Court Opinion

ID: 9910209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 05:04:40.038011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:27.828708
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

In re Attorney Fees of JOHN W. UJLAKY.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     December 14, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 364889
                                                                     Allegan Circuit Court
FREDERICK ALLAN MATTHEWS,                                            LC No. 2022-025034-FH

               Defendant,

and

JOHN W. UJLAKY,

               Appellant.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and RICK and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Appellant, John W. Ujlaky, appeals as of right the trial court’s order reducing his requested
attorney fees from $4,606.72 to $3,406.72 for his services representing defendant during
defendant’s direct appeal to this Court. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we vacate the
attorney-fee award and remand for further proceedings.

                                 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       A jury found defendant guilty of second-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(3); and
malicious destruction of a building in the amount of $1,000 or more but less than $20,000,
MCL 750.380(3)(a). The Allegan Circuit Court subsequently appointed Ujlaky to represent
defendant in his postconviction proceedings. Ujlaky’s representation of defendant included a

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number of services, such as reviewing the lower court record, meeting virtually with defendant,
and preparing an appellate brief raising five separate legal issues.1

         Ujlaky filed a statement of services and request for attorney fees in the total amount of
$4,606.72, which consisted of $4,575 for legal services and $31.72 in expenses. The Michigan
Appellate Assigned Counsel System standard fee for an appeal from a trial conviction in a Level
II case is $75 an hour, with a presumptive maximum of 45 hours. In other words, the presumptive
maximum fee for a Level II appeal is $3,375. With the fee request, Ujlaky provided an itemized
billing statement detailing the date, number of billable hours, and $75 hourly rate for the legal
services provided in the appeal. He also filed a petition for fees in excess of the standard
maximum. In the petition, Ujlaky explained that additional time was necessary for the appeal
because of the serious nature of the conviction and the issues requiring consideration on appeal.
Ujlaky claimed that he spent a total of 61 hours working on the appeal and requested $4,575 in
legal fees. The trial court only approved payment of $3,375 for legal services and $31.72 for
expenses, for a total of $3,406.72. The trial court did not hold a hearing to address the request for
additional fees. In the summary section of the fee request, the court simply commented that the
“[r]equest for additional fees not justified.” This appeal followed.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

       Ujlaky’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
provide an adequate explanation for its decision to reduce the fees requested. We agree.

        “A trial court’s determination regarding the reasonableness of compensation for services
and expenses of court-appointed attorneys is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” In re Attorney
Fees of Foster, 317 Mich App 372, 375; 894 NW2d 718 (2016). “A trial court abuses its discretion
when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

        To constitute reasonable compensation, “the compensation actually paid must be
reasonably related to the representational services that the individual attorneys actually perform.”
Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n v Wayne Circuit Court, 443 Mich 110, 131; 503 NW2d 885 (1993).
The trial court has broad discretion to determine what constitutes reasonable compensation, but
even so, it may not “simply deny” compensation for billed services without an explanation. See
In re Attorney Fees of Jamnik, 176 Mich App 827, 831-832; 440 NW2d 112 (1989), aff’d sub nom
People v Hunter, 434 Mich 883 (1990). A trial court must “either award the requested fees, or
articulate on the record its basis for concluding that such fees are not reasonable.” In re Ujlaky,
498 Mich 890 (2015).

       This Court has articulated the following factors for a court to consider while determining
reasonable compensation for appointed counsel:

1
    See Michigan Court of Appeals, Docket No. 362717.

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              1. The complexity and difficulty of the case and the time and expense of
       counsel which can reasonably be justified.

               2. The trial court’s policy as to compensation.

              3. The minimum standards for indigent criminal appellate defense services
       promulgated by the Michigan Supreme Court in Administrative Order 1981-7, 412
       Mich lxxxiv-xci.[2] [In re Attorney Fees of Jamnik, 176 Mich App at 831.]

See also Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n, 443 Mich at 131 (holding that “whatever the system or
method of compensation utilized, the compensation actually paid must be reasonable related to the
representational services that the individual attorneys actually perform”). “Although the
expenditure of any amount of time beyond that contemplated by the schedule for the typical case
does not, ipso facto, warrant extra fees, spending a significant but reasonable number of hours
beyond the norm may.” In re Ujlaky, 498 Mich at 890.

         In this case, Ujlaky requested fees in excess of the standard fee for handling an appeal from
a trial conviction. He provided an itemized billing statement detailing the tasks that he completed
and the time spent on each task. However, the trial court simply awarded the standard fee without
considering whether the request for additional fees was reasonable in light of the actual services
rendered. The approval of payment merely states that “[a]ny reductions or changes to Counsel’s
request are indicated above with strikethrough,” and every item on the list for which Ujlaky
requested additional reimbursement is crossed out. As earlier noted, the court’s only stated reason
for declining to reimburse Ujlaky as requested is a brief comment noting: “Request for additional
fees not justified.” In the absence of any analysis as to why these fees were not justified, however,
we conclude that the court’s attorney-fee award fell “outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes” available in this case. In re Foster, 317 Mich App at 375. Accordingly, a remand to
the trial court is required. On remand, the trial court must “either award the requested fees, or
articulate on the record its basis for concluding that such fees are not reasonable.” In re Ujlaky,
498 Mich at 890.

        Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                              /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                              /s/ Noah P. Hood

2
 The standards in Administrative Order No. 1981-7 were later revised and replaced by
Administrative Order No. 2004-6, 471 Mich c (2004).

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