Court Opinion

ID: 9925681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 19:02:14.540095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.604044
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/22/24 P. v. Thomas CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B326682
                                                            (Super. Ct. No. CR45419)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Ventura County)

v.

EDWARD NOEL THOMAS,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      In an unpublished opinion filed more than 22 years ago, we
affirmed appellant Edward Noel Thomas’s judgment of
conviction. (People v. Thomas (Mar. 28, 2001, B138135).)
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s order resentencing him
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He claims the trial
court abused its discretion in reducing his original sentence by
only one year. We affirm.

         1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                    Appellant’s Original Sentence
       In 1999 a jury convicted appellant of second degree robbery
(§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)); possession of a firearm by a felon
(former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), now § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); and false
imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237.) The jury found true an
allegation that appellant had personally used a firearm during
the commission of the robbery. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) Appellant
admitted one prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)); one
prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)); and one prior
conviction within the meaning of California’s “Three Strikes” law.
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12.) The prior strike was a conviction
of attempted armed robbery.
       Appellant was originally sentenced to prison for an
aggregate term of 27 years, four months, calculated as follows: 10
years for the robbery (the upper term of five years doubled
because of the strike), plus consecutive terms of one year, four
months for possession of a firearm by a felon (one-third the two-
year middle term doubled because of the strike); 10 years for the
firearm use enhancement; five years for the prior serious felony
conviction, and one year for the prior prison term. The court
imposed the three-year upper term for false imprisonment by
violence but stayed execution of the sentence pursuant to section
654.
                     Section 1172.75 Proceedings
       In July 2022 appellant filed in this court a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus (B321493). Appellant requested that he be
resentenced pursuant to section 1172.75. In November 2022 we
ordered the Director of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation to show cause “in a return before the superior
court . . . why the relief prayed for in the petition should not be

                                 2
granted.” The Attorney General states, “[T]he superior court
granted appellant’s writ and determined he was entitled to a full
resentencing [hearing] pursuant to section 1172.75.”
       Appellant was entitled to a full resentencing hearing
because his one-year prior prison term enhancement was “legally
invalid” since it was not “imposed for . . . a sexually violent
offense.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) If a sentence includes such an
invalid prior prison term enhancement, “the court shall recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).) “The
court shall apply . . . any . . . changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion . . . .” (Id., subd.
(d)(2).) “By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full
resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly
‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th
393, 402.)
       At the time of the resentencing hearing in February 2023,
appellant was 59 years old. The trial court struck the one-year
prior prison term enhancement and resentenced him to prison for
26 years, four months. The resentencing order is appealable as
“a final judgment of conviction.” (§ 1237, subd. (a).)
            Trial Court’s Refusal to Strike Prior Serious
         Felony Conviction and Firearm-Use Enhancement
       Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to strike the five-year prior serious felony conviction
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and the 10-year firearm use
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). “[A] trial court does not
abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony).)

                                  3
       Appellant acknowledges that “[w]hen he entered prison,
[he] was a gang member who had spent most of his adult life in
and out [of] trouble . . . .” But appellant claims that “[t]oday] . . .
[he] is a very different person. . . . [He] has turned his life around
about as much as one can while they are locked up behind bars. .
. . He’s . . . converted to Islam, observes his religious obligations
daily, and is obtaining his GED.”
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
strike the enhancements. The court reasonably concluded that
“dismissal of the enhancements would endanger public safety.”
(See § 1385, subd. (c)(2) [proof of one or more specified mitigating
circumstances “weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety”].) The trial court
noted, “[Appellant’s] criminal history is serious, having
committed the above delineated serious and violent felonies [the
present offense of armed robbery and the prior strike of
attempted armed robbery], but also having been convicted of
possessing a shank in jail and committing an aggravated assault
upon a law enforcement officer, both resulting in other prison
commitments.”
       The court said appellant’s “prison behavior [while
incarcerated for the present offenses] has been atrocious.” In
2005 he was convicted of battery by a prisoner upon a
nonprisoner (§ 4501.5) and two counts of obstructing or resisting
an executive officer (§ 69). The victim of the battery was a
correctional officer. He described the attack as follows:
“[Appellant] suddenly grabbed my left hand, pulling me towards
him. I observed what appeared to be a small metal object in his
right hand. I tried to step back but [appellant] lunged forward,

