Court Opinion

ID: 9943114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:10:56.874102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:04.622683
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re J.Q.-P, 2024-Ohio-661.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE J.Q.-P.                                  :

A Minor Child                                  :             No. 112618

[Appeal by B.P., Father]                       :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 22, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                                 Case No. FA18107682

                                         Appearances:

                 Nathaniel E. Wilkinson, for appellant.

                 S.Q., pro se.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

                   Father-appellant, B.P. (“Father”), appeals from the juvenile court’s

judgment entry following an evidentiary hearing on motions related to Father’s

parenting time with, and support obligations for, his daughter, J.Q.-P. Father

contends that the juvenile court erred in (1) denying his motion to amend his

pleadings to conform to the evidence pursuant to Civ.R. 15(B) and (2) dismissing his

motion to modify custody of J.Q.-P.
              For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile

court.

Procedural and Factual Background

              J.Q.-P. was born on December 11, 2016. Father’s paternity was

established on March 10, 2017. An administrative order for child support and

medical support was entered on May 24, 2017. On June 15, 2018, Father filed an

application to establish a shared parenting plan in the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (the “juvenile court”). On May 28, 2019, the

juvenile court denied Father’s application for a shared parenting plan and entered

an order designating Mother as the residential and custodial parent of J.Q.-P. and

granting Father parenting time.

              On September 13, 2019, Mother filed (1) a motion to modify parenting

time and support and (2) an emergency motion to terminate visitation. Mother

alleged that Father had physically and/or sexually abused J.Q.-P., that Father had

failed to provide adequate nutrition for J.Q.-P. and had otherwise failed to meet her

basic needs during his parenting time and that J.Q.-P. had demonstrated

unexplained “psychological changes” and harmful “self-inflicting behavior”

following visits with Father. The juvenile court appointed a guardian litem to

conduct an investigation and make a recommendation.

              On September 30, 2019, Father filed a motion to show cause,

requesting that Mother be required to show cause why she should not be held in

contempt for interfering with his court-ordered parenting time with J.Q.-P. Father
alleged that Mother had denied him visitation since September 12, 2019. On

October 30, 2019, Father filed an amended motion to show cause, alleging that

Mother had continued to deny him court-ordered visitation throughout October

2019.

                 On November 19, 2019, Mother filed a motion to show cause,

requesting that Father be held in contempt for failing to pay for certain medical

expenses incurred on behalf of J.Q.-P.

                 On November 25, 2019, an evidentiary hearing was held on Mother’s

emergency motion to terminate Father’s visitation. A magistrate denied the motion

but ordered that Father’s parenting time be supervised pending further

investigation.

                 On December 12, 2019, Mother filed an amended motion to show

cause, providing further support for her claim that Father had failed pay certain

medical expenses incurred on behalf of J.Q.-P. and alleging that Father had failed to

timely make child support payments.

                 An evidentiary hearing on the pending motions was originally

scheduled for June 2020 but was continued due to issues related to the COVID-19

pandemic. Numerous continuances followed due to scheduling issues and/or as the

parties engaged in settlement discussions in an attempt resolve the matter.

                 Following a conference conducted on April 27, 2021, the magistrate

entered an order indicating that, through their negotiations, the parties had reached

“substantial agreement in the matter” but were “not in agreement as to the issue of
which parent will be designated as residential parent for school purposes” and that

“[t]he matter should be set for trial on the remaining issue of which parent shall be

designated residential parent for school purposes.” The matter was then assigned a

July 2021 trial date.

                On May 4, 2021, the parties agreed that Father’s parenting time

would no longer be supervised and the juvenile court adopted the parties’

agreement.      Following a conference on May 27, 2021, the magistrate entered an

order indicating that the parties were “coming to an agreement” that they

anticipated would “encompass all custody and support matters.”

                In June 2021, Mother’s counsel was granted leave to withdraw.

Mother then proceeded pro se. Shortly thereafter, the July 2021 trial was cancelled,

and the case was transferred to a visiting judge. The assigned visiting judge passed

away before the matter could be heard and the case was transferred to a new visiting

judge.

                Following a pretrial conference on January 27, 2022, an evidentiary

hearing was scheduled for April 26 and 27, 2022. In its journal entry summarizing

the conference, the juvenile court stated:

         For any modification of the May 28, 2019 Journal Entry, the moving
         parties must show that there was a “change of circumstances” and that
         the proposed modification is in the “best interest of the child.”

