Court Opinion

ID: 9840883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 16:09:20.964194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:32.210792
License: Public Domain

J-E01004-23

                                  2023 PA Super 172

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                              :          PENNSYLVANIA
                      Appellant               :
                                              :
                                              :
              v.                              :
                                              :
                                              :
 NATHANIEL WILLIAMS                           :     No. 980 EDA 2021

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 22, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): MC-51-CR-0030428-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., STABILE,
        J., DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

DISSENTING OPINION BY OLSON, J.:                    FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2023

      I believe that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence at the

preliminary hearing stage to hold Appellee, Nathaniel Williams, for court on

one count each of unsworn falsification (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904(a)), tampering

with or fabricating physical evidence (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910), tampering with

public records (tier-3 felony) (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4911), and obstructing

administration of law or other governmental function (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101).

Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

      The learned Majority sets forth the proper standard of review in

determining whether the Commonwealth met its burden of proof in presenting

a prima facie case against Appellee during the preliminary hearing stage.

Majority Opinion at 6-7. Although accurately reciting the legal principles, the

Majority   deviates   from   the     well-settled   law   in   concluding   that   the
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Commonwealth failed to meet its burden.      Instead, the Majority holds the

Commonwealth to a more stringent standard; i.e. the Commonwealth is

required to disprove or rebut interpretations of the evidence that favor

Appellee, even when the evidence presented provides for a reasonable

inference that a crime was committed and that Appellee was the person who

probably committed the crime. In my view, this is error.

     Our Supreme Court has repeatedly provided that a “preliminary hearing

is not a trial. … At this hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden of

establishing at least a prima facie case that a crime has been committed and

that the accused is probably the one who committed it.” Commonwealth v.

Perez, 249 A.3d 1092, 1102 (Pa. 2021), quoting Commonwealth v.

McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991) (emphasis omitted). Moreover,

     [a] prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces
     evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged
     and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the
     accused committed the offense. … A judge at a preliminary
     hearing is not required, nor is he authorized to determine the guilt
     or innocence of an accused; his sole function is to determine
     whether probable cause exists to require an accused to stand trial
     on the charges contained in the complaint. … The weight and
     credibility of the evidence are not factors at the preliminary
     hearing stage, and the Commonwealth need only demonstrate
     sufficient probable cause to believe the person charged has
     committed the offense. …

     Inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which
     would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, and the
     evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the
     Commonwealth’s case. The use of inferences is a process of
     reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established
     is deduced as the logical consequence from the existence of other
     facts that have been established. The more-likely-than-not test

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       must be applied to assess the reasonableness of inferences relied
       upon in establishing a prima facie case of criminal culpability.

Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102-1103 (brackets and quotation marks omitted). “The

trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining whether, as a matter of law

and in light of the facts presented to it, the Commonwealth has carried its pre-

trial, prima facie burden to make out the elements of a charged crime.”

Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005).

       In applying these legal principles to the facts of this case, I believe that

the Commonwealth clearly met its burden of establishing a prima facie case

that Appellee committed the four offenses charged.          Accordingly, I would

reverse the trial court so that all four charges against Appellee may proceed.

       In analyzing whether the Commonwealth met its burden of proof, we

must begin with the pertinent facts that were established during the two

preliminary hearings on September 11, 2020 and April 22, 2021.1

       On October 14, 2017 at approximately 12:00 p.m., Theresa Williams2

was in the parking lot of Michaels craft store.        N.T. Preliminary Hearing,

____________________________________________

1 As noted by the Majority, at the preliminary hearing on September 11, 2020,

the trial court dismissed all charges against Appellee. The Commonwealth
refiled the charges and a second preliminary hearing was held on April 22,
2021. At the April 2021 hearing, the testimony from the September 2020
hearing was incorporated and the Commonwealth introduced a transcription
of a police interview of Appellee and telephone records. Majority Opinion at
1-2.

2 All parties agree that Theresa Williams is not related to Appellee  or Edwin
Williams who was charged as a co-defendant.          The charges against Edwin
Williams are not at issue in this case.

