Court Opinion

ID: 9394027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 22:00:22.545929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.938058
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit

No. 22-1488

                          VALERIE SULLIVAN,

                        Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                  v.

   ETECTRX, INC., a Delaware Corporation; JEFFREY P. SPAFFORD;
  EDWARD H. HENSLEY; RICHARD J. KRUZYNSKI; ETRX HOLDINGS, INC.,

                        Defendants, Appellees.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

              [Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]

                                Before

                   Kayatta, Gelpí, and Montecalvo,
                           Circuit Judges.

     David J. Shlansky, with whom Colin R. Hagan and Shlansky Law
Group, LLP were on brief, for appellant.
     Aaron M. Katz for appellees.

                             May 11, 2023
            KAYATTA, Circuit Judge.       Valerie Sullivan worked for

etectRx, Inc. ("etectRx"), a digital health company, as its CEO

from August 2020 until August 2021.          Her one-year, automatically

renewable employment agreement required etectRx to pay her twelve

months of salary as severance benefits in the event her "employment

[wa]s terminated by the Company" without cause or if Sullivan

terminated her employment for good reason.          After etectRx decided

that it no longer wished to continue its relationship with Sullivan

as defined in the employment agreement and she subsequently left

the company, etectRx refused to pay severance benefits.                The

company argued that it merely exercised its right not to renew the

employment    agreement   and   thus   did    not   terminate   Sullivan's

employment.    The district court accepted this argument in granting

etectRx's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and

Sullivan timely appealed.

            We agree that a mere non-renewal of the employment

agreement by etectRx would not have entitled Sullivan to severance

benefits.     But we also find that Sullivan's complaint adequately

alleges that etectRx obligated itself to pay severance benefits by

ending her employment under the agreement without cause before the

end of the one-year term.       Our reasoning follows.

                                  - 2 -
                                      I.

          "[W]e assume that the facts alleged in the complaint,

plus reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, are true."

Kaufman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 836 F.3d 88, 90 (1st Cir. 2016).

          Sullivan began working for etectRx, a digital health

company, as a contractor in August 2019.          A year later, she began

employment as etectRx's CEO, pursuant to a negotiated employment

agreement (the "Agreement") dated August 1, 2020.               The Agreement

was effective for an "Initial Term" of one year and would be

"automatically   extended      for    an     additional    12-month      period

commencing at the end of the Initial Term, and successively

thereafter for additional 12-month periods . . . , unless either

party gives written notice to the other party that such party does

not desire to extend the term of this Agreement."            Such notice of

non-renewal "must be given at least sixty (60) days prior to the

end of the Initial Term or the applicable Additional Term."

          In   addition   to   allowing      non-renewal   by    sixty    days'

written notice, the Agreement stated that "either Executive or the

Company may terminate Executive's employment with the Company for

any reason, at any time, upon not less than thirty (30) days' prior

notice." Any such termination by etectRx (except for cause, death,

                                     - 3 -
or disability) would trigger an obligation to pay severance under

section 6 of the Agreement, which stated as follows:

           6.     Effect of Termination.
           (a) Effect of Termination by Company without Cause
           or by Executive for Good Reason     If Executive's
           employment is terminated by the Company for any
           reason other than [for cause, death, or disability]
           or by Executive for Good Reason, Executive shall be
           entitled to receive (i) Executive's monthly Base
           Salary for twelve (12) months (the "Severance
           Benefit"); and (ii) those amounts earned and unpaid
           under Sections 3(a) and 3(b) through the date of
           termination together with any accrued vacation.
           The Agreement also provided that, "[u]pon the expiration

of this Agreement or termination of Executive's employment with

the Company for Cause, neither party shall have any further

obligation or liability under this Agreement to the other party,

except as set forth in Sections 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 16 of

this Agreement.      The date of expiration of the Employment Term

shall be referred to as the 'Termination Date.'"

           Finally, the Agreement included a non-compete covenant

barring   Sullivan      from    competing      with   etectRx   "[d]uring    the

Employment Term and for a period of twelve (12) months following

the termination of Executive's employment for any reason (the 'Non-

Compete Period')."

