Court Opinion

ID: 9409833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 17:08:16.627194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.869377
License: Public Domain

J-A15004-23

                                         2023 PA Super 125

    IN RE: ESTATE OF DONALD THOMAS             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    SCHAEFER                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: DONNA S. GARTNER                :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1342 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 15, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                       Orphans’ Court at No. 02-19-01431

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                                    FILED: July 19, 2023

        Donna S. Gartner (Appellant), as executrix of the estate of Donald

Thomas Schaefer (Decedent), appeals from the order dissolving a preliminary

injunction and directing distribution of Decedent’s Merrill Lynch individual

retirement account (IRA) to his second wife, Florence Schaefer (Florence).

Upon review, we vacate and remand with instructions.

        We take the underlying facts and procedural history from this Court’s

prior opinion:

        By way of background, in August 2018, Florence and [Decedent],
        both octogenarians, entered into a premarital agreement [the
        agreement] drafted by their shared attorney, Jennifer Lynch
        Jackson, Esq. [Jackson]. …

             The record reflects multiple contradictions and ambiguities
        between Jackson and Florence’s remembrance of events. Largely
        gleaned through Jackson’s statements, at Florence and
        [Decedent’s] request, they met with Jackson for the specific
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A15004-23

     purpose of obtaining that premarital agreement.2 During their
     several-hour meeting, Florence and [Decedent] indicated that
     they, among themselves, had materially disclosed the
     financial contents of their estates and sought to protect
     those assets from passing, in death, to the other potential
     spouse.3 Their desire to proceed having full cognition of each
     other’s assets4 was communicated and emphasized to Jackson at
     several points throughout the meeting, which was conducted
     entirely in person. There would be no detailed accounting or
     discussion of [Decedent’s] assets or liabilities during this meeting.

           2 They would also present to Jackson a document
           addressing religious issues between the couple. As an
           addendum, they wanted it notarized and appended to
           the premarital agreement.        In addition, they
           requested that Jackson prepare wills for them,
           which would further state that there was to be
           no cross inheritance. Instead, their estates
           were to pass to their respective children and/or
           heirs.

           3 Jackson would later testify that Florence expressly
           disclaimed wanting an asset and liability sheet
           attached to the premarital agreement. When it was
           her opportunity to do so, Florence refuted Jackson’s
           statement.

           4 However, Florence’s recollection of her preexisting
           knowledge at the meeting was that she had not been
           apprised of [Decedent’s] individual retirement
           accounts and stock holdings.

            In addition to general monetary discussions, Florence and
     [Decedent] stressed that, should [Decedent] precede Florence in
     death, Florence was permitted to stay at his residence in the form
     of a life estate. This point would later become incorporated into
     [Decedent’s] will.

           After Jackson obtained the necessary information from
     Florence and [Decedent], she explained the agreement to them,
     line by line. When Jackson concluded, she specifically advised
     Florence and [Decedent] that they should take the unsigned
     agreement home and have it reviewed by an independent attorney
     of their choosing. Florence and [Decedent] rejected this advice

                                     -2-
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     and correspondingly      entered   into   the    at-issue   premarital
     agreement.

            Florence and [Decedent] married in the month after
     consummation of their agreement. Approximately five months
     into their marriage, [Decedent] died.

           Following [Decedent’s] death, his will was probated.
     Thereafter, Florence filed a declaratory judgment action, asserting
     the agreement to be void because of Jackson’s professional
     negligence that surrounded the construction of the agreement.
     Specifically, Florence identified that Jackson did not properly
     explain the agreement to her, failed to draft the agreement
     correctly, and incorrectly executed the document. Moreover,
     Florence sought damages from Jackson due to, in her words,
     “malpractice.” Simultaneously, Florence sought her elective share
     from [Decedent’s] estate. [In 2019, Florence sought, and the
     orphans’ court granted, a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
     sale or transfer of Decedent’s IRA.]

            Ultimately, after the denials of both Florence’s motion for
     summary judgment and [Decedent’s] estate’s motion for
     judgment on the pleadings, the premarital agreement’s validity,
     the subject of the case presently before this Court would be
     litigated in orphans’ court, with Florence advancing several bases
     as to why the agreement is legally insufficient under Pennsylvania
     law. Following a hearing, the court, inter alia, found Jackson’s
     recollection of events to be credible and determined the
     agreement to be valid.

Estate of Schaefer, 281 A.3d 1044 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished

memorandum at *1-2) (some footnotes omitted, others in original, emphasis

added).

     This Court affirmed the orphans’ court.         Id.   We expressly rejected

Florence’s position that she did not receive the financial disclosures. Id. at

*4-5. We observed: “The agreement clearly contemplates waiver of a right

to the other party’s estate.” Id. at *5. Further, we stated:

                                    -3-
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       As to whether Florence received the legally required financial
       disclosures from [Decedent], the [orphans’] court found Jackson
       to be credible when she unequivocally indicated that Florence and
       [Decedent] had materially discussed all of [Decedent’s] assets in
       a way that was satisfactory for both signators to the premarital
       agreement and that Florence wanted no corresponding list of
       assets and debts prepared. …. [W]e find no abuse of discretion
       or error of law in the [orphans’] court’s determination, given
       Jackson’s clear testimony as to Florence’s level of financial
       knowledge and Florence’s then-desire to not delve into the
       specifics of [Decedent’s] assets.

Id.   See also id. *6-7 (noting Florence failed to show she was not “fully

cognizant of [Decedent’s] assets,” including the existence of Decedent’s IRA,

and concluding “there is evidence of record, both in the form of testimony and

documentary, indicating that Florence knew of [Decedent’s] assets.”

(emphasis in original)).

       On September 19, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to dissolve the

preliminary injunction, and requested that the orphans’ court direct

distribution of the IRA to Decedent’s estate. Both parties submitted briefs.

On November 15, 2022, the orphans’ court filed a memorandum opinion and

order dissolving the preliminary injunction, but directing distribution of the

IRA to Florence as the surviving spouse. This timely appeal followed.1

       Appellant raises a single issue for review:

       I.     Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion when it granted
              [Appellant’s] motion to dissolve preliminary injunction and
              direct distribution of Decedent’s [IRA] but where it ordered
              that said IRA be distributed to [Florence] and not to
____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement and did not issue an additional opinion.

                                           -4-
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            [Appellant,] despite [Florence] waiving any interest in the
            IRA pursuant to [the agreement]?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      In finding Florence was entitled to the IRA, the trial court opined:

      On October 11, 2022, [Appellant] filed a brief which included a
      single page of legal argument. It discussed one case. It’s not the
      first time the Estate has extolled the virtues of the Ohio Supreme
      Court’s decision in Kinkle v. Kinkle, 699 N.E.2d 41 (Ohio 1998).
      In addressing Kinkle before, [the orphans’ c]ourt made the
      following observation:

            In Kinkle, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld an
            antenuptial agreement involving an IRA that was
            specifically listed as the decedent’s property in an
            exhibit to the antenuptial agreement.            The
            [agreement] involved here … does not identify assets.
            For that reason, the magnetic force of Kinkle
            evaporates.

      Opinion, pg, 3 fin. 2 (Sept. 8, 2020). The passage of time and
      the Superior Court’s affirmation of [the c]ourt’s decision does
      nothing to change [the orphans’ c]ourt’s view of the Kinkle case.
      It just does not apply here. There, the spouse was made
      aware of an IRA. Here, Florence had no knowledge about
      its existence.

              While the [the orphans’ c]ourt has dispatched the sole legal
      theory from [Appellant] and could end on that note alone,
      [Florence’s] legal team advances some reasons which are worthy
      of discussion because of the likelihood of the issue arising in future
      litigation. The overarching theme of the surviving spouse here is
      that while the premarital agreement was deemed valid and
      enforceable[,] it does not preclude giving effect to the language
      in the IRA agreement.          The language of the pre-marital
      agreement, the language in the IRA custodial agreement and the
      influence of Sections 6108(a) and 2203 of Title 20 allows the
      surviving spouse to prevail in this case. That result is supported[]
      by some analogous case law. See[] The Estate of Kenneth
      Sipos, 47 Pa. D&C 5th 259 (CP; Phil, March 4, 2015). The Sipos
      decision references a state Supreme Court decision. Alkhafaji v.
      [TIAA-CREF] Individual &Institutional Servs., LLC, 69 A.3d

                                      -5-
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     219, 223 (Pa. 2013). Despite that decision being an evenly
     decided per curiam result, the case stands for the proposition
     ‘‘that the beneficiaries of an insurance policy could not be changed
     by a will”, Justice Saylor explained, “[t]o allow modification of
     non-testamentary contractual assets by testamentary documents
     blurs the timeless and very practical distinction between the two,
     notably set forth in 20 Pa. C. S. § 6108.” 69 A.3d at 223. He
     reasoned that “[p]arties to a contract must have the ability to rely
     on the terms of their contract[] and should not have to speculate
     about testamentary clauses in documents of which they have no
     awareness.” Id.

            Subsequent cases have also referenced Alkhafaji for
     recognition of an exception to the general rule. “[O]ur case law
     has recognized an exception where an insured makes reasonable
     but unsuccessful efforts to send notice. This exception will
     recognize a change in beneficiary designation, even though notice
     is received after the death of the annuitant, if the annuitant made
     every reasonable effort to comply with the notice requirements of
     the policy.” N.Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Legault, 15-CV-736
     (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2015), aff’d on appeal, N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v.
     Legault, 16-3259 (3rd Cir. March 2, 2017) (citing[] Alkhafaji
     and explaining that, under Pennsylvania law, a beneficiary change
     can be made either by strictly complying with policy terms or by
     making ‘every-reasonable effort to comply with the notice
     requirements of the policy’); see also[] Estate of Wilson by
     Killinger v. State Employees’ Ret. Bd., 219 A.3d 1141 (Pa.
     2019).

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/15/22, at 3-5 (footnotes and record citations

omitted, emphasis added).

     In response, Appellant argues:

     The validity of the [agreement] was decided by this Court] in favor
     of Appellant[.] … The [agreement] set forth that a full and
     complete disclosure of property and income has been made. …

           [The Superior Court] affirmed the decision of the [orphans’]
     court that [Florence] waived any claim to [Decedent’s] assets and
     [e]state by signing the [agreement].

                                    -6-
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             The [IRA] was part of [Decedent’s] assets when he passed.
      In its [o]pinion, the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt, without any evidence of
      record, states that [Florence] did not know about the IRA. This is
      inconsistent with [the Superior Court’s] conclusion that the
      [agreement] was valid and [Florence] was fully advised of the
      assets of [Decedent]. Furthermore, the language of the IRA
      specifies that the proceeds should go to Julie Schaefer [Julie],
      [Decedent’s] first wife who preceded him in death. [Florence] was
      never a named beneficiary.

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.

      Florence counters that the agreement “does not apply to the [IRA.]”

Florence’s Brief at 5. She maintains that “the waiver upon death provision” of

the agreement does “not apply to all assets[] but is expressly limited to

testamentary assets.” Id. Florence repudiates the orphans’ court’s finding

that she was unaware of the IRA’s existence, stating, “the parties were clearly

aware of the IRA” when drafting the agreement. Id. at 10. Florence reiterates

that the trial court erred in finding she “had no knowledge of the IRA.” Id. at

13. Florence “acknowledges that the trial court relied on this factual error to

at least some degree” in making its decision. Id. at 14.

      We begin by recognizing:

      The findings of a judge of the Orphans’ Court Division, sitting
      without a jury, must be accorded the same weight and effect as
      the verdict of a jury, and will not be reversed by an appellate court
      in the absence of an abuse of discretion or a lack of evidentiary
      support. This rule is particularly applicable to findings of fact
      [that] are predicated upon the credibility of the witnesses, whom
      the judge has had the opportunity to hear and observe, and upon
      the weight given to their testimony. In reviewing the Orphans’
      Court’s findings, our task is to ensure that the record is free from
      legal error and to determine if the Orphans’ Court’s findings are
      supported by competent and adequate evidence and are not

                                      -7-
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     predicated upon capricious disbelief of competent and credible
     evidence.

In re Estate of Cassidy, --- A.3d ---, 2023 WL 3910447, at *3 (Pa. Super.

Jun. 9, 2023) (citation omitted). “However, we are not constrained to give

the same deference to any resulting legal conclusions. … This Court’s standard

of review of questions of law is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary,

as we may review the entire record in making our determination.”          In re

Estate of Tscherneff, 203 A.3d 1020, 1024 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

omitted).

