Court Opinion

ID: 9897472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:36.307515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:50.043320
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion   ap
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                EL JEN MEDICAL HOSPITAL, INC.,
                D/B/A EL JEN CONVALESCENT
                HOSPITAL AND RETIREMENT
                CENTER, A DOMESTIC                                     No. 83945
                CORPORATION; TOOMEY REAL
                ESTATE, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED
                LIABILITY COMPANY; AND JAMES
                TOOMEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
                ADMINISTRATOR,
                Appellants,
                VS.                                                     ELI
                                                                      CLERv                 URT
                STACY TYLER, INDIVIDUALLY, AS                        BY-
                SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE                              lIEF DE.PLITY CLERK

                ESTATE OF GARY TYLER, AND AS
                LEGAL GUARDIAN FOR OMEGA
                TYLER, A MINOR; AZIAH TYLER, AS
                STATUTORY HEIR TO GARY TYLER;
                AND HEAVEN TYLER, AS
                STATUTORY HEIR TO GARY TYLER,
                Respondents.

                           Appeal from a district court order denying, in part, a motion to
                compel arbitration in a wrongful death action. Eighth Judicial District
                Court, Clark County; Gloria Sturman, Judge.
                           Affirmed.

                Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP and S. Brent Vogel, Adam Garth,
                Robert D. Rourke, and Ethan M. Featherstone, Las Vegas,
                for Appellants.

                Cogburn Law and Jamie S. Cogburn and Hunter S. Davidson, Henderson;
                Cameron Law and Daven P. Cameron, Las Vegas,
                for Respondents.

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                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT CADISH, PICKERING, and BELL, JJ.

                                                 OPINION

                By the Court, PICKERING, J.:
                            Nevada's wrongful death statute,        NRS 41.085, provides

                separate causes of action for the decedent's estate and the statutory heirs.
                Following the death of her husband, Gary Tyler, respondent Stacy Tyler
                asserted wrongful death claims individually and on behalf of Gary's estate
                and their minor child, and was joined by two adult statutory heirs, against
                appellant El Jen Convalescent Hospital and Retirement Center (El Jen).

                The district court compelled the estate's claims to arbitration pursuant to
                an arbitration agreement signed during Gary's admission to El Jen but
                found that the statutory heirs were not bound by the agreernent, which they
                did not sign, and declined to compel arbitration of their claims.
                            El Jen appeals, and we affirm.      Arbitration is a matter of

                contract. NRS 41.085 provides the statutory heirs with separate causes of
                action arising upon the death of the decedent that require the heirs'
                agreement if arbitration is to be compelled. While the heirs' claims derive
                from the injury to the decedent, that does not authorize the decedent to bind
                the heirs to arbitration absent their agreement, which the district court
                correctly determined was lacking here.
                                                     I.
                                                     A.
                            After suffering a series of strokes, 54-year-old Gary Tyler was
                admitted to El Jen for long-term care. During his admission, Gary's wife,
                Stacy Tyler, provided El Jen with two documents—a Nevada general
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                 durable power of attorney and a durable power of attorney for healthcare
                 decisions (together, power of attorney documents)—both of which
                 designated her as Gary's agent in the event of his disability or incapacity_
                 As part of El Jen's admission paperwork, Stacy signed an arbitration
                 agreement on Gary's behalf as "the Resident." This agreement subjected
                 any claim related to El Jen's services or care of Gary to arbitration and
                 purported to bind all claims "derived through or on behalf of the Resident,"
                 including claims by Gary's heirs, to arbitration as well.
                              Gary was wheelchair-bound throughout his time at El Jen. At
                 his family's request, El Jen arranged for the Regional Transportation
                 Commission of Southern Nevada (RTC) to transport Gary to and from
                 church. One Sunday, when the transport driver returned Gary to El Jen
                 and found no El Jen staff member at the front desk, the driver left Gary
                 alone in his wheelchair in El Jen's lobby. Gary stood up and fell, hitting his
                 head on the floor. He later died, allegedly from complications stemming
                 from the fall.
                                                      B.
                             Stacy and Gary's children (collectively, the Tylers) and Gary's
                 estate sued El Jen, RTC, and others, asserting negligence, wrongful death,
                 and survivorship claims. El Jen moved to compel arbitration of the claims
                 against it pursuant to the arbitration agreement Stacy had signed on Gary's
                 behalf. After requesting and receiving the power of attorney documents and
                 supplemental briefing, the district court concluded that the estate's claims
                 against El Jen were subject to the arbitration agreement. But the district
                 court denied the motion as to Stacy's and the statutory heirs' individual
                 wrongful death claims, finding that arbitration is a matter of contract and
                 that neither Stacy nor the other heirs agreed to arbitrate their claims.
                 Although the district court stayed litigation of the statutory heirs' claims
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                against El Jen pending the outcome of this appeal, it denied El Jen's request
                to stay the litigation pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings
                between El Jen and the estate.
                            El Jen appeals.       It argues that the Tylers, as nonsignatory

