Court Opinion

ID: 9572085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:38:15.962126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:29.917204
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. Although Officer Cureton’s conduct is reprehensible, the issue is whether probable cause existed in spite of the investigator’s inclusion of a false statement and omission of exculpatory information from the supporting affidavit.1 In my opinion, probable cause remained in spite of the officer’s misrepresentations.2
*558In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983), the United States Supreme Court adopted the “totality of the circumstances” test for probable cause determinations:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
See State v. Bellamy, 336 S.C. 140, 519 S.E.2d 347 (1999).
“ ‘In dealing with probable cause ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act’.” State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454, 458, 462 S.E.2d 279, 282 (1995), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949).
Here, Officer Cureton included the following false statement in his affidavit: “ ‘Hot Sauce’ told [the informant] that he had the crack but he would call him when it was right.” The majority concludes that, disregarding this false statement, there still existed a substantial basis from which to find probable cause. I agree.
In addition, Officer Cureton failed to inform the magistrate of certain exculpatory information. First, he did not tell the magistrate that when the informant first returned from Hot Sauce’s apartment on February 3, the informant stated he was told respondent had the “stuff,” but it was not there. Furthermore, the investigator failed to tell the magistrate respondent subsequently entered Hot Sauce’s apartment. As a result, while wearing a wire, the informant again entered Hot Sauce’s apartment and, upon return, stated, “It’s not there. It’s not there.” Finally, the investigator did not advise the magistrate Hot Sauce had earlier told the informant he did not want to cook the cocaine at his apartment because his wife was *559trying to “go straight.” The majority concludes if Officer Cureton had included the omitted information in the supporting affidavit, probable cause to search Hot Sauce’s apartment would not have existed. I disagree with this conclusion.
Considering the totality of the circumstances as reflected in the supporting affidavit, minus the false statement, and with the addition of the exculpatory information, there remains a substantial basis from which to find probable cause. The totality of the circumstances indicate Hot Sauce and respondent planned to go to Atlanta and obtain cocaine which they would then cook into crack cocaine in Greenville. The informant wanted to purchase cocaine in the same quantity as he had purchased it from respondent every two weeks for the past two months.
Three days later, respondent called the informant and said Hot Sauce had returned and they were looking for a location to cook the cocaine. The informant paged Hot Sauce twice the same morning. Hot Sauce returned the pages and told ■ the informant he was continuing to look for a location to cook the cocaine. In the afternoon, the informant entered Hot Sauce’s apartment. Hot Sauce suddenly appeared nervous and unwilling to discuss the drug buy. Hot Sauce indicated respondent, who was not present, had the cocaine and stated he did not want to cook the cocaine at his apartment because his wife was trying to “go straight.”
After the informant left, respondent arrived at Hot Sauce’s apartment. Two other individuals left Hot Sauce’s apartment, purchased large quantities of baking soda, which is known to be used to process powder cocaine into crack cocaine, and returned to Hot Sauce’s apartment with the baking soda.3
These circumstances provide a fair probability that contraband or other evidence of a crime could be found at Hot *560Sauce’s apartment at the time the search warrant was issued. Even assuming the informant unequivocally knew the drugs were not present in Hot Sauce’s apartment, i.e., either because Hot Sauce had become suspicious and, hence, told the informant the drugs were not there or because respondent did hot enter the apartment after the informant left, there was still probable cause to believe evidence of a crime could be found in the apartment. A warrant need not be based on the probability of discovering an illegal item on the premise to be searched.4 Although common household items like baking soda are not incriminating, the purchase of a large quantity of baking soda by individuals associated with a recent drug purchase and looking for a location to cook cocaine is evidence of a crime. While officers may ultimately choose to wait until contraband is on the premise before obtaining a search warrant, knowledge the illegal substance is not on the premises does not automatically negate a finding of probable cause.
In my opinion, the trial judge properly ruled the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant should not be suppressed. State v. Asbury, 328 S.C. 187, 493 S.E.2d 349 (1997) (in criminal cases, appellate courts are bound by fact findings in response to preliminary motions where there has been conflicting testimony or where the findings are supported by the evidence and not clearly wrong or controlled by an error of law). I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
WALLER, J., concurs.

. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, 682 (1978) (1) where defendant establishes deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth and those allegations are accompanied by offer of proof and 2) if these requirements are met, and if, when material that is subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required).

. In my opinion, respondent did not have standing to challenge the sufficiency of the search warrant as he had no expectation of privacy in his co-defendant’s apartment. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).

. I note Officer Cureton’s testimony indicates the informant entered Hot Sauce’s apartment twice on the afternoon of February 3, 1995, while the supporting affidavit states the informant entered the apartment only once. However, the important portion of the testimony and affidavit, that the informant last informed Officer Cureton the drugs were not in Hot Sauce's apartment, is contained in both.

. Illinois v. Gates, supra (probable cause exists when "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place”); see United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1995) ("observations of conduct consistent with drug trafficking, even though apparently innocuous, can give rise to probable cause”); United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir.1992) (warrant authorizing search for envelopes, pieces of cardboard, paperclips, and string was unobjectionable for alleged crimes involving homemade bombs).