Court Opinion

ID: 9952067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 17:02:50.657134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:47.334266
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/19/24 P. v. Sirypangno CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080934

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 KONESAVANH DONALD                                                    (Super. Ct. No. SCD191585)
 SIRYPANGNO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Order affirmed; matter remanded with directions.
         George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION

      In 2008, a jury convicted Konesavanh Donald Sirypangno1 of first
degree murder, attempted murder, and assault with a semiautomatic
firearm, with true findings he committed the crimes for the benefit of a
criminal street gang, that he was a principal, and that a principal personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death.
After he prevailed in two petitions for writ of habeas corpus, his conviction for
attempted murder was vacated and his conviction for first degree murder was
reduced to second degree murder.
      In 2019, Sirypangno filed a petition under former Penal Code section

1170.95, now section 1172.6,2 which altered liability for those convicted of
murder under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. He argued in relevant part that his second degree
murder conviction should be vacated because he could not now be convicted of
second degree murder under the newly amended murder laws.
      In 2022, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
Sirypangno’s petition, finding he remained liable for second degree murder
under a still valid theory, namely that he directly aided and abetted a murder
and did so with express malice. In this appeal, Sirypangno contends the
court’s determination is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree
and affirm the order.

1     Sirypangno’s first name is sometimes spelled as “Konrsavanh” in the
record.

2     Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                       2
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                      I.

                            Factual Background3
      In 2005, Sirypangno and David Phommachanh were documented
members of the Oriental Killer Boys (OKB) criminal street gang.
Sirypangno’s gang moniker was “Reckless”; Phommachanh’s moniker was
“Felon.” Other OKB members included Devin Giraud (“Striker”) and Steven

Joyce (“Turtle”).4
      On the evening of June 11, 2005, Phommachanh drove his cousin,

Danny Boualouang, and Judy Rattana5 to a friend’s residence and later to a
birthday party for a girl. Rattana was Phommachanh’s girlfriend and the
mother of their daughter. Sirypangno, and Joyce and his girlfriend, Melissa
Rasasack, drove to these locations in a separate vehicle. Giraud also was at
the birthday party. At that party, Rattana learned some of her girlfriends
were going to another party in Mira Mesa and decided to accompany them.

3      The following factual background is taken nearly verbatim from this
court’s opinion in People v. Sirypangno (Feb. 15, 2012, D055015) [nonpub.
opn.] (Sirypangno I).

4     Giraud and Joyce were charged as defendants in this case. Before trial,
Joyce entered a negotiated guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter and an
admission he committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
Giraud entered a negotiated guilty plea to being an accessory after the fact
and admitted he committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street
gang.

5     Rattana was also charged as a defendant in this case, but entered a
negotiated guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter and an admission she
committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang. As part of the
plea agreement, Rattana agreed to testify truthfully at Sirypangno’s trial.

                                      3
Rattana left the birthday party with her girlfriends. The plan was for
Phommachanh to first pick up their daughter at her grandparent’s house and
take her home, then pick up Rattana at the Mira Mesa party and bring
Rattana home.
      Before Phommachanh went to the Mira Mesa party, he received a call
on his cell phone. Boualouang heard Phommachanh tell someone to bring a
“strap,” which is street jargon for a gun, because there might be “some
problems” at the party.
      At about 11 p.m., Phommachanh, Boualouang and Giraud went to the
Mira Mesa party, which was in the backyard of a house. Sirypangno, Joyce
and Rasasack went in a separate vehicle.
      Access to the party was through a side gate to the backyard; admission
cost $2. At first, Phommachanh and the others were not allowed to enter
because there were too many people at the party. Phommachanh told the two
young men who were manning the gate there would be trouble if he and his
friends were not allowed inside. Rattana walked up to the young men at the
gate and told them to let Phommachanh and the others in to avoid problems.
Phommachanh, Boualouang, Giraud and Rasasack walked into the backyard
without paying. Sirypangno and Joyce jumped over the backyard fence.
      There were a number of altercations at the party that evening,
including at least one before Phommachanh, Sirypangno and the others
arrived. While Hasib Farhan, an invited guest, was standing near a young
woman, he accidentally blew cigarette smoke in her face and almost burned
her hair. An argument ensued, and Julie Nguyen, who was with the young
woman, threatened to have Farhan jumped by OKB members if he did not
apologize. Nguyen, who is known to her friends as “Mai,” is an affiliate of

                                       4
OKB. After Phommachanh and the others entered the backyard, they were
greeted by Mai and the young woman.
         At one point, some of the invited guests complained they were
uncomfortable because Phommachanh and his group were “mad-dogging” or

staring at people at the party.6 Farhan and some of his friends, all of whom
played football in high school, approached Phommachanh and Sirypangno
together and told them to calm down or they would have to leave.
Sirypangno pulled up his shirt, removed a black semiautomatic gun from his
waistband, racked a round and pointed the gun at Farhan. Although Farhan
did not hear Sirypangno say “OKB” or “this is OKB” and did not see
Phommachanh flash gang signs, others who were present testified they did.
Once the gun was displayed, Farhan’s friends pushed him back into the
house. Sirypangno and Phommachanh jumped over the back fence and onto
a sidewalk. In the process, they knocked out one of the wood planks from the
fence.
         One of the party hosts, Natasha Richardson, who had gone outside with
Farhan, approached Mai, tapped her on the shoulder and asked Mai to have
Sirypangno put the gun away. Mai told Richardson not to touch her, yelled
“OKB” and punched Richardson in the face.
         After Sirypangno and Phommachanh jumped the fence, Sirypangno
stayed on the sidewalk behind the backyard of the party house, but
Phommachanh did not. Sirypangno became angry when he overheard
portions of a conversation between Tylor Thompson (the victim in the murder
count) and Jeremy Waller, who were standing near the fence. Waller and

