Court Opinion

ID: 9714838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:46:56.065676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:28.947240
License: Public Domain

*171BAKER, Judge.
While I concur with the majority's affirmation of the trial court's decision, I have grave concerns regarding the wisdom of opening the Pandora's box of assignment of legal malpractice claims.
The majority acknowledges the sound and persuasive nature of the numerous decisions which hold that assignment of legal malpractice claims is void as against public policy. Relying on Thurston v. Continental Casualty Co. (1989), Me., 567 A.2d 922, the majority nonetheless finds that assignment is valid and appropriate in this case. I disagree and dissent on this issue for two reasons.
First, I agree with the weight of authority that this type of assignment should not be allowed. "[T)he unique quality of legal services, the personal nature of the attorney's duty to the client and the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship . invoke [broad] public policy considerations." Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc. (1976), 62 Cal.App.3d 389, 397, 133 Cal.Rptr. 83, 87. "[Thhe real substance of a malpractice action is a client's claim that his attorney breached his personal duty and trust to that client by failing to exercise the requisite degree of care and skill or by failing to give the utmost loyalty and fidelity to the client's interests." Christison v. Jones (1980), 83 Ill.App.3d 334, 338, 39 Ill.Dec. 560, 563, 405 N.E.2d 8, 11.
The attorney-client relationship, the fidu-clary role of the attorney, and the regulation of attorneys are matters of great pub-lie concern. The Constitution of our State entrusts exclusive, original jurisdiction to the Indiana Supreme Court over matters relating to the practice of law. Indiana Const. art. VII, § 4. I believe, as did the Goodley court, that allowing the assignment of legal malpractice claims would
encourage unjustified lawsuits against members of the legal profession, generate an increase in legal malpractice litigation, promote champerty and force attorneys to defend themselves against strangers. The endless complications and litigious intricacies arising out of such commercial activities would place an undue burden on not only the legal profession but the already overburdened judicial system, restrict the availability of competent legal services, embarrass the attorney-client relationship and imperil the sanctity of the highly confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between attorney and client.
Goodley, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at 397, 133 Cal.Rptr. at 87. If such a change is to be levied on the profession and the public, then only our supreme court, the entity with exclusive constitutional authority over these matters, should make the decision.
Second, even if I believed we should allow assignment of legal malpractice claims, I would not do so in this case. I disagree with the majority's reliance on Thurston, supra, because I find the reasoning in that decision inherently flawed. In Thurston, as here, the losing defendant assigned its malpractice claim to the victorious plaintiff. As Raikos and Thomas point out, this requires the plaintiff to change its position by 180 degrees to prosecute the malpractice claim. At best, it is unsettling that a plaintiff in Colvin's position would have the opportunity, in essence, to mount a collateral attack against a judgment in his favor by suing the lawyers who represented his defeated opponent. At worst, the result in Thurston and here will lead to a practice by defeated defendants of routinely assigning legal malpractice claims (meritorious or otherwise) as a means of avoiding or deferring payment of judgments against them.' *172Over time, I fear this practice will lead to exactly that which the majority and I disdain: an open market for the assignment of legal malpractice claims.1
I therefore dissent on the threshold issue of the assignment of the malpractice claim. I concur with the majority's holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Raikos and Thomas on the basis of issue preclusion.

. The possibilities for manipulation and abuse, as well as harm to the profession and the public it serves, are virtually limitless. In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals of Michigan disallowed an excess insurer to bring a malpractice action against one of its customer's defense at-tormeys on a subrogation theory. American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co. (1988), 165 Mich.App. 657, 419 N.W.2d 447, appeal denied. The insurer argued the attorneys had negligently failed to settle a claim which was subsequently litigated adversely to the customer's position. The court held that a contrary decision "would be tantamount to saying that insurance defense attorneys do not owe their duty of loyalty and zealous representation to the insured client alone ... and would contradict the personal nature of the attorney-client rela*172tionship." Id., 165 Mich.App. at 660, 419 . N.W.2d at 448. A contrary decision "would also encourage excess insurers to sue defense attorneys for malpractice whenever they are disgruntled by having to pay within limits of policies to which they contracted and for which they received premiums. Were this to occur, [I] believe that defense attorneys would come to fear such attacks, and the attorney-client relationship would be put in jeopardy." Id., 165 Mich. App. at 660-61. 419 N.W.2d at 448-49.