Court Opinion

ID: 9402297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 16:14:37.088467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.858314
License: Public Domain

J-A01035-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    JOANN RODRIGUEZ,                    :  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellee             :
                                        :
             v.                         :
                                        :
    KEYSTONE QUALITY TRANSPORT          :
    CO.,                                :
                                        :
                   Appellant            : No. 2287 EDA 2019

              Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 16, 2019
            in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
          Civil Division at No(s): December Term 2017 No. 00517

BEFORE:     BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J. AND STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:
                                                     FILED JUNE 15, 2023
       Appellant, Keystone Quality Transport Co. (Keystone), appeals from a

judgment entered on July 16, 2019 in favor of Joann Rodriguez (Rodriguez).1

The case returns to us after our Supreme Court vacated our original order

entered on July 23, 2021, and remanded this matter for application of the

1 Keystone purported to appeal from a June 13, 2019 order denying its
motion for post-trial relief; however, an appeal properly lies from the entry
of judgment following the trial court’s disposition of post-trial motions. See
Fanning v. Davne, 795 A.2d 388 (Pa. Super. 2002). Although Keystone’s
notice of appeal was filed prematurely, final judgment was entered on July
16, 2019; hence, the notice of appeal relates forward to that date. See
Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5); see also Drum v. Shaul Equipment and Supply
Co., 787 A.2d 1050, 1052 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2001) (entry of final judgment
during pendency of appeal is sufficient to perfect appellate jurisdiction). We
have amended the caption accordingly.

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A01035-21

harmless error standard articulated in Grove v. Authority of Allegheny

County, 218 A.3d 877 (Pa. 2019).2 Upon review, we affirm the judgment

originally entered in the trial court.

      The underlying case stems from a motor vehicle accident that occurred

on September 1, 2006.       The trial court summarized the relevant facts as

follows.

      At the time of the incident, [] Rodriguez, a nurse’s assistant, was
      a front seat passenger in an ambulance owned by defendant,
      Keystone, and operated by its employee, [Daniel McCanns],FN1
      which rear-ended a car stopped at a red light at the intersection
      of Girard Avenue and 38th Street in Philadelphia. At the time,
      the ambulance was transporting [to court] a patient of the
      hospital where [] Rodriguez worked. Per her job duties, []
      Rodriguez was required to escort patients to and from the
      hospital after a visit to court for a hearing. She was not an
      employee or borrowed servant of Keystone, therefore worker
      compensation implications were not [implicated in her claims
      against Keystone].

      [Rodriguez sued Keystone for damages to compensate for lost
      wages and injuries, contending that Keystone’s employee
      operated the ambulance negligently]. A jury trial commenced on

2 When this appeal was originally before this Court, we consolidated it with
a related appeal docketed at 157 EDA 2020. At Superior Court docket
number 157 EDA 2020, Keystone challenged a December 12, 2019 trial
court order that directed it to post an appeal bond that conformed to
Pa.R.A.P. 1734. Since our original order vacated the judgment entered in
the trial court (and challenged on appeal at Superior Court docket number
2287 EDA 2019), our prior disposition dismissed the appeal lodged at 157
EDA 2020 as moot. Rodriguez did not challenge our disposition at docket
number 157 EDA 2020 in her petition for allowance of appeal and that
matter was not included within the Supreme Court’s remand order. Hence,
we shall treat the matter docketed at 157 EDA 2020 as fully and finally
concluded and shall not address it further in this memorandum.

                                         -2-
J-A01035-21

     January 29, 2019[,] and concluded with a verdict in her favor
     and against Keystone totaling $610,000.00.FN2             At trial,
     Rodriguez testified that [it was raining on the day of the
     accident] and the streets were wet. She testified that the
     ambulance driver was driving too fast and recklessly throughout
     the trip. Just prior to the accident, she estimated the speed of
     the ambulance as between 50 and 60 miles per hour. She made
     this observation just prior to observing the traffic stopped ahead
     at a red light. Keystone contested the speed of the vehicle and
     its employee[, Cory Lundberg, who was riding in the back of the
     ambulance,] testified [the ambulance] was traveling in the 35
     [mile-per-hour] range.

