Court Opinion

ID: 9668953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:33:33.667336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:50.506859
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Justice KELLER,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it reads Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution as strictly limiting expenditures from the state treasury to instances where appropriations have been made by law, I must respectfully dissent because the majority opinion construes so-called federal mandates and state statutory and constitutional directives to implement programs by passing further legislation as “appropriations” sufficient to. allow payment from the state treasury.
The majority opinion cites a variety of federal statutory schemes that allegedly require the states, including Kentucky, to spend money,1 describing these as “federal mandates.” The majority opinion claims that it does not directly address the issue of federal mandates, but it nonetheless claims that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution could require that any such mandate be funded regardless of Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution. But any actual mandate that the states enact a regulatory scheme, and thus spend money, is unconstitutional. As the United States Supreme Court noted in New York v. United States,2 “the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”3
In New York, the Court was faced with the question of the constitutionality' of parts of a federal regulatory scheme aimed at controlling low-level radioactive waste. The Court upheld the provisions pairing the right to choose whether to comply with an incentive to comply. The Court noted that conditions may be attached to the receipt of federal funds.4 The Court also noted: “[WJhere Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’s power to offer States the *881choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.”5 The Court cited, either directly or by citing to cases addressing the statutes, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Clean Water Act— all of which the majority opinion in the present case cites and describes as federal mandates — as examples of this second type of allowable incentive programs, or “program[s] of cooperative federalism.”6 In upholding these incentive approaches, the Court observed that compliance by the states was voluntary:
By either of these methods, as by any other permissible method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply. If a State’s citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant. If state residents would prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to problems other than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal Government rather than the State bear the expense of a federally mandated regulatory program, and they may continue to supplement that program to the extent state law is not pre-empted. Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.7
The Court distinguished between the true “incentive” provisions of the scheme and the outright commands to regulate when it addressed the provisions requiring the states either to take ownership of radioactive waste or to regulate according to the instructions of Congress. The Court declared those provisions unconstitutional as violating the Tenth Amendment, noting succinctly: “The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”8
The Court revisited the issue of federal mandates in Printz v. United States9 when addressing provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that imposed requirements on state law enforcement officers. Again the Court struck down the provisions, stating “the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”10 The Court concluded by expanding its holding in New York:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot *882circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether pol-icymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.11
While the full effect of these cases is unknown at this, time,12 surely a “mandate” from the federal government that requires a state to spend money from its treasury is the sort of improper impingement on state sovereignty that the Court rejected in New York and Printz. And as the Court noted in New York, many so-called “mandates;” including those cited in the majority opinion in this case, are actually just incentive programs that allow voluntary compliance by the states. By failing to pass a budget or to enact separate appropriations to fund participation in those programs, the General Assembly is choosing, albeit by default, not to participate. There is no federal requirement, operating through the Supremacy Clause or otherwise, that requires an expenditure of state funds for these programs. And there is little question that if actual federal mandates do exist, they are not binding, and certainly do not supersede Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution, because they are unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
The majority also claims that there are a variety of Kentucky statutory and constitutional provisions that contain or constitute appropriations independent of the appropriations normally found in the biennial budget bill, but, in my opinion, there is simply no support for such a reading in the text. For example, the majority finds an inherent appropriation in KRS 18A.15(2), which provides that “[ajppropriations shall be made from the general expenditure fund to the cabinet to meet the estimated pro rata share of the cost of administering the provisions of this chapter .... ” But the language “appropriations shall be made” does not constitute an appropriation, i.e., the “setting aside [of] a sum of money for a public purpose”;13 rather, it is a command for appropriations to be made in the future, e.g., in a budget bill. This language is not sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 230, which allows payment only after an. appropriation by law has been made.
As an example of this type'-of inherent appropriation in the Constitution, the majority points to Section 254, which provides that “[t]he Commonwealth shall maintain control of the discipline, and provide for all supplies, and for the sanitary conditions of the convicts .... ” But again, the provision *883contains no setting aside of money for this purpose and no command that the state make a payment. Section 254 only contains the command that the Commonwealth shall maintain discipline of and provide for the needs of prisoners. While there is little doubt that governments have some implied powers,14 such implications must fail in the face of express constitutional and statutory provisions to the contrary. Were Section 245 of the Kentucky Constitution to exist in a vacuum, then the requirement that the Commonwealth provide for prisoners would surely imply the means to do so, i.e., the power to pay for guards, supplies, etc. But we must read Section 245, and the various other similar provisions cited by the majority, in light of Section 280, which eliminates any implied power to spend money from the state treasury absent an express “appropriation made by law.”15
The majority also cites Section 183, which provides for the establishment and maintenance of public schools: “The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State....”16 The majority interprets this as sufficient to constitute an appropriation for the purposes of Section 230, but this section simply does not direct that costs of establishing and maintaining the public schools be paid. In fact, the very language of Section 183 implies that the means for establishing and maintaining the public schools, which presumably includes payment for services, supplies, et cetera, are to be provided through other legislative action of the General Assembly. Again, this is a command to the General Assembly to do something; it is clearly not an appropriation. Reading an “appropriation” into this language contradicts the clear command of Section 230 that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the State Treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations made by law....”
By requiring that spending be allowed for those constitutional and statutory provisions at the level previously provided for in the expired biennial budget, the majority, in effect, reads into these statutory and constitutional provisions a holdover provision analogous to the continuation budget statutory scheme that was in place from 1918 until 1983 when it was repealed by the General Assembly.17 But the statutory holdover provisions were repealed, and there is no actual constitutional provision applicable to the constitutional provisions that command certain programs to be enacted. This is most troubling because if the majority opinion is correct in inferring such a holdover capacity, then how can the General Assembly ever decrease the spending for such programs if a holdover provision is an inherent aspect of those constitutional provisions that impose a duty on the General Assembly? Either the command to make the expenditure is there, or it is not. And either the command to maintain spending levels at their previous level is there, or it is not. In the case of provisions like Sections 183 and 254, neither command is present.
This is not to say that these are the only statutory and constitutional provisions that *884require an end without providing for appropriations to supply that end. I simply offer these provisions as examples of the overreaching in the majority opinion. Section 230’s command that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the State Treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations made by law” is a limitation on any implied powers that the Governor or the General Assembly might try to justify with reference to other sections of the Constitution.
Upholding the Constitution, be it State or Federal, is not merely the responsibility of the Judiciary; it is the duty of all three branches to carry out those fundamental mandates. Where the Constitution commands the General Assembly to do something, e.g., “[i]t shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide by law, as soon as practicable, for the establishment and maintenance of an institution or institutions for the detention, correction, instruction and reformation of all persons under the age of eighteen years, convicted of such felonies and such misdemeanors as may be designated by law,”18 it is the General Assembly’s duty to follow that command by enacting positive law, includ-mg laws that appropriate funding, if necessary, for carrying-out its enactments. It is not the prerogative of the Executive to pick up the slack by following the command in the General Assembly’s stead, and it is especially not the Judiciary’s prerogative to order the General Assembly to follow the command.19
Admittedly, our Constitution contains various checks and balances among the three branches. For example, the Judiciary has the power to review and hold void unconstitutional laws; the General Assembly has the power to impeach civil officers; and the Governor has the power to veto legislation and to convene the General Assembly for special sessions. But our Constitution contains explicit separation of powers provisions.20 As such, the power to remedy a failure by one branch of government to perform a duty explicitly assigned to it by our Constitution rarely lies in one of the other branches. Instead, the remedy for such a failure to act lies in the people themselves. If the various legislators are faced with the prospect of closing the schools21 or of closing the prisons,22 along with the attendant impact of those *885closings on their constituencies, all due to a lack of funding caused by the failure to enact a budget or to enact appropriations, I believe that they will carry out the duties imposed on them by those constitutional provisions. If I am wrong and the legislators do not pay heed to those duties, then their constituents will likely exact a steep price at the polls at the next election. It is the people from whom all the power of this Commonwealth derives,23 and in the end they are the ultimate check on each branch of our government.
SCOTT, J., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970); 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977); 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (Clean Air Act).

