Court Opinion

ID: 9940974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 18:07:42.564447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:05.922159
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion       g
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                ALEXANDER M. FALCONI,                                 No. 85195
                Petitioner,
                vs.
                THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
                CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
                CHARLES J. HOSKIN, DISTRICT
                JUDGE,
                Respondents,
                                                                          ME
                and                                                       FEB 15 2024
                TROY A. MINTER; AND JENNIFER R.
                EASLER,
                                                                     BY
                Real Parties in Interest.                                  IEF DEPUTY CLERK

                            Original petition for a writ of mandamus or, alternatively,
                prohibition challenging local rules and a statute concerning access to
                certain court proceedings.
                            Petition granted.

                Luke A. Busby, Reno,
                for Petitioner.

                Page Law Firm and Fred C. Page, Las Vegas,
                for Real Party in Interest Troy A. Minter.

                The Law Offices of Frank J. Toti, Esq., and Frank J. Toti, Las Vegas,
                for Real Party in Interest Jennifer R. Easler.

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                  Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc., and Debra A. Bookout, Las
                  Vegas,
                  for Amici Curiae Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc.; Nevada Legal
                  Services; Northern Nevada Legal Aid; and Volunteer Attorneys for Rural
                  Nevadans.

                  Pecos Law Group and Shann D. Winesett and Michelle A. Hauser,
                  Henderson,
                  for Amicus Curiae State Bar of Nevada, Family Law Section.

                  Willick Law Group and Marshal S. Willick, Las Vegas,
                  for Amicus Curiae National American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
                  Committee.

                  BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.'

                                                   OPINION

                  By the Court, HERNDON, J.:
                              In June 2022, the Eighth Judicial District Court amended its
                  local rules EDCR 5.207 and EDCR 5.212, partially based on NRS 125.080.
                  Under this statute and the newly amended local rules, a child custody
                  matter is automatically closed and a family court proceeding must be closed
                  upon the request of a party. In practice, this means that a party has the
                  right to prohibit the public's access to court proceedings without a judicial
                  determination having been made that closure is necessary and appropriate.
                  However, the public has a constitutional right of access to court proceedings.

                        'The Honorable Patricia Lee, Justice, did not participate in the
                  decision in this matter. The Honorable Abbi Silver, Senior Justice, was
                  appointed to sit in her place.
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                Because the local rules and the statute require the district court to close the
                proceeding, they eliminate the process by which a judge should evaluate
                and analyze the factors that should be considered in closure decisions, and
                by bypassing the exercise of judicial discretion, the closure cannot be
                narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Thus, these local rules and
                NRS 125.080 violate the constitutional right of access to court proceedings.
                Accordingly, we hold that EDCR 5.207, EDCR 5.212, and NRS 125.080 are
                unconstitutional to the extent they permit closed family court proceedings2
                without the exercise of judicial discretion.
                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            On August 18, 2022, petitioner Alexander M. Falconi, who does
                business as the press organization Our Nevada Judges, filed a media
                request for camera access in a child custody proceeding between real parties
                in interest Troy Minter and Jennifer Easler. Easler did not oppose the
                media request, but Minter did. Minter argued that the parties' child was
                15 years old and it was not in the child's best interest to have his personal
                information broadcasted to the general public or to be available for the child
                to access on the internet. Lastly, Minter asserted that the custody dispute
                should be considered private and confidential.
                            On the same day as Falconi's request, the district court entered
                an order sealing the record in the case. The next day, the district court
                denied Falconi's request because the case was sealed, so "EDCR 5.207 and
                EDCR 5.212 require the matter to be private" and Supreme Court Rules

                      2We note that this opinion only concerns the constitutionality of NRS
                125.080, EDCR 5.2072, and EDCR 5.212. When in this opinion we refer to
                family law and/or family court proceedings, those terms do not include
                juvenile proceedings under NRS Title 5—Juvenile Justice.
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                  limit media access to private matters. Falconi then filed the underlying
                  writ petition, and this court invited amicus briefing.3
                                                   DISCUS SION
                  We exercise our discretion to entertain the writ petition
                              "This court    has    original   jurisdiction    to issue    writs of

                  mandamus."4 Gardner v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 730, 732, 405 P.3d
                  651, 653 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A writ of mandamus
                  is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires . . . or
                  to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion."          Int'l Game
                  Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558
                  (2008); NRS 34.160. "Writ relief is an extraordinary remedy that is only
                  available if a petitioner does not have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
                  in the ordinary course of law." In re William J. Raggio Farn, Tr., 136 Nev.
                  172, 175, 460 P,3d 969, 972 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
                  also NRS 34.170. "This court has considered writ petitions when doing so
                  will clarify a substantial issue of public policy or precedential value, and
                  where the petition presents a matter of first impression and considerations
                  of judicial economy support its review." Washoe Cnty. Hum. Servs. Agency

                        3At   oral argument, counsel for arnicus curiae National American
                  Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Committee, Marshal S. Willick,
                  represented that he was speaking on behalf of both real parties in interest.
                  After argument, Falconi filed a motion requesting this court correct the
                  record because Willick was not authorized to argue on Easler's behalf, as
                  she does not oppose the writ petition. We grant that motion and caution
                  counsel of the need to be accurate in representations made before this court.
                  See, e.g., RPC 3.3(a) (requiring veracity in statements made by a lawyer to
                  a tribunal).

