Court Opinion

ID: 9781846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:33:43.423396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.440473
License: Public Domain

*489DEITS, C. J.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992. He assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The trial court based its denial of the motion on its conclusion that defendant abandoned any protectable privacy or posses-sory interest in his property. The state cross-assigns error to the trial court’s decision, arguing that an alternative basis for denying the motion to suppress was that the evidence in question was discovered pursuant to a valid inventory. We reverse and remand.
We state the facts as found by the trial court when supported by evidence and, when the trial court has not made findings concerning facts that were in dispute, we presume the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968). While patrolling in the area of S.E. Foster Road and 97th Avenue in Portland, Officer Francis observed defendant riding his bicycle. Francis was familiar with defendant and knew that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Francis yelled at defendant to stop; in response, defendant sped up and rode his bicycle away from Francis. Defendant was apparently attempting to elude Francis, who pursued him. Defendant repeatedly circled the same block in the area of S.E. Foster Road and 99th Avenue, with Francis in pursuit. Defendant cut though the same yard at 9915 S.E. Foster Road, which was located along the block that he and Francis were circling, at least three times. After passing the house at 9915 S.E. Foster Road a third time, defendant threw his bicycle into some bushes on the lot that adjoined the residence and then ran into the house at that address. Francis testified:
“It’s when we had just passed the house again, 9915. And he went about maybe — see 9915 has a — like a fenced in lot connected to it where these guys in the house are storing junked cars. So he went around that lot and cut up the curb. Then it’s kind of overgrown with bushes, sticker bushes and some regular tree-like shrubs or something like that. Kind of an overgrown area. That’s where he threw the bike down right there.”
*490Francis said that he saw defendant run into the house, which was about one-half block away. Apparently, defendant knew the residents of the house. Francis approached the house and called for police assistance. While waiting for assistance, Francis removed defendant’s bicycle from the bushes and placed it near his patrol car. When police assistance arrived, Francis and another officer went to the door of the house and asked to see defendant. After a few minutes, defendant came out of the house and Francis arrested him.
A leather zippered shaving kit, which Francis described as a small travel bag, was attached by a bungee cord to the back of defendant’s bicycle. At some point before leaving 9915 S.E. Foster Road, Francis opened the shaving kit and inventoried its contents. Inside, Francis found $9 in quarters, a pair of shorts, defendant’s eyeglasses, and a small, opaque plastic key case. Francis opened the key case and discovered a bindle of “brown chunky powder substance,” which the police laboratory later identified as methamphetamine.
At trial for possession of a controlled substance, defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from Francis’s inventory, including the evidence found in the key case, arguing, inter alia, that the search violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. In response, the state argued that defendant had abandoned any protectable privacy or possessory interests in the bicycle and the bag. In the alternative, it contended that, even if defendant had not abandoned his interests, the officer discovered the methamphetamine pursuant to a valid police inventory policy. The trial court first rejected the state’s argument that the search of the key case was part of a valid inventory. The court then denied defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that defendant had abandoned his privacy or possessory interests and, thus, the officer’s search of defendant’s property was permissible. We turn first to the issue of abandonment.
In State v. Knox, 160 Or App 668, 675-76, 984 P2d 294, rev den 329 Or 527 (1999), we explained:
*491“ ‘Abandonment’ is a voluntary relinquishment of posses-sory and privacy interests in an article of property that necessarily involves both legal and factual questions. For purposes of ‘abandonment’ in the constitutional sense under the Fourth Amendment, the question is whether a defendant, in discarding the property, has relinquished a reasonable expectation of privacy so that the seizure is reasonable. In essence, what is abandoned is not necessarily the defendant’s property interest under the law of property but the reasonable expectation of privacy in the property. However, if the possessor has been coerced by illegal police conduct, courts will not consider the property to be abandoned in the constitutional sense.” (Citations omitted.)
