Court Opinion

ID: 9406196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 07:09:42.510245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:27.714689
License: Public Domain

In The

                                  Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                                ________________

                                NO. 09-22-00278-CV
                                ________________

      IN RE COMMITMENT OF RICHARD RAYMOND POLTORAK

________________________________________________________________________

                     On Appeal from the 359th District Court
                          Montgomery County, Texas
                        Trial Cause No. 21-09-12791-CV
________________________________________________________________________

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury unanimously determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Richard

Raymond Poltorak is a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent

Predators Act. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001–.153. In three

issues, Poltorak challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the jury’s finding that he is a sexually violent predator and the trial court’s

admission of expert testimony on unadjudicated offenses. We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                            1
                                  BACKGROUND

      The State filed a petition seeking Poltorak’s civil commitment as a sexually

violent predator. A jury trial was held to determine whether Poltorak should be

civilly committed as an SVP. In addition to the presentation of documentary

evidence, the State called two witnesses during trial, psychologist Dr. Jennifer

Rockett and Poltorak. The defendant did not call any witnesses at the trial.

Pretrial Hearing

      The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing to allow the parties to voir dire Dr.

Rockett. Dr. Rockett explained that for purposes of her evaluation, she reviewed

records, including offense reports, prison records, and court judgments, which were

records typically reviewed by experts in her field for these evaluations, and she met

with Poltorak. Rockett testified Poltorak had convictions from two courts for

indecency with a child by contact pertaining to Kensie and Carrie.1 She discussed

both offenses and described the conduct that led to the convictions. Rockett

explained that she considered the offense report noting Kensie alleged Poltorak had

engaged in the conduct several times, even though Poltorak was not convicted for

those allegations. Rockett testified the records showed that Carrie alleged Poltorak

      1
         We use pseudonyms to refer to the victims, minor children. See Tex. Const.
art. 1, § 30(a)(1) (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and
with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal judicial
process”).
                                          2
touched her vagina at least four times and threw her against a wall, which Rockett

took as an allegation of violence.

      Rockett testified that she considered other allegations including prison

misconduct and that Poltorak inappropriately touched another girl, Gina, based on a

police report. Rockett explained that these other allegations contributed to her

understanding of Poltorak’s grooming behaviors and possible victim patterns, and

thus to an overall understanding of his offending behavior.

      Rockett considered the victims’ outcries where reports indicated it happened

more than once, because “it establishes a pattern of behavior . . . when we think

about behavioral abnormality, we think about antisocial personality disorder, we

may think about sexual deviance. We’re looking for those patterns and behaviors.”

Rockett explained it was standard practice in her field to review documents like

police reports, prison records, and victim outcry statements when conducting

behavioral abnormality evaluations and sex offender risk assessments. The trial

court ruled that the unadjudicated offenses were admissible because Rockett relied

on them to form the basis of her opinion. The trial court cited to In re Commitment

of Day, 342 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. denied), and Rule 403 in

reaching her decision.

                                         3
                                 TRIAL EVIDENCE

Dr. Rockett’s Testimony

      Rockett conducted a behavioral abnormality evaluation on Poltorak. Rockett

has a doctorate in clinical psychology with a forensic emphasis and is licensed in

several states, including Texas. Rockett described the procedure she follows in

conducting a behavioral abnormality evaluation, which included: obtaining and

reviewing the records; conducting a clinical forensic interview; scoring the Static-

99R and PCL-R; and sometimes conducting collateral interviews. She testified the

method she followed in Poltorak’s case was “standard practice” and in accordance

with her training as a forensic psychologist. The records she reviewed included pen

packets, jail records, prison records, mental health records, court records, treatment

records, medical records, and any other records she could obtain. These are records

typically reviewed in her field, and she relied on the facts and data in them in forming

the basis of her opinion.

      She testified that she relied on records along with the interview since people

are not always truthful, so it is “important as a forensic psychologist that you’re not

just relying on one data point.” Rockett explained the importance of historical

information in determining whether Poltorak currently has a behavioral abnormality,

since past offenses inform as to patterns like grooming behaviors and how mental

illness may impact offending patterns. Rockett testified that “past behavior is

                                           4
methodically known as the best predictor of future behavior.” Rockett explained that

in the context of the applicable statute, they look for something that will make it

more likely or predispose the offender to commit sexual violence again. To

determine this, Rockett looks at various factors a person has which are shown in

research and literature to be associated with a risk of reoffending.

