Court Opinion

ID: 9884726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:09:43.014054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:40.366080
License: Public Domain

Tuohy, P. J., and Feinberg, J., specially concur: We agree with the result reached in the foregoing opinion but not with all therein stated. In our opinion the trial court did not depart from the established practice in dismissing the complaint as to Idle Motors, Inc. It appears from the decree that the cause came on for hearing and disposition * ‘ of the vari-' ous legal and jurisdictional questions presented by the pleadings . . . including plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, defendant’s Defense to said Amended Corn-plaint and plaintiffs’ Reply; and the 1 statements’ and arguments of respective counsel . . . and the pertinent section of the Zoning and Building Ordinances of the Village of River Grove, Illinois; and it having been admitted in said pleadings and in open court that the defendant Idle Motors, Inc., a corporation, has partially constructed a building under a permit issued to said defendant by the appropriate Officers of the Village . . . and that said building is located in the ‘B’ Commercial District in said Village, wherein ... it is permitted to build public garages . . . . ” A legal question was accordingly presented by the matters before the court as to whether or not the building thus partially constructed constituted a nuisance. No contention was made that a public garage is a nuisance per se, so that the question was narrowed to a consideration of whether or not the manner in which the building was to be used constituted a nuisance requiring the intervention of the injunctive processes of a court of equity. The trial court held that the building not having been completed, the question of nuisance was speculative and wholly insufficient to warrant a court of equity to intervene by way of injunction to abate a nuisance which might or might not exist in the future. With that conclusion we are in agreement, and in dismissing the complaint upon those legal grounds we find no violation of the accepted practice. Nor do we find that the trial court based his decision on matters extraneous to the pleadings. There is no report of proceedings in the record before us, and we cannot say what the particular statements or admissions were, made by counsel in open court, referred to in the decree. Every intendment is in favor of the decree, and under the Practice Act it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs, with respect to the recitals in the decree as to statements and admissions made, to have a report of proceedings to show what actually occurred upon the hearing. It does not appear from the record that plaintiffs made any objection to the procedure before the chancellor in hearing the matter as he did. If such objection was made, it should be preserved by such report of proceedings. In view of the state of the record before us, we deem the criticism directed against the chancellor unwarranted.