Court Opinion

ID: 9409412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 12:06:36.024746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:32.986734
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA22-852

                                  Filed 18 July 2023

Mecklenburg County, No. 20 CRS 100389

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

              v.

DARVIN MAX HOLLIDAY

      Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 6 May 2022 by Judge Jacqueline

D. Grant in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25

April 2023.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Matthew
      Baptiste Holloway, for the State.

      Ryan Legal Services, PLLC, by John E. Ryan, III, for defendant-appellant.

      ZACHARY, Judge.

      Defendant Darvin Max Holliday appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury’s

verdict finding him guilty of trafficking in fentanyl by possession. On appeal,

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct defense counsel to

call an out-of-state witness where Defendant and his attorney had reached an

“absolute impasse” regarding the issue. After careful review, we conclude that

Defendant received a fair trial, free from error.

                                    Background

      At approximately 4:00 a.m. on 6 December 2020, Officer Ian Casey of the
                                        STATE V. HOLLIDAY

                                         Opinion of the Court

Cornelius Police Department observed Defendant and Allie Meadows parked at the

Microtel Hotel in Cornelius, North Carolina. As Defendant and Meadows exited the

car and walked toward the hotel, Officer Casey approached and asked whether the

car in the hotel parking lot belonged to them. Defendant stated that he owned the

vehicle, but after determining that the vehicle’s license plate did not match its

registration, Officer Casey detained the couple. While talking with Defendant and

checking his identification, Officer Casey observed a red tube in the driver’s side door

compartment, which Defendant claimed contained “nothing[.]” Officer Casey asked

to search the vehicle and Defendant consented, providing Officer Casey with the keys

to the locked car.

       During the vehicle search, Officer Casey discovered three small packages

inside of the red tube, which he suspected contained illegal drugs. Officer Casey

arrested Defendant but permitted Meadows to leave in the car. The packages were

later determined to contain various illicit substances, including methamphetamine

and fentanyl.

       On 3 May 2022, this matter came on for trial in Mecklenburg County Superior

Court.1 Just prior to jury selection, Defendant asked to address the court regarding

his dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel:

       1  Defendant initially faced multiple charges arising from the events of 6 December 2020. On
the morning of trial, however, the State announced its decision to dismiss three of Defendant’s pending
charges and to proceed solely on the superseding indictment in 20 CRS 100389, charging Defendant
with trafficking in fentanyl by possession of more than four but less than 14 grams.

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                                 STATE V. HOLLIDAY

                                  Opinion of the Court

             [DEFENDANT]: I think that I might have been a little bit
             misrepresented here because I didn’t know that you could
             subpoena the girl that was with me[, Meadows,] that it was
             her heroin, and I didn’t know, so she’s not here today.

             THE COURT: Okay. All right. And is that -- are you
             wanting her to testify?

             [DEFENDANT]: Well, she should be here because it was
             hers. It was in my vehicle, but it was her heroin. And she
             was with me that night, but they let her drive off. She
             didn’t have her drivers license or nothing, but they let her
             drive off in [the] vehicle, which my plates were on the
             vehicle, but it wasn’t my vehicle.

      The trial court then asked to hear from defense counsel, Michael Kolb. Mr.

Kolb acknowledged that, at some point during the case’s pendency, he and Defendant

had discussed “[w]hether or not it would be a good idea to subpoena” Meadows, but

Mr. Kolb determined that she “would not be a good witness” for Defendant. According

to Mr. Kolb, the issue was not broached again until trial, when Defendant informed

Mr. Kolb “that he wished for [Meadows] to be . . . subpoenaed on it, though that was

not [Mr. Kolb’s] understanding that he was insisting on it.” Mr. Kolb further

explained: “[F]or reasons of trial strategy, I have not done that, but [Defendant] does

not agree with that today.”

      Defendant explained that Meadows told him that she was willing to testify that

the drugs were hers, but that he had not spoken with her in a month and was not

sure that she would answer his call. Defendant was also unsure that Meadows would

voluntarily travel from her home in West Virginia to testify in court in Charlotte

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                                  Opinion of the Court

“because she did get in some trouble for some heroin again.” In addition, Defendant

conceded that the last time he was in court, at the 28 March 2022 calendar call, he

had not discussed with Mr. Kolb the issue of whether Meadows would testify.

