Court Opinion

ID: 9960428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 14:08:00.484492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:31.731783
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0693-22

T.L.,1

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.D.S.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

                   Submitted on March 20, 2024 – Decided April 16, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket
                   No. FV-20-1352-22.

                   Carlos Diaz-Cobo, attorney for appellant.

                   Gomperts McDermott & Von Ellen, LLC, attorneys for
                   respondent (Marisa Lepore Hovanec, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

1
  We use initials to protect the parties' privacy and the confidentiality of the se
proceedings in accordance with Rule 1:38-3(d)(10).
      Defendant J.D.S. appeals from a September 23, 2022 amended final

restraining order (FRO) entered against him, and in favor of his wife, plaintiff

T.L., pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A.

2C:25-17 to -35. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his

request to consider a fifty-five-minute audio recording and certain photographs

at the FRO hearing and improperly concluded that plaintiff needed a FRO to

protect her from defendant. Based on our careful review of the record, we

conclude defendant has not shown the trial court's evidential rulings were an

abuse of discretion. Since plaintiff established the need for a FRO for her

protection from defendant, we affirm.

                                        I.

      On March 1, 2022, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order

(TRO) against defendant on plaintiff's complaint predicated on defendant's

physical assault of plaintiff and threat to kill her during the course of an

argument that occurred earlier that day. Plaintiff filed an amended domestic

violence complaint and an amended TRO was entered on March 8, 2022,

detailing: (1) assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1, as the sole predicate act; (2) one prior

incident of domestic violence between the parties in May 2021 which had not

been reported to law enforcement; (3) defendant's criminal history; and (4) that

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defendant was arrested for simple assault stemming from this incident. The

amended TRO prohibited defendant from: returning to the residence, engaging

in future acts of domestic violence against plaintiff, communicating with

plaintiff, stalking, following or threatening her, and possessing firearms or other

weapons.

      On March 22, 2022, plaintiff filed a second amended domestic violence

complaint, adding the predicate acts of terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3;

harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4; and false imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3.

Plaintiff also expanded the factual basis for relief, setting forth that defendant

would not allow her to leave the room she was in, ripped clothing from her body

and took her cell phone. The second amended complaint also detailed additional

past instances of domestic violence, including: in 2020, defendant threw a lamp

at plaintiff; in September 2021, defendant chased plaintiff from their home and

repeatedly hit and kicked the car she retreated to for safety; and in December

2021, defendant blocked plaintiff from exiting a bathroom she had sheltered in

after defendant chased her around the house. A second amended TRO was

entered based upon the additional allegations.

      On April 14, 2022, the trial court began a hearing (the FRO hearing),

which continued on May 3, 2022. Both parties were represented by counsel and

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testified. No other witnesses were called. At the outset of the hearing, the trial

court found it had jurisdiction to consider the entry of a FRO under the PDVA,

since plaintiff and defendant were married on February 13, 2021, and resided

together until the March 1, 2022 occurrence.

      Plaintiff testified at the FRO hearing that on March 1, 2022, she and

defendant were having an argument when defendant snatched her cell phone

from her hand and said "[t]his is my phone, b[*]tch." Plaintiff retrieved her iPad

and retreated into a walk-in closet. Defendant followed, grabbed plaintiff's iPad,

and said "[t]his is mine too, b*tch." Plaintiff testified that defendant then stood

in the doorway of the closet and would not move to allow her to leave.

Defendant yelled obscenities at her prior to running towards her to "flatten" her,

grabbing her, and saying "I will f[*]cking kill you," before headbutting her.

Defendant let plaintiff go after she said she was going to call the police.

      Plaintiff testified that defendant appeared to pretend to cry. After plaintiff

asked if he was "fake crying," defendant grabbed her, threw her into a dresser

and "choked her up," causing her to yell and scream "get off me." Defendant

grabbed her shirt, ripping it before taking hold of her and pushing her into

shelves, which came crashing down on both of them.