         The parties indicated the only issue before the Court is: Legal
         Custodian[;] Residential Parent for School Purposes; Child Support;
         and Medical Payments and Deductibles.
              Once again, the evidentiary hearing was continued. The evidentiary

hearing finally commenced on September 20, 2022.

      The Evidentiary Hearing

              The transcript reveals that at the outset of the hearing, there was

confusion as to what motions were to be addressed at the hearing. After some

discussion on the issue, which apparently left the juvenile court with the impression

that Father had filed a motion to modify the May 28, 2019 judgment entry, the

juvenile court indicated, “[W]e’re ready to proceed in regards to evidence and

testimony in regards to the issue of whether there should be a modification of the

Court’s last order in regards to residential parent. * * * So the obligation is on the

father at this point in time on the Motion to Modify.” Although Father had not, in

fact, filed a “motion to modify,” no one corrected the juvenile court.

              Mother proceeded with her case-in-chief, presenting testimony from

J.Q.-P.’s pediatrician, a social worker for the Cuyahoga County Division of Children

and Family Services, Father by cross-examination and her own narrative direct

examination. Father was the sole witness to testify on his behalf.

              In the middle of Father’s testimony, the juvenile court realized that

Father had not, in fact, filed a motion to modify custody. The following exchange

occurred:

           THE COURT: * * * You’ve asked for a change or modification.
      When was that motion filed?

           [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: The Court has been interpreting the
      mother’s motion as a full modification.
             We never actually filed a Motion to Modify, but that’s been —
      every since I was retained about mid-2019, that’s how this Court —

           THE COURT: Yeah. I didn’t see it either, so that’s kind of tricky
      to modify custody.

            First you have to have a change of circumstance, but then you
      have to have the best interest, but there’s no motion.

             [MOTHER]: I agree with that. There is not.

             THE COURT: So on what basis can I grant your request now?

             [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Obviously, this case has been pending
      for a very long time and mother has had notice of father’s intention to
      change parenting time.

             (Inaudible) we’ve been negotiating back and forth and due to the
      close proximity of mother’s emergency motion before [the magistrate]
      had been treating the entire — basically (inaudible).

             So the Guardian ad Litem’s report is —

            THE COURT: Obviously he understood that too. But
      nevertheless, there’s no motion for modification unless you know of
      one. * * * The only Motion for Modification was that of the mother.
      Okay. I’ll let you proceed and we’ll sort it out,

               Father continued with his testimony.        At the conclusion of his

testimony, Father made an oral motion to modify parenting time and custody. The

juvenile court responded: “Sometimes we’ll grant a motion to allow you to make a

motion to conform with the evidence or file a pleading to conform with the evidence,

but I don’t think this is an appropriate case for that.” At the conclusion of the first

day of the hearing, the juvenile court, once again, addressed the issue of Father’s

unfiled motion:
               THE COURT: * * * In regards to your motion for modification of
       custody and/or the motion to reflect the evidence or to conform with
       the evidence presented, I’m gonna consider it, so if you have something
       to write and file, you need to do so tonight. * * * I haven’t ruled on it.
       * * * I’ll consider it at that time.

               The next morning, Father filed (1) a motion to amend his pleadings

to conform to the evidence pursuant to Civ.R. 15(B) and (2) a motion to modify

custody.

               In his motion to amend his pleadings, Father argued that the parties

had “expressly and impliedly consented to try the matter of custody” at the

January 27, 2022 pretrial conference, that all parties had been “operating under the

understanding that custody was at issue * * * and had been doing so for many

months” and that Mother had “more than a fair opportunity to address the issue,”

given that her “witnesses and exhibits bore directly on the issue of custody.” Father

also noted that the guardian ad litem had recommended a change in custodial status.

Father did not, however, identify what “pleading” he sought leave to amend or,

specifically, what amendments he sought leave to make.

               In his motion to modify custody, Father requested that he be

designated the legal custodian and residential parent of J.Q.-P. or, in the alternative,

that Father be named the residential parent for school purposes, be given authority

to make medical decisions for J.Q.-P., have approximately equal parenting time with

J.Q.-P. and that child support be adjusted accordingly. In support of his motion,

Father asserted that “there has been a significant change in circumstances since the

last order of this court.”
               After receiving Father’s motions, the juvenile court indicated that it

would “not rule upon [Father’s motions] directly” but that it would “take [them]

under advisement” and “may or may not grant them.” The evidentiary hearing then

continued.

