Court Opinion

ID: 9854299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:04:43.057018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:00.397219
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent, respectfully suggesting that those of the majority opinion who participated in Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, appear to have departed from former concepts as to the nature and extent of authority granted under Chap. 126, L.Utah 1947. In so doing, the door is opened for invasion of public funds never contemplated by that statute.
This is a suit allegedly instituted on behalf of all taxpayers, advocacy for whom seems to be mostly honored in absence. Nowhere are the true purpose and intent of Chapter 126 discussed, and only a passing reference is made to Spence v. U. S. A. C., — the case which in the opinion of the writer is controlling here. There is no discussion or reference at all to the implications of the majority opinion, and great emphasis is placed on the Candland case and the special fund doctrine, both of which may or may not be pertinent. But the context of the act itself and the principles enunciated in the Spence case certainly seem pertinent here. Nowhere has counsel for either side discussed principles of statutory construction applicable to or the real meaning of the ephemeral words “other sources” and “etc.” around which this entire case of necessity must revolve.
In passing, it is submitted that so far as this case is concerned, whether the income from the land grant fund may be pledged for the payment of the bonds depends entirely on the language of Chap. 126, (now 58-38, U.C.A. 1953) since all of the litigants here assert their claims solely under the provisions of Chap. 126, and no question of general, independent or inherent power is involved.
Mr. Justice WADE asserts that the question to be determined here is whether pledging the income from the land grant fund in addition to revenues derived from the opera*200tion of the project would make the loan a debt payable by the State and hence unconstitutional. That may be one of the questions here, but there are other important questions first to be determined, viz.: 1) whether the specific language of Chap. 126 authorizes the use of the income from the land grant fund, and 2) whether this court has or has not already settled the interpretation of Chap. 126 as excluding such use.
A casual reading- of the act indicates that it authorizes only “self-liquidating” projects, which, as reflected in the Spence case, means that the cost is payable out of the project itself, and which logically demands use of funds produced by the project itself, to the exclusion of funds not produced from its operation and existence. The act’s title reflects the legislative intent that this is so when it authorizes the Board of Regents to “Fix Rents, Charges and Fees to Assure Payment of Principal and Interest” of the bonds. The very first section (Sec. 1) authorizes the Board to set aside portions of the campus to build dormitories, kitchens and the like and “other self-liquidating projects.” Sec. 2 authorizes the borrowing of money on the credit of the income and revenues “to he derived from the operation of the building,” on the imposition of student building fees or both, or from other sources “other than by appropriations by the Legislature,” and to issue bonds to raise the money, such bonds to be payable “from the combined revenues of all buildings acquired and/or student building fees to be collected.” Sec. 3, part of whose subtitle is “Special Funds,” declares that the bonds shall not be obligations of the State, the University or its Regents, but “shall be special obligations payable solely from the revenues to be derived from the operation of the building and student building fees, etc.” In order to assure prompt payment of the bonds, the Board of Regents, by resolution can “covenant as to the operation of the building” and administer the revenues “derived from such operation.” It is further authorized by resolution to collect “student building fees” and to pledge *201“said fees” for the payment of the bonds; also to “fix rents, charges and fees” which “shall be considered to be income and reevnues derived from the operation of the building, and are expressly required to be fully sufficient to assure the prompt payment of principal and interest on the bonds as each becomes due.” Further, the Board is authorized to covenant against any other obligations payable “from the revenues to be derived from the building.” Sec. 6 that all “income and revenues derived from the operation of the building” shall be deposited in a bank. Sec. 9, allowing for an alternative method of financing through a non-profit corporation, nevertheless provides that the Board can agree with the corporation to “make such fees and charges adequate to provide a sum sufficient to pay the cost * * * and the amortization of the cost of the building.”
