Court Opinion

ID: 9384025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 16:08:42.280483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.848443
License: Public Domain

J-A04002-23

                                  2023 PA SUPER 56

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
                                                        OF PENNSYLVANIA
                             Appellee

                        v.

    BEAU REED

                             Appellant                 No. 514 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 8, 2021
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Tioga County
               Criminal Division at No.: CP-59-CR-0000403-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J. and MCCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:                               FILED: MARCH 31, 2023

        Appellant, Beau Reed, appeals from his judgment of sentence of two to

five years’ imprisonment for corruption of minors and two counts of indecent

assault of a complainant less than sixteen years of age.1 Appellant argues

that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by allowing a text message from

Appellant to the minor victim, T.R., into evidence, (2) abused its discretion by

denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial, and (3) erroneously denied

Appellant’s motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. We affirm.

        The evidence adduced during trial demonstrates that Appellant had a

romantic relationship with T.R.’s mother, Tara Ruggles.       T.R. is Ruggles’

daughter from a prior relationship. Ruggles and T.R. moved into Appellant’s

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301 and 3126, respectively.
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residence, and Ruggles gave birth to Appellant’s child. In May 2018, five years

after their relationship began, Ruggles and Appellant became engaged.

      Later, on May 26, 2018, Appellant, Ruggles and T.R., then thirteen years

old, attended a picnic in New York and returned home that night. Appellant

had been drinking beer all day and remained intoxicated. Ruggles rebuffed

Appellant’s sexual advances and went to sleep. Appellant then entered T.R.’s

bedroom, got into her bed, and rubbed her vagina with his finger. He left

T.R.’s room but returned shortly thereafter and touched her in the same

manner as before. The following afternoon, T.R. described the incidents to

Ruggles. Ruggles and T.R. immediately moved out of Appellant’s house and

never lived there again.

      On August 5, 2019, Appellant was arrested and charged with corruption

of minors, indecent assault and aggravated indecent assault.             Multiple

continuances followed which we will delineate below in our discussion of

Appellant’s Rule 600 argument. Prior to trial, Appellant moved to dismiss all

charges under Rule 600, but the court denied the motion.

      On July 29, 2021, the court presided over a one-day jury trial. It does

not appear from the record that any party requested that the court sequester

witnesses or that the court did so on its own. Ruggles testified before the

lunch break, and T.R. testified after the break.

      During   Ruggles’    testimony,    over      Appellant’s   objection,   the

Commonwealth introduced a text message that Appellant sent T.R. and

Ruggles in a group chat several weeks after the assault. The text message

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stated, “[T.R.,] . . . let me apologize to you from the deepest depths of my

heart.” Commonwealth Ex. 1.

      During Ruggles’ testimony, defense counsel elicited her admission that

Appellant accused her of cheating on him around the time that they became

engaged.    N.T., 7/29/21, at 69.   Following the lunch break, T.R. took the

stand.   T.R. testified that during the lunch break, Ruggles told T.R. that

Appellant claimed Ruggles cheated on Appellant at some point. Id. at 108.

T.R. stated that she was not aware until “today” about Appellant’s accusation.

Id.   Appellant moved for a mistrial on the ground that Ruggles and T.R.

discussed Ruggles’ testimony during trial.      The Commonwealth recalled

Ruggles to the stand, and she admitted telling T.R. during the lunch break

about Appellant’s accusation. Id. at 120. Ruggles added that she neither

talked to T.R. about anything else in Ruggles’ testimony nor told T.R. what to

say in her own testimony. Id. at 120-21. The court denied Appellant’s motion

for mistrial.

      In its closing argument, the Commonwealth emphasized that Appellant’s

text message in which he “apologized” for his actions was a confession of guilt

for sexually assaulting T.R. Id. at 143.

      The jury acquitted Appellant of aggravated indecent assault but found

him guilty of corruption of minors and two counts of indecent assault. On

November 8, 2021, the court imposed sentence. Appellant filed timely post-

sentence motions, which the court denied via memorandum and order, and a

timely appeal to this Court. Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and the

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court filed a statement incorporating by reference its memorandum denying

Appellant’s post-sentence motions.

        Appellant raises three issues in this appeal:

        1. Whether the court erred in admitting a text message into
        evidence and allowing the reading of it to the jury?

        2. Whether the court erred in failing to grant a mistrial as a result
        of mother and daughter discussing testimony?

        3. Whether the court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion for
        dismissal pursuant to Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules Of
        Criminal Procedure?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

        The text message from Appellant to T.R. and Ruggles in which Appellant

“apologize[d]” to T.R. was a crucial piece of evidence in the Commonwealth’s

case.      In his first argument on appeal, Appellant argues that the

Commonwealth failed to authenticate the text message. We hold that the trial

court correctly ruled that the Commonwealth authenticated the text message,

and that the court acted within its discretion by admitting the text message

into evidence.

        When we review a trial court’s ruling on admission of evidence,

        decisions on admissibility are within the sound discretion of the
        trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion
        or misapplication of law. In addition, for a ruling on evidence to
        constitute reversible error, it must have been harmful or
        prejudicial to the complaining party. An abuse of discretion is not
        merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the
        law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
        manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,

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      bias[,] or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record,
      discretion is abused.

Commonwealth v. Talley, 236 A.3d 42, 55 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 governs the authentication of

evidence and authentication prior to the admission of electronic evidence.

See Commonwealth v. Murray, 174 A.3d 1147, 1157 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Rule 901(a) provides, “Unless stipulated, to satisfy the requirement of

authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent

claims it is.” Rule 901(b) provides in relevant part:

      The following are examples only—not a complete list—of evidence
      that satisfies the requirement:

                                     .         .   .

      (11) Digital Evidence. To connect digital evidence with a person
      or entity:

            (A) direct evidence such as testimony of a person with
            personal knowledge; or

            (B) circumstantial evidence such as:

            (i) identifying content; or

            (ii) proof of ownership, possession, control, or access
            to a device or account at the relevant time when
            corroborated by circumstances indicating authorship.

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Pa.R.E. 901(b)(11).2 “Digital evidence” includes “text messages.” Comment,

Pa.R.E. 901. “The proponent of digital evidence is not required to prove that

no one else could be the author.               Rather, the proponent must produce

sufficient evidence to support a finding that a particular person or entity was

the author.” Id. “Circumstantial evidence of ownership, possession, control,

or access to a device or account alone is insufficient for authentication [but

such evidence may be enough] in combination with other evidence of the

author’s identity.” Id. Such circumstantial evidence includes, for example,

testimony from the person who sent or received the communication or

contextual clues in the communication tending to reveal the identity of the

sender. Jackson, 283 A.3d at 819.

       Rule 901(b)(11) is consistent with decisions in which Pennsylvania

courts have held that the content of text messages provide circumstantial

evidence that the defendant wrote them. See Commonwealth v. Orr, 255

A.3d 589 (Pa. Super. 2021) (collecting cases); id. at 601 (circumstantial

evidence demonstrating that defendant sent threatening text messages to

murder victim on night of murder and throughout month prior was sufficient

to authenticate text messages in first-degree murder trial; defendant’s

girlfriend purchased and gave defendant cell phone used to send the

____________________________________________

2 Rule 901(b)(11) became effective on October 1, 2020, prior to Appellant’s
trial. Accordingly, it applies to this case. See Commonwealth v. Jackson,
283 A.3d 814, 818 & n.12 (Pa. Super. 2022) (applying Rule 901(b)(11) when
defendant’s trial took place after its effective date).

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messages, phone was found with defendant’s other belongings at time of

arrest, defendant and victim were involved in custody dispute over children,

and content of messages indicated defendant wrote them since multiple

messages focused on custody dispute).

     The Commonwealth’s first witness during trial, State Trooper Evanchick,

testified that in April 2019, the Pennsylvania State Police received a report

that Appellant had sexually abused a thirteen-year-old named T.R.       N.T.,

7/29/21, at 24. On May 7, 2019, Trooper Evanchick interviewed Ruggles. Id.

During the interview, Ruggles brought up a text message on her cell phone

and showed it to the trooper. Id. at 30. Ruggles then sent an email to the

trooper attaching the text message, and the trooper printed a copy of the

message. Id. at 31.

     Ruggles, the next witness, testified that prior to Memorial Day 2018,

she had a five-year relationship with Appellant, and they had become engaged

at the beginning of May 2018. Id. at 40. Appellant and Ruggles had a son

together, “J.”   Ruggles and Appellant lived together with T.R., J. and

Appellant’s mother.   Id. at 41-42.    Ruggles testified that Appellant drank

heavily and was intoxicated “too many times” for Ruggles to count. Id. at 45.

