Court Opinion

ID: 9943050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:01:38.696011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:00.186493
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8044     Document: 010111004019      Date Filed: 02/22/2024   Page: 1
                                                           FILED
                                               United States Court of Appeals
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS      Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     February 22, 2024
                          _______________________________________
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
     CHARLES KENZELL CARTER,

          Plaintiff - Appellant,
                                                          No. 23-8044
     v.                                          (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00021-SWS)
                                                            (D. Wyo.)
     WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF
     CORRECTIONS; WYOMING
     DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
     CLASSIFICATION AND HOUSING
     MANAGER; CARL
     VOIGTSBERGER, individually;
     WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF
     CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR; DAN
     SHANNON, individually,

          Defendants - Appellees.
                       _______________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _______________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                _______________________________________

 *
      Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have
 decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R.
 App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

       This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 23-8044   Document: 010111004019   Date Filed: 02/22/2024   Page: 2

       This case arose from the transfer of an inmate, Mr. Charles Kenzell

 Carter, from Wyoming to Virginia. Mr. Carter sued the Wyoming

 Department of Corrections and two officials (Mr. Carl Voigstberger and

 Mr. Dan Shannon). The district court summarily dismissed the action on

 grounds that it was frivolous and failed to state a claim on which relief

 could be granted, and Mr. Carter appeals.

       On appeal, he contends that

       •      prison authorities improperly removed good-time credits,

       •      summary dismissal impinged on the right to court access,

       •      he suffered unequal treatment in comparison to Caucasian
              inmates in Wyoming,

       •      the transfer to Virginia stemmed from retaliation,

       •      continued confinement in administrative segregation violated
              the right to due process, and

       •      the district court was biased.

 We conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the retaliation

 claim, but reject Mr. Carter’s other appellate contentions.

       First, Mr. Carter challenges the removal of his good-time credits.

 The district court rejected this challenge because Mr. Carter had sued

 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court distinguished between civil suits under

 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and habeas actions, explaining that a habeas petition was

 required because removal of the credits had lengthened Mr. Carter’s

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 confinement. See Carter v. Wyoming Dep’t of Corr., No 2:23-CV-00021-

 SWS, 2023 WL 4339466, at *7 (D. Wyo. June 12, 2023). Mr. Carter

 doesn’t question this explanation, so we can’t disturb this part of the

 ruling. See Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th

 Cir. 2015) (stating that an appellant must “explain what was wrong with

 the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision”). 1

       Second, Mr. Carter claims that summary dismissal impinged on his

 constitutional right to court access. Under federal law, the district court

 had to screen the complaint because Mr. Carter was proceeding in forma

 pauperis, suing government officials, and claiming deficient conditions in

 prison. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii), 1915A(b)(1); 42 U.S.C.

 § 1997e(c)(1). We have held that screening of prisoner complaints does not

 violate the Constitution’s right to court access. See Curley v. Perry, 246

 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[S]ua sponte dismissal of a meritless

 complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due

 process and does not infringe upon the right of access to the courts.”). 2

 1
       Mr. Carter’s pro se status doesn’t relieve him of the obligation to
 identify an error in the district court’s reasoning. See Garrett v. Selby
 Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]his court
 has repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of
 procedure that govern other litigants.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
 2
       In Curley, we addressed the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C.
 § 1915(e)(2). 246 F.3d at 1283. This section is virtually identical to
 sections 1915A(b)(1) and 1997e(c)(1).

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       Third, Mr. Carter alleges a denial of equal protection because his

 treatment was poorer than that received by Caucasian inmates housed in

 Wyoming. The district court dismissed this claim, reasoning that

       •      Mr. Carter hadn’t identified inmates getting better treatment or
              explained how they were similarly situated,

       •      the allegations in his complaint didn’t have enough detail,

       •      Mr. Carter hadn’t pleaded facts showing a discriminatory
              purpose, and

       •      Mr. Carter hadn’t adequately pleaded discriminatory treatment.

 Again, Mr. Carter hasn’t addressed the district court’s reasoning; so we

 can’t disturb the ruling on this claim.

       Fourth, Mr. Carter claims retaliatory transfer, alleging that

       •      he filed grievances in July 2019 for mistreatment by prison
              officials,

       •      he was soon subjected to a “compassionate transfer” to a
              Virginia prison, and

       •      the transfer did not meet the qualifications for a compassionate
              transfer under Wyoming regulations because Mr. Carter did not
              pay for the transfer.

 R. vol. 1, at 5, 43–44. Mr. Carter asserts that the transfer to Virginia

 constituted retaliation for his filing of the grievances. Id. But the district

 court did not address this assertion.

