Court Opinion

ID: 9387705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 19:01:35.321615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:15.132177
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
             C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                          ________________________

                               No. ACM 21014
                          ________________________

                             UNITED STATES
                                 Appellee
                                       v.
                          Jeremy M. ZIER
        Senior Master Sergeant (E-8), U.S. Air Force, Applicant
                          ________________________

Application for Grant of Review Pursuant to Article 69(d)(1)(B), UCMJ
                           Decided 18 April 2023
                          ________________________

Military Judge: Sterling C. Pendleton.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged on 14 August 2020 by SpCM convened at
Joint Base San Antonio-Randolph, Texas. Sentence entered by military
judge on 2 September 2020: reduction to E-7.
For Appellant: Robert A. Feldmeier, Esquire.
For Appellee: Major Alex B. Coberly, USAF; Major Jay S. Peer, USAF;
Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before POSCH, RICHARDSON, and CADOTTE, Appellate Military
Judges.
Senior Judge POSCH delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
Judge RICHARDSON and Judge CADOTTE joined.
                          ________________________

    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
    precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                          ________________________

POSCH, Senior Judge:
   This case is before the court on application for grant of review of the action
taken by The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) pursuant to Article 69(d)(1)(B),
                         United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 869(d)(1)(B).1 TJAG de-
nied Applicant’s three petitions seeking relief from the findings and sentence
of his special court-martial. While the application was pending, we specified
three issues2 for counsel for both parties to answer based on the apparent
scrivener’s errors in Article 69(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 869(c)(1)(A), (c)(2). We asked whether TJAG had the authority to review
Applicant’s case and, in turn, whether this court has the authority to review
the action taken by TJAG. To the extent these questions relate to jurisdiction,
and not scope of authority of TJAG and this court to review his case, we answer
both questions in the affirmative. Having settled the issue of jurisdiction in
Applicant’s favor, we grant review.

                                     I. BACKGROUND
   A special court-martial composed of officer members convicted Applicant of
dereliction of duty for failing to maintain professional relationships with sub-
ordinate Airmen, and committing abusive sexual contact by touching directly
the genitalia and inner thigh of another person, in violation of Articles 92 and
120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 920, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States

1Unless otherwise noted, references in this opinion to the UCMJ and Rules for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.) are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.)
(MCM).
2   The specified issues read as follows:
          I. WHETHER THE REFERENCES TO ARTICLE 65(B), UCMJ,
          WHERE IT APPEARS IN ARTICLE 69, UCMJ, AS AMENDED BY
          SECTION 5333 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
          ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017, NEGATE (A) THE AUTHORITY OF
          THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL TO REVIEW APPLICATIONS
          FOR RELIEF UNDER ARTICLE 69(C), UCMJ; OR (B) THE AU-
          THORITY OF THIS COURT UNDER ARTICLE 69(D), UCMJ, TO RE-
          VIEW THE ACTION OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL.
          II. WHETHER THE APPLICATION FOR RELIEF TO THE JUDGE
          ADVOCATE GENERAL WAS PROPERLY THE SUBJECT OF RE-
          VIEW BY THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL UNDER ARTICLE
          69, UCMJ, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 5333 OF THE NATIONAL
          DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017, OR BY
          ANY OTHER LAW.
          III. IF THE APPLICATION FOR GRANT OF REVIEW IS NOT
          PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, WHAT RELIEF, IF ANY, DOES
          THIS COURT HAVE AUTHORITY TO ORDER?

                                            2
                      United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

(2012 ed.).3 The sentence adjudged by members on 14 August 2020 and entered
by the military judge on 2 September 2020 consisted of reduction to the grade
of E-7. The convening authority denied Appellant’s request for deferment of
the reduction in grade.
   On 21 January 2021, an attorney designated by TJAG reviewed Applicant’s
case under Article 65, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 865. As a result of that review, the
same notation was affixed to both the entry of judgment and Volume I of the
record of trial, and states as follows:
        Article 65(d)[, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 865(d)], Review pursuant to
        the authority of R.C.M. [Rule for Courts-Martial] 1202(d)[4]:
        I conclude: (1) the court had jurisdiction over the accused and
        the offense; (2) each charge and specification stated an offense;
        (3) the sentence was within the limits prescribed as a matter of
        law; and (4) [w]hen applicable, a response to each allegation of
        error was made in writing by the accused.[5]
    Because it was not evident from the record that Applicant was notified of
the results of the 21 January 2021 review of his case, on 5 October 2022, we
ordered the Government to show good cause why we should not return the rec-
ord because it appeared incomplete after entry of judgment. On 17 October
2022, the Government responded to that order, conceding, inter alia, that there
was reason to believe that the designated reviewing attorney did not serve Ap-
plicant “by first-class certified mail” with the results of the Article 65, UCMJ,
review as required by R.C.M. 1201(g) (stating “[p]roof of service shall be at-
tached to the record of trial”).
   Despite not having been notified in accordance with that rule, Applicant,
with assistance of civilian defense counsel, nonetheless petitioned TJAG for

3Applicant was found not guilty of two specifications of abusive sexual contact under
Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920.
4 The citation to R.C.M. 1202(d) in the notation is incorrect. That rule pertains to de-
tailing appellate counsel. We assume the judge advocate who conducted the review
meant R.C.M. 1201(d), Form and content for review of cases not eligible for appellate
review at the Court of Criminal Appeals.
5 As to this fourth conclusion by the reviewing attorney, it does not provide the court
any additional information as to whether the accused did in fact raise any allegations
of error, and the record is silent on this.

                                             3
                       United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

relief pursuant to Article 69, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869, and R.C.M. 1201.6 In the
brief in support of his application filed with the court, Applicant provides a
concise statement of that petition and what happened next:
        On 23 September 2021, Applicant filed an initial petition for re-
        lief with [TJAG] pursuant to R.C.M. 1201. On 6 December 2021,
        [Applicant] filed a supplemental petition with TJAG pursuant to
        R.C.M. 1201. On 19 April 2022, Applicant filed a second supple-
        mental petition with TJAG, also pursuant to R.C.M. 1201. On 11
        August 2022, TJAG issued an action which denied all relief to
        Applicant and found that his second supplemental petition was
        untimely.
    On 29 September 2022, Applicant, again with assistance of civilian defense
counsel, submitted his case to this court in an application for review.7 That
application includes an accompanying brief that identifies five assignments of
error, which we summarize here: (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to sup-
port a conviction for dereliction of duty because the Government presented no
evidence as to the existence of any duty; (2) the military judge erred when he
permitted the Government to prove he committed the abusive sexual contact
offense with inadmissible propensity evidence; (3) the Under Secretary of the
Air Force and then the Secretary of the Air Force engaged in apparent and
actual unlawful command influence preventing Applicant from “receiv[ing] an
impartial consideration of the merits of his other claims” during appellate re-
view; (4) Applicant was subject to unlawful post-trial punishment in excess of
the sentence; and (5) TJAG improperly found Applicant’s second supplemental
petition8 to be untimely, despite the fact that he filed that petition before the
R.C.M. 1201(g) review was mailed to him and despite the fact that the petition
deals in part with allegations post-dating the original petition.

6 To qualify for review on application for relief to TJAG, an accused must submit such
application not later than one year after the later of the date when the accused is no-
tified of the decision under R.C.M. 1201(g), or the date in which the decision is depos-
ited in the mail to the accused. See R.C.M. 1201(h)(2)(B).
7 The application was submitted before 23 December 2022, the effective date of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, 136
Stat. 2395 (2022). Section 544(b) of that Act amended Article 66, UCMJ, and gave a
Court of Criminal Appeals jurisdiction over a timely appeal of, inter alia, a conviction
by special court-martial. Section 544(d) of the Act specifies that our expanded jurisdic-
tion will not apply to “any matter that was submitted before the date of the enactment
of this Act to a Court of Criminal Appeals . . . .”
8The petition at issue in this assignment of error sought relief from TJAG on grounds
that “the Secretary of the Air Force is engaged in apparent and actual unlawful com-
mand influence while [Applicant’s] conviction is pending Article 69, UCMJ[,] review.”

