Court Opinion

ID: 9764773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:39:28.207071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:01.460314
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of felony theft of property having the value of $200.00 or more but less than $10,000.00. A prior 1968 robbery by assault with a firearm conviction was alleged and proved. The jury assessed punishment at 20 years’ imprisonment.
On original submission appellant’s conviction was affirmed. We granted appellant’s motion for leave to file a motion for rehearing to consider two of his contentions.
*192The appellant contends this Court “erred in holding that the State’s Amended Motion for Continuance was filed within the 120 day period of the Speedy Trial Act (Article 32A.02 C.C.P.) so as to exclude all the time from April 15 until Appellant was tried since the time from the date of arrest through April 15, 1980 is 121 days rather than 120 days.”
On original submission this Court wrote:
“Therefore, the time from the filing of the motion for continuance until the trial date is properly excluded from calculating the 120 day limit. Even if we consider April 15 as the date of filing, it was the 120th day after commencement of the criminal action. We exclude all the time from April 15 until appellant was actually tried on April 28. Thus, the State just met the 120 day limit and complied with Article 32A.02. The ground of error is overruled.” (Emphasis added.)
Appellant is correct in his calculations. 1980 was leap year and there were 29 days in February, so April 15th was the 121st day after the commencement of the criminal action under the terms of the Texas Speedy Trial Act by the arrest of the appellant on December 16, 1979.
In reviewing appellant’s contention, it is necessary to briefly restate the facts. Appellant was arrested on December 16,1979. He was not indicted until March 27, 1980. On April 10, 1980, the appellant was arraigned, the State announced ready, and the case was set for trial on April 16, 1980. The State’s announcement of ready came 116 days after the commencement of the felony action. On April 11, 1980 (Friday) the State caused to be issued subpoenas for its witnesses. On April 14, 1980 (Monday) the prosecution learned that his “McLen-nan County subpoena” for the complaining witness Mitchell had not been executed. On the same date (April 14), the 120th day after the commencement of the criminal action, the State filed its motion for continuance on the basis of the absence of a material witness, Richard Doyne Mitchell. On April 15, 1980, the State filed its Amended Motion for Continuance on the same basis, but alleging additional facts that Mitchell was in Oklahoma City, had been contacted and was available, but he could not be in Waco until April 21, 1980, due to the unexpected hospitalization of a co-worker (replacement employee) who did the same work that Mitchell did. The court held a hearing on April 15, 1980 expressly stating it was on both the original motion as well as the amended motion for continuance. The assistant district attorney testified he had statements from all the State’s witnesses, had expected no difficulty in obtaining his witnesses, that the indictment was not returned until March 27, and the day after the case had been set for trial (April 11) issued his request for subpoenas, but had not learned that Mitchell was not in the county until April 14, and had on that date then filed his motion for continuance, had contacted Mitchell at 8 p.m. and learned the details set out in his amended motion for continuance filed at 9:28 a.m. on the next day (April 15), the day of the hearing. At the hearing appellant testified he had been in jail since December 16, 1979. At the conclusion of the hearing the court expressly granted both motions for continuance and entered separate written orders to that effect. In the written order granting the original motion for continuance the court reset the case for April 28, 1980, having stated at the hearing that because of other matters on the docket the case could not be heard on April 21, 1980.
On April 15, 1980 at 2:01 p.m. the appellant filed his motion to dismiss the indictment under Article 32A.02, Y.A.C.C.P., because 120 days had passed since the commencement of the criminal action and the State was not ready for trial. At the conclusion of the hearing on the motions for continuance on April 15, appellant asked his motion to dismiss be heard, asked that most of the testimony from the earlier hearing be considered, and offered additional testimony from the appellant. The motion was overruled.
On April 15, 1980 the court expressly granted the State’s original motion for continuance filed on April 14, 1980, the 120th day after the commencement of the felony criminal action. Therefore if the time from *193the filing of the original motion for continuance until the actual trial date (April 28) is properly excludable, the State met the 120 day limit and complied with said Article 32A.02 (Texas Speedy Trial Act). This is the basis upon which the opinion on original submission reached its conclusion even though it erroneously considered April 15th as the 120th day.
Appellant argues, however, the time ex-cludable under Article 32A.02, § 4(6)(A) and (B), is the time after the granting of the motion for continuance, not from the time of the filing of such motion, and that the State was over the 120 day limit by one day.
Article 32A.02, § 4, provides:
“Sec. 4. In computing the time by which the state must be ready for trial, the following periods shall be excluded:
“(1) * * *
“(6) a reasonable period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the state if the continuance is granted.
“(A) because of the unavailability of evidence that is material to the state’s case, if the state has exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe the evidence will be available within a reasonable time; or
“(B) to allow the state additional time to prepare its case and the additional time is justified because of the exceptional circumstances of the case; ....”
Appellant argues the statute refers to a period of delay resulting from a continuance granted, and that the important date is not the date of filing but the date the continuance motion is granted. It appears to be appellant’s position that the time between the filing and the granting of a State’s motion for continuance is not ex-cludable regardless of whether the trial court was able to hear the motion and regardless of the continued existence of the basis upon the motion is finally granted. Under this reasoning, if the trial judge is trying another case or home sick with a common cold, and can’t hear the motion for continuance and the time limit of 120 days in felony cases elapses during the pendency of said motion the appellant, upon proper request, is entitled to have the indictment dismissed without regard to guilt or innocence.
If we adhere to our original holding, then the time of the filing of the original motion for continuance on April 14 until the date the trial commenced on April 28 was properly excludable and the State would have complied with Article 32A.02, supra. Actually what we have here are two different time periods to be considered. First the time of the filing of the State’s original motion for continuance on April 14 until the hearing on said motion on April 15, and the time period from the granting of the motion for continuance on April 15 until the trial on April 28. There does not seem to be a real dispute about the later time period being properly excludable. It is the one day period between the filing of the motion and the time of the hearing that appellant contends is not excludable and which reflects the State was not ready within the prescribed 120 day period. The hearing on the motion was prompt and there is no claim that the delay of one day was not reasonably necessary under the circumstances. We hold that the time between the filing of the original motion for continuance until the hearing on said motion the next day was excludable as well as the time from the granting of said motion until the date of trial. Cf. Henderson v. United States, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). We adhere to the result reached on original submission.
We granted the motion for leave to file motion for rehearing to also consider appellant’s contention that this Court erred in holding that he “did not object timely and therefore waived any error in the admission of the ‘Extraneous matter’ at the bottom of State’s Exhibit No. 4.”
At the penalty stage of the trial appellant plead “true” to the allegation of a prior robbery by assault conviction alleged for enhancement of punishment. The State also offered proof of that robbery convic*194tion as well as proof of another robbery conviction. In addition the State offered proof of three misdemeanor convictions. See Article 37.07, V.A.C.C.P. In proving up one of the misdemeanor theft convictions, the State called Joel Ballard, who was an Assistant County Attorney at the time of the 1979 misdemeanor theft conviction of appellant in Cause No. 17212 in the San Patricio County Court. Ballard identified appellant as the person who was convicted of theft of property of the value of $20.00 or more, but less than $200.00. Ballard handled the case at the time of the trial. During his testimony Ballard identified State’s Exhibit No. 4 as a certified copy of the judgment and sentence and amended judgment in said cause. When the exhibit was offered, appellant’s counsel (Mr. Pearson) objected that the exhibit did not indicate on its face “that the jury was explained ... or the Defendant was explained his rights to an attorney. Also the judgment simply contains an allegation of information of theft, and it doesn’t ... may we approach the Bench, Your Honor?” A bench conference out of the hearing of the court reporter then occurred after which, without more, the court overruled the objection to State’s Exhibit No. 4. It was admitted into evidence. Another question or two were asked Ballard and answered, and then another off-the-record discussion ensued. Thereafter appellant’s counsel (Mr. Pearson) stated:
“Your Honor, we still would reurge our objection and ask the last question and his answer to it (that the conviction was for theft of property of the value of $20 or more but less than $200.00) be struck and the jury be instructed to disregard it, because on the Judgment, itself, it does not indicate it was theft. It just indicates theft but it doesn’t indicate whether it was over $5.00, under $20.00, or what. We would also renew our objection to....”
