Court Opinion

ID: 1000246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:37:13.730729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:12.065283
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JEFFREY D. CARLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                      No. 99-1671
GENERAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge.
(CA-98-3153-S)

Submitted: October 8, 1999

Decided: November 8, 1999

Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

William J. Murphy, John J. Connolly, MURPHY & SHAFFER, Balti-
more, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert C. von Ohlen, Jr., Patrick J.
Keating, KAPLAN, BEGY & VON OHLEN, Chicago, Illinois;
George R. A. Doumar, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Jeffrey D. Carle appeals the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of General American Life Insurance Company
("General American") in Carle's diversity suit seeking disability ben-
efits. We affirm. We deny General American's motion to supplement
the joint appendix in this Court.

I.

Carle, a professional jockey, was involved in an accident while rac-
ing on October 26, 1996. Carle took seven months to recover from the
injuries he received in this accident. He then worked as a jockey for
eleven months before determining that his injuries were serious
enough to end his career.

After leaving racing, Carle sought benefits under a disability insur-
ance policy issued by General American. This policy defined "perma-
nent total disability" as

          an injury which prevents the insured from being in any
          occupation for which he or she is qualified based on his or
          her education, training or experience. The insured must be
          so disabled and under the care of a physician for twelve
          months from the date the disability began.

The policy covered a permanent total disability"which commences
within ninety days after the accident causing the loss." (JA 37). Gen-
eral American determined that Carle was not disabled within the
meaning of this policy and therefore denied his claim.

Carle then sued General American in Maryland, and General
American removed the case to federal court. The district court granted

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summary judgment in General American's favor. This appeal fol-
lowed.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate "if there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250 (1986). Where the non-moving party would bear the burden of
proof of trial, the movant is entitled to summary judgment if the non-
moving party "fail[s] to make a sufficient showing on an essential ele-
ment of her case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
A district court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment is
reviewed de novo. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.
1994).

In this case, Carle did not become so disabled that he was unable
to work until eighteen months after his accident, well beyond the
ninety-day limitation. Furthermore, at the time this suit was filed,
Carle had not experienced twelve continuous months of disability.
Accordingly, he was not entitled to benefits under the clear language
of the policy issued by General American.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. In
light of this disposition, we deny General American's motion to sup-
plement the joint appendix. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
cess.

AFFIRMED

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