Court Opinion

ID: 9963469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:04:34.472893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:49.911307
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Fontanez, 2024-Ohio-1590.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                              No. 113105
                 v.                                  :

ALBERT FONTANEZ,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 25, 2024

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
          Case Nos. CR-21-664789-A, CR-22-669649-A, CR-22-670606-B,
                      CR-22-672399-A, and CR-22-674611-A

                                               Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Alexandria Serdaru, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Milton and Charlotte Kramer Law Clinic, Case Western
                 Reserve University School of Law, Andrew S. Pollis,
                 Supervising Attorney, and Spencer Luckwitz and Kory C.
                 Roth, Legal Interns, for appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

                Defendant-appellant, Albert Fontanez, appeals his convictions and

claims the following errors:
      1. The trial court erred by accepting Mr. Fontanez’s guilty plea without
      first informing him of the effect of his plea, determining that he
      understood the effect, and informing that the court could proceed to
      judgment and sentence, all as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).

      2. The trial court erred in denying Mr. Fontanez’s presentence motion
      to withdraw his guilty plea.

             We find that Fontanez understood the effect of his guilty pleas and that

he entered his pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. We, therefore, affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

                       I. Facts and Procedural History

             Fontanez was charged with 18 crimes in five separate cases.          In

Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-664789-A, Fontanez was charged with two counts of

felonious assault. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-669649-A, Fontanez was charged

with two counts of felonious assault, two counts of aggravated robbery, and three

counts of robbery. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-670606-B, Fontanez was charged

with one count of felonious assault, with one- and three-year firearm specifications,

two counts of having weapons while under disability, one count of improper

handling of firearms in a motor vehicle, and one count of criminal damaging or

endangering. In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-672399-A, Fontanez was charged with

one count of theft and one count of assault. And in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-

674611-A, Fontanez was charged with one count of failure to comply and one count

of receiving stolen property.

             Following discovery, the parties reached a plea agreement that

significantly reduced the charges and potential penalties in the five cases. After
thoroughly reviewing the terms of the state’s plea offer and the associated penalties,

as well as the penalties Fontanez could receive if he were found guilty at trial, the

court recessed to allow Fontanez to consult with his lawyer.           Following the

consultation, Fontanez indicated that he wanted to plead guilty. In CR-22-664789-

A, Fontanez pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault. In CR-22-670606-B,

Fontanez pleaded guilty to one count of discharging a firearm on or near a

prohibited premises with a one-year firearm specification, and one count of criminal

damaging. In CR-22-672399-A, Fontanez pleaded guilty to one count of attempted

theft and one count of assault. In CR-22-669649-A, Fontanez pleaded guilty to one

count of felonious assault and one count of theft. And in CR-22-674611-A, Fontanez

pleaded guilty to one count of failure to comply and one count of receiving stolen

property.

            The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing three weeks after taking

Fontanez’s guilty pleas. During the sentencing hearing but before sentence was

imposed, Fontanez made an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court

conducted a hearing on the motion and asked Fontanez’s counsel why he wished to

withdrawal his pleas. Counsel explained:

      After he entered into a guilty plea for the five cases on which we are
      here today, we had come to learn and find out that there were two new
      pending cases in Cleveland Municipal Court that were since bound
      over.

      Your Honor, he may not have entered ─ or he would not have entered
      into this plea agreement had he had knowledge of these two pending
      criminal cases.
(Tr. 112.) Upon questioning, the court learned that Fontanez knew about the two

new cases more than two weeks before the sentencing hearing because he was

arraigned in those cases. (Tr. 116-118.) When asked if there were any other reasons

for the motion, counsel replied, “Other than a change of heart, your Honor, no.”

(Tr. 117.) The state indicated it would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of Fontanez’s

guilty pleas because “[he] went capias for a long, long time” and it would be difficult

to coordinate the appearances of so many police officers and victims again. (Tr. 117.)

After hearing from both sides, the court denied Fontanez’s motion to withdraw his

guilty pleas.

                In CR-21-664789-A, the court sentenced Fontanez to 18 months in

prison on the amended aggravated-assault conviction. In CR-22-669649-A, the

court sentenced him to six to nine years on the felonious assault conviction as

charged in Count 1, and 180 days on the theft charge as amended in Count 3. In

CR-22-670606-B, Fontanez was sentenced to three years on the discharging a

firearm on or near a prohibited premises conviction plus three years on the

attendant firearm specification, as charged in Count 1, and 90 days in jail on the

criminal damaging conviction as charged in Count 5. In CR-22-672399-A, the court

sentenced Fontanez to 180 days in jail on the attempted theft and assault convictions

as amended in Counts 1 and 2. Lastly, in CR-22-674611-A, Fontanez was sentenced

to three years in prison on his failure to comply conviction as charged in Count 1,

and 180 days in prison on his receiving stolen property conviction as amended in

Count 2. The aggregate base sentence was 10 years in prison. This appeal followed.
                              II. Law and Analysis

                           A. Effect of a Guilty Plea

            In the first assignment of error, Fontanez argues the trial court erred in

accepting his guilty pleas without first informing him of the effect of his plea and

without informing him that the court could proceed immediately to judgment and

sentence.

            “Due process requires that a defendant’s plea be made knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily; otherwise the defendant’s plea is invalid.” State v.

Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 10, citing State v.

Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25; see also State v.

Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996).

            Crim.R. 11(C)(2) outlines the procedure a trial court must follow before

accepting a guilty plea to felony offense. Bishop at ¶ 11, citing State v. Veney, 120

Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 8. Crim.R. 11 ensures an

adequate record on review by requiring that the trial court (1) personally inform the

defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea, and (2) determine that the

plea is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio

St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 11, citing State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d

163, 168, 331 N.E.2d 411 (1975).

              Under Crim.R. 11(C), a trial court shall not accept a guilty plea in a

felony case without first addressing defendant and doing all of the following:
      (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
      understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
      penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
      for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at
      the sentencing hearing.

      (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
      understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the
      court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
      sentence.

      (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
      understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury
      trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory
      process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require
      the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a
      trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against
      himself or herself.

             We review the trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) de novo.

State v. Cardwell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92796, 2009-Ohio-6827, ¶ 26, citing

State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). In reviewing guilty pleas,

our focus is not on whether the trial judge has “‘[incanted] the precise verbiage’ of

the rule, * * * but on whether the dialogue between the court and the defendant

demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea[.]”

Dangler at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 92, 364 N.E.2d 1163

(1977), citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621,

¶ 15-16; Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 26; State

v. Miller, 159 Ohio St.3d 447, 2020-Ohio-1420, 151 N.E.3d 617, ¶ 19.

              “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on

appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the
trial court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13.

“The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Id.

at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). A

defendant must establish prejudice “‘on the face of the record’” and not solely by

virtue of challenging a plea on appeal. Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Hayward v. Summa

Health Sys., 139 Ohio St.3d 238, 2014-Ohio-1913, 11 N.E.3d 243, ¶ 26.

              However, no showing of prejudice is required (1) when a trial court

fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) that a

defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, or (2) when a trial court

completely fails to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C). Id. at ¶ 14-15, citing Clark

at ¶ 31; State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22.

“Aside from these two exceptions, the traditional rule continues to apply: a

defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was

prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R.

11(C).” Dangler at ¶ 16, citing Nero at 108. Thus, in evaluating whether a trial court

has complied with Crim.R. 11(C), we must ask

      (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule?

      (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported
      failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of
      demonstrating prejudice? and

      (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that
      burden?

Dangler at ¶ 17.
              Fontanez contends the trial court failed to inform him that his guilty

plea is a complete admission of guilt. However, the right to be informed that a guilty

plea is a complete admission of guilt is a nonconstitutional right. State v. Steele, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85901, 2005-Ohio-5541, ¶ 18, citing State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio

St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12. Thus, only a complete failure to

comply with Crim.R. 11(C) will justify vacation of the guilty pleas. And again, the

goal of Crim.R. 11(C) is to ensure that the defendant understands his rights and the

consequences of his plea. Dangler at ¶ 11.

              Unlike a plea of “no contest,” a legal term that carries consequences

that are not readily apparent to an ordinary person without further explanation, the

meaning of a “guilty” plea is self-explanatory. The term “guilty” is a plain and

commonly-used word in the English language. Dictionary.com defines it as “having

committed an offense, crime, violation, or wrong, especially against moral or penal

law; justly subject to a certain accusation or penalty; culpable[.]” Dictionary.com,

“guilty” available at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/guilty (accessed Mar. 28,

2024).

              The plain and ordinary meaning of the word “guilty” is obvious from

the plea colloquy itself. During the colloquy, the trial court asked Fontanez if he

committed the specific act charged in each count to which he was pleading guilty.

For example, when pleading guilty to aggravated assault in CR-22-664789-A, the

court asked Fontanez:
      THE COURT: In Count 1, how do you plead * * * on July 22 of 2021, in
      Cuyahoga County, you unlawfully did, while under the influence of
      sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which was brought
      on by serious provocation occasioned by [the victim], that was
      reasonably sufficient to incite you into using deadly force, you did
      knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to [the victim] by
      means of deadly weapon?

      To this felony of the fourth degree * * * how do you plead?

      THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

(Emphasis added.) (Tr. 54.) That Fontanez knowingly admitted the facts stated by

the judge is undeniable.

              Because a guilty plea is obviously an admission of guilt, the Ohio

Supreme Court has held that “a defendant who has entered a guilty plea without

asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely

admitted his guilt.” State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d

51, ¶ 19. See also State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d

677, ¶ 54 (“Any error by the trial court in failing to adequately inform [the defendant]

of the effect of his plea was not prejudicial, because [the defendant] did not assert

his innocence at the colloquy. He is, therefore, presumed to understand that a plea

of guilty is a complete admission of guilt.”).

              Many Ohio courts, including the Eighth District Court of Appeals,

have reached similar conclusions post-Dangler. See State v. Stewart, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 110219, 2021-Ohio-3600, ¶ 17-18; State v. Reyes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 110126, 2021-Ohio-3599, ¶ 24; State v. Kauffman, 2021-Ohio-1584, 170 N.E.3d

952, ¶ 15-16 (8th Dist.); State v. Blair, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2021-0055,
2022-Ohio-2572, ¶ 12-15, State v. Krieger, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 19 BE 0045, 2020-

Ohio-6964, ¶ 19, State v. McClelland, 2021-Ohio-3018, 176 N.E.3d 150, ¶ 41

(7th Dist.) (“The failure to use the exact language in Crim.R. 11(B)(1) is not a

complete failure to comply as the key concept is that the guilty plea constitutes an

admission of guilt.”).

              Fontanez expressly stated that he understood the charges against him,

the terms of the plea agreement, the constitutional rights he was waiving, and the

penalties he faced. He also admitted that he committed the acts described by the

judge in each of the charges and stated that he was satisfied with his lawyer’s

representation.    (Tr. 50.)   Therefore, the trial court complied with all the

requirements of Crim.R. 11. And because Fontanez has not asserted his innocence,

it is presumed that Fontanez understood that his guilty pleas were admissions of

guilt.

              Indeed, Fontanez does not even claim to have misunderstood the

effect of his guilty pleas. He sought to withdraw his guilty pleas because he was

indicted on additional charges. (Tr. 117.) Fontanez likely wanted to include the new

charges within his global plea agreement in this case.       However, a desire to

renegotiate a plea agreement to incorporate new charges is not a valid basis to

withdraw a guilty plea. And when asked if there were some other bases for the plea-

withdrawal request, Fontanez’s trial counsel replied, “Other than a change of heart,

your Honor, no.” (Tr. 117.) A change of heart, without more, is not enough to justify
the withdrawal of a guilty plea. State v. Musleh, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105305,

2017-Ohio-8166, ¶ 35.

              The trial court complied with the relevant provisions of Crim.R.

11(C)(2), except that it did not expressly state that a guilty plea constitutes a

complete admission of guilt. This minor failure does not involve a constitutional

right and, therefore, does not excuse Fontanez from the burden of demonstrating

prejudice. And yet, Fontanez does not claim any prejudice. Fontanez entered into

a very favorable plea agreement, cutting his exposure to prison-time exposure by

more than half of what it could have been if he had been found guilty at trial.

Fontanez’s decision to plead guilty was obviously based on a desire to reduce his

prison time rather than any alleged misunderstanding of the effect of his guilty plea.

              Fontanez nevertheless argues the trial court erred in failing to inform

him that it could proceed to immediate sentencing. However, the trial court told

Fontanez twice during the plea hearing that it would not proceed to sentencing that

day. (Tr. 43, 49.) And, as indicated, the court scheduled a sentencing hearing for a

later date. Therefore, Fontanez cannot demonstrate he was prejudiced by the court’s

failure to tell him that it could proceed directly to sentencing.

              The first assignment of error is overruled.

                      B. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

              In the second assignment of error, Fontanez argues the trial court

erred in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argues it

should have been freely granted since he made the motion before sentence was
imposed. He also argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider

the relevant factors governing presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas.

              Crim.R. 32.1 governs withdrawals of guilty pleas and provides that “[a]

motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence

is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice, the court after sentence may set aside

the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”

Ordinarily, a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and

liberally granted. State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992).

However, a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior

to sentencing. Id. Therefore, a trial court must conduct a hearing to determine

whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the plea withdrawal request.

Id.

               The decision to grant or deny a presentence motion to withdraw a

guilty plea is within the trial court’s discretion. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.

Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision must be affirmed. Id. at 527.

An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted

way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v.

Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. This court

has held that an abuse of discretion may be found where a trial court “applies the

wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly

erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-

1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). Courts do not have discretion to erroneously
apply the law. Johnson at ¶ 39 (“We take this opportunity to make it clear that courts

lack the discretion to make errors of law, particularly when the trial court’s decision

goes against the plain language of a statute or rule.”).

                Courts have traditionally considered nine factors when reviewing a

trial court’s decision denying a defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw a guilty

plea. State v. Hopkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 112430 and 112704, 2023-Ohio-

4311, ¶ 13. Those factors include whether a defendant was (1) represented by

competent counsel, (2) given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before he entered the plea, (3)

given a complete hearing on the motion to withdraw, and (4) the record reflects that

the court gave full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal request. State v.

Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 428 N.E.2d 863 (8th Dist.1980), paragraph three of

the syllabus.

                Consideration is also given to whether (5) the motion was made in a

reasonable time, (6) the motion stated specific reasons for withdrawal, (7) the

defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible penalties, and (8)

the defendant had evidence of a plausible defense. State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d

236, 661 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist.1995), see also State v. Heisa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

101877, 2015-Ohio-2269. Finally, courts have considered (9) “‘whether the state

would be prejudiced if the defendant were permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.’”

State v. Barnes, 172 Ohio St.3d 63, 2022-Ohio-4486, 222 N.E.3d 537, ¶ 32 (Brunner,

J., concurring), quoting State v. Richter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 46122 and 46123,

1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 15476, 2 (Sept. 29, 1983).
              The trial court noted that Fontanez was represented by competent

counsel that he, himself, retained. (Tr. 121.) The court also recounted how it

conducted an exhaustive Rule 11 plea colloquy. (Tr. 122.) The trial court found, and

the record confirms, that Fontanez understood the nature of the charges and the

possible penalties and that the court conducted a full hearing on Fontanez’s plea

withdrawal request. Fontanez, through counsel, stated the reasons for his request,

and the court considered those reasons. (Tr. 122.) Counsel explained that he wished

to withdraw his guilty pleas because he discovered he had been charged with

additional crimes in two new cases and because he had a change of heart. (Tr. 122.)

Finally, the court noted that Fontanez knew about the two new cases for at least two

weeks before the sentencing hearing, but he did not file a written motion to

withdrawal his guilty plea at that time. And, the state asserted that it would be

prejudiced by the withdrawal of the guilty pleas.       Therefore, the trial court

considered all the factors required for a motion to withdraw guilty pleas, and none

of the nine factors weighed in favor of withdrawing Fontanez’s guilty pleas.

              Moreover, the trial court recognized that Fontanez’s motion was

motivated by a change of heart. As previously stated, a change of heart regarding

one’s guilty plea is not a legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea. State v.

Hicks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112419, 2024-Ohio-974, ¶27, citing State v. Westley,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97650, 2012-Ohio-3571, ¶ 7.

             We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny

Fontanez’s motion to withdrawal his guilty pleas. The trial court considered all the
factors necessary for evaluating a plea withdrawal request, and Fontanez’s motion

was motivated by his change of heart, which is not a legitimate basis for a plea

withdrawal.

              Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS;
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., DISSENTING:

              Respectfully, I dissent.   Based on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s

decision in State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, I

am constrained to disagree with the majority.

              Although I believe the majority correctly states the law regarding the

exceptions to the general requirement for a demonstration of prejudice upon a

request for withdrawal of a plea, I believe its interpretation of the law is wrong.
Specifically, one of the exceptions to the general prejudice requirement is when a

trial court completely fails to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C). Under Crim.R.

11(C)(2), a trial court shall not accept a guilty or no contest plea in a felony case

without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following:

      (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
      understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
      penalty involved * * *.

      (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
      understands the effects of the plea * * *, and that the court, upon
      acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.

      (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
      understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury
      trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory
      process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require
      the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a
      trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against
      himself or herself.

              Crim.R. 11(B)(1) states the effect of a plea: “The plea of guilty is a

complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” Both the state and majority agree that

the trial court did not advise Fontanez that his plea was “a complete admission of

[his] guilt” under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).

              Pre-Dangler, appellate review of compliance with Crim.R. 11 revolved

around strict, substantial, or partial compliance with the rule. Now, the focus is no

longer on those levels of compliance when reviewing a trial court’s compliance with

Crim.R. 11. State v. Kauffman, 2021-Ohio-1584, 170 N.E.3d 952, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

The Dangler Court recognized that prior caselaw setting forth the strict-,

substantial-, and partial-compliance standards had “muddled [the] analysis by
suggesting different tiers of compliance with the rule” and “those formulations have

served only to unduly complicate what should be a fairly straightforward inquiry.”

Id. at ¶ 17. Instead, the court identified the following three questions to be answered:

(1) did the trial court comply with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court

did not comply fully with the rule, was the failure of a type that excuses a defendant

from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is

required, has the defendant met that burden? Id.

              I believe that under the questions posed by the Dangler Court, the

trial court did not comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) and its

failure to comply excused Fontanez from demonstrating prejudice.

              The majority, while acknowledging that the trial court “did not

expressly state that a guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt,” finds

that “[t]his minor failure does not involve a constitutional right and, therefore, does

not excuse Fontanez from the burden of demonstrating prejudice.”              Majority

opinion, ¶ 21. But Dangler holds that a complete failure to comply with any portion

of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice. Id. at ¶ 15. In

my opinion, the majority’s rationale reverts to the strict-, substantial-, partial-

compliance standards that the Supreme Court believed were unduly complicated

and sought to abolish in Dangler.

               The majority cites State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-

4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, and State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877

N.E.2d 677, for the proposition that a plea, without a claim of actual innocence,
equates to a presumption that the defendant understands he or she has completely

admitted guilt and that the failure of the trial court to state that the plea is a complete

admission of guilt is nonprejudicial.1 Griggs and Jones are pre-Dangler cases,

however, and I think the majority’s reliance on them is misplaced.

               In light of Dangler and precedent from this court, I would find merit

to Fontanez’s first assignment of error, vacate the pleas, and remand the case for

further proceedings. See Cleveland v. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111495, 2023-

Ohio-448; State v. Byas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110157, 2021-Ohio-3924; and

Cleveland v. Jones-McFarland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108581, 2020-Ohio-3662.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

       1 A guilty plea with a contemporaneous protestation of innocence is generally

known as an “Alford plea,” in reference to the United States Supreme Court case North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).