Court Opinion

ID: 9515198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:54:30.98607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:26.081726
License: Public Domain

MEIERHENRY, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 23.] I respectfully dissent. I would conclude that the “all vehicles” provision of the search warrant was unconstitutionally broad and that the good faith exception does not apply to the facts of this case. The broad sweep of this opinion erodes our citizens’ Fourth Amendment protections and undermines the court’s duty to insure those rights are protected.
[¶24.] In this case, the only challenge is to the “all vehicles” provision of the warrant. Applying the same analysis laid out in State v. Jackson, 2000 SD 113, 616 N.W.2d 412, leads to the conclusion of insufficient probable cause to search “all vehicles” on the premises. Unlike the late-night illegal drug activities in Jackson, the officer had no information that the stolen property was about to be distributed in broad daylight from the residence or was about to be transported in a vehicle. Therefore, the officer had no logical or reasonable basis to request an “all vehicles” warrant nor did the clerk magistrate have a basis to grant an “all vehicles” warrant.6 A sufficient nexus between the crime and the place to be searched needs more than mere speculation. Consequently, the “good faith” question here is whether the officer relied on a warrant based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” State v. Belmontes, 2000 SD 115, ¶ 11, 615 N.W.2d 634, 638 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
[¶ 25.] As we have previously said, “[i]f an officer’s warrant request lies outside the range of reasonable proficiency expected of an officer, then that officer cannot rely on the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant.” Belmontes, 2000 SD 115, ¶ 29, 615 N.W.2d at 641 (Konenkamp, J., concurring in result) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). In this case, the officer’s warrant request to search “all vehicles” “lies outside the range of reason*201able proficiency expected of an officer.” Additionally, it is unreasonable for an executing officer to rely on a search warrant issued from his own insufficient affidavit. As one court expressed:
When the Supreme Court announced the good faith exception in Leon, it weakened the exclusionary rule, but it did not eviscerate it. “Good faith is not a magic lamp for police officers to rub whenever they find themselves in trouble.” United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1280 (2ndCir.1996). And particularly where the affiant is also one of the executing officers, it is somewhat disingenuous, after having gone to the magistrate with the paltry showing seen here, to suggest, as the government suggests, that at bottom it was the magistrate who made the error and the search and seizure are insulated because the officer’s reliance on that error was objectively reasonable. That aside, “[T]he good faith exception requires a sincerely held and objectively reasonable belief that the warrant is based on a valid application of the law to all known facts.” Id. at 1273. The objective standard “requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.” [US v.] Leon, 468 U.S. [897] at 919-20 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.
United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 437-438 (3dCir.2002). We also recognized the mischief the “good faith” exception could foster: “an officer could submit an inadequate affidavit to a magistrate, which the officer knows is inadequate, and then willy-nilly go out and conduct the search because he has a “good faith” shield against any subsequent challenge.” Belmontes, 2000 SD 115, ¶ 20, 615 N.W.2d at 640. The facts of this case do not merit a good faith exception.

. This particular warrant was issued by a clerk magistrate. Clerk magistrates are not law trained but are allowed by statute to issue search warrants. SDCL 16-12C-7.