Court Opinion

ID: 9378013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 16:02:31.508102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:18.679943
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. 37
                   SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                                         No.   CR-22-571

                                                    Opinion Delivered:   March 9, 2023
 NICKOL CARTER
                                 APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
                                           COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, THIRD
 V.                                        DIVISION
                                           [NO. 60CR-09-564]

 STATE OF ARKANSAS                          HONORABLE CATHLEEN V.
                                   APPELLEE COMPTON, JUDGE

                                                    AFFIRMED.

                             SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

       Appellant Nickol Carter appeals from the trial court’s denial of his pro se petition to

correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl.

2016). On appeal, Carter argues that (1) his sentences were facially illegal because they were

enhanced in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Arkansas’s sentencing guidelines; (2) Arkansas Code Annotated

section 16-90-804 is unconstitutional on the basis of this court’s holding in Muhammad v.

State, 2021 Ark. 129, 624 S.W.3d 300; and (3) his sentence is illegal on its face because he

was impermissibly sentenced to a suspended imposition of sentence as a habitual offender.

Because none of the allegations raised by Carter establish that his sentence was facially illegal,

we affirm the trial court’s order denying relief.
                                        I. Background

       On December 11, 2009, Carter entered a plea of guilty to four counts of aggravated

robbery, four counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of robbery.

He was sentenced as a habitual offender to 420 months’ imprisonment and 180 months’

suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) for each count of aggravated robbery, to 120 months’

imprisonment for each felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm count, and 120 months’

imprisonment for the robbery. All the terms of imprisonment were to be served concurrently

for an aggregate term of 420 months’ imprisonment.

       On March 11, 2010, Carter filed in the trial court a pro se petition for postconviction

relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2010) and a pro se petition

for reduction of sentence pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl.

2003). The trial court denied the Rule 37.1 petition, finding that Carter had earlier filed a

motion to withdraw the guilty plea that had been treated as a petition under Rule 37.1, and

he was not entitled to file a second Rule 37.1 petition. The court also denied the section 16-

90-111 petition, holding that it had already denied postconviction relief under Rule 37.1

and that it did not have jurisdiction to modify the sentence. After Carter filed a motion

seeking to modify the order that denied the section 16-90-111 petition, this court dismissed

his appeal from the trial court’s denial of his request to modify the section 16-90-111

petition. Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 349 (per curiam).

       Carter subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the trial court,

contending he was subjected to a Brady violation, and that his plea was coerced. Brady v.

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Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The trial court denied the petition. After lodging the appeal

in this court and seeking photocopies at public expense and an extension of time, we

dismissed the appeal, finding it was clear that Carter could not prevail if the appeal were

allowed to proceed, and the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying his petition

for writ of error coram nobis. Carter v. State, 2012 Ark. 186 (per curiam).

                                     II. Standard of Review

       The trial court’s decision to deny relief pursuant to section 16-90-111 will not be

overturned unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Manuel v. State, 2022 Ark. 117. Under

section 16-90-111, a finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support

it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made. Millsap v. State, 2020 Ark. 38.

                        III. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 16-90-111

       Section 16-90-111(a) gives a trial court authority to correct an illegal sentence at any

time. Redus v. State, 2019 Ark. 44, 566 S.W.3d 469. An illegal sentence is one that is illegal

on its face. Id. A sentence is illegal on its face when it is void because it is beyond the trial

court’s authority to impose and gives rise to a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.

Sentencing is entirely a matter of statute in Arkansas. Id. The petitioner seeking relief under

section 16-90-111(a) must demonstrate that his or her sentence was illegal. Id. The general

rule is that a sentence imposed within the maximum term prescribed by law is not illegal on

its face. McArty v. State, 2020 Ark. 68, 594 S.W.3d 54. A trial court has subject-matter

jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving violations of criminal statutes, and

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typically, trial error does not implicate the jurisdiction of the trial court or, as a consequence,

implicate the facial validity of the judgment. Id.

                                      IV. Claims for Relief

       For the first time on appeal, Carter argues that Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-

90-804 (Repl. 2006) is rendered unconstitutional based on this court’s holding in

Muhammad, 2021 Ark. 129, 624 S.W.3d 300,1 and that his sentence is illegal because he was

not eligible for a suspended sentence due to his status as a habitual offender. Arguably,

Carter raised these claims in a supplemental brief and a second supplemental petition after

his original section 16-90-111 petition was filed in the trial court. However, the trial court

never made a ruling regarding the arguments raised in those pleadings. This court has

consistently held that arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered,

and even constitutional arguments must be raised in the trial court and ruled on in order to

preserve the issues for appellate review. Muhammad, 2021 Ark. 129, 624 S.W.3d 300;

Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491.