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      Plaintiff screamed for defendant to get off of her and then tried to run out

of the room. As she was attempting to take her phone back, defendant picked

plaintiff up and threw her on the bed. When he did that, plaintiff attempted to

gouge his eyes out and defendant picked her up off the bed and threw her into a

wall. Plaintiff spit on defendant and he called her a "stupid b[*]tch" and grabbed

her so that she could not move. Defendant then yelled obscenities at plaintiff,

and, in return, plaintiff spit at him several times and screamed back at him.

      Attempting to restrain plaintiff, defendant "slam[med] [her] body to the

chair." This hurt plaintiff's back, and she began to cry. Defendant let her go,

called her a stupid b[*]tch, took her iPhone and iPad, and left the house. There

happened to be police officers outside the house in a construction area and they

came to help plaintiff.

      Plaintiff's attorney moved several photographs depicting plaintiff's

injuries into evidence. The trial court sua sponte ruled additional photographs

of the same injuries were inadmissible as cumulative. When plaintiff's counsel

used these additional photographs of plaintiff's injuries later in the trial during

cross-examination to ask defendant about specific injuries plaintiff suffered,

defense counsel did not object.

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      Plaintiff testified to the following prior incidents of domestic violence:

(1) in May 2021, defendant grabbed her and left a permanent mark on her arm

by body slamming her and causing her back injury; (2) in September 2021,

defendant kicked the car she was hiding in and yelled obscenities , (3) in

December 2021, defendant blocked her from going outside of her house; and (4)

defendant threw a lamp at her in 2020. Plaintiff testified she was seeking a FRO

since she was fearful of defendant.

      On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that she told the police on March

1, 2022 that defendant had called her a "b[*]tch." Defense counsel attempted to

play a fifty-five-minute audio recording of an interaction between plaintiff and

police officers during which counsel alleged plaintiff did not relay this

information.    Counsel sought to impeach plaintiff's credibility with the

recording, but the trial court sustained plaintiff's objection due to the length of

the recording and since the evidence was only minimally relevant.              The

statement related only to the predicate act of harassment and was not dispositive

because plaintiff had spoken with the officers numerous times and all of their

conversations were not captured on the proffered audio.

      Defendant testified the parties had an argument that began in another part

of the house and ended up with them continuing the argument in the closet.

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Plaintiff attempted to walk out of the closet and defendant put his hands on

plaintiff's waist intending to give her a hug and she "took a swing" at him

resulting in defendant "grab[bing] her arms" and asking whether "she had lost

her mind." Defendant admitted he "c[ould]" have grabbed plaintiff's shirt when

this happened. Defendant testified that he held her arms down for a while and

when he let go she tried to kick him, so he grabbed her arms again to hold her

down. Defendant testified that his only physical contact with plaintiff was

"[m]ostly restraining her," and he did not falsely imprison her nor did he act

with an intent to harass her, kick, or shove her. Instead, he grabbed her to try

and stop the altercation.

      During direct examination of defendant, counsel attempted to elicit

testimony establishing that plaintiff did not fear defendant. Defendant testified

that plaintiff gouged his eyes and his physical conduct was for self-defense. He

asserted that he did not physically imprison plaintiff, kick, shove, offensively

touch or harass her. On cross-examination, defense counsel did not object to

plaintiff's counsel playing three audio recordings, including one where

defendant admitted pushing plaintiff.

      Defendant testified that when he moved back into the residence after the

TRO was entered, he learned that plaintiff had moved out, taking her belongings

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and those of her daughter. 2 He saw that there was some damage, stating there

were "tons of dishes broken, the bed was broken, some of [his] items were

missing" and there were "a lot of things that needed to be cleaned up and thrown

away based on the damage left in the house." Plaintiff's counsel objected based

on relevancy and defense counsel argued in response that "[t]he conduct of

[plaintiff] while she was departing the marital home, knowing that [defendant]

was going to be moving back in . . . directly contradict[s] the idea or the belief

that [plaintiff] . . . needed a [FRO] to protect herself from [defendant]." The

trial court did not strike the testimony, but sustained the objection to defendant

moving photographs of the damage into evidence, finding that the condition of

the house after the TRO was entered was not relevant.

