Court Opinion

ID: 9605509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:38:23.838079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:39.963018
License: Public Domain

.CROCKETT, Chief Justice.
The plaintiffs sued for damages and for injunctive relief based upon the claim that the defendants in draining and conditioning their land had drained water from the adjoining lands of the plaintiffs. From adverse judgment the plaintiffs appeal.
The attack upon the judgment poses these questions: (1) Does the evidence compel a finding that the draining of the defendants’ land caused loss of water from the land of the plaintiffs; and (2) if so, can the' defendants be held liable for damages caused thereby.
The properties of the parties here involved are located near Holladay, a suburb of Salt Lake City (general location point: 5100 South, 1500 East). They lie on the pediment of the Wasatch Mountains on the east side of Salt Lake Valley. The drainage from the snows and storms in the mountains is westward. Some of it courses through underground aquifers into the valley, part of which surfaces in springs and seeps in the properties in question.
The defendants are in the business of developing and constructing residential subdivisions. In 1953 and 1954 they acquired approximately 92 acres of land in that locality. The greater portion of it being swampy, they caused drains to be installed to lower the water table to condition the land for their purpose. It is this which the plaintiffs claim had the effect of draining the water from their lands and depleting their water sources. '
Plaintiffs Mower own approximately seven acres lying southeast of the defendants’ property, upon which there is a pond which was originally created by • Grandfather Mower in 1883. It has been since used for propagating fish and for recreational purposes. There is evidence that at some times a substantial income was made therefrom.
*310The Mower Pond also serves as a reservoir. At its lower (west) end is a headgate to regulate the flow of water therefrom which runs into what is called the Long Ditch. It courses northwesterly, carrying about two second feet of water normally, to the properties of plaintiffs Maggie Smith and of N. M. Long and Company. The former has a tract of about six acres which has been used for truck gardening and farming; the latter has about 17 acres which has been used for farming and also supports an orchard and vineyard.
The plaintiffs have established rights to the beneficial use of the waters in and flowing from the Mower Pond. Their evidence indicates that since the installation of the defendants’ drains, there has been a substantial diminution of water in the pond, and flowing therefrom. Nevertheless, upon the whole evidence the trial court remained unconvinced that the installation of the defendants’ drains was the cause of the depletion of the plaintiffs’ water, and also held that the defendants had done no wrongful act in conditioning their land to make it useful.
Assuming for the moment that the evidence would compel a finding that the defendants’ drains had the effect of depleting the plaintiffs’ water supply, we set aside the controversy over that issue to consider the more fundamental question as to the defendants’ right to use their property even, though it may have an adverse effect upon the water table in the lands of plaintiffs.
It is to be borne in mind that this is not a case dealing with competing claims to the propriety use of water. The defendants are not seeking to appropriate water to' which the plaintiffs had previously established rights to use. If it were so, the plaintiffs as prior appropriators would own the right to the use of the water and such rights would be entitled to protection.1 The situation here is significantly different; any effect the draining of defendants’ land had upon the water available to the plaintiffs resulted as an incident to the defendants’ efforts to make their own lands suitable for use. The question is: Are they obliged to let their lands remain in a swampy condition to provide support to underground waters to make them available to adjoining landowners.
It is generally considered to be axiomatic that the right to own property includes the right to make reasonable and ordinary uses thereof even though it may incidentally cause damage or unavoidable loss to another. Such damage or loss is said to be damnum absque injuria.2 But it requires little imagination to realize that rights to use property cannot be absolute. *311If one holds property by force alone he is always subject to being dispossessed by force. If he holds it by rule of law this involves the agreement of everyone else. To the extent they are required to respect his rights, he must similarly respect theirs.
As populations continue to increase and society becomes more complex, pressures increase in connection with the use of land and resources. The consequence of this is greater necessity for restrictions upon the manner in which property rights may be exercised. Just as the right to hold, use and enjoy property is by the collective consent of society, as represented by the law, the law within its proper limits may also impose such controls thereon as are necessary in the interest of the common welfare. One cannot demand of collective society to be protected in his ownership of property, and refuse to be hound by the conditions it sets upon which it will safeguard such ownership. The rights and duties are reciprocal and the enjoyment of property is confined within a framework limited by the rights of others as sanctioned by the law under principles of public policy.
 This case is a good illustration of the difficulty which arises when property owners attempt to so regard their rights and extend them to the limit. The plaintiffs assert an absolute right to the possession and use of subterranean waters and in insisting upon maintaining it unimpaired, attempt to extend controls over the defendants’ rights to use of their lands; on the other hand, the defendants insist upon the right to put their land to normal and ordinary uses even if it impairs the plaintiffs’ claimed rights. When conflicts of this character arise it is necessary to give consideration to the basic purposes for which property is possessed as established by the customs and practices of people in the use of property of similar character. It is the policy of the law to recognize the propriety of such uses and encourage the improvement of property so that it may be put to its best advantage. It is apparent that the trial court regarded it as necessary for the defendants to take the measures they did to accomplish that purpose. That being so, under well-established principles of law relating to interference with underground waters they would incur no liability unless they (1) wilfully or intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs’ water ; or (2) were negligent or reckless with respect thereto in installation of their drains.3
 The plaintiffs as the moving parties have the responsibility of demonstrating their rights to recover under the principles just stated. It is true that the de*312fendants should have been aware that the Mower Pond was fed by springs and water percolating in the soil. But the defendants’ land which lies north of the pond, is only slightly lower than the Mower property. The ground level of their subdivision is approximately 11 feet lower than the bottom of the pond; and the nearest drain is some 350 feet from it. Under the facts shown as to the drainage of the whole area the defendants were not obliged to anticipate that the drainage of their land would result in reducing the waters available to the plaintiffs.
There is some evidence of conversations indicating that the defendants were warned of the likelihood that draining their property might result in adversely affecting plaintiffs’ water supply. But the evidence is in conflict as to the import of such conversations. We do not regard it as making imperative a determination by the trial court that the defendants wilfully or intentionally depleted the plaintiffs’ water supply, nor that they were negligent or reckless with respect thereto in installing their drains.
We are in accord with the view taken by the trial court that under the circumstances the defendants did not have to let their land remain in a swampy condition for the purpose of protecting underground waters of adjoining lairds. They were entitled to make ordinary and reasonable uses of their property so long as they did so with due care and not in violation of the principles herein set forth. In addition to being a sensible recognition of defendants’ rights to make such use of their property, this conclusion accords with the salutary public policy of encouraging the development of property for useful purposes. The benefits of a residential subdivision as compared with the maintenance of a swamp need hardly be pointed out.
Our resolution of the issue as to defendants’ right to use their property renders moot the question whether the trial court erred in refusing to find that the draining of the plaintiffs’ property was the cause of the lowering of the water table and the depletion of the plaintiffs’ source of water.
Affirmed. Costs to defendants (respondents) .
McDonough, j., and Merrill c. FAUX, District Judge, concur.
HENRIOD, J., concurs in result.

. Wrathall v. Johnson, 1935, 86 Utah 50, 40 P.2d 755; Justesen v. Olsen, 1935, 86 Utah 158, 40 P.2d 802.

. See 1 C.J.S. Actions § 15, p. 1008.

. See Restatement of Torts IV, Secs. 822 to 840, and 849; also Annotation 29 A.L.R.2d, p. 1365.