6   Neither the people hosting the party nor the invited guests were gang
members.

                                        5
Thompson were talking about a group of girls who had earlier been fighting
and wondered where “the bitches” had gone. From the other side of the fence,
Sirypangno said: “Who you guys calling a bitch?” According to Waller’s
testimony, he and Thompson replied they were not talking to Sirypangno,
they did not know him and they did not call him a bitch. Sirypangno threw a
piece of wood over the fence at Waller and Thompson. When Waller and
Thompson looked over the fence, Sirypangno pulled up his shirt and
displayed the gun in his waistband.
      K.A. (the victim in the attempted murder count) who also was a friend
of Thompson, gave a slightly different version of the over-the-fence exchange
between Thompson and Sirypangno. K.A. testified Sirypangno said: “What
the fuck did you say?” Thompson replied: “I don’t know what you’re talking
about, I don’t even know you, you’re tripping” and “I don’t know who the fuck
you are.” Sirypangno said: “You fucking said something, what the fuck did
you say, don't be a pussy.” Thompson responded: “Fuck you, suck my dick.”
K.A. testified Sirypangno then said he would catch Thompson outside and
threw a piece of wood at them. E.N., a long-time friend of Phommachanh,
provided another version of this exchange. E.N., who is not a gang member,
testified Thompson said something to the effect that “these guys are not real
gangsters[;] they’re just bitches.” Upon hearing this, Sirypangno responded
by saying: “I’m a real fucking gangster[;] you’ll see when you get out.”
      After the Sirypangno-Thompson exchange, K.A., Thompson, his
girlfriend, and Brandon Guaderrama, who went to the party with Thompson,
remained in the backyard for 15 to 20 minutes before leaving to allow
tempers to calm down.
      Meanwhile, Phommachanh, Rattana and Boualouang decided to leave
the party and go home. As the trio started walking to the car, Giraud called

                                       6
out Phommachanh’s name and asked him to return. Phommachanh and
Boualouang walked back to see what Giraud wanted while Rattana continued
walking to the car. A visibly upset Sirypangno then approached
Phommachanh and told him about his exchange with Thompson. According
to Boualouang, Phommachanh told Sirypangno not to worry about it and
tried to calm him down. While Sirypangno and Phommachanh were talking,
Rattana drove up to the house. As Phommachanh stepped into the front
passenger seat, Sirypangno handed him the gun. When Rattana asked
Phommachanh about the gun, he replied he was just holding it.
Phommachanh then put the gun inside the glove compartment. Rattana
drove away and headed home.
      Within five minutes, Phommachanh received a cell phone call to come
back and pick up Sirypangno. The call was made by E.N. at Sirypangno’s
request. When they returned, Phommachanh put a bandana over his face,
removed the gun from the glove compartment and stepped out of the car.
Phommachanh waved the gun and shouted “who wants it”; he then joined
Sirypangno, Joyce and Giraud, who were lined up in front of the house
waiting for Thompson to emerge from the backyard. When Thompson came
out, Sirypangno approached him, said “you the fool that fucking told me to
suck your dick,” and punched or tried to punch him in the face. Guaderrama
then tackled Sirypangno, and Joyce joined the fight as well. Anderson tried
to get Thompson to stop fighting and pull him away.
      Phommachanh pointed the gun at Thompson, who put his hands up
and said “no.” He pulled the trigger but when the gun did not fire,
Phommachanh racked back the slide of the gun to clear the unfired round.
He then fired five shots, striking both Thompson and K.A. Thompson and
K.A. struggled to get up and run away, but both collapsed.

                                      7
      Phommachanh, Sirypangno, Joyce and Boualouang got into the car and
Rattana drove away. The group discovered Joyce had been shot in the foot.
Phommachanh gave the gun to Sirypangno. Sirypangno then told Rattana to
drive to Giraud’s house because they needed to hide “the strap.” Rattana
dropped off Phommachanh and Sirypangno at Giraud’s house, where the gun

was hidden in a rice bin.7 Rattana then drove home with Joyce and
Boualouang. Phommachanh phoned Rattana and told her to get rid of
Boualouang’s clothes, which had blood on it from Joyce’s wound. When
Phommachanh returned home, he tried to clean the blood from his car. He
told Rattana and Boualouang to say he was at home that night if anyone
asked. Phommachanh also phoned E.N., who had witnessed the shooting,
and told him not to tell anyone what had happened.
      Thompson bled to death. He had two gunshot wounds to the left side of
his body that could have been caused by the same bullet. One wound was to
the left arm; the other wound was to his left flank. The bullet that entered
the left flank severed the iliac artery and vein.
      K.A. had gunshot wounds to her abdomen and right hip. She had
surgery to remove her ruptured appendix and half of her colon. She was in
the hospital for five days.
      Detective Daniel Hatfield of the San Diego Police Department’s gang
unit testified that at the time of the shooting, OKB was an Asian criminal
street gang with 106 documented members. Hatfield said OKB engaged in a

7      During a search of Giraud’s residence, police located the firearm, which
was a .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun. Ballistics tests showed the gun
fired the shell casings that were found at the crime scene. Testing of the
DNA collected from the gun was a mixture of three possible DNA
contributors: Phommachanh, Sirypangno and a third person.

                                        8
pattern of criminal gang activity and the gang’s primary activities were
serious assaults, burglaries, automobile thefts and murders.
      Detective Hatfield also discussed gangs in general and explained that
reputation and respect are of upmost importance to gangs because they
enable a gang to instill fear among rival gangs and people who live in the
community. People who live in the community often are reluctant to testify
against gang members because they fear retaliation from the gang. Gang
members gain respect by committing violent crimes and by backing up their
fellow gang members in fights. Hatfield also testified that disrespect to a
gang member is considered disrespect to the entire gang. Such disrespect can
take many forms, including a person looking at a gang member in the “wrong
way.” Gang fights easily escalate into violence. When gang members are
involved in crimes, including murder, the gang’s reputation for violence
increases and the community’s fear of and intimidation by the gang
increases.
                                        II.
                            Procedural Background
      Sirypangno and Phommachanh were charged in an amended
information with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), attempted murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2), and assault with a semi-automatic firearm
(§ 245, subd. (b); count 3). It was further alleged that Sirypangno was a
principal, that at least one principal personally used a firearm in the
commission of the murder and attempted murder, proximately causing great
bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)), and that both
Sirypangno and Phommachanh committed all three of the charged crimes for
the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).

