Court Opinion

ID: 9598238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:07:01.019944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:19.927377
License: Public Domain

Judge JONES,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the judgment because I believe that, based on the advisement given him pursuant to People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo.1984), defendant here cannot have made a knowing and .intelligent decision concerning his right to testify. Furthermore, upon a reflection on People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 783 (Colo.1999), and on the circumstances here, I believe we can determine as a matter of law that the deficiencies in the advisement necessarily affected “the validity of.. .defendant’s waiver.”
I agree with defendant’s contention that thé trial court erred in failing to advise him adequately that his prior felony conviction could be considered only for purposes of impeachment of his credibility and that the jury would be instructed to consider the pri- or conviction only for impeachment purposes.
To relinquish effectively the fundamental right to testify, a defendant must be fully aware of that right, must know the consequences of testifying, must be cognizant that only he or she can'make the ultimate determination whether to testify, notwithstanding the advice of counsel, must understand that upon testifying the prosecution will be allowed to cross examine and thát, if he or she has been convicted previously of a felony, the prosecutor will be allowed to ask about it and disclose such to the jury, and “that if the felony is disclosed to the jury then the jury can be instructed to consider it only as it bears upon his or her credibility.” People v. Curtis, supra, 681 P.2d at 514.
Although the court must include all of the Curtis elements, a precise litany for the advisement is not required. People v. Chavez, 853 P.2d 1149 (Colo.1993). Nevertheless, examination of Colorado Trial Judges Criminal Trial Benchbook § 1.12.11 (1998), or People v. Curtis, supra, 681 P.2d at 514, is always well advised for a reminder of how a short, non-technical, and correct advisement can be given. As to the Curtis advisement, trial judges should consider it their duty, to eliminate any speculation on the defendant’s part as to the consequences of a decision to testify. People v. Milton, 864 P.2d 1097-(Colo. *371993). It is to be noted that, in People v. Bleh/m, supra, the supreme court has reaffirmed the Curtis advisement and the importance of advising correctly as to each element thereof.
If an advisement of the right to testify fails to inform a defendant that evidence of prior felonies can be admitted only for limited purposes of impeaching his or her credibility, it is necessarily incomplete. In the face of such an inadequate advisement, a defendant’s waiver of the right to testify, even if voluntary, cannot be knowing and intelligent. People v. Chavez, supra.
Here, after reminding defendant that the decision to testify was entirely his own, the court advised as follows:
[I]f you choose to testify, you must understand that you will be cross-examined by the District Attorney and not just answer your own attorney’s questions. You have the same protection as any others (sic) witness; that is, to be only asked questions that relate to the issues on trial. You must understand if you testify, one thing that then comes into a trial is whether the jury chooses to believe you or not. The law says that one thing that can be presented to a jury is prior felony convictions and what that conviction was for. On the other hand, if you don’t testify, you’re believable, so it can’t be presented to the jury.
Now, we all know that you do have a prior felony conviction, but the jury is not going to find out about that unless you testify. If you don’t want the jury to find out about the other conviction, you can’t testify. Because if you do testify, they are going to find out about it. On the other hand, if there is something you want the jury to know and nobody else testifies about it, and you don’t testify; doesn’t exist as far as the jury is concerned. Because I just got through telling the jury they are suppose to consider what has been presented to them during the trial. So doesn’t get presented by somebody, you don’t testify, doesn’t exist as far as they’re concerned.
So you have to make a tactical choice ... whether you need to testify or not.
On the other hand, I have already told you that I will tell them again, if you choose not to testify, they will be instructed not to hold that against you; something we assume they will abide by the oath and other instructions that I give them. So if you choose not to testify, they will be told not to allow that to prejudice you. On the other hand if you don’t testify and there’s something you want to tell them, they’re not going to hear about that either. So as a tactical evaluation, you need to make (sic) of whether you need to testify or whether you don’t.
The advisement given simply cannot be considered to have eliminated speculation about the consequences of testifying. Indeed, it may impart incorrect information; but even if not, it could certainly be confusing to most defendants. To say, for instance, that, “The law says that one thing that can be presented to a jury is a prior felony conviction and what it is for,” without specific reference at that point in the advisement to the limited purpose for which such evidence can be considered, is to leave the real impression that it can be used for any purpose. To follow up the above referenced segment by stating, “On the other hand, if you don’t testify, you’re believable, so it can’t be presented to the jury,” could very well lead a defendant to believe that the jury would believe him or her to be innocent, per se, by not testifying, and therefore, that to testify means allowing a jury to consider for all purposes a prior conviction, that could tag him or her as guilty on this charge.
Likewise, the statement, “If you don’t want the jury to find out about the other conviction, you can’t testify. Because if you do testify, they are going to find out about it,” with no reference to any limited purpose for which such evidence can be considered, and taken with rest of the advisement, leads to the conclusion that it can be considered for any purpose, including guilt. In addition, reference to “limited purpose,” “impeachment,” and “credibility” does not appear in the advisement. Nor are there any euphemisms that could be interpreted to mean those concepts. Furthermore, the advisement fails to mention that the jurors will be *38instructed of the limited purpose' for which they could consider the prior conviction.
Here, as in People v. Milton, supra, the defendant’s convictions should be reversed because the trial court failed, inter alia, to advise him of.the limited purpose for which felony convictions could be used, and that the jury would be instructed of those limited purposes. Thus, defendant was likely left with impression that the jury could consider the evidence of the prior conviction as propensity evidence rather than as evidence relating to the defendant’s credibility. See People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d 1362 (Colo.1981). This could reasonably have caused him to waive his right to testify where he would not otherwise have done so. Thus his waiver could not be valid. See People v. Blehm, supra.
The advisement here does not contain the information, clarity, and specific mention- of critical concepts that helped the Curtis advisements in People v. Gray, 920 P.2d 787 (Colo.1996) and People v. Deskins, 927 P.2d 368 (Colo.1996) to pass muster.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments and remand this cause for a new trial at which a proper Curtis advisement could be given so as to implicate a valid waiver if such is the defendant’s choice. For purposes of such retrial,' I concur with Part I of the majority opinion.