Court Opinion

ID: 9855155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:20:22.560613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:42.302609
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree with the majority that under the present statutory scheme, a party seeking appellate review of an order granting or refusing temporary alimony must comply with the interlocutory appeal procedure of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). However, I do not agree with the implication of the majority opinion that an order awarding or denying temporary alimony has always been subject to the interlocutory appeal provisions of what is now OCGA § 5-6-34 and that the resolution of the issue before us is simply a matter of applying Scruggs v. Ga. DHR, 261 Ga. 587 (408 SE2d 103) (1991) and Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 469, fn. 2 (448 SE2d 192) (1994). Therefore, I write separately to demonstrate that the conclusion as to appealability we reach today is a direct result of specific statutory changes made by the General Assembly in 1979. The rationale of Scruggs, which correctly overruled Straus v. Straus, 260 Ga. 327 (1) (393 SE2d 248) (1990), is simply that OCGA § 5-6-35 provides that orders which were otherwise di*834rectly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 were no longer appealable absent the approval by the appellate court of an application for discretionary appeal as provided in OCGA § 5-6-35. Scruggs further recognized, however, that if an order which is subject to the discretionary provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35 is also one requiring pursuit of the interlocutory appeal provisions of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), compliance with the requirements of both Code sections was mandated. See also Rebich v. Miles, supra.
Thus, application of OCGA §§ 5-6-34 and 5-6-35 to the order in the present case reveals that the award of temporary alimony is not only within the subject matter classification of cases under OCGA § 5-6-35, but is also one which, from a temporal standpoint, is not appeal-able without a certificate of immediate review and compliance with the interlocutory provisions of OCGA § 5-6-34. However, that has not always been the case. For its conclusion as to the applicability of OCGA § 5-6-34, the majority relies upon Ritchea v. Ritchea, 242 Ga. 524 (250 SE2d 435) (1978) and Gray v. Gray, 226 Ga. 767 (2) (177 SE2d 575) (1970). Those pre-1979 cases offer absolutely no support for that conclusion. Ritchea was a direct appeal from an order granting temporary alimony and nowhere addresses the appealability issue. Gray specifically and unequivocally holds that “[t]he judgment denying temporary alimony was an appealable judgment, and error may be assigned on the temporary custody order which was included in the same order, without reference to the appealability of the custody order standing alone.” (Emphasis supplied.) Gray v. Gray, supra at 768. Gray simply recognized that OCGA § 5-6-34 (a), as originally enacted, specifically authorized a direct appeal from a judgment granting or denying an award of temporary alimony. Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18-19. At that time, an interlocutory order not specifically mentioned in OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) was not appealable absent the entry of a certificate of immediate review from the trial court. When OCGA § 5-6-34 was subsequently amended by Ga. L. 1975, p. 757 so as to require not only the trial court’s certificate, but also the pursuit of the interlocutory application procedures of subsection (b), the direct appealability of temporary alimony awards was unaffected.
However, in 1979, the General Assembly enacted the discretionary appeal statute, now codified as OCGA § 5-6-35, which required application to and approval by the appropriate appellate court from orders in certain “types of cases.” The new statute applied to appeals in most domestic relations cases, including “judgments or orders granting or refusing . . . temporary . . . alimony. ...” Ga. L. 1979, pp. 619, 621. However, what is significant is that the same legislation also specifically amended what is now OCGA § 5-6-34 by deleting “application for alimony, either temporary or permanent” from the listing of judgments which, from a finality standpoint, were directly *835appealable. Ga. L. 1979, pp. 619, 620. Thus, prior to 1979, the grant or refusal of temporary alimony was directly appealable by notice of appeal without a certificate of immediate review or pursuit of the interlocutory appeal provisions of OCGA § 5-6-34 and, of course, there was no “discretionary” application procedure for any orders otherwise directly appealable. However, as a result of the 1979 enactment, an order granting or denying temporary alimony not only became subject to the discretionary application procedures applicable to other domestic relations cases, pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35, it also lost its temporal direct appealability because of the amendment to OCGA § 5-6-34. For these reasons, I agree with the majority that an order granting or denying temporary alimony is not appealable absent compliance with OCGA §§ 5-6-34 and 5-6-35.
Decided June 3, 1996 —
Reconsideration denied June 28, 1996.
Gerald P. Privin, for appellant.
Shepherd & Johnston, William G. Johnston III, for appellee.