Court Opinion

ID: 9965542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 18:09:16.995189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:10.897125
License: Public Domain

[Cite as W.G. V. D.G., 2024-Ohio-1690.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

W.G.,                                              :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,               :
                                                             No. 113108
                                                   :
                        v.
                                                   :
D.G.,
                                                   :
                Defendant-Appellee.

                              JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 2, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Domestic Relations Division
                                Case No. DR-21-384439

                                           Appearances:

                Robert O. Donegan, Jr., for appellant.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

                 Plaintiff-appellant, W.G., appeals the trial court’s judgment entry of

divorce because it used a de facto termination date of the marriage for the purpose

of distributing marital property and because her ex-spouse, D.G., was awarded the

federal tax exemption for the parties’ children. Because we do not find the trial court
abused its discretion in using a de facto date of termination of the marriage, thus

awarding D.G. his pension obtained after the de facto date of termination, or in

awarding D.G. the federal tax exemptions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

            PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS

              W.G. and D.G. were married on February 23, 2004, and have two

children from the marriage. In 2012, D.G. initiated an action for divorce. He later

dismissed his complaint. At that time, a child support order was enacted. D.G. paid

support to W.G. from March 23, 2012, through the trial date. On March 10, 2021,

W.G. filed a complaint for divorce, which case was tried before a magistrate on

December 5, 2022. After trial, the parties had an opportunity to file written

arguments and, thereafter, the magistrate issued a recommended order that the

parties should be granted a divorce on grounds of incompatibility and living

separate and apart for more than one year.

              As to the issues raised by W.G. in the appeal, D.G. testified that he

worked at Aramark, that he had a pension, and that the first contribution to the

pension was December 4, 2015. He stated that although he wanted to reconcile the

marriage after W.G. moved out “for the children’s sake,” the relationship between

W.G. and him had “long been over” prior to the time he filed for divorce. He

explained that he considered reconciliation for a week or so after W.G. left their

home. He further testified that since they separated, he and W.G had separate bank

accounts and he had a credit card. W.G. testified she had a hair salon since 2015.

She further testified that for eight years she had lived in a different city than D.G.
She testified that she had no credit card debt. As to reconciliation, W.G. testified

that she had numerous discussions with D.G. about reconciliation and still held on

to some hope the marriage could be reconciled because family mattered to her.

              In the recommended order, the magistrate found that for the purposes

of distribution of property, a de facto date of termination should be used for the

marriage. Within the recommended order, the magistrate explained the reasons for

selecting a de facto date of termination as follows:

                       DURATION OF THE MARRIAGE
      The undersigned finds that [D.G.’s] analysis of the Dill factors to be
      well taken. The marital property and debts in this case should be
      divided starting on the date the parties were married (2-23-2004),
      until the date that Defendant caused a child support order to be
      entered against him by the [Child Support Enforcement Agency]
      (3-23-2012). The undersigned finds that the evidence showed that by
      3-23-2012 the parties had separated on unfriendly terms, were not
      living as husband and wife, and were not cohabiting or intimate.
      The undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s reliance upon Defendant’s
      comments to the FES investigator that he wished to maintain a
      relationship with Plaintiff for the sake of facilitating joint parenting
      was misguided in light of the other Dill factors. The undersigned finds
      the fact that Defendant obtained, and Plaintiff accepted child
      support, under the auspices of a formal order, to be highly indicative
      that both parties considered their marital relationship to be all but
      legally over.

(Emphasis added.) Having found that the marriage ended on March 23, 2012, the

magistrate then determined that D.G.’s pension was not marital property subject to

division because D.G obtained his interest in the pension from his employer,

Aramark, after the de facto termination date of March 23, 2012.

              In considering the issue of child support, the magistrate found there

was “insufficient income and expense information introduced at trial to justify
modifying the current administrative child support order that began on 3-23-2012.”

In conjunction with this determination, the magistrate found that

      [D.G.] should be awarded the tax dependency exemptions for the
      minor children, because the amount of income [W.G.] reports from
      her hair salon would make the exemptions less valuable to her.
      Should Plaintiff’s reported income increase this could be the subject
      of a motion to modify child support which could be entertained in the
      future.