                        4 Falconi alternatively seeks a writ of prohibition.In light of Falconi's
                  requested relief, we consider his petition as one for a writ of mandamus.
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                v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 87, 521 P.3d 1199, 1203 (2022)
                (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
                            Whether EDCR 5.207, EDCR 5.212, and NRS 125.080 are
                constitutional is a matter of first impression, and our consideration of their
                constitutionality serves judicial economy. See, e.g., We the People Nev. v.
                Miller, 124 Nev. 874, 878-88, 192 P.3d 1166, 1169-70 (2008) (exercising
                discretion to entertain a writ petition raising the question of whether a
                statute is constitutional); Lyft, Inc. v. Eighth Jud, Dist, Ct., 137 Nev. 832,
                834-40, 501 P.3d 994, 998-1002 (2021) (same). Additionally, the scope of the
                press's and public's access to courts is an important issue of law, as well as
                a substantial issue of public policy, warranting our extraordinary
                consideration. Further, issues of access to courts happen frequently but
                evade review because closed hearings often will have already occurred while
                the party denied access to the court challenges the closure of the hearing.5
                Lastly, we have recognized that direct appellate review is often not
                available to the press, and thus, writs for extraordinary relief rnay be
                necessary to challenge a denial of access. See SCR 243 (providing that the
                press rnay "seek extraordinary relief by way of writ petition" concerning the
                interpretation or application of the Supreme Court Rules); Stephens Media,
                LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. 849, 858, 221 P.3d 1240, 1246 (2009)
                (providing that a petition for extraordinary writ relief was appropriate

                      5 Both Falconi and real parties in interest agree that this issue is not
                moot even though the hearing to which Falconi sought access has already
                occurred because the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to
                the mootness doctrine applies. See Washoe Cnty. Hum. Servs., 138 Nev.,
                Adv. Op. 87, 521 P.3d at 1204 (providing that "cases involving moot
                controversies may still be considered by this court if they concern a matter
                of widespread importance capable of repetition, yet evading review"
                (internal quotation marks omitted)). We agree.
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                because "the press did not have an adequate remedy at law to challenge the
                district court's order denying its application to intervene"). Accordingly, we
                exercise our discretion to consider this petition.
                NRS 125.080 and the newly amended EDCRs
                              NRS 125.080(1) provides that "[l]n any action for divorce, the
                court shall, upon demand of either party, direct that the trial and issue or
                issues of fact joined therein be private." NRS 125.080(2) provides that
                 upon such demand of either party, all persons must be excluded from the
                court or chambers wherein the action is tried, except" the parties, their
                counsel, witnesses, parents, or siblings. In order to exclude some of the
                people listed as exceptions to the closure, there must be a hearing where
                the requesting party shows good cause for the exclusion of that person. NRS
                125.080(3).
                              As the parties acknowledge, the newly amended EDCR 5.212
                was fashioned from the language in NRS 125.080. EDCR 5.212(a) provides
                that "the court shall upon demand of either party, direct that the hearing
                or trial be private." Subsection (b) of EDCR 5.212 then copies the language
                from NRS 125.080(2), which lists people excluded from that closure.
                Subsections (c) and (d) address when the excepted people may still be
                excluded from the proceedings.      EDCR 5.212(e) provides that "[u]nless
                otherwise ordered or required by rule or statute regarding the public's right
                of access to court records, the record of a private hearing, or record of a
                hearing in a sealed case, shall be treated as confidential and not open to
                public inspection." While EDCR 5.212 does not specify to what types of
                proceedings it applies, because Part V of the EDCR governs family division
                matters and guardianships, it appears to broaden NRS 125.080's
                application from divorce cases to all proceedings occurring in family court.

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                            The newly adopted EDCR 5.207 provides that "a case involving
                a complaint for custody or similar pleading addressing child custody or
                support between unmarried parties shall be construed as proceeding
                pursuant to NRS Chapter 126," which deals with parentage. NRS 126.211
                provides that "[a]ny hearing or trial held under this chapter must be held
                in closed court without admittance of any person other than those necessary
                to the action or proceeding."6 Additionally, NRS 126.211 provides that "[a]ll
                papers and records, other than the final judgment... are subject to
                inspection only upon consent of the court and all interested persons, or in
                exceptional cases only upon an order of the court for good cause shown."
                Thus, under the newly adopted EDCR 5.207, all custody actions must be
                closed and the records sealed.
                There is a constitutional right of access to family court proceedings
                            Falconi contends that the press and the public have a
                constitutional right of access to family court proceedings and that NRS
                125.080, EDCR 5.207, and EDCR 5.212 cannot withstand strict scrutiny
                because they permit closure of family court proceedings without granting
                the district court discretion to determine whether the closure is narrowly
                tailored to serve a compelling interest. We agree.
                            The United States Supreme Court has held that the public has
                a constitutional right of access to criminal trials and noted that "historically
                both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open." Richmond
                Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 & n.17 (1980). Since that
                case, the Supreme Court has yet to explicitly recognize a First Amendment
                right to access civil proceedings, but every federal circuit court that has

