Court Opinion

ID: 9830961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:39:40.704953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:53.581862
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing.
Both appellants and appellees filed motions for rehearing. Our opinion is attacked by appellees’ motion as misconstruing the first, second, and fourth orders of the court, and for dissolving the injunctive relief granted by them for the same reasons contended for in their original brief. But as to these matters we adhere to our former construction of the orders.
We held that the injunctive relief granted by the third order with reference to the 100-acre irrigated field was authorized under appellees’ allegations that Lee’s contract of November 25, 1925, and deeds of February 20, 1926, conveying it to Duncan, were fraudulently executed to deprive appel-lees of the possession of said irrigated field *672by virtue of the sale condition or provision of their lease contract with Lee. By their motion appellees now inform us for the first time at any stage of the proceedings that they did not in the trial court, rely upon that portion of their pleadings for the in-junctive relief granted as to the irrigated field, but that they relied then and now rely upon another count of their petition with reference to' the. 100-acre irrigated field. Neither the record nor judgment show that the third order was not based upon the above-mentioned pleadings. Appellees only briefed the case from the standpoint that the questions presented had become moot questions because the 60-day period mentioned in the judgment had expired. Appellants briefed the question raised by these pleadings as not being supported by any evidence. Now the only pleadings upon which appellees rely for the injunctive relief granted with respect to the irrigated field are, in substance, that at the time the lease contract of January 1, 1925, was executed it was claimed by appellees that lessor Lee had theretofore agreed with them orally that the lands contemplated to be placed under irrigation, and which were later placed under irrigation, should not be sold during the term of the lease; that the lease contract did not contain the provision, but that Lee represented to them that it would not be necessary to incorporate such provision in writing; that appellees relied upon such representations; and that Duncan, the purchaser, knew appellees were making such claim before he took his deed of date February 20, 1926, because he had heard them so testify in the trial of his trespass to try title suit against them.
We did not discuss these pleadings in our opinion because we thought them wholly insufficient to state grounds for the injunctive relief to which they relate, ánd for the further reason that we thought them immaterial, since we were affirming the portion of the injunctive relief to which they relate upon pleadings now abandoned by appellees. We are still of the opinion that the pleadings relied upon are wholly insufficient, and that the injunctive relief granted in the third order is not supported by any evidence. The oral agreement alleged was in direct conflict with the terms of the written lease contract. It was made before the written contract was ■executed. It was not even alleged that ap-pellees were induced to execute the written contract containing a contrary provision by reason of the representations alleged. It is not alleged that appellees were in any manner overreached by appellant Duncan at the time they executed the contract, but the facts are undisputed that they were dealing on equal footing and at arm’s length. There is no allegation that the provision in the contract which authorized the sale of the farm land during the terms of the lease contract was fraudulently prut there, but the testimony is undisputed that the parties knew and agreed that it should be put there. There is no allegation or prayer for a rescission of the contract because of the alleged fraudulent representation, nor that it should be reformed so as to incorporate the oral agreement alleged instead of the conflicting written agreement. It is nowhere alleged that at the time appellee Lee made the representations that he had no bona fide intention of carrying them out. We submit that these pleadings do not in any manner effect or ask relief against the provisions of the written contract that appellant Lee was authorized to sell the irrigated land at any time during lease, and as presented they merely allege that appellant Duncan, whom appellees now admit purchased the land in question in good faith,, had been informed prior to his purchase of it that appellees “claimed” a cause of action against appellant Lee for falsely representing to them, prior to the execution of the lease contract, that he would not sell the irrigated land during the period of the lease, which representations were in no way alleged to have vitiated the lease contract.
The testimony went no further than the allegation of the petition, and is therefore not sufficient to support the judgment. Fbr authorities upon the general proposition of fraud and what is necessary to enforce prior or contemporaneous oral agreements in conflict with the written contract, see the following: Wilkirson v. Bradford (Tex. Civ. App.) 200 S. W. 1094; Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Pendleton (Tex. Civ. App.) 202 S. W. 769; Alvis v. Holbert (Tex. Civ. App.) 238 S. W. 730; Frost v. Tilomas (Tex. Civ. App.) 238 S. W. 305; Osborn v. Coal Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 229 S. W. 359; Wagner v. J. B. Colt Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 234 S. W. 934.
Appellees’ motion for a rehearing will be overruled. Appellants’ motion to dissolve the injunctive relief granted in the third order as well as all injunctive relief granted by the court in this case is granted. The portion of our judgment affirming this injunctive relief with respect to the third order and irrigated field is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court granting that relief is reversed and the injunction dissolved; otherwise our former judgment herein is not disturbed.
Appellees’ motion overruled.
Appellants’ motion granted.