Court Opinion

ID: 9733809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:17:45.708255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.132087
License: Public Domain

*244MORGAN, Justice
(concurring in result).
I concur in the result of the majority decision. The decision does not pick up the basic error that I perceive in this case. That error, however, does not mandate reversal on procedural grounds; nor does it rise to constitutional dimensions in my view.
Stripped of all the ostentations, the purported constitutional violation of Article VI, § 2, deprivation of property without due process of law, arises from the provisions of SDCL ch. 31-19, which variously provides for immediate taking (SDCL 31-19-23), vesting title in the State (SDCL 31-19-24), and appeal not delaying the vesting of title and possession in the State (SDCL 31-19-38).
In this regard, I point out a procedural error. All parties are proceeding under SDCL 31-19-10.1; however, Chapter 31-19 is a special procedure limited by its terms to acquisition of right-of-way and borrow pits. SDCL 31-19-20 is the only provision for use beyond the scope of the above and that is limited to land or materials, dirt, sand or gravel required for construction, reconstruction, maintaining or repairing. In my opinion, SDCL ch. 31-19 should be strictly construed, for it is there we find the provisions to which Justice Henderson refers and as I have enumerated above. These provisions make sense in the context of the condemnation of a highway right-of-way. One or two recalcitrants should not hold up an interstate highway system on a question of necessity for their particular segment. Justice Henderson’s quixotic scenario, which suggests that the Transportation Commission is going to adopt a resolution of necessity to acquire a portion of the family farm is pure hyperbole.* In view of the corporation farming restrictions under SDCL ch. 47-9A, most farm land in South Dakota could be referred to as family farm land.
SDCL 31-29-61 et seq., which authorized this action, deals with highway beautification and advertising. SDCL 31-29-72 authorizes acquisition of nonconforming billboards by condemnation, but does not designate SDCL ch. 31-19 as the procedure to be used. In my view, by restricting Chapter 31-19 to only the acquisitions that it clearly covers, the State is required to use the general condemnation statutes, thus giving the property owner appropriate protection on the issue of necessity for taking. SDCL 21-35-20 provides for appeals in all cases under that chapter in the same manner as in other civil actions. Thus, it appears to me that in the event of a proposed taking which the property owner claims transgresses the bounds of propriety, the property owner would have the option to make application to this court for intermediate appeal. This court can give consideration to allowing intermediate appeal on that grounds only, thus delaying, if we so choose, the balance of the proceedings. SDCL 21-35-20 which provides that an appeal does not delay improvements, in my opinion, applies to appeals from a final adjudication.
While all parties tried the case under SDCL ch. 31-19, inasmuch as SDCL 31-19-21 provides that the chapter is cumulative to SDCL ch. 21-35, I would agree with the disposition of the majority opinion because appellant filed a direct appeal rather than petitioning for intermediate appeal.

 The subject of this action is a billboard. The use of eminent domain has admittedly been used on many other occasions. Our interstate highway system and the impoundments of our great Missouri River Dams would not have been possible without this tool.