Court Opinion

ID: 9926399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 17:09:58.143845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:44.472487
License: Public Domain

No. 33             January 24, 2024           237

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

              In the Matter of Z. M.-S. L.,
                         a Child.
         DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                 Petitioner-Respondent,
                            v.
                        M. D. L.,
                        Appellant.
             Yamhill County Circuit Court
             22JU00315; A181544 (Control)
              In the Matter of L. R.-M. L.,
                        a Child.
         DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                      Petitioner,
                           v.
                       M. D. L.,
                      Appellant.
             Yamhill County Circuit Court
                  22JU00316; A181545
              In the Matter of N. Z.-D. L.,
                         a Child.
         DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                 Petitioner-Respondent,
                           and
                       N. Z.-D. L.,
                       Respondent,
                            v.
                        M. D. L.,
                        Appellant.
             Yamhill County Circuit Court
                  22JU00317; A181546

  Cynthia Kaufman Noble, Judge.
238                    Dept. of Human Services v. M. D. L.

  Submitted November 16, 2023; on the joint Motion for
Expedited Decision filed October 17, 2023.
   Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, and Tiffany Keast, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin
Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent Department
of Human Services.
  Ginger Fitch filed the brief for respondent N. Z.-D. L.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Kamins, Judge.
  TOOKEY, P. J.
  Reversed and remanded; motion to expedite denied as
moot.
Cite as 330 Or App 237 (2024)                                                239

         TOOKEY, P. J.
         In this consolidated juvenile dependency proceed-
ing, father appeals judgments that changed the permanency
plan for each of his three children, Z, L, and N, from reunifi-
cation to adoption. He raises six assignments of error. In his
first through third assignments of error, father contends,
with respect to each of the three children, that the juve-
nile court “erred in ruling that the [Department of Human
Services’s (DHS)] efforts to reunify the family qualified as
reasonable.” We do not reach those assignments of error,
as father’s case is resolved on father’s fourth through sixth
assignments of error.
         In his fourth through sixth assignments of error,
father contends that the juvenile court erred when it barred
father’s counsel from participating in the final part of the
permanency hearing on father’s behalf, when father him-
self was not physically present in the courtroom. The state
agrees with father that the juvenile court erred in barring
father’s counsel from participating in the permanency hear-
ing and joins father in requesting that we reverse the juve-
nile court’s judgments and remand for a new hearing.1
         We agree, and therefore reverse and remand.
                       BACKGROUND
         The material facts are procedural and undisputed.
After a hearing in May 2022, the juvenile court entered
judgments asserting jurisdiction over father’s three chil-
dren, Z, L, and N, following a series of admissions by father
related to substance abuse and domestic violence. Between
May 2022 and January 2023, DHS worked with father to
provide services. In January 2023, the juvenile court con-
ducted a hearing regarding a DHS request to change the
children’s permanency plans from reunification to adoption.
Father argued that DHS efforts to reunify the family did
not, at that point, qualify as reasonable, because DHS had
yet to offer father a psychological evaluation. The juvenile

    1
      Child N has also filed a response in this case, agreeing with father and the
state that the juvenile court erred in barring father’s counsel from participating
in the hearing. Child N also agrees that if preservation is required in this case,
the error is plain, and we should exercise our discretion to correct the error. We
note Child N’s response, but we refer to only the state in the text of the opinion.
240                       Dept. of Human Services v. M. D. L.

court then ordered a 90-day continuance for father to par-
ticipate in a psychological evaluation. Father completed the
psychological evaluation in March 2023.
         The permanency hearing resumed in April 2023.
At that time, the doctor who had conducted father’s psycho-
logical evaluation had not provided a report or diagnosis
for father. During the first part of the April hearing, that
doctor testified as to the contents of his unfinished report,
including multiple diagnoses and treatment recommenda-
tions. Father was present in the courtroom and personally
participated during the first part of the permanency hear-
ing. Father also requested that the court allow his attorney
to withdraw and appoint him a new attorney, a request that
the court denied. The court then took a recess, and father
did not return to the courtroom after that recess.
         After the recess, a DHS caseworker testified about
the family’s status, responding to questions posed by attor-
neys representing DHS and two of the three children, as
well as by the court. The court then notified father’s counsel,
who was still present in the courtroom, as follows:
   “The Court: And I don’t—I don’t think we can have you ask
   any questions, [father’s counsel], but we’ll just put on the
   record that you’re still here and you’re still listening to the
   testimony so I will bring it back to you, [counsel for DHS].”

