Court Opinion

ID: 9752198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:43:28.918316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:09.251687
License: Public Domain

Roberts, J.,
dissenting. I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. It is my opinion that in enacting §§16-21-1 and 16-21-2 the legislature intended to require local school committees to provide transportation for school children who reside at such a distance from the school as to make their regular attendance thereat impractical or for children who, by reason of physical disability or infirmity, would find such regular attendance impractical. I find inescapable the conclusion that the legislative intent was to benefit such children by requiring local school authorities to furnish them with transportation in order that their regular attendance at school can be maintained.
The,legislation contemplates a right in the child to> such transportation rather than a discretion in the local school authority to provide it. This is particularly true where the regularity of a child’s attendance at school would be impractical because of the location of the school with respect to his place of residence. Where that situation exists, the child has a right to transportation, and it is the obligation of the school committee to furnish this transportation in such manner as will make regular attendance by the child practicable.
I perceive nothing in §16-21-1 or §16-21-2 which expressly or by necessary implication requires this court to' read into those sections a limitation on the right of a child to transportation thereunder because the school that such child is *145entitled to attend might be located outside of the geographical area supervised by the school committee charged with providing such transportation. I will not impute to the legislature an intent so to discriminate between children and. apropos of the instant case, children attending a private, nonprofit school located outside the town and children attending such a school located within the town in question. I am unable to join in the majority’s literal interpretation of this statute, being convinced that the effect thereof is to frustrate the intent of the legislature to require that transportation ,be furnished in the specified instances.
Moore, VirgadamO', Boyle & Lynch, Jeremiah C. Lynch, Jr., for appellants.
Edward J. Corcoran, Solicitor for the Town of Middle-town and for the School Committee.