                                        9
       In 2008, a jury found Sirypangno guilty as charged. In Sirypangno I,

this court affirmed his convictions.8 (Sirypangno I, supra, D055015.)
       In 2018, this court granted Sirypangno’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus in which he alleged his jury was improperly instructed on the natural
and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting first degree
premeditated murder. (In re Sirypangno (June 25, 2018, D073602) [nonpub.
opn.] (Sirypangno II); see People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158–159
(Chiu) [“We now hold that an aider and abettor may not be convicted of first
degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Rather, his or her liability for that crime must be based on direct
aiding and abetting principles.”]; In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1225
(Martinez) [holding the federal “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applies
when determining the prejudicial effect of a jury instruction marred by Chiu
error].) We vacated Sirypangno’s conviction for first degree murder and
directed the superior court to modify the judgment to second degree murder if
the People did not elect to retry Sirypangno for first degree murder. The
People chose not to retry Sirypangno. In 2019, the trial court reduced
Sirypangno’s murder conviction to second degree murder and resentenced
him.
       In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017‒2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which eliminated the natural and probable
consequences theory of liability as a basis for a murder conviction. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) In 2019, Sirypangno filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95, which has since been renumbered as section

8      Phommachanh was tried separately.

                                       10
1172.6 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10),9 challenging the validity of his second
degree murder conviction under the murder laws as amended by Senate Bill
1437. In 2020, after appointing counsel, the trial court denied the petition
without issuing an order to show cause after concluding Sirypangno had not
succeeded in making a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.
      In 2021, we granted Sirypangno’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and
vacated his attempted murder conviction after accepting the People’s
concession that the kill zone instruction provided to the jury with respect to
his attempted murder charge was legally erroneous under People v. Canizales
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 591. (In re Sirypangno (Oct. 14, 2021, D078705) [nonpub.
opn.] (Sirypangno III); see Canizales, at pp. 607–608 [holding the kill zone
theory applies where the defendant has a primary target and “ ‘reasons [that]
he cannot miss that intended target if he kills everyone in the area in which
the target is located,’ ” but does not apply where the defendant “acted with
only conscious disregard of the risk of serious injury or death for those
around a primary target”].) We remanded the matter to the trial court with
directions to allow the People to elect to retry Sirypangno on the attempted
murder charge. At the evidentiary hearing held in 2022 with respect to
Sirypangno’s resentencing petition, the People informed the trial court they
would not retry Sirypangno on the attempted murder charge, and the court
granted the People’s motion to dismiss that count.
      Also in 2021, and concurrently with our decision in Sirypangno III, we
reversed the trial court’s order denying Sirypangno’s petition for
resentencing. (People v. Sirypangno (Oct. 14, 2021, D078188) [nonpub.opn.]
(Sirypangno IV).) In Sirypangno IV, we accepted the People’s concession that

9     For clarity, we will simply refer to section 1172.6.

                                       11
the trial court erred and deviated from the statutorily mandated procedure
for adjudicating resentencing petitions by engaging in factfinding at the
prima facie stage. We remanded the matter to the trial court with directions
to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Sirypangno was eligible to be resentenced on his murder conviction.
      In July 2022, following remand and further briefing from the parties,
the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. The prosecution, relying on the
record of the jury trial, argued that Sirypangno was ineligible for
resentencing because the evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt
that Sirypangno was an aider and abettor of second degree murder who acted
with implied malice. Sirypangno, also relying on the trial record, argued the
evidence failed to demonstrate that he harbored implied malice.
      In September 2022, the trial court issued an order denying
Sirypangno’s resentencing petition under section 1172.6. The court found the
evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Sirypangno “did, with the
intent to kill, aid and abet the actual killer in the commission of second
degree murder.” This fifth appeal followed.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                       I.
Our Decision in Sirypangno II Did Not Preclude the Trial Court from Finding
       That Sirypangno Was a Direct Aider and Abettor of the Murder
      Before we discuss Sirypangno’s substantial evidence challenge, we
must first consider an argument he raises under the doctrine of the law of the
case. His argument is based on our decision in Sirypangno II, in which we
vacated his first degree murder conviction after finding the trial court
committed Chiu error by giving the jury an instruction that permitted it to
convict him of first degree murder on a natural and probable consequences

                                       12
theory. (See Sirypangno II, supra, D073602; Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at
pp. 158–159 [aider and abettor may not be convicted of first degree
premeditated murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine].)
      In Sirypangno II, after concluding the instruction given to Sirypangno’s
jury was not materially different from the instruction deemed erroneous in
Chiu, we considered whether the error was harmless. The relevant
harmlessness standard permitted us to affirm only if we concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a direct aiding and abetting
theory, which remained a legally valid theory of first degree murder after
Chiu. (See Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1218 [“Chiu error requires
reversal unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury actually relied on a legally valid theory in convicting the defendant
of first degree murder”].) The People, who bore the burden of establishing
harmlessness under this standard, did not “point to anything in the verdict
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury made the findings necessary
to convict Sirypangno as a direct aider and abettor.” Instead, they asserted
the evidence in the record demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury necessarily relied only on a direct aiding and abetting theory when it
convicted Sirypangno of first degree murder.
      In analyzing the merits of the People’s harmlessness argument, we
made several statements conveying our view of the facts and of the relative
strength of the evidence supporting the valid aiding and abetting theory
versus the invalid natural and probable consequences theory. We stated, for
example, that Sirypangno’s attack of Thompson “raises a reasonable doubt in
this court regarding what Sirypangno believed Phommachanh would do and
when he would do it.” As another example, we commented that while the

                                      13
evidence “shows a tacit agreement that Phommachanh would return to the
party,” it was “not entirely clear from the record . . . whether Sirypangno and
Phommachanh agreed on what the backup would entail.” We further stated
that it was “not clear from the evidence that Sirypangno assailed Thompson
knowing and intending that Phommachanh should shoot him,” that we found
it “reasonably plausible that Sirypangno thought Phommachanh would point
the gun at Thompson to scare him, like Sirypangno had done to another
individual earlier at the party,” and that the fact that Phommachanh shot
Thompson “does not prove that Sirypangno shared the same intent as
Phommachanh.”
      Sirypangno contends the trial court was bound by these comments from
Sirypangno II under the doctrine of the law of the case, and was precluded
from finding he acted as a direct aider and abettor who harbored an intent to
kill. He characterizes our statements in Sirypangno II as “a judicial
determination that the evidence presented at [his] trial did not prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that [Sirypangno], while harboring an intent to kill,
directly aided and abetted Phommachanh in the commission of murder.”
      We disagree. The law of the case doctrine provides that when an
appellate court “states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to
the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be
adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and
upon subsequent appeal . . . , and this although in its subsequent
consideration this court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision
is erroneous in that particular.” (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892–
893.) “The principle applies to criminal as well as civil matters.” (People v.
Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 841 (Shuey).) However, the “application of the
rule is . . . subject to the qualifications that ‘the point of law involved must

