Court Opinion

ID: 9881148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 19:04:16.1884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:10.831345
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 In re E.C. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re E.C. et al., Persons Coming                               D081944
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH                                         (San Diego County
 AND HUMAN SERVICES                                              Super. Ct. Nos. J520536A-D)
 AGENCY,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 J.J.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael P. Pulos, Judge. Affirmed.
         Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
      J.J. (Mother) appeals from orders made pursuant to Welfare and

Institutions Code,1 section 366.26 hearing terminating her parental rights
with respect to her four children. Her sole contention is that the juvenile
court erred in declining to apply the parent-child relationship exception to
adoption. We affirm the orders.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Agency’s Petitions
      This case involves a mother and her four young children, E.C., J.C.,
V.C., and K.C. In September 2020, the San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (Agency) filed petitions on behalf of the children alleging a
violation of section 300, subdivision (b). At the time, E.C. was eight years old,
J.C. was six years old, V.C. was four years old, and K.C. was one year old.
The Agency had received multiple child abuse referrals alleging domestic

violence, drug use, and concerns for father’s mental health.2
      The Agency’s investigation revealed father’s history of engaging in
erratic, bizarre, and volatile behavior in front of the children, including
physically abusing Mother and destroying property. Mother allowed the
children to be exposed to this behavior. The Agency’s investigation also
uncovered Mother’s prior deferred judgment for possession of a controlled
substance and father’s multiple domestic violence charges.
      Initially, the juvenile court ordered the children to remain in Mother’s
home on the condition that the father remain out of the home. The court also

1    All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise stated.

2     The father is the presumed father of all four children and does not
appeal. He will be referenced when necessary to address the issues Mother
raises on appeal.
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granted Mother a temporary restraining order against the father. However,
just two months later, the court learned Mother was allowing the father to
spend time at her home, so it removed the children from Mother’s home and
placed them with their maternal grandmother.
      In January 2021, the court sustained the children’s petitions and
entered dispositional orders removing the children from their parents’
custody and ordering reunification services.
Reunification Period
      Although the caregiver initially supervised Mother’s visits, the
caregiver expressed concern that unsafe individuals were transporting
Mother to visits. The caregiver also reported that Mother was not adhering
to visitation timeframes, as she would arrive several hours late or leave to get
something and not return. The Agency provided Mother multiple referrals to
a family visitation center to coordinate visits, but Mother failed to
communicate with the center, and it cancelled the referrals.
      At the contested six-month status review hearing in September 2021,
the court denied Mother’s request for expanded visitation due to her lack of
consistency with the current schedule. The next month, the Agency
discontinued Mother’s visitation because she was excessively tardy and had
several no-shows and late cancellations. Even so, the Agency submitted
another referral to the visitation center in November 2021. Mother also had
the opportunity to call the children twice a week, but the caregiver reported
that Mother would call, but then ask to call back later because she was out
shopping, talking on the other line, or driving.
      In April 2022, at the contested 12-month status review hearing, the
court terminated the parents’ services while maintaining “liberal” supervised
visitation. Mother continued to miss and arrive late for visits supervised

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either by a social worker or the family visitation center. When she did show
up, the children were happy to see her, referred to her as “mom” or “mommy,”
hugged her and often said “I love you.” She typically brought activities, gifts,
snacks, and food, and would remind them to do things like wash their hands,
brush their teeth, and pick up trash. The children mostly separated easily at
the end of visits, but sometimes they cried for a few minutes.
Mother’s Incarceration
      In January 2023, Mother was incarcerated for burglary, elder theft by a
caretaker, and theft of over $950. Just before Mother was incarcerated, the
visitation center rejected the Agency’s most recent referral:
      “This is the 12th time receiving the referral. We get as far as
      setting it up and having the contingency plan for mom to arrive
      at a certain time before we pick up the children; which still
      doesn’t work out. Due to having to wait for [three]
      cancellations/no shows this will take time away from another
      family that could be having visitations as mom has shown time
      and time again that she cannot make these visits.”

