Court Opinion

ID: 9846820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:48:55.924941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:51.452024
License: Public Domain

*258BURKE, J.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance as to defendant Hollinger and of reversal as to defendant city. The evidence would support a jury finding that the city had retained some control over the premises where plaintiff’s injury occurred. Accordingly, I believe the court erred to plaintiff’s prejudice in refusing to give his requested instruction setting forth the liabilities of the city as an invitor in case the jury did so find, and that plaintiff is entitled to a reversal on that ground. (See Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 232 [4] [282 P.2d 69] ; Kuntz v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co. (1961) 57 Cal.2d 100, 104 [18 Cal.Rptr. 527, 368 P. 2d 127].)
However, issues relating to the theory of tort liability of one who engages an independent contractor found in section 416, Restatement Second of Torts, are not properly before this court. That section comes into play only if the work involves a peculiar risk of bodily harm. Plaintiff did not request an instruction based on section 416, and in his brief states that during trial he did not contend that the work in which he was engaged created an unreasonable risk of injury. He should not be permitted to raise the point for the first time on appeal.
MeComb, J., concurred.