Court Opinion

ID: 9373302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:03.810724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.866300
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     TONY KING,                                      DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  AT-0752-18-0079-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: October 20, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Andrew Kim, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

           Jose Calvo, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     reversed the appellant’s removal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT
     the agency’s petition for review and REVERSE the administrative judge’s finding
     on the appellant’s affirmative defense, instead finding that the appellant failed to

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     prove that retaliation for filing equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints
     was a motivating factor in the agency’s removal action.           We AFFIRM the
     administrative judge’s reversal of the appellant’s removal

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The     agency   removed   the   appellant   from   his   GS-12   Enforcement
     Investigative and Analysis Officer (EIAO) position with the Food Safety and
     Inspection Service based on the charges of (1) unprofessional conduct and
     (2) failure to follow instructions.    Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 15-19,
     153-59. Regarding the charge of unprofessional conduct, the agency alleged that
     during a December 6, 2016 Routine Listeria Monocytogenes ·(RLM) sampling at
     Wayne Farms in Decatur, Alabama, the appellant, who was aided by a Consumer
     Safety Inspector (CSI), got within inches of the CSI’s face and stated, “Do you
     know who I am?” Id. at 153. The agency alleged that the appellant’s behavior
     and tone were intimidating and his conduct unprofessional. Id. Regarding the
     charge of failure to follow instructions, the agency alleged that on three occasions
     the appellant failed to timely respond to email instructions. Id. at 154.
¶3         The appellant filed a Board appeal of the agency’s action, alleging
     retaliation for filing EEO complaints and requesting a hearing. IAF, Tabs 1, 19.
¶4         After the hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     reversing the removal. IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 20. She found
     that those present at the Wayne Farms RLM sampling included, in addition to the
     appellant and the CSI, another EIAO and an employee of Wayne Farms.              ID
     at 7-8.     She credited the testimony of the Wayne Farms employee that the
     appellant did not raise his voice, speak in a threatening manner or get close to the
     CSI’s face, and was not combative. ID at 11. Thus, she found that the agency
     did not prove charge (1). Id. She also found that the agency failed to show that
     the appellant did not timely respond to three emails and thus failed to prove
                                                                                             3

     charge (2). ID at 11-15. Additionally, she found that the appellant established
     that the removal action constituted retaliation for his EEO activity. ID at 16-20.
¶5         In its petition for review, the agency alleges that the administrative judge
     erred in finding that it did not prove charge (1). 2 Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tab 1 at 4-5, 8-14. 3    In addition, the agency contends that the administrative
     judge erred in making findings on the appellant’s affirmative defense of reprisal
     for filing EEO complaints because the affirmative defense became moot when the
     appellant failed to seek consequential damages.          Id. at 4-5, 14-15.    Also, the
     agency asserts that the administrative judge erred in finding retaliation.             Id.

     2
       The agency does not argue that the administrative judge      erred in finding that the
     agency failed to prove charge (2). We therefore find           no basis to disturb the
     administrative judge’s determinations regarding charge (2).     See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
     (noting that the Board normally will consider only issues      raised in a timely filed
     petition or cross petition for review).
     3
       In the initial decision, the administrative judge ordered interim relief. ID at 21 -22.
     Accompanying the agency’s petition for review is evidence that it has complied with
     the interim relief order. PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-36. In a January 12, 2020 filing titled
     “Petition for Enforcement,” the appellant argues that the agency is not in compliance
     with the interim relief order because it subsequently effected a second removal action
     against him for unrelated misconduct. PFR File, Tab 8 at 4 -8. The agency has filed a
     response opposing the appellant’s request. PFR File, Tab 9. It is well settled that an
     interim relief order does not insulate an appellant from a subsequent adverse action so
     long as that action is not inconsistent with the initial decision. Rothwell v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 68 M.S.P.R. 466, 468 (1995). Here, nothing in the initial decision precluded
     the agency from initiating a second action. Moreover, when an agency effects a second
     removal action during a period of interim relief ordered in an initial decision in a prior
     removal action, and the appellant files an appeal of the second action, the Board
     considers the second removal action on its merits. See generally Wilson v. Department
     of Justice, 66 M.S.P.R. 287, 291, 296-97 (1995). The appellant filed a separate appeal
     of the agency’s second removal action, an initial decision on the merits was issued in
     that case, and the Board denied the appellant’s petition for review of that initial
     decision. See King v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. AT‑0752-19-
     0350-I-1, Initial Decision (July 1, 2019); King v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB
     Docket No. AT‑0752-19-0350-I-1, Final Order (Oct. 18, 2022). Thus, we find it
     unnecessary to issue an order requiring the agency to submit evidence of compliance
     with the interim relief order, and we deny the appellant’s request. See Elder v.
     Department of the Air Force, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 20 (2016).
                                                                                            4

     at 15-19. 4 The appellant has responded in opposition to the petition. PFR File,
     Tab 6. The agency has replied to the appellant’s response. PFR File, Tab 7.

