Court Opinion

ID: 9588752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:38:11.616255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:48:15.548332
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
First, the majority opinion reaches beyond the sole issue in this case and rules that the insurance policy covers punitive damages. Lunceford, defendant in this declaratory judgment action, did not move for summary judgment, the trial court did not deny summary judgment to Lunceford, his entitlement to summary judgment was not briefed below, and he does not assert on appeal that he is entitled to summary judgment. His enumeration of error is that “the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Appellee, Peachtree Casualty Insurance Company.” Yet the majority opinion concludes that “the phrase ‘because of bodily injury or property damages’ must be construed against Peachtree as providing coverage for punitive damages” and that “we must continue to interpret the policy in favor of the insured.” The majority in effect rules that Lunceford is entitled to summary judgment.
But issues not raised and ruled on by the trial court are not decided in this Court. Ford Motor Co. v. Tippins, 225 Ga. App. 128, 130 (1) (483 SE2d 121) (1997); Butler v. State, 172 Ga. App. 405, 406-407 (1) (323 SE2d 628) (1984). We do not create and then rule on cross-motions for summary judgment.
At most in this case, Lunceford would be entitled to raise the issue in the trial court if this case were properly reversed, that is, if Peachtree is not entitled to summary judgment.
The second reason for this dissent is that the policy does not *10cover punitive damages. The trial court correctly applied the rules of interpretation for contracts as found in OCGA § 13-2-2 and came to this conclusion. The undisputed facts support it.
“The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties.” OCGA § 13-2-3; Irvin v. Laxmi, Inc., 266 Ga. 204, 205 (1) (467 SE2d 510) (1996); Hull v. Lewis, 180 Ga. 721 (180 SE 599) (1935). Parol evidence outside the four corners of the contract itself may explain a contract, by way of proving the attendant and surrounding circumstances, when there is ambiguity in the terms. OCGA § 13-2-2 (1). Immediately above the insured’s signature on the application for insurance in a box marked “APPLICANT’S STATEMENT — READ BEFORE SIGNING,” there is a paragraph designated “PUNITIVE DAMAGES.” Therein is the statement, quoted in part in the majority opinion, that the application does not include a request for punitive damages, explaining when and why punitive damages can be awarded in cases in general, and concluding with the information: “Punitive damages are damages which may be awarded above the actual costs of: (1) Repairing/replacing other people’s property; or (2) the actual medical expenses and pain and suffering that you might accidentally cause in an accident.” In the portion of the application designated “COVERAGE & RATING” and “PREMIUMS MUST BE SHOWN HERE,” there is no listing for punitive damages coverage or a punitive damages premium.
It was thus made abundantly clear that punitive damages are a category separate from the two covered categories described, that the policy would not cover punitive damages, and thus that the premium charged for the policy, as specified immediately below Brown’s signature, did not include such coverage.
The policy itself was in conformity with this and plainly stated, in straightforward fashion, what was covered. The whole contract is to be examined in arriving at the construction of any part. OCGA § 13-2-2 (4).
In the middle of the front page, whereon all the particulars with respect to this specific policy are shown, it is stated: “THERE IS NO COVERAGE PROVIDED UNDER THIS POLICY UNLESS A SPECIFIC PREMIUM CHARGE IS SHOWN BELOW.” Charges are listed for four categories of coverage: “Bodily injury Liability,” “Property Damages Liability,” “Damage to your auto — other than Collision,” and “Damage to your auto — Collision.” There is nothing for punitive damages.
The provision quoted at the outset of Division 1 of the majority opinion constitutes the insurer’s promise to pay. It is near the beginning of “Part I — LIABILITY TO OTHERS,” which starts out by naming the types of coverage included: “Coverage A — Bodily Injury. Coverage B — Property Damage.” In the quoted provision, the words *11“bodily injury” and “property damage” are in bold print. In the definitions portion of the policy on the first narrative page of the policy, “Bodily Injury” is defined as meaning “bodily harm to a person and sickness, disease or death that results from it.” “Property Damage” is defined as meaning “damage to or destruction of tangible property.” “Accident,” as used in the provision, is defined as meaning “an unexpected and unintended event that causes bodily injury or property damage and arises out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a car.” Again, the words “bodily injury” and “property damage” are in bolder print.
There is no mention anywhere of punitive damages. Such did not have to be listed among the “Exclusions” because punitive damages are not part of bodily injury damages or property damages in the first place. Indeed, such an exclusion from either one of these two categories would be out of place. Explicitly covered were only those monetary damages which were related to bodily injury and property damage. Monetary damages related to anything else were obviously not covered. Punitive damages are for “something more” than damages for bodily injury and property damage. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 218 Ga. App. 248, 254 (3) (b) (461 SE2d 877) (1995), rev’d on other grounds, Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 267 Ga. 226 (476 SE2d 565) (1996).
Punitive damages relate to the tortfeasor’s lack of respect for others’ well-being, as described in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b), the statute authorizing them in limited circumstances. They are to punish the wrongdoer, and they constitute an award beyond full compensation for the injuries and damage inflicted on the victim. As stated in Roman v. Terrell, 195 Ga. App. 219, 221 (2) (393 SE2d 83) (1990), “[p]unitive damages are not awarded ‘because of’ the bodily injury or property damage sustained by the victim, but rather ‘because of’ some aspect of the tortfeasor’s conduct which caused the victim’s loss: wilfulness, perhaps, or some other aggravating circumstance which prompts the desire to punish the wrongdoer and prevent similar conduct in the future.”
Whether utilizing this logic in statutory interpretation, as in Roman, or in contract construction, as here, the result is the same. It is a matter of the meaning of common English words used. “Because of” was equated with “on account of” by the United States Supreme Court in O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U. S._(117 SC 452, 136 LE2d 454) (1996), in describing the meaning of “on account of.” The Court wrote that other ways of putting the same relational concept, again drawing on the dictionary, are “for the sake of” or “by reason of.” That case dealt with whether punitive damages arise “on account of” personal injury.
Punitive damages are not awarded “for the sake of” or “by reason *12of” or “on account of” bodily injury or property damage. This means that they are not awarded “because of” bodily injury or property damage either. If Brown is found legally liable for punitive damages, she is not “legally liable” for punitive damages “because of bodily injury [or] property damage” but rather because of her reprehensibly irresponsible conduct. The policy covers only compensation.
Decided December 5, 1997
Reconsideration denied December 18, 1997
Freedman & Sinowski, Marc H. Bardack, for appellant.
Chambers, Mabry, McClelland & Brooks, Douglas F. Aholt, Beth S. Reeves, for appellee.
Dawson & Huddleston, Patrick A. Dawson, amicus curiae.
The trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Peachtree should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.