Court Opinion

ID: 9373215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:29.204524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.152120
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SOCIAL SECURITY                                 DOCKET NUMBERS
  ADMINISTRATION,                               CB-7521-13-0008-T-1
              Petitioner,                       CB-7521-14-0004-T-1

             v.

MARLENE R. ABRAMS,                              DATE: November 17, 2022
             Respondent.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Michelle M. Murray, Esquire, and Sharese M. Reyes, Esquire, Baltimore,
        Maryland, for the petitioner.

      Patrick W. Carlson, Chicago, Illinois, for the petitioner.

      Julie M. Brady, Esquire, Peter H. Noone, Esquire, Robert Fedder, Esquire,
        Sean M. Foley, Esquire, Belmont, Massachusetts, for the respondent.

                                      BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member
                            Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). .
                                                                                       2

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1        The respondent administrative law judge (respondent) has filed a petition
     for review, and the Social Security Administration (SSA or petitioner) has filed a
     cross petition for review, of the initial decision, which sustained charges of
     unacceptable docket management and medical inability to perform, found that the
     respondent did not prove her disability discrimination claims, and determined that
     SSA had good cause to remove the respondent.        Generally, we grant petitions
     such as these only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains
     erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative law judge’s rulings during either the
     course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     neither party has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the
     petition or cross petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review
     and the cross petition for review. We MODIFY the initial decision to find that
     the respondent has not proven her claim of disability harassment, but a different
     outcome is not warranted. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order,
     we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2        SSA proposed to suspend the respondent for 30 days based on a charge of
     failure to follow instructions. Social Security Administration v. Abrams, MSPB
     Docket No. CB-7521-13-0008-T-1, Initial Appeal File (0008 IAF), Tab 1. SSA
     subsequently proposed to remove the respondent based on charges of medical
                                                                                               3

     inability to perform, unacceptable docket management, neglect of duties, and
     failure to follow instructions. Social Security Administration v. Abrams, MSPB
     Docket No. CB-7521-14-0004-T-1, Initial Appeal File (0004 IAF), Tab 1. The
     administrative law judge (ALJ) who was assigned to adjudicate this matter joined
     these appeals.     0008 IAF, Tab 85.       A multi-day hearing was held.           Hearing
     Transcripts (HTs) 1-13. The ALJ granted the respondent’s request to merge the
     charges of unacceptable docket management and neglect of duties.                0008 IAF,
     Tab 162 at 10-11, Tab 166. The ALJ issued an initial decision in which he made
     the following findings: (1) SSA proved the unacceptable docket management and
     medical inability to perform charges; (2) SSA did not prove either of the failure
     to follow instructions charges; (3) the respondent did not prove her disability
     discrimination claims; and (4) SSA demonstrated good cause to remove the
     respondent. 0008 IAF, Tab 175, Initial Decision (ID) at 17-55.
¶3         The respondent has filed a petition for review, SSA has filed a response,
     and the respondent has filed a reply brief.          Social Security Administration v.
     Abrams, MSPB Docket No. CB-7521-13-0008-T-1, Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tabs 3, 8-9. 2 SSA also has filed a cross petition for review, the respondent
     has filed a response, and SSA has filed a reply brief. 3 PFR File, Tabs 8, 10, 12.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶4         In her petition for review, the respondent argues that the ALJ erred in
     analyzing the unacceptable docket management charge , and she cites to “new”

     2
      For consistency, we will only cite to the parties’ submissions on review in MSPB
     Docket No. CB-7521-13-0008-T-1.
     3
       The agency filed a motion for additional time to file a reply brief , and it filed a reply
     brief. PFR File, Tabs 11-12. Although our regulations do not provide for a reply to a
     response to a cross petition for review, we have considered the agency’s reply brief.
                                                                                            4

     evidence in support of this argument. 4 PFR File, Tab 3 at 15-17. She also asserts
     that the ALJ improperly analyzed her claims of disability discrimination and
     harassment and the relevant factors for determining if SSA had good cause to
     remove her.    Id. at 8-14, 17-26.     She further asserts that the ALJ improperly
     joined the appeals and issued a protective order. 5 Id. at 5-8. In its cross petition
     for review, SSA asserts that the ALJ improperly analyzed the failure to follow
     instructions charges. PFR File, Tab 8 at 23-26. For the following reasons, we
     deny the petition for review and cross petition for review, and we affirm the
     initial decision as modified herein.

