Court Opinion

ID: 9753588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:19:44.303899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:38.820804
License: Public Domain

OPINION
Justice ROBINSON
for the Court.
The defendant, Mark Sampson, appeals from a judgment of conviction for second degree child abuse after a bench trial in the Superior Court for Kent County. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial justice committed reversible error because, in his view: (1) G.L.1956 § 11-9-5.3 (the statute pursuant to which the defendant was convicted) is unconstitutionally vague; (2) the evidence was insufficient for an adjudication of guilt and for denial of the defendant’s motion for new trial; (3) the defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel; and (4) it was an abuse of discretion to adjudicate the defendant guilty and to deny the defendant’s motion for new trial.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel1
On September 27, 2007, defendant, Mark Sampson, was charged by criminal information with second degree child abuse. The criminal information set forth the charge in pertinent part as follows:
“That Mark Sampson, * * * on days and dates between July 30, 2007 and August 3, 2007, * * * did abuse [Jacob], a child, by inflicting upon said child a serious physical injury, not resulting in permanent disfigurement or disability, in violation of [G.L.1956] § 11 — 9— 5.3(b)(2)(d)(e):!: * *.”2,3
*1133It is undisputed that Jacob is defendant’s son, who was three years old when the child abuse allegedly occurred.
A
The Defendant’s Waiver of Counsel and Waiver of a Trial by Jury
Mr. Sampson’s trial commenced on April 7, 2008 in the Superior Court. Just prior to the voir dire process with respect to prospective jurors, defense counsel addressed the court regarding certain concerns that defendant wished to raise. Counsel, speaking on Mr. Sampson’s behalf, stated that Mr. Sampson was “alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because [the attorney] [was] not going to call [defendant’s other] son, [Michael], as a witness.”4 Mr. Sampson, speaking on his own behalf, added that he “didn’t want a jury trial, but [his attorney] wants to have a jury trial * *
Addressing the disagreement over whether or not to call Michael as a witness, the trial justice indicated to Mr. Sampson (1) that he “presumefd] that there [was] a valid tactical reason” for the attorney’s decision and (2) that ineffective assistance of counsel is usually alleged in the context of a postconviction proceeding. Mr. Sampson responded that “it [was] good enough to have on record.” In response to that statement, the trial justice indicated that they were, in fact, making a record; he then proceeded to deal with the jury trial issue.
With respect to the jury trial issue, the following exchange between defendant’s attorney and the trial justice occurred:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: * * * The issue of a [b]ench versus a jury trial, Mr. Sampson and I discussed that way back when I was first appointed * * *. We had been going back and forth[.] I have spoken to several attorneys, including the attorney who litigated the Thorpe case, and based upon all the information that I have * * * I do believe that it is in Mr. Sampson’s best interest based on the work that I have done in preparing for this case, not to waive the jury trial. That’s my strategic decision, and whether or not to call a specific witness or put — what questions to ask of a specific witness, these are decisions that are made by counsel, not by the client. The client decides whether or not he wants to testify. I’ve advised Mr. Sampson in this regard.
“THE COURT: * * * [Y]our reading of Strickland is that this decision is defense counsel’s to make?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It is, your honor.” (Emphasis added.)5
Following the just-quoted exchange, the trial justice proceeded to advise defendant *1134of the rules governing attorney conduct in this jurisdiction, and he again advised defendant that he would be able to address, in a postconviction relief proceeding, what he considered to be his attorney’s ineffective assistance. The following ensued:
“THE COURT: * * * [W]e do have rules that are set by our Supreme Court that [govern] attorney conduct in these proceedings, and specifically in the Supreme Court Rules Article 5 Rule Number 2 which involves the role of a counselor, and Rule 2.1 involves just what [your attorney] is obligated to do as both your attorney and as an officer of this [c]ourt in representing a client. I’m quoting, ‘A lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid ... ’ I emphasize, ‘... candid advice. In rendering advice a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to a client’s situation.’ Now, the commentary with regard to that rule says in part, ‘Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. However, a lawyer shall not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that that advice will be unpalatable to the client.’
