Court Opinion

ID: 9621670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:03:19.023937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:28.941495
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The literal language of § 928(a) provides for the award of reasonable attorney’s fees in this case regardless of whether the fees were for representation before or after “controversion.” While the provision for “reasonable fees” might be limited to fees for court work but not work done at the claim-preparation level, such an argument has been consistently rejected in numerous analogous contexts and it would be anomalous to accept such an argument here. The only basis for coming to a different conclusion in this case is the limitation in § 928 on the award of any fees to cases in which the services of an attorney are utilized after the employer has declined to pay within thirty days of notice of the claim. This limit, which gives full meaning to the word “thereafter” in the statutory language, simply does not address the scope of the fees awarded once the condition is met. To read more into the statutory language is the equivalent of adding words that are not there. I therefore respectfully dissent from parts II.A and II.B of the majority opinion, while I concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.
In relevant part, § 928(a) provides that If the employer ... declines to pay any compensation on or before the thirtieth day after receiving written notice of a claim ... and the person seeking benefits shall thereafter have utilized the services of an attorney at law in the successful prosecution of his claim, there shall be awarded ... a reasonable attorney’s fee ... in an amount approved by the deputy commissioner, Board, or court ... which shall be paid directly by the employer ... to the attorney for the claimant.
33 U.S.C. § 928(a) (emphasis added). Thus, if: (1) the employer, after receiving notice, refuses to pay compensation within thirty days, and (2) the employee subsequently uses an attorney’s services in the successful prosecution of his claim, then (3) responsibility for “reasonable” fees shifts to the employer. The “thereafter” clause thus makes the post-controversion use of legal services, like employer refusal, a precondition to fee shifting. The “thereafter” clause does not, however, by its terms act to limit the services for which fees may *422shift. The “thereafter” language is not even located in the clause of § 928(a) addressing the type of fees awardable and the method of their payment, which is found in the latter half of that subsection and similarly makes no mention of temporal limitations. In fact, the only explicit restriction anywhere in § 928(a) on what fees may be awarded is that they must be “reasonable.”
There is simply no way that the word “thereafter” has no meaning or effect under this reading, or that it does not have its dictionary meaning of “after that.” Pre-controversion fees do not shift unless the employer controverts its liability and “after that” the employee utilizes an attorney’s services in the successful prosecution of his claim. WebsteR’s ThiRD New International DiCtionary 2372 (2002) (defining “thereafter” to mean “after that” or “from then on”).
There is, moreover, a perfectly logical rationale for reading the “thereafter” clause — as it is written — as a precondition to any fee-shifting. If an employer decides to pay a claim within thirty days, even when a lawyer worked to help present the claim, the employer does not have to pay the attorney’s fees. This encourages employers to pay claims they are not sure of winning in court, and thus serves as a powerful encouragement to pay promptly without litigation.
Absent reliance on the “thereafter” clause, § 928(a) would certainly be interpreted properly to provide for pre-contr-oversion fees, in light of the consistent court holdings regarding analogous schemes for the provision of attorney’s fees. Like § 928, most federal fee-shifting statutes, such as the Equal Access to Justice Act and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, state only that awards of attorney’s fees, where appropriate, must be “reasonable.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Supreme Court has explained that this language “[njormally [permits recovery for] all hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (interpreting § 1988). “Of course, some of the services performed before a lawsuit is formally commenced ... are performed ‘on the litigation.’ ” Webb v. Bd. of Educ. of Dyer County, Tenn., 471 U.S. 234, 243, 105 S.Ct. 1923, 85 L.Ed.2d 233 (1985) (interpreting § 1988). Thus, a “reasonable” fee award may include money for tasks completed in anticipation of litigation if they were “both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance ... the litigation.” Id. The Courts have accordingly permitted awards of attorney’s fees for pre-litigation work under, for example, the Voting Rights Act, see Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 458 (5th Cir.1993), the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Native Village of Quinhagak v. United States, 307 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir.2002), the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pollgreen v. Morris 911 F.2d 527, 536 (11th Cir.1990), the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Perotti v. Seiter, 935 F.2d 761, 764 (6th Cir.1991), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Wright v. Hanna Steel Corp., 270 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir.2001).
To preclude pre-controversion fees would be entirely anomalous and out of sync with all of these cases unless the “thereafter” clause makes § 928 different. But the “thereafter” clause does nothing of the sort, and it follows as a matter of pure statutory interpretation that pre-contr-oversion fees may be awarded.
Such awards are moreover supported by the policies underlying the Act, as the Director persuasively asserts in this case. First, the availability of pre-controversion *423fee awards promotes the swift resolution of compensation disputes. As the Supreme Court has observed, the main policy of the Act is to “encourage the prompt and efficient administration of compensation claims.” Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596, 612, 101 S.Ct. 1945, 68 L.Ed.2d 472 (1981). Shifting pre-controversion fees furthers this end by making it less cost-prohibitive for employees to obtain legal representation during the claims-filing stage. When employees utilize the services of an attorney during this period, they are able to develop their cases earlier and more fully. This, in turn, allows both parties to assess the strength of the claim more accurately, enabling them to make better informed choices and the dispute resolution process to proceed more efficiently. Where the employee does have a meritorious compensation claim, it is advantageous for both parties to be aware of that early on in the process. Armed with such knowledge, most employers will begin voluntarily paying compensation, thereby avoiding costly adjudicatory proceedings and the shifting of attorney’s fees. Employees, of course, will benefit in this situation by receiving compensation sooner, rather than later. When a claim is without merit, on the other hand, it is likewise preferable for the parties to be informed of that as soon as possible. Particularly from the employer’s standpoint, it is important to know whether the employee’s claim is truly weak, or merely appears weak because the employee does not have the legal training to properly present his claim. Without such knowledge, the employer risks either paying compensation unnecessarily, or erroneously controverting the claim and eventually incurring substantial costs and fees.
