Court Opinion

ID: 9919418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:07:24.977166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.933609
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Minifee, 2024-Ohio-64.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                             No. 112521
                 v.                               :

BRANDON MINIFEE,                                  :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 11, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-07-498906-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, Owen Knapp and Alan F. Dowling, Assistant
                 Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

                 Kimberly Kendall Corral and Gabrielle M. Ploplis, for
                 appellant.

LISA B. FORBES, J.:

                   Brandon Minifee (“Minifee”) appeals the trial court’s journal entry

denying his motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. After reviewing the facts

of the case and pertinent law, we reverse the trial court’s decision.
I.   Facts and Procedural History

               On December 14, 2007, Minifee was found guilty of felony murder

with firearm specifications, two counts of felonious assault with firearm

specifications, and having a weapon while under disability related to the killing of

Ronald Pierce (“Pierce”). The court sentenced Minifee to an aggregate term of 19-

years-to-life in prison. In 2009, this court affirmed in part and reversed in part

Minifee’s convictions and prison sentence. State v. Minifee, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 91017, 2009-Ohio-3089, (“Minifee I”).          Specifically, this court found that

Minifee’s felony-murder conviction and two felonious-assault convictions should

have merged into one allied offense for sentencing purposes under R.C. 2941.25.

Minifee I at ¶ 106, 113. This court remanded the case to the trial court “for further

proceedings consistent with [the] opinion” in Minifee I.1 Minifee I at ¶ 115. This

remand order contemplated a resentencing hearing for merger of allied offenses.

See State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 13

      1 Our review of the record shows that the court did not hold a resentencing hearing

in accordance with Minifee I’s mandate. We note that, in 2013, this court released State
v. Minifee, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99780, 2013-Ohio-5132 (“Minifee II”), in which the
trial court was again instructed to resentence Minifee pursuant to the mandate in Minifee
I. Minifee II at ¶ 3.

       This case is remanded to the trial court for a third time to resentence Minifee. We
note that, on August 9, 2011, the state filed a “notice of election of allied offenses and
request for hearing on order of remand,” in which it elected to proceed to resentencing on
Minifee’s felony-murder conviction. We further note that “[w]hen an inferior tribunal
refuses to follow the mandate of [a] superior one, mandamus or prohibition may lie.”
State ex rel. Gallagher v. Collier-Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111229, 2022-Ohio-
1177, ¶ 13. See also State ex rel. Heck v. Kessler, 72 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 647 N.E.2d 792
(1995) (“[I]n Ohio, it is recognized that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy to
require a lower court to comply with an appellate court’s mandate directed to that
court.”).
(“[F]or an allied-offenses sentencing error[,] the appellate court’s remand requires

the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing.”).

               Pertinent to this appeal, on August 5, 2021, and on October 4, 2021,

Minifee filed motions for leave to file a motion for a new trial based on newly

discovered evidence. This court will address Minifee’s motions together. Attached

to the motions are three affidavits. In one of the affidavits, Patricia Gunn (“Gunn”),

who testified at Minifee’s trial, recanted her testimony that “[s]he did not see Pierce

shooting a gun.” Instead she claimed that she saw Pierce had a firearm and shot at

Minifee “three times” before Minifee “might have shot back” at Pierce. We find that

Gunn’s affidavit is dispositive of this appeal and limit our discussion accordingly.

               On February 16, 2023, the trial court denied Minifee’s motions for

new trial. The next day, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law,

which include the following as related to Gunn’s affidavit: “Minifee provided no date

specific information as to when he actually learned about * * * Gunn’s recantation

to counsel * * *.” Therefore, the trial court concluded, the “over 13[-]year delay was

wholly unreasonable.”

               It is from this order that Minifee appeals, raising, verbatim, these five

assignments of error for our review:

      I. The trial court abused its discretion wholly ignored the Supreme
      Court decision of State v. Bethel, instead holding that a defendant must
      establish that he filed his motion for leave within a reasonable time
      after discovering the evidence relief upon to support the motion for new
      trial.
      II. The trial court abused its discretion when it confused the delay
      standard set forth in R.C. 2953.23 with the delay standard Criminal
      Rule 33 which only requirs the defendant to establish he was
      unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence on which he
      relies within 120 of his conviction.

      III. The trial court abused its discretion when it inferred, based on no
      facts, that Minifee could have discovered the information in Patricia
      Gunn, Dennis White, and Dameian Webber

      IV. The trial court abused its discretion when it determined that
      Minifee was not unavoidably delayed from discovering information
      which the state did not disclose in violation of appellant Minifees 4th
      and 15th amendment rights.

      V.    The trial court abused its discretion in failing to hold an
      evidentiary hearing.

II. Law and Analysis

               Appellate courts review the denial of leave to file a motion for a new

trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Sutton, 2016-Ohio-7612, 73 N.E.3d 981, ¶ 13

(8th Dist.).   An abuse of discretion ‘“connotes more than an error of law or

judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable.”’ Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140

(1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). The

Ohio Supreme Court recently explained that an abuse of discretion “involves more

than a difference of opinion.” State v. Weaver, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4371,

¶ 24. That is, a trial court’s judgment that is “profoundly and wholly violative of fact

and reason” constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.

               Pursuant to Crim.R. 33(A)(6), a “new trial may be granted on motion

of the defendant * * * [w]hen new evidence material to the defense is discovered
which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and

produced at the trial.” Under Crim.R. 33(B), motions for a new trial based on “newly

discovered evidence” shall be filed within 120 days from the day the verdict was

rendered. There is an exception to this 120-day rule: “If it is made to appear by clear

and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from the

discovery of the evidence upon which he must rely, such motion shall be filed within

seven days from” the day the court grants the motion for leave to file a motion for a

new trial. Crim.R. 33(B).

               The Ohio Supreme Court has explained “clear and convincing” proof

as follows: “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.

It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of

such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt * * *. It does not mean clear

and unequivocal.” (Emphasis sic.) Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120

N.E.2d 118 (1954).

               Ohio courts have cited with approval the Tenth District’s explanation

of “unavoidably prevented”: “a party is unavoidably prevented from filing a motion

for new trial if the party had no knowledge of the existence of the ground supporting

the motion for new trial and could not have learned of the existence of that ground

within the time prescribed for filing the motion for new trial in the exercise of

reasonable diligence.” State v. Walden, 19 Ohio App.3d 141, 145-146, 483 N.E.2d
859 (10th Dist.1984). See also State v. Glover, 2016-Ohio-2833, 64 N.E.3d 442,

¶ 27 (8th Dist.) (citing Walden with approval).

               Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that Crim.R. 33(B)

“does not establish a time frame in which a defendant must seek leave to file a

motion for a new trial based on the discovery of new evidence.” State v. Bethel, 167

Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470, ¶ 55. Bethel rejected the notion

that “it was within the trial court’s discretion to deny Bethel’s motion for leave based

on Bethel’s failure to file the motion within a reasonable time after discovering” the

new evidence. Id. at ¶ 58.

               Upon review, we find that the trial court erred when it denied

Minifee’s motion for leave based, in part, on the “wholly unreasonable” delay

between “discovering” the new evidence and filing the motion, as well as Minifee’s

failure to provide “date specific information as to when he actually learned about

* * * Gunn’s recantation * * *.” Under Bethel and Crim.R. 33(B), these are not proper

reasons to deny a motion for leave to file a motion for new trial.

               Comparing Gunn’s affidavit to her testimony at Minifee’s trial, we

find the affidavit presents new evidence. Gunn states the following in her affidavit

pertinent to Minifee’s argument that he should be granted leave to file a motion for

a new trial: Gunn saw the Pierce shooting from her bedroom window. Her house is

across the street from where the shooting took place. “My window overlooks the

street and I could see across the street. * * * I saw the whole thing.” Pierce got out

of a car and walked across the street toward a truck. Minifee was “right at the back
of the truck looking at” Pierce. Pierce said, “[Y]ou waiting on me?” Minifee did not

say anything. Pierce pulled out a gun. Pierce “fired his gun. He just started shooting

at [Minifee]. I think he shot three times. I heard more gun shots, I think [Minifee]

might have shot back. I didn’t see him. I just saw sparks.” Pierce said he was “hit,”

put his gun in “the mailbox,” and ran back to his porch.

              Gunn’s affidavit states that Pierce “fired that gun first.” According to

Gunn, she and Minifee “didn’t get along.”

      This was not a murder. [Minifee] was just shooting in self defense.
      [Pierce] was shooting at him first. I feel guilty about how I testified. I
      was just so mad at [Minifee] back then. It bothers me, it really bothers
      me real bad that he has done so much time. I know what I saw and I
      know in my heart he didn’t want to do that. It bothers me. I know
      [Minifee] didn’t murder [Pierce] because I know what I saw. I know
      my testimony at trial wasn’t all of what I saw. I had so much anger at
      Minifee back then and it just came out that way. I need to do the right
      thing now and tell what [I] saw. These are the facts.

              Gunn’s testimony at Minifee’s 2007 bench trial was described as

follows in Minifee I regarding what she saw and heard from her second-story

bedroom window:

      [S]he heard a car pull up and then a car door slam. She looked out her
      window again and “heard [Pierce] say * * * you waiting on me.” She
      explained that when Pierce said that, he was “headed up the steps” to
      his porch. And then, “the gunshot started, just boom, boom, boom.”
      She said the shots came from behind a black truck parked * * * between
      the truck and a red car. She could not see the shooter, but saw a man
      come out from where the shots had come. She watched him walk
      toward East 70th Street and then saw him take his black “hoodie” off.
      When he did, she saw that the man was [Minifee]. She said she could
      see him “real good” under the street light. * * * She did not see Pierce
      shooting a gun.

      ***
       On cross-examination, Gunn agreed that she did not tell the police that
       she saw Minifee shoot Pierce on the night of the murder. When asked
       why, she said that nobody asked her. She told Pierce’s mother three or
       four days later and then called the police.

Minifee I at ¶ 12, 14.

                “A witness’s recantation of testimony can be newly discovered

evidence if the court finds the new testimony credible and if the new testimony

would materially affect the outcome of the trial.” State v. Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 92646, 2010-Ohio-11, ¶ 29. At trial, Gunn testified that Minifee was the sole

shooter, and she did not see Pierce fire a gun. In her affidavit, Gunn stated that, not

only did Pierce fire a gun, he shot at Minifee before Minifee “might have shot back.”

Gunn’s affidavit amounts to a recantation of her trial testimony, which may be a

proper reason to grant a new trial to Minifee should he be granted leave to file his

motion.

               In following the Crim.R. 33(B) test for granting leave to file a motion

for a new trial, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether there is “clear

and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from”

discovering Gunn’s recantation.

               In State v. Alexander, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2011-T-0120, 2012-

Ohio-4468, ¶ 18-20, the court provided context for analyzing leave to file a motion

for a new trial based on a trial witness’s recantation:

       The case law has not provided a clear guidance as to what is required of
       an appellant in order to show unavoidable delay, when the newly
       discovered evidence is a recantation of trial testimony. Some courts
       have held that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the
      issue of unavoidable delay if the defendant’s motion for leave includes
      documents that “on their face” support the defendant’s claim that he
      was unavoidably prevented from timely discovering the evidence.
      State v. McConnell, 170 Ohio App.3d 800, 2007 Ohio 1181, 869 N.E.2d
      77 (2d Dist.2007); State v. York, 2d Dist. No. 99-CA-54, 2000 Ohio
      App. LEXIS 550 (Feb. 8, 2000). In these Second District cases, the
      appellant presented a recanting affidavit from a trial witness, and the
      court held that because the affidavit on its face supported a claim of
      unavoidable delay, the appellant would be entitled to a hearing on the
      issue of unavoidable delay.

      Following these cases, therefore, it would appear that the trial court,
      before denying the motion for leave to file a delayed motion, should
      have held a hearing to determine whether there is unavoidable delay in
      the motion for a new trial filed by an appellant in the position of Mr.
      Alexander, who presented a recanting affidavit showing the witness
      decided to recant his testimony beyond the 120-day period. As such,
      an appellant would have no control over the time when the witness
      decided to “do the right thing,” and thus could not have learned of the
      existence, even in the exercise of reasonable diligence, [of] the affidavit
      * * *.

      As to what type of evidence is required to show unavoidable delay, at
      least one court suggested that the appellant should present the
      following evidence for the trial court’s consideration: “when or why the
      affiants decided to recant their trial testimony, whether appellant
      played a role in that decision, or whether and at what point appellant
      learned of their willingness to come forward with the new testimony.”
      [State v.] Peals, [6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1035, 2010-Ohio-5893, ¶]
      24.

               Alexander, like the vast majority of cases analyzing leave to file a

motion for a new trial based on trial witness recantation, was decided prior to Bethel,

167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470. As explained previously,

Bethel eliminated the oft-used consideration of whether the motion for leave was

filed within a “reasonable time” from the time the defendant “discovered” the new

evidence. Therefore, the trial court, as well as this court, should not consider
whether Minifee filed his motion for leave within a “reasonable time” after

discovering the new evidence.

              Having established that “reasonable time” after discovery of the new

evidence is no longer an appropriate consideration, courts are left with not much to

go on regarding witness recantation other than assessing whether the affidavit

establishes, on its face, that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from

discovering the evidence within 120 days of the verdict. Gunn avers in her affidavit

that she “need[s] to do the right thing now * * *”; she “had so much anger at

[Minifee] back then * * *”; and she “feel[s] guilty about how [defense counsel]

testified.” Gunn’s affidavit, on its face, shows why she decided to recant in 2021.

Nothing suggests that Minifee played any role in Gunn’s decision to recant. In fact,

in Minifee’s motion for leave, his defense counsel stated that Gunn “had contact with

[her] on another matter.” It is worth noting that Minifee has been incarcerated since

this shooting occurred in 2007 and has had limited resources to investigate the

possibility that the state’s only eyewitness to the shooting — who, incidentally, did

not get along with Minifee and was “angry” at him when she testified against him —

would one day change her mind.

              Gunn’s statements in her affidavit, coupled with the fact the she was

subject to cross-examination at Minifee’s trial, establish, by clear and convincing

proof, that Minifee was unavoidably prevented from “discovering,” within 120 days

from his trial, that Gunn would recant her testimony.
               Additionally, we are mindful that this case concerns leave to file a

motion. It does not concern, at least yet, the merits of whether Minifee is entitled to

a new trial. See, e.g., State v. Tiedjen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106794, 2019-Ohio-

2430, ¶ 41 (citations omitted) (“Specifically, the trial court’s analysis improperly

‘conflates two distinct issues’ by resolving the motion for leave based on the merits

of whether the appellant is entitled to a new trial rather than addressing the

threshold issue of whether appellant was unavoidably prevented from discovering

new evidence.’”). The credibility of Gunn’s statements does not factor into whether

Minifee should be granted leave to file a motion for a new trial, and we leave that

question for another day.

               Minifee’s first assignment of error is sustained.      The remaining

assignments of error are rendered moot pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

               Judgment reversed. Case remanded to the trial court to allow Minifee

to file a motion for a new trial, upon which the court should conduct a hearing

pursuant to Crim.R. 33(A)(6). Also, as noted previously in this opinion, case

remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., DISSENTING:

                Application of Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192

N.E.3d 470, and State v. Hatton, 169 Ohio St.3d 446, 2022-Ohio-3991, 205 N.E.3d

513, is creating a bright-line rule that all defendants must be granted leave to file a

belated motion for new trial when the defendant is able to present any alleged

recantation of trial testimony. The Ohio Supreme Court had an opportunity to

provide clarity on reviewing a motion for leave to file a belated motion for new trial

but was unable to do so. This bright-line application of Bethel and Hatton that is

developing runs roughshod over how courts have traditionally defined and analyzed

newly discovered recantation evidence. Neither Bethel nor Hatton altered the

totality of that analysis. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the

decision of the trial court.

                This case boils down to the fact that Minifee believes his felony-

murder conviction, based on the undisputed fact that the death of Pierce occurred as

a proximate result of the felonious assault Minifee committed against Pierce, should

be called into question because a trial witness now claims that a shootout occurred
after Minifee confronted and threatened Pierce’s life at his home. That recanted

testimony, even assuming the truth of it, is immaterial to the outcome of trial.

Throughout trial, the state conceded that a shootout occurred between Pierce and

Minifee after Minifee threatened Pierce’s life on at least two occasions immediately

preceding the shooting. There is nothing new here, and therefore, the recantation

cannot be deemed to be newly discovered evidence that Minifee was “unavoidably

prevented” from timely discovering under the applicable standard. See Gray, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92646, 2010-Ohio-11, at ¶ 29, citing State v. Burke, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 06AP-686, 2007-Ohio-1810, ¶ 18.

                Further, Minifee presented affidavits attached to his motion for leave

that confirmed the jury’s verdict including, for the first time against his own interest,

direct evidence that he possessed the same caliber weapon that fired the lethal shot.

There is no need for further expenditure of judicial resources in this matter.

                The result of this case aptly demonstrates that there is no longer any

gatekeeping function with respect to reviewing a motion for leave to file a motion for

new trial when that motion involves an alleged recantation of trial testimony. As the

majority concludes, the recantation is necessarily newly discovered evidence since

the defendant would never be able to present that affidavit until the witness decides

to recant. I believe this bright-line rule goes too far and strays from the applicable

standards. Under Minifee’s theory, leave to file a belated motion for new trial is

perfunctory because he was able to muster one affidavit recanting some trial

testimony and courts are unable to review the credibility of the affidavit until after
granting leave. Because leave is required before a belated motion for a new trial may

be filed, courts must be able to review whether the evidence submitted is even

material to the outcome of trial in order to preserve some semblance of discretion

with respect to the request for leave. Gray at ¶ 29. To conclude otherwise in cases

involving alleged recantations renders the motion for leave to file a belated motion

for new trial to be a perfunctory act of no importance. Crim.R. 33 requires a

convicted offender to seek leave before filing a belated motion for new trial. That

leave requirement must have meaning.

               Recantations are not necessarily newly discovered information just

because the recantation belatedly occurred. This case is emblematic of this point.

Gunn’s recantation in this case is best defined as a new twist on old evidence —

Minifee was always aware of her perjured testimony and several times tried to prove

that point through trial and postconviction proceedings. Thus, although Gunn’s

recantation is newly available, the subject matter of the recantation is not newly

discovered evidence. Generally, under Crim.R. 33, just because a defendant is

finally able to prove something over time, does not make that proof newly discovered

evidence per se, solely because of when it was obtained. State v. Lenard, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 112283 and 112966, 2023-Ohio-4529, ¶ 13, citing State v. Jackson,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108241, 2019-Ohio-4893, ¶ 20, and State v. Cashin, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-338, 2017-Ohio-9289. Although some recantations will

truly be considered newly discovered evidence, as defined as evidence materially
affecting the outcome of trial, courts cannot create a bright-line rule establishing

that all recantations necessarily meet that standard.

               Under Crim.R. 33, “[t]he sole question before the trial court when

considering whether to grant leave is whether the defendant has established by clear

and convincing proof that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the

evidence on which he seeks to base the motion for a new trial.” Hatton, 169 Ohio

St.3d 446, 2022-Ohio-3991, 205 N.E.3d 513, at ¶ 30, citing Bethel 167 Ohio St.3d

362, 2022-Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470, at ¶ 41. The weight, or credibility, of the

evidence presented can only be considered in resolving the motion for new trial itself.

Id. Thus, a motion for leave must demonstrate two things: (1) that the defendant has

obtained what constitutes newly discovered evidence; and (2) that he was

“unavoidably prevented” from timely discovering that evidence. Minifee has not

demonstrated either factor.

      A. Facts

               The facts were thoroughly presented in Minifee’s direct appeal,

Minifee I at ¶ 4-31. It suffices for the purposes of this postconviction proceeding that

Minifee and Pierce were involved in a day-long, ongoing feud regarding Minifee’s

belief that Pierce owed $200 for drugs Pierce had taken. Various witnesses heard

the two arguing around Pierce’s home throughout the day. At one point, the two

were on Pierce’s porch and Minifee brandished a firearm and threatened Pierce:

“I’m not playing with you, man, I’m going to kill you. I want my money or my shit.”

Id. at ¶ 11. That incident was deescalated by Pierce leaving. Evidently, Minifee
remained at Pierce’s home. Importantly for the current procedural posture of this

case, Dennis White was present and confirmed that series of events.

               Gunn lived across the street.    She too witnessed the argument

escalating between Minifee and Pierce throughout the day, including Minifee’s

threat on Pierce’s porch. A while later, Gunn heard a car pull up, and she heard

Pierce say, “[Y]ou punk mother-fu***, you waiting on me.” She explained that when

Pierce said that, he was “headed up the steps” to his porch. And then, “the

gunshot[s] started, just boom, boom, boom.” She said the shots came from behind

a black truck parked on Quimby Avenue between the truck and a red car. She could

not see the shooter but saw a man come out from where the shots had come. She

watched him walk toward East 70th Street and then saw him take his black “hoodie”

off. When he did, she saw that the man was Minifee, also known as “Cheezy.” She

said she could see him “real good” under the street light. Gunn said he was wearing

a black “hoodie” with white “stripes or something” on it. She did not see Pierce

shooting a gun. Id. at ¶ 12.

               Upon cross-examination, Gunn confirmed that she never saw Pierce

with a weapon. Gunn did not mention to anyone that her son, Dameian Webber,

may have been present, but she told the jury he was her son. In her testimony, Gunn

testified extensively to her history and relationship with Minifee, including an

incident in which she was convicted for shooting at Minifee. Gunn’s alleged perjury

regarding Pierce’s possession of a firearm formed the basis of Minifee’s 2008
petition for postconviction relief based on a statement from Webber in a 2008

affidavit. That petition was overruled.

               Nevertheless, there was evidence of a shootout between Pierce and

Minifee, as the state even conceded during its closing argument at trial. According

to the state, it did not matter whether Pierce fired the first shots or not; the

altercation was created by Minifee threatening Pierce’s life, and Pierce died as a

result of that altercation.

               The evidence at trial also supported the state’s trial theory that a

shootout occurred. The red car near where Minifee was located according to trial

testimony had bullet defects in the front, driver-side tire. That location was where

Gunn saw what appeared to be shots being fired toward Pierce’s home by someone

she later identified as Minifee. Police officers recovered several 9 mm shell casings

ejected from a semiautomatic handgun around the home, but Pierce was shot with

a .38- or .357-caliber handgun, which is typically a revolver and does not

automatically expel the shell casings after the weapon is discharged. Pierce was shot

in the leg while standing on the steps of his porch, with the bullet entering his thigh

in an upward trajectory according to the coroner’s testimony.           That in part

corroborated Gunn’s trial testimony to seeing Pierce being shot as he stood on the

top step of the stairs to his porch and matched blood stains photographed after the

fact. After being shot, Pierce pounded on the front door and his girlfriend dragged

him inside, where he died from blood loss. The bullet pierced his femoral artery.
               Forensic testing, introduced at trial, indicated that Pierce had

gunshot residue on his left hand, but there were no metallic deposits consistent with

his actually holding a firearm. It is unclear whether Pierce is left- or right-handed.

               Shahid Saifullah, who had known Minifee for years, spoke with him

while both were incarcerated. His testimony was that

      he saw Minifee in the “holding area.” He said they talked for about one-
      and-a-half hours. Saifullah asked Minifee what happened. He said that
      Minifee told him that Pierce shot at him first. According to Saifullah,
      Minifee also told him that he would not have shot at Pierce if Pierce had
      not shot at him. Minifee further explained to Saifullah that he had left
      some crack cocaine in an abandoned house across the street from
      Pierce’s house. Minifee said he left for a short time; when he came
      back, the drugs were gone. A girl in the neighborhood told Minifee that
      she had bought crack cocaine from Pierce. Minifee saw the girl’s crack
      cocaine and identified it as the drugs he had left in the abandoned
      house. Minifee then went to Pierce and demanded that Pierce give him
      the “stuff” or $200.

      On cross-examination, Saifullah said that the “first information on the
      street” was that “four guys with black hoodies came from behind the
      house, and attempted to rob [Pierce].” Saifullah stated that he heard at
      least 25 shots.

Minifee I at ¶ 25-26.

               In his motion for leave to file a belated motion for new trial, Minifee

presented three affidavits.

               In the first affidavit, Webber, who is Gunn’s son, claims to have been

on Gunn’s front porch when the shooting occurred. In his affidavit, Webber claims

to have seen Pierce “hop out of the car and ask [Minifee] ‘are you looking for me’ or

‘are you waiting on me,’ something like that. I heard like four gunshots, pop pop
pop pop. I saw the gun in [Pierce’s] hands, he was shooting toward [Minifee].”

Webber claims Minifee never fired or possessed a weapon.

               In the second affidavit, White, who was present and witnessed

Minifee threaten Pierce with a handgun on the porch, claims the events unfolded

quite differently. According to White, Pierce jumped out of the car, pulled a

handgun from his waistband, and proceeded to shoot himself in the groin or leg,

which remarkably differs from the coroner’s testimony regarding the bullet’s

upward trajectory and the blood evidence found at the crime scene indicating that

Pierce was shot on the steps while ascending the stairs as Gunn testified. Pierce,

according to White, climbed onto the porch, fired his weapon, went inside, and then

stepped outside once again to discharge “like three more shots.” Pierce then went

into the living room and collapsed. White claims that Pierce was internally bleeding

into his stomach, which became distended — a curious statement in light of the

coroner’s testimony establishing that the bullet traveled through Pierce’s upper

thigh coming to rest in his buttocks.

               Confusingly, from Minifee’s current perspective, White then averred

that “I know Brandon [(Minifee)] didn’t murder him [(Pierce)]. The man shot

himself. Brandon [(Minifee)] had a .357 Dude [sic] had a 9 mm.” (Emphasis added.)

White seemingly confirms that Minifee had the same caliber weapon that caused

Pierce’s death on the night of the shooting, a fact of consequence the state was

unable to provide direct evidence of at trial.
               And finally, Minifee presented an affidavit from Gunn, in which she

purportedly admitted to providing perjured testimony at Minifee’s trial.           Her

affidavit largely tracked the trial evidence about seeing shots fired from the area that

Minifee was standing (which coupled with White’s affidavit seems to confirm the

facts to support the felony-murder conviction), but she now claims that she saw

Pierce with a firearm and shooting at Minifee after getting out of the car, in direct

contradiction of her unambiguous trial testimony to the contrary. She also claims

Minifee shot back, but she did not see him actually firing the weapon (a statement

that reflects her trial testimony that she never saw Minifee shooting, only that she

saw sparks from the area where Minifee was located during the shooting). She also

now claims that Pierce was shot after getting out of the car, which was near the street

according to the trial evidence, and ran back to the porch (instead of being shot on

the top step while ascending the steps as her trial and other testimony unequivocally

established). And finally, she confirms that Minifee did indeed shoot Pierce.

               Gunn claims she only testified that Pierce did not have or shoot a

firearm because she “was just so mad at [Minifee] back then.” She came forward

because of remorse, but she now claims, “I know what I saw and I know in my heart

he didn’t want to do that. I know [Minifee] didn’t murder [Pierce] because I know

what I saw.” Her statement as to knowing Minifee did not murder Pierce is not

relevant to the felony-murder charge. Minifee was convicted of causing the death of

Pierce as a proximate result of Minifee committing a felonious assault.
      B. Newly Discovered Evidence Analysis

               As has been the standard for decades, a defendant is “unavoidably

prevented” from filing a motion for new trial if he can demonstrate that he “‘had no

knowledge of the existence of the ground’ supporting the new-trial motion and could

not have learned of the existence of that ground within the time prescribed for filing

a new-trial motion.” (Emphasis sic.) Lenard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 112283 and

112966, 2023-Ohio-4529, at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Conner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 103092, 2016-Ohio-301, ¶ 21; Walden, 19 Ohio App.3d at 145-146, 483 N.E.2d

859. Under binding black-letter law, “[a] defendant cannot claim that evidence was

undiscoverable merely because the defendant or his defense counsel did not

undertake to obtain the evidence sooner.” Id., citing Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 108241, 2019-Ohio-4893, at ¶ 20, citing Cashin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-

338, 2017-Ohio-9289.

               This analysis applies equally to recanting witnesses. A defendant may

not claim that evidence was undiscoverable simply because an affidavit recanting

testimony was not obtained sooner. State v. Miller, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110571,

2022-Ohio-378, ¶ 14, (“Miller I ”) aff’d, State v. Miller, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-

3448, ¶ 1 (“Miller II”), citing State v. Fortson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82545, 2003-

Ohio-5387, ¶ 11; see also State v. Houston, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112689, 2023-

Ohio-3888, ¶ 20 (concluding that the newly discovered disciplinary history of a

nontestifying witness was not material to the defense, and therefore, the trial court

did not err by denying the defendant leave to file a motion for new trial). Although
the Ohio Supreme Court accepted Miller I for review, the court was unable to muster

a majority vote to reverse the appellate decision. Miller II at ¶ 1 (“In the absence of

four votes to reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, that

judgment is affirmed.”). Miller II presented a missed opportunity to present some

clarity in this area, but Miller nonetheless remains the law of this district.

