Court Opinion

ID: 9364631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 20:01:02.274737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.455336
License: Public Domain

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                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 21-13002
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                        Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        ANNAMALAI ANNAMALAI,
        a.k.a. Dr. Commander Selvam,
        a.k.a. Swamiji Sri Selvam Siddhar,

                                                     Defendant-Appellant.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                 21-13002

                    D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00437-TCB-CMS-1
                           ____________________

        Before BRANCH, GRANT, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Following a lengthy trial in 2014, a jury convicted
        Annamalai Annamalai of 34 criminal offenses. See United States v.
        Annamalai, 939 F.3d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir. 2019) (Annamalai I). On
        appeal, we reversed some of the convictions and remanded for
        resentencing. Id. at 1225–35, 1238–39. The district court
        resentenced Annamalai to 216 months’ imprisonment followed by
        five years’ supervised release. In this appeal from his resentencing,
        he argues that: (1) the district court erred in failing to conduct a de
        novo resentencing; (2) the district court erred in failing to recuse
        itself from the resentencing proceedings; and (3) his sentence is
        procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After careful review,
        we affirm.
                                   I.     Background
                         A. Annamalai’s Trial and Direct Appeal
               Annamalai, “a self-proclaimed Hindu priest,” ran the Hindu
        Temple and Community Center of Georgia, Inc., in Norcross,
        Georgia from 2005 to 2009. Annamalai I, 939 F.3d at 1221. “The
        Hindu Temple generated income in part by charging fees for
        religious and spiritual products and services, including religious
        ceremonies and horoscopes.” Id. “The evidence at trial showed
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        21-13002              Opinion of the Court                       3

        that Mr. Annamalai used the Hindu Temple as part of a criminal
        scheme to defraud his followers and commit bank fraud.” Id.
        Specifically, he made unauthorized transactions on his followers’
        credit cards, and then, if they complained, he would cite to the
        temple’s “no refund” policy. Id. On other occasions, he “would
        publish detailed stories of the followers’ confidential personal
        struggles in [the temple’s] magazine.” Id. He also submitted false
        documents, altered audio recordings, and other false information
        to banks and law enforcement to justify the fraudulent charges. Id.
        He “used the fraud proceeds to fund a lavish lifestyle, including
        multiple homes and expensive cars.” Id.
                The Hindu Temple shut down after it filed for bankruptcy.
        Id. at 1221–22. Undeterred, Annamalai started a second temple. Id.
        at 1222. A grand jury in the Northern District of Georgia indicted
        Annamalai on 34 counts, including conspiracy to commit bank
        fraud, bank fraud, filing a false federal income tax return,
        conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, bankruptcy fraud, money
        laundering, making a false statement in writing, obstruction of
        justice, making false statements under oath in a bankruptcy
        proceeding, and conspiracy to harbor a fugitive. Id. The case
        proceeded to a lengthy 11-day trial, and the jury convicted
        Annamalai on all 34 counts. Id. The district court sentenced him
        to a total of 327 months’ imprisonment. Id.
              On appeal, we reversed Annamalai’s convictions for
        bankruptcy fraud (Counts 11–20), conspiracy to commit
        bankruptcy fraud (Count 10), money laundering (Counts 21–30),
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                     21-13002

        and conspiracy to harbor a fugitive (Count 34). Id. at 1228–35. We
        also determined that the district court erred in its loss amount
        determination related to the bank fraud counts. Id. at 1235–38. We
        summarily affirmed several other sentencing enhancements that
        Annamalai challenged, including “the enhancement for the
        number of victims, the enhancement for abuse of trust, the
        enhancement for vulnerable victims, the enhancement for
        sophisticated means, [and] the enhancement for role in the
        offense.” Id. at 1239 n.5. Because the loss amount affected the
        guidelines calculation, we remanded the case for resentencing with
        instructions for the district court to set the loss amount “at more
        than $70,000 but less than $120,000 under [U.S.S.G.]
        § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E) of the 2013 Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 1238–39
        & n.5. We also instructed the district court to recalculate
        restitution on remand. Id. at 1239 n.5.
                                 B. Annamalai’s Resentencing
              On remand, Annamalai argued that he was entitled to a de
        novo resentencing and that the guidelines enhancements related to
        the number of victims and vulnerable victims should not apply.1
        The government argued that because we affirmed the application
        of those guidelines enhancements in Annamalai I, those
        determinations were binding on the district court under the law of
        the case doctrine. Following a hearing on the scope of