                statutory heirs, are bound by the arbitration agreement because a statutory
                heir's claim under NRS 41.085 is "entirely derivative" of the decedent's
                claim.   Alternatively, El Jen argues that the district court abused its
                discretion under NRS 38.221(7) by failing to stay the litigation until the
                estate's arbitration concludes.
                                                       11.
                            A district court's order resolving a motion to compel arbitration

                may involve mixed questions of law and fact. See Gonski v. Second Judicial
                Dist. Court, 126 Nev. 551, 557, 245 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010), overruled on
                other grounds by U.S. Horne Corp. .v. Michael Ballesteros Tr., 134 Nev. 180,
                415 P.3d 32 (2018). We review purely legal questions de novo, Clark Ct,y.
                Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. Pearson, 106 Nev. 587, 590, 798 P.2d 136, 137 (1990),
                and defer to the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly
                erroneous or not based on substantial evidence, see May v. Anderson, 121
                Nev. 668, 672-73, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005).
                                                       A.
                            El Jen argues that nonsignatory statutory heirs asserting
                wrongful death claims under NRS 41.085 are bound bY a decedent's pre-
                death arbitration agreement. But as a predicate matter, the Tylers argue
                that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because Stacy lacked legal
                authority to bind anyone since her powers of attorney were invalid. See id.
                at 672, 119 P.3d at 1257 (stating that enforceable contracts require
                acceptance by the offeree). Because the question of Stacy's legal authority

                is a question of fact, see Simmons Self-Storage Partners, LLC v. Rib Roof,
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                Inc., 130 Nev. 540, 549, 331 P.3d 850, 856 (2014), we defer to the district
                court unless its finding iS clearly erroneous or not based on substantial
                evidence.
                             Nevada has adopted the Uniform Power of Attorney Act (2006),

                8B U.L.A. 175 (2014) (Uniform Act), codified at NRS 162A.200 through NRS
                162A.660. NRS 162A.220(2) requires that a certificate of the principal's
                competency be attached to a power of attorney if, at the time of its execution,
                "the principal resides in a hospital, residential facility for groups, facility
                for skilled nursing or home for individual residential care."        See NRS

                162A.790(5) (2019) (imposing the same requirement for a durable power of

                attorney for healthcare decisions).       The Tylers argue that this statute

                invalidates Stacy's powers of attorney because no certificate of competency
                was attached, and Gary signed them while he was a patient at Mountain's
                Edge Hospital.      Further, citing deposition testimony from litigation
                involving another facility that cared for Gary, the Tylers allege that Gary
                may have lacked mental competency when he signed the power of attorney
                documents. See 2A C.J.S. Agency § 28 (2023) (defining competency to sign
                powers of attorney as "whether that person is able to understand and
                comprehend their own actions").
                             The district court rejected these challenges. It noted that the
                powers of attorney were signed two years before El Jen accepted Gary for
                long-term care and that they were notarized and appeared regular on their
                face.   Under the Uniform Act, "[a] person that in good faith accepts an
                acknowledged power of attorney without actual knowledge that the power
                of attorney is . . . invalid" may rely on the power of attorney as valid. NRS
                162A.360(2); see NRS 162A.815(2) (making similar provision for good faith
                reliance on a durable power of attorney for healthcare decisions). Even

