Court Opinion

ID: 9693619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:53:00.97768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.994812
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

The Supreme Court of the United States has twice expressly reserved the question of "[wjhether and to what extent a State can enforce” a notice-of-alibi rule "by excluding relevant, probative evidence” offered by the defendant, recognizing that it "is a question raising Sixth Amendment issues.” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970). See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 n. 4, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973). Under circumstances like those in this case, where the sanction of exclusion for violating a notice-of-alibi rule operates to prevent a criminal defendant from calling his only alibi witness and thus from presenting his only defense to the charges, where the violation was not deliberate, and where any prejudice to the prosecution could have been *399cured by a short continuance, the application of a notice-of-alibi rule’s exclusionary sanction violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The majority, in holding that the state procedural rule overrides the petitioner’s right to call his only witness, has denied petitioner the most fundamental constitutional right that exists in a criminal case — the right to present a defense.
I.
In order to understand better the full impact of the majority’s position, it is necessary to recount some of the critical facts in this case.
The petitioner, Vernon Taliaferro, was indicted for robbery with a deadly weapon, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, and lesser charges which were nol prossed. On the first day of his trial, Wednesday, May 21, 1980, the petitioner requested a continuance in order that one of his witnesses, Carol Bellamy (a former girl friend), could be summonsed to testify. Defense counsel stated that she had been unable to reach Bellamy before the trial, although she had had Bellamy’s telephone number for some time, and that she had only obtained her address on the day of the trial. Even though the State had no objection to a continuance, the trial judge denied Taliaferro’s request, stating: "The defendant has waited until the day of the trial to give his counsel an address of a witness which is not, in my view, a reason to continue a case, so I will not continue it.” 1
On the next day of his trial, Thursday, May 22, 1980, the petitioner sought to call Edward Rich, who was then present in the courthouse, as an alibi witness. The State objected on the ground that Taliaferro had failed to name Rich as an * alibi witness in response to the State’s request made pur*400suant to Maryland Rule 741. The State claimed that it had been surprised by the last-minute proffer of Rich, was unprepared to cross examine him, and had had no opportunity to investigate his background. The State indicated, however, that it would have no objection to Rich’s testifying if the case were continued until the following Monday, May 26.2
The record shows that the trial judge appeared disposed towards continuing the case until he learned that the terms of six of the jurors were to expire on Friday, and that the following Monday was a federal holiday. Nevertheless, Monday was not a state holiday, and the court was required to be open on that day. The judge feared that by resuming the case on Monday, he might disrupt the long-weekend plans of the six jurors whose terms were to expire. The judge, however, made no inquiries to determine whether this fear had any basis. He made no effort to ascertain whether a brief continuance would inconvenience a single juror. Instead, the trial judge simply refused to continue the trial, and ruled that Rich would not be permitted to testify as a sanction for Taliaferro’s violation of Rule 741.3
*401The trial judge did not find that Taliaferro’s violation of Rule 741 was deliberate; instead he found that the defendant was not "diligent” and "hadn’t made any real effort, except yesterday, to locate the witness.”
After the trial judge’s decision excluding Rich as a witness, defense counsel requested a ruling that the State not be permitted to impeach Taliaferro with his prior criminal record if he decided to take the stand in his own defense. The judge denied counsel’s request, and the defendant never took the stand.
Ultimately, then, Taliaferro was unable to present any defense to the charges against him. Taliaferro’s defense had been alibi, and he had sought to introduce the testimony of two witnesses and to testify himself. Because of the trial judge’s evidentiary rulings, Taliaferro’s "defense” was reduced to an attack on the credibility of the State’s only witness against him.4
*402II.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment rights to offer testimony of witnesses and to compulsory process are applicable to state criminal proceedings, and that a Texas statute prohibiting accomplices from testifying for each other violated those rights. The Court said (388 U.S. at 19):
"The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.”
See also In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) (recognizing the right to offer testimony as one of several rights which "are basic in our system of jurisprudence.”)
In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), Justice Powell, for the Court, wrote (410 U.S. at 294, emphasis supplied):
"The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one’s own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.”
*403In Chambers, the Court held that a criminal defendant was impermissibly denied these rights by a Mississippi voucher rule which had precluded him from calling witnesses to discredit one of his own witnesses whose testimony had been damaging.
In the present case, as a result of the trial judge’s application of a nonmandatory sanction pertaining to a mere procedural rule, the defendant was precluded from calling his only alibi witness, and thus from presenting his only defense to the state’s accusations.5 Moreover, the violation of the rule was not deliberate, and any prejudice to the prosecution was concededly curable by a short continuance.6 Finally, the record fails to show that anyone would have been inconvenienced by a short continuance. This application of a state procedural rule cannot be squared with the mandate of Chambers, Washington and In Re Oliver. Under the teaching of those cases, Taliaferro was convicted in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
*404The majority opinion rejects Taliaferro’s constitutional argument, stating that "state courts and lower federal courts have decided that the exclusion of alibi testimony offered by an accused who has violated an alibi discovery requirement does not offend the Sixth Amendment right to have compulsory process for the obtaining of witnesses.” Yet none of the cases cited by the majority hold that exclusion pursuant to a notice-of-alibi rule can never be unconstitutional. In fact, courts have held, on constitutional grounds, that a trial judge cannot exclude a defendant’s witness merely as a sanction for a discovery rule violation. United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 243 (5th Cir. 1981) ("We hold, therefore, that the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment forbids the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence solely as a sanction to enforce discovery rules or orders against criminal defendants). See United States v. Perez, 648 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1981) (error to have excluded witness because of violation of discovery order to reveal reports of physical examinations, but error was harmless). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has recently held that it is constitutionally impermissible to apply a notice-of-alibi rule so as to preclude the defendant from testifying in his own defense as to an alibi. Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1982).
