Court Opinion

ID: 9448715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:43:23.676032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:32.064941
License: Public Domain

SHACKELFORD MILLER, Jr., Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I am of the opinion that the judgment of the District Court should be reversed.
It appears to be settled law that whether the plaintiff has a cause of action under the Federal Torts Claims Act is determined by the law of the state. Accordingly, we look to Section 50-914, Tennessee Code Annotated, to determine that question and to see in whom the right exists.
The Tennessee statute provides that the injured employee has a right of action against the third party tortfeasor and that the action to enforce this claim must be instituted within one year from the date of the injury. It then provides that, “Failure on the part of the injured workman, * * *, to bring such action within the time herein specified, shall operate as an assignment to the employer of any cause of action in tort which the workman, * * *, may have against any other party for such injury or death, * *
I am of the opinion that under this statute the workman’s cause of action was automatically assigned as a matter of law to his employer after the expiration of the year following the date of the injury. See: Wilson v. City of Chattanooga, 179 Tenn. 234, 237, 165 S.W.2d 373. After that time there was no cause of action under the statute in favor of the employee. It is not a question of his cause of action being barred by a statute of limitations. Whatever cause of action he had under the state statute has been transferred by that same statute to his employer. The statute is all inclusive — -it specifies “any cause of action in tort which the workman, * * *, may have * * *.” (Emphasis added.) I find nothing in the Tennessee statute providing for a reassignment back to the workman, nor does the record show any such reassignment.
In my opinion, the plaintiff is not the party in interest who has the right to prosecute this claim. Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 130 F.Supp. 896, affirmed 222 F.2d 261, C.A.2nd; Dinardo v. Consumers Power Co., 181 F.2d 104, 107, C.A. 6th; Farnham v. Daar, Inc., 184 F.Supp. 809, W.D.Mo.