              On March 8, 2023, W.G. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.

On May 5, 2023, after the transcript of proceedings was filed, she supplemented her

objections, which read:

      1. The magistrate erred by misapplying the test laid out in Dill to the
      facts and determining the de facto date of marriage termination to be
      3-23-2012. The general criteron [sic] for establishing the de facto date
      of marriage in the Schweinfurth case needs also to be considered if
      using the de facto marriage termination theory.

      2. The magistrate erred in awarding the Aramark pension in entirety
      to the defendant as a result of the de facto marriage termination date
      being erroneously determined.

      3. The magistrate erred in awarding the children’s exemption solely to
      the defendant.

              The trial court overruled these objections. In overruling W.G.’s first

objection, the trial court found that

      [i]t is undisputed that the parties separated on unfriendly terms. The
      record does not indicate the parties were intimate after their
      separation. The only factors that weigh against finding the de facto
      termination of marriage date is the testimony of the Parties that
      Plaintiff moved in and out of marital residence several times and may
      have had discussions of reconciliation for the children’s sake after the
      initial divorce was dismissed. However, in light of many of the other
      factors being satisfied, this holds less weight. As the Magistrate
      indicated, the Defendant’s willingness to obtain and pay child
       support, and Plaintiff’s willingness to receive it, is highly indicative of
       their intentions to remain separated. Therefore, upon review of the
       record, the Court finds that the Magistrate did not err when he found
       the Dill factors weigh in favor of the de facto dates of the marriage
       being from February 23, 2004 until March 23, 2012.

              The trial court also overruled W.G.’s second objection, finding that the

Aramark pension was properly awarded to D.G. as his interest accrued after the de

facto termination date. In overruling the third objection, the trial court found the

magistrate did not err in determining D.G. would benefit more than W.G. from the

tax exemptions where W.G. testified to a small amount of income and did not

produce tax returns or other documentation of that income.

              W.G. appeals the judgment entry of divorce; D.G. did not appear or file

a brief in this appeal.

                             LAW AND ARGUMENT
                              Assignments of Error

              W.G. raises three assignments of error, which mirror the objections

filed before the trial court. They read:

       1. The magistrate erred and abused its discretion by misapplying the
       test laid out in Dill to the facts and determining the de facto date of
       marriage termination to be 3-23-2012. The general criteron [sic] for
       establishing the de facto date of marriage in the Schweinfurth case
       needs also to be considered if using the de facto marriage termination
       theory.

       2. The trial court erred in awarding the Aramark pension in entirety
       to the defendant as a result of the de facto marriage termination date
       being erroneously determined.

       3. The trial court erred in awarding the children’s tax dependency
       exemptions solely to the defendant.
 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a de facto date of
      termination for the marriage or awarding D.G. his pension

              We address the first and second assignments of error concurrently as

our resolution of the first assignment of error guides our resolution of the second.

In this case, the trial court used a de facto termination date of the marriage. The

date of termination of marriage is presumed to be the date of the final hearing in the

divorce case. O’Brien v. O Brien, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89615, 2008-Ohio-1098,

¶ 40, citing Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 321, 432 N.E.2d 183 (1982). But,

“[i]f the trial court determines use of the final hearing date would be inequitable

given the circumstances of the parties, the court may ‘select dates that it considers

equitable in determining marital property.’” Id., quoting R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b).

              In selecting a de facto termination date, the trial court has broad

discretion and that decision “should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of

that discretion.” Smith v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110214, 110245, and

110274, 2022-Ohio-299, ¶ 25, citing Berish at 321. Moreover, a trial court may use

a de facto date of termination if the evidence “‘clearly and bilaterally shows that it is

appropriate based on the totality of the circumstances.’” Bailey v. Bailey, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 98173, 2012-Ohio-5073, ¶ 13, quoting Boggs v. Boggs, 5th Dist.

Delaware No. 07CAF020014, 2008-Ohio-1411, ¶ 66.

