Court Opinion

ID: 9961633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 14:07:52.742316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:13.051818
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 12, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1535-MR

DENTON TREADWAY                                                      APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 18-CI-01137

CHAPMAN RENTALS, LLC AND
VIRGINIA CAROLINE CHAPMAN                                            APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND JONES, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Denton Treadway, Appellant, appeals the Kenton Circuit

Court’s December 14, 2022 order granting summary judgment for Appellees,

Virginia Chapman and her company, Chapman Rentals, LLC. Appellant argues

the circuit court incorrectly determined no evidence of record indicated Appellees

had notice of a hazardous condition in the shower of his apartment, namely, that
the shower doors were made of non-tempered glass. We detect no error and

affirm.

                                        BACKGROUND

                Appellees, Virginia Chapman and Chapman Rentals, LLC own and

manage an apartment building in Covington, Kentucky. In 2003, Mrs. Chapman,

owner of Chapman Rentals, LLC, inherited the four-unit building from her parents,

who built it in 1964. Each unit’s shower originally featured sliding glass doors

made of non-tempered glass; tempered glass was not required when constructing

showers until 1980 with the passage of KRS1 198B.320.2 When Mrs. Chapman

inherited the building, all four units still were fitted with the original shower doors.

                According to depositions of Mrs. Chapman and Dale Unkraut who

worked for Appellees as a maintenance man, Appellees renovated apartments 2

and 4 in 2011 or 2012. Mr. Unkraut added new bathroom tile and removed the

original shower doors. He replaced the original glass shower doors with shower

curtains.

                Appellant signed a lease with Appellees for apartment 1 in October of

2016. Apartment 1 still featured the original shower doors. On July 27, 2017,

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
 KRS 198B.320 states: “It shall be unlawful within the Commonwealth of Kentucky to knowingly
sell, fabricate, assemble, glaze, install, consent or cause to be installed glazing materials other than
safety glazing materials in, or for use in, any hazardous location.” KRS 198B.300(2) defines
“hazardous locations” to include glass shower doors.

                                                  -2-
Appellant was about to take a shower when he fell into the shower door. The

door’s non-tempered glass broke into large shards. Appellant suffered significant

injuries, including a punctured diaphragm, which required a lengthy hospital stay.

              Appellant filed suit, alleging (1) negligence; (2) negligence per se

based on violations of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, KRS

383.500 et seq. (URLTA); and (3) violation of URLTA and Covington’s ordinance

requiring tempered glass – itself an adoption of URLTA. Appellees filed their

original motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted in part and

denied in part on June 17, 2022. While the circuit court dispensed with

Appellant’s negligence per se claim under URLTA, it denied the motion as to

Appellant’s other claims.

              The parties conducted additional discovery. This included a sworn

declaration by Mark Tudor, who lived in apartment 4 of Appellees’ building.

Therein, Tudor stated he knew a woman named Audra Dryer who lived in

apartment 3; Tudor stated Dryer told him and a woman named Susan Linton that a

previous resident of apartment 4 fell into the glass shower door, breaking it.

Linton also signed a sworn affidavit reflecting her recollection of this conversation

with Dryer.

              Appellant himself submitted a sworn declaration. Appellant recalls

Linton and Tudor telling him that Dryer knew about the previous tenant who fell

                                          -3-
into the shower door and that Dryer believed this is why apartment 4 had a shower

curtain instead of a glass door. Appellant also stated Dryer told him directly about

the previous tenant falling into the shower door.

             Dryer herself was deposed. Dryer recalled, with apparent difficulty,

that previous tenants told her about a man who used to live in apartment 4. These

tenants told Dryer that the man had fallen into and broken his glass shower door.

Dryer described this information as “drunken gossip.” Dryer also recalled her

interaction with Linton and Tudor; she alleged the pair were “trying to get

information out of” her in preparation for Appellant’s lawsuit. But she did testify

that she told Linton and Tudor she heard gossip about a previous tenant who had

come home drunk and fallen into his shower door.

             Dryer did not remember the name of that former tenant, but described

him vaguely: the man was tall, thin, and had a noisy white dog. Apparently, no

party has been able to locate this man to obtain his version of events.

             Appellees filed a second motion for summary judgment. The circuit

court granted to motion as to both of Appellant’s remaining claims. As to

Appellant’s negligence claim, the circuit court concluded that, though two

apartments had their glass shower doors removed, no admissible evidence of

record indicated Appellees knew the shower doors in Appellant’s apartment were

constructed of non-tempered glass. Accordingly, the circuit court determined no

                                         -4-
evidence of record demonstrated Appellees had a duty to warn Appellant of the

hazardous nature of his shower doors.