Such language makes it obvious that the act itself contemplates only “self-liquidating” projects, to be paid for out of funds produced by the project itself. Neither the majority opinion, nor counsel, discusses the language of the act or its purpose, except the phrase “other sources” and the abbreviation “etc.”, — whatever those words mean. “Self-liquidating” should, from the act’s language alone, mean but one thing — that the project pays for itself without resort to any funds other than those it produces. Little solace comes in arbitrarily concluding that “other sources” includes something unspecified in the act or something that is antithetical to such concept of self-liquidation. The majority opinion takes phrases, meaningless unless viewed in the light of the context of which they are a part, and attaches to them a connotation that is unnatural, illogical, unreasonable and unsupportable under any syllogistic reasoning, — a meaning that does violence to the logic and reason of the rule “ejusdem generis,” a rule prescribing that general words following those of specific meaning, shall not be construed in their widest extent, but apply only to the same general kind of thing mentioned by those preceding. Applying the rule to this case it appears obvious that the *202phrase “other sources” is akin to “income and revenues derived from the operation of the building,” and to “student building fees.” It takes little imagination to conclude that “other sources” in this case easily could include rental for use of a hall or a classroom in the building itself, rental for use of the grounds or other parts of the premises such as the cafeteria, rental of the dormitory rooms to private citizens at times when school is not in session, income from the sale of surplus heat to public or private interests, proceeds from the sale of used furniture, books, equipment, or advertising space, and a thousand and one other items of income derived from the project itself. Although none is specifically mentioned in the act, all would fall within the category of “other sources” of income from the “operation of the building” and would satisfy the rule “ejusdem generis.” On the other hand it is difficult to know how the rule would be satisfied by including within the term “other sources,” in a self-liquidating project, the income from a land grant fund which was in existence for over half a century before the self-liquidating project ever was born.
Mr. Chief Justice WOLFE seems to justify his position by asserting that there is no reason to exclude gifts and bequests made to pay the bonds or for university purposes. The fundamental fallacy of such assertion is two-fold: 1) if the gift be earmarked to pay the bonds, the existence of the project is the reason for the gift, and therefore a court easily could conclude that such gift is included in “other sources” resulting from the operation of the project itself, such as rentals and student building fees, since the gift is the result of the existence of the project, else it never would have been made, — all of which satisfies the rule “ejusdem generis” logically and factually; and 2) a gift does not affect the taxpayer adversely, but operates in reverse, and represents a windfall to him that actually cuts his tax burden rather than raiding funds in which he has a vested interest, requiring replacement by taxes if dissipated.
*203The dangerous implications of the majority decision are pointed up when one refers to Chap. 85, L.Utah 1951, which provides that
“The dedicated credits, such as tuitions, fees, federal grants, and proceeds from sales, received by the university and colleges may be retained by these institutions and used in accordance with each institutional work program.”
In the biennium ending June 30, 1951, the University acquired $4,078,561.35 of such dedicated credits,1 and the estimated amount of such credits for the biennium ending June 30,1953, is $3,637,231.2 In other words, the University receives about $2,000,000 of dedicated credits annually, included in which is the income from the land grant fund, which amounts only to about $25,000 per year, significantly the smallest or one of the smallest dedicated credits possessed. If the dedicated credit known as “Fees and Licenses” which amounts to about $1,350,000 had been pledged, or committed, if you please, to secure or pay the contract here, the taxpayers’ burden of replacement would have ben pointed up in bold relief, and the decisions in the Spence, Candland and Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 P. 878, cases then would have assumed considerably more significance. But by pledging the income from the land grant fund, the smallest dedicated credit available, we have been lulled into a false sense of security on the theory that a little pregnancy is unobjectionable. In this respect, the writer is unimpressed with oral arguments that there is only a remote possibility that the income from the land grant fund ever will be needed. Little pregnancies seldom result in the still-born.
Under the authority of the main opinion, there seems to be little or no reason why the $2,000,000 annual dedicated *204credits of the University, and lesser but nonetheless staggering annuities of other institutions of the State,3 could not be used for constructing “self-liquidating” projects under Chap. 126. Nor is there any reason that such amounts could not be so used annually in the future. Any substantial use of such funds makes obvious the necessity of replacement by legislative appropriation out of tax funds, — in fact, such amounts not only would require replacement, but the added construction, representing an expansion of the institution, would demand additional public funds for support and maintenance. It becomes apparent what the unnecessary and unjustified interpretation of “other sources” and “etc.”, contained in a statute designed for purely self-liquidating projects could do, and illustrates the point that conclusions arrived at because of the exigencies of a particular situation, might loom as spectres later come to haunt us.
Great emphasis has been given to the Candland case and to the principle of the special fund doctrine, while very little has been accorded the act or the decision in Spence v. U. S. A. C., — to the point where the writer suggests we can’t see the forest for the trees. The facts in the Spence case were identical to those here, except that in the instant case, something new has been added, — an attempted use, under the very same statute, of funds quite foreign and logically inimical to the concept of self-liquidation. But the decision in the Spence case certainly strikes down the use of any such funds not produced by the project itself. The very reason that Spence v. U. S. A. C. was decided as it was (and the majority opinion and concurrence of Mr. Chief Justice WOLFE clearly bear me out), is that the Agricultural College carefully pledged only those funds produced by opera*205tion of the project, and carefully avoided pledging any funds not produced by the project. The decision in that case clearly reflects that it was rendered only because the project was “self-liquidating” and did not call upon any other funds than those charged for rentals and student building fees, negativing any idea that funds other than those produced by the project could be tapped. Mr. Justice LATIMER without doubt indicated that had any funds been suggested for use other than were produced from the project itself, the college would have exceeded its authority under the statute, when he said, in giving his reasons for the decision, that:
“The bonds which will be sold to the public show * * * that money necessary for repayment cannot he obtained from sources other than from the revenue and income derived from the operation of the student union building and the student fees paid by students of the college”. [225 P. 2d 28.]
Such language and the entire tone of the decision indicate that had there been an attempt to use other funds than those produced by the project itself, a violation of the same statute, Chap. 126, L.Utah 1947, (under which defendants here have claimed, and under which they must stand or fall), would have occurred.
It seems obvious that Mr. Chief Justice WOLFE felt the same way since he used the phrase “self-liquidating” on 9 occasions in his opinion, and the phrase (or substantially the phrase) that the bonds were payable “solely from the revenues to be derived from the operation of the building and student building fees” about as many times. It would seem that his present position deserts his language in the Spence case when he said:
“The Legislature by the passage of Ch. 126 sought to avoid the effect of See. 1 of Art. XIV by permitting the issuance of building revenue bonds, the principal and interest of which were to make payable entirely and only out of revenues derived from the building itself and thus by making such bonds a charge aainst a special fund”.
*206Also it is to contradict his farther language that:
“If the Board decides to build, Ch. 126 provides the manner and method of issuing revenue-building bonds which are made payable as to principal and interest only out of the revenues derived from the building which is constructed.”
Nor is his .present position consistent with his remarks there that:
“Ch. 126 * * * furnishes legislative authority for the issuance and sale of negotiable revenue bonds for the purpose of financing the building of certain self-liquidating projects * * * under certain conditions, limitations and restrictions. One of these restrictions is that the bonds issued should not constitute an indebtedness * * * but -shall be special obligations payable solely from the revenues to be derived from the operation of the building and student building fees.”
Other language of the Chief Justice in that case, is similar, and as emphatic. It is no answer to say the University could build without authority of Chap. 126. That problem was raised unsuccessfully by amicus curiae in the Spence case. Here, unlike there, the question is not even raised, and the parties have chosen to stand or fall under the provisions of Chap. 126 which necessarily involves only the construction to be placed on that statute’s language, particularly the words “other sources” and “etc.” It is impossible for the writer to understand how the Chief Justice conceivably can conclude that income from the land grant fund is includable in the phrase “other sources” in Chap. 126, in the light of his expressions in the Spence case, — unless he intends to reverse himself, rendering impotent the word “self-liquidating” which he used so freely and unequivocally in the Spence case.
The special fund doctrine was bom in Barnes v. Lehi City, has never been repudiated and has been reaffirmed time and again. We are invited to repudiate it now because some other jurisdictions have done so. Why they have done so is the subject of many debatable explanations, not the *207least of which might be a changing attitude in the past few decades looking toward a more indiscriminate use of taxpayers’ money to satisfy the exigencies of an existing economic emergency. But the doctrine, though repudiated elsewhere, has foundation in good sense, since it is based primarily on the protection and preservation of taxpayers’ funds. The principle is embodied in constitutional inter-dictions against tax levies in excess of those expressly granted. This court consistently has frowned on plans and schemes to circumvent that philosophy, as is reflected in the decisions and language of State v. Candland, Barnes v. Leki, Fjeldsted v. Ogden, Wadsworth v. Santaquin, U. P. & L. v. Ogden City, 95 Utah 161, 79 P. 2d 61 and Spence v. U. S. A. C. It is difficult to determine how this court now can say that the plan of the defendants to use income from the land grant fund, a fund having no connection with the project, can be a part of a special fund created by a project that is supposed to pay for itself.
Mr. Justice WADE attempts to distinguish the instant case with the group of cases cited above on the theory that the former involves a state institution while the latter involves municipalities, giving as a reason for the distinction the fact that the state, unlike municipalities, cannot be sued. He has overlooked the fact that in the very case which gave birth to the doctrine, Barnes v. Lehi City, the municipality was not subject to suit under any circumstances, the contract giving rise to the litigation expressly providing for non-liability on the part of the city. The special fund doctrine is not predicated on any tenuous distinction as to whether an institution can or cannot be sued. It is bottomed, rather, on the fundamental principle that where a fund created by an improvement is charged with full payment of its cost, without additional burden on public funds, it is a valid constitutional arrangement, and if there is an attempt to include in such fund, other funds in which the taxpayer has a vested interest, requiring replacement with public funds other than those solely produced from *208the improvement itself, such attempt is constitutionally objectionable until and unless all constitutional interdic-tions first have been observed. It is submitted that the inclusion here of the income from the land grant fund in the so-called special fund to be created by the dormitories themselves, fails to stand the test of the special fund principle since it obviously takes university funds (and therefore state funds) and commits them to a “self-liquidating” project, which is rendered not “self-liquidating” if it does not pay for itself. It is no answer to say the State cannot be sued and is not legally obligated to pay, since it is unrealistic to say that the State will not carry out its mandatory duty to support the University in perpetuity, which requires the substitution of funds pledged to that support if for one reason or another they are lost or dissipated.
Mr. Justice WADE concedes that the special fund doctrine applies in the case of municipalities, but that it should not be extended where a state institution is involved. To say we are extending the doctrine when we apply it to state institutions is an ipse dixit, since the doctrine, if sound, is applicable in both instances, — perhaps more so where a state institution is involved, since more taxpayers are involved. It was held applicable, without distinction and without any suggestion of extension of the doctrine, to an improvement planned by a state institution, in Kasch v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E. 813.
As to State v. Candland, which declared that a loan of the land grant fund to the University created a debt of the State, that case has never been repudiated in this State. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish that case from the instant case by asserting that the act authorizing the loan in the Candland case in fact and in law contemplated that the debt created was that of the State. It was this court that said the act contemplated a State debt, — the act itself specifically stating that “such loan shall be a debt of the University of Utah, and not of the State of Utah.” Laws 1909, c. 124, §2. So that the distinction attempted *209to be made by the majority opinion seems unmeritorius since, in the instant case, we just as reasonably could say that Chap. 126 in fact and in law contemplates that the pledge of the land grant fund income is in fact and in law a pledge of the State.
The writer can see no practical difference of obligation on the part of the State where the corpus of the fund is loaned, or where the income therefrom is used. The Cand-land case, whose wisdom is reflected in its language far better than this writer can assert, says the loan to the University was a subterfuge to circumvent the constitution. In the instant case, using the income from the land grant fund is a subterfuge not only to circumvent the constitution, but a device to weaken or destroy the special fund doctrine and read into a statute authorizing only self-liquidating projects, something that isn’t there. If all of the $8,000,000 of dedicated credits available to the University in the past two bienniums had been used up on “self-liquidating” projects under the provisions of Chap. 126 and the authority of the main opinion, it is obvious that all or a goodly portion of such amount of necessity would have required replacement by appropriation of public funds, in which event the wisdom of the Candland case, the special fund doctrine, and the Spence case readily would have become crystal clear. To say that in such case the state could not be sued, would not be obligated legally to replenish such fund, but has only a moral obligation to do so, is to blind oneself to reality, particularly since the public is charged with the duty of supporting and maintaining the University in perpetuity. The replacement of the $8,000,000, or the smaller amount representing the income from the land grant fund is a matter of degree only, but the implications of the main opinion persist nonetheless — regardless of the magnitude of the one situation or the pusillanimity of the other.
These funds not only cannot be pledged for the reasons heretofore stated, but they cannot be pledged or used under *210the very wording of Chap. 126 which the majority opinion uses to arrive at its result. Great stress is laid on the words “other sources.” The entire phrase is “other sources other than by appropriations by the legislature.” The interest from the land grant fund is a dedicated credit, and dedicated credits are biennially appropriated by the Legislature. They not only are appropriations, but must be expended for educational purposes before other general appropriations of the Legislature are expended.
Under Chap. 123, Laws of Utah, 1951 (and the same is true under the 1953 act, not yet published, but being H.B. 239, 30th Legislature), which is entitled “Appropriations Act of 1951”, it is provided in Sec. 11 and
“All * * * dedicated credits * * * shall he deposited at least monthly and shall be credited * * * to the appropriations account * * *. Such * * * dedicated credits shall be first allotted for expenditures to the extent of such collections. All * * * dedicated credits shall be subject to all provisions of law applicable to appropriated funds * *
It is obvious, therefore, that the interest from the land grant fund cannot be pledged or used to pay for a building under the self-liquidating provisions of Chap. 126, since it does not come from another source “other than by appropriations by the Legislature.” In fact, were this item not an appropriation by the Legislature it still couldn’t be used as a practical matter, since, being a dedicated credit, it must be deposited at least monthly and must be “first alloted for expenditure.” Furthermore the interest from the land grant fund, if any remains, lapses two months after each biennium and ceases to exist, as is provided In Sec. 10 of the 1951 Appropriations Act (and the same provision is found in the 1953 Act), where it is provided that
“The state finance commission shall, on or before August 31 * * * close out to the proper fund or account all unexpended balances of appropriations * *
The same is true of all dedicated credits.
*211Since the foregoing was written, my learned colleague, Mr. Justice McDONOUGH, has written an opinion which not only attempts to refute what has been said in this dissent but apparently represents a reversal of his concurrence in Spence v. U.S.A.C., Utah 225 P. 2d 18, which opinion I shall discuss hereinafter.
The report of this decision in The Salt Lake Tribune of April 23, 1953, in part confirms the matters about which I am concerned, but about which Mr. Justice McDONOUGH apparently is not, when it reported that the comptroller of the University, stated that this decision cleared the way for the $1,800,000 Union Building. This being so, there is no reason, under the main opinion, why $1,800,000 of dedicated credits could not be used to build the new, second and additional Union Building, and if this were accomplished, it becomes obvious that the taxpayers would have to replace the $1,800,000 by appropriation at the next legislature.
In defense of my position, I feel constrained to answer what Mr. Justice McDONOUGH has to say. He cites Greenhalgh v. Woolworth, to support his statement that
“The expression ‘self-liquidating’ is not, in all cases, as restricted in meaning as to require that the structure itself produce all of the moneys to pay off the indebtedness incurred in its erection.”
The case may be authority for such a broad generalization but it does not say that Chap. 126 is the type of statute where “self-liquidating” does not mean what it says. Pie fails to point out that the Greenhalgh case, supra, is not similar in any respect to the case here, and that the Green-halgh case actually and specifically recognizes that there are situations like that here where “self-liquidating” means just that — “self-liquidating.”
Mr. Justice McDONOUGH says
“The use of the expression ‘self-liquidating’ does not, of course, mean that the indebtedness incurred in erecting the structure * * * *212must be obtained from the revenues from the structure [project] itself.”
This is an ipse dixit which, I believe and respectfully suggest, Mr. Justice McDONOUGH fails to support. He says that “self-liquidating” does not mean “self-liquidating” because that fact is evident from the body of the Act which defines what is meant by self-liquidating. The body of the act does not specifically define the word, but the repetition of the word “self-liquidating” in the act seems to contradict Mr. Justice McDONOUGH’s conclusion. In supporting his contention he has lifted out of the context of the act subdivision (3) of section 3, Chap. 38, Title 53, which gives the Board of Regents authority
“to ‘collect student building fees from all students and to pledge said fees to the payment of building bonds’ ”,
and then assumes that this means fees from students other than those using the facilities of the project. It is submitted that the phrase mentioned applies only to those taking advantage of such facilities, if read in light of the entire context of the act. Such construction of the act is clearly shown to have been intended in subdivision (7) of the same chapter, having to do with the power to fix such fees, when it says the Board can
“fix rents, charges and fees> including student building fees, to be imposed in connection with and for the use of the building and the facilities supplied thereby, which rents, charges and fees shall be considered to he income and revenues derived from the operation of the building, and a/re expressly required to be fully sufficient to assure the prompt payment of principal and interest on the bonds 4: % ty
It seems clear, therefore, that the construction given the phraseology of subsection (3) is not only strained, but is negated in the very section from which Mr. Justice Mc-DONOUGH lifts a phrase, and to which he attaches an important significance.
*213Mr. Justice McDONOUGH says that as to subdivision (7)
“It is plain from the very section * * * that it was the intention of the Legislature that other sources be available for payment of the principal and interest * *
It would seem that it is not only not plain but it is very plain that the Legislature intended just the opposite when it says that such rents, charges and fees (from the building) are “expressly required to be fully sufficient to assure the prompt payment” of the bonds. To attach any connotation to the word “fully” other than that with which it universally is accompanied simply is to ignore its meaning; and to say the wording only means that such rents, charges and fees are supplemental to something else is to ignore the whole act, which announces in its very first section that it authorizes “self-liquidating” projects, — not the type of project where 99% is paid out of dedicated credits and 1% from the revenue it might or might not produce.
Mr. Justice McDONOUGH asserts that to restrict the phrase “other sources” to revenues derived from the project is to give the phrase no meaning at all, because the sentence in which the phrase is used specifically includes all of the income and revenues to be derived from the operation of the building. This is not so. My learned colleague forgets that the legislature did not include in the sentence mentioned other sources of income such as a gift earmarked for payment of the bonds, a legacy charged with the same trust, sales of used equipment no longer needed, sales of advertising media, and a host of other conceivable sources of income that might spring from the existence of the project itself, and only by reason of its existence.
Mr. Justice McDONOUGH speaks of Title 53-31-3, U.C.A. 1953, in support of his contention. This section has nothing to do with this case, was never mentioned by counsel in argument or brief, — and I repeat that the litigants must stand or fall within the four corners of Chap. 126, arid *214not within those of some other statute. It is obvious that this other statute has no relevancy, since it is designed only to allow the acceptance of gifts charged with a trust, and if the trust imposed is for payment of the bonds, then the gift must be used to help pay the bonds, — which would be an item included in “other sources” which spring from the existence of the project itself, — else the gift never would have been made.
Mr. Justice McDONOUGH discusses dedicated credits as going into a maintenance and building fund under the statute. No one has any quarrel with such statute, but it is difficult to see how that has anything to do with this case. Such fund has other statutory interdictions, and if the legislature had intended to have such funds usable under Chap. 126, it would have been a simple matter to have said so. If that were the case, there would be little need for Chap. 126, the self-liquidating project statute. The University could then issue building bonds and pledge the monies in the maintenance and building fund without Chap. 126. Without discussing them, it is suggested that serious questions of sanction for such procedure would arise.
I join in the confidence Mr. Justice McDONOUGH reposes in the present Board of Regents and our future legislatures, but such confidence hardly is a basis for an opinion of this court, and amounts only to saying that we think a Saviour likely would not be followed by a Judas. His statement that
“It is not likely that the visualized building expansion program will he undertaken before the next legislative session”
was made meaningless by the pronouncement of one of the University’s officials that this decision clears the way for a $1,800,000 new building in addition to the dormitories.
The attempt to include the income from the land grant fund in this obviously self-liquidating project violated Chap. 126, Laws of Utah 1947, the constitution as reflected in the *215Candland case, the decision in Spence v. U.S.A.C., and the special fund doctrine, and the relief prayed for should have been granted.

Utah State Auditor’s Report for periods ending June 30, 1950 and June 30, 1952.

Governor’s Biennial Budget, transmitted to the Legislature, Jan. 15, 1951.

Departmental Estimated Dedicated Credits for Biennium ending June 30, 1953; University of Utah, $3,637,231; U. S. A. C., $2,135,-084.48; Weber College, $452,265.00; Carbon College, $94,100.00; Branch Agricultural College, $54,100.00; Snow College, $50,176.00; Dixie College, $49,500.00.