Court Opinion

ID: 9603958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:11:46.167226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:15.876987
License: Public Domain

FORT, J.,
dissenting.
The state concedes that there is no express authorization for appeal from an order issued pursuant to *9ORS 137.225. It also concedes that this court in State v. Beal, 19 Or App 343, 527 P2d 262 (1974), dismissed a similar appeal on the ground this court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. That appeal was sought under ORS 138.060(3) and (4).
In its brief here the state suggests first that an appeal from an expunction order "might be characterized as an unconventional motion in arrest of judgment” and thus appealable under ORS 138.060(2). Since a motion for arrest of judgment must be filed within five days and heard and determined within 20 days after entry of judgment (ORS 136.535(1) and (3)), it is obvious that an order of expunction cannot be so treated. Indeed the state concedes this case cannot proceed as a criminal appeal.
ORS 138.010 provides:
"Writs of error and of certiorari in criminal actions are abolished. The only mode of reviewing a judgment or order in a criminal action is that prescribed by ORS 138.010 to 138.300.”
ORS 137.225, as the state concedes, was expressly made a part of the Oregon Criminal Code by Oregon Laws 1971, ch 434, § 1.1 Thus it seems clear to me that the legislature intended that it be considered a part of the criminal law. Indeed it has no relation at all to civil matters. It is found in ORS ch 137 along with such subjects as imposition of judgment and sentence, presentence reports, postjudgment procedures, of which ORS 137.225 is itself a part, and such special statutory procedures as provide for the granting and revocation of probation, all of which are also a part in common parlance of criminal law. That the legislature clearly intended it to be a part of the Criminal Code cannot therefore be doubted.
It has long been the rule that the state in a criminal proceeding has no right of appeal unless conferred *10upon it expressly by statute. State v. Foster, 229 Or 293, 366 P2d 896 (1961); State v. Cannon/Clark/Green/Donnelly, 17 Or App 379, 521 P2d 1326, Sup Ct review denied (1974).
The Post-Conviction Relief Act found in ORS 138.510 to 138.680 is for example a special statutory procedure and a relatively recent innovation in the framework of the criminal law also. Yet that statute in ORS 138.6502 contains its own provision for appeal and thus is not governed either by ORS 138.060 or 19.010(4). If the reasoning of the majority is correct, one can also conclude that the provision for appeal in such special statutory procedures as the Post-Conviction Relief Act were surplusage.
If appeal rights granted in ORS 19.010(4) are to be expanded to allow an appeal from the granting or denial of an expunction order arising out of a criminal conviction, it is in my opinion solely the province of the legislature to do so. Accordingly, I conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction of this appeal under ORS 19.010(4). Thus I would not reach the second assignment of error.

 Oregon Laws 1971, ch 434, § 1:
"Section 2 of this Act is added to and made a part of ORS chapter 137.”

 ORS 138.650:
"Either the petitioner or the defendant may appeal to the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the entry of final judgment on a petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680. The manner of taking the appeal and the scope of review by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court shall be the same as that provided by law for appeals in criminal actions, except that the trial court may provide that the transcript contain only such evidence as may be material to the decision of the appeal.”