Court Opinion

ID: 9781221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:23:50.36809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:21.605030
License: Public Domain

FEW, C.J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority opinion except in two respects. First, I would reverse the trial court’s decision not to direct a verdict in favor of Sellers. Second, I would remand the case to the circuit court to conduct a post-trial review of punitive damages and to consider other pending post-trial motions.
Buyers alleged only one theory of recovery: negligence. Because Sellers owed no duty of due care to Buyers, Sellers’ motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. Buyers did not allege an action against Sellers under the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act.8 Had they done so, and had they proven the requisite conduct on the part of Sellers under section 27-50-65 of the South Carolina Code (2007), they would have been entitled to recover damages. They chose, however, to sue in negligence, and thus they are foreclosed from recovery.
Historically, a seller of real estate could not be liable to a buyer in negligence. See Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 412, 175 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1970) (“The doctrine of caveat emptor ... has, in the absence of fraud and misrepresentation long governed the obligations of the parties in the sale of real estate in this State.”). Under this rule of law, a seller could be liable for making a fraudulent statement about the property but could not be liable for negligent failure to disclose a latent defect. Our courts have gradually moved away from this doctrine in specific situations. See, e.g., Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 134, 161 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1968) (imposing a duty of due care upon builder-vendor of new homes); Rutledge, 254 S.C. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795 (recognizing a right of *652recovery for breach of warranty for the sale of a new house by a builder-vendor); Lane v. Trenholm, Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 500, 229 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1976) (holding an implied warranty of fitness for its intended use arises from the sale of a new building). However, no decision of our appellate courts imposes a duty of due care upon a seller of residential property who is not in the business of building or selling homes. While the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act imposes a duty on a seller of residential property to disclose to buyers environmental conditions such as the existence of mold, this duty is not in negligence. In order to recover damages for the breach of this statutory duty of disclosure, a plaintiff must prove more than negligence on the part of the seller. Such a plaintiff must prove the seller knew of the mold and knowingly failed to disclose it. See S.C.Code Ann. § 27-50-65 (2007) (“An owner who knowingly violates or fails to perform any duty prescribed by any provision of this article or who discloses any material information on the disclosure statement that he knows to be false, incomplete, or misleading is liable for actual damages proximately caused to the purchaser and court costs.” (emphasis added)); S.C.Code Ann. § 27-50-40(C) (2007) (“The rights of the parties to a real estate contract in connection "with conditions of the property of which the owner has no actual or constructive knowledge are not affected by this article.”).
In my opinion, this case should be remanded to the trial court. When the circuit court granted the motion for a new trial based on the court’s failure to charge the proper standard of proof for punitive damages, there were other motions pending, and the circuit court never ruled on them. Now that this court has reversed the order granting a new trial, those motions must be resolved. Exactly which rulings remain to be made should be determined by the circuit court, but they certainly include the court’s duty to review the punitive damages award for compliance with due process. See Mitchell v. Fortis Ins. Co., 385 S.C. 570, 583, 686 S.E.2d 176, 183 (2009) (holding an appellate court must conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s determination of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award); James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 371 S.C. 187, 194, 638 S.E.2d 667, 670 (2006) (requiring courts to *653determine whether an award of punitive damages is consistent with due process).
The majority argues that Sellers should have cross-appealed this issue. I disagree because the trial court made no ruling on which to file such an appeal. When the trial court granted Sellers’ motion for a new trial, Sellers became the prevailing party. The trial court did not rule against Sellers on any post-trial motion. The only possible additional action the trial court could have taken to benefit Sellers was to rule on some alternative ground raised in their post-trial motions. However, Sellers were not obligated to request the trial court rule on alternative grounds when the court had already ruled in Sellers’ favor. See I’On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 419, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) (“It would be inefficient and pointless to require a respondent to return to the judge and ask for a ruling on other arguments to preserve them for appellate review.”). Therefore, because Sellers were not aggrieved by any of the trial court’s rulings, they could not cross-appeal. See Rule 201(b), SCACR (“Only a party aggrieved by an order, judgment, sentence or decision may appeal.”).
Further, this is not an issue Sellers could have raised as an alternative sustaining ground. The trial judge’s ruling granted a new trial as to all issues, including actual and punitive damages. It is not possible to “sustain” that ruling by asking this court to review the punitive damages amount for its consistency with due process. See I’On, 338 S.C. at 417, 526 S.E.2d at 722 (stating an additional sustaining ground is when “the party who prevailed in the lower court urges an appellate court to affirm the lower court’s ruling for a reason other than one primarily relied upon by the lower court” (emphasis added)). Even if we were to rule in Sellers’ favor on the constitutionality of the award, our ruling would simply reduce the amount of the punitive damages award, leaving part of the punitive damages award and the entire actual damages award intact. Even if we did grant a new trial, we would do so only as to punitive damages. Therefore, Sellers could not have raised the issue as an alternative sustaining ground. Moreover, there is no precedent for an appellate court to rule on the constitutionality of a punitive damages award except on review of such a ruling by the trial court. While our courts *654have never expressly disapproved such a procedure, current law contemplates that the appellate courts review the trial court’s ruling. See Mitchell, 385 S.C. at 583, 686 S.E.2d at 183.

. The majority interprets the complaint to allege an action under the Act. Our disagreement over the interpretation of the complaint is not significant, however, because the only claim presented to the jury was a claim for negligence. While the trial judge explained various sections of the Act to the jury, he did so only in the context of Buyers' claim for negligence.