Court Opinion

ID: 9913078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 20:06:43.809812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:58.898953
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Yost v. Crossridge, Inc., 2023-Ohio-4721.]

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   JEFFERSON COUNTY

  STATE OF OHIO EX REL. DAVE YOST, OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                            Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                         v.

                                   CROSSRIDGE, INC. ET AL.,

                                        Defendants-Appellants.

                         OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                           Case No. 23 JE 0005

                                      Civil Appeal from the
                         Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, Ohio
                                     Case No. 99CV00137

                                          BEFORE:
                  David A. D’Apolito, Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

                                                 JUDGMENT:
                                                   Affirmed.

 Atty. Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Atty. Amy M. Geocaris, Atty. Amber Wootton-
 Hertlein, Atty. Emily E. Hudson and Atty. Matthew E. Meyer, Assistant Attorneys
 General, Environmental Enforcement Section, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

 Atty. Steven A. Stickles, for Defendants-Appellants.

                                        Dated: December 14, 2023
                                                                                                       –2–

 D’APOLITO, P.J.

        {¶1}    Appellant, Joseph G. Scugoza, appeals the February 3, 2023 judgment of
the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas finding him in civil contempt for 20 violations
of its previous orders, including October 8, 2003, October 15, 2012, August 5, 2014, and
September 11, 2019.1 On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in adopting
Appellee’s, State of Ohio, ex rel. Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, proposed purge
terms because they were impossible for him to complete. Appellant also contends the
court erred in ordering a $250 fine on each finding of contempt and ordering that each
fine be levied consecutively for a total of $5,000. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

                             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        {¶2}    This court set forth the following facts and procedural history underlying this
case in Appellant’s first appeal, State ex rel. Yost v. Crossridge, Inc., 2022-Ohio-1455,
188 N.E.3d 629 (7th Dist.):

        This matter has been litigated at length before the trial court and this Court
        since its inception in April of 1999. The facts up until this point are largely
        taken from our Opinion in State ex rel. DeWine v. C&D Disposal Techs.,
        2016-Ohio-476, 58 N.E.3d 614 (7th Dist.) (“C&D II”).

        Crossridge is a corporation that operated a landfill in Jefferson County.
        Joseph N. Scugoza, now deceased, was the principle shareholder of
        Crossridge. In April of 1999, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency
        brought an enforcement action against Crossridge and Mr. Scugoza. In May
        of 2001, the estate of Joseph N. Scugoza was substituted as a party in place
        of Mr. Scugoza after a suggestion of death was filed. After Mr. Scugoza’s
        death, his son, Appellee, took over as managing member and principle

1 Crossridge, Inc. (“Crossridge”) is also a named party.   However, for purposes of this appeal, we will only
refer to Scugoza as Appellant.

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      shareholder of Crossridge. Appellee was also the principle and sole
      shareholder of C&D.

      In October of 2003, the parties reached a settlement and entered into a
      consent order and final judgment (“2003 consent order”). As part of the
      agreement, the estate of Joseph N. Scugoza was dismissed. In return, C&D
      consented to become a party defendant and to guarantee Crossridge’s
      compliance with the order and the payment of the applicable civil penalties.
      The 2003 consent order resolved the environmental enforcement action
      and enjoined and ordered the parties to comply with its terms. Appellee
      signed the order as both executor of his father’s estate and as the principle
      of C&D. In October of 2007, the parties entered into an extra-judicial
      agreement (“2007 extra-judicial agreement”), which partially amended the
      2003 consent order. C&D II at ¶ 3-4.

      In March of 2011, the state filed contempt charges against Crossridge,
      C&D, and Appellant as an individual for failure to comply with the 2003
      consent order. The trial court dismissed the complaint due to the state’s
      failure to reference the 2007 extra-judicial agreement. The state appealed
      the trial court’s decision in State ex rel. DeWine v. C&D Disposal
      Technologies, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 11 JE 19, 2012-Ohio-3005, 2012 WL
      2522288, (“C&D I”). On appeal, we reversed the trial court’s decision and
      held that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the contempt
      complaint without first holding a show cause hearing.

      On remand, notice of a hearing was sent to all parties. Appellant’s notice
      was sent to his attorney, who informed the court that he had withdrawn from
      representation of Appellant. However, he claimed that he had forwarded the
      notice to Appellant at his business address. Appellant failed to attend the
      hearing. The trial court entered judgment against Appellant (individually),
      Crossridge, and C&D, jointly and severally. In the court’s 2012 contempt
      order, the defendants were ordered to provide financial assurances within

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      thirty days, comply with the final and post-closure plans, close the landfill
      within one year, begin post-closure care of the landfill, and pay the
      stipulated penalty of $19,316,000. Instead of directly appealing the trial
      court’s order, Appellant filed a pro se Civ.R. 60(B)(1) motion on behalf of
      not only himself, but he also purported to represent Crossridge and C&D.
      The court denied the motion. Importantly, Appellant did not appeal the
      court’s decision. Id. at ¶ 7.

