Court Opinion

ID: 9954284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 21:10:21.763169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:04.571936
License: Public Domain

Valladares v Henry V. Murray Senior, LLC
               2024 NY Slip Op 30926(U)
                     March 20, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 155344/2018
                  Judge: John J. Kelley
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                                                                                                                        INDEX NO. 155344/2018
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 107                                                                                             RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/20/2024

                                   SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                             NEW YORK COUNTY
            PRESENT:             HON. JOHN J. KELLEY                                                PART                              56M
                                                                                      Justice
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X      INDEX NO.          155344/2018
             EDWIN VALLADARES,
                                                                                                    MOTION DATE         11/08/2023
                                                         Plaintiff,
                                                                                                    MOTION SEQ. NO.         002
                                                 -v-
             HENRY V. MURRAY SENIOR, LLC, 89 MURRAY STREET
             ASSOCIATES, LLC, BOARD OF MANAGERS OF THE
                                                                                                      DECISION + ORDER ON
             WARREN STREET CONDOMINIUM, and PLAZA
             CONSTRUCTION, LLC,                                                                             MOTION

                                                         Defendants.
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

             HENRY V. MURRAY SENIOR, LLC, and PLAZA
             CONSTRUCTION, LLC,

                                                          Third-Party Plaintiffs,

                                                 -against-

             B&G ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS OF N.Y., INC.,

                                                          Third-Party Defendant.
             --------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

            The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 46, 47, 48, 49, 50,
            51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80,
            81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
            106
            were read on this motion to/for                                                      JUDGMENT - SUMMARY                   .

                I.         INTRODUCTION

                      In this action to recover damages for personal injuries arising from a construction site

            accident, alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), 240(2),

            240(3), and 241(6), the defendants third-party plaintiffs, Henry V. Murray Senior, LLC (HVMS),

            and Plaza Construction, LLC (Plaza; together the Plaza defendants), move pursuant to CPLR

            3212 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and on

            the issue of liability on their third-party causes of action for contractual indemnification and

             155344/2018 VALLADARES, EDWIN vs. HENRY V MURRAY SENIOR LLC                                               Page 1 of 20
             Motion No. 002

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            alleging breach of contract against the third-party defendant, B&G Electrical Contractors of N.Y.,

            Inc. (B&G). B&G supports and joins in those branches of the Plaza defendants’ motion seeking

            summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, otherwise opposes the motion, and

            cross-moves move pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment dismissing the third-party

            contractual indemnification and breach of contract causes of action. The plaintiff opposes both

            the Plaza defendants’ motion and B&G’s cross motion. He separately cross-moves pursuant to

            CPLR 3042(b) and 3043(c) for leave to serve a supplemental bill of particulars, and pursuant to

            CPLR 3212 for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of

            action insofar as asserted against the Plaza defendants.

                   The Plaza defendants’ motion is granted to the extent that they are awarded summary

            judgment on the issue of liability on the third-party breach of contract and contractual

            indemnification causes of action against B&G, dismissing the common-law negligence/Labor

            Law § 200 cause of action insofar as asserted against HVMS, dismissing the Labor Law §§

            240(2) and 240(3) causes of action insofar as asserted against both of them, and dismissing the

            Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action insofar as asserted against both of them, except insofar as

            that cause of action is premised upon an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1). The

            Plaza defendants’ motion is otherwise denied. B&G’s cross motion is granted to the extent that

            it is awarded summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(2) and 240(3) causes of

            action and the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action to the same extent as it was dismissed

            against the Plaza defendants, and its cross motion is otherwise denied. The plaintiff’s cross

            motion is granted to the extent that he (a) may serve a supplemental bill of particulars asserting

            that the Plaza defendants violated 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1), and (b) is awarded summary

            judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action against the Plaza

            defendants, and his cross motion is otherwise denied.

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             Motion No. 002

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               II.      BACKGROUND

                     On December 4, 2017, the plaintiff was employed by B&G as an electrician in

            connection with construction work in an apartment located on the 33rd floor at 111 Murray

            Street, New York, New York (the premises). HVMS owned the premises, Plaza was the

            construction manager, B&G was the electrical subcontractor, and non-party Total Safety was

            the site safety contractor. On the day in question, the plaintiff had been working in the subject

            apartment all day, and for approximately 75 minutes in the room where the accident occurred.

            The plaintiff was tasked with wiring a smoke alarm that was approximately nine feet off the

            ground, for which he was provided with an A-frame ladder that he set up to give him access to

            the portion of the ceiling where the wire and alarm were to be installed. A stack of sheetrock

            measuring approximately four feet high, ten feet long, and four feet wide was situated behind

            the location at which he set up the ladder. Upon finishing the installation of the smoke alarm,

            the plaintiff began to descend the ladder, when his foot came into contact with the edge of the

            sheetrock stack. The plaintiff alleged that he lost his balance, after which the ladder moved,

            and he fell to the ground, sustaining injuries to his shoulders.

