Court Opinion

ID: 9960067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 10:09:37.977206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:07.809177
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 9, 2024

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                               NO. 01-22-00893-CR
                            ———————————
                       SERGIO ALVARADO, Appellant
                                         V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 351st District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                        Trial Court Case No. 1679186

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted appellant, Sergio Alvarado, of the second-degree felony

offense of indecency with a child by contact.1 After Alvarado and the State reached

1
      See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1), (c)(1).
an agreement on sentencing, the trial court assessed Alvarado’s punishment at four

years’ confinement.

      In three issues, Alvarado argues that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in

denying his motion for a directed verdict; (2) the State failed to present sufficient

evidence that Alvarado touched the complainant with the intent to arouse or gratify

the sexual desire of any person; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to admit the

complainant’s forensic interview under the rule of optional completeness to clarify

a false impression. We affirm.

                                    Background

      A.S. (“Alexis”) has three daughters, including the complainant A.C.

(“Adele”).2 Adele’s father passed away in 2015, when she was three years old, but

Adele remained close with her father’s side of the family. One of her father’s sisters,

Elizabeth, is married to Alvarado. Alvarado and Elizabeth have four children,

including two daughters who are a few years older than Adele.

      Of her father’s family, Adele was particularly close to Anjelica, her paternal

grandmother. Anjelica used to babysit Adele and her younger sister while Alexis

worked, and the girls would frequently spend the night at Anjelica’s house.

Elizabeth, Alvarado, and their children lived next door to Anjelica. Adele and her

2
      In this opinion, we use pseudonyms for the complainant and her mother to protect
      their privacy.
                                           2
sister often went to Elizabeth’s house so they could play with their cousins. Adele

was “very close” with Elizabeth, and it was common for Adele and her sister to

spend the night at Elizabeth’s house. Alexis did not always know when Adele was

at Elizabeth’s house, as opposed to Anjelica’s house, but she trusted Elizabeth and

she had no concerns with this arrangement.

      As a young child, Adele had been “happy [and] very friendly,” frequently

smiling and “goofing around.” In 2019, however, when Adele was seven years old,

Alexis began noticing changes in Adele’s behavior. Adele would have “angry

outbursts” in which she would slam doors and say things like, “I hate this family.”

Adele became quieter and more reserved, and she played less with her friends. Adele

also stopped wanting to go to Elizabeth’s house, preferring instead to stay with

Anjelica. Alexis thought it was odd that Adele did not want to spend time at

Elizabeth’s house, but she believed that perhaps Adele just wanted to spend more

time with Anjelica and was more comfortable sleeping at Anjelica’s house.

      In January 2020, when Adele was eight years old, Alexis took Adele to the

doctor because of a possible urinary tract infection. At the beginning of the

appointment, Adele was quiet and “just to herself.” When the female doctor started

to remove Adele’s pants for the examination, Adele “started crying and screaming

that she didn’t want [the doctor] to do that.” Alexis was shocked by Adele’s behavior

because this was not how she normally reacted when someone touched her.

                                         3
      In the car on the way home, Alexis questioned Adele about her reaction in the

doctor’s office. Adele told Alexis not to tell Elizabeth. After Alexis reassured Adele,

Adele disclosed that Alvarado had touched her “down there” and pointed to her

vagina. When asked if Adele told her where this had happened, Alexis testified:

      Yes, she [Adele] said at [Elizabeth’s] house. That she was staying the
      night. Her two cousins were in their room sleeping, and she was
      sleeping on the couch. She said it was nighttime and that the way their
      house is . . . their couch is right here and across the room is their
      [Alvarado and Elizabeth’s] bedroom. The bedroom is usually open.
      They have like a wide door.
      So what she told me was [Alvarado] sat down next to her and started
      touching her private part down there, and that’s when she told him to
      stop, to please stop and he didn’t. Finally, he did; and he went across
      the room changed his shirt and sprayed cologne. She told me cologne.

Adele reported to Alexis that she was “about six, seven” when this occurred.

