Court Opinion

ID: 9674389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:28:05.362897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:27.387130
License: Public Domain

FOURNET, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I am in full accord with the views expressed in the majority to the effect that the manner in which the district attorney, while interrogating the accused on the stand — not only touching on her prior convictions for traffic violations but also bringing out the details of the arrests forming the basis thereof, as well as the details forming the basis of the charge in the instant case, although she had not at that time been convicted of this violation — was highly prejudicial to the defendant’s cause and constituted a substantial violation of her statutory and constitutional rights. Consequently, the conviction and sentence are properly being reversed.
However, I do not agree that the case should be remanded to the lower court for a new trial, being of the opinion the motion to quash the indictment should have been sustained, for, in response to a motion for a bill of particulars, the district attorney declared the defendant was operating her car in an easterly direction on Sale street and failed to yield the right-of-way to traffic approaching the intersection moving in a southerly direction on Lake street, by which declaration the state is bound;1 and in the motion to quash it is *307shown the city of Lake Charles has no ordinance granting the right-of-way to southbound traffic on Lake street at its intersection with Sale street, where the collision occurred, and in the absence of such an ordinance or other regulation, the right-of-way under the law universally obtaining in other states as well as this state2 is given the motorist approaching the intersection from the right. Accordingly, the eastbound traffic on Sale street had the right-of-way over the southbound traffic on Lake street.
From the foregoing it is obvious the accused is not guilty of any act constituting criminal negligence within the intendment of Article 32 of the Criminal Code (now R.S. 14:32). At best her action could only be likened to the ordinary negligence sufficient to support a civil action, and falls far short of the gross negligence and recklessness necessary to sustain a charge of criminal negligence, for, .as was very aptly observed in the comments under R.S. 14:32, drafted by those entrusted with the codification of our criminal law, “The term ‘criminal negligence’ is defined in Chapter 2 of Title I of the Code. Its meaning is similar to the terms ‘gross negligence or recklessness’ which have been used often in criminal statutes. The ordinary negligence sufficient to support to (sic) civil action is not enough. * * * The Louisiana court in State v. Dean, 154 La. 671, 98 So. 82, 83 (1923), declared, *• * “gross negligence” and recklessness should be interpreted to mean something more or a greater degree of negligence and recklessness than a mere omission of duty, or a rashly negligent, careless, and heedless act.’ ”

. See, State v. Bienvenu, 207 La. 859, 22 So.2d 196; State v. Pettifield, 210 La. 609, 27 So.2d 424; State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So.2d 785; State v. Masino, 214 La. 744, 38 So.2d 622; State v. Kershaw, 234 La. 579, 100 So.2d 873; State v. Picou, 236 La. 421, 107 So.2d 691; State v. Scott, 237 La. 71, 110 So.2d 530; and the concurring opinion of the author of this dissent and concurrence in State v. Peterson, 232 La. 931, 95 So.2d 608.

. The pertinent portion of R.S. 32:121 is to the effect that “When two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left, shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right.” It is obvious, therefore, that the vehicle travelling south on Lake street was, under this provision, compelled to yield the right-of-way to the vehicle driven by the defendant that was travel-ling in an easterly direction on Sale street.