Court Opinion

ID: 9653647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:51:00.269962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:52.006453
License: Public Domain

McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I agree that the present conviction is not barred by the doctrine set forth in Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 68 S.Ct. 237.
I do not agree that the trial court committed reversible error in defining “possession”.
The indictment originally contained four counts. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of appellant on Counts One and Two. The Third Count charged possession by appellant of certain counterfeited ration stamps. The Fourth Count charged possession of the same stamps with intent to utter them.
In this case there was evidence that the back room of the second floor of the house in question was rented to appellant He gave $10 a week for it though the requested rent was only $8. At the time of the rental there was no lock on the closet door within the room. Later, during the rental by appellant, the landlord noticed that a lock had been put on the door. There was also evidence that appellant was seen entering and leaving the particular house. There was testimony that while the appellant was in custody and as he was being brought to the said house, one of the officers following closely behind him heard something jingle. Check*358ing this, he picked up a key. The, key fitted the closet door lock. The closet contained a large quantity of counterfeited ration stamps, including those mentioned in the indictment.
The basis of the majority opinion is the holding that the jury was not told that possession included control.
The trial judge at the outset of his charge read to the jury Counts Three and Four of the indictment which were the two then remaining counts. The pertinent language of the possession count so read was, “The defendant, * * * wilfully and unlawfully possessed and controlled certain counterfeited ration documents * * (Emphasis added.) The indictment was in evidence and went to the jury. Later in the charge, after the request to charge “as to possession under this Act, and-what possession means under the facts of this case”, the court said:
“You will observe that the third count charges the possession of the stamps and the fourth count charges the defendant with possession with intent to utter the stamps. The possession of the stamps you could find if you concluded from the evidence that this defendant was in possession of these stamps alone; in that case he would be found guilty on Count 1 [3] alone. If, however, you have concluded that he was in possession of the stamps, and from the evidence you concluded that he intended to utter them, then he would be, and you could properly find him, guilty on Count 4 likewise.
“Mere possession of and by itself would not weigh against him on that fourth count because there you did not find that he intended to utter them, but I say to you again, that there is evidence sufficient for you to pass upon here on both counts, and for that reason I am submitting the entire matter to you.”
In the body of the charge where the trial judge was discussing the presumption of .innocence, 'he stated that such presumption would remain with the defendant “throughout the entire trial of this case, until the presumption is removed by evidence that convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the offenses charged!’ {Emphasis added.)
It seems to me that under the facts the above presentation fairly apprised the jury that proof of appellant’s control of the stamps was necessary in order to convict him. The court might perhaps have restated the language of the indictment; but in adhering to the latter’s exact phraseology and forcibly stressing that, for a conviction, the evidence must be convincing beyond a reasonable .doubt of guilt “of the offenses charged”, the jury was told that both possession and control must be found to exist before there could be a verdict of guilty. The reason assigned ■by the majority is not the substantial error that would justify reversal of this judgment of conviction.