Court Opinion

ID: 9603639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:08:23.751352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:42.277571
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY
specially concurring:
I agree with the majority opinion that section 18-8-306, 8B C.R.S. (1986), is not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face in violation of the state and federal constitutions. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the analysis employed by the majority in part II.B. of its opinion. In my view, we should not decide whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to Janousek. Although styled as an “as applied” challenge, Janousek’s complaint is not constitutional in nature. In fact, both Janousek and the trial court concede that Janousek could be punished under this statute if his letter constitutes a “threat of violence” within the meaning of the statute. As the People correctly point out, Janousek’s argument that the statute is unconstitutional “as applied” to him is based on his contention that he has not violated the statute. This is a matter of statutory interpretation and not a question of constitutional law.
Section 18-3-306 provides that a person is guilty of attempting to influence a public servant if he or she:
[Attempts to influence any public servant by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal against any person or property, with the intent thereby to alter or affect the public servant’s decision, vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter which is to be considered or performed by him or the agency or body of which he is a member.
The critical elements of this offense are (1) an attempt to influence a public servant (2) by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal (3) with the intent to alter or affect the public servant’s decision or action. People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261, 1269 (Colo.1985). The problem in this ease con*1198cerns the second critical element, the means by which the influence was attempted.
Although Janousek submitted a “bill” to the judge demanding outlandish items such as a life-time ski pass, no one is seriously maintaining that the basis of this charge is a threat of economic reprisal. Rather, the critical statutory language involved in this case is the phrase “threat of violence.” Janousek claims that he did not directly threaten Judge Allen or any other public official. Although written in abusive and often profane language, Janousek argues that the letter was nothing more than a vituperative criticism of a decision reached by Judge Allen in a prior case. The prosecutor, however, contends that Janousek’s letter goes beyond the mere expression of criticism and constitutes an actual threat of violence.
At the end of the April 5,1993 hearing, the trial court expressly found that the phrase “threat of violence” in the statute was neither vague nor overly broad. I agree. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (per curiam) (holding statute which prohibited threats to kill the president to be constitutional on its face). However, the trial court believed that the statute did not apply to Janousek since there was “no direct threat of violence contained in defendant’s letter.” In other words, the trial court found that Janou-sek’s letter did not fall within the scope of the conduct prohibited by the statute. The trial court did not hold that the statute was “unconstitutional as applied” to Janousek.
In my opinion, the trial court adopted an unduly narrow interpretation of the phrase “threat of violence” by requiring that the threat be “direct” before it will fall within the scope of section 18-8-306. In other contexts, we have defined the term “threat” to mean a statement of purpose or intent to cause injury or harm to another person, and have not required the threat to be “direct.” See People v. Hines, 780 P.2d 556, 559 (Colo.1989); Schott v. People, 174 Colo. 15, 18, 482 P.2d 101, 102 (1971). Instead, the critical inquiry for First Amendment purposes is whether the statements, viewed in the context in which they were spoken or written, constitute a “true threat.” Watts, 394 U.S. at 708, 89 S.Ct. at 1401; United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 618 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006, 105 S.Ct. 1364, 84 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985); United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247, 1256 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934, 104 S.Ct. 339, 78 L.Ed.2d 307 (1983). A “true threat” is a serious threat, as opposed to mere political argument, talk or jest, Dy-sart, 705 F.2d at 1256, and the critical inquiry is whether those who hear or read the threat reasonably consider that an actual threat has been made. Id.
When the evidence presented at the hearing is viewed under the correct legal standards, and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, see, e.g., Hines, 780 P.2d at 559; People v. Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588, 592 (Colo.1982), it is clear that the trial court erred in dismissing the charge against Janousek prior to trial. A jury could find that Janousek’s letter constituted nothing more than a crude method of expressing criticism of Judge Allen, see Welch, 745 F.2d at 618, in which case Janousek would not be guilty of the crime of attempting to influence a public official. However, as the majority recognizes, the prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to permit a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Janousek’s letter constituted a true threat of violence. Accordingly, the trial court’s order dismissing the case should be reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the charge against Janousek.
ERICKSON, J., joins in the special concurrence.