Court Opinion

ID: 9909280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 21:02:31.249593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:39.190731
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/12/23 T.R. v. Superior Court CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 T.R.,
           Petitioner,
 v.
 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF                                                    A168809
 SOLANO COUNTY,
                                                                          (Solano County
           Respondent;
                                                                          Super. Ct. No. J45386)
 SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH &
 SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
           Real Party in Interest.

         T.R. (Father) petitions this court for extraordinary relief after the
juvenile court terminated reunification services with his son, Alexander R.,
and set a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26
(all statutory references are to this code). He contends that the evidence does
not support the juvenile court’s findings and that the court abused its
discretion in reducing his visitation with Alexander. We deny the petition on
the merits.
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jurisdiction and Disposition
         Alexander tested positive for methamphetamine after he was born in
November 2021. His mother (Mother) had not received prenatal care, and

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she had no provisions for Alexander. She denied ever using drugs, and
suggested the positive methamphetamine test might have been the result of
drinking an herbal tea given her by a neighbor. She claimed not to have
known she was pregnant; however, she later made the contradictory
statement that in August, she was told she was 22 weeks pregnant, a
statement consistent with her medical records.
      Mother initially denied having other children, but when questioned
acknowledged she had two older children, neither of them in her custody.
One lived with his father and Mother had not seen him for about two years.
Another had been the subject of an earlier dependency proceeding, during
which Mother failed to reunify and her parental rights were terminated.
      Father had a 12-year-old son (Brother), who lived with Father and
Mother. Father said he used no substances and he was unaware of Mother’s
drug use. He did not know Mother was pregnant before he took her to the
emergency room.
      A home visit raised no safety concerns, and Brother appeared happy
and healthy.
      Mother and Father were told they were scheduled for drug testing, but
they did not appear for the scheduled tests. Minor was detained and placed
in a foster home.
      The Solano County Health and Welfare Services Department (the
department) filed a dependency petition under section 300 on November 12,
2021. At the March 30, 2022 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the
juvenile court found true allegations as to Mother that she and Alexander
tested positive for methamphetamines at the time of his birth, she had
untreated mental health and substance abuse disorders, she had not received
prenatal care, she had no provisions to care for Alexander, and she had failed

                                      2
to reunify with an older child and her parental rights were terminated. As to
Father, the juvenile court found true that Alexander was at substantial risk
of physical harm and/or neglect because Father was unaware that Mother
was using drugs despite living in the same house, that Father continued to
live with Mother, and that he worked full-time outside the home, preventing
him from protecting Alexander from Mother’s drug use.
Six- and 12-Month Review
      The juvenile court retained Alexander in foster care and ordered
reunification services for Mother and Father, including supervised visitation
twice a week, a psychiatric evaluation for Mother, and drug and alcohol
testing for Mother and Father. Mother’s case plan required her to participate
in counseling, a parenting education program, and substance abuse services.
Father’s case plan included participating in a parenting education program.
The parents’ case plans also required them to provide a stable and safe home
environment, free of substance abuse, for Alexander.
      Before the scheduled September 2022 six-month status review, the
department reported that Mother had completed a psychiatric/psychological
evaluation, but she had not yet begun mental health services. She had
completed a parenting education program. She had begun but failed to
complete an outpatient substance abuse program, she had missed 11 of 20
scheduled drug tests (three of the missed tests due to testing positive for
COVID-19), and she had tested positive for alcohol once. Father had
completed a parenting education program. He was scheduled to drug test 21
times; he missed six tests (two forgiven because of a COVID-19 diagnosis)
and tested positive for marijuana 11 times. He said he used marijuana after
work to relax and to relieve back pain. Mother and Father regularly visited

