Court Opinion

ID: 9946159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 16:01:04.051597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:28.439064
License: Public Domain

22-1039
     Honickman v. Blom Bank SAL

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER

     RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
     CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
     PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
     PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
     SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
     MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
     (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A
     SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
     REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 3   New York, on the 29th day of February, two thousand twenty four.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               DENNIS JACOBS,
 7               RICHARD C. WESLEY,
 8               BETH ROBINSON,
 9                           Circuit Judges.
10   _________________________________________
11
12   MICHAL HONICKMAN, Individually and for the Estate of
13   HOWARD GOLDSTEIN, EUGENE GOLDSTEIN, LORRAINE
14   GOLDSTEIN, RICHARD GOLDSTEIN, BARBARA GOLDSTEIN
15   INGARDIA, MICHAEL GOLDSTEIN, CHANA FREEDMAN,
16   DAVID GOLDSTEIN, MOSES STRAUSS, PHILIP STRAUSS,
17   BLUMA STRAUSS, AHRON STRAUSS, ROISIE ENGELMAN,
18   JOSEPH STRAUSS, TZVI WEISS, LEIB WEISS, Individually
19   and for the Estate of MALKA WEISS, YITZCHAK WEISS,
20   YERUCHAIM WEISS, ESTHER DEUTSCH, MATANYA
21   NATHANSEN, Individually and for the Estate of TEHILLA
22   NATHANSEN, CHANA NATHANSEN, Individually and for
23   the Estate of TEHILLA NATHANSEN, YEHUDIT
24   NATHANSEN, S.N., a minor, HEZEKIAL TOPOROWITCH,
25   PEARL B. TOPOROWITCH, YEHUDA TOPOROWITCH, DAVID
 1   TOPOROWITCH, SHAINA CHAVA NADEL, BLUMY ROM,
 2   RIVKA POLLACK, RACHEL POTOLSKI, OVADIA
 3   TOPOROWITCH,      TEHILLA      GREINIMAN,      YISRAEL
 4   TOPOROWITCH, YITZCHAK TOPOROWITCH, HARRY
 5   LEONARD BEER, Individually and as the executor of the
 6   Estate of ALAN BEER AND ANNA BEER, PHYLLIS MAISEL,
 7   ESTELLE CAROLL, SARRI ANNE SINGER, JUDITH SINGER,
 8   ERIC M. SINGER, ROBERT SINGER, JULIE AVERBACH,
 9   Individually and for the Estate of STEVEN AVERBACH,
10   TAMIR AVERBACH, DEVIR AVERBACH, SEAN AVERBACH,
11   ADAM AVERBACH, MAIDA AVERBACH, Individually and
12   for the Estate of DAVID AVERBACH, MICHAEL
13   AVERBACH, EILEEN SAPADIN, DANIEL ROZENSTEIN, JULIA
14   ROZENSTEIN SCHON, ALEXANDER ROZENSTEIN, ESTHER
15   ROZENSTEIN, JACOB STEINMETZ, Individually and for the
16   Estate of AMICHAI STEINMETZ, DEBORAH STEINMETZ,
17   Individually and for the Estate of AMICHAI STEINMETZ,
18   NAVA STEINMETZ, ORIT MAYERSON, NETANEL
19   STEINMETZ, ANN COULTER, for the Estate of ROBERT L.
20   COULTER, SR., DIANNE COULTER MILLER, Individually
21   and for the Estate of JANIS RUTH COULTER, ROBERT L
22   COULTER, JR., Individually and for the Estate of JANIS
23   RUTH COULTER, LARRY CARTER, Individually and as the
24   Administrator of the Estate of DIANE LESLIE CARTER,
25   SHAUN CHOFFEL, RICHARD BLUTSTEIN, Individually and
26   for the Estate of BENJAMIN BLUTSTEIN, KATHERINE
27   BAKER, Individually and for the Estate of BENJAMIN
28   BLUSTEIN, REBEKAH BLUTSTEIN, NEVENKA GRITZ,
29   Individually and for the Estate of DAVID GRITZ and
30   NORMAN GRITZ, JACQUELINE CHAMBERS, Individually
31   and as the Administrator of the Estate of ESTHER
32   BABLAR, LEVANA COHEN, Individually as the
33   Administrator of the Estate of Esther BABLAR, ELI
34   COHEN, SARAH ELYAKIM, JOSEPH COHEN, GRETA
35   GELLER, as the Administrator of the Estate of HANNAH
36   ROGEN, ILANA DORFMAN, as the Administrator of the
37   Estate of HANNAH ROGEN, REPHAEL KITSIS, as the
38   Administrator of the Estate of HANNAH ROGEN, TOVA
39   GUTTMAN, as the Administrator of the Estate of
40   HANNAH       ROGEN,     TEMIMA      SPETNER,     JASON

                                                2
 1   KIRSCHENBAUM, ISABELLE KIRSCHENBAUM, Individually
 2   and for the Estate of MARTIN KIRSCHENBAUM, JOSHUA
 3   KIRSCHENBAUM,       SHOSHANA     BURGETT,   DAVID
 4   KIRSCHENBAUM, DANIELLE TEITELBAUM, NETANEL
 5   MILLER, CHAYA MILLER, AHARON MILLER, SHANI
 6   MILLER, ADIYA MILLER, ALTEA STEINHERZ, JONATHAN
 7   STEINHERZ, TEMIMA STEINHERZ, JOSEPH GINZBERG,
 8   PETER STEINHERZ, LAUREL STEINHERZ, GILA ALUF,
 9   YITZHAK ZAHAVY, JULIE ZAHAVY, TZVEE ZAHAVY,
10   BERNICE ZAHAVY,
11
12                  Plaintiffs-Appellants,
13
14   ARIE MILLER,
15
16                  Plaintiff,
17
18                          v.                                     No. 22-1039
19
20   BLOM BANK SAL,
21
22               Defendant-Appellee.
23   _________________________________________
24
25   FOR APPELLANTS:                             MICHAEL RADINE (Gary M. Osen, Aaron
26                                               Schlanger, on the brief), Osen LLC,
27                                               Hackensack, NY.
28
29   FOR APPELLEE:                               MICHAEL MCGINLEY, Dechert LLP,
30                                               Philadelphia, PA.
31
           Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

     District of New York (Matsumoto, Judge).

                                             3
      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the district court’s order entered on April 8,

2022 is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

      Plaintiffs-Appellants are victims and their family members of attacks

carried out by HAMAS, a group the United States has designated as a foreign

terrorist organization. In January 2019, Plaintiffs sued Defendant-Appellee

BLOM Bank SAL (“BLOM Bank”) for aiding and abetting HAMAS by providing

financial services to certain customers Plaintiffs allege are affiliated with

HAMAS, in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, as amended by

the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), id. § 2333(d)(2). A year

later, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. Honickman for Estate of Goldstein v. BLOM

Bank SAL, 432 F. Supp. 3d 253, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Honickman I”).

      On appeal, a panel of this Court concluded that the district court applied

the wrong legal standard for aiding-and-abetting liability under JASTA.

Nonetheless, we affirmed the district court’s judgment because Plaintiffs’

complaint still failed to state a claim under the correct standard. Honickman v.

BLOM Bank SAL, 6 F.4th 487, 490 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Honickman II”).

                                           4
       Armed with this Court’s clarifications, Plaintiffs returned to the district

court and moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and 15(a)(2) to

vacate the judgment of dismissal and grant them leave to file a first amended

complaint. The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion in an April 2022 order, Honickman

v. BLOM Bank SAL, No. 19-CV-0008, 2022 WL 1062315, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8,

2022) (“Honickman III”), which Plaintiffs now appeal. We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments on

appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to vacate and

remand.

       We review for abuse of discretion both a district court’s “denial of a

motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6)” and its “denial of a post-

judgment motion for leave to replead.” Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 88 F.4th 353,

359 (2d Cir. 2023). 1 That means “we must affirm the denial of vacatur, unless the

ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous

assessment of the evidence.” Id. Where, as here, plaintiffs “seek to file a first

amended complaint . . . it is an abuse of discretion to deny post judgment relief

‘without any justifying reason,’ such as ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory

1 In quotations from case law and the parties’ briefing, this opinion omits all internal quotation
marks, alterations, footnotes, and citations, unless otherwise noted.

                                                5
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by

virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment.’” Id. at 362

(quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

       We conclude that the district court exceeded its discretion by basing its

ruling on an erroneous view of the law because it failed to balance Rule 60(b)’s

finality principles and Rule 15(a)’s liberal pleading principles. 2

       A plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief “only when there are

extraordinary circumstances justifying relief, when the judgment may work an

extreme and undue hardship, and when the asserted grounds for relief are not

recognized in clauses (1)–(5) of the Rule.” Metzler Investment Gmbh v. Chipotle

Mexican Grill, Inc., 970 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2020). But “[w]hen vacatur is sought

in order to obtain leave to file an amended complaint, special considerations

come into play.” Mandala, 88 F.4th at 361. In such cases, the district court must

give “due regard” to “both the philosophy favoring finality of judgments . . . and

the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a).” Id. Therefore, when presented with

2 Because “abuse of discretion,” which is a legal term of art, can apply to determinations that
do not involve “‘abuse’ in the ordinary sense of the word,” we use the more precise term
“exceeded” to describe the same thing. JTH Tax, LLC v. Agnant, 62 F.4th 658, 666 n.1 (2d Cir.
2023).

                                                6
a motion to vacate and amend, the district court is required to consider Rule

60(b) finality and Rule 15(a) liberality in tandem.

      Here, the district court evaluated Plaintiffs’ motion under only Rule 60(b)’s

standard. The court concluded that it “would be contradictory to entertain a

motion to amend the complaint” under Rule 15(a) without “a valid basis to

vacate the previously entered judgment” under Rule 60(b). Honickman III, 2022

WL 1062315, at *2 n.2. As a result, it incorrectly treated Plaintiffs’ motion to

vacate and amend as calling for two distinct analyses, requiring Plaintiffs to

successfully navigate Rule 60(b)’s finality gauntlet before they could invoke Rule

15(a)’s liberal repleading policy. The district court’s framework for analyzing

Plaintiffs’ motion was erroneous as a matter of law.

      We accordingly vacate the district court’s order and remand the case for

the court to reconsider Plaintiffs’ motion applying the above standards. In doing

so, the district court should balance Rule 60(b)’s finality and Rule 15(a)’s liberal

amendment policies, and it should examine all the “special considerations [that]

come into play” “[w]hen vacatur is sought in order to obtain leave to file an

amended complaint.” Mandala, 88 F.4th at 361. Our discussion of the various

                                          7
considerations in Mandala will be particularly helpful to the district court’s

analysis. Id. at 361–65.

         For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order is VACATED, and the

case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this summary

order.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                          8