Court Opinion

ID: 9473973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:44:53.764077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:50.600765
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, COFFIN, BOWNES, BREYER and TORRUEL-LA, Circuit Judges.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.
This matter is before us for review en banc of our decision in Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir.1985) wherein we reaffirmed the holding of this circuit, first espoused in United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir.1970), to the effect that “young adults” (ages 18-34) constitute a sufficiently cohesive group to be cognizable in determining whether they are adequately represented within the jury venires for sixth amendment purposes. Upon further consideration we reverse our prior ruling in this case and overrule our holding in Butera and its progeny.1
We need only a brief restatement of the most relevant facts, which were otherwise *997adequately covered in our earlier opinion. At his trial before the Superior Court of Massachusetts, appellant challenged the composition of the venires from which was chosen the jury that tried and convicted him. As indicated, his challenge was based on his contention that persons between the ages of 18 to 34, his definition of “young adults,” were under-represented in the ve-nires. He supported this allegation by presenting in evidence a study2 that statistically establishes a substantial disparity in the traverse jurors in the 18 to 34 age group as compared with the general population encompassing this age group. Appellant presented no other evidence before the state trial court on this issue. This challenge was denied at all state court levels, as well as by the district court in a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Apparently appellant was under the misapprehension, as he has been throughout this appeal, that the establishment of mere statistical disparity in the chosen age group is sufficient to establish a prima facie violation under the sixth amendment. It is beyond argument, however, that the first step in such a claim is the demarcation of a “distinctive” group. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S.Ct. 692, 697, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). This requires: (1) that the group be defined and limited by some clearly identifiable factor (for example, sex or race), (2) that a common thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience run through the group, and (3) that there be a community of interest among the members of the group, such that the group’s interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process. See Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 3546, 82 L.Ed.2d 849 (1984). The reason for these requirements is readily apparent. In choosing a jury we are looking not merely for a statistical mirror of arbitrary segments of the population’s composition. The goal that we seek is that the jury generally represent the attitudes, values, ideas and experience of the eligible citizens that compose the community where the trial is taking place.
The Supreme Court has never gone so far as to hold that the constitution requires venires to be, statistically, a substantially true mirror of the community. See Duren v. Missouri, supra; Taylor v. Louisiana, supra; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 67 S.Ct. 1613, 91 L.Ed. 2043 (1947); United States v. Blair, 493 F.Supp. 398 (D.Md.1980), aff'd, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.1981). While courts often speak in terms of “fair cross section,” they have realized that practical reasons, as well as the sterility of such an endeavor, militate against total realization of this ideal. United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2179, 80 L.Ed.2d 561 (1984); United States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d 692 (11th Cir.1984), reh’g denied, 740 F.2d 979 (1984); United States v. López, 588 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.1979), reh’g denied, 591 F.2d 102 (1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 2895, 61 L.Ed.2d 319 (1979), reh’g denied, 444 U.S. 888, 100 S.Ct. 188, 62 L.Ed.2d 122 (1979). Some people are simply less available than others to serve as jurors, such as highly mobile people, with few local contacts like college students or traveling salesmen; people tied to jobs that are traditionally considered essential to the welfare of the community like firemen, police officers, physicians; and people with social or physical impairments like alcoholics, the hearing impaired, or individuals not versant in the English language. Because a true cross section is practically unobtainable, courts have tended to allow a fair degree of leeway in designating jurors so long as the state or community does not actively prevent people from serving or actively discriminate, and so long as the system is reasonably open to all. United States v. Hafen, supra; United States v. Gregory, supra; United States v. López, supra; Hansen v. United States, 393 F.2d 763 (8th *998Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 833, 89 S.Ct. 103, 21 L.Ed.2d 103 (1968). Strict statistical analysis has been used only in situations where special groups that have been discriminated against are involved. Duren v. Missouri, supra; Taylor v. Louisiana, supra.
Only if we test the goal of communal attitudinal representation against groups that can be identified through principled criteria can we adequately conclude whether the goal has been met. Furthermore, only if principled criteria are established, can appropriate guidance be given to courts and administrators to allow them to determine, in the future, not only whether the goal has been achieved, but also the composition of other groups that litigants may wish to challenge.
In the present case there is simply no evidence in the record for determining that people between the ages of 18 and 34 (as opposed to some other ages) belong to a particular group. The essence of a distinctive group is that its members share specific common characteristics. Yet, what can we identify as the common characteristics of people in an age group that spans a sixteen-year gap, covering such dynamic years in a person’s life as those that are encompassed between the ages of 18 to 34? To be sure, they are all younger than people over 34. But what is the evidence that the attitudes and thinking of, say, 30 year olds have more in common with 18 year olds than they do with 40 year olds, or for that matter, going to the other end of the scale, that 18 year olds have more in common with 28 year olds than with 16 year olds? How do we know that there should not be two groups, 18 to 28 and 28 to 35, or three, or four groups encompassing other boundaries?
