Court Opinion

ID: 9908269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:09.429535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:04.384461
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                    TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals

                    NO. 2022-CA-0867-MR

JOEL FREDERIC AND ELIZABETH                         APPELLANTS
FREDERIC

            APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 21-CI-00766

CITY OF PARK HILLS BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT; CATHLEEN
MATCHINGA; CHARLES MEYERS;
JUSTIN ODOR; MARK KOENIG;
MISSIONARIES OF SAINT JOHN
THE BAPTIST, INC.; ROBERT
SWEET; SHEILA BURKE TRUST;
SHEILA BURKE, IN HER CAPACITY
AS TRUSTEE FOR THE SHEILA
BURKE TRUST; AND THOMAS
MICHAEL                                              APPELLEES

                         OPINION
                        REVERSING

                        ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON,1 AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellants, Joel and Elizabeth Frederic, appeal the Kenton

Circuit Court’s June 29, 2022 Order affirming the decision of the City of Park Hills

Board of Adjustment (Board) granting both a conditional use permit and a setback

variance to enable Appellee, Missionaries of Saint John the Baptist, Inc. (Saint

John), to construct a grotto behind the Our Lady of Lourdes church. Appellants

argue the conditional use permit and setback variance are impermissible under the

city’s zoning ordinance. We agree, and reverse.

                                    BACKGROUND

              Saint John owns property on Amsterdam Road in the City of Park

Hills, Kentucky and there operates Our Lady of Lourdes, a Catholic church.

Appellants own a residence on Park Drive in the City of Park Hills, and one side of

their property is across the street from Saint John’s property. Appellees Sheila

Burke and the Sheila Burke Trust owned land adjacent to the church.

              On March 18, 2021, Appellees Jordan Odor, acting on behalf of Saint

John, and the Sheila Burke Trust applied to Kenton County Planning and

Development Services for a conditional use permit for the construction of a grotto

behind the church. In their briefs, Appellants describe the proposed grotto as

1
 Judge Donna Dixon concurred in the Opinion prior to her retirement effective November 20,
2023. Release of this Opinion was delayed by administrative handling.

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“large”; Appellees describe it as “small.” The grotto would include a shrine,

plaza, walking path, and retaining wall. The church also requested a variance for

its rear and side yard setbacks.

                The City of Park Hills Board of Adjustment held a public hearing on

the application on April 15, 2021. The Board approved both the conditional use

permit and the setback variances on the condition that a portion of the land owned

by Appellees Sheila Burke and the Sheila Burke Trust be deeded to the church.

Burke and the Burke Trust deeded the land to Saint John on June 22, 2021.

                Appellants appealed the Board’s decision to the circuit court pursuant

to KRS2 100.347. The circuit court affirmed, concluding Appellants “have not met

their burden of persuading this court that the [Board] acted arbitrarily or in any

way outside of its regulatory authority.” Appellants appealed the circuit court’s

decision, which is now before us for our review.

                                 STANDARD OF REVIEW

                “[J]udicial review of administrative action is concerned with the

question of arbitrariness.” Am. Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson

Cnty. Plan. & Zoning Comm’n, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964) (emphasis

original). An administrative agency’s decision is arbitrary if the agency acted in

excess of its statutory power, if a party affected by an administrative action was not

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -3-
afforded procedural due process, or if the administrative decision was not

supported by substantial evidence. Id. (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence

has been conclusively defined by Kentucky courts as that which, when taken alone

or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in

the mind of a reasonable person.” Bowling v. Nat. Res. & Env’t Prot. Cabinet, 891

S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky. App. 1994) (citing Kentucky State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller,

481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972)).

                                     ANALYSIS

             First, we must determine whether the Board acted in excess of its

statutory authority in granting the requested conditional use and variances. We

conclude that it did.

