Court Opinion

ID: 9663969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:56:36.565182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:59.779644
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 24. (dissenting). I agree with the majority opinion on several issues:
1. Both the default notice and the lease in the *189instant case are ambiguous about curing a default, whether the documents are read independently or together.
2. When provisions in a default notice differ from those in a lease, the terms of the default notice control if the terms of the default notice are more favorable to the tenant. Accordingly, the default notice provision controls as to the calculation of the 30-day period in the instant case.
3. The general interpretive rule applicable to ambiguous documents is to construe them against the drafter. The Landlord drafted the lease and default notice in the instant case; therefore, those documents are construed against the Landlord.
¶ 25. I disagree with the majority opinion's ultimate conclusion because it is inconsistent with this applicable interpretive rule.
¶ 26. The default notice — the governing instrument here — provides that "unless [the specified] defaults are resolved on or before the expiration of thirty (30) days after service of this Notice, Landlord will exercise its remedies ... including... the right to terminate [the Tenant's] right to possession." The Landlord is exercising its right to terminate the Tenant's possession under the default notice.
¶ 27. The Landlord mailed the default notice (dated September 13, 2002) by certified mail on September 13, 2002. The Tenant received the notice on September 16, 2002.
¶ 28. What is the date of "service" of the notice? September 13 or September 16? The calculation of the date of "service" of the notice is not set forth in the *190default notice or the lease.1 Apparently relying on the Hotel Hay case2 (which is factually distinguishable), but without fully explaining its interpretation, the majority opinion interprets the date of "service" of the notice as the date the Tenant received the notice.
¶ 29. Applying the governing interpretive rule, I would interpret the default notice against the Landlord, the drafter, and would conclude that service of the notice starting the 30-day period means the date the Tenant received the notice. By using this date the Tenant will have more time to cure the default than if service of the notice were interpreted as the date of mailing.
¶ 30. I now turn to calculating the date by which the Tenant must "resolveü" the default under the default notice. Although it is clear that the Tenant may resolve the default by paying the rent, the notice is silent about calculating the date rent was paid for purposes of calculating the end of the 30-day period. Must the Tenant personally hand over the money to the Landlord within the 30-day period after receipt of the default notice? Or may the Tenant merely place the payment in the mail properly addressed to the Landlord within the 30-day period? Or, if the Tenant mails the payment, must the Landlord actually receive the mailing within the 30-day period?
*191¶ 31. The majority opinion concludes that because it defines service of the notice as the date the Tenant receives the notice, it must define the date of resolution of the default as the date the Landlord receives the rent payment. "Why so?" I ask. Because, responds the majority, the date of receipt of service is derived from the default notice, while the date of mailing of payment is derived from the lease.3 The majority will not allow the Tenant to "have it both ways,"4 to have a "convoluted combination of the notice and the lease,"5 that is, the Tenant cannot mix and match provisions from the notice and the lease.6
¶ 32. Assuming for the sake of argument that the majority opinion's principle against mixing and matching is sound, the principle has no application to the instant case. The Tenant's practice has been to mail the rent payment to the Landlord. The lease provides that the rent is due on the first of the month but that interest will not begin to accrue unless the Landlord receives the payment after the seventh of the month.7 These provisions simply do not specify whether mailing or receipt of payment was to occur by the first of the *192month. Therefore, the lease itself refutes the majority opinion's conclusion that the Tenant's definition of "payment" derives from the lease.
¶ 33. The majority opinion goes on to state that the Tenant's interpretation would require the court to "completely ignore language within the notice" and would allow the Tenant "to rely on some provisions in the notice while effectively deleting others."8 Yet the majority fails to cite any such provisions. Thus, the majority opinion implies that the default notice provides that the Landlord must receive the payment of rent by the end of the 30-day period.
¶ 34. The majority opinion adopts the arbitrary rule that "either the dates of receipt control, or the dates of mailing control."9 The majority opinion ultimately justifies this rule by claiming that any other interpretation of the time period would be "fundamentally unfair,"10 but it fails to identify any fundamental unfairness. Furthermore, the majority opinion does not clarify whether its rule of construction applies in all cases or only in the instant case.
¶ 35. Faced with two ambiguous documents, I would in the instant case interpret the 30-day period examining only the default notice, which sets forth the 30-day period. Given that the default notice is unclear as to both the date of service and the date of payment, I would adhere to the rule that an ambiguous document should be interpreted against the drafter. Accordingly, I *193would give the Tenant the advantage in calculating both the date of service and the date of payment. I would say that the service of the notice is the date of receipt by the Tenant and that the date of payment of the rent is the date the Tenant mails the payment.
¶ 36. Unlike in many eviction actions, in the instant case the parties were represented by counsel. A typical tenant facing eviction and a typical landlord seeking eviction often appear in a busy small claims court without representation. Because of the press of business, the court usually has a very limited time in which to make a decision and does not have the benefit of written or oral argument by counsel or the parties.
¶ 37. The majority opinion today passes up an opportunity to provide guidance to circuit courts in eviction cases. The majority opinion states the interpretive rule correctly but inexplicably never applies it either in defining the date of service on the Tenant or in defining the Tenant's date of payment to the Landlord. I would have had this court state that in an eviction action in which both the lease and the default notice were drafted by the landlord and are ambiguous, the tenant is entitled to rely on the interpretation of the document most favorable to the tenant.11
¶ 38. For the reasons set forth, I respectfully dissent.

 Majority op., ¶ 8. The lease does not use the word "service"; it addresses the date of the notice (apparently September 13 here) and the date of the mailing of the notice (apparently September 13 here) as beginning the 30-day cure period.

 Hotel Hay Corp. v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 255 Wis. 482, 486-87, 39 N.W.2d 363 (1949) (relying on the terms of the lease and Corpus Juris for the principle that service of a notice is not effected until receipt).

 Majority op., ¶ 21.

 Id.

 Id.

 The Tenant does argue that the language of the lease implies that rent is paid upon mailing to support its argument that the language of the notice implies the same. I do not rely on this argument.

 Paragraph 3 of the lease provides, "LESSEE agrees and covenants to pay LESSOR ... an annual fixed rent... payable in advance in equal monthly installments on the first day of each and every calendar month during the term of this Lease and any extension thereof. If any payment of rent is not received by the seventh (7th) day of the month in which it is due *192and LESSOR notifies LESSEE of the same, it is agreed that a one and one half percent (1.5%) penalty per month shall he due LESSOR."

 Majority op., ¶ 21.

 Id.

 Id.

 Another issue is not sufficiently addressed in the briefs or the majority opinion, see majority op., ¶ 22, namely whether the Tenant loses anyway because it did not timely cure the non-monetary defaults specified in the notice. I therefore do not address that issue.