Court Opinion

ID: 9635588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:55:03.27165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:51:11.269836
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that the evidence was insufficient to convict the appellant of violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3742(a). I respectfully disagree and shall therefore set forth my reasons in this opinion.
In Commonwealth v. Stamoolis, 6 Pa.Commw.Ct. 617, 297 A.2d 532 (1972), the commonwealth court construed 75 P.S. § 1027, the predecessor to the aforementioned statute. With regard to the former provision, the court stated:
The section is obviously aimed at those drivers who attempt to flee the scene of an accident in which they have been involved without making known their identity, thus seeking to evade their responsibilities, either criminal or financial, or both..... It is clear, therefore, that § 1027(d) should not be so narrowly and technically construed so as to reach an absurd result.
Id., 6 Pa.Commw.Ct. at 620, 297 A.2d at 533-34. It is my belief that the appellant was not in compliance with either the letter or the spirit of the statute.
Section 3742, and by incorporation Section 3744, imposes certain requirements upon “the driver of any vehicle in*470volved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person.” These requirements are: to stop; to identify oneself; and to render any necessary assistance. The purposes of this statute are obvious. First, it requires the drivers to take immediate measures to mitigate damage to property and injury to persons resulting from the accident. Second, it requires those involved in the accident to exchange certain information which will ensure their later availability to resolve questions of responsibility, and liability. In light of these statutory purposes, I believe the legislature intended that the driver of the vehicle must identify himself as having been involved in the accident. To construe this provision in any other manner will open the way for a myriad of abuses of the statute.1 Since the appellant admits that he did not identify himself as the driver of the vehicle. I would conclude that he has failed to meet the technical requirements as expressed by the letter of the statute.2
In addition, the appellant’s conduct clearly violates the spirit of the statute. The majority states that: “There is no incidence of appellant’s trying to evade his responsibilities— only that of trying to realize his responsibilities.” Majority Opinion, at 469. I would suggest that the inference is not only unsupported in fact, but contrary to the basic legal principle that all favorable inferences are to be given to the verdict winner; in this case the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 450 A.2d 975 (1982); Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 498 Pa. 455, 447 A.2d 234 (1982). Herein, the appellant was aware; (1) that he felt a bump while driving his vehicle; (2) that his vehicle sustained damage (the right front headlamp and reflector were bro*471ken and the radio antenna); and (3) that a mortally wounded man was lying in the street at approximately the location where he felt his vehicle being bumped. Despite these indications which would lead any reasonable man to conclude that he had struck the victim, the appellant chose to conceal his involvement, and in fact denied any knowledge of the accident when specifically asked by a policeman. (N.T. May 19, 1982, at 13).
The present case invites an interesting comparison to Commonwealth v. Hyman, 117 Pa.Super. 585, 178 A. 510 (1935). In Hyman, the defendant was driving east on West Chester Pike late one evening. He was temporarily blinded by the combined oncoming headlights of an automobile and a trolley car when he felt a brushing on the right side of his automobile. He stopped and returned to the point where the brushing occurred and seeing nothing there resumed his journey. When he reached his destination, he parked the vehicle in a public garage, whereupon, he noticed that the passenger side door handle was broken off.
The next day, the defendant read in the newspaper that a man had been killed by a vehicle on West Chester Pike the evening before; a broken off door handle was found at the scene of the accident.
A jury found the defendant guilty of failing to stop and render assistance. This court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove the defendant knew that he had hit someone. The court cited the fact that the victim was thrown off the road and into the bushes by the impact with the car, and the fact that the defendant did not discover the damage to his vehicle until after he had reached his destination.
In the present case, the appellant knew that his car had been damaged, and further knew that an injured man was lying in the road at the approximate point the damage had been sustained. Under these circumstances, the jury could find, and I would submit did find, that the appellant knew that he struck the victim. I would therefore conclude that the appellant was required to identify himself as the driver *472of the vehicle which struck the victim, as soon as possible after his discovery that he was involved in an accident. Because he failed to do so, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.

. An example pointed out by the Commonwealth is where an intoxicated driver is involved in a single car accident, goes home, sobers up and then returns to report his "suspicion" that he was involved in an accident. See Commonwealth v. Wetmore, 69 Pa.D. & C.2d 344 (1974).

. We reiterate that the appellant's failure to proffer the registration number of the vehicle he was driving was also in derogation of the relevant statute.