        1 Under his proposed revised calculations, his advisory guidelines range would
        be 63 to 78 months’ imprisonment.
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        21-13002                Opinion of the Court                          5

        resentencing, the district court concluded that, based on our
        decision in Annamalai I, Annamalai was not entitled to a de novo
        resentencing. Rather, it determined that our mandate on remand
        was limited, and that it was simply to adjust the loss amount as
        directed, hear arguments regarding the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
        sentencing factors, issue a new sentence, and recalculate
        restitution.
               At the resentencing hearing, the district court first stated for
        the record that we correctly determined that the temple operation
        was not “entirely fraudulent,” and that its prior conclusion
        otherwise was incorrect. Nevertheless, the court noted that there
        was still a “mountain of fraud” in the case based on Annamalai’s
        convictions on the eight counts of bank fraud alone. The district
        court then determined that with the adjusted loss amount,
        Annamalai’s base offense level was 33, which produced an advisory
        guidelines range of 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment. Annamalai
        renewed his objections to the calculation, but he acknowledged
        that in light of the district court’s prior rulings, the calculation was
        correct.
               The government requested an upward variance sentence of
        216 months’ imprisonment and provided extensive argument as to
        why the § 3553(a) sentencing factors supported an upward
        variance.   Specifically, the government argued that three
        overarching reasons warranted the requested sentence. First, the
        government pointed to the nature and circumstances of the
        offense—Annamalai took advantage of people who came to him
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                    21-13002

        for help and counseling, and several victims testified during the first
        sentencing hearing that Annamalai threatened them when they
        confronted him about the stolen money. Second, the government
        pointed to Annamalai’s personal history and characteristics—he
        had a history of intimidating and harassing witnesses, as evidenced
        by threatening letters he sent following his trial, numerous
        frivolous and malicious lawsuits, and involuntary bankruptcy
        petitions, that he filed against witnesses after his convictions. The
        government noted that Annamalai also impersonated a victim and
        corresponded with a Special Agent investigating the case, and he
        made false statements during his bankruptcy proceedings. And he
        demonstrated a lack of remorse. Third, the government argued
        that the requested sentence reflected the seriousness of the offense,
        promoted respect for the law, protected the public, provided
        adequate deterrence, and provided Annamalai an opportunity to
        receive much needed mental health treatment.
               On the other hand, Annamalai’s counsel requested a 63-to-
        78-month sentence, which with credit for the time served would
        result in his release. His counsel maintained that the § 3553(a)
        factors supported a sentence in this range given (1) the nature of
        the offense—Annamalai only kept “a tiny fraction” of the money
        the temple received, and the church was not a total fraud;2

        2 He also reiterated his objection to the two guidelines enhancements related
        to the number of victims—which we affirmed on appeal—arguing that the
        number of victims who suffered an actual loss was substantially lower because
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        21-13002               Opinion of the Court                        7

        (2) Annamalai’s mental and physical health conditions; (3) his
        troublesome family history; (4) that several years had passed since
        Annamalai filed the allegedly frivolous lawsuits against witnesses
        and most of the time the defendants in those suits were never
        served; (5) he had low scores on recidivism assessments; and (6) he
        would be deported upon completion of his sentence, which would
        protect the public against future crimes. Annamalai also made a
        statement to the court and apologized for his actions. He
        acknowledged that he had filed numerous lawsuits against
        individuals related to the case because he was mad, but he
        apologized, and noted that he had “100 percent backed off” over
        the last two years. He emphasized that he was in “extremely bad
        health” and begged the court for mercy.
               The district court then discussed the § 3553(a) factors. In
        particular, the district court highlighted details of the underlying
        scheme—that Annamalai held “himself out as a high priest” and
        used his temples “as mere vessels through which he moved cash
        for his benefit”; “used the victims’ vulnerabilities against them by
        manipulating, threatening, blackmailing, and defrauding them”;
        used victims’ signatures from packages for “fraudulent purposes”;
        and obstructed justice to make it appear as though the victims had
        agreed to the unauthorized charges. The district court also noted
        that following his sentencing, he sent threatening letters to victims

