Court Opinion

ID: 9721377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:57:41.363274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:25.243459
License: Public Domain

ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 31. (dissenting). While I agree with the majority opinion's decision on the open meetings law, its identification of Wis. Stat. § 66.46(4m)(c)l (1997-98)1 as the statutory criteria that the Joint *647Review Board (JRB) must apply in its review of tax incremental district (TIF District) No. 6 and its conclusion that those criteria were reasonably applied by the JRB, I write in dissent because I conclude that Bartlett Olson did not waive his right to certiorari review of the common council's decision to include the costs of improvements lying outside of the geographic boundaries of TIF District No. 6 in the TIF District's project costs.
TIF District Overview.
¶ 32. In order to form a TIF District, all of the statutory directives must be followed. Wis. Stat. § 66.46(4); see also City of Hartford v. Kirley, 172 Wis. 2d 191, 493 N.W.2d 45 (1992); Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House Corp. v. City of Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 288 N.W.2d 85 (1980). No statutory appeal process has been created to review the formation of a TIF District; therefore, the review of the decision of both the common council and the JRB is by certiorari. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 549-50, 185 N.W.2d 306, 311 (1971). However, because only final decisions of a board or council are reviewable by certio-rari, State ex rel. Czapiewski v. Milwaukee City Serv. Comm'n, 54 Wis. 2d 535, 539, 196 N.W.2d 742, 744 (1972), neither the original resolution of the common council (July 27, 1999) nor the approval by the JRB (August 26, 1999) could be reviewed until all of the steps set out in § 66.46(4)(a)-(k)2 were completed and the TIF District was then statutorily created. An action requesting certiorari review must be commenced within six months of when the decision for which *648review is sought becomes final. State ex rel. Casper v. Board of Trs., 30 Wis. 2d 170, 174-75, 140 N.W.2d 301, 303 (1966).
Olson's Complaint.
¶ 33. Olson's first complaint challenging TIF District No. 6 was filed November 10, 1999, and therefore, it was timely.3 In the complaint, he set forth three separate counts: Count 1 — allegations that a violation of the open meetings law occurred; Count 2 — a petition for writ of certiorari based on allegations that the JRB did not follow the statutory review criteria set out in Wis. Stat. § 66.46(4m)(c); and Count 3 — a petition for writ of certiorari based on allegations that the project plan approved by the common council improperly included costs for improvements to Highway 12 and a bridge over the Wisconsin River because both lie outside the geographic boundaries of the TIF District and had been approved for construction previously.
¶ 34. Although the second count alleges that the JRB did not comply with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 66.46(4m)(c), it requests no specific relief within the count itself. Additionally, while the third count alleges that the common council included inappropriate expenses in the TIF District's project costs, the only relief requested within that count is set out in paragraph 34 which states, "There is no other adequate remedy available other than an order, signed by this Court, invalidating the actions taken by the City of Baraboo Joint Review Board in approving TID No. 6." *649However, the portion of the prayer for relief relating to the petitions for writs of certiorari requests:
That a writ of certiorari be allowed requiring Respondent Cheryl Giese, in her official capacity as Clerk of the-City of Baraboo, to transmit the entire record of the City of Baraboo and the City of Baraboo Joint Review Board pertaining to the creation of Tax Incremental District No. 6. to the Court for its review.
Further, after review by the Court of the public record, planning documents and the resolution passed by the City of Baraboo, that the Court award judgment, pursuant to Sec. 781.01, Wis. Stats., declaring the actions taken by the said City of Baraboo and the City of Baraboo Joint Review Board in creating Tax Incremental District No. 6 were contrary to law and void.
¶ 35. The circuit court agreed that certiorari review of the TIF District was appropriate. However, counsel for the City argued that the writ as proposed was too broad because it sought more than the record of the JRB review. The City had not moved to dismiss the claim for certiorari review of the City's acts. Instead, it based its argument to limit the scope of the writ on the quote from paragraph 34 of the complaint that I have repeated in ¶ 34 of this dissent. The circuit court agreed that the complaint was not sufficient to support the scope of the writ Olson had drafted, saying:
I think I agree with Attorney Arntsen that that request goes beyond the scope of the review I'm asked to do in the pleadings.
I've reviewed those pleadings and, specifically, the counts two and three are dealing with the record — or proceedings of the board of review on the evening in question. And even count three, the final paragraph, is, there's no adequate remedy available other than order — an order signed by this court invalidating actions taken by the City of Baraboo Joint Review Board. *650That's what I'm being asked to do, and I think that's what the writ should be limited to, to proceedings of the joint review board.
¶ 36. We review as a matter of law whether the pleadings are sufficient to state claims for relief. See, e.g., Hertlein v. Huchthausen, 133 Wis. 2d 67, 72, 393 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Ct. App. 1986). As we have explained, "notice giving" is the main purpose of pleading rules in the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure. Under notice pleading, all that is required of a complaint is to give the other party fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Id. It is true that a petition or complaint that commences an action for a writ of certiorari must set out the irregularities that the court is being asked to consider. Merkel v. Village of Germantown, 218 Wis. 2d 572, 578, 581 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Ct. App. 1998). However, Olson's complaint factually described alleged irregularities in the actions of both the common council and the JRB with sufficient particularity to give notice to the City of how it alleged that both governmental bodies had not followed the law. The complaint also gave the City sufficient notice of the relief sought. Additionally, there is no authority for requiring that the relief requested in a complaint appear count by count or the complaint will be held insufficient, as the circuit court did here. Accordingly, I conclude the complaint was sufficient to require the circuit court to issue a writ broad enough in scope so that the decisions of both the JRB and the common council could be reviewed by the circuit court. I further conclude that the circuit court's decision in this regard is error requiring reversal and remand.4
