Court Opinion

ID: 9964038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 20:01:55.716554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:08.685463
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
PENLAND, HAYES, and MORRIS
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
Vv.
Sergeant RYAN C. THOMAS
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20210662

Headquarters, Fort Stewart
G. Bret Batdorff, Military Judge (arraignment)
Alyssa S. Adams, Military Judge (trial)
Colonel Joseph M. Fairfield, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Captain Kevin T. Todorow, JA (argued); Colonel Philip M. Staten,
JA; Lieutenant Colonel Autumn R. Porter, JA; Major Robert W. Rodriguez, JA;
Captain Kevin T. Todorow, JA (on brief, on brief on specified issue, on reply brief
on specified issue).

For Appellee: Captain Alex J. Berkun, JA (argued); Colonel Christopher B. Burgess,
JA; Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline J. DeGaine, JA; Major Kalin P. Schlueter, JA;
Captain Alex J. Berkun, JA (on brief, on brief on specified issue).

29 March 2024

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

HAYES, Judge:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant,
pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of failing to obey a general regulation and
one specification of adultery, in violation of Articles 92 and 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 892 and 934. Contrary to his pleas, a panel
consisting of officer and enlisted members found appellant guilty of two
specifications of cruelty and maltreatment and two specifications of sexual assault of
a child, in violation of Articles 93 and 120b, UCMSJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 893 and 920b.
THOMAS — ARMY 20210662

The panel sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge and confinement for eight
years.

We review the case under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant raises three
assignments of error. This court specified an additional issue and heard oral
argument on the first two assigned errors and the specified issue.! The second
assigned error and the specified issue merit discussion, but no relief. For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm the findings and sentence.

LAW AND DISCUSSION
Prior Consistent Statements

At trial, Miss J testified that appellant raped her once and sexually
assaulted her on three occasions. On cross-examination, appellant’s counsel
extensively attacked Miss lls credibility based on a number of
inconsistencies drawn from her initial reports to a social worker, a subsequent
report to Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), and more recent
interviews conducted by government and defense counsel.

The government sought to counter the impeachment by introducing
Miss [Js forensic interview conducted the day after one alleged incident
under Military Rule of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). The
government pointed to specific instances on cross-examination in which Miss
GMM s testimony was challenged as the product of a faulty memory or a general
lack of credibility as a witness. Further, the government indicated how the
prior consistent statements in the forensic interview were relevant to
rehabilitate Miss M's testimony on those bases of attack.

Finding appellant’s cross-examination had sted a recent motive to
fabricate and had challenged the accuracy of Miss s memory and her
credibility as a witness, the military judge admitted select portions of the
forensic interview under both Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and Mil. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B)Gi). The military judge did not precisely identify which prior
consistent statements in the interview were admitted under Mil. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B)(i) to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, or which prior
consistent statements were admitted under Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) to
rehabilitate Miss a; testimony when attacked due to faulty memory or
general lack of credibility as a witness.

' We have given full and fair consideration to the matters personally raised by
appellant pursuant to United States v Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), and
find they merit neither discussion nor relief.
THOMAS — ARMY 20210662

This court reviews a military judge’s decision to admit evidence for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Frost, 79 M.J. 104, 109 (C.A.A.F. 2019).
Prior inconsistent statements are admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)
provided (1) the declarant testifies; (2) the declarant is subject to cross-
examination about the prior statement; (3) the prior statement is consistent
with the declarant’s testimony; and the statement is offered either: (4) to rebut
an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted
from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying, or (5) to
rehabilitate the declarant’s testimony as a witness when attacked on another
ground. Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).

United States v. Finch clarified two additional requirements for prior
consistent statements to be admitted substantively under Mil. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B)Gi). 79 M.J. 389, 396 (C.A.A.F. 2020). The declarant’s
credibility as a witness must have been attacked on another ground other than
the ones listed in subsection (i), and the prior consistent statement must
actually be relevant to rehabilitate the witness’s credibility on the basis on
which he or she was attacked. Id. The military judge must make a
determination that each prior consistent statement is relevant to rehabilitate
the witness on one of the grounds cited in Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Jd.
(emphasis added).

Unlike in Finch, the military judge did not admit the entire prior
statement without determining if and how each portion qualified as a prior
consistent statement. Here, she allowed three short clips of the videotaped
interview she determined contained prior consistent statements relevant to
rehabilitate the witness under one of the grounds cited in Mil. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(B). In each of the first two clips, Miss[made two statements.
In the last clip, she made eleven. Each one was consistent with her trial
testimony and rebutted either her lack of memory or her general credibility as
a truthful witness under Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) or served to refute the
motive to fabricate under Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(i).

While the trial judge did not parse out each individual statement in her
ruling, the record is clear she deliberately identified the statements she found
to be both consistent and relevant to rehabilitate the witness on the basis for
which each portion of the witness’s testimony was attacked. No one piece of
evidence was clearly admitted under both Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and
(ii). Therefore, we do not find she abused her discretion when she admitted
the relevant prior consistent statements from the forensic interview.
THOMAS — ARMY 20210662
The Batson Challenge

This Court specified the issue of whether the military judge abused her
discretion when denying appellant’s Batson challenge to Major (MAJ) J.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). This court reviews a decision
denying a Batson challenge for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams,
44 M.J. 482, 485 (C.A.A.F. 1996).

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) “adopted a per se
application of Batson, placing the burden on the challenging party, upon
timely objection, to provide a race-neutral explanation for the challenge.”
United States v. Hurn, 58 M.J. 199, 200 n.2 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citing United
States v. Moore, 28 M.J. 366, 368 (C.M.A. 1989). “A race neutral explanation
in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based on something
other than the race of the juror.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360
(1991). Unlike the lower standard in civilian courts, in military courts-
martial the explanation must be a “reasonable, racially neutral explanation.”
United States v. Tulloch, 47 M.J. 283, at 287 (C.A.A.F. 1997), United States
v. Moore, 26 M.J. 692, 701 (A.C.M.R. 1982).

It is “the ultimate responsibility of the military judge to determine the
existence of purposeful discrimination on the part of trial counsel.” United
States v. Greene, 36 M.J. 274, 281 (C.M.A. 1993). The military judge “must
review the record and weigh trial counsel’s credibility” before making “a
factual determination regarding the presence or absence of purposeful
discrimination[.]” /d. “The trial court’s decision on the ultimate question of
discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great
deference on appeal.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.

Despite MAJ Bil cing one of several members of the venire who had
been the target of racial epithets, the government made no challenges for
cause. MAJ Bl was the only one peremptorily challenged. When appellant
requested a race-neutral explanation for MAJ s challenge, trial counsel
responded by distinguishing MAJ s responses from the other prospective
members who had been subjected to racial epithets. Trial counsel noted MAJ

ppeared to be the most unaffected by such slurs unless they impacted his
protessional life. In his personal life, MAJ said he preferred to “ignore it
and move on.” This sentiment appeared to be supported by the life
experiences MAJ iscussed during individual voir dire.

Similar to the concerns expressed by the prosecutor in Hernandez about
the veniremen’s specific responses and demeanor, trial counsel noted that
MAJ i: body language and the sentiments he expressed above appeared_to
minimize the impact of racist language and presented a concern that MAJ

THOMAS — ARMY 20210662

would expect others to react with the same level of resilience that he did when
confronted with racial epithets. See generally, Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.
Essentially, the government assessed MAJ s someone who would not
appreciate the severity of a number of. specifications he would be required
to adjudicate. This concern that MAJ ay not give certain charged
offenses the weight or scrutiny they were due was both plausible and
irrespective of MAJ Mls race. “Where there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”
Hernandez, 500 U.S. 369 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
574 (1985). Like the court in Hernandez, “the trial court took a permissible
view of the evidence in crediting the prosecutor’s explanation.” Jd.

While MAJ i: race might have conceivably factored into trial
counsel’s challenge in some way, the law recognizes the trial judge is in the
best position to make that determination, and we rely on her assessment of
trial counsel’s credibility. While his motivations or personal beliefs were
unknown to the trial judge, and unknowable to us, his explanation when
challenged was plausible and the trial judge, able to observe trial counsel’s
demeanor and sincerity, concluded the provided explanation was racially
neutral. Her finding, while lacking analysis, was not an abuse of discretion.

The findings of guilty and the sentence are AFFIRMED.
Judge MORRIS concurs.
Senior Judge PENLAND, dissenting:

I agree with my colleagues’ brief treatment and resolution of Appellant’s
assigned errors. I also join their judgment that appellant’s personally-raised
Grostefon matters lack merit. But for my following concerns, I would vote to
summarily affirm the findings and sentence.

I respectfully dissent, because in my view the military judge erred in denying
appellant’s Batson challenge under current military justice standards. I also believe
this case demonstrates it is time to re-examine and change the standards.

We do not know much about the panel members’ races in this case; we rarely
do. However, considering the circumstances alleged, including racist language
about African-Americans, the parties reasonably asked questions about the panel
members’ experience with racial epithets. This was appropriate under United States
v. Ramirez, _M.J. _, 2024 CAAF LEXIS 122* (C.A.A.F. 29 February 2024). When
three members indicated they had been addressed with racist language, the parties
asked them individual questions. MAJ a whose race the parties apparently agree
is African-American, was asked the most specific questions (the other two panel
THOMAS — ARMY 20210662

members were not African-American). He disclosed racist treatment as a youngster
growing up in Germany, and as a Soldicr serving in the Army. He further indicated
he would objectively evaluate the circumstances surrounding which an accused
allegedly made racist comments, rather than automatically perceive such comments
as unlawful.

