Court Opinion

ID: 9671766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:43:11.041997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.923284
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 59. {concurring). We have previously determined that negligent supervision claims against a religious body are barred in Wisconsin by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because of the threat of excessive entanglement between government and religion. L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d 674, 686-98, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 325-331, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995). We have also previously concluded that the discovery rule does not save intentional sexual assault claims in priest abuse cases from the applicable statute of limitations. BBB Doe v. Archdiocese, 211 Wis. 2d 312, 366, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997).
¶ 60. The issues of the Establishment Clause and the discovery rule are again before us, but in a different context. Our prior cases can be readily distinguished from the allegations made here.
¶ 61. The petition for review in this case sets forth two questions: (1) Whether a review of the Archdiocese's conduct for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or fraud would require the court to become "excessively entangled" in solely ecclesiastical matters in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and (2) Whether the discovery rule applies to save the plaintiffs claims against the defendants from the bar of the statute of limitations.
*340¶ 62. Instead of answering the questions, however, the majority dodges them. It decides this case in an error correcting fashion based on the sufficiency of particular allegations in an individual complaint.1
¶ 63. As a result, the questions in this context remain open. I believe that the court should have answered them because they were fully briefed and argued. For the benefit of the lower courts and future litigants, I address the questions left unanswered by the majority.
¶ 64. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." U.S. Const. Amend. 1. This constitutional guarantee is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757 (1995).
¶ 65. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment involves the separation of church and state and prohibits the government from enacting laws that "aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). Although different in purpose than the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause *341shares the concept of neutrality as one of its central principles. Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 687 n. 11.
¶ 66. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a three-part test to determine whether a neutral law violates the Establishment Clause: (1) the law must have a secular purpose; (2) the primary or principal effect of the law must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the law must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).2 There is no question that the tort laws at issue satisfy the first two prongs of Lemon. Thus, the analysis necessarily centers on its third prong.
¶ 67. In this case, there is no threat of excessive entanglement between government and religion. After all, Doe is not asking the judicial branch to interpret church canons, church polices, or church practices in order to resolve this case. Rather, he is asking it to help ascertain, through neutral tort principles, whether the church-employer took the necessary steps to prevent foreseeable harm to children. This task is not beyond the capabilities of the courts. Employers, including religious employers, must be subject to such laws if our children are to be made safe.
¶ 68. Nevertheless, the court of appeals here concluded that negligent supervision claims against a religious body are barred in Wisconsin by the Establish*342ment Clause of the First Amendment.3 Doe v. Archdiocese, Nos. 03-1416, 03-1417, unpublished slip op., ¶ 6 (Wis. Ct. App. July 30, 2004) (citing Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 325-31; Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 686-98). It further determined that Pritzlaff and Clauder implicitly barred Doe's claims of breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. Id. I conclude that the court of appeals' reliance on Pritzlaff and Clauder is misplaced.
*343¶ 69. The facts in both Pritzlaff and Clauder are readily distinguishable from the case at hand. In those cases, this court considered a claim that the church negligently hired and retained a priest who engaged in consensual sexual conduct with an adult woman. See Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 307-08; Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 679. The harm at issue would have required consideration and interpretation of church doctrines, including the vow of celibacy. See Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 310; Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 696.
¶ 70. By contrast, the harm alleged in the present case involved criminal sexual assault against a minor child. Such facts do not warrant examination of church doctrine. Indeed, this court in Clauder contemplated that such an action would survive a constitutional challenge. Quoting with approval Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206, 208 (La. Ct. App. 1994), we stated: "This is a secular court. If sexual or other conduct of a priest violates secular standards, e.g., child molestation, this Court will impose whatever civil or criminal secular sanctions may be appropriate." Clauder, 209 Wis. 2d at 696 (emphasis added).
¶ 71. This court should not allow church officials to be beyond reproach of the law. As one court has recently warned, "to hold otherwise and immunize the Church Defendants could risk placing religious institutions in a preferred position over secular institutions, a concept both foreign and hostile to the First Amendment." Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 365 (Fla. 2002)
¶ 72. I conclude these allegations emanating from alleged child sexual assault pose no threat of excessive entanglement between government and religion. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is not a bar here because secular, not religious, standards are implicated. As the Clauder court instructed: if con*344duct violates secular standards, this court will provide criminal sanctions and civil remedies as appropriate. 209 Wis. 2d at 696. Accordingly, I would hold that in the context of cases involving child sexual assault, the Establishment Clause does not bar plaintiffs from pursuing these secular actions.
