Court Opinion

ID: 9789492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:37:01.246773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:22.582740
License: Public Domain

LANE, Presiding Judge,
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority that this case should be remanded for an evidentiary *680hearing to determine: (1) whether the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before giving a confession and (2) whether there was a plea bargain arrangement. Pursuant to defendant’s motion to suppress the confession as being obtained in violation of his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights, the trial court conducted a pretrial evidentiary hearing addressing these issues. After hearing the evidence presented the trial judge overruled the motion.
However, defendant’s counsel failed to object when the statement was offered at trial. When a defendant timely files a Motion to Suppress but fails to renew the objection by objecting to its introduction at trial, this constitutes a waiver of his right to complain to the court. Wing v. State, 579 P.2d 196, 198 (Okl.Cr.1978). Since an assignment of error has not been properly preserved, the court review is limited to fundamental error only. Cole v. State, 766 P.2d 358 (Okl.Cr.1988). See also Harris v. State, 645 P.2d 1036 (Okl.Cr.1982). For the reasons set forth below, I am of the opinion that fundamental error did not occur in this case.
When an appellant challenges the admis-sability of a statement or confession the burden is on the State to show it was voluntary. Hardin v. State, 649 P.2d 799 (Okl.Cr.1982). A confession is voluntary when it is not extracted by any sort of threats of violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. Young v. State, 670 P.2d 591, 594 (Okl.Cr.1983) quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). At the hearing and at trial, Detective Whit-tington testified the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant signed the Miranda form acknowledging that he understood them and requested counsel whereby the interview was terminated. While walking to the jail he stated that he had “changed his mind” and wished to talk about the “charges at hand.” The detective again advised defendant of his Miranda rights. The defendant waived them and proceeded to make the statement which is the subject of this appeal.
It is clear from the record that it was the defendant who instigated the conversation absent any threats of violence, promises or improper influence on behalf of the detective. It is clear he voluntarily signed a Miranda form and he understood his rights as they were communicated to him by the arresting officer. It is clear that he freely and voluntarily waived those rights. There was sufficient intervening circumstances that occurred between defendant’s arrest and his confession to show the confession was voluntary. Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653 (Okl.Cr.1985). See also Wong Sung v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
The State has established prima facie that the confession was voluntary. The appellant offered absolutely no evidence to the contrary. Appellant’s constitutional rights were therefore, not violated and there was no error in the admission of the statement into evidence. See Dixon v. State, 737 P.2d 942 (Okl.Cr.1987) quoting, Stout v. State, 693 P.2d 617 (Okl.Cr.1984).
Furthermore, I disagree with the majority that an evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether there was in fact a plea bargain arrangement and the nature of said arrangement. The State does not dispute and the record shows that an agreement was made whereby Detective Harris would “hold the charges” as long as the defendant assisted in further narcotics investigations that lead to the arrest of a particular individual. The detective informed the defendant that if the information provided did not lead to an arrest “the charges would be filed with the District Attorney’s office and he would be prosecuted.”
Appellant erroneously asserts all statements are protected pursuant to 12 O.S. 1981, § 2410 as part of plea negotiations. Even assuming that statute applies and all statements made from the time of the plea “arrangement” and the arrest on June 23 are inadmissable, nothing defendant said during this time period was offered into evidence. The only statement at issue occurred after defendant was arrested. Fur*681thermore, to determine whether the statement was involuntary as part of plea negotiations, this Court has held that a two tiered analysis must be applied. First, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion and second, whether the accused’s expectation was reasonable given the totality of objective circumstances. Gillum v. State, 681 P.2d 87, 88 (Okl.Cr.1984). See also Blackwell v. State, 663 P.2d 12 (Okl.Cr.1983).
The record reveals the defendant was given several adequate Miranda warnings prior to giving his statement. Defendant had the knowledge that not only did he have the right to an attorney, but also anything he said could be used against him. In fact, it is clear that Defendant understood his rights when he requested counsel. The defendant therefore must have realized the consequences of waiving his rights and talking to the detective. Despite the fact that Defendant was not informed the agreement was off, there are so many intervening circumstances between the “arrangement” and the confession to dissipate any belief that the statements would still be protected. The defendant who is not a newcomer to the legal system, could not have reasonably believed that he was still in an informant relationship with the State. The expectation that any communication by the defendant was still part of a plea agreement was not reasonable given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement.
For the above reasons I DISSENT to the remanding to the trial court for an eviden-tiary hearing.