Court Opinion

ID: 9881064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:01:04.942135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:01.535994
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREG MOORE; PATRICIA                No. 22-16236
MOORE,
         Plaintiffs-Appellees,         D.C. No.
                                    4:19-cv-00290-
and                                    RM-LAB

SOUTHWEST NONPROFIT
HOUSING CORPORATION; JC               OPINION
MOORE GRANDCHILDREN'S
TRUST; ESMJ PARTNERS,
           Plaintiffs,

 v.

SEAN GARNAND, Detective; DAIN
SALISBURY, Sergeant,
           Defendants-Appellants,

and

REBECCA LOPEZ, Detective;
RICHARD RADINSKY, Sergeant;
KIMBERLY FRIE, Sergeant; AMY
GARNAND; BENJAMIN FRIE;
HOLLY RADINSKY; CITY OF
TUCSON,
          Defendants.
2                       MOORE V. GARNAND

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                 for the District of Arizona
        Rosemary Márquez, District Judge, Presiding

             Argued and Submitted July 12, 2023
                 San Francisco, California

                   Filed September 29, 2023

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Mark J. Bennett, and Holly A.
                Thomas, Circuit Judges.

                   Opinion by Judge Bennett

                          SUMMARY**

     First Amendment Retaliation/Qualified Immunity

    The panel reversed the district court’s order on summary
judgment denying qualified immunity to police officers in
an action alleging, in part, First Amendment retaliation
arising from defendants’ investigation of two arsons at
properties connected to plaintiff Greg Moore.
   Plaintiffs alleged that in retaliation for Mr. Moore
remaining silent during police questioning and plaintiffs’
subsequent civil rights lawsuit and request for disclosures of
public records, defendants, among other things, opened

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                      MOORE V. GARNAND                       3

criminal investigations against them and attempted to induce
the IRS into opening a criminal investigation.
    The panel first held that it had jurisdiction over the
district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to plaintiffs’
First Amendment claims because defendants presented a
purely legal issue: whether, taking as true plaintiffs’ version
of the facts, it was clearly established that defendants’
conduct violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.
    The panel next concluded that plaintiffs failed to show
that defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. It
was not clearly established that Mr. Moore has a First
Amendment right to remain silent when questioned by the
police. Nor was it clearly established that a retaliatory
investigation per se violates the First Amendment.
Defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity on
the First Amendment claims based on Mr. Moore’s silence
and plaintiffs’ lawsuits and requests for public disclosures.
    The panel addressed plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
claims in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

                         COUNSEL

Dennis P. McLaughlin (argued) and Sarah E. Pace, Principal
Assistant City Attorneys; Michael G. Rankin, City Attorney;
City Attorney’s Office, Tucson, Arizona; for Defendants-
Appellants.
Lawrence J. Wulkan (argued) and Jennifer L. Allen,
Zwillinger Wulkan PLC, Phoenix, Arizona; Michael G.
Moore, Law Office of Michael Garth Moore, Tucson,
Arizona; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
4                         MOORE V. GARNAND

                              OPINION

BENNETT, Circuit Judge:
    Greg and Patricia Moore (collectively, “Plaintiffs”),
husband and wife, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against
several officers of the Tucson Police Department. Officers
Sean Garnand and Dain Salisbury (collectively,
“Defendants”) are the only remaining defendants. Plaintiffs’
complaint alleged First Amendment retaliation claims
arising from Defendants’ investigation of two arsons that
occurred at properties connected to Mr. Moore.1 Defendants
appeal from the district court’s order denying without
prejudice their motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity.
    We have jurisdiction to consider the purely legal issue of
whether, taking as true Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, it was
clearly established that Defendants’ conduct violated their
First Amendment rights. Because Plaintiffs fail to show that
Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the First
Amendment claims. Thus, we reverse the district court’s
denial of summary judgment as to the First Amendment
claims.
                       I. BACKGROUND2
   Defendants’ investigation started on the afternoon of
June 8, 2017, when a fire broke out at a building. The cause

