Court Opinion

ID: 9792168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:24:20.589655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.884340
License: Public Domain

OP ALA, Justice,
with whom KAUGER, Chief Justice, and WILSON, Justice, join, concurring.
¶ 1 The court holds today that loss by theft covered in a homeowners/renters’ insurance policy is subject to the two-year limitation prescribed for casualty insurance policies,1 rather than to a one-year period for fire insurance policies.2 I concur in the court’s view that saves this insured-loss claim from the bar of the shorter limitation period. While I opt for the solution crafted by the court in this case, I write separately to reiterate my long-held position that discrete legislative enactments which address limitations for less than all categories of insured-loss claims are “special acts” in violation of Art. 5, § 46, Okl.Const.3 Each of these enactments indiscriminately attempts to sever some type of loss category from the time bar generally applicable to breach-of-contract litigation.4 I cannot consider any of these separated limitations as free from constitutional taint. None has been fitted into the framework of a single comprehensive and structured class.
¶ 2 Were I writing today for the court, I would (a) hold that all shorter-than-contractual time bars for actions to recover loss insured by a written policy are constitutionally impermissible as fatally underinclusive, (b) declare that recovery of losses insured by a policy in writing is governed by the general limitations in 12 O.S.1991 § 95(1),5 and (c) invite the legislature to revisit all separately enacted time bars that govern insured-loss recovery for their incorporation into a single comprehensive class with permissible subclasses. This would take discrete provisions out of the several special acts and place them beyond the risk of fundamental-law infirmity. Because my pronouncement would have an adverse effect on the insurance industry and on the affected regulatory measures, I would hold that, except only for the case before us, the court’s opinion would apply to claims that shall accrue after 12:01 AM., November 1, 1999.
I
THE TERMS OF ART. 5, § 46, OKL. CONST.6, PROHIBIT THE LEGISLATURE FROM REGULATING LIMITATIONS BY SPECIAL ACTS
¶ 3 The parties argue both in this as well as in the federal court that the one-year limitation period the insurer invokes is constitutionally infirm and may not be applied to *648a loss under the policy’s theft coverage.7
¶4 The strictures of Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const., prohibit the legislature from regulating limitations by special or local law. A special act is one that deals with a subject already covered by general law and gives that subject a treatment different from that accorded by general law.8 A statute offends the § 46, mandated statewide uniformity of limitations9 when it “targets for different treatment less than an entire class of similarly situated persons or things.”10
¶ 5 To comply with the § 46 strictures, it is incumbent upon the legislature to (a) declare that litigation for recovery of insured losses constitutes a category separate from the general rubric of actions on written contracts and (b) bring these losses under one limitation or divide them into some discrete subclasses that would pass constitutional muster based on identified distinguishing characteristics which may be viewed as legally cognizable.11
¶ 6 State law which, mthout some rational basis for the imposed separation, treats some contract-based suits differently from others will not pass constitutional muster. That law is subject to condemnation for invidious underinclusion.12 It gives some contract claims protection against shorter limitations but excludes others from the same state-conferred largesse. While the legislature may depart from the general statutory limitations scheme, it'must do so within the framework of a comprehensive and structured enactment that covers an entire class.
¶ 7 To the extent that my views may be perceived as in conflict with those expressed by the court in Walton v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co.,131 would declare Walton to be flawed by an incorrect exposition of § 46 standards.
