency with the district court. Second, and in any
        event, the verdict was not legally inconsistent.
                A verdict is inconsistent when there is “no rational, non-
        speculative way to reconcile . . . two essential jury findings” Witt v.
        Norfe, Inc., 725 F.2d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations
        and citation omitted). A district court “must make all reasonable
        efforts to reconcile an inconsistent jury verdict and if there is a view
        of the case which makes the jury’s answers consistent, the court
        must adopt that view and enter judgment accordingly.” Burger King
        Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1489 (11th Cir. 1983). See also Atl. &
        Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)
        (“When there is a view of the case that makes the jury’s answers to
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                   23-10005

        special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that
        way.”).
                But “[a] party must object to a verdict as inconsistent before
        the jury has been dismissed.” Reider v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 793
        F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Walter Int’l Prods., Inc. v. Sa-
        linas, 650 F.3d 1402, 1419–20 (11th Cir. 2011)). Indeed, failure to
        object to an inconsistent verdict before the jury is excused forfeits
        the objections. See Reider, 793 F.3d at 1259. See also Mason v. Ford
        Motor Co., 307 F.3d 1271, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[The defend-
        ant’s] failure to raise its objection before the jury was discharged
        waived the right to contest the verdicts on the basis of alleged in-
        consistency.”). “The reason for this particular raise-it-or-lose-it rule
        is that if the inconsistency is raised before the jury is discharged, the
        jury can be sent back for further deliberations to resolve the incon-
        sistency in its verdict or interrogatory answer,” but “that is not pos-
        sible” once the jury is gone. See Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc. v. E. Shore
        Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1225 (11th Cir. 2012). Ms. Phillips’
        counsel did not object either to the verdict form itself or the jury’s
        verdict as inconsistent until her post-trial motion was filed on July
        11, 2022—long after the jury had been discharged.
              In any event, the jury’s verdict on the Title VII claims can be
        reconciled and is therefore legally consistent. The verdict was also
        supported by the evidence.
               Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to fail or re-
        fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrim-
        inate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
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        23-10005               Opinion of the Court                         15

        terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
        dividual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §
        2000e–2(a)(1). An employer may not retaliate against an employee
        because she has opposed any practice made unlawful under that
        law, and a protected activity means an employee participated in fil-
        ing a formal complaint with the EEOC or in the investigation of
        proceedings under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); EEOC v.
        Total Sys. Serv. Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000).
               In a Title VII race discrimination case, even if the plaintiff
        provides evidence that the defendant, in making an adverse em-
        ployment decision, was motivated in part by an impermissible con-
        sideration, such as race, the defendant can prevail if it can prove by
        a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
        decision even in the absence of the discriminatory consideration.
        See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Pullman v. Tallapoosa Cnty. Jail, 185 F.3d
        1182, 1184 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, defendants in Title VII employ-
        ment discrimination cases may prove as an affirmative defense that
        they would have reached the same employment decision even in
        the absence of bias. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); Pullman, 185
        F.3d at 1184.
               To establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
        must prove that she engaged in statutorily protected activity, she
        suffered a materially adverse action, and there was some causal re-
        lation between the two events. See Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co.,
        513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). After the plaintiff has estab-
        lished the elements of a claim, the employer has an opportunity to
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                      23-10005

        articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged
        employment action as an affirmative defense to liability. See id.
        The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving retaliation by a
        preponderance of the evidence and that the reason provided by the
        employer is a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. See id.
               Regarding her Title VII discrimination claim, the jury found
        that FedEx Ground took an adverse employment action against
        Ms. Phillips and that her race was a motivating factor in that ad-
        verse action. But, per the verdict, the jury also found that FedEx
        Ground would have taken the same adverse action against Ms.
        Phillips even if FedEx had not taken her race into account. As to
        her Title VII retaliation claim, the jury found that Ms. Phillips en-
        gaged in protected activity, but that FedEx Ground did not termi-
        nate Ms. Phillips because of that protected activity.
                These findings are not inconsistent. It is reasonable that a
        jury could conclude—based on the evidence introduced by the par-
        ties at trial—that FedEx Ground would have fired Ms. Phillips for
        reasons other than her race (such as her abandonment of the job),
        and that, as such, her internal complaints and EEOC claims were
        not the cause of her ultimate termination. Though the jury also
        found that race was a motivating factor in the adverse actions taken
        by FedEx Ground, it does not necessarily follow that her race-based
        complaints were the reason she was fired.3 Indeed, there is overlap

        3 Ms. Phillips introduced evidence at trial that she was subject to various ac-

        tions,   including   unwarranted     write-ups   and    refusals   for   injury
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        23-10005                Opinion of the Court                          17

        between FedEx Ground’s “same decision” affirmative defense and
        its articulation of a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for Ms. Phil-
        lips’ termination.
               The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms.
        Phillips’ request to set aside or vacate the judgment, or the request
        to grant a new trial.
                                           VI
               We affirm the district court’s judgment against Ms. Phillips
        and its order denying her motion to set aside that judgment and/or
        for a new trial.
               AFFIRMED.

        accommodations, which could have been considered adverse by the jury (and
        indeed, were argued to have been adverse by Ms. Phillips).