      Rockett testified that another psychologist, Dr. Darrel Turner, first evaluated

Poltorak and prepared a report that she reviewed. She explained it was important to

see what a person has told another evaluator when you consider what they are telling

you. Poltorak renewed his pretrial objection, added a hearsay objection, and

requested a limiting instruction; the trial court overruled the objection and read a

limiting instruction to the jury informing them that Rockett relied on the information

to form the basis of her opinion, but explained that it could not be considered as

evidence to show the truth of the matter asserted. Rockett testified that Turner opined

Poltorak has a behavioral abnormality.

      Rockett met with Poltorak over two days in November 2021. She scored

actuarial testing instruments including the Static-99R and the Hare Psychopathy

Checklist-Revised (PCL-R). Rockett explained how and why she used the actuarial

measures in her evaluation and how they helped her predict risk. In evaluating those

things, she looked at the facts and data related to the sexual offenses. She said she

used tools given to the people in her field, scored the actuarial testing instruments,

                                          5
and considered the interviews and other things to form her opinion. Rockett testified

that Poltorak has two convictions for sexual offenses, and it was appropriate to

consider allegations of sexual offenses that had not led to convictions, because it

shows patterns of victims and grooming behavior, plus it was important to assess the

person’s behavior over time.

      Rockett testified the first sexual offense Poltorak committed as an adult was

when he was nineteen against a five-year-old girl, Kensie. Prior to discussing the

detailed allegations, Poltorak again objected based on hearsay and renewed his

pretrial objection to this testimony, which the trial court overruled noting it was

information Rockett reviewed that formed the basis of her opinion. The trial court

again admonished the jury with the limiting instruction. Poltorak told Rockett that

he and Kensie were neighbors; he helped her mother with bills and babysat Kensie.

Rockett testified that Poltorak put a dollar bill in his pocket for the vending machine

and had Kensie reach into his pocket for the dollar to touch his “private part,” which

is the offense for which he was convicted. Rockett reviewed Poltorak’s voluntary

statement given to police, and she noted that Poltorak admitted to the offense since

he signed a plea bargain. However, Poltorak told Rockett it was not intentional or

sexual, and she noted it was significant that he alternately admitted and denied the

crimes by providing contradictory statements, then “mix[ed] the two together in a

very manipulative way.” The records showed that Kensie said this happened three

                                          6
or four times, which “speaks to [a] possible pattern of grooming, possible pattern of

behaviors that went undetected.” Rockett testified this offense against Kensie was

sexually deviant because it involved a prepubescent child. Poltorak pled guilty and

was put on deferred adjudication probation for ten years but violated conditions of

his probation by obtaining employment that involved children and by having

unsupervised contact with minors. Rockett considered these probation violations

since they constituted a risk factor for general and sexual violence. Rockett testified

Poltorak’s deferred adjudication probation was revoked, and he was incarcerated on

the indecency with a child by contact offense against Kensie. In 1994, he received

an eight-year sentence and was sent to prison.

      Rockett testified that in 1996, Poltorak was released on parole, which also

required him to comply with certain conditions, including staying away from

children, but Poltorak violated his parole conditions again by having contact with

children and Poltorak was returned to prison to serve his sentence. Rockett explained

this violation of conditional release was problematic because he “did similar type

behaviors and patterns that led him to be arrested in the first place,” while out of

prison.

      Rockett discussed the complaint made in 1999 for his second indecency with

a child by sexual contact offense, which involved five-year-old Carrie. Rockett

spoke with Poltorak about Carrie, and like the previous victim, he was friends with

                                          7
Carrie’s mother and helped her “by paying bills, babysitting for her occasionally,

and being involved in the home[,]” which were further indicators of his grooming

patterns. Rockett said the records revealed he fondled Carrie’s vagina several times

and once forcibly pushed her into a wall doing so, which he denied when he spoke

with Rockett. She testified this was also a sexually deviant offense. Rockett

explained that Poltorak’s version starkly contrasted with the records, which is

significant when you look at his history and grooming patterns. She discussed the

significance of Poltorak going to prison for an offense, being released, then

committing the same offense again, which showed his patterns, and “one of the

strong risk factors is violation of conditional release. . . if a person is not being

deterred by the punishment, then they’re considered at a higher risk.”

