Court Opinion

ID: 9414597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 06:11:55.045616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.086015
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED; and Opinion Filed July 25, 2023

                                    S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00526-CR

                     JOSE ALBERTO GARCIA, Appellant
                                  V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F22-00230-W

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith
                             Opinion by Justice Smith

      Appellant Jose Alberto Garcia was convicted by a jury for the offense of

capital murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03. The State did not seek the

death penalty and, thus, the trial court automatically sentenced him to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. § 12.31(a)(2). In three issues,

Garcia challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, including

the jury’s rejection of his claim of self-defense, and the admission of police

testimony regarding the meaning of abbreviations and slang words used in text and

Instagram messages. On our own motion, we modify the judgment to reflect the
State waived the death penalty and, therefore, the related special issues were not

submitted to the jury. Because we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support

Garcia’s conviction for capital murder and the trial court did not err in admitting the

detective’s testimony, we affirm the judgment as modified.

                                Factual Background

      The victims in this case were twenty-one-year-old Christian Marmolejo and

seventeen-year-old Jason Baez. At the time of the offense, Garcia was eighteen

years old and lived with the following people: his sister, Laysha Garcia; Laysha’s

boyfriend, Christopher Avila; his girlfriend, Dunia Figueroa; and Avila’s cousin,

Luis Gonzalez. Each of the five roommates were ultimately charged with the capital

murder of Marmolejo and Baez.

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Isassi v. State, 330

S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The sufficiency of the evidence is

measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury

charge.   Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).                A

hypothetically correct jury charge is “one that accurately sets out the law, is

authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of

                                         –2–
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately

describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.

      When conducting a legal sufficiency review, we consider all evidence in the

record regardless of whether it was properly or improperly admitted. Clayton v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We review the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic to

ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516,

525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. The jury may choose to

believe or disbelieve any part of any witness’s testimony. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d

18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “When the record supports conflicting inferences,

we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and

therefore defer to that determination.” Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

      A criminal conviction may be supported by both direct and circumstantial

evidence as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.

Id. “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the

guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish

guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

      To prove that Garcia committed capital murder as charged in the indictment,

the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he intentionally or knowingly

caused the deaths of Marmolejo and Baez during the same criminal transaction. TEX.

                                          –3–
PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(7)(A). In the alternative, the State had to

prove that Garcia committed capital murder by intentionally causing the death of

Marmolejo in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. Id. §

19.03(a)(2). A person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft, and

with the intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he intentionally or

knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Id.

§ 29.02(a)(2). A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature

of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire

to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly,

or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his

conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or when he is aware that his

conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). The intent of a

defendant may be inferred by his acts, words, and conduct, as well as the method he

used to commit the crime and the nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim. Hart

v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Manrique v. State, 994

S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., concurring)). “In assaying the

record for evidence of intent, we look to ‘events before, during and after the

commission of the offense.’” Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 856 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2020) (quoting Wygal v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)).

      A person can be criminally responsible for the conduct of another and, thus,

criminally responsible for the offense if, “acting with intent to promote or assist the

                                          –4–
commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid

the other person to commit the offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 7.01(a), 7.02(a)(2).

There must be sufficient evidence of an understanding or common scheme to commit

the offense. Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A

person can also be criminally responsible for an offense when it occurs while

carrying out a conspiracy:

      If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony,
      another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators
      are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to
      commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful
      purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the
      carrying out of the conspiracy.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(b). Thus, as relevant here, the State could also prove

Garcia committed capital murder by conspiring to commit robbery or aggravated

assault and, in carrying out the conspiracy, one or more of the conspirators murdered

Marmolejo and Baez. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 183 S.W.3d 63, 73 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2005, pet. ref’d); Thompson v. State, 54 S.W.3d 88, 95–97 (Tex. App.—Tyler

2001, pet. ref’d).

      Where the defendant has claimed he was justified in shooting the victim, our

sufficiency review includes a determination of whether any rational juror could have

rejected appellant’s self-defense and defense of a third person claims beyond a

reasonable doubt. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

(citing Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).            The

                                        –5–
defendant bears the burden to produce evidence of self-defense or defense of

another, while the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove the defensive

issues raised. Id. at 608. Thus, “we look not to whether the State presented evidence

which refuted [the defendant’s] self-defense testimony” but, instead determine

whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any

rational juror could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt and also could have found against the defendant on the issues of

self-defense or defense of another beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Saxton,

at 914). Self-defense is a fact issue for the jury, and a guilty verdict is an implicit

finding rejecting the defendant’s theory of self-defense. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913–

14.

      A person is justified in using deadly force when a person reasonably believes

the force is immediately necessary to protect the person against another’s use or

attempted use of unlawful deadly force or to prevent the other’s imminent

commission of, among other offenses, murder. TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.32(a). Deadly

force is force “intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use

or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 9.01(3).

A reasonable belief is one that an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the

same circumstances as the actor. Id. § 1.07(a)(42). The actor’s belief that deadly

force was immediately necessary is presumed to be reasonable if the actor (1) knew

or had reason to believe that the person against whom the force was used was

                                         –6–
committing or attempting to commit murder; (2) did not provoke the person against

whom the force was used; and (3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity.

See id. § 9.32(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)–(3).

      A person is justified in using deadly force against another to protect a third

person if the actor would be justified in using deadly force to protect himself against

the unlawful deadly force he reasonably believes to be threatening the third person

and if the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to

protect the third person. Id. § 9.33.

      Garcia argues in his first and second issues that the evidence was legally

insufficient to show that he committed capital murder. He contends that the evidence

shows that he killed Marmolejo in self-defense. And, even if the jury could have

rejected his self-defense claim, the evidence shows that he committed murder, not

capital murder because there was no evidence that he was involved with the alleged

aggravated assault or robbery. Deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations, as

we must, see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), we

disagree that the evidence is legally insufficient to support Garcia’s conviction for

capital murder.

      The evidence at trial showed that in the early morning hours of May 15, 2020,

Marmolejo picked up Laysha and Figueroa after Laysha messaged Marmolejo

looking for marijuana. While they drove around, Laysha kept in contact with her

boyfriend, Avila. Text and Instagram messages recovered from their phones showed

                                         –7–
that Laysha and Avila were trying to coordinate locations so that Avila could rob

Marmolejo. Laysha advised Avila that Marmolejo was “bared out” (meaning they

took Xanax) and “just has that gun,” a picture of which she sent to Avila showing

him it was in the center console; she asked what she should do. Avila told her to tell

Marmolejo that she “got a plug,” meaning a dealer, as they were still looking for

marijuana. Avila also told her to flirt with Marmolejo so she could get his gun, and

in a later message Avila told her to make sure Figueroa got the gun because Garcia

would be waiting for it so that they would have two guns. Avila and Laysha

attempted to coordinate a meet several times without success.

      Laysha continued to advise Avila as to their whereabouts and, at one point,

told Avila that Marmolejo had money so Avila should be sure to take his wallet.

Laysha later took Xanax as well and told Avila she felt like she had to because

Marmolejo was watching. She started to not feel well, and Avila messaged that he

was coming for her. At 6:21 a.m., she asked, “Are you still robbing him?” Avila

responded, “Yes.” At 6:22 a.m., Laysha called Avila from the gas station where the

incident ultimately occurred.

      Araceli Ramos, the cashier at the gas station at the time of the offense, testified

that the gas station’s surveillance footage captured multiple angles of the incident

on video. The footage first shows Laysha and Figueroa exiting the passenger side

of a black sedan driven by Marmolejo. The girls went inside the gas station and

went to the restroom. They were smiling and appeared to be laughing when Laysha

                                          –8–
made the call on her cellphone. Marmolejo also exited the sedan and went to the

restroom but returned before the girls.

      Shortly after everyone returned to the sedan, Garcia arrived in a red Charger.

He parked in front of and perpendicular to the black sedan, as if to block it in. He

was accompanied by Avila and Gonzalez. Avila exited the front passenger side

holding an AR15, walked over to the black sedan, tried to open the driver’s side

door, and pointed the AR15 at the driver’s side window. The video depicts Avila’s

mouth moving as if he is talking to the passengers but, because there is no sound on

the surveillance footage, the record does not show what he said. Garcia exited the

driver’s side of the red Charger, opened the front passenger door of the black sedan,

and leaned over Laysha. For a brief moment, it appears as though Marmolejo is

trying to back out, as the car reverses a few inches and then comes to an abrupt stop.

A struggle ensued between Garcia and someone in the sedan.

      Meanwhile, Avila walked around the rear of the sedan, briefly pointed the

AR15 through the front passenger door, which was open at the time, and then broke

the rear passenger window. Baez, who was in the back passenger seat on the driver’s

side of the sedan, exited the sedan and ran with his hands in the air. Avila aimed at

him with the AR15 as he was running across the gas station lot, and Baez fell face

first to the ground.

      Simultaneously, Garcia emerged from the front passenger side of the sedan

holding a revolver. Garcia first pointed the revolver at Baez and then pointed it at

                                          –9–
Marmolejo, who had exited the driver’s side of the sedan, first walking and then

running away from the sedan with his hands in the air. Several flashes can be seen

coming from the revolver before Marmolejo fell to the ground. Marmolejo tried to

sit up but collapsed over on his back.

      During the offense, Gonzalez hit on the windows of the sedan and tried to

open two of the doors. After Garcia emerged with the revolver, Laysha exited the

sedan and walked toward the Charger. Figueroa exited the sedan after Baez and

Marmolejo were shot. The entire incident occurred in less than one minute. After

the offense, Garcia, Avila, Laysha, Figueroa, and Gonzalez fled in the red Charger.

      Ramos and a witness at the nearby intersection called police. After police

arrived at the scene, a neighbor informed officers that a red Charger had wrecked in

a nearby alley, was not drivable, and had been abandoned. Police then received

another 9-1-1 call reporting that people were seen running from the alley into a shed

in the backyard of a residence. Ultimately police found Garcia, Avila, Laysha,

Figueroa, and Gonzalez in the shed, and they were arrested. Police also found the

AR15 Avila used to shoot Baez and the .38 Special revolver Garcia used to shoot

Marmolejo in a wooded area adjacent to the alley.

      DPD Homicide Detective Phillip Wheeler testified that he learned during the

course of his investigation that Avila and Marmolejo had a prior altercation that had

caused “bad blood” between them, and Avila was seeking revenge. As he watched

the surveillance footage at trial, he commented that Garcia went toward the center

                                         –10–
console of the sedan, which is where Laysha had advised the gun was. He also

pointed out that Gonzalez had a hoodie pulled tight around his head by the

drawstring so you could not see much of his face.

      Dr. Tracy Dyer, the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for the Dallas County

Medical Examiner’s Office, performed the autopsies of Marmolejo and Baez. She

testified that each died of gunshot wounds. Marmolejo had two gunshot wounds to

his back, which perforated his lungs, and another superficial perforating gunshot

wound that entered his upper back and exited the bottom of his neck where it met

his back. She explained that this third gunshot wound indicated that he was likely

falling while still being shot. Baez had one gunshot wound to the back of his head

and one to his back.

      Garcia testified that he did not know about the robbery plan. Instead, he was

trying to rescue Laysha and Figueroa because Avila was “basically telling [him] that

they’re in trouble,” as they had left with some guys, taken Xanax, and the guys would

not bring them home. Garcia explained that he and his sister Laysha were very close,

that he had previously lost a sister, and that he did not want to lose another one. He

did not realize that Avila was lying to him. Garcia also testified he could not

communicate with the girls directly because his phone did not work.

      According to Garcia, he and Avila left and went driving around looking for

Laysha and Figueroa. Avila told him where to drive. They pulled in the gas station,

and Garcia saw the car the girls were in, so he parked his car to block them from

                                        –11–
leaving. Garcia testified that he went over to his sister. When he opened the car

door, Marmolejo aimed the revolver at him. Garcia jumped in the car, struggled

with Marmolejo, and took the gun from him. He did not bring his own gun and was

not interested in an altercation with Marmolejo when he approached the car. Garcia

saw Marmolejo reach for something in the side of the door as he was getting out of

the car, and Garcia thought it could have been another gun. Marmolejo and Baez

got out of the car and ran. Garcia saw Marmolejo running with his hands up but then

he dropped one of his hands and Garcia did not know whether he was reaching for a

gun. Garcia testified he feared for his life, so he shot Marmolejo and ran back to his

car. He blacked out, wrecked the car, and woke up to everyone screaming at him.

He parked it and they ran to the storage shed where the police found them.

      On cross-examination, the State showed the surveillance footage to Garcia

and asked him about Marmolejo’s hand dropping. Garcia responded, “I don’t think

you can really see it in that video, sir.” Our review of one of the angles depicted on

the surveillance footage does show Marmolejo’s left hand drop down some, and a

reasonable juror could have concluded he was holding out his hand to say stop.

      Garcia conceded that he did take Marmolejo’s gun, even though no one took

his money. He also conceded that he shot Marmolejo with the gun; hid it deep in

the woods (he guessed because he was scared); knew Avila had a loaded rifle when

they went to the gas station because Avila was sitting in the front seat, next to him,

and the rifle was between Avila’s legs; and knew Avila was going to get out of the

                                        –12–
car with the loaded rifle. Garcia testified that they took the AR15 for protection

because they knew the other men would have guns. Garcia also admitted that he

knew Marmolejo had a gun in the car, but he thought it had been moved from the

center console because that is what Avila said Laysha told him. According to Garcia,

everyone knew about the robbery but him.

      In closing arguments, defense counsel emphasized that none of the messages

coordinating the robbery included Garcia. However, some of the messages did refer

to “we” or “us” implying other people were with Avila. The jury was free to

disbelieve Garcia’s testimony that the did not know about the robbery. Moreover,

the jury was able to watch the incident on the surveillance footage. The jury could

have found that the incident was an ambush, not a rescue, and that Garcia intended

to promote or assist in the robbery by encouraging or aiding Avila in its commission.

See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 7.02(a)(2), 29.02(a)(2).

      Even if the jury believed that Garcia was initially trying to rescue his sister,

the jury could have found that Garcia and Avila conspired to commit aggravated

assault because they took the AR15 to threaten Marmolejo and Baez and should have

anticipated their murders as a result of confronting and threatening them with a

loaded AR15. See id. §§ 7.02(b), 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2).

      And, finally, the jury could have also found that Garcia and Avila worked

together, as parties to the offense, to murder Marmolejo and Baez, as the surveillance

footage showed both Garcia and Avila pointing their weapons at both Marmolejo

                                        –13–
and Baez. See id. §§ 7.01(a), 7.02(a)(2), 19.02(b)(1). Texas law does not require a

showing of premeditation for a jury to find the defendant intentionally or knowingly

caused the death of an individual. See id. § 19.02(b)(1); Rousseau v. State, 855

S.W.2d 666, 674–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The intent can be formed at the time

the defendant commits the offense. Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 674. Here, Garcia

raised the revolver and aimed it at Baez and then shot at Marmolejo while they were

fleeing from the car with their hands up. In that instant, the jury could have

reasonably concluded that Garcia formed the requisite intent to kill Marmolejo and

assist or promote Avila’s murder of Baez. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 7.01(a),

7.02(a)(2), 19.03(a)(7)(A). The jury could also have found that, in that instant,

Marmolejo was not using or attempting to use unlawful deadly force against Garcia

or Laysha and that Garcia could not have reasonably believed that his intervention

was immediately necessary to protect Laysha or himself. See id. §§ 1.07(a)(42),

9.01(3), 9.32(a), 9.33.

      We conclude that a rational juror could have found that Garcia committed

capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt and also could have found against Garcia

on his claims of self-defense and defense of Laysha beyond a reasonable doubt.

Therefore, we overrule Garcia’s first and second issues.

                                       –14–
                          Admission of Police Testimony

      In his final issue, Garcia argues that Detective Wheeler was not properly

qualified to opine and speculate the meaning of each of the abbreviations in the text

messages admitted by the State.

      In addressing opinion testimony allowed under Texas Rules of Evidence 701

and 702, the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained:

      A distinct line cannot be drawn between lay opinion and expert
      testimony because all perceptions are evaluated based on experiences.
      However, as a general rule, observations which do not require
      significant expertise to interpret and which are not based on a scientific
      theory can be admitted as lay opinions if the requirements of Rule 701
      are met. This is true even when the witness has experience or training.
      Additionally, even events not normally encountered by most people in
      everyday life do not necessarily require the testimony of an expert. The
      personal experience and knowledge of a lay witness may establish that
      he or she is capable, without qualification as an expert, of expressing
      an opinion on a subject outside the realm of common knowledge. It is
      only when the fact-finder may not fully understand the evidence or be
      able to determine the fact in issue without the assistance of someone
      with specialized knowledge that a witness must be qualified as an
      expert.

Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (internal citation

omitted). Rule 701 permits opinion testimony by a lay witness when it is rationally

based on the witness’s perception and it is helpful to clearly understand the witness’s

testimony or to determine a fact issue. TEX. R. EVID. 701.