        many of the victims received the money back from their credit card
        companies.
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                    21-13002

        and filed numerous frivolous and vindictive lawsuits and
        involuntary bankruptcy petitions against victims, witnesses, and
        others. The district court noted that:
               In the initial sentencing I stated that Mr. Annamalai
               used false lawsuits to inflict pain and extort payment.
               He enjoyed preying on weak and vulnerable people.
               He, as a so-called man of the cloth, is a fraud. He is
               heartless, and ruthless, he is not a holy man.[ 3] I find
               that he is a veritable sociopath, a manipulative liar,
               swearing out multiple outrageous false affidavits, and
               repeatedly testifying falsely.

               At the original sentencing I stated that this was the
               worst obstruction of justice I had seen. And despite
               that fact, the defendant was unrepentant and
               incorrigible. None of this has changed. In fact, his
               just-described behavior following his original
               sentencing solidifies, if not intensifies, my views. I
               can almost hear the cries of the victims who we heard
               from for two weeks and the defendant treated
               mercilessly. He is not entitled to mercy now, nor
               would mercy be just.

        3 Later, after the district court announced the sentence, Annamalai’s counsel
        objected to the district court’s statement that Annamalai was not a holy man,
        and the court clarified that whether Annamalai was a holy man was “not for
        [the court] to decide” and the court did not care whether Annamalai was a
        high priest or not.
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        21-13002               Opinion of the Court                       9

              I’ve read the victim impact statements, and many of
              them tell of the defendant’s repeated threats. One of
              the victims testified at trial how the defendant
              responded when she resisted his misconduct. This is
              the one to whom Mr. Annamalai said, quote, once
              you are in my clutches, only I can release you, closed
              quote. This man is the opposite of remorseful. He
              committed crimes to cover up his fraud, and he
              intimidated witnesses, and obstructed justice. And he
              has filed scores of lengthy and frivolous motions and
              other documents in the case swelling the docket to
              almost a thousand filings. And from these, and
              everything else in the case, the great weight of other
              evidence, I can say colloquially he doesn’t get it. The
              bottom line is that this man is evil.

        (emphasis in original). Turning to the nature and circumstances of
        the offenses, the district court noted that Annamalai led “a highly-
        calculated scheme” that involved “preying on particularly
        vulnerable victims”—an act for which he had not shown genuine
        remorse.       Regarding Annamalai’s personal history and
        characteristics, the court noted that the psychologist on whom
        Annamalai relied found that Annamalai “exaggerated his mental
        illness symptoms, and that he [was] an unreliable historian who has
        a history of exaggeration, deceit, and manipulation” and
        “demonstrated . . . severe character pathology.” The district court
        explained that “[o]nly a lengthy term of incarceration” would serve
        to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, reflect the
        seriousness of the offense, protect the public from future crimes by
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                21-13002

        Annamalai, and provide him with needed medical care. The court
        noted that its determination was “the product of careful, solemn,
        and prolonged deliberation.” The court stated that “[w]hile my
        contempt for Mr. Annamalai is without affectation, I have had
        ample opportunity for sedate reflection to consider what the
        sentence should be. It is in no way intended to punish the
        defendant for appealing the judgment of conviction. He got it right
        on appeal.”
                Annamalai’s counsel moved for recusal of the district court
        judge, arguing that recusal was warranted based on the judge’s
        contempt for Annamalai and because the court’s comments did not
        “reflect the reality or reflect [this Court’s] opinion” on direct
        appeal. The district court denied the motion. However, the court
        clarified its contempt comment, explaining that:
              I do hold him in contempt. Not in contempt of court
              . . . , but [for] what he did to these victims. What he
              did to these victims, I am offended by. And part of
              my job here is to vindicate the interest of the public.
              And there is nothing wrong with a trial judge being
              irritated at a criminal defendant who has caused
              untold amounts of misery to innocent victims. That
              is what I mean when I say I have this contempt for
              him.

              The district court then imposed a sentence of 216 months’
        imprisonment, which was an upward variance from the guidelines
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        21-13002                Opinion of the Court                        11

        range, to be followed by five years’ supervised release. Annamalai
        timely appealed.
                                   II.     Discussion
                   A. Whether de novo resentencing was required
               Annamalai argues that the district court erred and failed to
        comply with our mandate when it declined to conduct a de novo
        resentencing proceeding. Relying heavily on our decision in
        United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996), Annamalai
        argues that when a criminal sentence is vacated, the entire
        sentencing package (including any sentencing enhancements) is
        voided in its entirety, and the default result is that the defendant is
        to be resentenced de novo.
                Generally, “when a sentence is vacated and the case is
        remanded for resentencing, the district court is free to reconstruct
        the sentence utilizing any of the sentencing components.” Stinson,
        97 F.3d at 469. If we remanded on a limited issue, however, our
        mandate restricts the range of issues the district court may consider
        on resentencing. United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1519–20
        (11th Cir. 1996). The “district court when acting under an appellate
        court’s mandate, cannot vary it . . . or give any other or further
        relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon a matter decided
        on appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as
        has been remanded.” Id. at 1520 (quotations omitted). “The
        mandate rule is simply an application of the law of the case doctrine
        to a specific set of facts.” Id. (quotations omitted). Furthermore,
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        “[b]ecause it is in the interest of judicial economy for the district
        court not to redo that which had been done correctly at the first
        sentencing hearing, we have held that there is nothing improper in
        the district court’s limiting the scope of a resentencing
        proceeding.” Id. (alterations adopted) (quotations omitted).
               Based on our decision in Annamalai I, the district court
        determined correctly that our mandate on remand was limited.
        Annamalai raised a number of challenges related to his sentencing
        and the guidelines’ calculations in Annamalai I. Specifically, he
        argued, among other grounds, that (1) the district court erred
        in determining that the loss amount was greater than $400,000 but
        less than $1,000,000, which resulted in a 14-level guidelines
        enhancement; (2) the district court erred in applying a four-level
        enhancement based on a finding that there were more than 50
        victims of the bank fraud; (3) the district court erred in applying a
        two-level vulnerable victims enhancement; (4) his 327-month
        sentence was substantively unreasonable; and (5) the court erred in
        basing restitution on the total loss. Annamalai I, 939 F.3d at 1236,
        1239 n.5.
               We concluded that the evidence did not support the district
        court’s determination as to the loss amount because the
        government’s methodology for statistical extrapolation was
        flawed. Id. at 1236–38. Thus, we held that resentencing was
        required and we instructed the district court on remand to set the
        loss amount “at more than $70,000 but less than $120,000 under
        [U.S.S.G.] § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E) of the 2013 Sentencing Guidelines.”
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        21-13002                  Opinion of the Court                            13

        Id. at 1238. However, we “summarily affirm[ed]” among other
        enhancements “the enhancement for the number of victims . . .
        [and] the enhancement for vulnerable victims.” Id. at 1239 n.5. 4
                In other words, we did not vacate the entire sentencing
        package in Annamalai I. Rather, we remanded with express
        instructions that the district court set the loss amount at a specific
        amount and resentence Annamalai. Id. at 1239 & n.5. We affirmed
        a variety of other sentencing enhancements, and those rulings were
        binding as law of the case on the district court. United States v.
        Jordan, 429 F.3d 1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The law of the case
        doctrine bars relitigation of issues that were decided, either
        explicitly or by necessary implication, in an earlier appeal of the
        same case.”); see also United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 830
        (11th Cir. 2007) (“The law of the case doctrine (and, by implication,
        the mandate rule) applies to findings made under the Sentencing
        Guidelines.”);Venn v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1058,
        1063 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Under the law of the case doctrine, both the
        district court and the appellate court are generally bound by a prior
        appellate decision of the same case.”). Accordingly, contrary to
        Annamalai’s contention, the district court was not free to revisit
        the sentencing enhancements that we affirmed in Annamalai I. See
        United States v. Stein, 964 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding,

        4 Because we were remanding for resentencing, we declined to address the
        substantive reasonableness of his sentence or the restitution issue, and we
        instructed the district court to recalculate restitution on remand. Annamalai
        I, 939 F.3d at 1239 n.5.
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                       21-13002

        under similar circumstances to those present in Annamalai’s case,
        that the mandate was limited and the district court determined
        correctly that it could not reconsider the forfeiture calculation);
        United States v. Bordon, 421 F.3d 1202, 1207 (11th Cir. 2005)
        (declining to consider defendant’s claim that the district court
        improperly calculated the amount of loss “because this Court
        previously reviewed and affirmed the calculation” in the
        defendant’s initial direct appeal).
                              B. Recusal from resentencing
              Annamalai argues that the district court erred in failing to
        recuse itself from his resentencing.
               Section 455 of Title 28 of the United States Code sets forth
        two conditions for recusal. 5 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b). First,
        subsection (a) provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate
        judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
        in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id.
        § 455(a). The question for purposes of § 455(a) “is whether an
        objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts
        underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would
        entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality, and any

        5 A defendant can also move for recusal of a judge based on bias or prejudice
        by “mak[ing] and fil[ing] a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before
        whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him
        or in favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. No such affidavit was filed
        in Annamalai’s case. Therefore, we will not discuss recusal under § 144.
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        21-13002                Opinion of the Court                        15

        doubts must be resolved in favor of recusal.” United States v. Patti,
        337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and
        quotations omitted).
                Second, under subsection (b), a judge must recuse himself
        “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
        party . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1); see also Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321
        (explaining that recusal under subsection (b) is mandatory once it
        is established that any of the enumerated circumstances in (b)
        exist). “The bias or prejudice must be personal and extrajudicial; it
        must derive from something other than that which the judge
        learned by participating in the case.” Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 828
        (quotations omitted).
                Importantly, “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of
        facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current . . .
        [or] prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or
        partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or
        antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v.
        United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). “Thus, judicial remarks
        during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or
        even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do
        not support a bias or partiality challenge.” Id.; see also United
        States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he judge’s
        conduct during the proceedings should not, except in the ‘rarest of
        circumstances’ form the sole basis for recusal under § 455(a).”
        (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555)). “We review a judge’s decision
        not to recuse for an abuse of discretion.” Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 828.
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        16                          Opinion of the Court                        21-13002

                Annamalai argues that recusal was necessary under § 455(a)
        because an objective observer with full knowledge of the facts of
        the case would harbor a significant doubt about the trial judge’s
        impartiality based on the judge’s statements during the
        resentencing hearing.6 In support, he points to the trial judge’s
        contempt comment, comments that were negative concerning
        Annamalai’s character, and statements that he argues implied
        Annamalai was not a “man of the cloth” and that the temple was a
        total fraud.
               We have reviewed the comments Annamalai highlights.
        While at times the judge was unwisely hostile toward Annamalai
        and disapproving of his character, when considered in context, the
        comments did not display a deep-seated antagonism that would
        make fair judgment impossible. Rather, the comments reflect