           According to Sullivan's complaint, two etectRx board

members held a video call with her on May 26, 2021, during which

they   informed   her    that    her   employment     with   the   company   was

                                       - 4 -
terminated with immediate effect.   They also asked that she remain

as an "at-will" employee through August 1, 2021, the last day of

the Initial Term.    The next day, one of those board members sent

a letter to Sullivan to "serve[] as written notice by etectRx of

its decision not to continue the term of the Agreement beyond the

Initial Term" while also asking Sullivan to "remain employed as an

at-will employee for continued support during this period."

          Sullivan informed etectRx that she would work through

the remainder of the Initial Term but refused to continue her

employment on an at-will basis beyond that point. In July, etectRx

instructed her to transfer her responsibilities to a new executive.

She otherwise continued to perform her duties through August 1,

2021.   On August 2, 2021, etectRx sent an email to Sullivan in

which it asserted that Sullivan had abandoned her role.        The

following day, etectRx sent Sullivan a letter reminding her of the

Agreement's restrictive covenants, including the one-year non-

compete provision.    In this letter, etectRx also maintained that

it had not terminated Sullivan's employment "with the expiration

of the Agreement" because it had asked her to remain employed on

at at-will basis.

          In due course, Sullivan brought suit against etectRx and

three named board members (Jeffrey Spafford, Edward Hensley, and

Richard Kruzynski), claiming that etectRx violated the terms of

the Agreement and the implied covenant of good faith and fair

                               - 5 -
dealing, and that etectRx and the three board members violated the

Massachusetts Wage Act by failing to provide the severance benefits

she was owed.     EtectRx filed a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, which the district court granted.          Sullivan timely

appealed.

                                   II.

            We review the district court's order granting a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo.          Germanowski v.

Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2017).         To that end, "we ask

whether the well-pleaded factual allegations, viewed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, . . . 'plausibly narrate a claim

for relief.'"    Id. (quoting Schatz v. Republican State Leadership

Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)).

            Sullivan's   opening    brief   on   appeal    raises   three

arguments.    First, that the terms of the Agreement require the

payment of severance benefits if the employer opts not to renew

the Agreement.    Second, that the complaint alleges facts plausibly

establishing that etectRx terminated her employment without cause

during the term of the Agreement, and therefore that etectRx owes

severance benefits even if such benefits are not due merely because

of non-renewal.    And third, that should she prevail on either of

the first two arguments, her complaint also alleges facts entitling

her to additional remedies under the Massachusetts Wage Act.           We

address each argument in turn.

                                   - 6 -
                                             A.

            The    parties      agree        that    Delaware      law   governs     the

interpretation of the Agreement.                    They further agree that the

pivotal   issue    is    whether       the    Agreement     entitles      Sullivan   to

severance benefits, based on the facts alleged in the complaint,

as supplemented by reference to the Agreement itself.                      Sullivan's

first argument turns on interpretation of the language of the

contract, which is a question of law.                      See Vinton v. Grayson,

189 A.3d 695,      699    (Del. Super. Ct.            2018) ("In Delaware, the

interpretation of a contract is a question of law suitable for

determination on a motion to dismiss." (quoting Markow v. Synageva

Biopharma   Corp,       C.A.   No. N15C-06-152,         2016    WL    1613419,     at *4

(Del. Super.      Ct.    Mar. 3,       2016)(unpublished))).             Dismissal   is

warranted only if the "defendants' interpretation is the only

reasonable construction as a matter of law."                    Id. at 700 (quoting

L&L   Broad.,     LLC    v.    Triad    Broad.      Co.,    C.A.     No. N13C-10-028,

2014 WL 1724769, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2014)).                       Whether

a contract is susceptible to more than one of several possible

interpretations is a question of law.                  Allied Cap. Corp. v. GC-

Sun Holdings, L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1030 (Del. Ch. 2006).                             "A

contract is not rendered ambiguous simply because the parties do

not agree upon its proper construction.                     Rather, a contract is

ambiguous only when the provisions in controversy are reasonably

or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two

                                         - 7 -
or more different meanings."        Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy

Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Basic

Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del.

1992)).

