Court Opinion

ID: 9929314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 14:07:20.382033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:17:51.821047
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Fiani v. Worldpay, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-304.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                           HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 RAMEZ M. FIANI,                                      :   APPEAL NO. C-230175
                                                          TRIAL NO. A-1902178
         Plaintiff-Appellant,                         :

   VS.                                                :     O P I N I O N.

 WORLDPAY, LLC,                                       :

    and                                               :

 WORLDPAY, INC.,                                      :

       Defendants-Appellees.                          :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 31, 2024

Freking Myers & Reul LLC, Randolph H. Freking and Jon B. Allison, for Plaintiff-
Appellant,

Jackson Lewis P.C., Emily J. Gelhaus and David A. Nenni, for Defendants-Appellees.
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, Judge.

       {¶1}   Plaintiff-appellant Ramez Fiani filed a complaint against his former

employers, defendants-appellees Worldpay, LLC, and Worldpay, Inc., (collectively

referred to as “Worldpay”) asserting claims for national-origin discrimination, race

discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation. A jury returned verdicts in favor

of Worldpay on all counts. Fiani now appeals, arguing in two assignments of error that

the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for leave to amend his

complaint and that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to Worldpay’s

untimely and selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Finding Fiani’s

arguments to be without merit, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                    I. Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶2}   In 2010, Fiani was hired by Fifth Third Processing Solutions (“FTPS”),

a predecessor company of Worldpay, as a senior vice president of procurement. Fiani

signed an offer of employment from FTPS. This document stated:

       I agree not to commence any action or suit related to my employment

       by FTPS:

              1. More than six months after the termination of my

                  employment if the action or suit is related to the termination

                  of my employment; or

              2. More than six months after the event or occurrence on which

                  my claim is based if the action or suit is based on an event or

                  occurrence other than the termination of my employment.

                  I agree to waive any statute of limitations to the contrary.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶3}   The procurement function was underneath the legal function in the

company’s structure. Fiani’s direct supervisor was Ned Greene, a chief business

services and legal officer, and also a close friend of Fiani’s. Shortly after his hiring,

Fiani was additionally placed in charge of the company’s real estate and facilities

management function. FTPS subsequently changed its name to Vantiv before merging

with Worldpay in late 2017/early 2018. The merged company operated under

Worldpay’s name. The merger resulted in duplicative positions that had to be

eliminated. It also resulted in the procurement function being placed in the corporate

structure underneath the finance department, rather than the legal department.

       {¶4}   While Fiani served as the head of procurement for Vantiv at the time of

the merger, a woman named Sarah Willmott filled that same role for Worldpay.

Willmott was new to that role and had previously been an IT project manager.

Following the merger, Greene was responsible for selecting either Fiani or Willmott to

serve as the company’s interim global procurement officer. Greene ultimately elected

to offer that job to Willmott. Despite his belief that Fiani was a “solid performer” and

was qualified for the position, Greene did not believe Fiani could succeed in the role

because Mark Heimbouch, the company’s chief operating officer, did not think Fiani

was the right person for the job and would not accept him.

       {¶5}   Fiani expressed his frustration with Greene’s selection of Willmott to

Kellie Morton, a senior human resources business partner. During his conversation

with Morton, Fiani made allegations of discrimination against several senior officers

in the company, including Heimbouch and Stephanie Ferris, who at that time was the

company’s chief financial officer.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶6}   Fiani, who was Lebanese, told Morton that Heimbouch was a bigot. He

alleged that Heimbouch repeatedly mocked his accent; told him in a meeting not to

speak Arabic and to speak English (when he was, in fact, already speaking English);

mocked him for being nominated to lead Vantiv’s African-American affinity group;

and made joking comments about Fiani’s cousins constructing a parking garage. With

respect to Ferris, he alleged that she had once asked him, “You’re an Arab, right?” and

followed up by asking him if he had a problem with Israel or with Jewish people. On

one occasion, a statue of a camel was left on Fiani’s desk.

       {¶7}   Although Fiani did not ask her to, Morton reported Fiani’s concerns to

the legal department. Carrie Russell, the company’s general counsel, conducted an

investigation into Fiani’s allegations with the assistance of John Turner, then a

human-resources partner. Russell ultimately determined that there was no support

for an allegation that Fiani was not given the global procurement role for any

discriminatory reason.

