Court Opinion

ID: 9546927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:38:04.337535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:02.232605
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the judgment. The Court of Appeal did not err in affirming the judgment of the superior court. As a result, we must affirm its judgment in turn.
*703I write separately, however, to address a single issue of general importance.
Before our decision in People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247, 92 A.L.R.3d 845], California courts instructed juries in trials of sexual offenses that the testimony of the complaining witness could support a conviction even if uncorroborated but that such testimony should be examined with caution. (See id. at pp. 873-877.) Evidently, these so-called “cautionary” and “no-corroboration” instructions functioned as “counterweight[s] ” the one to the other—the former “to protect the accused,” the latter “to protect the public.” (Id. at p. 876, internal quotation marks omitted.)
In Rincon-Pineda, we thenceforth prohibited trial courts from giving the cautionary instruction. (14 Cal.3d at p. 882.) Such an admonition, we reasoned, “impermissibly focusses on the character of the crime rather than the nature of the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 882-883, fn. 6.)
In my view, we should now bar the no-corroboration instruction. An advisement of this kind shares the same impermissible focus. Further, with its “counterweight” gone, it is without function.
Contrary to the majority’s implication, there is no legitimate benefit from the continued use of the no-corroboration instruction.
Generally, a conviction can be obtained for practically any crime, whether or not sex-related, on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim. I doubt whether the typical juror has any conception, less still misconception, about this principle. Evidently, the law itself is in agreement. It does not require a no-corroboration instruction in the general case. Quite the contrary. Such an instruction would be inappropriate. (People v. McIntyre (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 899, 907 [176 Cal.Rptr. 3]; People v. Jamison (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1173 [198 Cal.Rptr. 407] [following McIntyre].)
It might perhaps be asserted that jurors in sex-crime trials labor under the misconception that a conviction is not obtainable on the complainant’s uncorroborated testimony. Perhaps that was once the case. Twenty years ago, it appears, prosecutions for sexual offenses were much less successful than those for other major crimes. (People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 879-880.) Today, by contrast, prosecutions for such offenses fare at least as well. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics *7041990 (1991) table 5.42, p. 520.)1 Hence, any assertion that jurors in sex-crime trials labor under the cited misconception appears altogether unfounded.
To be sure, it is evidently beneficial to advise the jury as to the possible sufficiency of the testimony of any single witness—whether that witness is the complainant in a sexual-offense case or not. An instruction specially fit for that purpose is available.
CALJIC No. 2.27 (1991 rev.) (5th ed. pocket pt.) states that “You should give the [uncorroborated] testimony of a single witness whatever weight you think it deserves. However, testimony by one witness which you believe concerning any fact [whose testimony about that fact does not require corroboration] is sufficient for the proof of that fact. You should carefully review all the evidence upon which the proof of such fact depends.”
A sufficiency instruction such as the foregoing embraces the substance of—and hence obviates any “need” for—the no-corroboration instruction. True, it does not expressly state the rule of law that conviction of a sexual offense is obtainable on the complainant’s uncorroborated testimony. But it plainly conveys the message that the rule is intended to give to the jury, viz., that the complainant’s uncorroborated testimony can indeed support conviction.
It may well be that trials of sexual offenses not infrequently end up as credibility contests between the accuser and the accused. In this respect, however, they are far from unique. Twenty years ago, there was no substantial differential on this point between trials of sex-related and other crimes. (See People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 881-882.) Today, from all that appears, the situation is the same. A sufficiency instruction like that quoted above gives proper direction to the jury—whether it is trying sexual or other offenses—without “impermissibly focuss[ing] on the character of the crime rather than the nature of the evidence.” (id. at pp. 882-883, fn. 6.)
In fact, it is hard to conclude that the no-corroboration instruction is needed for credibility contests over sexual offenses. As noted, there are contests of this sort over other crimes as well. But in such cases, a no-corroboration instruction is evidently not needed. Indeed, as stated, it would be inappropriate. If such an instruction is unnecessary for charges that are not sex-related, it is unnecessary for charges that are.
*705Also contrary to the majority’s implication, there is some possible harm from the continued use of the no-corroboration instruction.
Such an instruction may be reasonably—albeit improperly—understood to favor the testimony of the complainant, who is explicitly singled out, in support of guilt and to disfavor the testimony of other witnesses, who are not mentioned, in support of innocence. This is especially true when a sufficiency instruction is also given. A reasonable juror would surely attempt to construe each advisement to carry its own meaning. He would, of course, hear the sufficiency instruction to declare that the complainant’s testimony, after careful review, could be weighty enough to convict. And he would likely take the no-corroboration instruction to suggest that such testimony was in fact weighty in and of itself—and, perhaps, did not require careful review.
If understood to favor the testimony of the complainant in support of guilt and to disfavor the testimony of other witnesses in support of innocence, the no-corroboration instruction can indeed do harm. Put simply, it threatens to function as a thumb—or in the word the majority might use, a “counterweight”—on the scales of justice, tilting the balance in the state’s favor and thereby lightening its statutory and constitutional burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Consequently, I would henceforth prohibit trial courts from giving the no-corroboration instruction. The advisement has clearly “outworn its usefulness” and “now performs no just function.” (People v. Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 877, 883.) I would accordingly overrule or disapprove each and every decision to the contrary.2

There is no indication that the no-corroboration instruction or any similar mechanism is responsible for the change.

If (rial courts continue to instruct that the testimony of the complaining witness need not be corroborated, they should also instruct that the same is true for the testimony of other witnesses, including (if applicable) the defendant. Simple fairness requires no less.