Court Opinion

ID: 9385138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 22:03:04.544112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.200002
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/5/23 P. v. Garcia CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C093543

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 10F06795)

           v.                                                                     OPINION ON TRANSFER

    ELIAS GARCIA,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Elias Garcia guilty of murder and found true a special
circumstance enhancement that the murder occurred during the commission of an
attempted robbery. Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section

1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                             1
1172.62 alleging he was not the actual killer, did not have the intent to kill, and was not a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The trial court
denied the petition for two reasons: (1) the jury’s special circumstance finding rendered
defendant ineligible for resentencing, and (2) our opinion in defendant’s direct appeal
concluded defendant was found to be the actual killer. (People v. Garcia (Mar. 27, 2018,
C077082) [nonpub. opn.] (Garcia).) In this appeal, defendant argued he could challenge
the special circumstance finding through a section 1172.6 petition. In an unpublished
opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s resentencing petition,
concluding section 1172.6 was not the appropriate avenue to challenge a special
circumstance finding. As a result, we held the jury’s true finding on the special
circumstance allegations remained valid, rendering defendant ineligible for resentencing
under section 1172.6. (People v. Garcia (Mar. 29, 2022, C093543) [nonpub. opn.].)
       The California Supreme Court subsequently granted review and transferred the
matter back to us with directions to vacate our opinion and reconsider the cause in light
of People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). By separate order, we vacated our
decision.
       In supplemental briefing after transfer, defendant argues the trial court erred in
finding him (a) ineligible for relief, and (b) the actual killer. We find defendant is
ineligible as a matter of law because the jury found he was the actual killer, a conclusion
not impacted by Strong, and again affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was recodified without substantive
change to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Defendant filed his petition under
former section 1170.95, but we will refer to the current section 1172.6 throughout this
opinion.

                                              2
                                     BACKGROUND
       During trial, witnesses testified to seeing four men get out of a car and walk
towards an apartment, hearing a gunshot, and then seeing the men run back to the car and
leave. Two accomplices testified defendant was the “group’s ringleader” and that the
group went to the apartment to rob the occupant, Donald Kirby. Defendant struggled
with Kirby after he opened the door and the gun fired, striking Kirby in the head, killing
him. (Garcia, supra, C077082.)3
       On February 24, 2014, the jury found defendant and his codefendant Roman
Hooker guilty of first degree murder and attempted second degree robbery, and found
true the special circumstance the two defendants were engaged in the attempted
commission of robbery during the murder. The jury found not true that defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm.
       There were multiple instructions given for the special circumstance finding.
Under CALCRIM No. 730, the jury had to find defendant and Hooker attempted to
commit or aided a robbery and that “Defendant Elias Garcia did an act that caused the
death of another person.” CALCRIM No. 703 was also provided and stated: “If you
decide that a defendant is guilty of first degree murder but was not the actual killer, then,
when you consider the special circumstance of murder committed in the perpetration of
attempted robbery, you must also decide whether the defendant acted either with intent to
kill or with reckless indifference to human life.” If a defendant did not have the intent to

3  On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our opinion affirming the judgment of
conviction and sentence in defendant’s direct appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a),
[“The reviewing court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452”],
452, subd. (d) [permitting a court to take judicial notice of records of “any court of this
state”].) We provide this summary of facts from the prior opinion in defendant’s direct
appeal solely for context and do not rely on these facts for our analysis or disposition
here. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

