Court Opinion

ID: 9390270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 14:08:09.916876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:32.767611
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Crenshaw v. Hemmons-Taylor, 2023-Ohio-1379.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE EX REL MARIAH CRENSHAW, :

                Relator,                             :
                                                                      No. 112602
                v.                                   :

WILLA MAE HEMMONS-                                   :
TAYLOR, ET AL.,
                                                     :
                Respondent.

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: COMPLAINTS DISMISSED
                DATED: April 21, 2023

                            Writs of Quo Warranto and Mandamus
                                      Order No. 563593

                                           Appearances:

                Mariah Crenshaw, pro se.

                Willa Hemmons, East Cleveland Director of Law, and
                Heather McCollough, Assistant Director of Law, pro se.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

                  Relator, Mariah Crenshaw, seeks a writ of quo warranto or, in the

alternative, mandamus to remove respondents, Willa Mae Hemmons-Taylor and

Heather McCullough, from positions of law director and assistant law
director/prosecutor for the city of East Cleveland, respectively. Crenshaw claims

that respondents do not validly hold these positions. However, because relator lacks

standing to maintain an action in quo warranto and what she seeks is in essence a

declaratory judgment with injunction, we sua sponte dismiss the complaint and

amended complaint.

I. Background

              On April 7, 2023, Crenshaw filed a “verified complaint for writ of quo

warranto and injunction to cease engaging in representing the city of East Cleveland

for multiple violations of the [East Cleveland] City Charter.” The complaint includes

allegations that respondents have engaged in actions that violate the city charter,

were never validly appointed to the positions they claim to hold, are not qualified to

hold their claimed positions, and have engaged in activity that has harmed relator

through their representation of the city of East Cleveland. The complaint sought to

have this court interpret provisions of the city charter and ordinances and declare

respondents unable to hold their claimed positions.

              On April 11, 2023, this court ordered relator to show cause why the

case should not be dismissed for lack of standing and stayed the case pending the

outcome of briefing. In response, relator filed a brief arguing that she possessed the

requisite standing to maintain the action and filed an amended complaint where she

added a claim for relief in mandamus. In her amended complaint, relator asks this

court:
      1. To require “respondents” to provide this court with legal
      authorit(ies) which allows them to engage in legal representation on
      behalf of the residents of the city of East Cleveland, and

      2. To determine the correct language of the city of East Cleveland
      Charter, and

      3. To issue an order for “respondents” to immediately vacate the
      office(s) and to return any compensation they have received from the
      city of East Cleveland as of at least January 26, 2023.

               Respondents filed a brief on April 12, 2023, styled “motion to dismiss

for lack of standing.” There, they argued that relator lacked standing and requested

that the action be dismissed.

II. Law and Analysis

      A. Standard for Sua Sponte Dismissal of a Complaint

               An original action is subject to dismissal without notice and on the

court’s own initiative where the claims are frivolous or “‘“the claimant obviously

cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.”’” State ex rel. Neal v.

Mandros, 162 Ohio St.3d 154, 2020-Ohio-4866, 164 N.E.3d 418, ¶ 8, quoting State

ex rel. Bunting v. Styer, 147 Ohio St.3d 462, 2016-Ohio-5781, 67 N.E.3d 755, ¶ 12,

quoting State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859

N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14. A court must presume as true all material allegations of the

complaint and make all reasonable inference in favor of the relator. Id., citing Scott

at ¶ 14. After doing so, a complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal if it is beyond

doubt that relators could prove no set of facts entitling them to a writ. Id.
      B. Requirements for Quo Warranto and Mandamus

              A writ of quo warranto “is the exclusive remedy to litigate the right of

a person to hold a public office.” State ex rel. Flanagan v. Lucas, 139 Ohio St.3d

559, 2014-Ohio-2588, 13 N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Deiter v.

McGuire, 119 Ohio St.3d 384, 2008-Ohio-4536, 894 N.E.2d 680, ¶ 20. See

also State ex rel. Ebbing v. Ricketts, 133 Ohio St.3d 339, 2012-Ohio-4699, 978

N.E.2d 188, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Johnson v. Richardson, 131 Ohio St.3d 120,

2012-Ohio-57, 961 N.E.2d 187, ¶ 15.

              An action for writ of quo warranto is primarily an action that belongs

to the state. R.C. 2733.04 and 2733.05 specify that a writ of quo warranto must be

brought by the state attorney general or a prosecuting attorney of the state.

