Court Opinion

ID: 9572537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:42:39.707216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:26.668322
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting). This appeal presents an important issue under the mediation-arbitration provisions of the Municipal Employment Relations Act: Under sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, Stats., may the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission find a municipal employer guilty of a prohibited practice for failing to implement a provision of a collective bargaining agreement which was not a disputed issue in mediation-arbitration?1 Because I conclude that it may not, I respectfully dissent.
*45The legislature substituted binding mediation-arbitration for the right to strike in municipal employment.2 Ch. 178, Laws of 1977. Briefly, the procedure includes open meetings between the parties to present initial bargaining proposals, mediation, possible grievance arbitration, and interest arbitration.
Interest arbitration may be initiated by petition of either or both parties to WERC.3 Section 111.70(4)(cm)6, Stats. (1983-84), provides: "If a dispute has not been settled after a reasonable period of negotiation and after mediation . . . and the parties are deadlocked with respect to any dispute between them over wages,, hours and conditions of employment to be included in a new collective bargaining agreement," a petition may be filed. (Emphasis added.) To determine whether an impasse exists, WERC makes an investigation. Subdivision 6.a provides in part that, "Prior to the close of the investigation each party shall submit in writing its single final offer containing its final proposals on all issues in dispute to the commission." Sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6.a, Stats. (1983-84) (emphasis added). The final offers are public documents. Id. If WERC concludes that an impasse exists, arbitration is initiated. Subdivision 6.b provides in part that, "The final offers of the parties . . . shall serve as the initial basis for mediation and continued negotiations between the parties with respect to the issues in dispute." (Emphasis added.) "The mediator-arbitrator acting as arbitrator shall adopt without further modification the final offer of one of the *46parties on all disputed issues submitted under subd. 6.a . . .." Sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6.d, Stats. (1983-84) (emphasis added).
WERC acknowledges that in this case, retroactivity of the fair-share/voluntary dues deduction provision in the existing collective bargaining agreement was not an issue in dispute in mediation-arbitration. Nonetheless, the union filed a prohibited practice complaint against the employer under sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, Stats., for failing to make fair-share and union dues deductions retroactive to the beginning of the contract year.
Section 111.70(3)(a), Stats., provides: "It is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer ... 7. To refuse or otherwise fail to implement an arbitration decision lawfully made under sub. (4)(cm).1'
The meaning of a statute is a question of law which we decide independently of the trial court's conclusion or the agency's determination. La Crosse Footwear, Inc. v. LIRC, 147 Wis. 2d 419, 422, 434 N.W.2d 392, 393 (Ct. App. 1988).
The primary source of construction of a statute is the language of the statute itself. Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons, 137 Wis. 2d 397, 419, 405 N.W.2d 354, 363 (Ct. App. 1987). Section 111.7Q(3)(a)7, Stats., was enacted at the same time as sec. 111.70(4)(cm)..Ch. 178, Laws of 1977. Where statutes of direct and immediate linkage are enacted in the same legislation, they must be considered in pari materia and harmonized if possible. State v. DILHR, 101 Wis. 2d 396, 403, 304 N.W.2d 758, 762 (1981).
I begin my effort to harmonize the statutes by considering what is not a prohibited practice under sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, Stats. It is not a prohibited practice under sec. 111.70(3)(a)7 for a municipal employer to refuse or fail to implement a collective bargaining agreement. *47That conduct may be a prohibited practice under another provision of sec. 111.70(3)(a), but it is clear it is not reached by subd. 7.4 What is prohibited by subd. 7 is the employer's refusal or failure to implement "an arbitration decision lawfully made undér sub. (4)(cm)." (Emphasis added.) The arbitrator's decision "shall be incorporated into a written collective bargaining agreement." Sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6.d, Stats. Where there is an existing collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator's decision on the disputed issues is incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. But the arbitrator does not make a decision on the provisions of the existing agreement which, pro forma, become part of the new agreement. I do not find the language of sec. 111.70(3) (a) 7 ambiguous; it clearly applies to the arbitrator's decision on the disputed issues between the parties, and not to the collective bargaining agreement in which the arbitrator's decision on those issues is incorporated.
If sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, Stats., is extended beyond the arbitrator's decision, important disputed issues may be hidden from public scrutiny. The opportunity for public participation in the mediation-arbitration (interest arbitration) process is firmly established state policy.
Section 111.70(4)(cm)2, Stats., provides in part: "The meetings between parties to a collective bargaining agreement or proposed collective bargaining agreement under this subchapter which are held for the purpose of presenting initial bargaining proposals, along with supporting rationale, shall be open to the public." (Emphasis added.) Section 111.70(4) (cm)6.b requires a public hearing upon petition of citizens, at which members of *48the public may comment on and make suggestions as to the parties' proposals.5 "Before issuing his or her arbitration decision, the . . . arbitrator shall. . . conduct a meeting open to the public for the purpose of providing the opportunity to both parties to explain or present supporting arguments for their . . . offer[s] . . Sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6.d, Stats, (emphasis added).
The purpose of public participation in the collective bargaining process is to encourage reasonable and responsible collective bargaining. Also, the public meeting and hearing requirements give the public an opportunity for input and to be informed, particularly as to economic items which may impact the delivery and cost of municipal services. These salutary purposes are subverted if a disputed issue is not subjected to the mediation-arbitration (interest arbitration) process.
Retroactivity was disputed between the parties. It was simply not subjected to the mediation-arbitration process. The bargaining history reveals that the employer has.consistently refused to deduct fair-share contributions and union dues when a contract was not in effect, and has refused to make retroactive deductions when agreement was reached during the contract year. The bargaining history also reveals, however, that the union has never acceded to the employer's practice. In fact, on March 5, 1985, the union filed a prohibited practice complaint alleging that the employer, by ceasing to deduct dues and fair-share contributions, had violated sections 111.70(3)(a)l, 2, 3, and 4, Stats.
Shortly after the union filed its petition for mediation-arbitration, the employer's negotiating committee informed the union, by letter of January 14, 1985, that the employer would discontinue all deductions for union *49dues or fair-share contributions with regard to any bargaining unit not covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the union had fair notice that the employer would follow its previous practice of not making retroactive fair-share and dues deductions. The union elected not to expose that issue to public scrutiny under the mediation-arbitration process. It subverts that process to now allow the union to claim (as it must) that the issue was disputed and was the subject of the arbitrator's decision.6 This is contrary to the union's position as stated to the arbitrator: "The Union argues that the two issues of primary significance are wages and health insurance payments. It contends that all other issues in dispute have less importance or no significance.” (Emphasis added.)
If the union claims that retroactivity was not a disputed issue between the parties, the union is no better *50off. The issue would not then have been subject to the arbitrator's decision and a prohibited practice complaint against the employer would not lie under sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, Stats.
My conclusion does not leave the employees and their representative without recourse. Under the grievance procedure provided in the contract, the union could grieve the employer's refusal to make the fair-share and union dues deductions. Denying the union access to a prohibited practice complaint under sec. 111.70(3)(a)7, preserves the mediation-arbitration (interest arbitration) procedure for issues which are, in fact, disputed. Most important, it preserves the public's opportunity to hear the rationale of the employer and the employee's representative as to each of their positions. We must accept the legislature's judgment that this is a valuable right.

