Court Opinion

ID: 9666185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:07:20.99125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:24.603210
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur with the result reached by the majority in the remaining points of error, I respectfully dissent to the disposition reached in interrelated points of error one, two, three, four and five1. For the *527following reasons, I would abate this appeal.
As I understand the majority opinion, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), stands for the following proposition: when the possibility of a conflict of interest is brought to the attention of the trial court by either a pretrial motion or a trial objection, the trial court has the constitutional duty to determine whether a conflict exists, and, if such a conflict exists, to take appropriate remedial action. Pg. 519. In short, upon receiving notice of a possible conflict of interest, the trial court has a constitutional duty to make an inquiry into the possibility of that conflict.
Appellant’s reluctance to accept legal counsel stemmed from disagreements between appellant and Hunt and Guerrero, the attorneys who represented appellant at his original trial for the same offense. Appellant’s initial conviction and death sentence were reversed because of the inability of the court reporter to provide this Court with a complete statement of facts for appellate review. Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). When the trial court attempted to provide appellant with Hunt and Guerrero for the second trial, appellant lodged the following objection:
The third reason I [appellant] have that is objectionable to the Court-appointed attorneys is that I filed a malpractice [sic] against said attorney that representation of them [sic] in the first trial that was conducted in this case [was ineffective]. Attorney Robert Hunt even mentioned said suit to the defendant on July 17, 1987, and stated that he had to hire an attorney to represent him because of the suit.
At p. 518.
The majority acknowledges that the foregoing objection regarding the pending malpractice suit against Hunt and Guerrero, in connection with their original representation of appellant, was sufficient under Holloway to alert the trial court that a possible conflict of interest existed. Once alerted, the trial court had a constitutional duty under Holloway to inquire into the possible conflict. An inquiry by the trial court would have accomplished three objectives. First, such an inquiry was of the utmost importance because appellant was charged with the offense of capital murder and had previously been sentenced to death for this alleged offense. Therefore, appellant clearly needed conflict free counsel to prepare for his trial rather than being left to fend for himself. Secondly, such an inquiry would have allowed Hunt and Guerrero to respond to appellant’s allegations. Possibly, the two attorneys considered the malpractice suit nothing more than a nuisance and a dilatory tactic by appellant. Perhaps Hunt and Guerrero harbored no ill will toward appellant, and, therefore, no conflict of interest existed. Finally, such an inquiry would have provided this Court with an appellate record sufficient to determine if a conflict of interest existed as alleged in appellant’s points of error one, two, three, four and five. Without such an inquiry, the trial court did not discharge its constitutional duty under Holloway.
Because we cannot determine from the record before us whether a conflict existed, I believe this appeal should be abated and the cause remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine if such a conflict existed.2 I do not believe that we should address the merits of appellant’s points of error one, two, three, four and five until we have a complete record on the conflict of interest issue before us. For these reasons I respectfully dissent to the affirmance of this cause, at this time.
MALONEY, J., joins this opinion.

. Appellant’s Points of Error One through Five:
1) The trial court committed reversible error when it presented appellant with the “Hobson’s Choice" of accepting Mr. Hunt and Mr. Guerrero as appointed counsel or representing himself against a charge of capital murder after appellant had apprised the court of an ethical and actual conflict of interest between appellant and these particular attorneys.
2) Appellant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by both the Texas and United States Constitutions when the trial court appointed Mr. Hunt and Mr. Guerrero as standby counsel over appellant’s objection that an ethical and actual conflict of interest existed between appellant and these particular attorneys.
3) Appellant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by both the Texas and United States Constitutions when the trial court appointed Mr. Hunt and Mr. Guerrero to represent appellant at trial over appellant’s objection that an ethical and actual conflict of interest existed between appellant and these particular attorneys.
4) Appellant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by both the Texas and United States Constitutions when the trial court reappointed Mr. Hunt and Mr. Guerrero as standby counsel over appellant's objection that an ethical and actual conflict of interest existed between appellant and these particular attorneys.
5) The trial court committed reversible error by denying appellant’s pre-trial request for the appointment of conflict-free assistance of counsel when to do so would not have caused any unnecessary delay in the proceedings.

. This Court has abated appeals in the past. See, Reynolds v. State, 760 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st] 1988) where we remanded the cause to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Afterwards, the trial court forwarded the statement of facts from that hearing to the Court of Appeals for review.