Court Opinion

ID: 9536641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:04:08.268805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:50:41.584797
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
— I dissent. In my opinion the trial court was without power to grant relief which exceeded that authorized by statute (Prob. Code, §661), requested in the petition for order to set apart probate homestead, and designated in the notice of hearing on the petition as the relief sought. Furthermore, it is my opinion that the writ of certiorari should be available to Treasure Alice Arens for the reason that she lost her right to appeal from the order setting aside the homestead without fault on her part because she had no actual notice of the making of such order, and even if she had received actual notice she would have had no reason to anticipate that she should appear to oppose the granting of relief in excess of that prayed for and statutorily authorized.
The real property in question was acquired by decedent Chauncey L. Hartman by purchase prior to his marriage to Nellie May Hartman; from this it would appear to have been wholly his separate property. However, the order which purports to set it aside absolutely to Nellie May Hartman states that it appears that such property “was owned, as to an undivided one-third interest, by Nellie May Hartman, the surviving widow of decedent, as her separate property, and as to the remaining two-thirds interest by decedent, as his separate property.” This language substantially follows language of the petition for an order to set apart a homestead. It is apparently based upon a will of decedent which was filed with a petition for letters of administration but was not probated because proof of the signatures of the sub*627scribing witnesses could not be obtained. The will stated that Chauncey L. Hartman and Nellie May Hartman had mutually agreed that he owned a two-thirds interest in the realty as his separate property and she owned a one-third interest as her separate property; it purported to devise decedent’s two-thirds interest to Nellie May for life with remainder to decedent’s two children, Treasure Alice and Donald.
The petition for order setting apart a probate homestead prays that the order set apart the property to Nellie May Hartman “for her lifetime.” In the notice of hearing the relief prayed for is not stated but the “petition is hereby referred to for further particulars.” The order finds “that notice of the hearing on said petition has been regularly given” (italics added). Yet the superior court proceeded to order that the real property “shall vest absolutely in and belong to” Nellie May Hartman.
Whether the decedent owned the entire fee in the real property or a two-thirds interest as his separate property, the probate court was authorized by statute to set it aside only for a limited period not exceeding the lifetime of the widow. Section 661 of the Probate Code provides, in material part, that the court must select a homestead “out of the community property or out of real property owned in common by the decedent and the person or persons entitled to have the homestead set apart, or if there be no community property and no such property owned in common, then out of the separate property of the decedent. If the property set apart is the separate property of the decedent, the court can set it apart only for a limited period, to be designated in the order, and in no case beyond the lifetime of the surviving spouse. ...” Under this section the separate property interest of a decedent, whether it be the entire ownership of the property or an interest in common with the survivor entitled to the homestead, can be set apart for a limited time only. (Estate of Maxwell (1935), 7 Cal.App.2d 641, 642 [46 P.2d 777].)
It has been stated and held that an order setting aside absolutely a probate homestead to a widow from separate property of the deceased husband, although erroneous, is not void. (Estate of Bette (1915), 171 Cal. 583, 585-586 [153 P. 949] ; Estate of Euelsman (1899), 127 Cal. 275, 276 [59 P. 776] ; In re Moore (1892), 96 Cal. 522, 531 [31 P. 584] ; Fergodo v. Donohue (1919), 40 Cal.App. 670, 671 [181 P. 819] ; see also Estate of Burns (1880), 54 Cal. 223, 227-228; *628Rountree v. Montague (1916), 30 Cal.App. 170, 176-178 [157 P. 623].) The foregoing cases, however, did not concern an attack by certiorari upon the order setting apart the homestead, nor did they concern the effect of an order which granted relief in excess of that prayed for in the petition and designated in the notice as the relief which would be sought.
For the purpose of determining the right to review by certiorari, action contrary to that authorized by statute (here, the granting of relief in excess of that authorized by Prob. Code, § 661) is action in excess of jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Burtnett v. King (1949), 33 Cal.2d 805, 807 [205 P.2d 656, 12 A.L.R.2d 333]; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941), 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] ; Rodman v. Superior Court (1939), 13 Cal.2d 262, 270 [89 P.2d 109].) Furthermore, in a proceeding instituted in the probate court by statutorily authorized posted notice, where interested persons have no actual notice, policy should demand that the relief granted cannot exceed that which, according to the notice, will be sought. Such policy is analogous to that which underlies the rule that in civil default actions a decree which grants relief in excess of that prayed for exceeds the court’s jurisdiction and is void. (Burtnett v. King (1949), supra, 33 Cal.2d 805, 808.)
I agree with petitioner’s contention that, despite the theoretical availability of the remedy of appeal, certiorari should be available because without any fault on her part she had no actual knowledge of the proceeding to set apart the homestead and therefore could not appeal. (Grinbaum v. Superior Court (1923), 192 Cal. 528, 556 [221 P. 635] ; see also Lee v. Small Claims Court (1939), 34 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [92 P.2d 937], and cases there cited [the statute which resulted in a situation where the time for appeal from the judgment of the small claims court might well expire without defendant having notice of entry of judgment against him has been since amended (Code Civ. Proc., § 117j; Am. Stats, 1951, ch. 1143, p. 2912, § 1; Stats. 1951, eh. 1737, p. 4087, § 20; Stats. 1955, ch. 566, §1)].)
For the foregoing reasons, I would annul the order of April 18, 1951, which sets apart the homestead absolutely.