Court Opinion

ID: 9574817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:08:40.74576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:17.403588
License: Public Domain

ROGGENSACK, J.
(dissenting). Because I conclude that Elgin and Carol stated a claim sufficient to warrant a hearing on the issue of visitation and that the circuit court erred when it granted the department's motion to dismiss their visitation petition, I respectfully dissent from the part of the majority opinion which addresses visitation.
No evidence was taken in regard to Elgin and Carol's petition for visitation. Instead, the circuit court dismissed it on the department's motion. Such a dismissal is a dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief. Therefore, the circuit court's decision can be sustained only if under no circumstances could Elgin and Carol be afforded the visitation they seek. See Heinritz v. Lawrence University, 194 Wis. 2d 606, 610, 535 N.W.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 1995).
Visitation is not controlled solely by statute. See Holtzman v. Knott, 193 Wis. 2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995). A visitation petition which meets the two-part *53test of asserting a significant "triggering" event and a sufficient parent-like relationship states a claim for relief when it is filed by one who is not a parent, even when the parent of the child objects to visitation. Id.
[A] circuit court has equitable power to hear a petition for visitation when it determines that the petitioner has a parent-like relationship with the child and that a significant triggering event justifies state intervention in the child's relationship with a biological or adoptive parent.
Id. at 694, 533 N.W.2d at 435. Once sufficient allegations have been made in the petition, a hearing must be held to determine whether the petitioner can prove the components necessary to each requirement. If this burden is carried, then the circuit court must consider whether visitation is in the best interest of the child. Id.
The holding in Holtzman is bottomed on the supreme court's conclusion that a parent does not have an absolute right to determine who shall visit his/her child.
The law does not support... [the] claim that biological or adoptive parents have absolute rights in their children. The public policy of the state, established by the legislature, directs the court to respect and protect parental autonomy and at the same time to serve the best interest of the child.
Id. at 692-93, 533 N.W.2d at 435. The supreme court acknowledged the judicial trend toward "considering or allowing visitation to nonparents who have a parent-like relationship with the child if visitation would be in the best interest of the child." Id. at 693 n.37, 533 N.W.2d at 435 n.37. This trend is grounded in the rec*54ognition that there may be some relationships that are in the child's best interest, even though the parent objects. The trend to balance the interest of the child with that of the parent was reaffirmed in Sallie T. v. Milwaukee County Dept. of Health and Human Services., 212 Wis. 2d 694, 570 N.W.2d 46 (1998). In Sallie T., the supreme court concluded there is no legal presumption that a biological parent's compliance with the conditions of a circuit court's CHIPS dispositional order conclusively proves that the best interest of the child would be furthered by returning the child to the biological parent. Id. at 708-09, 570 N.W.2d at 52-53.
It is important to note that in both Holtzman and Sallie T. the party petitioning the court was not the child or the child's guardian ad litem.1 However, the court, nonetheless, examined the requested visitation from the perspective of the best interest of the child, thereby weighing the child's interests even though the child was not a party. The outcomes in Holtzman and Sallie T. are driven by the relationships of the petitioners to the children. Therefore, in order for a relationship to achieve status sufficient to obtain consideration from the courts, it must be a significant parent-like, bonded relationship which was developed with the consent of the child's parent, through time spent with, and care given to, the child. It is not necessary that the relationship be familial; nor would a person who had a familial relationship to the child be precluded from seeking visitation under the standards set in Holtzman and Sallie T.
I have examined the petition filed by Elgin and Carol in light of the directive of the supreme court in Holtzman. They alleged a significant parent-like rela*55tionship with Jeffrey, for more than nine years. They claimed assumption of his education and development and that they cohabited and shared childcare and financial responsibility for Jeffrey in a bonded, dependent relationship, with the consent of Christie, Jeffrey's mother. Furthermore, they alleged the department's termination of their visitation on March 21, 1997, which the circuit court could conclude was a significant triggering event warranting the intervention of the state.2
Therefore, because I conclude that the petition is sufficient to state a claim for visitation, I also conclude Elgin and Carol should have been given a hearing to determine whether they could prove the facts alleged constituted a significant triggering event and a sufficient parent-like relationship with Jeffrey.3 I must respectfully dissent.

 In Holtzman, the petitioner was the former partner of the mother and in Sallie T., the petitioner was the foster mother.

 Elgin and Carol filed their visitation petition on March 27, 1997. The current adoptive parents, Tamra and Jeff, did not file their petition for adoption until August 28,1997.

 If they satisfy that burden, the court should then hold a hearing to determine whether visitation with Elgin and Carol is in Jeffrey's best interest.