*651Waiver.
¶ 37. The majority opinion does not address the circuit court's conclusion that the complaint was insufficient to support a writ to review the actions of the common council. Instead, it concludes that even if Olson stated a claim for certiorari review of the common council's inclusion of the Highway 12 and bridge construction costs in the project costs for TIF District No. 6, he waived it in one brief comment of counsel in a February 15, 2000 hearing. Majority at ¶¶ 20-23.
¶ 38. Waiver is a rule of judicial administration. Shoreline Park Pres., Inc. v. DOA, 195 Wis. 2d 750, 763, 537 N.W.2d 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1995). It is directed at issues which were raised for the first time on appeal. Id. Because our waiver rule does not affect the power of this court, we "retain the discretion to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal." Id. We often do so when the issue has been adequately briefed, id. at 763-64, 537 N.W.2d at 392, and when the issue presents as a question of law. Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443-44, 287 N.W.2d 140, 145-46 (1980).
¶ 39. I would not apply the waiver rule to Olson's legally sufficient complaint for four reasons: (1) the request for certiorari review of the acts of the common council was presented to the circuit court;5 (2) the record shows that Olson opposed the City's contention that the scope of the writ should be narrowed; (3) the *652parties have briefed whether we should address Olson's claim for certiorari review of the common council's action; and (4) it is in the public interest to permit citizens to seek review of governmental actions, rather than to apply rules of judicial administration to defeat that interest.
¶ 40. In my view, the majority opinion's application and discussion of wavier is not well founded because, as I have already explained, Olson did present the issue to the circuit court. Therefore, the request for certiorari review of the acts of the common council does not appear for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the majority's interpretation of counsel's comment, "I see what you're saying, Judge," as a waiver of the claim for certiorari review of the acts of the common council is not the type of waiver addressed in Coston v. Joseph P., 222 Wis. 2d 1, 586 N.W.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1998) or Safe Water Ass'n v. City of Fond du Lac, 184 Wis. 2d 365, 516 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1994), cases relied on by the majority opinion.6
¶ 41. Joseph E involved a guardianship petition to which no objection had been filed, as was required by Milwaukee County Local Court Rule 781 in order to raise before the circuit court the issue that was appealed. Joseph P., 222 Wis. 2d at 18-19, 586 N.W.2d at *65360. Because of the failure to file the required objection, we held that any right to object that the appellants may have had was waived. Id. at 20, 586 N.W.2d at 60. Here, a written claim for certiorari review of the actions of the common council was filed not once but twice.
¶ 42. In Safe Water, the other case relied on by the majority, summary judgment was granted to the City upon cross-motions for summary judgment. Safe Water claimed on appeal that the circuit court should have granted its motion to compel discovery before it addressed the cross-motions for summary judgment because if the City had been required to produce all Safe Water had requested, the circuit court may well have granted summary judgment to it. Safe Water, 184 Wis. 2d at 373, 516 N.W.2d at 16. We concluded that Safe Water gave up its right to have its motion decided because it took affirmative steps inconsistent with the further development of facts for the lawsuit. "[Its] motion for summary judgment carried with it the explicit assertion that Safe Water is satisfied that the facts are undisputed . ..." Id. Here, Olson took no act inconsistent with his claim for certiorari review of the acts of the common council.
¶ 43. What occurred here was the dismissal of a well-pled claim for relief when there was no pending motion to dismiss or to strike. The majority affirms the dismissal by concluding that Olson waived his claim. However, waiver based on counsel's comment would require intent to waive the claim, which is a factual determination, not a legal conclusion for any court to make, unless the facts of record could be interpreted in only one way. Consumer's Co-op v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 492, 419 N.W.2d 211, 221 (1988). Here, the circuit court made no factual finding and counsel's comment cannot be interpreted in only one way, which precludes *654us from deciding whether Olson waived his claim for certiorari review of the acts of the common council as a question of law. Olson's attorney opposed the court's ruling by trying to explain the pleadings:
This is John Kassner. Judge, as to the court's ruling relative to the scope of the writ, it was my understanding — Howard Goldberg wrote these pleadings — that the third count of the petition for writ of certiorari does address actions by the City of Bara-boo, and that the third count was the basis for asking for the records of the planning commission and the common council of the city.
The court responded that it was standing by its earlier ruling that "the scope of the writ shall be limited to the proceedings of the City of Baraboo Joint Review Board." It was then that Attorney Kassner made the comment quoted by the majority.
¶ 44. I conclude that Attorney Kassner did not waive his client's claim; rather, his comment appears to have been his acknowledgement of the court's interpretation of the wording of a complaint which had been drafted by another attorney in the law firm. Additionally, the comment occurred after the court had ruled limiting the scope of the writ. Therefore, it could not have been a waiver of that claim because the court had already dismissed it. Furthermore, a second complaint, including the same allegations of irregularities in the project costs for the TIF District was filed two months after the court's ruling. But most importantly, Olson had no reason to waive the claim.
¶ 45. In conclusion, I note that there is a longstanding public policy in Wisconsin of providing citizens with an avenue to review the actions of governmental bodies. See Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 426, 279 N.W.2d 179, 184 (1979). Where no avenue for *655review is available by statute, certiorari review satisfies the policy interest of holding governmental bodies accountable to the citizenry of this state. State ex rel. Johnson, 50 Wis. 2d at 549-50, 185 N.W.2d at 311. In my view, the majority decision thwarts that policy. Because I would not apply a rule of judicial administration to limit our consideration of the issues Olson has presented on appeal and because I have concluded that the circuit court erroneously dismissed Count 3 of Olson's complaint, I must respectfully dissent.

