Court Opinion

ID: 9904743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 19:01:01.123909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:18.435846
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30359         Document: 00516979099             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/27/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                  November 27, 2023
                                        No. 21-30359                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   William B. Hungerford, Jr.,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:18-CR-112-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Willett, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          William B. Hungerford challenges his conviction on nine counts of
   various forms of fraud and money laundering. He raises twelve alleged trial
   errors. We find no reversible error and affirm.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-30359      Document: 00516979099          Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/27/2023

                                    No. 21-30359

                                         I.
                                         A.
          The crimes in this case arise from a federal foreign investment
   program known as “EB-5.” United States Citizenship and Immigration
   Services (“USCIS”) uses the EB-5 program to offer wealthy aliens a pathway
   to permanent residence. Alien investors must invest $1,000,000 of capital in
   a qualified business, maintain that investment for at least two years, and show
   that the investment created at least ten American jobs by the end of the two-
   year period. ROA.8442–3. But if the alien investors send their capital to
   targeted employment areas—rural areas or high unemployment areas in need
   of economic investment, like New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina—then
   the EB-5 program only requires a $500,000 investment. ROA.8443. The
   program also allows investors to contribute their capital to “Regional
   Centers” that pool investor capital to promote growth in a particular
   geographic region. ROA.2062. Aliens who invest money in creating
   American jobs in accordance with the EB-5 rules can apply for permanent
   residence.
          Three immigration forms play important roles in the EB-5 program.
   The first is the I-526. An immigrant investor files an I-526 petition to enter
   the United States as a conditional permanent resident. The I-526 requires the
   immigrant investor to show that he has made the required investment in the
   United States and to submit a business plan for creating the required
   American jobs. After USCIS approves the I-526 petition, the immigrant
   investor receives conditional permanent residence status (colloquially called
   a “temporary green card”) for two years. At the end of the two-year
   investment period, the investor may file an I-829 petition for removal of
   conditions on their residency (colloquially called a “permanent green card”).
   The I-829 requires the immigrant investor to show that he did not receive

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   any of the invested money back and that the required jobs were in fact
   created. The final form that is important for this case is the I-924. The I-924
   is an annual report filed by a Regional Center. The Regional Center uses that
   form to certify to USCIS that it continues to meet the EB-5 eligibility criteria
   by promoting growth and jobs in its designated region.
                                         B.
          Hungerford and his partner, Timothy Milbrath, opened the New
   Orleans Regional Center (“the Center”) as part of the EB-5 program. They
   operated the Center from 2007 until 2012. ROA.5730–33, 9543. Hungerford
   and Milbrath ran the Center through their company, NobleOutReach, LLC
   (“NOR”). ROA.3638. NOR served as “an umbrella entity” over the
   Center’s portfolio projects. And those portfolio projects were the
   purportedly job creating entities (“JCEs”) that would ultimately satisfy the
   EB-5 program’s job-creation requirements. ROA.8442.
          Hungerford and Milbrath recruited forty-six aliens to invest with the
   Center. Thirty-one of those aliens submitted I-526 petitions for temporary
   green cards via the EB-5 program. ROA.13114. The documents NOR
   prepared for the investor petitions included assurances that the Center’s
   JCEs would be located within Orleans Parish and that the minimum investor
   capital ($500,000 per investor) would be invested within the geographic
   boundaries of the New Orleans targeted employment area. ROA.10692–94.
          As it turns out, however, Hungerford and Milbrath did not invest the
   aliens’ money to create jobs in New Orleans; they instead used that money
   to enrich themselves. Hungerford and Milbrath established Bay-Nola-
   Management (“BNM”) as a purportedly New Orleans-based JCE. BNM
   purported to provide “marketing, financial management, due diligence and
   business analysis” in New Orleans. ROA.8587. And in NOR’s required I-
   924 annual reports to USCIS, signed by Hungerford under penalty of perjury,

