Court Opinion

ID: 9796778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:04:50.728303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:36.391048
License: Public Domain

Luckert, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: I dissent from the majority’s determination that there was probable cause to search the person of Ramon I. Fewell. I concur in the other holdings of the majority.
Regarding the majority’s analysis of the probable cause issue, I do not quarrel with the statements regarding the applicable law. Rather, I disagree with the application of those principles to the facts of this case. Specifically, I reject the majority’s conclusion that the officer’s investigation did not lessen the reasonable suspicion that arose from Fewell’s presence in a vehicle that smelled of burnt marijuana.
As the majority recognizes, probable cause to arrest or search a particular individual does not arise merely because that person is present at the scene of a crime or in the company of someone who is believed to have committed a crime. Rather, to justify a search or arrest of a particular individual, there must be “probable cause particularized with respect to that person.” Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979), reh. denied 444 U.S. 1049 (1980); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968) (probable cause did not arise because defendant talked to known drug users over period of *397several hours). In this case, there is no circumstance that raises a particularized suspicion that Fewell engaged in illegal activity.
Rather, the particularized circumstances pointed suspicion toward the passenger and away from Fewell. As the officer gained information during the course of the traffic stop, the passenger was singled out as the one who had committed the crime — Fewell accused the passenger, the passenger admitted culpability, and the search of the passenger revealed he possessed marijuana on his person.
The effect of such a singling out of one suspect over another was discussed in a case cited by the majority, United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 92 L. Ed. 2d 210, 68 S. Ct. 222 (1948). In Di Re, an informant advised a government investigator that the informant could buy counterfeit ration coupons from a particular individual. The investigator followed the suspect and approached a car occupied by the suspect, Di Re, and the informant. The informant had counterfeit coupons in his hand. When asked about the coupons, the informant stated he received them from the driver. Despite no evidence particularized toward Di Re, he was arrested. The Government argued there was probable cause to believe Di Re was implicated in a conspiracy to knowingly possess counterfeit coupons. The Court rejected the argument, noting that Di Re’s presence was the only link between him and the crime. Moreover, the Court noted that “whatever suspicion might result from . . . mere presence seems diminished, if not destroyed” when the informant did not incriminate Di Re. 332 U.S. at 594. The Court noted there was no reason for the informant not to implicate evelyone involved in the crime, but he had not mentioned Di Re. “Any inference that everyone on the scene of a crime is a party to it must disappear if the Government informer singles out the guilty person.” 332 U.S. at 594.
Subsequently, this singling out was an important point of distinction when the Court decided Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003). In Pringle, an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding. A consensual search of the vehicle revealed cocaine behind the upright back-seat armrest and $763 in the glove compartment. The officer told the three occupants *398that unless one of them admitted ownership all would be arrested. No one spoke up, and the officer arrested all the occupants. At the police station, Pringle confessed and the others were released. Rejecting Pringle’s argument he had been arrested without probable cause, the Court contrasted the situation to that in Di Re where the informant incriminated only one suspect. The Pringle Court noted: “No such singling out occurred in this case; none of the three men provided information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or money.” 540 U.S. at 374.
A similar focus upon whether a particular suspect is singled out during an investigation can be found in Kansas cases. For example, in State v. Anderson, 281 Kan. 896, 136 P.3d 406 (2006), as more fully discussed by the majority, this court found law enforcement officers did not have probable cause to arrest a driver after a traffic stop investigation pointed to the passenger as the wrongdoer. Officers had observed a bag of marijuana protruding from a passenger’s shoe, and a drug dog had alerted on the car. Yet, a search of the vehicle did not reveal any additional illegal substances, and there were no other particularized circumstances that pointed to the driver.
Anderson, like Di Re and Pringle, suggests that a narrowing of suspicion reduces, if not eliminates, suspicion regarding someone who is merely present at the scene of the crime. Under such circumstances probable cause is not established.
