Court Opinion

ID: 9489643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:20:23.327949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:38.097413
License: Public Domain

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
The military may no longer discharge homosexual servicemembers simply because they are homosexual. Instead, federal law authorizes the dismissal of homosexual ser-vicemembers only if they engage or intend to engage in prohibited homosexual conduct, or if they demonstrate a propensity to do so. The statute, however, blurs the line between status and conduct by making a servicemem-ber’s admission that he or she is a homosexual sufficient grounds for presuming that the servicemember is likely to or intends to engage in prohibited conduct. If this presumption were irrebuttable, the statutory scheme would raise serious First Amendment problems. Accordingly, it is our job to review the record with great care to ensure that Captain Richenberg had a proper opportunity to rebut the presumption. After reviewing the evidence submitted to the Board of Inquiry, it is my view that Captain Richenberg met his burden and should not have been discharged.
The First Amendment prohibits the government from penalizing people because of their thoughts and feelings. Indeed, “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1248, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). Captain Richenberg admitted that he is a homosexual but also stated under oath that he did not intend to violate military law by acting upon those feelings. To assume automatically that he would is to disadvantage him simply for who he is and not for what he has done or will do. The First Amendment does not allow the government to make this assumption without at least affording Captain Richenberg some realistic opportunity to show that the assumption is erroneous in his particular case.
An irrebuttable presumption would also violate the First Amendment by penalizing servicemembers solely for the content of their speech. It is one thing to use a person’s speech as evidence to help establish an element of some offense. It would be quite another matter, however, to presume conclusively from Captain Richenberg’s expression that he intended to or was likely to violate military regulations when he has expressly disavowed such an intent. Such a scheme would target only speech and would thus violate the First Amendment absent some compelling justification for the restriction.
The propensity presumption is supposed to be rebuttable. See Brief of Appellees 40.9 *265Given that excessive deference to the presumption by the Board of Inquiry would violate the First Amendment, I would review the record de novo to ensure that the Board of Inquiry gave Captain Richenberg a fair chance to rebut the presumption. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1959-60, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (in First Amendment cases, appellate courts should review de novo questions of fact that are tried to a judge or jury).
It is undisputed that Captain Richenberg told several people that he was a homosexual. He swore, however, that he had no intention of acting upon his orientation in violation of military regulations and that he was “very capable” of abstaining from prohibited conduct. Appellant’s App. 296-97. The record presents many reasons to believe him and insufficient reason to doubt him. Captain Richenberg appears to have been an outstanding Air Force officer. His Officer Performance Reports (OPRs) are full of praise for his professionalism, dedication, and leadership abilities, and he received many medals over the course of his Air Force career. A characteristic report described him as “the most professional and highly motivated officer I have had on my crew.” Id. at 375. Another called him the reporter’s “most professional officer!” Id. at 869. He flew 25 combat missions in Operation Desert Storm. Brief of Appellant 12.
Four fellow officers and friends also testified on Captain Richenberg’s behalf at the Board of Inquiry, praising his abilities and performance. All four attested to his honesty, integrity, and discipline, as well as to his dedication and loyalty to the Air Force. One of these officers, Captain Yaphe, testified that he had told a fellow officer a month before the hearing that he had no reason to believe that Captain Richenberg would not abstain from homosexual conduct if he said he would. Appellant’s App. 263.
The government introduced no evidence that called any of this testimony into question. Nor did the Board of Inquiry explain its finding that Captain Richenberg had failed to rebut the presumption. In fact, the Board of Inquiry devoted only a single line to the issue. (“The Board finds that the respondent does have a propensity to engage in homosexual acts.”) Id. at 451. As things stand, we do not even know whether the Board found that Captain Richenberg intended to violate military regulations, that he was likely to do so, or both. Without an explanation we are forced to rely upon those sources that are available to us, without the aid, for example, of the Board’s evaluation of Captain Richenberg’s demeanor at the hearing. It may be that the Board simply did not find Captain Richenberg to be credible. If so, it should say so and explain why, for it may also be that the Board impermissibly based its decision upon an assumption that homosexuals in general will not be able to abstain from prohibited conduct. Cf. Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that ALJs who reject disability claimants’ subjective complaints of pain must make express credibility finding and give reasons for disbelieving the testimony).
The Air Force Board of Review provided more explanation for the decision, but its reasoning is no more convincing. It relied upon Captain Richenberg’s admission that he was physically attracted to men. Appellant’s App. 458. This admission adds nothing to his admission of homosexuality. Were it enough to justify the Board’s finding, the presumption would be effectively irrebuttable and, therefore, unconstitutional.
The Board of Review also discounted the testimony of Captain Riehenberg’s character witnesses because “none of [his] witnesses was asked about [his] behavior or to opine as to his propensity to commit homosexual acts.” Ibid. Character witnesses in such proceedings will in general be able to testify, as Captain Yaphe did, only to a servicemem-ber’s sense of honor, duty, and discipline. Even if they cannot “opine” specifically as to his sexual propensities, they can say whether *266he is the kind of man who does what he promises to do. The record establishes that Captain Richenberg is that kind of man.
I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand "with directions to grant Captain Richenberg’s motion for summary judgment. In the alternative, I would remand the case to the District Court with instructions for it to remand to the Board of Inquiry for additional explanation of its decision. I express no view on the large constitutional questions discussed in this Court’s opinion.

. In addition to pointing out that the presumption is rebuttable, the government invokes the *265customary deference that courts give to military judgments on the need to restrict certain types of speech. See Brief of Appellees 43. The government, however, does not attempt to justify an irrebuttable presumption, and this dissent does not challenge the validity of a properly applied rebuttable presumption. Moreover, deference to military judgment does not extend to the application of law to fact, in an area in which a military tribunal carnes no special expertise.