Court Opinion

ID: 9931662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 17:01:12.308551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:16.481161
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USCA11 Case: 23-10001    Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 02/09/2024    Page: 1 of 10

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10001
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        MANTAS KAKLIAUSKAS,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A089-643-408
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10001

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Mantas Kakliauskas petitions for review of the Board of
        Immigration Appeals’s order denying his motion for
        reconsideration of the Board’s earlier order affirming an
        immigration judge’s denial of his request to continue his removal
        proceedings. He also claims, for the first time on appeal, that he
        has suffered a violation of his due process rights during the entire
        course of proceedings. Because the first claim is meritless, and the
        next unexhausted, we deny the petition in part and dismiss it in
        part.
                                          I.
               In June 2002, Mantas Kakliauskas, a citizen of Lithuania,
        entered the United States as a nonimmigrant on a J-1 visa, which
        permitted him to remain temporarily in the country until October
        2002. But Kakliauskas never left. He married U.S. Citizen Shandra
        Fitzpatrick in 2006, and she filed a Form I-130 Petition for Alien
        Relative to adjust Kakliauskas’s immigration status. She sat for an
        interview regarding Kakliauskas’s eligibility for that form of relief,
        but later withdrew her petition and testified in a sworn statement
        that she had received money for marrying Kakliauskas to help him
        receive his green card. The pair formally divorced in 2007.
              In 2012, Kakliauskas applied for asylum, withholding of
        removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT),
        claiming that he feared persecution if he returned to Lithuania.
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        23-10001               Opinion of the Court                        3

        While that application was pending, Kakliauskas married his
        current wife, Tatiana Volcov. She too filed a Form I-130 on behalf
        of Kakliauskas.
                In 2015, during his pending asylum proceedings, Kakliauskas
        informed the immigration judge that Volcov’s I-130 petition had
        been denied because United States Citizenship and Immigration
        Services (USCIS) had found that he had previously committed
        fraud in his marriage to Fitzpatrick. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). Because
        USCIS’s decision barred him from obtaining the requested visa, the
        immigration judge decided to extend his removal hearing date so
        Volcov and Kakliauskas could appeal USCIS’s decision. But rather
        than appeal the denial of her initial petition, Volcov filed a second
        I-130 petition. The new filing included a new sworn statement
        from Fitzpatrick, this time saying her marriage to Kakliauskas had
        been legitimate. Fitzpatrick claimed that she only withdrew the
        initial I-130 petition because she had been threatened and
        intimidated by the examiner during the interview process.
               Kakliauskas’s removal proceedings finally resumed in 2019,
        and he moved for the immigration judge to continue the
        proceedings again, this time on the ground that Volcov’s second
        pending I-130 petition would likely be approved. The immigration
        judge denied the motion. Specifically, the immigration judge
        pointed out that this exact issue had already been raised, and that
        proceedings had already been pushed back to give Kakliauskas
        more time to have the marriage fraud issue reconsidered. At this
        point, more than a year later, a continuance was unwarranted, the
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                23-10001

        immigration judge said, because any possibility of a status
        adjustment was merely speculative. Kakliauskas’s removal
        proceedings then moved to the merits. The immigration judge
        denied Kakliauskas’s petition for asylum, withholding of removal,
        and relief under CAT, and ordered him removed under 8 U.S.C.
        § 1228.
               Kakliauskas appealed this decision to the Board of
        Immigration Appeals. He argued that the immigration judge
        should not have proceeded with removal while the I-130 petition
        was pending since its approval would have made him prima facie
        eligible for a status adjustment. And he contended that the
        immigration judge erred in concluding that he did not have an
        objective fear of persecution in Lithuania.
              While that appeal was pending, USCIS denied the second
        Form I-130 petition from Volcov, Kakliauskas’s second wife, again
        based on the marriage-fraud bar. Specifically, USCIS found that for
        Kakliauskas’s first marriage, to Fitzpatrick, the documents
        submitted by the couple for the original I-130 application appeared
        to have been created following receipt of their interview notice;
        there was no demonstrated payment toward any kind of shared
        marital obligations like rent or insurance; and the couple provided
        contradictory testimony about things like the marriage proposal,
        where they spent their wedding night, and when they cohabitated.
        On top of all these inconsistencies was Fitzpatrick’s sworn
        statement that her marriage to Kakliauskas was a sham. USCIS
        acknowledged Ms. Fitzpatrick’s new statement, but concluded that
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        23-10001                  Opinion of the Court                                5

        “the original statement is considered more credible than the
        recantation seven years later.”
               The Board dismissed Kakliauskas’s appeal. It agreed with
        the immigration judge on the merits of the asylum claims and
        affirmed the denial of Kakliauskas’s motion for a continuance. The
        immigration judge had noted that Kakliauskas had already been
        granted numerous continuances, had two I-130 petitions denied,
        and still had the marriage-fraud bar in place. As a result, the Board
        concluded that the record did not support a finding of good cause
        for continuance. That order was entered in December 2021, and
        Kakliauskas did not seek judicial review.
               Instead, he filed a motion to reopen and reconsider the
        Board’s decision and to remand pending complete adjudication of
        Volcov’s second I-130 petition. This filing contested the Board’s
        decision regarding the propriety of a continuance, but did not raise
        any due process argument.
                In December 2022, the Board denied the motion. It found
        that it had considered the appropriate factors in reaching its earlier
        decision, and that Kakliauskas had not introduced any new
        evidence to the contrary. Kakliauskas timely appealed the Board’s
        order. 1

        1 Kakliauskas only petitioned this court for review of the Board’s 2022 decision

        denying his “Motion to Reconsider of the BIA decision affirming the Removal
        Order of the Immigration Court,” not the underlying Board decision itself.
        Moreover, even if Kakliauskas had intended this petition to seek review of the
        underlying Board decision, it would have been untimely. See 8 U.S.C.
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                       23-10001

