Court Opinion

ID: 9861961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:55:57.950244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:51.504420
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting.
In the appellate review of criminal sentences, this Court may not revise a sentence authorized by statute except where "manifestly unreasonable," which means "no reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate to the particular offense and offender." Ind.Appellate Rule 17(B). I decline to conclude the trial court's sentencing decision meets this extreme standard.
I further disagree with the majority's conclusion that the aggravating circumstances supported consecutive sentences but not enhanced sentences. Trial courts are authorized to impose enhanced sentences (greater than the statutory presumptive sentence) based upon the same list of factors upon which it may base the imposition of consecutive terms when there are multiple convictions. Ind.Code § 385-38-1-7.1(b). Thus, if the consecutive sentencing was proper, so were the individual sentence enhancements.
In the present case, the trial court's detailed written findings include the following aggravating circumstances: "given the opportunity, the defendant is likely to kill again"; "no evidence of remorse"; premeditation and advance planning of the murders and escapes; "[the killing itself was brutal and vicious"; "the defendant's continuing cold-blooded resolve to eliminate the sources of unwelcome authority from his life"; and "imposition of a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime." Record at 337-38. The majority correctly notes that the "depreciate the seriousness" factor may generally only be used to support a refusal to reduce the presumptive sentence. However, the other aggravating circumstances properly support the trial court's decision both to enhance the sentences and to order them served consecutively. The trial court is not limited in the matters it may consider in determining the sentence. Ind. Code § 35-88-1-7.1(d).
The majority opinion observes that the trial court accepted the defendant's plea of guilty but mentally ill but declined to consider the defendant's mental illness as a mitigating cireumstance. If the trial court erred in failing to consider such mitigating cireum-stances, a preferable appellate resolution would be to remand to the trial court for reconsideration and a new sentencing order.