Court Opinion

ID: 9755970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:01:22.605652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:13.464828
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Allen M. Steaene:
The legal problem presented is whether in an adoption case an appellate court will reverse a finding of abandonment made by a hearing judge, who alone saw and heard the witnesses, where such finding is amply supported by the testimony. The majority opinion repudiates such supported findings. I therefore dissent.
In Schwab Adoption Case, 355 Pa. 534, 50 A. 2d 504, we reversed the court below where a majority repudiated the finding of a hearing judge that the abandonment was not proven to his satisfaction. The majority in the present case, conversely, repudiate a supported finding that there was an abandonment.
I agree with the majority that “The statute does not provide for an appeal, but, on the other hand, it does not forbid one; therefore our review by certiorari is 'in the broadest sense’, including a consideration of the testimony to determine whether the findings of the court below are supported by competent evidence”. But by a review of the testimony in the “broad sense” is not meant that the appellate court reviews all the evidence — that which the hearing judge accepts and also rejects — and then substitutes its own judgment for that of the hearing judge. In appeals from decrees of adoption an appellate court does not review the merits of the case. The scope of the review *12is that exercisable on certiorari: Helen Frances Young’s Adoption, 259 Pa. 573, 103 A. 344; Weinbach’s Appeal, 316 Pa. 333, 175 A. 500; Davies Adoption Case, 353 Pa. 579, 46 A. 2d 252; Busko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A. 2d 132; Adoption of Henry Bastin, 10 Pa. Superior Ct. 570; In re McGinness’s Adoption, 74 Pa. Superior Ct. 523; Montgomery Adoption Case, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 635, 76 A. 2d 240. Our review is limited to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to support the findings. In Busko Adoption Case, supra, Chief Justice Maxey said, p. 81: “The scope of review exercised by this Court in the instant [adoption] case is that exercisable on certiorari; and, consequently, we are required to review the testimony in an attempt to ascertain whether there was evidence sufficient to support the findings: Weinbach’s Appeal, 316 Pa. 333, 175 A. 500.” See also McNutt Appeal, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 641, 646, 84 A. 2d 360. The Act of April 4, 1925, P. L. 127, sec. 1, as last amended by the Act of June 30, 1947, P. L. 1180, 1 PS 1, et seq. provides for adoption. Under section 2 of the act the consent of the mother of an illegitimate child is unnecessary where she has abandoned the child “provided such fact is proven to the satisfaction of the court or judge hearing the petition, in which case such court or judge shall so find as a fact.”. (Emphasis supplied) In the present case the court below found as a fact that the natural mother had abandoned her infant illegitimate child. As stated by President Judge Rhodes in McNutt Appeal, supra, p. 646: “Whether or not a child has been abandoned is a question of fact. Hazuka’s Case, . . . 345 Pa. 432, 435, 29 A. 2d 88” and “. . . our scope of review is to determine whether there is evidence sufficient to support the findings.”
A finding of abandonment, in the absence of a direct admission thereof, is a deduction or inference and *13the result of reasoning: Southard Adoption, 358 Pa. 386, 390, 57 A. 2d 904. But inferences and deductions may only be drawn from established findings of the hearing judge. A contrary finding will not be reached by accepting testimony which the hearing judge rejected, or by our own conjecture or suspicion. Findings of fact of a hearing judge will never be disturbed unless there is manifest error or clear mistake. Such findings are like a verdict of a jury, which is not disturbed if there is sufficient evidence to support it, even though another judge might have reached another or different conclusion. Credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony because of their character, intelligence and knowledge of the subject, can much better be determined by the judge who hears them. The cases which support these principles are numerous, inter alia, Jacob’s Trust Estate, 320 Pa. 539, 544, 183 A. 49; Teats v. Anderson, 358 Pa. 523, 527, 58 A. 2d 31; Harbison Estate, 365 Pa. 468, 473, 76 A. 2d 187.
The hearing judge was squarely faced with an issue of credibility. Witnesses gave diametrically contrary testimony. The situation is an old story too frequently repeated. Bonnie Sue Harvey, the mother of the child, a sixteen year old high school girl, residing in West Virginia, became pregnant. With her parents she came to Pittsburgh and made arrangements with the Roselia Foundling and Maternity Hospital (a charitable institution) for her pre-natal care. Two months thereafter, on April 29, 1951, the baby was born. Her board and charges for delivery were paid by her father. Nine days after delivery the mother signed a consent to adoption. (Because of her minority the consent as such was ineffective but, nevertheless, constituted an element of proof of abandonment). According to the testimony of the religious and lay officials of the hos*14pital, who are wholly disinterested, the mother expressed her desire to have the institution arrange for the child’s adoption; she was fully aware of the nature of her relinquishment of her illegitimate child and was free from emotional disturbance; she left the hospital on May 8, 1951, and neither she nor her parents made any provisions whatever for the support and care of the child. On September 27,1951, the child was placed in the custody of Mr. and Mrs. Arthur J. Marhoefex*, of Meadville, Crawford County (whose character and ability to properly care for the child are unqxxestioned), preparatory to adoption.
