Court Opinion

ID: 9488249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:40:12.010071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:46.871227
License: Public Domain

EBEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with much of the majority’s comprehensive and thoughtful opinion, and concur in its denial of most of Hatch’s numerous claims. I further agree that we should limit our review to issues presented by the innocence/guilt phase of Hatch’s trial, his appeal, and his third sentencing hearing, because any errors from Hatch’s earlier sentencing hearings were nullified by the third sentencing hearing, from which his death sentence resulted. However, I dissent to express my disagreement with the majority’s - treatment of two of Hatch’s claims. In particular, I would grant Hatch relief on (1) his due process claim based on his right to a state court appeal from the death sentence issued at the third sentencing hearing; and (2) his ex post facto claim based on Oklahoma’s retroactive repeal of the statutory right to proportionality review of death sentences.
I. RIGHT TO A STATE COURT APPEAL
When Hatch appealed his third death sentence to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the court refused to consider ten of Hatch’s twelve claims of error. Hatch v. State, 835 P.2d 880, 883 (Okla.Crim.App.1992) (Hatch III )1 The court reasoned that those ten issues went beyond the scope of the remand it had previously ordered after Hatch’s earlier appeal in Hatch v. State, 662 P.2d 1377 (Okla.Crim.App.1983) (Hatch I). However, when Hatch had previously sought appellate review by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals after his first death sentence, the court refused to consider several of Hatch’s claims of error because it was remanding the case for further proceedings. Id. at 1379 n. 1. Thus, Hatch has never received appellate review of the ten claims of error he asserted following his third sentencing trial, which we have held was the operative penalty proceeding. This appellate refusal to consider Hatch’s claims that Oklahoma imposed his death sentence in error, I believe, violated Hatch’s constitutional rights.
I am less certain than is the majority regarding whether criminal defendants sentenced to death have an independent constitutional right to appeal their death sentences. The majority accurately notes that the Supreme Court has stated that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to appeal a conviction. See, e.g., Goeke v. Branch, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1275, 1278, 131 L.Ed.2d 152 (1995); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2038-39, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). However, the Court has never so stated in the context of the death penalty. To the contrary, it has underscored *1473that meaningful appellate review is an important safeguard in a state’s death penalty scheme that helps prevent the random or arbitrary imposition of the death sentence in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45, 104 S.Ct. 871, 876-77, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2749-50, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2935-36, 2940-41, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Thus, although the Court has not explicitly held that the right to appeal a death sentence is constitutionally required, I expect that if a state ever tried to deny a right of appeal to a defendant sentenced to death that the Supreme Court would conclude that the Constitution requires some form of meaningful appellate review of such cases. As to the ten issues that Hatch seeks to raise, the state of Oklahoma has effectively denied him any appeal at all. I believe that denial violates Hatch’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
However, even if there is no independent constitutional right to direct appeal of a death sentence, I believe Hatch was deprived of a state-created right to appeal in contravention of the Due Process Clause. As the majority recognizes, when a state creates a right to appeal, it must comply with the constitutional requirements of due process if it then seeks to deprive a defendant of that right. Here, Oklahoma provides that defendants have a statutory right to appeal adverse judgments to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 22 § 1051(a). In the case of the death penalty, appellate review is mandatory. Id. at tit. 21 § 701.13(A) (“Whenever the death penalty is imposed, ... the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.”) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, Oklahoma appears to have deprived Hatch of his statutory right to an appeal without justification by refusing to hear ten of his twelve claims of error. Such an arbitrary deprivation of a state-created liberty interest does not comport with due process.
The majority reaches a contrary conclusion because it holds that Hatch received a state court appeal when the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed two of the twelve claims that he appealed. The majority characterizes Hatch’s claim as a claim that he did not receive an “adequate” appeal, and it concludes that Oklahoma law does not provide for any such right because it grants broad discretion to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in the exercise of its appellate powers. I disagree because Oklahoma has curtailed the discretion of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in the context of the death penalty, and because whatever discretion remains must still be exercised in conformity with due process norms. Cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654-55, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2043-45, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (explaining that providing inadequate counsel is tantamount to providing no counsel at all); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358, 83 S.Ct. 814, 817, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) (stating that granting an indigent defendant a right to appeal without providing them counsel renders the appeal a “meaningless ritual”).
First, the broad discretion accorded to the Court of Criminal Appeals to exercise its appellate power cited by the majority is inapplicable to the review of death sentences. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21 § 701.13(A) mandates that the Court of Criminal Appeals “shall review” death sentences. That legislative mandate would be eviscerated if the court could nominally take an appeal but arbitrarily decline to review claims of error. Although the court “has the authority to determine, in a criminal matter, when it has the power to proceed,” Duvall v. State, 871 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Okla.Crim.App.1994), its determinations must be made according to statutory parameters. In the present action, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ refusal to consider substantial portions of Hatch’s appeal was not based on any reasoned interpretation of its statutory authority. Rather, the court simply failed to fulfil Oklahoma’s statutory mandate to review death sentences.
Moreover, even if Oklahoma law provided the Court of Criminal Appeals with complete discretion to consider appeals, an exercise of discretion in an arbitrary manner would vio*1474late constitutional due process requirements. As the Supreme Court stated in Evitts v. Lucey, “when a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution — and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause.” 469 U.S. 387, 401, 105 S.Ct. 830, 839, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); see also id. at 400-01, 105 S.Ct. at 838-39 (“The right to appeal would be unique among state actions if it could be withdrawn without consideration of applicable due process norms.”). Although Oklahoma can establish reasonable procedures to govern death penalty appeals, the ad hoc refusal even to consider substantial portions of Hatch’s appeal constitutes the type of action that strikes at the core of the Due Process Clause. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”) (citation omitted). In granting Hatch’s claim, we would not be second-guessing the adequacy of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ substantive treatment of an issue of state law; rather we would only be preventing the court from acting in a seemingly arbitrary manner in refusing even to consider certain of the claims raised on appeal.
Whether Hatch’s right to an appeal is rooted in the Constitution itself or in state law as safeguarded by the Due Process Clause, federal habeas review is not an adequate substitute for direct review by Oklahoma’s courts. Most importantly, federal habeas courts cannot review Hatch’s state law claims. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 479-80, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Moreover, even as to Hatch’s federal claims, we must entitle any underlying state court factual findings to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lujan v. Tansy, 2 F.3d 1031, 1034 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1074, 127 L.Ed.2d 392 (1994). Accordingly, I believe Hatch’s death sentence cannot stand unless he is given his right to a state court appeal.
II. EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
The majority acknowledges that Oklahoma retroactively applied to Hatch its repeal of the statutory requirement that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals review every sentence of death to assess whether it is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the retroactive application of the repeal did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the change merely altered the “procedures” by which Hatch’s case was adjudicated, and did not change the substantive criminal law establishing Hatch’s punishment. I disagree because I believe that the repeal effectively increased the punishment to which Hatch was exposed after the commission of his crime.
Increasing punishment for a crime after its commission remains a core prohibition of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Collins v. Young-blood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2718-19, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-92, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)). In the instant action, when Hatch committed his crime, Okla.Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 701.13(C)(3) capped his punishment at the proportionate sentences of similarly situated defendants. That maximum punishment likely would have been a life sentence, given that Hatch’s codefendant Ake was only given life despite being the trigger-man and arguably orchestrating the crime.2 However, the limit on the punishment that Hatch could receive was removed when Oklahoma repealed the statutory right to propor*1475tionality review of death sentences. Such a statutory change violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it “produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.” California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1603, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995).
The majority disagrees because “[t]he penalty for first degree murder, both before and after the legislature changed section 701.13(C)(3), was death.” Thus, the majority characterizes the statutory repeal as a mere procedural change. However, such an abstraction of Oklahoma’s criminal law elevates form over substance and ignores the realities that Hatch’s risk of receiving the death penalty was substantially increased when he lost the right to have his sentence reviewed for proportionality against his partner in the crime, who received only a life sentence. We, like a legislature, cannot immunize a retroactive statutory change from ex post facto scrutiny merely by labeling it “procedural.” See Collins, 497 U.S. at 46, 110 S.Ct. at 2721. While there is no clear line dividing “procedural” and “substantive” statutory changes, Morales, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1603, we must evaluate whether a given change exposed a defendant to the risk of greater punishment, id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1603; Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2452, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (emphasizing that disadvantaging defendants by depriving them of an “opportunity” to receive a lesser sentence implicates ex post facto concerns).3 Here, Hatch was not exposed merely to some theoretical risk of greater punishment, but actually received a sentence he likely would not have received under the criminal law in place at the time he committed his crime had his sentence been subject to a proportionality review. Accordingly, the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Constitution cannot countenance his death sentence unless he is given the proportionality review to which he was statutorily due under the laws of Oklahoma.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I would conditionally grant Hatch’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and vacate his death sentence, unless the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals within ninety days accords Hatch his rights to (1) appellate review of those claims the court earlier refused to consider; and (2) proportionality review of his sentence under the now repealed Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21 § 701.13(C)(3).

