Court Opinion

ID: 9798430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:59:13.649204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:21.822713
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 12] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 13] The law is well-established. On a motion to suppress evidence, the moving *624party has the duty to establish a prima facie case before the State has a duty to put on any evidence. The moving party, the defendant, put on no evidence. The State, therefore, had no burden to put on any evidence. Because the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case, he loses.
[¶ 14] The majority, at ¶ 7, acknowledges the defendant’s burden to establish a prima facie case before the State has any burden. But then the majority ignores the law it set forth.
“Prima facie evidence to support a motion to suppress is not required in a party’s moving papers.” State v. Fitterer, 2002 ND 170, ¶ 6, 652 N.W.2d 908 (citing Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 761 (9th Cir.1967)). Supporting affidavits or other evidence are permissive, but not required. Fitterer, at ¶ 6 (citing N.D.R.Crim.P. 47). The motion itself is enough to reach a hearing on the motion, provided it gives adequate notice of the issues raised. Id. at ¶ 9. A defendant then has the burden of establishing a prima facie case at the motion hearing before the State is required to put on evidence. Id. at ¶ 10 (citing City of Jamestown v. Jerome, 2002 ND 34, ¶ 6, 639 N.W.2d 478; State v. Glaesman, 545 N.W.2d 178, 182 n. 1 (N.D.1996)). To do so, the defendant must make an eviden-tiary showing that the search and seizure was illegal. Fitterer, at ¶ 10; Jerome, at ¶ 6. Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden of persuasion shifts to the State to justify its warrantless search. Jerome, at ¶ 6. While “[t]here may be some cases in which a suppression motion is capable of decision based on stipulated facts[,] ... trial courts should be wary of dispensing with an evidentiary hearing when[ ] ... the parties have raised a flurry of Fourth Amendment issues.” State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 18, 566 N.W.2d 410.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 15] This case differs significantly from Avila, in which there was a specific, on-the-record stipulation as to the facts.
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties “orally agreed on the record to forego the evi-dentiary hearing and oral arguments on the motion to suppress and instead, the parties stipulated to the facts as set forth in Officer Gordon Olson’s February 27, 1996 Supplementary Offense Report, which is nine pages long, Alejandro Avila’s affidavit, and Lori Kehrberg’s affidavit.” Kehrberg said in her affidavit, “I did not consent to the police officers entering my apartment.” Avila said in his affidavit, “I did not consent to the search of my backpack by the police.” Neither the search warrant nor the affidavit in support of the warrant were made a part of the record.
State v. Avila, 1997 ND 142, ¶ 9, 566 N.W.2d 410. Because there was no stipulation as in Avila, that case did not eliminate Canfield’s burden of establishing a prima facie case in support of his motion to suppress.
[¶ 16] We explained in Glaesman:
In suppression cases, the defendant has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that the evidence was illegally seized. United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 486 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 [99 S.Ct. 200, 58 L.Ed.2d 182] (1978) (“The burden is on the movant to make specific factual allegations of illegality, to produce evidence, and to persuade the court that the evidence should be suppressed.”); United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 [97 S.Ct. 530, 50 L.Ed.2d 611] (1976); U.S. v. Sacco, 563 F.2d 552, 558 (2d Cir.1977), *625cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 [98 S.Ct. 779, 54 L.Ed.2d 789] (1978); U.S. v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954 [98 S.Ct. 479, 54 L.Ed.2d 312] (1977).
State v. Glaesman, 545 N.W.2d 178, 182 n. 1 (N.D.1996).
[¶ 17] Here there was no stipulation as in Avila. The defendant, who had the burden of going forward with the evidence, waived an evidentiary hearing. I would reverse because the moving party — the defendant — failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case for the suppression of evidence.
[¶ 18] DALE V. SANDSTROM.