Court Opinion

ID: 9375830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 22:03:20.378608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.979348
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/23 P. v. Arellano CA2/5
(unmodified opinion attached)
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B314753
                                                                  (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Super. Ct. No. BA109210)

           v.                                                     ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
                                                                  AND DENYING REHEARING
 RUBEN ARELLANO,
                                                                  [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
           Defendant and Appellant.

      THE COURT:
      It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 30,
2023 be modified as follows:
      1. On page 20, footnote 13, replace “December 1, 2021”
with “October 14, 2021.”
     There is no change in the judgment.
     Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

____________________________________________________________
MOOR, J.                RUBIN, P. J.              BAKER, J.

                                2
Filed 1/30/23 P. v. Arellano CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B314753

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA109210)
           v.

 RUBEN ARELLANO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
      Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Daniel C. Chang, David E. Madeo and
Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                      ——————————

                                                    3
      In 1997, Ruben Arellano was convicted of robbery (Pen.
Code,1 § 211), conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)),
and first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)).2 The jury found true
the special circumstance that Arellano committed the murder
during the commission of the robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)
Arellano appeals the trial court’s 2021 order denying his petition
for vacatur of his murder conviction and resentencing under
Senate Bill No. 1437 and former section 1170.953 (now § 1172.6),
following an order to show cause and hearing pursuant to
subdivision (d)(3).
       On appeal, Arellano contends that the court’s finding that
he could still be convicted of murder as a major participant in the
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life is not
supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the trial court’s
order.

      1 Allfurther statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
      2 The suggestion in the People’s brief that Arellano was
convicted of carjacking is inaccurate.
      3 EffectiveJune 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

                                 4
           FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY4

The Murder

      On the night of April 26, 1995, Arellano, Gerardo Fuentes,
Claudia Garcia, Sylvia Sanchez, Maribel Ochoa, and Leonor
Guerrero (collectively, the group) were gathered at Ochoa’s
apartment. The victim, Martin Quintanilla, came by in his car
and spoke to Ochoa. The stereo in his car was playing loudly.
Quintanilla made arrangements with Ochoa to return later.
      After Quintanilla left, Fuentes outlined a robbery plan, as
described below. At some point, Arellano left Ochoa’s apartment,
went home briefly, and then returned to Ochoa’s apartment.
There is not substantial evidence that Arellano heard the
discussion of the robbery plan when Fuentes first proposed it.
The rest of the group heard the plan and agreed to participate in
it.
      Fuentes outlined the plan as follows: he said that he
wanted to steal Quintanilla’s car stereo. Fuentes proposed
convincing Quintanilla to drive the group to the beach to drink
beer. One or more of the four girls5 would flirt with Quintanilla
and suggest that they would engage in sexual activity with him
at the beach. At a designated time, the girls would get
Quintanilla’s car keys and return to the car. Fuentes and

      4 The  People’s September 6, 2022 request for judicial notice
of the prior appellate opinion (People v. Arellano (Dec. 16, 1998,
B113028) [nonpub. opn.]) is granted.
      5 Garcia, Sanchez, Ochoa, and Guerrero were juveniles at
the time of the offenses.

                                 5
Arellano would remain behind with Quintanilla and beat him up.
The group would then depart in Quintanilla’s car and leave him
stranded at the beach. Fuentes said they would need a knife to
scare Quintanilla.
       Later that night, Quintanilla returned to Ochoa’s
apartment, and Guerrero and Ochoa accompanied him to the
store to buy beer. When Guerrero, Ochoa, and Quintanilla came
back to Ochoa’s apartment, Ochoa retrieved a kitchen knife, hid
it in a jacket, and gave the jacket to Guerrero to take to the
beach.
       Prior to leaving for the beach, Guerrero heard Fuentes tell
Arellano that the plan was to beat Quintanilla, carjack him, and
leave him stranded. Arellano responded that he would put on
gloves so that he would not leave fingerprints “on the car or the
guy.” Arellano put on his gloves before getting into the car. The
group departed for the beach with Quintanilla.
       At the beach, everyone got out and walked towards the
ocean. Guerrero gave the knife to Fuentes.
Garcia obtained Quintanilla’s car keys from him under the
pretense of needing to get her cigarettes. The girls walked away,
leaving Arellano and Fuentes behind with Quintanilla.
       Before the girls reached the car, Arellano and Fuentes ran
up behind them and told them to start running. Fuentes was
holding the knife, which was “[f]ull of blood.” Guerrero turned
around and looked back. She saw Quintanilla getting up from
the ground and then falling down. Fuentes ran to the car.
Arellano walked ahead of the girls. Fuentes yelled for Arellano to
come to the car. Initially Arellano continued walking, but he
came back to the car with the rest of the group.

