Court Opinion

ID: 9790482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:53:36.574792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.842225
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority reverses the district court’s suppression of all statements made by Daniel Trujillo (Trujillo) to Detective Richard Archer (Detective Archer) on June 17,1996. The majority holds that the record does not sup*128port the trial court’s finding that Trujillo was under custodial interrogation prior to being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The majority therefore remands the case to the trial court to conduct further proceedings “to make findings of fact regarding whether the defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation.” Maj. op. at 3. I dissent to this part of the majority’s opinion because I believe that the record supports the trial court’s finding that Trujillo was subjected to a custodial interrogation before he was advised of his Miranda rights. As such, I would affirm the trial court’s suppression of Trujillo’s statements made prior to the Miranda advisement.
Because the statements Trujillo made before being advised of his Miranda rights were voluntary, however, any statements he made after being advised of his Miranda rights should not be suppressed.
I.
On April 28,1996, S.D., a ten-year-old boy, reported to his parents that he had been sexually assaulted by Trujillo while spending the previous night at the home of family friends. Specifically, S.D. reported that Trujillo had put his hand down S.D.’s pants and touched S.D.’s “private parts.” S.D.’s parents reported the incident to the Thornton Police Department, and Detective Archer was assigned to investigate the matter.
On June 17, 1996, Trujillo and his wife arrived at the Thornton Police Department for a scheduled interview with Detective Archer. When they arrived at the police station, they stayed in the waiting area for approximately five to fifteen minutes. While Trujillo’s wife remained in the waiting area, Detective Archer directed Trujillo through a locked door leading to the detective division of the police station. Detective Archer and Trujillo then proceeded down a hallway and through another door to a small interview room.
According to both Trujillo and Detective Archer, the tone of the interview was conversational at first, although Trujillo testified that he felt required to' answer Detective Archer’s questions. At the beginning of the interview, Detective Archer obtained Trujillo’s background information, such as his full name and date of birth. Detective Archer also informed Trujillo of the detective’s police background, particularly his investigation of cases involving sexual assault on children.
According to Trujillo, approximately fifteen minutes after the interview began, Detective Archer briefly left the room. Trujillo testified that as the detective left the room, he stated, “If you need to go to the bathroom or anything, you’re going to have to knock on the door because it is locked.” Trujillo also testified that the interview lasted a total of approximately two hours. According to Detective Archer, although he initially testified that he did not leave the interview room prior to the conclusion of the interview, he later conceded that he may have briefly left the interview room to obtain a Miranda advisement form once he determined the need to inform Trujillo of his Miranda rights. Additionally, Detective Archer testified that the interview with Trujillo lasted for only one hour, although he stated that Trujillo may have been at the police station for a total of two hours.
After Detective Archer returned to the interview room, he advised Trujillo of his Miranda rights and Trujillo signed a form indicating that he understood and waived those rights. According to Trujillo, Detective Archer discussed with him “the hard way” to proceed with the case, which involved Trujillo being arrested, having his children taken away by Social Services, and being required to take a drug which would diminish his sex drive. Trujillo further testified that Detective Archer also discussed “the easy way” to proceed, which involved Trujillo confessing to the sexual assault on S.D., being on probation, participating in counseling, and continuing with his plans to move out of Colorado. In contrast, Detective Archer testified that although he discussed with Trujillo the possible ways in which the case could develop, he did not promise or threaten Trujillo with any particular outcomes if Trujillo did or did not confess.
At the suppression hearing on January 3, 1997, the district court found that “a reason*129able person in Mr. Trujillo’s circumstances at the time Detective Archer began Ms interrogation in the interrogation room would not believe that he was free to leave.” As such, the district court concluded that Trujillo was subjected to a custodial interrogation and suppressed all statements Trujillo made pri- or to being advised of Ms Miranda rights.