The only way to establish the present group, particularly in view of the absence of any scientific or expert evidence in this record, is by arbitrary fiat superimposed on intuition. Even assuming we can be flatly arbitrary, we cannot seriously say that a grouping whose contours are rationally unsupportable is “distinctive.” Is not a “distinctive” group, by definition, one whose membership is reasonably set apart from others by clear lines of demarcation?3 See United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.1977).
Without much effort we can point to various significant social indicators that would seem to punctuate clear differences in the attitudes, values, ideas and experiences of 18 year olds vis-a-vis 34 year olds, to pick only the outer boundaries of appellant’s “young adults” classification. Taking judicial notice4 of official statistics5 we can note meaningful contrasts in such social indicators as their marital and divorce rates,6 school enrollment7 and educational attainment,8 economic status,9 employment *999rate,10 criminality,11 experience in such matters as service in the armed forces in time of war or even in peacetime,12 mental health,13 attitude towards such important social issues as abortion,14 and participation in the political processes,15 and in the ownership of capital property.16 Such differences emphasize the inappropriateness of grouping potently dissimilar age categories, if we are to do other than pay mere lip service to the teachings of Duren.
Of course, we can say, “It does not matter what the precise contours are — dispro-portionality is bad whether the group is 18 to 28, 18 to 35, or 18 to 45.” But if we establish this criteria without more, must we not also be prepared to let each complainant’s attorney select his own age group, based solely upon the age boundaries that suit his purposes by showing the greatest statistical disparity, merely to gain tactical advantage rather than to meet constitutional standards? If we take this approach, then we are clearly doing something different from what the Supreme Court contemplated when it formulated the “distinctive group” concept in Duren. We are losing sight of the goal pursued, that of seeking attitudinal representativeness, and exchanging it for statistical bureaucracy. And as a corollary to all this, those charged with administering the day-to-day workings of the jury system would have great difficulty in determining whether they have complied with the Constitution if they have to contend with such a fluid mark. What guidelines or criteria will they use to determine whether all “groups” are properly represented in the venires?
Implying that any important deviation from a statistical cross section is suspect is torturing the words “distinctive group” into a very different concept. The Duren court used the concept of “distinctive group” in a case where women were subjected to discrimination. It is fair to assume that the court wanted to give heightened scrutiny to groups needing special protection, not to all groups generally. There is nothing to indicate that it meant to take the further step of requiring jury venires to reflect mathematically precise cross sections of the communities from which they are selected. Yet if the age classification is adopted, surely blue-collar workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an endless variety of other classifications will be entitled to similar treatment. These are not the groups that the court has traditionally sought to protect from under-representation on jury venires. See, e.g., Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct. 1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559 (1942) (blacks); Duren v. Missouri, supra (women); United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074, 99 S.Ct. 849, 59 L.Ed.2d 41 (1979) (Indians).
That is not to say, however, that if a classification were specifically and systematically excluded from jury duty the same standard would be used as here, where defendant simply relies on a statisti*1000cally disparity in the venires to challenge its constitutionality. If certain people are specifically and systematically excluded from jury duty, then the jury-administrating authority would have created its own group. Clearly, the state has no right to deliberately exclude specific classes or groups from juries without some very special reason. Thus, it may not forbid blue-collar workers, chess players, Masons, etc., from serving on juries. But if there are, as in the present case, mere statistical imbalances, unexplained, the problem is different. Statistical imbalances can be due to a host of factors — younger people may be away at school, serving in the armed forces, surfing in Hawaii, etc. Unless one is prepared to say that there is an affirmative constitutional duty to produce a true cross section on the venire for every imaginable group that exists in our complex society, something which no court has even come close to holding, we should avoid the overwhelming problems and sterile solutions that will result from attempting to subdivide a continuum of ages into “distinctive groups.”
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled upon whether age groups are “distinctive” enough for sixth amendment purposes (cf. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, decided July 1, 1985, in which the court indicated its declination “to extend heightened [equal protection] review to differential treatment based on age.”), every circuit that has considered this issue, except the First, until now, has ruled against appellant’s contention. See United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905, 93 S.Ct. 2291, 36 L.Ed.2d 970 (1973); United States v. Guzman, 337 F.Supp. 140, 145 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937, 93 S.Ct. 1397, 35 L.Ed.2d 602 (1973); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782, 783-84 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948, 102 S.Ct. 2017, 72 L.Ed.2d 472 (1982); United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969, 92 S.Ct. 2426, 32 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972); Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141, 146 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 975, 103 S.Ct. 310, 74 L.Ed.2d 289 (1982); United States v. Di Tommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 391 (4th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934, 89 S.Ct. 1209, 22 L.Ed.2d 465 (1969); Cox v. Montgomery, 718 F.2d 1036, 1038 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir.1976). We are convinced not by the weight of their numbers but by that of the logic and policy they espouse. We thus join them.
Our earlier decision is vacated and the decision of the district court is affirmed. No costs.

