Court Opinion

ID: 9929896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 18:01:03.429182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:52.438286
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DE WITT LAMAR LONG,                         No. 22-15997

               Plaintiff-Appellant,        D.C. No. 1:19-cv-
                                            00235-JMS-RT
 v.

SUGAI, Correctional Sgt. at Halawa            OPINION
Correctional Facility, sued in his/her
individual and official capacities;
LYLE ANTONIO, Chief of Security
at Halawa Correctional Facility, sued
in his/her individual and official
capacities; WYATT, Correctional Sgt.
at Halawa Correctional Facility, sued
in his/her individual and official
capacities; TORRES, Case
Manager/Correctional Counselor at
Halawa Correctional Facility, sued in
his/her individual and official
capacities; INMATE GRIEVANCE
OFFICER, Halawa Correctional
Facility, sued in his/her individual and
official capacities; DOES, John and
Jane, 1-50,

               Defendants-Appellees.
2                          LONG V. SUGAI

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                 for the District of Hawaii
       J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted November 8, 2023
                   Pasadena, California

                     Filed February 5, 2024

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, William A. Fletcher, and John
                 B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

                 Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

                          SUMMARY *

                     Prisoner Civil Rights

    The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated
in part the district court’s judgment in favor of prison
officials in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by Hawaii prison inmate DeWitt Lamar Long, a practicing
Muslim, alleging that prison officials violated his First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion and
unconstitutionally retaliated against him for engaging in
protected First Amendment activity.
    The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, at the
screening stage, of Long’s claims for injunctive

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                        LONG V. SUGAI                       3

relief. Although Long’s pro se complaint alleged only past
actions by defendants, his “Request for Relief” asked,
among other things, that staff be properly trained and that
Ramadan meals be served hot. The district court should
have allowed Long to amend his complaint to allege facts
showing a need for injunctive relief.
    The panel vacated the district court’s summary judgment
in favor of Sergeant Lee, holding that delivery of Long’s
evening meal at 3:30 p.m. during Ramadan substantially
burdened his free exercise of religion. The district court
should have evaluated the four factors set forth in Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), to determine whether the burden
was justified. The panel remanded to allow the district court
to conduct that analysis.
    The panel affirmed the district court’s partial summary
judgment in favor of Chief of Security Antonio on Long’s
claim that he was transferred from a medium-security
facility to a high-security facility in retaliation for filing
grievances. The panel agreed with the district court that the
sequence of events leading to the transfer was insufficient to
show retaliatory intent.
    The panel affirmed the district court’ judgment,
following a bench trial, in favor of Sergeant Sugai on Long’s
free exercise of religion and retaliation claims, determining
that ample evidence supported the district court’s findings.
    Finally, the panel affirmed the district court’s judgment,
following a bench trial, in favor of Chief of Security Antonio
on Long’s free exercise claim. The district court did not err
by concluding that (1) the substantial burden on Long’s free
exercise rights caused by his transfer to a high-security
facility was justified; and (2) Chief of Security Antonio was
not authorized to arrange weekly transportation to a
4                       LONG V. SUGAI

medium-security facility for religious services and therefore
was not a proper defendant.

                        COUNSEL

Curt Cutting (argued) and Rebecca G. Powell, Horvitz &
Levy LLP, Burbank, California; Maxwell Lyster and Macy
Merritt (argued), Certified Law Students, Pepperdine Caruso
School of Law Ninth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Clinic,
Malibu, California; for Plaintiff- Appellant.
Jennifer H. Tran (argued), Caron M. Inagaki, and Isaac H.
Kenneth Ickes, Deputy Attorneys General; Anne E. Lopez,
Hawaii Attorney General; Hawaii Attorney General’s
Office, Honolulu, Hawaii; for Defendants-Appellees.

