Court Opinion

ID: 9368175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 23:02:40.10086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.084781
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/2/23 P. v. Nelson CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B313825

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. KA019560)
           v.

 SERGIO NELSON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
      Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

         _________________________________________
       In 1993, defendant Sergio Nelson shot to death two
individuals sitting in a parked car. In 2016, the Supreme
Court reversed the lying in wait special circumstance finding
and remanded the case to the superior court for a new penalty
trial. (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 522 (Nelson).)
The prosecution thereafter elected not to seek the death penalty
and defendant agreed to waive his right to a new penalty trial.
Defendant filed a motion for relief under the California Racial
Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1, p. 3706) (the Racial
Justice Act), which the court summarily denied. The court
sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of
parole.
       On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred (1) by
denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his motion for relief
under the Racial Justice Act; (2) by imposing the upper terms on
the firearm enhancements although no jury findings supported
such terms; and (3) by imposing a sentence that violates federal
and state constitutional bans on cruel and unusual punishment.
We agree with his contention regarding the imposition of
the upper term for the firearm enhancements and reject his
remaining contentions.

   FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Our Supreme Court summarized the facts of this case as
follows: “On September 11, 1993, [defendant] resigned from his
job at Target after failing to receive a promotion. Shortly before
4:00 a.m. on October 2, 1993, he shot and killed Robin Shirley,
the woman who received the promotion [defendant] believed he
had deserved, and Lee Thompson, a coworker who had defended
Shirley when [defendant] harassed her about her promotion.
[Defendant] knew Shirley typically waited in the parking lot for

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the store to open. He rode to the Target parking lot on his
bicycle, armed with a loaded gun. Shirley and Thompson were in
the front seat of Thompson’s car. [Defendant] parked his bicycle,
approached the car on foot from behind and fired several shots
into the car through an open rear window, then started to walk
away before returning and firing again into the car. After
shooting Shirley and Thompson, [defendant] fled the scene on
his bicycle, which he then abandoned when police chased him.”
(Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 522.)
       In August 1995, a jury convicted defendant of two counts
of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187)1 and found true special
circumstance allegations that he committed multiple murders
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and committed them while lying in wait
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). The jury also found that he personally
used a firearm in committing each murder. (Former § 12022.5,
subd. (a).) The court sentenced him to death.
       In 2016, the California Supreme Court reversed the
lying in wait special circumstance finding based on insufficiency
of the evidence and, accordingly, reversed his death sentence.
(Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 549–550, 574.) The court held
that defendant was “entitled to a new penalty trial.” (Id. at
p. 573.)
       Because neither the prosecution nor the defendant
requested a new penalty trial, the court set only a resentencing
hearing.
       On July 6, 2021, the date set for sentencing, defendant,
without the assistance of his counsel, filed a motion for relief

     1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

                                3
under the Racial Justice Act. In support of his Racial Justice
Act motion, defendant wrote that he “is of mixed race”2
(capitalization omitted) and alleged that of the 215 people
on California’s death row as a result of prosecutions in
Los Angeles, 85 percent “are people of color.” As support for
the statistic, defendant cites an amicus curiae brief filed in the
California Supreme Court by Governor Newsom in People v.
McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97.3 Defendant further asserted
that he “was charged and convicted of a more serious offense
than the defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins
who commit similar offen[s]es and are similarly situated, and the
evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought
or obtained conviction for more serious offen[s]es against people
who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity or national-origin
in the Los Angeles County.” Defendant sought an evidentiary
hearing on the motion and an order dismissing the enhancements
or the special circumstance allegations, and a reduction of “one or
more of the charges.”
       The court denied defendant’s motion. The court briefly
described the circumstances of the murders, then explained that
“[t]his was a cold-blooded killing. It doesn’t matter what your
race, your ethnicity, color of your skin is. You’re going to be
treated as the law mandates for an individual who has engaged
in that type of conduct.”

      2   A probation report describes Nelson as “Black/Hispanic.”
      3 The cited amicus curiae brief is purportedly attached
as an exhibit to defendant’s motion, but it is not included in our
record. On appeal, defendant cites to an Internet address for the
amicus brief, but the address does not appear to work. The cited
brief can be found here: https://perma.cc/FT4F-DHV2.

