Court Opinion

ID: 9896300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 21:05:26.645815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:41.296090
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/9/23 In re Joel H. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re JOEL H., a Person                                      B327983
 Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County Super.
 Court Law.                                                   Ct. No. 20CCJP03202B)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 I.M.,

      Defendant and
 Appellant.
     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Charles Q. Clay, Judge. Affirmed.

     Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Senior
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                               ******
       I.M. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s exertion of
dependency jurisdiction over her 12-year-old son Joel H. as well
as its orders that she submit to a psychological examination and
drug and alcohol testing. We conclude there was no error and
affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
I.     The Family
       Joel H. is the child of mother and Joel H. (father), who
passed away in May 2021. Mother and father separated before
father’s death, and mother began dating Daniel B. (boyfriend) in
late 2019. By January 2022, mother and Joel were living with
boyfriend in boyfriend’s residence.

1      Consistent with the applicable standard of review, we set
forth the facts in the light most favorable to the rulings below.
(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)

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II.   Prior Dependency Case Based on Domestic Violence
With Father
      In August 2020, the juvenile court exerted dependency
jurisdiction over Joel after sustaining allegations that (1) mother
and father engaged in domestic violence in Joel’s presence,
including one incident of physical violence where mother beat
father with a broomstick, father pushed mother, and Joel put
himself between them; and (2) mother has a history of substance
abuse, including using methamphetamine and amphetamines.
The court ordered Joel removed from mother’s custody, but
returned him to her custody approximately one year later after
she completed her case plan, which included substance abuse
treatment, drug and alcohol testing, a domestic violence support
group, and individual counseling. The court terminated
jurisdiction over Joel on January 18, 2022.
III. Domestic Violence With Boyfriend
      Just months after the juvenile court terminated its
jurisdiction over Joel, mother stopped taking the psychotropic
medications prescribed by her primary physician for the PTSD he
suggested she had. Mother also stopped attending therapy for
the PTSD and the “abandonment issues” she claimed to
experience when her mother did not accompany her and her
father when they immigrated to the United States decades ago.
In place of her prescribed medication and therapy, mother
decided to self-medicate by smoking pot. She also resumed
drinking alcohol. Due to her cessation of taking her medications
and therapy, mother started to “feel[] anxious and started being
needier.” From late January 2022 to October 2022, mother and
boyfriend had verbal fights, including a “verbal dispute” in

                                 3
October 2022 where police responded to boyfriend’s residence and
found mother “very intoxicated and at times incomprehensible.”
       Things came to a head on November 1, 2022. That night,
while watching a movie with Joel, mother and boyfriend drank
alcohol and got into a verbal argument over boyfriend’s loyalty to
her. After boyfriend threw an object at mother and mother
threatened to call the police, boyfriend tried to leave. Mother
blocked his path, but boyfriend wove his way around her. Once
out in the driveway, boyfriend punched mother in the stomach
and pushed her away, causing her to fall backwards and hit her
head on the bumper of a car. Joel was present for the entire
altercation, and was able to tell the police what he saw. Mother
also reported that “an incident like this” “might have happen[ed]”
previously.
       In subsequent interviews, mother recanted the statements
she made to police on the night of November 1, contending
instead that boyfriend never touched her and that her fall was
accidental. Joel also recanted his statements to police,
contending instead that he was not present and, paradoxically,
that the entire event was an “accident” (because mother and
boyfriend told him it was). Mother was also less than forthright:
She denied the existence of the prior dependency case, denied
using alcohol on November 1, and admitted to lying about these
issues only after being confronted with contrary evidence.
 IV. Current Dependency Case
       On December 28, 2022, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (the Department)
filed a petition again asking the juvenile court to exert
dependency jurisdiction over Joel due to (1) mother’s “history of
engaging in violent altercations” with boyfriend, including the

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November 1 altercation; (2) mother’s “history of substance abuse”
and her “current use[] of alcohol and marijuana”; and (3) mother’s
“mental and emotional problems[,] including a diagnosis of
PTSD.” As a result, the Department alleged, mother had “failed
to protect” Joel and “endanger[ed his] physical health and
safety,” thereby placing him at “risk of serious physical harm”
that justified the exertion of jurisdiction under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).2
      On March 2, 2023, the juvenile court held the jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing. The court sustained all three
jurisdictional allegations, left Joel in his mother’s custody, and
ordered the Department to provide mother with family
maintenance services. Those services were comprised of (1) drug
and alcohol services, including a 12-step program and random
drug and alcohol testing; (2) mental health counseling, including
a psychological evaluation and requiring mother to take all
prescribed psychotropic medications; and (3) individual
counseling to address case issues.
V.    Appeal
      Mother filed this timely appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
I.    Substantial Evidence
      Mother argues that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. (I.J., supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
      Section 300, subdivision (b), authorizes the assertion of
dependency jurisdiction where a child “has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm

2     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

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or illness, as a result of” (1) “[t]he failure or inability of the child’s
parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child”; or (2)
“[t]he inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the
child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness . . . or substance
abuse.” (§ 300, subds. (b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(D).) Exposing a child to
domestic violence can constitute a failure to protect a child from
the risk of serious physical injury under subdivision (b) of section
300 (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194 (Heather
A.); In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941), at least if, at the
time of the jurisdictional hearing, the evidence supports a finding
that the “violence is ongoing or likely to continue” rather than
being a one-time incident unlikely to recur (In re Daisy H. (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 713, 717, disapproved on other grounds by In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 278; In re M.W. (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453-1454; cf. In re J.N. (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1010, 1025-1027). A parent’s substance abuse or
mental illness can also justify the exertion of dependency
jurisdiction, at least if at the time of the jurisdictional hearing
there is a defined risk of harm linked to that substance abuse or
mental illness. (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 830.)
Under any of these grounds, risk of harm means just that: The
juvenile court “need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 159, 165; In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th
1376, 1383 (Kadence P.), superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 322; In re
Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 993.) A parent’s past
conduct is a “good predictor” of her future conduct, and hence
whether a child is at risk. (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126,
133 (T.V.).)

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      Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings in this case. Substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding that Joel is at substantial risk of
serious physical harm by virtue of the domestic violence between
mother and boyfriend. Joel was present when boyfriend punched
and pushed mother on November 1, and Joel has shown a
willingness to get in between mother and her assailants; Joel is
therefore in harm’s way. (Accord, Heather A., supra, 52
Cal.App.4th at p. 194 [“Obviously the children were put in a
position of physical danger from [domestic violence occurring in
their presence], since, for example, they could wander into the
room where it was occurring and be accidentally hit”].)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that mother’s
neglect of her mental illness by not taking her prescribed
medications and ceasing her therapy, as well as her use of alcohol
and marijuana, placed Joel at substantial risk of serious physical
harm. Mother herself admitted that it was her neglect of her
mental illness that led to her self-medication through alcohol and
marijuana, which led to her feeling anxious and needy, and which
thus prompted her to instigate the argument with boyfriend that
escalated to physical violence in Joel’s presence on November 1.
What is more, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
that Joel remained at risk at the time of the jurisdictional
hearing because the ingredients that led to the November 1
incident that placed Joel in harm’s way still remained: (1)
Mother and boyfriend continued to be in a relationship; (2)
mother had yet to address the mental health and substance
abuse issues that precipitated verbal arguments that, on two
occasions, escalated into physical violence between them; and (3)
Joel continued to be in the household. Mother’s subsequent

