Court Opinion

ID: 9471904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:43:47.770477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:38.116051
License: Public Domain

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
There can be no doubt that an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is permitted, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), and containers found during the search may be opened, see Illinois v. Lafayette, — U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983). Nevertheless, the government must prove that such a search was truly inventorial, and not investigative. In other words, the government must demonstrate that the search was performed “in accordance with established inventory procedures.” Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2611; see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372, 96 S.Ct. at 3098. Absent proof of compliance with settled inventory rules, evidence seized during the search must be suppressed. See, e.g., State v. Jewell, 338 So.2d 633 (La.1976); State v. Blais, 416 A.2d 1253 (Me.1980).
The district court found that the Indiana State Police has a “departmental policy that all impounded vehicles be inventoried prior to being towed or driven away.” This finding is based on the testimony of Trooper Hostetter who stated: “[WJhen I take a car in for protective custody or to impound it I inventory that vehicle because our standard operating procedure I am supposed to do that. That protects the wrecker service and protects me.” Indeed, in United States v. Balanow, 528 F.2d 923 (7th Cir.1976), we recognized the same policy of inventorying cars before turning them over to tow-service drivers.
The uncontroverted testimony in this case reveals, however, that the standard practice was not followed. To be sure, Trooper Hostetter did conduct an inventory search prior to turning the car over to Roger Fulton — the tow-service driver. In the course of that search the trooper noticed, but did not open, a package wrapped in plastic tape. Only after Roger Fulton drove the ear to a maintenance area did Trooper Hostetter renew his search, open the wrapped package, and discover the phencycledine.
If the established practice is to inventory a car before it is turned over to a tow-service driver, I must conclude that the search in the maintenance area was not in accord with settled procedures. Trooper Hostetter, in directing Roger Fulton to drive the car to a maintenance area, implicitly acknowledged that the roadside inventory search was adequate to protect himself and Roger Fulton. The subsequent search in the maintenance area, and the opening of what Trooper Hostetter termed a “suspicious” package, simply do not square with the routine inventory practice. To summarize, I am unaware of any Indiana State Police policy that calls for two inventory searches — one roadside search and one subsequent search to investigate “suspicious” items.
I would thus affirm without discussing the merits of the district court’s conclusion that the evidence must be suppressed because “the scope of the search appears to have been left to the absolute discretion of Trooper Hostetter.” I cannot subscribe, however, to the majority’s characterization of the district court’s reasoning as “a new and novel theory to further restrict law enforcement procedures under the guise of *489constitutional interpretation.” See Majority Opinion at 483 n. 10.
As noted above, inventory searches are constitutionally permissible only if performed in accord with standardized procedures. This principle of law would be meaningless if an adequate “standardized procedure” is the commitment of absolute discretion in the searching officer. As the Ninth Circuit noted in United States v. Hellman, 556 F.2d 442 (1977), “[a] locally followed practice gives some assurance that a particular car was not singled out for special searching attention.” Id. at 444; see generally 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.4, at 576-77 (1978). Indeed Justice Powell, whose vote was needed for a majority in Opperman, finds inventory searches reasonable because “no significant discretion is placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually has no choice as to the subject of the search or its scope.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 384, 96 S.Ct. at 3104 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). I leave for another day the question whether the Indiana State Police’s inventory policy is sufficiently specific. I need only note that the policy, as general as it is, did not sanction the trooper’s actions in this case.
I respectfully dissent.