Court Opinion

ID: 9586165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:07:56.833455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:52.168696
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that in Georgia, arraignment is a critical stage in a criminal prosecution. It is a critical stage because the arraignment hearing identifies the person indicted, puts the defendant on notice of the charges against him, forms the issues to be tried, and gives him the opportunity to enter a plea. Wells v. Terrell, 121 Ga. 368 (3) (49 SE 319) (1904). See OCGA § 17-7-93; Daniel, Georgia Criminal Trial Practice, § 16-1 (2001 ed.). It is deemed so critical that the defendant must be present at the time of arraignment. Wells, supra, 121 Ga. at 371 (to arraign prisoner in his absence is legally impossible); Smith v. State, 60 Ga. 430, 432 (3) (1878). The time of arraignment is also important because under Rule 31.1 a defendant must file all pretrial motions at or before arraignment. Ledford v. State, 247 Ga. App. 885 (545 SE2d 396) (2001).
In this case, it is undisputed that Kellogg was indicted by a grand jury in May 2000. He was arrested in Tennessee in November 2001 and placed in the custody of Georgia authorities on January 6, 2002. In February 2002, prior to his arraignment, he timely filed several pretrial motions including, inter alia, motions for discovery, a motion to sever and to suppress evidence, and a demurrer to the indictment. Kellogg was formally arraigned on June 24, 2002.
Notwithstanding that Kellogg timely filed his pretrial motions in accordance with Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1, the trial court held that Kellogg waived his right to file such motions by failing to file them not before his own arraignment, but prior to the arraignment of Cox and Parker in their 2001 trial. I write separately to emphasize that nothing requires an indicted individual to file pretrial motions at or prior to the arraignment of another defendant. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court erred in denying Kellogg his procedural right to file pretrial motions where his time to file had not expired. I concur with the majority opinion, however, because I agree that in this case Kellogg has failed to demonstrate that the error caused him harm.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Fletcher joins in this concurrence.
*230Decided March 14, 2005
Reconsideration denied April 14, 2005.
J. Michael Raffauf, for appellant (case no. S04A2060).
D. Todd Wooten, for appellant (case no. S05A0032).
Jeffery Cox, pro se (case no. S05A0033).
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Anne E. Green, Peggy R. Katz, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Raina J. Nadler, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.