Court Opinion

ID: 9403231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 18:09:14.101587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.594688
License: Public Domain

J-A12027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 JULIAN NAVARRO                       :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 812 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 7, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-39-CR-0002844-2019

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 JULIAN NAVARRO                       :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 813 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 7, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-39-CR-0002845-2019

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 JULIAN NAVARRO                       :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 814 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 7, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-39-CR-0002846-2019

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-A12027-23

                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 JULIAN NAVARRO                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 815 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 7, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-39-CR-0002847-2019

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 JULIAN NAVARRO                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 816 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 7, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-39-CR-0002848-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED JUNE 20, 2023

      Appellant Julian Navarro appeals from the judgment of sentence

following his convictions of five counts of possession of a controlled substance

with intent to deliver (PWID). On appeal, Appellant argues that he did not

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Appellant

also raises claims concerning the sufficiency and weight of the evidence and

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we vacate the

judgment of sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

memorandum.

                                     -2-
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      The trial court summarized the procedural history of this matter as

follows:

      Appellant was charged with five counts of [PWID], 35 P.S. § 780-
      113(a)(30), all of which are ungraded felonies. Appellant was
      initially represented by Attorney Steven Mills. . . .

                                 *     *     *

      [In March of 2020, while criminal trials were suspended for the
      COVID-19 pandemic,] Appellant filed a pro se handwritten letter
      requesting [the] removal of Attorney Mills as his counsel. The
      [trial court] received that letter on March 19, 2020. The same
      day, Attorney Mills filed a petition to withdraw as counsel. The
      [trial court] granted that petition on April 20, 2020. On May 15,
      2020, Kathryn Smith, Esq.[,] of the Lehigh County Public
      Defender’s Office entered her appearance on Appellant’s behalf.
      However, Attorney Smith petitioned to withdraw on August 10,
      2020. Following a hearing, her petition was granted and Appellant
      proceeded pro se.

      Appellant subsequently filed several pro se motions including a
      [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600 motion, a motion to suppress physical
      evidence, a petition for disclosure of the confidential informant,
      and a petition for habeas corpus. The [trial court] held a hearing
      on the Rule 600 motion on October 9, 2020[,] and denied it by
      order entered November 5, 2020. On November 24, 2020, the
      [trial court] held a hearing on all outstanding pretrial motions and
      took them under advisement. The [trial court] entered an order
      denying them on December 4, 2020.

      A status conference was conducted on February 10, 2021.
      Appellant expressed an interest in entering a plea, but then
      expressed discomfort with the proposed plea agreement. Out of
      an abundance of caution and so as not to become involved in plea
      negotiations, the [trial court] subsequently appointed Robert
      Sletvold, Esq.[,] as counsel for Appellant.        After numerous
      additional continuances, a jury trial was held on November 16-17,
      2021. Attorney Sletvold served as stand-by counsel for Appellant.
      At the close of the trial, Appellant was convicted on each of the
      five criminal informations. A presentence investigation (PSI)
      report was ordered and sentencing was scheduled for January 7,
      2022.

                                     -3-
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        Appellant filed a pro se [Post Conviction Relief Act1] petition on
        December 20, 2021 against Attorney Sletvold. The [trial court]
        dismissed it without prejudice on December 28, 2021 based on
        the filing being premature.

        On December 23, 2021, Joseph Schultz, Esq.[,] entered his
        appearance on Appellant’s behalf. Attorney Schultz subsequently
        submitted a detailed sentencing memorandum which included
        letters from Appellant’s family members.

        The sentencing hearing was held on January 7, 2022.        The [trial
        court] considered the PSI, sentencing guidelines,          and the
        submissions contained in the sentencing memorandum.        The [trial
        court] sentenced Appellant to twelve to twenty-four         years of
        incarceration.

        Appellant filed [counseled] “Defendant’s Post Setence (sic)
        Motions and Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence” on January
        16, 2022. The [trial court] denied those motions on February 23,
        2022.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/8/22, at 5-7 (footnotes omitted, formatting altered).

        Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Rule

1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

        On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

        1. Whether [] Appellant was deprived of his right to counsel and
           did not knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently waive his right in
           accordance with Commonwealth v. Grazier, [713 A.2d 81
           (Pa. 1998)?] At the motions hearing on November 24, 2020,
           [] Appellant proceeded pro se, despite being entitled to
           counsel. Additionally, there is no record to suggest that the
           trial court conducted a colloquy to ensure that [] Appellant
           knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to
           counsel.

____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

                                           -4-
J-A12027-23

      2. Whether there was insufficient evidence to sustain              []
         Appellant’s convictions for the five charges of [PWID?]

      3. Whether the jury’s verdict of guilty for five counts of [PWID]
         was against the weight of the evidence[?]

      4. Whether the [trial] court’s aggregate[] sentence of 12 to 24
         years of incarceration was an abuse of discretion which did not
         adequately consider [] Appellant’s mitigating factors and was
         greater than the 10-to-20-year sentence of incarceration which
         was recommended by the Lehigh County Adult Probation
         Department[?]      Especially when, in justifying its upward
         departure from the sentencing guidelines, the [trial] court
         stated that it considered the impact of fentanyl, despite the
         sentencing guidelines already recommending increased offense
         gravity scores for crimes involving fentanyl.

      5. Whether the [trial] court’s decision to impose consecutive
         sentences for the five counts of [PWID] was an abuse of
         discretion[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 11-12 (some formatting altered).

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that he did not knowingly, voluntarily,

or intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 18. In

support, Appellant refers to the trial court’s on-the-record exchange with

Appellant at the suppression hearing. Id. at 21-22. Appellant argues that

“[e]ven if this [C]ourt considers [the] exchange a ‘colloquy,’” it was

“constitutionally deficient and a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 121” and “does not

cover four of the essential components necessary in [a] colloquy pursuant to

Grazier.”   Id. at 23-24.    Appellant also contends that although he “was

ultimately represented by counsel at his trial, he was deprived of that right at

his suppression hearing,” which was a critical stage of the criminal proceedings

                                      -5-
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and constitutes structural error. Id. at 25. Therefore, Appellant requests that

we remand the case for further proceedings. Id. at 35-36.2

       “Both the right to counsel and the right to self-representation are

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by

Article I, Section [9] of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Deprivation of these

rights can never be harmless.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 158 A.3d 117,

121 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

       Pennsylvania courts have recognized that “[a] criminal defendant’s right

to counsel under the Sixth Amendment includes the concomitant right to waive

counsel’s    assistance     and    proceed     to   represent   oneself   at   criminal

proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Green, 149 A.3d 43, 56 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citing, inter alia, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)). However,

although a defendant’s right to self-representation is guaranteed, it is not

absolute. Commonwealth v. Brooks, 104 A.3d 466, 474 (Pa. 2014). To

exercise the right to self-representation, a “defendant must demonstrate that

he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waives his right to counsel.” Id.

(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2).

       This Court has explained:

____________________________________________

2 In its brief, the Commonwealth maintains that because Appellant failed to
include the August 10, 2020 transcript in the certified record, his first issue is
not reviewable. Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. We note, however, that the
August 10, 2020 transcript was included in a supplement to the certified
record.

                                           -6-
J-A12027-23

     In order to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, the individual
     must be aware of both the nature of the right and the risks and
     consequences of forfeiting it.

     Moreover, the presumption must always be against the waiver of
     a constitutional right. Nor can waiver be presumed where the
     record is silent. The record must show, or there must be an
     allegation and evidence which shows, that an accused was offered
     counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.

     Thus, for this Court to uphold such a waiver, the record must
     clearly demonstrate an informed relinquishment of a known right.

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 93 A.3d 847, 852 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted and formatting altered).

