Court Opinion

ID: 4075927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-30 06:42:03.930303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:32:50.944041
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                  14-15-00093-CV
                                                  FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                               HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                             12/7/2015 4:14:26 PM
                                                            CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                           CLERK

            NO. 14-15-00093-CV

                                                 FILED IN
                                          14th COURT OF APPEALS
       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS               HOUSTON, TEXAS
FOR THE FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF            12/7/2015 4:14:26 PM
                                       TEXAS
                                          CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
           HOUSTON, TEXAS                          Clerk

          STATE FARM LLOYDS,
                     Appellant

                      v.

            GINGER HANSON,
                     Appellee

    On Appeal from Cause No. 2012-68087
      In the 281st Judicial District Court
             Harris County, Texas

   APPELLANT STATE FARM LLOYDS’
           REPLY BRIEF

               Bruce E. Ramage
            State Bar No. 5492500
            ramage@mdjwlaw.com
                 Kevin G. Cain
           State Bar No. 24012371
              cain@mdjwlaw.com
            Levon G. Hovnatanian
           State Bar No. 10059825
         hovnatanian@mdjwlaw.com
MARTIN, DISIERE, JEFFERSON & WISDOM, L.L.P.
             808 Travis, Suite 1800
             Houston, Texas 77002
          Telephone: (713) 632-1700
          Facsimile: (713) 222-0101
     ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
                                         TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                                    PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........................................................................................i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................... iii
I.      HANSON FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE
        SHINGLES WERE IN A SATISFACTORY STATE BEFORE THE
        STORM...........................................................................................................1

II.     HANSON FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY PROBATIVE EVIDENCE
        THAT THE WIND CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE SHINGLES.................. 1
III.    HANSON FAILS TO IDENTIFY EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT
        THE SHINGLES CHANGED FROM A SATISFACTORY STATE
        TO AN UNSATISFACTORY STATE ON JUNE 1, 2012. ..........................3

IV.     FREEMAN DID NOT RULE OUT OVERDRIVEN STAPLES AS
        THE CAUSE OF THE PULL THROUGH DAMAGE. ................................3

V.      HANSON HAS NOT SHOWN SHE WAS EXCUSED FROM
        SATISFYING THE POLICY’S CONDITION PRECEDENT
        REQUIRING HER TO REPAIR THE SUPPOSED DAMAGE IN
        ORDER TO BE ENTITLED TO REPLACEMENT COST
        BENEFITS. .....................................................................................................4

VI.     HANSON FAILS TO IDENTIFY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
        ESTABLISH THAT SHE SEGREGATED THE CLAIMED
        ATTORNEY’S FEES. ....................................................................................5

VII     HANSON HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT RULE 167 DOES NOT
        PRECLUDE HER RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AND
        ATTORNEY’S FEES THAT ACCRUED AFTER DECEMBER 4,
        2013. ...............................................................................................................6

VIII. HANSON FAILS TO SHOW THAT SHE PROPERLY
      SEGREGATED RECOVERABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES FROM
      THOSE THAT ARE NOT RECOVERABLE. ..............................................8

IX.     HANSON HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ATTORNEY’S
        FEE AWARD IS NOT EXCESSIVE...........................................................10
                                                              i
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................13

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................................................................13

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...............................................................................14

                                                         ii
                                        INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

                                                                                                                    PAGE

Cases
Alief Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Perry,
  440 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013,
  pet. denied) ............................................................................................................9
Ashford Partners, Ltd. v. ECO Res., Inc.,
  401 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. 2012) ...................................................................................7
Brasel v. Manhattan Homeowners Ass’n,
  2014 WL 2809816 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014,
  no pet.) .................................................................................................................12

Citizens Nat’l Bank v. NXS Constr., Inc.,
  387 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012,
  no pet.) .............................................................................................................8, 10
El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas,
  370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012) .................................................................................6
Farmers Group Ins., Inc. v. Poteet,
  434 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014,
  pet. denied) ....................................................................................................10, 12
Farrar v. Hobby,
  506 U.S. 103 (1992) ..........................................................................................11

Flagship Hotel, Ltd. v. City of Galveston,
  117 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003,
  pet. denied) ............................................................................................................9

Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc.,
  739 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987,
  writ denied)..........................................................................................................12

Long v. Griffin,
  442 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2014) .................................................................................6

                                                             iii
Saitchick v. American Motorists Ins. Co.,
  554 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. N.Y.) .............................................................................4, 5

Schenck v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate, Inc.,
  803 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990,
  no writ) ................................................................................................................10
Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Trust,
  296 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. 2009) .............................................................................11
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello,
  941 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1997) ...................................................................................9
USAA County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cook,
 241 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007,
 no pet.) .................................................................................................................12
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Merrell,
 313 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. 2010) .................................................................................2
Ware v. United Lloyd’s,
 2013 WL 1932812 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013,
 no pet.) ...........................................................................................................11, 12

Statutes
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001...................................................................7

Rules
TEX. R. CIV P. 167 .....................................................................................................6
TEX. R. CIV. P. 167(b) ...............................................................................................7

TEX. R. CIV. P. 167.4(a) ............................................................................................7

                                                             iv
I.    HANSON FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE
      SHINGLES WERE IN A SATISFACTORY STATE BEFORE THE
      STORM.
      Hanson claims that her testimony that a home inspector “did not find any

damage to the home at all that was not cosmetic” establishes that the shingles were

in a satisfactory state at the time she purchased the home in 2011. Appellee’s Brief

at 4. However, nothing shows he climbed onto the roof and inspected the shingles.

3:34-35. She also relies on the seller’s disclosure from the 2011 purchase in an

attempt to show that the shingles were not damaged.          Appellee’s Brief at 4.

However, as Hanson acknowledges, that shows at best that the seller was simply

not aware of any unsealed shingles. Appellee’s Brief at 4.

      Finally, she contends that an underwriting report that State Farm prepared

approximately 11 months before the purported storm “did not reflect any concerns

about the roof at all.” Appellee’s Brief at 4. However, there is no evidence anyone

climbed up on the roof to examine the shingles.         One cannot determine the

presence of unsealed shingles from the ground. 6:71-72. Nor can overdriven

staples be seen from the ground. 5:254. The only way to detect them is to lift the

corners of shingles and look at the staples. 5:254.

II.   HANSON FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY PROBATIVE EVIDENCE
      THAT THE WIND CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE SHINGLES.
      Hanson cites Kimmel’s testimony that the wind lifted unsealed shingles and

pulled them through the staples. Appellant’s Brief at 6-10. However, Kimmel’s

                                          1
conclusions are not probative evidence because they do not exclude construction

defects as a cause of the damage.

      Kimmel repeatedly states that shingles were pulled through the staples, but

never states how he differentiates the damage from that caused by overdriven

staples. For example, he states,

      “Now in this exhibit if you see that fastener just pulled with it. The
      nail came completely out. Okay. And that’s not what’s happening
      here. It’s actually pulling through the staple. There’s a staple on the
      roof and it’s pulled through the staple.”

3:178-79. He continued, “In this instance, in her roof, it’s pulled through that

fastener so it’s actually torn right there at the fastener. So it is damage, it’s got

actual direct physical loss.” 3:179. The mere fact that the shingles were unsealed

was what Kimmel based his conclusions on: “And the depiction – the shingles are

lifting up, just like I told you, so that tells me that these fasteners are pulled . . . .”

3:180. But he never ruled out that the unsealed shingles were torn at the fastener

because the staples were overdriven. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Merrell, 313
S.W.3d 837, 838 (Tex. 2010). He did not state how he could differentiate between

pull through damage and overdriven-staple damage.               Nor did he show that

unsealed shingles could not have been torn by overdriven staples.

                                            2
III.   HANSON FAILS TO IDENTIFY EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE
       SHINGLES CHANGED FROM A SATISFACTORY STATE TO AN
       UNSATISFACTORY STATE ON JUNE 1, 2012.
       Hanson attempts to deflect attention from the lack of evidence showing that

the shingles became unsealed on June 1, 2012 by relying on evidence that trees fell

over on a golf course. Appellee’s Brief at 15. Even if that were evidence of high

winds at Hanson’s house, it is not evidence that any supposed damage to the

shingles occurred that day.

       Hanson also relies on evidence that other neighbors were having work

performed on their roofs. Appellee’s Brief at 16. But nothing shows that those

roofs were not in a condition similar to Hanson’s. Unsealed shingles are common

on roofs over five years old. 5:240. That other roofs in her neighborhood were

being worked on is not evidence that wind caused pull through shingle damage or

caused the shingles to unseal on June 1, 2012.

IV.    FREEMAN DID NOT RULE OUT OVERDRIVEN STAPLES AS THE
       CAUSE OF THE PULL THROUGH DAMAGE.
       Hanson contends Freeman ruled out overdriven staples as a cause of damage

to the shingles. Appellee’s Brief at 12. However, Freeman limited his testimony

to only the most severe type of overdriven staple. He considered a staple to be

overdriven if it penetrated the plywood decking:

       A.    Typically when it’s overdriven in my experience it will go
             down into the decking.

                                         3
      Q.    What will?

      A.    The fastener.

4:11-12.

      The undisputed evidence showed that a staple was overdriven if it merely

penetrated the top layer of shingles. 5:252. A properly driven staple is flush with

the surface of the top layer of shingles. 5:252. The roof had numerous staples that

were flush with the top surface of the bottom layer indicating they were overdriven

through the top layer. 5:252. A staple can also be overdriven when it does not

completely penetrate the top layer. 5:248. Freemen never ruled out these other

types of overdriven staples as alternate causes of the damage. Kimmel did not rule

out any kind of overdriven staple as a cause of the damage. Consequently, their

testimony was not probative evidence. See Merrell, 313 S.W.3d at 838.

V.    HANSON HAS NOT SHOWN SHE WAS EXCUSED FROM
      SATISFYING THE POLICY’S CONDITION PRECEDENT
      REQUIRING HER TO REPAIR THE SUPPOSED DAMAGE IN
      ORDER TO BE ENTITLED TO REPLACEMENT COST BENEFITS.
      Hanson can only muster one opinion in which a court held that the insured

could recover replacement cost benefits without first repairing the damage.

Appellee’s Brief at 20. Hanson contends that the opinion in Saitchick v. American

Motorists Insurance Co., 554 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. N.Y.), supports her recovery of

replacement cost benefits. There, the insurer asserted that the insureds had not

satisfied the condition precedent for recovery. Id. at 216. The insureds asserted

                                        4
that “various equitable axioms,” including estoppel, precluded the insurer from

relying on the condition precedent. Id. The court based its conclusion that the

insureds were entitled to replace cost benefits based on “equitable considerations”

and case law.    Id. at 217 (stating, “I find that both case law and equitable

considerations render replacement cost the appropriate method of valuing

plaintiffs’ damages.”). Here, Hanson never asserted estoppel as an affirmative

defense to her required satisfaction of the condition precedent. In fact, she never

asserted or pled that she was not required to satisfy the condition precedent.

Additionally, Hanson failed to show that she could not recover replacement cost

benefits under the policy after recovering the proceeds of a judgment for actual

cash value and performing the repairs.

VI.   HANSON FAILS TO IDENTIFY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
      ESTABLISH THAT SHE SEGREGATED THE CLAIMED
      ATTORNEY’S FEES.
      In order to support her deficient attempt to comply with the lodestar method

for proving attorney’s fees, Hanson is forced to reduce the requirements in Long

and El Apple to “at least some indication of the time spent on various parts of the

case.” Appellee’s Brief at 25. But both require much more. “To establish the

number of hours reasonably spent on the case, the fee application and record must

include proof documenting the performance of specific tasks, the time required for

those tasks, the person who performed the work, and his or her specific rate.” El

                                         5
Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 765 (Tex. 2012). “[G]eneralities about

tasks performed provide insufficient information for the fact finder to meaningfully

review whether the tasks and hours were reasonable and necessary under the

lodestar method.” Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2014).

      While she claims that the evidence here is “vastly different” from that in

Long and El Apple, that is not the standard. Hanson fails to show how the notation

“preparation for trial” permits the trial court to determine whether the time

expended was reasonable and necessary. Appellee’s Brief at 25. Plainly, it does

not. It does not even identify what was done to prepare for trial. Because it does

not document the performance of “specific tasks,” but gives only a general

category of work it is insufficient.

      Moreover, she fails to show how entries giving the total time expended for a

day, but listing four tasks permits a meaningful review of whether the time spent

on each was reasonable and necessary. Obviously, the trial court has no way of

determining reasonableness and necessity without knowing the amount of time

expended on each task.

VII   HANSON HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT RULE 167 DOES NOT
      PRECLUDE HER RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S
      FEES THAT ACCRUED AFTER DECEMBER 4, 2013.
      Hanson states that the “language” of rule 167 “makes it clear that the

$15,000 attorney’s fee award must be included in the equation” determining

                                         6
whether Hanson recovered 80 percent of State Farm’s offer. Appellee’s Brief at

27. Conspicuously absent is any reference to any such language. Nor does

Hanson establish that an attorney’s fee award is a “monetary claim.”

