Court Opinion

ID: 9767070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:07:56.748465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:28.116203
License: Public Domain

LOWENSTEIN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Three particular hurdles must be overcome for the matter to be reversed on appeal.
SCOPE OF REVIEW AND THE FACTS
The majority says “ordinarily in a court tried case the appellate court is bound by the findings of fact.” 696 S.W.2d at 519. The majority relies upon Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. banc 1979), as authority to dispense with treating the facts on review as those supportive of the judgment in the trial court. Schroeder was submitted at trial on stipulated facts. As such, that ease allows for appellate review of the legal conclusions from those facts and is inapplicable here.
Review of this case has to be under Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976), and Rule 73.01 which give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to determine credibility. When review is on the basis of substantial evidence supporting the judgment, all evidence and inferences favorable to the prevailing party must be accepted as true and evidence to the contrary must be disregarded. State ex rel. Miller v. McLeod, 605 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Mo.App.1980). Where no findings or conclusions were requested, all fact issues are to be considered in accordance with the court’s result. Watkins v. Johnson, 606 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo.App. 1980). The trial judge had leave to believe none, part or all of the testimony of the witnesses. Husky Industries, Inc., v. Craig Industries, 618 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Mo.App.1981).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment for Southgate, the facts are as follows: Southgate’s only witness was its bank officer, John Clements, who dealt with this particular loan and repossession. Clements testified that the bank sent its notice by certified mail of a private sale on March 1, and that around March 18 or 19 (within the 20 day redemption period) he received an offer from May for a waiver of the bank’s rights to any deficiency balance and $2,500.00. This offer was rejected. Clements did not know of any further settlement offer communicated either by May or the bank’s attorney. Contrary evidence presented by May under the applicable standard of review can be disregarded. This court should also not be at liberty to consider facts contained in the unsuccessful request for summary judgment made by May.
DOES THE LAW ALLOW THE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT TO BE SET ASIDE
The majority first asserts the bank did not give reasonable notice of its intent to sell the truck and is therefore precluded from receiving a deficiency judgment. The facts are that on March 1, the day of repossession, the bank sent a certified letter to the defendant telling him that he could redeem within 20 days for the stated debt and costs, or the truck would be sold at private sale. The law requires “reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale ... is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor.” Section 400.9-504(3). UCC Comment 5 to this section states: “[Ejxcept for the requirement of notification there is no statutory period during which the collateral must be held for disposition.” Reasonable notification is not defined in this article of the code but is to be a sufficient time for the debtor to take appropriate steps to protect his interest. Id.
It should be noted May acknowledged the notice and made no contention the notice was not given or the time for sale was too short.
Section 400.9-506 states at any time before disposal of the collateral the debtor may redeem by “tendering fulfillment” of all obligations. The Comment says *524“tendering fulfillment” means more than a new promise to perform on an existing promise — it requires payment in full.
In this ease May had not tendered fulfillment prior to the sale of the truck.
Section 400.9-507(1) provides if the disposition of the property was not disclosed without notification the debtor may recover damages for a commercially unreasonable dispostion.
In this case a private sale, as contemplated by the loan documents, was held on April 29th. Although much is made of the sale price being less than May had offered, there never has been a direct attack on the sale price by May. May has neither attacked the sale as being commercially unreasonable nor brought an action for damages for lack of reasonable notice.
Section 400.9-507(2) states the fact a better price could have been obtained does not mean the sale was not conducted in a commercially unreasonable manner.
Since May brought no action under § 9-507(1), there is a question as to whether the denial of a deficiency judgment is an available remedy under the code adopted in this state. “The Code itself does not mention the denial of a deficiency as a remedy, not has any Missouri case so held. Section 9-507 provides that ‘if the disposition has occurred, the debtor ... has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this part.’ ” Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Mo.App. 1974); Jefferson Bank & Trust Company v. Horst, 599 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Mo.App.1980). Contra Executive Financial Services, Inc. v. Garrison, 722 F.2d 417 (8th Cir.1983) (where the court felt Missouri law could require written as opposed to oral notice to be given to the debtor as a prerequisite to the creditor gaining a deficiency judgment). At best, it is most dubious whether the approach taken by May and adopted by the majority is a viable remedy. On the basis of Wirth, supra, it appears highly doubtful the reasonable notice requirement of the sale could be used as was done here to set aside a deficiency. Wirth suggests rather than denying a deficiency, the better practice where there has been creditor misbehavior would be for the court to examine the evidence as to the amount of the sale, giving a presumption first of the collateral being worth the debt. Id. at 268-69.
THE QUESTION OF LAW
Even assuming for the sake of argument appellate consideration is available on all the facts as contained in the majority, and assuming the defense advocated by May is proper, the ultimate matter to be reviewed is whether the trial judge’s conclusion adverse to a finding of estoppel was proper.
Before reaching the estoppel issue, the conclusion of the majority that the parties had agreed to the postponement of the sale should be addressed. This conclusion sounds of a binding contract having resulted and of a right of May to seek judicial relief for its breach. No such action or theory has ever been present in this case.
The element of the detriment or injury, which the trial court found wanting, even under facts favorable to May cannot be satisfied. The majority concedes May did not change his position by becoming obligated to pay for the truck. That he did not have the opportunity to offer more money or somehow outbid someone at a private sale simply does not satisfy the element of injury necessary to estoppel and does not allow the trial court’s decision to be overturned.
There is just nothing in the UCC to allow a result which the majority reaches. This case involves only a matter of legal ethics and fair dealings between members of the bar. It is here on the issues of proper notice under the UCC and estoppel. Despite the unfairness of the result, the points on this appeal are lacking.