Court Opinion

ID: 9740849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:42:47.961943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.664339
License: Public Domain

Murphy, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to eliminate his obligation to pay alimony.
Relevant to this appeal, the judgment of divorce contained the following language with respect to alimony and the parties’ respective pensions from their employers:
ii. re: alimony
It is further ordered that the Defendant, Richard Weaver, shall pay to the Plaintiff, Shirley Ann Weaver, alimony in the sum of one hundred fifty ($150.00) dollars per week payable until the death or remarriage of the Plaintiff or the further Order of the Court ....
m. re: property settlement agreement
It is further ordered and adjudged that the Plaintiff, Shirley Ann Weaver, shall receive any and all pension benefits which she may have from the General Motors Corporation, free and clear of any claim on the part of the Defendant.
It is further ordered and adjudged that the *264Defendant, Richard Weaver, shall receive any and all pension benefits which he may have from General Motors Corporation, free and clear of any claim on the part of the Plaintiff.
Despite the fact that defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff $150 per week in alimony, less than a year later he filed a motion to eliminate alimony. Defendant, who voluntarily took early retirement between the time of the judgment of divorce and the motion to eliminate alimony, claimed that a change in circumstances had occurred lessening his income. Defendant further claimed that under Walker v Walker, 155 Mich App 405; 399 NW2d 541 (1986), the income from his pension, pursuant to the judgment of divorce, was his separate property and could not be considered as income for alimony purposes. There is no question from the record that plaintiff’s needs remain the same and that her economic situation has not significantly improved since the time of the divorce.
The trial court did not believe that Walker applied and denied defendant’s motion to eliminate alimony for the following reasons:
The alimony was based upon an ability to pay both then, and if in fact he took retirement, subsequently. This was not something that has arisen all of a sudden today. This was a matter that preceded the Judgment. It is not a change of heart. This is not now suddenly deciding, well, here he has a pension, we want part of that. The property settlement would probably have been completely different if — because of the health of the wife and so forth, it was necessary that some provision be made for her, and therefore the property was divided as it was.
The Court still feels he has the ability to support his wife just as he did at the time, and when what was originally decreed, and therefore deny the Motion for Rehearing.
*265The standard for appellate review of motions to modify alimony in a judgment of divorce was summarized by this Court in Eckhardt v Eckhardt, 155 Mich App 314, 316-317; 399 NW2d 68 (1986):
Authority for modifying a divorce judgment is statutory. MCL 552.28; MSA 25.106. Modifying an award of alimony under this section may be based only upon new facts or changed circumstances arising since the judgment which would justify revision. Crouse v Crouse, 140 Mich App 234; 363 NW2d 461 (1985). The party requesting modification has the burden of showing a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant it. Couzens v Couzens, 140 Mich App 423; 364 NW2d 340 (1985). This Court reviews divorce judgment modifications de novo and will not disturb trial court decisions unless convicted [sic] it would have reached another result. Schaeffer v Schaeffer, 106 Mich App 452; 308 NW2d 226 (1981).
In reviewing this case I acknowledge that defendant’s wages were substantially reduced by his early retirement and that there was a correlative reduction in his income. However, I also note that defendant was only fifty-one years old when he retired and arguably he is capable of finding other employment. In addition, his early retirement was largely self-imposed and less than one year after he agreed to pay plaintiff $150 per week in support.1 The record further reflects that plaintiff’s economic needs have not decreased and that defendant receives $1,800 per month in pension benefits. Under these circumstances, my judgment would be the same as that of the trial judge who declined to eliminate alimony. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s decision._
*266I also acknowledge that this decision, and perhaps analysis, may be inconsistent with the opinion in Walker, supra. The Court in Walker seemed to adopt a bright-line rule that in a consented-to judgment of divorce, if pension benefits are awarded to one party, those benefits cannot be considered as income in determining ability to pay alimony. To hold otherwise, according to Walker, "would violate the binding divorce judgment as well as the equitable principles upon which divorce actions are based.” I simply cannot follow the Walker decision if it is so construed. I believe it would often lead to inequitable results if income from pensions, just like income from other items described as "property,” could not be considered along with other factors in making decisions regarding motions to modify alimony or child support.
