Court Opinion

ID: 9398486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 15:06:24.29968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.952770
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                            APRIL L. YOUNG,
                               Appellant,

                                     v.

       NEW RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION f/k/a
         DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, and NEWREZ, LLC d/b/a
            SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING, LLC,
                          Appellees.

                              No. 4D21-2579

                              [May 31, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Barry J. Stone, Senior Judge, Judge; L.T. Case No.
CACE19006695.

   Jeffrey M. Liggio of Liggio & Cornell, West Palm Beach, Geoffrey Stahl
of Gordon & Partners, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, and Philip M. Burlington
and Adam Richardson of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm
Beach, for appellant.

   Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, and William P. Heller
of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

    CORRECTED OPINION ON APPELLEES’ MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

PER CURIAM.

   We grant the appellees’ motion seeking clarification, withdraw our prior
opinion, and replace it with this corrected opinion.

   In this appeal, the appellant April L. Young (Young) challenges the trial
court’s March 2021 and August 2021 orders dismissing her causes of
action against the appellees New Residential Investment Corporation (New
Residential) and New Rez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, LLC
(Shellpoint) in the foreclosure proceedings initiated by Ditech Financial
LLC (Ditech). During the pendency of the foreclosure proceedings, New
Residential acquired Ditech’s entire mortgage business, including the
promissory note and mortgage executed by Young in favor of Ditech’s
predecessor-in-interest. Shellpoint then serviced the note on behalf of New
Residential. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits
of certain issues raised by Young in this appeal, and that those issues over
which we have jurisdiction lack merit.

    Young argues in this appeal that the trial court committed reversible
error by dismissing her: (1) Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act
(FCCPA) cause of action against Shellpoint; (2) equitable accounting cause
of action against both New Residential and Shellpoint; and (3) contractual
causes of action against both New Residential and Shellpoint. The trial
court’s March 2021 order dismissed Young’s FCCPA cause of action
against Shellpoint, and the equitable accounting cause of action against
both New Residential and Shellpoint. The August 2021 order dismissed
the contractual causes of action against both New Residential and
Shellpoint.

    We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Young’s causes of action against
Shellpoint without further comment. However, we lack jurisdiction to
review the trial court’s dismissal of Young’s equitable accounting and
contractual counterclaims against New Residential because those causes
of action are compulsory to the main foreclosure claim which remains
pending in the trial court. Neither the March 2021 nor August 2021 orders
can be considered partially final either with respect to the “entire case” as
to New Residential as a party, or with respect to the causes of action
asserted against New Residential, because those causes of action are
“interdependent with” and not “separate and distinct” from “other pleaded
claims” not yet adjudicated—namely, the main foreclosure claim. See Fla.
R. App. P. 9.110(k) (only partial judgments that dispose of “an entire case
as to any party,” or “a separate and distinct cause of action that is not
interdependent with other pleaded claims,” are immediately appealable
prior to entry of “the final judgment in the entire case”); see also 4040 Ibis
Circle, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 193 So. 3d 957, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA
2016) (borrowers’ counterclaims against holder of note and mortgage for
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing were compulsory in nature to main foreclosure action such
that order dismissing counterclaims, without any accompanying final
adjudication of main foreclosure claim, was not immediately appealable as
partial final judgment).

   We therefore dismiss this appeal to the extent Young seeks review of
the March 2021 and August 2021 orders dismissing her equitable
accounting and contractual causes of action against New Residential,
without prejudice to Young’s ability to challenge these orders in any

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plenary appeal from the trial court’s final judgment on the main
foreclosure claim. In all other respects, we affirm the orders on review.

   Dismissed in part, affirmed in part.

WARNER, CIKLIN and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                            *        *       *

 Final Upon Release; No Motion for Rehearing Will Be Entertained.

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