                                             4
                         United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

                                     II. DISCUSSION
A. Legislative History
    For every court-martial that ends in a judgment of guilty, a convicted ser-
vicemember is entitled to a review of the findings of guilty and the sentence.
Depending on the sentence, it is generally understood that appellate review
may include evaluation of the record by TJAG. See United States v. Brown, 81
M.J. 1, 4 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (stating “[the accused] may yet seek review by TJAG
pursuant to Article 69(b), UCMJ[, 10 U.S.C. § 869(b)]”).
      1. The Military Justice Act of 2016
    In the Military Justice Act of 2016 (MJA), Congress included a provision
that a Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) “may review the action taken by
[TJAG]” in a case submitted to the court “by the accused in an application for
review.” See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17
NDAA), Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5333, 130 Stat. 2000, 2936 (2016) (amending
Article 69, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869). However, in doing so, and as discussed in
this opinion, Congress appeared to legislate that a CCA’s expanded authority
in two articles of the UCMJ—Articles 66(b)(1)(D) and 69(d)(1)(B), UCMJ9—
would apply to cases that TJAG was not eligible to review as set forth in an-
other article, Article 65(b), UCMJ.10 Congress seemed to give with one hand
what it took away with the other. To resolve this seeming contradiction, we
begin with a discussion of the background of two amendments to the UCMJ
when Congress enacted the MJA.
      2. Articles 65 and 69, UCMJ
    In the MJA, Congress amended Articles 65 and 69, UCMJ. See FY17 NDAA
§§ 5329, 5333. As amended, Article 65, UCMJ, describes types of cases eligible
for review by an attorney within the office of TJAG or designee, and the scope
of review; Article 69, UCMJ, describes in subsection (c)(1) the kinds of relief
TJAG may order when reviewing certain cases, and in subsection (c)(2), the
scope of review when an appeal is waived or withdrawn.
   As relevant here, the legislative history reflects minor substantive differ-
ences in these amended articles as passed by the House of Representatives
(House) and Senate. However, an apparent difference lies in the way each
chamber enumerated and identified subsections of those articles in bills that
worked their way through the legislative process.

9   10 U.S.C. §§ 866(b)(1)(D), 869(d)(1)(B).
1010 U.S.C. § 865(b) (identifying cases eligible for automatic review and direct appeal
review).

                                               5
                      United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

    The amended articles were complementary within the bills in each cham-
ber, but each chamber’s draft legislation enumerate subsections differently.
Stated succinctly, the House made provisions for TJAG review in Article 65(b),
and the Senate put those provisions in Article 65(d).11 In November 2016, a
conference report to accompany Senate Bill 2943 was submitted to each cham-
ber for approval. H.R. REP. NO. 114-840 (2016). The report summarized the
relevant provision of the Senate bill, noting:
       The Senate bill contained a provision (sec. 5293) that would
       amend section 869 of title 10, United States Code, (Article 69,
       Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)) to authorize an ac-
       cused, after a decision is issued by the Office of the Judge Advo-
       cate General under Article 69, UCMJ, to apply for discretionary
       review by the Court of Criminal Appeals under Article 66,
       UCMJ[, 10 U.S.C. § 866]. The Judge Advocates General would
       retain authority to certify cases for review by the appellate
       courts.
H.R. REP. NO. 114-840, at 1528. The report also stated, “The House amend-
ment contained a similar provision (sec. 6813).” Id.
   The conference report that accompanied Senate Bill 2943 passed the
House. 162 CONG. REC. H7134 (daily ed. 2 Dec. 2016). The Senate agreed.
162 CONG. REC. S6873 (daily ed. 8 Dec. 2016). The President signed Senate Bill
2943 on 23 December 2016 and Articles 65 and 69, UCMJ, as amended, became
law as implemented by the President effective on 1 January 2019 in Executive
Order 13,825, § 3(a), 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (8 Mar. 2018).12