. 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992).

. Id. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 2423.

. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct at 2423.

. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. at 2424.

. Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S., 264, 289, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2366, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981)).

. Id. at 168, 112 S.Ct. 2408 112 S.Ct. at 2424 (emphasis added); see also id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. at 2424. ("This is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to encourage a State to regulate in a particular way, or that Congress may not hold out incentives to the States as a method of influencing a State’s policy choices. Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests.").

. Id. at 188, 112 S.Ct. at 2435.

. 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914(1997).

. Id. at 925, 117 S.Ct. at 2380.

. Id. at 935, 117 S.Ct at 2384.

. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2205-06 (1998) (“The breadth of Printz s effect on other federal statutes is unclear, although a small number of statutes are clearly invalid under Printz.")', see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 936, 117 S.Ct. at 2385 (O’Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid.”).

.BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (8th ed.2004); see also BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 71 (2d ed.1995) (defining “appropriation” in part as "a public body's act of voting a sum of money for any of various public purposes”).

. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 290 (J. Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed. 2000) ("No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included.’').

. KY. CONST. § 230.

. (Emphasis added.)

. See KRS 45.120 (repealed 1983 by 1982 Ky. Acts, ch. 450, § 79).

. KY. CONST. § 252.

. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them .... The judiciary .. . has no influence over either the sword or the purse.”).

. See KY. CONST. § 27 ("The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit; Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another.”); id. § 28 ("No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.”).

. See KY. CONST. § 183 (requiring that "[t]he General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State,” (emphasis added), without directing that costs of establishing and running those schools be paid).

. See KY. CONST. § 254 (requiring that "[t]he Commonwealth shall maintain control of the discipline, and provide for all supplies, and for the sanitaiy conditions of the convicts” without providing for payment of those expenses).

. KY. CONST. § 4 ("All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety, happiness, and the protection of property. For the advancement of these ends, they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such a manner as they may deem proper.").