        Subsequently, after the attorneys for DHS and for
each of the three children presented their closing argu-
ments, father’s counsel made the following request:
   “[Father’s Counsel]: This is not a closing argument, but
   can I just add one thing, Your Honor?”

The court then allowed father’s counsel to express father’s
position related to restraining orders proposed by the chil-
dren’s attorneys.
         The court then determined that DHS’s efforts to
reunify the family had been reasonable and entered judg-
ments changing the children’s permanency plans from reuni-
fication to adoption. Father now appeals those judgments.
Cite as 330 Or App 237 (2024)                                                241

                                 ANALYSIS
         As noted above, father raises six assignments of
error on appeal. We do not reach the merits of father’s first
through third assignments of error, as we resolve father’s
case on his fourth through sixth assignments of error. In
his fourth through sixth assignments of error, father argues
that he “was entitled to appear at the permanency hear-
ing through counsel,” and therefore that “the juvenile court
erred in barring [father’s] counsel from participating in the
hearing as a sanction for father’s not personally appearing.”
Father contends that, in preventing his counsel from ques-
tioning a witness and from delivering a closing statement,
the juvenile court violated father’s statutory rights under
ORS 419B.875(2),2 which include the right of a party to a
juvenile proceeding to “participate in hearings.” The state
agrees that the juvenile court erred in barring father’s
counsel from participating in the permanency hearing on
father’s behalf even when father himself was not present. As
explained below, we agree.3
          Before reviewing the error that father alleges in his
fourth through sixth assignments, we first consider whether
the alleged error was preserved for review on appeal. ORAP
5.45(1). Father contends that he “was not required to preserve
    2
      ORS 419B.875(2) provides, in pertinent part:
    “The rights of the parties include, but are not limited to:
    “(a) The right to notice of the proceeding and copies of the petitions,
answers, motions and other papers;
    “(b) The right to appear with counsel and, except for intervenors under sub-
    section (1)(b) of this section, to have counsel appointed as otherwise provided
    by law;
    “(c) The right to call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses and participate in
hearings;
    “(d) The right of appeal; and
    “(e) The right to request a hearing.”
    3
      Father also argues that the juvenile court violated his due process right
to a fundamentally fair proceeding and his right under ORS 419B.875(2)(b) to
“appear with counsel” during the permanency hearing. We need not reach those
arguments, because we resolve this appeal on the basis that the juvenile court
violated father’s statutory right to participate under ORS 419B.875(2)(c).
    Additionally, the state, Child N, and father filed a joint motion requesting
“that this court immediately take the matter under submission, accept respon-
dents’ concessions, and expedite its decision in this appeal.” We deny that motion
as moot.
242                     Dept. of Human Services v. M. D. L.