                      6 Because no party asked us to consider the constitutionality of NRS
                126.211, we do not do so here.
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                considered the issue has concluded that the constitutional right applies in
                both criminal and civil proceedings.       Courthouse News Servs. v. Planet
                (Planet III), 947 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing to multiple cases,
                including cases that recognize the same). While this court has yet to have
                the opportunity to consider whether the constitutional right to access
                applies to civil proceedings, or even more specifically family law
                proceedings, we have followed the United States Supreme Court's precedent
                and held that it applies in criminal proceedings. Stephens Media, 125 Nev.
                at 860, 221 P.3d at 1248.
                            Given the "constant tension between the interest in public
                disclosure and privacy concerns," courts generally use the "experience and
                logic test" to determine whether there is a constitutional right of access.
                Courthouse News Servs. u. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 2018).
                Under this test, courts consider "whether a proposed right reflects a well-
                developed tradition of access to a specific process and whether the right
                'plays a significant role in the functioning of the particular process in
                question." Id. at 1070 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-
                Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (considering the right of access to preliminary
                hearings in criminal proceedings)). Even if there is an affirmative answer
                to the experience and logic test, the presumption of a First Amendment
                right of access can be overcome when the closure is necessary to preserve a
                compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Press-
                Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13-14.

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                Civil proceedings are presumptively open
                            We take this opportunity to expand our discussion in Stephens
                Media, which concluded that there is a right to access criminal proceedings,
                and hold that the right to access also applies in civil proceedings, including
                family law proceedings.
                            The presumption of open proceedings is grounded in both
                history and logic, as "the tradition of openness can be traced back to
                sixteenth-century English common law, which carried over to colonial
                America ... [and] existed as common practice before the United States
                Constitution was ratified." Stephens Media, 125 Nev. at 859, 221 P.3d at
                1247 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501,
                505-08 (1984), and Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J.,
                concurring)); see also Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068
                (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing a tradition of openness for civil trials in English
                common law).     "The value of openness lies in the fact that people not
                actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are
                being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives
                assurance that established procedures are being followed and that
                deviations will become known."      Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. at 508. Thus,
                courts have recognized that "[o]penness in judicial proceedings enhances
                both the basic fairness of the proceeding and the appearance of fairness so
                essential to public confidence in the system, and forms an indispensable
                predicate to free expression about the workings of government." Planet III,
                947 F.3d at 589 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
                            In light of the important role open court proceedings play, and
                in accordance with the jurisdictions that have considered this issue, we
                conclude there is a presumption that civil proceedings must be open, just
                like criminal proceedings. See, e.g., NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v.
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                  Superior Ct., 980 P.2d 337, 359-61 (Cal. 1999) (concluding that "in general,
                  the First Amendment provides a right of access to ordinary civil trials and
                  proceedings" after recognizing that the United States Supreme Court "has
                  not accepted review of any of the numerous lower court cases that have
                  found a general First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings" and
                  providing that "we have not found a single lower court case holding that
                  generally there is no First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings").

                              Further, we conclude there is no reason to distinguish family
                  law proceedings from civil proceedings in this context. Traditionally, across
                  the nation, family law proceedings are, and have been, presumptively open.
                  See W. Thomas McGough, Jr., Public Access to Divorce Proceedings: A Media
                  Lawyer's Perspective, 17 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law, 29, 31 (2001) (citing to
                  both 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 303 (1998), and constitutional
                  provisions from 24 states that guarantee public access to courts); 24 Am.
                  Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 283 (2023); see also, e.g., In re Burkle, 37
                  Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 816-17 (Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that family law
                  proceedings are presumptively open across the country); In re Rajea T., 165
                  N.Y.S.3d 647, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022) ("This fundamental presumption of
                  public access to judicial proceedings applies equally to matters heard in
                  Family Court." (internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted)); N.J.
                  Div. of Youth and Farn. Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261, 269 (N.J. 1990)
                  (recognizing that while there may often be circumstances warranting a
                  closure of parental rights termination proceedings, those proceedings
                  cannot   be automatically closed     and the court     must consider     the
                  circumstances of each individual case in determining if closure is
                  appropriate); Copeland v. Copeland, 930 So. 2d 940, 941 (La. 2006)
                  (explaining that, in light of the presumption of open proceedings, an action

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                cannot be closed or sealed merely because it involves the custody of minor
                children); France v. France, 705 S.E.2d 399, 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011)
                (providing in a child custody action that "[w]hile a trial court may close
                proceedings to protect minors in certain situations . . . we can find no case
                supporting the closing of an entire proceeding merely because some
                evidence relating to a minor child would be admitted"). While Minter and
                two of the amici argue that this court need only consider whether family
                law proceedings in Nevada have been traditionally open, we conclude the
                constitutional question is not one of Nevada's history regarding family law
                proceedings, but one of whether family law proceedings have historically
                been open across the United States. El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico,
                508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993) (concluding that "the 'experience' test of Globe
                Newspaper does not look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction,
                but instead to the experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout the
                United States" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, because family
                law proceedings have been historically open nationwide, the first part of the
                experience and logic test has been met.7
                            Next, we must consider the logic portion of the test, and we
                conclude that open family law proceedings play a significant role in the
                functioning of the family court, warranting a presumption of open access.
                Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 8-12 (describing the experience and logic test as
                applied to criminal preliminary hearings and noting with regard to the logic
                test "that public access to criminal trials and the selection of jurors is

