Court Opinion

ID: 9584317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:46:50.458461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:31.998580
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Thompson, Dr. Mulliniks, Dr. Rowley, Dr. Coxwell, Dr. Weldon, and nurse Taylor (the defendants) on the basis that the five-year statute *814of repose in OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) expiredbefore the medical malpractice action was asserted against them in the second amended complaint filed on April 20, 2004. This cause of action was asserted by Patricia and Charles Johnson on behalf of their minor child, Evan Johnson, seeking to recover damages for prenatal injuries allegedly suffered by the child during the delivery process just prior to his birth on April 27, 1997. See Peters v. Hosp. Auth. of Elbert County, 265 Ga. 487, 488 (458 SE2d 628) (1995). The Johnsons alleged that the defendants negligently provided prenatal care to Patricia Johnson while she was pregnant with the child, and that this negligence was a concurring proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the child during the subsequent delivery process.
Whether the alleged negligence of the defendants in providing prenatal care to Patricia Johnson was a proximate cause of injuries suffered by the child during the subsequent delivery is not at issue in this appeal. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the applicable statute of limitation and statute of repose expired before the medical malpractice cause of action was filed. The issue was whether the limitation and repose periods set forth in OCGA § 9-3-71 applied, or whether the more extended limitation and repose periods for minors set forth in OCGA § 9-3-73 applied. The trial court found that the five-year statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) applied, which required that the action be commenced within five years after the date of the alleged malpractice. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) expired onApril 21, 2002, five years after the last alleged prenatal malpractice by the defendants occurred on April 21, 1997, and that the action was not filed against the defendants until April 20,2004. The trial court found it unnecessary to rule on the defendants’ claim that the applicable statute of limitation had expired.
The trial court concluded that the five-year statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) applied because the court found that the statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-73 (c) (2) (A) did not apply by its express terms. Under OCGA § 9-3-73 (c) (2) (A),
in no event may an action for medical malpractice be brought by or on behalf of... [a] minor ... [a]fter the tenth birthday of the minor if such minor was under the age of five years on the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred. . . .
The trial court reasoned that, because the child was a fetus and not a minor when the alleged wrongful acts or omissions occurred, the statute of repose applicable to minors could not be applied to the *815child’s claims for prenatal injuries. Under this reasoning, the five-year statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-71 (b) expired before expiration of the extended statute of limitation in OCGA § 9-3-73 (b), applicable to the child as a minor under the age of five years when the cause of action arose. It is reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not intend this result, and that the statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-73 (c) (2) (A) should be construed to apply to a medical malpractice action brought on behalf of a minor alleging that the minor sustained prenatal injuries caused by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions. See Smith v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 262 Ga. 566, 568, n. 3 (423 SE2d 235) (1992); Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga. App. 21, 22 (522 SE2d 522) (1999); Bynum v. Gregory, 215 Ga. App. 431, 433-434 (450 SE2d 840) (1994). The medical malpractice action against the defendants was filed on April 20, 2004, well before the applicable statute of repose in OCGA § 9-3-73 (c) (2) (A) expired on the child’s tenth birthday on April 27, 2007.
Decided July 9, 2007
Reconsideration denied July 26, 2007
Chambers, Aholt & Rickard, Dale C. Ray, Jr., for appellants.
Green, Johnson & Landers, Henry D. Green, Jr., David V. Johnson, Lawrence J. LoRusso, Mary P. Adams, for appellees.
I agree with the majority opinion that the medical malpractice action against the defendants was also timely filed within the applicable statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-73 (b). The action for prenatal injuries arose on the date the child was born on April 27, 1997, and OCGA § 9-3-73 (b) provides that “[a] minor who has not attained the age of five years shall have two years from the date of such minor’s fifth birthday within which to bring a medical malpractice action if the cause of action arose before such minor attained the age of five years.” “Minors are subject to the period of limitation provided in [OCGA] § 9-3-71 (a), except that if a minor was less than five years old when a cause of action for medical malpractice ‘arose,’ the minor has two years from her fifth birthday to bring a medical malpractice action.” Crowe v. Humana, Inc., 263 Ga. 833 (439 SE2d 654) (1994); OCGA § 9-3-73 (b). The action was filed on April 20,2004, before the applicable statute of limitation expired on the child’s seventh birthday on April 27, 2004.