Court Opinion

ID: 9535827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:45:05.4088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:21.435712
License: Public Domain

*685Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
For the reasons more particularly set out hereinafter, I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case.
I believe the evidence in this case is insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged. As noted by the majority, the defendant was charged with unintentionally causing the death of a pedestrian while operating a motor vehicle in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-644 (Reissue 1978). All the evidence relied upon by the State to obtain the conviction was circumstantial.
Section 39-644 requires that “every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway . . . The statute, of course, must mean something more than imposing absolute liability upon a driver to avoid colliding with a pedestrian. The act, of necessity, presumes that the pedestrian is in a place and walking in a manner that a driver exercising due care can avoid colliding with the pedestrian. The record is totally devoid of any evidence as to where the pedestrian was moments before being struck by the truck. While it is true that a witness observed the truck striking the victim, the witness was unable to testify as to where the victim was just before being struck, and testified that the weather was “pretty bad.”
We have previously held that “a defendant may not be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged.” State v. Doyle, 205 Neb. 234, 238, 287 N.W.2d 59, 62 (1980). Not only is the driver of a motor vehicle obligated to operate a motor vehicle so as to avoid colliding with a pedestrian upon a roadway, but, likewise, the pedestrian is called upon to exercise due care to avoid a collision with the motor vehicle. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-643(1) and 642(2) (Reissue 1978). The evidence in this case is not sufficient to eliminate the possibility that the victim suddenly darted in front of the vehicle. As a matter of fact, *686there was some evidence that the victim may not have seen the vehicle because her vision was obscured by an umbrella she was holding. Likewise, there is some indication that she may have been running in a diagonal direction and not within the crosswalk. Any one of those factors, if true, might be sufficient to exonerate the appellant in this case. As we said in State v. Doyle, supra at 240, 287 N.W.2d at 63: “Any fact or circumstance reasonably susceptible of two interpretations must be resolved most favorably to the accused.”
In this case, we have apparently concluded that because an accident occurred, the driver must have failed to exercise due care. That conclusion is not justified in a criminal matter. “ ‘If circumstantial evidence is relied upon in a criminal prosecution, proof of a few facts or of a multitude of facts all consistent with the supposition of guilt is not sufficient to warrant a verdict of guilty. In order to convict, it is necessary not only that the circumstances all concur to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime and be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, since that is to be compared with all the facts proved, but that they be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion and exclude every other reasonable theory or hypothesis except that of guilt. The facts proved must be consistent with each other and with the main fact sought to be established.’” See Jeppesen v. State, 154 Neb. 765, 776, 49 N.W.2d 611, 617 (1951). On the basis of the record before us, I would have reversed and dismissed.