Court Opinion

ID: 9375859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 01:00:24.610581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.375588
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10385         Document: 00516660401             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/28/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 22-10385
                                     Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                     ____________                              February 28, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Christopher Darnell Douglas,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 5:21-CR-124-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Southwick, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Christopher Darnell Douglas appeals his conviction and sentence for
   production of child pornography. He says the district erred in two ways by:
   (1) imposing a supervised release condition limiting contact with his son, and
   (2) accepting a guilty plea based on a factual basis that failed to admit an
   offense. The Government contends that Douglas is precluded from raising
   these points of error under the plea agreement’s appeal waiver. We pretermit
          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10385        Document: 00516660401              Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/28/2023

                                         No. 22-10385

   consideration of the applicability of the appeal waiver and reach the merits.
   See United States v. De Leon, 915 F.3d 386, 289 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019).
           We first address whether the district court exceeded its authority
   under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) by imposing a supervised release condition that
   limited contact with Douglas’s son “to occasions when the probation officer
   is informed in advance of the defendant’s intent to have that contact and the
   probation officer approves it.” Because the district court gave Douglas
   notification that it intended to impose the condition and Douglas did not
   object, we review for plain error. See United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551,
   560 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Accordingly, Douglas must show that
   imposition of the supervised released condition was clearly or obviously
   wrong and that the imposition affected his substantial rights. See Puckett v.
   United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
           The district court has broad discretion to impose any condition of
   supervised release it deems appropriate as long as it is reasonably related to
   certain statutory criteria. 1 United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 412–13
   (5th Cir. 2009) (citing § 3583(d)). Douglas does not point to any statute or
   case prohibiting the district court from imposing such a condition. And we
   have upheld similar conditions under §§ 3583(d)(2) and 3553(a)(2)(C) as
   reasonably related to protecting children even considering the sanctity of the
   parent-child relationship. See id. at 417–18; see also United States v. Christian,

           _____________________
           1
             Conditions must (1) be “reasonably related to the factors set forth in”
   § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B)-(D); (2) not involve a “greater deprivation of liberty than is
   reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section [3553(a)(2)(B)-(D)]”; and (3) be
   “consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
   18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

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Case: 22-10385        Document: 00516660401             Page: 3      Date Filed: 02/28/2023

                                        No. 22-10385

   344 F. App’x 53, 55–56 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 2 Douglas thus fails to
   show the district court plainly erred.
           Douglas next challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis for his
   conviction based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bond v. United States,
   572 U.S. 844, 847–49 (2014). The Government argues that Douglas is raising
   a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), which was waived by his
   unconditional guilty plea, and that he is couching his arguments as
   challenging the factual basis to avoid the waiver issue. As noted above, we
   need not resolve this dispute. Even if Douglas did not waive his argument by
   pleading guilty, the issue does not survive plain-error review.
           It is well settled that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to
   prohibit local, intrastate production of child pornography where the materials
   used in the production had been moved in interstate commerce. See United
   States v. Bailey, 924 F.3d 1289, 1290 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); United
   States v. Dickson, 632 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Kallestad,
   236 F.3d 225, 226–31 (5th Cir. 2000). Douglas concedes that the cell phone
   used in his crime moved in interstate or foreign commerce and that his
   argument on this point is foreclosed by current law. See Bailey, 924 F.3d at
   1290.
           We have also previously rejected Douglas’s alternative argument,
   based on National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
   551 (2012), that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate only
   commercial activity and not activity that is tenuously related to interstate
   commerce. See United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013).

           _____________________
           2
              Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not binding
   precedent, but they may be persuasive authority. Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7
   (5th Cir. 2006); 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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Case: 22-10385     Document: 00516660401           Page: 4   Date Filed: 02/28/2023

                                    No. 22-10385

   Under the rule of orderliness, we are “not at liberty to overrule our settled
   precedent because the Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation did
   not overrule it.” Id. We are bound by Dickinson and Kallestad. Douglas is
   correct that relief under plain-error review is unavailable. See Dickson, 632
   F.3d at 192; Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 226–31.
          The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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