Court Opinion

ID: 9580869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:09:48.328334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:34.570372
License: Public Domain

SCHUMACHER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The evidence regarding the results of the polygraph test was introduced solely by defendant’s attorney on cross-examination of Erickson, contrary to the trial court’s admonition. It cannot now be complained of and used as a basis to reverse defendant’s conviction.
The issue of the polygraph test arose in the following manner. At a pre-trial conference, the prosecution advised the court it was going to call Erickson as a witness. The conversation between the prosecution, defendant’s attorney and the court was as follows:
MR. LYNCH: If we call Mr. Erickson, the anticipated testimony would have nothing to do with the polygraph exam; rather just that he was also present while the May 4th statement was taken, and his testimony very briefly would be, “I was there and this is what he said.”
MR. MACK: In and of itself, that’s not objectionable. I’m troubled with him because I can see that he’s just going to be loaded for bear and to say “And, furthermore ...”
THE COURT: Well, number one, I think that any references to the polygraph examination should not be heard by the jury, and I would caution counsel for the State as well as the defense that the Court would view that with a jaundiced eye if that in fact occurred, so perhaps a preliminary caution to the State’s witnesses and defense witnesses would be appropriate. We’ll see where that goes. But that’s what my ruling would be. And I think it’s appropriate that you review that statement in detail before you proceed with it, and if you find any references to the polygraph examination, I would suggest that these be deleted and that we do so in chambers so the jury doesn’t have a chance to look at that inadvertently.
Later in the conference, defendant’s attorney argued that he wanted to introduce evidence of the polygraph to show the jury that defendant’s confession was induced by the polygraph. The court ruled on the issue as follows:
This is a thorny issue. What I’m going to allow is this: I’ll allow you to make cross-examination on the existence of a polygraph examination. I will not allow any testimony whatsoever about the results of the polygraph examination. *726And, frankly, I’m quite concerned about even making mention of it in the jury's hearing that there was in fact a polygraph examination. Period. The only reason I am inclined to allow counsel to do so is because it's counsel for the defense that wishes to bring that subject up for the purposes of impeaching the value or the reliability of this confession. And I think you're really treading on thin ice myself, and I have a concern about the fairness of a trial to the defendant himself when the specter of a polygraph examination may in fact come up during the course of the trial. (Emphasis added).
During this conference, defendant’s attorney recognized that using polygraph evidence “could be prejudicial to the defendant.” He further states that “[ijt’s a touchy tactic, I know that, but I think I am not consistent in my approach to the polygraph if I don’t take that position.”
During the trial, the prosecution called Erickson to testify. In its direct examination, neither the prosecutor nor Erickson made any mention of the polygraph test. Defendant’s attorney introduced evidence of the polygraph and its results during his cross-examination of Erickson. Relevant portions of this cross-examination are as follows:
Q: Officer, you are a polygraph operator; is that correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Prior to the interview that Officer Friedrich conducted and that we’ve just been talking about, you ran a polygraph interview on the defendant; is that not correct?
A: I did.
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Q: And you informed Mr. Schaeffer that, in your opinion, he had been lying on the polygraph; is that correct? (Emphasis added).
A: That’s correct.
After this cross-examination, the court instructed the jury as follows:
Before I call upon you, Mr. Lynch, I want to instruct the jury they are to disregard any evidence whatsoever about the results of a polygraph examination. The reliability of polygraphic examinations and tests are not recognized in Minnesota or anywhere else in the courts of this country. And, as a result, the actual results of any' such tests may not be admitted at trial, and therefore you are specifically instructed to disregard any testimony regarding that. The only reason that that topic is even broached during the course of this trial is to give you an opportunity to know of the circumstances of the defendant’s statement that was given in May of 1988 and to consider the circumstances of the statement in determining the reliability of the same, and only for that reason.
As the transcript shows, defendant’s attorney, ' on cross-examination of Erickson, asked a leading question which directly mentioned the results of the polygraph test. Defendant should not, in deliberately and consciously pursuing his trial strategy, be able to introduce evidence about the polygraph test and, when that strategy proves unsuccessful, claim that it was reversible error to allow him to introduce that evidence.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that when a defendant failed to make an appropriate objection regarding opinion testimony given on cross-examination, he waived any right to question the admissibility of such testimony after trial. Kenney v. Chicago Great Western Railway Co., 245 Minn. 284, 289, 71 N.W.2d 669, 673 (1955). From the holding in Kenney, it follows that if defendant’s attorney mentions the polygraph results and asks questions about it on cross-examination, he cannot later object to that evidence as constituting reversible error. The trial court properly gave a cautionary instruction which would have negated any misunderstanding the jury could have had regarding the use of the polygraph test evidence.