Court Opinion

ID: 9829390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:16:24.993785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:00.679420
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Article 3356, Vernon’s Sayles’ Texas Civil Statutes, reads as follows:
“Should there be more than one executor or administrator of the same estate at the same time, the acts of one of them as such1 executor or administrator shall be as valid as if all had acted jointly; and, in case of the death, resignation or removal of an executor or administrator, if there be a coexecutor or coadminis-trator of such estate, he shall proceed with the administration as if no such death, resignation or removal had occurred.”
In the case of Armstrong v. O’Brien, 83 Tex. 639, 19 S. W. 269, it was held that by virtue of that statute certain letters written by one alone of two joint executors were admissible against both as joint executors of the estate. That was a suit against the two executors for commissions claimed by plaintiffs for negotiating the sale of land belonging to the estate. The opinion does not disclose the contents of the letters held to be admissible. It does not appear whether they were introduced to prove the alleged con-, tract of both executors employing the plaintiff to sell the land, or relates merely to some issue incidental to that issue. It is significant that the opinion, after referring to the provisions of the statute above, added, “But this provision, however, does not apply to the conveyance of real estate, in which all who are acting must join. Art. 1937,” which latter- article is now No. 3357.
[4, 5] As , shown in our original opinion, the estate of the decedent was devised to N. P. Dodge, Jr., and P. S. Pusey, “as joint tenants,” in trust for the purposes stated in the will, and the power to sell the property was conferred upon them as joint tenants and trustees and not as executors. It is an elementary general rule that one of two joint tenants cannot make a valid contract of sale of the entire title to the joint property without the consent of the other. 23 Oyc. 494. And the same general rule applies to trustees in whom confidence has been reposed jointly, with no power given them, either expressly or by implication, to act singly. 1 Perry on Trusts, § 411. If the will be construed as authorizing the sale of the land by Dodge and Pusey in their offices as executors and not as joint tenants and trustees, and if N. P. Dodge, acting alone as executor, could make a valid contract of employment of Lacey as agent for the estate to sell the land, then Lacey, as such agent, could bind the estate by his contract of sale, and thus convey an equitable title to the land, contrary to the provisions of article 3357 of the *403Statutes, requiring both executors to join in the conveyance. And it would be clearly contrary to the general rules of common law and equity, mentioned above with respect to the powers of joint tenants and joint trustees, for N. P. Dodge by such a course to dispose of the land in controversy without the consent and concurrence of his joint tenant and cotrustee, Pusey. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, we cannot believe that in disposing of the case of Armstrong v. O’Brien, supra, our Supreme Court intended to hold that one of two joint executors, acting alone, can confer upon his agent authority to bind the estate to sell land notwithstanding the fact that the statute referred to in the opinion expressly provides that both executors must join in such a c'onveyance.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.