Court Opinion

ID: 9770238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:55:25.522152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:15.904140
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority continues to disregard the true connotation of the core statutory term in the definition of the offense of criminal trespass set out in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 30.-05(a), viz: “property ... of another.”
The former statutes and earlier cases “obviously presuppose that the ‘property of another’ contemplates ‘ownership’ in the sense of ‘belonging to,’ ‘possessed by* or ‘held by’ some person other than the alleged trespasser who is bereft of any such ‘ownership.’ ” Kinsey v. State, 861 S.W.2d 383, at 385-386 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (Clinton, J., concurring).
The present statutory phrase embraces “only ‘real property of another,’ ‘of being used in the sense of ‘owning1 such real property.” Langston & Sjodin, 855 S.W.2d 718, at 722 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (Clinton, J., concurring) (emphasis in original); Kinsey v. State, 861 S.W.2d 383, at 385 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (Clinton, J., concurring) (information may be reasonably and fairly read to allege that ap-pellee remained on the property of “Norman Whitlock (‘another’), the owner thereof’).
As thus used in the criminal trespass statute the Legislature understood it was protecting the “property of another” whose “ownership” and concomitant rights are exclusive against intruders who have no right of possession whatsoever. Vanderburg v. State, 843 S.W.2d 286, at 288-289 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1992). Joint ownership can be a defense to criminal trespass because the defendant who enters his jointly owned property does not enter “property of another,” that is, “a person other than the [defendant].” Palmer v. State, 764 S.W.2d 332, at 334 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1988), and cases cited, no PDR. Therefore, a finding of “greater right of possession” is not sufficient to support a “conviction for criminal trespass.” E.g., State v. Staley, 814 S.W.2d 534, at 535 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1991), PDR refused; Langston v. State, 812 S.W.2d 406, at 408 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1991), af*380firmed on other grounds 855 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).
Because the majority is laying groundwork for considerable confusion, if not much mischief, I must dissent.
MILLER and MEYERS, JJ., join.