      Rockett testified that in diagnosing Poltorak “with unspecified paraphilic

disorder likely pedophilia[,]” she used the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM),

which is relied on by psychologists and psychiatrists. Rockett explained pedophilic

disorder is an attraction to children which some people act on. Rockett testified that

in this case, unspecified paraphilic disorder is a congenital or acquired condition,

which can affect a person’s emotional or volitional capacity, and Poltorak’s sexual

offenses are evidence that his emotional or volitional capacity has been affected.

Rockett explained that if a person cannot regulate their emotions or tendencies, they

have an increased risk of acting out their sexual urges, and the same is true with

                                          8
volitional capacity and an inability to regulate behavior. She agreed that this chronic

condition can go into remission but requires active mitigation to prevent the person

from acting on it.

      Rockett also diagnosed Poltorak with antisocial personality disorder. She

explained that “[a] person with anti[social] personality disorder has a persistent and

lifelong disregard for the rights and feelings of others. They tend to act out upon that

lack of empathy by doing . . . things to other people to violate . . . their rights. They

may engage in antisocial or criminal activity. They may manipulate other people.”

Rockett explained that to diagnose antisocial personality disorder, there had to be

conduct showing problems before the age of fifteen, and she described some of

Poltorak’s behavioral problems as a child, including alleged sexual improprieties

with his adopted sister. During this testimony, the trial court gave the same limiting

instruction to the jury when Poltorak objected. As an adult, evidence of his antisocial

personality disorder included violating conditional release and problems in prison

with anger and becoming emotionally dysregulated. Rockett testified that antisocial

personality disorder was a congenital or acquired condition that can affect a person’s

emotional volitional capacity, which she observed with Poltorak. Rockett testified

this would also require active mitigation strategies to overcome acting on those

tendencies.

                                           9
       Rockett scored two actuarial instruments, including the PCL-R and Static-

99R. Rockett explained how she scored these instruments. She testified that the PCL-

R looks at psychopathy traits that research has shown to be associated with an

increased risk of violence, and Factor 2 portions of the assessment addressed

antisocial history, which “is the best predictor of sexual violence in terms of looking

at the psychopathy personality.” Rockett testified that Poltorak’s PCL-R Factor 2

score was above average compared to other criminals and caused her concern

because it showed his inability to control his behavior. Poltorak’s overall score on

the PCL-R was above-average for psychopathic features and contributed to her

opinion that he suffers from a behavioral abnormality.

       The Static-99R, which except for the subject’s age, looks at risk factors that

do not change. Rockett testified that Poltorak’s age of fifty-two was factored into his

score by reducing it one point to a “2” on the Static-99R. Nevertheless, she did not

believe Poltorak’s age reduced his risk because he was able-bodied and focused on

grooming children. Poltorak’s score on the Static-99R suggests he is a low to

moderate risk to re-offend, but Rockett considered other factors outside of that

instrument. She testified that there was a body of literature “on risk factors” for

violent sexual offender risk assessments, but she could not cite any specific

literature.

                                          10
        While completion of sex offender treatment can be a protective factor, Rockett

did not find it was a protective factor in Poltorak’s case, because he “has not

internalized any of the stuff that they are taught” and he did not appear to understand

why he offended, which was the point of the treatment. She testified Poltorak’s

problems with other inmates included stalking, trying to groom them by exposing

himself, and giving them candy, and his sexual encounters with other male inmates

before the current treatment program all showed he had continued problems, and

once he was removed from treatment for being verbally and physically aggressive.

        Rockett concluded that Poltorak has a behavioral abnormality that makes him

likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. In determining that Poltorak

suffers from a behavioral abnormality, Rockett considered that his sexual deviance

combined with his antisocial personality traits or psychopathic features elevated his

risk.