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¶ 8 UNTIL LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATION UNDERGOES A CHANGE THAT PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER, INSURANCE POLICIES ARE TO BE TREATED AS WRITTEN. CONTRACTS WHOSE ENFORCEABILITY MUST BE DEEMED GOVERNED BY THE GENERAL LIMITATIONS FOR WRITTEN CONTRACTS IN 12 O.S. 1991 § 95(1)
¶ 9 The legal relationship between the insured and insurer is contractual.14 Okla*649homa jurisprudence teaches that an action against the insurer for its refusal to pay a loss is ex contractu and stands governed by the principles and procedures applicable to contract' actions.15 In Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co.,16 an insured’s claim for loss was held to fall under the statutory five-year limitation for written contracts.17
¶ 10 Without reclassifying insured-loss recovery as a class separate from other contract litigation, the legislature appears to have created a number of special exceptions for actions that fall under the general rubric of written-contract recovery.18 These discrete enactments bear no rational connection to any existing system of classification for limitation purposes. More importantly, the one-year limitation the insurer invokes in this case is, like many others, facially devoid of any logical nexus to some lawful legislative purpose that would support a permissible exception from the general statutory regime prescribed for actions based on written contracts.
¶ 11 Insurance litigation may, in fact, constitute a class separate from other written-contract actions. Policies of insurance do bear characteristics distinguishing them from other private agreements by a host of statute-authorized regulatory requirements.19 But in order to establish a distinct class of litigation for insured loss, which would pass the § 46 muster, the legislature has to stake out the class and define its outer limits in a rational and systematic manner. For application of distinct time bars, insurance-loss recovery has never been explicitly (or even implicitly) declared by the legislature to merit a separate classification that would sooner extinguish the available remedies for insured losses in a manner apart from other contract litigation.
¶ 12 I would today invite the legislature to re-examine its several separately enacted limitations for insured-loss recovery and, if it so desires, it should set that class apart from other written contracts for limitations purposes. A structured approach should be *650used to establish different time bars for identified subclasses for losses that fall under varied types of coverage.20
SUMMARY
¶ 13 Although statutory construction canons teach that a special law is to be preferred over a general statute,21 there can be no special time bars for insurance litigation unless that category be established as distinct from other contract actions (for recovery on •written contracts) and then, if necessary, be divided into identified subclasses that can pass fundamental-law muster. Art. 5, § 46, Okl.Const. Limitations are constitutionally infirm when they stand established as an exception to the general rule rather than be created for a separated and comprehensively defined class or for some of its permissibly severed subclasses. If the severed class is underinclusive, § 46 is offended. Viewed through the constitutional prism, the several discrete limitations enacted for insured-loss recovery are set up in a haphazard manner. If insured-loss litigation is indeed to be considered a single class that may stand distinct from other written contract controversies, it must first be (a) legislatively defined and established and then (b) crafted in an all-inclusive single act that embraces the entire severed class. This means, of course, that the defined class would omit nothing that falls within its parameters, nor would it include that which lies dehors its outer range.
¶ 14 I would not, directly or obliquely, place today this court’s imprimatur on any discrete legislative time-bar exceptions for insured-loss recovery, which are set at less than five years22 — the general statute’s time bar for recovery on written promises — until a comprehensive and structured regime has been crafted for extinguishment of all remedies affecting the entire class of recovery for loss protected by a written policy.