                                  4
        The court then sentenced defendant on count 1 to prison for
life without the possibility of parole based on the multiple murder
special circumstance finding, plus the upper term of five years on
the firearm enhancement.4 The court struck the multiple murder
special circumstance allegation as to count 2 and sentenced
defendant on that count to a consecutive prison term of 25 years
to life, plus a consecutive five years on the firearm enhancement.5
The court sentenced count 2 consecutive to count 1 because of
“the brutality and senseless nature of the attack upon these two
separate victims at the same time.”
        The court acknowledged and considered its discretion to
strike the firearm enhancements (see § 12022.5, subd. (c)), but
declined to do so, stating: “[S]triking the gun use enhancements
as to either of these two counts . . . would be tantamount to
disregarding the means used to violently end the lives of these
two unsuspecting victims. This was a senseless crime. There
was no reason for it despite your motivation, and the court[’]s not
going to give you the benefit of striking a gun use allegation when
you used the gun to end the lives of these two individuals.”

      4 At the time of defendant’s offenses, former
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), prescribed a sentencing
range for the firearm enhancement of three, four, or five years.
(Stats. 1990, ch. 41, § 3, pp. 245−246.) The current version of
the statute permits a sentence enhancement of up to 10 years.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) Both versions require the enhancement
term run consecutive to the base term.
      5  As the trial court acknowledged, the court was required to
strike one of the multiple murder special circumstance findings
because “the use of two such special circumstance allegations
artificially inflates the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.”
(People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1148.)

                                 5
      Defendant timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION
      A.    The Racial Justice Act
       The Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act in
2020 with the expressed intent “to eliminate racial bias from
California’s criminal justice system” and “to ensure that race
plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in
sentencing.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2(i), pp. 3707−3708; see
Young v. Superior Court of Solano County (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
138, 149−150.) Its goal is “to provide remedies that will
eliminate racially discriminatory practices in the criminal justice
system, in addition to intentional discrimination.” (Stats. 2020,
ch. 317, § 2(j), p. 3708.)
       The Racial Justice Act enacted section 745, which provides
that “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or
seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity,
or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a).) A defendant may establish
a violation of the Racial Justice Act in various ways, two of which
are relevant here.
       Under subdivision (a)(3) of section 745, which is concerned
with racial bias in charging decisions and convictions, the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he or she “was charged or convicted of a more serious offense
than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins
who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated,
and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more
frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious
offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity,

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or national origin in the county where the convictions were
sought or obtained.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(3).)
      Under subdivision (a)(4)(A) of section 745, which is
concerned with racial bias in sentencing, the defendant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “[a] longer or
more severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was
imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the
same offense, and longer or more severe sentences were more
frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the
defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants
of other races, ethnicities, or national origins in the county where
the sentence was imposed.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(4)(A).)
      The phrases, “ ‘more frequently sought or obtained’ ”
and “ ‘more frequently imposed’ ” are statutorily defined to
permit “statistical evidence, aggregate data, or nonstatistical
evidence” that “demonstrates a significant difference in seeking
or obtaining convictions or in imposing sentences comparing
individuals who have committed similar offenses and are
similarly situated, and the prosecution cannot establish race-
neutral reasons for the disparity.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(1).)6

      6  At the time Nelson made his motion and the court ruled
on it, section 745 did not include a definition of “similarly
situated.” The Legislature subsequently amended section 745
to define that phrase. The statute now provides: “ ‘Similarly
situated’ means that factors that are relevant in charging and
sentencing are similar and do not require that all individuals
in the comparison group are identical. A defendant’s conviction
history may be a relevant factor to the severity of the charges,
convictions, or sentences. If it is a relevant factor and the defense
produces evidence that the conviction history may have been

