Court Opinion

ID: 9767967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:37:07.612867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:35.181615
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
POPE, Justice
(dissenting).
In my opinion, the courts below have correctly decided this case and the Railroad Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the petition. In fact the majority, while reversing those judgments, makes direct holdings that the Commission has jurisdiction over the gas controlled by the two public utilities, Lo-Vaca and TUFCO. The court expressly holds that the Commission has power:
“to allocate Lo-Vaca’s gas among cities, towns and corporations, and is already doing so.
“to allocate TUFCO’s gas, and the gas of all other gas utilities among cities, towns and corporations.
“to deal with the gas shortage . according to the acts and effect of the shortage, and of its orders upon the entire State.
“to regulate and apportion the sales and disposition of gas owned by each gas utility, so as to protect the public interest.
“to require a utility to deliver gas to several cities and corporations in amounts at variance with their contracts, and the damages which might be recoverable or not because of unperformed contractual obligations is a matter for the courts to decide.”
Since Lo-Vaca and TUFCO are subject to the Cox Act powers, the Commission possessed jurisdiction and Docket No. 510 should not have been dismissed.
The facts are not developed concerning many matters recited in the majority opinion. The .Commission entertained evidence only as it bore upon the title dispute about ownership of gas and for the limited purpose of determining its jurisdiction. We do not have a development of the facts about the purposes or progress in the Commission’s exercise of its powers under Docket 520, but the majority has concluded that Docket 510 was properly dismissed because Docket 520 is still pending. At the trial court level, counsel for the Commission was asked two times by opposing counsel and one time by the court whether in Docket 520, “the Commission will investigate these transactions and these alleged discriminations.” His answer was “No.” Docket 510 was filed first. It was not held in abeyance; it was not consolidated with Docket 520; it was not dismissed for an orderly control of the Commission’s docket and for consideration in Docket 520. It was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.1 *283One wonders why the Commission lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter in Docket 510 but has it in Docket 520. The question posed before this court is clearly that of the Commission’s jurisdiction.
I disagree with the majority view that a dispute over contract rights and ownership of gas can oust the Commission of its Cox Act powers to protect the public. The Commission operates upon gas owned or controlled by a public utility; the courts adjust the title questions and award damages. I would hold that, just as the courts may not be ousted from their jurisdiction over title questions and the validity of contracts by an administrative proceeding before the Railroad Commission; the Commission is not divested of its jurisdiction by a collateral lawsuit concerning title or rights under contracts. We have so ruled. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Edgar, 62 S.W. 2d 359 (Tex.Civ.App.1933, writ ref’d).
I disagree with the majority view that gas which Lo-Vaca sold outright has escaped the powers detailed by the Cox Act. Particularly is this so, when the Lo-Vaca gas that was sold to TUFCO did not so escape. Since 1920, when the Cox Act was enacted, public utilities and those who deal with them have been subject to Article 6054 which vests jurisdiction in the Commission over all orders and agreements on hearing after notice. That article provides:
Art. 6054. All orders and agreements of any company or corporation, or any person or persons controlling such pipe lines establishing and prescribing prices, rates, rules and regulations and conditions of service, shall be subject to review, revision and regulation by the Commission on hearing after notice as provided for herein to the person, firm, corporation, partnership or joint stock association owning or controlling or operating the gas pipe line affected. Acts 1920, 36th Leg., 3rd C.S., p. 18, ch. 14, § 3. (Emphasis added.)
The Cox Act is cumulative of the common law applicable to public utilities, and it is settled that a utility may not disable itself or impair its power to perform duties owing the public. Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 9 S.Ct. 553, 32 L.Ed. 979 (1889); Lone Star Gas Co. v. Municipal Gas Co., 117 Tex. 331, 3 S.W.2d 790 (1928); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Morris, 67 Tex. 692, 4 S.W. 156 (1887); Gulf Pipeline Co. v. Lasater, 193 S.W. 773 (Tex.Civ.App.1917, writ ref’d). I would hold that the public interest and the Commission powers under the Cox Act attached to the Lo-Vaca gas when Lo-Vaca acquired the reserves necessary to fulfill its long-term public commitments, and that the public interest and Commission powers follow those reserves into the hands of whoever acquired them. Unless this is the correct rule, the majority holding means that if Lo-Vaca had sold all, instead of half of its reserves, the Cox Act would have been wholly defeated.
Section 1 of Article 6053 confers broad jurisdiction upon the Commission. It is better understood when we break it into its parts and add letters to enable better identification. It says:
The Commission after due notice
a.) shall fix and establish and enforce the adequate and reasonable price of gas and fair and reasonable rates of charges and regulations for transporting, producing, distributing, buying, selling, and *284delivering gas by such pipe lines in this State;
b.) and shall establish fair and equitable rules and regulations for the full control and supervision of said gas pipe lines and all their holdings pertaining to the gas business in all their relations to the public, as the Commission may from time to time deem proper;
c.) and establish a fair and equitable division of the proceeds of the sale of gas between the companies transporting or producing the gas and the companies distributing or selling it;
d.) and prescribe and enforce rules and regulations for the government and control of such pipe lines in respect to their gas pipe lines and producing, receiving, transporting, and distributing facilities;
e.) and regulate and apportion the supply of gas between towns, cities, and corporations, and when the supply of gas controlled by any gas pipe line shall be inadequate, the Commission shall prescribe fair and reasonable rules and regulations requiring such gas pipe lines to augment their supply of gas, when in the judgment of the Commission it is practicable to do so;
f.) and it shall exercise its power, whether upon its own motion or upon petition by any person, corporation, municipal corporation, county, or Commissioners precinct showing a substantial interest in the subject, or upon petition of the Attorney General, or of any County or District Attorney in any county wherein such business or any part thereof may be carried on. As amended Acts 1939, 46th Leg., p. SOI, § 1. (Emphasis added.)-
The provisions designated (a), (e) and (f) have no requirement for advance rules. The statute carries its own power. It is self-enacting. The significant provision is the first part of (e), which omits the requirement for rules in advance and empowers the Commission to “regulate and apportion the supply of gas between towns, cities, and corporations . . While the case of State v. Public Service Corporation, 88 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.Civ.App.1935, writ ref’d) did not involve the precise question posed here, it did involve the general scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction, and considered the same statutes which we are charged with construing. It concluded:
The aforementioned statutes [Articles 6050, 6051, 6052, 6053, 6023, and 1119] show the legislative intent to confer full and plenary authority, power and jurisdiction . . . ultimately upon the Commission, to completely regulate, control, and govern the natural gas industry in all of its phases .... (Emphasis added.)
The later case of Terrell v. Community Natural Gas Co., 117 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Civ.App.1938, writ dism’d) contains this language:
The provisions of Art. 6053, supplemented by other provisions found in the statute germane to the subject, we think, have the effect of conferring upon the Commission an overlordship control and supervision of the affairs of gas utilities in regard to all matters, as expressed in the statute, “pertaining to the gas business in all their relations to the public, as the Commission may from time to time deem proper.”
A similar question occurred in 1947, when the City of Miami, Texas, was unable to obtain a supply of gas. Mobeetie Gas Company had contracted in 1928 with certain individuals who held the franchise to supply gas to the .City of Miami for a period of twenty years. Mobeetie had no contract with Miami, and it intended to stop its supply to the franchisees at the end of twenty years. When the question arose in 1947, the Railroad Commission sought an opinion of the Attorney General who also concluded that the gas supplier, even without a contract, was not free to stop its sup*285ply to the public in need.2 The Railroad Commission took jurisdiction of the dispute and refused the utility’s request to discontinue its gas service until the City of Miami obtained another source of gas. The court of civil appeals, on review, dismissed the case as moot by reason of the city’s obtaining another gas supply; however, the court by way of dicta stated that the Commission should pass on the right of other rural users to continued service, concerning which the court said, “and its jurisdiction to do so cannot be here denied.” Public Service Commission v. Railroad Commission, 215 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Civ.App.1948, no writ).
And if rules in advance are necessary to apportion gas even though the statute does not so require, the Commission has jurisdiction to make those rules ancillary to its proceedings in Docket 510. Presently the subject matter is dismissed and while it has been forty-five years since the Cox Act was enacted, the record does not reveal that the rules are even yet under consideration. I would hold that the administrative agency surely has jurisdiction in Docket 510 to make suitable rules.
I would affirm the judgments of the courts below which hold that the Commission has jurisdiction to entertain Docket 510.