      Approximately one year later, Appellant filed a second and successive
      Civ.R.60 (B)(1) motion, this time through counsel. The trial court granted
      Appellant’s second motion. In C&D II, we reversed the judgment of the trial
      court, holding that Appellant’s remedy was to have filed a direct appeal, not
      a successive Civ.R. 60(B) motion. It does not appear that any attempt has
      been made to date to enforce the 2012 contempt finding.

      Since that time, there have been several filings and hearings before the trial
      court. Relevant to this matter, on October 28, 2019, the state filed “Written
      Charges in Contempt, Motion to Show Cause & Request Hearing” against
      Appellant, Crossridge Inc., C&D Disposal Technologies, LLC, and the
      Estate of Joseph N. Scugoza.

      The same charges were also filed against “new parties”: Barbara Scugoza
      (wife of Joseph N. Scugoza, deceased), Delores Russell Scugoza (wife of
      Joseph G. Scugoza), Kevin Lisewski (day-to-day manager and operator of
      the site and manager of Phoenix Scrap Metals LLC), Phoenix Scrap Metals,
      LLC (owned by Delores Russell Scugoza), and Phoenix Off Road Park, LLC
      (owned by Delores Russell Scugoza). According to the state, although
      these new parties were not included in any previous court order, there is
      evidence that they acted in concert or participated in the violation of the
      court’s orders.

      The charges included: (1) failure to provide financial assurance for the
      Crossridge Landfill, (2) failure to complete closure of the Crossridge Landfill,

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      (3) failure to properly remove leachate from the Crossridge Landfill and
      open dump area and provide receipts, (4) failure to perform explosive gas
      monitoring at the Crossridge Landfill, (5) failure to perform groundwater
      monitoring of the Crossridge Landfill, (6) failure to begin post-closure care
      of the Crossridge Landfill, (7) failure to pay stipulated penalties, (8) failure
      to provide accounting for off-road events, (9) failure to cover the C&D
      Disposal Landfill, (10) failure to cover erosion rills on the C&D Disposal
      Landfill, (11) acceptance of additional waste, (12) failure to apply for NPDES
      permits, (13) failure to pay civil penalties, (14) failure to remove and dispose
      of solid waste and other materials at the open dump area and provide
      financial assurance for the C&D Disposal Landfill, (15) failure to close the
      C&D Disposal Landfill, (16) failure to perform post-closure care and provide
      financial assurance for the C&D Disposal Landfill, (17) failure to obtain a
      stormwater general permit, (18) failure to stabilize the disturbed area of the
      site, (19) failure to install and maintain proper stormwater controls, and (20)
      failure to provide written discovery.

      Appellant and Crossridge filed an answer to the charges. Delores Russell-
      Scugoza, Phoenix Scrap Metals, LLC, and Phoenix Off Road Park, LLC
      filed a motion to dismiss the charges filed against them based on lack of
      personal jurisdiction. Barbara Scugoza filed a similar motion to dismiss. It
      does not appear that either of these motions have been resolved to date. It
      does not appear that Kevin Lisewski has ever filed an answer or motion to
      dismiss.

      We note that this matter as it concerns defendant C&D Disposal is subject
      to a bankruptcy stay as of March 20, 2019. It does not appear that the stay
      has yet been lifted. The trial court determined that the stay did not apply to
      codefendant Crossridge. Regardless, this appeal involves only Appellant
      Joseph G. Scugoza, who has admitted to his contempt.

Case No. 23 JE 0005
                                                                                           –6–

      A hearing on the contempt charges was originally set for December 17,
      2019, however, procedural issues within this case delayed the hearing.
      After this Court’s remand on February 8, 2016, the parties continued to file
      motions and the trial court continued to rule on those motions and set
      hearing dates. However, on December 2, 2019, the trial court requested the
      assignment of a visiting judge. The Ohio Supreme Court appointed a visiting
      judge to preside over the case on December 30, 2019. The original trial
      court judge continued all hearings and held all motions in abeyance while
      the appointment was pending. Some motions continue to remain
      outstanding even after the appointment, however, these motions do not
      involve Appellant. The rulings have been delayed, at least in part, due to
      the fact that the visiting judge retired on February 1, 2020, just over a month
      after the appointment. On February 26, 2020, a second visiting judge, who
      is retired, was appointed to the case.

      After the appointment of the second visiting judge, a hearing was held
      where Appellant admitted to his contempt. Then, on July 14, 2021, the trial
      court sentenced Appellant to a $250 fine and 10 days to be served at the
      Jefferson County Jail on each of the twenty counts to run consecutively, for
      an aggregate total of 200 days in jail, and a $5,000 fine. It is from this entry
      that Appellant timely appeals.

