Court Opinion

ID: 9960550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 16:01:48.151845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:36.618563
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                  STATE OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                         v.

                  ALLISON BOISVERT, Defendant/Appellee.

                              No. 1 CA-CV 23-0582
                                FILED 4-16-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                         No. LC2023-000215-001
                          Mesa Municipal Court
                             No. 2022058505
                   The Honorable Justin Beresky, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Mesa City Prosecutor’s Office, Mesa
By Paul W. Hawkins
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Gordon Thompson, Phoenix
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
                           STATE v. BOISVERT
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1            The State of Arizona (“the State”) appeals the superior court’s
judgment accepting jurisdiction but denying relief in a special action
challenge to the municipal court’s interpretation of Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 36-2852(B). We affirm.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            In April 2022, Allison Boisvert, Real Party in Interest (“RPI”),
was charged with a violation of A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3) after a driving under
the influence (“DUI”) investigation revealed the presence of marijuana
metabolites in her blood. The provision states:

              It is unlawful for a person to drive or be in actual
              physical control of a vehicle in this state . . . [w]hile
              there is any drug defined in § 13-3401 or its metabolite
              in the person’s body.

A.R.S. § 28-1381(A)(3).

¶3            In November 2020, Proposition 207 (“Prop 207”) was passed,
legalizing the use of marijuana by persons twenty-one years or older. Prop
207 adopted A.R.S. § 36-2852(B) which states:

              Notwithstanding any other law, a person with
              metabolites or components of marijuana in the
              person’s body is guilty of violating § 28-1381,
              subsection A, paragraph 3 only if the person is also
              impaired to the slightest degree.

(Emphasis added.)

¶4           At the time of the alleged violation, RPI was under twenty-
one. The State filed a motion in limine requesting the jury instructions not
include the impairment requirement stated in A.R.S. § 36-2852(B) arguing

                                      2
                            STATE v. BOISVERT
                            Decision of the Court

that Prop 207 only applied to individuals twenty-one years or older. The
municipal court denied the motion. The State filed a special action with the
superior court, which accepted jurisdiction but denied relief.

¶5            The State timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

                           DISCUSSION

¶6             The State first argues the superior court erred when it did not
determine the intent of the electorate in implementing A.R.S. § 36-2852 or
consider the initiative in the context of the electorate’s overall intent to
regulate driving under the influence of marijuana for persons over the age
of twenty-one only. The State requests we interpret A.R.S. § 36-2852(B) to
define “person” as individuals aged twenty-one or older. In the alternative,
it requests we remand the matter to the superior court for a determination
of the intent of the electorate in enacting that statute.

¶7            We review a special action in which the superior court accepts
jurisdiction but denies relief for an abuse of discretion. Files v. Bernal, 200
Ariz. 64, 65, ¶ 2 (App. 2001). “We review the superior court’s legal
conclusions de novo.” Merlina v. Jejna, 208 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 6 (App. 2004).
Therefore, we must consider the merits of the argument and may not
remand a matter of statutory interpretation back to the superior court.

¶8            “[W]e look first to the plain language of a statute as the most
reliable indicator of its meaning.” State v. Givens, 206 Ariz. 186, 188, ¶ 5
(App. 2003). When the plain language of the statute is clear, as it is in this
case, “we must follow the text as written without employing other rules of
statutory construction.” Id. The superior court did not err.

¶9            Turning to the plain language of the statute, the State argues
the term “person” refers to individuals who are twenty-one years or older.
The State contends that because A.R.S. § 36-2852 legalized the use of
marijuana only for persons over the age of twenty-one years, the DUI
statute that criminalizes driving under the influence of marijuana also
refers only to adults over the age of twenty-one years and that any other
interpretation will lead to inconsistent and illogical results.

¶10           In the criminal context, a “‘Person’ means a human being.”
A.R.S. § 13-105(30). Black’s Law Dictionary also defines “person” as a
“human being.” Person, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Prop 207
distinguishes between a “person,” a “person who is under twenty-one,” an
“individual who is under twenty-one,” and an “individual who is at least

                                      3
                            STATE v. BOISVERT
                            Decision of the Court

twenty-one” in multiple instances. See A.R.S. §§ 36-2851, -2852, -2853.
“[C]onstruction of a statute should be favored which will render every
word operative rather than a construction which makes some words idle
and nugatory.” State Bd. of Tech. Registration v. McDaniel, 84 Ariz. 223, 236
(1958).

¶11          To illustrate its argument, the State points to A.R.S. § 36-
2853(A) as an example. The section reads:

              Notwithstanding any other law and except as
              otherwise provided in this chapter, a person who
              possesses an amount of marijuana greater than the
              amount allowed pursuant to section 36-2852 . . . is
              guilty of a petty offense.

A.R.S. § 36-2853(A) (emphasis added). The State then argues if a “limited
interpretation” of “a person” is applied to A.R.S. § 36-2853(A), then it
becomes something unintended by the electorate. This is not true. The
cross-reference to section 36-2852, which makes possession legal only if an
individual is at least twenty-one years old, acts as an age constraint even if
the plain meaning of “person” is used.

¶12            The State also points to A.R.S. § 36-2853(B)(3) and A.R.S. § 36-
2853(C) as being contradictory if the plain meaning of “person” is used.
Section 36-2853(B)(3) states “a person who is under twenty-one years of
age,” who possesses, consumes, transports or transfers marijuana may be
found guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor on their third or subsequent
violation. Section 36-2853(C) states, “[a] person who smokes marijuana in
a public place or open space is guilty of a petty offense.” The State asks,
“[i]s it a petty offense if an underage individual smokes marijuana in a
public place or is it a class 1 misdemeanor?” The answer is both. Using the
plain meaning of “person” shows a person under the age of twenty-one
would violate both A.R.S. § 36-2853(B)(3) and A.R.S. § 36-2853(C) if they
were smoking marijuana in a public place or open space.

¶13           The State uses the same reasoning to argue that applying the
plain meaning of “person” to the provision at issue in this case, A.R.S. § 36-
2852(B), would be contradictory because no one under twenty-one years
old can legally have marijuana in their system. Applying the plain meaning
of “person” does not lead to inconsistent or illogical results. An individual
under twenty-one may violate possessing, consuming, transporting or
transferring marijuana statutes and at the same time also violate marijuana
DUI laws if they meet the elements outlined in A.R.S. § 36-2852(B).

                                      4
                             STATE v. BOISVERT
                             Decision of the Court

¶14            DUI offenses involving the use of alcohol provide useful
guidance in our analysis. The DUI statutory scheme for alcohol makes clear
that while the level of impairment or the percentage of alcohol
concentration in a person’s body determines whether a DUI offense has
been committed, for persons under twenty-one years of age it is a violation
of the law to have any amount of spirituous liquor in their body. See A.R.S.
§ 4-244(34). (“It is unlawful . . . [f]or a person who is under twenty-one
years of age to drive or be in physical control of a motor vehicle while there
is any spirituous liquor in the person’s body.”). The electorate, acting in its
legislative capacity, could have imposed a similar absolute bar for DUIs
involving marijuana use by persons under twenty-one years of age. But it
has not done so. The superior court did not err when it applied the
marijuana DUI statute as written and denied relief.

                                CONCLUSION

¶15           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

                                          5