Court Opinion

ID: 9758535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:35:10.344245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:52.280679
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
specially concurring.
¶ 39 I concur with my colleagues’ decision affirming Eddington’s conviction because Eddington was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to strike a venireperson for cause. But I disagree with their conclusion that the court abused its discretion by not striking the deputy for cause. And I disagree with their creation of a new per se rule disqualifying peace officers from jury service when their agency conducted the investigation that is the subject of a criminal trial. As a preliminary matter, it is unnecessary for us to address whether the court erred when it denied Eddington’s motion to strike the deputy for cause. “A defendant in a criminal case must show prejudice” before he is entitled to harmless error review for the curative use of a peremptory challenge. State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d 418, 424 (2003). Because Eddington failed to prove the denial of his challenge for cause resulted in a jury that could not be fair and impartial, he has shown no prejudice. Absent a showing of prejudice, Eddington is not entitled to review, and we need not consider or analyze whether the court erred in refusing to strike the deputy for cause. But my colleagues nevertheless have granted review and decided that the trial court abused its discretion. I disagree.
¶ 40 Here, the court conducted appropriate voir dire on all of the issues potentially related to whether the deputy should have been struck for cause. After the court learned that the deputy was employed by the Pima County Sheriffs Department and knew “about half’ of the witnesses, it asked him whether his employment and familiarity with witnesses would affect his ability to be fair and the deputy said it would not. The deputy expressly stated that neither his training in law enforcement nor his employment as a court security officer for the previous two years would affect his ability to be fair and impartial.
¶ 41 At the request of Eddington’s counsel, the court called the deputy to the bench and allowed counsel to question him. He told her he did not recognize Eddington or the names of his eodefendants and that he had limited contact with defendants in the courthouse. He stated that other than the two years he had been working as a courtroom deputy, he had been a detective in Green Valley and “a corrections officer at [the] very beginning.” The deputy told counsel he knew, but had not worked with or had a personal relationship with, one of the investigating detectives, and *84that he knew “[m]aybe a third” of the other investigators. The deputy said that he would not assign more credibility to officers from the same agency. He also reported he had heard nothing about the case. Based on the deputy’s answers, the court concluded there was “not sufficient basis to strike him for cause.” The trial court’s decision is entitled to deference because the trial court has the opportunity to observe “the prospective juror’s demeanor and the tenor of his answers,” State v. Munson, 129 Ariz. 441, 443, 631 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1981), and “is in a position to determine first hand whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict,” State v. Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 139, 589 P.2d 5, 13 (1978).
¶ 42 Relying upon A.R.S. § 21-211, my colleagues conclude today that the trial court erred by failing to disqualify the deputy because he had an interest in the ease. “The decision as to whether a juror [is] disqualified in a particular case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, based upon the evidence.” State v. Moraga, 98 Ariz. 195, 200, 403 P.2d 289, 293 (1965). Although Eddington never squarely raised this issue in the trial court,14 it is presumed the court knew the criteria set forth in A.R.S. § 21-211 for disqualification of jurors. Cf. State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 128, 871 P.2d 237, 249 (1994) (“[T]he trial court is presumed to know and follow the law.”). The trial court conducted appropriate voir dire on all of the issues potentially related to whether the deputy might have an interest in the case. Thus, it gave focused attention to the facts which might have supported such a finding. Having done so, the court implicitly concluded that those facts did not support a finding that the deputy was disqualified from jury service on this case.
¶ 43 I cannot agree with my colleagues’ finding of error based on the application of their new per se rule that peace officers must be disqualified when their agency conducted the criminal investigation because they “have a particular interest in seeing that matters their offices have investigated are prosecuted successfully.” Although I agree there are many situations in which it would be appropriate for the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to disqualify a similarly situated venireperson, I reject the creation of a per se rule which strips the trial court of its fact-finding role and discretion.
