Court Opinion

ID: 9898660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 21:07:37.882246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:43.236300
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             Nos. 125,196
                                                  125,197

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                     CARIB QUENTAE WALKER,
                                            Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; SETH L. RUNDLE, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed November 9, 2023. Affirmed.

        Patrick H. Dunn, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W.
Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before COBLE, P.J., MALONE and WARNER, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: Carib Quentae Walker appeals the district court's denial of his
presentence motions to withdraw his pleas in two separate cases. Walker argues that the
district court erred because his pleas were the product of deficient representation and
coercion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court's judgment.

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                                          FACTS

       In April 2020, the Exploited and Missing Children's Unit of the Wichita Police
Department began investigating a runaway minor, A.B., who had been found in the
company of Walker. The police informed Walker that A.B. was a minor in the custody of
the State and that he should have no further contact with her. By May, A.B. had run away
again and a detective soon found sexually explicit advertisements of her on several
websites. Police set up a sting operation, contacted the phone number from the
advertisements, and ended up finding A.B. with Walker in a Wichita motel room. After
he was arrested, the State charged Walker with aggravated human trafficking in case No.
20CR1160. The district court issued a protective order, restraining Walker from
contacting A.B. Walker later posted bond and was released from custody.

       After running away from State custody again, A.B. called a social worker on July
21, 2020, stating that she wanted to turn herself in—a quick investigation revealed that
there were once again sexually explicit advertisements of A.B. on an adult dating site.
A.B. told a detective that Walker was physically abusive and had set up the
advertisements. Walker—who was still out on bond from the prior case—was once again
arrested. Based on these actions, the State filed another case charging Walker with
aggravated human trafficking and battery in case No. 20CR1494.

       The State moved to consolidate the two cases. At the hearing on the motion, the
State explained that it also intended to file an amended complaint, adding 10 counts
alleging that Walker had violated the protective order prohibiting contact with A.B. The
district court consolidated the cases over Walker's objection.

       On May 5, 2021, Walker filed a hand-written motion alleging ineffective
assistance of his counsel, Evan Watson. In his motion, Walker broadly alleged that
Watson was violating Walker's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to prepare

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a defense on his behalf and was trying to force him to take a plea. The district court held
a hearing on Walker's motion the next day. At the hearing, Walker reasserted his claim
that Watson was trying to force him to plead guilty. Watson responded that he simply
conveyed the plea negotiations to Walker and was not trying to force Walker into
pleading guilty. After hearing the parties' arguments, the court denied Walker's motion,
noting that Walker had not received ineffective assistance of counsel and that it believed
that Watson would continue to competently represent Walker moving forward.

       The day after the hearing, the State filed its amended petition adding the 10
violations of a protective order charges. Then, on the Friday before the trial was set to
start, the State notified Watson that new information had been uncovered from Walker's
cellphone. The State showed the evidence to Watson and expressed that it believed the
photos and videos supported new charges of sexual exploitation of a child.

       On the morning of trial, the parties informed the district court that they had
reached a plea agreement in which Walker would enter an Alford guilty plea to two
counts of felony sexual exploitation of a child and one count of misdemeanor battery in
exchange for dismissing the other charges. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91
S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). The State asked the district court to set aside its prior
order for consolidation and explained that it would amend the charges consistent with the
plea deal. The parties agreed to recommend sentences of the high number in the grid box
for the sexual exploitation charges and 6 months for the battery charge, with those
sentences to be served concurrently, resulting in a total term of 100 months'
imprisonment.

       As part of the plea colloquy, Walker agreed that he had been given sufficient time
to discuss the deal with Watson, that he understood the maximum sentences associated
with the charges, that he was entering the plea of his own free will, and that he
understood the particulars of the deal. Watson explained to the district court that a similar

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plea agreement had been in the works for several weeks, the only difference was that the
initial agreement had contemplated attempted aggravated human trafficking charges, not
sexual exploitation of a minor charges. The prosecutor confirmed that "we did have this
general plea proposal pending for several weeks. This is not a rushed deal this morning."

       The State then made a proffer of the evidence it would have presented at trial,
which consisted mainly of the evidence seized from Walker's cellphone depicting A.B. in
the nude and performing sexual acts on Walker, as well as the reports of Walker slapping
A.B. The district judge again questioned Walker whether he "had some time to think
about whether you want to take this plea agreement," and Walker stated that he had. The
court pressed on, asking, "[Y]ou understand that we have the jury sitting in the
courtroom, and you have the absolute right to say, I don't want to do this; let's just go
have the trial and see how it turns out?" Again, Walker replied, "Yes, sir." The court then
accepted Walker's plea to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor in case No.
20CR1160 and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of battery in
case No. 20CR1494.

       Eleven days after entering his Alford guilty pleas, Walker moved to withdraw his
pleas in each case. In the motions, Walker alleged that he had discovered new evidence
that A.B. had committed perjury, that Walker was intimidated and coerced into entering
his pleas by his attorney, Watson, and that Walker was rushed into a decision on the plea
deal. Walker later filed several memoranda in support of his motions to withdraw his
pleas—these documents all asserted similar arguments.

