Court Opinion

ID: 9534850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:43:10.262715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:32:55.925641
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice,
dissenting.
This contract is unambiguous when read as a whole. I find it clear from the language of the contract that the parties did not intend the Assignment in Trust provision to be a condition precedent, but instead a severable provision. I dissent and would uphold the decision of the district court.
Conditions precedent are not a favorite of the law and will not be read into a contract by implication. Lewis v. Roper, 579 P.2d 434, 439 (Wyo.1978). For that proposition in Lewis, we relied upon 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 321 at 752 (1964) which states that “courts will not construe stipulations to be [conditions precedent] unless required to do so by plain, unambiguous language * * *.” No such language exists here.
The contract did contain a section labeled “Condition Precedent.” The Assignment in Trust provision was not contained in this section. The contract did not indicate that it would become void in the event the Assignment in Trust provision was unenforceable. Cf. Cheyenne Dodge, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds Co., 613 P.2d 1234 (Wyo.1980). Instead the contract provided for such possibility. The contract’s sever-ability provision stated:
“In the event any one or more of the provisions contained in this Agreement or in any other instrument referred to herein shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable, such illegality, invalidity or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision of this Agreement.”
This language is clear, unambiguous, and reflects the intention of the parties to perform the contract even if later events reveal that a part of the contract may not be enforceable.
The district court correctly ordered specific performance of the contract, and I would affirm.