      On July 19, 2021, we granted Appellant’s motion for a stay of execution of
      sentence pending appeal. We specified that the stay applied only to the jail
      sentence.

      After the notice of appeal was filed in this matter, the state filed several
      motions both to the trial court and in this Court. First, the state filed a motion
      in the trial court requesting a nunc pro tunc entry specifying that this matter
      involves civil contempt and requesting the inclusion of purge conditions. The
      trial court responded by filing a one-paragraph handwritten entry stating that
      this matter involves civil contempt and that Appellant “may purge the civil

Case No. 23 JE 0005
                                                                                         –7–

       contempt order upon a motion and hearing to this court and this judge. So
       ordered.” (7/28/21 Nunc Pro Tunc.) The state filed a motion in this Court
       requesting that we enlarge the appellate record to include the nunc pro tunc
       entry. We overruled the motion, as the state had a procedure by rule, App.R.
       3(C) (Cross appeal), available for this purpose. The state also filed a motion
       asking this Court to reconsider the issue of whether Appellant must pay a
       supersedeas bond. We overruled the motion.

       On July 28, 2021, the state filed a motion seeking to supplement the
       appellate record with the missing portions of the transcripts Appellant
       originally had requested in the praecipe. However, this motion was
       improperly filed under the trial court caption and never became a part of the
       appellate record. As such, we were not given the opportunity to rule on the
       motion.

       However, during our review of this case, it was readily apparent that
       Appellant’s praecipe requested “Transcript of Day 1 of the hearing wherein
       the defendant Joseph G. Scugoza admitted to contempt and the transcript
       of the entirety of the proceedings on July 14, 2021.” Despite this instruction,
       the court reporter prepared only a partial transcript of the July 14, 2021
       hearing. Thus, we were not given any part of the “Day 1 hearing” or the
       remaining July 14, 2021 transcripts Appellant had requested. Accordingly,
       on January 11, 2022, we issued a judgment entry allowing the parties seven
       days to file the additional transcripts. On January 18, 2022, we received the
       full transcripts.

Crossridge, supra, at ¶ 2-16.

       {¶3}   In that appeal, Case No. 21 JE 0016, Appellant Joseph G. Scugoza, raised
two assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in failing to provide purge conditions;
and (2) the court erred in ordering his jail term for each of the 20 violations to run
consecutively. Id. at ¶ 17, 28. On March 28, 2022, this court “reversed and remanded
for resentencing and for the purpose of imposing clear instructions as to conditions

Case No. 23 JE 0005
                                                                                                   –8–

necessary for Appellant to purge his contempt.” Id. at ¶ 50. This court did so, in part,
because a lengthy jail sentence would only “further impair the already slow moving
remediation efforts and perhaps halt these efforts all together during the jail term[.]” Id.
at ¶ 47.
        {¶4}    Following remand, on October 4, 2022 and January 27, 2023, the trial court
held hearings on the imposition of purge terms. Prior to the new hearings, the trial court
indicated that a site visit was just completed. The record reveals that this “site” was the
landfill itself.2 The State submitted 28 exhibits and Appellant submitted one.
        {¶5}    The trial court heard evidence that as of October 3, 2022, the day before
the hearing, there had been no compliance with the court’s prior orders. (Id. at p. 27). It
was revealed that Appellant had directed an associate to make physical modifications to
the site immediately prior to the court’s October 4, 2022 site visit to block a path used to
access the top of the larger landfill. (Id. at p. 151-159). It was also revealed that Appellant
had deliberately been unemployed and refused to generate income while this case is
pending despite having no physical or mental impairments that would prevent him from
working and generating funds to put towards site cleanup. (Id. at p. 245-248).
        {¶6}    Appellant argued in favor of what amounted to a 430-month “compliance
plan.” (Id. at p. 17, 19-20). Appellant proposed a plan in which he would haul just 100
tons of solid waste away from the open dump per month. (Id. at p. 17). The open dump
contains three acres, or approximately 43,000 tons, of solid waste sitting exposed to the
elements. (Id. at p. 53, 60). At a rate of 100 tons per month, it would take 35.83 years,
or 430 months, to clear the site of openly dumped solid waste.
        {¶7}    Anderson testified regarding the lack of compliance to the previous orders
requesting that Appellant safely close the site. (Id. at p. 25). Anderson stated the site
should be closed and the approximate cost of the closure would total approximately 7.7
million dollars. (Id. at p. 29, 31). When asked if the $10,000 per month request from the
State is reasonable to fund a financial assurance for the closure and post-closure care of
the site, Anderson said that it is but that the Ohio EPA has yet to receive this ordered

2 The State’s witness, Sara Anderson (“Anderson”), an Environmental Specialist III with the Ohio EPA, was

asked, “Now, we were just at the site an hour or so ago[?]” (10/4/2022 Hearing Tr., p. 24). Anderson
stated, “Correct.” (Id.)

Case No. 23 JE 0005
                                                                                         –9–

amount from Appellant. (Id. at p. 33). Additionally, when asked if the 10,000 gallons of
leachate per week removal is an appropriate term, Anderson agreed that it is. (Id.)
       {¶8}       Anderson further explained that the flow value controlling the leachate into
the holding pond is currently being kept closed thereby preventing the waste water from
being disposed of properly in the designated area. (Id.) Anderson revealed if it were to
be opened now, the holding area would overflow without the removal of leachate due to
Appellant’s neglect. (Id. at p. 45). Anderson opined that the removal of 10,000 gallons
per week is not nearly enough but taking into consideration Appellant’s financial situation,
it was something the Ohio EPA was comfortable with. (Id. at p. 49). Anderson explained
that the removal is equal to just two tankers per week on any given day. (Id.)
       {¶9}       When asked further by the trial court if the mandate of the 10,000 gallons
per week would prevent the holding areas from overflowing if we were to encounter
another “hundred-year storm,” Anderson stated that the 10,000 gallons per week was:

       [J]ust what we felt was a reasonable ask [sic] for this Court at this point. It
       is not what we would expect from, you know, a facility - - an owner/operator
       that’s in compliance with our rules. We would expect that they dispose of as
       much leachate as - - as is generated per month, to ensure that there is less
       than a foot of head of leachate on the liner and that the leachate tank is not
       overflowing to the environment.

       So this is - - this is much less than we would expect a compliant landfill to
       do.

(Id. at p. 52).

       {¶10} When asked about the proposed purge term, Anderson revealed the Ohio
EPA has estimated that Appellant has illegally disposed of approximately 45,000 tons of
waste on the three-acre open site without engineering controls, no leachate collection, or
cap of any type. (Id. at p. 53). However, Anderson stated another company, IWS, along
with Appellant, have removed approximately 2,000 tons of waste which leaves
approximately 43,000 tons remaining. (Id.)

Case No. 23 JE 0005
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        {¶11} The proposed purge term for the removal of this solid open waste is 750
tons per month which places the cleanup of this environmental hazard at five years. (Id.
at p. 55-56). Anderson mentioned the environmental concern as there was no proper
construction of the waste area at its inception which allows all leachate water to
presumably flow into the ground water and presents a fire hazard. (Id. at p. 56). The fire
hazard of open dumps is very difficult to extinguish and produces even more leachate
since they have to be smothered with water. (Id. at p. 57). Additionally, there is no
monitoring system on the open site to alert if dangerous levels of flammable gasses were
building under the surface. (Id.) In order to prevent the additional formation of leachate
waters on site, if a fire were to break out, Anderson said it would have to be smothered
with soil, which Appellant has no means of providing or fighting the fire.3 (Id.) Wintersville
Fire Chief William Herrington testified that if Appellant’s landfills caught fire, his
department would have great difficulty even trucking water to the site in order to fight the
fire. (Id. at p. 106-107).
        {¶12} Appellant claimed he could only remove and dispose of 3,000 gallons of
leachate per month from the site. (Id. at p. 238-244). Appellant also claimed he could
install and monitor an explosive gas monitoring system.                    (Id.)   Appellant claimed
impossibility in purging his contempt due to a complete lack of financial resources. (Id.
at p. 193, 196). Appellant admitted he has detailed, technical knowledge of what needs
to be done and how to do it, and has knowledge of the closure process. (Id. at p. 217-
219). Appellant admitted he has engineering plans, has accumulated proper fill material
at the site to construct a landfill cap, and has detailed knowledge and understanding of
the cost and process of hauling leachate. (Id. at p. 213, 218). Appellant also admitted
he possesses a tanker trailer used for hauling leachate. (Id. at p. 208).
        {¶13} Appellant testified there is nothing physically or mentally wrong with him
which would prevent him from working and generating income to put towards cleaning up
his derelict landfills and open dump. (Id. at p. 245). Appellant said he simply will not work
while this case is pending, claiming that “trying to deal with this and the legal and
everything else is kind of a full-time job” and “it’s kind of a little tough to do that with
everything that is going on with this in my life[.]” (Id. at p. 245, 248).

3 This is presumably a known safety precaution at other compliant sites.

Case No. 23 JE 0005
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       {¶14} It was revealed that Appellant has the ability to summon equipment and
personnel to do work at the site. During the October 4, 2022 site visit, the trial court
personally observed physical modifications Appellant had made to the C&D Landfill just
a short time before. Appellant admitted that he had, just days earlier, directed Phoenix
Scrap Metal employee Kevin Lisewski to use a Phoenix Scrap Metal loader to deposit
large boulders on a path running up the side of the C&D Landfill. (Id. at p. 148-158).
Appellant said that his wife owns Phoenix Scrap Metals. (Id. at p. 156). Appellant arrived
at the site visit in a brand new Ford Bronco Diamond Edition which he claimed his wife’s
company had purchased. (Id. at p. 156, 168). Appellant admitted, however, that he
primarily uses the vehicle for personal purposes. (Id. at p. 156).
       {¶15} The trial court held a second hearing on January 27, 2023. The court heard
oral arguments concerning the parties’ respective positions regarding purge terms.
Appellant once again submitted no evidence to support his claim of impossibility.
       {¶16} On February 3, 2023, the trial court issued its judgment and order on
contempt finding Appellant, “admitted liability to civil contempt, including all twenty
charges” including;4

       a. In the first charge of contempt, failure to provide closure and post-
           closure care financial assurance for the Crossridge Landfill;
       b. In the second charge of contempt, failure to complete closure of the
           Crossridge Landfill;
       c. In the third charge of contempt, failure to properly remove leachate from
           the Crossridge Landfill and open dump area, and provide receipts;
       d. In the fourth charge of contempt, failure to perform explosive gas
           monitoring at the Crossridge Landfill;
       e. In the fifth charge of contempt, failure to perform groundwater monitoring
           at the Crossridge Landfill;
       f. In the sixth charge of contempt, failure to begin post-closure care of the
           Crossridge Landfill;
       g. In the seventh charge of contempt, failure to pay stipulated penalties;

4 See (10/4/2022 New Sentencing and Purge Hearing Tr., p. 131).

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      h. In the eighth charge of contempt, failure to provide accounting for off-
           road events;
      i.   In the ninth charge of contempt, failure to cover the Construction and
           Demolition (“C&D”) Disposal Landfill;
      j.   In the tenth charge of contempt, failure to cover erosion rills on the C&D
           Disposal Landfill;
      k. In the eleventh charge of contempt, acceptance of additional waste;
      l.   In the twelfth charge of contempt, failure to apply for any NPDES
           permits;
      m. In the thirteenth charge of contempt, failure to pay civil penalties;
      n. In the fourteenth charge of contempt, failure to remove and dispose of
           solid waste and other materials at the open dump area;
      o. In the fifteenth charge of contempt, failure to close the C&D Disposal
           Landfill;
      p. In the sixteenth charge of contempt, failure to perform post-closure care
           and provide financial assurance for the C&D Disposal Landfill;
      q. In the seventeenth charge of contempt, failure to obtain a storm-water
           general permit;
      r. In the eighteenth charge of contempt, failure to stabilize the disturbed
           areas of the Site;
      s. In the nineteenth charge of contempt, failure to install and maintain
           proper storm water controls; and,
      t. In the twentieth charge of contempt, failure to provide written discovery
           regarding financial institutions.

(2/3/2023 Judgment Entry and Order on Contempt, p. 2-3).

      {¶17} The trial court ordered the following:

      1. Defendant is ordered to serve thirty (30) days in the Jefferson County
           jail, which shall be held in abeyance pending compliance with the purge
           conditions set forth below;

Case No. 23 JE 0005
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       2. Defendant is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $250.00 per count,
           for a total fine in the amount of $5,000.00, not less than thirty (30) days
           after the effective date of this Order;
       3. Defendant is ordered and enjoined to comply with all applicable
           provisions of R.C. Chapters 3714, 3734, and 6111 and all rules adopted
           under those chapters. Defendant shall ensure that activities conducted
           at the Site are conducted in compliance with this Order and with all terms
           and conditions of any permits and/or licenses issued for the Site; and,
       4. Defendant shall comply with this Court’s Orders dated October 8, 2003,
           October 15, 2012, August 5, 2014, and September 11, 2019 regarding
           injunctive relief at the Site.

(Id. at p. 3-4).

