Court Opinion

ID: 9401122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-10 19:13:39.988168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.880390
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00045-CV

                                    COURT OF APPEALS

                        THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                           CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

                          IN THE INTEREST OF S.A.L., A CHILD

                   On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
                            of Nueces County, Texas.

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                       Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                       Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

        Appellant C.H.1 (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son

S.L. By three issues, Mother argues: (1) the trial court was without jurisdiction when it

entered its order terminating her rights, and therefore the judgment is void; (2) the

evidence is insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights; and

(3) termination was not in S.L.’s best interest. We affirm.

        1   To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the children and their relatives by their
initials or an alias. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(a).
                                          I.      BACKGROUND

        Mother is the biological parent of J.C., A.C., D.B., T.H., J.F., and S.L. Only S.L. is

the subject of this suit. S.L. was born on September 18, 2020. On December 28, 2020,

appellee the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (Department) filed a

petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights, alleging Mother tested positive for

methamphetamines and amphetamines while pregnant with S.L.; S.L. was residing with

his alleged father V.R. and his wife S.V.; and V.R. and S.V. were unwilling to provide a

drug test. The Department further alleged that while V.R. identified himself as S.L.’s

primary caregiver, he did not allow the Department access to his home to conduct a home

assessment. Thus, it was “unknown if [S.L.] has proper sleeping arrangements or if the

inside of [V.R.’s] home pose[d] a safety threat for [S.L.].”2

        The trial court rendered an order appointing the Department temporary managing

conservator on March 23, 2021. On September 19, 2022, the trial court held a bench trial.

S.L. was two years old at the time of trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court

terminated Mother’s parental rights and appointed the Department permanent managing

conservator of S.L. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother

had knowingly allowed S.L. to remain in conditions which endangered his physical or

emotional well-being, placed S.L. with persons who endangered his physical or emotional

well-being, constructively abandoned S.L., failed to comply with the family plan of service,

and used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of S.L.

        2 The Department noted that Adult Protective Services (APS) received a report alleging physical
neglect of V.R.’s physically disabled father. APS’s disposition was that the allegation of physical neglect by
V.R. was validated.

                                                      2
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P). The trial court also found

by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in S.L.’s

best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Mother then appealed.

                                   II.    THE EVIDENCE

       The Department presented evidence demonstrating the need for termination of

Mother’s parental rights through the testimony from Ariel Burger, a Department

conservatorship supervisor; Irma Saenz, a Department conservatorship supervisor;

Mother; and Foster mother.

A.     Burger’s Testimony

       Burger testified that the Department became involved in this case because Mother

tested positive for methamphetamines throughout her pregnancy with S.L. S.L. was

placed in the care of V.R., who claimed to be S.L.’s father, but genetic testing later

revealed that V.R. was not S.L.’s biological father.

       Burger described V.R. and S.V. as being uncooperative; they refused to drug test

without a court order, and they refused the Department access to their home. The

Department was concerned about S.L. residing with V.R. because V.R. tested positive

for benzodiazepines and cocaine following a court order, and S.V. tested positive for

cocaine and marijuana. After the Department was named temporary managing

conservator, V.R. refused to surrender S.L. Consequently, the court issued a writ of

attachment to obtain possession of S.L. When the writ was executed, V.R. still refused to

surrender S.L., and he became combative. Eventually, Mother surrendered S.L. to the

Department, but according to Burger, she was irate, using foul language, and recorded

                                             3
the incident on her phone. Law enforcement assisted the Department in keeping Mother

away for the Department’s employees’ safety.

      Burger testified that the Department has provided services to mitigate its concerns

for removal such as drug testing, parenting and individual counseling, substance abuse

counseling, which Mother was required to complete as part of her family plan of service.

Burger stated that although Mother did attend “some” classes, Mother did not complete

the requested services, such as substance abuse counseling, individual counseling,

parenting classes, and she failed to submit to an “exceptional amount” of drug tests.

According to Burger, Mother was asked to drug test at least twice a month but missed

several. Burger explained that the Department offered Mother bus passes to alleviate any

transportation issues, but she never requested one.