     This case involves the interplay between the language of the agreement,

the IRA, and Decedent’s overall estate plan. Thus, we recognize:

     Prenuptial agreements are contracts and should be interpreted
     using contract principles. Raiken v. Mellon, [ ] 582 A.2d 11, 13
     ([Pa. Super.] 1990).

            “When interpreting a prenuptial agreement, the court, as in
     dealing with an ordinary contract, must determine the intention of
     the parties.    When the words of a contract are clear and
     unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be discovered from
     the express language of the agreement.” Id. “The court must
     construe a contract as written and may not modify the plain
     meaning of the contract under the guise of interpretation.”
     Tuthill v. Tuthill, 763 A.2d 417, 420 (Pa. Super. 2000)[.]
     However, where an ambiguity exists, “the courts are free to
     construe the terms against the drafter and to consider extrinsic
     evidence in so doing.” Raiken, 582 A.2d at 13. If a contract “is
     fairly susceptible of different constructions and capable of being
     understood in more than one sense[,]” it will be found to be
     ambiguous. Tuthill, 763 A.2d at 420. “It is the function of the
     court to decide, as a matter of law, whether the contract terms
     are clear or ambiguous. The fact that the parties have different
     interpretations of a contract does not render the contract
     ambiguous.” Id. (citations omitted).

                                    -8-
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In re Estate of Blumenthal, 812 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2002).

     Moreover:

     The testator’s intent is the polestar in the construction of every
     will and that intent, if it is not unlawful, must prevail. … The
     words of a will are not to be viewed in a vacuum but rather as part
     of an overall testamentary plan.

In re Estate of Davis, 128 A.3d 819, 821 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

     With these principles in mind, we address Appellant’s issue. This Court

previously determined that Florence and Decedent entered into a valid

prenuptial agreement. Schaefer, 281 A.3d at *8. The relevant portions of

the agreement provide:

     1.01. The Parties to this Agreement intend to identify their
     separate property as of the date of marriage, and to clarify that
     neither will obtain any interest in the specified separate
     property of the other as a result of the marriage except as
     provided herein.

     ….

     2.02. Each Party to this Agreement has given the other a full and
     complete disclosure of his or her property and income as of the
     date of this Agreement.

     ….

     3.01. Each Party shall have the absolute and unrestricted right to
     manage, control, dispose of, or otherwise deal with his or her
     separate property free from any claim that may be made by the
     other Party by reason of their marriage, and with the same
     effect as if no marriage had been consummated between them.
     By this Agreement, each Party waives, discharges, and
     releases all right, title, and interest in and to the separate
     property that the other Party now owns or will own in the
     future.    Separate property is defined as any property

                                    -9-
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       bearing the individual party’s name alone or property that
       is joint with person or persons other than the Prospective
       Spouse.

       ….

       5.01. Parties acknowledge that they have been advised that by
       virtue of their marriage each will have an interest in the other’s
       estate or any intestacy. It is the intention of parties that each
       party will waive any interest that he or she may have in the
       estate or any intestacy of the other. Each party is free to
       transfer his or her separate property under a Will without claim
       from the other.

Agreement, 8/20/18, at 1-3 (emphasis added).

       The parties agree that Decedent named Julie, who predeceased him, as

the beneficiary of his IRA. See Appellant’s Brief at 8; Florence’s Brief at 2.2

The IRA contract provides:

       You can designate in writing a beneficiary to receive the balance
       of your IRA upon your death. If you make no designation, the
       balance will be distributed to your surviving spouse, if you are
       married. If you do not have a surviving spouse, the balance will
       be distributed to your estate.

       You can change your designation at any time by notifying us in
       writing. The change will not become effective until we receive
       notice and accept the change in beneficiary.

IRA, Traditional IRA Disclosure Statement, § 4, ¶¶ 19-20 (paragraph

numbering omitted, emphasis added).

____________________________________________

2 Portions of copies of the IRA in the certified and reproduced records are of
poor quality, such that we are unable to discern any beneficiary designation.
As stated above, the parties do not dispute Decedent’s designation of Julie as
the IRA’s sole beneficiary.

