Court Opinion

ID: 9682247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:08:25.495437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.420896
License: Public Domain

CHAPA Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because, at the time appellant entered his pleas, his trial counsel did not possess substantial evidence that appellant was insane when he committed the charged offenses, I agree with the majority that trial counsel was not ineffective for choosing to use appellant’s mental condition as mitigating evidence during punishment instead of as a defense. However, because I believe the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas once it was presented with evidence of a complete defense, I respectfully dissent.
*188I recognize that the standard of review to be applied when a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea depends on when the motion is made. When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made after the ease has been taken under advisement, as in the present case, the trial court’s ruling is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Jackson v. State, 590 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). On the other hand, where a similar motion is made prior to the court accepting the defendant’s plea, the trial court’s actions are reviewed for harmful error. Id.
As such, I also recognize that Payne v. State, 790 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), is distinguishable from the present case in that it appears that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea in Payne was made prior to the adjudication of guilt. Payne was, therefore, decided under a harmless error standard of review. We are bound here by an abuse of discretion standard. In any event, the facts in Payne are instructive. After pleading guilty to aggravated robbery, Payne testified that he used a toy gun rather than a real gun in the robbery. Id. at 651. The State cross-examined Payne, attempting to discredit his testimony with allegations of fabrication. Id.
The court of criminal appeals held that Payne’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted as his testimony clearly raised a factual issue as to whether he could be guilty of aggravated robbery. Id. at 652. The court reasoned that under such circumstances, it could not find that harm had not occurred. Id. In Payne, the new defensive evidence could have exonerated Payne from the charge of aggravated robbery. However, there is nothing to indicate that Payne could not have been found guilty of a lesser included offense in spite of the new evidence he offered. Yet, the court still found harm. In the present case, by establishing that he was insane when he committed the offense, appellant would have been exonerated from any charge the State could have brought against him under these facts. Therefore the facts in the present case, when compared to those in Payne, indicate an even greater likelihood of harm resulting from the denial of appellant’s motion to withdraw.
At the hearing on his motion to withdraw, appellant presented independent evidence that he was not sane at the time he committed the charged offenses. This evidence came from a court appointed expert, and therefore, unlike the evidence offered in Payne, it was objective and not prone to fabrication. Further, the evidence went un-contradieted and unchallenged by the State. Certainly, uncontroverted evidence of insanity raises a factual issue as to whether appellant could be guilty of the charged offense, or, for that matter, of any offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01 (Vernon 1994) (establishing insanity as an affirmative defense to prosecution).
The majority focuses on the fact that Dr. Potterfs opinion regarding appellant’s sanity at the time of the offenses was non-responsive to the trial court’s order to determine competence to stand trial. The majority also finds important the fact that Dr. Potterfs conclusion was made in “a one sentence statement.” I do not see the relevance of these distinctions. Regardless of whether Dr. Potterfs conclusion regarding sanity was presented independently or upon request, in an entire report or in one sentence, it constituted impartial and uncontroverted evidence that appellant was not sane when he committed the charged offenses.
The trial court’s implied finding that appellant was not insane when he committed the crimes with which he was charged is contrary to the only evidence on this issue presented at the hearing. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in the face of clear evidence indicating a complete defense to any offense arising from the facts of this case. The evidence clearly warranted further development of the issue of appellant’s sanity at the time of the offense. Appellant was unquestionably harmed by the denial of an opportunity to completely establish a newly discovered defense that could have completely exonerated him of the charges he faced.
I would reverse the judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.