Court Opinion

ID: 9777086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:55:43.215207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:19.854519
License: Public Domain

*349On Petition to Rehear.
FELTS, J.
Appellants have filed a petition for rehearing, complaining of our affirmance of the Chancellor’s decrees punishing them for contempt for flouting his temporary injunction. They assert we overlooked, or disregarded, controlling decisions of the Supreme Court of this State which required us to hold this injunction was void and could be contemned by them with impunity.
The decisions to which petitioners refer, as having establishd the law of this State contrary to our holding, and on which they claim to be discharged as contemners, are these: Oliver v. Local or Subordinate Lodge No. 656, etc., 182 Tenn. 236, 185 S. W. (2d) 525; Manning v. Feidelson, 175 Tenn. 576, 136 S. W. (2d) 510; Howell v. Thompson, 130 Tenn. 311, 170 S. W. 253.
The Oliver case was a suit by discharged employees for reinstatement, back pay, and damages, upon the allegation that though not members of the union, they had been discharged under a maintenance-of-union-membership clause. The Court held that this was a charge of an unfair labor practice under sec. 8(a) (3) of the federal Act, and the state Court had no jurisdiction to enter any order except to dismiss the suit. Cf. International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, 78 S. Ct. 923, 2 L. Ed. (2d) 1018.
In the Manning case, the National Labor Relations Board found that an employer had been guilty of an unfair labor practice in discharging its employees, and made an award for back pay to them. By compromise settlement, the employer paid $20,000 to the Board’s *350Regional Director, as trustee, to distribute to the employees. One of them sued, the trustees to enjoin him and control the manner of distribution. It was held that exclusive jurisdiction of the matter was in the Board and the Court could only dismiss the suit.
In the Howell case [130 Tenn. 311, 170 S. W. 255] the Attorney General of the State applied for a super-sedeas to vacate a temporary injunction of the Chancellor, enjoining him from proceeding against complainants under the Nuisance Act. The Court denied the application, holding that, under our practice, supersedeas issues to supersede an interlocutory order only where such order (1) “trenches upon final relief” and (2) is “of a nature to be actively enforced”; and that this injunction had neither of these features.
Thus, it is seen none of these decisions supports petitioners’ claim that the Chancellor’s temporary injunction was void and could be contemned by them with impunity. In none of those cases was there any question of contempt, or did any party defy the Court as a usurper, as petitioners did here. Instead, all the parties respected the Court’s authority to hear the case and determine the question of its jurisdiction.
Along with those cases, petitioners, also rely on our case of Churchwell v. Callens, 36 Tenn. App. 119, 252 S. W. (2) 131. There, this Court affirmed the Chancellor’s decree punishing defendant for contempt for disobeying a temporary injunction. Obviously, that case does not support, but negatives, petitioners’ claim.
In the above cited cases, the Court used some general expressions, on which petitioners rely, as follows:
*351(1) In the Oliver case: “[Tjhis Court held that our State Courts are without jurisdiction of controversies under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 151 et seq., and it follows, therefore, that any order that we might enter, except that of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, would be void. Manning v. Feidelson, supra, 175 Tenn. at page 578, 136 S. W. (2d) 510.” 182 Tenn. 240, 185 S. W. (2d) 527.
(2) In the Howell case: “If the court is without jurisdiction of the subject-matter in which it is undertaking to proceed, its orders are void. An injunction made in respect to a subject-matter beyond the jurisdiction of the court is a mere nullity, and is binding on no one. It may he disregarded. State v. Ragghianti, 129 Tenn. 560, 167 S. W. 689.” 130 Tenn. 323, 324, 170 S. W. 256.
(3) In the Churchwell case. “A void judgment binds nobody, but a voidable judgment binds everybody and justifies every act done under it until reversed or modified on appeal. Gibson, Sec. 814, note 43.
“If the Court has jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter, it is a valid order though it be erroneous, and disobedience of same by a party affected is a contempt of court. In re: Vanvaver, 88 Tenn. 334, 12 S. W. 786; Life Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 5 Hig. 232.
Such an order must be obeyed until the party obtains a dissolution or discharge, or he is in contempt. Gibson Secs. 846 and 847; 12 Am. Jur. 408; 17 C. J. S. *352Contempt sec. 14, p. 19.” 36 Tenn. App. 131, 252 S. W. (2d) 131, 136.
