Court Opinion

ID: 9763321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:41:04.762403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:41.115890
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice,
with whom Justice FLAHERTY joins, dissenting.
We respectfully dissent from the holding in this case. We read the enhanced sentencing provisions of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) as applying to all misdemeanors, including petty misdemeanors. Thus, we would have remanded this case so defendant could be sentenced as a felon pursuant to G.L.1956 § 12-29-5.
General Laws 1956 § ll-45-l(c) (disorderly conduct statute) requires that “[a]ny person found guilty of the crime of disorderly conduct shall be imprisoned for a term of not more than six (6) months, or fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both.” Under G.L.1956 § 11-1-2, petty misdemeanors are those offenses “punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six (6) months or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or both * * When reading these provisions alone, there is no question that disorderly conduct is punishable as a petty misdemeanor. However, such a simplistic analysis belies the General Assembly’s legislative intent.
It is well-established that when this Court interprets a statute, “our ultimate goal is to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. * * * The best evidence of such intent can be found in the plain language used in the statute.” State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 516 (R.I.2004) (quoting Martone v. Johnston School Committee, 824 A.2d 426, 431 (R.I.2003)). If the statute is unclear or ambiguous, however, we will “glean the intent and purpose of the Legislature ‘from a consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind [the] nature, object, language and arrangement’ of the provisions to be construed.” Stebbins v. Wells, 818 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I.2003) (quoting Mottola v. Cirello, 789 A.2d 421, 423 (R.I.2002)).
In State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 643 (R.I.2003), we held that the DVPA is penal in nature. Under the rule of lenity, we acknowledge that if two constructions of a penal statute are possible, then the analysis must resolve in favor of the defendant. State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 924 (R.I.2001).
In this case, however, § 12-29-2(a) (DVPA definitions provision) unambiguously includes disorderly conduct as a *695crime of domestic violence if it involves “one family or household member against another.” See Carter, 827 A.2d at 644. Section 11-45-1 (d) of the disorderly conduct statute states that “[w]here the provisions of ‘The Domestic Violence Prevention Act/ * * * are applicable, the penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5.” Section 12-29-5(c)6 (enhanced sentencing provision) requires that “[e]very person convicted of an offense punishable as a misdemeanor involving domestic violence as defined in [the DPVA definition provision] shall * * * [f]or a third and subsequent violation be deemed guilty of a felony * * There is no question that defendant has been convicted of three domestic crimes; the only issue goes to the classification of those crimes.
The majority holds that because disorderly conduct is a petty misdemeanor and not a misdemeanor, a conviction of disorderly conduct as a third domestic offense under the DVPA will not trigger the enhanced sentencing provision. Under Carter, 827 A.2d at 642, this Court held that a crime would count as a qualifying offense under the enhanced sentencing provision only if it was enumerated in the DVPA definition provision, which includes disorderly conduct among a list of ten other crimes. But reading the majority opinion in conjunction with Carter, the crime of disorderly conduct would be excluded from the DVPA definition provision. This is an illogical result that guts the meaning of the DVPA. Clearly, in enacting the DVPA, the General Assembly intended that all misdemeanors (including petty misdemeanors) and felonies listed in the DVPA definition provision apply so that if a defendant is convicted of any three crimes listed in the DVPA definition provision, then the third conviction will be considered a felony regardless of the classification of the underlying crime.
The disorderly conduct statute is consistent with the purpose of the DVPA, which “is to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a serious crime against society and to assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide.” Section 12-29-1. Reading the disorderly conduct statute in concert with the DVPA leaves us with no doubt about the General Assembly’s intent. Because there is only one possible interpretation, the rule of lenity has no application.
The enhanced sentencing provision is aimed directly at the recidivist, and treats offenders harshly to deter future bad behavior. To conclude that domestic disorderly conduct fails to invoke the guidelines set forth in the enhanced sentencing provision ignores the potential harm to domestic violence victims — the very people the statute is intended to protect. Under the majority’s ruling, a defendant who repeatedly commits the crime of domestic disorderly conduct will continue to pay fines and attend batterer’s intervention courses, but will never be sentenced to more time in prison. Although criminal or penal statutes must be strictly construed, such a construction should not ignore the plain language, intent and meaning of the statute.
The majority’s opinion puts too much weight on one word: petty Black’s Law Dictionary defines “petty” as “[rjelatively insignificant or minor.” Black’s Law Dic*696tionary 1166 (7th ed. 1999). Accordingly, a petty misdemeanor is a misdemeanor that qualifies for less jail time or lower fines relative to other misdemeanors, but it is still a misdemeanor. The word “petty” simply qualifies “misdemeanor,” and therefore is rightly included in the enhanced sentencing provision. Although domestic disorderly conduct is classified as a petty misdemeanor, the Legislature explicitly recognized that in certain situations the crime would require a heftier sentence, specifically a sentence prescribed for felonious conduct. See § 11 — 45—1(d). This understanding is not inconsistent with § 11-1-2, which distinguishes between felonies, misdemeanors, petty misdemeanors and violations. Significantly, § 11-1-2 states that “[ujnless otherwise provided” the four classifications of crimes based on sentences would govern. The DVPA definition provision expressly “otherwise provide[s]” that disorderly conduct, as defined by the disorderly conduct provision, is within the DVPA and will be treated as a felony if the offender has already been twice convicted for misdemeanors or felonies set forth in the DVPA definitions provision.
For the foregoing reasons, we would reverse the decision of the Superior Court.

. General Laws 1956 § 12-29-5(a)-(b) requires that anyone convicted of a domestic offense attend a batterer’s intervention course and pay $25 in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying offense. The majority agrees that § 12-2 9-5 (a)-(b) applies to the crime of disorderly conduct.