Court Opinion

ID: 9410254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 16:09:50.219775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:56.416172
License: Public Domain

J-A15036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    MICHELE JEWETT                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOHN R. RODGERS                            :   No. 1429 WDA 2021

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 22, 2021
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County
                       Civil Division at No(s): 2021-2615

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                              FILED: July 20, 2023

        Michele Jewett (“Jewett”) appeals from the order denying her petition

for a final order pursuant to the Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) Act.1     We

affirm.

        We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this case

as follows: John R. Rodgers (“Rodgers”), a married insurance agent, began

an affair with Jewett in May 2020. See N.T., 11/22/21, at 43. The affair

lasted for nearly a year, terminating in March 2021. Id. Rodgers and Jewett

would communicate daily by text and speak once or twice a week on the

phone. Id. They saw each other in person once or twice a week. Id. The

relationship was sexual, and the two would have intercourse in Rodgers’s

office, and, sometimes, at Jewett’s house. Id. at 7-8.

____________________________________________

1   See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101 - 6122.
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      The relationship deteriorated when Jewett realized Rodgers had no

intention of leaving his wife (hereinafter “Wife”), and the affair ended after

what Rodgers described as a “heated exchange back and forth about the

status of the relationship and how it was moving.” Id. at 59. Jewett testified

that she left Rodgers when it became clear he did not intend to leave Wife.

Id. at 10. Rodgers testified that Jewett was angry at him and that she told

him she would get back at him by telling Wife and sending her “the information

that she had.” Id. at 59-60. Jewett, at one point, told Rodgers, “You need

to fess up to [Wife] and . . . take your beating. We will both leave you.” Id.

at 74. After the breakup, Rodgers learned that Jewett had taken a still photo

of her and Rodgers—from her home surveillance system—and posted it to

Facebook in the form of a “banner picture.” Id. at 64-65.

      On March 14 and 15, 2021, after the affair concluded, Wife received

messages via her work e-mail account about the affair, purportedly from

someone        named       “Amanda         Gill,”       using      the     address

“germantown979@yahoo.com.” Id. at 24-26. The March e-mails referenced

specific conversations Rodgers had with Jewett, including a specific instance

of   Rodgers   advising   Jewett   that   Wife      stopped   by   Rodgers’s   office

unannounced, and that Jewett should not come over. Id. at 77. The e-mails

also referenced another conversation Jewett and Rodgers had about Wife in

which Rodgers told Jewett he had told Wife to “go find your happiness.” Id.

at 76. Wife blocked the “germantown979” address. Id. at 29.

                                      -2-
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       Subsequently, on September 15, 2021, Wife received approximately

thirty-four e-mails from Amanda Gill containing screenshots of text messages

between Rodgers and Jewett. Id. at 29, 66.2 The outgoing address of these

emails was “germantown999@yahoo.com,” though the messages had been

forwarded to “germantown999” from “germantown979.” Id. at 29.3 Those

e-mails had attachments of screenshots of text messages Rodgers received

from Jewett following their breakup.             Id. at 65, 68, 70.   In those text

messages—which Jewett admitted she originally sent to Rodgers—Jewett

expressed anger at Rodgers for “play[ing]” her. Id. at 68, 70. The allegations

in the e-mails matched the allegations in the text messages, including that

Jewett had not wanted a relationship with Rodgers, and sought to “run” or

“cut him off,” but he had “pursued” or “chased” her, and the e-mails and text

messages accused Rodgers of speaking “bullshit.” Id. at 70-72. Jewett also

sent Rodgers messages exhorting him to “fess up to [Wife] and take your

beating.” Id. at 74.

       In September 2021, within days of Wife receiving e-mails containing

text messages between Rodgers and Jewett, Rodgers received messages from

a phone number ending in -3308 taunting him about whether he would get a

____________________________________________

2Wife’s testimony is unclear about which, if any, of these September e-mails
were directed to her personal e-mail address.

3Wife also received a text message on September 16, 2021, and an e-mail
on September 21, 2021, both from Amanda Gill, the subject of which was
Rodgers’s affair with Jewett. Id.

                                           -3-
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divorce and telling him he would never admit to the affair because he was

“more concerned with [his] reputation,” among other things. See id. at 58-

59. Wife likewise received messages earlier that month from the same -3308

number about her marriage. Id. at 27, 28.

       The Rodgerses’ daughter, M.R., worked at a Quaker Steak & Lube,

located over an hour from her parents’ residence. N.T., 11/22/21, at 103,

107. In October 2021, Jewett approached M.R. in person in the bathroom of

the restaurant and told her about the affair. Id. at 103. According to M.R.,

Jewett did not threaten her or Rodgers at that time. Id. at 106.

       Rodgers testified that he was afraid of Jewett, specifically,

       I have no idea what she is capable of doing. She’s reaching out
       to my family and friends. She . . . has driven out of the way to
       confront my daughter. These are things that have all escalated
       since the dumping [of e-mails on Wife in] September. I truly do
       believe that she’s capable of doing more than this, and I don’t
       want to not be ready.

Id. at 80.4

____________________________________________

4  Wife, when asked what in the messages she found threatening toward
Rodgers, explained, “I find the behavior erratically dangerous by confronting
both myself and my family, and stalking us, and following us around on
Facebook and other venues, finding out my e-mail, finding out my work e-
mail, finding out my cell phone number, all of these things are extremely
frightening.” N.T., 11/22/21, at 41. Wife also became frightened because—
in addition to the communications she had personally received—Jewett had
personally sought out her and Rodgers’s daughter to tell each of them about
the affair. Id.

                                           -4-
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       Jewett, for her part, testified that on September 8, 2021, she had been

driving to participate in a 5K run when Rodgers began “aggressively following

[her] . . . tailgating [her, to the extent that she had] to drive aggressively to

get away from him. He was tailgating [her], weaving in traffic and trying to

keep up with [her].” Id. at 10-11.5

       Jewett and Rodgers cross-petitioned for PFA orders.       The trial court

granted a temporary PFA order for Rodgers but denied Jewett’s request.

Following a hearing on the cross-petitions, the trial court denied Jewett’s

petition for a final PFA order and granted Rodgers’s petition for a final PFA

order. See N.T., 11/21/22, at 140-41. Jewett timely appealed both the denial

of her petition and the granting of Rodgers’s petition. The case sub judice

concerns Jewett’s appeal from the order denying of her petition for a final PFA

order.6 Both Jewett and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Jewett raises the following issues for our review:

       1. The court erred by not determining that [Jewett] was in
          reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm.

       2. The court erred by deeming [Rodgers] credible.
____________________________________________

5 We note that Jewett alleged in her PFA petition that Rodgers had on “several
occasions . . . drugged [her] against her will in order to sexually abuse her,
including physically restraining her.” Jewett’s PFA Petition, 10/14/21, at ¶ 8.
Our review of the record reveals that she did not testify to such at the PFA
hearing. Rodgers denied these allegations on cross-examination. See N.T.,
11/22/21, at 79.

6We separately address Jewett’s appeal from the order granting Rodgers’s
petition for a final PFA order at Rodgers v. Jewett, No. 1428 WDA 2021.

                                           -5-
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       3. The court erred by failing to consider [Rodgers’s] prior actions
          as [they] relate to [Jewett’s] reasonable fear of harm.

       4. The court erred/abused its discretion by admitting
          unauthenticated text message and e[-]mail evidence.

       5. The court erred by admitting irrelevant testimony regarding
          [Jewett’s] phone records.

       6. The court erred by admitting hearsay evidence related to
          information regarding [Jewett’s] alleged prior criminal charges.

       7. The court erred by using the denial of a final PFA order in this
          matter as punishment for [Jewett’s] actions in the cross-PFA
          matter which were unsubstantiated.

Jewett’s Brief at 1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted; issues re-ordered for

ease of disposition).7

       Our standard of review for an order denying PFA relief is as follows:

              [T]his Court reviews the trial court’s legal conclusions for an
       error of law or an abuse of discretion. A trial court does not abuse
       its discretion for a mere error of judgment; rather, an abuse of
       discretion occurs where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable
       or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that
       the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. . . .
       Finally, we review the evidence of record in the light most
       favorable to, and grant all reasonable inferences to, the party that
       prevailed before the PFA court.

____________________________________________

7 We note with disapproval that Jewett’s statement of questions involved lists
nine issues—with issues one and six being duplicates, and issues two and
seven being duplicates. Accordingly, the nine issues raised in the statement
of questions involved do not match the seven issues discussed in her argument
section. Compare Jewett’s Brief at 1 with id. at 8-9; cf. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a),
2119(a). We address the issues that Jewett both included in her statement
of questions involved and addressed in the argument section of her brief.

                                           -6-
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Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). A PFA petitioner must establish that abuse occurred by

a preponderance of the evidence, which this Court has defined as “the greater

weight of the evidence, i.e., [enough] to tip a scale slightly.” E.K. v. J.R.A.,

237 A.3d 509, 519 (Pa. Super. 2020) (internal citations and quotations

omitted, brackets in original).8

        In her first three issues, Jewett argues the trial court abused its

discretion by finding her incredible, finding Rodgers credible, and giving

insufficient weight to her testimony about Rodgers’s prior actions. We address

____________________________________________

8   The PFA act defines “abuse” as:

        (1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
            causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary
            deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual
            assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or
            incest with or without a deadly weapon.

        (2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily
            injury.

        (3) The infliction of false imprisonment pursuant            to   18
            Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2903 (relating to false imprisonment).

        (4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children . . ..

        (5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly
            committing acts toward another person, including following
            the person, without proper authority, under circumstances
            which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury . . ..

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(1)–(5).

                                           -7-
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these issues together, as “the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be

accorded to their testimony is within the exclusive province of the trial court

as the fact finder.” C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(internal citation omitted). Further, as noted above, our standard of review

is abuse of discretion. See Kaur, 259 A.3d at 509. Moreover, “on appeal,

this Court will defer to the credibility determinations of the trial court as to

witnesses who appeared before it. It is well-settled that the trier of fact while

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Id.

      In her first issue, Jewett argues the trial court erred in denying her

petition because she credibly testified to Rodgers “restricting her movement,

drugging her, aggressively tailgating her and harassing her through the legal

process….” Jewett’s Brief at 14. In her second issue, Jewett again asserts

that the trial court erred in finding her testimony incredible and Rodgers’s

credible given that Rodgers had acted deceptively in the past by hiding his

affair with Jewett from his family. See id. at 30-31. In her third issue, Jewett

argues the trial court erred in not placing “more weight” on her credible

testimony that Rodgers had plied her with alcohol prior to their “romantic and

                                      -8-
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sexual encounters,” and at least once physically forced her to engage in sexual

relations. Id. at 16-17.9

       The trial court considered these issues and concluded they were

meritless. The court explained:

             [T]his [c]ourt found [Jewett] to be incredible. [She] alleges
       [Rodgers] followed her in a car and at another time,
       approximately a year earlier, drugged and physically assaulted
       [her]. However, [Jewett] continued to see [him] after the alleged
       drugging and sexual abuse incident and continued to showcase
       images of [the two of them] together on her social media profile
       and to engage [Rodgers’s] family in harassment (even according
       to [Jewett’s] own testimony) after all alleged incidents,
       undercutting [Jewett’s] truthfulness and/or [her] actual fear.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/22, at 16-17. Moreover, as for Rodgers, the court

determined that his “demeanor and candor as well as testimony . . . suggested

substantial credibility.” Id. at 17.

       Following our review, we conclude that the trial court committed no

abuse of discretion. The evidence in the light most favorable to Rodgers, with

all reasonable inferences therefrom, established that Jewett pursued and

harassed Rodgers and his family following the end of their affair, which

militated against Jewett’s allegation that she was abused by, and feared,

____________________________________________

9 Apart from Rodgers’s denial on cross-examination that he drugged, non-
consensually restrained, or sexually abused Jewett, we discern no testimony
by Jewett about these matters. See N.T., 11/22/21, at 79. We observe that
Jewett fails to pinpoint where in the record there is evidence supporting these
assertions. See Jewett’s Brief at 16-17; Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c).

                                           -9-
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Rodgers. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/22, at 16-17.10 Moreover, the trial

court, sitting as fact-finder, was entitled to assess Rodgers’s credibility based

on the substance of his testimony as well as his demeanor and candor, and to

reject Jewett’s testimony as incredible.           See Kaur, 259 A.3d at 509.

