Court Opinion

ID: 9809768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:26:10.695714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:12.078529
License: Public Domain

Avery, J.
(concurring): Where the plaintiff in a controversy involving the ownership to laud offers evidence tracing the defendant’s claim to the same source from which he shows the older and better right in himself, Chief Justice Pearson said, both in Nowlin v. Osborne, 2 Jones, 154, and Frey v. Ramsour, 66 N. C., at p. 472, that the defendant w-as precluded from denying plaintiff’s right, without first showing a title superior to that of the common source and connecting himself therewith, not because an estoppel arose out of such evidence, but by a *805rule of evidence established for convenience in the trial of actions of ejectment. On the other hand a tenant is estopped from denying the right of his landlord to the possession until he either voluntarily surrenders it or is evicted by superior title. So rigidly is this rule of good faith enforced, as an estoppel, that persons who were not sui juris, such as slaves and infants, when the relation began, are nevertheless as effectually precluded from denying its existence as though they have been parties to an agreement to demise. Rut it must be admitted that in some other opinions of this Court the rule relating to tracing title to a common source has been said to operate as an estoppel, and conceding that Chief Justice Pearson was in error in either aspect of the question, the fact remains that the evidence is offered to siiow title, not the right to possession. B. brings an action against C. in which he claims title to and possession of a tract of land, and offers an unbroken chain of conveyances from A. to both of them, but it appears that the older and better title derived from A. is in B.; this is prima facie evidence of title, but B. cannot recover still unless he goes further and prove that C. is in possession and wrongfully withholds the possession of the land from him.
The Constitution, Art. IY., Sec. 27, provide that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “ of civil actions founded on contract, wherein the sum shall not exceed $200, and wherein the title to real estate shall not be in 'Controversy.” The sum demanded may determine the jurisdiction of money demands, but if the testimony develops the fact that title to land is in dispute, it is declared to be the duty of the justice, though the plaintiff claims in the pleadings that the defendant is his tenant, to forthwith desist from attempting to try. Hahn v. Guilford, 87 N. C., 172. On the other hand, where the plaintiff proposes to *806show that the defendant is a tenant, unlawfully holding over, the justice may try the issue of tenancy, because that involves only the right to the possession, if nothing more appears upon the trial to be involved in the dispute. Hahn v. Guilford, supra; Foster v. Penry, 77 N. C., 160; Parker v. Allen, 84 N. C., 466. If A. die before the expiration of the term of his lessee, C, and the land descend to his heir-at-law, B, it is familiar learning that the estoppel growing out of the tenancy operates in favor of A.’s privy in blood, B., (1 Wood L. & T., Sec. 231,) and if C. hold over, B has the same summary remedy to evict him that his ancestor had. Yet, if evidence of the descent and the tenancy shows a common source of title, it is undeniable that it raises the question of title and ousts the jurisdiction of the justice. It is inaccurate, therefore, to say that a rule, whether of practice or estoppel, (which Chief Justice Peakson says was “ adopted by the courts for the purpose of aiding the administration of justice by dispensing with the necessity of requiring the plaintiff to prove the original grant and mesne conveyances by proof that the defendant claimed under the same person,”) is applicable merely because the reversion of a lessor descends to the heir during the term. It is well settled by all courts where the common-law is administered that the lessor who holds the fee, as well as his heir and grantee, are, as privies, estopped from denying his right to dispose of the possession, when he made the demise, and, on the other hand, that the mutual estoppel which precludes the original lessee from denying the title of the lessor and his privies in estate, operates upon his sub-lessee or assignee. 1 Wood Landlord and Tenant, Secs. 231, 232; Lunsford v. Alexander, 4 D. & B., 40; Farmer v. Pickens, 83 N. C., 549; Pate v. Turner, 94 N. C., 41.
When a plaintiff brought an action of ejectment under *807the old practice and proved that he or his grantor or ancestor demised to the defendant or his assignor, the defendant was estopped from denying his landlord’s title, whatever interest the latter claimed, and the plaintiff recovered possession upon the idea that his lessee and those in privity with him were precluded from denying the claim of ownership by virtue of which the demise was made. Clarke v. Diggs, 6 Ired., 159. And after the forms of actions were abolished and the action for possession could be brought so as to involve and become conclusive as to the ownership of land, it was held that “ the allegation of title in fee imported such title actual and probable by deed or such against defendant by estoppel.” Farmer v. Pickens, 83 N. C., at page 551. It was held also in the last-named case that there was no want of probata corresponding with the allegata, because though the estoppel of the tenancy only concluded the tenant in all cases as to the right of possession, in the absence of other proof it was also prima facie evidence of the title claimed as in the old action of ejectment. The issue of sole seizin having been raised in this case, the effect of establishing the fact that the defendant (.-ribbon entered as the tenant of the ancestor of the plaintiff was under the rulings in the cases last cited to estop him completely from claiming the ¡possession, and to show prima facie only that the plaintiff had title as well as the right to possession. But while the defendant’s mouth was closed against setting up a claim to the tenancy, until evicted, it was competent for him to have offered evidence tending to show title in himself in order to have escaped the bar of estoppel as to title in a future action, and for this purpose he might have offered a grant from the State bearing date subsequent to that of the lease under which he entered, even though compelled to yield the possession as a tenant to his landlord. The ruling in *808Conwell v. Mann, 100 N. C., 334, and in Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N. C., 112, settles nothing except that proof of the right to possession by estoppel carries with it jprima faoie evidence of title. But while it is decided in Heyer v. Beatty, 76 N. C., 28, and many other cases passed upon by the Court when Chief Justice PbaksoN presided and concurred, he still adhered in Frey v. Ramseur, supra, to the opinion that the rule in reference to showing a claim of title from a common source was not founded on the doctrine of estoppel. If the principle which precluded a party from denying a tenancy was an illustration of the doctrine of estoppel, while the other was not, then the two rules were not the same.
I concur in the conclusion of the Court, but not in the opinion, for the reasons given.