Court Opinion

ID: 9787383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:15:24.873289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.470301
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring.
There are few less pleasant judicial duties than to reverse a conviction because a police officer, though charged with enforcing the law, obtained important evidence by deliberately improper means. Yet I must join the majority in condemning the tactics used by Detective Mario Martin of the Tulare County Sheriff’s Department.
In superficial deference to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] (Miranda), Martin told defendant, a suspect in custody, that he had the “right” to the presence and assistance of counsel before any questioning. But then, contrary to Miranda, Martin ignored defendant’s repeated efforts to invoke that “right.” Martin badgered defendant, made coercive threats and promises, and finally relegated defendant to overnight confinement with no food, water, or toilet access. These ploys had their intended effect. Placed in this situation, defendant—18 years old, unsophisticated, and ill-versed in the criminal justice system—could easily *90assume that his right to counsel was illusory, that he would receive no legal help, and that he had no choice but to cooperate. It is no surprise that the next morning, chastened by his experience, defendant sought a renewed meeting with his interrogator and twice confessed.
I therefore concur in the majority’s conclusion that both defendant’s reinitiation of contact with Martin, and his subsequent confessions, were involuntary. Hence, as the majority hold, the confessions cannot be used against defendant for any purpose. Their use here was prejudicial, and defendant’s conviction must therefore be reversed.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this fiasco is Martin’s admission that he was taught on the job to disregard Miranda in order to obtain statements for use as evidence in criminal cases against the declarants. Martin testified he knew he was supposed to stop questioning a custodial suspect who asked for a lawyer, but he ignored this prong of Miranda in hopes of eliciting evidence that could be used to impeach defendant if he testified in his own behalf in a criminal trial. According to Martin, he received training from a Sergeant Lomeli, who informed Martin that this tactic “can be a useful tool.”
As Martin knew, statements obtained in violation of Miranda’s standards are excluded from the prosecution’s case-in-chief, but if not otherwise involuntary, they may be used to impeach the suspect’s trial testimony. (Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 225-226 [28 L.Ed.2d 1, 91 S.Ct. 643] (Harris).) Moreover, we have held that use for impeachment is not obviated simply because the interrogating officer’s failure to honor Miranda was deliberate. (People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1191-1205 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212] (Peevy).)
In Peevy, we expressly declined to consider whether a different result might apply to statements obtained “pursuant to ... a systematic policy of police misconduct.” (Peevy, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1205.) But nothing in Peevy was meant to condone deliberately improper interrogation tactics, whether individual or systematic.
As we explained in Peevy, the courts’ refusal to extend the exclusionary sanction of Miranda to impeachment evidence is not founded upon any notion that it is legitimate for the police to interrogate a suspect in custody despite his demand for counsel. Rather, the United States Supreme Court has simply concluded that if the statements thereby elicited were voluntary, the cost of excluding them from evidence is too great where the result is to leave the defendant free to perjure himself at trial. (Peevy, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1204-1205; see Harris, supra, 401 U.S. 222, 224.)
California courts have time and again noted and decried deliberate police use of tactics that violate Miranda standards. (Peevy, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1184, *911204, citing, inter alia, People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1042 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544] [police officers’ “conduct in deliberately interrogating defendant after [he] had invoked his right to counsel was unethical and it is strongly disapproved”]; In re Gilbert E. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1602 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 866] [deploring deliberate Miranda violation and observing that “[w]hen the police deliberately step over the line and disobey Supreme Court pronouncements, respect for the . . . law necessarily diminishes”]; People v. Bey (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1623, 1627 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 28] [expressing grave concern at deliberate Miranda violation, and observing that such police misconduct appears not to be a new tactic]; and People v. Baker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 574, 579 [269 Cal.Rptr. 475] [also deploring intentional Miranda violation and noting “the trial court here was well aware of the unlawfulness of the police conduct and stated that it intended to initiate steps to prohibit the San Diego Police Department from using such procedures in the future”].) It could not be clearer that efforts to gather court evidence by such means are improper.
Given this history, it is unconscionable for police departments or supervisors to give contrary instruction or encouragement to the officers under their jurisdiction. Law enforcement agencies have the responsibility to educate and train officers carefully to avoid improper tactics when conducting custodial interrogations. Officers must be made aware that they have an absolute obligation to play by the rules when questioning suspects in custody, and that their deliberate failure to do so will be severely disciplined. There can be no suggestion—formal or informal, direct or indirect—that improper interrogation tactics are required, encouraged, approved, condoned, or tolerated. Exactly the opposite impression must be conveyed to each and every officer. Only in this way can the police perform the crucial responsibilities they carry.1
In a free society, we place the police in a position of unique power, but only on condition that they will do their best to uphold the law, and to enforce it nobly and fairly. Their ability to function effectively depends upon their credibility in that role. The community must trust that they do not operate by deliberately violating the very standards they are sworn to observe. When the police dishonor proper procedures, community respect for the police, and for the law itself, is undermined. (See In re Gilbert E., supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1602.)
*92Police officers are human beings, charged with the important, difficult, and “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” (Johnson v. United States (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 14 [92 L.Ed. 436, 68 S.Ct. 367].) Individual mistakes and overreaching will occur despite the best efforts of departments, supervisors, and officers acting in good faith. But our community should never be subjected to cynical efforts by police agencies, or the supervisors they employ, to exploit perceived legal loopholes by encouraging deliberately improper interrogation tactics. Such practices tarnish the badge most officers respect and honor.
These concerns reinforce my agreement with the reasoning and result set forth by the majority today.
Chin, J., and Moreno, J., concurred.

 Of course, Miranda standards do not apply to all police questioning of suspects in custody. A long recognized exception is questioning reasonably prompted by immediate concern for the safety of the officer or another person. (See New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 655-656 [81 L.Ed.2d 550, 104 S.Ct. 2626].) No such issue is presented here. Martin’s testimony left no doubt he had been trained to disregard Miranda for purely evidentiary purposes.