Court Opinion

ID: 9912215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 20:02:25.217284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:56.454704
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/21/23 In re D.W. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 In re D.W., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.                                       B328675

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                            (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                        Super. Ct. No.
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                          21LJJP00070A)

          Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 Dav. W.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tara Newman, Judge. Conditionally reversed
and remanded with directions.
      Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, and Sally Son, Senior
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      In this appeal from a parental rights termination order,
Dav. W. (Father) asserts the dependency court and the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(the Department) did not comply with their obligations under the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law.
The Department confesses error and does not oppose conditional
affirmance or reversal of the order to allow it to “conduct a
complete inquiry and, if required by . . . ICWA, [to] proceed in
accordance with . . . ICWA’s notice mandates.” On the facts here,
which we will review briefly, we hold a remand for further ICWA-
related process is required.

                        I. BACKGROUND
      Father and A.S. (Mother) are the parents of D.W. (Minor).
In 2021, the Department filed a dependency petition alleging
Minor and his siblings (who are not parties to this appeal) were
dependent children as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300.1
      During the ensuing dependency proceedings, Mother
informed the Department and the juvenile court that she had no
Indian ancestry as far as she knew. Mother also represented,
however, that she had been the subject of dependency
proceedings as a child herself and “was in foster care” for a period
of time that the appellate record does not reveal.
      Father, by contrast, represented (although not in entirely
consistent fashion throughout the proceedings) that he did have
Indian ancestry. On a Parental Notification of Indian Status

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                 2
form filed in June of 2021, Father declared he may have Indian
ancestry and identified the source of that ancestry as “Cherokee.”
Father identified his parents as people who would have
information about Indian ancestry, and Father listed contact
information for his father and his brother.
       The Department made ICWA-related inquiry of Father’s
parents in February 2023 and submitted the results of that
inquiry to the juvenile court in a supplemental report filed
shortly before the permanency planning hearing. Father’s
mother told the Department that her maternal grandmother, her
maternal great grandmother, and her paternal great, great
grandmother (all of whom she identified by name) all had Indian
ancestry (though Father’s mother did not believe any of them
were enrolled tribal members or lived on a reservation). Father’s
mother stated all of these relatives were deceased and there were
no other living relatives who would have more information about
the family’s Indian ancestry. Father’s father, on the other hand,
reported he was not a member of an Indian tribe and did not
believe there were any other family members who would know
more about Indian ancestry on his side of the family.
       At the April 2023 permanency planning hearing from
which this appeal is taken, the juvenile court stated it “previously
found that [ICWA] does not apply in this case” and “reiterate[d]
that finding.”

                         II. DISCUSSION
       Father challenges the juvenile court’s ICWA finding as to
both his own side of the family and Mother’s. As to Mother’s side
of the family, he believes the Department did not satisfy its
ICWA-related obligations because the record does “not reflect

                                 3
that the Department ever asked Mother for the names and
contact information of any relatives who could further discuss the
family’s lineage.” As to Father’s own side of the family, he
believes the Department should have made ICWA-related inquiry
of Father’s brother (Minor’s paternal uncle) and should have
contacted “the three federal Cherokee tribes and asked whether
[Minor] was an Indian child.” The Department concedes a
remand is required because it did not make “proper inquiry
pursuant to . . . ICWA.” We hold conditional reversal of the
parental rights termination order is required because the juvenile
court’s ICWA finding is unsupported by substantial evidence.
       Under ICWA and related California law, the Department
and the juvenile court have “an affirmative and continuing duty
to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).)
Section 224.2, subdivision (b) states “[i]nquiry includes, but is not
limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the
child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” Subdivision
(e)(1) of the same statute explains “[t]here is reason to believe a
child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the
court, social worker, or probation officer has information
suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a
member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”
Under section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2), when reason to believe a
child is an Indian child exists, “further inquiry is necessary to
help the court, social worker, or probation officer determine
whether there is reason to know a child is an Indian child” and

                                 4
such further inquiry includes interviewing the parents and others
to gather information and contacting (among others) the tribe or
tribes in question. When there is reason to know a child is an
Indian child, the Department must provide formal notice to the
tribe or tribes in question as provided in section 224.3. (§§ 224.2,
subd. (f), 224.3, subd. (a)(5).)
       Under these statutory provisions, it was error for the
juvenile court to conclude no further ICWA process was required
on the state of the record— particularly in light of Father’s own
statements and the statements his mother made to the
Department about Cherokee ancestry. The error requires
remand of the cause to permit the additional ICWA-related
process that is required. (In re H.V. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433,
438; In re A.C. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 130, 140 (dis. opn. of Baker,
J.).) Specifically, on remand, the juvenile court shall oversee
ICWA-related inquiry of Minor’s paternal uncle and determine,
at least in the first instance, whether to order ICWA-related
inquiry of extended family members on the maternal side of
Minor’s family, whether to order ICWA-related inquiry of others
having an interest in Minor, and whether to require the
Department to make contact with Cherokee tribes (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(2)(C)). The juvenile court shall also consider whether
prudence counsels in favor of directing the Department to provide
formal notice to Cherokee tribes in light of the representations
made by Minor’s paternal grandmother regarding Indian
ancestry and the unavailability of additional sources of inquiry.
       If, after this additional process we have described, the
juvenile court finds Minor is an Indian child, the juvenile court
shall proceed in accordance with ICWA and related California
law. If, on the other hand, the juvenile court again finds ICWA

                                 5
inapplicable, the court’s order terminating parental rights shall
be reinstated.

                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s parental rights termination order is
conditionally reversed and the cause is remanded solely for
further proceedings required by this opinion.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                            BAKER, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             KIM, J.

                                 6