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                crediting the heirs' argument that a certificate of competency should have
                been attached, the arbitration agreement was nevertheless enforceable
                because the heirs failed to dcmonstrate that El Jen did not rely in good faith
                on the powers of attorney Stacy furnished.         A properly executed and
                acknowledged power of attorney permits a party "to rely in good faith on the
                validity of the power of attorney, the validity of the a.gent's authority, and
                the propriety of the agent's exercise of authority"—and thus carry out the
                agent's instructions in effecting a transaction—"unless the person has
                actual knowledge to the contrary." Unif. Power of Attorney Act § 119 cmt.,
                8B U.L.A. 214.
                            The Tylers argue that the district court's finding of El Jen's
                good faith reliance was not supported by substantial evidence. Pointing to
                other admission documents th.at Stacy signed as "immediate family
                member" or "spouse," they. maintain that she did not sign the arbitration
                a greement under her powers of attorney. But Stacy signed the arbitration
                agreement as "Resident/Representative," with "Resident" referring to Gary,
                and provided El Jen with the power of attorney documents identifying her
                as Gary's agent. Considering this evidence, the district court found that,
                while it was "difficult to tell" Stacy's intent when signing the arbitration
                agreement, "[i]t does appear that it was represented to [El Jen] that [Stacy]
                held power of attorney" when El Jen "entered into this agreement to take
                this person as a patient." The district court also found that the admission
                documents did not reasonably provide El Jen with knowledge of Gary'S
                residency at Mountain's Edge Hospital or possible lack of competency two
                years earlier when he signed the power of attorney documents.
                            This sufficiently supports the district court's finding that El Jen
                did not have actual knowledge of the possible invalidity of Stacy's powers of

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                attorney and thus relied on them in good faith when it agreed to provide
                service and care to Gary. See McClanahan v. Raley's, Inc., 117 Nev. 921,
                924, 34 P.3d 573, 576 (2001) ("Substantial evidence has been defined as that
                which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
                conclusion.") (internal quotation marks ornitted).       The lack of actual

                knowledge, as well as Stacy's signature as the "Resident/Representative" on
                the arbitration agreement pursuant to notarized powers of attorney
                identifying her as Gary's agent, allowed El Jen to rely on Stacy's authority
                to effectuate the arbitration agreement as Gary's attorney-in-fact. Based
                on the materials submitted to it, the district• court properly rejected the
                Tylers' challenge to the arbitration agreement's validity.
                                                     B.
                            El Jen argues that the district court should have enforced the

                arbitration agreement against the statutory heirs as well as the estate. It
                maintains that, as written, the arbitration agreement subjects all claims
                arising from the care El Jen gave Gary to arbitration:
                                  It is the intention of the parties to this
                            Arbitration Agreement that it shall in[ Jure to the
                            benefit of and bind the parties, their successors and
                            assigns, including the agents, employees and
                            servants of the Facility, and all persons who[se]
                            claim is derived through or on behalf of the
                            Resident, including that [of] any parent, spouse,
                            child, guardian, executorM administrator, legal
                            representative, or heir of the Resident.

                Contracts that involve interstate commerce, like the arbitration agreement
                in this case, are subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 9 U.S.C.
                §§ 1-16 (2012); Maide, LLC v. DiLeo, 138 Nev. 80, 82, 504 P.3d 1126, 1128
                (2022). While the FAA "reflects a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
                agreements," Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane •Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35
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                (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), its goal is "to make arbitra tion
                agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so," Prima Paint
                Corp. u. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).         An

                enforceable arbitration agreement requires offer, acceptance, meeting of the
                minds, and consideration. See May, 121 Nev. at 672, 119 P.3d at 1257. And
                "[a]s a general rule, no one can be forced to arbitrate unless they have
                agreed to do so." 1 Thomas H. Oehrnke & Joan M. Brovins, Commercial
                Arbitration § 8:1 (3d ed. Supp. 2023); see also Truck Ins. Exch. v. Palmer J.
                Swanson, Inc., 124 Nev. 629, 634, 189 P.3d 656, 660 (2008) (stating that "a
                party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has
                not agreed so to submit") (internal quotation marks omitted). "There are
                exceptions when a nonsignatory may be bound to arbitrate," but "[a]
                signatory to an arbitration agreement has the burden to establish facts that
                would compel a resistant nonsignatory to arbitrate." Oehmke, supra, § 8:1.
                            The statutory heirs did not sign the arbitration agreement, nor
                is there any evidence they assented to its terms.' However, "nonsignatories
                to an agreement subject to the FAA may be bound to an arbitration clause
                when rules of law or equity would bind them to the contract generally." In
                re Labatt Food Seru., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009); see Truck Ins.
                Exch., 124 Nev. at 634-35, 189 P.3d at 660 (noting theories by which courts
                have bound nonsignatories to arbitration, including incorporation by
                reference, assumption, agency, veil-piercing/alter ego, and estoppel). El Jen