      Recommendation of the Guardian Ad Litem

               On September 14, 2022, the guardian ad litem filed a report in which

he recommend that “due to a significant change in circumstances,” the juvenile court

“issue an order for shared parenting with a relatively equal allocation of parenting

time,” that Father be given the right “to make all medical and school-related

decisions” for J.Q.-P. and that Father be designated the residential parent for school

purposes. The guardian ad litem further stated that “should the Court decide that it

is in [J.Q.-P.’s] best interest that she be placed in Father’s exclusive custodial and

residential care,” he would “endorse that.” The guardian ad litem explained that his

recommendation was based on the fact that although there was “little to no basis in

fact for her accusations” of abuse, Mother “continue[d] to push the narrative of

abuse when interacting with involved professionals including the child’s school.” He

indicated that Mother’s continued accusations, “without [Mother’s] willingness to

seek help or acknowledge a problem, foretells a potentially dangerous future that

would not be in [J.Q.-P.’s] best interest” and that although Mother had for years

claimed that J.Q.-P.’s issues were attributable to Father, “it is abundantly clear that

she is[,] in fact, the primary source of the distress.” At the hearing, the guardian ad
litem described his investigation and placed his recommendation on the record. He

then answered questions posed him by the parties.

      The Juvenile Court’s Ruling

              On March 7, 2023, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry in

which it denied Mother’s motion to modify parenting time and overruled and

dismissed Father’s motion for leave to amend his pleadings and his motion to

modify custody.1

              With respect to Mother’s motion to modify parenting time, the

juvenile court found that Mother had “failed in her burden of proof” and that there

was “no evidence” to support her motion. The juvenile further found that there was

no evidence of abuse or neglect of J.Q.-P. while in Father’s care and “not a thread of

evidence that sexual abuse of [J.Q.-P.] occurred” — while in Father’s care or

otherwise.    The juvenile court noted that “[i]ndividuals’ perceptions or

presumptions are not significant threats” and that “[f]alse reports could lead to a

‘change of circumstances’ and affect the best interest of the child.” With respect to

Father’s motions, the juvenile court stated:

            When browsing the Court’s file on September 20, 2022, the
      Court found no motion was filed by Father for modification of the
      Court’s Parenting Time Order or modifying the parent approved for
      school purposes or medical decisions.

      1 On March 6, 2022, the juvenile court issued a separate journal entry addressing

the issue of child support. Finding a substantial change in circumstances that was not
contemplated at the time of the original child support order, the juvenile court
significantly reduced Father’s monthly child support obligation. The parties have not
appealed this journal entry.
            On the second day of trial, September 21, 2022, Father filed
      motions to allow him to file a Motion to Modify Parental Rights and
      Responsibilities and/or amend his pleadings to conform to the
      evidence. The Court overruled those motions as not timely filed. The
      Court subsequently took Father’s motions under advisement.

      ***

            The Court overrules and dismisses Father’s motions, filed
      September 21, 2022, on the second day of trial to modify custody or
      allow Father to amend his pleadings to conform to the evidence.

            Mother is pro se. Mother prepared and argued her Motion to
      Terminate or Modify Father’s Parenting Time; however, to consider
      modification of the parental custody without a motion filed in this case
      would be a denial of due process and be fundamentally unfair.

      ***

            Since no motion is pending in Father’s case, the Court cannot
      order modification of the parties’ current custody/parenting order of
      May 28, 2019.

      ***

            Inasmuch as the Court dismissed Father’s motions, the Court
      has not made a ruling on “change of circumstances” for Father.

              Father appealed, raising the following two assignments of error for

review:

      Assignment of Error 1: On page 13 of the Judge’s Decision, the court
      erred when the court overruled Father’s 15(b) motion to conform the
      evidence to match the pleadings.

      Assignment of Error 2: On page 13 of the Decision, the court erred
      when the court dismissed Father’s motion to modify custody.
Law and Analysis

      Motion for Leave to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence

              In his first assignment of error, Father argues that the juvenile court

abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend his pleadings to conform to

the evidence under Civ.R. 15(B). He asserts that the matter should “be decided as if

his 15([B]) motion was granted” and that “he be named the residential parent and

legal custodian of J.Q.-P.”