                                 7
       Relief under the Racial Justice Act may be sought by
motion prior to the entry of judgment or, if judgment has been
entered, by petition for writ of habeas corpus. (§§ 745, subd. (b);
1473, subd. (f).) If the defendant proceeds by motion and
“makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a)”
of section 745, the court must hold a hearing on the defendant’s
motion. (§ 745, subd. (c).)
       The defendant makes a prima facie showing if he or she
“produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial
likelihood that a violation of subdivision (a) occurred.” (§ 745,
subd. (h)(2).) A “ ‘substantial likelihood’ requires more than a
mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than
not.” (Ibid.)
       Here, we agree with the trial court that defendant failed
to make a prima facie showing of relief under the Racial Justice
Act. The only fact defendant produced in support of his claim
that the District Attorney charged him, or that the jury convicted
him, in violation of subdivision (a)(3) of section 745 is a statistic
that 85 percent of the 215 people on California’s death row
as a result of prosecutions in Los Angeles County “are people
of color.” Regardless of whether that allegation is true, the
statistic provides no information with which to compare the
race, ethnicity, or national origin of persons who, like defendant,
engaged in multiple murders and the race, ethnicity, or national
origin of persons who, having engaged in multiple murders, were
charged with crimes or special circumstances less serious than

impacted by racial profiling or historical patterns of racially
biased policing, the court shall consider the evidence.” (§ 745,
subd. (h)(6); Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.)

                                  8
the charges and special circumstances alleged against defendant.
Defendant did not, therefore, establish a substantial likelihood
that the District Attorney charged offenses less serious than
special circumstance murder against persons who engaged in
multiple murders and whose race, ethnicity, or national origin
is different than defendant’s. Similarly, the proffered statistic
fails to show a substantial likelihood that juries convicted such
other persons of charges less serious than defendant’s special
circumstance murder conviction.
       Defendant asserts that the death row statistic shows
that persons of color are charged with and convicted of special
circumstance murders in Los Angeles County at a rate that is
significantly disproportionate to their share of the population.
A relevant comparison, however, is not of the racial makeup
of death row inmates and the racial makeup of the general
population, but rather the racial makeup of those charged with
or convicted of multiple murders and the racial makeup of those
who engaged in multiple murders. Defendant offered no facts to
support such comparison.
       Defendant also failed to make a prima facie showing
of unlawful racial bias in sentencing. Under section 745,
subdivision (a)(4), defendant was required to produce facts that,
if true, establish a substantial likelihood that the court imposed
on him a “longer or more severe sentence” than the sentence
“imposed on other similarly situated individuals convicted of the
same offense.” (§ 743, subd. (a)(4)(A).) Defendant relied on the
same statistic cited above: 85 percent of persons on death row
as a result from prosecutions in Los Angeles County are persons
“of color.” The cited statistic, however, provides no information
as to whether defendant’s life without the possibility of parole

                                9
sentence is a longer or more severe sentence than the sentence
imposed on persons of other races, ethnicities, or national origin
who were convicted of special circumstance murder. Indeed,
the statistic is particularly unhelpful to defendant’s sentencing
bias claim because the statistic relates to people sentenced to
death, whereas the prosecution elected in this case to seek, and
the court imposed, the less severe sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. Moreover, as the Attorney General points
out, defendant’s sentence is by statute the least severe sentence
a court may impose on a defendant convicted of special
circumstance murder. (§ 190.2, subd. (a).)
       Defendant also challenges certain statements the court
made in connection with its ruling on defendant’s Racial Justice
Act motion. The court told defendant, for example, that his
motion was “racked with baseless allegations and boldface
conclusions that you are the victim of systematic, racial injustice
within the criminal justice system” and that “[y]ou feel that
your race, ethnicity, color of your skin has impacted how the
prosecution has treated your case.” The court also referred
to “the victim impact comments” the court had received and
how persons affected by the murders have expressed their
“disappointment with how the criminal justice system has
showed you leniency throughout the years and continues to do
so.” The court concluded: “You certainly aren’t treated differently
than any other who would be in your situation.” Defendant
contends that such comments and considerations “should have
no bearing on a determination of the sufficiency of a prima facie
showing made in a [C]RJA motion.”
       We need not determine whether the challenged comments
were improper. We review the court’s ruling, not its rationale,

                                10
and we will not reverse the court’s decision where, as here,
the facts the defendant produced in support of his motion
are insufficient as a matter of law to establish a substantial
likelihood that a violation of section 745, subdivision (a) occurred.
(§ 745, subd. (h)(2).)