      Burger explained that Mother had an extensive history with the Department as five

other children had been removed from her care beginning in 2010. Maternal grandmother

H.H. is the permanent managing conservator of Mother’s four minor children but informed

the Department that she was unable to care for S.L. because she did not have any more

space in her home, and Mother caused “too much drama.”3

      The Department made numerous visits to Mother’s apartment pursuant to the trial

court’s order, but Mother prohibited the Department from entering her residence. Burger

opined that Mother is not able to provide S.L. with a safe environment. Additionally, the

Department was unable to verify that Mother had stable employment. Burger believed

that termination was in S.L.’s best interest because Mother had not demonstrated a

      3   Mother’s adult child, J.C., lives alone.
                                                     4
lifestyle change to mitigate any of the Department’s concerns. According to Burger, S.L.

is currently with his fifth foster family, who intends to adopt him.

B.     Saenz’s Testimony

       Saenz testified that Mother’s involvement with the Department began in April 2010

when the Department received allegations that Mother physically abused her children,

J.C. and A.C., smoked marijuana in and out of the home, and was around the children

while intoxicated. Mother participated in drug treatment, and those allegations were ruled

out. In January 2017, the Department received another report, alleging physical abuse of

A.C., Mother used drugs in front of the children, and the children had access to drugs. It

was also alleged that Mother threw J.C. and hit him with both open and closed fists, but

the Department was unable to complete its investigation because Mother was

uncooperative. In November 2018, the Department was involved with Mother again for

allegations of neglectful supervision of D.B. and T.H., and Saenz stated “it was alleged

that [Mother] was 30 weeks pregnant and tested positive for marijuana at a doctor’s

appointment.” In September 2019, the Department received a report that A.C. was found

unresponsive due to a suicide attempt by ingesting drugs. Two months later, the

Department received another allegation regarding Mother’s neglectful supervision of J.F.

because he was born at twenty-nine weeks, weighing two pounds, and Mother tested

positive for amphetamines upon admission at the hospital.

       The Department made numerous attempts to locate S.L., but Mother would not

provide any information. Saenz indicated that it took the Department “a couple of months”

                                              5
to locate S.L. Saenz added that Mother was always “irate,” “uncooperative,” and would

use[] foul language.”

C.     Mother’s Testimony

       Mother agreed that she tested positive for methamphetamines on August 12, 2020,

but she did not recall testing positive for methamphetamines any other time. According to

Mother, she is unaware that she has missed several drug tests because she does not

“have an actual phone” anymore although she can be reached via e-mail. Mother

admitted she “talk[ed] foul to” the Department but claimed that she “tried to keep it cool,

calm, and collected with them” until she felt she was being “belittled.”

       According to Mother, she was aware that she was required to complete court-

ordered services, but she did not complete those services because she cannot “attend all

these classes when [she has] to make a living” for herself and for her five minor children.

Mother admitted that her virtual visits with S.L. were suspended. When pressed as to

whether her visitations were suspended because Mother was not cooperating and not

participating in the required services, Mother replied, “I’m not sure as to why they were

suspended, actually.”

       Mother stated that H.H. lives in a two-bedroom apartment with Mother’s four minor

children. Yet, Mother disagreed that it would be difficult for H.H. to care for S.L. because

S.L. is “a little person.”

       Mother stated she is temporarily residing with another individual in an apartment

doing “various jobs,” “odd jobs,” and “[d]ifferent stuff.” Mother clarified that her stay at this

apartment was just “a temporary one,” but she had “room” for S.L.

                                               6
D.     Foster Mother’s Testimony

       S.L.’s Foster mother testified that she has had S.L. in her care for about one week

but had “respite care for him prior to that for around three weeks.” Nonetheless, she has

known S.L. for at least six months because she is good friends with his previous foster

parents, and she met S.L. while he was placed there. Foster mother testified that she

invited S.L.’s previous foster parents to his birthday party so that he is still able to maintain

contact with them. S.L. currently attends the same school program he attended with his

previous foster placement, so S.L. is able to interact with the kids he has grown familiar

to.