                                  4
striking me twice to the left side of the face. [Appellant] then
jumped up and pulled me into the cell, grabbing me by my upper
torso in a bear hug and ran me into the wall in the back of the
cell, causing me to hit my head on the wall.” Another officer who
was present reported: “I realized that [appellant] had a razor
blade in his left hand. I ordered him to drop the razor, with
negative results. I grabbed [appellant’s] left hand and forced it
open and the razor fell to the floor.” For the 2005 felony battery
conviction, appellant was sentenced to prison for a consecutive
term of four years.
       The trial court listed numerous additional acts committed
by appellant in prison that involved either violence or a threat of
violence. For example, in 2005 a correctional officer found “three
razor blades hidden in [appellant’s] shower shoe.” In 2011
appellant and another inmate got into a fist fight. In 2014
appellant possessed an “Inmate Manufactured Deadly Weapon.”
In 2017 he and eight other inmates “attacked Sgt. Hernandez
and staff.” Appellant and the “other inmates were observed by
staff hitting Sgt. Hernandez and staff in the head and upper
torso area.” In 2018 appellant punched a correctional officer in
the neck. In April 2021 appellant resisted correctional officers’
efforts to control him and kicked one of the officers in the left
shin. During the struggle, appellant said to Sgt. Gonzales, “‘Fuck
you Gonzales’ and ‘We can fight right now.’” At a disciplinary
hearing in May 2021, appellant threatened to physically harm
correctional officers. During an inventory of appellant’s property
in June 2021, a correctional officer found “an Inmate
Manufactured Weapon” that “was approximately 3 inches long
and approximately 1/8 inch wide at its widest point with a sharp

                                 5
pointed end. The [weapon] was made of metal stock . . . .” It had
“melted plastic for a handle.”
       Appellant claims “[t]he resentencing court . . . abused [its]
discretion by relying [in part] on Administrative Segregation
Unit Placement Notices and Rules Violation Reports to establish
that [appellant] would endanger public safety if he were released
from pris[]on.” Instead of relying on such “mere allegations” of
his violent behavior in prison, appellant argues that the trial
court should have relied only on “findings of guilt made after a
full disciplinary hearing.” But appellant has not cited any
authority requiring the court to disregard correctional officers’
reports of violent prison conduct unless the alleged conduct was
proven at a full disciplinary hearing.
       The trial court credited testimony by appellant and his
brother that, as a child, appellant had suffered from “child abuse”
and had been “expos[ed] to domestic violence.” But the court
concluded “there was minimal evidence that [his] prior
victimization and childhood trauma were substantially connected
to [his] involvement in the commission of [the instant] offenses.”
        The trial court also credited appellant’s “claims of mental
illness and physical incapabilities.” But in view of his conduct in
prison, the court found appellant’s “testimony regarding
rehabilitation after 2014 upon conversion to the Muslim
religion . . . to not be credible.” The court stated that credible
“evidence of rehabilitation is virtually nonexistent.”
       Accordingly, the trial court did not act irrationally or
arbitrarily in refusing to dismiss the enhancements because
dismissal “would endanger public safety.”

                                 6
                     Appellant’s Motion to Take
                   Additional Evidence on Appeal
       Eight days after the filing of his reply brief, appellant filed
a motion requesting this court “to take documentary evidence of
the following facts: [¶] [(1)] On May 12, 2023, Correctional
Counselor Stephen Cabral ‘discovered’ that Rule Violation Report
Log # 3A-14-09-049R, which alleged that Thomas had been in
‘Possession of an Inmate Manufactured Deadly Weapon,’ had
been dismissed by the Chief Disciplinary Officer. [¶] [(2)] On
June 6, 2019, Rule Violation Report Log # 218724 was
‘adjudicated,’ and Thomas was found ‘Not Guilty’ of ‘ASSAULT
ON A PEACE OFFICER BY MEANS LIKELY TO CAUSE GBI,’
and all related charges were “dismissed in the Interest of Justice.’
[¶] [(3)] On February 10, 2023, Monterey County Superior Court
Judge Gilbert T. Brown dismissed Case Nos. 19CR004854 and
19CR007932, wherein it was alleged that Thomas had twice
violated Penal Code section 4501.5 (Battery by Prisoner on a
Non-Prisoner).”
       Appellant made the motion pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 909 and rule 8.252(c) of the California Rules of
Court. The People have not filed a response to the motion.
       “It has long been the general rule and understanding that
‘an appeal reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the time of
its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial
court for its consideration.’ . . . This rule reflects an ‘essential
distinction between the trial and the appellate court . . . that it is
the province of the trial court to decide questions of fact and of
the appellate court to decide questions of law . . . .’ [Citation.] . . .
‘Although appellate courts are authorized to make findings of fact
on appeal by Code of Civil Procedure section 909 and rule

                                   7
[8.252(c)] of the California Rules of Court, the authority should be
exercised sparingly. [Citation.] Absent exceptional
circumstances, no such findings should be made.” (In re Zeth S.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.)
       Here, exceptional circumstances do not justify making the
findings of fact requested by appellant. If the evidence had been
introduced at the resentencing hearing, it is not reasonably
probable that the resentencing would have been different. The
documents attached to appellant’s motion show that on February
10, 2023, four days after appellant had been resentenced, the
Monterey County Superior Court dismissed two felony charges of
battery allegedly committed by appellant against two correctional
officers.
       The documents attached to appellant’s motion show that he
was found not guilty of the alleged 2017 assault on a correctional
officer. As to the 2014 charge of “Possession of an Inmate
Manufactured Deadly Weapon,” he “was found guilty of a lesser
charge of [possession of] Dangerous Contraband.” In view of the
numerous acts of violence committed by appellant inside and
outside of prison, the findings as to the 2017 and 2014 charges do
not undermine the trial court’s conclusion that “dismissal of the
enhancements would endanger public safety.” Accordingly, we
deny appellant’s motion to take additional documentary evidence
on appeal.
            Trial Court’s Refusal to Dismiss Prior Strike
       Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying his motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction. (See
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375 [“a trial court's refusal or
failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation under
section 1385 is subject to review for abuse of discretion”].)