                                        14
have been necessary to the prior decision, that the matter must have been
actually presented and determined by the court, and that application of the
doctrine will not result in an unjust decision.’ ” (Id. at p. 842; see
Quackenbush v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 867, 874
(Quackenbush) [“dicta . . . is not binding on the parties, the trial court or
[intermediate appellate] court as law of the case”].)
      There are three reasons why Sirypangno’s reliance on the doctrine of
the law of the case is unavailing. First, in Sirypangno II we were presented
with a claim of instructional error, not an insufficiency of the evidence
challenge. We determined only that the record failed to demonstrate beyond
a reasonable doubt that the jury exclusively relied on a direct aiding and
abetting theory, and not on a natural and probable consequences theory, in
convicting Sirypangno of first degree murder. We neither considered nor
decided whether there was insufficient evidence in the record upon which to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Sirypangno was guilty under a
direct aiding and abetting theory. Thus, the issue raised in Sirypangno’s
resentencing petition was not “ ‘actually presented and determined by [this]
court’ ” in Sirypangno II. (Shuey, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 842.)
      Second, contrary to Sirypangno’s argument, in Sirypangno II we
expressly refrained from finding the trial evidence insufficient to support the
conclusion that he acted as a direct aider and abettor. We stated: “Although
it may be that this evidence would be sufficient to support a conviction under
a direct aiding and abetting theory, the evidence also supports the theory
that the murder was a natural and probable consequence of gang motivated
battery.”
      Third, the relevant question in Sirypangno II was whether we could
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s verdict finding him

                                        15
guilty of first degree murder was based only on the still-valid direct aiding
and abetting theory such that the error in instructing the jury with the
invalid natural and probable consequences theory was harmless. The
assertions in which we offered our view of the facts and of the persuasiveness
of the People’s aiding and abetting theory went further than was necessary to
answer this question. Our factual commentary was therefore “not necessary
or essential to our decision[ and] was dicta.” (Quackenbush, supra, 79
Cal.App.4th at p. 874.)
       Accordingly, we reject Sirypangno’s contention that the foregoing
comments from Sirypangno II were binding on the trial court as law of the
case so as to preclude it from finding him guilty of second degree murder on a
direct aiding and abetting theory.
                                        II.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding That Sirypangno Is
     Guilty of Second Degree Murder Because He Directly Aided and Abetted
              Thompson’s Murder and Acted with Express Malice
A.     Legal Principles
       1.    Senate Bill 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775
       Senate Bill 1437 “was enacted to ‘ “amend the felony murder rule and
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to
ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” ’ ”
(People v. Didyavong (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 85, 93 (Didyavong).) “Senate Bill
1437 did this by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189,
which defines the degrees of murder. . . . Amended section 188 states:
‘Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of

                                        16
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Amended section 189 states: ‘A participant in
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision
(a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is
proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not
the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] [or] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.’ (§ 189,
subd.(e).)” (Didyavong, at p. 94, first citation omitted.)
      “Senate Bill 1437 also established resentencing relief for eligible
defendants. . . . Under former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6, subd. (a)), ‘[a]
person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory may file a petition’ with the sentencing court to have his
or her murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts ‘when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was
convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted
a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first
degree or second degree murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted
of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019’ under Senate Bill 1437. After receiving a
petition containing the required information, ‘the court must evaluate the

                                        17
petition “to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.” ’ . . . If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing.” (Didyavong, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 94, citations omitted.)
      “Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) amended section 1172.6 to clarify certain aspects of
the law, including that (1) the burden of proof at a resentencing hearing
under this section is ‘on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is guilty of murder’ under California law as amended by
Senate Bill 1437 and (2) ‘[a] finding that there is substantial evidence to
support a conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.’ . . .
Senate Bill 775 [also] clarified that the trial court’s role in a section 1172.6
proceeding is to act as an independent fact finder and determine, in the first
instance, whether the petitioner committed murder under the law as
amended by Senate Bill 1437.” (Didyavong, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 94–
95, citations omitted.)
      2.    Aiding and Abetting Second Degree Murder
      Although Senate Bill 1437 eliminated natural and probable
consequences liability for second degree murder, a defendant who did not
personally kill may still be convicted of second degree murder under a direct
aiding and abetting theory. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990;
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848–849 (Gentile).) “ ‘One who
directly aids and abets another who commits murder is thus liable for murder
under the new law just as he or she was liable under the old law.’ ” (People v.
Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 953 (Vargas).)

                                        18
      “Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness,
premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first
degree murder.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151.) “Malice can
be express or implied. It is express when there is a manifest intent to kill
(§ 188, subd. (a)(1)); it is implied if someone kills with ‘no considerable
provocation . . . or when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(2)).” (Gentile, supra, 10
Cal.5th at p. 844; see also People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 485, 500 [explaining that a killing is committed with implied
malice when it is proximately caused by “ ‘ “an act, the natural consequences
of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a
person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who
acts with conscious disregard for life” ’ ”].)
      Liability for a crime extends to the direct perpetrators of a crime as
well as those who aid and abet the crime’s commission. (See § 31; Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843 [“A person who aids and abets the commission of a
crime is culpable as a principal in that crime.”].) “Guilt as an aider and
abettor is guilt ‘based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and
the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental state.’ ” (People v. Powell
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 710.) “[P]roof of aider and abettor liability
requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—
a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens
rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to
assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus
reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of
the crime.” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225 (Perez).)

                                         19
      To act with the mental state necessary to be found guilty of second
degree murder under a theory of express malice, the aider and abettor “must
have ‘knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator’ and ‘the intent or
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating’ the commission of the
offense. . . . Alternatively, in the context of implied malice murder, the aider
and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to commit a life-endangering
act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, know the act
is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life.”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 468 (Curiel), citation omitted.)
      3.     Substantial Evidence Standard of Review
      “We review the trial court’s factfinding on the question of whether a
defendant committed a murder under a still-valid theory for substantial
evidence.” (Didyavong, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 97.) “Under this familiar
standard, ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” . . . We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” . . . In so
doing, [we] “presume[ ] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ ” (Vargas, supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 951, citations omitted.) “ ‘The same standard applies when
the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.’ . . . ‘An appellate
court must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have drawn
from the circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Didyvavong, at p. 97, citation omitted.)
When we review a decision under this standard, “[w]e will not reverse unless

                                       20
there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial evidence exists to
support the trial court’s decision.” (Ibid.)

