Court Opinion

ID: 999646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:29:08.594864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:32.390832
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SAMUEL L. MCMULLIN,
Claimant-Appellant,

and

ONE PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY
CONTAINING TWO AND SEVENTY-FIVE
ONE THOUSANDTHS OF AN ACRE
                                                               No. 99-1416
(2.075), COMMONLY KNOWN AS "SAM
MELS" NIGHTCLUB,AND LOCATED AT
158A OLD BROADWAY SCHOOL ROAD,
IN BROADWAY TOWNSHIP,IN THE
COUNTY OF ANDERSON, STATE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA,WITH ALL
IMPROVEMENTS THEREON,AND WITH
ALL RIGHTS AND EASEMENTS
APPERTAINING,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson.
G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-94-1061-8)

Submitted: June 30, 1999

Decided: September 17, 1999

Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges,
and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Samuel L. McMullin, Appellant Pro Se. Robert F. Daley, Jr., Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Samuel L. McMullin appeals from the district court's order deny-
ing his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a consent order
of forfeiture as void. We affirm.

McMullin contends that the contested order of forfeiture is void for
three reasons:

          (1) he was not afforded a preseizure notice and hearing as
          required by United States v. James Daniel Good , 510
          U.S. 43 (1993);

          (2) the complaint of forfeiture failed to plead sufficient
          facts to establish probable cause; and

          (3) the forfeiture was barred by the five-year statute of
          limitations set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994).

Addressing the first of these issues, although it appears that
McMullin was denied a pre-seizure notice and hearing, a due process
violation of this nature does not render the forfeiture void. See United

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States v. Marsh, 105 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the
district court did not err in denying Rule 60(b) relief on this basis.

Turning to the lack of probable cause issue, we note that McMullin
was provided with notice prior to the forfeiture, as evidenced by his
filing of a claim, but that he failed to file an answer. We conclude that
this failure constitutes a waiver of his right to challenge the substance
of the complaint.

Finally, although the five-year limitations period of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1621 is applicable to the forfeiture at issue, we note that McMullin
did not purchase the defendant property until August 8, 1989. The
Government's complaint of April 1994 was therefore timely.

In light of the above, we affirm the district court's denial of
McMullin's Rule 60(b)(4) motion. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED

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