Court Opinion

ID: 9853893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:51.337723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:13.633848
License: Public Domain

Justice Frye
dissenting.
Although our cases have in the past made reference to the existence of an “additional consideration” exception to the doctrine of employment at will, see Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 629, 356 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1987); Tuttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 219, 139 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1964), and our Court of Appeals has more fully described the exception based on moving residence, see Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 345, 328 S.E.2d 818, 828, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985); Burkhimer v. Gealy, 39 N.C. App. 450, 454, 250 S.E.2d 678, 682, disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 298, 254 S.E.2d 918 (1979), as the majority notes, this Court has never expressly passed upon the precise issue presented by the facts of this case. This Court granted defendant’s petition for discretionary review in this case to decide, first, whether North Carolina recognizes an exception to the rule of employment at will based on: (1) an employer’s making statements that can be construed as assurances that the employee will be discharged only for deficient performance, and (2) an employee’s providing “additional consideration” by moving his residence to accept employment in response to those assurances. I believe a more precise statement of this question is whether an enforceable contract exists between employer and employee, so as to remove the presumption that the employment is terminable at will, where the employer makes specific assurances and the prospective employee gives additional consideration in reliance on those assurances.
The majority correctly states that North Carolina follows the doctrine of employment at will. However, employment at will is not, nor should it be, an ironclad mandate which prevents employers and employees from negotiating the terms of the employment relationship to their mutual satisfaction. The general rule of employment at will is more accurately construed as a rebuttable presumption which can be overcome by the words and conduct of the parties, allowing a jury to find that the parties in fact reached certain agreements within *336a contract of employment. I read the majority’s decision as holding that representations made by an employer to a prospective employee and supported by additional consideration are insufficient as a matter of law to create an enforceable contract unless the employer specifies a definite term of service. Because this holding contradicts established principles of contract law, I must respectfully dissent.
The case often cited as the earliest adoption of North Carolina’s employment-at-will rule, Edwards v. Seaboard & Roanoke R.R. Co., 121 N.C. 490, 28 S.E. 137 (1897), in fact recognized the contractual nature of the employment relationship. The facts in Edwards' required the Court to discern the intent of the parties as to the term of employment. The Court held that the contract was not specific as to the term of service, and therefore, “[i]t does not seem unreasonable that the parties intended that the service should be performed for a price that should aggregate the gross sum annually, leaving the parties to sever their relations at will, for their own convenience.” Id. at 491, 28 S.E. at 137 (emphasis added).
In reviewing the origins of employment at will, this Court has noted that American courts moved toward the doctrine after “the industrial revolution and the development of freedom of contract.” Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 174, 381 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1989). Nothing else appearing, freedom of contract arguably presumes the freedom of either party to terminate the employment relationship at will. However, an inflexible adherence to this presumption cannot stand in the face of evidence of contrary intent on the part of the contracting parties. As stated by the majority, “parties can remove the at-will presumption by specifying a definite period of employment contractually.” Likewise, where an employer agrees to restrict his right to discharge an employee in exchange for additional consideration provided by the employee, the courts must recognize that a contract has been formed which removes the presumption of employment at will.
In applying this analysis, the essential inquiry is whether the necessary elements of an enforceable contract were present. “A contract is an agreement, upon a sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing.” Campbell v. Campbell, 234 N.C. 188, 191, 66 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1951). Cases in which an employee relocates merely as an incident of accepting new employment will not rebut the presumption of employment at will. However, an agreement and consideration are both present where the employer has induced the employee to *337move his residence based on specific assurances that he will not be discharged except for deficient performance. This approach, which relies on contract principles, does not establish a “general exception” to employment at will in all cases involving a relocation.
The second issue presented by defendant-appellant in this case is whether, if North Carolina recognizes such an exception to the rule of employment at will, the record in this case supports the application of the exception and is sufficient to sustain the verdict returned in favor of plaintiff. Again, I believe a more precise question is whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support a jury’s finding that an enforceable contract existed so as to rebut the presumption of employment at will. The majority states that the assurance primarily relied upon by plaintiff “is not sufficient to make this indefinite hiring terminable only for cause” and holds that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court, which denied defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. I disagree.
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b)(1) is essentially a renewal of an earlier motion for a directed verdict. See Raintree Homeowners Ass’n v. Bleimann, 342 N.C. 159, 164, 463 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1995) (citing Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 201 S.E.2d 897 (1974)). Therefore, the test for determining whether a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted is the same as that which is applied when determining whether a motion for a directed verdict could have been properly granted. See id. (citing Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1977)). “A directed verdict is proper only if it appears that the nonmovant failed to show a right .to recover upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably tends to establish.” West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 40, 326 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1985); see also Haas v. Warren, 341 N.C. 148, 152, 459 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1995). Further, all of the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here the plaintiff, giving plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom and resolving all conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies in plaintiff’s favor. See Haas, 341 N.C. at 152, 459 S.E.2d at 256.
In this case the jury was presented, and answered, the following crucial questions:
Before plaintiff, Kurtzman, accepted a position of employment with defendant, AAI, did AAI make specific assurances to *338him that he would be discharged from employment with AAI only for deficient performance?
Answer: Yes
Did the defendant, AAI, breach the employment contract by terminating the plaintiff, Kurtzman, without just cause?
Answer: Yes
The proper question for this Court, therefore, is whether there was evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-moving party, from which the jury could find that defendant made specific assurances to plaintiff that he would be discharged only for deficient performance and that defendant breached the employment contract by terminating plaintiff without just cause.
There was testimony in this case that during the course of negotiation for employment, plaintiff made known his concern about job security and received certain assurances from defendant. Plaintiff, who at that time held a secure position, was concerned about the security of the position for which he was being recruited. Defendant assured plaintiff that it was a “career position.” When plaintiff specifically inquired about a written contract, defendant responded that he did not need a contract “if he was any good” and that as long as he did his job, he would have a job. From these statements a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant promised plaintiff he would not be discharged unless his performance was deficient. In reliance on these assurances, and in acceptance of defendant’s promise, plaintiff resigned from his job and moved his residence in order to accept employment with defendant. A jury could reasonably find that this action by plaintiff constituted sufficient additional consideration to support the employment contract.
All the evidence considered by the jury, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, could reasonably support plaintiff’s contention that defendant made specific assurances that plaintiff would not be discharged unless his performance was deficient and that the contract was supported by additional consideration apart from plaintiff’s services. Therefore, I believe that the trial judge properly denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court.