Court Opinion

ID: 9659669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:52:03.943617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:10.611408
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
The majority rightly holds the minor plaintiff’s age is a relevant fact in determination of his alleged contributory negligence. However, in the same opinion division we find an unrelated reference to cases holding violation of § 321.328, The Code, (pedestrian duties in crossing roadway) is negligence per se. Both cited cases involved adult pedestrians. Similarly confusing in this minor’s case is majority’s reference to Stewart v. Hilton, 247 Iowa 988, 77 N.W.2d 637 (1956), as authority that § 321.328 “places a positive duty upon every pedestrian.” The language of that case should not be extended beyond its facts. The plaintiff in Stewart was 55 years old. Assume the plaintiff victim in the instant case were six years old, presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence. See Law v. Hemmingsen, 249 Iowa 820, 89 N.W.2d 386 (1958); Paschka v. Carsten, 231 Iowa 1185, 3 N.W.2d 542 (1942). Then we could not say he (clearly within the phrase “any pedestrian”) had a positive duty. Such treatment of children would be contrary to this court’s humanitarian concern for minor pedestrians. See Udell v. Peterson, 257 Iowa 474, 133 N.W.2d 119 (1965); Webster v. Luckow, 219 Iowa 1048, 258 N.W. 685 (1935).
In Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1972) we noted the tension between the concept that in certain circumstances violation of a statute is negligence per se, and the enlightened rule that conduct of children is to be measured, not by adult standards, but the standard of reasonable behavior in children of similar age, intelligence and experience. See Giarratano v. Weitz Company, 259 Iowa 1292, 147 N.W.2d 824 (1967). In Rosenau we unanimously held a child is not ordinarily charged with negligence per se even though his conduct involved violation of a statute which, when violated by an adult, would require application of that rule. We reserved the question whether this principle should apply when the child has engaged in an adult activity, such as driving an auto or flying an airplane. This case does not fall within the reserved area.
It is no answer to say the rationale in Rosenau [filed after submission of this case] was not advanced either below or here and therefore has no part in this decision. In this case our sua sponte application of the right rule should be controlled by the issues, not by omissions in counsels’ briefs. Nor does it aid the trial judge, burdened with instructing the jury upon remand, to say the child’s age is to be considered but also refer to an inconsistent rule which, after Rosenau, has no application in this case.
UHLENHOPP and McCORMICK, JJ., join in this special concurrence.