Court Opinion

ID: 9865284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:30:09.928171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:19.487152
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Otto Bock
dissenting.
■ I regret my inability to concur. This controversy involves fundamental principles of separation of the pow*93ers of three departments of government, the importance of which in a democracy such as ours always has been recognized. It tends to prevent arbitrary action by each of them. That the imposition or suspension of sentence in a criminal case is “judicial power” cannot successfully be questioned. Martin v. People, 69 Colo. 60, 64, 168 Pac. 1171. No authority to the contrary has been cited. We held in Grundel v. People, 33 Colo. 191, 79 Pac. 1022, that in the absence of a permissive statute, the indefinite postponement of sentence of one convicted of crime deprives the court of jurisdiction to pronounce sentence at a subsequent term, and operates to discharge the prisoner. In a number of states it has been held that, unless authorized by statute, courts have no power to defeat conviction by an indefinite postponement of sentence. 16 C.J., p. 1286, §3041. Section 1, chapter 140, ’35 C.S.A. (S.L., ’31, c. 136, §1), concerning probation, provides: “ * * * the court shall have power, with the approval of the district attorney after conviction or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, * * * to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence for such period and upon such terms and conditions in conformity with this chapter as he may deem best.”
The phrase which challenges constitutionality is “with the approval of the district attorney.” The district attorney has no judicial power, and while in some instances his duties may be included under the heading “judicial department,” he is not thereby given such power, which is vested solely in the courts.
The question of separation of powers involved here was determined by this court in a well-reasoned opinion by Mr. Justice Burke in Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 18 P. (2d) 907. The legislative attempt to limit the court’s judicial power of suspending sentence, conditioned upon the approval of the district attorney, clearly violates article III and section 1 of article VI of our Constitution. Section 9, chapter 136, 1931 Session Laws, recites that the legislature would have passed the act, *94and each part thereof, irrespective of the fact that any other portions be declared unconstitutional. It will also be observed that the performance of every act authorized in section 1, supra, is conferred upon the court, with the sole exception of the imposition and suspension of sentence, which requires approval of the district attorney, the validity of which is here, challenged.
We are not concerned with the reasonableness of section 1. Our concern is with its invasion of judicial processes. It is true that the district attorney, from his knowledge of each case, is in a very favorable position to give advice to the court, as to the propriety of suspension or imposition of sentence, and the court in granting suspension without considering this advice would be acting arbitrarily. Such assistance by the district attorney could not, however, be construed as participation in the exercise of a judicial function.
In my opinion, the writ should be denied.