Court Opinion

ID: 9707657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:17:41.785133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:36.361178
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
Unfortunately, the predicate of the majority’s analysis is “there is no jurisdictional venue issue in this case, and the issue is solely one of forum non conveniens." Majority opinion pp. 513-514. Such an abbreviated treatment of venue ignores Appellant, Township of Lower Merion, as a party to the litigation.
The specific venue rule applicable in the case sub judice is Pa.R.C.P. 2103(b). The rule provides:
Except when the Commonwealth is the plaintiff or when otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly, an action against a political subdivision may be brought only in the county in which the political subdivision is located.
(emphasis added).
The Township of Lower Merion is located within Montgomery County. However, this factor does not conclude the required analysis because Pa.R.C.P. 1006(c) controls when, as here, there is an action to enforce joint or joint and severable liability against two or more defendants. Pa.R. C.P. 1006(c) provides:
An action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more defendants, except actions in which the Commonwealth is a party defendant, may be *523brought against all defendants in any county in which the venue may be laid against any one of the defendants under the general rule of Subdivisions (a) or (b).
(emphasis added).
Because the Township of Lower Merion is located within Montgomery County and the fact that the Commonwealth is a party defendant, venue can only be proper in Montgomery County.
NO. 88 E.D. APPEAL DOCKET, 1988
I agree with the majority herein that Superior Court properly quashed as interlocutory the appeal from the order of Common Pleas Judge DiBona refusing to reconsider his order denying the Pfaumers’ petition to transfer. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(c). Similarly, I agree with the majority that Judge DiBona’s ruling on the Pfaumers’ petition was contrary to jurisprudential policy and his interpretation of Judge White’s order as applying only to the Denison petition was in error. It is at this juncture I part company with the majority in its conclusion that the Pfaumers are not entitled to transfer of venue pursuant to Judge White’s order. For the reason set forth in the following section, I must disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this matter should be returned to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for that court to rule on the Pfaumers’ petition.
No. 89 E.D. Appeal Docket, 1988
The majority improperly analyzes whether Judge White’s order of transfer was supportable. This occurs because the majority engrafts on to Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d)(1) a requirement that a judge in determining forum non conveniens must conduct a hearing in order to develop a record on which to base his order. The plain language of the rule does not require such a result. Furthermore, Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d)(1) is distinguishable from Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d)(2) which requires a hearing when parties seeking a change of venue have alleged reasons why a fair trial can not occur in the county. *524The contrasting language of these subsections serves to confirm that a hearing is not required to develop a record in the case sub judice.
Review of the record indicates, however, there was an adequate factual basis for Judge White to have made his decision. In fact, the information before Judge White was virtually indistinguishable from that presented to Judge DiBona, which was later used by Superior Court to finally determine not to transfer the action to Montgomery County. Furthermore, in contrast to Superior Court’s determination that there was limited information in the petition and answer, review of the record reveals that both of those documents were accompanied by extensive memoranda of law. This detailed information supplied by the parties addressed each of the important considerations affecting their interests. See Fox v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 315 Pa.Super. 79, 461 A.2d 805 (1983) (ease of access to the sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses; the possible need for a view of the premises, etc.). Because no abuse of discretion can be attributed to Judge White, it can be discerned that Superior Court merely substituted its own judgment for that of Judge White. See Iole v. Western Auto Supply Co., 352 Pa.Super. 528, 508 A.2d 600 (1986).
Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court should be reversed and Judge White’s order of transfer of the entire case to Montgomery County should be reinstated.
For these reasons, I dissent in the majority’s disposition of this appeal.