Court Opinion

ID: 9513304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:34:02.422149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:48.897061
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring.
[¶ 13] I join in the reversal of the change in the medical expense obligation and in the remand for consideration of Withey’s request for attorney fees. However, I only concur in the result of denying Hager’s motion to reduce child support, and I write to give my reasons.
[¶ 14] The July 1996 agreement between these parents was intended only to settle arrearages in spousal and child support. By its plain language, it was not intended to affect current child support in any way. The clause agreed:
Child support shall continue at the rate specified commencing August 1, 1996, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter pursuant to paragraph III of Amended Judgment dated April 6, 1995. All support payments made after August 1, 1996, shall be applied to future child support.
The parties specifically agree that Ken’s child support obligation from August 1, 1996, forward is not considered a part of this stipulation and agreement, but shall be considered to be a separate and distinct matter separate and apart from this agreement.
In this context, “[c]hild support shall continue” cannot imply “renewal” for another year, but must mean “unaffected” by the stipulated amendment of the judgment. Fairly read, “Ken’s child support ... forward is not considered a part of this stipulation.... ”
[¶ 15] Therefore, Ken was entitled under NDCC 14-09-08.4(4) to move to amend the child support order entered on April 6, 1995. Ken’s motion was made on August 7, 1996, more than a year after the last effective order setting child support, as the statute authorizes.
[¶ 16] Still, I concur in the denial of a decrease in Ken’s child support obligation because the only basis that Ken argued to the trial court was that his 1995 tax return was the sole determinant of Ken’s current income to fix future child support. See NDAC 75-02-04.1-02(7): “Where gross income is subject to fluctuation, ... information reflecting and covering a period of time sufficient to reveal the likely extent of fluctuations must be provided.” Since the prior child support determination had used a five-year income average for Ken’s fluctuating income, and Ken never asked the trial court to re-calculate his obligation with a new five-year income average, I agree the trial court’s denial should be affirmed.
[¶ 17] As we have ruled in many cases, an appellant cannot raise a new ground on appeal that has not been fairly presented to the trial court. While a new five-year average might have decreased Ken’s child support obligation, Ken did not satisfactorily present that position to the trial court.
[¶ 18] Herbert L. Meschke