                     On June 7, 2018, the plaintiff commenced this action. On August 13, 2018, the Plaza

            defendants served and filed their answer with cross claims. On December 18, 2018, the

            defendant 89 Murray Street Associates, LLC, served and filed its answer with cross claims. On

            June 13, 2019, the plaintiff entered into a stipulation to discontinue the action, without prejudice,

            only as against the defendants 89 Murray Street Associates, LLC, and Board of Managers of

            the Warren Street Condominium. On September 5, 2019, the Plaza defendants filed a third-

            party complaint against B&G, asserting claims for contractual and common-law indemnification,

            contribution, and breach of contract for failure to procure unrestricted insurance. On November

            7, 2019, B&G served and filed its answer to the third-party complaint. On January 31, 2022, the

            plaintiff filed the note of issue and certificate of readiness. On March 31, 2022, the Plaza

            defendants timely made the instant motion.
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               III.       DISCUSSION

                          A. The Plaza Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion

                      In both his complaint and initial bill of particulars as to all of the defendants, the plaintiff

            alleged that the Plaza defendants were negligent in their ownership, operation, supervision,

            management, and control of the premises. The plaintiff also alleged that the Plaza defendants

            violated Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), 240(2), 240(3), and 241(6), the latter based upon violation of

            several provisions of Rule 23 of the Industrial Code of the State of New York (12 NYCRR), and

            the rules of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In particular, the

            plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (general responsibility of

            employers), 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 and 23-1.7(f) (protection from general hazards), 12 NYCRR 23-

            1.15 (safety railing), 12 NYCRR 23-1.16, 23-1.16(a) and (b) (safety belts, harnesses, tail lines

            and lifelines), 12 NYCRR 23-1.17 (life nets), 12 NYCRR 23-1.21, 23-1.21(b)(1), (b)(3)(i),

            (b)(4)(ii), (b)(4)(iv), and (e) (ladders and ladderways), 12 NYCRR 23-5 (scaffolding), and 12

            NYCRR 23-9.6 (aerial baskets).

                      In support of their motion, the Plaza defendants submitted the pleadings and the

            deposition transcripts of the plaintiff, as well as those of Matthew Pagnani, Plaza’s field

            superintendent, and David Hochman, the general foreman for B&G. The Plaza defendants also

            submitted the construction management agreement between Plaza and HVMS, and the

            subcontract between Plaza and B&G. In response to the Plaza defendants’ motion, B&G

            adopted the Plaza defendants’ submissions and further submitted excerpts of the plaintiff’s

            deposition transcript, a photograph of the area at which the plaintiff was working at the time of

            the accident, depicting an exposed wall with the number 33 painted in red, smoke detector

            wiring, and a pile of sheetrock, and a certificate of liability insurance for B&G. The plaintiff

            submitted the photograph of the area at which he was working at the time of the accident, an

            excerpt of the construction management agreement between Plaza and HVMS, and his own

            affidavit supplementing his deposition testimony.
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                                              1. Summary Judgment Standards

                   It is well settled that the movant on a summary judgment motion “must make a prima

            facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to

            eliminate any material issues of fact from the case” (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64

            NY2d 851, 853 [1985] [citations omitted]). The motion must be supported by evidence in

            admissible form (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]), as well as the

            pleadings and other proof such as affidavits, depositions, and written admissions (see CPLR

            3212). The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (see Vega

            v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 503 [2012]). In other words, “[i]n determining whether

            summary judgment is appropriate, the motion court should draw all reasonable inferences in

            favor of the nonmoving party and should not pass on issues of credibility” (Garcia v J.C.

            Duggan, Inc., 180 AD2d 579, 580 [1st Dept 1992]). Once the movant meets his or her burden,

            it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to establish the existence of material issues of fact

            (see Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d at 503). A movant's failure to make a prima facie

            showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see

            id.; Medina v Fischer Mills Condo Assn., 181 AD3d 448, 449 [1st Dept 2020]).

                   “The drastic remedy of summary judgment, which deprives a party of his [or her] day in

            court, should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of triable issues or the

            issue is even ‘arguable’” (De Paris v Women's Natl. Republican Club, Inc., 148 AD3d 401, 403-

            404 [1st Dept 2017]; see Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr. v Mount Eden Ctr., 161 AD2d 480, 480 [1st

            Dept 1990]). Thus, a moving defendant does not meet his or her burden of affirmatively

            establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law merely by pointing to gaps in the

            plaintiff's case. He or she must affirmatively demonstrate the merit of his or her defense (see

            Koulermos v A.O. Smith Water Prods., 137 AD3d 575, 576 [1st Dept 2016]; Katz v United

            Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, 135 AD3d 458, 462 [1st Dept 2016]).

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                                                2. Labor Law § 240(1)

                   Labor Law § 240(1) provides, in pertinent part, that,

                        “[a]ll contractors and owners and their agents, . . . , in the erection, demolition,
                        repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish
                        or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor,
                        scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons,
                        ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to
                        give proper protection to a person so employed.”

            The statute “imposes absolute liability on building owners and contractors whose failure to

            provide proper protection to workers employed on a construction site proximately causes injury

            to a worker” (Laverty v 1790 Broadway Assoc., LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 32309[U], *4, 2017 NY

            Misc LEXIS 4148, *3 [Sup Ct, NY County, Oct. 27, 2017], quoting Wilinski v 334 E. 92nd Hous.

