Court Opinion

ID: 9910194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 05:04:31.123521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:24.118285
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re STEPHENSON, Minors.                                            December 14, 2023

                                                                     No. 366223
                                                                     Calhoun Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2004-002952-NA

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). We affirm.

                                 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        Calhoun County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned for the
termination of respondent’s parental rights to three children during 2021 related to physical neglect
and improper supervision of the children. Respondent admitted to methamphetamine use and
addiction; however, she refused substance-abuse treatment and more often than not failed to
submit to drug screens. The trial court ordered that the children be placed in temporary foster care
and ordered respondent to participate in various services to enable reunification with the children.
The children were removed from respondent’s care on February 1, 2022. The children were
diagnosed with generalized tooth decay in multiple areas of the primary and permanent teeth and
required significant dental treatment. Over the course of the proceedings, respondent had
psychological evaluations scheduled that she failed to complete and she took minimal steps toward
substance-abuse treatment and failed to complete the program and services made available to her.
Respondent was provided parenting time but missed a substantial number of visits. DHHS filed a
supplemental petition in January 2023 seeking termination of respondent’s parental rights. At the
conclusion of the termination proceedings, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights.
Respondent now appeals.

        II. ADJOURNMENT AND/OR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a respondent’s motion for an adjournment is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 28; 501 NW2d 182 (1993).

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A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.
In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 130; 777 NW2d 728 (2009).

        A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel generally presents a mixed question of fact and
constitutional law, with questions of fact reviewed for clear error and questions of law reviewed
de novo. In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 318; 964 NW2d 881 (2020). Respondents in parental-
rights proceedings are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, and claims regarding
ineffectiveness are reviewed under the same principles that apply in criminal proceedings. In re
Martin, 316 Mich App 73, 85; 896 NW2d 452 (2016). “Clear error exists when the reviewing
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v
Anderson, 284 Mich App 11, 13; 772 NW2d 792 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
We review de novo whether a particular act or omission fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 19-20.
Because respondent did not move in the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on this
matter, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the existing record. In re AMB, 248 Mich
App 144, 231-232; 640 NW2d 262 (2001).

                                      A. ADJOURNMENT

        Respondent argues that the trial court erred by denying her request to adjourn the
termination hearing to have the opportunity to consult and present an expert witness regarding
respondent’s positive drug screen. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a respondent’s motion
for adjournment is largely controlled by MCR 3.923(G), which provides as follows:

              Adjournments of trials or hearings in child protective proceedings should
       be granted only

               (1) for good cause,

               (2) after taking into consideration the best interests of the child, and

               (3) for as short a period of time as necessary.

This Court has determined “that in order for a trial court to find good cause for an adjournment, ‘a
legally sufficient or substantial reason’ must first be shown.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 11;
761 NW2d 253 (2008) (citation omitted). In a child-protective proceeding, a motion to adjourn
must identify a good cause, and the court’s ruling should consider the child’s best interests.
MCR 3.923(G)(1), (2). The court rules applicable to other types of proceedings specify that the
unavailability of a witness or evidence may amount to good cause, but “only if the court finds that
the evidence is material and that diligent efforts have been made to produce the witness or
evidence.” MCR 2.503(C)(1), (2).

        Applying MCR 3.923(G) to the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying respondent’s motion to adjourn the termination hearing. Respondent, through counsel,
moved for an adjournment at the conclusion of day three of the termination proceedings.
According to trial counsel, the adjournment was necessary to refute testimony presented for the
first time regarding the credibility of respondent’s exposure to methamphetamine during the
cleaning of her residence. The record reveals, however, that respondent and trial counsel were

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aware and had proper notice of the positive drug screen approximately 14 days before the
termination hearing and that respondent contested that positive drug screen. Additional testimony
was presented regarding respondent’s immediate reaction to the positive drug screen and her claim
that it was a false positive. Evidence was presented that respondent informed her caseworker that
it was a false-positive result before the termination proceedings and that respondent had provided
at least two factual situations that she argued were the cause of the false-positive result.
Respondent argues, on appeal, that evidence regarding skin exposure to methamphetamine was
introduced for the first time at the termination hearing; however, contact exposure was the entirety
of respondent’s argument both when she initially discovered the positive drug result and at the
termination hearing. Further, respondent testified at the same termination hearing regarding her
cleaning the basement of her residence, lack of protective equipment, and possible contact or
ingestion of methamphetamine from failing to wash her hands and shower.

