Court Opinion

ID: 9725259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:37:23.119446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.055761
License: Public Domain

ROTH, P. J.
I concur in the order of the court but am not content to rest my agreement upon the ground emphasized by the majority that “Copeland’s abduction, accompanied by petitioner’s threat to kill him if the police were called, substantially increased the risk of harm to him far beyond that inherent in the crime of robbery. (People v. Timmons, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 415; People v. Ellis, 15 Cal.App.3d 66 [92 Cal.Rptr. 907]; People v. Stathos, 17 Cal.App.3d 33 [94 Cal.Rptr. 482], and decisions therein cited.)”
The facts show as the majority state that “Manifestly, appellant entertained the intent to commit robbery continuously from the moment he entered the J. C. Penney store until he and his confederates reached their ‘place of temporary safety’ in Pacific Palisades. (Cf. People v. Tribble, 4 Cal.3d 826 [94 Cal.Rptr. 613, 484 P.2d 589].)”
Thus, the “abduction” at bench was not an incidental part of the crime. The facts at bench demonstrate as they did in Stathos (p. 39), that asportation was an integral, “. . . even necessary, part of the criminal project, for without it there could be no robbery, at least in the manner planned. . . .” (Cf. People v. Carroll, 1 Cal.3d 581, 585 [83 Cal.Rptr. 176, 463 P.2d 400].)
At bench, too, the evidence shows that Copeland’s person was- held by appellant and the other victims were told Copeland would be held until *938the ransom of 15 minutes time had been paid. The movement (kidnaping) was “for ransom” in the sense of Penal Code section 209, although the ransom demanded was time and not currency.
Applicability of People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.2d 1119 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225] is governed by a two-pronged test. First, the movement must be merely incidental to the commission of the robbery or it must substantially increase the risk of harm inherent in the underlying crime. Thus, the first test of Daniels is not met at bench as it was not met in Sfathos.
Daniels has no application at bench because the movement was an inherent part and not incidental to a planned robbery or, alternatively, because a separate crime of kidnaping for payment of ransom is made' to appear.
I am not persuaded that the asportation at bench “substantially increased the risk of harm . . .” within the meaning of People v. Timmons, 4 Cal.3d 411 [93 Cal.Rptr. 736, 482 P.2d 648]. At bench the movement was short in time and distance. Moreover, as we know since the express disapproval of People v. Thomas, 3 Cal.App.3d 859 [83 Cal.Rptr. 879], in Timmons, supra (p. 414, fn. 1), it is not the likelihood of the use of violence always inherent in the underlying crime of armed robbery, nor the removal to a place where the chance of rescue is lessened which satisfies the second test of Daniels. There must be a risk of harm “ó-ver and above” that which is inherent in every armed robbery. A short movement for a short period of time may have increased the risk of harm “in some slight degree” but such is not enough; the movement has to increase the risk of harm substantially. (People v. Timmons, supra, at p. 416.) It is instructive to compare the lack of actual injury suffered by Mr. Copeland to the brutal pistol-whipping inflicted on the victims in People v. Mutch, 4 Cal.3d 389, 398 [93 Cal.Rptr. 721, 482 P.2d 633], which our Supreme Court opined to be “. . . unfortunately, a risk inherent in the crime of armed robbery ...” and thus caused that court to subject the movement accompanying those vicious assaults to the Daniels decision.
In brief, distance traveled does not per se substantially increase the risk of bodily harm as is demonstrated by the facts of Mutch where the movement was incidental and the physical harm substantial and the facts at bench, wherein the asportation was much more substantial in time and distance—and the actual physical injury none.
The majority gives no reason for its conclusion other than a statement of the facts that the asportation here involved substantially increased the risk of harm to Mr. Copeland. In my opinion, it can be creditably *939argued from those facts that the asportation calculated as a part of the robbery here perpetrated actually decreased the risk of any harm to Copeland and the other victims.
The order should stand for the reason, if no other, that the movement here involved was not merely incidental to the crime (the first Daniels test).
A petition for a rehearing was denied September 24, 1971, and petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 18, 1971.