             Appellants argue that, because boards of adjustment are prohibited by

statute from both granting variances which contradict zoning regulations and from

enlarging or extending a previously existing nonconforming use, the Board

exceeded its statutory authority in granting Appellees’ requests.

             As Appellees note, KRS 100.237 authorizes the board to “approve,

modify, or deny any application for a conditional use permit.” KRS 100.237(1).

However, this power is not without limitation. Variances are not permitted where

such variance would violate applicable zoning regulations. KRS 100.247 prohibits

the board from exercising “power to grant a variance to permit a use of any land,

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building, or structure which is not permitted by the zoning regulation in the zone in

question, or to alter density requirements in the zone in question.” KRS 100.247.

This means “one cannot obtain a variance for the use if the property is not

permitted by the zoning regulation or alters the density requirements.” Louisville

& Jefferson Cnty. Plan. Comm’n v. Schmidt, 83 S.W.3d 449, 451 (Ky. 2001)

(citing KRS 100.247).

             Additionally, while nonconforming uses which predate applicable

zoning regulations may continue once the regulations are adopted, a board of

adjustment may not enlarge or expand that nonconforming use. KRS 100.253 is

determinative of the issue and says:

             (1) The lawful use of a building or premises, existing at
             the time of the adoption of any zoning regulations
             affecting it, may be continued, although such use does not
             conform to the provisions of such regulations, except as
             otherwise provided herein.

             (2) The board of adjustment shall not allow the
             enlargement or extension of a nonconforming use beyond
             the scope and area of its operation at the time the
             regulation which makes its use nonconforming was
             adopted, nor shall the board permit a change from one (1)
             nonconforming use to another unless the new
             nonconforming use is in the same or a more restrictive
             classification, provided, however, the board of adjustment
             may grant approval, effective to maintain nonconforming-
             use status, for enlargements or extensions, made or to be
             made, of the facilities of a nonconforming use, where the
             use consists of the presenting of a major public attraction
             or attractions, such as a sports event or events, which has
             been presented at the same site over such period of years

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            and has such attributes and public acceptance as to have
            attained international prestige and to have achieved the
            status of a public tradition, contributing substantially to the
            economy of the community and state, of which prestige
            and status the site is an essential element, and where the
            enlargement or extension was or is designed to maintain
            the prestige and status by meeting the increasing demands
            of participants and patrons.

KRS 100.253(1)-(2).

            The church is located in an R-1EE zone, which is governed by Section

10.4 of the Park Hills Zoning Ordinance. Section 10.4 says:

            A. PERMITTED USES:

                  1. Single-family residential dwellings (detached).

                  2. Two-family residential dwellings.

                  3. Planned Unit Development (PUD), as regulated
                     by ARTICLE XI of this Ordinance.

            B. ACCESSORY USES:

                  1. Customary accessory buildings and uses.

                  2. Fences and walls, as regulated by ARTICLE XVI
                     of this Ordinance.

                  3. Home occupations, subject to the restrictions and
                     limitations established in SECTION 9.23 of this
                     Ordinance.

                  4. Signs, as regulated by ARTICLE XV of this
                     Ordinance.

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              C. CONDITIONAL USES: No building or occupancy
                 permit shall be issued for any of the following, nor
                 shall any of the following uses or any customary
                 accessory buildings or uses be permitted until and
                 unless the location of said use shall have been applied
                 for and approved of by the Board of Adjustment, as set
                 forth in SECTION 9.13:

            ....

                   2. Churches and other buildings for the purpose of
                      religious worship, provided they are located
                      adjacent to an arterial street.

Park Hills, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 10.4(A)-(C).

            Section 19 of the Zoning Ordinance governs the Board, and Section

19.6 provides the Board’s powers with respect to dimensional variances and

nonconforming uses. Section 19.6, Subsection B provides:

            B. DIMENSIONAL              VARIANCE           CANNOT
               CONTRADICT ZONING REGULATIONS: The
               Board of Adjustment shall not possess the power to
               grant a dimensional variance to permit a use of any
               land, building, or structure which is not permitted by
               this Ordinance in the zone in question, or to alter the
               density requirements in the zone in question.

