Court Opinion

ID: 9535528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:50:32.065293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:16.566146
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN, dissenting: I disagree with the decision of the majority. The majority held the Commission’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence because of two conclusions — (1) that Blye’s testimony inculpating Starkey “lacked sufficient probative value”; and (2) that the Commission did not give proper deference to its hearing officer’s conclusions “that Starkey’s exculpatory testimony was truthful.” Neither of the majority’s conclusions is supported by the record. First, while the majority finds that Blye’s testimony was lacking in probative value, the hearing officer found that “the evidence of Marilyn Blye was the most probative gathered in this case” and that “there is no reason to doubt the investigators’ recantation of Blye’s statement.” Furthermore, tenuous reasons are given by the majority in concluding that Blye’s testimony was lacking in probative value. They are (1) Blye was the target of a criminal investigation at the time her statements were made; (2) Blye made the statements while being interviewed at a police station and at the office of an investigator; (3) Blye believed that Starkey was responsible for her discharge; (4) Starkey cooperated with agents who were investigating Blye; and (5) “one of the agents initially testified that Blye merely said she thought that Starkey admitted being guilty of fraud.” As to (1), there is nothing to indicate that Blye was the target of a criminal investigation. Investigator McDermott testified that at the time of the first interview with her, he and the other officers “were interested in claims that she may have been involved in which could have been false,” and it was at the second interview that she was asked whether other employees were involved in filing false claims; as to (2) the place at which the interviews were had with Blye have no relevance whatsoever; as to (3), the fact that Blye believed Starkey was responsible for her discharge would only go to her credibility and has little significance because it was drawn by the majority from one statement to the investigator that she said Starkey was responsible for the loss of her job and at the same time told him that she was not out to get Starkey, and there is nothing else in the record indicating that Blye may have been resentful or which even remotely suggests that Blye’s statements inculpating Starkey were untruthful; as to (4), there is nothing to indicate that Blye knew that Starkey had cooperated with anyone investigating her (Blye); and, as to (5), no agent testified, as stated by the majority, “that Blye merely said she thought Starkey admitted being guilty of fraud.” The only testimony in this regard was from Investigator McDermott, who stated that during a second interview with Blye — when he asked her whether other employees were involved in filing false claims — she replied as follows: “[T]hat Josie Starkey had filed a false claim for her mother. She said that Josie Starkey brought the claim to her while she was at the computer terminal. She said she thought that Miss Starkey stated that her mother had not been working as listed in the claim.” McDermott testified also that: “Blye stated that Starky [sic] brought the claim to her, and that Blye input it. Blye stated that she knew that Mrs. McCoy was not working as claimed, and Mrs. Starky [sic] just merely laughed. Starky [sic] repeated to Blye that to file a claim for unemployment compensation, which would be incorrect, a false claim, all that was needed was a social security number, and to put the wages in by affidavit. She also stated that Starky [sic] also told her that an address or addresses would be needed to which the employer’s notices would be sent. These would be the employer’s notices of the last employing unit, and the base period employer. She also stated that it was called an S.U.A. claim. Blye stated that just because the address was incomplete, did not mean that the notices to the employers would not go out. They would go out, but would be returned by the post office as undeliverable if the addresses were incomplete. I believe that was the extent of the conversation with Marilyn Blye at that time.” Investigator Tobias corroborated that testimony of McDermott, and the testimony of both investigators concerning the statements of Blye were admitted by the hearing officer under the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule. In the light of the above, it appears clear that the reasons given by the majority do not support its conclusion that Marilyn Blye’s inculpatory testimony lacked probative value. The second conclusion given in support of the majority’s decision was “that the hearing officer’s determination that Starkey’s exculpatory testimony was truthful is a finding which is entitled to deference.” The record, however, discloses no finding that Starkey was truthful. Rather, after finding that a false claim was clearly entered on behalf of McCoy and that Starkey did not participate in the processing of that claim except to a very small degree, the hearing officer went on to find that Blye’s statement “indicated Starkey was actively engaged in the fraudulent scheme”; that Blye “indicated to the investigators that she and Starkey discussed how claims could be submitted fraudulently”; and that Blye indicated that she held Starkey responsible for her (Blye’s) losing her job. The hearing officer then concluded that “fortunately for Starkey this [the resentment of Blye towards Starkey] absolves her [Starkey] of all liability.” Thus, although the hearing officer found that McCoy’s claim was clearly false and that Starkey had participated at least to a small degree, he absolved her of all liability because of a conclusion, reached by pure conjecture, that Blye’s inculpatory statements were the result of resentment towards Starkey. Blye, of course, did not testify, and the only reference to possible resentment appears in the testimony of Investigator McDermott that Blye said that she was not friendly with Starkey because she thought Starkey was responsible for the loss of her job, but that she (Blye) never said she would get even with Starkey. This testimony could not support the finding of the hearing officer that Blye’s resentment was so strong that it absolved Starkey of all liability. It was only after this absolution that the hearing officer found that “Starkey’s testimony was credible,” which is not a finding