      B.    Senate Bill No. 567
        In July 2021, when the court resentenced Nelson,
section 1170.1, subdivision (d) provided that when an
enhancement statute provides for a triad of possible prison
terms, “the court shall, in its discretion, impose the term that
best serves the interest of justice.” (Former section 1170.1,
subd. (d); Stats. 2020, ch. 887, § 7, p. 6010.)
        Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended
section 1170.1, separating subdivision (d) into two paragraphs.
(Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 2, pp. 9110−9111.) As amended, subdivision (d)(1), provides:
“If an enhancement is punishable by one of three terms, the court
shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not
to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in
[subdivision] (2).” (§ 1170.1, subd. (d)(1).)
        Under new subdivision (d)(2) of section 1170.1, “[t]he
court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only
when there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond
a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.”
        The parties agree, as do we, that the amendment applies
retroactively to defendants, like Nelson, whose judgments are not

                                 11
yet final. (See People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 403,
review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655; People v. Zabelle (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1109 (Zabelle).)
       Here, the court imposed the upper term of five years
on the firearm enhancement. The court did not explicitly state
its reasons for the upper term, or even identify the five-year
term as the upper term. And, as the Attorney General
concedes, defendant did not stipulate to facts underlying any
aggravating circumstances and the jury did not find such facts,
as section 1170.1, subdivision (d) now requires before the court
can impose an upper term.
       The Attorney General, citing People v. Sandoval (2007)
41 Cal.4th 825, argues that the error is harmless because
this court can determine, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard,
unquestionably would have found true at least a single
aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury.”
(Id. at p. 839; see People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495,
499 [applying Sandoval test where jury did not find aggravating
factors in Senate Bill No. 567 context].) Defendant contends that
the Sandoval harmless error standard is not applicable after the
enactment of Senate Bill No. 567; rather, he relies on People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, which holds that the reviewing
court “must ask both whether we can be certain the jury
would have found beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating
circumstances relied on by the court and whether the trial
court would have exercised its discretion in the same way if
it had been aware of the statutory presumption in favor of the
middle term.” (People v. Wandrey (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 962,
982, review granted Sept. 28, 2022, S275942; accord, People v.

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Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1354, petn. for review pending,
petn. filed Jan. 30, 2023, S278266); see also Zabelle, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113.)
       We need not determine which test for harmless error
applies. Our record does not reveal the aggravating factors
the court relied on to impose the upper term on the firearm
enhancement. Although the Attorney General points to the
court’s statements that defendant used a firearm to “violently
end the lives of these two unsuspecting victims,” that “[t]his
was a senseless crime,” and “[t]here was no reason for it
despite [defendant’s] motivation,” these statements were made
in connection with the court’s decision not to strike the gun
enhancement, not as reasons to impose the upper term. Even
if we infer that the court had the same reasons for imposing
the upper term, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that
“the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard,
unquestionably would have found true” the facts underlying
these reasons (if Sandoval applies) or, if we could make that
determination as to some, but less than all of these reasons
(and Lopez applies), further determine that the court would
have exercised its discretion to impose the upper term if it could
rely on only the reason or reasons that satisfy the Sandoval test.
       In the absence of the jury finding or admission required
under section 1170.1, subdivision (d)(1), as amended by Senate
Bill No. 567, we therefore reverse the court’s imposition of the
upper term on the firearm enhancements.

      C.    Cruel or Unusual Punishment
      Nelson contends that his life without the possibility of
parole sentence violates the federal and state constitutional
bans on cruel or unusual punishment. He points to his youth—

                                13
he was 19 years old when he murdered Robin Shirley and
Lee Thompson—and to his “minimal criminal record”—he
had been placed on probation as a juvenile for burglary.
       Courts have consistently rejected challenges to the
constitutionality of sentences of life without the possibility
of parole (or their functional equivalents) for persons who
committed their crimes when they were over 18 years of age.
(See, e.g., People v. Montano (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 82, 114;
People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1032; People v.
Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 190; People v. Perez (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 612, 617; People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th
1211, 1220−1221; People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478,
1482.) We agree with these authorities and reject defendant’s
contention.

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                         DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s convictions are affirmed. The imposition
of the upper term of five years on the firearm enhancements
is reversed. The People may elect to proceed by meeting
the requirement of section 1170.1, subdivision (d)(1) that true
findings on facts underlying aggravating circumstances be
found by a jury or admitted by the defendant, or alternatively,
to have the court resentence defendant on the record as it
stands. After the People make this election, and after the
court conducts any further proceedings that may be necessary,
the trial court is directed to resentence defendant consistent
with applicable sentencing laws. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                  BENDIX, J.

                  WEINGART, J.

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