      The State noted that Defendant had also neglected to raise, at any time prior

to trial, Defendant’s apparent dissatisfaction with counsel, or Mr. Kolb’s failure to

subpoena Meadows.

      The trial court informed Defendant that Mr. Kolb did not have the power to

subpoena a witness from outside the state. The court then attempted to clarify

Defendant’s desired remedy, inquiring whether he sought to replace Mr. Kolb as his

attorney:

             THE COURT: And understanding that you just spoke with
             your attorney, and if you need to speak with him further
             about the willingness to reach out to [Meadows] to see if
             she’s voluntarily willing to come down, are you then
             comfortable proceeding with Mr. Kolb as your attorney? I
             can’t tell exactly what you’re asking me because it’s sort of
             one of these, here’s what I wanted him to do, but he hasn’t
             done.

             [DEFENDANT]: Right.

             THE COURT: But it may be a little bit of
             misunderstanding of what his powers were to begin with,
             and so that’s why I’m trying to get -- seek clarification of
             exactly what you’re asking me.

                   ....

             THE COURT: . . . I was trying to figure out when you were
             talking about -- you started off by saying this female that
             you wanted to be called as a witness and you were -- you

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                                  Opinion of the Court

             had wanted her to be subpoenaed and she wasn’t and that’s
             why I just wanted to make you aware because it sounds
             like that’s what you were upset about.

             MR. KOLB: And, Your Honor, she can be voluntarily asked
             to be here, but again, we still have the problem of I don’t
             really want her, but he does.

             THE COURT: Correct. And that I will let y’all discuss
             privately, but understanding that we can’t compel her to
             come here --

             [DEFENDANT]: I do understand that. Yes, I do.

             THE COURT: -- is that are you comfortable then allowing
             Mr. Kolb to continue representing you? You guys can
             discuss whether or not it’s a good idea to ask her to come
             down here since she has those other charges against her,
             and your attorney can explain to you how one’s credibility
             if they take the witness stand can be impeached. And so
             are you okay with Mr. Kolb -- are you still wanting Mr. Kolb
             to represent you in this matter? And then you guys can
             discuss, you know, whether or not you want to reach out to
             her to see if she would voluntarily come or not.

             [DEFENDANT]: No, ma’am, I would exactly maybe like to
             get a hold of another attorney or, you know, I’ve got a friend
             that would probably represent me . . . I would rather, you
             know, get another attorney to represent me because he has
             misrepresented me, you know, I think that he has.

(Emphases added).

      The trial court again asked whether Defendant was moving to substitute

counsel, and Mr. Kolb explained the extent to which Defendant had mentioned his

desire to retain new counsel:

             THE COURT: Okay. And so are you seeking to retain your
             own counsel?

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                                  Opinion of the Court

             [DEFENDANT]: Yes, ma’am.

                    ....

             MR. KOLB: Just to let you know, while he has not been --
             Mr. Holliday has always been extremely polite to me and
             everyone he’s been around, there’s not any bad blood up
             here at all. He has told me a few times that he has spoken
             -- when I say a few times, this week and earlier, that he has
             spoken to other attorneys about his case, which I prefer he
             not, because that throws --

             THE COURT: Correct.

             MR. KOLB: -- off some other things. But he hasn’t hired
             them, but I will tell you he has not shown up today with --
             first time I’ve ever heard that he might be hiring somebody
             and that is only really come up since the previous calendar
             call, which April --

             [DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.

             MR. KOLB: Early April, whatever the last calendar call
             was, that’s when he first brought it up. He hasn’t hired
             anybody. He did talk about that he might do that, he’s
             thinking about it, so I will let the Court know while he
             hasn’t hired anyone, I’ve not ever heard from anyone. It
             was brought up before today but only at that last time.

(Emphases added).

      In opposing Defendant’s motion, the State expressed concerns that Defendant

had “not gone the extra step to hire his own counsel,” and argued that “coming in on

the day of trial to ask for new counsel and argue about trial strategy amount[ed] to

nothing more than a delay tactic[.]” The trial court requested that Defendant provide

the contact information of the attorneys with whom he had communicated concerning

representation. After speaking with those attorneys, the court confirmed Defendant’s

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                                  Opinion of the Court

basis for seeking to substitute counsel:

             THE COURT: . . . [W]hat you’ve indicated or what I’ve
             heard from you about why you were seeking to replace Mr.
             Kolb and substitute in and retain counsel was really a
             difference -- a disagreement about trial strategy, this one
             particular witness that you wanted -- you wanted her to be
             called as a witness, and Mr. Kolb does not believe that is a
             good idea.