. Whereas the Commission is of the opinion and finds that the instant Application brings into issue contractual transactions in the circumstances surrounding the intent, purpose and execution thereof; and these matters are in litigation in both State and Federal District Courts; and that such issues in such litigation are not subject to Railroad Commis*283sion jurisdiction; and that the oral arguments, briefs and record evidence presented herein to the Commission further raises a multitude of issues regarding title and property rights of both utility and non-utility buyers, sellers and consumers, in and to natural gas, which we inherently judicial in nature md 'beyond those powers conferred upon the Commission. (Emphasis added.)

. By virtue of Article 6053, supra, the Commission is empowered with “-full control and supervision of said gas pipe lines and all their holdings pertaining to the gas business in all their relations to the public.” It is further empowered with the “government and control of such pipe lines in respect to their gas pipe lines and producing, receiving, transporting, and distributing facilities” and empowered to “regulate and apportion the supply of gas controlled by any gas pipe line.” It may exercise its power upon “its own motion or upon petition.”
It would be an empty “jurisdiction” and an empty “full control” if the Commission could not continue a service by a utility. Otherwise the utility could abandon at will and bargain on that basis.
SUMMARY
1. It is necessary for the Public Service Corporation, a “gas utility” as defined by our statutes (Article 6050, Y.C.S.), to have the consent of the Railroad Commission to discontinue the furnishing of gas to the distributor for the City of Miami. State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Missouri Southern R. Co. (1919), 279 Mo. 455, 214 S.W. 381, 384; State v. Kansas Postal-Telegraph-Cable Co. (Sup.Ct.Kans.1915), 96 Kan. 298, 150 P. 544, 547.
2. A hearing must be held by the Commission on an application of a “gas utility” for requested permission to discontinue service to a municipality. Article 6053, V.C.S. Atty. Gen’l Op. No. V-309, Daniel (1947). (Emphasis added.)