Court Opinion

ID: 9849754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:45:34.527142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:25.700381
License: Public Domain

Bridgewater, C. J.,
dissenting — The majority uses judicial interpretation to construe RCW 43.43 to permit the Chief of the Washington State Patrol (WSP) to delegate her duty as “reviewing officer” of the trial board decision and her duty to take appropriate disciplinary action. I agree that it would be best if the reviewing officer were free from bias when making decisions regarding punishment, but giving the power to delegate to the Chief is a legislative function, not a judicial one. I therefore respectfully dissent.
*514When reviewing a statute, our function is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent. The most basic principle with regard to judicial interpretation is that a statute is not subject to judicial interpretation where the language is plain and unambiguous. See State v. Kazeck, 90 Wn. App. 830, 832, 953 P.2d 832 (1998). RCW 43.43 requires the Chief and only the Chief to determine disciplinary action and therefore does not permit delegation of the Chiefs authority. It is unambiguous. Thus, judicial interpretation should not be used to determine the Legislature’s intent.
The majority uses the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), RCW 34.05, to bolster their argument that we can imply the authority to delegate into RCW 43.43. But I disagree with their assertion that the APA applies to this case—it does not. The APA itself makes it clear that its provisions cannot apply here. RCW 34.05.030(2)(e) states that the APA does not apply wherever RCW 43.43 is inconsistent with the APA. The majority does not see an inconsistency between the APA and RCW 43.43. But RCW 43.43 requires the Chief to personally act as the reviewing officer and does not provide for delegation, while the APA addresses instances where there is a conflict of interest and allows delegation. That is an inconsistency. Thus, the inconsistent APA provisions cannot prevail over RCW 43.43. In addition, RCW 34.05.464(2) states that reviewing officers “may appoint a person to review initial orders and to prepare and enter final agency orders” only when it is “authorized by law.” RCW 43.43 does not authorize the Chief to appoint a person in her stead to review initial orders. Thus, the APA itself provides that APA provisions do not apply to this situation and cannot be used to justify the Chiefs recusal and delegation.
Furthermore, if the Legislature had intended to allow re-cusal and delegation, it would have provided for it. The Legislature knows how to provide for delegation of authority by agency heads—RCW 28A.300.120 (Superintendent of Public Instruction); RCW 41.05.021 (Administrator, State Health Care Authority); RCW 43.20A.110 (Secretary, Department of Social and Health Services); RCW 43.21A-*515.090 (Director, Department of Ecology); RCW 43.24.024 (Director, Department of Licensing); RCW 43.30.170 (Supervisor, Department of Natural Resources); RCW 43.41.060 (Director, Office of Financial Management); RCW 43.51.061 (Parks and Recreation Commission); RCW 43.60A.060 (Director, Department of Veterans Affairs); RCW 43.70.040 (Secretary, Department of Health); RCW 43.300.040 (Commission, Department of Fish and Wildlife); RCW 43.330.040 (Director, Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development); RCW 72.09.050 (Secretary, Department of Corrections); and RCW 82.01.080 (Director, Department of Revenue). RCW 43.17.040 gives the directors of several state agencies the power to delegate their authority to a chief assistant director in case of their absence, disability, or vacancy in office. The WSP is conspicuously omitted from the list of agencies. The maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” tells us that where a statute specifically designates the things upon which it operates, an inference exists that all things omitted were intentionally omitted. Thus, since the list of state agencies that have the power to delegate omits the WSP, we can infer that it was intentional and that the WSP chief does not have the authority. The Legislature did not grant the authority to the Chief of the WSP the power to delegate and there is no basis to infer that it intended to do so.
Furthermore, without express legislative action, the Chief does not have the power to delegate. Administrative agencies have only the express powers granted to them and those necessarily implied from the statutory grant of authority. Tuerk v. Department of Licensing, 123 Wn.2d 120, 124-25, 864 P.2d 1382 (1994). We know that the authority to delegate this function was not expressly granted from the Legislature. But, is it necessarily implied? The majority answers “yes,” but I think the answer must be “no” if the decision can be made under any circumstance by the Chief. The Chief argues that for her to decide the case would violate the appearance of fairness doctrine. But the doctrine of necessity would allow the Chief to act.
It is established by the great weight of authority that where *516a public officer, or an administrative board, or a legislative body—such as the city council—is given exclusive jurisdiction to conduct a hearing and determine whether an individual should or should not be removed from office, and no alternate or substitute is provided, disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the premises.
Kennett v. Levine, 50 Wn.2d 212, 219, 310 P.2d 244 (1957). The doctrine of necessity is also set forth in RCW 42.36.090, the statute pertaining to appearance of fairness. RCW 42.36.090 allows a person to continue to participate as a member of a decision-making body, even where there is a conflict of interest, providing that he or she declares the conflict prior to acting. Thus, her disqualification must yield to necessity. Accordingly, because the Chief could have made a decision based upon necessity, the power to delegate is not a “necessarily implied” power.
Sherman v. Moloney, 106 Wn.2d 873, 725 P.2d 966 (1986), applied the appearance of fairness doctrine to the Chief of the WSE In that case, the Chief sat as the presiding officer of the trial board. Sherman claimed that there was an appearance of fairness violation and that the Chief was biased against him. The Supreme Court found neither bias nor probable bias and let the decision stand. While this case was pending, the Legislature considered RCW 43.43 and made the following changes: (1) it removed the Chief from the trial board and replaced the Chief with an administrative law judge as a nonvoting, presiding officer; and (2) it amended the APA tó clarify that when the statutes pertaining to the State Fatrol are inconsistent with the APA, the State Patrol statutes will prevail. The Legislature left the Chief as the reviewing officer with the power to determine discipline. The Legislature did not provide a safety valve of a delegable authority in case of absence or disability. The Legislature had the opportunity to provide for delegation in case of bias and did not provide that mechanism.
The Legislature may have good reason to distinguish the WSP from other agencies in this respect—it is unique in state government. The Chief appoints all patrol officers, *517promotes them, determines their compensation, makes final decisions regarding their disability issues, and defines their rank and duties. This agency is exempt from any inconsistent provisions of the APA. If we judicially provide for delegation in a most important area such as this— punishment—then “delegation” will exist in any area the Chief wishes. Whether this is appropriate is not a judicial issue, it is a legislative problem that deserves study and a decision based on policy.
Therefore, I respectfully disagree with my colleagues as to whether we can judicially interpret that the Legislature meant to include delegation. I do not disagree that it should be provided. But, this is a legislative matter, not a judicial one. The case should be remanded back to the WSP for review and decision by the Chief.