     The ambulance driver then attempted to make a sudden stop,
     but the ambulance skidded and slid on the trolley tracks,
     [colliding with] the rear of a car stopped at a red traffic light. []
     Rodriguez testified that she [felt] immediate pain in her left leg
     and went to her employer[-]referred medical office immediately
     after returning to the hospital.

     _____
     FN1 Mr. McCan[n]s did not attend the trial.

     FN2 The jury awarded $10,000.00               for   lost   wages   and
     $600,000.00 for pain and suffering.
     _____

     An MRI of [Rodriguez’s] lumbar spine revealed a large herniated
     and protruding disc at L5-S1 impinging on the S1 nerve. She
     followed the doctors’ advice and underwent physical therapy for
     approximately six months. She was out of work for five months
     and then placed on limited duty for three and [one-half] months.
     The jury [heard] evidence of … her lost wages to be
     $20,0000.00. Her workers compensation doctor, Mark Allen,
     M.D., testified that the injuries she suffered were permanent,
     severe[,] and a “ticking time bomb” with a potential for serious
     future complications and possibly even surgery. After hearing all
     of the evidence presented by both parties, the jury deliberated
     and returned the aforesaid verdict.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/2020, at 7-8 (footnotes in original; party

designations and unnecessary capitalization altered).

                                     -3-
J-A01035-21

        Keystone timely filed a post-trial motion, which the trial court denied

on June 13, 2019. Judgment was entered in Rodriguez’s favor on July 16,

2019. Keystone filed a notice of appeal, which was docketed at 2287 EDA

2019.     The trial court ordered Keystone to file a concise statement of

matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and

Keystone complied.

        On appeal, this Court vacated the judgment entered in favor of

Rodriguez, concluding that the trial court erred, under Pa.R.E. 407, in

admitting evidence that Keystone terminated the ambulance driver after the

accident.    See Rodriguez v. Keystone Quality Transp. Co., 260 A.3d

160, at *4-7 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum).                We further

concluded that Keystone was entitled to a new trial since the erroneous

admission of the driver’s termination was not harmless.

        On October 20, 2021, Rodriguez filed a petition for allowance of appeal

raising two claims.      Rodriguez first claimed that this Court erred in

concluding    that   admission   of   the   driver’s   termination   constituted   a

subsequent remedial measure under Pa.R.E. 407.                Second, Rodriguez

asserted that any erroneous admission of such evidence was harmless. On

April 12, 2022, our Supreme Court granted Rodriguez’s petition as to her

                                       -4-
J-A01035-21

second issue only,3 vacated the prior decision of this Court, and remanded

this matter to allow us to consider whether the erroneous admission of the

driver’s termination was harmless under the standard articulated in Grove,

supra.

      Before we address the issues that currently confront us, we briefly

review the facts and legal conclusions reached by our Supreme Court in

Grove. In that case, a pedestrian filed a negligence action against a county

transportation authority to recover for severe injuries she sustained when

she was struck by a county bus. At a charging conference convened at the

conclusion of trial, the county authority requested a negligence per se

instruction and asked the court to charge the jury on four provisions in the

Motor Vehicle Code that pertained to a pedestrian’s duty of care. The trial

court declined the authority’s request, noting that the pedestrian was not

cited for any statutory violation referenced by the authority.4 Ultimately, the

jury reached a verdict, finding the pedestrian and the authority each 50%

3
  Since the Supreme Court declined to review Rodriquez’s claim that this
Court erroneously concluded that the termination of the driver constituted a
subsequent remedial measure under Pa.R.E. 407, we shall treat our earlier
disposition of that issue as final.

4
  During deliberations, the jury submitted three written questions to the trial
court, two of which touched upon a pedestrian’s exercise of care. In
response, the authority renewed its request that the court instruct the jury
about the Motor Vehicle Code provisions. Again, the court refused to
instruct the jury in accordance with the authority’s request. See Grove,
218 A.3d at 883.

                                     -5-
J-A01035-21

negligent.   Considering the pedestrian’s contributory negligence, the court

reduced the jury’s award by half and, subsequently, further reduced its

verdict to comply with the statutory cap on the liability of a Commonwealth

agency. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8528(b).

      The authority requested a new trial in a post-trial motion which argued

that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on a pedestrian’s duty of

care as addressed in the various Motor Vehicle Code provisions highlighted

by the authority.   The court denied the authority’s motion, reasoning that

“the most a negligence per se instruction could have done for [the authority]

would have been to lead the jury to find [the pedestrian] negligent.” Grove,

218 A.3d at 883.    Accordingly, the court concluded that, because the jury

found the pedestrian negligent, the absence of the per se charge did not

impact the jurors' negligence determination and the omission could not have

been prejudicial to the authority. See id.

      After the authority appealed, a divided panel of the Commonwealth

Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for a new trial,

concluding that the court failed to properly charge the jury regarding the

apportionment of comparative negligence.      Grove v. Port Authority, 178

A.3d 239, 241 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), appeal granted, 193 A.3d 343 (Pa.

2019). Noting that the jury’s request for guidance concerning a pedestrian’s

duty of care signified the importance of such instructions, the panel majority

found that the trial court’s refusal to provide the requested guidance could

                                     -6-
J-A01035-21

have impacted the jury’s ultimate apportionment of damages. Grove, 178

A.3d at 249 (finding “a substantial possibility that the trial court's refusal to

provide [the] requested instructions . . . influenced the jury's apportionment

deliberations”).   A dissenting panel member agreed with the majority that

the trial court should have given the requested negligence per se instruction

but reasoned that the omission was harmless since such a charge would not

have made a difference in the jury’s final allocation of fault.     Grove, 178

A.3d at 252.

      Our    Supreme     Court   rejected   the    analysis   offered   by   the

Commonwealth Court’s majority.          Substantively, the Supreme Court’s

analysis recalled that, under Pennsylvania tort law, a negligence per se

charge related only to the first two elements of a negligence claim, duty and

breach of that duty, and not to the element of causation. Grove, 218 A.3d

at 888.     Since the Grove jury ultimately found the pedestrian to be

negligent, the Court reasoned that the jury found she breached a duty she

owed to the authority. Regardless of whether the jury found the pedestrian

negligent under a general theory, or because she violated a statute bearing

upon a pedestrian’s duty of care, the omitted negligence per se charge bore

no relevance to the jury’s deliberations pertinent to the distinct issues of

factual causation and the allocation of comparative fault.          See id. at

888-889. Hence, in the Court’s view, any omission of a negligence per se

                                      -7-
J-A01035-21

charge was not a fundamental error and the authority was not prejudiced.

See id. at 888.

     After observing that, “[t]he harmless error doctrine underlies every

decision to grant or deny a new trial[,]” Grove, 218 A.3d at 888, our

Supreme court declared that “an appellate court [may] not grant a new trial

absent a finding of [] fundamental error or prejudicial omission.” Id. Relief

in the form of a new trial is unwarranted simply because an irregularity or

error occurred during the proceedings, and a speculative conclusion that an

irregularity at trial may have affected an outcome does not establish valid

grounds for a retrial. See id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the

order of the Commonwealth Court.5

     After the Supreme Court vacated our original order and remanded this

matter for application of the harmless error standard articulated in Grove,

this Court directed the parties to file briefs addressing the application of

Grove to the facts of this case. Both parties have now done so. Keystone

urges us to affirm our prior ruling and again vacate the trial court’s

judgment because the erroneous admission of evidence pertaining to the

driver’s termination was not harmless.    Specifically, Keystone asserts that

prejudice was inherent in the trial court’s erroneous admission of subsequent

5
  In a subsequent decision, the Supreme court suggested that prejudice is
shown where there is a reasonable probability that a trial outcome would be
different if an error or irregularity had not occurred. Graham v. Check, 243
A.3d 153, 173 (Pa. 2020).

                                    -8-
J-A01035-21

remedial measure evidence.       See Keystone’s Brief on Remand at 6.

Keystone also claims that the trial court’s error was not harmless since

counsel for Rodriguez emphasized the evidence and invited the jury to

consider it during deliberations. See id. at 7. Rodriguez counters that any

prejudicial effect arising from the trial court’s error is purely speculative

since Keystone’s counsel conceded that the driver was negligent, and the

facts introduced at trial compellingly showed the driver was unable to avoid

a rear-end collision because he was operating the ambulance too fast for

rainy conditions. See Rodriguez’s Brief on Remand at 5.

