Court Opinion

ID: 9617814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:01:47.273859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:17.494414
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, P. J.,
dissenting.
I have full respect for my colleagues’ ability to conduct a thorough and thoughtful de novo review of the record before us. Nevertheless, I must dissent, because I believe strongly that, where questions of credibility are concerned, this court should defer to the trial judge, who has had the benefit of evaluating the witnesses first hand. These kinds of proceedings — while involving very important constitutional and statutory safeguards — are often emotionally charged and generally end up presenting human, not legal, questions, where the evaluation of the witness is the most critical key in resolving the case. In that light — absent a clear factual showing pointing only to one logical conclusion — I am extremely hesitant to reverse a trial judge’s commitment decision on the basis of our assessment of a cold record.
Here, the majority’s sole reason for reversing the trial court is its belief and acceptance of the testimony of appellant and his mother. I believe that the trial judge was in a far more advantageous position to evaluate the credibility of those witnesses than are we from our remote vantage point. Although we should always be vigilant in our response to legal error, we should not feel at liberty to reverse a trial judge when the only claimed error is that the judge believed or disbelieved a witness. Our judicial system would truly be amiss if that became a guiding standard.1
*569There was clear evidence before the trial court that appellant had contemplated killing himself, although he denied that at the commitment hearing. The trial judge is the only judge who has sat with appellant, eyeball to eyeball; he was in the superior position to ascertain what the fact really was. There was also evidence that appellant’s mother and her husband might not be able to manage appellant sufficiently to even dispense the care that they are willing to provide to him. Again, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the likely success of mother’s plan to provide care.
Given the potential consequences of not committing a mentally ill person who is, in fact, a danger to himself or whose basic needs will not be met, I cannot in good conscience go down the path taken by the majority.

 The majority is certainly correct in emphasizing that our objective is to review de novo; I do not question that. I disagree only with its implicit holding that there should be no deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of credibility.