Court Opinion

ID: 9918361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 18:02:45.1245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:44.703331
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                         )
                                          )
         v.                               )     ID No. 1809000341
                                          )
DARNELL O. FARRARE                        )
                                          )
                      Defendant.          )

                                        ORDER

         And now, this 12th day of January 2024, the Court makes the following

findings:

          1.    The Defendant – along with over 20 others – was caught up in a

    wiretap investigation that led to a racketeering indictment.1 Although there was a

    suppression ruling concerning the wiretap that went against the defendants, it does

    not appear that Defendant or his counsel joined in the motion.2

          2.    Rather, Defendant elected to tender a guilty plea to one count of

racketeering and one count of drug dealing.3 On June 25, 2021, he was sentenced

to 12 years in prison, followed by decreasing levels of community supervision.4

1
  Appendix to Memo. in Supp. Mot. to Withdraw, pp. A26-A52.
2
  Id. at A119-A122.
3
  Id. at A135-A145.
4
  Id. at A167-A172.
                                      1
          3.   No appeal was taken by the Defendant. Then, in May, 2022, the

    Defendant filed a pro se motion under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 for postconviction

    relief.5

          4.   In order to invoke the Court’s review of a conviction using the device

of Rule 61, the movant must pass the procedural hurdles laid out in the rule. First,

the motion must be presented within one year of the date on which the conviction

became final.6 Defendant has cleared this hurdle by filing 11 months after his

sentencing. It is also Defendant’s first postconviction motion under Rule 61 and

satisfies the rule against second and subsequent motions.7

          5.   The substance of Defendant’s motion relates to the wiretap(s) and the

fruits of the wiretap evidence, which led to search warrants and the recovery of

evidence against the Defendant.8 His thesis is that the wiretap warrants were not

issued based upon a finding of probable cause and that because they were

improperly authorized, evidence was seized that should not have been and he pled

guilty because of that evidence against him.9

5
  Id. at A173-A176.
6
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
7
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (d)(1)-(2).
8
  Appendix to Memo. in Supp. Mot. to Withdraw, pp. A177-A203.
9
  Id. at A189-A191.
                                      2
      6.      But the question whether the wiretap warrants contained probable

 cause was fully litigated and decided by the Court, albeit by other defendants in

 the same racketeering indictment.10 Counsel for co-defendant Fairley and counsel

 for co-defendant Grayson filed motions to suppress the wiretap evidence, it was

 duly briefed by the parties and ultimately denied from the bench.11 Even if we

 accept that Farrare’s trial counsel fell below an objective standard of

 reasonableness in not filing a suppression motion – and there is no reason to do so

 as counsel says he reviewed the warrants and found no basis to challenge them12 –

 Farrare cannot establish prejudice since the Court found probable cause for the

 intercepts and search warrants.

      7.     Putting aside that Ferrare’s complaint about his counsel not filing a

suppression motion goes nowhere since the Court has previously ruled that the

warrants were proper, it is appropriate to recall that he pled guilty. A guilty plea is

a signal event in the life of a criminal case. The defendant controls the decision to

plead guilty, not his attorney.13

10
   Id. at A53-A134.
11
   Appendix to Memo. in Supp. Mot. to Withdraw, pp. A119-A122.
12
   See Counsel’s Letter to the Court, Sept. 29, 2022.
13
    See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 213 A.3d 560, 567-70 (Del. 2019) (discussing a
defendant’s “autonomy interest” in electing to plead guilty).
                                         3
      8.     This was a case in which the Defendant had a serious legal difficulty.

Not only was he picked up on a racketeering wiretap, but a search warrant executed

as the police closed down the phone intercepts resulted in the seizure of about 2

kilos of heroin from the Defendant’s residence.14 In addition, the Defendant’s

record includes 2 prior felony convictions for drug dealing as well as a felony

assault. It is thus understandable that his counsel says, “I seem to recall discussing

this [the lack of merit in a suppression motion] with Mr. Fararre and suggesting he

focus his attention elsewhere” such as “how best to defend/mitigate the

allegations.”15

      9.     The Court recalls what the Delaware Supreme Court said in Ploof v.

State: “Rule 61 is intended to correct errors in the trial process, not to allow

defendants unlimited opportunities to relitigate their convictions.”16         While

collateral review helps preserve the integrity of the truth finding process when

errors occur, such review also is in a natural tension with finality in judgments.

Thus, Defendant’s argument that the Court should now conduct a review of a

suppression matter that was not raised prior to entering his guilty plea rings hollow.

14
   Appendix to Memo. in Supp. Mot. to Withdraw, pp. A148.
15
   See Counsel’s Letter to the Court, Sept. 29, 2022.
16
   Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013); see State v. Brooks, 2022 WL
2229780, at *5 (Del. Super. June 21, 2022).
                                         4
      10.    Unlike federal courts, which permit a “conditional guilty plea” that

preserves a pretrial suppression ruling for review on appeal, 17 there is no provision

in the Delaware rules that allows for the preservation of suppression issues once the

defendant tenders a guilty plea.18 It is ironic that the Defendant, having waived his

right to a suppression hearing by tendering a guilty plea, now would have the Court

undo his guilty plea by granting review of the right (to seek suppression) he waived

by pleading guilty.

      11.    The Court has reviewed the arguments of the pro se pleading and has

carefully reviewed the brief in support of the motion to withdraw as Rule 6119

counsel. These counsel, after a Court appointed, assiduous review of the record,

Mr. Farrare’s claims and the underlying law, have found no good faith basis to press

any argument favoring a grant of Rule 61 relief.20 They have supported this

conclusion with a thorough and candid review of all the evidence and the

arguments. They have found no good faith basis to further press for relief under

Rule 6121 and Defendant has added no formal protestations on the record. The

17
   See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 4 U.S.C.A. § 11 (West 2024).
18
   See generally Scarborough v. State, 2015 WL 4606519 at *3 (Del. July 30, 2015);
Wilson v. State, 2010 WL 572114, at *2 (Del. Feb. 18, 2010); Smith v. State, 2004
WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004).
19
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61.
20
   Id.
21
   Id.
                                         5
Court has likewise reviewed the file and the brief of counsel and concurs that no

relief is available under Rule 61.22

           For all the reasons stated above, Farrare’s Motion for Postconviction Relief

is DENIED and Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                 /s/ Charles E. Butler
                                                 Charles E. Butler, Resident Judge

cc:        Prothonotary
           Cynthia F. Hurlock, Deputy Attorney General
           Michael Cooksey, Deputy Attorney General
           Patrick J. Collins, Esquire
           Kimberly A. Price, Esquire

22
     Id.
                                             6