         On appeal, respondent argues that research regarding methamphetamine exposure “took a
matter of a minute or so to find” and that “any competent professional could have testified on the
issue.” The trial court did not err by expecting respondent to be prepared with evidence to refute
the drug screen that she immediately opposed upon her discovery of the test results. Accordingly,
the trial court properly determined that respondent and trial counsel were notified and contested
the positive drug screen and could have timely presented evidence to refute the positive drug
screen. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent’s motion for
an adjournment of the termination proceedings.

                        B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       In analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at termination hearings, we apply
by analogy the principles of ineffective assistance of counsel as they have developed in the
criminal law context. In re Trowbridge, 155 Mich App 785, 786; 401 NW2d 65 (1986). Both the
Michigan and federal Constitutions guarantee the right to the assistance of counsel in criminal
cases. Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const, Am VI. Given the nature of accusations and
consequences in child-protective proceedings, this right has been extended to these civil
proceedings. In re Martin, 316 Mich App at 85.

        If defense counsel provided deficient assistance and the deficient performance prejudiced
the defendant’s trial, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668,
687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). To successfully establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a respondent in child-protective proceedings must show “that (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced the respondent.” In re Martin, 316 Mich App at 85. “To
demonstrate prejudice, a party must show the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, the results of the proceeding would have been different, and a reasonable
probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” In re Mota, 334
Mich at 319.

        “When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must be cognizant
of, and guard against, the bias of applying 20/20 hindsight to counsel’s performance.” In re Casto,
___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 357656); slip op at 8. “In reviewing
counsel’s performance, this Court ‘must determine whether the strategic choices were made after

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less than complete investigation, and any choice is reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.’ ” Id., quoting People
v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). There is a “strong presumption that
counsel’s performance was born out of sound trial strategy.” Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52.
“[T]rial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise an objection or motion that would have been
futile.” People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998).

         Respondent argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing
to object during the termination hearing to the foster-care caseworker’s testimony regarding her
conversation with an employee at the drug testing laboratory. The Michigan Rules of Evidence,
other than rules respecting privileges, do not apply at the termination hearing, and the trial court
is permitted to receive all relevant and material evidence. MCR 3.977(H)(2). The Michigan Rules
of Evidence apply to an initial dispositional hearing when the petitioner has asked for termination
at the initial disposition, and they apply to a dispositional hearing held on a supplemental petition
asserting a ground for termination that is new or different from the offense that led the court to
take jurisdiction. See MCR 3.977(E); MCR 3.977(F). For other dispositional hearings, the rules
of evidence generally do not apply. MCR 3.973(E); MCR 3.977(H)(2); In re Sanders, 495 Mich
394, 406; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). Instead, all relevant and material evidence is admissible and
certain evidentiary privileges are abrogated. MCR 3.973(E)(1); MCR 3.973(E)(2). Therefore,
hearsay is admissible. In re Hinson, 135 Mich App 472, 475; 354 NW2d 794 (1984). Further, the
trial court may consider all exhibits and testimony elicited during prior hearings, including exhibits
not formally received into evidence at the earlier proceedings. In re King, 186 Mich App 458,
465; 465 NW2d 1 (1990). If the court at any time believes that the evidence requires further
development, the court may examine a witness, call a witness, or order the production of additional
evidence. MCR 3.923(A); In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 137; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). A
ground is new or different when the grounds for termination are “unrelated to the basis on which
the probate court initially established its jurisdiction over the children.” In re Snyder, 223 Mich
App 85, 90; 566 NW2d 18 (1997).

        In this case, petitioner filed a petition in February 2022 alleging, in relevant part, that
respondent “neglected or refused to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical,
surgical, or other care necessary for the children’s health or moral, or . . . subjected the children to
a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being” and that respondent’s “home or
environment . . . is an unfit place for the children to live.” The petition also included specific
factual allegations, stating, in part, that respondent “admits to continued use of methamphetamine”
and that respondent “refused critical treatment.” Other allegations included respondent’s refusal
to participate in drug screens, her most recent uses of methamphetamine, and her regular use and
significant addiction to methamphetamine.

          In January 2023, petitioner filed a supplemental petition, seeking termination of
respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j). The supplemental petition
again alleged, in part, that respondent “neglected or refused to provide proper or necessary support,
education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for the children’s health or moral,
or . . . subjected the children to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being” and that
respondent’s “home or environment . . . is an unfit place for the children to live.” The
supplemental petition also included additional factual allegations of respondent’s drug use
occurring after adjudication, including allegations that respondent had not addressed her

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methamphetamine abuse, postponed or voluntarily chose not to participate in various treatment
programs, and had subsequent positive drug screens for methamphetamine.

        At the termination hearing, the foster-care caseworker testified regarding respondent’s
most recent positive drug screen for methamphetamine and her conversation with an employee of
the drug testing laboratory regarding respondent’s contention that it was a false-positive drug
screen. Trial counsel did not object during the direct examination of the witness but attempted to
raise concerns regarding the employee’s credibility during his cross-examination with questions
regarding the caseworker’s knowledge of the employee’s training and expertise. The trial court
permitted petitioner to introduce hearsay by permitting the caseworker’s testimony regarding her
conversation with the drug testing laboratory employee. Hearsay is “a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). However, hearsay is admissible at the dispositional phase
of the proceedings unless it relates to issues alleged in a supplemental petition not subject to the
prior adjudication. In re DMK, 289 Mich App 246, 258; 796 NW2d 129 (2010).

        In this case, respondent’s methamphetamine use was an ongoing issue since the initiation
of the case and throughout all later proceedings. Because these statements were postadjudication
with respect to the allegations of the initial petition, the rules of evidence did not apply.
Accordingly, the testimony was admissible, and respondent’s counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the introduction of admissible testimony. “Counsel is not
ineffective for failing to make a futile objection.” In re Archer, 277 Mich App 71, 84; 744 NW2d
1 (2007).

                                       C. EXPERT WITNESS

        Next, respondent argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
present an expert in substance-abuse toxicology. Respondent maintains that testimony by an
expert would have provided an effective challenge to the trustworthiness of the testimony
presented regarding the most recent positive drug screen and corroborated respondent’s testimony
that the drug screen presented a false-positive result.

         “An attorney’s decision whether to retain witnesses, including expert witnesses, is a matter
of trial strategy.” People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). It is presumed
that counsel’s trial strategy is effective; therefore, a party challenging counsel’s trial strategy must
present evidence to rebut the presumption of effectiveness. Id. On appeal, respondent simply
argues that trial counsel should have retained an expert to refute the positive drug screen that the
trial court considered, in part, in its determination to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

        Respondent failed to address that trial counsel requested an adjournment to retain an expert
after the testimony regarding the drug screen was presented at the termination hearing and after
respondent had provided testimony to rebut the positive drug screen. Further, trial counsel
attempted to refute the positive drug screen by presenting evidence that the drug screen could have
been a false-positive result through testimony from the foster-care caseworker regarding the low
level of the results and regarding the caseworker’s knowledge of the lab employee’s training and
expertise on touch exposure versus ingestion. Additionally, trial counsel elicited testimony
regarding respondent’s negative drug screens before and after the positive drug screen and

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respondent’s previous high levels when she admitted to using methamphetamine versus the low
levels of the recent test in which she denied using methamphetamine. Trial counsel also elicited
testimony from respondent regarding her cleaning process and her detailed experience with the
various drug paraphernalia to which she had exposure during her cleaning process.

        Respondent failed to present evidence regarding how an expert witness would have
effectively refuted the positive drug screen and argues only that an expert may have challenged
the trustworthiness of the caseworker’s testimony and corroborated respondent’s testimony.
Respondent provided no evidence or affidavits to establish what expert could have been called or
what testimony would have been presented. Instead, respondent only included a reference to a
publication that indicated that contamination and exposure of methamphetamine in residential
homes was an issue of concern to public health and that there are uncertainties pertaining to
exposure and health effects. At most, respondent offered speculation that such an expert may have
supported her position. Lacking additional details, we cannot evaluate whether trial counsel’s
decision not to call an expert was sound strategy or whether any prejudice resulted from the
decision.

        Even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to retain an expert
witness, respondent has failed to show prejudice resulting from that deficiency. The evidence in
the case supported the termination of respondent’s parental rights because respondent’s substance
abuse was just one of the multiple reasons that the trial court determined that statutory grounds
existed for termination of respondent’s parental rights and that termination served the children’s
best interests. The trial court discussed respondent’s inability to care for her children and
respondent’s ongoing issues regarding stability, employment, and unsuitable housing. The trial
court discussed respondent’s lack of participation in services, the length of time that respondent
would need to provide suitable housing for the children, respondent’s adult daughter with addiction
issues living with her, respondent’s mental-health issues, respondent’s sporadic employment, and
the children’s anxiety about returning to respondent’s care.

