Court Opinion

ID: 9917020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 15:04:39.354835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:47.992265
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13279

                 COMMONWEALTH   vs.   NYASANI WATT.

        Suffolk.      March 8, 2023. – January 11, 2024.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Homicide. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. Practice,
     Criminal, Postconviction relief, Assistance of counsel.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on December 21, 2011.

     Following review by this court, 484 Mass. 742 (2020), a
motion for a new trial, filed on August 10, 2020, was heard by
Mark D. Mason, J.

     A request for leave to appeal was reported by Cypher, J.,
in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk.

     Elizabeth Doherty for the defendant.
     Elisabeth Martino, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
     Afton M. Templin, Committee for Public Counsel Services,
for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel
Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

    BUDD, C.J.   In 2020, this court affirmed Nyasani Watt's

convictions of murder in the first degree and related offenses,
                                                                    2

as well as the denials of his motions for a new trial, after

plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E (§ 33E).    Commonwealth

v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 765 (2020).    The defendant subsequently

filed another motion for a new trial alleging, for the first

time, that his trial counsel slept during critical portions of

the trial, constructively depriving him of his constitutional

right to counsel.    A Superior Court judge (motion judge), who

was not the trial judge, denied the motion without a hearing,

and the defendant sought leave to appeal the denial from a

single justice of this court pursuant to § 33E.     The single

justice reserved and reported this matter to the full court.

For the reasons discussed infra, we reverse the order denying

the defendant's motion and remand this matter to the Superior

Court for a new trial.1

     Background.    The evidence presented in the defendant's

trial is summarized in Watt, 484 Mass. at 744-745.    Facts

concerning the postconviction pleadings and subsequent

allegations against trial counsel are taken from the record and

from the undisputed findings of the motion judge.

     In 2013, the defendant and his codefendant, Sheldon Mattis,

were convicted of murder in the first degree for shootings that

     1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services
and Citizens for Juvenile Justice.
                                                                      3

killed sixteen year old Jaivon Blake and wounded fourteen year

old Kimoni Elliott.     Watt, 484 Mass. at 744.   Following trial,

the defendant's trial counsel withdrew, and new counsel filed an

appearance as the defendant's appellate counsel (first appellate

counsel).   The defendant moved for postconviction relief and a

new trial based on claims of extraneous juror influence.       See

id. at 757-761.     Although the defendant raised with his first

appellate counsel that his trial counsel slept during portions

of the trial, first appellate counsel dismissed the issue as

unmeritorious and did not investigate it further.

     The defendant's first motion, essentially treated as a

motion for a new trial, was denied in March 2015, and his

subsequent motion for a new trial was denied in October 2017.

At the defendant's request, his first appellate counsel withdrew

in December 2017.     The defendant obtained a second, and his

current, appellate counsel (second appellate counsel), who filed

a supplemental motion in support of a new trial.2     This motion

was denied in July 2018.     The defendant's appeal from his

convictions and from the denials of his motions for a new trial

were consolidated before this court and received plenary review

pursuant to § 33E.     On December 10, 2019, after this court heard

     2 The supplemental motion raised an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to investigate
a "critical" aspect of a prosecution witness's testimony.
                                                                    4

oral argument, second appellate counsel learned for the first

time from the codefendant's trial counsel that the defendant's

trial counsel had slept during portions of the trial.3    Almost

six months after oral argument, this court affirmed the

defendant's convictions and the orders denying his motions.

Watt, 484 Mass. 765.   Approximately two months later, the

defendant filed another motion for a new trial, contending that

he was deprived of his right to counsel because his attorney was

sleeping during critical parts of the trial.   In support of this

motion, the defendant submitted his own affidavit as well as

affidavits from his second appellate counsel, his codefendant,

his codefendant's two trial attorneys, the two trial

prosecutors, and his mother.   Each affidavit described the

affiant's recollection as to whether trial counsel was observed

sleeping during the trial and, if so, when and for how long.4

     The defendant's affidavit states that trial counsel "fell

asleep a number of times during the trial," including during

jury selection and the questioning of two witnesses, one

possibly being Jeremiah Rodriguez, a key witness for the

     3 On receiving this information, second appellate counsel
confirmed its veracity with the defendant and others who were
present at the defendant's trial and filed the motion for a new
trial that is before this court on appeal.