                        OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

    Hawai‘i prison inmate DeWitt Lamar Long is a
practicing Muslim. In a pro se complaint, he alleged various
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials,
including Sergeant Rodney Sugai, Chief of Security Lyle
Antonio, and Sergeant Wyatt Lee. As relevant to this appeal,
Long alleged that defendants violated his First Amendment
right to free exercise of his religion and unconstitutionally
retaliated against him for engaging in protected First
Amendment activity.
   Long appeals from the district court’s screening
dismissal of his claims for injunctive relief; its summary
                        LONG V. SUGAI                       5

judgment in favor of Sgt. Lee; its partial summary judgment
in favor of Chief Antonio; and its judgment after a bench
trial in favor of Sgt. Sugai and Chief Antonio.
    We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Long’s
claims for an injunction and vacate its summary judgment in
favor of Sgt. Lee. We otherwise affirm.
                   I. Factual Background
    Long is a practicing Muslim. With the exception of a
short period in a private prison in Arizona, he has been
imprisoned at Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”) in
Aiea, Hawai‘i. He was incarcerated in HCF’s medium-
security facility between December 16, 2015 and May 8,
2017, when he was transferred to HCF’s high-security
facility.
                    A. Non-Pork Meals
    Soon after his arrival at HCF in December 2015, Long
requested meals consistent with his Islamic faith. He did not
insist on a strict halal diet, but he did request a “non-pork
diet.” Long stated in a prison grievance that after submitting
his request he was served meals with pork seven or more
times and was not offered a substitute meal. On January 6,
2016, prison officials approved Long’s request for a
specialized diet. For approximately a month following the
approval, Long received accommodating religious meals.
    During his time at HCF, Long filed several grievances
relating to his meals at the medium-security facility,
accusing Sgt. Sugai of harassment and of deliberately
denying him non-pork meals, in violation of the posted meal-
accommodations list. The district court concluded that
Sugai was not responsible for the denial of non-pork meals.
The court found that several of the denials occurred before
6                       LONG V. SUGAI

Long’s religious-diet request was approved. The court also
found that Sugai did not disregard the posted meal-
accommodations list.
    In early February 2016, while Sgt. Sugai was overseeing
the kitchen, Long received a meal containing pork remnants.
Long exchanged the meal for a pre-wrapped substitute
vegetarian meal. The district court found that the substitute
meal also contained strands of pork and that Long became
sick from the meal. Long contended that Sugai had directed
inmates who worked in the kitchen to contaminate Long’s
meal with pork, but the district court found that “any cross-
contamination between pork-based foods and Plaintiff’s
vegetarian foods was not attributable to Sgt. Sugai.” The
court noted that Gary Kaplan, a prison “program control
administrator,” attributed the cross-contamination to “the
fact that the kitchen uses the same utensils for the vegetarian
meal that they use to serve the pork.”
    Long testified at trial that on at least three occasions
between March 2016 and May 2017 Sgt. Sugai prevented
him from getting any food at all, and that, at other times,
Sugai directed inmate workers to give Long smaller
portions. The record contains a signed declaration from an
inmate-worker stating that Sugai would direct him to make
“Mr. Long’s trays smaller than other trays.” Crediting
Sugai’s testimony, the district court found that Sugai had not
prevented Long from getting meals and had not directed
anyone to give him smaller portions.
    On July 23, 2016, Long filed a grievance alleging that
Sgt. Sugai had denied him a non-pork meal and had
intimidated him by cursing at him and calling him a crybaby.
Long testified at trial that the “next time when [he] went to
the chow hall,” Sugai ordered him to pick up his non-pork
                         LONG V. SUGAI                        7

meal and take it back to his housing unit rather than eat in
the dining hall. Long testified that Sugai effectively imposed
his own version of the prison’s “meals to modules”
program—a meal-delivery program reserved for inmates
whose mental or physical disabilities required that they eat
in their cells. Long testified that he was forced to eat in his
cell for the next six to eight months. However, the district
court found that Sugai had sent Long to eat in his housing
unit only a “few times,” and that he did so because Long
“was being ‘argumentative’ and ‘disruptive’ with the kitchen
staff regarding the food service.”
            B. Transfer to High-Security Facility
    On May 8, 2017, three days after he filed his last
grievance against Sgt. Sugai, Long was transferred from the
medium-security facility to a high-security facility at HCF.
Chief Antonio testified at trial that he ordered the transfer to
the high-security facility in order to create a “cooling off
period” between Sgt. Sugai and Long.
    In the high-security facility, Long lost access to many
benefits he had enjoyed at the medium-security facility. His
telephone use was restricted to fifteen minutes every other
day. He was not allowed to buy food in the commissary, to
use the microwave, or to use a law library. He was strip
searched and escorted when he moved about the facility.
Finally, he was unable to attend Friday Jumu’ah prayer
services, which were held only in the medium-security
facility. Jumu’ah services are “commanded by the Koran
and must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its zenith
and before the Asr, or afternoon prayer.” O’Lone v. Est. of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (citing Koran 62:9–10).
   After Long was transferred to the high-security facility,
he filed a grievance against Chief Antonio complaining
8                       LONG V. SUGAI

