Court Opinion

ID: 9526434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:17:16.597389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:48.864890
License: Public Domain

SCHUMACHER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the Commissioner’s denial of unemployment benefits.
When Valenty was laid off from her full-time employment as a dental assistant, she became unemployed and was entitled to receive unemployment compensation benefits. Thereafter, however, Valenty accepted full-time employment at Medical Concepts. When Valenty began that full-time employment, her entitlement to unemployment benefits ceased.
Valenty voluntarily quit her job with Medical Concepts, claiming that she quit because of her back injury. Valenty argued that she was entitled to receive unemployment benefits pursuant to the “serious illness exception” to disqualification. See Minn.Stat. § 268.09, subd. 1(c)(2) (1990). The referee and Commissioner’s representative considered this claim and, based upon the record and applicable law, properly concluded that the serious illness exception was inapplicable because Valenty did not make reasonable efforts to retain her job at Medical Concepts.
Now, for the first time on appeal, Valenty claims that she quit the job with Medical Concepts because the position was not suitable for her. Even if the issue of suitability is relevant in this situation, as the majority concludes, that issue was not raised below and therefore should not be considered for the first time on appeal. See Wesley v. Durance Corp., 363 N.W.2d 858, 859 (Minn.App.1985) (citing Eakman v. Brutger, 285 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Minn.1979)). By determining that the job at Medical Concepts was unsuitable for Valenty, the majority has usurped the factfinding function assigned, appropriately, to the referee and Commissioner’s representative.
The referee and Commissioner’s representative found that Valenty was unavailable for work between October 2 and 15, 1991 because of her back injury. The record supports this finding. Valenty testified that she probably could not have worked during that time, as a result of her pain.
This court will review the commissioner’s fact findings in the light most favorable to the decision below and will not disturb them if there is evidence reasonably tending to sustain those findings.
Ress v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., Inc., 448 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Minn.1989) (citations omitted). By reversing both the referee *685and the Commissioner’s representative on this issue, the majority has improperly “weighted] the evidence and ma[d]e a determination as to where the preponderance lies.” Nyberg v. R.N. Cardozo & Brother, Inc., 243 Minn. 361, 364, 67 N.W.2d 821, 823 (1954).