     4 It was not possible to obtain an affidavit from the
defendant's trial counsel as he passed away in June 2019.
                                                                        5

prosecution.    The defendant's affidavit further recounts that

others in the court room, including the trial judge and

prosecutor, witnessed trial counsel sleeping during portions of

the trial, that trial counsel at one point was snoring, and that

trial counsel tried to conceal his fatigued state.

    One of the codefendant's two trial attorneys attested that

the defendant's trial counsel slept at least once during

testimony.     The other attorney stated in his affidavit that the

defendant's trial counsel closed his eyes several times during

the trial, but that he was uncertain whether trial counsel was

sleeping.

    One of the two trial prosecutors stated in his affidavit

that he had observed the defendant's trial counsel "dozing off"

on multiple occasions during the trial, and that he recalled one

specific instance in which he had to rouse trial counsel to show

him a photograph before showing it to a testifying witness.       The

other trial prosecutor recalled being informed by another

attorney at trial that the defendant's trial counsel had nodded

off during the examination of one witness.

    The codefendant stated in his affidavit that he saw the

defendant's trial counsel "sleeping or nodding off" a number of

times during the trial and noted two specific instances:     during

the testimony of an emergency medical technician and during the

testimony of the younger brother of one of the victims.     The
                                                                   6

defendant's mother stated in her affidavit that trial counsel

"nodded off to sleep" or "was dozing" at some points during the

trial.   She further stated that trial counsel appeared to be

"sick" and "did not seem alert," and that he had informed her

that he had "recently been hospitalized."

    The defendant's second appellate counsel recounted in her

affidavit that after becoming aware of the allegation, she

reached out to the jurors from the trial regarding whether they

observed the defendant's trial counsel sleeping.   The one juror

who responded did not recall anything specific about the

defendant's trial counsel.   Second appellate counsel spoke with

the defendant's first appellate counsel, who confirmed that the

defendant did raise "something" about trial counsel "being able

to stay awake at trial," but that the defendant's first

appellate counsel did nothing with the information because he

believed there was no basis to pursue the claim.

    The motion judge indicated that he credited the affidavits,

all of which corroborated that trial counsel had fallen asleep

multiple times during the trial.   The motion judge nevertheless

denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, concluding that

the defendant had waived the claim by failing to raise it on

appeal or in a previous motion for a new trial, and that trial

counsel's slumber neither rose to the level of structural error

nor prejudiced the defendant's case.
                                                                       7

    Discussion.   1.   Gatekeeper analysis.   Because the

defendant raised the issue of his trial counsel sleeping during

the trial after this court had heard and decided his direct

appeal, we review the appeal from the denial of the instant

motion for a new trial only if the defendant presents "a 'new

and substantial' issue that this court could not have considered

in the course of plenary review."   Commonwealth v. Gunter, 459

Mass. 480, 487, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011).    See G. L.

c. 278, § 33E.   We conclude that he has done so.

    Section 33E, the mechanism by which this court exercises

plenary review of all convictions of murder in the first degree,

provides this court with "extraordinary powers" to "consider the

whole case, both the law and the evidence, to determine whether

there has been any miscarriage of justice."    Dickerson v.

Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 744 (1986).     This unique form of

review requires our consideration of issues raised by the

defendant, as well as issues not raised, "but discovered as a

result of our own independent review of the entire record."      Id.

Balancing the exercise of our extraordinary powers with the

interests of judicial economy and finality, § 33E simultaneously

limits a capital defendant's "ability to appeal subsequent

postconviction motions" following plenary review.    Id.    Pursuant

to § 33E, such a defendant must first obtain leave to pursue an

appeal from a single justice of this court, who acts as
                                                                      8

gatekeeper to determine whether the defendant "presents a new

and substantial question which ought to be determined by the

full court."   G. L. c. 278, § 33E.5

     "The bar for establishing that an issue is 'substantial' in

the context of the gatekeeper provision of § 33E is not high."