B.    Analysis10
      We first consider an issue the parties raise regarding the scope of our
substantial evidence review. Both sides agree that although the prosecution
opposed Sirypangno’s resentencing petition on the ground he acted with
implied malice in aiding and abetting Phommachanh’s murder of Thompson,
the trial court denied the petition on the finding Sirypangno acted with
express malice in aiding and abetting Phommachanh’s murder of Thompson.
We agree with the parties that the trial court found Sirypangno acted with
express malice in aiding and abetting the murder. In its order denying
Sirypangno’s petition, the court stated it found “beyond a reasonable doubt,
that he did, with the intent to kill, aid and abet the actual killer in the
commission of second degree murder.” (Italics added.) The italicized phrase
was the equivalent of a finding of express malice. (See People v. Smith (2005)

10    In December 2022, Sirypangno filed a motion with this court seeking
judicial notice of the transcripts and records from his direct appeal of the
judgment of conviction in case number D055015. We grant this request. In
the motion, Sirypangno also seeks judicial notice of “[t]he records” in case
numbers D073602, D078188, and D078705, without specifying or citing any
particular records to be noticed. We grant this request in part as to our prior
decisions in case numbers D073602, D078188, and D078705. To the extent
Sirpangno seeks judicial notice of any other records from the latter three
cases, this request is denied for failure to identify the records to be noticed
and establish their relevance to this appeal. (See People v. Franklin (2016)
63 Cal.4th 261, 280 [motion for judicial notice of document denied for failure
to establish document’s relevance]; accord, People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1171, fn. 3 (Young).) In sum, we grant in part and deny in part
Sirypangno’s motion.

                                        21
37 Cal.4th 733, 739 (Smith) [“Intent to unlawfully kill and express malice
are, in essence, ‘one and the same.’ ”].)
      However, the parties dispute whether we must limit our review to
determining whether there is sufficient evidentiary support for the conclusion
Sirypangno acted with express malice, or whether we can also affirm if we
find the theory he acted with implied malice to be factually supported.
Sirypangno, relying on Eaton v. Tulsa (1974) 415 U.S. 697, contends our
review must be limited to the express malice theory. Eaton was a criminal
contempt case in which the state appellate court was held to have violated
the defendant’s due process rights by affirming his conviction after
determining substantial evidence supported convicting him of contempt on an
alternate ground not alleged in the information. Sirypangno argues we
would run afoul of Eaton’s holding if we were to affirm the trial court’s ruling
on a factual theory it did not expressly adopt, even if (as was the case here)

that theory was advanced by the prosecution as a basis for convicting him.11
      The People contend we may affirm if we find sufficient evidentiary
support for either the express malice or implied malice theories of guilt for
aiding and abetting second degree murder. They rely in part on People v.
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, in which the prosecution advanced two
theories of first degree murder—murder by means of torture and felony-
murder burglary—and the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree
murder without “specify[ing] the theory on which it rested its verdict.” (Id. at

11     Sirypangno has not argued the trial court erred by denying his petition
on the basis of a theory not advanced by the prosecution. Any such claim has
therefore been forfeited. (See e.g., People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550,
fn. 9 [claim forfeited where not raised in opening brief]; accord People v.
Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1290; People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th
236, 254, fn. 5; People v. Taylor (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1114.)

                                        22
p. 715.) The People contend we must do as the Edwards court did and affirm
on any theory of guilt supported by the evidence, even if (as was the case
here) the factfinder’s decision expressly rested on only one of those theories.
      Ultimately, we do not need to resolve the parties’ dispute about our
ability to affirm on the basis that Sirypangno acted with implied malice. The
parties agree, and so do we, that we can affirm the trial court’s decision to the
extent we conclude substantial evidence in the record supports its finding
that Sirypangno acted with express malice in aiding and abetting
Phommachanh’s murder of Thompson. (See e.g., Didyavong, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 97 [“We review the trial court’s factfinding on the question
of whether a defendant committed a murder under a still-valid theory for
substantial evidence.”].) Because our review of the record persuades us the
express malice theory of guilt is factually supported, we can affirm on this
basis without addressing whether it would also be proper to affirm under an
implied malice theory.
      For the following reasons, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that Sirypangno aided and abetted the
murder of Thompson and did so with the intent to kill. Again, “proof of aider
and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct
perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the
aider and abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful
intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the
aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact
assists the achievement of the crime.” (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225.)
      Here, Sirypangno concedes the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that
Phommachanh, the direct perpetrator, committed a crime: he murdered
Thompson. Sirypangno also raises no dispute whether the evidence

                                       23
establishes he engaged in conduct—e.g., supplying Phommachanh with the
murder weapon; starting the brawl that ended in Thompson’s death—that in
fact assisted Phommachanh in the achievement of that crime. We agree with
his concessions. Our review of the record persuades us both of these
requirements of direct aiding and abetting liability have ample evidentiary
support.
      Instead, Sirypangno’s challenge is limited to disputing whether
substantial evidence supports the remaining requirement for aiding and
abetting a murder with express malice—that is, whether Sirypangno knew
Phommachanh intended to kill Thompson and whether Sirypangno shared
that intent. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468 [aider and abettor of
second degree express malice murder “must have ‘knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator’ and ‘the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating’ the commission of the offense”].) Viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude there is
sufficient substantial evidence in the record to support such a finding beyond
a reasonable doubt.
      Although direct evidence of Sirypangno’s intent was lacking,
circumstantial evidence supported the inference that in aiding and abetting
Phommachanh’s commission of the murder, Sirypangno harbored express
malice. (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055 [because “ ‘[e]vidence
of a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial . . .
circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a
conviction’ ”]; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741 [“it is well settled that intent
to kill or express malice, the mental state required to convict a defendant of
attempted murder, may . . . be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the
circumstances of the crime”].) Witnesses who observed Sirypangno and

                                        24
Phommachanh’s conduct before, during, and after the shooting testified to the
following facts, which collectively support this conclusion.
      Sirypangno and Phommachanh were good friends as well as fellow
OKB members. Earlier in the evening, before the Mira Mesa party at which
Thompson was shot and killed, Phommachanh was overheard telling

someone—inferably, Sirypangno12—to bring a “strap” (street lingo for a
“gun”) because there might be some “funk” (meaning “problems”) at that
party.
      Once Sirypangno and Phommachanh arrived at the party, their
demeanor was aggressive. Phommachanh pushed his way past the entrance
gate, and both men were “mad-dogging” the invited party guests. Tensions
appeared to escalate after Farhan and his friends approached Phommachanh
and Sirypangno in the backyard to tell them to calm down or leave the party.
One witness testified there were 10 people in Farhan’s group, and although
they did not intend to do anything to Phommachanh or Sirypangno, they
looked “threatening.” There was “cussing” back and forth between Farhan’s
group and the OKB members. It was at this point that Sirypangno jumped
on a retaining wall, raised his shirt, pulled out a .45-caliber semiautomatic
handgun, and chambered a bullet while pointing the gun at Farhan from a
distance of only one or two feet as Mai, who was standing nearby, cursed and
said “OKB.” One witness also heard Sirypangno say “OKB” in a raised voice.
      Testimony of multiple witnesses established that Sirypangno then
jumped over the backyard fence, gun in hand, breaking one of the fence’s
wooden planks in the process. He then got into another conflict with another

12    Sirypangno was not present at the Mira Mesa party when
Phommachanh made this call; he thereafter joined Phommachanh at the
party and brought a gun, later used in the shooting.

