Court Opinion

ID: 9529304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:49:38.903807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:43.979764
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand for a new trial. Section 115 — 10 is in essential conflict with Crawford, hut the majority would allow section 115 — 10’s use of ex parte examinations to continue, by pro forma putting the child on the stand even if she is unable to answer a single question. The majority is complimentary of the questioning of J.E. at the De Witt County sheriff’s department. Whitaker, a social worker employed by McLean County to pursue such investigations, “asked J.E., open-ended questions and resorted to leading questions only to clarify details.” 355 Ill. App. 3d at 789. Whitaker even audiotaped the interview, following the recommendations issued by this court in other cases. 355 Ill. App. 3d at 797. Whitaker did not coach J.E. on what to say (at least so far as we know). 355 Ill. App. 3d at 797. The problem, however, is that neither defendant nor his attorney was present for the interrogation. There was no opportunity to cross-examine. What we have here is the principal evil at which the confrontation clause was directed, the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 192, 124 S. Ct. at 1363. The statement taken by Whitaker was clearly testimonial. The similar tape-recorded statement in Crawford, “knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 194 n.4, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4. Whatever else “testimonial” covers, it applies at a minimum to police interrogations. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374; People v. West, 355 Ill. App. 3d 28, 34-35 (2005). The Whitaker questioning, which had as its goal the production of testimony with an eye toward trial, was a police interrogation. Where the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) works at the behest of and in tandem with the State’s Attorney with the intent and purpose of assisting in the prosecutorial effort, DCFS functions as an agent of the prosecution. T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d at 989-92, 815 N.E.2d at 801-03 (surrogate testimony of social workers); Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 781, 817 N.E.2d at 188. The Whitaker interrogation was clearly a substitute for testimony at trial. The confrontation-clause errors in this case could not have been harmless. See T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95, 815 N.E.2d at 805 (testimonial statements provided significantly more detail about the assault than evidence properly admitted at trial); West, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 41 (reasonable probability admission contributed to convictions); E.H., 355 Ill. App. 3d at 574-75. The majority seeks to justify the admission of this ex parte examination on the basis that J.E. appeared at trial and was “subject to unrestricted cross-examination.” Owens, 484 U.S. at 560, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 958, 108 S. Ct. at 843. “[A] witness is regarded as ‘subject to cross-examination’ when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions.” Owens, 484 U.S. at 561, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 959, 108 S. Ct. at 844. The confrontation clause is not violated where the declarant testifies and is “subject to full and effective cross-examination.” Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 88, 538 N.E.2d at 489. There clearly was not unrestricted cross-examination in this case. A declarant who gives only some preliminary testimony is not “available” as a witness. Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 817 N.E.2d at 189-90. A child witness becomes “unavailable” for purposes of section 115 — 10 when she testifies that the defendant had given her a “bad touch” but then freezes up and refuses to discuss details of the incident. People v. Coleman, 205 Ill. App. 3d 567, 583, 563 N.E.2d 1010, 1020 (1990); Rolandis G., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 817 N.E.2d at 189-90 (key is ability to cross-examine the witness). J.E. did not respond fully and willingly to questions. She would not answer questions about what happened after she and defendant were alone. The State’s Attorney asked four variations of the question: “What happened *** after you went to the ground?” In each instance, J.E. remained silent. Defense counsel was entitled to accept the answers to the prosecutor’s questions and was not required to re-ask the questions, risking antagonizing the jury for no purpose other than to bail out the prosecution. See Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d at 114-15, 699 N.E.2d at 584 (“Catch-22” if defense must either call the child and risk inflaming the jury against it or forgo completely its right to cross-examine). Crawford was not a children’s hearsay case, and neither were Owens and Fenster, the cases cited by the majority. Those unusual cases were not mentioned by Crawford. See Miles, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 869-70, 815 N.E.2d at 47-48 (Cook, J., specially concurring). Inability to testify is not unusual in children’s hearsay cases. In most cases child victims, due to their tender years, are unavailable to testify at trial. T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d at 997, 815 N.E.2d at 807 (O’Mara Frossard, RJ., specially concurring). It is a stretch to justify a statute where witnesses are routinely not available for cross-examination on the basis of the isolated cases cited by the majority. The solution provided by section 115 — 10, allowing children’s statements without cross-examination, provided they are found rehable by a judge, was specifically rejected in Crawford. T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d at 997, 815 N.E.2d at 807 (O’Mara Frossard, RJ., specially concurring). Even where the declarant is “available” for cross-examination, hearsay may not be admitted unless it fits within some recognized exception, statutory or otherwise. The presence of the declarant in court does not excuse compliance with the hearsay rule. People v. Lawler, 142 Ill. 2d 548, 557, 568 N.E.2d 895, 899 (1991). Is there anything left of section 115 — 10? Is it still a recognized exception? Section 115 — 10’s test for admissibility relies on an ad hoc judicial determination of the reliability of the statement, contrary to the very essence of Crawford. R. Ruebner & T. Scahill, Crawford v. Washington, the Confrontation Clause and Hearsay: A New Paradigm for Illinois Evidence Law,_Loy. U. Chi. L.J. (forthcoming). Crawford was very critical of “sufficient safeguards of reliability” hearings. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 200, 124 S. Ct. at 1371 (“amorphous,” “unpredictable,” “demonstrated capacity to admit” statements that should be excluded). It is questionable whether the legislature would reenact portions of a statute which are dependent upon such a highly criticized test. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 372, 671 N.E.2d 700, 712 (1996) (test is whether legislature would have passed the valid portions of the statute absent the invalid portions). We should not try to pick out pieces of section 115 — 10 that might survive Crawford. Fiorito v. Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 531, 540, 236 N.E.2d 698, 704 (1968) (provisions are not separable if they are essentially and inseparably connected in substance). The legislature should decide whether it wants a new section 115 — 10, one which will be very different from the one it enacted. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464, 114 L. Ed. 2d 524, 537-38, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1927 (1991) (construing statutes to uphold them if possible is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature). The applicability of Crawford to section 115 — 10 could not be clearer. Section 115 — 10 is unconstitutional. E.H., 355 Ill. App. 3d at 576. In response to Justice Turner’s special concurrence, it is not my suggestion that this area is off-limits for the legislature. I suggest only that section 115 — 10 as it presently exists raises many questions. The legislature may want to rewrite section 115 — 10, but we should not attempt to do so ourselves.