           In dismissing the complaint, the district court held

that the Agreement could not be construed as granting severance

benefits in the event that the Agreement simply expired upon either

party's exercise of its right of non-renewal.             In brief, reasoned

the district court, non-renewal of the Agreement did not trigger

an obligation to pay benefits due only in the event that Sullivan's

"employment [wa]s terminated by the Company" without cause.

           In so ruling, the district court relied on our prior

decision   in   Mason    v.   Telefunken     Semiconductors         America,   LLC,

797 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2015).        Like the district court, we see no

good reason to reach a different result than we reached in Mason.

Mason's observation that "'[n]on-renewal' and 'termination' are

distinct terms having different meanings," id. at 42, applies a

fortiori here, with the Agreement expressly referring on the one

hand to "expiration of this Agreement" and, on the other hand, to

"termination of Executive's employment."               The very clause that

created a conditional right to severance benefits on its face

applied only "[i]f Executive's employment [wa]s terminated by the

Company"   without      cause.     As   in    Mason,    the    Agreement       also

established     separate      notice    requirements          for     non-renewal

                                    - 8 -
(sixty days) and for termination of Sullivan's employment without

cause (thirty days). This would make little sense if a non-renewal

left the parties in the same position as if the Agreement was

terminated without cause.             Id. at 43.          And the sixty-day notice

requirement      for   non-renewal       would      be    entirely     superfluous         if

etectRx    could   instead      simply      terminate           Sullivan's       employment

thirty days from the renewal date, with the same result.

            Sullivan rests her contrary reading on a sentence in

section 2 of the Agreement stating that "[u]pon the expiration of

this Agreement or termination of Executive's employment with the

Company for Cause, neither party shall have any further obligation

or liability under this Agreement . . . , except as set forth in

Sections 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 16 . . . ."                         She points out

that    section 6(a)     is    the    paragraph          that    creates     a    right    to

severance benefits.         And, she says, because those benefits do not

apply when the company terminates the Executive's employment for

cause, that provision's "survival" must mean that it applies

"[u]pon the expiration of this Agreement." Otherwise, she reasons,

there    would    be   no    reason    to    include        section 6      among       those

provisions that survive.

            Sullivan's        argument      fails    because       there     is    a   clear

explanation      for   why     severance       obligation          must    survive        the

expiration of the Agreement, even if a mere expiration does not

trigger the severance benefits.              The severance obligation could be

                                         - 9 -
triggered   prior   to   the    expiration      date    (by,   for   example,    a

termination without cause), in which case the section 2 survival

clause ensures that etectRx will pay severance for a full twelve

months -- including those months following the expiration date.

Said   differently,   the   survival    of      section 6      ensures   that   an

already-triggered obligation to pay severance does not disappear

upon the expiration date.       In short, the reference to section 6 is

not surplusage under the district court's reading of the Agreement

because the reference has meaning and effect even if a non-renewal

does not trigger severance.

            Finally, Sullivan points again to section 2, noting that

it defines the date of expiration of the "Employment Term" to be

the "Termination Date."        But the question is not whether there was

a termination of      her employment       --    both parties agree that,

ultimately, there was.          The question is whether there was a

termination    of   Sullivan's     employment     "by    the    Company"   under

section 6 that would trigger severance benefits.                  As previously

noted, this section does not use the defined term "Termination

Date,"   and   conditions      severance    benefits      on    termination     of

employment by the Company without cause or by the Executive for

Good Reason, not on the expiration of the Agreement.

            It is true that, literally, Sullivan's status as an

under-contract employee obviously ended if and when the Agreement

was not renewed. But that hardly means that a non-renewal rendered

                                   - 10 -
Sullivan's "employment . . . terminated by the Company" without

cause.     In any event, Mason's holding that non-renewal of an

employment agreement is different from termination of employment,

plus the Agreement's differential treatment of termination of

employment as contrasted with non-renewal, leaves no room for a

holding in Sullivan's favor.        Therefore, we affirm the district

court's rejection of Sullivan's claim that etectRx owes severance

benefits even if it merely opted not to renew the Agreement.

                                    B.

           Sullivan's    alternative     argument    fares     better.     She

contends   that   her   complaint   adequately      alleges    that   etectRx

actually terminated her employment, without cause, before the

contract   ran    its   twelve-month     course   and   thus    incurred    an

obligation to pay severance benefits under the Agreement. We agree

with Sullivan on this point.

           EtectRx does not dispute that it sought to transition

Sullivan from employment under the terms of the Agreement to

employment as an at-will employee.           Because etectRx made clear

that a change from under-contract to at-will employment would not

impact Sullivan's compensation or benefits, we can comfortably

deduce that the principal difference between employment under the

Agreement and employment at-will would relate to termination.               As

is most relevant, under the Agreement, etectRx had to give Sullivan

thirty days' notice to terminate her without cause and also pay

                                 - 11 -
severance.   Conversely, as an at-will employee, she could be fired

without cause, notice, or severance.

           EtectRx   contends     that   it    attempted    to    effect   that

transition by not renewing the Agreement and thus triggering its

expiration on August 1.    And as we have just now said, letting the

Agreement expire by its own terms would not have resulted in

etectRx owing severance benefits to Sullivan.              Sullivan, though,

alleges that etectRx effected that transition in May by telling

her that her employment under the Agreement was terminated with

immediate effect and declaring her an at-will employee, thus ending

her employment under the Agreement and replacing it with a similar

but materially different arrangement.          Effectively, etectRx ended

the Agreement and unilaterally changed the terms of Sullivan's

employment to at-will, leaving her title, duties, and pay identical

but   stripping   the   parties    of    the   Agreement's       bargained-for

protections, including the severance provision.

           Because we are reviewing the dismissal of the case under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we must accept as true

Sullivan's description of the video call on May 26, and we must

construe the May 27 letter in a light fairly favorable to Sullivan.

In short, we must assume that in May, etectRx unilaterally and

without cause and without prior notice ended Sullivan's employment

under the Agreement and converted her employment status to at-

will.   Such a transition would be a termination by etectRx of

                                  - 12 -
Sullivan's employment without cause or notice entitling her to

severance.     And this is so even though her transition did not

result in actual unemployment before August 1.                Cf. Id. at 39–41

(holding that a change in employer due to a corporate restructuring

may work a "termination" that triggers severance); see id. at 39

(noting that "unemployment is not a prerequisite to the right to

separation pay"; instead, that right "may, and frequently does,

exist where there is no interruption whatever in the continuity of

employment"    (quoting      Chapin   v.   Fairchild      Camera   &   Instrument

Corp., 107 Cal. Rptr. 111, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973))).                 If etectRx

could unilaterally convert Sullivan's under-contract employment to

at-will   prior   to   the     expiration      of   the   contract     term,   and

simultaneously claim not to have terminated her employment for

severance purposes, that would strip Sullivan of the contracted-

for severance benefits and leave her with no recourse if etectRx

decided to fire her the next day, in the middle of the original

contract term. The language of the Agreement here does not provide

etectRx with that power.

           Notably, etectRx does not claim to read the Agreement

otherwise.    That is to say, it does not claim that it had the power

to convert Sullivan to an at-will employee without cause during

the term of the Agreement without effectively terminating her

employment    under    the    Agreement.        Instead,     etectRx    disputes

Sullivan's characterization of its actions and contends that in

                                      - 13 -
the May 27 letter, the company was simply providing the requisite

notice of its intent not to renew the employment contract and

offering Sullivan the opportunity to continue on as an at-will

employee following the expiration of the initial term of employment

on August 1, 2021.

