Court Opinion

ID: 9904084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:18:22.525695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.590246
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                 DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

LORENZO KEANDRE SMITH,

            Petitioner,

v.                                    Case No. 5D22-1663
                                      LT Case No. 2019-CF-007172-A-O
STATE OF FLORIDA,

          Respondent.
________________________________/

LORENZO KEANDRE SMITH,

            Petitioner,

v.                                    Case No. 5D22-1688
                                      LT Case No. 2020-CF-001103-A-O
STATE OF FLORIDA,

          Respondent.
________________________________/

Opinion filed October 3, 2022

Petition for Writ of Prohibition,
Wayne C. Wooten, Respondent Judge.

Robert Wesley, Public Defender, and
Robert Thompson Adams IV,
Assistant Public Defendant,
Orlando, for Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and
Roberts J. Bradford, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General,
Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

WOZNIAK, J.

      Lorenzo Smith has filed essentially identical petitions for writ of

prohibition seeking therein to prohibit the trial court from proceeding in his

two underlying violation of probation cases for lack of jurisdiction. 1      He

contends that when his jail credit for time served awaiting disposition is

correctly credited against the overall probationary term in each case, it is

clear he was no longer serving probation at the time the affidavits of violation

of probation were filed, leaving the trial court without jurisdiction over the

violation of probation proceedings. We agree and grant the petitions.

      We begin by observing that a writ of prohibition premised on a lack of

jurisdiction is appropriate only where it is clear that the lower tribunal is

without jurisdiction or attempting to act in excess of its jurisdiction. State v.

Jackson, 306 So. 3d 936, 944 (Fla. 2020) (observing that prohibition may

      1
        Although separate petitions were filed, we have chosen to address
them in a single opinion inasmuch as Smith’s two petitions arise out of the
same facts and circumstances, involve the same parties, and present the
same issue, namely the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider the alleged
violations of probation where the probation violation affidavits were
assertedly filed after Smith’s probation had concluded.

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only be granted when it is shown that a lower court is without jurisdiction or

attempting to act in excess of jurisdiction); Golub v. Golub, 325 So. 3d 164,

171 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (“A writ of prohibition is intended to be ‘very narrow

in scope and operation and must be employed with caution and utilized only

in emergency cases to prevent an impending injury where there is no other

appropriate and adequate legal remedy.’” (quoting Mandico v. Taos Constr.,

Inc., 605 So. 2d 850, 854 (Fla. 1992))).

      It is established law that when a defendant has been placed on

probation, the sentencing court loses jurisdiction over the defendant once

the probationary period expires unless proceedings to modify or revoke

probation have been instituted in the interim. See § 948.04(2), Fla. Stat.

(2020) (“Upon the termination of the period of probation, the probationer shall

be released from probation and is not liable to sentence for the offense for

which probation was allowed.”); State v. Hall, 641 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 1994)

(“It has long been the rule that ‘upon expiration of the probationary period

the court is divested of all jurisdiction over the person of the probationer

unless in the meantime the processes of the court have been set in motion

for revocation or modification of the probation . . . .’” (quoting Carroll v.

Cochran, 140 So. 2d 300, 301 (Fla. 1962))).         Thus, if the affidavits of

probation violation were filed after Smith’s probation ended, the trial court

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had no jurisdiction to rule on the alleged violations, and Smith’s motions to

dismiss were erroneously denied.

      We must thus determine the date Smith’s probation concluded, which

requires a review of the probation documents to determine precisely how the

period of confinement was to be implemented vis-à-vis the period of

probation. In both cases at issue here, the probation order imposes twenty-

four months of supervised probation, with the condition that Smith complete

a term of six months in jail with credit for time served. Smith maintains that

the period of confinement was imposed as a condition of probation, as

opposed to being a so-called probationary split sentence in which a period

of confinement is followed by a period of probation. He is correct. The term

of confinement was clearly a condition of probation, which arrangement is

authorized by section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2020) (stating that “[t]he

enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions does not prevent the

court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper” and

imposing requirements “if the court . . . imposes a period of incarceration as

a condition of probation”). 2

      2
       The authorization is not without limitation. When a sentencing court
imposes a period of incarceration as a condition of probation, “the period
may not exceed 364 days, and incarceration shall be restricted to either a
county facility, or a probation and restitution center under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Corrections.” § 948.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2020).

                                       4
      Although the Legislature has expressly authorized incarceration as a

condition of probation, it has not spoken on the proper application of jail time

credit in an instance such as Smith’s. No statute expressly directs that jail

credit is to be applied to the entire probationary period. However, the courts

have filled that void. Building upon the Florida Supreme Court’s finding in

Van Tassel v. Coffman, 486 So. 2d 528, 529–30 (Fla. 1985), that there is “a

legislative intent to grant gain time to the prison punishment of all offenders,

whether by the historic straight sentence, the now authorized split sentence,

or probation which contains a condition of imprisonment,” this Court, in

Griner v. State, 523 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), concluded,

“Following the logic of Van Tassel, we can discern no reason for denying

credit for prior jail time to one confined as a condition of probation.” Indeed,

this Court has consistently so held. See, e.g., Belt v. State, 748 So. 2d 386

(Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding, where incarceration was imposed as condition

of probationary term, proper calculation of probationary term requires jail

credit be given against entire probationary term); Greer v. State, 605 So. 2d

178 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (observing defendant entitled to jail time credit as

matter of law; remanding for amendment of sentence to provide such credit

against county jail time ordered as condition of community control).

                                       5
      To be clear, we have concerns regarding the absence of express

statutory authority for the award of jail time credit to the entire probationary

period; however, we are bound to follow the precedent of the Florida

Supreme Court and this Court permitting it. Thus, we agree with Smith that

based on this precedent, where probation has been imposed with jail time

as a condition thereof, any jail time credit for time served is to be applied to

the entire term of probation. By properly crediting Smith with his jail time

credit against the entire probationary term in each case and comparing that

date with the date the affidavit of violation was filed in each case, we must

conclude that his probationary terms had terminated prior to the date the

affidavits of violation were filed.

      Using one of his cases to illustrate the correct computation of the

termination date of probation, Smith was placed on twenty-four months’

probation on May 21, 2020. The last day of the probationary term, i.e., the

last day on which Smith would be on probation, but for the jail credit, was

thus on or about May 20, 2022. Crediting May 20, 2022, and another 116

days, places the end date of probation, i.e., the last date on which Smith

would have been on probation, on or about January 23, 2022. Because the

affidavit of violation was filed over two months after Smith’s probation had

concluded, the trial court had no jurisdiction to proceed in that case. Similar

                                       6
calculations reflect that the affidavit in the remaining case was also filed after

the probationary period had ended. Thus, the trial court was divested of

jurisdiction to proceed in either case.

      Because the trial court should have granted Smith’s motions to dismiss

the violation of probation proceedings, we grant the petitions for writ of

prohibition. As we are confident that the trial judge will promptly comply with

this Court’s opinion, we withhold formal issuance of the writ.

      PETITIONS GRANTED; WRITS WITHHELD.

SASSO and NARDELLA, JJ., concur.

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