Court Opinion

ID: 4067192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 23:07:06.899565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:32:36.807737
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                     07-15-00060-CV
                                                        SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                  AMARILLO, TEXAS
                                                                 6/4/2015 5:34:23 PM
                                                                    Vivian Long, Clerk

            NO. 07-15-00060-CV

                                                     FILED IN
                                              7th COURT OF APPEALS
                IN THE                          AMARILLO, TEXAS
           SEVENTH COURT OF                   6/4/2015 5:34:23 PM
                                                   VIVIAN LONG
               APPEALS                                CLERK
            AMARILLO, TEXAS

        JODY JAMES FARMS, JV,
                 Appellant,
                      V.
       THE ALTMAN GROUP, INC.
            AND LAURIE DIAZ,
                 Appellees.
_                                                               _
    Appeal from the 110th District Court of
           Floyd County, Texas
         Cause Number 10,422
           APPELLANT’S BRIEF
               June 4, 2015

               Respectfully submitted,
               JENKINS, WAGNON & YOUNG, P.C.
               P.O. Box 420
               Lubbock, TX 79408
               (806) 796-7351
               Fax: (806) 771-8755
               Jody D. Jenkins
               State Bar No. 24029634
               jjenkins@jwylaw.com
               ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

    ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED
                 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Judge Presiding at Trial:
The Honorable William P. Smith

Plaintiff and Appellant:
Jody James Farms, JV

Plaintiff’s Trial and Appellate Counsel:
Jody Jenkins
Jenkins, Wagnon & Young, P.C.
P.O. Box 420
Lubbock, Texas 79408

Defendants and Appellees:
The Altman Group, Inc. and Laurie Diaz

Defendants’ Trial and Appellate Counsels:
J. Paul Manning
Anna McKim
Field, Manning, Stone, Hawthorne & Aycock, P.C.
2112 Indiana Avenue
Lubbock, Texas 79410

                                     ii
                                         TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                        PAGE
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ................................................ ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................... 1

ORAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ........................................................ 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS ................................................................... 4

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES................................................................... 6

ISSUE NUMBER 1

         Whether a non-party to an arbitration agreement can compel
         arbitration of claims that are not within the scope of the
         arbitration agreement ...................................................................................6

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................19

PRAYER .................................................................................................................19

SIGNATURE ..........................................................................................................20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................20

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE...................................................................21

APPENDIX .............................................................................................................23

                                                           iii
                                        INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:                                                                                                                  Page

All-Tex Roofing, Inc. v. Greenwood Ins. Group, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 412 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) .........................................................17

Blumberg v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d. 1061 (Fla. 2001) ......................16

Bosscorp, Inc. v. Donegal, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, no pet.) .................................................................................................13

Centex/Vestal v. Friendship W. Baptist Church, 314 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2010) .............................................................................................................18

Delfingen US-Texas, L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2013) ........................................................................................................7, 8, 12

DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 1999) ........................10

Ellman v. JC Gen. Contractors, 419 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. App. -- El Paso 2013,
no pet.)....................................................................................................................6, 7

Frost Nat'l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2005) (per
curiam) .....................................................................................................................14

Great Am. Assur. Co. v. Sanchuck, LLC No. 8:10-CV-2568 –T-33AEP, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7477 at * 20 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2012) .......................................16

G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire VP, LP, 2015 Tex. LEXIS 273 (Tex.
2015) ..............................................................................................................9, 10, 12

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Guidry, 327 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. 1959) ..........................................18

In re Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. 2006) .................................. 7

In re Kellogg & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2005) .................................12, 13

In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2009). .................................... 6

                                                              iv
In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2008) ............................................ 8

In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2005) ...........................................9, 10

In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 300 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2009) ..........................................................................................................................7

J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003) ......................7, 12, 14

Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Moulton Props., No. 3:05cv401/LAC, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73478 (N.D. Fla. July 19, 2006) .........................................................17

MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.1999)........ 12

Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011) ......................................19

Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008)................................................... 7
Rice v. Louis A. Williams & Assocs., 86 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. App.—Texarkana,
2002, pet. denied) ...............................................................................................16, 17

South Texas Water Authority v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2007)....................12

Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)......................19

Surplus, Inc. v. Home State Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-95-00007-CV, 1995
Tex. App. LEXIS 3305 at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 21, 1995, writ
denied) ......................................................................................................................14

Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Burnette, 560 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1977) .......................................................................................................11

United Protective Servs., Inc. v. West Village Ltd. P'ship, 180 S.W.3d 430
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)...........................................................................14

Statutes and Rules

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2015) ................................................................................. 18, 19

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §17.42(a) (West 2015) ............................................18

                                                               v
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.565 (West 2015) ........................................ 17, 18
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (West 2015) ..................................... 17
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §16.070 (West 2015) ......................................18
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.021(a)(1) (West 2015) ............................ 7
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.088 (West 2015) ............................. 18, 19

Tex. Const. Art. I, § 13 ............................................................................................19

                                                          vi
                         STATEMENT OF THE CASE

    James filed suit against Altman and Diaz for breach of fiduciary duty and

violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. CR 3-6. After Altman and

Diaz answered with a general denial, they filed their Motion to Compel Arbitration.

CR 9-17. James filed its Response to Motion to Compel Arbitration denying that

an agreement to arbitrate existed and attached evidence. CR Supp. 4-76. After the

trial court granted the Motion to Compel Arbitration, CR 27, James asked the trial

court to reconsider or clarify its ruling to compel arbitration. CR 28-36. The trial

court ultimately denied the motion to reconsider and the case proceeded to

arbitration. CR 41.

    After arbitration, Altman and Diaz filed their Petition to Confirm and Enforce

Final Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and Costs. CR 42-54. James

objected to the Petition to Confirm and Enforce Final Arbitration Award and filed

its Motion to Vacate and to Set Aside Arbitration Award. CR 57-73. The trial

court entered its Final Judgment on January 20, 2015. CR 125-126.            James

subsequently filed its notice of appeal on February 17, 2015. CR 128.

                              ORAL ARGUMENT

      Oral argument is requested in this matter.

                                         1
                              ISSUE PRESENTED

ISSUE NUMBER 1:

      Whether a non-party to an arbitration agreement can compel arbitration
      of claims that are not within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

                           STATEMENT OF FACTS

      Altman is an independent insurance agency who markets for Rain and Hail,

L.L.C. (Rain and Hail); Rain and Hail is owned and controlled by ACE Property

and Casualty Insurance Company; ACE Property and Casualty Insurance Company

issues crop insurance policies. CR Supp. 21 (stating in the caption of the Multiple

Peril Crop Insurance Application and reporting form that Rain and Hail services

ACE’s policies; the document also bears the signature of Barry Altman in his

capacity as “Licensed Agent”); see also CR Supp. 56 (Diaz testifying that Rain and

Hail hired the insurance adjuster). Altman has been James’s agent for crop

insurance since approximately 2008.      CR Supp. 51-58.     Diaz is a registered

insurance agent employed by Altman where she also serves as Altman’s

Operations Manager; she has been employed with Altman for the entire time that

Altman has been James’s agent.      CR Supp. 52. At some point before James

incurred a loss, Diaz became involved with James’s 2010 crop insurance policy.

CR Supp. 53. Sometime thereafter, James incurred a loss on its insured crop during

the policy period. CR Supp. 55.
                                        2
       James purchased a Crop Revenue Coverage Insurance Policy (the “Policy”

attached as Exhibit 4 to the Appendix of this Brief) from Rain and Hail via his

agent Altman to indemnify against loss on its 2010 milo crop. See CR Supp. 21;

25-50. The Crop Revenue Coverage Insurance Policy required Rain and Hail to

indemnify James for any loss that arose under the Policy. CR Supp. 25-50. The

arbitration clause contained in the Policy with Rain and Hail stated as follows at

paragraph 20:

       If you and we fail to agree on any determination made by us except
       those specified in Section 20(d), the disagreement may be resolved
       through mediation in accordance with Section 20(g). If resolution
       cannot be reached through mediation, or you and we do not agree to
       mediation, the disagreement must be resolved through arbitration.

CR Supp. 44.

       In November of 2010, James incurred a loss on an insured milo crop. CR

Supp. 23. After the loss was incurred, Diaz was notified by telephone of the loss.

