Court Opinion

ID: 9403226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 18:09:12.238813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.709839
License: Public Domain

J-S06001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    ISAAC'S AT SPRING RIDGE, LLP               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MMG INSURANCE COMPANY                      :   No. 455 MDA 2021

                  Appeal from the Order Entered March 2, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
                        Civil Division at No: CI-20-03613

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED: JUNE 20, 2023

        Appellant, Isaac’s At Spring Ridge, LLP, appeals from the March 2, 2021

order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellee, MMG Insurance

Company. We affirm.

        The trial court recited the pertinent facts:

              [Appellant] is the owner and operator of Isaac’s at Spring
        Ridge, LLP, a deli and restaurant located in Wyomissing,
        Pennsylvania. [Appellant] purchased a Special Business Owner’s
        Policy with Business Valu-Pak and Pennsylvania Endorsements.
        The policy provided coverage for the period December 31, 2019
        to December 31, 2020. On March 6, 2020, the Governor of the
        Commonwealth of Pennsylvania issued a Proclamation of Disaster
        Emergency declaring the Covid-19 pandemic a disaster
        emergency. On the same day, the order of the Governor of the
        Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Regarding the Closure of All
        Businesses That Are Not Life Sustaining (“Order”) was issued
        closing all restaurants and bars to dine-in operations.
        Accordingly, [Appellant] closed its dine-in operations but all other
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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      aspects of [Appellant’s] business were permitted to continue.
      [Appellant filed a claim with [Appellee] requesting coverage for
      their pandemic-related business interruption income losses
      caused by the dine-in ban. [Appellee] denied [Appellant’s] claim
      explaining that there was no coverage under [Appellant’s] policy.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/21, at 2 (pagination ours).

      Appellant commenced this action on May 14, 2020, with a complaint

seeking a declaratory judgment. Appellee filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings on October 29, 2021. The trial court heard argument on February

24, 2021. On March 2, 2021, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion. This

timely appeal followed. Appellant presents four questions:

            1. Whether the trial court erred in determining the Policy
               ‘explicitly excludes coverage for loss or damage caused
               by or resulting from any virus’ when [Appellant]
               purchased an enhancement that contained no virus or
               bacteria exclusion?

            2. Whether the trial court erred when it determined
               [Appellant] was not entitled to coverage because it
               ‘suffered no direct physical loss of or damage to its
               premises’ when the Policy is ambiguous because it can
               reasonably be read to differentiate between ‘loss of’ and
               ‘damage to’ property?

            3. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to construe
               the ambiguous Policy against [Appellee] when it
               determined the Policy did not provide coverage for the
               losses that [Appellant] sustained when Governor Wolf
               closed its dine-in restaurants in response the Covid-19
               pandemic?

            4. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to focus its
               coverage inquiry on the reasonable expectation of the
               insured, here, [Appellant]?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

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      We analyze the trial court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings as

follows:

             Entry of judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when
      there are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is
      entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Our scope of review is
      plenary and we will reverse only if the trial court committed a clear
      error of law or if the pleadings disclose facts that should be
      submitted to a trier of fact. We accept as true all well-pleaded
      allegations in the complaint.

Okeke-Henry v. Sw. Airlines, Co., 163 A.3d 1014, 1016–17 (Pa. Super.

2017).

      Because this case involves interpretation of an insurance policy, we note

the following:

            An insured may invoke the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 7531, et seq., to determine whether an insurance
      contract covers an asserted claim. Where the language of the
      policy is clear, this Court must give it effect. Also, we do not treat
      the words in the policy as mere surplusage and, if at all possible,
      we construe the policy in a manner that gives effect to all of the
      policy’s language. We will construe any ambiguity in favor of the
      insured. Contract language is ambiguous if it is reasonably
      susceptible to more than one construction and meaning. The
      insured bears the initial burden of establishing that the asserted
      claim is covered. If the insured is successful, the insurer bears
      the burden of establishing the applicability of an exclusion.

MacMiles, LLC v. Erie Ins. Exch., 286 A.3d 331, 333-34 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).            Insurance

exclusions are to be construed strictly. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. v.

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 580 A2d 799, 802 (Pa. Super. 1990).

      Appellant alleges it is entitled to coverage for losses arising from the

Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting closure of in-person dining at eateries

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throughout the Commonwealth.              The pertinent provisions of its all-risks

insurance policy (the “Policy”) issued by Appellee, are specified in the

Businessowners Coverage Form:

       Section I – Property

       A. Coverage

                   We will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered
            Property at the premises described in the Declarations caused by or
            resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.

Policy, Businessowners Coverage Form, § I(A).1 A Covered Cause of Loss is

“Direct physical loss unless the loss is excluded or limited under Section I –

Property.” Id.at § I(A)(3). The Policy also covers business income during

suspension of operations caused by a “direct physical loss of or damage to”

Appellant’s covered property.         Id. at § I(A)(5)(f)(1)(a).   Recovery of lost

business income is limited to the “period of restoration.” Id. The period of

restoration ends when the covered property is “repaired, rebuilt, or

replaced[,]” or when business resumes “at a new permanent location.” Id. at

§ I(H)(9)(a)(2).     The Policy excludes coverage for damage resulting from

viruses or bacteria. Id. at § I(B)(1)(j).

