Court Opinion

ID: 9659501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:48:07.727998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:08.916783
License: Public Domain

LEE, Justice,
dissenting on Rehearing.
To the extent the plurality holds that the Trevino’s state law claims based on inadequate signalization are not preempted by federal law, I respectfully dissent.
As the plurality correctly points out, this case is controlled by CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993), where the United States Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiffs state law claims based on inadequate signalization were preempted by federal law. After analyzing 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) and (4), the Court found that such claims are preempted “if federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices at a crossing.” Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670, 113 S.Ct. at 1741.
Since Easterwood, many courts have examined the issue of the preemption of state law claims based on inadequate signalization. In Hester v. CSX Transp., Inc., 61 F.3d 382 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093, 116 S.Ct. 815, 133 L.Ed.2d 760 (1996), the plaintiffs’ son was killed at a railroad crossing in Orange Grove, Mississippi. Id. at 383. At the time the accident occurred, the crossing was equipped only with reflectorized cross-bucks and other passive warning devices. Id. at 386.1 After discussing Easterwood, the Fifth Circuit explained, “[t]he test we thus must apply is whether federal funds ‘participated’ in the installation of ‘warning devices’ at the Hately Circle crossing. If they have, the Hesters’ common law claims based on inadequate signalization are preempted.” Id. The court ultimately found the evidence supported the defendant’s claim of preemption. Other courts, including this court, have strictly followed the straightforward preemption test articulated in Hester. Armijo v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 87 F.3d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir.1996); Elrod v. Burlington N.R.R., 68 F.3d 241, 243 (8th Cir.1995); Hatfield v. Burlington N.R.R., 1 F.3d 1071, 1072 (10th Cir.1993) (“the precise issue to be resolved is whether ‘federal-aid funds participate[d] in the instal*212lation of [a warning] device’ prior to the collision_”); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Lemon, 861 S.W.2d 501, 514 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ dism’d by agmt.) (holding “the only question” relevant to preemption is whether federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices).
In the present case, it is undisputed that passive warning devices were installed at the 16th Street crossing.2 Therefore, the issue is whether federal funds participated in the installation of these warning devices.3
Santa Fe’s summary judgment proof includes Texas Department of Transportation (“TDOT”)4 records and the affidavits of former and present TDOT and Santa Fe representatives which, contrary to the plurality’s opinion, demonstrate that federal funds were approved and expended for the installation and upgrading of refleetorized crossbueks at the 16th Street crossing. Darin K. Kosmak, TDOT’s Railroad Liaison Manager, and John Dodson, former TDOT Bridge Division Railroad Liaison, explained that in 1977, TDOT implemented a program to improve all unsig-nalized public grade crossings in Texas. This program, administered pursuant to Section 203 of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1976 and approved by the Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”), utilized a total of $11,222,382 of federal funds to install reflec-torized crossbucks at railroad crossings that did not have active warning devices. Kos-mack stated the installation of steel cross-bucks in District 5, “which included DOT Crossing No. 017-331N at the 16th Street crossing in Abernathy,” was completed in 1980 at a cost of $641,000.68. Kosmaek also pointed out that 100% of the District 5 project was federally funded.
Kosmaek’s claim that federal funds were approved and used to install the crossbueks at the 16th Street crossing is supported by Don Morris’ affidavit. Morris, who from 1977 through 1981 was responsible for the repair or replacement of warning devices at the 16th Street crossing, verified that in 1980, the wooden posts and crossbucks at the crossing were replaced by galvanized steel posts and crossbucks. Morris stated that the project was not funded by Santa Fe.
Santa Fe’s summary judgment proof also contains a 1989 letter in which the United States Department of Transportation (“US-DOT”) advised the TDOT that refleetorized material should be attached to the backs of the posts and crossbucks located at “low-volume crossings that only have advance warning signs, crossbucks and pavement markings.” The letter further recognized that “the use of active railroad grade crossing devices such as flashing lights and gates are not warranted at these crossings.... ”
Kosmak and Dodson indicated that in 1989, in response to the USDOT’s concerns, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2681, which mandated the installation of reflector-ized material to the backs of all crossbuck signs and support posts located at crossings without active warning devices.5 This Act covered the 16th Street crossing in Abernathy, Texas. The project was completed in August of 1991, and the amount of federal *213funds approved and expended for this project was $1,371,384; ninety percent of the project’s total cost.
This summary judgment proof was uncon-troverted. In fact, Dr. Kenneth W. Heath-ington, the Trevino’s own expert, conceded the 16th Street crossing received the benefit of federal funds. Based on this record, I would hold that Santa Fe has established that federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices at the 16th Street crossing.