Park Hills, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 19.6(B). Further, Subsection D provides:

            D. CHANGE FROM ONE NONCONFORMING USE
               TO ANOTHER: No change from one nonconforming
               use to another will be granted by the Board of
               Adjustment, unless and until:

                1. The Board of Adjustment shall find that the new
                   nonconforming use is in the same or more
                   restrictive classification of use as the prior

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                   nonconforming use. In the determination of the
                   same or more restrictive classification of use, the
                   applicant shall establish and the Board of
                   Adjustment shall find:

                   a. That the new nonconforming use shall generate
                      less vehicular traffic (automobile and truck) than
                      the prior nonconforming use;

                   b. That the new nonconforming use is of a nature
                      which will emit less noise and air pollution than
                      the prior nonconforming use;

                   c. That the new nonconforming use will be more in
                      character with the existing neighborhood than
                      the prior nonconforming use, in that it is more in
                      conformance with the area – wide
                      comprehensive plan as adopted by the Kenton
                      County and Municipal Planning and Zoning
                      Commission, and also, more in conformance
                      with the uses permitted in the zone in which the
                      use is located, than the prior nonconforming use.

            ....

               3. The Board of Adjustment shall not allow the
                  enlargement or extension of a nonconforming use
                  beyond the scope and area of its operation at which
                  time its use became nonconforming.

Park Hills, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 19.6(D)(1), (3).

            The Zoning Ordinance defines an “arterial street” as “[p]ublic

thoroughfares which serve the major movements of traffic within and through the

community, as identified in the adopted comprehensive plan for the city of Park

Hills.” Park Hills, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 7.

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               As relevant to this appeal, the Zoning Ordinance also defines

“collector streets” as “[p]ublic thoroughfares which serve to collect and distribute

traffic, primarily from local residential streets to arterial streets.” Id. It also

defines “local streets” as “[f]acilities which are designed to be used primarily for

direct access to abutting properties and leading into the collector street system.”

Id.

               According to a report zoning staff provided to the Board, Amsterdam

Road is a collector street. Therefore, the church is not located on an arterial street

as the Zoning Ordinance requires. Because the church came into existence prior to

implementation of the Zoning Ordinance, it constitutes a preexisting

nonconforming use.3

               We agree with Appellants that the Board failed to follow Park Hills’

zoning ordinances and, therefore, acted outside the bounds of its statutory

authority. First, Appellant is correct that construction of the grotto in the rear of

the church property would constitute either a change or an expansion of the

church’s preexisting nonconforming use. If construction of the grotto constitutes a

change in the nonconforming use, under Section 19.6(D)(1) of the Zoning

3
 Appellees argue in their brief that, because the church is a preexisting nonconforming use, Park
Hills’ Zoning Ordinance is not violated because the church is not located next to an arterial street.
However, Appellant does not contest the church’s status as such or argue that the nonconforming
use must be discontinued. The continued operation of the church is not a subject of this appeal.

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Ordinance, the Board was required to find that the new nonconforming use – in

this case, the grotto – would generate less vehicular traffic, create less noise and air

pollution, and be more in line with the character of the neighborhood than the

previous nonconforming use.

             Expansion of preexisting nonconforming uses is plainly prohibited by

Section 19.6(D)(3) of the Zoning Ordinance, which says, “[t]he Board of

Adjustment shall not allow the enlargement or extension of a nonconforming use

beyond the scope and area of its operation at which time its use became

nonconforming.” Construction of a grotto – large or small – in the rear of the

church property, for both the church membership and the public to use, constitutes

an expansion of both the scope and area of the nonconforming use. KRS

100.253(2) prohibits the church from doing so.

