Court Opinion

ID: 9901332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:09:32.705828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.998726
License: Public Domain

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas P. Keller                                         Theodore E. Rokita
South Bend, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
                                                         Steven J. Hosler
                                                         Deputy Attorney General
                                                         Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Stevie Bradley,                                          November 21, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                         22A-CR-2317
        v.                                               Appeal from the St. Joseph
                                                         Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable John M.
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Marnocha, Judge
                                                         Trial Court Cause No.
                                                         71D02-2109-F1-000020

                                  Opinion by Judge Felix
                              Judges Crone and Brown concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023                   Page 1 of 14
      Felix, Judge.

      Statement of the Case
[1]   Stevie Bradley was charged with multiple offenses stemming from his attack on

      his then-girlfriend. At the first two hearings after Bradley’s arrest and before he

      was represented by counsel, Bradley orally moved for an early trial pursuant to

      Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B) (“C.R. 4(B)”). After a delay in proceedings due to

      Bradley’s competency evaluation, the trial court reset Bradley’s trial date for

      more than a month after Bradley’s C.R. 4(B) 70-day period expired. Bradley

      objected to the new trial date and subsequently filed several motions for

      discharge pursuant to C.R. 4(B).

[2]   The trial court overruled Bradley’s objection and denied his motions for

      discharge based on the trial court’s belief that Bradley’s new trial date had been

      set within the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period. A jury ultimately convicted Bradley of

      most of the charges brought against him, and the trial court sentenced Bradley

      to a total of 40 years. Bradley appeals and raises one issue for our review,

      which we restate as follows: Whether Bradley’s C.R. 4(B) 70-day period

      expired before he was brought to trial.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Bradley was arrested in September 2021 for attacking his then-girlfriend. At his

      first post-arrest hearing on September 16, 2021, Bradley, who was in custody

      and chose to proceed pro se, made a motion for an early trial. The magistrate

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023      Page 2 of 14
      ordered Bradley to file this motion in writing. The magistrate also set bond, but

      Bradley remained in jail.

[4]   Twelve days later, on September 28, 2021, at his second post-arrest hearing,

      which was before the presiding judge, Bradley, who was still pro se, again orally

      moved for an early trial. The trial court did not require Bradley to file this

      motion in writing, granted this motion, and set Bradley’s trial to begin on

      December 6, 2021.

[5]   On November 29, 2021, the trial court sua sponte ordered Bradley to undergo a

      competency evaluation.1 Bradley was deemed competent on March 15, 2022,

      at which time the trial court reset Bradley’s trial to begin on May 4, 2022. In

      choosing this date, the trial court noted that Bradley’s trial had a priority setting

      and was within the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period. Bradley, who was pro se at that

      time, immediately objected to the new trial date as being outside of the C.R.

      4(B) 70-day period.

[6]   On May 4, 2022, before Bradley’s trial began, he moved for a continuance

      based on a discovery issue and also requested the court appoint him counsel.

      The trial court granted the continuance over the State’s objection but found that

      1
        The trial court explained at a later hearing that its decision to sua sponte order a competency evaluation for
      Bradley was based on “in-court and remote conduct by Mr. Bradley”; “a jail e-mail that was received that
      was filed in this case indicating Mr. Bradley had a psychiatric history and there were some issues with respect
      to medication”; and Bradley’s refusal, at that point in time, to be transported to court. Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 5.
      Bradley objected to the last basis, arguing that he did not refuse to come to court; rather, he “refused to take
      his kufi off [his] head,” which allegedly resulted in jail officials not allowing Bradley to come to court. Id. at
      8.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023                                 Page 3 of 14
      the delay in Bradley’s trial was attributable to him. The trial court reset the trial

      for July 18, 2022.

[7]   On June 16, 2022, Bradley filed a motion for discharge pursuant to C.R. 4(B);

      the trial court denied the motion approximately one month later. On July 5,

      2022, due to a change in Bradley’s appointed counsel, the trial court reset the

      trial for August 8, 2022.

[8]   Before Bradley’s trial began on August 8, 2022, Bradley again moved for

      discharge based on his trial being set after the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period expired;

      the trial court denied this motion. After a three-day trial, the jury ultimately

      convicted Bradley of attempted murder as a Level 1 felony, domestic battery

      resulting in serious bodily injury as a Level 5 felony, battery by means of a

      deadly weapon as a Level 5 felony, intimidation as a Level 5 felony, and

      aggravated battery as a Level 3 felony. The trial court sentenced Bradley to a

      total of 40 years. This appeal ensued.

      Discussion and Decision2
[9]   Bradley contends that he was entitled to discharge under C.R. 4(B) because,

      while he was incarcerated,3 more than 70 days elapsed between the date he

      2
        Bradley failed to include citations to the Record on Appeal or Appendix in his Statement of the Case in
      violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(5). Bradley also failed to include a statement of the applicable
      standard of review in his Argument in violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b). Nevertheless, we address the
      merits of his claim.
      3
        According to the trial court’s sentencing order, Bradley was incarcerated for 358 days when the trial court
      sentenced him on September 7, 2022. Because the parties do not address whether and when Bradley was

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023                               Page 4 of 14
       moved for an early trial and the date his trial began. In evaluating alleged

       violations of C.R. 4(B), we review factual findings for clear error and questions

       of law de novo. Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608, 614 (Ind. 2020) (citing Austin

       v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1040 & n.10 (Ind. 2013); State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d

       994, 1002 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 701).

[10]   C.R. 4 was adopted to implement a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy

       trial; it was not adopted to discharge defendants. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1037

       (citing Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind. 2012)). C.R. 4(B) in

       particular allows an incarcerated defendant to “move for an early trial” and

       then be “discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) days.” Ind. Crim.

       Rule 4(B)(1). An incarcerated defendant can trigger C.R. 4(B) at any stage of

       his criminal prosecution, so the 70-day clock does not begin to run until the

       incarcerated defendant makes the necessary motion. Watson, 155 N.E.3d at

       615–16.

[11]   Bradley argues that after he was deemed competent on March 15, 2022, the

       trial court erred in setting his trial for May 4, 2022, because that date was after

       his C.R. 4(B) 70-day period expired. The State contends that Bradley’s C.R.

       4(B) 70-day period was extended beyond May 4, 2022, due to congestion of the

       incarcerated, we assume based on the trial court’s calculation of credit time that Bradley was incarcerated for
       the duration of the proceedings in this case.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023                               Page 5 of 14
       court’s calendar. The law and record in this case compel us to agree with

       Bradley.

[12]   The C.R. 4(B) 70-day period includes “each and every day after the filing of

       such motion for early trial . . . including every Saturday, every Sunday, and

       every holiday” unless the seventieth day is “a Saturday, a Sunday, or a holiday,

       then such trial may be commenced on the next day thereafter, which is not a

       Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” Crim. R. 4(B)(2).

[13]   The C.R. 4(B) 70-day period does not include any calendar days that are

       attributable to the defendant moving for a continuance, to a delay caused by the

       defendant’s act, or to congestion of the court calendar. Crim. R. 4(B)(1), (F).

       When defendant-caused delays occur, the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period is “extended

       by the amount of the resulting period of such delay.” Crim. R. 4(F).

       “However, if the defendant causes any such delay during the last thirty (30)

       days of any period of time set by operation of [C.R. 4], the State may petition

       the trial court for an extension of such period for an additional thirty (30) days.”

       Id.

[14]   For example, if a defendant requests a competency evaluation of himself, then

       any resulting delay is chargeable to him; that is, any delay caused by the

       defendant’s request for a competency evaluation is not counted in calculating

       the expiration date of the 70-day early trial period. Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d

       1143, 1150 (Ind. 2011) (citing Baldwin v. State, 411 N.E.2d 605, 606 (Ind.

