Court Opinion

ID: 9632335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:11:05.958148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:37.640792
License: Public Domain

SMART, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
Although I concur in the decision to vacate the summary judgment ruling and remand the case for further proceedings, I write separately in order to discuss the concepts of dangerous condition and proximate cause.
The majority opinion might be interpreted as suggesting that a controlled intersection which has lost its signals due to lack of power is necessarily a condition of property which a jury could reasonably find to be a dangerous condition. I submit that the submissibility of the hypothesis of dangerous condition depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. A controlled intersection which lacks power and is therefore without signals is the equivalent of an uncontrolled intersection. An uncontrolled intersection is not necessarily a dangerous condition. The fact that some other driver may drive carelessly and illegally, thereby colliding with the plaintiffs car is not enough, in itself, to allow plaintiff to demonstrate that a street or an intersection is a dangerous condition of property. Otherwise, every street and every intersection and every roadway would potentially be a dangerous condition of property. In this case, it cannot be stated as a matter of law that this intersection necessarily qualifies as a dangerous condition of property. None of the circumstances are before us by way of stipulation or otherwise. On remand, one of the things the court will consider is whether the circumstances of the intersection make the hypothesis of dangerous condition sub-missible to the jury.
For a condition to be dangerous within the meaning of § 587.600, more is required than simply the notion that a collision is likely to happen there if someone does not follow the rules. Certainly, a roadway may be negligently designed in such a way as to be dangerous when the condition itself significantly aggravates the common dangers of vehicle operation which would already be present. Jemes v. Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1977); Linton v. Missouri Hwy. & Transp. Comm’n, 980 S.W.2d 4 (Mo.App.1998). Even a downed stop sign might create a dangerous condition where, for instance, the cross street might be designed without a stop sign or other control and, given other factors such as visibility, the downed stop sign could cause the intersection to be a dangerous condition. See Donahue v. City of St. Louis, 758 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. banc *6151988) (holding claim of downed stop sign sufficient for pleading purposes). The court in Logan v. Phillips, 896 S.W.2d 38 (Mo.App.1994), which was a case that, like this case, involved a power outage to a light controlled intersection, did not address the specific issue of dangerous condition because the defendant in that case was not a municipality but a power company, and because the court there decided that the power outage was not a proximate cause of the collision. However, because of the overlap between the concepts of dangerous condition and proximate cause, the case is worthy of consideration in this context. Logan suggests that such an intersection is not necessarily a dangerous condition. We have found no case holding that a claim that a controlled intersection which lacks the power for the operation of its signals is necessarily submissible as claim of a dangerous condition. On remand, the court will examine the facts and circumstances in context, in determining whether the hypothesis that the intersection is a dangerous condition qualifies for submissibility to the jury.
Although I agree that the MHTC did not in this case establish that the negligence of the alleged errant driver was the intervening cause or the sole efficient cause in this case, I also do not think it necessarily can be said that the causation element is submissible. The statute requires not only that there be a dangerous condition of property, but also that plaintiffs injury must have “directly resulted” from the dangerous condition. As already stated, we do not know whether the intersection in this case can qualify as a “dangerous condition,” because we do not know all of the facts. Moreover, we do not know whether the failure of the signals to operate was an efficient cause of plaintiffs injuries because we do not know what the evidence will show at trial as to the facts of the collision. In Logan, v. Phillips, 896 S.W.2d 38 (Mo.App.1994), mentioned briefly above, the vehicle causing the injury entered the uncontrolled intersection out of turn (the other cars were stopping, as at a four-way stop, and crossing alternately) and at an excessive rate of speed for the circumstances. The court held that the lack of functioning signals was not a proximate cause of the collision because the negligence of the other vehicle operator (which happened to be a police officer) was the sole efficient cause of the collision. The lack of power was considered too remote to be considered an efficient cause of the collision.
Although issues of dangerous condition and proximate cause are generally issues for the jury, such issues are sometimes questions of law for the court. Logan v. Phillips, 896 S.W.2d 38 (Mo.App.1995); Linton v. Highway Comm’n, 980 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Mo.App.1998). Not every allegation of dangerous condition or proximate cause creates an issue for the jury’s determination. On remand, the trial court will examine the allegations in the light of the facts and circumstances as to all of the requirements for submission of a claim under § 537.600 RSMo 1994.