Court Opinion

ID: 9410665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 05:00:32.293626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:59.409864
License: Public Domain

In the

     United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2404
TODD M. REARDON, SR.,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

JESSE DANLEY, et al.,
                                               Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                    Central District of Illinois.
             No. 21-cv-02260 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.
                     ____________________

       ARGUED MAY 19, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 21, 2023
                ____________________

   Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
    FLAUM, Circuit Judge. In 2020, Todd Reardon ran for State’s
Attorney in Coles County, Illinois, against the incumbent,
Jesse Danley. After losing the election, Reardon brought a
§ 1983 lawsuit against various public oﬃcials (including Dan-
ley), the City of Mattoon, and Coles County, alleging viola-
tions of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss,
and Reardon appeals. For the following reasons, we aﬃrm.
2                                                         No. 22-2404

                            I. Discussion

    We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Kap Holdings, LLC v. Mar-Cone Appliance Parts Co., 55 F.4th 517,
523 (7th Cir. 2022). To determine if the complaint states a plau-
sible claim for relief, we take “as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations and mak[e] all possible inferences from the allega-
tions in the plaintiff’s favor.” Roe v. Dettelbach, 59 F.4th 255,
261–62 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
   This litigation stems from three events: (1) a subpoena for
Reardon’s Facebook data; (2) the removal of a Reardon cam-
paign sign; and (3) the Mattoon Chief of Police’s endorsement
of Danley on Facebook. We take each in turn, including only
the allegations pertinent to our analysis. 1
    A. Facebook Subpoena
    In October 2019, Danley and the Mattoon Police Depart-
ment (MPD) subpoenaed Reardon’s Facebook account infor-
mation as part of an investigation into his potential involve-
ment in a perjury/bribery case. In response, Reardon filed a
motion to quash the subpoena in Coles County Circuit Court.
Judge Thomas O’Shaughnessy denied the motion, finding the
subpoena was properly issued. However, he declined to re-
lease the documents to the State’s Attorney until after a prob-
able cause hearing. Now, Reardon seeks to enjoin Judge
O’Shaughnessy from releasing the documents.

    1 We note that Reardon’s complaint and opening brief are somewhat
convoluted. His decision not to file a reply brief compounds the problem.
Against this backdrop, we endeavor to decipher Reardon’s arguments but
indicate where his shortcomings result in waiver.
No. 22-2404                                                                  3

    Section 1983 curtails the availability of injunctive relief
against judicial officers. When an officer acts in his judicial ca-
pacity—as Judge O’Shaughnessy indisputably did here—in-
junctive relief will only be granted if “a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; see also Smith v. City of Hammond, 388 F.3d 304, 307 (7th
Cir. 2004) (upholding dismissal of claims for injunctive relief
against state court judge as foreclosed by § 1983). The com-
plaint does not allege that either exception applies here, and
Reardon only cursorily argues—in one sentence—that declar-
atory relief was unavailable to him. Consequently, his claim
fails. 2 See Lanahan v. County of Cook, 41 F.4th 854, 866 (7th Cir.
2022) (holding that an appellant waived a challenge that was
“perfunctory, undeveloped, and cursory”).
    B. Campaign Sign
    Stan Metzger, a Coles County Board member, removed a
Reardon campaign sign from a resident’s lawn a few weeks
before the election. During a subsequent Board meeting,
Metzger explained that he did so because he mistakenly be-
lieved the sign was placed there without permission. Based
on this explanation, the Board determined that no further ac-
tion needed to be taken. Reardon construes these actions as

    2  Reardon seems to contend that Judge O’Shaughnessy is not entitled
to immunity because he has retained the documents without subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction. However, this argument is “unsupported by pertinent au-
thority” and therefore waived. Greenbank v. Great Am. Assurance Co., 47
F.4th 618, 629 (7th Cir. 2022). Reardon also waived his claim seeking an
injunction against Danley by, among other things, not “engag[ing] with
the reasoning of the district court,” Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59
F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023), which abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971).
4                                                         No. 22-2404

