Court Opinion

ID: 9431435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:32:16.899229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.158411
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall,
with whom Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that the “independent source” exception to the exclusionary rule may justify admitting evidence discovered during an illegal warrantless search that is later “rediscovered” by the same team of investigators during a search pursuant to a warrant obtained immediately after the illegal search. I believe the Court’s decision, by failing to provide sufficient guarantees that the subsequent search was, in fact, independent of the illegal search, emasculates the Warrant Clause and undermines the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule. I therefore dissent.
This Court has stated frequently that the exclusionary rule is principally designed to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906 (1984); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 (1960). By excluding evidence discovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the rule “compel[s] respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way, by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Id., at 217. The Court has crafted exceptions to the exclusionary rule when the purposes of the rule are not furthered by the exclusion. As the Court today recognizes, the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule “allows admission of evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431, 443 (1984); see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 (1920). The independent source exception, like the inevitable discovery exception, is primarily *545based on a practical view that under certain circumstances the beneficial deterrent effect that exclusion will have on future constitutional violations is too slight to justify the social cost of excluding probative evidence from a criminal trial. See Nix v. Williams, supra, at 444-446; cf. United States v. Leon, supra, 906-909. When the seizure of the evidence at issue is “wholly independent of” the constitutional violation, then exclusion arguably will have no effect on a law enforcement officer’s incentive to commit an unlawful search.1
Given the underlying justification for the independent source exception, any inquiry into the exception’s application must keep sight of the practical effect admission will have on the incentives facing law enforcement officers to engage in unlawful conduct. The proper scope of the independent source exception, and guidelines for its application, cannot be divined in a factual vacuum; instead, they must be informed by the nature of the constitutional violation and the deterrent effect of exclusion in particular circumstances. In holding that the independent source exception may apply to the facts of these cases, I believe the Court loses sight of the practical moorings of the independent source exception and creates an affirmative incentive for unconstitutional searches. This holding can find no justification in the purposes underlying both the exclusionary rule and the independent source exception.
The factual setting of the instant case is straightforward. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents stopped two vehicles after they *546left a warehouse and discovered bales of marijuana. DEA Supervisor Garibotto and an assistant United States attorney then returned to the warehouse, which had been under surveillance for several hours. After demands that the warehouse door be opened went unanswered, Supervisor Gari-botto forced open the door with a tire iron. A number of agents entered the warehouse. No persons were found inside, but the agents saw numerous bales of marijuana in plain view. Supervisor Garibotto then ordered everyone out of the warehouse. Agents did not reenter the warehouse until a warrant was obtained some eight hours later. The warehouse was kept under surveillance during the interim.
It is undisputed that the agents made no effort to obtain a warrant prior to the initial entry. The agents had not begun to prepare a warrant affidavit, and according to FBI Agent Cleary, who supervised the FBI’s involvement, they had not even engaged in any discussions of obtaining a warrant. App. 52. The affidavit in support of the warrant obtained after the initial search was prepared by DEA Agent Keaney, who had tactical control over the DEA agents, and who had participated in the initial search of the warehouse. The affidavit did not mention the warrantless search of the warehouse, nor did it cite information obtained from that search. In determining that the challenged evidence was admissible, the Court of Appeals assumed that the initial warrantless entry was not justified by exigent circumstances and that the search therefore violated the Warrant Clause of the Fourth' Amendment.
Under the circumstances of these cases, the admission of the evidence “reseized” during the second search severely undermines the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule. Indeed, admission in these cases affirmatively encourages illegal searches. The incentives for such illegal conduct are clear. Obtaining a warrant is inconvenient and time consuming. Even when officers have probable cause to support a warrant application, therefore, they have an incentive first *547to determine whether it is worthwhile to obtain a warrant. Probable cause is much less than certainty, and many “confirmatory” searches will result in the discovery that no evidence is present, thus saving the police the time and trouble of getting a warrant. If contraband is discovered, however, the officers may later seek a warrant to shield the evidence from the taint of the illegal seareh. The police thus know in advance that they have little to lose and much to gain by forgoing the bother of obtaining a warrant and undertaking, an illegal search.
The Court, however, “see[s] the incentives differently.” Ante, at 540. Under the Court’s view, today’s decision does not provide an incentive for unlawful searches, because the officer undertaking the search would know that “his action would add to the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is probable cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no information gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers’ decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate’s decision to grant it.” Ibid. The Court, however, provides no hint of why this risk would actually seem significant to the officers. Under the circumstances of these cases,, the officers committing the illegal search have both knowledge and control of the factors central to the trial court’s determination. First,, it is a simple matter, as was done in these cases, to exclude from the warrant application any information gained from the initial entry so that the magistrate’s determination of probable cause is not influenced by the prior illegal search. Second, today’s decision makes the application of the independent source exception turn entirely on an evaluation of the officers’ intent. It normally will be difficult for the trial court to verify, or the defendant to rebut, an assertion by officers that they always intended to obtain a warrant, regardless of the results of the illegal search.2 The testimony of the officers *548conducting the illegal search is the only direct evidence of intent, and the defendant will be relegated simply to arguing that the officers should not be believed. Under these circumstances, the litigation risk described by the Court seems hardly a risk at all; it does not significantly dampen the incentive to conduct the initial illegal search.3
The strong Fourth Amendment interest in eliminating these incentives for illegal entry should cause this Court to scrutinize closely the application of the independent source exception to evidence obtained under the circumstances of the instant cases; respect for the constitutional guarantee requires a rule that does not undermine the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule. When, as here, the same team of investigators is involved in both the first and second search, there is a significant danger that the “independence” of the *549source will in fact be illusory, and that the initial search will have affected the decision to obtain a warrant notwithstanding the officers’ subsequent assertions to the contrary. It is therefore crucial that the factual premise of the exception— complete independence — be clearly established before the exception can justify admission of the evidence. I believe the Court’s reliance on the intent of the law enforcement officers who conducted the warrantless search provides insufficient guarantees that the subsequent legal search was unaffected by the prior illegal search.
To ensure that the source of the evidence is genuinely independent, the basis for a finding that a search was untainted by a prior illegal search must focus, as with the inevitable discovery doctrine, on “demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S., at 445, n. 5. In the instant cases, there are no “demonstrated historical facts” capable of supporting a finding that the subsequent warrant search was wholly unaffected by the prior illegal search. The same team of investigators was involved in both searches. The warrant was obtained immediately after the illegal search, and no effort was made to obtain a warrant prior to the discovery of the marijuana during the illegal search. The only evidence available that the warrant search was wholly independent is the testimony of the agents who conducted the illegal search. Under these circumstances, the threat that the subsequent search was tainted by the illegal search is too great to allow for the application of the independent source exception.4 The Court’s *550contrary holding lends itself to easy abuse, and offers an incentive to bypass the constitutional requirement that probable cause be assessed by a neutral and detached magistrate before the police invade an individual’s privacy.5
The decision in Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984), is not to the contrary. In Segura, the Court expressly distinguished between evidence discovered during an initial warrantless entry and evidence that was not discovered until a subsequent legal search. The Court held that under those circumstances, when no information from an illegal search was used in a subsequent warrant application, the warrant provided an independent source for the evidence first uncovered in the second, lawful search.
Segura is readily distinguished from the present cases. The admission of evidence first discovered during a legal search does not significantly lessen the deterrence facing the law enforcement officers contemplating an illegal entry so long as the evidence that is seen is excluded. This was clearly the view of Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice O’Connor, when he stated that the Court’s ruling would not significantly detract from the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule because “officers who enter illegally will recognize that whatever evidence they discover as a direct result of the entry may be suppressed, as it was by the Court of Appeals in this case.” Id., at 812. As I argue above, extending Segura to cover evidence discovered during an initial illegal search will eradicate this remaining deterrence to illegal entry. Moreover, there is less reason to believe that *551an initial illegal entry was prompted by a desire to determine whether to bother to get a warrant in the first place, and thus was not wholly independent of the second search, if officers understand that evidence they discover during the illegal search will be excluded even if they subsequently return with a warrant.
In sum, under circumstances as are presented in these cases, when the very law enforcement officers who participate in an illegal search immediately thereafter obtain a warrant to search the same premises, I believe the evidence discovered during the initial illegal entry must be suppressed. Any other result emasculates the Warrant Clause and provides an intolerable incentive for warrantless searches. I respectfully dissent.