. For the two-year statute of limitations that governs casualty insurance litigation, see 36 O.S. 1991 § 3617, infra note 18.

. For the one-year statute of limitations applicable to fire insurance loss, see 36 O.S.1991 § 4803, infra note 18.

. For the pertinent provisions of Art. 5, § 46, Okl.Con., see infra note 6.

. For the general limitations that govern breach-of-contract litigation, see 12 O.S.1991 § 95(1) infra note 17.

. For the pertinent provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 95(1), see infra note 17.

.The pertinent terms of Art. 5 § 46, Okl.Const., are:
“The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing:
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Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts, justices of the peace, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators, or other tribunals ...;
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For limitation of civil or criminal actions; * * * ” (Emphasis added.)

. In support of their constitutional argument, the plaintiffs cite Art: 5, §§ 46, 59 and Art. 23, §§ 8, 9, Okl. Const.

. Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, 760 P.2d 816, 822.

. For the relevant terms of Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const., see supra note 6.

. Reynolds, supra note 8 at 823.

. See, e.g., the Uniform Commercial Code [UCC], where by the provisions of 12A O.S.1991 § 2-725(1) the legislature developed a comprehensive, all-inclusive and structured regime for limitations applicable to commercial contracts. Under § 2-725(1) of the UCC, written and oral sales contracts are governed by a five-year statute of limitations. The general statutory limitation for actions based on oral contract is only three years (12 O.S.1991 § 95(2)). The official comment that follows § 2-725 of the UCC, prepared by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, states in pertinent part:
“Purposes: To introduce a uniform statute of limitations for sales contracts, thus eliminating the jurisdictional variations and providing needed relief for concerns doing business on a nationwide scale whose contracts have heretofore been governed by several different periods of limitation depending upon the state in which the transaction occurred. This Article takes sales contracts out of the general laws limiting the time for commencing contractual actions....”
In Sesow v. Swearingen, 1976 OK 97, 552 P.2d 705, 706-07, the contract subclass carved out by the UCC was held to be free of infirmity.

. For a discussion of classifications that are impermissibly underinclusive, see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 1108, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-14, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 1377, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975).

. 1993 OK 115, 860 P.2d 222, 223. In Walton, I was in dissent from the court’s pronouncement that the one-year statute of limitations for recovery of loss by fire (rather than the five-year general limitations that apply to written contracts) is not in violation of the Art. 5, § 46 interdiction.

. An insurance policy constitutes a contract. First Bank of Turley v. Fidelity and Deposit Ins. Co. of Maryland, 1996 OK 105, 928 P.2d 298, 302, citing 36 O.S.1991 § 102; Silver v. Slusher, *6491988 OK 53, 770 P.2d 878, 883; Christian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1977 OK 132, 566 P.2d 445, 448; 12 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 7004 at 34-56 (1981 & Supp.1995).

. An action is one ex contractu when recovery is sought for breach of (a) an express promise, (b) a promise implied in fact or (c) a promise implied in law. Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., 1983 OK 41, 662 P.2d 681, 684; Thiry v. Armstrong World Industries, 1983 OK 28, 661 P.2d 515, 519 (Opala, J., concurring).

. Uptegraft, supra note 15 at 683.

. The pertinent terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 95(1) are:
"Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods, after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards: 1. Within five (5) years: An action upon any contract, agreement, or promise in writing; * * * ”

. The pertinent terms of 36 O.S.1991 § 3617 (two-year limitation period for casualty insurance litigation) are:
"No policy delivered or. issued for delivery in Oklahoma and covering a subject of insurance resident, located, or to be performed in Oklahoma, shall contain any condition, stipulation or agreement ... (3) limiting the time within which an action may be brought to a period of less than two (2) years from the time the cause of action accrues in connection with all insur-anees other than property and marine and transportation insurances; in property and marine and transportation policies such time shall not be limited to less than one (1) year from the date of occurrence of the event resulting in the loss. Any such condition, stipulation or agreement shall be void, but such voidance shall not affect the validity of the other provisions of the policy.” (Emphasis added.)
The pertinent terms of 36 O.S.1991 § 4803 (one-year limitation for fire insurance loss) are:
"A. The printed form of a policy of fire insurance as set forth in subsection G of this section shall be known and designated as the standard fire insurance policy to be used in the State of Oklahoma.
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G. The form of the standard fire insurance policy, with permission to substitute for the word "company” a more accurate descriptive term for the type of insurer, shall be as follows:
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Suit. No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve months next after inception of the loss. * * * " (Emphasis added.)

.Chief among the regulatory requirements is that insurers must maintain reserves to cover liabilities accruing under the policies. 36 O.S. 1991 §§ 1501 et seq.

.My counsel to the court in Lewis v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 1983 OK 100, 681 P.2d 67, may appear to be in discord with the views I express today. In Lewis I wrote in dissent from the court's application of the two-year statute for negligent tort limitations (12 O.S.1981 § 95(3)), urging that the one-year time bar (36 O.S.1981 § 4803(G)) applied. There, my position was that an action for bad-faith refusal to pay a claim should be treated, for limitation purposes, as a contract rather than a tort action. Unlike in the present case, the plaintiffs in Lewis did not challenge the shorter limitations as unconstitutional.

. State ex rel. Trimble v. City of Moore, 1991 OK 97, 818 P.2d 889, 899; McCracken v. City of Lawton, 1982 OK 63, 648 P.2d 18, 21 n. 10.

. For the general limitation of five years which governs breach-of-contract litigation, see 12 O.S. 1991 § 95(1), supra note 17.