Court Opinion

ID: 9568328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:02:34.652389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:37.250957
License: Public Domain

Wright, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. The issue in this case is whether Slominski had sexual intercourse with Reavis without her consent. The evidence was based upon the testimony of two medical doctors regarding whether Reavis lacked the legal capacity to consent *750to the sexual intercourse. One doctor said that Reavis’ ability to consent was “compromised by the circumstances.” The rest of his testimony was equivocal, but he stated that it was easier for Reavis to refuse when there were other people around. The other doctor stated that Reavis “felt that her job depended upon having sex with [Slominski] and that she had no recourse.” In my opinion, there was no basis for submitting the issue of lack of capacity to consent to the jury. A threat of loss of employment did not impair Reavis’ ability to say no.
I also cannot accept the plurality’s position that Slominski could have known that Reavis could not effectively give consent, because Slominski had repeatedly been able to engage in sexual contact in the past, despite Reavis’ requests that he not touch her. Reavis admitted that she had previously been able to successfully refuse Slominski’s advances.
In my opinion, there was a valid consent to the sexual intercourse, and the district court should have directed a verdict in favor of Slominski at the close of all of the evidence.