Court Opinion

ID: 9905101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 19:03:25.22543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:41.016375
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/28/23 P. v. Guzman CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079021

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. INF1500253)

 SERGIO LOPEZ GUZMAN,                                                    OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dale R. Wells, Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions.

         Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Kristen

Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Sergio Guzman was convicted of six counts of robbery and one count of active

gang participation. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 186.22, subd. (a); unlabeled statutory citations

refer to this code.) As to the robbery counts, the jury found true the allegations that

Guzman committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang, that he

personally used a firearm, and that a principal used a firearm. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b),

12022.53, subds. (b), (e).)

       On appeal, Guzman contends that the judgment must be reversed because of

changes to the law made by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly

Bill 333). First, he argues that under the new law’s amendments to section 186.22 there

is insufficient evidence to support the conviction on the gang offense and the true

findings on the gang-related enhancements (i.e., the gang enhancements and the

principal-use enhancements). Second, he argues that the robbery convictions also cannot

stand because the trial court’s failure to try those offenses apart from the gang-related

charges was prejudicial error under section 1109, which was added by Assembly Bill

333. The People agree with the first argument but not the second.

       We agree with the parties regarding Guzman’s first argument, but we reject his

second argument because the failure to bifurcate under section 1109 was harmless. We

therefore vacate the conviction on the gang offense and the true findings on the gang-

related enhancements, vacate the sentence, and remand for further proceedings. We

otherwise affirm the judgment.

                                              2
                                    BACKGROUND

      A.     The Robberies

      Guzman committed a string of robberies in Cathedral City with his two minor

codefendants—A.T. and E.H.—and other fellow members of the local criminal street
                             1
gang “Barrio Dream Homes.” The group’s first victim, Ismael D., lived in an apartment

with his wife and her parents. Shortly after midnight, as Ismael was walking to his

garage, he noticed a black Chevrolet Silverado truck driving by at a slow pace. The

truck’s driver, whom Ismael identified at trial as Guzman, was wearing a hat with the

letter “D” on it. Guzman was staring at Ismael, prompting Ismael to ask if there was

something he could do to help. Guzman stopped the truck and responded, “Oh, you think

you’re gangster?”

      Guzman then got out of the truck, lifted up his shirt to show Ismael that he had a

gun, and approached Ismael. Guzman said “You think you’re gangster? You think

you’re hard?” and asked if Ismael knew anyone from “Cathedral City,” a question Ismael

understood to be about gang affiliation. When Ismael responded that he did not know

any gang members, A.T. and E.H. got out of the truck and joined Guzman. A.T.

demanded that Ismael empty his pockets, and E.H. struck Ismael in the face with a

shotgun.

      1 E.H.’s appeal was the subject of our decision in People v. E.H. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 467 (E.H.).
                                            3
       At that point, additional individuals armed with weapons exited the truck while

Guzman pointed his gun at Ismael and told him to “hurry up.” Ismael complied and

handed over his phone and driver’s license. Guzman hit Ismael in the face with his gun,

and the rest of the group then joined in and started kicking Ismael and beating him with

their weapons. During the attack, Ismael was able to reach his doorstep and ring the

doorbell with his elbow. Ismael’s wife woke up and saw what was happening through

the window. She yelled that she was calling the police, and the group fled.

       Next, the group went to Duane S.’s apartment and entered with guns drawn as

Duane, his girlfriend (Allison W.), and his brother were drinking and recording rap music

on an electronic tablet. The intruders demanded that everyone get down and empty their

pockets. Guzman announced that he was from Barrio Dream Homes and was there to

collect money that Duane owed to Guzman’s “brother,” another member of the gang.

Both Duane and Allison knew who Guzman was because they had seen him on previous

occasions, and they immediately recognized him.

       Guzman pointed his gun at Duane, said “Where’s my fucking brother’s money?”

and struck Duane three times in the head with the butt of his gun. Guzman took $40 from

Duane and pistol whipped Allison in the head. After threatening to kill Duane and

Duane’s entire family if they notified the police, Guzman yelled “Dream Homes!” One

of the intruders took the tablet that the victims had been using.

