Court Opinion

ID: 9665488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:49:36.942553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:16.050318
License: Public Domain

BARDGETT, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The circuit court’s judgment should be affirmed because the legislature’s power under the Missouri Constitution to set salaries of county officers *327was not directly or indirectly affected by the so-called “Hancock Amendment”, Mo. Const, art. X, §§ 16-24.
Article X, § 21 is the provision of the Hancock Amendment that Boone County contends requires the state to pay the increase in salary to the collector. An existing and continuing provision in our constitution mandates that the salaries of county officials are tp be set by law — by the general assembly. Mo.Const. art. VI, § 11 provides as follows:
Except in counties which frame, adopt and amend a charter for their own government, the compensation of all county officers shall be prescribed by law uniform in operation in each class of counties. Every such officer shall file a sworn statement in detail, of fees collected and salaries paid to his necessary deputies or assistants, as provided by law. (Emphasis added.)
The relevant parts of art. X, § 21 (Hancock) will be examined to see if the legislative power under art. VI, § 11 has been affected.
Art. X, § 21 (Hancock Amendment) provides:
The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed portion of the costs of any existing activity ....
As applied to this case, the state is not reducing the state financed portion of the cost of the collector’s office, even if it is thought of as an activity, because the state never paid any part of the collector’s salary anyway.
... or service required of counties and other political subdivisions.
The statute increasing the collector’s pay does not reduce the state financed portion of any service required of counties. The state never paid any part of the county salary.
A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the general assembly or any state agency of counties or other political subdivisions, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the county or other political subdivision for any increased costs.
The statute does not require any new activity or any activity by the collector’s office or the county beyond that which was required of a collector prior to the passage of this statute raising the salary. Nor, in my opinion, is there any increase in the activity required of the county. This statute does not require any new service beyond that which is required by the previously existing statutes relating to the duties of a collector. The statute does not require any increase in the level of any activity or service performed by the collector or the county beyond that required by previously existing law. In fact, the statute does not change any service or activity to be performed by the collector or the county at all.
When art. X, § 21 is considered at face value, word by word, phrase by phrase, and as a whole, it is seen that there is no curtailment of the legislature’s constitutional power to act pursuant to art. VI, § 11 in prescribing the compensation for county officers.
Article X (Hancock Amendment) did not repeal or even mention art. VI, § 11. Consequently, art. VI, § 11 remains as a viable part of our constitution. This is not to say that an amendment to the constitution could not reduce or curtail existing power of the general assembly under some other provision of the constitution. Clearly, the “Hancock Amendment” has done that with reference to the general assembly’s power to require a county to perform specific services exceeding services required by law pri- or to the passage of the Hancock Amendment without state funding. The amendment should be viewed as a restriction on existing powers of the general assembly; and that restriction should, in my opinion, be given a narrow construction in order that the restriction on the power of the people acting through the general assembly will not be curtailed more than the Hancock Amendment specifically provides.
I do not suggest that the Hancock Amendment is easy of interpretation or ap*328plication in all respects; however, the amendment as proposed to the voters contained a notice and that notice undertook to state or predict what constitutional provisions were or may be changed, repealed, modified by implication, or may be construed to change, repeal, or to be modified by implication by the Hancock Amendment. That notice provided:
You are advised that the proposed constitutional amendment changes, repeals, or modifies by implication, or may be construed to change, repeal, or modify by implication, in addition to the provisions of the Constitution which are specifically added, the following provisions of the Constitution of Missouri — Article II; Sections 1, 38(b), 46, 46(a), 47, 48, and 51 of Article III; Sections 15, 22, 23, 24, 28, and 30(a) of Article VI, Sections 18(c), 18(d), 19, 25, and 26(f) of Article VI; Sections 1(a) and 3(b) of Article IX; and Sections 1, 4(d), 10(b), 11(a), 11(f), and 12(a) of Article X.
See Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 24 (Mo. banc 1981).
Article VI, § 11 is not mentioned in this notice. Although perhaps not conclusive, I am convinced that this is a very strong indication that this amendment was not intended to restrict, repeal, curtail, or modify the legislature’s constitutional power specifically provided for in art. VI, § 11.
For these reasons, I believe that the legislative power under art. VI, § 11 and pursuant to which the pay raise statute in question was enacted has not been modified or repealed by the amendment to art. X (Hancock Amendment).
The principal opinion uses what it perceives as the overall general purpose of the amendment to deny to the general assembly a specific power granted by Mo.Const. art. VI, § 11, even though the specific power is not even mentioned in the amendment. In fact, as noted, the “Notice to Voters” specifically mentions art. VI, §§ 18(c), 18(d), 19, 25, and 26(f), but does not suggest any impairment, limitation, or condition on art. VI, § 11, which is the constitutional requirement that the general assembly set the salaries of county officers.
The committee that advised about and prepared the Hancock Amendment, according to the memorandum referred to in the principal opinion, was composed of, among others, seven state senators and four state representatives, some of whom are lawyers, and at least two other lawyers. It is not reasonable to think that if these people wanted to condition the power of the general assembly to set or increase salaries of county officers, upon the willingness of the general assembly to appropriate the money for the increase out of state general revenues, that they would not have known how to say it specifically and in plain English. The reason that a limiting or modifying provision cannot be found in the amendment is, in my opinion, because it isn’t there.
In my opinion, the circuit court ruled correctly, and I would affirm the judgment; consequently, I dissent.