Court Opinion

ID: 9582981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:33:26.626923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:53.063111
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ontario Sewing Machine Company, Ltd. and Texmatic Machinery, Ltd. (the manufacturers of the machine at issue) must be reversed, but not for all the reasons stated in the majority opinion.
Ontario and Texmatic moved for summary judgment on several grounds, one of which was that, even assuming the machine was negligently designed or manufactured, the injury suffered by Regina Smith while using the machine in the employment of Wilen’s Mop Manufacturing was proximately caused by acts of Wilen and not by acts of Ontario or Texmatic. In support of this claim Ontario showed that, over a year prior to Smith’s injury, it sent Wilen a letter stating that: (1) because of two prior injuries suffered by machine operators at Wilen’s plant, Ontario was voluntarily recalling the machine to avoid any further injuries; (2) Wilen was advised to stop using the machine; (3) Wilen would be reimbursed for what it paid Ontario for the machine; and (4) the reimbursement offer was valid for 90 days. It is undisputed that Wilen was aware of the two prior injuries, that it refused to stop using the machine, and that Smith subsequently suffered an injury similar to the two prior injuries while using the machine in the employment of Wilen. Ontario and Texmatic claimed that Wilen’s refusal to stop using the machine after receiving the recall letter was an intervening act by Wilen which proximately caused Smith’s injury and negated any claim that they proximately caused the injury.
In granting summary judgment to Ontario and Texmatic, the trial court addressed only this ground. The trial court found that: (1) Wilen was aware of the danger of continuing to use the equipment because of the two prior similar injuries to its employees; and (2) Wilen chose not to stop using the equipment and refused to participate in the recall because the costs of doing so, including lost profits, were too great and because Ontario refused to pay for all the costs of the recall. The trial court specifically found that whether the warning of the danger given by Ontario was sufficient to put the machine user, Smith, on notice of the danger was not the issue being addressed by the court. The trial court stated that the issue was whether Wilen had a duty to stop using the machine after receiving the recall letter and whether its refusal to do so was an intervening cause of Smith’s injury which relieved Ontario and Texmatic from any liability. Finally, the trial court decided this issue by ruling that Wilen’s refusal to stop using the machine was an intervening act which caused Smith’s injury and severed any proximate causal con*377nection between the injury and actions of Ontario and Texmatic.
I agree in principle that a negligent failure by a business in Wilen’s position to cooperate with a manufacturer’s reasonable recall of a product may become the sole proximate cause of injuries sustained by an employee of the business while using the product. “A [business’] negligent failure to cooperate with a manufacturer’s reasonable recall program [may become] the proximate cause of injuries sustained by [an employee of the business]. Thus, the duty of the manufacturer may be excused because of this intervening negligence of the [business].” Maleski, Ga. Products Liability (2nd ed. 1993), § 1-6. Under the present facts, however, whether Wilen’s refusal to stop using the machine and cooperate in the recall was an intervening act which became the sole proximate cause of the injuries is a question of fact for the jury.
It is well settled that there can be no proximate cause where there has intervened between the act of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff, an independent, intervening, act of someone other than the defendant, which was not foreseeable by defendant, was not triggered by defendant’s act, and which was sufficient of itself to cause the injury.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 192 Ga. App. 806, 807 (386 SE2d 386) (1989). Ontario’s recall offered to reimburse Wilen for the actual cost of the machine if accepted within 90 days. Whether this was reasonable in light of the time constraint and the total costs the recall would have imposed on Wilen and whether Wilen’s refusal to comply with the terms of the recall was foreseeable by Ontario and Texmatic are factual issues in this case. Accordingly, it is for the jury to decide whether the proximate cause of Smith’s injury was solely acts of Ontario and Texmatic, or solely acts of Wilen, or a combination of those acts. Blossman Gas Co. v. Williams, 189 Ga. App. 195, 196-199 (375 SE2d 117) (1988).
Ontario and Texmatic also moved for summary judgment in the trial court on four other grounds which the trial court did not address in its order: (1) the sole proximate cause of Smith’s injury was Wilen’s failure to install recessed activation buttons on the machine; (2) Smith assumed the risk of incurring the injury; (3) the alleged defective condition of the machine was known and obvious; and (4) because Wilen substantially modified the machine prior to Smith’s injury, any defect allegedly existing in the machine at the time it was sold to Wilen was not the proximate cause of the injury. Given that a judgment right for any reason will be affirmed, it is necessary to consider whether the trial court’s grant of summary judgment can be upheld based on any of these additional grounds raised in the *378motion. Newsome v. Dept. of Human Resources, 199 Ga. App. 419, 423 (405 SE2d 61) (1991).