       Guzman and his confederates then kicked down the locked door to the bedroom

where Allison’s son and two of his friends were playing video games. The intruders

                                              4
pointed their guns at the boys and told them to empty their pockets. The group took

several items from the boys, including the gaming system and the TV, and one of the

intruders hit one of the boys in the face with a pistol.

       B.     The Investigation

       On the basis of Ismael’s description of the perpetrators’ truck, the police located

the group driving down a Cathedral City street shortly after the robberies. Guzman

refused to pull over and led the police on a chase until he crashed the truck. Guzman and

his associates fled on foot and were able to escape, with the exception of E.H., whom

police found crouched in a bush, in possession of a cell phone that belonged to one of the

victims. Inside the truck, the police found the guns used in the robberies, the stolen

property, the hat that Ismael had seen Guzman wearing, a receipt bearing Guzman’s

name, and Guzman’s fingerprints. The tablet, which had been recording the entire time,

contained an audio recording of the robberies at Duane’s apartment, the group’s

conversations in the truck afterward, and the police pursuit. On the recording, which was

played for the jury at trial, one of the perpetrators yells “Where the fuck is my brother’s

money?” and E.H.’s first name can be heard at various points.

       Approximately one month after the robberies, Guzman was extradited from

Florida to face the charges in this case.

       C.     Verdicts (from the First and Second Trials) and Sentencing

       The jury found Guzman guilty of five counts of home invasion robbery in concert

(§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)), one count of second degree robbery (§ 211), and one count of

                                               5
active gang participation (§186.22, subd. (a)). As to the robbery counts, the jury found

true the allegations that Guzman committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal

street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd.

(b)), and that a principal used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)).

       Before sentencing, Guzman moved for a new trial on the gang offense and the six

gang enhancements on the basis of the prosecution’s posttrial disclosure that, after the

preliminary hearing but before trial, their gang expert had been removed from the

Cathedral City Police Department’s gang unit because of timecard fraud. Apparently

through inadvertence, defense counsel failed to move for a new trial on the principal-use

enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivision (e), which depend on a finding that

the principal committed an enumerated offense (here, robbery) for the benefit of a

criminal street gang. (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)(A).) The court granted the motion, and

the jury at the second trial found Guzman guilty of the gang offense and found the gang

allegations true.

       At sentencing, the trial court imposed a total sentence of 41 years and eight

months in prison for the robbery counts and the personal-use enhancements, and it stayed

the sentences for the substantive gang offense and the six gang enhancements. Also

apparently through inadvertence, the court neglected to impose or stay the sentences for

the principal-use enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)) from the first trial.

                                              6
                                      DISCUSSION

       A.     Section 186.22

       The parties agree that Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 apply

retroactively to this case and that under the new law the evidence is insufficient to

support Guzman’s conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang and the 12

gang-related enhancements (i.e., the six gang enhancements and the six principal-use

enhancements). We concur.

              1. Relevant Background

       Detective Jeff Blachley of the Cathedral City Police Department testified as the

People’s gang expert at Guzman’s second trial. Blachley testified that Barrio Dream

Homes has about 20 to 30 members and is one of two main gangs in Cathedral City, the

other being Barrio Dream Homes’ rival, Barrio Cathedral City. Barrio Dream Homes’

primary activities include vehicle theft, robbery, assault with firearms, murder, and illegal

possession of firearms. Members of the gang charge a “tax” for drug sales made within

their territory, and there are consequences if someone fails to pay a debt. The letter “D”

is one of the gang’s symbols. Blachley identified four “predicate offenses” for which

four different Barrio Dream Homes members were convicted: a robbery for which Diego

Loya was convicted in 2014, a grand theft from a person for which Anthony Vivanco was

convicted in 2014, and a grand theft from a person for which Samuel Reyes was

convicted in 2013.