      While Alexis and Adele were still in the car, Alexis called Elizabeth and told

her about Adele’s disclosure. Elizabeth was “in disbelief” over the allegation. Alexis

dropped Adele off at their house and then drove to pick up Elizabeth. Elizabeth was

standing outside, and she appeared “really shocked and worried and already saying,

No. Like, no, no.” Back at Alexis’s house, Adele told Elizabeth what had happened.

In response, Elizabeth told Adele that “it was just a dream and it’s not true and that

[Alvarado] wouldn’t do that.” Alexis was upset that Elizabeth did not believe Adele,

and she took Elizabeth home.

                                          4
      Alexis then told other members of the family, including Anjelica and Adele’s

other aunts.3 Although some family members believed Adele’s disclosure, Elizabeth

and Anjelica did not. Adele no longer communicates with Anjelica, Elizabeth,

Elizabeth’s children, and Alvarado. Adele’s “angry outbursts” stopped after her

disclosure.

      Alexis called the police and reported Adele’s disclosure. Baytown Police

Department Detective Adrian Soto testified about the investigation that he conducted

in response to the report. On cross-examination, Soto agreed that he learned during

his investigation that an older cousin of Adele’s had shown her “some pornographic

images or videos.”4

      As part of the investigation, Adele underwent a physical examination and a

forensic interview at the Harris County Children’s Assessment Center (“CAC”). The

trial court admitted the medical records from Adele’s physical exam. Sharon Record,

the nurse who performed the exam, also testified. Both Record’s testimony and the

3
      Alexis also let her older sister, Nicole, know about Adele’s disclosure. After Nicole
      finished work for the day, she came over to Alexis’s house and spoke with Adele
      alone. Nicole testified about Adele’s demeanor during this conversation, but she did
      not testify about what Adele had told her.
4
      Adele testified that when she was eight or nine years old, one of her older cousins
      showed her “naked people” on a phone. Adele did not say anything to her cousin
      about it, but she remembered being bothered by it and thinking, “Why are you
      showing me this? I’m not supposed to be seeing this.” Adele agreed with defense
      counsel that this occurred shortly before she disclosed to Alexis that Alvarado had
      touched her.
                                            5
medical records discussed Adele’s statements concerning the allegations against

Alvarado.

      The individual who conducted Adele’s forensic interview was not available

to testify at trial. Claudia Hauser, the supervisor of Forensic Services at the CAC,

reviewed the video recording of Adele’s interview. Prior to Hauser’s testimony,

defense counsel argued that the recording of the entire forensic interview should be

admitted under the rule of optional completeness. The State argued that the recording

was inadmissible hearsay. After several discussions concerning the admissibility of

the forensic interview, and after Hauser’s direct examination, the trial court

ultimately ruled that the recording was inadmissible hearsay.

      In addition to testifying about the general forensic interview process, Hauser

testified about several stages of disclosure of abuse, including tentative disclosure

and active disclosure. With respect to Adele specifically, Hauser testified that

Adele’s demeanor during the interview was “avoidant, reserved, hesitant.” She

“struggled” with providing sensory details, and it “was really difficult to get those

details from her.” Hauser believed Adele appeared to be in the tentative disclosure

stage. Hauser further testified that Adele “present[ed] very avoidant which is

common for a tentative disclosure,” but as the interview continued, she “move[d]

into active disclosure where she disclose[d] more details about the offense.”

                                         6
      Defense counsel cross-examined Hauser about Adele’s stage of disclosure.

Hauser testified that Adele “presented in the [t]entative stage or phase where it’s

very ambivalent,” and she would provide some information but also say things like,

“I don’t know. I’m not sure.” It did not take very long, however, for Adele to

transition into “[a]ctive disclosure” and there “was more information that was being

elicited by the child.” During the beginning of the interview, Adele generally

answered questions with “one or two word statements,” but she “did loosen up more

towards the end” of the interview. Hauser agreed that the topic of pornography was

raised during the forensic interview. She also agreed that when pornography was

discussed, Adele “volunteered information.”

      Adele also testified. She was ten years old at the time of trial. She testified

that she frequently spent time at Alvarado and Elizabeth’s house, playing with her

cousins and spending the night. When spending the night, Adele would sometimes

sleep in her cousins’ bedroom, but she usually slept on the couch in the living room.