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   NOR claimed BNM performed “Food Service” and “Construction,” and
   listed BNM’s and NOR’s addresses as in New Orleans. E.g., ROA.2130,
   2367–69. But BNM operated primarily out of Maryland, where Hungerford
   and Milbrath lived, not out of New Orleans. Mail addressed to BNM went to
   a New Orleans address, only to be forwarded to the Maryland office.
   ROA.2359. And there is no evidence that BNM actually created jobs in New
   Orleans, or that BNM was anything more than a pass-through entity for
   funneling money back to Hungerford and Milbrath via their corporate alter
   ego, NOR.
          The fraud came to light when the thirty-one alien investors filed their
   I-829 petitions for permanent green cards. USCIS denied the aliens’
   petitions on the grounds that NOR could not sufficiently demonstrate that
   the investors’ funds had been used in New Orleans. ROA.3659; 12116–19.
   In 2012, several investors sued NOR based on their lost investment and
   denied immigration petitions. Despite the suit, Hungerford and Milbrath
   continued to file quarterly reports with the city of New Orleans, reaffirming
   that their remaining capital was still invested in New Orleans, and NOR
   continued to hold property in New Orleans. ROA.7956–8027, 8028–99,
   8100–71, 8173–8247. NOR finally sold one property, Maurepas Foods, in
   2016, but Hungerford and Milbrath split the proceeds ($120,000 each),
   rather than reinvesting the money in New Orleans. ROA.13365; 13395–96.
         In 2018, a grand jury indicted Hungerford and Milbrath with nine
   counts: three counts of conspiracy to commit mail/wire fraud, immigration
   fraud, and money laundering and six counts of substantive wire fraud. After
   a three-week trial, the jury convicted both defendants on all counts.
   Hungerford timely appealed. 1

          _____________________
          1
              Milbrath died in custody after filing his opening brief in this appeal.

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                                               II.
           Hungerford raises twelve alleged trial errors. 2 We divide them into
   four categories: (A) four sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, (B) a
   constructive-amendment-of-the-indictment claim, (C) three improper-
   witness-testimony challenges, and (D) four jury-instruction claims. He also
   claims that (E) even if no individual error is reversible, their cumulative effect
   is. We address each category in turn.
                                               A.
           Hungerford properly preserved his sufficiency objections. Therefore,
   our review is de novo but with “great deference” to the jury’s verdict. United
   States v. Churchwell, 807 F.3d 107, 114 (5th Cir. 2015). This court “must
   affirm a conviction if, after viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences
   in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
   have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
   United States v. Jordan, 945 F.3d 245, 255 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted)
   (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Sanders, 952 F.3d 263, 273 (5th
   Cir. 2020).
           Hungerford challenges (1) the conspiracy convictions and (2) the
   substantive wire fraud convictions based on the sufficiency of the evidence.

           _____________________
           2 The twelve alleged errors are: insufficiency of the evidence for the (1) mail and

   wire fraud, (2) immigration fraud, and (3) money laundering conspiracies; (4) insufficiency
   of the evidence for the substantive wire fraud counts; (5) constructive amendment of the
   immigration fraud conspiracy count; (6) improper expert testimony from lay witness Jan
   Lyons; (7) improper hearsay evidence; (8) improper summary witness testimony from
   Yvonne Evans; and improper jury instructions (9) for failure to issue an estoppel
   instruction, (10) incorrect use of an “ignorance of the law” instruction, (11) incorrect use
   of a “deliberate ignorance” instruction, and (12) failure to cure jury confusion.

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                                          1.
          First, Hungerford says the Government introduced insufficient
   evidence that he conspired with Milbrath. To sustain a conspiracy
   conviction, “the Government must prove (1) an agreement between two or
   more persons to pursue an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant’s knowledge
   of the unlawful objective and voluntary agreement to join the conspiracy; and
   (3) an overt act by one or more of the members of the conspiracy in
   furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy.” United States v. Mann, 493
   F.3d 484, 492 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363,
   370 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Fiero, 38 F.3d 761, 768 (5th Cir.
   1994) (listing five elements of conspiracy to launder money that are
   represented by the three elements in Mann). Mail and wire fraud conspiracies
   require these same elements, except that they do not require an overt act. See
   United States v. Kuhrt, 788 F.3d 403, 414 (5th Cir. 2015).
          In proving these elements, the Government may rely on indirect
   evidence. “An agreement may be inferred from concert of action, voluntary
   participation may be inferred from a collection of circumstances, and
   knowledge may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.” United States
   v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The upshot:
   “Direct evidence of a conspiracy is unnecessary; each element may be
   inferred from circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889,
   907 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
          The record easily contains sufficient evidence to prove that
   Hungerford conspired to commit mail and wire fraud, immigration fraud, and
   money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (conspiracy to commit mail or wire
   fraud); id. § 371 (general federal conspiracy, here applied to the immigration
   fraud); id. § 1956(h) (conspiracy to launder money). In fact, the record teems
   with such evidence, so any attempt to describe it would be woefully