The plurality asserts that Santa Fe offered no summary judgment proof showing the FHWA expressly approved the installation of only passive warning devices at the 16th Street crossing and holds that such approval is essential to support a finding of preemption. I disagree.
Santa Fe’s summary judgment proof includes a document entitled “Letter of Approval and/or Authorization” (the “letter”) in which the FHWA expressly approved the use of federal money to fund the 1991 project. Specifically, the letter provided that, “[sjtate forces are authorized to (1) install crossbuck reflectorization kits and (2) replace missing crossbuck signs.” As noted, these federal funds were used to place refleetorized material to the backs of the crossbucks and posts at the 16th Street crossing.
However, even without this document, the plurality’s assertion that “[tjhere must be direct evidence of the Secretary [of Transportation’s] specific approval” in order to trigger preemption is incorrect.6 In Easter-wood, the Supreme Court stated, “[f]or projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of the warning devices, the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection.” Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 671, 113 S.Ct. at 1741 (emphasis supplied). In Hester, the Fifth Circuit further explained:
The regulations direct the Secretary [of Transportation] to authorize the expenditure of federal funds only on projects that satisfy, inter alia, the requirements of federal law, specifically 23 U.S.C. § 109. Under that section, “[n]o funds shall be approved for expenditure ... unless proper safety protective devices complying with safety standard determined by the Secretary at that time as being adequate shall be installed or be in operation at any highway and railroad grade crossing....” The fact that federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices legally presupposes that the Secretary approved and authorized that expenditure, which in turn legally presupposes that the Secretary determined that the safety devices installed were adequate to their task.
Hester, 61 F.3d at 387 (citations omitted); see also Elrod 68 F.3d at 244 (holding that “[fjederal funding is the touchstone of preemption in this area because it indicates that the warning devices have been deemed adequate by federal regulators.”); Armijo, 87 F.3d at 1191 (joining the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in finding that the participation of federal funds legally presupposes the Secretary of Transportation’s approval of the type of safety devices installed).
As the Supreme Court, as well as the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have pointed out, federal law prohibits the Secretary of Transportation from approving the expenditure of federal funds unless the Secretary first determines the warning devices to be installed are adequate. Easterwood 507 U.S. at 670-71, 113 S.Ct. at 1741; Armijo, 87 F.3d at 1191; Elrod 68 F.3d at 244; Hester, *21461 F.3d at 387; see 23 U.S.C. § 109(e). In this case, the plurality’s finding that the Secretary approved the expenditure of federal funds without first determining the safety devices at the 16th Street crossing were adequate, not only ignores well reasoned, authoritative precedent, it also implicitly suggests the Secretary has violated federal law. I cannot reach such a conclusion.
Hester establishes a legal presumption which assumes that secretarial approval of the use of federal funds to install warning devices is equivalent to a determination that the devices were adequate at the crossing in question. Hester, 61 F.3d at 387. Therefore, absent of some evidence demonstrating that at the time the Secretary approved the 1980 and 1991 erossbuck projects, the Secretary indicated the refleetorized erossbucks were inadequate to warn the public of danger at the 16th Street crossing, we must presume the Secretary determined that refleetorized crossbucks were adequate warning devices. See, e.g., Armijo, 87 F.3d at 1192; Hester, 61 F.3d at 387.
Finally, the plurality points out that no automatic gates were installed at the 16th Street crossing as required by 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3). The plurality maintains that the FHWA had “no discretion to approve anything else and could not allow the continuation or repair of crossbuck signs which had been installed previously pursuant to state law.” The court then holds that because Santa Fe failed to establish that automatic gates were installed at the 16th Street crossing, summary judgment should be reversed. Once again, I disagree.
In Easterwood, the Court held that “under §§ 646.213(b)(3) and (4), a project for the improvement of a grade crossing must either include an automatic gate or receive FHWA approval if federal funds ‘participate in the installation of the [warning] devices.’ ” East-erwood, 507 U.S. at 670, 113 S.Ct. at 1741 (footnote omitted and emphasis supplied). Santa Fe’s uncontroverted summary judgment proof clearly shows that FHWA officials approved the expenditure of federal funds that participated in the installation and upgrade of the warning devices at the 16th Street crossing. Contrary to the plurality’s assertion, “[t]he fact that federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices legally presupposes that the Secretary approved and authorized the expenditure, which in turn legally presupposes that the Secretary determined that the safety devices installed were adequate to their task.” Hester, 61 F.3d at 387. The plurality’s contention that a finding of preemption hinges upon the presence or absence of automatic gates at the crossing is simply incorrect.7
*215The record in this case clearly demonstrates that significant federal funds participated in the installation and upgrade of the warning devices at the 16th Street crossing. Because federal expenditure is the touchstone of preemption in this area, I would hold that the Trevino’s state tort law claims based on Santa Fe’s failure to provide adequate warning devices are preempted by federal law and would affirm that portion of the summary judgment.8

