Court Opinion

ID: 9546679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:33:59.65291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:46.136811
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
LEVINSON, J.,
WITH WHOM RICHARDSON, C J., JOINS
I dissent.
*444I agree with the view expressed by the majority that the plaintiffs failure to move for a directed verdict in the circuit court posed no procedural obstacle to her right to seek a new trial on separate grounds. I also agree that the circuit court’s denial of her motion for a new trial is subject to review by this court. Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that the jury’s verdict absolving the City and County of Honolulu of negligence in the maintenance of the barbecue pit at Hanauma Bay was “clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.” I reach this result fully cognizant of the admonition in Laudermilk v. Carpenter, 78 Wash. 2d 92, 98, 457 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1969), that “it is not our province to indulge in conjecture as to the thought processes of juries or to change the law to accommodate our view of the facts in a particular case.” Contrary to that court’s opinion, however, I believe that it is the very essence of the appellate judicial function “to correct the decision of a callous and unthinking jury who may well have substituted . . . their own practices, for that of the reasonably prudent man.” Id. I would reverse the circuit court’s order denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial.
In the absence of a requested instruction on strict liability, the circuit court properly instructed the jury that the duty of ordinary care which the city and county owed “the public rightfully using” the park is relative and depends upon circumstances, “increasing or decreasing in proportion of the danger that should reasonably be apprehended.”
In Wax v. City & County of Honolulu, 34 Haw. 256, 259 (1937), this court recognized that:
Municipal parks in addition to their esthetic value are natural playgrounds for children. It is essentially for their use that public parks are established and maintained. Hence it is that the degree of care required by the municipality to keep its public parks in a reasonably safe condition for children must be consistent with its use by children possessing only the instincts and lacking in the discretion and restraint by which their immaturity is marked.
*445Stated another way, the duty of care which the city and county owed to Jill Petersen, a 22-month old child, in taking reasonable precautions to protect her from harm was proportioned to her inability to foresee and avoid the perils which she might encounter while playing in a place where she not only had a right to be, but which was specifically designed for her use. See Grace v. Kumalaa, 47 Haw. 281, 285, 386 P.2d 872, 875 (1963); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 339, 343B, and § 339, comments e and j (1965).
Measured by the aforementioned standard, the city and county failed to exercise ordinary care with regard to protecting young children from suffering foreseeable injury in the public park where Jill Petersen was injured. The record indicates that the plaintiff suffered her injuries when she stepped into some ashes which were either in a barbecue pit or scattered about thé grassy area surrounding it. The pit, which was built of hollow tile in the shape of a U, was about 10 inches high and completely open and practically level with the ground on the fourth side. There was testimony that the pits were “checked” daily by the senior grounds keeper and inspected at least weekly by the district parks supervisor. However, the senior grounds keeper testified that the pits were cleaned of ashes only on a biweekly basis. Both the district parks supervisor and the superintendent of operations and maintenance testified that they frequently observed gray matter resembling ashes scattered around the pit while accompanying the grounds keeper on inspection tours. At the time of the accident, no sign which might have alerted the parents marked the location of the pit. No screen had been placed on or around the pit to prevent ashes from spilling. The pit had not been fenced off in such a way as to prevent small children from walking into or touching the pit or the ashes. In short, instead of taking any effective measures to protect small children from serious injury, the pit which the city and county maintained at Hanauma Bay, as in Tucker Brothers, Inc. v. Menard, 90 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla. 1956), “merely served as an invitation that in effect led the child into what might be termed a ‘booby trap.’ ” *446This in my view amounts to negligence as a matter of law. See Wax v. City & County of Honolulu, supra at 258.
Whether the plaintiff s mother was negligent in her supervision is irrelevant to the question of the existence and scope of the city and county’s duty. Thacker v. J. C. Penny Company, 254 F.2d 672, 679 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 820 (1958). A parent’s primary duty to protect his child from injury does not mitigate the duty of the city and county to provide park facilities reasonably safe for the public, including small children, using them. Thus, if it is determined that the city and county failed to exercise ordinary care, any inquiry into the propriety of the parent’s conduct is unwarranted except as to the issue of contribution, which is not involved in this appeal.