Court Opinion

ID: 9498304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:14:06.495035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:45.308779
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Having carefully reviewed the record, I conclude that Rodriguez did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal. The Id’s acceptance of his waiver therefore resulted in a deprivation of Rodriguez’s right to judicial review. I arrive at this conclusion for two reasons.
First, our court has unambiguously held that an alien’s waiver of his appellate rights cannot be knowing or intelligent if the alien is not advised “of his right to appeal the administrative decision in federal court.” United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir.1989). At Rogriguez’s deportation hearing, the IJ advised the respondents as a group that they would have a right to appeal to the BIA if they disagreed with his decision. The IJ also asked Rodriguez individually if he wanted to reserve his right to appeal or accept the decision made by the IJ. At no point in the hearing, however, did the IJ inform Rodriguez or the other respondents that they would have the right to judicial review, as opposed to administrative review.4
The failure of the IJ to inform Rodriguez of his right to appeal to the federal courts before accepting his waiver of his right to appeal was sufficient in itself to deprive Rodriguez of an opportunity for meaningful review. This omission is more serious because the IJ’s other comments suggest that he could be relied upon to provide a comprehensive assessment of the respondent aliens’ legal rights and options. In his initial remarks to the respondent aliens, the IJ clarified:
[Contrary to popular belief, I do not work for the Immigration Service. The purpose of today’s hearing is for me to determine the validity of the charges made against you by the Immigration Service. If the charges turn out to be invalid, I will dismiss the case against you. And even if the charges are valid, there are some times [sic] ways to avoid deportation in the immigration laws. That will depend on the facts of your case. Once I know more about your case, I will let you know if you are eligible to avoid deportation or not.
Later, addressing Rodriguez’s request for voluntary departure, he stated: “You are not eligible for anything, not a single *836thing.” These comments are troubling both because they create the impression that the IJ would be offering legal advice to the respondents, and because the assessment the IJ made of Rodriguez’s case was incomplete if not incorrect.
The IJ’s comments were based on the assumption that Rodriguez’s conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol was an aggravated felony. Because this conclusion was consistent with recent BIA determinations, the IJ also advised Rodriguez that any appeal was not likely to succeed. By omitting any mention of a potential appeal to the federal courts, the IJ created the impression that the issue was firmly settled, when, in fact, the Ninth Circuit had not yet addressed the matter. The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court subsequently determined that driving under the influence was not an aggravated felony. Leocal v. Ashcroft, —U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004); United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.2001). This is more than a mere failure to anticipate a future change in the interpretation of the law;5 it is a failure to adequately advise Rodriguez of his current appellate rights. In this group proceeding the IJ had “an affirmative obligation ... to advise [Rodriguez] effectively of his ... right to judicial review of deportation proceedings,” an obligation which is heightened, not diminished, by Rodriguez’s decision to proceed without counsel. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d at 251. Rodriguez should have been informed of his opportunity to appeal his deportation order in federal court. I would therefore hold that Rodriguez was deprived of the right to judicial review.

. While the IJ stated that "the appeals court made a ruling” that drunk driving is an aggravated felony, this was a reference to a BIA decision, In Re Carlos Istalin Magallanes-Garcia, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1 (1998). The Ninth Circuit addressed this question more than two years after Rodriguez’s hearing before the IJ. See United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.2001).

. In some cases an IJ’s failure to anticipate a change in interpretation has been held to invalidate a waiver of appellate rights. However, this issue has not been treated consistently throughout the circuits. Compare United States v. Calderon, 391 F.3d 370 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that failure to advise an eligible alien of the possibility of relief under § 212(c) invalidated a waiver of appeal rights even though the BIA believed such relief was statutorily barred and the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the issue), United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.2004) (same), and United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that alien’s waiver of appellate rights was not considered or intelligent where the IJ did not inform him of his eligibility for relief from deportation because she believed the alien had been convicted of an aggravated felony) with United States v. Aguhre-Tello, 353 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir.2004) (en banc) (holding that an alien did not have a constitutional right to be informed of discretionary relief he or she may be eligible for) and United States v. Roque-Espinoza, 338 F.3d 724 (7th Cir.2003) (suggesting that an alien was not deprived of the right to judicial review where the IJ failed to inform him of his eligibility for relief under § 212(c)).