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9/11/20, at 6. While in the parking lot, Edwin Williams (“Edwin”) approached

Ms. Williams and tried to start a conversation. He asked for her phone number

and indicated that he wanted to take her out, however, Ms. Williams stated

that she was not interested. Id. at 8. During the brief conversation, Edwin

told Ms. Williams that he was a bus driver for the Southeastern Pennsylvania

Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”). Id. at 9. Ms. Williams proceeded to get

into her vehicle at which time Edwin walked away. As Ms. Williams went to

back out, Edwin came up behind her in his vehicle and stopped.        He was

looking in the direction of her vehicle. Id. at 8-9.

      Approximately a week or two later, Edwin arrived at Ms. Williams’ home

and knocked on her door. Ms. Williams opened the door “and asked how the

hell he found [her].” Id. at 9-10. Edwin responded that “he had his ways.”

Id. at 13-14. Edwin persisted in talking with Ms. Williams, so in an effort to

get him to leave, she asked him to write his name and telephone number on

a piece of paper. Id at 10. Edwin then left.

      During the next few weeks, Edwin continued to contact Ms. Williams

indirectly by leaving a greeting card and roses on her vehicle.    Id. at 16.

Eventually, Ms. Williams filed a report with the SEPTA Police Department

which, in turn, notified the Philadelphia Police Department. Id. at 10-11, 28.

      On November 2, 2017, Lieutenant James Clough of the Internal Affairs

Division of the Philadelphia Police Department was assigned to investigate the

complaint filed by Ms. Williams. Id. at 56, 59. In the complaint, Ms. Williams

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alleged that someone had approached her and she suspected that her vehicle

license tag had been “run which led to someone coming to her home.” Id. at

58.   On November 7, 2017, Lieutenant Clough requested all computerized

inquiries that were made by Appellee on October 17, 2017 to determine

whether these computer systems were accessed to obtain information about

Ms. Williams.3 Id. at 59, 61. These systems included the National Crime

Information Center (“NCIC”), the Police Crime Information Center (“PCIC”)

and the Pennsylvania Justice Network (“JNET”). Lieutenant Clough discovered

that, on October 17, 2017 (three days after Edwin first approached Ms.

Williams in the Michaels craft store parking lot), Appellee accessed Ms.

Williams’ license plate tag at 3:35 p.m. and her voter registration at

approximately 3:37 p.m. At 3:42 p.m., he searched Ms. Williams’ name on

JNET. Id. at 61-62, 64. Within days after these searches, Edwin appeared at

Ms. Williams’ doorstep.

       As part of his investigation, Lieutenant Clough interviewed Edwin on

November 24, 2017.4 During the interview, Edwin claimed that he did not

____________________________________________

3 Appellee used his police payroll number to access these computer systems;

accordingly, Lieutenant Clough audited the systems that had been accessed
by Appellee’s police payroll number. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at
59.

4 During the September 2020 preliminary hearing, Lieutenant Clough read into

the record Edwin’s written statement which Edwin signed acknowledging that
the statement was true and correct to the best of his knowledge. N.T.
Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 68-76.

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know Appellee well. In fact, he stated that he only met Appellee one time

when a friend introduced them at a party. Id. at 74. He stated that they

merely shook hands.         Id. at 75.     Edwin stated that he never spoke with

Appellee again and that they never spoke to each other via telephone or text

messages. Id. at 74-75.

       On December 27, 2017, Lieutenant Clough interviewed Appellee.5

Appellee stated that he was employed as an officer with the Philadelphia Police

Department in the Homicide Division. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 4/22/21, at

32.    He claimed that he was investigating a homicide and, during the

investigation he witnessed the target of the investigation getting into a

vehicle. Therefore, on October 17, 2017,6 he did a computer search of the

license plate tag of the vehicle that the target entered. Id. at 35. Once he

obtained the identity of Ms. Williams from searching the license plate tag,

Appellee did various computer cross-checks including voter registration,

____________________________________________

5 At the preliminary hearing held on April 22, 2021, Lieutenant Clough read

into the record the written statement given by Appellee. N.T., Preliminary
Hearing, 4/22/21, at 29, 32-45. The written statement was in the form of a
transcript as it recited the specific questions posed by Lieutenant Clough and
the answers given by Appellee.