. See La Roche v. Perrin, 718 F.2d 500 (1st Cir.1983).

. Prepared in connection with Commonwealth v. Flaherty, Norfolk Criminal No. 76813.

. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 1971 ed., p. 659, defines "distinctive” as: serving to distinguish, setting apart from others, individualizing; characteristic, peculiar; special; discriminating. Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 425, defines "distinct" as: clear to the senses or mind; easily perceived or understood; plain; unmistakable. Evidently not identical; observably or decidedly different.

. Fed.R.Evid. 201.

. Unless otherwise indicated, they are contained in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982-83, (103d ed.), Washington, D.C., 1982, hereinafter referred to as Abstract.

. Abstract, "Table No. 49. Marital Status of the Population, by Sex and Age, 1981," p. 39. See also "Table No. 124. Marriages and Divorces: 1950 to 1979,” p. 82.

. Abstract, "Table No. 221. School Enrollment and Rate, By Age Sex and Race: 1960 to 1981,” p. 140.

. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Chap. D, "Detailed Population Characteristics," Part 1, § A: United States Tables 253-310 (March 1984).

. Abstract, "Table No. 671. Median Weekly Earnings of Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers, By Selected Characteristic: 1970 to 1981,” p. 404; Abstract, "Table No. 711. Money Income of Households — Aggregate and Mean Income, By Race and Spanish Origin of Householder: 1980,” p. 431, see columns on age of householder, for all races; and Abstract, “Table No. 723. *999Median Money Income of Year-Round Full-Time Workers with Income, By Sex and Age: 1970 to 1980,” p. 438.

. Abstract, "Table No. 626. Civilian Labor Force and Participation Rates, By Race, Sex, and Age: 1960 to 1981,” p. 377.

. Abstract, “Table No. 303. Persons Arrested— Sex, Age and Race: 1970 to 1981,” p. 181; Abstract, "Table No. 330. Jail Inmates — Selected Characteristics: 1978," p. 192.

. Abstract, "Table No. 612. Living Veterans, By Age and Period of Service: 1981,” p. 366.

. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., "Suicide Surveillance, 1970-1980" (April 1985).

. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs., "Abortion Surveillance, 1979-1980” (May 1983).

. Abstract, "Table No. 805. Voting-Age Population, and Percent Reporting Registered and Voted: 1972 to 1980,” p. 492.

. Abstract, "Table No. 860. Stock Ownership— Characteristics of Shareholders: 1959 to 1981," p. 519; Abstract, "Table No. 1146. Farm Operators — Tenure and Characteristics: 1974 and 1978,” p. 654; Abstract, “Table No. 1367. Recent Home Buyers — General Characteristics and Downpayments: 1976 to 1981,” p. 762.