Other courts have held that specific applications of preclusion sanctions violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, held that it is unconstitutional to *405preclude a defendant from calling witnesses and presenting an insanity defense when formal notice was the only deficiency in complying with the applicable notice rule, and when any prejudice could have been ameliorated by lesser means than exclusion. Ronson v. Commissioner of Cor. of State of N.Y., 604 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1979). The court’s reasoning is applicable to the instant case (604 F.2d at 178-179):
"While a defendant’s right to call witnesses on his behalf is not absolute, a state’s interest in restricting who may be called will be scrutinized closely. ... In this regard, maximum 'truth gathering,’ rather than arbitrary limitation, is the favored goal... . Given that a grant of continuance would have served to minimize any prejudice to the state resulting from the lack of formal notice, the refusal of the trial court to exercise discretion to allow [the defendant] to call [his psychiatrist] and to present an insanity defense, then, was a violation of Ronson’s sixth amendment rights.”
See also the well-reasoned opinion of the United States District Court in the same case, Ronson v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey issued a writ of habeas corpus where a prisoner was convicted after a trial in which he was not permitted to introduce alibi testimony. Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F.Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1980). Although the defendant’s noncompliance was, as the majority suggests, "technical,” the court did not focus on that factor. Instead, the court began by noting that "[t]he right to present witnesses in one’s defense is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 1335. After reviewing the facts, the court concluded that "there is no indication that petitioner waived his constitutional right to present the alibi testimony of witnesses . . . The trial court’s refusal to permit the introduction of evidence crucial to petitioner’s case visited a *406terrible punishment on . . . [him]. He was deprived of the right to defend himself.” Id. at 1340.
The Supreme Court of Washington has indicated that excluding defense witnesses as a sanction for noncompliance with a notice requirement may be unconstitutional. In State v. Martin, 165 Wash. 180, 187, 4 P.2d 880 (1931), the court stated:
"If, in such a case as this, the state should claim surprise [resulting from noncompliance], it might become the duty of the court, not to declare that the appellant’s evidence should not be received, but that the state should have a reasonable opportunity to prepare itself against surprise; for the constitution, by guaranteeing an accused person the right to defend himself and to compel the attendance of witnesses by the court’s own process, necessarily gives him the right to have attending witnesses heard.”
Many other cases have recognized the existence of constitutional problems in applying the preclusion sanction for violation of notice-of-alibi provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 757 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Wainwright, 459 F.Supp. 244, 247 (M.D. Fla. 1978); People v. Jackson, 71 Mich.App. 395, 399, 249 N.W.2d 132 (1976); Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 372 Mass. 337, 343, 361 N.E.2d 1289 (1977); State ex rel. Sikora v. District Ct., 154 Mont. 241, 462 P.2d 897, 903 (1969); People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262, 269-270, 372 N.Y.S.2d 25, 333 N.E.2d 339 (1975); State v. Smith, 50 Ohio St.2d 51, 52 n. 2, 362 N.E.2d 988 (1977); State v. Wolfe, 273 Or. 518, 525, 542 P.2d 482, 486 (1975); State v. Silva, 118 R.I. 408, 374 A.2d 106, 108 (1977).7
*407While some of the above-cited cases have left the constitutional issue undecided, none of them has involved a situation as extreme as that in the present case, where the judge excluded the defendant’s only witness, thus precluding the defendant from presenting any defense, without finding that the failure to comply was deliberate, and where any disadvantage to the prosecution was admittedly curable by a continuance.
In addition, commentators have taken the position that exclusion of the defense witnesses, as a sanction for violating a discovery rule, presents serious constitutional problems. Professor Clinton, for example, concludes that
"applying the preclusion sanction to the accused would in most cases be constitutionally suspect. The *408application of the preclusion sanction ... should survive constitutional challenge only when the evidence excluded is not very important to the accused or, in the usual case, where other means of effectuating the state’s interest are practically unavailable.” Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 839 (1976).
See also Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 137-138 (1974); Note, The Preclusion Sanction — A Violation of the Constitutional Right to Present a Defense, 81 Yale L.J. 1342 (1972). See generally Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 994 (1972). The American Bar Association, II ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 11-4.7 (a) (2d ed. 1980), rejects the exclusion sanction on both policy and constitutional grounds.
If excluding a criminal defendant’s witness for a violation of a discovery rule ever infringes upon the Sixth Amendment, it does so in the present case.' The defendant’s only defense was alibi, and the excluded witness was his only alibi witness. The prosecution’s case was based upon the identification testimony of a single witness, who had initially identified the photograph of someone else as the perpetrator of the crime, who was a police informant, and who had a criminal record. The only issue before the jury should have been to decide which of two witnesses was telling the truth — the prosecution’s identification witness or the defendant’s alibi witness. But, because of the trial judge’s ruling excluding the defendant’s evidence as a sanction for violating a discovery rule, the jury heard only the prosecution’s witness. To reiterate, the violation of the discovery rule was not deliberate and was admittedly curable by a short continuance. Under these circumstances, the defendant simply did not receive a fair trial.
The majority takes the position that the decision to prohibit the defendant’s witness from testifying was within "the discretion” of the trial court. In my view this is true only if *409a trial court has "discretion” to abridge the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. I would reverse the conviction and award Taliaferro a new trial.
Judges Cole and Davidson have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein.

