Court Opinion

ID: 9633060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:32:47.24316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:28.494095
License: Public Domain

KLEIN, Justice,
concurring.
The majority correctly affirms the circuit court’s order of suppression. I concur separately because Bowe’s statements were inadmissible pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 621-26 (1985), and the constitutional issues need not have been reached. As stated in State v. Kam, 68 Haw. 631, 726 P.2d 263 (1986), “[i]t is axiomatic that appellate courts should pass upon constitutional issues only where the case is such that a decision of such issues is unavoidable.” 68 Haw. at 635, 726 P.2d at 266. In the instant case, HRS § 621-26 provides an independent statutory basis for excluding Bowe’s statement, and it was on that basis that the circuit court ruled below.
HRS § 621-26 provides that “[n]o confession shall be received in evidence unless it is first made to appear to the judge before whom the case is being tried that the confession was in fact voluntarily made.” Although State v. White, 1 Haw.App. 221, 617 P.2d 98 (1980), implied that this statutory provision was merely a codification of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), an examination of the history of HRS § 621-26 reveals that the precise language contained in the current version of the statute predated Jackson by some 37 years. See Act 204, § 1, 1927 Haw. Sess.Laws 207.
In addition, HRS § 621-26 is contained in Title 33, Chapter 621 of the HRS; Title 33 deals generally with evidence and Chapter 621 is entitled “Evidence and Witnesses, Generally.” Thus, although HRS § 621-26 is not a part of the Hawaii Rules of Evidence, it is clearly evidentiary. In interpreting this evidentiary law, this court has held that “[incriminating statements, to be admissible in evidence, must be voluntary. The adverb ‘voluntarily’ as applied to the admissibility in evidence of extrajudicial confessions has been construed by this court[1] as inclusive of the several tests prescribed by the leading authorities on evidence.[2]” Territory v. Young, 37 Haw. 189, 192 (1945) (footnotes renumbered). The reliance on the “leading authorities” demonstrates that HRS § 621-26 was essentially a codification of the common law rule against coerced confessions. Cf. State v. Foster, 303 Or. 518, 525, 739 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1987) (noting that Oregon statutory provision “is an expression of the common law rule against coerced confessions”). The common law rule “would prohibit the admission in evidence of any out-of-court confession or admission of defendant made to the police during interrogation prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings if the statements were made under the influence of fear produced by threats, or of promises, made by anyone.” Foster, 303 Or. at 525, 739 P.2d at 1036 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). See also 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 637 (11 ed. 1935) (inducements made by private parties can render a confession involuntary).
According to the undisputed findings of fact, Wallace told Bowe that “he had to go down to the Honolulu Police Department ... [and] that Wallace would accompany him [there] in place of an attorney.” Furthermore, Wallace “instructed [Bowe] to make a statement.” Because Wallace “had the authority to suspend athletes or remove them from the Basketball Team and, in the case of scholarship-athletes [such as Bowe], to initiate procedures to withdraw their athletic-scholarships,” Bowe “believed that he could not refuse to follow Wallace’s directions.” Thus, it is apparent that Wallace did not *62simply advise Bowe to make a statement, but took control of the situation by directing Bowe to go to police station, accompanying him there, and specifically instructing him to make a statement. These facts indicate that Bowe’s statements were not “in fact voluntarily made,” but were made under the implied threat of sanctions from Wallace.
The prosecution faded to demonstrate that Bowe’s statements were voluntarily made and, therefore, the statements were inadmissible pursuant to HRS § 621-26. Because the circuit court correctly suppressed Bowe’s statements based on HRS § 621-26, we need not—and should not—address the constitutional issues.

. King v. Marks and Butler, 1 Haw. 81 [(1851)]; The King v. Paakaula and Kahauliko, 3 Haw. 30 [(1867)]; Ter. Haw. v. Matsumoto, 16 Haw. 267 [(1904)]; Territory v. Chung Nung, 21 Haw. 214 [(1912)]; Ter. v. Fukunaga, 30 Haw. 697 [(1929)].

. 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16 ed.) § 219a, p. 354; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11 ed.) § 591 et seq., p. 978 et seq.; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) § 821 et seq., p. 238 et seq.