Court Opinion

ID: 9598918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:13:08.242422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:40.654586
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority opinion, as expressed in Section II, that fundamental principles of due process are satisfied by methods of service and notice of parking violations currently provided by Denver.1 I further agree with that part of Section III of the court’s opinion that holds that a hearing is not constitutionally mandated prior to the immobilization of a vehicle.
I respectfully disagree with the analysis and conclusions of that part of Section III which holds that Patterson is entitled to a hearing after immobilization (booting) of his vehicle and would therefore reverse the judgment of the district court.
In 1977, Stephen Patterson, who was the owner of an automobile bearing New Mexico license plates, received seven summonses and complaints for illegal parking which were placed on the windshield of his car. He admitted that he received and ignored each of these summonses and complaints and did not appear before the Traffic Violations Bureau within seven days to either pay or contest the charges of illegal parking pursuant to section 505.5 of the Denver Municipal Code.
Patterson, having admitted that he received the summonses and complaints, was also aware that if he did not respond to the *540charge his vehicle was subject to being impounded.2
Patterson’s argument that he was denied due process of law rises or falls on whether the notice that he received was adequate and provided him an opportunity to contest the charge of illegal parking. The summons and complaint advised the recipient that, “If you wish to protest any charge you may appear before a referee between the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon or 2 p.m. to 4:45 p.m.”
Patterson failed, in each of seven instances, to avail himself of the opportunity to contest the charge of illegal parking and therefore by his own acts, or failure to act, placed himself in jeopardy of having his automobile “booted.”
In my view, the summonses and complaints he received were sufficient notice of his right to a hearing and the possible penalty of impoundment to permit the booting. Having been given notice of and the opportunity for a hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, the requirements of procedural due process have been met. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972).
The court’s opinion correctly points out that a person with an “interest in the property to be seized must be afforded an opportunity for a hearing and adequate notice of the hearing.” It notes that the owner of an automobile has a right to the use of his property and an interest in the boot fee he has paid for the removal of the boot. It then concludes that the Denver ordinance is unconstitutional because it provides no mechanism whereby the owner of the automobile can challenge, in a post-deprivation hearing, the booting procedure as improper. Further, it condemns the ordinance because no provision exists for obtaining release of a vehicle by posting a bond while a deprivation hearing is pending.
It is here that I part company with the majority opinion, for it is my view that Patterson had ample opportunity to challenge the basic underlying offense which resulted in his car’s being booted and failed to do so. Patterson’s failure to respond to the tickets which were affixed to his car foreclosed his contesting the fines which were applied against his car and obviated the necessity of allowing him to post a bond while a deprivation hearing was pending. In short, Patterson was not entitled to a post-deprivation hearing and lacks standing to raise the unconstitutionality of the ordinance because, by his failure to appear in response to the summonses and complaints, he was in default and had confessed his guilt of the underlying offense, illegal parking.
Patterson had ample opportunity to challenge the charge of illegal parking which was the basis of the original booting and failed to do so. He is not entitled, nor does due process require, another opportunity to challenge the booting as unjustified.
In essence, the majority opinion countenances the acts of a citizen in ignoring the law and rewards the scoff law who habitually violates parking regulations and ignores tickets placed on his car.
I would reverse the judgment of the district court.

. Sections 505.4 and 505.5 of the Denver Municipal Code. See fn. 1 and 8 of the majority opinion.

. The summons contained the following language:
“IMPORTANT: FAILURE TO RESPOND WITHIN 30 DAYS OF ISSUE DATE WILL SUBJECT THE VIOLATOR TO SUCH OTHER PENALTIES AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, INCLUDING THE IMPOUNDING OF THE VEHICLE INVOLVED AND THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF THE VIOLATOR.”