Court Opinion

ID: 9377465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 21:00:36.06005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:14.258979
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USCA11 Case: 22-12172    Document: 19-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2023   Page: 1 of 16

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12172
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        FAUSTO AGUERO ALVARADO,

                                                   Defendant- Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20026-KMM-5
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12172

        Before LAGOA, ANDERSON, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Defendant Fausto Aguero Alvarado, a federal prisoner at
        FCI Bennettsville, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
        for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on
        Amendment 782 to the sentencing guidelines and his motion for
        compassionate release pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Govern-
        ment has filed a motion for summary affirmance. We find no error
        in the district court’s rulings, and we conclude that summary affir-
        mance is warranted. Thus, we GRANT the Government’s motion
        and AFFIRM the district court’s denial of both motions.
                                 BACKGROUND
               In July 2013, Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspir-
        ing to distribute cocaine knowing that it would be imported into
        the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 963, and
        960(b)(1)(B). In its verdict, the jury expressly found that Defendant
        conspired to distribute cocaine “weighing five kilograms or more.”
        Five kilograms is the amount of cocaine necessary to impose the
        maximum penalty provided for in 21 U.S.C. § 960(b), including a
        minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of life imprison-
        ment. See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B).
              According to the undisputed facts in the PSR, Defendant’s
        conviction arose from an investigation conducted by the Drug En-
        forcement Agency, the United States Department of Homeland
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        22-12172               Opinion of the Court                       3

        Security (“DHS”), and Colombian law enforcement in 2009 con-
        cerning the sale of weapons to a terrorist organization in Colombia
        in exchange for cocaine. During the investigation, Defendant in-
        formed a Confidential Informant (“CI”) that he had “M-60 machine
        guns, AK-47s, Red Eye surface-to-air missiles” and other weapons
        manufactured in the United States that were available to be sold in
        Honduras and Nicaragua. Defendant also told the CI that he had a
        connection with a Nicaraguan national named Franklin McField-
        Bent who ran a drug trafficking organization in Colombia that
        transported drugs throughout Central America and into Mexico.
        The authorities subsequently learned that Defendant had intro-
        duced McField-Bent to a woman named Lina Grandet who pur-
        portedly had between 1,000 and 1,500 kilograms of cocaine in Co-
        lombia available to ship to Honduras. McField-Bent arranged to
        send $20,000 to Grandet to initiate a purchase of the cocaine, but
        the purchase was not completed.
                Later in the investigation, the CI met with and advised De-
        fendant that he was trying to acquire weapons for Autodefensas
        Unidas de Colombia, a Colombian organization that DHS has iden-
        tified as an armed and violent foreign terrorist group. After the CI
        made a down payment of $3,000 to one of Defendant’s associates
        for weapons to be provided in the future, Defendant introduced
        the CI to McField-Bent. Thereafter, Defendant served as a middle-
        man or broker for several deals between the CI and McField-Bent
        involving the exchange of weapons manufactured in the United
        States for hundreds of kilograms of cocaine located in Colombia.
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                    22-12172

        Evidence recovered by Colombian police indicates that one of the
        deals involved 442 kilograms of cocaine and another, separate deal
        involved 400 kilograms of cocaine. These quantities are in addition
        to the 1,000 to 1,500 kilograms of cocaine involved in the deal be-
        tween McField-Bent and Grandet referenced above. Based on
        these quantities, the PSR concluded that Defendant was accounta-
        ble for “well over 150 kilograms of cocaine.”
                The PSR assigned Defendant the highest base offense level
        of 38 pursuant to § 2D1.1(a)(5) of the sentencing guidelines, which
        at the time applied to an offense involving 150 kilograms or more
        of cocaine. The PSR added a 2-level enhancement for obstruction
        of justice, resulting in a total offense level of 40. Defendant’s crim-
        inal history category was I, yielding a recommended guidelines
        range of 292 to 365 months in prison, with a ten-year minimum
        term of imprisonment and a maximum term of life pursuant to 21
        U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii).
                Defendant stated at his sentencing hearing that he did not
        have any objections to the PSR’s description of his offense conduct
        or to its calculations. 1 Consistent with the recommendations in the
        PSR, the district court sentenced Defendant to 360 months in
        prison, to be followed by five years of supervised release. This

        1 Defendant initially asserted two objections to the PSR: (1) that the PSR
        incorrectly stated that Defendant received $3,000, money Defendant claimed
        was given to his co-defendant McField-Bent, and (2) that the PSR improperly
        applied the 2-level obstruction of justice enhancement. Defense counsel rep-
        resented at the sentencing hearing that those objections had been resolved.
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        22-12172                Opinion of the Court                         5

        Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence on direct ap-
        peal. See United States v. Alvarado, 808 F.3d 474, 496 (11th Cir.
        2015). In its opinion, the Court specifically referenced deals involv-
        ing Defendant that included 1,000 kilograms and 400 kilograms of
        cocaine, respectively. See id. at 480–81.
                In March 2019, Defendant filed a pro se motion for a sen-
        tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782
        to the sentencing guidelines. In support of his motion, Defendant
        argued that his base offense level of 38, the level that applied to 150
        kilograms of cocaine at the time of his original sentencing, should
        be reduced by two levels to 36 under Amendment 782, a retroac-
        tively applicable amendment to the sentencing guidelines that low-
        ered the base offense level for offenses involving at least 150 kilo-
        grams but less than 450 kilograms of cocaine. Defendant claimed
        the guidelines adjustment would result in a recommended guide-
        lines range of 235 to 293 months in prison for his offense.
                In July 2020, Defendant filed a motion for compassionate re-
        lease pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As amended by the
        First Step Act of 2018 (the “First Step Act”), that statute authorizes
        a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the reduction is
        warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and if it is
        consistent with the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a) and the applicable guidelines policy statements. See 18
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-12172

        U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 2 In support of his motion for compassion-
        ate release, Defendant argued that he was vulnerable to contract-
        ing COVID-19 because of the “poor sanitary conditions at his facil-
        ity” and because of the many cases of COVID-19 among BOP staff
        and inmates. Additionally, Defendant argued that he had a “flaw-
        less” inmate disciplinary record and that he had been involved in
        continuous programming while in prison and at one point had
        acted heroically to “sav[e] the life of an employee of the United
        States Government.” Finally, Defendant emphasized his rehabili-
        tation efforts and he claimed that he no longer posed any danger to
        the public.
               The district court denied Defendant’s motions for a sentence
        reduction and for compassionate release in a single order. Regard-
        ing the Amendment 782 motion, the court cited undisputed facts
        in the PSR indicating that Defendant was accountable for at least
        1,842 kilograms of cocaine, which quantity-finding triggered the
        same base offense level of 38 even when one applied Amendment
        782. The court thus concluded that Defendant did not show he
        was entitled to a lower guidelines range under Amendment 782, as
        required to invoke § 3582(c)(2). As to compassionate release under
        § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court found that Defendant did not sat-
        isfy his burden of demonstrating extraordinary and compelling

        2 Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also authorizes a sentence reduction under certain cir-
        cumstances if “the defendant is at least 70 years of age” but it is undisputed
        that Defendant does not qualify for an age-based sentence reduction. See 18
        U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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        22-12172               Opinion of the Court                        7

        reasons for his release, as required under that provision. Alterna-
        tively, the court stated that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against
        compassionate release.
                Defendant appeals, arguing that the district court erred and
        abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a sentence re-
        duction under § 3582(c)(2). As to his motion for compassionate
        release, Defendant essentially concedes that he does not qualify for
        relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A) based on any of the grounds this Court
        held in United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2021) can
        support such relief—that is, an inmate’s age, qualifying medical
        condition, or family circumstances. Instead, Defendant argues that
        the Court should abandon its precedent in Bryant and expand its
        definition of what qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling rea-
        son justifying compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A).
                                   DISCUSSION
        I.    Standards of Review
               We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions about
        the scope of its authority to modify a sentence under 18 U.S.C. §
        3582(c)(2). United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233,
        1238 (11th Cir. 2017). Assuming the district court has such author-
        ity, we review the court’s decision to grant or deny a sentence re-
        duction under § 3582(c)(2) only for abuse of discretion. Id. Simi-
        larly, we review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for com-
        passionate release pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) and, if eligibility is
        established, we review the denial of a motion for compassionate
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                     22-12172

        release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th
        1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion if
        it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures
        in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are
        clearly erroneous.” United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911–12
        (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d
        1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted)).
               Summary disposition of an appeal is appropriate when “the
        position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so
        that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the
        case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivo-
        lous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th
        Cir. 1969). 3 This Court has used summary disposition to resolve
        appeals that do not warrant extended discussion.
        II.    Defendant’s Motion for a Sentence Reduction Under 18
               U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
               Defendant argues that the district court erred when it denied
        his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
        based on Amendment 782 to the sentencing guidelines, which was
        implemented after Defendant was sentenced. Amendment 782 re-
        duced by two levels the base offense level applicable to certain drug
        offenses under § 2D1.1(c) of the guidelines. See Hughes v. United

        3 Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued
        before October 1, 1981, are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
        661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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        22-12172               Opinion of the Court                       9

        States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2018). Of relevance here, Amendment
        782 lowered the base offense level for offenses involving at least
        150 kilograms but less than 450 kilograms of cocaine to 36, and it
        reserved the highest base offense level of 38 for offenses involving
        450 kilograms or more of cocaine. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend.
        782 (2014). As noted, the PSR assigned Defendant a base offense
        level of 38, which at the time of Defendant’s sentencing applied to
        offenses involving at least 150 kilograms of cocaine. See U.S.S.G. §
        2D1.1(c) (2013). Defendant contends that, per his § 3582(c)(2) mo-
        tion, the district court should have retroactively applied Amend-
        ment 782, lowered his base offense level from 38 to 36, recalculated
        his guidelines range, and reduced his sentence accordingly.
               A district court’s authority to modify a prison sentence “is
        narrowly limited by statute.” United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d
        1190, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2010). Section 3582(c)(2) provides for such
        authority under certain circumstances when a defendant was “sen-
        tenced to a term of imprisonment based on a [guidelines] range
        that has subsequently been lowered.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See
        also United States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328, 336–37 (11th Cir.
        2013) (explaining the governing principles applicable to a §
        3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction). To authorize a sen-
        tence reduction, an amendment to the guidelines must be listed in
        § 1B1.10 of the guidelines as retroactively applicable, and the
        amendment must in fact result in a lower sentencing range than
        the range upon which the defendant’s sentence was based. See
        Hamilton, 715 F.3d at 337 (noting that a sentence reduction is not
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12172

        authorized by § 3582(c)(2) “if the amendment does not have the
        effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guidelines range” (ci-
        tation and quotation marks omitted)). Assuming both of those re-
        quirements are met, the district court still must exercise its discre-
        tion to determine whether a sentence reduction is warranted based
        on the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as well as any ap-
        plicable guidelines policy statements. See id.
                Applying the principles set out above, a two-step analysis
        governs a defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction under
        § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th
        Cir. 2000). First, the district court must determine whether a ret-
        roactively applicable amendment to the sentencing guidelines re-
        sults in a lower guidelines range for the defendant, thus making
        him eligible for a reduced sentence. See Hamilton, 715 F.3d at 337.
        In making that determination, the district court must leave intact
        “all of its previous factual decisions”—including any drug quantity
        findings. See id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also
        United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1336 (11th Cir. 2023) (reaf-
        firming the rule in this circuit that a district court, when consider-
        ing a First Step Act motion, is bound by prior fact findings—includ-
        ing judge-made drug quantity findings that trigger penalties later
        modified by the Act). As the § 3582(c)(2) movant, the defendant
        has the burden at this stage of showing, based on those findings,
        that he would have received a lower guidelines range if the amend-
        ment “had been in effect at the time of his original sentencing.”
        Hamilton, 715 F.3d at 341. Next, and assuming the defendant has
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        22-12172               Opinion of the Court                        11

        shown he is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), the
        court must decide at the second stage of the analysis “whether, in
        its discretion, it will elect to impose the newly calculated sentence
        under the amended guidelines or retain the original sentence” after
        considering the pertinent § 3553(a) sentencing factors and any ap-
        plicable guidelines policy statements. See Bravo, 203 F.3d at 781.
                Here, the district court correctly found at the first stage of
        the analysis that Defendant is not eligible for a sentence reduction
        under § 3582(c)(2). As the court acknowledged, Amendment 782
        is retroactively applicable per § 1B1.10 of the guidelines. See
        U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). Nevertheless, Defendant failed to demon-
        strate that his offense involved less than 450 kilograms of cocaine,
        such that his base offense level would be lower under Amendment
        782 than the level that was applied at his sentencing. On the con-
        trary, the unobjected to—and thus undisputed—facts in the PSR
        show that Defendant’s offense involved a minimum of 1,842 kilo-
        grams of cocaine. See United States v. Davis, 587 F.3d 1300, 1303–
        04 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendant was “deemed to
        have admitted, for sentencing purposes, the facts in the PS[R] he
        did not object to clearly and specifically at sentencing” and that the
        district court was “permitted to make factual findings based on the
        undisputed statements in the PS[R]” when ruling on the defend-
        ant’s § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction). As such, De-
        fendant’s base offense level under Amendment 782 would be 38,
        the same base offense level applied at his sentencing. See U.S.S.G.
        App. C, Amend. 782 (2014). Accordingly, the district court was not
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-12172

        authorized by § 3582(c)(2) to reduce Defendant’s sentence and it
        clearly did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion for a sen-
        tence reduction under that provision. See Hamilton, 715 F.3d at
        337.
                The only substantive argument Defendant makes in support
        of his appeal as to the § 3582(c)(2) issue is that he was sentenced
        based on “uncharged quantities” of drugs, in contravention to Al-
        leyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). Alleyne has no relevance
        to Defendant’s case. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that
        “[f]acts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are . . . el-
        ements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a rea-
        sonable doubt.” Id. at 108. Here, there is no dispute that Defend-
        ant’s mandatory minimum was based on the jury’s finding that he
        conspired to distribute cocaine “weighing five kilograms or more.”
        See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B). Further, the Court’s holding in Al-
        leyne derives from a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
        to a jury trial. See Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 104. The Supreme Court
        has made it clear that the sentence modification procedures of §
        3582(c)(2) “are not constitutionally compelled” and thus “do not
        implicate the Sixth Amendment right to have essential facts found
        by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Dillon v. United States, 560
        U.S. 817, 828 (2010).
              In short, the district court did not err when it denied Defend-
        ant’s motion for a reduced sentence under § 3582(c)(2), and the
        Government’s argument to that effect clearly is correct as a matter
        of law. See Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. The
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        22-12172                 Opinion of the Court                           13

        Government’s motion for summary affirmance is thus GRANTED
        as to this issue, and the district court’s order denying the motion is
        AFFIRMED.
        III.   Compassionate Release
                Defendant also argues that the district court erred by deny-
        ing his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
        § 3582(c)(1)(A). As amended by the First Step Act, § 3582(c)(1)(A)
        authorizes the district court to grant a defendant’s motion for com-
        passionate release if: (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons
        warrant” such relief and (2) the defendant’s release is consistent
        with the sentencing factors of § 3553(a) and the “applicable policy
        statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. §
        3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The relevant policy statement, found in U.S.S.G.
        § 1B1.13, echoes the statutory requirements, stating that a district
        court may grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate release
        “if, after considering the factors set forth in . . . § 3553(a),” the court
        determines that: (1) “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons war-
        rant” the defendant’s release and (2) “[t]he defendant is not a dan-
        ger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as pro-
        vided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See also
        United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2021)
        (“1B1.13 is an applicable policy statement for all [§ 3582(c)(1)(A)]
        motions[.]”); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir.
        2021) (listing three conditions that are necessary for a sentence re-
        duction under § 3582(c)(1)(A): support in the § 3553(a) factors,
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12172

        extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adherence to U.S.S.G.
        § 1B1.13’s policy statement).
                The applicable guidelines policy statement, cited above,
        identifies three extraordinary and compelling reasons that can au-
        thorize a court to grant a motion for compassionate release under
        § 3582(c)(1)(A). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)-(C). First, a de-
        fendant’s medical condition can constitute an extraordinary and
        compelling reason for release if the defendant can show that he is
        suffering either from a “terminal illness” or a “serious physical or
        medical condition” that “substantially diminishes [his] ability . . . to
        provide self-care” in prison and “from which he . . . is not expected
        to recover.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A). Second, release is per-
        mitted under certain circumstances if the defendant is at least 65
        years old. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(B). And finally, a defend-
        ant’s family circumstances can create an extraordinary and compel-
        ling reason for release based on the “death or incapacitation of the
        caregiver of the defendant’s minor child” or the “incapacitation of
        the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the defendant
        would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered
        partner.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(C). The policy statement also
        contains a catch-all provision that allows the Bureau of Prisons
        (“BOP”) to determine that there are other extraordinary and com-
        pelling reasons for a particular defendant’s release, but this Court
        has held that only the BOP—as opposed to the court—has the au-
        thority to determine that release is warranted under that provision.
        See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1263 (“We cannot replace the phrase ‘[a]s
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        22-12172                Opinion of the Court                          15

        determined by the Director of the [BOP]’ with ‘as determined by a
        district court.’”).
                Defendant does not demonstrate—or even argue—that he
        is eligible for compassionate release based on any of the reasons set
        out above. Instead, he argues for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) as a
        result of: (1) his susceptibility to COVID-19 based on the poor san-
        itary conditions of prison, (2) his “flawless” discipline record; (3) his
        heroic action saving the life of an employee of the United States
        Government, and (4) his rehabilitation. This Court held in Bryant
        that relief can only be granted under § 3582(c)(1)(A) based on one
        of the reasons expressly set out in the applicable guidelines policy
        statement—that is, a qualifying medical condition, advanced age,
        or family circumstances requiring the defendant to act as a care-
        taker to a minor child, spouse, or registered partner. See id. at 1265
        (“Because [the defendant’s] motion does not fall within any of the
        reasons that 1B1.13 identifies as extraordinary and compelling, the
        district court correctly denied his motion for a reduction of his sen-
        tence.” (quotation marks omitted)). The factors cited by Defend-
        ant do not qualify. As such, summary affirmance is warranted be-
        cause Defendant failed to establish extraordinary and compelling
        reasons to justify his compassionate release.
               Defendant essentially concedes that his compassionate re-
        lease motion is not viable under Bryant, but he urges the Court to
        reconsider and vacate the panel opinion in Bryant based on prece-
        dent from other circuits and district courts around the country. De-
        fendant’s argument is precluded by this Court’s prior panel
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12172

        precedent rule. See In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir.
        2015). Under that rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all
        subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined
        to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court” or by this Court
        sitting en banc. Id. Because Bryant has not been overturned by the
        Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc, this Court is bound
        by it. Defendant’s argument that we should disregard Bryant is
        thus clearly unavailing.
                                  CONCLUSION
                As the movant, Defendant had the burden of establishing his
        eligibility for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and
        compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See Ham-
        ilton, 715 F.3d at 337. The district court correctly held that Defend-
        ant failed to meet that burden here. The Government’s motion for
        summary affirmance is thus GRANTED, and the court’s order
        denying both Defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction under
        § 3582(c)(2) and his motion for compassionate release under
        § 3582(c)(1)(A) is AFFIRMED.