Court Opinion

ID: 9797246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:16:14.668171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:53:33.601592
License: Public Domain

Judge ROY
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
For injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, an employee surrenders any right to claim damages from the employer except for the remedies granted by the Act. Section 8-41-104, C.R.S.2006; see also § 8-41-102, C.R.S.2006 (employer is not *121subject to any other liability except as provided in the Act). The Act thus represents a legislative decision to establish exclusive remedies for injuries that are covered by it. Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d 470 (Colo.2001); Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth. v. Baker, 955 P.2d 86 (Colo.App.1998); see McKelvy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 983 P.2d 42 (Colo.App.1998) (exclusivity provisions may not be avoided by framing a claim as a breach of contract, but claims for bad faith breach of insurance contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and outrageous conduct could be pursued).
Section 8-41-401(l)(a), C.R.S.2006, which defines a statutory employer provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any ... corporation operating or engaged in or conducting any business by leasing or contracting out any part or all of the work thereof to any ... eontractor[ ] or subcontractor, irrespective of the number of employees engaged in such work, shall be construed to be an employer as defined in articles 40 to 47 of this title and shall be liable as provided in said articles to pay compensation for injury or death resulting therefrom to said ... contractors [ ] and subcontractors and their employees....
Section 8-41-401(2), C.R.S.2006, provides immunity to contractors if the injured worker’s direct subcontracting employer carries workers’ compensation insurance:
If said ... contractor[ ] or subcontractor is also an employer in the doing of such work and, before commencing such work, insures and keeps insured its liability for compensation as provided in articles 40 to 47 of this title, neither said ... eontractor[ ] or subcontractor, its employees, [n]or its insurer shall have any right of contribution or action of any kind, including actions under section 8-41-203 [actions against third parties], against the person, company, or corporation operating or engaged in or conducting any business by leasing or contracting out any part or all of the work thereof, or against its employees, servants, or agents.
(Emphasis added.)
Here, it is undisputed that (1) Webb Crane, a subcontractor and Cowger’s direct employer, was an independent contractor which carried workers’ compensation insurance covering Cowger at the time he was injured; (2) Cowger was acting within the scope of his employment with the subcontractor at the time of the accident; and (3) Cowger had received benefits under that insurance. Therefore, the plain meaning of § 8-41-401(2) precludes this action by Cow-ger against Henderson.
In addition, in my view, the phrase in § 8-41-401(2), “including actions under section 8-41-203,” requires this conclusion. Section 4-41-203 permits an injured employee to sue a third-party tortfeasor, which Henderson would arguably be if it were not a statutory employer under § 8-41^401(1); and § 8-41-203 also provides the basis upon which the interest of Pinnacol Assurance, the direct employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, is premised. Section 8-41-203(l)(b), C.R.S. 2006. Further, my conclusion is consistent with the exclusivity of remedies intended by the General Assembly, see Horodyskyj v. Karanian, supra, and with the policy of encouraging general contractors to ensure that subcontractors carry the requisite workers’ compensation insurance covering their employees, as that protects the general contractor under § 8-41-401(2).
Finally, I find comfort in the ease authority construing and applying § 8-41-401(2)’s statutory predecessor, Colo. Sess. Laws 1975, ch. 71, § 8-41-101(2) at 296-97 (now codified with minor amendments as § 8-41^401(2)). In Buzard v. Super Walls, Inc., 681 P.2d 520 (Colo.1984), the plaintiff, an independent contractor, was a sub-subcontractor on a construction project and was injured by falling through a roof. The plaintiff had his own workers’ compensation insurance and had received benefits under that policy. The plaintiff commenced a tort action against the general contractor alleging that its employees had negligently installed roof trusses thereby causing the roof to collapse and his fall. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he did not come within the purview of § 8-41-101(2) because he was not, himself, an employer under the circumstances. The supreme court rejected that argument:
*122This argument fails when subsections (1) and (2) are considered together. For the purposes of this statute, a self-employed independent contractor ... is an “employee” subject to injury or death as well as an “employer” able to insure his liability for workers’ compensation. Under subsection (1) he may reach “upstream” to [the general contractor and subcontractor] to establish liability for workers’ compensation; they are liable without regard to fault as any employer would be. Under section 8-48-101(2) if he has obtained insurance he cannot reach “upstream” to [the general contractor and subcontractor] to establish tort liability; they are immune from suit as any insured employer would be. Statutory immunity goes hand in hand with statutory liability. The requirement that [plaintiff], acting as an employer, obtain insurance in order for [the general contractor] to be immune from suit guarantees that there will be immunity only when full workers’ compensation benefits are obtainable. It also encourages those contracting out work to require that contractors and subcontractors obtain workers’ compensation insurance, as occurred in the present case. We conclude that [plaintiff] is an employer who has insured his liability within the meaning of subsection (2), and therefore that [the general contractor] is immune from tort liability to [plaintiff].
Buzard v. Super Walls, Inc., supra, 681 P.2d at 523 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Finlay v. Storage Tech. Corp., 764 P.2d 62 (Colo.1988).
To reach the contrary result, my learned colleagues rely, in part, on language contained in Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444 (Colo.2005), which states that § 8-41-401(2) must be read in conjunction with § 8^41-401(1) because the language of the former is clearly linked to the language of the latter. While I agree that § 8-41-401(2) must be read in conjunction with § 8-41-401(1), I do not agree that this reading requires the result reached by my learned colleagues.
Later in its Newsom, the supreme court states:
Subsection 8-41-401(2) of the current statute came into being in 1963, in effect responding to and reversing the outcome otherwise required by a federal court interpretation of then-existing language [in Thomas v. Farnsworth Chambers Co., 286 F.2d 270 (10th Cir.1960) ]. In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, the federal court refused to construe the statute as immunizing a general contractor from a negligence suit by an employee of its subcontractor, even where the general contractor was a statutory employer of the subcontractor’s employee and the subcontractor had insured its liability for the death or injury of its employee as required by statute. [The general assembly responded by adding language to make clear that if a subcontractor of whom the general contractor was deemed to be the employer kept insured its own liability for its employees as statutorily required, the general contractor would be considered to have fulfilled its obligation as an employer, and neither the subcontractor nor its employees would “have any right of contribution or action of any kind” against the general contractor. [Section] 8-48-101(2), C.R.S. (1989) (currently § 8-41-401(2)). This provision remains unaltered today.
Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, supra, 125 P.3d at 449 (additional citations omitted; emphasis added).
Therefore, in my view, a contractor is immune from tort liability to the employee under § 8-41-401(2). I would affirm the order granting summary judgment in favor of Henderson.