Court Opinion

ID: 9409535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 16:09:24.575639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:51.301829
License: Public Domain

J-A12021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.Y., A MINOR :        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                   :             PENNSYLVANIA
                                   :
 APPEAL OF: T.Y., MOTHER           :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :        No. 2819 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0000992-2020

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.D.Y.T., A        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
                                        :
 APPEAL OF: T.Y., MOTHER                :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :   No. 2820 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the Decree Entered September 26, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000247-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                           FILED JULY 18, 2023

     T.Y. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to

S.Y. (Child), born in September of 2020, and changing Child’s permanency

goal to adoption. After careful review, we vacate the trial court’s order and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
J-A12021-23

       The trial court summarized the underlying history of this matter as

follows:

       DHS first became aware of this family on April 8, 2019, when it
       received a General Protective Services (GPS) report indicating
       concerns for the safety of Child’s older sibling and Mother’s mental
       health issues.     The report stated that Mother had been
       hospitalized for mental health treatment at Fairmount Behavioral
       Health system for exhibiting erratic behavior such as yelling in the
       streets and threating family members with knives. The report
       further stated that Mother tested positive for marijuana, cocaine,
       oxycodone, and benzodiazepines in the past. The report was
       determined to be valid and Child’s sibling was committed to DHS.
       On May 1, 2020, the Philadelphia Police Department received a
       GPS report that on April 30, 2020, Mother was located on a
       highway attempting to sell Child’s sibling for drugs, hitting herself,
       talking to people who were not present, throwing food and her
       mobile phone, and attempting to walk into traffic. Mother failed
       to provide a urine sample for toxicology.           The report was
       determined to be valid.

       On September 4, 2020, the day following the birth of Child, DHS
       received a GPS report which alleged Mother tested positive for
       Marijuana, Oxycodone, Fentanyl, and Tramadol during Child’s
       birth. Child tested positive for Marijuana and Oxycodone. Child
       was born at thirty-three weeks gestation, weighing three pounds
       and eight ounces. Child was admitted to the Neonatal Intensive
       Care Unit. Mother admitted to using Marijuana, Oxycontin, and
       Tramadol but denied using Fentanyl. Mother was diagnosed with
       Bi-Polar Disorder, Schizoaffective Disorder, Major Depressive
       Disorder, Cannabis and Opiate use, and showed severe psychotic
       symptoms. Mother was not receiving drug or alcohol treatment.
       Mother has a history of unstable housing and was residing in a
       hotel. On September 18, 2020,[1] DHS obtained an Order of
____________________________________________

1 The record reflects that the trial court initially appointed Claire Leotta, Esq.
to act as Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL). See Recommendation for Shelter
Care, 9/21/20, at 2. On August 30, 2022, the trial court appointed Irene Julie
Levy, Esq. to serve as Child’s GAL. See Letter of Appointment, 8/30/22.
There is no indication that the trial court appointed separate legal counsel on
Child’s behalf.

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      Protective Custody (OPC) for Child and placed Child into the pre-
      adoptive home of Tamekia McFadden. The adjudicatory hearing
      was held on November 17, 2020, whereby this court adjudicated
      Child dependent based on present inability of parents to provide
      proper parental care and control, and Child was fully committed
      to DHS.

Trial Ct. Op., 1/13/23, at 1-2.

      On April 13, 2022, DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental

rights to Child and change Child’s permanency goal to adoption.        The trial

court conducted a hearing on September 26, 2022.           At that time, DHS

presented testimony establishing that Mother’s reunification goals had

remained the same throughout the life of the case and that Mother had failed

to make any progress on those goals. See N.T. Hr’g, 9/26/22, at 28.

      With respect to the testimony regarding Child’s bond with Mother, the

trial court explained:

      Mother [] testified that Child called [Tameika McFadden (Foster
      Mother)] her mother and she had to tell Child who she is in relation
      to her.    She also stated that while visiting with Child they talk
      and play and that Child called her “mom” twice. Mother admitted
      that Child does not know her “like that” but believes Child is
      bonded with her. . . . Mother testified that she did not want her
      rights terminated.