1
  In this opinion, we address only the First Amendment claims. In a
concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we address Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment claims.
2
 For purposes of this opinion, we accept Plaintiffs’ version of the facts
as true. See Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1185 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001).
                      MOORE V. GARNAND                        5

of the fire was determined to be arson. Mr. Moore arrived at
the scene while the firefighters were still tending to the fire.
He identified himself as being responsible for the property.
Mr. Moore left the scene after an investigator from the fire
department told him that he could leave. Later that night, a
police officer called Mr. Moore and asked if he could meet
to talk about the fire. Mr. Moore said that he could meet the
next day at his office.
    The next day, Defendants went to Mr. Moore’s office
with a search warrant that they had obtained on the night of
the fire. Mr. Moore was in his office with an attorney.
Officer Garnand identified himself and started to ask Mr.
Moore questions. The attorney advised Mr. Moore to remain
silent. Officer Garnand then explained that he had a warrant
to seize Mr. Moore’s cell phone and evidence from his
person. The attorney said that Mr. Moore would not give up
his cell phone. At that point, Officer Garnand took a cell
phone out of Mr. Moore’s hand and handcuffed him. Mr.
Moore refused to answer any questions, stating that he was
invoking his right to remain silent. Mr. Moore was
transported to the police station, where his DNA and
fingerprints were taken. He was released soon after.
    Five days after Mr. Moore’s arrest, Defendants obtained
a warrant to search Mr. Moore’s office and the Moores’
home. The warrant was supported by Officer Garnand’s
affidavit, which referenced a 2011 arson at a property
connected to Mr. Moore and the recent June 8, 2017 arson.
Officer Garnand led the search at the Moores’ home. Mrs.
Moore was home alone and, sometime during the search,
Officer Garnand told her, “You know we wouldn’t be here
if your husband had just talked to us.”
6                        MOORE V. GARNAND

    In November 2017, Defendants caused the Tucson
Police Department to open a criminal financial investigation
against Plaintiffs. As part of the investigation, the police
identified companies linked to Plaintiffs and obtained four
subpoenas for the companies’ financial records. These
subpoenas were served on various banks. The investigation
was closed on April 11, 2018, because there was no evidence
that Plaintiffs had committed any crimes.
    On August 13, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a § 1983 action in
federal court against Officer Garnand.3 The suit alleged
Fourth Amendment violations related to the search warrants.
After learning about that suit, Defendants reopened the
criminal investigation against Plaintiffs.       Defendants
questioned two witnesses—the last contractor and the last
tenant present at the property before the fire—and seized the
contractor’s cell phone. Defendants also tried to induce the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to open a criminal
investigation against Plaintiffs.
    In October and December 2018, Plaintiffs submitted
public records requests to the Tucson Police Department,
seeking all records related to them. In March 2019, Plaintiffs
filed a special action in state court against the City of
Tucson, seeking to compel the disclosure of certain
documents that had been withheld.
    Plaintiffs filed this suit in May 2019. They claim that
Mr. Moore had a First Amendment right to remain silent
when Defendants sought to question him at his office, and
that their lawsuits and requests for information were also
protected First Amendment activities. In retaliation for

3
 Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this suit in mid-2019 and replaced it
with the instant suit.
                           MOORE V. GARNAND                                  7

exercising those rights, Defendants allegedly, without any
reasonable suspicion, opened a criminal investigation
against Plaintiffs; obtained four subpoenas for their
companies’ financial records; interviewed two witnesses;
attempted to induce the IRS into opening a criminal
investigation against Plaintiffs; and reopened the criminal
investigation against Plaintiffs after it had been closed.4
Additionally, as to the First Amendment claim based on Mr.
Moore’s silence, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants also
retaliated by arresting Mr. Moore and obtaining and
executing the search warrant for Mr. Moore’s office and the
Moores’ home.
    In December 2021, a magistrate judge granted
Defendants leave to file their oversized motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. That same day, the
district court lifted its order granting Defendants’ law
enforcement investigatory privilege (“LEIP”), which had
been in effect since December 2019 and significantly limited
Plaintiffs’ scope of discovery. Plaintiffs moved to stay
summary judgment briefing under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(d),5 arguing that they had been unable to

4
  Defendants opened the criminal investigation in November 2017 and
obtained the subpoenas sometime before April 2018. Because these acts
happened before August 2018, which is when Plaintiffs first engaged in
any protected activity by filing suit against Officer Garnand, we do not
consider them in analyzing Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation
claims based on their lawsuits and requests for information. See Pratt v.
Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (a decision to transfer an
inmate that preceded the inmate’s television interview could not have
been made in retaliation for the interview). As noted below, however,
we do consider them in analyzing the First Amendment retaliation claims
based on Mr. Moore remaining silent.
5
  “If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court
8                         MOORE V. GARNAND

obtain evidence necessary to oppose the motion because of
the LEIP.
    In February 2022, Defendants filed an amended motion
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and
Plaintiffs renewed their Rule 56(d) motion. A magistrate
judge granted Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion in part by
ordering Defendants to produce certain discovery but stayed
all other discovery. The magistrate judge also ordered
Plaintiffs to respond to Defendants’ summary judgment
motion.
    Plaintiffs challenged the magistrate judge’s rulings
before the district court. The district court issued an order
overruling the magistrate judge’s relevant decisions. The
order granted Plaintiffs Rule 56(d) relief and lifted the
discovery stay. Rather than defer ruling on the motion, the
district court decided to deny it: “Defendants’ Amended
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 348) is denied without
prejudice and with leave to re-file after the completion of
discovery.” Defendants timely appeal from the district
court’s denial.
                      II. JURISDICTION
    The parties dispute whether we have jurisdiction to
consider the “First Amendment” portion of this appeal.6 “An
interlocutory appeal may be taken from the denial of
immunity if the denial presents a question of law.” KRL v.
Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2004). A question

may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain
affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other
appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
6
 We resolve the parties’ Fourth Amendment jurisdictional dispute in our
concurrently filed memorandum disposition.
                       MOORE V. GARNAND                        9

of law is presented if the defendant argues that “assuming
the facts as alleged by [plaintiff] to be true, his conduct did
not violate [plaintiff’s constitutional] rights, and that even if
it did, he was entitled to qualified immunity.” Giebel v.
Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote
omitted); see also KRL, 384 F.3d at 1110 (“[T]he application
of qualified immunity to Plaintiffs’ allegations is a question
of law . . . .”).
    Defendants present a purely legal question. They argue
that, even assuming Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity
because the unlawfulness of their conduct was not clearly
established. We have jurisdiction to consider that legal
issue. See Ames v. King County, 846 F.3d 340, 347 (9th Cir.
2017) (“[W]e may adjudicate ‘legal’ interlocutory appeals;
that is, we may properly review a denial of qualified
immunity where a defendant argues . . . that the facts, even
when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
show . . . no violation of a right that is clearly established in
law.”).
     Plaintiffs argue that we lack jurisdiction because the
district court did not conclusively determine whether
Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. But our
caselaw does not support Plaintiffs’ position. In Ganwich v.
Knapp, 319 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2003), we rejected plaintiffs’
argument that we lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of
qualified immunity because “the district court’s ruling
occurred before the completion of discovery and expressly
left the qualified immunity question open for reconsideration
after the completion of discovery.” Id. at 1119. We
reasoned that jurisdiction was proper because “[f]orcing the
defendant officers to undergo discovery, without the
possibility of appeal to us, would erode any qualified
10                        MOORE V. GARNAND

immunity to the burdens of discovery the officers might
possess.” Id.; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,
308 (1996) (holding that qualified immunity gives
government officials a right “not merely to avoid standing
trial, but also to avoid the burdens of such pretrial matters as
discovery” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)
(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)));
Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[A]n order clearing the way for burdensome pre-trial
discovery obligations renders the denial of immunity
effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment—
immunity from suit is of no use at that late stage.”).
    Under Ganwich, we have jurisdiction to consider purely
legal qualified immunity questions when, as here, the district
court denies the qualified immunity motion (thereby forcing
defendants to undergo burdensome discovery) but leaves the
issue open for reconsideration.7
    Plaintiffs contend that Ganwich is distinguishable
because it did not involve a denial of qualified immunity
based on the district court’s perceived need for further
discovery. Under the circumstances, we do not view this as