       1980)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023      Page 6 of 14
[15]   For the purposes of this opinion, we assume that Bradley’s early trial period

       began when he made his second motion for early trial on September 28, 2021.4

       If no delays had occurred here, Bradley’s C.R. 4(B) 70-day period would have

       expired on December 7, 2021. The trial court originally set Bradley’s trial to

       begin on December 6, 2021. On November 29, 2021, 62 days after the trial

       court granted Bradley’s early trial motion, the trial court vacated the December

       6, 2021, trial date and sua sponte ordered a competency evaluation of Bradley.

       Bradley and the State agree that the resulting 107-day delay is not chargeable to

       the State. Appellant’s Br. at 14 (citing Baldwin, 411 N.E.2d at 606); Appellee’s

       Br. at 12 (citing Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1150).

[16]   When Bradley was deemed competent on March 15, 2022, the State had eight

       more days—up to and including March 23, 2022—to bring Bradley to trial

       unless Bradley delayed trial or the trial court found congestion of the calendar

       prevented such a quick turnaround. See Crim. R. 4(B)(1)–(2), 4(F). In looking

       for new dates for Bradley’s trial, the trial court stated: “I’m going to treat your

       original motion for a speedy trial as a continuing motion. So we are at day -- let

       me see here -- 74. 70 days would be 144.” 2d Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 4. It is

       difficult to discern what the trial court meant by “continuing motion,” but it

       appears the trial court calculated the new end date for Bradley’s early trial

       4
         While Bradley raises an issue regarding when the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period began, that issue is not relevant
       to our analysis. Accepting, without deciding, the State’s contention that Bradley’s early trial period started
       on September 28, 2021, the later of the two dates, is accurate, the result remains the same—a C.R. 4(B)
       violation occurred.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023                               Page 7 of 14
       period as 70 days after March 15, 2022, as if Bradley had made a subsequent

       early trial motion. See Finnegan v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1186, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App.)

       (citing Minneman v. State, 441 N.E.2d 673, 677 (Ind. 1982), reh’g denied; Hahn v.

       State, 67 N.E.3d 1071, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied), trans. denied,

       209 N.E.3d 1175 (Ind. 2023).

[17]   The trial court ultimately set Bradley’s trial to begin on May 4, 2022, to which

       Bradley objected as being outside of the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period. The trial

       court responded to Bradley’s objection in relevant part as follows:

               Well, you’re correct in your timing issue with respect to all of
               this; but nonetheless, I think an adequate record was made on all
               of those dates which later led to my belief that there might be
               some competency issues that tolls or extends the amount of
               time[.]

       2d Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 5.

[18]   The trial court further explained its March 15, 2022, statements in ruling on

       Bradley’s June 15, 2022, motion for discharge:

               The trial was vacated on November 29 as a result of the Court’s
               concern over a competency issue. . . . We had the doctors
               evaluate Mr. Bradley, and on March 15 of 2022, the trial was set
               within -- set for May 4. That trial was set within 70 days. I did not
               require Mr. Bradley to file yet a new written motion for an early trial,
               which I think would be required. That time, while the competency
               issue was pending, does not count against the State for purposes
               of discharge in this case.

       Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 5–6 (emphases added).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023               Page 8 of 14
[19]   Reading all these statements together reveals that when the trial court set

       Bradley’s trial for May 4, 2022, the trial court was under the belief that

           1. Bradley was required to file a new written C.R. 4(B) motion after he was
              deemed competent; and
           2. the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period was reset rather than merely tolled by the
              competency evaluation it sua sponte ordered.

       2d Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 4–5; Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 5–6.

[20]   As noted above, delays and continuances generally extend (i.e., toll, pause,

       suspend) the 70-day early trial period as set forth in C.R. 4(B)(1) and (F).

       Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that the dismissal and refiling of

       the same charges does not automatically reset the starting date of the C.R. 4(B)

       70-day period. Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ind. 1997) (citing State ex

       rel. Turner v. Hancock Circuit Court, 385 N.E.2d 447, 448 (Ind. 1979)). Instead,

       the defendant’s previous early trial motion is considered to still be effective, so

       the clock stops running on the day the charges are dismissed and begins running

       again on the day that the same charges are refiled or that the defendant is

       arrested thereon, whichever is later. Id. (citing Turner, 385 N.E.2d at 448).

[21]   If the dismissal and refiling of the same charges do not reset the C.R. 4(B) 70-

       day period, and if a defendant’s request for a competency evaluation of himself

       does not reset the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period, then a trial court’s sua sponte

       ordering of a competency evaluation for a defendant does not reset it, either.

       Likewise, if a defendant is not required to refile a motion for early trial when

       the State dismisses and refiles the same charges or when the defendant requests

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023         Page 9 of 14
       a competency evaluation for himself, then it makes sense that a defendant

       would not be required to refile such a motion after a trial court sua sponte

       orders he undergo a competency evaluation. At the very least, we cannot find

       any support for the contentions that a competency evaluation nullifies a

       defendant’s C.R. 4(B) motion or that a competency evaluation resets the

       defendant’s early trial period.

[22]   Therefore, absent any delay caused by Bradley or a finding by the trial court

       that Bradley’s trial had to be scheduled after March 23, 2022, due to court

       congestion or emergency, Bradley’s C.R. 4(B) 70-day period expired on March

       23, 2022. There is no evidence in the record that Bradley caused any delay that

       would have necessitated setting his trial for May 4, 2022.

[23]   Further, there is nothing in the record that adequately describes court

       congestion or emergency so as to justify scheduling Bradley’s trial after March

       23, 2022. The State points to the following statements by the trial court on

       March 15, 2022, to support its assertion that court congestion prevented the

       trial court from scheduling Bradley’s trial within the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period:

               THE COURT: . . . I know, Mr. Lenyo, that you are backup
               counsel; and I know that sometimes a pro se situation involves
               issues that often complicate a trial; but in your view of the
               evidence, do you think this can be done in two days?

               MR. LENYO: I think that there’s a possibility.

               THE COURT: Well, possibility doesn’t give me much pause.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023      Page 10 of 14
               MR. LENYO: It’s two or three is what I think.

               THE COURT: I don’t have three days that week. Well, I’m
               going to push it ahead a little bit. Cause is set for trial May 4.
               It’s a priority case setting because of –

               DEFENDANT: I object, your Honor.

       2d Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 4. These statements do not adequately establish that the

       trial court could not schedule Bradley’s trial within his early trial period due to

       court congestion.

[24]   While the magic words “court congestion” need not be used, a trial court must

       create a record of some kind that clearly indicates the defendant’s trial cannot

       be scheduled within his early trial period due to court congestion. See Austin,

       997 N.E.2d at 1039 (quoting Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. 1995)).

       The Indiana Supreme Court has held that

               [u]pon appellate review, a trial court’s finding of congestion will
               be presumed valid and need not be contemporaneously explained
               or documented by the trial court. However, a defendant may
               challenge that finding, by filing a Motion for Discharge and
               demonstrating that, at the time the trial court made its decision to
               postpone trial, the finding of congestion was factually or legally
               inaccurate. Such proof would be prima facie adequate for
               discharge, absent further trial court findings explaining the
               congestion and justifying the continuance.

       Id. (quoting Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 552).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023         Page 11 of 14
[25]   In other words, if a trial court finds that court congestion (or emergency)

       prevented scheduling the defendant’s trial within the C.R. 4(B) 70-day period,

       the trial court does not have to explain or document the reasons underpinning

       that finding. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1039 (quoting Clark, 659 N.E.2d at 552).

       Once the defendant challenges that finding, however, the trial court must make

       further findings (which need not be reduced to writing) explaining the

       congestion and justifying the continuance. Id. at 1039, 1043 (quoting Clark, 659

       N.E.2d at 552).

[26]   For instance, in Austin v. State, Austin, the incarcerated defendant, had moved

       for an early trial pursuant to C.R. 4(B), and trial was set shortly before his early

       trial period ended. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1041. Approximately a week before

       his trial, the State moved to continue Austin’s trial due to court congestion that

       was predominantly caused by the State’s need to try another criminal defendant

       whose cause predated Austin’s cause, who had moved for a speedy trial, and

       who had been in custody for nearly two years. Id. at 1041–42. The trial court

       granted the State’s motion without hearing. Id. at 1042.

[27]   At the next pretrial conference, Austin objected to any continuance of his trial.

       Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1042. Nevertheless, the trial court noted the other

       criminal defendant’s speedy trial motion as the basis for a finding of congestion

       in Austin’s case and, over Austin’s objection, rescheduled Austin’s trial outside

       of his original C.R. 4(B) 70-day window. Id. Once Austin’s original early trial

       period ended, he moved for discharge and challenged the trial court’s

       congestion finding. Id. In particular, Austin presented evidence that the trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023      Page 12 of 14
       court’s calendar could have accommodated his trial within his early trial period.

       Id.

[28]   At the hearing on Austin’s discharge motion, the trial court clarified its calendar

       and why Austin’s trial could not have been held as he contended. Austin, 997

       N.E.2d at 1042. The State also argued that trying Austin during the alleged

       availability was not logistically feasible. Id. The trial court subsequently

       maintained Austin’s new trial date and thus implicitly denied his motion for

       discharge. Id. In reviewing these events, the Indiana Supreme Court ultimately

       determined that the trial court’s further findings were not clearly erroneous, so

       the trial court did not err in denying Austin’s motion for discharge. Id. at 1043.

[29]   The facts here are demonstrably different from those in Austin. First, the State

       did not file a motion for continuance based on insufficient time to try Bradley

       due to congestion of the trial court’s calendar, as required by C.R. 4(B)(1) and

       as the State did in Austin. Because the State did not make such a motion, there

       is no ruling from the trial court from which we could infer that Bradley’s trial

       was set outside his early trial period due to court congestion.

[30]   Second, the trial court did not make any statements on the record or in writing

       that can be construed to denote court congestion. In setting Bradley’s trial after

       he was deemed competent, the trial court stated that it was “going to push

       [Bradley’s trial date] ahead a little bit” because it did not “have three days that

       week.” 2d Supp. Tr. Vol. II at 4. The record does not reveal to which week the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023      Page 13 of 14
       trial court was referring, thereby rendering these statements ambiguous in

       isolation.

[31]   When read together with the statements the trial court made in ruling on

       Bradley’s June 15, 2022, motion for discharge, as quoted above, the record

       demonstrates that the trial court’s “push ahead” language indicates that it was

       considering setting Bradley’s trial for an unspecified date later than May 4,

       2022. In other words, as discussed above, the record reveals the trial court

       mistakenly believed that Bradley’s C.R. 4(B) 70-day period reset once he was

       deemed competent. On this record, we are constrained to conclude that the

       record does not contain any indication or finding of court congestion.

       Consequently, there was nothing for Bradley to challenge under the framework

       described by the Indiana Supreme Court in Austin.

       Conclusion
[32]   In sum, without any evidence in the record demonstrating that Bradley’s trial

       could not be scheduled until May 4, 2022, due to some delay caused by

       Bradley, court congestion, or emergency, we are required to conclude that

       Bradley’s May 4, 2022 trial date fell outside of his C.R. 4(B) 70-day period.

       Accordingly, Bradley should have been discharged after his C.R. 4(B) 70-day

       period expired on March 23, 2022. We therefore vacate Bradley’s convictions.

[33]   Vacated.

       Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2317| November 21, 2023     Page 14 of 14