               An abuse of discretion is one where the decision is arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unconscionable. Id., citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d

217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). We have also stated that an abuse of discretion
occurs when “‘a discretionary act * * * reaches an end or purpose clearly against

reason and evidence.’”    Bradley v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109792,

2021-Ohio-2514, ¶ 34, quoting Flemco, L.L.C. v. 12307 St. Clair, Ltd., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 105956, 2018-Ohio-588, ¶ 15.

             Within the first assignment of error, W.G. argues the magistrate erred

by using a de facto termination date of a marriage because the factors enumerated

in the Third District Court of Appeals case, Dill v. Dill, 179 Ohio App.3d 14,

2008-Ohio-5310, 900 N.E.2d 654 (3d Dist.), weigh in her favor. She also argues

that the trial court should have further considered the criterion listed in

Schweinfurth v. Meza, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80506, 2002-Ohio-6316, before

applying a de facto termination date.

             In Dill, the appellant argued the trial court erred by not applying a de

facto date of termination of the marriage for the purpose of determining marital

property. Id. at ¶ 6. The Third District Court of Appeals stated that

      [s]everal factors should guide a trial court when determining whether
      a de facto termination of marriage date is equitable, including, but not
      limited to whether: (1) the parties separated on less than friendly
      terms; (2) the parties believed the marriage ended prior to the
      hearing; (3) either party cohabited with another person during the
      separation; (4) the parties were intimately involved during the
      separation; (5) the parties lived as husband and wife during the
      separation; (6) the parties maintained separate residences; (7) the
      parties utilized separate bank accounts or were/were not financially
      intertwined (with the exception of temporary orders); (8) either party
      attempted to reconcile; (9) either party retained counsel; and (10) the
      parties attended social functions together or vacationed together.
Id. at ¶ 11. In addition to noting that the list of factors is not all-inclusive, the Dill

court stated that none of the factors are dispositive; “rather, the trial court must

determine the relative equities on a case-by-case basis.” Id. This court recently

recognized that “Dill appears to be the foremost case in Ohio to set forth a

nonexclusive list of factors to consider when analyzing de facto termination of

marriage dates.” Machen v. Miller, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 112453, 112454, and

112479, 2024-Ohio-1270, ¶ 48. In Schweinfurth, the trial court used a de facto date

of termination for the marriage, that being the date when wife filed a complaint for

separation. Id. at ¶ 6. In affirming that date, this court noted “that once the

complaint for divorce had been filed, there was no further talk of reconciliation nor

commingling of marital funds or concerted financial activity.” Id. at ¶ 9.

              W.G. argues that the magistrate erred and the trial court abused its

discretion by using March 23, 2012, as the de facto date of determination because

the Dill factors weighed in her favor. She further argues that the trial court should

have given more weight to the parties filing of joint tax returns after the de facto date

and the testimony regarding reconciliation, factors noted in Schweinfurth.

              In overruling objections to the magistrate’s order, the trial court

referenced the factors in Dill, 179 Ohio App.3d 14, 2008-Ohio-5310, 900 N.E.2d

654, in making its determination, finding that

      [i]t is undisputed that the parties separated on unfriendly terms. The
      record does not indicate the parties were intimate after their
      separation. The only [Dill] factors that weigh against finding the de
      facto termination of marriage date is the testimony of the Parties that
      Plaintiff moved in and out of marital residence several times and may
      have had discussions of reconciliation for the children’s sake after the
      initial divorce was dismissed. However, in light of many of the other
      factors being satisfied, this holds less weight. As the Magistrate
      indicated, the Defendant’s willingness to obtain and pay child
      support, and Plaintiffs willingness to receive it, is highly indicative of
      their intentions to remain separated. Therefore, upon review of the
      record, the Court finds that the Magistrate did not err when he found
      the Dill factors weigh in favor of the de facto dates of the marriage
      being from February 23, 2004 until March 23, 2012.

              At the time of the final hearing in December 2022, W.G. and D.G. had

lived apart for at least eight years according to W.G. and for over a decade according

to D.G. They filed one joint tax return in 2017 and maintained separate bank

accounts and neither testified they had taken on debt jointly.

