Court Opinion

ID: 9782541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:55:59.248456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:05.317018
License: Public Domain

*283MOSK, J.
I dissent.
The majority broadly extend the scope of Civil Code section 3333.4, which limits automobile insurance claims by uninsured motorists, to this claim not against an insured driver but against public entities responsible for failing to safely maintain a public roadway. I disagree. The voters who passed Proposition 213, thereby enacting Civil Code section 3333.4, did not intend to limit damages for injuries to motorists based on a dangerous condition of property or nuisance.
As we emphasized in Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109, 114 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 884, 980 P.2d 433]: “In the case of a voters’ initiative statute ... we may not properly interpret the measure in a way that the electorate did not contemplate: the voters should get what they enacted, not more and not less.” Consistent with the purpose of Proposition 213, Russell Glen Day, whose motorcycle was hit by a car because the City of Fontana and County of San Bernardino (hereafter the city and county) failed to correct or warn of an obstruction blocking the motorists’ view in a public intersection, should be permitted to seek recovery of damages against the city and county for noneconomic as well as economic damages.
I
In September 1991, Day, then 19 years old, suffered devastating injuries when his motorcycle was struck by a car in an intersection; the accident was the result of the configuration of the intersection and obstructions seriously limiting visibility. The motorcycle was not insured. Day commenced this action in August 1992, including a claim against the city and county for a dangerous condition of public property and nuisance.
Although the case was classified as a fast track action, it was not called for trial until May 1997; by then, Civil Code section 3333.4, enacted as part of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, had gone into effect. The city and county successfully moved to exclude all evidence or recovery of noneconomic damages under the provision. The jury found no fault on the part of Day, allocating responsibility for the accident about equally between the driver of the car and the city and county. The court entered a judgment for economic damages only, which the Court of Appeal affirmed.
II
Civil Code section 3333.4 provides, in relevant part: “[I]n any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle, a *284person shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages if ... HQ ... H[| .. . [t]he injured person was the operator of a vehicle involved in the accident and the operator can not establish his or her financial responsibility, as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)
In Hodges v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th 109, we looked beyond the literal words of the provision, which we concluded were “not pellucid” (id. atp. 113; see also id. atp. 119 (cone. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [referring to “this poorly drafted, ambiguous statute”]), to discern the voters’ purpose, as indicated in the ballot arguments and elsewhere. We explained: “It seems clear that a primary aim of Proposition 213 .. . was to limit automobile insurance claims by uninsured motorists. The electorate wanted to ensure that uninsured motorists, who contribute nothing to the insurance pool, would be restricted in what they receive from it. This principle of fairness fueled the initiative. ... [ID Proposition 213’s statement of legislative purpose supports this view, identifying the principal intended beneficiaries of die measure as Californians who obey the financial responsibility laws.” (Id. at p. 115.) The ballot materials for the measure specify the purpose of “ ‘restoring] balance to our justice system.’ ” (Ibid.) As Hodges made clear: “With regard to uninsured motorists, the ‘system’ in need of change in order to ‘restore balance to our justice system’ is the one that permits those who do not contribute to the insurance pool—and thereby drive up the costs of premiums for automobile insurance—to reap the benefits of coverage paid for by law-abiding motorists. . . . Moreover, use of the words ‘Californians’ and ‘law-abiding citizens’ indicates that the initiative was aimed principally at providing balance for those who obey the financial responsibility laws . . . .” (Ibid.)
Hodges concluded that Proposition 213 “was primarily intended to limit awards against insured drivers.” (Hodges v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 116.) Thus, the ballot arguments, “considered as a whole, . . . indicate that voters were being urged to distinguish between law-abiding motorists who pay for liability insurance, on the one hand, and law-breaking uninsured motorists who refuse to pay for such insurance on the other. By limiting the amount of damages available to uninsured motorists, the law-abiding motorists would receive some savings in the form of reduced premiums. The arguments for and against the measure refer principally to remedying an imbalance in the justice system that resulted in unfairness when an accident occurred between two motorists—one insured and the other not.” (Ibid.) The stated purposes of the statute of “punishing illegal behavior and encouraging personal responsibility are emphatically directed at ‘reform[ing] an unfair *285system’ with respect to law-abiding drivers who ‘pick up the tab’—i.e., those who ‘play by the rules’ and ‘take personal responsibility’ [citation] but have been required to ‘pay additional premiums to protect themselves from uninsured drivers.’ ” (Id. at p. 117.)
We thus determined in Hodges that Civil Code section 3333.4 was intended to resolve inequities involving the allocation of costs between motorists who carry automobile liability insurance and motorists who do not. The former—scofflaw uninsured motorists—are held accountable as both a punishment and incentive; the latter—motorists who obey the financial responsibility laws—are the beneficiaries. We found nothing in the ballot materials suggesting “that such punishment or incentive was also intended—or should be permitted—to benefit” other defendants “not reasonably included among ‘those who play by the rules’ or ‘take personal responsibility’ or ‘pick up the tab’ for the ‘skyrocketing] ’ costs of automobile insurance.” (Hodges v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 117.) Hodges itself involved a products liability claim against the manufacturer of the car. In the absence of a clear expression of voter intent, we declined to adopt “a broad literal interpretation of the initiative” that would limit damages in such a claim, emphasizing that to do so would raise “ ‘substantial policy concerns.’ ” (Id. at p. 118.)
In my view, it follows ineluctably from our analysis in Hodges that the liability at issue in this case—based on the dangerous condition of public property and nuisance—does not fall within the purview of Civil Code section 3333.4. The city and county, which failed to maintain safe roadways and which did not contribute to the relevant insurance pool, are not reasonably numbered among those who “play by the rules” or “take personal responsibility” or “pick up the tab” for skyrocketing automobile insurance costs. When a claim for injury is based on a defective or dangerous condition of property, as opposed to negligence by an insured driver, applying the statute does nothing to advance the voters’ intent under Proposition 213. The ballot materials do not indicate that Proposition 213 intended to change the “system” with regard to a public entity’s liability for nuisance or dangerous conditions of property—or suggest that any such change is needed.
Moreover, as in the case of the products liability claim in Hodges, broad literal application of the provision to this case against the city and county for failure to remedy an unsafe condition in a public intersection raises obvious and substantial policy concerns. Compensating the victims of injuries caused by unsafe design or maintenance of public streets for pain and suffering operates as a strong incentive for cities and counties to prevent or abate dangerous conditions, thus minimizing risks to the public. It also serves the *286important social goal of compensating injured persons for damages caused by the negligent acts of public entities. The majority’s broad application of Civil Code section 3333.4, by relieving cities and counties of liability for all damages caused by their negligence, will erode public policy aimed at securing the safety of all motorists.
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of Proposition 213 that it was intended to alter the special statutory provisions regarding tort claims against public entities. Government Code section 835, a provision of the Tort Claims Act, expressly makes a public entity liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of property.1 There is no mention whatever, either in Civil Code section 3333.4 or in the ballot materials regarding Proposition 213, of limiting governmental liability in dangerous condition cases. Unlike the majority, I disagree that the carefully tailored provisions of the Tort Claims Act may be modified by implication. Nor do I discern any justification for providing a windfall to the public entities responsible for failing to keep their roadways safe for motorists.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Kennard, J., concurred.

Government Code section 835 provides, in pertinent part, that “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred” and the public entity “had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition . . . and a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”