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Alexander together, and the visits went well. The visits had recently been
changed from supervised to monitored.
      The six-month review hearing was continued multiple times, and it
ultimately became the 12-month review hearing.
      According to a February 2023 status review report, Mother’s “mood and
affect [had] become erratic” and she provided a letter that she claimed,
falsely, was from her therapist attesting to her participation in therapy. She
reported, also falsely, that she had completed a virtual outpatient treatment
program and that she had recently become a registered nurse. She had
missed all but two of her random drug tests between August 2022 and
February 2023, some of which were excused because she was out of the
county. Of the two samples she provided, one, in January, was positive for
methamphetamine and the other, in February, was diluted and could not be
properly tested. Mother said she was not aware of using methamphetamine,
and claimed she was exposed while smoking marijuana with Father.
      Father continued to use marijuana, but he had agreed not to do so
while inside or while in the presence of his children. Father had been asked
to submit to drug testing, and until he did so and produced a negative result,
the department was requiring visits to be supervised.
      The parents had been generally consistent in visiting Alexander once or
twice a week, with a few interruptions due to illness, a trip out of state to
visit Father’s relatives, and a sudden change of residence due to unpaid rent.
The social worker had suggested increasing visits to one visit with both
parents and two individual visits per week, but Mother and Father did not
agree to this plan. Father would not increase the visits unless Mother was
also present, and he did not think there was a need for a parenting coach or
social worker to be present. During visits, Father played with Alexander, but

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did not take initiative with such tasks as feeding him, soothing him, and
changing his diaper. When the social worker pointed this out, Father
“explained he wanted to allow the mother to bond and ‘not do everything’
himself.” Mother was “observed during visits to have minimal engagement,
often instead watching [Father] playing with Alexander.”
      On January 29, 2023, the social worker received a message from
someone posing as a child welfare representative cancelling a scheduled visit.
      The parents had not prepared their home or set up the provisions they
would need to care for a young child; they said they would get the house
ready when Alexander came home. Father acknowledged that Mother’s
behavior caused concern, but he was not willing to ask her to leave the home
so Alexander could live with him.
      At the February 27, 2023 review hearing, the juvenile court continued
reunification services and set the matter for an 18-month review hearing on
July 13.
18-Month Review
      After additional continuances, a contested 18-month review hearing
took place on September 27, 2023. The department recommended that the
juvenile court terminate reunification services and set a selection and
implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
      The department reported that Mother had been diagnosed with a
personality disorder with turbulent and histrionic features, and with trauma
and stressor-related disorder. She had attended therapy sessions only
sporadically, and there was no confirmation that she had done so since April.
She had been inconsistent in attending monthly visits with the social worker
to discuss her case plan objectives.

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      Mother had missed most of the random drug tests scheduled during the
reporting period without a valid reason. She delayed for several weeks
completing a hair strand test, stating she needed time for “preparation”;
when the hair strand test was taken in September 2023, it was positive for
methamphetamine. Yet, Mother declined a referral to drug dependency court
and had not attended an outpatient substance abuse service program,
although she said she was open to doing so. She underwent a substance
abuse assessment in May 2023, but because she acknowledged using
substances only twice, in November 2021 and January 2023, the counselor
who conducted the assessment could refer her only to a behavioral health
program rather than substance abuse treatment. Mother reported,
apparently falsely, that she had contacted a substance abuse treatment
center and was waiting to hear about whether a space was available. Also
apparently falsely, she said in April that she made arrangements to meet
with a substance abuse counselor, but that he failed to show up for the
meeting and later told her he had cancelled it.
      Father had not provided any drug tests since February or March of
2023, when a test came back positive only for marijuana. He kept his
marijuana in a location that could be accessible to a small child. Although he
said he would lock it into a higher place, he had not allowed the social worker
into the home to find out where the marijuana was now stored. Despite
Father’s earlier agreement not to use marijuana inside the home or in his
children’s presence, the department had been told that Alexander smelled of
marijuana after visits with Father and that the smell of marijuana came
from the home when Alexander was picked up after a visit.
      Mother’s visits with Alexander were supervised. Father was allowed
unsupervised visits in the family’s home, but he was not authorized to