     Where a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, Rule 121 of the

Pennsylvania    Rules   of   Criminal   Procedure   sets   forth   the     following

requirements:

     To ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is
     knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge . . . at a minimum,
     shall elicit the following information from the defendant:

        (a)     that the defendant understands that he or she has the
                right to be represented by counsel, and the right to
                have free counsel appointed if the defendant is
                indigent;

        (b)     that the defendant understands the nature of the
                charges against the defendant and the elements of
                each of those charges;

        (c)     that the defendant is aware of the permissible range
                of sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged;

        (d)     that the defendant understands that if he or she
                waives the right to counsel, the defendant will still be
                bound by all the normal rules of procedure and that
                counsel would be familiar with these rules;

        (e)     that the defendant understands that there are
                possible defenses to these charges that counsel might

                                        -7-
J-A12027-23

               be aware of, and if these defenses are not raised at
               trial, they may be lost permanently; and

         (f)   that the defendant understands that, in addition to
               defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if not
               timely asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if
               errors occur and are not timely objected to, or
               otherwise timely raised by the defendant, these errors
               may be lost permanently.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2).      Rule 121 further requires that, “[w]hen the

defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel after the preliminary hearing,

the judge shall ascertain from the defendant, on the record, whether this is a

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(C).

      This Court has explained:

      Failing to conduct an on the record colloquy pursuant to Rule
      121(C) before allowing a defendant to proceed pro se constitutes
      reversible error. Once federal constitutional rights are involved,
      and once it is clear . . . a particular defendant did not exercise
      those rights, our inquiry must be whether there was a valid waiver
      of those constitutional rights. Furthermore, [a] waiver cannot be
      presumed [from] a silent record.

      The inherent importance of the right to counsel justifies its
      overwhelming protection and the rigorous requirements necessary
      to find waiver.

                                  *    *    *

      A judge’s thorough inquiry into the accused’s appreciation of both
      the right to counsel and the right to represent oneself must be
      used in certain summary proceedings, at trial, guilty plea
      hearings, sentencing, and every critical stage of a criminal
      proceeding.     A critical stage in a criminal proceeding is
      characterized by an opportunity for the exercise of judicial
      discretion or when certain legal rights may be lost if not exercised
      at that stage.

Johnson, 158 A.3d at 121-22 (citations omitted, formatting altered).

                                      -8-
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      In the instant case, the record reflects that the trial court convened a

hearing on Attorney Smith’s motion to withdraw as counsel on August 10,

2020. At the hearing, the following exchange occurred between Appellant and

the trial court:

      THE COURT: You had two bites at the apple, a paid [lawyer] and
      a free [lawyer], and if you don’t like Attorney Smith to represent
      you, as I said, you’re the lawyer.

      Now, I don’t think you’re trained as a lawyer, and I don’t think
      you know all the legal arguments and defenses to be able to offer
      in a trial of each one of these cases if we went that far; is that
      correct?

      [Appellant]: Correct.

      THE COURT: How old are you?

      [Appellant]: 27.

      THE COURT:      What was the highest level of school you’ve
      completed?

      [Appellant]: High school graduate.

      THE COURT: What kind of job did you have before you got locked
      up?

      [Appellant]: I was always locked up.

      THE COURT: Since the age of 18?

      [Appellant]: No, well, mainly.

      THE COURT: So you sound like an intelligent person. You were
      able to converse here today. And I think you understand what’s
      going on here.

      [Appellant]: Yes, sir.

      THE COURT: But that doesn’t mean you know everything that
      Attorney Smith, who is highly respected by the [trial court] in her
      representation of you, whether it’s for purposes of crafting of a
      guilty plea, or representing you at trial, or offering arguments at
      sentencing.

                                       -9-
J-A12027-23

       [Appellant]: Right.

       THE COURT: So you have some choices to really think through
       here. I know Attorney Smith has said she thinks the two of you
       are friendly enough, but that you don’t have confidence in her.
       And she thinks it’s gotten to a point where it’s not a healthy
       attorney-client relationship, but I think you need to think very,
       very carefully about whether you want to proceed with asking me
       to have her withdraw as your lawyer because, as I said, I’m not
       here for the purpose of just keeping throwing lawyers at you to
       see if you like that, does this shoe fit, does that shoe fit, not like
       that.

