Court Opinion

ID: 9959309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 15:09:11.703951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.595281
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Counts, 2024-Ohio-1362.]
                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiffs-Appellants,            :
                                                             Nos. 112715 and 112775
                 v.                                :

KAYLYNN COUNTS,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellee.               :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 11, 2024

           Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
                              Case No. CR-18-634510-A

                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Chadwick Cleveland and Anthony T.
                 Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant
                 the state of Ohio.

                 Elizabeth A. Well, Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center, for
                 alleged victims-appellants.

                 Russell S. Bensing, for appellee Kaylynn Counts.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 John T. Martin and Erika B. Cunliffe, Assistant Public
                 Defenders, amicus curiae urging affirmance.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

       {¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, state of Ohio (“the state”) and the alleged victims

(“victims”) in this case appeal the trial court’s decision dismissing the case against

defendant-appellee, Kaylynn Counts (“Counts”).         We reverse the trial court’s

decision and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1

I.     Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} The facts of this case are as follows:

       [I]n the fall of 2018, Kaylynn Counts, a college student, was staying in
       the home of a family member, Lavon Thomas, a 72-year-old woman
       and the mother of Felicia Kelly. On November 9, 2018, Thomas and
       Kelly told Counts to leave the home. It is alleged that in the ensuing
       altercation Counts assaulted Thomas and stabbed Kelly. Counts has
       maintained that she acted in self-defense.

State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108633, 2019-Ohio-

5129, 137 N.E.3d 1278, ¶ 2 (“McGinty I”).

       {¶3} Counts was indicted on December 3, 2018, for attempted murder and

felonious assault. On April 1, 2019, Counts filed a motion for “Criminal Rule 16,

Entry upon Land for Inspection and Photograph,” seeking an order from the trial

court to access the victims’ home. In the motion, Counts states that her ability to

inspect and photograph the home is material to the preparation of her defense.

1 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 112715 and 112775 were consolidated by this court on January

30, 2024, only for disposition.
      {¶4} On May 16, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. The trial

court granted the motion and stated in its journal entry, in part:

      The court finds that the defendant’s motion for Criminal Rule 16 entry
      upon land for inspection and photograph is granted. The court orders:
      The parties communicate to provide 3 available days with a specific
      time to allow state to confer with homeowner. The state will indicate
      to defense counsel the date for discovery. The court orders that bailiff
      shall be the court representative and be present at all times while the
      defendant, defense counsel, and their experts are within the
      residence. At all times, the defendant, defense counsel, and their
      expert shall be within the view of the bailiff. The court orders that a
      sheriff’s deputy shall assist bailiff in this procedure. The victim shall
      not be in the residence once the discovery process commences. The
      court further orders that Cleveland Police Department and County
      Prosecutor personell [sic] may be present, but may not be within the
      residence when the discovery is ongoing.

Journal Entry No. 108790054 (May 20, 2019).

      {¶5} On May 21, 2019, the state filed a motion for leave to appeal. This court

denied the motion and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court of Ohio also

declined to accept jurisdiction over the appeal. On May 31, 2019, the victims in the

case filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the trial court judge. In

McGinty I, this court dismissed the petition and granted the trial court’s motion to

dismiss. Id. at ¶ 1.

      {¶6} The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed this

court’s decision and stated:

      Although crime victims have a right under the Ohio Constitution to
      judicial review of discovery orders affecting their Marsy’s Law rights,
      a writ of prohibition is not the correct mechanism to challenge Judge
      McGinty’s order. We therefore affirm the Eighth District’s judgment.
State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty, 164 Ohio St.3d 167, 2020-Ohio-5452, 172

N.E.3d 824, ¶ 2 (“McGinty II”).

      {¶7} The Supreme Court stated that the trial court’s order failed to order the

appellants to provide access to their home. Id. at ¶ 22. Additionally, the Supreme

Court held that “a writ of prohibition remains an inappropriate vehicle for a

nonparty to a criminal proceeding to challenge a discovery order.” Id. at ¶ 23.

      {¶8} On February 2, 2021, the state filed a notice of discovery in connection

with the trial court’s May 20, 2019 discovery order. The state explained to the court

that after conferring with the victims’ counsel, neither victim would agree to a

defense inspection of the residence where the incident took place.

      {¶9} The trial court held a hearing on July 13, 2021, in response to the notice

of discovery. At the hearing, it was discussed whether the victims were willing to

provide a date to open their home pursuant to the court order. Tr. 50. The victims

indicated that they were unwilling “to do so.” Tr. 51. The victims expressed to the

court that they were uncomfortable with Counts coming back to the home. Tr. 53.

The court inquired if the victims would allow Counts’s attorneys, without Counts,

to inspect the home. They agreed, as long as Counts was not allowed in the home.

They also expressed to the court that they would not be comfortable with allowing

the court staff or Counts’s attorneys in the home without one of their family

members present.
[Cite as State v. Counts, 2024-Ohio-1362.]
        {¶10} Counts’s counsel explained to the court that there were two areas of

disagreement. First, they insisted that Counts be able to come to the home and

explain what took place. Second, they refused to agree to a family member being

present because they would not be free to have any discussions.

        {¶11} The family rejected this, but asked the court if Counts’s counsel could

Facetime Counts while they were in the home, so that she would not be physically

present in their home. The trial court stated that it was a “wonderful suggestion,”

however Counts’s trial counsel would not agree. The trial court stated:

        Okay. Here’s my thought process. We’re sitting here. The order was
        back on May 20, 2019. We’ve had a little bit of COVID. We’ve had a
        couple trips to the court of appeals, two trips to the supreme court.
        The case is back here. We’re still on Zoom with the majority of the
        parties. If I put an order on ordering the inspection – I’m just talking
        outloud [sic] right now – it sounds like the victims under Marsy’s Law
        are going to appeal, and then we’ll be back here in two more years.
        Anybody disagree with what I just said?

Tr. 63.

        {¶12} On November 19, 2021, the trial court issued the following decision:

        The trial court is the gate-keeper of the discovery process as governed
        by Crim.R. 16, and has the power to mandate reasonable discovery
        orders. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Criminal Rule 16 Entry
        Upon Land for Inspection and Photograph is granted. The victims in
        this case are ordered to make the premises available for inspection by
        the Defendant, her counsel, and experts without victims or the victim
        representatives present, including the County Prosecutor’s Office and
        the City of Cleveland Police Department.

Journal Entry No. 119620134 (Nov. 19, 2021).
[Cite as State v. Counts, 2024-Ohio-1362.]
        {¶13} The trial court set a trial date for January 19, 2022. On November 23,

2021, the victims filed an interlocutory appeal in State v. Counts, 2022-Ohio-3666,

201 N.E.3d 942, (8th Dist.) (“Counts I”). This court reversed and remanded the

lower court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The trial court’s

decision stated:

        In this case of first impression, the trial court applied a balancing test
        to determine whether it would allow a criminal defendant to inspect a
        victims’ home over her objection. In applying that balancing test of
        the criminal defendant’s constitutional and trial rights versus the
        victims’ constitutional rights, the trial court did not apply the correct
        standards of law nor did it require the defendant to state a specific
        need for the discovery. By employing incorrect standards of law in
        assessing the weight of the respective rights of the defendant and the
        victims, the trial court abused its discretion.

Id. at ¶ 41.

        {¶14} On December 2, 2022, after this court’s decision in Counts I, Counts

filed a motion to dismiss for denial of defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial,

arguing that the speedy trial time was not tolled during the 736 days the private

actions were pending before this court and the Supreme Court. The state argued

that the victims’ appeal tolled and should not be counted towards Counts’s speedy

trial time.

        {¶15} On April 17, 2023, the trial court held a hearing, and on May 11, 2023,

the trial court issued a decision granting Counts’s motion to dismiss, stating, in

part:

        Although the appeal was filed on behalf of the victims, the State could have
        filed a motion to stay pending the appeal. However, no motion to stay was
      filed with the trial court or the appellate court. In construing the statutes
      strictly against the state, and liberally in favor of the Defendant, this Court
      finds that the speedy trial time was not tolled during the pendency of the
      victims’ appeal. The appeal was filed November 23, 2021, and the Eighth
      District Court of Appeals issued its decision, reversing the trial court’s order,
      on October 13, 2022. That constitutes a period of 324 days, bringing the total
      to 475 days, or 205 days beyond the speedy trial time. Therefore, pursuant
      to R.C. 2945.73, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Denial of Right to Speedy
      Trial is granted and Defendant is discharged.

Journal Entry No. 146522117 (May 11, 2023).

      {¶16} The victims and the state filed companion appeals, which were

consolidated only for disposition, assigning one error for our review:

      The trial court erred in dismissing the indictment on the basis of
      speedy trial.

II.   Standard of Review

      {¶17} “When reviewing a speedy trial issue, the appellate court counts the

days and determines whether the number of days not tolled exceeds the time limits

for bringing the defendant to trial as set forth in R.C. 2945.71.” State v. Geraci, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101946 and 101947, 2015-Ohio-2699, ¶ 20, (8th Dist.), citing

State v. Gibson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100727, 2014-Ohio-3421, ¶ 15.

      {¶18} “‘Appellate review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss

for a speedy trial violation raises a mixed question of law and fact.’” S. Euclid v.

Njoku, 2022-Ohio-4388, 203 N.E.3d 147, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Burks,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106639, 2018-Ohio-4777, ¶ 22. “The legal issues are

reviewed under a de novo standard but great deference is given to the trial court’s
factual findings if the findings are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id.,

citing State v. Loder, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 93242 and 93865, 2010-Ohio-3085,

¶ 9.

III.   Law and Analysis

       {¶19} In the state’s sole assignment of error, they argue that the trial court

erred in dismissing the indictment against Counts on the basis of a speedy trial

violation because the case was not resolved within the time prescribed by R.C.

2945.71.

       {¶20} “A defendant is guaranteed the constitutional right to a speedy trial

pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Williams,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100898, 2014-Ohio-4475, ¶ 51, citing State v. Taylor, 98

Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 32. “Pursuant to its authority to

prescribe reasonable periods in which a trial must be held that are consistent with

these constitutional requirements, Ohio enacted R.C. 2945.71, which sets forth the

specific time requirements within which the state must bring a defendant to trial.”

State v. Ramey, 132 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-2904, 971 N.E.2d 937, ¶ 14.

       {¶21} R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) states: “A person against whom a charge of felony

is pending: Except as provided in division (C) of section 2945.73 of the Revised

Code, shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the person’s

arrest.”
       {¶22} We determine from the record that the total days from the time

Counts was arrested until the trial court dismissed the case against her was 136

days. In light of this decision, we have provided a chart to determine the number

of days concerning Counts’s speedy trial clock.

 Start Date End Date       Event                      Statute/Case             Time in

                                                                               days

 11/09/18     11/13/2018   Arrested.                  R.C. 2945.71(E)          12

 11/13/18     12/17/2018   Bond.                      R.C. 2945.71(E)          46

 12/17/18     1/4/19       Arraignment.                                        64

 12/19/18     Tolling      State’s    demand     for State v. Brummett, 4th    64
                           discovery. 1              Dist. Highland No. 03-
                                                     CA-5, 2004-Ohio-431;

                                                      State v. Borrero, 8th
                                                      Dist. Cuyahoga No.
                                                      82595, 2004-Ohio-739,
                                                      ¶ 11;

                                                      State v. Mitchell, 8th
                                                      Dist. Cuyahoga No.
                                                      88977, 2007-Ohio-
                                                      6190, ¶ 33

       1 State v. Geraci, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101946 and 101947, 2015-Ohio-2699

allows the trial court to toll the time after 30 days, but it is not a mandate. However, even
 1/4/19       1/15/19      Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)           64
                           requests continuance.

 1/15/19      2/4/19       Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)           64
                           requests continuance.

 2/4/19       2/19/19      Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)           64
                           requests continuance.

 2/19/19      3/12/19      Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)           64
                           requests continuance.

 3/12/19      4/2/19       Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)           64
                           requests continuance.

 4/2/19       4/16/19      Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)           64
                           requests continuance.

 4/16/19      4/30/19      Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)           64
                           requests discovery.

 4/30/19      5/20/19      Pretrial: continued for R.C. 2945.72(E)             64
                           hearing on motion to
                           compel discovery.
 5/20/19      5/20/19      Hearing.                R.C. 2945.72(E)             64

 5/21/19      6/11/19      Notice of appeal filed.    R.C. 2945.72(I)          64

 6/11/19      6/27/19      Appeal         dismissed; R.C. 2945.72(I)           64
                           appellate motion period.

 6/28/19      9/17/19      State appeals to Ohio R.C. 2945.72(I)               64
                           Supreme Court.

 9/17/19      9/27/19      Appellate motion period.   R.C. 2945.72(I)          64

 9/28/19      12/1/19      Time runs. 2                                        128

 12/2/19      12/12/19     Pretrial; continuance.     R.C. 2945.72(I)          128

 12/12/19     2/28/20      Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(I)           128
                           requests continuance.

if we were to add the 30 days to the tolled time, it would bring the total days to 166, less
than the 270 days required by law.
        2 In the state’s brief, it conceded that an additional 64 days should be added to the

tolled time during this period. State’s Appellate Brief, p. 6.
2/28/20    5/6/20     Pretrial; COVID-19                                   128
                      administrative order.

5/6/20     6/10/20    Pretrial;       COVID-19                             128
                      administrative order.

6/10/20    7/20/20    Pretrial; awaiting Ohio R.C. 2945.72(I)              128
                      Supreme Court decision.

7/20/20    12/2/20    Pretrial; awaiting Ohio R.C. 2945.72(I)              128
                      Supreme Court decision.

12/2/20    12/10/20   Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)            128
                      requests continuance.

12/10/20   1/13/21    Pretrial; waiting for the R.C. 2945.72(I)            128
                      full opinion from the court
                      of appeals.
1/13/21    2/3/21     Pretrial;        defendant R.C. 2945.72(E) and (I)   128
                      requests       continuance;
                      Waiting for the full
                      opinion from the court of
                      appeals.
2/3/21     3/10/21    Pretrial;        defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)           128
                      requests continuance.

3/10/21    4/14/21    Pretrial;      COVID-19                              128
                      administrator order.

4/14/21    5/17/21    Pretrial;        defendant   R.C. 2945.72(E)         128
                      requests to negotiate a
                      plea.
5/17/21    5/27/21    State asks for continuance   State   v.   Stoddard, 128
                      due to another trial         2020-Ohio-893,      152
                      scheduled.                   N.E.3d 990 (9th Dist.)
5/28/21    6/2/21     Time runs.                                           133

6/3/21     7/13/21    Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)            133
                      requests continuance.

7/13/21    8/30/21    Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)            133
                      requested continuance.

8/30/21    9/22/21    Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)            133
                      requests continuance.

9/23/21    9/29/21    Waiting    for    decision                           133
                      regarding    motion     to
                      compel discovery.
9/29/21     10/20/21    Pretrial;       defendant R.C. 2945.72(E)        133
                        requests continuance.

10/20/21    10/29/21    Pretrial;   trial     court Stoddard             133
                        unavailable due to trial.

10/22/21    11/5/21     Pretrial;        defendant R.C. 2945.72(C)       133
                        requests       continuance
                        because trial counsel in
                        unavailable.
11/5/21     11/16/21    Pretrial; continued at trial Stoddard            133
                        court’s request as they
                        held       an     attorney
                        conference.
11/17/21    11/19/21    Waiting     for    decision                      133
                        regarding     motion      to
                        compel discovery.
11/19/21    11/22/21    Motion       to     compel                       136
                        discovery granted.

11/23/21    10/13/22    Victims appealed the trial R.C. 2945.72(E) and   136
                        court’s decision; waiting
                        for court of appeals to (H)
                        issue decision; trial court
                        does not have jurisdiction
                        until 45 days after
                        10/13/22.
12/02/22    5/11/23     Defendant files motion to R.C. 2945.72(E)        136
                        dismiss for speedy trial.

5/11/23                 Trial   court      grants                        136
                        defendant’s motion.

      {¶23} Counts’s first argument is that the time was not tolled by a failure to

respond to discovery. Counts’s argument is misplaced.

      “A defendant’s untimely compliance with the state’s discovery request
      is chargeable to the defendant under R.C. 2945.72(D), which extends
      the time for trial for any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or
      improper act of the defendant.”

State v. Brummett, 4th Dist. Highland No. 03CA5, 2004-Ohio-431, ¶ 18, quoting

State v. Stewart, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA98-03-021, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4384
(Sept. 21, 1998), citing State v. Larsen, 9th Dist. Medina No. 2363-M, 1995 Ohio

App. LEXIS 1128 (Mar. 25, 1995).

      {¶24} Additionally, this court has also held that “speedy trial time is tolled

while the state awaits responses to its discovery requests, pursuant to Crim.R.

16(C).” State v. Borrero, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82595, 2004-Ohio-739, ¶ 11.

“‘[Defendant] can hardly ignore a lawful request for information, and then claim

that she was not timely tried caused by her own motions and neglect.’” State v.

Mitchell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88977, 2007-Ohio-6190, ¶ 33, quoting Chagrin

Falls v. Vartola, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 51571 and 51572, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS

6926 (Apr. 2, 1987).

      {¶25} Further, “[i]n State v. Christopher, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 54331,

1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4732, (Dec. 1, 1988), this court, citing Vartola, supra,

explained that the State’s request for discovery ‘tolled the statutory time even

further under R.C. 2945.72(H) as a continuance granted other than on the

accused’s own motion.’” Id. at ¶ 34. “Other courts have agreed that the time

continues to be tolled until defendant supplies the requested discovery

information.” Id., citing State v. Litteral, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA98-02-002,

1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4 (Jan. 4, 1999); State v. Stewart, 12th Dist. Warren No.

CA98-03-021, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4384 (Sept. 21, 1998); State v. Larsen, 9th

Dist. Medina No. C.A. No. 2363-M, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 1128 (Mar. 22, 1995).
      {¶26} In State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio St.3d 457, 2007-Ohio-374, 860 N.E.2d

1011, the Supreme Court stated, “In the case at bar, the trial court held, in effect, that

it was reasonable to allow the defendant 30 days to provide its response to the state’s

request for reciprocal discovery and that thereafter the defendant was in neglect of

its duty to respond.” Id. at ¶ 23. However, the court did not explicitly state that it is

required to add 30 days to the tolling time. In fact, this court has repeatedly held,

“that speedy trial time is tolled while the State awaits responses to its discovery

requests.” Mitchell at ¶ 33. It is not mandatory from the statute or case law that

30 days be counted against the state while waiting for the defendant to respond to

a discovery request. The court in Palmer merely stated that the trial court’s

holding was reasonable.

      {¶27} Counts’s second argument and the trial court’s reasoning for

dismissing the case against Counts is that the victims’ interlocutory appeal in 2021

was not a tolling event. R.C. 2945.72(E) states:

      The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the
      case of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only
      by * * * any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or
      abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the
      accused.

      {¶28} The state argues that Counts’s action of not agreeing to the victims’

request regarding Counts’s presence in their home is what caused the victims to

file the interlocutory appeal. Thus, Counts’s actions necessitated the delay. The

state’s position is well-taken. The victims’ action of appealing the trial court’s
discovery decision should not count against them. It was an action initiated by the

defendant that caused the victims to appeal. “Marsy’s Law expressly provides that

a crime victim ‘may petition the court of appeals for the applicable district’ when a

trial court’s ruling implicates the victim’s rights.” McGinty, 164 Ohio St.3d 167,

2020-Ohio-5452, 172 N.E.3d 824, at ¶ 39, citing Article I, Section 10a(B), Ohio

Constitution. “Thus, Section 10a(B) specifically authorizes a victim to seek relief

in the court of appeals.” Id.

      {¶29} The victims’ interlocutory appeal is also a tolling event under R.C.

2945.72(H), which states:

      The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, or, in the
      case of felony, to preliminary hearing and trial, may be extended only
      by * * * the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than
      upon the accused’s own motion.

      {¶30} “This Court has acknowledged that ‘[a] trial court may continue a

trial date without violating a defendant’s right to a speedy trial if the purpose and

length of the continuance are reasonable.’” State v. Stoddard, 2020-Ohio-893, 152

N.E.3d 990, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Brewer, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14-CA-

010608, 2016-Ohio-5366, ¶ 10. The trial court granted continuances throughout

the time the appeal was pending in this court. Neither the victims nor the state

had control over the length of time it took for this court to decide the merits of the

appeal. Thus, the victims’ appeal is considered a tolling event.
      {¶31} Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment on the

basis of a speedy trial violation. The appellants’ assignment of error is sustained.

      {¶32} Judgment reversed and remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      It is ordered that appellants recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

___________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCURS;
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY