Court Opinion

ID: 9382051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 18:02:56.876335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.811713
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/24/23 Mountaingate Open Space Maintenance Assn. v. Monteverdi CA2/2
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                             SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                            DIVISION TWO

 MOUNTAINGATE OPEN                                              B308496
 SPACE MAINTENANCE
 ASSOCIATION et al.,                                            (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
          Plaintiffs and Respondents,
                                                                19STCV33839)
          v.
 MONTEVERDI, LLC, et al.,
          Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Rupert A. Byrdsong, Judge. Affirmed
      Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, James P. Fogelman, Kahn Scolnick,
Shannon Mader and Katarzyna Ryzewska for Defendants and
Appellants.
      Loeb & Loeb, William M. Brody and William N. Grosswendt for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.

                     __________________________________________
       This lawsuit pits the residents of an upscale community against
the developers of a private nonresidential facility to be constructed on
undeveloped land adjacent to the community. The residents filed suit
stemming from claims that the proposed facility fails to comply with a
prior agreement limiting future construction on the undeveloped land
to new community homes. The trial court denied the developers’
special motion to strike the entire lawsuit because their alleged
misconduct is not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.161 ). We agree and affirm the order.
             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Facts
       Mountaingate is a master-planned luxury community in the
Santa Monica Mountains of Brentwood. It is located next to hundreds
of acres of undeveloped land (Property). In 1998, the city of Los
Angeles (City) rejected a proposal by homebuilder Castle & Cooke
California, Inc. (Castle & Cooke) to expand Mountaingate by
constructing 117 new homes on the Property. In 1998, Castle & Cooke
sued the City. In 1999, the Mountaingate Open Space Maintenance
Association (MOSMA 2 ) intervened in the lawsuit and negotiated a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Castle & Cooke. The
MOU limited to 29 the number of new Mountaingate homes to be
constructed on the Property (Reduced Density Plan). Castle & Cooke
dismissed its lawsuit. The City approved the Reduced Density Plan,
but home construction was put on hold.
       In 2014, Castle & Cooke sold part of the Property to Monteverdi,
LLC (Monteverdi), a subsidiary of the Berggruen Institute
(Berggruen).3 Monteverdi’s purchase includes most, if not all of the

      1   Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
      2MOSMA oversees and manages Mountaingate’s common areas
and open space on behalf of the residents.
      3 The Berggruen Institute is a self-described “multi-disciplinary,
multi-cultural scholarly institute, which develops ideas to reshape
                                      2
home lots specified in the Reduced Density Plan. Castle & Cooke,
through its own subsidiary, C&C Mountaingate, Inc., retained the
remainder of the Property but reserved for Monteverdi an option to
purchase.
       The same year, Berggruen approached MOSMA with its plan to
develop a large, private nonresidential facility (Berggruen Project)4 on
the Monteverdi land. MOSMA opposed the plan as violating the MOU.
Further discussions did not yield a consensus.
       In June 2019, Monteverdi and C&C Mountaingate, Inc., received
the City’s approval for the “Final Map” reflecting the 29 home lots of
the Reduced Density Plan. The City approved the Final Map, and it
was recorded.
       Berggruen and Monteverdi then announced they did not intend
to follow the Reduced Density Plan and would instead develop the
Berggruen Project.
       On July 31, or August 1, 2019, Berggruen and Monteverdi filed
an Environmental Assessment Form (EAF)5 and related documents
with the City requesting approval to develop the 25.4 acres designated
for the home lots under the Reduced Density Plan along with the
223,880 square-foot Berggruen Project.

