Court Opinion

ID: 9667366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:43:55.184763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:37.370864
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
On February 13, 1979, in the Berrien County Circuit Court, defendant was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of larceny in a building, MCL 750.360; MSA 28.592, and was thereafter sentenced to two years probation. Then, on July 30, 1980, defendant pled guilty to probation violation and, as a result, his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to 2-1/2 to 4 years imprisonment, MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134. Defendant appeals as of right.
The probation violation charge arose out of defendant’s alleged failure to report to his probation officer, after returning from an out-of-state vacation, as well as his alleged failure to report a change of address. Defendant’s probation officer filed a petition for order of bench warrant with the trial court. The petition made no mention of defendant’s right to a contested hearing but it did contain the following language:
"Therefore, your petitioner respectfully prays that a bench warrant for the arrest of Steve Lee Moore be issued by this court to show cause why said probation of said respondent should not be terminated.”
A bench warrant was subsequently issued commanding the sheriff to arrest defendant and "bring him before the [court] to be dealt with according to law”.
Defendant was arrested on the bench warrant and brought before the court where he acknowledged receipt of exact copies of the petition and *457bench warrant. The court informed defendant as follows:
"Before we proceed, Mr. Moore, there are some rights you have that I want to advise you of.
"You have a right to be represented by an attorney, at this hearing, an attorney of your choice, if you can afford one, or an attorney appointed by the court, to represent you, at public expense.”
The court then granted defendant’s request to have an attorney appointed to represent him and the matter was adjourned.
On the rescheduled date for the probation revocation hearing, defendant and his attorney appeared in court and, once again, defendant acknowledged receipt of copies of the petition and bench warrant. Before advising defendant of any of his constitutional rights or making any mention at all in regard to a contested hearing, the trial court inquired of defendant whether he had in fact failed to report, as alleged, and defendant admitted that he had.
The court then revoked defendant’s probation and sentenced him to the 2-1/2- to 4-year prison term. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to inform him, prior to acceptance of his plea, that he had the right to a contested hearing.
In Michigan, a new court rule, GCR 1963, 791.5, governs pleas of guilty to charges of probation violation. However, because this case arose well before May 14, 1981, the effective date of GCR 1963, 791, our holding is governed by the law of this state as it existed on July 30, 1980, the date of defendant’s plea.
A defendant charged with breaching the terms of probation is afforded certain minimal proce*458dural due process rights, including the right to a contested hearing on the charge. MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134, People v Michael Brown, 72 Mich App 7, 10-12; 248 NW2d 695 (1976). It is well established that before the court can accept a probationer’s plea of guilty to charges of probation violation, he must be advised of his right to a hearing and that there is an alternative to pleading guilty. People v Rial, 399 Mich 431; 249 NW2d 114 (1976) (Levin, J., concurring); People v Michael Brown, supra; People v Allen, 71 Mich App 465; 248 NW2d 588 (1976).
The question, then, is whether defendant was sufficiently advised of that right. We note at the outset that neither the petition for order of bench warrant nor the bench warrant itself contained language sufficiently advising defendant of his right to a hearing. As a matter of fact, neither document even mentioned the word "hearing”. Our conclusion in this regard is supported by the Supreme Court’s holdings in People v Ealey, 411 Mich 987 (1981), and People v Jerry Adams, 411 Mich 1070; 310 NW2d 671 (1981). In both Ealey and Jerry Adams, defendants were served with copies of bench warrants which contained language to the eifect that they were entitled to a hearing on charges of probation violation and yet the Supreme Court held that neither defendant had been sufficiently notified of his right to a hearing.
The question, of whether the trial court’s statement to defendant that "You have a right to be represented by an attorney, at this hearing” was sufficient to inform defendant of his right to a hearing, is a close one. The Michigan Supreme Court has never issued a definitive ruling on this question. An examination of the Supreme Court’s *459rulings in Ealey and Jerry Adams, supra, sheds no light on this issue as, in both of these cases, the trial court had made no mention whatsoever of a right to a hearing.
We are, however, in agreement with other panels of this Court which have previously ruled that similar language was insufficient to advise a probationer of his right to a contested hearing. In People v Gaudett, 77 Mich App 496, 500; 258 NW2d 535 (1977), where defendant was accused of violating the terms of his probation, the trial court asked the defendant the following question:
" 'Do you wish to have an attorney appointed for and on your behalf for today’s hearing?’ (Emphasis supplied.)”
On appeal, the Court rejected the prosecutor’s contention that the trial court’s use of the word "hearing” in the preceeding quotation was sufficient to advise the defendant of his right to a hearing. 77 Mich App p 501. Similarly, in People v Radney, 81 Mich App 303, 306; 265 NW2d 128 (1978), another probation violation case, the defendant was informed as follows:
"* * * you’re entitled to have a lawyer represent you at the violation hearing.”
On appeal, this Court held that the trial court’s mention of the word "hearing” in its colloquy with the defendant was insufficient to advise defendant of his rights to a hearing and to contest the charges.
We cannot agree with Judge Walsh’s dissenting opinion which characterizes the trial court’s advice to defendant as being merely an "imprecisely given” instruction of defendant’s right to a hear*460ing. A reasonable reading of the record reveals that this advice was not given at all.
Judge Walsh, in his dissent, stresses the fact that defendant freely admitted violating the terms of his probation, however, this does not change our holding. The fact that defendant admitted violating his probation does not relieve the court of the duty to ensure that the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. People v Hardin, 70 Mich App 204; 245 NW2d 566 (1976); People v Michael Brown, supra. Moreover, we are compelled to point out that a probation revocation proceeding encompasses a two-step analysis: (1) a factual determination of whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation and (2) a discretionary determination of whether the violation warrants revocation. People v Clements, 72 Mich App 500, 503; 250 NW2d 100 (1976). Thus, defendant’s admission alone was not enough to justify revocation of his probation. It is certainly possible that, had defendant exercised his right to a contested hearing and asked the court to consider mitigating circumstances, the trial court may not have revoked his probation. See People v Clements, supra, pp 504-505.
Similarly, we reject Judge Walsh’s "harmless error” analysis. In cases, such as the one at bar, where the alleged probation violation consists of merely failing to report to the probation officer as opposed to being convicted of a crime, we cannot presume that the trial court’s failure to advise defendant of his right to a contested hearing was not prejudicial.
Finally, Judge Walsh’s argument that affirmance is required because "the judiciary is constitutionally empowered to override a legislative enactment relating to the reversal of a judgment in a *461criminal case only when its 'responsibility of maintaining * * * due process of law’ * * * requires that it do so”, ignores the fact that due process requires, inter alia, that a probationer be given notice of his right to a contested hearing on a charge of probation violation. Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778; 93 S Ct 1756; 36 L Ed 2d 656 (1973), citing with approval Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 489; 92 S Ct 2593; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972).
Reversed and remanded.