Court Opinion

ID: 9410781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 16:00:40.576242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:00.307180
License: Public Domain

20-3880
     Mai v. Garland
                                                                              BIA
                                                                         Nelson, IJ
                                                                  A206 283 943/944

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 24th day of July, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
 9            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
10            MYRNA PÉREZ,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   LIYAN MAI, JINWEI WANG,
15            Petitioners,
16
17                    v.                                  20-3880
18                                                        NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONERS:                 Troy Nader Moslemi, Esq.,
25                                    Flushing, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                    Attorney General; Nancy E.
 1                               Friedman, Senior Litigation
 2                               Counsel; Virginia Lum, Attorney,
 3                               Office of Immigration Litigation,
 4                               United States Department of
 5                               Justice, Washington, DC.

 6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 9   is DENIED.

10       Petitioners   Liyan   Mai   and   Jinwei   Wang,   natives   and

11   citizens of the People’s Republic of China, seek review of an

12   October 22, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming a July 26,

13   2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied

14   Mai’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. 1        In

15   re Liyan Mai, Jinwei Wang, Nos. A206 283 943/944 (B.I.A. Oct.

16   22, 2020), aff’g Nos. A206 283 943/944 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City

17   July 26, 2018).   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

18   underlying facts and procedural history.

19       We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions.          See

20   Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005).

21   The applicable standards of review are well established.         See

     1 Mai does not challenge the BIA’s conclusion that she waived her
     claim under the Convention Against Torture. Wang, who is Mai’s
     husband, is a derivative applicant on Mai’s application.
                                     2
 1   8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of

 2   fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

 3   be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v.

 4   Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse

 5   credibility determination for substantial evidence).

 6       The    IJ   may,    “[c]onsidering      the   totality      of    the

 7   circumstances, and all relevant factors” base a credibility

 8   determination   on     the   plausibility   of    the   claim   and    on

 9   inconsistencies in an applicant’s or witness’s statements or

10   between those statements and other evidence “without regard

11   to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to

12   the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant

13   factor.”   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).         “We defer . . . to

14   an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality

15   of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-

16   finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”                Xiu

17   Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord

18   Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

19       Mai alleged that she gave birth to a daughter in 1992

20   and was then forced to have an abortion in March 1994 when

21   family planning officers discovered her second pregnancy.

                                       3
 1   Mai further alleged that she was forced to have intrauterine

 2   devices (“IUDs”) implanted after her first pregnancy and

 3   after she miscarried a third pregnancy in 1996.           Substantial

 4   evidence     supports     the   agency’s      adverse     credibility

 5   determination.      We therefore deny the petition.

 6         First, the agency reasonably relied on an omission of

 7   material facts from Mai’s application and written statement.

 8   Mai testified that she paid family planning officials $500 to

9    ignore her second pregnancy.          However, she did not mention

10   the bribe in the detailed three-page written statement she

11   submitted in support of her application; nor did Wang mention

12   it in his letter.        When asked about these omissions, Mai

13   testified she was “too afraid” to mention the bribe and was

14   “really confused” at the time.         Admin. Record at 108.     Wang

15   testified that he “wasn’t thinking that much.”           Id. at 142.

16   The IJ was not required to credit these explanations because

17   Mai and Wang came to the United States to apply for asylum

18   and   Mai   filed   an   affirmative    and   detailed   application.

19   Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A

20   petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

21   for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

                                       4
 1   demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

 2   to   credit    his   testimony.”        (internal     quotation       marks

 3   omitted)); cf. Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 723–24 (2d

 4   Cir. 2009) (holding that, unlike border and credible fear

 5   interviews    that    occur    shortly        after   arrival,       asylum

 6   interviews are not subject to “special scrutiny” because, an

 7   asylum applicant has filed an affirmative application in

 8   which they must give a “detailed and specific account” and

 9   have had time to obtain counsel).

10        Additionally, although “in general omissions are less

11   probative of credibility than inconsistencies created by

12   direct contradictions,” the IJ did not err in relying on these

13   omissions because the bribe was something “that a credible

14   petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose

15   under the relevant circumstances.”             Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d

16   at 78–79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

17        Second, the IJ       reasonably relied on circumstantial

18   evidence that Mai and Wang “simply wanted to move to the

19   United   States,”    Admin.    Record    at    63,    given   that    Wang

20   previously    travelled   to   other     countries     without    seeking

21   asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Siewe v. Gonzales, 408

                                        5
 1   F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two permissible

 2   views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them

 3   cannot be clearly erroneous.” (quotation marks omitted)).

 4         Third,   the     IJ     reasonably        relied       on    the     lack   of

 5   corroboration         in      making       its        adverse        credibility

 6   determination,        given     the    inconsistencies             among     Wang’s

 7   statements,     her     mother’s       letter,        and    the     absence      of

 8   confirmation of her medical history from her doctor in the

 9   United States.       See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273

10   (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or

11   her testimony may bear on credibility because the absence of

12   corroboration    in        general    makes      an   applicant          unable   to

13   rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into

14   question.”); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d

15   Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of

16   the   weight    to     be     afforded     an    applicant's         documentary

17   evidence.”).

18         Finally, the agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies

19   among Mai’s application and testimony, Wang’s testimony, and

20   documentary    evidence        regarding      the     date    of    the     alleged

                                            6
 1   abortion. 2   See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).                  Mai stated

 2   that the abortion occurred in March 1994 and that her husband

 3   and mother were present for the procedure, whereas Wang and

 4   mother stated it was in April 1994.                    The agency was not

 5   required to credit Mai’s and Wang’s explanations that there

 6   was   confusion    between     the   Chinese     and    western     calendars

7    because they did not present evidence of mistranslation and

8    Wang’s explanation indicated that he used a date Mai gave him

9    rather than his own memory.               See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.

10         Contrary    to   Mai’s   position      that     the   discrepancy    is

11   trivial and should not have been considered, the agency “may

12   rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse

13   credibility determination as long as the totality of the

14   circumstances     establishes        than   an   []     applicant    is   not

     2 The agency erred in finding that Mai inconsistently testified
     that the abortion was in November 1993. Mai testified that she
     learned she was pregnant in November 1993. See Admin. Record at
     84, 86.    Given the other bases for the adverse credibility
     determination, this error does not warrant remand. See Lianping
     Li v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2016) (“When an IJ or BIA
     decision contains errors, we may nevertheless deem remand futile
     and deny the petition for review if substantial evidence . . . ,
     considered in the aggregate, supports the IJ’s finding that
     petitioner lacked credibility, and . . . disregarding those aspects
     of the IJ’s reasoning that are tainted by error, we can state with
     confidence that the IJ would adhere to his decision were the
     petition remanded” (internal quotation marks and citations
     omitted)).
                                           7
 1   credible.”       Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (internal quotation

 2   marks and citation omitted); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137,

 3   145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might

 4   preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to

 5   find    him    credible.          Multiple    inconsistencies   would    so

 6   preclude even more forcefully.”).

 7          Taken     together,    the      omission,    the   circumstantial

 8   evidence,      the   lack    of    reliable    corroboration,   and     the

9    inconsistency provide substantial evidence for the adverse

10   credibility          determination.                 See     8     U.S.C.

11   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; see also

12   Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.

13   The    adverse    credibility       determination    is   dispositive   of

14   asylum and withholding of removal because both claims are

15   based on the same factual predicate.               See Paul v. Gonzales,

16   444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

17          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

18   DENIED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

19   stays VACATED.

20                                        FOR THE COURT:
21                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
22                                        Clerk of Court

                                            8