Court Opinion

ID: 9665610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:53:00.975014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:57.427578
License: Public Domain

GAMMAGE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority of this court has managed, in derogation of its own rules, to establish an autocratic system of summary compulsory discipline unlike any other state, even in cases such as this where the underlying crime is not even of the type for which an attorney must be disbarred. Under our rules, an attorney must be disbarred or have her license suspended if she is convicted of an “Intentional Crime.” Texas R. DISCIPLINARY P. 8.01-8.06. To be classified as an “Intentional Crime,” the conviction must be of a crime which (1) “requires proof of knowledge or intent as an essential element” and which (2) is a “serious crime” involving moral turpitude. Texas R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1.06(0), (U). Thacker’s conviction *311under Texas Penal Code § 25.11 fails both requirements.
First, violation of Texas Penal Code § 25.11 is not a crime which requires proof of knowledge or intent as an essential element. In other words, there is no mens rea requirement. See, e.g., In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex.1994) (willful attempt to evade tax); Muniz v. State, 575 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (willfully, knowingly and unlawfully conspiring to import marijuana). Without the requirement of intent, the crime cannot be classified as an “Intentional Crime” and cannot be the subject of compulsory discipline. Texas R. Disoiplinaky P. 8.01. On this point, I must agree with the majority that Thacker has waived her argument, arguing only that violation of Texas Penal Code § 25.11 is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
The majority errs, however, in concluding that violation of section 25.11 is a crime involving moral turpitude per se, thereby holding the Board need not look past the conviction to the facts surrounding the commission of the crime. Under the majority’s reasoning, once a conviction is established, the Board need never look into the circumstances surrounding the conviction. Instead, the Board is to “classify the crime” in a vacuum. 881 S.W.2d at 309. This analysis establishes summary disciplinary proceedings where every crime is either one involving moral turpitude per se or not at all, ignoring the fact that some crimes not normally involving moral turpitude may fit within the definition of an “Intentional Crime” because of the nature of the particular offense.
It is correct that the Board need not retry the crime to determine whether the conviction is proper or whether the attorney is in fact guilty. Texas R. Disciplinaey P. 8.02. Presumably, that issue has already been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. Neither must the Board hear evidence concerning the attorney’s character.
The compulsory discipline rules ... do not distinguish among convicted attorneys except by the nature of their crimes. Collateral or bad acts, or character traits not related to the record of conviction are not at issue.
In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d at 406; Texas R. DISCIPLINARY P. 8.04.
What is necessary, however, is that the Board hear evidence that is related to the record of conviction and which bears on “the nature of their crimes” — the question of moral turpitude. In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d at 406; see also Turton v. State Bar, 775 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.App.—San Antonio, 1989, writ denied).
A final judgment convicting an attorney of a crime involving moral turpitude is cause for the attorney’s suspension or disbarment. A plea of guilty [or a certificate of conviction] is conclusive evidence of commission of the offense. It does not, however, answer the question whether his crime, or the circumstances of its commission, involved moral turpitude.
Turton, 775 S.W.2d at 716, quoting Searcy v. State Bar, 604 S.W.2d 256, 260 n. 2 (Tex.Civ. App.—San Antonio 1980, writ refd n.r.e.). The Board is not bound to discipline once a conviction is established, but must “determine whether the attorney has been convicted of an Intentional Crime” and shall “sit, hear, and determine whether the attorney should be disciplined.” Texas R. Disciplinary P. 8.04.
Only if the dime is one which involves moral turpitude per se is the Board relieved of its duty to look into the circumstances surrounding the offense. Violation of Texas Penal Code § 25.11, however, is not such a crime. We have repeatedly defined “moral turpitude” in the terms of the person’s intent. “Moral turpitude has been defined as anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals.” Muniz, 575 S.W.2d at 411, citing Smith v. State, 490 S.W.2d 902, 907 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1972, writ refd n.r.e.). “Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference ...” Muniz, 575 S.W.2d at 411. “ ‘[M]oral turpitude’ connotes a fraudulent or dishonest intent ...” State Bar v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex.1980). A case proclaiming that aggravated assault *312does not involve moral turpitude per se identified such crimes as “involving intentional dishonesty for personal gain.” Turton v. State Bar, 775 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
To reiterate, violation of Texas Penal Code § 25.11 does not require that the person committing the offense intend to do so, much less that the intent rise to the level of moral turpitude.1 Because the crime involved here is not one involving moral turpitude per se, I would reverse Thacker’s suspension and remand to the Board so that it may examine the facts surrounding Thacker’s conviction to determine whether, in this case, the crime involved moral turpitude.

. The elements of "Intentional Crime” are in fact intertwined. Texas R. Disciplinary P. 1.06(0), (U). First, the crime must be one requiring intent. Texas R. Disciplinary P. 1.06(0). Second, of those crimes, the intent of the participant must rise to such a level as to be labelled moral turpitude. Texas R. Disciplinary P. 1,06(U); see State Bar v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex.1980); Muniz v. State, 575 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978), writ ref’d n.r.e.); Turton v. State Bar, 775, 712, 717 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
By saying that section 25.11 does not, per se, involve moral turpitude, I do not defend the act of the "sale or purchase of a child.” Texas Penal Code § 25.11. I am merely stating that violation of section 25.11, an act of strict criminal liability not even requiring intent as an element, cannot be, per se, an act involving moral turpitude. The Board must hear evidence concerning the commission of the crime to determine if Thacker in fact violated section 25.11 with the level of intent necessary to be classified as moral turpitude. It is possible she may have been acting in a way she thought was lawful.