Court Opinion

ID: 9369008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 17:08:42.634792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:12.249370
License: Public Domain

J-S39010-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 CHRISTOPHER LEE SCHWENK                    :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 852 MDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 4, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000656-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2023

      Christopher Lee Schwenk appeals from the order denying his first

petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9545. Schwenk argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective for allowing him to waive his ability to raise an ineffectiveness claim

during trial and for presenting alternative inconsistent defenses at trial. We

affirm.

      This Court previously summarized the evidence supporting Schwenk’s

conviction for third-degree murder:

      In the early morning hours of November 6, 2013, Ashley
      Rodriguez got into an altercation with Eddie Gallon. Schwenk, a []
      paramour of Rodriguez, came to her aid. Gallon left the scene but
      returned shortly thereafter and threw a rock through one of
      Rodriguez’s mother’s windows. Schwenk obtained Rodriguez’s
      9mm Smith and Wesson semi-automatic handgun, chased Gallon
      for a brief distance and fired seven shots at him. All the bullets
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     missed the intended target, but one of them struck the victim,
     Monique Nixon, who died from the gunshot wound.

     When the police arrived at the scene of the crime, Roque Castro
     informed them he witnessed a black male attempting to pick up
     shell casings before running into a nearby apartment. He also
     informed the police he heard an argument and glass breaking at
     that apartment prior to hearing gunshots.

     The police recovered several 9mm shell casings from the crime
     scene. Detective First Class Jeffrey Spence was the detective
     supervisor for the crime and sought to enter the apartment
     indicated by Castro. Rodriquez answered the door and refused
     warrantless entry to the police. After 10 to 20 minutes passed,
     Detective Spence believed the situation had become unsafe. He
     [entered] the apartment without a warrant. Inside, Schwenk was
     found, naked on the bed. A 9mm Smith & Wesson semi-automatic
     weapon was also located near the bed. Subsequent forensic
     analysis determined the fatal bullet and the shell casings found at
     the crime scene were all fired by the handgun found in the
     Rodriguez apartment. Forensic analysis also determined Ashley
     Rodriguez’s DNA was on the handgun, but Schwenk’s DNA was
     not. However, Schwenk had gunshot residue on his hands, while
     Rodriguez did not.

     Although all inhabitants of the apartment were taken into custody
     for questioning, only Schwenk was ultimately arrested. While in
     custody and awaiting trial, a jailhouse informant told the
     authorities Schwenk had admitted to the shooting, claimed to
     have had sex with Rodriguez after the shooting, and that
     Rodriguez had taken the handgun, wiped it off and hidden it in the
     bedroom, where it was ultimately found.

Commonwealth v. Schwenk, 1912 MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 6,

2019) (unpublished memorandum at 1-3) (footnote omitted).

     The police arrested Schwenk, and the Commonwealth charged Schwenk

with first-degree murder, third-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. During the trial, Schwenk’s trial counsel

presented two alternative defenses – (1) Schwenk was not the shooter and

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(2) if Schwenk was the shooter, he acted in self-defense. In reaction to

counsel’s strategy, the trial court addressed the issue with Schwenk and

questioned whether he wanted to proceed with both defenses. The trial court

further asked Schwenk to waive any ineffective assistance claim regarding

counsel’s chosen strategy. Schwenk indicated that he respected counsel’s

decision and that he wanted counsel to proceed. Following trial, the jury found

Schwenk guilty of third-degree murder. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced

Schwenk to 20 to 40 years in prison. This Court affirmed the judgment of

sentence, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See Schwenk,

1912 MDA 2017; appeal denied, 236 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2020).

      Schwenk filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed

Schwenk counsel, who filed an amended petition, raising two claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, Schwenk argued trial

counsel was ineffective for allowing him to waive his right to bring an

ineffectiveness claim regarding counsel’s strategy to present alternative

defenses at trial and for raising alternative inconsistent defenses. After holding

a hearing, the PCRA court denied the petition, finding Schwenk waived his

right to bring an ineffectiveness claim through his statements at trial accepting

counsel’s strategy, and counsel was not ineffective for raising alternative

defenses. Schwenk timely appealed.

