Court Opinion

ID: 9568397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:03:11.505142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:42.268472
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.' I concur in the judgments overruling the general and special demurrers to the petition. I dissent from the judgments of the majority for the reason that I do not think the court should have submitted to the jury the question whether the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Pennington were simultaneous.
The common-law rule regarding death in a common catastrophe is as follows: “Where two or more persons perish in the same disaster and there is no fact or circumstance to prove which survived, the law will no more presume that all died at the same instant than it will presume that one survived the other.” 16 Am. Jur. 34, Death, § 41; Green’s Georgia Law of Evidence, § 53, Survivorship; Roberts v. Hardin, 179 Ga. 114 (175 S. E. 362) and cases cited by dissenting Justice Hutcheson; 25 C. J. S. 1069, Death, § 11; Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, § 2532; Pollard v. Gorman, 52 Ga. App. 127 (182 S. E. 678).
The plaintiff in this case had the burden to prove that Mrs. Pennington survived her husband or that her death and that of her husband were simultaneous. There is no evidence in my judgment which would have authorized the jury to find that either of the parties might have survived the other. In my opinion there is no evidence, positive or circumstantial which would authorize the finding that the deaths were simultaneous. The jury could not have found that the positive evidence on both sides was impeached on the theory that any witness was impeached by the disproof of facts testified to for the reason that a witness cannot be impeached by this method unless contrary testimony is accepted by the jury. A jury cannot arbitrarily discard all conflicting testimony and create a kind of synthetic and artificial situation by throwing away all pertinent evidence and fix a status where there is no evidence as to which person survived, when there is no evidence, positive or circumstantial to *448establish simultaneous death. The only thing which would have justified the jury in ignoring the positive testimony is that there was circumstantial evidence, inconsistent with the positive testimony, which would have authorized a finding that the deaths were simultaneous. In my opinion there is no circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable and rational conclusion that the deaths were simultaneous could be drawn. “A jury in arriving at a conclusion upon disputed issues of fact may believe a part of the testimony of a witness or witnesses, and reject another part thereof, it being their duty to ascertain the truth of the case from the opinion they entertain of all of the evidence submitted for their consideration.” Sappington v. Bell, 115 Ga. 856 (42 S. E. 233); Lawhon v. Henshaw, 63 Ga. App. 683 (11 S. E. 2d 846). “It is the province of the jury to determine which of the witnesses has spoken the truth, even if in order to do so it is necessary to impute perjury to one or the other.” Champion v. State, 84 Ga. App. 163, 166 (65 S. E. 2d 280); Hunter v. State, 136 Ga. 103 (1) (70 S. E. 643). It is the duty of the jury to reconcile the conflicts if possible and not to impute perjury to anyone and if that cannot reconcile the conflicts it is then their duty to believe that witness or those witnesses who they think are most entitled to credit at their hands. Teague v. Keith, 214 Ga. 853, 856 (108 S. E. 2d 489). Sporrer v. Ady, 150 Md. 60 (132 A. 376).
The only evidence which even purports to establish simultaneous deaths is that which shows that both parties were dead within fifteen minutes from the time of the accident and the testimony of a witness who stood on the embankment above the wrecked vehicles two minutes after the wreck that he heard some unidentified person say that both of the parties were dead. Besides being the rankest kind of hearsay, the testimony next above referred to has no probative value at all. The testimony of this unidentified person would not be admissible unless he stated facts to support his conclusion. Especially would such a rule apply as to' the deaths of those here involved.
The bystander’s statement was not shown to be a spontaneous and involuntary reaction to the occurrence, assuming that the question of the fact of two persons dying at the same time is *449such an act or occurrence as is contemplated by Code § 38-305. It does not appear that the bystander made a spontaneous exclamation upon arriving at the scene. If such were the case the evidence would not be admissible because it would have been a layman’s conclusion or opinion. If the statement was made after a careful examination of the bodies it was not a spontaneous exclamation but a considered and deliberate, judgment. Furthermore the statement may have been based on what some other bystander stated who arrived at or about the same time or before or after the person whose statement was testified to. The value of a spontaneous exclamation is its trustworthiness and in this case there is no basis of fact for such trustworthiness as the cross-examination of the bystander would conclusively show that the declaration was not admissible as a spontaneous exclamation but either a deliberate statement or lay conclusion.