Second, along with promoting the efficient resolution of compensation disputes, the shifting of pre-controversion fees prevents an employee’s recovery from being diminished by attorney’s fees. Section 928 was “designed to ensure that an employee will recover the full amount of his statutory benefits” and “will not have to reach into [those] benefits to pay for legal services, thus diminishing the ultimate recovery.” Oilfield Safety & Mach. Specialties, Inc. v. Harman Unlimited, Inc., 625 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir.1980); see also Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 854 F.2d 632, 637 (3d Cir.1988); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Simmons, 706 F.2d 481, 485 (4th Cir.1983). If pre-controversion legal fees cannot be shifted, an employee’s compensation will, for all practical purposes, necessarily be reduced in many cases.
Further, awarding attorney’s fees for services performed during the claims-filing period is consistent with the 1972 amendments to the Act, which streamlined the dispute resolution process. It does appear that in passing these amendments, Congress was trying to reduce an employee’s need for counsel during the claims-filing period by giving the Secretary a larger role in resolving compensation disputes. Congress appears to have hoped that these changes would allow employees, if they wished, to rely on the Secretary for advice. See H. Rep. No. 92-1441 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4710 (expressing a desire that assistance from the Secretary would “enable the employee to receive the maximum benefits due to him without having to rely on outside assistance”). But Congress did not expect such aid from the Secretary always to be forthcoming; the assistance of attorneys would thus often still be necessary. Although § 939 of the Act requires the Secretary to provide employees with certain general information, it does not mandate that she act as their lawyer. Under the terms of that section, the Secretary “shall” supply employees with information con*424cerning, for example, the scope of the Act’s coverage or the availability of rehabilitation services. 33 U.S.C. § 939(e)(1). With respect to specific legal advice, however, § 939 states only that the Secretary “may, upon request, provide [employees] with legal assistance in processing a claim.” Id. (emphasis added). The discretionary nature of legal assistance from the Secretary is confirmed by the legislative history to the amendments, which states that “[t]he bill also makes legal assistance in processing the claim for benefits ... available in needy cases upon request subject to the Secretary’s discretion.” H.R. Rep. 92-1441 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4710. Congress’s recognition that legal assistance would sometimes be needed, yet not available from the Secretary, certainly allows the conclusion that Congress permitted the shifting of pre-controversion fees.
Pre-controversion Secretarial assistance is also consistent with the availability of precontroversion fees in light of the risk that no fees will shift because the employer pays the claim within the thirty days. Employees with a less than certain claim will obtain risk-free help in processing their claim by turning to the Secretary in the first instance, and resorting to an attorney only where the Secretary is unable to provide assistance.
Finally, the categorical exclusion of pre-controversion fees would require attorney’s fees to be artificially divided based upon the time at which the underlying legal assistance was given. What should be most relevant, however, is not the fortuity of when a service is performed, but whether that service contributed to a successful outcome. Services are no less “useful” to the prosecution of a claim simply because they are performed prior to an employer’s controversion.
While these many policy considerations are not controlling, they do confirm a straightforward reading of § 928 to permit reasonable pre-controversion attorney’s fees as long as the services of an attorney are utilized after the employer disputes its liability or simply does not pay within the thirty-day post-notice period.
This conclusion is further bolstered by a certain amount of deference that we owe the Director in the interpretation of the Act. Exactly as the Supreme Court held with respect to the Director’s interpretation of a different provision of the same Act:
Our view, as it turns out, coincides on this point with the position taken by the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), who is charged with the administration of the Act, and who also construes the Act [the same way as reasoned earlier in the opinion]. See Brief for Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs 12-21, 24-31. The Secretary of Labor has delegated the bulk of her statutory authority to administer and enforce the Act, including rule-making power, to the Director, see Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 125-126, 115 S.Ct. 1278, 131 L.Ed.2d 160 (1995); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 519 U.S. 248, 262-263, 117 S.Ct. 796, 136 L.Ed.2d 736, (1997), and the Director’s reasonable interpretation of the Act brings at least some added persuasive force to our conclusion, see, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (giving weight to agency’s persuasive interpretation, even when agency lacks “power to control”); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345-346, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997).
*425Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 136, 117 S.Ct. 1953, 138 L.Ed.2d 327 (1997). It is true that the Director’s interpretation has not been consistent over the years, see Childers v. Drummond Co., 2002 WL 32301637, at *4 (Ben.Rev.Bd.2002), and this lessens the level of Skidmore deference somewhat. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976). But this inconsistency is not enough to discount wholly the Director’s considered interpretation, id., and Skidmore deference thus brings some added force to the conclusion that pre-controversion fees are permitted by § 928.
There is yet one more consideration in favor of interpreting § 928 to permit pre-controversion fees. Doing so ensures that identical sections of the Act and the Black Lung Act are interpreted in the same manner. Pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 932(a), the Black Lung Act incorporates § 928 in its entirety. Normally, “when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes ..., it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005). Under the regulations to the Black Lung Act, which are entitled to the more deferential Chevron deference, attorney’s fees payable under that statute “shall include reasonable fees for necessary services performed prior to the creation of the adversarial relationship.” 20 C.F.R. § 725.367(a). To give § 928 a different reading under the Act would create an anomalous incongruence in the meaning of identical language in two analogous statutory provisions.
For these reasons, reasonable pre-contr-oversion fees are permitted by § 928(a). This conclusion obviates the need to interpret § 928(b) in this case. I therefore
respectfully dissent from parts II.A and II.B of the majority opinion, although I join in the rest.