Court Opinion

ID: 9948267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 19:01:36.226449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:26.187601
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50043         Document: 80-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/06/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                               FILED
                                                                        March 6, 2024
                                  No. 23-50043
                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                               Clerk

United States of America,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                        versus

Oscar Barrera, Jr.,

                                          Defendant—Appellant.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                          USDC No. 2:21-CR-1125-1
                 ______________________________

Before King, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
        Oscar Barrera Jr. pleaded guilty to distribution and receipt of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252. On appeal, Barrera argues that
the district court erred by declining to reduce his sentence based on an
arbitrary, formalistic requirement not mandated by the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”). He also contends that the district

        _____________________
       *
           Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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court erred by imposing a $35,000 special assessment under the Amy, Vicky,
and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018 (“AVAA”),
because it erroneously believed that a maximum $35,000 special assessment
was mandatory. We AFFIRM.
                                      I.
       In April 2022, Defendant-Appellant Oscar Barrera Jr. pleaded guilty
to distribution and receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252. In the factual basis for his plea, Barrera admitted that, between June
2020 and June 2021, he used iPhone applications to receive and distribute
child pornography. After Barrera admitted this conduct at his rearraignment
and plea hearing, the district court advised him that most defendants in his
position “have earned credit for what’s called ‘acceptance of
responsibility,’” but that he could “lose that credit” if he “commit[s] any
offense—state, federal, misdemeanor, felony, charged or uncharged.”
       After this hearing, Barrera was interviewed by a probation officer.
Barrera stated during the interview that the conduct comprising his offenses
“began during a hardship with [his] dad and his deteriorating health,” in
which Barrera acted as his father’s caregiver while experiencing anxiety and
depression. He stated that “all [those] factors led [him] down a very dark
place,” and “[c]hild pornography was introduced into [his] life, and [he] was
not strong enough to stop.” Barrera further stated that “[h]aving [his]
charges read in open [c]ourt, made [him] sick,” and that he felt “ashamed
and ha[d] a lot of guilt.”
       In Barrera’s presentence report (“PSR”), the probation officer
determined that Barrera did not meet the criteria for a reduction to his
offense level computation for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1. Specifically, the probation officer concluded that “the defendant did
not admit to the conduct comprising the offenses of conviction.”

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       The PSR noted that Barrera was subject to a special assessment of
“not more than $35,000 on any person convicted of any other offense for
trafficking in child pornography” under the AVAA.               See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2259A(a)(2). Regarding Barrera’s ability to pay fines, the PSR noted that
“it appears the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine within the
guideline range; however, it appears he has the ability to pay a reduced fine.”
The probation officer accordingly recommended that Barrera pay a reduced
fine—below the guideline range for his offenses—and she recommended a
$1,000 special assessment under the AVAA.
       After the initial PSR was prepared, Barrera filed a motion for leave to
re-interview for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district
court denied the motion.
       Barrera objected to the PSR’s determination that he did not qualify
for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Barrera contended that he
indeed met § 3E1.1’s criteria for the reduction, as he acknowledged and
accepted the elements of his offenses and made post-offense rehabilitative
efforts. He averred that his actions of pleading guilty, admitting to the
conduct of the offenses without the benefit of a plea agreement, cooperating
with the investigation, feeling remorse, and seeking rehabilitation and
therapy warranted the reduction. Barrera also requested that the district
court not impose any “fine or special assessment fee” because “he is
indigent and unable to pay any fines.”
       In January 2023, Barrera appeared for sentencing before the district
court. The district court first addressed Barrera’s objection to the PSR’s
denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. At the outset, the district
court stated that it would only look at Barrera’s interview with the probation
officer when ruling on an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.