       At the hearing on the motions, Walker was represented by new counsel. Walker
testified and generally reiterated the arguments from his motions. He asserted that he felt
that he had been rushed into deciding whether to accept the State's plea offer and that
Watson was dishonest and had coerced and intimidated him into doing so. Walker
claimed Watson coerced him by telling him, "Take this plea. Its evidence that [the State]

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got that—some picture or video, I guess. With these charges, . . . you'll never see the
daylight." Walker also presented an audio recording of an interview of A.B. performed
by his former counsel, Watson, in which A.B. denied that Walker had trafficked her or
that he even knew that she was performing sex work. Walker explained that he only
received a copy of the interview after he entered his plea and would not have entered the
plea if he had known about the contents of the interview.

       After Walker testified, the State called Anastasia Leininger, a colleague of
Watson's who had been present during the conversation about the plea agreement
between Walker and Watson on the morning of the scheduled trial. Leininger testified
that Watson never threatened, blackmailed, or intimidated Walker during the meeting.
The only rush he placed on Walker was reminding him of the looming start of the trial
that morning. Leininger could not remember Walker ever stating that he did not want to
take any plea or that he wanted to go to trial. Leininger observed that the evidence
supporting the sexual exploitation charges was strong.

       Finally, Watson testified about the circumstances of the plea deal, noting the
difficulties of negotiating in a situation where "[t]he charges changed on the eve of trial
based upon the new evidence of the child pornography that was located on his phone."
Although he conceded that "blunt advice from a criminal defense attorney to a client can
be perceived as a threat," he denied ever threatening Walker in any way—he merely
informed Walker of the unlikelihood of success considering the strength of the State's
evidence. Watson claimed that he told Walker, "'You don't have to take this plea. We've
got a jury in the next room. We're ready to go. If you want to go to trial, we can go trial.
It's your choice." When asked about the interview with the alleged victim, Watson noted
that A.B. had given various accounts to the police—both favorable and unfavorable to
Walker. And Watson also explained that he and Walker had discussed the particulars of
the evidence depicted on the seized cellphone.

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       After hearing the evidence and reviewing the recording of A.B.'s interview, the
district court ruled from the bench and denied Walker's motions, finding he had failed to
show good cause to withdraw his pleas. While the district court agreed that A.B.'s
interview indicated that she was unlikely to cooperate with the State at trial, it noted that
her cooperation would have only impacted the human trafficking charges, not the sexual
exploitation charges to which Walker pled guilty. The district court stated that it did not
agree with Walker's characterization of Watson's advocacy as lacking.

       The district court later issued a motion minutes order supplementing its ruling and
clarifying three points: (1) Walker waited until A.B.—who had only been made available
to testify via a material witness warrant—was released from custody to move to withdraw
his pleas, which the court found to suggest bad faith; (2) while A.B.'s interview suggested
that her testimony would favor Walker, her prior inconsistent statements to law
enforcement would likely have been admissible at trial; and (3) Walker's arguments
supporting his motions to withdraw focused on the human trafficking charges, not the
sexual exploitation charges to which Walker pled guilty.

       At the sentencing hearing on April 14, 2022, the district court followed the plea
agreement and sentenced Walker to 100 months' imprisonment on each count of sexual
exploitation of a child and a 6-month jail sentence on the battery conviction, all to run
concurrent. Walker timely appealed the district court's judgment in each case, and the
cases have been consolidated on appeal.

                                         ANALYSIS

       Walker argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions
because he received lackluster representation, was coerced into entering the pleas by his
counsel and the State, and his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. The State

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counters that Walker's arguments "fail to take into account the reality of the facts," and
the district court's decision was not an abuse of discretion.

       When a defendant challenges the district court's denial of a presentence motion to
withdraw a plea, the defendant must establish on appeal the district court abused its
discretion in denying the motion. Judicial discretion is abused if the decision is arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable; based on an error of law; or based on an error of fact. State v.
Frazier, 311 Kan. 378, 381, 461 P.3d 43 (2020). In reviewing such a challenge, this court
will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility and must give deference to the
district court's findings of fact. State v. Anderson, 291 Kan. 849, 855, 249 P.3d 425
(2011). As the party alleging an abuse of discretion, Walker bears the burden to establish
the district court abused its discretion in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his
plea. See, e.g., State v. Woodring, 309 Kan. 379, 380, 435 P.3d 54 (2019).

       Before sentencing, a criminal defendant may withdraw a plea for "good cause
shown." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3210(d)(1). When determining whether a defendant has
shown good cause, a district court considers at least three factors, known as the Edgar
factors: (1) was the defendant represented by competent counsel; (2) was the defendant
misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) was the plea fairly
and understandingly made? Frazier, 311 Kan. at 381 (citing State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30,
36, 127 P.3d 986 [2006]). Courts cannot "ignore other factors impacting a plea
withdrawal that might exist in a particular case." State v. Schaefer, 305 Kan. 581, Syl. ¶
2, 385 P.3d 918 (2016). Relevant here, when a defendant claims their counsel was
unconstitutionally ineffective, they may rely on "'lackluster advocacy'" to show good
cause under the first Edgar factor. State v. Herring, 312 Kan. 192, 198, 474 P.3d 285
(2020).

