Court Opinion

ID: 9697412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:15:59.651378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:23.539869
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
Where questions of fact remain unresolved, summary judgment is not appropriate. Because I believe that this is the case here, I respectfully dissent.
Sims and Colonial seek to impose liability on Whitemarsh under the real property exception to governmental immunity, arguing that a jury could find both that Whitemarsh had possession and control of the pool at the time of the accident and that a defective condition of the property contributed to *631Sims’ death.1 Here, the majority appears to concede that because Sims makes allegations of defects in the property itself, the cause of Sims’ drowning presents a jury question. I agree. However, the majority concludes that no material issue of fact is in dispute which would defeat Whitemarsh’s motion for summary judgment because, regardless of the cause of Sims’ death, the real property exception to governmental immunity does not apply to impose liability on White-marsh where Whitemarsh was not in possession of the property at the time of Sims’ accident. The majority reasons that if a fact finder were to find that negligent supervision was the cause of Sims’ death, Whitemarsh would not be liable because negligent supervision alone is insufficient to impose liability under the real property exception to governmental immunity. If, on the other hand, the fact finder were to determine that a defective condition of the pool design or insufficient lighting caused the drowning, Whitemarsh would, nonetheless, be immune for lack of possession. I cannot agree that, under the circumstances here, the issue of possession can be decided as a matter of law.
The majority bases its determination on the fact that Whitemarsh did not own the pool but was merely occupying the premises for a limited period of time and was not responsible for its regular repairs or maintenance. I recognize that Whitemarsh did not own the property; however, this is not determinative of whether it had possession of the pool at the time of the accident. Possession for purposes of § 8542(b)(3) has not been construed to require ownership; rather, a mere possessory interest is sufficient to expose a local agency to liability under section 8542(b)(3) of the Judicial Code. Lowman v. Indiana Area School District, 96 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 389, 507 A.2d 1270 (1986). Control or occupancy can constitute possession, without regard to ownership. Nevertheless, citing York Redevelopment Authority v. Keener, 101 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 464, 516 A.2d 832 (1986), Prescott v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 124 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. *632124, 555 A.2d 305 (1989), and Walsh by Walsh v. Camelot Bristol Co. Inc., 102 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 76, 517 A.2d 577 (1986) as authority, the majority concludes that Whitemarsh’s limited control or occupancy of Colonial’s property was insufficient to impose liability pursuant to § 8542(b)(3). Although we refused to find that a city or local agency had possession of real property under the circumstances in Keener, Prescott and Walsh, I do not feel that these cases, relied on by the majority, compare to the present situation.
In Keener, a subcontractor was injured when he fell through the floor while renovating a property purchased “as is” as part of a city redevelopment plan. At the time of the accident, legal title and possession of the property had been transferred from the Redevelopment Authority to the current owners, who had hired the subcontractor. However, prior to the sale, a city employee had performed various services in connection with the property by conducting inspections, showing the property to prospective buyers and overseeing preliminary renovations. We determined that to consider this extremely limited, past involvement with the property as “possession” would defy any notion of the term.
In Prescott, suit was filed against the Philadelphia Housing Authority on behalf of a child who suffered lead poisoning after ingesting lead-based paint from the walls of his apartment. The apartment was one rented to persons eligible for housing assistance under the Federal Housing Assistance Program. In accordance with a line of cases refusing to interpret possession, for purposes of the exception to government immunity, to include control exercised by a municipality or local agency solely through its regulatory and enforcement powers, we held that the Housing Authority did not assume possession of the apartment based on its responsibility under Federal regulations connected with the housing program. See also Mentzer v. Ognibene, 126 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 178, 559 A.2d 79 (1989), appeal denied, 523 Pa. 644, 565 A.2d 1168 (1989); Kline v. Pennsylvania Mines Corp., 120 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 7, 547 A.2d 1276 (1988); Buffalini v. Shrader, 112 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 228, 535 A.2d 684 (1987).
*633Walsh is even farther afield. In Walsh, a fireman, injured while combatting a blaze, alleged that the volunteer fire company negligently ordered him to remain in the building without proper safety equipment. We held that the fire company’s temporary occupancy of a privately owned building for the limited purpose of extinguishing a fire did not constitute possession of that property for the purposes of section 8542(b)(3).
This case is easily distinguishable from each of these opinions. Unlike the city in Keener, Whitemarsh’s use of the property here was not a past event; Whitemarsh was actually occupying and supervising the premises when the drowning occurred. Moreover, Whitemarsh’s alleged possession of the pool had no connection with its regulatory or enforcement responsibilities, as was the case in Prescott. Finally, White-marsh’s use of Colonial’s pool does not compare with the firefighter’s temporary presence on the property in Walsh. This was not a one-time occupation of the facility for the benefit of the owner but rather, virtually from the time that the pool was constructed, was a regularly scheduled takeover of the premises, during which Whitemarsh received the financial benefit of its use. In addition, absent from all the cases relied on by the majority, is the sort of continuing written agreement that existed between Whitemarsh and Colonial, pursuant to which Whitemarsh was using the pool at the time of Sim’s accident. The existence of the contract makes this case more akin to Rhoads v. Lancaster Parking Authority, 103 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 303, 520 A.2d 122 (1987) than to any of the opinions previously discussed.
In Rhoads, a patron of a Municipal Parking Authority garage was assaulted on the property and filed a complaint against the Authority and the city for failing to provide adequate security in the garage. Rhoads alleged that both the city and the Authority possessed the garage; however, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on grounds that it had relinquished care, custody and control of the garage to the Authority. We stated that summary judg*634ment on this ground was improper because questions of material fact on this issue existed where evidence showed that the city had a leasehold interest in the parking garage and exercised some degree of control over its operations.
Here too, Whitemarsh had a contractual interest in the periodic use of Colonial’s property and exercised a degree of control over it at those times. On the evening of Sims’ drowning, Whitemarsh was using the property pursuant to the written contract between Whitemarsh and Colonial. The contract provided that the parties could use each others’ facilities under specific conditions which made each party accountable for its own actions and activities while using the other party’s property. Therefore, although WHiitemarsh may not have owned the property, I feel that Whitemarsh acquired liability by contracting for possession and control of the pool at specific times. To effectuate this contractual shift in responsibility, Whitemarsh assumed the obligation for any damage which occurred during the time that it conducted its program at the pool and provided pool personnel, including lifeguards, to open and close the premises and supervise the facility. No one but Whitemarsh had the right to use the facility during these periods, and Whitemarsh charged an admission fee to those persons who came to swim, no portion of which went to Colonial.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Marks v. Tasman, h21 Pa. 132, 589 A.2d 205 (1991). At the very least, Sims and Colonial present evidence showing that Whitemarsh had a contractual interest in the regularly ongoing, periodic use of the pool and exercised some degree of control over its operations during those periods. I feel that this evidence is sufficient to raise questions of material fact on the issue of whether Whitemarsh possessed the pool at the time of the accident, making summary judgment inappropriate. Accordingly, on this basis, I would reverse and remand for trial.

. Colonial agrees, however, with the trial court that Sims died solely as a result of negligent supervision.