11 The FY17 NDAA was introduced in Congress as H.R. 4909. 162 CONG. REC. H1634
(daily ed. 12 Apr. 2016). The House passed the bill in May 2016. 162 CONG. REC. H2813
(daily ed. 18 May 2016). The bill made provisions for “Review by Judge Advocate Gen-
eral” (TJAG review) in subsection (b) of Article 65. H.R. 4909, 114th Cong. § 6809 (as
engrossed in House, 18 May 2016). The bill also made conforming amendments to Ar-
ticle 69(c), UCMJ, to refer to a case reviewed by TJAG under section “865(b)” of title
10, United States Code (Article “65(b)”). See id. § 6813. The Senate passed similar leg-
islation in Senate Bill 2943, but it differed from H.R. 4909 by placing provisions for
TJAG review in subsection (d) of Article 65, and not subsection (b) as the House had
done. See 162 CONG. REC. S4245 (daily ed. 15 Jun. 2016). The Senate’s version of the
legislation made conforming amendments to Article 69(c) to refer to TJAG review un-
der section “865(d)” of title 10, United States Code (Article “65(d)”). See id. S4247.
12The specifications of which Applicant was convicted alleged offenses before 1 Janu-
ary 2019. Nonetheless, Articles 65 and 69, UCMJ, as amended by the MJA apply to his
case. See FY17 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5542(c)(1), 130 Stat. 2000, 2967 (2016),
as amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (FY18 NDAA),

                                             6
                        United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

    As amended, counsel for both parties agree that there appear to be scrive-
ner’s errors in Article 69(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 669(c)(1)(A);
(c)(2): the language in both subsections refers to a case reviewed under Article
65(b), UCMJ; however Congress could have meant Article 65(d), UCMJ, in-
stead.
        a. Article 65, UCMJ
    As amended by the MJA, Article 65, UCMJ, subsections (b) and (d) read as
follows:
        § 865. Art. 65. Transmittal and review of records
        ....
        (b) CASES FOR DIRECT APPEAL.—
        (1) AUTOMATIC REVIEW.—If the judgment includes a sentence of
        death, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midship-
        man, dishonorable discharge or bad-conduct discharge, or con-
        finement for 2 years or more, the Judge Advocate General shall
        forward the record of trial to the Court of Criminal Appeals for
        review under section 866(b)(2) of this title (article 66(b)(2)).[13]
        (2) CASES ELIGIBLE FOR DIRECT APPEAL REVIEW.—
        (A) IN GENERAL.—If the case is eligible for direct review under
        section 866(b)(1) of this title (article 66(b)(1)), the Judge Advo-
        cate General shall—(i) forward a copy of the record of trial to an
        appellate defense counsel who shall be detailed to review the
        case and, upon request of the accused, to represent the accused
        before the Court of Criminal Appeals; and (ii) upon written re-
        quest of the accused, forward a copy of the record of trial to civil-
        ian counsel provided by the accused.
        (B) INAPPLICABILITY.—Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if the
        accused—(i) waives the right to appeal under section 861 of this

Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 531(n)(1), 131 Stat. 1283, 1387 (2017). The Acts clarify that the
President shall prescribe whether, and to what extent, MJA amendments apply to a
case in which a specification alleges the commission, before 1 January 2019, of an of-
fense in violation of the UCMJ.
13 This sentence was further amended in subsequent legislation by striking “section
866(b)(2) of this title (article 66(b)(2))” and inserting “section 866(b)(3) of this title (ar-
ticle 66(b)(3)).” See FY18 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1081(c)(1)(J), 131 Stat. 1283,
1598 (2017).