                                             7
       Blachley opined that Guzman and his codefendants A.T. and E.H. were members

of Barrio Dream Homes. According to Blachley, Barrio Dream Homes controlled the

geographic area where Duane’s apartment was located, whereas the gang’s rival, Barrio

Cathedral City, controlled the area where Ismael lived. Given a hypothetical fact pattern

based on the charged robberies, Blachley opined that the offenses were committed for the

monetary and reputational benefit of Barrio Dream Homes.

              2. Applicable Law

       “Section 186.22 makes it a crime to actively participate in a ‘criminal street gang,’

and the statute provides for enhanced punishment when a defendant is convicted of an

enumerated felony committed ‘for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with

any criminal street gang.’” (E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 476, citing former

§ 186.22, subds. (a), (b)(1).) Assembly Bill 333 made numerous ameliorative changes to

section 186.22 that took effect after Guzman’s second trial but before his sentencing, and

because the judgment in this case is not final, those amendments apply. (People v. Tran

(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran).)

       As relevant here, Assembly Bill 333 made the following changes to section

186.22: First, “whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s

members ‘individually or collectively engage in’ a pattern of criminal activity in order to

constitute a ‘criminal street gang,’ Assembly Bill 333 requires that any such pattern have

been ‘collectively engage[d] in’ by members of the gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics

added.)” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1206.) Second, the new law “narrowed the

                                             8
definition of a ‘pattern of criminal [gang] activity’ by requiring that (1) the last offense

used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date

that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses

were committed by two or more gang ‘members,’ as opposed to just ‘persons’; (3) the

offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a

pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense. (§ 186.22,

subd. (e)(1), (2).)” (Ibid.) Finally, Assembly Bill 333 “narrowed what it means for an

offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any ‘common benefit’

be ‘more than reputational.’ (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)” (Tran, at p. 1206.)

       Those new definitions of “criminal street gang,” “pattern of criminal gang

activity,” and “common benefit” added elements to the substantive gang offense and

gang-related enhancements that did not exist at the time of Guzman’s second trial. (E.H.,

supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 479.) As a result, the People were not required to prove those

additional elements, and the court did not instruct the jury on them. In such cases, we

must reverse unless “‘it appears beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the jury verdict would

have been the same in the absence of the error.” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.)

              3. Analysis

       On this record, we cannot conclude that the failure to require proof of the new

elements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As the People acknowledge, Blachley

testified that, because of the violent way in which the robberies were committed and the

perpetrators’ references to Barrio Dream Homes during the offenses, the robberies would

                                              9
have enhanced the gang’s reputation for violence. The People also acknowledge that

there was no evidence that the predicate offenses were committed by two or more gang

members or that those offenses provided a common benefit to the gang. Because of those

deficiencies in the evidence, the failure to require proof of the new elements was not

harmless.

       “The proper remedy for this type of failure of proof—where newly required

elements were ‘never tried’ to the jury—is to remand and give the People an opportunity

to retry the affected charges” and enhancement allegations. (E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th

at p. 480.) We therefore vacate Guzman’s conviction under section 186.22, subdivision

(a), and the true findings under section 186.22, subdivision (b), and remand for further

proceedings.

       In addition, we agree with the parties that the principal-use firearm enhancements

(§ 12022.53, subd. (e)) are also affected, because the enhancement statute expressly

incorporates section 186.22. (People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 346-348.)

Subdivision (d) of section 12022.53 provides for a 25-years-to-life enhancement for any

person who “personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately causes

great bodily injury . . . or death” during the commission of any felony listed in

subdivision (a). Subdivision (e)(1) of section 12022.53 “imposes vicarious liability” for

all of the statute’s enhancements on any person who aids and abets the enumerated

offense under gang-related circumstances. (People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166,

1171.) That is, the statute imposes the 25-years-to-life enhancement on any principal

                                             10
who “violated subdivision (b) of section 186.22” if at least one principal in the offense

personally used a firearm as defined in subdivision (d). (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)(A),

(B).) Thus, because the principal-use enhancement requires proof of the new elements of

the gang enhancement, Assembly Bill 333’s changes to section 186.22 require us to

vacate the true findings on those enhancements as well. (Lopez, at pp. 347-348.) On

remand, the People shall have the opportunity to retry the gang offense and the gang and

principal-use enhancements.

