Court Opinion

ID: 9709137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:41:04.451833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.394597
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The record facts material to the suppression issue presented in this appeal are as follows: Appellant Wisehart was living in the Christian Center, just around the corner from the Anderson Police Department. Detective Lloyd Brown and another officer went there and picked up appellant for questioning. Within a room in the police station, at 6:00 P.M. on October 15, 1982, the following took place according to Brown's testimony.
A I have a procedure that I use when I advise anyone of their rights. I, uh, read, uh, the rights waiver in a question form.
* # * # # *
Q And can you tell us what you did as far as this particular exhibit was concerned before you saw Mark Wisehart sign it?
A Yes, I advised him that before we ask him any questions 1 had to make sure that he understood his rights. Then I asked him quote, I said, "Do you understand that you have the right to remain silent," and he answered that he did. Uh, asked him then, "Do you understand anything you say can be used against you in a court," and I again waited for a verbal reply of yes. Uh, I then asked him, "Do you understand that you have the right to con*960sult with an attorney and have an attorney present," and he again verbally said yes. I then asked him, uh, "Do you understand if you cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you so desire?" He again said yes. I then asked him, "Do you understand that if you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time and do you also understand that you also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer?" He again said yes. I then asked him to read this himself, uh, and if he would sign it at the bottom. Uh, I advised him by signing it he was not admitting or denying any guilt or giving up any rights. I explained to him that his signature was acknowledging that I had read his rights to him, that he understood them and that he had read them himself.
Q Okay, and the waiver on the bottom, uh, did you read that to him or did he read it to your knowledge?
A Uh, he gave me the indication that he read it himself. I did not read it to him.
Q Okay. And did he ... After reading this did he sign it at that time?
A Yes, he did in ... in my presence.
The form signed is the following:
ANDERSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
ADVICE OF RIGHTS
YOUR RIGHTS
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can be used against you in a Court.
You have the right to consult with an Attorney and to have an attorney present.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning, if you so desire.
If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to answer questions and/or make a statement. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand, and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no presure or coercion of any kind has been applied to me and I am acting voluntarily and of my own free will.
Appellant was interrogated until about 10:00 P.M., when he went to another place in the police station for a polygraph examination. Officer Fancher who gave the test testified as follows regarding the second advisement and waiver.
Q What did you do?
A I filled out the top portion. It was given to Mark Wisehart for him to read, which time he read it. I asked him if he understood his rights. He said, yes, he did. I give it to him to sign. He signed it. I witnessed it.
Q Okay, you witnessed it. And after that what took place, after he signed this particular exhibit?
A I interviewed him.
The form referred by Fancher is identical to the one used at 6:00 P.M. by Brown which is set out in full above in this dissenting opinion.
Fancher was permitted at trial to testify that appellant admitted killing the victim during his interview. This was appellant's first admission of guilt, and it was admitted against him at trial over a continuing objection.
Brown testified as to the events then next occurring. Fancher called him, and he went to where appellant had been inter*961viewed by Fancher. Brown's testimony continued
A Okay. Ub, when I first saw him he had ... he, uh, was erying slightly. He had a couple of tears running down his cheeks.
Okay, and is that all that you noticed about him at that time?
Uh, at that time he was kind of slouched down in a chair and when I came in he again recognized me and I asked him if it would be okay if Sergeant Moberly would also be present. He said that was fine and by about that time he had quit erying and, ub, he was getting back to his normal self that I'd ... like I'd seen him before.
© Did he make any further statements to you at that time:
jp Yes, he did.
What statements did he make?
Uh, he admitted that he had killed Marjorie Johnson.
p> Okay. Could you relate as best you can what ... what he said and what you folks said, you and Sergeant Mob-erly?
Uh, we asked him if we could talk to him at this time to get a statement from him while we were still in this same area and he said it was alright; that he wanted to talk. He told me that ... first of all that he was sorry that he lied to me when I talked to him earlier in the evening and he also wanted me to convey to Detective Tracy, uh, to tell him that he was sorry for lying to him also. Uh, we then started asking him how this murder had come about. He at that time started to tell us that he'd been at the Christian Center in the afternoon and that he had decided two weeks prior that he was going to kill Marjorie Johnson. Brown then went on to testify over the continuing defense objection, to a forty-five minute dialogue during which appellant described his crime in great detail, and to a description of events in the interrogation room during the dialogue. It may be noted, that this forty-five minute dialogue between appellant and Brown resulted in the second oral confession, the first having been made to Fancher, and was itself not preceded by new warnings, over and above those previously given by Brown at 6:00 P.M. and those given by Fancher at about 10:00 P.M., and by waivers, over and above those purportedly given by appellant at 6:00 P.M. and 10:00 P.M.
Detective Brown, after concluding his testimony about the detailed oral confession, testified to what happened next.
Q And then what took place?
A We asked Mark if he would accompany us back to the police station, uh, back to the library and give us a ... a signed ... a written statement which consisted of it being typed as he dictated it and then he could read it and sign it if he felt that it was true and accurate. And he did say that this was fine; he would do this.
Q In the conversation that you had with him that took half an hour to forty-five minutes what was his demeanor during that time?
A Uh, it was calm. Uh, he wasn't upset, uh, to the fact that he was nervous. Uh, and one thing that ... that parti-culary struck me is while he was smoking a cigarette sometimes he would blow a smoke ring.
Now the statement, the written statement what area was that taken? ©
Uh, that ... What area of the police department: [p>
Yes, police department. ©
That was ... that was taken in the same library that the original interview had started in. p
Q Can you tell us what happened ... Uh, well, did anything happen just prior to taking that statement?
A Uh, he was again advised of his right. Uh, they were read aloud to him by Lieutenant Moberly as they are stated on the statement form and he was asked if he understood his rights and he stated that he did. Uh, at this time *962he was asked to dictate in his own words and by the notes that we had taken earlier if he would give us another statement and he did and ... or he said that he would and he did.
This is in typewritten form; is that correct? ©
Yes, it is. p
And who typed? ©
Uh, Sergeant Moberly if I remember correctly is the one that actually typed it himself. p
Q Can you, please, just relate how ... just how it took place that ..., you know, how the ... were there questions asked?
A There were questions asked of him. Uh, he related ... he gave answers to the questions and also the questions some of them were, uh, based on the notes that had been taken earlier by Lieutenant Moberly when we were taking the oral statement. And then as the statement was typed some additional questions about details were asked of Mark and he answered them.
The above recital provides the totality of material upon which the suppression issues must be resolved. From this material, one must conclude that those events, including warnings and purported waivers occuring after appellant's first complete admission of guilt to officer Fancher during the polygraph interview, are irrelevant and must be disregarded. It is the warnings and purported waivers occurring prior to that interview which are relevant, and it is upon their sufficiency which the admission of the Fancher confession of guilt and all subsequent confessions and evidence stemming therefrom depend, as a matter of legal principle. We are left therefore with the conduct of appellant in signing the identical waiver forms at 6:00 and 10:00 P.M., and Detective Brown's statement accompany ing the first signing in which he orally advised appellant "I advised him by signing it [the waiver] he was not admitting or denying any guilt or giving up any rights." (record at 505). It is from these three elements, taken within the circumstances, upon which this court must decide whether the trial court was warranted in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily relinquished the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 884 U.S. 486, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Edwards v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 887, 412 N.E.2d 228.
In determining whether a valid waiver of Miranda rights has occurred, we look to the cireumstances surrounding its giving to determine whether it was "induced by any violence, threats, promises, or other improper influence." Montes v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 390, 382 N.E.2d 786, 792. The burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the knowing and voluntary character of the waiver. Burton v. State (1978), 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790. Furthermore, the signing of a waiver form does not conclusively show a valid waiver. Dickerson v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 562, 276 N.E.2d 845. Here, the waiver section of the form was not read to appellant, but he was asked to read that part for himself. This is true as to both written waivers. Thus there was no aid or assistance provided appellant in understanding that section, by either interrogator. Indeed the first reading by appellant was accompanied by an explanation by the interrogator which was contrary to the actual legal consequence of signing, namely that by signing he was not giving up any right. The further point needs to be made here, that the waiver section of the form is obscure in the manner in which it approaches waiver. The form does not specifically inform the reader that a choice to give up or relinquish something is at stake. A lawyer might perceive an inference that a "giving up" or "relinquishing" was occurring, but it would be difficult for a person untrained in this area to do so. This obscurity existed in both waiver sections, and since only four hours separated the two acts of signing them, the enhancement of the obscurity flowing from Detective Brown's direct statement that appellant was not giving up any rights by signing, impacted both. This does not comport with the requirements of *963the federal constitution governing waivers of constitutional rights. I would therefore reverse this conviction for a new suppression hearing to establish what evidence was acquired by the State by reason of this constitutional violation, and a new trial at which appellant's admissions of guilt and any additional evidence acquired by the state by exploiting those admissions, are excluded.