Court Opinion

ID: 9718854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:36:27.082841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:03.215214
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge:
Appellant was tried with a codefendant and convicted by a jury on two counts of grand larceny1 from the hotel rooms of Messrs. Cutcliffe and Kehoe, and on one count of second-degree burglary2 of Cut-cliffe’s room.3 Appellant appeals only his burglary conviction. He contends that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal based on the failure of the government to prove he possessed the required criminal intent at the time he entered the guest rooms he was accused of burglarizing at the Capital Hilton Hotel. We affirm.
The government presented the following evidence bearing on the intent issue: Appellant and a codefendant were employed as window washers at the Capital Hilton Hotel. On the day in question, they were at work and at all relevant times were assigned to the floor where Cutcliffe’s and Kehoe’s rooms were located. A tag had *1077been hung on the closed doors of those rooms indicating that the windows were being washed. Appellant signed a pawn ticket for a camera taken from Cutcliffe’s room; his codefendant signed a pawn ticket for the camera taken from Kehoe’s room.
D.C.Code 1973, § 22-1801 requires the government, in order to support a conviction of burglary, to prove that a person “[broke] and enter[ed] or enter[ed] without breaking, ... with intent ... to commit any criminal offense, .... ” This intent must be present at the time of entry. Franklin v. United States, D.C.App., 293 A.2d 278, 279 (1972). “The requisite intent, of course, is a state of mind particular to the accused and unless such intent is admitted, it must be shown by circumstantial evidence.” Massey v. United States, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 296,299 (1974) (citing United States v. Fox, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 433 F.2d 1235 (1970) (per curiam).
The evidence is sufficient to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was in these rooms at approximately the time when both thefts occurred. However, because appellant had authority to be there as a window washer, we confront the difficult question whether a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant entered Cut-cliffe’s room with the intent, at the time of entry, to commit a criminal offense.
In White v. United States, D.C.App., 300 A.2d 716 (1973), this court held that possession of recently stolen property, while sufficient for “an inference that the possessor [appellant] is the person who stole it,” id. at 718 (citations omitted), “could not give rise to an inference respecting the commission by appellant of ... burglary,” id. at 719, since “there was absolutely no evidence of a breaking, nor was there other evidence calculated to place appellant within the building.” Id. at 720 (citations omitted). Here, in contrast, there was evidence that appellant entered. But was there other evidence that would support the required finding that appellant intended, upon entry, to commit a crime, rather than merely succumbing to temptation upon seeing the camera while washing windows?
If this were a single entry and theft the answer very likely would be no, for there probably would be a reasonable doubt that a person — having legitimate business in the room — intended, nonetheless, to commit a crime when he entered. But here we have two entries and thefts. Appellant was convicted of two larcenies, from rooms 627 and 628 on the same floor of the hotel, at approximately the same time on January 30, 1979 — the very day on which the evidence tends to prove appellant and his code-fendant each signed a pawn ticket at the same pawn shop for Cutcliffe’s and Kehoe’s cameras, respectively.4 The incidents underlying these two larceny convictions— from which no appeal has been taken— manifest enough of a theft pattern for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt5 that appellant intended to steal when he entered at least one of the rooms, Cutcliffe’s.6
In convicting appellant of two counts of grand larceny but only one count of burglary, see note 3 supra, the jury apparently perceived that appellant and his codefend-ant were acting together but elected to convict appellant of burglary only with re*1078spect to the room from which the pawn ticket evidenced he personally had taken the camera. The record supports the jury’s perception and permits that verdict.

Affirmed.

. D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2201.

. D.C.Code 1973, § 22-1801(b).

.The jury acquitted appellant of burglarizing Kehoe’s room.

. The codefendant signed in his own name. A handwriting expert testified it was “highly probable” that appellant, using an alias, had signed the pawn ticket representing Cutcliffe’s camera.

. Crawford v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 158, 375 F.2d 332, 334 (1967); Curley v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 389, 392-93, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837, 67 S.Ct. 1511, 91 L.Ed. 1850 (1947).

.Appellant’s codefendant testified in his own defense, admitting that both he and appellant were in rooms 627 and 628 together when the codefendant saw the cameras, but claiming that he (codefendant) returned alone to the rooms, took both cameras, and gave one to a stranger who helped him find a suitable pawn shop. The jury was free to disbelieve this testimony insofar as it exonerated appellant and to believe instead the handwriting expert who found it “highly probable” that appellant had signed the pawn ticket. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.