Court Opinion

ID: 9760577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:01:02.951932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:13.831413
License: Public Domain

DEVANY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority has held that passive, unknowing, neglect may constitute “conduct” sufficient to terminate parental rights under section 15.02(1)(E) of the Texas Family Code. The majority has instantly antiquated section 15.02(1)(D) and its attendant requirement that neglect be committed “knowingly” in order to justify termi*101nation. The majority has replaced it with an all-encompassing subsection (E), which has no “knowingly” requirement. In the process, the majority has overruled case law from this court which coherently avoided interpreting the requirements of subsection (D) into oblivion.
The jury answered the pertinent special issues as follows:
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that [the parents] knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child ... to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child? Answer[:] We Do Not.
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that [the parents] engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child ... with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child? Answer[:] We Do.
Hence, the jury refused to find that the parents “knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings” endangering the child’s physical or emotional well-being. There is no evidence that the parents engaged in affirmative actions which could have endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Consequently, in order to reconcile the jury’s answers to the special issues and have an answer supported by the evidence, I must conclude that the jury found that the parents’ conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child was to unknowingly allow the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being —i.e., that they neglected the child due to their ignorance.
If this was a proper basis for termination, why did the legislature specifically reuire in subsection (D) that neglect be committed knowingly in order to form the basis for termination? Why, under the majority’s analysis, will termination ever be sought under subsection (D) when the “knowingly” requirement may be sidestepped by proceeding under subsection (E)?
I have another, even more fundamental disagreement with the majority’s approach. Termination of parental rights is a complete, final, and irrevocable act, divesting for all time a parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers with respect to each other save the child’s right to inherit. Wetzel v. Wetzel, 715 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, no writ).
The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions, and, therefore, involuntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1976); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.1985); Wetzel, at 388. Consequently, termination is not, and should not be, appropriate when a parent, “through lack of intelligence or training, illness or misfortune is unable to provide a desirable degree of physical care and support for his or her children.” D_ F_ v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933, 940 (Tex.Civ.App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ). See also Sanchez v. Texas Department of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260, 264-65 (Tex.Civ.App. —Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); In the Matter of R_ E_ W_ , 545 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tex. Civ.App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Again, because there was no evidence of abusive conduct, and because the jury declined to find that the parents knowingly neglected their child, the conclusion is inescapable that the parents’ rights were terminated in the trial court because of their unknowing, ignorant neglect of their child.
I recognize that portions of Higgins v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 544 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Civ.App. —Dallas 1976, no writ), have not withstood the test of time. I agree that the dictum in Higgins that states, in order to support termination, that the parents’ abusive conduct must be directed at the child, has properly been rejected, sub silencio, by this court. See Clark v. Clark, 705 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1985, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (violent acts directed towards the child’s sibling constitute “conduct” under subsection (E)). *102I emphatically disagree with the majority, however, which overrules the sound conclusion in Higgins that passive neglect does not constitute “conduct" under subsection (E). I fear that the majority has now inappropriately opened the door for termination of parental rights based solely upon the ignorant, unknowing neglect of the child by his parents.
I believe it extremely significant that in Higgins the jury found that the parents “had knowingly allowed their son ... to remain in conditions and surroundings which endangered his physical well-being.” Higgins, 544 S.W.2d at 746 (emphasis added). In the instant case the jury found that neither parent knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. Thus, we have a fact situation presented where poor, ignorant, parents did not knowingly neglect their child, yet the majority tells us that ignorance or inability in caring for a child is tantamount to a course of “conduct” to justify termination under the language of section 15.02(1)(E). For example, when we are faced with an economic depression and parents cannot provide adequate food for their children, under the majority holding, termination will be justified. The majority has enacted law that in a time of poverty parental rights will be terminated. The majority will have the state become a “big brother” form of government of such supremacy that it can destroy the very base of freedom and democracy in this country by destroying the family. “Termination involves fundamental constitutional rights that require that statutes authorizing involuntary termination be strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Clark v. Dearen, 715 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Tex.App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ) (emphasis in original).
Our case is unique because a jury has found no mala in se in the obvious neglect and undernourishment of the child in this case. Yet the majority has seized upon the helplessness of the underprivileged to not only take away their child, but to forever terminate their rights. To excuse the majority in its shortsightedness by using the cliché “hard facts make poor law,” is being too kind.
One must look beyond the hard facts of this case and foresee the ultimate consequences of what the majority has done to our society: for example, parental rights will be terminated based upon (1) poverty; (2) ignorance; (3) poor judgment; or (4) a standard of family conduct not acceptable by a government agency.
It is one thing to deliberately abuse a child, but it is quite another to be too poor or too ignorant to meet the standards of modern medical technology or the prevailing attitude of a state social service agency. I will further point out that the legislature has provided an adequate remedy where the best interests of the child are concerned in section 14.01 of the Texas Family Code where a managing conservator may be appointed in circumstances such as these to protect the child without termination of parental rights.
I would hold that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment rendered for the parents of S.H.A.
McCLUNG, HOWELL and BAKER, JJ., join in this opinion.