an objection to the court’s ruling to disallow his counsel from
participating in the hearing and thereby require father to
proceed without the assistance of counsel,” citing Dept. of
Human Services v. S. C. P., 262 Or App 373, 324 P3d 633
(2014). S. C. P. does not support father’s position.
         In S. C. P., the juvenile court denied the mother’s
motion to set aside relinquishment of her parental rights
after the mother’s counsel moved to withdraw and declined
to assist the mother in the courtroom. Id. at 379-80. We
vacated and remanded on the ground that, without effective
assistance of counsel, the mother had not had the benefit of
a fundamentally fair proceeding. Id. at 384. We did not dis-
cuss preservation. See, generally, id.
         This case is not like S. C. P. In this case, father was
represented by counsel, and father’s counsel continued to
advocate for father—to the extent the court allowed—even
after father left the courtroom. Consequently, father was not
excused from preserving an objection to the court’s ruling
barring his counsel from participating in the hearing. And
father did not preserve that issue for appeal, because father
never raised any objection to the juvenile court’s ruling bar-
ring his counsel from advocating on his behalf.
         Father asks that, if we determine that preserva-
tion requirements were not met in this case, we conduct
plain error review. Under ORAP 5.45(1), this court may con-
sider an unpreserved allegation of error if we (1) determine
that the error is plain error and (2) decide to exercise our
discretion to review and correct that plain error. State v.
Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629-30, 317 P3d 889 (2013).
        We turn to the question of whether the juvenile
court plainly erred when it barred father’s counsel from
advocating on father’s behalf in the permanency hearing.
“For an error to be plain error, it must be an error of law,
obvious and not reasonably in dispute, and apparent on the
record without requiring the court to choose among com-
peting inferences.” Id. at 629. For the following reasons, we
conclude that the juvenile court plainly erred.
        A parent is a “part[y] to proceedings in the juve-
nile court.” ORS 419B.875(1)(a)(B). In the context of a
Cite as 330 Or App 237 (2024)                                             243

permanency proceeding, we have considered the meaning
of the right of a party “to participate in hearings” under
ORS 419B.875(2)(c), and stated that that right, in addition
to the right “to call witnesses” specified in that paragraph,
“includes the right to testify [on] the party’s own behalf.”
Dept. of Human Services v. D.J., 259 Or App 638, 643-44,
314 P3d 998 (2013). We have noted that “[p]articipating in a
hearing solely through counsel cannot substitute for partic-
ipating as a witness if a party wishes to offer his or her own
testimony[.]” Id. at 644; see also Dept. of Human Services v.
A. E. R., 278 Or App 399, 404, 374 P3d 1018 (2016) (sum-
marizing and quoting D. J.). We have also noted another
right that is specified in ORS 419B.875(2)(b), the “right to
appear with counsel.” D. J., 259 Or App at 644. And, the
right to “participate in hearings” under ORS 419B.875(2)(c)
includes “the right to consult with counsel about strategic
evidentiary decisions and to complete the presentation of
his evidence.” A. E. R., 278 Or App at 406. In sum, we have
examined the text and context of those statutory provisions
and understood them to ensure the participation of parents
in permanency hearings.
         We are not aware of any statute or other source of
law that requires a parent to be physically present in the
courtroom during a permanency hearing in order for the
parent to exercise that right through counsel. In contrast,
in the context of a juvenile proceeding to establish depen-
dency jurisdiction, ORS 419B.815(8)4 provides that “[i]f the
summons requires [a] person to appear personally before
the court, or if a court orders the person to appear person-
ally at a hearing * * *, the person may not appear through
the person’s attorney,” except in certain circumstances. See
Dept. of Human Services v. S. C. T., 281 Or App 246, 261,
380 P3d 1211 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 752, 360 Or 851 (2017)
(“Although an attorney may attend the hearing, the attorney
does not provide a parent an opportunity to appear sub rosa

   4
      ORS 419B.815(8) provides:
   “If the summons requires the person to appear personally before the court, or
   if a court orders the person to appear personally at a hearing in the manner
   provided in ORS 419B.816, the person may not appear through the person’s
   attorney, unless the person is the child at issue in the proceeding who has
   been served with summons in accordance with ORS 419B.839 (1)(f).”
244                             Dept. of Human Services v. M. D. L.

to make objections while the parent is in violation of the
court’s order to attend personally.”). And, in the context of
a proceeding to establish permanent guardianship or to
terminate parental rights, ORS 419B.819(8)5 provides that
“[i]f the summons requires the parent to appear personally
before the court, or if a court orders the parent to appear
personally at a hearing * * *, the parent may not appear
through the parent’s attorney.” See Dept. of Human Services
v. M. L. B., 283 Or App 911, 913, 391 P3d 999 (2017) (“ORS
419B.819(8) barred mother’s attorney from taking action on
her behalf at the termination trial when mother failed to
appear at trial.”); see also State v. Lobue, 300 Or App 340,
345, 453 P3d 929 (2019) (explaining that “to appear” is a
term of art in Oregon law, “meaning appearance personally
or through counsel,” and that unless a statute or agreement
explicitly specifies that a party must, themselves, “appear
personally” in court, a party may “appear” through counsel).
       But there is no similar bar to a parent participating
through the parent’s counsel during a permanency hearing
when the parent is not present. ORS 419B.470 - 419B.476.
         As noted above, the legislature has specified situa-
tions in which a parent must appear before the court, and
permanency hearings are not among those that have been
specified. Nor does any other source of law so specify. We
therefore conclude that the juvenile court violated father’s
statutory right under ORS 419B.875(2)(c) to participate in
the permanency hearing when it prevented father’s counsel
from questioning a key witness and from making a closing
argument on father’s behalf when father was no longer pres-
ent in the courtroom. And we conclude that that is an error
of law that is obvious and not reasonably in dispute, and
also apparent on this record.6
    5
        ORS 419B.819(8) provides:
     “If the summons requires the parent to appear personally before the court, or
     if a court orders the parent to appear personally at a hearing in the manner
     provided in ORS 419B.820, the parent may not appear through the parent’s
     attorney.”
     6
        We note that the parties have not pointed us to any pertinent legisla-
tive history. Nor have we independently sought such legislative history, as it is
unnecessary for us to do so in this case, in light of the text of ORS 419B.875(2)
(c) and its context. ORS 174.020(3) (“A court may limit its consideration of legis-
lative history to the information that the parties provide to the court.”); see also
Cite as 330 Or App 237 (2024)                                              245

         We now consider whether we should exercise our
discretion to correct that error. ORAP 5.45(1). “That discre-
tion entails making a prudential call that takes into account
an array of considerations, such as the competing interests
of the parties, the nature of the case, the gravity of the error,
and the ends of justice in the particular case.” Vanornum,
354 Or at 630. “Ultimately, a decision to review a plain error
is one to be made with the ‘utmost caution’ because such
review undercuts the policies served by the preservation
doctrine.” Id. at 630-31 (quoting Ailes v. Portland Meadows,
Inc., 312 Or 376, 382, 823 P2d 956 (1991)).
          Initially, and as a general matter, we observe that
a parent’s statutory right under ORS 419B.875(2)(c) to par-
ticipate in proceedings serves the interests of all parties to
a permanency hearing, not just parents. The legislature has
recognized that “there is a strong preference that children
live in their own homes with their own families” and that
it is in the interest of the state to help children return to
their families, if at all possible, given the best interests of
the children. ORS 419B.090(5). Further, a change in perma-
nency plan from reunification to adoption, as occurred here,
has the effect that “a parent seeking dismissal bears the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the jurisdictional bases no longer pose a current threat of
serious loss or harm to the child that is likely to be realized,”
Dept of Human Services v. T. L., 279 Or App 673, 692, 379
P3d 741 (2016), and allows DHS to file a petition to terminate
the parental rights of a child’s parent, ORS 419B.498(3).
         Moreover, and in this case in particular, the juve-
nile court’s ruling prevented father’s counsel from eliciting
testimony from the DHS caseworker—testimony that may
have been particularly important given that the court and
the parties had just heard, for the first time, the results of
father’s psychological evaluation. The ruling also prevented
father’s counsel from advocating during closing argument
that DHS had yet to provide father with the services that
father would need to address his mental health issues.

Baldwin v. Seida, 297 Or App 67, 76, 441 P3d 720, rev den, 365 Or 769 (2019) (“We
need not exercise our discretion to seek legislative history, particularly when
unnecessary.”).
246                     Dept. of Human Services v. M. D. L.

         For those reasons, we exercise our discretion to cor-
rect the juvenile court’s plain error.
        Reversed and remanded; motion to expedite denied
as moot.