Court Opinion

ID: 9893622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 22:00:46.718613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:39.990998
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
             C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                          ________________________

                               No. ACM 40301
                          ________________________

                            UNITED STATES
                                Appellee
                                      v.
                          Kyle M. KROETZ
             Senior Airman (E-4), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                          ________________________

        Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                         Decided 27 October 2023
                          ________________________

Military Judge: Jason M. Kellhofer.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 4 April 2022 by GCM convened at Joint
Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia. Sentence entered by military judge on
18 May 2022: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 68 months, for-
feiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1.
For Appellant: Major Matthew L. Blyth, USAF.
For Appellee: Major Brittany M. Speirs, USAF; Captain Olivia B. Hoff,
USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before RICHARDSON, CADOTTE, and KEARLEY, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge KEARLEY delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
Judge RICHARDSON and Senior Judge CADOTTE joined.
                            ________________________
    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
    precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                       ________________________
KEARLEY, Judge:
   A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted Appellant, in
accordance with his pleas and pursuant to a plea agreement, of one charge and
one specification of conspiracy to distribute child pornography, one charge and
                    United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

one specification each of wrongful possession and distribution of child pornog-
raphy, and one specification of indecent language, in violation of Articles 81
and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 881, 934.1 The
military judge sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement
for 68 months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the grade
of E-1. The convening authority suspended the adjudged forfeitures of pay and
allowances for six months and waived the automatic forfeitures for a period of
six months.
    Appellant asserts two assignments of error: (1) whether a plea agreement
requiring a dishonorable discharge renders the sentencing procedure an
“empty ritual” and thus violates public policy; and (2) whether Appellant’s sen-
tence is inappropriately severe.2 Additionally, we address an issue discovered
during our review of this case: (3) whether Appellant is entitled to relief when
the plea agreement does not specify agreed-upon limitations for confinement
for each enumerated offense as required by service regulations. We find no er-
ror materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights, and we affirm the
findings and sentence.

                                 I. BACKGROUND
    Appellant’s offenses involved possession of 398 video or digital image files3
of child pornography and participation in private chatrooms where he dis-
cussed, received, and distributed child pornography. He actively participated
in a group chat on a social media application to send and receive child pornog-
raphy, and he conspired with other individuals to distribute child pornography.
He was involved as an administrator in the management of the chatrooms
where he vetted and verified the chatroom users and he provided directions to
set up an autonomous program to screen potential members. Additionally, he
communicated indecent written language to another chatroom user.
   On 1 April 2022, Appellant entered into a plea agreement with the conven-
ing authority in which Appellant agreed that upon acceptance of his guilty
plea, the sentencing authority must enter a sentence including a “mandatory
dishonorable discharge.” The plea agreement stated that if the “mandatory

1 Unless otherwise noted, all references in this opinion to the UCMJ and the Rules for

Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019
ed.).
2 The second assignment of error is raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12

M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).
3 The parties stipulated that 357 of those “were unique, nonduplicate image and video

files.”

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                     United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

punitive separation is found to be invalid, based on relevant rules, law, or case
law, that provision [relating to the dishonorable discharge] shall be severed
from this plea agreement and shall not affect the binding nature and enforce-
ability of the other provisions contained” therein.
    The military judge discussed the plea agreement with Appellant. The mil-
itary judge first referenced the minimum and maximum confinement that may
be adjudged pursuant to the plea agreement.4 Then, the military judge pointed
out that the paragraph regarding the dishonorable discharge “binds the court
with regard to judicial discharge action.” The military judge further high-
lighted that the agreement created a minimum punishment that was not re-
quired by law based on the offenses. Appellant agreed with the military judge’s
assessment of the agreement and confirmed he was satisfied with his military
defense counsel, who also signed the agreement. The military judge did not
specifically address the clause in the plea agreement which referenced what
would happen if the mandatory punitive separation is found to be invalid. Ap-
pellant refers to this clause of the plea agreement as the “severability clause.”

