Court Opinion

ID: 9759111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:06:17.422271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:59.520494
License: Public Domain

CATHELL, J.,
Dissenting and Concurring.
I agree with the majority’s determination that Childress has violated MRPC 8.4(d), based upon the applicability of the *68Virginia statute. I disagree with the majority’s holding that Childress did not violate the provisions of CJ section 3-831. I also disagree with the sanction imposed in this case.
In respect to CJ section 3-831, the majority holds, in effect, that the evidence did not support a finding that Childress had performed acts rendering the child there at issue in need of supervision. The majority states: “Nevertheless, there is no evidence in this case, at least to the clear and convincing evidence standard, that TINA97 was ‘a child who requires guidance, treatment or rehabilitation.’ ” Accordingly, says the majority, a determination that she needed supervision could not be made.
My disagreement is simple and, I believe, self-evident. In my view, a child fifteen years of age or younger, who engages over the Internet with older men, or with total strangers for that matter, for the purpose of exploring the possibility of meeting and becoming sexually intimate with that stranger, is in need of guidance. I simply cannot comprehend how any person can conclude otherwise.
My greatest disagreement, however, is with the majority’s position in respect to the sanctions imposed, even for the one violation the majority has determined occurred. Today the majority says that an adult sexual predator who has used the Internet as a means to entice young females away from their homes and families to meet with him for sexual purposes, and has actually met with those young girls for sexual purposes, is, or may be after a period of suspension, fit to practice law and has not engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The majority, given that the oft-stated primary function of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public, in essence holds that it is more important to protect the general public in respect to their money matters, than in respect to their children.
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 541 A.2d 966 (1988), we disbarred an attorney for embezzling over $200,000 from his firm. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hollis, 347 Md. 547, 702 A.2d 223 (1997), we disbarred *69an attorney for misappropriating over $80,000. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. White, 328 Md. 412, 614 A.2d 955 (1992), an attorney misappropriated approximately $14,000 of a client’s money. Although he replaced the money prior to any complaints being filed against him, we still had him disbarred. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 710 A.2d 926 (1998), a reciprocal case, we disbarred an attorney for misappropriating $14,000 and for other acts of fraud relating to money. We disbarred the attorney in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Williams, 335 Md. 458, 644 A.2d 490 (1994), for several infractions, including the misappropriation of $4,966.40. In Fellner v. Bar Association, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957), we disbarred an attorney for using slugs in place of quarters in parking meters.
Steal money, you are disbarred. Steal a quarter’s worth of parking time and you are disbarred. Forever steal a child’s innocence and you’re suspended. In my view, the Court has a serious problem with its priorities. I would disbar the respondent.
Items admitted into evidence before the trial court in this disciplinary proceeding1 were excerpts from the testimony of the respondent in his criminal case, United States v. Childress (CRDKC 95-0213); a transcript of the testimony of FBI special agent Patricia Ferrante’s testimony in that case; excerpts of the testimony of FBI special agent Mark Pollitt’s testimony in that case; a transcript of the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiester’s testimony in that case; Stipulated Findings of Fact; and summaries of FBI interviews.
In the original hearing, the trial court, based upon the evidence submitted to it, made the following findings, especially relevant, I believe, to the matter of sanctions: (1) respondent was arrested in the Montgomery Mall by federal agents and charged with Interstate Travel with Intent to Engage in a Sexual Act with a Minor; (2) he was found guilty of that *70offense in a jury trial in a federal court; (3) he received a sentence of five months and a substantial fine and an extensive period of supervised probation; and (4) that the conviction was overturned on a technicality (ie., Congress had made an inaccurate statutory reference).
Additionally, the trial court made the following findings in respect to the actual conduct of respondent: (1) between 1993 and April of 1995, he used his home computer to intentionally communicate over the Internet with females he believed to be under the age of consent, and who were previously unknown to him; some of these communications involved graphic conversations regarding sex, i.e., orgasms, etc; (2) he would represent that he was younger than his actual age, for example that he was twenty-four when he was actually in his thirties; and (3) that he would ask females who he thought to be minors, and in most cases were minors, if they wanted to meet with him for the purposes of having sex. If the female, who he believed to be a female, and who he believed to be under the age of consent, indicated that she wanted to have sex with him, he would arrange a meeting. The trial court’s findings also included that he actually met with at least five of these females whom he believed to be, and were, females of minor age and whom he had made arrangements to meet for sexual purposes. On at least one occasion, he drove from his home in Virginia to the Village Center in Columbia, Maryland, and met with two of such children. On three other occasions, he met with a child whom he had arranged to meet for sexual purposes knowing she was only thirteen years of age.
There was no evidence that actual sexual activities took place on any of the occasions;2 the respondent denied any *71sexual activity, as did the young girls. At all times, however, when he was to meet with the children, he especially arranged to take with him a “safe-sex kit.” It contained condoms, dental dams, latex gloves, alcohol, and hydrogen peroxide. The trial court found, and respondent “testified he would fantasize about minor females and sought them out via the Internet because they were ‘non-judgmental’ and less likely to carry STD’s.”
At the first hearing, the trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent committed criminal acts under the federal statute, when crossing state lines into Maryland with the intent to commit a sexual act with a minor, even if the sexual act was not consummated. Because the conviction of the federal violation was reversed due to a technical mistake in the drafting of that statute, we remanded the case to the hearing judge for further consideration as to whether respondent had committed other criminal offenses or sanctionable acts.
