Court Opinion

ID: 9710134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:02:54.159401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.493337
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring and dissenting opinion.
I agree with the majority that a settlement offer made on the record before the trial court is the functional equivalent of a written offer for purposes of Rule 238 and that delay damages should have been awarded for the period between June 3, 1992 (settlement offer), and June 9, 1992 (jury verdict). I must dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that delay damages are not tolled while post-trial motions are pending after a jury’s verdict in favor of the defendant.
The majority attempts to distinguish cases in which an appeal is pending after a final judgment from this case because it involves a motion for a new trial. The majority reasons that the outcome of the case remains “reasonably in doubt” until the trial court disposes of post-trial motions. I disagree. In most instances post-trial motions are merely pro forma. I dare say more often than not, the post-trial motions are denied. Rule 238 is designed to encourage defendants to settle meritorious claims as soon as practicable. When a jury has returned a verdict in favor of a defendant, there is little or no incentive for the defendant to seriously consider settlement at that point. The defendant need no longer weigh the chances for a successful defense against the plaintiffs claim when a jury has already found that the plaintiffs claim has no merit.
The majority places great emphasis on the fact that a final judgment is entered before an appeal is taken to the appellate court. While it is true that a trial court may entertain post-trial motions and enter an order granting a new trial or judgment n.o.v., the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading *26the court that such an order is appropriate. From a practical standpoint, a defendant who must assess the chances that a plaintiff will be successful on post-trial motions is in no different a position than one who makes that assessment while the case is pending on the plaintiffs appeal from the trial court. In both situations, the defendant has successfully persuaded the factfinder that the plaintiffs claim is not meritorious. Whether the verdict is ultimately upheld after it is rendered, either on post-trial motions or on appeal to an appellate court, is of no moment in considering whether Rule 238 serves its purpose after a successful defense verdict.
It is illogical to say that Rule 238 serves as an incentive to settlement negotiations when the defendant has won the trial. I agree with the Superior Court that the reasoning underlying the proposition that a verdict winner is entitled to rely on the judgment during the appeal period is equally applicable to this case. As the court observed,
... the [defendants] were entitled to rely on their favorable verdict until such time as the trial court granted [the plaintiff] a new trial. It was only at that point that [defendants] were again exposed to possible liability.
Arthur v. Kuchar, 441 Pa.Super. 250, 256, 657 A.2d 496, 499 (1995). As to this issue, then, I must dissent from the majority opinion.
CASTILLE, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.