political and social institutions in the face of a changing social and
political landscape.” It was founded by Nicholas Berggruen.
      4 Defendants refer to this facility as “the Scholars’ Campus.”
Because there is an issue as to the nature of these facility, we refer to it
as the Berggruen Project.
      5 The filing of an EAF or Environmental Assessment Form
triggers the City’s mandatory environmental review of proposed
construction under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub.
Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). (Vineyard Area Citizens for
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th
412, 442; see, e.g., A Local & Regional Monitor v. City of Los Angeles
(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 630, 636.)
                                     3
II.    Procedural Background
       MOSMA and Crest/Promontory Common Area Association 6
(collectively plaintiffs) sued Monteverdi, Berggruen, and Castle &
Cooke (collectively defendants). In the operative first amended
complaint, plaintiffs assert seven causes of action: The first and second
causes of action are for declaratory relief, in which plaintiffs seek a
judicial determination that the MOU is binding on defendants and
limits construction on the disputed undeveloped acres to the Restricted
Density Plan. The third and fourth causes of action allege a breach of
the terms of the MOU and, alternatively, a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The fifth cause of action is for intentional
interference with contract. The sixth cause of action is for unjust
enrichment. The seventh cause of action is for declaratory relief, in
which plaintiffs seek a judicial determination that defendants do not
have an ingress or egress easement over Stoney Hill Road, a private
Mountaingate street.
       Defendants filed a special motion to strike plaintiffs’ entire
amended complaint, arguing “the causes of action” are “a direct
response” to defendants’ filing of the EAF, which initiates the City’s
environmental review. As such, defendants argued, the EAF falls
within the scope of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1), which protects
“any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative [or]
executive . . . proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law,” and subdivision (e)(2), which protects “any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative [or] executive . . . body, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law.” Defendants also argued
plaintiffs’ claims are meritless for several reasons, among them, that
the MOU is neither binding on defendants nor creates a permanent
restriction on developing the Property.

      6 Crest/Promontory Common Area Association is responsible, on
behalf of Mountaingate residents, for the oversight and management of
Stoney Hill Road and other private streets in Mountaingate.
                                    4
       Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and defendants filed a reply. Both
parties filed declarations and objections to one another’s evidence. 7
       At the conclusion of a hearing, the trial court denied defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion. The court found plaintiffs are “really asserting
[their] rights under the MOU,” not “attacking” the “petitioning activity”
of the EAF submission. Defendants timely appealed.
                               DISCUSSION
I.     Anti-SLAPP Statute and Standard of Review
       “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established
that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate
defendants from any liability for claims arising from the protected
rights of petition or speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding
out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
       “Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process.
First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the
challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in
which the defendant has engaged.’ [Citation.] Second, for each claim
that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the
claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.” ’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot
make this showing, the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St.
Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)
       On appeal, we apply the same two-step process in reviewing
de novo the trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion. (Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1067.) However, as we discuss, this is a first-step anti-SLAPP case

      7 The trial court’s evidentiary rulings are not included in the
record on appeal.
                                    5
because we agree with the trial court that none of plaintiffs’ claims
arise from protected activity. We therefore need not consider the
second step. (See Coretronic Corp. v. Cozen O’Connor (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 1381, 1393.)
II.     Defendants Failed to Show Protected Activity
        In the first amended complaint the causes of action rest on the
following allegations: (1) defendants are bound by the MOU either as a
party or as successors and/or assignees to adhere to the Reduced
Density Plan for the development and use of the adjacent undeveloped
land; (2) “despite the City’s approval of the Final Map for the Reduced
Density Plan,” defendants “announced they do not desire or intend to
develop the Reduced Density Plan and plan to pursue other,
nonresidential, and much more intensive development” of the land;
(3) defendants filed an EAF and related documents with the City
indicating defendants are “now seeking rights to develop the 25.4 acres
designated for the homes under the Reduced Density Plan with
approximately 223,880 square feet of facilities” for the Berggruen
Project; (4) defendants’ EAF and related documents “concede” the
proposed Berggruen Project “exceeds the City’s Hillside Development
Standards”; (5) defendants’ documents falsely portray the proposed
Berggruen Project under the Zoning Code as an “educational
institution,” which may allow it to be located in a residential area;
(6) “[t]o avoid the City planning and zoning restrictions that would
prohibit the development and operation of the [Berggruen Project]” on
the undeveloped land, defendants have “hosted elected representatives
at lavish parties, made political contributions, and engage public
officials . . . to lobby public officials to approve” the Berggruen Project;
and (7) defendants are not entitled to use Stoney Road, but nonetheless
have claimed in the Final Map and EAF that they have an ingress and
egress easement over the street, which is not required by the MOU for
the Berggruen Project.
        On appeal, defendants seek to strike the allegations concerning
the filing of the EAF and related documents as well as the lobbying of

