Court Opinion

ID: 9712229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:49:32.059564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.067384
License: Public Domain

Inbody, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
While I agree with the majority that the CIR had subject matter jurisdiction over the appellees’ claims, I must respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion affirming the CIR’s finding that the appellees’ claims were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
In its order, the CIR noted that like the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, “[t]he issue of the statute of limitations under any *483duty of fair representation in Nebraska is one of first impression.” The CIR found as follows:
The limitation period for duty of fair representation claims begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Many federal courts have determined that accrual occurs when the employee discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged violation. . . . However, in the instant case, the [appellees] allege that [the FOP] has committed continuing violations that have occurred for years in the past and have continued up until the filing of this [complaint] and in certain instances still occur. . . .
In the instant case, the [appellees] have presented a significant amount of evidence that establishes a clear and continuing pattern of activity on the part of the [FOP]. Furthermore, the [FOP] and Douglas County are currently in negotiations for their next two-year contract for the years of 2003 to 2005. The parties’ current contract expired in July of 2003 and they are operating under a contract continuation clause in the 2001 to 2003 contract. The [FOP] continues to have the ability to negotiate any issues that are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Therefore, no cause of action has accrued with regard to any negotiable issues. Furthermore, the issues are ongoing. The evidence presented at trial, like in Marlowe[ v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973)], clearly established that the [FOP’s] actions or lack thereof have continuously occurred over the [appellees’] employment . . . and up to and including the present time or after the filing of the original complaint. Therefore, we find that the remaining [appellees’] allegations are not barred by any expiration of the statute of limitations under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-825(1).
The CIR found that the FOP had continually failed to address the female appellees’ claims and that this constituted “a clear and continuing pattern of activity on the part of the [FOP].” However, in its brief, the FOP claims that the CIR’s finding of a continuing violation “fails to cite even one overt act on the part of the [FOP] that occurred during the statutory period.” Brief for appellant at 32. Further, in its order, the CIR did note, when dealing with the *484merits of the appellees’ claims, that the appellees “did not prove that the [FOP] was actively opposing or harassing [the] female [appellees] in their efforts to obtain equal working conditions and any attempt to secure changes in the terms and the conditions of their employment.” The CIR further noted that “[i]nstead, most of the evidence surrounds the [FOP’s] inaction, as opposed to any active opposition or harassing efforts.” (Emphasis supplied.) Also, the only claim of the appellees sustained by the CIR was that the FOP had “refus[ed] to fairly bargain with the employer, Douglas County, in the matter of rule changes.”
Decisions of the NLRB provide guidance and are' helpful to the CIR in resolving issues where there are similar state statutory provisions. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 571 v. City of Plattsmouth, 265 Neb. 817, 660 N.W.2d 480 (2003). The NLRA provides a 6-month statute of limitations, while § 48-825(1) provides that a party must commence an action in the CIR by filing a complaint with the commission within 180 days after the alleged violation. Therefore, the provisions are similar.
In cases governed by the NLRA’s 6-month statute of limitations, the statute of limitations begins running when the employee should reasonably have known of the union’s alleged breach. Scott v. United Auto. (UAW Union), Local 879, 242 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2001).
A continuing violation requires unlawful acts to occur within the limitations period. See Local No. 1424, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 422, 80 S.Ct. 822, 4 L.Ed.2d 832 (1960) (“Bryan Manufacturing”). As the Supreme Court has explained, there is no continuing violation sufficient to delay the statute of limitations if the conduct within the six month period is only unlawful in light of conduct outside of the six month period.
Christiansen v. APV Crepaco, Inc., 178 F.3d 910, 915 (7th Cir. 1999). Continued union inactivity after an initial failure to respond to a grievance request does not constitute a continuing violation of the duty of fair representation. Id. Even though a plaintiff continues to request a union’s assistance during the limitations period, the union’s inactivity with respect to the grievance was not an unfair labor practice if the inactivity was unfair only *485by reason of circumstances existing at or before the start of the limitations period. See id. Under those circumstances, the union’s conduct cannot be used to revive a time-barred claim. Id. Both Scott v. United Auto.(UAW Union), Local 879 and Christiansen v. APV Crepaco, Inc. involved claims made against a union allegedly breaching the duty of fair representation, as does the case at bar.
In this case, Davis testified that female officers were having difficulty receiving adequate restroom breaks since 2000 and that she had attempted to get the FOP to address that issue. She discussed a meeting with the FOP executive board in which a group of male and female officers approached the FOP for help in changing their work conditions and rules, but she claimed that after the meeting, the FOP did nothing to address that issue.
It further appears from the record that the issues facing the female appellees occurred as a result of § 47-111. The testimony at trial indicates that the issues complained of by the female appellees, including inadequate bathroom breaks and mandatory overtime, occurred as a result of this statute.
As noted in the majority opinion, on January 3, 2003, a memorandum was sent to all correctional staff by the chief deputy for the Douglas County Department of Corrections indicating that the department intended to request a change in § 47-111, in order to alleviate the problems faced by the female appellees. On January 9, a meeting was held between, among others, representatives of the FOP, the department, and the county attorney’s office. At this meeting, possible changes to § 47-111 were discussed. Then, on January 29, another memorandum was presented to all correctional employees from the chief deputy. In the latter memorandum, the chief deputy notified all employees that the FOP was opposed to attempting to change § 47-111 and that it was decided that the department would make no further effort to change the statute.
Based on the record, it appears to me that the female appellees either were aware, or should reasonably have been aware, as of January 29, 2003, of the FOP’s position that it would not attempt to secure a change in § 47-111. While it is true that the FOP continued to refuse to secure a change in the statute from that day forward, the continued inactivity of the FOP does not constitute *486a continuing violation. The 6-month statute of limitations began to run, at the latest, on January 29. This would have given the appellees until August 1 to file a complaint with the CIR. The appellees did not file their petition with the CIR until October 31. Thus, I believe that the appellees’ claims regarding the FOP’s refusal to attempt to change § 47-111 were time barred and that the CIR’s finding that the appellees’ claims were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations was contrary to law. While I sympathize with the female appellees, and although I am not happy with this result, I do believe that the result is correct under the law. Therefore, I would remand the cause to the CIR for entry of an order consistent with this dissent.