7
  Because the district court denied Defendants’ summary judgment
motion, Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over an order that “did not
expressly deny the motion” but “deferred ruling on immunity”), and
Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 972–73 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the district court’s
deferral of the summary judgment motion), do not control. Miller and
Moss are further distinguishable because here, the district court’s order
subjected Defendants to discovery without limitation. See Miller, 335
F.3d at 892 (explaining that the order “deferred a ruling, pending limited
discovery” (emphasis added)); Moss, 572 F.3d at 973 (explaining that
“the district court ha[d] yet to order any discovery or to compel the
Agents to submit to depositions”).
                          MOORE V. GARNAND                             11

a material distinction. The district court’s determination that
Plaintiffs should have the opportunity to conduct further
discovery under Rule 56(d) does not affect our ability to
accept as true Plaintiffs’ version of the facts and apply the
qualified immunity legal standards to those facts.8 See KRL,
384 F.3d at 1117 (holding that we could decide qualified
immunity as a matter of law, even though the district court’s
denial was based on a perceived need for more discovery).
And our underlying rationale in Ganwich for finding
jurisdiction—that “[f]orcing the defendant officers to
undergo discovery, without the possibility of appeal to us,
would erode any qualified immunity to the burdens of
discovery the officers might possess,” 319 F.3d at 1119—
applies with equal force here, as the district court’s order
denying summary judgment subjected Defendants to
unlimited discovery.
    In sum, accepting as true Plaintiffs’ version of the facts,
we have jurisdiction to consider whether Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights were not clearly established at the time.
See Ames, 846 F.3d at 347.
               III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo a district court’s denial of qualified
immunity. Ames, 846 F.3d at 347. We “assume the version
of the facts asserted by the nonmoving party.” Moss, 572
F.3d at 973.

8
  Because our de novo review of the qualified immunity issue, see
Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 61 (9th Cir. 2022), does not require us
to consider the district court’s reason for denying the summary judgment
motion, we do not reach the question whether a Rule 56(d) determination
could be an immediately appealable collateral order.
12                   MOORE V. GARNAND

                   IV. DISCUSSION
    Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claims can be
divided into two categories: retaliation based on (1) Mr.
Moore’s decision to remain silent when Defendants sought
to question him at his office; and (2) Plaintiffs’ lawsuits
against Officer Garnand and the City of Tucson, and their
requests for disclosures of public records.

       To recover under § 1983 for [First
       Amendment] retaliation, a plaintiff must
       prove: (1) he engaged in constitutionally
       protected activity; (2) as a result, he was
       subjected to adverse action by the defendant
       that would chill a person of ordinary firmness
       from continuing to engage in the protected
       activity; and (3) there was a substantial
       causal      relationship      between      the
       constitutionally protected activity and the
       adverse action.

Blair v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 608 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 2010)
(footnote omitted).
    “[T]o overcome qualified immunity, Plaintiffs must
show that [defendants] (1) ‘violated a federal statutory or
constitutional right’ and (2) ‘the unlawfulness of their
conduct was clearly established at the time.’” Ballentine v.
Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 61 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)). We may
analyze these elements in any order. Id. Here, we consider
only whether Defendants’ conduct violated a clearly
established right.
                     MOORE V. GARNAND                      13

    “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly
established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct,
‘the contours of a right are sufficiently clear’ that every
‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is
doing violates that right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 741 (2011) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). While
we “do not require a case directly on point, . . . existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” Id. “The Supreme Court has
repeatedly stressed that courts must not define clearly
established law at a high level of generality.” Ballentine, 28
F.4th at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590).
    “In the Ninth Circuit, we begin [the clearly established]
inquiry by looking to binding precedent. If the right is
clearly established by decisional authority of the Supreme
Court or this Circuit, our inquiry should come to an end.”
Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004)
(internal citation omitted). “[I]n the absence of binding
precedent, we look to whatever decisional law is available to
ascertain whether the law is clearly established for qualified
immunity purposes . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of
Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003)).
A. Retaliation Based on Mr. Moore’s Silence
    Plaintiffs claim that Defendants retaliated against them
because Mr. Moore exercised his First Amendment right to
remain silent when questioned by Defendants. But Plaintiffs
identify no case that clearly established that a person has a
First Amendment right to remain silent when questioned by
the police.
14                       MOORE V. GARNAND

