Court Opinion

ID: 9723988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:40:22.539258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.916061
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, J.
Defendant appeals as of right from an order terminating plaintiffs obligation to pay alimony. We reverse.
The parties were divorced in 1985. The divorce judgment provided that plaintiffs obligation to pay defendant $320 a month in alimony would terminate "when [defendant] should reside with an *180unrelated adult male person.” One year later, plaintiff filed a motion for the termination of alimony, alleging that defendant was residing with an unrelated male, John Robinson. The trial court granted the motion following an evidentiary hearing. This Court reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant resided with Robinson. Beason v Beason, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided March 29, 1988 (Docket No. 98716).
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed this Court’s decision because it was based on an incorrect standard of appellate review. Beason v Bea-son, 435 Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207 (1990). The Court further noted that "it appears the trial court’s findings of fact may have been based on an erroneous view of the law,” id., and remanded the case to the trial court "for consideration of the meaning of the term 'reside’ in the parties’ divorce judgment.” Id. at 806.
On remand, the trial court concluded that "reside” was an ambiguous term undefined by Michigan law, and resorted to a benefit test and the definition set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed). Applying essentially undisputed facts, the court again concluded that defendant was residing with Robinson, and therefore again ruled that plaintiff was no longer obligated to pay alimony. It is this determination that defendant now appeals.
Unlike the trial court, we do not believe that the term "reside” is ambiguous. On the contrary, the definition of "residence” is well settled in this state. In Wright v Genesee Circuit Judge, 117 Mich 244, 245; 75 NW 465 (1898), our Supreme Court defined the ordinary meaning of "residence” as follows:
Residence means the place where one resides; an *181abode; a dwelling or habitation; especially, a settled or permanent home or domicile. Residence is made up of fact and intention. There must be the fact of abode, and the intention of remaining.
See also Banfield v Banfield, 318 Mich 38, 43; 27 NW2d 336 (1947); Leader v Leader, 73 Mich App 276, 280-281; 251 NW2d 288 (1977); Bingham v American Screw Products Co, 398 Mich 546, 564; 248 NW2d 537 (1976); In re Scheyer’s Estate, 336 Mich 645; 59 NW2d 33 (1953); Reaume & Silloway, Inc v Tetzlaff, 315 Mich 95, 99; 23 NW2d 219 (1946); Hartzler v Radeka, 265 Mich 451; 251 NW 554 (1933).
Applying this definition to the undisputed facts, it is apparent that the trial court erred in concluding that John Robinson resided with defendant. There was no evidence that either defendant or Robinson considered defendant’s home to be Robinson’s settled or permanent home. Rather, the evidence established a transient relationship in which Robinson was at most a frequent guest at defendant’s home. Further, there was no evidence that Robinson intended to become a permanent occupant of defendant’s household. Absent such an intent, Robinson falls outside the definition of "resident” consistently adopted by this Court and our Supreme Court.
Where a trial court’s finding is derived from an erroneous application of law to facts, the appellate court is not limited to review for clear error. Beason, supra, 435 Mich 804-805. Nor is an appellate court so limited where the trial court’s factual findings may have been influenced by an incorrect view of the law. Id. at 805. Because the trial court failed to apply the facts of this case to the well-settled definition of the term "reside,” we reverse the order terminating plaintiffs alimony obligation.
*182Reversed.
Wahls, P.J., concurred.