Court Opinion

ID: 9564204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:56:05.984468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:16.763746
License: Public Domain

Ingram, Justice,
concurring specially. I concur in the majority decision of the court, but wish to express my views in this separate opinion on the issues discussed in Division 12 of the court’s opinion.
The motion to quash the indictment in this case asserts that the indictment is void because three separate crimes are alleged in three different counts of the same indictment. In my judgment, the mere inclusion in the indictment of three separate crimes of the same species, alleged in different counts, would not put the defendant’s character in issue or violate any of his constitutional rights.
We are not holding in this case that it would be constitutionally permissible to try an accused for three separate and distinct offenses, which have no logical relationship to each other, when proper objection thereto is made by the accused. The record in this case disclosed no motion to require the state to try these offenses separately or any objection at the time of trial to proceeding with the trial on all three offenses. It is conceivable that in some instances an accused might purposefully wish to face one jury on all three offenses rather than three different juries. If the proper motion had been made in this case, objecting to the trial of these separate and distinct offenses in one proceeding, I would join the dissent. However, I do not think this court can convert a motion to quash an indictment into other motions to reach alleged legal improprieties of a subsequent trial. A motion to quash is directed procedurally to the indictment itself and does not cover events which may or may not thereafter occur if the motion is overruled. See Jackson v. State, 64 Ga. 344 (1); Walker v. State, 73 Ga. App. 20 (35 SE2d 391); Lastinger v. State, 84 Ga. App. 760 (1) (67 SE2d 411); Burke v. State, 116 Ga. App. 753 (2) (159 SE2d 176); and, McDonald v. State, 222 Ga. 596 (3a) (151 SE2d 121).
In conclusion, let me emphasize that I do believe it would be reversible error, over proper objection, to try an accused in one proceeding for three separate and distinct offenses having no logical relation to each other. In addition, I believe it is equally prejudicial for the jury to be made aware of the other alleged offenses during the trial on one of them. Thus, if a district attorney elects to seek an indictment which includes multiple counts, covering separate and distinct offenses, special care must be taken *102at the trial on each count not to disclose to the jury the existence of the other counts in the indictment. Such care should extend not only to avoiding verbal references to the remaining counts but also to preventing the indictment from being seen by the jury during the trial and the jury’s deliberations. Otherwise, in my opinion, harmful error would occur requiring a new trial in the event of conviction. However, we can rule on these matters only when they are urged in the trial court.
For these reasons, I concur in the holding in Division 12 of the court’s opinion and in the judgment of the court.