Court Opinion

ID: 9724608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:04:22.539674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:03.024021
License: Public Domain

Thomas Gallagher, Justice
(dissenting).
Shortly after the accident and while Mary Jane Lustik was still hospitalized therefrom, the action for death by wrongful act under Minn. St. 573.021 was commenced against her. Attorneys representing her automobile liability insurer took over the defense of this action and remained in complete charge of it throughout. No counterclaim on her behalf could be interposed therein because plaintiff-*525trustee there did not appear as personal representative of the estate of Ruth Rankila under § 573.01.2
Upon her release from the hospital, the present action for injuries sustained in the accident was commenced by Mrs. Lustik against the personal representative of the estate of Ruth Rankila, deceased, under § 573.01. When the two cases were called for trial at the April 1962 term of the St. Louis County District Court, motions were made for their consolidation. The court in reliance upon Lambach v. Northwestern Refining Co. Inc. 261 Minn. 115, 111 N. W. (2d) 345,3 denied such motions and directed that the action for death by wrongful act have precedence as it had been commenced first.
In the trial of that action, the court instructed the jury pursuant to § 602.044 that in so far as Ruth Rankila was concerned there was a presumption that she had exercised due care for her safety at the time of the accident and that the jury was to determine whether *526the evidence was sufficient to rebut such presumption. The jury returned a verdict of $17,648 in favor of Roy Rankila as trustee against Mary Jane Lustik as defendant in such action.' This verdict in effect determined that the latter had been negligent at the time of the accident and that such negligence had been a proximate cause thereof. After the trial of the action for death by wrongful act, counsel for the special administrator of the estate of Ruth Rankila, as defendant in the present action, moved for summary judgment therein on the ground that the verdict in the action for death by wrongful act was res judicata on the issue of negligence in that thereunder it had been determined that Ruth Rankila was not guilty of- negligence proximately causing such accident and that Mary Jane Lustik was guilty of negligence.
In a memorandum attached to its order granting this motion, the court stated:
“* * * this Court feels that the fact issue between the drivers of the two vehicles [Mary Jane Lustik and Ruth Rankila] has been litigated and a determination made in a Court of competent jurisdiction. It is clear to this Court that the adversary requirement pointed out in the case of Bunge vs. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N. W. 2d 446 is amply satisfied. The determination by the jury in the prior action was determinative of the claimed negligence of the drivers of both vehicles. * * * hence, this Court feels that the issues of negligence could not be re-litigated.
“The Court further relies on Radmacher vs. Cardinal [264 Minn. 72] 117 N. W. 2d 738.”
On appeal from the summary judgment herein plaintiff contends that the parties in the two cases are not identical, and further that the issues sought to be litigated in the present action are not identical to those in the prior action in that in the present action the presumption of due care as covered by § 602.04 will have no bearing upon the jury’s determination of issues relative to Ruth Rankila’s negligence.
It is well established that before a verdict in one action can operate as an estoppel in a subsequent action the issue involved must *527be identical; and likewise the adversaries must appear in the same capacity. Myhra v. Park, 193 Minn. 290, 258 N. W. 515; Schmitt v. Emery, 215 Minn. 288, 9 N. W. (2d) 777; Halloran v. Knoph, 243 Minn. 120, 66 N. W. (2d) 551; Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N. W. (2d) 364, 54 A. L. R. (2d) 316; Olson v. Linster, 259 Minn. 189, 107 N. W. (2d) 49. Thus, in the Olson case we stated (259 Minn. 191, 107 N. W. [2d] 50):
“* * * We have held on a number of occasions that issues determined by verdict or judgment in a prior action are conclusive only as to parties to such action and their privies, Halloran v. Knoph, 243 Minn. 120, 66 N. W. (2d) 551, and that, before estoppel against a party may arise under such circumstances, it must appear that such party appears in the second action in the same capacity that he appeared in the prior action.”
Defendant in the present action is a statutory entity created under § 525.305 and appears by virtue of § 573.01 as personal representative of the estate of Ruth Rankila, deceased. As such, his capacity is distinct and separate from that of plaintiff-trustee in the prior action whose entity is derived from § 573.02. That this distinction is important becomes apparent when it is noted that in the prior action § 602.04 was applicable in favor of plaintiff there because the action was instituted under § 573.02; but offers no help to defendant in the present action where as personal representative of the estate he lacks authority to invoke § 602.04 in favor of decedent. Accordingly, in the action for death by wrongful act, pursuant to § 602.04 the jury was instructed to determine whether the presumption of due care which favored decedent therein had been rebutted by the evidence. The effect of this instruction upon a jury is noted in TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 492, 53 N. W. (2d) 468, 473, as follows:
*528“Under these circumstances, the only effect of giving the presumption to the jury is to lead it to believe that even though it is convinced that defendant has sustained the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that decedent was guilty of contributory negligence it may still decide the issue against defendant on account of the presumption of due care. Obviously, such a result is wrong. The court’s instruction on the issue of contributory negligence, if properly given, will require a finding against defendant if the evidence is in balance or fails to preponderate in his favor. The presumption cannot and should not be permitted to cast any greater burden upon defendant than he already has under such instructions.”
The disadvantage to plaintiff by this procedure is obvious and is emphasized by the fact that she had no choice as to her position in the prior litigation. She did not choose the forum for it and could only appear defensively therein. She had there no opportunity to litigate her affirmative claims without the statutory presumption embodied in § 602.04 against her. She was without authority to interpose a counterclaim or to present her claims for injuries in a consolidated trial of the two cases. She lacked completely the opportunity of establishing decedent’s liability under evidentiary rules not “stacked” against her. The instructions given in the prior action as to the presumption of decedent’s due care pursuant to § 602.04 would have been erroneous except for the statute which now gives evidentiary stature to the presumption. TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N. W. (2d) 468.
In Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N. W. (2d) 364, cited in the majority opinion, we held merely that the defense of res judicata was available in favor of the defendants therein who were not parties to a prior action in which the identical plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to establish that they had been guilty of fraudulent conduct. In the subsequent action plaintiff again sought to establish the same claim of fraud against the same individuals, but was held barred from so doing because of the prior judgment on this issue. As we there pointed out, this was because plaintiff had deliberately selected the prior forum where neither his pleadings nor his proof had been limited; and where he had had the opportunity of presenting his evi*529dence without restrictive evidentiary rules; and because the evidence which formed the basis of the prior judgment against him was to be submitted by him in the second action in support of the identical claim of fraud as to the identical individuals. Obviously, that decision would have no application here where Mary Jane Lustik was without the right to assert an affirmative claim in the prior action, and where in the prior action plaintiff therein had the benefit of the presumption provided in § 602.04. While other cases cited in the majority opinion give expression to the general rules governing estoppel by. verdict in ordinary situations, none of them relate to the exceptional procedural questions presented here.