                                  II. DISCUSSION
A. Plea Agreement to Adjudge a Dishonorable Discharge
    Appellant argues the term of the plea agreement requiring a dishonorable
discharge should be severed from the plea agreement in accordance with its
“severability clause” because it is contrary to public policy. Appellant argues
that the “mandatory dishonorable discharge” term “hollowed out the presen-
tencing proceeding and deprived [ ] Appellant of his opportunity to secure a
fair and just sentence.” We disagree and find no relief is warranted.
   1. Law
   We review questions of interpretation of plea agreements de novo, as such
are questions of law. See United States v. Lundy, 63 M.J. 299, 301 (C.A.A.F.
2006) (citation omitted); United States v. Cron, 73 M.J. 718, 729 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 2014) (citing United States v. Acevedo, 50 M.J. 169, 172 (C.A.A.F. 1999)).
The standard is the same in our assessment of whether a plea agreement’s
terms violate the Rules for Courts-Martial.
   The Military Justice Act of 2016, enacted through the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,5 brought several changes to the

4 The plea agreement required a cumulative sentence to confinement for all charges

and specifications to which Appellant pleaded guilty be a minimum of three years and
a maximum of six years. We discuss this issue in Section C, infra.
5 Pub. L. No. 114-328, §§ 5001-5542, 130 Stat. 2943 (23 Dec. 2016).

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                     United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

military justice system. One change included an entirely new article, Article
53a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 853a.6 This article, titled Plea agreements, explains
that an accused and convening authority may enter into an agreement over
various matters, to include “limitations on the sentence that may be adjudged
for one or more charges and specifications.” Article 53a(a)(1)(B), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 853a(a)(1)(B).
    The President implemented Article 53a, UCMJ, in Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 705, also titled Plea agreements. Plea agreements may include prom-
ises by convening authorities to limit the sentence which may be adjudged.
R.C.M. 705(b)(2)(E). These may include a limitation on the maximum punish-
ment which may be imposed, a limitation on the minimum punishment which
may be imposed, or both. R.C.M. 705(d)(1).7 An accused or the Government
may propose, or a convening authority may counteroffer, any term or condition
not prohibited by law or public policy. R.C.M. 705(e)(1), 705(e)(3)(A).
    “Subject to such limitations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe, an
accused and the convening authority may enter into a plea agreement in ac-
cordance with this rule.” R.C.M. 705(a). The parties can agree to a limit on the
maximum and minimum amount of punishment that can be adjudged by the
court-martial. See R.C.M. 705(d)(1). The Secretary of the Air Force prescribed
limitations on plea agreement terms in a duly published Department of the Air
Force instruction, prohibiting any plea agreement which “includes an exact
agreed[-]upon term of confinement (e.g., no more than one year confinement
and no less than one year confinement) . . . .” Department of the Air Force
Instruction (DAFI) 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, ¶ 12.9.2.2 (18
Jan. 2019, as amended by AFGM 2021-02, 15 Apr. 2021); see also Department
of the Air Force Policy Directive 51-2, Military Justice and Other Criminal Pro-
ceedings, ¶ 2.15 (21 Jun. 2021) (where convening authority and accused will
not enter a plea agreement for specific agreed-upon term of confinement).8

6 Prior to the creation of this article, the UCMJ did not contain any provisions related

to such agreements. Rather, the Manual for Courts-Martial’s guidance on pretrial
agreements was found solely in the Rules for Courts-Martial. See R.C.M. 705, Pretrial
agreements, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.).
7 R.C.M. 705(d)(2) addresses plea agreement limitations on confinement and fines,

while R.C.M. 705(d)(3) explains that a plea agreement “may include a limitation as to
other authorized punishments as set forth in R.C.M. 1003.” R.C.M. 1003(b)(8), in turn,
discusses punitive separations which may be adjudged by a court-martial.
8 This was the applicable paragraph that was in effect when Appellant signed the plea

agreement. It has since been changed and it is likely to be changed in the future. See
DAFI 51-201, ¶ 17.6.2 (14 Apr. 22).

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                    United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