A petition for adoption was filed February 29, 1952. On April 17, 1952, a petition for habeas corpus was filed. A joint hearing on both petitions was held May 8, 1952. There is no separate orphans’ court in Crawford County. Judge Mook acted both as an orphans’ coux*t judge with respect to adoption and as judge of the court of common pleas as to custody. The following excerpt from his opinion for the court in banc clearly demonstrates that at the hearing on these two petitions ample testimony was presented from which the Judge could have found either abandonment or no abandonment, depending on which witnesses he believed: “A careful analysis of the credible evidence in this case leaves us no alternative but to find as a fact that Bonnie Sue Harvey abandoned her child for a period of more than six months. While the testimony of Sister Miriam Teresa has been violently attacked by the learned counsel for the respondent as interested, biased and prejudiced testimony, yet we find nothing whatsoever in the record to indicate that the Sister did not tell the truth in every detail so far as the conversations between herself and Bonnie Sue were-concerned. As we have already mentioned, Sister Miriam Teresa testified that Bonnie Sue told her on *15at least two occasions that she wanted to leave the baby for adoption. A social worker, Miss Kearns, testified that Bonnie Sue spoke to her about having the papers prepared and she drew up the papers, which Bonnie Sue signed with full knowledge of its contents. While this paper may not have legal sanction as a consent to the adoption of her child under the statute, yet it is evidence of her intention to abandon her child. We totally reject the testimony of Bonnie Sue Stanley that she did not know or understand the contents of this paper. While Bonnie Sue may not have been an adult at the time the paper was signed, yet from her appearance on the witness stand and from her testimony, we had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that she was a young woman of normal intelligence and no person of her intelligence could possibly take even a casual glance at this paper without immediately seeing that it was entitled in heavy black type ‘Consent to Adoption.’ Furthermore, there is no reason to conclude that the responsible officials and social workers of so well a respected institution as the Boselia Foundling Home would engage in such slipshod methods as having a young mother of a new born baby sign so important a document without fully advising her of its nature and contents.
“Neither do we accept the explanation of Bonnie Sue Stanley that she was so emotionally upset on the day the paper was signed that she did not know what she was doing. On the day the paper was signed she took a trip to downtown Pittsburgh to shop with another girl from the institution and then walked back to the Home, which indicates to us that she had made a remarkable recovery from her confinement and was apparently in good health and spirits. Finally, there is the undisputed fact that on the very next day Bonnie Sue left the Home in the company of her parents *16without taking the baby with her and without making any arrangements whatsoever about its future care and support. Now, if Bonnie Sue and her parents had any intention of taking the child at some later time, certainly there would have been some arrangement made with the Home for its keep and how long it would be left there before being taken to the Harvey home. On the contrary, nothing of this sort took place. To be sure Bonnie Sue testified that she thought she could make a settlement with the Home at some later indefinite date when she might see fit to take the child. This, in our judgment, is a weak explanation of her failure to make any arrangements at the time she left the Home or to later communicate with the Home in regard to the care of her child. We, therefore, can reach no other conclusion than that on the 8th day of May, 1951, Bonnie Sue Harvey left the Boselia Foundling Home with the settled purpose to forego all parental duties for her child and relinquish all parental claims. We further find as a fact that Bonnie Sue persisted in this purpose until December 27, 1951 when she first indicated to the officials of the Boselia Home any definite intention to the contrary. We wholly reject her testimony and the testimony of her witnesses that she made several calls to the Boselia Home in the meantime. Sister Miriam Teresa has testified that she never talked to Bonnie Sue prior to December 27, 1951 and she further states that so far as she knows no message was ever left at the home for her. She is corroborated in her testimony by the social worker, Miss Kearns, who, all during that period, was in the employ of the Plome.”
It is true that the court below improperly rejected certain corroboratory testimony offered by Bonnie Sue’s mother, father, aunt, uncle, and brother. If this testimony were a vital factor in the case, we would *17be obliged to return the Eecord to the court below for a reconsideration of all the admissible evidence and a new finding of fact. In no event is this Court free in reviewing a case on certiorari to “balance” conflicting declarations and make a conclusion on credibility. The adoption statute explicitly assigns this task to the judge who sees and hears the witnesses. However, I am convinced that it would be pointless to remand the present Eecord. All the testimony in question was heard by the judge and rejected as incompetent only after full consideration. Apart from the question of admissibilty, Judge Mook clearly indicated that he disbelieved this testimony when he said, immediately following the statement of his reasons for holding it incompetent: “The wisdom of this rule is clearly illustrated in the present case.” Furthermore, he categorically rejected other testimony given by Bonnie Sue on points which were corroborated by testimony admitted by the court below. The credibility of the mother was the touchstone of the entire case. It would be illogical to disbelieve most of what she said and base the crucial finding of fact on other portions of her testimony. Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Finally, it will be observed from a reading of the opinion that the court below placed considerable reliance on objective facts which indicated Bonnie Sue’s intention to abandon. The probative value of these facts would be unshaken by the declarations which the court below rejected.
Since the issue before the hearing judge was solely one of credibility, with ample testimony to support his findings of fact, I would affirm the decree.
Mr. Justice Chidsey joins in this dissenting opinion.