      The Agency arranged visits consistent with the rules at Mother’s
facility. Mother had a video visit with the children in March 2023 and was
scheduled to have an in-person visit the following month. Mother also called
the children multiple times per week and the caregiver reported the calls
were appropriate.
Permanency Planning Hearing
      In April 2023, the juvenile court held a contested 366.26 hearing and
received into evidence the Agency’s report, seven addendum reports, and
Mother’s three exhibits, including a visitation calendar, a document
containing strategies for abused women, and a letter from Mother’s
stepmother.

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      Mother testified that the children generally knew why she was in
custody. Since she has been in custody, she has phoned her children as often
as possible and has had one video visit and one in-person visit. She has
called them five or six different days, taking turns during each time to speak
with each child for 15 minutes. At the in-person visit, the children were very
excited to see her and jumped up and down. “It’s four of them, one of me, and
they [were] all going crazy for my attention.” They played with toys and
wanted to style her hair. They cried at the end of the visit and suggested
they would not see her again. She wished she could visit with them more
frequently.
      Mother testified that she consistently visited her children before she
was in custody. She visited them “at least once a week” unless she could not
see them because, for example, the children had lice. There were also one or
two months she could not see them when her visits were being supervised by
the family visitation center. There was another month she did not see the
children because she failed to maintain contact with the Agency. She
acknowledged that her visits were not as consistent because she “was not
very easy to get a hold of.” She also acknowledged that her children felt “sad
and worried” when she failed to show up for the visits.
      According to Mother’s testimony, she played with the children and
brought them gifts and activities, such as arts and crafts, before she was in
custody. They watched movies in the park and had picnics, “slumber
part[ies]” and “spa day[s].” Unless they were distracted by a fun activity, the
children cried at the end of the visits. They also had video visits a couple
times per week unless she did not make it home in time for the call, called
late or was shopping. She felt she was “pretty consistent” in talking to them.

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      Mother acknowledged that she had “made mistakes” in her past where
she put herself ahead of her children and placed them in danger by staying in
the relationship with the father. She said the children needed her in their
lives, that they had a close relationship and bond, and that it was “the worst
feeling in the world to not have my children.” She “would do anything for
them” and wanted to tell them she was sorry.
The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
      The juvenile court found that the children were generally and
specifically adoptable. Once the court made that finding and determined that
adoption was available, adoption was the “preferred permanent plan” unless
an exception applied. The court set forth elements that Mother was required
to prove to establish that the parent-child relationship exception applied,
including “regular visitation and contact,” the “continuation” of a beneficial
relationship, and that the “termination of parental rights would be
detrimental” to the children. The court then analyzed whether Mother
proved each element.
      Regarding the first element, the court explained that the evidence “very
clearly” demonstrated that “visitation was not consistent and regular.” The
court gave credit to Mother’s efforts to visit while incarcerated but found that
she failed to visit consistently when she was “out in the free world.” The
court pointed out that Mother was late and failed to show up for visits, failed
to take advantage of extra visitation that had been offered to her, missed
phone calls, and was distracted and not engaged when she did participate in
phone calls. The court, therefore, found that Mother failed to satisfy the first
element.
      Regarding the second element, while the court found there was a
relationship, it did not find any evidence the relationship was beneficial to

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the children. The court acknowledged the children’s attachment and love for
Mother, but found the attachment was not beneficial. The children longed for
Mother who was “absent,” which created “complicated feelings” that, on the
one hand, could illustrate they need her. However, the court determined
“[i]t’s also longing for a relationship that just isn’t there because of the
absence and the inconsistencies.” The court did not find “evidence . . . that
this relationship is beneficial, and that’s what needs to be shown to the
Court.” Although the children referred to Mother as “mom,” that is “a fact”
and the court cannot “change[ ] that biological connection.” That does not
speak to the “beneficial nature of the relationship” and determined Mother
failed to satisfy the second element.
      Finally, the court analyzed the third element and found that the benefit
of a new adoptive home would outweigh any harm the children would
experience, even assuming they had a significant positive emotional
relationship with Mother. The court acknowledged that the children would
likely suffer “feelings of loss” and “grief,” but pointed out this could be “offset
by the stability that adoption in general offers” and therapy. It further
acknowledged that it could not consider that the children’s caregiver was a
relative.
      The court terminated parental rights and referred the children for
adoption.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception did not apply. We disagree. Substantial
evidence supports the court’s findings that Mother did not visit the children
consistently and that the children did not have a significant, positive,

