Court Opinion

ID: 9373568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:54.815861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.279095
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MONTE M. PARHAM                                 DOCKET NUMBERS
                  Appellant,                         DA-0432-16-0254-I-1
                                                     DA-1221-15-0345-W-1
                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
       SECURITY,                                     DATE: July 20, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Stephanie Bernstein, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the appellant.

           Shaun Southworth, Esquire and Terina Williams, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia,
             for the appellant.

           Benjamin Owen and Daniel Rodriguez, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision s, which
     dismissed the appellant’s individual right of action (IRA) appeal and his

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                             2

     chapter 43 removal appeal as settled. 2        For the reasons discussed below, we
     GRANT the agency’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decisions, and
     REMAND both appeals to the regional office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.
                                        BACKGROUND
¶2         On April 24, 2015, the appellant filed an IRA appeal with the Board .
     Parham      v.    Department       of      Homeland      Security,     MSPB       Docket
     No. DA-1221-15-0345-W-1, Initial Appeal File (W-1 AF), Tab 1. Thereafter, on
     March 1, 2016, he filed an appeal challenging his chapter 43 removal. Parham v.
     Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-0432-16-0254-I-1,
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1.           The appeals were assigned to different
     administrative judges.    Following a hearing on his IRA appeal, but prior to a
     hearing on his removal appeal, the parties entered into an oral settlement
     agreement that resolved both matters.            W-1 AF, Tab 30; IAF, Tab 30. 3
     The agency agreed to rescind the appellant’s removal and reinstate him.
     W-1 AF, Tab 30; IAF, Tab 30.            It further agreed that, once it rescinded the
     appellant’s removal, it would place him in a sick leave status from the date of
     reinstatement until his return to work.           W-1 AF, Tab 30; IAF, Tab 30.
     Thereafter, on June 8, 2016, the administrative judges issued two separate initial
     decisions entering the settlement agreement into the record and dismissing each

     2
       We JOIN the two appeals under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(b), because doing so would
     expedite the processing of the appeals without adversely affecting the interests of the
     parties. On remand, the regional office may elect to sever these appeals, if appropriate.
     See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36.
     3
       In both its petition for review and reply, the agency indicates that the record does not
     contain a complete recording of the parties’ oral settlement agreement. Parham v.
     Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-0432-16-0254-I-1, Petition
     for Review File, Tab 2 at 4 n.1, Tab 5 at 4. Although the record of the appellant’s IRA
     appeal contains only a partial recording of the oral agreement, W-1 AF, Tab 30, the
     record of the appellant’s chapter 43 removal appeal contains the complete recording,
     IAF, Tab 30.
                                                                                          3

     appeal as settled.         W-1 AF, Tab 31,        Initial Decision; IAF, Tab 31,
     Initial Decision.
¶3         The agency has filed a petition for review for both appeals in which it
     asserts that the settlement agreement should be set aside based upon the parties’
     mutual mistake because Federal regulations prevent it from placing the appellant
     in a sick leave status when he was not incapacitated. Parham v. Department of
     Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-15-0345-W-1, Petition for
     Review File, Tab 1 at 4-11; Parham v. Department of Homeland Security,
     MSPB Docket No. DA-0432-16-0254-I-1, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2
     at 4-11, Tab 7 at 4-5. The appellant has responded, asserting that the settlement
     agreement was not unlawful and should instead be set aside based upon the
     agency’s refusal to abide by the agreement. PFR File, Tab 4 at 3. The appellant
     does not appear to assert that the agency failed to properly reinstate him. 4
     PFR File, Tab 2 at 14-15, Tab 4 at 3. The agency has filed a reply wherein it
     avers that it did not act in bad faith and that it is unable to lawfully comply with
     an essential term of the settlement agreement. PFR File, Tab 5 at 4-6.
                                         ANALYSIS
¶4         It is well settled that a settlement agreement is a contract between the
     parties that may be set aside or voided only on the basis of certai n limited
     grounds, including fraud or a mutual mistake of material fact under which both
     parties acted.      Vance v. Department of the Interior, 114 M.S.P.R. 679, ¶ 12
     (2010).   A mutual mistake of fact is a shared, mistaken belief of the parties
     regarding a material assumption of fact underlying their agreement. Id.
¶5         Here, both parties entered into the settlement agreement under the
     assumption that the agency had the authority to place the appellant in a sick leav e
     status. W-1 AF, Tab 30; IAF, Tab 30; PFR File, Tab 2 at 17-18. The parties

     4
       The appellant avers in his response that the agency’s “bad faith negotiations” caused
     him “to endure additional time without employment,” PFR File, Tab 4 at 3; however, it
     appears that he is referring to his inability to use sick leave, PFR File, Tab 2 at 14.
                                                                                      4

     were mistaken, however, because the agency may only place an employee in a
     sick leave status under certain circumstances specified by regulation, such as
     when he is incapacitated. 5 C.F.R. §§ 630.401(a), 630.405(a). We find that this
     mistake relates to a material assumption of fact underlying the settlement
     agreement because, as the parties state, without the ability to place the appellant
     in a sick leave status, the agency cannot comply with the settlement agreement .
     PFR File, Tab 2 at 9-10, 14; see Brady v. Department of the Navy, 95 M.S.P.R.
     619, ¶ 8 (2004). Thus, the settlement agreement must be set aside. See Miller v.
     Department of Defense, 45 M.S.P.R. 263, 266 (1990) (finding that a settlement
     agreement that granted the appellant retroactive administrative leave for 1 year
     should be set aside based upon a mutual mistake because the agency lacked
     discretion to authorize a grant of administrative leave for an extended period of
     time under the circumstances of the case); see also Mansfield v. National
     Mediation Board, 103 M.S.P.R. 237, ¶ 23 (2006) (recognizing that the Board has
     the discretion not to accept a settlement agreement into the record for
     enforcement purposes when it provides the appellant with pay and benefits not
     authorized by law).
¶6        When a settlement agreement must be set aside because of the failure of an
     essential part of the agreement but the appellant has obtained other benefits
     pursuant to that agreement, such as reinstatement, the Board has found it
     appropriate to offer the appellant a choice between reinstating his appeal or
     accepting the settlement agreement as is.    Vance, 114 M.S.P.R. 679, ¶¶ 16-17.
     Accordingly, upon remand, the administrative judge shall inquire whether the
     appellant wishes to reinstate his appeals or accept the settlement agreement
     notwithstanding the agency’s failure to place him in a sick leave status for the
     relevant period.      Alternatively, the parties may choose to negotiate a new
     settlement agreement.     The administrative judge then shall issue a new initial
     decision.
                                                                                   5

¶7        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
     for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

     FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                             Jennifer Everling
                                             Acting Clerk of the Board
     Washington, D.C.