Court Opinion

ID: 9927631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 17:04:21.349312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:58.507623
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Jan 29 2024, 8:32 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Casey A. Farrington                                        Theodore E. Rokita
Marion County Public Defender Agency                       Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Samuel J. Dayton
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kenyonn Sincere,                                           January 29, 2024
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CR-1172
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable William J. Nelson,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
                                                           The Honorable Mark F. Renner,
                                                           Magistrate
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           49D18-2109-F6-30044

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                            Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024                           Page 1 of 18
      Case Summary                   1

[1]   On August 31, 2021, Kenyonn Sincere falsely represented himself to be a

      detective with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department to the owner of the

      Fundae’s Ice Cream Shop (“the Shop”) in Speedway. The State charged

      Sincere with Level 6 felony impersonating a law-enforcement officer. After a

      jury found Sincere guilty, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction as a

      Class A misdemeanor. Sincere appeals his conviction. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   At all times relevant to this appeal, Cassandra Miller owned the Shop. On

      August 31, 2021, Miller and Ashley Wagner were working at the Shop when a

      man, who was later determined to be Sincere, came in and indicated that he

      “was looking for a missing person.” Tr. Vol. II p. 115. Sincere claimed to be a

      detective and asked Miller for the “security footage that [the Shop] had and

      receipts and just any information that we had from the day prior.” Tr. Vol. II p.

      115. Sincere was wearing a polo shirt with the words “Marion County” and/or

      “detective” printed on it and a badge on his waist. Tr. Vol. II pp. 116, 152.

[3]   At Sincere’s request, Miller accessed surveillance footage from the previous day

      and showed it to him. Sincere indicated that he was looking for a specific

      1
        We held oral argument in this case on January 11, 2023, at Terre Haute South High School. We thank the
      students, administration, faculty, and staff of Terre Haute South for their hospitality. We also commend
      counsel on the quality of their arguments.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024                         Page 2 of 18
      woman, and, when Sincere saw her on the surveillance footage, Sincere asked

      to see the receipt from her purchase, specifically a copy of the receipt that had a

      signature on it. Miller provided Sincere with a copy of the receipt but explained

      that the Shop no longer required signatures for credit- or debit-card purchases.

      Sincere “seemed surprised and disappointed that there wasn’t a signature” from

      the man who had made the purchase on the receipt. Tr. Vol. II p. 138.

[4]   Sincere asked for a copy of the surveillance footage and provided Miller with a

      telephone number and an email address where she could send the footage. The

      email address was “Duncan.Flagg@indy.gov,” and Sincere wrote “Sgt.” next to

      it. St. Ex. Vol. p. 3. Sincere hesitated before writing down the email address

      and said that he “always got his personal and his business email address[es]

      mixed up,” so it “took him a second [to] write it down.” Tr. Vol. II p. 125.

[5]   After Sincere left, Miller conducted a Google search and discovered that

      although an individual named Duncan Flagg worked for Marion County, he

      was not the same person who had visited the Shop. Miller contacted the

      Speedway Police Department “to find out what [she should] do and if there was

      in fact a missing person.” Tr. Vol. II p. 122. Speedway Police Detective

      Michael Hart called the number that Sincere had provided to Miller. No one

      answered but the number went to a voicemail recording which stated the caller

      had reached “Kenyonn Sincere Marion County Sheriff’s Department.” Tr. Vol.

      II p. 170.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024      Page 3 of 18
[6]   On September 28, 2021, the State charged Sincere with Level 6 felony

      impersonating a law-enforcement officer. The case proceeded to a jury trial on

      March 9, 2023. During opening statements, the deputy prosecutor outlined the

      State’s case, referring to each of its witnesses and providing an overview of the

      facts to which the deputy prosecutor expected the witnesses to testify. Sincere

      did not object to any of the deputy prosecutor’s statements.

[7]   Sincere objected to various statements made by Detective Hart during his

      testimony relating to the course of his investigation into the matter. The trial

      court overruled Sincere’s objections. In addition, both Miller and Detective

      Hart testified that although they had each found a photograph of an individual

      named “Duncan Flagg” who worked for Marion County, neither had found a

      photograph of anyone named “Duncan Flagg” that looked like Sincere.

      Although Sincere objected to Miller’s testimony on the subject, which objection

      was overruled, he did not object to Detective Hart’s testimony on the subject.

