Court Opinion

ID: 9551267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:50:22.342327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:25.051586
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. A. Defendant’s confession was not admissible in evidence. On December 2, 1974, defendant, an uneducated, 20-year-old Mexican-born laborer, was arrested for murder. On December 4, 1974, he was arraigned before a magistrate in Las Cruces. At that time, the sheriff and magistrate assisted defendant, an indigent, in the preparation and signing of the necessary papers for appointment of counsel to represent him. The district court entered such an order on the same day. The defendant wanted to talk to the sheriff and he was questioned by the sheriff and made answers, all taken down by means of a tape recorder. This first statement was exculpatory. On December 6, 1974, the district court appointed Edward E. Triviz, an attorney of Las Cruces, to represent the defendant in this case. On the morning of December 6th, defendant asked the sheriff if he had time later that afternoon to talk. At 3:30 p. m. the sheriff went to the district court clerk and was informed that Mr. Bruce Lowenhaupt had been appointed as defendant’s attorney. We assume that he was not aware of the fact that Mr. Triviz had been appointed. The sheriff met with Stephen Bridgforth, an assistant district attorney, who checked at the clerk’s office and also told the sheriff that defendant had Lowenhaupt as an attorney. No such appointment appears of record. The sheriff called Mr. Lowenhaupt’s office about 4:40 p. m. and learned that Mr. Lowenhaupt was not in his office. About 5:00 p. m. the sheriff called Mr. Bridgforth and told him the attorney could not be located. About ten minutes later, Mr. Bridgforth called the sheriff and said he could not find Mr. Lowenhaupt and asked if defendant was still pressing to make another statement. The sheriff said yes. The assistant district attorney said “Go through with the same procedures that you used yesterday, have him sign another waiver, and then, make sure that the girl takes the statement in shorthand and make sure that you record it.” The sheriff took the same precautions. The confession was inculpatory. The sheriff did not tell defendant that neither Lowenhaupt nor Triviz had been appointed his attorney. In fact, defendant did not know whether an attorney had been appointed, nor who the attorney was. The assistant district attorney told the sheriff that it is proper to interview a defendant without clearing with or first contacting his court appointed counsel. Defendant moved to suppress the statements made to the sheriff. The trial court denied the motion because defendant waived his right to have counsel present during interrogation and waived his right to confer with counsel prior to being interrogated. Section 41-22A-12(D), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1975 Supp.) of the Public Defender Act reads: Any person entitled to representation by the district public defender may intelligently waive his right to representation. The waiver may be for all or any part of the proceedings. The waiver must be in writing and countersigned by a district public defender. [Emphasis added]. This language is mandatory and demands compliance. It “clearly relates to waiver of sixth amendment rights to counsel.” State v. Rascon, 89 N.M. 254, 550 P.2d 266, 270 (1976), reversing State v. Rascon, 88 N.M. 395, 540 P.2d 875 (Ct.App.1975) (Sutin, J., dissenting). In the instant case, the appointed public defender was not notified of the interrogation, was not present and did not countersign the waiver. The defendant was not warned of his right to have the interrogation approved by his attorney. There was no valid waiver. “While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467 (1938), quoted in State v. Garcia, 47 N.M. 319, 327, 142 P.2d 552 (1943). The waiver was before the district court and opposing counsel. Prior to accepting the waiver, each had a duty to search the statutes to determine whether it was proper, valid and effective. “A man is not to be deprived of his liberty and reputation because of the inadvertence of a trial judge or the carelessness of his counsel in failing to call the attention of the trial court to palpable error which offends against the fundamentals of a fair and impartial trial.” Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 312 Pa. 543, 168 A. 244, 245 (1933); Commonwealth v. Wadley, 169 Pa.Super. 490, 83 A.2d 417,419 (1951). Defendant had the right to the assistance of counsel during the interrogation. This was a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. “The Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] guarantee of the assistance of counsel requires that counsel be present at all ‘critical stages’ of a criminal proceeding.” State v. Myers, 88 N.M. 16, 25, 536 P.2d 280, 289 (Ct.App.1975) (Sutin, J., dissenting); State v. Sanchez, 85 N.M. 368, 512 P.2d 696 (Ct.App.1973). The confession taken by the sheriff, in the absence of a public defender, violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. The confession was inadmissible in evidence. My brethren, in affirming the trial court conviction, have directed the State to pole vault to affirmance without a pole. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” “This is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra [304 U.S. at 462, 58 S.Ct. at 1022,82 L.Ed. at 1465]. Section 41-22A-10(B), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1975 Supp.) provides that: The representation shall begin not later than the time of the initial appearance of the person before any court and shall continue throughout all stages of the proceedings against him . Under this provision, the attorney-client relationship commenced for the defense in response to the Sixth Amendment, when defendant initially appeared before the magistrate and an order was entered directing the appointment of counsel. Rascón, supra. The majority opinion blindfolds itself to this constitutional question because it was not raised in the court below, nor briefed and supported by authority on appeal. In my opinion, the motion to suppress the statements made by defendant to the sheriff was sufficient to call this matter to the attention of the court even though the specific question was imperfectly presented. The motion declared that the statements “were obtained after Defendant had requested the assistance of counsel, which assistance of counsel the Defendant did not intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waive.” We must not say in a capital case that, because of the inadvertence of the trial court, the district attorney, and defendant’s attorney, all of whom overlooked a statute which required the waiver to be “countersigned by a district public defender”, the matter was not raised in the court below. Although it appears that this issue was not specifically presented, defendant’s brief presented by an appellate public defender, did cite authority that in addition to the Miranda warnings, “the right to have counsel present during interrogation must be effectively waived.” [Emphasis added]. United States v. Oliver, 421 F.2d 1034, 1038 (10th Cir. 1970). The majority opinion condones the conduct of the assistant district attorney who directed the sheriff to take the confession of defendant on December 6, 1974 without the presence of appointed counsel. “It is not the primary duty of the district attorney to convict a defendant. It is his primary duty to see that the defendant has a fair trial, that justice is done.” Chacon v. State, 88 N.M. 198, 201, 539 P.2d 218, 221 (Ct.App.1975) (Sutin, J., dissenting); State v. Quintana, 86 N.M. 666, 526 P.2d 808 (Ct.App.1974) (Sutin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ; State v. Chambers, 86 N.M. 383, 524 P.2d 999 (Ct.App.1974); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). This is especially true when an uneducated, Spanish-speaking young man. is charged with first degree murder. In my opinion, fundamental error also occurred. “Fundamental error is error which goes to the foundation of the case, or which takes from a defendant a right essential to his defense. Where it appears and justice requires this court will consider it whether or not exceptions are taken in the court below or whether or not it be assigned as error on appeal.” [Emphasis added]. State v. Sena, 54 N.M. 213, 218, 219 P.2d 287, 289 (1950). “Error that is fundamental must be such error [that takes] . . . from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive. . . . Also, there may be such a case .... which would so shock the conscience of the court as to call for a reversal.” State v. Garcia, 46 N.M. 302, 309, 128 P.2d 459, 462 (1942). “It will never be exercised in and of some strictly legal, technical or unsubstantial claim.” State v. Lott, 73 N.M. 280, 286, 387 P.2d 855, 859 (1963). Defendant was denied “a right essential to his defense” when his confession was taken absent his court-appointed attorney. We have a duty, when life or liberty is at stake, to thoroughly search the record. We must give the defendant the benefit of any obvious and substantial error committed which led to his conviction, even though it was not raised in the court below. Anderson v. State, 8 Okl.Cr. 90, 126 P. 840 (1912). The best statement on errors affecting fundamental rights is stated in 5 Am.Jur,2d, Appeal and Error § 549 (1962). It reads: A reviewing court may consider questions raised for the first time on appeal if necessary to serve the ends of substantial justice or prevent the denial of fundamental rights. This rule is peculiarly applicable in criminal cases and especially in capital cases. So, in a case involving deprivation of life or liberty, the court will notice errors appearing upon the record which deprived the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial, although no exceptions were preserved, or the question is imperfectly presented. [Emphasis added]. A review of authorities shows that courts have noticed matters raised for the first time on appeal and they have reversed where error was not as manifest as it is in this case. State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622 (1961); State v. Cullum, 23 Conn.Sup. 20, 1 Conn.Cir. 120, 176 A.2d 583 (1961); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 302 Ky. 275, 194 S.W.2d 530 (1946); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 366, 182 S.W.2d 948 (1944); State v. Morris, 41 Wyo. 128, 283 P. 406 (1929); State v. Hester, 137 S.C. 145, 134 S.E. 885 (1926); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936). In Edwards, supra, the assistant Commonwealth attorney made an improper oral argument. In ^reversing the conviction, the Court said: It is true that no objection at the time was made to the