Court Opinion

ID: 9950750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 19:01:14.274978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:37.985437
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 24a0121n.06

                                           No. 23-1595

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                     FILED
                                                         )                         Mar 14, 2024
 KAREN ALBRIGHT, et al.,
                                                         )                 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
        Plaintiffs-Appellees,                            )
                                                         )
 PAUL HALCZENKO,                                         )      ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                         )      UNITED STATES DISTRICT
        Proposed Intervenor-Appellant,
                                                         )      COURT FOR THE WESTERN
                                                         )      DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
                v.
                                                         )
                                                         )                             OPINION
 ASCENSION MICHIGAN, et al.,
                                                         )
        Defendants-Appellees.                            )

Before: GRIFFIN, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

       GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

       After proposed intervenor Dr. Paul Halczenko objected to receiving the COVID-19 vaccine

on religious grounds, his employer, defendant Ascension, suspended him without pay. He now

seeks to intervene in this class action brought by several Ascension employees who similarly

refused the vaccine for religious reasons. At the time Halczenko filed his motion to intervene, the

district court had already preliminarily approved a nationwide class settlement. The district court

denied Dr. Halczenko’s motion to intervene, and we affirm.

                                                I.

       A few months after the COVID-19 vaccine became available, Ascension required all

employees to receive it. Plaintiffs sought religious accommodations to the mandate, but their

requests were denied, and Ascension ultimately suspended them without pay when they failed to
No. 23-1595, Albright, et al. v. Ascension Michigan, et al.

comply. Five weeks later, some plaintiffs were recalled to work, while others were told that their

positions had been filled during their suspensions. Plaintiffs then commenced this action, filing a

class action complaint on behalf of Ascension’s Michigan employees who were denied a religious

exemption to the vaccine mandate and either suspended or forced to resign, alleging violations of

federal and Michigan law.

       Settlement negotiations were successful, and the district court preliminarily approved the

parties’ proposed settlement—class members would receive up to five weeks of the average

weekly salary for their subclass (either physician, nurse, or technician) based on how long they

were “suspended or removed from Ascension employment.” The district court’s order explained

that class members could opt out of the settlement, meaning they would not be bound by the

settlement agreement’s terms. But if class members did not opt out, they would automatically be

included in the class, and they would release all vaccine-mandate-related claims against Ascension

and could attend a fairness hearing to comment and object to the proposed settlement. The district

court also stayed all other cases raising similar claims elsewhere.         It approved the class

representatives and their attorneys as class counsel, and it permitted plaintiffs to file an amended

complaint. The amended complaint raised the same basic claims as the original complaint,

although it expanded the class (and claims) nationwide.

       Soon thereafter, Dr. Paul Halczenko moved to intervene permissively and as of right on

the basis that he had raised similar claims against Ascension in a separate class-action complaint

filed eight months before the complaint here. Dr. Halczenko also moved to set aside or stay the

district court’s preliminary order approving the class settlement and to transfer venue to the

Southern District of Indiana, where his case was pending. The district court denied these motions.

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No. 23-1595, Albright, et al. v. Ascension Michigan, et al.

         Dr. Halczenko timely appealed the district court’s order and, on appeal, moved for an

emergency stay pending appeal, which we denied. Since then, Dr. Halczenko has opted out of the

class.

                                                  II.

                                                  A.

         Dr. Halczenko first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to intervene

as of right. To intervene as of right, Dr. Halczenko

         must establish the following four elements: (1) the motion to intervene is timely;
         (2) the proposed intervenor has a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of
         the case; (3) the proposed intervenor’s ability to protect that interest may be
         impaired in the absence of intervention; and (4) the parties already before the court
         may not adequately represent the proposed intervenor’s interest.

United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 2005). If even a single element is missing,

Dr. Halczenko cannot intervene as of right. Id. “We review a district court’s denial of intervention

as of right de novo, except for the timeliness element, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”

Id.

