Court Opinion

ID: 9464404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:32:00.19416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:36.120603
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
concurring in the result:
This case raises the troubling question of how much evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of constructive possession when illicit drugs are found.in a common area of a residence shared by two or more people. Although I find that this Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 562 F.2d 681 (1977), forces us to affirm Herron’s conviction,1 I believe the question warrants further discussion.
*519At the end of the government’s case in chief, Herron moved for acquittal, arguing that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case. In considering his claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion, we are allowed to consider only that evidence presented by the government up to that point in the trial. As the majority opinion details, that evidence showed that both Herron and Watson lived in, or at least frequented, the apartment. Heroin was found lying in the open on a dining room table. It was packaged as if for sale, in small foil packets approximately 1 inch by Vi inch, and arranged in neat rows near $150-$200 in cash and other items on the table. Additional quantities of heroin, not essential to support his conviction, were found concealed in a bag behind the kitchen stove. An “amber-colored vial containing a leafy green vegetable material”2 — later determined to be marijuana dusted with phen-cyclidine — was found atop the kitchen refrigerator. No fingerprints were taken of any of these drugs or their containers.3
Assuming that the law were a clean slate, several approaches would be open to one working with this evidence alone. First, one could hold all regular occupants of the apartment liable for possession of the drugs whether present or absent at the moment of the search. Second, one could hold liable only those found in the apartment at the time of the search. Third, one could hold none liable without additional evidence. Which of these three approaches one followed would depend on the elements of the crime (determined by its common law or statutory definition) and permissible factual assumptions about probable human behavior (that is, what inferences the law should permit a jury to draw solely from a defendant s presence in a shared apartment where plainly visible containers holding illicit drugs are found in an area accessible to all residents 4).
The elements of the crime of possession are supposedly settled. The District of Columbia statute governing simple possession reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to . possess [or] have under his control . . . any narcotic drug . . .
33 D.C. Code § 402(a). The statute has been construed to require knowing possession. United States v. Weaver, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 3, 458 F.2d 825 (1972). Similarly, the federal statute for possession with intent to distribute reads:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to . possess with intent to . distribute ... a controlled substance .
21 U.S.C. § 841. The indictment on both counts charged Herron with “knowingly and intentionally” possessing the drugs found in his apartment. “Knowing possession” requires (1) knowledge that one possesses certain items and (2) knowledge as to what those items actually are. Cf. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
In case of constructive possession, additional proof of scienter is necessary to show the fact of possession itself apart from the knowledge underlying “knowing” possession. To paraphrase the standard jury instructions for the District of Columbia,
Constructive possession requires that a defendant know how to get at the narcotics (either directly or through an agent). *520Without such knowledge, the necessary “power” to exercise dominion and control is lacking. However, “mere presence in the vicinity of a narcotic drug, or mere knowledge of its physical location ” is not sufficient as a matter of law to establish constructive possession. Even though someone has the “power” to exercise dominion and control over an object, he is not in constructive possession unless he also has the “intention” to do so.
United States v. Davis, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 175, 562 F.2d at 694 (Bazelon, C. J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Thus, constructive possession supposedly requires proof that the defendant have (1) knowledge of where the items are located and how to get at them, (2) knowledge of what the items actually are (that is, that they are drugs and not something else), and (3) intent to exercise dominion and control over them. Does the evidence in this case show the presence of all these mental elements?
Inferring knowledge and intent beyond a reasonable doubt solely from a defendant’s presence in a shared apartment where drugs are found in “plain view” would require that one make the following factual assumptions: Because the drugs are conspicuous, the defendant is very probably aware of their presence. Given the disapproval and danger that attach to possession of drugs, the defendant is very probably at least a co-venturer because he tolerates their presence and because his roommate (if the drugs are his) trusts him alone in the apartment with these openly visible items.
That these assumptions are highly questionable should be manifest. How probable is it that the defendant here actually knew what was inside the small foil packets lying on the table with other items, or knew that the “leafy green vegetable material” in the jar on the refrigerator was not oregano or tea? And even if he knew that the foil packets and jar contained illicit drugs how probable is it that he intended to exercise control over them, rather than merely believing them to be his roommate’s property and none of his own business? Perhaps judges would waste no time in removing the drugs or themselves from the premises, but can a culpable mind be inferred from the failure of a person of a different background and outlook to do the same? 5
Still more troubling would be the attribution of knowledge and intent to those residents of an apartment who were absent when a search occurred. How probable is it that they even saw the items lying on the table or refrigerator, this assumed observation being the premise on which all the other assumptions and inferences rest? Similarly, the inference of knowledge and intent would be extremely tenuous for all the occupants, absent or present, if the drugs were concealed, even if in a place accessible to all. In each case, the question is whether a reasonable person could find knowledge and intent beyond a reasonable doubt from this evidence alone.
Some relaxation of the scienter proof requirement might be reasonable. For example, the law might permit the presumption that a person generally knows the actual nature of objects in his possession. In the present case, this would mean that the jury would be allowed to assume that Herron knew the contents of the foil packets on the table and the jar on the refrigerator even though there was no evidence that he was familiar with foil packaging of heroin or the appearance of marijuana — provided these items were found to be in his possession.
What disturbs me far more is the relaxation of scienter in proving possession itself in cases of constructive possession. “Knowledge of how to get at drugs” can be inferred if they are in plain view, as they were here.6 But that still leaves the re*521quirement of “intention to exercise dominion and control.” If we overlook this requirement — that is, if we permit juries to convict without sufficient proof of this element — we will have moved to a standard of strict liability, so that everyone living in a residence, regardless of his actual knowledge or intent, will be deemed in possession of drugs found in a place accessible to all. In effect, this would mean that every person who shares an apartment would be obligated to discover and separate himself from a roommate who illegally possesses drugs. I suppose the justification for such a standard of strict liability would rest on a determination that the good to be achieved generally outweighs the unfairness of penalizing some persons lacking culpable intent:
In the interest of the larger good [a standard of strict liability] puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger. .
Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting.7
their presence or knew how to get at them. Here, the drugs were in the open, giving more room for a contrary inference.
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281, 284, 64 S.Ct. 134, 136, 138, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943).
However, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), strict liability in the criminal law has generally been restricted to “regulatory” offenses where (1) “[t]he accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities” and (2) the “penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.” Id. at 256, 72 S.Ct. at 246. The Supreme Court has not “undertaken to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and crimes that do not,” but the Court has indicated its misgivings about stripping “the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose” in order to “ease the prosecution’s path to conviction.” Id. at 260, 263, 72 S.Ct. at 249. As I argued in *522Davis, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 176-177, 562 F.2d at 695-696:
If the Government is unable to pinpoint which cotenant is responsible for the presence of the drugs, it cannot sustain the charge against any of them, even though at least one is almost certainly guilty. But the alternative is conviction of the innocent with the guilty — something which has always been abhorrent to our legal traditions: “It is better that ten escape than that one innocent person suffer.” Even where narcotics offenses or other crimes arousing great public outrage are involved, condemning the innocent is an intolerable price for letting none of the guilty escape.
(footnote omitted).
In cases of constructive possession, I do not think that requiring proof of intent places an impossible burden on the government. In the present case, for example, the DEA agents could easily have checked the foil packets and other items for appellant’s fingerprints. If it had been shown that he handled the drugs, there would have been a much sounder basis for inferring that he intended to (and did) exercise control over them. Other kinds of circumstantial evidence of intent will often be available to substantiate a particular roommate’s guilt.8
Unfortunately, these questions have already been answered — at least implicitly— by a panel of this court in Davis. By finding the exceedingly scant evidence there sufficient to establish a prima facie case, the court eviscerated the scienter requirements for constructive possession, reducing it to a crime of strict liability at least in the factual situation of that case. This case, though slightly different in its facts, is not distinguishable. Here, the drugs were in the open, not concealed as in Davis. Whereas in Davis two of the three roommates were found at home when the search occurred, here only Herron was found in the apartment, raising at least the inference that whoever controlled the drugs trusted him there alone. In light of Davis, I am compelled to concur in affirming this conviction.

. In Davis the appellant was convicted along with his two roommates of (1) simple possession of hashish, (2) possession with intent to distribute LSD, and (3) possession with intent to distribute marijuana. I dissented from affirming the two distribution counts because the LSD and the marijuana were concealed and no evidence indicated which of the three roommates was responsible for these drugs. I concurred in affirming the possession count because the appellant was found next to the plainly visible hashish, various smoking apparatus lay around the room along with other evidence of frequent use, and appellant admitted using drugs there.

. This is how the drug appeared to one of the DEA agents involved in the search. Tr. 63.

. Tr. 37, 42.

. Other factual patterns may present different questions and support different inferences. Among the relevant variables are:
(1) whether the defendant and/or anyone else is found in the apartment at the time of the search;
(2) the frequency with which the defendant occupies or visits the apartment;
(3) the number of people with access to the place where the drugs are found;
(4) whether the drugs are found in plain view or are concealed (this factor includes their packaging or container);
(5) other evidence establishing a particular person’s nexus with the drugs, such as fingerprints, controlled buys, drug paraphernalia, etc.

. The young and other social groups may be sufficiently tolerant of drug use to invalidate the inference that continued proximity to drugs or frequent association with drug users implies participation. See United States v. Davis, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 177, 562 F.2d at 696 n. 10 (Bazelon, C. J., dissenting).

. I dissented in Davis largely because the drugs found there were concealed, thus undercutting the probability that the defendant was aware of

. In at least two instances, the “hardship” might become unconstitutionally acute. If the defendant did not stand in sufficiently close “relation to a public danger” to do anything about it, it might be a violation of due process to hold him liable under any theory. A casual visitor to an apartment, for example, surely could not be held responsible for failing to discover the presence of concealed drugs. The “hardship” might also become unconstitutionally severe where the charge was possession with intent to distribute, a much more serious crime than simple possession. If an intent to distribute could be inferred merely from the packaging or quantity of drugs discovered, with no greater showing of nexus between the drugs and the defendant than that required for simple possession under a standard of strict liability, an individual could be subjected to harsh penalties simply for his failure to be more vigilant about his roommate’s activities.
To alleviate this potential “hardship,” the law could set different proof (and perhaps scienter) requirements for the two offenses. For example, if simple possession were a crime of strict liability, possession with intent to distribute could be defined to require independent proof that the defendant knew of the drugs and intended to sell them. Knowledge and intent could not be inferred simply from the presence of the drugs in his shared apartment and their being packaged as if for sale.
It should be obvious that these relief-providing solutions are logically flawed. From the packaging of drugs one often can reasonably infer that whoever possesses them intends to sell them; and if we permit the conclusion that X possesses them, it should follow that X possesses them with the intent to distribute. The logical gap occurs at the first step, with the inference of possession. To correct for the possibility of error sanctioned at that stage, we tighten up the chain of inferences and requirements of proof at the second step, with the inference of an intent to distribute by a particular defendant. In doing so, we trade logical consistency for greater fairness with respect to those charged with possession with intent to distribute.
These constitutional questions were not presented to the panel and are not decided in the majority opinion.

. See United States v. Davis, 183 U.S.App.D.C. at 177, 562 F.2d 696 (Bazelon, C. J., dissenting).