Court Opinion

ID: 9664918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:33:59.637209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:11.118645
License: Public Domain

SUE WALKER, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s deadly weapon finding, I respectfully dissent. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the deadly weapon finding, a rational trier of fact could have found that Appellant Christopher Fitzgerald Stewart used a deadly weapon. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). Giving full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts, the evidence establishes that Stewart entered Lilliana Cervantes’s sister’s home, surprised Lilliana, took her into a bedroom and put a pillow case over her head, grabbed her hand “very tight,” and immediately forced her to the kitchen where she peeked out of the pillow case hood and observed Stewart locate and pick up a serrated steak knife. See Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (noting that an appellate court considers reasonable inferences from the evidence when conducting a legal sufficiency review); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). A photograph of the knife was introduced into evidence. After arming himself with this knife, Stewart forced Lilliana to accompany him through the home as he selected items to steal.
A deadly weapon question was submitted to the jury pursuant to article 42.12, section 3(g) of the code of criminal procedure. See Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. *6642.12, § 3g(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.2005). Thus, the jury was asked whether it found that “Stewart, during the commission of the offense or during the immediate flight following the commission of the offense, used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife, that in the manner of its use or intended use was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury,” and the jury answered affirmatively. The majority concludes that legally insufficient evidence exists for a reasonable juror to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the knife’s manner of use or intended use was to cause serious bodily injury or death.1
Regarding the first question — whether the knife was a deadly weapon — as the majority points out, a knife is not a deadly weapon per se, and as such, the jury was instructed that a deadly weapon is “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (defining a deadly weapon). The court of criminal appeals has held that “an object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (emphasis added) (holding that “the mere carrying of a butcher knife during such a violent attack ... was legally sufficient to show that the butcher knife was a deadly weapon”). Factors to consider in determining whether the knife was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury include (1) the size, shape, and sharpness of the knife; (2) the manner in which the appellant used the weapon; (3) the nature or existence of inflicted wounds; (4) testimony of the knife’s life-threatening capabilities; (5) the physical proximity between the victim and the knife; and (6) the words spoken by the appellant. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 821 S.W.2d 616, 619-20 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Tisdale v. State, 686 S.W.2d 110, 115 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (op. on reh’g); Williams v. State, 575 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Garcia v. State, 17 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd); see also Cossey v. State, No. 02-05-00032-CR, 2006 WL 59507, at *3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Jan. 12, 2006, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
Regarding the second question — whether the appellant “used or exhibited” a deadly weapon during the criminal transaction the phrase — “used ... a deadly weapon” during the commission of the offense means only that the deadly weapon was employed or utilized in order to achieve its purpose. Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2); Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). This statutory language encompasses or extends to any employment of a deadly weapon, even its simple possession, if such possession facilitates the associated felony. Patterson, 769 S.W.2d at 941. Thus, one can “use” a deadly weapon without exhibiting it. Id.
Here, Lilliana’s testimony and the photograph of the knife supply the only evidence of the knife’s physical characteristics and of how Stewart used the knife. The photograph of the knife shows that it was a serrated steak knife. Lilliana testified that after Stewart gained physical control over her and covered her eyes with a pillowcase, Stewart directed her to the kitchen. Once in the kitchen, he obtained a knife. Lilliana testified that Stewart grabbed her very tightly and proceeded to take her through the house. Lilliana is from Mexico and does not speak English, *67yet she testified that Stewart was mad, that he said “shut up,” and that he repeatedly demanded money. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that the knife was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in its manner of use or intended use. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B); McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503.
Additionally, the jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Stewart went to the kitchen first for the exact purpose of obtaining a knife, that he wanted a knife in his hand to facilitate the offense of stealing items, and that the knife was used by Stewart during the offense to ensure Lilli-ana’s cooperation. The fact that Lilliana cooperated and thereby averted any need by Stewart to overtly threaten her or to cut her does not lessen his “use” of the knife to ensure his success in stealing the items he desired. See McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503. Although Stewart did not exhibit the deadly weapon, he did use it.
Under a proper application of the legal sufficiency standard of review, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s deadly weapon finding. Accordingly, I dissent.

. The majority concedes that evidence exists that the steak knife was capable of causing serious bodily injury or death, but not that it was capable of causing such injury or death in the manner of its use or intended use.