     SSA proved the unacceptable docket management charge. 6
¶5         In the unacceptable docket management charge, SSA alleged that in fiscal
     year (FY) 2012, the respondent only held approximately 160 hearings, only issued
     approximately 144 decisions, and failed to move cases timely through

     4
       The respondent does not appear to challenge the ALJ’s conclusion that SSA proved
     the charge of medical inability to perform. ID at 35-42. We affirm the ALJ’s
     conclusion herein. See Fox v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 25 (2014)
     (explaining that, to establish a charge of physical inability to perform, the agency must
     prove a nexus between the employee’s medical condition and observed deficiencies in
     her performance or conduct, or a high probability, given the nature of the work
     involved, that her condition may result in injury to herself or others).
     5
       The respondent raises arguments concerning a third appeal. PFR File, Tab 3 at 14-15;
     see Abrams v. Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. CB-7521-15-0031-
     T-1. The Board denied Ms. Abrams’ petition for review of the initial decision in that
     matter. Abrams v. Social Security Administration, MSPB Docket No. CB-7521-15-
     0031-T-1, Final Order (Nov. 17, 2022).
     6
       The ALJ defined the charge of “unacceptable docket management” as managing a
     docket in a way that prevents an ALJ from meeting, or striving for, SSA’s benchmarks
     and goals. ID at 21 n.3. The ALJ further found that in order to prove the charge, SSA
     must show that the respondent had a duty to acceptably manage her docket, she failed to
     acceptably manage her docket, and the criteria relied upon by SSA allows measur ing
     her performance in a way that sufficiently establishes she was performing inadequately.
     ID at 21-22. The respondent does not challenge the ALJ’s definition of unacceptable
     docket management or the elements of the charge.
                                                                                           5

     ALJ-controlled statuses. 0004 IAF, Tab 1 at 16-17. SSA further alleged that in
     FY 2013,    the   respondent     held    approximately   only   66    hearings,   issued
     approximately only 81 decisions, and failed to move cases timely through
     ALJ-controlled statuses.   Id.    In the initial decision, the ALJ reviewed SSA’s
     expectations for production in terms of hearings held, decisions issued, and
     number of cases languishing in ALJ-controlled statuses, the respondent’s low
     productivity during the relevant time frames, SSA’s “extraordinary” efforts to
     assist her with docket management, and the respondent’s explanations for her
     poor production.    ID at 22-33.        The ALJ concluded that the respondent was
     unable to effectively manage her docket and that SSA proved this charge. ID
     at 33-35.
¶6        We agree with the ALJ that SSA proved this charge. The record reflects
     that, during the relevant time frames, SSA maintai ned benchmarks or goals of
     500-700 case dispositions per year, an average of 50 scheduled hearings per
     month, and 7 days in ALJ post-hearing review (ALPO) status. 0008 IAF, Tab 171
     at 63, 66; HT 4 at 1011, 1017-18, 1026. The respondent’s production in terms of
     hearings held and decisions issued fell well below these goals. ID at 11-12. In
     particular, SSA’s evidence showed that, in FY 2012, the average days that a case
     on the respondent’s docket was in ALPO status was 250 days, as compared to an
     average of 32 days for all of the ALJs in SSA’s Chicago Hearing Office (except
     the respondent), and an average of 15-16 days for ALJs in Region V and
     nationally. 0008 IAF, Tab 173 at 284; HT 3 at 932-34. SSA’s evidence further
     revealed that, in FY 2013, the average number of days that a case on the
     respondent’s docket remained in ALPO status was 323 days, compared to an
     average of 35 days for ALJs in the Chicago Hearing Office, an average of 14 days
     for ALJs in Region V, and 16 days for ALJs nationally.               0008 IAF, Tab 173
     at 284; HT 3 at 934-36.
¶7        The respondent contends on review that the underlying statistical models
     were flawed because SSA’s data did not consider certain critical variables, such
                                                                                             6

     as the complexity of each individual case, whether an ALJ had physical or mental
     disabilities, whether cases resulted in a favorable or unfavorable decision, and
     whether an ALJ received a reasonable accommodation. PFR File, Tab 3 at 15-16.
     The respondent references a Work Analysis Study commissioned by the
     Association of Administrative Law Judges (AALJ) (hereinafter, AALJ Work
     Analysis Study), which was issued after the close of the record below. 7 PFR File,
     Tab 3 at 17.   In its response to her petition, SSA asserts that the information
     contained in the AALJ Work Analysis Study concerning ALJ adjudications in
     fiscal years 2012 and 2013 was available and introduced before the close of the
     record, and the AALJ Work Analysis Study had not been found to satisfy
     reliability standards. PFR File, Tab 8 at 9-10 & n.4.
¶8         We need not resolve this evidentiary issue. Even if we assumed for the
     purposes of our analysis that the AALJ Work Analysis Study was reliable, and we
     considered its recommendations herein, a different outcome is not warranted.
     Notably, the respondent’s production numbers in FY 2012 and 2013 were
     significantly less than the AALJ Work Analysis Study’s “challenging goals” of
     277 annual case dispositions and 23 hearings on average per month. AALJ Work
     Analysis Study, Executive Summary at iii-v. It is true that SSA’s data did not
     account for all of the variables identified by the respondent; however, the AALJ
     Work Analysis Study did not account for all of the variables, either.
¶9         We also have considered the respondent’s assertion that the cases assigned
     to her were not substantially the same or similar to the cases assigned to every

     7
       The respondent does not include a copy of the AALJ Work Analysis Study, and she
     does not correctly cite to the AALJ website. However, it appears that she is referring to
     a November 12, 2015 Work Analysis Study, which we have found on the www.aalj.org
     website. See Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), Administrative Law
     Judge Work Analysis Study (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.aalj.org/wp-
     content/uploads/2017/08/aalj_work_analysis_study_executive_summary.pdf               (last
     visited Nov. 15, 2022).
                                                                                         7

      other ALJ in the Chicago Hearing Office. PFR File, Tab 3 at 16 (citing Shapiro
      v. Social Security Administration, 800 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015), for the
      proposition that SSA was required to show the average disposition rate for a
      particular region across the same time period).      The respondent’s reliance on
      Shapiro is not persuasive.     Importantly, the court in Shapiro held that, “in
      extreme cases . . . where [the respondent’s] production is, at best, roughly a
      quarter of that performed by the rest of the ALJs in his region, that [fact] standing
      alone is highly relevant and potentially preponderant evidence that he failed to
      manage his cases acceptably.” Shapiro, 800 F.3d at 1339. Similarly, we find that
      the exponentially higher length of time that many of the respondent’s cases
      languished in ALPO status constitutes relevant evidence that she did not
      acceptably manage her cases. Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s decision in this
      regard.

      SSA did not prove the failure to follow instructions charges.
¶10         To determine whether SSA proved the failure to follow instructions charges
      in the suspension and removal appeals, we must first look at the directives that
      were issued to the respondent and her responses thereto.          The May 7, 2012
      directive that was at issue in the suspension appeal ordered the respondent to
      “take action toward issuing a decision on [20 identified cases] by the close of
      business on May 18, 2012.” 0008 IAF, Tab 1 at 3, Tab 171 at 261. The directive
      further ordered the respondent to provide a written explanation by May 18, 2012,
      if she “move[d] a case into any status other than [UNWR status, which means that
      the case is ready to be written but has not been assigned]” or if she “fail[ed] to
      move one or more of these cases out of ALPO status.” 0008 IAF, Tab 171 at 261.
      The respondent submitted several timely responses to this directive.              Id.
      at 264-68, 270-74, 276-78. Likewise, the January 22, 2013 directive that was at
      issue in the removal appeal ordered the respondent to “decide and issue
      decision-writing instructions on the 25 cases [identified therein] by the close of
      business on February 1, 2013.”       0004 IAF, Tab 1 at 17; 0008 IAF, Tab 171
                                                                                                8

      at 336-38. The directive further advised the respondent that, if she were “unable
      to decide and issue instructions for any of these cases during this time period,”
      she was to provide the Hearing Office Chief ALJ with “a reason why [she was]
      unable to do so no later than February 1, 2013.” Id. at 336-37. The respondent
      submitted several timely responses to this directive.             Id. at 342-43, 345-52,
      354-59.
¶11         The ALJ determined that the respondent’s responses satisfied her obligation
      under the directives; the fact that SSA did not find her responses satisfactory was
      a different issue than whether or not she followed the instructions contained
      therein. ID at 20-21. We agree with the ALJ that neither directive required the
      respondent to submit “satisfactory” explanations; rather, she was only required to
      provide explanations if she were unable to move the requisite cases as directed.
      ID at 20-21. Her numerous responses indicate that she either moved the cases as
      directed or provided an explanation thereto.
¶12         We have considered SSA’s citation              to    Abrams v.        Social Security
      Administration, 703 F.3d 538 (Fed. Cir. 2012), to support its contention that it
      proved these charges. PFR File, Tab 8 at 23-26. Abrams is distinguishable from
      this matter, in pertinent part, because the respondent in Abrams “admitted that he
      had not fully complied with the directives,” Abrams, 703 F.3d at 543, whereas the
      respondent here testified that her written responses comported with SSA’s
      directives, HT 7 at 1944-49, 2011-17 (testimony of the respondent). For these
      reasons, we affirm the ALJ’s determination that SSA did not prove either of the
      failure to follow instructions charges.

      The respondent      did not   prove   her   claims        of   disability    discrimination
      or harassment.
¶13         To prove disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate, an
      employee must show that (1) she is an individual with a disability, as defined by
                                                                                            9

      29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a qualified individual with a disability as
      defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); 8 and (3) the agency failed to provide a
      reasonable accommodation. Miller v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189,
      ¶ 13 (2014).    The ALJ made the following findings of fact concerning the
      respondent’s medical conditions: (1) between December 2010 and January 2011,
      the respondent suffered a series of falls resulting in two concussions , and she was
      subsequently diagnosed with post-concussion syndrome; (2) she had been
      previously diagnosed with fibromyalgia 9 and chronic fatigue syndrome; and
      (3) the physical trauma resulting from her falls and long commute triggered a
      flare-up of her fibromyalgia symptoms. ID at 12-14. The ALJ further found that
      the respondent was disabled based on her conditions of post-concussion
      syndrome, fibromyalgia, and chronic fatigue syndrome, which substantially
      limited her major life activities. 10 ID at 12-14, 36-37.
¶14         The ALJ concluded, however, that the respondent was not a qualified
      individual with a disability because she was not able to perform the essential
      functions of her position—holding hearings and issuing timely decisions—with or
      without a reasonable accommodation. ID at 7, 43-45. In pertinent part, the ALJ
      noted that, as far back as 2011, the respondent requested a temporary cessation
      and/or reduction in the number of hearings that she had to hold, SSA provided her
      with several accommodations, including a reduced workload for an extended

      8
        A qualified individual with a disability is an individual who has the requisite skill,
      experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position
      such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
      perform the essential functions of such position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
      9
         Fibromyalgia is a disorder characterized by widespread musculoskeletal pain
      accompanied by fatigue, sleep, memory and mood issues. Mayo Clinic, Fibromyalgia,
      http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/fibromyalgia/home/ovc-20317786 (last
      visited Nov. 15, 2022).
      10
         The parties do not appear to challenge the ALJ’s finding on review, and we affirm
      it herein.
                                                                                         10

      period of time, a “very liberal” use of leave, 11 and additional staff for assistance
      and support.       ID at 45-48.      Notwithstanding SSA’s efforts to provide the
      respondent with significant adjustments to her work schedule and leave
      flexibilities, she continued to issue relatively few dispositions and maintained a
      high number of cases kept in ALJ-controlled statuses for extended periods of
      time. ID at 47. The ALJ further found that because the respondent’s conditions
      were triggered by stress, and being an ALJ was a stressful endeavor, there was no
      reasonable accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential
      functions of her position. ID at 48.
¶15         On review, the respondent contends that she was a qualified individual with
      a disability because she possessed the requisite skill, experience, and education of
      an ALJ, and she was able to perform all of an ALJ’s functions, including holding
      hearings 12 and writing decisions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10. She further alleges
      that SSA’s attack on her production levels did not constitute evidence that she
      was unable to perform the essential functions of her position.       Id. at 10. She
      contends that she did not request permanent relief from holding hearings or
      issuing decisions, but rather “sought accommodation from the obligation to hold
      hearings[] only during finite and specified time periods.” Id. at 10-12 (emphasis
      in original).
¶16         The       term   “reasonable   accommodation”   means,    in   pertinent   part,
      “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the mann er or

      11
         The ALJ noted that SSA informally allowed the respondent not to hold hearings in
      late August and September 2011, provided her with a drastically reduced caseload,
      granted her month-long leave requests for November 2012, December 2012 to
      January 2013, and May to June 2013, allowed her to work a part-time schedule with
      liberal use of leave from mid-March to May 1, 2013, and reduced her hearing schedule
      for March and April 2013. ID at 15-16.
      12
         The respondent conceded below that holding a hearing was an essential function of
      the ALJ position. 0008 IAF, Tab 160 at 18.
                                                                                          11

      circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed,
      that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the
      essential functions of that position” or “[m]odifications or adjustments that
      enable a covered entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and
      privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees
      without disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). Thus, a reasonable accommodation
      may include, but is not limited to, job restructuring and part-time or modified
      work schedules. Id. Absent undue hardship, 13 a covered entity is required to
      provide a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified individual who
      meets the definition of disability. Id.
¶17         The respondent frames her requested accommodations as a “modified work
      schedule,” PFR File, Tab 3 at 10, but she was essentially asking to be relieved of
      her essential functions for extended periods of time or, in 2013, an unspecified
      period of time. See, e.g., 0008 IAF, Tab 171 at 183 (asking, in her June 2011
      reasonable accommodation request, to “be excused from any new cases/hearings
      from at least August through September, 2011, until [her] pending cases have
      been resolved,” and then a 50% reduction in the assignment of any “new
      cases/hearings” for the following 3-6 months), 332 (explaining, in her

      13
         The ALJ mentioned in the initial decision that a reasonable accommodation does not
      include an accommodation that would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
      agency, noted that the respondent’s conditions were triggered by stress, and found that
      there was “no reasonable accommodation” that would allow her to perform the essenti al
      functions of the ALJ position in line with SSA’s expectations. ID at 48 (emphasis in
      original). On review, the respondent contends that SSA’s previous accommodations of
      temporary relief from her obligation to hold hearings or to issue decisions shows that
      her requested accommodation did not “present an actual, demonstrated undue hardship.”
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 13. We need not address this argument because we find that the ALJ
      did not make a finding of undue hardship in the initial decision. Notably, there is no
      discussion in the initial decision of the relevant factors described in 29 C.F.R.
      § 1630.2(p) to determine whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship,
      such as the nature and net cost of the accommodation, and the overall financial
      resources of the facilities involved and the covered entity.
                                                                                       12

      January 2013 reasonable accommodation request, that her “condition does not
      allow [her] to be certain that [she] will be physically able t o hear a case on a
      precise date”). We agree with the ALJ that, despite SSA’s numerous informal
      accommodations, the respondent continued to be unable to perform the esse ntial
      functions of her position and, therefore, she was not a qualified individual with
      a disability.
¶18         The respondent cites to Holland v. Social Security Administration, EEOC
      Appeal No. 01A01372, 2003 WL 22346114 (Oct. 2, 2003), to support her
      contention that an appropriate accommodation can be reducing the time that she is
      required to dedicate to an essential function. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10 & nn.12-13.
      However, the respondent misreads Holland.            In that matter, the Equal
      Employment Opportunity Commission found that an essential function of the
      complainant’s   Telephone    Service   Representative    position   was   “handling
      incoming telephone calls,” but he was not required to handle a certain number of
      calls within a specified time or have “constant” telephone availability. Holland,
      2003 WL 22346114, at *12-13. Here, in contrast, the respondent sought to have a
      reprieve from holding hearings, and in January 2013, requested a reprieve for an
      undetermined length of time, despite the fact that holding hearings was an
      essential function of her ALJ position. The respondent has not cited, and we are
      not aware of, any binding precedent that would require SSA to provide such an
      accommodation under these circumstances.        See, e.g., Byrne v. Department of
      Labor, 106 M.S.P.R. 43, ¶ 7 (2007) (finding that an agency is not required to
      lower production or performance standards, and, upon determining that the
      appellant was incapable of meeting the productivity requirements of his position,
      the arbitrator correctly concluded that the appellant was not a qualified individual
      with a disability because he could not perform the essential functions of his
      position with or without a reasonable accommodation).
¶19         We have considered the respondent’s challenge to the ALJ’s finding that
      her condition will never go into remission, PFR File, Tab 3 at 8; ID at 42, but this
                                                                                         13

      argument is unavailing.        The ALJ stated in the initial decision that it was
      “reasonable” to conclude that the respondent’s fibromyalgia will never go into
      remission because the only way for that to happen is to eliminate stress, and the
      very nature of the respondent’s job as an ALJ, coupled with her inability to
      manage her docket, “creates the impossibility of eliminating [her] stress.” ID
      at 42. Indeed, the respondent’s treating physician, who was admitted as an expert
      in the field of fibromyalgia, testified that patients who suffer from fibromyalgia
      “get better when their stress is lowered.” HT 12 at 3358, 3412 (testimony of the
      treating physician). However, the physician acknowledged that the respondent’s
      work was a stressor.       Id. at 3348, 3403 (testimony of the treating physician).
      Given the physician’s testimony, we discern no error with the ALJ’s statement in
      the initial decision.
¶20         In sum, the respondent has not proven that she was a qualified individual
      with a disability.      The record reflects that in 2010, prior to her falls (which
      resulted in the diagnosis of post-concussion syndrome and a flare-up of her
      fibromyalgia), the respondent was issued a Letter of Coun seling concerning her
      failure to manage her docket in a timely and efficient manner. 0008 IAF, Tab 171
      at 125-26, 138-41.       However, after her falls, the record demonstrates fairly
      conclusively that the respondent was unable to perform the essential functi ons of
      her position with or without an accommodation. Accordingly, we agree with the
      ALJ that the respondent did not prove her claim of disability discrimination based
      on a failure to accommodate.
¶21         We also have considered the respondent’s contention that SSA treated ALJ
      H.C. and other ALJs differently than her. In pertinent part, she asserts on review
      that, in fiscal year 2012, she issued more decisions and held more hearings than
      ALJ H.C., but ALJ H.C. was never reprimanded, disciplined, charged with
      unacceptable docket management, or had her removal proposed. PFR File, Tab 3
      at 15. We interpret this argument as a challenge to the ALJ’s conclusion that she
      did not prove her disparate treatment disability discrimination claim. ID at 49.
                                                                                            14

¶22         As with a claim of disability discrimination based on an agency’s failure to
      reasonably accommodate that disability, a claim based on an individual’s status as
      disabled requires that the individual be a qualified individual with a disability.
      Haas v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 28.                Further, to
      establish a claim of disparate treatment disability discrimination, the respondent
      has the burden of proving that her disability was a motivating factor in the
      agency’s proposed suspension and removal actions.            See Pridgen v. Office of
      Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 35, 37, 40, 42. If the respondent
      meets her burden, the Board will then inquire whether the agency has shown by
      preponderant evidence that the action was not based on the prohibited personnel
      practice, i.e., that it still would have taken the contested action in the absence of
      the discriminatory motive. Id., ¶¶ 33-34. If the Board finds that the agency has
      made that showing, its prohibited personnel practice will not require reversal of
      the action. 14 Id.
¶23         As we found above, we agree with the ALJ that the respondent was not a
      qualified individual with a disability. Furthermore, we agree with the ALJ that
      the respondent has not identified any comparators that had such deficiencies in
      docket management, low production, a backlog of cases, or inability to perform
      the essential functions of her position. ID at 49; see Brown v. Department of the
      Interior, 121 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 27 (2014) (explaining that for employees to be
      similarly situated for purposes of a disparate treatment discrimination claim, all
      relevant aspects of the employee’s employment situation must be “nearly
      identical” to those of the comparator employees).           For instance, the record
      reflects that ALJ H.C., a nearly 20-year employee who was diagnosed with

      14
         Because we affirm the ALJ’s finding that the respondent failed to show that any
      prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the petitioner’s actions, we need not
      resolve the issue of whether the respondent proved that discrimination was a but-for
      cause of the petitioner’s actions. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33.
                                                                                            15

      Stage 4 metastatic breast cancer, had her request to hold fewer hearings as an
      accommodation denied starting in 2012, she was issued a written directive to
      schedule more hearings in May 2013, but, in the following fiscal year, she issued
      more decisions and held more hearings than she had in previous years. 0008 IAF,
      Tab 174 at 666-68; HT 11 at 3160-61, 3189-91, 3195-96, 3199-3201. Therefore,
      we agree with the ALJ that the respondent has not proven her disparate treatment
      disability discrimination claim. 15

      SSA proved that it had good cause to remove the respondent.
¶24         Under 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a), “[a]n action may be taken against an [ALJ] . . .
      only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection
      Board on the record after an opportunity for a hearing.” Abrams, 703 F.3d at 543;
      Jennings v. Social Security Administration, 123 M.S.P.R. 577, ¶ 27 (2016). There
      is no statutory definition of good cause; thus, the interpretation of the term is left
      to the adjudicatory process and the facts of each case.                Social Security
      Administration v. Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 13 (2010), aff’d, 635 F.3d 526 (Fed.
      Cir. 2011). SSA must prove good cause by preponderant evidence.               Id., ¶ 12.
      The Board has made clear that the term “good cause” is not the equivalent of the
      efficiency of the service standard in cases arising in adverse action appeals
      pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7513, but chapter 75 appeals can provide some guidance

      15
         The respondent reiterates her claim, made below, that SSA harassed her based on her
      disability and reasonable accommodation requests by, among other things, issuing many
      directives to her. PFR File, Tab 3 at 17-25; 0008 IAF, Tab 160 at 5-15. The ALJ
      did not explicitly address this claim in the initial decision, and we modify the initial
      decision herein to do so. The respondent identifies on review the following legal
      standard for such a claim: (1) a qualified individual with a disability; (2) subject to
      unwelcome conduct or harassment; (3) based on the individual’s disability; (4) that
      unreasonably interfered with work performance or created a hostile work environment;
      and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability on the employer. PFR File, Tab 3 at 17-18
      (citing Wagner v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120103125, 2010
      WL 4972778 (Dec. 1, 2010)). Because we have found that the respondent is not a
      qualified individual with a disability, she also could not prevail on this claim.
                                                                                     16

      for determining what is good cause for an action against an ALJ.        Id., ¶ 13.
      Because we have affirmed the ALJ’s finding that SSA proved the charges of
      unacceptable docket management and medical inability to perform, we find that
      there is good cause to discipline the respondent. ID at 21-42.
¶25        In original jurisdiction cases such as this under 5 U.S.C. § 7521, it is the
      Board, rather than the employing agency, which selects the penalty.         Long,
      113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 47. The Board does not defer to SSA’s penalty selection, but
      it uses the factors articulated in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R.
      280, 305-06 (1981), to guide its penalty determination. Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190,
      ¶ 47. In the initial decision, the ALJ discussed several of the relevant Douglas
      factors, and he ultimately concluded that SSA demonstrated good cause to remove
      the respondent.    ID at 49-55.    On review, the respondent contends that her
      medical conditions warrant mitigation. PFR File, Tab 3 at 15, 25-26. We have
      considered this argument, but a different outcome is not warranted.
¶26        The respondent correctly notes that evidence that an employee’s medical
      condition played a part in the charged conduct is ordinarily entitled to
      considerable weight as a mitigating factor. PFR File, Tab 3 at 25; see Malloy v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 578 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Bowman v. Small
      Business Administration, 122 M.S.P.R. 217, ¶ 13 (2015); Roseman v. Department
      of the Treasury, 76 M.S.P.R. 334, 345 (1997). In the initial decision, the ALJ
      noted the respondent’s “several serious medical conditions” were mitigating
      factors. ID at 54-55. The ALJ found, however, that the mitigating circumstances
      were “lessened” because the respondent was unable to manage her case docket
      prior to any flare-up of her chronic conditions. Id.
¶27        We agree with the ALJ regarding the weight to be attributed to the
      respondent’s medical conditions.     In Mingledough v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 88 M.S.P.R. 452, ¶ 12 (2001), the Board noted that a medical condition
      was not a significant mitigating factor absent evidence that the impairment can be
      remedied or controlled, i.e., when the potential for rehabilitation was poor. We
                                                                                       17