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   underinclusive. To hit just some highlights: Both Hungerford and Milbrath
   received equal payments from NOR, owned a 50% share of NOR, and, most
   importantly, each engaged in behavior to further the conspiracy, to enrich
   themselves with millions of dollars, and to conceal the conspiracy. They
   created circular transactions to move money into their pockets and then
   omitted those transactions from USCIS filings to deceive the Government.
   And both knew that their actions were unlawful under the constraints of the
   EB-5 program—USCIS told them several times that the investors’ $500,000
   contributions could only go toward investments in New Orleans. Moreover,
   Hungerford conspired with Milbrath to cause immigrant investors to submit
   fraudulent immigration forms. See United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, 497
   (5th Cir. 2008) (holding conspiracy to make false statement can be proved
   where defendant conspired to cause a third party to make it). And
   Hungerford signed under penalty of perjury I-924 annual reports that he
   knew were fraudulent because BNM did not perform “Food Service” and
   “Construction” in New Orleans.
          The Government therefore presented sufficient evidence to convict
   Hungerford on each conspiracy charge.
                                        2.
          Hungerford next challenges his substantive wire fraud convictions.
   “The elements of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 are: (1) a scheme to
   defraud and (2) the use of, or causing the use of, wire communications in
   furtherance of the scheme.” Simpson, 741 F.3d at 547–48 (quotation
   omitted). Hungerford’s wire fraud convictions were based on five quarterly
   report emails he filed with the city of New Orleans and one sale of an NOR-
   held property, Maurepas Foods. ROA.145–46; ROA.7886–955, 7956–8027,
   8028–99, 8100–71, 8173–247; ROA.13365–69.

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          To satisfy § 1343, the fraudulent wire need only be “incident to an
   essential part of the scheme [to defraud] or a step in the plot.” United States
   v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2011) (alteration adopted) (quoting
   Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989)). And wires that
   conceal or delay detection of an ended scheme can be considered essential to
   the scheme. See United States v. Bowman, 783 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1986).
   That is because “actions taken to avoid detection, or to lull the fraud victim
   into complacency, can further the fraud.” United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d
   1348, 1363 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 402–03
   (1974)).
          Here, each of Hungerford’s five email reports contained assurances
   that the EB-5 investments were still located in New Orleans and that NOR
   was pursuing the Center’s goals. See ROA.7886–955, 7956–8027, 8028–99,
   8100–71, 8173–247; see also ROA.2701–14. But trial evidence showed that
   substantial portions of the investments were actually in Maryland or in the
   defendants’ pockets and that no significant work had been done in New
   Orleans for years. And the property sale was an even more direct piece of the
   scheme to defraud. Although the sale proceeds initially went to an NOR
   holding, they never got reinvested in New Orleans. Instead, Hungerford and
   Milbrath split them 50/50. A reasonable jury could certainly have found that
   Hungerford meant these wires to lull the city into believing that the Center
   was still investing in New Orleans while he wrapped up the loose ends of his
   scheme. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions
   for substantive wire fraud.
                                          B.
          Hungerford did not raise his constructive-amendment or material-
   variance claim to the district court, so we review the claim for plain error. See
   United States v. Broadnax, 601 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2010). Under plain