Poltorak’s Testimony

        Poltorak testified he went to prison for committing sexual offenses against

children, specifically two convictions for indecency with a child by contact. Poltorak

testified that Kensie touched his genitals, but he did not touch her. Poltorak testified

he gave a statement to police that he asked Kensie to take a dollar out of his pants

and she could have it but did not recall telling police it happened three times in one

day. He then agreed that his statement showed that is what he said. He then stated

                                          11
that “it wasn’t the reason of intentional touching[,]” instead he “had asked her if she

wanted to get a soda out of the vending machine and she grabbed the money – tried

to grab the money out of my pocket.” Poltorak testified that based on the statement,

he agreed that he intentionally put money in his underwear to have Kensie fondle

him while getting it, but he did not remember it that way. Instead, Poltorak

remembered that she was excited to get something from the vending machine, and

“for some reason, she wanted to just reach all of a sudden in my pocket and grab

it[,]” and he must have been confused at the police station. Poltorak said he

considered Kensie to be his victim but did not know why he committed the offense.

      Poltorak testified he pled guilty to indecency with a child by contact against

Kensie and was placed on deferred adjudication probation. He also testified about

his probation conditions and his awareness that he could be sent to prison for

violating them. He planned to control his behavior and follow the rules but did not,

and in 1994, his probation was revoked after he was found to have violated two

conditions. Poltorak testified he had contact with children several times but denied

touching another child, Gina inappropriately. Poltorak testified after his probation

was revoked, he was released early on parole and had to follow certain conditions.

Poltorak testified that he violated parole by having contact with children multiple

times. Poltorak testified his parole was revoked because he had contact with his

girlfriend’s children.

                                          12
      According to Poltorak, Carrie was his girlfriend’s daughter, and after he

returned to prison for violating parole, he was charged with a sexual offense against

Carrie that occurred while he was out. Poltorak denied that anything sexual

happened with Carrie, did not think he did anything wrong, and denied he was

sexually attracted to her. He agreed he pled guilty, was convicted of a second-degree

felony offense against Carrie, and he was serving a twenty-five-year prison sentence.

      When asked if he ever committed sexual offenses against a child, he said that

“the one against Kensie . . . [b]ut I don’t remember exactly doing that. With [Carrie],

no, I did not. With anyone else, no, I did not.” Poltorak said he admitted in his prison

group he sexually offended against Carrie but denied he did so just to get through

the program, rather he said that he “was doing my work and doing what I was told I

needed to do.” Poltorak explained that he tried to take responsibility for being around

children but denied committing the sexual offense.

      Poltorak testified he recently completed the sex offender treatment program,

and he testified he had problems with other offenders in treatment, including

allegations of snitching, name-calling, bullying, sexually inappropriate behavior,

and issues with boundaries. He testified he exposed his genitals to his cellmate but

said it was unintentional. He admittedly became angry when this incident was raised

in sex offender therapy, and he had an outburst where he cursed at the treatment

provider. Poltorak testified that he has anger issues and gets frustrated. Poltorak

                                          13
denied that he was sexually attracted to children. He testified he did not receive

disciplinaries for sexual misconduct, indecent exposure, or stalking behavior in

prison.

      Poltorak testified that if released he would stay away from children, not

because he is dangerous but because he did not want people to think badly of him.

He does not believe he is at risk to re-offend sexually. Poltorak testified that he

would not put himself in a position to re-offend, he is ready to be released after

twenty-two years, and believes he is rehabilitated.

Other Evidence

      Documentary evidence admitted at trial included: Dr. Rockett’s curriculum

vitae; Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) records for his offense against

Carrie including the indictment and judgment, among other things; TDCJ records

for his offense against Kensie containing the judgment adjudicating guilt and

indictment; State’s Motion to Adjudicate guilt showing violations including seeking

employment which involved children and that he failed to avoid contact with

children; and the Static-99R Coding Form showing a score of 2.

