Court Opinion

ID: 9586366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:09:54.97753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:47.601649
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
The writer concurs fully with all that is said in the majority opinion. The majority, citing Rider v. State, 103 Ga. App. 184, 185 (118 SE2d 749) (1961), and Jeffries v. State, 140 Ga. App. 477 (1) (231 SE2d 369) (1976), emphasizes “our Bill of Rights, which secure to us the guarantees of freedom upon which this country is founded.” It is appropriate to note that Judge Townsend, speaking in Rider, was articulating guarantees provided by the State Bill of Rights rather than those protected by the Bill of Rights under our U. S. Constitution. He uses the language “rights guaranteed by our Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied.) He was ahead of his day in the development of State Constitutional law.1
It must be remembered that the constitutions of most of the original states contained bills of rights which preceded the creation or the *626adoption of the Bill of Rights under the U. S. Constitution. Actually, the latter evolved from the creation of the former and not vice versa; therefore, state protections should be paramount and considered on a first priority basis. If the state protections are independent and adequate, the federal protections would be considered only on a secondary basis, and then only if the state protections of the liberties of citizens are not at least equally as broad as federal protections. Michigan v. Long,_U. S__(103 SC 3469, 77 LE2d 1201) (1983). It should be repeated that our state courts cannot consider liberty issues under the State Constitution unless they are first raised in the trial court.
Decided October 30, 1985.
Michael B. Perry, for appellant.
Glenn Thomas, Jr., District Attorney, James A. Chamberlin, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The father of our Constitution, James Madison,2 has emphasized that the rights possessed by our people are derived from a higher law and are therefore superior to the powers of the government, and that when the two clash the former must prevail over the latter unless legitimate — sometimes compelling — countervailing interests are demonstrated by the government. Madison magnified the rights of the people and emphasized that the powers of government could be superseded only by a higher or more fundamental law; and that this higher or more fundamental law, embodied in the Bill of Rights, actually constitutes a limitation on the power of government. This thought concept was coined, conceived, created, and considered central by our visionary founding fathers as necessary to contain, curtail, and control over-bloated big-brother bankrupt bureaucracy. These thoughts apply today no less to the State Bill of Rights in its relationship to state and local government than to the Bill of Rights of the U. S. Constitution, as it limits acts of the federal government and now, selectively through incorporation, the state and local governments. Compare Echols v. DeKalb County, 146 Ga. App. 560, 563 (247 SE2d 114) (1978), and see “Limitations on Judicial Power & Review,” Constitutional Law, Lockhart, Kamisar & Choper (June 1975).

 Developments in State Constitutional Law (B. D. McGraw ed., 1985).

 John Adams, Works (Lodge ed., 1881) Vol. 1.