Court Opinion

ID: 9846398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:40:18.593193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:29.258021
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree that the judgment below should be affirmed, I write separately because the record demonstrates there was no prosecutorial misconduct in the presence of the jury; therefore, there was no manifest necessity for the declaration of a mistrial. Appellant’s retrial is not barred because the requirement that there be intentional prosecutorial misconduct “intended to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause” was not met. See Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305, 312 (1) (A) (369 SE2d 232) (1988). Moreover, the termination of the trial resulted from appellant’s premature mistrial motion. “[S]elf-induced error is not grounds for reversal. [Cit.]” Sullens v. State, 239 Ga. 766, 767 (2) (238 SE2d 864) (1977).
The trial court is authorized to declare a mistrial when prejudicial conduct on the part of counsel in the presence of the jury “makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant.” OCGA §§ 16-1-8 (e) (2) (B); 17-8-75. In the instant case, the trial court granted appellant’s motion for a mistrial upon a finding of prosecutorial overreaching based on the prosecutor’s stated intention to subsequently introduce the testimony of a child regarding an allegedly obscene telephone call contrary to a pre-trial order on a motion in limine. However, there was no actual mention of the child or the obscene phone call in the presence of the jury, nor did the prosecutor say anything else before the jury immediately prior to appellant’s objection which could be construed as prejudicial. The record further shows that appellant stated his objection after the court excused the jury from the courtroom. As a result, the entire discussion regarding the admission of the testimony, in which the prosecutor stated his intention to introduce the testimony, occurred outside the presence of the jury. Thus, appellant’s motion for a mistrial and the court’s grant of the motion were premature, having occurred before the mention of obscene phone calls before the jury.
I also do not agree that the prosecutor’s mere expression of his intention to subsequently introduce such evidence, in and of itself, was prejudicial. “It is the trial court and not counsel who is given responsibility and power by law to exercise discretion in the admission of evidence and the control of the trial proceedings and of the parties before it. [Cits.]” Garcia v. State, 207 Ga. App. 653, 658 (2c) (428 SE2d 666) (1993). Rather than inviting appellant to move for a *80mistrial when the prosecutor announced his intention to introduce the testimony, the court should have responded by determining whether the testimony should have been excluded pursuant to the order on the motion in limine.
Decided January 13, 1995.
Amy A. Petulla, for appellant.
Clements & Clements, Patrick R. Clements, for appellee.