Court Opinion

ID: 9596090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:45:57.092627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:32.364026
License: Public Domain

J IM HANNAH, Justice, concurring. While I am compelled to concur in the result in this case, it must be noted that this case turns on a unique set of facts, and reliance on this opinion should take those facts into account. We have before us a couple who married and divorced twice. In this case, we are also faced with a chancellor in the second divorce of the parties who, despite a prior divorce decree setting out that Megan was born of the marriage, allowed DNA testing to disprove that prior finding and then declared John Triplett was not the father of Megan. There was no appeal from this divorce decree and, therefore, this issue was not brought to this court. Thus, when faced with its statutory obligation of locating the proper party to secure repayment of benefits, the Office of Child Support Enforcement was faced with a court order that declared that the presumed and previously declared father was not the father. Therefore, OCSE found no paternity had been established as to Megan and filed an action under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-104(4) (Repl. 1998) to establish paternity after the chancery court bastardized Megan. It is not my view that this decision opens the door to dispute paternity in the typical divorce decree setting out that children born of the marriage are the children of the husband and wife. See Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Williams, 338 Ark. 347, 995 S.W.2d 338 (1999). I am concerned that the analysis of the majority under res judicata and collateral estoppel may create the impression that divorce decrees are not the binding court orders they have been previously found to be. It is important as well to keep in mind that absent the chancery decree bastardizing Megan, there would have been no need to establish paternity. Paternity had been set out in the 1992 decree. Therefore, in such a case, any action by OCSE would be by way of assignment of rights by Merigayle to OCSE. OCSE would not be allowed to challenge Megan’s paternity because OCSE would stand in Merigayle’s shoes as the contractual assignee of her entitlement to support. Office of Child Sup. Enforcem’t v. Ragland, 330 Ark. 280, 954 S.W.2d 218 (1997). By the 1992 decree of divorce, Merigayle acknowledged Megan was born of the marriage. Further, by an affidavit dated June 17, 1993, Merigayle swore under oath that Megan was born of the marriage. Nothing in the statutes creating the paternity action purports to do away with the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during marriage. Hall v. Freeman, 327 Ark. 148, 936 S.W.2d 761 (1997). Further, nothing has altered the bar to parties to a divorce decree challenging the finding of paternity stated therein. Williams, supra. It should also be noted that there is not only the above noted false affidavit, but yet another affidavit stating the truth. There is an affidavit dated May 15, 1998, wherein Merigayle declares Willis is the father of Megan. Merigayle has lied in an affidavit in 1993. It is difficult to imagine this court would countenance Merigayle going into court after affirming under oath that Megan was the child of John Triplett to assert she was not. This would be so simply on grounds of public policy. The integrity of the court would be impugned thereby. Grable v. Grable, 307 Ark. 410, 821 S.W.2d 21 (1991). Because Merigayle could not do so, OCSE under Merigayle’s assignment of rights could not do so. As this court stated in Guaranty Nat’l Ins. v. Denver Roller, Inc., 313 Ark. 128, 854 S.W.2d 312 (1993), (citing Pacific Nat’l Bank v. Hernreich, 240 Ark. 114, 398 S.W.2d 221 (1966)). “It is well settled that ‘assignees can receive no better right than their assignors had.’ ” Thus, while I must concur in the outcome on this unique set of facts, I must express my concern that this decision not be read too broadly. THORNTON, J., joins in this concurrence.