Court Opinion

ID: 9774153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:10:17.987859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:02.959024
License: Public Domain

on appellant’s motion for rehearing
WOODLEY, Judge.
Counsel for appellant again urges that reversal of this conviction should be ordered because 13 jurors were sworn to try him. It is conceded that, insofar as possible for them to do so, appellant and his counsel agreed that the injured juror might be excused and the selection of the jury continue without the other jurors who had been selected being discharged.
It is, however, urged upon us that to affirm this conviction would be to hold that an accused who is on trial for a capital felony may waive a jury trial.
*566And it is argued that the authorities cited in the majority opinion do not support its holding.
That one accused of a capital offense may not waive a jury is beyond question. This principle of law is settled by statute as well as by the many decisions of this court construing the constitutional guarantee of the right of trial by jury. Const, of Texas, Art. 1, Sec. 15; Art. 11, V.A.C.C.P.;a Kemp v. State, 159 Tex. Cr. R. 110, 261 S. W. 2d 573; Jones v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 303, 106 S. W. 345.
It is also the well settled law of this state that a jury in the district court means a jury composed of 12 jurors. Such is the requirement of the Constitution of Texas, Art. V, Sec. 13. Clark v. State, 161 Tex. Cr. Rep. 278, 276 S. W. 2d 819.
It is true that 13 jurors were sworn to try the case before us. One of these, having become disabled so as to prevent his serving, was excused before the jury was complete, and therefore necessarily before any evidence was heard.
Appellant and his counsel admittedly agreed that this juror might be excused.
Having been stood aside, this juror was no longer a member of the jury.
Appellant and his counsel were given the choice as to whether the organization of the jury should continue with the jurors who had been selected, or whether such sworn jurors should be discharged and the selection of a jury begin anew. They chose to keep the jurors already sworn and the jury being completed again chose to be tried before the 12 so selected rather than to accept the court’s offer to discharge them.
This it is contended constituted the waiver of a jury by appellant and his counsel.
As to appellant’s contention that the swearing of 13 jurors to try the case violated his constitutional rights and is ground for reversal, we call attention to the line of cases which hold that where a juror has been selected in a capital case, for good cause shown why the juror cannot or ought not to serve on the jury not known and which could not have been discovered before the juror was impaneled, the trial court in his discretion may, before evidence is offered, stand the juror aside and another *567juror may be selected and sworn in his place. Mitchell v. State, 43 Tex. 512; Evans v. State, 6 Tex. App. 513; Black v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 590, 81 S. W. 302.
In Evans v. State, 6 Tex. App. 513, the defendant was charged with murder.
After the jury had been selected and sworn, the defendant made known to the court that one of the jurors had formed and expressed an opinion of the case unfavorable to the defendant and said he intended to hang him.
The juror was withdrawn at the request of the defendant, the county attorney agreeing, and another juror was selected in his place.
The defendant’s special plea for discharge because of the excusing of the sworn juror and substitution of another was overruled, this court saying:
“As a general rule, it is too late, after the jury has been empanelled and sworn, to inquire into the impartiality of a juror. But, Mr. Wharton says, after a juror has been sworn in chief, and taken his seat, if it be discovered that he is incompetent to serve, he may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, be set aside by the court at any time before evidence is given; and this may be done even in a capital case, as well for cause existing before as after the juror was sworn. The great purpose of the right to challenge a jury for actual bias is to secure to the defendant and the State a fair and impartial jury. It not only appears that the defendant consented to the discharge of the juror Huddle, but that it was done at his instance. The principle of justice applies here, as in other cases, that no man can complain of a thing to which he has given his consent. The doctrine of waiving constitutional rights does not rest, as a matter of reason, merely on the consideration that a man may relinquish what has been given him for his benefit; it rests equally, also, on the necessity of conducting causes in a way to secure justice to defendants. If they never could waive any thing, says Mr. Bishop, ‘the law, on the other hand, must pursue them with exact aim, since it could make no arrangement to vary its course.’ 1 Bishop’s Cr. Law, Sect. 848. This does not conflict with the rulings of our Supreme Court in the case of Horbach v. The State, 43 Texas, 242, where the court say: ‘No law, or established practice under the law, is known which sanctions the premptory challenge of a juror, by either party in such *568case, after the juror is accepted and empanelled, whether the jury be full or not, though there may be discretion in the court for excusing or setting aside a juror after he is thus selected, for good cause shown at the time why he cannot or ought not to serve on the jury.’ Nor does it conflict with the rulings of this court in the case of Baker v. The State, 3 Texas Ct. App. 525.”
In Black v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 590, 81 S. W. 302, a death penalty for murder was affirmed.
After 4 jurors had been selected, one of them made known to the court that he desired to make an explanation in regard to his answers to questions on his voir dire examination. Being permitted to do so, the juror stated that he was opposed to the infliction of the death penalty for crime under any circumstances.
The state’s challenge was sustained and the defendant excepted.
The trial judge informed counsel that upon further reflection he was inclined to the opinion that the juror would have to remain on the jury or else the whole panel would have to be discharged, and offered to discharge the jurors who had been selected, reset the case and draw another venire.
The defendant objected to such procedure, urging that the court had no right to discharge the panel without his consent, and contended that he could not be placed on trial again.
Over the objection of the defendant, the court then proceeded with the organization of the jury without the presence of the juror who was excused.
This court, citing a number of authorities including State v. Horbach, supra, Baker v. State, supra, and Evans v. State, supra, held that the ruling of the trial court in sustaining the state’s challenge to the juror was, under the circumstances, correct and the action of the court in proceeding with the organization of the jury was not illegal.
It is quite true that the court in Black v. State, distinguished the Ellison case, 12 Tex. App. 557, because it dealt with a sick juror and not a juror who was subject to challenge for cause. But it is apparent that the death penalty verdict was upheld *569though 13 jurors, counting the one stood aside, were sworn to try the case.
The majority opinion herein calls attention to the fact that in Ellison v. State the defendant refused to agree and objected to the juror being excused and another juror selected in his stead.
In Warren v. State, 130 Tex. Cr. R. 448, 94 S. W. 2d 430, the trial court declined to discharge an accepted and sworn juror who, it had been discovered, was related to the special prosecutor within the prohibited degree. This court, citing Evans v. State, supra, said:
“It occurs to us that if the trial court had seriously considered the appellant’s request and had examined the statutes hereinabove referred to, he no doubt would have complied with the appellant’s request at that stage of the trial and discharged the juror.”
In Burton v. State, 129 Tex. Cr. R. 234, 86 S. W. 2d 768, this court quoted liberally from Black v. State supra and held that it was not error for the trial court to stand aside a juror who had been sworn when it was learned that he had been convicted of a felony.
It is true that in Burton v. State the court was dealing with a juror whose disqualification was absolute, and as pointed out in appellant’s motion for rehearing, there is language in the opinion to the effect that it was not shown what happened to the other jurors that had been sworn.
Such is not true as to Black v. State, supra, where the juror was objectionable to the State because of his scruples against capital punishment, or in Evans v. State and Michell v. State, supra, where the juror had expressed an opinion which was unfavorable to the defendant. In each of these cases the sworn juror was excused and the jury completed with 12 other jurors, and the conviction by such jury was upheld.
There is a vast difference between waiving a jury trial and waiving the ordinary procedure governing the impaneling of the jury of 12 who are finally selected to try the case.
We hold that prior to the introduction of testimony the trial court, the defendant and his counsel consenting, is not without *570auhority to stand aside a juror who has been sworn to try the case but has become unable to do so, and with the consent of the defendant proceed with the organization of the jury, another juror being selected in the place of the excused juror. Such, we think, does not constitute a trial by a jury of more than 12, nor a waiver of a constitutional right to a jury trial.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.