Court Opinion

ID: 9857935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:09:12.81505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:13.025594
License: Public Domain

Ray Thornton, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision that Mr. Burnette did not desert the child. The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Bush v. State, 338 Ark. 772, 2 S.W.3d 761 (1999). When the appellate court construes a statute, it looks first at the plain language of the statute and gives the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Mr. Burnett argues that desert means to abandon permanently and the majority agrees. To the contrary, I believe that the word desert means to abandon during a time that a duty to protect the child is in existence, and that the clear intention of the statute was to protect against a breach of that duty. The statute does not require a time frame for the act of desertion, nor does the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute appear to relate only to permanent abandonment. It seems clear to me that the legislative intent is to protect children from being left alone in potentially dangerous settings or situations, without regard to time. Without legislative expression that a permanent abandonment was required to constitute desertion, we should construe desert to mean simply, abandon under circumstances where the welfare of the child is endangered, without regard to duration of the abandonment. Furthermore, the original commentary to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-202 (1987) states that §§ 5-27-201 — 203 (1987) were intended to “define the offenses of endangering the welfare of a minor in the first degree.” Id. The commentary goes on to state that “It should be observed that the section applies not only to parents and guardians, but also to other relatives, babysitters, or even teachers, when such persons are charged with the care of the child or incompetent.” Id. In light of the fact that babysitters and teachers are charged only with the temporary care of a child, it is clear that this statute was intended by the legislature to apply to acts of abandonment endangering the well-being of a child without regard to the duration of the abandonment. I respectfully dissent.