                                6
      At the car, Fuentes said he had killed Quintanilla by
stabbing him at least seven times.6 Fuentes screamed at Garcia
to take the knife. She refused at first, but later she cleaned the
knife and threw it out of the car window. The group returned to
Ochoa’s apartment in Quintanilla’s car. Fuentes took a pager
and two radios from the car, which Guerrero put in Ochoa’s
apartment. Garcia and Sanchez threatened to kill anyone who
talked about the robbery.
       Fuentes later confessed to killing Quintanilla, but claimed
it was not related to the robbery plan. He stated that he stabbed
Quintanilla because Quintanilla touched Sanchez’s breast.
       Quintanilla died of multiple stab wounds. The coroner who
autopsied his body testified that he was stabbed 13 times. All of
the wounds were inflicted while Quintanilla was alive. When
asked to estimate the amount of time that elapsed between
inflicting the first stab wound and the last, the coroner testified
that, although she could not state the exact amount of time the
attack lasted or the time to inflict each individual wound, when
she closed her report she estimated several minutes, and offered
as a reasonable estimate that the stabbing could take 10 to 15

      6 Guerrero,  the witness who testified to Fuentes’s
statements in the car after the stabbing, also testified at trial to
statements made by Fuentes about what Arellano had done. At
trial, the court overruled counsel’s objections to the statements
about Arellano based on finding that Arellano’s silence after
hearing Fuentes’s statements about him to be an adoptive
admission. On this appeal, Arellano argues this evidence was
improperly admitted and should not be considered. We assume,
without deciding, that the testimony was hearsay and do not
consider it in connection with our substantial evidence review.

                                  7
minutes, maybe more or maybe less. Quintanilla also suffered a
contusion and hemorrhaging to both sides of his skull that were
indicative of blunt force trauma. In the coroner’s opinion, the
injuries suggested Quintanilla had been struck in the head.

Trial, Sentencing, and Appeal

       Arellano, Fuentes, Garcia, Sanchez, Ochoa, and Guerrero
were charged with special circumstance robbery murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a) & 190.2, subd. (a)(l7)(A)), robbery (§ 211), and
conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(l)). It was further
alleged that Fuentes personally used a knife (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(l)). Ochoa and Guerrero pleaded guilty to voluntary
manslaughter and were sentenced to terms of 11 years each. The
other four defendants proceeded to jury trial. Arellano, Sanchez,
and Garcia were tried before one jury and Fuentes was tried
jointly before a second jury. All four defendants were convicted
as charged. Sanchez and Garcia were sentenced to 25 years to
life. Fuentes and Arellano were sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole.
       Arellano, Fuentes, Garcia, and Sanchez appealed. Another
panel of this division modified the abstracts of judgment to reflect
restitution fines imposed by the trial court, but otherwise
affirmed the convictions.

Petition for Resentencing Under Former Section 1170.95

       On January 11, 2019, Arellano filed a petition for vacatur
of his murder conviction and resentencing pursuant to former
section 1170.95. The prosecution opposed the petition and

                                 8
Arellano replied to the opposition. The trial court appointed
counsel for Arellano and issued an order to show cause.
      On June 21, 2021, the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing under former section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3). The
court ruled that the factors the Supreme Court articulated in
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 802 (Banks) and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) weighed in favor of finding
Arellano guilty of murder as a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alternatively, the court found that Arellano was a direct aider
and abettor who acted with intent to kill.

                           DISCUSSION

Section 1172.6

       As relevant here, pursuant to section 1172.6, a defendant
must file a petition in the sentencing court averring that “(1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime . . . . [;] [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder . . . following a trial . . . . [;] [¶] [and] (3) The petitioner
could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes
to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1)–(3); see id., subd. (b)(1)(A).)
       Upon receipt of a petition meeting these requirements, the
trial court will appoint counsel, if requested. (§ 1172.6,

                                   9
subd. (b)(3).) The prosecutor must file a response within 60 days
of the service of the petition, and the petitioner may file a reply
within 30 days of the response. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) When
briefing has been completed, “the court shall hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to
show cause.” (Ibid.) Within 60 days of issuance of the order to
show cause, the trial court shall hold a hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(1).)
       “At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019. The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed
by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider
evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law, including witness testimony,
stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court
may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in
any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay evidence that was
admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless
the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the
hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer
new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

                                10
      The trial court acts as the finder of fact when determining
whether the prosecution has met its burden beyond a reasonable
doubt. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 855.)
      Under California law as amended by the changes to section
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, a defendant may still
be convicted of murder under a felony-murder theory of liability if
the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3) & 189, subds. (a), (e)(3).)

Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Findings

       We review a trial court’s order denying a section 1172.6
petition following a subdivision (d)(3) hearing for substantial
evidence. (See People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 985;
People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1087; People v.
Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 663.) “The scope of our
review for substantial evidence is well settled. The test is . . .
‘whether any rational trier of fact could have’ . . .
determin[ed] . . . that ‘[t]he record . . . disclose[s] . . . evidence
that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find [as did the trial court].
[Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of
the [order] the existence of every fact the [trial court] could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]
“Conflicts [in the evidence] . . . subject to justifiable suspicion do
not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive
province of the trial judge . . . to determine the . . . truth or falsity

                                   11
of the facts upon which a determination depends.” ’ ” (Williams,
at p. 663.)
       We hold that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
findings that Arellano was a major participant in the underlying
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.7 In
so concluding, we review the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale.
(People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12; see People
v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 867, fn. 4.) In conducting
our review for substantial evidence here, we do not rely on the
evidence that Arellano challenges in his opening brief.8

      7 Because we conclude that the trial court’s major
participant and reckless indifference findings are supported by
substantial evidence, we need not reach the court’s alternative
finding that Arellano intended to kill Quintanilla.
      8 On  appeal, Arellano challenges specific evidence, none of
which we consider in reaching our conclusion that substantial
evidence supports that Arellano was a major participant in the
robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Most
significantly, we do not consider: (1) Fuentes’s statements
regarding Arellano’s actions during the stabbing; (2) the
prosecutor’s statements in argument at the jury trial that the
evidence directly or circumstantially supports the conclusion that
Arellano held Quintanilla down during the stabbing; (3) Garcia’s
purported statement that it would be easier to rob Quintanilla if
they killed him; and (4) statements from the transcript of
Guerrero’s interview with police that were quoted during
examination at trial.

                                 12
      Major Participant

       In determining whether the defendant was a major
participant in the underlying felony, “the ultimate question [is]
whether the defendant’s participation ‘in criminal activities
known to carry a grave risk of death’ [citation] was sufficiently
significant to be considered ‘major.’ ” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 803.) To do so, we consider multiple factors, including:
“What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What
awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by
the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or
conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at
the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after
lethal force was used?” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “No one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.” (Ibid.)
       With respect to the first Banks factor—Arellano’s role in
planning the offenses—the jury found that Arellano was guilty of
conspiracy to commit robbery. That conviction is not at issue in
this appeal and remains valid. Furthermore, Guerrero testified
that, prior to getting into the bed of Quintanilla’s car to go to the
beach, she heard Fuentes tell Arellano the plan was to beat
Quintanilla, carjack him, and leave him stranded at the beach.
Arellano responded that he would put on gloves so that he would
not leave fingerprints “on the car or the guy.” The evidence of
Arellano’s actions further supports a reasonable inference that he