     On Saturday of Memorial Day weekend, Appellant and Ruggles attended

a picnic with T.R. and J.   They returned home that night.     Appellant was

intoxicated and attempted to have intercourse with Ruggles, but she rebuffed

his advances and went to sleep. Id. at 45-46. On Sunday, T.R. told Ruggles

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that Appellant had assaulted her the previous night. Id. at 48-49. Ruggles

and T.R. immediately moved out of Appellant’s house. Id. at 49-50. Ruggles’

son remained with Appellant part-time, so Ruggles continued to communicate

with Appellant concerning their son. Id. at 50.3

       Ruggles testified that Appellant sent her and T.R. a text message. Id.

at 51-52. Ruggles knew that the text message was from Appellant “because

it’s a group chat and one picture is a picture of my daughter and the other

picture is a picture that I put as [Appellant’s] profile picture - and if I had

glasses, or could see, I could tell you what it says.”    Id. at 52.   Ruggles

testified:

       Q: Okay, so you know that to be his profile picture?

       A: Yes.

       Q: Because you made chat profile picture?

       A: I put it there, yes.

       Q: And, I’m assuming, prior to this - you were in a relationship
       with him - you probably sent other messages to and from?

       A: Correct.

       Q: Was that profile picture always visible when he sent you a
       message?

       A: Yes. It wasn’t always the same, the same picture. But after
       we split up, that was the profile picture I put there.

____________________________________________

3See also id. at 69 (Ruggles continued to communicate with Appellant until
April 2019 because “we had a child in common”).

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      Q: Okay. So, is that because - why would you have changed that,
      I guess?

      A: Because it talks about reacting to people who are trying to push
      your buttons.

      Q: Okay.

      A: And that no reaction is the best reaction.

Id. The prosecutor inquired whether anyone else would have known about

the details in the text message. Ruggles shook her head no. Id. at 53. She

then testified:

      Q: Why would nobody else have known that?

      A: Because it . . . was shortly after, and we didn’t talk about it.
      My daughter [T.R.] didn’t. She didn’t want to talk about it, so we
      didn’t. I mean we didn’t talk about it to anybody.

      Q: Okay, so you hadn’t told anyone? There’s no way anyone else
      would have known that information that’s within that message?

      A: Correct.

Id. at 53.

      Defense counsel objected to admission of the text message on the

ground that it lacked proper authentication. The court overruled the objection

and admitted it into evidence.

      The text message was dated, “Mon, Jun 18,” and it stated:

      [T.R.], let me start by thanking you! You brought so much joy in
      my life and I will never forget the memories we have. Now let me
      apologize to you from the deepest depths of my heart... I put you
      through things that no child should ever be put through! Although
      we all know I was thinking it was your mother, that is no excuse
      and your mother is 1000% right for getting out... and—never ever
      think that the hard times we are all going through right now is in

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      anyway your fault... never!!! I feel it’s better for your brother if
      me and your brother if me and your mother cut all ties and never
      speak again. So sadly this is a good bye to you also. I have loved
      you since the first time you came to Blossburg and I will never
      stop loving you, I know your going to do great things in life and I
      wish you all the best, you truly are an amazing young woman and
      I’m a better man for knowing you... I love you always.

      And I’m sorry I said those things about your dad in front of you!!
      I’m sure he’s a great guy, he seemed it the two times I met him.
      Please forgive me for that!

Commonwealth Ex. 1.

      T.R. testified after the court admitted the text message into evidence,

and she stated that Appellant apologized to her twice after the assault. One

apology was in person when Appellant took T.R. shopping. While stopped at

a red light, he “apologiz[ed] for everything that he put us through, and put

me through.” N.T., 7/29/21, at 96. The other apology was in “a group text

that I was a part of, and he addressed the text to me apologizing, saying that

I shouldn’t have gone through that and all that nonsense.” Id. at 97.

      Friction between Appellant and Ruggles continued after their separation.

In April 2019, Appellant filed a report with Child Protective Services (“CPS”)

in New York alleging that Ruggles physically abused J. N.T., 7/29/21, at 64.

