Court Opinion

ID: 9564828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:08:24.520315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:42.043635
License: Public Domain

WORTHEN, Justice
(concurring and dissenting).
*378I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, but am compelled to disagree both with the reasoning and the rule which its author prefers in this type of case, even though it is conceded that there is not sufficient evidence to make the rule operative. I am of the opinion that this court should repudiate the rule preferred by the author of the majority opinion.
In the case of State v. Ferry,1 our most recent declaration on this point, we, in October, 1954, observed:
“An accused cannot be convicted on his confession alone. We believe mid hold that in addition there must be independent, clear and convincing evidence of the corpus delicti, although we and the authorities generally do not require it to be convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Under the rule contended for in the majority opinion, every guide post and measuring stick appropriate for the trial judge to use are cast aside and there is substituted in their stead belief by reasonable minds. If the judge is satisfied that the crime charged is a real one and has been committed, the defendant has had his day in court and enjoyed to the top degree his constitutional guarantees. It needs only to quote the rule contended for — which seems to have found very limited support — in order to see the fallacy of the same. As-stated in the majority opinion, it is as-follows:
“ * * * The rule best suited to the administration of justice is that there must be substantial separate evidence of the corpus delicti, such that reasonable minds could believe that the crime is a real one which was in fact committed, and not one which is fanciful or imaginary.”
This rule rejects the idea of requiring-separate proof by clear and convincing evidence notwithstanding we said and held in the Ferry case, supra, that there must be additional evidence which is clear and con- • vincing.
The opinion is nothing less than an attempt to weaken an announced and accepted rule of this court in a situation where the same cannot have any bearing, since it is ■ conceded that there is not sufficient evidence to meet the requirements of the rule.
I am of the opinion that the concluding - statement in the majority opinion in effect concedes that the rule as stated cannot be accepted. In this case the evidence was • sufficient to support belief by reasonable minds that the crime charged is a real one - which has been committed and not one-which is fanciful or imaginary.
*379It seems an unjustified position to say that the evidence warrants a belief by reasonable minds that the crime charged is a real one which has been committed and then íurn^ — after reasonable minds have been fully satisfied as to the sufficiency of the •evidence for that purpose — and say that the reasonable minds should not have been convinced.

. 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P.2d 173.