Court Opinion

ID: 9457831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:34:11.782429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:31.512393
License: Public Domain

McCREE, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority opinion that Nalley’s conviction should be affirmed, but I respectfully dissent from that result in McGill’s case.
As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 141, 86 S.Ct. 279, 282, 15 L.Ed.2d 210 (1965), in which it held unconstitutional a statutory presumption that authorized a jury to infer from a defendant’s presence at an illegal still site that he had possession of the still:
[t]he United States has presented no cases in the courts which have sustained a conviction for possession based solely on the evidence of presence. All of the cases which deal with this issue and with which we are familiar have held presence alone, unilluminated by other facts, to be insufficient proof of possession ....
See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 30-36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969).
Nalley clearly knew where the stolen tractors were concealed. He rented a truck and organized a group of men to help him move them. But there is no evidence that McGill knew that he was employed to move stolen goods. In fact, the evidence suggests the contrary. Nalley’s confessed accomplice testified as a government witness as follows:
Q When was the first time that you learned that the tractor and trailer had stolen tractors in it?
A Well, actually that, uh, the F.B.I. and State Police were telling us about it, you know, and after we got to the jail or the courthouse they were interviewing Scamahorne and Nalley in the back room and, uh, McGill said something to me like, that he — uh, that he wished somebody had told him that trailerload of tractors had been there and he would have stayed home in bed.
Under Romano and the cases in our circuit following it, I would hold impermissible the inference that McGill possessed the stolen tractors from the mere fact of his presence 15 to 20 yards away from the trailer upon which they were loaded. That fact, without more, does not create a greater likelihood of criminal conduct than of innocent behavior and does not permit conviction of the crime of possessing stolen property. United States v. Readus, 367 F.2d 689, 690 (6th Cir. 1966). Compare United States v. Warren, 428 F.2d 15, 17-18 (6th Cir. 1970), with United States v. Johnson, 434 F.2d 816, 818-819 (6th Cir. 1970), and United States v. Reeves, 377 F.2d 524, 525 (6th Cir. 1967).
The fact that the stolen vehicles were carefully concealed does not make Mc-Gill’s presence more persuasive of his possession of them. In United States v. Romano, supra, the arrests were made at a still site concealed in an otherwise unused portion of a 42 acre industrial complex. Despite this circumstance, the Court of Appeals stated:
“The inference here is too strained and is not reasonably related to the fact proved. For example, one found present at a still may as well be a purchaser of the distilled product or a visitor for some other business purpose.” United States v. Romano, 330 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 382 U.S. 136, 86 S.Ct. 279, 15 L.Ed.2d 210 (1965).
The fact that McGill was in the company of other persons who were proven guilty is also an insufficient basis for inferring that he possessed the tractors. As we stated in United States v. Readus, 367 F.2d 689, 690 (1966):
mere presence on the scene and association with illegal posses*264sors [are] not enough to support convictions for possession or transportation.
It does not matter whether McGill’s attempted explanation of his presence was believable since the Government failed to establish a prima facie case of his guilt.
Since I would find the evidence insufficient to support the verdict of guilty in McGill’s case, I find it unnecessary to discuss the issues relating to the erroneous jury charge and the judge’s failure to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 which the majority opinion finds harmless.