Court Opinion

ID: 9632636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:20:46.233273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:20.311981
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I disagree with the court’s holding that evidence of resisting a search is admissible for purposes of establishing guilt. It is one thing to say that a person has no constitutional right to “use force to resist a peaceful search by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer performing his duties, regardless of whether the search is ultimately determined to be illegal.” Maj. at 1200. It is quite another thing to say that evidence of resistance may be used as establishing guilt.
The court’s opinion loses sight of the nature of Elson’s resistance. Elson’s resistance was not violent like the resistance in Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969), the case relied on by the court. In that case, the police officer stopped Miller’s car and informed him and his companion that they were under arrest. Miller got out of his car, but then became argumentative and, after a “scuffle,” returned to his car. After the officer forcibly removed Miller from the car, Miller began wielding a bayonet, slashing at the officer and even threatening to harm his companion. Id. at 423. One reason behind our holding in Miller that there is no constitutional right to resist an arrest was our belief that “[s]uch a rule helps to relieve the threat of physical harm to officers ... as well as to minimize harm to innocent bystanders.” Id. at 427.
*1206This rationale does not apply to Elson’s nonviolent resistance.1 Unlike Miller, Elson did not attempt to harm the officer or otherwise resist more than what was reasonably necessary to indicate his objection to the search. After Elson grabbed the officer’s wrist, the officer placed Elson’s hands on top of the patrol car. Elson did not try to resist any further, attempt an escape, or in any other way jeopardize the safety of the officer or the public. It is highly unlikely that Elson’s actions placed the officer in apprehension of physical harm.2
Elson’s nonviolent physical resistance was no more than an assertion of his mistaken belief that he had a right not to be searched. If his assertion had been verbal it would not have been admissible as evidence of guilt. Maj. op. at 1199. Thus, Elson is being penalized for his failure to distinguish between verbal and physical assertions of nonconsent. Such a distinction is categorically unfair in this case. Elson had no opportunity to verbally express his refusal to be searched because the officer did not ask whether Elson would consent to being searched. Instead, Elson’s first indication that he was being searched was when the officer began to put his hand into Elson’s pocket. Given the stressful circumstances, Elson cannot be faulted for reacting in a rapid and reflexive manner to this intrusion on his person. It is unreasonable to expect Elson to pause, assess the situation, and realize that it would be less detrimental in the long run to speak out rather than reach out, or at least to reach toward but not touch the officer.
The court’s' opinion states that individuals should not be penalized “for their ignorance of the arcane intricacies of search and seizure law by allowing mistaken assertions of perceived fourth amendment rights to be used as evidence of guilt.” Maj. at 1199. By allowing non-verbal assertions of perceived rights to be used as evidence of guilt, the court adds to the arcane intricacies of search and seizure law and penalizes individuals for their ignorance of the correct way to express their mistaken assertions.
I recognize that we cannot encourage violent resistance to police officers; however, adequate incentives for cooperation with the police are already present because individuals are subject to criminal penalties for resisting or interfering with an arrest. See AS 11.56.700. Given this incentive, it seems unnecessary to add the additional incentive that non-verbal resistance, no matter how inoffensively exhibited, can be used as evidence of guilt.
I join the court’s disposition of all other issues in the petition for hearing.

. Because this case involves a nonviolent resistance to a search, I do not discuss whether evidence of a violent resistance would be admissible to establish guilt.

. I note that a verbal refusal could be expressed in a tone that would place the officer in great apprehension of immediate physical harm.