We went on to explain that the question under Article I, section 9, is similar: “Has defendant relinquished his privacy or possessory interest in the [property] under circumstances that makes its seizure reasonable?” Id. at 676.
The critical inquiry here is whether, under all of the circumstances, defendant abandoned his privacy or possessory interest in the bicycle and the attached bag. See State v. Kauffman, 162 Or App 402, 407, 986 P2d 696 (1999), rev den 329 Or 650 (2000) (we examine the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a defendant has abandoned a protected possessory or privacy interest). We note at the outset that defendant does not contend that Francis’s pursuit and arrest of defendant was illegal in any respect, and, consequently, we must decide only whether defendant intended to forgo the exercise of his privacy and possessory interests. See State v. Ray, 164 Or App 145, 152 n 9, 990 P2d 365 (1999) (noting that the determination of whether a defendant has abandoned a constitutionally protected privacy interest after lawful police conduct turns on whether the defendant intended to forgo the exercise of his or her possessory and privacy interests).
After considering the entire circumstances here, we conclude that defendant did not abandon his privacy or pos-sessory interests in the bicycle and the attached bag. Although defendant separated himself from his possessions while being pursued by the police, he placed those possessions in the bushes on private property rather than in a place that was completely open to the public and where it was *492likely that members of the public would inspect them. See State v. Belcher, 89 Or App 401, 405, 749 P2d 591, affd 306 Or 343, 759 P2d 1096 (1988) (defendant had abandoned privacy interest after fleeing police and leaving his pack “in a public place”). The exact relationship of the fenced lot to the property at 9915 S.E. Foster Road is not entirely clear from the record. The lot was either a part of the property on which the house was located or, at a minimum, it was used by the residents of the house for the storage of junked vehicles. Further, as noted above, defendant remained in the general area where he placed his bicycle — he fled to a house that was about one-half block away.
Another part of the circumstances that we consider significant here is the nature of the property involved. Defendant placed his bicycle, a type of vehicle, on the lot. He then left it there and went inside a nearby house. It is common for a person to leave property of this nature outdoors, unattended. Our statutes, in fact, commonly treat vehicles differently than other property that is left unattended. Compare ORS 819.110 (vehicles deemed abandoned if there is reason to believe the vehicle is in fact abandoned and it is left for more than 24 hours on any public way without authorization) with ORS 98.005 (where money or goods are found and the owner is unknown, such property is considered lost). See also Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure § 2.5(a) at 553 (3d ed 1996) (“[A] car and an overcoat are different; one can hardly expect privacy in an overcoat left on the street, but cars are regularly parked on the street for brief periods of time without an expectation that they will thereby be subject to entry.”). Considering the entire circumstances here, we do not believe that defendant’s actions demonstrate an intent to relinquish his privacy or possessory interest in the items.
Finally, we note that, although an officer’s treatment of property does not determine whether a defendant has abandoned a privacy or possessory interest, Francis’s handling of the property reflects his understanding from defendant’s behavior that defendant did not relinquish his interests in the property. Francis stated that he took the bicycle and the bag and placed them by his patrol car in order to store them for defendant. Under the entire circumstances *493here, we hold that defendant did not abandon his privacy or possessory interests in his bicycle and bag and, accordingly, that the search and seizure of his property cannot be justified on that basis.
This case is distinguishable from our decision today in State v. Dickson, 173 Or App 567, 24 P3d 909 (2001), which also addresses the question of whether a defendant abandons privacy and possessory interests in property that he discards when fleeing the police. In Dickson, the defendant was leaving a residence when police officers left their vehicles, “yelling out that they were police and that they had a search warrant.” Id. at 569. The defendant then dropped his backpack in plain sight of the officers while he was immediately outside of the residence from which he had fled. Unlike this case, in Dickson, “the record [did] not show that defendant took any action indicating that he was attempting to maintain control of the backpack, such as hiding it in a place from which he might later be able to retrieve it.” Id. at 575. Similarly, in Dickson, even though the defendant dropped his backpack in an area where members of the public might be unlikely to seize and search it, the defendant’s act of dropping the backpack was undertaken with an awareness that the police had a search warrant and, in all likelihood, would search the backpack if he dropped it as he fled. Cf. State v. Rounds, 73 Or App 148, 152, 698 P2d 71, rev den 299 Or 663 (1985) (backpack was not abandoned where defendant had left it closed in the private driveway of his grandfather’s residence). Finally, as noted above, the nature of the property at issue is significant. It is more likely that a backpack left on the ground would be inspected than it would be for a vehicle.