      We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse

of discretion standard. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991) (op. on reh’g). We reverse a trial court’s ruling only if it is outside the “zone

                                        –15–
of reasonable disagreement.” Id. The trial court is given considerable latitude

regarding its evidentiary rulings. Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018).

      Here, the trial court allowed Detective Wheeler to testify, in his experience,

to the following meanings of abbreviated words or slang found in State’s Exhibit

Nos. 125, 126, 127, and 128, which were text messages between Laysha and Avila

and Instagram messages between Laysha and Marmolejo:

          WYM = what do you mean

          RN = right now

          You got bud? = You got marijuana?

          HN = hell no

          WYA RN = where you at right now

          BD = baby daddy

          PO = Pleasant Oaks

          LMK = let me know

          plug = dealer

          FR = for real

          HB = homeboy

          y’all should have served us = sold us marijuana

          OTW = on the way

          lick = burglary or robbery
                                        –16–
          bars = Xanax

          IDK = I don’t know

          IDC = I don’t care

          WYD = what are you doing

          TF = the f**k

          GTG = got to go

      Detective Wheeler testified to these specific meanings, based on his

experience, after reviewing the entirety of the communications between Laysha and

Avila and Laysha and Marmolejo on the morning in question. Detective Wheeler

walked the jury through the messages and showed how Laysha and Avila were

plotting to ambush and rob Marmolejo. The meanings listed above gave context to

the ongoing plan.

      Due to Detective Wheeler’s ten-year experience as a police officer, including

one year as a family violence detective and two years as a homicide detective, the

trial court could have found that the detective’s testimony was rationally based on

what he perceived in reviewing the messages and was helpful for the jury to

determine whether Garcia committed capital murder in the course of committing or

attempting to commit robbery. See, e.g., Arista v. State, No. 13-13-00701-CR, 2018

WL 637365, at *11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 31, 2018, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding trial court did not abuse its

discretion in allowing investigator to testify that “hit a lick” meant “to commit [a]
                                       –17–
home invasion” (alteration in original)); Morgan v. State, No. 05-16-00257-CR,

2017 WL 2871420, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 29, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in

allowing investigator to testify that “PGBC” on computer printout meant “pled

guilty before the court”); Austin v. State, 794 S.W.2d 408, 409–11 (Tex. App.—

Austin 1990, pet. ref’d) (concluding officer’s testimony that “Swedish Deep Muscle

Rub” was code for prostitution was admissible under Rule 701 or 702). Therefore,

we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision to allow Detective Wheeler to

testify as to the meaning of the above words and phrases was so arbitrary and outside

the zone of reasonable disagreement to be an abuse of discretion. Garcia’s third

issue is overruled.

                             Modification of Judgment

      This Court has the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we

have the necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State,

865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526,

529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). Here, the judgment states that

the jury was presented with, and returned findings on, special issues as if the State

had sought the death penalty against Garcia. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

37.071, § 2(a)(1), (b), (e)(1). However, the State did not seek the death penalty

against Garcia and, thus, the special issues were not presented to the jury for

consideration. Instead, the trial court assessed the automatic punishment for a capital

                                        –18–
murder case in which the State does not seek the death penalty—life without parole.

See id. art. 37.071, § 1(a); TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.31(a)(2). Therefore, we conclude

the following portion of the judgment should be deleted:

      The judgment should also be modified to delete, “JURY,” under “Punished

Assessed by:” and be replaced with “Trial Court.”

                                     Conclusion

      Having overruled Garcia’s three issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court as modified. The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected judgment

that reflects the modifications made in this Court’s opinion and judgment in this
                                         –19–
case. See Shumate v. State, 649 S.W.3d 240, 245–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no

pet.).

                                       /Craig Smith/
                                       CRAIG SMITH
                                       JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
220526F.U05

                                    –20–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

JOSE ALBERTO GARCIA,                         On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. F-2200230-W.
No. 05-22-00526-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
                                             Justices Molberg and Carlyle
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:
      to delete:

                                      –21–
      and to delete “JURY” and replace with “Trial Court” under “Punished
      Assessed by.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

      We DIRECT the trial court to prepare a corrected judgment that reflects this
modification.

Judgment entered this 25th day of July 2023.

                                      –22–