Court Opinion

ID: 9666151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:06:43.65348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:24.195312
License: Public Domain

HOLSTEIN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that portion of the majority opinion rejecting the concurrent sentence doctrine. However, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for armed criminal action.
The majority is somewhat unclear as to what is meant by “actual use” of a weapon as contrasted with “intention to use” a weapon. The majority seems to construe § 571.015.1 to require that there must have been an actual attack or an overt threat of attack using a weapon. I believe this construction of § 571.015.1 is incorrect. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used and, if possible, give effect to that intent. Trailiner Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 783 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Mo. banc 1990). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for construction. Community Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Director of Revenue, 752 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Mo. banc 1988); State v. Evers, 777 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Mo.App.1989). Each word of a statute should be given meaning. State ex rel. Missouri State Bd. for the Healing Arts v. Southworth, 704 S.W.2d 219, 225 (Mo. banc 1986).
The requirement of an attack or threatened attack using a weapon is not found in the statute and is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Use of a weapon is only one of the words describing the prohibited conduct. Someone “who commits any felony ... with ... [the] assistance, or aid of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon” is guilty of the crime of armed criminal action. § 571.015.1. The words “assistance” and “aid” are synonymous, meaning help, succor, encouragement or an auxiliary. Black’s Law Dictionary 63, 111 (5th edition 1979). Given the plain meaning of these words, the intent of the legislature was to discourage felons from arming themselves during commission of their crimes and to impose a separate criminal sanction against a felon whose criminal purpose is advanced by ready access to certain injurious devices. To hold otherwise empties the words “with ... assistance and aid” of any meaning.
The defendant in this case unlawfully entered an occupied building with a knife on his person. It may be reasonably inferred that the knife advanced any one of several aspects of the intruder’s criminal purposes. For example, the knife may have aided by bolstering the intruder’s confidence to enter a home in which the victims were sleeping. The knife may have aided by providing a means to impose the *330intruder’s will on the victims and overcome resistance. Finally, the knife was a ready source of assistance to make good the intruder’s escape. The fortunate chance that the knife was not exhibited and that no one was actually stabbed by the knife does not mean the intruder was without the weapon’s aid or assistance. In sum, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude the burglary was committed with' the aid and assistance of the knife. That is armed criminal action.
I do not find this case distinguishable from State v. Hart, 805 S.W.2d 234 (Mo.App.1991). I believe the Hart decision is well reasoned and controlling here. See also Forshee v. State, 763 S.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Mo.App.1989).
I concur with the first part of the majority opinion rejecting the concurrent sentence doctrine, but dissent as to that part involving armed criminal action. I would affirm that conviction.