Court Opinion

ID: 9702178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:58:16.654906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:34.471651
License: Public Domain

McDonald, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the Township Rural Zoning Act does not grant appellee, Hayes Township, the power to regulate riparian rights by ordinance1 because such authority is not specifi*658cally granted under MCL 125.271; MSA 5.2963(1). I disagree.
1963 Const, art 7, § 34, provides:
The provisions of this constitution and law concerning counties, townships, cities and villages shall be liberally construed in their favor. Powers granted to counties and townships by this constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied and not prohibited by this constitution. [Emphasis added.]
Riparian rights should not be treated differently than any other rights arising out of the ownership or an estate in land. The Supreme Court in Thompson v Enz, 379 Mich 667, 677, 684; 154 NW2d 473 (1967), defines riparian land as a parcel of land which includes therein a part of or is bounded by a natural water course. Riparian proprietor is defined as a person who is in possession of riparian lands or who owns an estate therein. Lastly, riparian rights are defined as being certain interests in rights vested in the shore owner, which grow out of his special connection as an owner. These rights are common to all riparian owners on the same body of water and rest entirely upon the title in the fee to the shore land.
I believe it is clear that riparian rights arise out of the fee in land the same as other rights, such as rights to earth, stone, gravel, subterranean water, oil, gas and air space. I agree with the Maryland Court of Appeals which in Harbor Island Marina Inc v Calvert County, Maryland, Bd of County Comm’rs, 286 Md 303, 318-319; 407 A2d 738 (1979), recognized that riparian rights are analogous to other property rights. The court stated:
This Court has previously recognized that riparian rights are "subject ... to [the] general rules *659and regulations [properly] imposed by the public authorities [as] necessary to protect the rights of the public.”. . . There is, therefore, really no reason why this right should be treated differently from the other privileges pertaining to the ownership of real property, including restrictions which are associated with validly enacted zoning laws.
In interpreting the Township Rural Zoning Act the majority follows the general rule of statutory construction that the inclusion of a thing by specific mention excludes that which is not mentioned. Thus the majority concludes that the absence of reference to regulation of waters, waterway access, dockage or boat usage, renders the ordinance in question outside the authority granted townships under the trza.
Such a construction is too narrow and contrary to the constitution’s mandate to liberally construe laws in the township’s favor. It is also contrary to the legislative intent expressed in the preamble to the trza:
An act to provide for the establishment in townships of zoning districts within which the proper use of land and natural resources may be encouraged or regulated by ordinance, and within which districts provisions may also be adopted designating the location of, the size of, the uses that may be made of, the minimum open spaces, sanitary, safety and protective measures that shall be required for, and the maximum number of families that may be housed in dwellings, buildings and structures, including tents and trailer coaches, that may be erected or altered after the effective date of this act.
In applying the majority’s strict construction to other rights arising out of the ownership of land the townships could not regulate and control the *660mining of sand, gravel, minerals, or air space within their boundaries as these rights are not specifically mentioned in the trza. Countless court decisions in this state conclude otherwise. The strict construction applied in this case would allow riparian owners unfettered use of their rights, free from local government control, and force their aggrieved neighbor riparian owners to look to the courts for relief on an individual basis. Such a situation would not only damage one of the state’s most precious natural resources but would also overburden our judicial system.
A fair reading of the trza would grant the townships the right, among other rights, to regulate land and the rights arising therefrom that are not speciñcally excluded by law. If such was not the intent of the Legislature there would be no reason for the statute’s specific prohibition of a township’s right to regulate or control the exploration, drilling, completion or operation of oil and gas wells in the grant of authority under the act.
It is unfortunate that the Legislature did not provide a definitional section in the act. However, MCL 8.3; MSA 2.212 and MCL 8.3i; MSA 2.212(9) provide:
In the construction of the statutes of this state the rules stated in sections 3a to 3w shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.
The words "land”, "lands”, "real estate” and "real property” mean lands, tenements and real estate, and all rights thereto and interests therein. [Emphasis added.]
The trza also allows the townships to regulate the use of buildings, dwellings and structures. The Inland Lakes and Streams Act, MCL 281.952(o); *661MSA 11.475(2)(o), defines "structure” as including "a marina, wharf, dock, pier, dam, weir, stream deflector, breakwater, groin, jetty, sewer, pipeline, cable and bridge.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it would appear that the Legislature when inclined to define "land” and "structure” included "riparian rights” and "docks” in said definitions.
In Thompson, supra, p 686, the Court divides riparian rights into two classes, natural and artificial. Natural rights are those rights which are basic to the survival of humans, such as to quench one’s thirst and other household uses. These rights are described as having a preferred nonproratable position with respect to all other users rather than a correlative one. Artificial riparian rights are described as uses to increase one’s comfort and are not essential to one’s existence, such as recreational and commercial uses. Users for artificial purposes occupy a correlative status with other riparian owners in exercise of their riparian rights. Use for an artificial purpose must be (a) only for the benefit of the riparian land and (b) reasonable in light of the correlative rights of other proprietors. Justice Brennan in his dissent states that Michigan needs wise and forethinking legislation which will protect our lakes from overcrowding and the pollution which flows from immoderate uses, so that all of the people of the state, including riparian cottage owners, will be able to enjoy our great natural bounty for centuries to come. Thompson, supra, p 699. I believe local communities should be and are allowed to regulate artificial riparian rights. The ordinance in question is designed to regulate and control artificial riparian rights and if reasonable should be upheld.
Some would argue that such regulation lies exclusively with the state Legislature. I disagree. *662The use and appreciation of riparian rights vary greatly from county to county throughout the state. The needs of heavy industry are not always consistent with those of the fisherman and nature lover. Thus regulation in general is best vested in the,local governments. The trza grants that authority to the communities of Michigan.
There are exceptions to the grant of authority to townships. The state has specifically preempted local regulation and control in environmental areas which cross community lines. However, this writer is unaware of any legislation that specifically preempts local control and regulation over all riparian rights. It is difficult to imagine why the state would assume the heavy burden of determining the correlative rights among riparian owners on the thousands of lakes, streams and rivers in Michigan. The state’s view of those correlative rights which are local in nature, as opposed to the community view, would be dim and difficult to weigh.
Plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal that the Hayes Township zoning ordinance is preempted by the Inland Lakes and Streams Act, MCL 281.951 et seq.; MSA 11.475(1) et seq. This issue was not raised in the pleadings or by motion in the court below, nor was it addressed by the trial court in its opinion of January 17, 1986. Thus this Court is precluded from considering the issue as it was raised for the first time on appeal. Harris v Pennsylvania Erection & Construction, 143 Mich App 790; 372 NW2d 663 (1985).
In summary, riparian rights are not different from any other rights that arise out of the ownership or an estate in land. Consequently those rights are subject to the regulation and control of the township under the authority of the Township Rural Zoning Act.
*663In the case at bar I have decided that appellee Hayes Township had the authority to regulate and control riparian rights under the trza. The questions whether appellee’s ordinance is constitutional as drawn or was unconstitutionally applied are not before us and must be decided by the trial court after a full hearing. Should appellant challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance as drawn or applied and is successful, it has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to show that it’s proposed use is reasonable. Schwartz v City of Flint, 426 Mich 295; 395 NW2d 678 (1986). In determining whether a use is reasonable the court must consider what the use is for, its extent, duration, necessity, and its application, the nature and size of the lake, and the several uses to which it is put, the extent of the injury to the one proprietor and the benefit to the other, and all other facts which may bear upon the reasonableness of the use. Thompson, supra, pp 687-688.
I would affirm the trial court’s denial of summary disposition and remand for further hearing pursuant to this opinion.

