Court Opinion

ID: 9833064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:25:26.313921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:59.229695
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In the opinion it is said:
“It is not alleged that any of the several acts complained of as constituting the fraud complained of were committed in Dallas county, so that the only contention that could be made to maintain the venue in Dallas county as to appellants is the construction to.be given section 29a of article 1995, R. C. S., as added by Gen. and Sp. Acts 40th Leg. 1st Called Sess. e. 72, § 2.”
Appellee complains of the above and says that the “fraud question,” in the opinion of counsel for appellee, was the only meritorious question involved. We had gotten the idea from the oral arguments that the construction to be given section 29a of article 1995, as added by Gen. and Sp. Acts, 40th Leg. 1st Called Sess. c. 72, § 2, was the one upon which appellee thought to hold the venue in Dallas county.
However that may be, the fraud issue was well briefed by appellees, and we will consider it more fully. The trial court states in the judgment that the parties agreed in open court, for the purpose of the hearing on the plea of privilege, that “all the material allegations of the plaintiff’s petition and controverting plea” were true, and upon such agreed statement overruled appellant’s plea to be sued in the county of their residence.
Omitting the formal parts of the controverting pleas it is as follows:
I. “That plaintiffs in their original petition filed herein, which same is hereby referred to and made a part of this plea for all purposes as if specially set out herein, alleged and now allege that the said defendants Hill and Harper acting in collusion with the. defendant St. Louis Southwestern Railway Compa*640ny of Texas, liad issued a certain shipper’s order bill of lading, which acted as a receipt for the therein described certain bales of cotton, as being in good condition without exceptions. That the said Hill and Harper then sold the said bill of lading and the cotton called for by the same to the plaintiffs herein. And the plaintiffs further alleged, and here allege in the alternative, that if the said defendants Hill and Harper, and the said railway company, negligently issued a bill of lading certifying that the said cotton was in good condition without exception, and that by reason of such facts the said defendants were jointly liable to the plaintiffs, and all such allegations are true and correct.”
II. “That this court has venue- of this suit because the defendant St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas is a carrier doing business in the state of Texas, and having an agent and representative in Dallas county, and this suit arises from damage to freight and by reason of its transportation, and a contract in relation thereto, that the said defendants Hill and Harper are properly suable in Dallas county, because there is a joint cause of action against said defendants and St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas, and the said Hill and Harper are necessary parties to the said suit, since the relief sought by the plaintiffs as against all of said defendants grows out of the same transaction, and the law is that whenever there are two or more defendants in any suit, brought in any county in this state, and such suit is lawfully maintainable therein under the provisions of article 1995 as to any of such defendants, then such suit may be maintained in such county against any and all necessary parties thereto.
“Wherefore, premises considered, plaintiffs pray that such plea of privilege be overruled.
“Wallace & Taylor,
“Attorneys for Plaintiffs.”
The plea is verified.
It will be noted that the reference in the plea to the statement in the petition, and made a part of the plea, is that Hill and Harper, acting in collusion with the railway company, “had issued a certain shipper’s order bill of lading, which acted as a receipt for the therein described certain bales of cotton as being in good condition without exceptions ; that the said Hill and Harper then sold the said bill of lading and the cotton called for by the same to the plaintiffs herein.”
The statute, subdivision 7 of the venue statute, provides that, to fix the venue of the suit in a county other than that in which appellants have their domicile, the facts must show a case of fraud, and when fraud is shown the suit may be brought in the county in which the fraud was committed, of where the defendant has his domicile. Subdivision 5 of the venue statute, article 1995, provides that, if a person has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular county, suit may be brought either in such county or where the defendant has his domicile.
Under subdivision 7 of the venue statute, appellee refers us to Landa v. Hunt (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S. W. 860, in which Judge Fisher said that if the defendants, residing in Wichita county, drew a draft upon the plaintiff, based upon a false claim, with the intention of deceiving and defrauding the plain- • tiff, and intending that the draft should be paid in Comal county, this, upon payment of the draft, would be a fraud in law, and the statute would give jurisdiction in the county where the fraud was perpetrated; the final act thereof being the presentation to and payment by the plaintiff in the county of his residence. We do not consider the Landa v. Hunt Case in point, since the controverting plea nowhere mentions the drawing of a draft on appellee or the payment of a draft in Dallas county. The drawing of the draft, or the sending of the draft to the Dallas Bank, or its payment by appellee, is not stated in the controverting plea. The controverting plea says that Hill and Harper had issued a certain shipper’s order bill of lading, which acted as a receipt for the therein described bales of cotton as being in good condition without exceptions, and that Hill and Harper then sold the said bill of lading and the cotton called for by the same to appellee. From the admission in open court of said facts, we consider them as proved; but the controverting plea does not allege that said facts occurred in Dallas county, and we cannot presume they did.
The facts, as alleged in the petition, as admitted are considered only as establishing the facts alleged in the controverting plea. By what we said in the opinion as to the suit against the railroad company, joined as parties in the suit, we meant only to say that, in our opinion, the joining of the railroad company in the suit did not of itself have the effect to fix the venue of the suit as to appellants in Dallas county.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.