Court Opinion

ID: 9707676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:18:05.663827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:36.649790
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge,
dissenting:
The basic issue1 in this appeal, which arises from the underlying action for support instituted by appellee, Caleb Milne, against his mother and father, is the effect of estrangement upon the qualified duty of a parent to assist to provide a college education for his or her child. I am compelled to this expression because I share the view of the eminent Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Judge William T. Nicholas that estrangement should not be a bar to an action for such support.
Karen and David Milne were married on April 16, 1962, and separated twenty-two years later in December of 1984. Caleb, the younger of two children born of the marriage, was a high school senior at the time of the separation of his parents, and continued to reside in the marital home with his mother for three months after the separation until, in March, 1985, by reason of the strain in relations between himself and his mother, he left the marital residence to reside in the home of his father. Six months after Caleb commenced to reside in the home of his father, he matriculated at the University of Richmond where he completed his freshman year of college and attained a 3.0 average. His father, appellee David Milne, provided for the payment of all expenses incurred by Caleb during the 1985-1986 academic year, and Caleb continued to reside with his father whenever he was not in residence at the University, Caleb had originally wished to attend Occidental College in California, and when that institution admitted him for completion of his undergraduate studies, he commenced this action *202of support against his mother and father to secure financial assistance in meeting the anticipated second year college expenses of $16,000, a sum far greater than his approximate yearly earnings of $3,000. The hearing court concluded that the estrangement was not a bar to an action for support by the son, and (1) directed Caleb’s father, appellee David Milne, to pay Caleb’s entire tuition, room, board, and transportation to and from college, and (2) directed Caleb’s mother, appellant Karen Milne, to partially reimburse David Milne for such education expenses by remitting to appellee the sum of $62.50 per week ($3250.00 per year). Appellant timely appealed.
The testimony of the parties established that Caleb did not communicate with or visit his mother after moving into the home of his father, and Karen Milne testified that, prior to his departure, her son “spat in my face and shoved me so that I fell over. He never spat but once. He did push me more than once. He struck me at least twice____ It was unpleasant in our house.” Thus, there is quite a valid basis for the finding of the hearing court that, sad to relate, the mother and son were estranged.
The principles which guide consideration of this claim by a son for contribution by his mother toward the cost of college study are well established. “The purpose of child support is to promote the best interest of the child; the associated legal obligation of parents is to provide for the reasonable expenses of raising the child.” Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 402, 528 A.2d 1318, 1322 (1987). The qualified duty of a parent to support a child in college was first delineated by this Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Sommerville, 200 Pa.Super. 640, 190 A.2d 182 (1963):
We believe that the law of this Commonwealth requires a father, under certain circumstances, to support a child while attending college and that this appeal brings squarely before us the question of what circumstances will justify the entry of a support order in favor of such child. In the first place, before the father should be *203required by court order to support a child in college, the child should be able and willing to successfully pursue his course of studies. Commonwealth ex rel. Grossman v. Grossman, supra, 188 Pa.Super. 236, 241, 146 A.2d 315 (1958). In the second place, the father should have sufficient estate, earning capacity or income to enable him to pay the order without undue hardship.
The duty of a parent to provide a college education for a child is not as exacting a requirement as the duty to provide food, clothing and shelter for a child of tender years unable to support himself. It is a natural law that a parent should spare no personal sacrifice to feed and protect his offspring. Therefore, beyond the barest necessities, a father should be required to sacrifice personal comfort in order to provide the necessities of a child too young to support himself. The same exacting requirement should not be demanded of a father to provide a college education for a child able to support himself. We are not suggesting that a father should be required to support a child in college only when the father’s income or estate is such that he could do so without making any personal sacrifices. Most parents who send a child to college sacrifice to do so. No mathematical rule can be formulated to determine how extensive the hardship upon a father must be before it will excuse him from supporting a child in college. It must be a matter of judgment in a field where the judgments of sincere and advised men differ materially.
Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Sommerville, supra, 200 Pa.Superior Ct. at 643-44, 190 A.2d at 184 (emphasis in original). Accord: Emrick v. Emrick, 445 Pa. 428, 430-431, 284 A.2d 682, 683 (1971); Leonard v. Leonard, 353 Pa.Super. 604, 608-609, 510 A.2d 827, 829-830 (1986); Miller v. Miller, 269 Pa.Super. 83, 86-87, 409 A.2d 74, 76 (1979). See also: Chesonis v. Chesonis, 372 Pa.Super. 113, 115-116, 538 A.2d 1376, 1378 (1988); Commonwealth ex rel. Stump v. Church, 333 Pa.Super. 166, 169-171, 481 A.2d 1358, 1360 (1984); DeVergilius v. DeVergilius, 329 Pa.Super. 434, 436, 478 A.2d *204866, 868 (1984); Curtis v. Curtis, 326 Pa.Super. 40, 43-44, 473 A.2d 697, 599 (1984).
It is, of course, well settled that
[o]n appeal, a trial court’s child support order will not be disturbed unless there is insufficient evidence to sustain it or the court abused its discretion in fashioning the award. An abuse, of discretion is not “ ‘merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.’ ”
Fee v. Fee, 344 Pa.Super. 276, 279, 496 A.2d 793, 794 (1985) quoting Boni v. Boni, 302 Pa.Super. 102, 109, 448 A.2d 547, 550 (1982) (citations omitted). Accord: DeWalt v. DeWalt, 365 Pa.Super. 280, 283-284, 529 A.2d 508, 510 (1987); Michael v. Michael, 360 Pa.Super. 312, 315-316, 520 A.2d 473, 475 (1987); Leonard v. Leonard, supra 353 Pa.Super. at 608-609, 510 A.2d at 829; Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v. Leider, 335 Pa.Super. 249, 254-256, 484 A.2d 117, 120 (1984); Straub v. Tyahla, 274 Pa.Super. 411, 414-415, 418 A.2d 472, 474 (1980).
Appellant initially argues that the hearing court abused its discretion when it held that the estrangement of Caleb and appellant was not a bar to an action for support by Caleb. This Court has previously recognized only two prerequisities to the entry of an order of college support: first, that the child establish a willingness and ability to successfully pursue a college education, and, secondly, that the evidence disclose an earning capacity or income sufficient to enable the parent to provide financial assistance to the child without assuming undue hardship. The question of whether estrangement will preclude an award of support for a child attending college has not, until this decision, been precisely decided by the appellate courts of this Commonwealth,2 although our Supreme Court has stated, in the *205context of the support for a child under the age of eighteen, that “the amount of time a parent spends with his or her children has no bearing on that parent’s obligation of support. Even a parent who never sees his or her children has a duty to support those children to the best of his or her ability.” Melzer v. Witsberger, 505 Pa. 462, n. 6, 480 A.2d 991, 996 n. 6 (1984).
This Court here squarely confronts the issue and adds a third prerequisite to the entry of an order of college support, namely, evidence that the child, by virtue of the relationship between the child and the parent, is “deserving” of the financial support he or she seeks. I am unable to agree that the present two-tiered test for such support should be expanded to include an inquiry into the parent-child relationship. I would instead, by reason of public policy considerations, hold that the estrangement of parent and child should not of itself, if the child has the ability to pursue college studies and the parent has sufficient resources, relieve the parent of the duty of continuing to. contribute to the support of a child pursuing a college education.
This Commonwealth is now numbered among those jurisdictions which permit dissolution of the marriage bond through the process of “no-fault” divorce. The legislature adopted the “no-fault” procedure only after prolonged consideration, and after proclaiming:
§ 102. Legislative findings and intent
(a) The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation of the family is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to:
(1) Make the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience.
*206(2) Encourage and effect reconciliation and settlement of differences between spouses, especially where children are involved.
(3) Give primary consideration to the welfare of the family rather than the vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs.
Kf >S* £ >{* >¡i $
23 Pa.C.S. § 102(a)(1, 2), (3).
As a result, the dissolution of a marriage is permitted without consideration of the events or conduct which may have led to the discord and the divorce, and the focus during the division of assets is the fact that the parties were once partners, rather than the circumstances which severed the partnership. It would seem prudent, as well as consistent, to have the “realities” which inspired the legislature to adopt no-fault procedures for estranged partners to a marriage guide resolution of the instant issue of support.
First, a finding as to the cause of the estrangement between parent and child could only follow an adversarial proceeding into fault, an impossible task for any earthly court since the determination would require a review and evaluation of the dynamics of the family relationship over the years of its existence. As our sister tribunal in Illinois opined in addressing this issue:
... defendant argues that his daughter has refused to have anything to do with him for many years, that the estrangement is the daughter’s fault and since she has now reached her majority he ought not to be required to contribute further to her support for any purpose. Being required to contribute to his daughter’s educational expenses is characterized by defendant as a ‘penalty’ which defendant insists he should not be required to sustain for the benefit of an ungrateful daughter____ Defendant has cited no Illinois cases and our research has likewise produced no authorities which have directly applied or discussed the fault of children concept as bearing on the obligation of parents. However to say as a matter of law that the estrangement between child and parent where *207there has been matrimonal discord between parents resulting in divorce can be solely the fault of a child is to state a principle difficult to sustain either on reason or logic____ Without deciding which of the parents was responsible for the acrimony it requires no great insight to conclude that the daughter’s attitudes and relations with her parents were shaped by many influences beyond her control and were more likely the result of conduct of both parents.
Hight v. Hight, 5 Ill.App.3d 991, 993-994, 284 N.E.2d 679, 681 (1972).
Second, application of risk/benefit principles demonstrates that an inquiry into the parent/ehild relationship would not be purposeful. If, where the parent and child are estranged, an inquiry into fault were to be conducted and a court were to erroneously relieve a parent of the obligation of support, both the child and society would be wrongly deprived of the benefits which a college education would bestow. On the other hand, were the court to err by burdening the parent with the duty to assist an undeserving child, the only damage occasioned thereby would be financial loss to the parent. It is thus apparent that the risk of erroneously depriving a deserving child far outweighs the risk of bestowing such a benefit upon an undeserving child.
Third, a cost/benefit analysis reveals that an inquiry into the basis for the estrangement would, in the long run, prove unwise for the parent, as well as the child. Surely, an adverserial proceeding into fault will serve to cement the bitterness between parent and child, and cause that filial relationship to be all but irretrievable. On the other hand, if the courts were to preclude an inquiry into the nature and depth, as well as responsibility for, the estrangement, the parent is enabled to view financial assistance provided an estranged child as the price of the inner peace that is certain to flow in subsequent years from the knowledge that the parent did not permit the merely material to thwart the possibility of a future reconciliation. This approach but mirrors, of course, the lesson of the ancients that without a *208father of unrelenting patience, unfailing forebearance, and unending forgiveness, there could not have been a prodigal son.
Thus it is that I would hold that the estrangement of parent and child should not of itself, if the child has the ability to pursue college studies and the parent has sufficient resources, relieve the parent of the duty of continuing to contribute to the support of a child pursuing a college education.
OLSZEWSKI, BROSKY and POPOVICH, JJ., join.

. An action for divorce was pending at the time of the support hearing.

. This issue was addressed as dicta in DeWalt v. DeWalt, supra, 365 Pa.Super. at 287-288, 529 A.2d at 512, and in a concurring opinion in *205Chesonis v. Chesonis, supra 372 Fa.Super. at 116-117, 538 A.2d at 1378-1379 (Concurring Opinion by Cirillo, P.J.)