      On appeal, Schwenk raises the following questions for our review:

      1. Trial counsel was ineffective for advising [Schwenk] to waive
         ineffective assistance of counsel claims when counsel pursued

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         two mutually inconsistent defenses at trial. [Schwenk’s] waiver
         of the claim was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
         made.

      2. Trial counsel was ineffective for raising two mutually
         inconsistent defenses contrary to established case law, one a
         defense of mistaken identity, and the other, self-defense.

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (issues reordered for ease of disposition).

      Our standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s order “is whether the

determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is

free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344, 347 (Pa. Super.

2017). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no

support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Garcia,

23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

      Further, to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, Schwenk must

demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that “(1) the underlying claim

has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action

or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s

action or inaction.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150 (Pa. 2018)

(citation omitted). Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the burden is on

Schwenk to prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426,

439 (Pa. 2011). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness

will require rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 244

A.3d 359, 368 (Pa. 2021).

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      In his first claim, Schwenk contends trial counsel was ineffective for

advising him to waive his ability to raise an ineffectiveness claim regarding

counsel’s strategy to raise alternative inconsistent defenses at trial. See

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Schwenk argues that his waiver of the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim during the trial was not knowingly or voluntarily

made. See id. Schwenk notes that neither counsel nor the judge explained

the consequences of waiving his right to raise an ineffectiveness claim as to

counsel’s presentation of the defense, and there is no way to establish he

understood the significance of his action. See id. at 18-19. Schwenk highlights

that counsel cannot raise her own ineffectiveness, and, as an extension,

argues that counsel cannot advise her client to waive any such claims for

specific issues raised at trial. See id. at 16-17. According to Schwenk, he was

effectively without counsel for the critical stage of trial because he had to

waive his ineffectiveness claim before permitting trial counsel to proceed with

the alternative defenses. See id. at 17-18. Schwenk concludes that he is

entitled to a new trial. See id. at 19.

      It is well-settled that for a waiver to be voluntary, it “must be the free

and unconstrained choice of its maker.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d

652, 667 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[A]n on-

the-record colloquy is a useful procedural tool whenever the waiver of any

significant right is at issue, constitutional or otherwise[.]” Commonwealth v.

Isaac, 205 A.3d 358, 366 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted); see also

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Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 697 (Pa. 2008) (“A waiver

colloquy is a procedural device; it is not a constitutional end or a constitutional

‘right.’”). “Consequently, a defendant must participate in an on-the-record

colloquy, which ensures the defendant is aware of the rights being

waived, i.e., the ‘essential ingredients’ of PCRA review.” Baker, 72 A.3d at

668. “The trial court must also ensure the defendant has made the decision

to waive his right to PCRA review after consulting with counsel (if any) and in

consideration of his rights as they have been explained in the colloquy.” Id.

For there to be an express waiver of a right, the trial court must ensure that

“the decision to waive the right is informed and voluntary.” Id.

      Here, after counsel revealed her strategy to raise alternative and

inconsistent defenses, the trial court questioned Schwenk as follows:

      THE COURT: Sir, you understand your attorney’s arguing in the
      alternative in this case. She’s arguing that, A, you didn’t do the
      shooting, or if the Jury believes that you did the shooting, that
      you did it in self-defense? You understand that those two are
      mutually exclusive; either you did the shooting or you didn’t, and
      you run the risk of perhaps the Jury thinking [she’s] throwing
      anything out there as a defense that’s possible? So[,] I want you
      to waive any ineffective assistance claim and agree to the
      introduction of contrary defenses. Okay. The issue came up
      yesterday. Your attorney said she’s arguing in the alternative, and
      as I said yesterday, I’ve never heard in a criminal case someone
      arguing in the alternative, especially, “acted in self-defense,” or “I
      didn’t do the shooting, but if you believe I did the shooting, I did
      it in self-defense.” You understand that?

      [Schwenk]: Right.

      THE COURT: And is that what you wish her to do?

      [Schwenk]: I respect my attorney’s opinion.

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      THE COURT: I just need you to say on the record that’s what you
      want her to do. You want her to argue in the alternative?

      [Schwenk]: Yes.

N.T., 7/21/15, at 215-16; see also N.T., 7/20/15, at 178.

