Court Opinion

ID: 9731662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:53:51.204832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.286491
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. I write separately only to emphasize the fact that the order providing for child support may be modified, either upward or downward, as the circumstances may dictate.
In June, 1986, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement which was incorporated but not merged into the Divorce Decree. The support provision thereof provided that appellee was to pay two hundred dollars ($200.00) per month in child support until such time as he became employed. Upon failure of appellee to pay the requisite amount of support, appellant petitioned the court *88and received an order of support in the amount previously agreed to by the parties. This order had been specifically made enforceable by the court’s contempt powers. In December, 1987, appellant petitioned for an increase in the support order, alleging that appellee had obtained employment. Subsequently, appellee became unemployed and upon being unable to comply with the court’s order, petitioned the court to modify the award downward. A single hearing date was set for both petitions. Prior to that date, appellant moved to vacate the order setting a hearing date on appellee’s petition alleging that the support order was not subject to reduction because it was predicated on the parties support agreement which was not modifiable. The trial court agreed and denied appellee’s petition. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, finding that the order, which was subject to the contempt powers of the court, was modifiable, either upward or downward, as the circumstances so require. The Superior Court noted that appellee did not seek to modify the agreement entered into between the parties, rather he sought only to reduce the amount of the support order entered by the court in response to a separate and distinct petition filed by appellant.
While the majority agrees with the rationale of the Superior Court, it neglects to note that appellee is, therefore, entitled to have his petition to reduce support considered on its merits as is appellant entitled to present evidence of the need for an increase in the amount of support.
Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court reversing the order of the trial court summarily dismissing appellee’s petition and remanding the matter for an evidentiary hearing should be affirmed.1

. I would also emphasize, as did the majority, that the distinction between merger and incorporation of an agreement into a divorce decree has been virtually eliminated by the recent enactment of Section 401.1 of the Divorce Code.