Court Opinion

ID: 9559784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:35:41.390428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:43.643555
License: Public Domain

DAVISON, Justice.
This is a proceeding whereby Gertrude Dunn and the First Baptist Church of Oklahoma City, a religious Corporation, seek to vacate, under the provisions of 11 O.S.1951 § 523 et seq., a portion of the plat of Park Estates, Burdick and Cutler’s Additions to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The relief soright was that said portion of said plat be vacated and the property restored to its un-platted condition without restrictions. To said application, W. B. Buck, Earl Pendley, E. W. Luker, Roy L. Fairchild and Wade Ramzy, by leave of court, filed a Protest and Petition for Injunction, seeking an order prohibiting said applicants from constructing a church upon the property described in the application. The parties will be referred to as applicants and protestants, as they appeared in the trial court.
 It was alleged in the application that the designated portion of said addition had never been used by the public but was, and had been, for more than five years, occupied adversely to the public, giving the court jurisdiction, under the provision of 11 O.S.1951 § 524, to vacate said portion of said plat, provided the rights and privileges of the other proprietors were not abridged or destroyed. Those rights include the benefits from restrictive covenants. Williamson v. Needles, 191 Okl. 560, 133 P.2d 211.
Protestants found their protest and their right to injunctive relief upon restrictive covenants contained in a recorded Owner’s Certificate and Restrictions of Park Estates and the amendments thereto. By reply, applicants specifically denied the violation of, or intention to violate, any of said restrictive covenants. Upon trial of the issues, the court found that the applicants planned the erection of a church upon the designated property and that protestants sought to enjoin its erection as being in violation of restrictive covenants running with the land. The injunction was denied upon the ground that the building of a church was not prohibited by the restrictions. Vacation of the plat as to the property involved was also ordered. From that judgment, protestants have perfected this appeal.
The evidence contained in the record amply sustains the allegations in the application and the judgment of the court finding them to be true, that said portion of said platted tract had never been used by the public but had been enclosed and occupied adversely to the public for more than five years. The existence of those facts warranted the court in vacating that portion of the plat. 11 O.S.1951 § 524; Bohnsack v. Ponca City Development Co., 167 Okl. 177, 29 P.2d 61; Town of Orlando v. Stevens, 90 Okl. 2, 215 P. 1050.
The remaining proposition, in the case now before us, is not so easily determined. Churches stand in the same position as other purchasers and their ownership is subject to the same valid restrictions. Christ’s Methodist Church v. Macklanburg, 198 Okl. 297, 177 P.2d 1008. Thus, the applicant herein, having acquired the property after the imposition of -restrictions, is bound thereby to the same extent as other owners. But restrictions as to the use of property are to be strictly construed. Nothing will be taken by implication or intendment, nor will any condition be inserted by construction. The intention of the parties will be gathered strictly from the terms employed. Test Oil Co. v. LaTourette, 19 Okl. 214, 91 P. 1025; Turk v. Wood, 202 Okl. 112, 210 P.2d 662, 665.
In the last above cited case the following rule from 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 163, pp. 517— 518 was adopted and approved:
“ ‘The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by construction or implication beyond the clear meaning of its terms, even to accomplish what it may be thought the parties would have desired had a situation which later developed been foreseen by them at the time when the restriction was written.’ ”
The restrictions which we are called upon to construe were contained in said Owner’s *298Certificate and Restrictions of Park Estates. As amended, they provide:
“(3) Only single-family detached residences etc. of a certain size should be' constructed on any one lot.
“(8) No building or structure of any sort may be placed, erected or used for business purposes on any of the lots * * * except on Lots etc.
“(9) No professional office, business, trade or commercial activity of any sort may be conducted in any residential structure or on any lot * * * except on Lots etc.
“(12) All cows, horses, goats, ponies etc.
“(13) (a) No single family residence, together with other improvements costing less * * * shall be permitted on etc.
“(b) No single family residence (same as (a) except as to amount) etc.
“(c) No single-family residence (same as (a) except as to amount) etc.
“(14) Sixty (60%) percent of the exterior surface walls etc.
“(15) Easements for utility installation etc.
“(16) These covenants are to run with the land etc.
“(17) Should the owner * * * violate etc.
“(18) Invalidation of any one of these covenants etc.”
It will be noted that only paragraphs numbered 7 to 11 prohibit the use of the property for any purpose. Obviously, none of these uses include church purposes unless, it would come within paragraph 8, ‘‘business purposes.” Although this court has not heretofore expressed itself on the matter, it seems rather universally accepted that “A restrictive covenant against the use of property for any business purpose is not violated by the erection of a church building.” 14 Am.Jur. 625, (rewritten in pocket part sec. 225.) In the case of Wiggins v. Young, 206 Ga. 440, 57 S.E.2d 486, 487, 13 A.L.R.2d 1237, in passing on a restriction very similar to the restrictions in the instant case, said:
“A church is a building consecrated to the honor of God and religion, with its members united in the profession of the same Christian faith. Josey v. Union Loan & Trust Co., 106 Ga. 608, 611, 32 S.E. 628. Under the general rule that the owner of land in fee has the right to use his property for any lawful purpose, and any claim that there are restrictions and limitations in the use of such property must be clearly and indubitably established, Randall v. Atlanta Advertising Service, 159 Ga. 217, 218, 125 S.E. 462; Kitchens v. Noland, 172 Ga. 684, 158 S.E. 562; Thompson v. Glenwood Community Club, Inc., 191 Ga. 196, 12 S.E.2d 623, the restriction against the use of property ‘for any business purpose,’ as contained in division (d) of the restrictive covenants, is not violated by the erection of a ohurch building.”
Therefore, in the case at bar, there is no restriction against the building of a church .unless it is contained in paragraph (3). That entire paragraph is as follows:
“Only single-family, detached residences, not to exceed two stories in height, servant’s quarters not to exceed a floor area of three hundred (300) square feet, and a private garage for not more than three (3) oars, may be constructed and/or located on any of the Lots in Park Estates, Cutler’s Addition or Burdick Addition, described hereinabove, except Lots Five (5) to Twelve (12), both inclusive, in Block Twenty (20); and lots Five (5) to Nine (9), both inclusive, in Block Twenty-one (21) are hereby specifically reserved for duplexes, multiple-family apartments, and/or business purposes.”
Considering that paragraph in the light of the rules of law above, it must be strictly construed and it cannot be made restrictive by implication. It will be noted that the persons who established'the restrictions did *299not interpret the paragraph as prohibiting business buildings or residential offices for professions because other paragraphs were included to prohibit the latter specifically. If paragraph (3) was intended to restrict all buildings in the addition to residences, then the prohibition of business buildings by paragraph (8) was unnecessary and a surplusage. Our interpretation of paragraph (3) is that it was intended to provide that “In building residences in the addition, only single-family detached residences not to exceed two stories * * * may be constructed and/or located on any of the Lots * * * »
By such interpretation the building of any other structure must be governed by other parts of the instrument. Business buildings are, certainly, otherwise prohibited. Nowhere, however, is the building of a church, prohibited.. We conclude, that the provisions of the restrictions did not include the building of a church and that the trial court was correct in so holding. This conclusion is not in conflict with the case, of Christ’s Methodist Church v. Macklanburg, supra [198 Okl. 297, 177 P.2d 1009], because in the reported case the restrictive covenant provided that “ ‘All lots in this plat are restricted to residences only.’ ” Nothing in the instant case is similar to such a clear and explicit restriction.
The judgment is affirmed.
HALLEY, C. J., and WELCH, ARNOLD, O’NEAL and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
JOHNSON, V. C. J., and CORN and WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent.