Court Opinion

ID: 9372826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:56.515043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.917365
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JANICE L. ATKINSON,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                       SF-0432-16-0418-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: February 16, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Ray Wilkins, St. Louis, Missouri, for the appellant.

           Joseph Manuel Briones, Esquire, Los Angeles, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained her performance-based removal. For the reasons discussed below, we
     GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and
     REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication consistent with

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     Santos v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 990 F.3d 1355 (Fed.
     Cir. 2021).

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The following facts, as further detailed in the initial decision, are not in
     dispute. The appellant most recently held the position of Rating Veterans Service
     Representative in the agency’s San Diego office—a position that generally
     involved adjudicating claims for veterans’ benefits. Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 11 at 51-52, Tab 35, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. The performance plan for
     that position included four critical elements, with one being “Quality.” ID at 2;
     IAF, Tab 11 at 51-52.
¶3        In June 2014, the agency reassigned the appellant to a different team and, as
     a result, she began reporting to a new supervisor. ID at 12; IAF, Tab 21 at 2 -3.
     Beginning in March 2015, her new supervisor measured the appellant’s Qu ality
     and found that it fell below the acceptable accuracy rate of 92%.         ID at 3.
     Subsequently, in June 2015, the agency placed the appellant on a 90 -day
     performance improvement plan (PIP). ID at 4; IAF, Tab 10 at 114 -18.
¶4        In November 2015, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal, based on
     her failure to improve and demonstrate acceptable performance in the critical
     element of Quality.     ID at 5-6; IAF, Tab 10 at 34-36.      The deciding official
     sustained her removal, effective March 20, 2016. ID at 6; IA F, Tab 8 at 52-55.
¶5        The appellant challenged her performance-based removal in the instant
     appeal. ID at 6. After developing the record and holding the requested hearing,
     the administrative judge affirmed the removal. She found that the agency met its
     burden to prove the charge, ID at 7-13, and the appellant did not prove any of the
     affirmative defenses she asserted, ID at 13-41.       The administrative judge also
     found the appellant’s remaining arguments, concerning due process and
     mitigation of the penalty, unavailing. ID at 41-42.
                                                                                           3

¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review, in which she challenges the
     administrative judge’s determination to sustain the charge. Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 2-3. She also presents arguments pertaining to her selection
     for team reassignment in June 2014, a 90-day acclimation period following this
     reassignment, and her participation in the Employee Assistance Program (EAP),
     all of which appear to be harmful error claims. Id. at 1-2. Finally, the appellant
     disagrees with the administrative judge’s denial of her disability discrimination
     claim while also asserting that the administrative judge failed to address the
     agency’s purported delay in issuing a decision on a reasonable accommodation
     request. 2 Id. at 1-4. The agency has filed a response to the petition for review.
     PFR File, Tab 3.

                                          ANALYSIS
     Remand is required in light of Santos.
¶7         At the time the initial decision was issued, the Board’s case law stated that,
     to prevail in an appeal of a performance-based removal under chapter 43, the
     agency must establish the following by substantial evidence: (1) the Office of
     Personnel Management (OPM) approved its performance appraisal system and
     any significant changes thereto; (2) the agency communicated to the appell ant the
     performance standards and critical elements of her position; (3) the appellant’s
     performance standards were valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1); (4) the agency
     warned the appellant of the inadequacies of her performance during the appraisal
     period and gave her a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable

     2
       The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s denial of her claim that
     the June 2014 reassignment was based on her disability and improper retaliation. IAF,
     Tab 21 at 2-3, Tab 23 at 4. In addition, she does not revisit the administrative judge’s
     denial of her due process claim or reassert that the penalty of removal should have been
     mitigated. We decline to revisit the administrative judge’s well -reasoned findings
     concerning these matters on review. ID at 33-37, 39-42; see Lee v. Environmental
     Protection Agency, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 6 (2010) (observing that the Board has no
     authority to mitigate a removal taken under chapter 43).
                                                                                        4

     performance; and (5) the appellant’s performance remained unacceptable in one
     or more of the critical elements for which she was provid ed an opportunity to
     demonstrate acceptable performance. Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency,
     115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 5 (2010). 3 Substantial evidence is the degree of relevant
     evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, might
     accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even though other reasonable persons
     might disagree. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p). The administrative judge found that the
     agency proved these elements. ID at 7-13.
¶8        On review, the appellant argues that the agency did not provide her with a
     meaningful opportunity to meet the applicable performance standards, PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 3, implicating the fourth element described above. 4 Specifically, the
     appellant contends that the agency did not provide her with “proper training,” a
     “90-day acclimation period after training,” or additional training required by her
     PIP and union agreement. Id. We are not persuaded.
¶9        In determining whether the agency has afforded an appellant a reasonable
     opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance, relevant factors include the
     nature of the duties and responsibilities of her position, the performance
     deficiencies involved, and the amount of time which is sufficient to enable the
     employee to have an opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance.          Lee,
     115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 32. However, the Board has recognized that an agency is not
     obligated to provide formal training to an employee to satisfy the requirement

     3
       We recognize that the administrative judge described the agency’s burden somewhat
     differently than we have in this decision. ID at 7 -8. However, the requirements
     remained the same. We are simply utilizing the description found in more recent Board
     decisions. See, e.g., White v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5
     (2013); Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 5.
     4
       The administrative judge found that the agency met its burden regarding the other
     elements as well—OPM approved its appraisal system, the agency communicated the
     standards to the appellant, the standards were valid, and the appellant’s performance
     remained unacceptable. ID at 8-12. The appellant’s petition for review contains no
     challenge to those findings, and we decline to disturb them.
                                                                                        5

      that it provide a reasonable opportunity to improve. Corbett v. Department of the
      Air Force, 59 M.S.P.R. 288, 290 (1993).
¶10        The administrative judge considered the available evidence, including the
      PIP itself, the appellant’s testimony, her supervisor’s testimony, and PIP meeting
      notes, to find that the agency provided the appellant with a reasonable
      opportunity to improve. ID at 4-5, 10-13; see IAF, Tab 10 at 70, 72, 84, 105,
      116-18, Tab 29, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD1) (testimony of the appellant and
      her supervisor). She found that, inter alia, the agency provided the appellant
      with a 90-day PIP period, a mentor to answer technical questions throughout the
      PIP, and regular progress meetings. ID at 11-12.
¶11        The administrative judge did not credit the appellant’s general assertion that
      the agency failed to provide her with appropriate training. ID at 12 -13. She
      noted that the appellant consistently denied the need for additional training in PIP
      meetings with her supervisor, as evidenced by numerous contemporaneous PIP
      meeting notes and hearing testimony. ID at 4-5, 12-13; compare IAF, Tab 10
      at 117 (PIP notice, indicating that the appellant was fully trained b ut offering to
      consider any specific training needs if the appellant identified them), with id.
      at 70, 72, 84, 105 (contemporaneous notes from PIP progress meetings, indicating
      that the appellant repeatedly denied needing additional training), and HCD1
      (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor). The appellant’s general reassertion that
      the agency failed to provide appropriate training does not warrant disturbing the
      administrative judge’s findings on that point.      See Haebe v. Department of
      Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the Board must
      defer to an administrative judge’s credibility determin ations when they are based,
      explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a
      hearing; the Board may overturn such determinations only when it has
      “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so).     We agree with the administrative
      judge’s conclusion that the agency provided the appellant with a reasonable
      opportunity to improve. See Towne v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R.
                                                                                        6

      239, ¶¶ 18-20 (2013) (finding that an employee was provided with an opportunity
      to improve when she received detailed written feedback and her supervisor held
      regular meetings during the PIP to provide feedback and respond to questi ons).
¶12         Although the appellant has identified no basis for us to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings regarding the agency proving the elements
      described above, we must remand this appeal for the agency to prove an
      additional element of its charge. During the pendency of the petition for review
      in this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in Santos,
      990 F.3d at 1360-61, 1363, that in addition to the five elements of the agency’s
      case set forth above, the agency must also “justify the institution of a PIP” by
      proving by “substantial evidence that the employee’s performance was
      unacceptable . . . before the PIP.”     The Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos
      applies to all pending cases, including this one, regardless of when the events
      took place.    Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16.
      Accordingly, we remand the appeal to give the parties the opportunity to present
      argument and additional evidence on whether the appellant’s performance during
      the period leading up to the PIP was unacceptable in one or more critical
      elements. See id, ¶¶ 15-17. On remand, the administrative judge shall accept
      argument and evidence on this issue and shall hold a supplemental hearing if
      appropriate. Id., ¶ 17.

      The appellant failed to establish a harmful procedural error.
            Training
¶13         As discussed above, the appellant raises allegations regarding her training
      before and during the PIP. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. Specifically, she claims that
      following her June 2014 team reassignment the agency failed to provide her with
      “a 90-day acclimation period” as required by agency policy. Id. at 3, 19-20. She
      also alleges that the agency did not comply with PIP training requirements set
      forth in the applicable collective bargaining agreement.        Id. at 3.   We have
      separately considered these as potential harmful error claims. Id. at 3, 19-20; see
                                                                                        7

      5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.4(r), 1201.56(c)(1) (explaining that the Board must reverse an
      action if the appellant shows that the agency’s error in applying its procedures in
      arriving at its decision is likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion
      different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error).
      However, the arguments are unavailing for a number of reasons.
¶14        First, although the appellant did allege a number of harmful errors and
      training concerns below, it appears that these allegations were not among them.
      Compare PFR File, Tab 1 at 3, with IAF, Tab 21 at 6-7, Tab 23 at 3-5, Tab 25
      at 2-4; see Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980)
      (recognizing that the Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the
      first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and
      material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence).
      Next, as to the appellant’s claim that she was not given training required by her
      union contract, a petition for review must contain sufficient specificity for the
      Board to ascertain whether there is a serious evidentiary challenge justifying a
      complete review of the record.         Thompson v. Department of the Army,
      122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 10 (2015).      Because the appellant has failed to identify
      where the training provision is in the record or explain what it requires, we
      decline to consider this argument further.
¶15        Further, as to the 90-day acclimation period, the appellant has provided a
      copy of the agency’s policy for the first time on review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19;
      see Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980) (recognizing that
      the Board will not consider evidence submitted for the first time on review absent
      a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the party ’s
      due diligence). It provides, as applicable here, that individuals changing from
      one team to another will not be subject to any performance -based action for the
      first 90 days of their assignment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19. Even if we were to
      consider the appellant’s new evidence and argument regarding the acclimation
      policy, we find that she has failed to identify any agency error. The policy is
                                                                                       8

      inapplicable because it is dated after the agency proposed her removal, compare
      IAF, Tab 10 at 34-36 (November 2015 proposal to remove the appellant), with
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 19 (February 2016 memorandum with “[t]he purpose of . . .
      establish[ing] policy for the rotation and reassignment of employees”), and the
      agency did not propose the appellant’s removal within 90 days of her June 2014
      team reassignment, IAF, Tab 21 at 3; PFR File, Tab 1 at 19.

            EAP
¶16        On review, the appellant also argues that the administrative judge erred in
      finding that that she only attended two EAP sessions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. She
      alleges that, as a result of her participation in the EAP, the agency’s collective
      bargaining agreement required that her removal be held in abeyance. Id. Again,
      we are not persuaded.
¶17        The appellant supports her argument with a new document, submitted for
      the first time on review. Id. at 8. Although the document itself is dated after the
      initial decision, the information contained is not new—the document merely
      identifies seven dates on which the appellant attended appointments covered by
      the EAP, all of which occurred after the agency proposed her removal and before
      the close of record below. Id.; see Avansino, 3 M.S.P.R. at 214; see also Grassell
      v. Department of Transportation, 40 M.S.P.R. 554, 564 (1989) (observing that to
      constitute new evidence, the information contained in the documents, not just the
      documents themselves, must have been unavailable despite due diligence when
      the record closed). Moreover, even if the evidence were new, the appellant has
      failed to establish that it is material.   See Russo v. Veterans Administration,
      3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (finding that the Board will not grant a petition for
      review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to
      warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision).
¶18        The administrative judge recognized below the pertinent provision of the
      collective bargaining agreement. ID at 38-39. While the provision indicates that
      the agency will hold proposed corrective actions in abeyance for an employee to
                                                                                       9

      attend EAP sessions and successfully complete treatment, it further states that,
      “the [EAP] program is not intended to shield employees from corrective action in
      all instances.”   IAF, Tab 23 at 10.    The administrative judge f ound that the
      agency offered the appellant EAP assistance months earlier, but the appellant did
      not avail herself of that program until several months after the agency proposed
      her removal.      ID at 39.   Under the circumstances, the administrative judge
      concluded that the appellant’s participation in the EAP was an attempt to shield
      herself from removal. Id. For that reason and others, the administrative judge
      found that the provision of the collective bargaining agreement regarding the EAP
      did not apply to the appellant’s situation. ID at 38-39. The appellant’s evidence
      submitted for the first time on review does not support a different conclusion.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 8.

            Seniority
¶19         The appellant also reasserts that her deficient performance was attributabl e
      to her June 2014 team reassignment and seniority rules dictated that a more junior
      coworker should have been reassigned instead of the appellant.      Id. at 2. The
      administrative judge found on the record below that the appellant’s coworker had
      greater seniority because she had been a Rating Veterans Service Representative
      longer than the appellant. ID at 37.
¶20         On review, the appellant submits a memorandum of understanding defining
      seniority as an employee’s enter-on-duty date with the regional office to which
      the appellant and her coworker were assigned. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12. However,
      she failed to present this evidence below. As previously recognized, the Board
      generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time on review absent
      a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s
      due diligence. Avansino, 3 M.S.P.R. at 214. Because the appellant failed to show
      that this memorandum of understanding, which is dated February 2012, was
                                                                                            10

      previously unavailable, we decline to consider it.        See PFR File, Tab 1 at 12.
      Accordingly, we find that she has failed state a basis for granting review. 5

      The appellant failed to establish disability discrimination. 6
¶21            The appellant’s final arguments on review concern her disability
      discrimination claim.       She alleges that the administrative judge refused to
      recognize her as disabled, instead substituting her own opinion for that of the
      appellant’s physicians.      PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-4.        This argument reflects a
      misunderstanding of the administrative judge’s analysis.
¶22            To prove disability discrimination, an appellant first must establish that she
      is an individual with a disability by showing that she:          (1) has a physical or
      mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities;
      (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an
      impairment, as that term is defined in the applicable regulations.            Thome v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 315, ¶ 24 (2015). Despite the
      appellant’s suggestion to the contrary, the administrative judge found that the
      appellant met this requirement based on her depression and anxiety disorders. ID
      at 24.

      5
         Even if the appellant had shown that the agency committed procedural error in
      reassigning her, she failed to submit evidence that the error was harmful. See Stephen
      v. Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681, 685 (1991) (recognizing that
      harmful error cannot be presumed; an agency error is harmful only when the record
      shows that the procedural error was likely to have caused the agency to reach a
      conclusion different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the
      error). While the appellant alleged below that the Quality standard was easier to meet
      on her previous team, the standard was the same. IAF, Tab 10 at 5, 7. Further, less
      than a year before her reassignment, the appellant’s supervisor warned her that she was
      failing on her production standard and threatened to place her on a PIP. IAF, Tab 21
      at 2-3. Although the appellant was able to improve her performance and avoid being
      placed on a PIP, the circumstances do not suggest that the appellant likely would have
      been successful had she remained on her previous team. Id. at 3.
      6
        Below, the only discrimination claims the appellant presented were those based on
      disability. IAF, Tab 24 at 2-3. Therefore, to the extent that the appellant is attempting
      to raise race or sex discrimination claims for the first time on review, see PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 4, we will not consider them, see Banks, 4 M.S.P.R. at 271.
                                                                                            11

¶23         An appellant also must establish, inter alia, that she was a qualified
      individual with a disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see Clemens v. Department of
      the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 10 (2014) (recognizing this requirement in the
      context of a disability discrimination claim based on a failure to accommodate);
      29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination against such an individual).
      With exceptions not applicable here, the term “qualified” means that the
      individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job -related
      requirements of the employment position the individual holds or desires and, with
      or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such
      position.   29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).        The administrative judge found that the
      appellant failed to prove this element of her disability discrimination affirma tive
      defense because the record showed that she could not perform the essential
      “Quality” standard of her position with or without accommodation. 7 ID at 24-26.
¶24         In her petition, the appellant appears to concede that she was unable to meet
      the Quality standard of her position, and she has not identified any
      accommodation that would have allowed her to meet that standard. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 3-4. Instead, she suggests that the agency should have offered her a
      reassignment.    Id. at 1, 4.   However, the appellant has failed to identify any
      position that was vacant and within her abilities. See Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616,
      ¶¶ 10, 17 (recognizing that an appellant bears the burden of proving that a
      requested accommodation existed and was reasonable and finding that an
      appellant failed to meet that burden when he asserted that the agency could have
      reassigned him without identifying any available positions). The administrative

      7
        The administrative judge further found that the appellant did not prove her allegations
      that the agency failed to accommodate her, ID at 26-27, failed to follow its reasonable
      accommodation procedures, ID at 27-28, or failed to follow its policies regarding
      reassignment as a last resort, ID at 28-29. The administrative judge also found that the
      appellant failed to prove that any valid comparators were treated more favorably. ID
      at 30-33. Except for those arguments discussed herein, the appellant has not challenged
      these findings and we decline to disturb them.
                                                                                      12

      judge considered two reassignment requests the appellant made prior to her
      removal. ID at 18-25. The first was a request to be moved to a different team
      while maintaining her existing Rating Veterans Service Representa tive position,
      and the second was a request for reassignment to a Supervisory Veterans Service
      Representative position.    IAF, Tab 9 at 78-81, Tab 10 at 17, 19.             The
      administrative judge found that the agency properly denied both requests because,
      inter alia, each position had the same Quality standard—a standard the appellant
      was unable to meet. ID at 25; see Byrne v. Department of Labor, 106 M.S.P.R.
      43, ¶ 7 (2007) (recognizing that reasonable accommodation does not require an
      agency to lower production or performance standards); Clemens v. Department of
      the Army, 104 M.S.P.R. 362, ¶ 27 (2006) (same). In the absence of any argument
      or evidence to the contrary, we agree.       Accordingly, we find no basis for
      disturbing the administrative judge’s findings concerning the alleged disability
      discrimination.
¶25        Separately, the appellant appears to reassert an argument she raised below,
      concerning the agency’s delay in responding to her February 2, 2016 reasonable
      accommodation request. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; see IAF, Tab 21 at 7. However,
      the relevance of this purported delay is not apparent under the circumstances,
      given that the appellant appears to concede that she could not perform the
      essential functions of her position, with or without accommodation. See supra,
      ¶ 24. Moreover, the policy the appellant relies on provides that accommodation
      requests “should ordinarily be processed within thirty (30) calendar days, not
      counting the time waiting for medical documentation.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 17.
      Although the administrative judge did not specifically address that policy, she did
      conclude that the agency responded to the appellant’s reasonable accommodation
      requests promptly, ID at 26, and we agree. The record shows that the agency
      quickly and continually engaged with the appellant, each time she requested
      accommodation.    See, e.g., IAF, Tab 11 at 54-64. Specific to the February 2,
      2016 request she refers to on review, the agency immediately responded, provided
                                                                                           13

      interim accommodations, and continued to seek additional information from the
      appellant and her physician, up through her March 2016 removal.               E.g., IAF,
      Tab 8 at 58-62, Tab 9 at 14-15, 41-43, 53-58. Therefore, to the extent that the
      appellant    suggests   that   this   interactive   process   amounted   to   disability
      discrimination or some other dispositive impropriety, we are not persuaded.
¶26         In conclusion, the arguments the appellant presented on review are
      unavailing. Nevertheless, we must remand this decision in light of Santos. On
      remand, the administrative judge shall accept argument and evidence on this issue
      and shall hold a supplemental hearing if appropriate. Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 17.
      The administrative judge shall then issue a new initial decision consistent with
      Santos.     See id.   If the agency makes the additional showing required under
      Santos on remand, the administrative judge may incorporate h er prior findings on
      the other elements of the agency’s case and the appellant’s affirmative defenses
      in the remand initial decision.       See id.   However, regardless of whether the
      agency meets its burden, if the argument or evidence on remand regarding the
      appellant’s pre-PIP performance affects the administrative judge’s analysis of the
      appellant’s affirmative defenses, she should address such argument or evidence in
      the remand initial decision. See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management,
      1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (explaining that an initial decision must identify all
      material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of
      credibility, and include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law and his
      legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).
                                                                                   14

                                          ORDER
¶27        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.