Court Opinion

ID: 9672320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:52:39.441761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:55.137021
License: Public Domain

SHARPE, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in reversal of the judgment but believe that the cause should be remanded for a completely new trial. On the present record we cannot modify and affirm nor can we here render judgment. In my view, a remand with instructions is not the proper disposition of this case.
It is apparent that the case was tried and decided on the wrong theory, and that the evidence was not completely developed. The Arkansas judgment which provided the sole basis for the judgment below was void as to its custody provisions. But appellee’s case was squarely based upon it. Since there was no valid order of custody, appellant’s custody of his children was legal. Illegal restraint was not shown. At the hearing on April 18, 1966 the trial judge made it clear that evidence concerning matters other than the Arkansas judgment would not be considered by him if he agreed with appellee’s theory. Much of the tendered evidence was not admitted, but appears in the record on bill of exception. It is difficult to determine in some instances whether evidence was admitted or was permitted only for bill of exception. The trial court’s refusal to entertain appellant’s eross-petition for custody was solely based *869upon the erroneous conclusion of law that the custody provisions of the Arkansas judgment were valid. It is apparent to me that the trial judge did not intend to preclude further hearing if that conclusion proved to be wrong.
The hearing in question was on the short notice of five days. Appellant was not a volunteer. He appeared and defended under compulsion of court orders. The record does not show that a regular citation was issued for a final hearing wherein permanent custody would be adjudicated. Appellee was not entitled to the relief sought and granted to her either when the court pronounced its decision nor when the judgment was entered. At the latter time, appellee’s cross-petition had been duly filed, citation had been served on appellee, and a jury properly demanded.
Appellant’s cross-petition properly invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court under Article 4639c, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. which provides for a situation in which a foreign divorce decree is silent as to custody of children. Here, the Arkansas judgment was legally silent as to that matter because its provisions concerning custody were void. Art. 4639c provides for issuance of a regular citation as in other cases upon the filing of suit thereunder. Appellee was duly served with a regular citation on appellant’s cross-petition, but appellant was not served with such a regular citation on ap-pellee’s original petition. Under these conditions I would hold that upon reversal of the judgment below, appellant would be entitled to a jury trial on his cross-petition under Articles 4639c enacted in 1959, and under 4639a, as amended in 1961. When the case reaches the trial court for further consideration, in my view, the issues of custody should not be restricted to facts developed at the hearing held on April 18, 1966. There is evidence in the present record which shows that conditions have substantially changed since the judgment was entered on April 22, 1966. Counsel for appellee has withdrawn from the case, but has tendered an amicus curiae brief and has also stated that appellee has disobeyed the order of the trial court in taking the children back to Arkansas. Appellee did not appear in the trial court on May 20, 1966, when her application for permanent injunction was set for hearing, and the same was denied. Under these conditions there are matters of fact to be ascertained and the matter to be decreed is uncertain under Rule 434, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for remand for new trial in such instances. The said provisions of that rule have been held to mean the same as “if it shall appear that the justice of the case demands another trial” under Rule 505, T.R.C.P. London Terrace v. McAlister, 142 Tex. 608, 180 S.W.2d 619 (1944). I would hold that we have a duty to remand for a completely new trial in this case, and, in any event, that we have discretion to do so; and that this is a proper case for that action.
I do not believe that Brown v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 135 Tex. 583, 145 S.W.2d 171 (1940), controls the disposition of the instant case. There the trial court incorrectly held that it did not have jurisdiction under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, believing that exclusive jurisdiction was in a federal admiralty court. Under stipulation of the parties the question of jurisdiction was reserved for decision and the case was completely tried to a jury with findings favorable to plaintiff. After verdict, the trial court dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the jurisdictional holding of the lower courts and remanded to the trial court for action on pending motions and for entry of judgment. In Brown, the case had been fully tried on the merits but judgment had not been rendered thereon because of the trial court’s incorrect view that it had no jurisdiction. In the instant case the trial court has rendered a final judgment on the merits concerning custody of the children. We are in agreement that such judgment was erroneous and must be reversed. At the time of its entry appel*870lant’s cross-petition was properly pending, as it is now. Under these circumstances, in my view, we cannot properly cut off appellant from a hearing on his cross-petition, and, in any event, we should not do so in the exercise of discretion.
Reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard constitute the essence of due process of law. In my view, if the parties are not accorded a completely new trial on remand of this case, serious due process questions will be raised under Article 1, Section 19, Constitution of Texas, Vernon’s Ann.St., and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See Goodman v. Goodman, 236 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.Civ.App., 1951, n. w. h., opinion per Pope, J.).
I concur in reversal of the judgment but respectfully dissent to a remand with instructions which would award anything less than a completely new trial.