Court Opinion

ID: 9522853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:53.040252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:06.376936
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
dissenting in part, concurring in part.
I respectfully dissent from the resolution of the second issue relating to the sufficiency of the evidence. Giving full cognizance to the standard of review as stated in the majority opinion, I am of the opinion that there was an absence of substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. The absence of direct evidence in support of the allegations of the complaint is obvious. The other evidence adduced by the plaintiffs at trial falls short in establishing by a preponderance of probative evidence, including the reasonable and logical inferences that flow therefrom, that there is any causality between Gash’s conduct and the decedent’s death. Taking that holding of Phegley v. Huffman, (1971) 149 Ind.App. 100, 271 N.E.2d 201, (circumstantial evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with guilt) one step further, circumstantial evidence does not permit conjecture, speculation, or guess, and, although the jury is entitled to choose between conflicting inferences, it cannot choose between conflicting possibilities. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Shuman, (1977) 175 Ind.App. 186, 370 *917N.E.2d 941. The reasonable hypothesis concept stated in Phegley should not be utilized to fill an evidentiary void or bypass the requirement that each essential element of the tort must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Although I would reverse on this issue, I concur with the remainder of the majority opinion.