Minn. St. 573.02, subd. 1, provides in part: “When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person or corporation, the trustee appointed as provided in subdivision 2 may maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have maintained an action, had he lived, for an injury caused by such wrongful act or omission. * * * The recovery in such action * * * shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin * * *. Funeral expenses and any demand for the support of the decedent, other than old age assistance, allowed by the court * * * are first deducted and paid.”
Subd. 2 of this section provides in part: “Upon written petition by the surviving spouse or one of the next of kin, the court having jurisdiction * * * shall appoint a suitable and competent person as trustee to commence or continue such action * *

Minn. St. 573.01 provides in part: “A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person dies with the person * * * except as provided in section 573.02. It also dies with the person against whom it exists, except a cause of action arising out of bodily injuries or death caused by the negligence of a decedent survives against his personal representatives.”

In Lambach v. Northwestern Refining Co. Inc. 261 Minn. 115, 111 N. W. (2d) 345, the court in substance held that, in view of Minn. St. 602.04, cases in which a trustee of a decedent sues to recover for his death should not be consolidated with cases in which the representative of the estate of the same decedent is sued as a defendant.

Minn. St. 602.04 provides: “In any action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of a person, it shall be presumed that any person whose death resulted from the occurrence giving rise to the action was, at the time of the commission of the alleged negligent act or acts, in the exercise of due care for his own safety. The jury shall be instructed of the existence of such presumption, and shall determine whether the presumption is rebutted by the evidence in the action.” This was adopted at the 1957 legislative session and became effective April 29, 1957; presumably, it was intended to counteract the effect of this court’s decision in TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N. W. (2d) 468, wherein we held that the jury should not be instructed with respect to this presumption in cases where the burden of proving contributory negligence rests on the party against whom a presumption of due care operates.

Minn. St. 525.30 provides: “Upon a showing of necessity or expediency, the court with or without notice may appoint a special administrator whether a petition for general administration or proof of will has been filed or not. There shall be no appeal from any order appointing or refusing to appoint a special administrator.”