Court Opinion

ID: 9742428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:13:39.691315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:32.650887
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE ENGLISH delivered the opinion of the court: In plaintiffs petition for rehearing, he concedes, in effect, that this court in its opinion may have pointed out the lack of proof in answer to the first two points in his brief (those principally argued), namely, that defendant would be liable “(1) Where the Object Came To Be in the Aisle Through the Negligence of the Store or Its Employees; (2) Where the Store or Its Employees Knew the Object Was in the Aisle or by the Exercise of Ordinary Care Should Have Known It Was There and Failed Either to Remove It or to Warn the Customer of Its Presence.” but that we had “misconstrued the plaintiffs theory of liability in this case” which was really the third point stated in his brief as follows: “(3) Where the Dangerous Condition Is Foreseeable to the Operator of the Store Because It Is Part of a Pattern of Conduct or . a Recurring Incident — in Which Case, the Injured Patron Need Not Prove That the Operator of the Business Establishment Had Either Actual or Constructive Knowledge of the Specific Item Which Caused the Injury.” In response we, in turn, will concede that we had not specifically answered plaintiffs third point (which is a valid principle of law), but do so now, and our answer is the same again — that plaintiff failed to establish his theory by evidence. Plaintiff does not argue his point as to any proof of a “recurring incident,” as there was none, but he does protest that we misconstrued his point (3) in failing to recognize that plaintiffs real theory of liability was that defendant had been engaged in a “negligent manner of merchandising,” and that he really had not relied on points (1) and (2) of his appellee’s brief. As an assist to the court in now understanding the theory of negligent merchandising, plaintiff has broken down his point into four parts: “(1) the roller-type object belonged to Defendant and was being sold by Defendant.” There was no dispute as to this. “(2) Defendant customarily sold these articles in the very part of the store where the accident occurred.” There was no dispute as to this either. “(3) at the time of the occurrence, Defendant had its merchandise stacked on low platforms in the aisles where the accident occurred.” Nor was there any dispute as to this if we are to attach the ordinary meaning (as we think we should) to the phrase, “stacked on low platforms in the aisles.” See below for further comment. “(4) these very same items were known to be rolling on the floor in the same part of the store on previous occasions.” As to this part of plaintiffs theory, there was a complete failure of proof which we pointed out in our original opinion and will not repeat here. In attacking our conclusion in this regard, plaintiff, in his petition for rehearing, quotes from the record (it was not in the abstract and there was no additional abstract filed) one portion of the testimony of Ann Pishum which was not included in the impeachment cross-examination through reference to her prior deposition, and in which he states that she “testified affirmatively” as follows: “Q. You don’t remember them [sic the roller objects] right on the shelf, right by the area where you found him? A. On the shelf in the cartons.” If this is evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, which proves or tends to prove a “negligent manner of merchandising” we will simply have to confess that we do not understand it to be any such thing. Plaintiffs petition also states that we overlooked part of the cross-examination testimony of David Neesan, an employee of defendant at the time of the occurrence, but later discharged, who was called as a witness by plaintiff. We think we may be excused for having done so because plaintiff did not consider it of sufficient importance to mention in his brief, nor was it abstracted in the form set forth as follows in plaintiffs petition from which we quote: “that the roller-type object was an attachment for vacuum cleaners and that he had seen them there and had handled the stock; that the vacuum cleaners were positioned around the decking back there on the side to where the Plaintiff was and * on that side where he was or across the aisle near the wall — the platform on the bottom. (R. 229) It was also demonstrated that the witness, David Neesan, was present on the day of the occurrence.” Again we demur, and rather think that plaintiff followed the wiser course in omitting this testimony from his argument the first time around. Probably the greatest difficulty which plaintiff has in searching for and arguing the existence of evidence to support his theory is counsel’s imprecise (and, we believe, incorrect) use of the terms “in the aisles” or “on the aisles” in reference to what is claimed to be negligent merchandising. The 20" x 13%" photograph introduced into evidence by plaintiff shows that large containers were displayed on low platforms and that this method of display actually formed the aisles, as there were no counters or tables employed apparently on account of the size of the items placed on sale in that department of the store. If the vacuum cleaners, in or out of cartons were displayed “in the aisles” as plaintiff’s petition would like us to find, there simply would have been no aisles.**  Consider a tiheater usher when he looks at your tickets and says that your seats are “in aisle 2.” Or, with luck he may use plaintiffs other term and advise you that your seats are in the fifth row “on the aisle.” Now, this, we suggest, is the ordinary and accepted use of these words. The usher obviously does not mean in either instance that you are to sit down on the floor of the aisle itself. Or consider a floor walker at Marshall Field’s who tells a prospective customer that she can find diamonds “in” the next aisle. This sort of direction has never, to our knowledge, produced a prospector-type rush to the next aisle in the expectation of scooping up diamonds from the floor of the aisle. Plaintiff, himself, understood this, we believe, in the following brief colloquy on cross-examination: “Q. How close was the merchandise in the aisle to where you were sitting after you said you fell?” (Emphasis added by us.) A. It was right along side of me, sir; right on the platforms and on the — whatever they are, the display cases.” (Emphasis added by counsel for plaintiff.) We remain of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. The original opinions recital of the testimony of Anna Stecyna has been somewhat modified without change in its effect. The petition for rehearing is denied. Opinion modified. Petition for rehearing denied. DRUCKER and LORENZ, JJ., concur.   The record does not include the word “and.” It states “Around that decking back there on the other side to where the man was. I am not certain of this either. On that side where he was or across the aisle by the wall, by the wall — platform on the bottom.”    At the time the photograph was taken there were two large cartons, apparently empty, extending part way into the aisle. There was no evidence that they were there at the time of the occurrence, however, nor is there any claim that they interfered with progress through the aisle or contributed in any way to plaintiff's fall.