Court Opinion

ID: 9714077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:30:02.150501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.134333
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I disagree with its interpretation and application of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 164 L. Ed. 2d 415, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006). Jones stands for the proposition that a party with the duty to provide notice to a property owner must “take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice” when “it is practicable to do so.” Jones, 547 U.S. at 225, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 126 S. Ct. at 1713. In explaining the types of steps necessary to fulfill this requirement, the Court reiterated the long-established standard cited in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950). Under that standard, to comport with due process, notice “ ‘must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Jones, 547 U.S. at 229, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 427, 126 S. Ct. at 1715, quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 94 L. Ed. at 874, 70 S. Ct. at 657. I do not believe that standard was met in this case. As the majority correctly notes (225 Ill. 2d at 225-26), the facts in Jones differ from those in this appeal. Those differences, however, only serve to underscore the need for heightened due process protections for property owners like Lowe, who face imminent danger of forfeiting all interest in their homes without an opportunity to object. In Jones, the Court addressed the sufficiency of Arkansas’ notice requirements prior to a tax sale. Jones, 547 U.S. at 226, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 126 S. Ct. at 1713. 225 Ill. 2d at 226. Here, the issue involves this state’s section 22 — 10 notice requirements after a tax sale has occurred but before the owner is actually stripped of title to the property. 225 Ill. 2d at 226-27. Without the section 22 — 10 notice, Lowe was at risk of irretrievably losing all interest in her home without being given an opportunity to make a timely objection or redeem the property. Furthermore, the property owner in Jones was mentally competent and simply neglected to ensure that the taxes on the property were paid and that the mailing address in the tax records was updated. Lowe, on the other hand, has a long history of serious mental-health problems and was undeniably incompetent when the section 22 — 10 notices were given. Moreover, her permanent mailing address in the tax records was correct because she continued to reside at the property except when she was hospitalized for mental-health treatment. Illinois’ section 22 — 10 “Take Notice” is designed to inform the owner that property has already been sold at a tax sale and that title will transfer to the tax purchaser if the property is not redeemed by paying the back taxes before the expiration of the redemption period. 35 ILCS 200/22 — 10 (West 1994). Thus, this notice provides the final opportunity for the property owner to preserve any interest in the property. Due to the magnitude and imminence of the risk of complete forfeiture, I believe that due process mandates even more stringent notice requirements than those required before the sale of the property. A heightened notice standard is justified when the parties’ interests are balanced, with the imminent, irreversible loss of title to a home or other property carrying substantial weight. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 94 L. Ed. at 873, 70 S. Ct. at 657 (explaining that the specific test for the sufficiency of notice depends on the balance between the interest of the individual being protected by the due process clause and the state’s interest). See also Jones, 547 U.S. at 229, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 427, 126 S. Ct. at 1715 (quoting Mullane). Indeed, our legislature has deemed it appropriate to enact more stringent statutory notice requirements in the postsale context than in the presale context. Compare 35 ILCS 200/21 — 110, 21 — 115, 21 — 135 (West 1994) with 35 ILCS 200/22 — 5, 22 — 10, 22 — 15, 22 — 20, 22 — 25 (West 1994). There is, however, one significant factual similarity between this case and Jones. In both instances, after it became apparent that the property owner had not received the statutory notice, the party obliged to provide notice “did — nothing.” Jones, 547 U.S. at 234, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 430, 126 S. Ct. at 1718. The Court in Jones concluded that due process necessitated “additional reasonable steps to notify [the property owner], if practicable to do so.” Jones, 547 U.S. at 234, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 430, 126 S. Ct. at 1718. More specifically, the Jones Court repeatedly noted the principle that due process mandates notice “ ‘such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Jones, 547 U.S. at 229, 230, 238, 240-41, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 427, 428, 433, 435, 126 S. Ct. at 1715, 1716, 1721, 1722, quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 94 L. Ed. at 874, 70 S. Ct. at 657. Here, it is difficult to imagine that someone “desirous of actually informing” Lowe of the impending loss of her property would find it unreasonable or “impracticable” to call the post office to inquire about the letter carrier’s notation on the returned certified mail envelope addressed to Lowe stating that she was “hospitalized.” While this standard conflicts with the inherently adverse interests of tax purchasers, who rationally wish to obtain their tax deeds with the least possible effort and expense, constitutional due process standards do not exist for the benefit of the party intent on taking possession of another’s property. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 94 L. Ed. at 873, 70 S. Ct. at 657. See also Jones, 547 U.S. at 239, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 433-34, 126 S. Ct. at 1721 (noting that the state has far less incentive to provide proper notice to property owners before taking actions adverse to them than it has to secure the revenue obtained from the taking). Fundamental due process safeguards are designed to provide property owners with the right to be heard. Due process entails the right to present objections and not be unwittingly stripped of property. This right has little meaning if the owner is not informed of the pending action and given the opportunity to object. See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449-50, 72 L. Ed. 2d 249, 254-55, 102 S. Ct. 1874, 1877-78 (1982). Moreover, while due process does not demand actual notice to the property owner (Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 606, 122 S. Ct. 694, 701 (2002)), the notice provided must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections” (emphasis added) (Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 94 L. Ed. at 873, 70 S. Ct. at 657). Here, the circumstances required Apex to follow up on the letter carrier’s notation that Lowe was hospitalized. Only by following up on that information would the notice provided be “reasonably calculated” to afford Lowe notice “under all the circumstances” known to Apex at the time. The arguably conflicting information suggesting that Lowe had moved (see 225 Ill. 2d at 229-30) did not negate the relevance of the additional information on the envelope to Apex’s duty to provide notice sufficient to satisfy due process. The duty to provide due process required the notice given to be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise” Lowe of the action. (Emphasis added.) Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 94 L. Ed. at 873, 70 S. Ct. at 657. See 225 Ill. 2d at 228. Similarly, ignoring information stating that the property owner is hospitalized does not comply with Apex’s statutory duty under section 22 — 15 (35 ILCS 200/22 — 15 (West 1994)). Section 22 — 15 mandates that a tax purchaser exercise “diligent inquiry and effort” in finding the property owner and serving a section 22 — 10 notice. 35 ILCS 200/22 — 15 (West 1994). The plain and ordinary meaning of “diligent” is “characterized by steady, earnest, attentive, and energetic application and effort in a pursuit.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 633 (1993). Under this definition, Apex’s failure to do anything after being informed that Lowe was hospitalized cannot reasonably be regarded as even “diligent inquiry and effort” to locate and serve Lowe. Nor does the mere possibility that Apex’s inquiries at the post office may have been unsuccessful in obtaining information about Lowe’s location or mental-health status fulfill its due process duty to at least attempt to provide notice based on all available information. Jones, 547 U.S. at 226, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 126 S. Ct. at 1713-14 (citing Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 606, 122 S. Ct. at 701, and Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 94 L. Ed. at 873, 70 S. Ct. at 657). See 225 Ill. 2d at 229-30. Surely due process does not allow the selective acknowledgment of information minimizing the tax purchaser’s duty of notification and the complete disregard of other available information requiring the “additional reasonable step[ ]” of simply inquiring about the notation at the post office. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 225, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 126 S. Ct. at 1713. Due process is intended, after all, to provide property owners with a reasonable opportunity to protect their interests. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 94 L. Ed. at 873, 70 S. Ct. at 657. The goal of due process is not to minimize the notification burden placed on a tax purchaser. Finally, requiring Apex to inquire about the letter carrier’s notation at the post office does not constitute the type of “open-ended search” rejected by the Jones Court. Jones, 547 U.S. at 236, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 432, 126 S. Ct. at 1719. Apex would initially be required to take the limited step of contacting the post office to inquire about the notation on the returned certified mail envelope indicating that Lowe was hospitalized. Apex may or may not be required to take other reasonable and practicable steps to follow up on any subsequent findings. Jones, 547 U.S. at 227, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 426, 126 S. Ct. at 1714 (quoting its explanation in Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115, 1 L. Ed. 2d 178, 182, 77 S. Ct. 200, 202 (1956), that “the ‘notice required will vary with circumstances and conditions’ ”). Regardless of the outcome of its inquiry, however, Apex would not be obliged to scour local hospitals in an open-ended search for Lowe. Thus, because “[u]nder the circumstances presented here, additional reasonable steps were available” to Apex, I believe it failed to satisfy its due process obligations. Jones, 547 U.S. at 225, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 126 S. Ct. at 1713. I would reverse the appellate court judgment and remand for further proceedings. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.