       B.     Section 1109

       In addition to the substantive changes to section 186.22, Assembly Bill 333 added

section 1109, which requires the court to bifurcate the trial of any gang enhancements

“[i]f requested by the defense.” (§ 1109, subd. (a).) Additionally, subdivision (b) of the

statute requires trial courts to try the substantive offense of gang participation “separately

from all other counts that do not otherwise require gang evidence as an element of the

crime,” whether or not requested by the defense. (§ 1109, subd. (b).)

       Guzman contends that the failure to try the robbery charges separately from the

gang charge and the gang enhancement allegations requires us to vacate his robbery

convictions. The People respond that section 1109 does not apply retroactively to this

case and that, in any event, the failure to bifurcate was harmless given the overwhelming

evidence of Guzman’s guilt on the robbery charges. We agree that the failure to bifurcate

was harmless.

                                              11
              1. Relevant Background

       Officer Alfredo Luna of the Cathedral City Police Department testified as the

People’s gang expert at Guzman’s first trial. Luna’s testimony describing Barrio Dream

Homes and its members, territory, primary activities, and rival (Barrio Cathedral City)

was similar to Blachley’s testimony at Guzman’s second trial. Luna testified that if

someone owes a debt to the gang, then the members of the gang will assault or steal from

that person in retaliation for the unpaid debt. He also testified that members of Barrio

Dream Homes will “hit up” a person by asking where they are “from” in order to

determine the person’s gang affiliation. Like Blachley, Luna opined that the robberies

were committed for the monetary and financial benefit of Barrio Dream Homes.

       Other officers from the Cathedral City Police Department testified as to various

contacts they had with other Barrio Dream Homes members. One officer said that in

2012 he found a firearm magazine (but no gun) after conducting a search of a car

occupied by three members of the gang. Another officer said that he detained a group of

Barrio Dream Homes members after he saw one of them hide a loaded semiautomatic

pistol in a bush. As for predicate offenses, the People presented evidence of the three

offenses used in the second trial, plus an attempted murder conviction and juvenile

adjudications for burglary and assault with a deadly weapon. Guzman was not involved

in any of the predicate offenses.

                                            12
              2. Analysis

       There is a split of authority among our appellate courts concerning whether section

1109 applies retroactively to cases with nonfinal judgments, and the issue is currently

pending before the California Supreme Court. (Compare People v. Perez (2022) 78

Cal.App.5th 192, 207 [section 1109 applies prospectively only], review granted Aug. 17,

2022, S275090, with People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 565-567 [section 1109

applies retroactively under Estrada], review granted July 13, 2022, S274743.) We need

not address the issue to resolve Guzman’s challenge because, even if we assume section

1109 applies retroactively, he cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the failure to

bifurcate the gang charge and the gang enhancement allegations. (See Tran, supra, 13

Cal.5th at p. 1208.)

       Guzman contends that the failure to bifurcate is reversible per se. The argument is

foreclosed by our Supreme Court’s decision in Tran, which held that such a failure does

not constitute structural error. (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1210.)

       We also reject Guzman’s claim that the failure to bifurcate requires reversal unless

it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,

24.) “‘[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due

process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.’” (People v. Tran,

supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209.) In this case, the prosecution’s gang evidence did not render

the trial fundamentally unfair. Much of the gang evidence was also admissible to

                                             13
demonstrate guilt, and the gang evidence not relevant to guilt was not so voluminous or

inflammatory that it altered the nature of the trial.