On the day of the incident, which occurred when she was six or seven years old,

Adele spent the day playing with her cousins. That night, she went to sleep on the

couch in the living room. Adele was wearing shorts, and she laid on the couch with

her head on the arm rest. No one else was in the living room with her.

      During the night, Adele woke up and saw Alvarado sitting on the couch next

to her legs. She was confused about why he was there instead of sleeping. Alvarado

                                         7
reached up the legs of her shorts and touched Adele’s vagina underneath her

underwear with his hand. Adele could not remember how long this lasted, but she

asked him to stop twice. After the second time, he finally stopped. Alvarado said

something to her, but Adele did not know what he said or whether he spoke to her

in English or in Spanish. After Adele told him to stop, Alvarado walked into his

bedroom and sprayed cologne. Adele went to the bathroom and then into her

cousins’ bedroom.

      Adele did not immediately tell anyone about this incident because she thought

no one would believe her, especially Elizabeth. Adele testified that when she later

went to a doctor’s appointment, she did not wish to take her clothes off for the

examination and she started screaming and yelling. When asked why she reacted in

that manner, Adele stated: “Because I didn’t know, like, if [the doctor] like saw

something, like, not saw something, if she was going to eventually know what

happened. I didn’t want anybody to know, and then I was like scared that I didn’t

want her to like, you know, do that. I didn’t want her to check right there.” During

the drive home from the doctor’s office, Adele told Alexis what had happened. Adele

also told Elizabeth, but Elizabeth did not believe her and told Adele that it “didn’t

happen” and that “it was a dream.”

                                          8
      After the State rested, Alvarado moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the

State had presented no evidence that Alvarado touched Adele with the intent to

arouse or gratify sexual desire. The trial court denied the motion.

      The jury found Alvarado guilty of the offense of indecency with a child by

contact. At the beginning of the punishment phase before the trial court, the parties

announced that they had reached an agreement concerning punishment. The court

accepted the agreement and assessed Alvarado’s punishment at four years’

confinement. This appeal followed.

                             Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In his first issue, Alvarado argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant

his motion for directed verdict. In his second issue, he argues that the State failed to

present sufficient evidence that he touched Adele with the intent to arouse or gratify

his sexual desire. We address these issues together.

A.    Standard of Review

      We treat an appellate issue complaining about the denial of a motion for

directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Orellana v. State,

381 S.W.3d 645, 652 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d); see Smith v. State,

499 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“A motion for instructed verdict is

essentially a trial level challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”).

                                           9
      When determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine

whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence, a

rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Edwards v. State,

666 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). The factfinder bears the responsibility

to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Edwards, 666 S.W.3d at 574 (quoting

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App.

2023) (stating that factfinder is sole judge of “the credibility and weight to be

attached to the testimony of witnesses”) (quotations omitted).

      We may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating

the weight and credibility of the evidence. Edwards, 666 S.W.3d at 574. When the

record supports conflicting inferences from the evidence, we presume that the jury

resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.

Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482 (quotations omitted).

      In our review, we consider “the cumulative force of the evidence.” Edwards,

666 S.W.3d at 574; see Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App.

2015) (stating that we may not use “divide and conquer” strategy when evaluating

sufficiency of evidence) (quotations omitted). “Each fact need not point directly and

                                         10
independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the

incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Dobbs v. State,

434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence,

and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v.

State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

B.    Intent to Arouse or Gratify the Defendant’s Sexual Desire

      A defendant commits the offense of indecency with a child if, with a child

younger than 17 years of age, the defendant engages in sexual contact with the child

or causes the child to engage in sexual contact. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1).

Penal Code section 21.11(c) defines “sexual contact” to include “any touching by a

person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the

genitals of a child” if the act is committed “with the intent to arouse or gratify the

sexual desire of any person.” Id. § 21.11(c)(1). Under the indictment and the jury

charge in this case, the State was required to prove that Alvarado touched Adele’s

sexual organ with the intent to arouse and gratify his sexual desire.

