Court Opinion

ID: 9855584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:27:40.595681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:13.420080
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Chief Judge,
Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because I would affirm the order of the trial court granting both defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
I differ with the majority’s interpretation of the law and facts in this case. The fundamental issue is one of the foreseeability of the injury. From the deposition testimony, it is quite clear that no one anticipated or could have anticipated that Blue would bolt under these circumstances. Both of Blue’s trainers, Brian Whaler and Mark Sheridan, testified that the horse was gentle and predictable, and that they regarded Blue as the last horse that would behave in this way. One of the expert witnesses, Donald Brannan, admitted that the horse’s trainers would be more familiar with the horse than anybody else. The gentle disposition of Blue prior to this incident is uncontested.
It is only the theoretical horses of the experts that adduce any showing of dangerousness. I am not persuaded by the experts’ testimony regarding the training of a “show horse.” The testimony is uncontroverted that this horse was trained as a western pleasure horse and that the 90 awards Blue received were in the western pleasure horse category. Furthermore, the trainers and one of the experts agree that a professionally trained horse, seasoned by the experience of show competition, is a more well-behaved and predictable horse. In light of that, the theory that Carole’s movements. may have confused a horse trained to respond to subtle cues is unpersuasive and entirely speculative.
Nevertheless, the majority apparently relies upon the experts’ theoretical testimony to a greater extent than that of the trainers, and finds there to be conflicting testimony warranting reversal. The experts’ testimony should be given no greater weight than that of other witnesses; on questions of law and fact the trial court is not bound by the experts’ testimony. Cook v. Great Western Bank, 141 Ariz. 80, 87-88, 685 P.2d 145, 152-53 (App.1984).
The majority states that Arizona courts have required the owner of the animal “to know the normal habits and tendencies of animals of its class, realizing that even ordinarily gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances.” See supra 1265, citing Vigue v. Noyes, 113 Ariz. 237, 240, 550 P.2d 234, 237 (1976). In Schleier v. Alter, 159 Ariz. 397, 767 P.2d 1187 (Ct.App.1989), this court reiterated the basis for liability at common law for injury by domestic animals first set forth in Jones v. Manhart, 120 Ariz. 338, 340, 585 P.2d 1250, 1252 (App.1978):
A possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the harm.
Here there was no reason for Carbrey to know Blue had “dangerous propensities abnormal to its class” because in fact Blue *373did not. The circumstances called into question here—a novice or inexperienced rider .on a three-year-old horse—are no different from those in which this particular horse might have been found at any time prior to the incident. The horse had been used by trainers and riding instructors to teach novice and inexperienced people how to ride. Blue was frequently ridden by inexperienced riders of all ages without incident. Therefore, Carbrey had a duty of ordinary care toward Carole. The horse on which she rode had no history of dangerous behavior; thus Carbrey had no knowledge of any special danger about which he should have warned Carole or from which he had a duty to protect her.
Carbrey’s knowledge of the normal behavior of Blue bears on the issue of foreseeability. Negligence necessarily involves a foreseeable risk, a threatened danger of injury, and conduct unreasonable in proportion to the danger. Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 43 (5th ed. 1984).
If one could not reasonably foresee any injury as the result of one’s act, or if one’s conduct was reasonable in light of what one could anticipate there would be no negligence, and no liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
Because Carbrey had no knowledge of any dangerous tendency of the horse, he could not have foreseen the injury to Carole. He had a duty of care toward her that I believe he met: he spoke to Carole of riding techniques. I also believe that having the reins held while Carole dismounted was a safety measure that met Carbrey’s duty of care. One of Blue’s trainers said that the practice of having someone on the ground holding the reins while a rider dismounts is done as an extra safety precaution. The trainer further stated that the training provided to Carbrey’s daughter, Allison (who held the reins), would have enabled her to control the horse under ordinary circumstances. The injury Carole sustained was not foreseeable, and therefore, Carbrey should not be held liable as a matter of law.
Case law in Arizona and other jurisdictions supports this position. In Vigue v. Noyes, Section 518 of the Restatement of Torts was applied to a particular animal in specific circumstances. The Vigue court said, “No evidence was presented in the instant case ... from which reasonable men might infer that a horse such as Whiskey would normally become vicious in these circumstances ...,” Vigue, 113 Ariz. at 240, 550 P.2d at 238. Comment e to Section 518 of the Restatement of Torts states that the “care which the keeper of a domestic animal is required to exercise ... is commensurate with the character of the animal.” The language of Section 518 that refers to “class of animal” has been narrowly construed in Arizona, in keeping with comment e of the Restatement, to mean a particular horse (“such as Whiskey”) and particular circumstances. Vigue v. Noyes. This treatment is consistent with the application of Section 518 in other jurisdictions and also with the manner in which other jurisdictions handle negligence cases involving horse-related injuries.
