Court Opinion

ID: 9569480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:15.800432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:00:26.877787
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion and concur in the judgment of reversal. I write only to emphasize that our opinion in no way alters the well-settled principle that one who petitions for a writ of habeas corpus after conviction of a crime “has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the judgment attacked is invalid because the prisoner’s constitutionally-protected rights were violated in obtaining the judgment. [Cits.]” Gaither v. Gibby, 267 Ga. 96, 97 (1) (475 SE2d 603) (1996). The fact that the State has the burden of showing a waiver of the “speedy trial” requirements of OCGA § 17-7-*301170 on direct appeal does not relieve the petitioner in a habeas proceeding from meeting his burden of proof. See Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 830 (2) (b) (493 SE2d 900) (1997). Thus, as the majority opinion recognizes, Sloan had the burden of proving both that the performance of his attorney on appeal was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. In my opinion, Sloan met this burden. The evidence before the habeas court showed that Sloan’s trial lawyer failed to move for dismissal pursuant to a timely filed statutory demand for speedy trial, and that the failure to raise the issue on appeal was not a tactical decision. The evidence also raised the inference that the demand was never waived. The respondent failed to produce any evidence that there was a waiver. Accordingly, I concur in reversal of the habeas court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus.
Decided July 6, 1999.
Carl L. Sloan, pro se.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Angelica M. Woo, Assistant Attorney General, W. Dennis Mullís, for appellee.