Court Opinion

ID: 9869518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:31:03.86132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:02.386161
License: Public Domain

KAPSNER, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 47] If this, stop and later seizure were to be constitutionally acceptable, it would have to be solely on the basis of what happened in Burleigh County and not with any reference to what happened in Stark County. What was observed in Stark County added no objective basis for the eventual detention and search. In Stark County, two men were seen in a car with out-of-state plates. The car was going slightly under the speed limit. The driver had his hands at “ten and two” and did not look at the officer driving beside him. The driver appeared to talk out of the side of his mouth to a passenger whose posture would indicate he was sleeping and the driver reached into the back seat. These mundane observations add very little to the calculus of a finding of reasonable suspicion. What the majority opinion does not mention is that the two men in the car with out-of-state license plates are black. In my opinion, the appellants were the subjects of a blatant case of “driving while black.”
[¶ 48] Tesfaye and Adan may or may not have come to the attention of law enforcement in Burleigh County for speeding, but the fact is Officer Clark in Stark County directed another officer in another county to be on the lookout for the car on the basis of information that Officer Clark acknowledged gave him no reason to stop the car. It is also worth noting Officer Clark had to turn his vehicle around after spotting the appellants traveling in the opposite direction. He followed the vehicle for roughly seven miles before deciding to disengage.
[¶ 49] At the suppression hearing, Officer Clark was asked by defense counsel on cross-examination:
Q. Could you see the driver and his features?
A. I saw a male driver. Yes.
Q. Did you take any notice of his skin color?
A. I observed he was African American. Yes.
Q. Did that play into your suspicion?
A. No.
Officer Clark testified the fact the men appeared to be African-American “played no role” in his decision to tell another officer in another county “if you could try and keep an eye out for the vehicle and if you can get a stop on it, see what’s going on.” Officer Clark could not remember if he had relayed the racial information to Officer Edwards. Officer Edwards observed the car in Morton County, had to turn around, and ultimately stopped the car in Burleigh County for following too close and traveling 65 miles per hour in a 60-mile-per-hour zone.
[¶ 50] Even if the directed stop was a total pretext, there is no license to drive five miles over the speed limit, so the stop for speeding was valid. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Officer Edwards issued a warning to Adan, which completed the purpose of the stop.
*852[¶51] Reasonable and articulable suspicion was necessary to justify the continued seizure of the two men. Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614-15, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015); State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 10, 662 N.W.2d 242. I dissent from the majority’s holding that reasonable and articulable suspicion justified holding the two men for forty-five minutes to bring a drug dog to the scene. “[A] dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.” Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615.
[¶ 52] Both the district court and the majority rely on events, in Stark County to bolster the conclusion that reasonable and articulable suspicion exists because the driver was “nervous.” Aside from the fact he was African-American and the car had out-of-state license plates, this assumption is made from the fact that he was driving in Stark County within the speed limit, with his hands on “ten and two,” did not look at the officer driving beside him, and possibly placed something in the back seat. These facts do not tend to lead to a conclusion a crime was being or about to be committed, regardless of any level of “training or experience.” What suggestion of criminal activity does this articulate? The officer and the majority rely on “nervousness” but being nervous is not criminal and unless this Court is going to reverse Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 19, 662 N.W.2d 242, it is not sufficient.
[¶ 53] The fact Adan was in a vehicle with an out-of-state license plate should add little or nothing to the calculus of whether reasonable suspicion exists. “It is wholly improper to assume that an individual is more likely to be engaged in criminal conduct because of his state of residence[.]” Vasquez v. Lewis, 834 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir.2016), I agree with the Tenth Circuit that “it is time to abandon the pretense that state citizenship is a permissible basis upon which to justify the detention and search of out-of-state motorists[.]” Id. “Absent a demonstrated extraordinary circumstance, the continued use of state residency as a justification for the fact of or continuation of a stop is impermissible.” Id. In this case, the stop was over as soon as the warning was given to Adan.
[¶ 54] Officer Edwards articulates his reasons for finding the driver suspicious in a manner that suggests he is rejecting common sense reasons for his observations in favor of finding them suspicious. According to Officer Edwards, a man without a coat who has walked through 30-degree windy weather does not shiver because he is cold:
Besides the quivering shoulders, I didn’t see any quivering of, like, the mouth. When you get cold, your teeth chatter. I didn’t see quivering of any other area except just the shoulders, where it could be nerve induced, I guess.
[¶ 55] Officer Edwards finds the driver’s and passenger’s stories inconsistent, The driver said he dropped another passenger off “in Watford City,” the passenger said “in the Williston area,” not, as the majority says, “in Williston.”
