Court Opinion

ID: 9466543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:19:11.657413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:47.809849
License: Public Domain

FAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Most respectfully, while concurring in parts I and II A of the majority opinion, I dissent from part II B and the reversal of the summary judgment entered by the district court.
I agree with Judge Goldberg that there is “no reason to treat the 180-day notice provision of the ADEA differently than the practically identical provision in Title VII” and consequently this case is controlled by our en banc opinion in McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1978). As I stated in Chappell, 601 F.2d at 1304, timely notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite and equitable considerations are irrelevant.
Judge Rubin’s dissent in McArthur, 569 F.2d at 278, is particularly helpful in understanding precisely what the majority held. I continue to be perplexed by panels of our court ignoring this controlling precedent.
Without discussing the “equities” of attempting to rely upon what an employer is alleged to have told a client after having been demoted and reduced in salary, I would affirm the summary judgment based upon lack of jurisdiction for failure to file a timely notice under 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1).