Court Opinion

ID: 9948938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:15:03.717387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:22.103018
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-0571-MR

RAYMOND EDWARD RHORER                                                APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE RICHARD A. WOESTE, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 21-CI-00322

DIANA L. RHORER                                                        APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant Raymond Rhorer (Husband) appeals the Campbell

Family Court’s April 19, 2022 Dissolution of Marriage Judgment and

accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, arguing the court erred

by awarding Appellee Diana Rhorer (Wife) equity in a house. Though the parties

purchased the house during their marriage, Husband argues Wife disclaimed any

interest in the property in 2008 by warranty deed. Finding no error, we affirm.
                                       BACKGROUND

               Husband and Wife were married in 1982. They purchased a house in

1990. While both parties are named on the deed, only Wife is named on the

mortgage. Husband and Wife separated in March 2007. Wife moved to Texas in

2008 but returned to Kentucky in 2019. Husband paid the mortgage from 2008

onward. Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on April 22, 2021.

               Husband argued before the family court, as he argues before us now,

that Wife deeded her interest in the house to him by warranty deed executed in

2010. The deed is signed by Wife and is notarized, but the deed was never

recorded.1 Several fields on the deed were left blank, and the deed is not dated.

Husband claims an attorney prepared the deed. Wife asserted before the family

court, though it appears as if she signed the deed, she signed several documents

when the parties previously contemplated divorce (though a marriage dissolution

action was never filed until the case underlying this appeal) and, therefore, she did

not realize what she had signed. Husband claims Wife agreed to deed her interest

in the house to Husband in exchange for Wife being relieved of any obligation to

pay child support for the parties’ then-minor child.

1
  “A deed is a contract executed. Even if not recorded, it passes the title, as against the grantor,
his heirs and devisees.” E.C. Artman Lumber Co. v. Bogard, 230 S.W. 953, 956 (Ky. 1921).
Because the issue is not who owns the property as between these parties, this rule is inapplicable.

                                                -2-
                The family court entered its decree of dissolution and corresponding

findings of fact and conclusions of law on April 19, 2022. The court concluded

Husband did not overcome the presumption that property acquired during the

marriage is marital and awarded Wife $30,000 in equity in the house, an amount

Wife testified was fair.

                Husband now appeals pro se. He argues the 2010 warranty deed

means Wife no longer has any marital interest in the house.

                                         ANALYSIS

                Husband acknowledges he is not an attorney. It is also apparent that

he made a good faith effort to comply with our appellate rules. Still, Husband’s

brief is deficient in a significant respect which bears mentioning: his arguments do

not contain statements of preservation as required. Arguments in appellants’ briefs

“shall contain at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the

record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in

what manner.” CR2 76.12(4)(c)(v).3 Statements of preservation are not optional.

                The appellate courts have three options when a party fails comply

with the appellate rules: “(1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review;

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
 The Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) became effective January 1, 2023. Because
Husband filed his brief on November 29, 2022, RAP 32’s predecessor, CR 76.12, was still in
effect.

                                            -3-
(2) to strike the brief [of] its offending portions, CR 76.12(8)(a) [now RAP

10(B)(3)]; or (3) to review the issues raised in the brief for manifest injustice only,

Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. App. 1990).” Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d

694, 696 (Ky. App. 2010). Indeed, “[t]he manifest injustice standard of review is

reserved only for errors in appellate briefing related to the statement of

preservation.” Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021).

                We opt to proceed with the present appeal but to review for manifest

injustice only; as in Hallis, “[o]ur decision to do so in this case, however, should

not be taken as precedent.” 328 S.W.3d at 698. Manifest injustice is found where

there exists an error which threatens a party’s entitlement to due process of law.

Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006). “Manifest injustice is

found if the error seriously affected ‘the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

the proceeding.’” McGuire v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 100, 112 (Ky. 2012)

(quoting Martin, 207 S.W.3d at 4).

                Our review reveals no manifest injustice in the family court’s division

of marital property upon application of KRS4 403.190. The court correctly noted

that all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital. “All

property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree of legal

4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -4-
separation is presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held

individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership[.]” KRS 403.190(3).

“The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property

was acquired by a method listed in subsection (2) of this section.” Id.

               Husband argues KRS 403.190(2)(d) exempts the home from marital

property.5 This exemption provides that otherwise marital property which is

“excluded by valid agreement of the parties” is nonmarital. KRS 403.190(2)(d).

The party attempting to rebut the marital property presumption must do so upon

clear and convincing evidence. Barber v. Bradley, 505 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Ky.

2016) (citing Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 266 n.23 (Ky. 2004)). “Clear and

convincing proof does not necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if

there is a proof of a probative and substantial nature carrying the weight of

evidence sufficient to convey ordinary prudent-minded people.” Rowland v. Holt,

70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Ky. 1934).

               We agree with the family court that Husband did not demonstrate, as

was his burden, the existence of an agreement between himself and Wife which

5
  Husband also argues that the cases the family court cited in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law are inapplicable because those cases contain circumstances not present in Husband’s case.
Specifically, he argues Sexton does not apply because, unlike Sexton, nonmarital asset tracing and
attorneys’ fees are not at issue in his case. See 125 S.W.3d 258 at 266-73. He argues Hunter v.
Hunter does not apply because there is no dispute in his case regarding a marital gift. See 127
S.W.3d 656, 658 (Ky. App. 2003). However, case law does not need to be perfectly on point for
general legal principles stated therein to apply, and the family court did not err by availing itself
of these cases.

                                                -5-
would exempt the equity in the home from marital property. Husband argues the

deed evinces such agreement; the deed plainly states Wife intended to “transfer

and/or release any and all legal interest, title or claim that she may have in and to

the within described real estate, including but not limited to her dower interest

herein, by virtue of her signature hereinafter set forth.”

             “Kentucky law clearly mandates that how title to property is held is

not determinative as to whether the property in question is non-marital or marital.”

Muir v. Muir, 406 S.W.3d 31, 36 (Ky. App. 2013). Husband argues in support of

the validity of the deed, asserting all legal requirements for a valid deed have been

met. But, even if the deed is valid and Husband holds sole title to the house, that

would not, without more, negate Wife’s marital interest in the home. The deed

alone does not prove the parties intended to exclude the equity from marital

property. And, though Husband claims that Wife agreed to execute the deed in

exchange for Wife no longer being responsible for child support, Husband

presented no evidence of this agreement. There is no manifest injustice in the

family court’s conclusion that because Husband did not furnish clear and

convincing evidence supporting the existence of such agreement, Husband was not

entitled to the KRS 403.190(2)(d) exemption.

             Nor do we detect manifest injustice in the family court’s calculation

of Wife’s equity. “The trial court has wide discretion in dividing marital property

                                          -6-
and the division need not be equal, but only ‘in just proportions.’” Davis v. Davis,

777 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Ky. 1989) (quoting KRS 403.190(1)). The manner by

which the family court determined the amount owed to Wife was far from unjust.

Though the parties were married until 2022, the family court calculated the amount

based on the taxable value of the home in 2008 when the parties separated. The

family court determined Wife’s share in the house was $33,800 – the difference

between the taxable amount of the house and the amount owed on the mortgage in

2008, divided in half. The family court discounted the amount owed to Wife even

further by rounding the amount down to $30,000, which Wife testified was

equitable. There is no manifest injustice in this result.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Campbell Family Court’s

April 19, 2022 Decree of Dissolution and its corresponding Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Raymond Edward Rhorer, pro se              Brenda L. Bonecutter
 Erlanger, Kentucky                         Newport, Kentucky

                                          -7-