6 Appellee stated that he worked the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift on October

17, 2017. However, he worked an additional four hours of overtime from 3:00
p.m. to 7:00 p.m. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 4/22/21, at 33. Appellee did not
do the computer search during his regular shift; instead, he searched the
computer systems for information regarding Ms. Williams beginning at 3:35
p.m. while he was working overtime.

                                           -6-
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criminal histories, property ownership and social media. 7 Id. at 36. Appellee

stated that he performed these computer searches to establish a connection

____________________________________________

7 Specifically, Appellee told Lieutenant Clough the following:

       QUESTION: Does the name Theresa Williams sound familiar in
       any of the ongoing investigations by you or any member of your
       squad or unit?

       ANSWER: There are some lawyers involved in the Williams
       Avenue case. It was a case from Northwest. It was from a
       shooting that happened on July 31st, and the decedent died on 8-
       1-17.

       QUESTION: Does the name Theresa Williams from the 6600
       block of Ogontz Avenue have anything to do with the investigation
       of the homicide you mentioned from Williams Avenue?

       ANSWER: I have not determined that yet. I saw the target of
       my investigation Tashaun Curtis get into a car a couple of months
       ago on the 6600 block of Ogontz right in front of his house. I was
       driving by. I saw him get into a white or white-colored SUV or
       van, and I drove around the block and the car was gone. A day
       later I surveyed the neighborhood, and I saw a vehicle that I
       though[t] he had gotten into. I ran the tag.

       QUESTION:          What follow[-]up did you do with that tag
       information?

       ANSWER: All kinds of cross[-]checks, car stops, 48-A’s, voters,
       real estate, criminal history, property ownership and social media.

       QUESTION: Who was with you when you saw Tashaun Curtis get
       into the vehicle.

       ANSWER: No one.

       QUESTION: What is the case number that is assigned to the
       Williams Avenue homicide?

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -7-
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to the target that he was investigating. Id. at 42. The information obtained

from these computer searches identified Ms. Williams; however, he could not

connect her to the target. Id. at 39.

       Also during the interview, Appellee stated that Edwin was his cousin

(directly contradicting Edwin who stated that he only met Appellee one time

briefly at a party). Appellee stated that he did not talk with Edwin frequently

and last spoke with him approximately a year ago. Id. at 36. Appellee denied

ever talking to Edwin about Ms. Williams and denied providing Edwin with the

information he obtained from the computer searches regarding Ms. Williams.

Id. at 39-42.

       At the end of the written statement, Appellee signed the statement

acknowledging that he “read the foregoing statement consisting of six pages

and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.” Id. at 44-45. Appellee

also signed each page of the written statement. Id. at 29.

       Immediately following the interview of Appellee, Lieutenant Clough went

to the Homicide Division to obtain the M17-185 case file. He was provided

with one file folder. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 77. This folder

contained no information regarding Ms. Williams. Id. at 78. The next day,

Lieutenant Clough was informed that Appellee had called to advise Lieutenant

____________________________________________

       ANSWER: M17-185, I think.

N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 4/22/21, at 34-36.

                                           -8-
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Clough that there was a second folder related to the M17-185 homicide

investigation.    This folder contained a photograph of Ms. Williams and her

children taken from her Facebook page. On the back of the photograph were

handwritten notes regarding Ms. Williams, including her license plate number

and that she had “no record/no wants.” Id. at 78. Lieutenant Clough testified

that the photograph was from a publicly available Facebook page.8 Lieutenant

Clough reviewed the entire second folder and noted that the photograph of

Ms. Williams was the only document contained within the folder that had

handwriting.     All of the other documents in the folder were “printouts of

various licen[s]e plates, tags, houses that were checked.” Id. at 80. In other

words, the document referencing Ms. Williams was different from the other

information contained within the folder. Id.

       Lieutenant Clough also obtained the records for the telephone numbers

for which Appellee and Edwin were identified as the subscribers. Contrary to

the statement given by Edwin that he never communicated with Appellee after

meeting him at a party and the statement given by Appellee that he and Edwin

had not communicated with each other in a year or more, the telephone

records revealed that there were numerous telephone calls and text messages

between the two telephone numbers in early and mid-October 2017, including

____________________________________________

8 Lieutenant Clough stated that he logged onto Facebook and was able to
retrieve the same photograph of Ms. Williams without any restrictions such as
being “a friend of Ms. Williams.” N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 79.

                                           -9-
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text messages being exchanged on October 14, 2017, the day Edwin

encountered Ms. Williams in the Michaels craft store parking lot. Id. at 87.

Most critically, there were five text messages between the two telephone

numbers on October 17, 2017, just minutes before Appellee accessed the

NCIC, PCIC and JNET computer systems to obtain information regarding Ms.

Williams. Id. at 87-88. These telephone calls and text messages continued

into early November and then ceased. On November 24, 2017, the same day

of Lieutenant Clough’s interview of Edwin, Appellee replaced his telephone

with another. Id. at 88.

      Based upon this evidence, the Commonwealth filed the four charges

against Appellee. When viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, including all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, I

conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden of proof in establishing a

prima facie case against Appellee on all four charges.

Unsworn Falsification to Authorities

      A person commits the offense of unsworn falsification to authorities

where, “with [the] intent to mislead a public servant in performing his official

function, he: (1) makes any written false statement which he does not believe

to be true.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904(a).

      As   established   at   the   preliminary   hearings,   Lieutenant   Clough

interviewed Appellee on December 27, 2017.             Lieutenant Clough then

transcribed the interview onto a six-page document entitled “Statement of

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Detective Nathaniel Williams.” Appellee signed at the end of the statement

acknowledging that he “read the foregoing statement consisting of six pages

and it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.”             N.T. Preliminary

Hearing, 4/22/21, at 44-45. Appellee also signed each page of the written

statement.

       The Majority does not address whether Appellee provided false

information to Lieutenant Clough during this interview but instead concludes

that “[t]he Internal Affairs interview, which was conducted as an oral

interview, memorialized in writing by Lieutenant Clough, and signed by

[Appellee], does not constitute a ‘written false statement,’ under [18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 4904(a).]”     Majority Opinion at 8-9.          In support of this conclusion, the

Majority cites to only one case, Commonwealth v. Gaithers, 13 Pa.D.&C.

3d 668 (Pa. C.P. Montg. 1978). Id. at 9. The Majority’s reasoning for citing

Gaithers is not readily apparent because it is a 1978 decision of the Court of

Common Pleas of Montgomery County in which the trial court found that the

evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of unsworn falsification where

the defendant signed a Miranda9 rights form using a false name. I do not

believe that this case lends support to the Majority’s conclusion. Instead, I

believe that Appellee’s conduct amounted to “making” a false written

statement.

____________________________________________

9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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      There is nothing in the language of the statute that requires the

defendant to be the actual scrivener of the written statement at issue.

Lieutenant Clough contemporaneously transcribed Appellee’s oral statements

provided during the interview. Appellee adopted the entire transcription by

signing all six pages and attesting to the fact that the “foregoing statement”

was “true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.”            N.T. Preliminary

Hearing, 4/22/21, at 44-45. These acknowledgements and attestations make

the statement Appellee’s own. There is no reason why an individual would

not be liable under Section 4904(a) for attesting to the truth of a written

statement that was memorialized by a third party. In fact, it is commonplace

for signatories to affidavits prepared by third parties to be subject to the

penalties prescribed by Section 4904. See e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 102 (definition

of “affidavit” in the Judicial Code, including “an unsworn document containing

statement of fact and a statement by the signatory that it is made subject to

the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4094.”).