                      'While our dissenting colleagues provide an exhaustive history of
                early family law cases and tradition, they do not address the more recent
                family law precedent across the country and do not consider precedent
                applying the requisite experience and logic test and concluding that the
                historical evidence supports a tradition of open family court proceedings.
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                essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system"). As the
                Ninth Circuit has recognized, "Mlle right of access is . . . an essential part
                of the First Amendment's purpose to ensure that the individual citizen can
                effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-
                government." Planet III, 947 F.3d at 589 (internal citations and quotations
                omitted). And as described by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, "public
                access to civil trials enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the
                factfinding process, fosters an appearance of fairness, and heightens public
                respect for the judicial process—an essential component in our structure of
                self government." Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16,
                23 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Del
                Papa v. Steffen, 112 Nev. 369, 374, 915 P.2d 245, 249 (1996) ("[O]pen court
                proceedings assure that proceedings are conducted fairly and discourage
                                                                                 ,
                perjury, misconduct by participants, and biased decision making."). This is
                especially important in a state where citizens elect their judges because it
                ensures that the public has the necessary knowledge to serve as a check on
                the judicial branch on election day. See Del Papa, 112 Nev. at 374, 915 P.2d
                at 249 ("The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are
                matters of utmost public concern." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                Further, as Falconi argues, and we agree, having open family law
                proceedings is important because many family law parties appear pro se
                and open proceedings provide such litigants with examples of what they can
                expect in their own case.      Accordingly, because both portions of the
                experience and logic test are met, we conclude that civil proceedings, and
                specifically family law proceedings, are presumptively open.

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                   The presurnption cannot be overcome because the rules and NRS 125.080 are
                   not narrowly tailored
                               Once the presumption of a constitutional right of access
                   attaches, that presumption can only be overcome "if 'closure is essential to
                   preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve those interests."
                   Planet III, 947 F.3d at 595 (quoting Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13-14).
                   Thus, to overcome the presumption, one must show three things: (1) closure
                   serves a compelling interest; (2) there is a substantial probability that, in
                   the absence of closure, this compelling interest could be harmed; and
                   (3) there are no alternatives to closure that would adequately protect the
                   compelling interest. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13-14.
                               We acknowledge that there is an interest in protecting litigants'
                   privacy rights in family law proceedings, as those proceedings apply wholly
                   to their private lives. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burkle, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d
                   805, 807-18 (Ct. App. 2006). However, a litigant's privacy interests do not
                   automatically overcome the press's and the public's right to access court
                   proceedings. In fact, the majority of jurisdictions to have considered this
                   issue have concluded that when there are no extraordinary circumstances
                   present, the public's right to access family law proceedings outweighs the
                   litigants' privacy interests. Laura W. Morgan, Strengthening the Lock on
                   the Bedroom Door: The Case Against Access to Divorce Records On Line, 17
                   J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 45, 59 (2001) ("[T]he trend in the case law has
                   been clear: divorce court records are open to the public, and the privacy
                   rights of the individual must yield to the First Amendment when all factors
                   are equal.").

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                            EDCR 5.207 automatically closes child custody actions, and
                NRS 125.080 and EDCR 5.212 require closure upon a party's request,
                eliminating the district court's discretion to weigh when a closure is
                warranted and when the public's right of access warrants keeping the
                proceeding open.     Additionally, they prevent the district court from
                considering alternatives to closure that might protect the parties' privacy
                while still keeping the proceeding open.       In any other proceedings in
                Nevada, before a district court can close those proceedings "(1) the party
                seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is
                likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure must be no broader than necessary to
                protect the overriding interest; (3) the trial court must consider reasonable
                alternatives to closing the proceeding; and (4) the trial court must make
                findings adequate to support the closure." Feazell v. State, 111 Nev. 1446,
                1449, 906 P.2d 727, 729 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                            It should be noted that the closure of various family law
                proceedings can and will be warranted in various instances.          What we
                recognize today is the critical importance of the public's access to the courts
                and the role that thoughtful, reasoned judicial decision-making plays in
                identifying the compelling interests at stake and determining: (1) if and
                when to order closure in any proceeding, be it family, civil, or criminal in
                nature; and (2) to what extent such closure should apply. We conclude that
                family court parties' privacy interests do not warrant a different standard
                for closed proceedings. The test that district courts apply on a case-by-case
                basis in closing proceedings in all other matters in Nevada can and will
                sufficiently protect family court parties' privacy interests.      Failure to
                consider whether to close a proceeding on a case-by-case basis, which is not
                a significantly high burden, falls short of the Press-Enterprise 11

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                requirement that closure is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.
                478 U.S. at 13-14.     Accordingly, because family law proceedings are
                presumptively open and NRS 125.080, EDCR 5.207, and EDCR 5.212
                preclude the district court from applying the balancing test to overcome that
                presumption on a case-by-case basis, they are unconstitutional in this
                re gard.8
                                              CONCLUSION
                            NRS 125.080, EDCR 5.207, and EDCR 5.212 violate the
                constitutional right to access court proceedings. Family law proceedings
                are presumptively open, as they have been traditionally open across the
                country and the openness of the proceedings plays a significant role in the
                functioning of the family court. Because NRS 125.080, EDCR 5.207, and
                EDCR 5.212 preclude the district court's exercise of discretion in closing
                proceedings, they are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.
                Thus, we hold that NRS 125.080, EDCR 5.207, and EDCR 5.212 are
                unconstitutional to the extent they permit closed court proceedings without
                the exercise of judicial discretion. Accordingly, we grant Falconi's petition
                and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing

                      8Because    we conclude that EDCR 5.207 and EDCR 5.212 are
                unconstitutional to the extent they permit closed court proceedings without
                the exercise of judicial discretion, we need not address Falconi's argument
                that SRCR 3(5)(c) and SCR 230 preempt them.
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                the district court to vacate its order denying media access in the underlying
                child custody case.

