Court Opinion

ID: 9892015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 05:08:03.334467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:16:46.438128
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

DANIEL G. KAMIN HOUGHTON LLC,                                        UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     October 19, 2023
               Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-
               Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 363956
                                                                     Houghton Circuit Court
FLEWELLING PROPERTIES, LLC, and LUCKY                                LC No. 21-017720-CZ
DINING, INC., doing business as KFC OF
FENTON, KFC OF HARTLAND, KFC OF
HOWELL, KFC OF OWOSSO, KFC OF UNION
LAKE, and KFC OF WATERFORD,

               Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs-
               Appellees.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and RIORDAN and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s opinion and order granting defendants’ motion
for summary disposition and denying plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition in this case
involving reciprocal easements. We vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

                                   I. BACKGROUND FACTS

        In 1993, Shopko Stores Inc. and Ironwood Oil Co. were owners of adjoining parcels of
land located in Houghton, Michigan. Shopko operated a discount department store and Ironwood
Oil leased its property to a business that operated a gasoline station and grocery store. In 1993,
Shopko and Ironwood Oil entered into an agreement titled “Cross-Easement Agreement,” which
generally granted reciprocal easement rights for pedestrian and vehicular ingress, egress, parking,
and for utilities in and through the common areas.

        In 2005, Shopko created two commercial outlots on its property near its store. In 2017,
plaintiff purchased Ironwood Oil’s property, which continued as a grocery store and gas station.
In 2019, Shopko ceased operating its department store and sold that property and building. It was

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eventually acquired by Evangel Community Church, which operates as a place of worship. In
2021, defendants, Flewelling Properties, LLC, purchased the commercial outlots formerly owned
by Shopko, apparently with the intention to lease one of the lots to defendant Lucky Dining, Inc.
Lucky Dining intended to construct a Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) restaurant. Lucky Dining
applied for a building permit in that regard and plaintiff appeared through counsel at the public
hearing held by the city planning commission, objecting on the grounds that the proposed
restaurant would violate provisions of the Cross-Easement Agreement. The city planning
commission, nonetheless, approved the application.

        Subsequently, plaintiff filed this breach of contract, trespass, and declaratory judgment
action, asserting in its second amended complaint that defendants wrongfully denied the validity
of the Cross-Easement Agreement on the ground that Shopko no longer owned the property.
Plaintiff asserted that the Cross-Easement Agreement is a binding agreement that runs with the
land and defendants’ conduct constituted breach of that contract and trespass onto plaintiff’s
property. Plaintiff further averred, in part, that defendants’ proposed development would prevent
plaintiff from being able to exercise its rights under the pedestrian easement in Section 2.01.1.
Plaintiff would also lose its right to a vehicular easement as provided in Section 2.01.2. Further,
defendants would not meet the requirements of parking and of unimpeded access as provided in
Sections 2.01.7 and 2.02. And defendants would be violating the requirements of restrictions on
development and use as provided in Section 6.01. Accordingly, plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that the Cross-Easement Agreement was binding on the parties and enforceable, and that
defendants’ proposed development violated that Agreement; thus, it was prohibited.

        Defendants answered plaintiff’s second amended complaint and filed a counter-complaint,
asserting that plaintiff had previously filed a complaint against the City of Houghton challenging
the Planning Commission’s approval of the site plan for the proposed KFC restaurant and it was
dismissed by the circuit court. Defendants alleged that plaintiff’s wrongful conduct intentionally
and improperly interfered with defendants’ contracts and business relationships and expectancies,
amounting to sabotage, and causing disruption, delay, and possible breach and/or termination.
Accordingly, defendants sought a judgment in their favor for compensatory damages.