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   error, “[t]he defendant must show that (1) the district court committed an
   error, (2) the error is plain, (3) the error affects his substantial rights, and
   (4) failure to correct the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity,
   or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. del Carpio
   Frescas, 932 F.3d 324, 332 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
   Thus, “[r]elief under the plain-error standard ‘will be difficult to get, as it
   should be.’” United States v. Figueroa-Coello, 920 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir.
   2019) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 n. 9
   (2004)).
          “A constructive amendment occurs when the government changes its
   theory at trial, allowing the jury to convict on a broader basis than that alleged
   in the indictment, or . . . proves an essential element of the crime on an
   alternate basis . . . not charged in the indictment.” United States v. Stanford,
   805 F.3d 557, 565 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Its less-severe sibling, a
   material variance, “occurs when the proof at trial depicts a scenario that
   differs materially from the scenario charged in the indictment but does not
   modify an essential element of the charged offense.” United States v.
   Rodriguez, 553 F.3d 380, 392 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Generally,
   constructive amendments are reversible error per se, while material variances
   are reviewed for harmless error. See United States v. Jara-Favela, 686 F.3d
   289, 299 (5th Cir. 2012). But under plain error review, even if a difference
   between the indictment and the proof at trial constituted a constructive
   amendment, we will reverse only if the amendment was also a clear or
   obvious error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights and meets our
   discretionary threshold. See Broadnax, 601 F.3d at 340.
          In determining what represents an amendment, the constructive
   amendment rules lie on top of rules governing the specificity of indictments.
   In general, “[a]n indictment is not required to expressly set out every action
   of the defendant which may have contributed to the commission of the crime

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   charged. Rather, the chief purposes of an indictment are to apprise the
   defendant of the specific charges he will be asked to rebut at trial and to
   protect him against double jeopardy.” United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329,
   1333–34 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). If the indictment specifies “one
   particular kind of falsity . . . [then] a conviction must rest on that charge.”
   United States v. Adams, 778 F.2d 1117, 1125 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, whether it
   is an error to allow the Government to present new or different evidence from
   that specified in the indictment turns on both the contents of the indictment
   and the degree of difference between the charges and the evidence at trial.
          Similarly, the constructive amendment doctrine serves chiefly to
   protect defendants from unfair surprise evidence at trial and from successive
   prosecutions for the same offense based on different evidence. See Berger v.
   United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935) (“The general rule that allegations and
   proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements (1) that the
   accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he
   may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the
   evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against another
   prosecution for the same offense.” (citation omitted)). If any amendment did
   not affect one of these two substantial rights, then we cannot say that it was
   plain error for the district court to allow evidence outside of the indictment.
          Here, Hungerford contends that the prosecution constructively
   amended or materially varied from the immigration fraud charge levied by
   the grand jury by introducing I-924 annual reports that Hungerford signed
   under penalty of perjury and submitted to USCIS to demonstrate compliance
   with the EB-5 program. True, the indictment mentions two immigration
   forms required by the EB-5 program (the I-526 and I-829 petitions, which
   immigrant investors submit to adjust their immigration statuses) and does
   not mention I-924s. But Hungerford cannot show that the omission satisfies
   the high bar for plain-error relief.

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          First, there was no risk of unfair surprise. The grand jury indicted
   Hungerford and Milbrath for “knowingly and willfully combin[ing],
   conspir[ing] and agree[ing] to make and cause to be made material false
   statements under oath and penalty of perjury on an application or other
   document required by the immigration laws or regulations of the United
   States, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a); all in
   violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.” ROA.143. The
   indictment further charged Hungerford with conspiring to make false
   “statements” (plural) on “an application or other document.” ROA.143.
   Hungerford knew that the EB-5 program included several kinds of
   documents, including the I-924, and he knew that he had submitted the
   fraudulent I-924s. And he points to no case requiring an indictment to list
   each piece of evidence the Government will use to prove an indictment’s
   allegations. As such, there was no fairness violation in introducing the I-924s.
          Second, there was no risk of a second prosecution. Because the
   overarching charge was the conspiracy to commit immigration fraud, not the
   substantive crime of immigration fraud, there was no risk that leaving the I-
   924 forms out of the indictment would subject Hungerford to the risk of
   another prosecution based on the I-924 forms alone. The conspiracy charge
   covered the scheme as a whole, of which the I-924 forms were only a piece.
   That the district court allowed them to be introduced here arguably protects
   Hungerford from a future prosecution for this same scheme.
          Thus, it is unclear there was any error. Even if there were, any error
   was not plain or obvious because none of our constructive-amendment or
   material-variance cases compel a finding of error here. And even if there were
   a plain error, Hungerford cannot show that he was prejudiced—much less
   that we should exercise our discretion to award relief.

