Court Opinion

ID: 9674106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:23:10.47438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.613443
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. MoF addin, Associate Justice (Dissenting). The majority has reversed the Chancery decree and has awarded Mr. Ayers a divorce on the ground of Mrs. Ayers ’ misconduct. I dissent from such holding of this Court, because the evidence shows that Mr. Ayers condoned any misconduct on the part of his wife. Their separation occurred in the fall of 1954; and they were negotiating concerning a property settlement until February 7, 1955. Mrs. Ayers testified that she had lived with her husband after the property settlement was signed on February 7, 1955. Here is her testimony : “Q. You have lived with him as husband and wife since the date the property settlement was signed? A. Yes, I have . . . Q. To refresh your memory, I ask you if the property settlement was signed on the 7th day of February, 1955. A. That’s right. Q. But you have lived together as husband and wife since the date of that contract? A. That’s right, he did not move that day.” When Mr. Ayers was asked about this matter of condonation, he testified: “Q. Mr. Ayers, the testimony has been throughout the trial that the last property settlement that you and your wife executed was on February. 7th, 1955. Is that true and correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. That’s true and correct. I’ll ask you on that night did you go to your home, where Mrs. Ayers was— I will ask you, did you all on that night sleep together as man and wife and have sexual relations as man and wife on the night that you signed the property settlement? A. On the night that we signed the property settlement? Q. Yes, sir. At 2120 Valley Lane. A. I don’t remember. Q. Would you say then that you did not or that you did? THE COURT: He said he didn’t remember, Mr. Rose. A. Jack, I can’t truthfully say yes and I can’t truthfully say no because I don’t remember that night.” Mr. Ayers knew all about the alleged misconduct and infidelity of his wife at the time of the signing of the property settlement on February 7, 1955; yet he did not deny that they resumed marital relations that night after the property settlement had been signed. I maintain that such testimony makes a clear case of condonation and that Mr. Ayers should not be granted a divorce since he had condoned the very acts on which the majority of this court is granting him a divorce. The majority opinion says: “We do not regard condonation as being an issue in the case, although it was mentioned during the court’s deliberations. In the course of her testimony the appellee stated that she and her husband had marital relations a day or two before they separated. This issue, however, was not raised by the pleadings, was not explored at the trial, and has not been argued in the briefs. A defense that was apparently waived by the appellee and that was certainly not fully developed should not be made the controlling point in the case.” The Chancellor said that Mr. Ayers had “almost” established Mrs. Ayers’ infidelity; yet the Chancellor denied Mr. Ayers a divorce; and it could well have been on this ground of condonation. In the case of Buck v. Buck, 205 Ark. 918, 171 S. W. 2d 939, we discussed in considerable detail the matter of condonation: “While appellant did not specifically plead con-donation as a defense in her answer, in the course of the trial, it developed, from the testimony, that there had been a condonation on the part of appellee, and we think the court should have treated, and did treat, the answer as amended to conform to this proof. As indicated, we think the preponderance of the testimony supports appellant’s contention that these parties resumed their marital relations voluntarily and in good faith; that ap-pellee, by his acts, condoned his wife’s misconduct, and that the court erred in awarding him a divorce.” Thus when condonation is shown by the evidence, the pleadings are treated as amended; and apparently the Chancellor so understood. The Chancery Court evidently considered the matter of condonation because the Chancellor denied Mr. Ayers a divorce. On appeal here, Mrs. Ayers was defending the decree granted to her; and so there was no occasion for her to mention con-donation in her brief. Certainly the appellant, Mr. Ayers, was not going to spend a great deal of time calling the Court’s attention to his condonation. But the majority is in error in saying that the matter was “waived”. Condonation is always an issue, because the State is always a silent third party in every divorce case ; and when’ parties have cohabited, with knowledge of infidelity, the State is entitled to have them remain as husband and wife. (See 27 C. J. S. 703 “Divorce”, § 114.) On this point of condonation, I respectfully dissent from the majority holding in the case at bar.