Court Opinion

ID: 9459329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:17:45.842253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:07.605539
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion.
I am completely unable to see how the plaintiff, a police officer, can be said to have been denied equal protection of the law as against persons not in the classified service of the City of Cranston. The City (as I believe my brothers would concede) had a legitimate interest, even a compelling one, in keeping its law enforcement personnel (at least) out of local politics. Thus, given the nature of his office, he was not improperly treated. That other civil servants holding less sensitive offices may have a stronger case (the point largely relied upon by the court) seems wholly irrelevant to the issue here, which is simply whether or not this plaintiff was denied rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
This is not a case of irrational under-inclusiveness — as it would be, for example, had uniformed police been barred from candidacy but detectives allowed to run. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockland, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942). Being placed in a class drawn so as to exclude others similarly situated would be a denial of equal protection since one is subjected to burdens from which others are irrationally excused.
But it does not necessarily follow that being placed in a class which may also include persons not identically situated, gives one constitutional cause for complaint. The others’ misfortune may, as here, constitute no conceivable unfairness to the person legitimately classified.1 Plaintiff (and what might be considered his sub-class, law enforcement personnel) would seem to have no right to a windfall simply because we speculate that others within the classified service (librarians, if any, etc.) might have better reason to object to being barred from politics. I do not see how their hypothetical complaints— which are not before us — demonstrate *202that plaintiff was in any respect denied equal protection.2
In Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 295-296, 32 S.Ct. 286, 288, 56 L.Ed. 439 (1912), where an unregistered osteopath challenged state registration laws for doctors, Mr. Justice Holmes said, “On these facts we are of the opinion that the plaintiff in error fails to show that the statute inflicts any wrong upon him contrary to the 14th Amendment. . If he has not suffered, we are not called upon to speculate upon other cases, or to decide whether the followers of Christian Science or other people might in some event [ever] have cause to complain.” See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) is likewise a case of arbitrary underindu.siveness (contraception could not be denied to the single but allowed to the married). Baird’s being allowed to raise the rights of the unmarried raises a different issue — analogous to the present plaintiff’s right, which I do not question, to raise the rights of those who might vote for him.
Thus I would limit the inquiry to whether a civil servant like the plaintiff can constitutionally be barred by law from seeking political office of the type plaintiff has been seeking; and I would hold that he can be so barred, just as judges may appropriately be barred from politics.
Admittedly if the case is analyzed on First Amendment rather than equal protection grounds, there is precedent for an “overbreadth” approach. To the rule that a plaintiff may not assert the rights of others, Raines, above, 362 U.S. at 22, 80 S.Ct. 519 notes the exception in cases of “freedom of speech.” Thus a statute burdening freedom of speech may properly be attacked on grounds of overbreadth by one who might be regulated by a more narrowly drawn statute. Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1972). The strongest statements that political candidacy may be a First Amendment right are in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L. Ed.2d 24 (1968). But as recently as Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972), the Court has limited its analysis of candidacy restrictions to equal protection grounds. It is by no means yet clear that every restriction on candidacy is such a burden on “freedom of speech” as to warrant First Amendment (much less overbreadth) analysis. Free speech, in its direct and usual sense, is presumed to facilitate the working of free government. I question the majority’s implicit assumption that the political candidacy of one in the full-time employ of the taxpayers is entitled to the benefit of the same presumption. Simply because political candidacy has an ultimate effect upon free speech does not mean that it is free speech, or that it reflects values which are in all respects indistinguishable.
In the present case, we deal with several interests, all of importance to the working of free government: the right of a citizen to seek office (and of voters to elect him), and the right of the body politic to control, and to ensure the faithfulness, of those in its employ. I see no constitutional reason to exalt the one over the other, and hence I see no reason to favor overbreadth analysis in this situation. By so doing we judicially establish a priority as to which the Constitution is silent.
For the same reason that I do not favor overbreadth analysis, I question application of the “compelling interest” standard. Bullock v. Carter, above, indi*203cates that that standard is applicable where an invidious economic burden is placed upon an otherwise qualified candidate. It does not go so far as to apply the standard to non-invidious restrictions based upon reasonable civic notions of eliminating politics from the civil service.3
Here, the compelling standard is immaterial so long as we focus upon plaintiff’s case; even under that test, the City was plainly warranted in restricting the candidacy of police officers. Yet my brothers are assisted by one aspect of the standard when they come to deal with the putative “others” within the class — non-law enforcement officers. They argue that since the challenged legislation can stand only to the extent there is a “compelling interest”, the City must follow the least restrictive alternative when regulating all its civil servants. I would hold, instead, that normal equal protection analysis, based upon determining whether or not the charter provision has a rational basis, should be applied.
I would reverse the decision of the district court and dismiss the complaint.

. I do not say that overinclusion, particularly if coupled with a definition of a simple class which is patently objectionable, may never give rise to an equal protection attack by one otherwise subject to appropriate regulation. Hero, however, we are dealing with a very complex overall class made up of numerous sub-classes of employees each of which has its own unique position. I do not think that judicial analysis in one fell swoop, in a case which .shows no impropriety in plaintiff’s classification, is either necessary or desirable, since it places us in a position of deciding issues which have not been fully aired by interested parties. I believe that a court should resolve constitutional questions only to the extent necessary to deal with the rights of the real litigants before it. I think that this is a particularly unfortunate case in which to resolve the broad issues considered by the majority.

. I do not, moreover, yet concede the validity of such hypothetical complaints. There are many different job categories in the classified service of the City of Cranston; I think a much better record is necessary before we attempt to decide whether or not the broad candidacy restriction is warranted with respect to the many differing positions. The reason for dealing with plaintiff’s, not someone else’s, case is that we are not well informed as to the latter.

. I have not attempted to discuss the many reasons which can be advanced to support the statute in issue. I think it not entirely beside the point that the federal Hatch Act was sustained twenty-five years ago. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). Its validity (and that of certain similar state legislation) are again under attack and will soon be redetermined. See National Ass’n of Letter Car. v. United States C. S. Com’n, 346 F.Supp. 578 (D.D.C.1972); review granted, 409 U.S. 1058, 93 S.Ct. 560, 34 L.Ed.2d 510 (1972). The decision in the latter case seems likely to control what we do here. I see no small principle at stake: the right of the citizens and taxpayers to attempt to deal as best they can with the frustrating and difficult problem of how to regulate and control those who, ostensibly, “serve” them (and whose salaries they pay). Many issues are involved : the possible conflict of interest between one who, for example, teaches at a school and is also on the school board; the impact on fellow civil employees of one who engages in politics. If one can run, then one should also be able to promote another’s candidacy. There are states where the personnel of a state agency customarily qpend their time before elections promoting candidates. I seriously doubt the wisdom of judicial decisions removing from flics citizenry and their legislatures much of their power to deal practically, if imperfectly, with such matters.
The difficulty of judicial intervention in this field is suggested in Broadrick v. Oklahoma State Personnel Board, 338 F. Supp. 711 (W.D.Okl.1972), review granted, 409 U.S. 1058, 93 S.Ct. 550, 34 L.Ed. 2d 510 (1972), where one issue before the Supreme Court is an alleged denial of equal protection because the employees of some but not all state agencies were precluded from political activity. If an attempt is made to reduce the scope of the legislation here in issue, one can foresee further equal protection attacks based upon the argument of arbitrary imderinclusiveness.