Court Opinion

ID: 9691990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:34:44.735179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:29.648720
License: Public Domain

*660SIMPSON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a final decree denying appellant an injunction to restrain the obstruction of a driveway leading from his homestead lot over the 'defendants’ lots to the public highway. Right to relief is sought to be rested on the doctrine of a way of necessity or an appurtenance to his lot inuring to his benefit by reason of the conveyance to him of the dominant estate by the then owner of the entire property over which the driveway extended.
The defendant Mrs. Minnie W. Taylor prior to 1947 owned the entire property and in March of that year conveyed to ' the complainant his lot by warranty deed. The lot fronted 181 feet on the west side of a paved highway known as Crabbe Road and at that time there was a driveway leading from the southern part of complainant’s lot, where, his garage was situated, southwardly over the remainder of Mrs. Taylor’s land to the Crabbe Road. This driveway had been in use for a number of .years by those residing on and using the property purchased by complainant, but there was no recital in complainant’s deed with respect to this driveway or any reservation showing an easement over the remainder of the property. Complainant testified that nothing was said about the use of the driveway when he bought the property but there is testimony to contradict this which had a tendency to show that complainant knew he had no right to the use of the driveway. It was for the trial court, of course, to reconcile this conflicting testimony. Complainant used the driveway until January 1949, when defendant Percy Tucker purchased a fifty-foot lot immediately south of complainant’s lot and over which the driveway extended. Tucker, after his purchase, proceeded to obstruct the driveway in furtherance of plans for the construction of a house on the lot. This precipitated the lawsuit. Mrs. Taylor stiil owns the last fifty feet of her original tract of land immediately south of the Tucker lot and over which the driveway also runs before it intersects with the Crabbe Road. Both Tucker and Taylor have been made parties defendant.
The hearing was before the judge in open court and much testimony was adduced, along with several maps, including a topographical map of the terrain of the property. At the conclusion of the evidence, on motion of complainant and acquiesced in by the defendants, the court, accompanied by the attorneys representing the parties, visited and viewed the premises before making up his conclusion and rendering the decree, in which relief was denied the complainant.
Following are, in part, the observations and conclusions of the trial court in his findings of fact which were embodied in the decree:
“The Court further finds that the complainant has no right, claim or title to any right-of-way or easement over any.portion of the land now owned by *661said respondents Percy Tucker, Donnie Tucker and Mrs. Minnie W. Taylor * * * that the complainant, J. S. Crawford, now has a driveway located entirely on his real property and did have such a driveway at the time that he purchased his said real property from the respondent, Mrs. Minnie W. Taylor, * * * that the complainant does have a way of ingress and egress to his real property without crossing the land owned by either respondent and that it is not reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the premises conveyed to the complainant by the respondent, Mrs. Minnie W. Taylor, for the complainant to have a right-of-way or easement over the respondent, Mrs. Minnie W. Taylor’s real property or the real property now owned by respondents, Percy Tucker and Donnie Tucker, conveyed to them by respondent, Mrs. Minnie W. Taylor. The Court further finds that the complainant does have other reasonable means of egress and ingress to his garage located on said premises or that same can be constructed with reasonable cost and further finds that it is not reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of his garage located on said premises for said complainant to have an easement or right-of-way across respondents’ land or the land of either of respondents.”
The law governing is well understood and has been referred to in many of our cases. Easements by implication or implied grant in favor of the grantee of a dominant estate are supported by a reasonable necessity for its use and enjoyment, while with respect to the servient estate there must be a strict or absolute necessity. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Mason, 222 Ala. 38, 130 So. 559; Brewer v. Avinger, 208 Ala. 411, 94 So. 590; Gaynor v. Bauer, 144 Ala. 448, 39 So. 749, 3 L.R.A.,N.S., 1082; Walker v. Clifford, 128 Ala. 67, 29 So. 588; Trump v. McDonnell, 120 Ala. 200, 24 So. 353. The question here, therefore, concerns the determination of whether the use- o-f the driveway over the defendants’ lots was reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant estate conveyed by Mrs. Taylor to the complainant. If there are other reasonably practical ways of ingress and egress over complainant’s property, then no easement over the defendants’ lots may be implied. That it might be more convenient or less expensive does not serve to raise the implication of such quasi easement. Cases, supra.
We have said that the right to such an easement is only an implication at best, the matter of whether the use and enjoyment of such a right of way as here involved is reasonably necessary to the estate conveyed being determined by the 'facts in the case, meanwhile keeping in mind that if the grantee has reasonable ingress and egress over his own land, although less convenient or more expensive, he cannot claim a way of necessity over the servi.ent estate. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Mason, supra; Gaynor v. Bauer, supra; Trump v. McDonnell, supra.
As observed, after hearing the witnesses testify in open court and on a view of the premises, the court found as above and denied relief. We can find no warrant whatever to overturn that conclusion. The tendency of the evidence seems to justify it. While the complainant is apparently genuine in his belief that he is entitled to a right of way over the lots of the defendants, the evidence was substantial to support the contrary conclusion. The driveway was open and visible when complainant purchased his property; he knew his conveyance did not grant any right of way or easement over the remainder of the property, and accepted it without any reservation or grant of an easement. The court found there were other outlets available to the property, though perhaps less convenient or involving some expense. In the light of our governing rule, we find ourselves bound to sustain the conclusion attained.
This case is peculiarly one where the rule should be applied that where the *662hearing is before the judge and the witnesses testify orally before him, his findings will be sustained on appeal unless palpably erroneous or against the great weight of the evidence. Particularly in this case, where he had the advantage of viewing the premises and knowing the locale,.the rule should be emphasized and we would be most reluctant to disturb his findings. Ramsey v. Kitchens, 249 Ala. 609, 32 So.2d 361.
It may.also.be observed that no case at all is made for the claim that the driveway is to be considered as an appurtenance to-the estate granted under the terms of the deed. No mention whatever is made in the conveyance of this alley or driveway and the presumptions are all to the contrary-effect. Brewer v. Avinger, supra.
One incidental matter will be disposed of. Appellant filed a petition in this court for a rule to be issued to appellees to show cause why the injunction seeking to prohibit appellees from obstructing the driveway should not be made final. The purpose of the petition is to enforce an alleged agreement claimed to have been made between these parties and t-heir attorneys in a law action theretofore pending in the circuit court of Tuscaloosa County in a cause in which appellant’s brother-in-law, Chester Collins, was plaintiff and appellee Percy Tucker was defendant. The petition alleges that all the 'parties to the instant cause and their attorneys were before that court and made the alleged agreement which embraced the subject matter of the instant suit. The petition avers that pursuant to said agreement there was entered on the minutes of the circuit court of Tuscaloosa County in the said law action the following: “12/7/50 Parties having reached an agreement in this case — case is continued generally for parties to work out certain details. V. W. Elmore, Judge.” This court granted a rule nisi on the basis of the stated petition, but we have come to the conclusion we were clearly in error in doing so. Manifestly such agreement, if-so, is unenforceable on this appeal. The parties here were not parties in the litigation in the circuit court, -the agreement was not in writing and does not even appear in the minutes of the circuit court, if that would have helped it any. It was purely abortive in so far as it affects decision here. “No private agreement or consent between the parties or their attorneys, relating to the proceedings in any cause, shall -be alleged or suggested by either against the other, unless the same be in writing, and signed by the party to be bound thereby.” Supreme Court Rule 22, Circuit Court Rule 14, Title 7, Code 1940. See also Title 46, § 46, Code 1940.
Nothing is made to appear to avert affirmance of the decree.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and FOSTER and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.