Court Opinion

ID: 9842461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-23 17:09:20.915927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:10.157491
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-21-00457-CV

                                    COURT OF APPEALS

                        THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                           CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

                               IN INTEREST OF D.T., A CHILD

                        On appeal from the 343rd District Court
                            of San Patricio County, Texas.

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION
                      Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                      Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

        In this suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), the trial court awarded

appellee Mother the person with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of

her child D.T.1 By three issues, appellant Father argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by: (1) awarding Mother the person with the exclusive right to designate the

         1 For the child’s privacy, we refer to the child by an alias and family members by their relationships

to the child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d).
primary residence; (2) improperly tasking an amicus attorney with duties of a “child

custody evaluator”; and (3) denying him a fair trial. We affirm.

                                   I.     BACKGROUND

       On June 4, 2019, Father filed the original SAPCR requesting that he and Mother

be appointed joint managing conservators, that he be designated the person with the

exclusive right to designate the primary residence of D.T., and that the trial court order

Mother to pay child support. Mother responded, requesting an order of paternity, that she

be appointed sole managing conservator, that she be designated with the exclusive right

to designate the primary residence of D.T., and that the trial court order Father to pay

child support. The trial court issued several temporary orders, rendering 14-day

alternating possession periods.

       On March 31, 2020, the trial court signed an agreed order appointing an amicus

attorney. On April 2, 2020, Father filed several motions: for a child custody evaluation, to

compel discovery, for sanctions, for modification of the temporary orders, and for a mental

health examination of Mother.

       The next day, Mother filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of

attachment, claiming that Father was illegally restraining D.T. from Mother’s possession

and was threatening D.T.’s “physical and emotional well-being because [Father was]

establishing and encouraging parental alienation between [D.T.] and her mother.” Mother

subsequently filed a motion for child custody evaluation, a motion for mental health

examination, and a motion for modification of the temporary orders.

                                             2
        On April 17, 2020, Father submitted a request for a new parenting facilitator.

According to Father, their current parenting facilitator was “rude, argumentative, [and]

belittling.” Father requested the services of Kate Rodriguez, PhD, LPC-S—a licensed

professional counselor-supervisor. On May 12, 2020, the trial court signed an agreed

order appointing Dr. Rodriguez.

        Father and Mother filed several motions for enforcement and motions to modify

temporary orders. On December 11, 2020, Father filed a motion for alcohol screening,

alleging Mother was an active alcohol drinker. Father further filed a motion to compel

discovery and for sanctions on December 18, 2020. Mother responded by filing another

petition for writ of habeas corpus and writ of attachment on December 28, 2020, alleging

Father was denying Mother access to D.T.

        On January 19, 2021, Dr. Rodriguez filed her report as parenting facilitator. In her

report, Dr. Rodriguez stated that Mother has never missed a session with Dr. Rodriguez

while Father cancelled two sessions and did not attend two other sessions. According to

Dr. Rodriguez, Father stopped communicating with her in August 2020 until the trial court

prompted him to continue with parent facilitation. In the following session, Dr. Rodriguez

informed Father that his messages on Our Family Wizard to Mother appear “very hostile.”2

Father explained that he would not change his communication patterns with Mother.

        In her report, Dr. Rodriguez further stated that Father accused Mother of alcohol

abuse, having unfit boyfriends, and lying, noting that Father “has admitted to having

        2 Our Family Wizard is a “co-parenting” application for families living separately that is monitored

by the court system.

                                                     3
various private investigators and friends follow” Mother. Father informed Dr. Rodriguez

that he has Mother followed even when she is not in possession of D.T.3 Dr. Rodriguez

stated that Father accuses Mother of “delusions and paranoia” when Mother reports

feeling like she is being followed, even suggesting that Mother needed a psychological

evaluation. Dr. Rodriguez stated that Father “has made it clear that his goal is to catch

[Mother] in lies in order to obtain full custody of [D.T.].”

       Dr. Rodriguez was concerned about Father’s constant harassment of Mother and

Mother’s consequential unwillingness to communicate with Father. If Mother did not

respond to Father immediately, Father repeatedly called and texted her. As a result,

Mother blocked Father from all communication except on Our Family Wizard. Dr.

Rodriguez stated that Father continued to harass Mother in “demeaning, controlling, and

threatening” ways.

       In their joint sessions, Father “attempted to dominate” the sessions and would not

allow Mother to respond to his accusations. Dr. Rodriguez testified that she tried to stop

Father from preventing Mother from speaking; however, Father yelled at Dr. Rodriguez

accusing her of being on Mother’s side and said that it was the “women against” him

again. Father reportedly refused to let Mother speak, claiming, “all [Mother] does is lie!”

Because Father continually displayed hostility toward Mother and declined to stop that

behavior, Dr. Rodriguez believed he “ha[d] made it clear that he does not want to work

       3 Father’s private investigator (PI) shared pictures of Mother with her male boss and vendors.
Father began calling Mother at her employment and accused her of having affairs.

                                                 4
on co-parenting, communication, or change any of his current behaviors.” Consequently,

Dr. Rodriguez ceased future sessions as they would not be beneficial.

      Dr. Rodriguez believed that Father’s behavior indicated that he was not concerned

about what was best for D.T. In her professional opinion, she suggested that he have a

psychological evaluation due to his behaviors, intense anger, and stalking. Dr. Rodriguez

indicated that Father was unreasonable, even demanding that Dr. Rodriguez give him her

notes so that he could correct them because, although he had never seen them before,

he “knows” they contained false information. Additionally, Dr. Rodriguez shared that

Father recorded Dr. Rodriguez without her consent. Thus, Dr. Rodriguez no longer felt

comfortable continuing with future sessions until Father sought psychological evaluation.

      On July 26, 2021, Father filed another motion to modify temporary orders, stating

that the present orders were no longer in the best interest of D.T. because Mother

consumed alcohol during her period of possession and moved D.T. “to a place that is not

suitable for young children.” In the motion, Father sought to be appointed sole managing

conservator and that Mother be given a standard possession order.

      On August 4, 2021, Father filed a motion for enforcement of injunction and order

to appear, asserting that his private investigator (PI) revealed that Mother was “drinking

beer” at her friend’s house. Father attached his PI’s affidavit, which allegedly confirmed

that Mother was drinking on June 26, 2021, July 20, 2021, and July 27, 2021. Father filed

another motion for enforcement of possession or access and order to appear, asserting

that Mother did not make D.T. available for Facetime on at least four occasions. Father

requested that Mother be held in criminal contempt, jailed for up to 180 days for each

                                            5
violation, fined in the amount of $500 for each violation, and placed on community

supervision for a period of ten years.

       The trial court held a final hearing on October 28, 2021. At the hearing, Mother

testified that she then-resided in Port Mansfield, and she lived in a home with her

stepfather and D.T.

       Mother further testified that she was then-employed as a manager at a restaurant,

and she also ran a catering business on the side. Prior to her employment as manager,

she testified to her previous employment history as follows: (1) she was employed at

another restaurant, but she had to cease employment because it interfered with her

catering business; (2) she worked at Port Mansfield Club for three weeks, but her position

was temporary to help renovate the establishment after a hurricane and freeze; (3) she

worked in Austin as an event manager, but it only lasted five months due to COVID; (4)

she worked at a retirement home previously, but she stopped working there to become

the event manager in Austin; and (5) she worked for Amazon prior to working at the

retirement home.

       In a two-and-a-half-year period (since the inception of this case), Mother stated

that she has had three boyfriends, but D.T. only met one. Mother admitted that she “might

have had a beer or two” in violation of the court’s temporary order during the periods of

possession of D.T.

       Mother stated that Father rents cars to stalk her, takes pictures of her, constantly

harasses her, and tracks her. “It never stops,” she said. Mother stated that she is fearful

of Father; he has showed up to her employment “probably three times” and jeopardized

                                            6
her employment. She explained that Father has not changed his co-parenting, even after

using the parenting facilitators. Father sends her “about 20 messages a day still[;] . . . one

minute [she is] trash and the next minute [Father] loves [her] and he wants [her] to come

home. It never stops.”

        Father testified that he lives in a home with his son and D.T.4 He admitted he

initiates communication with Mother daily, even on days that he has possession of D.T.

because he feels like Mother is dishonest with him. Father stated that Mother is a good

parent, but his primary concern is that Mother drinks and drives with D.T., which he

learned from his PI. According to Father, he is concerned with Mother not being truthful

to him. For this reason, he has hired two PIs. Father admitted the PIs have followed

Mother even when she is not in possession of D.T.