        6 In its response brief, the government argued that the district court’s
        statements did not reflect bias, but Annamalai argues that whether the district
        court was biased is not the correct standard. Rather, he argues that the only
        relevant standard was “whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully
        informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
        would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality,” and that
        “recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) does not require that the district court harbor
        actual bias against the defendant.” The government’s apparent confusion
        stems from Annamalai’s initial brief in which he referred frequently to the
        judge’s “bias.” Regardless, it is clear that “at issue in the present case is an
        aspect of ‘partiality’ already addressed in [§ 455(b)], bias or prejudice.” Liteky,
        510 U.S. at 553 n.2. And our task is to determine whether there is an “objective
        appearance” of such bias or prejudice—i.e., “an objective appearance of
        improper partiality.” Id.
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        21-13002               Opinion of the Court                        17

        “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even
        anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and
        women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges,
        sometimes display.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56; see also id. at 550–
        51 (“The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the
        evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who
        has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the
        judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice,” because his
        opinion is the product of information acquired during the course
        of the proceedings.). Furthermore, all of the comments were based
        on information that the trial judge learned during the course of the
        underlying proceedings (which spanned several years). And
        “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
        events occurring in the course of the current . . . [or] prior
        proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
        unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
        would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555; see also In re
        City of Milwaukee, 788 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Rarely will a
        judge’s comments show such favoritism or antagonism unless
        those comments reflect at least some reliance on an ‘extrajudicial
        source.’”).
              Indeed, other circuits have concluded similarly that recusal
        was not warranted based on similar comments to those made
        during Annamalai’s resentencing. See United States v. McTiernan,
        695 F.3d 882, 891–93 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that recusal was not
        warranted based on trial judge’s repeated statements that the
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                       21-13002

        defendant was a liar and was “willing to lie whenever it suits his
        purpose”); United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1252, 1277–78
        (10th Cir. 2000) (holding recusal not warranted based on trial
        judge’s remarks about the defendant’s character, including that the
        defendant was “repulsive,” “a punk, first class,” “a manipulator . . .
        [who] runs whores . . . [and] lives off . . . women,” “a predator,”
        “someone who ‘has [n]ever done anything decent in his life’ and
        ‘has nothing going for him,’” and “a poster boy for a life sentence
        in a federal penitentiary”). Accordingly, we conclude that the
        district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Annamalai’s
        motion for recusal.7

        7 Annamalai argues that recusal was also necessary because the trial judge
        failed to comply with the “spirit and express mandate” of this Court because
        the trial judge (1) stated that Annamalai “a so-called man of the cloth” was not
        a holy man, despite our statement in Annamalai I that it is not for the
        government to opine on religious qualifications; (2) made comments that
        indicated that the judge continued to believe that the temple was a total fraud,
        despite our determination in Annamalai I that the temple was not a total fraud;
        and (3) in failing to conduct a de novo resentencing. First, Annamalai takes
        the trial judge’s statements out of context. Although the trial judge stated that
        Annamalai was not a holy man, he clarified that whether Annamalai was a
        holy man was “not for [the court] to decide” and the court did not care
        whether Annamalai was a high priest or not. Second, the trial judge also
        acknowledged that Annamalai’s operation was not a total fraud, but noted
        correctly that, even though the operation “was [not] entirely fraudulent,”
        there was still “a mountain of fraud left standing” based on the eight counts of
        substantive fraud that we affirmed on direct appeal. Thus, an objective
        observer with full knowledge of the facts of this case would not entertain
        serious doubts about the trial judge’s impartiality based on these statements.
        Third, as we explained above, the district court correctly declined to conduct
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        21-13002                  Opinion of the Court                              19

               C. The procedural and substantive reasonableness of
                              Annamalai’s sentence
              Annamalai argues that his above guidelines 216-month
        sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He
        argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because it is
        based on clearly erroneous facts that we rejected in Annamalai I.
        Similarly, he maintains that his sentence is substantively
        unreasonable because (1) there was no justification for the upward
        variance, and the district court (2) relied on clearly erroneous facts
        in determining the sentence, (3) allowed animosity toward
        Annamalai to influence its decision, and (4) failed to give proper
        consideration to the guidelines range.
               We review a sentence for both procedural and substantive
        reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
        See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The burden rests
        on the party challenging the sentence to show “that the sentence is
        unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and
        the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United
        States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
               In reviewing a sentence for procedural reasonableness, we
        “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
        error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
        Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to

