Court Opinion

ID: 9542165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:31:35.220342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:52.103427
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice
(Dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
All statutory references are to the Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended unless otherwise indicated.
This is a post divorce action tried before the District Court, Salt Lake County, sitting without a jury, wherein both plaintiff and defendant sought to modify the decree of divorce between the parties entered on March 16, 1973, as well as subsequent orders of the Court.
A hearing in this action was held on June 14, 1976, and the order thereon was signed by the Court on September 8, 1976, after which defendant made a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, to amend the order made on September 8, 1976. The Court, after a hearing, denied this motion and defendant appealed.
The defendant claims error by the Court below when it (1) denied him visitation rights with the four children of the parties; (2) ordered support payments for the four children, the oldest one of whom has reached her eighteenth birthday, to continue to age twenty-one; (3) allowed an increase in support each month from $75.00 per child to $87.50; (4) denied his request for termination of alimony; and (5) awarded attorney’s fees to plaintiff. I shall discuss or note these points in the order listed and additional facts will be recited in the points to which they are relevant.
Concerning visitation rights, defendant’s claimed error is without merit because the Court made an order on September 20, 1974, pursuant to stipulation, which states, inter alia, “ . . . until . . . further order on visitation is made, the defendant is restrained from visiting or contacting the minor children of the parties . . ”. Defendant, in this action, seeks a further modification of the modified decree of September 20, 1974, which denied visitation rights. He cannot now prevail without showing a material or substantial change in *867circumstances.1 And no such change is shown by the evidence presented at the hearing held on June 14, 1976.
The next point of error defendant claims pertains to the Court’s increasing support payments of the parties’ children from age eighteen to age twenty-one. The Court, in ordering this matter, mandated that the following conditions must be met by each child:
a. Said child resides with plaintiff in the home, and
b. Said child remains unmarried, and
c. Said child remains otherwise uneman-cipated, and
d. Said child maintains an enrollment as a full-time college student carrying at least 15 credit hours of instruction for at least three (3) full quarters of each calendar year.
The Utah Legislature in 1975 amended Sec. 15-2-1 in order to make the age of majority the same for males and females, viz., eighteen years (the prior age for majority for males and females being twenty-one and eighteen years, respectively). The amended statute now reads:
The period of minority extends in males and females to the age of eighteen years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage. It is further provided that courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21.
The last sentence above was added afresh in the amendment.
Three categories of age present themselves in which support for children may be authorized by law,2 viz., when children are (a) less than eighteen years, (b) between eighteen and twenty-one years, and (c) of any age, if incapacitated and without sufficient means.3
It is, of course, of focus on the second category that is required in this matter. In Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah, 578 P.2d 1274 (1978), this Court affirmed the order of the District Court which refused to order the support of a child over eighteen years of age. Under the facts of that case, we held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling as it did. Other language therein about the Court’s not compelling a parent, except in unusual circumstances, to aid in the support of a child (over eighteen) in securing a college education is dictum and should not, in my opinion, be followed here.
In this matter, I believe the Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering support under the conditions specified. I do not by this comment wish to imply or suggest that the conditions imposed in this case by the District Judge are the only type which should fall within the perimeters of discretion that a trial judge may exercise. Pacts and circumstances of particular cases must, of course, in equity matters, “ . . .be permitted to control the chancellor’s conclusions”.4
I believe other claimed errors by defendant identified as points 3, 4, and 5 in the fourth paragraph, ante, are without merit as a review of the record discloses that there is sufficiency of evidence concerning these matters to uphold the Court’s findings and rulings.
Because of the reasons noted ante, I believe the judgment should be affirmed.
*868MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of WILKINS, J.

. Owen v. Owen, Utah, 579 P.2d 911, 912 (1978).

. See Sec. 30-3-5, which states: “When a decree of divorce is made, the court may make such orders in relation to the children and the maintenance of . children, as may be equitable. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to . the custody of the children and their support and maintenance . . . Also see Sec. 15-2-1, supra, as well as Sec. 78-45-2(4), which states: “ ‘Child’ means a son or daughter under the age of twenty-one years and a son or daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means.”

. In Dehm v. Dehm, Utah, 545 P.2d 525, this Court clearly acknowledged the right of the District Court of this State to order support for incapacitated children of any age, without sufficient means.

. Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943) quoting Steed v. Steed, 54 Utah 244, 181 P. 445, 447 (1919).