Court Opinion

ID: 9773796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:59:08.859791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:57.814615
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As to the nonparty witnesses, I cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion by barring evidence of their alcohol consumption. The principal opinion decides that the trial court erred based on the general rule regarding alcohol consumption — that the number of drinks an eyewitness has consumed prior to the event is relevant to credibility. This rule does not mean that evidence of drinking automatically gets in, however. On the other hand, prejudicial evidence is not automatically excluded.1 Unfairly prejudicial evidence, however, evidence that inherently has the tendency to induce a jury to decide an issue on an improper basis, can be excluded at the discretion of the trial court.2
The trial court has the best vantage point from which to evaluate unfair prejudice, and we can only reverse if there exists evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in making that evaluation.3 This is a very difficult standard of review to overcome. The trial court’s ruling will only be overturned if it is:
clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration; if reasonable people can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.4
It was logical for the trial court to exclude as unfairly prejudicial the evidence that several nonparties had consumed some wine the day of the accident and that one nonparty witness was feeling “tipsy.” These nonparties had been in the company of the plaintiff *112and the defendant-driver. The plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant-driver’s vehicle. The vehicle rolled over. The plaintiff sued the corporate defendants on the basis of product liability and the defendant-driver on the basis of negligence. The corporate defendants cross-claimed against the defendant-driver for negligent operation of the automobile and asserted the affirmative defense of contributory negligence against the plaintiff. Both the cross-claim and the defense were based on alcohol consumption. The evidence that the nonparties were drinking inherently has the danger of leading the jury to the conclusion that both the plaintiff and the defendant-driver had been drinking. By excluding this evidence the trial court was ensuring that the corporate defendants met their burden of establishing the negligence of the parties independent of evidence concerning activities of the nonparties. Considering the complete context in which this evidence was offered, the nuances of which only the trial court could truly discern, it does not shock the sense of justice that the trial court found these references to the drinking of the nonparty companions unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff, as well as the defendant-driver, concerning the issue of negligence.
As to the party witnesses, I agree with the principal opinion that the Doisy standard of “erratic driving” or “other circumstances” proved difficult to apply in the courtroom. The intent of Doisy was legitimate, however. When there is evidence of alcohol consumption in any negligence ease, it is not always admissible because of the unfairly prejudicial effect on the jury. Doisy attempted to emphasize this point. Following decisions treated Doisy as creating a new standard in automobile negligence eases. I agree with the principal opinion that a separate rule is not necessary and that the general rule on evidence of alcohol consumption is sufficient. The general rule in conjunction with the discretion that the trial court has in determining whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial ensures adequate protection against the improper use of evidence of alcohol consumption.
I disagree, however, with reversing the case before us on the grounds that we are overruling Doisy. To apply a rule retroactively in this manner is clearly within our power,5 but I would declare today’s rule to operate prospectively only. Whether or not we announce the overruling of precedent prospectively only is a case-by-case analysis.6 We have adopted a three-factor test to facilitate this analysis.7
First, the decision in question “must establish a new principle of law ... by overruling clear past precedent.”8 There is no question that this decision overrules Doisy to the extent that it created a separate standard for the admission of evidence of alcohol consumption in automobile negligence cases. “This Court therefore declares a new standard for parties in civil cases: Evidence of alcohol consumption is admissible, if otherwise relevant and material.”9
The second factor is whether retroactive application will enhance or retard the purpose and effect of the new rule.10 An overruling case is applied retroactively when it controls the legal outcome of circumstances occurring prior to the date of the decision.11 Even though the decision concerning the effect of overruling precedent is ultimately case specific, a general trend has emerged concerning the purpose and effect of new rules. Rules with substantive purpose and effect are applied retroactively as well as prospectively.12 Rules that are procedural are applied prospectively only.13
*113Substantive rules define the rights of parties, such as the elements of a cause of action or a defense.14 Evidentiary rules are generally considered to be procedural, as they relate more to “the machinery for carrying on the suit.”15 Our decision today does not change the ability of parties to bring causes of action for negligence involving automobiles. Overruling Doisy does change the mechanics of the admission of evidence once parties are inside the courtroom, however. This case is clearly procedural. This factor militates in favor of announcing the new rule prospectively only.
The third factor requires a balancing of:
the interest of those who may be affected by the change in the law, weighing the degree to which parties may have relied upon the old rule and the hardship that might result to those parties from the retrospective operation of the new rule against the possible hardship to those parties who would be denied the benefit of the new rule.16
Both parties presented their cases at trial and on appeal relying on Doisy. Neither side expected that this Court would overturn Doisy after thirty years of reliance on the case. Neither side requested this Court to do so. The argument of the defendants in this case was that the evidence they offered at trial “amply satisfied” the Doisy standard. To reverse for a new trial because we are overruling Doisy is a windfall for the defendants, and one for which they did not argue.
The trial court made its decision in compliance with Doisy when it was the controlling law. If we reverse this case for the wrongful exclusion of evidence, we are holding that the trial court abused its discretion. It seems incongruous to admit how “inconsistent and unpredictable” the Doisy standard proved to be at trial, and then single out this trial court for the conclusion that it reached under Doi-sy. We also - cannot hold the trial court to the standard of foreseeing that we would overturn thirty years of precedent. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and announce the overruling of Doisy prospectively only.
As to the clear and convincing standard for punitive damages, I would again apply the new rule prospectively only. The principal opinion states that this change in common law “relates to requirements at trial, which are procedural and apply prospectively only.” I agree. The principal opinion goes on, however, to apply the rule retroactively to this case and other pending cases. While it is within our power to announce a new rule in this manner, I do not feel it is appropriate to do so when the new rule is procedural and the trial court acted in accordance with the controlling law at the time.

. See State v. Williams, 652 S.W.2d 102, 113 (Mo. banc 1983). “The fact that such evidence might be prejudicial is not dispositive.”

. See State v. Gibson, 636 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. banc 1982). Although prejudice is not the dispositive issue, "due process does not require all relevant evidence to be received nor prohibit the refusal of highly prejudicial albeit relevant evidence.” Id. at 958. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. banc 1984) (holding that expert's testimony was not sufficiently based on technique to overcome inherent danger of prejudice created by his status as an expert); Gant v. Hanks, 614 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Mo.App.1981) (holding that defendant's concern for plaintiff in personal injury action was not "so inflammatory or prejudicial as to amount to abuse of discretion”).

. Gibson, 636 S.W.2d at 958.

. Richardson v. State, 863 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Mo. banc 1993).

. “[C]ourts of final decision may define and declare the effect of a decision, that is, whether or not it shall operate prospectively only.” Koebel v. Tieman Coal & Material Co., 337 Mo. 561, 85 S.W.2d 519, 524 (1935) (citing Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932)).

. Sumners v. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Mo. banc 1985).

. Id. at 724.

. Id.

. Op. at 108.

. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d at 724.

. S.R. Shapiro, Annotation, Overruling Decision-Application, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966).

. See Sumners, 701 S.W.2d at 725.

. Id. See also this opinion. Op. at 110.

. Shepherd v. Consumers Cooperative Association, 384 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. banc 1964).

. Id.

. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d at 724.