It is familiar law that a decision is authority for the point or points decided, and nothing* more, and that general expressions in an opinion are to be then in connection with the case in which they were used, and when they go beyond that, they are not authority for another case. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U. S. 264, 398, 5 L. Ed. 257, 290; Wright v. United States, 302 U. S. 583, 593, 58 S. Ct. 395, 82 L. Ed. 439, 445; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Eddings, 188 Tenn. 512, 523, 221 S. W. (2d) 695, 699; State ex rel. Parker v. Dunn, 39 Tenn. App. 190, 209, 210, 282 S. W. (2d) 203, 212, and cases there cited.
So, it is clear when these general expressions are taken with the case in which they were used, none of them countenances petitioners’ claim that the Chancellor’s temporary injunction was void and could be defied with impunity.
The above cases, with others cited in our opinion (323 S. W. (2d) at page 228), distinguish between an order that is void and one that is only voidable or erroneous; and State v. Ragghianti, supra, applied that distinction. It was there held that a temporary injunction preserving the status qiio, though granted ex parte and contrary to the statute, was not void but only voidable, defendant was bound to obey it while it remained in force, and was properly punished for contempt for disobeying it. The Court quoted the rule from Joyce:
“ ‘Unless an injunction order is void upon its face for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the judge who granted it, it must be obeyed, however erroneous the granting of it may have been, until it is dissolved *353on motion or appeal or some other method of direct review in the action in which it was granted.’ 1 Joyce on Injunctions, sec. 247” (italics onrs). [129 Tenn. 560, 167 S. W. 690.]
The Court referred to Weaver v. Toney, 107 Ky. 419, 54 S. W. 732, 50 L. R. A. 105, where the injunction was void, because it was granted ex parte, required the holding of an election next day, and, if obeyed, would have accomplished all the relief sought. The Court distinguished that injunction, which would have determined the rights of the parties before a hearing, from the temporary injunction before it, which preserved the status quo pending a hearing and determination of the case. The Court said:
“The temporary injunction here issued might have put the defendant to some inconvenience and slight pecuniary loss, but the subject-matter of the litigation was left open for future investigation and determination.” 129 Tenn. 568, 167 S. W. 691.
A similar case was Weidner v. Friedman, 126 Tenn. 677, 151 S. W. 56, 42 L. R. A., N. S., 1041. There, bills were filed to enjoin defendants from maintaining bawdy houses, and a temporary injunction was granted. Some of defendants violated it and were punished for contempt by the Chancellor. On appeal, the bills were dismissed because the Chancellor had no jurisdiction to entertain them, but this was held not to affect the contempt. The Court said:
“The dismissal of the said bills will have no effect upon the contempt proceedings. It was the duty of defendants to obey the injunction, and their failure to do so was a contempt of court for which they *354should be punished.’’ 126 Tenn. 685, 686, 151 S. W. 58.
That case was approved in Nashville Corp. v. United Steelworkers, etc., 187 Tenn. 444, 450, 215 S. W. (2d) 818, 820. There, the Court affirmed the Chancellor’s decrees punishing- defendants for contempt for violating his temporary injunction limiting picketing at a struck plant. The Court said:
“Regardless of whether or not the injunction was ‘irregular or erroneous’, ‘it must while it continues in force be obeyed. ’ 28 Am. Jur., sec. 330, p. 504. In a note to the above quoted statement numerous cases are cited as authority therefor. See also Vanvabry v. Staton, 88 Tenn. 334, 12 S. W. 786; Weidner v. Friedman, 126 Tenn. 677, 151 S. W. 56, 42 L. R. A., N. S., 1041* * *” 187 Tenn. 450, 215 S. W. (2d) 820.
As will be noted, the Nashville Corp. case and the Churchwell case, supra, referred to the text in American Jurisprudence (12 Am. Jur. 408, 28 Am. Jur. 504), which cites, among others, these cases cited by us in our former opinion (323 S. W. (2d) at pages 228-231): United States v. Shipp, supra; Howat v. State of Kansas, supra; United States v. United Mine Workers, etc., supra; and Pitcock v. State, supra.
Also, the Churchwell case and the Nashville Corp. case cited approvingly the text of Gibson (2 Crownover’s Gibson’s Suits in Chancery (5th ed.)) which is, in part, as follows:
‘ ‘ The mandates of a Court of Chancery must in all cases be obeyed * * without question, or evasion. The party, upon whom the order or command of the *355court operates, is not allowed to speculate upon the equity of the bill, or the legality or regularity of the order or decree, or the writ issued thereon; but his simple duty is to obey * * *” Gibson, sec. 964 (italics ours). Quoted in 187 Tenn. 450-451, 215 S. W. (2d) 821.