                                                             (4  .

                                                                                  J.
                                                       Herndon

                We concur:

                                            ,   C.J.
                Cadish

                         A                      J.
                Pickering

                                            , Sr. J.
                Silver

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                   STIGLICH, J., with whom PARRAGUIRRE and BELL, JJ., agree,
                   dissenting:
                                 Today's disposition errs in treating all family law cases
                   uniformly and in treating family law cases the same as all other civil
                   proceedings. Family law encompasses many types of proceedings with
                   disparate origins and traditions of openness and should be distinguished
                   from other civil proceedings in these regards. As to divorce and child
                   custody proceedings specifically, neither distinct traditions of openness nor
                   logic support finding a First Amendment qualified right of public access.
                   And as no right of access exists, strict scrutiny does not apply, and the
                   controlling standards dictate that a different result should be reached.
                                 Before inquiring into these traditions, it is important to note
                   that the disposition renders an advisory opinion. This writ petition arises
                   from a child custody proceeding, not a divorce proceeding. The disposition,
                   however, invalidates an uninvolved divorce statute that is not at issue here.
                   To reason that the divorce statute can be struck because rules pertaining to
                   child custody proceedings are based on it is an improper way to evaluate a
                   statute's constitutionality. Cf. Echeverria v. State, 137 Nev. 486, 489, 495
                   P.3d 471, 475 (2021) (rephrasing a certified question to avoid addressing a
                   related but not presented issue because doing otherwise would render an
                   advisory opinion); Personhood Neu. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d
                   572, 574 (2010) ("This court's duty is not to render advisory opinions but,
                   rather, to resolve actual controversies by an enforceable judgment."). This
                   reflects another facet of the misstep of treating all family law cases as alike.
                                 While the disposition correctly notes that the court must look to
                   the historic experience of the type of hearing in determining the tradition
                   of openness, the analysis does not do so, instead relying on a general
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                assertion of traditional openness. Courts properly look to the origins of the
                specific type of proceeding in assessing its experience of openness. See, e.g.,
                N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting
                the lack of a tradition of openness in deportation proceedings and
                concluding that there is no First Amendment right of access in such
                matters); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986)

                (considering the history of civil discovery proceedings and concluding that
                it does not exhibit a tradition of openness).     The disposition takes the
                opposite approach, going so far as to state that civil proceedings, writ large,
                are presumptively open. This is incorrect. The majority's reliance on NBC
                Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Ct., 980 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1999), for
                the proposition that civil law proceedings must be open misapplies that
                decision. NBC Subsidiary stated that no court has held that the right of
                access, as a general matter, cannot be found to apply to a civil proceeding.
                Id. at 358-59. This does not entail that the right of public access does apply
                to all civil proceedings. The most NBC Subsidiary stands for in this regard
                is a presumption of openness for "ordinary civil trials," and that court
                significantly provided that its holding did not apply to "particular
                proceedings governed by specific statutes" such as the Family Code. Id. at
                361 & n.30. To extend this reasoning to encompass all proceedings that
                may colorably be called "family law" proceedings conflicts with the Supreme
                Court's direction to consider openness as to the particular type of hearing.
                El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean Int'l News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico, 508
                U.S. 147, 150 (1993).
                            When the United States Supreme Court has considered the
                tradition of openness in criminal proceedings, it has examined the origins
                of the jury system in England before the Norman Conquest and observed

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                 that the public character of trials remained constant. Press-Enter. Co. v.
                 Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
                 Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1980) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). As
                 is obvious, this matter does not involve the right of public access to criminal
                 proceedings at any stage. The opinion here strikes a statute concerning
                 divorce proceedings, NRS 125.080, and rules concerning child custody and
                 maintenance, EDCR 5.207, and proceedings in the family division, EDCR
                 5.212. In determining whether there is a right of public access, the court
                 should look to the specific traditions of those types of proceedings. El Vocero
                 de Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. at 150-51 (providing that the "experience" test looks
                 "to the experience in that type or kind of hearing" (internal quotation marks
                 omitted)).   The historical backdrop of each type of family proceeding
                 radically departs from that of the criminal proceedings examined by the
                 Supreme Court.'
                              Let us begin with divorce. Historically, while criminal matters
                 invariably proceeded in open fora, divorce actions did not. The English
                 tradition provided the context in which the United States Constitution was
                 adopted and is instructive for interpreting these principles of our organic
                 law. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569; see Worthington v. Dist. Ct. of
                 Second Jud. Dist., 37 Nev. 212, 230, 142 P. 230, 237 (1914) (providing that
                 "the law of divorce as it existed at and prior to the time of the adoption of
                 the Constitution should be considered" in reviewing a constitutional
                 challenge to a durational residence statute). When the Constitution was