                                          - 10 -
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       In its opinion, the orphans’ court does not discuss the language of the

agreement or IRA except to say: “The language of the [agreement], the

language in the [IRA], and the influence of Sections 108(a)[3] and 2203[4] of

Title 20 allows the surviving spouse to prevail in this case.” Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 11/15/22, at 4 (footnotes added). This was error.

       Our review reveals no support the orphans’ court’s determination in

favor of Florence.      The parties agree that Florence was not named as a

beneficiary of the IRA, and Julie is the only named beneficiary. Appellant’s

Brief at 7-8; Florence’s Brief at 2.           Under the plain language of the IRA

contract, the surviving spouse only becomes a beneficiary “[i]f you make no

designation[.]” IRA, Traditional IRA Disclosure Statement, § 4, ¶ 19. The IRA

is silent as to what occurs if the named beneficiary predeceases the owner,

and the owner does not name a new beneficiary. As noted above, it is a long-

settled principle of contract interpretation that this Court “construe a contract

as written and may not modify the plain meaning of a contract under the guise

of interpretation” Tuthill, 763 A.2d 420. See Madison Const. Co. v. The

Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999) (“We will not …

____________________________________________

3Section 6108 provides that designation of beneficiaries of insurance or
employee death benefits is not testamentary. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(a).

4 Section 2203 concerns a spouse’s elective share and provides: “Interests
under any broad-based nondiscriminatory pension, profit sharing, stock
bonus, deferred compensation, disability, death benefit or other such plan
established by an employer for the benefit of its employees and their
beneficiaries[,]” are subject to election. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2203(b)(3).

                                          - 11 -
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distort the meaning of the language or resort to a strained contrivance in order

to find an ambiguity.”) (quotation marks and quotation omitted).

      Here, the plain and unambiguous language of the IRA contract provides

for inheritance by a surviving spouse only if there is no named beneficiary. As

Decedent named Julie as his beneficiary, Florence does not inherit.         The

orphans’ court’s determination is not supported by the plain language of the

IRA. See Tuthill, supra; Madison, supra.

      Moreover, Florence waived any interest in the IRA by signing the

agreement. Florence argues that Article 5.01 of the agreement, titled “Waiver

Interest in Estate,” does not apply because the IRA does not pass by will or

intestacy. See Florence’s Brief at 7-10; see also 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2203(a).

While we agree that the IRA is not testamentary, the IRA is part Decedent’s

estate.

      Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “estate” as “[a]ll that a person or

entity owns, including both real and personal property. [] The property one

leaves after death; the collective assets and liabilities of a dead person.”

Black’s Law Dictionary, 304 (5th Pocket ed. 1996). Pennsylvania considers an

IRA part of a decedent’s estate and subject to state inheritance tax. In re

Estate of Neiderhiser, 850 A.2d 68, 71-72 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (reversing

orphans’ court and finding decedent’s IRA subject to Pennsylvania inheritance

                                     - 12 -
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tax).5 Here, Florence agreed she intended to “waive any interest [she] may

have in the estate or any intestacy of the other.” Agreement, 8/20/18, at 3

(emphasis added). As Decedent’s IRA, while not testamentary, is part of the

estate, Florence waived her interest in it.

       Even if the IRA was not part of the estate, Florence further waived her

interest to it in Articles 1.01 and 3.01 of the agreement. Article 1.01 states

that the parties will not “obtain any interest in the specified separate property

of the other as a result of the marriage[.]” Agreement, 8/20/18, at 1. Article

3.01 provides:

       By this Agreement, each Party waives, discharges, and releases
       all rights, title, and interest in and to the separate property that
       the other Party now owns or will own in the future. Separate
       property is defined as any property bearing the individual’s party’s
       name alone or property that is joint with person or persons other
       than the Prospective Spouse.

Id. at 2.    Decedent was the sole owner of the IRA when he and Florence

married. Under the agreement, the IRA was Decedent’s “separate property”

and Florence waived any interest in it. See id. at 1-2.

       The Ohio Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Kinkle,

supra.6     In Kinkle, the husband (decedent) opened an IRA in 1992 with

____________________________________________

5While decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding, they may serve
as persuasive authority. See Estate of Brown, 30 A.3d 1200, 1204 n.2 (Pa.
Super. 2011).