                                              3
kill, the defendant must have been “a major participant in the crime” who “acted with
reckless indifference to human life.”
       Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Defendant appealed and we affirmed his conviction and sentence. (Garcia, supra,
C077082.) In responding to defendant’s argument in his direct appeal that the trial court
“erred by not instructing the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offenses of second
degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter,” (id. [at p. 36]),
we found any error harmless, in part, because the jury must have found defendant shot
Kirby but “did not shoot Kirby intentionally. Its findings on the firearm enhancements
and the special circumstance show the jury determined [defendant] shot Kirby
unintentionally.” (Id. [at pp. 40].)
       We also addressed Hooker’s contention a jury question on the “firearms
enhancements show it rejected the prosecution’s theory that [defendant] shot Kirby, and
showed the jury believed [another accomplice] shot Kirby.” We disagreed because “[t]he
prosecution’s theory was that [defendant] and Hooker intended to, and attempted to rob
Kirby, and that [defendant] shot Kirby as part of that attempt. As just discussed, the
jury’s finding that [defendant] unintentionally committed an act that caused Kirby’s death
shows the jury concluded [defendant] was the shooter. The only act [defendant] did that
could cause death was fire his gun.” (Garcia, supra, C077082 [at p. 41].) We
determined this was also supported by the evidence because “[t]here is no evidence
[another accomplice] shot Kirby or took any action that resulted in Kirby’s death. The
evidence shows only that [defendant] shot Kirby, and this act resulted in Kirby’s death.
And, again, the jury’s finding that [defendant]’s act resulted in Kirby’s death shows the
jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] unintentionally shot Kirby
during an attempted robbery. These findings show the jury would not have returned a
more favorable verdict had the court instructed it on second degree murder or voluntary
manslaughter.” (Id. [at p. 42].)

                                             4
       On January 4, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6 to vacate his murder conviction. Defendant alleged he was not the actual killer,
did not act with the intent to kill, and was not a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. He also declared he was convicted of first degree murder
under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine and
could not now be convicted of first degree murder because of changes made to sections
188 and 189. Defendant’s counsel also filed a brief specifically addressing the jury’s
special circumstance finding.
       On February 2, 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s petition for two reasons:
(1) the jury’s special circumstance finding foreclosed relief as a matter of law under
People v. Gomez (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1 and, (2) the record of conviction, including our
prior opinion, established defendant was the actual killer.
       Defendant timely appealed.
                                      DISCUSSION
       On appeal from the denial of his 1172.6 petition, defendant argued the trial court
erred because the jury’s special circumstance finding cannot preclude eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6 as a matter of law after the California Supreme Court’s decisions in
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522.
Defendant also contended the record of conviction did not conclusively establish he was
the actual killer.
       On transfer, defendant restates both arguments, adding to the first argument that
the special circumstance finding is no longer valid after Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698.
He contends the second basis is invalid because it is based on erroneous dicta in our
opinion in defendant’s original direct appeal. Defendant argues the jury could have
found he was not the actual killer under CALCRIM No. 703, and our prior opinion fails
to consider this possibility. The People rely on the finding in our prior opinion, which

                                             5
they say was supported by the jury instructions, verdicts, and the facts of the case. We
find defendant is ineligible as a matter of law as the actual killer.
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), effective
January 1, 2019, amended “the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It accomplished this by amending
sections 188 and 189. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
       Senate Bill 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, which
provides “a procedure for those convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 843.) Under this procedure, a defendant files a petition for resentencing and trial
courts first review the petition to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c).) In deciding whether a prima facie case is
made, a court may review the defendant’s record of conviction “to distinguish petitions
with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971.) If a prima facie case is made, the trial court issues an order to show cause and
holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the conviction and recall the
sentence. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d).)
       In Strong, our Supreme Court concluded a defendant is not ineligible for relief as a
matter of law for being found to be a major participant in a deadly felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life before People v. Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and
People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710 [“We now
conclude . . . [f]indings issued by a jury before Banks and Clark do not preclude a
defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437”].) The

                                               6
court invalidated People v. Gomez, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th 1, and other cases finding
otherwise. (Strong, at p. 718.)
       The first basis of the trial court’s decision was invalidated by Strong. Though the
jury must have found defendant was at a minimum a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life, this finding was before Banks and Clark and
therefore cannot be the basis for finding him ineligible as a matter of law for his section
1172.6 petition.
       But the trial court’s second basis for finding defendant ineligible, that he was the
actual killer, remains valid. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710 [“Senate Bill 1437 relief
is unavailable if the defendant was . . . the actual killer”].) And this finding was properly
made at the prima facie stage.
       The trial court relied in part on our prior opinion to conclude defendant was the
actual killer. Trial courts are permitted to review the record of conviction at the prima
facie stage and “[a]ppellate opinions . . . are generally considered to be part of the record
of conviction.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) “[T]he probative value of an
appellate opinion is case specific, and ‘it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion
might not supply all answers.’ ” (Ibid.) Our opinion considered and resolved the same
legal issue here: Was the defendant the actual killer? We reviewed the jury instructions
and the verdicts, as well as the facts established and arguments made at trial. From this,
we determined that the jury found defendant unintentionally shot Kirby and also that
there was no evidence anybody else did, thus, “the jury’s finding that [defendant]’s act
resulted in Kirby’s death shows the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that
[defendant] unintentionally shot Kirby during an attempted robbery.” (Garcia, supra,
C077082 [at p. 42].) This is not a passing remark in the factual background, but a fully
analyzed and resolved legal question. (Cf. People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
[finding appellate opinions may be considered, but that a statement in a prior opinion’s
factual background that the defendant punched the victim was insufficient to conclude as