       Adverse actions taken in retaliation for a prisoner’s filing of

 grievances may violate the First Amendment. See Williams v. Meese, 926

                                           4
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 F.2d 994, 998 (10th Cir. 1991). To withstand dismissal, the prisoner must

 allege specific facts demonstrating a retaliatory motive and but-for

 causation. Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 949–50 (10th Cir. 1991).

 Circumstantial evidence—like temporal proximity between the grievances

 and the transfer—may support a claim of retaliation. See id. at 949

 (holding that an inmate’s allegations of retaliation were sufficiently

 supported by the “only means available to him—circumstantial evidence of

 the suspicious timing of his discipline, coincidental transfers of his

 witnesses and assistants, and an alleged pattern by defendants of blocking

 his access to legal materials and assistance”).

       We conclude that Mr. Carter has adequately alleged three facts that

 could create liability for a retaliatory transfer:

       1.     activity protected by the First Amendment (the filing of
              grievances),

       2.     transfer to Virginia soon after Mr. Carter had filed the
              grievances, and

       3.     invalidity of the explanation for the transfer.

 R. vol. 1, at 5. Given these allegations, the district court erred in

 dismissing this claim based on frivolousness and failure to state a valid

 claim. See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating

 that if prison officials had retaliated against a prisoner based on his filing

 of administrative grievances, the officials could incur liability for a

 constitutional violation).

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       Fifth, Mr. Carter argues that the defendants failed to comply with

 Wyoming policies requiring periodic review of a prisoner’s placement in

 administrative segregation. The district court rejected this argument on the

 ground that a failure to comply with Wyoming policies did not establish a

 constitutional violation. See Carter v. Wyoming Dep’t of Corr., No 2:23-

 CV-00021-SWS, 2023 WL 4339466, at *6 (D. Wyo. June 12, 2023)

 (discussing Mr. Carter’s “mistaken belief that [Wyoming Department of

 Corrections policies] are equivalent to statutes, the Constitution, and are

 the law”).

       In his appellate brief, Mr. Carter doesn’t challenge the district

 court’s reasoning. He instead repeats his argument that the defendants

 violated Wyoming regulations. Mr. Carter doesn’t explain how the alleged

 regulatory violations would have amounted to a denial of due process.

       Prison conditions that “‘impose [] atypical and significant hardship

 on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life’ may

 create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Fogle v.

 Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sandin v. Conner,

 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). In some circumstances, placement in

 administrative segregation may impose an “atypical and significant

 hardship” warranting periodic review of an inmate’s placement. See Toevs

 v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 912 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that “administrative

 segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an

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 inmate” and that “[p]rison officials must engage in some sort of periodic

 review of the confinement of such inmates” (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459

 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin,

 515 U.S. at 483)). The required review “must be meaningful; it cannot be a

 sham or a pretext.” Id.

       Mr. Carter doesn’t contend that prison officials failed to provide

 meaningful review of his administrative placement while he was housed in

 Virginia. He argues only that Wyoming officials failed to comply with

 regulations involving review of administrative placements. So the district

 court properly dismissed this claim.

       Sixth, Mr. Carter doesn’t justify reversal based on judicial bias.

 “Under [Fed. R. App. P. 28], which applies equally to pro se litigants, a

 brief must contain more than a generalized assertion of error.” Garrett v.

 Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005)

 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). On the issue of bias, Mr.

 Carter’s brief contains only a generalized assertion, without any reasoning

 or support. So we do not consider this assertion any further.

       Finally, Mr. Carter criticizes the district court’s characterization of

 prior dismissals. When there are three or more dismissals for frivolousness

 or failure to state a valid claim, prisoners bear a heightened burden before

 they can avoid prepayment of the filing fee in future actions. 28 U.S.C.

 § 1915(g). The district court said that some of the prior dismissals

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 qualified; Mr. Carter disagrees on the ground that some of the dismissals

 were without prejudice.

       We need not address the classification of the prior dismissals. But we

 note that the heightened burden may arise even when the prior dismissals

 are without prejudice. See Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir.

 2013).

                                      * * *

       We affirm the district court’s ruling in part and reverse in part. We

 remand Mr. Carter’s retaliation claim for further proceedings consistent

 with this order and judgment. 3

                                     Entered for the Court

                                     Robert E. Bacharach
                                     Circuit Judge

 3
       Mr. Carter also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We grant
 leave because Mr. Carter cannot afford to prepay the filing fee. Mr. Carter
 must continue making partial payments until the filing fee is paid in full.

                                        8