Court Opinion

ID: 9861192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:48:33.81782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:34.321428
License: Public Domain

KINGSLEY, J., Dissenting.
I dissent.
Like the majority, I agree with respondents that Insurance Code section 11580.1, subdivision (b)(4), requires GEICO to include language in its policies that in this case makes the Rialto Unified School District (School District) an uninsured beneficiary of its teachers’ private insurance. I also agree that Insurance Code section 11580.9 contains provisions that make the teacher’s private insurance policy the primary policy in this case while that of the School District is merely excess. Unlike the majority, however, I am not so easily convinced that these sections are not in conflict with Government Code section 825 et seq., and that therefore the public entity may fulfill its obligations to defend and indemnify its employees by relying on the employees’ personal assets. It is farcical to insist that the School District is complying with its duty to indemnify its employees when the proceeds that allegedly do so come from an insurance policy bought and paid for by the employee and when it is the employee who, following a $100,000 claim, will certainly have to pay exorbitantly for such coverage in the future and may be totally uninsurable. To call it “indemnification” *177when the School District pays nothing and the employee foots the bill is absurd. Indemnification of this sort is no indemnification at all and cannot be reconciled with the mandate of the Government Code that the public entity must indemnify its employees. Therefore, this court must either decide that the Legislature intended to abrogate those sections of the Government Code requiring indemnification when it enacted the above provisions of the Insurance Code, or conclude that it did not, in which case the judgment should be reversed.
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed. There is nothing that indicates that the Legislature ever contemplated repealing the indemnification of government employees when it enacted the provisions of the Insurance Code relied on by respondents. The strongest argument that can be made is that Insurance Code section 11580.8 specifies that section 11580.9 expresses the total public policy of this state regarding whether an insurance policy is primary or excess. A consideration of whether a policy is primary or excess, however, is only relevant where there are two policies covering the same loss. That is, one must first determine whether a policy is applicable in a given situation. It is manifestly obvious that if a policy does not cover the intentional acts of an insured, say, the fact that it might be a primary policy would not make it liable for an intentional tort. A policy that is otherwise an excess policy, but without such restrictions, would have to satisfy the judgment. Under the Government Code, an employee’s assets are not liable for the judgments against him. The public entity is obligated to pay the entire judgment itself and cannot look to the employee for reimbursement. (Gov. Code, §§ 825.4, 825.6.) That Insurance Code section 11580.9 expresses the total public policy for determining whether an insurance policy is primary or excess does not change the fact that an employee’s assets are immune. Even though an employee’s policy may be primary, like the one that did not cover intentional torts, it cannot be applied to this situation. I see nothing in the Insurance Code that was intended to abolish this.
The above analysis would be transparently obvious where it not for the fact that Insurance Code section 11580.1, subdivision (b)(4) requires automobile liability policies to cover all persons responsible for the use of the vehicle. The School District could have been responsible for the use of the vehicle here under respondeat superior, only no lawsuit was ever filed against it. As it is now, the most that can be said is that the School District is responsible to Ms. McClellan to indemnify her under the Government Code. As a “person responsible” it seeks to discharge this duty by giving her the proceeds of her own insurance policy which she is already entitled to.
*178The majority sees nothing anomalous in this result nor even recognizes that it is inconsistent with Government Code section 825. Oxnard Union High School District v. Teachers Insurance Company (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 842 [99 Cal.Rptr. 478], which the majority cites approvingly, and which reached the same conclusion, at least has this self-criticism: “This holding represents a reasonable construction of the statute involved. It does, however, impose approximately 87 percent of the liabilities involved upon the insurer of the person (Farrow) who under the Governmental Tort Liability Act is immune from such liabilities.” (Oxnard Union High School District v. Teachers Ins. Co., supra, at p. 846, fn. 5.)
I cannot concur in such a result. Under the majority approach, had the plaintiff proceeded directly against the public entity, rather than against the employee herself, the public entity would still have been able to collect the judgment from the employee’s insurance policy for its liability. (In that case, the public entity could at least claim that it was responsible to a third party for something.) The consequence of this holding is that employees are now required to indemnify the public entities they work for, at least where they have insurance, rather than the other way around. The employees of the School District are being asked to bear the expense of insuring the District, which it finds too burdensome to do itself. While the majority characterizes the possibility that Ms. McClellan may pay higher rates in the future as “rank unsupported speculation,”1 our focus is not on her as an individual, but on public employees as a whole. As the court noted in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. American Mutual Ins. Co. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 983, 993 [105 Cal.Rptr. 295]: “If the employer-indemnitor’s insurer is permitted to look to the employee-indemnitee’s insurer there will be a tendency to shift the responsibility to the latter wherever possible.” This “puts the burden of furnishing primary insurance on the wrong party and it does not seem warranted in the light of the legislative purpose.” (Pacific Indemnity Co. v. American Mutual Ins. Co., supra, at p. 995.) I cannot believe it was the intent of the Legislature to do this and therefore feel compelled to construe the provisions of the Government Code as taking precedence over Insurance Code section 11580.1, subdivision (b)(4). Government Code section 825.6 specifies that a public entity may only recover the amount of a judgment from the employee if the employee acted with actual fraud, corruption, actual malice, or if he wilfully refused to defend *179the claim in good faith. I see no exception to this requirement on the grounds that the employee has been carrying his own insurance.
I would reverse.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 12, 1986.

The majority opinion evidently does not feel it is “rank, unsupported speculation” when it explores the internal machinations of insurance companies—a matter entirely beyond the record—to buttress its conclusion that Ms. McClellan’s rates are based solely on her driving history and not in the least on the fact that she subjected her insurer to a $100,000 judgment.