Court Opinion

ID: 9380098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 09:08:56.81769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:22.540474
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                          TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 10-21-00173-CV

PHARUS FUNDING, LLC
AS ASSIGNEE OF LHR, INC.,
                                                            Appellant
v.

JERRY SOLLEY AND
LOLA M. SOLLEY,
                                                            Appellees

                       From the County Court at Law No. 1
                             Johnson County, Texas
                           Trial Court No. C200800653

                                       OPINION

      Pharus Funding, LLC (Pharus), as assignee of LHR, Inc., (LHR) brings this appeal

from the trial court’s denial of its application to revive a dormant judgment against Jerry

and Lola Solley (the Solleys). We will vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss the

application.
                           Procedural and Factual Background

       The trial court awarded LHR a default judgment against the Solleys on April 22,

2009. The judgment was not renewed by execution or other means and became dormant.

In June of 2020, Pharus filed a notice of change of ownership and designation of lead

counsel that had two documents attached. The first document, titled “Assignment,” was

an agreement between LHR and Millennium Financial Group, LLC (Millennium) for the

transfer of “accounts receivable” from LHR to Millennium. The second document, titled

“Transfer and Assignment,” was an agreement between Millennium and Pharus for the

transfer of “accounts” from Millennium to Pharus. On July 16, 2020, Pharus filed its

application to revive the judgment that sought a writ of scire facias or an order reviving

the judgment. The trial court conducted a brief hearing on September 23, 2020 and denied

Pharus’ application. Pharus’ attorney was present via video link at the hearing, and the

Solleys did not appear even though Pharus’ attorney certified the Solleys had been given

notice of the hearing via certified mail.

                                            Issue

       On appeal Pharus contends the trial court erred in denying Pharus’ application for

Writ of Scire Facias to revive a dormant judgment.

AUTHORITY

       “If a writ of execution is not issued within 10 years after the rendition of a

judgment . . . the judgment is dormant and execution may not be issued on the judgment

Pharus Funding v. Solley                                                            Page 2
unless it is revived.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 34.001. “A dormant judgment

may be revived by scire facias or by an action of debt brought not later than the second

anniversary of the date that the judgment becomes dormant.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 31.006. “In deciding whether a judgment should be revived, the trial court

is without discretion to revive a judgment if the statutory requirements are satisfied.”

McShane v. McShane, 556 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet.

denied) (quoting Webb v. Yorkshire W. Capital, Inc., No. 05-16-00390-CV, 2017 WL 677825,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 21, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).           “A scire facias

proceeding is normally ‘a non-evidentiary hearing for which there is no need for findings

of fact and conclusions of law.’” Id. (quoting Cadle Co. v. Rollins, No. 01-09-00165-CV,

2010 WL 670561, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

A trial court when deciding whether to grant a scire facias considers: (1) the date of the

judgment, (2) evidence of any writs of execution issued on the judgment, and (3) the date

of the scire facia application to revive. Harper v. Spencer & Assoc.’s, P.C., 446 S.W.3d 53,

56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

DISCUSSION

       During the hearing conducted in the trial court, Pharus’ attorney requested “that

the court issue a writ of scire facias that can be served on the defendants to revive the

judgment.” The trial court denied Pharus’ requested relief. Before ruling, the trial court

Pharus Funding v. Solley                                                              Page 3
noted Pharus’ allegation of ownership of the judgment in its application but commented

that no document reflected that Pharus actually owned the judgment.

       The documents Pharus attached as exhibits to its notice of change of ownership

and designation of lead counsel reflect transfers of accounts from LHR to Millennium

and from Millennium to Pharus. The first document recites that LHR “hereby sells,

transfers, assigns to [Millennium] all of its rights, title, and interests, not otherwise

retained in the court’s order, in the accounts receivable more particularly described and

set forth in Exhibit A.” The record before us does not include an attached exhibit to the

first transfer document.      The second document recites that Millennium “hereby

absolutely transfers, assigns, sets-over and conveys to [Pharus] . . . all of Assignors’ right,

title and interest in and to each of the Accounts identified in the Account Schedule

attached hereto as Exhibit A. . . .” The record before us does not include an attached

exhibit to the second document. Furthermore, neither of the documents refer to the

judgment which Pharus seeks to revive.

       The First and Seventh Courts of Appeals have reviewed a question of ownership

of a judgment in a scire facias proceeding as a question of standing. See Vackar v. Mem'l

Bank, No. 01-00-01033-CV, 2002 WL 1303424, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June

13, 2002, no pet.); Cadles of Grassy Meadow, II, LLC v. Herbert, No. 07-09-00190-CV, 2010

WL 1705307, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 27, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op).

Pharus Funding v. Solley                                                                Page 4
       “Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Ass'n of

Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). “Because standing is a

component of subject[-]matter jurisdiction, we consider [standing issues] as we would a

plea to the jurisdiction.” Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015)

(internal quotes omitted). “[A] court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction is not required to

look solely to the pleadings but may consider evidence and must do so when necessary

to resolve the jurisdictional issues.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). Because subject matter

jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case, it is never presumed

and cannot be waived. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443-44. Questions of standing are

subject to de novo review. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 240

(Tex. 2020).    To establish standing, a person must show a personal stake in the

controversy. The M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 707-08 (Tex. 2001)

(citing In the Interest of B.I.V., 923 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. 1996))

       The trial court’s order denying the application to revive recites that the trial court

considered the “pleadings, arguments and applicable authority” before finding that the

requested relief should be denied. The trial court’s comment that no document reflected

that Pharus actually owned the judgment is significant because it indicates the trial court

reviewed and considered the court’s file along with the two documents attached to

Pharus’ notice of change of ownership when denying Pharus’ application. Furthermore,

Pharus Funding v. Solley                                                               Page 5
the two documents provided by Pharus do not make reference to a judgment, much less

the judgment in this cause by style, cause number, or name of debtor.

                                      Conclusion

       We conclude, after our review of the record, that Pharus failed to affirmatively

demonstrate its standing which deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

       We vacate the trial court’s order denying the application to revive a dormant

judgment and dismiss the application for want of jurisdiction.

                                                MATT JOHNSON
                                                Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,*
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Smith
       *(Chief Justice Gray dissents.)
Order vacated; application dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Opinion delivered and filed March 15, 2023
[CV06]

Pharus Funding v. Solley                                                            Page 6