            There   is    much   common     sense    supporting      etectRx's

assertion that in May it was only giving notice of non-renewal

while inviting Sullivan to stay on at-will after August 1.               It is

difficult to see why it would have done what Sullivan claims given

that it wanted her to work through at least the end of her initial

term.   And its May letter was captioned "Notice of Non-Renewal of

the Employment Agreement with etectRx, Inc."              On the other hand,

etectRx offers no explanation for why it would have told Sullivan,

as she alleges it did orally on May 26 and then again in its May 27

letter, that she was converted to at-will for the remainder of her

initial    term.     Indeed,     conspicuously      absent   from    etectRx's

argument is any mention of the May 26 conversation.                 Sullivan's

argument is bolstered by the language etectRx used in its letter,

apparently   drafted     by   counsel,    which   asked   that   she   "remain

employed as an at-will employee for continued support during this

period."     The prior sentence refers to the period "up to and

including the Termination Date," so the antecedent for "this

period" would seem to be the remainder of the initial term.              Thus,

it is plausible that etectRx immediately and unilaterally, even if

                                   - 14 -
foolishly,    ended   Sullivan's   under-contract   employment   without

cause and converted her to at-will status in May, triggering an

obligation to pay severance benefits.

          In any event, the case is at the pleading stage, so our

charge is not to weigh competing versions of what happened.

Rather, our task is to determine only whether Sullivan has a

plausible claim if her allegations are true.        And given that she

alleges point blank that she was told her employment under the

Agreement was terminated "presently" and "with immediate effect,"

that etectRx requested that she nonetheless remain employed "at-

will" for the remainder of her initial term, and that she was

instructed to transfer her responsibilities to a new executive in

July, she has alleged that etectRx terminated her without cause

and without notice, triggering the severance obligation.         She has

plausibly stated a claim for entitlement to severance benefits.

                                    III.

          Sullivan also appeals the district court's dismissal of

her claim that etectRx breached the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing by attempting to recharacterize her termination

as a non-renewal to avoid paying severance benefits.               Under

Delaware law, "to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant,

[Plaintiff]    'must    allege     a   specific   implied   contractual

obligation, a breach of that obligation by the defendant, and

resulting damage to the plaintiff.'"         Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings,

                                   - 15 -
L.L.C.,   971    A.2d   872,   888    (Del.    Ch.    2009)     (quoting       Cantor

Fitzgerald, L.P., v. Cantor, No. C.A. 16297-NC, 1998 WL 842316, at

*1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 1998)(unpublished)).                 When a valid contract

between the parties expressly governs the dispute, a plaintiff

cannot obtain relief through a claim for breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing.               See id. at 889 & n.45

(explaining that the plaintiff could not sustain a breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim when he

acknowledged     that   express      terms    of     the    contract     at    issue

"govern[ed] his right to receive the payments he seeks.").                         As

best we can tell from Sullivan's under-developed argument, she

contends that etectRx attempted to mischaracterize its without-

cause termination of her employment to avoid paying severance

benefits.     This is coterminous with her breach of contract claim.

To the extent that Sullivan argues that her breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim is distinct from her

breach of contract claim, she does so for the first time in her

reply brief.     And, even then, she does not identify "a specific

implied     contractual    obligation"        that    she     contends        etectRx

breached, nor does she explain why this claim is actionable despite

the express contract terms governing the severance benefits at

issue here.     To that end, Sullivan has failed to state a claim for

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

                                     - 16 -
                                    IV.

            Because the district court determined that etectRx did

not   owe   severance   benefits    to      Sullivan,   it   dismissed   her

Massachusetts Wage Act claim predicated on her being owed those

benefits.    As we disagree, at least insofar as the motion to

dismiss goes, we address Sullivan's Wage Act claim.

            "[T]he Wage Act requires the payment of wages on a weekly

or biweekly basis.      The act provides that 'any employee leaving

his [or her] employment shall be paid in full on the following

regular pay day,' and that 'any employee discharged from . . .

employment shall be paid in full on the day of his [or her]

discharge . . . the wages or salary earned by him [or her].'"            Mui

v. Mass. Port Auth., 89 N.E.3d 460, 462 (Mass. 2018) (quoting Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148).     Sullivan's claim can succeed only if

she demonstrates that the severance benefits at issue are "wages"

as that term is used in the Wage Act.1

            As etectRx notes, the Massachusetts Appeals Court has

held that severance benefits are not "wages" for purposes of the

Wage Act.   Prozinski v. Ne. Real Est. Servs., 797 N.E.2d 415, 419–

21 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).     And "federal courts . . . must follow

      1 The Wage Act does not define the term "wages," but
Massachusetts courts have construed the term to mean amounts
"definitively determined and . . . due and payable to the
employee." Mui, 89 N.E.3d at 712 (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149,
§ 148).

