Court Opinion

ID: 9847076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:53:22.982396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:00.274940
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which approves the award of attorney fees in the amount of $210,000 to the appellant beneficiaries. While the majority properly sets out the general rule that recovery from the estate is permitted where a benefit has been conferred on the estate, the record clearly discloses the sole motive behind this litigation initiated by the appellants is personal.
The trusts documents, analyzed from their four corners, leave no necessity for construction. In the midst of “sole” and “absolute” powers vested in the trustee, appellants focus on the minor “present interest” phrase and assert ambiguity; that construction in view of these well prepared trust documents is unreasonable as the majority concluded.
Even a cursory reading of the massive record in this case reveals the appellants’ sole motivation and purpose in pursuing their construction was to gain control of the management of the newspaper. Mr. John Eberhardt, a respected Wichita attorney unconnected with this litigation, testified that “however you label that action, [it] involved basically the control of probably the most desirable thing in Sedgwick County to control, the newspaper.” However well qualified appellants’ candidates may have been, the appellants’ purpose was in direct conflict with the purposes of Marcellus Murdock who placed his confidence in the Bank. The anticipated advantage sought by the appellants can only be characterized as personal.
Our longstanding rule is that no attorney fees will be chargeable against an estate when the object of the litigation is purely for the *220personal benefit of the litigant. In Householter v. Householter, 160 Kan. 614, 164 P. 2d 101, the court said:
“. . . Counsel for the appellant contend that the district court should have allowed them attorneys’ fees even though they represented the unsuccessful party in the case. They assert that the sole question to be decided is the proper construction of a will and that without a decision on such question, the appellees would have been unable to perfect title to the involved real estate. In support of their contention they cite Singer v. Taylor, 91 Kan. 190, 137 Pac. 931, and other cases. In the present case, however, the appellant sought the recovery of a specific interest in described land. The appellees were forced involuntarily to uphold a will which did not appear on its face to be ambiguous. No estate or trust fund was benefited by the litigation. From a standpoint of construction and equity there appears to be no more reason why the appellees should pay attorneys’ fees to counsel for appellant. . . . The appellant sought to recover for his personal benefit — not for the benefit of all parties incidentally concerned with the litigation. In such cases attorneys’ fees ordinarily are not properly allowed to counsel for the unsuccessful party. (See Bartlett v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 358 Ill. 452, 193 N. E. 501, and annotation in 142 A. L. R. 1459.)...”(pp. 619, 620.)
In the case of In re Estate of Reynolds, 176 Kan. 254, 270 P. 2d 229, the court said:
“The opinion In re Estate of Reynolds, 173 Kan. 102, 244 P. 2d 234, makes it clear that the portion of the will which counsel for Bertha J. Blue sought to have construed needed no construction. The language is clear. The efforts of her attorneys were for her own benefit. The trial court obviously was of the opinion that such services were not helpful in the administration of the estate and that there was no reason why the estate should have to pay it. . . . ” (p. 258.)
Here the appellants have failed on each substantive point raised in this litigation — “construction” of the trust, surcharge and removal. Aside from any lack of benefit to the estate, the unsuccessful outcome of the litigation on the facts in this case suggests that attorney fees should not be paid out of the trust estate. See, Annot., 9 A. L. R. 2d 1132, 1236 [1950].)
It is respectfully submitted the trial court erred in awarding counsel fees as to the appellants.
Fbomme and Miller, JJ., join in the foregoing dissent.