Court Opinion

ID: 9363620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 13:03:45.663632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:32.981019
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                        2023-NCCOA-1

                                        No. COA21-797

                                     Filed 17 January 2023

     Orange County, No. 20CVS564

     DEENA DIECKHAUS, GINA MCALLISTER,
     BRADY WAYNE ALLEN, JACORIA STANLEY,
     NICHOLAS SPOONEY and VIVIAN HOOD, each
     individually and on behalf of all others
     similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

                   v.

     BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE UNIVERSITY
     OF NORTH CAROLINA, Defendant.

             Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 17 June 2021 by Judge Edwin G.

     Wilson, Jr. in Superior Court, Orange County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 May

     2022.

             Anastopoulo Law Firm, LLC, by Blake G. Abbott, for plaintiffs-appellants.

             Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, LLP, by Jim W. Phillips, Jr.
             and Jennifer K. Van Zant, and Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special
             Deputy Attorneys General Laura McHenry and Kari R. Johnson, for defendant-
             appellee.

             STROUD, Chief Judge.

¶1           Plaintiffs Deena Dieckhaus, Gina McAllister, Brady Wayne Allen, Jacoria

     Stanley, Nicholas Spooney, and Vivian Hood appeal an order granting Defendant

     Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
                    DIECKHAUS V. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE UNIV. OF N.C.

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                                           Opinion of the Court

     Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint included both contract and unjust

     enrichment claims. Because sovereign immunity bars the unjust enrichment claims

     and because statutory immunity bars both the unjust enrichment and contract

     claims, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing all claims.

                                      I.      Background

¶2         Since this case is at the pleading stage, we rely upon the facts as alleged in

     Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.1         Defendant is the Board of Governors for the

     University of North Carolina System, and that System includes 17 “constituent

     institutions throughout the State” (collectively “Universities”). “As a precondition for

     enrollment” for the Spring 2020 Term, Defendant required students planning to

     attend the Universities to pay tuition. When charging tuition, Defendant charged

     students different rates depending on which of two types of programs the students

     chose, an “in-person, hands-on program[]” and a “fully online distance-learning

     program[.]” In addition to the differential pricing, Defendant marketed the two

     programs differently through its and the Universities’ “website[s], academic

     catalogues, student handbooks, marketing materials and other circulars, bulletins,

     1 We focus on the Amended Complaint because the order on appeal ruled on Defendant’s
     Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. On 22 May 2020, Plaintiffs filed their original
     Complaint. On 14 August 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Before
     that motion was heard, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on 30 December 2020, as
     discussed more below.
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                                       Opinion of the Court

     and publications” that differentiate between “fully online” programs and “non-online”

     programs with “references to and promises about the on-campus experience[.]”

¶3         Plaintiffs here all paid tuition and enrolled in the in-person program for the

     Spring 2020 Term, with one exception.        Plaintiffs Dieckhaus, McAllister, Allen,

     Stanley, and Spooney all enrolled as undergraduates in different Universities in the

     system. Plaintiff Hood paid tuition to enroll her daughter at one of the Universities’

     campuses for the Spring 2020 Term.

¶4         Beyond the tuition students paid to enroll, they paid additional fees.

     Defendant charged students, including Plaintiffs, “certain mandatory student fees.”

     In Defendant and its Universities’ “publications” including “catalogs” and

     “website[s],” Defendant “specifically describe[d] the nature and purpose of each fee.”

     The student fees paid by students were then “intended by both the students and

     Defendant to cover the services, access, benefits and programs for which the fees were

     described and billed.” Plaintiffs paid all applicable fees for the Spring 2020 Term.

     Finally, a certain subset of students, including Plaintiffs McAllister, Spooney, and

     Hood paid additional fees “for the right to reside in campus housing and for access to

     a meal plan providing for on campus dining opportunities.”

¶5         Plaintiffs and other students started the Spring 2020 Term with on-campus,

     in-person education and with access to the services for which they paid student fees,

     housing fees, and on-campus meal fees. “On or about March 11, 2020, in response to
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                                         Opinion of the Court

     the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendant issued a system-wide directive to all” the

     Universities “requiring that they transition from in-person to online instruction no

     later than March 23, 2020.” As a result, starting on 23 March 2020 through the end

     of the Spring 2020 Term, “there were no in person classes at” the Universities, “and

     all instruction was delivered online.” Another directive from Defendant to all the

     Universities “[o]n or about” 17 March 2020 “instruct[ed] students living in campus

     housing to remain at or return to their perme[n]ant residences.” As a result of this

     directive, the Universities closed their on campus residences and prevented student

     access to dining facilities. The campus shutdowns also meant students “no longer

     ha[d] the benefit of the services for which” they paid student fees.         Defendant

     “announced” it would be offering “pro-rated credits or refunds for students who pre-

     paid housing and meal costs for the Spring 2020” Term—and did offer some refunds—

     but it did not offer refunds for tuition or student fees.

¶6         Based on these alleged facts, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on 30

     December 2020. The Amended Complaint includes both breach of contract claims

     and unjust enrichment claims seeking “refunds . . . on a pro-rata basis” for “tuition,

     housing, meals, [and student] fees . . . that Defendant failed to deliver for the second

     half of the Spring 2020” Term after shutting down the Universities’ campuses in

     response to COVID-19. As to all these claims, the Amended Complaint alleges the

     General Assembly “has explicitly waived sovereign immunity in suits against
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                                        Opinion of the Court

     Defendant” because Defendant “is a body politic” that is, inter alia, “capable in law to

     sue and be sued in all courts whatsoever.” The Amended Complaint also asserts

     Plaintiffs “bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action” on behalf

     of four classes for each of the four categories of payments: tuition, fees, on-campus

     housing, and on-campus meals. As a result, the Amended Complaint includes “Class

     Action Allegations[,]” (capitalization altered), but the class action component of the

     lawsuit is not at issue in this appeal.

¶7         As to the tuition breach of contract claim, the Amended Complaint alleges

     Defendant offered to Plaintiffs and the proposed class its on-campus “live, in-person

     education” for the Spring 2020 Term in contrast to its “separate and distinct” online-

     only educational program. In addition to the descriptions through online and written

     materials discussed above, Defendant and its Universities differentiated between the

     two programs with respect to the Spring 2020 Term specifically by differences in how

     students registered for on-campus versus online instruction and “the parties’ prior

     course of conduct” in starting classes “for which students expected to receive in-

     person instruction” with such instruction and with class materials with in-person

     “schedules, locations, and . . . requirements.” Plaintiffs and the proposed class then

     “accepted that offer by paying tuition and attending classes during the beginning of

     the Spring 2020” Term. The Amended Complaint alleges Defendant then breached

     the contract by shutting down its campuses and shifting “all classes” to online
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     learning “without reducing or refunding tuition accordingly.” Finally as to this claim,

     the Amended Complaint states “[t]his cause of action does not seek to allege

     ‘educational malpractice’” but instead focuses on how “Defendant provided a

     materially different product,” online learning, from the one Plaintiffs and the

     proposed class paid for, “live[,] in-person[,] on-campus education[.]” As a result of

     this breach, Plaintiffs allege they suffered damages “amounting to the difference in

     the fair market value of the services and access for which they contracted, and the

     services and access which they actually received.”

¶8         The Amended Complaint also alleges a breach of contract claim for student

     fees. Defendant and its Universities offered “services, access, benefits and programs”

     by “specifically describ[ing] the nature and purpose of each fee” in “publications,” in

     particular in “catalogs . . . and website[s.]” Plaintiffs and the proposed fees class then

     accepted the terms and paid the fees, thereby forming a contract. The Amended

     Complaint alleges Defendant then breached the contract by shutting down the

     Universities’ campuses and “cancelling most student activities” halfway through the

     Spring 2020 Term—thereby not providing “recreational and intramural programs;

     fitness centers or gymnasiums; campus technology[,] infrastructure[,] or security

     measures; or Spring intercollegiate competitions”—without giving students any

     “discount or refund” on “any fees” as Defendant does for “fully online students[.]” As

     a result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiffs and the rest of the proposed class suffered
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                                         Opinion of the Court

       damages.

¶9           The Amended Complaint includes two final breach of contract claims for on-

       campus housing and meals. The Amended Complaint alleges Defendant offered the

       relevant Plaintiffs and proposed classes “on-campus housing” and “meals and on-

       campus dining options” in return for additional fees. The relevant Plaintiffs and

       proposed class members then accepted by paying those fees. When the Universities

       shut down their campuses, they “requir[ed] students to move out of on-campus

       housing facilities” and closed “most campus buildings and facilities, including dining

       facilities[,]” thereby breaching the contract. Defendant then “issued arbitrary and

       insufficient refunds” for on-campus housing and meals for most students because the

       campus shutdowns started earlier than the date applied to pro-rate the refunds.