                                   - 17 -
the decisions of intermediate state courts in the absence of

convincing evidence that the highest court of the state would

decide differently." Stoner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464,

467 (1940).

          Sullivan   cannot   make   this   showing.    Indeed,   the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has thrice cited Prozinski

with approval for its holding that the Wage Act does not cover

severance pay.   See Calixto v. Coughlin, 113 N.E.3d 329, 334 n.9

(Mass. 2018); Mui, 89 N.E.3d at 462; Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., 900

N.E.2d 89, 92 (Mass. 2009).

          Moreover, in Mui, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court held that the Wage Act did not encompass a percentage of

accrued sick time that the employer gave to departing employees

who worked for the employer for at least two years and were not

terminated for cause.   89 N.E.3d at 463–64.    The court noted that

"[t]he only contingent compensation2 recognized expressly in the

act is commissions," and that "[w]e have not broadly construed the

term 'wages' for the purposes of the act to encompass any other

type of contingent compensation."    Id. at 463.   Therefore, because

the sick pay was "only available to departing Massport employees

     2  In this context, compensation is contingent if it is
payable only upon the occurrence of a particular triggering event
(in contrast to an amount earned by the performance of work). See
Prozinski, 797 N.E.2d at 420 (reasoning that severance benefits
are contingent upon the event of severance and are thus distinct
from earned wages).

                               - 18 -
meeting certain criteria," that sick pay did not constitute "wages"

for purposes of the Wage Act.             Id. at 463–64.

              Here, like the sick pay in Mui, the severance benefits

are contingent on the departing employee meeting certain criteria,

namely that the "Executive's employment is terminated by the

Company for any reason other than [for cause, death, or disability]

or by Executive for Good Reason."

              Nonetheless, Sullivan contends that her circumstance is

distinguishable.       She argues that, unlike the employees in Mui,

Calixto,      Prozinski,     and   Weems,       she    earned   her   severance      by

complying with post-termination obligations, including her non-

competition     obligations        and    her   agreement       to   "cooperate     and

provide    assistance      to    Company     in   transitioning        the   work   of

Executive; ensure a smooth transition; and in answering questions

and completing tasks as requested by Company as necessary following

termination of employment" (as required by the general release she

must   sign    to   obtain      severance).           But   Sullivan's   receipt     of

severance benefits was not wholly dependent on completion of her

non-compete obligations.            Instead, the severance benefits were

contingent on her termination by etectRx not being for cause,

death, or disability, and then on Sullivan signing a release and

waiver of claims. So we see no basis for holding that her severance

benefits, if due, were the type of contingent compensation that

Massachusetts classifies as a wage for purposes of the Wage Act.

                                         - 19 -
These post-termination obligations do not distinguish Sullivan's

claims from Mui because, regardless of whether Sullivan must

perform post-termination obligations to obtain her severance, that

severance is still contingent on meeting certain criteria at the

time of the departure.

          Thus, we affirm dismissal of Sullivan's Massachusetts

Wage Act claim on the alternative grounds that her severance

benefits are not covered by the Wage Act.3

                                V.

          For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of

Sullivan's breach of contract claim against etectRx and affirm the

district court's dismissal of all other claims against etectRx and

Jeffrey P. Spafford, Edward H. Hensley, and Richard J. Kruzynski.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

     3  Sullivan also argues that payment of the severance benefits
was necessary for etectRx to comply with Massachusetts's "garden
leave" statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 24L, which requires
that non-competition agreements be supported by payments of fifty
percent of the employee's salary "or other mutually-agreed upon
consideration between the employer and the employee, provided that
such consideration is specified in the noncompetition agreement."
§ 24L(b)(vii). This assertion is irrelevant to whether severance
is a "wage" for purposes of the Wage Act.       At best, it is an
argument that the non-competition provision is unenforceable;
however, because etectRx released Sullivan from the non-
competition obligation in January 2022, this argument is moot.

                              - 20 -