Court Opinion

ID: 9721337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:56:57.443341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:24.999087
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that the appellate court should not have adopted the theory of market share liability set forth by the Washington Supreme Court in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories (1984), 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368. However, I would adopt the theory of market share liability established by the court of appeals of New York in Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1989), 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, because I believe that the Hymowitz theory provides a fair and rational way to remedy the injustice presented by this case and avoids the shortcomings of previous theories of market share liability. I therefore dissent from the majority’s outright rejection of market share liability. This court long ago described the common law as “a system of elementary rules and of general judicial declarations of principles, which are continually expanding with the progress of society, adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade, commerce, arts, inventions and the exigencies and usages of the country.” (Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer (1894), 149 Ill. 496, 502; see also Torres v. Walsh (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 338, 347; People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 520, 535 (the common law is “a system of law whose outstanding characteristic is its adaptability and capacity for growth”).) The common law, of course, does not change on its own. Instead, it is the responsibility of the legislature and the judiciary to cooperate “in examining and changing the common law to conform with the ever-changing demands of the community.” (Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 23.) Where “the legislature has, for whatever reason, failed to act to remedy a gap in the common law that results in injustice, it is the imperative duty of the court to repair that injustice and reform the law to be responsive to the demands of society.” (Emphasis added.) Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 23-24. This court has frequently exercised its duty to modify the common law to remedy an injustice that has resulted from changes in society. In Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617, for example, this court abolished the traditional common law requirement that a manufacturer could not be held liable for injuries to a person not in privity with the manufacturer, and held that any such liability need not be based upon negligence, but instead can be based upon strict liability in tort (Suvada, 32 Ill. 2d at 621-22). In so doing, this court rejected the idea that the abolition of negligence and privity of contract in products liability cases should be left for the legislature, stating that “ ‘[h]aving found [the doctrines of privity in contract and negligence] to be unsound and unjust under present conditions, we consider that we have not only the power, but the duty to abolish [those doctrines].’ ” Suvada, 32 Ill. 2d at 623, quoting Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 25. Similarly, in Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 24-25, this court replaced the traditional common law doctrine of contributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative negligence. This court explained: “Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed to obscure the changing needs of society or to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation. *** We cannot continue to ignore the plight of plaintiffs who, because of some negligence on their part, are forced to bear the entire burden of their injuries. Neither can we condone the policy of allowing defendants to totally escape liability for injuries arising from their own negligence on the pretext that another party’s negligence has contributed to such injuries.” Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 24-25. The plaintiff in this case has alleged that all of the DES manufactured by the defendants was identical and shared a common defect, and that plaintiff developed cancer as a result of this defect in the DES. The defendants’ sole argument on appeal is that even if the above allegations are true, the defendants cannot be held liable for negligence or strict liability because the plaintiff cannot show causation in fact. Thus, for the purposes of this appeal, the defendants have admitted that they manufactured and marketed a defective product, and that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defective product. Under the “elementary rules and *** general judicial declarations of principles” (Kreitz, 149 Ill. at 502) which comprise our tort system, the plaintiff will not be compensated for her damages because, through no fault of her own, she cannot identify which of the wrongdoing defendants manufactured the DES that caused her injuries. The plaintiff’s inability to identify the single manufacturer who caused her injuries is based upon a combination of factors, including the fungibility of DES, the length of time that it has taken for plaintiff’s injuries to manifest themselves since the DES was ingested by her mother, and the DES manufacturers’ inadequate record-keeping and product labeling. Unfortunately, this combination of factors prevents not only this plaintiff from recovering damages for her injuries under our current tort system, it is also likely to prevent numerous other so-called “DES daughters” from recovering damages for their injuries. That is, unless this court acts to remedy the gap in our common law which allows such injustices to occur. See Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 23-24. The principle of causation in fact, like the principles of contributory negligence, privity of contract and negligence in products liability cases, “is not an end of the legal system, but rather the means by which the legal system achieves its purposes” (Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories (1989), 116 