Court Opinion

ID: 9464234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:28:09.334462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:31.335644
License: Public Domain

HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the result because it is compelled by authorities both in this Circuit and elsewhere that permit the Government to choose to prosecute a taxpayer who makes a false statement to an Internal Revenue agent for a felony, under the general false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001,1 rather than for a misdemeanor, under 26 U.S.C. § 7207, a statute specifically directed to persons who make false statements to the Internal Revenue Service.2 (E. g., Nee*292ly v. United States (9th Cir. 1962) 300 F.2d 67; Brandow v. United States (9th Cir. 1959) 268 F.2d 559. See also United States v. Burnett (9th Cir. 1974) 505 F.2d 815, 816; United States v. Bettenhausen (10th Cir. 1974) 499 F.2d 1223, 1233-34, United States v. Heine (2d Cir. 1949) 149 F.2d 485, 487.)3
The prosecutor was alone in his lack of compassion for this petty offender. The jury acquitted Schmoker of the count framed under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (knowingly subscribing a false document (his tax return) under penalty of perjury).4 The court fined Schmoker $1,000 and placed him on probation (a sentence that is the equivalent of a misdemeanor penalty under § 7207). Perhaps there is some explanation for the prosecutor’s insistence on his draconian course, but none appears in the record. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in this case adds no luster to the concept of governmental fairness, but the court is forbidden to intervene when the choice of charges is legally committed to the prosecutor.

. § 101 provides: “Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

. § 7207, in pertinent part, provides: “Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to the . . [IRS] any list, return, account, state*292ment, or other document, known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as to any material matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.”

. Schmoker’s reliance on United States v. Bush (5th Cir. 1974) 503 F.2d 813, and similar cases, is misplaced. Such cases as Bush and United States v. Bedore (9th Cir. 1972) 455 F.2d 1109, apply a limiting principle to Section 1001 to prevent its broad language from being used to punish a person who answers “no” when he is asked if he committed a crime. This “exculpatory ‘no’ ” doctrine holds that prosecution under § 1001 cannot be added to prosecution for the underlying substantive offense because Congress did not intend to add a felony conviction to compel potential defendants to confess guilt to federal investigators. The “exculpatory ‘no’ ” doctrine is inapplicable to this case.

. The district court recognized that the acquittal was not technically inconsistent with the conviction on the remaining counts, but that the jury was expressing its compassion rather than making accurate, hair-splitting distinctions.