Court Opinion

ID: 9839292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 18:04:01.799674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:57.977632
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/12/23 In re A.M. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

In re A.M. et al., Persons                                   B320168
Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County
Court Law.                                                   Super. Ct. No.
                                                             22LJJP00086A–D)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

ERICA M.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
      Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, David Michael Miller, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

           _________________________________________

                      I. INTRODUCTION

      Mother Erica M. (mother) challenges on appeal
jurisdictional findings that her children, A.M. (born in 2010),
J.M. (born in 2011), J.R. (born in 2013), and J.R., Jr. (born in
2015) are dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 300. Mother contends that there
was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings
and the issuance of a three-year restraining order against her.
We affirm.
      The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for
publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and
consistent with constitutional principles (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14
[“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis
v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted
[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies

1     Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the
reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based,
[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”]).

                        II. DISCUSSION

A.    Jurisdictional Findings

       We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) We
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the findings and orders
of the juvenile court, and do not reweigh the evidence or reassess
credibility. (Ibid.)
       “‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for
its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s
jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing
court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged
statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’”
(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
       “Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), allows a child to be
adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court when ‘[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or
inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise
or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the

                                 3
child's parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child from the conduct of a custodian with whom the child has
been left.’ A jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1), requires the Department to prove three elements: (1) the
parent’s or guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to
protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or
illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.”
(In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601 (Cole L.).)
       Mother argues there was insufficient evidence that the
children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm at the
time of the jurisdictional hearing. We disagree. “Although
section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk
of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the
court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.
[Citations.] The court may consider past events in deciding
whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.
[Citations.] A parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of
current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct
will continue.’ [Citations.] ‘To establish a defined risk of harm at
the time of the hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere
speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.”’” (Cole L.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 601–602.) Domestic violence may
serve as the basis for dependency jurisdiction pursuant to section
300, subdivision (b)(1). (Id. at pp. 602–603.)
       Here, the record demonstrates that in 2018, J.R. (father)
and mother engaged in domestic violence in front of the children.
Mother had not addressed her domestic violence issues with
father as she continued to threaten violence against him after
their romantic relationship ended. Additionally, mother

                                 4
minimized the domestic violence incident with male companion,
B.S., describing B.S.’s conduct as merely “bump[ing]” into her
rather than the shove that she reported to the police. Further,
B.S. continued to reside in the family home, despite the juvenile
court’s order that B.S. have no contact with the children. On this
record, we find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
sustaining of counts b-1 and b-2.

B.    Restraining Order

       We “apply the substantial evidence standard to determine
whether sufficient facts supported the factual findings in support
of a restraining order and the abuse of discretion standard to
determine whether the court properly issued the order.” (In re
Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.)2
       Mother’s contention that the restraining order was not
supported by substantial evidence is belied by the record. Mother
and father had a history of domestic violence, with each party
having engaged in violence against the other. On
December 27, 2021, mother threatened to blow up paternal
grandmother’s home and to destroy father’s family’s property.
On February 25, 2022, she threatened to kill father. Substantial
evidence therefore supports the issuance of the April 13, 2022,
restraining order (see, e.g., In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 228 [husband threatening to kill wife
sufficient to support issuance of restraining order]) and the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by issuing it.

2     The Department takes no position on whether the court
erred in issuing the restraining order.

                                5
                      III. DISPOSITION

      The jurisdictional findings and restraining order are
affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

                                6