N.J. 155, 200, 561 A.2d 511, 534 (O’Hern, J., dissenting)). Where such “means” prove inadequate to meet the changing needs of society, or where such “means” cause injustice, our common law tradition demands that they be modified. (See, e.g., Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 24-25 (replacing contributory negligence with comparative negligence); Suvada, 32 Ill. 2d at 623 (abolishing requirements of privity in contract and negligence in products liability actions).) Thus, as the majority notes, where necessary to avoid injustice, courts have relaxed the requirement that a plaintiff prove causation in fact by adopting doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur and alternative liability. (See 137 Ill. 2d at 256-57.) Alternative liability, for example, as codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, provides: “Where the conduct- of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts §433B(3), at 441-42 (1965).) The policy justification for relaxing the causation requirement in alternative liability situations is that it would be unjust to permit “proved wrongdoers, who among them have inflicted an injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape liability merely because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them has caused the harm.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts §433B, comment/, at 446.) Although the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and alternative liability may not be applicable to the facts in this case (see 137 Ill. 2d at 257), both doctrines illustrate the fact that traditional tort concepts such as causation in fact must occasionally be modified to meet the needs of our ever-changing society. The highest courts of six of our sister States have directly addressed the issue that is currently before this court. Four of those courts have sought to remedy the injustice arising from gaps in their common law by replacing the element of causation in fact with some form of market share liability. (See Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 507, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947; Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980), 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144; Martin v. Abbott Laboratories (1984), 102 Wash. 2d 581, 584, 689 P.2d 368, 381; Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. (1984), 116 Wis. 2d 166, 191, 342 N.W.2d 37, 45.) These courts, while disagreeing as to precisely what variant of market share liability should be applied, have recognized that “the ever-evolving dictates of justice and fairness, which are the heart of our common-law system, require formation of a remedy for injuries caused by DES.” (Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 507, 539 N.E.2d at 1075, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 947; see also Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144; Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 584, 689 P.2d at 381; Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191, 342 N.W.2d at 45.) Only two of the six State high courts that have addressed the issue have refused to modify their common law to recognize market share liability. See Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Iowa 1986), 386 N.W.2d 67; Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co. (Mo. 1984), 676 S.W.2d 241. The most recent State high court to address the issue is the court of appeals of New York. As the majority notes, that court considered each of the previous three judicially promulgated theories of market share liability, and recognized those theories’ shortcomings, before developing its own theory in Hymowitz. (See 137 Ill. 2d at 244-45; see also Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 509-11, 539 N.E.2d at 1076-78, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948-50 (“we heed both the lessons learned through experience in other jurisdictions and the realities of the mass litigation of DES claims in this State”).) To avoid the theoretical and practical problems of the previous theories, the court of appeals of New York adopted a theory which apportions liability based upon “the over-all culpability of each defendant, measured by the amount of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-large.” (Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.) The “amount of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-at-large” is equal to the defendant’s share of the national market of DES sold for pregnancy use. Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950. Because liability under the Hymowitz theory “is based on the over-all risk produced, and not causation in a single case,” a defendant who was a part of the market of DES sold for pregnancy use cannot escape liability merely because the defendant can show that its DES could not in fact have been the DES that caused the plaintiff’s injuries. (Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.) However, a defendant can escape liability if the defendant can show that it “was not a member of the national market of DES marketed for pregnancy [by showing, for example, that it] sold DES in a form unsuitable for use during pregnancy, or *** that its product was not marketed for pregnancy use.” Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512 n.2, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 n.2, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950 n.2. The majority rejects the Hymowitz approach, concluding, in a rather cursory fashion, that “[j]ust as the previous theories have not been embraced by subsequent courts, it is unlikely that New York’s theory will receive broad acceptance.” (137 Ill. 2d at 246.) The majority’s rejection of the Hymowitz theory of market share liability is apparently based upon a number of specific criticisms which have been made of the market share theories previously developed by courts in this country, and upon other more general criticisms of the overall concept of market share liability. See 137 Ill. 2d at 251-52. One reason the majority rejects market share liability is the majority’s fear that “market share liability will surely broaden manufacturers’ liability exposure because they will need to insure against losses arising from the products of others in the industry as well as their own.” According to the majority, “[t]his added potential for liability will likely contribute to diminishing participants in the market as well as research and availability of drugs.” 