                                              7
a matter of law the defendant was convicted as the actual killer].) Our conclusion in that
opinion resolved the question now before us, that defendant was the actual killer.
       Even if the trial court improperly relied on our prior opinion, as defendant argues,
any error would be harmless. Errors in the section 1172.6 petition process are not
reversible unless the defendant can demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that in
the absence of the error, they would have obtained a more favorable result. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 973-974.)
       Our prior opinion is fully supported by the record of conviction. The jury
instructions on the special circumstance not only disclose that the jury found defendant
was at minimum a major participant who acted with reckless indifference, but that the
jury found he was the actual killer. Defendant and Hooker were tried together, and so the
jury was instructed on the special circumstance for both defendants. Given that, the
special circumstance instruction under CALCRIM No. 730 specifically listed defendant
as the one who caused Kirby’s death: “Defendant Elias Garcia did an act that caused the
death of another person.” This was because, as articulated in our prior opinion, the
prosecution’s theory was that defendant shot Kirby. Thus, the jury necessarily
determined defendant was the actual killer for the special circumstance finding for both
defendant and Hooker. This renders defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law
under section 1172.6.
       Defendant contends this conclusion, and our prior opinion, is incorrect because the
jury could have found defendant was not the actual killer and still found the special
circumstance finding true under the CALCRIM No. 703 instruction. He states, “[h]ad
CALCRIM No. 730 been the only instruction given defining the robbery-murder special
circumstance, the opinion’s analysis would have been correct. However, the superior
court also gave the jury CALCRIM No. 703.” We disagree. CALCRIM No. 703 is the
instruction for section 190.2, subdivision (d), the additional intent requirement if the
person was not the actual killer. But it alone does not satisfy the special circumstance

                                              8
requirement. “A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential
elements of a special circumstance allegation.” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400,
409.) The CALCRIM No. 703 instruction did not have any of the other requirements for
the special circumstance, such as the jury must find defendant was attempting to commit
a robbery, and, importantly here, a defendant caused the death of another person. These
are the requirements for section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) that were supplied by the
CALCRIM No. 730 instruction. The CALCRIM No. 703 instruction referred to the
CALCRIM No. 730 instruction for this reason, stating “when you consider the special
circumstance of murder committed in the perpetration of attempted robbery.” (Italics
added.) There was no definition for attempted robbery in the CALCRIM No. 703
instruction so this must have been referring to the CALCRIM No. 730 instruction.
       Our Supreme Court has analyzed a similar issue with the prior versions of the
same instructions in People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306. Both instructions were
provided to the jury and the defendant argued the instructions conflicted. The court
agreed with the People that the instructions supplemented each other: “[T]he two
instructions, read together, outline respectively the relationship of the murder to the
predicate felony (CALJIC No. 8.81.17) and the mental state required for either an actual
killer or an aider and abettor in the murder (CALJIC No. 8.80.1).” (Id. at p. 324.)
       Instead of the jury being able to apply one or the other, it had to apply CALCRIM
No. 730 and then apply CALCRIM No. 703 only if it thought the defendant was not the
actual killer. Under the circumstances here that could only be Hooker because, again, the
CALCRIM No. 730 instruction made clear only “Defendant Elias Garcia” was the
defendant being alleged as the one that did the act causing death. Thus, the jury
necessarily found defendant was the felony participant who was the actual killer,
rendering him ineligible for relief as a matter of law and rendering harmless any
procedural error under section 1172.6.

                                              9
                                    DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                                    /s/
                                                EARL, J.

We concur:

    /s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

      /s/
KRAUSE, J.

                                           10