 The clearest case for the application of the independent source exception is when a wholly separate line of investigation, shielded from information gathered in an illegal search, turns up the same evidence through a separate, lawful search. Under these circumstances, there is little doubt that the lawful search was not connected to the constitutional violation. The exclusion of such evidence would not significantly add to the deterrence facing the law enforcement officers conducting the illegal search, because they would have little reason to anticipate the separate investigation leading to the same evidence.

 Such an intent-based rule is of dubious .value for other reasons as well. First, the intent of the officers prior to the illegal entry often will be of *548little significance to the relevant question: whether, even if the initial entry uncovered no evidence, the officers would return immediately with a warrant to conduct a second search. Officers who have probable cause to believe contraband is present genuinely might intend later to obtain a warrant, but after the illegal search uncovers no such contraband, those same officers might decide their time is better spent than to return with a warrant. In addition, such an intent rule will be difficult to apply. The Court fails to describe how a trial court will properly evaluate whether the law enforcement officers fully intended to obtain a warrant regardless of what they discovered during the illegal search. The obvious question is whose intent is relevant? Intentions clearly may differ both among supervisory officers and among officers who initiate the illegal search.

 The litigation risk facing these law enforcement officers may be contrasted with the risk faced by the officer in Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431 (1984). Nix involved an application of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. In that case, the Court stressed that an officer “who is faced with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the evidence sought would inevitably be discovered.” Id., at 445. Unlike the officer in Nix, who had no way of knowing about the progress of a wholly separate line of investigation that already had begun at the time of his unconstitutional conduct, the officers in the Instant cases, at least under the Court’s analysis, have complete knowledge and control over the factors relevant to the determination of “independence.”

 To conclude that the initial search had no effect on the decision to obtain a warrant, and thus that the warrant search was an “independent source” of the challenged evidence, one would have to assume that even if the officers entered the premises and discovered no contraband, they nonetheless would have gone to the Magistrate, sworn that they had probable cause to believe that contraband was in the building, and then returned to conduct another search. Although such a scenario is possible, I believe it is more plausible to believe that the officers would not have chosen to re*550turn immediately to the premises with a warrant to search for evidence had they not discovered evidence during the initial search.

 Given that the law enforcement officers in these eases made no movement to obtain a warrant prior to the illegal search, these cases do not present the more difficult issue whether, in light of the strong interest in deterring illegal warrantless searches, the evidence discovered during an illegal search ever may be admitted under the independent source exception when the second legal search is conducted by the same investigative team pursuing the same line of investigation.