Court Opinion

ID: 9412021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:11:19.857455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:24.702684
License: Public Domain

J-A15007-23

  NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JACOB MATTHEW MALONE                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1318 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 18, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County
                 Criminal Division at CP-56-CR-0000590-2020

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED: July 28, 2023

       Jacob Matthew Malone (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after he pled guilty to terroristic threats.1 We affirm.

       In 2019 and early 2020, Appellant was incarcerated at SCI-Laurel

Highlands and serving a prison sentence (Chester County sentence) related to

his 2017 conviction of institutional sexual assault and other crimes. One of

Appellant’s fellow inmates, Angelo Tomeo (Tomeo), contacted police and

claimed Appellant had attempted to hire Tomeo to murder two people: the

judge who imposed Appellant’s Chester County sentence (Judge), and a

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(3).
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witness for the Commonwealth in that case (Pastor). Affidavit of Probable

Cause, 2/25/20. At Appellant’s guilty plea hearing, the parties agreed:

      Communications were made by [Appellant] with a cellmate to
      have cellmate commit crimes against Pastor and Judge, which was
      then communicated to both the Pastor and the Judge and created
      a reasonable possibility of both the Pastor and Judge changing
      their daily operations.

N.T., 10/26/21, at 5.

      On October 26, 2021, Appellant and the Commonwealth entered into an

open plea agreement: Appellant pled guilty to terroristic threats in exchange

for the Commonwealth withdrawing the remaining charges. At the guilty plea

hearing, the trial court admitted into evidence a written Guilty Plea

Questionnaire that Appellant had completed with the assistance of counsel.

Id. at 7-8. The trial court also conducted an oral colloquy, id. at 8-10, prior

to accepting Appellant’s guilty plea as knowingly and voluntarily tendered. Id.

at 10. The court deferred sentencing for the preparation of a “modified” pre-

sentence investigation report (PSI). See id. at 11-12 (Appellant agreeing to

waive his right to a full PSI, and the trial court stating, “what I will do is direct

the [Somerset County] Probation Department [(Probation Department)] to

prepare a modified Pre-Sentence in the nature of a record check.”).

      The Probation Department PSI provided, with respect to Appellant’s

Chester County sentence, his release on parole, and his recommitment

following filing of the charges in the instant case, as follows:

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      04-28-17[:] Guilty plea/sentenced; … aggregate sentence of
      three (3) to six (6) years [in a] State Correctional Institution, five
      (5) years [of] probation consecutive.
      11-19-21[:] Paroled.
      11-25-21[:] Recommitted; all parole and release orders
      rescinded.

PSI, 11/3/22, at 12 (unnumbered).

      Regarding the instant charges, the PSI stated:

      [Appellant’s] bond was set at $500,000 [], which he has been
      unable to post. However, he continues to serve the Chester
      County sentence[;] therefore, he is not eligible for
      incarceration credit on this case.

Id. at 16 (unnumbered) (emphasis added).

      On December 28, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 16 – 84

months in prison, within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines. The

court ordered the sentence to run consecutively to Appellant’s Chester County

sentence, but concurrently with Appellant’s pending, five-year sentence of

probation. N.T., 12/28/21, at 9-10.

      On January 6, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion for

reconsideration of sentence. Appellant claimed the court failed to apply “credit

towards his sentence for the time that he has spent in SCI Somerset.” Post-

Sentence Motion, 1/6/22, ¶ 4.      One day later, the Commonwealth filed a

motion to modify sentence, asserting there was a “facial[ly] apparent error in

the language of the sentencing order.” Motion to Modify Sentence, 1/7/22,

¶ 3; see also id. ¶ 2 (explaining the purported error).

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     The trial court held a hearing on the respective post-sentence motions

on February 18, 2022. The court first addressed Appellant’s motion:

     [B]ecause this issue was raised [by the defense] …, I did ask the
     Probation Department to again look at this issue and to investigate
     whether or not [Appellant] was entitled to any credit for
     incarceration for time served with respect to the sentence in this
     case. And the Probation Department determined that he was not
     entitled to any incarceration credit on this sentence.