about the lack of access to prayer services and requesting
transportation to Friday Jumu’ah services at the medium-
security facility. The request was denied. The district court
found that Antonio credibly testified that it was not feasible
to transport Long to the medium-security facility to attend
the prayer services. Two days after filing another grievance
regarding restrictions in the high-security facility, Long was
moved to a private prison in Arizona. He was later
transferred back to HCF, and was incarcerated there when
he filed his complaint in this case.
        C. Evening Meal Delivery during Ramadan
    Shortly after his transfer to the high-security facility,
Ramadan began. During Ramadan, Sgt. Lee delivered his
evening meal to him at about 3:30 p.m.—even though Long
could not break his fast until sundown, at about 7:30 p.m.
Long stated that by the time he could eat, the food was cold,
congealed, and unsafe under prison food-safety guidelines.
He stated further that the cold food aggravated his stomach
ulcers, and that on several occasions he was “unable to eat
the dinner meal.” He stated that he asked if Lee could call
the kitchen to request a hot meal or allow Long to use a staff
microwave to reheat the food. Lee refused, telling Long that
the kitchen was closed and that prison policy forbade staff
from using a staff microwave to heat food for inmates.
                II. Procedural Background
    Long alleged several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Sgt. Sugai, Chief Antonio, Sgt. Lee, a case manager
named “Ms. Torres,” and unnamed Doe defendants in their
official and individual capacities. Long was pro se in the
district court. He was assigned pro bono counsel for this
appeal.
                        LONG V. SUGAI                       9

     Long alleged § 1983 claims based on First Amendment
protections against government infringement on the free
exercise of religion and against government retaliation for
protected speech. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883
(9th Cir. 2008) (righ to free exercise of religion); Rhodes v.
Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) (right to file
grievances). He also alleged a § 1983 claim based on the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, contending
that the Doe defendants violated his due process rights by
failing to respond to and address his prison grievances. See
Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). He
requested injunctive relief and damages.
    In a screening order, the district court dismissed with
prejudice Long’s claims for injunctive relief and damages
against all defendants in their official capacities. The court
dismissed without prejudice Long’s § 1983 individual-
capacity claims against Ms. Torres and the Doe defendants.
The court allowed Long’s § 1983 individual-capacity claims
against Sgt. Sugai, Chief Antonio, and Sgt. Lee to go
forward and ordered that these three defendants be served.
    In a subsequent order, the district court granted summary
judgment to Sgt. Lee on Long’s free exercise claim arising
out of the early food delivery during Ramadan. In the same
order, the court also granted partial summary judgment to
Chief Antonio on Long’s retaliation claim arising out of his
transfer to the high-security facility.
     The remaining claims—Long’s free exercise and
retaliation claims against Sgt. Sugai and his free exercise
claim against Chief Antonio—went to trial. After a bench
trial, the district court entered judgment for Antonio and
Sugai.
10                      LONG V. SUGAI

                       III. Discussion
       A. Screening of Claims for Injunctive Relief
    As noted above, at the screening stage, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), the district
court dismissed with prejudice Long’s claims for injunctive
relief. Long did not ask the district court for leave to amend.
     The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at
screening is the “same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v.
Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). We review
the dismissal of a pro se prisoner’s complaint at screening de
novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 1997));
Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112.
    The district court correctly noted that Long’s pro se
complaint alleged only past actions by defendants.
However, in the “Request for Relief,” Long’s complaint
asked “that staff rea[ss]ess their policy and proce[]dures, and
be properly trained so as the religious rights of all are
respected equally[;] that the policy or practice of not
allowing (High) prisoners to attend Friday Islamic services
be changed, as well as during Ramadan evening meals be
served hot and or the microwave be made available.”
    For claims under the PLRA, we have “held that ‘a district
court should grant leave to amend even if no request to
amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of
other facts.’” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.
                        LONG V. SUGAI                       11

    Long, who is currently incarcerated at HCF, argues that
he should have been allowed to amend the complaint to
allege facts showing a need for injunctive relief. We agree.
Because we can “conceive of facts” that would justify
injunctive relief, the district court should have granted leave
to amend. Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1116
(9th Cir. 1975).
                   B. Summary Judgment
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. We must “determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of
material fact and whether the district court correctly applied
the relevant substantive law.” Id.
          1. Free Exercise Claim against Sgt. Lee
    As noted above, while Long was confined in the high-
security facility during Ramadan, Sgt. Lee brought Long’s
evening meal to him at about 3:30 p.m. By the time Long
could break his fast at about 7:30 p.m., the food was cold,
unappetizing, and potentially unsafe to consume. The food
also exacerbated his stomach ulcers. Long contended that
delivering his evening meal during his fast violated the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment to Lee.
    In granting summary judgment, the district court relied
on a single case, LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th
Cir. 1993), in which we held that serving prisoners
unappetizing but nutritious “Nutraloaf” did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
We wrote in LeMaire that food “served cold, while
unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.”
12                      LONG V. SUGAI

Id. (quoting Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575
(11th Cir. 1985)).
    LeMaire, decided under the Eighth Amendment, does
not control Long’s First Amendment claim. The question in
the case before us is not whether serving cold, unappetizing,
and possibly unsafe food is cruel and unusual punishment.
Rather, it is whether serving such food unconstitutionally
burdened Long’s free exercise of his religion.
    In ruling on a prisoner’s First Amendment free exercise
claim, we first determine whether the challenged prison
policy or practice substantially burdened the prisoner’s free
exercise of his or her religion. See Jones v. Williams, 791
F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). If it does, we then apply
the four factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987), to determine whether the burden was “reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.” Shakur, 514
F.3d at 884 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Long, by the time Long could eat his evening meal at about
7:30 p.m., the food was often inedible and potentially unsafe,
and, if eaten, exacerbated his stomach ulcers. We take
judicial notice of the fact that some food cannot safely sit at
room temperature for four hours. See Food Facts: Serving
Up          Safe         Buffets,       F.D.A.         (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/food/buy-store-serve-safe-
food/serving-safe-buffets [https://perma.cc/36EW-CVJ5]
(strongly advising that perishables left at room temperature
for more than two hours be discarded); Leftovers and Food
Safety,      U.S.D.A.,        https://www.fsis.usda.gov/food-
safety/safe-food-handling-and-preparation/food-safety-
basics/leftovers-and-food-safety [https://perma.cc/QQ8F-
G8CP] (last updated July 31, 2020) (describing food left out
                        LONG V. SUGAI                       13

for more than two hours as in the “danger zone” because
bacteria can rapidly grow at room temperature); 10
Dangerous       Food       Safety   Mistakes,    C.D.C.,
https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/ten-dangerous-
mistakes.html [https://perma.cc/DTG7-Y4SX] (last updated
Oct. 24, 2023).
    The evidence before the district court, viewed in the light
most favorable to Long, establishes that the 3:30 p.m.
delivery of Long’s evening meal during Ramadan
substantially burdened his free exercise of his religion. A
“substantial burden exists when the state places ‘substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
his beliefs.’” Jones v. Slade, 23 F.4th 1124, 1142 (9th Cir.
2022) (quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995
(9th Cir. 2005)). “[M]ore than an inconvenience on religious
exercise,” a substantial burden has “a tendency to coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs.”
Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir.
2013)). A prison practice “may impact religious exercise
indirectly, by encouraging an inmate to do that which he is
religiously prohibited or discouraged from doing.” Slade, 23
F.4th at 1140; see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995
(“[C]ompulsion may be indirect. . . .” (quoting Thomas v.
Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981))).
   We have consistently held that the failure to provide food
consistent with a prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs
constitutes a substantial burden on the prisoner’s free
exercise. In Shakur, 514 F.3d at 881–82, a Muslim prisoner
requested a kosher meat diet consistent with Islamic Halal
requirements because the vegetarian diet offered to him gave
him gas and irritated his hernia. When the prison denied his
request, he brought an action under the Free Exercise Clause.
14                       LONG V. SUGAI

Id. at 882–883. We held that the prison’s refusal
“implicate[d] the Free Exercise Clause” and that the district
court was therefore required to analyze the Turner factors.
Id. at 885; see also McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198
(9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“Inmates . . . have the right to
be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good
health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.”); Ward
v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding same);
Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding same).
    Our sister circuits agree that nourishment consistent with
a prisoner’s religious beliefs and practices must be provided
in a reasonable manner. See, e.g., Holland v. Goord, 758
F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that pressure “to
provide a urine sample by drinking water during [inmate’s]
fast . . . placed a substantial burden on [his] religious
exercise.”); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 199–200 (4th Cir.
2006) (“Under . . . the Free Exercise Clause . . ., a prisoner
has a ‘clearly established . . . right to a diet consistent with
his . . . religious scruples,’ including proper food during
Ramadan.” (last two ellipses in original) (quoting Ford v.
McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003))); Ford, 352
F.3d at 597 (recognizing a clearly established right to the Eid
ul Fitr feast, which celebrates the successful completion of
Ramadan); Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 2000)
(finding that prison officials substantially burdened an
inmate’s free exercise rights by refusing to provide meals in
his cell at particular times to accommodate his religious
practices).
   Makin v. Colorado Department of Corrections, 183 F.3d
1205, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999), is directly on point. There, a
Muslim prisoner housed in punitive segregation during
Ramadan was unable to eat his evening meal when it was
                        LONG V. SUGAI                       15

delivered to his cell. Id. at 1208–09. To maintain his fast,
he saved his “supper and food such as dry cereal and crackers
. . . from lunch and breakfast” to eat after sundown. Id. at
1209. Although the inmate managed to fast under these
circumstances for the entire month of Ramadan, the Tenth
Circuit held that the prison’s actions infringed on the
inmate’s right to free exercise of his religion and that the
defendants had not offered “any legitimate penological
interests to justify that infringement” under Turner. Id. at
1214. In Williams v. Hansen, 5 F.4th 1129, 1134–35 (10th
Cir. 2021), the court characterized Makin as “clearly
establish[ing] a substantial burden for a partial religious
deprivation” where “prison officials failed to provide meals
to an inmate at appropriate times throughout the month of
Ramadan.”
    Our own cases as well as out-of-circuit cases thus clearly
establish that delivery of Long’s evening meal at 3:30 p.m.
during Ramadan substantially burdened his free exercise of
religion. The district court should have evaluated the four
Turner factors to determine whether the burden was
justified. Because the court did not conduct that analysis, we
remand to allow it to do so. The district court also did not
conduct a qualified immunity analysis. If the court
concludes, after conducting the Turner analysis, that the
burden was not justified, our remand allows the court to
conduct a qualified immunity analysis.
        2. Retaliation Claim against Chief Antonio
    As noted above, Chief Antonio transferred Long from
the medium-security facility to the high-security facility
within HCF after Long filed grievances against Sgt. Sugai.
Long contended that the transfer was retaliation for filing the
16                       LONG V. SUGAI

grievances, in violation of the First Amendment. The district
court granted summary judgment to Antonio on this claim.
    A successful First Amendment retaliation claim by a
prisoner requires “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took
some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that
prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled
the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and
(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate
correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–68 (footnote
omitted). With respect to the fifth factor, the Supreme Court
has cautioned that “‘federal courts ought to afford
appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying
to manage a volatile environment,’ especially with regard to
‘the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life, a
common subject of prisoner claims.’” Pratt v. Rowland, 65
F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 482–83 (1995)).
    The district court found that the first, third, and fourth
factors weighed in favor of Long. However, with respect to
the second and fifth factors, the court found that Chief
Antonio’s transfer advanced the legitimate correctional goal
of maintaining order and safety within the prison, and that
there was insufficient evidence to show that this asserted
goal was pretextual. To establish impermissible motivation,
Long must “put forth evidence of retaliatory motive, that,
taken in the light most favorable to him, presents a genuine
issue of material fact as to [Antonio’s] intent” in transferring
Long. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2005)).
   Chief Antonio maintained that he transferred Long for
permissible reasons: He stated that he was aware that Long
“had complained of harassment and retaliation by Adult
                        LONG V. SUGAI                      17

