Court Opinion

ID: 9646267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:54:38.478968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:36.189649
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion sustains appellant’s second point of error on the basis that there is no probative evidence concerning “the number of payments appellant made under the agreement or the date appellant breached the agreement.” I respectfully submit that it was not necessary for appel-lee to prove the date of default because both parties, at the beginning of the trial, stipulated there were no issues of fact as to the fact of default or the date of the breach. Before the first witness was sworn, the following transpired:
THE COURT: Okay. I asked what the controverted issues of fact are. Is there a controversy over the date of the default?
*909[APPELLEE’S COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor, there’s no controversy. There's no controversy over the date that he quit paying rentals.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I think, Your Honor, to clarify things there’s no doubt the lease was executed. There’s no doubt a default occurred. I do not have the date of the default. Whatever date the counsel represents to the Court I’m willing to accept that. Then we get into what occurred after the default as far as the equipment, the value of the equipment, where it’s located, how much it was sold for. Those I think are the contested issues of facts and then from that fits obviously the Court’s decision as to the applicable law.
Appellant’s counsel specifically conceded that the date of default was whatever date appellee said it was. The parties agreed that was not a contested matter.
In its original petition, appellee stated: “Defendant has failed to pay the monthly rental payments when due. Rental payments have been due since October 15, 1986.” As a result of the stipulation that there was no issue of fact as to the date of default, appellee’s statement in its original petition as to the date of default is to be taken as true. A trial court can properly take judicial notice of pleadings in a case. Johnson v. Coca-Cola Co., 727 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r. e.); Texas Sec. Corp. v. Peters, 463 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1971, no writ). The pleadings themselves are not evidence, but a stipulation of the parties that certain allegations are true and uncontested obviates the need for evidence as to the matters conceded to by the defendant.
The rental agreement provided for payments of $458.80 per month, plus taxes, for 63 months commencing on November 15, 1985. The date of default was October 15, 1986. Therefore, 52 months remained on the rental agreement after default, and at a rental rate of $458.80 per month, a total of $23,857.60 would have been paid by appellant if there had been no default and payments were made through the end of the lease term.
The case was tried on the theory of anticipatory breach of the lease. Under this theory, appellee had to prove the present value of the remaining rental obligations that would have accrued under the lease contract, reduced by the reasonable market value of the unexpired term of the lease. Crabtree v. Southmark Commercial Management, 704 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Speedee Mart, Inc. v. Stovall, 664 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1983, no writ).
When the factfinder is provided with the sum total of the remaining rental obligations, it is within its prerogative to determine the present value of the future damages. In Texas, specific evidence of the present value discount rate is not required. Missouri R.R. v. Kimbrell, 160 Tex. 542, 547, 334 S.W.2d 283, 286 (1960); Taylor Publishing Co. v. Systems Mktg., Inc., 686 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
With regard to the last element of appel-lee’s measure of damages, i.e., “the reasonable market value of the unexpired term of the lease,” appellee’s witness testified as follows:
Question: If some TIE Ultracom 1236 equipment in used fashion was picked up since 1985, what is the likelihood that, say, 20 or so of those used TIE Ultracom 1236 telephones, what is the likelihood that any of them would have been rerent-ed?
Answer: Very, very small, very, very small.
Question: What is the likelihood that they will be rerented by October of 1990?
Answer: There again, very small.
Question: Would you say almost none?
Answer: Practically nil.
Question: Is the TIE Ultracom 1236 telephone currently being rented out as new equipment by TSI?
Answer: No, sir.
From this evidence, the trial court could have concluded that the unexpired term of *910the phone equipment lease had little or no reasonable market value.
In my opinion, the trial court had before it sufficient evidence on all the essential elements of appellee’s claim for damages to support its judgment in the amount of $18,-051.98. This is true, even disregarding the testimony of Mildred Davidson, which was complained about in appellant’s first point of error.
Because I conclude the error, if any, in admitting Davidson’s testimony was harmless, due to other sufficient, independent evidence to support the judgment, I would overrule appellant’s point of error one.
Because I believe the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment, I would overrule points of error two and three.
In point of error four, appellant asserts the trial court erred in entering the judgment in its present form because the judgment does not name against whom the judgment is recoverable. The judgment simply states that Plaintiff is “granted judgment in the amount of” $18,051.98.
There is only one plaintiff and one defendant in this case. If the identity of a party can be established from the caption, records, pleadings, and process in the case, the failure to name the party in the body of the judgment may be disregarded. Gomez v. Bryant, 750 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1988, no writ); see also Schaeffer Homes, Inc v. Esterak, 792 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, no writ); Crystal City Indep. School Dist. v. Wagner, 605 S.W.2d 748, 745 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Appellee sought judgment in its pleadings against appellant; appellant was served and answered; and appellant appeared at trial to defend the case. Appellant was the only one appellee could have been granted a judgment against.
I would overrule point of error four.
I would affirm the judgment.