Court Opinion

ID: 9767193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:12:17.014144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:29.414262
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
The lease agreement for Veterans Stadium between the City of Philadelphia, lessor, and the Philadelphia National League Club, Inc., lessee, reserved to the lessor “the exclusive right to offer for sale and sell ... [a]ll foods and beverages designed for human consumption____” Pursu*348ant thereto, the City of Philadelphia entered into an agreement granting to Nilón Brothers Enterprises, the appellee herein, “the exclusive privilege of operating the Stadium Club and Restaurant and General Concessions at [Veterans Stadium]____” This included specifically “food, drink, souvenirs, etc.” The agreement required that appellee, in exchange for such exclusive privilege, pay a designated percentage of gross receipts to the City of Philadelphia.
When superboxes were subsequently added to the stadium, Joseph A. Lucente and Mary Perrota, trading as Friendly Caterers, provided food catering services to the occupants. They did so at the instance of the owners of the boxes and with the consent of the Phillies and Eagles, who were tenants of the stadium, but without the consent of the City of Philadelphia and without complying with the bidding procedure required by the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court entered an order enjoining Friendly Caterers from conducting a “food service business within the confines of Veterans Stadium, including the Super Boxes thereof.” Friendly Caterers appealed.
A majority of this Court makes an independent determination—the trial court did not so find—that appellee was guilty of laches and reverses the injunction entered by the trial court. I am unable to agree with this disposition; and, therefore, must respectfully, but vigorously, dissent.
The essential elements of laches are inexcusable delay in instituting suit and prejudice resulting to defendant from such delay. It is an equitable defense; its existence depends on the particular circumstances of each case. Many decisions teach that laches should not be declared by an appellate court unless the existence thereof is clear on the face of the record. Laches is an issue of fact, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The exercise of the trial court’s discretion regarding the defense of laches will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse thereof. In Re Estate of Marushak, 488 Pa. 607, 610, 413 A.2d 649, 651 (1980); Leedom v. Thomas, 473 Pa. 193, *349200-201, 373 A.2d 1329, 1332 (1977); Siegel v. Engstrom, 427 Pa. 381, 386, 235 A.2d 365, 368 (1967); Thomson v. Mid-State Theatres, Inc., 403 Pa. 111, 113, 168 A.2d 737, 738 (1961); Manson v. First National Bank in Indiana, 366 Pa. 211, 215-216, 77 A.2d 399, 401 (1951); Margolis v. Blecher, 364 Pa. 234, 236, 72 A.2d 127, 128 (1950); Hansel v. Hansel, 300 Pa.Super. 548, 556-559, 446 A.2d 1294, 1298-1300 (1982); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F.Supp. 410, 427 (E.D.Pa.1980).
The trial court in the case sub judice did not find that Nilón had been guilty of laches. In ruling otherwise, the majority has made an independent determination and has substituted its discretion in a matter peculiarly within the purview of the trial court. My review of the facts and circumstances presented to the trial court does not disclose an abuse of that court’s discretion. Indeed, even the majority seems hard put to discern prejudice where, as here, appellants have continued to serve food in the stadium throughout the purported delay.
I would affirm the order of the trial court.