Court Opinion

ID: 989014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:00:56.566761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:57.960036
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ROY LEE DINGESS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                        No. 95-1249
SHIRLEY S. CHATER,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington.
Maurice G. Taylor, Jr., Magistrate Judge.
(CA-94-192-3)

Submitted: April 2, 1996

Decided: April 19, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and HAMILTON,
Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Cathy L. Greiner, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charlotte
Hardnett, Chief Counsel, William B. Reeser, Assistant Regional
Counsel, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attor-
ney, Stephen M. Horn, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Roy L. Dingess filed a claim with the Social Security Administra-
tion in September 1991 for supplemental security income and disabil-
ity insurance benefits alleging disability commencing January 12,
1988, as result of back and breathing problems. After denial and
reconsideration, Dingess requested a hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ decided that he was not disabled under
the Social Security Act because, although he could not perform his
past relevant work in underground coal mining, he had the ability to
perform a limited range of sedentary and light work and could per-
form several jobs identified by a vocational expert. The Appeals
Council denied his request for review. The ALJ's decision, then,
became the Secretary's final decision.

Dingess filed a complaint in the district court challenging the final
decision of the Secretary. The parties consented to a disposition by a
magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988). The magis-
trate judge entered a final order granting summary judgment to the
Secretary. This appeal followed.

We review the Secretary's final decision to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was
applied. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp. 1995); Hays v. Sullivan,
907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Dingess claims that the jobs
suggested by the vocational expert as suitable for a person with Din-
gess's limitations are not ones which the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles identifies as capable of being performed by an individual with
such limitations. Dingess, however, has waived appellate review of
this claim. See Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 32 F.3d 67, 70
(4th Cir. 1994); Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1985);
Williams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 1494, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Dingess
next claims that the ALJ failed to insure that a proper hypothetical

                    2
question was posed to the vocational expert. We find that the ALJ's
hypothetical question fairly set out all of Dingess's impairments.
Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1989). Finally, Dingess
claims that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding
that his credibility regarding his back pain was fair at best. However,
the ALJ gave specific reasons for his credibility determination and we
will not disturb it. Hammond v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir.
1985).

The ALJ made a thorough evaluation of the evidence, and we con-
clude that the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evi-
dence and was based on the correct legal standards. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
judgment.

AFFIRMED

                    3