         Although a panel of this court previously concluded Dr. Halczenko was unlikely to satisfy

the second and third elements, we will resolve this appeal on the fourth—Dr. Halczenko is not

entitled to intervention because he cannot demonstrate inadequate representation. “Applicants for

intervention bear the burden of proving that they are inadequately represented by a party to the

suit.” Id. When, as here, the proposed intervenor and a party to the suit “share the same ultimate

objective,” we presume representation is adequate. Id. at 444. “That presumption may be

overcome by showing, inter alia, that the party has interests adverse to the intervener.” Wineries

of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass’n v. Twp. of Peninsula, 41 F.4th 767, 774 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

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No. 23-1595, Albright, et al. v. Ascension Michigan, et al.

       We have “held that a movant fails to meet his burden of demonstrating inadequate

representation when 1) no collusion is shown between the existing party and the opposition; 2) the

existing party does not have any interests adverse to the intervener; and 3) the existing party has

not failed in the fulfillment of its duty.” Jordan v. Mich. Conf. of Teamsters Welfare Fund,

207 F.3d 854, 863 (6th Cir. 2000). “A mere disagreement over litigation strategy or individual

aspects of a remediation plan does not, in and of itself, establish inadequacy of representation.”

Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987). Indeed, a purported lack of vigor in

litigation compared to what the movant would have summoned cannot show the necessary

inadequate representation. See Jordan, 207 F.3d at 863. Similarly, the decision to negotiate with

the other side and reach a less-than-ideal compromise “is not the equivalent of ‘collusion’ with the

opposing party.” Bradley, 828 F.2d at 1193.

       Dr. Halczenko and plaintiffs are in the same positions. Both the allegations (Ascension

unlawfully denied them religious exemptions to the COVID-19 vaccine mandates) and the

requested relief (monetary damages) are identical. So, Dr. Halczenko and plaintiffs share the same

ultimate goal, which creates a presumption that the parties already before the court adequately

represent Dr. Halczenko’s interests. Michigan, 424 F.3d at 443.

       He cannot overcome this presumption by complaining that class counsel should have

negotiated more favorable terms with Ascension to show a purported adverse interest. See

Wineries, 41 F.4th at 774; Bradley, 828 F.2d at 1193. After all, settlements are exactly that—a

compromise in which neither side is likely to be happy. To the extent Dr. Halczenko argues that

class counsel did not press harder in negotiating the settlement, that is a classic example of

litigation strategy, which cannot satisfy his burden to show inadequate representation. See

Bradley, 828 F.2d at 1192. Nor does he identify any arguments class counsel failed to make, and

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No. 23-1595, Albright, et al. v. Ascension Michigan, et al.

instead reverts back to attacking the settlement’s substance—which, as set forth—furthered the

same ultimate goal he had. Finally, Dr. Halczenko speculates that the settlement was collusive,

but points to no such evidence.       For these reasons, Dr. Halczenko cannot overcome the

presumption of adequate representation.

        Thus, we affirm the district court’s order denying Dr. Halczenko’s motion for intervention

as of right.

                                                 B.

        Dr. Halczenko next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for permissive

intervention. “The denial of permissive intervention should be reversed only for clear abuse of

discretion by the trial judge.” Michigan, 424 F.3d at 445 (citation omitted).

        His parallel case in the Southern District of Indiana makes reversal inappropriate here. In

Head v. Jellico Housing Authority, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when

denying a motion for permissive intervention because the proposed intervenor had “availed herself

of other adequate means of asserting her rights” by filing a separate complaint that was

“substantially similar to her proposed intervenor complaint.” 870 F.2d 1117, 1124–25 (6th Cir.

1989). That is exactly the situation we are presented with here. Dr. Halczenko already has a

parallel case in federal court asserting his individual rights. And by opting out of the class here,

he has signaled that he views pursuing his claims individually as a better course than remaining a

member of the class. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dr.

Halczenko’s motion for permissive intervention.1

        1
          Dr. Halczenko also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to set aside and to
transfer, but he asks us to reverse that decision only “[i]f this Court reverses the decision of the
district court on intervention.” Appellant Br. at 53. Because we affirm the denial of his motion to
intervene, we need not address this conditional portion of Dr. Halczenko’s appeal.

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No. 23-1595, Albright, et al. v. Ascension Michigan, et al.

                                               III.

       For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

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