Court Opinion

ID: 9597934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:04:01.640442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:39.951909
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority’s opinion in this case and conclude that my opinion in Eure v. Cantrell Properties, 236 Ga. App. 427 (512 SE2d 323) (1999), must be overruled to the extent it states that federal, not state, procedure applies to determine when an order compelling or denying arbitration may be appealed. Rather, state procedure applies unless it “would undermine the goals and policies of the [Federal Arbitration Act].” Volt Information Sciences v. Bd. of Trustees &c., 489 U. S. 468, 478 (109 SC 1248, 103 LE2d 488) (1988). In this case, at least under the Eleventh Circuit precedent noted by the majority, the result is the same under either federal or state law — the trial court’s order was final and thus subject to appeal.
But 9 USC § 16 was passed as a means of enforcing the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and inherently recognizes that one of the purposes of arbitration is to provide a streamlined, less expen*91sive alternative to litigation, which could be impeded by the appellate process. And in enacting § 16, Congress determined that in certain instances delaying an appeal would better serve federal arbitration policy. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U. S. 614, 633 (105 SC 3346, 87 LE2d 444) (1985); Ermenegildo Zegna Corp. v. Lanificio Ermenegildo Zegna, S.p.A., 133 F3d 177, 180-181 (2nd Cir. 1998). Therefore, in a case where the availability of an appeal would depend upon whether federal or state procedure is applied, courts must determine whether the application of state procedure would undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. See Collins v. Prudential Ins. Co. &c., 2000 La. LEXIS 114 (January 19, 2000); Superpumper v. Nerland Oil, 582 NW2d 647 (N.D. 1998); Dakota Wesleyan Univ. v. HPG Intl., 560 NW2d 921 (S.D. 1997).
I am mindful of the Supreme Court of Georgia’s opinion in Phillips Constr. Co. v. Cowart Iron Works, 250 Ga. 488 (299 SE2d 538) (1983), in which the Supreme Court recommended that trial courts certify for interlocutory review most orders granting or denying stays pending arbitration. But that opinion predates the passage of § 16 and was decided at a time when the federal courts followed the Enelow-Ettelson2 doctrine, which distinguished cases based upon law from cases based upon equity in determining whether an order affecting arbitration was appealable.3 The Supreme Court understandably declined to adopt that federal policy and instead applied Georgia procedural law. 250 Ga. at 489-490. The Supreme Court has not addressed a case in which the application of state procedure conflicts with § 16. The appeal in Phillips Constr. Co. was from an order denying a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration. Id. at 490. Assuming an appellant followed the proper procedures for certifying the order for interlocutory review, such an order would be appealable under either Georgia law or § 16. Id. at 490; 9 USC § 16 (a) (1) (A). Therefore, in a case where a conflict between Georgia and federal law exists as to whether an appeal is available, Georgia courts will have to consider whether Georgia procedure undermines the policies of the FAA as set forth in § 16.
I am authorized to state that Judge Miller joins in this special concurrence.
*92Decided March 24, 2000.
Small, White & Marani, Gus H. Small, Jr., David A. Geiger, for appellant.
Sutherland, Ashill & Brennan, James A. Orr, Rebecca L. Burnaugh, for appellee.

 Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U. S. 379 (55 SC 310, 79 LE 440) (1935); Ettelson v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 317 U. S. 188 (63 SC 163, 87 LE 176) (1942).

 See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271 (108 SC 1133, 99 LE2d 296) (1988) (overruling the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine).