Court Opinion

ID: 9563073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:36:38.837378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:43.366262
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(dissenting):
I disagree with the majority’s insistence that a mere visitor’s purse, when not in the visitor’s actual possession, is subject to search where a warrant names particular premises and its residents but does not name the visitor. Its ruling is both contrary to reason and against the clear weight of precedent. The majority opinion primarily relies on a 1973 opinion from the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, which focused its analysis on whether or not a visitor’s purse was in her physical possession. United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C.Cir.1973).1 Since the visitor was not *1170“wearing” the purse, the court concluded that it was no longer an “extension of her person,” and thus was within the scope of the warrant which authorized search of the premises but did not name the visitor. Id.
Significantly, the physical proximity test announced in Johnson has been criticized and rejected by the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal. See United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 444-45 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 90, 116 L.Ed.2d 62 (1991); United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 544-45 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431 (1st Cir.1973). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.10(b) at 318 (2d ed. 1987) (physical proximity approach “rightly criticized”). According to the courts rejecting the physical proximity test, “in determining whether a search of personal effects violates the scope of a ‘premises’ warrant, one must consider the relationship between the object, the person and the place being searched,” rather than focusing exclusively on whether the object of the search is in the person’s actual physical possession. Young, 909 F.2d at 445. Accord United States v. Gray, 814 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1987); Giwa, 831 F.2d at 544-45; Micheli, 487 F.2d at 431. In support of its analysis, the First Circuit noted that
[i]t should not be assumed that whatever is found on the premises described in the warrant necessarily falls within the proper scope of the search; rather, it is necessary to examine why a person’s belongings happen to be on the premises. ‘[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,’ Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), and the protective boundary established by requiring a search warrant should encompass those extensions of a person which he reasonably seeks to preserve as private, regardless of where he may be.
Micheli, 487 F.2d at 432. Using the “relationship” formula, the “usual occupant of a building being searched would lose a privacy interest in his belongings located there; however, a transient visitor would retain his expectation of privacy, whether or not his belongings are being held by him or have been temporarily put down.” Young, 909 F.2d at 445. See Micheli, 487 F.2d at 432 (“[a] visitor in a private home stands in a different position from a habitue of a ‘shooting gallery'”); United States v. Neet, 504 F.Supp. 1220, 1227 (D.Colo.1981) (distinguishing the two “polar” eases of an occupant and a mere visitor).
While the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has apparently not ruled on the matter, other courts in the western states addressing the *1171issue have followed the majority “relationship” approach. See Neet, 504 F.Supp. at 1227-28 (rejecting physical proximity test, finding search of mere visitor’s purse unreasonable); People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1971) (same); State v. Bulgin, 120 Idaho 878, 820 P.2d 1235, 1237 (App.1991) (adopting “relationship” test, concluding that mere visitor’s purse not subject to search); State v. Lambert, 238 Kan. 444, 710 P.2d 693, 697-98 (1985) (search of visitor’s purse unreasonable even though not in physical possession). -Even the District of Columbia Circuit itself has modified its physical proximity approach to some extent. See United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182 (D.C.Cir.1976) (ruling that combination of factors, including fact that defendant was a mere visitor, made search of his bag unreasonable).
The “relationship” test is clearly the more reasonable approach for deciding what may be searched incident to a premises warrant, because it takes into account the particular facts of each case. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 814 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1987) (upheld search of visitor’s jacket where drug deal had just taken place); Micheli, 487 F.2d at 431-32 (search of briefcase upheld where defendant was co-owner of premises); Bulgin, 820 P.2d at 1237 (visitor’s purse subject to search where visitor was overnight guest, was described in affidavit, and was suspected of drug use). Accordingly, the relationship test better preserves the rights of individuals unconnected with the suspected criminal activity, as described in the affidavit underlying the search warrant, while giving police the leeway necessary to effectively search the premises.2
In the case at hand, defendant was a mere visitor to the premises. Her purse was on the kitchen counter near which she was standing. She clearly had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse.3 Neither she nor her personal belongings were within the scope of the search warrant, and therefore, absent special circumstances not found here,4 the search clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the trial court should have suppressed the evidence of the contents of defendant’s purse. I would reverse.

. Aside from the single trial court opinion, the other cases cited by the majority fail to support its pronouncement that a visitor’s purse is subject to search if it is out of her physical possession and is a plausible container of objects *1170sought in the search warrant. The cited cases are either perplexingly mischaracterized by the majority, based on different facts than those present here, or unnecessarily broad in analysis. See United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494, 495-96 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937, 89 S.Ct. 299, 21 L.Ed.2d 273 (1968) (concerned search of resident's purse rather than that of a mere visitor to the premises); Carman v. State, 602 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska 1979) (court held that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in visiting sister’s purse); Commonwealth v. Snow, 298 N.E.2d 804, 806, 812 (Mass.1973) (upheld search of visitor's jacket where warrant authorized arrest of all persons present in public place); State v. Kurtz, 612 P.2d 749, 752 (Or.App.1980) (upheld search of visitor’s day pack found in basement following visitor’s lawful arrest); Commonwealth v. Reese, 549 A.2d 909, 909-10 (Pa.1988) (search of visitor's jacket upheld where search warrant named visitor and described him as a "known drug user’’ and associate of premises’ resident). But see United States v. Riccitelli, 259 F.Supp. 665, 666 (D.Conn.1966) (upheld search of visitor's purse given combination of factors, including that purse was not in visitor's possession).
The selectiveness of the majority's analysis is best exemplified by its lengthy quotation of State v. Nabarro, 525 P.2d 573 (Haw.1974). While Nabarro does comment on the competing policies involved in determining whether the scope of a search warrant directed at particular premises should include a visitor’s purse, only one side of which the majority recites in its opinion, the Nabarro opinion actually goes on to hold that the search of the visitor's purse was "beyond the allowable scope of the warrant to search the room.” Id. at 577.
Other cases which, at first blush, appear to support the majority's opinion actually do not. See United States v. Martinez-Zayas, 857 F.2d 122, 133-34 n. 7 (3rd Cir.1988) (concerned search of resident's purse rather than visitor’s); People v. Coleman, 436 Mich. 124, 461 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Mich.1990) (search of visitor's purse upheld where she "had a special relationship to the person named in the search warrant and to the home being searched”).

. The majority claims that adopting the "relationship” test would allow supposed “visitors” to thwart the purpose of a search warrant by simply claiming ownership of "the contraband.” While the relationship test in reality avoids such absurd results due to its flexibility, the blanket approach embraced in the majority opinion truly "would facilitate the insulation of incriminating evidence from lawful searches through the simple act of stuffing it in one’s purse or pockets” upon hearing the police arrive. United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 445 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 90, 116 L.Ed.2d 62 (1991). As for the majority's statement that the relationship approach is "unworkable” since it does not constitute an absolute rule, it need only be pointed out that Fourth Amendment analysis, which focuses on whether or not a particular search is reasonable, by its nature requires a fact-sensitive inquiry in many contexts. See United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 432 (1st Cir.1973).

. This case involves a purse — not a jacket, suitcase, golfbag, or cookie jar. Because of differences in the way men and women in our society have traditionally carried their valuables and private effects, the approach favored in the majority opinion, as a practical matter, falls more harshly on women. A woman's expectation of privacy in her purse is as great as a man's expectation of privacy in his wallet. The fact that a wallet fits easily into a pocket, while a purse may be of a size or shape requiring temporary placement off one's body for comfort's sake, should not dictate whether society will recognize the existence of a similar expectation of privacy in each such item.

.Such circumstances include: where the individual consents to a search; where the item sought is in plain view, albeit on his or her person or in his or her possession; where the search is incident to a valid arrest; and where there is probable cause to search, coupled with exigent circumstances which excuse the usual requirement of a warrant. State v. Lambert, 710 P.2d 693, 698 (Kan.1985).