As to the claim regarding recessed buttons for the machine, after Ontario became aware of the two prior injuries suffered by Wilen employees while operating the machine, Ontario received information that those accidents may have been caused when the employees inadvertently activated the machine cutting sequence when they leaned over the machine to grab yam. According to this theory, the two buttons which the operator had to depress to activate the cutting sequence were designed and placed in such a manner that the operator’s body could possibly lean onto and depress both buttons at the same time and thereby inadvertently activate the cutting sequence while the operator’s arm or hand was in the cutting area. In order to prevent this possibility, Ontario designed new recessed buttons for the machine at its own cost which could be depressed only by use of the operator’s finger and which prevented accidental activation by leaning on the machine. These buttons were shipped to Wilen over a year prior to Smith’s injury, but Wilen failed to install the newly designed buttons prior to Smith’s injury.
Ontario and Texmatic argued on summary judgment that, like the prior injuries, Smith’s injury occurred when she inadvertently activated the cutting sequence by leaning onto the original nonrecessed buttons and that Wilen’s failure to install the new recessed buttons was an intervening act that was the sole proximate cause of Smith’s injury. Smith concedes on appeal that “[t]his would be a good ground for summary judgment if a lack of recessed buttons were the cause of [her] injury.” But Smith points to evidence that this was not what caused her injury. Smith testified on deposition that, at the time of her injury, she was not pushing or leaning on either of the buttons and that the machine’s cutting sequence spontaneously activated and cut her hand. Moreover, there was expert testimony in the record from which a jury could conclude that the machine was defectively designed or manufactured in a manner that would allow the cutting sequence to spontaneously activate without depressing the buttons. Accordingly, issues of fact precluding summary judgment remain on this claim, including resolution of the conflicting theories of what caused the cutting sequence to activate.
Ontario and Texmatic also claimed in the summary judgment motion that Smith cannot recover because evidence that she admitted knowing it was dangerous to reach over the cutting area established that she assumed the risk of the injury she incurred. However, knowing the cutting area was dangerous does not establish that Smith understood and appreciated the risk that she could be injured if the machine spontaneously activated without the buttons being pushed. Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864 (471 SE2d 866) (1996). *379Summary judgment was not appropriate on this issue.
Decided April 25, 2001
Butler & MacDougald, Daniel MacDougald III, for appellant.
Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, Earl W. Gunn, Ashley P. Nichols, for appellees.
Ontario and Texmatic sought summary judgment on the additional ground that, as to Smith’s claim that they failed to warn of the danger, they had no duty to warn of any danger associated with operation of the machine that was obvious or generally known or of which Smith had actual knowledge. Daniels v. Bucyrus-Erie Corp., 237 Ga. App. 828, 829 (516 SE2d 848) (1999). Although Smith concedes there was no duty to warn her that she should not knowingly press the activation buttons with her hand in the cutting area, she points to evidence that the danger of being injured if the machine spontaneously activated was not known or obvious. Summary judgment was not appropriate on this issue.
Finally, Ontario and Texmatic claimed they were entitled to summary judgment because, after they sold the machine to Wilen, it was substantially modified by Wilen prior to Smith’s injury. Accordingly, they claimed that the injury suffered by Smith was proximately caused not by an alleged defect in the machine as it was originally designed or manufactured by them, but by Wilen’s modified version of the machine. Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga. App. 130 (279 SE2d 264) (1981). The record shows, however, that whether or not the modifications at issue were done before or after Smith’s injury is a contested issue of fact, and summary judgment was not appropriate.
The above issues, which were the only issues raised and addressed by the parties in the motion for summary judgment, are the only issues presented on appeal to this Court. Fedeli v. UAP/Ga. Ag. Chem., 237 Ga. App. 337, 339 (514 SE2d 684) (1999). Accordingly, I do not concur in the majority’s commentaries on legal issues not presented in this appeal, nor do I concur in the majority’s numerous findings on disputed factual issues that are clearly for the jury in this case.