Court Opinion

ID: 9513517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:37:10.354329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:53.780479
License: Public Domain

*401Kapsner, Justice,
concurring in the result.
[¶ 47] I concur with the result of the majority, but I do not join in its reasoning. I would not reach the issue of the family car doctrine because I do not believe it is necessary to the decision in this case. The family car doctrine was created for purposes of extending liability to the owner of a car, thereby presumably creating a source of recovery for an injured individual. Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 455 (1979). The issue of insurance coverage for that liability, however, is a distinct issue and should be determined on principles of contract. While I have some question whether the family car doctrine makes continuing sense in the context of statutorily mandated insurance, I am convinced that the doctrine does not determine the outcome in this case. The Tuftys entered into a settlement which stipulated to liability, but limited direct recovery. The terms of that Miller-Shugart settlement allowed the McPhees to pursue coverage rights which the Tuftys had against AMCO. Therefore, the decision should be based on a determination of the contractual rights of coverage.
[¶ 48] With respect to whether there was “use” of the Toyota for purposes of Part A — Liability Coverage, I agree with the analysis of Justice Neumann in paragraphs 55 through 57 of his special concurrence.
[¶ 49] With respect to the issue of whether the Toyota was a covered “newly acquired vehicle” under the AMCO policy, like Justice Neumann, I believe the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court in Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 509 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1993) is persuasive because it comports with the plain language of the policy. As did the policy in the Iowa case, the AMCO policy in this case provides for coverage of a newly acquired vehicle “only if’ certain conditions are met. It is contrary to the plain meaning of such conditional language to imply automatic coverage for the first thirty days after acquisition of a new vehicle. Public policy does not provide a basis for finding automatic coverage as suggested by Justice Maring in her partial dissent. Legislative mandate requires certain insurance coverage for all drivers and that mandate was met by the Tuftys in this case. A separate policy which provided the mandatory coverage for the prior vehicle driven by Christopher was in place and the Toyota was treated as a newly acquired vehicle under that policy; coverage was extended for this accident to the limits of the Farm & City policy. I don’t believe public policy can be construed to extend beyond those mandates.
[¶ 50] The trial court made two findings on whether notice was given to AMCO for coverage of a newly acquired vehicle. The court found, after clarification on remand:
42.
Prior to November 27, 1994, the date of the accident, Curtis and Debra Tufty never requested to have the Toyota added to the AMCO policy. Prior to November 27, 1994, the agent never contacted the parent company and requested that the Toyota be added to the AMCO policy. Curtis Tufty testified that it was his understanding and expectation that Christopher and his vehicles were not involved with AMCO, that he did not intend to have the Toyota insured under his AMCO policy and that it was intended that Christopher and his vehicles would and could only be covered by Farm & City. Brian Orn testified that the [sic] he did not intend or expect coverage under the AMCO policy to apply to Christopher’s Toyota because coverage was separately issued by Farm & City for Christopher and the Pontiac and because the Toyota was intended to replace the Pontiac.
58.
.The Court makes a specific finding of fact that the report of the accident and *402conversation with the agent by Debra Tufty on November 27, 1994, was a request for coverage under both Farm & City and AMCO policies.
[¶ 51] I, too, have some difficulty in the holding of the majority opinion that the information Debra Tufty conveyed to Orn was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute notice of a newly acquired vehicle under the AMCO policy. I would hold that the finding is clearly erroneous because it is contrary to the evidence presented. The testimony of Brian Orn is summarized in Finding 42 as is the understanding of Curtis Tufty on the coverage of the Toyota automobile. There is no suggestion in the findings the court found these witnesses not to be credible. Mrs. Tufty did not testify. Therefore, the record contains no support for Finding 58. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support the finding. Moilan v. Moilan, 1999 ND 103, ¶ 9, 598 N.W.2d 81. In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated “[t]he newly acquired clause in the AMCO policy is ambiguous and must therefore result in coverage even though the Tuftys did not make a specific request for AMCO coverage on the vehicle within thirty days of the purchase.” Whether a policy is ambiguous is a question of law. Fisher v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 1998 ND 109, ¶ 5, 579 N.W.2d 599. I do not find the ambiguity that would permit the determination that coverage exists under these facts.
[¶ 52] Therefore, I concur in the result of the majority opinion.
[¶ 53] Carol Ronning Kapsner.