Poltorak’s Motion for Directed Verdict

      Poltorak moved for a directed verdict after the parties rested. He argued that

the evidence was legally and factually insufficient. He also asserted that Rockett

testified she did not close the “analytical gap” between the offenses. He argued the

                                         14
only evidence of his sexual deviance was from twenty-two years ago, and the recent

example of stalking behavior in prison was unsubstantiated. Finally, he argued

Rockett’s testimony about paraphilic disorder with likely pedophilia and antisocial

personality was conclusory as it related to a behavioral abnormality. The trial court

denied the Motion for Directed Verdict.

Charge, Verdict, and Order of Commitment

      The charge included the same limiting instruction on hearsay evidence that

the trial court used to admonish the jury throughout the testimony. The jury

unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Poltorak was a sexually violent

predator. The trial court then ordered him to be civilly committed.

          ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

      In issue one Poltorak contends the trial court erred by allowing testimony

about unadjudicated offenses and Poltorak asserts the source of the allegations was

unreliable and there was little probative value. He complains Rockett offered

confusing testimony on voir dire regarding other allegations of sexual misconduct

and some underlying allegations Rockett considered were unsubstantiated. Poltorak

contends “[t]hese unsubstantiated prison incidents were the only remotely recent

example of misbehavior” presented to the jury.

      We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 906 (Tex.

                                          15
2000); In re Commitment of Tesson, 413 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

2013, pet. denied) (citations omitted). If a trial court acts without reference to any

guiding rules and principles, or if it acts arbitrarily and unreasonably, it is considered

an abuse of discretion. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923

S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995). We will not reverse a jury’s verdict unless the trial

court’s erroneous admission of evidence probably caused the rendition of an

improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1); Tesson, 413 S.W.3d at 519.

      In SVP civil commitment proceedings, experts may disclose details of the

underlying facts or data they relied on in arriving at their opinion, including details

of adjudicated and unadjudicated sexual assaults. See Tex. R. Evid. 703, 705(a); see

also In re Commitment of Valsin, No. 09-19-00140-CV, 2021 WL 499069, at *9

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted); In re

Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543, 554–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2015, pet. denied). An expert’s explanation of the underlying facts and how those

facts shaped her evaluation “assists the jury in weighing the expert’s opinion that the

person has a behavioral abnormality, which is the ultimate issue that the jury must

determine.” In re Commitment of Langford, No. 01-18-01050-CV, 2019 WL

6905022, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 19, 2019, no

pet.) (citing Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 555) (other citation omitted).

                                           16
      Texas Rules of Evidence 703 and 705 govern the admission of the expert’s

opinion and the admission of this type of evidence forming the basis of the

opinion. See generally Tex. R. Evid. 703, 705. Rule 703 allows for an expert to rely

on facts and data they are “made aware of, reviewed or personally observed” in

forming their opinion, if other experts in their field reasonably rely on them, those

facts and data “need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.” Tex. R. Evid.

703. Rule 705(a) permits an expert to state an opinion and the reasons for it without

first testifying to the underlying facts or data but may have to disclose those on cross-

examination. See Tex. R. Evid. 705(a). Further, Rule 705(d) provides:

      If the underlying facts or data [that the expert relied on] would
      otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may not
      disclose them to the jury if their probative value in helping the jury
      evaluate the opinion is outweighed by their prejudicial effect. If the
      court allows the proponent to disclose those facts or data the court must,
      upon timely request, restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
      instruct the jury accordingly.

Tex. R. Evid. 705(d). When a trial court provides the jury a limiting instruction, we

presume the jury followed it. See Day, 342 S.W.3d at 199; see also In re

Commitment of Alvarado, No. 09-13-00217-CV, 2014 WL 1285136, at *11 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Mar. 27, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      Rule 403 allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence if its “probative value

is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]” Tex. R. Evid. 403.

“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has an undue tendency to suggest that a

                                           17
decision be made on an improper basis, commonly, but not necessarily, an emotional

one.” In re Commitment of Anderson, 392 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

2013, pet. denied). Under Rule 403, we conduct a balancing test considering

whether: “(1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential of the evidence

to impress the jury in some irrational way; (3) the time needed to develop the

evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence.” Langford, 2019 WL

6905022, at *4 (citations omitted).

