Court Opinion

ID: 9794550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:07:49.71599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:49.684329
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result of this case as announced in the majority opinion. I would prefer, however, that the court espouse for such instances a tolling rule with respect to the statute of limitations because it seems to me that there is a likelihood of situations arising in which the accused person would be foreclosed by the doctrines of res judica-ta and collateral estoppel from pursuing his civil action by virtue of a criminal conviction which ultimately might be set aside. If that reversal occurred after the statute of limitations for his civil action had run he would be effectively denied a remedy for the wrong. Because his opportunity for pursuing the civil action prior to conviction would be practically limited in many instances, I am not satisfied that the rule espoused by the majority opinion from Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2nd Cir.1980), is adequate to protect all whose rights might be infringed.
My position is influenced by the stance I took in my concurring opinion in Jessee v. State, Wyo., 640 P.2d 56, reh. denied 643 P.2d 681 (Wyo.1982). I there urged abrogation of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases in those instances in which there existed a reasonable good-faith belief by the law enforcement officer that his action was proper. I also said:
“ * * * Furthermore, I identify in the development of civil actions for deprivation of constitutional rights, and in the legal rules, whether statutory or common law, which have developed to permit suits against police officers a more effective deterrent than the exclusionary rule. * * * ” Jessee v. State, supra, 640 P.2d at 66.
I have not retreated from that position, but in order for the civil action to be a more effective deterrent it must be freely available to those whose rights are infringed. In my judgment it is more effectively preserved with a tolling rule than by proposing the prompt filing of the civil action with a stay until the criminal action appeal is determined as a solution.
I am satisfied that the thrust of Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980), is that the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to prevent the relitigation in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of issues tried in state court criminal proceedings. I can see no reason why those principles should not also foreclose the retrial of issues in claims based upon common-law torts. See also, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1840, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), and the cases there cited. During the time in which the criminal conviction remained unreversed the civil claim of the criminal defendant for a violation of his rights would be subject to dismissal. Since this is a very evident disability, arising out of a pending legal proceeding, I would rely upon it to justify the tolling.
I recognize that this is not a legal disability such as those contemplated in § 1-3-115, W.S.1977. I also recognize the rule of Rowray v. McCarthy, 48 Wyo. 108, 42 P.2d 54 (1935), to the effect that as a general proposition courts have no power to read into statutes of limitations exceptions not found therein because exceptions in favor of persons laboring under some disability are strictly construed, and the enumeration of specific exceptions by implication excludes all others. I believe this to be the general rule, but it is not an absolute rule. In State ex rel. Pink v. Cockley, 110 Ind.App. 417, 37 N.E.2d 284 (1941), it táas essential to pursuing an action that a prior civil proceeding be reversed on appeal. The court held that the time during which the action was prevented by the judgment in the other proceeding would not be counted against the party in determining whether the statute of limitations barred his action.
In 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 247, p. 278, the following language appears:
“Where a person is prevented from exercising his legal remedy by the pendency of legal proceedings, the time during which he is thus prevented should not be *174counted against Mm in determining whether limitations have barred his right, even though courts are reluctant to acknowledge exceptions additional to those contained in the statute itself: * * * ”
The cases cited there do support the textual conclusion. While factually different, the rationale of those cases does support a conclusion in cases like this that the statutory period of limitations should not be held to run during the pendency of the criminal appeal.
In 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 140, p. 711, the proposition is stated as follows:
“The broad rule is laid down that whenever some paramount authority prevents a person from exercising his legal remedy, the time during which he is thus prevented is not to be counted against him in determining whether the statute of limitations has barred his right even though the statute makes no specific exception in his favor in such cases. This rule enables the courts to give effect to a law creating an exception the object of which is to prevent the statute from running during the time the claimant is prevented, without fault on his part, from suing, so that he can have the full benefit of the time allowed him in which to bring his action. Under this rule, an injunction or other legal proceeding which prevents one from exercising his legal remedy against another tolls or suspends the operation of the statute of limitations. * * ”
Of like tenor and effect is the language found in 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 170, p. 740.
Because of my view that it is necessary to preserve this cause of action to citizens whose rights may be violated, I would not apply against them the statute of limitations during the period of time for which a criminal conviction is effective and could be asserted to foreclose the prosecution of civil claims under the doctrine of res judicata or the doctrine of collateral estoppel. If my argument in Jessee v. State, supra, has validity then the preservation of the civil action to serve as a deterrent to unlawful action by law enforcement officers is necessary and requires the creation of an exception to the statute of limitations. In this case the same result is reached as in the majority opinion because the statute is tolled for only 213 days yet the action was filed 2 years and 250 days after the causes of action accrued, except for malicious prosecution.
I do add that I am not in agreement with the position of the majority opinion that the cause of action for malicious prosecution accrued at the time of the defendant’s arrest and prosecution. The law in Wyoming is that the claim for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the underlying state court proceeding has terminated in favor of the plaintiff. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo., 540 P.2d 535 (1975). In this instance that cause of action did not accrue until November 27, 1979. I still concur in the decision of the majority, however, because there is no indication that these police officers were not acting within the scope of their official duties, and they therefore cannot be sued for malicious prosecution. Kimbley v. City of Green River, Wyo., 663 P.2d 871 (1983).
One other facet of the majority opinion troubles me. I do not agree that even the hypothetical application of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-101 et seq., W.S.1977 (Cum.Supp.1982), is appropriate. That statute became effective July 1, 1979, more than three months after the arrest of Lafferty. I am satisfied that it is substantive in nature and could have no application to those events which occurred prior to the date that it became effective. I would, therefore, rule that it has no application to these circumstances and would not discuss even hypothetically the computation of a period of limitations as affected by the statute.
I would hold in this case that the period of limitations was tolled from the date the criminal conviction was effective until the date it was reversed. In this instance that period of time is not long enough, however, to bar the application of the statute of limitations to appellant’s claim.