Court Opinion

ID: 9455227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:15:12.483239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:30.681979
License: Public Domain

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
Though I was among those who in Williams (and Coleman) v. United *1355States1 dissented from the en banc treatment accorded a superficially similar episode, I concur in Judge Tamm’s opinion sustaining the conviction before us for review. Williams, needless to say, is binding on me, and with Coleman’s conviction upheld under the circumstances there — which to three members of the court bespoke confusion and coercion of a juror — it would follow that Brooks must meet the same fate under the weaker circumstantial showing here. I think, however, that the facts of the two cases differ so markedly at really crucial points as to dictate that result anyway. So it is both with a feeling of intellectual honesty and a sense of judicial duty that I join in affirmance in this case.
In Williams, the doubting juror was asked four times about her verdict as to Coleman on one of the counts tried. The first three times she answered either “[ijnnocent” or “[n]ot guilty.” Only when the question was put a fourth time did she say “[gjuilty,” and that without any elucidation of her change in stance. Not until after the poll was resumed and completed, and she was revealed as the one juror forestalling an acceptable verdict, was the jury sent back to the jury room for its own determination on unanimity. When, 22 minutes later, the jury emerged to again announce a verdict of guilty, the defense sought no second poll and the court did not undertake sua sponte to conduct one. As indicated, a majority of the court concluded that the verdict survived Coleman’s claims of disunity and coercion.
In the case at bar, there were two jurors, Mrs. Haltiwanger and Mrs. Taylor, who voiced reservations as to the verdict on count 1 — charging armed robbery of Ellis — of the seven-count indictment. Unlike Williams, however, they were not peppered with inquiries as to what their individual verdicts were.2 Rather, the trial judge, at the very first omen of disharmony, posed to counsel the suggestion that the jury deliberate further,3 but defense counsel requested that the rest of the jurors be polled.4 When the poll was completed, the judge again proposed a resubmission of count 1 to the jury but, because any trouble on that count could have also involved the other two “Ellis” counts, he settled, with the ostensible approbation of both counsel, upon a brief inquiry to ascertain the extent of the difficulty. Mrs. Haltiwanger retracted her prior manifestation of disagreement and, explaining that she had been confused, unequivocally voiced her concurrence in the verdict of guilt on count 1. Mrs. Taylor stated that she, too, agreed with that verdict, but “with reservations.” That charted the course for the judge and, as in Williams, the jury was directed to deliberate further on the “Ellis” counts, in the judge’s words, to “see if you can arrive at a unanimous verdict without any reservations whatever on the part of any juror.” 5
Twenty minutes later, the jury returned to the courtroom to report unanimous verdicts of guilt on those counts. Unlike Williams, another poll was con*1356ducted, and each of the jurors vouched individual agreement in those verdicts.6 The judge then questioned Mrs. Halti-wanger and Mrs. Taylor in an effort to detect any sensitivity to any possible duress as to count 1. Mrs. Haltiwanger dismissed the thought and adhered to the verdict “because it was probably my verdict in the beginning but I was mixed up in my thoughts.” Mrs. Taylor likewise responded that she was in no way coerced, and had reached her decision of her own free will.
As the court declared in Williams, “[i]t is basic to our system of justice that a verdict of guilty in a criminal case may stand only if freely given and unanimous.” 7 That important value of jury trial remains constant only in the degree that judges — trial and appellate alike — insist upon true unanimity in jury verdicts. At the same time, it is obvious that the trial judge suddenly confronted with a problem in that regard must be indulged some flexibility as to the manner of dealing with it.8 As shaped by the cooperative endeavors of court and counsel9 toward a common end, the procedure under review, in my judgment, so far kept faith with precept as to call for affirmance of appellant’s conviction.

. 136 U.S.App.D.C. -, 419 F.2d 740 (1969).

. See also Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 192, 126 F.2d 224 (1942).

. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(d). Compare Williams v. United States, supra note 1, 136 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 419 F.2d at 746; id., 136 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 419 F.2d at 752 (dissenting opinion).

. I intimate no view as to whether, in the face of counsel’s specific request, the judge could have directed further deliberations without completing the poll.

. Concomitantly, the judge 'accepted the guilty verdicts on the “Jackson” counts. Compare Clainos v. United States, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 281-282, 163 F.2d 593, 596-597 (1947). X cannot accept appellant’s argument that this action portended any significant prejudice in the circumstances here.

. Compare Williams v. United States, supra note 1, 136 U.S.App.D.C. -, 419 F.2d at 752-53 (dissenting opinion).

. Id. 136 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 419 F.2d at 746. See also Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748, 68 S.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948).

. See Slocum v. United States, 325 F.2d 465, 468 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Shibley v. United States, 237 F.2d 327, 334 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873, 77 S. Ct. 94, 1 L.Ed.2d 77 (1956).

. See Jackson v. United States, 128 U.S. App.D.C. 214, 216, 386 F.2d 641, 643 (1967).