Court Opinion

ID: 9686679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:01:02.986523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:21.315517
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 50. (dissenting). I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that a parent's incarceration is a factor for circuit courts to consider in deciding whether there has been "a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to justify revision of the judgment or order."1 I also agree with the majority opinion that an incarcerated parent is not automatically entitled to a reduction in child support. Rather, as the majority opinion properly explains, a circuit court must consider the totality of the circumstances in any given case.
¶ 51. I disagree with the majority opinion, however, when it concludes that a circuit court may refuse to modify an incarcerated parent's child support order based on the nature of the underlying offense and the parent's moral culpability in committing the offense that led to incarceration.
¶ 52. A parent's moral culpability in the events that lead to a change in circumstances is relevant when considering a request to modify child support to the extent that it demonstrates an intent to reduce available income or assets to avoid paying child support. *327These cases are known as "shirking" cases, because a parent is found to have engaged in a course of conduct designed to "shirk" his or her responsibility to provide child support.2
¶ 53. The majority opinion is correct when it rejects the argument that incarceration is analogous to shirking.3 Aside from parents who are incarcerated for failing to pay child support, parents do not commit criminal acts leading to incarceration in order to avoid having to pay child support. Prison is a devastating and dangerous place, and the consequences of a criminal conviction and a term of incarceration extend well *328beyond a temporary loss of income.4 There is certainly no evidence in the present case that the father drove drunk while possessing cocaine so that his probation would be revoked, he would be incarcerated, his income would be reduced, and his child support obligations modified.
¶ 54. Nevertheless, the majority opinion condones the circuit court's conclusion that the father intentionally committed his crime, knowing that prison and a reduction in income would be the consequence, and its consequent refusal to modify his child support order. While expressly rejecting the idea that incarceration is analogous to shirking, the majority opinion adopts a shirking analysis in order to uphold the circuit court's decision in the present case when it writes that circuit courts may consider "the intentional nature of the crime" and the "nature of the offense and the relevant course of conduct leading to incarceration."5
‘ ¶ 55. The vast majority of crimes, by definition, require that the offender act voluntarily and with the intent to commit the crime. Moreover, it is always foreseeable that criminal activity will have consequences, including incarceration and loss of income. Permitting these factors to be considered in all cases will necessarily tip the balance against modifying child support for incarcerated parents.
¶ 56. Once a court determines that a parent is not incarcerated because of his or her failure to pay child *329support, the courts should direct its attention to the standard measures of a parent's ability to support his or her children and how those measures are affected by incarceration. Wisconsin Stat. § 767.31(1)(c)3. directs that a change in a payer's earning capacity may constitute a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to justify revision of a support order. Clearly incarceration affects earning capacity. As the defendant's brief aptly states, "[I]t is difficult to imagine anything having a more profound effect on a parent's ability to provide financial support to his or her children than a period of incarceration."6
¶ 57. Section 767.32(1)(c)4. also includes an opportunity for the court to consider "any other factor that the court determines is relevant."7 In the context of an incarcerated parent, "any other factor" should include, but is not limited to, such matters as how much the parent can pay from prison earnings, whether the parent has assets or other available means to continue paying child support while incarcerated, how long the parent will be incarcerated, the parent's past earnings, the future earning capacity and assets of the incarcerated parent, the impact of incarceration on the parent's employability and future earning capacity, the total amount of arrearages that will accumulate by the time of discharge, and the amount of the existing child support award.
¶ 58. That a parent cannot pay the full support order while in prison and will accumulate arrearages is not determinative of modifying the support order. In some cases, the parent might reasonably be able to pay the arrearages after release. In other cases, maintain*330ing a pre-incarceration support order and forcing a parent to accumulate substantial arrearages beyond what seems to be any ability to pay is unreasonable. It certainly does not help a child, since the child faces hardship due to the loss of the support money when the parent is incarcerated, regardless of whether the circuit court modifies the support order. Moreover, it imposes a burden on a parent that the parent cannot bear.
¶ 59. The factors set forth herein reflect a fair and equitable approach to the real circumstances facing an incarcerated parent and are the factors that a court should consider in cases where a parent seeks to modify a child support order due to incarceration. Cases in other jurisdictions support this approach.8
¶ 60. Using this approach, I conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in the present case when it failed to give reasoned consideration to the individual facts presented in this case.9 The circuit court focused almost exclusively on the prisoner's criminal conduct. It did not consider any of the other relevant factors. See the circuit court reasoning quoted at majority opinion, ¶ 9.
*331¶ 61. Prior to his incarceration, the father reported an annual income over $22,000, almost $2,000 per month. He earns about $45 per month while incarcerated. He has no assets or non-prison income from which to meet his child support obligations. His child support order was set at $543 per month based upon his pre-incarceration income. Maintaining the current child support order will increase his arrearages to $25,000 by the end of his three-year sentence. While he does not have a professional license that will be revoked because of his conviction, the consequences of his conviction for future employment and income, as is true for substantially all offenders, are significant. There is little likelihood in the present case that the father can pay off this large amount of arrearages within a reasonable time after his release even assuming that he earns what he did before imprisonment. In short, there has been a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to justify revision of the child support order in the present case.
¶ 62. There are also strong public policy reasons for modifying the order in this case. Child support amounts are set, as the majority opinion points out, to ensure that a child's standard of living should, to the degree possible, not be adversely affected because his or her parents are not living together.10 "While modifying the father's child support order here will undermine this goal in the short term, failing to modify the order will undermine this goal in both the short term and the long term, and will certainly not benefit his children.
*332¶ 63. Regardless of the child support order, the father here earns only $45 per month. Maintaining the support order at $543 per month while he is incarcerated does not change the fact that his children will not receive any more than $45 per month. Moreover, maintaining the support order will result in his release from prison with an insurmountable amount of arrearages that would likely discourage him from making payments or engaging in honest work with paychecks from which a court could order garnishment of his wages.11 It is absurd to suggest, as the majority opinion does, that a parent's redress in the face of arrearages is to request a modification at the time of release.12 What circumstance would be different post-incarceration than existed during incarceration that would alter a circuit *333court's decision?13 Both during and after release it was the parent's criminal behavior that led to the reduction of income.
¶ 64. In contrast, ordering payments in amounts that can be made while the father is incarcerated will allow him to establish a habit of making payments. Moreover, it allows him to be released from prison without additional insurmountable arrearages hanging over his head, making it more likely that he will continue to make payments, reducing the arrearages and supporting his children.
¶ 65. Recent studies, as the majority opinion notes, demonstrate the importance of maintaining public policies that emphasize parental responsibility and promote payment of child support.14 Reasonable support orders, that is, orders within the ability of the parent to pay, foster these public policies. Unreasonably high or low support orders do not. I agree with the arguments in the amicus brief of the Center on Fathers, Families and Public Policy and the Wisconsin Council on Children and Families, concluding that child support *334orders that are beyond a noncustodial parent's ability to pay are not in the best interests of the child.15
¶ 66. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court to apply the proper standards to determine whether the support order should be reduced.
¶ 67. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(c) (1999-2000).

