Court Opinion

ID: 9915763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 15:06:12.226297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:26.737428
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0786-22

BRIAN SARRATT,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NJ PLIGA,

     Defendant-Respondent.
________________________

                   Submitted December 20, 2023 – Decided January 8, 2024

                   Before Judges Accurso and Walcott-Henderson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Union County, L-3903-21.

                   John J. Pisano, attorney for appellant.

                   Flanagan, Barone & O'Brien, LLC, attorneys for
                   respondent (Michelle Mary O'Brien, of counsel and on
                   the brief; Frank Joseph Morano, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

          Brian Sarratt appeals from orders dismissing his complaint (and denying

reconsideration) against the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty
Association (PLIGA), the statutory administrator of the Unsatisfied Claim and

Judgment Fund (UCJF or Fund), pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to

establish he was a qualified claimant under N.J.S.A. 39:6-62 and to comply

with the notice provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6-65. We affirm.

      Plaintiff was riding a bicycle in Elizabeth on a rainy night in October

2021, when a small, white hatchback turned into him, knocking him to the

ground. The car didn't stop. Police and paramedics responded to the scene.

The police completed an accident report, documenting plaintiff's report that a

hit-and-run driver making a left turn collided with the front wheel of his

bicycle. The report did not note any witnesses to the accident. Plaintiff

declined medical attention and "limped" the few blocks home, his bike being

unrideable.

      Plaintiff promptly retained counsel who ten days later faxed PLIGA a

letter attaching the police report and notes from a medical provider, requesting

"all necessary forms, so as to arrange for the processing of this claim." The

following week, counsel filed a complaint on plaintiff's behalf asserting his

eligibility for bodily injury uninsured motorist benefits. Counsel, however, did

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not file a notice of intent to make a claim on plaintiff's behalf within the 180

days permitted by N.J.S.A. 39:6-65.1

        Counsel for PLIGA wrote to plaintiff's counsel on December 16, 2021,

thirty days after the complaint was filed, and nearly seven weeks after the

accident, requesting

              the requisite documentation in support of your client's
              application for benefits including:

              • Proof of residency on the date of loss

              • Notice of Intention

              • Affidavit of No Insurance

              • Certification of Medicare Eligibility; and

              • Application for PIP benefits.

1
    N.J.S.A. 39:6-65 provides in pertinent part:

              Any qualified person . . . who suffers damages
              resulting from bodily injury . . . arising out of the
              ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in
              this State on or after April 1, 1955, and whose
              damages may be satisfied in whole or in part from the
              fund, shall . . . within 180 days after the accident, as a
              condition precedent to the right thereafter to apply for
              payment from the fund, give notice to the association,
              the form and contents of which shall be prescribed by
              the association, of his intention to make a claim
              thereon for such damages if otherwise uncollectible
              ....

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      Plaintiff's counsel did not respond to that letter and did not submit the

requisite documents. Plaintiff did, however, provide answers to interrogatories

in mid-February 2022, disclosing his address, but not his social security

number, and certifying he lived alone and that there were no witnesses to the

accident. PLIGA's counsel wrote plaintiff's counsel again on April 5, 2022,

renewing her request for proof of plaintiff's residency and "plaintiff's

documents in support of UCJF eligibility." PLIGA's counsel received no

response to that letter either. The 180-day time period for notice expired on

April 27, 2022, without plaintiff's counsel filing the necessary documents.

      PLIGA deposed plaintiff on May 12, 2022. At his deposition, plaintiff

provided counsel his social security number. He also confirmed his address,

testifying it was an apartment belonging to a friend where he'd lived for two

years — contrary to his interrogatory response that he lived alone. He reported

his friend owned a Cadillac Escalade, which was insured on the date of the

accident. In response to a question from PLIGA's counsel about a motorcycle

and a black Lexus parked at his home, plaintiff responded that the Lexus

belonged to his friend and the motorcycle belonged to a friend of his friend.

      Although plaintiff certified in his answers to interrogatories that there

were no witnesses to the accident, he testified at his deposition there were two

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witnesses. One, a woman who stopped to help and another, a mechanic at a

garage "directly across" from where plaintiff was hit, who assisted him to a

chair in the garage and called the police. Plaintiff did not get either of their

names, describing both as Hispanic. 2

      Following the deposition, PLIGA's counsel wrote to plaintiff's counsel

on June 8, 2022, referencing her letter of April 5, and noting she had yet to

receive proof of plaintiff's residence or "plaintiff's documents in support of

UCJF eligibility." Counsel enclosed with that letter the PLIGA forms for an

affidavit in support of UCJF eligibility, certification of Medicare eligibility,

notice of intention to make a claim, and an application for PIP benefits, asking

counsel to supply the completed documents "forthwith," and that failure to do

so within ten days would result in the filing of a motion. Plaintiff's counsel

did not respond to that letter.

      Over two months later, PLIGA filed its motion to dismiss plaintiff's

complaint for failure to comply with the notice provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6-65.

