Court Opinion

ID: 9737664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:31:45.227663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.583964
License: Public Domain

Corrigan, J.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but for a different reason. In my view, the answer to the difficult venue question presented in this case lies in § 1641 of the Revised Judicature Act, which provides in full:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), if causes of action are joined, whether properly or not, venue is proper in any county in which either cause of action, if sued upon separately, could have been commenced and tried, subject to separation and change as provided by court rule.
(2) If more than 1 cause of action is pleaded in the complaint or added by amendment at any time during the action and 1 of the causes of action is based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, venue shall be determined under the rules applicable to actions in tort as provided in section 1629.
*386Section 1641 applies to claims involving the joinder of multiple “causes of action.” Whether plaintiff’s claim in this case involves the joinder of multiple “causes of action” under § 1641 depends on the proper construction of the statutory phrase “cause of action.”
When examining a statute, our primary task is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). This task begins by examining the language of the statute itself, as the words of a statute provide “the most reliable evidence of its intent.” See id., quoting United States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981). If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature will be presumed to have intended the meaning plainly expressed, and the language must be applied as written. “No further judicial construction is required or permitted.” Sun Valley, supra at 236. Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent. Id. The interpretation of individual words and phrases within a statute is governed by MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1), which provides:
All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may-have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.
“Cause of action” is a legal term of art. Therefore, it must be understood according to its “peculiar and appropriate meaning.” MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1). Depending on the context in which it is used, the term “cause of action” could mean (1) a particular *387claim against a particular defendant, (2) a legal theory, or (3) a lawsuit. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed), p 214, gives three alternate definitions corresponding to these three general ideas:
1. A group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person; claim (4) <after the crash, Aronson had a cause of action>.
2. A legal theory of a lawsuit <a malpractice cause of action. Cf. right of ACTI0N>.—Also termed (in senses 1 & 2) ground of action.
* * *
3. Loosely, a lawsuit cthere are four defendants in the pending cause of action>.
Section 1641 describes “causes of action” that are “joined.” For purposes of joinder, this Court has repeatedly defined “cause of action,” as being “the fact or combination of facts giving rise to or entitling a party to sustain an action.” See Multiplex Concrete Machinery Co v Saxer, 310 Mich 243, 253; 17 NW2d 169 (1945); Brewster Loud Lumber Co v General Builders’ Supply Co, 233 Mich 633, 638; 208 NW 28 (1926); Otto v Highland Park, 204 Mich 74, 80; 169 NW 904 (1918). Because § 1641 speaks in terms of the joinder of causes of action, this definition of “cause of action,” which is generally consistent with the word “claim,” best represents the “peculiar and appropriate meaning” of the statutory term in this context.
Understanding “cause of action” to mean “the combination of facts giving rise to or entitling a party to *388sustain an action,” e.g., Multiplex Concrete Machinery, supra at 253, supports the conclusion that separate claims against various defendants amount to separate “causes of action.” In this case, because each of plaintiffs claims involves the alleged negligence of a different person or entity, each claim involves a different “combination of facts” entitling plaintiff to “sustain an action,” and, therefore, each amounts to a separate “cause of action.” The conclusion that each claim amounts to a separate “cause of action” is further supported by the fact that defendant could have elected to sue any one of the defendants alone without joining her claims against the other defendants.1
Section 1641 is not a substantive venue provision. Standing alone, it does not instruct a litigant where to file an action. Rather, it demands reference to the various substantive venue statutes. Section 1641 explains that when a case involves joined “causes of action,” the entire case may be brought in any county in which it would have been proper to bring one of the various joined causes of action, if that cause of action had been sued upon separately. To determine whether a particular county would have been a proper venue for one of the various joined causes of *389action sued upon separately, one must refer to whichever substantive venue statute is applicable.2
Subsection 1641(2) provides an exception to the general rule set forth in subsection 1641(1) that venue for the entire case is proper in any county in which one of the joined causes of action could have been brought separately. In cases involving joined causes of action, where at least one cause of action is “based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death,” venue must be “determined” according to the rules of § 1629. Section 1629 is the substantive venue statute applicable to causes of action sounding in tort and wrongful death. Subsection 1641(2) creates a preference for § 1629 over the other substantive venue statutes.
Consider, for instance, a complaint that joins a cause of action sounding in tort with a cause of action sounding in contract. The proper venue for the tort cause of action would be determined by reference to § 1629, which is the substantive venue provision applicable to tort actions. The proper venue for the contract cause of action would be determined by reference to § 1621, which is the substantive venue provision applicable to contract actions. Under the general rule set forth in subsection 1641(1), either of these venues would be permissible for the entire case. Under the exception set forth in subsection 1641(2), however, only the venue determined proper by reference to § 1629 would be permissible for the entire case. Thus, the practical effect of subsection *3901641(2) is that, in cases involving the joinder of multiple causes of action, venues determined by reference to § 1629 take precedence over venues determined by reference to the other substantive venue provisions.
Applying the rules of § 1641 and § 1629 to the facts of this case, it becomes evident that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that Wayne County is a proper venue. If plaintiff had brought suit against only the Children’s Center, then venue would have been proper in Wayne County under § 1629. Subsection 1629(l)(a) would not apply, because the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and the Children’s Center is a Wayne County organization. Subsection 1629(l)(b) would not apply because the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and plaintiff is a Wayne County resident. Wayne County would satisfy the criteria of subsection 1629(l)(c), however, because no county satisfied the criteria of subsections (l)(a) or (l)(b), plaintiff is a Wayne County resident, and the Children’s Center has its place of business in Wayne County.
On the other hand, if plaintiff had brought suit against only defendant Camp Niobe, venue would have been proper only in Lapeer County under subsection 1629(l)(a), because the original injury occurred in Lapeer County and Camp Niobe has its place of business in Lapeer County. Because plaintiff elected to bring this suit against both the Children’s Center and Camp Niobe (as well as a number of the individual agents of those entities), this case involves the joinder of multiple “causes of action.” Under the general rule set forth in § 1641, venue would be proper in any county in which one of the joined causes of action could have been brought separately. *391In this case, as set forth above, that would include both Wayne County (for the cause of action against the Children’s Center) and Lapeer County (for the cause of action against Camp Niobe). Because each of these possible venues is “determined” by application of the substantive rules of § 1629, the exception set forth in subsection 1641(2) would have no practical effect in this case.
Cavanagh and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Corrigan, J.

 The Court of Appeals, in Schultz v Silver Lake Transport, Inc, 207 Mich App 267, 275; 523 NW2d 895 (1994), reached a different conclusion on this issue. There, the Court of Appeals held that a negligence suit against several defendants residing in different counties did “not involve the joinder of separate claims, but a single claim against multiple defendants.” Schultz did not cite any authority for its conclusion that a tort claim brought against several defendants for damages arising from a single accident does not involve the joinder of separate claims. Nor did the Court of Appeals explain its conclusion. Accordingly, I would reject the conclusion reached in Schultz, supra.

 The substantive venue statutes are §§ 1605, 1615, 1621, 1627, 1629, and 1635.