       {¶18} The trial court ordered the following purge requirements:

       5. Defendant may purge his contempt by complying with the following
           requirements at all times for the next six months:
         a. Not later than (30) days after the effective date of this Order, and by
             the first day of every month thereafter, Defendant shall pay $10,000
             per month into a trust fund that satisfies the requirements set forth in
             Ohio Adm. Code 3745-27-17 and has been approved by Ohio EPA for
             the proper closure and post-closure care of the Crossridge Landfill.
        b. Defendant shall ensure that the Crossridge Landfill leachate
            management system is operated as designed, including but not limited
            to the following:
              i. Immediately open and keep open the valve from the leachate
               conveyance system to the leachate storage tank;
              ii. Not later than (30) days after the effective date of this Order, install
               a pump with a flow meter at the leachate storage tank that accurately
               records the volume of leachate removed from the storage tank;

Case No. 23 JE 0005
                                                                                                   – 14 –

             iii. Not later than (30) days after the effective date of this Order, install
                a high-level alarm with a telemetry system provided by a third-party
                that will provide real-time electronic notification to Defendant, Ohio
                EPA, and the Jefferson County General Health District if any of the
                following occur: leachate levels exceed 25,000 gallons in the storage
                tank, a power outage, or any system malfunction.
             iv. Unless otherwise agreed upon in writing by Ohio EPA, Defendant
                shall ensure that these electronic notifications are delivered to email
                addresses provided by Ohio EPA and Jefferson County General
                Health District;
              v. Utilize the pump and flow meter each time leachate is removed from
                the storage tank;
             vi. Each and every calendar week, starting with the month after this
                Order becomes effective, Defendant shall remove and lawfully
                dispose of, at a minimum, 10,0005 gallons of leachate from the
                storage tank and provide disposal receipts to Ohio EPA documenting
                removal and lawful disposal of the leachate by the 10th day of each
                subsequent month; and
            vii. Defendant shall ensure the leachate storage tank contains no more
                than 25,000 gallons of leachate at any given time and, if leachate
                levels exceed this limit, Defendant shall immediately remove and
                lawfully dispose of leachate until leachate levels are below the limit.
        c. Defendant shall maintain the volume data from the flow meter specified
            in 5.b.ii. for a minimum of three (3) years and shall make the data
            available to Ohio EPA and the Jefferson County General Health District
            upon request.
        d. Each and every calendar month, starting the month after this Order
            becomes effective, Defendant shall remove and lawfully dispose of a

5 Appellant agrees to haul at least three truck loads per week in a tanker that holds about 6,000 gallons,

totaling approximately 18,000 gallons per week. (10/4/2022 Remanded Sentencing and Purge Hearing Tr.,
pg. 209, 241).

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            minimum of seven hundred fifty (750)6 tons of solid waste from the
            “Recycling Area” until all waste is removed and provide disposal receipts
            to Ohio EPA documenting removal and lawful disposal of the material
            by the 10th day of each subsequent month.
        e. This Order shall be reviewed for compliance and renewed in six-month
            intervals by this Court to determine whether more solid waste and/or
            leachate shall be removed.
        f. As this is civil contempt, Defendant is hereby granted 90 days from the
            date of this order to purge his contempt and the Court will hold a purge
            hearing on that day, to determine if Defendant is in full compliance with
            this Order.
        g. At any time, the State may notify the Court of any violation of this Order,
            and the Court may set a purge hearing within two weeks of the date of
            the notice.

(Id. at p. 4-6).

        {¶19} Appellant filed this appeal, Case No. 23 JE 0005, and raises two
assignments of error.7

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADOPTED THE APPELLEE’S
        PROPOSED PURGE TERMS THEREBY ISSUING TERMS WHICH THE
        TRIAL COURT KNEW WERE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE APPELLANT TO
        COMPLETE.

        {¶20} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court abused its
discretion in issuing purge terms that are impossible for him to fulfill.

6 It will take approximately five years to complete this clean up.
                                                               (Id. at p. 55). Appellant offers only 100
tons which would take approximately seven times longer to clean up an illegally opened open-dump site.
(Id. at p. 240).

7 This court granted Appellant’s motion for stay.

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       A trial court abuses its discretion when it orders conditions for purging that
       are unreasonable or impossible for the contemnor to meet. Pavlic v. Barium
       & Chemicals, Inc., 7th Dist. No. 02 JE 33, 2004-Ohio-1726, ¶ 71. The
       determination of whether a particular purge condition is unreasonable or
       impossible varies on a case-by-case basis. Id. The contemnor must present
       sufficient evidence at the contempt hearing that the trial court’s purge
       conditions are unreasonable or impossible for the contemnor to meet. Id.

Kirin v. Kirin, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 243, 2011-Ohio-663, ¶ 28.

       {¶21} An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment “in an
unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson
v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

       The burden of proof for the moving party in a civil contempt action is clear
       and convincing evidence. Brown v. Executive 200, Inc. (1980), 64 Ohio
       St.2d 250, 253, 416 N.E.2d 610. After the moving party establishes a prima
       facie case of contempt by showing evidence of nonpayment * * *, the burden
       shifts to the nonmoving party to establish a defense for nonpayment.
       Morford v. Morford (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 50, 55, 619 N.E.2d 71.

