Court Opinion

ID: 9529407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:50:30.743141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:46.045752
License: Public Domain

The motion to dismiss the appeals is allowed, except as to the plaintiff’s appeal from the portion of the decree awarding attorney’s fees and costs.
*198David Fain argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Black, Kendall & Pain and John J. Higgins, Portland.
Before Warner, Chief Justice, and Rossman, Latourette and Perry, Justices.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal, by reason of the earlier disposition of the motion hereinafter referred to, has been reduced to a challenge to the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees allowed by the circuit court to the defendant wife pursuant to ORS 107.100 (g).
The plaintiff Ralph R. Clark brought suit against his wife Lydia V. Clark for the dissolution of the marriage contract. The defendant countered with a cross complaint seeking a decree for separate maintenance and support. After a trial lasting approximately five days, the lower court entered a decree dismissing the complaints of both parties and allowing the wife the previously-ordered sum of $4,750 as attorneys’ fees, in addition to an earlier allowance of $750.
The plaintiff Clark appealed from the decree, alleging error in the denial of a divorce to him and in the allowance of attorneys’ fees to the defendant. However, after the appeal had been perfected and was ready for hearing in this court, the plaintiff died and W. U. Bauman was substituted as executor of the decedent Clark’s last will and testament.
Thereafter, the defendant widow moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal and the cross appeal taken by her. The motion was allowed in part and denied in part, leaving the appeal of the plaintiff standing solely with reference to the question of the reasonableness of the *199amount of the attorneys’ fees allowed by the circuit court.
We have carefully examined the record. Giving due weight to the nature of the case and the time employed in its preparation and presentation at trial and to the values of the properties accumulated by the plaintiff, we find the allowance made by the circuit court to be reasonable.
The defendant respondent, following the procedure indicated by Green v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 197 Or 160, 170, 251 P2d 437, 252 P2d 545, has employed her brief as the medium to pray for an additional allowance for the services of her counsel in this court. This request is predicated upon OES 107.100 (3) reading:
“If an appeal is taken from the decree or other appealable order in a suit for dissolution or annulment of the marriage contract, and the Supreme Court awards costs and disbursements to the prevailing party, it may also award to that party, as part of the costs, such additional sum of money as it may adjudge reasonable as an attorney’s fee on the appeal.” Oregon Laws 1953, ch 553 (7).
The respondent being entitled to an award for her costs and disbursements herein, we think she should also have judgment in the sum of $500 as a reasonable amount for the services of her attorneys on this appeal.
Affirmed.