that her testimony was truthful, as Black’s Law Dictionary 330 (5th ed. 1979) defines credible as “[w]orthy of belief; entitled to credit.” Moreover, although concluding that the Commission did not give proper deference to a finding of the hearing officer, the majority gives no deference to the finding of the Commission that Starkey’s defense was not credible even though its members are presumed to have broad experience in the field of labor-management relations. (See Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB (9th Cir. 1977), 565 F.2d 1074; NLRB v. Miller Redwood Co. (9th Cir. 1969), 407 F.2d 1366.) In this regard, Miller Redwood appears to be particularly significant. There, the trial examiner and the Board disagreed upon the employer’s motive for discharging an employee. The court upheld the Board’s position, stating “[t]he disagreement related solely to the inferences to be drawn from the whole record and the proper application of the statute. In such a case, ‘the presumptively broader gauge and experience of members of the Board have a meaningful role.’ ” 407 F.2d 1366, 1369. For a judgment of an administrative agency to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, it must appear that opposite conclusions are clearly evident; it is not enough that an opposite conclusion might be reasonable because, if the issue is merely one of conflicting testimony and credibility of witnesses, the agency’s determination should be sustained. (Keen v. Police Board (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 65, 391 N.E.2d 190; Walker v. State Board of Elections (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 877, 391 N.E.2d 507.) Furthermore, while the majority cites Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC (10th Cir. 1974), 497 F.2d 1178, cert. denied (1975), 419 U.S. 1105, 42 L. Ed. 2d 801, 95 S. Ct. 775, for the proposition that where a hearing officer and a commission reach opposite results upon review of the finding of the former, the hearing officer’s findings should be “given such weight as they merit within reason and in the light of judicial experience” (497 F.2d 1178, 1184), the majority does not discuss the application of the quoted language to the situation here. We note that it was also held in Coors that the findings of the hearing officer “are not sacrosanct and are not necessarily binding on the Commission or the court.” 497 F. 2d 1178, 1184. In any event, in its decision the Commission did not disagree with the finding that Starkey’s testimony was credible; rather, it found her defense was not worthy of belief, stating that “taking the record as a whole it is clear that petitioner has proved the charges. We cannot accept the proposition that respondent, an experienced employee, could have by innocent happenstance processed a fraudulent claim for her mother. Respondent’s defense is not credible.” The record discloses that a person seeking benefits was required to fill out an application form, to execute an affidavit of wages, and to furnish proof of those wages, which was done here by check stubs;1 that wage information is then verified by mailing a copy of the affidavit to the employer; that this is accomplished by entering the affidavit of wages into the computer which generates the verification letter sent to the employer; that McCoy testified two forms were presented to her — one being an application which she said was filled out by Starkey and the other a form filled out by a person she did not know — but that she (McCoy) made no entries and did no writing on either form; and that both investigators testified Starkey told them she had prepared the application which was processed on behalf of McCoy, and Starkey made no denial of this testimony. Starkey testified that she only partially filled out the application of her mother; that she did not (1) place the mark in the dependent child’s box — which gave her mother additional benefits, although there was no such child — ; (2) place the dash which appears in the place provided for the claimant’s signature (the application was not signed); or (3) erase what appears to be her signature — “J. Starkey” — at the bottom of the application. Starkey admitted that she wrote in both the name of H. Holmquist as her mother’s employer in 1976 and the date of August 27, 1976, as her mother’s last day of employment by the Holmquists. (The application was dated September 13, 1976.) She stated also that the address of the Holmquists was not written in the application by her, although she had also worked for them a few days that year. (The address does not appear on the form, and it should be noted that the failure to provide an address would prevent a certification letter being sent to an employer.) Moreover, Starkey said that she knew her mother should have signed the application and did not know why she had not done so, and that although Starkey testified at the hearing that she personally knew her mother had worked for the Holmquists until August 27,1976, the date she (Starkey) entered in the application as her mother’s last date of employment by the Holmquists, it is clear that her mother did not work for them for at least 6 or 7 years prior to the date of the claim. Thus, it was established that false wage information and false or nonexistent wage verification concerning McCoy must have been put into the computer, and from Blye’s testimony that Starkey was actively engaged in the fraud scheme in that she came to her (Blye) with the application of McCoy and told her (Blye) to put it through the computer. The initials “MB” appearing at the bottom of McCoy’s application are apparently those of Marilyn Blye, and the erased signature “J. Starkey” is still discernible on the application. Having this and the other evidence received at the hearing, some of which is set forth above, the experienced members of the Commission found that her defense was not credible. The Commission found, in effect, that her defense of knowing nothing about her mother’s false claim except that she filled out a portion of the application was not worthy of belief, and it appears to me that this conclusion is amply supported by the record. In any event, it cannot fairly be said that a decision opposite to that of the Commission is clearly evident. In the light of the above, it is my belief that there is no record basis for the finding of the majority that the decision of the Commission was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and I would affirm the Commission’s decision.   The check stubs could not be found and were not introduced at the hearing.