      The offense includes the requirement that the touching occur with the intent

to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person because “legitimate, non-

criminal, contact may occur between parents, nurses, doctors, or other care-givers

and a child, particularly a young child, on the relevant body parts.” Caballero v.

                                          11
State, 927 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, pet. ref’d). However, the

offense does not require “that the arousal or gratification actually occur.” Id. Instead,

“[t]he offense of indecency with a child is complete upon the contact accompanied

by the requisite intent.” Id. at 130–31. Indecency with a child “requires proof of the

accused’s intent to engage in the proscribed contact, rather than intent to bring about

a particular result.” Scott v. State, 202 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2006, pet. ref’d); Caballero, 927 S.W.2d at 131.

      The requisite intent may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct, his

remarks, and the surrounding circumstances. McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211,

216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Stephenson v. State, 673 S.W.3d 370, 384 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2023, pet. ref’d); Gonzalez v. State, 522 S.W.3d 48, 57 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). “No oral expression of intent or visible evidence

of sexual arousal is necessary.” Scott, 202 S.W.3d at 408; Gregory v. State, 56

S.W.3d 164, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d).

      On appeal, Alvarado argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence

that he touched Adele with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. Alvarado

acknowledges that visible evidence of arousal is not required for the evidence to be

sufficient, but he argues that if any contact occurred in this case, it “lasted mere

seconds,” which is “not enough to gratify any sexual desire.” He further argues that

                                           12
nothing in Adele’s testimony or her statements about the incident to other people

“indicated that [the touching] was sexual in nature.” We disagree.

      Adele testified that the incident occurred when she was six or seven years old

and she was spending the night at Alvarado and Elizabeth’s house after playing with

her cousins. Adele was sleeping alone on the couch in the living room when she

woke up during the night and saw Alvarado sitting on the couch next to her legs.

While mumbling something that she could not understand, Alvarado reached up

through the leg of her shorts and underneath her underwear. He touched her on her

vagina with his hand. She told Alvarado to stop twice before he did so. He then left

the living room and went back to his bedroom.

      The jury could have permissibly inferred the requisite intent from Alvarado’s

conduct and the surrounding circumstances. See McKenzie, 617 S.W.2d at 216. The

touching occurred at night, when the rest of the household was asleep, and Adele

was alone in the living room. Adele had been asleep before Alvarado touched her,

and Alvarado does not argue that the touching occurred accidentally, such as during

innocent play. See Perales v. State, 226 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (concluding that sufficient evidence supported requisite intent

even when defendant told police that he had been playing with his daughter, “she

started to fall, and he had caught her and held her vagina”). Additionally, Alvarado

was not Adele’s caregiver and thus had no medical or health reasons to touch Adele’s

                                          13
vagina, especially during the middle of the night while Adele slept. See Scott, 202

S.W.3d at 408–09 (rejecting defendant’s argument that he lacked improper intent

but instead touched stepdaughter’s vagina to assist her with applying medical cream

when stepdaughter was old enough to apply medication herself and defendant also

touched her “unrelated to application of medication”); Caballero, 927 S.W.2d at 130

(noting that offense of indecency with child contains requirement that touching

occur with intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire because “legitimate, non-

criminal, contact may occur between parents, nurses, doctors, or other care-givers

and a child, particularly a young child, on the relevant body parts”).

      Adele also testified that Alvarado reached up the leg of her shorts and

underneath her underwear to touch her. This is also a surrounding circumstance that

the jury could consider when determining whether Alvarado touched Adele with the

intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. See Scott, 202 S.W.3d at 409 (stating

that jury could have inferred requisite intent from child’s testimony that defendant

reached under her shirt to touch her breasts); see also Gonzalez, 522 S.W.3d at 57

(concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support conviction when child

testified that defendant “pulled her underpants aside to put his mouth and tongue on

her genitals”). Adele also told Alvarado to stop touching her. See Perales, 226

S.W.3d at 535 (considering fact that child told defendant to stop touching her).

                                          14
      The State was not required to prove that “the arousal or gratification actually

occur[ed]” when Alvarado touched Adele. See Caballero, 927 S.W.2d at 130.