. As noted in the majority opinion, the court refused to review Hatch’s claims that: (1) Oklahoma's retroactive revocation of two statutory provisions governing the review of death sentences violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) his actions were not probative of whether he was a continuing threat to society; (4) Judge Cannon unconstitutionally attributed Ake's acts to Hatch; (5) the bill of particulars did not satisfy state notice provisions; (6) the bill of particulars did not provide notice of the use of evidence of other crimes; (7) his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to Ake's sentence; (8) he was denied his right to be sentenced by a jury; (9) Judge Cannon unconstitutionally considered unadjudicated offenses; and (10) his death sentence was against the weight of the evidence. The court did consider Hatch's claims that (1) the use of a witness’ past recollection recorded violated his Confrontation Clause rights; and (2) the refusal to admit the expert opinions of the defense psychiatrist that Hatch had no intent to kill and was dominated by Ake violated his right to put on an effective defense.

. Although a defendant's sentence is not necessarily limited by the sentence given a codefend-ant under Oklahoma's interpretation of Okla. Stat.Ann. tit. 21 § 701.13(C)(3), it remains a relevant and important point of comparison in assessing the proportionality of a death sentence. See Brogie v. State, 695 P.2d 538, 547 (Okla.Crim.App.1985); Smith v. State, 659 P.2d 330, 337 (Okla.Crim.App.), vacated on other grounds, 464 U.S. 924, 104 S.Ct. 324, 78 L.Ed.2d 297 (1983). Here, Alte was originally sentenced to death, but a jury subsequently sentenced him to life after the first sentence was overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). The life sentence was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in 1989, Ake v. State, 778 P.2d 460 (Okla.Crim.App.1989), roughly three years before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed Hatch's ultimate death sentence.

. This principle has been recognized by several of our sister circuits, who have held after Collins that changes in “procedures” which in effect impact the legal consequences of a given act implicate ex post facto concerns. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bell, 991 F.2d 1445, 1448-49 (8th Cir.1993); Helton v. Fauver, 930 F.2d 1040, 1045 n. 8 (3d Cir.1991). Such a rule comports with our continued emphasis post-Collins on whether a change in the law disadvantages a defendant. See United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 96 (10th Cir.1994); Arnold v. Cody, 951 F.2d 280, 281 (10th Cir.1991).