Court Opinion

ID: 9578829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:48:47.706254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:30.583473
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J., Dissenting.
How did the constable blunder? What did the officers do that they should not have done? What should have been done that was left undone?
The conduct of the police was irreproachable. Therefore, the lesson (“prophylactic effect”) derived from today’s decision can only be that this court no longer accepts convictions based on voluntary confessions.1 This despite the fact that many convicted criminals (few criminals, of course, are convicted) would go free but for confessions. Worse, recognition that some desire to tell the truth-and should be permitted to do so—escapes the majority of our court.
*705There can be no doubt this 20-year-old defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda protections. As soon as the officers had reason to suspect defendant of the murders they fully advised him of his Miranda rights. He responded that he understood his rights and was willing to speak to the officers. When defendant subsequently invoked his rights and stated he did not wish to talk further without an attorney present, the officers immediately terminated the interview, told defendant they could not question him further, and advised he would have to reinitiate communication if he later wished to speak to them.
Defendant was then arrested. While being booked he asked to speak with Officer Cervi alone and “off the record.” This request was granted and when alone, defendant asked Cervi certain hypothetical questions regarding what would happen if he were in fact responsible for the murders. Cervi told defendant he would have to go to jail, but that it would be better for him if he gave Cervi a statement. Cervi then asked defendant if he were willing to give a tape-recorded statement, and defendant agreed to do so. At commencement of the statement defendant was reminded he had previously refused to talk further without an attorney. Defendant acknowledged this was the case and also admitted he had subsequently asked to talk further with Cervi. Defendant also stated he was acting voluntarily and was still aware of his right to have an attorney present. Cervi did not readvise defendant of his right to remain silent or of the privilege against self-incrimination, but, as the majority concede {ante, pp. 701-702), repeating these rights was unnecessary in light of the complete admonition given him less than two hours earlier. Defendant then detailed his crimes.
A few hours later defendant gave a taped statement to a deputy district attorney. Defendant was again given the Miranda admonition and again stated he understood it and was willing to waive its protection. He acknowledged he had previously been advised of these rights, had understood them at that time, had stated he did not wish to talk without an attorney present and had then been advised that if he wanted to talk further, he would have to reinitiate discussion with the officers. Defendant affirmed he had later told Officer Cervi he wished to speak to him, that he had acted voluntarily in reinitiating communication with the officer, and he had done so with his Miranda rights in mind. Defendant was again asked whether he was willing to waive his Miranda rights, stated he was and again gave a full description of his crimes.
*706It would be difficult to imagine more compelling evidence of waiver of one’s privilege to sit silent. Conversely, defendant’s desire to describe his conduct to those charged with its solution is clear and should not be frustrated by our court.
Defendant’s conviction for these grave crimes—cold-blooded murder of his father, mother and grandfather to secure his inheritance—should be affirmed.
Mosk, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 28, 1979. Mosk, J., Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

For recent cases manifesting our court’s attitude toward confessions, see People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595 [147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672]; In re Michael C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 471 [146 Cal.Rptr. 358, 579 P.2d 7], judgment reversed and cause remanded sub nomine, Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707 [61 L.Ed.2d 197, 99 S.Ct. 2560]; People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231 [145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108].