Gunter, 459 Mass. at 487.     An issue is "substantial" if it is "a

meritorious issue in the sense of being worthy of consideration

by an appellate court."     Id.   Here, the defendant presents us

with a substantial issue, where he alleges that his trial

counsel's slumber deprived the defendant of his right to the

assistance of counsel throughout his trial.

     Whether a defendant presents a "new" issue is a slightly

more complex question.6   Gunter, 459 Mass. at 487.    "An issue is

not 'new' within the meaning of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, where

either it has already been addressed, or where it could have

been addressed had the defendant properly raised it at trial or

on direct review."   Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Ambers, 397

     5 This threshold determination may be made by a single
justice or may be reserved and reported to the full court, as
occurred in this case. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass.
1, 2 (2011).

     6 Given the strict finality of gatekeeper determinations, we
do not often have occasion to analyze whether claims are "new"
as a full court. A single justice's determination of a new and
substantial issue "is final and unreviewable." Gunter, 459
Mass. at 485. Thus, unless the gatekeeper function itself is
reserved and reported (as it was here), the question would not
come before us.
                                                                     9

Mass. 705, 707 (1986).    In interpreting § 33E, we generally have

"require[d] that the defendant present all his [or her] claims

of error at the earliest possible time."     Gunter, supra, quoting

Ambers, supra.   Accordingly, we have rejected gatekeeper

petitions where a defendant raises no new facts and only

presents "subtle shift[s]" in his or her theory of the case,

Commonwealth v. Watkins (No. 1), 486 Mass. 801, 807 (2021),7 and

where previously litigated claims are repackaged as claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, see Gunter, supra at 490

("Reframing an omitted issue as an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim does not necessarily make it 'new'").

     Here, because no one contemporaneously raised the fact that

trial counsel was sleeping, the error was not apparent in the

trial record.    Contrast Trigones v. Attorney Gen., 420 Mass.

859, 861 n.5 (1995) (defendant's gatekeeper petition properly

denied where defendant failed to demonstrate that claims were

not evident from record on direct appeal).    Moreover, first

appellate counsel rejected the claim as nonviable when the

defendant brought the matter to his attention and therefore did

     7 See also, e.g., Gunter, 459 Mass. at 489 (defendant did
not raise "new" issue where, although presented as "different
theory," defendant did not allege change in applicable law or
any new facts); Commonwealth v. Pisa, 384 Mass. 362, 367 (1981)
("The legal theories, constitutional or otherwise, underlying
[the defendant's] three other claims were available at the time
of [the defendant's] first or second appeal . . .").
                                                                     10

not raise it in the defendant's direct appeal.      As a result of

first appellate counsel's ineffective assistance, this court was

not able to consider the claim under its plenary review, despite

the efforts of the defendant.8     In these unique circumstances, we

conclude that the defendant has presented a "new" question under

§ 33E, because this claim was not available to the defendant in

prior proceedings.     To hold otherwise would undermine the core

purpose of § 33E's framework guaranteeing capital defendants

exclusive access to plenary review "to determine whether there

has been any miscarriage of justice."      Dickerson, 396 Mass. at

744.

       2.   Merits of appeal.   Having determined that the defendant

meets the § 33E gatekeeper criteria, we turn to a review of the

denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial.      Where, as

here, the motion judge was not the trial judge and the evidence

       We note that the defendant's current motion did not allege
       8

that his first appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to investigate the claim that trial
counsel had been sleeping during the trial. Although the
question has not been put before us, the failure to investigate
an alleged error of this magnitude clearly was unreasonable.
See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 491 Mass. 362, 366 (2023), quoting
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (counsel "has
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigation unnecessary").
Accordingly, where the defendant raised the issue with his first
appellate counsel who refused to pursue it, we do not fault the
defendant for failing to include this claim on direct appeal.
In these unique circumstances, it would be unreasonable to
require the defendant to have done more.
                                                                   11

provided was purely documentary, our review is de novo.      See

Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 326 (2008).