            Dev. Fund Corp., 18 NY3d 1, 7 [2011]). To establish liability, the plaintiff must prove a violation

            of the statute and that the violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries (see id.). “The

            plaintiff need not demonstrate that the [safety device] was defective or failed to comply with

            applicable safety regulations, but only that it proved inadequate to shield [plaintiff] from harm

            directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person” (Soriano v St.

            Mary's Indian Orthodox Church of Rockland, Inc., 118 AD3d 524, 526 [1st Dept 2014]) (internal

            quotation marks and citation omitted).

                   The inexplicable shifting of a ladder establishes prima facie liability under Labor Law §

            240 (see Carchipulla v 6661 Broadway Partners, LLC, 95 AD3d 573, 574 [1st Dept 2012];

            Harrison v V.R.H. Constr. Corp., 72 AD3d 547, 547 [1st Dept 2010]; Hart v Turner Constr. Co.,

            30 AD3d 213, 214 [1st Dept 2006]). Failure to provide a properly secured ladder, so that it

            remains steady and erect while being used, is a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) (see Hill v City

            of N.Y., 140 AD3d 568, 569 [1st Dept 2016]; Montalvo v J. Petrocelli Constr., Inc., 8 AD3d 173,

            174-175 [1st Dept 2004] [holding that even though an object hit the ladder and caused it to

            shake, plaintiff was injured, at least in part, due to defendant’s failure to secure the ladder with

            adequate safety devices]; Morin v Machnick Bldrs., Inc., 4 AD3d 668, 670-671 [3d Dept 2004]

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            [partial summary judgment awarded on the issue of liability where safety equipment supplied

            was inadequate in preventing ladder from slipping on sheet of ice]).

                   The Plaza defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a

            matter of law in connection with the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. They argued that the

            plaintiff admitted that the ladder that he was using was not defective, was securely braced, and

            was inspected prior to use. They further contended that the plaintiff conceded that the ladder

            was an adequate safety device for the work he was performing. The Plaza defendants also

            argued that the plaintiff’s accident was caused by his foot contacting the sheetrock stack, of

            which he was aware at all times, and not by the effects of gravity. Finally, they argued that the

            plaintiff’s conduct was the sole cause of the accident since he had an adequate amount of

            space between the adjacent wall and the sheetrock stack, yet he chose to position the ladder

            close to the stack, and did not ask for the stack to be removed beforehand. Despite these

            arguments, the Plaza defendants failed to establish that the ladder in and of itself was sufficient

            to provide proper protection. Moreover, any alleged negligence on the plaintiff’s part goes only

            to the issue of comparative fault, and because Labor Law 240(1) imposes an absolute liability

            once a violation is shown, comparative fault is not a defense (see DaSilva v Toll First Ave., LLC,

            199 AD3d 511, 513 [1st Dept 2021]; Morin v Machnick Bldrs., Inc., 4 AD3d at 670; Sotarriba v

            346 W. 17th St., LLC, 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 840, *16-17 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Mar. 21, 2019]).

                   In any event, the plaintiff not only raised triable issues of fact, but established his own

            prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on his Labor Law §

            240(1) cause of action. The plaintiff testified that the ladder “moved a little bit” during the

            accident. When asked how the ladder moved, the plaintiff explained that he wanted to grab

            onto it, but “that’s when it moved a little bit and I fell backwards and I couldn’t hold onto it.” As a

            follow-up question, the plaintiff was asked very specifically if the ladder moved before his foot

            came into contact with the sheetrock, to which he answered that he could not remember. The

            court disagrees with the Plaza defendants’ characterization that the plaintiff’s latter answer
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            corrected his purportedly “inaccurate” earlier statement that the ladder moved. The plaintiff

            clearly testified that the ladder moved at some point during the accident when he tried to grab

            onto it. Whether the ladder shifted before or after the plaintiff’s contact with the sheetrock is

            unclear; however, the plaintiff’s testimony that he did not remember if it moved was in response

            to the specific question of wheter it moved before contacting the sheetrock.

                   In light of the foregoing, that branch of the Plaza defendants’ motion seeking summary

            judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action insofar as asserted against them

            must be denied. As explained below, this court will entertain the plaintiff’s cross motion for

            summary judgment even though it otherwise was untimely. Since the plaintiff established that

            the ladder did not provide sufficient protection from the dangers posed by height and gravity,

            and the Plaza defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition, that branch of the

            plaintiff’s motion seeking summary judgment on the issue of liability on that cause of action must

            be granted.

                                               3. Labor Law § 241(6)

                   Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon general contractors “to provide

            reasonable and adequate protection and safety to persons employed in, or lawfully frequenting,

            all areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed” (Rizzuto v

            L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 348 [1998] [citation and internal quotation marks

            omitted]; see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494 [1993]). To sustain a Labor

            Law § 241(6) cause of action, it must be shown that the defendant violated a specific, “concrete”

            implementing regulation of the Industrial Code, rather than generalized regulations for worker

            safety (see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d at 505). Labor Law § 241(6)

            requires a plaintiff to show that the safety measures actually employed on a job site were

            unreasonable or inadequate and that the violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries

            (see Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513 [1985]; Baptiste v RLP-East,

            LLC, 182 AD3d 444, 444 [1st Dept 2020] [Labor Law § 241(6) requires a finding that a
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            defendant violated the Industrial Code, and the additional finding that the violation showed a

            lack of reasonable care]).