             Additionally, a majority portion of the planned grotto is to be

constructed on the former Sheila Burke Trust property. This land was residential

property prior to the church acquiring it. This land was not used previously for the

preexisting nonconforming use of a church. And the fact that acquisition of this

land was necessary to construct the grotto further illustrates the grotto would

constitute an enlargement of the church’s preexisting nonconforming use in terms

of both scope and area, which KRS 100.253(2) prohibits.

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             Appellees offer Board of Adjustments, Bourbon County v. Brown, 969

S.W.2d 214 (Ky. App. 1998), to support the notion that minor or modest

expansions of preexisting nonconforming uses have been upheld by reviewing

courts. In Brown, we determined the enclosure of a porch to construct restroom

facilities for auction house patrons, as well as an increase of weekly auctions from

two to three, did not constitute an impermissible enlargement of a nonconforming

use. Id. at 217. However, the auction house proprietors in Brown also sought to

construct a parking lot on nearby land, which the Bourbon County Board of

Adjustments determined was not a permissible use under the county’s zoning

ordinance; the Board’s determination as to the parking lot was affirmed by the

circuit court, but not challenged on subsequent appeal. Id. at 215.

             However, the construction of the grotto is unlike the expansions of

preexisting nonconforming uses in Brown. In that case, the square footage of the

auction house’s operations was not increased, id. at 217, while the construction of

the grotto will require such increase. The grotto – which would largely be

constructed on adjacent land which was never used for a nonconforming purpose –

is more akin to the parking lot in Brown than the construction of restrooms or the

increased weekly auctions. We do not agree with Appellees that construction of

the grotto would constitute the same sort of minor or modest expansion as was

present in Brown.

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             Appellees also cite to A. L. Carrithers & Son v. City of Louisville, 63

S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1933), again for the proposition that minor expansions of

preexisting nonconforming uses can be permissible. However, circumstances in

that case are distinct from the current case. In A. L. Carrithers & Son, the

appellant, a corporation, had operated a milk business since 1909, and in 1931 a

health inspection required the business to either cease manufacturing butter or to

enlarge its plant in order to relocate a component of the operation into the enlarged

space. Id. at 494-95. This expansion violated a section of Louisville’s zoning code

prohibiting structural alterations to buildings constituting preexisting

nonconforming uses, and so the board of adjustments denied the appellant’s

application. Id. As the then-highest Kentucky court concluded, extending the

building’s walls for relocation of parts of the butter production process was not “a

change of such a nature as materially affects the realty itself, or its use, or the

health, morals, or general welfare of the zoned district.” Id. at 497 (citations

omitted). And because the zoning code did permit such structural alterations when

required by law or ordinance, and the milk business was required to expand its

building following an inspection, the expansion of the building’s walls was a

permissible enlargement of a preexisting nonconforming use. Id.

             We believe the grotto to be unlike the expansion of the plant in A. L.

Carrithers for several reasons. First, the church was under no requirement

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pursuant to law or ordinance to construct the grotto in the same way the milk plant

in A. L. Carrithers was required to expand following a government inspection. Id.

at 494. Further, unlike the building expansion in A. L. Carrithers, construction of

the grotto would fundamentally affect the realty and its use. Though the square

footage of the preexisting nonconforming use in A. L. Carrithers did increase, the

construction of the grotto is too dissimilar for A. L. Carrithers to provide an

applicable rule.

             Appellants also argue the Board’s decision was arbitrary because they

were denied due process during the administrative action. Specifically, they argue

they were denied due process because they were not permitted to cross-examine

Odor, the church’s representative. “When making a zoning decision, the

legislative body must provide a party whose constitutional interest is at stake ‘the

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Huxol

v. Daviess Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 507 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Ky. App. 2016) (quoting

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18

(1976)). Ordinarily, all that is required is that the legislative body conduct a

hearing, take and weigh evidence, consider the evidence, create findings of fact,

enter an order supported by substantial evidence, and respect subsequent judicial

review of its decision. Id. (citing Hilltop Basic Res., Inc. v. Cnty. of Boone, 180

S.W.3d 464, 468 (Ky. 2005)). “However, in zoning cases where a decision is

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made following a trial-type adjudicatory hearing, the parties also have the

additional right to cross-examine witnesses.” Id. (citing Kaelin v. City of

Louisville, 643 S.W.2d 590, 591-92 (Ky. 1982)).

