Court Opinion

ID: 9631722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:47:21.786678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:59.779959
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
William Andrews has filed an application seeking a writ of habeas corpus and an extraordinary writ, contending that the Board of Pardons failed to comply with the Open and Public Meetings Act and violated his constitutional rights in denying his request for a commutation hearing and in declining to hold hearings on the matter. Andrews filed this petition with this court on July 23, 1992. The following day was a legal holiday in Utah. As of the time of this order, the Board of Pardons has not responded to the petition. Just as this opinion was being finalized, an amicus brief was filed by the State, together with a motion for leave to file. We grant the motion and have considered the State’s brief.
We treat the petition only as a request for an extraordinary writ. See Utah R.App.P. 19. We rule as follows:
We begin with Andrews’ argument that the Board of Pardons failed to comply with the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act because it spent more than six weeks reviewing Andrews’ petition for a commutation hearing without ever holding an open, public hearing on its fact-finding and decision-making processes. Because of this failure, Andrews contends, this court should void the Board’s denial of a commutation hearing. We agree in part.
We agree with Andrews that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 to -9, applies to the proceedings of the Board of Pardons because the Board is a “public body” within the meaning of the Act. See id. § 52-4-2(2). The State argues that the process by which the Board arrived at the decision not to grant a commutation hearing was not a “meeting” within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, the Act has no application here. We reject the State’s argument. The plain language of the definitional section of the Act provides that meetings of the sort conducted by the Board are covered by the Act’s provisions. Section 52-4-2 provides that a “meeting” is
the convening of a public body, with a quorum present, ... for the purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the public body has jurisdiction or advisory power_ “Convening” ... means the calling of a meeting of a public body by a person or persons authorized to do so for the express purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which that public body has jurisdiction.
Clearly, the meetings of the Board by which it arrived at the decision not to grant a hearing, which, in turn, is a necessary constitutional prerequisite to the grant of commutation, constitutes a “meeting” for the purposes of the Act. The business done there was nothing if not the "discussion] or acting upon a matter over which the [Board] has jurisdiction.”
Having found that the Act applies, we cannot determine from the Board’s order of July 21, 1992, whether the Board has violated the requirements of the Act. According to that order, the Board proceedings to date consisted not of information gathering, but of deliberations over the petition for a new commutation hearing, deliberations that included a review of the full public commutation hearing held in 1989. If this is the case, these proceedings would *793be of a judicial nature and exempt from the provisions of the statute. See Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv. Comm’n, 598 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Utah 1979).
However, the Board’s order is less than clear as to the information that was considered in reaching the decision to deny a hearing. Petitioner has filed an affidavit averring that the Board, inter alia, has requested from outside sources videotapes of interviews of Andrews and other materials that were not a part of the record in the 1989 commutation hearing. Because of the ambiguity in the order and the conflict created by the affidavit on information and belief, we are unable to determine whether the Open and Public Meetings Act has been violated. We therefore direct the Board to respond to the allegations of petitioner and to inform this court of the materials upon which it relied in deciding not to order a full commutation hearing so that we can dispose of this aspect of the instant petition.
We next turn to Andrews’ constitutional argument. Andrews contends that a statute passed in 1992 created a new and higher substantive standard for obtaining a commutation hearing, a constitutional prerequisite for the grant of commutation. See Utah Const. art. VII, § 12; Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5.5(6) & (7). Andrews contends that this higher standard violates state and federal constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto laws. We agree.
For the Board to apply the substantive standards contained in the 1992 statute, section 77-27-5.5(6) and (7) of the Code, in deciding whether to grant Andrews’ petition for a commutation hearing would diminish the opportunity for commutation available at the time the crime was committed, in violation of article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution’s ban on ex post fac-to laws. See Utah Const. art. I, § 18; State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Utah 1986); State v. Coleman, 540 P.2d 953, 954 (Utah 1975); cf. Dugger v. Williams, 593 So.2d 180, 182 (Fla.1991) (decided under the Florida ex post facto provision). We think the result would be the same under the federal constitution. See Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558, 1561-65 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Snow v. Akins, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2915, 115 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1991); Watson v. Estelle, 859 F.2d 105, 108-09 (9th Cir.1988), vacated on other grounds, 886 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.1989); Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm’n, 594 F.2d 170, 174-76 (7th Cir.1979); Williams v. Dugger, 566 So.2d 819, 820-21 (Fla.Ct.App.1990); see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433-35, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2452-53, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). However, our interpretation of the Utah Constitution is not contingent upon the accuracy of our prediction of federal law. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3478, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983).
We cannot determine with certainty from the Board’s orders of July 21, 1992, that the Board actually decided to deny Andrews’ request for a commutation hearing because of the failure to satisfy the requirements of section 77-27-5.5(6) and (7). The language used in one of the orders— “that the Petition and supporting documents fail to raise new and substantial issues” — appears to state the legal standard set by those sections as necessary prerequisites for the grant of a commutation hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5.5(6) & (7). Because it appears from the order that the Board was guided by the new statute’s restrictions on the availability of a commutation hearing, and because it would be a denial of Andrews’ constitutional rights to deny his petition based upon these newly enacted statutory criteria, the Board of Pardons is directed either to make clear that it has not followed the restrictive criteria set forth in section 77-27-5.5(6) and (7) or to reconsider the petition for a commutation hearing under the substantive criteria that existed in 1974. See Rules and Regulations of Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, ch. IV, § 4 (adopted Apr. 24, 1952, amended July 23, 1969, amended July 11, 1973).
Finally, Andrews has supplemented his petition with a claim that the Board has failed to comply with the requirements of the Government Records Access and *794Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101 to -909. Specifically, Andrews asked the Board on the 25th of July to provide him with all documents upon which it based its decision to deny him a hearing. He asks this court to direct the Board to comply with the Act. We agree that the Act does apply to the Board by its terms. Id. § 63-2-103(9)(a)(i). However, the Board has five business days within which to respond to a request under the Act. Id. § 63-2-204(3)(a). Since the time for a response has not yet run, and we have no basis for assuming that the Board will not comply with the Act’s provisions, this matter is not yet ripe for adjudication. We therefore decline to order the relief requested by petitioner.
Nothing in this order should be construed as requiring that the Board grant Andrews a new commutation hearing. The grant or denial of such a hearing is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the Board of Pardons, so long as that discretion is exercised consistent with the rules of the Board, the statutes of this state, and the Utah and federal constitutions. Utah Const. art. VII, § 12; see Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735-45 (Utah 1991); Andrews v. Haun, 779 P.2d 229 (Utah), cert. denied sub nom. Andrews v. Barnes, 493 U.S. 945, 110 S.Ct. 354, 107 L.Ed.2d 341 (1989). We hold only that the Board appears to have complied with a statute that, as applied to Andrews, is violative of the Utah Constitution, and, independently, the federal constitution.
We deny the requested stay of execution. It is not clear that the Board cannot comply with the requirements of this opinion within the remaining period. If the Board feels that it needs additional time, it can request a stay.
DURHAM, J., concurs in the disposition of the petition, but dissents from the denial of the stay.
STEWART, J., dissents from the disposition of the petition and files a separate opinion, but concurs in the denial of the stay.