Court Opinion

ID: 9772713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:27:24.79069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:47.290428
License: Public Domain

OWEN, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
On motion for rehearing, the opinion of November 16, 1995, is withdrawn and the following substituted in its place.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment remanding this case for a new trial. I would hold that the cause of action for wrongful termination under article 8307c of the Texas Revised CM Statutes is barred by limitations. The evidence establishes as a matter of law that Sanchez knew she had been terminated more than two years before suit was filed. Similarly, Sanchez’s claim is untimely under the Court’s test of when a reasonable person would have known of the termination. The two year statute of limitations under section 16.003(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs.
Sanchez filed suit on April 1, 1991. She had sustained an on-the-job injury on April 10, 1987, and was unable to return to work for an extended period of time. In November 1987, her employer Johnson & Johnson advised her in writing that she had been placed on “indefinite medical lay-off.” In the same letter, she was told that medical benefits for her and any covered dependents would terminate at the end of that month. These benefits did in fact terminate. Irrespective of any ambiguity that may have been conveyed when Sanchez was told that her medical lay-off was “indefinite,” Sanchez unmistakably knew more than three years before suit was filed that she no longer had a job with or any source of income from Johnson & Johnson.
Sanchez’s own actions confirm this. In March 1988, three years before suit was initiated, Sanchez filed for and received unemployment benefits. She did so after contacting Johnson & Johnson about going back to work. At that time, Sanchez had been released by her doctor to perform only “light duty” functions. Sanchez was told by Johnson & Johnson that there were no “light duty” positions available. There is evidence this statement was untrue, but that does not undercut the uncontroverted evidence which establishes as a matter of law that Sanchez knew or should have known more than two years before she filed suit that she was no longer employed by Johnson & Johnson. She had received no compensation or other benefits since November 1987, and she sought and obtained unemployment compensation.
The following year, in March 1989, Sanchez received authorization from her doctor *931to return to regular, full-time employment. She then filled out an application seeking employment by Johnson & Johnson. She completed this application on March 27,1989, more than two years before suit was filed. The application inquired if she had ever worked for Johnson & Johnson or its affiliates. She checked the “yes” box and in her own handwriting indicated “Surgikos 1981-1987,” affirming once again that she knew her employment with Johnson & Johnson had terminated in 1987. (Surgikos was the affiliate of Johnson & Johnson for whom Sanchez worked at the time of her injury.)
The Court points out that Johnson & Johnson denied that it had terminated Sanchez in response to a request for an admission. The Court concludes that this discovery response is a concession by Johnson & Johnson that “indefinite medical layoff’ meant something other than “layoff.” 924 S.W.2d at 927. The denial of this request for admission should not be viewed in isolation from the answer to the interrogatory that was coupled -with it. Johnson & Johnson was asked and responded as follows:

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3:

Admit that Plaintiff was terminated by you.

ANSWER:

Denied.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

If you have denied Request for Admission No. 3, set forth in detail each and every fact that forms the basis for your denial.

ANSWER:

Plaintiff was unable to return to work after more than six months on leave of absence. Plaintiff was then placed on medical layoff status effective November 30,1987. During this layoff plaintiff had recall rights for one year. Plaintiff maintained that she was fully disabled during that time and was not recalled. Plaintiffs right of recall terminated on November 30,1988.
These responses do not raise a fact issue on the meaning of “indefinite medical layoff.” The interrogatory response reflects that Sanchez was laid off effective November 30, 1987. Whether this was a “medical” or other “layoff’ is immaterial to the question of whether Sanchez continued in the employment of Johnson & Johnson. She did not. She did continue to have certain recall rights under the collective bargaining agreement, and that fact is also reflected in the foregoing response. Reading these discovery responses in a light most favorable to Sanchez, the most that can be said is that Johnson & Johnson conceded that Sanchez’s employment and right of recall ended no later than November 30, 1988. This date is more than two years prior to the date she filed suit.
There are two related but separate claims in this case: wrongful termination and fraud based on alleged misrepresentations that Sanchez would be rehired. The Court has confused the question of when Sanchez knew she was terminated, which is pertinent to her cause of action for wrongful termination, with the question of when she knew she would not be rehired, which relates to her claim of fraud. Again viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Sanchez, representatives of Johnson & Johnson made statements to Sanchez to the effect that she would be considered for recall or rehire. The evidence reflects that at least until March 30, 1989, Sanchez may have been led to believe that she would be rehired. But that is a different issue from whether she knew she had been terminated. The distinct representations allegedly made as to whether she would be recalled or rehired do not and cannot undercut Sanchez’s knowledge that she had been laid off in November 1987, and that she would receive no further compensation or medical benefits unless rehired. All of the representations in the record and any confusion created by them relate solely to whether Sanchez expected to be rehired or recalled. That is relevant to her fraud claim but not to her cause of action for wrongful termination. Because Sanchez knew more than two years before suit was filed that she had been terminated, her claim under article 8307c is barred by limitations.
I agree with the Court that Sanchez has not made out a case of fraud. As the Court points out, there has been no detrimental reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. *932Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.