     A judge "may grant a new trial at any time if it appears

that justice may not have been done."    Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b),

as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).    The defendant argues

that he constructively was deprived of his right to counsel

under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because his

attorney was sleeping during the defendant's trial.9   Assessing

the merits of the defendant's motion, we determine that a

defendant constructively is deprived of his or her

constitutional right to counsel under art. 12 where trial

counsel sleeps for a significant portion or during an important

aspect of trial.

     a.   Legal framework.   It is well established in the

Commonwealth, as in Federal jurisdictions, that a person may be

deprived of counsel in certain circumstances, even though

counsel is present physically.   See United States v. Cronic, 466

U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984) (constitutional error found, without

any showing of prejudice, where counsel was present but was

     9 Article 12 states in relevant part that "every subject
shall have a right . . . to be fully heard in his defense by
himself, or his coun[sel] at his election." The Sixth Amendment
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for
his defen[s]e."
                                                                  12

"prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of

the proceeding").   See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57-

59 (1932) ("defendants were not accorded right of counsel in any

substantial sense" when counsel was appointed on first day of

trial for capital offense without preparation or sufficient time

to advise defendants or prepare defense); Commonwealth v. Dew,

492 Mass. 254, 263-267 (2023) (defendant constructively denied

counsel where counsel was found to have actual conflict of

interest).   We have not had occasion to consider the point at

which an attorney's slumber during trial results in deprivation

of counsel requiring reversal.   Thus, we look for guidance to

the Federal circuit courts that have addressed this question

with respect to the Sixth Amendment.10

     Notably, although those courts agree as a general matter

that a trial counsel's slumber constructively may deny

defendants their right to counsel such that a new trial is

warranted, each sets forth slightly differing conceptions of

when that occurs.   The United States Courts of Appeals for the

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits focus on whether

     10Although we review and consider the available Federal
precedents that speak to the meaning of the Sixth Amendment in
order to interpret art. 12, our decision today neither rests on
nor is "interwoven with the [F]ederal law." Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). See id. at 1041 (Federal cases
"used only for the purpose of guidance" do not negate "separate,
adequate, and independent grounds" of State court decision).
                                                                  13

counsel slept for a substantial portion of the trial.    See

United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609, 612 (4th Cir. 2016) ("a

defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel

when counsel sleeps during a substantial portion of the

defendant's trial"); Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623-626 (6th

Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1214 (2012) (recognizing that

denial of counsel with presumed prejudice where "attorney slept

through a substantial portion of the trial"); Burdine v.

Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535

U.S. 1120 (2002) ("a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to

counsel is violated when that defendant's counsel is repeatedly

unconscious through not insubstantial portions of the

defendant's capital murder trial"); Javor v. United States, 724

F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1984) ("when an attorney for a criminal

defendant sleeps through a substantial portion of the trial,

such conduct is inherently prejudicial and thus no separate

showing of prejudice is necessary").   Meanwhile, the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit focuses on

whether counsel was unconscious "at critical times," a

consideration that the Fifth Circuit has also discussed.

Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1996) (at trial,

"when counsel [was] unconscious at critical times" or

"repeatedly unconscious . . . for periods of time in which

defendant's interests were at stake," prejudice may be
                                                                     14

presumed).     See Burdine, supra at 349 (fact that counsel slept

during "critical stages of trial" significant).

       As discussed infra, based on our review of the Federal

cases that address sleeping counsel, we conclude that under art.

12, a deprivation of counsel occurs when counsel sleeps for a

significant portion of trial or sleeps through an important

aspect of trial.

       i.   Significant portion of trial.   Whether counsel slept

for a significant portion of the trial depends on, but is not

limited to, considerations of the duration and frequency of

counsel's sleeping.    See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622 n.11.   For

example, in Ragin, the Fourth Circuit held that no separate

showing of prejudice was necessary where counsel slept

"[f]requently . . . almost every day . . . morning and evening"

for "'[thirty] minutes at least' at a time."      Id. at 613, 622-

623.    In Tippins, the Second Circuit held that, even where it

could not be determined precisely when or for how long counsel

slept, no showing of prejudice was required where it was well

supported that counsel slept every day at trial and "was

repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time in which
                                                                    15

[the] defendant's interests were at stake."11    Tippins, 77 F.3d

at 687.