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The first Edgar factor

       Walker first claims that Watson was deficient because he failed to perform a
thorough and timely investigation of the evidence recovered from his cellphone and did
not give him enough time to consider the State's plea offer. While Walker complains that
Watson should have reviewed the videos on his cellphone earlier, the State possessed the
cellphone, not Walker. And detectives did not discover the evidence on the cellphone
until days before the trial was set to begin. After finding the explicit pictures and videos
of A.B. and sharing them with Watson, the State explained that it intended to pursue
additional charges for sexual exploitation of a child. Once the State shared the evidence
with Watson, he spoke with Walker about the incriminating nature of the pictures and
videos. To the extent that Walker now argues that Watson should have inspected the
cellphone earlier, Walker himself admitted that he did not recall the photos and videos
being on his cellphone. Watson reviewed the evidence when it was made available to him
by the State, and he promptly communicated with Walker about its impact and the State's
new plea offer. It may have been preferable for Watson to have been able to review the
evidence earlier, but his failure to do so does not render his representation lackluster.

       Similarly, Walker argues that Watson should have provided him more time to
consider whether to accept the State's plea offer. Walker asserts: "Relaying a plea offer
at such a late stage in the proceeding has the same effect as never relaying it at all[.]" But
as Watson and the State explained at the plea hearing, their negotiations had
contemplated a very similar deal for several weeks—the only thing that changed was the
specific offenses Walker would plea to. Walker does not assert that he ever asked Watson
to request a continuance so he could spend more time considering the plea offer. Further,
in direct contradiction to his argument on appeal, before entering his pleas, Walker told
the district court that he had been given sufficient time to consider the State's plea offer
and declined the court's offer to discuss the matter further with his counsel. The record
supports that Watson acted as an effective advocate on Walker's behalf.

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The second Edgar factor

       Next, Walker asserts that he was coerced, by both the State and his counsel, and
rushed into deciding whether to accept the State's plea offer. As for his counsel's
allegedly coercive actions, Walker claims Watson told him to take the plea offer or he
would "never see the daylight." Watson addressed the matter at the hearing on Walker's
motions to withdraw his pleas, explaining that he believed advice from a criminal defense
attorney may sometimes seem threatening, but it is often due to the gravity of the
situation. He denied threatening or coercing Walker and believed the plea offer to be the
best possible outcome. Leininger confirmed Watson's version of the plea offer. The
district court heard this evidence and was entitled to credit Watson's account of events
over Walker's.

       Walker also argues the State coerced him by threatening to file more charges if he
did not accept the plea offer. But the record does not bear out Walker's allegation. The
State did not threaten to add charges, it substituted the sexual exploitation charges for
aggravated human trafficking charges—this amendment dropped the severity level of the
highest offense from level 1 to level 3. The State's decision to amend the charges at such
a late hour was based on its discovery of new evidence, not used as an intimidation tactic.
And again, a nearly identical plea deal had been on the table for weeks. At the plea
hearing, Walker acknowledged that he was entering the pleas of his own free will, had
considered his options, and had not been threated or coerced.

The third Edgar factor

       Third, Walker argues his pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
entered. He claims that his pleas were not voluntary because the evidence was weak and
that his pleas were not knowingly made because the plea colloquy was insufficient. It
appears Walker's claim that the State's evidence was weak is based on his assertion that

                                              9
the A.B. is not the woman pictured in the evidence found on his cellphone. Walker first
made this claim during the hearing on his motions to withdraw his pleas—he raised no
such objection when the State proffered the evidence at the plea hearing. While Walker
questions whether the photos and videos recovered from his cellphone depicted A.B.,
Watson testified that he reviewed the evidence and believed the videos and pictures
showed Walker and A.B. engaging in sexual acts. Walker's assertion that the State's
evidence to support the sexual exploitation charges was not strong is conclusory and does
not support his argument that his pleas were involuntary.

       Finally, Walker's contention that his pleas were not knowingly made because the
plea colloquy was insufficient is belied by the record. Walker concedes that the district
court advised him of the nature of an Alford plea and ensured that he understood the
rights he was waiving by entering his pleas. Walker does not explain what additional
measures the district court should have taken, nor does he provide any authority to
support his argument. The record shows that during the district court's plea colloquy,
Walker stated that he understood the nature of his pleas, the details of plea agreement, his
various rights, and the maximum potential sentences for the charges. The transcript of the
plea hearing contradicts Walker's claim that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily
entered.

       Kansas courts have long held that "a defendant should not get relief from a plea
decision simply because he or she determines, in hindsight, that it was not the most
intelligent course of action." State v. Schow, 287 Kan. 529, 542, 197 P.3d 825 (2008).
Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's findings under each of the
Edgar factors and the district court's conclusion that Walker failed to show good cause to
withdraw his pleas. Walker has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion
in denying Walker's presentence motions to withdraw his pleas.

       Affirmed.

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