Court Opinion

ID: 9450684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:55:28.696975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:25.423480
License: Public Domain

RICH, Judge
(concurring).
I agree that an affirmance is called for in this case for the reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Armour & Co. v. Organon, Inc., 245 F.2d 495, 44 CCPA 1010, which seems to me indistinguishable from the present case.
The only issue here is descriptiveness of the mark under section 2(e) and I see no point in discussing anything else, particularly the prior confusion in the case law in this field. It does not seem to me to be necessary to review it every time this types of issue comes before us.
I do not know what is meant by the test under section 2(e) being no less “stringent” than the test under 2(d). The test under 2(e) is whether the mark sought to be registered is “descriptive.” The test under 2(d) is whether there is likelihood of confusion, deception, or mistake. I see no basis on which to compare the two.
Nor do I see why “secondary meaning” of appellee’s LIDOCATON mark is any concern of ours in this opposition. The Patent Office has found that mark to be registrable under the statute. Registration of LIDOCATON is predicated on Swiss registration No. 146,043, filed March 17, 1953, and section 44(e) of the Trademark Act (15 U.S.C. § 1126(e)). Appellee is a Swiss company. Under these circumstances, use of the mark in *196this country is not required. Ex parte Societe Fromageries Bel, 105 USPQ 392.