Court Opinion

ID: 9819190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:19:35.519521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.290699
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ZWICK, dissenting: My colleagues have failed to properly consider the law that governs the entrapment exception to the admission of so-called "other crimes evidence.” A thorough review of the correct law in this area, as applied to the State’s specific evidence, demonstrates that the defendant was forced to stand before a cascading landslide of irrelevant and prejudicial testimony concerning his involvement with "stolen” auto parts. I must, therefore, strongly dissent from the court’s order affirming defendant’s conviction. I begin by noting that the majority’s reliance upon People v. Millighan, 265 Ill. App. 3d 967, 638 N.E.2d 1150 (1994), and People v. Kimbrough, 138 Ill. App. 3d 481, 485 N.E.2d 1292 (1985), is decidedly unhelpful. Neither case substantively addresses the defense of entrapment. The correct law is instead set out by our supreme court’s decision in People v. Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d 477, 401 N.E.2d 528 (1980), which appears to be the court’s most recent pronouncement on the issue of entrapment as it relates to other crimes evidence. In Tipton, the court considered whether evidence of criminal acts committed by the defendant at a time subsequent to the time of the charged offenses could be introduced against the defendant, as an exception to the other crimes rule. As the majority in the present case correctly notes, and as Tipton discusses in detail, evidence of other crimes may be admitted against the defendant if it tends to show his criminal "predisposition” to rebut defendant’s claim of entrapment. Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d at 484-85, citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451-52, 77 L. Ed. 413, 422, 53 S. Ct. 210, 216 (1932). A careful reading of Tipton makes clear, however, that the State may not offer testimony of other crimes simply to establish defendant’s general tendency to commit criminal acts. Rather, it is only evidence of the commission of other crimes that are specifically relevant to the defendant’s claim of entrapment that may be admitted, as demonstrated by: (1) their similarity to whatever crimes are charged by the State, and (2) their proximity in time to the crime charged, whether committed prior to, or subsequent to, that crime. See Tipton, 78 Ill. 2d at 485. See also People v. Outten, 13 Ill. 2d 21, 25, 147 N.E.2d 284 (1958) (prior crimes may be admitted only as they "bear[ ] upon the issue of entrapment”). In this case the State charged defendant with specific crimes: possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and delivery of a controlled substance. At trial, however, the State did not limit its evidence to testimony regarding the drug charges or of defendant’s predisposition to commit such an offense. Rather, the State introduced protracted testimony of defendant’s activity in dealing in auto parts that the prosecutor and State witnesses again and again characterized as being "stolen.” This was so even though there was no substantive evidence to establish such an irrelevant and patently prejudicial fact. See People v. Karraker, 261 Ill. App. 3d 942, 956-57, 633 N.E.2d 1250 (1994) (conviction of receipt of stolen property charge requires evidence of an identified owner to testify regarding his superior property interest); see also People v. Walters, 69 Ill. App. 3d 906, 917, 387 N.E.2d 1230 (1979) (before evidence of another crime may be introduced, it must be shown that the crime actually occurred). In my view, allowing argument and testimony regarding defendant’s proclivity to deal in "stolen” auto parts delivered a body blow to defendant’s right to a fair trial. Even a cursory review of the quantity and type of testimony presented by the State makes this conclusion abundantly clear. The theme of the State’s case started virtually with the prosecutor’s first sentence. The prosecutor began, "Good morning. In September of 1991, the Illinois State Police received evidence that the defendant in this case, James Placek, was dealing in stolen auto parts.” The State’s opening statement then proceeded in earnest, replete with references to the "stolen” auto parts that the evidence would show were bought and sold by the defendant. During the course of the trial the State introduced the testimony of Officer Kim Castro. He testified that he was a member of the special "SSATIN” unit, the South Suburban Auto Theft Interdiction Network. Officer Castro testified that the police had received information that defendant was involved in receiving stolen auto parts. Castro eventually met defendant through an informant, a man known to be a "very good car thief.” Castro and defendant discussed how the informant was able to get parts easily from stolen cars. Castro told defendant that he had stolen auto parts for sale, and defendant told Castro that the parts he had were "not good movers.” Defendant went on to explain what parts were "good movers.” Defendant told Castro to contact him if he found any good parts to sell. Castro continued to offer more testimony relative to the purportedly stolen auto parts, testimony which was irrelevant to the State’s drug case. Castro testified that, on March 24, 1993, he met with defendant and sold defendant four mounted tires for $200. Officer Castro testified that he told the defendant that he and his brothers stole the tires. The tires had a "street value” of $600. Officer Castro stated that he next met defendant on March 31, 1993. The meeting was at defendant’s storage locker at the Space Place storage facility. Defendant had Castro block the door with his vehicle, and defendant bought parts from Castro for $200. These parts had a street value of $800. On another occasion, subsequent to the March 31, 1993, meeting, Officer Castro stated he met defendant again at the Space Place and sold him tires for $300. These tires had a street value of $800 or $900. Officer Castro next met with defendant on June 4, 1993. The two met at McDonald’s, and they talked inside defendant’s truck. Officer Castro told defendant that he knew of a "parts person” named "Julio.” Clearly, none of this testimony related to the crime for which defendant was charged or his predisposition to commit that crime, delivery of a controlled substance. Indeed, as I have already noted, there was not a scintilla of evidence to even establish that the parts sold to defendant had been stolen. Thus, it is plainly evident that testimony defendant dealt in "stolen” auto parts was wholly irrelevant. Accordingly, the exception to the introduction of other crimes evidence discussed in Tipton does not properly apply. Nor does the fact that defendant admitted at trial he was involved in the purchase and sale of stolen parts change my analysis. It must be noted that the State admitted testimony regarding stolen auto parts before defendant had put on any evidence of how he was entrapped by police. To the extent that defendant offered testimony concerning his involvement in stolen auto parts, the record makes clear that he did so only to respond to the State’s evidence, not as a central element of his entrapment defense. It was the trial court’s erroneous denial of defendant’s motion in limine to restrict the State’s use of the stolen parts testimony and Officer Castro’s testimony on the issue that forced defendant to defend in this way. Once the prosecution had established defendant was a fence, he had no other reasonable alternative. Finally, even if it were assumed the testimony regarding stolen auto parts was somehow relevant to the State’s drug case, which it was clearly not, it must be remembered that it is "incumbent upon the trial judge to weigh the relevance of the evidence to establish the purpose for which it is offered against the prejudicial effect the introduction of such evidence may have upon the defendant.” People v. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 62, 473 N.E.2d 840 (1984). Illinois law "requires that otherwise admissible evidence must be purged of references to other crimes if it is at all possible to do so without doing violence to the probative value of the evidence.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Bailey, 88 Ill. App. 3d 416, 420, 410 N.E.2d 545 (1980). Here, even if shown to be otherwise relevant, it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion not to have purged from the State’s case references to "stolen” parts. Such an order would have had little or no adverse effect upon the trial of the issues properly presented and would have protected defendant’s right to be fairly tried for the crime for which he was charged. In sum, the defendant in this case was denied a fair trial by the State’s insistence on introducing prejudicial and irrelevant evidence against him, and by the trial court’s refusal to limit the State to the specific issues properly raised. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand the case for further proceedings so as to afford the defendant a fair trial.