Court Opinion

ID: 9878699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 17:34:19.342814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:39.738109
License: Public Domain

WILSON, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
  

   ¶ 20. The majority denies Young's claim on three grounds: (A) by virtue of his voluntary, negotiated plea agreement, Young waived his present challenge to the legality of his life sentence,
   
    ante
   
   at (¶¶ 6-8); (B) the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions apply to legislative acts, not judicial decisions,
   

     id.
    

   at (¶ 16); and (C) Young waived any due process challenge to the retroactive application of
   
    Bester v. State
   
   ,
   
    188 So.3d 526
   
   (Miss. 2016), because he failed to brief that issue on appeal,
   

     id.
    

   at (¶¶ 17-18).
  

   ¶ 21. I concur in the result and in proposition (A)-that holding is dispositive, and the opinion could end there. Proposition (B) is a correct statement of law. I have doubts about proposition (C), but I would not write separately just to address that issue of waiver.
  

   ¶ 22. Rather, I write separately to address the majority's extended digression on whether
   
    Bester
   
   , a case interpreting the forcible rape statute, implicitly overruled
   
    Stewart v. State
   
   ,
   
    372 So.2d 257
   
   (Miss. 1979), a precedent interpreting the armed robbery statute.
   
    See
   

    ante
   
   at (¶¶ 9-15). This
   digression is dicta,
   
    3
   
   as it is not necessary to
   
    any
   
   of the "grounds" on which the majority's "decision rests."
   
    Ante
   
   at n.2. After arguing at length that
   
    Bester
   
   overruled
   
    Stewart
   
   , the majority renders the entire issue moot by declaring that Young has waived any viable objection to the retroactive application of
   
    Bester
   
   .
   
    Ante
   
   at (¶¶ 16-18). If Young waived that issue, then it simply does not matter whether
   
    Bester
   
   overruled
   
    Stewart
   
   .
   
    4
   

   ¶ 23. Ordinarily, I would not write separately just to respond to dicta. I do so here only because the dicta is inconsistent with this Court's obligation to continue to follow directly controlling Supreme Court precedent.
  

   ¶ 24. I agree with the majority that if our Supreme Court extends
   
    Bester
   
   's reasoning to the armed robbery statute, then a circuit court will have the authority to sentence a defendant convicted of armed robbery to life imprisonment without a jury recommendation. The armed robbery statute provides that "in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for
   
    any term
   
   not less than three (3) years."
   
    Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-79
   
   (Rev. 2014) (emphasis added). Interpreting the similarly worded forcible rape statute in
   
    Bester
   
   , the Supreme Court held: " 'Any term' includes life imprisonment."
   
    Bester
   
   , 188 So.3d at 529 (¶ 6). Therefore, the Court held that the statute permitted a judge to impose a life sentence without a jury recommendation.
   
    Id.
   
   I agree with the majority that there is no material difference between the relevant language in the forcible rape statute and the armed robbery statute; however, since its decision in
   
    Bester
   
   , the Supreme Court has not revisited the proper interpretation of the armed robbery statute.
  

   ¶ 25. Our problem, as an intermediate appellate court, is that directly controlling Supreme Court precedent holds that the armed robbery statute does
   
    not
   
   permit the sentencing judge to impose a life sentence without a jury recommendation.
   
    See
   

    Stewart
   
   ,
   
    372 So.2d at 259
   
   . In
   
    Stewart
   
   , the Supreme Court held that unless a jury first determines that the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment, the judge must sentence the defendant to "a definite term" of years "reasonably expected to be less than life."
   

     Id.
    

   The Supreme Court has never overruled
   
    Stewart
   
   , and this Court lacks authority to do so.
  

   ¶ 26.
   
    Bester
   
   does not overrule
   
    Stewart
   
   . Indeed, the concise majority opinion in
   
    Bester
   
   focused solely on the forcible rape statute and did not even mention
   
    Stewart
   
   or the armed robbery statute.
   
    See
   

    Bester
   
   , 188 So.3d at 527-30 (¶¶ 1-10). Only a dissent briefly referenced
   
    Stewart
   
   .
   
    See
   

    id.
   
   at 531 (¶ 17) (Kitchens, J., dissenting).
  

   ¶ 27. Thus, while
   
    Bester
   
   's reasoning signals that the Supreme Court may or is likely to overrule
   
    Stewart
   
   in the future, that is no basis for this Court to declare that
   
    Stewart
   
   has already been overruled. "This Court, sitting as an intermediate appellate court, is bound by established precedent as set out by the Mississippi Supreme Court and we do not have the authority to overrule the decisions of that
   [C]ourt."
   
    Bevis v. Linkous Constr. Co.
   
   ,
   
    856 So.2d 535
   
   , 541 (¶ 18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). As the United States Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts of appeals, "If a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."
   
    Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp. Inc.
   
   ,
   
    490 U.S. 477
   
   , 484,
   
    109 S.Ct. 1917
   
   ,
   
    104 L.Ed.2d 526
   
   (1989). An intermediate appellate court may not, "on its own authority, ... take[ ] the step of renouncing" precedent of a higher court.
   

     Id.
    

   ¶ 28. The majority notes that this Court has "referred to
   
    Stewart
   
   ... as no longer being 'good law.' "
   
    Ante
   
   at (¶ 11) (quoting
   
    Hayes v. State
   
   ,
   
    203 So.3d 1144
   
   , 1146 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) ). However,
   
    Hayes
   
   addressed a sentence for child exploitation that was imposed under a materially dissimilar statute-a statute that specifies a maximum term of years. In
   
    Hayes
   
   , we expressly recognized that
   
    Stewart
   
   's holding "did not apply to sentencing statutes that designate a specific maximum term of years."
   
    Hayes
   
   ,
   
    203 So.3d at 1146
   
   (¶ 7). Given that
   
    Stewart
   
   simply "did not apply" in
   
    Hayes
   
   , our commentary that
   
    Stewart
   
   was no longer "good law" was dicta.
  

   ¶ 29. The majority also notes that Justice Coleman has argued in two specially concurring opinions that
   
    Stewart
   
   should be overruled.
   
    5
   
   However, those opinions were "joined in part" by only three other justices, two of whom have since retired from the Court. Those special concurrences are not precedent and, therefore, cannot overrule precedent.
  

   ¶ 30. Moreover, although Justice Dickinson joined Justice Coleman's opinions in part, he also wrote separately to state that "due-process considerations" would preclude retroactive application of any decision overruling
   
    Stewart
   
   -i.e., that
   
    Stewart
   
   's interpretation of the statute would continue to govern in a case such as this one.
   
    6
   
   Indeed, Justice Coleman himself acknowledged that "the retroactive application of any holding overruling
   
    Stewart
   
   " would raise due process "concerns."
   
    7
   
   He did not address that issue precisely because he recognized "the fact that a majority of the Court disagree[d] with him and wishe[d] to uphold
   
    Stewart
   
   ."
   
    8
   
   Thus, not even one justice in
   
    Foster
   
   or
   
    Hampton
   
   stated that
   
    Stewart
   
   should be overruled and that its overruling should be applied retroactively in a case such as this. Only one thing is clear from the various opinions in
   
    Foster
   
   and
   
    Hampton
   
   : a majority of the Court was unwilling to overrule
   
    Stewart
   
   .
  

   ¶ 31. Overruling
   
    Stewart
   
   would also require the Supreme Court to consider the principle of stare decisis, which is sometimes said to be "particularly applicable to cases involving the construction of statutes."
  

    Land Comm'r v. Hutton
   
   ,
   
    307 So.2d 415
   
   , 421 (Miss. 1974). That remains a decision for the Supreme Court, not this Court.
  

   ¶ 32. On behalf of the State, the Attorney General "recognizes that ... this Court ... cannot expressly overrule
   
    Stewart
   
   ." The State raises this issue-whether the armed robbery statute permits a life sentence without a jury recommendation-only to preserve it "for certiorari review, should such a review be necessary." The State's primary argument is that this Court should affirm because Young waived any challenge to his life sentence when he accepted the sentence as part of a voluntary, negotiated plea agreement. Thus, the State also recognizes that only the Supreme Court can overrule
   
    Stewart
   
   .
   
    9
   

   ¶ 33. Following its discussion of
   
    Bester
   
   and
   
    Stewart
   
   , the majority finds that Young's retroactivity claim is "barred" for a second reason: He cites the wrong constitutional clauses. Young mistakenly relies on the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, which govern the retroactive application of legislative acts, rather than the "limitations on ex post facto judicial decision making ... inherent in the notion of
   
    due process
   
   ."
   
    Rogers v. Tennessee
   
   ,
   
    532 U.S. 451
   
   , 456,
   
    121 S.Ct. 1693
   
   ,
   
    149 L.Ed.2d 697
   
   (2000) (emphasis added);
   
    ante
   
   at (¶¶ 16-18). In other words, the substance of Young's claim is clear, but he relies on the wrong authority, so the claim is barred. This seems strict for a pro se prisoner who, on his first motion for post-conviction relief, filed a concise, legible, and intelligible brief that presents only one claim.
   
    10
   
   But if Young's claim really is barred for two different reasons, that just makes the majority's extended discussion of
   
    Bester
   
   and
   
    Stewart
   
   all the more unnecessary.
  

   ¶ 34. In summary, I concur in the holding in paragraph eight of the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent from the dicta that follows because it is inconsistent with this Court's obligation to follow directly controlling Mississippi Supreme Court precedent.
  

   GRIFFIS, P.J., AND CARLTON, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.
  

    "Dicta are statements 'not necessary to the court's ruling.' "
    
     Smith v. Normand Children Diversified Class Tr.
    
    ,
    
     122 So.3d 1234
    
    , 1237 (¶ 5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting
    
     McKibben v. City of Jackson
    
    ,
    
     193 So.2d 741
    
    , 745 (Miss. 1967) ).
   

    The majority also states that it addresses the issue because "this Court does not unanimously agree that
    
     Bester
    
    controls."
    
     Ante
    
    at (¶ 9). This is circular. The disagreement would not arise, and this opinion would not exist, if the majority opinion did not raise and address the issue.
   

     Foster v. State
    
    ,
    
     148 So.3d 1012
    
    , 1020 (¶ 26) (Miss. 2014) (Coleman, J., specially concurring);
    
     Hampton v. State
    
    ,
    
     148 So.3d 992
    
    , 1005 (¶ 36) (Miss. 2014) (Coleman, J., specially concurring).
   

     Foster
    
    , 148 So.3d at 1025-26 (¶ 39) (Dickinson, P.J., dissenting);
    
     accord
    

     Hampton
    
    , 148 So.3d at 1006 (¶ 37) (Dickinson, P.J., dissenting).
   

     Foster
    
    , 148 So.3d at 1025 (¶ 37) (Coleman, J., specially concurring);
    
     Hampton
    
    , 148 So.3d at 1005 (¶ 35) (Coleman, J., specially concurring).
   

     Id.
    
    In
    
     Bester
    
    , the Court requested briefing from an amicus curiae on a similar issue but then did not mention the issue in its opinion.
    
     See
    

     Bester
    
    , 188 So.3d at 536 n.10 (King, J., dissenting). Young raises the retroactivity issue in his brief in this appeal.
   

    While a concession by the Attorney General is not binding on this Court,
    
     see
    

     McCollum v. State
    
    ,
    
     186 So.3d 948
    
    , 950 n.7 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), it is at least as noteworthy as a concession of a pro se litigant.
    
     See
    

     ante
    
    at (¶ 9) (noting that "Young himself concedes that
    
     Bester
    
    controls").
   

     See, e.g.
    
    ,
    
     Chapman v. State
    
    ,
    
     167 So.3d 1170
    
    , 1172 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2015) ("[A] pro se prisoner's meritorious claims may not be ignored because of inartful drafting.");
    
     cf.
    

     Slayton v. Willingham
    
    ,
    
     726 F.2d 631
    
    , 634 n.7 (10th Cir. 1984) ("A pro se litigant's mere citation of the wrong constitutional amendment does not preclude his cause of action so long as the facts he alleges state a claim under an obviously applicable constitutional provision.").