“MR. SAMPSON: That’s advice though, sir, that is not the ultimate decision. That’s advice.
“THE COURT: Ultimately, in addition to his duty to you[,] [your attorney] is required, to proceed in a way that is calculated to get you the fairest and the best trial and try to [ejnsure the best chance of your acquittal of these charges. I quite agree with the decision to put your matter in front of a jury.
“MR. SAMPSON: Okay, I understand that you agree, but that doesn’t— does that mean that it is actually right, sir? Not questioning your authority.
“THE COURT: I know, Mr. Sampson. The only way to judge that would be if this matter were to proceed to a jury and if you were to be convicted, at that point an Appellate Court or probably in a proceeding for post-conviction relief there would be an opportunity to present that question, that the decision to retain or to move forward with a jury tri,al in lieu of a Bench trial was, in fact, the wrong decision and it made for a good case of ineffective assistance of counsel. The argument may be more persuasive if it was reversed, that [your attorney] was insisting that we have a Bench trial and they avoid a jury trial. That may be a better argument in some cases depending on the specific facts, but I appreciate your placing this on the record, I’ll treat it as a motion. I’m going to deny your motion. Is there anything else we need to address before the jury arrives?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, your Honor. Thank you.
“THE COURT: Very well, Mr. Sampson. Thank you for your comments. I can assure you our court reporter has taken down your comments, and as soon as the jury arrives we’ll commence the process of jury selection, we’ll be in recess until then.” (Emphasis added.)
After the above-referenced recess, the jury voir dire commenced. At the conclusion of the voir dire process, defendant asked to address the court; and, with the prospective jurors not being present, defendant indicated that he was concerned about the composition of the jury. The defendant also stated that he was not satisfied with counsel. The trial justice then began to pose the necessary questions to defendant so that he could assure himself that his waiver of counsel and decision to *1135represent himself was voluntary and knowing and intelligent. Before completing his inquiry of defendant, however, the trial justice continued the trial to April 9, 2008; he said that he was continuing the trial so that Mr. Sampson and his attorney could review the relevant case law with respect to waiver of counsel and so that Mr. Sampson could decide whether or not he wished to waive his right to an attorney.
On April 9, 2008, as defendant’s trial resumed, defendant’s attorney indicated to the court that defendant’s desire to waive his attorney persisted. The trial justice then continued his inquiry of Mr. Sampson with respect to whether or not he wished to represent himself. The following brief exchange ensued:
“THE COURT: I remember at the end of the discussion before we had completed it you told me you didn’t have the ability to represent yourself; do you remember that?
“MR. SAMPSON: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Do you still feel that way today?
“MR. SAMPSON: No. I feel that I don’t want the support of [this attorney]. If it is the only alternative that I have, I will proceed.
“THE COURT: We’re going to proceed today with you in charge of your own defense or with [this attorney]. So, do you feel that you can represent yourself today?
“MR. SAMPSON: Yes.” (Emphasis added.)
The following exchange, which occurred shortly thereafter and which we quote in pertinent part, is also of relevance:
“THE COURT: Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer, if you are found guilty, and in light of all the difficulties of you representing yourself, do you still desire to represent yourself, Mr. Sampson, and give up your right to be represented by a lawyer?
“MR. SAMPSON: (Brief pause) Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: You don’t sound very sure of that, sir.
“MR. SAMPSON: Your honor, I have to have confidence within my counsel and I don’t. So I feel as though I have to step up myself. I don’t have, as I stated, I don’t have the money myself for counsel. If I did, I would definitely do that.
“THE COURT: Your problem is primarily you don’t like the advice you’re getting from [your attorney]?
“MR. SAMPSON: We’re going in two different directions, sir, and I feel something is, you know, not being addressed.
“THE COURT: And you understand that you certainly are going to be able to make a case for that in a post trial proceeding with regard to [your attorney’s] effective representation of you; do you understand that much?