      After careful consideration, we agree with the trial court that the

erroneous admission of evidence pertaining to the driver’s termination was

harmless under the standard articulated in Grove and in view of the

circumstances of this case. Substantial and unrefuted evidence admitted at

trial supported the jury’s verdict that the negligence of Keystone’s

ambulance driver led to the rear-end collision which caused the injuries

sustained by Rodriguez.    At trial, Keystone’s employee Lundberg testified

that, at the time of the collision, he was seated in the back of the ambulance

when he experienced the sudden application of the vehicle’s brakes, sensed

the ambulance skidding several feet on the rain-slicked trolley tracks, and

felt the ambulance collide with a stopped vehicle.          In view of this

uncontested evidence, there is little reason to conclude that a different

outcome was likely if the jury did not learn that Keystone terminated

                                    -9-
J-A01035-21

McCanns     after   the   accident.      Additionally,   references       to     McCanns’

termination by counsel for Rodriguez do not alter our finding of harmless

error since counsel for Keystone conceded, on more than one occasion

(including his closing argument), that McCanns’ negligence led to the

collision in which Rodriguez sustained her injuries.

      We are reluctant to accept Keystone’s argument that a new trial is

warranted because inherent prejudice emerged from the trial court’s

erroneous evidentiary ruling, as such a position would tend to supplant the

harmless error inquiry in all cases.         In addition, we see little practical

difference between Keystone’s claim of inherent prejudice as grounds for a

new trial and the speculative justifications for retrial that were rejected by

the Supreme Court in Grove.           In short, the record in this case does not

establish   that    the   erroneous    admission   of    the   driver’s        termination

contributed materially to the jury’s determination that Keystones’ employee

was negligent. Hence, the trial court’s error was harmless.

      Having concluded that the erroneous admission of evidence pertaining

to McCanns’ termination following the accident constituted harmless error,

we now address the second and third claims Keystone raised in its original

submission. In its original second claim, Keystone argued that the trial court

erred or abused its discretion in denying Keystone’s request for a remittitur

of the jury’s award. To support this claim, Keystone relied upon Rodriguez’s

trial testimony in which she stated that she did not feel pain immediately

                                        - 10 -
J-A01035-21

after the accident, that she returned to work less than a year after the

accident, and that she currently experienced only intermittent discomfort

approximately four times per month last about 30 to 40 minutes.

Keystone’s Original Brief at 19-20.        In view of these facts, Keystone

maintains that the jury’s $600,000.00 award for pain and suffering bore no

relationship to the claimed injuries and the evidence introduced at trial. Id.

at 21. As such, Keystone concludes that the verdict does not represent fair

and reasonable compensation but, instead, an award tarnished by biased,

mistaken, corrupt, and prejudiced deliberations. See id.

      The following principles govern our review of an order disposing of a

request for remittitur.

      We review the trial court's decision to deny Appellant's request
      for remittitur for an abuse of discretion or error of law.
      Remittitur is justified only in limited instances such as [] where
      the verdict plainly is excessive, exorbitant, and beyond what the
      evidence warrants or where the verdict resulted from partiality,
      prejudice, mistake, or corruption.

      On appeal, we review whether the jury verdict so shocks the
      sense of justice such that the trial court should have granted
      remittitur as a matter of law. We cannot merely substitute our
      judgment for that of the fact-finder and we must review the
      record “in light of the evidence accepted by the jury. Our
      Supreme Court reiterated these principles as follows:           In
      reviewing the award of damages, the appellate courts should
      give deference to the decisions of the trier of fact who is usually
      in a superior position to appraise and weigh the evidence.

                                     ***

      The focus of our review is as follows:

                                    - 11 -
J-A01035-21

        In determining whether a jury's award of damages is
        supported by the evidence, the following factors are taken
        into account:

        1.) the severity of the injury;

        2.) whether the injury is demonstrated by objective physical
        evidence or subjective evidence;

        3.) whether the injury is permanent;

        4.) the plaintiff's ability to continue employment;

        5.) disparity between the amount of out of pocket expenses
        and the amount of the verdict; and

        6.) damages plaintiff requested in his complaint.

Smalls v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp., 843 A.2d 410-415 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(internal citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 857 A.2d 680

(Pa. 2004).

      The trial court carefully reviewed the evidence introduced at trial and

gave close attention to whether the jury’s verdict bore a reasonable

relationship to that evidence. The court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion offered

the following reasons for denying Keystone’s request for remittitur.