      At the PCRA hearing, Schwenk’s trial counsel testified that after a trial

judge speaks with a defendant, she would typically explain what the judge

was stating. See N.T., 12/21/21, at 30. To that end, Schwenk’s trial counsel

stated that she would have explained the judge’s statements regarding waiver

of the ineffectiveness claim to Schwenk, but further indicated that she did not

tell him what to do and that he had to make his own decision in response. See

id. at 22, 29-30, 32. Schwenk’s counsel could not recall if she suggested to

Schwenk that he have different counsel advise him as to whether he should

waive the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See id. at 32; see also id.

at 10 (wherein Schwenk testified that there was no discussion about retaining

different counsel regarding the waiver of the ineffective assistance of counsel

claim).

      The PCRA court found as follows:

      The trial court advised [Schwenk] of trial counsel’s ill-advised
      approach of arguing two mutually exclusive defenses, and
      [Schwenk] chose to proceed with trial counsel arguing both
      defenses. The trial court made [Schwenk] aware of its concerns
      regarding trial counsel’s inconsistent theories numerous times
      throughout trial. Therefore, because [Schwenk] selected to
      continue with trial after being cautioned by the court of trial
      counsel’s strategy, [the PCRA court] finds that [Schwenk]
      knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived any claims to
      ineffective assistance of counsel on this matter. … The trial

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      transcript does not indicate that at any time trial counsel
      permitted Petitioner to waive ineffective assistance of counsel
      claims. … Furthermore, the evidence does not establish that trial
      counsel chose to pursue legally impermissible inconsistent
      defenses, nor that trial counsel encouraged [Schwenk] to waive
      an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/1/22, at 6-7.

      Here, based upon this record, it is unclear whether Schwenk understood

he was waiving his right to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

related to the alternative defenses. The trial court merely asked Schwenk

whether he wanted to proceed based upon the alternative defenses presented

by trial counsel to which Schwenk agreed. However, the trial court did not

provide Schwenk with an accurate description of the rights that he was

foregoing on the record. Confusing this issue further was trial counsel’s bald

statements that she explained Schwenk’s rights, but that Schwenk had to

make the final decision. In effect, the trial court presented Schwenk with a

Hobson’s choice between accepting the alternative conflicting defenses by trial

counsel and waiving any ineffectiveness claims or foregoing counsel’s advice

and forcing counsel to state that her choice demonstrated her own

ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 398 (Pa.

2021) (stating that “counsel cannot argue his or her own ineffectiveness.”

(citation omitted)). Therefore, Schwenk did not make a voluntary, express,

and intelligent waiver of his right to PCRA review on this claim. See Baker,

72 A.3d at 668-69 (concluding that because there was nothing said on the

record was an accurate description of the PCRA rights the defendant was

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forfeiting, there was no express and voluntary waiver of his right to PCRA

review). Accordingly, the underlying ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit.

      Further, there was no reasonable basis for counsel to allow Schwenk to

waive the claim and Schwenk was prejudiced as he would not have been able

to raise the ineffectiveness claim in a timely PCRA petition. As such, because

Schwenk raises an ineffectiveness claim regarding counsel’s choice to raise

alternative conflicting defenses, we will address his argument in this regard.

      In his second claim, Schwenk contends that trial counsel was ineffective

for providing deficient advice in deciding to raise the alternative inconsistent

defenses at trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 20. Schwenk argues that his claim

has arguable merit because counsel’s decision produced confusion at trial to

the point the trial judge had side-bar discussions to understand the defenses

being presented. See id. at 22. Schwenk further asserts that there was no

reasonable basis to present the alternative defenses, claiming that they

distracted the jury from considering the merits of each defense. See id. at 22,

23-24. Schwenk maintains that the trial judge’s instruction on self-defense

does not establish that counsel acted reasonably, as a defendant who denies

the use of deadly force cannot avail himself of a self-defense instruction. See

id. at 23-24. Finally, Schwenk argues that counsel’s actions prejudiced him as

there was a reasonable probability that raising a single defense would have

changed the outcome of the trial. See id. at 24, 26-27. Schwenk claims that,

although the PCRA court cited to facts establishing his guilt, such evidence

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must be considered in the context of counsel’s choices, noting that a single

defense theory could have established that the gunshots occurred during a

“tussle” and the shots would have been justified. See id. at 24-25, 26.

