Court Opinion

ID: 9941647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 17:11:32.0457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:50.621517
License: Public Domain

J-S43009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOSHUA MENDEZ                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 558 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 16, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-41-CR-0000425-2022

BEFORE:      McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                       FILED: FEBRUARY 16, 2024

       Joshua Mendez appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on his

convictions for two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, two counts of

use of a communication facility, and one count of possession with intent to

deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”).1 Mendez challenges the weight of the

evidence, the denial of his motion in limine, and the length of his sentence.

We affirm.

       The trial court recounted the underlying facts as follows:

       On October 15, 2021, Detective Curt Loudenslager from the
       Lycoming County Narcotics Enforcement Unit (NEU) utilized a
       confidential information (CI), who indicated he could purchase
       methamphetamines from an individual he knew as “Josh.” The CI
       contacted “Josh” via telephone to purchase $200 of
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a); and 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(30), respectively.
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      methamphetamines. Detective Loudenslager strip-searched the
      CI, provided the CI with $200, and transported the CI to Second
      Avenue in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The CI entered Josh’s
      residence at 629 Second Avenue, provided the $200 to Josh, and
      Josh provided methamphetamines to the CI. The CI exited the
      residence, returned to Detective Loudenslager, and surrendered
      approximately 2.3 grams of suspected methamphetamines to the
      detectives.

      On October 25, 2021, the CI texted Josh to purchase 2 grams of
      methamphetamines. Detective Loudenslager strip-searched the
      CI and provided the CI with $200 in pre-recorded currency.
      Detective Loudenslager transported the CI to Second Avenue, the
      CI entered the residence at 629 Second Avenue, and Josh
      provided    the   CI     with   approximately     1.39   grams
      methamphetamines in exchange for the $200. Josh admitted that
      he was short about .5 grams. The CI exited the residence,
      returned to Detective Loudenslager, and surrendered the
      methamphetamines.

      On October 29, 2021, Detective Loudenslager obtained a search
      warrant for 629 Second Avenue. Joshua Mendez was alone in the
      first-floor bedroom of the residence. During the search, detectives
      from the NEU discovered seven bags of methamphetamines in a
      bag in an ashtray near the bed and another bag of
      methamphetamine on the bed.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/21/23, at 1-2.

      On the day before trial, the Commonwealth informed Mendez that the

NEU had just provided it with a surveillance video of the CI leaving Mendez’s

residence after the first controlled buy and asking one of Mendez’s neighbors

for a light for his cigarette. At the start of trial, Mendez made an oral motion

in limine to preclude the Commonwealth from introducing the video. He

argued that the Commonwealth had not disclosed it until the eve of trial and

his defense focused on reasonable doubt about where the CI had obtained the

methamphetamine.

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       The court denied the motion and held a jury trial. The jury convicted

Mendez of the above offenses. Following a hearing, the court sentenced

Mendez to an aggregate term of two and a half to five years’ incarceration

followed by five years’ probation. Mendez did not file any post-sentence

motions. This timely appeal followed.2

       Mendez raises the following issues:

       I. Was the jury’s finding of guilt at trial so against the weight of
       the evidence presented as to shock one’s conscience and sense of
       justice?

       II. Did the trial court err in denying [Mendez]’s pretrial motion to
       preclude bodycam footage?

       III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it sentenced
       [Mendez] to an aggregate sentence of thirty (30) to sixty (60)
       months[’] incarceration within a state correctional institution[?]

Mendez’s Br. at 6 (suggested answers omitted).3

       Mendez first challenges the weight of the evidence. He argues the

verdict is shocking to the conscience because the CI was the only eyewitness

to the controlled buys and was not credible. He argues the CI “could not

remember key points or facts,” “was a known user [of] heavy controlled

substances when the transactions were to have occurred,” and was “a dealer

of same prior to the transactions.” Id. at 18, 20. He also asserts the CI was

____________________________________________

2 The notice of appeal erroneously states the appeal is from the conviction and

sentencing order. We have amended the caption to reflect the appeal is from
the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Charles O’Neill, 578
A.2d 1334, 1335 (Pa.Super. 1990).
3 The Commonwealth has not filed a brief.

