Court Opinion

ID: 9701752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:36:10.939739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:28.582926
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones:
President Judge Boyle of the Orphans’ Court of Allegheny County, in dissent, in the court below well stated: “The record is barren of any actual notice, in any form, given to the sisters and brother of the decedent that there was a question of law involved in the proposed distribution which, if determined adversely, would reduce their distributive share by one-half. This *401failure to give actual notice and an opportunity to be heard was in violation of the fundamental right of the petitioners to due process of law: Galli’s Estate, 340 Pa. 561, 569-570. It was also in violation of the immemorial practice in the Orphans’ Court of Allegheny County which requires that actual notice of questions of law affecting distribution be given to the parties involved so that they may have an opportunity to be heard and to be represented by counsel. On this point it should be noted that on January 5, 1965, thirteen days before the audit on January 18, the representatives of the estate advised New York counsel for the sisters and brother of the decedent by letter (Exhibit F) which in part is as follows: ‘As you undoubtedly know, there is no requirement that you or your clients appear at the audit in order to participate in the distribution in this estate unless questions are raised which require judicial determination.’
“This advice in Exhibit F was misleading. Section 13 of local Rule 3 governing practice in the subjects of ‘Accounts, Audits and Distribution' in the Orphans’ Court of Allegheny County provides:
‘Attendance at Audits. See. 13. Accountants, claimants, and all other persons interested must attend audits at the time fixed therefor and furnish such information and produce such evidence as may be necessary to make proper disposition of exceptions, objections, and distribution.’
“The stark fact is that the audit in the case at bar did involve a very substantial question of law which was resolved against the petitioners for review by the executor by his mere averment in item 12 on page 4, supra, of the Petition for Distribution that there was a partial intestacy. The effect of this was to cut in half what otherwise would have been the distributive share of the brother and sisters of the decedent. Yet this question of distribution was not brought to the *402attention of the Court and no actual notice of the question was given to the parties affected.
“The executor and his counsel acted in good faith hut their omission in failing to give proper notice to the brother and sisters of decedent and in failing to properly inform the auditing judge of the important question of law to be determined by the Court constituted error which is sufficient to void the decree of distribution.
“The failure of the executor to bring the question of law to the attention of the Court denied the auditing judge the opportunity to see to it that the parties received actual notice of the question of distribution involved.” I fully agree with President Judge Boyle.
Moreover, Section 6, Rule 3 of the Orphans’ Court Rules of this Court provides that no account shall be confirmed in the absence of written notice of the filing of the account and the call thereof for audit or confirmation to every person of whom the accountant has notice or knowledge who claims an interest in the estate. In my opinion, the instant record fails to reveal a substantial compliance with Section 6, Rule 3, and I thoroughly agree with President Judge Boyle that the appellant did not have his “day in court, after due notice”.
In Shugars’s Estate, 312 Pa. 472, 476-477, 167 A. 567 (1933) this Court said: “. . . because of the failure to give the actual notice required by statute, the decree ordering distribution was void as to appellant’s claim. It could have no possible effect upon it. Such notice was indispensably necessary to give jurisdiction, and without such notice and an opportunity to appellant to be heard, the decrees of the court were absolutely void: [citing an authority].” Moreover, the rationale of Galli’s Estate, 340 Pa. 561, 17 A. 2d 899 (1941) commands reversal of the instant decree.
*403Even if the correspondence between counsel for tbe personal representative and counsel—not of record in the proceedings—for appellant be construed as notice, such notice fell far short of tbe standard of requisite notice and was highly inadequate under tbe circumstances.
I dissent from tbe view taken by tbe majority of tbis court. I believe that tbe decision in tbis case will constitute an unfortunate precedent in our case law and that it emasculates tbe requirements of adequate notice which is consonant with due process. I would reverse tbe decree in tbe court below.