              In determining that the magistrate properly used a de facto

termination date in distributing property, the trial court gave great weight to the fact

D.G. obtained an order for and continually paid child support, which support W.G.

accepted.   Further, the testimony indicated that outside of the child-support

payments, the parties’ maintained separate bank accounts and had their own credit

accounts. As such, the parties did not intertwine their finances. Further, they did

not seek to reconcile the marriage other than for “the sake of the children.”

Accordingly, where no one factor is conclusive in determining whether it is equitable

to use a de facto date of termination, we cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion by adopting the magistrate’s recommendation in applying a de facto date

of termination in this case.

              Because we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a

de facto termination date, we also find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding D.G. the entirety of his pension where he obtained interest in that pension

after the de facto termination date of the marriage adopted by the trial court.

              The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

     The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the tax
                   exemption for the children to D.G.

              W.G. argues the trial court should have awarded her the federal

income tax deductions for the children. R.C. 3119.82 requires that whenever a court

issues or reconsiders a child support order it is to designate which parent may claim

the child for federal income tax purposes. If the parties do not agree to whom the

deductions will be awarded, R.C. 3119.82 provides in relevant part that

      the court, in its order, may permit the parent who is not the residential
      parent and legal custodian to claim the children as dependents for
      federal income tax purposes only if the court determines that this
      furthers the best interest of the children and, * * * payments for child
      support are substantially current * * *. [T]he court shall consider, in
      making its determination, any net tax savings, the relative financial
      circumstances and needs of the parents and children, the amount of
      time the children spend with each parent, the eligibility of either or
      both parents for the federal earned income tax credit or other state or
      federal tax credit, and any other relevant factor concerning the best
      interest of the children.

We review the decision to designate a parent as the person able to claim the federal

tax deductions for an abuse of discretion. In re B.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111905,

2023-Ohio-1567, ¶ 9. “‘While the trial court does not need to state a basis for

allocating the exemption, the record does need to include financial data in relation

to the above factors to support the trial court’s decision.’” Branden v. Branden, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91453, 2009-Ohio-866, ¶ 36, quoting, Ankney v. Bonos, 9th

Dist. Summit No. 23178, 2006-Ohio-6009.

               W.G. argues that because she is the residential parent and could be

eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, Additional Tax

Credit, and status as Head of Household Filing, she would benefit more by having

the ability to claim the children as dependents. In overruling W.G.’s objections to

the recommended order, the trial court found that W.G. “testified, and her Financial

Affidavit indicates that her hair salon business income is $2,706 annually with no

other income.      Further, Plaintiff did not submit any tax returns or other

documentation to support her financial affidavit.”

               The evidence before the trial court regarding W.G.’s income was not

substantiated; she did not supplement her financial disclosure form or her

testimony with tax returns or other documents. Thus, when considering the relative

financial circumstances of the parties, eligibility of either parent for tax credits, or

for the overall benefit to the children, the trial court could not determine the effect

of awarding W.G. the federal income tax deductions with any certainty. As such,

W.G.’s arguments as to any benefit she might gain from being awarded the

deductions is speculative at best1 and we cannot say the trial court’s decision to

1 In addition to being speculative, even without the ability to claim the children as
dependents, W.G. may still be eligible for some of those benefits as a parent may be able
to file as Head of Household or claim the Earned Income Credit regardless of using the
tax deduction for the children pursuant to IRS Publication 501, Dependents, Standard
award D.G. the federal tax deductions was an abuse of discretion nor against the

evidence within the record.

              The third assignment of error is overruled.

                                  CONCLUSION

              The trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a de facto date of

termination where the parties’ finances were not intertwined, they did not seek to

reconcile the marriage other than for the sake of the children, they lived apart for

years, and D.G. obtained an order for and continually paid child support for over a

decade. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a de facto

termination date, it did not abuse its discretion by awarding D.G. the entirety of his

pension in which he obtained an interest after the de facto termination date of the

marriage. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding D.G. the

ability to claim the children as dependents where the trial court could not with

certainty determine the effect of awarding W.G. the deductions.

              Judgment affirmed.

      Appellant to pay costs.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

Deduction, and Filing Information (2023) 8, 12-17 and IRS Publication 596, Earned
Income Credit (EIC) 16-18 (2023).
      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and
EMANEULLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR