Court Opinion

ID: 9929448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 18:00:31.846906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:15.166949
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MICHAEL P. DUGAS,                               DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                        PH-0752-18-0104-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: February 1, 2024
            Agency.

               THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Amanda Moreno , Esquire, and Gary Poretsky , Esquire, Houston, Texas,
       for the appellant.

      Scott W. Flood , Esquire, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed his removal.       For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the
case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
Remand Order.
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

                                 BACKGROUND
      The appellant held the position of Welder at the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 28-30. In September 2016, officers
from the Kittery Police Department responded to a domestic disturbance that
occurred while the appellant was off-duty, involving him and his brother. E.g.,
IAF, Tab 6 at 110-12. Generally speaking, witness statements indicate that this
altercation included the appellant firing a gun several times, without hitting
anything of consequence, and his brother striking the appellant’s vehicle with an
ax. Id. Police arrested both. IAF, Tab 6 at 112, Tab 50 at 19. In the days that
followed, the agency barred the appellant from the shipyard and placed him in a
non-duty pay status. IAF, Tab 6 at 107. Several months later, in January 2017,
the appellant resolved the criminal matter by pleading guilty to a single count of
reckless conduct. IAF, Tab 50 at 92-98.
      In July 2017, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal for criminal
conduct unbecoming. IAF, Tab 5 at 135-39. The deciding official sustained the
charge and removed the appellant, effective November 13, 2017. Id. at 28-30.
      The appellant timely challenged his removal by filing the instant appeal.
IAF, Tab 1. In April 2018, the agency informed the administrative judge that it
had discovered an unspecified error and would soon cancel the removal action.
IAF, Tab 13 at 4-5. However, the agency indicated that it would not be returning
him to work, implying that it intended to correct the unspecified error and remove
the appellant again. IAF, Tab 13 at 4-5, Tab 14 at 4.
      Over the following months, the parties worked to reach an agreement about
outstanding matters, but those efforts were unsuccessful. IAF, Tabs 18-19, 24.
The agency then filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as moot. IAF, Tab 25 at 4.
In support of its motion, the agency indicated that it had cancelled the appellant’s
removal, and it provided a sworn declaration regarding back pay. IAF, Tab 27
at 7. The appellant opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that he had not yet
received all the back pay and benefits to which he was entitled. IAF, Tab 28 at 2.
                                                                                  3

      The administrative judge informed the parties of the Board’s standards
regarding mootness and status quo ante, and indicated that the record was not
sufficiently developed on the matter. Id. at 2-4. Consequently, both parties filed
additional arguments and evidence.      IAF, Tabs 29-30.     After reviewing the
parties’ submissions, the administrative judge requested more information, IAF,
Tab 31, and both parties responded once more regarding mootness and status quo
ante relief, IAF, Tabs 32, 35.
      Without any resolution to the dispute over the appellant’s return to status
quo ante, the agency reversed course and filed a motion to proceed to a hearing,
citing the extensive delays that it attributed to the appellant. IAF, Tab 36. The
administrative judge acquiesced. IAF, Tab 37.
      After further developing the record and holding the requested hearing, the
administrative judge issued an initial decision that affirmed the cancelled removal
action. IAF, Tab 61, Initial Decision (ID). The appellant has filed a petition for
review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response.
PFR File, Tab 3.
      On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred by
adjudicating a cancelled removal rather than his return to status quo ante. PFR
File, Tab 1 at 6-7.     In the alternative, the appellant presents a number of
arguments about the merits of the cancelled removal action.      Id. at 7-13. The
agency filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.
      The Clerk of the Board issued an order, instructing the parties to provide
additional information regarding mootness and status quo ante relief from the
cancelled removal action. PFR File, Tab 4. The appellant responded, arguing
that the agency still owed him overtime pay, annual leave hours, compensatory
time, reimbursement for work boots, and a return to duty. PFR File, Tab 5. The
agency disagreed, arguing that the appellant received all the relief to which he
was entitled.   PFR File, Tab 8.     Notably, the agency indicated that it had
continued paying the appellant until March 2020, when the agency effectuated his
                                                                                     4

removal, again, for the same conduct that formed the basis of its cancelled
removal action. Id. at 9-10. That alleged removal is not before us in this appeal.

                DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The administrative judge erred by affirming a cancelled removal action.
      Once again, the agency cancelled the November 2017 removal action, but
the parties could not agree about whether the agency had returned the appellant to
status quo ante. Rather than reaching a conclusion about the disputed matter,
status quo ante relief, the administrative judge adjudicated and affirmed the
cancelled removal action. By doing so, the administrative judge erred.
      In Kitt v. Department of the Navy, 116 M.S.P.R. 680 (2011), the Board
concluded that an agreement to cancel or rescind an adverse action required that
the associated Standard Form 50 (SF-50) be removed from an employee’s Official
Personnel File (OPF). To reach this conclusion, the Board relied on a decision by
the U.S. Court of Federal Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that to
“rescind” a record of an adverse action meant to “destroy it, erasing” it from the
employee’s professional record. Id., ¶ 7 (quoting Conant v. Office of Personnel
Management, 255 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).           The Board also relied on
language from the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Guide for
Processing Personnel Actions, 2 which instructs agencies to remove an SF-50 that
documents a cancelled personnel action from an employee’s OPF.            Id., ¶ 10
(citing Office of Personnel Management, Guide to Processing Personnel Actions,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/
personnel-documentation/#url=Personnel-Actions (last visited Feb. 1, 2024)).