Instead, “[t]he offense of indecency with a child is complete upon the contact

accompanied by the requisite intent.” Id. at 130–31. We conclude that a rational jury

could infer from Alvarado’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances that he

touched Adele with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. See McKenzie,

617 S.W.2d at 216; Gonzalez, 522 S.W.3d at 57. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that Alvarado touched Adele’s vagina with the intent to arouse or gratify his

sexual desire. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1), (c)(1). We hold that sufficient

evidence supports Alvarado’s conviction.

      We overrule Alvarado’s first and second issues.5

5
      On appeal, Alvarado cites two cases from our sister courts for the proposition that
      “other cases finding the evidence legally sufficient deal with facts far greater than
      those here.” See Breckenridge v. State, 40 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—San
      Antonio 2000, pet. ref’d); Hayden v. State, 13 S.W.3d 69, 72–74 (Tex. App.—
      Texarkana 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 66 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
      As this Court has previously stated, however, “Simply because cases exist in which
      more extreme conduct occurred—that is, in which intent to arouse or to gratify
      sexual desire could be more easily inferred—does not mean that a jury could not
      have inferred intent from the facts of this case.” See Perales v. State, 226 S.W.3d
      531, 535 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d).
                                           15
                          Rule of Optional Completeness

      In his third issue, Alvarado argues that the trial court erred by failing to admit

the video recording of Adele’s forensic interview under the rule of optional

completeness to clarify a false impression.

      We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse

of discretion. Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The

trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules and

principles or if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664,

669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

      Hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted in the statement. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d); Bahena v. State, 634 S.W.3d 923,

927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible unless the statement

falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. TEX. R. EVID. 802; Pena v.

State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Texas Rule of Evidence 107—

the rule of optional completeness—is such an exception and provides:

      If a party introduces part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing,
      or recorded statement, an adverse party may inquire into any other part
      on the same subject. An adverse party may also introduce any other act,
      declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement that is
      necessary to explain or allow the trier of fact to fully understand the
      part offered by the opponent. “Writing or recorded statement” includes
      a deposition.

                                          16
TEX. R. EVID. 107; Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 814; Prince v. State, 574 S.W.3d 561, 571

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). The rule of optional completeness

“is one of admissibility and permits the introduction of otherwise inadmissible

evidence when that evidence is necessary to fully and fairly explain a matter ‘opened

up’ by the adverse party.” Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 217–18 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007).

      This rule is “designed to reduce the possibility of the jury receiving a false

impression from hearing only a part of some act, conversation, or writing.” Pena,

353 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218). To be admitted under this

rule, the omitted portion of a statement must be on the same subject and must be

necessary to make the statement fully understood. Id. (quoting Sauceda v. State, 129

S.W.3d 116, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). The rule “does not permit the introduction

of other similar, but inadmissible, evidence unless it is necessary to explain properly

admitted evidence.” Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218; see Castillo v. State, 573 S.W.3d

869, 877–78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (stating that if party

questions witness about specific statements made by another during recorded

interview, opposing party “may introduce any remaining part of the interview that

concerns the same subject and is necessary to permit the jury to place those specific

statements in their proper context”).

                                          17
      Here, after Alexis called the police following Adele’s disclosure that Alvarado

had touched her, Adele underwent a forensic interview at the CAC in March 2020.

By the time the case went to trial in November 2022, the individual who had

conducted the forensic interview had moved and was no longer employed by the

CAC. Claudia Hauser reviewed the video recording of Adele’s forensic interview

and formed some opinions about the interview.

      Prior to Hauser’s testimony, defense counsel requested that the trial court

admit the recording of the entire forensic interview under the rule of optional

completeness, arguing that if any part of the interview is discussed—including

Adele’s demeanor during the interview—it would be misleading not to show the

entire interview. The State responded that it intended to ask Hauser general questions

about forensic interviews, outcries, and disclosures, and then it intended to

“connect[] those concepts to what [Hauser] reviewed on the actual forensic

interview.” The State did not intend to “elicit any hearsay from that video by any

means,” and it did not intend to play any portion of the interview. The State argued

that merely asking general questions about forensic interviews, whether the

interviewer followed proper protocols, and questions about Adele’s demeanor “does

not open the door to optional completeness.” The State objected to introduction of

the interview based on hearsay. The State also argued that it would call Adele as a

                                         18
witness later in the trial, and defense counsel would have the ability to cross-examine

her and “impeach her with pieces [of the interview] if he intends to do it that way.”

