Court Opinion

ID: 9674722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:34:20.779524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.420375
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority reverses this case based on the authority of Guevara v. State, 585 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). In that case I dissented because, by any reasonable construction, the information alleged that appellant intentionally obstructed his own arrest by use of force against the complainant and that appellant knew that the complainant was a peace officer. The same rationale applies to the present case.
The majority claims that the information does not allege that appellant obstructed or prevented a person whom he knew to be a police officer from making an arrest. In point of fact, however, any reasonable individual reading this indictment must conclude that all of those elements are present.
Article 21.17, V.A.C.C.P., states:
“Words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; it is sufficient to use other words conveying the same meaning, or which include the sense of the statutory words.”
In Nixon v. State, 572 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), and in Ex parte Burkett, 577 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), we held that the exact words of a statute need not be alleged when there is no material difference between the words of the statute and the allegation of the indictment or information.
*858This information is sufficient. The judgment should not be reversed.
Before the court en banc.