Court Opinion

ID: 9366819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-28 06:11:15.310214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:55.383510
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed January 26, 2023

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                                 No. 11-18-00037-CR
                                     __________

                   MICKEY RAY PERKINS, Appellant
                                        V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 35th District Court
                             Brown County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. CR24903

          MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND
       A jury convicted Mickey Ray Perkins of aggravated assault involving family
violence, a first-degree felony offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(1)
(West Supp. 2020). The jury assessed his punishment at confinement for a term of
twenty-seven years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice and a fine of $5,000.
      In 2020, we affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence. Perkins v. State,
No. 11-18-00037-CR, 2020 WL 976941, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 28, 2020,
pet. granted) (mem. op., not designated for publication), aff’d in part and remanded,
No. PD-0310-20, 2022 WL 4088529, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2022). In so
doing, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed
evidence of an unadjudicated extraneous offense in the guilt/innocence phase of
Appellant’s trial. Id. at *3. Appellant petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for
discretionary review asserting that, among other things, we “failed to conduct a
proper review of the trial court’s 403 decision.” Perkins, 2022 WL 4088529, at *4.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed our judgment in part but remanded the case
for us to conduct “a proper review of the trial court’s Rule 403 ruling.” Id. at *6.
      We subsequently permitted the parties to file supplemental briefs with respect
to the issue on remand. Following our review of the trial court’s Rule 403 ruling,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
                                  Background Facts
      On August 30, 2016, Lana Hyles met Appellant at Brownwood Regional
Medical Center so he could drive her home following a medical procedure. Hyles
testified that, instead of turning toward her home, Appellant continued straight down
another road. Hyles testified that she questioned Appellant and demanded that he
take her home. In response, Appellant “jammed” Hyles’s head into the console, held
her head down, and choked her. Hyles testified that she bit Appellant’s finger, broke
free, and exited the vehicle while it was still coming to a stop.
      Carrol Weathermon saw the parked car and “saw blood in the air” as she drove
by the incident. Weathermon testified that she then saw a woman, later identified as
Hyles, “crumpled up on the ground” and a man, later identified as Appellant,
standing over her. Weathermon testified that she called 9-1-1 and began honking
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her horn, which caused Appellant to “grab[] a handful of [Hyles’s] hair” and
unsuccessfully attempt “to pull her to the car.” Weathermon testified that Hyles
“crawled” into the passenger’s side of Weathermon’s vehicle and that Weathermon
drove Hyles back to the hospital because she was bleeding profusely. Hyles’s
injuries included a gash to her nose, which caused a permanent scar, and bruising to
her face.
      During cross-examination, Appellant’s trial counsel questioned Hyles’s
rendition of the incident and sought to elicit testimony that Hyles, not Appellant,
caused her own injuries by “slamming the truck into park [or reverse] while it was
still moving.” Trial counsel’s questions also implied that the gash could have been
caused by Hyles’s glasses. In response, the State sought to introduce evidence of an
extraneous assault involving a different victim, Sarah Rogers, that occurred
approximately six months prior to the charged offense. The State asserted that the
evidence was admissible to prove Appellant’s intent and motive, to prove the
absence of a mistake and lack of accident, and to rebut a defensive theory. See
TEX. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A), (b); Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016). Appellant’s trial counsel objected on Rule 403 grounds and offered to
stipulate to the evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. After a hearing, the trial court
conducted a Rule 403 balancing test and admitted the evidence with a limiting
instruction. See id.; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389–90 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991) (op. on reh’g); see also Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996).
      The State then called Rogers as a witness. Rogers testified that, approximately
six months prior to the indicted offense, Appellant assaulted her when she woke him
up following a night of drinking. Rogers testified that Appellant “forcefully” hit her
in the head after she “wouldn’t stop talking.” Rogers testified that Appellant
continued to hit her “wherever he could” until she lost consciousness. Rogers
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testified that the assault ended when he “dragged [her] from the bedroom by the head
of [her] hair” into the living room. Rogers testified that she was taken to the hospital
after calling 9-1-1. Rogers testified that she sustained head injuries, bruising to her
neck and eyes, and fractured ribs from the incident.
                                               Analysis
        The sole issue on remand is whether, under Rule 403, the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting the extraneous offense evidence.
        Standard of Review
        We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an
abuse of discretion standard. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). When reviewing a trial court’s determination under Rule 403, we
reverse the trial court’s judgment “rarely and only after a clear abuse of discretion.”
Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Montgomery,
810 S.W.2d at 392). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision
falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391.
        Admissibility of Extraneous Offense Evidence
        Extraneous-offense evidence is generally admissible if (1) it is relevant to a
fact of consequence in the case apart from its tendency to prove conduct in
conformity with character, 1 and (2) the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or
misleading the jury. See TEX. R. EVID. 401, 403, 404(b); Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d
463, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–
44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). If the extraneous evidence satisfies this two-prong test,

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         As noted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in its opinion remanding this matter to us:
“Extraneous-offense evidence is generally admissible if the evidence is relevant to a fact of consequence
apart from its tendency to prove character conformity.” Perkins, 2022 WL 4088529, at *5.
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a trial court’s ruling is generally within the zone of reasonable disagreement. De La
Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344.
      Pursuant to Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and if “the fact is
of consequence in determining the action.” TEX. R. EVID. 401. Under Rule 404,
relevant extraneous offense evidence may be admissible for noncharacter
conformity purposes such as rebutting a defensive theory that negates an element
of the charged offense or “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”         TEX. R.
EVID. 404(b)(2); De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343; Martin, 173 S.W.3d at 466.
Rule 403 requires a trial court, prior to admitting any extraneous offense evidence,
to conduct a balancing test to determine whether the “probative value [of the
evidence] is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403.
      Our Review of the Trial Court’s Rule 403 Decision
      In our Rule 403 review, we “must measure the trial court’s ruling against the
relevant criteria by which a Rule 403 decision is to be made.” Montgomery, 810
S.W.2d at 392. The Court of Criminal Appeals describes the relevant criteria as
follows:
      (1) how compellingly the extraneous offense evidence serves to make
          a fact of consequence more or less probable—a factor which is
          related to the strength of the evidence presented by the proponent
          to show the defendant in fact committed the extraneous offense;
      (2) the potential the other offense evidence has to impress the jury “in
          some irrational but nevertheless indelible way”;
      (3) the time the proponent will need to develop the evidence, during
          which the jury will be distracted from consideration of the indicted
          offense; [and]
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      (4) the force of the proponent’s need for this evidence to prove a fact
          of consequence, i.e., does the proponent have other probative
          evidence available to him to help establish this fact, and is this fact
          related to an issue in dispute.
Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 847; see Perkins, 2022 WL 4088529, at *6; see also
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We take
each factor in turn.
      First, we consider “how compellingly the extraneous offense evidence serves
to make a fact of consequence more or less probable.” Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 847.
We find that the extraneous evidence served to rebut Appellant’s main defensive
theory—that Hyles’s injuries were self-inflicted. This evidence was compelling
because of its similarity to the charged offense. Similarity existed in the manner
Appellant assaulted both women and the injuries each woman sustained.
Specifically, Appellant reacted violently in response to each woman talking to him,
grabbed or held each woman by the neck, forcefully hit each woman in the head,
dragged each woman by the hair, and caused head injuries and bruising to both
women, which resulted in their hospitalization. The similar details of the extraneous
assault and the charged offense tended to rebut Appellant’s defensive theory that
Hyles’s injuries were self-inflicted. See Perkins, 2022 WL 4088529, at *7 (Yeary,
J., concurring) (the details of the assault against Rogers were “relevant and strongly
probative” to prove that Hyles’s injuries were not self-inflicted).
      Moreover, the extraneous assault tended to prove Appellant’s intent and the
absence of mistake or lack of accident in the charged offense. For example, in the
instant offense, Appellant testified that Hyles put the car in “reverse or park,” so he
“hit the brakes . . . and she hit her face on the dash.” Similarly, in the assault against
Rogers, Appellant testified that he accidentally caused Rogers’s injuries and that her
head injury was caused by her head hitting the side table. Appellant also repeatedly
contacted both women following the assaults in an effort to control the situation or
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to explain his actions. Because evidence of the similar extraneous assault tended to
(1) prove Appellant’s intent and the absence of mistake or lack of accident and
(2) disprove Appellant’s defensive theory, we conclude that this factor weighs
heavily in favor of admission.
      Second, we consider “the potential the other offense evidence has to impress
the jury ‘in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way.’” Montgomery, 810
S.W.2d at 390; see Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 847. We conclude that the evidence did
not have the potential to impress the jury in an “indelible way” because the trial court
implemented several safeguards regarding the admission and presentation of the
extraneous offense evidence. For example, the trial court provided a detailed
limiting instruction prior to the admission of Rogers’s testimony, and it further
included the instruction, in addition to other limiting instructions, in the trial court’s
charge. Moreover, the arguments of counsel assisted in reducing any possible juror
confusion. During closing arguments, the State explained the purpose of the
extraneous evidence, and the State and Appellant’s trial counsel directed the jury to
focus on determining Appellant’s guilt or innocence for the indicted offense. We
conclude that this factor weighs in favor of admission. See Perkins, 2022 WL
4088529, at *7 (Yeary, J., concurring) (“[T]o the extent that this relevant evidence
may have caused Appellant some prejudice, it was very unlikely to be the kind of
‘unfair prejudice’ contemplated by Rule 403.”).
      Third, we consider “the time the proponent . . . need[ed] to develop the
evidence.” Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 847. As noted by the Court of Criminal Appeals,
the “second day of Appellant’s two-day trial was devoted in large part to extraneous
offense testimony,” which consisted of “three witnesses over approximately 40
transcript pages related to Rogers’s testimony.” Perkins, 2022 WL 4088529, at *2.
We note that the trial court excused one of the State’s main witnesses for the indicted
offense, shortening the trial overall, after that witness became ill. We further note
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that the State might have needed to present some rebuttal evidence regarding Rogers
following Appellant’s testimony to address any credibility issues and
inconsistencies. However, considering the amount of time dedicated to the Rogers
evidence overall, we conclude that this factor weighs in favor of exclusion.
      Fourth, we consider “the force of the proponent’s need for this evidence to
prove a fact of consequence.” Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 847. Under this factor, we
consider whether the State had additional evidence to prove the fact of consequence
at issue, the strength of such evidence, and whether the fact of consequence was
actually in dispute. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390. Here, as stated above, three
facts of consequence were in dispute: (1) Appellant’s intent; (2) whether Hyles’s
injuries were caused by mistake or accident; and (3) whether Hyles’s injuries were
self-inflicted. The State presented Hyles’s testimony, a 9-1-1 telephone call made
by Weathermon, photographs of Hyles’s injuries, and photographs of Hyles’s
vehicle in an attempt to substantiate each fact of consequence. However, Hyles had
difficulty remembering some of the details of the assault, and the only eyewitness to
the incident did not observe the cause of Hyles’s injuries. Moreover, Appellant’s
trial counsel indicated that the evidence on such facts was weak and that the State’s
witnesses were not credible. In this particular case, the State needed the extraneous
evidence to prove Appellant’s intent, to prove the absence of mistake or lack of
accident, and to rebut Appellant’s defensive theory that Hyles’s injuries were self-
inflicted. We conclude that this factor weighs in favor of admission.
      Following our review of the Rule 403 factors, we conclude that the compelling
nature of the probative evidence, the State’s need for the evidence, and the
safeguards implemented by the trial court each support the trial court’s ruling under
Rule 403. See TEX. R. EVID. 403; see also State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 442
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (finding that the “sum of the factors weigh in favor of
admissibility”); Render v. State, 347 S.W.3d 905, 921–22 (Tex. App.—Eastland
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2011, pet. ref’d) (trial court did not abuse discretion where extraneous assault was
similar to the charged offense, the trial court gave a limiting instruction, and the State
needed to present evidence to rebut defensive theory). We further conclude that the
extraneous offense evidence was relevant to a fact of consequence apart from
character conformity and that the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice. See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at
344. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s decision to admit the extraneous
offense evidence does not fall outside of the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it admitted such evidence. Therefore, we overrule the sole issue before us on
remand.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                JOHN M. BAILEY
                                                CHIEF JUSTICE

January 26, 2023
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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