Court Opinion

ID: 9420344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:54:03.557772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:24.258335
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in part.
The Court recognizes that central to determining the' effect of the Alien Property Custodian’s freezing and vesting orders is the effect under New York law of petitioner’s appointment as temporary receiver on June 13,. Í941. It observes that “The precise issue of state law involved, i. e., whether the temporary receiver under § 977-b of the New York Civil Practice Act- is vested with title by virtue of his appointment, is one which has not been *494decided by the New York courts.” And it concedes that the language of the relevant New York statutes “is easily susceptible of varying interpretations.” Yet.it puts its own interpretation on those statutes though that inter-pretation may be displaced tomorrow by the only courts which have power to render an authoritative interpretation of New York la^ — the courts of the State of New York.
In other eases that have come before us in which decision of a federal issue or the necessity for its decision depended on a seriously doubtful question of State law, we have directed that application should first be made to the courts of the State for final disposition of the State question. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478; Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168; Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101; A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582. In eacR of these cases the discretion of a federal court of equity could practicably be exercised in a way which retained ultimate jurisdiction of the case while permitting adjudication of the State question in the State courts. In each there were available State procedures capable of providing a prompt decision, and the litigation had not already consumed such an unconscionable amount of time as to make recourse to them inexpedient. Cf. Public Utilities Comm’n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U. S. 456. The present case meets all those conditions, see N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 473, and should receive the same dispesition.
It is true that in all but one of these cases recourse to the. State courts also served the purpose of avoiding what might have proved to be unnecessary decision of a constitutional issue. But see Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478. Even more fundamental, however, was recognition of the importance of maintain*495ing harmonious relations between parallel systems of State and federal courts in • a situation where, because State iaw controlled, the State courts had the last word and so a federal court at. best could make only an informed guess. That this was a dominant consideration in the mind of the- Court appears plainly in the language of its opinions. The following passages are illustrative:
1. “The last word on the meaning of Article 6445 of-the Texas Civil Statutes, and therefore the last word on the statutory authority of the Railroad Commission in this case, belongs neither to us nor to the district court but to the supreme court of Texas. In tips situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication. . . . The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. . . .
“Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of need-' less friction with state policies, whether the policy relates to the enforcement of the criminal law, Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240; Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89; or the administration of a specialized scheme for liquidating embarrassed business enterprises, Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176; or the final authority of a state court to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state, Gilchrist v. Interborough Co., 279 U. S. 159; cf. Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61. These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts, ‘exercising a wise discretion,’ restrain their authority because of ‘scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments’ and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary. See Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453, 457; Di Gio*496vanni v. Camden Ins. Assn., 296 U. S. 64, 73.” Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 499-501.
2. “We are of the opinion that the procedure which we followed in the Pullman case should be followed here. Illinois has the final say as to the meaning of the ordinance in question. It also has the final word on the alleged conflict between the ordinance and the state Act: The determination which the District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals, or we, might make could not be anything more than a forecast — a prediction as to the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois. ... As we said in the Pullman case, 'The resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a tentative decision’ and any ‘needless friction with state policies.’ . . . It is an exercise of a 'sound discretion, which guides the determination of courts .of equity.’ Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., [312 U. S. 45, 50]. In this case, that discretion calls for a remission of the parties to the state courts, which alone can give a definitive answer to the major questions posed. Plainly, they constitute the more appropriate forum for the trial of those issues. See 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1379. Considerations of delay, inconvenience, and cost to the parties, which have been urged upon us, do not call for a different result. For' we are here concerned with the much larger issue as to the appropriate relationship between federal and state authorities functioning as a harmonious whole.” Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168, 171-73.
3. “. . - . if, as the District Court thought, this Florida law is not self-executing, suits seeking to raise- the due process question or any other 'constitutional question would be premature until Florida supplied sanctions for its enforcement. A decision today on the merits might, therefore, amount to no more than an advisory opinion. . . . The resources of equity are not inadequate *497to deal with the problem so as .to avoid unnecessary friction with state policies, while selective cases go forward in the state courts for ah orderly and expeditious adjudication of the state law questions.” A. F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 598-99.
So here, though no constitutional issue is present, regard for the respective orbits of State and federal tribunals is the best of reasons, as a matter of judicial administration, for requiring a definitive adjudication by the New York courts rather than proceeding on the basis of our own tentative guess as to the meaning of the New York statutes. That federal issues may remain is no justification for refusing to submit to the New York courts a separable issue of New York law. We have no occasion to assume that they will go on to decide these federal questions when a federal court has expressly retained jurisdiction to decide them. Cf. Federal Power Comm’n v. Pacific Power & L. Co., 307 U. S. 156, 160.
We should remand the case to the District Court with instructions to retain jurisdiction pending submission to the courts of New York by appropriate procéedings of the question whether title to AKM’s claim against ASCAP passed to petitioner upon his appointment as temporary receiver.