What are the equitable principles referred to in Walker that would allow defendant in this case to keep all of his pension benefits because "plaintiff consented to a judgment of divorce which awarded defendant’s pension benefits to him as property,” while simultaneously denying plaintiff alimony that defendant had "consented to pay” less than a year before he voluntarily retired, especially when there has been no material change in the plaintiffs economic needs?
In applying the Walker rationale to various hypothetical situations, one can easily see that inequitable results may occur. For example, what equitable principles would take away agreed-to alimony, or child support, if it later develops that the defendant’s income was sizeable, but was from a pension, or piece of real estate for that matter, that was awarded to the defendant under the "property” provisions of a judgment of divorce?
What equitable principles would eliminate *267agreed-to alimony where the spouse’s wages decreased drastically, but income has remained stable, or increased, because of stock ownership that was by agreement awarded to the spouse under the "property” provision of the judgment of divorce?
What equitable principles would mandate that a trial judge terminate agreed-to alimony or child support in a situation where the husband gives up his employment after divorce because he won the Michigan lottery, on a theory that his lottery ticket was personalty and the judgment of divorce awarded him all personalty in his possession, free and clear of any claim by his spouse under a "property” provision of the judgment?
It does not take a great deal of imagination to come up with a myriad of facts that would result in unfair and inequitable results if the bright-line Walker rationale is applied across the board. Although a bright-line rule on pensions could provide a certain simplicity of application for the trial court, I am not prepared to subordinate general principles of equity to accomplish this goal.
The pension provisions in the divorce judgment in this case are most likely similar to the pension provisions in thousands of consented-to divorce judgments in this state. I suggest that, with rare exception, when alimony or child support is agreed to, neither party anticipates alimony or support to cease simply because the ex-spouse chooses to retire early and draw his or her pension. It may be that a voluntary or involuntary retirement, which leaves the retiring spouse with pension income alone, is enough of a change of circumstances justifying a modification of agreed-to alimony or support. However, the results mandated by Walker, that pension benefits cannot be considered under any circumstances, means that in most *268cases alimony or support would altogether cease. Such a result is often both inequitable and patently unfair.
If the Walker rule and its analysis is to be the law, and for reasons stated above I do not believe it should be,2 then lawyers and trial courts should fully consider the ramifications of awarding one party his or her pension as part of a property settlement, which is free and clear from the other party’s claims relative to alimony or child support. Presumably, the same considerations would be true with respect to other items of property which might later produce income or be sold and be turned into investments that produce income. Therefore, with respect to pensions, at least, the bench and bar must be fully cognizant of the fact that the party receiving the pension may opt for or be forced to accept early retirement.
Because of the inequities that would result from applying the Walker decision across the board, I sincerely believe the better rule is to permit the trial court, when considering whether agreed-to alimony or child support should be modified, to seek fairness and equity under all the circumstances, and to determine whether new facts or changed circumstances would justify a modification.3 These new facts or changed circumstances might include, when a pension is involved, the reasons for retirement, whether retirement was voluntary or involuntary, whether retirement was *269early or scheduled, whether retirement was contemplated by the parties at the time of entry of the judgment, and the amount of income the retiree receives from pension benefits and other sources. Consideration should also be given to income produced from other property awarded to a party at the time of judgment. These factors, together with other factors traditionally used in determining alimony4 and support, would then be part of the record for this Court to review de novo.
For reasons set forth above, I dissent and would affirm the trial court’s decision denying defendant’s motion to eliminate alimony._

 Voluntary reduction in income is not a proper basis for reduction in alimony. See Gerlach v Gerlach, 82 Mich App 605; 267 NW2d 149 (1978).

 Recently, two other panels of this Court seem to have recognized the potential inequities of the Walker holding. See Lang v Lang, 169 Mich App 429; 425 NW2d 800 (1988); Stoltman v Stoltman, 170 Mich App 653; 429 NW2d 220 (1988).

 1 wholeheartedly agree with the statement made in the majority opinion in Stoltman, supra, p 658, that "the decision whether to terminate alimony upon the retirement of the party obligated to pay alimony when a pension has been awarded to the obligor should be decided on a case-by-case basis.”

 Parrish v Parrish, 138 Mich App 546; 361 NW2d 366 (1984); Hatcher v Hatcher, 129 Mich App 753; 343 NW2d 498 (1983); McLain v McLain, 108 Mich App 166; 310 NW2d 316 (1981).