      In this case, the jury verdict was reasonable and proper where
      [Rodriguez] testified that she had severe pain and suffering and
      debilitating injuries.   Her medical expert, Mark Allan, M.D.,
      testified that she had suffered a large herniated and protruding
      [] disc at L5-S1 that was impinging on her S1 nerve, a bulging
      disc at L4-5 and a strain [] of her lower back, [and] that her
      injuries were permanent and she was “a ticking time bomb.” He
      directly related these injuries to the incident in question. Given
      these injuries, [Rodriguez] will be subject to ongoing
      participation in a therapy program, the possibility of steroidal
      injections and even lumbar disc surgery due to the extruded and

                                     - 12 -
J-A01035-21

      large disc herniation at L5-S1 which causes nerve compression
      directly on the S-1 nerve root.

      [Keystone] presented the videotape deposition of its medical
      expert, Dr. Christian Fras, who testified in a manner
      diametrically opposed to Dr. Allan. It was solely within the jury’s
      purview to credit which expert was more credible and [the trial
      court] will not and cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
      jury.

      During its charge, [the trial court] properly instructed the jury
      that [Rodriguez] had a 52.2 year life expectancy from the time
      of trial. In light of the testimony regarding the permanency of
      her injuries, it is apparent that the jury weighed this testimony
      and calculated a lifetime of pain and suffering in its
      non-compensatory damages award. Twelve (12) months per
      year times 52.2 years equates to approximately 626 months. In
      light of a $600,000.00 verdict for non-compensatory damages, it
      amounts to [$958.47] per month. Although the award may
      initially seem excessive on its face, in light of this breakdown, it
      does not in any way shock the conscious of [the trial court] to a
      point where it would be deemed excessive [and] warranting a
      new trial, nor does it require [the trial court] to cast doubt upon
      the jury’s conclusions which would warrant [the award to be
      downwardly adjusted].

Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/20, at 13-14.

      We agree with the trial court that, in view of the evidence introduced

at trial - particularly Dr. Allan’s testimony characterizing Appellant’s injuries

as permanent and severe, the jury’s award was neither plainly excessive nor

the product of biased, mistaken, or corrupt deliberations.      Hence, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Keystone’s request for

remittitur.

      In its original third claim, Keystone argued that it was entitled to a

new trial because the jury’s verdict was inconsistent.       In developing this

                                     - 13 -
J-A01035-21

claim, Keystone notes initially that Rodriguez requested $20,000.00, but

received only $10,000.00, for lost wages due to injuries she sustained in the

accident. Based upon this difference, Keystone infers that the jury rejected

the credibility of Rodriguez’s lost wage claim and believed she could have

returned to work sooner than she did.          Citing an alleged incongruence

between the jury’s supposed rejection of Rodriguez’s lost wages claim, and

its $600,000.00 pain and suffering award, Keystone insists that the verdict

in this case was inconsistent and that it is entitled to a new trial.

      Like the trial court, we read Keystone’s claim to be a challenge alleging

that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence introduced

at trial. Our standard of review for a weight claim is well established.

      [A]ppellate review of a weight claim is a review of the [trial
      court's] exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of
      whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
      Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
      the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
      consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
      judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
      assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the
      lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not against
      the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be
      granted in the interest of justice.

Phillips v. Lock, 86 A.3d 906, 919-920 (Pa. Super. 2014).

      Keystone’s claim does not merit relief.      Preliminarily, Keystone does

not cite pertinent authority or the certified record in support of its position;

instead, Keystone identifies a debatable inference and uses it as a platform

to suggest infirmities in the jury’s verdict. Essentially, Keystone asks us to

                                      - 14 -
J-A01035-21

re-weigh the evidence and adopt an interpretation of the facts consistent

with its view of what the trial testimony showed. This is inconsistent with

our function in reviewing the merits of a weight claim. Accordingly, based

on our review of the record and our assessment of the trial court’s

determination that the verdict was not contrary to the evidence introduced

at trial, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or

commit an error of law when it found that Keystone was not entitled to a

new trial.

      Judgment affirmed.

      Judge Strassburger did not participate in the consideration or decision

of this case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/15/2023

                                   - 15 -