Court Opinion

ID: 9574458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:05:09.225737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:36.095919
License: Public Domain

*154CARLEY, Justice,
concurring.
In footnote 1 of its opinion, the majority states that “[ajlthough Morrell has died while this appeal was pending, the case is not moot, as the issue involved is capable of repetition yet evading review. [Cits.]” However, the majority does not further explain its conclusion that this case is not moot. I agree that this appeal has not been mooted by Morrell’s death, and write separately to set forth in more detail the reason why.
As a general rule, the death of a criminal defendant during the pendency of his appeal renders the case moot. Dorsey v. State, 272 Ga. 283 (528 SE2d 257) (2000). However, the State, rather than Morrell, is the appellant in this case. An appeal is not considered moot if the alleged error is capable of being repeated in future cases, but is not likely to be the subject of appellate review when that occurs. See Collins v. Lombard Corp., 270 Ga. 120, 121 (1) (508 SE2d 653) (1998). Accordingly, the State’s appeal is not subject to dismissal for mootness if the trial court’s alleged error could be repeated in subsequent criminal cases, and yet evade appellate review at that future time. See Collins v. Lombard Corp., supra at 122 (2); Chastain v. Baker, 255 Ga. 432, 433-434 (339 SE2d 241) (1986).
As the majority notes, the issue here is whether the State has the right to appeal from the oral grant of a motion to suppress. That issue can recur in any future criminal case in which the trial court does not reduce its suppression order to writing. Therefore, the decisive factor in the determination of the mootness of this appeal is whether the issue of the appealability of the oral grant of a motion to suppress is likely to evade future appellate review.
If the defendant is convicted, he cannot, and would not if he could, enumerate as error the grant of his own motion to suppress, and the State does not have a right to cross appeal from such a ruling. See Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460 (591 SE2d 774) (2003). As the majority correctly notes, when the defendant is acquitted, the State likewise has no right to appeal. City of Atlanta v. McCary, 245 Ga. 582 (266 SE2d 193) (1980). Therefore, even though the issue of the appealability of an oral order granting a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress is likely to recur in the future, that issue will evade appellate review regardless of the final outcome of the proceeding. Therefore, Morrell’s death did not cause this appeal to be moot. However, the case nevertheless must be dismissed for the same reason that the issue is not moot. The State has no right to appeal when the defendant has been acquitted. City of Atlanta v. McCary, supra.
Accordingly, today’s opinion should not be read as approving a broad exception to the general rule that the death of the criminal defendant renders a pending appeal moot. This appeal is not moot *155because, notwithstanding Morrell’s death, it comes within the previously recognized principle “that a case which contains an issue that is capable of repetition yet evades review is not moot....” Collins v. Lombard Corp., supra at 122 (1).
Decided October 2, 2006
Reconsideration denied October 30, 2006.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellant.
Carl P. Greenberg, Kazuma Sonoda, Jr., for appellee.