             [DEFENDANT]: Yes, ma’am.

             THE COURT: I did not hear any other reason for which you
             were seeking to substitute counsel for Mr. Kolb. It sounds
             like he’s communicated with you, you’ve discussed your
             case, may not necessarily agree over complete trial
             strategy, but he’s communicated with you, you’ve been here
             for your --

             [DEFENDANT]: Oh, yeah, he’s been a great lawyer, but,
             like I said, we just -- I just disagreed with a couple things
             myself. It wasn’t that he was a bad attorney. It was just --
             I just thought I was misled, you know, because of the court
             --

      The trial court then denied Defendant’s “motion to substitute counsel”:

             THE COURT: . . . [Y]ou haven’t actually retained them,
             and so the Court is concerned that to just allow this -- this
             case has been pending for over two years, that that would
             just [obstruct] and delay justice in this case for the
             proceedings going forward.

             So the Court is going to -- unless Mr. Kolb has any
             additional arguments he wishes to make, the Court is going
             to deny . . . [D]efendant’s motion to substitute counsel. And
             the Court finds that in this case that Mr. Kolb is an
             experienced attorney, he appears to be competent, and the
             dissatisfaction in this case by [Defendant] was really over
             trial tactics and specifically calling a -- one witness who
             resides in West Virginia as a witness in this case. And that
             being the nature of the disagreement, the Court does not

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                                     Opinion of the Court

               find that nature, a disagreement over trial tactics, renders
               Mr. Kolb to be incompetent or ineffective to represent . . .
               [D]efendant. Likewise, . . . [D]efendant has had several
               months since this case has first been placed on the trial
               calendar to retain private counsel, including and most
               recently, the March 28, 2022, trial calendar date where . . .
               [D]efendant has had an opportunity to retain private
               counsel and that while there may have been some phone
               calls to different attorneys, no attorney was specifically
               retained and had been paid whatever they would require
               as a retainer fee to represent [Defendant].

               So based on all of that, the Court finds that there is no legal
               basis or reason to replace Mr. Kolb, and for those reasons,
               the Court is denying [Defendant]’s motion or what will be
               treated as a motion to substitute counsel.

      The trial proceeded as scheduled, and on 6 May 2022, the jury returned its

verdict finding Defendant guilty of trafficking in fentanyl by possession. The trial

court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict, sentencing Defendant to an active

term of 70 to 93 months in the custody of the North Carolina Division of Adult

Correction. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.

                                        Discussion

      On appeal, Defendant argues that “the trial court erred by failing to instruct

[Mr.] Kolb to call Meadows as a witness when it was clear that [Mr.] Kolb and

[Defendant] had reached an absolute impasse.” Specifically, Defendant asserts that

the trial court’s failure “to either appoint substitute counsel or to instruct trial

counsel on the impasse between the client and his attorney violated the constitution.”

We disagree.

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                                   STATE V. HOLLIDAY

                                   Opinion of the Court

      A criminal defendant’s right to counsel is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI; State v. Ali, 329 N.C. 394,

403, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (1991).

      Of course, the Sixth Amendment’s protections notwithstanding, “[n]o person

can be compelled to take the advice of his attorney.” Ali, 329 N.C. at 403, 407 S.E.2d

at 189 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed,

“[t]he attorney-client relationship rests on principles of agency, and not guardian and

ward.” Id. (citation omitted).

      At trial, “tactical decisions—such as which witnesses to call, which motions to

make, and how to conduct cross-examination—normally lie within the attorney’s

province.” State v. Brown, 339 N.C. 426, 434, 451 S.E.2d 181, 187 (1994), cert. denied,

516 U.S. 825, 133 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1995). “However, when counsel and a fully informed

criminal defendant client reach an absolute impasse as to such tactical decisions, the

client’s wishes must control . . . .” Ali, 329 N.C. at 404, 407 S.E.2d at 189. This is the

“absolute impasse” rule.

      In Ali, our Supreme Court instructed that “[i]n such situations, . . . defense

counsel should make a record of the circumstances, her advice to the defendant, the

reasons for the advice, the defendant’s decision and the conclusion reached.” Id.

      Where the trial court is aware that the defendant and counsel have reached an

absolute impasse on a tactical matter, it is reversible error for the court to allow the

attorney’s decision to prevail over the defendant’s wishes. State v. Freeman, 202 N.C.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

App. 740, 746, 690 S.E.2d 17, 22 (2010), disc. review improvidently allowed, 365 N.C.

4, 705 S.E.2d 734 (2011) (per curiam); see id. at 746–47, 690 S.E.2d at 22 (“The denial

of [the] defendant’s Ali right to make tactical decisions regarding the use of

peremptory challenges is analogous to the erroneous denial of a peremptory

challenge. The right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is

one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused . . . . Defendant is

entitled to a new trial.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

      Significantly, however, not all tactical disagreements between a defendant and

his or her attorney rise to the level of “absolute impasse.” First and foremost, a

defendant cannot compel his attorney to violate the law. See Ali, 329 N.C. at 403, 407

S.E.2d at 189 (providing that an “attorney is bound to comply with her client’s lawful

instructions” (emphasis added)); State v. Williams, 191 N.C. App. 96, 105, 662 S.E.2d

397, 403 (2008) (concluding that defense counsel “could not have lawfully complied

with [the d]efendant’s requests” where he “essentially concede[d] racially

discriminatory intent in his recommendations . . . regarding the exercise of

peremptory challenges”), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 684

S.E.2d 158 (2009).

      And “[n]othing in Ali or our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence requires an

attorney to comply with a client’s request to assert frivolous or unsupported claims.

In fact, to do so would be a violation of an attorney’s professional ethics[.]” State v.

Jones, 220 N.C. App. 392, 395, 725 S.E.2d 415, 417, disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 389,

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                                   Opinion of the Court

732 S.E.2d 474 (2012).

      Furthermore, no actual impasse exists, and Ali does not apply, when the record

fails to disclose any disagreement between the defendant and counsel with respect to

trial tactics. See, e.g., State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 385, 462 S.E.2d 25, 36 (1995)

(“[W]e find no indication in the record of ‘an absolute impasse’ between the client and

the defense team as it concerned trial tactics. At no time did [the] defendant voice

any complaints to the trial court as to the tactics of his defense team.”), cert. denied,

517 U.S. 1110, 134 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1996); Williams, 191 N.C. App. at 104, 662 S.E.2d

at 402 (“[E]ven though the foregoing evidence undoubtedly demonstrates an absolute

impasse between [the d]efendant and defense counsel as concerned the necessity . . .

that [the d]efendant stand trial at all, the evidence does not demonstrate an impasse

as it concerned trial tactics.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

      In the instant case, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct Mr. Kolb to subpoena Meadows where Defendant and Mr. Kolb had reached

an “absolute impasse” regarding whether to call Meadows to testify. According to

Defendant, Mr. Kolb’s “unwillingness” to do so, as evinced by Mr. Kolb’s decision not

to “timely move[ ] the court for a certificate and order of attendance” for Meadows,

together with the trial court’s “failure to properly instruct” Mr. Kolb, “deprive[d

Defendant] of his right to control his own defense.” We disagree.

      Preliminarily, we note that the parties agree that Mr. Kolb did not have the

authority to subpoena Meadows, an out-of-state witness. It is also evident that while,

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                                   Opinion of the Court

in theory, Meadows’s presence may have been secured pursuant to the Uniform Act

to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings

(“the Act”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-811 et seq. (2021), the trial court was not obligated

to instruct Mr. Kolb to commence proceedings pursuant to the Act, particularly given

the untimeliness of Defendant’s complaint. See State v. Cyrus, 60 N.C. App. 774, 776,

300 S.E.2d 58, 59 (1983) (reasoning that while “the officers and the court have a duty

to see that [a] defendant has an opportunity for securing material witnesses” under

the Act, “[t]hey are placed under no burden to demand that [the defendant] do so”).

      Here, the record reflects that although Defendant and Mr. Kolb had previously

discussed whether to call Meadows as a witness, Mr. Kolb did not understand that

Defendant was insisting on Meadows’s presence until the first day of trial, when

Defendant raised the issue prior to voir dire. By that point, Defendant’s case had been

pending for over two years. We therefore conclude that Defendant failed to timely

notify the trial court—as well as the State and his own attorney—that he wished to

seek to compel Meadows’s attendance at trial via the procedures set forth by the Act.