In Fertsch v. Hall, 78 Or.App. 232, 715 P.2d 502 (1986), a case in which Section 518 was applied, the facts showed that the defendants knew this particular horse was “cinchy” (sensitive to the bellystrap of a saddle). Because the extent of the defendant’s knowledge was in conflict, the court said the question was one for the jury.
From the evidence the jury could have found that, although defendants may not have been aware of the term as used in bulldogging, they knew that “cinchy” meant that a horse could react in a dangerous way in situations other than when it was being saddled. The jury could have found that defendants knew that this horse was cinchy and failed to warn plaintiff.
Fertsch, 78 Or.App. at 236, 715 P.2d at 504.
In Fertsch, Section 518 is applied with regard to the character of a particular horse and to the circumstances of the horse’s use. The evidence showed that the defendant knew the character of the horse and could have foreseen an injury occurring were the horse being used under usual circumstances. That is, defendants knew the horse would have become “cinchy” *374while being saddled and could have foreseen an injury in that circumstance. Under a replication of the known circumstances, duty or the breach thereof could be decided by the court as a matter of law.
It is the changed circumstances in Fertsch, however, which caused the question to be put to the jury. Because the injury occurred while the horse was being used in bulldogging, a question arose whether defendants knew the cinchy horse would exhibit its characteristic behavior under these circumstances.
No such changed or unusual circumstances exist in the present case. Novice riders frequently rode Blue and Blue had never bolted. Because Carbrey had no knowledge of any dangerous tendencies of the horse and because the circumstances of use were no different, Carbrey could not have foreseen the injury to Dolezal. There is, therefore, no question of fact that need be put to the jury, and the trial court properly found no breach of duty as a matter of law.
A similar conclusion was reached in Finneran v. Wood, 249 Md. 643, 241 A.2d 579 (1968), another case applying Section 518 of the Restatement of Torts. There a horse, which was known to be very tame and which had previously kicked only at other horses, kicked the plaintiff. It was admitted that the horse was trying to kick another horse and that plaintiff had been accidentally kicked. On appeal, the court said, however, there was no evidence that the defendant knew or should have known that the horse was likely to injure a human, and that judgment for the defendant was proper. See also Mercer v. Fritts, 9 Kan.App.2d 232, 676 P.2d 150, aff'd, 236 Kan. 73, 689 P.2d 774 (1984) (where owner rode mare near the stallion being ridden by a social guest, a question of fact regarding owner’s knowledge of stallion arose as owner had never before ridden the mare near the stallion in these circumstances).
Section 518 of the Restatement has also been applied in dog bite cases. In Kathren v. Olenik, 46 Or.App. 713, 719, 613 P.2d 69, 73 (1980), the court said that no duty to control or confine the animal is imposed on the owner absent “knowledge or a basis for knowledge” that the animal will behave in a potentially injurious manner. The court said that the defendants were not charged with a general knowledge that dogs will bite human beings. Kathren, 46 Or.App. at 720, 613 P.2d at 73. See also Arnold v. Laird, 94 Wash.2d 867, 621 P.2d 138 (1980) (it is not per se unreasonable to keep a dog in a fenced backyard if the animal has not exhibited dangerous tendencies).
In other jurisdictions where negligence suits have been brought against horse owners, the owner’s knowledge of the horse’s character was determinative in finding a duty breached. In Fortune v. Holmes, 48 Tenn.App. 497, 348 S.W.2d 894 (1960), the court found that the jury was entitled to determine whether a riding instructor used reasonable and ordinary care in furnishing a novice rider with a known tender-mouthed, spirited horse equipped with a severe type of bit. Similarly, in Deese v. White Belt Dairy Farms, Inc., 160 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla.App.1964), where evidence was presented that the defendant knew the horse was “a wild S.B.,” the jury could determine whether the defendant exercised ordinary care toward the social guest rider. In Heald v. Cox, 480 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.App. 1972), the jury could find that the owner knew of the horse’s tendency to buck, and that the owner had a duty to warn the social guests of the horse’s character. In Wolfe v. Wilkins, 491 P.2d 595 (Colo.App. 1971), where the horse had no history of vicious or dangerous behavior, had been ridden without incident by teenage children of the owner, and the professional trainer of the horse classified this horse as a good horse, the owner was not liable for injuries sustained by the social guest who was bucked off by the horse. Also, in Bradshaw v. Minter, 206 Va. 450, 143 S.E.2d 827 (1965), where the owner knew of the horse’s tendency to run, to be high spirited, to be nervous, and not good for an inexperienced rider the owner had a duty to warn the plaintiff/rider. For an extensive review of horse injury cases, see 6 A.L.R.4th 358 and 15 A.L.R.2d 1313, “Liability to Hirer or Bailee of Horse” and 85 A.L.R.2d 1161, “Injuries by Horses.”
*375The defendant Carbrey did not breach the duty he owed to Carole. The order of the trial court should be affirmed.
For similar and additional reasons, I would affirm the summary judgment in favor of defendant Holden. Case law on the issue relating to Holden’s liability (landlord’s liability for injury by a horse to a guest or entrant onto land) indicates that in the absence of statute or decisional law establishing a standard of care for the operation of a stable, the duty Holden owed to entrants onto his land was that of ordinary and prudent care.
The majority relies upon Section 360 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) for the proposition that Holden “ ‘could have discovered’ the condition posing an unreasonable risk of harm.” See supra 14. I do not think that the conditions in question, the open gate and the roof beam, remained undiscovered by Holden. He had placed a sign on the gate which said the gate should be closed for safety reasons. Clearly the risk of an open gate had been “discovered” by Holden, and he had dealt with this risk by placing the sign on the gate. Similarly, the risk posed by the low beam in the stall was not an undiscovered risk, since horse riding was to be conducted exclusively in the arena.
The question is whether Holden had a duty to install a self-closing gate on the arena or to in some fashion make safe the low beam in the horse stall, as is suggested by the experts. I do not believe he had such a duty.
In Clifton v. Holliday, 85 Ohio App. 229, 88 N.E.2d 304 (1949), the court held that the stable owner was not liable for the head injury suffered by a rider as a result of hitting a low beam within the stable when the horse she was riding bolted and ran through an unbarred stable door. The court said that in the absence of a showing of a recognized standard of care requiring stables to be equipped with bars over the entrance to the stalls, judgment for the stable owner was proper. A similar result was reached in Durham v. Barnes, 124 So.2d 792 (La.App.1960), wherein the operator of a stable was held not negligent, and in the absence of a showing that the horse was vicious, the security measures taken to enclose the horse in the stall were adequate.
In the case before us, there is no showing by plaintiff that there is a recognized standard of care with regard to the gates enclosing a riding arena or with regard to the height of beams in a horse stable. The experts testifying on behalf of the plaintiff could not, for example, cite one stable operator in Arizona who practices the experts’ suggested safety measures. Also, one expert, Brannon, testified that the gates used at the training facilities were those normally used at training facilities like Holden’s. Holden met the standard of care established by § 360 and the experts failed to establish a higher standard of care which Holden was obliged to meet under existing Arizona law. In Groh v. Hasencamp, 407 So.2d 949 (Fla.App.1981), the court found that in the absence of a duty expressed in statute or decisional law, there was no standard of care requiring a fence around a horse pasture to be electrically charged or if charged to be maintained at all times. “As there was no duty on [the defendant’s] part to either install or maintain an electrical charge on the fence, failure to turn it on the day of the accident is not actionable.” Groh, 407 So.2d at 952.
Here, there is no duty on Holden’s part to install self-closing gates or to reconstruct his stables. He has exercised reasonable care in the safety measures already undertaken. There is no evidence in the record indicating a higher standard of care appropriate to the operation of riding facilities to which Holden should be held and for that reason summary judgment should be affirmed. “Negligence is never presumed. It must be proved, and it must be shown to be the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.” Clifton v. Holliday, 85 Ohio App. at 235, 88 N.E.2d at 307.1
*376I would affirm the summary judgment granted to both defendants.

. Finally, I question any liability on the part of Holden for Carole’s injuries given the language of A.R.S. § 33-1551. The statute says: § 33-1551. Duty of owner, lessee or occupant of premises to recreational users; liability; definitions
*376A. An owner, lessee or occupant of premises does not:
1. Owe any duty to a recreational user to keep the premises safe for such use.
2. Extend any assurance to a recreational user through the act of giving permission to enter the premises that the premises are safe for such entry or use.
3. Incur liability for any injury to persons or property caused by any act of a recreational user.
B. As used in this section:
1. “Premises” means agricultural, range, mining or forest lands, and any other similar lands which by agreement are made available to a recreational user, and any building or structure on such lands.
2. “Recreational user” means a person to whom permission has been granted or implied without the payment of an admission fee or other consideration to enter upon premises to hunt, fish, trap, camp, hike, ride, swim or engage in similar recreational pursuits. The purchase of a state hunting, trapping or fishing license is not the payment of an admission fee or other consideration as provided in this section.
C. This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists for maintaining an attractive nuisance, or for wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use or activity.
Although this statute was not raised by the parties and this case can be decided on other grounds, I would note that Carole was clearly a recreational user of the premises since she paid no money to anyone for the opportunity to ride the horse.