                                 13
was aware of the robbery plan, as his participation followed the
plan Fuentes had outlined. Arellano put on his gloves before
getting into the car to go to the beach. After the girls left to go to
the car, he remained behind with Fuentes and Quintanilla. In
addition to the stab wounds, Quintanilla suffered injuries that
indicated he was hit in the head. After the stabbing, Arellano
returned to the car with Fuentes, who was holding a bloody knife.
Arellano left the scene in Quintanilla’s car with Fuentes and the
rest of the group. Members of the group stole a pager and two
radios from the car when they returned to Ochoa’s apartment.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Arellano knew the full extent of the plan to rob Quintanilla.
       As to the second Banks factor, there was no evidence that
Arellano provided Fuentes with the knife, and no substantial
evidence that he knew about the knife prior to the
commencement of the stabbing. However, given the gruesome
and prolonged nature of the attack, Arellano’s knowledge that
Fuentes was using a knife once the stabbing had begun is
significant. This was not an instance of a co-participant firing a
single shot from a previously-concealed gun. Fuentes used a
large knife to stab Quintanilla 13 times. Arellano remained with
Fuentes throughout the time that it took Fuentes to inflict the
13 stab wounds. Arellano clearly became aware that Fuentes
was armed well before the final wounds were inflicted, but stayed
with Fuentes and did nothing to try to prevent him from
continuing to stab Quintanilla brutally.
       Regarding the third Banks factor, no evidence was
presented that Arellano was aware that Fuentes or any other
participants in the crime had a history of, or propensity for,
violence. However, Arellano knew that Fuentes expected him to

                                 14
participate in the robbery by beating Quintanilla badly enough to
enable them to leave in Quintanilla’s car and strand him at the
beach. Arellano’s awareness that Fuentes intended for the
robbery to be violent and his willingness to participate in the
violence weighs against him.
      As to the fourth factor—was the defendant present at the
scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death?—Arellano does not contest that he
was at the scene when the stabbing occurred. He argues that
that there was no evidence that he hit Quintanilla,9 and that the
jury’s findings regarding an overt act precluded a finding that
Arellano hit Quintanilla. We reject these arguments.
       Arellano’s argument that the jury’s not true finding on
overt act number five—“On or about April 26, 1995, a conspirator
and a co-conspirator punched victim Martin Quintanilla” (italics
added)—precludes a finding that he hit Quintanilla is without
merit.10 The jury did not find that Arellano did not hit
Quintanilla; it found Quintanilla was not hit by both Arellano

      9 Arellano also argues there was no evidence that he held
Quintanilla down. We do not rely on this finding and therefore
do not address it.
      10 We  express no opinion as to whether the trial court’s
statement that it was “not bound by the jury verdicts” in a section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing was a correct interpretation of
the statute. On appeal, Arellano claims that, to the extent we
find that his argument regarding overt act number five was not
preserved, his trial counsel was ineffective. As we address the
issue on the merits, we need not reach this alternative
contention.

                                15
and another co-conspirator. Arellano argues that the jury had no
difficulty finding overt act number six—“a conspirator and a co-
conspirator stabbed victim Martin Quintanilla” (italics added)—
was true although there was no evidence that Arellano stabbed
Quintanilla. He reasons that the logical conclusion to be drawn
is that the jury interpreted the same language to mean that it
should find overt act number five not true only if neither Fuentes
nor Arellano hit Quintanilla.
       We reject Arellano’s theory. We presume that the jury
understands and follows instructions (People v. Hernandez (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1502), and that it did so when it found
overt act number five not true. The plain language of that
instruction required the jury to find that both Arellano and
Fuentes (or another co-conspirator) hit Quintanilla in order to
make a true finding on overt act number five. The jury found
overt act number five not true. The fact that the jury’s finding on
overt act six was not supported by sufficient evidence is
immaterial. We will not conclude that the jury misunderstood
one instruction because there is insufficient evidence to support a
different finding based on a different instruction. The jury’s not
true finding on overt act number five does not preclude a finding
that Arellano hit Quintanilla.
       The evidence of Arellano’s actions demonstrates that he
was in a position to aid Quintanilla but instead contributed to his
death. As we have already discussed, witness testimony and
forensic evidence in the record support the conclusion that, as
planned, Arellano hit Quintanilla and remained on the beach to
see that Quintanilla was immobilized. His involvement went
beyond insuring that he and Fuentes could get away. Arellano
stayed at the scene for the duration of Fuentes’s fatal assault.