                                     6
public officials, arguing they are protected activity under the anti-
SLAPP statute and supply the basis for all of plaintiffs’ claims.
       In response, plaintiffs do not dispute that initiating the City’s
environmental review is protected activity. They do not address
whether lobbying public officials is protected activity, but it certainly
constitutes “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech
in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” within
the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
       As set forth above, the first amended complaint contains
allegations of both protected and unprotected activity. The question
before us then is whether any of plaintiffs’ claims arise from the
protected activity and must therefore be stricken. “A claim arises from
protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for
the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) “Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying
the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ ” (Id. at p. 1063.)
On the other hand, “where a plaintiff’s claim is based upon ‘an action or
decision’ of the defendant, it is not enough that some protected activity
by the defendant precedes that action or decision, that some protected
activity is the means of communicating that action or decision, or that
some protected activity constitutes evidence of that action or decision.”
(Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
686, 700–701, citing Park, at pp. 1060–1061.) Accordingly, where
protected activity does not form the basis of a claim, but instead serves
as evidence in support of the claim, it does not come within the ambit of
section 425.16. (Park, at pp. 1060, 1064.)
       The first amended complaint does not arise from protected
activity. Plaintiffs’ four contract-related claims and two of their
declaratory relief claims challenge defendants’ repudiation and
anticipatory breach of the MOU. These claims arise from defendants’
conduct of refusing to be bound by the MOU’s Reduced Density Plan
and their decision to develop the Berggruen Project on the Property.

                                    7
The third claim for declaratory relief challenges defendants’ right to
use Stoney Hill Road for the Berggruen Project. This claim arises from
defendants’ asserted entitlement to an ingress and egress easement
over Stoney Hill Road. Filing the EAF and lobbying City officials do
not form the basis of any of plaintiffs’ claims. To the extent these
protected activities are referred to in some claims, they merely serve as
evidence in support of the claims. For example, in Gallimore v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1388, the
plaintiff sued the insurer for the alleged mishandling of claims. The
insurer filed an anti-SLAPP motion asserting the plaintiff’s suit was
based on confidential written reports that the insurer had submitted to
the department of insurance. (Id. at pp. 1391–1393.) Reversing the
trial court, the Court of Appeal held the insurer’s contention “confuses
[the insurer’s] allegedly wrongful acts with the evidence that [the]
plaintiff will need to prove such misconduct.” (Id. at p. 1399.) The
plaintiff “seeks no relief from [the insurer] for its communicative acts,
but rather for its alleged mistreatment of policyholders and its related
violations and evasions of statutory and regulatory mandates.” (Ibid.)
The court noted the department of insurance report may have
“ ‘triggered’ ” the plaintiff’s suit, but the suit did not arise from the
report nor from any related communication by the insured to the
department of insurance. (Ibid.)
       Graffiti Protective Coatings, Inc. v. City of Pico Rivera (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1207 is also instructive. In that case, the plaintiff
corporation, whose government contract with the city for bus stop
maintenance had ended, sued the city for awarding a new contract to a
business rival without competitive bidding. (Id. at pp. 1212–1213.)
The city filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the claims against it were
protected activity as based on its communications with plaintiff, the
business rival, and the public. (Id. at p. 1213.) Reversing the trial
court, the Court of Appeal held while the city’s communications
preceding its decision were helpful in establishing what events led up
to the termination of the plaintiff’s contract, the claims were not based
on them, but on the award of a new contract purportedly in violation of