        Father informed the court that his home is better for D.T. because it is stable; D.T.

would be in the same bed every night; D.T. would follow the same structure; and D.T.

would reside with her half-brother. He stated that when he has D.T., he takes an entire

week at a time off work.

        The amicus attorney asked Father whether he could allow Mother to parent during

her week without Father interfering and sending Mother messages:

        [Amicus]:       [I]f that was an injunction in saying that you’re going to have
                        to trust the good Lord and the mother that she is going to care
                        for [D.T.] during that time and she likewise is going to have to
                        trust that you’re going to do the right thing for [D.T.] during the
                        time you have her, and unless there is an emergency, y’all
                        aren’t going to communicate, is that a possibility with you?

        4 Father explained that his son had not seen his biological mother in over eleven years. According

to Father, his son’s biological mother suffered from substance abuse.

                                                    7
       [Father]:     Yeah, I could not text her. But do I believe that? No. I mean,
                     just because I know.

       The PI testified that on at least three occasions, he followed Mother and observed

her at her friends’ get-togethers. It appeared to him that Mother was drinking because

there was alcohol and cigarettes within her possession and directly in front of her. On at

least two of those occasions, he stated that he saw D.T. with Mother at the get-togethers.

       N.S., Mother’s mother, testified that Mother was a great parent. N.S. further stated

that Father harassed N.S. by calling her, texting her, and messaging her on Facebook,

such that Mother blocked Father from all communication. N.S. stated that Mother was not

an alcoholic and had never seen Mother display inappropriate behavior. Specifically, N.S.

stated that Mother has never acted inappropriately in front of D.T.

       The amicus attorney testified that the problem here is “an absolute dysfunctional

co-parenting.” The amicus attorney opined that Father should not have the exclusive right

to designate primary residence of D.T. because in her opinion he uses this power as a

weapon sometimes.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court appointed Father and Mother joint

managing conservators. The trial court awarded Mother the person with the exclusive

right to designate the primary residence of D.T. and stated, “I don’t know how long she is

going [to] stay with you, [Mother], because I don’t know that you’ll be able to hold it

together because you are on a thin line in my opinion . . . . [I]f not I know [Father] can do

a great job with that.” Father filed a motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2021,

requesting that the trial court award Father and Mother a one “week-on, week-off,”

possession schedule.

                                             8
       On December 2, 2021, the trial court issued its final order in accordance with its

ruling on October 28, 2021, appointing Father and Mother joint managing conservators

and appointing Mother the person with the exclusive right to designate the primary

residence of D.T. Father appealed.

                                  II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       In determining issues of conservatorship and possession and access, the primary

consideration is always the best interests of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 153.002; Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. 2002). We review a trial court’s decision

to modify an order regarding conservatorship or the terms of possession of and access

to a child under an abuse of discretion. See Baltzer v. Medina, 240 S.W.3d 469, 474–75

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts

arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. See

Flowers v. Flowers, 407 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

“Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, legal and factual insufficiency are not

independent grounds of error.” Id. Rather, they “are relevant factors in assessing whether

the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. “There is no abuse of discretion as long as some

evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court’s”

exercise of its discretion. Id.

                III.    EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO DETERMINE PRIMARY RESIDENCE

       By his first issue, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting

Mother the person with the exclusive right to determine D.T.’s residence. Specifically,

                                              9
Father argues the trial court supported its verdict with hearsay evidence.5 Without getting

into the merits of this issue and without considering the complained-of evidence, we look

to other evidence before the trial court—notwithstanding Father’s hearsay objection—to

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting Mother the person with

the exclusive right to determine D.T.’s residence.

A.      Applicable Law

        The best interest of the child is of paramount importance in making any custody

determination. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002; In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 342

(Tex. 2000). A court may use the following non-exhaustive list of factors to determine the

child’s best interests: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of

the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now

and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the

programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6)

the plans for the child by the individuals seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home; (8)

the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child

relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

        5 Father complains the following evidence constitutes hearsay. Father admitted that he has three

Facebook profiles under the name S.E. Although he regularly messaged his ex-wife on Facebook, Father
did not consider electronic communication as a form of harassment. The trial court asked, “I know you
haven’t talked to [your ex-wife], but have you ever thought that maybe your messaging or electronic
communication [on Facebook] may be seemed as harassing to [your ex-wife]? Have you ever thought about
that?” Father responded, “No.” The trial court replied, “Okay. I [know] that was the answer[] because he
doesn’t think that. That is part of our problem.”

