Court Opinion

ID: 9859147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 18:53:54.475903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:49.008841
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, J.,
dissenting in part.
Only from so much of the Court’s otherwise straightforward and eminently sensible opinion as attempts to come to grips with the slippery doctrine of retroactivity do I dissent. See Part IV, ante at 620-628, 608 A.2d 901-905. I join in the judgment because I agree that the Legislature did not intend that N.J.S.A. 38A:13-1.2 apply to plaintiff’s claim. See ante at 619, 608 A. 2d 901.
Not only is the discussion of retroactivity in Part IV unnecessary to the Court’s disposition of the appeal, as the opinion readily acknowledges, ante at 620, 608 A. 2d 901, it is entirely irrelevant. “Retroactivity” has nothing to do with this case. The problem is not one of applying today’s legislation to cases that antedate the effective date of the legislation; rather, the question is whether, by the very terms of its enactment, the Legislature has itself applied the statute to a given situation— here, plaintiff’s case. The Court has correctly decided that the statute does not apply. I would not further muddy the already-murky waters of retroactivity analysis.
For reversal and, remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7,
Opposed — None.