                                 8
        “‘[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious
and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the
Three Strikes law . . . “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to
Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the
court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature
and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.’” (Carmony, supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 377.)
        The trial court did not act arbitrarily or irrationally in
concluding that appellant should not be deemed to be outside the
spirit of the Three Strikes law. The court reasoned: Appellant
“had a prior strike for an attempted robbery on an elderly victim
[upon whom] great bodily injury was inflicted. While in custody
on that case he was convicted for having a shank . . . . The prior
strike offense was committed seven years prior to the instant
offense . . . . So . . . [the prior strike is] not remote in time.
[¶] . . . [H]is criminal history started in 1985. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The
nature of the instant case is serious. It involved a robbery with a
loaded firearm, a false imprisonment of the victim, removing the
victim’s ability to call 911. [¶] The Court took into account
[appellant’s] childhood trauma and the extent [to] which the
sentence would protect society. [¶] As such, the Court finds that
[appellant] falls within the spirit[] of the Three Strikes Law and
declines to exercise its discretion [to] strik[e] the strike prior.”

                                    9
                   Trial Court’s Refusal to Reduce
                Upper-Term Sentence to Middle Term
       Appellant contends: “The five-year and three-year [upper]
terms [imposed for robbery and false imprisonment by violence],
respectively, should have been reduced to their middle terms”
pursuant to section 1170, amended subdivision (b). But in
resentencing appellant, the trial court imposed the upper term
only for the robbery conviction. As to the conviction for false
imprisonment by violence, the court imposed the middle term of
two years and doubled it to four years because of the prior strike.
Pursuant to section 654, the court stayed execution of the four-
year sentence.
       “Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 amended
section 1170[, subdivision (b)] to provide that a court ‘shall, in its
sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).’ (§
1170(b)(1); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) In turn, subdivision (b)(2)
of the statute provides that ‘[t]he court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial.’ (§ 1170(b)(2).)” (People v. Fox (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 826,
830-831, fns. omitted.)
       In justifying imposition of the upper term for the robbery
conviction, the court stated: “I am not going to impose . . . [the]
mid[dle] term based upon the fact that the defendant was on
probation or parole. I believe he had been only out of custody for
a period of two months when he picked up the instant case. So he

                                 10
was on probation or parole at the time of the offense, and he
performed unsatisfactor[il]y on probation or parole.” Appellant’s
probation report stated that he had been paroled on October 16,
1998. The instant offenses were committed one month later on
November 15, 1998.
       Both parties agree that we should apply the “abuse of
discretion” standard of review to the court’s refusal to impose the
middle term. Appellant claims the trial court abused its
discretion by “focusing solely on unproven/ unstipulated
‘aggravating factors’” in violation of amended section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2). We conclude the trial court did not violate the
statute and did not abuse its discretion.
       In determining whether to impose the upper term, “the
court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions . . . based on
a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) “[T]he fact of a prior
conviction encompasses a finding that . . . defendant was on
probation or parole at the time the crime was committed.”
(People v. Pantaleon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 932, 938.)
       At the resentencing hearing appellant’s counsel said she
had no objection to the admission of “a certified copy of
[appellant’s 12-page] rap sheet.” The trial court could therefore
consider the rap sheet, which showed appellant’s criminal record
and performance on probation or parole. (See People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [“the waiver doctrine should apply to
claims involving the trial court's failure to properly make . . . its
discretionary sentencing choices]; accord, People v. Kidane (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 817, 826.)
       The trial court could also consider appellant’s probation
report. His counsel objected on hearsay grounds to the admission

                                 11
of the report. The trial court overruled the objection because the
probation report contained “reliable” hearsay. Appellant does not
claim the court erroneously admitted the probation report. (See
People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 831, 838-839 [for purposes of
resentencing, reliable hearsay statements in the probation report
are admissible]; People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 501
[probation report “established Flores's unsatisfactory
performance while on probation — he was on probation when
committing the offense against Doe”].)
       Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing the upper term for robbery based on appellant’s
commission of the offense while he was on parole. “Under
California's determinate sentencing system, the existence of a
single aggravating circumstance is legally sufficient to make the
defendant eligible for the upper term.” (People v. Black (2007) 41
Cal.4th 799, 813; see People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459,
467 [“unquestionably the trial court may still rely on any single
permissible aggravating factor to select an upper term sentence
under the newly-revised triad system” of section 1170,
subdivision (b)].)
                             Disposition
       The judgment entered upon resentencing is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:

             BALTODANO, J.

             CODY, J.

                               12
                   Michele M. Castillo, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Law Offices of Andrew F. Alire and Andrew F. Alire, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.