Court Opinion

ID: 9725131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:31:38.6468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:10.940916
License: Public Domain

OPINION
BAKER, Judge.
Appellant-plaintiff Claudette Cain appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees-defendants Roger and Lucy Griffin (collectively, the Griffins) and Auto-Owners Insurance (Auto-Owners), claiming that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Auto-Owners—who was the Griffins’ insurance company—breached a duty to deal with her in good faith. Concluding that Auto-Owners was not under a duty to deal with Cain in good faith because she was not its insured and did not occupy the position of a third party beneficiary under that insurance agreement, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

Auto-Owners issued an insurance policy to the Griffins that afforded liability coverage for their restaurant business located in Rockville. On June 8, 2001, Cain patronized the restaurant and, at some point, she *42fell in the parking lot that was allegedly slick and oil-covered. The fall caused injuries to Cain’s back and side. Cain left the restaurant and sought medical care at the Rockville Emergency Clinic, where a physician examined her. Cain was then sent to the emergency room at West Central Community Hospital (West Central) in Clinton, where she was treated and released.
On December 13, 2001, Bruce Auker-man—Cain’s legal counsel—sent correspondence to the Griffins. While Cain contends that this correspondence was also sent to Auto-Owners, there is no evidence in the record to support the assertion that Auto-Owners ever received Aukerman’s letter. In that correspondence, Aukerman included an invoice from West Central for treatment of the injuries that Cain received as a result of her fall, and instructed the Griffins to forward the correspondence and enclosures to their insurance company and/or attorney.
As there was no reply to the December 2001 correspondence, Cain filed a complaint against the Griffins on May 3, 2002, where she alleged that she had incurred medical and related expenses as a result of her fall at the restaurant. On May 28, 2002, attorney Mark Hassler entered his appearance for the Griffins whom Auto-Owners had retained to represent them. Thereafter, on October 28, 2002, Cain submitted her responses to discovery requests that had been served on her by the Griffins. Those responses included an itemized list of Cain’s medical expenses, including the previously submitted statement from West Central, a statement from a physician, and a bill from a diagnostic facility. However, Auto-Owners made no immediate payment on Cain’s claim.
Cain then amended her complaint on March 5, 2003, where she added a count against Auto-Owners, alleging that the company had full knowledge of Cain’s injuries, and that it “breached its duty that it owed to ... [Cain] to act in good faith and deal fairly with [her].” Appellant’s App. p. 47. As a result, Cain sought judgment from Auto-Owners in the amount of $1159.50 in compensatory damages “and for exemplary damages in a sum sufficient to punish and deter Defendant, Auto Owners and others similarly situated from the same or similar conduct in the future.... ” Appellant’s App. p. 48. In July 2003, Auto-Owners tendered a check to Cain for her medical bills. However, no amount was included as interest for the alleged late payment of Cain’s medical expenses. Cain refused to cash the check or accept the offer of settlement from Auto-Owners.
On , or about January 7, 2004, Auto-Owners filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming, among other things, that no demand for payment was ever submitted to Auto-Owners. In essence, Auto-Owners contended that Cain desired to find that the company committed an act of bad faith because it failed to pay for medical expenses that she had never requested them to pay. Auto-Owners went on to allege that Cain was not entitled to recover punitive damages because Cain never made a claim for payment and because Auto-Owners never denied a claim that had actually been presented to them. Finally, Auto-Owners argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because there was no duty to deal in good faith with Cain because there was no contractual or fiduciary relationship between Auto-Owners and Cain. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Auto-Owners’s motion for summary judgment. Cain now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard Of Review

We begin our discussion by setting forth the relevant standard of review. As we *43stated in Little Beverage Co., Inc. v. DePrez, 777 N.E.2d 74, 77-78 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied:
[S]ummary judgment is appropriate when no designated genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Our standard of review is not altered by cross motions for summary judgment on the same issues. A party appealing the denial of summary judgment carries the burden of persuading this court that the trial court’s decision was erroneous. The movant must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue and only then is the non-movant required to come forward with contrary evidence. This court may not search the entire record but may only consider the evidence that has been specifically designated. All pleadings, affidavits, and testimony are construed liberally and in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Additionally, the trial court’s order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is cloaked with the presumption of validity. Pedraza v. City of East Chicago, 746 N.E.2d 94, 99 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). And the purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there can be no factual dispute and which may be determined as a matter of law. Hermann v. Yater, 631 N.E.2d 511, 513 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

II. Cain’s Claim

Cain argues that the entry of summary judgment for Auto-Owners was erroneous because genuine issues of material fact exist surrounding the claims that she had advanced against it. Specifically, Cain asserts that although she had not contracted with Auto-Owners, she was a third party beneficiary under the agreement that had been executed between it and the Griffins. Hence, Cain makes the claim that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Auto-Owners dealt with her fairly and in good faith.
In general, there exists a cause of action for the tortious breach of an insurer’s duty to deal with its insured in good faith. Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515, 518 (Ind.1993). The Erie court recognized that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing with respect to the discharge of an insurer’s contractual obligation includes the duty to refrain from (1) making an unfounded refusal to pay policy proceeds; (2) causing an unfounded delay in making payments; (3) deceiving the insured; _ and (4) exercising any unfair advantage to pressure an insured into a settlement of his claim. Id. at 518-19. In order for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages from a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must plead and prove the existence of an independent tort of the kind for which Indiana law recognizes that punitive damages may be awarded. USA Life One Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534, 541 (Ind.1997). Punitive damages may be awarded only if there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant “acted with malice, fraud, gross negligence, or oppressiveness which was not the result of a mistake of fact or law, honest error or judgment, overzealousness, mere negligence, or other human failing.” Id..
Notwithstanding the pronouncements made in Erie, this court has made the following observations with regard to an insurer’s duty in a third party context:
While Indiana law recognizes a legal duty implied in all insurance contracts for an insurer to deal in good faith with its insured, ... this duty of good faith does not apply to an insurer’s dealings with a claimant in a third party claim. *44Menefee v. Schurr, 751 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied (2002); see Cromer v. Sefton, 471 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (there is no duty or fiduciary relation running from the insurer to the injured plaintiff. The insurer’s only duty is to the insured on the contract).
Brady v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 788 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); see also Donald v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 474, 482 (7th Cir.1994) (recognizing that “it is true that in Indiana an injured third party cannot sue the tortfeasor’s insurer for handling his claim in bad faith”). Applying these principles to the circumstances here, it is readily apparent that there was no duty on the part of Auto-Owners to deal with Cain in good faith. See Brady, 788 N.E.2d at 920. As discussed in the FACTS, the insurance contract existed between Auto-Owners and the Griffins. Cain occupied the status as a third-party claimant with regard to the insurance agreement, and she certainly cannot be considered a third party beneficiary of the contract between Auto-Owners and the Griffins with regard to the bad faith claim that she lodged against the company. Hence, Auto-Owners did not owe a duty to deal in good faith with Cain, and she cannot succeed upon her bad faith claim.1 Therefore, the trial court properly granted Auto-Owners’s motion for summary judgment.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.
SHARPNACK, J., dissents with opinion.

. We are aware of our colleagues' view on the Seventh Circuit that an individual may—in some instances—occupy the status as a third party beneficiary under an insurance contract that is related to medical payment provisions. See Donald v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 474, 482 (7th Cir.1994). Such a pronouncement is not binding on our courts and, even so, the record shows that Auto-Owners did tender payment to Cain for her medical expenses, once the claim had actually been presented to them. Moreover, we do not read Indiana law to the extent that one who is injured by another necessarily becomes a third party beneficiary under the tortfeasor’s insurance policy.