                                    8
laws governing competitive bidding. (Id. at p. 1215.) “The
communications assist[ed] in telling the story.” (Ibid.)
       Defendants respond with three arguments to shore up their
position that “but for” their protected activity, plaintiffs’ claims would
have no basis. First, defendants repeatedly argue the only “affirmative
acts” alleged in the first amended complaint are defendants’ filing of
the EAF and related documents and lobbying of public officials. This
argument ignores the allegations of defendants’ conduct—which we
have set forth—that is not protected activity under section 425.16 and
gives rise to plaintiffs’ claims.
       Second, defendants point to correspondence accompanying their
anti-SLAPP motion, which they contend confirms that their protected
activity is the root of plaintiffs’ claims. In a letter dated a month before
the commencement of this suit, MOSMA’s counsel wrote to defendants’
counsel that “MOSMA is informed that on July 31, 2019, Monteverdi
filed applications to develop the Property with a project other than the
Reduced Density Plan, which action constitutes a breach of the
Agreement.” We read this letter as advising defendants that the
planned development of the Property, not the filing of the EAF, is the
breach of the MOU. The letter also suggests the filing of the EAF
triggered the suit against defendants. We note plaintiffs’ declarations
attached to their opposition demonstrate the parties’ dispute arose
before the filing of the EAF. Both MOSMA’s president and counsel
averred that during a July 23, 2019 meeting, defendants said they were
not bound by the MOU, would not adhere to it, and planned to
construct the Berggruen Project. MOSMA’s president and counsel
responded that all parties were expected to comply with the MOU and
Reduced Density Plan, and they opposed the development of the
Berggruen Project. Defendants indicated they would build the Project
over plaintiffs’ objections.
       Third, defendants rely on Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th
82 (Navellier) to buttress their “but for” argument. Navellier, however,
is a very different case. It concerned activity on the part of a defendant
that is entirely different from the activity at issue here. In Navellier,

                                     9
the parties entered into a release of claims in the course of a federal
lawsuit. (Id. at p. 86.) However, the release did not settle the entire
lawsuit. While the federal lawsuit was still pending, the defendant
filed counterclaims against the plaintiffs. (Ibid.) In response, the
plaintiffs sued the defendant in state court and alleged: (1) the
defendant breached the release by filing counterclaims in federal court,
and (2) the defendant committed fraud in misrepresenting his intention
to be bound by the release and causing the plaintiffs to incur litigation
costs in the federal lawsuit they would not otherwise have incurred.
(Navellier, at p. 87.)
       The California Supreme Court held the defendant satisfied the
first step of the section 425.16 analysis. The defendant was being sued
based on allegations that he had committed fraud in misrepresenting
his intention to be bound by the release, and that he had committed
breach of contract by filing counterclaims in the federal action. “In fact,
but for the federal lawsuit and [the defendant’s] alleged actions taken
in connection with that litigation, plaintiffs’ present claims would have
no basis.” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 90.)
       Defendants also argue that the trial court erroneously applied
the “gravamen test” or “principal thrust test,” which, they assert, has
been recently “repudiated” by our Supreme Court in Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System, supra, 11 Cal.5th 995. But defendants have misread
that decision. The court in Bonni affirmed the use of the gravamen test
for the very purpose used here—to determine “whether particular acts
alleged within the cause of action supply the elements of a claim
[citation] or instead are incidental background [citations]. This
approach is consistent with Baral [v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p.
394], which reaffirmed that ‘[a]ssertions that are “merely incidental” or
“collateral” are not subject to section 425.16. [Citations.] Allegations of
protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a
claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.’ ”
(Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System, supra, at p. 1012.)
       As discussed, the protected activity urged by defendants in this
case is not the wrongful acts that give rise to plaintiffs’ claims. In sum,

                                    10
this is not a SLAPP lawsuit. The trial court properly denied
defendants’ special motion to strike.
                            DISPOSITION
       The order denying the special motion to strike is affirmed.
Respondents are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.

                                           LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      CHAVEZ, J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

                                   11