Court Opinion

ID: 9652371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:23:00.336801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:50.797610
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant’s decision to be tried by a judge, rather than a jury, was coerced by an unconstitutional sentencing scheme which exposed appellant to the possibility of a mandatory death sentence if, and only if, he exercised his constitutional right to trial by jury. Such a sentencing scheme constitutes “an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right.” United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 1217, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968). Because appellant’s decision was in fact the result of this improper influence, it cannot be held voluntary as required by the United States Constitution. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). Accordingly, judgment of sentence should be reversed and appellant granted a new trial.
I.
Appellant was indicted for criminal homicide as a result of the December 16, 1974, death of Samuel VanAuken. The victim was a prison guard at the Monroe County Jail and was allegedly killed by appellant, who was incarcerated in the jail on a burglary charge, in an escape attempt. The Crimes Code requires a sentence of death upon conviction of murder of the first degree and a finding that the victim was a peace officer killed in the performance of his duties and *434that no mitigating circumstances exist. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1311(d)(1)(i) (Supp.1977).1 However, at the time appellant was brought to trial no rules existed which would authorize imposition of a sentence of death after a guilty plea or a waiver of the right to trial by jury. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1311(e) (Supp.1977). Consequently, appellant could only receive a sentence of death if he exercised his constitutional right to a trial by jury.
The majority does not dispute that it was with this fact in mind that appellant waived his right to trial by jury. Appellant contends that the death penalty sentencing scheme as it existed when he pleaded guilty on March 31, 1975, under which a defendant could only be sentenced to death if the defendant elected to be tried by a jury, placed an unconstitutional pressure upon him to waive his right to trial by jury. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968). Because this unconstitutional scheme coerced appellant to waive his right to trial by jury, he asserts that his waiver was not truly voluntary and must be set aside.
The majority, without contending that the sentencing scheme as it existed when appellant was brought to trial was constitutional, nevertheless holds that appellant’s waiver of his constitutional right to a trial by jury was voluntary. The majority relies upon cases which hold that a plea of guilty is not rendered involuntary when it may have been induced in part by fear of receiving a sentence of death after trial, even if the statute authorizing a sentence of death is later held unconstitutional. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). See also Commonwealth v. Melton, 465 *435Pa. 529, 351 A.2d 221 (1976). Even if this Court feels compelled to follow Brady and Alford,2 they do not support *437the result reached by the majority. Many factors enter into a decision by a defendant to enter a plea of guilty, and important reasons exist for not disturbing such a plea, particularly when the defendant has been represented and advised by competent counsel. When, however, a defendant is unwilling to admit his guilt and exercises his undoubted right to put the Commonwealth to its proof, there can be no justification for holding as “voluntary” the waiver of the right to trial by jury when that waiver was admittedly compelled by a patently unconstitutional sentencing scheme. The decision of the majority reflects an insensitive regard for the basic principle that the waiver of a constitutional right must be voluntary, and not the result of impermissible coercion.
II.
There can be little doubt that the sentencing scheme for determining when a defendant could be sentenced to death was unconstitutional as it existed at the time appellant came to trial. In United States v. Jackson, supra, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the sentencing scheme of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (1966), which permitted a jury, but not a judge, to impose a sentence of death upon conviction. The Court held that such a scheme needlessly chilled the assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. To the argument that this effect was merely incidental to a scheme intended to mitigate the severity of the punishment, the Court responded: “The question is not whether the chilling effect is ‘incidental’ rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive.” Id. 390 U.S. at 582, 88 S.Ct. at 1216. It is clear that our sentencing scheme, at the time appellant came to trial, suffered the same constitutional infirmity. Indeed, if anything, our sentencing scheme had a more chilling effect than the Federal Kidnapping Act because, under our statute, the death penalty was mandatory rather than permissive. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1311 (Supp.1977). As the above quote indicates, it is of no *438constitutional moment that the unavoidable chilling effect of the scheme was unintended.
III.
Neither the majority nor the Commonwealth contend that appellant’s decision to waive his right to trial by jury was not in fact the result of the precise chilling effect which renders the sentencing scheme unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the majority holds that appellant’s decision, compelled by the statutory scheme in effect at the time, was voluntary. I cannot agree. In my view, the waiver of a constitutional right cannot be truly voluntary when it is induced by a patently unconstitutional factor.
The majority relies on North Carolina v. Alford, supra, and Brady v. United States, supra, in holding that appellant’s waiver of the trial by jury was voluntary. Although I question whether we should follow Brady and Alford as a matter of state law in cases involving guilty pleas actually coerced by an unconstitutional sentencing scheme, see note 2, supra, neither compels the result of the majority. Many factors enter into a defendant’s decision whether to enter a plea of guilty, and many judicial policies are implicated by guilty pleas, which are not involved in or affected by the decision whether to be tried by a judge or a jury. These factors and policies appear to have been uppermost in the Court’s mind when Brady and Alford were decided.
In Brady, the Court was clearly concerned that a decision that the fear of a possibly greater sentence after trial would render guilty pleas involuntary would seriously disrupt the entire criminal justice system. The Court stated:
“[A]t present well over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty, a great many of them no doubt motivated at least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than might be imposed if there were a guilty verdict after trial to judge or jury.
“Of course, that the prevalence of guilty pleas is explainable does not necessarily validate those pleas or the *439system which produces them. But we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.
“A contrary holding would require the States and Federal Government to forbid guilty pleas altogether, to provide a single invariable penalty for each crime defined by the statutes, or to place the sentencing function in a separate authority having no knowledge of the manner in which the conviction in each case was obtained. In any event, it would be necessary to forbid prosecutors and judges to accept guilty pleas to selected counts, to lesser included offenses, or to reduce charges. The Fifth Amendment does not reach so far.”
397 U.S. at 752-53, 90 S.Ct. at 1471 (footnote omitted). Alford, which applied Brady without further analysis, involved an explicit plea bargain, pursuant to which Alford entered a plea of guilty to murder of the second degree, thus foreclosing the possibility of a death sentence after conviction.
Whether or not one agrees that a contrary result in Alford3 would compel forbidding guilty pleas altogether, it is apparent that the same considerations do not apply when the question is whether a defendant who insists on his right to trial has been impermissibly coerced to waive his right to trial by jury. Compared to a guilty plea, the Commonwealth has considerably less interest in whether a defendant is tried by a judge or a jury.4 Most importantly, the decision *440whether to be tried by a judge or a jury in no way implicates the plea bargaining system, which, as Brady recognized, may be essential to the present criminal justice system. See 397 U.S. at 751-52, 90 S.Ct. at 1471.5
Moreover, a defendant who waives the right to jury trial, but who does not plead guilty, does not “demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime.” Id. 397 U.S. at 753, 90 S.Ct. at 1471. Given the emphasis the Supreme Court placed on the defendant’s admission of guilt, I do not believe Brady can be applied where a defendant does not admit his guilt, but insists on trial before a judge.
The criminal process often requires “the making of difficult judgments.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). This does not mean, however, that the state can force a decision on a defendant by improper means. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a free and voluntary waiver of fifth amendment rights “must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. ” Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568 (emphasis added). I believe the same standard applies here. The sentencing scheme as it existed when appellant was brought to trial “had no other *441purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who [chose] to exercise them . .” United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581, 88 S.Ct. at 1216. Since the record clearly demonstrates that the scheme had its impermissible effect in coercing appellant to waive his right to trial by jury, appellant’s waiver was obtained through “the exertion of . improper influence” and should be set aside. I dissent.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The majority concedes that there were no mitigating circumstances. We have recently held that the limited mitigating circumstances recognized by the Crimes Code render the death penalty statute unconstitutional. Commonwealth v. Moody, - Pa. -, 382 A.2d 442 (1977); Commonwealth v. White, 475 Pa. 343, 380 A.2d 753 (1977). Although I did not participate in those cases, I agree with their disposition, and note that I would reach same result under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) was the first case in which the Supreme Court considered the effect of United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) in relation to the voluntariness of a guilty plea. The Court stated that “Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not.” 397 U.S. at 747, 90 S.Ct. at 1468. The first part of this holding — that all pleas motivated by fear of the death penalty are not per se involuntary — I agree with. The second part, however, seems merely to beg the question regarding the effect of an unconstitutional encouragement on the voluntariness of a guilty plea. The result in Brady appears to be correct, in that the district court had found that Brady’s plea was motivated by considerations other than the unconstitutional sentencing scheme. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970) and Brady v. United States, supra (dissenting and concurring opinions of Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.), 397 U.S. 798, 816, 90 S.Ct. 1474, 1483 (1970). Thus, to the extent the language in Brady supports the proposition that even an unconstitutional inducement to plead guilty, which in fact results in a plea, does not render that plea involuntary, it would appear to be dictum. Moreover, the dictum does not appear to be supported by the rationale of the Court in Brady. The majority reasoned:
“Insofar as the voluntariness of his plea is concerned, there is little to differentiate Brady from (1) the defendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge and jury have the same range of sentencing power, who pleads guilty because his lawyer advises him that the judge will very probably be more lenient than the jury; (2) the defendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge alone has sentencing power, who is advised by counsel that the judge is normally more lenient with defendants who plead guilty than with those who go to trial; (3) the defendant who is permitted by prosecutor and judge to plead guilty to a lesser offense included in the offense charged; and (4) the defendant who pleads guilty to certain counts with the understanding that other charges will be dropped. In each of these situations, as in Brady’s case, the defendant might never plead guilty absent the possibility or certainty that the plea will result in a lesser penalty than the sentence that could be imposed after a trial and a verdict of guilty. We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant’s desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.”
