Court Opinion

ID: 9587764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:26:01.532988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:55.505581
License: Public Domain

Judge Greene
dissenting.
I accept the general premise that Judge Smith, who entered the order in dispute dismissing plaintiffs claim for equitable distribution (ED), could not overrule Judge Cobb’s earlier order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ED claim. See Madry v. Madry, 106 N.C. App. 34, 37-38, 415 S.E.2d 74, 77 (1992). It appears the basis for both motions (i.e., that plaintiff and defendant were not separated at the time the ED claim was filed and it therefore was premature) was the same. As noted by Judge Smith in his extensive order, however, Judge Cobb did not address the legal implications of defendant’s motion to dismiss. Instead, Judge Cobb utilized equitable principles in denying the motion: “the Court being of the opinion that the ends of justice would best be served by the denial of the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Judge Smith, very much aware of his constraints in reevaluating the motion to dismiss, concluded that the “ends of justice would no longer be served by denying [defendant’s] motion to dismiss,” and set forth five separate reasons in support of this conclusion, which all are supported by the record. Accordingly, Judge Smith, finding material changes in circumstances since the entry of Judge Cobb’s order, was justified in addressing the merits of the motion to dismiss. Id. (second judge may enter contradictory ruling from earlier ruling if there has been a material change in circumstances and the matter is one addressed to the discretion of the court). In addressing .the merits of the motion to dismiss, Judge Smith concluded that plaintiff’s ED claim was not asserted after the date of separation and before the entry of the divorce, thus making it invalid. I agree. N.C.G.S. § 50-21(a) (Supp. 1997) (ED claim can be filed at “any time after a husband and wife begin to live separate and apart”); see also Howell v. Howell, 321 N.C. 87, 361 S.E.2d. 585 (1987) (valid ED claim must be filed before grant of divorce). There are findings to support this conclusion and those findings are supported in this record. Because plaintiff had no valid ED claim prior to the time she dismissed it, the refiling of that same claim is also invalid. Thus, Stegall v. Stegall, 336 N.C. 473, 444 S.E.2d 177 (1994), relied upon by the majority, is of no help to plaintiff.
I, therefore, would affirm the trial court.1

. The majority, in reversing the trial court, relies in part on the argument that defendant asserted an ED claim in his divorce complaint and because he has never dismissed that claim, the ED claim remains properly before the trial court. I do not agree. *91The divorce complaint simply acknowledged there were, at the time the divorce complaint was filed, pending ED claims filed by both plaintiff and defendant. This acknowledgment does not itself constitute an ED claim.
The majority also relies in part on equitable estoppel to prevent the dismissal of plaintiffs ED claim. I, however, do not believe equitable estoppel applies in this case. The Hunt v. Hunt case, 117 N.C. App. 280, 450 S.E.2d 558 (1994), relied upon by the majority, is distinguishable. In Hunt, the wife filed a reply joining in the husband’s request in his counterclaim for an equitable distribution of their marital property. The Hunt trial court, in granting the parties a divorce, included language in the divorce judgment noting that a valid ED claim had been asserted in the counterclaim and that the ED claim would be preserved for further proceedings. This Court subsequently held that the husband, based on the facts in that case, was equitably estopped from defeating the wife’s ED claim by taking a voluntary dismissal of his counterclaim. In this case, however, defendant asserted an ED claim in his counterclaim, but plaintiff did not join in that claim. Instead, her reply alleges “that defendant go without relief on his counterclaim.” Furthermore, in this case, the divorce judgment only acknowledged that ED claims were pending. In any event, any party seeking to assert equitable estop-pel is required to present themselves to the court with clean hands, see Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C. App. 561, 573, 343 S.E.2d 266, 273 (1986), and as acknowledged by the majority, plaintiff is partially to blame for the long delays and confusion in this case and thus is not entitled to assert equitable estoppel.