Court Opinion

ID: 9674608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:31:40.072579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.474524
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Judge
(concurring).
As I understand appellant’s claim he contends the statutes under which the probate proceedings were commenced violate due process and are unconstitutional because they do not require executors to exercise due diligence in notifying heirs, legatees and devisees, but are satisfied with only an indifferent effort on the part of the executors. Here, for instance, although the executors presumably could easily have obtained appellant’s exact address, they did no more than to say he was in federal prison and gave him notice only by publication. Appellant thus is contending that the procedure followed was insufficient even to confer jurisdiction on the probate court to open the estate and, of course, if appellant is correct in this, the mere passage of six months of time would not serve to cut off his rights despite Sec. 473.083, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., as it does not begin to operate until an estate has been validly opened. So I believe we necessarily must address ourselves to the question of whether Secs. 473.017 and 473.033, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., violate due process as to notice.
The fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections . . . The notice must be of such nature as reasonable to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance . . .” Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1949).
Missouri cases agree that due process sometimes requires more notice than is required by a statute. See State ex rel. Deems v. Holtcamp, 245 Mo. 655, 151 S.W. 153 (1912); Clapper v. Chandler, 406 S. W.2d 114 (Mo.App.1966). And see Maus, Missouri Practice, Probate Law and Practice, Vol. 3, Sec. 514.
Appellant’s argument that due diligence in giving notice is essential to due process is the gist of the Mullane decision and would logically seem applicable to probate proceedings. A due diligence requirement would not put a heavy burden on executors nor would it thwart the state’s interest in the final settlement of estates, but it would further protect the rights of persons with an interest affected by probate of the will. In this case, for example, it would have required no more than an inquiry by the probate judge as to what efforts the executor had made to locate appellant’s address. If *48no effort had been made the court could direct the executor to make reasonable efforts to determine appellant’s whereabouts. On the other hand, were the probate court satisfied that due diligence had been complied with, it could proceed.
However, courts of other states have not applied the due process language of Mul-lane to the notice requirements of probate proceedings. In addition other decisions of the Supreme Court give support to the validity of the notice requirements of our probate code. The court has held that an ex parte probate followed by a one-year period for contest affords due process of law. Farrell v. O’Brien, 199 U.S. 89, 25 S.Ct. 727, 50 L.Ed. 101 (1905). And the Supreme Court has construed the due process provisions of the fourteenth amendment not to overturn aged practices. See Ownbey v. Morgan, et al., Executors of Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921), [although doubt may be cast on this by some of the language in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972)] and cases cited in “Probate Proceedings — Administration of Decedent’s Estates — The Mullane Case and Due Process of Law”, 50 Mich.L.Rev. 124 (1952). It is for this reason I concur in the result of the opinion written by Higgins, C.
It should be noted, however, that the concept of due process has changed considerably since 1905 and courts today do not look with favor on ex parte proceedings which affect property rights. See e. g., Fuentes v. Shevin, supra: B-W Acceptance Corporation v. Alexander, 494 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. banc 1973); and State ex rel. Williams v. Berrey, 492 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. banc 1973). The subject of whether our probate statutes should be amended to require executors to exercise due diligence in giving notice would seem, therefore, to be deserving of legislative attention. Even in the absence of more precise statutory requirements, careful executors will no doubt take pains to exercise due diligence in giving notice to interested parties. See annot. Duty and Liability of Executor with Respect to Locating and Noticing Legatees, Devisees, or Heirs, 10 A.L.R.3d 547.