statement; but, where the defendant’s life is at stake, technical rules of procedure must give way to the more lofty aim that justice may be done. [182 S.W.2d at 952], In Cullum, supra, where defendant failed to properly restate his reasons in a motion to set aside the verdict, the Court said: In the trial of a person charged with the commission of a crime, it is more important to enforce the time-tested safeguards which the law has erected for the protection of the innocent than to distort and subvert them in order to block the escape from punishment of even an apparently guilty person. Such has ever been the policy of this state. [176 A.2d at 586]. Similar quotations, vibrant in tone and resolute in expression, are manifold, even in cases where error did not affect the substantial rights of the accused. See State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948), 16 A.L.R.2d 1317 (1951); Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 180 N.E. 279 (1932), 83 A.L.R. 1349 (1933); State v. Martin, 243 Iowa 1323, 55 N.W.2d 258 (1952), 34 A.L.R.2d 904 (1954) ; Anderson v. State, supra. Without the confession of December 6, 1974, there was no evidence upon which a conviction could be had. The admission of that confession affected the substantial rights of the defendant. It was plain error of a fundamental nature. I find it to be a basic constitutional question which is reviewable as plain error, as well as fundamental error. Rule 103(d) of New Mexico Rules of Evidence [§ 20-4-103(d), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4,1975 Supp.)] reads: (d) PLAIN ERROR. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the judge. [Emphasis added]. Rule 103(d) is part of a rule concerned with evidentiary rulings. State v. Sanchez, 86 N.M. 713, 526 P.2d 1306 (Ct.App.1974). This rule applies to criminal proceedings. Section 20^1 — 1101. “Plain error” means error both obvious and substantial. Sykes v. United States, 373 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1966). It does not require legal acumen to state unequivocally that the admission in evidence of the confession of December 6, 1974, based upon an invalid waiver of the right to counsel, was plain error, obvious and substantial. Plain error apart from evidentiary proceedings supports a reversal. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941) held that a commitment for contempt of court for refusal to comply with an order of a Federal District Court for a physical examination was a plain error of such a fundamental nature that the Supreme Court should notice it, notwithstanding a failure to assign it as error either in the Supreme Court dr the Circuit Court of Appeals. See also, United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910); 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1798, p. 419 (1962). Furthermore, the original confession taken in Spanish was not introduced in evidence. An unsigned, translated copy was presented. Rule 1002 of the Rules of Evidence [§ 20-4-1002, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, 1975 Supp.)] provides: To prove the content of a writing the original writing is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute. Rule 1004 sets forth the exceptions, none of which are applicable. Under the best evidence rule, the unsigned, translated confession of the defendant was not admissible in evidence. Furthermore, the trial court erred in excluding State Police laboratory reports. No argument is necessary. The trial court had territorial jurisdiction. Section 40A-1-15, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6) provides: In the event that death occurs in this state as a result of the criminal action in another state, trial may be had in the county in which the death occurred. There was a miscarriage of justice to permit this conviction to stand. It shocks my conscience. The defendant did not have a fair trial. I repeat what I said in my dissenting opinion in State v. Myers, 88 N.M. 16, 26, 536 P.2d 280, 290 (Ct.App.1975) : A criminal trial is an adversary procedure in which the State, seeking the conviction of an accused, and the accused, fighting for his liberty, engage in combat. Each side should fight with zeal, yet not without respect for the rules that maintain the fairness of the adversary process. The accused must be given the benefit of all procedural safeguards provided by the Constitution, by statutes, and by case law. This is the essence of a fair trial, one in which evenhanded justice is dispensed. A sporting contest is analogous to a lawsuit, in that it is an acceptable form of combat in our society, acceptable because the “rules of the game” maintain fairness between the adversaries. In boxing, the rules do not require that one adversary shall fight with one arm strapped to his back. In tennis, the rules do not require a right handed adversary to use the racquet with his left hand. Similarly, in a criminal trial, defendant, a young, uneducated, Spanish-speaking man, should not be burdened, in a fight for life or liberty, with the inadvertence and error of a trial court, the whims of a district attorney, the absence of an appointed attorney at a critical stage of the proceedings, or the failure of an appointed attorney to properly present a fundamental matter to the court. It is a fundamental principle of justice, independent of the federal or state constitutions, that the defendant have a fair trial.