[8]   During closing arguments, the deputy prosecutor again provided an overview of

      the State’s case, referring to the witnesses and the facts as they were testified to

      by the witnesses. The deputy prosecutor argued that the State’s evidence had

      proven that Sincere had falsely claimed to be a detective named Duncan Flagg

      and had done so with the intent that Miller would provide him with certain

      information. Sincere objected to, and the trial court struck, an additional

      comment indicating that the woman in the video was Sincere’s wife and that

      Sincere had been checking to see if she had been at the Shop with another man.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024        Page 4 of 18
[9]    On rebuttal, the deputy prosecutor again argued that Sincere had

       “misrepresented who he was to get the information,” and Sincere objected on

       the basis that the prosecutor allegedly was stating facts that were not in

       evidence. Tr. Vol. II p. 208. The trial court overruled that objection, finding

       that the argument was “a fair argument based on” the evidence. Tr. Vol. II p.

       208. Sincere again objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, when

       the deputy prosecutor stated that Sincere was “not a detective with the Marion

       County Sheriff’s Department.” Tr. Vol. II p. 209.

[10]   Following its deliberations, the jury found Sincere guilty as charged. The trial

       court subsequently entered judgment of conviction as a Class A misdemeanor,

       sentenced Sincere to a 365-day suspended sentence, and ordered him to pay a

       $500.00 fine.

       Discussion and Decision
       I.      Admission of Evidence
[11]   Sincere first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

       certain evidence during trial.

               Generally, a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence is
               accorded a great deal of deference on appeal. Because the trial
               court is best able to weigh the evidence and assess witness
               credibility, we review its rulings on admissibility for abuse of
               discretion and only reverse if a ruling is clearly against the logic
               and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a
               party’s substantial rights.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024           Page 5 of 18
       Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015) (internal citations and quotations

       omitted).

       A.      Hearsay
[12]   “‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while

       testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth

       of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible

       unless these rules or other law provides otherwise.” Evid. R. 802. A statement

       made by an opposing party, however, is not hearsay. See Evid. R. 801(d)(2)(A).

       Further, “[o]ut-of-court statements made to law enforcement are non-hearsay if

       introduced primarily to explain why the investigation proceeded as it did.”

       Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 565 (Ind. 2014). “[C]ourse-of-investigation

       testimony is excluded from hearsay only for a limited purpose: to ‘bridge gaps

       in the trial testimony that would otherwise substantially confuse or mislead the

       jury.’” Id. (quoting Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1046 (7th Cir. 2011)).

       1.      Sincere’s Identification in Voicemail Recording

[13]   Sincere claims that Detective Hart’s testimony about what he had heard when

       he had called the telephone number provided by Sincere to Miller was

       impermissible hearsay as it recounted an out-of-court statement allegedly made

       by Sincere. For its part, the State claims that the outgoing voicemail message

       was not hearsay, but rather was a statement made by a party-opponent, which

       is not hearsay. See Evid. R. 801(d)(2)(A). We agree with the State.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024        Page 6 of 18
[14]   The evidence establishes that Sincere had provided Miller with a telephone

       number at which he claimed she could reach him and, in the voicemail box

       associated with this telephone number, Sincere had identified himself on the

       outgoing voicemail message not as Duncan Flagg but as Kenyonn Sincere.

       This statement was a statement by a party-opponent as it was made by Sincere

       and was communicated via the telephone number that he had claimed to be his.

       The statement, therefore, was not inadmissible hearsay.

       2.      Course-of-Investigation Testimony

[15]   Sincere also claims that Detective Hart’s testimony was inadmissible as it was

       “almost entirely about what other people told him” and “introduced to bridge

       gaps in the State’s case.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 19, 24. For its part, the State

       argues that Sincere “has not shown that [Detective Hart’s testimony was] not

       admissible under the course-of-investigation exception.” Appellee’s Br. p. 18.

       The State further argues that “Sincere’s claim that course-of-investigation

       testimony subjected him to some sort of unfair risk that the jury would rely

       upon that evidence for the truth of the matter asserted is not well founded.”

       Appellee’s Br. p. 18.

[16]   The trial court made it clear that the challenged testimony was being admitted

       solely as course-of-the-investigation testimony and not for the truth of the

       matter asserted. Moreover, as the State points out, both Miller and Wagner

       had testified and been cross-examined at trial before Detective Hart testified,

       and the jury had been able to determine their credibility, “which had generally

       been admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, before [Detective Hart]
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024      Page 7 of 18
       summarized what they told him as part of his investigation.” Appellee’s Br. p.

       19.

[17]   Even if the trial court had erred in admitting the challenged testimony, “[a]n

       error in admitting evidence does not require reversal unless it affects the

       substantial rights of a party.” Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2019), trans. denied.

