Court Opinion

ID: 9953622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 16:01:01.018902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:45.408556
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10282     Document: 23-1       Date Filed: 03/22/2024   Page: 1 of 11

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10282
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        WILLIAM CHOATE,
                                  Plaintiﬀ-Counter Defendant-Appellant,
        versus
        ATLANTA RADIO, LLC,
        a subsidiary of Cumulus Media, Inc.,
        CUMULUS MEDIA, INC.,

                               Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10282

                         D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-04234-JPB
                             ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               William Choate appeals following the district court’s grant
        of partial summary judgment in favor of Cumulus Media, Inc. (Cu-
        mulus) and its subsidiary Atlanta Radio, LLC (collectively, the Ap-
        pellees) in Choate’s action alleging gender and sexual orientation
        discrimination in his termination in violation of Title VII of the
        Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Choate
        asserts the district court abused its discretion by excluding from ev-
        idence the declaration of his former co-worker, Brian Thomas. He
        also contends the district court erred in granting summary judg-
        ment to Appellees because a reasonable jury could conclude Cu-
        mulus terminated him because of his sexual orientation. After re-
        view, we affirm.
                                  I. JURISDICTION
               We issued a jurisdictional question asking the parties to ad-
        dress whether the district court’s certification of a partial final judg-
        ment on Choate’s Title VII claims under Rule 54(b) was proper.
        The parties responded, and we carried the jurisdictional issue with
        the case. Generally, an order that adjudicates fewer than all claims
        against all parties is not final and appealable absent certification by
        the district court under Rule 54(b). Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v.
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        23-10282                Opinion of the Court                            3

        Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291;
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) provides:
               When an action presents more than one claim for re-
               lief . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the
               court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one
               or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if
               the court expressly determines that there is no just
               reason for delay.
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). We have noted “appeals before the end of
        district court proceedings are the exception, not the rule.” Peden v.
        Stephens, 50 F.4th 972, 977 (11th Cir. 2022) (alteration omitted).
                To certify a case under Rule 54(b), a district court must fol-
        low a two-step analysis. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health
        Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 2007). First, the district
        court must determine its final judgment is both “final” and a “judg-
        ment.” Id. Second, the district court must determine there is “no
        just reason for delay” in permitting the parties to appeal its decision
        immediately. Id. A district court’s Rule 54(b) certification is not
        conclusive on this Court, and if the district court incorrectly
        granted Rule 54(b) certification, we will dismiss the appeal for lack
        of jurisdiction. See Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d
        162, 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1997).
        A. Final Judgment
               To constitute a “final judgment,” the court’s decision must
        be “final in the sense that it is an ultimate disposition of an individ-
        ual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action, and a
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10282

        judgment in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim
        for relief.” Lloyd Noland Found., Inc., 483 F.3d at 777 (quotation
        marks omitted). Moreover, a final judgment must either entirely
        dispose of a separable claim or completely dismiss a party from the
        case. Id. at 779. Claims are separable when there is more than one
        possible recovery or if “different sorts of relief” are sought. Brandt
        v. Bassett (In re Se. Banking Corp.), 69 F.3d 1539, 1547 (11th Cir.
        1995). “When either of these circumstances exists, claims are sep-
        arately enforceable and subject to Rule 54(b) certification even if
        they arise out of a single transaction or occurrence.” Id. (quotation
        marks omitted). “Thus, the touchstone for determining whether
        an entire claim has been adjudicated for purposes of Rule 54(b) is
        whether that claim is separately enforceable without mutually ex-
        cluding or substantially overlapping with remedies being sought by
        the remaining claims pending in the district court.” Lloyd Noland,
        483 F.3d at 780 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
               The partial summary judgment order is final for purposes of
        Rule 54(b). Although the district court’s partial judgment did not
        completely dismiss any party, it did completely resolve Choate’s
        Title VII claims. And while there is potentially some overlap be-
        tween his Title VII claims and his breach of contract claim, Choate
        can recover different relief simultaneously under each of the
        claims. Thus, the contract and statutory claims are separable, and
        the partial summary judgment order is final for purposes of Rule
        54(b). See Lloyd Noland, 483 F.3d at 780; In re Se. Banking Corp., 69
        F.3d at 1547.
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        23-10282               Opinion of the Court                         5