                                                7
                    United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

      title (article 61); or (ii) declines in writing the detailing of appel-
      late defense counsel under subparagraph (A)(i).
      ....
      (d) REVIEW BY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL.—
      (1) BY WHOM.—A review conducted under this subsection may
      be conducted by an attorney within the Office of the Judge Ad-
      vocate General or another attorney designated under regula-
      tions prescribed by the Secretary concerned.
      (2) REVIEW OF CASES NOT ELIGIBLE FOR DIRECT APPEAL.—(A) IN
      GENERAL.—A review under subparagraph (B) shall be com-
      pleted in each general and special court-martial that is not eli-
      gible for direct appeal under paragraph (1) or (3) of section
      866(b) of this title (article 66(b)).
      (B) SCOPE OF REVIEW.—A review referred to in subparagraph
      (A) shall include a written decision providing each of the follow-
      ing: (i) A conclusion as to whether the court had jurisdiction over
      the accused and the offense. (ii) A conclusion as to whether the
      charge and specification stated an offense. (iii) A conclusion as
      to whether the sentence was within the limits prescribed as a
      matter of law. (iv) A response to each allegation of error made in
      writing by the accused.
      (3) REVIEW WHEN DIRECT APPEAL IS WAIVED, WITHDRAWN, OR
      NOT FILED.—
      (A) IN GENERAL.—A review under subparagraph (B) shall be
      completed in each general and special court-martial if—(i) the
      accused waives the right to appeal or withdraws appeal under
      section 861 of this title (article 61); or (ii) the accused does not
      file a timely appeal in a case eligible for direct appeal under sub-
      paragraph (A), (B), or (C) of section 866(b)(1) of this title (article
      66(b)(1)).
      (B) SCOPE OF REVIEW.—A review referred to in subparagraph
      (A) shall include a written decision limited to providing conclu-
      sions on the matters specified in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of par-
      agraph (2)(B).
      ....
FY17 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5329, 130 Stat. 2000, 2930–31 (2016) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).

                                          8
                     United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

       b. Article 69, UCMJ
    As amended by the MJA, Article 69(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2), UCMJ, appears to
contain scrivener’s errors by reference to a case reviewed under Article 65(b),
UCMJ, rather than Article 65(d), UCMJ. Subsection (c) of the statute reads in
its entirety as follows:
       § 869. Art. 69. Review by Judge Advocate General
       ....
       (c) SCOPE.—
       (1)(A) In a case reviewed under section 864 or 865(b) of this title
       (article 64 or 65(b)), the Judge Advocate General may set aside
       the findings or sentence, in whole or in part[14] on the grounds
       of newly discovered evidence, fraud on the court, lack of jurisdic-
       tion over the accused or the offense, error prejudicial to the sub-
       stantial rights of the accused, or the appropriateness of the sen-
       tence.
       (B) In setting aside findings or sentence, the Judge Advocate
       General may order a rehearing, except that a rehearing may not
       be ordered in violation of section 844 of this title (article 44).
       (C) If the Judge Advocate General sets aside findings and sen-
       tence and does not order a rehearing, the Judge Advocate Gen-
       eral shall dismiss the charges.
       (D) If the Judge Advocate General sets aside findings and orders
       a rehearing and the convening authority determines that a re-
       hearing would be impractical, the convening authority shall dis-
       miss the charges.[15]
       (2) In a case reviewed under section 865(b) of this title (article
       65(b)), review under this section is limited to the issue of
       whether the waiver or withdrawal of an appeal was invalid un-
       der the law. If the Judge Advocate General determines that the

14This sentence was further amended in subsequent legislation by inserting a comma
after “in part.” See FY18 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1081(c)(1)(L), 131 Stat. 1283,
1598 (2017).
15 This paragraph was further amended in subsequent legislation enacted on 27 De-
cember 2021, and will apply to offenses that occur two years after that date. See Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, §§ 539A,
539C, 135 Stat. 1541, 1698, 1699 (2021).