       Foster mother lives in a four-bedroom home with her two biological children ages

nine and six, and a two-and-a-half-year-old toddler who she adopted through foster care

six months prior to trial. According to Foster mother, S.L. is “doing wonderful,” “bonding

with the other siblings,” and “showing signs of healthy growth.” She explained that S.L.

and his foster sister get along as they are very close in age. Currently, Foster mother is

working on S.L.’s speech, and since he has been in her care, has learned ten new words.

Foster mother stated that she would “absolutely” pursue adoption if the trial court

terminated Mother’s rights. Foster mother believed she could provide S.L. with a stable

environment.

                                     III.    JURISDICTION

       By her first issue, Mother argues the trial court’s judgment is void because the trial

court’s jurisdiction was not properly extended pursuant to § 263.401(a) of the family code,

so the court “lost jurisdiction over the case on March 28, 2022.”

                                               7
A.     Applicable Law

       Section 263.401(a) of the family code provides that if a trial court fails to

commence the trial on the merits or grant an extension within one year after the trial court

appointed the Department as temporary managing conservator, the trial court’s

jurisdiction terminates, and the case is automatically dismissed. See id. § 263.401(a)

(providing that the trial court’s jurisdiction ends on the first Monday after the first

anniversary of the date the trial court rendered a temporary order appointing the

department as temporary managing conservator); In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 292

(Tex. 2021). However, § 263.401(b) provides that the trial court may extend its jurisdiction

by an additional 180 days if extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining

in the Department’s conservatorship and continuing the Department’s appointment is in

the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b).

       Here, the trial court rendered an order appointing the Department temporary

managing conservator on March 22, 2021. The first Monday after the anniversary of that

date was March 28, 2022. Therefore, unless the trial court either (1) “commenced the trial

on the merits,” or (2) “granted an extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1)” under

§ 263.401, the court’s jurisdiction over the case ends on March 28, 2022. See id.

§ 263.401(a), (b). This extension may be made “orally on the record or in some other

writing.” In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 299.

B.     Discussion

       The record provides that on March 17, 2022, the trial court held a hearing to

consider the Department’s request for an “extension pursuant to § 263.401.” According

                                             8
to the record, Mother attended the hearing, and Mother’s counsel “agreed” to an

extension pursuant to § 263.401. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally

granted the Department’s unopposed motion for continuance.

       Following the trial court’s oral extension, the trial court held a placement hearing

on March 31, 2022, and another hearing on April 19, 2022. Mother appeared at the

hearings. A new scheduling order was held on May 3, 2022, setting a trial date for August

22, 2022.

       Thereafter, on June 22, 2022, the Department submitted a written order for the trial

court to memorialize its March 17, 2022 order granting an oral extension, which the trial

court signed on June 28, 2022. The order reads that the trial court—before the end of the

initial dismissal period—found “that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child

remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship” of the Department and further

extended the dismissal date to September 24, 2022.4 See id. at 300–01 (“But there is no

requirement in the statute that this order be rendered before the initial dismissal date.”).

       The family code permits the court to render the order orally. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 101.026 (providing that pronouncement may be made orally in the presence of the

court reporter or in writing, “including on the court’s docket sheet or by a separate written

instrument”); see also In re O.O., No. 13-21-00411-CV, 2022 WL 1559725, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 17, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (permitting a trial

court to grant extension through a docket entry); In re R.J.R., No. 04-21-00246-CV, 2021

       4 The order further provides other findings leading to the continuation of the Department’s
conservatorship.

                                                9
WL 5813827, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 8, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[T]he

court may have orally extended the automatic dismissal date during the March 16

hearing.”). “In the absence of a record, we presume the evidence was sufficient to support

the trial court’s findings,” and Mother bears the burden on appeal to show that did not

occur. See In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 300 (finding that the parents bore burden to bring

forth record on appeal “to demonstrate the absence of evidence to support the required

findings”). Mother did not move to dismiss after the March 28, 2022 dismissal date or

otherwise assert that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed. See id. at 301.

