Court Opinion

ID: 9602737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:59:28.460858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:06.279636
License: Public Domain

Spratley, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the majority that this case should be reversed and a new trial awarded. My concurrence, however, is based upon the failure of the trial judge to fully inform the jury upon the point to which their inquiry was directed. I do not think we should hold it to be improper for a trial judge to advise the jury of the law of parole and pardon where full information is- given in response to an inquiry of the jury relating to that subject. The reasons assigned for the conclusion of the majority seem to me to be unsound. The conclusion is moreover against the great weight of authority. In State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P. (2d) 542, the cases on this subject are reviewed and the reason for the rule adopted in most of the jurisdictions is well expressed.
The function of the jury is to determine the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused and the degree or graveness of his offense. It is their duty to impose the penalty which they think appropriate, in view of the nature of the crime and the character of the accused as revealed by his record and their impressions of him at the trial. The object of the penalty is to punish the accused, deter others from crime, and to protect the public. In considering these elements, questions naturally arise whether the accused will be required to suffer the punishment imposed, or will be able to escape therefrom by reason of the provisions of some other law. In such consideration, the jury cannot act intelligently in determining the measure of punishment to fit the crime and the man, unless they have knowledge *281of the possible consequences of the law relating to the payment of the penalty by the convict.
When the court itself fixes the measure of punishment, the trial judge knows, or ought to know, whether the penalty imposed may be diminished by some other arm or agency of the State. No valid objection can well be made to this knowledge of the trial judge. It seems to me it should be no less proper for a jury to have the same information, especially in view of the weight which we give to their verdicts. How can it be wrong to inform the jury of the law relating to the execution of a penalty assessed by them when we hold that it is not error for a trial judge with knowledge of the law to fix the measure of punishment?
The power of parole and pardon is one of law and common knowledge. The question asked by the juror in this case clearly showed that the jurors, or some of them, knew that there was some provision of law for the release of convicts; but were not aware of the specific conditions under which it was operative. They had already determined that the accused was guilty of murder in the first degree. In view of the nature of the crime and the disclosed character of the accused, they did not, as his counsel says in his brief, want him “to be released and recommit a similar offense.” The only way for them to effectuate their determination to keep the accused from being paroled and thereby become a menace to society was to fix his punishment at death or at life imprisonment. Virginia Code, 1950, § 53-251 (2). A simple refusal to answer their inquiry would have left them in confusion-and doubt as to whether their determination could be effected. The several jurors might have differed as to the provisions for pardon, parole, and good conduct allowance for convicts. Some might have thought that only certain of the provisions were applicable to this case; while others night have believed that none was. As a result they would have been unable to unanimously reach a fair and intelligent conclusion in accordance with their determination. In such a situation of confusion, there may be a reaction, just as likely against the accused as in his favor.
The duties of the Virginia Parole Board are correctional and not penal. Virginia Code, 1950, § 53-250. The exercise of the powers of the Board is dependent upon the eligibility of the convict for parole, after a certain period of confinement. This *282eligibility is based largely upon Ms outward conformity to prison rules and regulations. All too frequently, as experience has shown, the more hardened convicts will conduct themselves in conformity to the rules, or break the rules in such a manner that they cannot be caught, solely for the purpose of saving time and not because of any real desire to reform their social attitudes or better themselves otherwise. The functions and duties of juries and the Virginia Parole Board are, therefore, highly distinctive and not in conflict.
The accused relies upon the cases of Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S. E. 414 and Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 178 S. E. 797, each decided by a divided court.
The majority opinion does not cite the first named case, apparently because there are numerous grounds for the reversal of the conviction there, besides the remarks of the Commonwealth Attorney to the jury with reference to the power of the Executive Department of the State to lessen punishment.
The opinion in the Coward Case supports, in part, the contention of the accused here; but it goes further and says that the error complained of is “harmless in murder cases when the sentence is death,” a statement which receives but slight consideration by the majority here. Because of the view I take of the question under review, I would disregard- the conclusion of error in that case, -and make the proper ruling in this case in accordance with the logic of the situation and the weight of authority.
In Williams v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 607, 609, 8 S. E. 470, where a trial judge complied with the request of the jury for information, tMs court said, “It was, however, proper for the court to fully and completely respond to inquiry which might come from the jury for information touching their duties; and if tMs was done, and correctly done, then neither side had any valid right to demand .more.” See Hebner v. Sullivan, ante, p. 259, 72 S. E. (2d) 689.
The refusal of the court in the present case to fully answer the inquiry of the jury was, I think, prejudicial to the accused. The language of their inquiry clearly indicates that they wanted assurance that the accused would be confined for life, that is, never be released to prey upon society. Being unable to secure that assurance, or full information as to the possibility of his future release, they imposed the punishment of death, when a *283sentence of life imprisonment might have carried out their determination. Having undertaken to answer their inquiry, the court should have informed them of the good conduct allowance for convicts, (Code of Virginia, 1950, § 53-213); the eligibility of a convict to parole, (Virginia Code, 1950, § 53-251); and the constitutional power of the Governor to grant pardons or reprieves, (Constitution of Virginia, § 73; Code of Virginia, 1950, § 53-228). In my opinion, no prejudice would have resulted had such information been given in simple and direct language.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Smith concurs in the foregoing views.