        B. No Just Reason for Delay
                Once having found finality, the district court must deter-
        mine whether there is “any just reason to delay the appeal of indi-
        vidual final judgments.” Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 165. We review a
        district court’s determination there is no just reason for delay for
        abuse of discretion. See Lloyd Noland, 483 F.3d at 778 n.5. When a
        district court concludes Rule 54(b) certification is proper, and it
        supports its conclusion by clearly articulating its reasoning and
        providing supporting factual and legal determinations, or if the rea-
        sons are otherwise “obvious,” we “will not disturb the district
        court’s assessment unless it was clearly unreasonable.” Ebrahimi,
        114 F.3d at 166. “This deferential standard reflects a recognition
        that the task of weighing and balancing the contending factors is
        peculiarly one for the trial judge, who can explore all the facets of
        a case.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
                In its order granting the motion for Rule 54(b) certification,
        the district court explained there was no just reason for delay be-
        cause “this case would be most efficiently resolved by avoiding the
        possibility of two, separate jury trials on the Title VII claims and
        the still-pending breach of contract claim and counterclaims, par-
        ticularly because these claims arise out of the same underlying ter-
        mination incident.” The court also noted Choate had indicated the
        resolution of the Title VII claims on appeal might increase the pos-
        sibility of a settlement.
              The district court’s assessment there was no just reason for
        delay was not clearly unreasonable. If there is no immediate
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                23-10282

        review and the parties proceed to trial, this could require two sep-
        arate trials involving many of the same witnesses. Relatedly, an
        immediate appeal would help narrow and minimize any eviden-
        tiary disputes during any future trial. Thus, appellate review at this
        stage could eliminate the need for any further judicial involvement.
        In light of this, the district court’s assessment was not clearly un-
        reasonable, and we have jurisdiction over the court’s grant of sum-
        mary judgment.
                                 II. DISCUSSION
        A. Thomas’s Testimony
                Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
        that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mo-
        vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
        56(a). In determining whether the movant has met this burden,
        courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        non-movant. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253,
        1263-64 (11th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, courts “may not weigh con-
        flicting evidence or make credibility determinations of [their]
        own.” Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir.
        2016) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, unsupported factual
        allegations, affidavits based on information and belief instead of
        personal knowledge, and mere conclusions cannot withstand a mo-
        tion for summary judgment. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1327
        (11th Cir. 2005).
            The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
        Thomas’s testimony based on a lack of first-hand knowledge.
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        23-10282               Opinion of the Court                         7

        Furcron, 843 F.3d at 1304 (reviewing the district court’s decisions on
        the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion). Thomas’s
        testimony does not meet the standard articulated in Rule 56, as he
        lacks personal knowledge of Cumulus’s employment practices dur-
        ing the relevant time frame, as he was not a Cumulus employee
        when the termination occurred. Furthermore, he did not testify as
        to how Choate’s termination actually occurred, and his testimony
        thus amounts to mere speculation. See Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1327. As
        the district court concluded, Thomas’s declaration amounts to a
        belief that Sean Shannon was involved in Choate’s termination de-
        cision because he was involved in such decisions during Thomas’s
        employment. Such a belief is insufficient to defeat summary judg-
        ment, as it cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. See id.
        Choate’s argument there is no indication Cumulus changed its em-
        ployment practices following Thomas’s employment is contra-
        dicted by the testimony of several current Cumulus employees.
        David Milner and Brian Philips, for example, testified that they,
        Todd McCarty, and Richard Denning, made the decision to termi-
        nate. Additionally, McCarty testified that Shannon was not in-
        volved in the decision-making or investigative process. Thus, the
        district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Thomas’s tes-
        timony regarding Shannon’s involvement in termination decisions.
        B. Merits of Summary Judgment
              Discrimination claims under Title VII can be brought as ei-
        ther mixed-motive or single-motive claims, which are different the-
        ories and serve as alternative causation standards for proving
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10282