           And I believe the reason for that, again, is that … [Appellant]
     had been paroled on his Chester County sentence; that he was
     then charged with the alleged crimes in [this] Somerset County
     case; as a result of that, the [Pennsylvania] Parole Board [(Parole
     Board)] put [Appellant] back into S.C.I.[-Somerset] based on the
     new charges that were filed on a parole detainer, and [Appellant]
     was being detained in his Chester County case, not on the
     Somerset County case necessarily; and any incarceration that
     occurred prior to [Appellant’s] sentencing on December 28th,
     2021, was time that was allocated to his Chester County case
     and not his Somerset County sentence.

          So for those reasons, I am denying [Appellant’s] Motion for
     Reconsideration of Sentence.

           I will also add that the language that was in my original
     sentencing order directed the [Pennsylvania] Department of
     Corrections [(“D.O.C.” or “Department of Corrections”)] to advise
     this court whether they believed [Appellant] was entitled to any
     incarceration credit with respect to the Somerset County
     sentence, and I did not receive any response or any information
     from the D.O.C.; and specifically, they did not notify me that
     [Appellant] was entitled to any credit.

N.T., 2/18/22, at 5-6 (emphasis added; some capitalization modified).

     Next, the trial court addressed the Commonwealth’s motion to modify

sentence, which it granted. The court stated:

            [Q]uite frankly, I was surprised [] to hear that the D.O.C.
     was aggregating these sentences and that [Appellant] would be
     eligible for parole very soon on the sentence that I imposed.

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            My clear intent was that [Appellant] would serve a minimum
      sentence of at least 16 months on the Somerset County charge[,]
      with that sentence beginning on the date of sentencing, which was
      December 28th, 2021.

             In order to effectuate the intent of this court’s sentence, I
      am going to issue an amended sentencing order today. Although
      that order is being entered today, it will have an effective date of
      December 28th, 2021, which was the original date of sentencing;
      and [Appellant] would be entitled to incarceration credit from
      December 28th, 2021, coming forward. But, nonetheless, it was
      clearly my intent, and still is today, that the minimum sentence in
      this case begin to run on December 28th, 2021, and then run
      prospectively with respect to [Appellant’s] eligibility for parole in
      this case.

Id. at 8-9 (some capitalization modified).

      The   trial   court   resentenced   Appellant   and   imposed   the     same

incarceration term previously imposed (i.e., 16 – 84 months in prison). Id.

at 9-11. The court explained:

            [Appellant] is not entitled to any credit on this sentence for
      any periods of incarceration that occurred prior to December 28th,
      2021.

            The reasons for the sentence are that it falls within the
      standard range of the sentencing guidelines; also, [Appellant]
      committed this offense while serving a state incarceration
      sentence; and [Appellant] threatened individuals who were
      associated with that case for which he is currently serving a state
      sentence, including the sentencing Judge; also, [Appellant’s]
      actions have caused the [Pastor] to suffer emotionally and
      psychologically and to continue to fear for his life; and any lesser
      sentence would depreciate the seriousness of this offense.

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Id. at 10-11 (some capitalization modified).2

       On March 23, 2022, Appellant filed a facially untimely, pro se notice of

appeal at 605 WDA 2022.            See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (appeals must “be filed

within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”).

Also, Appellant’s counsel had filed a motion to withdraw his appearance on

March 16, 2022, which the trial court subsequently granted.

       On March 23, 2022, while still represented by counsel, Appellant filed a

facially untimely, pro se “Motion for Post-Sentence Relief Nunc Pro Tunc.” See

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 957 (Pa. 2018) (“no defendant

has a constitutional right to hybrid representation, either at trial or on appeal.”

(citation omitted)); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, cmt. (“No direct appeal may be taken

by a defendant while his or her post-sentence motion is pending”); but cf.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 241 A.3d 353, 355 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“where

counsel has effectively discontinued working on a defendant’s behalf, this

Court has concluded that a pro se filing does not offend considerations of

hybrid representation”).

       On April 4, 2022, the trial court denied Appellant’s pro se post-sentence

motion. On April 27, 2022, Appellant filed a second, pro se notice of appeal

from the April 4, 2022 order. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 283 A.3d

814, 816 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“In a criminal action, [an] appeal properly

____________________________________________

2 As we discuss below, the trial court did not advise Appellant of his post-
sentence or appeal rights at this hearing or in the amended sentencing order.

