Court Opinion

ID: 9594481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:30:27.013162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:33.311911
License: Public Domain

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the majority’s result but respectfully dissent as to one section of its opinion. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, inoperability is never relevant to the issue of whether a defendant was in control of a motor vehicle. Operability is relevant to only one question: whether the thing at issue is, in fact, a motor vehicle.
The statute makes it a crime to “be in physical control of any motor vehicle * * * when the person is under the influence of alcohol.” I would not read the word “operable" into the statute to permit the jury to require physical control of an operable motor vehicle.
Operability has nothing to do with control, and allowing the defense to raise it needlessly complicates what should be a straightforward determination. If defendants can claim, and juries can consider, inoperability, police officers will be forced to test drive every car they stop and parties will be forced to bring in automotive experts to testify. In the end, any trial involving this issue is what will be inoperable.
The real question being raised here is factual impossibility. The defense argument appears to be that a driver cannot possibly cause harm while in control of an inoperable vehicle. But factual impossibility is never a valid defense in a case like this one. C. Torcía, 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 76 (14th ed. 1978).
I respectfully dissent from the court's conclusion that inoperability is potentially relevant.