                                       25
guest, this time Thompson, over his perception that Thompson had slighted
him by calling him a “bitch” and telling him “fuck you, suck my dick.”
Sirypangno responded by throwing a two-and-one-half-foot-long wooden
plank—missing Thompson’s head only because Thompson moved—displaying
his gun, and telling Thompson, “I’m a real fucking gangster, you’ll see when
you get out” or “I’ll show you when you get outside.”
      K.A., who witnessed this altercation from inside the backyard, testified
Thompson took Sirypangno’s threat seriously. According to Detective
Hatfield, calling a gang member a “bitch” or saying “you can suck my dick”
would be taken by a gang member as a sign of disrespect, and that acts of
disrespect toward a gang member generally result in violence, including a
shooting.
      After Thompson’s over-the-fence exchange with Sirypangno, E.N. saw
Sirypangno approach Phommachanh. Sirypangno appeared angry and was
“very firm with his actions.” Sirypangno talked to Phommachanh. Rattana
then pulled up in Phommachanh’s car, headlights facing west (the same
direction in which she pulled up later when she returned with
Phommachanh). Phommachanh got in the front passenger seat, and
Sirypangno “[d]iscreetly” passed him the gun. Rattana testified there was a
conversation between Phommachanh and Sirypangno at this point, but she
could not recall what was said. Rattana testified Phommachanh did not seem
surprised Sirypangno had handed him the gun.
      Minutes after Rattana and Phommachanh drove off, Phommachanh
received a phone call asking him to return to the party to pick up Sirypangno.
E.N., who placed the call for Sirypangno, testified that Phommachanh said he
and Rattana were already on their way back. Rattana testified that as they
headed back to the house, Phommachanh, moving “quickly,” retrieved the

                                      26
gun and donned the bandana. Phommachanh’s actions led Rattana to think
he was probably going to shoot the gun “at someone.” When they returned to
the party, Rattana stopped the car at the corner of the house with the
headlights facing west and remained in the driver’s seat of the car with the
engine running.
      Phommachanh then exited the car, gun in hand, and began “waving”
the gun while yelling “who wants it” and “all right, we’re going to do this
shit.” Sirypangno did not try to get in the car, despite having had E.N. call
Phommachanh for a ride. Instead, Sirypangno, Phommachanh, and the other
OKB gang members who had attended the party lined up in front of the car.
They stood in that location “looking towards the exit of the party where
everyone was exiting.” E.N. testified there was a conversation between
Sirypangno and Phommachanh although he did not know what was said.
      When Thompson emerged from the party, Sirypangno “pointed him
out,” said “you the fool that fucking told me to suck your dick,” and struck
him. Accounts of the ensuing fight differed. According to E.N., after
Sirypangno struck Thompson, two of the other OKB members “jump[ed]”
Thompson and it became a three-on-one fight. As Sirypangno and the two
other gang members continued fighting Thompson, Phommachanh stepped
forward from the area where he had been lined up in front of his car, pulled
out the gun, pointed it at Thompson, and attempted to shoot. When the gun
did not fire, Phommachanh “fiddl[ed]” with the gun and pulled back the slide
to clear the unfired round. He then fired five shots in Thompson’s direction,
hitting Thompson, K.A., and Joyce and killing Thompson. Phommachanh did
not fire a warning shot; the “very first place” he pointed the gun was “right at
[Thompson].” Thompson fell to the ground and “was motionless.”

                                       27
       The OKB members fled to the awaiting car with Rattana in the driver
seat and the engine still on. Sirypangno did not appear to be injured. Once
all the gang members were in the car, Rattana “peel[ed] out”—she pressed
the accelerator so that the tires lost traction and spun—and headed
westbound on an adjacent street. Everyone in the car was nervous;
Sirypangno said, “shit, where the hell we going to put the strap at.”
Phommachanh gave the gun to Sirypangno, who told Rattana to drive to
“Striker’s” (i.e., Giraud’s) house. When Rattana stopped there, Sirypangno
exited with Phommachanh; the gun was later recovered from a rice bin at
Giraud’s house.
       A reasonable fact finder could infer from the totality of these facts that
Sirypangno acted with express malice in aiding and abetting the murder of
Thompson. Even before Sirypangno became embroiled in his argument with
Thompson, he revealed a willingness to use a gun in confrontations with
partygoers when he racked the gun to chamber a bullet and aimed it directly
at Farhan at close range. But it was the verbal exchange with Thompson
that appeared to particularly provoke Sirypangno’s rage. According to
Detective Hatfield, the language Thompson used would have been perceived
by a gang member as disrespectful, and the perceived disrespect was
sufficient to motivate a violent response—including a shooting—from gang
members. (See People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599 (Glukhoy)
[motive is a circumstance to be considered in determining aiding and abetting
liability]; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741 [evidence of motive is probative
of intent to kill].)
       Sirypangno’s actions before the shooting support the conclusion he told
Phommachanh what Thompson had said and then, with Phommachanh,
formulated a plan to retaliate against Thompson by committing an act of

