Court Opinion

ID: 9564255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:56:50.740337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:19.222149
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Judge,
specially concurring:
I have examined the law cited by the respondent in the written opinion of March 18, 1980, in support of the holding that the new reverse certification statute denies equal protection to persons charged under it. I concur with Judge Bussey that this statute does not deny equal protection.
The respondent’s written opinion recites that legislative classification must not be arbitrary and that it must rest upon a differentiation that is fairly and reasonably related to the objective of the legislation, so that all similarly situated persons will be treated equally. Royster Guano Company v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920). However, in Royster, the United States Supreme Court also held that the equal protection guarantee does not prohibit the states from exercising wide discretion in creating legislative classifications. In Royster, the Court looked at legislation for taxing corporations in Virginia. There was no rational basis for distinguishing between corporations that did business within the state and those that did not in determining their exempt status for paying taxes on out-of-state income; and so the statute was struck down.
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court also struck down a sterilization law aimed at preventing the inheritance of criminal propensities, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655. Because the right being infringed upon was one of privacy and procreation, the Court applied the fundamental rights-strict scrutiny test, finding that the discrimination between the classes of criminals who were candidates for sterilization and those who were immune was not supported by a compelling state interest.
The distinction between Skinner and the respondent’s expressed view is obvious. In Skinner, the classification infringed upon a fundamental right and, when examined in *261light of the strict scrutiny of the Court, it could not pass. The objective of the reverse certification statute as expressed in the respondent’s opinion is to define out of the juvenile code individuals of a particular age who are charged with one of a number of crimes. Since there is no constitutional guarantee that certain persons will have access to the juvenile system, the classification need pass only the rational basis test, as defined in Royster.
If we believe that the Legislature is constitutionally authorized to define certain persons out of the juvenile code, and we do, then we must apply the rational basis test to that classification to determine its constitutionality. We find that there is a rational connection between the crimes listed as committed by the included ages and the intended purpose of protecting society. We do not agree with the respondent that all other 16 and 17-year-old persons who commit unlisted felonies are “similarly situated.” Neither do we find the choice of crimes to be arbitrary. The Legislature is afforded discretion, and it is obvious that the crimes listed are serious felonies. It is not this Court’s duty to ascertain the “wisdom” of legislation, but only its constitutionality.
I would also suggest that the procedure outlined in 10 O.S.Supp.1979, § 1104.2 B and C should be adhered to with studious detail. Although the statute indicates that the magistrate is not required to detail his responses to each of the four considerations pertaining to reverse certification, those magistrates who wish to preserve their record for meaningful review are advised to interpret this requirement in light of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). The review standard of Kent is appropriate here, which is not to suggest the applicability of the Kent criteria. Therefore, the magistrate’s order should include a statement of the reasons for granting or denying the waiver set forth “with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.” Kent v. United States, supra, 86 S.Ct. at 1057.
Finally, my examination of the statutes indicates that the review of reverse certification by this Court, if any, would only come at the time of the regular appeal in the event of conviction. As I perceive the statutes, there is no provision for the accused person to appeal from the refusal to certify that person to juvenile court nor by the State from an order certifying the person to juvenile court. Admittedly, should the State reserve a question of law for appeal, that would fall within the provisions of 22 O.S.Supp.1979, § 1053. Likewise, as stated above, in the event of conviction, the magistrate’s action may be reviewed on appeal.