Court Opinion

ID: 9632276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:08:10.415693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:11.839597
License: Public Domain

Scholfield, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent.
The verified employment charge was filed with the Seattle Department of Human Rights (Department) on March 27, 1985. The only entity named as respondent was First Impressions Printing, Inc. First Impressions was administratively dissolved in March 1987,2 years after the filing of the charge and 18 months after the running of the 6-month limitation period imposed by the Seattle Fair Employment Practices Ordinance, Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 14.04.090.
On June 19,1990, a Seattle city attorney filed a complaint for discrimination with the office of the hearing exdminer, naming as respondents First Impressions and George Russell. This was the first time George Russell was personally *422named as a respondent in the action. Russell moved for dismissal of the complaint against him, based on the statute of limitations. His motion should have been granted.
The majority opinion acknowledges that Russell was not named as a respondent until over 5 years after the filing of the verified employment charge.
Under SMC 14.04.090, a complainant has 6 months from the date of the alleged unfair employment practice in which to file a charge with the Department. The 6-month limitation was not met in this case. Nevertheless, the majority brushes aside the 6-month bar, arguing that liberal construction justifies it. I disagree. I prefer to leave the function of amending city ordinances and statutes to those constitutionally authorized to legislate.
When this issue was addressed by the hearing examiner, the examiner concluded that although the Department erred in not originally naming Russell as a party, this error was excusable as "all parties believed that by serving the corporation, the [Department] was also serving George Russell, the president and general manager." Hearing examiner decision, conclusion 3. The examiner's reasoning is insupportable, and the majority opinion makes no effort to assert otherwise.
SMC 14.04.100 governs amendments and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The charging party may amend a charge to cure technical defects or omissions; or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein; or to add allegations related to or arising out of the subject matter set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the original charge. For jurisdictional purposes, such amendments shall relate back to the date the original charge was first filed.
It is indisputable that the language of the ordinance relating to amendments does not address the effect of an attempted amendment of a charge adding a party. In particular, it does not address amendments adding a party after the 6-month filing period has expired.
*423The enabling legislation, RCW 49.60, states that administrative law judges conducting hearings "may permit reasonable amendment to any complaint or answer." RCW 49.60-.250(4). It is equally obvious that the enabling legislation does not attempt to address the precise issue involved here: an amendment to a charge adding a party after the 6-month filing period has expired.
In apparent recognition that nothing in the Fair Employment Practices Ordinance permitted the amendment, the hearing examiner resorted to CR 15(c), which permits relation back of amendments to pleadings where the requirements of the rule are met. Relation back under CR 15(c) is also subject to a court-imposed requirement that relation back will not be permitted if the plaintiff's delay in naming the proper party is due to inexcusable neglect. North St. Ass'n v. Olympia, 96 Wn.2d 359, 368-69, 635 P.2d 721 (1981).
The majority opinion recognizes that CR 15(c) is inapplicable because this action was not brought in superior court. CR 1 provides that the civil rules "govern the procedure in the superior court in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases of law or in equity. . .". (Italics mine.)
The majority opinion places reliance upon a 4-part test set forth in Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248 (3d Cir.) (quoting Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1977)), cert. denied sub nom. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. G.C. Murphy Co., 449 U.S. 949 (1980), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 935 (1981).
The reasoning of the Third Circuit in Glus is of very doubtful applicability here. The Glus case does not involve an attempt by a complaining party to add a new defendant. It involves the right of a named party to proceed in an action for contribution against another named party. Furthermore, since all of the parties involved were named in the original complaint, there are no late joinder or statute of limitations issues in Glus. See 562 F.2d at 885.
*424For these reasons, the reasoning of the Glus court allowing the action for contribution to proceed provides no guidance on the fundamental issues involved in the case before us.
Because the statute of limitations bars the action against Russell and the law provides no legal basis for relation back for an amendment naming Russell as a party approximately 5 years after the time for filing a complaint has expired, I would reverse and dismiss the action as .to Russell.
Review denied at 123 Wn.2d 1011 (1994).