Court Opinion

ID: 9614651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:27:02.684981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:37.784252
License: Public Domain

Koontz, C.J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the statutory scheme embodied in the pertinent statutes which control the issues presented by this appeal. Specifically, I disagree with the majority determination that the statutory scheme prior to the 1989 amendment of Code § 62.1-44.15(3a) imposed upon the State Water Control Board (SWCB) a two-step duty in promulgating its standards of quality for state waters, first to hold public hearings of an informal and informational nature (Code § 9-6.14:7.1(B)), and second to hold evidential hearings (Code § 9-6.14:8). In my view, the SWCB was required to hold the public informational hearing and to afford APCO an opportunity to request a public evidential hearing. APCO’s failure to request an *263evidential hearing negated the requirement to conduct such a hearing. In short, I find nothing within the provisions of these statutes which reflects a legislative intent to require the SWCB to conduct an evidential hearing without a request to do so by an affected or interested party. Rather, I believe it was the legislative intent to mandate such a hearing only upon such a request.
At the time of these proceedings, Code § 62.1-44.15(3a) provided in pertinent part: “The Board shall, from time to time, but at least once every three years, hold hearings as hereinafter provided for the purpose of reviewing the standards of quality, and, as appropriate, adopting, modifying, or cancelling such standards.” (emphasis added). Subsection (3b) provided: “Such standards . . . are to be adopted or modified, amended or cancelled in the manner provided by the Administrative Process Act (§ 9-6.14:1 et seq.).” Code § 9-6.14:8 provides, in pertinent part, that the agency “may conduct or give interested persons an opportunity to participate in a public evidential proceeding', and the agency shall always do so where the basic law requires a hearing.” (emphasis added). Reading these Code sections together, the majority concludes that the phrase “shall . . . hold hearings” in Code § 62.1-44.15(3a) coupled with the phrase “the agency shall always do so where the basic law requires a hearing” in Code § 9-6.14:8 mandates that the SWCB hold an evidential hearing in every instance that it proposes to amend its standards, regardless of whether an interested or affected party, such as APCO in this case, requests a formal evidential hearing. Such an interpretation would require the SWCB to conduct an evidential hearing even when there might be no participants or issues to be resolved. In my view, such a result was not intended by the legislature, nor is such an interpretation required by the language of these statutes.
Because the term “hearing” is not defined in the basic law, Code § 9-6.14:8 of the Administrative Process Act (APA) is controlling. The majority maintains that the mandate “shall always do so” in that section refers only to “conduct ... a public evidential proceeding.” In my view, the mandate “shall always do so” modifies both the mandate to “conduct ... a public evidential proceeding” as well as the mandate “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in a public evidential proceeding.” If “an opportunity to participate in a public evidential proceeding” means the same as “shall conduct” such a hearing, the former is *264meaningless. For that reason, I believe the legislature intended to give each part of the phrase a separate meaning. Consequently, I interpret the statutory language to mean that the SWCB is required to hold an evidential hearing upon the request of an interested person; without such request, the agency need not engage in a futile act. In my view, such an interpretation is consistent with and is the logical extention of the statutory requirement imposed upon the agency to hold a public informal and informational hearing so that issues can be raised and identified for which interested persons could determine to request an evidential hearing.
To bolster its interpretation of these code sections, the majority in footnote three draws a distinction between “an opportunity to participate” and “an opportunity to request” a hearing, and concludes that the latter transfers the “onus” to the private party to initiate the hearing. I agree with that distinction, but I disagree that such an “onus” offends the statutory scheme within the APA. The majority finds this onus offensive because:
the evidential hearing is the vehicle created by Code § 9-6.14:8 by which the formal record which serves as the basis for adopting the standard is preserved. Code § 9-6.14:8 provides that the agency “shall promulgate [the standard] only upon (i) its findings of fact based upon the record of evidence made pursuant to [the evidential hearing].”
In my view, Code § 9-6.14:17 expressly recognizes that an evidential hearing is not the only vehicle by which the basis for adopting the standard may be preserved.
Where there is no such agency record so required and made, any necessary facts in controversy shall be determined by the court upon the basis of the agency file, minutes, and records of its proceedings under § 9-6.14:7.1 or § 9-6.14:11 as augmented, if need be, by the agency pursuant to order of the court or supplemented by any allowable and necessary proofs adduced in court ....
Moreover, Code § 9-6.14:8, in addition to referring to the promulgation of standards by an agency upon its findings of fact based upon the record of evidence made pursuant to [the evidential hearing] also provides that it do so upon “(i) . . . facts of which judicial notice may be taken, (ii) statements of basis and purpose *265as well as comment upon data received in any informational proceedings held under § 9-6.14:7.1 and (iii) the conclusion or conclusions required by the terms of the basic law under which the agency is operating.” These additional provisions, I believe, expressly recognize that the SWCB in some instances may promulgate standards or preserve a record for judicial review without holding evidential hearings.
Finally, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the 1989 amendment to Code § 62.1-44.15(3a) was a change in the basic law. When interpreting a statutory amendment there is a presumption that the legislature intended to effect a change in the law; however, that presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the legislative amendment was intended to interpret or clarify the original act. 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.30 at 266 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1985). “When amendments are enacted soon after controversies arise ‘as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act — a formal charge — rebutting the presumption of substantial change.’ ” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 16, 20-21, 215 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1975)(quoting 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.30 at 184 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972)). Further, “[a]n amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change the law, whereas no such purpose is indicated by the mere fact of an amendment of an ambiguous provision.” 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.30 at 266 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1985).
As this appeal illustrates, prior to the 1989 amendments the provisions in Code § 62.1-44.15(3a) were ambiguous. Moreover, the 1989 amendment followed the enactment of emergency standards, signed by Governor Baliles, which were virtually identical to those declared invalid in the circuit court. We may assume that at the time of the amendment the legislature was mindful of the revisor’s note to Code § 9-6.14:8, which interpreted the statute to mean that a formal evidential proceeding was necessary only when requested by an interested or affected party and was not mandatory in every instance that the SWCB sought to change its standards. Thus, in my view, by enacting the amendment the legislature intended merely to clarify the language of the original act. For this reason, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion in footnote three that because the legislature stated that the amend*266ment would not affect pending litigation the obvious intent of the amendment was to effect a change in the law. In my view, the amendment does not affect pending litigation in any event since it only serves to clarify the prior ambiguous statutory language.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.