137 Ill. 2d at 261-62. The majority apparently believes that market share liability will increase liability exposure in three ways. First, the majority notes that market share theories which variously inflate liability to account for those manufacturers that are not before the court, impose joint and several liability, or impose liability on a pro rata basis, may cause manufacturers to incur liability in excess of their market shares. (See 137 Ill. 2d at 240-42, 267-68.) However, liability under the Hymowitz theory is not inflated to account for absent manufacturers, is several only, and is not imposed on a pro rata basis. Instead, manufacturers under the Hymowitz theory can only be held liable for their market share. The majority also believes that liability imposed under market share theories, unlike liability imposed under traditional tort principles, may exceed the actual harm caused by the manufacturers. (See 137 Ill. 2d at 246-47, 254.) However, as the following hypothetical illustrates, this assumption is simply not true. Let us assume that there were only three manufacturers of DES: manufacturer X, who manufactured 50% of the DES market, and manufacturers Y and Z, who each manufactured 25% of the DES market. Because each manufacturer’s DES was identical and shared a common defect, we could assume that the DES manufactured by X would cause 50% of the cancers resulting from DES, and that both Y and Z would have manufactured the DES which caused 25% of the cancers resulting from DES. If identification of the DES manufacturer could be made in all cases, X would be the sole defendant in 50% of the DES daughter cases and would be liable for 100% of the damages in those cases. Similarly, Y and Z would each be liable for 100% of the damages in 25% of the DES daughter cases. If the average amount of damages awarded in X’s cases was equal to the average amount of damages awarded in Y’s and Z’s cases, then X would be paying 50%, and Y and Z would each be paying 25%, of the damages arising from DES. Under market share liability, on the other hand, X, Y and Z would all be named defendants in 100% of the DES cases and each manufacturer would only be liable for its market share of the damages in each case. Thus, X would be liable for 50%, and Y and Z would each be liable for 25%, of the damages arising from DES; precisely what each would be expected to pay under traditional tort principles. See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 963, 994 (1978). The correlation between market share liability and liability under traditional tort principles may not be perfect. It is of course possible that the average amount of damages in X’s cases under traditional tort principles could be less than the average amount of damages in Y’s and Z’s cases, in which case X would incur more liability under market share liability than under traditional tort principles. However, it is equally possible that the average amount of damages in X’s cases could exceed the average amount of damages in Y’s and Z’s cases, in which case X would incur more liability under traditional tort principles. In either event, the correlation between the potential for liability under traditional tort principles and the potential for liability under market share theories is close enough to allay any fears that market share liability will greatly increase manufacturers’ liability exposure. See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 963, 994 (1978). A third way in which liability exposure may be increased under market share liability is that certain manufacturers may be exposed “to double liability, first to plaintiffs who can identify them as the causal party, and again to plaintiffs who cannot.” (137 Ill. 2d at 255, citing Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden in DES Litigation: The Market Share Liability Theory, 65 Marq. L. Rev. 609, 632-33 (1982).) “Double liability” does not mean that plaintiffs will be able to recover additional damages, or bring more than one action for damages, if market share liability is adopted. Instead, “double liability” refers to the possibility that manufacturers who are liable to certain DES daughters under traditional tort principles, and who are also liable to other DES daughters under market share liability, may incur more than their market share of liability in cases arising from DES. For example, let us assume that manufacturer X from the above hypothetical, in addition to being held liable for 50% of the damages in all cases in which identification could not be made, was also identified in a number of cases as the manufacturer of the DES which was the cause in fact of the plaintiffs’ injuries. Because identification could be made, the plaintiffs in those cases would seek recovery under traditional tort principles, rather than under market share liability. If those plaintiffs prevailed in their suits, X would be liable for all the damages in those cases. Let us further assume that the DES manufactured by Y and Z could not be identified as the cause in fact of any plaintiff’s injuries. Y and Z would therefore be liable for their market shares in cases in which identification could not be made, but would incur no liability in those cases involving X in which identification could be made. Under such a scenario, X’s total liability in DES cases would be greater than his market share, while Y and Z would be liable for less than their market shares. X would in effect be paying for damages caused by Y and Z. I agree with the majority that, if market share liability were adopted, manufacturers who can be causally linked to DES which caused damages in a specific case could incur a disproportionate amount of liability. However, to ameliorate any disproportionate allocation of liability that could occur from so-called “double liability,” I would allow a manufacturer who has been held liable in a “cause in fact” case a right to recover contribution from other DES manufacturers. Each of the manufacturers would be liable in contribution for a percentage of the plaintiff’s damages equal to the manufacturers’ individual market shares. Contribution would therefore compensate the original manufacturer for any liability it incurred under traditional tort principles in excess of its market share, and would force the other manufacturers to pay the amount of damages they would have paid had identification not been made. It is certainly true that recognizing market share liability may result in the drug manufacturers in this case incurring liability for the manufacture of defective products that, because the plaintiff cannot prove causation in fact, the manufacturers would not otherwise incur. However, I do not believe that, under the guise of limiting “liability exposure” and encouraging participation “in the market as well as research and availability of drugs” (137 Ill. 2d at 261-62), wrongdoing manufacturers should be allowed to benefit from this situation. The unfortunate result of the majority’s logic is that “a manufacturer must bear the same risks of liability that the majority seeks to insulate the industry from, except to the extent that the company can issue a product that would be for any reason difficult to distinguish from that of other manufacturers.” Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories (1989), 116 N.J. 155, 202, 561 A.2d 511, 535 (O’Hern, J., dissenting). A second reason the majority rejects market share liability is that under market share liability, “it is inevitable that some defendants wholly innocent of wrongdoing towards the particular plaintiff will shoulder part or all of the responsibility for the injury caused” (137 Ill. 2d at 258; see also 137 Ill. 2d at 247), and that “[t]he concept that liability may be imposed based merely on a breach of duty, without causation being established, has long been rejected in American tort law” (137 Ill. 2d at 266). Although the majority’s assertions are true, they simply do not address the question at issue here. The question at issue in this case is “whether, in a negligence and strict liability cause of action, Illinois should substitute for the element of causation in fact a theory of market share liability when identification of the manufacturer of the drug that injured the plaintiff is not possible.” (137 Ill. 2d at 226.) The majority’s claim that market share liability should not be adopted because market share liability will result in liability being imposed upon defendants who did not actually cause the plaintiff’s injuries essentially amounts to an argument that market share liability should not be substituted for the element of causation in fact because, under market share liability, defendants may be held liable without a showing of causation in fact. The argument thus begs the question. The fact that causation in fact has been around a long time similarly fails to address the question. A third reason for the majority’s decision is that the majority is not convinced that adoption of market share liability will either provide incentive for production of safe drugs, or encourage drug manufacturers to adopt procedures which would enable plaintiffs to identify culpable parties. (137 Ill. 2d at 264.) The majority states that “it is not clear that the drug industry needs this even further amount of encouragement to produce safer drugs, above and beyond the incentives that products liability and negligence laws provide.” (Emphasis in original.) 137 Ill. 2d at 263. The majority may be correct that, where traditional products liability and negligence laws can be utilized to impose liability upon manufacturers of defective drugs, additional encouragement to produce safe drugs may not be needed. However, where manufacturers can escape liability because it is impossible for a plaintiff to prove causation in fact, traditional tort laws do not provide any incentive to produce safe drugs. In such situations, market share liability would not act as a further encouragement to produce safe drugs. Instead, market share liability would act as the only encouragement to produce safe drugs. Thus, market share liability insures that the incentive to produce safe products provided by traditional tort laws will remain effective in situations where identification of a particular wrongdoer is impossible. The majority further states that “it is unlikely that an overall safety incentive could result from imposition of market share liability 40 years after the undesirable behavior occurred and almost 20 years after the potential harm was discovered and the product removed from the market.” (137 Ill. 2d at 263-64.) Furthermore, because market share liability “is only being applied to manufacturers of DES or similar products *** the goal of warning manufacturers to produce safer products likely will not reach a wide array of producers.” (137 Ill. 2d at 264.) This aspect of the majority’s reasoning is somewhat disingenuous. When the majority considers the potential negative effects of market share liability (i.e., stifling development and marketing of new drugs), the majority argues that adoption of market share liability in this case will have far-reaching, dramatic consequences on the entire pharmaceutical industry. (See, e.g., 137 Ill. 2d at 261-62 (“adoption of a market share theory will dramatically increase liability exposure ***[,] dramatically increase [insurance] premiums *** [and] will likely contribute to diminishing participants in the market as well as research and availability of drugs”).) However, the majority also argues that any potential positive effects of market share liability (i.e., encouraging the production of safe drugs) are unlikely to occur because this is an isolated case which will have little impact on the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. See 137 Ill. 2d at 264. If the majority believes that the potentially negative effects of adopting market share liability in this case would be felt throughout the pharmaceutical industry, then