Court Opinion

ID: 9527376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:30:03.359501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:45.485433
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Justice
(dissenting).
In my view, the ultimate decision of this Court is based upon the erroneous factual premise that only a “single order” by Craftsman Hardwood Lumber Company is involved in determining whether Craftsman transacted any business in this State. Despite the conclusion based upon this factual premise, the majority opinion itself recognizes in the statement of facts that three purchases by Craftsman in Louisiana had taken place. All involved substantial purchases of lumber from Louisiana lumber dealers. This lumber Craftsman utilized in its business for fabrications which it advertised for sale in Louisiana in at least two trade publications.
No provision of Sections 3201 through 3207 of Title 13 of the Revised Statutes requires more than one transaction to vest jurisdiction in Louisiana Courts, even if it be assumed that only one transaction is involved in Craftsman’s dealings here. To the contrary, those sections refer to “a cause of action” and to transacting “any business” in this state. In the case of injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense, the reference is to “an act or omission” in this state. Again, in this connection, I note the comments explain that “transacting business” as used in Section 3201 “is intended to mean a single transaction of either interstate or intrastate business,” and to be as broad as the phrase “engaged in a business activity” of Section 3471(1) of the Revised Statutes.
As the comments to Section 3201 of Title 13 of the Revised Statutes state, Sections 3201 through 3207 were adopted to permit the Courts of this state to. tap the full potential of jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents permitted by International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) and McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed.2d 223 (1957). The majority opinion fails to grasp and apply the spirit of this law. To the contrary, in its determination *645the majority has applied a much more restrictive view of the law than the standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the McGee case.
Louisiana has a manifest interest in providing effective means for its citizens to pursue a claim against another, short of following the defendant “to a distant state in order to hold it legally accountable.” McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, supra.
Before this Court is a case involving a •contract executed and performed in Louisiana, controlled by Louisiana law, by a defendant who has previously been involved in similar transactions with other Louisiana firms, purchasing materials used in defendant’s business in another state, the materials being essential to that business. The value of the purchase by defendant is substantial and defendant hoped to profit by this transaction.
While seemingly concluding that this transaction would vest jurisdiction if a sale by a foreign business firm to a Louisiana buyer was involved, the majority decrees that a like result does not obtain because the foreign resident here is the buyer. There is no logical or rational basis for such a distinction, and the injustice of the result reached here on this basis is apparent.
I respectfully dissent.