Court Opinion

ID: 9366939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 12:08:26.138975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.176713
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-22-00402-CV
     ___________________________

  IN THE INTEREST OF A.G., A CHILD

  On Appeal from the 325th District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 325-710726-21

    Before Birdwell, Kerr, and Bassel, JJ.
    Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant B.H. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her

child A.G.1 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2).

      Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that this appeal

is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967);

see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, order)

(holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases), disp. on

merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1,

2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). The brief meets the Anders requirements by

presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no

arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. We provided Mother the opportunity to

obtain a copy of the appellate record and to file a pro se response, but she did not do

so. The Department has agreed that Mother has no meritorious grounds for appeal

and thus has declined to file a responsive brief.

      When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate

record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-

00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op.); see also Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays

v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). We also

      1
        In a termination-of-parental-rights case, we use aliases or initials for the names
of the children and their parents. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App.
P. 9.8(b)(2).

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consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-18-00073-

CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied)

(mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig.

proceeding).

      We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. Finding no

reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v.

State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

terminating Mother’s parental rights to A.G.2

                                                      Per Curiam

Delivered: January 23, 2023

      2
        Mother’s counsel remains appointed in this appeal through proceedings in the
supreme court unless she is otherwise relieved of her duties for good cause in
accordance with Family Code Section 107.016. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016;
In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016).

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