Court Opinion

ID: 9943498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:11:03.833461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:07.294588
License: Public Domain

J-A22027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRIAN ALLEN MARTIN                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1428 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 5, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Elk County Criminal Division at No(s):
                          CP-24-CR-0000362-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: February 23, 2024

       Appellant, Brian Allen Martin, appeals from the December 5, 2022 order

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Elk County that denied his petition

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm, in part, and vacate, in part, the December 5, 2022

order, and remand this case in accordance with this memorandum.1

       The record demonstrates that, on January 22, 2020, a jury convicted

Appellant of third-degree murder and recklessly endangering another person

____________________________________________

1 On November 2, 2023, the Commonwealth filed an application with this
Court, requesting an extension of time in which to file a responsive brief in
the instant appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
105(b). In light of our disposition herein, we deny the Commonwealth’s
request as moot.

On December 18, 2023, Appellant filed pro se a motion for extraordinary relief,
with this Court, requesting a stay of appellate proceedings and a remand to
allow the PCRA court to address Appellant’s request for new PCRA counsel. In
light of our disposition here, we deny Appellant’s motion as moot.
J-A22027-23

(“REAP”) following an incident at a local bar in Elk County in which Appellant

shot the victim several times, while inside the establishment, and the victim

later died.2 On March 2, 2020, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence

of 12 to 24 years’ incarceration.3 This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of

sentence on November 15, 2021, and Appellant did not seek discretionary

review with our Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Martin, 268 A.3d 424,

2021    WL     5294016      (Pa. Super.        filed   Nov.   14,   2021)   (unpublished

memorandum). As such, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on

December 15, 2021. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(b)(3) (stating, “[a] judgment

becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary

review, in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking the review”); see

also Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (requiring a petition for allowance of appeal to be filed

within 30 days after entry of the order of this Court to be challenged on

review).

       On March 31, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first, as

well as a memorandum of law in support thereof, raising twelve claims of

ineffectiveness of trial counsel.       PCRA counsel was appointed to represent

Appellant. Counsel filed an amendment to Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition
____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 2705, respectively.

3 Appellant was sentenced to a term of 12 to 24 years’ incarceration for his

third-degree murder conviction and to a concurrent term of 6 to 12 months’
incarceration for his REAP conviction.

                                           -2-
J-A22027-23

on May 9, 2022, and an additional amendment to Appellant’s pro se PCRA

petition on June 21, 2022.4 The Commonwealth filed a response to Appellant’s

petition on July 11, 2022. On July 14, 2022, the PCRA court conducted an

evidentiary hearing. Upon conclusion, the PCRA court permitted Appellant to

submit a counseled memorandum of law in support of his petition within 30

days of receipt of the hearing transcript. The PCRA court also permitted the

Commonwealth to submit a response within 14 days of Appellant’s

submission. N.T., 7/14/22, at 53.

       On September 19, 2022, Appellant submitted pro se a memorandum of

law in support of his petition. That same day, counsel for Appellant submitted

a memorandum of law in support of the petition and attached, as an exhibit,

____________________________________________

4 PCRA counsel did not file an amended PCRA petition but, rather, filed an
amendment and an additional amendment to Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition
that incorporated all of the allegations contained in Appellant’s pro se PCRA
petition, as well as asserted new and additional allegations in support of
Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims.

In the May 9, 2022 filing, PCRA counsel reiterated Appellant’s claim that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to request an “unreasonable belief”
voluntary manslaughter jury instruction and to request that the offense be
included on the verdict slip. See Amendments to Pro Se PCRA Petition,
5/9/22.

In the June 21, 2022 filing, PCRA counsel asserted additional claims that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness and for failing to introduce
medical evidence of injuries Appellant allegedly sustained on the night of the
incident. See Additional Amendments to Pro Se PCRA Petition, 6/1/22.

                                           -3-
J-A22027-23

Appellant’s pro se memorandum of law.5 The Commonwealth subsequently

filed its response.

       On November 10, 2022, Appellant filed pro se a motion for appointment

of new PCRA counsel, alleging claims of ineffectiveness against then-current

PCRA counsel pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth

v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).6 The PCRA court denied Appellant’s

motion for appointment of new PCRA counsel on December 5, 2022, as having

been untimely filed.

       On December 5, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition.

