Court Opinion

ID: 9652406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:23:25.143722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:51.097879
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Justice,
concurring.
Although life without parole is certainly less onerous than death, Hudson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 610 (1980), it is substantially more onerous than life without parole for twenty-five years. Since the new penalty is more onerous than one of the two penalties previously authorized by KRS 532.030(1) and less onerous than the other, I am unable to conclude that the addition of the newly authorized penalty by the 1998 amendment of KRS 532.030(1) satisfies the “definitely mitigating” test which we have applied to KRS 446.110 since Coleman v. Common*109wealth, 160 Ky. 87, 169 S.W. 595, 597 (1914).
However, Appellee Phon obviously believed the new penalty was “definitely mitigating,” for otherwise he would not have requested an instruction authorizing its imposition. If he is correct, then the instruction in this case was properly given pursuant to KRS 446.110. If he is incorrect, then he waived any possible ex post facto claim regarding the imposition of a penalty more onerous than life without parole for twenty-five years. Either way, the sentence in this case was determined by a properly constituted jury, which, having been presented with all three options, decided that life without parole was the most appropriate penalty in this case. We should not presume to hold that the verdict was wrong and that death was a more appropriate penalty in this case. Nor should we presume that absent the option of life without parole the jury would have imposed the death penalty rather than a sentence of life without parole for twenty-five years, or vice versa.