             As Appellees note, Appellant Joel Frederic was present at the hearing

and commented on the application. Though Frederic did not attempt to ask

questions of Odor himself, other hearing attendees did. The Board never barred

anyone from asking questions, and each attendee was given the opportunity to

question testimony. In our view, Appellants are unable to demonstrate that they

were denied the opportunity to cross examine Odor.

             Appellants additionally argue the Board’s decision was arbitrary

because it was not supported by substantial evidence. As the circuit court

determined, the administrative record demonstrates substantial evidence supported

the Board’s decision, including findings that the grotto “will comply with any

regulations and conditions specified in the applicable ordinances and will not allow

an unreasonable circumvention of the zoning regulations.” However, as discussed

above, the Board acted beyond the bounds of its statutory authority in granting the

church’s application. Therefore, we do not need to examine whether the evidence

relied upon by the Board in making its decision was substantial.

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                Finally, Appellees argue the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.4 § 2000cc et seq., prohibits the Board from

preventing the construction of the grotto. We note that the circuit court made no

reference to RLUIPA in its Order.

                As a “general rule,” the statute provides:

                No government shall impose or implement a land use
                regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden
                on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious
                assembly or institution, unless the government
                demonstrates that the imposition of the burden on that
                person, assembly, or institution –

                (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
                    interest; and

                (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
                    compelling government interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). However, as the Sixth Circuit notes, there is “no

substantial burden when, although the action encumber[s] the practice of religion,

it d[oes] not pressure the individual to violate his or her religious beliefs.” Living

Water Church of God v. Charter Tp. Of Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729, 734 (6th Cir.

2007) (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449,

108 S. Ct. 1319, 99 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1988)).

4
    United States Code.

                                           -15-
             “RLUIPA’s history demonstrates that Congress intended to leave

intact the traditional ‘substantial burden’ test, as defined by the Supreme Court’s

free exercise jurisprudence.” Episcopal Student Found. v. City of Ann Arbor, 341

F. Supp. 2d 691, 701 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citations omitted). Federal courts have

identified two categories of alleged substantial burden upon free exercise of

religion. Id. at 701. As to the first, “courts routinely find substantial burdens

where compliance with the statute itself violates the individual’s religious beliefs

and noncompliance may subject him to criminal sanctions or the loss of a

significant government privilege or benefit.” Id. at 701-02 (citing Wisconsin v.

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972)). In the second,

“courts have been far more reluctant to find a violation where compliance with the

challenged regulation makes the practice of one’s religion more difficult or

expensive, but the regulation is not inherently inconsistent with the litigant’s

beliefs.” Id. at 702 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S. Ct. 1144, 6 L.

Ed. 2d 563 (1961)).

             The Park Hills Zoning Ordinance falls squarely within the second

category. The application of the ordinance to prohibit construction of the grotto

may make practice of religion somewhat more difficult for the church’s

congregation or the adherents of the Catholic faith broadly, but the Zoning

Ordinance is not inherently inconsistent with their religious beliefs. Accordingly,

                                         -16-
we find the Park Hills Zoning Ordinance imposes no substantial burden on the

religious exercise of any Appellee and, therefore, the ordinance does not constitute

a violation of RLUIPA.

                                  CONCLUSION

              For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Kenton Circuit Court’s June

29, 2022 Order affirming the decision of the City of Park Hills Board of

Adjustment.

              ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Christopher Wiest                         Daniel R. Braun
Crestview Hills, Kentucky                 Covington, Kentucky

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