              Civ.R. 15(B) provides:

      When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
      consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
      been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may
      be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
      these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even
      after judgment. Failure to amend as provided herein does not affect
      the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the
      trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
      pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall
      do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
      subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that
      the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
      action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance
      to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.

              In determining whether the parties impliedly consented to litigate an

issue, courts consider various factors, including “whether they recognized that an

unpleaded issue entered the case; whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity

to address the tendered issue or would offer additional evidence if the case were to

be retried on a different theory; and whether the witnesses were subjected to

extensive cross examination on the issue.” State ex rel. Evans v. Bainbridge Twp.
Trustees, 5 Ohio St.3d 41, 46, 448 N.E.2d 1159 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus.

“Under Civ.R. 15(B), implied consent is not established merely because evidence

bearing directly on an unpleaded issue is introduced without objection. Rather, it

must appear that the parties understood the evidence was aimed at the unpleaded

issue.” Id. at 46. Further, an issue may not be tried by implied consent where it

would result in substantial prejudice to a party.         Id. at 45.    “[D]ue to the

requirements of procedural due process, trial of unpleaded issues by implied

consent is not lightly inferred.” Meilen v. Meilen, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-66,

2013-Ohio-4883, ¶ 24, citing Grand Light & Supply Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771

F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir.1985).

              We review a trial court’s denial of a Civ.R. 15(B) motion to amend

pleadings for abuse of discretion. Evans at paragraph three of the syllabus. A trial

court abuses its discretion if its decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140

(1983). As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19

Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 1248 (1985):

      “[A]n abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in * * *
      opinion * * *. The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of
      an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing
      considerations. In order to have an ‘abuse’ in reaching such
      determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of
      fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of
      will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise
      of reason but rather of passion or bias.”
Id. at 87, quoting State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984).

A decision is unreasonable when “no sound reasoning process” supports the

decision. AAAA Ents. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50

Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). An abuse of discretion also occurs when

a court “applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or

relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d

401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

               Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying

his motion for leave to amend his pleadings because the parties “expressly and

impliedly consented to try the matter of custody,” Mother had notice of and a “fair

opportunity” to present evidence on “the issue of custody” and, in fact, presented

evidence on the issue at the hearing, each witness who could speak to the issue was

cross-examined on “the issue of custody” and Father had relied on the juvenile

court’s prior statements that custody was at issue in failing to file a motion to modify

custody earlier in the proceedings, thinking it was “unnecessary.” Father further

contends that “[w]hile it could be viewed as reasonable to deny the motion based on

the discussion and [M]other’s presentation of [the] case involving the issue of

custody, to deny Father’s motion in contravention of the Court’s own statements is

unreasonable” and that Mother’s pro se status should not have been considered

when ruling on the motion because Mother “chose to represent herself.”

               We are mindful that our role is to determine whether the juvenile

court abused its discretion, not whether the juvenile court’s decision was the same
decision this court would have made. When reviewing a decision for abuse of

discretion, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court.

                Based on a thorough review of the record, we cannot say that the

juvenile court abused its discretion in denying Father’s motion. The record reflects

that the juvenile court carefully considered Father’s motions. After reviewing

Father’s motions and considering the arguments of the parties and the evidence

presented at the hearing, the juvenile court denied Father’s motion because (1) no

motion was pending in Father’s case, (2) Mother, who was proceeding pro se,

“prepared and argued” her motion to terminate or modify Father’s parenting time,

not a motion to change her designation as the residential parent and legal custodian

of J.Q.-P. and (3) “to consider modification of the parental custody without a motion

filed in this case would be a denial of due process and would be fundamentally

unfair.” Even assuming Civ.R. 15(B) applied here,2 Father has not shown that the

       2 In the context of continuing jurisdiction in divorce actions, the Tenth District

observed in Meilen, 2013-Ohio-4883:

                Although Civ.R. 15(B) refers to pleadings, not motions, we find it
       applicable to this case. Generally, the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure govern
       divorce actions, Civ.R. 75(A), and nothing in Civ.R. 75 specifically exempts
       divorce actions from the application of Civ.R. 15(B). Moreover, a motion
       invoking a domestic relations court's continuing jurisdiction operates much
       like a complaint. When a party files such a motion, it must serve the motion
       as if it was a complaint. Civ.R. 75(J). Like a complaint, the motion notifies the
       non-moving party and the domestic relations court of the issues the moving
       party seeks to resolve. Civ.R. 15(B), therefore, determines when the scope of
       the motion must expand to include issues not raised in the motion.