                      'Although     Stacy    signed    the    arbitration   agreement      as
                "Resident/Representative," the district court found that Stacy "did not agree
                to be bound individually" to the arbitration agreement, nor did she intend
                to bind the remaining statutory heirs, including her minor child. El Jen
                does not dispute this finding, nor does it argue that Stacy intended to sign
                the arbitration agreement in her individual capacity as statutory heir.
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                argues that the heirs' wrongful death claims under NRS 41.085 are
                derivative in nature and that the heirs, therefore, are bound by the
                arbitration agreement, which requires any claimant to arbitrate claims
                arising out of the care El Jen provided Gary.
                            "Wrongful death is a cause of action created by statute having
                no roots in the common law." Alsenz v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 109 Nev. 1062,
                1064, 864 P.2d 285, 286 (1993). Nevada's wrongful death statute, NRS
                41.085, provides that "[w]hen the death of any person . . . is caused by the
                wrongful act or neglect of another, the heirs of the decedent a.nd the
                personal representatives of the decedent may each maintain an action for
                damages against the person who caused the death." NRS 41.085(2); see
                NRS 41.085(1) (defining "heir" in this context to mean "a person who, under
                the laws of this State, would be entitled to succeed to the separate property
                of the decedent if the decedent had died intestate"). "The NRS 41.085
                statutory scheme creates two separate wrongful death claims, one
                belonging to the heirs of the decedent and the other belonging to the
                personal representative of the decedent, with neither being able to pursue
                the other's separate claim.' Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 130 Nev.
                252, 256, 321 P.3d 912, 914 (2014); see also Alsenz, 109 Nev. at 1064, 864
                P.2d at 286 ("Under [NRS 41.085], •both the decedent's heirs and
                representatives can maintain a cause of action for wrongful death. In this
                respect, NRS 41.085 is bifurcated."). The statutory heirs' damages include
                those that are personal to the heirs themselves—such as for the heir's "grief
                or sorrow[ and] loss of probable support [and] companionship"—and the
                heirs' damages "are not liable for any debt of the decedent." NRS 41.085(4).
                The estate's damages include special darnages that "the decedent incurred
                or sustained before the decedent's death, and funeral expenses," see NRS

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                41.085(5)(a), and "penalties. .. that the decedent would have recovered if
                the decedent had lived," see NRS 41.085(5)(b). The damages awarded to the
                estate "are liable for the debts of the decedent unless exempted by law." Id.
                            Although NRS 41.085 creates separate claims for both the
                statutory heirs and the estate, we have not addressed whether an heir's
                wrongful death claim is "wholly derivative" of the decedent's rights such
                that the decedent may bind nonsignatory statutory heirs to arbitration.
                States elsewhere are split on this issue and reach different conclusions
                based on a variety of considerations, including the language of their
                wrongful death statutes. See, e.g., Boler u. Sec. Health Care, LLC, 336 P.3d
                468, 472-76 (Okla. 2014) (categorizing states that hold their wrongful death
                statutes are "wholly derivative" of, as opposed to "independent arid
                separate" from, the decedent's claims); James E. Rooks, Jr., Recovery for
                Wrongful Death §§ 9:4 & 9:5 (2022) (collecting cases). States that conclude
                that claims under their wrongful death statutes are "wholly derivative"
                generally rely on statutory language that limits the heirs' recovery to
                instances where the decedent would otherwise have been entitled to pursue
                an action for the underlying injury.2 See Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc.,
                109 So. 3d 752, 760 (Fla, 2013) (noting that "the language of the Act makes