       Because we conclude the trial court effectively extended the automatic dismissal

date, it retained jurisdiction to render an order of termination, and we proceed to the merits

of Mother’s appeal. See id. at 298 (concluding the only reasonable interpretation of a

docket entry regarding a hearing was that the trial court extended the automatic dismissal

date); In re P.Z.F., 651 S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, pet. denied) (“Based

on G.X.H., we imply the [§] 263.401(a) findings were made on the record at the oral

hearing.”). We overrule Mother’s first issue, and we proceed to the merits of her appeal.

                                IV.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       For a trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship, there must be clear and

convincing evidence that: (1) the parent’s actions or omissions satisfy at least one

statutory termination; and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b)(1), (2); see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); In re J.L.,

163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the

mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought

                                              10
to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007; In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.

       Only one predicate act under § 161.001 (b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment

of termination in addition to the required finding that termination is in the child’s best

interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). To determine whether the evidence

is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s findings, we look at all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the finding and ask whether a reasonable factfinder could have

formed a firm belief or conviction the finding was true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266

(Tex. 2002). We must assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding

if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and we disregard all evidence a reasonable

factfinder could have disbelieved or found incredible. Id.

       When reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we “give

due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear

and convincing.” Id.; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). We determine “whether

the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction

about the truth” regarding the Department’s allegations. In re. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

We consider whether disputed evidence is such that “a reasonable factfinder could not

have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding.” Id. “If, in light of the entire

record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor

of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm

belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.

                                              11
                                        V.      ENDANGERMENT

        By her second issue, Mother argues the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights pursuant to

§ 161.001 (D) and (E). According to Mother, the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support a finding that that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that

endangered S.L. physically or emotionally.

A.      Applicable Law

        Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) both require a finding of endangerment.5 See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). “Because the evidence pertaining to

subsections 161.001 (1)(D) and (E) is interrelated, we may conduct a consolidated

review.” In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). To

“‘endanger’ means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.” Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs.

v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987) (internal citations omitted). The specific danger

to a child’s physical or emotional well-being need not be established as an independent

proposition, but it may be inferred from parental misconduct. Id.

        Pursuant to subsection D, the endangerment analysis focuses on the evidence of

the child’s physical environment although the environment produced by the conduct of

the parents bears on the determination of whether the children’s surroundings threaten

their well-being. See In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 221 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet.

denied); see also In re J.J.M., No. 13-22-00131-CV, 2022 WL 3257520, at *6 (Tex. App.—

        5“Allowing [§] 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) findings to go unreviewed on appeal when the parent has
presented the issue to the court thus violates the parent’s due process and due course of law rights.” In re
N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam).

                                                    12
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 11, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Subsection D “permits

termination if the petitioner proves parental conduct caused the children to be placed or

remain in an endangering environment.” In re J.J.M., 2022 WL 3257520, at *6.

       It is not necessary that the parent’s conduct be directed towards the child
       or that the child actually be injured; rather, a child is endangered when the
       environment creates a potential for danger which the parent is aware of but
       disregards. Conduct that demonstrates awareness of an endangering
       environment is sufficient to show endangerment. In considering whether to
       terminate parental rights, the court may look at parental conduct both before
       and after the birth of the child. Section D permits termination based upon
       only a single act or omission.

In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d at 221–22 (cleaned up).

       Under subsection E, the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the

endangerment of the children’s physical well-being was the direct result of the parent’s

conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. Id. at 222. Either the parent’s conduct

or the conduct of a person with whom the parent knowingly leaves the children that

endangers their physical or emotional well-being is sufficient. Id. (“It is not necessary,

however, that the parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer

injury.”). In either instance, it is thus the direct result of the parent’s conduct that results

in the termination of the parental rights. Id.

B.     Discussion

       Mother admitted that it would be concerning for S.L. to be in a home with drug

users, yet Mother repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines

throughout her involvement with the Department for over a decade, and admitted that she

tested positive for drugs while she was pregnant with S.L. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d

336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (“We accordingly agree that a parent’s use of narcotics and its effect

                                                 13
on his or her ability to parent may qualify as an endangering course of conduct.”); see In

re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (“[A]

parent’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency of a termination suit,

when the parent is at risk of losing a child, supports a finding that the parent engaged in

conduct that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.”). Additionally,

Mother failed to comply with court-ordered drug tests and went through periods of

noncompliance. Drug use and its effect on a parent’s ability to parent may establish an

endangering course of conduct. See Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Family &

Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)

(noting that mother’s continued narcotics use after child’s removal and in face of drug

testing, jeopardized her relationship with her child).

       Mother did not allow the Department access to her apartment so that they could

conduct the requisite home evaluations required for reunification. See In re R.W., 129

S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (explaining that conduct that

subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s physical and

emotional well-being). The Department engaged a special investigator, but Mother “would

never open the door.”

       Furthermore, Mother refused to provide the Department with S.L.’s location;

caused the Department to spend months attempting to locate S.L.; and allowed S.L. to

reside in a home with drug users, stating that V.R. had “partial custody.” In her brief,

Mother stated that V.R. “welcomed [S.L.] with open-arms into his home.” However, there

was evidence that V.R. was uncooperative in the Department’s investigation, did not allow

                                             14
the Department access to his home, and did not provide any information or comply with

any efforts of the Department. There was also evidence that V.R. and his wife tested

positive for cocaine, marijuana, and benzodiazepines. Though Mother denied she knew

that V.R. and his spouse were drug users,6 the trial court could have disbelieved Mother’s

testimony. See In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 751 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied)

(providing that evidence that a parent allowed a child to be around persons using drugs

can support a conclusion that the child’s surroundings endanger the child’s physical or

emotional well-being); see also In re J.J., No. 07-13-00117-CV, 2013 WL 4711542, at *4

(Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 29, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] parent’s decision to leave

a child in the care of a known drug user is relevant to the predicate acts or omissions

outlined in subsections (D) and (E).”).

        The Department alleged multiple instances of neglect beginning in 2010 as Mother

has an extensive history with the Department. In fact, all of Mother’s prior children have

been removed from Mother’s care, and, according to the Department, the trial court

ordered Mother not to have contact with her other children “due to it harming the welfare

and safety of the children.” See In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Tex. App.—Eastland

2010, pet. denied) (“If a parent abuses or neglects . . . other children, that conduct can be

used to support a finding of endangerment even against a child who was not yet born at

the time of the conduct.”); see also A.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 394

S.W.3d 703, 712 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) (providing that a factfinder may infer

        6Mother testified, “[I]t came to a surprise that all of us came out with the same drug, supposedly,
when I never even took a drug test for the Department.”

                                                    15
from a parent’s past conduct of endangering the well-being of the children that similar

conduct will recur in the future); In re E.A., No. 13-06-503-CV, 2007 WL 2471459, at *8

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 31, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because there

is evidence that appellant’s past actions were unsuitable, the trial court could have

inferred that similar unsuitable conduct could recur in the future if the children are returned

to appellant.”).

       According to Mother, the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a

finding that that Mother engaged in a course of conduct that endangered S.L. physically

or emotionally because “[t]here was no evidence presented from law enforcement or

psychologists or doctors that Mo[ther] posed a danger” to S.L. “or was engaged in any

such dangerous behavior.” However, the evidence presented belies such a conclusion.

Furthermore, Mother cites no authority that evidence of endangerment must be presented

through the testimony of law enforcement, psychologists, or doctors, and we have found

none. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Nonetheless, the statute does not require that evidence

of endangerment come from a specific source. Cf. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001. A

parent’s conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the

child’s physical and emotional well-being. In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 739. There was

evidence of such problematic conduct by Mother, as discussed supra. See Cervantes-

Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 253 (“The specific danger to the child’s well-being may be

inferred from parental misconduct standing alone.”).

       Burger concluded that allegations of neglectful supervision against Mother was

ultimately substantiated, as indicated in her “reason to believe” finding. The trial court was

                                              16
also privy to evidence of Mother’s noncompliance with her family plan of service, wherein

Mother failed to: maintain a safe and stable home for S.L.; allow the Department access

to her current residency to conduct assessments; attend all scheduled visits with S.L. and

all court hearings; provide the Department with proof of a stable job and income; complete

parenting classes; complete drug counseling; attend and successfully complete drug and

alcohol assessments; submit to random drug tests; and obtain clean drug tests. See In

re R.F., 115 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (providing that as part of

the endangering-conduct analysis, a court may consider a parent’s failure to complete a

service plan). The trial court was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and was free

to believe the Department’s evidence and to disbelieve Mother’s explanations. See In re

J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346.