        In August 2022, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s second
amended complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendants explained that the KFC was to be
located on a commercial outlot created in 2005 by Shopko and which had been for sale for 15
years. Plaintiff bought the adjoining property in 2017, fully aware that two commercial outlots
were for sale including the one at issue here. In 2019, a church acquired Shopko’s property and
building that had been used as a department store, but the outlots remained for sale. There had
been no shopping center on the parcels since 2019. Defendants asserted that the “circumstances
underlying the restrictions contained in the Cross-Easement Agreement recorded in 1993 when the
shopping center was built have substantially changed.” Defendants claimed that the Cross-
Easement Agreement governed the operation of the shopping center at the time, but those two
parties no longer owned the respective properties—and those properties were no longer being used
as a shopping center as contemplated by the Agreement. Therefore, defendants argued in relevant
part, because of the substantial change of circumstances, it would be improper and inequitable to
enforce restrictions and negative covenants intended for a shopping center that no longer exists.
In support of their argument, defendants relied on the cases of Dipboye v Acchione, 351 Mich 550;
88 NW2d 611 (1958) and Windemere-Grand Improvement & Protective Ass’n v American State

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Bank of Highland Park, 205 Mich 539; 172 NW 29 (1919). But in any case, defendants argued,
the Cross-Easement Agreement provisions plaintiff referred to either did not apply or were not
violated by defendants’ proposed use. Therefore, defendants requested the trial court to grant its
motion for summary disposition and dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Several
exhibits were attached to defendants’ motion, including a copy of the Cross-Easement Agreement.

        Plaintiff responded to defendants’ motion for summary disposition, arguing that the Cross-
Easement Agreement is unambiguous and must be enforced as written. And the plain reading of
the Agreement defeats the arguments asserted by defendants. “There has been no change in
circumstance that warrants any deviation from the contract/cross-easement provision, which
specifically prevents Defendants’ arguments.” Accordingly, plaintiff requested that defendants’
motion for summary disposition be denied.

        In September 2022, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary disposition or summary
disposition of its declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
and for dismissal of defendants’ counterclaim under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and affirmative defenses
under MCR 2.116(C)(9). Plaintiff explained that it leased its real property to a business that
operates a grocery store and gas station. Defendants have proposed the development of a KFC on
property located right in front of the Evangel Community Church. But both plaintiff and
defendants’ properties are subject to the Cross-Easement Agreement recorded in the chain of title.
And plaintiff filed this lawsuit requesting the court to declare the Cross-Easement Agreement valid
and binding on the parties, and that defendants breached the Agreement and trespassed in violation
of the Agreement. Plaintiff argued, in brief, that by the express, unambiguous terms of the Cross-
Easement Agreement—including Articles III, XI, and XIV, i.e., Sections 3.01, 3.02, 3.03, 11.01,
11.02, and 14.01—it was a covenant that ran with the land and was binding on every entity having
any interest in any portion of the parcels of land at issue; any transfer of land was subject to its
provisions and it was perpetual in duration. Plaintiff further argued that, contrary to defendants’
affirmative defenses, even if the Agreement had been breached or not previously enforced, the
validity of the Agreement remains unaffected and is enforceable, as set forth in Article V, Section
5.03 and Article XIV, Section 15.01. And defendants’ proposed development would breach that
Agreement, including by preventing or inhibiting plaintiff’s vehicular and pedestrian access rights
under that Agreement. Accordingly, plaintiff argued that it was entitled to summary disposition,
or at least partial summary disposition, of its claims and defendants’ counterclaim should also be
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff attached several exhibits to its motion, including
deeds, a copy of defendants’ building permit, a copy of the planning commission meeting minutes,
a copy of the Cross-Easement Agreement, and maps and photos of the properties.

        Defendants responded to plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, arguing that the
Cross-Easement Agreement was recorded in 1993 as part of the construction of a “single integrated
shopping center” but the only reason for the Agreement—that shopping center—no longer existed.
Moreover, defendants’ proposed development, which was approved by the planning commission,
is consistent with the dictates of the Agreement. For example, vehicular and pedestrian access
between the adjoining properties remains available. Defendants’ approved plan shows that
“pedestrian and vehicular access on the KFC site is reasonable, safe, and does not impede the
movement of vehicles or pedestrians to or from either side of the adjacent properties.”
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition should be denied.

