Court Opinion

ID: 9745951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:44:21.045364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:06.681587
License: Public Domain

ZELON, J., Dissenting.
While I concur in the majority’s conclusion that an interim award of fees is appropriately sought under the terms of this agreement and concur that the issue presented by this case is extremely close, I cannot conclude that this is a matter for the trial court, rather than the arbitrator.
The language of this agreement is broad, requiring arbitration of “[a]ny dispute regarding any aspect of this Occupancy Agreement or an act which allegedly has or would violate any provision of this Occupancy Agreement.” Indeed, at the trial court, respondent never asserted that this dispute could not properly be submitted to arbitration under the terms of the agreement; instead, he asserted that the failure of Acosta to object to the trial court’s reservation of jurisdiction after this court ordered the contractual dispute submitted to arbitration was a waiver. He conceded at oral argument that the matter would be arbitrable but for this claimed waiver. The history of this case does not, however, support a finding of waiver.
First, the court, in its reservation of jurisdiction, made at the conclusion of a hearing after we reversed the denial of the petition for arbitration, did not hear argument from either party with respect to the arbitrability of the fee request, a request that had not yet been filed. After the request was filed, and the matter heard, the court did not make any finding that the parties had agreed that the question of fees had been excluded from the disputes to be *1134arbitrated; instead, the court relied solely on the fact that it had reserved jurisdiction over that issue at the earlier hearing. In opposition to Acosta’s petition to compel arbitration and request for stay, which had been filed prior to the hearing on fees, but was not heard until a later date, Kerrigan again did not argue that the matter was not arbitrable, but rather that the right to arbitrate had been waived.
Kerrigan’s burden of proof to establish a waiver defense is heavy. (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 517, 82 P.3d 727] [“waivers are not to be lightly inferred and the party seeking to establish a waiver bears a heavy burden of proof’].) Courts consider a number of factors when assessing a waiver claim: “ ‘ “(1) whether the party’s actions are inconsistent with the tight to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) ‘whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place’; and (6) whether the delay ‘affected, mislead, or prejudiced’ the opposing party.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1196.) A showing of some prejudice from the delay is essential to a waiver claim. (Berman v. Health Net (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1364 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 295].)1
Even if we were to find that Acosta should have asserted that the fee issue was arbitrable at the hearing where jurisdiction was reserved, Kerrigan has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from Acosta’s failure to do so. “Prejudice in the context of waiver of the right to compel arbitration normally means some impairment .of the other party’s ability to. participate in arbitration.” (Groom v. Health Net (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1197 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 836].) “For example, courts have found prejudice where the petitioning party used the judicial discovery process to gain information about the other side’s case that could not have been gained.in arbitration [citation]; where a party unduly delayed and waited until the eve of trial to seek arbitration [citations]; or where the lengthy nature of the delays associated with the petitioning party’s attempts to litigate resulted in lost evidence [citation].” (St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacificCare of California, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 1204). None of these factors are present here.
*1135This failure to show prejudice must be balanced against our strong public policy in favor of arbitration, where “ ‘[d]oubts regarding the scope of arbitrable issues must be resolved in favor of arbitration’ ”(Kennedy; Cabot & Co. v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1175 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 66]). The parties agreed to a broad arbitration provision, covering any dispute. Kerrigan, having previously asserted the breadth of that agreement, does not seek to limit its scope now, nor should he. Any doubt in this matter should be resolved in favor of the arbitration to which the parties agreed prior to the time the dispute arose. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 The majority correctly assesses the benefits and efficiencies of the trial court hearing this fee motion rather than an arbitrator. While this is a significant factor, I cannot conclude it is sufficient to outweigh the choices made by the parties in determining how disputes were to be resolved.