Metzger “us[ing] formal County meetings as a bully pul-
pit … to defend his criminal conduct,” and alleges that, by do-
ing so, Metzger interfered with his First Amendment rights.
    To state a § 1983 claim, Reardon must suﬃciently allege
that Metzger was “acting under color of state law,” Bohanon v.
City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation
omitted)—that is, “exercising power … made possible only
because [Metzger was] clothed with the authority of state
law,” DiDonato v. Panatera, 24 F.4th 1156, 1159 (7th Cir. 2022)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This require-
ment operates as an important limitation: “[M]erely private
conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,” cannot
lead to § 1983 liability. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation omitted).
    Reardon’s claim falters from the start. His complaint con-
tains no allegations that Metzger acted under color of state
law when he took the sign, that the act was related to his po-
sition as a Coles County Board member, or that he possessed
any State authority to remove it. See First Midwest Bank v. City
of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021) (“An action is not
‘under color of state law’ merely because it is performed by a
public employee or officer ….”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 389
(mem.). Reardon nevertheless urges that when considering
“the totality of [Metzger’s] actions,” he was acting under color
of state law. He emphasizes that, in addition to taking the
sign, Metzger “invoked his position as a Coles County Board
Member [and] inject[ed] his own activity of depriving [Rear-
don’s] civil rights into” the Board meeting, causing the Board
to “retroactively adopt[]” Metzger’s conduct. 3 However, the

    3 To the extent Reardon argues that Metzger’s presentation of the is-
sue to the Board constitutes a First Amendment violation, he provided no
No. 22-2404                                                                5

district court correctly concluded that whether the Board ret-
roactively adopted Metzger’s wrongful actions goes to Coles
County’s liability, not Metzger’s.
    To that end, Reardon also appears to argue that Coles
County is liable under § 1983 based on the Board’s alleged rat-
iﬁcation of Metzger’s conduct. To be liable under a ratiﬁcation
theory, Coles County must have “approve[d] both [Metzger’s]
conduct and the basis for that conduct, i.e., [Metzger’s] moti-
vation.” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 618 (7th Cir. 2019)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Reardon’s
complaint falls short, yet again, because it fails to allege that
Metzger revealed his alleged unconstitutional motive to the
Board, let alone that the Board aﬃrmatively approved of that
motive or Metzger’s conduct. See Darchak v. City of Chi. Bd. of
Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 630 (7th Cir. 2009) (aﬃrming award of
summary judgment to Chicago Board of Education where
there was “no evidence … that the Board was aware of any
potential retaliatory basis for the [recommendation]” that it
adopted); Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 435 (7th Cir.
2011) (concluding that § 1983 claim failed where there was
nothing suggesting that the “‘ratifying’ authority shared the
unconstitutional motivation of the initial decisionmaker”).
    C. Facebook Endorsement
    Approximately two weeks before the election, Jason Tay-
lor, the Chief of Police for the City of Mattoon, posted a photo
of himself (in uniform) with Danley, inside his oﬃce, on the

authority to support such a claim. See Gross v. Town of Cicero, 619 F.3d 697,
704 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is not this court’s responsibility to research and
construct the parties’ arguments, and conclusory analysis will be con-
strued as waiver.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
6                                                    No. 22-2404

oﬃcial MPD Facebook page with a caption encouraging peo-
ple to vote for Danley. Through this allegedly “exclusive cam-
paign advertising,” Reardon contends that Taylor, Danley,
and the City of Mattoon violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. However, Reardon’s failure to pro-
vide any authority to support that Taylor or Danley violated
the Constitution dooms his claim. See Shipley v. Chi. Bd. of Elec-
tion Comm’rs, 947 F.3d 1056, 1063 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Arguments
that … lack supporting authority are waived.”); Word v. City
of Chicago, 946 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 2020) (upholding dismis-
sal of Monell claim where plaintiﬀ “failed to establish an un-
derlying constitutional violation”).

                        II. Conclusion

    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.