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supervise Mother’s visits. Mother was expected to submit her work schedule
to verify that she would not be present in the home when Alexander visited
with Father. On one occasion, the social worker learned that Mother was not
at work when she said she was scheduled to work. On that day, the couple’s
car was parked along the building’s back wall rather than its assigned
parking space, giving the false impression that Mother was out and about
with the car. As a result, Father’s visits reverted to being supervised.
Alexander continued to enjoy his visits with Father. By the time of the
review hearing, Father was receiving monitored visits.
      Although Father had complied with his case plan, the department did
not support returning Alexander to him because the social worker believed he
had not shown he could be a primary parent to Alexander, and he was
unwilling to separate from Mother.
      Father testified that he believed Alexander would be safe in his care.
He said he would “never leave [Alexander’s] side or leave him alone with my
wife.” He also expressed willingness to have Mother leave the home and go
into an inpatient treatment program, as long as he could be assured that the
bills would be paid. Father testified that both he and Mother were currently
receiving unemployment benefits, that they would not be able to support two
households, and that Mother would be homeless if she had to leave the family
home.
      Father said that he had no trouble meeting Alexander’s needs during
unsupervised visits: he fed him, changed his diaper, and played with him,
and Alexander was never hurt while under his care. He had successfully
cared for Brother as a single parent after the death of his first wife when
Brother was eight. He said that he and Mother were a team and she had
helped him to raise Brother.

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      Father testified that he had not known Mother was pregnant, and he
was surprised Alexander tested positive for methamphetamines at birth
because Mother never used drugs in front of him or showed any signs of being
on drugs.
      The juvenile court concluded that reasonable services had been offered
and that there was no substantial probability Alexander could be returned to
his parents by the time of a 24-month review hearing. It relied for this
conclusion on the facts that Mother had not tested for drugs as required; that
she had been using drugs recently; that she was not participating in
substance abuse counseling or treatment or in mental health therapy; that
Father did not know that Mother was using drugs or when she used them;
and that Father would not be able to ensure he was never away from
Alexander in the home. Those factors, the court concluded, posed a
substantial risk to Alexander. The court therefore terminated reunification
services and set the matter for a hearing under sections 366.26 and 366.3.
      The juvenile court also explained that if the parents wished to be
successful in a petition to change the court’s order under section 388, Mother
would need to leave the home, at least temporarily, and that a residential
treatment program would be helpful. Father asked to have his visitation
remain at the current level of once a week for three hours, but the court
reduced visits to one-hour visits twice a month, with the department to have
discretion to increase the visits.
                                 DISCUSSION
   I. Substantial Evidence of Detriment
      Father contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial
court’s finding that Alexander may not safely be returned to his care.

                                       8
      At the 18-month hearing, the juvenile court must order a child
returned to the parent or legal guardian’s custody unless it finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that return would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the child’s safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-
being. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) The court may order an additional six months
of reunification services if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent is making significant and consistent progress in establishing a safe
home for the child, and if it finds that there is a substantial probability the
child will be returned in that extended time or that reasonable services have
not been provided. (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) Otherwise, the juvenile court must
set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to establish a permanent plan for
the child. (§ 366.22 subd. (a)(3).)
      We review an order terminating reunification services and setting a
section 366.26 hearing for substantial evidence, reviewing the record in the
light most favorable to the juvenile court’s conclusion, and drawing all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support its findings. (Kevin R. v.
Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688–689.) We do not reweigh the
evidence or exercise our independent judgment, but rather determine
whether the record contains facts sufficient to support the juvenile court’s
findings. (Id. at p. 689.)
      Father contends the evidence before the juvenile court is insufficient to
support a finding that Alexander would be at substantial risk of detriment if
returned to his custody. He points to the evidence that he cared for Brother
with no ill effects; that he completed a parenting education class; that he
visited regularly with Alexander and that the visits went well; that he did not
test positive for any substances other than marijuana; that he drove Mother
to her drug testing when he had a car and was unemployed; that he

