Court Opinion

ID: 9851715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:18:30.684309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:13.903871
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
concurring specially.
That portion of the charge of the trial court which is under collateral attack here was never challenged at the trial of the case nor in Grace’s direct appeal. After the trial judge concluded his instructions to the jury, he inquired of the defendant’s counsel if there were any exceptions to the charge. Counsel replied that the words "Preponderance of the evidence” should not have been used with respect to any burden on the defendant to overcome the presumption of sanity. After considerable colloquy, the trial judge overruled the exception. Later that evening he reconsidered, recalled and recharged the jury, and specifically instructed them that he was striking the words "by a preponderance of the evidence.” The record indicates that defendant’s counsel had no further objections. After conviction, the defendant appealed to *676this court and filed two enumerations of error, neither of which concerned the charge attacked in this collateral proceeding. This court held both enumerations to be without merit. Grace v. State, 231 Ga. 113 (200 SE2d 248). The two dissenting opinions and the special concurrence were merely discussions of the views of those Justices on the subject of proper jury instructions on insanity.
I do not think the charge under attack here places an unconstitutional burden on the defendant under the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 43 USLW 4695 (June 9, 1975). However, even if it did, it must be remembered that a "criminal defendant may in a procedural setting implement choices which have the effect of waiving basic constitutional guarantees.” Patterson v. State, 233 Ga. 724, 731 (213 SE2d 612). On waiver of objections to jury instructions see Rule 30, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and American Bar Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Jury Instructions 4.6, p. 329-330.1 The efficacy of this principle was explained in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States where that court noted the probable result of allowing such a point to be raised as an afterthought: "Strong tactical considerations would militate in favor of delaying the raising of the claim in hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be difficult.” Davis v. United States, 411U. S. 233, 241. Even more recently that Court has held that "Our cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 235.
Even if it be said that Grace did not waive in the trial court his right to object to the insanity instruction, surely *677he waived it by failing to raise the point on direct appeal. "At some point the law must convey to those in custody that a wrong has been committed, that consequent punishment has been imposed, that one should no longer look back with the view of resurrecting every imaginable basis for further litigation. . .” Id., p. 262. To put it another way — shall a conviction never be final? When will it end; when will it ever end?
If the question of the construction of the charge here under collateral attack should be reached, Justice Hill and I agree that the charge as a whole did not deprive the defendant of due process of law. I see no error and certainly no error of constitutional proportion. It is in substance the same charge that has been given over the years in Georgia. It is also a very clumsy and prolix one.2 However, it does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that "instructions to the jury are not to be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Boyd v. United States, 271 U. S. 104, 107 (1926); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973).” Mullaney, supra, concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist. Furthermore, this court has recently turned away from the pernickety and technical appellate court construction of jury charges which was condemned by Pound3 almost seventy years ago. Lavender v. State, 234 Ga. 608.
After stating the presumption of sanity, the trial judge charged that the burden was upon the defendant to *678establish the insanity defense to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury and that if he did this, he should be acquitted.4 Reasonable satisfaction means no more than a finding that the evidence favorable to the defendant on the issue of insanity is enough to overcome the presumption of sanity. How much is "enough” is answered by the next paragraph in the charge5 which clearly informs the jury that in order to convict they must find the defendant to be sane beyond a reasonable doubt. The failure of the Maine charge in Mullaney to put the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon the prosecution was the basis for the reversal in that case. (See the text of Mullaney and footnote 30 concerning the rule in Maine on proof of self-defense, and also the discussion in footnote 31 on the ultimate burden of the prosecutor by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.) In the case before us, this burden quite properly remained at all times upon the prosecution.
We should always be on guard against "mechanical jurisprudence” which exalts form over substance and remember the cautionary advice of Justice Cardozo that there "is danger that criminal law will be brought into contempt ... if gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence . . .” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 122.

 See also my dissenting opinions in Thomas v. State, 234 Ga. 615; Leach v. State, 234 Ga. 467; Gaither v. State, 234 Ga. 465 and Sims v. State, 234 Ga. 177 (214 SE2d 902).

 A modern pattern charge on this issue is currently under preparation by the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions, Council of Superior Court Judges. See Patterson v. State, supra, for the new approved charge on alibi.

. The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 ABA Rep. 395 (1906). See also, Meador, Criminal Appeals, English Practices and American Reforms 97, 107 (1973) on difference between the English and American (State and Federal) systems and a rationale of causes.

 It was pointed out in Lavender, supra, in discussing justification, that it was not necessary to find the defendant justified in order to have a duty to acquit, "and it is not necessary for the court to give such a redundant instruction.”

 "I charge you that although the burden of establishing the insanity or unsoundness of mind at the time of the alleged offense be not successfully carried by the defendant, so as to authorize his acquittal on this ground, it is nevertheless the duty of the jury to consider the evidence touching the alleged insanity in connection with the other evidence in the case; and if, in view of all the evidence, the jury entertains a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, he should be given the benefit of that doubt and acquitted.”