                                                -3-
        On October 11, 2022, the trial court held oral arguments on the cross-motions for summary
disposition and the parties argued consistently with their briefs. In short, defendants argued that
the parties who entered into the Cross-Easement Agreement are no longer involved but, more
importantly, the Agreement’s fundamental purpose of developing and utilizing the former parties’
large, adjacent parcels as a single, unified shopping center no longer exists. In fact, in 2019, the
original Shopko department store became a church—not a retail store, thereby demonstrating that
the original intent of the contracting parties was defunct. Defendants argued that the circumstances
had drastically changed and the fundamental purpose of the Agreement no longer existed;
therefore, many provisions of the Agreement are invalid and not enforceable, particularly as to the
commercial outlot at issue. But in any case, defendants argued, the provisions of that Agreement,
particularly as pertains to vehicular access, are not being violated as evident by defendants’ site
plan for the proposed KFC which shows that vehicles coming to or leaving the KFC never enter
the area that used to be a shopping center.

        To the contrary, plaintiff argued, the plain, unambiguous language of the Cross-Easement
Agreement must be applied as written in its entirety; it runs with the land and successors like
defendants are bound by it. And according to the Agreement, “this KFC can’t be permitted because
the traffic that’s the flow back and forth between the parties - - between the - - the parking lots is
supposed to be open. They’re literally going to build right in the middle of it. So, it violates in
[sic] the vehicular, unimpeded access and no curbing.” Following arguments, the court took the
matter under advisement.

        On November 3, 2022, the trial court issued its opinion and order granting defendants’
motion for summary disposition and granting plaintiff’s motion to summarily dismiss defendants’
counter-complaint, thereby dismissing plaintiff’s complaint and defendants’ counterclaim. With
regard to plaintiff’s claims, the court stated that the question to be decided was: “Does the 1993
agreement bar construction of a restaurant and supporting structures on Defendant Flewelling’s
property?” The trial court noted that it must enforce the easement as written if unambiguous, and
noted that the language of the easement was not ambiguous. In fact, the court noted, as recognized
permissible in MacLeod v Hamilton, 254 Mich 653; 236 NW 912 (1931), the agreement’s
particular purpose was specifically identified. The court stated: “[T]he particular purpose for the
granting of reciprocal easements was to utilize the two parcels as an ‘integrated shopping center’ ”
which “envisioned the free flow of pedestrian and vehicular travel from one property to the other,
thereby providing easy and convenient access for the retail customers of one to avail themselves
of the products and services offered by the other.” The court noted that the department store and
retail establishments operated by the parties to the Cross-Easement Agreement certainly came
within the definition of a “shopping center,” which was defined as a “group of retail stores and
service establishments usually with ample parking facilities . . . .” However, the court held, once
“Shopko abandoned its property and it was no longer occupied by a retail or service establishment,
the former Shopko property and the former Ironwood Oil property, in combination, no longer
could be considered an ‘integrated shopping center’ as contemplated by the Cross-Easement
Agreement. In other words, the express purpose for which the easement grants came into existence
ceased to exist.” The trial court quoted the MacLeod decision, which stated that “[a] grant of an
easement for particular purposes having been made, the right thereto terminates as soon as the
purposes for which granted cease to exist or are abandoned or are impossible.” MacLeod, 254
Mich at 656 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court held:

                                                 -4-
       as soon as the purposes for which the 1993 easement grants ended, the easements
       terminated. The reciprocal easements, therefore, ceased to exist in 2019 when the
       former Shopko building was converted to a church and no retail establishments
       remained on the former Shopko property. As a result, the 1993 Cross-Easement
       Agreement does not prevent Defendants’ proposed construction and operation of a
       restaurant on the involved outlot as the Cross-Easement Agreement is no longer
       valid or enforceable.

Thus, defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was granted and
plaintiff’s motion in that regard was denied. And because the trial court concluded that plaintiff’s
actions challenging the planning commission’s decision and seeking review of its potential
easement rights were undertaken for legitimate business reasons, defendants’ allegations in their
counterclaim were insufficient to state a cause of action and plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition of that counterclaim was granted. This appeal followed.

        Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s interpretation of the purpose of the Cross-Easement
Agreement was erroneous, but even if it was for the purpose of supporting an integrated shopping
center, the reciprocal easements were valid and enforceable.

                                         II. ANALYSIS

                                 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Loweke
v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC, 489 Mich 157, 162; 809 NW2d 553 (2011). We review
de novo a lower court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR
2.116(C)(10). Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 173; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). A motion brought
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual support of a plaintiff’s claim.” Spiek v Dept of Transp,
456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). The moving party must identify the matters that have
no disputed factual issues, and has the initial burden of supporting its position with documentary
evidence. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). The party
opposing the motion must then establish by evidentiary materials that a genuine issue of disputed
fact exists. Id. at 362-363. After considering the documentary evidence submitted in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court determines whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists to warrant a trial. Walsh v Taylor, 263 Mich App 618, 621; 689 NW2d 506 (2004).