There are additional cases indicating the types of sanctions we have imposed for conduct I believe to be less egregious than the conduct in the present case. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 667 A.2d 659 (1995), we suspended an attorney for six months for willful failure to file tax returns. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gilbert, 356 Md. 249, 252, 739 A.2d 1, 3 (1999), we suspended an attorney for thirty days for possession of crack cocaine. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 692 A.2d 465 (1997), we suspended an attorney indefinitely (with right to reapply after six months) for failure to report to court-ordered DWI clinic. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 619 A.2d 100 (1993), we suspended an attorney indefinitely (with right to reapply after one year) for breaking and entering. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Lazerow, 320 Md. 507, 578 A.2d 779 (1990), we disbarred an attorney for misappropriation of a home purchaser’s money. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Greenspan, 313 Md. 180, 545 A.2d 12 (1988), we suspended an attorney for six months for making false representations to *72savings and loan institution. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Proctor, 309 Md. 412, 524 A.2d 773 (1987), we suspended an attorney for one year for possession of controlled dangerous substances. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Silk, 279 Md. 345, 369 A.2d 70 (1977), we disbarred an attorney for misappropriation or embezzling funds of a “Fathers Club.” In Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Hirsch, 274 Md. 368, 335 A.2d 108 (1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 2638, 45 L.Ed.2d 676 (1975), we disbarred an attorney for bribery. In Maryland State Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 318 A.2d 811 (1974), we disbarred an attorney for willful evasion of income taxes. And last, but not least, in Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 213 Md. 243, 131 A.2d 729 (1957), we disbarred an attorney for inserting slugs into parking meters. Respondent’s misconduct is far more serious than the types of misconduct next above mentioned.
In my view, this Court should recognize by sanction, as well as words, the very real dangers inherent in the use of the Internet by sexual predators, and at least act to ensure, as far as possible, that these predators are not attorneys. Respondent’s conduct is, in my view, more serious, and much more dangerous to the public, than income tax evasion, making false statements, embezzlement of a civic club’s funds, simple possession of controlled dangerous substances, using slugs in parking meters, and the like.
The act of a man in his thirties, trained in the law, using the Internet to attempt to arrange criminal sexual liaisons with minor children, then crossing state lines to meet girls he believes to be under the age of consent, or who are juveniles, and who, for the most part are under the age of consent, or are minors, for the purpose of furthering criminal activity of a sexual nature, of necessity, involves the attempt to commit base and vile acts of depravity. More important, in my view, his conduct in contacting the juvenile girls and enticing them to meet with him for sexual purposes, constituted acts that helped place the girls in need of guidance, in respect to the very real dangers the majority, by its words, if not its sane*73tion, acknowledges are created by this Internet facilitated “grave social problem.”
In Walker v. State, 363 Md. 253, 768 A.2d 631 (2001), this Court recently upheld the felony conviction and sentencing of a twenty-nine year old man for having sex with a fourteen-year-old girl when the man had a legitimate “mistake of age” defense: the girl had told him she was seventeen, she was working in the same store he worked in and the store had a minimum age requirement of seventeen. In the case sub judice, Childress actively sought out girls under the age of consent. His situation involved no mistake, it was intentional. Yet he can, after a period of time, move to have his suspension lifted. I fail to see “justice” in a system that sustains the felony conviction of a person who engages in sex with a person he genuinely, but mistakenly, believes is of age, yet declines to disbar a lawyer/sexual predator who intentionally and knowingly seeks out children under the age of consent, or who are minors, for sexual purposes. Something is seriously out of kilter when such a situation is permitted to exist.
In Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 587, 632 A.2d 797, 805 (1993), in affirming a statutory conviction under Article 27, section 673, we noted that the statute was “designed to protect young persons from the dangers of sexual exploitation by adults, loss of chastity, physical injury, and, in the case of girls, pregnancy.”3 In Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, 680-81, 724 A.2d 43, 51-52 (1999), Judge Chasanow, writing for the majority, recently stated: “Indeed, it is hard to imagine when a defendant, necessarily four years older than the victim under § 463(a)(3), would be ‘morally blameless’ when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with a child as young as age 13.” In the present case, unlike Garnett and Owens, where mistake of age was an issue, there is no mistake. Childress was, in fishing vernacular, trolling on the Internet for only one *74species of fish — female children either under the age of consent or juveniles in obvious need of guidance that would make them aware of the dangers Childress, and others like him, presented. He found them, arranged meetings, took steps to consummate the end result of his illegal activities, but failed (perhaps) for reasons unknown, to have sexual intercourse, or engage in sexual acts with the girls. He was nonetheless hunting for legally forbidden fruit. The hunting itself, in my view, sufficiently warrants the sanction of disbarment.
I know of no person that would, under present day circumstances, say that respondent’s conduct is less serious than putting quarter slugs in parking meters. Yet, respondent receives a sanction that permits, or may permit him to return to the practice of law. He has, in my opinion, already brought great shame to the profession of law. If sexual predators, especially those actively seeking to sexually abuse children, are permitted to be members of our profession, it will be difficult to continue to maintain, as we have for centuries, that we are an honorable profession. Respondent shamed our profession. The majority, in my view, perpetuates that shame with the imposition of what, under the circumstances, is a lenient sanction.
In my view of the present world we live in, sexual predators who are permitted to remain as attorneys potentially are more damaging to the image of the profession and more dangerous to the public,4 than most of those we have disbarred, and all of those on whom we have imposed lesser sanctions.5 This case *75involves an adult’s repeated attempts to engage in improper and sometimes illegal and criminal sexual activity with children. Now is the time to say that there are certain sexual practices involving children that will forever bar a person from membership in the heretofore honorable profession of law.
Respondent’s misconduct seriously undermined public confidence in the legal profession. The public is becoming increasingly aware that adults preying on children via the Internet is a grave social problem. Imposition of a sanction more significant than an indefinite suspension for a period of one year is needed to deter similar future conduct by this Respondent and to serve notice on the members of the Bar that this type of conduct by an officer of this Court will not be tolerated.
With its lenient sanction, the majority equates the attempts of respondent to illegally sexually prey upon young children, with an attorney who was suspended for consensually spanking adult women. See Attorney Grievance v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 624 A.2d 503 (1993). In other words, attempts to corrupt children are no more serious than spanking consenting adults and are no more serious than putting twenty-five cent slugs in parking meters.
I would disbar him in a second.
Judge RAKER joins in the views expressed herein.