                                           -3-
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biased against Mendez and “had a criminal history that included making false

reports and lying to law enforcement, specifically during prior controlled buy

situations.” Id. at 19. He argues that while law enforcement testified that they

watched the controlled buys through a real-time video feed, the footage was

not clear. He also points out that the pre-recorded money used in the

controlled buys was not recovered from Mendez or the search of his residence.

      Mendez did not raise this issue before the trial court. It is therefore

waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(a) (stating defendant must preserve a weight

claim by raising it before sentencing or in a post-sentence motion);

Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 494 (Pa. 2009).

      Even if it were not waived, we would find it meritless. Our standard of

review is as follows.

      We review a trial court’s order denying a weight challenge for an
      abuse of discretion. Because the trial judge has had the
      opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate
      court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and
      reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s
      determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence. A trial court should not grant a new trial on weight
      grounds because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because
      the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different
      conclusion. The role of the trial judge is to determine that
      notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater
      weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all
      the facts is to deny justice. Courts have stated that a new trial
      should be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the
      evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a
      new trial is imperative so that right may be given another
      opportunity to prevail.

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Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up).

       While the trial court observed this claim to be waived, it also opined that

the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. The court

recounted the evidence corroborating the CI’s testimony. This included the

audio and video recording of the CI during the first controlled buy, which

depicted “Mendez placing the methamphetamines in the cellophane wrapper

and handing it to the CI,” and the audio recording of the CI during the second

controlled buy. Trial Ct. Op. at 5. The court also recalled the testimony of the

detectives who had surveilled the area and who had observed the CI walking

into and out of Mendez’s residence. It further noted a detective had testified

that, during the search of Mendez’s residence, he had called the telephone

number that law enforcement had used to arrange the controlled buys, and

Mendez’s phone had rung. The court also considered the fact that law

enforcement had not recovered the pre-recorded money from Mendez, and

found it was “not surprising” considering the controlled buys occurred on

October 15 and 25, 2021, but the residence was not searched until October

29, 2021, and Mendez was not arrested until February 28, 2022. Id. at 6-7.

       The court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the verdict was

not shocking to the conscience. It was the province of the jury to determine

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the CI’s credibility, and even assuming he was a wholly unreliable witness, his

testimony was corroborated by ample other evidence.4

       Mendez next argues the court erred in denying his motion in limine to

exclude the surveillance video showing the CI leaving Mendez’s residence after

the first controlled buy and asking Mendez’s neighbor for a light for his

cigarette. He argues that while the police narratives he received earlier in

discovery “indicate the interaction occurred,” they “were devoid of the

specifics of said interaction.” Mendez’s Br. at 23-24. He argues that until he

received the surveillance video on the eve of trial, he “believed that a

reasonable doubt could be raised with the fact finder as to whether the

controlled substance the CI provided to the NEU came from the neighbor, and

it was based on this that Mr. Mendez decided to proceed to trial.” Id. at 24.

       We review this issue pursuant to the following standard:

       The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the
       trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial
       court clearly abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
       merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
       misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
       manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will,
       or partiality, as shown by the evidence or the record.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 646-47 (Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned

up).

____________________________________________

4 To the trial court’s recitation of the corroborating evidence, we add that
seven bags of methamphetamine were recovered during the search of
Mendez’s apartment.

                                           -6-
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      “Pre-trial discovery in criminal cases is governed by Pennsylvania Rule

of Criminal Procedure 573.” Id. at 647. “The rule lists certain items and

information that are subject to mandatory disclosure by the Commonwealth

when they are: (1) requested by the defendant, (2) material to the case, and

(3) within the possession or control of the prosecutor.” Id. The Rule also

imposes on the Commonwealth a continuing duty to promptly disclose

additional evidence that is subject to discovery or inspection under the Rule.

Id. However, “[w]here the evidence is equally accessible or inaccessible to

both the Commonwealth and the defense, the defense cannot use the

discovery rules against the Commonwealth for its failure to produce the

evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, “a defendant seeking relief from

tardy disclosure under the rule . . . must demonstrate prejudice.”

