Court Opinion

ID: 9421697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:59:23.08011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:31.724283
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins,
concurring.*
California, in effect, has imposed a tax on belief and expression. In my view, a levy of this nature is wholly out of place in this country; so far as I know such a thing *530has never even been attempted before. I believe that it constitutes a palpable violation of the First Amendment, which of course is applicable in all its particulars to the States. See, e. g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395, 396-397; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 162; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 109; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666. The mere fact that California attempts to exact this ill-concealed penalty from individuals and churches and that its validity has to be considered in this Court only emphasizes how dangerously far we have departed from the fundamental principles of freedom declared in the First Amendment. We should never forget that the freedoms secured by that Amendment — Speech, Press, Religion, Petition and Assembly — are absolutely indispensable for the. preservation of a free society in which government is based upon the consent of an informed citizenry and is dedicated to the protection of the rights of all, even the most despised minorities. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 445 (dissenting opinion); Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 580 (dissenting opinion).
This case offers just another example of a wide-scale effort by government in this country to impose penalties and disabilities on everyone who is or is suspected of being a “Communist” or who is not ready at all times and all places to swear his loyalty to State and Nation. Compare Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 496 (dis*531senting opinion); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 193 (concurring opinion); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 456, 472 (dissenting opinions). Government employees, lawyers, doctors, teachers, pharmacists, veterinarians, subway conductors, industrial workers and a multitude of others have been denied an opportunity to work at their trade or profession for these reasons. Here a tax is levied unless the taxpayer makes an oath that he does not and will not in the future advocate certain things; in Ohio those without jobs have been denied unemployment insurance unless they are willing to swear that they do not hold specific views; and Congress has even attempted to deny public housing to needy families unless they first demonstrate their loyalty. These are merely random samples; I will not take time here to refer to innumerable others, such as oaths for hunters and fishermen, wrestlers and boxers and junk dealers.
I am convinced that this whole business of penalizing people because of their views and expressions concerning government is hopelessly repugnant to the principles of freedom upon which this Nation was founded and which have helped to make it the greatest in the world. As stated in prior cases, I believe “that the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe in any governmental system, [to] discuss all governmental affairs, and [to] argue for desired changes in the existing order. This freedom is too dangerous for bad, tyrannical governments to permit. But those who wrote and adopted our First Amendment weighed those dangers against the dangers of censorship and deliberately chose the First Amendment’s unequivocal command that freedom of assembly, petition, speech and press shall not be abridged. I happen to believe this was a wise choice and that our free way of life enlists such respect and love that our Nation cannot be imperiled by mere talk.” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 555-556 (dissenting opinion).
*532Loyalty oaths, as well as other contemporary “security measures,” tend to stifle all forms of unorthodox or unpopular thinking or expression — the kind of thought and expression which has played such a vital and beneficial role in the history of this Nation. The result is a stultifying conformity which in the end may well turn out to be more destructive to our free society than foreign agents could ever hope to be. The course which we have been following the last decade is not the course of a strong, free, secure people, but that of the frightened, the insecure, the intolerant. I am certain that loyalty to the United States can never be secured by the endless proliferation of “loyalty” oaths; loyalty must arise spontaneously from the hearts of people who love their country and respect their government. I also adhere to the proposition that the “First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that can preserve a free government— one that leaves the way wide open for people to favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be to the rest of us.” Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 344 (separate opinion).
If it be assumed however, as Mr. Justice Brennan does for purposes of this case, that California may tax the expression of certain views, I am in full agreement with him that the procedures it has provided to determine whether petitioners are engaged in “taxable” advocacy violate the requirements of due process.

[Note: This opinion applies also to No. 382, First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, and No. 385, Valley Unitarian-Universalist Church v. County of Los Angeles, post, p. 545.]