        Additionally, the trial court specifically addressed respondent’s positive drug screen in its
findings. The trial court also stood in the position to make credibility determinations. We give
deference to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The trial court did not specifically state that
respondent’s argument for a false-positive result did not have merit; instead, the trial court
addressed how, on the basis of respondent’s experience with methamphetamine, the trial court did
not believe that respondent would clean her residence and have intentional contact with drug
paraphernalia without proper cleaning supplies, including gloves, and without washing her hands
or showering after hours of cleaning.

       Ultimately, the trial court determined that respondent’s argument lacked merit because
respondent would or should have known not to put herself in that situation. The trial court referred
to respondent’s past attempts to conceal her methamphetamine use and respondent’s failure to
provide proof that respondent claimed to have from her counseling agency regarding a
conversation with her counselor regarding her new prescription medications. The trial court did
not specifically indicate that respondent’s argument that contact with methamphetamine while
cleaning did not have merit; instead, the trial court determined that respondent’s version of events
was not credible and constituted a “last ditch effort” to conceal her recent drug use.

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        Accordingly, respondent failed to establish that she was prejudiced and that the outcome
of the proceedings would have been different had trial counsel retained an expert witness at the
termination proceedings. Therefore, respondent failed to establish the claim that her trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance.

                         III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

        We review “for clear error both the court’s decision that a ground for termination has been
proven by clear and convincing evidence and . . . the court’s decision regarding the child’s best
interest.” In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.”
In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).

                                  A. STATUTORY GROUNDS

        The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (the
conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that they
will be rectified within a reasonable time) and (j) (a reasonable likelihood exists that the children
will be harmed if returned to the home of the parent). Respondent argues that the trial court erred
because clear and convincing evidence did not support termination. We disagree.

         Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), the court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child
if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions that led to the adjudication
continued to exist and that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified
within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. The trial court entered an initial dispositional
order in March 2022. The termination hearing concluded in May 2023. More than 182 days
elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c).

        According to the petition and respondent’s dispositional hearing, the conditions that led to
adjudication were respondent’s ongoing addiction to methamphetamine, positive drug screens for
methamphetamine, respondent’s refusal of treatment, and respondent’s unemployment and
inability to support and care for the children. At the termination hearing, the trial court specified
that the conditions that led to respondent’s adjudication were respondent’s inability to care for her
children, her methamphetamine addiction, her refusal of treatment, and the need for stability and
employment.

        Regarding respondent’s methamphetamine addiction and refusal of treatment, evidence
established that respondent had struggled with substance-abuse issues for years and that
respondent’s struggles impacted respondent’s adult daughter and possibly contributed to her
addiction issues. Evidence established that respondent had not participated in services including:
missed psychological evaluation appointments, which ultimately delayed additional services;
parenting education program referrals, parenting education, which respondent was discharged
from because of missed visitations; two missed interview intakes for the Women’s Life Recovery
Program (WLRP), voluntarily choosing to stop Summit Pointe counseling treatment after two
appointments; and failing to complete required attendance of Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics
Anonymous meetings. The trial court specifically addressed that, if respondent would have

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utilized the WLRP, she would have had suitable housing and her children returned to her during
the program; however, respondent decided on her own that the program would not be good for her.
Evidence also established that several early drug screens were positive for methamphetamine and
a more recent drug screen obtained during a break of the termination proceedings reported a
positive result for methamphetamine use.

        Regarding employment, evidence established that respondent had been employed for a
week in January 2023 but she quit because she felt that the job was not a good fit for her. Evidence
showed that respondent participated in “curbing,” which involved respondent collecting materials
that individuals put by the road and then selling or trading the items as a source of income.
Respondent’s probation officer indicated that respondent had not obtained steady employment and
that respondent had failed to make any payments on her probation fines. Respondent testified that
she planned to develop a cleaning business when her schedule slowed down, hoping that it would
be a steady source of income eventually. Evidence was presented at the last termination hearing
that respondent had obtained a first-shift job; however, respondent never provided verification of
her employment. Evidence indicated that respondent had not had to pay rent and lived rent-free
at a home for which she had a pending agreement to purchase for $25,000.

