Court Opinion

ID: 9568115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:00:43.453009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:21.785110
License: Public Domain

*332RAMIL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority incorrectly reads the language of HRS § 269-16 to limit appellate jurisdiction. A direct appeal to the supreme court from every order made by the commission under chapter 269 may be made only by a “person aggrieved in the contested case hearing,” the procedures of which are “provided for” or laid out in HRS § 269-16. The majority opinion appears to acknowledge this reading of HRS § 269-16, majority at 328-329, 944 P.2d at 1271-72, yet proceeds to construe the statute in an excessively narrow manner.
In Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 881 P.2d 1210 (1994), we held that “[sjtanding is concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit. Subject matter jurisdiction is concerned with whether the court has the power to hear a case.” Id. at 67, 881 P.2d at 1213 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The wording of HRS § 269-16(f) reflects these concepts and is not ambiguous:
From every order made by the commission under this chapter that is final or, if preliminary, is of the nature defined by section 91-14(a), an appeal shall lie to the supreme court ... [2] only by a person aggrieved in the contested case hearing [3] provided for under this section ....
(Emphases added.) Part 1 of the statute clearly states that a direct appeal to the supreme court may be had from every order made by the commission under chapter 269. In parts 2 and 3, HRS § 269-16(f) goes on to give standing only to one who is “aggrieved” because he or she has participated in a-contested ease hearing as provided for under HRS § 269-16. The majority imposes the word “section” as an additional requirement of appellate jurisdiction when it is found in that portion of the sentence that places a restriction on standing.
The majority goes on to acknowledge that the scope of a contested case hearing is provided for under HRS § 269-16(a), and “is limited to ‘all rates, fares, charges, classifications, schedules, rules, and practices made, charged, or observed by any public utility.’ ” Majority at 328-329, 944 P.2d at 1271-72. At this point, I disagree with the opinion’s legal analysis insofar as it results in the conclusion that appeals are limited only to “ratemaking” eases.
Relying first on Honolulu Rapid Transit & Land Co., supra, the majority states that “we dismissed the direct appeal of a PUC order requiring the transit company to remove certain street railway tracks, holding that the non-ratemaking order at issue was not directly appealable to this court.... ” Majority at 329, 944 P.2d at 1272 (some emphasis in original and some added.) Unfortunately, the holding was far from being this succinct, and consisted of the following:
Whether the public utilities commission was properly acting within the scope of its' power and authority we are not now called upon to determine but we think it obvious that the commission was not attempting to regulate rates, fares, charges, classifications, rules and practices charged or observed by the public utility and for this reason no appeal lies to the supreme court in the first instance.
Honolulu Rapid Transit & Land Co., 25 Haw. at 334. What this decision does tell us is that in 1919, under RLH § 2234, an order by the PUC requiring Honolulu Rapid Transit and Land Company to move its street railway tracks could not be appealed directly to the supreme court. The opinion fails to provide any insight into how the court reached this conclusion.
It is also questionable whether this case is even relevant today in light of the subsequent amendments to the applicable PUC statutes. In 1933, the legislature changed the wording from “this section” to “this chapter.” Majority at 330, 944 P.2d at 1273 (emphasis added.) What this does suggest is that the legislature intended to broaden the *333scope of PUC orders from which one could file an appeal directly to the supreme court. In 1976, the legislature further refined HRS § 269-16 by adding a standing provision: “only by a person aggrieved in the contested case hearing provided for under this section.” The. legislative history of the 1976 amendment states that it clarifies “the law covering appeal procedures” by focusing on the issue of standing.
Nor is the fact that the legislature amended the title of HRS § 269-16 of great significance. Majority at 331, 944 P.2d at 1274. This court expressly rejected this argument in State v. Lau, 78 Hawai'i 54, 890 P.2d 291 (1995), when it overruled State v. Leatiota, 69 Haw. 253, 739 P.2d 930 (1987). The Leatiota court had held that Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 48 did not apply to driving under the influence (DUI) charges because DUI was a “traffic” offense as opposed to a “criminal” offense. In Lau, we discovered that the underlying rationale behind the decision in Leatiota had been that DUI appeared “in a chapter of the HRS entitled ‘Traffic Violations.’ ” Lau, 78 Hawai'i at 58, 890 P.2d at 295:
[ujnder this rationale, all offenses under HRS Chapter 291 would be “traffic offenses” and exempt from dismissal pursuant to HRPP Rule 48. In addition, because HRS Chapter 291C is entitled “Traffic Code,” all offenses under Chapter 291C would also be exempt from dismissal pursuant to HRPP Rule 48. However, in light of the many provisions under Chapter 291 and 291C that authorize a term of imprisonment, we believe that such a bright line rule would unjustifiably give dispositive weight to the mere title of a chapter and exclude the very type of offense HRPP Rule 48 was designed to cover. The mere fact that an offense is related to the operation of a vehicle should not automatically exempt the application of HRPP Rule 48.
Lau, 78 Hawai'i at 58-59, 890 P.2d at 295-96. Similarly, the title of HRS § 269-16—“[r]eg-ulation of utility rates; ratemaking procedures”—does not limit appeals to ratemaking issues alone.
Despite the fact that a “contested ease” proceeding is often referred to as an “economic hearing,” it does not follow automatically that “a contested case hearing ‘under this section’ could only mean a contested case hearing in a ratemaking case.” Majority at 330, 944 P.2d at 1273 (emphasis added). Simply because the legislature has noted that contested case hearings are commonly known as “economic hearings,” this does not mean that “economic hearings,” absent further clarification or explanation, could only refer to ratemaking issues. In fact, HRS § 91-1(5) (1993) provides that a
“Contested case” means a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after an opportunity for an agency hearing.
An “agency hearing” is defined as follows:
“Agency hearing” refers only to such hearing held by an agency immediately prior to a judicial review of a contested case as provided in section 91-14.
HRS § 91-1(6) (1993). Thus, a “contested case” could encompass a large spectrum of hearings.
Moreover, the word “economic” includes the following definition: “of, relating to, or based on the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and serviees[.]” Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 365 (10th ed. 1994) (emphasis added). In this case, the routing of HELCO’s transmission lines, i.e., their distribution, is at issue.
Additionally, both HRS §§ 269~16(a) and (b) clearly refer not only to ratemaking, but to “practices made” and “practices,” as well. Therefore, even if the word “section” were interpreted as a limitation on the jurisdiction of this court, as the majority asserts, the plain language of HRS § 269-16 refers to more than ratemaking. The legislature intended that “practices made” and “practices” have some meaning other than “rates, fares, [and] charges.” “Courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all words of the statute.” State v. Kaakimaka, 84 Hawai'i 280, 289-90, 933 P.2d 617, 626-27 (quoting State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 351-52, 845 P.2d 547, 551-52, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 849 P.2d 81 (1993)), reconsideration denied, 84 Hawai'i 496, 936 P.2d 191 (1997). *334Limiting direct appeals to the supreme court only when a PUC decision deals with utility rates or ratemaking procedures would render the words “practices made” or “practices” “superfluous or surplusage.” State v. Kwak, 80 Hawai'i 297, 301, 909 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1995).
The legislature has realized the tremendous impact public utilities have on the general public and, in the interest of speedy resolution of disputes, has seen fit to permit appeals directly to the supreme court by persons aggrieved in contested case hearings before the PUC. The effect public utilities exert on the general public is not limited to those generated by rate changes alone, but included “all ... practices made,” as evinced by the plain language of HRS § 269-16 (emphasis added). Accordingly, I believe that this court does have the jurisdiction, pursuant to HRS § 269—16(f), to hear this case.