       The statute provides, "If a settlement offer made under this rule is rejected,

and the judgment to be awarded on the monetary claims covered by the offer is

significantly less favorable to the offeree than was the offer, the court must award

the offeror litigation costs against the offeree from the time the offer was rejected

to the time of judgment."      Rule 167.4(a).   Here, the judgment awarded only

$12,878 for breach of contract, the monetary claim. Attorney’s fees are simply an

add on amount and their recovery is entirely dependent on a successful breach of

contract claim. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001 (stating “A person may

recover reasonable attorney’s fees from an individual or corporation, in addition to

the amount of a valid claim . . . .” (emphasis added)); Ashford Partners, Ltd. v.

ECO Resources, Inc., 401 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. 2012). “A judgment award on

monetary claims is significantly less favorable than an offer to settle those claims

if: (1) the offeree is a claimant and the judgment would be less than 80 percent of

the offer. . . .”   Rule 167(b).   The $12,878 award on the breach of contract

monetary claim is only 43 percent of State Farm’s $30,000 offer on that claim. CR

1541. Consequently, the rule applies.

                                          7
VIII. HANSON FAILS TO SHOW THAT SHE PROPERLY SEGREGATED
      RECOVERABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES FROM THOSE THAT ARE
      NOT RECOVERABLE.
      Hanson fails to offer any basis for her expert’s opinion that only five percent

of the fees incurred were for claims for which they were not recoverable. She cites

no testimony showing how he arrived at that percentage. She states, “Segregated

attorney’s fees can be established with evidence of unsegregated fees and a rough

percentage of the amount attributable to the covered vs. non-covered claims.”

Appellee’s Brief at 29. But her expert’s five percent figure does not even rise to

the level of a rough percentage.

      Hanson complains that the way the attorney applied a percentage to

segregate attorney’s fees in Citizens Nat’l Bank v. NXS Constr., Inc., 387 S.W.3d
74, 88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.), is not the standard for

segregation. But Hanson’s expert offered no methodology for coming up with the

five percent that he applied to determine what fees were incurred on claims for

which they were not recoverable:

            A. Chapa is a case that basically says when you have different
      causes of action -- like here we've got a breach of contract cause of
      action and we've got a bad faith cause of action. And it says you need
      to apportion your time to each in case you're not successful on one of
      them.

            But what basically happens is in this case we're trying to get a
      new roof. So 95 percent of the time that we spend on this case is
      towards that. And that -- so in other words, the breach of -- the work

                                         8
      you do for breach of contract and bad faith is inextricably intertwined.
      That's the terminology they use.

             I would estimate that 5 percent of the time that we've spent was
      spent solely on bad faith issues.

5:18-19. He provided nothing showing how he arrived at the five percent estimate.

He did not identify the amount of time that was spent on the extra contractual

claims. He did not identify the amount of time expended on the claims against

Traise whom Hanson had nonsuited. In short, the five percent segregation is based

on nothing more than the ipse dixit of the expert and is nothing but a bare

conclusion that is not probative evidence.

      Nor do the authorities on which Hanson relies show that an unsupported

percentage is probative evidence of segregation. She relies on dicta in a footnote

in Flagship Hotel, Ltd. v. City of Galveston, 117 S.W.3d 552, 565 n.7 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied), that a “rough percentage” of the amount

attributable to a breach of contract claim can be sufficient to segregate. However,

segregation by a percentage was not an issue in the case. The court never held that

an unsupported percentage was sufficient evidence of segregation.         Again, in

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. 1997), the

percentage based segregation was not challenged and the court did not address

whether it was sufficient. In Alief Independent School District v. Perry, 440
S.W.3d 228, 246 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied), the

                                         9
defendant never challenged how the plaintiff’s expert arrived at the percentage he

applied for segregation. Here, State Farm has. In Schenck v. Ebby Halliday Real

Estate, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 361, 369 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990, no writ), the

percentage that was applied was not challenged as lacking support. The court did

not hold that an expert witness can simply declare that a certain percentage should

apply without showing what he based the percentage on.

      In the end, the only courts that have addressed the sufficiency of a

percentage based segregation in the cases the parties have cited were the ones in

Farmers Group Ins., Inc. v. Poteet, 434 S.W.3d 316, 332 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2014, pet. denied), and Citizens Nat’l Bank v. NXS Construction, Inc., 387
S.W.3d 74, 88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). In Poteet, the

court held that applying a blanket percentage to the total amount of attorney’s fees

claimed was not evidence of segregation. 434 S.W.3d at 332, 333. That is what

Hanson’s expert did here. 5:18-19. In NXS Construction, the percentage was

based on the attorney deducting fees attributable to claims for which they were not

recoverable. 387 S.W.3d at 87-88. Hanson’s expert did not do that. 5:18-19.

