Court Opinion

ID: 9636227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:20:34.712303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:54.819184
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
dissenting.
Because I view the common-law employment contract exception to the going-and-coming rule as irreconcilable with the Legislature’s 1993 amendment td Section 301(c)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, I would hold that the exception no longer existed at the time of the accident.
As the majority notes, the courts have traditionally recognized several exceptions to the common-law going-and-coming rule, which generally precludes compensation under the Act for injuries sustained while driving from one’s home to a fixed place of work, or while returning home. Among these is the employment contract exception, pursuant to which compensation is available so long as the employee was driving a company car supplied under the terms of his or her contract of employment. The rationale behind that exception was artieu*488lated in McIntyre v. Strausser, 365 Pa. 507, 76 A.2d 220 (1950), where this Court stated:
Ordinarily the [Workers’ Compensation] Acts have no application where the employe is going to or coming from his work. But where the contract of employment provides that the employer shall furnish the means of going and returning from work, the employe is regarded as engaged in the furtherance of his employer’s business during such transportation.
Id. at 509, 76 A.2d at 221 (emphasis added).
The critical 1993 addition to Section 301(c)(1) proceeds as follows:
[N]or shall [the term “injury arising in the course of employment”] include injuries sustained while the employe is operating a motor vehicle provided by the employer if the employe is not otherwise in the course of employment at the time of injury.
77 P.S. § 411(1) (emphasis added).1
On its face, this provision categorically precludes compensation for injuries sustained while driving a company car unless the employee is “otherwise” acting in the course of employment at the time of injury. The term “otherwise,” in this context, indicates that the employee must be acting in furtherance of the employer’s business in some capacity beyond merely driving the vehicle. The statutory amendment, then, on its face abrogated the common-law employment contract exception to the going-and-coming rule; as noted above, that exception had its genesis in a judicial imputation of the state of being engaged in the furtherance of the employer’s business to the driver of a company car provided pursuant to an employment contract.
The majority reaches the opposite result by stating that the legislative amendment at issue did little more than re-affirm *489what the courts had already recognized and enforced for decades. See Majority Opinion, 584 Pa. at 485-87, 884 A.2d at 863. To the extent that one can discern any lack of clarity in the statutory text (which I cannot), the legislative history of Act 44 clarifies that its primary purpose was to reform the workers’ compensation system so as to reduce the burden upon employers, as the high cost of the system was contributing to a business-unfriendly environment in Pennsylvania as compared to neighboring states, resulting in a net loss of businesses and jobs. See, e.g., 1993 House Legis. Journal 518, 543-47 (daily ed. March 30, 1993) (remarks of various Representatives concerning the need to reform the workers’ compensation system so that businesses do not close or move out-of-state); 1993 Senate Legis. Journal 443 (daily ed. March 31, 1993) (reflecting the Senate’s understanding of the overriding purpose of the. bill to reform the workers’ compensation system to make it less burdensome upon the business community); id. at 472-73 (daily ed. April 19, 1993) (same). In light of these numerous statements affirming the need for reform, it is difficult to accept the majority’s position that the amendment to Section 301(c)(1) carried no legislative intent to alter the circumstances under which benefits would be available solely as a result of driving a company car. See generally 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(7) (instructing courts to consider a bill’s contemporaneous legislative history in resolving any perceived lack of clarity in its text); DeLellis v. Borough of Verona, 541 Pa. 3, 15 n. 11, 660 A.2d 25, 31 n. 11 (1995) (finding legislative floor remarks instructive in interpreting a statute).
I also respectfully differ with the majority’s affirmative suggestion that the amendment to Section 301(c)(1) signifies that “employees injured while driving a company vehicle are not entitled to Workers’ Compensation benefits unless they are acting within the scope of their employment at the time of injury or can prove an exception to the ‘going and coming rule.’ ” Majority Opinion, 584 Pa. at 485-87, 884 A.2d at 863 (emphasis added). The amendment’s text contains no indication that proving a common-law exception to the going-and-*490coming rule may operate effectively to nullify the limitation set forth. Rather, as discussed, the wording is absolute in its preclusion of benefits unless the employee is “otherwise” acting in the course of employment.2
In sum, I would conclude that the 1993 amendment to Section 301(c)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act abrogated the common-law employment contract exception to the going- and-coming rule, and that the rule otherwise applies to the facts of the present case.3 Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Commonwealth Court and reinstate the WCAB’s order denying benefits.
Justice CASTILLE and Justice NEWMAN join this dissenting opinion.

. This restrictive language was inserted by the Act of July 2, 1993, P.L. 190, No. 44, § 5 ("Act 44”).

. The majority reaches its result in part by relying on the Commonwealth Court's decision in Rox Coal Co. v. WCAB (Snizaski), 768 A.2d 384 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). On appeal, this Court determined that the Commonwealth Court's discussion of this issue was mere dicta because the employer had waived any objection to the employment contract exception during proceedings before the agency. See Rox Coal Co. v. WCAB (Snizaski), 570 Pa. 60, 71, 807 A.2d 906, 912 (2002). In any event, dicta or not, I believe that the Commonwealth Court's reasoning in Rox Coal was erroneous. The Commonwealth Court did not articulate any persuasive basis for its interpretation that the 1993 amendment merely solidified judicial precedent concerning the going-and-coming rule; additionally—and somewhat illogically—the court relied largely upon a pre-amendment decision to conclude that all of the exceptions to the going-and-coming rule remain in force even in the post-amendment setting. See id. at 389 & n. 14 (citing William F. Rittner Co. v. WCAB (Rittner), 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 596, 600-01, 464 A.2d 675, 678 (1983)).

. Appellee does not argue that any other exception applies presently.