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                                        C.
          Hungerford next alleges three evidentiary errors: (1) improper
   admission of hearsay evidence, (2) improper lay-witness testimony, and
   (3) improper summary-witness testimony. Hungerford raised his hearsay
   objection below, so we review it for abuse of discretion, “subject to the
   harmless error rule.” Jordan, 945 F.3d at 257; United States v. Ragsdale, 426
   F.3d 765, 774–75 (5th Cir. 2005). But Hungerford failed to raise his lay-
   witness objection below, so there we review for plain error. See Jordan, 945
   F.3d at 258. Finally, the parties dispute whether Hungerford sufficiently
   preserved his objection to the summary-witness testimony. The dispute does
   not matter because Hungerford’s claim fails in any event.
                                         1.
          First, hearsay. Hungerford objected to the prosecution’s introduction
   of out-of-court statements by Morrie Berez, a USCIS official-turned-NOR-
   consultant, concerning the legal requirements for running the Center.
   Although Berez did not testify, other witnesses offered a series of his
   comments, primarily in emails and documents, as evidence that Hungerford
   and Milbrath knew that their conduct was unlawful. Hungerford contends
   that these statements were inadmissible and that allowing them to be
   introduced constituted an abuse of discretion.
          The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these
   statements because the statements were not hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid.
   801(c)(2) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement that . . . a party offers in evidence
   to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”). Simply put, the
   prosecution did not offer Berez’s statements for the truth of the matter
   asserted; instead, the prosecution argued that the statements went to
   Hungerford’s knowledge that his conduct was illegal. ROA.2410; see United

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   States v. Chavis, 772 F.2d 100, 106 (5th Cir. 1985). That is not hearsay, and
   hence it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the statements.
                                          2.
          Second, lay witness Jan Lyons’s testimony. Lyons was a USCIS
   official. Hungerford argues the Government improperly used Lyons to
   introduce legal opinions about USCIS’s regulations and the agency’s
   understanding of its own rules. Most importantly, Lyons testified to USCIS’s
   interpretation of the EB-5 program, the regional center program, and its own
   guidelines. ROA.2063, 2070, 2129. But Hungerford did not object to
   Lyons’s testimony on these grounds below, so we review the testimony for
   plain error.
          “If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an
   opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s
   perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
   determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other
   specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701.
   Under Rule 701, “[i]t is . . . generally prohibited for a lay witness to interpret
   statutes and to give legal opinions.” United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467,
   511 (5th Cir. 2011).
          Even if the district court committed plain error in admitting Lyons’s
   testimony, Hungerford cannot show prejudice. Many of the conclusions from
   Lyons’s testimony were repeated in other testimony and evidence. For
   example, perhaps the most important conclusion from Lyons—that
   Hungerford and Milbrath could not use the alien investors’ $500,000 EB-5
   funds for anything other than investment in the New Orleans JCEs—also
   appeared in Milbrath’s book interview, ROA.6270, in the USCIS letter
   responding to the first temporary green card petition, ROA.11985, in NOR’s
   response to that letter, ROA.12051, and in testimony from investors,

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   ROA.1035–36. Although Lyons’s testimony was no doubt important,
   Hungerford cannot show a reasonable probability that, but for Lyons’s
   testimony, Hungerford would have been acquitted. Cf. United States v. Mims,
   992 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2021) (requiring a “reasonable probability of a
   different outcome absent the error” in plain error review of a sentencing
   error). Therefore, allowing Lyons’s testimony was not reversible plain error.
                                         3.
          Third, summary witness Yvonne Evans’s testimony. Here too,
   Hungerford cannot show that the district court committed a reversible error
   under any standard of review.
          The Federal Rules of Evidence allow witnesses to “use a summary,
   chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings,
   or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.” Fed. R.
   Evid. 1006. Our precedent allows parties to call witnesses to summarize
   large volumes of evidence. United States v. Nicholson, 961 F.3d 328, 335 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Baker, 923 F.3d 390, 397 (5th Cir. 2019)).
   As a general rule, summary witnesses of this kind are not supposed to
   introduce evidence that has not previously been presented to the jury. Ibid.
   There is no clear line between what constitutes fact-witness testimony and
   summary-witness testimony. See United States v. Hart, 295 F.3d 451, 457 (5th
   Cir. 2002); United States v. Lucas, 849 F.3d 638, 644–45 (5th Cir. 2017).
   Moreover, we have not held that a summary witness cannot also serve as a
   fact witness. See Nicholson, 961 F.3d at 335 (describing a witness as both).
          Hungerford cannot show reversible error under any standard. The
   parties stipulated to the authenticity of the evidence that Evans reviewed,
   such as financial documents. ROA.2680. Insofar as Evans summarized that
   evidence, her testimony was admissible under Nicholson. And insofar as
   Evans strayed beyond that evidence to testify about new facts, Hungerford