        a de novo resentencing on remand, and, therefore, there is no basis for recusal
        on that ground.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13002

        consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
        erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
        sentence.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir.
        2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
               After ensuring that a sentence is procedurally sound, we
        then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence in
        light of the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of
        any variance from the guidelines range. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
        The district court must issue a sentence that is “sufficient, but not
        greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of
        § 3553(a)(2), which include the need for a sentence to reflect the
        seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
        punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from
        future criminal conduct. Id. at 50 n.6; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The
        court must also consider the following factors: the nature and
        circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
        the defendant; the kinds of sentences available; the advisory
        Sentencing Guidelines and pertinent policy statements of the
        Sentencing Commission; the need to avoid unwarranted
        sentencing disparities; and the need to provide restitution to
        victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). “[T]he district court need
        only ‘acknowledge’ that it considered the § 3553(a) factors, and
        need not discuss each of these factors . . . .” Amedeo, 487 F.3d at
        833 (quotation and internal citation omitted). Importantly, the
        weight given to a particular § 3553(a) factor “is committed to the
        sound discretion of the district court,” and it is not required to give
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        21-13002               Opinion of the Court                        21

        “equal weight” to the § 3553(a) factors. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at
        1254 (quotation omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion
        when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due
        significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or
        irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in
        considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d
        1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
                Extraordinary justification or “rigid mathematical
        formula[s]” are not required for a sentence outside the guidelines
        range, but the district court should explain why the variance is
        appropriate and the “justification for the variance must be
        sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Id.
        at 1186–87 (quotations omitted). We will “vacate the sentence if,
        but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that
        the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
        the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the
        range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id.
        at 1190 (quotation omitted).
               Annamalai argues that his sentence is procedurally
        unreasonable because it is based on clearly erroneous facts that we
        rejected in Annamalai I. Specifically, he points to statements that
        the district court made that he claims question whether he was a
        Hindu priest and imply that the temple operation was a total fraud.
        He maintains that the district court erred in relying on these factors
        when determining his sentence because in Annamalai I we rejected
        the contention that the entire temple operation was a total fraud,
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                21-13002

        and we also noted that it was not for the “government to pass on
        religious qualifications.” See Annamalai I, 939 F.3d at 1225.
              Annamalai takes the district court’s statements out of
        context, and a review of the record confirms that the district court
        did not base the sentence on clearly erroneous facts. At the
        resentencing hearing, the district court stated:
              The over-arching theme of Mr. Annamalai’s shocking
              misconduct involved his holding himself out as a high
              priest to victims, registering his temples as nonprofit
              corporations . . . and seeking payments from victims
              with reference to donations to the temple, building
              new temples, and deducting payments to him as
              charitable contributions for tax purposes, yet Mr.
              Annamalai used the temples as mere vessels though
              which he moved cash for his benefit. He held or
              controlled over 40 bank accounts in the names of
              himself, his wife, various temples among which he
              moved money without regard for the source. He
              used marketing materials to identify and deceive
              individuals most susceptible to his strategians, falsely
              advertising that he would assist in marital, family,
              health, and legal problems. He then used the victims’
              vulnerabilities against them by manipulating,
              threatening, blackmailing, and defrauding them. He
              obtained victims’ signatures from packages he
              arranged to have delivered to them, and then used
              those signatures for fraudulent purposes.
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        21-13002                  Opinion of the Court                              23

