Court Opinion

ID: 9945876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 18:04:49.026345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:17.224443
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                                                  Electronically Filed
                                                  Intermediate Court of Appeals
                                                  CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                  28-FEB-2024
                                                  07:46 AM
                                                  Dkt. 75 SO

                           NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

                 IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

                         OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

               STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
                   DAMIAN LOO, Defendant-Appellant.

         APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
                     (CASE NO. 5CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

                     SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
  (By:   Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)

            Defendant-Appellant Damian Loo appeals from the

Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit's August 30, 2018 Notice of

Entry of Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, convicting him of

Harassment by Stalking, in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes

(HRS) § 711-1106.5(1) (2014), and Use of a Computer in the

Commission of a Separate Crime Relating to Harassment by

Stalking, in violation of HRS § 708-893(1)(h) (Supp. 2016). 1             The

     1   The Honorable Randal G.B. Valenciano presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

circuit court sentenced Loo to one-year and four-year terms of

probation, respectively.

          On appeal, Loo challenges the constitutionality of the

Harassment by Stalking statute, the sufficiency of the evidence,

and the denial of his motion to dismiss.

          Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to

the issues raised and the arguments advanced, we resolve Loo's

points of error as discussed below, and affirm.

          (1)    Loo first contends the Harassment by Stalking

Statute "is unconstitutionally void for vagueness due to its

failure to specifically define the term 'surveillance.'"

          Contrary to Loo's contention, the absence of a

statutory definition for surveillance does not render the

Harassment by Stalking statute vague.       HRS § 711-1106.5 provides

in relevant part as follows:

                A person commits the offense of harassment by
          stalking if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another
          person, or in reckless disregard of the risk thereof, that
          person engages in a course of conduct involving pursuit,
          surveillance, or nonconsensual contact upon the other
          person on more than one occasion without legitimate
          purpose.

(Emphasis added.)    Surveillance is defined in the dictionary as

"close watch kept over someone or something (as by a

detective)."    Merriam-Webster, Surveillance Definition &

Meaning, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2024),

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https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/surveillance

[https://perma.cc/GE5N-49TU].

           By applying the common meaning of surveillance, a

person of ordinary intelligence would know that he or she is

prohibited from engaging in a course of conduct involving

closely watching over someone "on more than one occasion without

legitimate purpose" "in reckless disregard of the risk" of

harassing, annoying, or alarming that person.   HRS § 711-1106.5.

See State v. Alangcas, 134 Hawai‘i 515, 530, 345 P.3d 181, 196

(2015) (explaining the test for determining whether a statute is

vague).   Moreover, the same analysis shows "there is no concern

of arbitrary or subjective police enforcement."   Id. at 535, 345

P.3d at 201.

           Thus, the lack of a statutory definition for the term

"surveillance" does not render HRS § 711-1106.5

unconstitutional.

           (2) Loo next contends "[t]here was no substantial

evidence to support [his] conviction for harassment by

stalking."

           The charging instrument asserted Loo, "in reckless

disregard of the risk of harassing, annoying, or alarming, [the

female employee], did engage in a course of conduct involving

surveillance upon [the female employee] on more than one

occasion without legitimate purpose[.]"

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            Kaua‘i Police Department (KPD) Sergeant Scott

Williamson (Sgt. Williamson) testified the surveillance camera

that feeds Channel 1 monitors "the entrance to the cellblock,

where the vehicles would pull up, the officer would wave their

badge, and it would open the gate for them to pull in with

prisoners."    One day, Sgt. Williamson and KPD Sergeant Ginny Pia

(Sgt. Pia) noticed the camera move and focus on a parking stall

assigned to a particular female employee.    The Channel 1 camera

focused on the empty parking stall for about eight minutes until

that female employee arrived.    Sgts. Williamson and Pia then

observed Loo in real time use the camera to zoom in and track

the female employee as she walked from her car to the entry

door.   When she entered the building, the camera was returned to

"its normally assigned position."

            Sgt. Williamson then reviewed the available video

footage saved on the system, and determined Loo used the

Channel 1 camera to monitor the same female employee in a

similar manner on eleven separate occasions – March 22, 2017;

March 23, 2017; March 24, 2017; March 28, 2017; March 29, 2017;

March 30, 2017; March 31, 2017; April 4, 2017; April 6, 2017;

April 7, 2017; and April 13, 2017.

            Evidence at trial also showed Loo admitted he had no

legitimate purpose in zooming in and watching the female

employee.    Loo further admitted that he could understand why the

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female employee would be "alarmed" upon learning his actions.

The female employee testified she felt "shocked," "alarmed," and

"scared" when learning of Loo's actions.

          Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to

the State, there was substantial evidence to support the jury's

conclusion that Loo, "in reckless disregard of the risk of

harassing, annoying, or alarming, [the female employee], did

engage in a course of conduct involving surveillance upon [the

female employee] on more than one occasion without legitimate

purpose[.]"   See State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawai‘i 43, 49, 237 P.3d

1109, 1115 (2010) (providing the standard of review for

sufficiency of the evidence); State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 254,

831 P.2d 924, 934 (1992) (explaining that "[g]iven the

difficulty of proving the requisite state of mind by direct

evidence in criminal cases, we have consistently held that proof

by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising

from circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct is

sufficient[.]") (cleaned up).

          (3) Finally, Loo contends the circuit court erred in

denying his motion to dismiss the Harassment by Stalking charge

as a de minimus infraction under HRS § 702-236(1) (2014).

          HRS § 702-236(1) provides:

                (1) The court may dismiss a prosecution if, having
          regard to the nature of the conduct alleged and the nature
          of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the
          defendant's conduct:

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               (a) Was within a customary license or tolerance,
                   which was not expressly refused by the person
                   whose interest was infringed and which is not
                   inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining
                   the offense;
               (b) Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or
                   evil sought to be prevented by the law defining
                   the offense or did so only to an extent too
                   trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction;
                   or
               (c) Presents such other extenuations that it cannot
                   reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the
                   legislature in forbidding the offense.

          Prior to trial, Loo moved to dismiss the charge as a

de minimis infraction, and during a hearing on the motion, Loo

argued in part that "the alleged facts is somebody was walking

by and he watched her on a camera in a public area without her

knowing, never told her."    The circuit court denied the motion,

concluding Loo "failed to show why his conduct did not cause or

threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by [HRS § ]711-

1106.5" and "failed to present evidence of" the factors in State

v. Rapozo, 123 Hawai‘i 329, 344, 235 P.3d 325, 340 (2010).

          During closing arguments, Loo renewed his motion to

dismiss the charge as a de minimus infraction, incorporating his

prior arguments.   The circuit court again denied the motion.

          That Loo secretly monitored the female employee, or

that it was in an area where other employees parked, did not

render his conduct a de minimis infraction.        After reviewing

Loo's arguments to the circuit court and the evidence adduced at

trial, we cannot say that the circuit court "clearly exceeded

the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law"

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in this case.    Rapozo, 123 Hawai‘i at 336, 235 P.3d at 332

(citation omitted).

            Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

August 30, 2018 Notice of Entry of Judgment of Conviction and

Sentence.

            DATED:   Honolulu, Hawai‘i, February 28, 2024.

On the briefs:                         /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
                                       Acting Chief Judge
Thomas M. Otake,
for Defendant-Appellant.               /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
                                       Associate Judge
Michelle M.L. Puu,
Deputy Attorney General,               /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
for Plaintiff-Appellee.                Associate Judge

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