       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we

conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Mother

knowingly placed or knowingly allowed S.L. to remain in conditions or surroundings that

endanger S.L. and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed S.L. with persons who

engaged in conduct that endangers S.L. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (b)(1)(D),

(E). Moreover, viewing all the evidence, we conclude that the evidence is such that a

factfinder could reasonably form “a firm belief or conviction about the truth” regarding the

Department’s allegations. See In re. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Accordingly, the evidence

is legally and factually sufficient to support the judgment. We overrule Mother’s second

issue. Because we find that the evidence is sufficient under subsections D and E, we

need not address Mother’s issues challenging the remaining statutory grounds on appeal.

                                            17
See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 (providing that only one predicate act under

§ 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination in addition to the

required finding that termination is in the child’s best interest).

                                          VI.      BEST INTEREST

        By her third issue, Mother argues there is legally and factually insufficient evidence

supporting the trial court’s finding of best interest.

A.      Applicable Law

        When considering the best interest of a child, we recognize there is a strong

presumption that the child’s best interest is served by preserving the parent-child

relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). However, we also

presume that “prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment” is in

the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a).

        In determining whether a parent is willing and able to provide the child with a safe

environment, we consider the factors set forth in the family code as well as the Holley

factors.7 See id. § 263.307(b); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

These factors are not exhaustive. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. “The absence of evidence

about some of these considerations would not preclude a factfinder from reasonably

forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest,

         7 These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and

physical needs; (3) any present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities
of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to
promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody;
(7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate
that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

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particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the

safety of the child.” Id. In analyzing these factors, we focus “on the best interest of the

child, not the best interest of the parent.” Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul.

Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ).

       Evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination may also

constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re C.H.,

89 S.W.3d at 28. “A best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence,

subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence.” In re

E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). “A trier of fact

may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct and determine whether

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.” Id.

B.     Children’s Desires, Ages, and Vulnerabilities

       “When children are too young to express their desires, the fact finder may consider

that the children have bonded with the foster family, are well-cared for by them, and have

spent minimal time with a parent.” In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 693 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (quoting In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). Although S.L. is too young to articulate his desires, there was

evidence that Mother’s other children “expressed their concerns about not wanting her

around and not wanting to visit with her.” See id. Foster mother testified that S.L. is doing

wonderful in her care, and he his bonding with the family and his other siblings. See In re

C.N.S., 105 S.W.3d 104, 106 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, no pet.) (considering the evidence

of a lack of an emotional bond between the children and the parent as relevant in

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determining the child’s desires). Foster mother is currently working on S.L.’s speech. She

is making notes of the new words S.L. has learned since being placed with her family.

Although S.L. has had a short time with Foster mother, he is doing well with his foster

family while Mother has not maintained significant contact with S.L. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 263.307(b)(12)(F) (providing that court may consider whether the family

understands the child’s needs and capabilities); In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (considering evidence of a child’s bond with

foster mother in the best-interest analysis). These factors weigh in favor of termination.

C.     Children’s Present and Future Emotional and Physical Needs, Plans for the
       Children, and Parental Abilities

       “The need for permanence is the paramount consideration for the child’s present

and future physical and emotional needs.” In re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d at 693 (quoting

Dupree, 907 S.W.2d at 87). “[T]he prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe

environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.307(a). “While it is true that proof of acts or omissions under [§] 161.001(1) does

not relieve the petitioner from proving the best interest of the child, the same evidence

may be probative of both issues.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see In re D.L.N., 958

S.W.2d 934, 941 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. denied) (holding that a factfinder may infer

that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the future if the child

is returned to the parent).