       “The extent of a party’s rights under an easement is a question of fact, and a trial court’s
determination of those facts is reviewed for clear error.” Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village of Dexter,
473 Mich 33, 40; 700 NW2d 364 (2005). We review de novo a trial court’s dispositional rulings
on equitable matters. Id., citing Stachnik v Winkel, 394 Mich 375, 383; 230 NW2d 529 (1975).

                            B. CROSS-EASEMENT AGREEMENT

        An express easement is interpreted according to the rules similar to those used for the
interpretation of contracts. Wiggins v City of Burton, 291 Mich App 532, 551; 805 NW2d 517
(2011). “Where the language of a legal instrument is plain and unambiguous, it is to be enforced
as written and no further inquiry is permitted.” Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699, 700; 664 NW2d 749

                                                -5-
(2003). Thus, the purpose of an express easement is ascertained by considering its plain language,
according its terms their ordinary meaning. Id.; see also Bayberry Group, Inc v Crystal Beach
Condo Ass’n, 334 Mich App 385, 400; 964 NW2d 846 (2020); Pugh v Zefi, 294 Mich App 393,
396; 812 NW2d 789 (2011). A court must “give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a
contract and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the contract surplusage or
nugatory.” Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 468; 663 NW2d 447 (2003).
The use of an easement must be confined to the purposes for which it was granted. Blackhawk
Dev Corp, 473 Mich at 41 (citation omitted). “Courts of equity do not aid one man to restrict
another in the use to which he may put his property unless the right to such aid is clear.” Eveleth
v Best, 322 Mich 637, 642; 34 NW2d 504 (1948) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        The Cross-Easement Agreement at issue here states that Shopko and “the Developer”—
defined as Ironwood Oil Company in the first paragraph—were the parties to the contract and that
they “desire[d] to develop and utilize the Shopko site and the Developer’s Site (hereinafter . . .
collectively referred to as the ‘Entire Parcel’) as an integrated and unified shopping center[.]” The
Agreement further provided:
       WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to provide reciprocal easements for pedestrian
       and vehicular ingress, egress, parking, passage and traffic and for utilities in, over,
       upon, across and through the Common Areas and such other areas as are hereinafter
       provided as though the Entire Parcel were developed and utilized as a single
       integrated shopping center. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the plain language that the contracting parties’ intent was to create reciprocal
easements, providing shared access to the “Entire Parcel” so as to allow vehicles and pedestrians
to have access into and out of the parking lots on their adjoining properties. More particularly,
Article II is titled “Easements” and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
               2.01. Grant of Easements. Shopko and the Developer hereby each grant to
       the other and to each individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, trust,
       unincorporated association, governmental agency or other business entity now or
       hereafter holding an ownership interest in fee in any part of the Entire Parcel (which
       persons are herein sometimes singularly called an ‘Owner’ and collectively called
       the ‘Owners’) the following easements for use by the owners and their respective
       permittees, without payment of any fee or charge, except as otherwise agreed in
       writing between the owners:

               2.01.1. Pedestrian Easements. . . .

               2.01.2. Vehicular Easements. . . .

                                                  * * *

               2.01.4. Utility Easements. . . .

               2.01.5. Access Easements. . . .

               2.01.6. Construction Easements. . . .

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                2.01.7. Parking Easements. . . .

                2.01.8. Lighting Facilities Easement. . . .

                2.01.9. Fire and Emergency Access. . . .

                2.01.10. Self-Help Easements. . . .

                2.01.11. Sign Easements. . . .

                2.01.12 Surface Water Drainage. . . .

                2.02 Unimpeded Access. . . .

                2.03 Prohibition Against Granting Easement. . . .

        Article III is titled “Nature of Easements and Rights Granted” and describes, in Section
3.01, that
        [e]ach and all of the easements and rights granted or created herein are
        appurtenances to the affected portions of the Entire Parcel and none of the
        easements and rights may be transferred, assigned or encumbered except as an
        appurtenance to such portions. For the purposes of such easements and rights, the
        particular areas of the Entire Parcel which are benefitted by such easements shall
        constitute the dominant estate, and the particular areas of the Entire Parcel which
        are burdened by such easements and rights shall constitute the servient estate.