2
  While OPM guides and handbooks lack the force of law, the Board has held that they
are entitled to deference in proportion to their power to persuade. See Warren v.
Department of Transportation, 116 M.S.P.R. 554, ¶ 7 n.2 (2011) (addressing an OPM
retirement handbook), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 105 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Luten v. Office of
Personnel Management, 110 M.S.P.R. 667, ¶ 9 n. 3 (2009) (granting “some deference”
to an OPM retirement Handbook). Here, we find that OPM’s Guide is persuasive for
explaining the consequences of an agency’s decision to rescind or cancel a personnel
action.
                                                                                   5

The Board in Kitt observed that to “cancel” an action meant “to bring [it] to
nothingness,” to “omit” or “to remove” it. Id., ¶ 8 (citing Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 200 (9th ed. 1985)).
      In the chapter of OPM’s guide covering cancellation and replacement
actions, OPM states that “[a] cancellation rescinds an earlier action that was
improper, that was proper but contains references to an improper action, or that
contains remarks that are inappropriate or erroneous and that should not have
been recorded.” Guide to Processing Personnel Actions, Ch. 32.2.b. It identifies
examples of situations where a cancellation is necessary, including where “[a]n
appointing officer determines an action should never have occurred . . . .”      Id.
The guide further states that, “[w]hen a replacement action is required to erase the
effects of a cancelled action,” agencies should “record only the replacement
action, making no reference to the cancelled action.” Id. at Ch. 32.5.c. Finally, it
states that the cancellation SF-50 should not be included in the OPF, and agencies
should “remove from the OPF the personnel action (SF 50) being cancelled, the
related SF 52, and supporting documents . . . destroy[ing] the material removed
from the OPF.” Id. at Ch. 32.5.d.
      In this case, while there remains a dispute about the return to status quo
ante, the agency has consistently acknowledged that it cancelled the appellant’s
removal. To do so, the agency returned him to a pay status, provided substantial
back pay, and purged his OPF of any reference to the November 2017 removal
action. E.g., IAF, Tab 30 at 16, Tab 32 at 7. Based on our interpretation of the
aforementioned authorities, the agency’s actions brought the November 2017
removal action to nothingness, rendering it legally inoperable. Accordingly, we
must vacate the administrative judge’s decision to affirm the cancelled
removal action.
                                                                                        6

The administrative judge must further develop the record and determine whether
the appellant has been returned to status quo ante.
      Although an action may be within the Board’s jurisdiction, subsequent
events may render an appeal moot and foreclose the Board’s review. Rodriguez v.
Department of Homeland Security, 112 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 12 (2009). A case is
moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome of the case.          Hess v. U.S. Postal Service,
124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶ 8 (2016). Mootness can arise at any stage of litigation, and an
appeal will be dismissed as moot if, by virtue of an intervening event, the Board
cannot grant any effectual relief in favor of the appellant.                  Rodriguez,
112 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 12.       However, an agency’s unilateral modification of its
personnel action after an appeal has been filed cannot divest the Board of
jurisdiction, unless the appellant consents to such divestiture or the agency
completely rescinds the action being appealed. 3 Id.
      For a rescission to be complete, the appellant must be returned to the status
quo ante and not left in a worse position as a result of the cancellation than he
would have been in if the matter had been adjudicated and he had prevailed. Id.
Accordingly, if the agency cancelled the appellant’s removal and returned him to
status quo ante, as it alleged, this appeal is moot and the Board is divested of

3
  The Board has routinely held that if an appeal is not truly moot despite cancellation of
the action under appeal, the proper remedy is for the Board to retain jurisdiction and to
adjudicate the appeal on the merits.            E.g., Price v. U.S. Postal Service,
118 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 8 (2012). To the extent that the parties or administrative judge
may have construed this precedent otherwise, we note that the Board retains
jurisdiction, but adjudicates only the live issues that remain. See, e.g., Sabio v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 124 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶¶ 3, 9, 44 (2017) (adjudicating a
discrimination claim, but not the underlying removal, where an agency rescinded the
removal after the appellant filed her appeal); Hess v. U.S. Postal Service,
123 M.S.P.R. 183, ¶¶ 6, 9-10 (2016) (finding that although an agency’s removal action
was rendered moot by its post-appeal rescission, associated equal employment
opportunity claims by the appellant required adjudication); Blyther v. U.S. Postal
Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶¶ 3, 14 (2009) (adjudicating discrimination and reprisal
claims that remained after the agency rescinded the reduction in grade that formed the
basis for the appellant’s appeal).
                                                                                 7

