Court Opinion

ID: 9367464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 20:02:27.065168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:59.811875
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/31/23 P. v. Gallow CA2/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Courty
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B300252

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. BA091853)
           v.

 WHITNEY GALLOW,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura F. Priver, Judge. Reversed.
      John Lanahan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance
E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan
Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Amanda V.
Lopez and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
       Whitney Gallow appeals the trial court’s denial of his
petition for relief under Penal Code 1 section 1172.6 (former
section 1170.95).2 We previously affirmed the court’s order
in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Gallow (Aug. 26, 2021,
B300252) (Gallow II).) Our Supreme Court granted review and
transferred this case back to us with directions to vacate our
decision and to reconsider the cause in light of People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). We have vacated our decision,
received supplemental briefing, reconsidered the cause, and
now reverse the trial court’s order with directions to conduct
an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In 1994, a jury convicted Gallow of two counts of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), one count of attempted murder (§§ 187,
664), and one count of robbery (§ 211). The jury found true
felony-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and multiple murder
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) special circumstance allegations as to
both counts of murder, and found that Gallow personally used a
handgun in the commission of the murders (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
The jury rejected an allegation that Gallow personally inflicted
great bodily injury in the commission of the attempted murder
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Gallow to two
consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of

      1Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
      2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in its text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10). For the sake of consistency, we will refer to the current
statutory designation.

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parole for the murders, plus an additional term of life with
the possibility of parole for attempted murder, plus 15 years
for three firearm enhancements.
       In Gallow’s direct appeal, we struck two of the firearm
enhancements but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v.
Gallow (Sep. 20, 1996, B088383) [nonpub. opn.] (Gallow I).)
       On May 23, 2019, Gallow filed in the superior court a
facially sufficient petition for resentencing under section 1172.6
and requested the appointment of counsel. The court did not
appoint counsel for Gallow and summarily denied the petition on
the ground that Gallow actually killed both victims and was the
only shooter in the case.
       Gallow timely appealed.
       We held that, under People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
the trial court erred by denying his petition without appointing
counsel to represent him. (Gallow II, supra, B300252.) We
concluded, however, that the error was harmless because the
jury had found true the felony-murder special circumstance
allegation. We explained that, “[i]n order to find the felony-
murder special circumstance true, the jury must have found
that Gallow either was the actual killer, that he was not the
actual killer but acted with the intent to kill in aiding, abetting,
soliciting, or assisting in the murder, or, at a minimum, that
he was a major participant in the felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. This is the same finding required
for a conviction of felony murder under the newly amended
section 189. (See § 189, subd. (e)(3).) He is therefore ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law because he cannot show
that he ‘could not be convicted of first or second degree murder

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because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective’
[January 1, 2019].” (Gallow II, supra, B300252.)
       We expressly rejected Gallow’s argument that the jury’s
finding on the felony-murder special circumstance was not
dispositive of his petition because, after the jury made that
finding, our Supreme Court clarified the requirements of that
special circumstance in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
       The Supreme Court granted Gallow’s petition for review
and held the case pending consideration of its review of People v.
Strong (Dec. 18, 2020, C091162) [nonpub. opn.], revd. (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698. (People v. Gallow, S271211, Supreme Ct. Mins.,
Nov. 10, 2021, p. 1579.)
       The Supreme Court decided Strong on August 8, 2022 and,
on November 22, 2022, transferred the instant case to this court
with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in
light of Strong. (People v. Gallow, S271211, Supreme Ct. Mins.,
Nov. 22, 2022, p. 1465.)

                         DISCUSSION
       Under section 1172.6, a defendant “convicted of felony
murder” may file a petition to have the murder conviction
vacated and “be resentenced on any remaining counts.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) A defendant makes a prima facie case
for relief under this section if, among other requirements, the
defendant “could not presently be convicted of murder” under
the amendments to sections 188 or 189 that became effective
on January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) These statutes, as
amended, still authorize a murder conviction under the felony
murder doctrine if the defendant “was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human

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life.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) Thus, if these facts can be established
as a matter of law based on the record of the defendant’s
conviction, the court may determine that the defendant has failed
to make a prima facie case for relief and deny the defendant’s
petition without an evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.)
       In Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, as in the instant case,
the defendant’s jury found true the special circumstance that he
was a “major participant” who acted with “reckless indifference
to human life.” (Id. at p. 703.) There, as here, the jury’s finding
was made prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, “which
for the first time provided substantial guidance on the meaning
of the two relevant statutory phrases.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 703.)
       In Strong, the trial court had summarily denied the
defendant’s petition under section 1172.6 on the ground that
jury’s pre-Banks and pre-Clark finding was binding. The
Supreme Court reversed, and explained that Banks and
Clark “substantially clarified the law governing findings
under . . . section 190.2, subdivision (d): Banks elucidated
what it means to be a major participant and, to a lesser extent,
what it means to act with reckless indifference to human life,
while Clark further refined the reckless indifference inquiry.”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 706–707.) As a result, facts
that would support a jury finding that a defendant was a major
participant or had acted with reckless disregard for life prior to
Banks and Clark would not necessarily be sufficient to support
the same finding after Banks and Clark. Thus, “unless a
defendant was tried after Banks was decided, a major participant

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finding will not defeat an otherwise valid prima facie case. And
unless a defendant was tried after Clark was decided, a reckless
indifference to human life finding will not defeat an otherwise
valid prima facie case.” (Id. at p. 721)
       In sum, after Strong, a pre-Banks and pre-Clark special
circumstance finding does not support a summary denial of
a section 1172.6 petition. Unless there is some other reason
for concluding that the defendant failed to make a prima facie
showing for relief, the matter must proceed to an evidentiary
hearing.
       Here, the only basis for our affirmance of the trial court’s
denial is that the court’s error in failing to appoint counsel for
Gallow was harmless because the jury had found that he was
a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. Because these findings
were made prior to Banks and Clark, the instant case is
indistinguishable from Strong. We therefore agree with the
Attorney General, who concedes that “the matter should be
remanded for the trial court to issue an order to show cause
and conduct an evidentiary hearing” pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). (Capitalization omitted.)

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                        DISPOSITION
      The court's order denying defendant’s petition for
resentencing is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                         ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 BENDIX, J.

                 WEINGART, J.

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