                Before Bethel and Hatton, courts considered a witness’s recantation

as newly discovered evidence “if the court finds the new testimony credible and if the

new testimony would materially affect the outcome of the trial.” Gray, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 92646, 2010-Ohio-11, at ¶ 29, citing Burke, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 06AP-686, 2007-Ohio-1810, at ¶ 18. However, under Bethel and Hatton, courts

may no longer assess the credibility of the evidence a defendant proffers within his

motion for leave. Thus, under that standard as altered by Bethel and Hatton, a

witness’s recantation may be deemed to be newly discovered if the testimony would

materially affect the outcome of trial. See id. Neither Bethel nor Hatton overruled

the totality of the existing standard of reviewing alleged recantations under the newly

discovered evidence inquiry. Although those cases eliminated the credibility review

from the newly discovered evidence inquiry, Bethel and Hatton did not impact the

preexisting standard that for a recantation to be considered newly discovered, the

recantation must materially affect the outcome of trial.

                Under that remaining analysis, the trial court correctly determined

that Gunn’s recanted testimony is not material to the outcome at trial. The state

conceded to the jury that a shootout occurred. The entire theory of the case was that
Minifee threatened Pierce’s life causing the shootout in which Pierce was fatally

wounded. Gunn’s recantation does not change or impact that theory. Gunn’s recent

recantation demonstrating what was already proven at trial cannot be deemed newly

discovered evidence.

      C. “Unavoidably Prevented” Analysis

               In addition, to prove the existence of newly discovered evidence, the

defendant must demonstrate that he was “unavoidably prevented” from timely

discovering the recantation. In this case, Minifee was acutely aware that Gunn

perjured herself at trial. He unsuccessfully attempted to prove that point in a petition

for postconviction relief. Tellingly, the majority does not consider the state’s claim

with respect to res judicata, again highlighting the perfunctory nature of a motion for

leave when a defendant proffers a witness’s purported recantation. As it has long

been held, “‘[t]he phrases “unavoidably prevented” and “clear and convincing proof”

do not allow one to claim that evidence was undiscoverable simply because affidavits

were not obtained sooner.’” Lenard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 112283 and 112966,

2023-Ohio-4529, at ¶ 13, citing Fortson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82545,

2003-Ohio-5387, at ¶ 11.      Permitting defendants to continually challenge trial

testimony in this fashion provides no finality to the proceeding.

               Regardless, none of the affidavits presented by Minifee demonstrate

that he was unavoidably prevented from timely filing his motion for new trial.

               “[A] party is unavoidably prevented from filing a motion for a new

trial if the party had no knowledge of the existence of the ground supporting the
motion for new trial and could not have learned of the existence of that ground

within the time prescribed for filing the motion for new trial in the exercise of

reasonable diligence.” Walden, 19 Ohio App.3d 141, at 146, 483 N.E.2d 859; State v.

Struckman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220658, 2023-Ohio-3582, ¶ 8; State v.

Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 111606 and 111612, 2023-Ohio-808, ¶ 26. Minifee

has not demonstrated that he was unavoidably prevented from filing a motion for

new trial based on the affidavits presented with his motion for leave.

              As the trial court concluded in this case, Minifee himself was aware of

White’s presence on the porch when Minifee threatened Pierce’s life while

displaying his handgun and should have been aware of his presence if White

witnessed the shooting given their relationship. Minifee has not explained how he

was unavoidably prevented from timely seeking testimony from White to

demonstrate the prosecutor’s trial concession that a shootout occurred between

Minifee and Pierce when Minifee was aware of his presence on the porch. White’s

affidavit likely explains that omission — White confirmed that Minifee possessed a

.357-caliber handgun, the same caliber weapon that caused Pierce’s death.

              With respect to Webber’s newest affidavit, he had previously

submitted an affidavit alleging the same allegations attached to Minifee’s 2008

petition for postconviction relief; Minifee has not explained how he was unaware of

Webber’s potential testimony either. He simply presumes that he was unavoidably

prevented from obtaining the new-found evidence because Webber did not come

forward sooner. That is facially deficient. App.R. 16(A)(7). Demonstrating that a
defendant was unavoidably prevented from filing a timely motion for new trial

“‘requires more than a mere allegation that a defendant has been unavoidably

prevented from discovering the evidence he seeks to introduce as support for a new

trial.’” State v. Lee, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-229, 2005-Ohio-6374, ¶ 9, quoting

State v. Mathis, 134 Ohio App.3d 77, 79, 730 N.E.2d 410 (1st Dist.1999). A

defendant, in pursuing leave to file a motion for new trial, bears the burden of

demonstrating that he was unavoidably prevented from timely obtaining the

information. A conclusory statement to that effect is not sufficient.

              And finally, the fact that Gunn now admits to perjuring herself during

Minifee’s trial is not considered newly discovered evidence per se as Minifee’s sole

argument contends. Minifee, through counsel, extensively cross-examined Gunn

regarding her relationship with Minifee, including her assault years earlier, and

asked several times whether Gunn saw Pierce with a firearm based on Minifee’s

personal knowledge of the events as they unfolded. “Generally, newly discovered

evidence that purportedly recants testimony given at trial is ‘looked upon with the

utmost caution.’” State v. Nunez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104917, 2017-Ohio-5581,

¶ 35, quoting State v. Nash, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87635, 2006-Ohio-5925, ¶ 10.

An affidavit from a recanting witness testimony is “‘viewed with extreme suspicion

because the witness, by making contradictory statements, either lied at trial, or in

the current testimony, or both times.’” Id., quoting Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 92646, 2010-Ohio-11, at ¶ 29. “A witness’s recantation of testimony can be

newly discovered evidence if the court finds the new testimony credible and if the
new testimony would materially affect the outcome of the trial.”                State v.

Woodward, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-1015, 2009-Ohio-4213, ¶ 20, citing

Burke, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-686, 2007-Ohio-1810, at ¶ 18.

               As briefly discussed before, under Bethel and Hatton, courts must set

aside Gunn’s credibility issues with respect to her recantation. State v. Blanton, 171

Ohio St.3d 19, 2022-Ohio-3985, 215 N.E.3d 467, ¶ 98 (the credibility of affidavits is

not an issue to be resolved in postconviction proceedings); but see State v. Calhoun,

86 Ohio St.3d 279, 292, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999) (the credibility of affidavits presented

in support of postconviction proceedings may be determined if the affidavits appear

frivolous on their face). Minifee, however, has not demonstrated that he was

unavoidably prevented from obtaining evidence proving Gunn’s perjury within the

stated period within which to file a timely motion for new trial.

               Minifee’s sole claim is that Gunn did not recant until now, and that

should not be held against Minifee. As the Tenth District has explained, “‘[I]f a

defendant is aware of the evidence at the time of trial, then it is not newly discovered

evidence under Rule 33.’”          State v. Ambartsoumov, 10th Dist. Franklin

Nos. 12AP-878, 12AP-877, 2013-Ohio-3011, ¶ 23, quoting United States v. Sims,

72 Fed.Appx. 249, 252 (6th Cir.2003). In situations in which “‘a witness who has

indicated to the defendant * * * an unwillingness to testify truthfully at trial * * * but

later supplies an affidavit exonerating the defendant of the offense, the affidavit is

merely newly available evidence, but it is not newly discovered evidence.’”

(Emphasis sic.) Id., quoting Sims; see also State v. Sawyer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 84487, 2004-Ohio-6911, ¶ 14, fn. 4. As Minifee has aptly demonstrated, White

was present on the day of the shooting and could confirm his theory that a shootout

occurred to further demonstrate Gunn’s perjury to the jury (if even necessary since

the state conceded that point at trial), but Minifee failed to exercise diligence in

obtaining White’s testimony. Although Gunn’s recantation is recent, her alleged

fabrication and the underlying fact of consequence regarding Pierce’s possession of

a firearm was known to Minifee at the time of trial and at the time of filing his

petition for postconviction relief. The trial court did not err in concluding that

Minifee was not prevented from presenting that evidence at trial.

               Generally, the fact that an offender can prove something is not to say

that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the information timely.

               Minifee, throughout the trial and the 2008 postconviction

proceedings, has maintained that Gunn perjured herself by testifying that she did

not see Pierce fire a weapon at Minifee. This evidence is not new to Minifee; he was

aware of whether he was shot at or not — and in fact the state conceded at trial that

a shootout occurred and that Pierce may have shot at Minifee. Without more than

Minifee’s conclusory statement that he was unavoidably prevented from obtaining

Gunn’s affidavit within 14 days of his trial, it cannot be concluded that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying leave. As this court has continually defined the

phrase “unavoidably prevented,” Minifee cannot demonstrate the lack of knowledge

of the existence of Gunn’s testimony that demonstrated what the state argued was
true at trial: Pierce had a weapon and a shootout occurred. Johnson, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 111606 and 111612, 2023-Ohio-808, at ¶ 26.

               Minifee is asking for a bright-line rule that providing any evidence

from a recanting witness would warrant leave to file a motion for new trial and that

a trial court must be declared as a matter of law. I cannot join the majority’s

acceptance of that proposition. And further, Minifee cannot demonstrate that

Gunn’s recantation was material to the outcome of trial as required under Gray, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92646, 2010-Ohio-11, at ¶ 29. Id., citing Burke, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 06AP-686, 2007-Ohio-1810, at ¶ 18. This case reaches the same issues

that the Ohio Supreme Court was unable to clarify in Miller II, demonstrating a lack

of clarity with respect to Crim.R. 33 and alleged recantations. In this vacuum, the

majority pushed this district over the edge of creating a bright-line rule that all

motions for leave under Crim.R. 33 must be granted if the convicted offender is able

to muster any affidavit from a recanting witness, no matter the materiality of that

recantation.

               It is from that conclusion that I respectfully dissent.