Court Opinion

ID: 9881044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 16:00:32.997301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:00.995026
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 29 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-10165

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:15-cr-01211-SPL-4
 v.

JUAN CARLOS JUAREZ-TORRES,                      MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

                    Argued and Submitted September 12, 2023
                               Phoenix, Arizona

Before: GOULD, HURWITZ, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      Juan Carlos Juarez-Torres appeals from his convictions and sentence on

various federal drug trafficking offenses, imposed after a guilty plea. We have

jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

      1. Juarez-Torres first contends his convictions should be reversed because his

counsel previously represented a person interviewed by federal agents about Juarez-

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Torres. The district court concluded that Juarez-Torres’s attorney was potentially

conflicted by the former representation and discussed the matter with Juarez-Torres.

The district court then asked whether Juarez-Torres approved of his lawyer staying

on the case and Juarez-Torres confirmed he wanted his attorney to continue to

represent him.

      On appeal, Juarez-Torres argues that he did not make a “voluntary, knowing,

and intelligent waiver” of his right to conflict-free counsel. Garcia v. Bunnell, 33

F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1994). We review the district court’s finding that the

defendant intelligently waived his right to conflict-free counsel de novo. United

States v. Christakis, 238 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001). Even assuming that

Juarez-Torres’s waiver of the conflict was insufficient, however, he has not

demonstrated that the alleged conflict “adversely affected [his] counsel’s

performance.” United States v. Walter-Eze, 869 F.3d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 2017)

(simplified).1 To show an adverse effect, Juarez-Torres cites counsel’s failure to

challenge a sentencing enhancement. But the record shows that counsel expressly

decided to argue that Juarez-Torres had a relatively minor role in the drug trafficking

organization, rather than challenge any particular enhancement. That strategy was

successful. The court varied downward significantly from the Guidelines sentence

      1
          Although Walter-Eze involved conflicts involving concurrent
representation, we assume that its standard applies here. See 869 F.3d at 900.

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that would have been applicable without the role enhancement. And nothing in the

record shows that his counsel’s decision to compare him to his superiors in the

conspiracy (rather than lower-level members allegedly like his former client) was

based on divided loyalties rather than strategy. See United States v. Wells, 394 F.3d

725, 735 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that speculative alleged failings are insufficient to

establish an adverse effect). Second, Juarez-Torres argues that his attorney failed to

speak with the former client because of the alleged conflict. But the record shows

that Juarez-Torres’s counsel attempted to contact the former client and was unable

to reach her. Juarez-Torres provides no evidence indicating that the lack of contact

was due to divided loyalties.

      2. Juarez-Torres next argues that the district court erred by conducting his

change-of-plea hearing in a video conference. The district court could conduct a

felony guilty plea by videoconference if: (1) it found specific reasons that the plea

could not be further delayed without serious harm to the interests of justice and (2)

the defendant consented after consultation with counsel. Coronavirus Aid, Relief,

and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 15002, 134 Stat. 281, 528–29

(2020); D. Ariz. Gen. Order 21-18 (Sept. 17, 2021). Because Juarez-Torres did not

object in the district court, we review for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 731–33 (1993); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

      Both requirements were satisfied. First, the court concluded that “there was a

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need to protect the public,” and that without the hearing the defendant would suffer

“serious harm.” Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, it was not a clear or obvious error

for the district court to find that those harms were specific and serious enough to

counsel against further delay. Second, Juarez-Torres orally consented to the video

appearance, and his attorney confirmed that they had discussed appearing by video.

      3. Finally, Juarez-Torres argues that the district court improperly applied the

sentencing enhancement for bribery of a law enforcement officer under USSG

§ 2D1.1(b)(11). Assuming that Juarez-Torres merely forfeited (rather than waived)

this argument, we review for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 731–33; Fed. R. Crim.

P. 52(b). Even though “we possess the discretion to refrain from applying the default

plain error standard of review in certain circumstances,” we decline to exercise that

discretion in this case. United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d 419, 426 (9th

Cir. 2011) (simplified).

      The district court did not commit clear or obvious error in applying

§ 2D1.1(b)(11) here, even if Juarez-Torres bribed a foreign law enforcement officer.

On its face, § 2D1.1(b)(11) applies to the bribery of “a law enforcement officer.”

Thus, § 2D1.1(b)(11) is not facially limited to bribery of domestic officers. While

this enhancement was enacted in response to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub.

L. No. 111–220, § 6, 124 Stat. 2373, which refers only to bribery of a “Federal, State,

or local law enforcement official,” the Sentencing Commission has discretion to

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adopt guidelines so long as they are not inconsistent with Congressional directives.

See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997).            The Sentencing

Commission’s choice to forgo Congress’s “Federal, State, or local” language is not

plainly “at odds,” id., with the statute. So the district court’s application of the

enhancement was not clearly or obviously wrong.

       AFFIRMED.

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