Court Opinion

ID: 9648786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:35:07.277582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:05.428886
License: Public Domain

PASHMAN, J.,
concurring.
For the reasons stated by Justice Clifford, I fully concur with the result reached today that the search of the automobile’s trunk violated the Fourth Amendment. I am in fundamental disagreement, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the holding of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed.2d 660 (1979), should not be accorded limited retroactive effect. Ante at 5 n.2. For the reasons stated in my opinion in State v. Carpentieri, 82 N.J. 546, 556 (1980) (Pashman, J., dissenting), I believe that the rule of Prouse should be applied to all cases pending direct review on the date of the Prouse decision, March 27, 1979. I would therefore apply the rule of Prouse to the present appeal.
I also write separately to address an issue the majority declines to discuss. The official conduct under scrutiny in this case involved two distinct intrusions into defendants’ constitutionally protected privacy: the search of the automobile’s trunk and the search of the shopping bag found in the trunk. Regardless of the validity of the first search, I believe that the warrantless search of the shopping bag was unlawful.
In considering the legality of any search or seizure, “[t]he ultimate question * * * is whether one’s claim to privacy *16from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152, 99 S.Ct. 421, 435, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). The reasonableness of a person’s asserted privacy is determined by “examin[ing] whether a person invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment took normal precautions to maintain his privacy—that is, precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy.” Id. Application of these standards leads to the conclusion that the search of the shopping bag violated the rule of United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).1
In Chadwick the Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search of a locked footlocker which had been seized from the trunk of a parked automobile. Although the government did not attempt to base the warrantless search of the footlocker on *17the “automobile exception” of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), “the logic of the Chadwick opinion suggests that an individual’s interest in keeping private the contents of personal luggage is not lost simply because that luggage is placed in an automobile.” People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514, 518-519 (Sup.Ct.1979), cert. den., 444 U.S. 887, 100 S.Ct. 181, 62 L.Ed.2d 117 (1979). In holding that a warrant was necessary before undertaking a search of the footlocker, the Chadwick Court stressed that “a person’s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.” 433 U.S. at 13, 97 S.Ct. at 2484.
More recently, in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, the Supreme Court applied the Chadwick rule to the warrantless search of an unlocked suitcase seized from the trunk of a taxicab. The Sanders Court held that the “automobile exception” did not encompass the search of a personal suitcase found in an automobile even though the police had probable cause to believe the suitcase contained contraband. Examining the dual rationale for the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement—the exigency resulting from mobility and the lesser expectation of privacy surrounding an automobile—the Court concluded “that a warrant generally is required before personal luggage can be searched and that the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are seized from an automobile.” Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.13, 99 S.Ct. at 2594 n.13, 61 L.Ed.2d at 245 n.13.
A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the search—after the police have seized the object to be searched and have it securely within their control. See 433 U.S. at 13, 53 L.Ed.2d 538, 97 S.Ct. 2476. Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the place from which it was taken. Accordingly, as a general rule there is no greater need *18for warrantless searches of luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from other places.
Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from other locations. One is not less inclined to place private personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by other means or temporarily checked or stored. Indeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for personal items when one wishes to transport them. [Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763-764, 99 S.Ct. at 2593, 61 L.Ed.2d at 244-245 (footnotes omitted)]
Turning to the facts of this case, the defendants’ privacy interest in the shopping bag is indistinguishable from such interests in the suitcase in Sander,s, or the footlocker in Chadwick. In each case the container’s “very purpose” was to “serve as a repository for personal items when one wishes to transport them.” Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764, 99 S.Ct. at 2593, 61 L.Ed.2d at 245. Like an article of luggage, a shopping bag which conceals its contents from public examination is not one of those containers hypothesized in Sanders—“a kit of burglar tools or a gun case”—which “by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance.” Id. at 764-765, n. 13, 99 S.Ct. at 2593 n. 13, 61 L.Ed.2d at 245 n. 13.
Nor is this a case where the contents of the container are open to “plain view,” thereby justifying a warrantless search. Id. (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (per curiam)). The contraband in the shopping bag was completely covered by a pillow, see ante at 16 n.3. Thus the contents of the bag could not be ascertained without probing. The fact, therefore, that this shopping bag was not a “closed” container does not obviate the need for a warrant.
My view that a reasonable expectation of privacy surrounds the contents of a shopping bag finds support in a multitude of decisions that have applied Chadwick and Sanders to a variety *19of packages, containers and parcels.2 See, e. g., United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (cardboard boxes); United States v. Bella, 605 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (guitar case); United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. den., 444 U.S. 991, 100 S.Ct. 522, 62 L.Ed.2d 420 (1980) (briefcase); United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979) (backpack); United States v. Johnson, 588 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979) (duffel bag); People v. Dalton, 24 Cal.3d 850, 157 Cal.Rptr. 497, 598 P.2d 467 (Sup.Ct.1979), cert. den., 445 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 781 (1980) (metal boxes); People v. Minjares, 24 Cal.2d 410, 153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514 (Sup.Ct. 1979), cert. den., 444 U.S. 887, 100 S.Ct. 181, 62 L.Ed.2d 117 (1979) (tote bag); People v. Bayles, 76 Ill.App.2d 843, 32 Ill.Dec. 433, 395 N.E.2d 663 (Ct.App.1979) (cloth drawstring whiskey bag); State v. DeLorenzo, 166 N.J.Super. 483 (App.Div.1979) (duffel bag); State v. Parker, 153 N.J.Super. 481 (App.Div.1977) (zippered satchel); State v. DeLong, 43 Or.App. 183, 602 P.2d 665 (Ct.App.1979) (camera case); State v. Marcum, 24 Wash.App. 975, 601 P.2d 975 (Ct.App.1979) (athletic bag).
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that even if there were probable cause for the police to open the trunk in this case, *20it would have been improper for the police to search the shopping bag. Regardless of its location, whenever the contents of any container or package cannot be ascertained without probing, law enforcement officials must obtain a warrant before they search except when “their actions [can] be justified under some exception to the warrant requirement other than that applicable to automobiles stopped on the highway.” Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766, 99 S.Ct. at 2594, 61 L.Ed.2d at 246. Application of this rule supplies an alternative ground for reversing the convictions in this case.
Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justice SULLIVAN join in the views expressed in the first paragraph of this concurring opinion.

The search at issue occurred on November 10, 1976, which was prior to the date of decision of either Chadwick or Sanders. However, neither Sanders, which applied the rule of Chadwick, nor Chadwick itself announced a “new” rule of law.
Chadwick announces no new constitutional doctrine, nor does it broaden any existing exclusionary rule. All the Court did in Chadwick was to hold that warrantless searches of luggage absent an exigency are an invasion of a “legitimate privacy interest” and cannot be justified under any of the long established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. In so holding, the Court stressed that “in this area we do not write on a clean slate.” [United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1174 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 9, 97 S.Ct. at 2482)]
Hence, the rule of Chadwick presents no question of retroactivity. See State v. Carpentieri, 82 N.J. at 564 n.7 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Although my Brother Schreiber believes that Chadwick should not be applied retroactively, post at 17-18, I am convinced that Schleis presents the sounder approach. See United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175, 1178 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. den., 443 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 3102, 61 L.Ed.2d 876 (1979); People v. Minjarcs, 24 Cal.3d 410, 153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514, 519 n. 6 (Sup.Ct.1979), cert. den., 444 U.S. 887, 100 S.Ct. 181, 62 L.Ed.2d 117 (1979).

Relying on the recent decision in United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624 (D.C.Cir. April 17, 1980), Justice Schreiber appears to accept the view that one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a mere paper bag. Post at 22 n.l. However, I fully agree with Judge Bazelon’s opinion in Ross, which states in part:
The simple fact is that in some of our subcultures paper bags are often used to carry intimate personal belongings. And, the sight of some of our less fortunate citizens carrying their belongings in brown paper bags is too familiar to permit such class biases to diminish protection of privacy. [Ross, supra (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)]
The degree of constitutional protection available to a person cannot depend on his ability to purchase a more traditional repository for his belongings.