When the prosecution peremptorily challenged MAJ the defense objected
under Batson. The military judge asked the prosecution for a race-neutral reason,
and the prosecution responded with the following: concern that MAJ [i would not
take racist language seriously enough, and instead that he would reason if he could
handle it, others could also; reasoning that it would make no sense for the
prosecution to purposefully exclude an African-American panel member in light of
the alleged misconduct;? MAJ s personal resilience; and MAJ fs body
language. The defense disputed these justifications, but the military judge granted
the peremptory challenge, stating, “I’ve considered both of the positions and I find
that the government has offered a racially neutral reason for their peremptory
challenge, so I’m going to grant that challenge.”

The record does not indicate which of the prosecution’s responses prompted
the military judge’s brief ruling. In my view, the first three reinforced race — the
second one explicitly so. On this record, it is fair to describe MAJ {fs race and his
outlook on racist language as inextricable. It is equally fair to say the record does
not support the government’s remaining objection to MAJ s “body language” —
the record discloses nothing about it. None of the government’s stated grounds were
reasonably race neutral.

This case requires us to consider MAJ a. independent constitutional right
not to be excluded from the panel based on his race. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex. rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127 (1994), (‘we have recognized that whether the trial is criminal or civil,
potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection
procedures that are free from state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and
reflective of, historical prejudice.”). (See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991);
United States v. Mencias, 83 M.J. 723 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)). I am concerned
about how MAJ a might have reacted when told of excusal. I hope he asked why.

* The government said here, “[T]his is a case where the accused is white and he’s
being accused of making negative racial remarks about a black person. So, it
doesn’t really make sense that the government would have a racial reason to try to
remove African-American members of the panel.”

This reflected a misunderstanding of the law, for it is never acceptable, and it never
“make[s] sense”, to include or exclude a panel member based on race. United States
v. Jeter, 84 M.J. 68 (C.A.A.F. 2023) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87, “[a] person’s

race simply is unrelated to [their] fitness as a juror.”).
THOMAS — ARMY 20210662

Would he, or an impartial observer, have reason to believe his race was the
determining factor? Would the prosccution’s proffcrs diminish that concern, or
increase it? Did MAJ say anything to contradict the convening authority’s
determination that he was “best qualified” under Article 25 to perform this duty?

These concerns further cause me to question what appear to be internal — and
unintentional - inconsistencies in framing problems and standards of review for
panel member challenges. To make it plain, in my view our current standards
require reversal under these facts; however, and with all respect for judicial
restraint, it is necessary to change the status quo.

If this case involved the more general problem of implied panel member bias
where a number of potential issues may spark a causal challenge, the law would
currently require closer scrutiny.?> However, equally compelling interests apply to
the more specific problem of racial bias in peremptory challenges — in the context of
military justice, the Fifth Amendment conveys the interests bearing on both. With
implied bias, we consider the prospect of an outside observer having reasonable
doubts about a panel member’s impartiality.4 In the context of racial bias, we
should be equally concerned about the prospect that one might reasonably believe
race was a motivating factor for excusal or inclusion. And, when we grant limited
deference to trial judges on questions of implied bias, we should be equally exacting
on questions of racial bias. I firmly believe these disparate problem statements and
standards of review are unintentional — they seem to have developed independent of
one another according to the unique facts of various cases. Considering the issues
presented here, we can and should adopt a more equal approach.

I am confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the findings and sentence
would be the same if MAJ Mad served on the panel. Reversal would give
appellant a significant-if-temporary reprieve, for his rights were held intact and
suffered no prejudice; the law very rarely yields such an outcome. However, the
Constitution guarantees equal access to the law — including access to participate as a
panel member. Where a case does not do that, it should be tried again.

3 “This Court’s standard of review on a challenge for cause premised on implied bias
is less deferential than abuse of discretion, but more deferential than de novo
review.” United States v. Rogers, 75 M.J. 270, 273 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citing United
States v. Bagstad, 68 M.J. 460, 462 (C.A.A.F. 2010)); United States vy. Dockery, 76
M.J. 91, 96 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

* The contexts are distinct — peremptory versus causal — but that does not warrant a
different principle.
THOMAS — ARMY 20210662

FOR THE COURT:

JAMES W. HERRING, JR.
Clerk of Court