                                        9
encouraged Mother to participate in mental health services; and that he
expressed his intention never to leave Alexander alone with Mother. These
factors, he argues, establish that Alexander could safely be returned to his
care. And, he urges, Mother’s methamphetamine use is not detrimental to
Alexander because she has never used the drug in Alexander’s presence, and
Father has never been aware of her using it.
      On this record, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude Alexander
could not yet be returned to Father’s care safely. Mother was living in the
family home, and not only had she missed most of her drug tests, but a recent
test had been positive for methamphetamine, suggesting her use of the drug
was ongoing. She had not participated in substance abuse treatment, and in
fact had denied she used drugs except on two occasions when a test had been
positive. Despite her erratic behavior, she participated in therapy only
inconsistently and there is reason to think she falsified a letter regarding her
participation in counseling.
      Father professed willingness to ensure Mother was never left alone
with Alexander, but the juvenile court could reasonably doubt the practicality
of this suggestion. (See Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family
Services v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 692, 694, 699 [explaining,
in context of sexual abuse by one parent, “the very concept of monitored
visitation is fundamentally incompatible with around-the-clock in-home
contact that necessarily includes periods when the designated monitor will be
unable to perform his or her protective function”].) The evidence that Father
used marijuana inside the home or while Alexander was present despite
agreeing not to do so, and that Mother took steps to give the impression she
was out with the family’s car while a visit was taking place in the home,
could also reasonably give rise to concern that Father would not abide by his

                                       10
agreement to ensure Mother was never alone with Alexander. His ability to
protect Alexander from Mother is also called into question by his apparent
ignorance of her methamphetamine use despite their sharing a residence.
The evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings.
      Father contends that Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 1322, and In re L.C. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 646, lead to a
different result, but neither case assists him. The children in Jennifer A.
were placed in protective custody after their mother left them alone while she
went to work, apparently expecting their father to arrive soon to care for
them. Over the ensuing year and a half, she substantially complied with her
reunification plan, completed parenting classes and counseling, completed
drug treatment, and knew proper parenting behavior. (Jennifer A., at
p. 1326.) However, she tested positive for alcohol on one occasion, tested
positive for marijuana on at least one other, and missed or was unable to
produce a satisfactory specimen on a number of other occasions. (Id. at
pp. 1342–1343.) The appellate court concluded the mother had substantially
complied with the terms of her reunification plan. (Id. at p. 1343) The
positive and missed tests encompassed only about 11 out of 95 testing
obligations. (Ibid.) And, the court explained, the finding that she had not
made substantial progress toward alleviating the causes necessitating
placement was not supported by substantial evidence: there was no
indication of a direct link between alcohol or marijuana use and the mother’s
lapse in judgment in leaving the children alone, she had accepted
responsibility for leaving them, drug use was not a ground for the children’s
removal, and she had made substantial progress in court-ordered treatment
programs addressing the problems that caused the detention. (Id. at
pp. 1344–1345.) There was no evidence she had used any drugs other than

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alcohol and marijuana or that she used them in the children’s presence. (Id.
at p. 1345.) And she had been steadily employed in a responsible position
and there were no concerns about her current living conditions. (Id. at
pp. 1326, 1345.) The record thus did not support a finding that return to the
mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children’s well-
being. (Id. at p. 1346.)
      Here, in contrast, Mother’s use of methamphetamine while pregnant
was the cause of Alexander’s removal, and she had not adequately addressed
that issue: she missed most of her drug tests, she did not participate in drug
treatment, she did not comply with the mental health component of her case
plan, and she continued to use methamphetamine. Jennifer A. does not
establish that Alexander was not at substantial risk of detriment in Father’s
care while Mother lived in the home.
      Nor does In re L.C. lead to a different result. The appellate court there
reversed a jurisdictional order based on a legal guardian’s occasional
methamphetamine use outside the home, while the child was in the care of
another adult, explaining that drug use, without more, is an insufficient
ground for dependency jurisdiction. (In re L.C., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 650, 653–654.) Even before the jurisdictional hearing, the guardian
enrolled in a drug treatment class and tested on his own for controlled
substances, and he expressed his willingness to continue to test twice a week
for controlled substances. (Id. at pp. 650–651, 653.) Here, of course, there
was more than mere drug use; Mother used methamphetamine while
pregnant, resulting in Alexander being born exposed to the drug. Father
does not contend that was not an adequate basis for removing Alexander
from the home, and Mother’s continued presence in the home and the
practical difficulty of ensuring she is never alone with Alexander, coupled

