Court Opinion

ID: 9600304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:25:49.375408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:51.642073
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
In this automobile forfeiture action, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) asserted that it was an innocent interest holder under OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) (1) (A). However, the trial court rejected that defense and granted the forfeiture. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. State of Ga., 268 Ga. App. 473 (602 SE2d 235) (2004). Today, however, a majority of this Court reverses, “concluding] that the Court of *333Appeals erroneously applied an improper legal standard in reaching [its] determination . ...” P. 329.1 submit that, in affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the proper legal standard, and that this Court, rather than the Court of Appeals, errs in its disposition of this forfeiture proceeding.
The applicable legal standard has never been in question. OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) (1) (A) unambiguously provides that
[a] property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section if the owner of such interest or interest holder establishes that the owner or interest holder . . . [i]s not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur. . . .
Despite the majority’s intimation to the contrary, the Court of Appeals clearly analyzed this case in accordance with that standard. GMAC v. State of Ga., supra at 475 (1) (quoting the text of OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) (1) (A)). Accordingly, the majority mischaracterizes the basis of its reversal as the erroneous application by the Court of Appeals of an improper legal standard in affirming the trial court. Instead, the majority’s fundamental disagreement is with the finding by the trial court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that GMAC failed to meet the evidentiary burden of proving its innocent interest holder defense under OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) (1) (A). Once the dispositive issue in this appeal is properly identified as evidentiary sufficiency, rather than application of the appropriate legal principle, the fallacy in the majority’s analysis becomes readily apparent.
The Court of Appeals correctly notes:
“Once the State establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove his status as an innocent owner by a preponderance of the evidence.” [Cit.] Forfeiture actions are tried by the court without the intervention of a jury. [Cits.] “On appeal, the trial court’s findings of fact will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous, and due regard must be given to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” [Cit.] “Thus, an appellate court will not disturb fact findings of a trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them.” [Cit.]
GMAC v. State of Ga., supra at 474. The majority acknowledges that the State of Georgia showed that Childrey used the Silverado truck to transport contraband, and thus shifted the burden to GMAC to prove *334its innocent interest holder defense. “The question of preponderance of the evidence is a matter resting with the trier of facts and where the trier finds either way, it will not be set aside on appeal if there is any evidence to support the finding. [Cits.]” Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 218 (244 SE2d 864) (1978) (reversingthe CourtofAppealsfor failing to apply the any evidence standard when reviewing a finding of fact). Therefore, the trial court’s finding that GMAC failed to prove its defense by a preponderance of the evidence must be affirmed unless the evidence demanded a contrary finding.
Under OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) (1) (A), GMAC’s lack of actual knowledge that the Silverado truck was subject to forfeiture, standing alone, is not sufficient to show that it was an innocent interest holder. The statute clearly provides that, in order to establish its status as an innocent interest holder, GMAC must show by a preponderance of evidence that it “did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, even if GMAC did not have actual knowledge that the truck was subject to forfeiture, it is not an innocent interest holder unless it also could not reasonably have known that Childrey would use the vehicle in his drug activities or that he was likely to use it for that illegal purpose. GMAC did have actual knowledge that Childrey had used at least one of his other vehicles to transport drugs. Indeed, as the majority concedes on p. 329,
Agent Neal also advised GMAC that Childrey was using other GMAC-financed vehicles for the transportation and sale of illegal narcotics, and should Childrey be caught again, GMAC would no longer be considered an innocent interest holder with respect to those vehicles.
The majority summarily dismisses this information provided to GMAC as “convey [ing] nothing more than a mere suspicion of future illegal activity.” Pp. 330-331. If, however, such a suspicion is sufficient to show that GMAC reasonably could have known that Childrey was likely to use the Silverado to transport and sell drugs, then GMAC cannot be an innocent interest holder under the plain terms of OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) (1) (A). In that regard, “knowledge that an individual has used one vehicle to transport contraband is sufficient to give . .. notice that the individual is likely to use other vehicles to transport contraband. State of Ga. v. Tucker, [242 Ga. App. 3 (528 SE2d 523) (2000)].” GMAC v. State of Ga., supra at 476 (2). Thus, the evidence certainly does not demand a finding that GMAC was an innocent interest holder, but rather authorizes the contrary finding that GMAC chose to remain willfully ignorant that Childrey was likely to use the Silverado to transport contraband. “The trial court had *335grounds for finding that [GMAC’s] superficial actions were inadequate to investigate the matter and to prevent the illicit use of the vehicle.” GMAC v. State of Ga., supra at 476 (2).
In her concurrence, Presiding Justice Sears refers to “the unfairness of the State’s position in this case.” However, the unfairness which she perceives does not exist. When Agent Neal initially contacted GMAC, he stated that the Silverado was not subject to forfeiture at that time because there was insufficient evidence that the vehicle was then “directly or indirectly, used or intended for use in any manner to facilitate a [controlled substance] violation.” OCGA § 16-13-49 (d) (3). It is undisputed, however, that Childrey eventually did use the Silverado in the commission of a drug offense. The relevant question in this appeal is whether the evidence demands a finding that GMAC “did not know” of this subsequent conduct on his part “and could not reasonably have known of [it] or that it was likely to occur.” OCGA§ 16-13-49 (e) (1) (A). With regard to whether it was reasonable for GMAC to have known of the likelihood that Childrey would use the Silverado in a drug violation, the State of Georgia does not rely upon Agent Neal’s initial statement that there was insufficient evidence to authorize a forfeiture of that vehicle at that time. Instead, it relies upon GMAC’s actual knowledge that Childrey had in fact used at least one of his other automobiles in connection with a drug violation. As noted, that actual knowledge was sufficient to authorize the trial court to find that GMAC had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that it could not reasonably have known of the likelihood that Childrey would use any remaining unforfeited automobile, such as the Silverado, to commit another drug offense. State of Ga. v. Tucker, supra. There is simply no inequity evidenced by the trial court’s determination, as the finder of fact, that GMAC had failed to prove its innocent interest holder defense by a preponderance of the evidence. As observed by the Court of Appeals,
GMAC determined that it had sufficient grounds to repossess all the GMAC-financed vehicles, including the Silverado truck, on the basis that Childrey was exposing the vehicles to misuse, seizure, or confiscation. But GMAC made a business decision to hold off executing the repossession until all the vehicles were parked simultaneously at Childrey’s residence, apparently so that a repossession could take place in one convenient fell swoop. The trial court had grounds to find that this business decision of convenience was unreasonable, since one or all of the vehicles could continue to be used to transport drugs in the meantime. (Emphasis supplied.)
*336Decided May 23, 2005.
Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, William D. Barwick, Thomas M. Byrne, Valerie S. Sanders, for appellant.
William T. McBroom, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Andrew T. Jones, Gary D. Bergman, for appellee.
GMAC v. State of Ga., supra at 476-477 (2).
This Court has consistently recognized in the past that “ ‘ [w] e are neither authorized nor inclined to substitute our judgment on the evidence for the judgment of the trial court unless the record discloses absolutely no evidence in support of the finding by the trial court. . . . [Cits.]’ [Cit.]” Wilkins v. Wilkins, 234 Ga. 404, 405 (216 SE2d 302) (1975). Here, the Court of Appeals properly adhered to this principle by applying the any evidence standard and affirming the trial court’s finding that GMAC did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was an innocent interest holder. Today, however, this Court departs from our long-standing precedent, concluding that it is both authorized and inclined to make its own factual determinations on appeal notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings reached by the trial court. The Court of Appeals was correct, and we should affirm its judgment.