       According to the Amended Complaint, the relevant Plaintiffs and proposed class

       members suffered damages for the additional amounts they should have been

       refunded.

¶ 10         In the alternative to each of the four breach of contract claims, the Amended

       Complaint alleges unjust enrichment claims. Each of the claims follows a similar

       pattern. The Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiffs and the proposed class “conferred

       a benefit” non-gratuitously on Defendant by paying the relevant tuition or fees, and

       Defendant “realized this benefit by accepting such payment.” Plaintiffs and the class

       members did not receive “the full benefit of their bargain[,]” i.e. the services and
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                                         Opinion of the Court

       benefits they paid for, but Defendant “retained this benefit” unjustly. The Amended

       Complaint then alleges “[e]quity and good conscience require” Defendant “return a

       pro-rata portion of the monies paid” as tuition or the relevant fees, especially

       considering the money Defendant and its Universities saved by operating online

       rather than in-person, their “billions of dollars in endowment funds,” and the

       “significant aid from the federal government” Defendant received. Finally, the claims

       request Defendant “be required to disgorge this unjust enrichment[.]”

¶ 11         On 15 January 2021, Defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss [the] Amended

       Complaint” under Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) based on

       five grounds. (Capitalization altered.) First, Defendant argued Plaintiffs’ claims

       were barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311, which is part of Article 37 entitled “An Act

       to Provide Immunity for Institutions of Higher Learning.”            Next, Defendant

       contended Plaintiffs’ claims were “barred by sovereign immunity.”        According to

       Defendant, Plaintiffs also failed to state claims for relief for breach of contract and

       unjust enrichment, including on the grounds that the Amended Complaint was “an

       attempt to assert a claim for educational malpractice which is not a cognizable claim

       under North Carolina state law.” Then, Defendant argued the Amended Complaint

       failed to allege “damages were proximately caused by Defendant.” Finally, Defendant

       contended Plaintiffs lacked standing because they “failed to allege a sufficient injury

       and they purport to allege claims against [U]niversities with whom they had no
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                                            Opinion of the Court

       relationship.”

¶ 12          The trial court held a hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on 19 May

       2021. At the hearing, Defendant discussed each argument raised in its Motion to

       Dismiss.    When discussing statutory immunity under North Carolina General

       Statute § 116-311, the parties argued about both the applicability and

       constitutionality of the statute. Plaintiffs argued the statute was unconstitutional on

       a number of grounds, including “the federal contracts clause.”2 In addition to arguing

       Plaintiffs had failed to show § 116-311 was unconstitutional on the merits, Defendant

       argued Plaintiffs were making a facial constitutional challenge to the statute but had

       not followed the correct procedure to make such a challenge so Plaintiffs had “waived

       their right to challenge the statute.” Plaintiffs repeatedly argued they were not

       raising a facial challenge but instead were making an as-applied challenge to the

       constitutionality of § 116-311. The trial court ended the hearing without making a

       ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or any discussion of whether Plaintiffs were

       making an as-applied or facial challenge to §116-311.

       2Our record does not include information about all the grounds on which Plaintiffs argued §
       116-311 was unconstitutional. The transcript only includes this reference to “the federal
       contracts clause[,]” an argument “this law was passed specifically because of this case[,]” and
       a couple other references to impairing contracts in violation of the federal Constitution.
       Based on the transcript, the parties filed briefing on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, but we
       do not have those briefs in our record. As a result, we do not know the details of Plaintiffs’
       arguments before the trial court as to the unconstitutionality of § 116-311.
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                                          Opinion of the Court

¶ 13         On 17 June 2021, the trial court entered an order granting Defendant’s Motion

       to Dismiss without specifying the grounds for that decision.         On 15 July 2021,

       Plaintiffs filed a written notice of appeal from the order granting Defendant’s Motion

       to Dismiss.

                                          II.   Analysis

¶ 14         On appeal, Plaintiffs argue, “The trial court erred in granting Defendant’s

       Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiffs adequately plead claims for breach of a contract

       and unjust enrichment.”      (Capitalization altered.)    As part of this overarching

       argument, Plaintiffs make five contentions. First, Plaintiffs argue they “state[d] a

       claim for breach of contract.” (Capitalization altered.) Plaintiffs also argue they

       “state[d] a claim for unjust enrichment.” (Capitalization altered.) Third, Plaintiffs

       assert “Defendant is not entitled to sovereign immunity.” (Capitalization altered.)

       Plaintiffs then contend “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311 is unconstitutional and

       inapplicable to this action.”      (Capitalization altered.)     That statute grants

       “institution[s] of higher education . . . immunity from claims” for “tuition or fees paid

       . . . for the spring academic semester of 2020” when the claims “allege[] losses or

       damages arising from an act or omission by the institution of higher education during

       or in response to COVID-19, the COVID-19 emergency declaration, or the COVID-19
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                                           Opinion of the Court

       essential business executive order.”3 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a) (2021). Finally,

       Plaintiffs argue they “hav[e] standing on all claims.” (Capitalization altered.)

¶ 15         We will address Plaintiffs’ contentions as to why the trial court erred in

       granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in the following order. First, we will address

       the immunity issues—both sovereign immunity and the potential statutory immunity

       of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311—because of the special nature of immunity as more than

       “just a mere defense in a lawsuit” in comparison to other defenses raised under Rule

       of Civil Procedure 12. See Lannan v. Board of Governors of the University of North

       Carolina, 2022-NCCOA-653, ¶¶ 23, 29 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (when

       considering the interlocutory nature of an appeal, recognizing this nature of sovereign

       immunity means its loss affects a substantial right but requiring a petition for writ

       of certiorari to address the Rule 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim issue); see also Stahl

       v. Bowden, 274 N.C. App. 26, 28, 850 S.E.2d 588, 590 (2020) (recognizing claims of

       immunity in general, including specifically statutory immunity, affect a substantial

       right when considering an interlocutory appeal). Within the two types of immunity,

       we will address sovereign immunity first because Plaintiffs raise constitutional issues

       around statutory immunity and “it is well settled that ‘the courts of this State will

       3The statute has additional requirements we will discuss more below. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
       116-311(a) (including four subsections of requirements). We only include enough information
       here to demonstrate the relevance of Plaintiffs’ argument about the statute.
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                                         Opinion of the Court

       avoid constitutional questions, even if properly presented, where a case may be

       resolved on other grounds.’” See Holdstock v. Duke University Health System, Inc.,

       270 N.C. App. 267, 277, 841 S.E.2d 307, 314 (2020) (quoting Anderson v. Assimos, 356

       N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002)). Because we ultimately hold sovereign

       and/ or statutory immunity bar all of Plaintiffs’ claims, we do not reach the remaining

       issues of stating claims for breach of contract and for unjust enrichment or the

       standing issue.

       A. Sovereign Immunity

¶ 16         Focusing on sovereign immunity first, Plaintiffs argue “Defendant is not

       entitled to sovereign immunity.” (Capitalization altered.) Sovereign immunity is at

       issue because “[s]overeign immunity protects the State and its agencies from suit

       absent waiver or consent” and “Defendant Board of Governors is an agency of the

       State” that “can claim the protection of sovereign immunity.” See Lannan, ¶ 22

       (citations and quotation marks omitted). As a result, if Defendant is entitled to

       sovereign immunity, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred and the trial court did not err in

       dismissing them.

¶ 17         Turning to Plaintiffs’ specific arguments against the application of sovereign

       immunity, Plaintiffs contend as to the contract claims the State, including Defendant

       as a state agency, waives sovereign immunity when entering into an implied-in-fact

       contract. Defendant responds only an express contract, not a contract implied-in-fact,
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                                         Opinion of the Court

       waives sovereign immunity. Then, Defendant contends even if an implied-in-fact

       contract is sufficient to waive sovereign immunity, “the Amended Complaint is

       completely void of any factual allegations establishing the existence of even an

       implied contract.” Plaintiffs do not include any argument on the waiver of sovereign

       immunity for their unjust enrichment claims, which Defendant highlights. After

       setting out the standard of review, we examine whether Defendant has sovereign

       immunity first as to the unjust enrichment claims and then as to the contract claims.

¶ 18         At the outset, we note many of these questions have been addressed by this

       Court’s recent decision in Lannan v. Board of Governors of the University of North

       Carolina. That case also involved contract claims arising out of a “switch from in-

       person to online learning” during the COVID-19 pandemic, although it covered the

       Fall 2020 Term rather than the Spring 2020 Term at issue in this case. See Lannan,

       ¶¶ 5-6.   And in Lannan this Court addressed identical issues surrounding the

       applicability of sovereign immunity to implied-in-fact contract claims. See id. ¶¶ 30-

       31 (involving issues of whether an implied-in-fact contract could waive sovereign

       immunity and whether the plaintiffs had “pled a valid implied-in-fact contract”).

