Court Opinion

ID: 9520614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:45:21.762231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:32.134925
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in result but for different reasons than Judge Garrard. First, I do not think that it is accurate to conclude, as Judge Hoffman does in his opinion, that "In the Johnson case the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held a similar statute imposed such a duty on railroads for the benefit of surrounding landowners." What the Seventh Circuit actually held in Johnson was that even if the duty created by the statute was so limited, the instruction given at trial removed any argument regarding the possibility of such limitation. Its actual holding was as follows: ,
"Finally B & O objects to an instruction that a violation of Indiana's weed-cutting statute, Burns' Ind.Stats. Annot. -Code Ed. 8-38-7-1 [55-8512] (1978), constitutes evidence of negligence. The statute requires the cutting and destruction of 'noxious weeds' growing on railroad property between July 1 to July 20 of each year. We find no harm in the instruction. While the statute may well have been primarily aimed at the spread of weeds and brush to contiguous land, the instruction required a finding not only that B & O had violated the statute but also that such violation appreciably contributed to Johnson's injuries. This removed any possible objection to the court's action in this regard." (My emphasis.)
Johnson v. Baltimore & O.R. Co. (7th Cir.1976), 528 F.2d 1313, at 1316.
Secondly, Judge Hoffman's conclusion that "Ind.Code 82-10-4-1 (Burns Code Ed.) imposes a duty on the state to trim natural growth along curves and intersections to *353prevent it from obstructing motorist's view." is questionable in light of the Fourth District's opinion in Board of Com'rs of Monroe Cty. v. Hatton (1981), Ind.App., 427 N.E.2d 696. Strictly applying the language of the statute, Hatton held that there was only a duty to trim the weeds down to five feet and not to whatever height is necessary to achieve visual safety for motorists. Judge Young, author of the Hatton opinion, wrote the following analysis:
"The statute, as originally enacted in 1891, specifically covered the cutting of hedge or other live fences. In 1891 visibility concerns were primarily focused upon the visibility of horses. In 1921 the statute was extended to cover 'other obstructions' and in 1983 'other natural growth.' No changes were made concerning the height requirement. In addition, LC. 32-10-5-1 limits partition fences to 'a height of not to exceed five feet'. A fence of two feet or less would defeat the purpose of a fence. Therefore, to accept plaintiff's meaning would require elimination of live fences if they obstructed the view. If this were the legislative intent, they would have so stated. The language, used in its ordinary sense and consistent with other see-tions, indicates nothing more than a duty to cut any offending growth to five feet. The statute does not impose a duty to cut below five feet if necessary to open the view."
Bd. of Com'rs of Monroe Cty., supra at 708. If we follow Judge Young's analysis of the statute, there is no need to find a comparable statute for county highways as suggested by Judge Hoffman in his opinion.
I agree that whether the county has a common law duty to reasonably maintain safe roads for motorists is a question of law and not a question of fact for the jury. Walters v. Kellam & Foley (1977), 172 Ind.App. 207, 360 N.E.2d 199, 205. As Judge Sullivan points out in Walters:
"If a duty exists as a matter of law, it is generally within the province of the jury to determine whether under the precise facts of the case, the defendant's conduct measured up to the legal standard of care required by the relationship."
Walters, supra at 205.