    Plaintiffs mainly rely on Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977). In Wooley, the Court held that it was a First
Amendment violation to compel plaintiffs to display the
motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates. Id. at 713.
In reaching its holding, the Court stated generally that “the
right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”
Id. at 714 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs contend that this
general statement clearly established Mr. Moore’s First
Amendment right to remain silent when questioned by
Defendants.
    But Plaintiffs’ position is at odds with the Supreme
Court’s command that clearly established law not be defined
at “a high level of generality.” Ballentine, 28 F.4th at 64
(quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590). “[T]he right allegedly
violated must be established, ‘not as a broad general
proposition,’ but in a ‘particularized’ sense so that the
‘contours’ of the right are clear to a reasonable official.”
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (first quoting
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam);
and then quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). Wooley did
not deal with First Amendment rights during police
questioning. Nor did it suggest that its general statement
about a First Amendment right to refrain from speaking
could be extended to refusing to speak in response to police
questioning, with or without Miranda rights. Thus, Wooley
did not clearly establish a First Amendment right to remain
silent during police questioning.9 See Riley’s Am. Heritage

9
 Plaintiffs also point to Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853 (9th Cir.
2008), and Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
                        MOORE V. GARNAND                           15

Farms v. Elsasser, 32 F.4th 707, 729 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The
right to be free from First Amendment retaliation cannot be
framed as ‘the general right to be free from retaliation for
one’s speech.’ Rather, the right must be defined at a more
specific level tied to the factual and legal context of a given
case.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Reichle, 566 U.S.
at 665)).
    Substantial authority, although nonbinding, reinforces
our conclusion that a First Amendment right to remain silent
during police questioning was not clearly established at the
time. See, e.g., Newsome v. Bogan, 617 F. Supp. 3d 133, 152
(W.D.N.Y. 2022) (“No case in the Second Circuit has
expressly held . . . that the right to decline to speak protects
an individual’s right to decline to participate in a police
interview . . . .”); Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d
298, 308 (5th Cir. 2017) (“The sparse case law that does
exist . . . indicates no consensus that a defendant has a First
Amendment right not to answer an officer’s questions during
a [Terry] stop . . . .”); Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d
1228, 1244 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e . . . have found no
authority recognizing a First Amendment right to refuse to
answer questions during a Terry stop.”); McFadyen v. Duke
Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, 949 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (“[T]he
Court rejects Plaintiffs’ legal contention that declining to
speak to police officers during a criminal investigation raises
First Amendment protections.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
dismissed in part on other grounds sub nom. Evans v.

banc). But neither case suggested—much less clearly established—a
First Amendment right to remain silent during police questioning. See
Beck, 527 F.3d at 868–69 (analyzing First Amendment retaliation claims
based on “brusque comments” and “advocacy efforts”); Lacey, 693 F.3d
at 916–17 (analyzing First Amendment retaliation claims based on
“newspaper articles criticizing public officials”).
16                     MOORE V. GARNAND

Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir. 2012). But see Mendia v.
Garcia, No. 10-CV-03910-MEJ, 2016 WL 2654327, at *8
(N.D. Cal. May 10, 2016) (recognizing that plaintiff had a
First Amendment right not to speak to ICE agents).
   Because it was not clearly established that Mr. Moore
had a First Amendment right to remain silent when
questioned by Defendants, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims based on
Mr. Moore’s silence. See Ballentine, 28 F.4th at 61.
B. Retaliation Based on Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits and
   Requests for Information
    Plaintiffs filed suits against Officer Garnand and the City
of Tucson and requested disclosures of public records.10
Plaintiffs claim that in retaliation for exercising those First
Amendment rights, Defendants conducted a criminal
investigation against Plaintiffs without any reasonable
suspicion—which included interviewing two witnesses—
and attempted to induce the IRS into opening a criminal
investigation against Plaintiffs. In short, Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants violated their First Amendment rights by
pursuing a retaliatory investigation.
    Again, however, Plaintiffs identify no caselaw that
clearly established that a retaliatory investigation per se
violates the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has not
decided the issue. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262
n.9 (2006) (“Whether the expense or other adverse
consequences of a retaliatory investigation would ever
justify recognizing such an investigation as a distinct
constitutional violation is not before us.”); see also Rehberg

