Court Opinion

ID: 9405674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 21:05:52.613329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:23.534061
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                    2023 IL App (4th) 220962-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                       FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                          June 28, 2023
                                            NO. 4-22-0962
not precedent except in the                                                           Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                                     4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).                IN THE APPELLATE COURT                              Court, IL

                                             OF ILLINOIS

                                         FOURTH DISTRICT

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,           )     Appeal from the
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                  )     Circuit Court of
            v.                                   )     Mercer County
  MICHELLE L. SULLIVAN,                          )     No. 19CF11
            Defendant-Appellant.                 )
                                                 )     Honorable
                                                 )     Norma Kauzlarich,
                                                 )     Judge Presiding.
  ______________________________________________________________________________

                   JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
                   Justices Zenoff and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

  ¶1      Held: Because defendant’s appeal lacks arguable merit, the Office of the State Appellate
                Defender is granted leave to withdraw as appellate counsel and the trial court’s
                judgment dismissing defendant’s pro se postconviction petition is affirmed.

  ¶2               Defendant, Michelle L. Sullivan, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her pro se

  postconviction petition. On appeal, this court appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender

  (OSAD) to represent her. OSAD has moved to withdraw as counsel, arguing defendant’s appeal

  lacks arguable merit. We grant OSAD’s motion and affirm the court’s dismissal of defendant’s

  postconviction petition.

  ¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

  ¶4               In March 2019, the State charged defendant with obstructing justice (720 ILCS

  5/31-4(a) (West 2018)), alleging she furnished false information to a law enforcement officer with
the intent to prevent herself from being prosecuted. In February 2020, she pleaded guilty to

misdemeanor attempted obstruction of justice (id. §§ 8-4(a), 8-4(c)(5), 31-4(a)) pursuant to a fully

negotiated plea agreement with the State. Defendant was sentenced to 24 months’ conditional

discharge and 24 days in jail, the latter of which was stayed. She was also ordered to pay a $500

fine and $8064 in restitution. During a guilty plea hearing, the trial court found there was a factual

basis for defendant’s plea, although that factual basis was not set forth in the hearing transcript,

and it accepted defendant’s plea.

¶5             In December 2021, defendant appeared before the trial court, asserting that a

“charge” against her husband was “reversed” and seeking the same with respect to her conviction.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea as

more than 30 days had passed since her guilty plea and sentencing.

¶6             In September 2022, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the

Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)), and despite never

having previously initiated any postconviction proceedings, a motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition (id. § 122-1(f)). She sought to challenge her conviction based on “new

evidence” and referencing “overturned charges” in her husband’s case.

¶7             In October 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing in the matter. It noted defendant

had “completed her conditional discharge” sentence in the case. The court also found defendant’s

postconviction filings were “outside the [two-year] statute of limitations” and, as a result, it had

“lost jurisdiction” over defendant’s case.

¶8             This appeal followed.

¶9                                           II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10           As stated, OSAD has moved to withdraw as appellate counsel on the basis that any

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appeal by defendant is without arguable merit. In particular, OSAD argues a first-stage dismissal

of defendant’s pro se postconviction petition was appropriate because, following the completion

of her sentence, she lacked standing to seek relief under the Act. This court granted defendant

leave to file a response to OSAD’s motion, but she did not respond. For the reasons that follow,

we agree that defendant’s appeal lacks any arguable merit, although not for the reason articulated

by OSAD.

¶ 11           “The Act provides a method by which ‘any person imprisoned in the penitentiary’

may assert that his or her conviction was the result of a substantial denial of his or her rights under

the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both.” People v. Johnson, 2021 IL

125738, ¶ 22, 182 N.E.3d 728 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2016)). It contemplates a

three-stage process. People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 16, 185 N.E.3d 1234. “During the first

stage ***, the circuit court must independently review the postconviction petition, without input

from the State, and determine whether it is ‘frivolous or is patently without merit.’ ” Id. (quoting

(725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2008)). The trial court must consider a petition’s substantive

virtue and not its procedural compliance. People v. Hatter, 2021 IL 125981, ¶ 22, 183 N.E.3d 136.

“A postconviction petition is frivolous or patently without merit if it has no arguable basis either

in law or in fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id. ¶ 23. The trial court may summarily

dismiss a petition when it meets this standard. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 16. Additionally, the trial

court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition is subject to de novo review. People v. Buffer, 2019

IL 122327, ¶ 12, 137 N.E.3d 763.

¶ 12           As OSAD points out on appeal, a defendant’s statutory standing under the Act

“depends on whether he fulfilled the statutory condition of being ‘imprisoned in the penitentiary’

when he instituted the postconviction proceedings.” Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 32. The phrase

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“imprisoned in the penitentiary” requires that a postconviction petitioner be someone “whose

liberty, in some way or another, was curtailed to a degree by the state.” People v. Carrera, 239 Ill.

2d 241, 246, 940 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (2010). A defendant who has fully served his underlying

sentence before seeking postconviction relief no longer has his liberty curtailed and may not be

deemed a person “imprisoned in the penitentiary” as required by the Act. Id. at 253. Accordingly,

such defendants lack standing to file a petition for postconviction relief. Id.; see Johnson, 2021 IL

125738, ¶ 37 (“[A] petitioner loses standing to seek relief under the Act if he is no longer

‘imprisoned in the penitentiary’ because he has fully discharged his sentence for the challenged

conviction.”). Moreover, a lack of standing is an appropriate basis upon which the trial court may

summarily dismiss a postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 59.

¶ 13           Although, here, OSAD is correct with respect to its assertions of standing under the

Act, it has overlooked the fact that defendant in this case was convicted and sentenced for a

misdemeanor offense. As a result, her ability to seek postconviction relief does not stem from the

Act. Because relief under the Act is limited to persons “imprisoned in the penitentiary,” it has been

interpreted as applying only to those challenging felony convictions. People v. Shanklin, 304 Ill.

App. 3d 1056, 1058, 711 N.E.2d 796, 797 (1999) (citing People v. Davis, 54 Ill. 2d 494, 496, 298

N.E.2d 161, 163 (1973)). Rather than seeking postconviction relief under the Act, a misdemeanor

offender may seek such relief pursuant to the supreme court’s decision in People v. Warr, 54 Ill.

2d 487, 298 N.E.2d 164 (1973).

¶ 14           In Warr, the supreme court recognized the lack of a postconviction remedy for

misdemeanor offenders and exercised its supervisory authority to direct that such an offender “may

institute a proceeding in the nature of a proceeding under the *** Act” when alleging a substantial

denial of constitutional rights in the proceedings that resulted in his or her conviction. Id. at 493.

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It further held has follows:

               “Such a proceeding shall be governed by the *** Act except in the following

               respects:

                         (1) the defendant need not be imprisoned;

                         (2) the proceeding shall be commenced within [four] months after rendition

                         of final judgment if judgment was entered upon a plea of guilty and within

                         six months after the rendition of final judgment following a trial upon a plea

                         of not guilty;

                         (3) counsel need not be appointed to represent an indigent defendant if the

                         trial judge, after examination of the petition, enters an order finding that the

                         record in the case, read in conjunction with the defendant’s petition and the

                         responsive pleading of the prosecution, if any, conclusively shows that the

                         defendant is entitled to no relief.” Id.

¶ 15           In this case, because defendant pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, a

misdemeanor offense, the statutory standing requirements of the Act did not apply to her. In fact,

as set forth in Warr, to seek postconviction relief, a misdemeanor offender need not have been

“imprisoned” as contemplated by the Act. Id. Accordingly, we disagree with OSAD that

defendant’s appeal lacks arguable merit because she lacked standing under the Act to seek

postconviction relief.

¶ 16           We also disagree with the rationale relied upon by the trial court in this case. The

court effectively entered a first-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition on the basis

that it was untimely under the Act’s two-year limitations period. Although defendant’s petition

was untimely filed under both the Act and Warr, the court’s summary dismissal on that basis was

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improper. Again, Warr provides that, aside from the explicit exceptions noted in that decision, a

misdemeanor postconviction proceeding is “governed by the *** Act.” Id. The Act does not

authorize a first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition on the basis that the petition is

untimely filed. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 99, 789 N.E.2d 734, 740 (2002). Instead, a time

limitation should be considered an affirmative defense that the State can raise, waive, or forfeit.

Id. at 101.

¶ 17            While we are not persuaded by OSAD’s argument on appeal and find the trial court

relied on an unauthorized basis for its summary dismissal of defendant’s petition, as indicated, we

agree with OSAD’s ultimate conclusion that defendant’s appeal lacks arguable merit. Notably, on

review, we may affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of a postconviction petition on any

basis supported by the record. People v. Wright, 2013 IL App (4th) 110822, ¶ 32, 987 N.E.2d 1051.

In this instance, defendant’s postconviction filings are devoid of factual allegations and, in fact,

fail to set forth any clear contention of error such that her petition is frivolous and patently without

merit.

¶ 18            “The threshold for a petition to survive summary dismissal at the first stage of

[postconviction ] proceedings is low, given that most postconviction petitions are drafted by pro se

petitioners with little legal knowledge or training.” Hatter, 2021 IL 125981, ¶ 23. “The allegations

of the petition, taken as true and liberally construed, must present the gist of a constitutional claim.”

Id. ¶ 24. “[T]o survive summary dismissal, a petitioner is only required to include a limited amount

of detail and need not present formal legal arguments or citations to legal authority.” Id. However,

the Act states that a petition must “clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner’s constitutional

rights were violated.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020). Additionally, a pro se petitioner is not

excused “from providing any factual detail at all surrounding the alleged constitutional violation.”

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Hatter, 2021 IL 125981, ¶ 24. Although a pro se petition need not “set forth a complete and

detailed factual recitation, it must set forth some facts which can be corroborated and are objective

in nature or contain some explanation as to why those facts are absent.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (2009).

¶ 19           Here, defendant’s postconviction filings consisted of a petition for postconviction

relief, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and to appoint counsel, an affidavit, and a motion for

leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Defendant’s postconviction petition, which is

two pages in length, is partially illegible and contains no ascertainable constitutional claim. Both

defendant’s affidavit and her successive postconviction petition contain only the following

incomplete single-sentence allegation: “2-1401B—In light of new evidence see attached appellate

court papers for John F. Sullivan case # 19CF12 in regards to overturned charges.” Despite

defendant having alluded to an attachment to her filings, the record contains none. Because

defendant’s postconviction filings contain no clearly articulated claim of error and no supporting

factual allegations, she cannot meet the low threshold for surviving the first stage of postconviction

proceedings. Her petition was frivolous and patently without merit, and, on this record, the trial

court’s dismissal of her petition was warranted.

¶ 20                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21           For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw as appellate counsel

and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 22           Affirmed.

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