                                16
There is ample evidence that the attack lasted long enough to
give Arellano the opportunity to leave the beach and dissociate
himself from the attack or to intervene either by action or words.
Through his inaction as well as his actions, Arellano played a role
in bringing about Quintanilla’s death. The coroner testified that
of the 13 knife wounds Quintanilla sustained, five wounds were
over five inches in depth and fatal or potentially fatal. There
were several stab wounds that went through one part of
Quintanilla’s body and reentered a different area. All of the
wounds were inflicted while Quintanilla was alive. The coroner
closed her report with an estimate that the attack took several
minutes, and while not knowing the exact duration, estimated
that an attack of this nature could reasonably last 10 to 15
minutes. Despite the severity and duration of the attack, there is
no evidence that Arellano attempted to stop the stabbing, nor did
Arellano leave the scene of the stabbing while it occurred. This
factor, too, weighs heavily against him.
       Finally, as to the fifth Banks factor—Arellano’s role after
the stabbing—there is no evidence that Arellano aided
Quintanilla after the attack or tried to get help. The evidence
shows that Quintanilla survived the attack itself, and that it
could be easily ascertained that he was still alive. Guerrero
testified that she saw Quintanilla stand up after the attack and
then fall back to the ground. The coroner testified that
Quintanilla likely lived for several minutes after the stabbing.
       Arellano argues that Quintanilla would have died
regardless of whether he tried to aid him. This is beside the
point. What matters is that Arellano made no attempt either to
help Quintanilla or extricate himself from the situation.
Quintanilla was alive and indisputably in need of help. Arellano

                                17
either knew this was the case and abandoned him, or simply did
not bother to look back. Which of these scenarios occurred is
irrelevant. In either case, he failed to render aid. Instead, he
fled the scene in Quintanilla’s car with the rest of the group, who
stole items from Quintanilla’s car as planned.
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Arellano was a major participant.

      Reckless Indifference

         “ ‘A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of
the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
         “In determining whether [the defendant] exhibited
‘ “ ‘reckless indifference to human life’ ” ’ within the meaning of
section 190.2, subdivision (d),” “we consider the specific facts of
[the] case in light of some of the case-specific factors that this
court and other state appellate courts have considered in
upholding a determination of reckless indifference to human life
in cases involving nonshooter aiders and abettors.” “ ‘[N]o one of
these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.)
Several of the factors overlap with those considered when
determining whether a defendant was a major participant.

                                18
(People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 955 (Harris).) The
Clark factors include: (1) knowledge, use, and number of
weapons; (2) physical presence at the crime and opportunity to
restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; (3) the duration of the
felony; (4) the defendant’s knowledge of the likelihood of killing;
and (5) the defendant’s efforts to minimize the risk of violence
during the felony. (Clark, at pp. 618–622.) As in the “major
participant” inquiry, these factors are not exclusive. (In re Moore
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454 (Moore).) Courts of appeal have
considered youth as a factor when determining whether a
defendant has acted with reckless indifference. (Ibid.; accord,
Harris, at p. 960.)
        We have already analyzed the first factor with respect to
the major participant prong of our analysis—although Arellano
did not procure the knife and there is not substantial evidence
that he knew Fuentes was armed prior to the attack, once the
stabbing commenced the evidence supports the conclusion that
Arellano knew Fuentes was wielding a weapon but allowed the
attack to continue for a significant amount of time.
        We have already analyzed the criteria for the second factor
and concluded that the considerations weigh heavily against
Arellano—he was at the scene of the stabbing and assisted
Fuentes by hitting Quintanilla. Arellano did nothing to stop the
brutal attack.
        With respect to the duration of the felony, although the
evidence did not suggest a specific amount of time, it was
established that Arellano was aware of the robbery plan before
the group got into the car and went to the beach—Guerrero
testified that Fuentes told him the plan and that Arellano had
already put on his gloves in anticipation of the robbery.

                                19
Arellano’s participation in the robbery began with the gloves,
continued through the car ride, the time the group spent on the
beach, and the time that it took to complete the attack. It can be
reasonably inferred that this was a significant time period, and
certainly a long enough time for Arellano to reflect and change
course.
        Regarding Arellano’s knowledge of the likelihood of the
killing, Arellano knew that the plan was to beat Quintanilla as a
means of facilitating the robbery. A typical armed robbery does
not necessarily entail significant physical violence. Fuentes and
Arellano planned to beat Quintanilla severely enough to strand
him at the beach while they absconded with his vehicle. That
type of violence carries a risk of death outside the realm of a
garden variety robbery. Although Arellano may not be as
culpable as a defendant with knowledge that a co-participant has
killed before, at the very least this factor does not weigh in his
favor.
        As to the fifth Clark factor, Arellano made no attempt to
minimize the risk of violence. He initiated the attack by hitting
Quintanilla in the head. Arellano did nothing to stop the
protracted and repeated stabbing, and did not summon help.
       Finally, Arellano argues that the trial court failed to
consider his youth as a factor when evaluating reckless
indifference. We disagree. Where the record is silent, we
presume that the trial court understood its discretion. (People v.
Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 867.) The current case law
stating that youth may be a valid consideration in the reckless
indifference analysis (see, e.g., Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
p. 454; Harris, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 955) does not
articulate a novel concept of which the trial court would have

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been unaware. Courts have long had discretion to consider
factors additional to those articulated in Banks and Clark.
Moreover, the People argued that any adult of average
intelligence would understand the dangers posed by Arellano’s
conduct. Arellano’s counsel responded that Arellano was only 19
years old at the time of the offense, and that his co-participants
were all within the ages of 15 and 19.11 Nothing in the record
leads us to believe that the court did not take these arguments
into consideration. We presume the trial court determined that
Arellano, who was not a minor when the crime was committed,
was capable of understanding the gravity of his own actions and
Fuentes’s. There is no evidence that this was not the case, or
that Fuentes pressured or exerted influence over Arellano. We do
not view Fuentes telling Arellano to get into Quintanilla’s car
after the stabbing as rising to the level of pressure—there was no
evidence that Fuentes threatened Arellano.12
      Arellano’s argument that his constitutional rights were
violated because he was treated unfairly in comparison to the
young females who participated in the robbery lacks merit.13 The

      11 Itis unclear from the record whether Arellano was 18 or
19 years old at the time the crimes were committed. The People
concede that Arellano was 18 at the time of the stabbing. It is
undisputed that Arellano was an adult.
      12 On appeal, Arellano argues that, to the extent we find
his counsel in the trial proceedings failed to preserve the issue of
his youth, counsel was ineffective. As we find no waiver, we need
not address this alternative contention.
      13 On  March 14, 2022, Arellano filed a request to augment
the record, or in the alternative, a request for judicial notice.
This court denied the motion to augment in an order filed on

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females played a much less pivotal role in the robbery, they were
not present at the scene of the stabbing, they did not directly
facilitate the murder, and they were not in a position to prevent
it. Moreover, evidence was presented that Fuentes exerted
pressure on at least one of the females—his girlfriend Sanchez—
to flirt with Quintanilla as part of the robbery plan. The
circumstances are not comparable. The trial court did not err or
violate the constitution by treating Arellano differently than his
female codefendants.14

March 22, 2022, and deferred the request for judicial notice to the
panel. We grant Arellano’s request that we take judicial notice of
the transcript of the police interview of Yvonne Abaunca, the Los
Angeles Superior Court proceedings on Sylvia Sanchez’s petition
for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95, on December 1,
2021, in case number BA109210, and the Los Angeles Superior
Court minute orders for Sylvia Sanchez’s and Claudia Garcia’s
petitions for resentencing in case number BA109210.
      14 Arellano attempts to make the same arguments with
respect to intoxication as a mitigating factor. He did not argue
intoxication at the hearing and cites to no evidence in the record
to demonstrate that he was drinking, let alone that his judgment
was impaired by the consumption of alcohol. In the absence of
evidence of intoxication, we will not entertain this argument.

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                         DISPOSITION

     We affirm the trial court’s order denying Arellano’s Penal
Code section 1172.6 petition.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    MOOR, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

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