Court Opinion

ID: 9684107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:46:44.564582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.839782
License: Public Domain

*839TEAGUE, Justice,
dissenting.
By analogy I find that the majority opinion, in its apparent quest to reach a desired result, that the trial court did not err in impairing the appellant’s perfect right of self-defense, mixes apples with oranges to get pineapple juice.
Provoking a difficulty is always in direct conflict with justifiable homicide. Thus, it is not permissible to impair the accused’s right of self-defense unless the accused, by his acts, words, or conduct, occasioned or produced the original difficulty, unless it is established that although the deceased is shown to have been the one who commenced the difficulty, it is also established that during the progress of the difficulty the accused, through acts, words, or conduct, did something that would have produced the difficulty had it been used prior to the difficulty, i.e., during the progress of the difficulty, the true reason why the difficulty originally commenced is brought out.
In Trevino v. State, 83 Tex.Cr.R. 562, 204 S.W. 996, 997-98 (Tex.Cr.App.1918), the following was written: “When perfect self-defense is relied upon by the accused, there should be, as a prerequisite to its impairment, evidence that the accused produced the occasion for the killing as an excuse for the homicide. His acts, conduct or words must precede such condition, and must be evidenced by the testimony. This is the law under correct legal views and under the well-considered jurisprudence of this state. The facts must precede and lead to the homicide. If the difficulty does not so begin, provoking the difficulty is not a part of the case, and a charge limiting the right of perfect self-defense would constitute error, and of such a nature as to constitute its giving necessarily fatal to the conviction. If the deceased began or provoked the difficulty, that issue is not in the case. Provoking a difficulty by the deceased cannot be utilized by the state, therefore, to defeat or impair the right of self-defense in homicide.”
It is now axiomatic that to constitute provocation such as will affect a person’s right of self-defense, the acts, words, or conduct of provocation by the accused must occur at the time of, or immediately before, the difficulty. They must be the occasion for bringing about the difficulty. 21 Tex. Jur.Srd, Section 1733.
An exception to the rule that provoking the difficulty by the deceased cannot be taken advantage of by the State exists: “Where the accused is not in the wrong originally, but because, during the progress of the difficulty, he [does something by acts, words, or conduct], that would have produced the difficulty had it been used prior to the difficulty,” Trevino v. State, supra, 204 S.W. at 999, (My emphasis), then the question of provoking the difficulty by the accused arises.
The majority opinion acknowledges that “according to the evidence, the deceased made the first attack.” By using sheer speculation, it also finds that the appellant brought on the difficulty between himself and the deceased “as a pretext to injure the deceased.” In so finding, it ignores the above principle that if it is shown that the deceased commenced the difficulty, then, unless it is also established that during the progress of the difficulty the accused did something, through acts, words, or conduct, that might reflect or indicate the real reason why the difficulty commenced, provocation is not in the case. This omission is what is wrong with the majority opinion.
Provoking a difficulty, however, as before stated, is based upon the proposition that the accused does some act or performs some conduct or uses words as would occasion or provoke a difficulty, and with that purpose in view causes the difficulty to commence. If the evidence reflects that the deceased commenced the difficulty, unless it is also established that the accused during the progress of the difficulty does something, by acts, words, or conduct, that would have produced the difficulty had it been used prior to the commencement of the difficulty, i.e., the true reason why the difficulty commences is brought out during the progress of the difficulty, then there can be no impairment placed upon the de*840fendant’s perfect right of self-defense. Trevino v. State, supra, 204 S.W. at 999.
The majority opinion correctly points out that "... according to the evidence, the deceased made the first attack, so to speak...” Thus, the appellant was not in the wrong originally. Nevertheless, did he, during the progress of the difficulty, by any acts, words, or conduct do something that would have produced the difficulty had it been used prior to the difficulty arising? Under the facts and circumstances of this case, only in the latter instance would the question of the appellant provoking a difficulty arise.
The majority opinion does not point to any evidence or testimony in the record, and I cannot find any reference to any by the parties, that after the deceased made the initial attack upon the appellant, the appellant, during the progress of the difficulty, did something, by acts, words, or conduct, that would have produced the difficulty had it been used prior to the difficulty arising, i.e., during the progress of the difficulty, the true reason why the difficulty commenced did not come out. Again, for emphasis, if the facts only reflect or indicate that the deceased started the difficulty, then the issue-of provocation is not in the case. See Trevino v. State, supra, and Walker v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 421, 201 S.W.2d 823 (App.1947).
In reaching its desired result, the majority opinion makes much over the fact that when the appellant went to the decedent’s office, to “discuss” the purchase of a piece of real estate, he was then financially embarrassed, i.e., the majority opinion is holding that we may infer from the sole fact that because the appellant was financially embarrassed when he went to the decedent’s office, this caused him to provoke the deceased into an argument so that he could kill and rob the deceased. Notwithstanding that under the facts at bar I am unable to agree with this proposition, nevertheless, I must ask: Where is it established that during the progress of the difficulty the appellant did something, by acts, words, or conduct, that would establish that this was the only reason for the commencement of the difficulty. I find that the majority opinion is erroneous because it simply bootstraps by way of too many inferences to satisfy the above principle of law.
I respectfully dissent.