6 “The decisions of courts of other states are persuasive, but not binding,
authority.” Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772, 780 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en
banc).

                                          - 13 -
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Fidelity Investments Southwest Company (Fidelity). Kinkle, 699 N.E.2d, at

42. He did not designate a beneficiary. Id. In 1994, the decedent married,

but prior to the marriage, he and his future wife signed an antenuptial

agreement waiving all rights to the other’s property. Id. The decedent died

three months after getting married. Id. Following the decedent’s death, the

bank released the IRA to the wife, as the surviving spouse, pursuant to the

IRA’s clause stating if the decedent died without naming a beneficiary, the IRA

went to the surviving spouse. Id. The decedent’s children brought an action

on behalf of decedent’s estate to recover the IRA funds. Id. Both the trial

court and the intermediate appellate court ruled in favor of the estate. Id.

      On discretionary appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court explained its

affirmance:

      [T]here are two contracts involved in this case. The first, the
      contract between Fidelity and [the decedent], was performed
      according to its terms. Since [the decedent] did not designate a
      specific beneficiary, the beneficiary became his wife through the
      language of the IRA contract. Fidelity performed under the
      contract. At that point, the second contract, the antenuptial
      agreement governed by Ohio law, came into play. The question
      is whether through an antenuptial agreement a spouse may waive
      her right to be a beneficiary under an IRA contract. We find that
      she may certainly do so.

            This court has long held that prenuptial agreements
      controlling the distribution of assets upon the death of a spouse
      are enforceable. … In Ohio, there is no public policy, statute or
      case law which prevents parties to antenuptial agreements from
      cutting one another off entirely from any participation in the estate
      of the other upon the death of either. [The a]ppellant … would
      have us simply ignore the existence of the antenuptial agreement
      as far as the IRA at issue is concerned. However, the contract
      that she entered into with [the decedent] determines her rights to

                                     - 14 -
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       [his] property and estate, not the contract [the decedent] entered
       into with Fidelity.

       ….

             [The appellant] expressly waived and released all rights and
       interests, including contingent interests, that she might acquire in
       [the decedent’s] property or estate by virtue of her marriage to
       him. [The appellant’s] interest in the IRA account was contingent
       on [the decedent’s] death[] and arose only by virtue of her
       marriage to him—she was never listed specifically as a beneficiary
       under the IRA contract.

             At the time [the decedent] entered into the contract, [the
       appellant] was not his wife.       Only because she became a
       “surviving spouse,” i.e., by reason of her marriage to [the
       decedent], did [the appellant’s] interest arise. [The appellant]
       waived any interest of that kind in the antenuptial agreement.

Id. at 43-44 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

       The facts in Kinkle are align with the facts before us. Further, we are

persuaded by the reasoning in Kinkle.7             Here, Decedent obtained the IRA

prior to marrying Florence. Decedent did not name Florence as a beneficiary

____________________________________________

7 The orphans’ court distinguished Kinkle on two bases: (1) Florence did not
know about the IRA; and (2) the list of assets attached to the antenuptial
agreement in Kinkle included the IRA, while there was no asset list attached
to the antenuptial agreement between Decedent and Florence. Orphans’
Court Opinion, at 3-4. As noted, the parties agree that Florence knew about
the IRA prior to signing the agreement. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8; Florence’s
Brief at 10. This Court affirmed the validity of the agreement, and specifically
referenced the clause stating that the parties had informed each other of all
“property and income.” Schaefer, 281 A.3d at *4-5; see also Hunnell as
Trustee of Hunnell Family Revocable Living Trust v. Krawczewicz, 284
A.3d 1192, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2022) (explaining law of the case doctrine).
Further, we rejected Florence’s claim that she had not received a full disclosure
of Decedent’s assets, noting that “Florence … wanted no corresponding list of
assets and debts prepared.” Id. at *5; see also id. at *7.

                                          - 15 -
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(unlike the decedent in Kinkle, Decedent named a beneficiary).           Florence

signed a prenuptial agreement waiving her right to Decedent’s separate

property and any part of his estate.           As in Kinkle, we conclude Florence

waived any interest in the IRA. See id. at 44.

