Court Opinion

ID: 9753006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:50:13.810155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:13.555999
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
Because Taylor has failed to produce any evidence that the unimproved dirt road was ever a public road under *208section 2781 or section 2735, I, like the majority, would affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Carringer. See 36 Pa.S. §§ 2781 & 2735. Moreover, I also agree with the majority’s finding that Taylor’s failure to plead his quiet title action as a separate count of his counterclaim in equity operates as a waiver of that cause of action at law. The majority has also, in my opinion, correctly disposed of Carringer’s contention that the trial court erred when it amended its order dismissing Taylor’s quiet title action at law to read “dismissed without prejudice.” However, because I do not believe that Carringer has made a sufficient showing that he would have been substantially prejudiced had the trial court granted Taylor’s petition for leave to amend his counterclaim in equity to include easement theories, I would reverse the trial court’s order and remand the case for a hearing on Taylor’s easement claims.
As the majority’s procedural recitation indicates, on June 5, 1989, while the exceptions to the decree nisi in Carringer’s equity action were pending, Taylor instituted a separate action at law to quiet title, asserting a right of way or easement [by necessity or prescription] along the roadway with all reasonable rights of repair. Subsequently, on July 12, 1989, Taylor filed a petition for leave to amend his counterclaim in equity to incorporate the allegations set forth in his quiet title action.1 Taylor’s petition was filed before argument was held on the exceptions to the decree nisi and the preliminary objections to the quiet title action at law.
Subsequently, the trial court entered a final decree denying Taylor’s exceptions to the decree nisi and granting Carringer’s exceptions. The court also denied Taylor’s mo*209tion to amend his counterclaim to include easement theories. Judge Wolfe reasoned that while “easement rights may be afoot,” Taylor’s motion to amend was “untimely” since he failed to raise these theories prior to entry of the decree nisi.2
The majority concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor’s motion to amend his counterclaim to include easement theories. The majority finds no abuse of discretion because Taylor did not file this motion until after entry of the decree nisi. I disagree with the majority’s finding, and would reverse the trial court order.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1033 states:
A party, either by filed consent of the adverse party or by leave of court, may at any time change the form of action ... or amend his pleading. The amended pleading may aver transactions or occurrences which have happened before or after the filing of the original pleading, even though they give rise to a new cause of action or defense. An amendment may be made to conform the pleading to the evidence offered or admitted.
Pa.R.C.P. 1033.
When reviewing a trial court’s order that relates to a motion to amend pleadings, we must keep in mind that “the policy of Pennsylvania courts is that amendments to pleadings will be liberally allowed in order to secure a determination of cases on their merits.” Tanner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 321 Pa.Super. 132, 137, 467 A.2d 1164, 1167 (1983); see also Laursen v. General Hospital of Monroe County, 494 Pa. 238, 431 A.2d 237 (1981); Posternack v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966); Gallo v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 335 Pa.Super. 311, 484 A.2d 148 (1984), alloc. denied, 517 Pa. 623, 538 A.2d 876 (1988); Sands v. Forrest, 290 Pa.Super. 48, 434 A.2d 122 (1981); Gregg v. Gacon Const. Co., 249 Pa.Super. 377, 378 A.2d 344 *210(1977). Moreover, our supreme court has also held that while the decision to grant or deny a petition to amend pleadings is within the sound discretion of the trial court, this discretion is not unfettered. Bata v. Penn Central Nat’l Bank of Philadelphia, 448 Pa. 355, 293 A.2d 343 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108, 93 S.Ct. 910, 34 L.Ed.2d 689 (1973) (allowing an amendment to a complaint after the trial court’s decree was entered); Sands, supra; Gregg, supra. An amendment will not be permitted where its effect would be to prejudice or surprise the adverse party. Small v. Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc., 363 Pa.Super. 61, 525 A.2d 424 (1987); Newcomer v. Civil Service Com’n of Fairchance Borough, 100 Pa.Cmwlth. 559, 515 A.2d 108 (1986), alloc. denied, 514 Pa. 626, 522 A.2d 51 (1987); Del Turco v. Peoples Home Savings Ass’n., 329 Pa.Super. 258, 478 A.2d 456 (1984).
Our supreme court explained the concept of prejudice under Pa.R.C.P. 1033 in Bata, supra:
All amendments have this in common: they are offered later in time than the pleading which they seek to amend. If the amendment contains allegations which would have allowed inclusion in the original pleading (the usual case), then the question of prejudice is presented by the time at which it is offered rather than the substance of what is offered. The possible prejudice, in other words, must stem from the fact that the new allegations are offered late rather than in the original pleading, and not from the fact that the opponent may lose his case on the merits if the pleading is allowed.
Bata, 448 Pa. at 380, 293 A.2d at 357 (emphasis in original, citations omitted). See also Winterhalter v. West Penn Power Co., 355 Pa.Super. 17, 512 A.2d 1187 (1986) (grant of leave to amend pleadings is limited only to consideration of whether it might unduly prejudice an adverse party; prejudice is defined as something more than detriment to the other party); Sands, supra (the prejudice that would prevent the grant of an amendment must be something more than detriment to the adverse party, since any amendment *211almost certainly will be designed to strengthen the legal position of the amending party and correspondingly to weaken the position of the adverse party).