      Defendant also proffered photographs of scratches around his eye and

eyelid as the result of the altercation with plaintiff on March 1, 2022, but the

trial court precluded the introduction of additional photos as cumulative.

Defendant initially denied any prior domestic violence incidences occurred.

However, after plaintiff's counsel played an audio recording, defendant admitted

2
   The record is unclear as to the age of plaintiff's daughter, as well as her
relationship to defendant.
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pushing plaintiff across the room in May 2021 stating, "I admit that I pushed

her."

        At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered the requested FRO

finding plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence the predicate acts of

assault and harassment, as well as the need for entry of a FRO to protect her

from defendant. The trial court found that although plaintiff alleged harassment,

terroristic threats, assault, and false imprisonment as predicate acts, only one

predicate act must be established in order for a FRO to be issued. The trial court

found that plaintiff established by a preponderance of the credible evidence that

defendant attempted to cause, or purposely, knowingly or recklessly cause d

bodily injury sufficient to constitute simple assault. The trial court found

plaintiff to be a more credible witness than defendant and, as a result, concluded

that defendant injured her.

        The trial court also found that plaintiff established the predicate act of

harassment based upon defendant's conduct. The trial court found plaintiff's

audio recordings lacked credibility since she was the only one aware the

conversation was being recorded and, thus, she could adjust her behavior

accordingly.    Since the trial court found that assault and harassment were

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                                         9
established by a preponderance of the credible evidence, it stated that there was

no need to address terroristic threats or false imprisonment.

      The trial court rejected defendant's assertion that the March 1, 2022

occurrence was a mutual fight, in light of the history of domestic violence

between the parties which was established through plaintiff's credible testimony.

The trial court found plaintiff credible as to the May, August and September,

2021 domestic violence incidents between the parties and the prior incidents

involving defendant's former spouses or girlfriends.       The trial court found

defendant less credible since he was sometimes evasive and he attempted to

contradict his admission to throwing plaintiff across the room, which was

confirmed in an audio recording.

      The trial court found that a FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from

immediate danger and to prevent further abuse. The arguments that the FRO

was not needed because the parties were getting divorced were rejected by the

trial court because it did not mean that defendant would not have an opportunity

to contact plaintiff, especially since they have children together. The trial court

cited A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 2016), in support of its

conclusion that plaintiff fleeing the marital home and no longer being in

immediate danger are not factors weighing against the issuance of a FRO under

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                                       10
Silver.3 As a result, the trial court ruled that because of the history of domestic

violence, and the nature of the predicate offenses, a FRO was necessary to

prevent further abuse, regardless of whether the parties divorce.

        After the decision was rendered, plaintiff's counsel told the trial court she

intended to file a certification of services in support of a request for an order

compelling defendant to pay for plaintiff's counsel fees. The court instructed

that plaintiff's counsel was to make defendant's counsel aware when these

documents were filed and to follow the proper court processes and procedures

for doing so.4

        On September 23, 2022, the trial court entered an amended FRO awarding

$5,950 in counsel fees as compensatory damages under the PDVA payable by

defendant to plaintiff's counsel, within thirty days. Defendant appeals from the

September 23, 2022 amended FRO.

                                          II.

        Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in prohibiting

defendant from playing an audio tape purporting to show that plaintiff's

testimony was untruthful and barring defendant's use of photographs allegedly

3
    Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (2006).
4
    The record is unclear as to when plaintiff's certification of services was filed.
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                                         11
showing damage to defendant's belongings after the TRO was entered.

Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly found "the FRO was

necessary."