Following Appellant’s complaint to CPS, Ruggles reported Appellant’s assault

on T.R. to the Pennsylvania State Police. Id.

      Contextual clues in the text message, in conjunction with Ruggles’ and

T.R.’s testimony, provide ample evidence to authenticate the text message as

a communication from Appellant under Rule 901(b)(11)(B)(ii).          The text

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message came from a device that Appellant possessed and controlled, since

the profile picture that Ruggles created for Appellant’s text messages

appeared at the top of the message. Ruggles testified that the profile picture

was uniquely suited to Appellant, because the words in the profile picture

referred to “reacting to people who are trying to push your buttons,” an

allusion to their turbulent relationship. Both Ruggles and T.R. testified that

they received the text message during a group chat with Appellant. The words

in the text message (“Now let me apologize to you from the deepest depths

of my heart... I put you through things that no child should ever be put

through!”) were similar to Appellant’s words in person to T.R. while they were

shopping (Appellant “apologiz[ed] for everything that he put us through, and

put me through”).4 The message mentions a series of family issues, including

(1) the fact that Ruggles “[got] out” of the relationship, (2) the “hard times

we are all going through right now,” (3) the presence of a “brother” in the

family (Appellant’s and Ruggles’ young son and T.R.’s half-brother), (4) the

suggestion that Appellant and Ruggles “cut all ties and never speak again,”

(5) Appellant’s love for T.R., (6) Appellant’s negative remarks about T.R.’s

father, (6) the fact that Appellant met T.R.’s father twice, and finally, (7)

Appellant’s statement that “[I] apologize to you from the deepest depths of

____________________________________________

4 Although the Commonwealth did not mention this detail in its brief, we may
affirm the trial court’s decision on any basis that is supported by the record.
In Re A.J.R.-H, 188 A.3d 1157, 1175-76 (Pa. 2018).

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my heart... I put you through things that no child should ever be put through.”

Appellant is the person most likely to have authored a message to Ruggles

and T.R. that mentioned this combination of sensitive issues. Indeed, it is

unlikely that anyone other than Appellant, Ruggles and T.R. would have known

about this array of issues, because T.R. did not want to talk about the incident

with Appellant, and Ruggles and T.R. did not discuss it with anybody. The

date of the message, “Mon, Jun 18,” is noteworthy as well. The most recent

year in which June 18th fell on a Monday was 2018,5 and June 18, 2018 fell

several weeks after the events referenced in the text message. An apologetic

text message on this date fits logically within the chronology of this case. 6

Viewed collectively, this evidence demonstrates that the trial court properly

overruled Appellant’s objection to the authenticity of the text message.

        In his second argument, Appellant contends that the trial court abused

its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial due to the conversation that

Ruggles had with T.R. during the lunch break before T.R.’s testimony in the

one-day trial. The trial court properly denied this motion on the ground that

Appellant suffered no prejudice.

        A motion for mistrial

        is within the discretion of the trial court. A mistrial upon motion
        of one of the parties is required only when an incident is of such
        nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the appellant of a
____________________________________________

5   2012 is the only other year after 2010 in which June 18th fell on a Monday.

6   See n.4, supra.

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        fair and impartial trial. It is within the trial court’s discretion to
        determine whether a defendant was prejudiced by the incident
        that is the basis of a motion for mistrial.

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 834 A.2d 619, 623 (Pa. Super. 2003).                     “A

mistrial is an extreme remedy only warranted when the prejudice to the

movant cannot be ameliorated to ensure a fair trial.”         Commonwealth v.

Risoldi, 238 A.3d 434, 458 (Pa. Super. 2020).

        The trial court reasoned that Ruggles’ conversation with T.R. at the

lunch break did not prejudice Appellant:

        [I]t is undisputed that [] Ruggles made a statement to her
        daughter while they ate lunch together over the lunch recess—
        which occurred after [] Ruggles testified but prior to her
        daughter’s testimony—that the defense claimed that at some
        point in time she cheated on [Appellant]. [] Ruggles admitted to
        making the statement. Yet, [] Ruggles was unequivocal in that
        she neither talked to her daughter about anything else in her
        testimony nor talked to her daughter about what to testify to.
        Moreover, [] Ruggles testified she was not present in the
        courtroom when her daughter testified and had no idea what she
        testified to.