10
 Defendants do not dispute that these actions were protected First
Amendment activities.
                      MOORE V. GARNAND                       17

v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 851 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[The] right to
be free from a retaliatory investigation is not clearly
established.    The Supreme Court has never defined
retaliatory investigation, standing alone, as a constitutional
tort . . . .”).
     Plaintiffs rely on two Ninth Circuit cases, but neither
held that a retaliatory investigation by itself was
unconstitutional. In Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir.
2003), plaintiff “[a]llege[d] that prison officials violated his
First Amendment right to file prison grievances when they
validated him as a [gang] member in retaliation for his filing
of several grievances.” Id. at 1288. Bruce is inapt because
the alleged retaliatory action was the validation of the
plaintiff as a gang member, not any investigations conducted
by the prison officials. See id. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214
(9th Cir. 2000), did involve a retaliatory investigation. Id. at
1226. But in White, the government’s investigation was
materially different than the investigation here. The officials
in White questioned plaintiffs under threat of subpoena,
directed them to produce documents, told plaintiffs and
reported to a newspaper that plaintiffs had violated the Fair
Housing Act, and “advised [plaintiffs] to accept a
‘conciliation proposal’ that required them to cease all
litigation and the distribution of ‘discriminatory’ newsletters
and flyers.” Id. at 1220. We held that, considering the
entirety of the officials’ acts, they had violated plaintiffs’
First Amendment rights. Id. at 1238 (“The scope and
manner of the investigation violated the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights.” (emphasis added)).
   Defendants’ actions (even as Plaintiffs allege them and
even disregarding the uncontested facts as to the arsons
18                       MOORE V. GARNAND

themselves11)—unjustifiably         pursuing    a     criminal
investigation, interviewing two witnesses, and attempting to
induce the IRS to open an investigation—were materially
different from the acts at issue in White. Other than perhaps
putting Defendants on notice at a very high level of
generality that their actions might raise First Amendment
concerns, White could not have put Defendants on sufficient
notice that their actions would violate Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
    Although it is Plaintiffs’ burden to identify the clearly
established law, see Ballentine, 28 F.4th at 61, we were also
unable to find any binding precedent that clearly established
a First Amendment violation based on a retaliatory
investigation. See, e.g., Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton, No. 21-CV-
01644-MMC, 2021 WL 1893140, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 11,
2021) (noting that “Twitter cites no case holding the
institution of an allegedly retaliatory investigation, by itself,
constitutes a cognizable adverse action,” and that the issue
has not been decided by the Ninth Circuit). Our review of
nonbinding authority also supports that it was not clearly
established that a retaliatory investigation violates the First
Amendment. See Lincoln v. Maketa, 880 F.3d 533, 539–41
(10th Cir. 2018) (holding that a criminal investigation into
plaintiff and his children was not an adverse employment
action supporting a First Amendment retaliation claim
because it was not clearly established that a “retaliatory
criminal investigation entails a constitutional violation,” id.
at 540)12; Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 851 (“[The] right to be free

11
  And even further disregarding that Mr. Moore was later indicted for
the arsons.
12
  Lincoln, 880 F.3d at 540, noted that in Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320
F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2003), we had suggested that a retaliatory criminal
                         MOORE V. GARNAND                             19

from a retaliatory investigation is not clearly established.”);
Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 513 (5th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting a First Amendment retaliation claim because Fifth
Circuit “caselaw unequivocally hold[s] that retaliatory
criticisms, investigations, and false accusations that do not
lead to some more tangible adverse action are not actionable
under § 1983”).
    Because Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of showing
that Defendants’ investigatory conduct violated clearly
established law, Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity on the First Amendment claim based on Plaintiffs’
lawsuits and requests for disclosures. See Ballentine, 28
F.4th at 61.
                       V. CONCLUSION
    We have jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims
because Defendants present a purely legal issue: whether,
taking as true Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, it was clearly
established that Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiffs’
First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs fail to show that
Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. Thus,
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the First
Amendment claims, and we reverse the district court’s

investigation could violate the First Amendment. Even assuming
without deciding that Coszalter suggested as such, we never held that a
retaliatory investigation alone could violate the First Amendment, as our
holding rested on much more than just a retaliatory investigation. See
id. at 976–77 (listing numerous retaliatory acts and concluding that
“[w]hen taken together, it is clear that these acts amounted to a severe
and sustained campaign of employer retaliation that was ‘reasonably
likely to deter’ plaintiffs from engaging in speech protected under the
First Amendment” (emphasis added)).
20                          MOORE V. GARNAND

denial of summary judgment as to the First Amendment
claims.
       REVERSED.13

13
     The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.