       The nonmoving party must then prove any defense by a preponderance of
       the evidence. Jeffers v. Jeffers, 7th Dist. No. 07 BE 36, 2008-Ohio-3339, ¶
       15. “The preponderance of the evidence standard simply requires the trier
       of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its
       nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden
       to persuade the [judge] of the fact’s existence.” (Internal citations omitted.)
       Crick v. Starr, 7th Dist. No. 08MA173, 2009-Ohio-6754, ¶ 35.

Kirin, supra, at ¶ 21-22.

       Impossibility of performance is a valid affirmative defense to a contempt
       charge. Gauthier v. Gauthier, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011–05–048,
       2012-Ohio-3046, 2012 WL 2524374, ¶ 33. Impossibility of performance

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       occurs when an unforeseen event arises that renders a party's performance
       of an obligation impossible. Id. The performance of the obligation must have
       been rendered impossible without any fault of the party asserting the
       defense. Id. A party who raises the defense of impossibility of performance
       has the burden of proving it.

State ex rel. DeWine v. Washington C.H., 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2013-12-030, 2014-
Ohio-3557, ¶ 29.

       {¶22} “A contemnor’s ‘(u)nsubstantiated claims of financial difficulties do not
establish an impossibility defense to a contempt charge.’” State ex rel. Yost v. Anthony,
4th Dist. Hocking No. 22CA2, 2022-Ohio-3188, ¶ 32, quoting Wagshul v. Wagshul, 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 23564, 2010-Ohio-3120, ¶ 41. A “‘contemnor’s unsupported claims
of financial difficulty or an inability to pay are insufficient to establish that the trial court’s
conditions are unreasonable.’” Anthony at ¶ 32, quoting In re I.L.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 109564, 2020-Ohio-5434, ¶ 14.
       {¶23} The State aptly summarizes this case as follows:

       The major environmental problems at the Crossridge landfill, the C&D
       Disposal Technologies landfill and the open dump (collectively the
       “Crossridge Site”) persist after 19 years of non-compliance from the first of
       multiple court orders requiring clean-up. Most urgently, dangerous leachate
       (wastewater) continues to pour from the Crossridge Site onto the ground
       and into the surface water of Jefferson County and the State of Ohio. Both
       landfills still lack a properly engineered cap, the Crossridge Landfill has no
       explosive gas monitoring, and the open dump’s large mass of solid waste
       still sits exposed to the elements. The lack of properly engineered landfill
       caps aggravates the leachate problem and exposes the community to a
       continuing risk of disastrous landfill fires. These major environmental harms
       continue because the Crossridge Site’s owner and operator, defendant-
       appellant Joseph G. Scugoza – who previously admitted to contempt on 20
       separate counts – has largely ignored his obligations and refused to clean
       up his mess. * * *

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       Evidence from the October 4, 2022 purge terms hearing offered no reason
       why Scugoza could not clean up his mess. Scugoza submitted no
       independent evidence of an inability to fulfill the purge terms, and his own
       testimony firmly established that Scugoza has tried to avoid his obligations
       through intentional unemployment. * * *

(Emphasis sic) (5/22/2023 Appellee’s Brief, p. 2).

       {¶24} The record establishes the trial court’s purge terms are reasonable and
within its inherent discretion. The purge terms, if complied with, would purge Appellant’s
contempt charges as well as make significant progress in cleaning up the Crossridge Site.
There is approximately 43,000 tons of solid waste (garbage) on the site. The court’s
imposed purge terms require the removal and lawful disposal of 750 tons of solid waste
per month. Thus, the court provided Appellant with more than 57 months, nearly five
additional years, to clean up this portion of his mess, which was previously ordered years
ago. As such, the court’s purge terms, which balance the public’s interest regarding the
widespread environmental violations, are reasonable.
       {¶25} In fact, it is Appellant’s proposed terms that are unreasonable. Appellant
proposed a plan in which he would remove solid waste at a rate of only 100 tons per
month, which would take him 430 months, or nearly 36 years, to complete the clean-up.
Appellant acknowledges that his plan may have no practical completion date, suggesting
that the clean-up efforts would continue “in perpetuity.” (5/1/2023 Appellant’s Brief, p. 5).
       {¶26} The record also establishes Appellant failed to meet his burden to present
independent evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of an ability to comply.
During the hearings, Appellant did not present any independent evidence, and no actual
financial records, showing a reduced ability or an inability to comply with the trial court’s
orders. Appellant merely claims he lacks the necessary equipment or money to fix the
problems at his landfills and open dump. However, Appellant’s unsupported, self-serving
statements are insufficient to meet his burden to establish evidence of an inability to pay.
See Anthony, supra.
       {¶27} As stated, Appellant showed up at the site visit in a brand new Ford Bronco
Diamond Edition and admitted that he primarily uses the vehicle for his personal

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                                                                                      – 19 –

purposes. Appellant also admitted that he can use his wife’s company’s equipment and
personnel at the Crossridge Site when he wants to. Appellant admitted he has detailed,
technical knowledge of what needs to be done and how to do it, and has knowledge of
the closure process. Appellant admitted he has engineering plans, has accumulated
proper fill material at the site to construct a landfill cap, and has detailed knowledge and
understanding of the cost and process of hauling leachate. Appellant also admitted he
possesses a tanker trailer used for hauling leachate.
       {¶28} Appellant’s admitted, intentional unemployment does not support a finding
of impossibility. Again, Appellant testified there is nothing physically or mentally wrong
with him which would prevent him from working and generating income to put towards
cleaning up his derelict landfills and open dump. Appellant said he simply will not work
while this case is pending, claiming that “trying to deal with this and the legal and
everything else is kind of a full-time job” and “it’s kind of a little tough to do that with
everything that is going on with this in my life[.]” (10/4/2022 Hearing Tr., p. 245, 248).
Appellant’s refusal to work has created his inability to fulfill his court ordered
environmental obligations. Also, Appellant’s 430-month (over 35 years) “compliance
plan” is clearly unreasonable.
       {¶29} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the purge terms and
rejecting Appellant’s unsupported claims of an inability to pay. Appellant has made no
efforts to comply whatsoever and failed to offer any independent evidence or financial
records to meet his burden to show that purging his contempt was unreasonable or
impossible. Thus, Appellant cannot demonstrate the court’s purge terms are
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
       {¶30} Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED A $250.00 FINE ON
       EACH COUNT OF CIVIL CONTEMPT AND ORDERED THAT EACH FINE
       BE LEVIED CONSECUTIVELY TO ONE ANOTHER, THEREBY
       CREATING A TOTAL NET FINE OF $5,000.00 EVEN THOUGH

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                                                                                       – 20 –

      IMPOSING CIVIL CONTEMPT SANCTIONS CONSECUTIVELY TO ONE
      ANOTHER IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

      {¶31} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court abused
its discretion in ordering the fines to run consecutively for a total of $5,000. Instead,
Appellant claims the court could only impose a single $250 fine for a single count of
contempt.
      {¶32} R.C. 2705.05 states in part:

      (A) In all contempt proceedings, the court shall conduct a hearing. At the
      hearing, the court shall investigate the charge and hear any answer or
      testimony that the accused makes or offers and shall determine whether the
      accused is guilty of the contempt charge. If the accused is found guilty, the
      court may impose any of the following penalties:

      (1) For a first offense, a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars, a
      definite term of imprisonment of not more than thirty days in jail, or both[.]

R.C. 2705.05(A)(1).

      {¶33} “[T]he [Ohio Supreme] Court made it clear that the legislature cannot limit
a court’s inherent power to punish contempt.” Crossridge, supra, at ¶ 38, citing State ex
rel. Johnson v. Cty. Court of Perry Cty., 25 Ohio St.3d 53 (1986). “That said, it is also
clear that R.C. 2705.05(A) is to be considered as a guideline for the court when punishing
a contemptor.” Crossridge at ¶ 38; see also Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Dist. Council 51, 35
Ohio St.2d 197, 207 (1973) (“the power to punish for contempt has traditionally been
regarded as inherent in the courts and not subject to legislative control”); State ex rel.
Anderson v. Industrial Com’n., 9 Ohio St.3d 170, 172 (1984) (courts have “wide discretion
to determine the punishment for contempt of [their] own orders.”)
      {¶34} Appellant admitted to 20 separate counts of civil contempt spanning
decades of noncompliance with numerous court orders. The trial court acted within its
discretion in imposing consecutive fines for the 20 counts of admitted contempt
proportionate to the environmental significance of Appellant’s noncompliance. The court
imposed a $250 fine for each of the 20 instances of Appellant’s admitted contempt, for a

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                                                                                    – 21 –

total fine of $5,000, within the R.C. 2705.05(A)(1) statutory framework. The court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing a cumulative $5,000 fine for Appellant’s 20 counts of
contempt as the size of the fine is not disproportionate to the magnitude and continuing
nature of his noncompliance and defiance.        See, e.g., Citicasters Co. v. Stop 26-
Riverbend, Inc., 147 Ohio App.3d 531, 2002-Ohio-2286 (7th Dist.).
       {¶35} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.

                                     CONCLUSION

       {¶36} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error are not well-
taken. The February 3, 2023 judgment of the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas
is affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.

Case No. 23 JE 0005
[Cite as State ex rel. Yost v. Crossridge, Inc., 2023-Ohio-4721.]

          For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
 are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of
 the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed
 against the Appellants.
          A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
 in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that
 a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into
 execution.

                                          NOTICE TO COUNSEL

          This document constitutes a final judgment entry.