                      2 E1 Jen also directs us to the California Supreme Court case Ruiz v.
                Podolsky, which held that wrongful death claims of nonsignatory statutory
                heirs may be bound to an arbitration agreement that is governed by
                California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) if the
                agreement demonstrates an intent to bind those claims to arbitration. 237
                P.3d 584, 592 (Cal. 2010). However, this holding rests on the policy
                considerations underlying MICRA; outside of these specific arbitration
                agreements, a decedent's arbitration agreement generally does not bind
                nonsignatory statutory heirs. See Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living, Inc.,
                151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273, 280-81 (Ct. App. 2013).
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                clear a cause of action for wrongful death that is predicated on the
                decedent's entitlement to maintain an action and recover damages if death
                had not ensued" and holding that this makes the heirs' claim "wholly
                derivative") (internal quotation marks omitted); Labatt, 279 S.W.3d at 644
                (emphasizing that "wrongful death beneficiaries may pursue a cause of
                action only if the individual injured would have been entitled to bring an
                action for the injury if the individual had lived" and holding that this makes
                their claims "wholly derivative") (internal quotation marks omitted); see
                also Ballard v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., •327 N.W.2d 370, 371 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)
                (similar); Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108, 118 (Miss. 2006) (similar).
                These courts reason that the statutory limitation places the heirs in the
                same "legal shoes" as the estate—those of the decedent—and empowers the
                decedent to preclude the heirs' claims altogether by settling globally pre-
                death and releasing the defendant from liability. See, e.g., Labatt, 279
                S.W.3d at 645-46. In their view, since the decedent can bar the heirs'
                subsequent recovery through pre-death settlement agreements, the
                decedent may also bind the heirs to pre-death arbitration agreements. Id.
                            A growing majority of courts disagree and conclude that, under
                their wrongful death statutes, the decedent cannot bind the heirs to
                arbitrate their claims. These courts hold that, where a wrongful death
                statute establishes a distinct claim to compensate heirs for their individual
                loss, the heir's claim is separate from the decedent's and not subject to the
                decedent's pre-death contracts, unless those contracts extinguish the
                defendant's liability altogether. See, e.g., Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co.,
                976 N.E.2d 344, 359 (Ill. 2012) (holding that lallthough a wrongful-death
                action is dependent upon the decedent's entitlement to maintain an action
                for his or her injury, had death not ensued, neither the Wrongful Death Act

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                nor this court's caselaw suggests that this limitation on the cause of action
                provides a basis for dispensing with basic principles of contract law in
                deciding who is bound by an arbitration agreement"); Ping v. Beverly
                Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 599 (Ky. 2012) (holding that because "the
                wrongful death claim is not derived through or on behalf of the [decedent],
                but accrues separately to the wrongful death beneficiaries and is meant to
                compensate them for their own pecuniary loss, . . . a decedent cannot bind
                his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful death claim"). In these
                states, "a wrongful death action, while derivative in the sense that it will
                not lie without a viable underlying personal injury claim, is a separate claim
                that comes into existence upon the death of the injured person." Bybee v.
                Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 46 (Utah 2008). The heirs pursuing a wrongful death
                claim thus "stand in, at most, one shoe of the decedent." Id. While the
                wrongful death claim may depend on the decedent having had a viable
                personal injury claim at time of death, that does not give the decedent the
                power to bind the heirs to pre-death contracts, such as arbitration
                agreements, that do not affect the viability of the personal injury claim. Id.
                at 47; see Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 660 (Pa. Super.
                Ct. 2013) (stating that "wrongful death actions are derivative of decedent's
                injuries but are not derivative of decedent's rights").3

                      3A split of authority exists as to whether a release of liability by the

                decedent also releases the heirs' separate damages claim, with most
                jurisdictions holding that it does. 1 Jacob A. Stein, Stein on Personal Injury
                Daniages Treatise § 3:48 (3d ed. 2023). Our holding that a pre-death
                contract not affecting the viability of the personal injury claim requires the
                heirs' consent as a matter of contract law makes it unnecessary to resolve
                this issue. See Bybee, 189 P.3d at 44 n.3 (similar).
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                            Considering this split. authority, we conclude that NRS 41.085

                does not allow a decedent to bind a statutory heir's wrongful death claim to
                arbitration without the heir's consent.    First, unlike the statutes in the

                derivative states, NRS 41.085(4) creates an independent cause of action in
                the heirs that is distinct from both the decedent's claim and that of the
                estate. Unlike Nevada, some derivative states require the estate to pursue
                damages on behalf of the decedent's heirs through a single action. See Fla.
                Stat. Ann. § 768.20 (West 2011) ("The action shall be brought by the
                decedent's personal representative, who shall recover for the benefit of the
                decedent's survivors and estate all damages . . . ."); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
                § 600.2922(2) (West 2010) ("Every action under this section shall be brought
                by, and in the name of, the personal representative of the estate of the
                deceased."). Other derivative states allow the heirs to pursue a wrongful
                death claim but require interested parties to pursue all recoverable
                damages through a single action. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (2019)
                (stating that "there shall be but one (1) suit for the same death which shall
                ensue for the benefit of all parties concerned"). Nevada's wrongful death
                statute, by contrast, allows both the statutory heirs and the estate to "each
                maintain an action for damages," NRS 41.085(2) (emphasis added), giving
                statutory heirs a cause of action separate and distinct from that of the
                estate. Alcantara, 130 Nev. at 256, 321 P.3d at 914; see Fernandez v. Kozar,
                107 Nev. 446, 449, 814 P.2d 68, 70 (1991) (holding that a "wrongful death
                action . . . creates an independent right in designated survivors for damages
                they sustain by reason of the decedent's death") (omission in original)
                (internal quotation marks omitted).
                            Second, while Nevada's wrongful death statute limits the
                estate's recovery to "special damages . . . incurred or sustained before the

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                decedent's death," "funeral expenses," and "penalties . . . that the decedent
                would have recovered if the d.ecedent had lived," and makes those awards
                liable for the decedent's debts, NRS 41.085(5), the heir's award is not
                similarly liable for the decedent's debts and includes no statutory limitation
                based on the decedent's right to pursue a claim for the underlying injury,
                see NRS 41.085(4). This differentiates NRS 41.085 from nearly all the
                derivative states cited by El Jen. See Laizure, 109 So. 3d at 760; Ballard,
                327 N.W.d at 371; Labatt, 279 S.W.3d at 644. Instead, Nevada's wrongful
                death scheme more closely aligns with the wrongful death statutes in states
                that provide a separate claim that arises upon the death of the decedent
                and compensates the statutory heirs for their individual loss. Compare, e.g.,
                Gilloon v. Humana, Inc., 100 Nev. 518, 520, 687 P.2d 80, 81 (1984) (stating
                that "NRS 41.085 creates an independent cause of action in the heirs and
                personal representatives of one whose death is caused by the wrongful act
                or neglect of another" and that "has no existence before the death of the
                decedent has occurred"), with Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 360 (noting that "a
                wrongful-death action does not accrue until death and is not brought for the
                benefit of the decedent's estate, but for the next of kin who are the true
                parties in interest"). To illustrate, statutory heirs in Nevada may pursue
                "their respective damages" for losses that the heirs suffered individually,
                such as "grief or sorrow" and "loss of probable support, companionship,
                society, comfort and consortium," which are not liable for payment of the
                decedent's debts. NRS 41.085(4). "[O]n behalf of the decedent's estate," the
                estate's personal representatives may also pursue damages, which are
                liable for payment of the decedent's debts and include penalties "that the
                decedent would have recovered if the decedent had lived" and damages
                incurred before the decedent's death (plus funeral expenses).           NRS

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                41.085(5)(a), (b).   This provides statutory heirs with a separate and
                independent claim to compensate them for their personal losses resulting
                from the decedent's death.
                            We acknowledge that the damages a statutory heir may recover
                under NRS 41.085(4) complicates our analysis because these damages
                include not only those that are personal to the heirs—such as for the heirs'
                grief or sorrow—but also "damages for pain, suffering or disfigurement of
                the decedent" (emphasis added). While pain and suffering damages are
                traditionally personal to the decedent plaintiff, see, e.g., NRS 41.100(3)
                (providing for the survival of a deceased plaintiffs claims for pain and
                suffering, to be recovered by the decedent's administrator), we do not believe
                that, by including them in the recovery available to the statutory heirs in a
                wrongful death suit, the Legislature viewed the heirs' claim as derivative,
                given the dual-claim structure of wrongful death claims in Nevada, the
                statutory language particular to heirs' claims, and the other categories of
                darriages personal to the heirs. In so deciding, we do not determine whether
                that particular category of damages is subject to the decedent's pre-death
                contracts, since NRS 41.100(3) excepts the estate's wrongful death action
                from its purview and the parties have not briefed this issue. See Badillo v.
                Arn. Brands, inc., 117 Nev. 34, 42, 16 13.3d 435, 440 (2001) (declining to
                consider an issue that has not been fully raised by appellants or
                meaningfully briefed by either party").
                            El Jen further argues that the heirs' claims, being derivative of
                the underlying injury, are also derivative of the decedent's/estate's right to
                bring a claim and the damages recoverable based on that claim. El Jen
                supports its argument by comparing wrongful death claims under NRS
                41.085 to loss of consortium claims at common law, where we have held that

