Court Opinion

ID: 9852275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:34.364681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.925133
License: Public Domain

Phipps, Judge.
A jury found Owen Vogleson guilty of trafficking in cocaine and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. His co-defendant negotiated a reduction in sentence in exchange for his testimony against Vogleson. Vogleson claims that the trial court erred by denying him his constitutional right to cross-examine his co-defendant1 about the mandatory minimum sentence the co-defendant was facing before he agreed to testify against Vogleson. He also claims that the only evidence linking him to the crimes was the uncorroborated testimony of his co-defendant, which was insufficient to support his convictions. Although we find that the evidence was sufficient to support Vogleson’s convictions, we reverse because we find that the trial court erred by limiting Vogleson’s cross-examination of his co-defendant.
*556On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence.2 Viewed in that light, the evidence shows that on April 26, 1999, DeKalb County Police Detective Franklin received a tip from a confidential informant that a white Jeep Cherokee, license tag number 324 JLC, could be found immediately in the area of Redan Road and Covington Highway and that the Jeep would be carrying a large amount of illegal drugs. The informant told Franklin that the Jeep would be occupied by two black males. When he received the tip, Franklin notified uniformed officers Becker and Frank that he would be moving into the area.
When he reached the area, Franklin observed the Jeep and was able to confirm the license tag number, the race and gender of the driver and the race of the passenger. The passenger had his seat reclined, making it difficult for Franklin to determine his gender. Franklin eventually was able to determine that the passenger was male. Franklin testified that the driver repeatedly looked into his side view and rear view mirrors and turned around in his seat to watch the vehicles following him. Franklin notified Officers Becker and Frank of his observations and of the Jeep’s location.
Officer Becker located the Jeep, drove behind it and activated his blue lights. When the Jeep stopped, Becker, speaking through his public address system, asked the driver, whom he identified as Wilson, to get out and go to the rear of the vehicle. Wilson complied with that request and with Becker’s request for his driver’s license. Becker asked Wilson if there were any guns in the vehicle, and Wilson said, “yes.” Wilson told Becker that there was a gun under the driver’s seat. After patting Wilson down, Becker went to the driver’s side of the vehicle, looked under the driver’s seat and found a gun and a bag of marijuana. When Wilson acknowledged that the gun and marijuana belonged to him, Becker placed him under arrest.
Becker then approached the passenger, whom he identified as Vogleson, and instructed him to exit the Jeep. After Vogleson exited, Becker asked Officer Frank to conduct an open air search of the vehicle. Frank walked his dog (trained in the detection of narcotics) around the outside of the vehicle. The dog “alerted” on the front driver’s side and the front passenger’s side of the vehicle and again in those areas and the backseat when he entered the vehicle. The officers found two bags containing almost two kilograms of cocaine on the front passenger floorboard and a large amount of marijuana under the backseat.
At trial, Wilson testified to the following. His involvement in the *557buying and selling of cocaine was limited to connecting suppliers with potential purchasers, thereby earning a “finder’s fee.” Vogleson had cocaine he needed to sell, and a friend (the informant) had told Wilson he was interested in buying up to five kilograms. On April 26, 1999, Wilson and Vogleson met to sell the cocaine. At Vogleson’s suggestion, they went to a restaurant on Covington Highway to get something to eat. Vogleson went into the restaurant and talked to someone who had entered the restaurant carrying a box. When Vogleson exited the restaurant, he was carrying a white plastic grocery bag, which contained food and two kilograms of cocaine. In the car, Vogleson gave Wilson the food, showed him the cocaine and placed the bag containing the cocaine under his leg. They then left the restaurant and headed in the direction of Wilson’s friend’s house to sell him the cocaine.
1. Vogleson claims that the trial court committed reversible error by denying him the right to cross-examine Wilson about the mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking in cocaine. He argues that he was denied his constitutional right to explore Wilson’s bias as a witness.
On direct examination, Wilson admitted that he received a deal from the State in exchange for his testimony in this case, including a recommendation for a reduction in sentence that would require him to serve ten years in prison. On cross-examination, the following transpired:
VOGLESON’S ATTORNEY: And so you are going to plead guilty to a reduced charge of possession with intent to distribute the cocaine?
WILSON: Yes.
VOGLESON’S ATTORNEY: But you want this jury to believe that the cocaine belonged to Mr. Vogleson?
WILSON: That’s who it belonged to. . . .
VOGLESON’S ATTORNEY: By pleading guilty to the possession with intent to distribute you save yourself from getting a mandatory —.
THE COURT: We don’t talk about mandatory sentences. We don’t talk about any of that stuff.
VOGLESON’S ATTORNEY: Okay. You are saving yourself 15 years, aren’t you?
Before Wilson could answer, the trial judge admonished Vogleson’s attorney for disregarding his instruction. Vogleson’s attorney then asked additional questions on other subjects designed to explore Wilson’s bias.
*558Vogleson argues that Hernandez v. State3 requires reversal. In Hernandez, we held that cross-examination of an accomplice regarding the deal he had made with the prosecution, including the potential sentence he could receive and the fact that he would not be eligible for parole, was constitutionally protected because it sought to show the witness’s motive, bias or interest in cooperating with the State and testifying against Hernandez.4 The fact that he faced a sentence without eligibility for parole, or a mandatory minimum sentence, gave him much more incentive to give favorable testimony.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” This guarantee applies to both federal and state criminal defendants.5 Implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation is the right of cross-examination, which is an essential and fundamental requirement for a fair trial.6
“Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”7 Because the exposure of a witness’s motivation in testifying is an important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination, the potential bias or partiality of a witness may always be explored at trial.8 “It is especially important in a case where a witness or an accomplice may have substantial reason to cooperate with the government that a defendant be permitted to search for an agreement between the government and the witness”9 and explore the details of any agreement.
Much of Wilson’s deal with the State was revealed on direct examination. But the trial court completely precluded any testimony regarding the sentence Wilson would have received if he had not reached a deal with the State and had been convicted of the crimes for which he was indicted. By doing so, the trial court prevented the jury from considering the most important aspect of Wilson’s deal — how much prison time he was avoiding by agreeing to cooperate with the State.
We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination *559designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” [Cit.] [Vogleson] has met that burden here: A reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [Wilson’s] credibility had [Vogleson’s] counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed . . . cross-examination.10
Because the trial court denied Vogleson his constitutionally protected right to explore Wilson’s motive, bias and interest in cooperating with the State and testifying against Vogleson, we reverse.11
We previously addressed restrictions on cross-examination of an accomplice in Whitlock v. State12 and Ross v. State.13 In Whitlock, an accomplice testified that he had pled guilty to certain charges, but had not made a deal with the State. Defense counsel wanted to show that the accomplice could have received a maximum sentence of eighty years imprisonment if he had been convicted of the crimes charged in the indictment but was given only a minimum sentence of ten years. The court allowed counsel to show the crimes with which the accomplice had been charged and the counts that were dismissed, and that he received the “minimum sentence” for the crimes to which he pled guilty even though he could have received a “substantial amount of time” on the charges. The court would not let counsel inform the jury of the lengths of the minimum and maximum sentences. We held that the limitation on cross-examination did not hamper Whitlock’s ability to challenge the accomplice’s credibility.14
In Ross, defense counsel elicited the fact that an accomplice was facing a mandatory sentence of ten years for armed robbery and that by pleading guilty to robbery, he was able to reduce the sentence to seven years.15 We held that Ross’s ability to question his accomplice about his motive to lie was not improperly restricted by the trial court’s refusal to allow questions couched in the terms of “mandatory minimum sentence.”16
We recognize the potential conflict between Hernandez on the one hand and Whitlock and Ross on the other. Because Hernandez more fully protects a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation, we will follow it and disapprove of Whitlock and Ross only to the *560extent they suggest that it is not reversible error to preclude cross-examination of an accomplice regarding the deal he has reached with the State, including the disparity between the sentence the State will recommend in exchange for the accomplice’s cooperation and the sentence he would have received without that cooperation.
The State argues that to the extent Hernandez permits cross-examination regarding mandatory minimum sentences, it conflicts with the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Hodo v. State.17 There, the court held that Hodo’s constitutional right to confrontation was not violated when the trial court refused to allow him to question a State’s witness about the potential sentence the witness could face if prosecuted for the criminal conduct he admitted on the stand. Hodo was permitted to ask the witness if he realized that he could be prosecuted and about any benefit he expected to receive in exchange for his testimony.
We find Hodo distinguishable. The witness, a drug dealer, was not involved in the crimes being tried and had not been charged with any crime. Requiring such a witness to speculate about possible punishment for crimes with which he might be charged differs from requiring an accomplice to reveal the punishment he would receive if not for his deal with the State.
The dissent takes issue with our reliance on Hernandez to support reversal in this case. Although the issue arose in a different context in Hernandez, we nevertheless held as a basis for reversal that “[flinally, and perhaps most importantly, such cross-examination is proper because it is constitutionally protected.”18 We did not find the cross-examination was improper but held that any concerns held by the State regarding its scope could have been addressed by the court without resort to a mistrial.19 For example, the court could have instructed the jury that the cross-examination should not be considered for purposes of determining Hernandez’s guilt or innocence but only for judging the credibility of the witness. The same limiting instruction would have worked here as well.
2. We now address Vogleson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. An appellate court does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia.20 Under Jackson v. Virginia, we determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Vogleson claims that the only evidence linking him to the cocaine *561came from Wilson. In fact, Wilson’s testimony was corroborated by the officers’ testimony that the cocaine was discovered on the floorboard of the passenger side of the car where Vogleson was sitting. The corroborating evidence tended to show Vogleson’s participation in the crimes and was therefore sufficient as a matter of law.21 We cannot say that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judgment reversed.

Pope, P. J., Johnson, P. J., Smith, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur. Ruffin and Miller, JJ., concur and concur specially. Blackburn, C. J, Andrews, P. J., Eldridge, Ellington and Mikell, JJ., dissent.

 We affirmed the conviction of his co-defendant. Wilson v. State, 249 Ga. App. 560 (549 SE2d 418) (2001).

 Newman v. State, 233 Ga. App. 794 (1) (504 SE2d 476) (1998).

 244 Ga. App. 874 (537 SE2d 149) (2000).

 Id. at 876-877 (1) (c).

 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (85 SC 1065, 13 LE2d 923) (1965).

 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 295 (93 SC 1038, 35 LE2d 297) (1973).

 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (94 SC 1105, 39 LE2d 347) (1974).

 Id.

 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (290 SE2d 911) (1982).

 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 680 (106 SC 1431, 89 LE2d 674) (1986).

 Hernandez, 244 Ga. App. at 877.

 239 Ga. App. 763, 765-766 (2) (521 SE2d 901) (1999).

 231 Ga. App. 506, 509 (3) (499 SE2d 351) (1998).

 239 Ga. App. at 766.

 231 Ga. App. at 509 (3).

 Id.

 272 Ga. 272, 274-275 (4) (528 SE2d 250) (2000).

 244 Ga. App. at 876-877 (1) (c).

 Id. at 877.

 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

 See id.