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 83 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

      In its opinion, the court explains that it denied the motion “because the

video was provided as soon as the assistant district attorney received it and

[it] was consistent with the other evidence that the defense possessed.” Trial

Ct. Op. at 8. It explained that the CI’s bodycam footage, which the

Commonwealth       provided   to   Mendez     during   discovery,   “captured    a

conversation of the CI asking an individual for a light for his cigarette but . . .

showed the direction the CI was walking and did not depict the individual on

the porch.” Id. at 8-9. It noted that the new surveillance video confirmed that

after asking for a light, the CI picked up a lighter from the banister of the

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porch, lit his cigarette, and returned it to the banister. The video showed that

“[n]othing was exchanged between the CI and the other individual.” Id. at 9.

The court also observed that the bodycam footage had “depicted Mendez

placing methamphetamines in the cellophane wrapper of a cigarette pack and

handing it to the CI and Mendez counting money as the CI was leaving the

residence.” Id. at 8.

      We discern no abuse of discretion. Because the Commonwealth did not

withhold the video from Mendez, no relief is due. Miller, 172 A.3d at 647.

Furthermore, while the surveillance video confirms that the CI did not obtain

any drugs during the interaction with the neighbor, this simply corroborates

the CI’s bodycam footage showing Mendez had already given the CI the drugs

inside the apartment. Mendez has therefore failed to prove he was prejudiced

by the late delivery of the surveillance video. Lopez, 57 A.3d at 83.

      In his final issue, Mendez argues the court abused its discretion in

sentencing him to two and a half to five years’ incarceration followed by five

years’ probation. However, Mendez failed to raise this issue before the trial

court. It is therefore waived. See Commonwealth v. Padilla-Vargas, 204

A.3d 971, 975-76 (Pa.Super. 2019).

      Even if it were not waived, Mendez would be due no relief. An appellant

challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must include a Pa.R.A.P.

2119(f) statement that presents “a substantial question that the sentence

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Id. at 975.

Mendez’s Rule 2119(f) statement claims his sentence is “manifestly excessive

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in relation to his criminal conduct, personal history, and rehabilitative needs,”

considering “the information pertaining to him specifically as found in the pre-

sentence investigation [(“PSI”)] and read in[to] the record by the sentencing

court.” Mendez’s Br. at 14. Such a bald claim of excessiveness does not raise

a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936

(Pa.Super. 2020).

      If Mendez had raised a substantial question, we would find no abuse of

discretion. See id. at 936-37 (“Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound

discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion” (citation omitted)). In his

argument section, Mendez claims the court failed to consider his “individual

rehabilitative needs, . . . particularly his extensive history of struggling with

active drug addiction.” Mendez’s Br. at 26. He argues that the Commonwealth

objected to his being made eligible for the state drug treatment program, and

that the court should therefore have imposed a sentence of county

confinement. Id. at 26-27.

      First, as Mendez acknowledges, the court was apprised by a PSI report.

We therefore presume the court properly considered all relevant sentencing

factors, including Mendez’s need for rehabilitation. See Commonwealth v.

Harper, 273 A.3d 1089, 1097-98 (Pa.Super. 2022).

      Next, the trial court’s opinion belies Mendez’s claim that the sentence

was manifestly excessive and failed to account for Mendez’s struggle with

addiction. The court noted that it imposed a sentence for PWID falling at the

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top of the standard guideline range. On the delivery counts, it imposed

sentences falling in the middle of the standard ranges, to be served

concurrently with the PWID sentence. Finally, it imposed consecutive

sentences of probation for the criminal use of a communication facility

convictions, which were below the mitigated guidelines ranges. The court

explained it imposed consecutive probation because it “wanted to ensure that

Mendez had a period of supervision after he was released from prison.” Trial

Ct. Op. at 12. It also pointed out that it made Mendez eligible for Recidivism

Risk Reduction Incentive program (“RRRI”) and boot camp. Furthermore,

while the Commonwealth had precluded Mendez’s participation in the state

drug treatment program, the court had requested the Department of

Corrections to consider Mendez for placement in a therapeutic community.

The court gave the following reasoning.

      On the one hand, Mendez committed several felonies. On the
      other hand, Mendez was a bright individual with a difficult
      upbringing and a history of controlled substance use. The court
      reviewed all of the facts and circumstances and imposed an
      aggregate sentence that the court believed properly balanced
      them. The court made Mendez eligible for as many programs as
      possible so that if he is sincere in his desire to address his drug
      use and better his life, he will be able to do so. The court could
      not, however, give Mendez a “free pass” and impose no
      incarceration at all.

Id. at 13.

      The court did not abuse its discretion.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/16/2024

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