However, a private individual may bring an action for writ of quo warranto under

certain circumstances. R.C. 2733.06 sets forth the standing requirements for an

individual bringing an action sounding in quo warranto. Flanagan at ¶ 19. It

provides that “[a] person claiming to be entitled to a public office unlawfully held

and exercised by another may bring an action therefor by himself or an attorney at

law, upon giving security for costs.” R.C. 2733.08 adds:

      When an action in quo warranto is brought against a person for
      usurping an office, the petition shall set forth the name of the person
      claiming to be entitled to the office, with an averment of his right
      thereto. Judgment may be rendered upon the right of the defendant,
      and also on the right of the person averred to be so entitled, or only
      upon the right of the defendant, as justice requires.
               The Supreme Court of Ohio has interpreted these statutes to require

a private individual bringing a claim for writ of quo warranto to show two things: A

good-faith belief that the relator is entitled to the public office and the respondent is

unlawfully holding the disputed public office. Id. at ¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. Halak

v. Cebula, 49 Ohio St.2d 291, 361 N.E.2d 244 (1977), citing State ex rel. Heer v.

Butterfield, 92 Ohio St. 428, 111 N.E. 279 (1915), paragraph one of the syllabus; State

ex rel. Lindley v. The Maccabees, 109 Ohio St. 454, 142 N.E. 888 (1924); State ex

rel. Smith v. Nazor, 135 Ohio St. 364, 21 N.E.2d 124 (1939).

               A writ of mandamus may issue where a relator establishes by clear

and convincing evidence that the relator has a clear legal right to the relief requested,

respondent has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and relator lacks any other

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Clough v. Franklin

Cty. Children Servs., 144 Ohio St.3d 83, 2015-Ohio-3425, 40 N.E.3d 1132, ¶ 10,

citing State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d

452, ¶ 6. The legal duty must be unequivocal and without any discretion on the part

of the respondent.     State ex rel. McElroy v. O'Donnell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 111752, 2022-Ohio-3240, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate, 83 Ohio

App.3d 199, 205, 614 N.E.2d 827 (4th Dist.1992).

      C. Standing for Quo Warranto

               A court is required to determine that a claimant has the requisite

standing to bring an action before addressing the merits. Flanagan, 139 Ohio St.3d

559, 2014-Ohio-2588, 13 N.E.3d 1135, at ¶ 17. Whether a party has standing to
institute an action seeks to determine whether the claimant bringing the action is

the real party in interest. “The concept of ‘standing’ involves whether the plaintiff

to a civil action has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy

that he or she is entitled to have a court hear the case.” Progressive Macedonia,

LLC v. Shepherd, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0036, 2021-Ohio-792, ¶ 59, citing

Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St.3d 287, 2012-Ohio-780, 964 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 15.

               In Flanagan, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that to have

standing a private individual requesting a writ of quo warranto must have a good-

faith belief that he or she is entitled to the disputed office. Id. at ¶ 22-23. Without a

claim that the relator is entitled to hold the disputed office, a relator lacks standing

to bring and maintain the action. Id. at ¶ 29.

               Flanagan involved the results of a contested sheriff election. The

losing candidate brought a complaint for writ of quo warranto, arguing that the

winning candidate did not have the requisite qualifications to serve as sheriff under

R.C. 311.01. Id. at ¶ 1. The Flanagan Court did not reach the merits of this claim.

Instead, it held that as the loser of an election, the claimant had no good-faith belief

that he was entitled to hold the office. Id. at ¶ 27.

               Here, Crenshaw does not claim that she is entitled to hold the position

of law director or assistant or deputy law director for the city of East Cleveland. She

has specifically acknowledged this in her briefing to this court. Without such a

claim, courts have sua sponte dismissed complaints for writs of quo warranto. See,

e.g., State ex rel. Baker v. Fox, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2022 AP 01 0002,
2022-Ohio-667 (complaint sua sponte dismissed where relator did not assert good-

faith belief that they were entitled to hold the position).

               Relator asks this court to adopt the view of the dissenting justices in

Flanagan, 139 Ohio St.3d 559, 2014-Ohio-2588, 13 N.E.3d 1135, and find that

relator possesses standing in this action. However, an appellate court is not free to

disregard binding precedent of the Supreme Court of Ohio and adopt an

interpretation of the law expressed by a minority of justices. Delost v. Ohio Edison

Co., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 162, 2012-Ohio-4561, ¶ 19. This court is bound

to follow the holding of the majority in Flanagan and find that relator lacks

standing.

               Relator, at several places, argues that she has standing as a taxpayer

to initiate and maintain suit. For instance, she asserts

      “[r]elator” does not claim [a] right to the specific public offices which
      “respondents” occupy but is a taxpayer who has a right to challenge
      persons who are unlawfully holding public offices and receiving public
      tax dollars they are not entitled to. A reasonable mind can conclude
      there is a good faith standing [sic] to establish legal standing in this
      unique situation.

