Court Opinion

ID: 9584556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:50:04.109651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:38.782873
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. I concur in the ruling in Division 1 but dissent from the ruling in Division 2 and from the judgment of affirmance.
In my opinion the ruling by the majority is based on a total misconception of the issue involved in this case. I know that a charge on impeachment of witnesses must be requested for a failure to charge on it to be reversible error. I also know that impeaching testimony ordinarily cannot establish an affirmative fact and nobody is arguing to the contrary.
The question here is not whether the statement signed by the witness is true or false, but whether it could be considered by the jury at all. The question is whether he was in such a state of mental competency as to know, appreciate and consciously intend to make the statement. That is a question which the jury had to decide before it ever got to the question of the truth or falsity of the statement. The principle here involved has been *458established by the Supreme Court of this State and I contend that the majority’s effort to evade it is wholly irrelevant and illogical. In Dowdy v. Watson, supra, the Supreme Court of this State held: “If a witness has been declared competent by the court, and during the progress of the trial evidence should be introduced which would make his competency doubtful, the jury should be instructed to determine this question of fact, .and, if they should find that the witness is incompetent, not to consider his testimony on the points concerning which he was not competent to testify.” In my opinion the above is analagous to the present situation. The majority says that there is no question of impeachment involved. It is true that there is no question of the impeachment of the truth of the witness’ testimony, as is the case here, but there is a matter of impeachment involved and that is as to the question of the competency of the witness. Goodson v. State, 162 Ga. 178 (132 SE 899); Jackson v. Lipham, 158 Ga. 557 (4) (123 SE 887). In Byars v. State, 73 Ga. App. 727 (3) (38 SE2d 53) this court held that “whether a confession was freely and voluntarily made when issuable, should be submitted to the jury for determination.” If the question arises with regard to dying declarations and similar questions I think the courts would follow the same rule. See Swain v. State, 1491 Ga. 629 (4, 5) (101 SE 539); Plummer v. State, 200 Ga. 641 (3) (38 SE2d 411); Holsenbake v. State, 45 Ga. 43 (2), supra; Phillips v. State, 206 Ga. 418 (4c), supra; Smith v. State, 148 Ga. 332 (1, 2) (96 SE 632). Much ado is made by the majority that the evidence here involved is im.peaching rather than substantive evidence. I fail to see what difference it makes what kind of evidence is involved so long as the main question is whether the jury can finally consider the evidence at all, whatever kind it is and whatever purpose it serves. I fail to see how any case cited by the majority sheds any light on the question involved. The kind of charge on impeachment which has to be requested is not in any way involved. I do not wish to prolong this dissent unnecessarily but let us examine the case of Bivins v. State, supra, cited by the majority. This case shows that a witness who had admitted that he had committed perjury at a coroner’s inquest was en*459titled to explain his reason for doing so. There was no question whether any part of his testimony under certain circumstances could be considered at all by the jury. His credibility was the whole issue on this point. The other citations are no more applicable. Judge Frankum concurs in the dissent.