Court Opinion

ID: 9547301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:44:47.974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:34.773337
License: Public Domain

*653Sullivan, D. J.,
concurring:1
I concur in the judgment denying the motion to excuse Justice Rose but write separately because I see a number of other reasons to reach the same conclusion as those stated in the majority opinion.
First of all, the law is clear in this matter. NRS 1.225 requires that:
1. A justice of the supreme court shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when he entertains actual bias or prejudice for or against one of the parties to the action.
2. A justice of the supreme court shall not act as such in an action or proceeding when implied bias exists in any of the following respects:
(a) When he is a party to or interested in the action or proceeding.
(b) When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree.
(c) When he has been attorney or counsel for either of the parties in the particular action or proceeding before the court.
(d) When he is related to an attorney or counsel for either of the parties by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree.
3. A justice of the supreme court, upon his own motion, may disqualify himself from acting in any matter upon the ground of actual or implied bias.
(emphasis added). This statute contemplates bias against the party to the action and not against the attorney for the party. Even though the ethics rules go further and contemplate disqualification for demonstrated bias against the attorney for the party, this court ought not to go further than the legislative mandate of NRS 1.225.
Furthermore, the judicial ethics rules cited by the parties in this case are irrelevant for this court’s consideration in disqualifying a supreme court justice. See, e.g., Canon 3(E). Those rules apply to disciplinary actions and are handled by a separate body for consideration. Certainly the ethics rules are important in each judge’s own consideration of whether he or she should disqualify themselves.
Secondly, the court should return wholeheartedly to the policy *654enunciated in In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 790-91, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988).
[A] allegation of bias in favor or against an attorney for a litigant generally states an insufficient ground for disqualification because “it is not indicative of extrajudicial bias against a ‘party.’ ” In a small state such as Nevada, with a concomitantly limited bar membership, it is inevitable that frequent interactions will occur between the members of the bar and the judiciary. Thus, allegations of bias based upon a judge’s associations with counsel for a litigant pose a particularly onerous potential for impeding the dispensation of justice.
(citations omitted). See Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989). It is clear in the environment in which the small Nevada bar operates that lawyers and judges will have disagreements and take opposite stands. In order for the judicial system to function in this state, the judge and the attorney must set aside differences and the judge must mete out justice and make rulings based upon the law. Likewise, the attorney must present his or her case with civility.
Furthermore, if after a disagreement or an interaction between an attorney and a judge, the attorney moves to disqualify the judge on all subsequent cases, and this court sanctions this in any fashion, the court is allowing unjustified judge-shopping. The power of the judiciary could be manipulated and eroded. NRS 1.225 requires that disqualification have merit — actual or implied bias against the party whom the attorney represents.

The Governor designated the Honorable Jerry V. Sullivan, Judge of the Sixth Judicial District Court, to sit in the place of The Honorable A. William Maupin, Justice. Nev. Const, art. 6, § 4.