       Accordingly, we apply the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 standard, which

requires Guzman to establish that it is reasonably probable that he would have obtained a

more favorable result if the robbery charges had been tried separately from the gang

charge and the gang enhancement allegations. (See Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209

[applying Watson]; see also People v. Session (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 723, 734 [same].)

Guzman has not carried that burden.

       A significant amount of the evidence regarding Barrio Dream Homes and

Guzman’s gang membership was relevant to the robbery charges because Guzman

himself injected his gang status into the robberies. Guzman confronted Ismael by asking

him a series of gang-related questions, and when Guzman entered Duane’s apartment, he

identified himself as a gang member and used that status to demand money from Duane.

Luna’s expert testimony regarding hit ups and debt repayment helped the jury to

understand that Guzman’s conduct was not only gang-related but also probative of both

motive and the use of fear, which is an element of robbery. (See People v. Hernandez

(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1050 (Hernandez) [failure to bifurcate was harmless where

“[m]uch of the gang evidence . . . was relevant to the charged offense”].)

       In evaluating the prejudicial effect of the gang evidence that was unrelated to the

robbery charges, we consider whether the evidence supporting the verdict “‘is so

relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively

                                              14
weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains

affected the result.’” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 870.) The evidence that

Guzman committed the charged robberies was overwhelming. At trial, Ismael identified

Guzman as one of the perpetrators, as did Duane and Allison, who were familiar with

Guzman before the incident and whose descriptions of the home invasion were

corroborated by the tablet recording. In addition to those eyewitness identifications, the

truck that the perpetrators were driving on the night of the robberies contained ample

evidence linking Guzman to the robberies. His fingerprints were found inside the truck,

along with the stolen property, one of his receipts, and the hat that Ismael said Guzman

was wearing during the robbery. Given the strength of all of that incriminating evidence,

it is not reasonably likely that Guzman would have obtained a more favorable verdict on

the robbery charges in the absence of the evidence of the uncharged crimes committed by

other members of Barrio Dream Homes. (See Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1051.)

       Finally, the jury was given a limiting instruction regarding its consideration of the

gang evidence, and we presume the jury followed that instruction. (See, e.g., People v.

Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1132.) For all of these reasons, we conclude that the

failure to bifurcate was harmless.

       C.     Guzman’s Remaining Claims Are Moot

       Guzman makes three additional claims of error, all of which relate to sentencing.

First, he argues that the trial court erred under subdivision (c)(2)(C) of section 1385 by

failing to dismiss his personal-use enhancements, because their “application . . . could

                                             15
result in a sentence of over 20 years.” Second, relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30

Cal.App.5th 1157, he argues that the court erred by imposing a restitution fine, a court

operations assessment fee, and a criminal conviction assessment fee without first

determining his ability to pay them. And third, he argues, and the People correctly

concede, that the original and amended sentencing minute orders incorrectly state that he

suffered a prior strike conviction.

       Because we are vacating Guzman’s sentence, those claims are moot. (See People

v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“[W]hen part of a sentence is stricken on review, on

remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial

court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances’”].) At

his resentencing, Guzman may ask the trial court to exercise its discretion under section

1385 to dismiss his personal-use enhancements. (See generally People v. Mendoza

(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294-297 & fn. 6 [describing the scope of the trial court’s

discretion to dismiss an enhancement “in furtherance of justice” under section 1385]).

He may also object to any fines and fees on the ground that he lacks the ability to pay.

And finally, we need not order correction of the sentencing minute orders because they

will be superseded by the new sentencing minutes issued after resentencing. The trial

court should ensure that the new sentencing minutes do not contain the error noted above.

                                       DISPOSITION

       We vacate the conviction under section 186.22, subdivision (a); the true findings

on the gang enhancements under section 186.22, subdivision (b); the true findings on

                                             16
principal-use enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivision (e); and the sentence.

We remand to the trial court to give the People the opportunity to retry the gang offense

and the gang enhancements under the new law as amended by Assembly Bill 333 and

then to resentence Guzman. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                               MENETREZ
                                                                                            J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL
                          J.

                                            17