Court Opinion

ID: 9531867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:15:29.365972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:36.305010
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
There is very little language contained in the majority opinion to which I agree. A serious wound to precedent is created by the majority opinion in that it is erosive to our holding in Hoffman, and it appears to ignore our most recent decision on the 180-day statute in State v. Cooper, 421 N.W.2d 67 (S.D.1988). In Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d at 375, we held: “To foster certainty and finality, we hold that a motion for a good cause delay must be filed prior to the expiration of the 180-day period.” Id. (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
In Cooper, we held: “The State, under SDCL 23A-44-5.1, is required to dispose of criminal matters within 180 days and under Hoffman, supra is required to file a motion for good cause delay where they want to toll the time.” Cooper, 421 N.W.2d at 70. In this case, the good cause for delay was not clearly substantiated and a motion was never filed. See PROCEDURAL HISTORY below.
Were we to strictly follow the Hoffman and Cooper precedent, surely this case should have been dismissed because a motion was not filed by the State of South Dakota, for good cause delay, prior to the running of the 180-day requirement. Quite obviously, as the State finds itself in the weak position of not having complied with the State statute, and being unable to bring itself within the holdings of either Hoffman or Cooper, the State must find a hole to “wiggle out.” The hole, essentially, is “tolling.” * Another cutting rationale creeps in: namely, that the State has not intentionally or purposely tried to evade the purposes of the statute (since when did the absence of bad faith surface as a defense to a failure to prosecute timely?). If subjective factors such as intent and good faith are advanced as reasons for compliance or noncompliance of the 180-day rule, we are down to examining a prosecutor’s mind and not cold, hard facts. Review becomes examining the nebulous. It is the duty of the prosecution and the courts, not the defendant, to dispose of a case, to move it along, to bring it to trial, to bring it to finality. United States v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir.1976); People v. Deason, 670 P.2d 792 (Colo.1983). In Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 338 Pa.Super. 615, 488 A.2d 63 (1985), the holding was mani*241fest that the state or commonwealth must come forward and request an extension of time before the time under the rule has expired. Note the lackluster and lackadaisical action of the State, as set forth in the PROCEDURAL HISTORY, which I have set forth below.
However, there is a “wiggle-out” within the 180-day rule. It is called “good cause delay.” In Hoffman, we expressed that the “180-day period may be tolled if State moves for and can show good cause for delay.” Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d at 375. We further admonished that to foster certainty and finality, as I have mentioned above, this motion must be filed prior to the expiration of the 180-day period. No motion was filed herein by the State for “good cause de'ay.” The record establishes charge and dismissal. Then, charge and dismissal, and for the third time, charge and dismissal. If, indeed, a State prosecutor is permitted to follow this course of action, full well knowing that this will consistently toll the 180 days, what restraints are upon his prosecutorial hand? The answer is: None. Let the prosecutor come forth with the reasons, in writing, for the delay (subjective intent and palaver unacceptable); let the trial court weigh upon these reasons; then, the trial court may adjudicate upon the propriety of the reasons.
There is no doubt that many factual scenarios can develop which will justify an extension of the 180-day rule. However, let the State comply with the rule and make a motion for “good cause delay.” Spread the “good cause” on the printed page. In State v. Kerkhove, 423 N.W.2d 160, 164 (S.D.1988), decided April 27, 1988, we held:
We urge trial courts to make particularized findings regarding causes and periods of attributable delay under the 180-day rule. We also urge trial courts to avoid the “carte blanche” type permission giving the state, i.e. “the time necessary to dispose of all criminal charges and related issues including trial.” (Emphasis added.)
We have a 1987 factual appeal before us; obviously, the trial court did not know of our Kerkhove decision. Notwithstanding, Kerkhove is called to the reader’s attention for this purpose: This Court has expressed, in the past, an intent to put some teeth in the 180-day rule. Too many detours can spoil a good road.
I concur in the result of this opinion for one reason, and one reason alone, and that is because, as the majority points out, the charges which defendant first faced were not the charges upon which he was ultimately convicted.
To illustrate my point, I confidently submit this concise chronology for an illumination of the case procedural history, believing it speaks for itself.
DATE PROCEDURAL HISTORY
March 6, 1987 Complaint Filed, Third-degree Burglary, Grand Theft
May 6, 1987 First Appearance
June 3, 1987 Complaint Dismissed, State’s Witnesses Fail to Appear
June 5, 1987 Complaint Refiled
June 24, 1987 First Appearance
July 17, 1987 Indictment Filed, Third-degree Burglary, Two Counts Grand Theft
July 20, 1987 Complaint Dismissed, on June 5 Complaint
July 27, 1987 Arraignment
September 14, 1987 Indictment Dismissed, Absolutely No Reason Given in the Record
September 23, 1987 Indictment Refiled
October 1, 1987 Arraignment
November 3, 1987 Trial Commenced
November 4, 1987 Verdict Returned
*242House Bill No. 1055 was introduced in the 1988 Legislative Assembly by eight State Representatives, co-sponsored by three State Senators, on behalf of the Attorney General, to severely restrict the 180-day rule. Journal Index and Journal Corrections for S.D. Senate and House of Representatives, Sixty-Third Session, at 142 (1988). It had a stormy legislative history, passing in the House of Representatives but failing in the State Senate. Through these elected legislators, the peo-pie speak. Tattered and besieged, the 180-day rule is still alive. At the command post, I would stand and defend it. It has a worthy purpose.

 State cites many tolling holdings in other states; we have our own statute and this Court has ruled thereon. Why must we seek foreign jurisdictions to now guide us?