      Plaintiff argues that defendant improperly appealed only the September

23, 2022 amended FRO, which added a counsel fee award and, therefore, we do

not need to address the merits of the May 3, 2022 FRO. We are unconvinced

that we should view defendant's appeal so narrowly. The September 23, 2022

amended FRO incorporates the FRO protections entered on May 3, 2022,

coupled with the fee award. Thus, it is appropriate for us to consider whether

the trial court erred in granting the FRO relief on May 3, 2022, which was re-

entered by way of the September 23, 2022 amended FRO.

                                      III.

      Appellate review of a trial court's decision to enter a FRO in a domestic

violence matter is limited. Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116, 121 (App.

Div. 2005). "A reviewing court is bound by the trial court's findings 'when

supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting Cesare

v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "This deferential standard is even more

appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of

credibility.'" L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 421 N.J. Super. 523, 533 (App. Div. 2011)

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                                      12
(quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). A trial

judge who observes witnesses and listens to their testimony is in the best

position to "make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who

appear on the stand." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88,

104 (2008).

      Further, we "accord particular deference to the Family Part because of its

'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J.

Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). "Reversal

is warranted only when a mistake must have been made because the trial court's

factual findings are '"so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests

of justice."'" Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433 (App. Div. 2015)

(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974)). However, we review de novo "the trial judge's legal conclusions, and

the application of those conclusions to the facts." Ibid. (quoting Reese v. Weis,

430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).

      Rulings as to the admissibility of evidence or testimony are also governed

by an abuse of discretion standard. Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531,

551 (2019). Therefore, we "review a trial court's evidentiary ruling only for a

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                                      13
'clear error in judgment.'" State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020) (quoting

State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)). The de novo standard of review only

governs where the trial court applies the incorrect legal standard to decide an

evidential objection. Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190, 214 (App. Div.

2021). See Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371

(2011).

                                           IV.

      We address defendant's argument that the trial court's evidential rulings

deprived him of a fair hearing.     Defendant first posits that the trial court

improperly ruled that it would not consider a fifty-five-minute audio tape of a

conversation between plaintiff and two police officers evidencing plaintiff never

alleged defendant called her a "b[*]tch" to show her testimony was untruthful.

Defendant also argues the trial court erred in not allowing testimony and photos

which he contends establish plaintiff was not in "fear for her life" and did not

need a FRO to protect her from defendant.

      As to the video recording, defendant has not established the trial court

abused its discretion in precluding defendant from playing a fifty -five-minute

audio tape which would have established, at best, only that plaintiff did not

complain to the police that defendant specifically called her a "b[*]tch" on

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March 1, 2022. There were other conversations between plaintiff and various

police officers regarding the March 1, 2022 event in which she may have relayed

this expletive. As a result, under N.J.R.E. 403, the probative value of the

evidence was substantially outweighed by interests of judicial efficiency in not

allowing a lengthy audio tape to be played.

      Nor has defendant established the trial court abused its discretion in

precluding him from using photographs to establish plaintiff was not in fear of

him because his personal property, including clothing, was in disarray in the

apartment when he arrived to retrieve it post-TRO. Even if plaintiff damaged

defendant's clothing, the photographs of damaged clothing bore no relevance

under N.J.R.E. 401 to the issues before the court. There was no abuse of

discretion in the determination not to permit the photographs.

                                      V.

      In light of our conclusions regarding the evidential issues, we need only

briefly discuss defendant's generalized argument that the amended FRO was

improperly entered.

      Defendant does not take issue with the applicability of the PDVA or the

finding of the predicate acts of assault and harassment. He only contends the

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trial court erred in finding that a FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from

further acts of domestic violence.

      We begin by acknowledging that the purpose of the PDVA is to "assure

the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law

can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting

State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting N.J.S.A.

2C:25-18)). Consequently, "[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of

domestic violence," J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 473 (2011) (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will

"liberally construe[] [the Act] to achieve its salutary purposes ." Cesare, 154

N.J. at 400.

      In order for a FRO to be entered, the two prongs under Silver must be

satisfied. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. First, the court "must determine

whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence,

that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has

occurred." Id. at 125. Satisfaction of this prong is not at issue here.