“MR. SAMPSON: Yes.
“THE COURT: Very well. It seems to me that it is very important that we have this conversation, that you are not comfortable representing yourself; is that true?
“MR. SAMPSON: I’m trying to win the case. I’m not the greatest — I’m not the most comfortable but I’m content.
“THE COURT: Content with what?
“MR. SAMPSON: Trying to resolve it for myself.
“THE COURT: Even though you are not the most comfortable—
“MR. SAMPSON: Yes, sir. We have two different avenues that we’re taking. He wants to go with a jury, I want to go straight up against the judge.
*1136“THE COURT: In other words, you would desire to proceed without a jury this morning; is that correct?
“MR. SAMPSON: Yes, sir.” (Emphasis added.)
Shortly thereafter, the trial justice made the following ruling on the record with respect to Mr. Sampson’s waiver of his right to counsel:
“I find in light of the extensive discussion that you and I have had that based on your answers, you are knowingly and voluntarily waiving your right to counsel and I’m going to allow you to represent yourself * * (Emphasis added.)6
Having determined that Mr. Sampson’s waiver of his right to counsel passed constitutional muster, the trial justice proceeded to consider the request for a waiver of jury trial that Mr. Sampson had filed. After a brief colloquy with Mr. Sampson regarding that issue, the trial justice granted his request to waive the jury.
B
The Bench Trial
Mr. Sampson’s trial continued before a justice of the Superior Court (the same justice as presided over the above-described proceedings) sitting without a jury on April 9, 10, and 11, 2008. Mr. Sampson represented himself at that trial, with standby counsel being present.
The prosecution presented two witnesses — Elisa C.7 (the child’s mother) and Cheryl Trager (the physician’s assistant who examined the child at Elisa’s request).8
Elisa testified at trial that, on July 30, 2007, Mr. Sampson picked up their two children for a “visitation” and that, on August 3, 2007, Mr. Sampson returned the children to her care. It was Elisa’s testimony that, the next day, August 4, she was helping Jacob with his toilet training when she “saw bruises and other marks on his behind.” According to Elisa, she asked Jacob what had happened, and he responded: “Daddy spanked me.” It was Elisa’s testimony that she spoke with defendant shortly thereafter; she stated that defendant admitted to spanking Jacob and that defendant told her that “the kids are bad and he had to discipline him.” Elisa testified that she photographed Jacob’s buttocks and then “brought him to the pediatrician.” It was Elisa’s testimony that, after she took Jacob to the pediatrician, she went to the Wickford State Police Barracks and provided the police with a statement.
Cheryl Trager testified at trial that she was the physician’s assistant who examined Jacob on August 4, 2007. She testified that the examination was “very nor*1137mal * * * except for diffuse bruising on [Jacob’s] buttocks, the left cheek greater than the right cheek.” Ms. Trager further testified that, on Jacob’s “left buttocks, * * * he had two linear parallel abrasions that were about two centimeters long.” In Ms. Trager’s estimation, based upon “[t]he extent of the bruises and the placement,” the bruising “appear[ed] to be not accidental.” It was Ms. Trager’s testimony that, in view of the observations that she made during her physical examination of Jacob, she was required to contact the Department of Children, Youth and Families. She stated that she “called the child abuse hotline” and completed a standardized form to document her observations.
C
The “Memorandum of Decision”
On April 22, 2008, a “Memorandum of Decision” was issued. In that document, the trial justice summarized the travel of the case, as well as the testimony and evidence presented at trial. The trial justice also made certain credibility determinations with respect to each witness. He determined that Ms. Trager was “completely candid and credible” and that Elisa was “credible with regard to her account of the relevant facts of this case.”
The trial justice then proceeded to make certain additional factual findings, which he indicated had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Among those findings were the following: (1) that defendant “administered corporal punishment to the victim by spanking or otherwise striking the victim on his buttocks;”9 (2) that “[i]n administering corporal punishment upon the victim * * *, the [defendant inflicted injuries to the buttocks of the victim;” (3) that “[t]he corporal punishment administered by [defendant to the victim caused bruising to victim’s buttocks;” and (4) that “[defendant acted intentionally, purposefully], and knowingly each time he administered corporal punishment to the victim.”
