Court Opinion

ID: 9897082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:06:48.100003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:39.630528
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-2362
                   LT Case No. 2020-CJ-000401
                  _____________________________

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES,

    Petitioner,

    v.

J.G., a Child, and STATE OF
FLORIDA,

    Respondents.
               _____________________________

Petition for Certiorari Review of Order from the Circuit
Court for Lake County.
Cary Frank Rada, Judge.

Joyce L. Miller, Assistant General Counsel, of Department of
Children and Families, Tavares, for Petitioner.

Michael A. Graves, Public Defender, and Robyn Anne Hudson,
Assistant Public Defender, Tavares, for Respondent, J.G., a
Child.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T.
Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Respondent, State of Florida.

                       November 9, 2023

PER CURIAM.
     The Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) petitions
this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the circuit
court that committed J.G. (“the minor”) to DCF for competency
restoration services. Because the minor’s alleged incompetence
stems from his age and immaturity rather than a mental illness,
intellectual disability, or autism, we grant the petition and quash
the order under review.

                                  I.

     The minor has been charged by petition for juvenile
delinquency. In that petition, the State alleges that, in February
2020, when he was approximately 13 years and nine months old,
the minor committed several sexual offenses against a younger
child who was under the age of 12.

     On September 1, 2020, a psychologist evaluated the minor a
concluded that he was incompetent to proceed. The psychologist
found that the minor “displays overall immaturity caused by his
young age and has limited insight into his own behavior, which
precludes his ability to rationally understand the requirements of
the law for competency to proceed.” The psychologist also opined
that this immaturity “will likely remedy with age, experience,
psychotherapy, and continued academic education.”

     On April 21, 2022, a psychiatrist evaluated the minor and
likewise concluded he was not competent to proceed. However, the
psychiatrist concluded that the minor had “no current diagnosable
mental illness,” and he could become competent “with some basic
education about the process, the roles of the various individuals in
the court room, and the importance of being honest and
forthcoming with his attorney.”

     On June 27, 2023—more than a full year after the minor’s
second competency evaluation—the circuit court adjudged the
minor incompetent to proceed, and it committed him to DCF for
the provision of competency restoration services. The court
concluded that the minor does not presently risk bodily harm to
himself or others and likewise does not pose a risk of injurious self-
neglect. Therefore, the court concluded that he “does not meet the
criteria for secure placement” under section 985.19(3), Florida

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Statutes (2023). The court instead directed DCF to “place the child
within a community treatment program.” DCF then filed its
petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, arguing that the
minor’s commitment to DCF departs from the essential
requirements of the law.

                                 II.

     “[T]o obtain a writ of certiorari, there must exist (1) a
departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting
in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be
corrected on postjudgment appeal.” Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v.
Lotton, 172 So. 3d 983, 985 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “As a general rule, certiorari is the proper vehicle
for seeking this court’s review of orders committing an individual
involuntarily.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although
DCF was party to neither the juvenile case nor the commitment
proceeding, “it has standing to seek certiorari review of the circuit
court order because it is affected by the order and no other remedy
is available.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                III.

     Section 985.19(2), Florida Statutes (2023), generally requires
commitment to DCF of incompetent minors charged with felony-
level delinquent acts or offenses. However, the statute provides the
following exception: “A child who has been adjudicated
incompetent to proceed because of age or immaturity, or for any
reason other than for mental illness, intellectual disability, or
autism, must not be committed to the department or to the
Department of Children and Families for restoration-of-
competency treatment or training services.” § 985.19(2), Fla. Stat.

     The statutory exception undoubtedly applies here. Both
medical professionals found the minor incompetent to proceed due
to his age and immaturity rather than a mental illness,
intellectual disability, or autism. On this record, therefore, the
circuit court lacked any competent evidence that could justify its
commitment of the minor. Its commitment thus departed from the
essential requirements of the law, and a writ of certiorari is
warranted. We therefore grant the petition, quash the order under

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review, and remand the case to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with our opinion.*

    PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED; REMANDED.

EDWARDS, C.J., and PRATT, J., concur.
MAKAR, J., concurs with opinion.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

    *  We also note the State’s assertion that the competency
evaluations were stale at the time the court issued its order. The
first evaluation took place when the minor was 14 years old, and
the second took place as he neared his sixteenth birthday. The
court issued its competency determination over a year later, when
the minor was 17 years old. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Reilly,
970 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Brockman v. State, 852 So.
2d 330, 333–34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). However, because DCF’s
petition does not place at issue whether the evaluations were too
stale to support a finding of incompetency, we decline to reach the
question.

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                                             Case No. 5D23-2362
                                     LT Case No. 2020-CJ-000401
MAKAR, J., concurring.

     I concur in the disposition of this case because the minor does
not meet the commitment criteria in section 985.19, Florida
Statutes, and, additionally, because the competency evaluations
upon which the trial judge relied were outdated. See, e.g.,
Brockman v. State, 852 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (finding
two reports, one eleven months old and the other four months old,
were inadequate to show defendant’s present competency to stand
trial; “The question of competence is whether the defendant has a
sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney and whether
the defendant has a present rational and factual understanding of
the proceedings against him.”). Should an issue of the minor’s
competence continue to exist in this case, the trial court has an
obligation to “order an updated examination of [the minor] and
schedule a competency hearing.” Id. at 334.

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