      If a court finds a predicate act occurred, "the judge must [next] determine

whether a restraining order is necessary to protect the plaintiff from future

danger or threats of violence." D.M.R. v. M.K.G., 467 N.J. Super. 308, 322

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(App. Div. 2021). This is done by "an evaluation of the factors set forth in

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6)." J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76 (quoting Silver,

387 N.J. Super. at 127).     The factors which the court should consider , if

applicable, include but are not limited to:

            (1) The previous history of domestic violence between
            the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,
            harassment and physical abuse;

            (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or
            property;

            (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and
            defendant;

            (4) The best interests of the victim and any child;

            (5) In determining custody and parenting time the
            protection of the victim's safety; and

            (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection
            from another jurisdiction.

            [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).]

      "[W]hether the victim fears the defendant" is an additional factor the trial

court may consider. G.M., 453 N.J. Super. at 13 (quoting Carfagno v. Carfagno,

288 N.J. Super. 424, 435 (Ch. Div. 1995)). The trial court must determine,

pursuant to the totality of the circumstances, whether the FRO is necessary "to

protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver,

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387 N.J. Super. at 127; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b) (stating "the court shall

grant any relief necessary to prevent further abuse"). The inquiry is necessarily

fact specific. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127-28.

      Although the trial court is not required to incorporate all of these factors

in its findings, "the [PDVA] does require that 'acts claimed by a plaintiff to be

domestic violence . . . be evaluated in light of the previous history of violence

between the parties.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 401-02 (quoting Peranio, 280 N.J.

Super. at 54). Whether a restraining order should be issued depends on the

seriousness of the predicate offense, on "the previous history of domestic

violence between the plaintiff and defendant including previous threats,

harassment and physical abuse," and on "whether immediate danger to the

person or property is present." Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 248

(App. Div. 1995).

      The trial court must exercise care "to distinguish between ordinary

disputes and disagreements between family members and those acts that cross

the line into domestic violence." R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 225 (App.

Div. 2017).     The PDVA is not intended to encompass "ordinary domestic

contretemps."    Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. at 250.      Rather, "the [PDVA] is

intended to assist those who are truly the victims of domestic violence." Silver,

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                                      18
387 N.J. Super. at 124 (quoting Kamen v. Egan, 322 N.J. Super. 222, 229 (App.

Div. 1999)).

      The trial court did not err in concluding the second Silver prong was

established based upon consideration of the applicable factors set forth in

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a), in addition to whether plaintiff fears defendant. The

previous history of domestic violence between the parties, the threats of danger

to plaintiff on March 1, 2022, and plaintiff's best interests as a victim of

domestic violence all support the issuance of the FRO. A FRO is also necessary

to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence based on plaintiff's

credible testimony that she was fearful of defendant, who had purposefully tried

to physically harm her on prior occasions and had the opportunity to do so in

the future.

      The multiple prior acts of domestic violence between the parties are

engrained in the fabric of their relatively short marriage. Plaintiff testified to

various physical altercations and actions taken by defendant to control her

through intimidation and violence.       Defendant admitted to prior physical

altercations. The record in this case clearly depicts a history of physical violence

between the parties, which weighs in favor of the entry of a FRO to protect

against future abuse.

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      At the FRO hearing, plaintiff confirmed that she was in fact afraid of

defendant because he has been physically violent to her. During the March 1,

2022 incident, defendant threatened to kill plaintiff. The trial court's credibility

determinations based upon the testimony at the hearing are afforded deference.

We are convinced based upon the credible evidence in the record that the trial

court did not err in concluding a FRO is necessary to protect plaintiff from

defendant.

      Our consideration of the FRO hearing record, along with the trial court's

credibility findings, and an evaluation of applicable factors set forth in N.J.S.A.

2C:25-29(a), as required by prong two of Silver, supports entry of the September

23, 2022 amended FRO. Therefore, we affirm the September 23, 2022 amended

FRO, finding that it is necessary to protect plaintiff from future danger or threats

of violence from defendant.

      Affirmed.

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