Court Opinion

ID: 9955327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 13:00:51.660424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:33.660632
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11970    Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 03/28/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11970
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       MARCELL HILL,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-01854-WFJ-MRM
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11970     Document: 35-1         Date Filed: 03/28/2024   Page: 2 of 7

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11970

       Before JORDAN, LAGOA AND DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Marcell Hill, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
       order dismissing with prejudice her second amended complaint
       that asserted twelve various claims against the United States pur-
       suant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Hill asserted
       claims of gross negligence and negligence arising from an incident
       involving Marine officers that allegedly occurred many years prior
       to her memory of the events. Hill claimed that a Marine Major
       ordered his subordinates, as part of a hazing/initiation, to drug and
       sexually assault Hill and her companion. Hill also claimed that the
       Major breached his duty, under the Marine Officer Oath and Code
       of Conduct, by ordering his subordinates to perform these illegal
       acts and to cover-up the incident. The district court dismissed the
       complaint on the grounds that it was a shotgun pleading, was
       barred by sovereign immunity, and was untimely. On appeal, Hill
       argues that her claims under Counts I and II were not barred by
       sovereign immunity because they related to negligence, not inten-
       tional torts. She also contends that her claims were timely and that
       that her complaint was not a shotgun pleading. After reviewing
       the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we affirm in part, vacate
       and remand in part, with instructions that the district court dismiss
       Counts I and II without prejudice.
                                            I.
USCA11 Case: 23-11970      Document: 35-1          Date Filed: 03/28/2024   Page: 3 of 7

       23-11970                Opinion of the Court                          3

               We review de novo a district court’s determination of sover-
       eign immunity, Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the
       Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1313 (11th Cir. 2011), and a district
       court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Motta ex rel. A.M. v. United
       States, 717 F.3d 840, 843 (11th Cir. 2013). Jurisdiction is a “threshold
       issue.” United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1332 (11th Cir. 2020).
       “Sovereign immunity is inherently jurisdictional in nature.” Dupree
       v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 2024). Thus, where a district
       court’s dismissal is “based on sovereign immunity grounds, the ju-
       risdictional nature of the dismissal requires it to be entered without
       prejudice.” Id. at 1008 (vacating and remanding “for the limited
       purpose of allowing the district court to dismiss the case without
       prejudice”). The federal government is entitled to sovereign im-
       munity from civil lawsuits, except to the extent that it consents to
       be sued. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S. Ct. 1349,
       1351 (1980).
                                             II.
               The FTCA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity
       for tort claims. Motta ex rel. A.M., 717 F.3d at 843. It confers on
       federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims against
       the United States for money damages “caused by the negligent or
       wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
       while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28
       U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). This limited waiver of sovereign immunity is
       strictly construed in favor of the United States. Lane v. Pena, 518
       U.S. 187, 192, 116 S. Ct. 2092 (1996).
USCA11 Case: 23-11970      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 03/28/2024     Page: 4 of 7

       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11970

               The FTCA makes the United States liable to the same extent
       as a private individual under similar circumstances under the law
       of the place where the tort occurred, subject to enumerated excep-
       tions to the immunity waiver. Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503,
       506-07, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1228 (2013). The relevant exception in this
       case is 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), which preserves the government’s im-
       munity from suit on “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false
       imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of pro-
       cess, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
       contract rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (emphasis added). We have
       referred to § 2680(h) as the “intentional tort exception.” Levin, 568
       U.S. at 507, 133 S. Ct. at 1228. The intentional tort exception con-
       tains a proviso that waives sovereign immunity when such torts
       are committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the
       United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
              Further, we have noted that “the phrase ‘arising out of ’
       should be broadly construed.” Metz v. United States, 788 F.2d 1528,
       1533 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 104
       S. Ct. 1519 (1984)). Under this broad construction, a claim arises
       out of “a § 2680 excepted tort if the governmental conduct that is
       essential to the plaintiff’s cause of action is encompassed by that
       tort.” Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1333 (11th Cir. 2015).
       This is true “even if the plaintiff has denominated, as the basis for
       the cause of action, a tort not found within § 2680(h)’s list of ex-
       cepted torts.” Id. “Accordingly, it is the substance of the claim and
       not the language used in stating it which controls.” Id. at 1334
       (quotation marks omitted).
USCA11 Case: 23-11970      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 03/28/2024     Page: 5 of 7

       23-11970               Opinion of the Court                          5

                                            III.
              Pro se pleadings will be liberally construed. Campbell v. Air
       Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, “is-
       sues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed aban-
       doned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Fur-
       thermore, “we do not address arguments raised for the first time in
       a pro se litigant’s reply brief.” Id. We may affirm on any ground
       supported by the record. Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla., 833
       F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016).
              As an initial matter, Hill only challenges the district court’s
       dismissal of her claims raised in Counts I and II of her second
       amended complaint. Thus, she has abandoned any challenge to
       the dismissal of the remaining counts. Moreover, we decline to
       address any arguments Hill raises for the first time in her reply brief
       regarding the federal law enforcement proviso of § 2680(h). See
       Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.
               In a similar case to the present one, the Supreme Court ad-
       dressed “whether the survivor of a serviceman, who was murdered
       by another serviceman, may recover from the Government under
       the [FTCA] for negligently failing to prevent the murder.” United
       States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 53, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 3040 (1985). The
       Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff’s claim arose out of
       the battery committed by another service member such that the
       claim was barred by sovereign immunity. Id.at 55, 105 S. Ct. at
       3041. The Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiff could not
       “avoid the reach of § 2680(h) by framing her complaint in terms of
USCA11 Case: 23-11970      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 03/28/2024     Page: 6 of 7

       6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11970

       negligent failure to prevent the assault and battery. Id. The Su-
       preme Court stated that § 2680(h) “in sweeping language . . . ex-
       cludes any claim arising out of assault or battery. Id. Hill’s claim is
       similar and arises out of an alleged assault or battery.
              The record demonstrates that the district court appropri-
       ately determined that Counts I and II were barred by sovereign im-
       munity. Although Hill argues that the Marine Major was negligent
       in issuing illegal orders, and the Marine subordinates were negli-
       gent by complying with those orders, her claims nevertheless arise
       out of intentional torts, as she asserts that the orders were to com-
       mit assault and battery. Hill cannot change the essence of these
       allegations by using language that sounds in negligence. See Zelaya,
       781 F.3d at 1334 (“it is the substance of the claim and not the lan-
       guage used in stating it which controls”).
              In any event, even if Hill’s negligence claims did not arise
       out of intentional torts, they would still be barred, as her negli-
       gence claims are based on a breach of duty arising from a military
       oath and code of conduct and are not independently tortious under
       applicable state law. See Smith v. United States, 14 F.4th 1228, 1233
       (11th Cir. 2021) (finding that an alleged duty created under the
       Postal Operations Manual would arise only under federal law and
       noting that a federal employee’s conduct must be independently
       tortious under applicable state law to be liable under the FTCA);
       see also Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir.
       2006).
USCA11 Case: 23-11970    Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 03/28/2024   Page: 7 of 7

       23-11970             Opinion of the Court                      7

              Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-
       firm the district court’s determination that Counts I and II were
       barred by sovereign immunity without reaching other issues raised
       on appeal. However, we vacate and remand for the limited pur-
       pose of allowing the district court to dismiss the claims without
       prejudice.
           AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN
       PART.