                       1The disposition's response to the ensuing analysis as not taking into
                 account recent developments misapprehends the standard. As the
                 hallmark Supreme Court analyses of this right show, what matters are the
                 origins of the type of proceeding.
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                    adopted, sole jurisdiction for divorce actions in England lay with
                    ecclesiastical courts, where it remained until 1857. Worthington, 37 Nev.
                    at 230-31, 142 P. at 237; Morgan v. Foretich, 521 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1987).
                                Early American authorities recognized this tradition. Schwab
                    v. Schwab, 54 A. 653, 655 (Md. 1903) ("[O]ur predecessors said that the
                    decisions of the English ecclesiastical courts have been uniformly cited and
                    relied on as safe and authoritative guides for the courts of this state in
                    disposing of divorce cases."). In Scott v. Scott, Viscount Haldane described
                    to the House of Lords the closed practices of the ecclesiastical courts:
                               [I]t was not their practice to take evidence viva voce
                               in open Court. The evidence was taken in the form
                               of depositions before commissioners, who conducted
                               their proceedings in private. The parties were not
                               represented at this stage in the fashion with which
                               we are familiar. When a witness was tendered for
                               examination the commissioners could, in the course
                               of taking his deposition, put to him interrogatories
                               delivered by the other side, but there was no cross-
                               examination, or, for that matter, examination-in-
                               chief, of the parties. Each side could tender
                               witnesses, but until the evidence was complete
                               neither side was allowed to see the depositions
                               which had been taken. After the commissioners
                               had finished their work, what was called
                               publication took place. This did not mean that the
                               evidence was published to the world, but only that
                               the parties had access to it.
                    [1913] AC 417 (HL) 417, 433 (appeal taken from Eng.), https://www.iclr.
                    co. uk/wp -content/uploads/media/vote/1865-1914/Scott_ac1913-1-417.p df.
                    The practice described in Scott is hardly what we would now describe as an
                    open court. The experience in ecclesiastical courts thus did not feature an
                    abiding "public character" akin to that of criminal matters that led the

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                Supreme Court to find a presumption of openness. Press-Enter., 464 U.S.
                at 506-08.
                             The disposition's statement that "family law" proceedings were
                traditionally open does not consider the tradition of divorce proceedings,
                conflates all family law proceedings as arising from the same tradition, and
                is mistaken.2    Absent a presumption of openness in divorce proceedings,

                      2 While the disposition cites a law journal article's observation that 24
                state constitutions have open-court provisions, this proposition is of little
                use here, given that it neglects to differentiate between types of
                proceedings. See San Bernardino Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Superior
                Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 343 n.9 (Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting that juvenile
                proceedings may be simplistically labeled "civil" or "criminal" without
                engaging with the unique attributes of that type of proceeding); Morgan,
                521 A.2d at 252 n.11 ("Although technically classified as civil cases, family
                proceedings do not have the same historical presumption of openness as
                discussed above."). Moreover, these constitutional provisions have yielded
                disparate outcomes, as, for instance, Louisiana's open-court provision has
                been held to require open divorce proceedings, Copeland v. Copeland, 966
                So. 2d 1040, 1045 (La. 2007), while Delaware's has not, C. v. C., 320 A.2d
                717, 728 (Del. 1974). And of course, the Nevada Constitution features no
                such provision. Other decisions relied on in this context also lack the force
                given to them. In re Burkle, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 816-17 (Ct. App. 2006),
                does not recognize that family law proceedings were presumptively open
                across the country; rather, Burkle did not consider any nationwide practice
                but did "find nothing to suggest that, in general, civil trials in divorce cases
                have not historically been open to the public just as any other civil trial," id.
                at 814. Burkle, however, offered no supporting authorities for this bare
                statement and did not examine the tradition of divorce proceedings. As the
                discussion here shows Burkle's factual proposition to be incorrect, Burkle is
                not persuasive in this regard. Similarly, In re Rajea T., 165 N.Y.S.3d 647,
                651 (App. Div. 2022), is not instructive, considering that its presumption of
                openness rests on a New York rule providing "[t]he Family Court is open to
                the public," N.Y.C.R.R. § 205.4, consistent with a statutory right of
                openness, N.Y. Jud. § 4 (providing that court proceedings are public with
                certain exceptions stated). N.J. Div. of Youth & Farn. Servs. v. J.B., 576
                A.2d 261, 269 (N.J. 1990), meanwhile presumes that termination-of-
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                   NRS 125.080 should not be reviewed for strict scrutiny but rather for
                   whether it has a rational basis. Finding a rational basis to permit parties
                   to close divorce proceedings is not hard, and the Supreme Court has done
                   so in a different context, observing that "the common-law right of inspection
                   has bowed before the power of a court to insure that its records are not 'used
                   to gratify private spite or promote public scandal' through the publication
                   of 'the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case." Nixon
                   v. Warner Cornrn'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (quoting In re Caswell,
                   29 A. 259 (R.I. 1893)).
                               The nature of divorce law establishes further the distance of its
                   tradition from that of civil proceedings more generally. The ecclesiastical
                   courts were not common law courts, but rather "administered the unwritten
                   law of the realm" on matters within their jurisdiction. Foote v. Nickerson,
                   48 A. 1088, 1089 (N.H. 1901).         Given that there has not been an
                   ecclesiastical-court tradition in the United States, adopting the common law
                   did not incorporate a body of divorce law in the states of the United States,
                   and states built their doctrines of divorce law by statutory enactment.
                   Worthington, 37 Nev. at 231, 142 P. at 237; cf. Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S.
                   586, 593-94 (1890) ("The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
                   and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the