      Defense counsel responded that he intended to cross-examine Hauser about

Adele’s demeanor during the interview. Counsel stated:

      Specifically, the hesitation part at the beginning and then the
      confidence, volunteering information when they’re talking about
      [Adele’s cousin] and the pornography. It’s one of those—if there is a
      saying that there’s no change in demeanor, we can’t separate that
      without getting into the subject matter of the interview. By asking about
      demeanor, they open the door to impeachment. And once we open the
      door—once the door is open to impeachment and we get to play any
      [p]art of the tape, even if it’s just for impeachment purposes, at that
      point one part of the interview has been played and optional
      completeness applies.

The State agreed that defense counsel could ask Hauser about what she witnessed

concerning Adele’s demeanor, but it disagreed that counsel could elicit from Hauser

hearsay statements made by Adele during the interview. The State also disagreed

that it would be necessary for defense counsel to show the video to impeach Hauser.

The court ruled that if the State elicited expert opinions from Hauser “regarding

information gathered from the video,” defense counsel would be entitled to cross-

examine Hauser “by presenting pertinent sections of the video that address the

expert’s opinion.”

      During Hauser’s direct testimony, she discussed different “stages” of

disclosure of abuse. These stages include “tentative disclosure,” in which the child

is “testing the waters” and is ambivalent. The child “may share some information
                                          19
but not all the information, kind of wanting to see maybe their parents’ reaction.”

Another stage is “active disclosure,” in which the child “is ready to tell everything

that’s happened.”

      Adele’s demeanor during the interview was “avoidant, reserved, hesitant.”

Adele “struggled” to provide sensory details, and Hauser stated that it was “really

difficult to get those details from her.” Hauser believed that Adele was in the

“tentative” stage of disclosure. She testified: “I would say she was, you know, she

started off very, like, I don’t know why I’m here. And there was a lot of—.” At this

point, defense counsel objected based on hearsay. One of the prosecutors stated:

      I think that based off the ruling, we have to go forward with putting in
      the video. So we’re fine with not eliciting information if that’s not
      where we’re heading. We’re only putting in the video because of the
      defense’s request.

The court requested that the parties “avoid hearsay on the table until you actually

seek to admit the interview,” and it sustained the objection.

      When questioning resumed, Hauser testified that Adele “present[ed] very

avoidant which is common for a tentative disclosure.” However, as the interview

progressed, Adele “move[d] into active disclosure where she disclose[d] more

details about the offense.” Hauser did not testify concerning any specific statements

about the incident made by Adele during the interview. The State did not offer the

recording of the interview into evidence during Hauser’s direct examination.

                                         20
      Before testimony began the following morning, the trial court stated that it

had reconsidered its ruling on the admissibility of the interview. After hearing

Hauser’s testimony on direct examination, the court did not “think that it opened the

door to defense playing parts of the video.” The court therefore sustained the State’s

hearsay objection to the video. When asked by the court which portions of the video

defense counsel had wanted to introduce, counsel responded:

      [Hauser] was talking about how the complaining witness was being
      timid. I wanted to play the parts where she was talking about
      pornography, where she was volunteering information where it wasn’t
      a teeth pulling. She was like, I saw this porn. I knew it was bad. I knew
      it was porn. I knew I shouldn’t have [seen] that. That her demeanor
      changed in that part of the video. That was very clearly not timid. At
      the very least, it’s a question of fact for the jury.

The court informed defense counsel that if, upon cross-examining Hauser, it

believed that it was appropriate to play a portion of the video, the court would

“entertain your motion at that time.”

