Court Opinion

ID: 9760546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:59:56.586223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:13.513725
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
MURPHY, J.
I agree that, under the unique circumstances of the case at bar, the petitioner is entitled to a hearing on his motion for *362modification of sentence and that the hearing must be held by a judge other than the judge who originally imposed the sentence. I also agree that Duffin does not compel a contrary conclusion. I do not agree, however, that Whitaker v. Prince George’s County supports the proposition that current Rule 16-103 vests an Administrative Judge with the discretionary authority to direct that a Rule 4-345(e) motion be reassigned to a judge other than the judge who imposed the original sentence.1 I am persuaded that the reassignment of a Rule 4-345(e) motion requires either (1) the consent of the sentencing judge,2 or (2) a factual finding that the sentencing judge has become disabled or must be recused.
I
Maryland Rule 4-361 details the procedure to be followed when it is necessary for another judge to substitute for a judge whose absence is due to “termination of office, ... or other disability.” In the case at bar, both the prosecutor and petitioner’s counsel (1) agreed that the judge who imposed sentence would be a necessary witness at the motion for modification hearing, and (2) received the sentencing judge’s permission to present their concerns to the Administrative Judge. While with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the Administrative Judge should have held an on-the-record hear*363ing before ordering that the motion be reassigned to another judge, it is equally clear that the Administrative Judge—as a practical matter—granted a joint motion for recusal following a conference with counsel. This ruling was based upon (1) the non-clearly erroneous finding of (stipulated) fact that the sentencing judge would be an essential witness at the modification hearing, and (2) the correct conclusion of law that, under both Maryland Rule 5-605 and Canon 3D(l)(a) of Maryland Rule 16-813,3 the sentencing judge could not be both witness and decision maker.
The record also shows that the sentencing judge initially acquiesced in the decision of the Administrative Judge. Under these circumstances, the sentencing judge did not have the authority to “reassign” the case to himself in order to enter the December 30, 2005 Order.
II
As to the further proceedings in the Circuit Court, the record shows that, in petitioner’s MOTION FOR RULING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF SENTENCE, it is expressly asserted that petitioner’s guilty plea was “based on previous discussions that contemplated a specific sentence upon reconsideration[,]” and that “specifically, [the sentencing judge] agreed that [petitioner’s] sentence would be modified to a sentence of life suspend all but fifty years, pursuant to discussions between the [petitioner], the State and the Court.” The record also shows that on March 3, 1998, the following transpired at a bench conference:
THE COURT: As [petitioner’s counsel] no doubt has told you, Mr. Strickland, whenever one pleads guilty to felony murder, as I just indicated, it is a first degree charge, and therefore, it carries a life sentence, and judges such as myself cannot give you a numerical number in terms of a *364sentence. What I mean by that is we can suspend a portion of the time, but the life sentence still remains in effect.
THE COURT: Now, I did tell [petitioner’s counsel] yesterday, in [the prosecutor’s] presence, that assuming [petitioner’s counsel] is going to be filing, as he indicated to me yesterday, after sentencing today, assuming your plea is accepted, assuming we go forward with sentencing today, which is my intent, if that procedure follows, [petitioner’s counsel] will be filing on your behalf what we call a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which has to be filed within 90 days of sentence.
It doesn’t mean that the judge -will act on that motion within that 90-day window, but to safeguard your rights, that motion must be filed within 90 days.
Do you understand, Mr. Strickland?
[THE PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: What I indicated to [petitioner’s counsel] is that if you conduct yourself in a well-mannered posture, that is to say, you refrain from getting into any disciplinary problems to speak of while you are incarcerated, the Court would be inclined to favorably consider that motion at some point in time in the future.
And, let’s suppose, hypothetically, that I imposed a sentence today of life in prison, under felony murder, if that were to happen, then the prior convictions the jury has rendered as to robbery with a deadly weapon would merge into the felony murder____
So that means if the Court, one, did not impose life without parole, and I indicated to [the prosecutor] and [petitioner’s counsel] that in all likelihood I’m not going to do that today, I would be inclined to impose a life sentence, and I would be inclined to favorably consider a motion for reconsideration of sentence if you do what I just indicated that you should do, and that is to conduct yourself as a model inmate, then the Court would be inclined to grant at anoint in time in the future, which is yet to be determined, relief by granting *365your motion for reconsideration of sentence to the extent that I would reconsider your sentence by suspending a portion of your life sentence down to 50 years----
[T]he sentencing of yourself at this point will be up to myself in this case. Do you understand that, Mr. Strickland?
[THE PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: ... [I] have sent a message to you clearly up here at the bench that I’m not inclined at all to impose a life without parole sentence in this case. My theory here, as I told [the prosecutor] and [petitioner’s counsel] yesterday, is that if somebody pleads guilty to the lead count, in this case felony murder, then they should be entitled to some consideration for doing that. Do you understand that?
[THE PETITIONER]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: But at the same token, what I am obviously doing is putting the onus, the responsibility, on your shoulders to demonstrate through your actions after sentencing that you are deserving of reconsideration of sentence.