   “If a plea agreement exists, the military judge shall require disclosure of
the entire agreement before the plea is accepted.” R.C.M. 910(f)(3). “If a plea
agreement contains limitations on the punishment that may be imposed, the
court-martial . . . shall sentence the accused in accordance with the agree-
ment.” R.C.M. 910(f)(5).
   “To ensure that the record reflects the accused understands the pretrial
agreement [or plea agreement] and that both the Government and the accused
agree to its terms, the military judge must ascertain the understanding of each
party during the inquiry into the providence of the plea.” Cron, 73 M.J. at 729
(quoting United States v. Smith, 56 M.J. 271, 272–73 (C.A.A.F. 2002)).
    A military judge must reject any plea agreement which “is prohibited by
law” or “is contrary to, or is inconsistent with, a regulation prescribed by the
President with respect to terms, conditions, or other aspects of plea agree-
ments.” Articles 53a(b)(4) and 53a(b)(5), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 853a(b)(4), (5).
“To the extent that a term in a pretrial agreement violates public policy, it will
be stricken from the pretrial agreement and not enforced.” United States v.
Edwards, 58 M.J. 49, 52 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citing R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B)9) (addi-
tional citation omitted).
      “In sentencing an accused under [Article 53, UCMJ], a court-martial shall
impose punishment that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to pro-
mote justice and to maintain good order and discipline in the armed forces
. . . .” Article 56(c)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856(c)(1). Pretrial agreements or plea
agreements which have the effect of transforming sentencing proceedings into
“an empty ritual” are impermissible. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 50 M.J.
426, 429 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting United States v. Allen, 25 C.M.R. 8, 11
(C.M.A. 1957)) (describing this premise as a “fundamental principle” in mili-
tary jurisprudence). “A term or condition in a plea agreement shall not be en-
forced if it deprives the accused of . . . the right to complete presentencing pro-
ceedings” and “the complete and effective exercise of post-trial and appellate
rights.” R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B).
    “A [pretrial agreement] creates a constitutional contract between the ac-
cused and the convening authority wherein the accused agrees to waive consti-
tutional rights in exchange for a benefit.” Cron, 73 M.J. at 729 (citation omit-
ted). “However, due process concerns outweigh the contract principles as ‘the
[G]overnment is bound to keep its constitutional promises.’” Id. (citation omit-
ted). “To that end, a provision that denies the accused a fair hearing or other-
wise ‘substitutes the agreement for the trial, [thereby] render[ing it] an empty
ritual’ violates public policy.” Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).

9 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2000 ed.).

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                   United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

“It is the military judge’s responsibility to police the terms of pretrial agree-
ments to insure [sic] compliance with statutory and decisional law as well as
adherence to basic notions of fundamental fairness.” Id. (quoting United States
v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115, 120 (C.A.A.F. 2013)).
    “This court has adopted the principle that terms in a [pretrial agreement]
are contrary to public policy if they ‘interfere with court-martial fact-finding,
sentencing, or review functions or undermine public confidence in the integrity
and fairness of the disciplinary process.’” United States v. Hoard, No. ACM
S32424, 2018 CCA LEXIS 49, at *8 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 31 Jan. 2018) (unpub.
op.) (quoting United States v. Raynor, 66 M.J. 693, 697 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2008)).
    This court has found that a “plea agreement provision requiring a military
judge or court members to sentence [an a]ppellant to a bad-conduct discharge”
did not violate the United States Constitution, UCMJ, or public policy. United
States v. Geier, No. ACM S32679 (f rev), 2022 CCA LEXIS 468, at *13 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 2 Aug. 2022) (unpub. op.), rev denied, 83 M.J. 86 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
   2. Analysis
   The question for our determination is whether Appellant’s plea agreement
provision requiring a minimum sentence requirement of a dishonorable dis-
charge was prohibited by law or prohibited by public policy. We determine it
was not.
       a. Prohibited by Law
    We begin by determining whether a plea agreement clause requiring a dis-
honorable discharge is prohibited by law. As a result of the Military Justice
Act of 2016, plea agreements may now include provisions to limit the sentence
which may be adjudged to include a maximum and a minimum punishment
which may be imposed, or both. R.C.M. 705(d)(1). Both the convening authority
and Appellant agreed to a minimum punishment that included a dishonorable
discharge. This agreement is now permissible pursuant to R.C.M. 705(d)(1).
   Therefore, Appellant’s plea agreement provision requiring a minimum sen-
tence requirement of a dishonorable discharge is not prohibited by law; in-
stead, it is a permitted term allowed by R.C.M. 705(d)(1).
       b. Prohibited by Public Policy
    Despite it being permissible under the new R.C.M. 705 to have a limitation
on the minimum punishment in a plea agreement, Appellant claims that his
plea agreement mandating a dishonorable discharge “hollowed out” the
presentencing proceeding and deprived him of his opportunity to secure a fair
and just sentence and was therefore against public policy. Appellant raises his
claims by addressing legislative intent and sentence authority discretion and

