Court Opinion

ID: 9493891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:22:32.815181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:05.526520
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the sanction imposed was not commensurate with the prejudice resulting from the government’s failure to comply with the discovery dead*674line, I must respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion.
With all due respect to the broad discretion that a district court of necessity must possess to control its schedule and to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, I believe that the exclusion of evidence that the district court itself characterized as “critical” to the government’s case resulted in prejudice greater than that which would have resulted had the government’s request for a continuance been granted. The public has an interest in the effective prosecution of public offenses, especially one involving the level of violence and terror that was exhibited by the defendants in the present case. The exclusion of critical evidence is a sanction that should be imposed only if the government has been guilty of flagrant misconduct resulting in substantial prejudice to the defendant. Cf. United States v. DeCoteau, 186 F.3d 1008, 1010 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Tulk, 171 F.3d 596, 598 (8th Cir.1999).
Had the district court granted the motion for continuance, it would have lost a week of valuable trial time, there being no alternative case available for trial on April 3. As it turned out, of course, that is what occurred as a result of the denial of the motion, with the additional prejudice to the defendants of their having to languish in confinement for what will have been at least an additional twelve months. Although the continuance would not have addressed the court’s scheduling problems (which I do not for a minute minimize, given the dramatic increase in the number of indictments in the district), those scheduling problems, however significant and burdensome, must be weighed in the balance against the public’s right to have these defendants brought to book with all the evidence the government has within its power to present.
Weighing the circumstances before the district court in the light of the factors and the authorities set forth in the court’s opinion, I am forced to conclude that the district court erred in imposing the sanction of exclusion when the lesser sanction of continuance would have protected the rights of the defendants, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. DeCoteau, 186 F.3d at 1010, notwithstanding the fact that it would have resulted in a not inconsiderable disruption in the court’s schedule. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.