Court Opinion

ID: 9807722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:14:14.765295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:33.736004
License: Public Domain

Clark, J.
dissenting: This action is for the recovery of twenty-five acres of land, specifically described in the complaint by metes and bounds. The complaint avers that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to possession thereof, and that defendant is wrongfully in possession. The answer denies these averments, and further denies that there is any such land in the county as that described in the complaint.
The following issue was submitted to the jury: “ Is the plaintiff the owner of the land described in the complaint and entitled to possession thereof?” To which the jury responded, “Yes; one-seventh of the Sandy Bmtom tract, 160 acres.” And the Court below gave the plaintiff judgment for the twenty-five acns described in the complaint.
When this case was here before (103 N. C., 14), the Court construed that the plaintiff was entitled to an undivided one-seventh of the 25 acres. This is now conceded to have been an inadvertence, as the effect was to give the defendant six-sevenths of 25 acres described in the complaint, when the jury found that the plaintiff was the owner of the whole, and to give plaintiff one-seventh of 25 acres, when the verdict gave him land which it described as one-seventh of 160 acres, thus giving plaintiff one-forty-ninth instead of one-seventh of 160 acres. This inadvertence resulted from treat*341ing tlie verdict as necessarily for an undivided one-seventh, and as if plaintiff were suing as a tenant in common to be let into possession with his co-tenants.
The verdict was evideiitly for “ the land described in the complaint ” It says so, and the superadded description of it as one-seventli of the Sandy Bottom tract is doubtless caused by the denial in the answer that there was any such land in the county. There seems no confusion in the verdict in this view, and the learned Judge who tried the cause, and who comprehended all the points in controversy, must have understood there was none, or he would not have received the verdict in that shape. A consideration of the evidence will sustain this view, which is so entirely in accordance with the pleadings, the issue, and the judgment The case on appeal states: “ On the trial it was agreed that one Ezekiel Leary had originally owned the land. The plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that Emanuel Leary was son and heir of Ezekiel Leary, and then offered a deed from ■Emanuel Leary to Bradford Allen, dated- in 1842 The plaintiff then offered evidence that he was son and heir of Bradford Allen, who had six other children, his heirs. There was evidence tending to show the location of the land described in the deed to Bradford Allen, and tending to show that it was known as the “ Sandy Bottom tract of 160 acres.” There was also evidence tending to show possession by Bradford Allen, and those claiming under him, for forty years, of the land in controversy. There were many deeds offered by defendant from heirs of Ezekiel Leary and others, which defendant insisted covered the land in controversy, and offered evidence tending to show it. There was no evidence that any judicial proceeding had ever been had for partition of the lands of Ezekiel Leary. The defendants claimed under deed from the heirs of Ezekiel Leary, which they contended covered the land in controversy. Take it that Emanuel Leary was tenant in common with the other *342heirs of Ezekiel Leary, still Emanuel Leary’s deed to Bradford Allen in 1842 for the Sandy Bottom 160 acres was color of title; and the forty years open adverse and continuous possession under it, of the specific twenty-five acres in controversy, by Bradford Allen and his son, the plaintiff, gives them the title against the co-tenants, heirs of Ezekiel Leary, and the defendants who claim under them. Indeed, twenty years would have been mfficieut, even if co tenancy had been admitted. Gaylord v. Respass, 92 N. C., 553. The plaintiff’s title in loto being denied, is an admission of actual ouster, and seven years was sufficient. Withrow v. Biggerstaff, 82 N. C., 82, and Page v. Branch, 97 N. C., 97. It is true that plaintiff is only one of the heirs of Bradford Allen, but one tenant in common can maintain an action for recovery of the common property. Thames v. Jones, 97 N. C., 121; Brittain v. Daniels, 94 N. C., 781; Yancey v. Greenlee, 90 N. C., 319, and cases there cited. This view of the case is clear from the only exception taken on the trial, which was that the Judge charge d, “If the plaintiff, and those under whom he claims, held possession of a part of the land embraced in his deed for moie than s.even years openly, continuously and adversely, it would ripen his title to all the land embraced in his deed, which was not occupied by some one else.” That is, ns the plaintiff', according to the above evidence, had a deed for 160 acres, if he had shown himself in continuous adverse possession of the twenty-five acres de-eribed in the complaint, or any part thereof, for seven years (actual ouster being admitted by defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s title), it would ripen his title to the part so held in adverse possession. The Court could not be understood to charge thus as to the open adverse possession of an undivided one-seventh.
It is true that a plaintiff may claim title to one thousand acres, and on proof of title, or possession ripening a color of title to 100 acres, he will recover the 100 acres. But *343here he alleges title to twenty-five acres; he shows color of title to 160 acres, and adverse possession ripening that title to the twenty-five acres claimed, , and the jury following, it is to be presumed, the instructions of the Court, answer as to the query, “ Is the plaintiff the owner of the twenty-five acres described in the complaint?” “Yes; he is.” This is clear and unmistakable from the evidence, the charge and the pleadings. That the jury should have added the identifying description of it, that it was one-seventh of the Sandy Bottom tract, is not strange, considering the denial of the location of the land coniained in the answer, and, at the most, it was mere surplusage. There is nothing either in the pleadings, in the evidence, or in the charge, to suggest that the jury could have meant an undivided one-seventh, or anything except a mere identification of the twenty-five acres described in the complaint as being a part of a better known tract called “Sandy Bottom.” It would be a hardship to put the parties to the expense of another trial, in which the Court below says there “ was a volume of evidence,” on account of the well intended identification of the land sued for, which the jury unnecessarily, and by way of surplusage, added to their unequivocal finding that the plaintiff was “ the owner and entitled to possession of the land described in the complaint”
The defendant, indeed, in his printed brief, admits that the deed of 1842 to the plaintiff, in fact, conveyed only the twenty-five acres specifically described in the complaint, but it is immaterial whether the color of title was for 160 acres or twenty-five acres; besides, we must follow the case as stated by the Judge. The Judge told the jury the plaintiff could recover the twenty-five acres, or a part thereof, if embraced within the color of title, and of which he had shown seven years’ continuous adverse possession. Had the plaintiff shown possession, as well as color of title, beyond the twenty-*344five acres he could not recover it without an amendment to his complaint. This he did not ask He is content with the response of the jury that he is the owner of the land described in the complaint and entitled to its possession. What the jury have given him, he should have judgment for without modification or further litigation.