      Moreover, this Court previously affirmed a conviction under Section

4904(a) where a false written statement was memorialized by a third party

and   then   adopted   by   the   way    of   the   defendant’s   signature.    In

Commonwealth v. Cherpes, 520 A.2d 439 (Pa. Super. 1987), the defendant

served as the chairman of a local municipality’s board of commissioners. As

such, he was required by law to file financial disclosure statements.          The

defendant filed a financial disclosure statement that failed to disclose certain

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income that he received through his insurance business. He claimed that he

was out of town when the statement was due; therefore, his wife completed

as well as signed the form.     During trial, evidence was presented that the

signature was, in fact, the defendant’s signature.       Although the form was

completed by the defendant’s wife, the jury found the defendant guilty of

violating Section 4904(a).     On appeal, this Court held that, drawing all

reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, the jury properly

convicted the defendant of unsworn falsification.

      As I believe that the written statement signed by Appellee was a “written

statement” as required by Section 4904(a), I turn to whether the evidence

presented at the preliminary hearings was sufficient to establish a prima facie

case that Appellee made false statements to Lieutenant Clough in an effort to

mislead him. The Majority does not address whether Appellee lied or misled

Lieutenant Clough, but I believe that, viewed in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, the record provides ample evidence that Appellee was

being untruthful in an effort to derail Lieutenant Clough’s official investigation.

Indeed, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the record

reveals the following.

      During the interview, Appellee was untruthful when he stated that he

had not “spoken to” his cousin, Edwin, for a year or more. This statement is

directly contradicted by the telephone records from Appellee and Edwin that

show numerous telephone calls and text messages were exchanged between

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the two men during the relevant time period, including on October 14, 2017,

the day Edwin encountered Ms. Williams in the Michaels craft store parking

lot, and October 17, 2017, the day Appellee accessed the police databases.10

Most critically, the two men stopped communicating (even via text messaging)

in early November 2017 when Lieutenant Clough began his investigation.

Moreover, on November 27, 2017, the day Lieutenant Clough interviewed

Edwin, Appellee replaced his telephone.

       Appellee also denied that he used government databases to assist his

cousin in learning Ms. Williams’ personal information, however, there is ample

evidence to support that that is exactly what occurred. The record supports

the reasonable inference that Appellee obtained Ms. Williams’ personal

information at Edwin’s request. On October 14, 2017, the day on which Edwin

____________________________________________

10 Appellee acknowledges that Appellee and Edwin communicated via text
messaging, however, he argues that “while Appellee and Edwin communicated
with each other frequently via text message, Appellee was not asked when he
last communicated with Edwin. Rather, he was specifically asked when he last
spoke to Edwin. And, while the Commonwealth introduced into evidence cell
phone records that demonstrated that Appellee and Edwin had apparently
attempted to call each other, none of the calls was longer that two minutes in
duration which suggested that the men did not in fact speak as the lines were
engaged only long enough to activate the phones’ voice mail messages.”
Appellee’s Substituted Brief at 18. I find this argument to be specious.
Although Lieutenant Clough asked Appellee when he had last “spoken to”
Edwin, it can reasonably be inferred that Lieutenant Clough was inquiring as
to all types of communication between Appellee and Edwin, and that Appellee
understood the question to include text messages (that Appellee does not
deny occurred). Moreover, whether or not Appellee and Edwin actually spoke
during the two minute telephone calls that were noted on the telephone
records is a question of fact for a jury to decide.

                                          - 14 -
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encountered Ms. Williams in the parking lot and Edwin pulled his vehicle

behind Ms. Williams’ vehicle and looked in the direction of her license plate,

there were text messages between Edwin and Appellee.         Three days later

(October 17, 2017), there were five text messages between Appellee and

Edwin, just minutes before Appellee accessed the NCIC, PCIC and JNET

computer systems to obtain information regarding Ms. Williams. There were

additional text messages between the two men over the next several days.

Shortly after Appellee obtained Ms. Williams’ information, Edwin just

happened to arrive at Ms. Williams’ doorstep and, when asked how he found

her, he responded that “he had his ways.” In applying the more-likely-than-

not test addressed by our High Court in Perez, supra, I believe that it is more

likely than not that Appellee accessed the various computer systems on

October 17, 2017 to provide his cousin with Ms. Williams’ address.