SECTION 5.13 — SHORELAND PROTECTION STRIP
No building or structure, except docks or launch ramps, shall be erected closer than fifty (50) feet from the shoreline at normal high water level of any lake, stream or creek within the township. In addition, a strip of land thirty-five (35) feet wide from the normal high water mark bordering the body of water shall be maintained in trees and shrubs in their natural state. Trees and shrubs may be pruned, however, to afford a view of the water.
A. Limitation of Boat Dockage
Not more than one (1) mooring, slip or dock space for each one hundred (100) feet of lake frontage may be provided for mooring or dockage of boats in any zoning district in the Township.
B. Limitation of "Funnel Development”
Any development in any zoning district which shares a common lakefront or stream area may not permit more than one (1) single family home, cottage, condominium or apartment to the use of each one hundred (100) feet of lake or stream frontage in such common lakefront or stream area as measured along at the water’s edge of normal high water mark of the lake or stream. This restriction is intended to limit the number of users of the lake or stream frontage to preserve the quality of the waters, and to preserve the quality of recreational use of all waters within the Township. This restriction shall apply to any parcel regardless of whether access to the water shall be gained by easement, common fee ownership, single fee ownership or lease.
The Zoning Board of Appeals may, upon petition and after notice and hearing as provided in Article vn, vary or modify the strict application of this provision if it shall determine that undue hardship will otherwise result and the spirit and intent of this Ordinance will be preserved by such variance or modification. The Board of Appeals may, as a condition of such variance or modification, impose such conditions upon the use of the lands and lakefront or streamfront as it shall deem necessary to preserve the spirit and intent of this Ordinance.