Court Opinion

ID: 9950639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 16:09:19.277135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:28.222304
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion                15
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                 CLARK COUNTY, A POLITICAL                             No. 85185
                 SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
                 NEVADA,
                 Appellant,
                 vs.
                 6635 W OQUENDO LLC, A NEVADA                             MAR 14 2024
                 LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,                               ELI
                                                                       CLERK
                 Respondent.                                           BY--
                                                                              EF DEPUTY CLERK

                             Appeal from a district court order denying an anti-SLAPP
                 special motion to dismiss. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County;
                 Mark R. Denton, Judge.
                             Affirmed.

                 Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Timothy J. Allen, Deputy District
                 Attorney, Clark County,
                 for Appellant.

                 Steven L. Yarmy, Las Vegas,
                 for Respondent.

                 BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

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                                                     OPINION

                    By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
                                NRS 41.660 is colloquially referred to as Nevada's "anti-
                    SLAPP" statute.' It permits a "person" to file a special motion to dismiss a
                    complaint when the complaint is based on the person's "good faith
                    communication in furtherance of ... the right to free speech in direct
                    connection with an issue of public concern." At issue in this appeal is
                    whether a governmental entity is a "person" entitled to bring an anti-
                    SLAPP motion. We conclude that a governmental entity is not a "person"
                    for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute and affirm the district court's order
                    denying appellant's special motion to dismiss.
                                                       FACTS
                                In early 2019, appellant Clark County received a complaint that
                    a residential property was being operated as a short-term rental and party
                    house. The property at issue is owned by the eponymous respondent 6635
                    W Oquendo LLC (Oquendo).           The Clark County Code Enforcement
                    Department opened an investigation, during which the Department spoke
                    with several short-term renters at the Oquendo property.             Finding
                    violations of the Clark County Code, the Department issued Oquendo seven
                    civil penalties totaling $38,350. After the civil penalties went unpaid, Clark
                    County recorded a lien against the Oquendo property for each penalty.
                    Oquendo did not contest the penalties or liens, and in early 2021, Oquendo
                    sent Clark County a check for the entire $38,350. Thereafter, Clark County
                    released the liens.

                          1NRS 41.660 is codified within a subset of statutes, NRS 41.635-.670,
                    which are referred to plurally as Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes.
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                             Then, in 2022, Oquendo filed the underlying action against
                 Clark County. Generally speaking, Oquendo's complaint alleged that Clark
                 County lacked the authority to impose the civil penalties and to record liens
                 against the property. Clark County filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing
                 that the conduct forming the basis for Oquendo's claims—recording liens
                 against the Oquendo property—was protected speech covered by the anti-
                 SLAPP statutes.2    At a hearing on the motion, Oquendo's counsel argued
                 that "I just don't believe that these Anti-SLAPP statutes were meant for the
                 government to just dismiss complaints." The district court agreed and
                 entered an order denying Clark County's motion, finding that "Clark
                 County is not a person for purposes of anti-SLAPP." Clark County now
                 appeals.
                                                DISCUSSION
                             Determining whether Clark County and other governmental
                 entities are a "person" for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute is a matter of
                 statutory construction, which we review de novo. See Young v. Nev. Gaming
                 Control Bd., 136 Nev. 584, 586, 473 P.3d 1034, 1036 (2020).
                             As indicated, NRS 41.660 refers to a "person" bringing an anti-
                 SLAPP motion. Oquendo argues that Clark County is not a "person" for
                 anti-SLAPP purposes based on NRS 0.039, which, in its entirety, provides,
                             Except as otherwise expressly provided in a
                             particular statute or required by the context,
                             "person" means a natural person, any form of
                             business or social organization and any other
                             nongovernmental legal entity including, but not
                             limited to, a corporation, partnership, association,
                             trust or unincorporated organization. The term

                       2In light of our resolution of this appeal, we need not address whether
                 recording a lien can constitute protected speech under the anti-SLAPP
                 statutes.
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                             does not include a government, governmental
                             agency or political subdivision of a government.
                 (Emphases added.) See also NRS 0.010 (providing that NRS Chapter 0
                 t<provides definitions and declarations of legislative intent which apply to

                 Nevada Revised Statutes as a whole"). Thus, according to Oquendo, NRS
                 0.039 plainly precludes Clark County from being a person for purposes of
                 the anti-SLAPP statute.
                             We agree and are not persuaded by either of Clark County's two
                 counterarguments.     First, Clark County relies upon the Legislature's
                 language in NRS 41.031(1) providing for the waiver of sovereign immunity
                 on behalf of the State and its political subdivisions. This statute provides
                 that "[t]he State of Nevada hereby waives its immunity from liability and
                 action and hereby consents to have its liability determined in accordance
                 with the same rules of law as are applied to civil actions against natural
                 persons and corporations." NRS 41.031(1). According to Clark County,
                 because the anti-SLAPP statute is a "rule[ ] of law [that applies to] natural
                 persons," it is entitled to bring an anti-SLAPP motion.
                             While Clark County's reasoning is plausible, we are
                 nevertheless confined by NRS 0.039's plain-language definition of "person."
                 See Young, 136 Nev. at 586, 473 P.3d at 1036 (recognizing that this court
                 interprets statutes by their plain meaning unless there is ambiguity, the
                 plain meaning would provide an absurd result, or the plain meaning clearly
                 was not intended). As indicated, when read as a whole, NRS 0.039 states
                 that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in a particular statute or
                 required by the context," "[person] does not include a government,
                 governmental agency or political subdivision of a government."          It is
                 undisputed that NRS 41.660 does not "expressly provideff that "person"
                 includes governmental entities. Nor does NRS 41.660's context require
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                "person" to be construed as including governmental entities, as it is wholly
                reasonable that the Legislature would wish to exclude governmental
                entities from anti-SLAPP protection. Cf. Simonian v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll.
                Sys. of Nev., 122 Nev. 187, 191, 128 P.3d 1057, 1059-60 (2006) ("[A] long-
                standing principle of statutory construction instructs that person does not
                include the sovereign" and that, "unless a statute expressly indicates
                otherwise, we will presume that the statute does not confer person status
                on a state entity." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Namely, when the
                Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP statutes in 1997, it expressly declared
                that the anti-SLAPP statutes' purpose was to protect "participation by
                citizens in government" and "giv[e] the people the right to petition the
                government for     redress of grievances       [consistent   with] the   First
                Amendment to the United States Constitution and in section 10 of article 1
                of the constitution of the State of Nevada." 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 387, at 1363-
                64 (emphases added) (preamble to bill amending anti-SLAPP statutes). In
                other words, affording the government anti-SLAPP protection would appear
                to be contrary to the Legislature's purpose in enacting the anti-SLAPP
                statutes. Cf. Crosby v. Town of Indian River Shores, 358 So. 3d 444, 447
                (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023) (concluding that Florida's anti-SLAPP statute
                does not apply to governmental entities because the statute "protects the
                right guaranteed to each of us by the First Amendmentf, which] protects
                citizens' speech only from government regulation; government speech itself
                is not protected by the First Amendment" (internal quotation marks
                omitted)). Accordingly, we reject Clark County's first counterargument.3