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statements lying about past events and minimizing the
November 1 incident show mother’s willingness to conceal facts
in order to keep custody of Joel, even when such custody
exacerbates the risk to Joel. (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11
Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial is a factor often relevant to
determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior
in the future without court supervision”].)
       Mother resists this conclusion with what boil down to two
sets of arguments.
       First, mother asserts that mental illness and substance
abuse are, by themselves, insufficient to warrant the exercise of
dependency jurisdiction. This is true (In re L.W. (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 840, 849; In re A.L. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 1044,
1050), but also irrelevant. That is because the evidence here
supported the juvenile court’s implicit finding that mother’s
mental illness and substance abuse contributed to the domestic
violence that put Joel at substantial risk of harm. (Cf. In re L.C.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 646, 652-654 [parent’s methamphetamine
use did not create risk of harm when parent left child in care of
competent adult while using the drug]; In re J.A. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046-1047 [mother’s use of edible marijuana
gummies did not create risk of harm to fetus when no evidence
established actual adverse effects on the fetus, and parent
immediately stopped consuming gummies once informed of
potential adverse effect].)
       Second, mother asserts that any risk of harm to Joel no
longer exists because her fight with boyfriend was an isolated
incident and because mother went back on her prescribed
medication, tried to resume therapy, and stopped drinking once
the Department again became involved. We reject these

                                 8
assertions. Accepting mother’s assertion that the November 1
altercation was an isolated incident would require us to ignore
mother’s earlier statements in favor of her later, self-serving
statements; this is inconsistent with the governing standard of
review. And mother’s recent and hasty resumption of medication
and therapy does not negate all risk. Mother’s past conduct in
stopping her medication and therapy (and using marijuana and
alcohol to self-medicate) after the prior dependency case closed
supports a reasonable inference mother would do the same thing
again if Joel were not subject to the court’s jurisdiction in this
case. (Accord, In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1653
[parent’s refusal to take medication contributed to risk and
indicated parent’s “unwillingness to accept and acknowledge how
her mental problems contributed to [the] situation”].) The
juvenile court acted reasonably in concluding that Joel remained
at risk until mother had established she would not engage in the
same pattern of conduct again.
II.    Dispositional Order
       Mother also challenges two of the juvenile court’s
dispositional orders—namely, (1) that mother submit to a
psychological assessment, and (2) that mother submit to drug and
alcohol testing. A juvenile court has wide discretion to impose
“reasonable orders to the parents,” and this standard is satisfied
as long as the order is “appropriate and in the child’s best
interest” and is designed to “eliminate [the] conditions that led to
the court’s finding [of jurisdiction].” (§ 362; In re A.L. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 138, 145 [orders imposed as part of family
maintenance services must also satisfy these standards]; see In
re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229.) We review a juvenile
court’s decision regarding which orders to impose for an abuse of

                                 9
discretion (In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186-187),
and review any subsidiary factual findings supporting such
orders for substantial evidence (T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p.
136).
       The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
either challenged order in this case. The court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering the psychological assessment because, as
noted above, substantial evidence showed that mother’s
untreated mental illness was a contributing factor to the
domestic violence that posed a risk to Joel. Although it is true (as
mother argues on appeal) that mother’s personal physician had
diagnosed her with PTSD, mother nevertheless freely admitted
no psychologist had examined her, and the court ordered the
assessment “to ensure the reliability of [the non-psychologist
physician’s] diagnosis” and “to ensure that mother is pursuing
the appropriate course of treatment in terms of medication and
therapy.” (Accord, Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 195, 199-203 [“psychological evaluation is an
‘information-gathering tool’” that is “frequently used in
dependency cases”].) This order was accordingly appropriate, in
Joel’s best interest, and aimed at trying to eliminate one of the
conditions supporting the court’s finding of jurisdiction. And
even if we assume that mother properly preserved her objection
to the drug and alcohol testing, the court also did not abuse its
discretion in ordering that testing because substantial evidence
showed that mother’s self-medication using marijuana and
alcohol was also a contributing factor to the domestic violence
that posed a risk to Joel.

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                         DISPOSITION
      The orders are affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                      ______________________, J.
                                      HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.*
KWAN

*     Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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