          At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it was going to “place D.T. with the parent
I feel like that will facilitate the relationship with the other [parent,] and that is [Mother].” The trial court
explained that Father “has done it with [his ex-wife]. He doesn’t facilitate. As a parent you’ve got to make it
happen. That is just how I feel about it.”

                                                       10
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27

(Tex. 2002) (providing that proof of the best interest of a child is not limited to the Holley

factors, nor do all the factors apply in every case).

B.     Discussion

       In challenging the trial court’s order granting Mother the person with the exclusive

right to determine D.T.’s primary residence, Father points to Mother having moved seven

different times over a two-and-a-half-year period, holding multiple jobs for less than six

months, having different “boyfriends,” and violating the trial court’s order by not providing

the amicus attorney with the names of D.T.’s caretakers and drinking alcohol while in

possession of D.T.

       Mother explained that she was living in Port Mansfield prior to her involvement with

Father and owned a catering business there for at least twelve years. She and D.T.

subsequently moved to Austin with N.S. when Mother’s relationship with Father ended.

The trial court inquired what Mother’s long-term plans were as far as living arrangements.

Mother stated that her stepfather is battling stage four cancer and is currently in hospice

care. According to Mother, the home she currently lives in will be split between her

stepfather’s children, including her. “[W]e have already all agreed that after he passes—

and we all get along . . . that [D.T.] and I can stay there. [The other children] live

elsewhere . . . . [D.T.] and I are welcome to stay in the house,” and it would be Mother’s

responsibility to maintain the house, but taxes and insurance would be split among all of

stepfather’s children. Mother explained that D.T. was already enrolled in a relatively small

school.

                                             11
       Father informed the trial court that Mother “is a good mother,” but “she just does

certain things that worry” him like drinking and driving. However, Mother denied drinking

and driving with D.T. During a two-and-a-half-year period, Mother has had “one or two

beers” while D.T. was in her possession. Mother was then presented with photos of her

at friends’ gatherings with alcohol in front of her, but Mother denied that she was drinking

on those occasions. In fact, Mother stated that D.T. did not even attend one of those get-

togethers. Regarding Father’s allegations about Mother’s boyfriends, Mother stated that

D.T. only met one person.

       N.S. testified that Mother “is a great mom, very caring, loving, concerned over

anything that might come up.” N.S. stated there were no concerning behaviors of Mother.

The amicus attorney testified that she has seen Mother’s home: “There is a bed, there

[are] toys, and there is everything there for the young girl.”

       On the other hand, Dr. Rodriguez, Mother, N.S., the amicus attorney, and Father

elucidated Father’s concerning behavior as it related to his ability to coparent. Mother

stated that Father stalks her, takes pictures of her, and that she is the subject of constant

harassment. Father testified that although Mother is not receptive to having conversations

with him, he continues to message her daily “[b]ecause it has got [to] change sooner or

later to get along or something.” N.S. stated that Father harassed her, causing her to

block him from her phone and on social media. Dr. Rodriguez stated that she felt

threatened by Father, refused to continue her role as parenting facilitator, and

discontinued her services. Dr. Rodriguez further opined that Father was not interested in

what was best for D.T., he was not interested in becoming a better parent, and he

                                             12
continued to be hostile with Mother. When the amicus attorney questioned whether Father

could refrain from messaging Mother daily for the sake of co-parenting and allow Mother

to parent, Father stated he did not believe that he could.

       The trial court was in the best position to observe the demeanor and personalities

of the witnesses, and we defer to the trial court’s determinations regarding the credibility

of the witnesses. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005). We can

infer the trial court credited Mother’s testimony, and we conclude that there is some

evidence of a substantial and probative character to support the trial court’s decision that

it was in the best interest of D.T. to appoint Mother the person with the exclusive right to

designate D.T.’s primary residence. See Flowers, 407 S.W.3d at 459; In re K.L.W., 301

S.W.3d 423, 428 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (“In determining which conservator

will have exclusive right to establish primary residence under [§] 153.134(b), the trial court

is vested with broad discretion.”). We therefore find no abuse of discretion. See Flowers,

407 S.W.3d at 459. We overrule Father’s first issue.

                                 IV.    AMICUS ATTORNEY

       By his second issue, Father argues that “the trial court abused its discretion when

it tasked [the amicus attorney] with duties that qualified her as a child custody evaluator.”

Father does not elaborate what specific duties the trial court tasked the amicus attorney

to perform that are objectionable, and Father concedes that “the order is silent.”

       To present a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that (1) the

complaint was presented to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion stating

the specific grounds for the desired ruling if the specific grounds are not apparent from

                                             13
the context and (2) the trial court ruled on the request. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Bush v.

Bush, 336 S.W.3d 722, 729 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). To be

considered timely, the request, objection, or motion generally must be made at the earliest

possible opportunity, thereby allowing the trial court an opportunity to cure the error. See

Lake v. Premier Transp., 246 S.W.3d 167, 174 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.).

       Here, the trial court entered an agreed order appointing the amicus attorney on

March 31, 2020, “to assist the Court in protecting the best interest of” D.T., to “take any

action consistent with the child’s interests that [the amicus attorney] considers necessary

to expedite the proceedings,” and to “advocate the best interests of the child after

reviewing the facts and circumstances of the case.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 107.001(1) (providing that an “amicus attorney” is “an attorney appointed by the court

in a suit, other than a suit filed by a governmental entity, whose role is to provide legal

services necessary to assist the court in protecting a child’s best interests rather than to

provide legal services to the child”). The trial court specifically tasked the amicus attorney

with the duties as outlined in §§ 107.003 and 107.005. See id. §§ 107.003 (“Powers and

Duties of Attorney ad Litem for Child and Amicus Attorney”), 107.005 (“Additional Duties

of Amicus Attorney”). The amicus attorney appeared throughout this case. See O’Connor

v. O’Connor, 245 S.W.3d 511, 515 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)

(providing that the amicus attorney is appointed to assist the court; it is not to represent

the child or either of the parents). Father did not object or file any motions to disqualify

the amicus attorney based on her alleged role as child custody evaluator.6 See Gabel v.

       6 In fact, Father filed a motion requesting that the trial court appoint a child custody evaluator on

                                                   14
Gabel-Koehne, 649 S.W.3d 590, 603 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.)

(“Because Haden did not raise his objection until after the final hearing had occurred and

the amicus attorney had already completed her work on the case, the objection was not

timely.”). At trial, the amicus attorney testified without objection. See id. Furthermore,

Father did not file any post-judgment motion complaining of the amicus attorney’s alleged

dual role. See Bush, 336 S.W.3d at 729 (holding that an objection to the scope of amicus

attorney’s appointment made in a motion for new trial failed to preserve complaint for

appeal). Therefore, this issue has not been properly preserved for appeal. See id. (“Even

if we were to take Tracy’s argument in her motion for new trial as an objection to the trial

court’s appointment of the amicus attorney in a limited scope, this objection came over a

year and a half after the trial court appointed the amicus attorney with those limitations

specifically stated without any objection.”). We overrule his second issue.

                              V.      FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL

        By his third issue, Father argues that the trial court denied him “a fair trial when it

did not allow [him] to present a defense and by the Court’s deep-seated antagonism

toward [him].”

A.      Applicable Law

        Due process requires a neutral and detached judge. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411

U.S. 778, 786 (1973); Ellason v. Ellason, 162 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005,

no pet.) (providing that the parties have a right to a fair trial before an impartial judge).

We presume the trial judge was neutral and detached “in the absence of a clear showing

April 1, 2020.

                                              15
to the contrary.” Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 1993), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 855 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim App.

1994). The opinions a judge forms during a trial do not call into question a judge’s bias or

partiality “unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make

fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). A judge’s

criticism, disapproval of, or even hostility towards counsel, the parties, or their cases are

not behaviors that do not ordinarily support a bias or partiality challenge. Id.

“[E]xpressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger,” do not

establish bias or partiality. Id. at 555–56. “A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom

administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom

administration—remain immune.” Id. at 556.

       The trial court has broad discretion over the conduct of a trial and may properly

intervene to maintain control in the courtroom, to expedite the trial, and to prevent what it

considers to be a waste of time. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex.

2001) (per curiam). The trial judge has a duty to direct competent and material questions

to a witness to clarify testimony or to elicit testimony that has not otherwise been brought

out, and such practice is especially proper in a bench trial where the best interests of

children are at issue. Sklar v. Sklar, 598 S.W.3d 810, 825 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2020, no pet.); see also In re A.T.M., No. 13-21-00008-CV, 2021 WL 2584402, at

*17 (Tex., App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing

Trahan v. Trahan, 732 S.W.2d 113, 114–15 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1987, no writ))

                                             16
(holding the right to an impartial judge was not violated where the trial court asked more

questions than either of the attorneys)).

B.     Discussion

       Father complains for the first time on appeal of statements that occurred at a writ

of attachment hearing on January 15, 2021. Father cites instances where he alleges that

the trial court interrupted him, prohibited him from elaborating or from “present[ing] his

side,” and referenced Dr. Rodriguez’s report, which Father asserts is an “outside report.”

However, no objection was made to these exchanges. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re

L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 708 (Tex. 2003) (“[A]dhering to our preservation rules [in a

parental termination case] isn’t a mere technical nicety; the interests at stake are too

important to relax rules that serve a critical purpose.”); In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 431

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Requiring parties to preserve their

complaints in family-law cases furthers the legislative intent that such cases be resolved

expeditiously and with finality.”).

       Additionally, Father alleges that the trial court denied him an opening statement

and demonstrated “deep[-]seated antagonism” toward him when it asked Mother whether

Father was still “hypervigilant” at the final hearing. However, Father did not request an

opportunity to make an opening statement, and he did not object to the trial court’s inquiry.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d at 708; see also In re of A.C.R., No.

11-22-00358-CV, 2023 WL 3872722, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 8, 2023, no pet.)

(holding that appellant waived a complaint that the trial court erred by not allowing him an

opportunity to make an opening statement at a bench trial where appellant did not request

                                             17
an opportunity to make an opening statement); In re G.M.K., No. 13-22-00016-CV, 2023

WL 5122524, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 10, 2023, no pet.) (“Jared

failed to object to the trial court’s comments or questions and does not attempt to argue

why they were incurable or would excuse his failure to preserve error,” and “does not

argue that preservation was unnecessary because the error was fundamental.”).

        After considering the entire record, we cannot conclude that the trial court

demonstrated a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible.” See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Father’s complaints involve the trial court’s

skepticism as to Father’s behavior and his unwillingness to change his co-parenting

habits.7 The trial court’s statements about Father concern “routine trial administration

efforts,” “ordinary admonishments (whether or not legally supportable) to counsel,” “and

all occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and n[one] . . . displayed deep-seated

[nor] unequivocal antagonism that would render [a] fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 556.

In fact, the trial court acknowledged, “[Father] is the best father in the entire world. It’s

how he handles the relationship with [Mother] that is the causing the problems.” The trial

court stated that it wanted Father “to have time with his child. He loves his child. He’s not

a bad parent. He just cannot co-parent. And until he learns to co-parent, his time is going

        7 In the complained-of exchanges, the trial court stated that “whenever a parent starts controlling—

trying to control the other by keeping a child from a parent, that is a no-no in my court, [Father].” The trial
court stated that it was “not going to put up with it” and was “irritated in this case” when it saw how the
parties treated each other. “And that’s my number one pet peeve,” it explained. The trial court elaborated
that it had “severe concerns of allowing [Father] to have the child for a[]while.” The trial court continued:
“[Father] is overprotecting. He’s going to have to learn to ratchet that back. And me giving him an order that
he doesn’t get to see his kid isn’t going to help that. He needs to have counseling and he needs to address
those issues.” The trial court further explained that Father needed to learn to put his fears in a healthy
perspective.

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to be limited to this child. I cannot have this happening. It’s detrimental to that child[,] and

she is my number one interest.”8

        Lastly, Father complains the trial court modified its temporary order “unilaterally.”

However, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality

motion.” Id. at 555. After applying the applicable principles to this case and carefully

examining the trial court’s comments and allegedly extrajudicial consideration in the

context of the entire record, we conclude there is no evidence of judicial bias. Id. Instead,

the trial court exercised its broad discretion to maintain control over highly emotional and

contentious proceedings. See id. Accordingly, we overrule Father’s last issue.

                                           VI.     CONCLUSION

        We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                   JAIME TIJERINA
                                                                                   Justice

Delivered and filed on the
21st day of September, 2023.

        8 We note that during this exchange, Father interrupted the trial court and the amicus attorney, and

Father’s counsel stated, “[Father,] if you could be quiet, that would be great.”

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