In Binswanger v. Levy, 311 Pa.Super. 41, 457 A.2d 103 (1983), this court held that the right to amend may even be granted following a trial court order dismissing a plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Id., 311 Pa.Superior Ct. at 48, 457 A.2d at 107. There, a group of brokers filed a complaint against three property vendors alleging that they had been offered a commission if the vendors’ properties had been sold to the brokers’ clients. The complaint also stated that the sale of the vendors’ properties to the brokers’ clients would not have occurred in the absence of the brokers’ services. We held that the brokers’ complaint failed to state a cause of action against the vendors. Id., 311 Pa.Superior Ct. at 48, 457 A.2d at 107. The brokers, however, had also filed a motion to open judgment with the trial court, alleging that they possessed newly discovered documents to support their claim to the commission.3 We noted that in light of the brokers’ additional averments, it was unclear that they failed to state a cause of action or that granting them leave to amend their complaint would have been futile. Consequently, we held that the brokers were entitled to amend their complaint since there was a reasonable possibility that they would succeed on the merits of their new claims. Id., 311 Pa.Superior Ct. at 48, 457 A.2d at 107. See also Dietrich Industries, Inc. v. Abrams, 309 Pa.Super. 202, 213, 455 A.2d 119, 125 (1982) (“If there exists a reasonable possibility that a cause of action may be stated, the right to amend will not be withheld.”); Mace v. Senior Adult Activities Center of Montgomery County, 282 Pa.Super. 566, 423 A.2d 390 (1980) (same).
*212Here, the trial court conceded, as the majority recognizes, that there is a possibility that Taylor would have prevailed had he been- permitted to assert easement rights with respect to the dirt road.4 Nonetheless, the majority affirms the trial court’s decision denying Taylor’s petition for leave to amend his counterclaim. I find little merit in Carringer’s argument that the triab court properly denied Taylor’s petition. Taylor, like the plaintiff-brokers in Binswanger, has made a sufficient showing that his proposed amendment, if granted, would not have been futile. Accordingly, Taylor’s “... right to amend should not be withheld [since] ... there is some reasonable possibility that the amendment can be accomplished successfully.” Binswanger, 311 Pa.Super. at 48, 457 A.2d at 107 (citation omitted); see also Dietrich Industries, 309 Pa.Super. at 213, 455 A.2d at 125.
The majority’s finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this instance also ignores the maxim that mere delay in the proceedings is not a sufficient claim of prejudice that would prevent the allowance of an amendment. William Penn Parking Garage Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975). Taylor filed his petition for leave to amend his counterclaim before argument was held on the parties’ exceptions to the interlocutory decree nisi and the preliminary objections to Taylor’s action at law to quiet title. Moreover, Carringer has made no allegation that there was insufficient time to respond to the new averments which Taylor sought to introduce. Even if Carringer required additional time to respond to Taylor’s allegation that he is entitled to improve the dirt road by virtue of an easement, the trial court could have granted a continuance rather than deny Taylor’s petition to amend his counterclaim. Sands, 290 Pa.Super. at 52, 434 A.2d at 125; Gregg, 249 Pa.Super. at 378, 378 A.2d at 345. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to deter*213mine how the timing of Taylor’s proposed amendment has prejudiced or surprised Carringer. Bata, supra.
To deny Taylor’s petition for leave to amend his counterclaim circumvents a stated objective of the courts of this Commonwealth to obtain determinations of cases on the merits wherever possible. Laursen, 494 Pa. at 243, 431 A.2d at 240; Sands, 290 Pa.Super. at 52, 434 A.2d at 124. Taylor’s attempt to strengthen his legal position by amending his counterclaim will likely have the corresponding effect of weakening Carringer’s position. Such an effect, however, does not rise to the level of prejudice which would support the trial court’s decision to deny Taylor’s request to amend his pleading. Sands, supra. Moreover, Carringer has set forth no compelling arguments, nor does the record before us indicate anything that would preclude the parties from proving or disproving Taylor’s allegation that he may improve the dirt road abutting the parties’ properties because of an easement. Consequently, I would reverse the trial court’s order denying Taylor’s petition for leave to amend his counterclaim in equity,

. Taylor also petitioned for consolidation of the actions at law and in equity. In response, Carringer filed preliminary objections to Taylor’s action at law, alleging that dismissal was proper due to Taylor's failure to comply with the compulsory joinder provisions of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1020(d)(1) & (4). Additionally, Carringer argued that the doctrine of lis pendens barred Taylor’s consolidation request. Finally, Carringer filed for an allowance of attorney’s fees under section 2503, alleging that Taylor’s action at law was brought in bad faith. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503.

. In addition to the final decree, Judge Wolfe also filed an order dismissing Taylor's quiet title action at law and denying his petition for consolidation.

. In their motion, the brokers averred that the vendors and buyers reached an agreement under which the vendors would be responsible for paying the commission to the brokers. Additionally, the brokers alleged that the vendors had rejected the buyers produced by the brokers in bad faith and had done so for the purpose of depriving the brokers of their commission.

. Judge Wolfe stated, "We recognize easement rights may be afoot; however, Defendant did not raise the issue definitively prior to the Decree Nisi, and we will not now entertain it.” Final Adjudication of August 22, 1989, at 5.