Court Opinion

ID: 9529078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:47:15.643431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:39.086737
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SPOMER, specially concurring: Contrary to the dissenting opinion of my colleague Justice Goldenhersh, I believe the resolution of the issue of the trial court’s failure to recharacterize the defendant’s petition for relief from judgment as a postconviction petition is dispositive of the relief this court can afford the defendant. Because I agree with my colleague Justice Welch that the trial court’s order must be affirmed, I concur in that result. However, I write separately because I would use a different analytical framework to reach that conclusion. I believe the plain language of section 122 — 1(d) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(d) (West 2006)), and the cases interpreting it, dictates that once a trial judge determines that a pleading does not specify “in the petition or its heading that it is filed under” section 122 — 1(d) and that the pleading therefore has not properly invoked the Act, the judge may do one of three things. First, the judge may stop right there and rule on the pleading as filed, without evaluating whether the pleading states grounds for relief under the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(d) (West 2006) (“A trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this Article”). By implication, when this approach is taken, the pleading will not be recharacterized as a petition under the Act. Second, the judge may evaluate the pleading to see if it states grounds for relief under the Act and then decline to recharacterize it, either because it does not fit under the Act or for other reasons. Third, the judge may evaluate the pleading to see if it states grounds for relief under the Act and then recharacterize it, which of course triggers the admonishments the Illinois Supreme Court has held in People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 57 (2005), must be given when a pleading is recharacterized as a postconviction petition. In my opinion, under the plain language of the Act, quoted above, if the judge chooses the first course of action described above and declines to evaluate whether the pleading states grounds for relief under the Act (and by implication does not recharacterize it), that choice is nonreviewable. The discretion to do this appears to be, as my colleague Justice Welch states, “unfettered.” 391 Ill. App. 3d at 249. Although one might argue that the specter of the General Assembly creating a mechanism whereby a trial judge, rather than Illinois courts of review, becomes the final arbiter of the decision of whether to evaluate a pleading to determine if it states grounds for relief under the Act raises troubling constitutional questions, the Illinois Supreme Court seems to be have rejected those arguments, having held in Shellstrom that “while a trial court may treat a pro se pleading as a postconviction petition, there is no requirement that the court do so” (emphasis in original) and that “if a pro se pleading alleges constitutional deprivations that are cognizable under the Act[ ] but, as in the case at bar, the pleading makes no mention of the Act, a trial court is under no obligation to treat the pleading as a postconviction petition.” 216 Ill. 2d at 53 n.l. That said, I do not agree with Justice Welch that a trial court also has “unfettered discretion to refuse to” recharacterize a petition. 391 Ill. App. 3d at 249. I believe that if the judge chooses the second or third course of action described above and actually evaluates the pleading to see if it states grounds for relief under the Act, then the decision reached following that evaluation, whether the decision is to re-characterize or not to recharacterize, is reviewable under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., People v. Holliday, 369 Ill. App. 3d 678, 682 (2007) (“a trial court’s decision regarding recharacterization is addressed to its sound discretion and will be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard”); People v. Starks, 365 Ill. App. 3d 592, 597 (2006) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to a review of the trial court’s implied construction of the defendant’s “ ‘motion for a new trial’ ” asa petition under the Act). The key question becomes whether there is evidence in the record that the judge evaluated the pleading, as opposed to simply declined to evaluate it. Often the record will contain no such evidence. In the absence of proof that the judge conducted an evaluation, I would conclude that both the plain language of the Act and the cases interpreting it dictate that we cannot review the judge’s action or inaction. See 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(d) (West 2006) (“A trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this Article”); People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 53 n.l (2005) (there is no requirement, and no obligation, that a trial court treat a pro se pleading as a postconviction petition). In the case at bar, no evidence has been presented that the judge engaged in an evaluation of whether the pleading stated grounds for relief under the Act. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court on that basis. Under a different set of circumstances, where it was clear from the record that an evaluation occurred, I would review the decision resulting from that evaluation under an abuse-of-discretion standard. For example, if a judge denied a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401 (West 2006)) because the petition did not state grounds for relief under 2 — 1401 and the judge stated that he or she also had evaluated the petition and concluded that it did not state grounds for relief under the Act, then, if the petition did in fact state grounds for relief under the Act, I would reverse as an abuse of discretion that trial judge’s failure to recharacterize it. Because I agree, for the foregoing reasons, that the trial court’s decision in this case must be affirmed, I concur in the result reached by Justice Welch but write separately to explain how I came to that result.