Court Opinion

ID: 9556259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 18:04:06.128231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:09.700750
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/16/23
                   CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION EIGHT

                                        B322152
 In re
                                        Los Angeles County
     ANDRE PIERRE HARRIS                Super. Ct. No. 22STCP00711

                for Change of Name.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michelle Williams Court, Judge. Affirmed.
       Andre Pierre Harris, in pro per, for Petitioner and
Appellant.
                       ____________________
       Andre Pierre Harris is the name on Harris’s birth
certificate. Harris applied to the trial court in March 2022 to
change his name to :Minko: Yona-Gvinge: El-BeyⓇ. On the
ground that Harris has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court
denied Harris’s petition. We affirm because there was no abuse
of discretion. (See In re Ross (1937) 8 Cal.2d 608, 609.)
       Before the hearing on his petition, Harris published his
request four times in a newspaper of general circulation, as
required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1277, subdivisions
(a)(2)(A) and (a)(3). Had his request for a change of name been
for purposes of gender affirmance, under Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1277.5, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2019,
publication would not have been required.
       The trial court evidently ran Harris’s name through law
enforcement records and found “warrant(s).” It issued a tentative
opinion stating it planned “to deny the petition on the ground
that petitioner has an outstanding warrant(s).” Its final order
stated that, “[h]aving heard from petitioner,” the court was
adopting its tentative ruling and the petition was denied without
prejudice. The “petitioner may reapply.”
       Harris’s appellate record does not describe his court
hearing. Nor does this record elaborate the number or nature of
the “warrant(s)” that were the focus of the court’s ruling.
       By statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law
enforcement records when considering Harris’s petition to change
his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use
the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
(CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to
determine whether a name change applicant must register as a
sex offender. “If a court is not equipped with CLETS or CJIS, the
clerk of the court shall contact an appropriate local law
enforcement agency, which shall determine whether or not the
petitioner is required to register . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1279.5,
subd. (f).)
       By passing this statute, the Legislature sought to ensure
people required to register as sex offenders cannot change their
names to frustrate the registration requirement.

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        If this law enforcement check reveals the applicant has
outstanding warrants, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to deny the name change until the applicant rectifies the
situation. Arrest warrants are written orders, signed by a
magistrate, commanding the arrest of named people. (4 Witkin &
Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law Pretrial (4th ed. 2023) Issuance and
Service of Warrant, § 18; see Pen. Code §§ 814-816.) Bench
warrants may issue for bailed defendants who do not appear.
(4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law Pretrial, supra, § 18.)
        Arrest and bench warrants serve the public interest by
bringing people to court who should come to court. Because
warrants name the wanted person, a name change could
frustrate their function. People wanted by law enforcement
should not be able to use the legal system to avoid obligations to
the legal system.
        Harris argues this is a case of mistaken identity. He cites
page 18 of the record, which ostensibly is a request for judicial
notice he filed in the trial court. This request, however, begins
with a set of factual assertions in the nature of a declaration or a
brief. Harris avers he is a “living soul, the Spiritual man made
from the dust with the holy breath of the Creator YHWH (God)
[Genesis 2:4-7].” He is a “native born Mu’ur, native to this land .
. . .” (Cf. U.S. v. Hillman (7th Cir. 2015) 610 Fed.Appx. 574, 575-
578 (unpublished) [conviction affirmed despite Habib Jimananu–
Bey’s argument that the government failed to prove he pretended
to be a diplomat from a foreign country because the Mu'ur
Republic did not exist]; City of Shaker Heights v. El–Bey (2017)
86 N.E.3d 865, 866-867 [Brandon Profit El–Bey claimed to be a
national of United Washitaw de Dugdahmoundyah Mu'ur; court
rejected appeal, commenting that many courts “have rejected

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similar challenges to convictions based on ‘sovereign citizen’ or
‘sovereign nation’ arguments”].)
       Harris’s request contained other assertions, as well as a
request that the court take judicial notice of submissions Harris
made to the federal Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission.
       These submissions are not relevant to Harris’s petition to
change his name. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
failing to discuss this ostensible request for judicial notice.
       On appeal, we cannot adjudicate a factual question about
mistaken identity. The trial court invited Harris to resubmit his
name change application. The trial court is the proper forum for
initial resolution of Harris’s factual claim.
       Harris asserts a procedural violation. He argues no one
objected to or appeared to oppose his application, so the trial
court was obligated to grant his petition. He writes that the
court denied his “name change petition in favor of [a] third-party
interloper from another state without requiring the party to file
written petition objecting to the name change, and without
requiring the party to appear in court to testify with firsthand
knowledge to claims of controversy against the name.”
       The record contains no evidence about a third party. We
interpret Harris’s objection to mean that he is familiar with a
warrant issue, that he believes someone in another state is
responsible, and that he argues the trial court must approve his
petition if no one from that other state appeared or filed
objections in this California trial court.
       This argument is mistaken.
       The statute does allow people, in writing or in person, to be
heard and to appear in opposition to name changes. For

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instance, a court denied one Eugene Weingand’s petition to
change his name to Peter Lorie. The famous actor Peter Lorre
protested the petition by the unknown Weingand, who was no
relation to Lorre but while working as a real estate agent had
passed himself off as Lorre’s son. Weingand bore a physical
resemblance to Lorre, and affected a manner of speech similar to
Lorre’s, but had no family connection with the name Lorre or
with any name sounding like Lorre or Lorie. The court held it
was no abuse of discretion to deny this name change petition.
(Weingand v. Lorre (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 289, 291–294.)
       Certainly people can appear to oppose a name change. If
no one appears, however, the court is not required to approve the
change. The statute does not mandate approval if no one has
registered written or oral opposition. The provision about sex
offender registration proves this. That provision implicitly
authorizes a court, on its own, to deny a name change. Whether
other people do or do not raise objections is immaterial.
       Harris levels a different but invalid attack by suggesting
the court unethically engaged in the practice of law by
representing a “third-party interloper.”
       It is possible for judges to violate ethical principles by
undertaking their own factual investigations into a case being
tried to a jury and then calling and questioning their own
witnesses before that jury. (See Ryan v. Commission On Judicial
Performance (1988) 45 Cal.3d 518, 536–537.)
       This trial court did nothing like that. This court’s conduct
was proper. A statute mandated its approach: the court “shall
use” law enforcement databases to determine whether the name
change applicant must register as a sex offender. (Code Civ.

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Proc., § 1279.5, subd. (f).) Harris’s charge that the court acted
unethically is in error.
       Harris suggests the court improperly relied on hearsay by
considering the warrants against him. Harris forfeited this
objection by offering no timely or specific objection in the trial
court. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)
       Harris filed a motion in this court to compel a finding in his
favor, arguing that we failed to schedule timely oral argument
and that no brief opposed his appeal. We deny this motion: oral
argument was in the normal course, and the absence of an
opponent does not imply decisive merit. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.220(a)(2).)
       On July 20, 2023, Harris filed another document titled
“Letter and Notice of Mandatory Judicial Notice of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 referenced as Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968.” This document is a combination of a declaration
asserting facts, a brief asserting legal arguments, and a request
for judicial notice of a federal statute. We do take notice of this
statute, but it has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. We
disregard the aspects of the document that make factual
assertions and legal arguments. The trial court and not the
appellate court is the right place for factual presentations. We
have not requested, and we do not accept, further legal briefing.
///

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                       DISPOSITION
     We affirm the order and do not award costs.

                                        WILEY, J.
We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             GRIMES, J.

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