Id. at ¶ 22.

        Likewise, in this case, the juvenile court’s continuing jurisdiction was invoked by
the filing of a motion. See Juv.R. 35(A); see also In re H.W., 114 Ohio St.3d 65, 2007-
juvenile court acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or unconscionably in denying him

relief under Civ.R. 15(B).

               In his motion for leave to amend his pleadings, Father did not identify

the “pleading” he sought leave to amend or the specific amendment he sought to

make to such pleading. He merely asserted that the juvenile court should grant his

motion to amend because the parties “recognized that Custody was at issue,” had “a

more than fair opportunity to address the issue” at the evidentiary hearing and

“Mother’s witnesses and exhibits bore directly on the issue of custody.”

               However, the only motions Father had filed were a motion to show

cause and an amended motion to show cause, both of which related to Mother’s

alleged interference with his parenting time. Father had not filed any motion to

modify the juvenile court’s May 28, 2019 judgment entry allocating parental rights

and responsibilities. Further, the record reflects that Father withdrew his motions

to show cause during the hearing, after the parties reached an agreement with

respect to Father’s missed parenting time. Accordingly, there was no “pleading” of

Father’s to amend. The only motion before the court was Mother’s motion to modify

parenting time and support.

               Despite Father’s claims to the contrary, we see nothing in the record

to indicate that Mother expressly consented to litigate the issue of whether the

Ohio-2879, 868 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 11 (“The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to custody
proceedings in juvenile court except when they are clearly inapplicable.”), citing former
Civ.R. 1(C)(7) and State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith, 68 Ohio St.3d 357, 360, 626 N.E.2d 950
(1994); In re A.Z., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108627, 2020-Ohio-2941, ¶ 36. Accordingly,
we believe a similar rationale would apply here.
juvenile court should change her designation as J.Q.-P.’s residential parent and legal

custodian. There is no transcript of the January 27, 2022 pretrial conference in the

record. Accordingly, we do not know what was said at that conference. The juvenile

court was in the best position to know what occurred at that conference, including

whether Mother understood that an “unpleaded issue” was part of the case, and to

what extent Mother would be prejudiced if Father’s motion for leave to amend were

to be granted and the issue of a possible change in residential parent/legal custodian

status were to be litigated at the September 20, 2022 evidentiary hearing. That the

parties may have previously been engaged in settlement discussions that included a

possible change in the residential parent does not mean Mother agreed to litigate

that “unpleaded issue” when those settlement discussions failed.           When the

possibility of proceeding on Father’s unfiled motion was raised in the middle of the

evidentiary hearing, Mother did not agree to it.

              That Mother presented evidence on issues relevant to custody at the

evidentiary hearing does not mean she impliedly consented to litigate the issue of

whether she should continue to be the residential parent and legal custodian of

J.Q.-P. At issue was her own motion to modify Father’s parenting time. The

evidence Mother presented was relevant to that motion.

              Father has cited no relevant legal authority supporting his position

that the juvenile abused its discretion in denying his motion for leave to amend his

pleadings. Apart from Civ.R. 15(B) and two cases setting forth the standard of

review on a Civ.R. 15(B) motion, Father cites only three cases in his appellate brief
— Edmondson v. Steelman, 87 Ohio App.3d 455, 458, 622 N.E.2d 661 (12th

Dist.1992); Vignal v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 69603, 1996

Ohio App. LEXIS 4194 (Sept. 26, 1996); and Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 4th Dist.

Pike No. 468, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4737 (Sept. 9, 1992). None of those cases

involves facts or circumstances even remotely similar to those at issue here. None

of those cases involves a situation in which a party sought leave to amend a pleading

or motion under Civ.R. 15(B) that was never filed and none of those cases involves a

situation where the parties were found to have impliedly consented to litigate

whether a parent’s status as a child’s residential parent and legal custodian should

be changed (or any other child custody issue).