      Appellee claimed that he legitimately obtained Ms. Williams’ personal

information as part of a homicide investigation that he was conducting and

that he did not obtain this information to provide to his cousin. However,

consideration of his alternative explanation, his credibility and the weight of

conflicting evidence must be reserved for the jury in the first instance. The

trial court was not permitted at the preliminary hearing stage to credit

Appellee’s story and disregard the Commonwealth’s explanation as all

evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in favor

of the Commonwealth.

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      Viewed in the proper manner, since the record reflects that Appellee

gave a false written statement to Lieutenant Clough with an intent to mislead,

I believe that the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the unsworn

falsification charge.

Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence.

      A person commits the offense of tampering with or fabricating physical

evidence when that person,

      believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or
      about to be instituted, he:

      (1) alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document
      or thing with intent to impair its verity or availability in such
      proceeding or investigation; or

      (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing
      knowing it to be false and with intent to mislead a public servant
      who is or may be engaged in such proceeding or investigation.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910.

      At    the   preliminary   hearings,   Lieutenant   Clough   testified   that,

immediately following the interview of Appellee during which Appellee stated

that he accessed the computer systems to obtain Ms. Williams’ personal

information as part of a homicide that he was investigating, Lieutenant Clough

went to the Homicide Division to obtain the M17-185 case file.            He was

provided with one file folder which contained no information regarding Ms.

Williams.   However, on the next day, Appellee called to advise Lieutenant

Clough that there was a second folder. This folder contained a photograph of

Ms. Williams and her children taken from her Facebook page and on the back

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were handwritten notes with some of Ms. Williams’ personal information. This

photograph was the only document regarding Ms. Williams and was different

than the other documents contained within the second folder which were

computer printouts and had no handwriting. The Commonwealth argues that

this is prima facie evidence that Appellee “manufactured the second homicide

file after learning about [Lieutenant] Clough’s investigation into his use of

restricted access systems and did so knowing it to be false and with the intent

to mislead [Lieutenant] Clough in conducting that investigation.” Appellant’s

Substituted Brief at 16.

      The Majority disagrees, finding that there was insufficient evidence to

establish that the information regarding Ms. Williams was added to the

homicide file after Appellee learned of the Internal Affairs Division’s

investigation, and that there was no testimony that Lieutenant Clough

“obtained the entire file when he initially procured it.” Majority Opinion at 11.

Respectfully, the Majority fails to follow the standard of review that we are

required to follow at the preliminary hearing stage and discounts reasonable

inferences that Appellee tampered with the file.

      Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence

demonstrates that Appellee told Lieutenant Clough during the December 27,

2017 interview that he accessed the police databases to obtain Ms. Williams’

personal information as part of a homicide that he was investigating.

Immediately following the interview, Lieutenant Clough went to the

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Philadelphia Police Homicide Division and requested homicide file M17-185

and he was provided with one file folder.          There was no reference to Ms.

Williams in the file. The next day, Appellee called to advise Lieutenant Clough

that there was a second file and this file contained a photograph of Ms.

Williams which had her personal information handwritten on the back. This

second folder appeared suspect to Lieutenant Clough as the photograph

appeared to come from a public Facebook page and the handwritten

information contained on the back was the type of information that Lieutenant

Clough had asked Appellee if he obtained regarding Ms. Williams. 11 In sum,

____________________________________________

11 Specifically, during the preliminary hearing on September 11, 2020, the
following exchange took place:

       Commonwealth: The Facebook picture, did that appear to you
       that it came from a publicly available Facebook profile?

       Lieutenant Clough: Yes, because I actually logged in and
       viewed it myself and I was able to see it without being restricted,
       without having to be a friend of Ms. Williams.

       Commonwealth: And those handwritten notes, was that all
       information that you would have referred to in [Appellee’s]
       interview with him?

                                          ....

       Lieutenant Clough: Those things that were handwritten on
       there, yes. They were in – some of them were in the interview of
       [Appellee], yes. And he received a copy of that interview at the
       conclusion of his statement.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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the only material contained in the second folder regarding Ms. Williams was a

print-out of a publicly available Facebook photograph, on the back of which

Appellee had handwritten Ms. Williams’ personal information corresponding to

the same information that Appellee provided to Lieutenant Clough during the

interview a day earlier. Unlike the other materials in the folder, Appellee did

not print out any of the database inquiries of Ms. Williams from October 17,

2017.

