Court Opinion

ID: 9677705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:57:49.771089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.909061
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
The statute in question is not a statute of limitations; it is a statute of nullification which rends the very soul of tort law: the allowance of an innocent injured to recoup damages from a negligent party. Once again, the majority has placed a brick in that ever-towering wall which prevents a party from receiving an adequate award for damages. See Kephart v. Backhaus, 312 N.W.2d 473 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., dissenting). I would thus hold that SDCL 15-2-9 fails to pass constitutional muster as it is violative of due process.
Basically, the underlying rationale for striking down the type of statute herein involved is obvious: constitutional mandates preclude any manifest usurpations of a plaintiff’s right of redress, that is, access to the courts. See Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1980); Overland Construction Company, Inc. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla.1979); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.1973); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo.1980).
The United States Constitution art. 14, § 1 provides, inter alia: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” South Dakota Constitution art. VI, § 2 provides: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” South Dakota Constitution art. VI, § 20 provides: “All courts shall be open, and every man for an injury done him in his property, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice, administered without denial or delay.” Here, the legislation in question shuts the courtroom door for redress of an injury; it does not keep it open for a remedy by due course of law. Appellant’s privilege to bring suit for a wrong is being abridged; she is being deprived of her property (damages) without due process of law. SDCL 21-1-1 states: “Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which is called damages. Detriment is a loss or harm suffered in person or property.” A vested cause of action is a property right. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 21 F.Supp. 645 (S.D.Cal.1937) aff’d., 107 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1939). “It may be properly conceded that all statutes of limitation must proceed on the idea that the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the courts.” Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62, 22 S.Ct. 573, 575, 46 L.Ed. 804, 807 (1902).
Appellant is also being denied equal protection of the laws. Writing for this Court in Matter of Certain Territorial Electric Boundaries, Etc., 281 N.W.2d 65, 70 (S.D.1979), Justice Fosheim expressed:
The grant of special or exclusive privileges for private benefit is within the prohibition of the constitution. Grants of special or exclusive privileges, even those that are essentially monopolistic in character, are not, however, forbidden, where the primary purpose of the grant is the promotion of the public interest and not the private benefit of the grantees.
Surely, the absolute immunity granted unto these professionals is a private benefit at the expense of the public. Appellees are *141granted immunity as a special class. Very recently, in McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Company, 494 F.Supp. 1334 (D.Colo.1980), applying Colorado law, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado declared the Colorado “property improvement” statute unconstitutional because, inter alia, the statute created a classification bearing no reasonable relation to the purpose of the legislation and granted immunity to certain classes of defendants. Appellees, in this case, are given a special shield. This shield, however, cannot withstand constitutional attack for it constitutes a barrier to equal justice under the law. A constitutional challenge to a statute comparable to the one under examination here was recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court in Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967), the theory being that architects and contractors should not be granted special immunity. By its terms, SDCL 15-2-9 is relegating appellant to an inferior class of citizenship. This is an intolerable wrong.
A statute which prohibits a party the opportunity to recoup his damages solely on the basis that the injury occurred at a certain point in time subsequent to the design and/or construction of building is, in my opinion, not a statute of limitations but rather is an unconstitutional abolishment of a legal right. I quote from Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders — Blueprints for Non-Action, 18 Cath.L.Rev. 361 (1968-1969) (footnotes omitted):
In barring actions which have yet to accrue, these statutes are unique, since a statute of limitations proceeds on the theory that a right of action exists, with the limitation defining the period for pursuit of judicial redress. For a statute to bar an action which has not accrued is anomalous; such a statute does not merely limit the remedy, but bars the right of action from ever coming into existence.

While ostensibly statutes of limitations, they function to limit actions in only certain instances, if at all. The form of the limitation of actions statutes is utilized to abolish a right altogether.

[U]sing a limitation [statute] to abolish a right altogether only serves to devitalize the theory, the policies, and the law of limitation of actions.
I am in total agreement with these observations.
I pose this question: How can a plaintiff be prevented from bringing a cause of action due to the passage of time prior to that action accruing? As stated in Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co., 132 F. 434 (8th Cir. 1904), the answer to this query is that it cannot, not without violating basic constitutional guarantees. Death cannot occur without there first being conception, nor dusk come without daylight. Neither can a cause of action expire before it accrues. Appellant has not slept on her rights. Her opportunity for access to the courts is stripped. It has been held that the federal constitution requires this opportunity to be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). Legal analyses which, in essence, go through extensive mental gymnastics to conclude that the abolition of a legal right is not necessarily abhorrent to a legitimate legislative objective, are, in my opinion, strained efforts to circumvent the blatantly inequitable nature of these types of laws. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Company, 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978). The rationale of these cases is unpersuasive when compared to the constitutional principles they negate.
Finally, though the burden is upon appellant to establish the unconstitutionality of SDCL 15-2-9, and confessedly a heavy burden, it is not impossible. We on this Court, mindful of the great doctrine of separation of powers, owe a duty to strike down legislative acts which are repugnant to the state constitution and thereby preserve unto our citizenry the blessings of a free people through an open, and not closed, courtroom door.