        When considered in context, it is clear that the district court was
        not questioning whether Annamalai was a high priest or basing its
        sentence on that improper factor. 8 Rather, the court was
        summarizing the nature of the offense, which is a § 3553(a) factor
        that the court must consider, and its summary of the offense is
        consistent with our findings in Annamalai I that Annamalai used
        his position as a religious figure to prey on his victims. 939 F.3d at
        1224 (holding that the “description of Mr. Annamalai and his
        temple as ‘a scam’ was a fair comment on the evidence,” and noting
        that Annamalai was prosecuted for “a scheme in which he abused
        his position as a Hindu priest by, among other things, causing his
        followers’ credit cards to be charged in excess of agreed amounts
        and without authorization, and submitting false documents to
        financial institutions to substantiate the unauthorized charges”).
                Furthermore, a review of the record confirms that the
        district court did not base the sentence on the improper conclusion
        that the temple operation was a total fraud. The district court
        stated expressly at the resentencing hearing that that the operation
        was not a total fraud. However, as the district court correctly
        noted, even though the operation “was [not] entirely fraudulent,”
        there was still “a mountain of fraud left standing” based on the
        eight counts of substantive bank fraud that we affirmed on direct

        8 In fact, the district court later clarified that whether Annamalai was a holy
        man was “not for [the court] to decide” and the court did not “care” whether
        Annamalai was a high priest or not.
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        24                        Opinion of the Court                      21-13002

        appeal. 9 Thus, the district court’s comment was a fair comment
        on the evidence, and the district court did not base the sentence on
        an improper factor. 10 Accordingly, we conclude that the district
        court did not commit any procedural error.
               Turning to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
        we conclude that Annamalai’s 216-month above guidelines
        sentence is substantively reasonable. Contrary to Annamalai’s
        claim, the record demonstrates that the district court gave proper
        consideration to the guidelines range of 135 to 168 months’
        imprisonment, but it determined that the government’s requested
        upward variance to 216 months’ imprisonment was appropriate
        given the § 3553(a) factors. There is no indication that any alleged
        animosity toward Annamalai affected the court’s decision. Rather,
        the record demonstrates that the sentence was based solely on the
        § 3553(a) factors, including Annamalai’s personal history and
        characteristics and the nature and circumstances of the offense.

        9 We reject Annamalai’s contention that there was not a “mountain of fraud”
        because “$12 million . . . came into the temple,” and we held in Annamalai I
        that the government proved approximately $100,000 in loss amount—
        meaning that Annamalai received “only [0].8% of the temple’s proceeds.”
        First, as a matter of record, the temple received $10 million, not $12 million.
        Annamalai I, 939 F.3d at 1236. Second, regardless of the loss amount, the
        record supports that there was substantial fraud in this case that spanned a
        number of years and involved numerous victims.
        10 Although Annamalai also argues that his sentence is substantively
        unreasonable because the district court relied on these allegedly improper
        factors, this argument necessarily fails for the same reasons discussed above.
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        21-13002                   Opinion of the Court                              25

        The district court’s stated reasons for the upward variance are
        “sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”
        Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187 (quotations omitted). As the district court
        noted, Annamalai was the leader of a “highly-calculated scheme”
        that involved preying on “vulnerable victims through fraud,
        blackmail, and defamation”—a crime for which he demonstrated
        no remorse. And Annamalai took actions following the first
        sentencing to continue to harass witnesses and people who stood
        up to him.11
               Furthermore, the district court made clear that the chosen
        sentence was “the product of careful, solemn, and prolonged
        deliberation,” and that the upward variance was necessary to
        achieve the sentencing goals of general and specific deterrence and
        to protect the public—§ 3553(a) factors the court is directed to
        consider. Moreover, another indicator of the substantive
        reasonableness of the sentence is that Annamalai’s sentence is well
        below the 30-year statutory maximum for each of the eight bank
        fraud counts. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324
        (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a sentence that is below the
        statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness).

        11 Annamalai repeatedly emphasizes that many of the individuals he initiated
        lawsuits against following his convictions were not served with those actions,
        but whether they were served is irrelevant. The fact remains that Annamalai
        took actions that were intended to harass and intimidate witness, and that type
        of action is a legitimate factor the district court may consider under § 3553(a)
        when determining the appropriate sentence.
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                21-13002

        Accordingly, given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
        that the sentence is substantively reasonable.
                                  III.   Conclusion
               Annamalai is not entitled to relief on any of his claims, and
        we affirm his sentence.
              AFFIRMED.