jurisdiction. If, however, the agency cancelled the appellant’s removal without
returning him to status quo ante, as the appellant alleged, the appeal is not moot
because that issue remains live.
      Restoration to the status quo ante generally requires that the employee be
placed back in his former position or in a position substantially equivalent in
scope and status to his former position. Harris v. Department of the Air Force,
96 M.S.P.R. 193, ¶ 6 (2004). Specifically, return to the status quo ante requires
return, with back pay, to a position of the same grade, pay, status, and tenure as
the one occupied before the agency’s action. Id. Additionally, restoration to the
status quo ante requires that the agency remove all references to the adverse
action from the appellant’s personnel file.   Id. An appellant is not, however,
entitled to be placed in a better position than he would have enjoyed had the
appealable action not occurred. Sink v. Department of Energy, 110 M.S.P.R. 153,
¶ 19 (2008).
      As previously mentioned, the parties disagreed about several issues
regarding the appellant’s return to status quo ante below, and the administrative
judge did not reach any conclusions about the disagreement.        Compare IAF,
Tabs 27, 30, 32 (agency’s filings regarding the relief provided), with IAF,
Tabs 29, 35 (appellant’s arguments about further relief). The appellant argued
that although the agency provided some relief, it still owed him for approximately
$65,000 for additional overtime pay, IAF, Tab 29 at 9, 11 hours of compensatory
time, id. at 1, more than 100 hours of annual leave, id. at 20, and $107
reimbursement for work boots, IAF, Tab 35 at 3.
      On review, the Clerk of the Board ordered the parties to submit additional
argument and evidence regarding the appellant’s return to status quo ante. PFR
File, Tab 4.   Most notably, the order explained the following:     an agency is
required to provide an appellant with a full accounting of his back pay award.
De Luca v. U.S. Postal Service, 76 M.S.P.R. 487, 489 (1997).           Placing an
appellant on administrative leave following the cancellation of an adverse action
                                                                                     8

generally does not constitute a return to the status quo ante.        Id. at 488. An
agency can decline to restore an employee to his prior position only if it has a
strong overriding interest requiring reassignment to another position. Shelton v.
U.S. Postal Service, 53 M.S.P.R. 483, 485 (1992).            However, an agency’s
assertion that it is contemplating reinstating charges against an appellant is not
such an interest. De Luca, 76 M.S.P.R. at 488-89.
       In his response, the appellant once again presents evidence and argument
regarding overtime pay, compensatory leave, annual leave, and work boots. PFR
File, Tab 5 at 4-5. He also notes that the agency never returned him to duty.
Id. at 6.
       For its part, the agency presented arguments about only some of the matters
raised by the appellant, and no evidence.        PFR File, Tab 8.       The agency’s
response contains no mention of the overtime or leave balances the appellant has
characterized as required for his return to status quo ante.          Concerning the
appellant’s allegations about reimbursement for work boots, the agency merely
describes the demand as unreasonable. 4 PFR File, Tab 8 at 7 n.3. The agency
provided no further information, such as any underlying policy regarding this
alleged entitlement.    Concerning the appellant’s placement on administrative
leave, rather than his return to duty, agency counsel asserts that he has been
removed a second time, which could render that specific matter moot. Id. at 6
n.1, 9-10; see Williams v. Department of the Army, 97 M.S.P.R. 246, ¶ 8 (2004)
(recognizing that an agency’s placement of an appellant on administrative leave
after cancelling its first removal action became moot when the agency removed
him a second time because the Board could not provide any relief), overruled on
other grounds by Durr v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 99 M.S.P.R. 283
(2005). But, as previously warned, agency counsel’s statements in a pleading do

4
  The receipt the appellant submitted into the electronic record for his work boots is
difficult to read. PFR File, Tab 5 at 36. It appears to be dated January 2017, which is
after the September 2016 date on which the agency first removed him from duty but
before his November 2017 removal. E.g., IAF, Tab 6 at 104-07.
                                                                                   9

not constitute evidence. Hendricks v. Department of the Navy, 69 M.S.P.R. 163,
168 (1995); PFR File, Tab 4 at 3.
      Under these circumstances, we are unable to determine whether the
appellant is entitled to additional relief because the record remains insufficiently
developed, despite repeated attempts to gather relevant evidence from the agency.
IAF, Tabs 28, 31; PFR File, Tab 4.       We therefore remand this appeal to the
administrative judge for further adjudication of the appellant’s return to status
quo ante. Reed v. U.S. Postal Service, 98 M.S.P.R. 585, ¶ 12 (2005) (remanding
the appeal of an action that was cancelled as the appeal was pending for further
adjudication regarding the appellant’s return to status quo ante), overruled on
other grounds by Fernandez v. Department of Justice , 105 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 5 n.1
(2007).

                                     ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.