Court Opinion

ID: 9731183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:37:25.369565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:44.501895
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). The writer would here reverse the trial court, dismiss the writ of certiorari and affirm the decision of the state parole board denying the privilege of parole to the respondent. The writer sees a parole as a privilege granted, within the discretion of the paroling authority.1 The applicable statute provides only that the department “may parole an inmate of the Wisconsin state prisons.” 2 It contains no provisions for *217standards, the fulfillment of which entitle an inmate to parole. The writer would grant judicial review by cer-tiorari of denials of parole but with such review limited to a consideration of whether the board acted discrim-inatorily, or illegally.3 A broader base of judicial review is available where one, once granted the conditional liberty of parole, is to be returned to the penal institution from which he was paroled.4 But there are significant differences in the two situations.5 Parole revocation rests *218upon a determination that conditions of parole were violated.6 Whether an inmate is to be released on parole involves the consideration of many factors, not limited to the conduct of the inmate while confined.7 The protection of the public, as well as anticipations of the prisoner, is involved, with matters such as the nature and gravity of the offense clearly material. The writer sees no entitlement to parole, nor right to judicial review, except where the claim is that the paroling authority acted discriminatorily or illegally. With the number of serious crimes being committed by prisoners released on parole, the writer sees every reason for continuing to hold that a prison inmate should be required to convince the parole board that his conditional release would be in the public interest, as well as in his interest. The paroling authority ought not have to convince a judge that it was entitled not to grant parole in a particular case. If parole authorities are to be required to state their reasons for denial, and have the adequacy of their reasons for denial-judicially reviewed, we find no basis for overturning the parole board’s denial of parole in the case before us. Those reasons were clearly stated, and included the facts that: (1) Respondent had been consistently involved in criminal activity for thirty years; *219(2) he broke the terms of his last parole; (S) his parole plan for work and residence in Minnesota was not acceptable to the Minnesota authorities; and (4) by his own admission, he had not made an effort to develop new attitudes which would support him on his release. Even if the reasons for denial of parole were not this clearly stated and overwhelmingly adequate, since there is here neither allegation nor proof that the parole board acted illegally or discriminatorily, the writer would reverse the decision of the lower court and reinstate the denial of parole to this respondent by the state parole board.

 See: 67 C. J. S., Pardons, pp. 604-606, sec. 20, stating: “A parole is a mere matter of grace, favor, or privilege, and a prisoner is not entitled thereto as a matter of right. Subject to the limitations imposed by statute, the question whether a prisoner shall be paroled is a matter for the discretion of the paroling authority, whether it be a court or an officer, board or commission. . . Quoted with approval in Tyler v. State Department of Public Welfare (1963), 19 Wis. 2d 166, 173, 119 N. W. 2d 460.

 Sec. 57.06 (1) (a), Stats., as amended by sec. 300, ch. 90, Laws of 1973, providing in part: “The department may parole an inmate of the Wisconsin state prisons ... at any time if there *217is no minimum prescribed for the offense, or when he has served the minimum term prescribed by statute for the offense, or when he has served 20 years of a life term, less the deduction earned for good conduct . . . .” Minimum term for eligibility to parole held to be one year in Edelman v. State (1974), 62 Wis. 2d 613, 215 N. W. 2d 386.

 See: Farries v. United States Board of Parole (7th Cir. 1973), 484 Fed. 2d 948, 949, where the petitioner alleged that he was denied parole based upon religious discrimination, with the court reversing and remanding for evidentiary hearing, but holding: “Parole Boards, of course, enjoy a broad range of discretion in determining whether to grant or deny an application for parole, and it has therefore been held that a prisoner need not be accorded a hearing on his application or provided with a statement of reasons for the Board’s actions. ... It seems equally true, however, that a prisoner may not discriminatorily be denied parole on account of religious prejudice. . . .”

 See: State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 540, 548, 185 N. W. 2d 306, this court stating: “. . . Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that there is a significant distinction between the status and freedom enjoyed by one on probation or parole and one confined in a penal institution. After one has gained the conditional freedom of a probationer or parolee, whether by action of court, parole board, or statute, the state cannot summarily revoke such status without giving petitioner a rea-, sonable opportunity to explain away the accusation that he had violated the conditions of his probation or parole. . . .”

 United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Board of Parole (2d Cir. 1971), 443 Fed. 2d 1079, 1086, the court stating: “. . . It is not sophistic to attach greater importance to a person’s justifiable reliance in maintaining his conditional freedom so long as he abides by the conditions of his release, than to his mere anticipation or hope of freedom. . . .” Quoted in Morrissey *218v. Brewer (1972), 408 U. S. 471, 92 Sup. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484.

 Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, footnote 5, at pages 483, 484, the high court stating: “This discretionary aspect of the revocation decision need not be reached unless there is first an appropriate determination that the individual has in fact breached the conditions of parole. . . .”

 Tyler v. State Department of Public Welfare, supra, footnote 1, at page 175, this court stating: “. . . In view of the nature of the matter it would probably be impossible for a court to declare that the refusal to parole was either ‘unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or . . . arbitrary and capricious’ while at the same time giving due weight to ‘the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency involved, as well as discretionary authority conferred upon it.’ ”