The district court also suppressed all statements Trujillo made after being advised of Ms Miranda rights, reasoning that the Miranda advisement given to Trujillo “after [Detective Archer] had spent some period of time talking to him doesn’t make the situation right.” The district court thereafter took the issue of the voluntariness of Trujillo’s statements under advisement and reserved ruling until a later date. On January 10, 1997, the district court made the following ruling regarding the voluntariness of Trujillo’s statements:
After considering the testimony of the officers as to the issue of voluntariness, the court will find that while the statements have been precluded from use because of the Miranda advisal, the statements were made voluntarily to ... Officer Archer and the court will find that they were voluntarily and freely made.
The prosecution subsequently filed tMs interlocutory appeal to determine whether the district court properly ruled that Trujillo was subjected to a custodial interrogation before being advised of Ms Miranda rights and whether the district court properly suppressed Trujillo’s statements after he was advised of his Miranda rights.
II.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Umted States Supreme Court held that prosecutors may not use statements made during a custodial interrogation of a defendant uMess the prosecution demonstrates that the defendant was adequately advised of Ms rights. See People v. Denison, 918 P.2d 1114,1115 (Colo.1996). In determining whether an individual is in custody at the time of questioning, courts must determine whether a reasonable person in the same position would consider himself deprived of Ms freedom of action in a significant manner. See People v. Moore, 900 P.2d 66, 71 (Colo.1995). To resolve this issue, courts must consider the totality, of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. See id. An appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s findings on appeal if such findings are supported by competent evidence in the record and the trial court applied the correct legal standard. See id. at 71-72.
. Factors wMch may be considered to determine a reasonable person’s belief regarding his or her freedom of action include: (1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the mterrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; and (9) the defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response to such- directions. See People v. Dracon, 884 P.2d 712, 717 (Colo.1994). Under the reasonable person objective standard, “neither the interrogating officer’s subjective state of mind nor the suspect’s mental state is conclusive on the issue of whether a reasonable person in that situation would have considered the interrogation to be custodial.” Id. (quoting People v. Hamilton, 831 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Colo.1992)).
We have held that custody is not limited to those situations involving a formal arrest. See People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816, 818 (Colo.1990). Additionally, the teitial voluntariness of a person’s presence at a police station does not preclude the determination that Ms presence thereafter is custodial in nature. See id. Even when a defendant is repeatedly told that he is free to leave the police station and that he would not be arrested that same day, the defendant may still be found to have been subjected to a custodial interrogation. See id. at 818-19.
Where the trial court’s factual findings lack detail but the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions, we have avoided remand-*130mg the case for further factual findings by considering findings which are fairly implied by the trial court’s conclusions. See People v. Pease, 934 P.2d 1874, 1376-77 (Colo.1997). This approach to a determination of custody for Miranda purposes is appropriate because custody is essentially a factual issue to be determined by the trial court. People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 792 (Colo.1990).
In the current case, it is not necessary to remand the case to the trial court with directions to find facts supporting the trial court’s determination of custody when the evidence both supports and predicts the findings which will be forthcoming. Although Trujillo and Detective Archer supplied conflicting testimony as to the details of the interview, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Trujillo was subjected to a custodial interrogation on June 17,1996. After Trujillo arrived at the police station, he was separated from his wife and directed to pass through a locked door leading to the detective division of the police station. Trujillo and Detective Archer then proceeded down a hallway and, according to Trujillo’s testimony, through another locked door to reach the interview room. .The two locked doors alone, viewed from the objective perspective of a reasonable person, supports the conclusion that a reasonable person would have considered himself deprived of his freedom of action in a significant manner. Moreover, the fact that Detective Archer later left Trujillo in the locked interview room, also supports the conclusion that Trujillo was subjected to a custodial interrogation once he entered the interview room. The totality of the circumstances thus objectively indicates that Trujillo’s freedom of movement was limited during the interrogation at the police station on June 17,1996.
Although the district court did not make explicit factual findings, the record supports the district court’s conclusion that “a reasonable person in Mr. Trujillo’s circumstances at the time Detective Archer began his interrogation in the interrogation room would not believe that he was free to leave” and that Trujillo was thus subjected to a custodial interrogation. Because the district court’s conclusion is supported by competent evidence in the record, I believe that this ease need not be remanded for factual findings regarding the issue of custodial interrogation.
III.
The district court also suppressed all statements Trujillo made after being advised of his Miranda rights, reasoning that the Miranda advisement given to Trujillo “after [Detective Archer] had spent some period of time talking to him doesn’t make the situation right.”
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a law enforcement officer’s initial failure to administer a Miranda advisement tainted subsequent admissions which a suspect made after being fully advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived. In Elstad, the suspect was arrested at his home on a charge of burglary, but was not advised of his Miranda rights at that time. The arresting officer told the suspect that he believed the suspect was involved in the burglary. The suspect replied to the officer’s remark by stating, “Yes, I was there.” The suspect was then transported to the police station where he was advised of his Miranda rights for the first time. After the Miranda advisement, the suspect agreed to talk to the police and made a statement detailing his involvement in the burglary.
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not require the suppression of a confession made after a proper Miranda advisement and waiver. Id. at 318,105 S.Ct. at 1297-98. The Court stated that a suspect’s answers during a custodial interrogation in the absence of the required Miranda advisement must be excluded from evidence at trial. Id. at 317,-105 S.Ct. at 1297. However, the Court determined that there was little justification for excluding evidence of a subsequent voluntary confession made after being advised of Miranda rights when neither the suspect’s initial incriminating statement nor his subsequent confession is coerced. Id. at 312, 105 S.Ct. at 1294-95. The Court reasoned that “there is no warrant for pre*131suming coercive effect where the suspect’s initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary. The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.” Id. at 318,105 S.Ct. at 1297-98.
In People v. Mendozar-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810 (Colo.1990), Colorado adopted the reasoning in Elstad under circumstances similar to those of the current ease. In Mendozar-Rodriguez, the defendant was handcuffed, transported to the police station, placed in an interview room, and questioned for approximately fifteen to twenty minutes prior to being properly advised of his Miranda rights. After the Miranda advisement, the defendant made additional inculpatory statements. This court ruled in Mendoza-Rodriguez:
[Ajbsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.
Id. at 814 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. at 1296). This court held that in order to determine the voluntariness of post-Miranda statements, a court must first determine whether the defendant’s pre-Mi-randa statements were given voluntarily. Id. If the pre-Miranda statements were voluntary, then the post-Miranda statements would not be rendered involuntary. Id. This court thus concluded that the officers’ initial failure to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights did not necessarily impermissi-bly taint his subsequent post-Miranda statements. Id. at 815.
In the current case, after Detective Archer returned to the interview room, he advised Trujillo of his Miranda rights and Trujillo signed a form indicating that he understood and waived those rights. The district court specifically found that Trujillo’s pre-Miranda statements were voluntary. In accordance with this court’s holding in Mendoza-Rodriguez, because Trujillo’s pre-Miranda statements were found to be voluntary, his post-Miranda statements are not rendered involuntary. As such, although Trujillo’s pre-Miranda statements should be suppressed because he was subjected to a custodial interrogation, his post-Miranda statements should be admitted because they were voluntary and not tainted by Detective Archer’s initial failure to advise him of his Miranda rights.
IV.
In my view, the record supports the district court’s conclusion that Trujillo was subjected to a custodial interrogation throughout his interview with Detective Archer on June 17, 1996. Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s suppression of Trujillo’s statements prior to being advised of his Miranda rights. Because the statements Trujillo made before being advised of his Miranda rights were voluntary, however, any statements he made after being advised of his Miranda rights should not be suppressed. Thus, I would affirm in part and reverse in part.
I am authorized to say that Justice MARTINEZ joins in this dissent.