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                a spouse's loss of consortium claim is a "derivative claim" that is "dependent
                upon" the success of the underlying negligence claim. Turner v. Mandalay
                Sports Entm't, LLC, 124 Nev. 213, 221-22 & n.31, 180 P.3d 1172, 1178 &
                n.31 (2008) (citing Gunlock v. New Frontier Hotel Corp., 78 Nev. 182, 185
                n.1, 370 P.2d 682, 684 n.1 (1962), abrogated on other grounds by Foster v.
                Costco Wholesale Corp., 128 Nev. 773, 291 P.3d 150 (2012)).            Loss of
                consortium claims depend upon the underlying injury and are "derivative
                in the sense that the beneficiaries would be required to establish
                [defendant] was liable [to the decedent] for the[] . . . underlying injury in
                order to recover damages." Labatt, 279 S.W.3d at 646. But a claim for loss
                of consortium is not "derivative of' the decedent's claim for the purpose of
                binding a claimant to arbitration agreements because loss of consortium
                provides a surviving spouse "an independent action for negligence" that is
                individual to the surviving spouse. Bennett v. Topping, 102 Nev. 151, 153,
                717 P.2d 44, 45 (1986); see also Labatt, 279 S.W.3d at 646 ("[L]oss of
                consortium claims are not entirely derivative as are wrongful death claims
                [in Texas]; . . . they are separate and independent claims distinct from the
                underlying action.").
                            All wrongful death statutes, whether "derivative" or "separate,"
                require the plaintiff to prove the defendant's liability for the underlying
                injury to the decedent. In this sense, wrongful death claims brought by
                statutory heirs always derive from the decedent's underlying injury. See
                Pisano, 77 A.3d at 659.      But the fact that a wrongful death claim is
                "derivative" in the sense that it derives from the injury to the decedent "does
                not mean that [the claimant] is subject to any and all contractual
                limitations—such as an agreement to arbitrate—that are applicable to the
                decedent." Carter, 976 N.E.2d at 359; see Bybee, 189 P.3d at 47 (holding

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                   that, while a wrongful death claim is subject to decedent-created defenses
                   that "go to the viability of the underlying personal injury action," that rule
                   does not extend to contractual provisions such as arbitration agreements
                   that do not affect the action's viability).
                                  Although El Jen argues otherwise, the holdings in Carter and

                   Bybee, which we adopt as most consistent with Nevada wrongful death
                   statutes and caselaw, do not run afoul of Marmet Health Care Center, Inc.
                   v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012). In Marrnet, the United States Supreme
                   Court struck down "West Virginia's prohibition against predispute
                   agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against
                   nursing homes" as "a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular
                   type of claim [that] is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA." Id.
                   at 533. But unlike the categorical prohibition in Marmet, the rule that a
                   party to an agreement cannot bind a nonparty applies to all sorts of
                   agreements, not just agreements to arbitrate. "Indeed, had the decedent's
                   agreement [in Carter] been about choice of law, judicial forum, allocation of
                   costs and fees, confidentiality, or any number of standard contract
                   provisions, the results would have been the sarne"--the decedent could not
                   have bound the wrongful death claimant to its terms.          Cole v. Granite