Accordingly, Jewett’s first three issues merit no relief.

       In her fourth issue, Jewett argues the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting unauthenticated text and e-mail messages. We review a trial court’s

evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth

v. Orr, 255 A.3d 589, 594 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal denied, 266 A.3d 2 (Pa.

2021). Regarding authentication, this Court has recognized:

             Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 requires authentication
       prior to admission of evidence. The proponent of the evidence
       must introduce sufficient evidence that the matter is what it
       purports to be. Pa.R.E. 901(a). Testimony of a witness with
       personal knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be can
       be sufficient.   Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1).   Evidence that cannot be
       authenticated by a knowledgeable person, pursuant to subsection
       (b)(1), may be authenticated by other parts of subsection (b),
       including circumstantial evidence pursuant to subsection (b)(4).
       Pa.R.E. 901(b)(4) (item’s appearance, contents, substance,
       internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken
       together with all the circumstances).

Orr, 255 A.3d at 595.

____________________________________________

10  We also observe that the trial court found Jewett’s testimony about her
friend “Amanda Gill” to be suspect based on her evasive answers and
consequently doubted that the person existed, given Jewett’s refusal to
answer any questions in court about Gill. Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/22, at 15
n.27.

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       Jewett does not contest the accuracy of the messages or that Wife

received them. See, e.g., Jewett’s Brief at 18 n.2. Instead, she argues that

Rodgers failed to identify her as the sender. Id.11 Jewett cites Pa.R.E. 901(a)

which provides that, to authenticate evidence, its proponent “must produce

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent

claims it is.”

       We observe, initially, that Jewett did not object or challenge the

admission of Exhibit 8, which contained the September 2021 e-mails from

“Amanda Gill” to Wife, and which included attachments of screenshots of text

messages between Jewett and Rodgers. See N.T., 11/22/21, at 66 (wherein

Rodgers moved for admission of “all of the e-mails that were dumped on

[Wife]” in September 2021, with attached text messages between Rodgers

and Jewett; and Jewett stated, “No objection, Your Honor”). Thus, Jewett has

waived her challenge to the September e-mails and attached text messages

at issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised in the lower

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

____________________________________________

11We note, again with disapproval, that Jewett fails to identify which specific
exhibits she purports to challenge on appeal, nor does she explain which
specific messages she contests. See Jewett’s Brief at 18-24. We therefore
address her generalized assertion that the trial court erred in admitting “a
series of emails sent to [Wife] and three text messages sent to [Rodgers and
Wife] . . ..” Id. at 19.

                                          - 11 -
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       We next address the remaining communications. Following our review,

we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other

e-mails and text messages, namely, the March 2021 e-mails to Wife and the

text messages from the phone number ending in -3308.12 As we noted above,

electronic communications may be authenticated by circumstantial evidence.

See Orr, 255 A.3d at 595. The circumstantial evidence authenticating the

March 2021 e-mails and the -3308 text messages is as follows:             All the

communications at issue concerned Jewett’s affair with Rodgers. The e-mails

to Wife first began around the time Jewett’s and Rodgers’s affair concluded in

March 2021.       See N.T., 11/22/21, at 24-25.        The March 2021 e-mails

referenced specific conversations between Rodgers and Jewett, including a

conversation about one instance of Wife stopping by unannounced at

Rodgers’s office.     Id. at 77.     The e-mails also followed Jewett’s threat to

Rodgers to “tell [Wife] and send her the information that she had.” Id. at 59-

60. Furthermore, as discussed supra, Wife received e-mails in September

2021—whose admission was uncontested—originating from the same e-mail

address as the March 2021 e-mails (though the September 2021 e-mails were

____________________________________________

12 The trial court’s explanation for its ruling focused on the “best evidence
rule,” rather than authentication. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/22, at 13-14
(discussing Pa.R.E. 1001). However, we may affirm on any basis appearing
of record. See Clark v. Peugh, 257 A.3d 1260, 1271 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2021),
appeal denied, 268 A.3d 1079 (Pa. 2021) (“We may affirm the trial court’s
decision . . . on any basis that is supported by the record”) (internal citation
omitted).

