Court Opinion

ID: 9531820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:14:45.034883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:35.525661
License: Public Domain

YETKA, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s view that the parties’ narrow, stipulated facts prevent us from deciding the broader issue of whether appellant’s actions constituted the unauthorized practice of law. I would affirm the trial court and find that appellant’s conduct did constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
As the majority recognizes, MLRB provided a variety of closing services for a fee of $250. This fee was charged even in cases where all the services were not performed. One of the services which appellant purported to perform was a review of the conditions of the purchase agreement immediately following its execution. Studying the conditions of a purchase agreement clearly involves legal judgment and is a duty that should be performed only by an attorney.
The majority also acknowledges that appellant was involved in “ordering necessary searches, including judgment, bankruptcy, state and federal tax lien searches, special and pending assessment searches and real estate tax searches.” These services, as well as the ordering of abstract continuations and registered property abstracts, require legal judgments and constitute the practice of law.
I will not repeat all of the other “services” that the realtors could or would perform. They are outlined in the majority opinion. Suffice it to say that many of those services arguably are legal services as well. While portions of the services cited by the majority may not, by themselves, be the unauthorized practice of law, the services listed, taken together, do constitute unauthorized practice.
The majority argues that merely drafting an instrument for a fee does not constitute the practice of law; however, in Cowem, we held that it would and the facts here lead to such a conclusion.1 The closing services provided by appellant for $250 were complex and implicated legal judgments and conclusions. That fee, together with the services outlined above, in my opinion, constitutes the practice of law.
The real concern of this court should be, as the majority opinion points out, the protection of the public. In my opinion, the services here and the method of their performance do little to protect buyers in real estate transactions. Because realtors have an incentive to sell property and close the deal as quickly as possible to collect their fee, buyers, unless they are attorneys, are largely left unprotected. Title records are replete with instances of defective conveyances drafted by realtors. Moreover, title transactions are becoming increasingly complex as real estate holdings such as condominiums and townhouses become more popular.'
In many instances, a realtor who represents both a seller and a buyer at closing and charges each separately may be involved in an improper conflict of interest. Certainly, realtors, at the very least, should be required to disclose at or prior to closing *871who they represent and the charges made therefor.
In conclusion, I believe that the trial court decision should be affirmed and that the services outlined within for the fee charged do, in fact, constitute the unauthorized practice of law.

. In Cowem, this court said: “We do not accept the legislature’s declaration that in such matters he may charge for such services.” Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 647, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (1940).