. When referring to hearings in this matter, I refer to both the original hearing, and the hearing on remand.

. This finding is based on respondent's statements and the statements of the young girls. It would be speculation to suggest that both he and the minor girls had reasons not to admit to having sex, even if it had occurred. His reason is obvious. One could speculate that the minor girls would not want their parents to know of any sexual acts that did occur. What is clear is that he met with the girls, and they, with him, for sexual purposes, and that he made sure that he was in possession of safe sex-devices when meeting with the girls.

. I would, had I been on the Court at that time and agreed with the majority opinion, have included that “pregnancy” was also a concern of boys, at least should be a concern of boys, as well as a concern of the parents of boys.

. I realize that there is no evidence that he was successful in his endeavor to have sexual relationships with children. The evidence is, nonetheless, clear that such relationships were intended by the respondent. The mere fact that he made no "kill” should not be considered as a mitigating factor. Even a lion, I am told, misses in four out of five hunts. Nonetheless, the lion remains a lion. Childress remains a sexual predator. With the majority’s action, a sexual predator who preys on young girls may, all too soon, again be a practicing lawyer.

. Had I the opportunity, I would have voted to disbar the attorney in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mitchell, 308 Md. 653, 521 A.2d 746 (1987), who had been convicted of a second degree sexual offense for *75performing sexual acts on a thirteen-year-old boy. The present case is the second case in which this Court has imposed less than the maximum sanction of disbarment of an attorney who has sexually preyed upon children. This case, like Mitchell, will, regrettably, subsequently be used to justify lessor sanctions in similar cases in the future.