Court Opinion

ID: 9577300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:33:42.14234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:18.964271
License: Public Domain

Judge Greene
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction constituted harmless error under Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. ---, 95 L.Ed. 2d 439, 107 S.Ct. 1918 (1987). Under Pope an erroneous instruction as to the “value” prong of the obscenity test under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L.Ed. 2d 419, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973) is harmless error if the “reviewing court concludes that no rational juror, if properly instructed, could find value” in the allegedly obscene materials. Pope, 481 U.S. at —, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 447 (emphasis added). The “properly instructed” condition refers to, among other things, the juror’s being instructed to employ the “reasonable person” standard also enunciated in Pope.
Without discussion or example, the majority merely states no rational juror could find value in these materials. I disagree. Neither the “reasonableness” nor the “rationality” of Drs. Nemeroff and Wade has been disputed. Their testimony that these materials “could” have scientific and educational value can only mean that, if these doctors were jurors in this case, they “could” find serious educational or scientific value in these materials. Despite the majority’s implication, the doctors are certainly not required to “conclusively” establish these materials’ serious value in order that one rational juror “could” reach the same value judgment reached by the doctors: such an interpretation turns the Pope standard on its head. The “no rational juror” basis for finding harmless error under Pope is refuted by demonstrating that even one hypothetical “rational” juror could find value in these materials when using the proper “reasonable person” standard.
*31I note that, in concurrence, Justice Scalia states it would “carry refinement to the point of meaninglessness to ask whether [a reasonable person] could” find value in a particular publication. 481 U.S. at —, 96 L.Ed. 2d at 448 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Yet, “could” is the key word adopted in the “no rational juror” standard of harmless error. Given Justice Scalia’s criticism, I would further note that only four Justices expressly approved the actual “no rational juror” test applied by the majority of this panel to affirm the instant defendant’s conviction.
Nevertheless, given this standard, the instant conviction should be reversed: While a properly instructed juror could find no value despite the doctors’ testimony, that juror could just as rationally find the necessary value based on that testimony. In light of the “no rational juror” standard under Pope and the testimony of Drs. Nemeroff and Wade, I therefore cannot conclude that no rational juror could find in these materials the serious scientific, artistic, literary or political value required under Miller.
I fail to see how the majority can simply presume its value judgment accords with that of a “reasonable person” while a contrary judgment based upon the actual experience of two experts does not. Indeed, since the majority reaches its conclusion without discussion or example, its opinion is subject to the charge that the majority has merely imposed its own views rather than apply the “reasonable person” test. This is the very defect under Pope that I and the majority recognize in the trial court’s instructions to this jury.
I refuse to compound the trial court’s error and would remand this case for retrial based upon the trial court’s failure to instruct in accord with Pope. As I would remand the case for retrial, I do not address the defendant’s other assignments of error.