Court Opinion

ID: 9628465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:21:15.692581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:05.839872
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge, specially
concurring:
I cannot agree with the majority that the State failed to prove the murders of the two children were “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” beyond a reasonable doubt. See 21 O.S.1981, § 701.12(4). This aggravating circumstance is limited to murders involving torture or serious physical abuse. Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla.Crim.App.1987) (Opinion on Rehearing). As was true in Stouffer, the jury in this case was properly instructed that “[t]he phrase ‘especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel’ is directed to those crimes where the death of the victim was preceded by torture of the victim or serious physical abuse.” (O.R. 124) See Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction-Criminal (OUJI-CR) 436 (1981).
Six-year-old Joseph White and three-year-old Amanda White died as the result of seventeen and twenty-two stab wounds respectively. While it is true the State did not present direct testimony that the two children suffered torture or serious physical abuse preceding death, the record contains testimonial as well as photographic evidence that both children were awakened after midnight and suffered multiple nonfatal stab wounds. The blood splattered on the bed, wall, and floor of the children’s bedroom suggested a struggle, and indicated the children did not die instantaneously. I believe the foregoing constitutes sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the two children suffered torture or serious physical abuse preceding death. Accordingly, I find the “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravating circumstance supported by the evidence. See Harris v. State, 438 So.2d 787, 789 & 797 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963, 104 S.Ct. 2181, 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984); Breedlove v. State, 413 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 184, 74 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982), reh’g denied, 459 U.S. 1060, 103 S.Ct. 482, 74 L.Ed.2d 627 (1982); Washington v. State, 362 So.2d 658, 665 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 2063, 60 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979). Consequently, an independent reweighing is unnecessary.
Finally, in accordance with Green v. State, 713 P.2d 1032, 1041 (Okla.Crim.App. 1985), I find it necessary to conduct the proportionality review formerly required by 21 O.S.1981, § 701.13(C). Although this case was not pending on appeal at the time the Oklahoma Legislature amended Section 701.13(C) to delete such review, see 21 O.S. Supp.1985, § 701.13(C), the critical dates for ex post facto purposes “are the date that the offense was committed and the date the statute became effective.” Bromley v. State, 757 P.2d 382, 388 (Okla.Crim.App.1988). The murders for which appellant was convicted occurred in May of 1982, while the amendment deleting proportionality review became effective July 16, 1985. Thus, the formerly mandated proportionality review, which was in effect at the time appellant committed the murders for which he was convicted, should be conducted. I *176have compared the sentence imposed herein with previous cases, and find the sentence proper. See Castro v. State, 745 P.2d 394, 409-10 nn. 3, 4 (Okla.Crim.App.1987); Munson v. State, 758 P.2d 324 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); Bromley v. State, 757 P.2d 382 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); Stewart v. State, 757 P.2d 388 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); Wilson v. State, 756 P.2d 1240 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); Dutton v. Dixon, 757 P.2d 376 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); Brown v. State, 753 P.2d 908 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); Rojem v. State, 753 P.2d 359 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); Hale v. State, 750 P.2d 130 (Okla.Crim.App.1988); Mann v. State, 749 P.2d 1151 (Okla.Crim.App.1988). On the basis of the foregoing, I concur.