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                   United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

directs the court’s attention to our sister service’s opinion in United States v.
Libecap, 57 M.J. 611 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2002).
           i) Sentence minimums in plea agreements
    Appellant first argues Congress chose not to make the offenses of which
Appellant was convicted carry a “mandatory dishonorable discharge,” there-
fore the plea agreement to a dishonorable discharge violates public policy. See
Article 56(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856(b) (setting forth offenses which carry sen-
tence minimums). Appellant argues “statutes codified by the legislature and
rules enacted pursuant to those laws by the executive are public policy.” There-
fore, Appellant claims public policy dictates plea agreements may not mandate
a dishonorable discharge for non-listed offenses.
    As the military judge pointed out in his discussion with Appellant, the plea
agreement clause requiring a dishonorable discharge adds a minimum sen-
tence when one does not exist under the law. The military judge ensured Ap-
pellant realized he would be accepting a sentence term not required by law.
While additional changes to the Military Justice Act of 2016 included minimum
sentences for certain offenses, we reject Appellant’s suggestion that because no
minimum sentence exists for Appellant’s offenses under law, it is impermissi-
ble to have a minimum sentence in a plea agreement. We are not convinced
Congress intended to limit plea agreements for offenses they did not list as
having mandatory minimums.
    Appellant and the convening authority had more flexibility in plea agree-
ment terms than they would have if Congress had prescribed a sentence mini-
mum for Appellant’s offenses. Appellant and the convening authority agreed
to minimum and maximum sentence terms based on the facts, circumstances,
and offenses in Appellant’s case. The sentencing authority was aware of and
bound by those terms, yet still had a range of sentencing elements to choose
from before deciding on a final sentence.
    R.C.M. 705(a) states, “Subject to the limitations as the Secretary concerned
may proscribe, an accused and the convening authority may enter into a plea
agreement in accordance with this rule.” The Secretary of the Air Force pro-
vided a specific prohibition on plea agreements involving an exact term of con-
finement. See DAFI 51-201, ¶ 12.9.2.2. Notably, there is no prohibition on
agreeing to a particular punitive discharge, and we do not find that public pol-
icy prohibited doing so in this case.
           ii) Sentencing authority’s discretion
    To further his public policy argument, Appellant asks this court to find that
the dishonorable discharge clause violates public policy because it “prevents
the sentencing authority from adjudging—in its sole discretion—a punishment
that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” and therefore is inconsistent

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                     United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

with the mandate of Article 56(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856(c)(1). (Second em-
phasis added). Appellant’s argument implies that no minimum sentence could
be agreed to in a plea agreement, because doing so would take away the sen-
tencing authority’s sole discretion to determine what is both sufficient and nec-
essary.
    First, we find no “sole discretion” requirement written into Article 56(c),
UCMJ. Any plea agreement with a limitation on sentence by its nature re-
moves some of the sentencing authority’s discretion. While the sentencing au-
thority’s minimum and maximum sentence options were limited by the plea
agreement—instead of limited solely by statute and executive order—the mil-
itary judge still had “sole discretion” to determine what punishment is suffi-
cient and necessary considering the nature and the circumstances of the of-
fense, the impact of the offense, and the need for the sentence to accomplish
other requirements in Article 56, UCMJ.10
   Next, our military justice system is evolving, and new sentencing proceed-
ings are different from previous practice. Rule for Courts-Martial 705(d)(1) was
re-written to allow, in part, plea agreements to contain minimum punish-
ments, along with maximum punishments. “The fact that military justice
evolves is not . . . against public policy.” United States v. Rivero, 82 M.J. 629,
635 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2022) (finding that appellant’s plea agreement pun-
ishment limitations did not render sentencing proceedings meaningless, and
therefore did not violate public policy), rev. denied, 83 M.J. 35 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
Appellant exercised a relatively new option to agree to a minimum sentence in
exchange for other terms in the plea agreement. Appellant was free to not sign
the plea agreement. Appellant and the convening authority were also free to
agree to other factors such as stipulated facts and pleas to various offenses.
Even having signed the agreement, Appellant was able to inform the sentenc-
ing authority’s decision-making. The sentencing proceeding provided Appel-
lant an opportunity to put forward evidence in mitigation and extenuation, call
witnesses, and provide argument, including whether any sentence component
was appropriate. Additionally, the military judge still had latitude with other

10 Article 56(c)(1)(C), UCMJ, indicates:

        a court-martial shall impose punishment . . . taking into consideration
        the need for the sentence—(i) to reflect on the seriousness of the of-
        fense; (ii) to promote respect for the law; (iii) to provide just punish-
        ment for the offense; (iv) to promote adequate deterrence of miscon-
        duct; (v) to protect others from further crimes by the accused; (vi) to
        rehabilitate the accused; and (vii) to provide, in appropriate cases, the
        opportunity for retraining and return to duty to meet the needs of the
        service.
10 U.S.C. § 856(c)(1)(C).

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                   United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

punishment options, to include the term of confinement between three and six
years.
    Given all the options still available to Appellant and the sentencing author-
ity, the plea agreement in this case did not preclude the sentencing authority’s
ability to determine a sentence that is sufficient and necessary, but not greater
than necessary, to promote justice and to maintain good order and discipline
in the armed forces, taking into consideration other aspects of Article 56,
UCMJ.
    Our conclusion is not novel. In Geier, this court found a plea agreement
provision requiring the military judge to adjudge a bad-conduct discharge did
not violate the appellant’s constitutional or other rights. Geier, unpub. op. at
*13; see also United States v. Walker, No. ACM S32737, 2023 CCA LEXIS 355,
at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 21 Aug. 2023) (unpub. op.) (finding no error in a plea
agreement term requiring the military judge to adjudge a bad-conduct dis-
charge).
           iii) United States v. Libecap
    Appellant points to United States v. Libecap to show how the United States
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (CGCCA) rejected a provision of a pre-
trial agreement where an appellant agreed to request the military judge im-
pose a bad-conduct discharge. Appellant asks us to apply the CGCCA’s analy-
sis to Appellant’s case. Libecap is not binding on this court; nonetheless, we
will address Appellant’s arguments.
    The court in Libecap expressed concerns that a requirement in the pretrial
agreement that the accused must request a bad-conduct discharge would “cre-
ate the impression, if not the reality, of a proceeding that was little more than
an empty ritual . . . with respect to whether a punitive discharge should be
imposed.” 57 M.J. at 616 (emphasis added).
    Appellant argues that Libecap provides helpful insight because the CGCCA
found the request for a punitive discharge offended due process by curtailing
complete presentencing proceedings. We do not apply the reasoning in Libecap
to this case for several reasons. First, Libecap was decided before the President
issued an executive order which, in part, changed R.C.M. 705(d)(1), allowing
agreements for minimum sentences and requiring full disclosure of any sen-
tence limitations prior to the sentencing authority’s determination of a sen-
tence. See Executive Order 13,825, Annex 2, § 2, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889, 9966–9967
(1 Mar. 2018). Therefore, the complete sentencing proceeding envisioned in Li-
becap, where the military judge was not aware of the sentence limitations until
after sentence was announced, would be different than a complete sentencing
proceeding today.

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                     United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

    Additionally, the court in Libecap determined that the appellant’s request
for a bad-conduct discharge undercut any other efforts at trial to argue a puni-
tive discharge was undeserved. 57 M.J. at 615. The court further determined
that R.C.M. 705(c)(1)—as it read at that time—prohibited the provision of the
pretrial agreement requesting the bad-conduct discharge, because in CGCCA’s
view, it negated the value of putting on a defense sentencing case, which de-
prived the accused of a complete sentencing proceeding. Id. at 616.
    In addition to being non-binding on this court, Libecap is not particularly
helpful given the issue was a “request” for a particular sentence component.
We can distinguish a request for a punitive discharge, as described in Libecap,
from Appellant’s agreement to a punitive discharge. The former meant that
defense counsel would not be able to argue forcefully for a sentence that did
not include a punitive discharge. Id. at 617. Affirmatively requesting a puni-
tive discharge may give the impression that the defense counsel and the ac-
cused agreed the accused deserved a punitive discharge and that it was mer-
ited by the facts and circumstances of the offense. In contrast, here agreeing to
a punitive discharge does not require an expression or argument of outward
support for that punishment; it merely establishes Appellant is willing to ac-
cept the specified punishment in return for a favorable aspect of the plea agree-
ment.11
    In conclusion, Appellant’s plea agreement term regarding a dishonorable
discharge was not prohibited by law or public policy. It did not deprive Appel-
lant of his opportunity to secure a fair and just sentence, nor did it render the
sentencing proceeding an “empty ritual.” Therefore, no relief is warranted.
B. Sentence Appropriateness
    Appellant contends his sentence is inappropriately severe. He claims the
military judge’s experience in federal courts led to his sentence to confinement
being more like those in civilian courts and out of line with other sentences in
military cases. Appellant points out that under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) and
(b)(1), the sentencing range for distribution of child pornography is 5 to 20
years. Appellant also claims that the sentence was inappropriately severe
based on the offender and the offenses. We do not find Appellant’s sentence to
be inappropriately severe.

11 Although not cited by Appellant, we also considered United States v. Soto, 69 M.J.

304 (C.A.A.F. 2011), on this issue. For the reasons set forth in our analysis of Libecap,
we similarly conclude that the CAAF's decision in Soto does not foreclose the propriety
of a mutually agreed upon plea agreement term imposing a punitive discharge as a
component of the adjudged sentence.

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                   United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

   1. Additional Background
     In accordance with his plea agreement, Appellant was sentenced by a mil-
itary judge. The military judge was a reserve member of the United States Air
Force, who worked as a civilian at the United States Attorney’s Office for the
Eastern District of North Carolina. During voir dire, trial defense counsel
questioned the military judge about his role as an Assistant United States At-
torney. The military judge described his role as a criminal deputy chief in the
national security section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office where he worked. He said
that child pornography cases are not the mission of his section, but if other
sections are overburdened, their cases, to include child pornography cases, may
fall to attorneys he oversees in the national security section. When trial defense
counsel asked the military judge if he had any concerns that he would give
more deference to the Government’s argument than he would to the Defense’s
argument in this case, the military judge replied “no.”
    Trial defense counsel went on to question the military judge about the fed-
eral sentencing guidelines for federal cases, and asked if his knowledge and in-
depth use and interaction with such guidelines would play any role in his de-
termination of an appropriate sentence in this case. The military judge replied
that the federal sentencing guidelines were “inapplicable.” Further voir dire by
the trial defense counsel confirmed that the military judge would be able to
separate his role as a prosecutor in his civilian job from his role as an unbiased
fact finder in the military proceeding. At the end of this questioning, neither
party challenged the military judge despite being provided the opportunity.
   2. Law
    We review issues of sentence appropriateness de novo. United States v.
Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270,
272 (C.M.A. 1990)). Our authority to determine sentence appropriateness “re-
flects the unique history and attributes of the military justice system, [and]
includes but is not limited to considerations of uniformity and evenhandedness
of sentencing decisions.” United States v. Sothen, 54 M.J. 294, 296 (C.A.A.F.
2001) (citations omitted). We may affirm only as much of the sentence as we
find correct in law and fact and determine should be approved on the basis of
the entire record. Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d). “We assess sentence
appropriateness by considering the particular appellant, the nature and seri-
ousness of the offense[s], the appellant’s record of service, and all matters con-
tained in the record of trial.” United States v. Anderson, 67 M.J. 703, 705 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Although we have great
discretion to determine whether a sentence is appropriate, we have no power
to grant mercy. United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (cita-
tion omitted).

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                   United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

   Military judges are presumed to know the law and to follow it absent clear
evidence to the contrary. United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 225 (C.A.A.F.
2007) (citing United States v. Mason, 45 M.J. 483, 484 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).
   3. Analysis
    Appellant has not identified any evidence to support his argument that the
military judge improperly allowed his experience as a federal prosecutor and
familiarity with federal sentencing guidelines to impact his determination of
the sentence. To the contrary, while he was questioned by trial defense counsel
during voir dire, the military judge specifically stated that the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines did not apply to Appellant’s case.
    Military judges are presumed to know the law and to follow it absent clear
evidence to the contrary. Mason, 45 M.J. at 484. We presume that the military
judge would not improperly apply federal sentencing guidelines when deter-
mining Appellant’s sentence in a military court-martial. Appellant claims that
his adjudged sentence of 68 months of confinement appears to include applica-
tion of the federal sentencing guidelines for his offenses, since the federal sen-
tencing guidelines range from 5–20 years of confinement. While Appellant’s
sentence to confinement may also be within that range, it is within the terms
of the plea agreement, which included a minimum term of confinement of three
years and a maximum of six years. The military judge ordered a total term of
confinement of 68 months, which is four months under six years. We are not
convinced the military judge improperly allowed his experience as a federal
prosecutor to impact his determination of a sentence.
    Furthermore, we do not find Appellant’s sentence to be inappropriately se-
vere given Appellant’s involvement in actively managing the private cha-
trooms for members to discuss and share child pornography. He not only pos-
sessed and distributed child pornography, he also actively engaged in and at
times led implementation of some of the administrative tasks associated with
the chatrooms. Considering Appellant, his record of service, his personal cir-
cumstances, and the record of trial, we conclude Appellant’s sentence to a dis-
honorable discharge, 68 months’ confinement, total forfeiture of pay and allow-
ances, and reduction to the grade of E-1 is appropriate.
C. Confinement Limits for Enumerated Offenses
    In our review, this court noticed that Appellant’s plea agreement did not
specify agreed-upon limitations for confinement “for each enumerated offense,”
as required by DAFI 51-201, ¶ 12.9.2.3, and incorporated by R.C.M. 705(a).
While not raised by Appellant, this court recognizes that the military judge
should have rejected this plea agreement for failing to specify agreed limita-
tions for confinement for each offense to which Appellant intended to plead
guilty.

