Court Opinion

ID: 9473715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:37:47.292509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:42.051299
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
Although I concur in the Court’s disposition of this appeal, I write separately to express my disagreement with the holding by the majority that Luce v. United States, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), should be applied retroactively in the context of this case.
I
The defendant in the present proceeding was accused of bank robbery and conspiracy. His defense was based largely on an alibi; he claimed to have been in Pittsburgh at the time of the crime. While several of his witnesses helped to establish his alibi, as is often the situation with such a defense the defendant’s own testimony would have been of considerable importance. Dunbar, however, had a prior conviction for rape. His counsel believed that if admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 609, there was substantial danger that such conviction would serve as devastating impeachment evidence against Dunbar.
With that possibility in mind the defense attorney moved prior to trial to exclude evidence of Dunbar’s prior rape conviction. The district court postponed ruling on that request until the issue arose at the trial. App. at 71. At a sidebar conference requested by the defense during the final stages of the presentation of the case for the defendant, the district court did in fact rule on the issue, holding that if Dunbar were to testify, the rape conviction would be admissible.
At the time of the trial, the rule governing the necessity of testifying in order to preserve for appellate review the question of the admissibility of a prior conviction was set forth, at least for the Third Circuit, in United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1002 n. 22 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899, 101 S.Ct. 267, 66 L.Ed.2d 129 (1980). In Provenzano this Court declared that a defendant’s failure to risk admission of a prior conviction “by actually testifying did not prevent him from raising the issue on appeal.” (emphasis added). One court of appeals had held that it was necessary for the defendant to testify in order to preserve the point for appeal. See Luce v. United States, 713 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir.1983). Five other courts of appeals had held to the contrary. See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049 (D.C.Cir.1983) (in banc); *77United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349 (1st Cir.1981); United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083 (7 th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 2335, 68 L.Ed.2d 854 (1981); United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985, 101 S.Ct. 403, 66 L.Ed.2d 248 (1980); United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528 (4th Cir.1978).
Immediately following the district court’s decision to permit the impeachment evidence, the defense rested; Dunbar did not testify. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant appealed to this court asserting inter alia the district court’s ruling regarding the use of the prior rape conviction. After the appeal was filed and while the case was awaiting disposition, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Luce v. United States, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). In Luce, the Supreme Court held that in order for a defendant to preserve an objection of this type, he or she must actually testify. As a result of the Supreme Court’s holding, we must decide whether we should apply Luce retroactively.
II
As the majority notes, the Supreme Court has established a three-prong test for determining whether to apply a rule of law retrospectively. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). The first factor is whether the decision has established a new principle of law, by overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. The next involves an assessment of whether retroactive application will further the purposes of the rule. Finally, the court must consider whether retroactive application would produce substantial injustice or hardship. It is with the application of the first factor, whether the decision in Luce established a new principle of law, and with the third, whether substantial unfairness would result, that I have concerns.
The Supreme Court has established different criteria for guiding resolution of the question whether new constitutional and criminal procedure decisions should be applied retroactively. E.g., Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984). The Court has stated that the purpose to be served by the new standard, the extent law enforcement authorities have relied on the old standards, and the effect on the administration of justice of the retroactive application of the new standard should be weighed. Id. In applying this test, courts have emphasized that where the major purpose of a new rule is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function, retroactivity probably should be accorded. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cannon v. Johnson, 536 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 928, 97 S.Ct. 334, 50 L.Ed.2d 298 (1976). No truth-finding function is involved here.
While the present case arises in the criminal context, use of the rule in Chevron would appear to be proper. Essentially, at stake is the question of what steps a party must take to preserve an evidentiary issue for appellate review. Illustrative in this regard is West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.1983). There we applied the Chevron test to the question of the retroactivity of a decision holding that in order to preserve an appeal on the merits, litigants must file a cautionary appeal from a predicate decision on the merits, notwithstanding the pendency of an attorney fees petition. The existence of the criminal context should, nevertheless, properly influence our application of the Chevron factors, particularly the fairness concern.
The majority asserts that Luce did not establish a new principle of law since at the time of Dunbar’s trial the Sixth Circuit had decided that a defendant must take the stand in order to preserve for appeal his contention regarding impeachment by prior conviction. However, where there is disagreement among the courts of appeals, as there was here, I take it that the rule in this Circuit as well as the predominant *78view of the majority of courts of appeals would be our most instructive guidepost.
As noted, the governing rule in this Circuit had been laid down in Provenzano, in which we held that a failure to testify did not prevent the defendant from raising the impeachment issue on appeal. While the majority today claims that Provenzano did not establish a Third Circuit rule that the defendant need not testify in order to preserve his contention, from the standpoint of a defendant like Dunbar the Provenzano court’s statements cannot fairly be read in any other manner. Indeed, the opinion in Provenzano has been interpreted in that fashion by the other courts of appeals that have addressed the appealability issue. E. g., United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1069 n. 71 (D.C.Cir.1983) (in banc).
As a fallback position, the majority suggests that it was crucial in Provenzano that the defendant had made clear his intention to testify, with a degree of certainty that is lacking in the present case. But, that would appear to read far too much, I believe, into the Court’s simple statement that “Provenzano desired to testify____” 620 F.2d at 1002. Significantly the Provenzano court did not cite the Ninth Circuit’s rule that in order to preserve his point on appeal, a defendant must have made a record clearly indicating a definite intention to testify if the prior conviction was excluded. See United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir.1979) (in banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034, 100 S.Ct. 706, 62 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980). Indeed, the correct construction of Provenzano is clearly suggested by the fact that the panel in that case cited the less stringent rule of United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1978) and of United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C.Cir.1976). See also United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1069 (D.C.Cir.1983) (in banc). Moreover, in the present case the district court had ruled on the admissibility of Dunbar’s prior conviction at a sidebar conference requested by the defendant during the presentation of the case for the defense. Immediately following the district court’s decision to permit the impeachment evidence, Dunbar rested. It is unrealistic to believe that the defense would have raised the issue at that juncture if the defendant had no intention of testifying. App. at 210-11.
In addition to the decisions of the courts of appeals cited in Provenzano, and in contradistinction to the isolated Sixth Circuit holding, a number of other courts of appeals had permitted review even when the defendant — as here — did not take the witness stand. See United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349 (1st Cir.1981); United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 2335, 68 L.Ed.2d 854 (1981); United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 985, 101 S.Ct. 403, 66 L.Ed.2d 248 (1980). Thus, I would hold that the Supreme Court in Luce did overrule clear past precedent.
Given this Court’s previous statement in Provenzano and the views of the significant majority of other courts of appeals, defense counsel in the position of Dunbar’s would have reasonably concluded that the defendant need not testify in order to preserve appellate review of the impeachment issue. This would seem particularly understandable since, if counsel had put Dunbar on the stand, the highly prejudicial effect of the previous rape conviction would have gone directly to the jury. To deny appellate review of the question because of the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Luce would be, as I view it, unjust to the defendant. Accordingly, I would hold that out of concern for fairness Luce should not be applied retroactively in this case.
Ill
Despite the foregoing discussion of retroactivity, I would concur with the result reached by the Court today. Even if the district court erred in stating that it would permit admission of Dunbar’s prior conviction — a close question — the error was harmless in light of the very substantial evidence against the defendant that was presented by the prosecution.