Court Opinion

ID: 9864546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 13:53:54.176282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:42.354603
License: Public Domain

THE COURT.
Appellant, in its petition for rehearing, calls our attention to section 2966 of the Civil Code, as it read prior to its amendment by the legislature in 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 140), in relation to the removal of mortgaged property from the county in which it is situated at the time of the mortgage to some other county, and thus giving the right to take possession to the mortgagee, and insists that the tes*730timony shows that the automobile involved in this transaction was removed from San Francisco to the county of Fresno, and the taking of possession by the appellant was consequently lawful.  There are two reasons why this contention is untenable. The first is that the instrument in question does not come under the provisions of. the law relating to the execution of chattel mortgages in so far as the removal of property is concerned, or the recording of instruments are affected. The lien in this case existed only between the mortgagee and mortgagor by reason of the nature of the transaction, and not by reason of the statute relating to the form and manner of executing chattel mortgages.  The second reason is that the instrument in question describes the home and place of residence of the mortgagor as Fresno, in the county of Fresno, and it is evident that the automobile, if in San Francisco at the time of the execution of the mortgage, was there only for temporary purposes, and that its situs was really in Fresno, the home of the mortgagor.
The foregoing points are mentioned herein because not called to our attention in the briefs upon which the case was submitted.
The petition for rehearing is denied.