                                          ANALYSIS
     The administrative judge properly found that the agency failed to prove
     charge (1).
¶6         The agency has the burden to prove charged misconduct by preponderant
     evidence, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)(ii), and it contends that it met that burden.
     The agency argues that, because the words that the administrative judge found
     were spoken by the appellant to the CSI during the Wayne Farms RLM sampling,
     “You don’t know who I am,” are so similar to the phrase, “Do you know who I
     am?” recited in the charge, the agency proved the essence of the charge. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 7-11. The agency also contends that the appellant’s testimony that
     the CSI provoked his statement is contradicted by the Wayne Farms employee,
     whom the administrative judge found credible. Id. at 11-14. Thus, the agency
     contends that, by showing that the words spoken by the appellant were in essence
     no different from those charged and that those words were not provoked by
     something the CSI said or did, it proved that the appellant’s statement was
     “unprofessional” and proved charge (1).
¶7         The administrative judge considered whether, during the RLM sampling, the
     appellant stated, “Do you know who I am?” or “You don’t know who I am.” ID
     at 9-10. She found it illogical that the appellant would have said, “Do you know

     4
       The agency argues for the Board to draw an adverse inference because the appellant
     did not call one of the witnesses whom he alleged witnessed the exchange underpinning
     charge (1). PFR File, Tab 1 at 14. The Board has held that an adverse inf erence of
     misconduct can be inferred from the failure of the appellant to testify or to call a
     witness only in limited circumstances. Shustyk v. U.S. Postal Service, 32 M.S.P.R. 611,
     613-15, aff’d, 831 F.2d 305 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Table). The Board has not permitted a
     negative inference to be made against a party who, as here, s imply fails to call his own
     nonhostile witnesses at the hearing. See Logan v. Department of the Navy, 29 M.S.P.R.
     573, 577–78 (finding that the administrative judge erred when he imposed sanctions by
     drawing negative inferences against the agency for its failure to produce two witnesses
     at the hearing), aff’d, 809 F.2d 789 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Table).
                                                                                       5

     who I am?” with its implication that he should not be crossed due to his position
     because, while it is true that the appellant held a higher grade than the CSI, the
     appellant was not the CSI’s supervisor or anywhere in his chain of command, and
     the record does not reflect that he had any power over the CSI. ID at 9-10. She
     found that, given that the Wayne Farms employee’s and the other EIAO’s
     testimony were consistent with one another that the appellant stated, “You don’t
     know who I am,” it was more likely than not that the appellant said to the CSI,
     “You don’t know who I am,” and that he said it in the context of the CSI making
     unflattering comments about the appellant’s character and conduct.        ID at 10.
     She found that the evidence leads to a conclusion that, more likely than not, the
     appellant was saying, in effect, “you don’t know me.” Id.
¶8        The administrative judge’s careful analysis shows a clear difference
     between the meaning of the statement “Do you know who I am?” and the
     statement “You don’t know who I am” under the circumstances of the exchange
     between the appellant and the CSI during the Wayne Farms RLM sampling.
     While the former phrase could be viewed as threatening, the latter phrase is a
     proper response to personal accusations by another person. Thus, the agency’s
     assertion is unavailing that the phrase that the administrative judge found that the
     appellant uttered and the phrase recited in charge (1) are so similar that the
     agency proved that he uttered words that might be viewed as unprofessional.
¶9        The agency’s contention that the Wayne Farms employee testified that the
     appellant’s words were not provoked by something the CSI said or did is equally
     unavailing.   The administrative judge credited the Wayne Farms employee’s
     testimony that the CSI said something to the appellant that the Wayne Farms
     employee found surprising, and in response, the appellant did not raise his voice,
     speak in a threatening manner or get close to the CSI’s face, and was not
     combative. ID at 11. The Board must give deference to an administrative judge ’s
     credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the
     observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may
                                                                                       6

      overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for
      doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .
      Here, the administrative judge found the Wayne Farms employee credible based,
      in part, on that individual’s carriage, behavior, manner of testifying, and
      appearance. ID at 8. The agency has not given sufficiently sound reasons to
      overturn the administrative judge’s finding that the Wayne Farms employee
      credibly testified that the appellant gave a measured response to the CSI ’s
      surprising statement.   Thus, the administrative judge properly found that the
      agency failed to prove that the appellant’s behavior and tone were intimidating
      and his conduct was unprofessional. She therefore properly found that the agency
      failed to prove charge (1).

      The administrative judge was not precluded from adjudicating the appellant ’s
      allegation of retaliation for filing EEO complaints.
¶10         If an appellant prevails in an appeal before the Board based o n a finding of
      discrimination, he may recover compensatory damages from the agency pursuant
      to the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Hess v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 40,
      ¶ 19 (2016). Thus, reversal of an agency action when an appellant has raised the
      affirmative defense of discrimination or retaliation for filing a complaint of
      discrimination does not afford the appellant all possible relief available to him,
      and the administrative judge must adjudicate the affirmative defense . See Morey
      v. Department of the Navy, 38 M.S.P.R. 14, 17 (1988).
¶11         However, the Board’s regulations require that a claim for compensatory
      damages be raised before the close of the prehearing conference and must be set
      forth in writing, specifying the amount sought and the reasons why the appellant
      believes that he is entitled to an award of compensatory damages.         5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.204(a)-(b). The agency contends that, even though the appellant alleged
      retaliation for filing EEO complaints, because he did not raise a claim for
      compensatory damages as provided by section 1201.204, he is precluded from
                                                                                        7

      establishing entitlement to such damages, and the administrative judge should not
      have adjudicated his affirmative defense of retaliation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-15.
¶12        Here, we need not reach the issue of whether a failure to raise a claim for
      compensatory      damages   pursuant   to   section   1201.204   could   allow   an
      administrative judge, after reversing an agency action, to dismiss the affirmative
      defense of discrimination or retaliation without adjudicating it.     Although the
      appellant did not clearly raise a claim for compensatory dama ges below, there is
      no indication in the record that he received the appropriate information with
      respect to how to raise any such damages claim. Board regulations do not require
      administrative judges or the Board to provide notice of th e right to request
      compensatory damages. Hawkes v. Department of Agriculture, 103 M.S.P.R. 345,
      ¶ 9 (2006), aff’d, 253 F. App’x 939 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, the Board has
      found it appropriate to waive the appellant’s failure to comply with the
      requirements of 5 C.F.R. § 1201.204(a)-(b) when the appellant was never
      apprised of the requirements.      See Harris v. Department of the Air Force,
      96 M.S.P.R. 193, ¶ 11 (2004).      Thus, we find no error in the administrative
      judge’s adjudication of the appellant’s allegation of retaliation for filing EEO
      complaints.

      The administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant established retaliation
      for filing EEO complaints.
¶13        When an appellant asserts an affirmative defense of discrimination or
      retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, the Board first will inquire whether,
      considering the evidence as a whole, the appellant has shown by preponderant
      evidence that the prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the
      contested personnel action.      Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 28 (2016), clarified by Pridgen v. Office of Management &
      Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-24; Savage v. Department of the Army,
      122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 41 (2015), overruled in part by Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶¶ 23-25.     Such a showing is sufficient to establish that the agency violated
                                                                                           8

      42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, thereby committing a prohibited personnel practice under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1). Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 51.
¶14         In finding that the appellant proved his affirmative defense, the
      administrative judge considered that the appellant had filed eight EEO
      complaints, about one per year over the past 8 years, and that the proposing and
      deciding officials were aware of those complaints. ID at 16. She considered that
      the Deputy District Manager, who had initiated the disciplinary process but who
      was not the proposing or deciding official, was aware of those complaints as well,
      had suggested that the appellant be disciplined for contacting management
      officials about a pending EEO complaint while he was on leave for the death of a
      family member, and had stated that he was looking to build a case and “throw
      darts” against the appellant. 5 ID at 16-17. The administrative judge also relied
      upon her finding that the Deputy District Manager “and perhaps others” had a
      motive to retaliate, that the process was tainted by procedural irregularities
      because the agency did not appear to follow its own procedures that the alleged
      misconduct be investigated by the Internal Control Office (ICO) and did not get a
      statement from the appellant regarding the events underlying the unprofessional
      conduct charge, and that the evidence fell far short of supporting a removal. ID
      at 17-20.
¶15         We agree with the administrative judge that the record shows that the
      Deputy District Manager’s motivation to have the appellant disciplined was
      significant; however, we disagree with her finding that his motivation was based
      on retaliation for EEO activity and that he influenced the decision making
      process.    The administrative judge found that there was no evidence that the
      Deputy District Manager was implicated in or punished as a result of the