                                        28
violence against him. The evidence is overwhelming that their plan involved
shooting Thompson. Sirypangno approached Phommachanh before he left
the party with Rattana, and the two of them were continuing to talk when
Sirypangno “[d]iscreetly” handed Phommachanh the gun. The subsequent
phone call to Phommachanh telling him to return to give Sirypangno a ride
home was inferably pretextual. Phommachanh started putting on the
bandana before he got back to the party; when he arrived, Sirypangno made
no effort to get in the car, and instead Phommachanh immediately got out,
waved the gun, and used words that conveyed an intent to shoot (“who wants
it” and “all right, we’re going to do this shit”). Although Sirypangno asked to
use E.N.’s cell phone to call Phommachanh, it was E.N. who placed the call.
Thus there was no opportunity for Sirypangno and Phommachanh to speak
and further coordinate their actions. Yet their subsequent actions—
Phommachanh telling E.N. he was already on the way back, donning the
bandanna even before his arrival, retrieving the gun, lining up with
Sirypangno and the other OKB members— demonstrate that Sirypangno and
Phommachanh had already coordinated their plan before execution.
      That the men’s plan specifically entailed inflicting Thompson with a
fatal wound was supported by the evidence of both men’s behavior during and
after the gang assault. After Sirypangno pointed out Thompson and then
struck him, Phommachanh stepped forward and pointed the gun directly at
Thompson from a short distance of eight feet away and pulled the trigger.
When his first attempt failed, he racked the slide again and successfully fired
five shots in total, stopping only after Thompson fell. Phommachanh did not
fire a warning shot; instead, he immediately pointed the gun directly at
Thompson. Although the evidence showed not all of the subsequent shots
actually hit Thompson, Phommachanh’s actions nevertheless demonstrated

                                      29
that Thompson was his target and his intent was to kill Thompson. (See
People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1218 [“The act of shooting a
firearm toward a victim at close range in a manner that could have inflicted a
mortal wound had the shot been on target is sufficient to support an
inference of an intent to kill.”]; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 742 [the fact
that a bullet misses its mark is not dispositive, since the very act of firing a
weapon in a way that could have caused a mortal wound if the bullet had
been on target is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill].)
      Sirypangno, who was seen speaking with Phommachanh before
Phommachanh initially drove off with the gun, and again after
Phommachanh returned, waving the gun around and yelling “who wants it,”
inferably knew of Phommachanh’s homicidal purpose. That Sirypangno
continued fighting and did not object or attempt to intercede as
Phommachanh aimed the gun at Thompson and fired it again and again
suggests Sirypangno was not surprised by Phommachanh’s actions and did
not object to them. (See Glukhoy, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 599 [“It is well
settled that the presence at the scene of the crime and failure to prevent it,
companionship and conduct before and after the offense, including flight, are
relevant to determining whether a defendant aided and abetted in the
commission of the crime.”].)
      Sirypangno’s conduct after the shooting further supports the conclusion
he intended for Phommachanh to inflict Thompson with a fatal wound.
(Glukhoy, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 599.) Sirypangno did not summon aid,
nor did he attempt to distance himself from the crime. Instead, he fled side
by side with Phommachanh, accepted possession of the murder weapon, and
took responsibility for hiding it. (See People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101,
112 [defendant’s actions after striking fatal blow “were not those of an

                                        30
unintentional killer,” including because defendant did not call an ambulance
and tried to obscure evidence of the killing].)
      For all of these reasons, there is sufficient substantial evidence in the
record to support the trial court’s conclusion that Sirypangno acted with
express malice in aiding and abetting Thompson’s murder. We do not find
Sirypangno’s arguments to the contrary persuasive. He contends, first, there
is “no evidence” that when he gave Phommachanh the gun he told
Phommachanh he was doing so because he wanted Phommachanh to kill
Thompson. He argues further that he would not have allowed Phommachanh
to drive away if this was his plan. We reject both assertions. The evidence
showed Sirypangno talked with Phommachanh before Phommachanh left
with Rattana, and again as Phommachanh was getting in the car to leave.
Although there was no evidence of the precise content of their conversation as
Phommachanh entered the car, for the reasons we have already discussed, a
factfinder could reasonably infer from the events that followed that they were
concocting a plan whereby Phommachanh would leave with the gun, don the
bandana, and return with his facial features concealed in the hopes of
avoiding detection for the planned shooting.
      Similarly, Sirypangno contends there is “no evidence” he asked
Phommachanh to return to the party because he had formed the intent to kill
in the few minutes Phommachanh was away, and that there is no evidence he
spoke to Phommachanh about shooting Thompson after Phommachanh
returned. No such evidence is necessary, however, given our conclusion that
the record supports the inference their plan had already been developed prior
to Phommachanh leaving.
      Next, Sirypangno asserts that “[a] verbal dispute between a member of
a street gang and someone like Thompson who was not a member of a street

                                       31
gang rarely results in the death of the non-gang member.” Sirypangno does
not accompany this factual assertion with any citation to the record
demonstrating that it has evidentiary support. We will not consider claims
based on factual assertions that are not accompanied by citations to the
record. (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1222, fn. 14.)
      Sirypangno’s remaining arguments posit nonculpable inferences we
might draw from certain witnesses’ testimony. That there might be evidence
in the record to support inferences favoring his position is not material to our
substantial evidence review. Provided that the factfinder’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence (as we have determined that it is), the fact
that a contrary finding is also supported is irrelevant. Stated differently, “
‘[w]here the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
a reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s
reversal.’ ” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 626 (Clark).)
      Nor do we find Sirypangno’s arguments to be persuasive. He asserts
that if he intended to kill Thompson, he could have done so himself while
arguing with Thompson over the backyard fence. However, although
Sirypangno did not shoot Thompson at his earliest opportunity, it is inferable
from his and Phommachanh’s subsequent actions that both he and
Phommachanh nevertheless decided later to have Phommachanh shoot and
kill Thompson. (See Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741 [a defendant’s actions
may serve as circumstantial evidence of intent].) That Sirypangno arguably
could have killed Thompson sooner does not negate this inference.
      Sirypangno further asserts that Thompson was taller and heavier than
he; if the plan was to have Phommachanh shoot Thompson, this could have
been more logically and safely achieved by identifying Thompson and then

                                       32
standing out of the way while Phommachanh shot him. However, this
position overlooks Detective Hatfield’s testimony about the importance of
respect within gang culture, and specifically Hatfield’s testimony that a gang
member who gets in a physical fight which then leads to a shooting would
gain respect from his gang, would benefit by showing his fellow gang
members “that he’s backing his own gang set,” and would be “elevated in . . .
stature within the gang itself.” A factfinder could reasonably infer
Sirypangno’s decision to physically attack Thompson in the leadup to the
shooting served this goal of earning respect within his gang, even if it was not
the most logical or safest course of action.
      Next, Sirypangno argues Phommachanh looked “scared” during the
shooting and was “shooting crazy,” and suggests Sirypangno therefore could
not have known Phommachanh intended to kill Thompson. His description of
Phommachanh’s demeanor is based on the testimony of Phommachanh’s
cousin Boualouang. However, Boualouang’s testimony about Phommachanh
“shooting crazy” was contradicted by E.N., who testified Phommachanh fired
the shots “at the victim” and agreed “the very first place that
[Phommachanh] pointed [the gun] was right at the victim when he fired[.]”
(Italics added.) The trial court impliedly resolved this conflict by rejecting
Boualouang’s testimony in favor of E.N.’s description of Phommachanh’s
aiming of the gun directly at Thompson, from which a reasonable observer
could discern that Phommachanh intended to inflict Thompson with a fatal
wound. (See Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181 [“[r]esolution of conflicts
and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of
fact” and “unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently
improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
conviction”].) Further, we are not persuaded that “looking scared” while