IX.   HANSON HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ATTORNEY’S FEE
      AWARD IS NOT EXCESSIVE.
      The appellants spill a lot of ink trying to rebut the supreme court’s assertion

that “the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success goes to the reasonableness of a

fee award” and “‘the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a
                                        10
fee award is the degree of success obtained.’”                 Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam

Trust, 296 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.
103 (1992)). Appellee’s Brief at 33-36. They imply that that is only true in civil

rights cases. Appellee’s Brief at 33-36. However, Smith was not a civil rights

case. Id. at 546.

       There, the plaintiffs sought damages for breach of a commercial lease. Id.

The plaintiff sought $200,000 in damages, but the jury awarded only $65,000. The

supreme court concluded that the $62,438.75 fee sought “was unreasonable in light

of the amount involved and the results obtained, and in the absence of evidence

that such fees were warranted due to circumstances unique to this case.” 1 Id. at

548. Thus, the court’s statements quoted above were neither limited nor applied to

civil rights cases.

       Other courts also recognize that the degree of success is the most critical

factor in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee award. In Ware v.

United Lloyd’s, 2013 WL 1932812, *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.), the

only factor the court applied was the degree of success obtained. It affirmed the

trial court’s refusal to award attorney’s fees where the plaintiff recovered $7833.01

1
  Nor did State Farm heavily rely on the holding in Farrar as appellants incorrectly assert.
Appellee’s Brief at 35. State Farm referred to Farrar only once in Appellant’s Brief (stating in a
parenthetical to the citation to Smith, “(quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992))).”

                                               11
in damages and sought $133,947 in attorney’s fees. Id. at *3. See also Brasel v.

Manhattan Homeowners Ass’n, 2014 WL 2809816 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2014, no pet.), and Farmers Group Ins. Inc. v. Poteet, 434 S.W.3d 316 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied) (both recognizing “the most critical factor in

determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained.”).

      Hanson also cites a long list of cases that have supposedly “held fee awards

reasonable even when the amount of fees far surpasses the amount of actual

damages.” Appellee’s Brief at 38. Here, the fees surpass the damages by a ratio of

nearly six to one. Only two cases on which Hanson relies involved that type of

fees to damages ratio. However, in Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe &

Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied), the fees

were not excessive because trial lasted four weeks. Here, trial lasted four days.

The case does not establish that the fees here were not excessive. In USAA County

Mutual Insurance Company v. Cook, 241 S.W.3d 93, 102-03 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.), the plaintiff recovered $23,310 in fees and $1926.56 in

damages. However, the amount originally demanded was $2126.56, so the degree

of success was 90 percent. See id. at 103. Here, the degree of success was only

about 33 percent based of Hanson’s demand during trial and about 25 percent of

what she sought before trial. CR 1541. Cook does not establish that the attorney’s

fee award here is not excessive.

                                        12
                                CONCLUSION
      State Farm respectfully requests the Court to grant the relief sought in

Appellant’s Brief.

                               Respectfully submitted,

                               MARTIN, DISIERE, JEFFERSON & WISDOM, L.L.P.

                               By: /s/ Bruce E. Ramage
                                  Bruce E. Ramage
                                  State Bar No. 5492500
                                  ramage@mdjwlaw.com
                                  Kevin G. Cain
                                  State Bar No. 24012371
                                  cain@mdjwlaw.com
                                  Levon G. Hovnatanian
                                  State Bar No. 10059825
                                  hovnatanian@mdjwlaw.com
                               808 Travis, 20th Floor
                               Houston, Texas 77002
                               (713) 632-1700 – Telephone
                               (713) 222-0101 – Facsimile

                               ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
                               STATE FARM LLOYDS

                     CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
      This is to certify that this computer-generated Appellant State Farm Lloyds’
Reply Brief contains 2941 words.

                                     /s/ Bruce E. Ramage
                                     Bruce E. Ramage
                                     Dated: December 7, 2015

                                       13
                        CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
      This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant
State Farm Lloyds’ Reply Brief has been forwarded to the individual(s) listed
below, by the method indicated, on this 7th day of December, 2015:

      Mr. Richard D. Daly
      rdaly@dalyblack.com
      Mr. John Black
      jblack@dalyblack.com
      Ms. Melissa Waden Wray
      mwray@dalyblack.com
      RICHARD DALY LAW FIRM
      2211 Norfolk Street, Ste. 800
      Houston, Texas 77098
      (via e-filing and e-mail)
      (Attorneys for appellee Ginger Hanson)

                                    /s/ Bruce E. Ramage
                                    Bruce E. Ramage

                                      14