Court Opinion

ID: 9808420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:37:44.670739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:14.495808
License: Public Domain

Hoke, J.,
concurring in part: Plaintiff having entered within the boundaries of defendant’s lot and completed its road before the appeal could be heard and the rights of the parties determined, there seems to be no present good to come from dissolving the injunction, but I am clearly of the opinion that such a process should never have been issued against defendant unless it had also run against the plaintiff and its avowed purpose to enter on and appropriate a part of the dwelling lot *263claimed by tbe defendant and where be and bis family made tbeir borne. From tbe facts in evidence as I understand tbem, defendant and bis family, as stated, claimed, occupied, and used as Their home a bouse and lot in tbe city of Raleigh, adjacent to plaintiff’s single track, now connecting Johnson Street, its original terminal, with North Carolina Railroad and its own track, running from Raleigh to Cary. That plaintiff, having decided that it would be to its interest and facilitate tbe connection and proper operation of its trains .at this point to have a double track for tbe purpose parallel to its former single track, ascertained that in order to construct such track would require a portion of defendant’s lot. Under existent conditions there was no likelihood that it could successfully condemn tbe property under tbe law, this being a part of defendant’s dwelling lot, Pell’s Revisal, sec. 2578; and plaintiff thereupon having advanced a claim for right of way of 100 feet on each side of its single track from Johnson Street through the city of Raleigh to the junction with its track leading to Cary, entered the present suit, setting up its claim and asking that defendant be enjoined from committing trespass or otherwise interfering with plaintiff’s operations in extending its track and taking over a portion of the yard and lot occupied by defendant. The statute relied on by plaintiff to justify this claim seems rather to refer to the method whereby, for certain purposes, plaintiff may be allowed to acquire property and not to any specified amount or width of right of way; but if it be conceded that there is a hona fide controversy between these parties as to the existence of such right on the facts presented in this case, it was to my mind a most improvident order by which defendant was enjoined from any and all interference and plaintiff permitted to proceed and take over the property peaceably occupied and claimed by defendant as his home. There arfe many decisions with us to the effect that when the principal purpose of action is to obtain an injunction, and the facts are such as to present a serious controversy as to the rights of the parties, an injunction will be continued to the hearing. Tise v. Whitaker, 144 N. C., 508. But even in cases of that character, and this is not one of them, the principle only applies where the effect of the injunction is to maintain existent conditions until the right can be properly and finally determined. In the present case the defendant was in the peaceable possession of the property, and the only move that threatened a disturbance was the proposed action of the plaintiff, and yet the process of the court was issued to stay the defendant and allow plaintiff to proceed, and the affidavit of defendant filed in the case here will disclose that plaintiff was prompt to take advantage of the conditions thus created. It is as follows: “That after the order of Judge Bond grant*264ing the injunction herein, the plaintiff took possession of a part of defendant's lot and proceeded to cut through the same for the purpose of double tracking its line; that the edge of. the cut at one point at the time the work was done was within 18 inches of one of the corners of defendant’s house, and at another point about 30 inches from defendant's bedroom; that since the cut was made rains have washed away a part of the top of the cut and it is nearer now to defendant’s said house. That the cut is almost perpendicular .and in such close proximity to defendant’s house that it is dangerous and defendant fears in a short time the safety of his house will be imperiled by the constant washing in of the sides of the cut; that under the order of the court it was required that the cut be sloped down and not perpendicular, and the defendant avers that plaintiff did not leave safe and sufficient support for the underpinning of his house. That the track of the plaintiff has not been completed entirely to the connection with the main line at Boylan Bridge, and the condition of the track is of such character that it can be removed elsewhere, and there is nothing of permanency about it”; and this on facts showing that defendant was in possession .and on a finding by his Honor that there was a bona fide question of the rights of the parties. It is not required to look beyond our own decisions to show that no such order should have been made nor such untoward results permitted. In R. B. v. Olive, 142 N. C., 25Y, a contest about a right of way, it was held, among other things, Connor, J., delivering the opinion: “Before a railroad company is entitled to invoke th in-junctive power of the court it must show clearly: (l)-that it has a right of way over the lands in controversy; (2) the extent of such right; (3) that defendants are obstructing or threaten to obstruct its use. If there is a controversy in respect to any facts necessary to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to the injunction, both parties will be restrained from trespassing or interfering until a trial can be had.” And in Cobb v. Clegg, 137 N. C., 153, opinion by Walker, J., it was said: “It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal or equitable right to grant an interlocutory injunction, to the right in ■statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction because a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction or a refusal of one on application in the first instance will virtually decide the case on its merits and deprive plaintiff (here defendant) of all remedy or relief even though he should afterwards be able to show ever so good a ease.”
In this case, as stated,'defendant, in the peaceable possession of his home, has had his case practically prejudged contrary to our decisions, *265and, in my opinion, the injunctive order should be even now so modified as to restrain plaintiff from entering or trespassing on the lot occupied and claimed by defendant until the issues can be tried and the rights of the parties properly determined. It is no doubt a correct proposition that when a railroad company has constructed its road, and, in the exercise of its quasi-public franchise, is operating its trains, its work should not be lightly interfered with in furtherance of individual or private interests; but this doctrine, wholesome as it is, has no proper application here, and, on the facts of the record as I understand them, I am of opinion, as stated, that both parties should be restrained till the hearing, and if, on a full and fair investigation, it should be determined that plaintiff had a right of way, it is well and will be so adjudged; but if it shall be then established that plaintiff has wrongfully trespassed on defendant’s rights of property, as he claims, it should be held to restore the lot to its former condition and make proper compensation to defendant for the injury inflicted upon him.
AlleN, J., concurs.