      agree with the ALJ that there is not a good potential for rehabilitation because the
      respondent has been unable to manage her docket since she began her tenure as an
      SSA ALJ, which is before she had her two falls, was diagnosed with
      post-concussion syndrome, or experienced any flare-up of her fibromyalgia
      symptoms, and her work as an ALJ was inherently stressful and would likely
      result in additional flare-ups.    ID at 53-54.   Accordingly, we have considered
      evidence surrounding her conditions, but we find that they do not outweigh other
      relevant factors, such as the nature and seriousness of the offenses. See, e.g.,
      Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 48 (explaining that the Board considers first and
      foremost the seriousness of the charged conduct and its relationship to the
      employee’s position and duties).
¶28        For the reasons discussed herein and in the initial decision, we concur with
      the ALJ that SSA has shown good cause to remove the respondent under 5 U.S.C.
      § 7521.   See, e.g., Shapiro, 800 F.3d at 1340 (finding no error in the Board’s
      removal of the respondent based on a charge of unacceptable performance);
      Social Security Administration v. Mills, 73 M.S.P.R. 463, 467-75 (1996) (finding
      that an ALJ’s long-term absence from duty as a result of a disability with no
      realistic chance of return, coupled with the agency’s demonstrated need t o fill the
      position, constituted good cause for removal under 5 U.S.C. § 7521), aff’d,
      124 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Table).

      We discern no error with the ALJ’s decision to join the appeals or to issue the
      protective order.
¶29        We have considered the respondent’s argument that, in joining the
      suspension and removal appeals, the ALJ denied her the opportunity to “learn
      from her mistakes” and was counter to the principle of progressive discipline.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 5-6. SSA, in its response, asserts that joinder is appropriate in
      cases involving successive disciplinary petitions, cites to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36, and
      states that the respondent does not challenge that there are common witnesses,
                                                                                          18

      evidence, and affirmative defenses between the two matters.           PFR File, Tab 8
      at 20.
¶30            We agree with SSA and the ALJ that joinder was appropriate.               The
      regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(b) states that an ALJ may join cases if doing so
      would expedite processing of the cases and not adversely affect the interests of
      the parties. The respondent has not identified how her interests were adversely
      affected when, as here, she was on notice of her performance deficiencies as early
      as December 2010. Moreover, when there is voluminous evidence and witnesses
      in common, we see no basis to preclude joinder in the absence of such an adverse
      effect. See, e.g., Abrams, 703 F.3d at 540-42 (noting that the three complaints,
      involving a 14-day suspension, a 30-day suspension, and a removal, were
      “combined”).
¶31            Finally, the record reflects that SSA filed a motion for a protective order to
      protect personal medical records of claimants, personnel information about other
      employees, and its internal deliberations that would be provided to the respondent
      during discovery, and the ALJ granted this request over the respondent’s
      objection.     0008 IAF, Tabs 16, 20. The respondent asserts on review that the
      protective order denied her rights as set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 1201.139(b)(2), which
      states in pertinent part that, when an agency files a complaint proposing an action
      against an ALJ, the ALJ has a right to be represented. PFR File, Tab 3 at 6-8. In
      particular, the respondent asserts that her right to representation was limited
      because the protective order “imposed broad restrictions upon [her] ability to
      provide her counsel with materials and information.” Id. at 7. She appears to
      contend that she was unable to share any document that she authored or received
      in the course of her work as an ALJ, including to supervisors or doctors, nor
      could she share with her attorney any emails that she may have sent to her
      supervisor that contained protected whistleblowing or other disclosures. Id.
¶32            The Board will not reverse an administrative judge’s rulings on discovery
      matters absent an abuse of discretion.          Wagner v. Environmental Protection
                                                                                           19

      Agency, 54 M.S.P.R. 447, 452 (1992), aff’d, 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
      (Table). The abuse-of-discretion standard is a very high standard and allows for
      great deference.    Pecard v. Department of Agriculture, 115 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 15
      (2010). We have reviewed the protective order. However, we are not persuaded
      that the ALJ’s decision to grant SSA’s request for a protective order constituted
      an abuse of discretion because it does not appear to prohibit the respondent from
      sharing with her attorney any documentation that she deemed essential to her
      defense in these matters.
¶33         Accordingly, the initial decision is affirmed, except as modified herein.

                                             ORDER
¶34         The Board authorizes SSA to remove the respondent from her ALJ position
      for good cause shown, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7521.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 16
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

      16
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      20

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                  21

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases   involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).            If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     22

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 17   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

17
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                23

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.