      Rockett testified she considered the allegations pertaining to Gina, and it

contributed to her understanding of his possible grooming behaviors and offense

patterns. When asked what kind of problems he had in the sex offender treatment

program, Rockett described his issues with other inmates in treatment, including

accusations of stalking, grooming behaviors that included suggestive dance where

he exposed himself and giving candy to people, and one incident where he had to be

removed from treatment for an angry outburst. Regarding the stalking, Rockett

agreed Poltorak self-reported the accusation to a chaplain and the other incident was

unsubstantiated. Rockett explained that the incident where he exposed himself to

other inmates went to Poltorak’s sexual deviance and difficulty controlling his urges.

This aligned with Rockett’s voir dire testimony about these incidents. She also

explained during voir dire and trial that experts in her field typically reviewed and

                                         18
relied on this type of information when conducting behavioral abnormality

evaluations.

      Poltorak challenged some facts Rockett reviewed and relied on in formulating

her opinion. Although Poltorak denied the details of some incidents, he admittedly

had problems with other inmates. He also testified that exposing himself to another

inmate was unintentional, and he never received a disciplinary in prison for indecent

exposure. He also denied touching Gina inappropriately.

      The record establishes that Rockett, like other experts in her field, reviewed

prison records, as well as other sexual misconduct allegations made against Poltorak

in forming her opinion about whether Poltorak had a behavioral abnormality. See

generally Tex. R. Evid. 705. Poltorak’s problems with other inmates in sex offender

treatment and the alleged misconduct toward Gina were part of Rockett’s review and

assessment of whether Poltorak had a behavioral abnormality. Poltorak questioned

the truth of those facts during the trial, but the trial court could have reasonably

concluded the probative value of the testimony outweighed the risk of unfair

prejudice. See Tex. R. Evid. 403; Alvarado, 2014 WL 1285136, at *11; Day, 342

S.W.3d at 199 (holding the trial court acted within its discretion when allowing

experts to discuss the details of offenses and other bad acts committed by Day that

are contained in the records they reviewed). Finally, the trial court provided a

limiting instruction to the jury several times during the testimony as Poltorak

                                         19
requested and in the court’s charge. See Tex. R. Evid. 705(d). We presume the jury

followed the limiting instruction. See Alvarado, 2014 WL 1285136, at *11; Day,

342 S.W.3d at 199. The trial court did not err in admitting this evidence, and

considering the evidence and facts, the rulings probably did not cause the rendition

of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1); see also Alvarado, 2014

WL 1285136, at *11. We overrule issue one.

                     LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY

      In issue two, Poltorak contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support

the jury’s determination that he is a sexually violent predator, and in issue three, he

claims the evidence is factually insufficient.

      When conducting a legal sufficiency review of a determination that an

individual is a sexually violent predator, we use the same legal sufficiency standard

applied in criminal cases. See In re Commitment of Barbee, 192 S.W.3d 835, 839

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, no pet.) (citing In re Commitment of Mullens, 92

S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied)). Accordingly, we

examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine

whether any rational trier of fact could find the elements required for civil

commitment as a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mullens,

92 S.W.3d at 885 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). It is the

jury’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and

                                          20
draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. at 887 (citations

omitted).

      When reviewing factual sufficiency, the Texas Supreme Court held in In re

Commitment of Stoddard that

      [t]he appellate standard governing a factual-sufficiency review of a
      finding that a person is a sexually violent predator is whether, in light
      of the entire record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could
      not have credited in favor of the verdict, along with undisputed facts
      contrary to the verdict, is so significant that the factfinder could not
      have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory elements were
      met.

619 S.W.3d 665, 678 (Tex. 2020); Valsin, 2021 WL 499069, at *7–8 (citation

omitted).

      In a civil commitment proceeding under chapter 841 of the Texas Health and

Safety Code, the State must prove a person is a sexually violent predator beyond a

reasonable doubt. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.062(a). To be a “sexually

violent predator,” an individual: (1) must be a repeat sexually violent offender; and

(2) suffer from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a

predatory act of sexual violence. Id. § 841.003(a). “Behavioral abnormality” is

defined as “a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s emotional

or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense,

to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another

person.” Id. § 841.002(2). “A condition which affects either emotional capacity or

                                         21
volitional capacity to the extent a person is predisposed to threaten the health and

safety of others with acts of sexual violence is an abnormality which causes serious

difficulty in behavior control.” In re Commitment of Almaguer, 117 S.W.3d 500, 506

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, pet. denied).