       {¶8}   In the spring of 2018, after it became clear that he would not be given

the global procurement role, Fiani was assigned to work with Royal Cole, who ran the

company’s North American business, on the integration of Vantiv and Worldpay.

Willmott ultimately resigned from the company before actually serving in the global

procurement role. Greene asked Fiani to step in to fill the role on an interim basis, but

Fiani elected to work with Cole instead.

       {¶9}   Ferris, in her role at that time as chief financial officer, elected to hire

someone to serve as a chief operating officer for the finance organization, rather than

directly hire someone to serve as head of global procurement. This was a broader role

than head of procurement, and Ferris intended for the future chief operating officer to

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

subsequently hire someone for the global procurement position. Ferris selected a

woman named Joanna Fielding to fill the chief operating officer role. Fielding

ultimately hired an outside contractor, James Berry, to fill the procurement role.

       {¶10} Fiani’s assignment with Cole was initially offered for a 12-to-18-month

period, but the integration work was completed much sooner. In November of 2018,

Cole met with Fiani to let him know that the company was terminating his

employment. The official date of Fiani’s termination was January 1, 2019.

       {¶11} Fiani filed a complaint against Worldpay on May 3, 2019, asserting

claims for national-origin discrimination, race discrimination, age discrimination, and

retaliation. The complaint contained allegations that Fiani was treated differently than

similarly-situated employees because of his national origin, race, and age, that he was

subject to a hostile work environment, and that his employment was terminated in

violation of R.C. Chapter 4112. It further alleged that he was terminated in retaliation

for his allegations of discrimination.

       {¶12} On September 21, 2020, Fiani filed a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint adding a claim for gender discrimination. The motion stated that he had

discovered facts during discovery that would support this additional claim. Fiani’s

proposed gender-discrimination claim alleged that he was discriminated against on

the basis of his gender because the company treated him less favorably by selecting

Sarah Willmott and Joanna Fielding to head procurement and by terminating his

employment in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112. Worldpay filed a memorandum in

opposition to Fiani’s motion to amend, contending that the motion was futile,

untimely, and contradicted facts known and previously testified to by Fiani in a

deposition.

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶13} Worldpay filed a motion for summary judgment on September 25,

2020, asserting that all of Fiani’s allegations of discrimination fell outside of the

contractually agreed upon six-month limitations period contained in his signed

acceptance of FTPS’s offer of employment. The motion further argued that the actual

termination of Fiani, which occurred within the applicable six-month limitations

period, was not done with any discriminatory intent or with any retaliatory animus.

Worldpay filed a second motion for summary judgment on February 18, 2021,

reiterating the argument from its first motion about the contractual limitations period

and arguing that Greene’s decision in the spring of 2018 to not give Fiani the global

procurement role was not discriminatory or retaliatory. Fiani filed a memorandum in

opposition to Worldpay’s motions for summary judgment.

       {¶14} In September of 2021, the trial court denied both motions for summary

judgment and overruled Fiani’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. A jury trial

was held in February and March of 2022. The jury returned a verdict for Worldpay on

all claims, and Fiani now appeals.

                  II. Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint

       {¶15} In his first assignment of error, Fiani argues that the trial court abused

its discretion by denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint.

       {¶16} A trial court’s decision to deny a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Maas v. Maas, 2020-Ohio-5160, 161 N.E.3d 863,

¶ 84 (1st Dist.). “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that the court’s attitude is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Garry v. Borger, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.

C-220069, 2023-Ohio-905, ¶ 14, citing Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169, 559

N.E.2d 1301 (1990).

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶17} The amendment of pleadings is governed by Civ.R. 15(A), which

provides that:

       A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within

       twenty-eight days after serving it or, if the pleading is one to which a

       responsive pleading is required within twenty-eight days after service of

       a responsive pleading or twenty-eight days after service of a motion

       under Civ.R. 12(B), (E), or (F), whichever is earlier. In all other cases, a

       party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written

       consent or the court’s leave. The court shall freely give leave when

       justice so requires.

       {¶18} As the Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized, it is preferable to resolve

cases upon their merits, rather than upon pleading deficiencies. Peterson v. Teodosio,

34 Ohio St.2d 161, 175, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973). “Although the grant or denial of leave

to amend a pleading is discretionary, where it is possible that the plaintiff, by an

amended complaint, may set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted, and it is

tendered timely and in good faith and no reason is apparent or disclosed for denying

leave, the denial of leave to file such amended complaint is an abuse of discretion.” Id.

       {¶19} Relevant factors for the trial court to consider when ruling on a motion

to amend include “whether the movant made a prima facie showing of support for the

new matters sought to be pleaded, the timeliness of the motion, and whether the

proposed amendment would prejudice the opposing party.” Maas, 2020-Ohio-5160,

161 N.E.3d 863, at ¶ 85. “A trial court properly refuses to grant leave to amend when

amendment would be futile.” Id.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶20} Fiani’s motion for leave to amend asserted that he learned additional

information during the discovery process that would support a claim for gender

discrimination. The additional, proposed gender-discrimination claim alleged that

Worldpay discriminated against Fiani because of his gender by selecting Sarah

Willmott and Joanna Fielding to head procurement and terminating his employment

in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112.

       {¶21} The trial court overruled Fiani’s motion for leave to amend, stating that

the motion was not well-taken. It found that there was no evidence that the motion

was filed in bad faith or for delay, but it provided no further explanation as to the basis

for its ruling. A consideration of the factors set forth above leads us to hold that the

trial court, despite its failure to provide an explanation for its denial of Fiani’s motion,

did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.

       {¶22} Fiani made a prima facie showing of support for a claim for wrongful

termination on the basis of gender discrimination. In support of this claim, the

amended complaint alleged that “Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because

of his gender by, including but not limited to, treating him less favorably by selecting

Sarah Wilmot [sic] and Joanne [sic] Fielding to head Procurement and terminating

Plaintiff’s employment in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112.” The amended complaint

could certainly have gone into greater detail regarding the assertion of gender

discrimination, but the law is well-settled that “a plaintiff is not required to prove his

or her case at the pleading stage.” Fox Consulting Group, Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of

Pittsburgh, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210250, 2022-Ohio-1215, ¶ 7, quoting York

v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991).

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

         {¶23} The record contains no evidence or indication that Worldpay would

have been prejudiced if the motion for leave to amend had been granted. Worldpay

was already on notice to defend against claims for wrongful termination and

discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and age. And while Worldpay

opposed Fiani’s motion for multiple reasons, it did not assert that it would suffer

prejudice if it had to defend against an additional claim of gender discrimination.

         {¶24} We next consider the timeliness of Fiani’s motion for leave to amend.

The complaint was filed on May 3, 2019, and Worldpay’s answer was filed June 7,

2019. The motion for leave to amend the complaint was filed over a year later, on

September 21, 2020. This was well past “twenty-eight days after service” of the answer.

See Civ.R. 15(A). However, the motion was filed during the discovery period, which

was set to be open until January 11, 2021.

         {¶25} When considering whether the motion was timely filed, we must take

into account when the motion was filed in relation to when Fiani became aware of the

viability of the additional claim. Fiani alleged in the motion for leave to amend that

“[t]hrough the discovery process Plaintiff has discovered facts that support the

additional claim as reflected in the Amended Complaint.” The motion did not explain

specifically what this additional information was or where and when it was discovered,

but the record shows that the depositions of Worldpay employees Chris Thompson,

Kellie Morton, Stephanie Ferris, Royal Cole, and Mark Heimbouch were taken in

August of 2020, approximately one month before the motion for leave to amend was

filed.

         {¶26} However, the only new facts alleged in the amended complaint were that

Fiani had expressed concerns about discrimination on the basis of national origin,

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

race, and gender, and that Joanna Fielding was hired to perform the procurement

duties that had previously been performed by Fiani. The record contains evidence that

Fiani was already aware of this information concerning Fielding prior to the

depositions being taken. In his own deposition, taken December 5, 2019, Fiani was

asked about who ultimately filled the procurement role. He answered that Stephanie

Ferris had hired Joanna Fielding to serve as her chief operating officer, and that

procurement would go through Fielding. Fiani further stated that he offered to give

Fielding background information about the job, and that she took him up on the offer.

Given that Fiani was aware before his employment was terminated that Fielding was

hired after Willmott, his motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a claim for

gender discrimination was not timely filed. See McElwee v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc.,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19813, 2004-Ohio-171, ¶ 33 (holding that, where plaintiffs

admitted that any new claims were based on facts that been known two years earlier

when the original complaint was filed, the claims could have been included in the

original complaint and there was no justification for the delay).

         {¶27} Fiani asserts on appeal that “while [he] may have known that Wilmott

[sic] and Fielding were hired in 2018, not until depositions were conducted, including

the Ferris deposition, did Fiani uncover facts showing that the decisions to hire them

and fire him were unlawfully motivated by his gender.” (Emphasis sic.) But this

allegation cannot be found in his motion for leave to amend or in the amended

complaint itself. Because this argument was not presented to the trial court, we find

that on this record, Fiani’s motion for leave to amend the complaint was not timely

filed.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶28} But even if the motion had been timely filed, we nonetheless find no

abuse of discretion by the trial court in overruling the motion because the amendment

would have been futile. Fiani’s complaint asserted that he was wrongfully terminated

on the basis of various types of discrimination. Fiani reiterated this point in his

appellate brief, stating that “all of his claims were based on his wrongful termination.”

However, the additional facts allegedly uncovered during discovery and the additional

claim of gender discrimination as set forth in the proposed amended complaint do not

concern or relate to Fiani’s ultimate termination by Cole. Rather, they concern the

failure to promote him to the role of interim head of global procurement. Based on the

absence of evidence tying Fiani’s ultimate termination by Cole to gender

discrimination, Fiani could not have succeeded on a gender-discrimination claim and

the amendment would have been futile.

       {¶29} We sympathize with Fiani’s frustration over the trial court’s failure to

provide an explanation for its denial of his motion, particularly where the trial court’s

ruling was issued approximately one year after the motion was filed. But where the

motion was not timely filed and the amendment would have been futile, we find no

abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion for leave to amend.

       {¶30} The first assignment of error is accordingly overruled.

                           III. Attorney-Client Privilege

       {¶31} In his second assignment of error, Fiani argues that the trial court erred

in overruling his objection to Worldpay’s untimely and selective waiver of the

attorney-client privilege. He contends that the trial court erred in allowing Worldpay

to use the privilege as both a sword and a shield.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶32} Worldpay asserted the attorney-client privilege throughout the course

of the discovery period. The privilege was asserted to prohibit its employees from

discussing Russell’s investigation into Fiani’s assertions of discrimination concerning

the failure to promote him to the global procurement role. During Russell’s deposition,

Worldpay not only asserted the privilege, but assured Fiani that the privilege would

not be waived at trial. Despite this assurance, Worldpay later decided after the close

of discovery to waive the privilege. Worldpay provided Fiani with Russell’s

investigation report and offered to reopen depositions at Worldpay’s cost. Fiani did

not take Worldpay up on this offer.

       {¶33} In its amended pretrial statement, Worldpay discussed its decision to

waive the attorney-client privilege. In relevant part, it explained:

       Fiani will present evidence at trial about Greene’s March 2018 decision

       and Russell’s March/April 2018 investigation. He also intends to

       substantially focus on Worldpay’s assertion of the attorney-client

       privilege related to Russell’s investigation to falsely suggest to the jury

       and Court that Worldpay is hiding the facts.

       In light of this, Worldpay decided to waive the attorney client privilege

       that applied to Russell’s investigation so it can respond to Fiani’s

       allegations and present all the facts to the Court and the jury.

       {¶34} Worldpay’s waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurred in August of

2022. At that time, the trial was scheduled for November of 2022, although the trial

was ultimately continued until February 2023. Upon being made aware of Worldpay’s

intent to waive the privilege and receiving Russell’s report, Fiani did not file a motion

in limine or move to compel Worldpay to produce additional information that it

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

believed was omitted from the report. Rather, Fiani objected to the waiver of the

privilege for the first time at trial.

        {¶35} During opening statements, Fiani’s counsel briefly alluded to Russell’s

investigation. He first referenced Fiani’s conversation with Morton and stated that

Fiani did not intend to make a complaint about the failure to promote him and

Heimbouch’s related bigotry because he feared retaliation. Counsel then stated that “a

couple” weeks after Fiani’s conversation with Morton, Fiani received a call from

Russell, resulting in a meeting where he laid out his concerns regarding Heimbouch

and asked her not to conduct an investigation because he feared retaliation. Counsel

further told the jury “the evidence is going to show that that’s exactly what happened,

retaliation.”

        {¶36} Defense counsel, during opening statements, started to reference

Russell’s investigation into Fiani’s allegations of discrimination. Fiani immediately

objected. During a sidebar, Fiani’s counsel explained that Fiani elected not to take

Worldpay up on its offer to reopen depositions because Fiani was concerned that doing

so would delay the trial. Thus, counsel argued that it would be unfair to allow

Worldpay “to introduce evidence as to the matters on attorney-client privilege

throughout litigation.” In response, defense counsel argued that Worldpay offered to

waive privilege when the company realized that Fiani “was going to make a significant

issue about the company asserting attorney-client privilege and about the

investigation.” Counsel explained, “This will be a significant issue in the case as the

plaintiff just explained during their opening, and the defense has to be able to explain

what happened in the investigation.” After hearing arguments from counsel, the trial

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

court overruled the objection. The court determined that if anything about the

investigation is relevant, then “it is probably going to come in.”

       {¶37} Fiani contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to

Worldpay’s waiver of the attorney-client privilege. He argues that we should review

the trial court’s decision to allow defendants to waive the attorney-client privilege de

novo. He relies on this court’s holding in Shell v. Drew & Ward Co., L.P.A., 178 Ohio

App.3d 163, 2008-Ohio-4474, 897 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), quoting Roe v. Planned

Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region, 173 Ohio App.3d 414, 2007-Ohio-4318, 878

N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.), affirmed on other grounds, 122 Ohio St.3d 399, 2009-

Ohio-2973, 912 N.E.2d 61, that “[t]he management of the discovery process is

reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, but questions of privilege, including

the propriety of disclosure, are questions of law and are reviewed de novo.”

       {¶38} Worldpay, on the other hand, frames the issue not as a dispute over

privilege, but as a dispute over the propriety of an evidentiary ruling by the trial court.

It accordingly contends that the trial court’s admission of evidence concerning the

investigation should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Worldpay relies on both

the well-established law that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within the trial

court’s discretion, State v. Summerlin, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160539, 2017-Ohio-

7625, ¶ 35, and the proposition of law that a trial court’s disposition of discovery issues

must be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion, State ex rel. V Cos. v. Marshall, 81

Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 692 N.E.2d 198 (1998).

       {¶39} We agree with Worldpay and hold that an abuse of discretion is the

appropriate standard of review to apply in this situation. Critical to our decision is the

fact that the issue in this case is not whether Russell’s investigation report is subject

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

to protection under the attorney-client privilege—all parties agree that it is. Rather,

the issue is whether the trial court erred in allowing Worldpay to waive the attorney-

client privilege and, correspondingly, whether it was error to admit Russell’s

investigation report.

       {¶40} Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. BBI Logistics LLC, 12th Dist. Clermont

No. CA2021-04-012, 2022-Ohio-1440, is instructive on this point. In Total Quality

Logistics, the trial court held that a party asserting the attorney-client privilege had

waived the right to assert the privilege by making only boiler-plate assertions of

privilege, failing to provide supporting evidence with respect to the assertion of the

privilege, and submitting deficient privilege logs. Id. at ¶ 10. The Twelfth District

applied an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing the trial court’s actions. It

held that “[a] trial court has discretion to determine waiver [of privilege] on a case-by-

case basis.” Id. at ¶ 23. We accordingly review the trial court’s overruling of Fiani’s

objection to Worldpay’s waiver of the attorney-client privilege for an abuse of

discretion.

       {¶41} Fiani argues that Worldpay used the attorney-client privilege as both a

sword and a shield against him by failing to disclose significant portions of Russell’s

investigation and report. While the asserted proposition of law is correct, namely that

“[t]he attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword,” the

record does not support Fiani’s assertion that Worldpay used the attorney-client

privilege in this manner or that it failed to disclose certain documents from Russell’s

investigation. See Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127

Ohio St.3d 161, 2010-Ohio-4469, 937 N.E.2d 533, ¶ 41, quoting In re Lott, 424 F.3d

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

446, 454 (6th Cir.2005), quoting United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d

Cir.1991).

       {¶42} Fiani alleges that Worldpay failed to disclose Russell’s notes from her

interview with Ferris, as well as details from conversations between Russell and

Greene regarding his decision to give the procurement role to Willmott. Fiani further

contends that the investigation report did not indicate whether John Turner, who

assisted Russell in the investigation, interviewed Heimbouch, and that it did not

contain notes from Turner’s interview with Fiani’s former coworker Anup Nair

regarding whether Nair was subject to discriminatory treatment.

       {¶43} Russell testified that it was her practice to type her handwritten notes

in an email to herself and then shred the handwritten notes. Accordingly, any

handwritten notes from Russell’s interview with Ferris would have been shredded, and

the record does not support Fiani’s assertion that Worldpay failed to disclose them.

The same is true of Fiani’s assertion that Russell failed to disclose details about her

conversations with Greene. Russell testified that she did not take notes every time that

she met with Greene.

       {¶44} With respect to Fiani’s assertion that Russell’s report did not indicate

whether Turner had interviewed Heimbouch, Russell’s testimony answered this

question in the negative. While Turner did not interview Heimbouch, he did give

Russell his opinion regarding Heimbouch’s general character, stating that he had

never heard Heimbouch treat anyone in a discriminatory manner.

       {¶45} Fiani’s remaining allegation is that the report that he was provided did

not contain information about Turner’s interview with Nair. Nair was a former

employee that left Worldpay. After Fiani mentioned Nair’s name to Russell, she asked

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Turner to reach out to him. Turner testified at trial that he spoke to Nair “and asked

questions around the allegations in the claim that [Russell] had filled me in on.” He

further testified that he had a debrief about his conversation with Nair with several

Worldpay employees, including Russell and Greene. Fiani’s counsel asked Turner if he

took notes during his conversation with Nair or in his subsequent debrief session with

Russell and Greene. Turner responded, “I don’t remember.” He was then asked if he

was aware if any notes from these conversations still existed, to which he responded,

“I don’t know of any.” Russell testified that Turner reached out to Nair at her request,

but her testimony did not address whether Turner took notes during that

conversation. We accordingly find that the record does not support Fiani’s allegation

that Worldpay failed to include notes from Turner’s interview with Nair in Russell’s

investigation report.

       {¶46} On this record, we cannot hold that Worldpay used the attorney-client

privilege as both a sword and a shield by failing to disclose portions of Russell’s

investigation.

       {¶47} Fiani urges this court to hold that a party may not invoke the attorney-

client privilege during discovery and “subsequently waiv[e] it at the eleventh-hour.”

We decline to impose such a bright-line rule.

       {¶48} While we can foresee circumstances in which it would be inappropriate

to assert the attorney-client privilege during discovery and then ultimately elect to

waive the privilege at a later date, we hold that it was not unreasonable for Worldpay

to do so in this case. Worldpay initially took the position that all of Fiani’s

discrimination claims investigated by Russell were outside of the six-month

limitations period that Fiani contractually agreed to when he signed the offer of

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

employment from FTPS. Heimbouch’s and Ferris’s allegedly discriminatory actions

occurred in the spring of 2018 or before, and Fiani’s lawsuit was not filed until May of

2019. Worldpay accordingly sought to protect Russell’s investigation report and

asserted the attorney-client privilege. Worldpay filed a motion for summary judgment

based on this same argument. The trial court ultimately denied the motion for

summary judgment in September of 2021. In August of 2022, after learning that Fiani

was going to make a significant issue at trial about the company’s assertion of the

attorney-client privilege, Worldpay elected to waive the privilege because it did not

want a jury to think that it was hiding any information. Worldpay could have certainly

made the decision to waive the privilege sooner. But at the time the waiver was made,

there were still three months remaining before the trial was scheduled (and, as a result

of the trial being continued, the waiver occurred six months before the trial actually

took place).

       {¶49} After electing to waive the attorney-client privilege, Worldpay sent Fiani

a letter informing him of its intent to do so. Worldpay also offered to reopen

depositions at its expense. Worldpay again set forth its intention to waive the attorney-

client privilege in its amended pretrial statement. Fiani did not file a motion in limine

to prevent Worldpay from waiving the privilege or from admitting the investigation

report at trial. Nor did he file a motion to compel any parts of the investigation report

that he believed were not disclosed.

       {¶50} Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s decision to overrule Fiani’s objection to Worldpay’s waiver of the attorney-

client privilege. The second assignment of error is overruled.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                  IV. Conclusion

       {¶51} Having overruled Fiani’s assignments of error, we accordingly affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

BOCK, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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