       We also conclude the orphans’ court’s reliance on the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court’s split decision in Alkhafaji,8 and the Philadelphia Orphans’

Court’s decision in Sipos,9 is misplaced. In Alkhafaji, as part of a divorce

settlement, the decedent purchased annuities naming two children from his

prior marriages as beneficiaries. Alkhafaji, 69 A.3d at 221. Years later, the

decedent executed a new will naming his then-spouse and all of his children

as beneficiaries of the annuities. Id. at 221-22, 226. The decedent did not

notify the holder of the annuities, TIAA-CREF, of the change.           Id.   Our

Supreme Court addressed whether a testator could change the beneficiaries

of an annuity by will, and, if so, what type of notice the testator was required

to give the plan holder. See id. at 220, 221-22, 224-25, 226.

       In Sipos, the decedent designated his caretaker as beneficiary of his

IRA. Sipos, 47 Pa. D.&C. 5th, at 260-61. Two years later, the decedent

____________________________________________

8There are four opinions in Alkhafaji, none of which garnered a majority.
One justice did not participate; two advocated for affirmance, and two
advocated for reversal. Alkhafaji, 69 A.3d at 531.

9 “[C]ourt of common pleas decisions provide, at most, persuasive but not
binding authority.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 69th St. Retail Mall, L.P., 126
A.3d 959, 972 (Pa. Super. 2015).

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J-A15004-23

executed a will naming his brother as the IRA’s beneficiary. Id. at 261. There

was no evidence the decedent attempted to comply with the IRA’s

requirements for changing a beneficiary. Id. at 268. Following the decedent’s

death, the caretaker cashed the IRA. Id. at 263. The orphans’ court found

that under those circumstances, “the beneficiary of [the decedent’s IRA] was

not changed by his will as no reasonable effort by [the decedent] to comply

with the terms of the policy was demonstrated.”        Id. at 269 (footnote

omitted).

     We see nothing compelling in Alkhafaji and Sipos. Both cases involve

a conflict between beneficiaries: those named in accordance with the plans,

and those named by will. By contrast, we are presented in the instant case

with the issue of whether a surviving spouse, not named as a plan beneficiary,

whose interest was acquired solely by marriage, contracted away her interest

by executing a prenuptial agreement. As the Ohio Supreme Court explained,

testamentary documents are different from prenuptial agreements:

     [The case relied upon by the appellant] concern[s] testamentary
     disposition, which involves a unilateral decision by the holder of
     the retirement fund to change the beneficiary in a separate
     document outside the IRA contract.          However, there is no
     testamentary disposition at issue in this case.          Here, the
     beneficiary herself denied any interest in the funds at issue. She
     did so pursuant to an antenuptial agreement of unquestioned
     validity, a contract evidencing a meeting of the minds of her and
     her soon-to-be husband.

Kinkle, 699 N.E.2d at 43.

                                    - 17 -
J-A15004-23

       Similarly, in this case, Decedent did not dispose of the IRA in a

testamentary document, see Will, 8/20/18, at 1-3, and Florence signed a valid

prenuptial agreement in which she waived her rights to the IRA.           Thus,

Florence is not entitled to distribution of the IRA.

       Our holding honors Decedent’s stated wishes. See Davis, 128 A.3d at

821.    We previously observed that the agreement “clearly contemplates

waiver of a right to the other party’s estate.” Schaefer, 281 A.3d at *5; see

also id. at *1 n.2 (explaining that Decedent and Florence requested Jackson

“prepare wills for them, which would further state there was to be no cross

inheritance. Instead their estates were to pass to their respective children

and/or heirs.”).   When Decedent executed the prenuptial agreement, he

changed his will in accordance with the terms of the agreement.         His will

bequeathed to Florence a life interest in Decedent’s home, but if she chose to

vacate the property prior to her death, Decedent’s “real estate shall be equally

divided among my herein named children[.]” Will, 8/20/18, at 1. Also, there

is no evidence Decedent attempted to change the beneficiary of his IRA. The

record demonstrates Decedent’s intent that Florence inherit a life interest in

his home, and nothing more.

       For the above reasons, we vacate the order of November 15, 2022, and

remand for entry of an order dissolving the preliminary injunction and

directing distribution of the IRA to the estate.

                                      - 18 -
J-A15004-23

      Order vacated.      Case remanded with instructions.   Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/19/2023

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