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lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence

motions.” (citation omitted)). This Court docketed the appeal at 605 WDA

2022.

        On August 10, 2022, this Court directed Appellant, at 605 WDA 2022,

to show cause as to why the appeal should not be quashed as untimely, where

Appellant filed his notice of appeal more than 30 days after the entry of the

February 18, 2022, amended sentencing order.              Appellant’s new counsel

timely responded in correspondence filed August 19, 2022, detailing the

unique procedural history discussed above. This Court discharged the rule to

show cause on August 26, 2022, and referred the matter to the merits panel.

        Appellant presents two issues for review:3

        I.    Whether the [trial] court abused its discretion by
              implementing a local rule which categorically rejects
              negotiated plea agreements containing a set duration of
              confinement, and accepts only open plea agreements, where
              said local rule is inconsistent with statement rule [sic] 590[?]

        II.   Whether Appellant’s sentence is illegal where the sentencing
              court: (1) refused to calculate time credit; (2) breached a
              non-delegable duty by ordering the Pennsylvania Department
              of Corrections to calculate time credit; and (3) unlawfully
              modified the sentence in violation of the negotiated plea
              agreement?

____________________________________________

3 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization modified).4

       Before we address Appellant’s issues, we must determine whether his

appeal is timely. Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1170 (Pa. 2020)

(“The timeliness of an appeal … [goes] to the jurisdiction of [an appellate]

Court and its competency to act.” (citation omitted)). As noted above, the

trial court never advised Appellant of his post-sentence or appeal rights, at or

after resentencing on February 18, 2022, in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P.

704(C)(3)(a) (mandating that at the time of sentencing, “[t]he judge shall

determine on the record that the defendant has been advised … of the right

to file a post-sentence motion and to appeal, of the time within which the

defendant must exercise those rights….” (emphasis added)); see also

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(4)(a) (“An order denying a post-sentence motion … shall

include notice to the defendant of … the right to appeal and the time limits

within which the appeal must be filed”). We conclude that the trial court’s

failure to comply with the foregoing rules “constitutes a breakdown that

____________________________________________

4 We note Appellant purported to withdraw his first issue, days prior to oral

argument, in a “reply brief” filed on June 20, 2023. We nevertheless address
the issue, which Appellant preserved in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) concise
statement. Concise Statement, 6/8/22, ¶ 1.

                                           -8-
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excuses the untimely filing of Appellant’s notice of appeal.” Commonwealth

v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 499 (Pa. Super. 2007).5, 6

       In his first issue, Appellant claims his “guilty plea is invalid,” because it

“was not accompanied by the necessary colloquy.” Appellant’s Brief at 12, 13

(some capitalization modified). Appellant asserts:

       At no point in the proceeding did the lower court ask the Appellant
       any questions regarding giving up his right to a trial by jury, nor
       did the lower court inform him of the permissible ranges of
       sentences and fines his guilty plea carried.

Id. at 13 (some capitalization modified). According to Appellant, the court

____________________________________________

5 Alternatively, we note that Appellant was incarcerated when he filed his pro

se notice of appeal, dated March 18, 2022, i.e., within the 30-day period of
Rule 903(a), supra. Under the prisoner mailbox rule, a prisoner’s pro se filing
“is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison authorities for mailing.”
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1132 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted)); Pa.R.A.P. 121(f) (same).

6 In Appellant’s appeal at 605 WDA 2022, he presents identical issues and an

essentially identical brief. Thus, we quashed 605 WDA 2022 as duplicative.

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violated Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 590.7 Id. at 14 n.2 (stating

trial court “fail[ed] to comply with Rule 590 in the form of an on-the-record

colloquy”).8    Appellant cites this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Prendes, 97 A.3d 337 (Pa. Super. 2014), where we stated:

____________________________________________

7 Rule 590 provides in relevant part:

     (B) Plea agreements.

        (1) At any time prior to the verdict, when counsel for both
        sides have arrived at a plea agreement, they shall state on the
        record in open court, in the presence of the defendant, the
        terms of the agreement….