                                       12
                    United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

   1. Additional Facts
   Appellant’s plea agreement stated, “I offer to . . . [a]gree to be sentenced by
the military judge” alone. It further states,
       In exchange for my plea of guilty to the aforementioned charges
       and specifications, I agree . . . [to] a cumulative sentence [which]
       will include a minimum of 3 years of confinement and a maxi-
       mum of 6 years of confinement . . . .
The minimum and maximum terms of confinement for each offense were not
addressed in the plea agreement.
   The military judge announced the sentence to confinement as follows:
       As to the Specification of Charge I: 68 months;
       Specification 1 of Charge II: 24 months;
       Specification 2 of Charge II: 64 months;
       Specification 3 of Charge II: 3 months.
       All adjudged terms of confinement shall run concurrently to one
       another thus resulting in a total term of confinement of 68
       months.
   2. Law
   “Subject to such limitations as the Secretary concerned may proscribe, an
accused and the convening authority may enter into a plea agreement in ac-
cordance with this rule.” R.C.M. 705(a).
   “Military judges adjudge confinement, if any, and fines, if any, for each
enumerated offense of which the accused is found guilty.” DAFI 51-201,
¶ 12.9.2.3 (citing R.C.M. 1002(d)(2)). “A plea agreement that requires sentenc-
ing by a military judge and includes sentencing limitations must specify any
agreed-upon limitations regarding confinement and/or fines with each enumer-
ated offense, if any.” Id.
    We review questions of interpretation of plea agreements de novo, as such
are questions of law. See Hunter, 65 M.J. at 401. “When interpreting pretrial
agreements, we consider basic principles of contract law, however contract
principles are outweighed by the Constitution’s Due Process Clause[12] protec-
tions for an accused.” United States v. Brown, No. ACM 34037, 2002 CCA
LEXIS 15, at *4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 10 Jan. 2002) (unpub. op.) (citing Acevedo,
50 M.J. at 172).

12 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

                                       13
                     United States v. Kroetz, No. ACM 40301

   3. Analysis
    Since Appellant’s plea agreement required sentencing by military judge
alone, it should have specified agreed-upon limitations for confinement for
each offense, pursuant to DAFI 51-201, ¶ 12.9.2.3. It did not. The requirements
pertaining to plea agreements listed in DAFI 51-201 are the limitations pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the United States Air Force pursuant to R.C.M.
705(a) and, therefore, must be followed. While Appellant’s agreement specified
a minimum term of confinement and a maximum term of confinement, it ran
afoul of the limitation prescribed by the service Secretary and should have been
rejected in its current form at the court-martial.
    Appellant and the convening authority both signed the plea agreement
without agreed limitations for confinement for each offense. While considering
basic principles of contract law, it seemed all parties understood the plea agree-
ment when they signed it, and the trial proceedings were sufficient to make
sure there was no misunderstanding about the effect of the agreement. The
military judge properly sentenced Appellant in accordance with his responsi-
bility under DAFI 51-201, ¶ 12.9.2.3, by adjudging confinement for each “enu-
merated” offense of which Appellant was found guilty and staying within the
range of minimums and maximums for the sentence to confinement. Given that
Appellant did not raise this issue at trial, nor on appeal, and this court does
not find any material prejudice to Appellant’s substantial rights, we find no
relief is warranted.13

                                 III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the Appellant occurred.
Articles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the
findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                      FOR THE COURT

                      CAROL K. JOYCE
                      Clerk of the Court

13 Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a).

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