Court Opinion

ID: 9777802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:24:42.819571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:01.702731
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent, substantially for the reasons advanced by Judge Maus in Williams v. Malone, 592 S.W.2d 879 (Mo.App.1980), which, as the principal opinion states, involved an issue “substantially identical to the one in this case.”
The obvious purpose of § 516.200, RSMo 1978, was to provide relief for a plaintiff who sought to sue a defendant who was not available for service of process so that a personal judgment could be rendered. In two early cases, Garth v. Robarás, 20 Mo. 523 (1855) and Miller v. Tyler, 61 Mo. 401 (1875), the Court declined to apply the strict letter of a predecessor of 516.200, containing language which was operatively identical, when a defendant had absented himself from the state but remained a resident so that service could be made on him by delivering a copy of the summons and petition to a member of his household.
I would not reject a holding that the “longarm” statute, § 506.500, RSMo Supp. 1984, and § 506.510, RSMo 1978, which authorizes a personal judgment (§ 516.520) had the effect of repealing § 516.200 by implication. The purpose of the latter is evident, as shown by Garth v. Robarás, supra. There is no reason for perpetuating it as to a defendant who may be subjected to personal judgment in Missouri. The legislature does not always consult the entire body of statutory law before taking action. Even though repeals by implication are not favored, they may be found when the legislative purpose is evident.
The principal opinion comments on the difficulties sometimes encountered in making a personal service outside the jurisdiction. I fail to see the pertinence of this argument. By Rule 53.01, “a civil action is commenced by filing a petition with the court.” By Rule 54.01, the clerk may issue such separate and additional summons as the plaintiff shall request. The statute of limitations is interrupted by the filing of suit. Delay in service of process is not a factor in the statute of limitations, at least so long as the plaintiff uses due diligence in obtaining service.
By the holding in the principal opinion, the plaintiff may delay filing suit indefinitely, so long as the defendant remains outside the state. I do not believe that this was what was intended by the legislature when it adopted a statute giving the plaintiff the right to longarm service.
I would affirm the judgment.