 The union petitioned for mediation-arbitration December 13, 1984, to resolve disputed issues as to a successor collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator issued his award October 15, 1985. 1985 Wis. Act 318, sec. 4, amended the mediation-arbitration procedures set forth in sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6, effective May 7, 1986. A prohibited practice complaint filed under sec. 111.70(3)(a)7 for failure of a municipal employer to implement a collective bargaining agreement under the "interest arbitration" procedure contained in sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6, as amended, would present the same issue as is presented by this case. There is no substantive difference between mediation-arbitration prior to May 7, 1986 and interest arbitration thereafter.

 The labor organization has a right to strike if both parties withdraw their final offers and agreed-upon modifications. Sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6.c, Stats.,

 The title to sec. 111.70(4)(cm)6, Stats. (1983-84), was "Mediation-arbitration." 1985 Wis. Act 318, sec. 4, more correctly titled the procedure "Interest arbitration."

 WERC found that the employer was guilty of a derivative violation of sec. 111.70(3)(a)l, Stats. The commission made clear, however, that that violation depended on finding that the employer violated sec. 111.70(3)(a)7.

 Section 111.70(4)(cm)6.b, Stats., as amended, substitutes a hearing for mediation-arbitration sessions.

 If WERC's decision is to have any legitimate claim to logic, WERC must also claim that retroactivity of fair-share and dues deduction was a disputed issue. However, WERC fails to point to anywhere in the process where retroactivity was negotiated, mediated or arbitrated. WERC's only basis for applying the dura-tional clause to the fair-share and dues provision of the contract is one sentence from the union's final offer as follows: "All provisions of the Labor Agreement of 1983-84 except as modified above." The union's final offer was submitted in the handwriting of its negotiator. The arbitrator noted:
The Arbitrator is of the opinion that the written final offer submitted by the Union to the Commission's investigator was prepared in a rather casual manner. A final offer may determine the wages, hours and conditions of employment for a substantial period of time and every effort should be made to prepare it in a manner that is definite and certain.
I accept that the union by its "casual" offer did not intend to sandbag the employer or the arbitrator. It simply had no intention of making retroactivity an issue in mediation-arbitration.