Court Opinion

ID: 9959228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 08:12:42.777746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:41.214469
License: Public Domain

In The
                              Court of Appeals
                     Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                    No. 07-23-00263-CV

                       STEPHEN PATRICK BLACK, APPELLANT

                                             V.

                       JONATHAN MICHAEL FLOYD, APPELLEE

                               On Appeal from County Court
                                    Lamb County, Texas
              Trial Court No. CC-3436, Honorable James M. DeLoach, Presiding

                                       April 4, 2024
                             MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       Appellant, Stephen Patrick Black, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his negligence suit against Appellee, Jonathan

Michael Floyd, for want of jurisdiction. By three issues, he maintains dismissal of his suit

was error because the trial court failed to (1) provide adequate notice of the jurisdictional

issue, (2) allow him an opportunity to amend and cure jurisdictional defects, if any, and

(3) rule on his motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
                                           BACKGROUND

       Black is committed in the Texas Civil Commitment Center (TCCC) pursuant to the

Sexually Violent Predators Act.1 Floyd is an independent contractor who administered a

polygraph to Black as part of the sex offender treatment program at TCCC. The report

generated from the polygraph test recites “[s]ubject has multiple convictions of sexual

assault.” Black sued Floyd in the justice court of Lamb County for negligence alleging

“he does not possess ANY convictions for sexual assault in the State of Texas, or

anywhere at any time, past, present, or future.”2 Floyd, proceeding pro se, filed his

original answer asserting he did not owe a duty to Black, Black had not suffered any

damages, and the polygraph report had been amended to recite “[s]ubject has multiple

convictions involving a sexual component.” The suit was summarily dismissed for want

of jurisdiction and Black appealed to county court.

       In the county court proceedings, Floyd filed a general denial but did not urge a plea

to the jurisdiction. Black filed a traditional motion for summary judgment supported by his

affidavit and various exhibits. Black’s suit was dismissed with the trial court finding it did

not have jurisdiction and could not therefore render a judgment.

ISSUES ONE, TWO, AND THREE

       Black’s complaints regarding the trial court’s failure to provide him notice of

jurisdictional defects, an opportunity to cure such defects, and failure to rule on his motion

       1 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 841.001–.151.

          2 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Black was convicted of indecency with a child in 2006 and was

civilly committed as a sexually violent predator in 2016.
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for summary judgment do not present reversible error. We review questions of jurisdiction

de novo. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. 2020).

       Generally, the committing court retains jurisdiction of a civil commitment case with

respect to certain suits filed.      See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.082(d)

(providing that the committing court retains jurisdiction of the case with respect to a

proceeding conducted under [Subchapter E] . . . or to a civil commitment proceeding

conducted under Subchapters F and G).                 Black maintains his negligence suit was

unrelated to his civil commitment and was not required to be filed in the committing court.3

We disagree with Black’s contention.

       Subchapter E of the Act lists commitment requirements a committing court shall

impose to ensure compliance with treatment and supervision to protect the community.

§ 841.082(a). One of those requirements is “participation and compliance with the sex

offender treatment program provided” by TCCC. § 841.082(a)(3).

       In the underlying case, Black acknowledged a Polygraph Agreement which

included that “[p]olygraphs are a part of my treatment plan.” He also signed a “Polygraph

Informed Consent Form” wherein he accepted that the exam was a condition of

supervised release. The polygraph report recites, in part, as follows: “[i]n conjunction with

the sex offender treatment program of Littlefield Civil Commitment, polygraph

examinations were administered to [Black]. The purpose of the exam was to verify facts

as part of the sex offender therapy program.”

       3 Black’s civil commitment occurred in the 274th District Court of Guadalupe County, Texas.
                                                                                                 See
Black v. McLane, No. 07-19-00241-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2195, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 23,
2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Black v. Edd, No. 07-21-00168-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 3666, at *1–2 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo May 31, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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       The record shows that Black’s negligence suit against Floyd resulted from

participation in his sex offender treatment program which falls under the commitment

requirements of section 841.082, part of Subchapter E of the Act.              Under section

841.082(d), the committing court retained jurisdiction of the case and the Lamb County

Court was without jurisdiction to render judgment. See generally Black v. McLane, No.

07-19-00241-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2195, at *5–6 (Tex. App. —Amarillo March 23,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding Black’s challenge to wearing a GPS tracking monitor

pursuant to section 841.082(a)(4) was required to be filed in the committing court under

subparagraph (d) of the statute). Just as Black’s complaints regarding a GPS tracking

monitor fell under Subchapter E of the Act, his complaints against Floyd are related to his

sex offender treatment program which also falls under Subchapter E. A plaintiff has a

right to amend pleadings to cure a jurisdictional defect; however, in the underlying case,

it was not possible for Black to amend his pleadings to cure the jurisdictional defect. See

Tex. DOT v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2002). In our de novo review, we find the trial

court correctly dismissed Black’s negligence suit against Floyd filed in Lamb County,

Texas, instead of in the 274th District Court of Guadalupe County, Texas, for want of

jurisdiction. Issues one, two, and three are overruled.

                                        CONCLUSION

       The trial court’s order dismissing Black’s suit for want of jurisdiction is affirmed.

                                                          Alex Yarbrough
                                                              Justice

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