the majority should conclude that the potentially positive effects of adopting market share liability in this case would be felt throughout the pharmaceutical industry. Conversely, if the majority believes that the positive aspects of adopting market share liability would not be noticeable because they could only affect the DES market, a market which has been nonexistent for 20 years, then the majority should also conclude that the potential negative effects of market share liability would only be felt in the now nonexistent DES market (and so there would be no need for the majority to fear that adoption of market share liability would stifle the development and marketing of new drugs). Another reason the majority is not convinced that adoption of market share liability will encourage the production of safe drugs is that “market share liability imposes potential liability on all manufacturers in the particular industry; thus there may not be an incentive to produce safer products if liability could still be imposed as a result of the negligence of others in the industry and if the manufacturer knows that others in the industry will absorb the damages resulting from its negligence.” 137 Ill. 2d at 264. This argument is incorrect, as an initial matter, because market share liability would not impose liability upon all manufacturers in a particular industry. Instead, market share liability can only be imposed upon those manufacturers within,a particular industry who manufacture an identical product, and only if that product shares a common defect which caused a plaintiff’s injuries. Furthermore, it is incorrect to assume that market share liability would not provide an incentive to produce safe products. If a manufacturer took steps to insure that its product was not defective, then the product manufactured by the manufacturer would not be identical to the defective products manufactured by those manufacturers subject to market share liability. For example, if any of the defendants in this case had taken precautions to insure that their DES was not defective, those defendants would have altered their DES to correct the defects before marketing it. By altering the DES to correct the defects, those defendants would have manufactured a product which was not identical to the defective DES that was manufactured by the other defendants. The defendants who took precautions and modified their DES, therefore, could not be held liable under market share liability. On the other hand, those defendants who did not take safety precautions, but instead manufactured a defective product, would be the only manufacturers subject to market share liability. It is therefore clear that market share liability does provide a strong incentive for manufacturers to produce safe products. The majority also argues that market share liability “punishes plaintiffs who can satisfy the identification element, while creating an incentive not to locate the particular manufacturer.” (137 Ill. 2d at 255.) However, because liability under the Hymowitz market share theory is several only and is not inflated to reflect manufacturers that are not before the court, and in light of the fact that many DES manufacturers are now bankrupt, plaintiffs utilizing the market share theory of liability are certain to recover less than 100% of their damages. Plaintiffs who are able to identify the manufacturer of the DES that caused their injuries, on the other hand, will be able to recover 100% of their damages under traditional tort law: Consequently, plaintiffs would still have a strong incentive to identify specific manufacturers. The final reason the majority refuses to adopt market share liability is the majority’s belief that, as a practical matter, it'will be impossible to accurately establish market shares. The majority notes that “[t]he courts which have adopted market share liability have done so while ruling on pretrial motions and have not had the benefit of first having heard evidence on the availability of market share data.” (137 Ill. 2d at 252.) However, I note that the majority in this case is also ruling on a pretrial motion, and therefore the majority is similarly acting “without the benefit of first having heard evidence on the availability of market share data.” The only pieces of “evidence” which the majority cites in support of its belief that market share liability is unworkable are a statement made by a San Francisco trial court judge that market share liability can only “logically or practically be applied” on a national, rather than regional, scale (In re Complex DES Litigation (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County), No. 830 — 109), and a statement made by a Los Angeles trial judge which “expressed exasperation with the task of attempting to formulate market shares” (see Stapp v. Abbott Laboratories (Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County), No. C 344407). (See 137 Ill. 2d at 252-53.) Neither of these pieces of “evidence” convinces me that it would be impossible to accurately establish a manufacturer’s national market share as required by the Hymowitz theory of market share liability. On the contrary, the San Francisco trial judge’s statement actually suggests that such a national market can be established. Furthermore, according to the court of appeals of New York, a national market has in fact been established in the San Francisco case. See Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 509, 539 N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948, citing In re Complex DES Litigation (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County), No. 830-109. I have no doubt that establishment of a national market would be a very difficult, costly, and time-consuming process. I also agree that a legislative response to the problems of DES daughters might provide a more efficient remedy than litigation. (See 137 Ill. 2d at 253.) Until such time as the legislature acts, however, this court has a duty to continue developing the common law to keep up with the demands of our changing society. I therefore dissent. JUSTICE CALVO joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.