        discrimination. Quigg v. Thomas County School Dist., 814 F.3d 1227,
        1235 & n.4. (11th Cir. 2016). In mixed-motive cases, at summary
        judgment, a plaintiff pursuing a mixed-motive claim “need only
        produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defend-
        ant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and
        (2) a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the de-
        fendant’s adverse employment action.” Id. at 1232-33 (quotation
        marks and alteration omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (stat-
        ing “an unlawful employment practice is established when the
        complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating
        factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
        motivated the practice”). In other words, the court must deter-
        mine whether “the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence for a
        reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
        that [his] protected characteristic was a motivating factor for an ad-
        verse employment decision.” Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239 (quotation
        marks and alterations omitted). “[T]he plaintiff will always survive
        summary judgment if [he] presents circumstantial evidence that
        creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory in-
        tent.” Id. at 1240 (quotation marks omitted). The Court noted the
        mixed-motive theory of discrimination was designed to protect the
        employee who cannot rebut his employer’s proferred reasons for
        an adverse action but offers evidence demonstrating the employer
        also relied on a forbidden consideration. Id. at 1237-38.
               The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
        in favor of the Appellees. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1263 (reviewing
        de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, using the
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        23-10282               Opinion of the Court                         9

        same legal standards applied by the district court). The parties
        agree that Cumulus took an adverse employment action against
        Choate. See Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1232-33. Thus, the relevant question
        is whether the district court erred in determining a protected char-
        acteristic, Choate’s sexuality, was not a motivating factor for the
        adverse employment action. See id. First, the court did not err in
        concluding the evidence supported a finding that Shannon—the
        Market Manager Choate alleged was biased against him because of
        Choate’s sexual orientation—was not involved in the termination
        decision. Multiple Cumulus employees testified that Milner,
        Philips, and McCarty, in consultation with Denning, made the de-
        cision to suspend and terminate Choate. The evidence supports
        that not even Greg Frey, who conducted most of the investigation,
        was involved in the final termination decision. Similarly, Kriston
        Fancellas testified she was only informed of the decision after it was
        made. Although various individuals forwarded emails to Shannon
        early on and kept him updated on the situation, the record does not
        support that he was involved in the actual termination decision.
               Additionally, Choate’s argument that Cumulus’s deviation
        from its standard practice of including Shannon in its triple sign-off
        creates an inference of discrimination is unpersuasive. The district
        court did not err in finding the evidence showed this policy was not
        always used. For example, Frey testified the Market Manager is not
        always involved in termination decisions. Milner also testified that
        whether a triple sign-off for termination is used “depends on the
        situation.” Philips also noted the Market Manager is not always
        involved in termination decisions and that “something of this
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                23-10282

        scale” would likely rise to McCarty, Milner, Denning, and himself
        alone. Thus, the record does not support a finding that Cumulus
        deviated from its standard termination policy, and this does not
        create an inference of discrimination.
               As to Choate’s argument regarding the Appellees’ favorable
        treatment of Corey Dylan, the record shows they believed Dylan’s
        behavior was dissimilar to Choate’s. Dylan was accused of being
        rude and belligerent because she was not recognized and not al-
        lowed in the VIP lounge. Conversely, Choate was accused of yell-
        ing at Live Nation employees, threatening their jobs, calling them
        “fat and stupid,” and requiring the head of security be called to the
        VIP lounge to handle the situation. Additionally, Choate was ac-
        cused of grabbing a person’s butt and grinding on their leg, both
        without the other person’s consent. Frey testified the investigation
        into Dylan “did not dig up any other incidents other than just her
        not being where she should be and not being very nice.” Frey also
        noted “[t]he level of allegations directed toward Choate far out-
        weighed what was directed towards Corey Dylan.” Milner simi-
        larly explained that, although the allegations against both Choate
        and Dylan were concerning, those against Choate were “much
        more severe and much more concerning.” The district court did
        not err in concluding a reasonable jury would not find that Cumu-
        lus’s different treatment of Choate and Dylan demonstrated dis-
        crimination.
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        23-10282               Opinion of the Court                         11

                                III. CONCLUSION
                The district court’s certification of its grant of partial sum-
        mary judgment as a final and appealable order under Federal Rule
        of Civil Procedure 54(b) was proper. The district court did not
        abuse its discretion in excluding Thomas’s testimony and the dis-
        trict court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
        the Appellees on Choate’s Title VII claims.
               AFFIRMED.