Court Opinion

ID: 9499413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:47:51.459328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:29.352508
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The court concedes that its conclusions are “not free from doubt.” Ante at 1056. I concur in this observation to the point that I agree with the district court’s analysis and would affirm.
Duluth, by its adopted procedures, admits, in essence, that it faced a firm sixty-day deadline in meeting all of its statutory obligations unless plaintiffs/appellees were “given written notice that the period has been extended an additional sixty days.” Ante at 1053. It apparently did not do this or, at least, cannot now prove that it followed this previously established and, in this case, necessary protocol. Duluth now seeks to use this court as a cat’s paw to “pull its burning chestnuts from the fire.” Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (1898). Minnesota law, established both by statute and the several judicial decisions cited by the court, in conjunction with applicable City meeting procedures obviously prompted Duluth “to extend the statutory sixty-day period to 120 days by mailing every applicant the extension notice” referred to above. Ante at 1054 (emphasis added). Thus, the court’s resolution of the opposing parties’ views on legislative intent, based on a “textual nuance in the statute” and a perceived shortening of the legislatively mandated sixty-day period “by whatever time is required under local law to deny [a] request at one meeting and adopt a written statement” at the next, loses its force. Ante at 1055. The solution for Duluth was to act within the statutorily mandated sixty-day period or to send the extension notice as required by the Minnesota lawmakers and thereby elongate the time it had to take action within the framework of its regularly adopted local meeting schedules. It did neither. So, the permit should issue as a matter of law.
Accordingly, I dissent.