Court Opinion

ID: 9755626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:44:49.216683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:09.721391
License: Public Domain

Justice CASTILLE,
dissenting.
Although I might agree with the lead opinion’s substantive resolution of this issue, I am not satisfied that appellee *117presented a timely challenge below. I conclude that appellee’s challenge was not timely and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Appellant School District argues in its brief, and the Commonwealth Court held, that the Local Agency Law, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571, provides the time frame for challenging a decision like the April 28, 1999 letter from the School District which apprised appellee, William Merrell, of its decision to hire another candidate for the teaching position for which Merrell had applied. Section 5571 provides clearly and unambiguously that “an appeal from a tribunal or other government unit to a court ... must be commenced within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” The plurality finds that the April 28, 1999 letter did not constitute an adjudication because “Merrell does not have a property right to preference in employment such as to render the letter of April 28th an adjudication.” 579 Pa. at 110-11, 855 A.2d at 721. I disagree with the plurality’s view of what amounts to an adjudication.
In my view, the Common Pleas Court correctly found that the April 28, 1999 letter was an adjudication within the meaning of 2 Pa.C.S. § 101, which defines an adjudication as: “Any final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the parties to the proceeding in which the adjudication is made.” The letter sub judice embodied the School District’s final decision to hire someone other than Merrell, and that decision was a final adjudication triggering Merrell’s rights under the Veterans’ Preference Act.
I am concerned that the lead opinion’s conclusion that the preference had not yet “ripened” because Merrell had not reached the final stage of consideration will provide an easy avenue for employers to circumvent the precepts of the Veterans’ Preference Act. The Act does not require that a veteran reach the final stage of consideration in order for the preference to be triggered. Section 7104(a), 51 Pa.C.S. § 7104(a), relating to non-civil service employment, provides: “Whenever any soldier possesses the requisite qualifications and is eligible *118to appointment to or promotion in a public position, where no such civil service examination is required, the appointing power in making an appointment or promotion to a public position shall give preference to such soldier.” Under the plain language of the Act, Merrell’s right to the preference arose when he applied for the teaching position. As a result, the April 28, 1999 letter fits the statutory definition of an adjudication and the letter triggered Merrell’s thirty-day period in which to appeal the decision to the Common Pleas Court, which he failed to do.
The School District contends that the Commonwealth Court’s finding that the April 28, 1999 letter was not a valid adjudication based upon this Court’s decision in Callahan v. Pennsylvania State Police, 494 Pa. 461, 431 A.2d 946 (1981), is in error because the Commonwealth Court misstated our holding in Callahan. I agree with the School District that the Commonwealth Court misread the Callahan decision as stating that an adjudication that is invalid is not subject to the thirty-day limitation period for filing an appeal. In Callahan, as the School District notes, the agency letter notified the appellant that his Heart and Lung Act benefits would be terminated at a future date. This Court held that the actual date of termination, rather than the notification date, triggered the thirty-day appeal period. Here, irrespective of the merits of the decision, the School District’s April 28, 1999 letter comprised the sole action on the part of the School District. There was no future date on which the School District would take further action with respect to Merrell. The letter notified Merrell that the School District had already acted by appointing another candidate. The letter was, therefore, the triggering event for the thirty-day appeal period.
I also find persuasive the School District’s argument that, because the School District would be taking no further action on his application, Merrell was obligated to appeal within thirty days:
Unlike the police officer in Callahan who had not been deprived of his existing right at the time that he received *119his letter, Merrell definitively knew that he had not been selected for the job and that no further action would be taken with regard to his application. Nonetheless, on July 21, 1999, eighty-four (84) days after receiving the letter from the District, Merrell filed his Complaint with the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Merrell, having already received notice of the Board’s action, and having no reason to wait for further action, had no reasonable basis to sit on any right that he had to appeal the District’s decision to hire another candidate.
Appellants’ Brief at 31-32. On this record, in my view, the School District is correct.
For these reasons, I would find that the April 28,1999 letter constituted an adjudication from which Merrell had thirty days to mount any challenge. Merrell failed to do so in a timely manner. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court and reinstate the Common Pleas Court order dismissing Merrell’s complaint.