Court Opinion

ID: 9405467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 17:01:11.63688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.332570
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11986    Document: 22-1     Date Filed: 06/28/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11986
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       ARTHUR PICKLO,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-00666-HLA-PDB
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11986      Document: 22-1     Date Filed: 06/28/2023     Page: 2 of 7

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11986

       Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Arthur Picklo, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
       the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate
       on his claim that his conviction for depriving another of the rights
       protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States under
       color of state law by attempting to kill another by the use of a fire-
       arm that resulted in bodily injury, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, could not
       serve as a valid predicate offense for his conviction under 18 U.S.C.
       § 924(c). He argues that § 242 can be violated without the use, at-
       tempted use, or threatened use of force, so his § 924(c) sentence
       should have run consecutively only to his other valid predicate of-
       fenses.
              The government responds by moving for summary affir-
       mance of the district court’s order and argues that any error that
       the district court made was harmless because Picklo’s sentence for
       his § 924(c) conviction had to run consecutively to all other sen-
       tences, so it is irrelevant whether his § 924(c) sentence was imposed
       consecutively to his § 242 conviction or his other two valid predi-
       cates.
              Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
       the essence, such as where “the position of one of the parties is
       clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial
       question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more
USCA11 Case: 22-11986         Document: 22-1        Date Filed: 06/28/2023         Page: 3 of 7

       22-11986                  Opinion of the Court                                3

       frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc.
       v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1161–62 (5th Cir. 1969). 1
               When reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to
       vacate, we review questions of law de novo and findings of fact for
       clear error. Thomas v. United States, 572 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir.
       2009). “[T]he scope of our review of an unsuccessful § 2255 motion
       is limited to the issues enumerated in the [certificate of appealabil-
       ity].” McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011).
       We review cases on collateral review for harmless error. Granda v.
       United States, 990 F.3d 1272, 1292 (11th Cir. 2021). Under harmless
       error, “[t]here must be more than a reasonable possibility that the
       error was harmful.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 268 (2015) (inter-
       nal quotation marks omitted).
              A prisoner in federal custody may file a motion to vacate, set
       aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting
       the right to be released because his “sentence was imposed in vio-
       lation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . the court
       was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, . . . the sentence
       was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise
       subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Unless the
       claimed error involves a lack of jurisdiction or a constitutional

       1 We are bound by decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

       Circuit issued before October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206
       (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
USCA11 Case: 22-11986      Document: 22-1       Date Filed: 06/28/2023     Page: 4 of 7

       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11986

       violation, however, § 2255 relief is limited. United States v. Addoni-
       zio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979).
              Section 924(c) provides a mandatory consecutive sentence
       for anyone that uses or carries a firearm in furtherance of a crime
       of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). A “crime of violence,” in turn, is a
       felony offense that: (A) “has as an element the use, attempted use,
       or threatened use of physical force against the person or property
       of another”; or (B) “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
       physical force against the person or property of another may be
       used in the course of committing the offense.”                    Id.
       § 924(c)(3)(A)-(B). The first prong of that definition is referred to
       as the “elements clause,” while the second prong contains the “re-
       sidual clause.” In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032, 1040 (11th Cir. 2019).
              In Davis, the Supreme Court held that § 924(c)(3)(B)’s resid-
       ual clause is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 139 S.
       Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). We have held that the movant “‘bear[s] the
       burden of showing that he is actually entitled to relief on his Davis
       claim, meaning he will have to show that his § 924(c) convic-
       tion[s] resulted from application of solely the [now-unconstitu-
       tional] residual clause.’” Alvarado-Linares v. United States, 44 F.4th
       1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d at
       1041) (second and third alterations in original). We have held that
       Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements
       clause. In re Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016).
              On collateral review, the harmless-error standard mandates
       that collateral relief for a Davis claim is proper only if the court has
USCA11 Case: 22-11986     Document: 22-1      Date Filed: 06/28/2023    Page: 5 of 7

       22-11986               Opinion of the Court                        5

       “grave doubt” about whether an error had a “substantial and inju-
       rious effect or influence” in determining the verdict. Granda,
       990 F.3d at 1292. In Granda, we explained that a petitioner must
       show more than a reasonable possibility that the error was harm-
       ful, and we would grant relief “only if the error ‘resulted in actual
       prejudice’” to the movant. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
       U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). There, we reasoned that the record did not
       provoke a grave doubt about whether Granda’s § 924(o) convic-
       tion rested solely on the invalid predicate because it was inextrica-
       bly intertwined with other valid predicate offenses. Id. at 1293. We
       explained that the alternative predicates were inextricably inter-
       twined and that the offenses encompassed a “tightly bound factual
       relationship” that precluded Granda from establishing actual prej-
       udice. Id. at 1291. We noted that it was proper to look at the record
       to determine whether the defendant was actually prejudiced by the
       invalid predicate, in that it led to his conviction as opposed to the
       jury finding him guilty under a valid predicate. Id. at 1294. We
       held that “[t]he inextricability of the alternative predicate crimes
       compels the conclusion that” instructing the jury on a constitution-
       ally invalid predicate as one of several potential alternative predi-
       cates was harmless. Id. at 1292.
              Section 924(c) states that “no term of imprisonment im-
       posed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently
       with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, in-
       cluding any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of vio-
       lence or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used,
       carried, or possessed.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). We have held
USCA11 Case: 22-11986      Document: 22-1     Date Filed: 06/28/2023     Page: 6 of 7

       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11986

       that “[t]he plain language of the statute expressly states that a term
       of imprisonment imposed under section 924(c) cannot run concur-
       rently with any other term of imprisonment, period.” United States
       v. Wright, 33 F.3d 1349, 1350 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
               Finally, under the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound
       by prior published decisions that have not been overruled by the
       Supreme Court or this Court en banc. United States v. Romo-Villa-
       lobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
              Here, the government is entitled to summary affirmance be-
       cause its position is clearly correct as a matter of law. Groendyke
       Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1161–62. Even assuming that 18 U.S.C.
       § 242 is not a crime of violence, Picklo failed to demonstrate that
       he was entitled to relief on his § 2255 motion because he remains
       convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, which we have held is a valid
       predicate crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause. Al-
       varado-Linares, 44 F.4th at 1341; In re Fleur, 824 F.3d at 1340. Under
       Granda, Picklo’s convictions for deprivation of civil rights under
       color of law, Hobbs Act robbery, and attempted murder were in-
       extricably intertwined because all three charges arose from a single,
       “tightly bound factual relationship.” Granda, 990 F.3d at 1291. As
       such, Picklo cannot demonstrate that his § 924(c) conviction rested
       solely on his § 242 conviction in Count 1, and because his convic-
       tions were inextricably intertwined, any error that the district court
       made in “instructing the jury on a constitutionally invalid predicate
       as one of several potential alternative predicates was harmless.” Id.
       at 1292.
USCA11 Case: 22-11986     Document: 22-1      Date Filed: 06/28/2023    Page: 7 of 7

       22-11986               Opinion of the Court                        7

               As to the district court’s imposition of a consecutive sen-
       tence under § 924(c), both the § 924(c) statute and our binding prec-
       edent require that a term of imprisonment for a § 924(c) conviction
       must run consecutively to all other terms of imprisonment. See
       18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii); Wright, 33 F.3d at 1350. Because the
       district court sentenced Picklo to 360 months’ imprisonment on
       Count 1, and 240 months’ imprisonment on each Count 2 and 3 to
       run concurrently to Count 1, Count 4 had to run consecutively to
       all other sentences, so it is irrelevant whether Count 4 was predi-
       cated on Count 1, 2, or 3, as Picklo’s total sentence remains
       480 months’ imprisonment. Therefore, even if the district court
       erred when it found that Picklo’s § 242 conviction was a valid pred-
       icate crime of violence within § 924(c)’s element’s clause, any error
       was harmless because Picklo remains convicted of at least one valid
       predicate crime of violence, so his consecutive § 924(c) sentence
       was proper. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii); Granda, 990 F.3d at 1292;
       Wright, 33 F.3d at 1350.
             Therefore, we GRANT the government’s motion for sum-
       mary affirmance.
             AFFIRMED.