See id. (“It is . . . true that the right to compulsory process is a fundamental right and

that neither our statute nor the Constitution prescribes time limits within which to

exercise that right. It is equally true, however, that rights can be waived.”).

      Moreover, contrary to Defendant’s argument on appeal, Mr. Kolb’s failure to

“timely move[ ] the court for a certificate and order of attendance” does not

demonstrate the existence of an absolute impasse between Defendant and counsel.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Rather, Defendant merely presents a disagreement with his appointed attorney over

trial tactics, one that counsel believed had been resolved well before trial.

      As Mr. Kolb explained to the trial court, he had previously determined that

Meadows “would not be a good witness for” Defendant’s case, due to “reasons of trial

strategy”—including the fact that Meadows “would be subject to impeachment on

cross-examination.” Nonetheless, upon learning of Defendant’s concerns, Mr. Kolb

agreed to discuss the matter further with Defendant, despite the attorney’s

misgivings as to whether Meadows’s appearance would be in Defendant’s best

interest. This does not indicate a deadlock. Cf. Williams, 191 N.C. App. at 103, 662

S.E.2d at 402 (“[The d]efendant certainly disagreed with defense counsel’s advice

regarding the jury selection, but specific disagreement did not rise to the level of an

absolute impasse because [he] ultimately deferred the decision to defense counsel.”).

      And although Defendant argues that “[d]iametric opposition like that depicted

in the record between Mr. Kolb and [Defendant] cannot be construed as anything but

an absolute impasse[,]” he ultimately “makes no argument rooted in law that an

impasse existed, besides using conclusory terms.” State v. Curry, 256 N.C. App. 86,

98, 805 S.E.2d 552, 559 (2017).

      Consequently, Defendant has failed to demonstrate the existence of an

absolute impasse. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to

instruct Mr. Kolb to call Meadows as a witness.

      Finally, we briefly respond to these arguments in the context of Defendant’s

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                                   Opinion of the Court

motion to substitute counsel. As Defendant acknowledges on appeal, in arguing

before the trial court, he “was unable to clearly vocalize the true issue,” which he now

articulates as the “absolute impasse” issue of which we have already disposed.

However, at trial, Defendant characterized the relief he sought as substitution of

counsel, stating that “I would exactly maybe like to get a hold of another attorney or,

you know, I’ve got a friend that would probably represent me . . . I would rather, you

know, get another attorney to represent me because [Mr. Kolb] has misrepresented

me[.]” Regardless of its characterization, Defendant’s argument lacks merit.

      A “trial court is constitutionally required to appoint substitute counsel

whenever representation by counsel originally appointed would amount to denial of

[the] defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, that is, when the initial

appointment has not afforded [the] defendant his constitutional right to counsel.”

State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 352, 271 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1980). “[A] disagreement

over trial tactics generally does not render the assistance of the original counsel

ineffective.” Id.; see also State v. Gary, 348 N.C. 510, 514, 501 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1998)

(concluding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to substitute

counsel where the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arose out of

his attorney’s decision “not to subpoena certain witnesses whom [the] defendant

claimed would have provided alibi testimony”).

      Here, after explaining that Meadows could not be subpoenaed, the trial court

repeatedly sought clarification from Defendant that substitute counsel was the

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                                   Opinion of the Court

remedy he desired. Defendant responded affirmatively in each instance. Defendant

then provided the trial court with contact information for several attorneys from

whom he had purportedly sought representation; but after the first attorney failed to

immediately recognize Defendant and declined to represent him, the trial court

determined that it would not “delay this trial again” and denied Defendant’s motion

to substitute counsel. Defendant did not revisit the issue of Meadows’s attendance,

but rather proceeded to trial with Mr. Kolb as his attorney.

      To the extent that Defendant now challenges the trial court’s denial of his

motion to substitute counsel, he offers no distinct reason or supporting argument in

his brief, beyond those we have already addressed and soundly rejected. Accordingly,

this issue is abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6); see also, e.g., State v. Ambriz,

286 N.C. App. 273, 292, 880 S.E.2d 449, 466 (2022) (declining to address the

defendant’s bald contention that certain of the trial court’s findings were “incomplete,

unsupported, or incorrect[,]” and concluding that because he “made no substantive

argument regarding th[o]se findings, he . . . waived any challenge” on appeal).

                                     Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial, free

from error.

      NO ERROR.

      Judges GORE and GRIFFIN concur.

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