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emotional attachment to her such that they would benefit from a continuing
relationship.
A.    Legal Principles and Standard of Review
      “After reunification services have terminated, the focus of a dependency
proceeding shifts from family preservation to promoting the best interest of
the child including the child’s interest in a ‘placement that is stable,
permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional
commitment to the child. [Citation.]’ ” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 529, 534.) At a permanency plan hearing, the court may order
one of three alternatives: terminate parental rights and order adoption,
appoint a legal guardian, or place children in long-term foster care. If the
dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over
the alternative permanency plans. (Ibid.; In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1224.) Once the juvenile court finds the child is adoptable, the burden
shifts to the parent to demonstrate that a statutory exception applies. (Id. at
p. 1225; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the parent does not establish the
applicability of a statutory exception, the juvenile court must terminate
parental rights. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316
(Katherine J.).)
      One exception is when a beneficial parent-child relationship exists.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling
reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child”
because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with
the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(Ibid.) This exception requires the parent to prove three elements: “1)
regular visitation and contact [with the child,] taking into account the extent
of visitation permitted; (2) a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to

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the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship; and 3) a showing that terminating the
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against
the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 836, 847.)
      “We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the
existence of a beneficial parental relationship, for substantial evidence.” (In
re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 [citing to In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 639–640 (Caden C.)].) We do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts’ ” and
will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings even where substantial evidence
to the contrary also exists. (Caden C., at p. 640, citations omitted.) “[T]he
ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with [the] parent—is
discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) A court
abuses its discretion “ ‘ “ ‘by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)
B.    Analysis
      Mother acknowledges that she “missed some visitation and was late to
visits resulting in her visitation referral being canceled at the visitation
center multiple times.” Nevertheless, she argues that, “despite these
problems,” she maintained regular visitation and contact with the children
through phone calls, in-person visits and zoom meetings. She asserts that
she is “not to blame for the lack of visits at the facility” during her current
incarceration and, before then, she was “actively in” the children’s lives,
except for when the children had head lice, when she was “hard to get a hold

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of,” and when she “missed some visits and [there was] a week in November
when she was incarcerated.”
      Although the court found Mother’s visits since incarceration were
“more consistent,” it also determined that her visits before incarceration were
inconsistent and irregular. The court correctly pointed out that Mother was
routinely late and failed to show for visits, that she did not take advantage of
additional visits, that she was often distracted and unengaged when she
called the children and sometimes failed to call them at the arranged time.
The Agency initially attempted to coordinate visits outside the center but had
to discontinue them due to Mother’s excessive tardiness and no-shows.
Mother continued to miss and arrive late for visits supervised either by a
social worker or the family visitation center. The visitation center
discontinued Mother’s visits when she repeatedly cancelled and failed to
show for scheduled visits. When Mother did call the children, she prioritized
other aspects of her life and often made excuses to call back later. The court
correctly found that the evidence “bears out very clearly” that Mother’s
“visitation was not consistent and regular.”
      Based on our own review of the record, we conclude that the parent-
child relationship exception does not apply because substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding that the first element was not met. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636 [“[T]he parent asserting the parental benefit
exception must show . . . regular visitation and contact.”].) Even though that
could end our analysis, we nevertheless also consider “evidence showing
whether the parent’s actions or inactions ‘continued or developed a
significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’ ” (In re B.D.,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230 [italics added].) Courts consider factors
including the age of the child, the amount of time the child spent in the

