Court Opinion

ID: 9398734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 00:00:37.671128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:35.929308
License: Public Domain

Case: 19-50562        Document: 00516770258             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                                                                            FILED
                                                                                        May 31, 2023
                                       No. 19-50562
                                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                            Clerk
   Russell Hope, Jr.,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Anthony J. Patrick; William A. Burroughs; Daniel
   Parker; Ibu Zaffa; Francisco Gonzalez; Marcus
   Dorman,

                                                                Defendants—Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                                  No. 6:17-CV-317

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Dennis and Haynes, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Russell Hope, Jr. appeals the district court’s Rule 41(b) dismissal of
   his § 1983 action.       Because the district court abused its discretion by
   concluding that lesser sanctions would not prompt diligent prosecution, we

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 19-50562      Document: 00516770258           Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/31/2023

                                     No. 19-50562

   vacate the order of dismissal and remand for the imposition of a lesser
   sanction and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                          I
          Hope, an inmate in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal
   Justice (TDCJ), filed a pro se § 1983 action against several TDCJ officials
   after he was allegedly assaulted during transport between correctional
   facilities. The district court appointed counsel to represent Hope, and Hope
   diligently pursued his claims, submitting numerous discovery requests and
   deposing nine witnesses. The court ultimately set trial for 9:00 a.m. on
   February 4, 2019. Shortly before trial, TDCJ transferred Hope to the Hughes
   Unit, a correctional facility thirty-eight miles from Waco, where the trial was
   to take place. Coincidentally, the Hughes Unit is the facility where the
   alleged assault underlying Hope’s suit occurred. Hope asserts that, in the
   days before trial, Hughes Unit officers taunted him and withheld his meals in
   retaliation for the lawsuit.
          On the morning of trial, TDCJ officers prepared to strip search Hope
   before transporting him to court. When the guards placed hand restraints on
   Hope, he pulled the restraints and key into his cell, covered his cell door with
   a mattress, damaged the key by scraping it on the floor, and flushed the key
   down the toilet. After removing the mattress and relinquishing the hand
   restraints, Hope repeatedly told the guards that he had flushed the key and
   did not have it in his possession. Hope repeatedly explained that he took the
   key because an officer had withheld his meals the previous day. After
   approximately thirty minutes, guards removed Hope from his cell without
   the need for force. As officers escorted Hope to the strip search cage, Hope
   lay on the ground for about thirty seconds before complying with orders to
   stand up and submitting to a strip search.

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          After the search, Hope received bench warrant clothes but refused to
   wear them, tearing the provided shirt. Officers brought a different shirt,
   explaining that the garment was merely for transport and that Hope’s
   attorneys would provide him with court-appropriate clothing. Hope agreed
   to wear the shirt. Officers ordered Hope to approach the body office security
   scanning (BOSS) device, which detects metal in human bodies. Hope
   initially refused to undergo a BOSS scan but relented after approximately
   fifteen minutes. The scan revealed no metal, and officers escorted Hope to
   the transport van without further incident. TDCJ personnel did not file a
   report regarding problems with Hope’s transport.
          Hope arrived at the district court before his trial began, during jury
   selection for another matter. However, the United States Marshals did not
   permit Hope to enter the courthouse after TDCJ officers reported that Hope
   had likely swallowed the key to his hand restraints and needed to be taken to
   the hospital for an x-ray. Accordingly, the district court postponed Hope’s
   trial. The TDCJ officials then filed a Rule 41 motion to dismiss, which the
   court granted, concluding that Hope engaged in contumacious conduct
   warranting dismissal of his claims with prejudice. The district court denied
   Hope’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, and Hope timely appealed.
                                                II
          On appeal, Hope contends that the district court erred in dismissing
   his § 1983 suit for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 41(b).1 This court typically reviews Rule 41(b) dismissals for
   abuse of discretion.2 Dismissal with prejudice is, however, “an extreme
   sanction,” reserved for cases in which “the plaintiff’s conduct has

          1
              See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
          2
              See Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992).

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   threatened the integrity of the judicial process” such that “the court [has] no
   choice but to deny that plaintiff its benefits.”3 We affirm dismissals with
   prejudice only when (1) “the district court has expressly determined that
   lesser sanctions would not prompt diligent prosecution, or the record shows
   that the district court employed lesser sanctions that proved to be futile” and
   (2) “there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the
   plaintiff.”4 In most cases affirming dismissals with prejudice, moreover, we
   have discerned “at least one of three aggravating factors: (1) delay caused by
   [the] plaintiff himself and not his attorney; (2) actual prejudice to the
   defendant; or (3) delay caused by intentional conduct.”5
                                               A
           Before sanctioning a party via dismissal with prejudice, the district
   court must “expressly determine[] that lesser sanctions would not prompt
   diligent prosecution, or the record [must show] that the district court
   employed lesser sanctions that proved to be futile.”6 In other words, the
   district court should “find . . . that dismissal with prejudice is the least
   sanction which would serve the ends of justice.”7 Hope contends that the
   district court abused its discretion by failing to consider adequately lesser
   sanctions, such as issuing a warning or permitting Hope to testify by video,

           3
            McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks
   omitted) (quoting Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1982)).
           4
               Berry, 975 F.2d at 1191.
           5
            Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Price v. McGlathery, 792 F.2d 472,
   474 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)).
           6
               Id.
           7
               McNeal, 842 F.2d at 794.

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   because this was Hope’s first instance of delay, and Hope had represented
   that he would not contribute to further delays.
            In its order of dismissal, the district court concluded that lesser
   sanctions would not prompt diligent prosecution. The court noted that
   assessing fines and costs would not be appropriate because Hope’s attorneys
   represent him on a pro bono basis. The court also “considered issuing a
   warning” but ultimately found this potential sanction ineffectual. The court
   reasoned that Hope’s conduct, was “not the type of behavior that one would
   expect from a plaintiff who truly wished to diligently prosecute his case,”
   because “[t]he [c]ourt gave Hope what he wanted—a day in court to have his
   claims heard—yet he chose to willfully disobey orders and resist authority
   despite knowing that his actions might have negative consequences on his
   case.”
            The district court’s determination that lesser sanctions would not
   suffice is not plausible in light of the entire record.8                 First, as Hope
   emphasizes, this was his first instance of noncompliance. It is undisputed
   that both before and after appointment of counsel, Hope vigorously pursued
   his claims by conducting substantial discovery, meeting deadlines, and
   attending conferences. Thus, we agree with Hope that “the district court
   erred by declining to recognize the significant commitment Hope had
   displayed in prosecuting his case prior to the morning of trial.” Second,
   video taken on the morning of trial, which the district court reviewed prior to
   dismissal, depicts Hope’s clear intention to appear before the court and

            8
             See United States v. Wilcox, 631 F.3d 740, 747 (5th Cir. 2011) (“A district court
   abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law or ‘if it bases its decision on a clearly
   erroneous assessment of the evidence.’” (quoting United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303,
   338-39 (5th Cir. 2002))); Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985)
   (explaining “[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the
   record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it”).

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   further belies the conclusion that Hope did not wish to pursue his case.
   Finally, the district court does not appear to have considered Hope’s
   explanation for his behavior on the morning of trial. In an affidavit, Hope
   explained that his defiant conduct was a response to Hughes Unit guards
   withholding his food in retaliation for the lawsuit. These allegations do not
   excuse Hope’s behavior. But they nonetheless indicate that, by misbehaving
   during transport, Hope meant to antagonize TDCJ officers, not avoid his
   trial. Given the unique circumstances surrounding Hope’s nonappearance
   at trial, as well as Hope’s repeated assurances that he will not contribute to
   further delay, the record does not support the district court’s determination
   that lesser sanctions would not spur diligent prosecution. Thus, although the
   district court expressly found lesser sanctions inadequate, the court based
   this conclusion o a clearly erroneous view of the evidence and thereby abused
   its discretion.9
                                                   B
          We turn next to the other prong of our Rule 41(b) analysis, which
   requires (1) “a clear record of delay” or (2) “contumacious conduct by a
   plaintiff” to support a dismissal with prejudice.10
                                                   1
          The district court perceived no clear record of delay warranting
   dismissal.        Nor do we.           Our caselaw recognizes that the requisite
   “delay . . . must be longer than just a few months; instead, the delay must be
   characterized by significant periods of total inactivity.”11 Delay justifying

          9
               See Wilcox, 631 F.3d at 747.
          10
               Berry, 975 F.2d at 1191.
          11
             Millan v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 326-27 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal
   quotation marks omitted) (quoting McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1988)).

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   dismissal with prejudice is thus usually “egregious and sometimes
   outrageous.”12
           Here, no such delay occurred. Throughout the litigation, Hope met
   all deadlines and appeared at status and pretrial conferences. Regarding the
   day of trial, Hope admits that his behavior did slow the transport process that
   morning. But, as the TDCJ officials concede, Hope’s outbursts added a mere
   forty-five minutes or so to his transport. That minimal lag is nowhere near
   the lengthy delays we have required to uphold other dismissals and is not a
   “significant period[] of total inactivity.”13 Moreover, the postponement of
   Hope’s trial does not give rise to a clear record of delay justifying dismissal.
   The parties dispute whether Hope is to blame for the postponement. But any
   resulting delay, irrespective of its cause, was too brief to merit dismissal with
   prejudice.14 Because trial could have proceeded once security concerns over
   the missing handcuff key were allayed, “we cannot assume from the record
   before us that [Hope] would have remained unprepared for significant
   periods.”15
                                                  2
           Instead of delay, the district court based its dismissal on contumacious
   conduct. We define contumacious conduct as “stubborn resistance to
   authority.”16 When assessing a litigant’s contumaciousness, this court has

           12
              Id. at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669
   F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1982)).
           13
             Millan, 546 F.3d at 327; see also McNeal, 842 F.2d at 791 (“[D]elay which
   warrants dismissal with prejudice must be longer than just a few months . . . .”).
           14
                See McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787 at 791 (5th Cir. 1988).
           15
                Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
           16
                Id. at 792 (quoting John v. La., 828 F.2d 1129, 1132 (5th Cir. 1987)); ROA.1439.