                                       12
with her ongoing unaddressed drug use, her lack of honesty with the
department, and the evidence that she may have been in the home during an
unsupervised visit between Alexander and Father, adequately support the
juvenile court’s findings. (See In re K.B. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 603–604
[distinguishing In re L.C. on ground guardian there ensured child was
properly cared for and supervised by another adult and came clean and
reformed when he realized he could lose custody].)
      As explained in another case distinguishing In re L.C., “The obvious
and significant difference between L.C. and this case is that mother had the
poor judgment to use while she was pregnant and then failed to take the
proactive monitoring and treatment steps that L.C.’s guardian took.” (In re
E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 214.) Similarly here, the juvenile court
“could reasonably infer that [F]ather lived in an environment unsuitable for
children” and that he would not be able to protect Alexander from Mother’s
drug use. (Id. at p. 216.)
      In reaching this conclusion, we do not suggest the evidence that
Alexander would be at substantial risk of detriment in Father’s care is
overwhelming or that reasonable minds could not differ on this point. The
record suggests Father is a capable parent to Brother, and there were no
sustained allegations that any positive conduct on Father’s part caused a risk
of harm to Alexander. We are also troubled by the department’s apparent
criticism of Father for the loyalty preventing him from separating from his
wife, and its lack of expressed concern for the financial difficulty of
supporting two households or for where Mother would live if she left the
family’s home. Nonetheless, in light of the substantial evidence supporting
the juvenile court’s ruling, we will not disturb it.

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   II. Reduction in Visitation
      Father also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
reducing his visitation with Alexander to one-hour visits twice a month (from
the previous weekly three-hour visits), while giving the department
discretion to increase the visits. He argues that his visits with Alexander
went well and that continued weekly visits would allow him to maintain his
bond with Alexander, which would assist him if he brought a petition under
section 388 seeking additional reunification services or Alexander’s return.
      Once a juvenile court has terminated reunification services, “the
parents’ interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child are no
longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the
child for permanency and stability.’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 317; accord, In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) However, even
when reunification services are terminated and a hearing pursuant to section
366.26 is set, the court must continue to allow visitation unless it finds
visitation would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3); see In re
Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504.) “Meaningful visitation is
pivotal to the parent-child relationship, even after reunification services are
terminated.” (Hunter S., at p. 1504.) If a parent is to have any hope of
avoiding termination of parental rights by showing he has maintained
regular visitation and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship (see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), that parent must be able to
maintain regular contact with the child. (Hunter S., at pp. 1504–1505.) We
review the juvenile court’s order on visitation for abuse of discretion (In re
Emmanuel R. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465), disturbing the exercise of
discretion only if the court exceeded the bounds of reason (In re S.H. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557–1558).

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       At the 18-month hearing, Father asked to have visits maintained at
the current level. Counsel for the department objected, explaining that it
was department policy to reduce visits, that the matter would be transferred
to the adoptions unit, and that the department had “limited capacity to
increase those visits at this time.” The juvenile court ruled, “I would like to
see some progress from mom and dad in terms of father working on some of
the issues that remain outstanding. The court is going to reduce the visits to
twice a month; one hour per visit, with the department having discretion to
increase.” The court went on to explain to the parents that the case was “now
in your hands. . . . It now becomes really your time to work. . . . [A]nd do the
work to either increase the visits, based on what you’re able to show, and
maybe get additional services, if you’re able to be successful in a JV-180
[Request to Change Order]. But now it’s your work.”
      Thus, although the juvenile court reduced the frequency of visits, it did
not eliminate them or limit them to a mere token number, instead allowing
visits twice a month. And it encouraged Mother and Father to be honest
about her drug use, urged Mother to enter a residential program, and gave
the department discretion to increase visits if the couple made progress in
addressing the issues underlying the dependency. On this record, we see no
abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
                                 DISPOSITION
      We deny on the merits Father’s petition for extraordinary relief.
(§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h).) This decision is
final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
The request for a stay of the January 16, 2024 hearing is denied.

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                                        TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

T.R. v. Superior Court (A168809)

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