Court Opinion

ID: 9693097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:22:15.503243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:02:44.192292
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority to order that the appeal filed by Kerry Freedman be dismissed as untimely rather than heard on the merits. This Court in Watterson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 816 A.2d 1225 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), under factual circumstances very similar to those present here, affirmed a trial court’s refusal to quash an appeal as untimely filed. In Watterson the driver *499did not appeal from the April 2001 notice of suspension that he received from the Department of Transportation with an accompanying notice that an ignition interlock device must be installed on all vehicles that he owned before restoration of his operating privileges. In February 2002 the driver appealed from the Department’s refusal to restore his license until he had complied with the ignition interlock requirement. The Department moved to quash the appeal, and the trial court denied the Department’s motion.
This Court affirmed the trial court’s nunc pro tunc consideration of the merits in Watterson. In doing so, the Court found that the trial court was correct in relying on Schneider v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), which held that only the trial court had the authority to impose the ignition interlock requirement and that the Department had no independent authority to do so absent a court order. Because the requirement imposed upon the driver by the Department was void ab initio, the Court held that equitable relief was mandated under the extraordinary circumstances of the case and, therefore, that the trial court could properly consider the merits of the appeal nunc pro tunc. This Court followed the holding of Watterson on the issue of nunc pro tunc appeals from notices of intent to impose an interlock requirement in countless later cases, including Hines v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 820 A.2d 922 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), and Conroy v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 825 A.2d 799 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). Thus the Court’s position on this question has been consistent, and it has provided rehable guidance to courts of common pleas throughout the Commonwealth.
In Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578, 588 n9, 673 A.2d 898, 903 n9 (1996), the Supreme Court stated: “The rule of stare decisis declares that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.” This Court stated in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Insurance, 720 A.2d 1071, 1073 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), aff'd, 560 Pa. 595, 747 A.2d 355 (2000): “Stare decisis binds us to fohow decisions of our own court until they are either overruled or compelling reasons persuade us otherwise.”
Now, however, the majority overrules the Watterson fine of cases on the basis of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 575 Pa. 5, 834 A.2d 488 (2003), although Mockaitis did not expressly address the issue of nunc pro tunc appeals in ignition interlock cases. In Mockaitis the Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the Act commonly known as the Ignition Interlock Device Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7001-7003, constituted an unconstitutional delegation of executive department functions to the trial court, and it severed and struck those provisions, i.e., subsections 7002(b), 7003(1) and 7003(5). The court also held that remaining provisions authorized the Department to impose the restriction on repeat DUI offenders when they seek to restore their operating privileges after expiration of the mandatory suspensions.
Further, as the majority notes, a ruling on the petition for allowance of appeal from this Court’s order in Schneider, the first of this Court’s ignition interlock decisions, has been reserved by the Supreme Court pending disposition in Mockaitis and another case. In its brief the Department lists eight other decisions of this Court in ignition interlock cases for which *500petitions for allowance of appeal are pending in the Supreme Court. No such ruling has yet been rendered by the Supreme Court, and neither this Court nor any other may forecast what rationale the Supreme Court might later follow in a given set of circumstances. Therefore, in recognition of the long-established policy promoted by judicial adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis and for the sake of uniformity, predictability and consistency, this Court should follow and be bound by its own precedents unless and until they are overruled by the Supreme Court or other compelling circumstances prevail to persuade this Court otherwise. In short, no reason exists for the Court to overrule Watterson and those cases that followed it.
A separate reason exists for recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the appeal of Freedman. In Hess v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 821 A.2d 663 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), the Department sent to the licensee a letter that on the first page notified him of the suspension of his driver’s license, following his second conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, and informed him of the ignition interlock requirement and the penalty for failure to comply. The letter, mailed in February 2001, then stated: “ ‘You will receive more information regarding this requirement approximately 30 days before your eligibility date.’ ” Id. at 665. The final section indicated that the licensee had the right to appeal “ ‘this action’ ” within thirty days, and it reminded the licensee that “ ‘this is an OFFICIAL NOTICE OF SUSPENSION.’ ” Id. The Court in Hess concluded that because the notice promised more information about the ignition interlock requirement, it suggested that the suspension and the ignition interlock requirement were different actions; therefore, it was not clear whether the notice-of the right to appeal “this action” within thirty days applied to the ignition interlock system requirement. Noting this Court’s prior decision in Schneider, the Court accordingly concluded that there had been a breakdown of the administrative process justifying the nunc pro tunc appeal, which Hess filed in April 2002.
The notice of suspension received by Freedman in the present case, dated April 9, 2002, is virtually identical to the notice sent by the Department in Hess. The first sentence of the first paragraph states: “This is an official notice of the Suspension of your Driving Privilege as authorized by Section 1532B of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.” R.R. 20a. The ignition interlock requirement is listed on the second page among other requirements, such as paying the restoration fee, that the licensee must fulfill before restoration, and that paragraph promises more information in the future. The appeal section at the end refers to “this action,” and the letter concludes: “Remember, this is an OFFICIAL NOTICE OF SUSPENSION.” R.R. 22a. Thus the holding in Hess provides a further basis for this Court to affirm the trial court’s decision to hear Freedman’s appeal nunc pro tunc. I therefore dissent from the majority’s failure to apply and/or to follow recently decided cases from this Court.
Judge PELLEGRINI and Judge FRIEDMAN join in this dissenting opinion.