Court Opinion

ID: 9474245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:51:52.239868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:58.948293
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case does not warrant dismissal of the indictment, even under a rule that requires dismissal even though the defendant cannot demonstrate substantial prejudice from the misconduct. I also agree that there was sufficient evidence of the conspiracy to form a foundation for the admission of Jackson’s extrajudicial statements.
Unlike the majority, however, I am convinced that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case merits strong criticism. The prosecutor manipulated the evidence and deceived the grand jury. The prosecutor deliberately sought to prevent the grand jury from ascertaining that the Government had little evidence to support its conspiracy charge. After four years of surveillance, the Government was well aware that its only evidence regarding conspiracy was the defendant’s association with the Vitales. The prosecutor and the testifying agent, however, left the grand jury with the impression that the defendant was engaged in a massive conspiracy with various other persons. Even though I do not believe that this misconduct rises quite to the level of “outrageous or intentional prosecutorial misconduct” warranting dismissal of the indictment, United States v. Udziela, 671 F.2d 995, 1001 (7th Cir.1982), I believe that the prosecutor’s conduct here deserves more than passing criticism.
It is not merely conjecture or speculation to conclude that the Government added the conspiracy charge and misrepresented the strength of its evidence on that charge in order to shore up its charges of intent to distribute. At the first grand jury proceedings, the Government was unable to secure an indictment because, in my view, it did not have sufficient evidence regarding intent to distribute even though it had surveilled the defendant for four years. Without the conspiracy charge at the second grand jury proceeding, the possession charges would have failed, and vice versa. This is another instance of the disturbing abuse by the Government of employing the conspiracy statute to bolster its case. See United States v. Cerro, 775 F.2d 908, 913 (7th Cir.1985).
With these caveats, I concur.