Court Opinion

ID: 9726746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:06:13.220595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:30.247010
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. When read together, sections 510(d) and 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, pars. 510(d), 513) authorize the court to enter an order against a deceased parent’s estate for the payment of college expenses of an emancipated child. Section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act governs the modification and termination of provisions for maintenance, support and property disposition. Under section 510(d), “[wjhen a parent obligated to pay support dies, the amount of support may be modified, revoked or commuted to a lump sum payment.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 510(d).) I do not believe that the legislature intended the term “obligated” to mean currently obligated, or obligated under an existing court order. There is no rationale for such an interpretation which could produce harsh and artificial results. For example, a parent may be under no current obligation to pay support because of illness, unemployment, or simply failure of personal service. If the parent then dies, under the majority’s interpretation, the child cannot assert a claim for support against the parent’s estate. The fortuitous death of the parent controls the court’s disposition, and the child is severely prejudiced. Such a result is not in harmony with the legislature’s intent to mitigate the harm to children as a result of divorce. To the contrary, according to the court’s interpretation in Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382, the tenor of section 510(d) is that the death of the parent should not prejudice the child. Section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act governs support for nonminor children and educational expenses. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 513.) Under section 513, the court, as equity requires, may make provisions for the education of either minor or emancipated children. Application for educational support may be made before or after such child has obtained majority age. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 513.) Application pursuant to section 513 is considered to be a modification of the divorce decree, regardless of whether the decree contains any provision requiring either parent to contribute to the child’s college education. (Wait v. Wait (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 271, 510 N.E.2d 600.) The court retains jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree as changing circumstances warrant. (In re Marriage of Albiani (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 519, 512 N.E.2d 30.) Under the general provisions outlined above, there is no question that notwithstanding the absence of any such provision in the original divorce decree, an emancipated child has a right to assert a claim for college expenses against a living parent. (Wait v. Wait, 158 Ill. App. 3d 271, 510 N.E.2d 600.) I do not believe that the legislature intended a fortuitous circumstance, such as the death of the parent, to sever the child’s entitlement to assert a claim. In conclusion, section 510(d) provides in part that “provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child, except as otherwise provided herein, but not by the death of a parent obligated to support the child.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 510(d).) The statutory language “or otherwise provided herein” refers to section 513. (In re Estate of Champagne (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 560, 505 N.E.2d 1352.) When read together, the two statutes provide that the parent’s obligation to support a child and any obligation to pay for educational expenses that may arise under section 513 are not terminated by the death of the parent. When so interpreted the statutes provide, as they were intended to, that children of divorced parents are protected from loss through disinheritance of support and educational opportunities.