HH h*H
¶ 73. Having addressed the First Amendment issue, I turn next to the Archdiocese's statute of limitations defense. In this case, the Archdiocese maintains that all of Doe's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Doe, meanwhile, asserts that the limitations period relevant to his claims was tolled until he discovered the nature of his claim and the cause of his injury. He asserts that the "discovery rule" that we recognized in Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983), applies to save his claim from the bar of the statute of limitations.
¶ 74. "In the interest of justice and fundamental fairness," the Hansen court held that tort claims "shall accrue on the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should be discovered, whichever occurs first." Id. at 560. The cause of injury does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers both the nature of his claim and the cause of his injury. Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 314-15 (citing Borello v. United States Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 406-07, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986)).
¶ 75. Here, the court of appeals resolved the statute of limitations dispute in favor of the Archdiocese. Relying on BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d 312, it concluded that any derivative claim against the Archdiocese, because it is derivative, accrued at the same time the underlying intentional tort claims accrued. Doe v. Archdiocese, *345unpublished slip op. at ¶ 4. Additionally, it observed that to the extent the plaintiff asserted any direct claims against the Archdiocese, those claims also would be tied to the accrual date of the underlying intentional tort of the perpetrator. Id. at ¶ 5. The court of appeals errs when it concludes that BBB Doe foreordains the result here.
¶ 76. Like Pritzlaff and Clauder, BBB Doe can be distinguished from the case at hand. The analysis of the court in BBB Doe focused on the claim against the perpetrator, not the Archdiocese. The court stated that it was not addressing the negligent employment claims against the Archdiocese and assumed that all claims against the Archdiocese were derivative. BBB Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 366.
¶ 77. Subsequent to BBB Doe, the law of negligent employment theories has evolved. This court in Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. recognized the tort of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. 219 Wis. 2d 250, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998). Also subsequent to BBB Doe, the nature of such claims has been clarified. This court has acknowledged that these claims are not derivative. Rather, the claims against the Archdiocese here are independent and direct.
¶ 78. In Doyle v. Engelke, we determined, "While negligent supervision does require an underlying wrong to be committed by the employee as an element, the tort actually focuses on the tortious, i.e. negligent, conduct of the employer." 219 Wis. 2d 277, 291 n. 6, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998). Likewise, in Clauder, we observed that in a cause of action for negligent supervision, "liability does not result solely because of the relationship of the employer and employee, but instead because of the independent negligence of the employer." 209 Wis. 2d at 699. Because these claims are no longer considered *346derivative, the underlying rationale for tying the accrual date of the claim against the Archdiocese to the accrual date of the intentional tort of the perpetrator no longer applies.
¶ 79. In addition, our discovery rule jurisprudence has evolved since BBB Doe was decided. Two years after the BBB Doe decision, this court addressed the application of the discovery rule in the context of false allegations of sexual abuse.
¶ 80. In Sawyer v. Midelfort, the plaintiffs sued for injuries they sustained in 1985, when they alleged that their daughter made false allegations that her parents sexually abused her. 227 Wis. 2d 124, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999). The plaintiffs did not file their suit alleging negligence against the therapist until 1996 when they obtained access to their then deceased daughter's therapy records, which reflected a form of therapy known as repressed memory therapy. The plaintiffs claimed that they did not know that the therapy was the cause of their daughter's false memories and their resulting injuries until they obtained the records. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by Wis. Stat. § 893.54, the three-year statute of limitations governing injury to the person.
¶ 81. In addressing the statute of limitations issue, the Sawyer court acknowledged that the Hansen discovery rule could be applied to benefit claims involving false allegations of sexual abuse. Id. at 155-56. Ultimately, the court concluded that it could not state as a matter of law that the Sawyers failed to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the cause of their injury. Id. at 158. Accordingly, it remanded the matter to the circuit court for further fact-finding consistent with the discovery rule. Id.
*347¶ 82. In contrast to the Sawyer case, actual sexual abuse is alleged here. It makes no sense to apply the discovery rule in cases involving false allegations of sexual abuse, but to deny its benefit in cases involving allegations of actual sexual abuse. Such a distinction would be without a principled difference. The benefit of the discovery rule should be applied to both.