     Under this standard, a defendant might prevail regardless

of the demonstrated importance of the particular times at which

counsel slept, if the duration and frequency of counsel's

sleeping was significant in and of itself.   Although less

frequent or shorter periods of unconsciousness at trial may

support a claim of structural error, mere momentary lapses in

attention or consciousness are insufficient.12   See Tippins, 77

     11In Tippins, the court's analysis also included that
counsel slept during critical testimony of a codefendant and at
least one witness and that, on at least one occasion, the trial
judge stopped the trial to instruct counsel "not to sleep any
further, [and] that he should be paying attention." Tippins, 77
F.3d at 687.

     12Such claims still may be brought under the traditional
ineffective assistance of counsel framework. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 691-692; Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96
(1974). Similarly, broad claims of a condition or behavior by
counsel that could cause serious lapses in attentiveness or
unconsciousness are best suited for review as claims of
ineffective assistance requiring a defendant to demonstrate
actual prejudice resulting from demonstrated, deficient
behavior. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 308 (2d
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 960 (1993) ("given the
varying effects health problems can have on an individual's
ability to function, claims of ineffective assistance based on
attorney illness are best suited to the fact-specific prejudice
inquiry mandated by Strickland"); Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872,
875-876 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988)
(generalized claim of attorney's mental illness evaluated under
ineffective assistance framework because "mere existence of a
loosely described mental illness or condition cannot be assumed
to affect legal proceedings unless the condition manifests
itself in courtroom behavior").
                                                                   16

F.3d at 688 ("the appearance of 'sleeping' may cover a range of

behavior.   Lawyers may sometimes affect a drowsy or bored look

to downplay an adversary's presentation of evidence");

Commonwealth v. Keaton, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 87 (1994)

("Meditation may be mistaken for somnolence").      But see Tippins,

supra at 689 ("The point is well taken that consciousness and

sleep form a continuum, and that there are states of drowsiness

that come over everyone from time to time during a working day,

or during a trial, for that matter.      The record here

demonstrates that [trial attorney] was actually unconscious").

Rather, the core inquiry focuses on noticeable and meaningful

lapses of attentiveness so significant throughout the trial that

"the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because

of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts

on to produce just results."    Ragin, 820 F.3d at 620, quoting

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).

    ii.     Important aspect of trial.    Even if a defendant cannot

demonstrate that counsel slept for a significant portion of the

entire trial, prejudice may be presumed where a defendant

demonstrates that counsel slept through an important aspect of

trial. In so holding, we again draw support from the Federal

circuit courts, which have taken into consideration the

significance of the particular events through which counsel

slept.
                                                                  17

    For instance, in Tippins, 77 F.3d at 689-690, the Second

Circuit presumed prejudice where trial counsel, in addition to

missing parts of the testimony of other prosecution witnesses,

was found to have slept through "half" of a codefendant's

testimony and "two-thirds" of the testimony of a confidential

informant -– "two witnesses of undeniable importance to the

prosecution of [the defendant]."   In Burdine, 262 F.3d at 349,

the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant was entitled to a

presumption of prejudice where defense counsel repeatedly slept

"through not insubstantial portions" of trial during which the

prosecution introduced evidence and examined witnesses adverse

to the defendant.   The Fifth Circuit characterized these moments

as comprising the "critical guilt-innocence phase of [the

defendant's] capital murder trial."   Id.   By comparison, the

Sixth Circuit found that no presumption of prejudice was

warranted where a single juror recalled that defense counsel

slept through a "brief" period of the defendant's cross-

examination.   Muniz, 647 F.3d at 624.

    In suggesting that courts assess the importance of any

given aspect of trial, we are mindful of the fact that the

entire trial itself may be considered to be a "critical stage"

where a defendant's Sixth Amendment and art. 12 rights attach.

See Commonwealth v. Neary-French, 475 Mass. 167, 170-172 (2016).