The court overruled the objection. Appellant’s counsel stated he didn’t think the court reporter had his objection “on the record.” The court permitted counsel to restate the objection for the record which the court noted had been overruled when the exhibit had been admitted. Counsel Pearson then stated:
“Okay, the Defendant’s objection to State’s Exhibit #4 is that the document nowhere shows that the Defendant had an attorney; that he was explained his right to an attorney or that he waived his right to an attorney. And on those basis (sic), we feel that this Judgment and this offense should not be admitted.
“THE COURT: Overruled.”
The record then reflects:
“MR. WASH (also appellant’s counsel): One other matter that I want to get on the record, Your Honor, is an objection, at the bottom of the Judgment the extraneous matter about what the court took into consideration, we object to that say that it should be stricken from the record.
“THE COURT: Overruled.” (Emphasis supplied.)
At the bottom of both the judgment and sentence are the words “The Court took into consideration allegation that the defendant escaped on the 11th day of June, 1979 from the Arresting Officer.” The penalty assessed for the misdemeanor theft was 15 days in jail. It appears that the County Court of San Patricio was utilizing V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 12.451 and made such entry to prevent appellant’s future prosecution for escape.2 See § 12.45(c).
*195It is fundamental that a timely and specific objection to inadmissible evidence must be urged at the first opportunity. Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Guzman v. State, 521 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Garcia v. State, 573 S.W.2d 12 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Montelongo v. State, 681 S.W.2d 47 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Cisneros v. State, 692 S.W.2d 78 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). This was not done nor has appellant shown a reason for delaying his objection. Renfro v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 400, 242 S.W.2d 772 (1951). The objection as to the “extraneous matter” was made for the first time by appellant’s second counsel after the exhibit had been admitted over objection, the interrogation of the witness had continued, and the original objection was restated and again overruled. We adhere to our original holding that the objection was not timely made.
If it can be argued otherwise, the error, if any, was harmless. After appellant was convicted of felony theft, he plead “true” to the prior robbery by firearms alleged for enhancement. This alone authorized his punishment for a second-degree felony. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 12.42(a). There was also proof of still another robbery conviction and three misdemeanor theft convictions. The oral testimony of Ballard was sufficient alone to prove the misdemeanor theft conviction from San Patricio County. State’s Exhibit No. 4 was not essential. Under said § 12.45 a defendant must admit his guilt of an unadjudicated offense before it can be taken into account for assessing punishment for a charged offense. Such admission, when taken into account, will bar prosecution for the admitted unadjudi-cated offense. It is logical that when such action is taken it should be included in the formal judgment.3 And is this then not a part of a defendant’s prior criminal record and admissible under Article 37.07 V.A.C. C.P.? Under any circumstances, no reversible error is presented.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

. Said § 12.45, in effect at the time of the 1979 conviction, provided:
"(a) An individual may, with the consent of the attorney for the state, admit during the sentencing hearing his guilt of one or more unadjudi-cated offenses and request the court to take each into account in determining sentence for the offense or offenses of which he stands adjudged guilty.
"(b) Before a court may take into account an admitted offense over which exclusive venue lies in another county or district, the court must obtain permission from the prosecuting attorney with jurisdiction over the offense.
"(c) If a court lawfully takes into account an admitted offense, prosecution is barred for that offense.”

. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 38.07(a) and (b).

. Such an entry in the judgment is beneficial to a defendant to prevent later prosecution for the admitted unadjudicated offense.