                                          - 12 -
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forwarded to another similar address before Wife received them). Id. at 29,

60. Attached to those e-mails were screenshots of text messages Rodgers

received from Jewett following his breakup with her. Id. at 65, 68, 70. In

those   text   messages—which          Jewett   admitted   she   originally   sent   to

Rodgers13—Jewett expressed anger at Rodgers for “play[ing]” her. Id. at 70.

The allegations in the e-mails matched the allegations in the text messages,

including claims that Rodgers had “pursued” or “chased” Jewett, and that

Rodgers spoke “bullshit.” Id. at 70-72. Jewett also sent Rodgers messages

exhorting him to “fess up to [Wife] and take your beating.” Id. at 74. We

reiterate that the September e-mail address (“germantown999”) received

forwarded messages from the March e-mail address (“germantown979”). In

early September 2021, prior to Wife’s receipt of the e-mails, she received a

text message about her marriage from the phone number ending in -3308.

See id. at 28.      Days after Wife received the e-mails with text messages

between Jewett and Rodgers, Rodgers received a text message from the same

number ending in -3308 taunting him and asking him how his divorce was

going. See id. at 54, 58-59. Given the voluminous circumstantial evidence

establishing Jewett’s authorship of the March 2021 e-mails and -3308 text

____________________________________________

13 See N.T., 11/22/21, at 68 (stipulation by Jewett that the text messages
attached to the September 2021 e-mails were text messages between her and
Rodgers).

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messages, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them.14

Therefore, Jewett’s fourth issue warrants no relief.

       In her fifth issue, Jewett contends the trial court erred in admitting

Rodgers’s phone records into evidence.             As noted above, the standard of

review for a trial court’s evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. See Orr,

255 A.3d at 594.        Evidence is relevant “if it logically tends to establish a

material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable

or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.”

Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also Pa.R.E.

401 (defining “relevant” evidence as that which “has any tendency to make a

fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and . . . the

fact is of consequence in determining the action”).            Further, given “the

protective purposes of the act, it [is] within the trial court’s discretion to hear

any relevant evidence that would assist it in its obligation to assess the

____________________________________________

14 Jewett also cites this Court’s non-precedential decision M.H.W. v. C.J.O.,
159 A.3d 995 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum). See Jewett’s
Brief at 19-23. Citation to this Court’s non-precedential memoranda, filed
prior to May 2, 2019, is prohibited. See 210 Pa. Code § 65.37(B). Jewett
additionally cites Hood-O'Hara v. Wills, 873 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. Super.
2005) in support of her authentication argument. See Jewett’s Brief at 21,
23. Hood-O’Hara is inapt, however, because in that case, this Court affirmed
the trial court’s exclusion of an e-mail on hearsay grounds. See Hood-
O’Hara, 873 A.2d at 760. To the extent this Court in Hood-O’Hara also
affirmed the trial court’s ruling based on the e-mail’s lack of authentication,
we did not consider circumstantial evidence of authentication.

                                          - 14 -
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[petitioner’s] entitlement to and need for a [PFA] order.” Miller on Behalf

of Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1259 (Pa. Super. 1995).

      Jewett argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a zip drive

of Rodgers’s phone records because, she alleges, the records are not relevant,

given “no tie was made by [Rodgers] between [Jewett] and these messages

or this phone number.” Jewett’s Brief at 25.

      The trial court determined Jewett’s argument merits no relief.            It

explained that the records were relevant as they related to messages Rodgers

received that contained “specialized knowledge and images which could only

have come from [Jewett],” used to “harass and stalk” Rodgers; and they are

evidence of the “reasonableness of [Rodgers’s] fear as well as the non-

existence and unreasonableness of [Jewett’s] fear.”         Trial Court Opinion,

1/26/22, at 15.

      Based on our review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding Rodgers’s phone records were relevant. As we concluded above,

the circumstantial evidence established Jewett as the author of the -3308 text

messages. In addition to Rodgers’s testimony about when he received the

messages from the number ending in -3308, his phone records served to

further corroborate the dates on which he received the taunting messages

from Jewett. See N.T., 11/22/21, at 47 (counsel for Rodgers giving an offer

of proof for Rodgers’s phone records).        As the trial court explained, these

messages were relevant in that they made it less probable that Jewett feared

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Rodgers and supported the reasonable inference that Jewett instead sought

to antagonize Rodgers. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in determining that Rodgers’s phone records were relevant.

