Court Opinion

ID: 9463568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:10:05.752436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:10.367930
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge,
with whom TUTTLE and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Judge Tjoflat has explained pointedly and persuasively why collateral estoppel provides the proper conceptual framework for dealing with the problem before the court and why the majority’s approach is wholly misguided. I am pleased to join his thoughtful opinion with two brief reservations.
First, I would emphasize that the rigors that are conditions precedent to application of collateral estoppel generally must be scrupulously observed in this context of state prisoner § 1983 claims. Judgments resting on a plea of guilty raise the most serious concerns. Because very little is “litigated” at the acceptance of a guilty plea, the doctrine must here be most sparingly enforced. See IB Moore’s Federal Practice K 0.418[1], pp. 2707-08 (1974). The appellant’s claim, however, is directed at the voluntariness of the plea itself. Because the state judge was constitutionally obligated to determine on the record that the plea was in fact voluntary and because the record here demonstrates that appellant was interrogated and affirmed the volun-tariness of the plea, giving the judgment collateral estoppel effect on the specific issue of the plea’s voluntariness is not unwarranted. Absent either of these conditions, I see no justification for according collateral estoppel effect to a judgment resting on a guilty plea.
Second, I would note that previous cases applying the doctrine elaborated by Judge Tjoflat have justified enforcement of a collateral estoppel bar in part on the availability of the federal habeas forum for redeter-*346mination of the prisoner’s constitutional claim. See Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5 Cir. 1974). Under the recent Supreme Court decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, however, alleged violations of the fourth amendment may not be redetermined in federal habeas proceedings once fully and fairly litigated in the state courts. Application of the doctrine developed by Judge Tjoflat to such claims would accordingly preclude any federal forum from inquiring into a fourth amendment claim litigated in state criminal proceedings. I simply note that application of collateral estop-pel to claims covered by Stone would raise an additional, troublesome question not involved in the case at bar.