Court Opinion

ID: 9486241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:41:37.978374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:35.270512
License: Public Domain

EISELE, Senior District Judge,
dissenting.
With respect to Mr. Heard only, I respectfully dissent.
On appeal Mr. Heard contends that the record fails to demonstrate an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea, and for the district judge’s conclusion that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. The shortcomings, the appellant asserts, are in violation of F.R.Cr.P. 11.
The standard of review applied in a direct appeal of a conviction arising from a guilty plea is that noneompliance with Rule 11 constitutes reversible error. United States v. Frazier, 705 F.2d 903, 907 (7th Cir.1983). See also United States v. DeCicco, 899 F.2d 1531, 1534 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Fountain, 777 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Fels, 599 F.2d 142, 149 n. 5 (7th Cir.1979). Rule 11 serves the purpose of “making clear exactly what the defendant admits to, -and whether the admissions are factually sufficient to constitute the alleged crime.” Fountain, 777 F.2d at 355. Rule 11(f) requires the district court to determine whether there is a factual basis for a guilty • plea before entering judgment. “It is well settled in this circuit that the failure of the defendant to admit to the factual basis of a plea is the equivalent of a plea of not guilty, that a ‘district judge shall not accept a guilty plea until he has determined that there is a factual basis for the plea.’ ” United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920, 924 (7th Cir.1981) (quoting United States v. Wetterlin, 583 F.2d 346, 352-53 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127, 99 S.Ct. 1044, 59 L.Ed.2d 88 (1979) (emphasis in original)).
■ Rule 11(d) requires the court to inquire whether the defendant’s willingness to plead guilty results from prior discussions between the U.S. Attorney and the defendant or his attorney. Subsection (f) of Rule 11 requires the Court to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis in the record.
At the beginning of the change of plea hearing, the following dialogue took place:
THE COURT: Would you look over Count I of the Indictment and then tell me in your own words what you understand the government says that you did?
* * * * * *
THE DEFENDANT: That I sold cocaine.
THE COURT: Do you understand the government says that you agreed with some other people — namely Cleo Hightower, Eddie Mae Ivory, Robert Ivory, Theresa Jackson, Shawn Laird, and Betty Ann Berry — to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it.
THE DEFENDANT: No, I didn’t know who they were.
THE COURT: That’s what the government says you did.
THE DEFENDANT: Oh.
THE COURT: Do you understand that’s what the government is saying in this Indictment, that you reached an agreement with some or all of these people to possess cocaine and cocaine base with the intent to distribute it.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I understand.
THE COURT: Okay. You understand that the government says that" you reached that agreement sometime between April of 1991 and October of 1991.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that they are saying that, but I—
THE COURT: Okay. . You understand that the government says that you reached *1418that agreement in the Western District of Wisconsin.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
(Transcript of Guilty Plea Hearing at 4-5) (emphasis added). The Court then questioned Mr. Heard to determine whether he understood the various rights that he would be giving up by pleading guilty. This was followed by the Court calling upon the government to state what it could have proven at trial. The- government stated that it could prove that Mr. Heard sold cocaine and “gave a portion of the proceeds back to [Hightower and Ivory].”1 (Guilty Plea Transcript at 11). The government put great stock in the expected testimony of one Canary Smith, who the government said would testify that “Mr. Heard himself, although apparently a user and in need of some cocaine base, wanted to be a worker, wanted to sell cocaine base.” (Guilty Plea Transcript at 12) (emphasis added). When asked whether there was anything that the government could not prove, Mr. Heard’s testimony refuted the allegation of a conspiracy. The relevant parts of the colloquy are quoted as follows:
THE COURT: Is there anything that he stated that you think he could not prove at trial?
MR. GLICKMAN: No.
THE COURT: And, Mr. Heard, is there anything that you think Mr. Van Wagner could not prove at trial?
THE DEFENDANT: That I — that he was giving me, supplying me with some cocaine. Okay, like I was cleaning his vans and cars and stuff. And he would give me, you know, a couple bags. But I wasn’t— he wasn’t supplying me to sell cocaine.
