Court Opinion

ID: 9776063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:17:48.98574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:33.618730
License: Public Domain

GAMMAGE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the reversal of this conviction, but I must respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority to remand the cause for a new trial.
Appellant’s testimony at the punishment stage of her trial — that she was forcibly raped twice by an assailant who, after an attempted third rape, in response to her pleas to be taken home, explained that she would also have to “take care of” his friends, and who grabbed the barrel of the rifle held by appellant whereupon it discharged and killed him — is clearly not a judicial confession to murder, the offense for which the jury was charged and the verdict was returned.
The majority correctly notes that, at the time appellant moved for a directed verdict, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. However, the majority goes on to hold that any evidence from the punishment stage of the trial may be read-back and considered along with that admitted in the guilt-innocence stage for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the evidence. I believe such an interpretation of the “read-back rule” to be incorrect. It purports to allow such evidence to include statements amounting to less than a judicial confession — an admission of the essential elements of the offense for which a verdict of guilty has been returned.
At the guilt-innocence stage, this case involved only circumstantial evidence which was clearly insufficient to support the conviction of appellant for murder or any other crime. After the trial court erroneously overruled appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, and after the jury was erroneously allowed to render its guilty verdict, appellant testified during the punishment stage to the circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased. At no time did appellant admit the act of firing the rifle or that she intentionally or knowingly caused the death of the deceased. These elements are essential to constitute a judicial confession to the offense of murder. We may not presume their presence to defeat the presumption of appellant’s innocence, nor may we infer them to convert appellant’s exculpatory statement into a judicial confession. See Harrell v. State, 659 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Cr .App.1983).
In Daughtrey v. State, 544 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), relied upon by the majority, the Court of Criminal Appeals declined to pass on the question of sufficiency of the evidence because it had an inadequate record before it. While the Court in dictum at one point recited the read-back rule in the language used by the majority in the instant case, in stating the rationale for the rule at another point in the same paragraph it impliedly restricted its use to situations involving only judicial confessions.1
*504In Smyth v. State, 634 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Cr.App.1982), also relied upon by the majority, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically declined to allow the accused’s admission of one element of the offense at the punishment stage to be used to cure the trial court’s error of admitting objectionable testimony of another, and otherwise unproven, element of the offense during the guilt-innocence stage of the trial.
Finally, in Garcia v. State, 522 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), the accused took the stand at the punishment stage of his trial, admitted he shot the deceased and asked for forgiveness. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, because of this admission during the punishment stage, the accused could not complain that the evidence at the guilt-innocence stage did not prove he shot the deceased.
In all the cases I have examined applying the read-back rule (or related cases dealing with statements of the accused which resulted in waivers to evidentiary objections), the involved statements included admissions to necessary elements of the offense for which the accused stood convicted.2
In the instant case, however, while we have clearly insufficient evidence at the guilt-innocence stage to sustain a conviction for murder, we do not have a judicial confession at the punishment stage which may be read-back to overcome this deficiency. Furthermore, even were appellant’s statement in this case sufficient to consti*505tute a judicial confession, I believe the rationale for the read-back rule — to allow the statement’s use in testing sufficiency of the evidence in order to avoid a further trial — no longer has valid application.
This rationale was adopted prior to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), wherein it was held the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment precluded a second trial where the first conviction is reversed solely on the basis of insufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict.
Since retrial is no longer possible in cases reversed for insufficient evidence, and since the rationale behind the read-back rule was that such retrials should be avoided because the inculpatory testimony of an accused at the punishment stage would only be used to provide sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict at retrial, the basis for the read-back rule in cases involving insufficient evidence no longer exists.
As Presiding Judge Onion stated in the dissenting portion of his opinion in Gordon v. State, 651 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), the decisions relied upon by the majority in the instant case
dealt with the sufficiency of the evidence, where defendant had admitted guilt only at the penalty stage of the trial, and reversal for lack of sufficient evidence would mean use of his testimony at any retrial. These cases may well be questioned in light of [Burks and Greene], particularly if a motion for instructed verdict is erroneously overruled at the guilt stage of the trial. [emphasis added]
Gordon at 797.
In the case before us we have just such a situation where a motion for instructed verdict was erroneously overruled. In the majority’s view, this error was waived because appellant took the stand at the punishment stage and made a statement which was even less than an admission of guilt.
I disagree. The judgment should be reversed and an acquittal ordered.

. "Further, this court has held that where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, evidence from the punishment stage, including a judicial confession by the defendant, is to be considered in deciding the question.... As stated in [Boothe v. State, 474 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) ] at p. 221: ‘It would be an exercise in futility to reverse such a case for insufficient evidence [at the guilt stage of trial] where the testimony of the appellant *504[judicial confession at the penalty stage of trial] could be used against him on a retrial.’ ” [emphasis added; brackets in original]

. See for example:
Wheeler v. State, 628 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (Accused pleaded guilty and admitted possession of heroin "as charged,” thereby waiving question of legality of search.)
Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (Accused did not testify at all, but case sets out principle that if accused does testify he may waive his rights.)
Lasker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (Accused "admitted all the elements of the offense," and could not then challenge sufficiency of the evidence.)
Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (Not in point, but accused argued it was a denial of due process to not permit him to admit guilt without waiving claimed error. Court said it was common sense and not a denial of due process.)
Dugger v. State, 543 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (Accused confessed murder, thereby waiving sufficiency of evidence.)
Jones v. State, 532 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (Accused took stand at punishment phase in support of motion for probation and made “judicial confession” of burglary of a building.) Hunnicutt v. State, 531 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (Accused admitted guilt to "offense charged,” thereby waiving objection to search.) Jones v. State, 518 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Accused admitted guilt “of the allegations in the indictment," thereby waiving sufficiency of the evidence.)
Downey v. State, 505 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (Accused admitted possession of marihuana, thereby waiving legality of search.)
Sims v. State, 502 S.W.2d 730 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (Accused admitted possessing capsule containing heroin, could not then contest legality of search.)
Rozell v. State, 502 S.W.2d 16 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (Accused testified he was guilty at punishment stage, granting of new trial to get co-defendant's testimony would serve no purpose.)
Creel v. State, 493 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (Accused took stand to "explain away” items in vehicle, admitted they were there, thus waiving probable cause objection to search.)
Brown v. State, 487 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (Accused pleaded guilty and testified as to extraneous offense, thereby waiving objection to State’s witness testifying to same.)
McKenzie v. State, 487 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (Accused made judicial confession, thereby waiving objection to tainted identification.)
Sheridan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (Accused admitted possessing marihuana, thereby waiving probable cause objection to search.)
Evans v. State, 480 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972) (Accused took stand at guilt stage and admitted shooting his wife, could not then object to admissibility of statement of a witness as to accused’s earlier admission of same at scene.)
Chaney v. State, 477 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (Accused judicially confessed to possession of heroin, thereby waiving objection to legality of search.)
Palmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972) (Accused admitted possessing heroin, cannot question lawfulness of search.)
Boothe v. State, 474 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) (Accused at punishment stage, admitted possession of marihuana, thereby waiving sufficiency of evidence.)
Richardson v. State, 458 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) (Accused admitted guilt and asked for mercy, thereby waiving sufficiency.)