Court Opinion

ID: 9643300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:24:47.32543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:56.043056
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. Most likely, due to the few days this court has had to and deliberate on the issues raised in this election case, the majority court’s decision is confusing and reflects a fundamental lack of understanding of Arkansas’ election process. I must dissent. First, I wish to address those pertinent Arkansas election laws and procedures that must be followed to permit a person’s name to be printed on the ballot as a candidate for president or vice president. These statutory procedures must (shall) be conducted.1 In each year in which a president and vice president are chosen, each political party or group in the state shall choose, by its state convention, electors of president and vice president.2 Any political party or group which has qualified under § 7-8-302 shall by state convention certify its total list of electors to the secretary of state and the certificate shall be filed no later than September 15 in the year of the election. Now, it is necessary to understand how the names of a political party’s candidates for president and vice president qualify to have their names printed on the general election ballot. If we are speaking of an established political party candidate, the party shall nominate by primary election. A political party under Arkansas law is defined as any group of voters which, at the last preceding general election, polled for its candidate for governor in the state or its nominees for presidential electors with at least three percent (3%) of the entire vote cast for the office. In our case, the Democratic and Republican Parties are political parties that are required to nominate by primary election. On the other hand, a new political party formed under our law may nominate by convention if the presidential election is the first general election after the party was certified. Applied in this case, the Populist Party sought to nominate by convention, assuming the political group complied with Arkansas law, especially the petition requirements set out in § 7-8-302(5) (B). That statutory provision dictates that a political group shall file with the secretary of state a petition containing the signatures of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors. In the petition, the electors must declare their desire to have printed on the ballot, the names of their candidates for president and vice president. If the group’s petition was found insufficient, the secretary of state must notify the group’s designated agent of the deficiencies. Here, that person was Jim Macri. When the notice is delivered, the sponsors (group) have ten (10) days to correct the insufficiency, but any amendments or corrections shall not materially change and effect the petition, and no changes shall be made in the group’s petition except to correct apparent typographical errors or omissions. Once the new political group qualifies by petition to place its candidate on the ballot, the group shall submit a certificate of choice, stating the names of its candidates for president and vice president, signed under oath by the chair, vice chair, or secretary of the new political party’s convention. The Populist Party repeatedly failed to comply with the laws required to establish its party in Arkansas. To begin with, the group seeking to form its party by petition never informed the person signing the petition of the name of the proposed new party sponsoring the group’s petition. The group claims such identifying language is unnecessary because its candidates, Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo, were identified as candidates for president and vice president on some of the petitions. However, this procedure and language used by the Populist Party/Better Life Group are improper because this language is used by persons wishing to qualify as an independent candidates. The practice used by the Populist Party only confused matters further, because Arkansas does not authorize or permit persons to run for president and vice president as an independent candidate. In Arkansas, one can only run for president if one is selected and certified by a political party’s state convention. Thus, because Arkansas law only provides for party candidates to have their names printed on the general election ballot, it is vital for the signers of the petition to be informed of the name of the party attempting to qualify so that it can later select its candidate for president and vice president by convention. Also adding to the confusion in this case, the persons (or group) that first commenced circulating petitions called themselves the Better Life Party; after failing to gather the requisite number of signatures, the group changed its name to the Populist Party of Arkansas. Obviously, the persons who signed the group’s initial petitions did not know what party was being formed because no party name appeared on the petitions. This leads one to ask the question, if a person and legal voter signing a petition is asked to sign a petition to establish a new party, shouldn’t she or he be apprised of the name of that party? Too, Arkansas law on this subject is designed such that the names of the persons whom the party may select at its convention need not be identified. For example, in 1972, the American Party in Arkansas was previously known as George Wallace’s Party. However, when Mr. Wallace could not run for president, the American Party leaders tried to qualify as a party in Arkansas so it could subsequently select John G. Schmitz as the party’s new presidential candidate. The American Party failed to qualify as a party, so Schmitz was never selected. See American Party of Arkansas v. Brandon, 253 Ark. 123, 484 S.W.2d 881 (1972). Nonetheless, under Arkansas law, any political group that does qualify may wait to select its presidential candidates when its state convention meets. If a party has no candidate at the time petitions are circulated, or for some reason loses its intended candidates, the new party can still select other candidates to represent it, since it is the political party that selects its presidential candidates. In the present case, the political group’s failure to identify it by name could only lead to confusion and litigation. As noted above, the original petitions were circulated by persons who referred to themselves as the Better Life Group. That group later labeled itself the Populist Party. While this newly named group was referred to as one touting Nader for president, Nader is also a presidential candidate representing the Reform Party in some states. In his presidential bid in 2000, he ran as the Green Party candidate. Nader is now identifying himself as representing the Populist Party, but, again, that party’s name did not appear on the petition that the people (legal voters) signed. It is difficult to know which party Mr. Nader represents. Surely some of this confusion could have been eliminated if the petitions circulated had consistently settled on one party and revealed the group’s true name before and during the time the petitions were circulated. In short, it defies common sense to conclude that a political group’s petitions are valid when they neither identify the group, nor indicate to the signers to the petition the name of the group seeking to gain access to the ballot. As stated by the appellants, if this court condones the Populist/Better Life Group’s failure to follow Arkansas law and validates that group’s circulation of petitions without identifying the political group’s name, a political group could obtain the required number of signatures and later disclose the group’s name is the Neo-Nazi Party, and its party’s name would be listed as such on the ballot. Surely, the persons signing the petition should have the right to know what group they are proposing