[¶ 56] The reason for finding the presence of a GPS suspicious borders on ridiculous. GPS devices have become so ubiquitous in today’s technological society that the presence of a GPS unit in a vehicle traveling on an interstate- highway should not be surprising, much less suspicious. Officer Edwards carefully explained that drug traffickers “are doing cross country travel where they don’t know where they’re going.” Adan and Tesfaye’s trip was from St. Cloud, Minnesota, to Watford City.
So from Fargo to Watford City, which would consist of, typically, traveling *853along 1-94 and taking one right-hand turn on Highway 85. .
Q, So it’s just a simple trip with one turn is something you typically wouldn’t need a GPS for?
A. Correct.
Apparently North Dakotans and those who travel here have no need of technology to find locations within the state, or, we are suspicious if we use it. If that is the case, every driver with a “smart phone” is suspicious.
[¶ 57] Officer Edwards found it suspicious that the two men were traveling across two states, but he did not see luggage in the ear. He acknowledged he did not ask them if they had luggage or look in the trunk before reaching this conclusion. Officer Edwards also noted Officer Clark made him aware that Adan and his passenger were driving a rental car. There- is nothing inherently suspicious in an individual’s use of a rental car. See, e.g,, United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1137 (8th Cir.1998) (holding there was -nothing inherently suspicious about the defendant’s use of a rental car); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir.1997) (finding the defendant’s use of a rental car was not inherently suspicious).
[¶ 58] Officer Edwards found the presence of an air freshener, an Ozone spray, and a cigarette lighter suspicious. We have said the presence of odor maskers can contribute to reasonable and articula-ble suspicion. State v. Franzen, 2010 ND 244, ¶ 16, 792 N.W.2d 533. However, Officer Edwards testified neither Adan or his passenger seemed under the influence or exhibiting strange behavior; Officer Edwards did not detect any odor of marijuana; Adan stopped appropriately when pulled over, although he left his turn signal on; Adan had no trouble locating his driver’s license; Office Edwards saw nothing that indicated drug paraphernalia; he saw no signs that Adan had ingested drugs; he saw no indicators of any driving impairment; Adan did not appear to be intoxicated; there was nothing unusual about Adan’s eye color; Adan was “very decent to talk to. Upbeat, almost talkative. Very cooperative” until he was told he was being detained to bring a drug dog;
[¶ 59] While reasonable suspicion is something determined under the totality of the circumstances, such a finding should not be created based upon piling up of innocuous facts. It is “impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” Beck, 140 F.3d at 1137. The concrete reasons in this case go no further than simply claiming each innocuous fact is suspicious in connection with the officers’ “training and experience.”'
[¶ 60] Officer Edwards issued a warning about fifteen minutes after he stopped Adan. At that point the purpose of the stop was complete. Officer Edwards decided to detain Adan and call for a drug dog when Adan declined his request to search the car. At that time, Officer Edwards had nothing more than a hunch, which proved to be a good hunch, there were drugs in the car. “[A] search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success.” United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948). “[A] mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion[.]” Navarette v. California, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014). As the majority notes, “[t]he question is whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged *854in unlawful activity.” State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 538.
[¶ 61] While there were odor maskers present in this case like in Franzen, based on Officer Edwards’ description of Adan’s demeanor and behavior, there was no “extreme and persistent nervousness” or evidence of a drug culture to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. 2010 ND 244, ¶ 14, 792 N.W.2d 533. In this case, the arresting officer tried to rely on the absence of illegal activity, even law-abiding activity, to suggest that reasonable and articulable suspicion existed. This driver was sought out initially by Officer Edwards for law-abiding driving in Stark County. He found it suspicious to have a GPS for a “simple trip with one turn.” Officer Edwards was asked whether his “training and experience” would suggest drug traffickers are not under the influence when they are arrested. His answer was that “videos” indicate people who are transporting are not under the influence. This suggests that it is equally suspicious to appear and not to appear to be under the influence of a substance.
[¶ 62] Whether reasonable and articu-lable suspicion exists is a question of law and fully reviewable on appeal. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 6, 662 N.W.2d 242. It must be determined under the totality of the circumstances. Navarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1687. The courts are gatekeepers to this decision. “[A] traffic stop ‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614-15 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)). What is articulated by an arresting officer must be reasonable and must pass a credulity test. If it does not, a completed valid stop cannot be extended in the hopes of drug interdiction. Rodriguez, at 1614-15. What Officer Edwards articulated passes neither test. I would reverse and allow Adán and Tesfaye to withdraw them guilty pleas.
[¶ 63] Carol Ronning Kapsner