. “Passive warning devices” are "those types of traffic control devices, including signs, markings and other devices, located at or in advance of grade crossings to indicate the presence of a crossing but which do not change aspect upon approach or presence of a train.” Conversely, “active warning devices” are "those traffic control devices activated by the approach or presence of a train, such as flashing light signals, automatic gates and similar devices, as well as manually operated devices and crossing watchmen, all of which display to motorists positive warning of the approach or presence of a train.” 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.204(i), (j).

. Santa Fe’s summary judgment proof includes exhibits showing two refleetorized crossbuck signs were located at the 16th Street crossing at the time the accident occurred. Crossbucks, the X-shaped signs spelling out "RAILROAD CROSSING,” are passive wanting devices that face oncoming traffic on each side of a crossing.

. This is not to suggest that state law claims based on inadequate signalization are automatically preempted by federal law simply because some federal funds are spent to install warning devices at a crossing. The Tenth Circuit has held that federal participation must be "significant” rather than merely a "casual financial connection” in order to trigger preemption. Armijo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 19 F.3d, 547, 550 (10th Cir.1994). The Eighth Circuit has held that federal financial participation triggers preemption only when warning devices have been completely installed and are operational. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Malone Freight Lines, 39 F.3d 864, 866-67 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1110, 115 S.Ct. 1963, 131 L.Ed.2d 854 (1995). Nothing suggests either of these conditions would apply to defeat preemption in the case at bar.

. The TDOT is formerly known as the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation.

. House Bill 2681, entitled "Enhanced Warning Sign Visibility at Railroad Crossings” was passed by the 71st Texas Legislature Regular Session. This Act was later codified as Texas Annotated Civil Statutes Article 6370b (Vernon Supp.1990).

. The plurality cites Thiele v. Norfolk Western Ry. Co., 68 F.3d 179 (7th Cir.1995) to support its contention that direct evidence of the Secretary’s specific approval must exist before preemption applies. Thiele is a Seventh Circuit case and is based on the court’s previous holding in Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F.3d 304 (7th Cir.1994). In Shots, the court acknowledged that under Easterwood, if the Secretary of Transportation’s approval and funding of a project could be interpreted as an affirmative determination that re-fleclorized crossbucks were sufficient under 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(4), state law claims based on inadequate signalization would be preempted. However, the court declined to read Easterwood "literally” and held that the Secretary’s funding of crossing devices did not necessarily imply federal approval of particular measures taken at particular crossings sufficient to preempt state law. Id. at 307. This holding has been soundly criticized and uniformly rejected by courts considering the issue of secretarial approval. See Armijo, 87 F.3d at 1191-92; Elrod, 68 F.3d at 244; Hester, 61 F.3d at 387.

. The concurrence concedes that Santa Fe's summary judgment proof shows that federal funds were spent to install and upgrade reflector-ized crossbucks at the 16th Street crossing. Nevertheless, the concurrence would hold that summary judgment is improper in this case because Santa Fe "did not establish that the 16th Street crossing was not a (b)(3)(i) crossing.” The concurrence further suggests that contrary to the proper standard of review of summary judgments, Hester indulges an inference in favor of the movant that the crossing in question was not a (b)(3)(i) crossing. I disagree with this conclusion for two reasons.
First, Hester infers no such fact. Rather, Hester recognizes a legal presumption that the participation of federal funds implies the Secretary of Transportation has approved the type of safety device installed. See Hester, 61 F.3d at 387. A legal presumption is a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by which the finding of a basic fact gives rise to the existence of the presumed fact, until the presumption is rebutted. Black’s law DtcTio-nary 1067 (5th ed.1979). Conversely, an inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established. Black’s law dictionary 700 (5th ed.1979). In my opinion, recognizing the legal presumption articulated in Hester does not offend the standard of review we apply to summary judgments.
Second, I believe the concurrence confuses the issue of preemption with its search for the correct label to attach to the 16th Street crossing. The fundamental issue in determining whether preemption applies is whether the federal government has ”displace[d] state and private deci-sionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained.” Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670, 113 S.Ct. at 1741. In the present case, the Secretary agreed to provide the funds necessary to install refleetorized cross-bucks at a number of railroad grade crossings in Texas, including the crossing where the Trevinos were injured. At the point the Secretary approved the expenditure of the funds, the 16th Street crossing became a “project where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of [warning] devices," 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)(i), *215and the type of warning device used was under the Secretary’s control. The Secretary’s authorization of passive warning devices was "tantamount to a determination, pursuant to 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(4), that only passive rather than active warning devices were sufficient,” and that determination took the matter out of Texas’ and Santa Fe’s hands. See Armijo, 87 F.3d. at 1190.

. The plurality emphasizes that state law claims based on the inadequate maintenance of warning devices and the failure to warn the public of defective devices are not subject to preemption. I agree. Easterwood, Hester, Elrod, and Armijo dealt exclusively with whether state law claims based on inadequate signalization are preempted by federal law. However, the plurality’s emphasis relating to this point is puzzling because the Trevino’s pleadings contain no allegations that Santa Fe inadequately maintained the crossbucks or failed to warn the public of defective warning devices.