“An exclamation of a bystander which merely expresses an opinion or conclusion is inadmissible.” Harnage v. State, 7 Ga. App. 573 (67 S. E. 694); Hill v. State, 17 Ga. App. 294 (86 S. E. 657); Carr v. State, 96 Ga. 284 (22 S. E. 570); Roberts v. Hardin, 180 Ga. 757 (180 S. E. 634); Jones on Evidence, p. 633, § 345. See Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751, 776 (12 S. E. 18).
The ruling in Pollard v. Gorman, 52 Ga. App. 127, supra, is not controlling here because there was evidence in that case that both parties were immediately found dead. While I doubt the correctness of that ruling, it distinguishes this case. I think the result reached in the Pollard case was right because there was no evidence as to which person died first, which brings the common law into play.
In this case the jury could have reasonably made a mistrial, but all twelve jurors could not disregard all of the sworn testimony and create an artificial “lack of evidence” and decide that the, deaths were simultaneous.
The evidence on survival of the respective parties was substantially as follows: Rev. Luther E. Cook, who had been driving behind the Pennington pick-up truck for several miles, saw the collision and immediately stopped his car at the scene. On getting out, he saw two colored boys, who were helpers on *450the drink truck, crawling up the embankment and just as he started to remove them to1 the roadway another man, later identified by him as the witness O’Neal, came up and helped him carry the boys and lay them down. After accomplishing this the witness and O’Neal went down the embankment to examine the wrecked vehicles. The witness first went to the pick-up truck on the side where the woman, Mrs. Pennington, was lying. He saw no movement or -signs of life and further’ observed that “she had a cut on her thigh and that cut was not bleeding.” He did not take her pulse or make any further examination of the body. Having decided that she was dead, he went around to the side of the pick-up truck that the driver was on and heard the man, Mr. Pennington, groan in agony. He observed the man “breathing—-gasping for breath—breathing fast” with what he described as a continual gasping. He then went over to the drink truck to investigate the condition of its occupants and, after a short time started back toward the pick-up truck to see if the driver was still alive at which time the man in the cab of the pick-up “gave a violent jerk and blood came down and that was ^11 the movement that he saw from him.” He saw no further movements or signs of breathing and heard no- further groans.
L. D. O’Neal, a witness for the defendant, was employed on a construction job about a quarter of a mile from the scene of the accident. Hearing the collision, he jumped onto a dump truck and immediately proceeded to the scene, sending the truck driver back to call the officers and the ambulance. Rev. Cook, whom he did not know at the time, was already standing on the shoulder of the road. The witness helped to remove one colored boy onto the shoulder and Cook helped another up to- the road by himself. He and Cook proceeded down the embankment to the side of the pick-up truck on which the girl was- lying. The witness reached in and caught hold of the girl’s head and moved it. It “moved funny like, kind of a jerk like—didn’t move smooth,” from which he concluded that her neck was broken. He felt her wrist and tried for a minute to- find her pulse but was unsuccessful. He observed a deep wound on her- thigh which was not gushing blood but “there might have been a seepage from it.” As to whether there was any possible breathing on *451her part he looked to see but “couldn’t tell any.” He “didn’t hear any noise at all from the girl.” Having concluded that she was dead, he looked to see if he could do anything for the boy. He did not try to feel the boy’s pulse and did not touch him at all but heard him moan “off and on” while he was there “approximately three or four minutes.” He did not observe any signs of breathing on the part of the boy but formed an opinion “that he was living at the time ... by the noise that was being made.” He further testified that “one of his arms moved a little; now whether it was a reflex of the muscles or whether when I stepped on the running board up on the side of the truck it shook it and his arm slipped, I couldn’t say.” That was the only movement that he saw. The witness then went over to the drink truck for a short time and upon returning to the pick-up truck “I didn’t hear any noise ... I just figured he was dead.”
