Court Opinion

ID: 9723484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:17:07.677004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:48.980826
License: Public Domain

Broadfoot, J.
Ida Scheffler was one of eight children. Her only sister and three of her brothers predeceased her. Her husband was one of 11 children. The testatrix made special bequests to some of her own relatives and to some of her deceased husband’s relatives.
At the hearing on the construction of the will the children of Edwin Schuette, six in number, contended that each was entitled to the sum of $1,000 under the provisions of paragraph Fifth. The executor and the other residuary beneficiaries contended that the children of Edwin Schuette were to divide the sum of $1,000. Certain Wisconsin cases and annotations appearing in 16 A. L. R. 15, 31 A. L. R. 799, 78 A. L. R. 1385, 126 A. L. R. 157, and 13 A. L. R. (2d) 1023, deal with the subject.
*423The trial court in its memorandum decision analyzed the Wisconsin cases and some from foreign jurisdictions that appeared in the annotations. We have read the Wisconsin cases cited, together with the annotations and some of the cases therein referred to. We find none in which the language of the will or the surrounding circumstances are sufficiently close to be controlling. We do, however, find in some of the Wisconsin cases principles of law that may be applied. In Will of Asby, 232 Wis. 481, 487, 287 N. W. 734, appears the following:
“However, it appears that the great majority of the courts have recognized and followed the rule of construction that if a testamentary gift is made to one or more persons named and the children of another person, as for instance, to A and the children of B, the persons entitled will, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention, take per capita, and not per stirpes.”
That quotation was cited with approval in Will of Bray, 260 Wis. 9, 15, 49 N. W. (2d) 716. In the Asby Case, the paragraph in question was as follows (p. 483) :
“All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, real and personal, wherever situated and of whatever nature I might die seized or possessed of, I give, devise and bequeath, share and share alike, to Arthur Wilkins and the grandchildren of William Asby, my late husband, surviving me at the time of my decease.”
The trial court in that case concluded that it was the intention of the testatrix by that paragraph to give one half of her residuary estate to Arthur Wilkins and one half to the surviving grandchildren of William Asby as a class. Upon appeal this court reversed the trial court and held that Arthur Wilkins and all of the grandchildren of the testatrix’s deceased husband who survived her should share equally in her residuary estate, that is, on a per capita rather than on a *424per stirpes basis. The same rule is cited in 3 Page, Wills (lifetime ed.), p. 288, sec. 1081, as follows:
“A gift to testator’s son A, to the children of his deceased daughter B, and to the children of his daughter C, imports a per capita distribution. Even if the two parents thus described are related to testator in unequal degrees of relationship, the gift is, prima facie, per capita. Even if testator names the parents, and then gives the names of the children who make up the class, the gift is one per capita. A gift to ‘A’s children (naming them), to the heirs of B (naming them) . . . also C’ (naming him) requires a per capita distribution.”
In Estate of Porter, 238 Wis. 181, 298 N. W. 624, the same rule is recognized but it was there held that a very slight circumstance is sufficient to overcome the rule or presumption. We can find no circumstances here that would overcome the presumption. Viola Jordan, who was given $1,000 by the codicil to the will, was not a blood relative of the testatrix. One of testatrix’s brothers, Gustave Sixel, predeceased her, leaving five children for whom no provision was made in the will. Another deceased brother, Albert, had one child who was left a bequest of $100. The sum of $100 was left to each of the living brothers of the testatrix and nothing was left to any of their children. There was no attempt on the part of the testatrix to divide her meager estate equally by families or by degrees of consanguinity.
The trial court held that paragraph Fifth of the will was not ambiguous and on this appeal all parties contend that it is not ambiguous. We agree, and from the language of the will and the surrounding circumstances as shown by the record we must conclude that the trial court arrived at a proper determination of the meaning of the paragraph in question.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.