Court Opinion

ID: 9687084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:15:43.401061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:24.158033
License: Public Domain

WALLACE D. BERNING, District Judge,
Sitting by Designation.
I dissent. The decision of the majority is disappointing and, more importantly, fundamentally erroneous. The Administrative Agencies Practice Act at 28-32-06(2) incorporates the evidentiary rules of privilege for “all stages of an administrative proceeding” and protects “trade secrets” from being disclosed under the circumstances enumerated in NDREv 507.
I strongly disagree that a tariff filing is not a “stage of an administrative proceeding” as contemplated by 28-32-06(2), NDCC. Although the phrase “administrative proceeding” is not defined in NDCC 28-32, a common, usual, and, indeed, ordinary meaning of the word “proceeding” is a “legal action” or “taking of legal action.” Webster’s New World Dictionary, Second College Edition (1980). Like definitions appear in all reputable dictionaries. In Black’s Law Dictionary the term “administrative proceeding” is not defined. However, the phrase “administrative procedure” is defined as: “Methods and processes before agencies as distinguished from judicial procedure which applies to courts.” The applicable definition of “proceeding” is defined as: “An act which is done by the authority or direction of the court, agency, or tribunal, express or implied; an act necessary to be done in order to obtain a given end ...” (Emphasis added).
Additionally, statutes must be construed as a whole to give meaning, if possible, to all clauses and phrases in the act. E.g., County of Stutsman v. State Historical Society, 371 N.W.2d 321 (N.D.1985). A perusal of NDCC 28-32 indicates that it makes several references to different kinds of “proceedings”: i.e., contested cases [28-32-01(4), 28-32-05(1) and (2), 28-32-12.1, 28-32-12.2]; rulemaking authority [28-32-02 and 28-32-19.1]; uncontested cases [28— 32-05(3) ]; informal disposition of “contested case, noncontested case, or other administrative proceeding” [28-32-05.1]; formal hearing [28-32-07]; investigatory hearings [28-32-08]; hearing officers for an administrative proceeding [28-32-08.1]; interven*249tion in an administrative proceeding [28— 32-08.2]; subpoena powers for hearing or other proceeding [28-32-09]; administration of oaths in an administrative proceeding [28-32-11]; agency compilation of record at “any contested ease proceeding, non-contested case proceeding, or other administrative proceeding” [28-32-12]; findings of fact, conclusions of law and order in “a proceeding before an administrative agency” [28-32-13]; appeal by “any party to any proceeding heard by an administrative agency” [28-32-15]; and agency to certify record on appeal of “contested case proceeding, noncontested case proceeding, or other administrative proceeding” [28 — 32— 17].
When read together, those statutory provisions indicate that the Legislature intended the term “administrative proceeding” to encompass many different procedural postures for matters before an administrative agency. In the context of NSP’s rate filings and the information in this case, the PSC is required to supervise the rates of all public utilities and may “originate, establish, modify, adjust, promulgate, and enforce tariffs, rates, joint rates, and charges of all public utilities.” NDCC 49-02-03. The PSC has the power to review NSP’s rates, and when NSP files a rate for inter-ruptible natural gas service, the rate is accepted unless the PSC rejects the filing within twenty days. Neither Section 28-32-06(2), nor any other provision in Chapter 28-32 excludes rate filings from “administrative proceedings.” The PSC actions with regard to NSP’s rate filing fits comfortably under the ordinary meaning of “all stages of an administrative proceeding.” Moreover, even if a rate filing, by itself, does not qualify as a “stage of an administrative proceeding,” NSP’s actions in filing an application for a protective order for its information would seemingly qualify as a “stage of an administrative proceeding.” If not earlier, at least by then, the PSC would have given NSP’s application a docket number and title. NDAC 69-02-01-04.
To add nails to the coffin the majority concludes that even if the rate filings are deemed “a stage of an administrative proceeding,” there is still no requirement for protection of trade secrets under NDREv 507. However, the only permissible and proper interpretation of that rule and the accompanying explanatory note is that the subject agency or tribunal must make a preliminary determination to ascertain if sustaining the privilege would “... tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.” The record shows no such determination by the PSC in this case. Rather, the PSC decision indicates that it categorically determined that “we cannot protect the information.” This Court has often reversed and remanded cases when a trial court or an administrative agency has failed to make necessary determinations for such omissions. Schempp-Cook v. Cook, 455 N.W.2d 216 (1990); Evans v. Backes, 437 N.W.2d 848 (1989); Hystad, v. Industrial Commission, 389 N.W.2d 590 (1986).
For the above reasons, I would reverse the PSC decision and remand for a determination under the guidelines of NDREv 507.