Court Opinion

ID: 9632622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:20:25.356302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:37.595643
License: Public Domain

Manoukian, C. J.,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the conviction of the infamous crime against nature. The majority, however, has concluded that the rape conviction is infirm because “[t]he combined effect of the two statements would lead the jury to conclude Manning had a criminal record, probably sexual in nature,” which would, in turn, prejudice appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. I disagree that reversal is dictated under the guidelines set out by our cases which have addressed the issue of previous-offense testimony. See Coats v. State, 98 Nev. 179, 643 P.2d 1225 (1982); Reese v. State, 95 Nev. 419, 596 P.2d 212 (1979); Geary v. State, 91 Nev. 784, 544 P.2d 417 (1975); Founts v. State, 87 Nev. 165, 483 P.2d 654 (1971). See also, Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 576 P.2d 275 (1978).1 Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the opinion.
The statements made by the officer and detective in the present case fall far short of those complained of in the above-referenced cases. In Reese v. State, supra, a Las Vegas police officer “testified that he had had ‘previous contacts’ with [the accused] and his brother.” Id. at 422, 596 P.2d at 215. In Geary v. State, supra, an officer testified that he had arrested the accused on “another incident.” Id. at 788, 544 P.2d at 420. In Founts v. State, supra, the victim testified before the grand jury that the accused had also robbed him on a previous occasion. There, the prosecuting attorney repeatedly referred to the “unusual” or “unfortunate” nature of the earlier confrontation between the accused and the victim. Id. at 168, 483 P.2d at 656. This court, in all three cases, held that because “[t]here was no description of or further reference to these contacts . . .” Reese at422, 596 P.2d at 215, or any “description of the *90offense which occurred,” Founts at 168, 483 P.2d at 656, “no damaging previous-offense testimony was introduced, and the rule proscribing proof of a distinct independent offense at the trial of a person accused of a crime was not violated.” Geary at 788, 544 P.2d at 420-421. Here, a police officer testified that after receiving a description of the crime from the complainant, he had “come to an understanding or an idea of who the suspect might be in this particular case.” The detective told the jury that he reached this conclusion when the victim said her assailant was a “young man by the name of Benny or Sid.” The detective then testified that “when she mentioned Benny, I knew of Benny Manning myself.” According to Reese, Founts and Geary, these statements do not rise to the level of damaging previous-offense testimony because they do not describe these previous contacts or the offense which occurred.
The detective also testified that, based on his belief that the suspect was Benny Manning, he went to the identification division of the police department to obtain a mug shot. In Coats v. State, supra, the detective testified that he obtained the photographs of the defendants used in a photographic lineup from the homicide division of the Las Vegas Police Department. There, this court held that the references to the homicide division and the mug shots did not introduce damaging previous-offense testimony. Id. at 181, 182, 643 P.2d 1226, 1227. See also Porter v. State, supra.
In my view, the references of the officer and the detective to their familiarity with Manning and the detective’s testimony concerning the mug shots did not introduce damaging previous-offense testimony. Because I have concluded that the admission of the detective’s and the officer’s testimony did not constitute error, it is not necessary to decide whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, I would affirm both convictions.

In Porter v. State, supra, cited by the majority, Porter alleged, under the accumulated error doctrine, that a police witness’ testimony regarding “mug shots” improperly implied that Porter had a previous arrest record. There, citing Wilson v. State, 86 Nev. 320, 468 P.2d 346 (1970), we refused to reverse due to Porter’s failure to object, implicitly determining that plain error had not occurred. We reached that conclusion notwithstanding the fact that Porter had also presented some evidence that the line-up procedure improperly implied that he had a previous arrest record. This was in addition to an allegedly prejudicial closing argument by the prosecutor.