Court Opinion

ID: 6986527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-24 03:17:15.303376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:09:28.570931
License: Public Domain

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join in the opinion but write separately to underscore that First Amendment protection of political contributions is not absolute. Here, in light of the specific evidence presented and in light of the requirements of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), the state failed to sustain its burden of articulating a compelling interest for the restrictions. This is not to say, however, that such compelling interests do not exist, even in the context of initiative elections. The Supreme Court’s recent treatment of the evi-dentiary burden is instructive:
The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised. Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor implausible.
*1059Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S.Ct. 897, 907, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000). Although Shrink concerned candidate elections, its reasoning on judicial scrutiny of state-asserted compelling interests applies with similar force to campaigns for ballot measures.
Legitimate policy concerns have prompted legislators to address the power of the corporate contributor. I believe that a statute may be carefully crafted and tailored to meet a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, such as where contributions so distort the political process that they undermine our democratic system. But that is a case for another day.