Court Opinion

ID: 9719311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:48:28.90282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.899412
License: Public Domain

BARTEAU, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In Lannan v. State (1992), Ind., 600 N.E.2d 1334, our supreme court abandoned the "depraved sexual instinct" exception to the admission of uncharged crimes and criminal conduct in favor of the policy espoused in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B). Because the supreme court did not provide that Lannan would operate only prospectively, its holding is applicable to, at a minimum, all cases pending on direct appeal where the issue is properly preserved. Pirnat v. State (1993), Ind., 607 N.E.2d 973 (opinion on rehearing) (Pirnat II);, Pirnat v. State (1992), Ind., 600 N.E.2d 1342 (Pirnat I); Sink v. State (1993), Ind.App., 605 N.E.2d 270; Vanover v. State (1992), Ind.App., 605 N.E.2d 218; Moran v. State (1992), Ind.App., 604 N.E.2d 1258.
The case before us was pending on direct appeal at the time Lonnaonr was decided, but here no objection was made at trial to the presentation of the "depraved sexual *282instinct" testimony. The majority takes the position that defense counsel's failure to object to the "depraved sexual instinct" testimony operates as a waiver of that issue on appeal, citing Pirnat II. Pirnat II provides that "Pirnat and others whose cases properly preserved the issue and whose cases were pending on direct appeal at the time Lannan was decided" receive the benefit of Lonnan. While the language in Pirnat II specifically grants review in cases where the issue is preserved and the case is pending on direct appeal, it does not specifically mandate that Lonnan is inapplicable, or that a finding of waiver is required, in cases pending on direct appeal where the issue is not preserved. Waiver is the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Because the right to not be faced with evidence of uncharged molestations did not exist at the time of defendant's trial, failure to object to that testimony cannot be considered an intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right.1
Any law of evidence is subject to review, even one which has been firmly entrenched for decades. If, as the majority posits, an objection is required to preserve review in the event a change is implemented prior to the case becoming final, then it would be incumbent upon a defense attorney to object to each and every bit of evidence offered by the prosecutor in order to provide effective advocacy and to protect a client's interest lest the evidentiary rule relied upon be altered prior to the case becoming final. If we require defense attorneys to practice precognitive objecting, then it is only fair to hold prosecutors to the same standard and require them to refrain from presenting evidence which might be deemed objectionable before conclusion of the direct appeal. Likewise, judges should be found in error for not anticipating the actions of higher courts.
"[OJnce a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, even-handed justice requires that it be ap-. plied retroactively to all who are similarly situated." Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 300, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1069-1070, 103. L.Ed.2d 334. Whether a defendant is "sim- j ilarly situated" is a matter of fundamental | fairness. As such, each defendant whose: case is not yet final or is pending on direct! review should have his or her case evaluat-} ed to determine whether fundamental fair-i? ness requires application of the Lannan" rule. If the impermissibly tainted evidence ,; was such a central part of the case against" the defendant that we could not say with a certainty that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict with or without this evidence, then retroactive application of the new rule is appropriate. Rowley v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 1078. See also Strong v. State (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 969 (Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
A review of the record in this case convinces me that the "depraved sexual in-stinet'" testimony of M.H. was such a significant part of the evidence that we cannot say the integrity of the jury verdict was not undermined by its admission. As with many child molest cases, there was no direct evidence that a molestation had occurred other than the victim's testimony. Instead, the prosecution's case consisted of the testimony of the victim, bolstered by the testimony of several others repeating the victim's allegations (a practice curtailed by Modesitt v. State (1991), Ind., 578 N.E.2d 649), and the "depraved sexual instinct'" testimony of M.H. that defendant had molested her when she was his stepdaughter. It is impossible to say that, in a , contest of credibility between two people, evidence of a previous molestation would: *283not be significantly weighted by a fact-finder. Thus, because defendant's case was pending on direct review at the time Lannan was decided, fundamental fairness requires that the rule announced therein be applied retroactively to defendant's case.
For the above reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. It also seems incongruous that in civil cases of a like nature a precognitive objection is often not required. See Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crabtree (1984), Ind.App., 467 N.E.2d 1220 (even though no objection was made to punitive damages instruction, the issue was remanded for retrial because the case was being tried on the day the supreme court issued the opinion changing the standard of proof for punitive damages); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dercach (1983), Ind.App., 450 N.E.2d 537 (no objection to punitive damages instruction but nevertheless ordered a new trial on the issue because the opinion changing the standard of proof was issued while the case was pending on direct review). Surely the liberty interest inherent in criminal cases is more worthy of protection than the pecuniary interest involved in a civil case.