Court Opinion

ID: 9731738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:56:50.087703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.925745
License: Public Domain

BENDER, J.,
Concurring:
¶ 1 While I concur with the Majority in affirming Appellant’s judgment of sentence, I write separately to respectfully express my concern over the liberal interpretation of what constitutes a “playground” under the statutory language of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317. Given the serious consequences of the imposition of a mandatory minimum increase in sentencing, this determination should not be made without careful consideration of the actual circumstances of the case as well as the children the statute was enacted to protect. In *113order to ensure fair and equal application of the law, it is necessary to find limitations for such broad definitions and adequate evidentiary support to sustain greater terms of imprisonment.
¶2 This concern for the inappropriate imposition of enhanced sentencing was shared by this Court in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 758 A.2d 1231 (Pa.Super.2000). The only case to date, which has addressed the issue of interpreting the statute before us, Campbell discusses the need for narrow definitions in analyzing statutory criminal penalties, stating “[pjenal statutes must be strictly construed.” Id. at 1236 (citing Commonwealth v. Runion, 427 Pa.Super. 217, 628 A.2d 904, 905-906 (1993)).
¶ 3 In defining the term “playground,” the majority cites Campbell for the proposition that the statute in question “protects our children in the places where they routinely play.” Id. 1237. While the legislative intent that fostered this statute was surely meant to create a safe habitat void of illegal drug sales, the statutory language must be given a specific context for its application. The mere presence of children alone cannot give rise to a “playground” absent some additional indications of a designated facility for their recreational use.
¶ 4 In Campbell, the area described was unquestionably a playground designed for use by the children of a privately-owned apartment complex. Id. at 1233. Containing swing sets, a basketball court, picnic tables, sliding boards, and a metal climbing apparatus, there is little doubt that this area would be considered a playground by the general definitions of the word.6 Id. at 1235.
¶5 In the present case, there is some evidence in the record indicating that the area in question was used as a playground. Both parties agreed to the stipulated testimony of Officer Freeman that the basketball court was a place used by children and adults alike. There was no evidence submitted by Appellant which would suggest that these statements were inaccurate. The picture of the area submitted into evidence depicted an empty paved rectangular lot in the shape of a basketball court with a pole and hoop at either end. The paved lot is surrounded by grass and located in the middle of a residential neighborhood.
¶ 6 Given these specifications and no contrary indications to its use, the trial court and this Court have concluded that this area is a playground under the statute. While I do not necessarily disagree with this conclusion, I am concerned about the broad interpretation of the statutory language. Appellant argues in his brief “[t]o permit such a structure to meet the definition of playground would turn every street where a milk carton is attached to a telephone pole into a ‘playground.” ’ Appellant’s Brief at 20. This concern must be met by sufficient development of the record to ensure that the Commonwealth cannot use this statute to impose additional sentencing where there is no real concern for children nor evidence of a playground. In the present case, additional *114testimony by residents of the neighborhood and photographs taken while children are present in the space would help to strengthen the Commonwealth’s argument and ensure that Appellant did in fact act “within 250 feet of the real property on which is located a recreation center or playground....” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317(a).
¶ 7 Enhancement of sentence should only be upheld where there is clear and convincing evidence on the record indicating the presence of a playground. While extending this definition to include a basketball court may be appropriate in the instant case, we must be cautious in our interpretation of statutory language and ensure that the record supports the intent of the statute.7
¶ 8 Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the Majority.

. As cited in the majority opinion, Campbell used the following dictionary definitions to characterize the term "playground."
The term "playground has...been defined as "a piece of land used for and usu[ally] equipped with facilities for recreation especially] by children.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 874 (8th ed.1981). Playground has also been defined as "[a]n outdoor area set aside for recreation and play; especially, one containing seesaws, swings, and the like.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1005 (7th Ed. 1978).
Id. at 1235.

. While not raised in the instant case, it would seem that a jury would be required to make this determination in future cases using the beyond reasonable doubt standard. Blakely v. Washington, - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).