2
  Plaintiff also testified at his deposition that he'd used the name Keith Sarratt
as "an alias" in the past. We note this not to suggest any fraud or abuse on
plaintiff's part but to underscore the importance to PLIGA of the timely rece ipt
of information, including a claimant's social security number, to allow it to
conduct an effective investigation of the claim. See Giacobbe v. Gassert, 29
N.J. 421, 425 (1959) (noting the statutory "notice is designed to afford a timely
inquiry and thus to safeguard the fund against fraud and imposition").
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Two days later, plaintiff's counsel responded with an executed affidavit in

support of UCJF eligibility, an executed notarized PLIGA claim form, an

executed certification of Medicare eligibility, a notice of intention to make a

claim, and a completed application for PIP benefits. Plaintiff did not include

an affidavit of no insurance. PLIGA argued plaintiff's failure to supply an

affidavit stating he was without insurance on the date of the accident rendered

him disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 39:6-62, and the eligibility

documents he supplied in response to the motion were tendered well beyond

the 180-day limit for notice under N.J.S.A. 39:6-65. Plaintiff countered that he

had provided all required information, and PLIGA's regulations expressly

provide that "[a] Notice of Intention to Make Claim under N.J.S.A. 39:6-65

may be filed on [the form designated]" by the UCJF and written notice "in any

other form that contains the information required by this section shall b e

acceptable." N.J.A.C. 11:3-26.2(a) and (b).3 (Emphasis added).

3
    N.J.A.C. 11:3-26.1 provides:

(a) Notice of intention to make a claim under N.J.S.A. 39:6-65 shall contain
the following information:

             1. The claimant's name, address, date of birth and
             social security number;

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      After hearing argument, the judge issued an order and a written

statement of reasons granting PLIGA's motion and dismissing plaintiff's

complaint. The judge began by explaining that the purpose of the Unsatisfied

Claim and Judgment Fund Law, N.J.S.A. 39:6-61 to 90.1, "is to 'provide a

measure of relief to persons who sustain losses inflicted by financially

            2. The time, date, location, municipality and county
            in which the loss occurred;

            3. The identity of the operators and vehicles involved
            in the accident, including the name and address of the
            owner and operator and the license plate number of
            the vehicle;

            4. Such witnesses to said accident as are then known;

            5. A short description of the accident, including the
            claimant's role or position therein;

            6. A description of the injuries then known, and
            attached thereto a medical certificate if then available.
            In any event the medical certificate shall be filed as
            soon as available;

            7. A description of the damage sustained to property,
            and attached thereto an estimate of the cost of repairs
            if then available; and

            8. The policy number of any insurance applicable to
            the accident, including the name and address of all
            insurance companies involved.

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irresponsible or unknown owners and operators of motor vehicles, where such

persons would otherwise be remediless.'" Dixon v. Gassert, 26 N.J, 1, 5

(1958). The judge noted "the purpose of the Act was never to 'make every

claimant whole or to compensate all accident victims.'" Jimenez v. Baglieri

152 N.J. 337, 342 (1998). Instead, "it was intended 'to offer some measure of

relief to those who come within the class intended to be protected, to prevent a

claimant from being forced to absorb the entire economic loss caused by the

accident.'" Id. at 342-43 (quoting Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd. v.

New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 185, 189 (1994)).

      The judge also noted the well-established principle that our "courts are,

in essence, 'the guardian[s] of the trust monies represented by our statutory

Fund'" and must give full effect to those provisions designed to protect the

Fund, underscoring that "[t]he doctrine of liberal construction relates to the

scope of the legislation and not to the proof or the evidence necessary to

establish compliance with its terms and conditions." Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71

N.J. Super. 347, 358-359 (App. Div. 1962). The judge quoted the Supreme

Court's observation that "[t]o be eligible for Fund benefits, claimants must

comply with numerous procedural requirements." Jimenez, 152 N.J. at 343.

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      The judge concluded plaintiff failed to establish he was a qualified

person under N.J.S.A. 39:6-62 because he had not satisfactorily demonstrated

that he was without insurance coverage on the date of the accident . The judge

further found that plaintiff had not complied with the notice requirements of

N.J.S.A. 39:6-65 and N.J.A.C. 11:3-26.1 because he'd not provided either

proof of residency or his social security number within the 180-day statutory

period.

      The judge rejected plaintiff's argument on reconsideration that although

he'd "dispensed with the formality of the Affidavit of No Insurance," he'd

provided his social security number at deposition, answered "no" to all

provisions of question 12 on the affidavit in support of UCJF eligibility about

the ownership of autos on the date of the accident, and responded to PLIGA's

interrogatories certifying he "live[d] alone" and did "not own a motor vehicle,"

thereby satisfying the statutory notice requirement. The judge denied the

motion for reconsideration, finding the notice provisions of the statute are

clear and that the court was not "at liberty to modify or re-legislate" the

protective restrictions embodied in the statute's conditions precedent for

recovery. Szczesny, 71 N.J. Super. at 358.

