Court Opinion

ID: 9587745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:25:51.695131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:32.347679
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge.
Ervin Smith, Bryant Wilburn and Arnell Rorie were indicted for possessing cocaine (OCGA § 16-13-30 (a)), possessing cocaine with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30 (b)), and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a public housing authority (OCGA § 16-13-32.5 (b)). Wilburn pled guilty; Smith and Rorie were tried before a jury.
At the close of the State’s evidence, the court granted directed verdicts to Rorie on the two counts of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Rorie then pled guilty to the remaining charge of possessing cocaine. The court denied Smith’s directed verdict motions, *224and the jury found Smith guilty of all three charges. The simple possession charge was merged into the possession with intent to distribute charge, and a total sentence of 35 years was imposed.
Smith asserts on appeal that the court erred in denying his directed verdict motions because there is insufficient evidence that he possessed any cocaine. That is not so. The jury’s verdict is entirely defensible under the law.
The standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is set out in Jackson v. Virginia:1 The question is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” The convicted person “no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.”2 The role of the appellate court, the members of which are remote from the live presentation, is commensurately narrow, for it “determines only the legal sufficiency of the evidence” given to the factfinder “and does not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses.”3 In examining the evidence so as to determine whether the denial of the motion was permitted by law, all the evidence adduced, including that which is presented after the motion is ruled on, is considered.4
Police officers had a warrant to search Smith and his mobile home, as well as other occupants of it, for cocaine. Three of the officers went to the front door, knocked, announced they were police, and were greeted by sounds of someone running inside. It took two of them to break through the locked door by kicking. When Officer Frank Farr immediately approached Smith because he was lying on a sofa in the living room, Smith greeted him with “How ya doing, Frank?” He had made no effort to respond to the police knock but instead allowed a delay to occur before they gained entry. In the interval, the cocaine in packages (but for a package buried in the sofa and a package with only residue) almost disappeared down the sewer. Wilburn had run from the kitchen to the bathroom while the police were entering and dumped the packages. Two bags containing cocaine were found in Wilburn’s pockets. Smith had $1,027 in small bills in his pocket.
A portable telephone and the police scanner were found in the living room, where defendant alone was present when the police entered. The scanner was operating audibly, tuned to the frequencies *225for the local police department and sheriff’s office.5
Rorie was in the bedroom. The police brought her to the living room and had her sit on a couch other than the one on which Smith had been lying. Before she sat down, the police searched it and found no cocaine. Later, when the police moved Rorie from the couch, they searched it again and found a bag of cocaine under the cushion where she had been sitting. A urine sample provided by Rorie tested positive for cocaine.
The power bill for the residence was in Smith’s own name. Although the phone bill was in the name of co-defendant Wilburn, who was Smith’s nephew, Wilburn lived with his sister on an adjacent street. The bill for the month of July was over $200, covered many long distance calls, and followed a bill for over $170 the month before. In the hour to hour and a half the police were there, at least five calls came in for cocaine. The police recognized the voices of two of the callers.
The cocaine residue wrapped in tinfoil was behind a trash can next to the freezer in the kitchen area adjoining the living room where Smith was reclining.
Smith’s defense was that although present when the search warrant was executed on his residence, Smith did not even have joint constructive possession of any of the cocaine which constituted the basis for the three charges.
His two witnesses testified that they had purchased Smith’s 1978 Chevrolet truck from him the same day as the incident on trial (October 6, 1995) and paid $1,200 in cash for it. That was offered to explain the $1,027 police found in his pocket in small bills and to eliminate the inference that the large amount of cash was proceeds of drug sales. No money was found on the person of co-defendant Wilburn or elsewhere on the premises; the female co-defendant was not searched.
One of the witnesses, Smith’s father, said he paid all of the $1,200. The other witness, Smith’s nephew and the brother of the co-defendant who was found flushing cocaine packets down the commode, testified that he and his grandfather bought the truck together. They had no documents with respect to the truck, it was not *226registered, tagged or insured, and they said it merely stayed on the farm.
The jury rejected the defense and excluded not only the theory promoted by defendant but any other reasonable hypothesis deducible from the evidence, in keeping with the trial court’s instructions.6 The State’s evidence implicating Smith, although circumstantial, permitted reasonable inferences that he was indeed criminally involved in the drug trade being conducted at the mobile home shared by him and his girlfriend, the co-defendant who pleaded guilty to possession mid-trial.
This evidence supports a finding of Smith’s joint constructive possession, as defined in Shropshire v. State,7 at the very least as an aider and abettor to Smith’s two companions, both of whose guilty pleas were known to the jury. The court fully instructed the jury on these principles, as well as on mere presence, mere association, and equal opportunity. Evidence of one of these relationships alone is not enough.8 But “[w]here there is evidence other than a defendant’s own equal access connecting an accused to contraband, as here, it is for the jury to determine guilt or innocence.”9 No objection was made to any of the charges or to the recharge on the same principles after the jury requested clarification.
There indeed was evidence “other than [Smith’s] own equal access connecting [him] to contraband,” and thus it was “for the jury to determine guilt or innocence.”10 Presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances allowing an inference of criminal intent.11

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Blackburn, Ruffin and Eldridge, JJ, concur. Pope, P. J., dissents.

 (Emphasis omitted.) 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hight v. State, 221 Ga. App. 574-575 (1) (472 SE2d 113) (1996).

 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id.

 Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525, 527 (1) (314 SE2d 436) (1984); Coleman v. State, 229 Ga. App. 642 (494 SE2d 549) (1997).

 In this case, as frequently happens, a diagram was used during trial and not included in the record because it was not introduced into evidence. Such documents, even though not physically entered as an exhibit, should be part of the record because they constitute a vital visual aid to understanding the evidence when reference is made in testimony to “here” and “there” and spatial and relational information is pointed out. In this case a drawing of the interior of the mobile home prepared by two police officers on the scene was used as a demonstrative aid. Thus the jury could grasp evidence by seeing that to which this Court is not privy.

 OCGA § 24-4-6. See Blair v. State, 216 Ga. App. 545, 546 (1) (455 SE2d 97) (1995) (only reasonable hypotheses of innocence must be excluded).

 201 Ga. App. 421 (411 SE2d 339) (1991).

 Murrell v. State, 200 Ga. App. 231, 233 (1) (407 SE2d 460) (1991).

 Williams v. State, 207 Ga. App. 782, 784 (4) (429 SE2d 153) (1993).

 Id.; Poden v. State, 216 Ga. App. 188, 189 (1) (453 SE2d 788) (1995) (need connection other than spatial proximity); Whipple v. State, 207 Ga. App. 131, 132 (1) (427 SE2d 101) (1993) (need more than presence); Whitfield v. State, 217 Ga. App. 402, 405 (3) (457 SE2d 682) (1995) (example of facts in addition to spatial proximity).

 Lu v. State, 223 Ga. App. 336, 338 (477 SE2d 581) (1996).