Appellant filed a counseled notice of appeal on December 7, 2022, and, on

____________________________________________

5 It is well-established that a petitioner, such as Appellant, who is represented

by counsel, typically, has no constitutional right to hybrid representation in
either a PCRA court or an appellate court. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626
A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa. 1993). When PCRA counsel is aware of a pro se filing
and subsequently adopts the pro se filing, however, the PCRA court may give
force to the pro se filing without offending consideration of hybrid
representation. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 671 (Pa.
2015).

Thus, Appellant’s filing pro se of a memorandum of law in the case sub judice
constitutes hybrid representation. However, because PCRA counsel adopted
Appellant’s pro se memorandum, as demonstrated by the attachment of the
pro se filing as an exhibit to his own memorandum of law, we conclude that
Appellant’s pro se filing does not offend the considerations of hybrid
representation. Id.

6 Although Pennsylvania jurisprudence disfavors hybrid representation, as
discussed supra, our Supreme Court’s decision in Bradley, as discussed in
greater detail infra, permits a petitioner to file pro se a claim alleging
ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel at the first opportunity available, even when
represented by PCRA counsel who is the subject of the ineffectiveness claim.

                                           -4-
J-A22027-23

December 13, 2022, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On December 16, 2022, PCRA counsel filed a

Rule 1925(b) statement.7 The PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on

January 5, 2023, relying on its opinion that accompanied the December 5,

2022 order dismissing Appellant’s petition.

       On January 27, 2023, Appellant filed pro se, with this Court, a motion

for appointment of new PCRA counsel pursuant to Bradley, supra.8              In a

____________________________________________

7 PCRA counsel raised the following issues in the Rule 1925(b) statement:

       1.     [Appellant] asserts that the [PCRA] court erred in failing to
              find [Appellant’s] trial counsel ineffective for failing to
              request a jury instruction on “unreasonable belief” voluntary
              manslaughter (18 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2503(b)), and failing to
              request that the crime of voluntary manslaughter be placed
              on the jury’s verdict slip[.]

       2.     Trial counsel’s failures as noted above had no reasonable
              basis designed to effectuate [Appellant’s] interests, and
              [Appellant] was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failures as
              there exists a degree of likelihood sufficient to undermine
              confidence in the outcome of the proceedings[.]

       3.     The [PCRA] court erred in failing to find [Appellant’s] trial
              counsel ineffective, and in thereby failing to grant
              [Appellant] a new trial[.]

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/16/22 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

8 Appellant’s pro se motion for the appointment of new PCRA counsel was
timestamped as having been received by this Court on January 31, 2023. The
postmark on the envelope Appellant used to mail his motion, however, reveals
a postage cancellation stamp dated January 27, 2023. Pursuant to the

                                           -5-
J-A22027-23

February 7, 2023 per curiam order, this Court denied Appellant’s motion for

appointment of new PCRA counsel without prejudice “for Appellant to seek the

appointment of substitute counsel in the [PCRA] court.”9 On February 13,

2023, PCRA counsel filed an appellate brief, and the Commonwealth

subsequently filed its responsive brief on April 13, 2023.

       On April 21, 2023, PCRA counsel filed with this Court a praecipe to

withdraw as counsel for Appellant. In his request for permission to withdraw,

PCRA counsel attached a copy of an April 5, 2023 PCRA court order granting

Appellant’s request for the appointment of new PCRA counsel without

objection by the Commonwealth. On May 18, 2023, this Court, in a per curiam

order, granted original PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw and directed the

prothonotary of this Court to enter the appearance of Appellant’s new PCRA

counsel.

       On June 8, 2023, new PCRA counsel filed a motion for a continuance

with this Court, requesting “additional time to review the matter and

potentially submit an amended brief.” Motion for Continuance, 6/8/23, at ¶2.

In a June 12, 2013 per curiam order, this Court granted the request for a
____________________________________________

“prisoner mailbox rule,” we deem Appellant’s motion for the appointment of
new PCRA counsel as filed on January 27, 2023. See Commonwealth v.
Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997) (explaining that, pursuant to the
“prisoner mailbox rule,” a document is deemed filed on the date an inmate
deposits the mailing with prison authorities or placed it in the prison mailbox).

9 In the per curiam order, this Court did not explicitly remand the case to the

PCRA court to permit Appellant to file a request for the appointment of new
PCRA counsel. See Per Curiam Order, 2/7/23.

                                           -6-
J-A22027-23

continuance.10 On October 4, 2023, new PCRA counsel submitted an appellate

brief on behalf of Appellant.