                   parental-rights proceedings will be closed to the public, not open. Copeland
                   v. Copeland, 930 So. 2d 940, 941 (La. 2006), rests its openness
                   determination on a controlling state constitutional provision, cf. La. Const.
                   Art. 1, § 22 ("All courts shall be open . . . ."). And the court in France v.
                   France, 705 S.E.2d 399, 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), stated that a matter
                   should not be closed unless a specific statutory mandate closing that type of
                   proceeding applies, such as one closing adoption proceedings. France would
                   support the constitutionality of the provisions invalidated here.
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                laws of the United States."). Two aspects warrant particular mention in
                this regard.
                               First, in early American practice, the legislature itself would
                issue a divorce as a "legislative declaration by special act." People ex rel.
                Christiansen v. Connell, 118 N.E.2d 262, 266 (1ll. 1954); see also C. v. C.,
                320 A.2d at 726 ("Since our first divorce statute in 1832, it has been
                recognized that divorce jurisdiction emanated solely from the act of the
                General Assembly and not from common law."); cf. Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G.
                & J. 463, 474 (Md. 1829) ("[D]ivorces in this State from the earliest times
                have emanated from the General Assembly, and can now be viewed in no
                other light, than as regular exertions of legislative power."). Legislatures
                ultimately granted courts jurisdiction over divorce proceedings but retained
                the paramount role in setting forth the procedure and substantive law
                regarding divorce. Christiansen, 118 N.E.2d at 266; see also Worthington,
                37 Nev. at 234-35, 142 P. at 238 (collecting cases supporting the propositions
                that jurisdiction regarding divorce is purely statutory and that legislatures
                are empowered to enact controlling provisions).
                               Second, the central role of a legislature in this regard arises
                from the subject regulated itself. As the United States Supreme Court has
                recognized, Indarriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as
                having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any
                other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature."
                Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). The Florida Supreme Court has
                relatedly observed that "[s]ince marriage is of vital interest to society and
                the state, it has frequently been said that in every divorce suit the state is
                a third party whose interests take precedence over the private interests of
                the spouses."      Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970).       A

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                    legislature has a heightened role in enacting statutes to implement a state's
                    public policy regarding divorce, as divorce is historically apart from the
                    common law tradition and involves matters of elevated public policy
                    significance. The Nevada Legislature has enacted a statute permitting
                    parties to a divorce to close the proceedings at their discretion. The court
                    here should be reticent to overturn the Legislature's expression of public
                    policy.
                                  Just as family law cases cannot be treated as a monolith
                    alongside other civil proceedings, matters now regarded collectively as
                    family law proceedings do not emerge from like traditions of openness. And
                    so I conclude that the tradition of child custody proceedings does not support
                    a presumption of openness either, but for different reasons. Traditionally,
                    courts have placed the best interests of the child as the paramount aim of
                    custody proceedings and have not felt bound by strict procedural rules,
                    tolerating closed proceedings where the circumstances warrant.
                                  Unlike the strict ecclesiastical jurisdiction governing divorce
                    proceedings, child custody matters were customarily placed within
                    chancery courts. In re Morgan, 21 S.W. 1122, 1123 (Mo. 1893). Except when
                    resolved as incident to a separate action for divorce, a custody action would
                    commence by application to the chancellor or by petition for a writ of habeas
                    corpus.   Finlay u. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo, J.);
                    William Pinder Eversley, The Law of the Domestic Relations 545 (London,
                    Stevens & Haynes 1885).       This approach was well established in both
                    American and English law. State ex rel. Herrick u. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272,
                    274 (1860).
                                  Analogous to the special interest the legislature takes in
                    matters of divorce, the court traditionally occupied a role distinct from that

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                of more general litigation.       In the seminal chancery court case De
                Manneville v. De Manneville, the court explained that it adjudicated custody
                matters as parens patriae, exercising power as the representative of the
                monarch in resolving the habeas petition however best served the child. De
                Manneville v. De Manneville (1804), 32 Eng. Rep. 762, 765. In describing
                the Anglo-American tradition in this regard, Judge Cardozo recognized that
                the chancellor here does not adjudicate a dispute between two parties but
                rather acts as parens patriae "to do what is best for the interest of the child,"
                as though "in the position of a 'wise, affectionate, and careful parent,' . . . 'by
                virtue of the prerogative which belongs to the Crown as parens patriae."
                Finlay, 148 N.E. at 626 (quoting a Queen's Bench decision); see also Pearce
                v. Pearce, 33 So. 883, 884 (Ala. 1903) ("The character and purpose of the
                proceedings [involving child custody] are different from an action where
                only the rights of the parties litigating are involved."). In the United States,
                the court stands in parens patriae as the representative of the people, duty
                bound to protect children and act in their best interests. Helton v. Crawley,
                41 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Iowa 1950). This role—and its extreme delicacy—was
                deemed "indispensable to good order and the just protection of society" and
                is of a long provenance in our system of law. People ex rel. Brooks v. Brooks,
                35 Barb. 85, 87-88 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1861). And so, from this tradition, the
                court has had its own role in custody proceedings, as distinguishable from
                simply adjudicating a dispute between two parties.
                             In determining what best served a child's interest in custody
                adjudications, courts have traditionally been less constrained by formal
                rules, and a tradition of openness ascribable to civil cases cannot be
                extended to include custody proceedings.            Courts have distinguished
                custody proceedings from those cases "proceed[ing] under the common-law

