Court Opinion

ID: 9624038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:49:16.611088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:59.232354
License: Public Domain

Miller, Judge,
dissenting.
In my view, not only is there evidence of a breach of the duty of care, but the issue of foreseeability should go to a jury. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
Generally,
an intervening criminal act of a third party, without which the injury would not have occurred, will ... be treated as the proximate cause of the injury thus breaking the causal connection between the defendant [’s] negligence and the injury unless the criminal act was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant [’s] conduct. [Cit.]1
So if the character of the intervening act claimed to break the causal connection “was such that its probable or natural consequences could reasonably have been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen by the original wrong-doer, the causal connection is not broken, and the original wrong-doer is responsible for all the consequences resulting from the intervening act.”2 With respect to the issue of proximate *653cause, it makes “ ‘no difference whether the intervening actor is negligent or intentional, or criminal. Even criminal conduct by others is often reasonably to be anticipated.’ [Cit.]”3 In Lay v. Munford, Inc.,4 in a similar circumstance, the Supreme Court held: “The question of reasonable foreseeability and the statutory duty imposed by [former] Code [Ann.] § 105-401 [now OCGA § 51-3-1], to exercise ordinary care to protect the plaintiff in the circumstances of this case, is for a jury’s determination rather than summary adjudication by the courts.”5
Decided July 6, 2001
Reconsideration denied July 19, 2001
Dean, Smith & Therrell, Peter R. Roberts, John R. Burdges, for appellant.
Magill & Atkinson, Thomas E. Magill, for appellees.
By statute, the bailor of rental cars must keep its vehicles in suitable repair for hire and further warrants that the vehicle is free from any secret fault rendering it unfit for the purposes for which it was hired.6 To the ordinary consumer, the purposes for renting a vehicle are to conduct and complete travel safely, conveniently, and economically. When a traveler is stranded by the side of the road, it is not beyond the apprehension of ordinary foresight to realize that someone could and would attempt to take criminal advantage of that situation.7 Therefore, the question of reasonable foreseeability and the statutory duty imposed by OCGA § 44-12-63 to exercise ordinary care to protect the plaintiff bailee from secret defects in this case is for a jury’s determination rather than summary adjudication by the courts. In my opinion, the trial court erred in granting Enterprise’s motion for summary judgment.
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this dissent.

 (Emphasis supplied.) Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga. App. 91, 94 (469 SE2d 268) (1996) (whole court). Accord Williams v. Grier, 196 Ga. 327, 328, hn. 2 (a) (26 SE2d 698) (1943).

 Southern R. Co. v. Webb, 116 Ga. 152, hn. 1 (42 SE 395) (1902).

 Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 177 (2) (210 SE2d 350) (1974).

 235 Ga. 340 (219 SE2d 416) (1975).

 Id. at 341.

 OCGA § 44-12-63 (2).

 See, e.g., Wallace v. Boys Club &c., 211 Ga. App. 534, 536-537 (2) (439 SE2d 746) (1993) (whole court) (absence of prior abductions and assaults does not render the danger of such criminal attacks on an unsupervised child unforeseeable as a matter of law).