               Edmondson involved the denial of a motion for leave to amend a

complaint under Civ.R. 15(A) to assert a prayer for punitive damages in a negligence

action. In that case, the Twelfth District held that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion because the appellant failed to make a prima facie

showing that he could present sufficient evidence to support a claim for punitive

damages. Edmondson at 457-458, 460-461. In Vignal, the plaintiff sought to

recover damages after a physician perforated his intestine during a surgical

procedure. This court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the plaintiff’s Civ.R. 15(B) motion for leave to amend his complaint (which alleged

lack of informed consent) to include a claim for battery because the plaintiff “failed

to make a prima facia showing that he could support, with facts, an allegation of

battery.” Vignal at 16-17. In Shoemaker, the Fourth District held that the parties
did not impliedly consent to try the unpleaded issue of whether appellee had a right

of action against appellant for contribution. Shoemaker at 15-18.

               Because Father has not shown that the juvenile court acted

unreasonably, arbitrarily or unconscionably in denying his motion for leave to

amend his pleadings, Father’s first assignment of error is overruled.

      Dismissal of Father’s Motion to Modify Parenting Rights

               In his second assignment of error, Father asserts that the juvenile

court erred in dismissing his motion to modify custody. However, Father’s brief

contains no argument in support of his second assignment of error. An appellant's

brief must include “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with

respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support

of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record

on which appellant relies.” App.R. 16(A)(7). An appellate court may disregard an

assignment of error presented for review if the appellant fails to identify in the

record the error on which the assignment of error is based, fails to cite to any legal

authority in support of an argument or fails to argue the assignment separately in

the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A)(7). See App.R. 12(A)(2) (“The court may

disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to

identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to

argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).”); V.C.

v. O.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109988, 2021-Ohio-1491, ¶ 87; Story v. Story, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109850, 2021-Ohio-2439, ¶ 29.
               “An appellate court is not obliged to construct or develop arguments

to support an appellant’s assignment of error and ‘will not “guess at undeveloped

claims on appeal.”’” State v. Jacinto, 2020-Ohio-3722, 155 N.E.3d 1056, ¶ 56 (8th

Dist.), quoting State v. Piatt, 2020-Ohio-1177, 153 N.E.3d 573, ¶ 39 (9th Dist.),

quoting McPherson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21499,

2003-Ohio-7190, ¶ 31. “‘If an argument exists that can support this assigned error,

it is not this court’s duty to root it out.’” Strauss v. Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

95377, 2011-Ohio-3831, ¶ 72, quoting Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit Nos.

18349 and 18673, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2028, 22 (May 6, 1998).

               Father’s generalized assertion that the juvenile court erred in

dismissing his motion to modify custody — without any explanation or citation to

supporting legal authority — does not satisfy Father’s obligation under

App.R. 16(A)(7). Accordingly, we disregard Father’s second assignment of error.

               Furthermore, even if Father had argued his second assignment of

error, it is doubtful that we would have jurisdiction to consider it given that (1) no

ruling was made on the merits of Father’s motion, i.e., the motion was dismissed

without prejudice, (2) Father could refile it and (3) Father did not show that he

would relinquish any rights or would otherwise be prejudiced if required to refile his

motion. Here, the juvenile court in its judgment entry clearly left the door open for

Father to refile his motion to modify custody, noting that the court had “not made a

ruling on ‘change of circumstances’ for Father” and providing instruction regarding

the use of evidence “to establish their case-in-chief” “[i]f either party files a motion
to modify the Judgment entry of May 28, 2019.” A dismissal that is not based on

the merits and is without prejudice is generally not a final, appealable order because

it does not prevent a party from refiling. See, e.g., M.E.D. v. P.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 112070, 2023-Ohio-3471, ¶ 11 (trial court’s dismissal of father’s motion to

modify child support and obligation for medical insurance after he failed to perfect

service of the motion on mother was not a final, appealable order); V.C. v. O.C., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 113181, 2024-Ohio-344, ¶ 6-7, 9, 21, 30-31 (trial court order

dismissing, for want of prosecution and failure to comply with court order, father’s

motions to modify parental rights and to show cause based on alleged interference

with parenting time was not a final, appealable order where dismissal was without

prejudice, father could refile his motions and father did not claim that there were

certain rights he would be relinquishing if he had to refile his motions or that a

refiling of his motions would prejudice his ability to seek the relief sought in his

motions).

               Judgment affirmed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Common

Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR