Court Opinion

ID: 9773061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:35:39.768955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.826458
License: Public Domain

MOTION FOR REHEARING
TOM COLEMAN, Retired Judge.
In their motion for rehearing appellees have asserted that “the Court of Appeals erred in failing to include in its judgment, prejudgment interest on those elements of damages, as found by the jury, to which appellee would be entitled to prejudgment interest.”
The question of prejudgment interest was not presented to the trial court, or by cross-point in the briefs filed by appellees prior to submission of this cause.
This failure is understandable because prior to June 5, 1985, it was generally understood by the bench and bar of Texas that prejudgment interest was not recoverable in a personal injury case. On that date the opinion in Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1985), was rendered by the Supreme Court of Texas.
In Cavnar the Supreme Court held that “as a matter of law, a prevailing plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest compounded daily (based on a 365-day year) on *774damages that have accrued by the time of judgment. Prejudgment interest shall accrue at the prevailing rate that exists on the date judgment is rendered according to the provisions of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.05 sec. 2 (Vernon Supp.1985).”
The court also held that in non-death personal injury cases, “interest shall begin to accrue on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages from a date six months after the occurrence of the incident giving rise to the cause of action.”
Finally, the court held that the law established by Cavnar applies “to all future cases as well as those still in the judicial process involving wrongful death, survival and personal injury actions.”
This Court did not err in failing to include prejudgment interest in its judgment because it affirmed the judgment of the trial court before the question of prejudgment interest was raised by the plaintiffs. See Allright, Inc. v. Pearson, 711 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), where motion for prejudgment interest was allowed after submission and before the court’s judgment. It is well settled that an appellate court will not reverse a judgment by reason of a matter that is not assigned as error in the brief of a party.
It is also settled law that questions not raised in the Court of Appeals on the original hearing may not be raised for the first time on the motion for rehearing unless fundamental error or jurisdictional points are involved. 5 TexJur. (Third) sec. 573.
While this case is “still in the judicial process” and the rules of law established in Cavnar apply, the question yet to be answered is whether the Supreme Court intended to modify procedural rules to the extent necessary to afford prejudgment interest in cases tried to a judgment before the decision was announced.
The language “still in the judicial process” may well have been included to insure that the decision would apply to all cases on appeal in which the trial court refused to grant prejudgment interest and the error was properly preserved. . As a general rule where the appellees fail to except to a judgment or in any way inform the court of their dissatisfaction with the judgment entered, the complaint is waived. Portwood, v. Buckalew, 521 S.W.2d 904, 922 (Tex.Civ.App — Tyler 1975, writ ref. n.r.e.).
It has long been the rule that the right to recover prejudgment interest is waived if not asserted in the trial court. National Moving and Storage, Inc. v. Vargo, 501 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.). However, it has been held that the interest which an award bears after judgment is a creature of statute and is recoverable even if the judgment makes no reference to its recovery. Trinity Portland Cement Division, General Portland Cement Company v. Coastal Industrial Water Authority, 551 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, rev’d on other grounds, 563 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.1978); Hoffman v. Love, 523 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1975, no writ).
It may be that the Supreme Court intends that the rule of law applicable to statutory post judgment interest be applicable also to prejudgment interest. See, Allright, Inc. v. Pearson, 711 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1986). Nevertheless, it is the opinion of this Court that we lack authority to reform the judgment of the trial court on a point of error presented for the first time in a motion for rehearing.
The other point presented in appellees’ motion for rehearing raises no new matter. Appellees’ motion for rehearing is denied.
Appellant has also filed a motion for rehearing which presents no new matter. The motion is denied.