The trial justice proceeded to indicate that “[t]he sole remaining issue to be resolved involve[d] a determination of whether [defendant's administering of corporal punishment to the victim was excessive within the meaning of the law” (emphasis added) and that “[r]esolution” of that issue would begin “with an analysis of the relevant portions of Brendan’s Law.”10 In so *1138doing, the trial justice observed that, in a 1995 version of the statute, the term “serious physical injury” was defined as “any injury, other than a serious bodily injury, which arises other than from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment.” He then stated that “[t]he definition has remained constant through the years up to and including the present time.” (Emphasis in original.) The trial justice noted that legislation which was enacted in 2001 “shows a strikethrough of the word ‘serious’ in the definition section dealing with the term ‘serious other physical injury.’ ” He concluded his analysis of the statutory provisions as follows:
“The Public Laws of 2001, Chapter 109 depicts that the definition remains exactly the same. An examination of the underlying legislation, including the original draft as well as the final amended form of the bill again reveals no change to the definition that has been in existence since the very beginning. To construe any change to the definition based upon what is depicted in the Public Laws of 2001 would amount to a repeal of the crime of second degree child abuse. This is clearly not the Legislature’s intent and would amount to an absurd result.” (First emphasis in original; second emphasis added.)
Accordingly, the trial justice’s ruling of law with respect to the statute was that the definition of the term “other serious physical injury” in (b)(2) of § 11-9-5.3 (the section pertaining to second degree child abuse) was the same as the definition for “other physical injury” which was provided in (d), despite the fact that the term in (b)(2) contained the word “serious.”
Having so ruled, the trial justice proceeded to determine whether or not the bruising on Jacob’s buttocks constituted “any injury, other than a serious bodily injury, which arises other than from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment.” He first determined that the bruising “clearly qualifiefd] as ‘any injury.’ ” He next determined that, “as set forth in the testimony of the witnesses, the bruising on the victim’s buttocks [did] not rise to the level of a ‘serious bodily injury.’ ” (A “serious bodily injury” is what would be required for a charge of first degree child abuse.)
The trial justice then proceeded to engage in an analysis of whether or not Jacob’s injury arose from excessive corporal punishment. The trial justice relied primarily on this Court’s decision in State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785 (R.I.1981), for guidance with respect to what constitutes excessive corporal punishment. The trial justice’s “Memorandum of Decision” reads in pertinent part as follows:
“There is no inflexible rule that defines what, under all circumstances, is unreasonable or excessive force. The accepted degree of corporal punishment must vary in relation to the sensitivity and character of the child, the child’s age, sex, physical condition, as well as in relation to the particular offense for which punishment is to be meted out. The word ‘excessive’ is sufficient to convey the meaning that a parent may inflict corporal punishment to discipline and correct the child, but may not do so to vent his/her anger or frustration on the child. The test of unreasonableness is met at the point at which a parent ceases to act in good faith and with *1139parental affection and acts immoderately, cruelly, or mercilessly with a desire to inflict pain, rather than make a genuine effort to correct the child by proper means.” (Internal citation omitted.)
Having set forth the general parameters of the definition of “excessive” in the context of corporal punishment, the trial justice made a determination with respect to the evidence and testimony presented at Mr. Sampson’s trial. His ruling provided in pertinent part as follows:
“[T]he [cjourt finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [djefendant’s actions were excessive. The corporal punishment that left the bruises * * * is excessive. The punishment, in leaving such bruises, goes beyond usual, necessary, right, proper, or just considering the situation in its complete context. The extent of the punishment, as evidenced by the bruises, is out of proportion to the offenses for which the punishment was meted out. * * * [Tjhe [cjourt finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the [dje-fendant was motivated by anger and frustration in administering the particular corporal punishment to the extent he did.”
The trial justice’s “Memorandum of Decision” concluded with the following adjudication of guilt:

“GENERAL FINDING

“Because the [cjourt has found the corporal punishment administered by the [djefendant to be excessive beyond a reasonable doubt[,j the [cjourt finds that the [djefendant is guilty as charged.” (Emphasis added.)
On May 2, 2008, defendant filed a motion for new trial. On June 17, 2008, defendant’s motion was heard and denied; and defendant was sentenced to five years, with fifteen months to serve and the remainder suspended with probation. A judgment of conviction entered on June 27,-2008. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
Standard of Review
With respect to a trial justice’s determination as to whether or not a criminal defendant’s waiver of his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, we review same in a de novo manner, while deferring to the trial justice’s findings of historical fact. State v. Laurence, 848 A.2d 238, 253 (R.I.2004); see also State v. Brumfield, 900 A.2d 1151, 1153 (R.I.2006); State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1026 (R.I.2002).
We review questions of statutory interpretation in a de novo manner. State v. Graff, 17 A.3d 1005, 1010 (R.I.2011); see also In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I.2006).
III
Analysis
A
The Defendant’s Waiver of His Right to Counsel
Mr. Sampson argues on appeal that he never knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In defendant’s view, the trial justice “erred in forcing him to choose to defend himself pro se or proceed to trial with an attorney who refused to implement Mr. Sampson’s personal right to waive a jury.” We agree.
A criminal defendant has a right to an attorney pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. Amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the assistance of coun*1140sel for his defense.”)- A defendant may waive that right to counsel and proceed pro se, provided that the waiver is given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. E.g., State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1379 (R.I.1996); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
In conducting a determination as to whether or not a defendant’s waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, this Court “looks to the totality of the circumstances ” and will consider a waiver properly “effectuated only if a defendant knows what he [or she] is doing and, his [or her]-choice is made with eyes open.” Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1379-80 (brackets in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525.
Separate and apart from a criminal defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel is the right to a trial by jury; and, significantly, a defendant in this jurisdiction has the right to waive the jury and proceed with a bench trial. In Rhode Island, this Court has explicitly stated that the decision whether or not to waive the jury is ultimately the decision of the defendant and not of counsel. In State v. Moran, 605 A.2d 494 (R.I.1992) we wrote as follows with respect to that issue:
“Rhode Island law is well settled that a criminally accused defendant has an absolute right to waive a trial by jury if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This substantive right to invoke a bench trial belongs to the defendant and is subject only to the procedural requirement that a trial justice determine that the defendant understands and accepts the consequences of executing a waiver.” Id. at 496 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).11
Unfortunately, and contrary to the clear pronouncement of this Court, defendant’s attorney advised the trial justice that the decision as to whether or not to waive the jury belonged to him as Mr. Sampson’s attorney and not to Mr. Sampson. While this Court certainly does not entertain even the slightest suspicion that defendant’s attorney was attempting to purposefully mislead the trial justice, at the end of the day the attorney’s erroneous statement of law, coupled with the trial justice’s acquiescence therein, ultimately infected Mr. Sampson’s waiver of counsel.
It is clear from the record that the trial justice accepted defense counsel’s representation as to who ultimately decides whether or not to waive the jury, and he proceeded to advise defendant in accordance with what defense counsel had said. The trial justice erroneously suggested to defendant that the decision as to whether or not to waive the jury was addressed in Article V, Rule 2.1 (and the comments thereto) of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, which Rule states that “a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.” The more pertinent rule would have been Article V, Rule 1.2(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, which states in pertinent part:
“In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to * * * whether to waive jury trial * * (Emphasis added.)
The trial justice also erroneously suggested to defendant on numerous occa*1141sions that, if he disagreed with his attorney’s decision to proceed with a trial by jury, the appropriate forum wherein to pursue that grievance would be a postcon-viction proceeding. Essentially, Mr. Sampson was provided with two choices: (a) a trial by jury, against his wishes, represented by counsel or (b) a bench trial, in accordance with his wishes, representing himself. More unfortunate perhaps is the suggestion by the trial justice that Mr. Sampson should have elected to pursue option “(a),” take his chances under that option, and hope that the jury would not find him guilty, retaining postconviction relief as a remedial avenue if he were found guilty. A third choice was never presented to him: viz., (c) a bench trial, in accordance with his wishes, represented by counsel.12
Because Mr. Sampson was never provided with that third choice and was never properly informed that the decision as to whether or not to waive the jury was his to make, his decision to waive his right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. Having determined that Mr. Sampson’s waiver of counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, in violation of his Sixth Amendment constitutional right, we vacate the judgment of conviction. Furthermore, because the defect in Mr. Sampson’s waiver of counsel was so pervasive — affecting nearly every aspect of the trial — Mr. Sampson must be afforded a new trial on remand. See United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 373 (4th Cir.1991) (holding, on appeal from a bench trial, that “[bjecause we conclude that Tatum’s counsel had conflicts of interest which deprived Tatum of the effective assistance of counsel during critical stages in the prosecution, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial ”) (emphasis added).13
B
The Trial Justice’s Interpretation of Brendan’s Law
Since we have determined that Mr. Sampson’s waiver of his right to counsel did not comport with what the United States Constitution requires, we need not and do not address his arguments with respect to the vagueness vel non of the statute. However, we pause briefly to impart a specific instruction to the Superior Court with respect to the proceedings on remand.
As currently drafted, Brendan’s Law distinguishes between first and second degree child abuse based upon the nature of the injury inflicted or sustained. Subsection (b)(2) of § 11-9-5.3, the section pursuant to which defendant was charged, states that the injury required to sustain a conviction for second degree child abuse is: “any other serious physical injury.”14 *1142Subsection (d) of § 11-9-5.3 provides a definition of other physical injury as being “any injury, other than a serious bodily injury, which arises other than from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment.”
In conducting statutory analysis in his “Memorandum of Decision,” the trial justice construed the statute so as to, in effect, delete the word “serious ” from subsection (b)(2) of § 11-9-5.3; he did so by ruling that the definition in subsection (d) was sufficient alone to describe the injury set forth in subsection (b)(2).15 We hold that it was error to do so. The statute, as currently drafted, contains the word serious in subsection (b)(2) of § 11-9-5.3; accordingly, an adjudication that a defendant is guilty of second degree child abuse requires a determination as to whether or not the defendant inflicted a serious physical injury. Such a determination will have to be made at the conclusion of the defendant’s new trial on remand before he can be adjudged guilty of second degree child abuse.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court. The record in this case may be returned to that tribunal for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