               The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the
               conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence
               of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no
               substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to
               the conviction. The erroneous admission of evidence may also
               be harmless if that evidence is cumulative of other evidence
               admitted.

       Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).

[18]   Without deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

       Detective Hart’s testimony, we conclude that its admission was, at most,

       harmless. Detective Hart’s testimony was largely duplicative of Miller’s and

       Wagner’s testimony. Again, Miller testified that Sincere had claimed to be a

       detective for the Marion County Sheriff’s Department who had allegedly been

       investigating a missing-persons case. He had been dressed in a manner

       consistent with how an on-duty detective would dress, had had what appeared

       to be a law-enforcement badge on his hip, and had identified himself in writing

       as Sgt. Duncan Flagg, providing an email address for Flagg. Miller notified the

       Speedway Police Department after she had determined that the individual who

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024       Page 8 of 18
       had come into the Shop was not the only individual named Duncan Flagg who

       appeared to be employed by Marion County. Furthermore, to the extent that

       Detective Hart’s testimony went beyond these facts to indicate that the Marion

       County Sheriff’s Department does not have a missing-persons division, such

       fact was irrelevant to the question of whether Sincere had impersonated a

       detective.2

           B.   Identification Evidence
[19]   Sincere also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

       testimony relating to Miller’s and Detective Hart’s determinations that Sincere

       was not Duncan Flagg, claiming that its admission violated various evidentiary

       rules. Sincere, however, has waived this challenge because he did not object to

       testimony relating to Miller’s and Detective Hart’s determinations that Sincere

       was not Duncan Flagg on the challenged grounds at trial. See Durden v. State,

       99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018) (“A party’s failure to object to an alleged error

       at trial results in waiver.”); Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. 2011).

       (“[A] defendant may not argue one ground for an objection to the admission of

       evidence at trial and then raise new grounds on appeal.”).

[20]   Sincere attempts to avoid the effects of his waiver by claiming fundamental

       error.

       2
         Because we conclude that admission of Detective Hart’s testimony was harmless, we need not consider
       Sincere’s alternative argument that the testimony amounted to impermissible vouching testimony.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024                         Page 9 of 18
                Fundamental error is an error that makes a fair trial impossible or
                constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary
                principles of due process presenting an undeniable and
                substantial potential for harm. Fundamental error applies only
                when the actual or potential harm cannot be denied. An
                appellate court receiving contentions of fundamental error need
                only expound upon those it thinks warrant relief. It is otherwise
                adequate to note that the claim has not been preserved.

       Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131–32 (Ind. 2009) (internal citations and

       quotation omitted).

[21]   Sincere argues that a fair trial was impossible because Miller claimed to have

       located the picture of Duncan Flagg that she had looked at via Google, which

       Sincere asserts “is not an inherently reliable source.” Appellant’s Br. p. 31.

       Sincere notes that the record “does not indicate where Detective Hart saw the

       photo.” Appellant’s Br. p. 32. As such, he asserts that “[n]either witness could

       have authenticated the photo pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 901.”

       Appellant’s Br. p. 32. We need not determine whether the trial court abused its

       discretion in admitting Miller’s and Detective Hart’s testimony regarding the

       photographs because this testimony was cumulative of other evidence that

       Sincere was not Flagg. Again, Sincere identified himself as Kenyonn Sincere

       on the voicemail-box recording for the telephone number that he had provided

       Miller.3 Thus, admission of the challenged evidence was cumulative of other

       3
         To the extent that Sincere asserts that Miller’s and Detective Hart’s testimony was prejudicial because no
       other evidence supported the finding that Flagg is a law-enforcement officer, we note that the question of
       whether Flagg is a law-enforcement officer is irrelevant to the question of whether Sincere impersonated a
       law-enforcement officer. Stated differently, Flagg’s status or non-status as a law-enforcement officer has no

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024                             Page 10 of 18
       properly admitted evidence and therefore harmless. See Pelissier, 122 N.E.3d at

       988.

       II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
[22]   Sincere next contends that the deputy prosecutor committed prosecutorial

       misconduct.

                When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we must
                first consider whether the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. We
                then consider whether the alleged misconduct placed the
                defendant in a position of grave peril to which she should not
                have been subjected. Whether a prosecutor’s argument
                constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and
                the Rules of Professional Conduct. The gravity of the peril is
                measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on
                the jury’s decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the
                conduct.