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parent’s custody, the interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
needs. (Caden C., at p. 632.) The court should also examine “how children
feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.” (Ibid.) We look
at the evidence supporting what the court did find—even though there may
be evidence in the record which might have supported a different conclusion.
(In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 230.)
      The court found that the children are “attached to” and “love” Mother.
They enjoyed their visits, were affectionate toward her and sometimes cried
at the end of the visits. The court, however, did not find that the attachment
was “a beneficial attachment” or that the relationship was “beneficial.”
Rather, the children were “longing for a relationship that just isn’t there
because of the absence and the inconsistencies.”
      The court’s determination is a reasonable inference from the evidence
that Mother did not visit regularly and consistently, and that the children
enjoyed visiting with her when she did visit and experienced sadness when
she had to leave. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641 [where the trial court
makes an inference that “can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute” its own inference for that of
the trial court].)
      Finally, if a beneficial parent-child relationship existed, then the abuse
of discretion standard of review would apply to the court’s determination of
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.
When making this discretionary determination, the court weighs the harm to
the child of losing the relationship against the benefits of placement in a new,
adoptive home. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.)
      Here, the court found that the children “need stability” and
“consistency in their lives,” and that the “feelings of loss, feelings of grief”

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would be “offset by the stability that adoption in general offers and therapy
and so forth.” With that, the court did not find that the children would suffer
detriment if their relationship with Mother was terminated. The court’s
finding is supported by the record of Mother’s inconsistent and irregular
visits, as discussed above, and by the Agency’s conclusion that Mother’s
inconsistencies “impacted the quality of the parent-child relationship” and
exposed the children to a “cycle of instability.” The children “expressed their
worry” for Mother when she failed to attend visits or was late.
      The Agency also was concerned that Mother abused substances. She
had another baby in May 2022 and they both tested positive for
methamphetamine. Her substance abuse “affected her ability to form
relationships with her children.” Because she failed to address her substance
abuse, she could not demonstrate that she can “safely parent” her children
and did not progress to unsupervised visits. Additionally, Mother also
continued to “make false promises to the children about returning home to
her care.”
      The court did not abuse its discretion when it found the benefit of a
new adoptive home outweighed any detriment the children would suffer if the
relationship were terminated. (See, e.g., In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
503, 533 [concluding that the court did not abuse its discretion where
“[n]othing in the record suggests the benefit [the child] might gain by
continuing her relationship with Mother is outweighed by the well-being she
would gain from having a permanent home.”].)
      The cases cited by Mother do not help her. In contrast to In re Amber
M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, the court here addressed each element of the
exception, understood it could not consider that the caregiver was a relative
and evaluated substantial evidence of Mother’s relationship with the

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children. (Id. at pp. 689–691 [reversing order terminating parental rights
where it examined exception in “no more than a cursory manner and did not
look at the long-term effect on the children of terminating Mother’s parental
rights.”].) In In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, unlike here, the father’s
regular and consistent contact and visitation there was undisputed. (Id. at
p. 298 [reversing order terminating parental rights where “[t]he parties agree
[the father] maintained regular, consistent and appropriate visits with [the
child] throughout the dependency proceedings.”].) Moreover, we have made
clear that “S.B. is confined to its extraordinary facts.” (In re C.F. (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 549, 558 [S.B. “does not support the proposition a parent may
establish the parent-child beneficial relationship exception by merely
showing the child derives some measure of benefit from maintaining parental
contact.”].) Similarly, Mother’s reliance on In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th
68, is misplaced because here, in contrast to In re E.T., the court made clear
it “can’t even consider” the fact that the children’s caregiver was a relative.
(Id. at p. 78 [reversing order terminating parental rights where the court
might have “considered that the children may have contact with Mother even
though her rights were terminated.”].)
      The record here does not support a conclusion that this is an
extraordinary case where preservation of the parent’s rights should prevail
over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement. (In re J.C. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 503, 533.) Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion
terminating Mother’s parental relationship after declining to apply the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption.

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                               DISPOSITION
    The orders are affirmed.

                                             McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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