       Here, Mother was residing in a temporary home, was doing “odd jobs,” and she

had no plan for S.L. going forward. Moreover, there was evidence that Mother was hostile

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with the Department throughout the entire process, calling them “liars” and “bitches.”8

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10) (providing that Mother’s willingness “to

cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision” is a relevant

consideration in the best interest analysis). Thus, Mother’s unwillingness to cooperate

with the Department because she “disagree[s] with what they’re saying,” demonstrates

her own developmental immaturity, indicating an inability to prioritize reunification with

S.L. and effect personal change for the betterment of her child. See id. § 263.307(b)(11)

(providing that “the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive

environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time” is a relevant

consideration in the best interest determination). Additionally, demonstrative of Mother’s

inability to provide S.L. with a safe and drug-free home was her testified-to

“unaware[ness]” that she had missed several required drug tests. See id.

§ 263.307(b)(12). Mother also suggests that because S.L. is an infant and “a little person,”

H.H. should be able to care for him along with her four other minor children in H.H.’s two-

bedroom apartment. This demonstrates Mother’s lack of understanding of S.L.’s basic

needs. See id. These factors favor termination.

D.      History of Substance Abuse

        An additional factor to consider in a best interest determination is whether there is

a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s

home. See id. § 263.307(b)(7). Mother admitted that she was using drugs when she was

        8  In closing arguments, the Department asked the trial court to consider Mother’s demeanor and
attitude at trial where mother was “laughing and mocking” the Department while she was being questioned.

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pregnant with S.L. and that she subsequently tested positive during the pendency of her

cases with the Department. See In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 269 (concluding “[p]arental

drug abuse reflects poor judgment,” and is a relevant consideration in the best interest

determination); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)

(“A mother’s use of drugs during pregnancy may amount to conduct that endangers the

physical and emotional well-being of the child.”). The Department presented evidence

that Mother failed her drug tests on multiple occasions and that she left her child with V.R.

and S.V. who both tested positive for narcotics. These factors weigh in favor of

termination.

E.     Programs Available and Parent’s Acts, Omissions, and Willingness to
       Accept Help

       There was evidence that after removal, Mother tested positive for drugs, failed to

submit to drug tests, and failed to complete her required court-ordered services. See In

re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (providing that a

parent’s failure to submit to a drug test can be considered a positive result). Mother was

unsuccessfully discharged from Gulf Coast Services. As the factfinder, the trial court may

have inferred from Mother’s failure to take the initiative to complete the services required

to regain possession S.L. that she does not have the ability to motivate herself to seek

out available resources needed now or in the future. See In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 267.

       The Department presented evidence that Mother was uncooperative and

disengaged from her services for months at a time, demonstrating that Mother was not

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willing to interact with the Department. 9 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(10)

(stating that willingness and ability “to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate

agency’s close supervision” is relevant consideration in deciding whether parent can

provide child with safe environment); Wilson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 923, 930 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2003, no pet.) (providing that a parent’s lack of motivation in improving parenting

skills is evidence to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest).

Although Mother recently started attending virtual visitation with S.L., there was evidence

that Mother also failed to attend visitation with S.L., and her visitation was further

suspended for months because she refused to cooperate with the Department and the

trial court.

        Burger testified that Mother demonstrated an inability to provide S.L. with a safe

environment because she was living in a temporary apartment with an unnamed person,

and she was planning to move soon. In addition, the evidence showed that Mother did

not have stable employment or a plan to care for S.L. From this evidence the trial court

could have reasonably found that Mother is unable to provide for S.L.’s emotional and

physical needs. See In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no

pet.) (“Without stability, income, or a home, [a parent] is unable to provide for the child’s

emotional and physical needs.”). These factors weigh in favor of termination.

F.      Conclusion

        Having reviewed the record and considered the evidence in the appropriate light

for each standard of review, we conclude the trial court could have formed a firm belief or

        9   Mother attributed this to not having a phone, but she admitted she was available through e-mail.

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conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in S.L.’s best interest. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). Accordingly, we hold the evidence is legally and

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest findings. We overrule Mother’s

third issue.

                                    VII.    CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                        JAIME TIJERINA
                                                                        Justice

Delivered and filed on the
8th day of June, 2023.

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