Court Opinion

ID: 9478828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:59:03.385158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:38.213097
License: Public Domain

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join the majority in its affirmance of the dismissal of Balderman’s claim that his termination was a disciplinary action requiring a pretermination hearing, but respectfully dissent from its reversal of the dismissal of his claim with respect to tenure rights.
My difference with the majority pertains to the substantive law applicable to Balder-man’s claim of tenure rights. As the Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), for purposes of summary judgment, “the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; see Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, 832 F.2d 726, 731 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1470, 99 L.Ed.2d 700 (1988).
Balderman claims that his conversion to part-time status was “never effected,” complaint 1118, or “never properly effected,” id. If 19, as a result of which Balder-man “retained the rights of a full-time physician,” id. 1Í 28, including tenure rights. The defect in the conversion is asserted to be the government’s failure to advise Bald-erman “in writing of the [tenure] conditions of employment under the new appointment,” as required by the VA Manual.
Balderman is claiming, in other words, that because of its failure to comply with the VA Manual, the government is es-topped from treating him as a part-time physician, but must rather deem him a full-time physician, for tenure purposes. In my view, authoritative Supreme Court precedent precludes the assertion of this estoppel claim against the government, and there is accordingly “no genuine issue as to any material fact” requiring remand. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Preliminarily, I recognize that the case was not decided on this basis below. It is, however, “settled that, if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.” Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937); see Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 103 n. 11 (2d Cir.1980).
Turning to the merits, the most pertinent authority is Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981) (per curiam). There, as here, a government manual, the Social Security Administration Claims Manual, required certain action by a government agent which was not *64undertaken.1 Specifically, that manual “instruct[ed] field representatives to advise applicants of the advantages of filing written applications and to recommend to applicants who are uncertain about their eligibility that they file written applications.” Id. at 786, 101 S.Ct. at 1470. A government field representative nonetheless erroneously told an applicant that she was not eligible for certain benefits, and neglected to advise her to file a written application or apprise her of the advantages of doing so. The applicant thereafter filed for the benefits, but in accordance with the applicable regulations, received retroactive benefits only for the twelve months preceding the filing.
The applicant then sued to collect benefits retroactive to twelve months prior to her receipt of the erroneous advice from the government representative. The Supreme Court rejected her claim, stating, and answering in the negative, the following question:
The question is whether [the SSA representative’s] erroneous statement and neglect of the Claims Manual estop petitioner, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, from denying retroactive benefits to respondent for a period in which she was eligible for benefits but had not filed a written application.

Id.

In so ruling, the Court reversed a contrary decision by this court, see Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.1980), rev’d sub nom. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981), specifically agreeing, 450 U.S. at 788, 101 S.Ct. at 1472, with the dissent of Judge Friendly therein, see Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d at 949 (Friendly, J., dissenting). The Court concluded that the government representative’s errors fell far short of the misconduct which would raise a serious question of estoppel. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. at 790, 101 S.Ct. at 1472.
I regard the rule stated in Schweiker v. Hansen as controlling here. It is true that Balderman, unlike the applicant in Schweiker v. Hansen, is in a contractual relationship with the government. It has long been settled, however, that the rule against estoppel of the government is applicable to such relationships. In Federal Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. 1, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947), the government, acting as insurer, was held not to be es-topped from denying coverage under the insurance contract, despite its agent’s affirmative misrepresentation to the insured that the insurance contract covered the situation for which recovery was unavailingly sought.
Nor has the authority of Federal Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill and Schweiker v. Hansen eroded since those cases were decided.2 The Supreme Court more recently considered this issue in Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984), where it reiterated that:
When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined. It is for this reason that it is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant.
Id. at 60, 104 S.Ct. at 2224. The Court reserved only the question whether, in an exceptional case, the “interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor and reliability in their dealings with their Government” might allow an estoppel to be successfully asserted against the govern*65ment. Id. at 60-61, 104 S.Ct. at 2224-2225; see Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 935, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 2339, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (also reserving question). It cannot plausibly be contended that the instant case poses that issue.
Finally, as I suppose is evident, I am unpersuaded by the majority’s discussion of this issue. The majority cites Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 71 S.Ct. 553, 95 L.Ed. 729 (1951), and Patton v. Dole, 806 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.1986), for the proposition that “not every case in which the government has failed to provide a claimant with material information must be decided as if it depended solely on a theory that the government is estopped.” Be that as it may, neither Moser nor Patton provides any basis to disregard estoppel analysis on the facts presented here, or to reject the authority of Schweiker and Merrill.
Patton involved a question of statutory construction, in which the court perceived the “claim as one for breach of a statutorily prescribed contractual provision,” 805 F.2d at 30, and “ma[de] clear that our holding is not intended to broaden the limited circumstances under which the federal government may be estopped by the conduct of its employees,” id. I am simply at a loss as to what authority Patton provides for disregarding the application of Schweiker and Merrill here.
The facts and rationale of Moser are amply stated in the majority opinion. There is precedent for the attempted invocation of Moser to avoid the application of Merrill, and it would be pure vainglory for me to attempt any improvement upon Judge Friendly’s response to that effort:
In the thirty two years since Merrill, no Supreme Court decision has gone counter to what that case has held. While some courts and commentators have sought to find a contrary indication in Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 47, 71 S.Ct. 553, 556, 95 L.Ed. 729 (1951), this is an instance of the wish being father to the thought. The four survivors of the Merrill majority joined in Moser; decision was placed on the ground that a claim to citizenship could be relinquished only be [sic] intelligent waiver, which Moser had not done; Merrill was not cited; and the opinion expressly said, “There is no need to evaluate these circumstances on the basis of any estoppel of the Government or the power of the Swiss Legation to bind the United States by its advice to petitioner.”
Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d at 950 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
I suggest that the suspect generative process which Judge Friendly discerned in Hansen v. Harris is replicated in the majority’s invocation of Moser here. The Supreme Court’s most recent citation of Mos-er indicates either that it might be a precedent for the invocation of estoppel in the (still reserved) exceptional case of extreme affirmative misconduct by the government, Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. at 60 n. 12, 104 S.Ct. at 2224 n. 12, or that it simply has no application to a case where the question of estoppel properly arises on the facts presented, id. at 68, 104 S.Ct. at 2228 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Neither view of Moser does anything for Balderman’s tenure claim.
For the reasons above stated, I join the majority in its affirmance of the dismissal of Balderman’s claim that his termination was a disciplinary action requiring a preter-mination hearing, but respectfully dissent from its reversal of the dismissal of his claim with respect to tenure rights.

. Schweiker is particularly apposite to the instant case in this respect. Although the Supreme Court in Schweiker specified that it had "no doubt” about the government representative's failure to comply with the pertinent government manual, 450 U.S. at 789, 101 S.Ct. at 1471, the Court refused to allow an estoppel against the government, stating: "the Claims Manual is not a regulation. It has no legal force, and it does not bind the SSA.” Id.; see Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 2341, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) ("not all agency publications are of binding force") (citing Schweiker).

. We recently followed Schweiker v. Hansen, albeit reluctantly, in Scime v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.1987).