Court Opinion

ID: 9601414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:43:09.51792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:57.368489
License: Public Domain

IRWIN, Justice
(dissenting).
Title 84 O.S.1961, § 151, provides that a will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator. The Legislature, by enactment of Title 84 O.S.1961, § 132, unequivocally, placed a burden upon a testator, if he intends to omit to provide in his will for any of his children or for the issue of a deceased child, to make it appear that such omission was intentional.
Although our general statutory provisions do not prohibit a testator from omitting to provide for a child, or the issue of a deceased child, section 132, supra, does place a limitation upon the manner in which a child or the issue of a deceased child may be omitted. That is, a child or the issue of a deceased child, is not prohibited from sharing in the estate by merely omitting to provide in the will for the child or the issue of a deceased child, but it is incumbent upon the testator to make it appear that the omission to provide was intentional.
In my opinion, there is a clear-cut and a vital distinction between the language employed, in sec. 132, supra, which states "unless it appears that such omission was intentional” and language employed in certain jurisdictions which states "unless it appears that such omission was not intentional”. In the former, which is our statute, the presumption is that the testator did not intend to omit to provide for the preter-mitted heir, and to overcome such presumption in favor of the pretermitted heir, it must appear that such omission was intentional.
By the same reasoning, where the statute provides “unless it appears that such omission was not intentional”, the presumption is that the testator did intend to omit to provide for the pretermitted heir, and to overcome such presumption, it must appear that such omission was not intentional. My reasoning, in part, is based on 170 A.L.R. p. 1387.
In In re Castle’s Estate, Okl., 262 P.2d 704, we said the intention of a testator to disinherit his children, or the issue of a deceased child, must affirmatively appear from the four corners of the will.
In construing section 132, supra, in In re Revard’s Estate, 178 Okl. 524, 63 P.2d 973, we said it is important to observe that the test is not whether it was an unintentional omission, such as an oversight, but whether “it appears” that the omission was intentional.
The district court, on trial de novo, in effect found that it did not appear that the omission to provide for Darlene Whitlatch *901was intentional, and therefore, she was entitled to share in the estate of the testatrix as if she had died intestate.
On appeal to this Court, the above finding and judgment rendered thereon will not be disturbed unless such finding and judgment are against the clear weight of the evidence. See Lunceford v. Lunceford, 208 Okl. 404, 255 P.2d 909.
In the will under consideration, the testatrix provided for all of her living children and all her grandchildren except Darlene Whitlatch. She specifically mentioned all of her grandchildren by name, but left only a present interest to her grandson, Bill Ray Whitlach, and all of her other grandchildren, except Darlene Whitlatch, were devised a remainder as a class. Testatrix also set forth how the estate should be distributed in case of, and on the death of, the devisees and legatees. However, the will is barren of (1) any language indicating an intention to omit to provide for her granddaughter, Darlene Whitlatch, whose father had died, (2) any language indicating a reason for omitting to provide for her, (3) any language indicating an intention not to provide for all her children and all her grandchildren, and (4) any language indicating a preference between her grandchildren. In other words, the testatrix not only omitted to provide for Darlene Whitlatch, but in my opinion, failed to employ any language which would make it appear that such omission was intentional.
Since, in my opinion, there is a presumption that the testatrix did not intentionally omit to provide for Darlene Whitlatch, I can not say that the inherent finding of the trial court that this presumption was not overcome by the language in the will for the reason the testatrix did not make it appear that the omission was intentional, is against the clear weight of the evidence.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice JACKSON concurs in the views herein expressed.