We emphasize that our ruling today does not augment, reduce, or
                                                                   18

even rely on our existing body of caselaw identifying "critical

stages of the prosecution."   Id. at 170, 173 ("The term

'critical stage' is a term of art and only refers to [those]

actions and events postindictment or arraignment" at which

defendant's right to counsel attaches).13   Rather, the standard

we adopt today for determining whether a constructive

deprivation of counsel has occurred at trial affirms that which

already may be intuitive -- that there is a distinction between

those portions of trial where unremarkable, ancillary evidence

is being presented versus when direct evidence of guilt or

innocence is being presented, and that the line between the two

must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.   And although those

distinctions may speak to the "magnitude" of constitutional

error at play, Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 196

(2014), quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, acknowledging such a

distinction for the limited purpose of determining whether a

trial counsel's sleeping constitutes structural error does not

diminish the extent to which a defendant's foundational right to

counsel applies during critical stages of the proceedings, such

as trial.

     13This separate body of law is useful primarily to decipher
which moments leading up to, surrounding, and following trial,
in addition to the trial itself, are "critical" and require
counsel's presence.
                                                                  19

    We are convinced that this dual approach to considering

claims of sleeping counsel provides a proper basis to determine

whether the defendant constructively was denied counsel under

art. 12.   Although any slumber by counsel during trial is

distressing and detrimental, counsel's constructive absence

during either a significant portion of trial or an important

aspect of trial so offends the constitutional protections

surrounding the right to assistance of counsel that it renders

the entire adversary process "presumptively unreliable" and

creates an uncurable error, "even if the error was ultimately

harmless."   Valentin, 470 Mass. at 196, quoting Cronic, 466 U.S.

at 659.

    This approach is appropriate in light of the unique

evidentiary hurdles facing defendants whose rights to counsel

have been infringed due to a deprivation of counsel.    Indeed,

when counsel is absent either for a significant portion or

during an important stage of trial, "the evil lies in what the

attorney does not do, and is . . . not readily apparent on the

record."   Javor, 724 F.2d at 834, quoting Cooper v. Fitzharris,

586 F.2d 1325, 1332 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).

    b.     Application.   Here, the affidavits submitted by the

defendant "provide a sufficient factual basis" to support the

conclusion that trial counsel slept for a significant portion of
                                                                    20

trial, and likely slept through an important aspect of trial.

Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 473 Mass. 832, 839 (2016).

    Based on the affidavits, multiple people had observed trial

counsel sleeping during trial.   The defendant asserts that trial

counsel slept recurrently and during significant moments, such

as jury selection and the testimony of two witnesses, possibly

including Jeremiah Rodriguez, a central prosecution witness.

Codefendant Mattis confirmed that the defendant's trial counsel

slept repeatedly during trial, naming two specific occasions,

including the testimony of an emergency medical technician and

the victim's younger brother.    One of the prosecutors at trial

had contemporaneously discussed with a colleague and one of

codefendant's counsel that trial counsel slept on several

distinct occasions, including one where the prosecutor had to

rouse trial counsel to review a photograph before it was shown

to the testifying witness.   One attorney for the codefendant

confirmed that trial counsel slept at least once during

testimony; the other attorney for the codefendant stated that

trial counsel's eyes were closed several times throughout the

trial.   The defendant's mother also confirmed the repetitiveness

of trial counsel's sleeping during trial.    Notably, none of the

affiants provided statements to the contrary.

    Together, these affidavits not only "cast doubt" on whether

the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to
                                                                  21

counsel, but also demonstrate as much (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 473 Mass. 606, 622-623 (2016).      See

Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 418 Mass. 562, 572 (1994), cert.

denied, 513 U.S. 1091 (1995) (no abuse of discretion where judge

decided motion for new trial on memorandum of law without

holding evidentiary hearing where only substantial issue raised

was question of law, not fact).   First, we note that this is not

a case where we only have a defendant's self-serving affidavit

in support of the defendant's claim.   See Commonwealth v.

Goodreau, 442 Mass. 341, 351 (2004).   To the contrary, the

defendant submitted affidavits from both sides of the aisle, all

of which corroborate the defendant's claim that trial counsel

was sleeping throughout trial.    See Ragin, 820 F.3d at 621

("every witness who testified stated that [trial counsel for the

defendant] was asleep, appeared to be asleep, or was 'nodding

off' at some point" during trial).   Second, as the affiants'

descriptions of when trial counsel slept varied, with some

accounts more specific than others, we cannot discount the

possibility that each account represents a separate occasion

during which trial counsel was asleep.   See id. at 621-622

(error to "fail[] to consider the likely possibility that each

witness saw [trial counsel] asleep or nodding off on different

occasions").   Moreover, the fact that the trial judge neither

contemporaneously addressed the issue nor provided an affidavit
                                                                    22

as to the defendant's claim on appeal is not dispositive.     See

id. at 622 (rejecting argument that lack of remediation or

admonishment by judge on record suggested that trial counsel was

not asleep during trial).14

     Based on the uncontested affidavits provided by the

defendant, "we find it impossible not to conclude" that trial

counsel at least slept through a significant portion of the

trial, and likely through an important part of trial, i.e.,

Jeremiah Rodriguez's testimony.15   Ragin, 820 F.3d at 622.   Thus,

we conclude that the defendant was deprived of his right to

counsel under art. 12.

     c.    Structural error and substantial risk of miscarriage of

justice.   Having concluded that the defendant was deprived of

his right to counsel under art. 12, we next consider whether the

error entitles the defendant to a new trial.

     14Similarly, we cannot conclude that any sleeping by trial
counsel could not have been significant if neither the
Commonwealth nor the trial judge contemporaneously addressed the
issue on the record. Cf. Tippins, 77 F.3d at 690 ("we cannot
count on a trial judge to serve as the defense lawyer's alarm
clock whenever matters arise that touch the client's interest").

     15The claim that trial counsel slept through Jeremiah
Rodriguez's testimony arguably is less conclusive from the
affidavits than the fact that trial counsel was repeatedly
asleep for a significant portion of the trial. However, we note
that the potential veracity of the claim that a trial counsel
was asleep during the Commonwealth's presentation of critical
evidence against a defendant would suffice as a separate basis
to determine structural error under the disjunctive standard we
recognize today.
                                                                  23

     Deprivation of counsel amounts to structural error, i.e.,

error that affects the "framework within which the trial

proceeds, rather than simply . . . the trial process itself."

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).    Because

structural error generally "render[s] a criminal trial

fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining

guilt or innocence," Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457 Mass. 152, 163

(2010), quoting Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 219

(2006), preserved claims of structural error, if substantiated,

result in automatic reversal, Commonwealth v. Williams, 481

Mass. 443, 454 (2019).     However, unpreserved claims of error --

even those that are structural in nature -– are reviewed to

determine "whether the error created a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice."    Commonwealth v. Francis, 485 Mass. 86,

88 n.1, 102-103 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2762 (2021).

     To avoid waiver, a defendant "must raise a claim of error

at the first available opportunity" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96, 102-103, cert. denied,

574 U.S. 933 (2014).16   Here, the motion judge concluded that the

     16 Although our analysis of waiver invokes similar
considerations to our analysis of newness under § 33E, namely,
whether the defendant could have raised a claim sooner, waiver
is a matter distinct from the gatekeeper query. See, e.g.,
Francis, 485 Mass. 94, 104-106 (defendant raised new and
substantial issues satisfying § 33E but had waived claim of
error).
                                                                   24

defendant waived his claim by failing to investigate and raise

the claim prior to his direct appeal.   See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30

(c) (2), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).17   We need not

determine whether the motion judge is correct on this point

because, as discussed infra, we conclude that the error created

a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

     In assessing whether an error poses a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice, we consider the nature of the error, the

strength of the Commonwealth's case against the defendant, and

"whether the error is 'sufficiently significant in the context

of the trial to make plausible an inference that the [jury's]

result might have been otherwise but for the error.'"

Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 385, 396 (2011).   Additionally,

the United States Constitution requires reviewing courts, at the

very least, to vacate where the defendant has shown, despite

waiver, that the error "led to a fundamentally unfair trial."

Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 304-305 (2017).

