Court Opinion

ID: 9479534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:21:01.591348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:06.327493
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The court today concludes that trial counsel Hager’s failure to interview Jones or to call him as a witness at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland’s tests for reviewing claims of ineffective performance and prejudice. Because I conclude that neither element of the Strickland test is satisfied, I would affirm the judgment of the district court denying the writ.
The decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in its consideration of the facts in the case clearly indicates that evidence to support the self-defense instruction could have *1325come only from Jones,1 and we know from the record that Jones was not called to testify at the second trial. However, the state trial court, in considering the collateral attack under Missouri’s Rule 27.26, concluded that Jones’ testimony, on balance, was more damaging than helpful to Chambers. After observing that counsel “could cho[o]se between a weak self-defense theory that carried with it a strengthening of the State’s case,” or try the case as he did, the state court concluded that the decision not to call Jones was a reasonable one.2 The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, Chambers v. State, 745 S.W.2d 718 (Mo.Ct.App.1987), and Chambers’ application for transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court was denied. The district court, in this habeas corpus action, concluded that Jones’ testimony would have supported the state’s theory of the case. It also concluded that because the trial counsel’s failure to investigate further resulted from a strategic decision made in the exercise of professional judgment, his performance was not deficient. Because it decided that the trial counsel rendered effective assistance, the district court did not reach the question of prejudice.3
I.
The effectiveness component of the Strickland test asks whether the defendant received “reasonably effective assistance.” 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Moreover, Strickland teaches that judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be *1326“highly deferential,” id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, and should eliminate the “distorting effects of hindsight,” id.
In performing the first part of the Strickland analysis, courts distinguish between pretrial preparation and trial strategy decisions. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788-95, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3122-26, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384-87, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2587-89, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184-87, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2473-75, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-67; United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir.1989); Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1382-86 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1944, 104 L.Ed.2d 415, reh’g denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3179, 104 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1989). “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. The Third Circuit recently stated: “Ineffectiveness is generally clear in the context of complete failure to investigate because counsel can hardly be said to have made a strategic choice against pursuing a certain line of investigation when s/he has not yet obtained the facts on which such a decision could be made.” Gray, 878 F.2d at 711.
In contrast to the relatively close scrutiny which courts give to an attorney’s preparatory activities, greater deference is given to an attorneys’ informed strategic choices. Indeed, it has been clear since Strickland that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. In reviewing the performance of counsel, “courts must resist the temptation to second-guess a lawyer’s trial strategy.” Laws, 863 F.2d at 1393 (quoting Blackmon v. White, 825 F.2d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir.1987)). Even a losing strategy “may have been reasonable in the face of an unfavorable case.” Id. at 1394 (emphasis removed) (quoting Blackmon, 825 F.2d at 1265).
Chambers attempts to formulate arguments based upon Hager’s allegedly inadequate investigation. However, as the Seventh Circuit has observed:
When the allegation of the ineffectiveness of counsel centers on a supposed failure to investigate, we cannot see how, especially in the context of a habeas proceeding that collaterally attacks the state court conviction, the petitioner’s obligation can be met without a comprehensive showing as to what the investigation would have produced. The focus of the inquiry must be on what information would have been obtained from such an investigation and whether such information, assuming its admissibility in court, would have produced a different result.
United States ex rel. Cross v. DeRobertis, 811 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir.1987).
Hager, trial counsel in Chamber’s second trial, read the transcript of Jones’ testimony in the first trial and concluded that it was more damaging than helpful. The only reason to interview Jones would have been to see if he would change his story. Hager decided not to interview Jones because even any substantial changes in his story would create an excessive danger of devastating impeachment. Chambers v. State, 745 S.W.2d at 720. Thus, although Chambers claims that he is challenging Hager’s preparation, he is, in fact, attempting to challenge these strategic decisions by Hager.
My review of the record convinces me that both the state trial court and the district court properly assessed Jones’ testimony. At the first trial, Jones testified that Chambers arrived in a car which was turned to face the exit of the parking lot. (Tr. first trial 748). As Chambers entered the building, the car was left running and was still occupied by the driver. (Tr. 748-49). Jones testified that he saw Chambers come out the door, get about half the distance of an automobile or truck, and turn half-way toward the door. (Tr. 738). Oes-tricker followed Chambers out the door and *1327struck Chambers hard enough to knock him down. (Tr. 738). Chambers then got up, took a step forward, and shot Oestricker. (Tr. 738). However, on cross-examination, Jones revealed that when Chambers walked out the door and turned around half-way, he already had a pistol in his hands, (Tr. 740), with the gun against his leg and positioned behind him, (Tr. 741). Oestricker was just emerging through the door when Chambers stopped, turned around with the gun in hand, and waited for Oestricker to come out. (Tr. 741-42). Jones testified that he had not seen Oes-tricker attempt to strike Chambers before Chambers initially took the gun out. (Tr. 742). According to Jones, after Chambers shot Oestricker, Chambers said either “[t]ake that tough guy,” or “[t]ake that.” (Tr. 742). After being shot, Oestricker made a grunting sound and backed up three or four steps. (Tr. 742). Chambers then walked toward him and slapped him in the head with the pistol “over and over again.” (Tr. 742-43). Oestricker was standing about six feet away from Chambers at the time of the shot and was not moving toward Chambers. (Tr. 747). Jones also said that, after shooting Oes-tricker, Chambers walked into the building and asked “if anybody else wanted any of this.” (Tr. 746). As he left the building, Chambers said to Oestricker, “Lay there and die.” (Tr. 747).
Based upon this testimony, I cannot conclude that trial counsel acted in any unreasonably ineffective manner by deciding not to call Jones. Even if Jones’ testimony supported a self-defense instruction, as the Supreme Court of Missouri held, the testimony also indicated that Chambers, with a pistol concealed against his leg, waited for Oestricker to come out the door and, after being struck, fired the fatal shot while Oestricker was six feet away and was not moving toward him. Chambers, after threatening the crowd in the bar, then ran to the car which had waited for him, with its motor running, during the entire incident.
While the question of whether there was evidence to support the giving of a self-defense instruction involves consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable to Chambers, a professional evaluation of the trial impact of the testimony involves consideration of that testimony in the light that the jury would consider it. This is a far broader analysis and I cannot conclude that Hager was unreasonably ineffective in his assessment of the impact of the Jones testimony on the jury. The Supreme Court has refused to find ineffective assistance where a lawyer did not introduce helpful evidence which, in turn, could have led to the introduction of other more harmful testimony. See Burger, 483 U.S. at 788-95, 107 S.Ct. at 3122-26; Darden, 477 U.S. at 184-87, 106 S.Ct. at 2473-75. The testimony of Jones presented just such a dilemma for Hager, and we should follow the teaching of the Supreme Court by refusing to conclude that there was ineffective assistance in this respect.
It is also important to consider the fact that, before the second trial, Chambers signed a statement in which he agreed with the decision not to call Jones. The Supreme Court stated in Strickland that “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions,” 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, and that those statements are critical to a proper assessment of litigation decisions, id. When this statement is considered in combination with the content of Jones’ testimony at the first trial, I am convinced that the decision not to call Jones was reasonable under Strickland.
Furthermore, even if the trial counsel should have called Jones, the Strickland test is not satisfied unless Chambers can also demonstrate “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In order to prove prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is defined as one which is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. After a thorough examination of the record, I conclude that there is not a reasonable probability that the introduction of *1328Jones’ testimony would have changed the outcome of the second trial.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court denying the writ.
ORDER
The panel opinion filed and judgment entered September 15, 1989 are vacated, and appellee’s suggestion for rehearing en banc is granted. Counsel will be notified as to the time of oral argument. Counsel will each be given thirty days from the date of this order to file any supplemental briefs which are not duplicative of the briefs originally filed. The supplemental briefs shall not exceed fifteen pages.

. The Missouri Supreme Court, in reversing the Chambers I trial, observed that there was conflicting evidence as to the incident and that "[i]n examining the record for evidence of self-defense, we must consider the evidence in [the] light most favorable to appellant Chambers.” State v. Chambers, 671 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo.1984) (en banc). After reviewing the evidence in that manner, the court concluded that “[w]hile the evidence of self-defense is not so unequivocal as to mandate a directed verdict of acquittal, the evidence is sufficient to justify submission of self-defense to the jury." Id. at 784.

. The detailed reasoning of the state trial judge is as follows:
During this proceeding, Donald Hager testified that the decision not to call Jones was [a] deliberate one, based upon strategic concerns. That, having the benefit of Jones’ testimony on cross-examination adduced at the first trial, in his professional opinion, the disadvantages of Jones’ testimony outweighed the advantages. The State’s cross-examination * * * was highly damaging in that it supported the State's theory of the case under a capital murder submission. Mr. Hager knew that although Jones’ testimony would have supported a self-defense instruction, it corroborated the State’s main witness — Fred Iep-pert — and conflicted with his defense strategy. His strategy at trial was to: 1) attack the credibility of the State’s witnesses; 2) suggest that Oestricker had a pair of pliers in his hands; and 3) attempt to negate the element of Chambers reflecting “cooly” upon * * * taking the life of Oestricker. The fact that Jones was in a position to observe the condition of the getaway car with running engine and the distance between the victim and petitioner at the time of the fatal shot would have made this trial strategy almost impossible from a practical standpoint.
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Without Jones’ testimony a jury might believe, as at least one [Missouri] Supreme Court Judge did, that the whole matter was just "an ordinary barroom altercation” thus negating the cool reflection that might not exist under those circumstances.
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In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner’s trial counsel’s decision not to call Jim Jones was a reasonable one based on his professional judgment in consideration of the evidence and the circumstances in the first trial.
Chambers v. Missouri, No. CV186-4580-CC-J3, slip op. at 12-13 (23d Cir.Ct. March 11, 1987). The court also rejected Chamber's claim that he had not read the signed statement which indicated that he agreed with the decision not to call Jones. Id. at 14 n. 2.

.The district court’s reasoning is of interest:
The Court finds reasonable counsel’s conclusion that Jones’ testimony would have tended to support the state’s theory of the case and thus his decision not to call Jones as a witness. This is especially true in view of petitioner’s written and signed pretrial statement that he agreed with counsel’s decision in this regard. As the United States Supreme Court noted, ”[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the petitioner’s own statements or actions.” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691 [104 S.Ct. at 2066]. Furthermore, counsel reasonably assessed the affect [sic] of Jones’ earlier testimony on both the state’s theory of the case and Jones' credibility as a witness.
Chambers v. Armontrout, No. 88-0567C(3), slip op. at 12 (E.D.Mo. July 19, 1988).