        Clear and convincing evidence established that respondent’s employment and ability to
financially support her children and support respondent’s own basic needs remained unstable.
Respondent held employment only short in duration, had significant gaps of unemployment, and
she remained extremely inconsistent in maintaining employment. Moreover, respondent’s
caseworker never received verification that respondent was employed by the last termination
proceeding.

        The record in this case supports the trial court’s determination that clear and convincing
evidence established respondent’s unresolved and ongoing issues with substance abuse, refusal to
participate in treatment, and ongoing inability to financially support her children as of the time of
the termination hearing. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that a statutory ground
existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) for termination of respondent’s parental rights to the
children.1

                                       B. BEST INTERESTS

        “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. “[T]he focus at the best-
interest stage” is on the children, not the parent. Id. at 87. The trial court should weigh all the
evidence available to it in determining the child’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357.

1
  Termination of parental rights needs only to be supported by a single statutory ground. In re
HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Therefore, we need not address the trial
court’s additional findings under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Regardless, having reviewed the record,
we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence
established that a reasonable likelihood existed, based on respondent’s lack of parenting skills,
failure to abide by the case service plan, and her struggles with stability and sobriety, that the
children would be harmed if they were returned to respondent’s home.

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The trial court may consider factors including “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting
ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home
over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012)
(citations omitted). This Court has also considered the length of time the child was placed in foster
care or with relatives and whether it was likely “that the child could be returned to her parents’
home within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d
569 (2012). To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, this
Court may consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or
her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while
in care, and the possibility of adoption. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 715; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

        Addressing the best-interest factors, the trial court found that the children shared a close
relationship and strong bond with respondent. The trial court, however, noted that the children
exhibited significant anxiety because of severe nightmares about being returned to respondent’s
care. The trial court considered the evidence presented by the children’s counselors regarding the
children’s self-harm and emotional struggles throughout the case proceedings and that respondent
had not yet established a proper and consistent home for the children. The trial court also noted
the petitions and state intervention and how respondent failed to address her issues, including
substance abuse, that gave rise to early state intervention. The trial court also indicated that the
children were thriving and doing very well in their preadoptive placement.

        Evidence established that respondent shared a close bond with the children and that she
loved them. Respondent struggled to attend all parenting visits early in the case; however, her
attendance improved and she did not miss a visitation from November 2022 to the termination of
her parental rights. Respondent actively participated in the visits by playing activities with the
children and bringing snacks for the children. The record reflects that the children were slow to
leave, did not want to end their visitations with respondent, and that visitations went very well.

        However, the trial court was also presented with evidence that respondent missed
24 visitations and only began to comply with the visitation schedule once the goal changed from
reunification to adoption. Evidence established that the children had significant anxiety about
being returned to respondent’s care and suffered nightmares that they were at respondent’s home
and had to protect her from intruders. Additionally, the children felt the need to assist respondent
financially and offered to sell their artwork for money to put toward obtaining a home. Evidence
also established that the children had black and rotted teeth and needed extensive dental treatment
including 6 to 10 tooth extractions each to remedy the problems. During the proceedings,
respondent failed to consistently attend their dental treatment appointments. Because of
respondent’s inconsistent involvement, the state sought and obtained an emergency order from the
trial court to gain authority to consent to the children’s treatment. Later, respondent failed to attend
all the follow-up treatment appointments despite being informed of the appointment dates and
being offered a gas card to help her attend.

        Evidence demonstrated that the children had a close bond with their foster parents and
referred to them as “mom” and “dad.” Their foster placement expressed willingness to adopt all
three children and the children made remarks indicating that they wanted to live with their foster
placement forever.

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        Respondent exhibited a lack of accountability regarding the impact that her way of living
had on her children. She testified: “I feel like the foster care system has caused more stress and
trauma to my kids than my addiction did,” and “I had eight—or 16 investigations when everyone
of them knew I was on methamphetamines and still closed out every single investigation because
I provided for my kids.” Evidence, however, established that the children were adversely impacted
by respondent’s ongoing struggles.

        The record establishes that the children needed stability, permanency, and consistency, and
respondent could not provide that. Respondent failed to successfully address her substance-abuse
issues, failed to obtain suitable housing, failed to obtain and maintain consistent employment, and
failed to gain the ability to support the children. Further, respondent failed to take responsibility
for her methamphetamine addiction by failing to follow through with treatment programs.

         A preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the
termination of respondent’s parental rights served the children’s best interests. See In re
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42; see also In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249. Accordingly,
the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to the children.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                              /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                              /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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