Court Opinion

ID: 9575120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:11:48.370749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:45.152276
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
1. In considering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, “the jury is the final arbiter of the facts [so] the verdict must be construed by the trial and appellate courts in the light most favorable to upholding the jury verdict. (Cits.)” Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 763, 767 (1) (320 SE2d 872) (1984).
There was evidence from which a jury could find that the city maintained a dangerous condition for a period of time which constituted a nuisance, given that the dangerous condition had existed twice earlier and had been promptly corrected (from which can be inferred an acknowledgment that it was dangerous), that the city knew seven hours before the collision that the dangerous condition existed again (by virtue of its police officer’s knowledge, gained in in*329vestigation of a previous collision that occurred under the very same condition), and that although a crew was available to eliminate the danger by returning the traffic signals to the red-yellow-green mode (which was the standard signal for this vision-obstructed, unusually configured intersection), no crew was dispatched until after the collision at bar materialized.
“[O]rdinarily whether a nuisance exists is a question of fact for a jury (cits.). . . .” City of Bowman v. Gunnells, 243 Ga. App. 809, 811 (2) (256 SE2d 782) (1979). The Supreme Court recognized in that case that there is not “a precise legal definition of nuisance that would apply to all situations.” The best that it could do was to synthesize “guidelines” from the prior appellate cases in this State. Applying them to the evidence in this case and allowing all reasonable inferences, the jury could find that a nuisance existed. It is a judgment call here, and neither the trial judge nor we can substitute our judgment for that of the jury, because the law of nuisance does not compel a finding of “no nuisance.”
The first guideline is that “[t]he defect or degree of misfeasance must be to such a degree as would exceed the concept of mere negligence.” City of Bowman, supra at 811. The flashing lights, which did not signal traffic which was headed in one direction to remain stopped until intersecting traffic was similarly signalled, was an admittedly dangerous condition under the circumstances. The view of drivers coming in either direction was totally obscured by the MARTA piers, and one had to depend on the traffic lights as best one could rather than rely merely on one’s ability to see approaching traffic. This was especially so at night, when the dangerous condition was created. The degree of dangerousness was more acute than existed in the City of Atlanta v. Roberts, 133 Ga. App. 585 (211 SE2d 615) (1974). For one thing, the dangerousness had been demonstrated by an earlier collision. For another, the lights were operating in such a manner as to invite passage by a driver’s having to take a chance that intersecting traffic was not approaching. The physical layout of the streets and the structures erected in the vicinity of the intersection enhanced the degree of dangerousness from that which might be present at an ordinary intersection.
The second guideline is that “[t]he act must be of some duration . . . and the maintenance of the act or defect must be continuous or regularly repetitious.” City of Bowman, supra at 811. Although four hours was held insufficient in Roberts, supra, here the city knew that another collision had occurred under these conditions, at least seven hours earlier, and did not correct the lights before the city traffic on a mid-week morning commenced. A collision was virtually invited. It did not take a long time for the inadequate traffic signals to be working in only the flashing mode before either of the two collisions oc*330curred.
Decided December 4, 1991
Reconsideration denied December 19, 1991
Branch, Pike, Ganz & O’Callaghan, Gregory J. Digel, Keith J. Reisman, Mitchell & Hersh, Bruce E. Mitchell, for Denson.
Eric C. Silver, for Golden.
Michael V. Coleman, Kendric E. Smith, Sarah I. Mills, Lisa E. Steinmetz, for City of Atlanta.
Carter & Ansley, Robert A. Barnaby II, for MARTA.
This leads to the third guideline, “[fjailure of the municipality to act within a reasonable time after knowledge of the defect or dangerous condition.” City of Bowman, supra at 811. Considering that the city had a crew available to correct the lights, that it had experienced the same situation twice earlier, that it knew of another collision occurring under these conditions, and that there was no reason for not promptly dispatching a crew, whether it acted within a reasonable time is governed not by an established legal mandate but rather is for a jury to discern. Here there is sufficient evidence “to show the active operation and maintenance of a dangerous condition and knowingly allowing such condition to continue to the injury of the plaintiff(s).” Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips, 224 Ga. 834, 838 (165 SE2d 141) (1968).
Applying the law governing judgments notwithstanding the verdict, which in the majority opinion is quoted from Bryant v. Colvin, 160 Ga. App. 442, 444 (287 SE2d 238) (1981), and is repeated in Troy, supra, Denson and Golden are entitled to judgments on the verdicts.
2. I would affirm the dismissal of the city’s third-party complaint against MARTA.