Court Opinion

ID: 9408552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 07:00:21.164126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:44.825121
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                            MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARVIN CLEVELAND BRYAN, JR.,                    DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-3443-17-0660-I-1

                     v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: July 12, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                     THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Marvin Cleveland Bryan, Jr., New Rochelle, New York, pro se.

           Christina Knott, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                            BEFORE

                                  Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his appeal regarding the agency’s rescinding its job offer for lack of
     jurisdiction.        For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
     petition for review, AFFIRM the initial decision to the extent that it found that
     the appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over this appeal as a cancellation of a

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been id entified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     promotion or appointment, MODIFY the initial decision to find that the appellant
     failed to nonfrivolously allege that the agency took a suitability action because he
     did not apply for a covered position, and REMAND the case to the regional office
     for further adjudication of the appellant’s claim under the Uniformed Services
     Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at
     38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA) in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant applied and was tentatively selected for the Attorney Advisor
     GS-0905-11 position with the Board of Veterans Appeals. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 1 at 5, Tab 3 at 17, 21-26. He was notified of the tentative selection
     on June 20, 2017, but then the agency notified him on July 10, 2017, that it was
     rescinding its offer. IAF, Tab 3 at 17, 28.
¶3        The appellant filed the instant appeal challenging the agency’s action and
     requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. He argued that he received a final offer of
     employment that the agency later withdrew and that the agency took a neg ative
     suitability action against him. IAF, Tab 3 at 12, Tab 10 at 4. He also asserted
     that the agency’s decision was due in part to his request for benefits because of
     his status as a combat-injured disabled veteran. IAF, Tab 3 at 11-12. Namely, he
     stated that the agency failed to offer him 8 hours per pay period of annual leave
     that he “gallantly earned while being injured in a combat zone” and that he
     notified the agency that, because he was a disabled veteran, he would require a
     special chair when he entered on duty. Id. at 5, 7-8. However, the administrative
     judge did not provide the appellant with notice of his jurisdictional burden under
     USERRA. IAF, Tabs 9, 16.
¶4        Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision that dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF,
     Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID).        She found that the appellant failed to
     nonfrivolously allege that he was subjected to an appealable action in the form of
                                                                                             3

     cancelling a promotion or appointment because he failed to nonfrivolously allege
     that a promotion or appointment actually occurred and that, even if he were
     appointed, he failed to nonfrivolously allege that the appointment was not
     revoked. 2 ID at 7-9. She also found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously
     allege that the agency took a suitability action. ID at 9-12. Further, she stated
     that the appellant had not raised claims regarding, among other things, his
     military service, which could have provided a basis for the Board’s jurisdiction.
     ID at 2 n.1. Finally, she found that, absent an otherwise appealable action, the
     Board lacked jurisdiction over any of the appellant’s other arguments. ID at 12.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has responded
     in opposition to his petition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     We modify the initial decision to find that an attorney advisor is not a “covered
     position,” and thus the appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that the agency
     took a suitability action.
¶6         The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that the agency
     did not take a suitability action against him, asserting that he was denied
     discovery and the opportunity to develop the record regarding this issue. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 5-6; ID at 9-12; IAF, Tab 9 at 4-5. A “suitability action” is defined
     as a cancellation of eligibility, a removal, a cancellation of reinstatement
     eligibility, and a debarment.      5 C.F.R § 731.203(a).       Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 731.101(b) describes a “covered position” for
     purposes of defining a suitability action as “a position in the competitive service,
     a position in the excepted service where the incumbent can be noncompetitively

     2
       The appellant does not challenge the finding that he failed to establish jurisdiction on
     the basis of a cancellation of a promotion or appointment , and we find no reason to
     disturb it. Petition for Review File, Tab 1; ID at 7-9; see Levy v. Department of Labor,
     118 M.S.P.R. 619, ¶ 10 (2012) (stating that to establish jurisdiction in an appeal from
     the cancellation of a promotion or appointment as a reduction in grade, the appellant
     must show that the promotion or appointment actually occurred).
                                                                                          4

     converted to the competitive service, and a career appointment to a position in the
     Senior Executive Service.”         Hudlin v. Office of Personnel Management,
     119 M.S.P.R. 61, ¶ 6 n.2 (2012).
¶7         The position at issue is an excepted-service position that does not provide
     for noncompetitive conversion to the competitive service. IAF, Tab 3 at 24; see
     5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(d).     Thus, it is not a “covered position” for purposes of
     determining whether a suitability action occurred.         Cf. Hopper v. Office of
     Personnel Management, 118 M.S.P.R. 608, ¶ 7 n.3 (2012) (finding that, although
     the appellant was in the excepted service, he was a covered employee for
     purposes of a suitability action because he could be noncompetitively converted
     to the competitive service), aff’d, 786 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Accordingly,
     although we agree that the appellant has failed to nonfrivolously allege that he
     was subjected to a suitability action, we modify the initial decision to find that
     this was because he did not apply for a “covered position.” 3

     The appellant nonfrivolously alleged a cognizable claim under USERRA when he
     asserted that the agency rescinded its offer because he is a disabled veteran.
¶8         Under 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), “[a] person who . . . has performed . . . service
     in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment,
     retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an
     employer on the basis of that . . . performance of service. . . .” To establish
     jurisdiction over a USERRA discrimination claim under section 4311(a), the
     appellant must nonfrivolously allege the following: (1) he performed duty or has
     an obligation to perform duty in a uniformed service of the United States; (2) the
     agency denied him initial employment, reemployment, retention, promotion, or
     3
       The appellant asserts that the administrative judge improperly denied him discovery
     on whether the agency took a suitability action against him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6.
     The Board will not find reversible error in an administrative judge’s discovery rulings
     absent an abuse of discretion that prejudiced the appellant’s substantive rights. See
     Jones v. Department of Health and Human Services, 119 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 18 (2013),
     aff’d, 544 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Because the appellant did not make a
     nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction as a matter of law, we find no such prejudice.
                                                                                              5

      any benefit of employment; and (3) the denial was due to the performance of duty
      or obligation to perform duty in the uniformed service. 4 Gossage v. Department
      of Labor, 118 M.S.P.R. 455, ¶ 10 (2012).           A claim of discrimination under
      USERRA should be broadly and liberally construed in determining whether it is
      nonfrivolous.    Id.   Allegations of discrimination based on one’s status as a
      disabled veteran are cognizable under USERRA. Kirkendall v. Department of the
      Army, 94 M.S.P.R. 70, ¶ 6 (2003). As discussed below, we find that the appellant
      has nonfrivolously alleged a cognizable claim under USERRA on the basis of his
      status as a disabled veteran.
¶9          We find that the appellant performed military duty, that the agency was
      aware that he did so, and that the agency took an action covered under USERRA.
      The appellant asserted below, and on review, that he served in combat and he is a
      disabled veteran. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; IAF, Tab 19 at 6. He also asserted that
      the agency was aware of his service because his application for employment
      included his DD Form 214/Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty,
      30 percent disability letter, and combat-related special compensation letter. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 6; IAF, Tab 19 at 6. Further, it is undisputed that this constitutes
      an action covered under 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) because the statute specifies that an
      agency shall not deny initial employment.
¶10         We also find that the appellant’s claim constitutes a nonfrivolous allegation
      that his status as a disabled veteran was the reason that the agency revoked his
      offer of employment.       The appellant asserted that the agency discriminated
      against him when it rescinded its offer of employment on the basis of his status as
      a disabled veteran, his ability to earn 8 hours of leave because of his service, and
      his statement that he would need a special chair because of his status as a
      disabled veteran. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; IAF, Tab 3 at 5, 7 -8, 11-12. He also
      argues that the agency’s rescinded offer constitutes discrimination against a
      4
        A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
      issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
                                                                                          6

disabled veteran. 5 Because the appellant argues that the agency took its action
because of his status as a disabled veteran, we find that he has nonfrivolously
alleged a claim under USERRA. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a); Davison v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, 115 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶¶ 12-15 (2011) (finding Board
jurisdiction over the appellant’s allegation of retaliation based on use of leave to
which he was entitled only due to his status as a disabled veteran) ; Kirkendall,
94 M.S.P.R. 70, ¶ 6 (finding that the appellant’s claim that the agency did not
select him for a position because of his status as a disabled veteran was a claim
cognizable under USERRA).              Because we find that the appellant has
nonfrivolously alleged that the agency rescinded its offer because of his status as
a disabled veteran, we find that he is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his
USERRA claim. See Gossage, 118 M.S.P.R. 455, ¶ 10 (explaining that, once an
appellant has established Board jurisdiction, he has an unconditional right to a
hearing on the merits of his USERRA claim). Thus, we remand the appeal to
provide the appellant with his requested hearing.

5
  To the extent he is alleging disability discrimination as opposed to discrimination on
the basis of his status as a disabled veteran, the Board lacks jurisdiction over this claim.
See Mims v. Social Security Administration, 120 M.S.P.R. 213, ¶ 22 (2013) (finding
that, to the extent the appellant claimed he was discriminated against based on a
disability arising from his military service, such a claim was not cognizable under
USERRA).
                                                                                    7

                                          ORDER
¶11        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.