Court Opinion

ID: 9741644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:00:04.497625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.266401
License: Public Domain

Murphy, Justice
(concurring).
As I understand the dissenting opinion, it holds that under the provisions of the Sheldon will the leasing of the auditorium to' a private party for the operation of a motion picture business is not permitted. This holding must necessarily be based upon an interpretation of the Sheldon trust. The basis for that holding was briefed and argued by the parties, but in our original opinion we based our decision on a different ground. Even if the pleadings had placed in issue the right of the city to use the auditorium in compliance with the terms of the trust, that issue could not be considered because the plaintiff had no standing to raise it. A citizen, resident, or taxpayer may not sue in his *105own behalf to compel compliance with conditions impressed upon a gift for a charitable purpose. Only the attorney general may do that. 3 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 1423c. M. S. A. 501.12, subd. 3, relating to express trusts for charitable, educational, religious, and other public uses, provides that:
“* * * The attorney general shall represent the beneficiaries in all cases arising under this section and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the courts.”
Our decision did not go beyond the holding that the city could not engage in a private business. It is one thing for the city itself to engage in a private business; it is quite another thing for the city to permit the operation of a private business upon property which it may have the right to lease. We did not attempt to limit the right of the city to use or permit the use of the building for other purposes.
The original opinion does not disturb Anderson v. City of Montevideo, 137 Minn. 179, 162 N. W. 1073, which holds that where a city auditorium is no longer needed for municipal purposes the municipality has the legal right to lease it for private use where it will lighten the burden of taxation. The gist of our decision was that under Nerlien v. Village of Brooten, 94 Minn. 361, 102 N. W. 867, the Wrights were entitled to an injunction because as taxpayers and competitors they were being injured by the act of the city in engaging in a private business. The decision was not intended to leave the city with a large auditorium on its hands which it could not rent out to others for authorized purposes within the holding of Anderson v. City of Montevideo, supra.
All we decided was that the city could not operate a movie house in competition with the Wrights. It seems to me, however, that the dissent goes beyond our decision and reaches a new result — namely, that under the terms of the Sheldon trust the city is prevented from leasing the property for use in the conduct of a private business. If our decision had turned upon the issue of the standing of the Wrights to test the authority of the city under the trust, we would have had to affirm the trial court in granting summary judgment. Longcor v. City of Red Wing, 206 Minn. 627, 289 N. W. 570, involved a taxpayer’s *106action brought to require the city of Red Wing to comply with the provisions of the Sheldon trust. There had been an accumulation in the auditorium fund to the amount of $100,000. Some of this money had been used for purposes other than maintenance of the auditorium. The plaintiff sought to have this money restored to the fund. We held there, however, that the plaintiff was without standing to maintain the action and that the attorney general is the proper party plaintiff to compel compliance with the conditions impressed upon a gift for a charitable purpose. More recently in Schaeffer v. Newberry, 227 Minn. 259, 261, 35 N. W. (2d) 287, 288, we said:
“* * * we held in Longcor v. City of Red Wing, 206 Minn. 627, 289 N. W. 570, supra, that the same reasons for entrusting this obligation to the attorney general in respect to charitable trusts apply to gifts on condition to a charity or a municipality.”
Here, Wright has no interest in the will as an heir or in any other way. He is legally a stranger to the will and cannot avail himself of any limitation in it. His only standing derives from his right as a taxpayer and competitor. Our decision has given him the only relief to which he is entitled — namely, to be free from the direct competition of a business conducted by the city.
In summary, I think the original opinion should not be disturbed for the reasons (1) if we say that the plaintiff has standing to raise the issue of whether or not the city is complying with the provisions of the Sheldon trust we will be overruling our holdings in Longcor v. City of Red Wing, supra; Schaeffer v. Newberry, supra; In re Estate of Quin-lan, 233 Minn. 35, 45 N. W. (2d) 807; and (2) the matter should be left to the district court to decide on proceedings properly brought by the attorney general how this trust property should be administered.
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frank T. Gallagher.