Court Opinion

ID: 9903243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:33:34.869393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:10.523408
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                     FIFTH DISTRICT
                                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ROSIE LEE WILLIAMS,

            Appellant,

v.                                           Case No. 5D23-478
                                             LT Case No. 2022-DR-00660

ROGER WILLIAMS, SR.

         Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed May 1, 2023

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Clay County,
Gary L. Wilkinson, Judge.

J. Nickolas Alexander, Jr., of J.
Nickolas Alexander, Jr., P.A., Orange
Park, for Appellant.

No Appearance for Appellee.

LAMBERT, C.J.

      Rosie Lee Williams (“Wife”) appeals the trial court’s “interim” order

entered after a hearing in her dissolution of marriage litigation below that she

asserts denied her motions for temporary spousal support, for interim partial
equitable distribution of marital assets, and to enjoin Roger Williams, Sr.

(“Husband”) from dissipating certain marital assets. While orders denying

an injunction or determining the right in family law matters to immediate

monetary relief are reviewable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure

9.130, the instant order merely granted Husband’s motion to stay the

proceedings.     Such an order is not one of the listed nonfinal orders

reviewable under this rule. See Westwood One, Inc. v. Flight Express, Inc.,

940 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“Appellate jurisdiction to review

an appeal from a non-final order is limited to the types of rulings set forth in

rule 9.130 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.”).

      This, however, does not end our analysis. The proper remedy for an

alleged erroneous entry of a stay is certiorari relief. See Shoemaker v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 890 So. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“A trial

court has broad discretion to grant a motion for stay, but certiorari is available

as a remedy if the delay in proceedings constitutes a departure from the

essential requirements of law causing material injury that cannot be

remedied on direct appeal.” (citing Smith v. St. Vil, 765 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla.

4th DCA 2000))). Accordingly, we shall treat this appeal as a petition seeking

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certiorari relief 1 and, for the following reasons, dismiss the petition.

      To obtain a writ of certiorari, Wife here must show that the nonfinal

order entered is “(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law,

(2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot

be corrected on postjudgment appeal.” Golub v. Golub, 325 So. 3d 164, 170

(Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (quoting Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132 (Fla.

2011)). These “second and third prongs are sometimes collectively referred

to as the ‘irreparable harm’ element, and they are jurisdictional.” Id. (citing

Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mahon, 293 So. 3d 1091, 1095

(Fla. 5th DCA 2020)).

      The trial court was apprised that petitions had been filed in separate

cases to determine whether Husband was mentally incapacitated and, if so,

to appoint a plenary guardian for Husband.          The court indicated that it

anticipated that orders would be issued within the month resolving those

petitions and thus elected to briefly stay the dissolution of marriage

proceedings until these separate orders were entered.

      1
       See Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) (“If a party seeks an improper remedy,
the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought . . . .”
(emphasis added)); Pridgen v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Orange Cnty., 389
So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (concluding that the language in rule
9.040(c) is mandatory).

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      As previously indicated, a trial court has broad discretion to grant a

motion for stay. Shoemaker, 890 So. 2d at 1197. Under these specific

circumstances, we conclude that there is a lack of irreparable harm caused

by this brief stay. We therefore dismiss the petition. See Golub, 325 So. 3d

at 170 (recognizing that absent a showing of irreparable harm, an appellate

court lacks jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and the proceeding is to be

dismissed, rather than denied (citing Mahon, 293 So. 3d at 1096)). Our

dismissal, however, is without prejudice to Wife seeking further relief if,

assuming Husband has been found incapacitated and had a guardian

appointed, the trial court does not thereafter vacate the stay in the dissolution

of marriage litigation.

      DISMISSED, without prejudice.

BOATWRIGHT and KILBANE, JJ., concur.

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