                                           9
                      United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

        waiver or withdrawal of an appeal was invalid, the Judge Advo-
        cate General shall order appropriate corrective action under
        rules prescribed by the President.
        ....
FY17 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5333, 130 Stat. 2000, 2935–36 (2016) (em-
phasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
     3. The Manual for Courts-Martial
    The Joint Service Committee on Military Justice (JSC) states in the Preface
to the Manual that it “contains amendments to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) made by [the] Military Justice Act of 2016.”16 Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) (MCM), Preface. However, Article
69(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869(c), is stated differently in the Manual than the
language quoted above from Section 5333 of FY17 NDAA. As stated in the
Manual, the provisions of Article 69, UCMJ, in subsection (c)(1)(A)—for the
kinds of relief that may be ordered following TJAG review, and in subsection
(c)(2)—for the scope of that review when a direct appeal to a Court of Criminal
Appeals is waived or withdrawn, most closely tracks Senate Bill 2943, supra,
but not the law.
    In that regard, the Manual recites, incorrectly, Article 69(c)(1)(A) and
(c)(2), as follows:
        (c) SCOPE.—
        (1)(A) In a case reviewed under section 864 or 865(d) of this title
        (article 64 or 65(d)), the Judge Advocate General may set aside
        the findings or sentence, in whole or in part, on the grounds of
        newly discovered evidence, fraud on the court, lack of jurisdic-
        tion over the accused or the offense, error prejudicial to the sub-
        stantial rights of the accused, or the appropriateness of the sen-
        tence.
        ....
        (2) In a case reviewed under section 865(d) of this title (article
        65(d)), review under this section is limited to the issue of
        whether the waiver, withdrawal, or failure to file an appeal was
        invalid under the law. If the Judge Advocate General determines
        that the waiver, withdrawal, or failure to file an appeal was in-

16 The Preface further states that the Manual contains amendments made by the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Year 2018 and Fiscal Year 2019.

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                       United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

         valid, the Judge Advocate General shall order appropriate cor-
         rective action under rules prescribed by the President.
MCM, App. 2, at A2-29 (emphasis added).
   In summary, Article 69(c), UCMJ, as amended by the MJA, differs in three
ways from the language of the article contained in the Manual:
     •   Article 69(c)(1)(A), UCMJ, references actions TJAG may direct
         on appeal by reference to a case reviewed under Article 65(b),
         UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 865(b); however, the Manual references such
         actions with respect to a case reviewed under a different subsec-
         tion, that is, one reviewed under Article “65(d).”
     •   Article 69(c)(2), UCMJ, references the limited scope of review of
         a case under Article 65(b), UCMJ; however, the Manual, again,
         references such limited review with respect to a case reviewed
         under Article “65(d).”17
     •   Additionally, the Manual includes within the scope of TJAG’s
         authority to order appropriate corrective action whether an ac-
         cused’s “failure to file an appeal” was invalid. This language is
         not included in Article 69(c)(2), UCMJ, as amended by the MJA.
B. Responses to Specified Issues
   On 22 December 2022, by order of the court, we specified three issues, su-
pra n.2, for briefing. In response to our order, Applicant argues that “[t]he ap-
parently erroneous references in Article 69(c)(1)(A)[, UCMJ,] to Article 65(b)[,
UCMJ,] . . . does not affect the ability of the Judge Advocate General of the Air
Force [TJAG] to review the application at issue here because that authority
derives from Article 69(a), UCMJ[, 10 U.S.C. § 869(a)].” As to the matter of this
court’s authority to review TJAG’s decision, Applicant cites the opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) in Brown, in
which the CAAF favorably acknowledged the authority of this court to review
such decisions, stating:
         For cases referred on or after January 1, 2019, pursuant to Arti-
         cle 66(b)(1)(D), 10 U.S.C. § 866(b)(1)(D), an accused is now enti-
         tled to have the [C]ourts of [C]riminal [A]ppeals review his case
         with respect to matters of law if the accused applies for review

17Applicant argues the provisions in Article 69(c)(2), UCMJ, “are not applicable to [his]
application.” The Government argues Congress could amend Article 69(c)(2), UCMJ,
to “reference Article 65(d)(3)[, UCMJ].” We find that we need not reach either conten-
tion to decide the question of jurisdiction.