Hugh P. Davidson, also a witness for the defendant, lived on a side road near the scene of the accident. After hearing the crash on the main highway he dressed and rode over to the scene, arriving about 10 or 15 minutes after the wreck. He went down to the pick-up truck, reached in and felt the girl’s wrist but could find no pulse whatsoever. He saw no breathing or other signs of life and concluded that she was dead. He also felt the boy’s wrist and could feel no pulse nor did he see any movement on the boy’s part but he testified that the boy made one or two gasps “kind of like a shortness of breath,” but aside from that he saw no life whatever in him. “I figured he died right then after the gasp—I’m no doctor; I don’t know whether he died then or not, but I mean that’s what I thought; I thought he was dying then. There was no other sign of life in him after that gasp or two.”
For the plaintiff, James Avera, Deputy Sheriff of Bibb County, testified that he was on patrol on the morning of the accident and that he reached the scene approximately 11 minutes after he was first notified. He first went to the pick-up truck and attempted to feel the wrist of the young lady to ascertain whether there was any pulse. In the course of this examination he “either got a very weak pulse movement or a muscle reflex” *452but he “only felt it one time.” There was no sign of breathing or motion on her part. In his opinion, the girl was alive. He felt no reaction from the young man in the pick-up track and thought that he was dead.
Bennie Otha Addle-ton, a witness for the plaintiff, was in the driveway of his home near the scene when the crash occurred. He jumped in his car and arrived in less than two minutes after the wreck. He did not go down the embankment but asked someone down below him about the condition of the occupants of the pick-up truck. Some fellow down next to the truck stated that they were both dead, but he never got any closer to the bodies himself.
Dr. Leonard H. Campbell, Bibb County Medical Examiner, was called as a witness by the plaintiff. He- testified that he examined the bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Pennington at the Macon Hospital and determined that the cause of death in each case was massive injuries to the head and chest. There was some blood on each of the bodies but “there was no laceration that caused death.” That “it was my opinion that death probably was immediate, and that due to the nature of the injuries, the man, being situated in the position of the truck that he was supposed to have been behind the steering wheel, that he died first.” On examination of the bodies an hour after death occurred there is no- clinical means which can be used to determine with any degree of certainty which one died first. Doctors use tests other than feeling the pulse to ascertain whether or not a person is dead or alive, such as checking the eyelids, listening to the chest for a heartbeat and checking for vapor formed by breathing. “Frequently, after respiration and heartbeat have stopped, a person will gasp two or three times—it’s not actually a movement of air in or out—it’s just opening of the mouth and occasionally moving of the air in and out.” This frequently results in a noise which is termed a “death rattle.” This is not a groan or moan as it does not involve the vocal chords. This phenomenon could occur, without any stimulation, about 5 or 10 minutes after death and might be mistaken by an untrained observer for some form of breathing or respiration. As to whether in feeling for the pulse of a person, some muscle contraction *453might be mistaken for a pulse, “it’s hard to conceive of a muscle contraction over the wrist producing that phenomenon.” On cross-examination, Dr. Campbell testified that if the girl did have a deep gash in the thigh and if there was practically no bleeding from that cut, it is difficult to say whether this would suggest that the heart was no longer pumping blood because of “so many other factors like shock or the like.” But “if there was no bleeding at all, the wound would have to have been caused at the time of death or afterwards.” If a person who is apparently dead has a head that flops or is pushed back further than normal that would be suggestive of immediate death, but the witness made no test which would decide whether or not the young lady did die from a broken neck. It is possible that a person feeling another’s pulse may mistakenly feel a pulsebeat after death because “the person that’s trying to feel the pulse themselves are excited and their heart beats stronger or faster, more or less, and that in trying to obtain sensation of the pulsation, they feel their own pulse action—their heart’s beating faster and throwing more blood out into their fingers.”