Court Opinion

ID: 9771119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:33:03.663918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:25.514537
License: Public Domain

COVINGTON, Judge,
dissenting.
I hereby withdraw my concurrence in the principal opinion and enter my dissent.
The principal opinion holds that the appeal is permitted because of the trial court’s certification pursuant to Rule 74--01(b). I respectfully disagree, finding no reason to depart from traditional concepts of appealability. The question of whether to permit interlocutory appeals is not one of first impression. Missouri has historically permitted appeals only from final judgments.
The Court first states that Rule 74.01(b) “does not borrow substantially from the federal model” that is, Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Comparison of the rules, however, reveals that the sole differences in them relate to the method by which a judgment is entered. Otherwise the rules are identical in determination of when a court may certify a case for appeal and the basis for certification, as well as in the requirement that a “claim” be adjudicated. The federal authorities, therefore, are sound precedent for the court of appeals’ conclusion that a trial judge cannot enter an appealable judgment that determines only the issue of liability, leaving the question of damages for future determination. See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 61-63 (2d Cir.1978); General Television Arts v. Southern Railway, 725 F.2d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir.1984); Kaszuk v. Bakers & Confectioneries Union, 791 F.2d 548, 553 (7th Cir.1986); Rudd Construction Equipment Co., Inc., v. Home Ins. Co., 711 F.2d 54, 56 (6th Cir. 1983); see, e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 *911L.Ed.2d 435 (1976); Petrol Corp., v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 162 F.2d 327, 329 (2d Cir.1947); National Corn Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 730, 732-733 (8th Cir.1980). The principal opinion offers no persuasive rationale to reject these authorities.
The majority cites previous opinions of this Court purporting to support its conclusion that “a determination of liability is a matter that can be the subject of an independent judgment.” The cases cited, however, fail to elucidate any standard that can be applied in making the independent judgment. The majority appears to limit the determination to declaratory judgment actions, but the trial court explicitly dismissed the portions of the prayers seeking declaratory relief. What differentiates this case from any other where liability is at issue is not perceptible. The Court appears to leave the question of the appealability of an issue to the trial court, specifically declining to provide guidance as to when and in what manner this newly-vested authority should be exercised.
The Court contends its decision “is fortified by Rule 74.04(c), which authorizes the entry of summary judgment on issues of liability, leaving questions of damage for future determination.” I respectfully disagree, reading the rule to say that determinations of liability are interlocutory in nature and, therefore, not appealable. In Missouri a final judgment is one that disposes of all claims against all parties. If damages have not been ascertained, no separate claim has been adjudicated.
Finally, whether a matter is appealable is a decision reserved to the legislature. Mo. Const, art. V, § 5, specifically prohibits this Court from adopting any rule affecting the “right of appeal.” To meet these mandates Rule 74.01(b) must be read to require that an entire claim is to be adjudicated. The principal opinion’s interjection of interlocutory appeals constitutes a practice contrary to statute and the constitution. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.