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shooting at a victim is inconsistent with the shooter harboring an intent to
kill that victim, nor did the trial court have to accept Boualouang’s
characterization of Phommachanh’s facial expression. (See Stevens v. Parke,
Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 67–68 (Stevens) [“ ‘[T]he jury properly may
reject part of the testimony of a witness, though not directly contradicted,
and combine the accepted portions with bits of testimony or inferences from
the testimony of other witnesses thus weaving a cloth of truth out of selected
available material.’ ”]; accord People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 715,
fn. 34 (Fuiava).)
      Similarly, Sirypangno cites Rattana’s testimony that he made
statements like “oh, shit, oh, shit” in the car after the shooting, which he
asserts is evidence he was shocked and surprised and therefore must not
have foreseen the shooting. We disagree that these statements, even
assuming they are properly interpreted as expressions of shock or surprise
(as opposed to a rush of adrenaline), are inconsistent with the conclusion that
before the shooting happened his intent was for Phommachanh to shoot
Thompson. Further, the trial court was not required to accept Rattana’s
testimony with respect to Sirypangno’s demeanor after the shooting.
(Stevens, supra, 9 Cal.3d at pp. 67–68; Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th 622, 715,
fn. 34.)
      Next, Sirypangno contends the murder was out of proportion with the
events leading up to it, and that this demonstrates he neither foresaw nor
intended for Phommachanh to shoot and kill Thompson. However, courts
have recognized that mere verbal altercations may be sufficient to motivate a
murder. (People v. Lunafelix (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 97, 102 [stating that the
law does not require that a murderer “have a ‘rational’ motive for killing”;
”[a]nger at the way the victim talked to him [citation] or any motive, ‘shallow

                                       34
and distorted but, to the perpetrator, genuine’ may be sufficient”].) Here,
Detective Hatfield’s testimony established that perceived acts of disrespect
against a gang member “will” result in violence, including a shooting, and
that calling a gang member a “bitch” or telling him to “suck my dick” would
be seen by a gang member as disrespectful. Further, the testimony of
numerous witnesses who observed the events leading up to the murder
showed that first Sirypangno and then Phommachanh were angered by
Thompson’s words, and that the duo came up with a plan for retaliation that
involved the gang assault and fatal shooting of Thompson. Thus,
proportionate or not, the trial evidence sufficiently demonstrated that the
murder was indeed the intended result of Sirypangno and Thompson’s earlier
verbal altercation.
      Similarly, Sirypangno, relying on the probation report prepared for the
purpose of Phommachanh’s sentencing in the underlying case, contends it
shows Phommachanh’s criminal history before the murder did not include
violent offenses, and that this shows he could not have foreseen that
Phommachanh would commit a homicide. We are not persuaded.
Phommachanh’s probation report was prepared after the jury trial in the
underlying case. Sirypangno cites no evidence in the record demonstrating
that at the time of the murder he was aware of Phommachanh’s prior
criminal record. Moreover, we disagree with the proposition that a particular
homicide is unforeseeable unless the perpetrator was previously convicted of
a similar offense.
      Sirypangno’s remaining points are equally unavailing. He points to
testimony of E.N. to the effect that E.N. thought Phommachanh would only
scare Thompson with the gun, not shoot him. He relies on Boualouang’s
testimony that he overheard Sirypangno saying he “might freaking sock”

                                      35
Thompson, and Boualouang himself did not expect anything other than an
ordinary fight. He further observes that he only pointed the gun at Farhan’s
group during the backyard altercation and did not shoot. He argues this
evidence supports the conclusion he did not anticipate or intend for
Phommachanh to shoot Thompson, let alone kill him. Again, however, when
we review a factfinder’s decision for substantial evidence, we determine only
whether there is sufficient evidence of reasonable, credible, and of solid value
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.) For the
reasons we have already explained, we conclude the record does contain
substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that
Sirypangno acted with the intent to kill in aiding and abetting the murder of
Thompson. That the record might also contain evidence supportive of a
different conclusion does not establish a basis for reversal. (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 626 [“ ‘[w]here the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of
fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant
the judgment’s reversal’ ”].)
      For all of these reasons, we reject Sirypangno’s substantial evidence
challenge and affirm the trial court’s order denying his petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6.
                                      III.
 We Will Remand the Matter so the Trial Court Can Fully Comply with Our
                         Disposition in Sirypangno III
      In Sirypangno III, we vacated Sirypangno’s attempted murder
conviction and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to allow
the People to elect to retry Sirypangno on the attempted murder charge. Our

                                       36
disposition in that case further instructed the trial court that if the People
did not elect to bring Sirypangno to trial on the attempted murder charge
within the time prescribed by law, the trial court was to enter judgment
reflecting vacatur of the attempted murder conviction and resentence
Sirypangno accordingly. (See Sirypangno III, supra, D078705.)
      At the 2022 evidentiary hearing held with respect to Sirypangno’s
section 1172.6 petition, the People elected to not retry Sirypangno on the
attempted murder charge and the trial court granted the People’s motion to
dismiss the charge. However, the record on appeal does not include an order
or amended abstract of judgment reflecting vacatur of the attempted murder
conviction or any subsequent resentencing on the remaining counts. Instead,
the most recent abstract of judgment in the appellate record, which is dated
April 17, 2019, shows that Sirypangno stands convicted of attempted murder
and is serving a seven-year sentence for that conviction.
      “[W]hen an appellate court remands a matter with directions governing
the proceedings on remand, ‘ “those directions are binding on the trial court
and must be followed.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64.)
In supplemental briefing, the parties agreed the trial court has not yet fully
complied with our disposition in Sirypangno III. Accordingly, we will remand
the case to the trial court with instructions to complete the actions necessary
to do so.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order denying Sirypangno’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
      The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to complete
the following actions necessary to fully comply with our disposition in
Sirypangno III: (1) issue an order reflecting vacatur of the attempted murder

                                       37
conviction, (2) resentence Sirypangno, and (3) issue an amended abstract of
judgment reflecting the vacatur of the attempted murder conviction and the
new sentence.

                                                                       DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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