According to Schwenk, counsel’s testimony at the PCRA hearing that she

considered his input in presenting the defenses does not absolve her

responsibility to provide effective counsel. See id. at 27.

      “[G]enerally, where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned,

counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if [s]he chose a

particular course that had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate [her]

client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012)

(citation omitted). “If counsel’s chosen course had some reasonable basis, the

inquiry ends and counsel’s assistance is deemed effective.” Commonwealth

v. Williams, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted).

      At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that she sought to raise

alternative defenses as a method to attack and poke holes in the

Commonwealth’s evidence. See N.T., 12/21/21, at 20-21, 22, 28-29, 30-31.

Trial counsel highlighted that Schwenk insisted that he did not fire the gun,

and indicated that Rodriguez was the shooter, but would not implicate her in

the murder. See id. at 20-21, 23-24, 33-34. As a result, trial counsel indicated

she could not put Schwenk on the stand to testify. See id. at 21. She felt that

her best chance to not contradict Schwenk’s stated position that he was not

the shooter was to give the jury an alternative defense to obtain a lesser

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conviction. See id. at 24, 30-31. Trial counsel noted that the trial court

provided a self-defense instruction to the jury, and that the self-defense claim

was viable as the jury had to determine whether the Commonwealth proved

its case. See id. at 25, 34; see also N.T., 7/24/15, at 189-93 (instructing the

jury regarding self-defense). Trial counsel also testified that she went over the

legal repercussions with Schwenk about introducing the alternate defenses.

See N.T., 12/21/21, at 22.

      At trial, the Commonwealth argued to the jury that Schwenk should be

found guilty of first-degree murder. Trial counsel’s argument was that

Schwenk was not the shooter, and, in the alternative, if the jury believed

Schwenk was the shooter, he acted in self-defense. In effect, counsel used

this strategy to avoid a first-degree murder conviction and mandatory life

sentence. Indeed, the evidence presented at trial established that Schwenk

was seen chasing after Gallon when the gunshots were heard; the gun used

to shoot the victim was found near Schwenk; Schwenk had gunshot residue

on his hands immediately after the shooting; a man matching Schwenk’s

description was seen attempting to pick up shell casings at the crime scene;

and a jailhouse informant claimed Schwenk admitted to the shooting and

sought to frame Rodriguez.

      Schwenk has not established that seeking a sole defense would have

resulted in a greater success, especially considering the fact the trial court

instructed the jury on both defenses. See Commonwealth v. Charleston,

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94 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“Where matters of strategy and tactics

are concerned, a finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is

not warranted unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen

offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually

pursued.” (citation omitted)). Therefore, although counsel’s strategy did not

acquit Schwenk, we conclude that it was reasonable strategy to mitigate the

risk of a first-degree murder conviction under the circumstances. See

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 104 A.3d 267, 292 (Pa. 2014) (stating that

trial counsel’s strategy to make alternative defense arguments at trial was

reasonable because the burden of proof still rests with the Commonwealth).

Likewise, Schwenk cannot establish that he was prejudiced, as the trial court

instructed the jury on the two defenses and the jury was shown a substantial

amount of evidence indicating that he was the shooter.

      We also reject Schwenk’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Mayfield,

585 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Super. 1991) (en banc), to support his ineffectiveness

claim. In Mayfield, this Court determined whether the defendant was entitled

to a self-defense instruction when he denied committing the act for which he

was convicted. See id. at 1070. This Court emphasized that a denial of the

use of deadly force would preclude the defendant from raising his self-defense

claim, but concluded that, because the defendant argued he did not cause the

injuries, he was entitled to a self-defense instruction. See id. at 1077. Here,

Schwenk    received   a   self-defense   instruction,   and   Schwenk   fails   to

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demonstrate that Mayfield establishes counsel is ineffective by raising

alternate defenses. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Schwenk’s

ineffectiveness claim is without merit.

      In conclusion, we find that Schwenk did not waive his right to raise an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim for raising alternative defenses at trial;

however, his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for raising the alternative

inconsistent defenses is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s

order.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/07/2023

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