Court Opinion

ID: 7827378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 18:10:39.17874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:54.159343
License: Public Domain

A NNABELLE Clinton Imber, Justice, dissenting. I agree with the majority that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-104 (Repl. 1998 and Supp. 2001) confers standing on R.N. to petition for the establishment of paternity. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the substantive right to mandatory paternity testing provided in the paternity testing permissive after a hearing on the best interest of the child. Furthermore, I must dissent because the majority has interpreted our paternity statutes in such a way as to offend the United States Constitution. The majority would allow a putative father to have standing under section 9-10-104 of the paternity statutes, but then would strip him of his substantive right to mandatory paternity testing granted under section 9-10-108 if the child is presumed legitimate. Once a party has standing, that party has all the substantive rights that flow from standing. In that case of a paternity action, if a putative father has standing, he is entitled to all the substantive rights granted to him by the General Assembly under the paternity-statutes, including those granted to either party under section 9-10-108. The majority concludes that the General Assembly intended for a putative father to have standing to file a paternity action where the child is presumed legitimate and also for the putative father to somehow lose standing when he attempts to invoke his right to mandatory testing. The majority cannot have it both ways — either a putative father has standing and all the rights that flow therefrom, or he does not. The General Assembly made it clear that he does. Sections 9-10-108 of the paternity statutes and 16-43-901 both provide for genetic testing to establish paternity. The mjority correctly points out that statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be read harmoniously if possible, but if the statutes conflict, then the more specific statute takes precedence over the more general statute. See Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 94, 8 S.W.3d 552, 560 (2000); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999). The majority asserts that the trial court should grant a motion to test for paternity only after conducting a hearing to determine the best interest of the child, not because section 9-10-108 of the paternity statutes authorizes the judge to do so, but because section 16-43-901 of the evidentiary statutes does. The majority attempts to harmonize the two statutes by simply ignoring the rights granted to a party to a paternity action under section 9-10-108 if the child is presumed legitimate. A more consistent reading of the statutes is that they merely provide for paternity testing under two different circumstances. In a non-paternity case where evidence of paternity becomes an issue, section 16-43-901(g)(1) of the evidentiary statutes allows the trial court to order paternity testing under section (e)(1) after a hearing on the best interest of the child under section (g)(2). In a paternity case, section 9-10-108 of the paternity statutes grants a substantive right to the parties to request and obtain paternity testing without such a hearing. The facts in the instant case bring the testing under the mandatory provisions of section 9-10-108 because paternity is the central issue of the case. If the General Assembly had intended for the paternity testing upon the motion of a party to a paternity action to be conditioned on a hearing to determine the best interest of the child, it could have done so. However, the General Assembly did not require such a hearing, and this court is not empowered to add that restriction to the statute. The majority also states that to the extent section 9-10-108 and 16-43-901 conflict, section 16-43-901 should take precedence because it deals specifically with a situation in which the child is presumed legitimate. The majority does not disagree that if section 9-10-108 takes precedence, the plain language of the statute makes the paternity testing mandatory because of the use of the phrase “the trial court shall order. . . .” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(l). The majority’s analysis of specific versus general statutes is flawed. The cases cited by the majority in support of the proposition that a general statute must yield to a statute specific to the subject matter are instructive on the issue of how to distinguish a specific statute from a general one. In Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 90, 8 S.W.3d 552 (2000), the statute of limitations relating specifically to minor children in a medical malpractice case took precedence over a general statute of limitation for actions by minors. In Board of Trustees v. Stodola, 328 Ark. 194, 942 S.W.2d 255 (1997), the specific statute relating to forfeiture of personal property from drug trafficking took precedence over a general statute covering goods confiscated from any crime. In Donoho v. Donoho, 318 Ark. 637, 887 S.W.2d 290 (1994), a statute prohibiting setoffs for money judgments to a defendant after the plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant took precedence over a statute generally allowing setoffs in money judgments. In Conway Corp. v. Construction Engineers, Inc., 300 Ark. 225, 782 S.W.2d 36 (1989), a statute not requiring a taxing unit to accept the lowest bid on public improvement contracts took precedence over a general statute requiring the acceptance of the lowest bid. In each case, the general or specific nature of a statute was determined by how broad a range of legal actions were covered by the statute in question. Where the statute specifically related to the subject matter of the case at bar, it took precedence over statutes that only generally related to the subject matter. In reaching its conclusion, the majority states that section 16-43-901 is more specific than section 9-10-108 because it is limited to circumstances “in which the child is born during marriage and is presumed legitimate.” This assertion is not supported by the plain language of the statute. The General Assembly clearly sets out the broad range of legal actions covered by section 16-43-901: “The purpose of this section is to enable the courts to receive into evidence relevant facts concerning the paternity of a child in any court proceeding or administrative hearing involving paternity or support obligation for a child.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-43-901 (g)(1). (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, the plain language of section 9-10-108 sets out its limited scope. “Upon motion of either party in a paternity action, the trial court shall order that the putative father, mother, and child to submit to scientific testing for paternity. ...” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-108(a)(l). (Emphasis added.) Section 16-43-901 applies to legal proceedings in general, including administrative hearings. Section 9-10-108 is limited to paternity actions. The instant case is a paternity action, and so, according to our caselaw, the statute that is specific to the subject matter takes precedence over a general statute covering a broad range of legal proceedings. Section 9-10-108 specifically applies only to paternity actions and takes precedence over Section 16-43-901 that applies to a broad range of legal proceedings. The majority’s reliance on Leach v. Leach, 57 Ark. App. 155, 942 S.W.2d 286 (1997), is misplaced because Leach was a divorce action, not a paternity action under section 9-10-104. Id. The court of appeals correctly applied the general provisions of section 16-43-901 in Leach because it was a divorce action, and paternity testing under section 9-10-108 can only be initiated by a party to a paternity action. In the instant case, the paternity of A.M. has not been established. Once paternity is established, then the circuit court must, as the court of appeals required in Leach, consider the best interest of A.M. in matters of visitation, custody, support, or other issues affecting the child. I must also dissent because the majority has interpreted the paternity statutes in a manner that calls into question their constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The majority’s decision creates two standards — one for children presumed legitimate, and another standard for children not presumed legitimate. According to the majority opinion, after a paternity suit is initiated under section 9-10-104, if the child is presumed legitimate the trial court is to apply section 16-43-901 to a motion for paternity testing and only grant the testing if a hearing determines it is in the child’s best interest to do so. However, if the child is not presumed legitimate, a motion for paternity testing is governed by section 9-10-108 and the testing is mandatory without a “best interest” hearing. Thus, a “best interest” hearing is afforded to a presumed legitimate child, but denied to a child not presumed legitimate. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[A] State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded to children generally.” Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). Because I believe that the majority’s interpretation of sections 9-10-108 and 16-43-901 discriminates against children not presumed legitimate in violation of the Equal Protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, I must respectfully dissent. Glaze, and Brown, JJ., join in this dissent.