       1
        Carter’s constitutionality claim regarding section 16-90-804 and the procedures
involved with a departure and sentencing procedure were raised in Carter’s original petition
without reference to Muhammad, and the claim itself is discussed infra. With respect to his
claim that “running suspended sentences consecutive to each of the other charges made the
sentences illegal” on the basis of the holding in Muhammad, the claim is not preserved for
appeal. Notwithstanding Carter’s misunderstanding of the holding in Muhammad, the
circumstances in Muhammad are not applicable to Carter’s case, as he was not sentenced to
suspended sentences to run consecutively to terms of imprisonment imposed for separate
offenses; and the term of his suspended sentences, when combined with the period of
imprisonment, did not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense. See Muhammad, 2021
Ark. 129, at 6–7, 624 S.W.3d at 305.
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       Carter contends on appeal, as he did below, that a durational departure occurred and

that when such a departure occurs, the reasoning for the departure must be clearly stated on

the record. Essentially, he contends that there were no reasons given for the durational

departure, which makes the sentencing order invalid as to all counts and the sentences

facially illegal pursuant to Blakely and Apprendi.

       A claim that a sentence exceeds the presumptive sentence goes behind the face of the

judgment and does not implicate the facial validity of the judgment. Hall v. State, 2022 Ark.

16, 638 S.W.3d 270. Rather, it is a claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner

and is therefore governed by the time limitations set out in Arkansas Rule of Criminal

Procedure 37.2(c). Manuel, 2022 Ark. 117.

       Carter further argues that Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-804 affords him

an opportunity to argue against the upward departure, and because the plea and sentencing

take place “usually within minutes of each other[,]” the procedure does not comport with

Arkansas law. Moreover, Carter contends that section 16-90-804 contains discretionary

language regarding when departure hearings may occur, which “violates the mandatory

language in the reasoning and holding of Blakely and Apprendi,” making section 16-90-804

unconstitutional. In support of his claim, he argues that his plea statement and hearing did

not constitute an explicit waiver or stipulation as required by Blakely and Apprendi because

those cases require that he specifically state that he wanted the trial court to decide all the

matters—including departures and enhancements—and that he was specifically waiving

sentencing by a jury. In the same vein, Carter further contends that he was not advised by

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the trial court that he could seek sentencing by the jury pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 16-97-101(6) (Repl. 2006) and that since the language in section 16-97-

101 is discretionary in contravention of Blakely and Apprendi, it is also unconstitutional. As

with his previous argument, Carter’s claims go behind the face of the judgment and do not

implicate the facial validity of the judgment. Manuel, 2022 Ark. 117. Although he couches

his claims as challenges to the constitutionality of sections 16-90-804 and 16-97-101 with

respect to Blakely and Apprendi, Carter’s claims, at best, amount to an allegation that his

sentence was illegally imposed. Id.

       Notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, Carter’s judgment is not illegal on its

face. He was sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section

5-4-501(a) (Supp. 2009). Aggravated robbery, a Class Y felony, is subject to a term of not less

than ten years nor more than sixty years, or life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(a)(2)(A). Robbery

and being a felon in possession of a firearm, both Class B felonies, are subject to a term of

not less than five years nor more than thirty years. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(a)(2)(C). Carter

was sentenced to 420 months’ or 35 years’ imprisonment and 180 months’ or 15 years’ SIS

for each count of Class Y felony aggravated robbery, well within the statutory maximum

subject to the habitual-offender enhancement.2 He was also sentenced to 120 months’ or 10

       2
        While a trial court can impose a suspended sentence for up to the maximum term
of imprisonment allowed, when the suspended sentence is combined with a period of
imprisonment, the total period of imprisonment is subject to the limitations imposed by the
relevant statutory maximums set forth in sections 5-4-401 and -501. Muhammad, 2021 Ark.
129, 624 S.W.3d 300. Here, the total sentence imposed for each count of aggravated
robbery, including the suspended sentence, was fifty years to be served concurrently.
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years’ imprisonment on each of the Class B felony convictions—also well within the statutory

maximum of thirty years with the habitual-offender enhancement. Carter is not entitled to

relief to correct an illegal sentence because his sentences are not illegal. See Swift v. State,

2018 Ark. 74, 540 S.W.3d 288.

       Affirmed.

       Nickol Carter, pro se appellant.

       Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Jacob H. Jones, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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