Court Opinion

ID: 9574357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:04:24.717264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:26.660503
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because in my opinion the bail set by the trial court was excessive, as prohibited by both our state and federal constitutions. Moreover, because the defendant in this case was entitled to have bail set as a.matter of statutory right, the granting of excessive bail here was, in effect, a denial of that right.
The majority concludes that the amount of bail assessed reflects the trial court’s concern that the defendant be present at trial. However, the state presented no evidence which would justify the trial court in concluding that the amount of bail set was necessary for that purpose. At the hearing on defendant’s first petition for bond, held before the same trial judge, defendant testified he was a resident of the county, that he had lived all his life there, that he would appear for trial and would assist his attorney in preparing his defense. At the second hearing, defendant’s court-appointed attorney requested that bail be set in a reasonable amount, informed the court that defendant had no savings, that there was no risk of defendant fleeing and that “a high bond would do [nothing] more to ensure his presence than a $5000 to $10,000 bond.” The State offered no evidence concerning the factors enumerated above, but merely requested that the bond be adequate to ensure defendant’s appearance at trial and that the court consider the seriousness of the offenses in determining the amount to *254be assessed. Although the offenses (selling crack cocaine) were serious, the amount involved in each sale was obviously small, based on the amount paid for the drugs by the undercover agents ($20 on each occasion).
Decided December 5, 1990
Rehearing denied December 20, 1990.
Hemmann & Hemmann, Paul E. Hemmann, for appellant.
Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, for appellee.
“There are no hard and fast rules for determining what is reasonable bail and what is excessive bail. The question must be determined according to the circumstances of each case. ‘The gist of the problem confronting a court in setting the amount of bail is to place the amount high enough to reasonably assure the presence of the defendant when it is required, and at the same time to avoid a figure higher than that reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose, and therefore excessive.’ [Cit.]” (Indention omitted.) Jones v. Grimes, 219 Ga. 585, 587 (2) (134 SE2d 790) (1964).
Considering all the circumstances in this case, however, and ever mindful of the discretion of the trial court in cases of this type, I conclude that the bail set was clearly excessive, and therefore would remand this case to the trial court to allow it to fix bail in an amount reasonably required to assure defendant’s presence at trial.
I am authorized to state that Judge Beasley and Judge Cooper join in this dissent.