Court Opinion

ID: 9628999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:35:38.352683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:14.164896
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to point out that under other circumstances, this matter should be remanded to the Board to consider the effect of Wakkary, Lolong, and Sael — all decided since the Board dealt with the present case. This remand would enable the Board to consider Halim’s evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution against similarly situated individuals (disfavored group evidence) in relation to his individualized risk of persecution. Such a remand would be futile here, however, in light of the IJ’s finding that Halim’s testimony lacked credibility, leaving no basis for evidentiary analysis.
The majority refers to a “prima facie showing” to demonstrate entitlement to a remand to allow the Board to consider a disfavored group analysis. But I would emphasize the role of the Board, rather than our role, in pursuing the proper analysis. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186-87, 126 S.Ct. 1613, 164 L.Ed.2d 358 (2006); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16, 123 S.Ct. 353; Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that the court cannot affirm the Board on a ground it did not articulate). Where, as here, remand would be futile because there is no credible evidence that could support findings that the petitioner faced an individualized risk of future persecution, we need not remand even though more recent caselaw has clarified the weight of pattern or practice evidence. I therefore join the majority opinion and would deny the petition for review.