 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 177 Wis. 2d 128, 136-37, 501 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1993); Van Offeren v. Van Offeren, 173 Wis. 2d 482, 492, 496 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Paternity of R.L.M., 143 Wis. 2d 849, 852, 422 N.W.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1988).

 Majority op., ¶ 42. See, e.g., Voecks v. Voecks, 171 Wis. 2d 184, 187-88, 491 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1992) ("We conclude that the 'shirking' cases are inapplicable. .. . While we do not wish to reward criminal conduct, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that criminal conduct must be treated as deliberate conduct designed to reduce income to avoid paying child support. Therefore, we conclude that even though incarceration results from intentional criminal conduct, it is a change in circumstances that gives a trial court competence to review a child support order. We also conclude that incarceration is a factor that the court may consider when determining whether it should exercise its discretion to modify child support."); Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331, 339 (Md. App. 1995) ("The contention that [the father's] incarceration and subsequent impoverishment should be considered 'voluntary' because he made the free and conscious choice to commit a crime stretches the meaning of the word beyond its acceptable boundaries."); Johnson v. O'Neill, 461 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. App. 1990) ("Intention to commit a crime does not automatically translate into intention to limit income.").

 See generally Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 153 (2000); see also Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, Fed. Probation, Sept. 1996, at 10.

 Majority op., ¶ 41.

 Defendant's Brief and Appendix at 25.

 Wis. Stat. § 767.31(1)(c)4. (1999-2000).

 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hamilton, 857 P.2d 542, 544 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331, 334-36 (Md. Ct. App. 1995); Oberg v. Oberg, 869 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Thomasson v. Johnson, 903 P.2d 254, 256-58 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); Willis v. Willis, 840 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. 1992); see also Lewis Becker, Spousal and Child Support and the "Voluntary Reduction of Income" Doctrine, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 647, 713-19 (1997) (proposing a factor-oriented test in deciding whether to grant an incarcerated parent's request for modification of a child support order).

 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).

 Majority op., ¶ 15 (quoting Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 40.01).

 As the father explained to the circuit court in the present case:
There is no way I can pay that [$25,000] off. ... [T]o have this kind of debt to come out, that's just saying that I'm probably going to relapse, or just go to work and find a small job, and that's just pushing me away. You've got no incentive to do anything.

 Majority op., ¶ 36. In some states a trial court can hold a petition for modification in abeyance until the prisoner is released. The trial court can then determine whether the support order should be modified. During the time the petition is held open, support installments do not accrue as an obligation that cannot be altered. See, e.g., Halliwell v. Halliwell, 741 A.2d 638, 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (plurality opinion).

 The majority is apparently saying that a circuit court may determine that a parent is eligible for modification of a support order once the parent is released from prison if he has no job or his earnings are reduced, even though the circuit court would not modify the support order while the parent was in prison without a job and no opportunity for greater earnings. To not grant modification to a parent while in prison but to grant modification to the same parent at release makes apparent that the circuit court's decision to modify is based on the underlying criminal behavior, not on the ability to pay or any other factors that remain the same, such as the needs of the children.

 Majority op., ¶ 32.

 Amicus Brief of Center on Fathers, Families and Public Policy and the Wisconsin Council on Children and Families, passim.