Section 3.02 addresses the “Nature and Effect of Easements” and states that the easements,
covenants, restrictions, and provisions in the Agreement are for the direct, mutual, and reciprocal
benefit of the occupants (which are defined to include the parties, and their heirs, successors and
assigns); they create mutual equitable servitudes; constitute covenants running with the land; and
“[s]hall bind every person or entity having any fee, leasehold or other interest in any portion of the
Entire Parcel at any time or from time to time to the extent that such portion is affected or bound
by the easement, covenant, restriction, or provision . . . .” Section 3.03, titled “Transfer of Title,”
states: “The acceptance of any transfer or conveyance of title from any party hereto or its respective
heirs, representatives, successor or assigns of all or any part of its interest in its Site shall be deemed
to:
        (a) Require the prospective grantee to agree not to use, occupy or allow any lessee
        or occupant of such Site to use or occupy the Site in any manner which would
        constitute a violation or breach of any of the easements and covenants contained
        herein; and

        (b) Require the prospective grantee to assume and agree to perform each and all of
        the obligations of the conveying party under this Agreement with respect to any
        such Site which will be conveyed to each grantee, in each case by a written
        instrument executed, acknowledged and recorded in the Office of the Register of
        Deeds of Houghton County, Michigan.

                                                   -7-
         Article IV of the Agreement is titled “Maintenance of Common Areas” and generally
states, in Section 4.01, that each owner “shall maintain the Common Areas from time to time
located on its Site in a first class manner and in accordance with all applicable laws.” Subsequent
provisions detail the maintenance, repairs, and care expected and the actions taken for such
failures. Article V is titled “Enforcement – Injunctive Relief,” and authorizes in Section 5.01, the
parties or their respective successors or assigns—in the event of any violations of the terms of the
Agreement—the right to collect damages and to enjoin any violations or threatened violation. It
further states, in Section 5.03, that a breach of the Agreement does not affect the Agreement, in
that it does not cancel, rescind, or otherwise terminate the Agreement.

         Article VI of the Agreement is titled “Restrictions on Development and Use,” and generally
states, in Section 6.01, that “the Entire Parcel shall be developed and utilized consistently with the
Site plan attached hereto as Exhibit ‘3’.” Exhibit 3 appears to show three building sites—the
proposed Shopko, the proposed food store, and an outlot where a building would be permitted.
Section 6.02 provided for “use restrictions” in that, in general, no other “general merchandise
discount department store” could be operated as long as Shopko was on site and no other grocery
store, convenience store, and/or gas station could be operated as long as Ironwood Oil was on site.

       Article XI of the Agreement is titled “Duration and Termination.” Section 11.01 states:
“The easements, covenants, restrictions and other provisions of this Agreement shall be of
perpetual duration.” Section 11.02 is titled “Amendment,” and states:
       This Agreement, or any easement, covenant, restriction or undertaking contained
       herein, may be terminated, extended or amended as to each of the portions of the
       Entire Parcel only by the recording of the appropriate document in the Office of the
       Register of Deeds of Houghton County, Michigan, which document must be
       executed by all of the owners and mortgagees, and other holders of recorded
       interests affected thereby, as of the date of such document, of the Entire Parcel.

Article XIV, titled “Benefit,” states in Section 14.01: “The Agreement shall inure to the benefit of,
and be binding upon, the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators,
representatives, successors and assigns.” And, Article XV, titled “Waiver,” states in Section
15.01: “No waiver of any breach of any of the easements, covenants and/or agreements herein
contained shall be construed as, or constitute, a waiver of any other breach or a waiver,
acquiescence in or consent to any further or succeeding breach of the same or any other covenant
and/or agreement.”

        Plaintiff here is a successor in interest to the Cross-Easement Agreement between Shopko
and Ironwood Oil. Plaintiff purchased Ironwood Oil’s property in 2017—while Shopko was still
operating its department store—and leases it to another entity which continues to operate a grocery
store and gas station just as Ironwood Oil did at that location. And plaintiff purchased the property
subject to “covenants, conditions, restrictions of record as of the date” of purchase—which
includes the Cross-Easement Agreement at issue here.