Trial Court Memorandum Denying Post-Sentence Motions, 3/4/22, at 6. It

was within the trial court’s discretion to reach this conclusion.       Although it

does not appear any order of sequestration was in effect pursuant to Pa.R.E.

615,7 the fact that Ruggles discussed her testimony with T.R. before T.R.

____________________________________________

7   Pa.R.E. 615, regarding sequestering witnesses, provides:

        At a party’s request the court may order witnesses sequestered
        so that they cannot learn of other witnesses’ testimony. Or the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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testified necessarily raised an issue of prejudice. Nevertheless, the subject of

the discussion, Ruggles’ alleged cheating, was not central to this case, and

there was no evidence that Ruggles discussed anything more important with

T.R. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that Ruggles’ mention of

the cheating issue to T.R. before T.R.’s testimony did not deprive Appellant of

a fair trial.

       It must be noted that Appellant conceded in his post-sentence motions

that the issue of whether Ruggles cheated on Appellant was not critical to his

innocence or guilt. Trial Ct. Mem. at 7. Appellant insisted, however, the fact

that Ruggles told T.R. about this issue during trial “demonstrated [Ruggles’]

desire to see Appellant convicted.” Id. (citing Appellant’s Brief In Support Of

Post-Sentence Motions at 11).8 The trial court disagreed, stating:

____________________________________________

       court may do so on its own. But this rule does not authorize
       sequestering:

        (a) a party who is a natural person;

        (b) an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural
       person (including the Commonwealth) after being designated as
       the party’s representative by its attorney;

        (c) a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to
       presenting the party’s claim or defense; or

        (d) a person authorized by statute or rule to be present.

The rule is discretionary, not mandatory. See Comment to Pa.R.E. 615.

8 Appellant makes the same argument in the same words in this Court.
Appellant’s Brief at 16.

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      The [trial court] disagrees with [Appellant]’s statement the
      incident “demonstrates [Ruggles’] desire to see the [Appellant]
      convicted.” The Court determines that position to be too big a
      leap of logic. Moreover, the argument is conclusory in that there
      is no support in either counsel’s brief or the record to substantiate
      defense counsel’s position. If, for example, [Ruggles] desired to
      see [Appellant] convicted, she would have discussed testimony
      with her daughter about the incident in the bedroom rather than
      about a peripher[al] issue. However, [] Ruggles testified, under
      oath, that she did not discuss anything else from her testimony
      nor tell her daughter how she should testify. Although [Appellant]
      does not argue the incident to be a negative against [] Ruggles’
      credibility, the jury already had occasion to assess [] Ruggles’
      credibility since the incident happened after she testified.
      Furthermore, the jury would have been able to factor this
      peripher[al] issue into its reassessment of [] Ruggles’ credibility
      since the information came to light in their presence through the
      victim’s testimony.

Id. The court found that the incident during the lunch break was at most

“harmless error.” Id. We agree with the trial court’s perceptive analysis that

the matter was peripheral.     Indeed, Appellant implicitly concedes that the

issue was peripheral by admitting that it was not critical to his guilt or

innocence.

      Finally, Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion by denying

his motion to dismiss under Rule 600. We disagree.

      When presented with a speedy trial claim arising under Pennsylvania

Rule of Criminal Procedure 600, our standard of review is well settled.

      In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a trial
      court's decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
      Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
      facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
      and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
      error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
      overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly

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     unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will,
     as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

     The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record
     of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the
     [trial] court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light
     most favorable to the prevailing party.

     Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court is
     not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. Rule
     [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection
     of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of
     society. In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy
     trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's
     right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain
     those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.
     However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not
     designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith
     prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

     So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
     Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial
     rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner
     consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime. In
     considering [these] matters ..., courts must carefully factor into
     the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual
     accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law
     enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Bethea, 185 A.3d 364, 370 (Pa. Super. 2018). The

Commonwealth bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence,

that it acted with due diligence throughout the proceedings. Commonwealth

v. Kearse, 890 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa. Super. 2005).

     Rule 600 provides that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written

complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from

the date on which the complaint is filed.”      Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a).      In

computing the Rule 600 deadline, however, we do not necessarily count all

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time following the filing of the complaint. Rather, “periods of delay at any

stage    of   the   proceedings   caused   by   the   Commonwealth    when    the

Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the

computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods

of delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

Rule 600 expressly excludes from computation periods of delay resulting from

“any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the defendant’s

attorney.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(3)(b). Continuances based on joint requests

by the Commonwealth and the defendant are excludable time under this rule.

Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

        The Rule 600 analysis entails three steps:

        First, Rule 600(A) provides the mechanical run date. Second, we
        determine whether any excludable time exists pursuant to Rule
        600(C). We add the amount of excludable time, if any, to the
        mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date.

        If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply the
        due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600([D]). As we have
        explained, Rule 600[] encompasses a wide variety of
        circumstances under which a period of delay was outside the
        control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the
        Commonwealth's lack of diligence. Any such period of delay
        results in an extension of the run date. Addition of any Rule 600[]
        extensions to the adjusted run date produces the final Rule 600
        run date. If the Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to
        trial on or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss
        the charges.

Commonwealth v. Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 956–57 (Pa. Super. 2017).

        Here, the complaint was filed on August 5, 2019, and trial took place

725 days later, on July 29, 2021. The court calculated the adjusted run date

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as September 4, 2021, Appellant’s Brief at 16, and determined that 311 of

these days were chargeable to the Commonwealth and 414 were chargeable

against Appellant.

       The only time period discussed in Appellant’s brief is the continuance

from the scheduled trial date of August 12, 2020 to the scheduled date of

December 9, 2020. Id. The court held that this time was chargeable against

Appellant because the Commonwealth and defense counsel filed a joint

request for a continuance on August 10, 2020. Trial Court Memorandum

Denying Post-Sentence Motions, 3/4/22, at 12.         Appellant argues that he

himself objected to this continuance and demanded that the case proceed

immediately to trial. Therefore, Appellant was not bound by his attorney’s

consent to a continuance, and the time period between August 10 and

December 9 was chargeable to the Commonwealth. As a result, Appellant

concludes, the Commonwealth violated Rule 600 because it was responsible

for more than 365 days of delay.

       Based on our review of the record, we disagree with Appellant. During

a pretrial hearing on August 10, 2020, defense counsel advised:

       [t]hey brought [Appellant] down - he was scheduled for guilty
       pleas, but we’re not going to enter any guilty pleas today. And
       it’s got to the point where I can’t properly represent him. We can’t
       agree on the best way to proceed. I can no longer represent him
       effectively, and I filed a petition to withdraw.9
____________________________________________

9 Subsequently, defense counsel withdrew his appearance, and a different
attorney represented Appellant at trial than the attorney who represented him
on August 10, 2020.

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N.T., 8/10/20, at 1. Appellant stated that he objected to counsel’s withdrawal

from the case, and he insisted that he was ready to proceed to trial

immediately. Id. at 2. Counsel responded that “[because] of the possible

plea agreements we were trying to reach, I have not subpoenaed an

appropriate number of witnesses to proceed on Wednesday [August 12].” Id.

at 5. The Commonwealth stated that “my victim [presumably T.R.] is either

in or on the way back from the state of Florida . . . so we can’t have her in

here [for trial] anyway [because] she’d need to quarantine.” Id. Both counsel

requested leave to file a motion for continuance, and the court said that they

were welcome to submit it. Id. at 7.

      Later that day, the Commonwealth and defense counsel filed a joint

request for a continuance.     The Commonwealth stated that it needed a

continuance because its juvenile witness needed to be in COVID-related

quarantine for fourteen days because she had traveled to several southern

states. Motion For Continuance, 8/10/20, at ¶ 3. Defense counsel stated that

he needed a continuance because he “[did] not feel he can effectively

represent [Appellant] at trial.” Id. at ¶ 4.

      The continuance from August 12 to December 9 is chargeable against

Appellant on two grounds: the continuance was requested by defense counsel,

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(3)(b), and it was a joint request for a continuance with

the Commonwealth, Hunt, 858 A.2d at 1243. The trial court acted within its

discretion by granting a continuance to the Commonwealth and defense

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counsel, since T.R. was unavailable for trial due to COVID quarantine

requirements, and since it appears that a breakdown had taken place in

defense counsel’s relationship with Appellant that impaired the effectiveness

of counsel’s representation.    Under these circumstances, the fact that

Appellant insisted he was ready for trial does not cast doubt on the court’s

decision.

      For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2023

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