Court Opinion

ID: 9555089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 19:04:05.364982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:13.792376
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/10/23 P. v. Reeves CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080704

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.
                                                                      (Super. Ct. Nos. 289485 &
 JOHN K. REEVES,                                                      294234)

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed.
         Pauline E. Villanueva, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
         John K. Reeves appeals from a condition of his probation which ordered
him to stay away from the Pacific Beach neighborhood of San Diego. After
filing his notice of appeal in this matter, his probation was revoked for
reasons unrelated to that condition of probation. The primary issue on
appeal therefore is moot and we decline to reach it. We remand to address a
technical issue with the abstract of judgment.
                                BACKGROUND
      Relevant to this appeal, Reeves pled guilty to offenses in two different
cases. In case number SCD289485 (case 485), on August 23, 2021 Reeves
pled guilty to possession for sale of a controlled substance. On October 21,
2021 the trial court sentenced him to a two-year term of probation for that
offense.
      In case number SCD294234 (case 234), on May 18, 2022 Reeves pled
guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. He also admitted that he
violated his probation in case 485.
      At a sentencing hearing on June 23, 2022 the trial court considered
both the probation revocation on case 485 as well as the sentence for case
234. The court continued the two-year term of probation for case 485, and
sentenced Reeves to a two-year period of probation for case 234, to be served
concurrently.
      In doing so, the trial court also considered a proposed condition of
probation that Reeves “[s]tay away from Pacific Beach, 92109 zip code.”
Reeves objected to this condition, arguing that there was no nexus between
the crime and the Pacific Beach stay-away order. The court disagreed, noting
that case 485 involved drug sales and that there was “an absolute nexus”
between the stay-away order and the offense. The court referred to dozens of
convictions outlined in the probation report, many of them for drug offenses
and other crimes that occurred in the Pacific Beach area. The court
concluded that “[b]ased on not just the conviction alone, but also his past
record and his activities, past convictions, past failed probation grants, it is

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an appropriate nexus to, frankly, both cases, given the activity and where
they took place in both cases,” and therefore included the condition in the
terms of Reeves’s probation.
        Reeves timely appealed that judgment of June 23, 2022. Shortly
thereafter, Reeves was rearrested for an unrelated offense, and on July 29,
2022 the trial court revoked his probation in case 485 and case 234. On
August 26, 2022 the trial court sentenced Reeves to two years in prison on
case 485 and sixteen months in prison on case 234. Accordingly, Reeves is no
longer on probation.
                                 DISCUSSION
I.      The Probation Condition Issue is Moot
        On appeal, Reeves challenges the imposition of the condition of
probation that he stay away from Pacific Beach, 92109 zip code. Because his
probation was revoked, he is no longer on probation and therefore the issue is
moot.
        “ ‘ “[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and
without any fault of the [opposing party], an event occurs which renders it
impossible for this court, if it should decide the case in favor of [defendant], to
grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal
judgment, but will dismiss the appeal” ’ as moot.” (People v. DeLeon (2017)
3 Cal.5th 640, 645.)
        A probation condition challenge becomes moot after probation is
terminated or revoked. (See People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120,
fn. 5; In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 611.) A ruling on the
validity of the challenged probation condition would have no practical effect
and would not provide any effective relief to Reeves.

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      Reeves concedes that his probation condition challenge is moot, but
asks us to consider the issue because, he argues, it is an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur and the issue may recur between the parties
here. (See Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495.)
      As to the issue of broad public interest, we fail to discern how a
probation term for Reeves has “broad public interest.” Reeves argues that
the claimed restrictions on his constitutional rights “should be reviewed as a
matter of public interest,” but provides no support for the assumption that
there is public interest in whether or not Reeves should be ordered to stay
away from Pacific Beach. Nor does he suggest that similar provisions are
commonly imposed or that the issue is likely to recur outside his own
individual case. Regardless, even if such provisions were commonly imposed,
the validity provision could be easily tested in another case in which the
defendant remains on probation and subject to the condition during the
pendency of the appeal.
      Reeves’s citation to In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 is not helpful.
The constitutional analysis there focused on whether a probationer had
forfeited her right to raise a constitutional challenge to a probation term
because she had failed to raise it below, which is not an issue in this case.
(Id. at p. 878.) Relevant to us, the Supreme Court noted that the appeal in
Sheena K. was moot, because the defendant had died during the pendency of
the appeal, but it chose to “exercise[] [its] inherent authority to retain this
case for argument and opinion,” in order to resolve a pending conflict among
the courts of appeal as to whether the forfeiture doctrine applied to
constitutional challenges to probation conditions. (Id. at p. 879.) To our
knowledge, no such conflict exists here. Without more, we cannot conclude

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that a broad public interest underlies the now-moot condition of Reeves’s
probation.
      In arguing that the issue “may recur between the parties,” Reeves
further contends that we should consider the issue because it is “likely that
Mr. Reeves will be subject to a similar parole condition upon his release from
custody.” We disagree. First, we decline to speculate what parole conditions
will be imposed upon Reeves when the time comes for him to be released from
custody. Second, absent some unusual circumstance, the sentencing court
will not be involved in fashioning parole conditions, which will be determined
by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation prior to Reeves’s release
from prison (Pen. Code § 3000, subd. (b)(7)), so the issue will not recur
“between the parties” involved in the probation condition before us. And
third, Reeves will have the ability to challenge the exact language of any
provision that may be imposed in any future proceeding. (See, e.g., In re
Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234 [stating that “[c]onditions of
parole must be reasonably related to the compelling state interest of fostering
a law-abiding lifestyle in the parolee”].)
      Accordingly, we decline to consider the merits of Reeves’s arguments
regarding the now-moot condition of probation.

II.   The Judgment Should Be Corrected to Clarify the Imposition of Only
      One Restitution Fine

      The parties agree that the abstract of judgment dated August 26, 2022
should be corrected so that it cannot be misinterpreted as imposing a
duplicative restitution fine under Penal Code section1202.4(b).
      When probation is revoked, the original restitution fine remains in
place, and the trial court cannot impose an additional restitution fine.
(People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 423.) Here, the trial court

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stated, “[t]he 300 that was suspended is now imposed with 300 stayed unless
parole is revoked.” But, as the People concede, the August 26 abstract of
judgment could be read to impose an additional restitution fine. Therefore,
the abstract of judgment should be corrected to avoid future
misinterpretation.
                               DISPOSITION
      The matter is remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to
correct the abstract of judgment dated August 26, 2022 to reflect that the
Penal Code section 1202.4(b) restitution fine was previously imposed. In all
other respects, the appeal is dismissed as moot.

                                                                  KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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