Court Opinion

ID: 9544164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:52:48.649243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:14.425386
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent.
*316I think the trial judge handled this matter wisely, fairly, correctly under the law, and as the interests of justice demand by permitting the reading of Mr. Travis’ former testimony.
If a witness has previously either made statements or testified differently from his instant testimony, the former statement can be used to impeach him. Insofar as logic, fairness and justice are concerned, I can see no difference between the situation where a witness tells a different story in the instant trial, and is impeached by prior testimony, as compared with the situation here: where the witness simply remained mute and without legal justification refused to testify. The practical effect is that he is insisting he knows nothing about the matter. He should be subject to impeachment the same as any other witness whose truthfulness is doubted.
The contention that the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Travis postulates something as being true which, upon reflection, seems to me to be without sound basis in fact. The defendant’s right to be confronted by the witness against him, and his right to cross-examine him were met. He was there in court. He was under oath. The defense was free to cross-examine him to their heart’s content. The fact that he, as is apparent, was a co-actor in the crime, chose not to respond to questions, should not be imputed to, nor charged against the State (the public who need and deserve protection from criminals) nor should the State be penalized on that account; nor should the defendant and his cohort be permitted to be benefitted by such anti-social and anti-justice behavior. In situations such as this it is my opinion that some verity should be accorded the judgment and discretion of an experienced and competent trial judge, who it appears has very properly regarded the trial as a procedure to discover the truth and to do justice.1

. That we should disregard any error unless upon a review of the whole case it appears to be of sufficient gravity that an injustice has been done, Sec. 77-42-1, U.C.A.1953; State v. Lyman, 10 Utah 2d 58, 348 P.2d 340; and see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1917), quoting Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 “There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt — that discredit will even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth Amendment — if gossamer possibilities of prejudice . . . are to nullify a . . . [judgment] . . . and set the guilty free.”