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   has not shown that Evans could not serve as both a fact witness and a
   summary witness.
                                           D.
           Preserved objections to jury instructions are reviewed for abuse of
   discretion. United States v. Green, 47 F.4th 279, 288 (5th Cir. 2022). We will
   find such an abuse only where “the defendant’s requested instructions
   “(1) are substantively correct; (2) are not substantially covered in the charge
   given to the jury; and (3) concern an important point in the trial so that the
   failure to give them seriously impairs the defendant’s ability to present
   effectively a particular defense.” United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 541 (5th
   Cir. 2012) (alterations omitted). Moreover, we will vacate a conviction only
   if the requested instruction would have led to an acquittal. Id. at 541–42.
   Meanwhile, challenges raised only on motion for new trial or afterward are
   reviewed for plain error. Id. at 540.
           Hungerford offered alternate instructions for his (1) estoppel
   instruction claim but did not object to the trial court’s instructions for his
   (2) ignorance of the law instruction, (3) deliberate ignorance instruction, or
   (4) failure to cure jury confusion claims. Therefore, we review the first
   argument for abuse of discretion but the rest for plain error.
                                           1.
           Hungerford requested an estoppel instruction on the basis that USCIS
   had “approved” of Hungerford and Milbrath’s conduct. That instruction
   read:
           The defendants assert the defense of equitable estoppel, on the
           grounds that the United States Customs and Immigration
           Service approved of their conduct in operating the immigrant
           investor program. The Constitution does not permit
           convictions to be obtained if the government has assured the

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                                      No. 21-30359

           defendant that his or her conduct is permissible. If you find that
           the USCIS approved of the defendants’ conduct in operating
           the immigrant investor program, you must find them not
           guilty. . . .
   ROA.423.
           “The defense of entrapment by estoppel is applicable when a
   government official or agent actively assures a defendant that certain conduct
   is legal and the defendant reasonably relies on that advice and continues or
   initiates the conduct.” United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir.
   1996) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Treviño-Martinez, 86 F.3d
   65, 69 (1996) (“the government must actively mislead the defendant . . .”
   (emphasis added)); United States v. Cornejo-Flores, 254 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir.
   2001)     (table    case)   (per    curiam)       (requiring   “an    affirmative
   misrepresentation” by an official). This rule emphasizes that mere approval
   by a government official is insufficient to entitle defendants to an estoppel
   defense. Hungerford’s proffered instruction did not track our rule, and
   therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing it.
                                           2.
           Hungerford next contends that the district court plainly erred in
   issuing an instruction that read: “Ignorance of the law or even a mistake of
   law is not a defense.” ROA.4079. Hungerford points to two potential defects
   in the instruction. First, he argues that the “maxim” that “ignorance of the
   law is no excuse” is subject to exceptions where a mistake of law eliminates
   the specific intent to commit a criminal act. Blue Br. 79. Second, Hungerford
   argues that even if the instruction was correct, it effectively negated the
   following good-faith-defense instruction.
           In its entirety, the disputed instruction says:

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                                      No. 21-30359