. Mr. Sampson raises a number of issues on appeal. However, we shall limit our "Facts and Travel” narrative to what is relevant to the legal issue upon which our decision is predicated.

. We have changed the name of the child who was allegedly abused, in order to protect his privacy.

. General Laws 1956 § 11-9-5.3, entitled "Brendan's Law,” is quoted in greater part in footnote 10, infra. With respect to the specific provisions enumerated in the criminal information, the statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
"(b) Whenever a person having care of a child * * * knowingly or intentionally:
"(2) Inflicts upon a child any other serious physical injuiy, shall be guilty of second degree child abuse.
“ * * *
“(d) For the purpose of this section, ‘other physical injwy ' is defined as any injuiy, other than a serious bodily injury, which arises other than from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment.
*1133“(e) * * * Any person who is convicted of second degree child abuse shall be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, nor less than five (5) years and fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).” (Emphasis added.)

. As we did with the boy who was allegedly abused, we have changed the name of defendant’s other son, in order to protect his privacy.

. It is clear from the context that defense counsel’s reference to the "Thorpe ” case was to State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785 (R.I.1981) and that the trial justice’s reference to "Strickland ” was to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The reader should note that, in the exchange that is quoted in the text (which took place in open court), the trial justice in no way took issue with defense counsel’s statement as to who has the right to decide whether or not to waive a trial by jury — even though, as will be discussed infra, counsel’s statement was wrong.

.We pause to observe that the trial justice's inquiry into Mr. Sampson's waiver of counsel was, in fact, extraordinarily extensive — touching upon Mr. Sampson's education, occupation, familiarity with the rules of evidence and procedure, familiarity with the charge he faced, and the penalties that could be imposed upon one convicted of such charge, etc. For the purposes of the instant appeal, we need not and do not set forth every aspect and detail of the colloquy that the record reflects, but we wish to acknowledge the precision, thoroughness, and courtesy with which the trial justice conducted the requisite inquiry.

. We shall refer to Elisa only by her first name, in order to further protect the privacy of the two children involved in the instant case. We certainly intend no disrespect.

