Court Opinion

ID: 9412810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 17:09:22.080068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:26.708277
License: Public Domain

J-S11013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 EDWARD DIETER                            :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1762 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 16, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0003601-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED AUGUST 1, 2023

      Appellant, Edward Dieter, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on June 16, 2022, following his bench trial conviction for driving while

operating privileges were suspended/revoked – driving under the influence

(DUI) related, third or subsequent offense, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(iii). We

affirm.

      We briefly set forth the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows.   On April 22, 2021, while on patrol, Officer Samuel Ladd of the

Bensalem Police Department observed a green Toyota truck with a tinted

cover over the license plate parked in the parking lot of a Holiday Inn Express.

N.T., 6/16/2022, at 5-6. Officer Ladd exited his patrol car and walked closer

to the truck because he could not read the license plate number due to the

tinted covering. Id. at 19. Officer Ladd could only read the license plate at a

distance of “[l]ess than 10 feet.” Id. at 24. Officer Ladd then “waited for [the
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truck] to move[,]” followed the vehicle out of the parking lot and through two

traffic lights before initiating a traffic stop. Id. at 6. Following one car-length

behind the truck, Officer Ladd could not see the license plate because of the

tinted cover. Id. at 7. Once stopped, Appellant was not able to produce a

valid driver’s license to Officer Ladd. Id. at 11. When Officer Ladd entered

Appellant’s name and date of birth into the police database, he learned that

Appellant’s license was suspended for DUI-related offenses. Id. The incident

was recorded on police dashboard and body cameras and played for the trial

court during the suppression hearing. Id. at 12-16.

      On May 19, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the

aforementioned crime. On June 13, 2022, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial

motion seeking to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop,

arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate a

traffic stop.   On June 16, 2022, the trial court held a suppression hearing

wherein Officer Ladd and Appellant testified.           The trial court denied

suppression. Id. at 27. Appellant waived his right to a jury and proceeded

directly to a stipulated bench trial.     Id. at 28-30.      The Commonwealth

incorporated the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing into the record.

Id. at 31. The trial court found Appellant guilty of driving while operating

privileges were suspended/revoked – driving under the influence (DUI)

related, third or subsequent offense. Id. at 32. The trial court sentenced

Appellant to a mandatory term of six to 12 months of incarceration, with credit

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for time served, plus a fine of $2,500.00.       Id. at 41.   This timely appeal

resulted.1

       On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

       Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress
       where the traffic stop was not supported by probable cause but
       was a pretextual stop?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (complete capitalization and lettering omitted).

       Appellant argues that, in this case, “it is clear that the officer stopped

[Appellant’s] vehicle solely because of an obscured license plate[,] there was

no investigation beyond the officer’s initial observation of the license plate

which would provide additional information as to whether a violation of [] the

Motor Vehicle Code had occurred[, and, t]herefore, Officer Ladd was required

to possess probable cause before initiating the traffic stop herein.”      Id. at

11-12. Appellant asserts that a review of the police dashboard camera video

“does not confirm the [o]fficer’s assertion that the license plate cover was

tinted” and his license plate was plainly visible. Id. at 12. Instead, Appellant

claims that Officer Ladd used the tinted license plate as “pretext to gather

information for another investigation” because “another officer requested that

[Officer Ladd] identify Appellant and his passenger.”         Id. at 14.    More

specifically, Appellant explains that Officer Ladd testified “quite clear[ly] that
____________________________________________

1 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 13, 2022. On July 14, 2022,
the trial court issued an order directing Appellant to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant
complied timely. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) on December 21, 2022.

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he wanted to have contact with Appellant and his passenger so he could

identify them, as part of another investigation, wholly unrelated to Appellant’s

vehicle.” Id. at 15. Finally, in further support of his claim that the traffic stop

was pretextual, Appellant maintains that “Officer Ladd was grasping at straws

in an attempt to justify the stop he initiated” because he originally told

Appellant “he was pulled over because of a broken taillight.” Id. at 14.

      Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence

is as follows:

      An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a challenge
      to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
      whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by
      the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
      facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
      the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
      Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
      remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
      a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are
      supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
      findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are
      erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the determination of the
      suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
      suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on the
      appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
      court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
      of law of the trial court are subject to plenary review.

      Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the
      evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a
      ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress. Also, it is within the
      suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal

quotations, original brackets, and citations omitted).

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     This Court has previously recognized:

     The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made
     applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and
     Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect
     individuals from unlawful searches and seizures.                It is
     well-established that “[a] vehicle stop constitutes a seizure under
     the Fourth Amendment.” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d
     108, 113 (Pa. 2008), citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
     806, 809-810 (1996). “Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police
     officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer
     observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.”
     Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super.
     2017) (stating, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prevent police
     from stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or
     suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if it is a minor offense”),
     citing, Chase, 960 A.2d at 113. “[A]ny violation of the Motor
     Vehicle Code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext
     for an investigation of some other crime.” Harris, 176 A.3d at
     1020.

     The United States Supreme Court has explained,

        [T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop
        context is determined by the seizure's “mission” - to address
        the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to
        related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction
        is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is
        necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the
        seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction
        are - or reasonably should have been - completed.

        [The Supreme Court] concluded that the Fourth Amendment
        tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not
        lengthen the roadside detention.        [A] traffic stop can
        become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
        reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a
        warning ticket. ... The seizure remains lawful only so long
        as unrelated inquiries do not measurably extend the
        duration of the stop. [A police] officer, in other words, may
        conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful
        traffic stop. [The police officer, however,] may not do so in
        a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable

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          suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an
          individual.

          Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic [citation, a
          police] officer's mission includes ordinary inquiries incident
          to the traffic stop.     Typically[,] such inquiries involve
          checking the driver's license, determining whether there are
          outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
          automobile's registration and proof of insurance. These
          checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the
          traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated
          safely and responsibly.

       Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-355 (2015)
       (citations, original brackets, and some quotation marks omitted);
       see also Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142, 149-150
       (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating, “within the context of a lawful traffic
       stop, [‘]mission related[’] inquiries addressed to the traffic
       violations which originally prompted the detention [are
       permitted], as well as incidental inquiries aimed at ensuring the
       safe and responsible operation of vehicles on the highway”).

       Thus, in sum, even if a traffic stop is a pretext for an investigation
       of another unrelated crime, the traffic stop is lawful provided (1)
       a police officer observes a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code,
       even if a minor offense, and (2) the traffic stop lasts no longer
       than is necessary to effectuate the “mission” of the traffic stop,
       which is to address the Motor Vehicle Code violation and attend to
       related safety concerns. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (stating, a
       police officer's “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
       probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”).

Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 2023 WL 2470282, at *4–5 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(unpublished memorandum) (footnote omitted).2

       The Motor Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]t is unlawful

to display on any vehicle a registration plate which [] is illegible, obscured,

covered or otherwise obstructed in any manner at a reasonable distance

____________________________________________

2See Superior Court I.O.P. 65.37(B) (Superior Court may rely on unpublished
memorandum decisions filed after May 2, 2019 for their persuasive value).

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[and/or] has a tinted plate cover.”       75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1332(b)(3) and (5).

Regarding   Section    1332,   this   Court   has   previously   determined     that

“[p]robable cause is established where, from a reasonable distance,

characters on a registration plate are illegible or the plate is at least partially

obscured.” Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 282 A.3d 796, 801 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 290 A.3d 1271 (Pa. 2023).

      Here, the trial court concluded:

      In the present case, [the trial court] found the testimony of the
      officer involved, credible and convincing. Based on the facts
      indicated by the record, officers observed Appellant [] operating a
      green, Toyota truck with a tinted cover on its license plate.
      Initially[,] the officer observed the vehicle in the parking lot of the
      Holiday Inn Express. The license plate was so obscured that it
      was necessary for the officer to exit his vehicle to read the
      characters on the plate. [When] Appellant [drove out of] the
      parking lot, the officer followed for a short period of time, finding
      the license plate obstructed by the tinted cover. The officer’s
      observation of the traffic violation [was] sufficient to establish
      probable cause. Not only was the court provided with credible[]
      and convincing evidence from the officer, the dash[board] camera
      video was admitted into evidence as [an] exhibit[.]                The
      dash[board] camera video provides insight into the reason for the
      stop, and in this particular case it is evident the license plate was
      obstructed. For these reasons, [the trial court] found the officer
      had probable cause to effectuate the traffic stop in which Appellant
      [] was the driver.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/2022, at 5-6.        The trial court further rejected

Appellant’s contention that the traffic stop was pretextual, opining “there was

no significant ulterior motive for conducting the traffic stop [where] the officer

provided specific, articulable facts to demonstrate probable cause existed,

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describing his close proximity to the vehicle, and yet the license plate

remained unintelligible.” Id. at 8.

      Upon review of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing,

applicable law, and the trial court’s decision, we discern no error in denying

Appellant’s request for suppression. Despite the fact that a tinted or obscured

license plate is a minor infraction of the Motor Vehicle Code, it is unlawful to

employ a tinted license plate cover or display a license plate that is illegible,

obscured, covered or otherwise obstructed when viewed from a reasonable

distance. Officer Ladd testified that he initiated the traffic stop at issue after

he was unable to read Appellant’s license plate from a reasonable distance, or

one-car length away, because it was obscured and obstructed with a tinted

cover. Officer Ladd could only read the license plate by exiting his police car

and walking closer to Appellant’s vehicle. Because Appellant was clearly in

violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, Officer Ladd had probable cause to initiate

a traffic stop. Moreover, the traffic stop did not last longer than necessary to

address the Motor Vehicle Code violation and attend to related safety

concerns.   Here, Officer Ladd inquired about Appellant’s driver's license to

ensure his vehicle was operated safely and responsibly. As such, the traffic

stop was lawful, even if initiated as a pretext for investigation of an unrelated

crime. Finally, we note that upon our review of the video from Officer Ladd’s

body camera, upon approaching Appellant, Officer Ladd told Appellant that he

was stopped for both a broken taillight and for having a tinted cover over his

license plate.   At the suppression hearing, Officer Ladd admitted that he

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mistakenly told Appellant that he conducted the traffic stop for a broken

taillight, but that it was only “one of the reasons” given for the stop. N.T.,

6/16/2022, at 17; see also id. at 9 (“[U]pon viewing my video, his taillight

was never out.”). Officer Ladd testified that “the tinted cover was still the

reason [he initiated] the [traffic] stop.”   Id. at 9.   The trial court validly

determined that Officer Ladd articulated factual observations that established

probable cause to support the instant traffic stop.      We discern no error.

Accordingly, the trial court properly denied suppression and Appellant’s sole

appellate issue is without merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      Judge King joins.

      Judge McLaughlin files a Concurring Memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/1/2023

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