to be on the ballot. In addition, if this court approves a petition containing only individual candidates’ names with no mention of party or group affiliation and finds that permissible, why did the general assembly provide that “only political parties or groups”can have access to the presidential ballot? The Populist Party also violated other requirements needed to place their presidential candidates names on the ballot. As alluded to above, Arkansas law required the Populist Party to hold a convention to select, nominate, and certify Nader and Camejo as its candidates. Mr. Macri, the Populist Party’s designated agent and party chairman, conceded that he and Mr. Smith actually selected the list of electors, and that Macri said he held a convention via telephone conference call, which included four, five, or six people (electors). Although Mr. Macri could not recall if these electors were actually picked prior to the convention, his description of what happened before his conference call clearly reflects that the electors had been selected by him and Mr. Smith in preparation for the convention. The appellants take umbrage at calling Macri’s conference call a nominating convention, and argue that a political convention is “an assembly of delegates chosen by a political party to nominate candidates for an approaching election.” Appellants submit that Macri and Smith fell short of such an assembly. Appellants further argue that, if such a sparsely attended phone conference call can be considered a convention, where would the line be drawn? In conclusion, it is apparent to me from all the evidence that the Populist Party had little staff and workers to perform the legal steps needed to establish a political party in Arkansas. Because of this, the support he did have simply was unable to perform those requirements the law provides to qualify political parties or groups. As a result, confusion prevailed. It is my firm belief that, while the trial court in this case decided Nader’s and Camejo’s names should not appear on the General Election ballots based on other grounds, I would affirm his order for the reasons set out above. Imber and Hannah, JJ., join this dissent. Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, dissenting. The central in this case is the of one fine in Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B): (Emphasis added.) When interpreting a statute for the first time, we look to the plain language of the statute. Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. 711, 718, 42 S.W.3d 496, 500 (2001). Here, the pivotal question is — in the phrase, “their candidate,” to whom does the word “their” refer? The trial court interpreted the plain language to mean the signers had to personally endorse Nadar and Camejo as “their” candidates. In doing so, it must have considered the plurality of the pronoun “their” in applying it to the obviously-plural noun, “electors.” This interpretation requires an unconstitutional declaration of how one intends to vote. Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981). As we must construe a statute to be constitutional, if possible, the trial court’s interpretation was incorrect. Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868, 120 S.W.3d 545 (2003). A political group desiring to have the names of its candidates for the President and Vice President printed on the ballot shall file a petition with the Secretary of State by noon on the first Monday of August. The petition shall contain at the time of filing the names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors of the state declaring their desire to have printed on the ballot the names of their candidate for President and Vice President. Under a plain-language interpretation, however, there is another option. The phrase “their candidate” could refer to the political group’s candidate. While the “political group” can be a singular noun with the appropriate possessive pronoun “its”, the term “political group” is a collective noun and, thus, can also be plural, with the possessive pronoun “their.” For example, the jury rendered its verdict; but the jury took their seats. In this statute, the legislature refers to the candidates of the political group as both “its candidates” and “their candidates,” recognizing the collective nature of the noun. See Ark. Code. Ann. §§ 7-8-302(1) (A), (5)(E) (2004). Applying this construction to the statute, it reads “the petition shall contain at the time of filing the names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors of the state declaring the [qualified electors’] desire to have printed on the ballot the names of [the political group’s] candidate.” Because this interpretation merely requires that the electors show their support for the political group’s access to the ballot and not support for the individual candidates, it is a constitutional interpretation. As the legislature did not intend to allow access to the presidential ballot for individuals, such a construction also gives effect to the intent of the legislature. When a statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it according to the legislative intent. Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. at 718, 42 S.W.3d at 500. Moreover, interpreting the statute as requiring individuals to indicate their support oía political group’s access to the ballot (rather than supporting the access of an individual) advances the overall legislative scheme by requiring a higher level of support for the presidential petitions. While it may be relatively easy to find 1,000 people who are willing to support the ballot placement of one candidate, it is much more difficult to find 1,000 people who are willing to give that support to a political group. Thus, when looking at section 7-8-302 in connection with section 7-7-103 (dealing with the placement of independent candidates on the ballot), it follows that section 7-7-103 requires significantly more signatures. Two statutes should always be construed so as to give effect to both, if possible. Garrett v. Andrews, 294 Ark. 160, 741 S.W.2d 257 (1987). Our review becomes an examination of the whole act. We reconcile provisions to make them consistent, harmonious and sensible in an effort to give effect to every part. Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. at 718, 42 S.W.3d at 500. Requiring that a presidential ballot petition under section 7-8-302 only state the desire of the signers that the named candidates appear on the ballot renders void the legislature’s obvious use of very different language in the drafting of these two statutes. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant; and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. Id. While constitutional, the majority’s interpretation unnecessarily violates this fundamental tenet of statutory construction. In light of the above arguments, the correct interpretation of section 7-8-302 is that a petition for a political group’s access to the ballot must be signed by 1,000 electors who state their desire to have the political group’s candidates placed on the ballot.1 Accordingly, as the petition in question did not request ballot access for any particular group but merely two individuals, it is invalid under the statute. Because the trial court reached the right result for the wrong reason, I would affirm. Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark. 434, 139 S.W.3d 500 (2003). For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. Glaze and FIannah, JJ., join this dissent.   See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 7-8-301—307 (Repl. 2000 and Supp. 2003).    See Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(1) (A) (2003).    This interpretation is consistent with the standard Presidential Group Candidate Petition form drafted by the Secretary of State’s election expert, Mr. Tim Humphries, which specifically requires the name of the political group to be placed on the petition.