       New PCRA counsel raises the following issues for our review:

       1.     Was trial counsel ineffective, and [] Appellant prejudiced
              thereby, for failing to request a jury instruction on
              “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter and failing to
              request that [this offense] be placed on the jury slip?

       2.     Was trial counsel ineffective, and [] Appellant prejudiced
              thereby, by failing to present testimony [and] medical
              records regarding [] Appellant’s physical condition at the
              time of the offense?

       3.     Was trial counsel ineffective, and [] Appellant prejudiced
              thereby, by failing to prepare [] Appellant in his [trial]
              testimony regarding the legal definition of “bodily injury”
              and “serious bodily injury,[”] and in failing to conduct
              redirect examination regarding what [] Appellant meant [by
              his use of] the term “bodily harm[?”]

       4.     Was trial counsel ineffective, and [] Appellant prejudiced
              thereby, in failing to object to the [Commonwealth’s]
              improper statements in [its] closing [remarks] that the
              decedent was defending the honor of a female bar patron?

Appellant’s Brief, 10/4/23, at 4.

       Appellant’s first issue raises a claim that trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance. Id. at 13-22. Specifically, Appellant alleges that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction for

“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter and to request that the offense

be included on the jury verdict slip. Id. Appellant argues that “[w]ithout the

____________________________________________

10 In the per curiam order, this Court relinquished panel jurisdiction but
retained appellate jurisdiction. Per Curiam Order, 6/12/23.

                                           -7-
J-A22027-23

benefit of a voluntary manslaughter instruction, the jury in the present case

was left to believe that, if [Appellant fired] his weapon with the specific intent

to kill, the only basis for not finding him guilty of either [first-degree murder

or third-degree murder] was if he reasonably acted in self-defense.” Id. at

19.   Appellant contends that “[h]ad there been a jury instruction for

[v]oluntary [m]anslaughter, [the] facts could have supported a jury

determination that [Appellant] had a belief, reasonable or unreasonable, that

shooting the decedent was necessary to defend himself.” Id. at 20. Appellant

asserts that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to request an

“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter instruction or to request that

the offense be included on the verdict slip. Id. Appellant further asserts that

trial counsel lacked a reasonable basis in advising Appellant to forgo such an

instruction or the inclusion of voluntary manslaughter on the verdict slip.

Appellant thus concludes that he was prejudiced when the jury convicted him

of third-degree murder. Id. at 20-21.

      In addressing Appellant’s issue, we are mindful of our well-settled

standard and scope of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition. Proper

appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a petition is limited to an

examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988,

992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

                                      -8-
J-A22027-23

omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court,

and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support

a contrary holding.”     Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions de novo.      Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).

      “It   is   well-established   that   counsel   is   presumed   effective[.]”

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012), citing Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691 (1984). To plead and prove a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must establish: (1) that the

underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel's actions lacked an

objective[ly] reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from

counsel's act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701,

706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 93 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014). “A

claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner's evidence fails to meet

any of these prongs.”     Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa.

2010). “In determining whether counsel's action was reasonable, we do not

question whether there were other more logical courses of action which

counsel could have pursued[. R]ather, we must examine whether counsel's

decision[] had any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Washington, 927

A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007). A petitioner establishes prejudice when he or she

demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

                                       -9-
J-A22027-23

[acts or omissions], the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009).

      Section 2503 of the Crimes Code defines voluntary manslaughter, in

pertinent part, as follows:

                      § 2503. Voluntary manslaughter

      ...

      (b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable. - A person who
      intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary
      manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the
      circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the
      killing under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general principles
      of justification), but his belief is unreasonable.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b).       “Unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter is

sometimes referred to as “imperfect self-defense.”            Commonwealth v.

Green, 273 A.3d 1080, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal denied, 289 A.3d 522

(Pa. 2022).

      An “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter jury instruction and,

in turn, the inclusion of the offense on a verdict slip, is not required but, rather,

is only justified in the limited circumstance where “a defendant held an

unreasonable rather than a reasonable belief that deadly force was required

to save his or her life, and all other principles of justification under 18

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 505 have been met.” Green, 273 A.3d at 1087 (citation and

original quotation marks omitted). The “other principles of justification” under

Section 505 require that the defendant did not provoke the threat and the

defendant did not violate a duty to retreat. Commonwealth v. Jones, 271

                                       - 10 -
J-A22027-23

A.3d 452, 458 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal denied, 282 A.3d 1122 (Pa. 2022),

cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 469 (2022). Thus, the difference between self-defense

and “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter is that self-defense

requires a “reasonably founded belief of either imminent peril to life or great

bodily harm” whereas “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter involves

an uncontrollable fear of death or great bodily harm, “conceivable as existing

[from the defendant’s subjective belief] but not reasonably[, or objectively,]

justified by the circumstances.”       Green, 273 A.3d at 1088, quoting

Commonwealth v. Light, 326 A.2d 288, 294 (Pa. 1974); see also

Commonwealth v. Tilley, 595 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa. 1991) (stating, an

“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter self-defense claim, also known

as the “imperfect self-defense,” “is imperfect in only one respect - an

unreasonable rather than a reasonable belief that deadly force was required

to save the [defendant’s] life”).

        Stated simply, “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter requires

that a defendant hold a subjective belief in the danger of, inter alia, death or

serious bodily injury and that the defendant’s belief, as determined by the

trier-of-fact, be unreasonable under the circumstances. Green, 273 A.3d at

1089.     “[A] trial court shall charge on [“unreasonable belief”] voluntary

manslaughter only when requested, where [] the offense of [“unreasonable

belief”] voluntary manslaughter has been made an issue in the case[,] and

the trial evidence could reasonably support a verdict on it.” Commonwealth

v. Carter, 466 A.2d 1328, 1329 (Pa. 1983) (recognizing that, the

                                     - 11 -
J-A22027-23

unconditional   requirement     that    an      “unreasonable   belief”   voluntary

manslaughter instruction be provided “only serves to confuse juries and invite

them to base their verdicts on whim and caprice”).

      In denying Appellant’s petition on this ground, the PCRA court stated,

      [Appellant] claims that [trial counsel] failed to offer to the [trial]
      court a proposed jury instruction on [“unreasonable belief”]
      voluntary manslaughter. [Trial counsel] testified [at the PCRA
      evidentiary hearing] that this was specifically discussed between
      [trial counsel and Appellant] and rejected by both [parties], as
      both confusing to the jury, and opening the possibility for a
      “compromise verdict.” The matter comes down to a credibility
      determination as to whether the conversation took place or not.
      Throughout his PCRA testimony, [trial counsel] was self-effacing
      and candid in his assessment as to many points and many topics.
      He openly [admitted] when he [could not] remember something,
      or when he failed to consider some questions or examination
      during the trial. On this point, however, [trial counsel] is clear,
      precise[,] and unequivocal. He [raised the “unreasonable belief”
      voluntary manslaughter instruction topic with Appellant], it was
      discussed, and it was rejected by [Appellant] and [trial counsel].
      The [PCRA court] determines that [trial counsel’s] testimony is
      credible on this point and finds no ineffectiveness by [trial counsel,
      as the matter was considered and rejected by [Appellant] and [his
      trial] counsel.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated) (extraneous capitalization

omitted).

      At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that prior to

submitting his proposed jury instructions to the trial court, which did not,

ultimately, include a proposed instruction on “unreasonable belief” voluntary

manslaughter, trial counsel met with Appellant to discuss the proposed

instructions. N.T., 7/14/22, at 28-29. At the meeting with Appellant, trial

                                       - 12 -
J-A22027-23

counsel’s draft of the proposed jury instructions included an “unreasonable

belief” voluntary manslaughter instruction, and this instruction was a point of

discussion with Appellant.       Id.    Trial counsel stated that he and Appellant

discussed     whether     to    include    the     “unreasonable   belief”   voluntary

manslaughter instruction “in detail.” Id. Trial counsel recalled explaining how

voluntary manslaughter was a lesser offense and would carry a lesser

sentence. Id. at 31. Trial counsel explained that the standard jury instruction

for “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter was, in his opinion,

confusing to the jury, making “it sound like the jurors have to convict

[Appellant] of voluntary manslaughter.”11 Id. at 28. Appellant agreed that

____________________________________________

11 Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction Section
15.2503A, relating to voluntary manslaughter – murder in issue, states, in
pertinent part, as follows:

           15.2503A VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER - MURDER IN
                                    ISSUE
       1. As my earlier definition of malice indicates, there can be no
       malice when certain reducing circumstances are present. When
       these circumstances are present, a killing may be voluntary
       manslaughter, but never murder. This is true when a defendant
       . . . [kills under an unreasonable mistaken belief in justifying
       circumstances].

       2. Accordingly, you can find malice and murder only if you are
       satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
       acting . . . [under an unreasonable belief that the circumstances
       were such that, if they existed, would have justified the killing].

       ...

                                          - 13 -
J-A22027-23

____________________________________________

       [5. The reducing circumstance of a defendant acting under an
       unreasonable belief that the circumstances of the killing were
       justified applies where:

       a. the defendant actually believed that [he] [she] [a third party]
       was in immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury [or
       kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat]
       from [name of alleged victim] at the time [he] [she] used deadly
       force, but [his] [her] belief was unreasonable in light of the facts
       as they appeared to [him] [her] at the time;

       b. the defendant did not provoke the use of force by the alleged
       victim by engaging in conduct that showed it was [his] [her] intent
       to cause death or serious bodily injury to the alleged victim; and

       c. the defendant did not violate [his] [her] duty to retreat from
       the place, surrender possession of something, or comply with a
       lawful demand, as I explained those terms when I described to
       you the justification defense.

       Therefore, you can find malice and murder only if the
       Commonwealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt one of the
       following elements:

       a. the defendant did not actually believe that [he] [she] [a third
       party] was in immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury
       [or kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat]
       from [name of alleged victim] at the time [he] [she] used deadly
       force. Note that the unreasonableness of the defendant's belief is
       not the issue here, as it was when I explained justification to you.
       The question is whether the defendant actually believed such an
       immediate danger existed at the time [he] [she] used deadly
       force, and to prove malice through this element, the
       Commonwealth must prove that the defendant did not actually
       hold such a belief; or

       b. the defendant provoked the use of force by the alleged victim
       by engaging in conduct that showed it was [his] [her] intent to
       cause death or serious bodily injury to the alleged victim; or

                                          - 14 -
J-A22027-23

the standard jury instruction was confusing and, ultimately, decided that it

should not be included in the proposed jury instructions submitted to the trial

court because he, as well as trial counsel, did not want to “give the jurors a

way out” by convicting Appellant of voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 28, 31.

In short, Appellant elected to narrow the jury’s options by eliminating

voluntary manslaughter as a potential verdict and confronting the jury with

the choice of either convicting Appellant of murder or exonerating him of that

offense. Id.

       Trial counsel explained that Appellant’s defense strategy was “wholly

self-defense,” and that the video and audio recording of the incident was the

____________________________________________

       c. the defendant could have avoided the use of deadly force by
       [retreating from the place] [surrendering possession of
       something] [or] [complying with a lawful demand], as I previously
       defined [this] [those] concept[s] for you when I discussed the
       defense of justification.]

       ...

       [6. If you do not find the defendant had malice and committed
       murder, you may find [him] [her] guilty of voluntary
       manslaughter as long as you are satisfied that the following three
       elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:

       First, that [name of victim] is dead;

       Second, that the defendant killed [him] [her]; and

       Third, that the defendant had the intent to kill.]

Pa.S.S.J.I. (Criminal) §15.2503A (revised May 2019) (brackets in original);
see also PCRA Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit C.

                                          - 15 -
J-A22027-23

“crux of the case.” Id. at 35. The video and audio recording, trial counsel

stated, showed the victim coming toward Appellant “aggressively swinging”

and attacking Appellant, that Appellant warned the victim he had a handgun,

and that Appellant acted reasonably in shooting the victim, especially after he

shot the victim once and the victim still came at Appellant. Id. at 32-33,

37-38,   40.         At   the   evidentiary    hearing,   trial   counsel   agreed,   on

cross-examination, that providing the jury with an “unreasonable belief”

voluntary manslaughter instruction, and including the offense on the verdict

slip, would have allowed the jury to “split the baby” and come to a

compromised guilty verdict based on “unreasonable belief” voluntary

manslaughter. Id. at 39. Trial counsel believed it was “advantageous” for

Appellant that the jury instructions, as well as the verdict slip, not to include

“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter, and Appellant agreed. Id.

      Upon review, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the

PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s petition on the ground that trial counsel was

ineffective    for   failing    to   request   an   “unreasonable    belief”   voluntary

manslaughter jury instruction or to request that the offense be placed on the

verdict slip. As discussed supra, a trial court is not required to provide an

“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter jury instruction.                 Rather, a

defendant is required to request such an instruction and the evidence must

support the instruction.

      Appellant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s exclusion of the

“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter instruction from the proposed

                                           - 16 -
J-A22027-23

jury instructions, and the verdict slip, lacked an objectively reasonable basis.

At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel explained that he believed that the

“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter jury instruction was confusing

and that the inclusion of the instruction, and listing the offense on the verdict

slip, simply provided the jury with an additional basis to convict him. Instead,

trial   counsel    stated    that   Appellant’s      defense   strategy   was    “wholly

self-defense” and that trial counsel believed that the video and audio recording

of the incident wholly supported their strategy of self-defense. As trial counsel

explained, providing an instruction for “unreasonable belief” voluntary

manslaughter, and listing the offense on the verdict slip, ran the risk that the

jury would view voluntary manslaughter as a “compromise” to finding

Appellant guilty of a criminal offense.               Therefore, Appellant failed to

demonstrate       that   trial   counsel    lacked    reasonable   grounds      to   omit

“unreasonable basis” voluntary manslaughter from the jury instructions. See

Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 618 (Pa. 2015) (stating that, the

question is not whether there were other more logical courses of action which

trial counsel could have pursued but, rather, whether trial counsel’s decisions

had any reasonable basis); see also Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d

1108, 1122 (Pa. 2012) (stating that, a court, in assessing trial counsel’s

performance in the context of a ineffectiveness claim, must be careful to

assess that performance “without the distortion of hindsight, and must instead

review the circumstances under which [trial] counsel’s decisions were made”);

Carter, 466 A.2d at 1329 (recognizing that, an “unreasonable belief”

                                           - 17 -
J-A22027-23

voluntary manslaughter jury instruction may confuse the jury and invite them

to return a guilty verdict based on whim and caprice).

       Finally, Appellant failed to show how he was prejudiced by the lack of

an “unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter jury instruction, and the

listing of the offense on the verdict form. The jury convicted Appellant of,

inter alia, third-degree murder, which required the jury to find that Appellant

killed the victim with legal malice, but without the specific intent to kill that

was    required    to   convict    Appellant   of   first-degree   murder.12   See

____________________________________________

12 The trial court’s charge included the following pertinent excerpts with regard

to third-degree murder and malice:

       For murder of the third[-]degree a killing is with malice if the
       perpetrator's actions show his wanton and willful disregard of an
       unjustified and extremely high risk that his conduct will result in
       the death or serious bodily injury of another. In this form of
       malice the Commonwealth need not prove that the perpetrator
       specifically intended to kill another. The Commonwealth must
       prove, however, that he took action while consciously disregarding
       the most serious risk he was creating and that, by his disregard
       of that risk, he demonstrated his extreme indifference to the value
       of human life.

       ...

       Third-degree murder is a killing with malice that is not first- or
       second-degree murder.        [Appellant] has been charged with
       third-degree murder. To find [Appellant] guilty of this offense,
       you must find that the following three elements have been proven
       beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that [the victim] is dead;
       second, that [Appellant] killed him; and third, that [Appellant] did
       so with malice.

                                          - 18 -
J-A22027-23

Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A.2d 85, 90 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating,

“[m]alice is the essential element of third[-]degree murder, and is the

distinguishing factor between murder and manslaughter”).               Assuming, for

purpose      of   our   discussion,   that     an   “unreasonable   belief”   voluntary

manslaughter jury instruction had been provided and the offense was listed

on the verdict slip, it still remains that the jury found beyond a reasonable

doubt that Appellant acted with malice and was, therefore, guilty of

third-degree murder. In determining that Appellant acted with malice, there

is a low probability that the jury would have convicted Appellant of

“unreasonable belief” voluntary manslaughter, as malice is not an element of

this criminal offense. Therefore, Appellant failed to demonstrate how he was

____________________________________________

       The word malice, as I'm using it, has a special legal meaning and
       it does not mean hatred, spite[,] or ill[-]will. Malice is a shorthand
       way of referring to particular mental states that the law regards
       as being bad enough to make a killing murder.

       ...

       When deciding whether [Appellant] acted with malice, you should
       consider all of the evidence regarding his words and conduct and
       the attending circumstances that may show a state of mind.

       If you believe that [Appellant] intentionally used a deadly weapon
       on a vital part of [the victim’s] body, you may regard that as an
       item of circumstantial evidence from which you may, if you
       choose, infer that [Appellant] acted with malice.

N.T., 1/29/20, at 234, 236-237.

                                          - 19 -
J-A22027-23

prejudiced        by   the   exclusion   of     the    “unreasonable     belief”   voluntary

manslaughter offense from the proposed jury instructions and verdict slip.

      In sum, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the PCRA

court’s order denying Appellant’s petition on this ground.                  Therefore, we

affirm, in part, the December 5, 2023 order dismissing Appellant’s petition on

this ground.

      Appellant’s remaining three issues are raised for the first time on appeal

within      the    context    of   a     Bradley       ineffectiveness    claim,    wherein

newly-appointed PCRA counsel asserts that Appellant discussed these issues

with original PCRA counsel, but the issues were not presented in the PCRA

petition.    Appellant’s Brief at 11 (stating that, original PCRA counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise these issues before the PCRA court, pursuant to

Bradley, supra).

      In Bradley, our Supreme Court held that

      a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after
      obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA
      counsel's ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if
      on appeal.

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401 (emphasis added) (recognizing that, in light of the

PCRA’s one-year jurisdictional time-bar (to wit, a petition must be filed within

one year of final judgment), permitting a petitioner to raise pro se PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity after the PCRA court denies

relief, preserves a petitioner’s right to effective PCRA counsel). In so holding,

the Bradley Court rejected the argument that “consideration on collateral

                                              - 20 -
J-A22027-23

appeal of claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness” constitutes a second or

subsequent serial PCRA petition or violates the PCRA’s one-year jurisdictional

time-bar. Id. at 404. Moreover, the Bradley Court recognized that “[i]n

some instances, the record before the appellate court will be sufficient to allow

for disposition of any newly-raised ineffectiveness claims.”        Id. at 402.

Otherwise, the Bradley Court explained, “the appellate court may need to

remand [the case] to the PCRA court for further development of the record

and for the PCRA court to consider such claims as an initial matter.” Id.

       A review of the record demonstrates that Appellant’s first opportunity to

raise original PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness emerged upon the filing of

current PCRA counsel’s appellate brief on October 4, 2023.              Because

Appellant’s three issues, noted supra, were first raised with this Court on

appeal within the context of a Bradley ineffectiveness claim, the PCRA court

did not have an opportunity to substantively consider these three issues. As

such, pursuant to Bradley, we are constrained to vacate, in part, the PCRA

court’s December 5, 2023 order, and remand this case so the PCRA court can

substantively consider Appellant’s three issues.13 See Bradley, 261 A.3d at

____________________________________________

13 On October 13, 2023, Appellant filed pro se, with this Court, a “notice of

intent to file another motion for appointment of substitute counsel with the
[PCRA] court.” The envelope Appellant used to mail his “notice” reveals a
postage cancellation stamp of October 13, 2023. Therefore, we deem
Appellant’s “notice” as filed with this Court on October 13, 2023. See Jones,
700 A.2d at 426. Moreover, although Appellant styles his “notice” filed with
this Court as a request for leave to file a motion for the appointment of new

                                          - 21 -
J-A22027-23

402 (permitting the remand of a case for further development of the record

and consideration of the issues by the PCRA court as an initial matter).

       Order affirmed, in part, and vacated, in part.          Case remanded.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

PCRA counsel, we deem Appellant’s “notice,” for purpose of the case sub
judice, as a motion for the appointment of new PCRA counsel.

In his “notice,” Appellant requests that this Court permit him to file a motion
seeking the appointment of new PCRA counsel pursuant to Bradley, supra.
Appellant’s Pro Se Motion, 10/13/23.          In his pro se request for the
appointment of replacement PCRA counsel, Appellant, relying on Bradley,
supra, asserts that current PCRA counsel was ineffective for filing an appellate
brief, on October 4, 2023, raising several issues that were not initially
presented to the PCRA court and, therefore, are subject to waiver because
they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Id., citing Pa.R.A.P. 302(a);
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 704 (Pa. 1998).

As discussed supra, current PCRA counsel raised these three issues, asserting
original PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, within the context of a Bradley
ineffectiveness claim in his October 4, 2023 appellate brief. Within the context
of this Bradley claim, we find that the issues are not subject to waiver.
Therefore, we dismiss Appellant’s “notice” as moot.

Upon remand, however, the PCRA court shall first determine if Appellant
wishes to proceed with current PCRA counsel or have new PCRA counsel
appointed.

                                          - 22 -
J-A22027-23

DATE: 02/23/2024

                   - 23 -