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                        United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

          from a decision of TJAG under Article 69(d)(1)(B) “and the ap-
          plication has been granted by the Court.”[18] Thus, it is no longer
          the case that only those cases that TJAG elects to refer to the
          [C]ourt of [C]riminal [A]ppeals under Article 69(d), UCMJ, may
          be heard by the lower court.
Brown, 81 M.J. at 4, n.5 (dictum) (noting “[t]he instant case was referred on
January 12, 2018”). Applicant urges that we must follow the CAAF’s guidance
in Brown.
    The Government agrees with Applicant that “the plain language of Article
69[, UCMJ,] seemingly contains a scrivener’s error in its internal reference to
Article 65(b)[, UCMJ].” Referring to the power of a court to sidestep “the literal
text of a statute when doing so would produce an absurd result,” the Govern-
ment notes that courts have applied the “absurdity doctrine,” but only “in very
limited circumstances.” See United States v. McPherson, 81 M.J. 372, 380
(C.A.A.F. 2021).
    While conceding that “consideration of the absurdity doctrine is war-
ranted,” the Government contends that application of that doctrine is “ulti-
mately unavailing because amending the scrivener’s error creates an absurd
result.” The Government argues that the references to Article “65(b)” where
they appear in Article 69(c), though erroneous, “would require congressional
revision” to correct. As a result, the Government contends that “the plain lan-
guage of Article 69, UCMJ, leaves Applicant without an avenue for relief” from
“either [TJAG] or this Court.”
C. Jurisdiction
   Jurisdiction is a legal question reviewed de novo. United States v. Bru-
baker-Escobar, 81 M.J. 471, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2021). At the same time, because
our jurisdiction is defined by statute, an issue of statutory construction is a
question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Wilson, 76 M.J. 4, 6
(C.A.A.F. 2017) (citing United States v. Atchak, 75 M.J. 193, 195 (C.A.A.F.
2016)). Usually the plain language of the relevant statute will control unless
the meaning is ambiguous. See United States v. Ortiz, 76 M.J. 189, 192
(C.A.A.F. 2017) (“From the earliest times, we have held to the ‘plain meaning’
method of statutory interpretation. Under that method, if a statute is unam-
biguous, the plain meaning of the words will control, so long as that meaning
does not lead to an absurd result.”), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018).
    “Whether the statutory language is ambiguous is determined ‘by reference
to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and

18   The opinion quotes Article 66(b)(1)(D), UCMJ.

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                     United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

the broader context of the statute as a whole.’” United States v. McPherson, 73
M.J. 393, 395 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
341 (1997)). The CAAF cautions that it “has no license . . . to construe statutes
in a way that ‘undercut[s] the clearly expressed intent of Congress.’” Id. at 396
(C.A.A.F. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bartlett, 66
M.J. 426, 428 (C.A.A.F. 2008)).
    The CAAF allows that “a court can refuse to apply the literal text of a stat-
ute,” but only “in very limited circumstances.” McPherson, 81 M.J. at 380. Or-
dinarily “when a legislature makes a substantive error concerning the actual
effect of a new law, ‘the remedy lies with the lawmaking authority, and not
with the courts’” Id. at 378 (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60
(1930)). In such a case, “‘a departure from the letter of the law’ may be justified
to avoid an absurd result if ‘the absurdity . . . is so gross as to shock the general
moral or common sense.’” Id. at 380 (quoting Crooks, 282 U.S. at 60).
D. Analysis
    Because Applicant’s sentence precludes a right of direct appeal to this
court, the question whether the court can exercise jurisdiction to grant the ap-
plication and review the action taken by TJAG turns on whether Congress in-
tended to vest jurisdiction in TJAG and this court to permit review of his case.
We hold that Congress did, and without reliance on the absurdity doctrine. It
follows that TJAG had the authority to review Applicant’s petitions and we
have jurisdiction to grant the application. Given these conclusions, it is unnec-
essary for us to decide the third issue we specified for briefing. Before proceed-
ing with the analysis that underlies our holding, two points require mention.
    First, while the JSC reference to Article 65(d), UCMJ, in Appendix 2 at A2-
29 of the Manual, seems logically correct, even so Section 5333 of the FY17
NDAA, which refers to Article “65(b),” would have precedence over the altered
recitation of Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5333, 130 Stat. 2000, 2935 (2016), in the
Manual. A federal statute may be surpassed only by the Constitution in the
hierarchy of sources of military law; and, in that regard, the UCMJ is of higher
precedence than the Manual. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 46 M.J. 269,
274 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (observing that “a lower source on the hierarchy may grant
additional or greater rights than a higher source, [but] those additional rights
may not conflict with a higher source”).
    Second, whether TJAG and this court have jurisdiction, on the one hand,
and the scope of our respective authority when exercising that jurisdiction, on
the other, are related questions. However, they are sufficiently different that
we need not decide them together. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234–
35 (1908) (observing “it sometimes may be difficult to decide whether certain
words in a statute are directed to jurisdiction or to merits, but the distinction

