Court Opinion

ID: 9450983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:02:16.454015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:28.158645
License: Public Domain

KILEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The question is whether there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, so as to justify the summary judgment. I think there is an issue whether the Civil Service Regulations 5 C.F.R. 22.603 and 22.607,1 as interpreted and applied in this case, deprive Brown, one of the class for whose benefit the Veterans’ Preference Act was intended, of the privileges held out in the Regulations.
Brown, a veteran and a Civil Service employee with more than twelve years of federal service, was charged with a second “major offense” against safety regulations for which the mandatory penalty is discharge. The only witnesses in support of the charges against him were two Air Force civilian mechanics. Their testimony was accepted at the hearing in the form of two unsworn written statements. These were admitted over the objection of Brown’s attorney that Brown was being denied due process by being deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the authors of the statements.
By implication, the Supreme Court in the language and orders in Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531, 83 S.Ct. 403 (1963) [order vacated and cause remanded 372 U.S. 765, 83 S.Ct. 1102 (1963), decided after both the hearing examiner’s decision and that of the Board of Appeal and Review in the present case] held that in this type of case a discharged employee entitled to the benefits of the Veterans’ Preference Act is denied a fair hearing where the employing agency, upon request, fails to produce witnesses within its control, after the employee has been unable to secure their attendance.
Civil Service Commission Regulation 5 C.F.R. 22.603 provides for Brown's opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. *465Regulation 22.607 requires him to make his “own arrangements for the appearance of witnesses.” In other words, if he desires to avail himself of the opportunity to be confronted with witnesses against him, implicit in the opportunity for cross-examination, and to cross-examine them, he must make arrangements to have them present.
The record before us contains evidence of what happened when Brown, in support of his subsequently withdrawn claim of discrimination in the discharge, sought to interview Czub and obtain a statement from Ten Eyck. There is evidence that Brown and his attorney were told by Air Force personnel, contrary to fact at that time, that the Air Force had written statements from two witnesses against him; that Ten Eyck was commanded by his superior not to give any statement to Brown; that when Brown’s attorney asked Ten Eyck if he could see him on a non-working day and whether he would make a statement, Ten Eyck said he did not want to make a statement; and that it was common knowledge among personnel at the base that there was no love lost between Czub and Brown, from which it could be inferred that Czub would not appear and testify at Brown’s request. Brown’s letter to the Commission requested that the Air Force produce Czub and Ten Eyck as witnesses at the hearing, and there is no denial that the Air Force was notified of this request in the course of ordinary Commission pre-hearing procedures. On this record, therefore, there are genuine issues of material fact whether Brown met his burden of attempting to obtain the witnesses and, failing in that, to request the Air Force to produce them, and on these issues rests the question of law whether he was denied a fair hearing within the requirements set forth in Williams v. Zuckert.
The offer by the Air Force and the Commission of a de novo hearing, made after the orders in Williams v. Zuckert, cannot deny Brown the right, if he chooses, to reject the offer and pursue his remedy of determination by the courts whether the hearing which he received met the tests set out in that case.
I would reverse the summary judgment and remand in substantially the same manner the Supreme Court did in Williams v. Zuckert, 372 U.S. 765, 83 S.Ct. 1102 (1963), “with instructions to hold a hearing and determine whether the petitioner, desiring the presence of witnesses at his hearing, either discharged his initial burden under the applicable regulations by making timely and sufficient attempt to obtain their presence or, under the circumstances and without fault of his own, was justified in failing to make such attempt, and, if so, whether proper and timely demand was made upon the Air Force so that it was required to produce such witnesses for cross-examination. Upon making such determination, the District Court shall thereupon enter such further order or judgment as may be appropriate.”

. Now 5 C.F.R. § 772.305(c).