. This ruling, although not before this Court, should be kept in mind in considering petitioner’s ability to present his defense.

. The majority suggests that the prosecuting attorney’s statement, that a continuance until Monday, May 26, would be sufficient, related only to the time within which Rich’s background and connection with the defendant could be checked. The prosecuting attorney, however, was in addition referring to "all sorts of things I can’t do on the spur of the moment,” before responding: "Monday. That would give me adequate time.” Later the prosecuting attorney referred to "putfting] the case off for a few more days,” and he unequivocally stated: "I am willing to go along with that.”
The record clearly shows, therefore, that the State believed that a short continuance would be sufficient and would cure any prejudice caused by the violation of the discovery rule. Although the majority appears to second-guess the prosecution in this regard, 1 believe that the attorney for the prosecution is the best judge of how much time he would need to be prepared to cross-examine the defendant’s witness.
Moreover, the trial judge’s ruling excluding the witness was not based upon the judge’s view that a short continuance would not be sufficient for the prosecution. Instead it was based upon the judge’s speculation that jurors might be inconvenienced by a short continuance.

. The majority speculates that because Prince George’s County adjoins the District of Columbia and many of its residents are employed by the federal government, the jurors "might have made plans for the three day federal holiday weekend.” Later in the opinion, the majority somehow becomes more certain, referring to "plans which those jurors likely had made for the three day federal holiday.” As pointed out above, however, the *401trial judge made no effort to determine whether any juror had holiday plans for Monday or for any other day. As far as this record shows, not a single juror would have been inconvenienced by a resumption of the trial on Monday.
Moreover, the record fails to disclose that any of the twelve jurors in the case were federal government employees. The total population of Prince George’s County is 665,071. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. PC80-1-A22, 1980 Census of Population — Characteristics of the Population: Number of Inhabitants, Maryland 22-12 (1982). Of this total number, approximately 450,000 persons are over the age of 18 and thus eligible for jury duty. Office of Planning Data, Md. Dep’t of State Planning, Maryland, 1980 Population By Age and Sex 28 (1982). I have been informed by an official in the Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States Department of Commerce, that 71,912 Prince George’s County residents are federal government civilian employees. In light of these figures, there is no basis for drawing an inference, based solely on Prince George’s County’s proximity to the District of Columbia, that the six jurors whose terms were to expire were likely federal employees.

. It is noteworthy that at an earlier stage of the trial, the trial judge had not anticipated that rulings on the admissibility of evidence would be such a major factor in the trial. On the first day of the trial, the judge announced that he was "personally acquainted” with the family of the robbery victim, having known them for twenty years. "I know where they live, have been in their house; they have been in my house.” But the judge concluded that he would have "no problem” trying the case "since it is a jury case, and my function, basically, is to determine the admissibility of evidence.” If the trial judge had anticipated that his rulings on the admissibility of evidence would determine whether or not a defense would be offered to the jury, his decision concerning the matter of disqualification might have been different.

