Court Opinion

ID: 9528961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:45:47.034993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:32.281780
License: Public Domain

Shepherd, J.
(dissenting). I dissent and would hold that Betty L. Duncan, the first wife of Norman Duncan, has a greater right to the pension benefits than Nancy Jeanne Duncan, the deceased’s second wife. I do not perceive this to be a case of an assignment of pension benefits or an attempt to use the court’s process to attach the funds themselves. I view this as the specific enforcement of an agreement between Norman and Betty Duncan.
If, at the time of the divorce, Norman had *407abided by the agreement and had named Betty as the beneficiary, there would be no question that the agreement could be enforced. Norman had the complete right to designate whichever beneficiary he chose, and by consenting to the judgment of divorce, he chose to designate Betty and agreed not to change his mind. In exchange for that agreement he obtained whatever benefits were awarded to him under the divorce settlement. I accept the fact that the court could not force him to designate a beneficiary, and this raises the issue whether the parties to the divorce action could agree to do an act which the court could not force them to do in the absence of an agreement. That issue was resolved in Kasper v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 412 Mich 232; 313 NW2d 904 (1981). Michigan law prohibited a divorce court from conveying property to a third party in a contested case. Nevertheless the parties agreed in the divorce that Stephen Kasper would be required to keep his minor child, Jason, as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy until the child reached the age of eighteen. Four months after the divorce Stephen Kasper named his father as the beneficiary. The Supreme Court held that, "predicated on an agreement, rather than the court’s separate power to adjudicate, the obligation of Stephen Kasper to maintain his minor son as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy would be enforceable.” 412 Mich 238.
The statute in question prohibits an assignment of benefits and the subjection of benefits to execution, garnishment, attachment, or any other process of law. As I have indicated, this was not an assignment of benefits. It might have been an assignment of benefits had the deceased been collecting benefits at the time of the agreement. In this case we are only concerned with the right to *408designate a beneficiary, and the only dispute before the court is which designated beneficiary has the greater right.
I am inclined to favor decedent’s first wife, who made a bargain and now is being deprived of her share of the bargain. To the extent that benefits were paid before the retirement system had notice of the claim, a legitimate argument can be made that the amounts already paid to the second wife, Nancy Jeanne Duncan, may not be recouped. That issue is not before us, nor did the trial court address it. For the reasons stated, I would aifirm the decision of the trial court without prejudice to the parties’ right to address the trial court on the proper allocation of benefits based upon the time of notification of the existence of the judgment of divorce and any factors relating to the computation of the benefits that are due Betty, including her status as a former wife, to the extent that the language of the pension plan makes a distinction between former and present spouses.