                      3Werecognize that California courts have interpreted California's
                anti-SLAPP statute to afford protection to governmental entities, .see, e.g.,
                San Ramon Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Emps. Ret. Ass'n,
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                            Clark County's second counterargument is that we already held
                in John v. Douglas County School District, 125 Nev. 746, 760, 219 P.3d 1276,
                1286 (2009), that governmental entities are entitled to bring an anti-SLAPP
                motion. Again, we disagree. John involved a teacher (John) who was
                disciplined for misconduct and then sued the school district that disciplined
                him, asserting an array of federal claims. 125 Nev. at 750-51, 219 P.3d at
                1279-80. The school district filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which identified
                communications between school officials and the school district in
                furtherance of investigations into John's misconduct as protected under the
                anti-SLAPP statute. The district court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. On
                appeal, this court identified two primary issues: (1) "whether Nevada's anti-
                SLAPP statute applies to John's federal causes of action raised in Nevada
                district court," and (2) "whether the district court erred in dismissing John's
                lawsuit under the statute." Id. at 749-50, 219 P.3d at 1279. After resolving
                the first issue in the school district's favor, we then turned to the second
                issue. Id. at 760, 219 P.3d at 1286. John had argued that the at-issue
                communications between the various school district employees did not
                constitute protected speech under NRS 41.637 because, in part, the school
                district was not a governmental entity, meaning that the communications
                did not petition or seek redress from a government agency pursuant to NRS
                41.637(1)-(3). Id. at 760-61, 219 P.3d at 1286. In rejecting his argument,

                22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 724, 731 (Ct. App. 2004); Bradbury v. Superior Ct., 57 Cal.
                Rptr. 2d 207, 211 (Ct. App. 1996), and that we typically construe our anti-
                SLAPP statute consistently with California's statute, see Coker v. Sassone,
                135 Nev. 8, 11, 432 P.3d 746, 749 (2019). However, we decline to do so here
                because California has no apparent analog to NRS 0.039, which, again,
                applies "to Nevada Revised Statutes as a whole." NRS 0.010. If the
                Legislature believes that governmental entities should be entitled to anti-
                SLAPP protection, it is free to make the necessary statutory amendments.
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                       we reasoned that the school district was a "political subdivision" as defined
                       in NRS 41.0305, such that the internal communications were aimed at
                       procuring governmental action, i.e., disciplining John at his job with the
                       school district. Id. at 749-50, 761-62, 219 P.3d at 1279-80, 1286-87. We
                       then proceeded to explain why John failed to rebut the school district's
                       showing that its communications were covered by the anti-SLAPP statute.
                       Id. at 761-62, 219 P.3d at 1286-87.
                                      Thus, John addressed whether internal disciplinary measures
                       taken by a school district were communications to a government agency
                       pursuant to NRS 41.637(1)-(3). Cf. id. At no point in the John decision did
                       the parties present the issue of whether a governmental entity was a
                       [(
                            person" for purposes of bringing a motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP
                       statute in the first place, nor did we make such a holding.4 See Senjab v.
                       Alhulaibi, 137 Nev. 632, 633-34, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021) (recognizing that
                       this court "review[s] only the issues the parties present"); Liu v. Christopher
                       Homes, LLC, 130 Nev. 147, 151, 321 P.3d 875, 877 (2014) (reviewing de novo
                       the interpretation of this court's caselaw). Accordingly, we reject Clark
                       County's second counterargument.
                                                       CONCLUSION
                                      We hold that a governmental entity is not a "person" entitled to
                       bring an anti-SLAPP motion. NRS 0.039 unambiguously defines "person"
                       to exclude governmental entities, and the context of NRS 41.660 does not
                       require that "person" as used in that statute be construed to include

                              We take this opportunity to clarify that while portions of the John
                                 4

                       decision could be read to infer as much, the court did not address whether
                       a governmental entity is considered a person for the purpose of anti-SLAPP
                       protections, and that was not the ultimate holding. See 125 Nev. at 760-61,
                       219 P.3d at 1286-87.
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                       governmental entities. The district court therefore correctly denied Clark
                       County's anti-SLAPP motion because it was not entitled to bring it.
                       Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying Clark County's
                       special motion to dismiss.

                                                                                               J.
                                                                 Parraguirre

                       We concur:

                         Ctki(                      , C.J.
                       Cadish

                                                        J.
                       Stiglich

                              0,1624
                       Pickering

                                                    7   J.
                       Herndon

                                                        J.
                       Lee

                        ell

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