Court Opinion

ID: 9530016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:56:23.333789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:58.662594
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Judge NEY.
In this civil action premised on allegations of sexual assault or sexual offense committed against a child, the trial court concluded that the time for bringing the action, as provided in § 13-80-103.7, C.R.S.1998, had run. Accordingly, it entered summary judgment for defendant, James J. Parks. Plaintiff, Marty W. Sailsbery, appeals, and we reverse and remand with directions.
Plaintiff filed her complaint in March 1996 and an amended complaint in May 1996, asserting claims of assault and battery, outrageous conduct, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. She alleged that defendant, her neighbor, doctor, and surrogate father, had sexually molested her when she was a child. She alleged that the conduct occurred between 1965 and 1972, when she was under the age of 18, but that she first recalled and discovered the acts and her resulting injuries beginning in October 1994. She further alleged that prior to that time she “suffered from disabilities and emotional inabilities, all preventing earlier acknowledgement.”
The parties have stipulated that defendant is incapacitated for purposes of presenting a defense.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant pursuant to §§ 13-80-103.7(3.5) and 13-80-103.7(3.7), C.R.S.1998. We agree.
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted only upon a clear showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dominguez Reservoir Corp. v. Feil, 854 P.2d 791 (Colo.1993). Review of a summary judgment order is de novo. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board, 901 P.2d 1251 (Colo.1995).
Section 13-80-108, C.R.S.1998, provides that a cause of action accrues on the date “both the injury and its cause are known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” (emphasis added)
Section 13-80-103.7, C.R.S.1998, provides in relevant part:
(1) Notwithstanding any other statute of limitations ... any civil action based on a sexual assault or a sexual ojfense against a child shall be commenced within six years after a disability has been removed for a person under disability, as such term is defined in subsection (3.5) of this section, or within six years after a cause of action accrues, whichever occurs later, and not thereafter. ...
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(3.5)(a) For the purpose of this section, “person under disability” means any person who is a minor under eighteen years of age, a mental incompetent, or a person under other legal disability and who does not have a legal guardian. “Person under disability” also includes ... a victim of a sexual offense against a child ... and where the victim is psychologically or emotionally unable to acknowledge the assault or offense and the harm resulting therefrom. For the purpose of this subsection (3.5), “special relationship” means a relationship between the victim and the perpetrator of the sexual assault which is a *139confidential, trust-based relationship, such as ... doctor-patient ... or familial relationship. It is the intent of the general assembly to leave in place the six-year limitation for adults subjected to a sexual assault except in the situations described in this paragraph (a) in which the victim is in a special relationship with the perpetrator of the assault. In the circumstances in which a victim is in a special relationship with the perpetrator of the assault or is a victim of a sexual offense against a child ... and where the victim is psychologically or emotionally unable to acknowledge the assault or offense and the harm resulting therefrom, the six-year limitation shall be tolled until the disability is removed....
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(3.7) An action may not be brought pursuant to subsection (3.5) of this section if the defendant is deceased or is incapacitated to the extent that the defendant is incapable of rendering a defense to the action.
(emphasis added)
Plaintiff contends that her cause of action against the defendant accrued under § 13-80-108 when she discovered or should have discovered the cause of her injuries, which she claims, based on her affidavit, was not until late 1994. The applicable statute of limitations under § 13 — 80-103.7(1) is six years from accrual or six years after removal of disability, as defined in § 13-80-103.7(3.5).
Defendant argues, and the trial court agreed, that, because defendant himself is incapacitated to the extent that he is incapable of defending this action, the tolling provision of § 13-80-103.7(3.5) is inapplicable. See § 13-80-103.7(3.7), C.R.S.1998. Indeed, plaintiff now concedes that the tolling provision is inapplicable and we agree.
Nevertheless, despite such concession, plaintiff maintains that summary judgment was improperly entered because there was no showing that her cause of action accrued more than six years prior to commencement of the suit. We agree that there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to when plaintiffs cause of action accrued.
As noted, under § 13-80-103.7(1), C.R.S. 1998, a civil action for sexual assault against a child must be brought within six years of the later of the date the cause of action accrued or the date the disability was removed.
In opposing defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the trial court, plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which she averred that it was not until “the end of 1994, through 1995 and well into 1996 that she became aware that she had been traumatized by [defendant],” that the trauma had caused her “long-term psychological injury,” and that the cause of her injury was the defendant and his wrongful actions toward her “as a minor child.”
Based on this affidavit, plaintiff argues that her cause of action did not accrue any earlier than in 1994 because it was not until then that she became aware of both her injury and its cause.
In its summary judgment ruling, the trial court did not determine ivhen plaintiffs action accrued. Instead, it concluded that the general accrual provision, § 13-80-108, “does not apply” and that § 13-80-103.7 exclusively governs the limitation period for claims based on alleged sexual assault of a child. We disagree with that conclusion.
The trial court reasoned that plaintiffs complaint fell squarely within the specific language in § 13-80-103.7(3.5), C.R.S.1998, which allows for tolling while “the victim is psychologically or emotionally unable to acknowledge” the alleged sexual misconduct. Reasoning that because § 13-80-103.7(3.5) is a statute addressing the specific and unique factual circumstances presented in this case, the court applied it, rather than the general accrual provision language found in § 13-80-108 and the specific statute of limitations provisions of § 13-80-103.7(1).
Section 13-80-103.7 does not purport 'to define when an action for sexual assault on a child accrues. Rather, it establishes the six-year limitation period and provides that the period runs from accrual or from the date of removal of disability, as specifically defined in § 13-80-103.7(3.5). We conclude that the general provision of § 13-80-108 does apply, *140and that the affidavit of plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact as to when she knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of both her injury and its cause.
Defendant relies on Cassidy v. Smith, 817 P.2d 555 (Colo.App.1991), a decision which preceded and apparently prompted the enactment of § 13-80-103. In Cassidy, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that because of the actions of their “surrogate father” they were prevented from divulging his sexual relationship with them when they were minors until they were confronted by their mother and commenced therapy.
Unlike in this case, however, in Cassidy it was established by affidavits and was essentially undisputed that the plaintiffs knew of both their injuries and the cause of those injuries more than six years before the action was filed. The record here simply does not support such a conclusion at this stage.
Accordingly, because there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to when plaintiff knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of both her injuries and their cause, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judge KAPELKE concurs.
Judge ROY dissents.