Court Opinion

ID: 9697878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:35:34.284509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:36.004986
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
While I join in the majority’s resolution of appellant’s first two assertions of error, I respectfully dissent from their determination that the trial court erred when, in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114, it permitted appellant’s videotaped confession to be shown to the jury, upon their request, after deliberations had begun.
The majority concludes that the lower court committed reversible error by allowing the jurors to take with them during deliberations a videotape made by police of the appellant reenacting the sexual activity which he engaged in with the victim on the night in question. Appellant asserts (and the majority agrees) that the videotaped reenactment,
was tantamount to a confession, [and] permitting the jury to view it during deliberations violated Pennsylvania Rule of *78Criminal Procedure 1114 on the prohibition of written confessions in the jury room[.] [T]he jury ineluctably placed undue emphasis on [the videotape’s contents] rather than relying on their collective recollection of the trial testimony and evidence, and Appellant was seriously prejudiced as a result. (Emphasis added.)
Brief for Appellant at 23-24.
Instantly, appellant was taken to the scene where the victim was found and was asked to reenact his actions on the night of the victim’s death, including the sex acts which appellant performed on the victim. Appellant complied with this request, and the police recorded this reenactment on videotape.
At trial, the court admitted the videotape as an exhibit, and the Commonwealth played the videotape for the jury. After retiring to deliberate, the jury requested that the videotape be sent to the jury room. Over objection by appellant’s counsel, the trial judge granted this request. After deliberations, the jury found appellant guilty of rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse but could not reach a verdict on the homicide charge (murder of the second/third degree or involuntary manslaughter), and the trial court granted a mistrial as a result thereof. Trial Transcript at 435.
Appellant urges this court to equate videotaped confessions with written ones, reading their proscription into. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114, which provides:
Upon retiring for deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to have a transcript of any trial testimony, nor a copy of any written confession by the defendant, nor a copy of the information or indictment. Otherwise, upon retiring, the jury may take with it such exhibits as the trial judge deems proper.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114 (emphasis added).
It is not our province, however, to rewrite this rule. Our supreme court’s having stated specifically that written confessions are prohibited, we may not include, by inference, videotaped or audio-taped confessions. See Commonwealth v. Riggins, 478 Pa. 222, 233, 386 A.2d 520, 525 (1978) (since exhibit *79was not specifically prohibited by Rule 1114, only question was whether exhibit was unduly prejudicial); Commonwealth v. Hall, 523 Pa. 75, 83, 565 A.2d 144,148 (1989). Certainly, when the Rules Committee drafted the amendment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114, in 1974, the technology for recording oral statements and video images was available, albeit not as commonplace as it is today. However, the Rules Committee saw fit to exclude specifically from the jury’s possession only trial transcripts, written confessions and copies of the information or indictment.
I am convinced the Rules Committee expressly excluded those written recordings of a person’s statements, i.e., trial transcripts and written confessions, because their character is markedly different from videotaped confessions (and oral confessions). Written confessions, unlike videotape confessions, are cold and faceless. However, while viewing a videotaped statement, the jury is able to view the witness’ demeanor and hear his or her personal account of the events. Thus, the jury is better able to assess the. veracity of the content of the videotape than of a written confession. Moreover, this same argument would also ring true (to a somewhat lesser degree) for taped oral confessions, where the defendant expresses his or her personal perceptions. Thus, the jurors would be able to hear the defendant’s voice and assess the veracity of the statement in much the same manner as they assess testimony at trial. This is especially true when one considers that a written confession is often not a verbatim statement but rather is a summary of the event prepared by police officers and given to the suspect for his perusal and signature.
In Hall, 565 A.2d at 148, our supreme court was presented with the question of whether the trial court erred in allowing written and tape recorded statements of two witnesses to be sent out with the. jury. The defendant therein conceded that Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114 did not specifically prohibit the jury from possessing such exhibits but argued that such exhibits could be manufactured by unscrupulous prosecutors and used to avoid the prohibition of the jury’s possession of trial transcripts during its deliberations. Our supreme court found no *80evidence of such behavior and also determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting those exhibits to go out with the jury. Hall, 565 A.2d at 148. However, our high court, in a footnote, stated, “we suggest in the future that this practice should not be followed.” Hall, 565 A.2d at 148 n. 11.
Although our supreme court in Hall, supra, looked upon providing the jury with the written and taped statements with a jaundiced eye, the court did not take that opportunity to equate those exhibits with those expressly excluded by Pa. R.Crim.P. 1114. I note that had our high court desired to expand the perimeters of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114, it would have done so in Hall, supra. Yet, the justices reaffirmed that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to permit exhibits, other than those specifically prohibited by the rule, to be sent out with the jury.
Since videotaped confessions are not among the items proscribed expressly by Rule 1114, the decision whether they may be sent out with the jury is for the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Riggins, 478 Pa. 222, 232-33, 386 A.2d 520, 525 (1978) (“[since exhibit was] not among the items which Rule 1114 specifically forbids the jury to have during deliberations ... the only question remaining is whether the court abused its discretion by doing so.... ”). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Akers, 392 Pa.Super. 170, 572 A.2d 746 (1990):
Decisions as to what exhibits may be taken out by the jury are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. To establish an abuse of discretion, appellant must show that the trial court disregarded or misapplied the law or that ‘the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record.... ’
Id. at 189, 572 A.2d at 755 (citations omitted).
Here, we have no basis to conclude, from the record before us, that the lower court abused its discretion by allowing the jury possession of this exhibit which was properly admitted into evidence. Cf. Commonwealth v. Sparks, 351 Pa.Super. *81320, 328, 505 A.2d 1002, 1006 (1986) (“[exhibits] which were released [to the jury during deliberations] were relevant, admitted into evidence, and requested by the jury. As such, the possibility that the court’s decision would prejudice appellant was at best minimal.”) The videotape was certainly relevant to the issues sub judice, and I do not believe it was unduly prejudicial.
The majority concludes that appellant was unduly prejudiced when the court permitted the jury to view the videotaped confession during its deliberations because the jury may have overemphasized the importance of this exhibit relative to the other evidence presented. Obviously, the videotaped confession is “prejudicial” to appellant’s defense, i.e., the video implicates appellant. However, it does not automatically follow that permitting the jury to view the video exhibit during deliberations prevents the jury from rendering a fair and true verdict. I am convinced the jury was capable of viewing the videotape without placing undue importance upon it, as evidenced by their inability to reach a verdict on the murder charge. Moreover, taken to its logical conclusion, the majority’s reasoning would prohibit a jury from viewing, during its deliberations, a video tape of a defendant actually committing the crime for which he is on trial. Certainly, the jury should be permitted to review such an exhibit during its deliberation. See Reed v. Texas, 794 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (trial court would have committed error had it not granted the jury’s request to view, during deliberations, a videotape of the defendant committing the misdemeanor offense of obstructing a passageway); Chennault v. Texas, 667 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Crim.App.1984) (audio tapes of defendant soliciting undercover officer to murder another individual were exhibits such that they could be released to the jury and replayed without limitation); State v. Fried, 92 N.M. 202, 585 P.2d 647 (1978) (same).
I note that my conclusion today is consistent with those of a majority of the jurisdictions which have addressed the issue of whether taped confessions may go out with the jury. See, e.g., Ingram v. State, 547 N.E.2d 823 (Ind.1989) (trial court did not *82abuse its discretion in replaying videotaped confession, in the court’s presence, during jury deliberations), State v. Fellows, 47 Ohio App.2d 154, 352 N.E.2d 631 (1975), overruled, on other grounds in State v. Walker, 53 Ohio St.2d 192, 374 N.E.2d 132 (1978) (trial court did not err in allowing jury to review videotape of defendant in which police officers made conclusory remarks), State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 527 N.E.2d 844 (1988), State v. Barbo, 339 N.W.2d 905 (Minn.1983), State v. Evans, 639 S.W.2d 792 (Mo.1982), Hampton v. State, 569 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977), People v. Walker, 150 Cal.App.2d 594, 310 P.2d 110 (1957), State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 595, 308 P.2d 182 (1957), State v. Triplett, 248 Iowa 339, 79 N.W.2d 391 (1956) (audio recording of confession properly allowed in jury’s possession during deliberations), State v. Halvorson, 346 N.W.2d 704 (N.D.1984), Chennault v. State, 667 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.Crim. App.1984), State v. Poulos, 230 Kan. 512, 639 P.2d 477 (1982), State v. Fried, 92 N.M. 202, 585 P.2d 647 (1978) (audio recording of incriminating statements permitted in jury’s possession during deliberations), Reed v. Texas, 794 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (trial court would have committed error had it not granted jury’s request to view, during deliberations, a videotape of defendant committing offense with which he was charged).1
Since I am convinced that it was not error to permit the jurors to view the videotape during their deliberations, I do not believe appellant is entitled to a new trial, nor do I believe it is necessary to review his counsel’s open and closing remarks for admission of guilt as to the rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse charges.

. But see, Franklin v. State of Wisconsin, 74 Wis.2d 717, 247 N.W.2d 721, 725 (1976) (allowing jury to have tape recording of confession in the jury room "presents the danger of overemphasis of the confession relative to testimony given from the witness stand.”), State of New Mexico v. Ross, 85 N.M. 176, 510 P.2d 109, 111 (1973) ("Playing [audiotape of defendant making incriminating statements] ... to the jury was error because it gave undue prominence to the recorded testimony.”).