Court Opinion

ID: 9846068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:33:57.025051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:32.751040
License: Public Domain

TOAL, Justice
(concurring and dissenting):
Because I profoundly disagree with the analysis and conclusions reached by the majority, I must join my brother Justice Burnett’s opinion in substance. I concur in Justice Burnett’s answer to the first certified question. He has set forth the legal standard which should be used to define the term lottery as it appears in South Carolina’s Constitution in a manner which is faithful to our Court’s precedents and well within the mainstream of American court decisions. I also concur with Justice Burnett’s answer to the second certified question in which he applies his definition of lottery to the machines in question and concludes that Type II and Type III video gaming machines do constitute lotteries under our constitution.
However, I write separately to express the view that the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina is free to answer the second question as Justice Burnett and I do. In order to explain this view, I concur only in that portion of the majority’s opinion which concludes that since the second certified question asks us to decide a factual question, no such finding will be binding on the federal district court for purposes of entry of any permanent injunction or award of damages. Since our opinions regarding the application of any of the proposed tests are advisory, it is within the federal district court’s prerogative to decide whether Type II and Type III machines are unconstitutional. My own advice to the federal court is that under any of the definitions of lottery put *121forth by this Court today, Type II and Type III machines are clearly unconstitutional in South Carolina. Each of these points is discussed below.
A. Advisory Nature of Opinions
The federal district court asked this Court to answer two certified questions. The first question asked us to provide South Carolina’s legal definition of a lottery. The second question asked us to apply that definition to the preliminary findings of fact in this case, i.e., to decide a factual question. In answering the second certified question, the majority advises the federal district court that under their definition of lottery, the video poker machines at issue here do not constitute lotteries under the South Carolina Constitution. Justice Burnett and I disagree with them.
As noted by Chief Justice Finney and stated in the Order of Certification, “no finding of this Court will be binding for entry of any permanent injunction or for the award of damages by the District Court.” This Court may accept certified questions only to answer questions of law. Rule 228(a), SCACR. Thus, this Court’s determination of whether Type II and Type III are in fact “lotteries” under our Constitution does not bind the federal district court. This determination is ultimately in the hands of the federal district court.
B. Application of the Majority Test
Under Justice Burnett’s test, in which I join, Type II and Type III machines are clearly unconstitutional. The majority, on the other hand, advises that under its test, Type II and Type III machines are not unconstitutional lotteries. However, I believe that even under the test proposed by the majority, the federal district court can conclude that Type II and Type III machines constitute a lottery under our Constitution.
The majority concludes that the video gaming machines are not unconstitutional lotteries because they do not involve (1) a drawing and (2) “tickets” or other indicium of entitlement to a prize.
Although the majority finds that the video gaming machines do not involve a “drawing,” the majority fails to consider that the machines at issue here function in the same manner as *122most modern popular lotteries. These popular lotteries involve a random generation of numbers to determine the winning combination. The “drawing” does not depend upon the number of people playing the lottery. As such, single person play would not negate the fact that a drawing takes place. Similarly, in this case, all of the video gaming machines are microprocessor based devices with random number generators. A player wins if the right combination of numbers is generated by the machine. Thus, a drawing occurs by the machines’ random generation of numbers, irrespective of the number of people playing.
As for the second requirement of “tickets,” even the majority recognizes that the definition of “tickets” should take into account modern technology. The majority states in footnote 10 of its opinion that “[electronic ticketing would not necessarily preclude finding a lottery where electronic registration is the functional equivalent of a lottery ticket....” In the instant case, although a player does not receive an actual ticket or token prior to playing the game, his opportunity to win is symbolized by the activation of the machine upon the insertion of money and the compilation of his credits or plays displayed during the game. Upon the insertion of money, the machines reveal the player’s monetary credit with that game. The machines keep track of the player’s initial credit and any “free plays” the player wins during his game. These credits are what the player exchanges with the store owner for cash. There is no practical difference between a physical ticket evidencing the right to play for a prize and an electronic representation of such a right in the form of free play credits. Furthermore, the right to receive the cash prizes from the machine owners is physically represented by the ticket the player receives when he cashes out a game. That prize amount is limited by statute.
Finally, although the majority opinion does not discuss the requirement of chance, it is patently clear Type II and Type III video machines would satisfy even a pure chance standard. As stated in the Order of Certification, all of the machines are microprocessor based devices with random number generators. The random selections occur independent of the control or direction of the player, regardless of the player’s skill, knowledge, or experience. (Ord. p. 6-7). The bottom line is *123that a player cannot alter the probabilities inherent in the play of Type I, Type II, or Type III video machine games. (Ord. p. 10).
Thus, in my view, under any of the tests proposed today, Type II and Type III video game machines are illegal lotteries under the South Carolina Constitution. Of course, the final application of the law to the facts of this case rests wholly within the discretion of the federal district court. It may very well be that the federal district court, having asked our advice on the application of our lottery test to the facts before it, will accept the advice of the majority. I simply express the view that these opinions give the federal district court a range of choices.
C. Conclusion
Although no solid consensus has been reached in this case, the members of this Court have attempted with mutual respect and in utter good faith to reconcile our positions on the South Carolina Constitution’s anti-lottery provision and its application to video gaming machines. As part of the judicial branch of government, our role is limited to discerning the meaning and application of existing law. Naturally, interpretations may vary among members of any court. My profound disagreement with my brothers in the majority is matched by my enduring respect for their sincerity and integrity. Although many appellate courts transform passionate philosophical disagreement into permanent rupture of the court’s collegiality,1 this Court will not splinter over any given opinion.2 We have each considered and circulated many drafts of these opinions. I offer this glimpse into the deliberations of conference in order to underscore the complexity of this matter and *124gravity of our consideration. We are greatly divided on this case, but one truth about our Constitution in which we are all united is that we have no role to play in answering the broader policy questions of whether video gaming machines and other lotteries should be allowed, prohibited, or regulated in South Carolina. These policy decisions can only be made by the statutory enactment of the General Assembly, regulatory action of the executive agencies so empowered, or by further Constitutional mandate of the people of South Carolina.

. See E. Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court, Times Books, Random House, 1998. In an act of consummate disloyalty to, the court he once served, the author, a former law clerk, describes bitter division with our highest court.

. Eminent contemporary southern historian Dr. Walter Edgar proposes as his working thesis for South Carolina: A History, University of South Carolina Press, 1998, that the hallmark of South Carolinians is our impulse to conduct ourselves so as to achieve "the good order and harmony of the whole community.”