Court Opinion

ID: 9489731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:22:40.747891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:41.062593
License: Public Domain

*793RYAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring separately.
In August 1995, as a member of the panel that decided this case initially, I subscribed to the view that punitive damages are available under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. I reached that conclusion because I thought the Supreme Court implicitly authorized punitive damages in Section 504 actions by reason of some of the language it employed in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), particularly the statement that “federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.” Id. at 71, 112 S.Ct. at 1035. Indeed, that was the view of all three members of the panel.
On rehearing en banc, I have revisited that question, and, after much deliberation and study, I am now satisfied that I erred in my initial judgment. I now think I assigned too little significance to the expression “appropriate relief’ in the foregoing quotation, particularly in light of other language on the subject of damages in Franklin, and in view of the compelling points made in part IV.B. of Judge Nelson’s excellent opinion for the en banc court.
While I am unpersuaded by the portion of my brother’s opinion which posits that Congress has indicated its intention not to allow punitive damages in section 504 actions, I recognize that the point is one subject to reasonable dispute, and I confess that my brother has made a compelling if, to me, unpersuasive ease for the congressional intent argument.
In sum, then, I concur in the majority view that Consolidated Rail Corporation has subjected itself to the prohibitions of section 504 by accepting federal funds for its railroad crossing improvements. I also now agree that punitive damages are not available under section 504, because, for the reasons developed in part IV.B. of Judge Nelson’s opinion, punishment is not “appropriate relief’ within the context of that statute.