Court Opinion

ID: 9552606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:13:50.804347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:21.271655
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
dissenting in Case No. 85-105.
My dissent from the “Ademption” section of the majority opinion was originally presented to the Court for consideration as part of the majority opinion. It read as follows:
ADEMPTION — CASE NO. 85-105
In In re Estate of Scott, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1982), on appeal after remand, 657 P.2d 361 (1983), we said that “[a]demption has been defined in several ways,” and we quoted definitions thereof from several sources. Among such definitions were:
“ ‘Ademption means “a taking away.” For our purpose if the particular piece of property, real or personal, is not found in the estate and the bequest or devise cannot be fulfilled there is said to be an ademption. * * * ’ In Re Bierstedt’s Estate, 254 Iowa 772, 119 N.W.2d 234, 236 (1963).
* 9$c * * sje
“ ‘It would consequently seem better, instead of attempting to deduce from the cases any all-inclusive definition of the term “ademption,” to point out that an ademption of a legacy or devise may result from a variety of causes or circumstances, among which may be mentioned, in the case of gifts of specific property, the nonexistence of the. property at the death of the testator, or its * * disposal by sale, gift, or other alienation, or change in form, during the lifetime of the testator * * *.’ 80 Am.Jur.2d Wills, § 1702 * * 642 P.2d at 1289-1290.
As long ago as 1916 we settled the relation between a vendor and vendee under a contract for sale of land in Wyoming as:
“ * * * [T]he vendee is treated as the beneficial owner of the land and the vendor as the owner of the purchase-money * * Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 134, 156 P. 27 (1916).
It is consistent to hold that a contract for deed is sufficient as a “sale” or “other alienation” of the property for the purpose of adeeming a specific devise of such property.
Of course, such recognized law could be changed by statute. And it was changed by the enactment of § 2-6-109(b), W.S.1977 *984(July 1980 Replacement), effective date of April 1, 1980.1 This section provides in pertinent part:
“(b) A specific devisee has the right to the remaining specifically devised property and:
“(i) Any balance of the purchase price together with any security interest owing from a purchaser to the testator at death by reason of sale of the property; * * *”
The statute would certainly settle the ademption question here presented with reference to a will executed subsequent to April 1, 1980 — there would not be an ademption. Plaintiffs contend that the statute prevented ademption in this case, wherein the deceased died after April 1, 1980, albeit the will was executed in 1969, prior to the enactment of the statute, and the contract for deed was executed on January 28, 1980, prior to the effective date of the statute. They point to § 2-l-102(d), W.S.1977 (July 1980 Replacement), which provides:
“The procedure herein prescribed shall govern all proceedings in probate brought after the effective date of this code. It shall also govern further procedure in proceedings in probate then pending unless the court determines its application in particular proceedings or parts thereof is not feasible or will work an injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply.”
However, § 2-l-102(d) speaks only to procedures. It has no application to substantive law. Section 2-6-109(b) did change the substantive law and cannot be applied retroactively. Retrospective operation of a statute to events occurring before enactment of a statute is not favored. In re Estate of Boyd, Wyo., 606 P.2d 1243 (1980), and cases quoted therein. Also see Ha-good v. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Company, Wyo., 356 P.2d 135 (1960). In construing a will to determine the intent of the testator as such appears from a full and complete consideration of the entire will when read in the light of the surrounding circumstances (see In re Estate of Croft), one of the most important “surrounding circumstances” is the law in force at the time the will was executed. The intent of the testator must be to have the will governed by such law. Deceased’s intent, at the time of execution of the contract for deed, was to dispose of the Converse County property other than by will.
Plaintiffs point to cases in which rights of inheritance and devolution rights are determined as of the time of the death of the testator or intestate.2 Such rights pertain to the status of beneficiaries and their respective interests in the property of the estate as of that time. They do not pertain to the determination of that which is in the estate and its attributes or to the intention of the testator concerning such when making his will. Our holding that the law in effect at the time the will was executed controls the fact ademption is not predicated upon any rights vesting in beneficiaries at the time of death. Such rights do not vest simply because a will is executed. The statute simply does not apply to the substantive right of the deceased to make a will and to adeem a provision thereof before her death in accordance with an intention formulated under existing law.
Plaintiffs also argue that § 2-6-104, W.S.1977 (July 1980 Replacement), requires the application to this case of Nebraska law, which is similar to § 2-6-109(b). Section 2-6-104 was enacted as part of the present Wyoming Probate Code. It provides:
“The meaning and legal effect of a disposition in a will is determined by the law of the state in which the will was executed, unless the will otherwise provides or unless the application of that law is *985contrary to the public policy of this state otherwise applicable to the disposition.”
Our determination of the law in effect at the time the will was executed makes unnecessary extensive consideration of this argument. Nebraska law at that time was substantially the same as Wyoming law before enactment of the present Wyoming Probate Code. Additionally,
“[a]t common law, if not modified by statute, the general rule in the United States is that the validity, operation, effect, etc., of a will by which real property is devised is determined by the law of the place where the land is situated; or, as it is sometimes called in the language of an earlier day, the lex rei sitae. * * * ” 6 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, § 60.3 at 445 (1962).
As an aside, the “unless” clause of § 2-6-104 indicates the propriety of the testator making a determination as to which law of the several states shall control the provisions of his will. It would seem to follow that, unless stated otherwise, he would intend the will to be controlled by the law in effect at the time he made the will.
The devise in Article X of deceased’s will was a specific devise of real property. The property was alienated by deceased before her death. Thus, the devise adeemed under the law in effect at the time the will was executed, and such law controls this particular incident.
I would have affirmed Case No. 85-105.

. The section is a part of the Wyoming Probate Code, which is a complete revision of the previous probate code and consists of §§ 2-1-101 through 2-15-107, W.S.1977 (July 1980 Replacement).

. In re Estate of Miller, Wyo., 541 P.2d 28 (1975); In re Estate of Randall, Wyo., 506 P.2d 432 (1973); Park County ex rel. Park County Welfare Department v. Blackburn, Wyo., 394 P.2d 793 (1964).