       So the question really for you is, do you want to proceed with your
       allegations of ineffectiveness with Attorney Smith such that I feel
       compelled to grant her motion to withdraw as your lawyer?

       [Appellant]: Yes.

       THE COURT: Meaning you want to be your own lawyer?

       [Appellant]: Until I can find another lawyer, paid lawyer.

       THE COURT: That doesn’t exist forever, either. You get a certain
       -- I’ll give you a trial date. And if you come in for the date of trial
       saying I need more time, that’s not going to happen.

       [Appellant]: Okay.

       THE COURT: I’m giving you full warning and full disclosure as to
       what you are going to be required to do to get a lawyer. And if
       you come back to me and say I can’t afford a lawyer, I need you
       to appoint me a new one, not going to happen. This is not a game.
       ...

N.T. Pretrial Hr’g, 8/10/22, at 13-17.3

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Attorney Smith’s

motion to withdraw. At that time, the trial court explained:

____________________________________________

3The remainder of the August 10, 2020 transcript included discussion of the
merits of Appellant’s Rule 600 petition and administrative scheduling matters.
See id. at 17-22.

                                          - 10 -
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      I’m not appointing Attorney Smith as standby counsel as happens
      in other cases. I’m not preventing you from filing a motion to ask
      for her to be appointed standby counsel, and I’ll hear you out on
      that. But I have to express to you, you are running a great risk
      by coming in here without a lawyer, especially on [September 17.]
      And I’m not going to continue to indulge a request to postpone
      your matter just so you can have more time. You and your family
      or whoever needs to start actively working towards finding counsel
      if that’s what you wish.

Id. at 22.

      On November 24, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s

omnibus pretrial motions.   At that time, Appellant was not represented by

counsel. After the Commonwealth requested that the trial court conduct an

on-the-record colloquy to determine whether Appellant had waived his right

to counsel, the following exchange occurred:

      THE COURT: Now, you are without counsel today [Appellant]; is
      that correct?

      [Appellant]: That’s correct.

      THE COURT: All right. And how old are you, [Appellant]?

      [Appellant]: I’m 27 years old.

      THE COURT: What’s the highest level of school you’ve completed?

      [Appellant]: High school graduate.

      THE COURT: And are you under the care of a doctor for any
      medical or mental health condition?

      [Appellant]: No.

      THE COURT: Have you had any drugs or alcohol of any type in
      the last three days?

      [Appellant]: No.

      THE COURT: Within the first document that was received by the
      clerk’s office on September the 4th – it’s actually dated August

                                     - 11 -
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       27th – you filed a motion to suppress physical evidence. Can you
       explain for [Assistant District Attorney] Zampogna and myself
       what it is you are seeking to have suppressed from presentation
       at trial?

N.T. Pretrial Hr’g, 11/24/20, at 4-5.4

       In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

       During the hearing on [August 10, 2020,] where the [trial court]
       considered Appellant’s letter asserting Attorney Smith’s alleged
       ineffectiveness, as well as Attorney Smith’s motion to withdraw as
       counsel, the [trial court] reviewed the status of the case as well
       as a plea offer tendered by the Commonwealth which substantially
       capped the [trial court’s] discretion pertaining to sentencing
       options. The [trial court] reviewed the sentencing range at issue,
       as well as Appellant’s history with attorneys in the case up to that
       point. Appellant requested that Attorney Smith be withdrawn
       from the case. The [trial court] explained to Appellant that if that
       request was granted, his options would be to proceed pro se or to
       retain private counsel. The [trial court] inquired into Appellant’s
       age, education, and work experience. Appellant indicated he
       wished to represent himself until he could find private [counsel].
       Based on this discussion, the [trial court] granted Attorney
       Smith’s motion to withdraw[.]         The [trial court] cautioned
       Appellant that his interest in terminating the attorney-client
       relationship with Attorney Smith would not serve as a basis to
       further delay the proceedings, and that if he did not retain private
       counsel prior to the next hearing, he would represent himself. . .

                                      *        *   *

       Appellant had private counsel, and after private counsel was
       granted leave to withdraw, Appellant was given a public defender.
       Appellant argued the public defender was ineffective based on her
       inability to see him, despite tacitly acknowledging this inability
       was not her fault and instead stemmed from the COVID-related
       precautions in place at the time. He expressed a desire to retain
       a different private attorney. The [c]ourt strongly admonished him
       that while his request to do so would be respected, if he appeared
       at the hearing without a lawyer, he would be representing himself.
____________________________________________

4 The remainder of the transcript depicts a discussion of the merits of
Appellant’s pretrial motions and scheduling matters. See id. at 5-17.

                                          - 12 -
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      Appellant did not appear with counsel despite ample opportunity
      to secure counsel and despite the warning that his election against
      securing counsel would carry with it the consequence [that he]
      would represent himself. As a result, Appellant represented
      himself for the omnibus pretrial motion hearing.[fn8] Based on the
      record, there is not any basis upon which Appellant is entitled to
      relief stemming from his pro se representation at the pretrial
      hearing.

             The [c]ourt notes that the outcome of the hearing did
         [fn8]

         not materially impact the ultimate resolution of the case.
         Appellant argued that items were seized during two traffic
         stops, one on April 4, 2019 and a second on April 23, 2019.
         Appellant was the driver during the first stop and a
         passenger during the second. There was not any evidence
         that anything was seized during these stops. Consequently,
         there was not anything to suppress. Appellant also sought
         disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant. A
         defendant seeking disclosure of the identity of a confidential
         informant has an initial burden of demonstrating that the
         informant’s identity is material to a defense, such as
         mistaken identity. There was not any evidence at either the
         hearing or the jury trial tending to support or advance a
         defense of mistaken identity or any other defense for which
         disclosure would be necessary. Lastly, Appellant filed a
         habeas petition asserting the Commonwealth failed to
         present a prima facie case. The [c]ourt denied the petition
         as untimely. Moreover, even if the [c]ourt erred with
         respect to this hearing, errors at a preliminary hearing
         concerning the sufficiency of the evidence are harmless as
         a matter of law if the defendant is convicted at trial.

Trial Ct. Op. at 12-13.

      Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that Appellant’s

waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. See Phillips, 93

A.3d at 852. The trial court’s on-the-record colloquy does not reflect that

Appellant understood: (1) that he had the right to be represented by counsel;

(2) the nature and elements of the charges against him; (3) the permissible

                                     - 13 -
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range of sentences and/or fines for the charges against him; (4) the fact that

as a pro se defendant, Appellant would be held to the same procedural rules

as counsel and that counsel would be familiar with those rules; (5) there may

defenses and/or rights available that would be lost if not raised in a proper

and/or timely manner. See Pa.R.A.P. 121(A)(2), (C); Phillips, 93 A.3d at

852.

       Although the trial court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to

relief based on his self-representation at the omnibus pretrial hearing, it is

well settled that a suppression hearing is a critical stage of the criminal

proceedings.     See Johnson, 158 A.3d at 122 (noting that a suppression

hearing constitutes “a critical stage requiring judicial inquiry into the

defendant’s right to counsel” (citation omitted)).            Further, because the

deprivation of a defendant’s right to counsel “can never be harmless,” see id.

at 121 (citation omitted), we reject the trial court’s conclusion that the

outcome of the omnibus pretrial hearing “did not materially impact the

ultimate resolution of the case.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 13, n.8.

       For these reasons, because we conclude that Appellant was deprived of

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, we are constrained to vacate

Appellant’s judgments of sentence and the trial court’s order denying

Appellant’s omnibus pretrial motions.              We remand this case for further

proceedings consistent with this memorandum.5
____________________________________________

5 In light of our disposition, we need not reach the merits of Appellant’s
remaining claims, as they are now moot.

                                          - 14 -
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     Judgment of sentence vacated.     Order denying Appellant’s omnibus

pretrial motions vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/20/2023

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