Court Opinion

ID: 9521545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:07:15.833589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:54.466931
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REID, dissenting: I dissent. I believe this matter should be remanded for a new trial in order to protect the process, even though this defendant would very likely be found guilty when the case is retried. While I understand that remanding the matter may seem to be a futile act, one that may only serve as instructive in terms of future cases with other defendants, I believe it is necessary because of the fundamental nature of the rights at stake when a body politic takes steps to deprive a citizen of his liberty. Generally, a defendant waives any error contained in the jury instructions if he does not object or proffer alternative instructions at trial and fails to raise the issue in a posttrial motion. People v. Red-dick, 123 Ill. 2d 184, 198 (1988), citing People v. Thurman, 104 Ill. 2d 326 (1984). However, “ ‘[t]he plain error doctrine (134 Ill. 2d R 615(a)) may be applied where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error is of such magnitude that it denied the accused a fair trial.’ ” People v. Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d 629, 635 (2001), quoting People v. Tisdel, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1143, 1153 (2000). “ ‘Plain error marked by “fundamental [un]fairness” occurs only in situations which “reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,” as distinguished from “typical trial mistakes.” [Citation.]’ ” Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 635, quoting People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995). In other words, even in a case where the relative closeness of the evidence is not necessarily an issue, plain-error review can still be proper where the asserted error is fundamental to the integrity to the judicial process. See Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 635, quoting Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 17. Here no objection was made to the written form of the jury instruction, merely how it was used by the State during closing arguments. When the error was made, Tisley raised an objection that was sustained with comment from the trial court that the evaluation of an identification is for the jury to make. There is no question that there was error in the form of the jury instruction presented. The error was compounded when the State improperly commented during closing. argument, incorrectly informing the jury that it needed to only find one of the identification factors. Case law clearly states that all five factors are to be considered and weighed in determining whether an identification is reliable. People v. Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d 629, 639 (2001), citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140, 154, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253 (1977). The committee has chosen to include the word “or” between the factors to indicate to trial courts that “ ‘only the particular *** factors that are supported by the evidence should be given.’ ” Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 639, quoting People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 354 (1995). “The trial court’s incorporation of the term ‘or’ between each factor implies, as a matter of law, that the identification testimony of an eyewitness may be deemed reliable if just one of the five factors listed weighs in favor of reliability.” Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 640. “The phrase preceding the five factors, stating that ‘all the facts and circumstances in evidence’ are to be considered, does not obviate the erroneous wording of the jury instruction.” Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 639, quoting Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.15 (3d ed. 1992). I believe this defendant must be given a new trial because the jury went into the jury room with an instruction containing a latent ambiguity that was incorrectly emphasized by the State in closing arguments. Regardless of the fact that there is significant evidence stacked against him, Tisley did not receive a fair trial as a result of this error.