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      Plaintiff appeals, arguing the order dismissing the complaint should be

reversed because he has established he is a qualified person under N.J.S.A.

39:6-62, and he complied with the notice requirements for recovering benefits

from the Fund. We disagree.

      "Every competent person is conclusively presumed to know the terms of

the statute and those physically able to meet the conditions precedent are

obliged to do so." Szczesny, 71 N.J. Super. at 358. Plaintiff nowhere explains

why the forms he filed two days after PLIGA moved to dismiss his complaint,

nearly ten months after the accident and four months after the 180-day

statutory notice deadline of April 27, 2022, could not have been filed prior to

that date. He does not claim he was physically or mentally incapable of doing

so, the only exceptions allowed by the legislature for the failure to give timely

notice. See Giacobbe v. Gassert, 29 N.J. 421, 425-26 (1959).

      As the trial court noted, "the Fund was never intended to make every

claimant whole or to compensate all accident victims; rather, it was intended to

'offer some measure of relief to those who come within the class intended to be

protected.'" Jimenez, 152 N.J. at 342-343 (quoting Unsatisfied Claim &

Judgment Fund Bd., 138 N.J. at 189). "Only claimants who are statutorily

qualified under N.J.S.A. 39:6-62 may recover benefits under the Fund." Id. at

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341-342. The purpose of the notice provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6-65 and

N.J.A.C. 11:3-26.1 is to allow PLIGA to ensure that only qualified claimants

have access to the fund. Jimenez, 152 N.J. at 343.4

      Applying those principles here, it is plain to us the trial court was correct

to find plaintiff ineligible to recover benefits from the Fund. It is undisputed

that plaintiff did not file the PLIGA forms, first requested in December 2021,

until PLIGA filed its notice to dismiss in August 2022, well beyond the 180-

day deadline. And while it is certainly true, as plaintiff noted in his motion for

reconsideration, that the forms are not required under N.J.A.C. 11:3-26.1(b)

and he submitted some of the necessary information in his answers to

4
 The Court in Jimenez noted in the case of hit-and-run accidents, N.J.S.A. 39:6-
78(a)-(f) requires

            that: (a) the plaintiff has given the Board written notice
            of intent to make a claim within the time permitted
            by N.J.S.A. 39:6-65, (b) the injuries are not covered by
            workers' compensation laws, (c) the plaintiff was not
            the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle at the time of
            the accident or operating an automobile in violation of
            an order of suspension or revocation, (d) the plaintiff
            has a cause of action against the operator or owner of
            the hit-and-run vehicle, (e) all reasonable efforts have
            been made to identify the vehicle and its owner, and (f)
            the action is not brought on behalf of an insurer under
            the circumstances prohibited by N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(l).

            [152 N.J. at 343.]
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interrogatories filed within the 180-day period, he ignores that the critical

information provided there about living alone and that there were no motor

vehicles associated with his household was inaccurate, as was his certification

that there were no witnesses to the accident.

      Plaintiff did not correct those statements until his deposition after the

180-day deadline had passed. Leaving aside the inaccuracy of some of the

information he timely provided to PLIGA, the Association is not required to

sort through plaintiff's submissions over several months' time to glean the

information required by the notice statute in bits and pieces. N.J.A.C. 11:3-

26.1(c) expressly provides that

            A notice of intention to make a claim that does not
            contain the items identified in N.J.A.C. 11:3-26.1(a) 1
            through 8 shall be returned to the sender and deemed
            to be not filed with the Unsatisfied Claim and
            Judgment Fund (UCJF) for the purpose of complying
            with N.J.S.A. 39:6-65 and shall not toll the statute of
            limitations.

      As our Supreme Court has long held, "[t]he public interest demands that

the Fund, although a trust fund for those individuals injured by financially

irresponsible or unidentified operators of motor vehicles, be administered in a

fashion to assure that only those persons legitimately entitled to participate in

its benefits are paid therefrom." Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 279 (1961).

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To that end, "[e]very provision of the Act designed for protection of the Fund

should be given full consideration and effect." Myers v. Cave, 55 N.J. Super.

185, 198 (App. Div. 1959) (quoting Re Sinclair v. Woodward, (Ont. Ct.

App. 1951) O.W.N. 816, 1 D.L.R. 398, 400 (1952)). As we long ago noted, "it

was not the legislative intent to make access to the Fund easy"; "each

application should be closely examined" to ensure the intent of the legislature

to limit the fund to qualified claimants is faithfully carried out. Szczesny, 71

N.J. Super. at 358. The trial court fulfilled that responsibility here.

      Finally, we note our obligation to fully recognize the express mandates

of the statute, "without regard to any notions of our own or of the parties as to

the fairness, procedural expediency, or administrative wisdom of any of the

legislative directions." Myers, 55 N.J. Super. at 193-194. It is not enough to

contend "that no abuse or fraud is shown in the particular instance.

Prophylactic statutory measures must be applied uniformly, or the legislative

design is inevitably subverted over the long run." Id. at 194.

      Affirmed.

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