 All further references in the dissent are to the 1997-98 version of the statutes unless otherwise noted.

 If an original project plan is not amended, Wis. Stat. § 66.46(4) (i) may not come into play in the formation of a TIF District.

 It is not apparent from the record when the action contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 66.46(4)(k) occurred, but no party alleges that it occurred before both of Olson’s complaints were filed.

 As the circuit court’s statement quoted above in ¶ 35 of this dissent shows, the court misread the complaint because the *651complaint, in ¶¶ 23 through 33, did allege specific irregularities in project costs allocated by the City to TIF District No. 6. Therefore, the complaint specifically sought review of actions taken by the City of Baraboo in addition to review of actions taken by the JRB.

 Olson's request for certiorari review of the actions of the common council was presented in a legally sufficient form in the *652complaint filed November 10,1999, and it was presented again, also in a legally sufficient form, in the complaint filed April 10, 2000.

 Bavarian Soccer Club, Inc. v. Pierson, 36 Wis. 2d 8, 153 N.W.2d 1 (1967), also cited in the majority opinion, concludes that a motion to dismiss is sufficient to preserve the appeal of a circuit court discovery order, id. at 15, 153 N.W.2d at 4, and that the denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final order and therefore cannot be appealed as a matter of right. Id. at 17-18, 153 N.W.2d at 5.