THE COURT: You are saying that the government could only prove that Mr. Hightower gave you cocaine sort of as a form of payment for cleaning out his van?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: But not enough for you to sell?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, yeah. I mean there was like a couple bags, you know, I could have sold, you know. But I wasn’t— I wasn’t — he wasn’t giving me enough to sell to make a profit off of.
THE COURT: I am not sure I understand you. He gave you enough or he gave you enough cocaine that you could sell it. But you are saying he didn’t give you enough that you could really make any money off of it.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Did you sell some of the cocaine that he gave you?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, once or twice I did. Once or twice I have sold it, a couple bags. But that I was mostly using it myself.
THE COURT: Mostly it was for your own use.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: And is it your position that Cleo Hightower is the only person you dealt with?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Did Eddie Mae Ivory ever give you any cocaine?
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am.
THE COURT: Or any of the others named in the conspiracy or in the Indictment?
THE DEFENDANT: I bought from just about everyone on there.
THE COURT: And did you buy just enough for your own use, or did you buy enough to sell to other people?
THE DEFENDANT: Just enough for my own use.
The appellant’s answer indicates that the movement of cocaine from Hightower to Heard was a form of payment for services performed by appellant Heard. And Heard’s statement at the time his plea was taken suggests that the cocaine was not moved with the knowledge or intent that it be sold. The dialogue also suggests that the expectation was that appellant Heard would consume the cocaine. There is no admission of, or even any indication of, an agreement between *1419Hightower and Heard concerning the distribution or sale of cocaine. In fact, appellant Heard is specifically denying such a relationship.
After Mr. Heard’s statements, the Court again asked whether the government could establish that Mr. Heard was actually a member of a conspiracy. The government said that Canary Smith would testify to having heard Mr. Heard ask Cleo Hightower for more work.2 The government stated that Mr. Heard “was aware” of the conspiracy. The government also observed that Heard was only “involved slightly at the beginning at a time when the operation hadn’t ‘cranked up’ so to speak.” After hearing the Assistant U.S. Attorney, the Court, without further addressing Heard, stated that it was satisfied that there was a factual basis for the plea and concluded that the defendant entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and with an understanding of the nature of the eharge.3 Heard was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 33 months to be followed by a term of five years of supervised release.
For “a guilty plea to be valid normally it must have a basis in fact and the defendant must admit to this basis in fact.” United States v. Frye, 738 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir.1984). The majority correctly notes that there are exceptions to this general rule, and that under certain circumstances a defendant may deny his guilt, but decide that the evidence of his guilt is such that it is in his best interest to plead guilty. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the constitutional requirements for acceptance of a guilty plea are that the plea represent a “voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant,” and that the defendant need not admit guilt to enter a valid guilty plea. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). There is no indication that this was a so-called “Alford plea” and it is far from clear that this defendant made such a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to him. It is not clear that he was aware that there was a difference between a buyer-seller relationship and joining a conspiracy, or that he was aware that guilt of possession or distribution did not necessarily mean guilt of conspiracy. Indeed, the trial court’s treatment of his responses could have led him to believe that there was no meaningful distinction.
The appellant’s answers to the questioning at the plea hearing are not examples of “agreeiñg to agree” to the facts set forth by the government, but instead represent denials of involvement in a conspiracy, although clearly acknowledging possession, and one or two occasions of distribution. Mr. Heard specifically denies having joined a “conspiracy” to distribute. Of course, under a conspiracy theory, Mr. Heard could be held accountable for the illegal activities of all members of the alleged conspiracy during the time period in which'he was a member of the conspiracy. Under a simple possession/distribution theory, he could be held accountable only for his own criminal conduct. Thus, this point is certainly not an academic one.
This Circuit has had occasion to address the definition of a conspiracy before. See, e.g., United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1322 (7th Cir.1989) (“If there is ‘one over-all agreement among the various parties to perform different functions in order to carry out the objectives of. the conspiracy, the agreement among the parties constitutes a single conspiracy.’ ” (quoting United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 742 (7th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040, 92 S.Ct. 1311, 31 L.Ed.2d 581 (1972)). The key question is “whether the conspirators are performing different functions in pursuit of common *1420criminal objectives.”) This Circuit has also long recognized the difference between a conspiracy and a simple buyer-seller relationship. We have stated that, in the context of a drug distribution relationship, mere knowledge of the “hub’s” activities, or those of the other spokes, is not enough to tie the conspiracy together. United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1391 (7th Cir.1991). “(W)hen dealer A sells drugs to dealer B, we don’t presume that A has agreed to work for the benefit of everyone else with whom B deals, or that A benefits from B’s other deals. If A knows of, and benefits from, B’s subsequent distribution, we may infer a limited agreement to distribute between A and B.” Id. at 1392. It is clear that the reverse would also be true: Simply from the circumstance that dealer B buys from dealer A, we do not presume that B has agreed to work for the benefit of everyone else with whom A deals, or that B benefits from A’s other deals. In spite of the majority’s contention, Heard never admitted to selling cocaine base for the drug enterprise, or to acting as a common laborer for the drug ring. He admitted to buying from Hightower, cleaning vans for Hightower, and selling “once or twice” on his own. This is not an admission to. joining a conspiracy.
I believe that the majority opinion imper-missibly intertwines two different strands of law: acceptance of a “normal” guilty plea and acceptance of an Alford, or “I didn’t do it, but I want to plead guilty anyway” plea. Acceptance of an ordinary guilty plea requires the district judge to find a factual basis for the plea, and I believe that it requires the defendant to admit to this basis in fact, or at least to “agree to agree” to the government’s proffer. See Frye, 738 F.2d at 199. If the defendant denies his guilt, in the face of the government’s asserted factual basis, , the Court is no longer faced with the ordinary guilty plea. It is faced with either a case which needs to go to trial, or a possible Alford plea. In order for there to be a valid Alford plea, the Court must establish that the defendant has a full understanding of the elements of his alleged crime and, with that knowledge, has made a knowing and voluntary decision to plead guilty in spite of his asserted innocence to avoid the possibility of more severe penalties at trial.
The majority cites United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1302 (7th Cir.1991) to support the argument that a judge may find the factual basis “from anything that appears on the record ... which includes the government’s proffer.” Id. (citations omitted). This language was directly followed by a discussion of Alford pleas. Id. Furthermore, in Musa, the defendant began by suggesting that he wanted to enter an Alford plea, but ended by specifically admitting to the elements of the charged conspiracy. Id. I do not believe that a district judge may accept a guilty plea based solely upon the government’s proffer unless it is clearly an Alford plea. This was.not an Alford plea, and in light of the defendant’s specific denial of the elements of the charged conspiracy, it was error to accept a plea of guilty. The district court did not fully satisfy the Rule 11 requirements. Therefore, I would vacate Mr. Heard’s guilty .plea and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

. There was no elaboration on this point. It is not clear whether the "portion of the proceeds” would have represented any profit for the conspiracy, or whether Mr. Heard was simply buying more cocaine for his personal use.

. In light of the undisputed testimony that Mr. Heard was cleaning Mr. Hightower’s vans and cars, Canary Smith’s expected testimony sheds little light on what type of work Mr. Heard was seeking.

. The majority notes that, as part of the plea bargain, the prosecutor stipulated that Heard did ' not anticipate that the other conspirators would distribute more than 5 grams of crack, enabling Heard to escape the mandatory minimum penalty. After thoroughly reviewing the record, especially the transcript of the sentencing, I find no basis for the implication that Mr. Heard manipulated the prosecutor by locking him into a concession at the plea stage and then attempting to renege.