Court Opinion

ID: 9401095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-10 00:01:18.64321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.793041
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40085         Document: 00516780915             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/09/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                      June 9, 2023
                                       No. 22-40085
                                      ____________                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk
   Martha Chavez, as next friend for J.C.,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Brownsville Independent School District,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 1:18-cv-173
                      ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Higginson, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          J.C. was born in 1995, suffers from cerebral paralysis, and is non-
   verbal. He enrolled in Brownsville Independent School District’s (BISD)
   special education program when he was three years old and routinely worked
   with paraprofessionals one-on-one, including Victor Villarreal, a level I state-
   certified paraprofessional aide. In 2016, J.C. suffered injuries at his high
   school while he was under Villareal’s care. Afterward, J.C.’s mother, Martha

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40085          Document: 00516780915            Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/09/2023

                                          No. 22-40085

   Chavez, invoked the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
   administrative process, filing a complaint and a request for a due process
   hearing before a Texas Education Administration hearing officer. See 20
   U.S.C. § 1415(a). In her complaint, Chavez alleged that BISD failed to
   provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for J.C.
          In June 2017, Chavez and BISD settled “all of their differences,
   complaints, claims and causes of action which fall[] under I.D.E.A. without
   resorting to litigation.” The settlement agreement released BISD from “any
   and all claims, demands, [and] causes of actions pursuant to IDEA” that
   occurred “prior to the finalization” of the agreement “arising out of any
   alleged failure on the part of [BISD] to provide [J.C.] a [FAPE], including,
   but not limited to any claims articulated in their request for a due process
   hearing.” J.C. subsequently graduated in 2018, transitioning out of BISD at
   age 22.
          Over a year later, Chavez filed this action on J.C.’s behalf against
   BISD and Villarreal, alleging that the Defendants violated J.C.’s Fourteenth
   Amendment due process rights to bodily integrity and equal protection, as
   well as his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Chavez
   sought compensatory damages, equitable relief to enjoin the Defendants, and
   attorney’s fees. BISD filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that
   there was no evidence of a custom or practice resulting in injuries to children,
   thus precluding any municipal liability under Section 1983. BISD also
   asserted that any claims for compensatory damages required a showing of
   intentional discrimination, which was not present.
          Critical to this appeal, the magistrate judge determined that Chavez
   failed to exhaust IDEA’s procedural remedies under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l),1
          _____________________
          1
              Section 1415(l) provides:

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Case: 22-40085       Document: 00516780915                Page: 3       Date Filed: 06/09/2023

                                         No. 22-40085

   barring her claims. The district court agreed, holding that Chavez’s claims
   were “barred because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and
   did not demonstrate that exhaustion would be futile or inadequate.” The
   district court declined to reach the merits and dismissed the case without
   prejudice. Chavez timely appealed.
          After the parties completed briefing and oral argument in this court,
   the Supreme Court, in Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023),
   held that § 1415(l) does not require exhaustion of the administrative
   processes under IDEA “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal
   law for compensatory damages—a form of relief everyone agrees IDEA does
   not provide.” Id. at 864; see also id. at 865 (“[A] suit admittedly premised on
   the past denial of a free and appropriate education may nonetheless proceed
   without exhausting IDEA’s administrative processes if the remedy a plaintiff
   seeks is not one IDEA provides.”).
          In view of Perez, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties.
   Chavez contends that Perez is dispositive regarding her claim for
   compensatory damages, i.e., that the claim does not hinge on exhaustion
   under IDEA, and thus requires remand for further consideration. BISD
   acknowledges Perez changed the exhaustion framework for compensatory
   damages claims but urges this court to affirm on other grounds.
          We agree that Perez mandates vacatur of the district court’s dismissal
   of Chavez’s claim for compensatory damages.                       The district court’s

          _____________________
          Nothing in [IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
          procedures, and remedies available under . . . Federal laws protecting the
          rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil
          action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [IDEA],
          [IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent
          as would be required had the action been brought under [IDEA].

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Case: 22-40085      Document: 00516780915           Page: 4    Date Filed: 06/09/2023

                                     No. 22-40085

   application of IDEA’s exhaustion requirement to Chavez’s claims seeking
   compensatory damages conflicts with Perez and cannot be sustained. See id.
   at 865–66 (clarifying that “nothing in [§ 1415(l)] bars” compensatory
   damages claims and remanding “for further proceedings consistent with this
   opinion”). Because the district court did not have the benefit of Perez’s
   holding when it dismissed Chavez’s complaint, we vacate the dismissal order
   regarding compensatory damages and remand for further proceedings.
          The same is not true for Chavez’s claim for equitable relief to enjoin
   Defendants. As the Supreme Court explained, “a plaintiff who files an ADA
   action seeking both damages and the sort of equitable relief IDEA provides
   may find [her] request for equitable relief barred or deferred if [she] has yet
   to exhaust § 1415(f) and (g).” Id. at 865; see also Li v. Revere Loc. Sch. Dist.,
   No. 21-3422, 2023 WL 3302062, at *13 (6th Cir. May 8, 2023) (describing
   the difference between forward-looking equitable relief and backward-
   looking compensatory damages in the light of Perez). The district court’s
   application of IDEA’s exhaustion requirement to Chavez’s request for
   equitable relief was thus not affected by Perez, and was not otherwise in error.
   We affirm the court’s order dismissing Chavez’s claim for injunctive relief.
        VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED.

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