Court Opinion

ID: 4697033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-06-19 05:15:23.326578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:44.008854
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed June 17, 2021

                                     In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   ___________

                              No. 11-21-00092-CR
                                   ___________

                MELVIN JOHNATAY HENRY, Appellant
                                        V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 104th District Court
                             Taylor County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. 22018B

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Appellant entered into a plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to that plea
agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to the third-degree felony offense of possession
of cocaine. The trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment, in accordance with the
terms of the plea agreement, at imprisonment for seven years. Appellant filed a pro
se notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal.
      This court notified Appellant by letter that the trial court had certified that this
is a plea bargain case in which Appellant has no right of appeal. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West
2018). We requested that Appellant respond and show grounds to continue the
appeal. We have received a response from Appellant’s court-appointed appellate
counsel in which counsel agrees that Appellant has no right to appeal and that this
appeal should be dismissed. Counsel notes that Appellant’s assertions can be
addressed in a postconviction writ of habeas corpus.
      Rule 25.2(a)(2) provides that, in a plea bargain case in which the punishment
does not exceed the punishment agreed to in the plea bargain, “a defendant may
appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on
before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the
specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2).
Subsections (A), (B), and (C) are not applicable here. We note that Rule 25.2 does
not permit a plea-bargaining defendant to appeal matters related to the voluntariness
of the plea bargain—unless the defendant has obtained the trial court’s permission
to appeal.   See Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);
Carender v. State, 155 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
      The documents on file in this appeal reflect that Appellant entered into a plea
bargain, that his punishment was assessed in accordance with the plea bargain, and
that he waived his right of appeal. The trial court certified that Appellant has no
right of appeal. Both the plea agreement and the trial court’s certification were
signed by Appellant, Appellant’s trial counsel, and the judge of the trial court. The
documents on file in this court support the trial court’s certification. See Dears v.
State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we must

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dismiss this appeal without further action. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State,
183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
      This appeal is dismissed.

                                                    PER CURIAM

June 17, 2021
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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