                    Here, the plaintiffs asserted violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (general responsibility of

            employers), 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 and 23-1.7(f) (protection from general hazards), 12 NYCRR 23-

            1.15 (safety railing), 12 NYCRR 23-1.16, 23-1.16(a), and (b) (safety belts, harnesses, tail lines

            and lifelines), 12 NYCRR 23-1.17 (life nets), 23-1.21, 23-1.21(b)(1), (b)(3)(i), (b)(4)(ii), (b)(4)(iv),

            and (e) (ladders and ladderways), 12 NYCRR 23-5 (scaffolding), and 12 NYCRR 23-9.6 (aerial

            baskets). The Plaza defendants have established, prima facie, that 12 NYCRR 23-1.7, 23-

            1.7(f), 23-1.15, 23-1.16, 23-1.16(a), and (b), 23-1.17, 23-5, and 23-9.6 are not applicable to this

            case. With respect to 12 NYCRR 23-1.7, subsections (a) through (d) and (f) through (h), are

            clearly inapplicable to the facts of this case. 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1), which pertains to tripping

            and other hazards in passageways, is also inapplicable since the accident did not occur in a

            passageway (see Wunderlich v Turner Constr. Co., 2016 NY Slip Op 30616[U], *13, 2016 NY

            Misc LEXIS 1328, *17-18 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Apr. 12, 2016]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(2), which

            pertains to tripping and other hazards in working areas, is inapplicable as well because, while

            the accident did occur in a work area, the hazard at issue, the sheetrock stack, was not

            “scattered” (see Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400, 401 [1st Dept 2003]). The Plaza

            defendants have also established, prima facie, that 12 NYCRR23-1.5 and 23-1.21, 23-

            1.21(b)(1), (b)(3)(i), (b)(4)(ii), (b)(4)(iv), and (e) are not applicable, were not violated, or that

            such violations, if any, did not cause or contribute to the plaintiff’s injury. The subparts of 12

            NYCRR 23-1.21 that the plaintiff identified pertain to the strength, maintenance, footing, and

            installation and use of a ladder, none of which the plaintiff testified to being an issue. In

            opposition to the Plaza defendants’ showing with respect to these matters, the plaintiff failed to

            raise a triable issue of fact.

                    The court notes that, inasmuch as the plaintiff may be asserting various OSHA

            provisions as a basis for liability under Labor Law § 241(6), those claims must be rejected, since
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            a plaintiff must plead and prove an applicable regulation of the Industrial Code instead (see

            Alberto v Disano Demolition Co., 194 AD3d 607, 608 [1st Dept 2021]; Garcia v 225 E. 57th St.

            Owners, Inc., 96 AD3d 88, 91 [1st Dept 2012]).

                   Thus, summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action must be

            awarded as to the above regulations of the Industrial Code. Nonetheless, as explained below,

            the court is permitting the plaintiff to serve a supplemental bill of particulars adding an allegation

            that the Plaza defendants violated 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1) which, had the plaintiff previously

            claimed it, would not have been subject to summary dismissal.

                                               4. Labor Law § 200 And Common-Law Negligence

                   The court notes that, in his cross motion, the plaintiff discontinued his Labor Law § 200

            and common-law negligence cause of action as to HVMS only.

                   Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty of an owner or general

            contractor to provide workers with a safe place to work (see Hartshorne v Pengat Tech.

            Inspections, Inc., 112 AD3d 888, 889 [2d Dept 2013]; see also Comes v NY State Elec. & Gas

            Corp., 82 NY2d 876 [1993]; Kennedy v McKay, 86 AD2d 597 [2d Dept 1982]). There are two

            distinct standards applicable to section 200 cases, depending on the situation involved – where

            the accident is the result of the means and methods used by the general contractor to do its

            work, and where the accident is the result of a dangerous premises condition (see McLeod v

            Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Sts., 41 AD3d 796 [2d

            Dept 2007]). To the extent that the plaintiff’s allegation is that the accident occurred when the

            his foot came into contact with the edge of the sheetrock stack, causing him to lose his balance,

            the plaintiff is claiming an injury due to a dangerous premises condition (see Padilla v Touro

            Coll. Univ. Sys., 204 AD3d 415, 416 [1st Dept 2022]; see also Jackson v Hunter Roberts

            Constr., LLC, 205 AD3d 542, 543 [1st Dept 2022]; Favaloro v Port Auth. of NY & New Jersey,

            191 AD3d 524, 525 [1st Dept 2021]). Inasmuch as the plaintiff also contended that his accident

            occurred because the ladder was not properly anchored or secured, and thus moved
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            immediately after his foot came into contact with the sheetrock, he also is claiming an injury due

            to the means and methods of the ongoing construction (see Breslin v Macy's, Inc. 211 AD3d

            569, 570-571 [1st Dept 2021]).

                    To sustain a common-law negligence claim for an injury resulting from a dangerous

            premises condition, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an owner or other responsible entity either

            created the allegedly dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of it (see Early v

            Hilton Hotels Corp., 73 AD3d 559, 560-561 [1st Dept 2010]). “To constitute constructive notice,

            a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the

            accident to permit defendant's employees to discover and remedy it” (Gordon v American

            Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 838 [1986] [citations omitted]). “A defendant

            demonstrates lack of constructive notice by producing evidence of its maintenance activities on

            the day of the accident, and specifically that the dangerous condition did not exist when the area

            was last inspected or cleaned before plaintiff fell” (Ross v Betty G. Reader Revocable Trust, 86

            AD3d 419, 421 [1st Dept 2011] [citations omitted]). Generally, a defendant moving for summary

            judgment on the ground that it did not have constructive notice of a dangerous condition must

            show that it recently inspected the area in question, or repeatedly inspected the area for a

            sufficient period of time leading up to the accident (see Guzman v Broadway 922 Enters., LLC,

            130 AD3d 431, 432 [1st Dept 2015]; Rivera v Tops Mkts., LLC, 125 AD3d 1504, 1505-1506 [4th

            Dept 2015]; Mike v 91 Payson Owners Corp., 114 AD3d 420, 420 [1st Dept 2014]). Moreover, it

            is a “well-established principle that a finding of ‘open and obvious’ as to a hazardous condition is

            never fatal to a plaintiff's negligence claim. It is relevant only to plaintiff’s comparative fault”

            (Saretsky v 85 Kenmare Realty Corp., 85 AD3d 89, 90 [1st Dept 2011]). Rather, a defendant

            moving for summary judgment dismissing a claim based on the existence of a dangerous

            condition may only succeed by establishing that the alleged condition was “open and obvious

            and not inherently dangerous” as a matter of law (Cardinale v Avalon W. Chelsea, 209 AD3d

            483, 484 [1st Dept 2022] [emphasis added]).
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                   To find an owner or general contractor liable under Labor Law § 200 for dangers arising

            from the means, methods, or materials of the work, it must be shown that the owner or general

            contractor had authority to supervise or control the injury-producing work (see Comes v New

            York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d at 877). However, “general supervisory control is

            insufficient to impute liability pursuant to Labor Law § 200, which liability requires actual

            supervisory control or input into how the work is performed” (Hughes v Tishman Constr. Corp.,

            40 AD3d 305, 311 [1st Dept 2007]; see Bednarczyk v Vornado Realty Trust, 63 AD3d 427 [1st

            Dept 2009]; Burkoski v Structure Tone, Inc., 40 AD3d 378 [1st Dept 2007]; Smith v 499 Fashion

            Tower, LLC, 38 AD3d 523 [2d Dept 2007]).

                   To the extent that the Labor Law § 200/common-law negligence cause of action was

            based on an allegation of a dangerous premises condition, Plaza failed to establish, prima facie,

            either that the placement or location of the sheetrock stack was not inherently dangerous, or

            that it lacked actual or constructive notice of that dangerous condition. Plaza claimed that the

            sheetrock stack was not inherently dangerous since the plaintiff had sufficient room to avoid the

            stack when he set up the ladder, and used it numerous times before the accident without any

            issues. It also claimed that there was no proof that it had requisite notice of the sheetrock stack

            in the bedroom of the particular apartment on the 33rd floor on the accident date, or that it

            received any complaints, including from the plaintiff himself, to have the stack removed before

            the accident. Plaza, however, did not submit evidence of their maintenance activities or show

            that the area in question was recently inspected. In fact, Pagnani, Plaza’s superintendent,

            testified that, while he could not recall if he received any complaints specifically about sheetrock

            stacks being in the way of B&G’s work on the 33rd floor, or before the date of the accident, he

            did receive specific complaints from B&G about sheetrock being in the way of their work in the

            rooms of the apartments throughout the course of the job. Moreover, Hochman, B&G’s general

            foreman, testified that, while he could not recall if he spoke with anyone from Plaza regarding

            the placement of the sheetrock stack in the apartment on the 33rd floor prior to the plaintiff’s
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            accident, he did speak with Plaza about the stack being in the way of the B&G’s work in multiple

            locations in the building, and that “it was common practice we’d have to have them move

            Sheetrock all the time,” even prior to the plaintiff’s accident. Such testimony effectively defeats

            Plaza’s attempt affirmatively to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with

            respect to a common-law negligence/Labor Law § 200 cause of action.

                   Hence, to the extent that the plaintiff is alleging a dangerous premises condition, that

            branch of the Plaza defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the common-law

            negligence/Labor Law § 200 cause of action insofar as asserted against Plaza must be denied.

                   The Plaza defendants did establish, however, through the parties’ deposition testimony,

            that it did not have authority to supervise or control the means and methods of the work that

            caused the accident. Since the plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact in connection with

            that showing, he may not pursue a common-law negligence/Labor Law § 200 cause of action

            based on Plaza’s alleged negligence in connection with the means and methods of the work.