CR Supp. 23. Based on James’s relationship and prior dealings with Altman and

Diaz, James did not follow up his claim in writing. CR Supp. 54-55 (Diaz explains

that it is common for clients to call in a claim without confirming it in writing).

After receiving evidence of the loss, Diaz delayed turning in the claim. CR Supp.

56 (Diaz explained that she didn’t turn in the claim and send it to Rain and Hail

until later).

                                        3
      Eventually, Rain and Hail denied James’s claim alleging it was untimely

submitted. CR Supp. 64-68. Rain and Hail explained that because the claim was

untimely filed, it was unable “to make the necessary and required loss

determinations.” CR Supp. 64.

      With no other recourse for his injury, James subsequently filed suit against

Altman and Diaz for their inaction in submitting the claim. CR 3-6. Against the

objection of James, the trial court compelled arbitration between James and

Altman and Diaz. CR 27; CR 41. The trial court based its decision on James’s

previous agreement with Rain and Hail to arbitrate disputes over determinations

made by Rain and Hail. CR 27; CR 41. Ultimately, James unwillingly participated

in the compelled arbitration and the arbitrator ruled against James. CR 52-54.

James now appeals the trial court’s order compelling arbitration and later enforcing

the arbitration award.

                         SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

      The trial court’s decision to compel arbitration and subsequently enforce the

arbitration award should be reversed and this case remanded for trial.

      First, there was no agreement to arbitrate between James and Altman and

Diaz. The only arbitration agreement that James entered into was with Rain and

Hail. Further, James did not agree to arbitrate with parties outside of its contract

                                         4
with Rain and Hail. Altman and Diaz could not possibly be a party to the

arbitration agreement because Altman and Diaz could not make a determination

under the Policy, and are not agents of Rain and Hail for the purposes of making

determinations under the Policy.

       Second, James is not estopped from denying the enforceability of the

arbitration agreement. James never sought a direct benefit under the Policy from

Altman and Diaz. Instead, James filed the instant claims based on a breach of

Altman and Diaz’s fiduciary duty and under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices

Act.

       Third, Altman and Diaz are not third-party-beneficiaries who can enforce the

arbitration agreement. Altman and Diaz were only incidental third-party-

beneficiaries to the contract between James and Rain and Hail. There was never

any intent on behalf of James or Rain and Hail to directly benefit Altman and Diaz

through the Policy.

       Fourth, James’s claims arose outside the scope of the otherwise

unenforceable arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement to which James

agreed covered only determinations made by the insurance company providing

insurance. The whole basis of James’s claims is that a determination was never

made due to Altman and Diaz’s breach of their duties.

                                         5
      Fifth, the trial court could not rewrite the arbitration agreement to bring

James’s claims within its scope. The arbitration clause at issue contemplated

review by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, which could not review

determinations by private insurance contractors; and set a one year limitation

period in violation of Texas law.

      Last, the trial court erred by enforcing an arbitration award which the

arbitrator had no authority to issue under either the Federal Arbitration Act or the

Texas Arbitration Act.

                         ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES

ISSUE NUMBER 1:

      Whether a non-party to an arbitration agreement can compel
      arbitration of claims that are not within the scope of the arbitration
      agreement.

      1.     Standard of Review

      A court reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a motion to compel

arbitration reviews the trial court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard.

Ellman v. JC Gen. Contractors, 419 S.W.3d 516, 520 (Tex. App. -- El Paso 2013,

no pet.). Under this standard, the reviewing court must defer to a trial court's

factual determinations if they are supported by evidence, and must review a trial

court's legal determinations de novo. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d
6
640, 643 (Tex. 2009). Ellman, 419 S.W.3d at 520.

      2.    The trial court erred by granting Appellees’ Motion to
            Compel Arbitration because there was not an agreement
            to arbitrate between James and Altman and Diaz.

      A party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a valid

arbitration agreement. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.021(a)(1) (West

2015). “The burden of establishing the existence of a valid and enforceable

arbitration agreement includes proving that the party seeking to compel arbitration

was a party to the agreement or had the right to enforce the arbitration agreement.”

In re Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 300 S.W.3d 818, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2009).

      Under both the Federal Arbitration Act and the Texas Arbitration Act, state

contract law principles determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. J.M.

Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003); Delfingen US-Texas,

L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791, 797 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013). The

determination of whether the parties agreed to submit the claims to arbitration

depends on an interpretation of the parties’ contracts, which is reviewed de novo.

See Id. (citing In re Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. 2006);

J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 227).

      Arbitration agreements are not more enforceable than other contracts. Perry

                                         7
Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 597 (Tex. 2008). No presumption in favor of

arbitration exists when a state court assesses whether a valid and enforceable

arbitration agreement exists under Texas law. In re Poly-America, L.P., 262
S.W.3d 337, 347 (Tex. 2008). In fact, a party seeking to compel arbitration is not

entitled to a presumption favoring arbitration until they prove that a valid

arbitration agreement exists. Delfingen, 407 S.W.3d at 797.

      In the case at bar, no valid and enforceable arbitration agreement exists

between the parties. In fact, the only agreement James entered into on the subject

matter at issue was with Rain and Hail. See CR Supp. 25-50. The Policy expressly

states that the words “you” and “your” refer to the named insured, which is James;

and the words “we,” “us,” and “our” refer to the “insurance company providing

insurance,” which is Rain and Hail. CR Supp. 25.

      The only mention of “insurance agent” within the Policy is in the beginning

paragraph and under “Your Duties:” “All notices required in this section that must

be received by us within 72 hours may be made by telephone or in person to your

crop insurance agent but must be confirmed in writing within 15 days,” with

“your” referring to the named insured under the Policy. CR Supp. 25, 38-39.

Because the insurance agent is not defined as a party under the Policy and is only

referenced in passing, the trial court’s conclusion that a non-party to the arbitration

                                          8
agreement in the Policy could enforce it is erroneous.

      Furthermore, the arbitration clause in the Policy could not possibly cover

Altman and Diaz, because Altman and Diaz could not, by their own admission,

make a determination. CR Supp. 56 (Diaz stated that, “Once the claim is turned in,

Federal crop rules says that the agent can no longer be involved.”). The arbitration

clause specifically and unambiguously covered only “any determination made by

us,” with “us” being defined by the Policy as “the insurance company providing

insurance.” CR Supp. 25, 44. Therefore, because Altman and Diaz were neither an

“insurance company providing insurance” nor a person with the capability of

making a determination, there was no valid and enforceable agreement between

James and Altman and Diaz.

      3.     The arbitration agreement cannot be enforced by Altman
             and Diaz through estoppel.

      James did not seek a direct benefit from Altman and Diaz through the

Policy. Although a party that seeks a direct benefit under a contract which includes

an arbitration clause cannot deny that the arbitration clause applies to a non-

signatory, independent claims are not subject to this defense. G.T. Leach Builders,

LLC v. Sapphire VP, LP, 2015 Tex. LEXIS 273 *54 (Tex. 2015). “Whether a claim

seeks a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause turns on the

substance of the claim.” Id. (quoting In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d 127, 131-
                                         9
32 (Tex. 2005)).

      It is not enough, however, that the party's claim ‘relates to’ the
      contract that contains the arbitration agreement. Instead, the party
      must seek “to derive a direct benefit”—that is, a benefit that “stems
      directly”—from that contract. The claim must “depend on the
      existence” of the contract, and be unable to “stand independently”
      without the contract. The alleged liability must “arise[] solely from
      the contract or must be determined by reference to it.”

G.T. Leach Builders, LLC, at *55 (internal citations omitted).

      “[T]he fact that the claims would not have arisen but for the existence of the

. . . contract is not enough to establish equitable estoppel.” Id. at *59. “‘[W]hen the

substance of the claim arises from general obligations imposed by state law,

including statutes, torts and other common law duties, or federal law,’” rather than

from the contract, ‘direct benefits’ estoppel does not apply, even if the claim refers

to or relates to the contract.” Id. at *55 (emphasis added) (internal citations

omitted); see also Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 132; DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop.,

Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 105 (Tex. 1999) (“The measure of damages, standing

alone, is not always determinative of whether a tort claim can co-exist with a

breach of contract claim).

      Here, the substance of James’s claim arises under Texas common law and

the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. “‘A local agent . . . owes his clients the greatest

possible duty. He is the one the insured looks to and relies upon. Most people do

                                          10
not know what company they are insured with.’” Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v.

Burnette, 560 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1977) (emphasis added).

The substance of James’s claim is the breach of this duty, which James has

characterized as a “fiduciary duty,” and the breach of the duty imposed by the

Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See CR 4-5.

      James specifically claimed that Altman and Diaz “breached their fiduciary

duty to Plaintiff by failing to timely submit the crop loss claim to Rain and Hail,

LLC.” CR 4. Altman and Diaz’s fiduciary duty is based on their relationship and

prior dealings with James, where Altman and Diaz would submit James’s claims

based on a notification of the claim by telephone without a confirmation by

writing. CR Supp. 54-55. It is the breach of this duty, upon which James based part

of its claims. Such duties are independent of the Policy and apply to James’s

relationship with its insurance agent and not to the Policy.

      Because Altman and Diaz’s liability does not arise from the Policy, estoppel

does not mandate arbitration of the claims asserted by James. In fact, the only

duties under the Policy are referred to as “Your Duties,” which refer to the “named

insured,” and “Our Duties,” which refer to the “insurance company providing

insurance.” CR Supp. 25, 38-39. There are no duties allocated by the Policy to

Altman and Diaz, as an insurance agency and James has not sued for any breach of

                                          11
the Policy.

      4.      Altman and Diaz are not third party beneficiaries that can
              enforce the arbitration clause.

      Under certain circumstances, which are not present here, third party

beneficiaries can enforce an arbitration agreement even though they are not parties

to the agreement. See In re Kellogg & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex.

2005); see also G.T. Leach Builders, LLC at *43. However, the third party

beneficiary must be able to enforce the contract through state contract law

principles. See J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 227; Delfingen, 407 S.W.3d at 797.

To do so, the third party beneficiary must overcome the “presumption against

conferring third-party-beneficiary status on noncontracting parties.” South Texas

Water Authority v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. 2007).

      Under Texas law, incidental third-party-beneficiaries are unable to enforce

contract provisions. Id. “A third party may only enforce a contract when the

contracting parties themselves intend to secure some benefit for the third party and

entered into the contract directly for the third party's benefit.” Id. “The intent to

confer a direct benefit upon a third party ‘must be clearly and fully spelled out or

enforcement by the third party must be denied.’” Id. (quoting MCI Telecomms.

Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex.1999)).

      Here, Altman and Diaz are at most incidental third-party-beneficiaries.
                                         12
There was no intent to confer a direct benefit upon Altman and Diaz by either

James or Rain and Hail. James entered into the contract with Rain and Hail only to

benefit itself via insurance for a crop, and Rain and Hail sought only to sale its

insurance products. CR Supp. 21, 25-50. The fact that Altman and Diaz might have

received a commission for facilitating the sale does not show a “clear and fully

spelled out” intent to directly benefit Altman and Diaz. In fact, Altman and Diaz

are not mentioned by name anywhere in the Crop Revenue Coverage Insurance

Policy. See CR Supp. 25-50. Thus, Altman and Diaz as incidental third-party-

beneficiaries are unable to enforce the arbitration provision between James and

Rain and Hail.

      5.     Even if there was an agreement between the parties to
             arbitrate, the trial court erred in compelling arbitration
             because James’s claims arose outside the scope of the
             arbitration clause.

      The determination of whether a claim is within the scope of the arbitration

clause is based on an interpretation of the parties’ contracts, which courts review

de novo. Bosscorp, Inc. v. Donegal, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 68, 75-76 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Disputes concerning the scope of an

arbitration agreement are generally resolved in favor of arbitration. In re Kellogg &

Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d at 737. However, when construing a written contract, the

court’s primary concern is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as
                                         13
expressed in the instrument. See J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 229.

      Courts consider the entire writing and attempt to harmonize and give effect

to all the provisions of the contract by analyzing the provisions with reference to

the whole agreement. Frost Nat'l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310,

312 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 229. Courts should

assume the parties intended every provision to have some effect. See United

Protective Servs., Inc. v. West Village Ltd. P'ship, 180 S.W.3d 430, 432 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). And, only when the provisions of a contract appear to

conflict, should courts attempt to harmonize the provisions. See Id. However,

courts cannot rewrite an arbitration agreement to bring claims within its scope,

even if those claims are intertwined with issues covered by the arbitration

agreement. See Surplus, Inc. v. Home State Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-95-00007-

CV, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 3305 at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 21, 1995, writ

denied).

      The arbitration clause in the case at bar solely covered “determinations.” CR

Supp. 44-45. Specifically, the arbitration clause obligated the parties to arbitrate

disputes arising out of “determinations made by us,” defining “us” as “the

insurance company providing insurance.” CR Supp. 25, 44-45. The breach of duty

by James’s agents, Altman and Diaz, was not a determination under the Policy and

                                        14
falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. No provisions in the Policy

even discuss the duties of Altman and Diaz to James.

      Further, evidence of the inapplicability of the arbitration clause to the

dispute at hand are the provisions of the arbitration agreement that cannot apply as

written. Section 20(a)(1) of the insurance contract states that if there is a “dispute

[which] in any way involves a policy or procedure interpretation. . . you or we

must obtain an interpretation from [the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation

“FCIC”] in accordance with 7 CFR part 400. CR Supp. 45. However, review by

the FCIC is not allowed for determinations made by private insurance contractors

such as Altman and Diaz. 7 CFR 400.91.

      In the instant suit, James has alleged that Altman and Diaz breached a duty

to it by failing to report a claim. CR 4. If Section 20(a)(1) is applied, Altman and

Diaz’s alleged conduct could be subject to review by the FCIC, which, by law,

cannot review the decisions made by private insurance contractors such as Altman

and Diaz.

      Another example of the error created by the application of the Rain and Hail

Arbitration Clause is that Section 20(b) requires arbitration to occur within 1 year

of the date “we denied your claim or rendered the determination with which you

disagree.” CR Supp. 44. Altman and Diaz did not deny James’s claims or render a

                                         15
determination with which he disagreed. CR Supp. 56 (Diaz stated that, “Once the

claim is turned in, Federal crop rules says that the agent can no longer be

involved.”). The denial of coverage was made by Rain and Hail prior to this suit

being initiated. CR Supp. 60-62. It was not until this dispute was resolved through

the first arbitration that James’s damages could be ascertained against Altman and

Diaz. See Great Am. Assur. Co. v. Sanchuck, LLC No. 8:10-CV-2568 –T-33AEP,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7477 at * 20 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2012); Rice v. Louis A.

Williams & Assocs., 86 S.W.3d 329, 337 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, 2002, pet.

denied).

      Negligence claims maintained by first-party insureds against insurance

agents do not ripen until the Plaintiff’s interests are confronted with a specific and

concrete risk of harm. Rice v. Louis A. Williams & Assocs., 86 S.W.3d 329, 337

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet denied). See also Great Am. Assur. Co. v.

Sanchuk, LLC, No. 8:10-cv-2568-T-33AEP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7477 at *20

(M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2012) (finding that a negligence cause of action against an

insurance agent accrues at the conclusion of a related or underlying proceeding

because a plaintiff cannot make a claim against an insurance agent for negligence

while simultaneously claiming policy coverage) (emphasis added); citing Blumberg

v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., 790 So. 2d. 1061, 1065 (Fla. 2001) and

                                         16
Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Moulton Props., No. 3:05cv401/LAC, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 73478 (N.D. Fla. July 19, 2006).

      Although the issues in the case at bar do not revolve around a limitations

issue like the cases cited above, James had at least a two year period in which to

file suit under Texas law for the claims in the instant suit. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code

Ann. § 17.565 (West 2015); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (West

2015). The arbitration agreement conflicts with that law. See CR Supp. 60-62

(denying James’s arbitration claim due to Diaz’s negligence in failing to timely file

James’s crop loss claim on April 10, 2012). See CR Supp. 63-68 (letter denying

coverage on April 26, 2011). It would be impractical for James to be required to

file suit before the determination was made because there was always a chance, no

matter how remote, that the arbitrator would find for James. Rice v. Louis A.

Williams & Assocs., 86 S.W.3d, at 339 (citing All- Tex Roofing, Inc. v. Greenwood

Ins. Group, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.

denied). In any event, limitations was not held to preclude James’s recovery in the

second arbitration and the clause had to be rewritten by the arbitrator or the court to

avoid that improper result.

      Specifically, Section 20(b)(1) provides that arbitration must be instituted

within one year of denial of the claim or the rendering of a determination. See CR

                                          17
Supp. 44. The DTPA specifically provides a two year statute of limitations period

for DTPA claims, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.565 (West 2015), and waiver

of any subsection under the DTPA is against public policy. Id. at 17.42(a); see also

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §16.070 (West 2015) (precluding a contract

which limits the statute of limitations to less than 2 years). Although not asserted

by the parties as a defense, enforcement of the arbitration clause as written required

a re-writing of its terms which cannot be done, and which would be against public

policy. Therefore, the only way the James’s claims could be within the scope of the

arbitration clause, was for the court or arbitrator to rewrite the arbitration clause

itself.

          6.    The arbitrator had no authority to enter an award relating
                to this case. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in
                enforcing the arbitration award.

          Under both the Texas Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act, an

arbitrator cannot issue a decision on matters outside the scope of the arbitration

agreement. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.088 (West 2015); 9

U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2015). An arbitrator has no authority to issue a decision when

parties have not agreed to arbitrate claims because an arbitrator derives their power

from the arbitration agreement itself. Centex/Vestal v. Friendship W. Baptist

Church, 314 S.W.3d 677, 684 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v.

                                          18
Guidry, 327 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. 1959)); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339
S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,

559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010)). Both Texas law and federal law require vacatur of an

arbitration award when an arbitrator exceeds their authority. Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. § 171.088 (West 2015); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2015).

      Here, the arbitrator exceeded his authority by entering an award where no

agreement to arbitrate existed and the scope of the arbitration agreement did not

cover the disputes. See infra Part I.A-E. Thus, because the arbitrator exceeded his

authority in entering an award, the trial court abused its discretion when it enforced

the arbitration award.

                                  CONCLUSION

      The right to open access to the courts is a fundamental right in Texas. See

Tex. Const. Art. I, § 13. Here, that right was violated when the trial court

erroneously compelled James to arbitrate and when the trial court enforced the

arbitration award against James. Justice requires that this Court reverse the trial

court’s order enforcing the arbitration award and remand of this case for trial.

                                     PRAYER

      WHEREFORE, Appellant, Jody James Farms, J.V., prays that the Court

reverse the trial court’s decision to compel arbitration and enforce the arbitration

                                         19
award, and remand this case for a new trial.

                                      Respectfully submitted,

                                      JENKINS, WAGNON & YOUNG, P.C.

                                      /s/ Jody D. Jenkins
                                      JODY JENKINS
                                      State Bar No. 24029634
                                      P.O. Box 420
                                      Lubbock, Texas 79408
                                      (806) 796-7351
                                      Fax: (806) 771-8755
                                      jjenkins@jwylaw.com
                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

                         CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
 instrument has been served via the Court’s Electronic Filing System on this 4th
 day of June, 2015.

 J. Paul Manning
 Anna McKim
 Field, Manning, Stone, Hawthorne
  & Aycock, P.C.
 2112 Indiana Ave.
 Lubbock, Texas79410
                                      /s/ Jody D. Jenkins
                                      Jody D. Jenkins

                                         20
                CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the word count in Appellant’s Brief is 3,532 words.

                                 /s/ Jody D. Jenkins
                                 Jody D. Jenkins

                                  21
APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF

              22
                              APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                     EXHIBIT
Order Granting Motion to Arbitrate (CR 27)....................................................... 1

Final Judgment (CR 125-127) ............................................................. 2

Notice of Appeal (CR 128) .......................................................................................3

Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) Insurance Policy (CR Supp. 25-50) ................. 4

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2015).........................................................................................5

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §17.42(a) (West 2015) ............................................ 6

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.565 (West 2015) ............................................. 7
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (West 2015) .................................... 8
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §16.070 (West 2015) ..................................... 9
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.021(a)(1) (West 2015).......................10

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.088 (West 2015) ................................11

Tex. Const. Art. I, § 13...........................................................................................12

                                                        23
806-792-1048
                                                                                              10:38:35a.m.   06-27-2013        3/3

                                                                      No.l0,422

          JODY JAMES FARMS, JV                                            §   IN THE II om DISTRICT COURT
                                                                          §
          v.                                                             §    OF
                                                                         §
          THE ALTMAN GROUP, INC. AND                                     §
          LAURIEDIAZ                                                     §    FLOYD COUNTY, TEXAS

                                      ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO ARBITRATE

                    ON TIDS the 20'11 day ofMay, 2013, the Court considered the Motion of Defendants, THE

          ALTMAN GROUP, INC. AND LAURIE DIAZ, to Compel Arbitration and, after considering the

          pleadings, affidavit, evidence, and the argument of counsel, the Court hereby grants said motion.

                    IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion of Defendants, THE ALTMAN GROUP,

          INC. AND LAURIE DIAZ to arbitrate this matter is hereby in all things GRANTED.

                    SIGNED       this..$-y of                  c,LY~-t ·           .
                                                                                   June, 2013. . ·

                                                                 ..   ~:~
                               FILED                                   JUDGE PRESIDING
                      Pcdfg~
                     District Clerk, Floyd Co1.1nty, 'f.9xa8

               By   '-22-WE                       . L;/~
                                                                                                                          -.

                                                                       EXHIBIT 1                                                27
8067921048                                                                           12:38:02 p.m.   01-16-2015            2/3

                                                         No. 10,422

             JODY JAMES FARMS, N                           §       IN THE llOTH DISTRICT COURT
                                                           §
             v.                                            §       OF
                                                           §
             THE ALTMAN GROUP, INC. AND                    §
             LAURIEDIAZ                                    §      FLOYD COUNTY, TEXAS

                                                   FINAL JUDGMENT

                     On this day came on to be heard the above-entitled and numbered cause wherein JODY
             JAMES FARMS, JV is Plaintiff and THE ALTMAN GROUP, INC. and LAURIE DIAZ, are the
         Defendants in the above entitled and numbered cause. The Court has read the pleadings and the
             papers on file, has considered the announcement of the parties and determined that it ·had
             jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this proceeding. The Court is of the opinion
             that upon consideration of Defendants' Petition to Confirm and Enforce Final Arbitration Award
             and Plaintiff, JODY JAMES FARMS, JV.'s, Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and all
             responses, briefs in support, exhibits and replies, if any, respectively thereto, it is hereby
             ORDERED and DECREED that Defendants' Petition to Confirm and Enforce Final Arbitration
             Award is GRANTED and the clerk is ordered to enter a judgment in favor of Defendants and
             against Plaintiff, JODY JAMES FARMS, JV and that Plaintiff, JODY JAMES FARMS, JV take
             nothing and all court costs are assessed against Plaintiff, JODY JAMES FARMS, JV. The judgment
             is to accrue interest at the rate of 5.00% per annum from the date of judgment until paid, plus all
             costs of court.

                     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Motion
             to Vacate the Arbitration Award is DENIED.

                     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants request
             for attorney's fees is DENIED.

             Final Judgment                                                                                 Page 1

                                                       EXHIBIT 2                                                     125
.   8067921048                                                                         12:38:26 p.m.   01-16-2015            3/3

                         IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants,
                 THE ALTMAN GROUP, INC. and LAURIE DIAZ have judgment against Plaintiff, JODY
                 JAMES FARMS, JV, as follows:

                         1.     Plaintiff take nothing;
                        2.      All costs of court are taxed against Plaintiff, JODY JAMES
                                FARMS,JV;and
                        3.      Post judgment interest on all costs and fees incurred at five
                                percent (5%) per year from the date of this judgment.

                        IT IS, FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant shall
                 have all writs and processes as may be necessary to enforce this Judgment.

                        All relief not expressly granted herein is denied. This judgment is final, disposes of all
                 claims and all parties, and is appealable.

                        The court orders execution to issue for this judgment.
                                                   /L
                        SIGNED on this     diJ- day of January, 2015.

             Final Judgment                                                                                   Page 2

                                                              EXHIBIT 2                                                126
8067921048                                                                        08:47: 13 a.m.   01-15-2015            2/4

             January 15, 2015
             Page2

                                                   Very truly yours,

                                                   FJELD, MANNlNG, STONE,
                                                   HAWTHORNE & AYCOCK, P.C.

                                                   ~."?~N\~
                                                   J.PaulManning        ~~
             JPM:slm

             Enclosure

                    Fax: 771-8755
                    E-Mail jjenkins@jwvlaw.com
             pc:    JODY JENKINS
                    JENKlNS, WAGNON & YOUNG, P.C.
                    P.O. Box420
                    Lubbock, TX 79408                                                FILED
                                                                         ~~·
                                                                       District   C~rk, Flo)O County, Thxae
                                                               ay   /-;I/J-c2LJ/5                   ~/LI~,;n_,
                                                                                                              u~

                                                 EXHIBIT 2                                                         127
                                                        No.10,422

JODY JAMES FARMS, JV                                          §         IN THE llOTH DISTRICT COURT
                                                              §
v.                                                            §         OF
                                                              §
THE ALTMAN GROUP, INC. AND                                    §
LAURIEDIAZ                                                    §         FLOYD COUNTY, TEXAS

                                               NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

     ~
           Plaintiff,
         ~--_....- "'::
                        Jody }ame~f(lrms,
                     .---=--~  -   •. ---- -
                                 ~---·
                                             JY,~desiresJo- app~alJrom
                                             -.,.- ·- - __ . . __.. . .
                                                                  ~--   -.-.__..
                                                                                 the- FinaU!!4gme11t~gl!ed.by
                                                                                        --   ..      ~
                                                                                                              this_.:;__              ---~

Court on January 16,2015.

           Plaintiff, Jody James Farms, JV, appeals to the Seventh Court of Appeals, Amarillo, Texas.

                                                          zctfully            submitted,

                                                               YJENKINS
                                                          SBN: 24029634
                                                          Jenkins, Wagnon & Young, P.C.
                                                          P.O. Box420
                                                          Lubbock, Texas79408-0420
                                                          (806) 796-73 51
                                                          FAX (806) 771-8755
                                                          jjenkins@jwylaw.com
                                                          ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

                                         CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
                                           .-:--::-..: _,- ·---·---,.-...·- :~- . . . ---~.,...._......,..,..,.~...,........-~~-~=-__;._ " ____ _)
       This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument has
been served upon the following via facsimile this 13th day ofFebruary, 2015.

J. Paul Manning
Field, Manning, Stone, Hawthorne & Aycock, P.C.
2112 Indiana A venue
Lubbock, Texas79410
Fax: (806)792-9148

                                                          J,_Jenkins

                                                                          FILED
                                                                  Poiit; .o,/IYJI-i~
                                                                         ((            '
                                                                OiS1r1tl Lie. •, Flutu Cour~y, T~

                                                              {) ~11 ·;)OJ;)                   i r. 11 ~
                                                       EXHIBIT 3                                                          128
..                                          CROP REVENUE COVERAGE (CRC) INSURANCE POUCY                                     2005-NCIS 7008-CRC
                                                    (This Is a continuous policy. Refer to section 3.)

      This Insurance policy Is reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) under the authority of section 50B(h) of the
       )9deral Crop Insurance Act (Act), as amended (7 U.S.C. 1508(h)). All provisions of the policy and rights and responsibUities of the
      ,...arties are specifically subject to the Act. The provisions of the policy may not be waived or varied in any way by us, our Insurance
      agent or any other contractor or employee of ours or any employee of USDA unless the policy specificaHy authorizes a waiver or
      modification by written agreement. We will use the procedures (handbooks, manuals, memoranda and bulletins), as Issued by FCIC
      and published on the RMA website at htto:l/nna.usda.gov/ or a successor website, in the administration of this policy, including the
      adjustment of any loss or claim submitted hereunder. In the event that we cannot pay your loss because we are Insolvent or are
      otherwise unable to perfonn our duties under our reinsurance agreement with FCIC. your claim will be settled In accordance with the
      provisions of this policy and FCIC will be responsible for any amounts owed. No state guarantee fund will be liable for your loss.

      Throughout the policy, "you" and "your" refer to the named insured shown on the accepted application and "we," •us; and •our" refer to
      the insurance company providing insurance. Unless the context Indicates otherwise, use of the plural fonn of a word includes the
      singular and use of the singular form of the word includes the plural.

      AGREEMENT TO INSURE: In return for the payment of the premium, and subject to all of the provisions of this policy, we agree with
      you to provide the insurance as stated In this policy. If there Is a conflict between the Act, the regulations pubHshed at 7 CFR chapter
      IV, and the procedures as Issued by FCIC, the order of priority Is as follows: {1) the Act: (2) the regulations: and (3) the procedures as
      Issued by FCIC, with (1) controlling (2), etc. If there is a conflict between the policy provisions and the administrative regulations
      published at 7 CFR part 400, the policy provisions control. If a conflict exists among the policy provisions, the order of priority is: (1) the
      Catastrophic Risk Protection Endorsement, as applicable; (2) the Special Provisions: (3) the Crop Provisions; and (4} these Basic
      Provisions, with (1) controlling (2), etc.

                                                                  BASIC PROVISIONS
                                                                 Terms and Conditions

      1.    Definitions                                                                 at 100 percent of the Base Price, or a comparable
            Abandon - Failure to continue to care for the crop,                         coverage.
            providing care so Insignificant as to provide no benefit to                 Administrative fee • An amount you must pay for
           the crop, or failure to harvest In a timely manner, unless                   additional coverage for each crop year as specified in
           an Insured cause of loss prevents you from property caring                   section B.
           for or harvesting the crop or causes damage to It to the                     Agricultural commodity - Any crop or other commodity
           extent that most producers of the crop on acreage with                       produced, regardless of whether or not it is Insurable.
           similar characteristics In the area would not normally                       Agricultural experts - Persons who are employed by the
           further care for or harvest it                                               Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension
           Acreage report - A report required by section 7 of these                     Service or the agricultural departments of universities, or
           Basic Provisions that contains, In addition to other                        other persons approved by FCIC, whose research or
           required Information, your report of your share of an                       occupation is related to the specific crop or practice for
           acreage of an insured crop In the county, whether                           which such expertise is sought.
           Insurable or not Insurable.                                                 Annual crop • An agricultural commodity that normally
           Acreage reporting date - The date contained In the                          must be planted each year.
           Special Provisions or as provided In section 7 by which                     Application - The form required to be completed by you
           you are required to submit your acreage report.                             and accepted by us before insurance coverage will
           Act - The Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 U.S.C. 1501 et                      commence. This form must be completed and filed in your
           seq.).                                                                      agent's offiCe not later than the sales closing date of the
            Actual Production History (APH) - A process used to                        initial Insurance year for each crop for which Insurance
            determine production guarantees In accordance with 7                       coverage Is requested. If cancellation or termination of
            CFR part 400, subpart (G).                                                 insurance coverage occurs for any reason, Including but
            Actual Yield - The yield per acre for a crop year                          not limited to Indebtedness, suspension, debarment,
            calculated from the production records or claims for                      disqualification, cancellation by you or us, or violation of
            indemnities. The actual yield Is determined by dividing                   the controlled substance provisions of the Food Security
            total production (which Includes harvested and appraised                  Act of 1985, a new application must be ffled for the crop.
            production) by planted acres.                                             Insurance coverage will not be provided if you are
            Actuarial documents - The material for the crop year                      ineligible under the contract or under any Federal statute
            which Is available for public Inspection In your agent's                  or regulation.
            offiCe   and    published      on     RMA's     website    at             Approved yield - The actual production history (APH)
            htto:/fwww.rma.uscla.gov/ or a successor website, and                     yield, calculated and approved by the verifier, used to
           which shows available coverage levels, Information                         determine the Final Guarantee by summing the yearly
           needed to determine amounts of insurance, premium                          actual, assigned, adjusted or unadjusted transitional yields
           rates, premium adjustment percentages, practices,                          and dividing the sum by the number of yields contained in
           particular types or varieties of the Insurable crop, Insurable             the database, which will always contain at least four
           ~creage, and other related information regarding crop                      yields. The database may contain up to 10 consecutive
           Insurance In the county.                                                   crop years of actual or assigned yields. The approved
           Additional coverage - A level of coverage equal to or                      yield may have yield adjustments elected under section
           greater than 50 percent of the approved yield Indemnified                  35, revisions according to sectl~o~l.iiW·~~~~~~
                                                                                                                               PLAINTIFF'S
     C 2004 National Crop Insurance Services, Inc.                    Page 1 of26
                                                                                                                                 EXHIBIT
                                                                  EXHIBIT 4
                                                                                                                           I     25
                                                                                                                                       s
..          according to FCIC approved procedures applied when                      full text of the CFR is available in electronic fonnat a
            calculating the approved yield. This yield is established for          hHo:/fwww.access.Qoo.gov/ or a successor website.
            basic or optional units. The approved yield for each basic             Consent - Approval in writing by us allowing you to take f
            or optional unit comprising an enterprise unit Is retained             specific action.
      "     for premium and Anal Guarantee purposes under an                       Contract- (see •Polley".)
       1 enterprise unit                                                           Contract change date - The calendar date by whict
            Area - Land surrounding the insured acreage with                       changes to the policy, if any, wiU be made available lr
            geographic characteristics, topography, soil types and                 accordance with section 5 of these Basic Provisions.
            climatic conditions similar to the Insured acreage.                    Conventional farming practice - A system or process fo1
            Assignment of Indemnity - A transfer of policy rights,                 producing an agricultural commodity, excluding organic
           made on our form, and effective when approved by us. It                 farming practices, that Is necessary to produce the crop
            Is the arrangement whereby you assign your right to an                 that may be, but is not required to be, generally
           Indemnity payment to any party of your choice for the crop              recognized by agricultural experts for the area to conserve
           year.                                                                   or enhance natural resources and the environment.
           Average yield • The yield, calculated by summing the                    County - Any county, parish, or other political subdivision
           yearly actual, assigned, adjusted or unadjusted transitional           of a state shown on your accepted appUcatlon, Including
           yields and dividing the sum by the number of yields                    acreage In a field that extends Into an adjoining county If
           contained In the database, prior to any adjustments,                   the county boundary Is not readily discernible.
           Including those elected under section 35, revisions                    Coverage - The insurance provided by this policy, against
           according to section 4, or other limitations according to              insured loss of revenue by unit as shown on your
           FCIC approved procedures.                                              summary of coverage.
           Base premium rate - A premium rate used to calculate                   Cover crop - A crop generally recognized by agricultural
          the risk associated with yield.                                         experts as agronomically sound for the area for erosion
           Base Price - The Initial price determined in accordance                control or other purposes related to conservation or soil
           with the Commodity Exchange Endorsement and used to                    Improvement. A cover crop may be considered to be a
          calculate your premium and Minimum Guarantee.                           second crop (see the definition of •second crop•).
          Buffer zone - A parcel of land, as designated In your                   Coverage begins, date - The calendar date Insurance
          organic plan, that separates agricultural commodities                   begins on the Insured crop, as contained In the Crop
          grown under organic practices from agricultural                         Provisions, or the date planting begins on the unit (see
          commodities grown under non-organic practices, and used                 section 12 of these Basic Provisions for specific provisions
          to minimize the possibility of unintended contact by                    relating to prevented planting).
          prohibited substances or organisms.                                     Crop Provisions - The part of the policy that contains the
          CertJffed organic acreage - Acreage In the certified                    specific provisions of insurance for each Insured crop.
          organic farming operation that has been certified by a                  Crop year - The period within which the Insured crop Is
          certifying agent as conforming to organic standards in                  normally grown, regardless of whether or not It Is actually
          accordance with 7 CFR part 205.                                         grown, and designated by the calendar year In whlch the
          Certifying agent - A private or governmental entity                     Insured crop Is normally harvested, unless otherwise
          accredited by the USDA Secretary of Agriculture for the                specified In the Crop Provisions.
          purpose of certifying a production, processing or handling             Damage - InJury, deterioration, or loss of revenue of the
          operation as organic.                                                  Insured crop due to Insured or uninsured causes.
          CRC base rate- The premium rate used to calculate the                   Days - Calendar days.
          risk associated with revenue.                                          Deductible - The amount determined by subtracting the
         CRC high price factor· A premium factor, as set forth In                coverage level percentage you choose from 100 percent.
         the actuarial documents, used to calculate the risk                      For example, If you elected a 65 percent coverage level,
         associated with an Increase In the Harvest Price relative to                                                                =
                                                                                 your deductible would be 35 percent (1 00% - 65% 35%).
         the Base Price.                                                         Delinquent debt - Any administrative fees or premiums
         CRC low price factor - A premium factor, as set forth in                for insurance issued under the authority of the Act, and the
         the actuarial documents, used to calculate the risk                     Interest on those amounts, If applicable, that are not
         associated with a decrease In the Harvest Price relative to             postmarked or received by us or our agent on or before
         the Base Price.                                                         the termination date unless you have entered into an
         Calculated Revenue - The production to count for the                    agreement acceptable to us to pay such amounts or have
         insured crop multiplied by the Harvest Price.                           filed for bankruptcy on or before the termination date; any
         Cancellation date • The calendar date specified In the                  other amounts due us for Insurance issued under the
         Crop Provisions on which coverage for the crop will                     authority of the Act (Including, but not limited to,
         automatically renew unless canceled in writing by either                Indemnities, prevented planting payments or replanting
         you or us, or terminated In accordance with the policy                  payments found not to have been earned or that were
         terms.                                                                  overpaid), and the Interest on such amounts, If applicable,
         Claim for Indemnity - A claim made on our form by you                   which are not postmarked or received by us or our agent
         for damage or loss to an insured crop and submitted to us               by the due date specified In the notice to you of the
         not later than 60 days after the Harvest Price is released              amount due; or any amounts due under an agreement
         (see section 15).                                                       with you to pay the debt, which are not postmarked or
        Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) - The codification of                  received by us or our agent by the due dates specified In
        general and permanent rules published In the Federal                     such agreement.
        Register by the Executive departments and agencies of                    Disinterested third party - A person that does not have
        the Federal Government. Rules published In the Federal                   any familial relationship (parents, brothers, sisters,
      )                                                                          children, spouse, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces,
        Register by FCIC are contained in 7 CFR chapter IV. The
                                                                                 nephews, first cousins, or grandparents, related by blood,

     C 2004 National Crop Insurance Services, Inc.                   Page2of26

                                                                EXHIBIT 4                                                 26
..           adoption or marriage, are considered to have a famHial                or contained In the organic plan. We may, or you rna~
             relationship) with you or who will not benefit financially            request us to, contact FCIC to determine whether or no
             from the sale of the Insured crop. Persons who are                    production methods will be considered to be "good farmln~
             authorized to conduct quality analysis In accordance with             practices.·
            the Crop Provisions are considered disinterested third                 Harvest Price - The final price determined In accordancE
            parties unless there Is a familial relationship.                       with the Commodity Exchange Endorsement and used t<
             Double crop - Producing two or more crops for harvest on              calculate your Calculated Revenue and the Harves
            the same acreage In the same crop year.                                Guarantee.
            Earliest planting date - The initial planting date contained           Household - A domestic establishment Including thE
            In the Special Provisions, which is the earliest date you              members of a family (parents, brothers, sisters, children
            may plant an Insured agricultural commodity and qualify               spouse, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews
            for a replanting payment If such payments are authorized              first cousins, or grandparents, related by blood, adoptior
            by the Crop Provisions.                                               or marriage, are considered to be family members) anc
            End of Insurance period, date of - The date upon which                others who live under the same roof.
            your crop Insurance coverage ceases for the crop year                 Insurable loss - Damage for which coverage is providec
            (see Crop Provisions and section 12).                                 under the terms of your policy, and for which you accep
            FCIC - The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, a wholly               an Indemnity payment.
            owned government corporation within USDA.                             Insured - The named person shown on the applicatlor
            Field - AU acreage of liftable land within a natural or               accepted by us. This term does not extend to any othe
            artificial boundary (e.g., roads, waterways, fences, etc.).           person having a share or interest In the crop (for example
            Different planting patterns or planting different crops do            a partnership, landlord, or any other person) unle~
            not create separate fields.                                           specifically indicated on the accepted application.
            Final Guarantee - The number of dollars guaranteed per                Insured crop - The crop in the county for which coverage
           acre determined to be the higher of the Minimum                        is available under your policy as shown on the applicatior
           Guarantee or the Harvest Guarantee, where:                             accepted by us.
           (1) Minimum Guarantee - The approved yield per acre                    lnterplanted - Acreage on which two or more crops are
                  multiplied by the Base Price multiplied by the                 planted In a manner that does not permit separate
                  coverage level percentage you elect.                           agronomic maintenance or harvest of the Insured crop.
           (2) Harvest Guarantee - The approved yield per acre                   Irrigated practice - A method of producing a crop b}
                  multiplied by the Harvest Price, multiplied by the             which water Is artificially applied during the growin~
                  coverage level percentage you elect.                           season by appropriate systems and at the proper times
           If you elect enterprise unit coverage, the basic units or             with the Intention of providing the quantity of water needec
           optional units comprising the enteJprise unit will retain             to produce at least the yield used to establish the Rna
           separate Anal Guarantees.                                             Guarantee on the irrigated acreage planted to the lnsurec
           Final planting date - The date contained in the Special               crop.
           Provisions for the Insured crop by which the crop must                Late planted - Acreage initially planted to the insured CI'OJ=
           Initially be planted in order to be Insured for the full Anal         after the final planting date.
           Guarantee.                                                            Late planting period - The period that begins the da~
           First Insured crop -With respect to a single crop year and            after the final planting date for the insured crop and ends
           any speclfic crop acreage, the first Instance that an                 25 days after the final planting date, unless otherwise
          agricultural commodity Is planted for harvest or prevented             specified in the Crop Provisions or Special Provisions.
          from being planted and is insured under the authority of               Liability - The dollar amount of insurance coverage use 2004 National Crop Insurance Services, Inc.                Page26 of26

                                                              EXHIBIT 4                                                     50
|   | Positive
As of: June 4, 2015 4:28 PM EDT

                                             9 USCS § 10
                              Current through PL 114-13, approved 5/19/15

United States Code Service - Titles 1 through 54       >   TITLE 9. ARBITRATION          >   CHAPTER 1.
GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
    (a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award
        was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
        arbitration--
        (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
        (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
        (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
            sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
            controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
            prejudiced; or
        (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
            final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
    (b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made
        has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
    (c) The United States district court for the district wherein an award was made that was issued
        pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating the award upon the application
        of a person, other than a party to the arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the
        award, if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with the factors set forth in
        section 572 of title 5.

History

  (July 30, 1947, ch 392, § 1,61 Stat. 672; Nov. 15, 1990, P.L. 101-552, § 5, 104 Stat. 2745; Aug. 26,
1992, P.L. 102-354, § 5(b)(4), 106 Stat. 946; May 7, 2002, P.L. 107-169, § 1, 116 Stat. 132.)

Prior law and revision:
  This section is based on Act Feb. 12, 1925, ch 213, § 10, 43 Stat. 885 (§ 10 of former Title 9).

                                               EXHIBIT 5
|   | Neutral
As of: June 4, 2015 4:31 PM EDT

                                Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.42
                    This document is current through the 2013 3rd Called Session

Texas Statutes and Codes > BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE > TITLE 2. COMPETITION AND
TRADE PRACTICES > CHAPTER 17. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES > SUBCHAPTER E.
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

§ 17.42. Waivers: Public Policy
    (a) Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter is contrary to public policy and
        is unenforceable and void; provided, however, that a waiver is valid and enforceable if:
        (1) the waiver is in writing and is signed by the consumer;
        (2) the consumer is not in a significantly disparate bargaining position; and
        (3) the consumer is represented by legal counsel in seeking or acquiring the goods or services.
    (b) A waiver under Subsection (a) is not effective if the consumer’s legal counsel was directly or
        indirectly identified, suggested, or selected by a defendant or an agent of the defendant.
    (c) A waiver under this section must be:
        (1) conspicuous and in bold-face type of at least 10 points in size;
        (2) identified by the heading ″Waiver of Consumer Rights,″ or words of similar meaning; and
        (3) in substantially the following form:
              ″I waive my rights under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, Section
            17.41 et seq., Business & Commerce Code, a law that gives consumers special rights and
            protections. After consultation with an attorney of my own selection, I voluntarily consent
            to this waiver.″
    (d) The waiver required by Subsection (c) may be modified to waive only specified rights under
        this subchapter.
    (e) The fact that a consumer has signed a waiver under this section is not a defense to an action
        brought by the attorney general under Section 17.47.

History

Enacted by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., ch. 143 (H.B. 417), § 1, effective May 21, 1973; am. Acts 1981, 67th
Leg., ch. 307 (S.B. 619), § 1, effective August 31, 1981; am. Acts 1983, 68th Leg., ch. 883 (H.B. 1438),
§ 1, effective August 29, 1983; am. Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 167 (S.B. 892), § 5.02(6), effective
September 1, 1987; am. Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 380 (S.B. 437), § 1, effective September 1, 1989; am.
Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 414 (H.B. 668), § 1, effective September 1, 1995.

                                             EXHIBIT 6
|   | Positive
As of: June 4, 2015 4:31 PM EDT

                               Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.565
                   This document is current through the 2013 3rd Called Session

Texas Statutes and Codes > BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE > TITLE 2. COMPETITION AND
TRADE PRACTICES > CHAPTER 17. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES > SUBCHAPTER E.
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

§ 17.565. Limitation

All actions brought under this subchapter must be commenced within two years after the date on which
the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after the consumer
discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the occurrence of the
false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice. The period of limitation provided in this section may be
extended for a period of 180 days if the plaintiff proves that failure timely to commence the action was
caused by the defendant’s knowingly engaging in conduct solely calculated to induce the plaintiff to
refrain from or postpone the commencement of the action.

History

Enacted by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 603 (S.B. 357), § 8, effective August 27, 1979; am. Acts 1987,
70th Leg., ch. 167 (S.B. 892), § 5.02(7), effective September 1, 1987 (renumbered from Sec. 17.56A).

Annotations

Case Notes

 Antitrust & Trade Law: Consumer Protection: General Overview
 Antitrust & Trade Law: Consumer Protection: Deceptive Acts & Practices: General Overview
 Antitrust & Trade Law: Consumer Protection: Deceptive Acts & Practices: State Regulation
 Antitrust & Trade Law: Consumer Protection: Deceptive Labeling & Packaging: State Regulation
 Antitrust & Trade Law: State Civil Action
 Antitrust & Trade Law: Trade Practices & Unfair Competition: General Overview
 Antitrust & Trade Law: Trade Practices & Unfair Competition: State Regulation: Claims
 Banking Law: Consumer Protection: State Law: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Pleading & Practice: Defenses, Demurrers & Objections: Affirmative Defenses:
General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Pleading & Practice: Defenses, Demurrers & Objections: Affirmative Defenses:
Statutes of Limitations: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Pleading & Practice: Pleadings: Amended Pleadings: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Pleading & Practice: Pleadings: Amended Pleadings: Relation Back
 Civil Procedure: Pleading & Practice: Pleadings: Time Limitations: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Summary Judgment: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Summary Judgment: Burdens of Production & Proof: General Overview

                                              EXHIBIT 7
|    | Positive
As of: June 4, 2015 4:32 PM EDT

                               Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003
                      This document is current through the 2013 3rd Called Session

Texas Statutes and Codes > CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE > TITLE 2. TRIAL,
JUDGMENT, AND APPEAL > SUBTITLE B. TRIAL MATTERS > CHAPTER 16. LIMITATIONS >
SUBCHAPTER A. LIMITATIONS OF PERSONAL ACTIONS

§ 16.003. Two-Year Limitations Period
     (a) Except as provided by Sections 16.010, 16.0031, and 16.0045, a person must bring suit for
         trespass for injury to the estate or to the property of another, conversion of personal property,
         taking or detaining the personal property of another, personal injury, forcible entry and detainer,
         and forcible detainer not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues.
     (b) A person must bring suit not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues in
         an action for injury resulting in death. The cause of action accrues on the death of the injured
         person.

History

Enacted by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959 (S.B. 797), § 1, effective September 1, 1985; am. Acts 1995,
74th Leg., ch. 739 (H.B. 2330), § 2, effective June 15, 1995; am. Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 26 (H.B.
368), § 2, effective May 1, 1997; am. Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 97 (S.B. 15), § 3, effective September
1, 2005.

Annotations

Notes
Legislative Note. --
 * See Texas Litigation Guide, Ch. 72, Limitation of Actions.

Editor’s Notes. --

  Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 97 (S.B. 15), § 10 provides: ″There is a direct appeal to the supreme court
from an order, however characterized, of a trial court granting or denying a temporary or otherwise
interlocutory injunction or a permanent injunction on the grounds of the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality, or other validity or invalidity, under the state or federal constitution of all or any
part of this Act. The direct appeal is an accelerated appeal.″
  2005 amendment,
  added ″16.0031″ in (a).

Case Notes

    Banking Law: Consumer Protection: Fair Debt Collection: Unfair Practices
    Bankruptcy Law: Case Administration: Examiners, Officers & Trustees: General Overview

                                                EXHIBIT 8
|    | Positive
As of: June 4, 2015 4:34 PM EDT

                              Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.070
                      This document is current through the 2013 3rd Called Session

Texas Statutes and Codes > CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE > TITLE 2. TRIAL,
JUDGMENT, AND APPEAL > SUBTITLE B. TRIAL MATTERS > CHAPTER 16. LIMITATIONS >
SUBCHAPTER D. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

§ 16.070. Contractual Limitations Period
     (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a person may not enter a stipulation, contract, or
         agreement that purports to limit the time in which to bring suit on the stipulation, contract, or
         agreement to a period shorter than two years. A stipulation, contract, or agreement that
         establishes a limitations period that is shorter than two years is void in this state.
     (b) This section does not apply to a stipulation, contract, or agreement relating to the sale or
        purchase of a business entity if a party to the stipulation, contract, or agreement pays or receives
        or is obligated to pay or entitled to receive consideration under the stipulation, contract, or
        agreement having an aggregate value of not less than $ 500,000.

History

Enacted by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959 (S.B. 797), § 1, effective September 1, 1985; am. Acts 1991,
72nd Leg., ch. 840 (S.B. 935), § 2, effective August 26, 1991.

Annotations

Notes
1991 Note:
 The amendments made by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 840 apply to a stipulation, contract, or agreement
entered into before, on, or after August 26, 1991. Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 840, § 5.
 * See Texas Litigation Guide, Ch. 72, Limitation of Actions.

Case Notes

    Civil Procedure: Federal & State Interrelationships: Choice of Law: General Overview
    Civil Procedure: Federal & State Interrelationships: Federal Common Law: General Overview
    Contracts Law: Breach: Causes of Action: General Overview
    Contracts Law: Contract Conditions & Provisions: Conditions Precedent
    Contracts Law: Defenses: Statutes of Limitations
    Governments: Legislation: Statutes of Limitations: General Overview
    Governments: Legislation: Statutes of Limitations: Time Limitations
    Governments: Legislation: Statutes of Limitations: Waivers
    Insurance Law: Claims & Contracts: Policy Interpretation: General Overview

                                                EXHIBIT 9
|     | Positive
As of: June 4, 2015 4:35 PM EDT

                              Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.021
                      This document is current through the 2013 3rd Called Session

Texas Statutes and Codes > CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE > TITLE 7. ALTERNATE
METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION > CHAPTER 171. GENERAL ARBITRATION >
SUBCHAPTER B. PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATIONS

§ 171.021. Proceeding to Compel Arbitration
     (a) A court shall order the parties to arbitrate on application of a party showing:
          (1) an agreement to arbitrate; and
          (2) the opposing party’s refusal to arbitrate.
     (b) If a party opposing an application made under Subsection (a) denies the existence of the
        agreement, the court shall summarily determine that issue. The court shall order the arbitration
        if it finds for the party that made the application. If the court does not find for that party, the
        court shall deny the application.
     (c) An order compelling arbitration must include a stay of any proceeding subject to Section
         171.025.

History

Enacted by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 165 (S.B. 898), § 5.01, effective September 1, 1997.

Annotations

Notes

Editor’s Notes. --

 For information regarding the reorganization of former Chapter 171, see the editor’s notes following
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.001.

Case Notes

    Business & Corporate Law: Corporations: Finance: Franchise Tax: Penalties for Noncompliance
    Civil Procedure: Pleading & Practice: Defenses, Demurrers & Objections: Motions to Dismiss
    Civil Procedure: Discovery: Methods: General Overview
    Civil Procedure: Summary Judgment: Motions for Summary Judgment: General Overview
    Civil Procedure: Alternative Dispute Resolution: General Overview
    Civil Procedure: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Arbitrations: General Overview
    Civil Procedure: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Arbitrations: Arbitrability
    Civil Procedure: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Arbitrations: Federal Arbitration Act: General

                                                EXHIBIT 10
|   | Positive
As of: June 4, 2015 4:35 PM EDT

                               Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.088
                     This document is current through the 2013 3rd Called Session

Texas Statutes and Codes > CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE > TITLE 7. ALTERNATE
METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION                      >   CHAPTER 171. GENERAL ARBITRATION                >
SUBCHAPTER D. COURT PROCEEDINGS

§ 171.088. Vacating Award
    (a) On application of a party, the court shall vacate an award if:
        (1) the award was obtained by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
        (2) the rights of a party were prejudiced by:
             (A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator;
             (B) corruption in an arbitrator; or
             (C) misconduct or wilful misbehavior of an arbitrator;
        (3) the arbitrators:
             (A) exceeded their powers;
             (B) refused to postpone the hearing after a showing of sufficient cause for the postponement;
             (C) refused to hear evidence material to the controversy; or
             (D) conducted the hearing, contrary to Section 171.043, 171.044, 171.045, 171.046, or
                 171.047, in a manner that substantially prejudiced the rights of a party; or
        (4) there was no agreement to arbitrate, the issue was not adversely determined in a proceeding
            under Subchapter B, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without
            raising the objection.
    (b) A party must make an application under this section not later than the 90th day after the date
        of delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant. A party must make an application under
        Subsection (a)(1) not later than the 90th day after the date the grounds for the application are
        known or should have been known.
    (c) If the application to vacate is denied and a motion to modify or correct the award is not pending,
        the court shall confirm the award.

History

Enacted by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 165 (S.B. 898), § 5.01, effective September 1, 1997.

                                               EXHIBIT 11
                                      Tex. Const. Art. I, § 13
This document is current through the 2015 regular session, 84th Legislature, S.B. 293 (chapter 2).

Texas Constitution > CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 1876 > ARTICLE I. BILL OF
RIGHTS

§ 13. Excessive Bail or Fines; Cruel and Unusual Punishment; Remedy by Due
Course of Law.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment
inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.

Annotations

Case Notes

 OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
 Administrative Law: Judicial Review: Reviewability: Jurisdiction & Venue
 Business & Corporate Law: Corporations: Dissolution & Receivership: Termination & Winding Up:
Limited Survival
 Business & Corporate Law: Corporations: Shareholders: Actions Against Corporations: Derivative
Actions: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Justiciability: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Justiciability: Case or Controversy Requirements: Immediacy
 Civil Procedure: Justiciability: Standing: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Justiciability: Standing: Burdens of Proof
 Civil Procedure: Justiciability: Standing: Injury in Fact
 Civil Procedure: Jurisdiction: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Jurisdiction: Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction Over Actions: General
Overview
 Civil Procedure: Jurisdiction: Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction Over Actions: Concurrent
Jurisdiction
 Civil Procedure: Equity: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Removal: Proceedings: Fraudulent Joinder
 Civil Procedure: Federal & State Interrelationships: Abstention
 Civil Procedure: Pleading & Practice: Pleadings: Amended Pleadings: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Pleading & Practice: Pleadings: Proceedings in Forma Pauperis: Prisoners: Petitions
 Civil Procedure: Parties: Capacity of Parties: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Parties: Prisoners: Dismissals of Petitions
 Civil Procedure: Parties: Prisoners: Screening of Petitions
 Civil Procedure: Joinder of Claims & Remedies: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Judicial Officers: Judges: Discretion
 Civil Procedure: Dismissals: Involuntary Dismissals: General Overview
 Civil Procedure: Dismissals: Involuntary Dismissals: Failures to Prosecute

                                             EXHIBIT 12