      Poltorak contends that without Rockett’s conclusory and speculative

testimony, no rational factfinder could have found the elements required for civil

commitment under the SVP statute beyond a reasonable doubt. He places emphasis

on the behavioral abnormality element, so that is where we focus our inquiry.

See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a). Poltorak points to Rockett’s

failure to cite specific articles in her testimony and asserts that her testimony

constituted mere “ipse dixit.”

      The jury heard Rockett describe the standard methodology for conducting

behavioral abnormality and sexual offender risk assessments, which included

reviewing records, interviewing the offender, and scoring actuarial instruments. She

said she used that methodology in this case. Although Rockett cited no specific

studies, she noted authors recognized within the field who studied risk factors and

the scoring of actuarial instruments. Rockett described protective factors she used to

score the actuarial instruments but explained why she did not view them as protective

in this specific case. Rockett testified it was important to look beyond the Static-

99R, and historical data provided indicators of patterns, such as grooming. Rockett

                                         22
explained Poltorak’s score on the PCL-R showed an above-average risk to re-offend,

and the specific portion that measures antisocial personality traits showed an

increased risk of re-offending compared to other criminals. She testified that

Poltorak’s behavior in prison showed continued difficulties with other inmates in

treatment and controlling his urges to do things which violated the rights of others.

      Rockett diagnosed Poltorak with “unspecified paraphilic disorder likely

pedophilia” which she said was an attraction to children and “antisocial personality

disorder,” described as “a persistent and lifelong disregard for the rights and feelings

of others.” She explained those conditions required active mitigation strategies. She

also testified that his offenses were sexually deviant since they involved

prepubescent children.

      In contrast, Poltorak testified that he was not at any risk to re-offend based on

his sexual history and he denied being sexually attracted to children. He admitted

certain details of his offense against Kensie and denied others, yet he testified he

viewed her as a victim. Despite his guilty plea, Poltorak denied that he offended

against Carrie, but he agreed this offense occurred while he was on parole. He

acknowledged continued difficulty controlling his emotions. He also testified he did

not believe he needed to avoid children if released because he was a danger, but he

stated he might stay away so people would not think badly of him.

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       As the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, the jury could

reasonably conclude that Poltorak suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes

him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. See id.; Stoddard, 619

S.W.3d at 675; In re Commitment of Lowe, No. 09–14–00098–CV, 2014 WL

4363624, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 4, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); see

also Mullens, 92 S.W.3d at 887. The jury was free to disregard Poltorak’s testimony

denying the offenses and denying that he was not attracted to children or that he did

not pose a risk of reoffending. See Mullens, 92 S.W.3d at 887. Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that Poltorak has a behavioral abnormality, and the evidence is

legally sufficient. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.002(2), 841.003(a);

see also Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 675; Mullens, 92 S.W.3d at 885. We overrule issue

two.

       The jury heard from the State’s expert that Poltorak suffers from a behavioral

abnormality and the basis for that opinion. The jury also heard Poltorak testify that

he does not pose a risk of reoffending and his denials of certain facts Rockett relied

on in forming her opinion. We will not usurp the jury’s role to determine the

credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony. See Stoddard,

619 S.W.3d at 668. We presume the jury resolved disputed evidence in favor of the

finding and determined the State’s expert was credible and gave more weight to that

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testimony. See id. After examining the entire record, we cannot say “the disputed

evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the verdict, along

with undisputed facts contrary to the verdict, is so significant that the factfinder

could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory elements were

met.” Id. at 678. Thus, the evidence was also factually sufficient. We overrule issue

three.

                                   CONCLUSION

         Having overruled each of Poltorak’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment and order of commitment.

         AFFIRMED.

                                               ________________________________
                                                     W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                          Chief Justice

Submitted on March 28, 2023
Opinion Delivered June 29, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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