                A prompt objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct allows
                the trial court an opportunity to prevent or remedy any prejudice
                to a defendant without the waste of time and resources involved
                in the reversal of a conviction. If a defendant does not object to
                the alleged misconduct, any claim of error is waived. In addition
                to objecting to alleged misconduct, a defendant must also request
                an appropriate remedy. In general, the correct procedure
                involves a request for an admonishment. If trial counsel is not
                satisfied that an admonishment will be sufficient to cure the
                error, then counsel may move for a mistrial. The failure to

       effect on the fact that Sincere had identified himself to a member of the public as a detective engaged in an
       active investigation.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024                              Page 11 of 18
               request either an admonishment or mistrial results in waiver of
               the issue.

       Collins v. State, 966 N.E.2d 96, 106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations and

       quotations omitted). “Where a claim of prosecutorial misconduct has not been

       properly preserved, our standard for review is different from that of a properly

       preserved claim.” Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006). “More

       specifically, the defendant must establish not only the grounds for the

       misconduct but also the additional grounds for fundamental error.” Id.

[23]   Sincere argues that “[b]y planning to rely on inadmissible evidence to make its

       case and repeatedly arguing facts not in evidence during closing arguments, the

       [deputy prosecutor] engaged in misconduct.” Appellant’s Br. p. 34. Sincere

       seems to acknowledge that he failed to preserve his claims of prosecutorial

       misconduct, arguing that the misconduct had placed him in a position of grave

       peril that resulted in fundamental error. He asserts that the misconduct “had a

       profound impact on the jury” and “[t]he probable persuasive effect of the

       misconduct was especially powerful here, where evidence of guilt was scant.”

       Appellant’s Br. p. 38.

[24]   To the extent that Sincere’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim is based upon his

       assertion that the State relied on inadmissible evidence in its opening and

       closing arguments, Sincere cannot prove error, much less fundamental error

       given our conclusion that the challenged evidence was either admissible or that

       its admission was harmless. As for the other allegedly improper statements

       made during opening and closing arguments, even if such statements amounted
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024      Page 12 of 18
       to misconduct (which they did not), the misconduct did not constitute

       fundamental error because the trial court properly instructed the jury that it

       could not rely on any arguments made by counsel as such statements were not

       evidence. See Pruitt v. State, 622 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ind. 1993) (providing that we

       presume on appeal that the jury followed the instruction of the trial court). 4

       IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[25]   Finally, Sincere contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his

       conviction.

                When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
                conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
                evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
                the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
                witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
                it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
                when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
                they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
                Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
                finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
                reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
                overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
                evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
                from it to support the verdict.

       4
         Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence and
       that the prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct, we reject Sincere’s claim that the cumulative
       effect of the claimed errors required reversal. See Lucas v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1090, 1098 (Ind. 1986) (“Alleged
       errors which do not present a single basis for reversal do not gain the stature of reversible error when viewed
       en masse.”) (emphasis in original).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024                              Page 13 of 18
       Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (cleaned up). Stated

       differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the

       evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither

       reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the

       judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.”

       Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[26]   In order to prove that Sincere had committed impersonating a law-enforcement

       officer, the State was required to prove that Sincere “with the intent to: (1)

       deceive; or (2) induce compliance with the person’s instructions, orders, or

       requests;” falsely represented that he is a law-enforcement officer. Ind. Code §

       35-44.1-2-6(a); -6(b). The General Assembly has defined a “law enforcement

       officer” in this context as:

               (1) a police officer (including a tribal police officer, a correctional
               police officer, and a hospital police officer employed by a
               hospital police department established under IC 16-18-4), sheriff,
               constable, marshal, prosecuting attorney, special prosecuting
               attorney, special deputy prosecuting attorney, the securities
               commissioner, or the inspector general;

               (2) a deputy of any of those persons[.]

       Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-185(a). The State concedes that although judgment of

       conviction was entered as a Class A misdemeanor, “the State was required to

       show that Sincere falsely represented himself to be a law enforcement officer,

       not just a public servant in general.” Appellee’s Br. p. 33.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024         Page 14 of 18
[27]   Sincere argues that under the statute, “[a] law enforcement officer who pretends

       to be a different law enforcement officer does not falsely represent their status as

       a law enforcement officer.” Appellant’s Br. p. 46. Thus, he claims that the

       State was required to prove that he is not a law-enforcement officer. Sincere,

       however, has pointed to no authority that supports his reading of the statute,

       acknowledging that “[c]aselaw is silent on this point.” Appellant’s Br. p. 45.

