Court Opinion

ID: 9572901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:45:37.649823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:37.493566
License: Public Domain

KAUS, J.,
Concurring. — In view of the dissent, the majority opinion’s lack of specificity fails tq do justice to the commission’s recommendation which we adopt. Therefore I feel compelled to detail some of the facts on which it is based.
During an in-chambers discussion regarding a criminal case involving two black defendants and a white victim, Judge Stevens remarked to counsel that black persons have to learn how to live in their own neighborhoods and that it was “typical” of black persons to fight unfairly.
Judge Stevens, during his term in office, referred to black persons as “Jig, dark boy, colored boy, nigger, coon, Amos and Andy, and jungle bunny.” With one exception, Judge Stevens did not use these terms in open court or with reference to a party, witness or attorney in a case before him. In 1974, in a probate case involving a controversy between black litigants regarding burial of a loved one, Judge Stevens stated in the presence of court personnel only, “let’s get on with this Amos and Andy show.” On another occasion, he privately referred to his court clerk as being “lazier than a coon.”
During another in-chambers discussion, Judge Stevens stated to a public defender that “Filipinos can be good, hard-working people and that they are clean, unlike some black animals who come into contact with the court.”
*405In connection with a child abuse proceeding involving an Hispanic defendant with a Spanish surname, Judge Stevens observed from his prior experience that (in effect) Spanish persons live by different standards than we do; that wife abuse is common and more acceptable for them; and that such abuse might explain defendant’s cotiduct toward her child.
In a civil settlement conference, Judge Stevens referred to Attorney Gonzales as “acting like a Mexican jumping bean” after he changed his position on settlement.
During his term in office, Stevens used such terms as “cute little tamales,” “Taco Bell,” “spic,” and “bean” when referring to persons with Hispanic surnames in conversations with court personnel.
It is beyond me how it can be argued that such behavior is not “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” simply because Judge Stevens otherwise performed his judicial duties “fairly and equitably.” “[J]ustice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” (Rex v. Sussex Justices (1924) 1 K.B. 256, 259 (Lord Hewart).) The administration of justice is prejudiced by the public perception of racial bias, whether or not it is translated into the court’s judgments and orders.
I am particularly puzzled by the dissent’s reference to Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15 [29 L.Ed.2d 284, 91 S.Ct. 1780]. The facts of that case are too well known to require repeating. Can it be seriously contended that Judge Stevens would not be subject to censure if— before performing his duties “fairly and equitably” — he took the bench wearing a robe on the back of which he proclaimed that as far as “coons” and “spies” are concerned, his feelings were precisely the same as Mr. Cohen’s toward the draft.
Bird, C. J., Newman, J., Broussard, J., and Reynoso, J., concurred.