        It strains credulity to believe that a second file folder – containing

information regarding Ms. Williams – was missing on December 27, 2017

when Lieutenant Clough retrieved and scoured file number M17-185 – which

had no information regarding Ms. Williams – yet it immediately appeared one

day later. Rather, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

____________________________________________

        Commonwealth: Besides that Facebook page and the notes on
        the back was there any other reference to Theresa Williams in the
        file?

        Lieutenant Clough: No, there was not. I looked extensively
        through that file. A lot of the inquiries that were made there was
        copies, there was printouts of various licen[s]e plates, tags,
        houses that were checked. And this was the only one, the only
        thing that was not printed out, it was just handwritten on the back
        of a Facebook page.

        Commonwealth:        So you are saying this information was
        different from the other checks that you saw in the file; is what
        you’re saying.

        Lieutenant Clough: Yes.

N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 79-80.

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Commonwealth, it is reasonable to infer that Appellee altered homicide file

M17-185 by creating a second folder of materials (which now included

information regarding Ms. Williams) in order to corroborate his purported

reason for accessing the police databases and he provided this second folder

to Lieutenant Clough to mislead him. By ignoring the reasonable inferences

drawn from this evidence and, instead, accepting the explanations given by

Appellee, the Majority is making improper credibility determinations and, in

essence, rendering a finding of innocence.

      When viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support a prima facie

case that Appellee altered the homicide file by creating a second folder with

Ms. Williams’ photograph and personal information to mislead and thwart an

official investigation.   Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the

charge of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence.

Tampering With Public Records or Information

      A person commits the offense of tampering with public records or

information when he:

      (1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any
      record, document or thing belonging to, or received or kept by,
      the government for information or record, or is required by law to
      be kept by others for information of the government;

      (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing
      knowing it to be false, and with intent that it be taken as a genuine
      part of information or records referred to in paragraph (1) of this
      subsection; or

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      (3) intentionally and unlawfully destroys, conceals, removes or
      otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any such record,
      document or thing.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4911(a). When the offense is charged as a felony, as in this

case, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant acted with an

intent to “defraud or injure.”   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4911(b).       “Fraud” generally

means “anything calculated to deceive, whether by single act or combination,

or by suppression of truth, or suggestion of what is false, whether it be by

direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look

or gesture.” Moser v. DeSetta, 589 A.2d 679, 682 (Pa. 1991); see also

Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 162 A.3d 1140, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      I believe that the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearings, when

viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, establishes a prima

facie case for tampering with public records or information.

      First, I agree with the learned Majority that the homicide file relied upon

by Appellee to establish the legitimacy of his inquiries regarding Ms. Williams

is a “record, document or thing belonging to, or received or kept by, the

government for information or record.” See Majority Opinion at 14; see also

Commonwealth v. Barger, 375 A.2d 756, 763-764 (Pa. Super. 1977) (“It is

a written report of an investigation of a motor vehicle accident which, at the

very minimum, is kept by the State Police for informational purposes.”). I

part company, however, with my learned colleagues’ finding that “the

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Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case that [Appellee] made a

false entry or alteration to the file.” Majority Opinion at 15.

       The Majority concludes that “[t]he Commonwealth’s assertion that

[Appellee] ‘falsified’ the second file is mere supposition and speculation.” Id.

Again, I believe that the Majority is applying the wrong evidentiary standard

in reviewing whether a prima facie case was established.          Circumstantial

evidence of a crime being committed is sufficient and conclusions must be

reached after reviewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Here, the elements

of tampering with public records, with the intent to defraud, were established

circumstantially.

       Viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence

demonstrates the following.          Ms. Williams was confronted by Edwin in a

parking lot on October 14, 2017, at which time she rebuffed his efforts to go

out with him. As Ms. Williams was leaving the parking lot, Edwin pulled up

behind her and looked in the direction of the rear of her vehicle, i.e. the

location of her license plate. On that day, text messages were exchanged

between Edwin and Appellee.12            Three days later, on October 17, 2017,

Appellee accessed multiple police databases to obtain personal information

regarding Ms. Williams, including her home address. Importantly, there were

____________________________________________

12Again, Appellee does not deny that he and Edwin frequently sent text
messages to each other. See Appellee’s Substituted Brief at 18.

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five text messages between Edwin and Appellee just minutes before Appellee

accessed the NCIC, PCIC and JNET systems. Shortly after these databases

were checked and information regarding Ms. Williams was obtained, Edwin

appeared at Ms. Williams’ door. When Edwin and Appellee were interviewed

by Lieutenant Clough, they both lied about their communications with each

other and, on the day of Edwin’s interview, Appellee stopped using the cell

phone that he had used previously to communicate with Edwin.

      During his interview with Lieutenant Clough, Appellee tried to explain

his purpose of accessing the police databases.       He claimed to have been

investigating a homicide when he just happened to have witnessed a target

of that homicide enter a vehicle. Appellee contended that he accessed the

license tag information for that vehicle to learn more about the target. When

the information came back as belonging to Ms. Williams, he did additional

searches to gather more information about her. Even though the suggested

link between Ms. Williams and the murder suspect was both tenuous and

uncorroborated, Appellee continued to access other databases to obtain more

of Ms. Williams’ personal information; however, he was never able to connect

Ms. Williams to the homicide suspect.

      Immediately after learning about this homicide investigation, Lieutenant

Clough obtained the file folder identified by Appellee as the file related to the

homicide investigation and there was no information in the file regarding Ms.

Williams. One day later, Appellee produced a second folder which he claimed

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was part of the homicide investigation file and, lo and behold, this second

folder contained a Facebook photograph of Ms. Williams.       Unlike all of the

other items in both folders, the one photograph of Ms. Williams was publicly

accessible, had handwritten notes on it, and was not time-stamped.

      When viewing this evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, I believe that it is more likely than not that

Appellee used official computer systems to help Edwin locate Ms. Williams then

tried to cover it up by manipulating a government record to make it appear

as if Ms. Williams were involved in a murder investigation. Appellee acted

intentionally to create a second folder as part of the M17-185 homicide

investigation file to deceive Lieutenant Clough and mislead him to believe that

his purpose for accessing these systems was legitimate. I acknowledge that

Appellee gave an innocent explanation for his actions; however, it is not

proper at this stage of the proceedings to rely on Appellee’s self-serving

statements and completely disregard the evidence that reasonably leads to

the conclusion that Appellee tampered with public records in violation of 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 4911(a).    Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing this

charge.

Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Functions

      A person commits the offense of obstruction of administration of law or

other governmental functions “if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts

the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence,

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physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful

act.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101. This crime requires more than “mere lying” or

giving false information to a police officer. See Commonwealth v. Shelly,

703 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1997).13 The conduct causing obstruction or

interference must be an independently illegal act. See id.

       The Majority concludes that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden

of establishing a prima facie case on the obstruction charge as the

Commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case for the other crimes

charged.     I set forth in detail why the record compels a finding that the

Commonwealth met its burden of establishing a prima facie case that Appellee

violated Sections 4904(a) (unsworn falsification), 4910 (tampering with or

fabricating physical evidence) and 4911 (tampering with public records) of the

Crimes Code. Since there is no question that Lieutenant Clough was engaged

in the administration of a governmental function while investigating Appellee,

all of the elements of Section 5101 were met. Therefore, the trial court erred

in dismissing the charge of obstruction.

       For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s orders

dismissing the charges of unsworn falsification, tampering with or fabricating

____________________________________________

13 As the Majority notes, Shelly’s holding that providing false identification to

law enforcement is not a crime has been superseded by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914,
however “that does not undermine its central holding that the ‘unlawful act’
element of Section 5101 can only be satisfied by allegations setting forth a
violation of codified law.” Majority Opinion at 17.

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physical   evidence,   tampering   with   public   records,   and   obstructing

administration of law or other governmental function, and remand so that all

four charges against Appellee may proceed.

      President Judge Emeritus Bender, Judge Stabile and Judge Dubow join

this Dissenting Opinion.

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