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                     United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

between the two is plain”). Today, we decide the former and leave questions
about the scope of our authority in conducting our review of TJAG’s action for
another day.
   1. TJAG Review under Article 69, UCMJ
    We agree with Applicant that TJAG’s review authority is derived most di-
rectly from the text of Article 69(a), UCMJ. That subsection and the title of the
article that precede it state,
       §869. Art. 69. Review by Judge Advocate General
       (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon application by the accused and subject
       to subsections (b), (c), and (d), the Judge Advocate General may
       modify or set aside, in whole or in part, the findings and sentence
       in a court-martial that is not reviewed under section 866 of this
       title (article 66).
    Our conclusion serves the purpose of Article 69, UCMJ, which is to provide
authority and direction to TJAG in the conduct of review of a court-martial
conviction and sentence. In that regard, the words of the title, held to their
ordinary meaning, manifest the clearest intent that Congress vested jurisdic-
tion in TJAG to review a case. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section
are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
    In subsection (a), supra, moreover, Congress used the phrase “subject to”
to refer to provisions in three other subsections. That phrase qualifies TJAG
review of a case by reference to, inter alia, subsections (b) and (c). The former
relates to timing of an application submitted to TJAG and the latter plainly
relates to the “[s]cope” of TJAG review, as may be distinct from jurisdiction.
Lastly, the legislative history reflects intent in both the House and Senate to
define TJAG’s “scope” of review under Article 69(c), UCMJ. Importantly, the
bills passed in both chambers vest jurisdiction in TJAG to review the findings
and sentence in a case, like Applicant’s, in which the judgment of the court
martial includes confinement of six months or less and no punitive discharge.
For these reasons, we conclude that TJAG had jurisdiction to review Appli-
cant’s petitions.
   2. CCA Review under Article 66, UCMJ
    On the question whether this court has jurisdiction under Article 66,
UCMJ, to review the action taken by TJAG, we find that we do. Article
66(b)(1)(D) expressly confers such authority upon timely appeal and submis-
sion of an application for review:
       §866. Art. 66. Courts of Criminal Appeals

                                         14
                     United States v. Zier, No. ACM 21014

       ....
       (b) REVIEW.—
       (1) APPEALS BY ACCUSED.—A Court of Criminal Appeals shall
       have jurisdiction of a timely appeal from the judgment of a court-
       martial, entered into the record under section 860c of this title
       (article 60c),[19] as follows:
       ....
       (D) In a case in which the accused filed an application for review
       with the Court under section 869(d)(1)(B) of this title (article
       69(d)(1)(B)) and the application has been granted by the Court.
      Our jurisdiction in that regard is succinctly stated in Article 69(d)(1)(B),
UCMJ, referenced above, which allows that “[a] Court of Criminal Appeals may
review the action taken by the Judge Advocate General under subsection (c)
. . . in a case submitted to the Court of Criminal Appeals by the accused in an
application for review.” As discussed above, both the House and Senate defined
TJAG’s “scope” of review under Article 69(c), UCMJ, as distinct from TJAG’s
jurisdiction, and this court’s. It follows that we may review TJAG’s action.

                               III. CONCLUSION
    The court has jurisdiction to grant the application. Having met the criteria
listed in Article 69(d)(2), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869(d)(2), the application is
GRANTED. A scheduling order will be issued by the court under separate or-
der, and a decision issued in due course.

                     FOR THE COURT

                     CAROL K. JOYCE
                     Clerk of the Court

19Article 60c, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 860c, requires an entry of judgment to record the
Statement of Trial Results as may be modified or supplemented by the convening au-
thority or military judge.

                                          15