Court Opinion

ID: 9544171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:52:53.836061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:17.505697
License: Public Domain

Green, J.
(dissenting)—Contrary to the opinion of my colleagues, I fail to find a “private” communication in this case and would affirm the trial court’s admission of the tape recording.
Only “private” communications are within the prohibitions of the statute. RCW 9.73.030(1) provides that it is unlawful to “intercept, record or divulge” any “private communication” transmitted by telephone without the consent of all participants. Even though a “private communication” is involved, the police are permitted to record such incoming calls for the limited purpose of “verifying the accuracy of reception of emergency calls.” RCW 9.73.090(1). The majority correctly reasons that if a “private” communication is recorded by the police under RCW 9.73.090(1), it may not be admissible in evidence by reason of the limiting language of that provision and the eviden-tiary prohibitions contained in RCW 9.73.050. However, these restrictions apply only to “private” communications or conversations. Therefore, the basic question is whether *124the communication in this case was “private.” The majority-in essence assumes the private nature of the call without considering the circumstances surrounding it and, in my view, errs.
The words “private communication” are not defined in the statute. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1969) defines the word “private” as:
. . . belonging to one’s self . . . alone . . . secret . . . intended only for the persons involved (a conversation) . . . holding a confidential relationship to something ... a secret message: a private communication . . . secretly: not openly or in public.
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1969) defines “private” as;
. . . confidential . . . personal and not publicly expressed . . . secret . . . removed from or out of public view or knowledge . . . not open or accessible to the general public . . .
In the absence of legislative definition, the ordinary and usual meaning must be attributed to statutory terms. Warmington v. Department of Employment Security, 12 Wn. App. 364, 529 P.2d 1142 (1974).
Whether a telephonic communication is “private” or not depends upon the intent or reasonable expectation of the parties as manifested by the facts and circumstances in each case. In this case, I am unable to find that the communication was “private.”
It is clear that the call to the police station was to report the shooting and request aid of the police and an ambulance. The defendant was not the initiator of the communication, but invited herself into the communication.15 It is *125evident that the defendant could overhear the police operator relay her statements to others, i.e., a prowl car and an ambulance. Further, the conversation took place in the presence of other people at both ends of the line. In that conversation, she voluntarily stated that she shot two people. Considering all of the facts and circumstances, I can find no evidence that the parties intended or could reasonably expect this communication to be “private.” Indeed, it is impossible for me to conclude that one who has just participated in a possible crime and calls the police department to report it can at the same time intend or expect that communication to be “private.”
The majority’s reliance upon State v. Grant, 9 Wn. App. 260, 511 P.2d 1013 (1973), is misplaced. In Grant the court was concerned with a surreptitious recording by a third party of what was determined to be a “private conversation” between two other parties under RCW 9.73.030(2). In the course of construing these words, the court said, at page 265:
RCW 9.73.030 (2) seeks to prevent encroachment upon the privacy of the parties to a conversation. The words “private conversation” . . . are not defined and have not heretofore been construed in any published opinion in this state. ... In construing the statutory words “private conversation,” we seek to best fulfill the purpose *126of the statute. ... In considering that purpose, we note the phrase “private conversation” is all-embracing and is broad enough to include a confidential or privileged conversation, and one protected against disclosure under the Fourth Amendment. To construe the words “private conversation” narrowly and grudgingly would unnecessarily fail to give full effect to the legislative purpose to protect the freedom of people to hold conversations intended only for the ears of the participants.
(Italics mine.) Accordingly, the court found a conversation between the defendant and his attorney to be private. Obviously, such a conversation is confidential in nature and not intended for the ears of third parties. Additionally, the court found a conversation between the defendant and a detective to be a private conversation, i.e., “intended only for the ears of the participants.” State v. Grant, supra at 265. However, the facts and circumstances surrounding this latter conversation are not contained in the opinion. Thus, we can only assume the existence of sufficient circumstances for the court to conclude that the conversation was intended to be “private.” Consequently, there are insufficient facts for the majority’s conclusion that no meritorious distinction exists between the conversation in Grant and the communication in this case.16
In my view, the majority errs in determining that the communication herein was “intended only for the ears of the participants” and thus “private” under Grant without basing such determination upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the communication. Such an approach assumes, in effect, that all telephonic communications to a police station are “private.” This results in judicial removal of the word “private” from RCW 9.73.030(1) and violates the principle that a statute should be read so as to give effect to all its terms. State v. Lundquist, 60 Wn.2d 397, 403, *127374 P.2d 246 (1962); Greenwood v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 13 Wn. App. 624, 536 P.2d 644 (1975). If the recording of all telephonic communication to a police station is to be prohibited, the statute should be amended by the legislature and not by the courts.
As previously noted, “private” communications to a police department may be recorded for limited purposes under RCW 9.73.090(1). The statements of Senator Andersen appearing in the majority opinion were made in reference to this provision. His comments assume the private nature of the call and do not relate to RCW 9.73.030(1) generally prohibiting the recording of “private” communications. Consequently, the comments are not pertinent to the central issue of whether a particular communication is “private.”
Additionally, defendant contends that the tape-recorded conversation with the police operator violated her constitutional rights. Specifically, the defendant argues that the tape recording is inadmissible because it constitutes an invasion of her right to privacy by an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and that the testimony of the police operator is likewise inadmissible as the conversation occurred without giving Miranda warnings to defendant. I find the defendant’s position untenable.
As previously indicated, the defendant in the present circumstances had no reasonable expectation that her communication with the police was “private”; hence, she cannot claim that her right of privacy has been violated. Secondly, the police operator in this case was not required to warn the defendant of her Miranda rights because the defendant was not in custody and was making voluntary and spontaneous statements. As the court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), noted:
There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make.
*128Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
(Footnote omitted.)
I would affirm.
Petition for rehearing denied September 24, 1975.
Appealed to Supreme Court September 26, 1975.

 The call to the police was not initiated by the defendant, but by her friend, Mrs. Hooper. Mrs. Hooper immediately stated, “Please come to 2903 East Gordon, there is a guy broke in and my girl friend shot him.” The officer requested that Mrs. Hooper stay on the line and at the same time the officer audibly relayed the information to a prowl car and requested an ambulance. It is readily apparent from listening to the tape recording that in the background the defendant shouted to Mrs. Hooper “get off the phone.” Mrs. Hooper told the defendant that *125the officer wanted her to stay on the telephone. Defendant replied “Give me that.” or words to that effect and Mrs. Hooper said, “Well, you talk to them.” The officer then asked defendant if the man who had been shot was still there. She replied that he was and related that the other man just went oil and might come back with a gun. In response to an inquiry about that person’s injury, defendant volunteered, “I don’t know ... I shot him twice.” In response to a question about the other man (decedent) lying in the house, defendant stated, “I shot him with a .25 automatic. Will you get somebody up here, please, before that guy comes back.” When the police arrived, defendant stated that she did the shooting and delivered the gun to the officers. At trial there was never any issue over whether defendant shot the two men. In fact, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the decedent was not a prowler but was brought to the house by a friend of Mrs. Hooper and the defendant for the purpose of settling a problem that existed between the defendant, Mrs. Hooper and the decedent.

 It should be observed that the court in State v. Grant, supra, understandably fails to dwell on the circumstances underlying its conclusion because the defendant played the recording to the jury after the trial court had excluded it and thus the use of the recording was found to be proper.