¶ 44 I disagree with my colleagues’ announcement of this new rule because such action is more appropriate for the legislature or our supreme court, in its rale-making capacity, after due consideration of the rule’s effect on the various jurisdictions within our state and the practicality of its application in connection with multi-agency investigations. A rule-making body could address, for example, my concern that the rule sweeps too broadly. In a county with millions of residents, thousands of law enforcement officers, and great distances between its communities, there will be situations in which the court appropriately finds that the peace-officer venireperson had no direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the criminal ease investigated by his or her agency. At the same time, the rale is too narrow to serve its purported purpose because it does not encompass other employees of investigating agencies who share the same alleged interests as the peace officers. I see no reasoned basis to exclude from a criminal jury peace officers employed by the investigating law enforcement agency, but not counsel or clerical and laboratory employees employed by the same agency. Additionally, my colleagues have not addressed the rule’s effect on small counties with small jury pools.
¶ 45 Neither our supreme court, in modifying the rule governing challenges for cause, nor the legislature, in amending the statute governing excuse from jury duty, found it necessary to create such a per se rule, even though these were logical opportunities for such action had either the legislature or the court considered it appropriate. Rule 18.4(b), Ariz. R.Crim. P., provides that the trial court shall strike a juror for cause “[w]hen there is reasonable ground to believe *85that a juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.” My colleagues cite the comment to this rale in support of their position, stating that a challenge for cause may arise from the fact that a venireperson “stands in the relationship of ... master and servant” to a party. But, that comment states that the list of possible grounds for disqualification, which had been part of the 1956 Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the source of the ground of a master-servant relationship, was removed from the rule in order to “direct the attention of attorneys and judges to the essential question — whether a juror can try a case fairly.” Thus, the court moved away from a per se rule in favor of a more balanced approach focused on whether a potential juror could be fair. That is a matter better determined by the trial court.
¶ 46 Finally, I note that our legislature recently has provided that a peace officer may apply to be excused temporarily from jury duty. A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(5). The peace officer’s employer is expressly prohibited from influencing in any way the peace officer’s decision to seek to be excused from jury service. Thus, in recently considering the propriety of having peace officers serve as jurors, our legislature has clarified that peace officers have that right, and has given the peace officer the right to decide if he or she wishes to serve. In view of the legislature’s recent consideration of peace officers’ jury sendee, I expect that, if the legislature had wished to create a per se prohibition against peace officers sitting on juries in certain circumstances, it would have done so, as have the legislatures of other states.15 Cf. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 219(b)(2) (“[N]o peace officer ... shall be selected for voir dire in criminal matters.”); Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 229(b) (“A challenge for implied bias may be taken” if the venireperson “[s]tand[s] in the relation of ... master and servant ... to either party____”); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-10-103(1)(k) (“The court shall sustain a challenge for cause” if “[t]he juror is a compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency or a public defender’s office.”).
¶ 47 Accordingly, because we are not required in the first instance to reach the issue of error and because the record supports the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in denying Eddington’s motion to strike the deputy for cause, I disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that the court abused its discretion in refusing to strike the deputy or disqualify him for cause. Because Eddington failed to raise the issue of disqualification under § 21-211 in his opening brief and because the creation of a per se disqualification rule is more appropriate for the legislature or the supreme court in its rule-making capacity, I cannot agree with today’s creation of a broad new rule disqualifying certain peace officers from serving as jurors. I concur with the majority opinion in all other respects.

. The issue of whether the deputy would be disqualified from jury service because he had an interest in the case based on his employment was neither raised in the trial court nor in Eddington's opening brief. It was not until we requested supplemental briefing on this issue that any party addressed it.

. Two of the three out-of-state cases upon which my colleagues rely were decided in states where such specific statutory support for a rule of this nature exists. See People v. Terry, 30 Cal.App.4th 97, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 729, 732 (1994); Tate v. People, 125 Colo. 527, 247 P.2d 665, 670-71 (1952).