      [Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) case manager supervisor
      Alicia] Lomax testified about the relationship and lack of parental
      bond Child and Mother have. She stated that Child and Mother do
      not share a parental bond and Child does not look to Mother as
      her caregiver. She further testified that Child does not have a
      close relationship with Mother nor does Child seek care or comfort
      from Mother. [CUA case manager Amira] Drayton, who was the
      visitation coach on this case for about five months, physically
      observed Mother’s interaction with Child.     While Ms. Drayton is
      uncertain of the exact number of visits she observed, she testified
      that there was no bond between Mother and Child. Ms. Lomax

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      also testified about the relationship and bond that the Child shares
      with her pre- adoptive family. Child is two years old and has
      resided in this home for her entire life. Ms. Lomax testified that
      for six months she personally completed monthly home visits
      [with Foster Mother] and witnessed interactions between Child
      and [Foster Mother]. She stated that she last saw Child in the
      home of [Foster Mother] in May of 2022. She testified that Child
      has a close relationship with her Foster Mother . . . and calls her
      “mom.” She further stated that [Foster Mother] meets Child’s
      daily emotional and medical needs, and that Child looks to [Foster
      Mother] for care and comfort. She stated that [Foster Mother]
      provides Child with safety and stability as Child has been in her
      current placement since birth. Additionally, Ms. Lomax testified
      that [] Child would not suffer any harm from terminating Mother’s
      [] parental rights and that she believes it is in the best interest of
      Child to change the goal to adoption.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a decree

terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing Child’s permanency goal to

adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) and finding

that termination of Mother’s parental rights best served Child’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

      Mother subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Mother and

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for review:

      Whether the trial court erred by finding, under 23 Pa.C.S. §
      2511(b), that termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves
      the [Child’s] developmental, physical and emotional needs and
      welfare.

                                      -4-
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Mother’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).2

       Before addressing Mother’s claim, we must review whether the trial

court appointed legal counsel to represent Child for the termination

proceedings pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).              See In re Adoption of

K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020). Our Supreme Court has interpreted

Section 2313(a) “as requiring ‘that the common pleas court appoint an

attorney to represent the child’s legal interest, i.e. the child’s preferred

outcome.’”     Id. (citation omitted).         Additionally, the failure to appoint a

“‘separate attorney to represent the child’s legal interests constitutes

structural error, meaning it is not subject to a harmless-error analysis.’” Id.

(citations omitted).

       It is well settled that “a single attorney cannot represent a child’s best

interests and legal interests if those interests conflict.” Id. at 1236 (citation

omitted). As such, our Supreme Court has held that before appointing an

individual to serve as both guardian ad litem (GAL) and legal counsel for a

child, the trial court “must determine whether counsel can represent the dual

interests . . .” Id. Further, where the trial court appoints one attorney “to

represent both the child’s best interests and legal interests, appellate courts

should review sua sponte whether the [trial] court made a determination that

those interests did not conflict.” Id. at 1235.

____________________________________________

2 We note that Mother did not raise any claims concerning the basis for
termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) in her Rule 1925(a)(2) statement nor
does she raise those issues in her brief.

                                           -5-
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       Here, the record reflects that the trial court appointed Attorney Levy as

Child’s GAL in August of 2022. See Trial Ct. Order, 8/30/22. The trial court

did not appoint separate counsel to represent Child’s legal interests. In the

absence of a conflict between Child’s best interests and legal interests,

Attorney Levy could have acted in a dual capacity on Child’s behalf. However,

there is no indication that the trial court made any determination as to whether

there was a conflict between Child’s legal interests and best interests.3 See

K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1236. For these reasons, we are constrained to vacate

the involuntary termination decree and remand for further proceedings. See

id.; see also Interest of A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d 563, 570-71 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(reiterating that “appellate review of this question does not involve second–

guessing whether GAL/[legal c]ounsel in fact had a conflict but solely whether

the [trial] court made the determination in the first instance” (citation

omitted)).

       On remand, within thirty days of the date the record is remitted, we

direct the trial court to fulfill its Section 2313(a) duty as articulated in K.M.G.

and determine whether Attorney Levy may represent both the best interests

and legal interests of Child. If the trial court determines that no conflict exists
____________________________________________

3 We recognize that Child was only two years old at the time of the termination
hearing. However, the trial court did not determine, nor did counsel indicate
on the record, whether Child was too young to articulate a preference as to
the outcome of the proceedings, such that no conflict could exist. See In re
T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018). Further, although we acknowledge that
remand will result in a delay, we are not in a position to make this
determination on the trial court’s behalf. See A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d at 570-71.

                                           -6-
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between Child’s dual interests, then the court shall re-enter the termination

order as to Mother.    If the trial court determines that there is a conflict

between Child’s best interests and legal interests, then the court shall appoint

separate legal counsel for Child and conduct a new termination hearing at

which time Child’s legal counsel can advocate on behalf of Child’s legal

interests. See K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1235.

      Order vacated.      Case remanded with instructions.          Jurisdiction

relinquished.

      Judge McLaughlin joins the memorandum.

      Judge Olson files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/18/2023

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