Court Opinion

ID: 9475607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:32:21.815605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:48.748624
License: Public Domain

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Chief Judge
(concurring).
This opinion was not originally scheduled for publication. Since I had no objection to a remand, I joined in the panel’s opinion without comment. Now that the panel, in response to requests from a number of practitioners, has agreed to publish its opinion, I add this short concurrence. I do so in order to emphasize that our decision in no way represents a departure from the longstanding recognition that Congress has assigned the Secretary the prime responsibility for factual analysis in social security disability cases. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.1981).
Indeed, our decision merely follows applicable Social Security Rulings. In addition to the language from Social Security Rulings 85-15 and 85-16 quoted in the panel’s opinion, Ruling 85-15 also states as follows:
Stress and Mental Illness____ Determining whether [mentally impaired] individuals will be able to adapt to the demands or “stress” of the workplace is often extremely difficult. This section is ... intended ... to emphasize the importance of thoroughness in evaluation on an individualized basis.
The reaction to the demands of work (stress) is highly individualized, and mental illness is characterized by adverse responses to seemingly trivial circumstances. The mentally impaired may cease to function effectively when facing such demands as getting to work regularly, having their performance supervised, and remaining in the workplace for a full day. A person may become panicked and develop palpitations, shortness of breath, or feel faint while riding in an elevator; another may experience terror and begin to hallucinate when approached by a stranger asking a question. Thus, the mentally impaired may have difficulty meeting the requirements of even so-called “low-stress” jobs.
*287West’s Social Security Reporting Service, Rulings, at 421 (Supp.1986). In this case, by contrast, the Secretary relied on medical evidence that Lancellotta could perform “non-stressful” work, and on vocational evidence that there exist in the economy a significant number of jobs that ordinarily would be considered “low-stress.” In other words, the Secretary ascertained only that there are a significant number of jobs in the economy that would be low in stress for the average worker. This approach falls short. Ruling 85-15 recognizes the Secretary’s obligation to undertake at least some subjective, individualized inquiry into what job attributes are likely to produce disabling stress in the claimant, and what, if any, jobs exist in the economy that do not possess these attributes. Not having identified the conditions that are likely to cause disabling stress in Lancellotta, the AU in the instant case failed to elicit from the vocational expert any testimony directed specifically to these particular stress-causing conditions. Cf. Arocho v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 670 F.2d 374 (1st Cir.1982) (ALJ’s hypothetical question to vocational expert inadequately conveyed precise nature of claimant’s limitation's).1 It is well settled, furthermore, that a remand to the Secretary is appropriate where the Secretary has failed to follow a policy set out in an applicable ruling. See McDonald v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 795 F.2d 1118 (1st Cir.1986); Andrades v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 790 F.2d 168 (1st Cir.1986); Munoz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 788 F.2d 822 (1st Cir.1986).
Accordingly, our decision cannot in any way be read to presage a greater willingness to examine on appeal the factual bases of the Secretary’s determinations. This court will not interfere with the Secretary’s assessment of the quality of factual evidence. The Secretary enjoys wide latitude in the case-by-case implementation of the Act. We merely hold the Secretary to his own Rulings.
I do not feel that adherence to this aspect of Ruling 85-15 will impose any great burden on the Secretary in future cases. He need only produce some evidence of the individualized nature of a claimant’s stress reactions, and elicit testimony about jobs in the economy that such a claimant could perform. And, of course, this inquiry is unnecessary unless the Secretary first determines that a claimant has a severe impairment or impairments that prevent return to his former work, and has a stress condition that significantly affects his ability to perform the full range of jobs consistent with any exertional or other limitations. See Perez Lugo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 794 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir.1986); Borrero Lebron v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 747 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.1984).

. I also note the inconsistency between the Secretary’s finding of no disability at step 5 and his finding that Lancellotta could not return to his former work as an assembler. The Secretary found claimant not disabled based on generalized testimony that he can petform low-stress jobs and that low-stress jobs exist in significant numbers. Yet the vocational expert characterized claimant’s former assembler job, which the Secretary implicitly found too stressful, to be a low-stress job. This inconsistency illustrates the need for a more individualized assessment of claimant’s condition.