Court Opinion

ID: 9735000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:56:00.072411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:53.577040
License: Public Domain

FLANDERS, J.,
concurring.
Although I join the Court’s opinion affirming the defendant’s conviction, I write separately only because I do not agree with the proposition set forth in the majority opinion that “a trial justice is not constitutionally required to advise a defendant of the risks of proceeding pro se,” citing to this Court’s opinion in State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1026 (R.I.2002). For the reasons set forth in my dissent in that case, id. at 1050-58, I still believe that, pursuant to the right-to-counsel provisions in both the United States and the Rhode Island Constitutions, “some type of inquiry or communication between the court and defendant is required to ascertain whether defendant is aware of ‘the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,’ before defendant sets a course leading to pro se representation.” Id. at 1050.
In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court ruled that each defendant “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ”
In this case, however, that issue is a moot point because the trial justice did exactly that by ascertaining on the record that the defendant appreciated the significant downside risks of representing himself at trial. Therefore, although I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the above-quoted proposition from the Thornton case to support its conclusion, I agree with the Court’s holding that in this case the defendant knowingly waived his right to counsel.