Correctional Officer (‘ACO’) Rodney Sugai,” and that
reports “had been prepared by HCF Staff, including ACO
Sugai that related to Plaintiff’s misconducts.” He further
stated that “[b]ased on these circumstances, [he] decided that
it was in the best interest of Plaintiff and ACO Sugai to
separate them in order to 1) prevent any further conflicts,
2) to allow time for HCF administration to investigate the
complaints, and 3) in the case that the allegations were
substantiated to prevent any further improper conduct on the
part of either party. [] Because ACO Sugai was responsible
for the kitchen area that the [medium-security facility]
utilizes, it was necessary to move Plaintiff to the Special
Needs Facility (‘SNF’).”
    Pointing only to this sequence of events, Long asks us to
infer that Chief Antonio had a retaliatory motive. We agree
with the district court that this sequence, standing alone, is
insufficient to show retaliatory intent. Without additional
evidence, there is no genuine dispute of material fact over
whether Antonio transferred Long based on an improper
motive.
                       C. Bench Trial
    After a bench trial, the district court ruled against Long
on his three remaining claims: two against Sgt. Sugai and
one against Chief Antonio. On appeal, Long challenges
several findings supporting the district court’s rulings. We
can reverse “only if the district court’s findings are clearly
erroneous to the point of being illogical, implausible, or
without support in inferences from the record.” Oakland
Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 960
F.3d 603, 613 (9th Cir. 2020). A finding is “clearly
erroneous” only when the reviewing body, looking at the
entire body of evidence, “is left with the definite and firm
18                      LONG V. SUGAI

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v.
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1984)).
                1. Claims against Sgt. Sugai
    The district court tried the free exercise and retaliation
claims against Sgt. Sugai.
                      a. Free Exercise
    Long contended that Sgt. Sugai had violated his First
Amendment free exercise right in four ways: (1) denying
Long non-pork meals; (2) directing kitchen workers to
contaminate Long’s meal with pork strands; (3) directing
kitchen workers to give Long smaller portions; and
(4) forcing Long to eat in his housing unit for six to eight
months.
    The district court rejected Long’s contentions. As to (1),
the district court found that, to the extent that Long was
denied non-pork meals, Sugai was not responsible for the
denials. The court held that the evidence showed that, on the
occasions at issue, Long was not on the meal-
accommodations list and that Sugai had no role in compiling
that list. As to (2) and (3), crediting Sugai’s testimony, the
court found that Sugai did not so direct kitchen workers. As
to (4), the court found that Sugai directed Long to take his
meals in his housing unit on only a few occasions and that
he did so based on permissible security concerns. Ample
evidence supports the district court’s findings.
                       b. Retaliation
   Long contended that Sgt. Sugai retaliated against him for
exercising his First Amendment right to file grievances. The
                        LONG V. SUGAI                       19

alleged retaliatory acts were the same predicate acts as for
Long’s free exercise claim against Sugai. The district court
rejected his retaliation claim for the same reasons it rejected
his free exercise claims. Ample evidence supports the
district court’s findings.
              2. Claim against Chief Antonio
    The district court also tried the free exercise claim
against Chief Antonio. Long contended that Antonio
violated his First Amendment free exercise right in two
ways: (1) by transferring him to the high-security facility
where there were no Friday Jumu’ah prayer services, and
(2) by refusing to arrange transportation to the medium-
security facility so that Long could attend Jumu’ah services
there. As to (1), the district court concluded that Long’s free
exercise rights were substantially burdened by the transfer,
but after applying the four Turner factors, the district court
found that the burden was justified. We find no error in that
conclusion. As to (2), Antonio testified that he would have
forwarded any request to attend religious services to an
official with authority to approve such requests. Based on
this testimony, the court found that Antonio was not
authorized to arrange weekly transportation to the medium-
security facility for religious services, and that he was
therefore not a proper defendant. We also find no error in
that conclusion.
                         Conclusion
  The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED in part,
REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, and
REMANDED.
   Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.