. The fact that Rich was the only witness which Taliaferro could have called contrasts with situations in which, for example, a defendant has called numerous witnesses, has presented a substantial defense and seeks to introduce "needlessly cumulative” evidence. United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1981). See also United States v. White, 583 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1978) (testimony of two alibi witnesses admitted, testimony of third alibi witness excluded for non-compliance with rule); Commonwealth v. LaFrennie, 13 Mass.App. 977, 432 N.E.2d 535 (1982) (same); Commonwealth v. Vecchiolli, 208 Pa.Super. 483, 244 A.2d 96 (1966) (same). In such cases, the ruling, although erroneous, may well be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This case is also distinguishable from those in which the proffered evidence is of limited probative value. See, e.g., United States v. Fitts, 576 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1978) (alibi was only for two out of four alleged attempts to cash stolen money orders); United States v. Smith, 524 F.2d 1288 (D.C.Cir. 1975) (alibi given for only one of three alleged heroin sales); Jensen v. State, 36 Wis.2d 598, 153 N.W.2d 566, modified, 36 Wis.2d 598, 154 N.W.2d 769 (1967) (alibi was for only two of three counts). Here, however, the constitutional violation could not possibly be considered harmless because the ruling resulted in the exclusion of the defendant’s only witness and precluded him from presenting his only defense.

. In many jurisdictions, as a prerequisite to excluding the defendant’s witness for violation of a notice of alibi or witness discovery rule, the trial judge must find either or both that the defendant’s violation of the rule was deliberate and that the prosecution would be significantly prejudiced unless the witness was excluded. See, e.g., United States v. White, 583 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1978); Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F.Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1980); State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 599 P.2d 199 (1979); Bradford v. State, 278 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1973); State v. Davis, 63 Hawaii 191, 624 P.2d 376 (1981) (exclusion proper when defense counsel concedes rule violation was a deliberate, *404tactical decision); State v. Bright, 229 Kan. 185, 623 P.2d 917 (1981); State v. Bias, 393 So.2d 677 (La. 1981); Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 372 Mass. 337, 343, 361 N.E.2d 1289 (1977); People v. Merritt, 396 Mich. 67, 238 N.W.2d 31 (1976); Williams v. State, 97 Nev. 1, 620 P.2d 1263 (1981); Founts v. State, 87 Nev. 165, 483 P.2d 654 (1971); State v. Smith, 50 Ohio St.2d 51, 362 N.E.2d 988 (1977); State v. Silva, 118 R.I. 408, 374 A.2d 106 (1977); State v. Martin, 165 Wash. 180, 4 P.2d 880 (1931); State v. Grant, 10 Wash.App. 468, 519 P.2d 261 (1974).
Furthermore, several jurisdictions consider the value of the precluded testimony to the defendant’s case. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 410 P.2d 132, 137 (Ariz.App. 1966); Commonwealth v. LaFrennie, 13 Mass.App. 977, 432 N.E.2d 535 (1982); State v. Lindsey, 284 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1979); Eckert v. State, 96 Nev. 96, 605 P.2d 617 (1980); Founts v. State, supra, 87 Nev. 165; State v. Miner, 128 Vt. 55, 258 A.2d 815, 825 (1969).

. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), held that notice of alibi provisions do not violate the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause, although, as previously discussed, the Court reserved ruling on the sanction of excluding the defendant’s evidence. Nevertheless, two states have declared notice-of-alibi provisions violative of state constitutional privileges against self-incrimination. In Alaska, the Supreme Court held that the state’s notice of alibi provision violated that state’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to the extent that *407the provision required more than mere notice of intent to present an alibi defense. The court held that beyond simple notice, the state could not compel the defendant to disclose any details of his defense such as who his witnesses are and where he was if he was not at the crime scene. Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974). Similarly, in Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.3d 520, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774, 557 P.2d 65, 67 (1976), the Supreme Court of California held that the self-incrimination clause of the constitution of that state prohibits compelled pretrial disclosure to the prosecution by a defendant if the disclosure " 'conceivably might lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case in chief.’ ”
In an earlier decision, the California Supreme Court struck down a judicially-created notice of alibi requirement, thereby rejecting the efforts of some lower courts in that state to create a common-law notice requirement. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 834, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 528 P.2d 45 (1974). In explaining its hesitation to create or sanction notice of alibi measures, the court gave particular weight to potential constitutional problems:
"[Clomplex and closely balanced questions of state and federal constitutional law are presented by a notice-of-alibi order.... [0]ur decision that it would be inappropriate for us to declare judicially a notice-of-alibi rule does arise from our sensitivity to the constitutional constraints on the power of the courts or the Legislature to require a defendant in a criminal case to reveal to the prosecution in advance of the normal course of trial tangible or intangible trial-related evidence or other material.” Id, at 837.
The Maryland Declaration of Rights also contains a provision guaranteeing citizens the right against self-incrimination. Article 22 states: "That no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case.” This Court has never ruled on the issue of whether Rule 741 may be partially invalid because it compels criminal defendants to give evidence against themselves contrary to Article 22. Because the parties have not raised the issue, it is not before us in this case, and 1 express no views on the matter.