         In 2021, defendants purchased commercial outlots formerly owned by Shopko, one of
which is the subject of this case. Defendants purchased the property subject to “building and use
restrictions, reservations, and easements of record.” When defendants sought to construct a KFC

                                                 -8-
restaurant on the property, plaintiff filed this legal action seeking to enforce several terms of the
Cross-Easement Agreement, including the easement provisions, as well as the parking and
unimpeded access provisions.

         In seeking summary disposition of plaintiff’s lawsuit, defendants argued essentially that
there had been no “shopping center” on the Entire Parcel since 2019, and thus, considering the
change in circumstances, it would be inequitable to enforce the terms of the Cross-Easement
Agreement. Defendants relied on two inapposite cases to support their argument, as they do on
appeal. First, Diboye, 351 Mich 550, concerned whether building and use restrictions applicable
to lots in a subdivision recorded in 1939—that only private residences could be constructed—were
applicable considering that the property at issue was located on a highway and had changed such
that it was used primarily for commercial purposes. Id. at 552, 556-557. Second, Windemere-
Grand Improvement & Protective Ass’n, 205 Mich 539, also concerned whether a building
restriction allowing only residential homes was applicable considering that the property at issue
was located on Woodward Avenue and had changed such that it was “admitted only can and should
be devoted to business purposes.” Id. at 540, 542. Clearly, the changing of a residential
neighborhood is not at issue in this case.

        Nevertheless, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition,
concluding that the purpose of the Cross-Easement Agreement was to support an “integrated
shopping center” and that purpose ceased to exist; thus, the reciprocal easements terminated. The
Court relied on the holding in MacLeod, 254 Mich 653, to support its decision. That case involved
a county easement for a drain granted in 1876 and, subsequently, “the proposed drainage was
provided elsewhere.” Id. at 654, 656. The MacLeod Court held: “For fifty-four years this easement
has been dormant and renounced by the county in the establishment of the drainage elsewhere.
Such an easement as this can be extinguished by abandonment of purpose or by renunciation
showing that other means employed serve the purpose.” Id. at 656. Similarly, here, the trial court
apparently concluded that the purpose of the reciprocal easements in this case was abandoned, and
thus, the easements were extinguished. We cannot agree.

        First, plaintiff and defendants are successors in interest to the Cross-Easement Agreement
by its plain terms and there is no evidence that plaintiff ever abandoned the purpose of the
Agreement or that the easements had been dormant for years. To the contrary, plaintiff leases the
property to a grocery store and gas station just like Ironwood Oil, its predecessor in title, did at
that location. In fact, when plaintiff purchased the property, Shopko was still operating its
department store. Consequently, plaintiff had a right to, and likely did, rely on the terms of that
Cross-Easement Agreement—and its stated reciprocal easements, rights, and obligations—when
it purchased its property to which the Agreement was applicable. Unlike in the case of MacLeod,
254 Mich 653, this case involves reciprocal easements. And easements are legal property interests,
although they are limited in nature. Michigan Dept of Natural Resources v Carmody-Lahti Real
Estate, Inc, 472 Mich 359, 378; 699 NW2d 272 (2005). Moreover, to establish abandonment of
an easement interest, both an intent to relinquish that interest and an external act showing a clear
intent to abandon that interest must be shown. Id. at 385 (citation omitted). Even nonuse is
insufficient to show abandonment. Id. And in this case, there was no evidence to establish
abandonment of the reciprocal easement interests.

                                                -9-
         Second, an easement “is the right to use the land of another for a specified purpose.”
Schadewald v Brulé, 225 Mich App 26, 35; 570 NW2d 788 (1997). While the original contracting
parties hoped or desired to develop an “integrated and unified shopping center,” the actual purpose
of the reciprocal easements was to provide shared access between their adjoining properties “for
pedestrian and vehicular ingress, egress, parking, passage and traffic and for utilities in, over, upon,
across and through the Common Areas and such other areas as are hereinafter provided as though
the Entire Parcel were developed and utilized as a single integrated shopping center.” (Emphasis
supplied). The purpose of an easement is determined by the language of the easement and, when
unambiguous and plain, it must be enforced as written. Blackhawk Dev Corp, 473 Mich at 41-42;
Little, 468 Mich at 700. The Cross-Easement Agreement plainly established reciprocal easement
rights to use each other’s land for the specified purpose of allowing shared access to common areas
and other designated areas of their adjoining properties. It also established contractual obligations
pertaining to the maintenance of those areas. Obviously, the Cross-Easement Agreement did not
establish a partnership to construct and develop a shopping center. “Once granted, an easement
cannot be modified by either party unilaterally.” Schadewald, 225 Mich App at 36.

        Third, the reciprocal easements were granted by the Cross-Easement Agreement, and thus,
we turn to that Agreement to determine their duration. Article XI addresses “Duration and
Termination.” Section 11.01 states: “The easements, covenants, restrictions and other provisions
of this Agreement shall be of perpetual duration.” Section 11.02 is titled “Amendment,” and states:
       This Agreement, or any easement, covenant, restriction or undertaking contained
       herein, may be terminated, extended or amended as to each of the portions of the
       Entire Parcel only by the recording of the appropriate document in the Office of the
       Register of Deeds of Houghton County, Michigan, which document must be
       executed by all of the owners and mortgagees, and other holders of recorded
       interests affected thereby, as of the date of such document, of the Entire Parcel.

Nevertheless, defendants argued in the trial court that the purpose of the easements ceased to exist
because a “shopping center” does not exist. It is true that an easement limited to a specific purpose
terminates when that “purpose ceases to exist, is abandoned, or is rendered impossible of
accomplishment.” Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc, 472 Mich at 381-382 (citation omitted). But,
as explained above, the purpose of the reciprocal easements at issue here was not to establish a
shopping center; the purpose was, at minimum, to allow shared access to common areas and other
designated areas with regard to these adjoining properties. There is no evidence that such purpose
ceased to exist, was abandoned, or rendered impossible. The parking lots, roadways, and other
paved and unpaved areas between the properties continue to exist. In fact, plaintiff filed this
lawsuit to enforce its legal rights under the Cross-Easement Agreement.

        And if the original contracting parties had intended the reciprocal easements and other
rights and obligations to terminate when Shopko or Ironwood Oil sold their properties, or when
any other particular event occurred, they could have so stated in the Cross-Easement Agreement.
We note, also, that there are no requirements or limitations stated in the Cross-Easement
Agreement with regard to the potential uses of the properties at issue with the exception that—as
stated in Section 6.02—as long as the Shopko site was operating a general merchandise discount
department store and as long as a gas station and grocery store were on the Developer’s site, no
such competing establishments were permitted. But there was no provision, for example, limiting

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property use to retail stores or retail services, or excluding movie theaters, banks, restaurants, or
other entities. Instead, Section 14.01 of the Cross-Easement Agreement states, without
qualification: “The Agreement shall inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon, the parties hereto
and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, representatives, successors and assigns.”
Moreover, defendants could have sought the termination or amendment of the “Agreement, or any
easement, covenant, restriction or undertaking contained” therein by the procedure set forth in
Section 11.02. But no such action was taken. Consequently, the Cross-Easement Agreement,
which was recorded in the chain of title and runs with the land, is binding and enforceable against
plaintiff and defendants as the successors in interest of the original contracting parties.

        Accordingly, the trial court erroneously concluded that the reciprocal easements
established by the Cross-Easement Agreement were no longer valid or enforceable. Therefore, the
trial court’s opinion and order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s
second amended complaint is vacated. We also vacate the trial court’s opinion and order denying
plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition or for summary disposition of plaintiff’s
declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims—to the extent the trial court concluded that
the Cross-Easement Agreement was not valid and enforceable, only. Plaintiff is entitled to
summary disposition of its declaratory judgment action, to the extent it sought a judicial
declaration that the Cross-Easement Agreement was valid and enforceable. And we affirm the
trial court’s opinion and order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition of defendants’
counter-complaint. This matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion,
including for resolution of plaintiff’s breach of contract and trespass claims.

       Vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                              /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                              /s/ Sima G. Patel

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