                This appeal follows. Appellant solely challenges the circuit court’s

conclusions as to his negligence claim.

                                         ANALYSIS

                Our appellate courts review summary judgments for “whether the trial

court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and

that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v.

Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996); CR3 56.03. Indeed, this is the circuit

court’s only duty on a summary judgment motion: “to determine whether there are

genuine issues to be tried and not to resolve them.” James Graham Brown Found.,

Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Ky. 1991) (citing

Mitchell v. Jones, 283 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1955)). In deciding summary judgment

motions, trial courts must view the record “in a light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his

favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.

1991) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “it appears that

it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial

warranting a judgment in his favor.” Id. However, “impossible” in the context of

3
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -5-
a summary judgment motion “is used in a practical sense, not in an absolute

sense.” Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992).

             Landlords’ duty of care toward their tenants, and thus a tenant’s

ability to succeed upon a negligence claim, is limited. “It has been a longstanding

rule in Kentucky that a tenant takes the premises as he finds them.” Milby v.

Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Ky. App. 1979). Therefore, a landlord is not

required to exercise ordinary care to ensure the premises are reasonably safe for

her tenants. Id. (citing Dice’s Adm’r v. Zweigart’s Adm’r, 171 S.W. 195 (Ky.

1914)). This does not mean landlords owe no duty of care to their tenants,

however. As relevant to the present appeal, “[i]t is an established principle that a

landlord has a duty to disclose a known defective condition which is unknown to

the tenant and not discoverable through reasonable inspection.” Id. (citations

omitted).

              Central to our review, therefore, is whether a genuine question exists

as to Appellees’ knowledge of the dangerous condition in Appellant’s shower. The

circuit court determined that the incident in which the previous tenant fell into his

shower and broke it was unsupported by admissible evidence. Though the circuit

court does not state so explicitly, it is obvious the circuit court determined

Appellant, Tudor, Linton, and Dryer’s statements about the previous tenant were

hearsay.

                                          -6-
                As Appellees note in their brief, “[e]vidence presented in opposition

to a motion for summary judgment must be affirmative and it must be admissible.”

Walker v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.3d 165, 177 (Ky. App. 2016) (citations

omitted); see also James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 898 (Ky. App. 2002) (holding

appellants’ sole evidence to support claims of civil conspiracy and negligent

encouragement constituted inadmissible hearsay and therefore inadmissible to

overcome a motion for summary judgment). The Kentucky Rules of Evidence

state plainly: “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by

rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.” KRE4 802. “Hearsay” is defined as “a

statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” KRE

801(c). While our Rules of Evidence provide ample exceptions to the general

prohibition against hearsay, none apply to the instant case.

                The out-of-court statements Appellant, Tudor, Linton, and Dryer

describe may not be used to prove a previous tenant fell into his shower door and

broke it.

                We can dispense with a remotely plausible argument that a hearsay

exception applies on the theory the statements were not offered to prove the tenant

fell into his shower, but to prove Appellees heard that such a thing happened and,

4
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                           -7-
therefore, they were on notice and did not correct the problem or warn tenants. We

do not agree.

             The purpose of the proffered out-of-court statements plainly was to

demonstrate their truth – that the former tenant fell into his shower door and broke

it. Without that fact established, a jury could only find Appellees were on notice

by building inference upon inference which we do not permit because it “raises the

specter of speculation[.]” Southworth v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 32, 45 (Ky.

2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

             In the absence of these out-of-court statements, no evidence of record

creates a genuine issue regarding the material fact of Appellees’ notice. Though

the shower doors of two other units were replaced with shower curtains, no

evidence demonstrates Appellees did so as a plan to replace non-tempered glass

shower doors. As the circuit court notes, even if the previous tenant fell into his

shower door, there is no evidence he was injured or that the shower door glass was

broken or that it was not tempered glass. Accordingly, no genuine issue of

material fact exists on this point, and the circuit court therefore did not err in

concluding Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

                                   CONCLUSION

             We affirm the Kenton Circuit Court’s December 14, 2022 summary

judgment order.

                                           -8-
            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Ronald R. Parry            David A. Shearer, Jr.
Cincinnati, Ohio           Jessica C. Harlow
                           Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
Philip Taliaferro, III
Erlanger, Kentucky

Phillip E. King, Jr.
Latonia, Kentucky

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