      In her sixth issue, Jewett maintains the trial court erred in admitting

hearsay evidence of her prior criminal conduct. Specifically, Jewett argues

the trial court erred in admitting “hearsay evidence related to information

regarding [her] alleged prior criminal charges.” Jewett’s Brief at 26. She

specifically objects to Wife’s testimony that she feared Jewett “due to her prior

criminal charges [which] is based on hearsay and should not be considered.”

Id. at 27.

      Before reaching the merits of this issue, we must discern whether Jewett

has preserved it for our review. A party is required to make a timely and

specific objection to a trial court’s evidentiary ruling in order to preserve the

issue for appellate review. See Hassel v. Franzi, 207 A.3d 939, 948-51 (Pa.

Super. 2019).    A failure to specify the basis for the objection waives that

argument on appeal. See id. at 951 (this Court concluding that, where the

appellant objected to testimonial evidence on one basis, but failed to specify

a second basis, the second argument was waived on appeal). Our review of

the record reveals that Wife explained that she was afraid of Jewett, in part,

because Jewett “pointed a loaded gun at her ex-husband and was arrested for

terroristic threats and aggravated assault.” N.T., 11/22/21, at 40. Jewett’s

objection consisted solely of: “Objection, Your Honor.” Id. Jewett failed to

                                     - 16 -
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make a timely and specific hearsay objection to Wife’s testimony and has

accordingly failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. See Hassel,

207 A.3d at 951; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

      However, even if preserved, Jewett’s issue warrants no relief.

Assuming, without deciding, it was error for the trial court to hear this

testimony, we conclude any error was harmless.         This Court has defined

“harmless error” as “an error that does not affect the verdict.” Knowles v.

Levan, 15 A.3d 504, 508 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citation omitted).

Here, we observe that, following Wife’s testimony at issue, the trial court

informed her that her response “wasn’t responsive to my question [of what

Jewett did to threaten Rodgers].”    N.T., 11/22/21, at 41.     The court then

redirected Wife to the question of what Jewett had written in her texts and e-

mails that was threatening toward Rodgers.      See id.    The trial court later

elaborated that it did not consider Wife’s statement. See Trial Court Opinion,

1/26/22, at 16. As the trial court did not rely on Wife’s testimony in deciding

Jewett’s petition, any error is harmless. Jewett is therefore due no relief.

      In her seventh issue, Jewett argues the trial court erred in denying her

PFA petition because it did so on the basis of her alleged conduct underlying

Rodgers’s cross-PFA petition. See Jewett’s Brief at 28.

      We must initially determine whether Jewett has developed her argument

sufficiently to preserve her issue for appeal. Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure 2119(a) and (c) require citations to pertinent authority and the

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relevant parts of the record. Failure to cite pertinent legal authority, or to cite

appropriately to the record, can result in waiver. See Norman for Est. of

Shearlds v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., 208 A.3d 1115, 1119 (Pa. Super.

2019) (finding waiver of an undeveloped argument that lacks citation to

pertinent legal authority); see also R.L.P. v. R.F.M., 110 A.3d 201, 208–09

(Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that “[a]rguments not appropriately developed

include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a

contention”); Sephakis v. Pennsylvania State Police Bureau of Records

& Identification, 214 A.3d 680, 687 (Pa. Super. 2019) (finding waiver of an

undeveloped issue lacking citations to the record and legal authority which

thereby precluded meaningful appellate review). Following our review, we

observe that the section of Jewett’s brief pertaining to this issue is

approximately one and a half pages long and is devoid of citations to pertinent

parts of the record or any supporting authority. See Jewett’s Brief at 28-30.

Because Jewett’s treatment of this issue is undeveloped, which impedes

meaningful appellate review, we find this issue waived. See Norman for Est.

of Shearlds, 208 A.3d at 1119; see also R.L.P., 110 A.3d at 208–09;

Sephakis, 214 A.3d at 687; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c).

      As none of Jewett’s preserved issues are meritorious, no relief is due.

      Order affirmed.

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J-A15036-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/20/2023

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