      5
       The administrative judge mistakenly attributed the District Manager’s testimony to the
      Deputy District Manager. ID at 17. The record shows that it was the District Manager
      who testified to building a disciplinary case and looking for darts to throw at the
      appellant. PFR File, Tab 3, Hearing Transcript at 130, 151 -52.
                                                                                         9

      appellant’s EEO complaints. ID at 17. The administrative judge also did not
      describe in any detail the nature of the EEO complaints or otherwise find that the
      acting officials were implicated in or punished as a result of those complaints.
      Moreover, the Deputy District Manager did not initiate the disciplinary process
      that resulted in the appellant’s proposed removal. Rather, he initiated the request
      for discipline because of the complaints filed by the CSI and EIAO who were
      present at the Wayne Farms RLM sampling. IAF, Tab 5 at 30‑31. Further, there
      is no evidence that he influenced the charges in the notice of proposed removal as
      those charges are significantly different from the request for discipline.     That
      request describes the appellant’s behavior at the Wayne Farms RLM sampling as
      bullying, a word not used in the notice of proposed removal. IAF, Tab 5 at 31,
      153. Further, the request alleges that the appellant failed in his technical ability
      to properly don sterile gloves for the sampling, a charge not made in the notice.
      Id. at 31. Additionally, the request identifies other alleged misconduct by the
      appellant, including an attempt to deceptively request compensatory time , failure
      to follow District Office Instructions to notify the District Office fol lowing the
      completion of an RLM sampling, and dishonest and unprofessional behavior in
      requesting leave for the death of a family member and then using this time to
      contact the agency about his EEO case. Id. at 30-31. None of these allegations
      resulted in misconduct charges against the appellant.
¶16        Further, the administrative judge’s finding that the process was tainted by
      procedural irregularities because the agency failed to follow a prescribed
      investigative process and obtain a statement from the appellant before taking the
      action is not supported by the record.     Contrary to the administrative judge’s
      finding that the proposing official testified that investigations are always
      delegated to the ICO, her testimony on cross-examination was that investigations
      are “usually” done by the ICO.      PFR File, Tab 3, Hearing Transcript at 223.
      Further, requests for discipline are submitted via a form that affords the
      requesting official the option of checking either an            “Investigation” or
                                                                                             10

      “Disciplinary Action” box, and in this case the request was checked “Disciplina ry
      Action.” IAF, Tab 5 at 30. Despite the administrative judge’s finding that the
      agency did not seek a statement from the appellant before deciding to discipline
      him, the record includes evidence that, in response to an inquiry about the events
      underlying the unprofessional conduct charge, the appellant indicated that the CSI
      was lying. Id. at 31. Importantly, there is no evidence that the Deputy District
      Manager influenced the deciding official such that he did not afford the appellant
      his opportunity to respond to the charges.         Although the administrative judge
      found that the credible evidence in support of the action was not strong, we find
      that any lack of strength in such evidence, when considered along with the other
      relevant evidence on this issue, is not sufficient to establish that retaliation for
      EEO activity was a motivating factor in the appellant’s removal. See Gardner,
      123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶¶ 29-31 (requiring a consideration of the evidence as a whole
      in determining whether an appellant has proven her affirmative defenses).
¶17         Accordingly, we find that the appellant has failed to show by preponderant
      evidence 6 that a prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the contes ted
      personnel action. 7 See Gardner, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 31; Savage, 122 M.S.P.R.
      612, ¶ 41.

                                              ORDER
¶18         We ORDER the agency to cancel the appellant’s removal and to restore the
      appellant effective October 10, 2017. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the

      6
        The Board’s regulations define “[p]reponderance of the evidence” as “[t]he degree of
      relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would
      accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue.”
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
      7
        Because we find that the appellant failed to show that any prohibited consideration
      was a motivating factor in the agency’s action, we need not resolve the issue of whether
      the appellant proved retaliation was a but-for cause of the agency’s decision. See
      Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33.
                                                                                        11

      Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no
      later than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶19         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, in terest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶20         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶21         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appel lant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶22         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Def ense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
                                                                                     12

Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
made within the 60‑day period set forth above.

                 NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                       YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                      ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      13

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                  14

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases   involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).            If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     15

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                16

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                                                                          17

                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
                                                                                          18

National Finance Center Checklist for Back Pay Cases
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, rest orations) or as
ordered by the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts .
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise
information describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
    a. Employee name and social security number.
   b. Detailed explanation of request.
    c. Valid agency accounting.
   d. Authorized signature (Table 63)
    e. If interest is to be included.
    f. Check mailing address.
   g. Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
   h. Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to
be collected. (if applicable)
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement. (if applicable)
2. Copies of SF-50's (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and
amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address
to return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of
the type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual
Leave to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay
Period and required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump
Sum Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
   a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
   b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
   c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.