[28]   The State disagrees with Sincere’s reading of the statute, claiming that

               [b]y claiming that the State had to disprove that Sincere was a
               law enforcement officer, Sincere appears to be suggesting that
               there is some sort of immunity for people who are already law
               enforcement officers to commit the crime of impersonating a
               public servant, but he has not identified any legal support for that
               claim.

       Appellee’s Br. p. 35. The State further claims that

               Sincere’s reading of the statute would have all sorts of
               unintended consequences, including authorizing law
               enforcement officers to operate outside their jurisdiction by
               falsely claiming to be a law enforcement [officer] within that
               other jurisdiction with the intent to deceive or induce
               compliance. His misreading of the statute would also permit one
               public servant to impersonate someone from another agency, or
               even from another federal, state, or local government simply
               because they were a public servant somewhere. There is no
               reason to believe that the legislature would have intended this
               sort of absurd result.

       Appellee’s Br. p. 36. We agree with the State. The plain language of Indiana

       Code section 35-44.1-2-6 requires only that the defendant, with the intent to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024       Page 15 of 18
       deceive or induce action, falsely represents that he is a law-enforcement officer.

       Upon review, we have found nothing in Indiana law to support Sincere’s

       assertion that the State should have also be required to disprove that he was a

       law-enforcement officer before it could prove that he had violated Indiana Code

       section 35-44.1-2-6, and we reject Sincere’s invitation to adopt such a

       requirement.

[29]   We next turn our attention to whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to

       sustain Sincere’s conviction. In Ferree v. State, 124 N.E.3d 109, 112 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2019), trans. denied, the evidence established that Ferree had (1) entered a

       mental-health facility, wearing a jacket with the Vigo County Sheriff’s

       Department’s logo on the front and the word “Sheriff” on the back; (2)

       identified himself as “John Wilson” and affiliated himself with the Sheriff’s

       Department; and (3) requested assistance for an inmate in the Vigo County Jail.

       We affirmed Ferree’s conviction, concluding that “[t]he only reasonable

       interpretation of the totality of the evidence – Ferree’s appearance; his request,

       which was commonly made by a law enforcement officer; the fact he gave a

       false name; and Dougherty’s testimony that he identified himself as a deputy –

       is that Ferree impersonated a law enforcement officer.” Id. at 114.

[30]   Likewise, in Poole v. State, 559 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), we

       concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction

       for impersonating a law-enforcement officer, citing the following evidence:

               Poole had gone to Wishard requesting treatment for injuries he
               claimed to have incurred while acting as a police officer. A nurse
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024      Page 16 of 18
               testified that as she was preparing the paperwork to discharge
               Poole, he requested a work release form and told her that he was
               a police officer with IPD and supplied her with the identification
               numbers for his badge, unit, supervisor, vehicle, and district.

       (Internal record cites omitted).

[31]   Like in Ferree and Poole, in this case, the evidence most favorable to the jury’s

       guilty finding supports the jury’s determination that Sincere had impersonated a

       law-enforcement officer. Again, Miller testified that Sincere had claimed to be

       a detective for the Marion County Sheriff’s department who had been allegedly

       investigating a missing-persons case. Sincere had been dressed in a manner

       consistent with how an on-duty detective would dress, i.e., wearing a polo that

       read “Marion County” and/or “detective” and what appeared to be a law

       enforcement badge on his hip and identifying himself in writing as Sgt. Duncan

       Flagg, providing his name and an apparent email address for Flagg. Tr. Vol. II

       pp. 116, 152. When giving Miller the email address for Duncan Flagg, Sincere

       indicated that “he always got his personal and his business email address[es]

       mixed up so that’s why it took him a second to -- to write it down because he

       wanted to make sure he was giving his business” email address, implying that

       the address belonging to Flagg belonged to him. Tr. Vol. II p. 125. Miller’s

       testimony also supports the reasonable inference that Sincere had made the

       representations with the intent to induce her compliance with his request for

       surveillance footage and a copy of the requested receipt. The evidence is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024     Page 17 of 18
       sufficient to sustain Sincere’s conviction.5 Sincere’s claim to the contrary

       effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not

       do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

[32]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       5
          Sincere also claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict. A directed verdict
       is appropriate only when there is a total lack of evidence regarding an essential element of the crime or when
       the evidence is without conflict and supports an inference in favor of innocence. See Edwards v. State, 862
       N.E.2d 1254, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Sincere relied on his sufficiency argument in support
       of his claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. Given that we rejected this
       argument and instead concluded that the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction, we further conclude
       that Sincere has failed to prove that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1172 | January 29, 2024                                Page 18 of 18