We turn now to the inventory argument. In its cross-assignment of error, the state argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the evidence contained in defendant’s key case was not discovered pursuant to a valid inventory of defendant’s property. We review the trial court’s determination of whether an inventoiy meets constitutional standards for errors of law, taking as binding the trial court’s findings of historical facts if evidence supports them. State v. Boone, 327 Or 307, 309, 959 P2d 76 (1998). If findings are not made on all issues, and there is evidence from which the facts could be *494decided in more than one way, we will presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the trial court’s decision. Ball, 250 Or at 487.
 An inventory of the possessions of a person being taken into custody may be conducted without violating Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, if it is made pursuant to “a properly authorized administrative program, designed and systematically administered so that the inventory involves no exercise of discretion^]” State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 10, 688 P2d 832 (1984). Where the record demonstrates that the inventory deviates from the established policy, the inventory is invalid. Id.
In this case, Francis performed the inventory pursuant to Portland City Code section 14.10.040, which provides, in relevant part:
“A. A police officer will inventory the personal property in the possession of a person taken into police custody and such inventory will be conducted whenever:
“1. Such person will be * * * transported in the secure portion of a police vehicle;
* * * *
“C. Inventories of the personal property in the possession of such persons will be conducted according to the following procedures:
íJí >¡< í}:
“3. A closed container in the possession of such person will have its contents inventoried only when:
“a. The closed container is to be placed in the immediate possession of such person at the time that person is placed in the secure portion of a custodial facility, police vehicle or secure police holding room; [or]
“* :Ji * * :¡:
“c. The closed container is designed for carrying money and/or small valuables on or about the person including, but not limited to, closed purses, closed coin purses, closed wallets and closed fanny packs.”
*495The state argues that Francis was justified in opening defendant’s key case, pursuant to Portland City Code section 14.10.040(C)(3)(c),1 because a key case is “designed for carrying money and/or small valuables.”2 However, under the Portland ordinance at issue, a “valuable” is defined as:
“1. Cash money of an aggregate amount of $50 or more; or
“2. Individual items of personal property with a value of over $500.” PCC § 14.10.020.
There is no evidence in the record that the key case involved here was designed to hold anything but a key. A key is not a “valuable” under the ordinance because it is not $50 or more in cash, nor is it an individual item of personal property with a value of over $500. The state argues that a key is itself an item of value because it often gives the holder access to valuables, such as a home or an automobile. We disagree. In view of the specific definition of “valuables” in the ordinance and the purpose of the inventory policy, which is to safeguard a defendant’s possessions and to protect the police from liability, we do not believe that the term, as used in the city’s ordinance, was intended to include items the only value of which is to allow access to other items that may be valuables. We conclude that the ordinance’s use of the term “valuables” includes only items that have the specified value in and of themselves. The opening of defendant’s key case was not permissible under the Portland inventory ordinance, and the trial court correctly ruled that the contents of the key case were inadmissible. Because the city’s inventory policy does not authorize the opening of the key case and, as discussed above, defendant did not abandon his possessory and privacy interests in the bag, we hold that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded.

 On appeal, the state does not separately rely on Portland City Code section 14.10.040(C)(3Xa) to justify the opening of the key case.

 Defendant does not dispute that Francis was justified in opening defendant’s shaving kit under Portland City Code section 14.10.40(CX3Xc), so we confine our analysis to the opening of the key case.