        (2) The judge shall conduct a separate inquiry of the defendant
        on the record to determine whether the defendant understands
        and voluntarily accepts the terms of the plea agreement on
        which the guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere is based.

        (3) Any local rule that is inconsistent with the provisions of this
        rule is prohibited, including any local rule mandating deadline
        dates for the acceptance of a plea entered pursuant to a plea
        agreement.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(B).

8 Though Appellant does not develop this claim in his argument, he asserted

in his statement of questions that the trial court improperly “implement[ed] a
local rule which categorically rejects negotiated plea agreements containing a
set duration of confinement …, [and] said local rule is inconsistent with [] rule
590[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 4 (capitalization modified). We caution Appellant:

     When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an
     appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently
     developed for our review. Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d
     869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006). The brief must support the claims with
     pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations
     to legal authorities. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), (c). …
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Under Rule 590, [a trial] court [presented with a guilty plea]
       should confirm, inter alia, that a defendant understands: (1) the
       nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual
       basis for the plea; (3) he is giving up his right to trial by jury; (4)
       [] the presumption of innocence; (5) he is aware of the
       permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible; and (6) the
       court is not bound by the terms of the agreement unless the court
       accepts the plea.

Id. at 352; Appellant’s Brief at 12-13.            Appellant asks us to vacate his

judgment of sentence so he may “withdraw his guilty plea.” Appellant’s Brief

at 14 (footnote omitted).

       This Court has detailed the relevant law as follows:

       A valid plea colloquy must delve into six areas: 1) the nature of
       the charges, 2) the factual basis of the plea, 3) the right to a jury
       trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing ranges,
       and 6) the plea court’s power to deviate from any recommended
       sentence.” Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107
       (Pa. Super. 2005) [(en banc)]; Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.
       Additionally, a written plea colloquy that is read, completed and
       signed by the defendant and made part of the record may serve
       as the defendant’s plea colloquy when supplemented by an oral,
       on-the-record examination. Morrison, 878 A.2d at 108 (citing
       Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590). “A plea of guilty will not be
       deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry of the
       plea disclose that the defendant had a full understanding of the
       nature and consequences of his plea and that he knowingly and
       voluntarily decided to enter the plea.” Commonwealth v.
____________________________________________

     This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop
     arguments on behalf of an appellant. Gould, 912 A.2d at 873.
     Moreover, when defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct
     meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or
     find certain issues to be waived. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis
added; some citations modified). Despite this defect, we decline to find
waiver.

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      Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. Super. 1993). “Our law
      presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware of
      what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise.”
      Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super.
      2003) (internal citation omitted). The entry of a negotiated plea
      is a “strong indicator” of the voluntariness of the plea.
      Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. Super.
      1994). Moreover, “the law does not require that the defendant be
      pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty:
      All that is required is that his decision to plead guilty be knowingly,
      voluntarily and intelligently made.”             Commonwealth v.
      Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782-83 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some

citations modified; brackets omitted).

      Instantly, the trial court explained its rejection of Appellant’s challenge

to his guilty plea:

      [Appellant] contends that the court abused its discretion by
      implementing a local rule which categorically rejects negotiated
      plea agreements containing a set duration of confinement. The
      Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County does not have a local
      rule which categorically rejects negotiated plea agreements
      containing a set duration of confinement. Therefore, this court
      does not maintain a local rule that is inconsistent with statewide
      Rule 590 as alleged by [Appellant]. More importantly, the record
      is clear that the Commonwealth and [Appellant] did not
      enter into a plea agreement that included a set duration of
      confinement. On October 26, 2021[, Appellant] entered an open
      guilty plea to one count of terroristic threats, pursuant to 18
      Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(3), a felony of the third degree. There was no
      discussion, nor were there any negotiations, with regard to what
      [Appellant’s] sentence would be. Furthermore, question No. 40 of
      the Guilty Plea Questionnaire was answered by [Appellant] in the
      affirmative and provides: “Do you understand that the Court is
      not bound by any plea bargain or agreement entered into by you
      and the District Attorney and that the decision as to what your
      sentence will be is solely that of the sentencing judge?” In the
      case of Commw. v. White, 787 A.2d 108[8], 1091 (Pa. Super.
      2001), the Pennsylvania Superior Court correctly recognized
      that[:]

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          In the interests of the orderly administration of the
          criminal justice system[,] the right of the Commonwealth
          and a criminal defendant to enter into dispositional
          contracts, or plea agreements, is well recognized. While
          the Commonwealth and a criminal defendant are free to
          enter into an arrangement that the parties deem fitting,
          the terms of a plea agreement are not binding upon the
          court. Rather the court may reject those terms if the
          court believes the terms do not serve justice.

      [Id.] Although the court is free to reject a plea agreement
      if the court believes the terms of the plea agreement do not
      serve justice, that did not happen here. In fact, the court
      accepted [Appellant’s] guilty plea in open court and simply
      exercised it[]s discretion in fashioning a sentence within the
      standard range of the sentencing guidelines.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/22, at 1-2 (emphasis added; some capitalization

modified; quotation to White indented).         The trial court’s reasoning is

supported by the record and the law.

      We further observe that the trial court conducted an oral colloquy of

Appellant prior to accepting his guilty plea.   See N.T., 10/26/21, at 8-10.

Appellant also completed a thorough Guilty Plea Questionnaire, which the trial

court admitted in connection with Appellant’s plea. Id. at 6-7. Thus, there is

no merit to Appellant’s claim that his guilty plea was not accompanied by the

requisite colloquy.   Appellant has failed to carry his burden of proving the

involuntariness of his plea. See Pollard, supra.

      In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court imposed an illegal

sentence by failing to apply credit for time Appellant spent in prison before

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trial.    See Appellant’s Brief at 14-17.        Appellant quotes our decision in

Commonwealth v. Mann, 957 A.2d 746 (Pa. Super. 2008), which stated:

         [A]ll time served by a parole violator while awaiting disposition on
         new charges must be credited to the original sentence if he or she
         remains in custody solely on a Board detainer. If the defendant
         is incarcerated prior to disposition, and has both a detainer and
         has failed for any reason to satisfy bail, the credit must be applied
         to the new sentence by the sentencing court.

Id. at 751 (emphasis in Mann; citations omitted); Appellant’s Brief at 16.

Appellant claims: “Here, Appellant did have a [Parole] Board detainer, but did

not satisfy bail. … Accordingly, ‘the time he served prior to disposition of the

new offense[] should have been credited to his new sentence.’” Appellant’s

Brief at 16 (quoting Mann, 957 A.2d at 751-52).             Appellant emphasizes

Mann’s holding that the “Department of Corrections, an executive agency,

has no power to change sentences, or to add or remove sentencing

conditions, including credit for time served; this power is vested in the

sentencing court.”      Id. at 15 (quoting Mann, 957 A.2d at 749 (emphasis

added by Appellant)). Appellant asks us to vacate his judgment of sentence

and “direct the [trial c]ourt to issue a sentencing order granting the Appellant

time served.” Id. at 17.

         The Commonwealth counters that the record does not support

Appellant’s claim:

         [P]rior to December 28, 2021, [Appellant] was not in custody as
         a result of the instant charges. Rather, [Appellant] was in custody
         on the Chester County sentence. [Appellant] claims, that because
         he was briefly paroled on February 13, 2020, but recommitted …
         days later on February 25, 2020, due to the filing of the instant

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      charges, that he was thereafter held on a pending parole violation
      decision, or a “parole detainer.” In fact, [Appellant] was not
      awaiting a parole violation decision. …

Commonwealth Brief at 9 (citations omitted); id. at 10 (claiming Appellant

“was serving time on [Appellant’s] Chester County sentence rather than the

new charges”). We agree.

      Appellant’s     claim   implicates   the   legality   of   his   sentence.

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 595 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“A

challenge to the trial court’s failure to award credit for time spent in custody

prior to sentencing involves the legality of sentence”). “The determination as

to whether a trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law; an

appellate court’s standard of review in cases dealing with questions of law is

plenary.” Commonwealth v. White, 268 A.3d 499, 500 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citation omitted).   Our scope of review is de novo.       Commonwealth v.

Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 697 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      This Court has explained:

      The Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, with regard to awarding credit
      for time served, provides in relevant part as follows:

         § 9760. Credit for time served

         After reviewing the information submitted under section
         9737 (relating to report of outstanding charges and
         sentences) the court shall give credit as follows:

            (1) Credit against the maximum term and any
            minimum term shall be given to the defendant for all
            time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge
            for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result
            of conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit

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            shall include credit for the time spent in custody prior
            to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending
            the resolution of an appeal.

            ***

            (4) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and
            later prosecuted on another charge growing out of an
            act or acts that occurred prior to his arrest, credit
            against the maximum term and any minimum term of
            any sentence resulting from such prosecution shall be
            given for all time spent in custody under the former
            charge that has not been credited against another
            sentence.

      42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1), (4). This statute does not specifically
      contemplate credit for time served following a parole violation and
      revocation. Our Supreme Court has held, however, that this credit
      statute mandates an offender receive credit for all incarceration
      served before sentencing for which he is being detained in
      custody. Gaito v. Pa. Bd. of Probation and Parole, … 412 A.2d
      568 (Pa. 1980).

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1166-67 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      Nonetheless, defendants are “not entitled to receive credit against more

than one sentence for the same time served.” Commonwealth v. Ellsworth,

97 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and brackets omitted).

“[S]uch ‘double credit’ is prohibited both by the statutory language of Section

9760 and the principle that a defendant be given credit only for time spent in

custody for a particular offense.” Id. (citation and ellipses omitted).

      Here, the trial court competently explained:

      [Appellant] alleges that the court issued an illegal sentence by
      refusing to calculate [and apply] time credit. A review of the
      Sentencing Order and related transcript, dated December 28,
      2021, indicates that the court determined that [Appellant] was
      not entitled to incarceration credit for his Somerset County

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      case. The court determined[] and was instructed by [the]
      Probation [Department], that [Appellant’s] prior incarceration
      was related to his Chester County case and his state parole
      revocation.      When pressed by [Appellant’s] counsel [at
      sentencing, who claimed] that [Appellant] was due credit, the
      court simply provided that if the D.O.C. ([] Parole Board)
      disagreed and determined that [Appellant] was due credit in his
      Somerset County case[,] the D.O.C. could advise the court of the
      same in writing and the court would issue an amended sentencing
      order.

      … The court did not breach a non-delegable duty by ordering the
      Pennsylvania D.O.C. to calculate time credit. As stated above, the
      court determined that [Appellant] was not entitled to incarceration
      credit on this case. At the request of defense counsel, the court
      did request that the D.O.C. review [Appellant’s] parole status and
      advise this court if it believed that [Appellant] was entitled to
      credit. Furthermore, a review of the Sentencing Order and related
      transcript, dated December 28, 2021, and the Amended
      Sentencing Order and transcript, dated February 18, 2022, reveal
      that this court determined that [Appellant] was not entitled to
      credit. The court did not delegate that determination to the D.O.C.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/22, at 2-3 (emphasis added; some capitalization

modified). The record supports the trial court’s explanation.

      Finally, we note that Appellant has failed to develop his claim, raised in

his questions presented, that the trial court “unlawfully modified the sentence

in violation of the negotiated plea agreement.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. This

has hampered our review, and we will not act as Appellant’s counsel. Gould,

912 A.2d at 873. Accordingly, the claim is waived. Id.

      However, in the absence of waiver, we would conclude there is no merit

to the claim. The trial court stated:

      A review of the record will confirm that on February 18, 2022, this
      court decided [Appellant’s] Motion for Reconsideration of
      Sentence, as well as the Commonwealth’s Motion to Modify

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     Sentence. The court issued an Amended Sentencing Order on
     February 18, 2022, and sentenced [Appellant] to a sentence
     within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines. A review
     of the record will reveal that there was no plea agreement that
     dictated whether the sentence would run concurrent or
     consecutive. That determination is within the discretion of the
     sentencing court.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/22, at 3 (emphasis added). It is well-settled that

“where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines,

Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing

Code.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s second issue does not merit relief.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

     Judge Pellegrini joins the memorandum.

     Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2023

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