Court Opinion

ID: 9748626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:08:16.829841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:37.780164
License: Public Domain

*165CAPPY, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the result reached in the disposition of this case with regard to one appellee, Douglas C. Byer, for reasons stated herein. However, I respectfully dissent with regard to the remainder of appellees, since I am unable to accept the majority’s analysis of Article III, which ignores the rules of statutory construction.
Initially, I must point out that I am perplexed by the majority’s conclusion that this issue was waived since appellee failed to present it in the Statement of Questions Involved. Slip opinion at 13-14. PennDOT, as appellant, raised this issue in its Statement of the Questions Involved and discussed it at length in its brief to this court. Appellant’s Brief at 3, 37-40. PennDOT does not allege that the trial court acted improperly in reviewing this issue or that appellee failed to preserve this issue for our review, but rather addresses the merits of this issue. Thus, at the very least, PennDOT waived any argument that appellee’s failure to raise the issue to this court did not preserve it. For these reasons, I simply cannot see how this issue is waived. Thus, I believe that our court can properly review it.
The majority approves PennDOT’s lack of compliance with Article III on the basis that the details omitted from the report would not have shed light on the conduct underlying appellee’s conviction. However, this conclusion ignores the fact that the requirements of Article III are mandatory. Based upon the rules of statutory construction, I would conclude that before PennDOT can suspend a license based on an out-of-state conviction report pursuant to Article IV, it must ensure that the report, which provides the foundation for the suspension, complies with the requirements of Article III.
Article IV of the Compact gives PennDOT the power to revoke, suspend, or limit the license to operate a motor vehicle on the basis of an out-of-state conviction that is reported pursuant to Article III. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581. Article III of the Compact sets forth certain information that a conviction re*166port submitted to PennDOT by the party state “shall” contain. The Compact provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Such report shall clearly” identify the person convicted, describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated, identify the court in which action was taken, indicate whether a plea of guilty or not guilty was entered or the conviction was a result of the forfeiture of bail, bond or other security and shall include any special findings made in connection therewith.
Id. Thus, when Article III and Article IV are read together, it is clear that PennDOT is revoking, suspending or limiting the operating licenses on the basis of the out-of-state reports that are submitted to PennDOT pursuant to Article III.
Appellee asserts that the requirements of Article III must be strictly followed because of the detrimental consequence, i.e., the suspension of a driver’s license, that the out-of-state conviction reports have on a Pennsylvania operator.1 Conversely, PennDOT acknowledges that the reports submitted to it by the party states do not comply with Article III of the Compact,' but argues that, for purposes of Article III, “shall” should be construed as directory instead of mandatory, and thus, the subsequent license suspensions based on the incomplete conviction reports were proper.2 Thus, this issue is distilled to whether “shall” for purposes of Article III is mandatory or directory.
Contrary to the urgings of PennDOT and the conclusion of the majority opinion, I cannot agree that “shall” is intended to be merely directory in the instant case. The rules of statutory construction provide that the plain meaning of statutes are not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). Recently, this court has stated that *167“by definition ‘shall’ is mandatory” for purposes of statutory construction. Oberneder v. Link Computer Corp., 548 Pa. 201, 696 A.2d 148, 151 (1997).3 Accordingly, “shall” should be construed as mandatory for purposes of Article III of the Compact and the reporting requirements of Article III must be strictly complied with in order to suspend a license pursuant to the Compact. In the instant case, the requirements of Article III were not met, and therefore, the incomplete conviction reports that were submitted to PennDOT by the party states cannot serve as a basis for a license suspension under Article IV of the Compact.4
I similarly reject the majority’s suggestion that PennDOT must only comply with the requirements of Article III when PennDOT is reporting the conduct to other states. Slip opinion at 16. Once more, the majority seems to be examining the intent of the legislature rather than the plain language of the statute. Article III does not direct that only the home state must comply with the requirements. Indeed, that section begins by enumerating what the “licensing authority of a party state” must report. (Emphasis added). If the legislature intended that this requirement would only apply to PennDOT’s reports submitted to party states, it could have clarified this intent by changing “party state” to “home state.” While I am fully cognizant of the fact that PennDOT does not control the information contained in the conviction reports submitted to it by a party state, PennDOT is clearly the entity in a better position than either licensees or courts to ensure that the information submitted by the party state is complete.
*168I also disagree with the majority’s intimation that the legislative attempt to amend the requirements of Article III by amending 75 Pa.C.S. § 1584 supports its conclusion, since it is unclear whether this amendment can overrule the mandatory requirements of Article III. Rather, at this time, it.is most prudent to limit our review to the plain meaning of the statute. Accordingly, except as noted herein, I would affirm the decision of the lower court.
Chief Justice FLAHERTY and Justice ZARPALA join this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. As noted by the majority, only one appellee, Steven Hirsh, filed a brief in this matter.

. In addressing the requirements of Article III, the trial court intimated that the requirements of Article III applied to the certified documents that were submitted to the court by PennDOT, rather than focusing on the conviction reports submitted to PennDOT by the party states. This analysis was incorrect, since Article III clearly applies to the reports submitted by the party states to PennDOT.

. I recognize that this author has remarked that although "shall” is generally regarded as mandatory, in some circumstances it has also been interpreted "to mean ‘may’ or as being merely directory.” Oberneder, 696 A.2d at 151 (Cappy, J. concurring)(disagreeing with majority's conclusion that "shall” should always be construed as mandatory); Baker, 690 A.2d at 167 ("shall” may be interpreted as either mandatory or merely directory). However, I recognize that the rule stated in Obemeder is stare decisis in this jurisdiction, and therefore, must be followed.

. I am constrained to join the majority opinion's result with regard to appellee, Douglas C. Byer, since the conviction report submitted to PennDOT by Florida’s licensing authority fully complied with the requirements of Article III.