Court Opinion

ID: 9491400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:13:16.344146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:43.290479
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
with whom LOKEN, Circuit Judge, joins,
concurring in part.
I concur in the result reached by Judge McMillian. I agree with those portions of his opinion holding that Mr. Mandanici has insufficient Article III standing to file either an initial action or an appeal seeking the imposition of lawyer discipline by the district court or by this court and with those portions holding that we do not have jurisdiction to reach the merits, if any, of Mr. Mandaniei’s allegations. However, I would go no further.
I first note that it is not entirely clear from the record how the district court treated the letter-complaints filed by Mr. Mandanici. If the letters were simply treated as disciplinary grievances, then the district court had inherent power to consider the substantive allegations contained therein. See Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 319 (8th Cir.1965). Otherwise, if they were treated as complaints filed by Mr. Mandanici as a party to the action, the district court had no jurisdiction to consider the merits.
Although it is fundamental that every court has inherent authority to disbar or discipline attorneys for unprofessional conduct, that is not the nature of this matter as presented in this court. See id. As noted by Judge McMillian, for more than thirty years this circuit has maintained that an individual such as Mr. Mandanici lacks standing to “institute and maintain” an action or an appeal seeking discipline against or disbarment of a lawyer. Id. at 318; accord In Matter of Continental Steel Corp., 966 F.2d 1456, 1992 WL 133897 (7th Cir.1992) (unpublished table decision) (embracing Mattice specifically). A person who files an ethics grievance concerning a particular attorney does nothing more than “supplfy] information for the court’s consideration.” Mattice, 353 F.2d at 319 (citation omitted). He does not thereby “initiate an action.” Id. If the district court “decides not to proceed with the matter, the complainant has no recourse.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, Mr. Mandanici’s current effort before this court must be construed as an attempt to invoke our Article III jurisdiction to seek review of an unap-pealable event.
“Article III of the Constitution limits the ‘judicial power’ of the United States to the resolution of ‘cases’ and ‘controversies,’ ” and “[a]s an incident to the elaboration of this bedrock requirement, [the Supreme Court] has always required that a litigant have ‘standing’ to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). The federal courts must consider their own jurisdiction^ “and standing ‘is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.’ ” United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995) (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990)) (alteration in original). Thus, in this appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, both in this court and in the court from which the record comes. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, — U.S. -,-, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). This requirement is a threshold matter that “‘spring[s] from the nature and limits’” of the federal judicial power and is “ ‘inflexible and without exception.’ ” Id. (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884)) (alteration in original). When this first question is answered, it is clear that Mr. Mandanici lacks standing directly to assert his various disciplinary complaints, see Opinion of McMillian at 17, and, as a result, this court *752does not have the jurisdiction or the power to consider them in any manner whatsoever. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990).
Without jurisdiction, which is clearly absent here, this court “ ‘cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases [or fails to exist in the first instance], the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’ ” Steel Co.; — U.S. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 1012 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868)). Accordingly, our proper course of action is to announce our complete lack of jurisdiction and to dismiss this case.