397 U.S. at 751, 90 S.Ct. at 1470 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). All of these examples involve situations where the motivating factor in entering a plea agreement, or pleading guilty, is to avoid the possibility of greater punishment which the state could legitimately *436impose after trial. The rationale may legitimately extend to the situation where a defendant pleads guilty to avoid greater punishment which might result after trial, but, because of an unanticipated change in the law, it later appears that the likelihood of such greater punishment would have been remote. But see Commonwealth v. Wright, 444 Pa. 588, 282 A.2d 266 (1971). However, in my view the comparisons offered by the Court in Brady are not apposite to the situation where a statutory scheme has a direct and unconstitutional coercive effect on the decision whether to stand trial, and it is shown that this impermissible coercive effect did in fact result in the decision to plead guilty. It seems ironic, at least, to hold that the very factor which renders such a statutory scheme unconstitutional — the needless chilling of the exercise of constitutional rights — will be ignored when it has in fact had its impermissible effect.
Nonetheless, Brady was uncritically applied to such situations in Parker v. North Carolina, supra, and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). My research indicates that this Court has never applied Brady and Alford to the situation where an unconstitutional sentencing scheme has in fact induced a waiver of constitutional rights. Commonwealth v. Reagen, 447 Pa. 186, 290 A.2d 241 (1972) and Commonwealth v. Henderson, 441 Pa. 255, 272 A.2d 182 (1971), relied on Brady and Alford only for the proposition that a decision to plead guilty motivated in part by fear of the death penalty is not per se involuntary. In neither case was it alleged that the decision to plead guilty was compelled by a statutory scheme which needlessly chilled the exercise of the right to stand trial, or that the death penalty could not legitimately have been imposed if that right had been exercised. See also, Commonwealth v. Hargrove, 434 Pa. 393, 254 A.2d 22 (1969). Commonwealth v. Melton, 465 Pa. 529, 351 A.2d 221 (1976), relied on by the majority, is also inapposite. In Melton, this Court rejected the argument that a guilty plea was coerced as a result of an allegedly unconstitutional jury selection system which tended to make juries more conviction-prone. This allegation, based on a change in the law after appellant’s guilty plea regarding jury selection, see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), was not based on a claim that an inherently coercive statutory scheme had its constitutionally prohibited effect in inducing the plea. The speculative concern of the defendant in Melton cannot be compared to the situation of the defendant squarely faced with a statutory scheme which declares that he must risk the possibility of death if he wishes to exercise his right to stand trial, but ensures him that no greater penalty than life imprisonment can be imposed if he foregoes his rights.
However, because there are significantly different considerations involved in the decision whether to plead guilty and the decision whether to proceed by jury or bench trial when the defendant elects to put the Commonwealth to its proof, I do not consider it necessary to decide whether, as a matter of state constitutional law, this Court should decline to follow Brady and Alford when an unconstitutional sentencing scheme has in fact coerced a plea of guilty.

. As I have indicated in note 2, supra, I would have no difficulty reaching the same result as the majority in Brady, since the district court expressly found that Brady’s guilty plea was not appreciably motivated by the unconstitutional sentencing scheme.

. This is reflected by our rules concerning waiver of the right to trial by jury. Although the trial court may have authority to refuse to *440accept a waiver of the right to a jury trial, the Commonwealth does not. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1101-02.

. The Commonwealth asserts another basis for finding the state’s interests are compromised by a holding that the appellant’s waiver was invalid because induced by the sentencing scheme. The Commonwealth argues that defendants would, in effect, be given the right to two trials, one before a judge, and one before a jury, and that, in the second, death could not be imposed because of the original life sentence. This argument has little merit. It overlooks the basic fact that the sentencing scheme, as it existed when appellant was tried, was patently unconstitutional and, thus, a sentence of death could not legally have been imposed. U. S. v. Jackson, supra. Once the unconstitutional system has been remedied, there is no longer any basis for setting aside the waiver of a defendant who elected to be tried by a judge. The fact that appellant will receive a new trial can hardly be a basis for denying him relief, once it is determined that his waiver of a trial by jury was in fact unconstitutionally coerced.