The following transpired after the petitioner and counsel returned to the trial tables:
THE COURT: [M]r. Strickland ... it’s my understanding ... that there really isn’t any plea bargaining between [the prosecutor], representing the State, and [petitioner’s counsel], representing you, wherein they have agreed to set sentence or to drop certain charges because that’s not being done here.
It’s my understanding that the State is going to make a recommendation. That recommendation may run the gamut of life without parole to life or whatever, but [the prosecutor] is free to tell the Court what he thinks the appropriate sentence is going to be.
[Petitioner’s counsel] is free to tell me what he thinks the appropriate sentence would be.
*366As I told you at the bench a few moments ago, whenever one pleads guilty to first degree felony murder ... it carries a life sentence. You understand that, Mr. Strickland?
[THE PETITIONER]: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: And to that extent, the Court is bound to impose a life sentence.
Now, the Court can suspend a portion of that life sentence.
Do you understand that?
[THE PETITIONER]: I do, sir.
THE COURT: And as I did indicate to you, and this is based upon conversations I had off the record with [petitioner’s counsel] and [the prosecutor] yesterday when he entered my chambers, that [petitioner’s counsel] made it clear to me that if the court accepts your plea of guilty today and proceeds to sentencing, and the life sentence is imposed, whether it’s mandatory, whether it’s a straight life, whatever it may be, [petitioner’s counsel] is going to request the Court reconsider your sentence in the future.
Myself being the sentencing judge ... I would be the one to decide whether or not to grant that motion for reconsideration of sentence. Do you understand that?
[THE PETITIONER]: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: I cannot increase your sentence. I could decrease your sentence or keep your sentence as is. In other words, unchanged. Do you understand that?
[THE PETITIONER]: Yes.
THE COURT: So the record is clear, I told you that if, indeed, I reconsider your case or your sentence, Mr. Strickland, the reason for doing so would be depending upon your conduct while you are incarcerated. Do you understand that?
[THE PETITIONER]: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: And the Court could reconsider your sentence to any extent, that is to say, hypothetically, if I *367wanted to go ahead and suspend all but 50 years, I could do that. Do you understand that?
[THE PETITIONER]: Yes, I do.
The following transpired immediately before the prosecutor recited the statement of facts that constituted the basis for the plea:
THE COURT: With that said, is that the full understanding of what you had between what the State is going to recommend, what [petitioner’s trial counsel] may recommend on your behalf, and what the Court may do in the future? [PETITIONER]: Yes, it is.
THE COURT: Nobody has promised you any additional promises, offers of reward, any kind of inducements or any type of statements to you, other than what I stated for the record to get you to plead guilty?
[PETITIONER]: No, they haven’t.
On the basis of the above quoted colloquy, it is difficult to hypothesize that the sentencing judge agreed that he would ultimately modify petitioner’s sentence even if petitioner attempted to murder a corrections’ officer and/or attempted to escape. It is clear, however, that the sentencing judge (1) did have an “off the record” conversation with the prosecutor and the petitioner’s counsel, and (2) did not request that either the prosecutor or petitioner’s counsel make an “on the record” statement as to what “disciplinary problems” would result in the forfeiture of petitioner’s entitlement to a modification. Under these circumstances, I would expressly require that the following determinations be made on remand.
The Circuit Court must first determine whether it is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner’s plea was based upon an agreement that the sentence would actually be imposed in two stages, with the modification being imposed regardless of petitioner’s institutional record. If petitioner can successfully shoulder the burden of persuasion on that issue, the petitioner is entitled to enforcement of the actual agreement.
*368If it is not persuaded that the parties agreed to a downstream modification regardless of petitioner’s institutional record, the Circuit Court must determine whether it is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner has substantially complied with the on-the-record statement of conditions imposed by the sentencing judge on March 3, 1998. If petitioner can successfully shoulder the burden of persuasion on that issue, the petitioner is entitled to the requested modification.
If it is not persuaded that petitioner has substantially complied with the conditions imposed by the sentencing judge, the Circuit Court shall exercise its discretion in deciding the issue of whether and/or the extent to which petitioner’s motion for modification should be granted.

. As noted by this Court in Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 29, 333 A.2d 37 (1975), the "Reduction of Sentence" provisions in the Maryland Rules are "virtually identical” to the provisions then contained in Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 39, 333 A.2d at 42. "Federal case law clearly indicates that, under Rule 35, motions to correct or reduce a sentence are to be heard by the court that rendered the original judgment and sentence. See Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal (Second) § 582 (1982).” State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678, 684 n. 3 (1988).

. Under Rule 4-347(e)(l), "[wjith the consent of the parties and the sentencing judge, the hearing [on a petition for revocation of a defendant’s probation] may be held before any other judge.” This provision would not be necessary if Rule 16-103 authorizes an Administrative Judge to order that a violation of probation hearing be held before a judge other than the sentencing judge, even if the sentencing judge does not consent to the reassignment.

. This Canon requires that a judge "recuse himself or herself from a proceeding in which ... the judge has ... extra-judicial knowledge of a disputed evidentiary fact concerning the proceeding[J”