Court Opinion

ID: 9769481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:52:28.852566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:41.523643
License: Public Domain

HARDBERGER, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Although I concur in the majority’s affir-mance of the trial court’s order, I disagree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion that presentment is a prerequisite to filing a claim under the Anti-Retaliation Law.
“The waiver of governmental immunity is a matter addressed to the Legislature.” City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex.1995). In order for the Legislature to waive immunity, it must do so by clear and unambiguous language. Id. By enacting section 504.002 of the Texas Labor Code, the Legislature waived immunity from liability for claims under the Anti-Retaliation Law. Kuhl v. City of Garland, 910 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex.1995).
The majority contends that section 81.041 of the Local Government Code serves as a condition precedent to a suit against a county, not as a waiver of immunity. If this contention were true, a county could not be sued even after presentment if the claimant could not prove waiver of immunity through another source. However, section 81.041 has not been so narrowly construed but has been held to authorize a claimant to sue the county after rejection of her claim by the commissioners court. Jensen Const. Co. v. Dallas County, 920 S.W.2d 761, 770 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1996, writ denied); see also Missouri Pac. R.. Co. v. Browns Navigation Dist., 453 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1970)(noting predecessor statute authorized suit after filing of claim prior to institution of the suit); Harris County v. Hermann Hosp., 943 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1997, no writ)(relying upon 81.041 as authority for lawsuit against county). Thus, the Legislature enacted section 81.041 to generally authorize suits against the county after presentment, effectively waiving immunity from such suits.
The Legislature also enacted the Anti-Retaliation Law to enable employees to bring suit against a county for wrongfully terminating an employee in retaliation for filing a worker’s compensation claim. Cf. Gregg County v. Fanur, 933 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied)(noting Whis-tleblower Act creates specific cause of action in addition to general claims allowed under section 81.041). By enacting this statute and permitting suits to be brought against a county for such claims, the Legislature could have incorporated a notice provision into the statute, but for whatever reason, the Legislature chose not to include a notice requirement. The majority opinion conditions the waiver of immunity for Anti-Retaliation Law claims despite the absence of a clear expression of such a condition in the statutory provisions creating the claim and granting the waiver. See Tex. Labok Code Ann. *112§§ 451.001-003, 504.002-504.003 (Vernon 1996). Thus, the majority takes a matter addressed to the Legislature and refines the Legislature’s resolution of that matter. The Anti-Retaliation Law does not require presentment of a claim to the Commissioner’s Court — it would probably be a waste of time to do so. But, whatever the reason, presentment is not required by the clear language of the statute. The majority now requires it. I would follow the statute’s wording. Had the Legislature wanted to make presentment a requirement, they would have done so. Since they did not, neither should we.
Because the Legislature did not condition the waiver of immunity for claims arising under the Anti-Retaliation Law upon presentment under section 81.041,1 would affirm the trial court’s order and permit Garcia to proceed with her counterclaim.