Court Opinion

ID: 9743604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:38:16.654797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:42.482194
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: The issue addressed in this case is whether the delay between the granting of the State’s motion for severance and the defendant’s July 1980 trial may be attributable to the defendant. The majority is correct that a delay partially due to the actions of the defendant is chargeable to him (People v. Boyce (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 549, 366 N.E.2d 914), but the majority neglects to mention that the trial court’s decision to charge or not to charge that delay to the defendant should be upheld absent a clear abuse of discretion (People v. Cunningham (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 949, 396 N.E.2d 876; People v. Wilkins (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 179, 395 N.E.2d 1036). The full exchange between defendant’s counsel and the court at the hearing at which the severance was granted was as follows: “DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, the defendant, John Oakley is going to object to any rephrasing of the statement. If this statement is going to come in, we wish it to come in in its original, pristine form, both of them and we’re going to object to any rephrasing and inform the Court that if it comes in, in a redacted form, in cross-examination, we’re certainly going to bring out the gist of it. We fully intend to and will do so. THE COURT: You intend then to bring out reference to John Spiller? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you will name him? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, sir. THE COURT: You will? The Motion for Severance is granted.” Before this hearing, the court intended to hold a joint trial of the defendant and Spiller, and direct that the defendant’s statement be redacted. After defense counsel’s emphatic demonstration of his intent to undermine any redaction, to the great prejudice of Spiller, the court felt that it had no choice but to sever the trials. Under these circumstances, I cannot say that the court clearly abused its discretion in finding that “the defendant’s acts in fact caused or contributed to the delay” due to the severance (People v. Fosdick (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 524, 529, 224 N.E.2d 242, 246), and therefore I must dissent from the decision of the majority.