          It is not necessary for the government to prove the defendants
          knew that a particular act or failure to act is a violation of the
          law. Ignorance of the law or even a mistake of law is not a
          defense. The defendants are entitled to a defense of good faith
          as a bar to a finding of criminal intent. Where ‘intent to
          defraud’ is a specific element of the count charged, it follows
          that a defendant who acts in ‘good faith’ cannot have the
          criminal intent required to commit these acts. Thus, if you find
          that any defendant acted in good faith in connection with the
          ‘schemes to defraud’ alleged by the government, you must find
          the defendants not guilty of these charges.
   ROA.4079. Hungerford is quite right that it would constitute legal error to
   instruct the jury that ignorance of the law is no excuse because ignorance can
   be an excuse. See, e.g., Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2019).
   But Hungerford is wrong to focus on the “ignorance of the law” sentence in
   isolation because the rest of the instruction specifies that good-faith
   ignorance can negate intent. We cannot say this instruction, taken as a whole,
   constituted a clearly erroneous statement of the law.
          But even assuming that the instruction was erroneous, there is little to
   suggest that it affected Hungerford’s substantial rights. The prosecution
   offered substantial evidence of Hungerford’s fraudulent scheme, and
   Hungerford responded with attempts to negate the specific intent element of
   his charges. And the trial court further clarified the jury instructions by
   reemphasizing the importance of the specific intent element, stating “if the
   evidence in this case leaves you with a reasonable doubt as to whether the
   defendants acted with an intent to defraud, then you must find them not
   guilty.” ROA.4079. The jury therefore had ample opportunity to consider
   Hungerford’s defense, and so he cannot show that this alleged error
   impacted his substantial rights.

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                                    No. 21-30359

                                         3.
          Hungerford next argues that the district court plainly erred by giving
   a deliberate-ignorance instruction. A deliberate-ignorance instruction allows
   the jury to find that the defendant knew a fact if the defendant deliberately
   turned a “blind eye” to it. To warrant a deliberate-ignorance instruction, the
   trial record must support “inferences that (1) the defendant was subjectively
   aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct; and (2) the
   defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct.”
   United States v. Oti, 872 F.3d 678, 697 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). In
   making that fact-based determination, “the court reviews the evidence and
   all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most
   favorable to the government.” Id.
          Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the
   record supported the instruction. At a bare minimum, there was sufficient
   evidence that Milbrath deliberately ignored evidence of Hungerford’s
   fraudulent conduct, such as backdating invoices. Because the two defendants
   were tried together, we cannot say that it was clear or obvious error to issue
   the deliberate ignorance instruction based on this evidence.
                                         4.
          Finally, Hungerford argues that the trial judge erred in referring the
   jury back to the original instructions when the jury sent a note expressing its
   confusion about the term “cause.” Hungerford’s counsel affirmatively
   consented to the district court’s response, ROA.4112, which forecloses our
   review. See United States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1995)
   (“Waived errors are entirely unreviewable, unlike forfeited errors, which are
   reviewable for plain error.”).
          But even if we could review for plain error, we would find none. “[A]
   trial judge, of course, enjoys wide latitude in deciding how to respond to such

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                                     No. 21-30359

   questions.” United States v. Stevens, 38 F.3d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation
   omitted). In reviewing a trial judge’s instructions, “we ask whether the
   court’s answer was reasonably responsive to the jury’s question and whether
   the original and supplemental instructions [if any] as a whole allowed the jury
   to understand the issue presented to it.” Id. Finally, it is not an error to refer
   the jury back to the original instructions “if the original charge is an accurate
   statement of the law.” United States v. Marshall, 283 F. App’x 268, 279 (5th
   Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Arnold, 416 F.3d 349, 359 n.13 (5th Cir.
   2005)).
             Here, the original instructions defined “to cause” as “to cause
   interstate wire communications facilities is to do an act with knowledge that
   the use of the wire communications facilities will follow in the ordinary
   course of business or where such use can reasonably be foreseen.”
   ROA.4085, 4112. This is an accurate statement of the law under the wire
   fraud statute. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954) (using this
   definition of “cause” in the context of mail fraud). Therefore, it was not an
   error (much less plain error) to refer the jury back to the original instruction.
                                          E.
             Hungerford’s final argument is that, even if his other claims fail
   individually, they succeed cumulatively. To prove reversible cumulative
   error, Hungerford must show that the alleged errors “so fatally infect[ed] the
   trial that they violated the trial’s fundamental fairness.” Oti, 872 F.3d at 690
   n.10 (quoting United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 344 (5th Cir. 2012)).
   Hungerford cannot make that showing. The evidence of Hungerford’s guilt
   was overwhelming. And he cannot show prejudice from any of his alleged
   errors.
             AFFIRMED.

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