Court Opinion

ID: 9707281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:07:33.191853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:30.422171
License: Public Domain

LANSING, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I believe that the exclusionary rule does not apply to the DNA sample. Accordingly, I believe the postconviction court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (“a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is necessary to the success of a Sixth Amendment claim [of ineffective assistance of counsel]” based on failure to seek suppression of evidence); see also State ex rel. Fruhrman v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 242, 244-45, 146 N.W.2d 174, 176 (1966) (“[N]o inadequacy can be attributed to counsel for failing to make a motion, which should have been denied had it been made.”).
The postconviction court concluded there was a “reasonable probability” that a motion to suppress the DNA sample would have been granted because the sample was “ordered illegally.” But even assuming this court’s prior decision in this case invalidated the basis for ordering Johnson to provide the DNA sample, it must still be determined whether exclusion is the appropriate remedy for that invalid seizure. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334, 105 S.Ct. 733, 738 n. 3, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (explaining that the question of whether evidence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves two discrete inquiries: whether the evidence was ille-*137gaily seized, and whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the violation).
It is well-settled in Minnesota that “[t]he purpose of suppression [of illegally obtained evidence] is not to vindicate a defendant’s rights nor to affirm the integrity of courts, but to deter police from engaging in illegal searches.” State, City of Minneapolis v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Minn.1993). In this case there was no misconduct to deter — by police or any other state authority. Johnson’s probation officer collected the biological specimen on the basis of a valid court order. The district court issued that order in accordance with a statutory requirement, see Minn.Stat. § 609.117 (stating that the court “shall order” collection of a biological specimen from specified offenders), and the order remained valid and binding until this court subsequently rejected the district court’s construction of the sex-offender registration statute.3 By that time, the initial sample had already been collected, analyzed, and linked to the unsolved 1992 sexual assault, and the state had already charged Johnson with first-degree criminal sexual conduct in connection with that assault. Under these facts, the exclusionary rule would have no deterrent effect and should therefore not apply. See State v. Smith, 652 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn.App.2002) (exclusionary rule should only be used when its deterrent value outweighs social costs of excluding probative, but illegally obtained evidence).
Because application of the exclusionary rule to the DNA sample would not be appropriate, Johnson did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s failure to seek suppression of the sample.

. Because the sentencing order that included the DNA sample requirement was not merely "facially valid,” U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 902, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3410, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), there is no question in this case of whether the probation officer who collected the sample acted in "good faith” reliance on a defective order. Accordingly, the fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not recognized a good-faith exception to the warrant requirement under the Minnesota Constitution does not affect the analysis.