Court Opinion

ID: 9943932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 15:20:03.968182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:52:21.989448
License: Public Domain

I respectfully dissent. The essential error of the majority opinion is that it writes about the method of drilling when the only issue concerns ownership of land. No one *Page 483 
disputes the power of the Railroad Commission to issue drilling permits and to prescribe drilling methods. Peterson v. Grayce Oil Company, Tex.Civ.App., 37 S.W.2d 367, affirmed128 Tex. 550, 98 S.W.2d 781. The issue in this case is not whether sand fracturing is a proper method. We take it that it is highly proper. The issue is not the waste or the conservation of the natural resources. Cf. Corzelius v. Railroad Commission, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W.2d 412. There is no claim of any waste by anyone. The rule of capture is not involved. Throughout appellants' case and their briefs, the claim is that they have a right to 'complete' a well. The issue again is not whether they have a right to 'complete' a well but whether they have a right to 'complete' it on lands they do not own. The true issue is whether appellants, using a proper method, may intentionally invade their neighbor's land. I say that they may not so invade another's realty. Hastings Oil Company v. Texas Company, 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d 389.
The majority and appellants argue that by using proper methods the Railroad Commission can authorize the use of a drilling permit any place. Methods of drilling and ownership concern two vastly different problems. I do not conceive that it has ever been the law that the Railroad Commission could authorize A to drill a well on B's land just because A proves he will use proper drilling methods. If the Commission issues a permit to drill upon land not owned by the permittee, I do not conceive it to be the law that the landowner must first go to the Railroad Commission instead of to the court house. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Commission, 141 Tex. 96, 170 S.W.2d 189, 191, says:
 "The function of the Railroad Commission in this connection is to administer the conservation laws. When it grants a permit to drill a well it does not undertake to adjudicate questions of title or rights of possession. These questions must be settled in the courts."
Accord, Novak v. Bruner, Tex.Civ.App., 320 S.W.2d 439; Nugent v. Freeman, Tex.Civ.App., 306 S.W.2d 167; Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Railroad Commission, Tex. Cip.App.,318 S.W.2d 17; Pan American Production Co. v. Hollandsworth, Tex.Civ.App., 294 S.W.2d 205; Whelan v. Placid Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 274 S.W.2d 125; Mueller v. Sutherland, Tex.Civ.App., 179 S.W.2d 801.
Appellants were enjoined from 'using acid under pressure sufficient to force it into the formation beyond the limits of Defendants' lease; from the use of sand and other fracturing material under pressure which would force such material out beyond the limits of Defendants' lease; from using any and all techniques and/or materials which would physically invade the subsurface of Plaintiffs' premises surrounding the well in question, and from creating channels, cracks or fissures in the subsurface of Plaintiffs' land.' In other words, the order simply prohibits operations on lands which appellants admit they do not own.
Appellants' complaint is that the order does not permit them to go 'beyond' their lease, and prohibits them from forcing material 'beyond' their lease, from 'physically invading' appellants' land, from 'creating channels, cracks or fissures' in appellees' land. This is not an injunction against the use of an improper method. It is not an injunction against appellants' drilling on their own land. This is an injunction against using a proper method on another's land. Appellants have ceased drilling with a bit, but they are not through drilling. They intend to 'complete' the well by lateral crevices artificially induced that will admittedly extend into their neighbor's lands, and to maintain these crevices by material introduced under force. They intend to extend the well bore into and into another's land. They are still drilling by a different method, and in this case the drilling admittedly has for its sole purpose the enlargement of a *Page 484 
small well bore beneath their strip to a super hole and caverns beneath appellees' land. For all practical purposes, appellants seek to bottom their well directionally or laterally on another's land.
If appellants invaded the surface of appellees' lands in manner similar to that which they intend to invade the subsurface, there would be a simple matter for the courts to determine. The Railroad Commission has never entertained the power to authorize a non-owner to move on another's land and to trespass upon it, just to drill or complete a well. If all of the undisputed evidence should demonstrate with certainty that proper sand fracturing methods will be used, I can not agree that this would be enough to empower the Commission to decide that a non-owner could commence a well from the surface of lands he does not own. Somehow, this matter is simple and usual when we view it from the top of the ground, and it seems to become very difficult when we talk about the same thing beneath the surface of the ground. The rule is the same, however. Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Company, Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W.2d 317, 321; 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d 389, 398. What the majority opinion will mean is that sub-surface land rights will in the future be determined by the substantial evidence rule. The import of such a decision and its resulting transfer of real property rights in subsurface lands to administrative decision is disturbing.
The trial court ordered that the status quo not be disturbed. That was the recited purpose of the order. It was proved to the trial court that once the subsurface is 'fractured', it can not be 'unfractured'. The whole object of the fracturing is to open crevices which will extend laterially outside appellants' boundaries and onto appellees' lands. That is its purpose, and once done it can not be undone. The Supreme Court has spoken on the subject of temporary injunction to maintain status quo. 'The only question before the court at a hearing on an application for a temporary injunction is the right of the applicant to the preservation of the status quo of the subject matter of the suit pending a trial on the merits, and the court is not authorized to enter judgment on the merits at such a hearing. James v. E. Weinstein Sons, Tex.Com.App.,12 S.W.2d 959; Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549.' Houston Belt Terminal Ry. Co. v. Texas New Orleans R. Co., 155 Tex. 407, 289 S.W.2d 217, 219. The Court went on to say that the trial court was without authority to convert the hearing into a trial on the merits, and that the rights of the parties on the merits will not be measured and determined by the appellate court on the basis of the evidence introduced at a preliminary hearing.
I conclude, therefore, that this Court is without power to jump the status quo matter and decide that the appellees are probably going to lose their suit sooner or later anyway. When this Court dissolves the injunction, it permits the subject matter of the suit to be destroyed. If this Court should ultimately be wrong, nonetheless the status quo is disrupted. I would, therefore, maintain the temporary injunction in force until the trial court and a jury have had an opportunity to decide the case on its merits. *Page 485