Court Opinion

ID: 9956954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:01:53.120906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.369497
License: Public Domain

22-6518
    Egemba v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                           A096 773 435

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                             SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of April, two thousand twenty-
    four.

    PRESENT:
                   RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
                   WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
                   STEVEN J. MENASHI,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    KENNETH CHINASA EGEMBA,
            Petitioner,

                   v.                                            22-6518
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                   Yoram Nachimovsky, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                    Attorney General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant
                                    Director; Tracie N. Jones, Trial Attorney,
                                    Office of Immigration Litigation, United
                                    States Department of Justice, Washington,
                                    DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.

      Petitioner Kenneth Chinasa Egemba seeks review of an October 4, 2022,

decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re

Kenneth Chinasa Egemba, No. A096 773 435 (B.I.A. Oct. 4, 2022). We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

      We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008). In his motion to

reopen, Egemba asserted that he was eligible to apply to adjust to lawful

permanent resident status based on an approved visa petition filed by his U.S.

citizen spouse.

      It is undisputed that Egemba’s 2022 motion was untimely because he filed

it more than five years after his removal order became final in 2016. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (setting 90-day deadline for reopening); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)
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(same). Egemba did not invoke any statutory exception to the deadline, and his

purported eligibility to adjust status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen does

not fall within an exception to the time limit.          See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)

(identifying exceptions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (same); see also Matter of Yauri, 25 I.

& N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009) (“emphasiz[ing] that untimely motions to reopen

to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the

statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before

the Board and will ordinarily be denied”). Accordingly, we deny the petition to

the extent it challenges the denial of his motion to reopen as untimely.

      Because Egemba did not demonstrate that the time limit should be excused,

“his motion to reopen could only be considered upon exercise of the [BIA’s] sua

sponte authority.” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). We lack

jurisdiction to review the agency’s “entirely discretionary” decision declining to

reopen proceedings sua sponte and dismiss the petition to that extent. Li Chen v.

Garland, 43 F.4th 244, 251–54 (2d Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Although

we may remand for reconsideration “where the Agency may have declined to

exercise its sua sponte authority because it misperceived the legal background and

thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail,” id. at 253 (quoting

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Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469), the BIA did not misperceive the law here. Indeed, the

BIA did not find that Egemba was ineligible to adjust status but rather explained,

in accordance with its precedent, that his potential eligibility for relief acquired by

marrying a U.S. citizen several years after being ordered removed did not

constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting sua sponte reopening. See In

re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1133–34 (B.I.A. 1999) (“As a general matter, we invoke

our sua sponte authority sparingly, treating it not as a general remedy for any

hardships created by enforcement of the time and number limits in the motions

regulations, but as an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional

situations.” (emphasis added)); see also Matter of H-Y-Z-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 156, 161

(B.I.A. 2020) (“[E]quities that were acquired while [the movant] remained illegally

in the United States after being ordered removed . . . generally do not constitute

such truly exceptional circumstances as to warrant discretionary reopening.”); cf.

Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t would be ironic,

indeed, if petitioners . . . who have remained in the United States illegally

following an order of deportation[] were permitted to have a second and third bite

at the apple simply because they managed to marry and have children while

evading authorities. This apparent gaming of the system in an effort to avoid

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deportation is not tolerated by the existing regulatory scheme.”).

      Further, there is no merit to Egemba’s argument that he warranted

discretionary reopening under In re Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253 (B.I.A.

2002). In that case, the BIA held that “a properly filed motion to reopen may be

granted, in the exercise of discretion, to provide an alien an opportunity to pursue

an application for adjustment where,” among other factors, “the motion is timely

filed.” 23 I. & N. Dec. at 256. Because Egemba’s motion to reopen was untimely,

Velarde-Pacheco was inapplicable. Id.

      Accordingly, because the Court lacks jurisdiction to the extent the petition

challenges the BIA’s decision declining to reopen sua sponte, the petition is

dismissed in remaining part. See Li Chen, 43 F.4th at 252–54.

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED in part and

DISMISSED in part. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays

VACATED.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                        Clerk of Court

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