Court Opinion

ID: 9741570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:58:20.557666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.614647
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting: After reviewing the facts of this case and the applicable law, I cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion and I would affirm the decision. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which finds that there was such an abuse by the court. At issue in this appeal is whether the court abused its discretion when it, in essence, converted an earlier ex parte order of protection to a plenary order following an evidentiary hearing. The majority finds (1) there was no harassment by Ross Radke that would warrant such an action by the court, and (2) because Laine and her mother, Kathryn, had an improper purpose in seeking the original order, the court’s entry of an order prohibiting harassment must be set aside, even though it was grounded in evidence adduced at a full hearing and it rejected any restriction on respondent’s visitation. Even a cursory reading of the facts clearly, in my opinion, demonstrates that neither Ross nor Laine Radke was acting reasonably. The girl freely admitted that she screamed, cursed, and kicked at her father during the visitation incident because she wanted to go home. The father, after letting such conduct continue without disciplinary efforts for several months, apparently decided to cure Laine’s problems all at once through the use of threats and intimidation. Neither was behaving appropriately in my view. Irrational conduct of a 12-year-old girl, while it cannot be condoned, is easier to understand and to explain than is that of her adult father. Looking only at Ross’s testimony, he admitted to threatening to call the police if Laine did not come for her scheduled visitation on January 7, 2003; admitted to refusing to let her use the phone to call her mother or the police; admitted to disabling the phones by disconnecting them from their wall outlets; admitted to threatening Laine that he could hit her if he wanted because he was a black belt; and admitted to pushing her down the hallway but denied throwing her across the room. When you add Laine’s version of events, which the trial judge found to be credible, you end up with conduct that I do not believe can be fairly characterized as “reasonable direction” to a child. Nor, accepting the correctness of the trial court’s assessment of Laine’s credibility, does it appear that Ross and his new wife gave due or fair consideration to Laine’s complaints of unkindness and lack of respect when she was in their home. So, does any of this support the trial court’s finding that Laine was “harassed” by her father? I believe it does. The Illinois Domestic Violence Act protects against “abuse,” which includes physical abuse, harassment, or intimidation. “Harassment” is defined as knowing conduct that is not necessary to accomplish a reasonable purpose under the circumstances, would cause a reasonable person to feel distress, and does cause distress to the person. 750 ILCS 60/103 (7) (West 2002). A rebuttable presumption of emotional distress arises when a respondent improperly conceals a child from the petitioner or threatens physical force, confinement or restraint. 750 ILCS 60/103 (7) (v), (vi) (West 2002). The court heard all of the evidence and made a determination, which we cannot dispute, that Laine’s testimony was credible. The judge apparently credited her allegations that her father told her that she was insane and that he was going to take her to a hospital; that this threat frightened her and she tried to call her mother; that he repeatedly prevented her from making the calls; that, when she left the house, he held her arms behind her back, pushed her into a door and pushed her into her room; that he tried to punch her twice, and that she suffered a bruise on her arm during this incident; and that he had slapped her on a previous occasion, causing an injury to her lip. A reasonable person could conclude that these actions were not necessary to accomplish the purpose of disciplining Laine. In particular, the court could (and did) conclude that denial of the use of the telephone to call her mother or police officers was not necessary to accomplish this purpose. Additionally, a reasonable person could conclude that telling Laine that she was insane, disconnecting (or ripping out) the phones, and trying (or threatening) to punch her were not actions necessary to discipline a 12-year-old child — even an offensive and obstreperous one. In sum, a reasonable person could conclude that Ross’s actions constituted harassment as that term is defined by the Act. Cf. Peck v. Otten, 329 Ill. App. 3d 266, 768 N.E.2d 769 (2002); In re Marriage of Blitstein, 212 Ill. App. 3d 124, 569 N.E.2d 1357 (1991). Accordingly, I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the order of protection against Ross. The majority has rejected Blitstein as irrelevant because the participants in the domestic conflict in that case were a husband and wife, not a father and daughter. While the case is certainly factually distinguishable on that basis, it does not necessarily follow that its basic principle does not apply. The refusal to allow any frightened family member — even a child — access to a protector, particularly the other parent, could be reasonably characterized as harassment under the domestic violence statute, and I do not believe that the decision of the trial judge to that effect constitutes an abuse of discretion. The challenge Ross has asserted to the entry of the plenary order of protection presents questions that are, for me, more troubling. It is clear from her own testimony that Laine wanted the order of protection as an instrument to remove any future obligation to have visitation in her father’s home unless she wanted to go. In some contrast, Kathryn testified that she obtained and used the interim protective order to keep Laine and her father separated between the date of its entry and January 30. It appears, if her testimony is credited, that she was seeking a cooling-off period because of the conduct involved in the incident, not an end to visitation. Nonetheless, her use of the domestic violence statute to accomplish that end was no more appropriate than its use to further the goal of her daughter. The trial judge firmly and quite properly found that the motives of both petitioners created an abuse of the statute. It is also of major concern that orders of protection are confrontational and divisive in nature and they should not be commonly or routinely employed in matters involving the discipline of children. Having said that, however, there certainly may be situations — hopefully rare — where the use of such an order would be appropriate. Turning to the specifics of this case, it appears to me that, if we accept the credibility determination of the trial judge, the court’s actual conclusion that there was harassment and that the plenary order was warranted could not be found to be either unreasonable or an abuse of discretion. The majority argues that the trial court implicitly rejected some of Laine’s testimony because it did not make an explicit finding of physical abuse. It appears to me, however, that the judge, by finding that prohibiting the girl’s use of the phone was harassment in light of her allegations, at least implicitly credited those allegations. At any rate, the statute does not require that the trial court find both physical abuse and harassment — the cognizable forms of abuse justifying an order of protection are stated in the disjunctive. The majority also asserts that the plenary order should not be affirmed because of the petitioners’ wrongful purpose in seeking the ex parte interim order of protection. I would agree with that position if the court had merely converted the order based on the petitioners’ original representations. It did not, however. It had a full-fledged evidentiary hearing and made its decision based on the testimony of all of the relevant actors and spectators. It is unfortunate to inject an order of protection into relations between parents and children. I would suggest, however, that it would be irresponsible for the trial court, in the face of its belief that the conduct at issue posed some threat to the child if allowed to continue or recur, to refuse to order protection for her because the interim order was improperly motivated. The plenary order does not have any impact on the right of the father to the extensive visitation he has previously enjoyed nor does it give Laine the ability to pick and choose whether or when she will spend time with her father in his home. It also does not enjoin Ross from any conduct with respect to his daughter that would not be inappropriate even without the order. In the trial court’s order, I see a concerned and restrained response to volatile conduct in an uncontrolled family situation; I do not see an abuse of discretion. I would affirm.