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                      system of procedure" to conclude that strict pleading rules do not apply.
                      People ex rel. Keator u. Moss, 39 N.Y.S. 690, 692 (App. Div. 1896). A court
                      in these matters traditionally "is not bound down by any particular form of
                      proceeding," which may include proceedings in open court or resolving the
                      matter "from its own knowledge alone," so long as it considers all of the
                      circumstances. Cowles v. Cowles, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 435, 438 (1846). The court
                      may traverse beyond "ordinary modes of trial," examine a child privately,
                      and withhold information concerning a parent's character, so long as the
                      decision promotes the child's welfare. Dumain v. Gwynne, 92 Mass. (10
                      Allen) 270, 275 (1865). Simply, the court "may interfere at any time and in
                      any way to protect and advance [the child's] welfare and interests." In re
                      Bort, 25 Kan. 308, 310 (1881). An early treatise explained the procedure
                      more fully, explaining that a custody hearing pursuant to a habeas petition
                      proceeded without a jury, characterizing it more as an inquisition than a
                      trial. Lewis Hochheimer, A Treatise on the Law Relating to the Custody of
                      Infants 70-71 (Baltimore, Harold B. Scrimger 3d ed. 1899). The outcome
                      should not turn on any procedural technicality, and the court is not limited
                      "to the ordinary modes of trial," should seek out "the exact truth," and "may
                      examine the child privately." Id. at 71; see also Eversley at 526 (recognizing
                      that private examination of a child may be warranted for sensitive
                      questions regarding religion). Both the role of the court and the nature of
                      the proceedings are distinguishable from those of civil proceedings
                      generally, and the tradition of child custody proceedings does not exhibit a
                      custom of openness.      Therefore, I would not conclude that a First
                      Amendment qualified right of public access is present in such matters.
                                  Logic should militate against finding a presumption of openness
                      as well. In presuming that custody proceedings be open, the disposition

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                limits what rules may be enacted to facilitate proceedings to only what may
                survive strict scrutiny. This places an obstacle on the court's pursuit of the
                child's best interests, by presuming that openness rather than privacy best
                serves the child. It also burdens parties who are in a delicate and possibly
                traumatic situation with proving that privacy is a narrowly tailored means
                to attain a compelling state interest.
                            The Florida Supreme Court reached an analogous outcome in
                concluding that a statute mandating the closure of adoption proceedings
                was constitutional. In re Adoption of II.Y.T., 458 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla.
                1984). It noted that the court in such proceedings had a different role than
                disinterestedly resolving claims from competing parties, given that the
                court must serve the best interests of the child. Id. The court declined to
                subject parties to an adoption to the burden of showing that their privacy
                interests should be protected where the legislature by statute enacted the
                public policy of protecting privacy rights in that context.      Id. at 1128.
                Florida courts later upheld the constitutionality of statutes closing
                termination-of-parental-rights proceedings with the same reasoning, Nat.
                Parents of J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 780 So. 2d 6, 10-11
                (Fla. 2001), and dependency proceedings by extension of H.Y.T., Mayer v.
                State, 523 So. 2d 1171, 1174-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
                            California decisions involving the law's treatment of children
                show how protecting their interests requires paying more heed to protecting
                their privacy. In the juvenile justice context, the California Court of Appeal
                upheld a confidential-records statute because privacy served protective and
                rehabilitative purposes, consistent with the aims of the juvenile justice
                system "to promote [the minor's] best interests, facilitate rehabilitation or
                family reunification, and protect the minor from present and future adverse

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                     consequences and unnecessary emotional harm." People v. Connor, 9 Cal.
                     Rptr. 3d 521, 533 (Ct. App. 2004). Similarly, the risk that third parties
                     would obtain damaging information and deny future opportunities to
                     minors posed an unjustifiable threat to the juvenile court's rehabilitative
                     goals. T.N.G. v. Superior Ct., 484 P.2d 981, 988 (Cal. 1971). This reasoning
                     has been carried over to dependency proceedings, where privacy serves the
                     rehabilitative purpose of the proceedings. San Bernardino Cnty. Dep't of
                     Pub. Soc. Serus. v. Superior Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 340 (Ct. App. 1991).
                     Neither experience nor logic support concluding that there is a qualified
                     right of public access to custody proceedings. This is not to say that there

                     is not considerable value to openness, but that interest should be balanced
                     with relevant privacy interests as a matter of public policy.
                                   Further, the public policy consequences of the disposition are
                     concerning.     By concluding—without any appropriate consideration of
                     different types of proceedings—that family law proceedings are both
                     traditionally open and logically should be publicly accessible, the analysis
                     renders presumptively unconstitutional NRS 127.140(1) (making adoption
                     proceedings confidential), NRS 128.090(5) (closing court for termination-of-
                     parental-rights proceedings), and undoubtedly other comparable statutes.
                     The opinion thus poses a significant risk to the enacted public policy that
                     these and other statutes represent.     The traditions of divorce and child
                     custody demonstrate a long-standing recognition that public policy has an
                     outsized role in these subjects. The Legislature's critical role in setting
                     forth—with the input and participation of members of the community—
                     what should be open and under what circumstances should not be lightly
                     cast aside.    Because today's disposition has misconstrued authority it

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                critically relies upon, has invalidated a statute not properly at issue, has
                neglected to specifically consider the types of proceedings at issue and
                accordingly has not recognized the relevant traditions of those proceedings,
                and has reached a broad holding that will upend large swathes of law, I
                respectfully dissent.

                                                                                  J.
                                                    Stiglich

                I co cur:

                                               J.
                Parraguirre

                                              J.
                Bell

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