       In    addition,   Appellant     purchased    an   endorsement    titled   the

“Businessowner Valu-Pak Plus Endorsement (the “Endorsement”).                    The

Endorsement begins:

____________________________________________

1 The Policy appears in the certified record as Exhibit A to Appellant’s May 14,
2020 complaint.

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       This endorsement modifies the insurance provided under the following:

       BUSINESSOWNERS COVERAGE FORM[2]

             The following is a summary of revised limits of insurance,
       additional coverages and coverage extensions provided by this
       endorsement. This endorsement is subject to the provisions
       of your policy which means that it is subject to all
       limitations and conditions applicable to this Coverage Form
       unless specifically deleted, replaced, or modified herein.”

Endorsement, preamble (emphasis added).               The Endorsement tracks the

coverage provision of the Policy, in that it covers “physical loss of or damage

to Covered Property.”        Endorsement, at § I.      The Endorsement does not

exclude damage resulting from virus or bacteria, nor does it specifically delete

the Policy’s virus and bacteria exclusion.

       As noted above, Appellant’s first argument is that the trial court erred

in finding that the Policy’s virus and bacteria exclusion (the “Virus Exclusion”)

applies here. Appellant does not deny that the “Virus Exclusion”, on its face,

would exclude coverage for its claim.            Rather, Appellant argues that the

Endorsement, which it purchased at extra cost, and which does not contain a

virus exclusion, overrides the Policy’s Virus Exclusion.

       The trial court found that the Endorsement enhances certain coverages,

provided in the policy, but does not create coverage for a situation expressly

excluded in the Policy.       In the trial court’s words, the Endorsement is “an

____________________________________________

2  “Businessowners Coverage Form” is the heading of the entire insurance
contract. It includes the Policy and Endorsement.

                                           -5-
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enhancement policy meaning it enhances the benefits already existing in the

[Policy]. One cannot enhance what has never existed.” Trial Court Opinion,

1/11/21, at 5 (pagination ours).     Appellant concedes that the trial court’s

interpretation is reasonable but argues that it is equally reasonable to read

the Endorsement as overriding the Virus Exclusion.          Appellant relies on

Bishops, Inc. v. Penn Nat’l Ins., 984 A.2d 982, 986 (Pa. Super. 2009),

appeal denied, 20 A.3d 482 (Pa. 2011), for the proposition that ambiguous

provisions in insurance policies, i.e., those that are subject to more than one

reasonable interpretation, are to be construed in favor of coverage.

Appellant’s statement of the law is correct, but his reading of the Policy and

Endorsement is not.

      In our view, the plain language of the Policy and Endorsement defeat

Appellant’s argument.    The Endorsement provides revised coverage limits,

additional coverages, and coverage extensions, but those are subject to

limitations of the Policy unless “specifically deleted, replaced, or modified” in

the Endorsement. Endorsement, preamble. Consistent with the preamble,

the Endorsement lists coverage limits for various occurrences, provides

coverage for items not addressed in the Policy, including, among many other

things, accounts receivable, computer equipment, fine arts, valuable papers

and records.    Endorsement, § IV.       Likewise, the Endorsement contains

numerous exclusions. Endorsement, at § V. While several of those exclusions

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are duplicative of exclusions contained within the Policy, nowhere does the

Endorsement specifically modify or delete the Policy’s Virus Exclusion.

      As noted above, we are to treat none of the policy language as

surplusage and give effect to all its terms. MacMiles, 286 A.3d at 333-34.

The Policy sets forth the basis terms of coverage, subject to exclusions

including the Virus Exclusion. The Endorsement sets forth enhancements and

additions to the coverage provided in the Policy, which are also subject to

exclusions and conditions as provided in the Endorsement. The Endorsement

is silent on the Policy’s Virus Exclusion. To infer, from that silence, that the

Endorsement vitiates the Virus Exclusion would reduce the Virus Exclusion to

mere surplusage, and would contradict Endorsement’s preamble, which

provides that the Endorsement does not delete any provision of the Policy

unless specifically so stated.

      Because Appellant has not offered any meritorious argument in support

of reversing the trial court’s conclusion that the Virus Exclusion bars coverage,

we need not analyze Appellant’s remaining arguments. We note, however,

that the Policy and the Endorsement both provide coverage for “physical loss

of or damage to…” covered property.         These provisions are substantively

identical to those at issue in MacMiles. For the reasons explained in that

case, Appellant’s claim for coverage would fail even in the absence of a virus

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exclusion.3 The trial court properly granted Appellee’s motion for judgment

on the pleadings.

       Order affirmed.

       Judge Nichols concurs in the result.

       President Judge Emeritus Stevens notes his dissent.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 06/20/2023

____________________________________________

3  We are cognizant that this Court reached a different conclusion on similar
facts in Ungarean v. CNA, 286 A.3d 353 (Pa. Super. 2022). Appellant did
not seek to file supplemental briefs addressing MacMiles or Ungarean.

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