Court Opinion

ID: 9718211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:18:54.746351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:57.965745
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
The facts of this case, had we heard them fifteen years ago, would have lent themselves to only one conclusion. In 1967, this Court wrote that “[ejvery precept of the law, as well as every instinct and rule of reason, dictate that a child of tender age should not be taken from its mother unless brute circumstances dictate that the child would fare badly with its mother. Nothing less than gross, inexcusable neglect, coupled with evidence of unconcern and irresponsibility toward meeting the duties devolving upon a mother in raising her child can take her offspring away from her.” In re Adoption of Austin, 426 Pa. 441, 233 A.2d 526 (1967).
*205The presumption in favor of mothers when deciding custody cases was a long-standing tradition in this Commonwealth, stemming from the sexist notion that women are uniquely equipped to raise children. It eventually became clear, however, that the bare preference for maternal love did not coincide with the law’s overriding concern in child custody cases, the best interests of the child.
In Commonwealth, ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977), this Court held that the outmoded “tender years doctrine” was a violation of Equal Protection as it was “offensive to the concept of the equality of the sexes which we have embraced as a constitutional principle within this jurisdiction.” 470 Pa. at 298-9, 368 A.2d at 639-640. The constitutional prohibition against sex-based discrimination is by now firmly rooted in the jurisprudential mortar of this Commonwealth. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner, 505 Pa. 571, 482 A.2d 542 (1984). As a result, when reviewing a custody award, an appellate court may not make assumptions about the fitness of those seeking custody based solely on their gender, but may only determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in making its determination.
In this case, the incontrovertible factual findings of the trial court were that while both homes were equally suitable for the child, the child expressed a clear preference to live with the father which was supported by good reasons. It was not a “bare preference,” as the Superior Court indicated, but a desire to leave behind certain circumstances of mistreatment which the trial court obviously accepted as true.
The court’s factual findings demonstrate that its decision to award custody to the father was not unreasonable and, therefore, does not represent an abuse of discretion. The Superior Court’s reversal can only have represented an archaic presumption that a child is best left with its mother.
I therefore agree with the result reached by the majority.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.