Court Opinion

ID: 9525862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:08:58.043241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:19.518894
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I believe that Elisabeth Anderson properly stated a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective business advantage. Although no formal job offer had been extended to her, that was not required. All that was necessary was that she have a reasonable expectancy of employment. The majority dismisses Anderson’s employment prospects with the YMCA as involving nothing more than mere hope. This characterization is completely inaccurate. According to the allegations of her complaint, which we must accept as true, Anderson had been specifically solicited for the fund-raising position there; she was the leading candidate for the position following successful completion of interviews with the YMCA’s personnel director, senior vice-president and director; and she had already been recommended for the job or was going to be recommended for the job after a final follow-up interview. Contrary to what my colleagues claim, these allegations are sufficiently specific to withstand a motion to dismiss under section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 1992)). The absence of additional details is not fatal to Anderson’s complaint. Under the Code, a plaintiff is not required to set out the particular evidence on which her complaint is based. The Code provides simply that the complaint "shall contain a plain and concise statement of the pleader’s cause of action.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 603 (West 1992). According to the Code, "[n]o pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or she is called upon to meet.” 735 ILCS 5/2— 612(b) (West 1992). There is no mechanical formula for applying these standards in a particular case, but the guiding principle is that pleadings must be construed liberally with the ultimate goal of doing substantial justice between the parties. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 603(c) (West 1994); Gonzalez v. Thorek Hospital & Medical Center (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 28, 34-35. The majority’s disposition not only fails to adhere to this principle, it does not even acknowledge that the principle exists. In so doing, it subjects Anderson’s complaint to a level of scrutiny that the law will not countenance. There is no reason Vanden Dorpel and Northwestern University should receive the deferential treatment afforded them by my colleagues. Even from a purely pragmatic point of view, adherence to the law will not place the defendants in any special or immediate peril. We are, after all, still at the beginning of the litigation process. If Anderson cannot substantiate her claims, Vanden Dorpel and Northwestern University will have ample opportunity to challenge her allegations through summary judgment or at trial. She should not be required to set out her case as a precondition of advancing beyond the pleading stage without even having been afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery. Accordingly, the appellate court was correct in reinstating Anderson’s claim for intentional interference with prospective business advantage. I also agree with the appellate court’s conclusion that Anderson’s defamation claim should not have been dismissed. Unlike the appellate court, however, I do not believe that either of the defamatory remarks allegedly made by Vanden Dorpel can be excused, as a matter of law, under the innocent construction rule. According to Anderson’s complaint, as amended, Vanden Dorpel knowingly made false statements to Anderson’s prospective new employer that she "did not follow up on assignments” and that "she could not get along with co-workers.” Both of these statements impute an inability to perform her job and are manifestly prejudicial to her in her profession. As a result, they are defamatory per se. Owen v. Carr, 113 Ill. 2d 273, 277 (1986). There is no dispute that Vanden Dorpel’s statements cannot reasonably be interpreted as referring to anyone other than Anderson. There should be no dispute that they cannot reasonably be interpreted innocently. This is not a situation where, taken in context, a statement does not necessarily imply a plaintiff’s lack of qualifications or skill in her calling. In context, that is precisely what the statements here imply. Based on the allegations of Anderson’s complaint and the inferences that can reasonably be drawn from those allegations, Vanden Dorpel knew Anderson was applying for a comparable position at the YMCA, knew he was being asked for his assessment of her ability to perform that job, and knew that his remarks would be understood to mean that she would be a bad employee at the YMCA. Indeed, the complaint alleges that the very point of Vanden Dorpel’s false remarks was to thwart Anderson’s attempt to obtain employment at the YMCA. To claim that Vanden Dorpel’s remarks might be understood as relating simply to Anderson’s abilities in the particular and limited circumstances of her job at Northwestern is therefore not only unreasonable, it is patently ridiculous. Admittedly, precedent can be found to support the majority’s position. Just because other courts have abused the innocent construction rule from time to time, however, does not mean that we should do so now. In Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 232 (1989), this court observed that the innocent construction rule had "spawned a morass of case law in which consistency and harmony have long ago disappeared.” The court there attempted to rise above the confusion and provide some sensible guidance for future cases. We should do that here, too. Instead, we have slipped back into the quagmire. JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.