. We narrate a veiy abbreviated version of the testimony presented by the prosecution at trial in order to provide the context within which the underlying allegation arose. Since this opinion will not delve into the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, we need not and do not present a thorough recitation of all of the evidence elicited at trial.

. In the “Court’s Findings of Fact” portion of the “Memorandum of Decision,” the trial justice referred to the "victim” as being defendant’s three-year-old child; earlier in the memorandum, he had indicated that, ’’[d]ue to the child’s age and considerations of privacy,” he would not refer to the child by name.

. It will be recalled that § 11-9-5.3, entitled “Brendan’s Law,” is the statute pursuant to which defendant was charged by criminal information with second degree child abuse. That statute provides in pertinent part as follows;
“(b) Whenever a person having care of a child * * * knowingly or intentionally;
"(1) Inflicts upon a child serious bodily injuiy, shall be guilty of first degree child abuse.
"(2) Inflicts upon a child any other serious physical injury, shall be guilty of second degree child abuse.
"(c) For the purposes of this section, ‘serious bodily injury ’ means physical injury that:
"(1) Creates a substantial risk of death;
"(2) Causes protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily parts, member or organ, including any fractures of any bones;
“(3) Causes serious disfigurement; or
“(4) Evidences subdural hematoma, in-tercranial hemorrhage and/or retinal hemorrhages as signs of ‘shaken baby syndrome’ and/or 'abusive head trauma.’
"(d) For the purpose of this section, ‘other physical injury' is defined as any injury, other than a serious bodily injury, which *1138arises other than from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment.
“(e) * * * Any person who is convicted of second degree child abuse shall be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, nor less than five (5) years and fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).” (Emphasis added.)

. See also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (“It is also recognized that the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testily in his or her own behalf, or take an appealf.]") (emphasis added).

.We pause to observe and acknowledge that defendant’s attorney indicated to the Superior Court that Mr. Sampson’s disagreements with him and with his representation of defendant were much broader and more numerous than the one issue involving defendant's preference for a bench trial. It may be that, if the trial justice had been properly informed of the law and had instructed defendant’s attorney to accede to defendant's wishes with respect to the waiver of the jury, Mr. Sampson might still have decided to waive his right to that attorney’s counsel. But that is not what happened, and our decision in this case must be predicated upon what did happen.

. Having determined that Mr. Sampson’s waiver of his right to counsel was not valid, and vacating on that basis, we need not and specifically do not address the other issues that Mr. Sampson has raised on appeal.

. It will be recalled that "any other serious physical injury” is to be distinguished from "serious bodily injury" (emphasis added) which is the injury required to sustain a charge of first degree child abuse pursuant to subsection (b)(1) of § 11-9-5.3. Subsection (c) of § 11-9-5.3 provides what is essentially a laundry list definition of "serious bodily injury.”

. We note that the trial justice is not alone in his struggles to decipher what § 11-9-5.3 requires to be proven in order to sustain a charge of second degree child abuse. In the instant case, two justices of the Superior Court were called upon to interpret the meaning of the provisions of Brendan's Law (the trial justice who presided over defendant's bench trial, as we describe in section "I C” of this opinion, as well as another justice who had previously heard defendant's motion to dismiss). Without going into detail about their reasoning, it suffices to say that the trial justice and the just-referenced hearing justice arrived at different conclusions as to the statute's meaning.
We further note that, in its argument before this Court during oral argument, the state candidly asserted that the Office of the Attorney General had submitted legislation to correct Brendan’s Law. Based upon the brief provided to this Court by the state, in the state’s view, a desirable way to "correct” Brendan's Law would be to, as the trial justice did in the instant case, delete the word "serious” from (b)(2) of § 11-9-5.3. We would note that such an interpretation would essentially mean that second degree child abuse requires the same conduct as that described and defined by this Court in State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785 (R.I.1981) — a case in which the defendant was charged with simple assault and battery, a misdemeanor rather than a felony. While it may be that the General Assembly’s intent with respect to the present statute was to equate the felony of second degree child abuse with the misdemeanor described in Thorpe, such an intent cannot be gleaned with confidence from the statute before us.