                                              II.
               This Court reviews the Board’s decision as a ﬁnal judgment,
        “unless the BIA expressly adopted” the immigration judge’s
        decision. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir.
        2016). Then, we review the decision of both the Board and the
        immigration judge. Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th
        Cir. 2010). We review the Board’s denial of a motion to reconsider
        and the denial of a motion for a continuance for abuse of
        discretion. Ferreira v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir.
        2013); Chacku v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 1281, 1285–86 (11th Cir.
        2008). Under this standard, “review is limited to determining
        whether the BIA exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
        capricious manner.” Zhang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 572 F.3d 1316, 1319
        (11th Cir. 2009).
                                              III.
                                              A.
               The Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to
        reconsider the order affirming the denial of Kakliauskas’s request
        to continue his removal proceedings. A motion to reconsider must
        “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or
        law” in the underlying decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also 8
        U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C). A motion to reconsider “that merely
        republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in

        § 1252(b)(1); Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 371 F.3d 771, 773 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004).
        Accordingly, we limit our review to the order denying reconsideration.
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        23-10001               Opinion of the Court                        7

        the first place gives the tribunal no reason to change its mind,” and
        therefore, “merely reiterating arguments previously presented to
        the BIA” is insufficient to succeed on this kind of motion. Calle v.
        U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation
        omitted). “The moving party bears a heavy burden” because
        motions to reopen or reconsider are especially disfavored in
        removal proceedings. Zhang, 572 F.3d at 1319; see also INS v. Abudu,
        485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988).
               Kakliauskas did not specify any errors of law or fact in the
        Board’s order denying his appeal; he repeated the same arguments
        he made below. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C). In his BIA appeal, he
        argued that the immigration judge should not have proceeded with
        his removal proceedings because he was likely to succeed on his
        Form I-130 petition because of Fitzpatrick’s new statement, and if
        that petition were approved, he would be eligible for adjustment
        of status. In his motion to reconsider, Kakliauskas reasserted these
        same points, arguing that Volcov’s second I-130 petition was
        supported by Fitzpatrick’s “credible affidavit” and that “reasonable
        discretion” called for a continuance until the adjudication of that
        petition was complete. Similarly, he argued in the appeal that
        Volcov had met her burden in proving that their marriage was
        legitimate, and that USCIS had failed to meet its burden to show
        that the first marriage was a sham. He made the same argument
        in his motion to reconsider, and even appears to have copied
        substantial sections of the exact same language from the first
        argument into the second.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10001

               Moreover, the underlying Board decision that Kakliauskas
        wanted reconsidered was not an abuse of discretion. The standard
        for granting a motion for continuance is “good cause shown.” 8
        C.F.R. § 1003.29. True, in cases where removal proceedings are
        occurring while an I-130 petition is pending, “discretion should, as
        a general rule, be favorably exercised where a prima facie
        approvable visa petition and adjustment application have been
        submitted in the course of a deportation hearing.” Bull v. INS, 790
        F.2d 869, 872 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Garcia, 16 I. & N. Dec.
        653, 657 (BIA 1978)). But that is not an absolute rule, and it is not
        an abuse of discretion to deny a request for a continuance based on
        the conclusion that the movant is “statutorily ineligible for
        adjustment of status,” or that there is only the “speculative
        possibility” that the petition will be granted. Id.; Zafar v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2006).
               Here, Kakliauskas did not show that he was prima facie
        eligible for adjustment of his status. The marriage-fraud bar was in
        place when the immigration judge made the original decision,
        when the Board affirmed that decision, and when the Board denied
        Kakliauskas’s motion to reconsider. So at all relevant time periods
        Kakliauskas was already statutorily ineligible for Form I-130
        approval. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).
               For both of these reasons, it was well within the Board’s
        discretion to deny Kakliauskas’s motion to reconsider. Calle, 504
        F.3d at 1331.
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        23-10001               Opinion of the Court                          9

                                          B.
               Kakliauskas argues, for the first time on appeal, that he was
        deprived of his right to due process and fair proceedings. He
        acknowledges that he does not have a constitutional right to the
        discretionary relief of a continuance, but still contends that he has
        a valid due process claim because “the totality of the record
        indicates that the order of removal was issued in violation of his
        right to due process and fair proceeding.” See Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2008).
               A court can only review a final order of removal if “the alien
        has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as
        of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Until recently, this Court has
        interpreted this rule to mean that we lack jurisdiction to consider
        unexhausted claims raised in a petition for review. See Amaya-
        Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2006). But in
        Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, the Supreme Court held that the
        obligation to exhaust administrative remedies is a claim-processing
        rule, not a jurisdictional limitation. 598 U.S. 411, 416–19 (2023). But
        if properly raised by a party, mandatory claim-processing rules are
        “unalterable.” See Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116, 121, 125
        (2017). Here, because the Attorney General raised the issue of
        exhaustion in his brief, and because Kakliauskas conceded that he
        did not raise a due process claim before the immigration judge or
        the Board, we enforce the exhaustion rule. See Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 83 F.4th 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2023). We thus dismiss
        Kakliauskas’s due process claim for failure to exhaust and decline
        to reach the merits.
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        10                    Opinion of the Court               23-10001

                                 *      *      *
              The Board did not abuse its discretion when it denied
        Kakliauskas’s motion to reconsider the order affirming the
        immigration judge’s denial of his application for asylum,
        withholding of removal, and relief under CAT. We do not
        consider the merits of his due process claim because it was
        unexhausted. Accordingly, Kakliauskas’s petition for review of the
        Board’s order denying his motion to reconsider is DENIED in part
        and DISMISSED in part.