Court Opinion

ID: 9715897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:19:19.80362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:39.725291
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THEIS, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached in this case, but because I would have analyzed the DNA issue differently, I specially concur. In Justice Greiman’s opinion, he applies a totality of the circumstances analysis and a balancing test when determining whether the suspicionless search of a convicted felon to obtain his DNA ran afoul of the fourth amendment. In doing so, he relies on Wealer. The Wealer court, citing Sitz, noted that the balancing test approach “relies primarily on the perceived willingness of the United States Supreme Court, under certain circumstances, to relax or eliminate any requirement of probable cause or individualized suspicion where the nature of the intrusion occasioned by a particular search or seizure is minimal and the government’s interest significant.” Wealer, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 14. The Wealer court decided to follow this balancing test although it noted that the Supreme Court had not applied this approach outside the context of police stops of motorists on public highways. Wealer, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 14. Because the Supreme Court in Ferguson recently distinguished its previous cases involving roadblocks such as Sitz and did not apply the balancing test in a case involving a search of a person’s body, I write specially. First, I note that while the United States Supreme Court has yet to address this exact issue, many courts around the country have found the suspicionless search of a convicted felon to obtain his DNA to be constitutional. See Garvin, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 854 (compiling a list of federal and state cases upholding the constitutionality of this search). While these courts have uniformly reached the same constitutional result, they contain no uniform analysis and frequently include numerous dissents and concurrences. The Supreme Court has held that a search or seizure is “ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 340, 121 S. Ct. at 451. The Court has recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule did not apply, such as where the program was designed to serve “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 340, 121 S. Ct. at 451, citing Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 582, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995) (random drug testing for student-athletes); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 710-11, 109 S. Ct. at 1398 (drug tests for United States Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 670-71, 109 S. Ct. at 1422 (drug and alcohol tests for railway employees involved in train accidents or found to be in violation of particular safety regulations). Additionally, the Court has also allowed searches for certain administrative purposes without particularized suspicion, provided that those searches were appropriately limited. See, e.g., Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-04, 96 L. Ed. 2d at 613-15, 107 S. Ct. at 2643-44 (warrantless administrative inspection of premises of “closely regulated” business). Lastly, the Supreme Court has upheld brief, suspicionless seizures of motorists at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1133-34, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3087 (1976)) and at a sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road (Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 423, 110 S. Ct. at 2488). In his opinion, Justice Greiman cites the recent Supreme Court case of Ferguson, but does not rely on it. While Ferguson presents a different issue from that in the present case, it involves the search of a person, as does this case, and I would follow its analysis here. In Ferguson, the Court addressed whether a state hospital’s action of testing urine samples of pregnant women for narcotics without their consent or individualized suspicion for law enforcement purposes was an unreasonable search. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69-70, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 211, 121 S. Ct. at 1284. In analyzing this issue, the Court stated that Ferguson differed from “the handful of seizure cases in which we have applied a balancing test to determine Fourth Amendment reasonableness,” citing Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.21, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 220 n.21, 1121 S. Ct. at 1291 n.21. The Court reasoned that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte involved roadblock seizures rather than “ ‘the intrusive search of the body or the home.’ ” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.21, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 220 n.21, 121 S. Ct. at 1291 n.21, quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 55, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 352, 121 S. Ct. at 461 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Court also noted that, “ ‘[W]e deal neither with searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.’ ” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.21, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 220 n.21, 121 S. Ct. at 1291 n.21, quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1130, 96 S. Ct. at 3084. Lastly, the Court explained that it had “explicitly distinguished the cases dealing with checkpoints from those dealing with ‘special needs’ ” in Sitz. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.21, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 220 n.21, 121 S. Ct. at 1291 n.21. Rather, the Ferguson Court applied the “special needs” analysis, relying on four previous cases where it had considered whether comparable drug tests “ ‘fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.’ ” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 216, 121 S. Ct. at 1288, quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513, 520, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1298 (1997). See also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582, 115 S. Ct. at 2396; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 710-11, 109 S. Ct. at 1398; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 670-71, 109 S. Ct. at 1422. In each of those cases, the Court “employed a balancing test that weighed the intrusion on the individual’s interest in privacy against the ‘special needs’ that supported the program.” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 216, 121 S. Ct. at 1288. However, before conducting this balancing test, the Court first determined whether the need in question was “special.” In making that determination, the Ferguson Court carried out a “close review” of the scheme at issue and considered all of the available evidence to determine the relevant primary purpose of the program. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 218, 121 S. Ct. at 1290. The Court stated that in each of its prior drug cases, the “special need” that was advanced as a justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion “was one divorced from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 217, 121 S. Ct. at 1289. After reviewing the evidence in Ferguson, the Court found that the immediate objective of the searches was “to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach” the ultimate goal of moving pregnant women into substance abuse treatment and away from drugs. (Emphasis in original.) Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 219-20, 121 S. Ct. at 1291. The Court then held that given that the primary purpose of the hospital’s program was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into treatment, and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials at every stage of the policy, “this case simply does not fit within the closely guarded category of ‘special needs.’ ” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 220, 121 S. Ct. at 1292. Because it determined that there was no “special need” to support the hospital’s program, the Court struck down the program as unconstitutional without conducting the balancing test described above. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “[a] State’s operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.” (Emphasis added.) Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 717, 107 S. Ct. at 3168. Based on both Griffin and Ferguson, I would find that this court must use the “special needs” analysis in addressing the constitutionality of the DNA statute at issue here. First, the court should determine the primary purpose behind the program in question, here, the suspicionless search of a convicted felon to obtain his DNA as provided for under section 5 — 4—3(a)(3.5). If that purpose is merely to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement or the general interest in crime control, this purpose will not fit within the narrow category of “special needs” cases. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79-81, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 217-18, 121 S. Ct. at 1289-90. If, however, the primary purpose of the program is something other than the State’s general interest in law enforcement, Ferguson indicates that the program may fall within the “special needs” exception. Only after determining that the primary purpose of the DNA collection program involved in this case is “divorced from” the State’s general interest in law enforcement and that the purpose falls within the “special needs” exception can this court apply a balancing test. I would agree with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the primary purpose of the DNA law at issue here was “not to search for ‘evidence’ of criminal wrongdoing,” but was “to obtain reliable proof of a felon’s identity.” Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2004).3 Given that the primary purpose of the DNA collection statute in Illinois is not merely to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement, it falls within the category of “special needs.” Next, I believe this court must weigh the intrusion on the individual’s interest in privacy against the “special needs” that supported the program. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 216, 121 S. Ct. at 1288. Here, the individuals subject to the mandatory collection of DNA are convicted felons, not unsuspecting pregnant women in a hospital as in Ferguson. The “inmates subject to testing because they are in custody! ] are already ‘seized.’ ” Green, 354 F.3d at 679. Further, the collection of DNA only minimally intrudes into the convicted felons’ privacy, especially considering that these individuals enjoy lesser privacy interests than the average person after they have been convicted of a crime and are incarcerated. Additionally, the practice of collecting DNA from a blood sample is relatively noninvasive and does not “constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual’s personal privacy and bodily integrity.” Winston, 470 U.S. at 762, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 670, 105 S. Ct. at 1617. Unlike the pregnant women seeking prenatal care in Ferguson, convicted felons are not simply receiving medical treatment and know the purpose and potential uses of the DNA test results. Green, 354 F.3d at 678-79. Moreover, DNA is the most reliable evidence of identification — stronger even than fingerprints or photographs. Green, 354 F.3d at 679. Thus, after balancing the individuals’ interest in privacy against the State’s “special need” to obtain reliable proof of a felon’s identity, I would agree with Justice Greiman that the suspicionless search of a convicted felon to obtain his DNA does not violate the fourth amendment. Finally, I note that Justice Greiman’s opinion relies on Knights in support of its analysis that the totality of the circumstances approach applies here. However, Knights is inapplicable to the present case because the Knights Court analyzed only whether a search conducted pursuant to the defendant’s probation condition and supported by reasonable suspicion satisfied the fourth amendment. The Knights Court expressly stated that it need not address the constitutionality of a suspicionless search “because the search in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n.6, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 505 n.6, 122 S. Ct. at 592 n.6. Thus, I do not believe that Knights provides any insight into whether the DNA statute at issue is constitutional. Accordingly, I concur with the result of the majority in affirming this case.  While Green interprets the Wisconsin mandatory DNA statute, our Illinois statute is similar to and operates in the same manner as the Wisconsin statute, and thus, Green’s analysis is applicable here.