Court Opinion

ID: 9914054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 15:04:44.861184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:56.713219
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 22, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2023-CA-0322-MR

JAMES MAXIE                                                          APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE JOSEPH ROARK, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 00-CR-00256

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND KAREM, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: James Maxie, pro se, appeals from the McCracken Circuit

Court’s order vacating its previous order expunging several of Maxie’s prior

criminal convictions pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 431.073.

Maxie contends that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter the order and

improperly relied on ex parte communications from the Department of Corrections
(DOC) in vacating the order of expungement. Because the circuit court retained

jurisdiction to vacate its prior order and its decision to do so was based upon

evidence already in the record, we affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND

               On November 11, 2022, Maxie filed an application and a petition to

expunge his past convictions for tampering with physical evidence and first-degree

trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine). He attached an expungement

eligibility certification notice compiled by the Administrative Office of the Courts

and the Kentucky State Police, which contains a list of Maxie’s charges, their

disposition, and whether they were eligible for expungement. On January 23, the

Commonwealth filed a response stating it had no objection to the expungement.

               A brief hearing on Maxie’s application was conducted on February 3,

2023. The circuit court noted that there was no objection to the expungement from

the Commonwealth and told Maxie it would grant his petition. At Maxie’s request,

the court stated that it would sign the expungement order that day. The actual

written order granting the application to vacate and expunge the convictions was

entered on February 13, 2023.1

1
 In addition to expunging Maxie’s convictions for tampering with physical evidence and first-
degree trafficking in a controlled substance, the order also expunged a persistent felony offender
charge.

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             On February 22, 2023, the circuit court on its own motion vacated the

order, upon notice from the DOC that Maxie had incurred new charges within the

past five years and was consequently disqualified from expungement under the

terms of the statute. Maxie filed a motion to reconsider, and the circuit court

conducted a hearing at which Maxie’s wife appeared on his behalf. The circuit

judge explained that he had not been aware at the time he granted the expungement

that Maxie was incarcerated for a probation violation related to the underlying

charges he was seeking to expunge. The court held that the charges could not be

expunged as a matter of law and denied the motion to reconsider. This appeal by

Maxie followed.

                                    ANALYSIS

             KRS 431.073 provides that a person may have certain Class D felony

convictions vacated and the records expunged upon application to the court in

which he or she was convicted. KRS 431.073(1). The application to have the

judgment vacated “shall be filed no sooner than five (5) years after the completion

of the person’s sentence, or five (5) years after the successful completion of the

person’s probation or parole, whichever occurs later.” KRS 431.073(2)(a). The

court may order the expungement only upon finding that: “[t]he person had not in

the five (5) years prior to the filing of the application to have the judgment vacated

been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor; [and] [n]o proceeding concerning a

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felony or misdemeanor is pending or being instituted against the person[.]” KRS

431.073(5)(a) and (b).

               Maxie argues that because more than ten days passed after the hearing

at which the circuit court informed him it would grant the expungement, the court

was without jurisdiction to enter the order vacating the expungement.

               A circuit court retains jurisdiction over its judgments for ten days after

their entry.

               Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court
               of its own initiative, or on the motion of a party made not
               later than 10 days after entry of judgment, may amend its
               findings or make additional findings and may amend the
               judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a
               motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.02.

               Within that ten-day period, “a court has unlimited power to amend

and alter its own judgments.” Henry Clay Mining Co., Inc. v. V & V Mining Co.,

Inc., 742 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Ky. 1987) (citation omitted). “Generally speaking, a

trial court lacks power to amend a judgment ten days after the entry of that

judgment.” Winstead v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 479, 485-86 (Ky. 2010).

               The circuit court’s statement to Maxie at the hearing, that the

expungement order would be signed that day, did not constitute the “entry of a

judgment” because “the circuit court . . . speaks only through written orders

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entered upon the official record.” Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v.

Sloan, 329 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. App. 2010) (citations omitted).

             Entry of a judgment occurs when the court clerk notes the written

order in the docket. CR 58(1). “The notation shall constitute the entry of the

judgment or order, which shall become effective at the time of such notation[.]”

CR 58(1). “It has long been established that, regardless of when a judgment or

order is rendered, it is the notation of the judgment or order in the docket by the

clerk which constitutes ‘entry’ of the document, and the document is not effective

until after it has been entered by being noted in the docket.” Staton v. Poly Weave

Bag Co., Incorporated/Poly Weave Packaging, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Ky.

1996) (citations omitted).

             The circuit court’s order vacating the expungement was entered by the

clerk on February 22, 2023, nine days after the entry of the written order of

expungement on February 13, 2023. The circuit court vacated its prior order

within ten days of its entry and therefore had jurisdiction to alter and amend the

judgment.

             Maxie further argues that the trial court improperly relied on ex parte

communications from the DOC in determining that he had incurred new charges in

the past five years.

             An “ex parte communication” is defined as “[a] generally
             prohibited communication between counsel and the court

                                         -5-
             when opposing counsel is not present.” BLACK’S LAW
             DICTIONARY 597 (7th ed.). When used as an adjective,
             the phrase “ex parte” is defined as being “[d]one or made
             at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and
             without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely
             interested[.]” Id.

Commonwealth v. Cambron, 546 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Ky. App. 2018).

             As noted above, the statute specifically prohibits the expungement of

a charge if the applicant has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor in the

five years preceding the filing of the application or if a felony or misdemeanor is

pending or being instituted against the person. KRS 431.073(5)(a) and (b). The

expungement eligibility certification notice Maxie filed with his petition showed

he had been convicted of charges in the five years preceding the filing of his

application. Therefore, the information the DOC drew to the circuit court’s

attention was already in the court record, placed there by Maxie himself. Maxie

had notice of the information and consequently it does not meet the definition of an

ex parte communication.

             Furthermore, as the Commonwealth points out and the circuit court

stated at the hearing on the motion to reconsider, Maxie was incarcerated at the

time of the evidentiary hearing under the same indictment number as the felonies

he was seeking to expunge, which rendered him ineligible for expungement under

KRS 431.073(2)(a), which permits an application for expungement no sooner than

five years after the successful completion of the person’s probation or parole.

                                         -6-
                 “Like parole, expungement is not a right but a statutory privilege – a

privilege the General Assembly has no obligation to provide at all and which it

may therefore provide subject to conditions that our Courts are not at liberty to

ignore.” Fisher v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Ky. App. 2020).

“Expungement is a privilege granted by statute, the express limits of which cannot

be extended by judicial fiat.” Id. (quoting Alexander v. Commonwealth, 556

S.W.3d 6, 9 (Ky. App. 2018)).

                 The circuit court was simply not at liberty to ignore the fact that

Maxie’s record did not meet the statutory conditions for expungement. The circuit

court’s decision to vacate its judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565, 579 (Ky. 2009). “The test for abuse of

discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,

or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d

941, 945 (Ky. 1999). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in vacating its

prior order upon discovering that Maxie’s record was ineligible for expungement.

As a matter of law, it could not extend the privilege of expungement to Maxie by

judicial fiat.

                                             -7-
                               CONCLUSION

            For the foregoing reasons, the McCracken Circuit Court’s order

vacating expungement is affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                   BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

James Maxie, pro se                    Daniel Cameron
West Liberty, Kentucky                 Attorney General of Kentucky

                                       Matthew R. Krygiel
                                       Assistant Attorney General
                                       Frankfort, Kentucky

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