Again the same authority (sec. 893) says:
“It matters not what irregularities may affect the proceedings, nor what error the Court, or Judge, may have committed in granting the injunction. * * * so long as the injunction is in force it must be scrupulously observed, and implicitly obeyed. And the defendant is not allowed to sit in judgment on the equity of the bill, or on the rightfulness of the writ, and should not as to the jurisdiction; his one duty is to obey” (italics ours). Cited in 36 Tenn. App. 131, 252 S. W. (2d) [136].
Thus, this says “in all cases”, no matter “what error” the Chancellor may have committed in granting the injunction, it must be implicitly obeyed, as long as it remains in force, and the defendant is not ‘ ‘ to speculate ’ ’ or “sit in judgment” as to its “equity”, or legality or “as to the jurisdiction”.
This broad generalization of “all cases”, of whatsoever error, must, of course, be taken with the distinction between a case of a void order and a case of a voidable or erroneous order; and, when so taken, it correctly states the general principle of equity which is the law of this State and is generally recognized by all courts, federal and state, and was applied in the cases cited and discussed in our opinion, 323 S. W. (2d) at pages 228-*356231; see also cases cited in the Annotation, 12 A. L. R. (2d) 1059, 1066, 1078, 1079.
So, it is seen we have not, as petitioners assert, undertaken to change the law or to apply “novel procedure” in this case. Instead, we have applied only the general principle of equity which has long been the law in this State and has long been applied in other states and in the federal courts.
As we have seen, that principle is: Where the action of a court of general equity jurisdiction is invoked by proper pleadings upon a matter fairly debatable — not obviously and indisputably outside its jurisdiction — it has authority to determine all the issues, including that of its own jurisdiction, and to grant a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo pending such determination, and to punish defiance of it as contempt.
This is true even in a case which the Court, or an appellate reviewing Court, may ultimately have to dismiss for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter. “The test of the jurisdiction of a court is whether or not it had power to enter upon the inquiry; not whether its conclusion in the course of it was right or wrong”. State v. Patten, 41 N. M. 395, 69 P. (2d) 931, 933; also cases cited in Annotation, 12 A. L. R. (2d) 1059, 1066, 1078-1079.
• ‘ Only when a court is so obviously traveling outside its orbit as to be merely usurping judicial forms and facilities, may an order issued by a court be disobeyed * * * Short of an indisputable want of authority on the part of a court, the very existence of a court presupposes its power to entertain a con*357troversy, if only to decide, after deliberation, that it has no power over the particular controversy. * * *
“* * * To say that the authority of the court may be flouted during the time necessary to decide is to reject the requirements of the judicial process.” Mr. Justice Frankfurter, United States v. United Mine Workers, etc., supra, 330 U. S. 310, 311, 67 S. Ct. 704, 91 L. Ed. 921, 922.
As pointed out in our opinion (323 S. W. (2d) at pages 225-228) the bill, upon which the Chancellor’s jurisdiction is to be tested, made a case within his jurisdiction, and alleged nothing to make a case pre-empted by federal power. So, he had jurisdiction to determine the issues, including that of his own jurisdiction, and to grant the temporary injunction to preserve the status quo pending such determination, and to punish defiance of it as contempt.
Thus, this case is distinguishable from Ex parte Twedell, Tex., 309 S. W. (2d) 834, on which petitioners rely, where a bill, to enjoin a union and its agents from picketing, alleged such a clear case of an unfair labor practice under sec. 8(b) (1) and (2) of the federal Act as excluded state action (see Weber case, supra, 348 U. S. 480, 75 S. Ct. 488, 99 L. Ed. 557).
Petitioners assert that our opinion “gives full approval to a procedure that circumvents the acts of Congress, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and, indeed, the decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee”.
*358This assertion is unsupported by any Tennessee decision cited by petitioners, or by any decision of the Supreme Court of the United States cited by them. It seems to be much the same kind of argument that was rejected by that Court in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros., 348 U. S. 511, 518, 75 S. Ct. 452, 99 L. Ed. 600, 609.
The petition for a rehearing is denied at petitioners’ cost.