The majority distinguishes Anderson by concluding that the investigation did not lessen suspicion regarding Fewell, but rather linked him to the crime. Fewell, 286 Kan. at 382-83. The majority mentions four circumstances: (1) FewelTs presence in the vehicle while, according to the passenger’s admission, the passenger smoked marijuana; (2) Fewell’s initial denial that there was an odor of burnt marijuana; (3) the passenger’s lie that he did not have any more marijuana, and (4) Fewell’s queiy about whether he was free to leave to pick up the passenger’s girlfriend. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, these circumstances — whether considered separately or, as we must do under the totality of the circumstances doctrine, in combination — do not link Fewell to the commission of a crime.
*399The majority’s focus on the smell emanating from the passenger compartment seems to imply agreement with the officer’s suspicion that the blunt had been shared. As appropriately concluded by the Arizona Court of Appeals, a belief that marijuana is commonly shared is not sufficient to establish probable cause:
“[T]he officer relied upon his experiential knowledge of a custom for two or more persons to sit and share in the smoking of a marijuana cigarette. But if the smoking of a marijuana cigarette where two or more persons are seated together is usually or in a majority of instances a joint activity, it is not always or necessarily such. While some persons in proximity to one engaged in this form of illicit activity may join in it, others may not.” State v. Hansen, 117 Ariz. 496, 498, 573 P.2d 896 (Ariz. App. 1977).
The Arizona court went on to note that probable cause could be established if there was an indicia of sharing, such as an officer’s observations of hand gestures consistent with passing a cigarette back and forth or a “direct attribution of odor” to the defendant. 117 Ariz. at 498-99; see also People v. Spriggs, 38 Ill. App. 3d 737, 738-40, 348 N.E.2d 468 (1976) (discussing cases where there was or was not a direct attribution of odor and effect on determination of probable cause).
No such indications of joint conduct exist in this case. The majority discounts the lack of evidence regarding such factors, specifically regarding the lack of any evidence regarding an odor of marijuana emanating from Fewell. 286 Kan. at 383-84. The majority is correct that we cannot surmise that there was no odor emanating from Fewell; rather, all we know is that the presence of an odor on him was not discussed on the record. Nevertheless, the fact that the State did not present any evidence substantiating the suspicion that the marijuana was shared or suggesting there was any type of joint conduct means the State failed to meet its burden and present circumstances particularized toward Fewell.
The majority adds to the circumstance of presence “Fewell’s first encounter with Trooper Engholm [that], far from dispelling the officer’s suspicion, increased his suspicion by denying the existence of the burnt marijuana smell emanating from the vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) 286 Kan. at 382.1 agree this denial may have made the officer suspicious. Nevertheless, especially in light of the pas*400senger’s subsequent admission, there is no basis to conclude that Fewell was doing anything other than protecting his passenger. Moreover, as the majority points out, at most there was a suspicion.
Next, the majority adds the fact that the passenger lied. Yet, the majority fails to explain (and I fail to understand) how this links Fewell to the smoking of marijuana. The fact that the passenger was not forthcoming about possessing additional marijuana does not mean that Fewell was aware of the contents of his passenger’s pockets or that there was any joint conduct. I concede that this point distinguishes Di Re, 332 U.S. at 594, where there was no reason to question the credibility of the informant. See also State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 24, 72 P.3d 570 (2003) (probable cause is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability). Yet, while tire passenger’s statements in this case may be viewed with suspicion, the statements do not link Fewell to the crime. Even if the passenger’s credibility is discounted, the circumstances single out the passenger and do not point toward Fewell.
Finally, the majority refers to Fewell’s request to leave so he could pick up his passenger’s girlfriend. In my view it is inappropriate to base probable cause on a citizen’s demand that officers do what the law requires: minimize the intrusion arising from a vehicle stop. See State v. Smith, 286 Kan. 402, 406-19, 184 P.3d 890 (2008) (discussing nature of traffic stop and temporal limits). Without probable cause, the officer had no justification to continue to detain Fewell, and he was within his rights to ask to be able to leave.
None of these circumstances discussed by the majority link Fe-well to the crime. Perhaps they arouse suspicion and, admittedly, the line between reasonable suspicion and probable cause is difficult to draw. Nevertheless, without any circumstance other than presence to link Fewell to the crime, probable cause is not established. The State does not justify the search based upon officer safety or any other exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, there is no basis for the search of Fewell’s person, and the evidence obtained from that search should be suppressed.
*401Rosen and Johnson, JJ., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.