Court Opinion

ID: 9882669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:18:17.624443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:54.994722
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. White, 2023-Ohio-3591.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COLUMBIANA COUNTY

                                            STATE OF OHIO,

                                            Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                        DONALD E. WHITE,

                                        Defendant-Appellant.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                            Case No. 22 CO 0049

                                  Criminal Appeal from the
                      Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio
                                   Case No. 2021 CR 559

                                          BEFORE:
                  Cheryl L. Waite, David A. D’Apolito, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

                                               JUDGMENT:
                                                 Affirmed.
                                                Remanded.

Atty. Vito J. Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor and Atty. Shelley M. Pratt,
Assistant Prosecutor, 135 South Market Street, Lisbon, Ohio 44432, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Atty. Rhonda G. Santha, 6401 State Route 534, West Farmington, Ohio 44491, for
Defendant-Appellant

                                      Dated: September 28, 2023
                                                                                          –2–

WAITE, J.

       {¶1}   Appellant Donald E. White appeals an October 28, 2022 Columbiana

County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry convicting him of several charges related

to a hit and run accident that caused the death of a minor. Appellant argues that a

possession of cocaine charge should have been severed at trial from the offenses related

to the accident, as they were unrelated. He also argues that his convictions were not

supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury

on a lesser-included charge.      For the reasons provided, Appellant’s arguments are

without merit and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to Appellant’s convictions.

However, the matter is remanded on a limited basis to allow the state to elect on which

count to proceed to sentencing regarding the merged convictions.

                              Factual and Procedural History

       {¶2}   On October 23, 2021, two thirteen-year-old boys, A.H. and M.T., at just

before 9:00 p.m., were riding their bikes south along State Route 164 in Columbiana,

Ohio. It appears that the boys were riding to the right of the road, with on-coming traffic

driving towards them. A.H. rode approximately ten feet ahead of M.T. A.H. had reflectors

on his pedals and M.T. had reflectors on the back of his seat and both pedals.

       {¶3}   At some point during their ride, M.T. heard a truck driving behind him and

called out to A.H. to move over. The two boys traveled further out of the roadway, near

a grassy area next to the road. Suddenly, the truck pulled off of the road, crossed the

white fog line and drove alongside M.T., who testified that it was so close he could have

reached out and touched the vehicle with his hand. The vehicle drove around him and

then straight into A.H. as the driver attempted to return the truck to the road. M.T. watched

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as A.H. was launched approximately seven to eight feet into the air and then landed

approximately sixty feet ahead.

       {¶4}    M.T. testified as to the impact itself and the driver’s actions:

       Q. Yeah. After the – the truck is passing you, you said it hit [A.H.]?

       A. Yes, it swerved around me.

       Q. Swerved around you and then what did it do next?

       A. Hit [A.H.] and went faster. Zoomed off. Didn’t – yeah.

       Q. When the truck hit [A.H.], did it appear to you that the truck had gone

       outside of the roadway?

       A. Yes.

(Trial Tr., p. 247.)

       {¶5}    As the truck drove off at an accelerated rate of speed, M.T. ran to A.H. and

placed his hand on his back. While he could feel A.H. breathing, A.H. made gurgling

sounds and was not responsive. M.T. used his cell phone to call 911 and later used the

flashlight on the phone to flag over the responding officer, Trooper William Kanters. When

Trooper Kanters reached A.H., A.H. was unresponsive and had no apparent vital signs.

A.H. was life-flighted to a hospital where he was pronounced dead.

       {¶6}    After A.H. was transported to the hospital, the Ohio State Patrol began

investigating the scene and the general area. M.T. informed Trooper Kanters that “the

truck barely missed him and struck [A.H.]. It did go off the road a little bit, then came back

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on.” (Trial Tr., p. 175.) M.T. could not give much information about the vehicle, partly

due to the poor lighting of the area and partly due to his apparent shock.

       {¶7}   Officers located several pieces of debris associated both with A.H.’s bicycle

and the vehicle that struck him. Among the debris, officers located a headlight bucket,

which had a serial number that officers used to determine the year, make, and model of

the truck. At some point during the investigation at the scene, Dep. Luke Skidmore of the

Columbiana County Sheriff’s Office learned that an officer “saw headlights off in the

distance on Crestview Road, parked in a fashion that would be inconsistent with the east

– and westbound traffic on that road, and the headlights weren’t moving.” (Trial Tr., p.

211.) Although Dep. Skidmore could not get to the vehicle at the time, he later learned

that Appellant and his wife had returned to the area and parked their car facing the crime

scene. Those were the lights observed by officers.

       {¶8}   Officers found the truck parked approximately two to three miles down the

road in a pull off area. Officers observed damage to the vehicle consistent with the debris

found at the scene. After running the license plate number through “LEADS,” officers

were able to determine that Appellant owned the truck. As initial attempts to locate

Appellant were unsuccessful, Sgt. Ben Dennison began monitoring cell phone tower

pings from Appellant’s phone and learned that he was in Canfield, which is located in

Mahoning County, near the intersection of State Route 224 and Ironwood Boulevard. He

then tracked the phone as it moved south on State Route 11 and eventually back to

Appellant’s residence.

       {¶9}   Trooper Josh Yeager returned to Appellant’s residence and encountered

Appellant’s wife, Ruth White. Ruth initially claimed that she did not know where the truck

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was and that they believed it had been stolen. She also claimed that Appellant was at

his nephew’s house all day. When Trooper Yeager informed her the vehicle was involved

in a crash that caused a death, “[h]er shoulders sunk forward. She started to look down

at her hands. And she was consistently fidgeting with her hands, where she was clasping

them and unclasping them, touching her fingers.” (Trial Tr., p. 208.)

       {¶10} When Trooper Yeager told Ruth that he did not believe her, she finally

admitted that Appellant had instructed her to tell investigators he was at his nephew’s

house all day and that he had hit a mailbox with his truck. She also told investigators that

Appellant had asked her to pick him up at his nephew’s house and take him to Mahoning

County to buy cocaine. She admitted that they were in the car parked near the scene

and were watching the investigation.

       {¶11} When Trooper Yeager told Appellant his truck was involved in a crash “[h]e

was very casual. It was an abnormal interaction for me, because he was very calm and

collected. It was a conversational tone.” (Trial Tr., p. 207.) Sgt. Dennison also spoke to

Appellant and informed him that a child had been killed in the accident.

       Q. What was this Defendant’s reaction when you told him that a child had

       been killed on State Route 164?

       A. There was really no reaction, just nonchalantly –

       Q. Just emotionless?

       A. Yes, that’s how I would describe it.

(Trial Tr., p. 305.)

Case No. 22 CO 0049
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       {¶12} During the interaction, Appellant told Trooper Yeager that he thought he had

hit a mailbox. At some point, Trooper Yeager placed Appellant in a cruiser, where he fell

asleep.

       {¶13} Deputy Eric Buday testified at trial that Ruth told him Appellant would

typically smoke cocaine in the garage. Ruth provided consent to allow a search of the

garage, resulting in the seizure of a “Choreboy,” which is apparently “a copper scrubber

type material” typically used to smoke drugs, and a baggie “tear off,” the corner of a plastic

bag in which drugs are placed. The corner is twisted around the drug and torn off, to

create a smaller baggie. (Trial Tr., pp. 324-325.) Ruth also consented to a search of

Appellant’s bedroom, where officers located the keys to the truck in Appellant’s jacket

pocket, a glass smoking pipe, and a hard rock-like substance found in a tobacco can,

later determined to be .17g cocaine.

       {¶14} Trooper Brian Cannon completed an accident reconstruction report. He

testified that the area of the accident is “a primarily straight roadway. There is a curve

south of the scene. It’s fairly far back. Straight, level. No poles, trees, mailboxes,

driveways, nothing like that along the roadway. It’s just open road with field.” (Trial Tr.,

p 369.) He observed a gouge in the road near the fog line, approximately three inches

over the line, where he determined the point of impact occurred. Based on the marking,

he concluded that there was sufficient room for Appellant to pass the cyclists without

impacting them. (Trial Tr., p. 393.) He saw no signs of braking.

       {¶15} On October 24, 2021, Appellant received a written citation for possession

of drug paraphernalia related to the discovery of the pipe. On October 25, 2021, Appellant

was charged with one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a felony of the third degree

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in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2). On June 8, 2022, a superseding indictment charged

Appellant with two counts of failure to stop after an accident, felonies of the second and

third degrees in violation of R.C. 4549.02(A)(2); aggravated vehicular homicide, a felony

of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a); and possession of cocaine, a

felony of the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A).

       {¶16} While Appellant was jailed, he made incriminating statements at two

separate times. The first of which occurred while he was receiving some sort of medical

treatment approximately one week after he was jailed. Appellant had learned that M.T.

initially reported to investigators that the truck that hit A.H. was white. Appellant’s truck

is a light color, but is not white. Appellant told the deputy who had accompanied Appellant

to his treatment that someone else, driving a white truck, hit A.H. and he fled the scene.

Appellant said that he later hit only the unoccupied bicycle. (Exh. 25.) Appellant also

admitted that he was culpable for possession of cocaine, but believed that investigators

unlawfully entered his home, and so he could not be convicted. The deputy used his

phone to record Appellant once it became clear Appellant was talking about his case.

       {¶17} The second instance was in a jail house call to his wife, where Appellant

again claimed that he thought he had hit a mailbox, then said “I guess I should have just

pulled the fuck over. I probably wouldn’t be in here now.” (Exh. 27, 9:00.) Apparently

changing his mind, he told his wife “I should have kept driving [after he noticed his tire

was flat] and got out of that area. But I called Donnie to get a tire and he come [sic] down

to get a tire.” (Exh. 27. 10:21.) When his wife responded that his friend Donnie probably

was unaware an accident had occurred, Appellant told her that when his friend met up

with him, he drove past the scene of the accident. (Exh. 27, 10:45.) He continued that

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“we didn’t get my truck out of there. Cause [sic] if they never connected my truck, they

wouldn’t have connected me.” (Exh. 27, 11:15.) He stated that if not for the flat tire, “I’d

have buried that truck.” (Exh. 27, 11:36.)

       {¶18} On October 19, 2022, Appellant filed a motion seeking to sever his

possession of cocaine charge from the other charges for purposes of trial. The trial court

denied Appellant’s motion. Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted Appellant of all

counts as charged. The court immediately proceeded to sentencing. On October 28,

2022, the court sentenced Appellant to an indefinite sentence of eight to twelve years

(failure to stop), a five year definite sentence with a lifetime driver’s license suspension

(aggravated vehicular homicide), and one year of incarceration (possession of cocaine).

The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for an aggregate total of fourteen

to eighteen years of incarceration with credit for 369 days served. The two failure to stop

convictions merged for purposes of sentencing. It is from this entry that Appellant timely

appeals.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

       The Trial Court abused its discretion to Appellant's prejudice when his

       motion to sever the Controlled Substance offense was denied.

       {¶19} Appellant argues that the court erred in denying his motion to sever the

cocaine possession charge from the accident-related charges. He claims they were not

of the same or similar character, not part of the same act or transaction, and were not

connected in any way. Appellant urges that the search leading to the discovery of the

Case No. 22 CO 0049
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cocaine occurred sometime after the accident itself and there was no evidence that he

was under the influence at the time of the offense.

       {¶20} In response, the state argues Appellant crossed into Mahoning County to

buy the cocaine immediately after causing the accident, and explains where Appellant

was when, during their accident investigation, his phone pinged cell towers near Rt. 224

and Ironwood Blvd. The state explains that their discovery of the drugs corroborated

statements related to the accident made by both Ruth and Appellant, and that the drugs

are also highly relevant to demonstrate Appellant’s lack of remorse and his mental state

following the accident.

       {¶21} Ohio law favors joining multiple criminal offenses in a single trial. State v.

Harrison, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 19 JE 0009, 2020-Ohio-3624, ¶ 55, citing State v.

Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991), citing State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d

160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990). “[J]oinder and the avoidance of multiple trials is favored

for many reasons, among which are conserving time and expense, diminishing the

inconvenience to witnesses and minimizing the possibility of incongruous results in

successive trials before different juries.” State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343, 421

N.E.2d 1288 (1981).

       {¶22} Crim.R. 8(A) provides:

       Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment, information

       or complaint in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged,

       whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar

       character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are based on two

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       or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a

       common scheme or plan, or are part of a course of criminal conduct.

       {¶23} A defendant may move to sever trial of joined offenses pursuant to Crim.R.

14 if he can establish prejudice. Lott, supra, at 163. In relevant part, Crim.R. 14 provides

that: “[i]f it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by * * * such joinder for trial

together of indictments, informations or complaints, the court shall order an election or

separate trial of counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other relief as

justice requires.”

       {¶24} The state may counter a claim of prejudice in one of two ways. The state

may demonstrate that the evidence presented at trial for each offense is simple and direct.

State v. Moore, 2013-Ohio-1435, 990 N.E.2d 625, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Coley,

93 Ohio St.3d at 259, 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001). Failing that, the state must show that all

of the evidence presented in the combined trial would have been admissible in each case

if tried separately. Id. If the state can demonstrate that the evidence is simple and direct,

then it is not required to prove the stricter admissibility test. State v. Harris, 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 13 MA 37, 2015-Ohio-2686, ¶ 29, citing State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d

95, 109, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000). Evidence is simple and direct when it is apparent that

the jury was not confused about which evidence proved which act. Harrison at ¶ 60, citing

State v. Harris, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 37, 2015-Ohio-2686, ¶ 30; Coley at 259.

       {¶25} At the outset, we note that all crimes were charged through a superseding

indictment, and we do not have a situation where multiple indictments were joined. Thus,

we first look to whether the incidents charged within the indictment were in some way

connected.

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       {¶26} The testimony demonstrated that Appellant had his wife drive him to

purchase the cocaine almost immediately after the accident occurred. First, Appellant

and his wife parked close to the scene to watch the investigators’ progress. When

investigators attempted to locate Appellant after linking him to the truck, he was in the

process of purchasing the drugs. While they tracked the location of his phone, he was

on his way home from purchasing those drugs. The search for these drugs occurred after

Ruth told the officers that she drove him to get drugs right after the accident and she

consented to the police search immediately after making that statement. Thus, while the

drug offenses and accident related offenses are two different acts, the evidence shows

that they are linked.

       {¶27} While the state contends that there was no overlap in witnesses, this is

misleading. Trooper Yeager, Dep. Luke Skidmore, Sgt. Dennison, Dep. Buday, and

Trooper Mike Gorlea all provided testimony related to discovery of the cocaine. These

same officers also testified about the investigation into the accident itself. Regardless,

the evidence used to prove these crimes remained simple and direct. The sole evidence

regarding cocaine possession was testimony that Ruth informed officers Appellant asked

her to drive him to purchase drugs following the accident. Ruth consented to two separate

searches, one of the garage and one of Appellant’s bedroom, and drugs were discovered

in these searches. It was clear at trial that investigators did not believe Appellant was

under the influence at the time of the accident, and that Appellant’s purchase and use of

the drugs occurred afterwards. Based on this record, Appellant’s first assignment of error

is without merit and is overruled.

Case No. 22 CO 0049
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                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

       The Trial Court erred in denying both Appellant's Rule 29 Motion to Dismiss

       as well as his request for jury instructions on a lesser included offense.

       {¶28} Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to

dismiss counts one and three, but he does not provide any substantive arguments. In

this regard, Appellant has failed to comply with the appellate rules. Appellant instead

focuses on his request for jury instructions on a lesser charge. In so doing, however,

Appellant abandons the argument he made to the trial court, that the evidence supported

negligent rather than reckless conduct. Instead, he claims on appeal that he should have

been charged with a misdemeanor, and that he possessed a defense that could have

resulted in an acquittal to the misdemeanor charges.

       {¶29} The state responds that a plethora of evidence supports each of Appellant’s

convictions. As to a lesser included charge, the evidence adduced at trial fully supported

a finding that Appellant’s actions were reckless, not negligent. Because there was no

evidence to support a lesser included offense, the state contends the trial court correctly

declined to provide this instruction.

       {¶30} In relevant part, Crim.R. 29(A) states:

       The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence

       on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of

       one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint,

       if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or

       offenses.

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       {¶31} Sufficiency of the evidence involves a legal question that addresses

adequacy. State v. Pepin-McCaffrey, 186 Ohio App.3d 548, 2010-Ohio-617, 929 N.E.2d

476 ¶ 49 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541

(1997). “Sufficiency is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to

determine whether a case may go to the jury or whether evidence is legally sufficient to

support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Draper, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 07 JE

45, 2009-Ohio-1023, ¶ 14, citing State v. Robinson, 162 Ohio St. 486, 124 N.E.2d 148

(1955). An appellate court does not determine “whether the state's evidence is to be

believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a

conviction.” State v. Rucci, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 34, 2015-Ohio-1882, ¶ 14,

citing State v. Merritt, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 09-JE-26, 2011-Ohio-1468, ¶ 34. In other

words, we must determine whether the state presented evidence on every element of the

charged crime that, if believed, supports conviction.

       {¶32} Although Appellant provides no argument regarding this issue, in the

interest of justice we will address the merits. At trial, Appellant raised a Crim.R. 29 motion

regarding his failure to stop and aggravated vehicular homicide charges. We will limit

review to only those offenses.

       {¶33} In relevant part, R.C. 4549.02 provides:

       (A)(1) In the case of a motor vehicle accident or collision with persons or

       property on a public road or highway, the operator of the motor vehicle,

       having knowledge of the accident or collision, immediately shall stop the

       operator's motor vehicle at the scene of the accident or collision. The

       operator shall remain at the scene of the accident or collision until the

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      operator has given the operator's name and address and, if the operator is

      not the owner, the name and address of the owner of that motor vehicle,

      together with the registered number of that motor vehicle, to all of the

      following:

      (a) Any person injured in the accident or collision;

      (b)   The operator, occupant, owner, or attendant of any motor vehicle

      damaged in the accident or collision;

      (c) The police officer at the scene of the accident or collision.

      (2) In the event an injured person is unable to comprehend and record the

      information required to be given under division (A)(1) of this section, the

      other operator involved in the accident or collision shall notify the nearest

      police authority concerning the location of the accident or collision, and the

      operator's name, address, and the registered number of the motor vehicle

      the operator was operating. The operator shall remain at the scene of the

      accident or collision until a police officer arrives, unless removed from the

      scene by an emergency vehicle operated by a political subdivision or an

      ambulance.

      ***

      (3) If the accident or collision results in the death of a person, failure to stop

      after an accident is whichever of the following is applicable:

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       (a) Except as provided in division (B)(3)(b) of this section, a felony of the

       third degree;

       (b) If the offender knew that the accident or collision resulted in the death

       of a person, a felony of the second degree.

       {¶34} Here, the sole element at issue is whether Appellant knew a person had

died as a result of the accident he caused. There is no direct evidence that Appellant

knew he caused a death. However, if believed, there is an abundance of circumstantial

evidence demonstrating this knowledge. First, Appellant could not have confused striking

a child with hitting a mailbox or an unoccupied bicycle. There was evidence of record

that a loud noise was produced on impact and it caused the child to be launched about

seven to eight feet into air and sixty feet forward. Although it was 9:00 p.m. during the

fall season, the driver of a vehicle causing this kind of impact would certainly have noticed

the child’s body flying through the air, not to mention that the impact caused by hitting a

person is vastly different from the impact that would be caused had he hit an unoccupied

bicycle or even a mailbox.

       {¶35} Second, there is evidence that Appellant crossed the white fog line and

swerved around M.T. and then hit A.H. in attempting to return to the road. The record

reveals he had knowledge that bicyclists were on the road, and that the impact was

caused by striking another bicyclist.

       {¶36} Third, not only did Appellant fail to stop his vehicle or even attempt to brake,

there is evidence that he actually increased his speed in an attempt to flee and avoid

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identification. If Appellant had hit a mailbox or an unoccupied bicycle as he alleged, there

would have been no reason to speed away.

       {¶37} Fourth, the crime scene was described as “a primarily straight roadway.

There is a curve south of the scene. It’s fairly far back. Straight, level. No poles, trees,

mailboxes, driveways, nothing like that along the roadway. It’s just open road with field.”

(Trial Tr., p. 369.) This testimony shows Appellant would have had an unobstructed view

of the damage he caused. It also shows that his contention that he struck a mailbox was

not credible, because the officer testified that there were no mailboxes or other objects

lining this portion of the roadway.

       {¶38} Fifth, his wife admitted that they returned to the scene to watch the

investigation. There was no reason for this if Appellant did not understand that the object

he struck was a human being. And certainly, once struck by a vehicle of the size and

weight of Appellant’s truck, the human had no chance of surviving.

       {¶39} Sixth, Appellant lied several times to investigators and initially asked his

wife to lie for him, as well. He first told investigators that someone stole his truck, then

pivoted to a claim that he thought he hit a mailbox. He then stated his belief he had hit

only the unoccupied bike after an initial collision was caused by another truck. As noted

by the state, if he did not believe that he hit and killed a human being, it would have been

unnecessary to resort to multiple lies. He instructed his wife to lie before he even learned

that investigators had linked his truck with the accident, and she admitted as much to law

enforcement. Based on all of the above, there was sufficient evidence that, if believed,

proved Appellant knew his collision had caused the death of a person.

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      {¶40} Regarding aggravated vehicular homicide, in relevant part R.C. 2903.06(A)

provides that:

      (A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor

      vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall

      cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's

      pregnancy in any of the following ways:

      (1)(a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of

      section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent

      municipal ordinance;

      (b) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section

      1547.11 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal

      ordinance;

      (c) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A)(3) of

      section 4561.15 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent

      municipal ordinance.

      (2) In one of the following ways:

      (a) Recklessly[.]

      {¶41} Appellant apparently contests whether sufficient evidence was presented to

show that he acted recklessly, leading to his argument that the court should have

instructed the jury on a lesser included offense. The state presented evidence that

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Appellant swerved from his lane of traffic and almost hit M.T. before attempting to return

to the road. When he hit A.H., he was approximately three inches over the fog line. He

offered no evidence that this swerve was the result of mere negligence, and the state

presented an abundance of evidence, as previously discussed, that his actions were

reckless.

       {¶42} We note Appellant argued at trial that the jury should have been instructed

on negligent operation instead of reckless operation. On appeal, he instead argues that

the jury should have been instructed on R.C. 4511.25, traveling outside the lane of traffic,

a minor misdemeanor.       However, he has not preserved this argument for appeal.

Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.

                                        Sentencing

       {¶43} While we affirm Appellant’s conviction in full, we must sua sponte, raise an

issue stemming from the trial court’s statement at the sentencing hearing and within its

judgment entry that the court elected to proceed with sentencing on count one following

merger of counts one and two. However, the state is required to elect on which count the

offender is to be sentenced, not the trial court. Thus, this matter is remanded on a limited

basis solely to allow the state to elect on which count to proceed with sentencing. The

remainder of Appellant’s sentence is affirmed and may not be addressed at the limited

hearing on remand.

                                        Conclusion

       {¶44} Appellant argues that his possession of cocaine charge should have been

severed from his other offenses for trial purposes, as they were unrelated. He also argues

that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court erred

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by failing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included charge. For the reasons provided,

Appellant’s arguments are without merit and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

However, the matter is remanded on a limited basis solely to allow the state to elect on

which count to proceed to sentencing for the merged convictions.

D’Apolito, P.J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.

Case No. 22 CO 0049
[Cite as State v. White, 2023-Ohio-3591.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. However, we hereby

remand this matter on a limited basis to allow the state to elect which count to proceed

with sentencing. Because the remainder of Appellant’s sentence is affirmed, it may not

be addressed at the limited remand hearing. Costs waived.

        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.