Court Opinion

ID: 9675049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:40:39.346498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:31.022400
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice
(concurring).
This case, involving a question of statutory procedure, is of great importance to the governmental agencies charged with enforcing our motor vehicle drivers’ license laws and of course to the public in general.
The particular statutes with which we are concerned are Secs. 10,1 22, and 31 of Art. 6687b, V.A.C.S.
It is my construction of these statutes that they provide for a person whose drivers’ license is sought to be suspended with three separate opportunities for having the facts determined, the first two hearings before administrative officers and the third before a court including the right to a jury.
The first hearing is before a Mayor, City Judge or Justice of the Peace under Sec. 22. The purpose of this hearing is to find the facts regarding the charges filed and certify such findings, if they affirm the charges, to the Department of Public Safety which has the authority to suspend the drivers’ license for a period not to exceed one year.
The second hearing is, in the. event of an appeal as provided in Sec. 22, before the “county court” where the appeal is to be “tried de novo.”
This is the provision which gives rise to confusion. But for section 31, later noticed, it might be argued that by this'provision a full trial before the “county court” was authorized.
My view is, however, that it merely vests the- County Court with the same authority originally vésted in the Mayor, etc., i. e., to find the facts as to the matters charged and, if in the affirmative, to certify them to the Department.
This is the holding of the Eastland Court in Prince v. Garrison, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W.2d 241, which I believe to be correct.
The third hearing is before the County Court at Law (or if there is no such court then before the County Court) where a full trial on the law and facts and with a jury is provided under Sec. 31.
There is considerable doubt in the case before us as to whether appellee attempted to perfect her appeal under Sec. 22 or under Sec. 31.
If the appeal is under Sec. 31 and such an appeal is permissible without first resorting to the appeal under Sec. 22 to the “county court” then we have jurisdiction of this appeal under Art. 2249, V.A.C.S., and since the judgment, no matter how erroneous it may be, finally disposes of the controversy we must dispose of the case on its merits and not dismiss the appeal.
Whether a driver may by-pass the second hearing and proceed directly under Sec. 31 I do not now decide because I do not believe, .from the record, that appellee has knowingly waived her right to. have a fact finding made by the “county court” under Sec. 22.
The record reflects that she was in an understandable state of confusion as to how she should proceed.
I concur in dismissing this appeal because, in my opinion, the appeal proceedings below, imperfect as they are, were under Sec. 22 and not under Seb. 31, and under Prince v. Garrison, supra, no appeal to this Court lies from the affirmative findings made by the “county court” under Sec. 22.
ARCHER, C. J., joins in this opinion.