Court Opinion

ID: 9697660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:24:48.538749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:34.112869
License: Public Domain

RAKER, J.,
dissenting.
The sanction in this case should be disbarment. I would not tack on a requirement that before respondent may apply for readmission to the Maryland Bar, he must first be readmitted to the Oklahoma Bar.
I recognize that this disciplinary action arises as a reciprocal disciplinary action. Respondent’s resignation was accepted in Oklahoma, his name was stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, and the state Supreme Court ordered that five years must elapse before he may make application for readmission to that Bar. Oklahoma treats resignation while disciplinary matters are pending as disbarment.
In Maryland, to my knowledge, no disbarred lawyer has been limited, as a matter of court order, to wait any particular period of time or to be readmitted in a foreign jurisdiction, before that lawyer may apply for readmission in the Maryland Bar. This is the situation even in reciprocal disbarment cases. While practically speaking, a disbarred lawyer must wait a substantial period of time before reapplying, this Court has not imposed a five year waiting period. What if respondent had been disbarred in Florida, Louisiana, Kentucky or Oregon, states that have permanent disbarment? Would that mean that respondent would be permanently disbarred in Maryland, even though Maryland does not have permanent disbarment?
*258This Court has stated often that in reciprocal disbarment cases, while we usually impose a like sanction, we are not bound to do so. We have explained as follows:
“This Court has often imposed sanctions, in reciprocal discipline cases, of facially equal severity to those imposed by a sister state. Nevertheless, there is no requirement that this should be done; we need not impose the same sanction as that imposed by the other jurisdiction. In fact, this Court is duty-bound to assess for itself the propriety of the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction and that recommended by the Commission. Indeed, we have stated the rule in reciprocal discipline cases to be:
“ ‘When the Court considers the appropriate sanction in a case of reciprocal discipline, we look not only to the sanction imposed by the other jurisdiction but to our own cases as well. The sanction will depend on the unique facts and circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar misconduct.’ ”
Attorney Grievance v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 83-84, 710 A.2d 926, 934 (1998) (quoting Attorney Grievance v. Willcher, 340 Md. 217, 222, 665 A.2d 1059, 1061 (1995)) (citations omitted); accord Attorney Grievance v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 371, 712 A.2d 525, 533 (1998).
This Court enunciated criteria for reinstatement after disbarment in In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948), which consistently have been reiterated and reaffirmed. See e.g., Matter of Murray, 316 Md. 303, 304-05, 558 A.2d 710, 710-11 (1989); Matter of Cory, 300 Md. 177, 180, 477 A.2d 273, 274 (1984); In re Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 199-200, 316 A.2d 246, 247 (1974); Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Boone, 255 Md. 420, 432-35, 258 A.2d 438, 444-45 (1969). In Murray, we stated as follows:
“Disbarment ‘does not in all circumstances forever prevent reinstatement....’ ‘There may be a point in time when it is proper to reinstate to the practice of law even one who has committed a most heinous crime.’ The fundamental inquiry is ‘whether, in the interval following the rendering of the *259judgment of removal, the petitioner has become a proper person to hold such office.’ ‘We ... look probingly at any reapplieation alleging reform, rehabilitation and competence’ because, although ‘[w]e continue to believe that a fallen lawyer may rise again,’ we permit reinstatement ‘only after a clear and demonstrated change from what he was before.’ In other words, ‘while disbarment does not necessarily operate as a permanent disability, it may only be overcome by a clear and convincing showing of rehabilitation and of legal competence, borne out by an applicant’s conduct over a long period of time.’ ”
316 Md. at 304-05, 558 A.2d at 710-11 (citations omitted). We pointed out, more specifically, that the essential factors to be evaluated include the following:
“1. The nature and circumstances of petitioner’s original misconduct.
2. Petitioner’s subsequent conduct and reformation.
3. His or her present character.
4. His or her present qualifications and competence to practice law.”
Id. at 305, 558 A.2d at 711.
I do not suggest that respondent should be readmitted at any particular time. Rather, I believe that he should stand disbarred, and if and when he applies for readmission, we should consider the criteria and factors for readmission and make our decision accordingly.