Court Opinion

ID: 9399831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 16:11:36.123205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.066120
License: Public Domain

J-S42034-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MICHAEL A. MARTIN                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 398 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 15, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                       at No(s): CP-65-CR-0003982-2013

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED: JUNE 6, 2023

        I agree with the Majority that this case must be remanded for the PCRA

court to address claims of prior PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.            I write

separately to highlight an issue of PCRA court error and its ramifications on

the proceedings following remand.

        These post-conviction proceedings began in the proper and customary

fashion. Upon the pro se filing of Appellant’s first PCRA petition, the PCRA

court     correctly   appointed      James     Robinson,   Esquire,   as   counsel.

Attorney Robinson sought to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v.

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d

213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc), and the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. In opposition,

Appellant availed himself of the holding of Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261

A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), and raised multiple pro se claims of Attorney Robinson’s

ineffective assistance “at the first opportunity to do so[.]” Id. at 401. In

particular, Appellant raised the same issues that he advances on appeal. See

Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss, 7/9/18, at 9-14 (claiming that

Attorney Robinson was ineffective in failing to pursue or address claims

concerning Appellant’s mental health records, the available diminished

capacity defense, the lack of communication of a plea offer, and the waiver

on direct appeal of the challenge to autopsy photos). Appellant later added a

claim of ineffective assistance in the failure to call Hope Miller as a witness at

trial. See Supplemental PCRA Summary, 10/4/19, at 1-5. The PCRA court

ultimately granted Attorney Robinson’s withdrawal request upon determining

that none of the issues Appellant had raised in his petition was meritorious or

warranted a hearing.1

       Thereafter, procedural irregularities ensued.    Despite concluding that

the petition raised no issues to be resolved after a hearing, the PCRA court

____________________________________________

1  In what in hindsight was the first indication that these proceedings were
straying from the usual path, the PCRA court did not immediately allow
counsel to withdraw upon determining that Attorney Robinson properly
concluded that the petition was meritless and there was no point in further
proceedings. Instead, the PCRA court took Attorney Robinson’s request under
advisement, and informed Appellant that he could respond to the notice pro
se or with the assistance of his not-yet-dismissed counsel. See Notice of
Intent to Dismiss, 3/19/18, at 11-12.

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also ruled that Appellant was “entitled to present facts that might support his

position” as to the claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. See N.T. Hearing,

10/16/18, at 8. Therefore, instead of dismissing the petition as indicated in

its Rule 907 notice, the PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s claims of

ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel, but denied his request for the

appointment of new counsel, requiring Appellant to proceed pro se.

      The PCRA court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent Appellant at the

PCRA hearing on his challenges to the ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel was

legal error. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(D), the PCRA court must appoint

counsel to represent an indigent petitioner any time it determines an

evidentiary hearing is necessary, even where no right to counsel otherwise

attaches. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Laboy, 230 A.3d 1134, 1138–39

(Pa.Super. 2020). The only time a PCRA petitioner should appear pro se at

an evidentiary hearing is if he has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of

his right to counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82

(Pa. 1998) (“When a waiver of the right to counsel is sought at the post-

conviction and appellate stages, an on-the-record determination should be

made that the waiver is a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one.”).

Furthermore, “[i]f the appointment of counsel is deemed necessary for

purposes of conducting an evidentiary hearing, then the petitioner requires

the assistance of counsel throughout the litigation of the issue,” including the

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appeal process. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 965 A.2d 280, 284 (Pa.Super.

2009).

      Thus, once the PCRA court determined that Appellant raised claims that

necessitated a hearing, it was required to appoint counsel to represent

Appellant at that hearing and thereafter. The PCRA court’s failure to do so

constituted reversible error that belies present PCRA counsel’s contention that

this appeal is wholly without merit. See Commonwealth v. Stossel, 17 A.3d

1286, 1290 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“[W]here an indigent, first-time PCRA

petitioner was denied his right to counsel—or failed to properly waive that

right—this Court is required to raise this error sua sponte and remand for the

PCRA court to correct that mistake.”). In my view, this overlooked issue itself

provides a basis to justify the Majority’s decision to deny present PCRA

counsel’s withdrawal request.

      Had this appeal followed a dismissal of Appellant’s petition after he

proceeded to his hearing pro se, remanding for the appointment of counsel to

litigate the claims of initial PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness would be the proper

disposition.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Betts, 240 A.3d 616, 624-25

(Pa.Super. 2020). However, in another unusual twist, after the hearing but

before the PCRA court dismissed the petition, Appellant retained PCRA

counsel, David J. Shrager, Esquire, who was granted permission to essentially

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begin    the   PCRA     process     anew       with   an   amended   PCRA   petition.2

Attorney Shrager’s petition both added new claims and re-asserted one of the

claims Attorney Robinson opined was without merit, and the PCRA court held

a new hearing on the new petition. As such, Appellant has already, to some

extent, seen his right to the assistance of counsel in prosecuting his first PCRA

petition vindicated. Consequently, I see no need to remand to restart the

proceedings at square one. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bates, 272 A.3d 984,

989 (Pa.Super. 2022) (requiring second PCRA petition to be considered a

timely first petition where the petitioner was denied counsel in connection with

his actual timely first petition).

        Rather, I agree with the Majority that, on remand, Appellant should be

afforded the right to pursue, with the assistance of appointed counsel, the

Bradley claims that he raised before Attorney Shrager entered an appearance

and in effect re-initiated these PCRA proceedings.             I also agree with my

esteemed colleagues that Appellant must be afforded the opportunity to

litigate those claims free from any ill-effects or unfavorable evidence or rulings

occasioned by the PCRA court’s error in compelling Appellant to present those

claims pro se. See Majority Memorandum at 14-15 (indicating that Appellant

has the right upon remand to relitigate with the assistance of counsel claims

____________________________________________

2  For clarity’s sake, I note that Attorney Shrager was permitted to withdraw
after the petition was denied, and present PCRA counsel, Adam R. Gorzelsky,
Esquire, was appointed to represent Appellant in this appeal.

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addressed in the pro se hearing).    Under the unusual facts of this case,

consideration of Appellant’s Bradley claims on a clean slate, with the

assistance of counsel, whether that be present counsel or a fourth appointed

attorney, is the proper remedy for the PCRA court’s prior error in denying

Appellant counsel.

     Judges Olson and Colins join this Concurring Memorandum.

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