                                               5. Contractual Indemnification and Breach of Contract

                   The court recognizes that a construction-related indemnification agreement that purports

            to indemnify a party for its own negligence is void and unenforceable (see General Obligations

            Law § 5-322.1; Giangarra v Pav-Lak Contr., Inc., 55 AD3d 869, 870 [2d Dept 2008]). As

            relevant here, the agreement between the Plaza defendants and B&G provided that

                           “[t]o the extent permitted by law, Subcontractor shall indemnify, defend, save and
                           hold Owner, Construction Manager, their respective partners, officers, employees
                           and anyone else acting for or on behalf of any of them (herein collectively called
                           "Indemnitees") harmless from and against all liability, damage, loss, claims,
                           demands and actions of any nature whatsoever which arise out of or are
                           connected with, or are claimed to arise out of or be connected with: . . . [t]he
                           performance of Work by the Subcontractor . . . [t]he use, misuse, erection,
                           maintenance, operation or failure of any machinery or equipment (including, but
                           not limited to, . . . ladders”

            Additionally, the agreement provided that

                           “[a]s a further clarification of the above, the indemnification obligations set forth in
                           this Article 9 shall include, to the fullest extent permitted by law, indemnification
                           for claims caused in whole or in part by an Indemnitee's negligence.
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                           Notwithstanding the foregoing, wherever there is a provision in the applicable law
                           governing this Subcontract making void and unenforceable any such
                           indemnification of an Indemnitee hereunder where such Indemnitee is negligent
                           or at fault, in whole or in part, then and in any event such indemnification shall
                           apply only to the extent permitted by such applicable law.”

                   Where an agreement authorizes indemnification “to the fullest extent permitted by law,” it

            does not violate General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 (see Giangarra v Pav-Lak Contr., Inc., 55

            AD3d at 871; Farrugia v 1440 Broadway Assoc., 157 AD3d 565, 569 [1st Dept 2018]), as the

            law itself permits indemnification where the indemnitor itself is shown to be negligent, or the

            indemnitee’s liability arises solely because it violated a statute that does not require a finding of

            negligence, provided that there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the indemnitee. In

            those circumstances, an indemnification clause is enforceable (see Brown v Two Exch. Plaza

            Partners, 76 NY2d 172, 179 [1990]; see also Itri Brick & Concrete Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur.

            Co., 89 NY2d 786, 795, n 5 [1997]). In fact, the courts have found that that statute also permits

            a partially negligent insured party to seek contractual indemnification “so long as the

            indemnification provision does not purport to indemnify” the party “for its own negligence”

            (Brooks v Judlau Contr., Inc., 11 NY3d 204, 207 [2008]).

                   The Plaza defendants have established, prima facie, that the indemnification provision of

            its agreement with B&G is enforceable, even though they have failed to establish that their

            negligence did not cause or contribute to the plaintiff’s accident, inasmuch as the primary claim

            upon which liability against them is grounded is a statutory, strict liability cause of action under

            Labor Law § 240(1) (see Brown v Two Exch. Plaza Partners, 76 NY2d at 179). B&G did not

            rebut or refute that showing. Thus, the Plaza defendants must be awarded summary judgment

            as to liability on its third-party contractual indemnification cause of action against B&G.

                   With respect to the third-party breach of contract claim, the Plaza defendants have

            established, prima facie, that B&G failed to procure appropriate insurance coverage pursuant to

            their agreement. The agreement between the parties required B&G to procure commercial

            general liability insurance in the amount of at least $2 million per occurrence, and at least $4
             155344/2018 VALLADARES, EDWIN vs. HENRY V MURRAY SENIOR LLC                           Page 14 of 20
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            million in the general aggregate, unless otherwise specified. The agreement, however,

            otherwise specified that the electrical trade subcontractors, including B&G, were to have general

            aggregate coverage limits of at least $10 million. In opposition to the Plaza defendants’

            showing that B&G did not secure insurance with sufficient aggregate limits, B&G failed to raise a

            triable issue of fact. While B&G submitted its certificate of liability insurance that named the

            proper insured parties, the policy limits did not meet the requirements of the parties’ agreement.

            The insurance certificate provided by B&G indicated that B&G obtained commercial general

            liability insurance of $2 million per occurrence, but only $4 million in general aggregate, instead

            of the $10 million as otherwise delineated for electrical subcontractors. Thus, summary

            judgment must be granted to the Plaza defendants on the issue of liability on the third-party

            breach of contract cause of action, alleging a failure to procure the proper insurance coverage.

                        B. B&G’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment

                   Inasmuch as B&G also moves for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint

            on the same grounds as the Plaza defendants, and adopts the Plaza defendants’ arguments on

            those claims, the court denies summary judgment to B&G dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1)

            cause of action, and the common-law negligence/Labor Law § 200 cause of action based on a

            dangerous premises condition, and awards it summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§

            240(2) and 240(3) causes of action, the common-law negligence/Labor Law § 200 cause of

            action to the extent based on the means and methods of work, and the Labor Law § 241(6)

            cause of action to the same extent and for the same reason as that cause of action is dismissed

            as against the Plaza defendants. With regard to those branches of B&G’s cross motion seeking

            summary judgment dismissing the Plaza defendants’ third-party causes of action to recover for

            contractual indemnification and breach of contract, the court denies that relief for the same

            reasons that it granted those branches of the Plaza defendants’ motion seeking summary

            judgment on the issue of liability on those third-party causes of action.

                   B&G’s remaining contentions are without merit.
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                        C. Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Leave to Supplement Bill of Particulars and for
                           Summary Judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) Cause of Action

                   Unless otherwise directed by the court, CPLR 3212(a) requires summary judgment

            motions to “be made no later than one hundred twenty days after the filing of the note of issue,

            except with leave of court on good cause shown” (CPLR 3212[a]; see Miceli v State Farm Mut.

            Auto. Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725, 726 [2004]; Freire-Crespo v 345 Park Ave. L.P., 122 AD3d 501, 502

            [1st Dept 2014]). Nonetheless, the court may consider an untimely cross motion for summary

            judgment, “even in the absence of good cause, where a timely motion for summary judgment

            was made seeking relief ‘nearly identical’ to that sought by the cross motion” (Filannino v

            Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 34 AD3d 280, 281 [1st Dept 2006]; see Fahrenholz v Sec.

            Mut. Ins. Co.., 32 AD3d 1326, 1328 [4th Dept 2006]). Here, the court directed the parties to file

            summary judgment motions no later 60 days after the filing of the note of issue. The note of

            issue was filed on January 31, 2022 and, thus, any summary judgment motion should have

            been made no later April 1, 2022 to be considered timely. The Plaza defendants timely filed

            their motion for summary judgment on March 31, 2022. After obtaining several stipulations of

            adjournment, B&G filed its cross motion for summary judgment on June 28, 2022. The plaintiff

            filed his separate cross motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2023. The parties stipulated

            several times to adjourn the return date of the motion to allow more time for any opposition and

            reply papers. In any event, inasmuch as the plaintiffs’ cross motion is seeking relief that is a

            mirror image of that sought by the Plaza defendants’ timely motion, that is, the Plaza

            defendants’ motion addressed causes of action under Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), 240(2),

            240(3), and 241(6), while the plaintiff’s cross motion addressed Labor Law § 240(1), this court

            will allow the filing of the plaintiff’s otherwise untimely cross motion. As explained above, the

            plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability on his cause of action to recover

            under Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against the Plaza defendants.

             155344/2018 VALLADARES, EDWIN vs. HENRY V MURRAY SENIOR LLC                          Page 16 of 20
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                   Leave to amend or supplement a pleading is to be freely given absent prejudice or

            surprise resulting from the amendment, provided that the evidence submitted in support of the

            motion indicates that the proposed amendment may have merit (see CPLR 3025[b]; McCaskey,

            Davies and Assocs., Inc v New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 59 NY2d 755 [1983]; 360

            West 11th LLC v ACG Credit Co. II, LLC, 90 AD3d 552 [1st Dept 2011]; Smith-Hoy v AMC Prop.

            Evaluations, Inc., 52 AD3d 809 [1st Dept 2008]). The court must examine the sufficiency of the

            proposed amendment only to determine whether the proposed amended pleading is “palpably

            insufficient or clearly devoid of merit” (MBIA Ins. Corp. v Greystone & Co., Inc., 74 AD3d 499,

            500 [1st Dept 2010]; see Hill v 2016 Realty Assoc., 42 AD3d 432 [2d Dept 2007]).

                   Here, the plaintiff seeks only further to specify the provisions of 12 NYCRR part 23 that

            allegedly were violated, and the court discerns no prejudice or surprise arising from granting the

            plaintiff leave to supplement his bill of particulars in this manner. The Plaza defendants were

            aware that the plaintiff was asserting violations of the Industrial Code, namely, various subparts

            of part 23, a part that relates to protection in construction, demolition, and excavation

            operations. Thus, for the plaintiff to supplement his bill of particulars to specify 12 NYCRR 23-

            1.7(e)(1) and (2), a provision relating to tripping and other hazards, and to add 12 NYCRR 23-

            2.1(a)(1), a provision relating to the maintenance and housekeeping of construction operations,

            would not cause prejudice or harm to the Plaza defendants (see Hageman v Home Depot

            U.S.A., Inc., 45 AD3d 730, 731 [2d Dept 2007] [holding that proposed supplemental bill of

            particulars did not prejudice defendant third-party plaintiff because it did not articulate a new

            theory of liability, but merely amplified the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action]; Dowd

            v City of New York, 40 AD3d 908, 911 [2d Dept 2007] [finding that leave to amend bill of

            particulars to specify Industrial Code violation was proper even after note of issue filed, where

            plaintiffs showed no prejudice to defendants]; Scherrer v Time Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 208, 209

            [1st Dept 2006] [allowing supplemental bill of particulars with additional statutory violations since

             155344/2018 VALLADARES, EDWIN vs. HENRY V MURRAY SENIOR LLC                          Page 17 of 20
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            it merely elaborated upon theory in original bill of particulars and raised no new theory of

            liability]).

                      Nonetheless, while the plaintiff otherwise would have been allowed to specify 12

            NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1) and (2) in a supplemental bill of particulars at this stage of the litigation, if

            they were applicable, the court already has awarded summary judgment to the Plaza

            defendants dismissing, in their entirety, all claims based on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7. The plaintiff’s

            allegations as to these provisions of the Industrial Code are without merit and, thus, his request

            to supplement his bill of particulars to assert a violation of these provisions is denied.

                      12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1), however, provides that,

                              “[a]ll building materials shall be stored in a safe and orderly manner. Material
                              piles shall be stable under all conditions and so located that they do not obstruct
                              any passageway, walkway, stairway or other thoroughfare.”

            The plaintiff has established that this provision of the Industrial Code is applicable to his

            accident (see Armental v 401 Park Ave. S. Assoc., LLC, 182 AD3d 405, 407 [1st Dept 2020];

            DeGabriel v Strong Place Realty, LLC, 29 Misc 3d 908, 915 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2010]).

            Thus, the plaintiff is granted leave to supplement his bill of particulars so as to add an allegation

            that the Plaza defendants violated 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1).

                      To the extent that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the Plaza defendants violated

            Labor Law § 240(2) and (3), the court notes that those provisions are not applicable to this case,

            and are, hence, summarily dismissed.

                      IV.     CONCLUSION

                      In light of the foregoing, it is,

                      ORDERED that the motion of the defendants third-party plaintiffs, Henry V. Murray

            Senior, LLC, and Plaza Construction, LLC, is granted to the extent that they are awarded

            summary judgment:

                              (a) on the issue of liability on their third-party breach of contract and contractual
                              indemnification causes of action against the third-party defendant, B&G Electrical
                              Contractors of N.Y., Inc.,
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                           (b) dismissing the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 cause of action
                           insofar as asserted against Henry V. Murray Senior, LLC,

                           (c) dismissing so much of the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200
                           cause of action insofar as asserted against Plaza Construction, LLC, as was
                           based on allegations involving the means and methods of the plaintiff’s work,

                           (d) dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(2) and 240(3) causes of action insofar as
                           asserted against Henry V. Murray Senior, LLC, and Plaza Construction, LLC, and

                           (e) dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action insofar as asserted
                           against Henry V. Murray Senior, LLC, and Plaza Construction, LLC, except to the
                           extent that that cause of action is premised upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-
                           2.1(a)(1),

            the motion is otherwise denied, the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 cause of

            action is dismissed insofar as asserted against Henry V. Murray Senior, LLC, so much of the

            common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 cause of action as was based on allegations

            involving the means and methods of the plaintiff’s work is dismissed insofar as asserted against

            Plaza Construction, LLC, the Labor Law §§ 240(2) and 240(3) causes of action are dismissed

            insofar as asserted against Henry V. Murray Senior, LLC, and Plaza Construction, LLC, and the

            Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action is dismissed insofar as asserted against Henry V. Murray

            Senior, LLC, and Plaza Construction, LLC, except to the extent that that cause of action is

            premised upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1); and it is further,

                   ORDERED that the cross motion of the third-party defendant B&G Electrical Contractors

            of N.Y., Inc., is granted to the extent that it is awarded summary judgment dismissing the Labor

            Law §§ 240(2) and 240(3) causes of action, so much of the common-law negligence and Labor

            Law § 200 cause of action as was based on allegations involving the means and methods of the

            plaintiff’s work, and the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action, except to the extent that that cause

            of action is premised upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1); and it is further,

                   ORDERED that the plaintiff’s separate cross motion is granted to the extent that he is

            granted leave to serve a supplemental bill of particulars adding an allegation that Henry V.

            Murray Senior, LLC, and Plaza Construction, LLC, violated 12 NYCRR 23-2.1(a)(1), and he is

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            awarded summary judgment on the issue of liability on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action

            insofar as asserted against Henry V. Murray Senior, LLC, and Plaza Construction, LLC, and his

            separate cross motion is otherwise denied; and it is further,

                       ORDERED that the parties shall appear for an initial pretrial settlement conference

            before the court, in Room 204 of 71 Thomas Street, New York, New York 10013, on April 17,

            2024, at 11:30 a.m., at which time they shall be prepared to discuss resolution of the action and

            the scheduling of a firm date for the commencement of jury selection.

                       This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.

                   3/20/2024                                                              $SIG$
                     DATE                                                         JOHN J. KELLEY, J.S.C.

             MOTION:                    CASE DISPOSED                 X   NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                                         □                                           □
                                         GRANTED             DENIED   X   GRANTED IN PART                OTHER

             APPLICATION:               SETTLE ORDER                      SUBMIT ORDER

                                                                                                     □
                                                                                                         REFERENCE
             CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:      INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN        FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT

             CROSS MOTION 1:             CASE DISPOSED                X   NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                                         □                                           □
                                         GRANTED             DENIED   X   GRANTED IN PART                OTHER

             APPLICATION:               SETTLE ORDER                      SUBMIT ORDER

                                                                                                     □
             CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:      INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN        FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT          REFERENCE

             CROSS MOTION 2:             CASE DISPOSED                X   NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                                         □                                           □
                                         GRANTED             DENIED   X   GRANTED IN PART                OTHER

             APPLICATION:               SETTLE ORDER                      SUBMIT ORDER

                                                                                                     □
             CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:      INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN        FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT          REFERENCE

             155344/2018 VALLADARES, EDWIN vs. HENRY V MURRAY SENIOR LLC                                 Page 20 of 20
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