      On cross-examination, Hauser again testified that Adele “presented in the

[t]entative stage or phase [of disclosure] where it’s very ambivalent.” Adele “would

provide some information; but then at times, she would also say, ‘I don’t know. I’m

not sure.’” However, it “didn’t take very long” for Adele to transition from tentative

disclosure to active disclosure. Hauser testified that it was not uncommon for

children to “present with different affects throughout the entire interview,” and she

agreed with defense counsel that an abrupt change in affect would be noteworthy.

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      Hauser also testified that Adele “loosen[ed] up more towards the end [of the

interview] as compared to the beginning.” Throughout the interview, Adele tended

to answer questions with “one or two word statements,” and the interviewer had to

prompt her to elaborate. Hauser agreed with defense counsel that the topic of

pornography was raised during the interview. She also agreed that when

pornography was discussed, Adele “volunteered information.” Defense counsel did

not ask the trial court if he could play any specific portion of the forensic interview

during Hauser’s cross-examination.

      On appeal, Alvarado argues that the recording of the entire forensic interview

was admissible under the rule of optional completeness “so that the conversation

between the Complainant and interviewer could be fully understood.” Alvarado

argues that his cross-examination of Hauser “called into question [Adele’s] level of

disclosure and the truthfulness of her statements, calling into question the entire

interview.” Admitting the full interview “would have explained [Adele’s] statements

about having seen pornography and would help point out conflicts in [Adele’s]

story.” Alvarado does not identify any specific conflicts between Adele’s statements

during the interview and Adele’s testimony at trial.

      No portion of the excluded interview is part of the appellate record. After the

trial court sustained the State’s hearsay objection and ruled that Hauser’s testimony

on direct examination did not open the door to admission of the interview, defense

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counsel stated that he had wanted to play the portions of the forensic interview in

which Adele discussed pornography because she “volunteered information” at this

point in the interview and getting her to talk about this topic “wasn’t a teeth pulling,”

unlike the other parts of her interview. Defense counsel did not make an offer of

proof that contained the recording of the entire forensic interview.

      To preserve error concerning the exclusion of evidence, the party must try to

introduce the evidence and obtain an adverse ruling from the trial court. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); Castillo, 573 S.W.3d at 881. The party

must also make an offer of proof that informs the trial court of the substance of the

excluded evidence unless the substance is apparent from the context. TEX. R. EVID.

103(a)(2); Castillo, 573 S.W.3d at 881. The offer of proof may be in question-and-

answer form, or it may consist of a concise statement by counsel. Mays v. State, 285

S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). If the offer is in the form of a statement,

it “must include a reasonably specific summary of the evidence offered and must

state the relevance of the evidence unless the relevance is apparent, so that the court

can determine whether the evidence is relevant and admissible.” Id. at 889–90.

Additionally, for a complaint to be preserved on appeal, the party’s appellate

complaint must be the same complaint that it made in the trial court. Castillo, 573

S.W.3d at 881; see Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

(“The point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”).

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      The purpose of an offer of proof is two-fold. The “primary purpose” is to

“enable an appellate court to determine whether the exclusion [of evidence] was

erroneous and harmful.” Mays, 285 S.W.3d at 890. A “secondary purpose” is to

“permit the trial judge to reconsider his ruling in light of the actual evidence.” Id.

Defense counsel stated on the record that he had wanted to play the portion of the

interview in which Adele discussed pornography. On appeal, Alvarado argues that

the trial court should have admitted the entire forensic interview. The recording of

the entire interview was not part of defense counsel’s offer of proof, nor was a

“reasonably specific summary” of the contents of the interview—other than Adele’s

statements about seeing pornography—included in the offer of proof. See id. at 889–

90.

      Without an offer of proof that contains the entire forensic interview or a

“reasonably specific summary” of the interview, we cannot determine whether

exclusion of the entire interview was erroneous or harmful. See id. at 890. We

therefore conclude that Alvarado has not preserved his complaint about exclusion of

the entire forensic interview for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); TEX.

R. EVID. 103(a)(2); Castillo, 573 S.W.3d at 881–82; see also Montgomery v. State,

383 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“It is the

appellant’s burden to make a record, through a bill of exceptions, of the evidence he

or she desires admitted.”).

                                         24
      We overrule Alvarado’s third issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                April L. Farris
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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