Court Opinion

ID: 9838662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 15:02:24.712221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:38.127252
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HAROLD JEAN-BAPTISTE,                              :
                                                   :
       Plaintiff,                                  :       Civil Action No.:       22-1420 (RC)
                                                   :
       v.                                          :       Re Document No.:        25
                                                   :
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF                        :
JUSTICE, et al.,                                   :
                                                   :
       Defendants.                                 :

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

                          GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

                                       I. INTRODUCTION

       Plaintiff Harold Jean-Baptiste, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action against the

Department of Justice (“DOJ”); Merrick B. Garland in his official capacity as the Attorney

General of the United States; the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”); Christopher Wray in

his official capacity as the Director of the FBI; and the Civil Process Clerk for the U.S.

Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff raises a

variety of allegations, asserting that the FBI has been monitoring Plaintiff’s computer and phone

in violation of the Fourth Amendment, interfering with potential employment opportunities, and

attempting to get Plaintiff to violate federal law. Plaintiff claims that the DOJ and the FBI are

targeting Plaintiff based on his race and in violation of his civil and constitutional rights.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

and for failure to state a claim. For the reasons detailed below, the Court grants Defendants’

motion to dismiss.
                                       II. BACKGROUND

       Plaintiff commenced this action on May 18, 2022. Compl., ECF No. 1. His original

complaint outlines various allegations against the FBI, claiming that the agency has harassed and

discriminated against Plaintiff in an “attempt[] to destroy [his] life.” Id. at 4–7. On May 24,

2022, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”). See FAC, ECF No. 3. On September

28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”). See SAC, ECF No. 13. 1

       Plaintiff first alleges that, after he submitted a bid for a government contract with the city

of Miami, the FBI contacted certain Miami government employees and asked them to select

Plaintiff for the bid in the hopes that he “would lie to try violate Federal Laws [sic] to win the

contract.” Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff next contends that the FBI monitored his computer and “sabotage[d]

plaintiff’s website . . . to prevent the plaintiff from have a [sic] commerce and generate revenue.”

Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff then includes a litany of allegations about the FBI interfering with various job

interviews by contacting his interviewers and telling them not to hire him. Id. ¶¶ 11–18.

According to Plaintiff, he has “suffered discrimination and harassment in whole by the FBI . . .

since August 1, 2020 [and has been] singled out for adverse treatment by FBI done under

‘National Security Letters’ . . . use to shield their violation of Federal Laws [sic].” Id. ¶ 1. In

short, Plaintiff claims that the FBI has violated multiple federal statutes and the Fourth and Ninth

Amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 22–30. He seeks $100 million in punitive

damages. Id. at 13.

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          The Court considers the SAC to be the operative complaint. Although Defendants
respond to the original complaint in their motion to dismiss, their arguments apply with equal
force to the SAC, which does not differ substantially from the original complaint.

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       On February 28, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 5, 7, ECF No. 25. In response, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’

arguments are “just gobbledygook” and that his case should be allowed to proceed to discovery,

considering the public interest of full judicial review. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss

(“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 2, 4, 7, ECF No. 29 (emphasis removed).

                                          III. ANALYSIS

       Because Plaintiff’s complaint is patently insubstantial, the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over this case. Complaints filed by pro se litigants are “construed liberally and [are]

held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Lemon v. Kramer,

270 F. Supp. 3d 125, 133 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(per curiam)). Nevertheless, “pro se plaintiffs retain the burden to establish that the Court has

subject matter jurisdiction over their case.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.

Trump, No. 18-cv-2820, 2019 WL 11769175, at *1 (D.D.C. May 6, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Xiu

Jian Sun v. Trump, No. 19-5197, 2020 WL 873534 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2020). A complaint may

be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the complaint is “patently insubstantial

and thus presents no federal question suitable for decision.” Id. (quoting Yi Tai Shao v. Roberts,

No. 18-cv-1233, 2019 WL 249855, at *15 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2019)) (cleaned up). “Declining to

hear a claim because it is patently insubstantial is ‘reserved for complaints resting on truly

fanciful factual allegations,’ while ‘legally deficient complaints’ are still reserved for 12(b)(6)

dismissals.” Yi Tai Shao, 2019 WL 249855, at *15 (quoting Vasaturo v. Peterka, 203 F. Supp.

3d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2016)) (emphasis in original). To meet this standard, “claims must be flimsier

than doubtful or questionable—they must be essentially fictitious.” Id. (quoting Vasaturo, 203 F.

                                                  3
Supp. 3d at 44) (cleaned up). “Essentially fictitious claims include ‘bizarre conspiracy theories,

any fantastic government manipulations of the will or mind, and any sort of supernatural

intervention.’” Id. (quoting Vasaturo, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 44) (cleaned up).

       Plaintiff’s accusations rely solely on unsubstantiated theories about the FBI interfering

with his life. Plaintiff claims that he would be able to prove each of the assertions about the FBI

interfering with his various job interviews by deposing the interviewers. See SAC ¶¶ 12–18.

Yet he offers no evidence beyond his bare allegations—the sort of “bizarre conspiracy theories”

and “clearly fanciful claims” that are “‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid

of merit.’” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330–31 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415

U.S. 528, 536 (1974)).

       Assertions “of surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins” like

Plaintiff’s have been dismissed by this Court and others in this District for patent

insubstantiality. Williams v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-cv-1084, 2023 WL 2139367

(D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2023); see also, e.g., Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1008 (D.C. Cir.

2009); Curran v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2009); Lewis v. Bayh, 577 F. Supp. 2d

47, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2008). For example, in Williams, this Court dismissed a plaintiff’s claim that

the FBI and other government agencies had planted listening devices in her home and stalked her

as part of a years-long investigation. See 2023 WL 2139367, at *7. Plaintiff's allegations

regarding the FBI blocking his various employment opportunities, interfering with his website,

and trying to set him up to commit fraud may be similarly characterized by the “common theme”

underlying each of the cases listed above that were dismissed for patent insubstantiality: they are

“not merely factually unsubstantiated, but factually fanciful to the point that they [are]

‘essentially fictitious.’” Yi Tai Shao, 2019 WL 249855, at *15 (quoting Best, 39 F. 3d at 330);

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see also Jean-Baptiste v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 23-cv-1054, 2023 WL 3736770, at *2

(D.D.C. May 31, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations that the FBI had

blocked him from making securities trades on E*TRADE based on subject matter jurisdiction).

        Moreover, and for the same reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S 544, 570 (2007)). When deciding a motion to dismiss, “the Court must . . .

‘treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff the benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. IRS, 261 F.

Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sparrow v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). “But a plaintiff must put forth factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2019 WL 11769175, at *2

(citation omitted and cleaned up).

        Plaintiff does not provide factual support for his allegations in the SAC, providing

nothing beyond the mere allegations that the FBI set up the Plaintiff to commit fraud, interfered

with his website, and contacted any of his interviewers to prevent him from being hired. See

SAC ¶¶ 9–18. Simply put, Plaintiff has not put forth any factual content from which the Court

might draw the inference that Defendants are liable for the alleged misconduct. See Church of

Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2019 WL 11769175, at *2.

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                                   IV. CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An order

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: September 7, 2023                                     RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
                                                             United States District Judge

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