               The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that taxpayers lack standing to

pursue claims in quo warranto. State ex rel. Cater v. N. Olmsted, 69 Ohio St.3d 315,

322, 631 N.E.2d 1048 (1994), citing State ex rel. Annable v. Stokes, 24 Ohio St.2d

32, 262 N.E.2d 863 (1970). See also Esarco v. Brown, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08

MA 47, 2008-Ohio-4517, ¶ 7 (rejecting a similar claim that a relator had standing in

quo warranto as a “resident, taxpayer, and registered elector” to seek the removal of
a member of Youngstown City Council). Relator’s arguments provide no basis for

this court to find that she has standing to seek the removal of a law director, assistant

law director, or city prosecutor for the city of East Cleveland.1

               The facts as alleged in the complaint and amended complaint, taken

as true, show beyond doubt that relator lacks standing to maintain the instant

complaint for writ of quo warranto. Therefore, we sua sponte dismiss the request

for writ of quo warranto in the complaint and amended complaint.

      D. Jurisdiction for Mandamus

               In her amended complaint, relator also seeks a writ of mandamus

where she requests that this court interpret the language or validity of certain

codified ordinances of the city of East Cleveland and declare whether respondents

have been validly appointed to and are qualified for their positions. Relator also

seeks an injunction that prohibits respondents from acting as lawyers for the city of

East Cleveland, including several cases in which relator is a party. Finally, she asks

this court to order respondents to return money they have received from this

allegedly improper representation from the time of an East Cleveland City Council

resolution that declared the position of law director and prosecutor vacant.2

      1  Relator also does not appear to be a resident of East Cleveland, Ohio, the
municipality she alleges employs respondents. Relator lists a Cleveland, Ohio address for
herself in her complaint and amended complaint.

      2 Relator’s complaint includes quotations from the East Cleveland City Charter that

indicates that the mayor, not city council, has authority to remove certain directors of
offices within the city.
              No matter how these are labeled, the thrust of relator’s claims sound

in quo warranto. “‘[I]t is well settled that “quo warranto is the exclusive remedy by

which one’s right to hold a public office may be litigated.”’” Zeigler v. Zumbar, 129

Ohio St.3d 240, 2011-Ohio-2939, 951 N.E.2d 405, ¶ 23, quoting State ex rel. Deiter

v. McGuire, 119 Ohio St.3d 384, 2008-Ohio-4536, 894 N.E.2d 680, ¶ 20, quoting

State ex rel. Battin v. Bush, 40 Ohio St.3d 236, 238-239, 533 N.E.2d 301 (1988). As

stated above, relator lacks standing to assert these claims in quo warranto and she

may not avoid this standing requirement by retitling her request for relief.

              To the extent these claims do not sound in quo warranto, they seek

declaratory judgment and associated injunctive relief. “It is axiomatic that ‘if the

allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus indicate that the real objects

sought are a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction, the complaint does

not state a cause of action in mandamus and must be dismissed for want of

jurisdiction.’” State ex rel. Obojski v. Perciak, 113 Ohio St.3d 486, 2007-Ohio-2453,

866 N.E.2d 1070, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d

629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 704 (1999). In making this determination, courts should look

to whether the complaint seeks to prevent rather than compel official action. Id.,

quoting State ex rel. Stamps v. Montgomery Cty. Automatic Data Processing Bd.,

42 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 538 N.E.2d 105 (1989).

              Here, relator seeks a declaration from this court that certain

provisions of East Cleveland City Charter were or were not validly enacted, a

determination of which provisions apply to the position of city law director, and a
declaration whether respondents are qualified to hold their respective positions.

Relator also asks this court to enjoin respondents from acting in their respective

positions and to return money the city of East Cleveland has paid them. These

claims do not sound in mandamus. Relator has not identified clear legal duties that

are imposed on respondents, the performance of which relator seeks to compel.

Relator, generally, alleges that respondents have violated provisions of the East

Cleveland City Charter. Mandamus may not be used to compel an official to

generally comply with laws or rules. State ex rel. Kuczak v. Saffold, 67 Ohio St.3d

123, 616 N.E.2d 230 (1993).

              While styled as a claim for mandamus, to the extent relator’s

allegations do not sound in quo warranto, relator clearly asks for declaratory

judgment and prohibitory injunction. This court lacks the requisite jurisdiction as

outlined in the Ohio Constitution to grant the requested relief. State ex rel. Swopes

v. McCormick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110860, 2022-Ohio-306, ¶ 19, citing State ex

rel. Esarco v. Youngstown City Council, 116 Ohio St.3d 131, 2007-Ohio-5699, 876

N.E.2d 953; State ex rel. Obojski; State ex rel. Grendell.

              For these reasons, relator’s request for writ of mandamus must be

dismissed.

III. Conclusion

              For the reasons stated above, relator lacks standing to bring an action

in quo warranto. Relator’s request for writ of mandamus must be dismissed because

this court does not have jurisdiction over claims for declaratory judgment. Relator’s
complaint and amended complaint are therefore sua sponte dismissed. Costs

assessed against relator. The clerk is directed to serve on the parties notice of this

judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Civ.R. 58(B).

              Complaints dismissed.

_____________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR