Court Opinion

ID: 9564895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:10:59.451962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:13.719853
License: Public Domain

Justice EXUM
dissenting.
I fully agree with the majority’s analysis of the legal problem presented. The majority has correctly identified the applicable legal principles by which the conduct of the police officers here must be judged. There was, in my view, a seizure of the occupants of the van, particularly the defendant Thompson, pursuant to which Officer Wolak got himself in a position to observe the hashish “in plain view” inside the van. The majority so assumes.
The question, therefore, is whether this seizure was justified under the circumstances present here. The majority concludes that it was. It is with this conclusion that I disagree. The state has shown no “specific and articulable facts,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), giving rise to inferences which in turn could form the basis of a reasonable or founded suspicion even through the eyes of reasonable and trained officers that the occupants of the van might have been engaged in particular criminal activity so as to justify the officers’ intrusion.
It is important first to note that at the time of this incident the Wilmington Azalea Festival, an old and well-known celebration marking the coming of spring and blossoming of azaleas, was in progress. The festival attracts tens of thousands of people to the area. Overnight accommodations are at an expensive premium and thousands of young people opt for traveling and sleeping in van-type motor vehicles as the young people in this case were obviously doing in a parking area open to the public at large. The *709occupants of the van were equipped with sleeping bags. The parking area was at the very end of U.S. Highway 421 close to a boat ramp —a natural place under the circumstances to settle in for the night.
I simply cannot conclude, as the majority does, that the mere existence of this van and its occupants at the location described somehow gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Neither do general reports of unspecified “break-ins” in the area involving an unspecified van of which the officers had no description give rise to a reasonable suspicion that this van and these persons were engaged in such activity.
The majority relies on Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Both these cases are distinguishable. In Terry a policeman of some 39 years experience observed three men standing on a corner for ten to twelve minutes. Two of them took turns walking down the street to a particular store and looking in the window. They would then return and confer. This pattern was repeated ten to twelve times. This behavior led the officer to believe they were planning a robbery. They were, in his words, “ ‘casing a job, a stick-up.’ ” Id. at 6. Upon going to them to investigate, the officer frisked defendant Terry, found a gun on him and placed him under arrest. The United States Supreme Court concluded that his actions were reasonable and justified under the Fourth Amendment.
Likewise, in Adams v. Williams, supra, there was a reasonable suspicion that a suspect had committed, or was about to commit, a particular crime. In Adams a police officer was on patrol in a “high-crime neighborhood.” He received a tip from an informant that an individual seated in a nearby car was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. On approaching the car, the officer reached in and removed a loaded revolver from the individual’s waistband. He then placed him under arrest and upon searching the car found other weapons and narcotics. Again, his actions were found sustainable under the Fourth Amendment.
In both Terry and Adams, police officers were possessed of specific facts which indicated that specific indivduals might have committed or were planning to commit particular crimes. While these facts were not considered sufficient to rise to the level of *710probable cause, they were enough to give rise in each case to a reasonable suspicion in the officers’ minds. There are no such facts in this case.
This case is instead quite like United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), which I believe controls it. There officers of the Border Patrol were on lookout near the Mexican border late at night for illegal aliens. They pursued defendant’s car and stopped it, finding two illegal aliens in it. Defendant was arrested and convicted for transporting illegal immigrants. Aside from the facts that it was late at night and near the border (i.e., at a time and place where such illegal activity would normally occur), the only reason the officers could articulate for having pursued and stopped the car was that the occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed defendant’s conviction. It held: (1) while Border Patrol officers could make roving-patrol stops they had to have a reasonable suspicion to do so; and (2) while appearance of Mexican descent was a relevant factor it was not under these circumstances justification for a stop.
In the case at bar, the officers were unable to point to any untoward activity on the part of the individuals involved as the officers in both Terry and Adams were able to do. Instead they could articulate only a generalized suspicion based apparently on the time, the place, and the facts that “a van” was involved and they had reports of unspecified “break-ins” involving a van in the area. Lacking more specific information about the break-ins which would tie this particular van or even one fitting its description to the “break-ins,” the officers here had no more reason to suspect criminal activity than the Border Patrol in Brignoni-Ponce.
For these reasons I believe there was error in failing to allow defendants’ motion to suppress the hashish seized and I vote for a new trial.