                   Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. 22-cv-312-JPG, 2022 WL 1306333, at *4
                   (S.D. Ill. 2022) (rejecting argument that the FAA preempts the holding in
                   Carter). "[F]ederal law does not force arbitration upon a party that never
                   agreed to arbitrate in the first place under the guise of preemption
                   principles."    Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 201
                   (2016).
                                                          C.
                                  El Jen offers two additional arguments in favor of compelling
                   the heirs to arbitration. First, since both the statutory heirs' claims and the
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                estate's claim must prove the same question of fact--whether the defendant
                was liable for the decedent's injuries—El Jen argues that as a prud.ential
                matter, both claims must proceed in the same venue. Second, El Jen argues
                that the heirs are equitably estopped from objecting to arbitration. Neither
                argument carries.
                               In Alcantara, we held that issue preclusion barred the statutory

                heir from relitigating the issue of liability because the estate had failed to
                prove liability in a previous case and "the issue of liability is interrelated
                because both claims are based on the same wrong." 130 Nev. at 262, 321
                P.3d at 918.      Although it is true that proving a wrongful death claim
                requires the claimant to prove the same underlying negligence, this does
                not make a wrongful death claim wholly derivative of the decedent's claim
                such that the heirs can be compelled to arbitration, despite not having
                agreed to it.    Moreover, as El Jen concedes, issue preclusion as to the
                common issue of liability does not apply here because El Jen s liability has
                not yet been litigated. See Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048,
                1055, 1.94 P.3d 709, 713 (2008) (outlining the four elements of issue
                preclusion).
                               El Jen next argues that equitable estoppel binds nonsignatory
                statutory heirs where they "knowingly exploit H the agreement containing
                the arbitration clause despite having never signed the agreement." Mundi
                v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co., 555 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
                quotation marks omitted). However, under the doctrine of "direct benefits
                estoppel," a nonsignatory is not bound to an arbitration agreement simply
                because its claim relates to a contract containing the arbitration provision.
                See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. 2005).
                Instead, this doctrine applies only if the nonsignatory party "seeks, through

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                the claim, to derive a direct benefit from the contract containing the
                arbitration provision." Id. Here, although the statutory heirs' claims relate
                to the services El Jen provided Gary, the heirs' wrongful death claims seek
                to derive privileges granted to them by statute and do not seek a direct
                benefit from the admission paperwork that included the arbitration
                agreement. Equitable estoppel thus does not apply.

                            El Jen alternatively argues that the district court abused its
                discretion by failing to stay its proceedings under NRS 38.221(7) pending
                the outcome of arbitration of the estate's claim against it.          An order
                resolving a request for a stay is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and we will
                affirm such an order unless the district court's decision is not supported by
                substantial evidence. Maheu v. Eighth Judicica Dist. Court, 89 Nev. 214.
                216-17, 510 P.2d 627, 629 (1973).
                            Nevada has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000, 7
                U.L.A. 25 (part 1A) (West 2009), codified at NRS 38.206 through NRS
                38.248. Under NRS Chapter 38, "[i]f the court orders arbitration, the court
                on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject
                to the arbitration." NRS 38.221(7). However, "[i]f a claim subject to the
                arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim." Id. El
                Jen argues that NRS 38.221(7) requires the district court to stay the
                litigation by the heirs against El Jen and RTC because it compelled the
                estate to arbitration against El Jen. We disagree. As set forth above, NRS
                41.085 allows the statutory heirs to pursue separate wrongful death claims
                that the statutory heirs did not agree to arbitrate. Since the statutory heirs'
                claims are not subject to an arbitration agreement, it follows that NRS
                38.221(7) did not require the district court to stay litigation of their claims.
                See also Mendez u. Puerto Rican Int'l Cos., 553 F.3d 709, 711-12 (2009)
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                    (applying 9 U.S.C. § 3 to facts analogous to the present case and concluding
                    a stay of proceedings was not required under the FAA). We therefore
                    conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
                    stay litigation of the statutory heirs' claims against El Jen and the other
                    defendants.
                                                   CONCLUSION
                                  Nevada's wrongful death statute creates a separate cause of
                    action in favor of. a decedent's statutory heirs.      The h.eirs' claims are
                    derivative in the sense that they depend on the decedent's personal injury,
                    but they are otherwise independent.         As such, a nonsignatory heir's
                    wrongful death claim is not bound to an agreement, like the arbitration
                    agreement in this case, that does not implicate the viability of the
                    underlying personal injury claim. Since the heirs are nonsignatories who
                    are pursuing their own individual claims, we also conclude that the district
                    court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to stay the litigation while the
                    estate proceeds to arbitration against El Jen. We affirm.

                                                                                         J.

                    We concur:

                    Cadish

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