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   also considered “whether the facts expose an obstinate disrespect for the
   judicial process.”17
           Hope’s case is dissimilar to our contumacious conduct precedent in
   which litigants repeatedly refused to comply with court orders or appear at
   scheduled proceedings.18 It is undisputed that throughout the litigation,
   Hope vigorously pursued his claims, conducting substantial discovery,
   meeting all deadlines, and appearing at status and pretrial conferences.
   Without a pattern of prior misconduct, Hope’s insubordination on the
   morning of trial is the only transgression potentially meriting dismissal.
           The district court found that Hope engaged in contumacious conduct
   that morning when he “willfully refused to have hand restraints placed on his
   person,” “pull[ed] said restraints into his cell,” “destroy[ed] the key by
   flushing it down the toilet,” and was generally “uncooperative and disruptive
   throughout the entire transport process by repeatedly refusing to comply
   with orders.” That behavior clearly demonstrates “stubborn resistance to
   authority.”19 The question, then, is whether “the facts expose an obstinate
   disrespect for the judicial process.”20 We hesitate to conclude that Hope’s

           17
              Id.; see also Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that our
   decisions affirming Rule 41(b) dismissals with prejudice involve “cases where the
   plaintiff’s conduct has threatened the integrity of the judicial process . . . leaving the court
   no choice but to deny that plaintiff its benefits”).
           18
              See, e.g., Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 443 (5th Cir.
   2016) (contumacious conduct occurred when the plaintiff engaged in a pattern of “applying
   for IFP status and then paying the filing fee rather than complying with an order to provide
   verifiable information in support of the IFP application”); Hornbuckle v. Arco Oil & Gas
   Co., 732 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 1984) (contumacious conduct occurred when an
   attorney moved to continue trial on multiple occasions, then scheduled two overlapping
   trials).
           19
                McNeal, 842 F.2d at 792 (quoting John, 828 F.2d at 1132).
           20
                Id.

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   intransigence, which occurred entirely within the prison and targeted solely
   TDCJ officers, meets this standard. Unlike other Rule 41(b) plaintiffs, Hope
   expressed no such resistance toward the court.21 The record supports a
   conclusion that Hope fully intended to appear at trial, and did in fact arrive
   at the courthouse, but was prevented from entering after TDCJ officers
   incorrectly informed court personnel that Hope had swallowed the handcuff
   key.
           Ultimately, however, we need not decide whether Hope obstinately
   disrespected the judicial process.                 Even if Hope’s conduct was
   contumacious, the district court nonetheless failed to consider lesser
   sanctions adequately before dismissing Hope’s claims with prejudice.
                                                III
           We express no opinion as to whether Hope’s case presents
   “aggravating factors” such as intentional delay caused by a party (not his
   attorney) or actual prejudice to the opposing party.22 The district court’s
   erroneous conclusion regarding the futility of lesser sanctions requires us to
   vacate the order of dismissal regardless of any exacerbating circumstances.23

           21
               See, e.g., Sampson v. Giles, 410 F. App’x 823, 824-25 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
   (unpublished) (concluding that an incarcerated § 1983 plaintiff engaged in contumacious
   conduct when he “state[d] multiple times that he was not going to court” and “could not
   be transported to court because he refused to accept prison issued toiletries and to submit
   to a strip search”).
           22
                Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992).
           23
             See id. (explaining that “[w]e will affirm dismissals with prejudice for failure to
   prosecute only when . . . the district court has expressly determined that lesser sanctions
   would not prompt diligent prosecution”).

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                                                IV
           Nor do we address Hope’s contentions regarding the effect of
   dismissal on his due process rights.24 Our conclusion that dismissal was an
   inappropriate sanction here renders moot any due process implications
   resulting from that dismissal.
                                        *        *         *
           For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the order of dismissal and
   REMAND for the imposition of a lesser sanction and further proceedings
   consistent with this opinion.

           24
               See Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 632, 633 (1962) (explaining that, in the
   context of Rule 41(b) dismissals, “[t]he adequacy of notice and hearing . . . turns, to a
   considerable extent, on the knowledge which the circumstances show such party may be
   taken to have of the consequences of his own conduct,” but also noting that “the
   availability of a corrective remedy such as is provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
   60(b)—which authorizes the reopening of cases in which final orders have been inadvisedly
   entered—renders the lack of prior notice of less consequence.”).

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