     17   Rule 30 (c) (2) states:

          "All grounds for relief claimed by a defendant under
     subdivisions (a) and (b) of this rule shall be raised by
     the defendant in the original or amended motion. Any
     grounds not so raised are waived unless the judge in the
     exercise of discretion permits them to be raised in a
     subsequent motion, or unless such grounds could not
     reasonably have been raised in the original or amended
     motion."
                                                                   25

     In our view, the deprivation of counsel at trial is the

type of structural error that inherently raises serious concerns

whether the trial itself was "an unreliable vehicle for

determining guilt or innocence."   Francis, 485 Mass. at 102,

quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).18    A

defendant whose attorney is unconscious and thereby

constructively absent for significant portions of the

proceedings or during an important part of the proceedings is

denied the right to "require the prosecution's case to survive

the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing," Cronic, 466

U.S. at 656, and the right to "consult with [his or her]

attorney or receive informed guidance from [his or her attorney]

during the course of the trial" (citation omitted), Ragin, 820

F.3d at 620.19   Given the unique nature of absentee counsel, it

     18Not every structural error poses a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., Francis, 485 Mass. at 107
(no substantial risk despite denial of right to counsel of
choice); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 154-155 (2018)
(substantial risk analysis to be used where structural error of
denial of right to public trial found).

     19In the proceedings below, the motion judge found no
substantial risk, relying in part on the fact that the
defendant's theory of defense was aligned with that of his
codefendant, whose two attorneys were not alleged to have been
asleep at any time during trial. This was an erroneous legal
conclusion. The right to counsel is a fundamental
constitutional right "accorded to every defendant."
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 389 Mass. 359, 366, cert. denied, 464
U.S. 941 (1983). While codefendants can consent to being
                                                                  26

would make little sense to require further proof of specific

prejudice beyond the absence itself to demonstrate a substantial

risk of a miscarriage of justice, where the absence endures for

a significant portion or through an important aspect of the

trial.   See Tippins, 77 F.3d at 687 ("Of course, the buried

assumption in our Strickland cases is that counsel is present

and conscious to exercise judgment, calculation and instinct,

for better or worse.   But that is an assumption we cannot make

when counsel is unconscious at critical times").   See also id.

("Under these circumstances . . . there is little difference

between saying that prejudice will be presumed and saying that

prejudice has been demonstrated").

    Our judicial authority to order a new trial pursuant to

Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) is predicated on the "fundamental

principle" that "the valuable finality of judicial proceedings

must yield to our system's reluctance to countenance significant

individual injustices."   Commonwealth v. Brescia, 471 Mass. 381,

388 (2015).   Even "meticulous efforts to do justice" can be

represented by the same counsel, see Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, as
amended, 490 Mass. 1303 (2022), the alignment of common
interests or theories of defense is not the harm at issue here.
Rather, a defendant whose attorney is asleep is deprived of the
ability to "consult with his attorney during the trial" or
receive "a lawyer's guidance" during "the trial process."
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88-89 (1976). That is not
an ill mitigated by the presence of some other attorney, even
one advancing a similar defense.
                                                                    27

frustrated by "extraordinary fact patterns."    Id. at 391.    Here,

where defense counsel fell asleep repeatedly at trial, and

potentially during at least one crucial witness's testimony, we

do not have confidence that justice was done.      Cf. Ragin, 820

F.3d at 624 ("[The defendant] was thrown unarmed into the arena

to face the gladiators without benefit of the assistance of

counsel to which he had an absolute right.     As a result, [the

defendant's] trial was not a confrontation between adversaries

in which any reasonable person can have confidence"); Tippins,

77 F.3d at 690 ("In short, there is simply no basis for the hope

that [defense attorney] was functioning as a lawyer during

critical times at trial"); Javor, 724 F.2d at 834 ("Prejudice is

inherent in this case because unconscious or sleeping counsel is

equivalent to no counsel at all").

    Conclusion.    The defendant constructively was denied the

right to counsel in violation of art. 12, and this denial

created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.       The

order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial is

reversed.   The defendant's convictions are vacated, the verdicts

are set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court

for a new trial.

                                     So ordered.