Court Opinion

ID: 9707416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:11:06.823485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:32.431937
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Achor, J.
My adverse opinion in this case is predicated upon a contrary interpretation of the- facts in evidence regarding (1) the “obviously dangerous” character of the ice machine and (2) appellant’s knowledge of “the custom of employees to obtain ice from the machine.”
As I see it, the direct testimony and all the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are that the machine was running at the time. That “anybody would know that it had saws and blades on it to cut ice and that it was dangerous to get snow if the machine was running.” And, although appellee testified she “did not see the knives,” the pictures in evidence' clearly show exposed “saws and blades” extending down into the chute where appellee reached for the ice, and was injured.
With regard to the court’s conclusion that “appellant knew of the custom of the employees to obtain ice from the machine,” in my judgment this statement only partially disposes of the issue. Here the “obvious danger” was not in the machine itself, but in one’s exposure to it during its operation. In this regard, although employees had been seen to take ice from the machine when it was not in operation, the positive tes*617timony is that employees to ere not known previously to get ice “when the machine would be running.”
This is not a case of “mistaken judgment” or mere “negligence,” nor was appellant’s act “wilful misconduct,” which must be specially pleaded. Patton Park Inc. v. Anderson (1944), 222 Ind. 448, 53 N. E. 2d 771, 54 N. E. 2d 277; Indianapolis Heat, etc., Co. v. Fitzwater (1918), 70 Ind. App. 422, 121 N. E. 126; §§40-1210, 40-1209, Burns’ 1952 Replacement.
. As I construe the undisputed facts, we are confronted here with a circumstance where an employee commits an act, solely for her personal comfort and enjoyment and not for the service of her employer but only incidental thereto, and not with the previous knowledge or consent of such employer; by which act, in reckless disregard of her own safety, she subjected herself to an obvious danger, and was injured thereby.
It occurs to me that the most humane or paternalistic construction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not contemplate that an employee be relieved of all responsibility for his own safety and that an employer be required, under duress of law, to compensate or reward irresponsible employees for injuries so brought upon themselves merely because of their current employment.
Note. — Reported in 105 N. E. 2d 906.