       While we now have the benefit of Lannan in making our decision, Lannan had not

       come out when the parties originally briefed this case.

          1. Standard of Review

¶ 19         In Lannan, this Court explained the standard of review on sovereign immunity
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issues as follows:

             Our Supreme Court recently explained an appellate court
             “reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion
             to dismiss based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity
             using a de novo standard of review.” State ex rel. Stein [v.
             Kinston Charter Academy, 379 N.C. 560, 2021-NCSC-163],
             ¶ 23 (citing White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360, 362–63, 736
             S.E.2d 166 (2013)); see also Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370
             N.C. 41, 47, 802 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2017) (“Questions of law
             regarding the applicability of sovereign or governmental
             immunity are reviewed de novo.” (quoting Irving v.
             Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 611, 781
             S.E.2d 282, 284 (2016))).

             To the extent the question of whether Plaintiffs[] pled a
             valid contract should be reviewed under the standard for
             orders on motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
             standard is the same, i.e. de novo. See State ex rel. Stein, ¶
             25 n.2 (explaining standard is the same because “the only
             factual materials presented for the trial court’s
             consideration were those contained in the complaint”); see
             also Wray, 370 N.C. at 46-47, 802 S.E.2d at 898 (stating
             appellate courts “review appeals from dismissals under
             Rule 12(b)(6) de novo” immediately before stating same
             standard for sovereign immunity (quotations and citations
             omitted)). In conducting such a review of the complaint,
             appellate courts treat as true the complaint’s allegations.
             Deminski on behalf of C.E.D. v. State Board of Education,
             377 N.C. 406, 2021-NCSC-58, ¶ 12, 858 S.E.2d 788 (“When
             reviewing a motion to dismiss, an appellate court considers
             ‘whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated as true,
             are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be
             granted under some legal theory.’” (quoting Coley v. State,
             360 N.C. 493, 494–95, 631 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2006))); see also
             State ex rel. Stein, ¶ 25. An appellate court “is not, however,
             required to accept mere conclusory allegations,
             unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
             inferences as true.” Estate of Vaughn v. Pike Elec., LLC,
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                                          Opinion of the Court

                    230 N.C. App. 485, 493, 751 S.E.2d 227, 233 (2013).

       See id. ¶¶ 32-33 (brackets from original omitted).

          2. Unjust Enrichment Claims

¶ 20         As Defendant identifies, Plaintiffs do not argue on appeal Defendant consented

       to suit or otherwise waived its sovereign immunity. Under our Appellate Rules,

       Plaintiffs have therefore abandoned the issue of whether sovereign immunity was a

       valid ground on which to dismiss their unjust enrichment claims. See N.C. R. App.

       P. 28(a) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a party’s brief are deemed

       abandoned.”).

¶ 21         Even if Plaintiffs had argued sovereign immunity did not bar their unjust

       enrichment claims, we would reject that argument. As this Court recently reaffirmed

       in Lannan, “contracts implied in law, which are also called quasi contracts and which

       permit recovery based on quantum meruit, do not waive sovereign immunity.” See

       Lannan, ¶ 37 (citing, inter alia, Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39, 41-42, 497 S.E.2d

       412, 414 (1998)). As Whitfield in turn explains, “Quantum meruit is a measure of

       recovery for the reasonable value of services rendered in order to prevent unjust

       enrichment. It operates as an equitable remedy based upon a quasi contract or a

       contract implied in law.” Whitfield, 348 N.C. at 42, 497 S.E.2d at 414-15 (emphasis

       added) (citations omitted). Thus, claims for unjust enrichment do not waive sovereign

       immunity because they involve contracts implied in law. See M Series Rebuild, LLC
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       v. Town of Mount Pleasant, Inc., 222 N.C. App. 59, 67, 730 S.E.2d 254, 260 (2012)

       (“[W]e decline to imply a contract in law in derogation of sovereign immunity to allow

       a party to recover under a theory of unjust enrichment.” (citation and quotation

       marks omitted)). Since Plaintiffs have provided no other reason Defendant waived

       sovereign immunity, their unjust enrichment claims are barred by sovereign

       immunity. The trial court did not err in dismissing those claims.

          3. Contract Claims

¶ 22         Turning to Plaintiffs’ remaining contract claims, the parties’ arguments

       present two questions: (1) whether a valid implied-in-fact contract can waive

       sovereign immunity and (2) whether Plaintiffs pled valid implied-in-fact contracts.

¶ 23         Lannan answers the first question; “a contract implied in fact can waive

       sovereign immunity under the contractual waiver holding” in Smith v. State. See

       Lannan, ¶ 51 (referencing Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976)); see

       also Smith, 289 N.C. at 320, 222 S.E.2d at 423-24 (“[W]henever the State of North

       Carolina, through its authorized officers and agencies, enters into a valid contract,

       the State implicitly consents to be sued for damages on the contract in the event it

       breaches the contract.”). Lannan reached that conclusion after an extensive analysis

       of our caselaw on contracts waiving sovereign immunity. Lannan, ¶¶ 35-50. Lannan

       also explained the existence of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311, i.e. the basis of the statutory

       immunity issue here, indicated the General Assembly did not believe the contract
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       claims were already barred by sovereign immunity because otherwise “[t]here would

       be no need for this separate immunity statute[.]” See Lannan, ¶ 50.

¶ 24         In undertaking that analysis, this Court also rejected the same arguments

       Defendant now advances when arguing a valid implied-in-fact contract does not

       waive sovereign immunity. First, the Lannan Court rejected Defendant’s argument

       Whitfield and Eastway Wrecker Service, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 165 N.C. App. 639,

       599 S.E.2d 410 (2004), require an express contract for a waiver of sovereign immunity

       because those two cases were limited to situations involving contracts implied in law

       even though they included “overly broad” statements at times. See Lannan, ¶¶ 38-

       41 (analyzing cases before concluding “Whitfield and Eastway Wrecker Service only

       allow the State to defend itself based on sovereign immunity against contracts

       implied in law, not contracts implied in fact”).

¶ 25         Lannan’s rejection of Defendant’s arguments also relied on “another line of

       cases holding the State waives its sovereign immunity when it enters into a contract

       implied in fact.” Id. ¶ 41; see also, id. ¶¶ 41-43 (full analysis of that line of cases,

       namely Archer v. Rockingham County, 144 N.C. App. 550, 548 S.E.2d 788 (2001),

       Sanders v. State Personnel Com’n, 183 N.C. App. 15, 644 S.E.2d 10 (2007), and Lake

       v. State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees, 234 N.C. App. 368, 760 S.E.2d

       268 (2014)). Defendant here contends those cases were limited to “employment

       settings” rather than the “educational setting” present here, (emphasis omitted), but
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       the Lannan court rejected a similar argument for several reasons. See Lannan, ¶¶

       44-48. First, the reasoning of that line of cases “extends beyond the employment

       context.” Id. ¶ 45. Second, “the employment context and the educational context are

       not so different that we can disregard the cases addressing contracts implied in fact

       in the employment context.” Id. ¶ 46. Finally, extending that line of cases “beyond

       the employment context is consistent with our treatment of implied in fact contracts

       in general” because “[o]ur Supreme Court has long held ‘an implied in fact contract

       is valid and enforceable as if it were express or written.’” Id. ¶ 47 (quoting Snyder v.

       Freeman, 300 N.C. 204, 217, 266 S.E.2d 593, 602 (1980)) (brackets omitted).

¶ 26         Since Lannan already determined a “contract implied in fact can waive

       sovereign immunity[,]” we turn to the remaining question, whether Plaintiffs pled a

       valid implied-in-fact contract.   See id. ¶ 51.     “[T]o plead a valid implied-in-fact

       contract, Plaintiffs needed to plead offer, acceptance, and consideration.” Id. ¶ 54.

       We examine this issue as to each of the four contract claims: tuition, student fees, on-

       campus housing, and meals.

¶ 27         Plaintiffs adequately pled their tuition claim.       Specifically, the Amended

       Complaint alleges “Defendant offered to provide, and members of the Tuition class

       expected to receive, instruction on a physical campus” rather than the “separate and

       distinct product[]” of “online distance education” based on: (1) Defendant and the

       Universities’ “website[s], academic catalogues, student handbooks, marketing
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                                           Opinion of the Court

       materials and other circulars, bulletins, and publications” that differentiate between

       “fully online” programs and “non-online” programs with “references to and promises

       about the on-campus experience,” which Plaintiffs included examples of in the

       Amended Complaint; (2) differences in how students register for on-campus versus

       online instruction; and (3) “the parties’ prior course of conduct” in starting classes “for

       which students expected to receive in-person instruction” with such instruction and

       with class materials with in-person “schedules, locations, and . . . requirements.”

       Turning to acceptance, Plaintiffs allege they accepted the offer for “live, in-person

       education” by “paying tuition and attending classes during the beginning of the

       Spring 2020” Term.      Finally, the Amended Complaint states Plaintiffs and the

       proposed class “paid valuable consideration in exchange” for in-person learning,

       which refers back to the tuition money they paid to accept the offer.

¶ 28          For the student fees contract claim, Plaintiffs allege Defendant “[i]n its

       publications and, particularly in its catalogs and website” described the “purpose of

       each fee” such that everyone understood “the monies Plaintiff[s] and other members

       of the [proposed class] paid towards these fees were intended . . . to cover the services,

       access, benefits and programs for which the fees were described and billed,” thereby

       constituting an offer. The Amended Complaint includes various descriptions of these

       fees. Plaintiffs then allege they paid the fees to the Universities, which constituted

       acceptance and consideration and therefore formed a contract.
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                                          Opinion of the Court

¶ 29         Similarly, as to the on-campus housing and meals claims, the Amended

       Complaint alleges the Universities offered “on-campus housing” and “meals and on-

       campus dining options” to students who agreed to pay certain fees. As pled, the

       students then accepted those offers and gave consideration when they paid the

       required fees to receive on-campus housing or dining and meals. Thus, Plaintiffs

       adequately pled a valid implied-in-fact contract as to each of the four contract claims.

¶ 30         None of Defendant’s arguments persuade us otherwise. While Defendant’s

       section on sovereign immunity only includes a single sentence arguing “the Amended

       Complaint is completely void of any factual allegations establishing the existence of

       even an implied contract,” Defendant later includes additional arguments about the

       ways in which “Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to identify a contract” in its

       section on how Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for breach of contract. (Capitalization

       altered.) Specifically, Defendant first argues “every contract requires a promise” and

       Plaintiffs did not include any such allegations of promises or, specifically, promises

       to refunds. This argument is partially premised on two cases, Ryan v. University of

       North Carolina Hospitals, 128 N.C. App. 300, 494 S.E.2d 789 (1998) and Montessori

       Children’s House of Durham v. Blizzard, 244 N.C. App. 633, 781 S.E.2d 511 (2016),

       that, according to Defendant, require allegations to be based on “identifiable

       contractual promises” such that “statements made in a university policy manual or

       other university publication are insufficient to support a breach of contract claim
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                                         Opinion of the Court

       unless they are explicitly included or incorporated into a contract.”       (Emphasis

       omitted.)

¶ 31         Defendant’s contention the Amended Complaint does not allege promises

       underlying a contract cannot be squared with the pleading. While the Amended

       Complaint does not include the specific term “promise” when describing what the

       Universities offered to students, the offers constitute promises to act nonetheless. As

       laid out above, the Universities offered in-person education, benefits as described in

       the student fee descriptions, and on-campus housing and meals according to the

       Amended Complaint.       Those offers were promises to provide those services if

       Plaintiffs and other members of the proposed classes paid the fees. In other words,

       by their acceptance and payment of consideration, Plaintiffs converted Defendant’s

       offer into promises. See Wilkins v. Vass Cotton Mills, 176 N.C. 72, 81, 97 S.E. 151,

       155 (1918) (“An acceptance by promise or act, and communication thereof when

       necessary, while an offer of a promise is in force, changes the character of the offer.

       It supplies the elements of agreement and consideration, changing the offer into a

       binding promise, and the offer cannot afterwards be revoked without the acceptor’s

       consent.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Thus, by properly alleging the

       contract, Plaintiffs have pled a promise necessary to form a contract.

¶ 32         Defendant’s reliance on Ryan and Montessori Children’s House is also

       misplaced. As this Court explained in Lannan, Ryan and Montessori Children’s
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       House both involved pre-existing written contracts. See Lannan, ¶¶ 57-58. As such,

       they differ from the case here where Plaintiffs allege the statements made in

       university publications “are the contract.” See id. ¶ 62. And thus their statements

       about requiring an “identifiable contractual promise” or incorporation of publications

       into a contract do not apply here to bar Plaintiffs’ contract claims. See id. ¶¶ 57-58

       (citation and quotation marks omitted).

¶ 33         Next, Defendant argues none of the described fees “support[] Plaintiffs’ claim

       that a contract exists entitling them to a refund for fees in the event the format of

       instruction changed” because Plaintiffs did not plead they took advantage of services,

       services ceased with the shift to online learning, or the pre-existing refunds for meals

       and housing were insufficient. First, while these arguments are under a heading

       labeled “Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to identify a contract and thus fails to

       state a contract claim[,]” they address breach because they all focus on the provision

       of services or remedy for lack of the allegedly contracted for services. This matters

       because the waiver of sovereign immunity only requires pleading a valid contract, not

       pleading breach; pleading breach is only relevant when looking at Rule of Civil

       Procedure 12(b)(6) and dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Lannan, ¶¶ 27-28

       (explaining a valid contract is necessary to both waive sovereign immunity and

       survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss but breach is also necessary to state a

       breach of contract claim that survives such a motion) and ¶ 66 (addressing only
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                                         Opinion of the Court

       breach to rule on 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss contract claims because this Court had

       “already determined above [the p]laintiffs pled a valid contract”).

¶ 34         Even if Defendant’s arguments on breach could impact whether Plaintiffs pled

       a valid contract sufficient to waive sovereign immunity, we would still reject its

       contentions. As to the contention Plaintiffs did not plead they took advantage of the

       services for which they paid student fees, the Amended Complaint alleges “as a result

       of being moved off campus,” Plaintiffs and the proposed class “no longer have the

       benefit of the services for which these fees have been paid” and lists numerous

       services. The language “no longer” suggests the Plaintiffs had used the services in

       the past. Further, some of the services, such as “campus . . . security measures” are

       things Plaintiffs would passively benefit from rather than actively take advantage of

       in many circumstances. As to Defendant’s argument Plaintiffs failed to plead services

       ceased when students shifted to online instruction, the Amended Complaint plainly

       states that transition included “closing most campus buildings and facilities, and

       cancelling most student activities.” That followed a more specific allegation that “as

       a result of being moved off campus” Plaintiffs “were unable to participate in

       recreational and intramural programs; no longer had access to campus fitness centers

       or gymnasiums; no longer benefit[t]ed from campus technology[,] infrastructure[,] or

       security measures; and no longer had the benefit of enjoying Spring intercollegiate

       competitions.” The Amended Complaint also includes allegations detailing why the
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       refunds for housing and meals failed to fully reimburse Plaintiffs for the services they

       could not access due to campus shutdowns by calculating the dates of the shutdowns

       versus the dates upon which the refunds were based.

¶ 35         Finally,    Defendant argues      “Plaintiffs’ claims are veiled educational

       malpractice claims which are not allowed in North Carolina,” again relying on Ryan

       as the only binding authority. (Capitalization altered.) While Defendant is correct

       North Carolina does not permit educational malpractice claims, see Ryan, 128 N.C.

       App. at 302-03, 494 S.E.2d at 791 (only permitting claim to go forward because it

       “would not involve an inquiry into the nuances of educational processes and theories”

       (quotation marks omitted)), Plaintiffs are not making such a claim. In Ryan, this

       Court clarified educational malpractice claims require “an inquiry into the nuances

       of educational processes and theories.” See id. at 302, 494 S.E.2d at 791. The Ryan

       Court also relied heavily on a Seventh Circuit case that clarified an educational

       malpractice claim alleged “the school breached its agreement by failing to provide an

       effective education” or “simply . . . that the education was not good enough.” See id.

       (quoting Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1992)).

¶ 36         Reviewing Plaintiffs’ contract claims does not require an investigation into

       educational processes or theories or a determination of whether the education was

       adequate. The student fees, housing, and meals claims do not involve education

       practices at all; they involve separate amenities Plaintiffs allege they paid to access
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       as discussed above. And Plaintiffs’ tuition claim alleges they paid for “live, in-person,

       on-campus education” but instead received instruction via “online distance learning

       platforms[.]” Defendants do not indicate any place where Plaintiffs’ tuition claim

       turns on whether one of those types of education is better than the other in terms of

       educational quality. Defendant’s best argument to the contrary is that calculating

       damages for Plaintiffs’ tuition claim would require determining “the difference in

       value between in-person and distance learning.” But the trial court would not need

       to do that in the future if this case reaches a damages stage because Defendant has

       already set different tuitions for on-campus and distance learning programs

       according to the allegations in the Amended Complaint. At its heart, Plaintiffs’

       tuition claim alleges they contracted and paid for product A and received product B

       for part of the Spring 2020 Term. Products A and B can represent anything in that

       scenario, demonstrating that the claim does not rely on reviewing educational

       processes or even on the educational setting itself.

¶ 37         Having rejected all Defendant’s arguments, we conclude after our de novo

       review sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ contract claims, although it does

       bar their unjust enrichment claims.

       B. Statutory Immunity

¶ 38         As the contract claims survive sovereign immunity, we next turn to statutory

       immunity. As explained above, Plaintiffs argue N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311, which
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       provides immunity to claims for tuition and fees for COVID-19 related university

       closures, “is unconstitutional and inapplicable to this action.”         (Capitalization

       altered.) See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a). Following the doctrine of constitutional

       avoidance, see Holdstock, 270 N.C. App. at 277, 841 S.E.2d at 314 (“[T]he courts of

       this State will avoid constitutional questions, even if properly presented, where a case

       may be resolved on other grounds.”), we will first consider whether § 116-311 is

       applicable here and then address the constitutionality of the statute.

          1. Applicability of North Carolina General Statute § 116-311

¶ 39         Plaintiffs first argue § 116-311 is “inapplicable to this action.” (Capitalization

       altered.) North Carolina General Statute § 116-311 provides, in relevant part:

                    Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to
                    G.S. 116-312, an institution of higher education shall have
                    immunity from claims by an individual, if all of the
                    following apply:

                           (1) The claim arises out of or is in connection with
                           tuition or fees paid to the institution of higher
                           education for the spring academic semester of 2020.
                           (2) The claim alleges losses or damages arising from
                           an act or omission by the institution of higher
                           education during or in response to COVID-19, the
                           COVID-19 emergency declaration, or the COVID-19
                           essential business executive order.
                           (3) The alleged act or omission by the institution of
                           higher education was reasonably related to
                           protecting the public health, safety, or welfare in
                           response to the COVID-19 emergency declaration,
                           COVID-19 essential business executive order, or
                           applicable guidance from the Centers for Disease
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                                            Opinion of the Court

                            Control and Prevention.
                            (4) The institution of higher education offered
                            remote learning options for enrolled students during
                            the spring academic semester of 2020 that allowed
                            students to complete the semester coursework.

       N.C.   Gen.    Stat.    §     116-311(a).       Plaintiffs’   first   argument   is   that

       the “plain meaning of this statute is to provide immunity for tort claims” because it

       includes the language “act or omission.” Plaintiffs also contend “Defendant’s refusal

       to provide fair tuition and [fee] refunds” is not “reasonably related to protecting public

       health or safety.”

¶ 40          As questions of statutory interpretation, we review Plaintiffs’ arguments de

       novo. See Winkler v. North Carolina State Board of Plumbing, 374 N.C. 726, 730, 843

       S.E.2d 207, 210 (2020) (“Thus, this case presents an issue of statutory interpretation,

       which we review de novo.” (citing Applewood Props., LLC v. New S. Props., LLC, 366

       N.C. 518, 522, 742 S.E.2d 776, 779 (2013))). “When the language of a statute is clear

       and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning

       of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.” Id.

       (quoting N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649

       (2009) (brackets omitted)).

¶ 41          Section 116-311(a), by its plain language, provides “immunity from claims[.]”

       N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a). Plaintiffs argue the term claims should be limited to

       tort claims, and thus not cover their contract claims, because the claim must “allege[]
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       losses or damages arising from an act or omission.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a)(2).

       But this argument ignores the statutory definition of claims. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-

       310 defines “Claim” as, “A claim or cause of action seeking any legal or equitable

       remedy or relief” for the purpose of the article on “Covid-19 Immunity for Institutions

       of Higher Education,” which includes § 116-311. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-310(1) (2021).

       That definition includes any claim or cause of action that could be brought, so it

       necessarily includes Plaintiffs’ contract claims, and, as an alternative basis for our

       decision, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims. “If a statute ‘contains a definition of a

       word used therein, that definition controls.’” Lovin v. Cherokee County, 248 N.C. App.

       527, 529, 789 S.E.2d 869, 871 (2016) (quoting In re Clayton-Marcus Co., Inc., 286 N.C.

       215, 219, 210 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1974)). Therefore, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument the

       statutory immunity provided by § 116-311 applies only to tort claims; it applies to all

       claims, including all of Plaintiffs’ contract and unjust enrichment claims.

¶ 42         The remainder of § 116-311 provides five requirements for immunity to apply.

       First, the statute imports the limits provided in § 116-312, which limits the timeframe

       of the immunity to “alleged acts or omissions occurring on or after the issuance of the

       COVID-19 emergency declaration until June 1, 2020.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311

       (making clear the immunity is “subject to G.S. 116-312”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-312

       (including quoted language on timeframe of immunity). Then, § 116-311 has the four

       individually numbered requirements listed above.
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                                         Opinion of the Court

¶ 43         Of these five requirements, Plaintiffs only contest the requirement in § 116-

       311(a)(3) that the “alleged act or omission by the institution of higher education was

       reasonably related to protecting the public health, safety, or welfare in response to .

       . . COVID-19 . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a)(3). Specifically, Plaintiffs contend

       “Defendant’s refusal to provide fair tuition and [fee] refunds” is not “reasonably

       related to protecting public health or safety.” In making that argument, Plaintiffs

       misunderstand the relevant “alleged act or omission.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a)(3).

       The alleged act or omission that gave rise to Plaintiffs’ claims was, at least in part,

       Defendant and its Universities shutting down their campuses and moving classes

       online according to Plaintiffs’ own Amended Complaint. For example, the tuition

       contract claim explains: “However, the University breached the contract with

       Plaintiffs and other members of the Tuition Class by moving all classes for the Spring

       2020 semester to online distance learning platforms, and restricting the on-campus

       experience without reducing or refunding tuition accordingly.” Similarly, the tuition

       unjust enrichment claim states:

                    Instead, Plaintiffs and other members of the Tuition Class
                    conferred this benefit on Defendant in expectation of
                    receiving one product, i.e., live in-person instruction in a
                    physical classroom along with the on-campus experience of
                    campus life as described more fully above, but they were
                    provided with a materially different product carrying a
                    different fair market value, i.e., online instruction devoid
                    of the on-campus experience, access, and services.
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       And Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint also pleads the shift to online instruction was a

       result of the COVID-19 pandemic: “On or about March 11 , 2020, in response to the

       COVID-19 pandemic, Defendant issued a system-wide directive to all constituent

       institutions requiring that they transition from in-person to online instruction no

       later than March 23, 2020.” (Emphasis added.) As part of that paragraph on the

       transition to online instruction, Plaintiffs include a footnote to a press release on

       Defendant’s website about the directive, which clarifies the decision to transition to

       online classes was related to “the health and safety of [the Universities’] students,

       faculty, and staff . . . .” UNC System Issues Update on Coronavirus Preparations, The

       University of North Carolina System (Mar. 12, 2020).4 Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’

       argument, the alleged acts or omissions were “reasonably related to protecting the

       public health, safety, or welfare in response to . . . COVID-19 . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. §

       116-311(a)(3).

¶ 44         The remaining four requirements for statutory immunity under § 116-311(a)

       are also met here. As to timing, the above allegation about the system-wide directive

       indicates the decision to shift to online learning was announced on 11 March 2020.

       Governor Roy Cooper had already entered “the first of many emergency orders . . . in

       response to the COVID-19 pandemic” on 10 March 2020, Hall v. Wilmington Health,

       4    Available    at:   https://www.northcarolina.edu/news/unc-system-issues-update-on-
       coronavirus-preparations/.
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       PLLC, 282 N.C. App. 463, 2022-NCCOA-204, ¶ 6; see also E.O. 116, Cooper, 2020, §

       1 (declaring a state of emergency based on “the public health emergency posed by

       COVID-19”), which started the period of immunity under § 116-312. See N.C. Gen.

       Stat. § 116-312 (applying immunity to “alleged acts or omissions occurring on or after

       the issuance of the COVID-19 emergency declaration until June 1, 2020”). The

       remaining actions related to the campus shutdowns all took place within this time

       period as well.

¶ 45         Turning to the next requirement, the claims all arose “out of or [are] in

       connection with tuition or fees . . . for the spring academic semester of 2020.” See

       N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a)(1). The Amended Complaint’s introduction explains the

       claims arise from “Defendant’s decision not to issue appropriate refunds for the

       Spring 2020 semester” for “tuition, housing, meals, fees and other costs that

       Defendant failed to deliver for the second half of the Spring 2020 semester . . . .”

       Similarly, the four groups of claims (one each for breach of contract and unjust

       enrichment) are for: tuition, student fees, on-campus housing fees, and meal fees.

       Further, as we have already discussed, the actions by Defendant and the Universities

       were taken “in response to COVID-19[.]” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a)(2). Finally,

       Plaintiffs acknowledge “[f]rom March 23, 2020 through the end of the Spring 2020

       semester, there were no in-person classes at Defendant’s institutions, and all

       instruction was delivered online[,]” (emphasis added), thereby meeting the final
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                                           Opinion of the Court

       requirement in § 116-311(a)(4). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a)(4).

¶ 46         Since all the statutory requirements are met here, § 116-311(a) applies to

       Plaintiffs’ claims, both their contract claims and their unjust enrichment claims.

       Thus, after our de novo review and under the statute’s plain language, Defendant has

       immunity from these claims. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a).

          2. Constitutionality of North Carolina General Statute § 116-311

¶ 47         Having decided § 116-311 applies to Plaintiffs’ claims and grants Defendant

       immunity, we now address Plaintiffs’ argument the statute is unconstitutional.

       Plaintiff argues the law is unconstitutional for five reasons: (1) “such a law squarely

       violates U.S. Con[s]t. art. I, § 10 cl. 1 which reads, in pertinent part, ‘[n]o State shall

       . . . pass any . . . law impairing the Obligation of Contracts[;]’” (2) “the statute would

       violate the equal protection clause of both the United States and North Carolina

       Constitutions[;]” (3) “the statute violates the due process clauses of the United States

       and North Carolina Constitutions[;]” (4) “the statute would violate U.S. Const.

       amend. V which prohibits the taking of private property without just compensation[;]”

       and (5) “the statute intrudes upon the separation of powers because it is a law that

       was passed in response to specific litigation already pending in the courts with the

       purposes of directing the courts on how to adjudicate the pending actions.”

¶ 48         Before arguing § 116-311 “is not unconstitutional[,]” Defendant contends

       “Plaintiffs have waived any purported constitutional challenges to” the statute. After
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                                         Opinion of the Court

       discussing the standard of review, we first review whether Plaintiffs have waived the

       issue and then the merits of Plaintiffs’ argument the statute is unconstitutional.

             a. Standard of Review

¶ 49         For challenges under both the federal and State Constitutions, we review the

       constitutionality of statutes de novo. See North Carolina Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v.

       State, 368 N.C. 777, 786, 786 S.E.2d 255, 262 (2016) (stating, in a case where a party

       argued a statute was unconstitutional under Article I, § 10 of the United States

       Constitution, “we review de novo any challenges to a statute’s constitutionality”);

       Cooper v. Berger, 376 N.C. 22, 33, 36, 852 S.E.2d 46, 56, 58 (2020) (stating, in a case

       challenging the constitutionality of a statute under our State Constitution,

       “[a]ccording to well-established North Carolina law,” appellate courts “review[]

       constitutional questions using a de novo standard of review”). “In exercising de novo

       review, we presume that laws enacted by the General Assembly are constitutional,

       and we will not declare a law invalid unless we determine that it is unconstitutional

       beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cooper, 376 N.C. at 33, 852 S.E.2d at 56 (citation and

       quotation marks omitted); see also North Carolina Ass’n of Educators, 368 N.C. at

       786, 786 S.E.2d at 262 (“This Court presumes that statutes passed by the General

       Assembly are constitutional, and duly passed acts will not be struck unless found

       unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” (citations omitted)).
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                                            Opinion of the Court

              b. Waiver

¶ 50          In its waiver argument, Defendant specifically asserts “[a] facial constitutional

       challenge to a state statute is governed by the procedure found in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§

       1-267.1, 1-81.1, and [1A-1,] N.C. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4).” Defendant alleges “Plaintiffs

       failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 42(b)(4)[5] for raising a facial challenge

       to the constitutionality” of § 116-311 and thus “have waived their ability to do so.”

¶ 51          Defendant’s argument rests on a faulty premise because Plaintiffs only raised

       as-applied constitutional challenges below.         During the hearing on Defendant’s

       Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs’ attorney emphasized four

       separate times they were making as-applied challenges:

                 •   “The first thing I will say and that I want to make very clear is that we

                     have not made a facial challenge to the statute. We are alleging as

                     applied in this case, as they wish to apply it, it is unconstitutional

                     particularly among a number of other sections against the federal

                     contracts clause.”

                 •   “Again, I would posit that we are not making a facial challenge but an

       5 The requirements of Rule 42(b)(4) control the application of the other two statutes
       Defendant previously mentioned, §§ 1-267.1 and 1-81.1. See Holdstock, 270 N.C. App. at 273,
       276, 841 S.E.2d at 312, 314 (explaining how Rule 42(b)(4) “limits the application of N.C.G.S.
       § 1-267.1(a1)” and then discussing how § 1-81.1 also “restricts” its “requirement to only
       properly raised challenges as set forth in Rule 42(b)(4)” (emphasis from original omitted)).
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                                          Opinion of the Court

                     as-applied challenge.”

                 •   “We’re making an as-applied challenge.”

                 •   “That is not what we’re trying to do is make a facial challenge to this.”

¶ 52         The as-applied nature of the challenge matters because the statutes Defendant

       directs our attention towards “only apply to ‘facial challenges to the validity of an act

       of the General Assembly, not as applied challenges.’” See Cryan v. National Council

       of Young Men’s Christian Associations of the United States, 280 N.C. App. 309, 2021-

       NCCOA-612, ¶ 19 (quoting Holdstock, 270 N.C. App. at 271, 841 S.E.2d at 311). And

       Plaintiffs clarifying they were not making a facial challenge, combined with the lack

       of a trial court ruling that Plaintiffs were actually making a facial challenge, means

       no facial challenge was made to trigger the requirements set out by §§ 1-267.1, 1-81.1,

       and 1A-1, Rule 42. See Cryan, ¶ 21 (“As Defendant made clear they were only making

       an as applied challenge to the 2019 amendments, and the trial court did not make a

       determination itself that Defendant’s constitutional challenges were in fact a facial

       challenge, no facial challenge was made in the time prescribed by Rule 42(b)(4) for a

       court to be able to transfer a facial challenge to a three-judge panel.”).

¶ 53         Although Plaintiffs argued their constitutional challenge was only an as-

       applied claim, we recognize that Plaintiffs’ own characterization of the claim is not

       necessarily the end of the analysis. Recently, this Court in Kelly v. State held “a court

       is not restricted per se by a party’s categorization of its challenge as facial or as-
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       applied and may conduct its own review to determine whether the party’s challenge

       is facial or as-applied.” Kelly v. State, 2022-NCCOA-675, ¶ 23. As Judge Hampson’s

       dissent in Kelly indicates, id. ¶¶ 47-48 (Hampson, J. Dissenting), this holding may

       conflict with Cryan because Cryan focused primarily on whether a party itself said

       they were making a facial or as-applied challenge. Cryan, ¶ 21 (“As [the d]efendant

       made clear they were only making an as applied challenge . . . no facial challenge was

       made . . . .”). If the tests from Cryan and Kelly were to lead to different outcomes, we

       would need to address this potential conflict in precedent. See, e.g., Huml v. Huml,

       264 N.C. App. 376, 395, 826 S.E.2d 532, 545 (2019) (explaining how to resolve “a

       conflict in cases issued by this Court addressing an issue”).

¶ 54         But we do not need to address this potential conflict in precedent. Whether we

       apply the test announced in Kelly or we rely upon Cryan, the result is the same:

       Plaintiffs’ challenge to § 116-311 here is an as-applied challenge. See Kelly, ¶¶ 24, 26

       (setting out test for “determining whether a challenge is as-applied or facial”). The

       Kelly Court explained the test to differentiate between as-applied and facial

       challenges requires a court to “look to the breadth of the remedy requested.” Kelly, ¶

       24. The Kelly Court then differentiated between the two types of challenges:

                    A claim is properly classified as a facial challenge if the
                    relief that would accompany it “reach[es] beyond the
                    particular circumstances of these plaintiffs.” Doe [v. Reed],
                    561 U.S. [186,] 194, 130 S. Ct. [2811,] 2817, 177 L. Ed. 2d
                    [493,] 501. A claim is properly classified as an as-applied
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                                           Opinion of the Court

                     challenge if the remedy “is limited to a plaintiff’s particular
                     case.” Libertarian Party v. Cuomo, 300 F. Supp. 3d 424, 439
                     (W.D.N.Y. 2018), overruled on other grounds by N.Y. State
                     Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, --- U.S. ----, 142 S. Ct. 2111,
                     213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022).

       Id. (first brackets in original). In Kelly, this Court determined the plaintiffs made a

       facial challenge because (1) the relief requested “would, if successful, effectively

       preclude all enforcement of the statute[;]” and (2) the plaintiffs did not allege any

       facts from which an as-applied determination could be made because they had not

       sought to be part of the challenged program. Id. ¶¶ 27-31 (citations and quotation

       marks omitted).

¶ 55          Here, examining Plaintiffs’ challenge with Kelly’s test, we again conclude

       Plaintiffs have made an as-applied challenge. First, looking at the relief requested,

       see id. ¶ 28, Plaintiffs made the constitutional challenge in the context of their specific

       case where they are seeking to recover money they and the proposed classes paid for

       tuition, fees, on-campus housing, and meals. This situation differs from Kelly where

       the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment the challenged program was

       unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against continued operation of that

       program. See id. ¶ 27. Here, we could find an as-applied constitutional violation that

       opens a limited pathway to allow Plaintiffs and the proposed class to recover the

       monies they seek without “effectively preclude[ing] all enforcement” of § 116-311

       since Plaintiffs do not seek a declaratory judgment that the statute is
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                                         Opinion of the Court

       unconstitutional or injunctive relief barring its enforcement. See id. ¶ 28. Plaintiffs

       merely seek a ruling § 116-311 cannot be used to grant Defendant immunity from

       their lawsuit. For example, they argued before the trial court: “That is not what we’re

       trying to do is make a facial challenge to this. I don’t care whether the state and

       Lenoir-Rhyne or Gardner-Webb try to enforce this immunity on any other students

       that might run this. I’m concerned about the case that I’ve brought.”

¶ 56         Further, unlike the plaintiffs in Kelly, Plaintiffs here could and did allege facts

       on which an as-applied constitutionality determination could be made because they

       were impacted by the challenged statute. See id. ¶ 30. For example, Plaintiffs’

       attorney argued below the challenge was partially based on “the federal contracts

       clause.” As discussed above, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges they personally

       entered into contracts with the Universities, so they could challenge § 116-311 on the

       ground it impaired their contracts specifically.         See North Carolina Ass’n of

       Educators, 368 N.C. at 786, 786 S.E.2d at 262 (explaining the Contract Clause of the

       United States Constitution bars a state from passing “any Law impairing the

       Obligation of Contracts” (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (ellipses omitted))).

       Although we do not have in our record Plaintiffs’ precise arguments before the trial

       court on this ground, see Fn. 2, supra, their separation of powers argument

       demonstrates the as-applied nature of their challenge to § 116-311 even more clearly.

       On appeal, Plaintiffs argue § 116-311 unconstitutionally “intrudes upon the
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       separation of powers because it is a law that was passed in response to specific

       litigation already pending in the courts with the purposes of directing the courts on

       how to adjudicate the pending actions.” This argument relies on when Plaintiffs filed

       their specific lawsuit, i.e. before the General Assembly passed the immunity statute,

       so it necessarily relies on facts “specific to” Plaintiffs “from which to determine

       whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied.” See Kelly, ¶ 30 (requiring such

       facts for a challenge to be as-applied).

¶ 57         Under both of Kelly’s factors, see id. ¶¶ 27-31, Plaintiffs here make an as-

       applied challenge to the immunity statute. Thus, applying Kelly’s test, we reach the

       same conclusion as our previous analysis based on Cryan.        Therefore, we reject

       Defendant’s argument Plaintiffs have waived their constitutional challenges to § 116-

       311 and the statutory immunity it provides against Plaintiffs’ claims.

             c. Merits

¶ 58         Turning to the merits, Plaintiffs argue § 116-311 is unconstitutional on five

       grounds: (1) the United States Constitution’s clause barring states from impairing

       contracts; (2) the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and North Carolina

       Constitutions; (3) the Due Process Clauses of the United States and North Carolina

       Constitutions; (4) the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United States

       Constitution; and (5) the separation of powers doctrine. We address each of those five

       arguments in turn.
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¶ 59          Under the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, “no State shall

       pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”           North Carolina Ass’n of

       Educators, 368 N.C. at 786, 786 S.E.2d at 262 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 10)

       (ellipses and brackets omitted). Our courts use a three-factor test to “determine

       whether a Contract Clause violation exists.” Id. (citing Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130,

       141, 500 S.E.2d 54, 60 (1998)). That test, adopted from the Supreme Court of the

       United States’s decision in U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, “requires a court to

       ascertain: (1) whether a contractual obligation is present, (2) whether the state’s

       actions impaired that contract, and (3) whether the impairment was reasonable and

       necessary to serve an important public purpose.” Bailey, 348 N.C. at 140-41, 500

       S.E.2d at 60 (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 52 L.Ed.2d 92

       (1977)).   Here, we have already determined Plaintiffs pled a valid contractual

       obligation when we decided the contract claims survived sovereign immunity, thereby

       meeting the first prong of the test. Assuming arguendo the second prong, impairment

       of the contract, is met, Plaintiffs fail at the third prong.

¶ 60          The third prong, “whether the impairment was reasonable and necessary to

       serve an important public purpose[,]” recognizes “[n]ot every impairment of

       contractual obligations by a state violates the Contract Clause” because the state can

       still permissibly use its police power. Bailey, 348 N.C. at 151, 500 S.E.2d at 66 (citing

       U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 21, 25-26, 52 L.Ed.2d at 109, 111-12). The third prong
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       “involves a two-step process, first identifying the actual harm the state seeks to cure,

       then considering whether the remedial measure adopted by the state is both a

       reasonable and necessary means of addressing that purpose.” North Carolina Ass’n

       of Educators, 368 N.C. at 791, 786 S.E.2d at 265 (citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc.

       v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412, 74 L.Ed.2d 569, 581 (1983)); see

       also Lake v. State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees, 380 N.C. 502, 2022-

       NCSC-22, ¶ 64 (quoting that portion of North Carolina Ass’n of Educators).

¶ 61         Here, the Article on immunity explains the purpose of the statute: “It is a

       matter of vital State concern affecting the public health, safety, and welfare that

       institutions of higher education continue to be able to fulfill their educational

       missions during the COVID-19 pandemic without civil liability for any acts or

       omissions for which immunity is provided in this Article.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-313

       (2021).   In North Carolina Ass’n of Educators, our Supreme Court explained

       “maintaining the quality of the public school system is an important purpose.” See

       North Carolina Ass’n of Educators, 368 N.C. at 791, 786 S.E.2d at 266. While the

       case did so in the context of elementary and secondary school public education, see id.

       at 781, 786 S.E.2d at 259 (referencing history of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-325 (2012));

       N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 115C (covering elementary and secondary education), the

       quality of post-secondary education is also an important purpose for the State,

       especially when it has decided to create a public university system to, inter alia,
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       “improve the quality of education[.]” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-1(a) (2021) (“In order

       to foster the development of a well-planned and coordinated system of higher

       education, to improve the quality of education, to extend its benefits and to encourage

       an economical use of the State’s resources, the University of North Carolina is hereby

       redefined in accordance with the provisions of this Article.”).

¶ 62         Turning to the second part of the third prong, we must determine “whether the

       remedial measure adopted by the state is both a reasonable and necessary means of

       addressing that purpose.” See North Carolina Ass’n of Educators, 368 N.C. at 791,

       786 S.E.2d at 265. The immunity statute was a reasonable means of ensuring the

       quality of education because it allowed the Universities to focus on how to best deliver

       education online rather than trying to continue in person and expending resources

       on all the public health measures necessary to try to achieve that prospect safely.

       With the benefit of hindsight, there are many different opinions on the effectiveness

       or wisdom of closures of educational institutions as a response to the COVID-19

       pandemic, but this Court need not attempt to resolve these questions as they are not

       presented by this case. The General Assembly limited the application of N.C. Gen.

       Stat. §116-311 to the spring semester of 2020 only, and this was the only semester

       during which the Universities had to deal with an immediate response to the COVID-

       19 pandemic for students who were already enrolled and on campus when the

       Governor’s Emergency Directives were issued. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-311(a)(1)
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                                   Opinion of the Court

(“The claim arises out of or is in connection with tuition or fees paid to the institution

of higher education for the spring academic semester of 2020.”); see generally E.O.

116, Cooper, 2020, § 1 (first COVID-19 Emergency Directive). The immunity statute

was a reasonable response to the COVID-19 pandemic at the time it was adopted, in

the context of the Governor’s Emergency Directives. See, e.g. E.O. 116, Cooper, 2020,

§ 1 (declaring a state of emergency based on “the public health emergency posed by

COVID-19”); E.O. 120, Cooper, 2020, § 4 (closing other educational institutions,

namely public schools, from 16 March 2020 to 15 May 2020 pursuant to, inter alia,

the state of emergency); E.O. 121, Cooper, 2020, § 1-2, 7 (imposing a 30-day stay-at-

home order effective 30 March 2020 pursuant to, inter alia, the state of emergency

with a limited exception for educational institutions, including public colleges and

universities, only for “facilitating remote learning, performing critical research, or

performing essential functions, provided” social distancing of at least six feet from

other people was respected).      The statute was also a necessary response to the

COVID-19 pandemic and the need to ensure educational quality during the early days

of the pandemic. Removing the possibility of liability from the Universities ensured

they could shift to online learning and focus on education without worrying about

either public health measures to continue in person or the prospect of lawsuits arising

from having to change the method of instruction mid-semester. Put another way, it

is unclear what else the General Assembly could have done to achieve the same goal
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       of ensuring the focus was on continuing the Universities’ educational mission in light

       of the uncertainty caused by the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. Because we

       find the immunity statute to be reasonable and necessary, we reject Plaintiffs’

       argument the statute violates the federal Constitution’s Contract Clause.

¶ 63         Second, Plaintiffs argue § 116-311 violates the equal protection clauses of the

       federal and State Constitutions because it “aimed at protecting only one group of

       specific entities[,]” Defendant and its Universities “against the claims of another

       specific group” and did not extend to other industries that also “suffered financially

       from the pandemic” such as “[g]yms, restaurants, and countless other businesses . . .

       forced to close their physical locations.” Since Plaintiffs’ argument rests on differing

       classifications of universities versus other businesses affected by the COVID-19

       pandemic, the tests under the federal and State Constitutions are identical. See

       Liebes v. Guilford County Dept. of Public Health, 213 N.C. App. 426, 428, 724 S.E.2d

       70, 72 (2011) (“Our courts use the same test as federal courts in evaluating the

       constitutionality of challenged classifications under an equal protection analysis.”

       (quoting Richardson v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 345 N.C. 128, 134, 478 S.E.2d 501,

       505 (1996))). This Court has described those tests as follows:

                    Upon the challenge of a statute as violating equal
                    protection, our courts must “first determine which of
                    several tiers of scrutiny should be utilized” and then
                    whether the statute “meets the relevant standard of
                    review.” Department of Transp. v. Rowe, 353 N.C. 671, 675,
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                                          Opinion of the Court

                    549 S.E.2d 203, 207 (2001). Where “[t]he upper tier of equal
                    protection analysis requiring strict scrutiny of a
                    governmental classification applies only when the
                    classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
                    a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
                    disadvantage of a suspect class,” we apply the lower tier or
                    rational basis test if the statute neither classifies persons
                    based on suspect characteristics nor impinges on the
                    exercise of a fundamental right. White v. Pate, 308 N.C.
                    759, 766-67, 304 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1983).

       See Liebes, 213 N.C. App. at 428-29, 724 S.E.2d at 72-73. Here, Plaintiffs do not argue

       any suspect classification or fundamental right is involved, so we apply only rational

       basis. See id. at 428-29, 724 S.E.2d at 73.

¶ 64         “The pertinent inquiry under rational basis scrutiny is whether the

       ‘distinctions which are drawn by a challenged statute or action bear some rational

       relationship to a conceivable legitimate governmental interest.’” Id. at 429, 724

       S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Texfi Industries v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11, 269 S.E.2d

       142, 149 (1980)). While we need not determine the actual purpose when conducting

       rational basis review, see id., here the statutory explanation in § 116-313 we

       excerpted above provides the required rational basis. Not only are the educational

       missions of institutions of higher learning a legitimate government interest, but the

       importance of education is also enshrined in our State’s Constitution. See N.C. Const.

       Art. IX, § 1 (“Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government

       and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall
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                                           Opinion of the Court

       forever be encouraged.” (emphasis added)). And the immunity law helped further that

       purpose by allowing the Universities to focus on educational quality rather than

       worry about lawsuits or what public health measures would be needed to allow

       schools to continue in person during the early stages of the pandemic. Since there is

       a rational basis for treating institutions of higher learning different than gyms or

       restaurants, the immunity statute survives equal protection analysis.

¶ 65         Third, Plaintiffs argue § 116-311 “violates the due process clauses of the United

       States and North Carolina Constitutions” because they were “deprived of their

       property rights in the contract, and their property rights in the chose of action that

       they have acquired as a result of Defendant’s breach of said contract.” Plaintiffs

       provide no authority in support of this argument. As with the Equal Protection

       Clauses, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

       Constitution is “synonymous” with the “term ‘law of the land’ as used in Article I,

       Section 19, of the Constitution of North Carolina,” see, e.g., In re Moore’s Sterilization,

       289 N.C. 95, 98, 221 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1976), so our analysis is identical under both

       the federal and State Constitutions.

¶ 66         The Supreme Court of the United States has long made clear “the State

       remains free to create substantive defenses or immunities for use in adjudication . . .

       .” See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432, 71 L.E.2d 265, 276 (1982).

       In such a case, “the legislative determination provides all the process that is due.”
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       Id. at 433, 71 L.E.2d at 276 (citing Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of

       Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915)). For example, in Martinez

       v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980), the Supreme Court of the United

       States “upheld a California statute granting officials immunity from certain types of

       state tort claims.” See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432, 71 L.E.2d at 276. While “the grant of

       immunity arguably did deprive the plaintiffs of a protected property interest . . . they

       were not thereby deprived of property without due process” because of the legislative

       determination. Id. at 432-33, 71 L.E.2d at 276. The only requirement was that the

       legislative action had “a rational relationship” to the legislature’s “purposes.”

       Martinez, 444 U.S. at 282, 62 L.Ed.2d at 487 (quotation marks omitted); see also

       Martinez, 444 U.S. at 282, 62 L.Ed.2d at 487 (“[E]ven if one characterizes the

       immunity defense as a statutory deprivation, it would remain true that the State’s

       interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal

       interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state

       action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational.”).

¶ 67         Here, faced with another immunity statute, we also only need to determine if

       there was a rational relationship between § 116-311 and its purpose. See id. As laid

       out above, the statute grants immunity to allow the Universities to fulfill their

       academic missions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 116-313. As noted above in our discussion

       of the reasonableness of the immunity statute when discussing the Contract Clause,
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                                          Opinion of the Court

       there is a rational relationship between the grant of immunity and that goal because

       immunity freed up the Universities to focus on how to best deliver education online

       rather than trying to continue in person and take all the public health measures

       necessary to do that, which would have necessarily taken resources away from efforts

       to ensure educational quality. Therefore, we reject Plaintiffs’ contention § 116-311

       violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause or our Constitution’s

       corresponding Law of the Land Clause.

¶ 68         Fourth, Plaintiffs argue the immunity statute violates the Takings Clause of

       the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because their “chose in

       action” from Defendant’s breach of contract is property that was taken without just

       compensation. The only authority Plaintiffs cite in support of this contention is Frost

       v. Naylor, 68 N.C. 325 (1873) and its statement “a chose in action is property.” See

       Frost, 68 N.C. at 326. But Frost focused on “our Constitution,” not the federal

       Constitution’s Takings Clause. See id. Plaintiffs present no caselaw showing a chose

       in action, or a right to sue in general, see Chose in Action, Black’s Law Dictionary

       (11th ed. 2019) (defining a chose in action as “[t]he right to bring an action to recover

       a debt, money, or thing”), can be the basis of a Takings Clause violation under the

       United States Constitution. Therefore, we reject this argument.

¶ 69         Finally, Plaintiffs argue § 116-311 unconstitutionally “intrudes upon the

       separation of powers because it is a law that was passed in response to specific
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                                           Opinion of the Court

       litigation already pending in the courts with the purposes of directing the courts on

       how to adjudicate the pending actions.” Plaintiffs provide no other argument, law, or

       citations to support that argument; the entire argument is that sentence. As such,

       even assuming arguendo passing a law in response to specific litigation already

       pending would violate separation of powers, Plaintiffs have failed to provide any

       evidence this law was passed in such a manner. Therefore, we reject Plaintiffs’

       separation of powers argument.

¶ 70         Thus, after our de novo review we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

       that § 116-311 is unconstitutional. Because we uphold the constitutionality of § 116-

       311 against all of Plaintiffs’ arguments and have already decided it applies to this

       case, we now hold Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by statutory immunity. This holding

       applies to bar Plaintiffs’ contract claims that survive sovereign immunity, and it also

       represents an alternative bar to Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims. Therefore, the

       trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims.

                                       III.    Conclusion

¶ 71         We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims. Sovereign immunity

       bars Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims, but it does not bar their contract claims

       because they have pled valid implied-in-fact contracts. Statutory immunity from N.C.

       Gen. Stat. § 116-311 bars Plaintiffs’ contract claims and, in the alternative, their

       unjust enrichment claims, because the statute applies to their claims based on its
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                                Opinion of the Court

plain language and meaning and is constitutional.

      AFFIRMED.

      Judges COLLINS and CARPENTER concur.