¶ 83. Because Doe's independent, direct claims against the Archdiocese involve different elements from any potential cause of action against Father Nuedling's estate, the discovery rule may still benefit Doe's claims even when the underlying claim against the perpetrator has already been time barred. As counsel for Doe explained at oral argument, the allegations in this case "do not arise out of the moment of the sexual attack. They arise out of the secrecy of the Archdiocese, which we only could learn about as of 2002."
¶ 84. Although the court of appeals suggests that Doe should have suspected the Archdiocese's role in the abuse sooner, there was no reason for him to do so. Until the priest abuse scandals gained national attention, most victims had no basis for believing that the institutional church was involved. Many of the child victims apparently believed that they were the only ones who were sexually abused. Information regarding the number of additional victims and the Archdiocese's role in perpetuating child abuse would be in the exclusive possession of the Archdiocese.
¶ 85. Failure to recognize the application of the discovery rule places Wisconsin victims of child molestation in an anomalous situation. Courts in other states have allowed claims of similarly situated child victims of clergy abuse to proceed against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee. See e.g., The Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Superior Court of Orange County, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154 *348(2003); cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2874; Delonga v. Diocese of Sioux Falls, et al, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (2004).
¶ 86. In Delonga, the plaintiff brought an action in a federal district court in South Dakota against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee and others. She alleged that between 1965 and 1970 she was regularly and repeatedly sexually abused by a priest of the Diocese of Sioux Falls while he was serving on assignment as a priest in the Milwaukee Archdiocese. Letters between the Bishops revealed that both were aware of the priest's past conduct of child molestation. In a letter dated February 28, 1965, the Bishop of Sioux Falls wrote to the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, asking "for any help you can give me and Father MacArthur in our present dilemma" and asked if an assignment could be found for him in the Milwaukee area. Id. at 1094.
¶ 87. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that despite her exercise of due diligence, she was prevented from discovering her causes of action because of the defendant Dioceses' fraudulent concealment and representations about Father MacArthur. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs claims were timed barred. The Delonga court, applying the discovery rule, allowed the plaintiff to proceed. Id. at 1104.
¶ 88. I am mindful of the policy concerns against allowing Doe's claim here. Yet, it is Doe who carries the burden of proof. While the passage of time may make his claims more difficult to prove, for the reasons stated above, he should not be barred from his opportunity to do so. Accordingly, I would hold that the discovery rule applies to save the plaintiffs claims against the defendants from the bar of the statute of limitations.
*349HH HH
¶ 89. In the end, the majority wastes a golden opportunity today to provide much needed guidance to this area of law regarding the Establishment Clause and the discovery rule. Because I believe that this court, in its law development capacity, should have reached these issues and concluded that they do not bar the plaintiffs claims, I respectfully concur.
¶ 90. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence, and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins Part I of this concurrence.

 The court of appeals' primary function is error correcting. Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 188, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997). By contrast, this court's primary function is that of law defining and law development. Id. at 189.

 Several U.S. Supreme Court Justices have expressed dissatisfaction with the Lemon test, advocating alternative frameworks. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (advocating and applying a coercion test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating adoption of an endorsement test). Until the Supreme Court reaches a consensus on its successor, however, Lemon remains a viable test.

 Such a conclusion would put Wisconsin in a distinct and diminishing minority. Recently, the Florida Supreme Court joined the "majority of both state and federal jurisdictions that have found no First Amendment bar under similar circumstances." See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 351 (Fla. 2002) (citing Bear Valley Church of Christ v. Debose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323 (Colo. 1996); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 314-15 (Colo. 1993); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 283-88 (Colo. 1988); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 450, 454 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997); Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702-03 (N.J. 1997); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 795-96 (1997); Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Oh. 1991); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Martinez v. Primera Asemblea de Dios, Inc., No. 05-96-01458, 1998 WL 242412, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. May 15, 1998); C.J.C. v. Corporation of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262, 277 (Wash. 1999); Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan, 196 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999); Smith v. O'Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1431-32 (N.D. Iowa 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1998); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (N.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998); Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F.Supp. 66 (D. Conn. 1995); Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1995)).