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       The district court acknowledged that Barrera’s statement in the
presentence interview admitted to receipt of child pornography, but it noted
that Barrera did not admit to distribution of child pornography. Barrera’s
counsel tried repeatedly to argue that Barrera indeed admitted to distribution
when accepting the factual basis for his guilty plea, but the court responded
that “a plea of guilty alone isn’t sufficient for acceptance.” When Barrera’s
counsel again tried to reference the transcript of Barrera’s plea hearing, the
district court replied:
       That is not part of the acceptance. If that were sufficient, we
       wouldn’t have that whole part of the guidelines of giving that
       statement to probation in their interview. . . . The problem is,
       it doesn’t meet the acceptance part of the guidelines. If it did,
       we wouldn’t have that part of the interview with probation.
       The district court ultimately denied Barrera’s objection, stating:
       I’m overruling the objection. He didn’t admit the elements of
       either offense to probation when he gave a statement, pursuant
       to 3E1.1, which indicates, “The defendant clearly
       demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense—” in
       this case, offenses—“and that is whether the defendant
       truthfully admits the conduct—” not the elements, but the
       conduct—“compromising [sic] the offenses of conviction.”
       That did not happen in this case. Not—I’m not saying he was
       untruthful. He was truthful, so I’m not worried about the
       truthfulness of it. I’m just saying, he didn’t admit the conduct.
       He admitted the title of one offense, but he didn’t admit the
       conduct. So the Court overrules that objection.
       Later in the hearing, the district court addressed the financial
penalties to be imposed as part of Barrera’s sentence. In listing the special
assessments that Barrera would be subject to, the district court referred to “a
35,000-dollar for distribution, mandatory,” which it later referred to as “one
mandatory 35,000-dollar special assessment.” The district court found that

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“[g]iven the amount of restitution and the mandatory special assessment, . . .
there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the defendant has the ability to
pay any fines,” and the court ordered that Barrera pay, inter alia, “the
required 35,000-dollar special assessment.”
       Barrera timely filed a notice of appeal.
                                          II.
       On appeal, Barrera first contends that the district court erred in
denying him a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. He
specifically argues that the district court’s denial of an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction was “without foundation because it rested on a
requirement that does not exist in guideline § 3E1.1.”
       Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), a defendant may receive a sentence
reduction if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
offense.” “Entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial
combined with truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense of
conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional
relevant conduct for which he is accountable . . . will constitute significant
evidence of acceptance of responsibility . . . .” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. 3. However,
“[a] defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under
this section as a matter of right.” Id.
       In appealing the district court’s denial of a sentence reduction for
acceptance of responsibility, Barrera faces a demanding standard of review.
Because “[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,” she is “entitled to great deference
on review.” Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. 5. We “will affirm a sentencing court’s decision
not to award a reduction . . . unless it is without foundation, a standard of
review more deferential than the clearly erroneous standard.” United States
v. Leontaritis, 977 F.3d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v.

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Juarez-Duarte, 513 F.3d 204, 211 (5th Cir. 2008)). “The defendant has the
burden of proving that the reduction is warranted.” Id.
       At his plea hearing, Barrera admitted the conduct contained in the
factual basis for his plea, which included details regarding his possession and
distribution of child pornography. But Barrera did not, in his presentence
interview, specifically admit to or take responsibility for distributing child
pornography.     Thus, although Barrera admitted to distributing child
pornography in the factual basis for his guilty plea, the PSR considered
Barrera ineligible for a sentence reduction because he did not admit to
distribution in his presentence interview.
       At Barrera’s sentencing hearing, the district court refused to consider
that Barrera admitted to the factual basis for his guilty plea, concluding,
“That is not part of the acceptance. If that were sufficient, we wouldn’t have
that whole part of the guidelines of giving that statement to probation in their
interview.”
       Contrary to Barrera’s position, comment 3 of § 3E1.1 clarifies that
“[a] defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under
this section as a matter of right.” Although this provision does not mean that
admitting conduct during a guilty plea is categorically irrelevant in an
acceptance-of-responsibility determination, the ultimate decision to afford a
reduction is within the district court’s discretion.
       Here, the district court denied Barrera an acceptance-of-responsibility
reduction because he “didn’t admit the elements of either offense to
probation when he gave a statement, pursuant to 3E1.1.” (emphasis added).
This conclusion was not without foundation. See United States v. Perez,
915 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1990).
                                      III.

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       Barrera next argues that the district court erred in its imposition of the
AVAA special assessment, as it mistakenly believed that a $35,000 special
assessment was mandatory.          Regarding preserved challenges to the
imposition of a special assessment, this court reviews the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and questions of law de novo. United States v.
Graves, 908 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 2018). But this court reviews unpreserved
challenges only for plain error. United States v. Danhach, 815 F.3d 228, 238
(5th Cir. 2016). On plain error review, an appellant must show: (1) a forfeited
error; (2) that is clear or obvious; and (3) affected his substantial rights.
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009). If he
makes such a showing, this court has discretion to correct the error if the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Id.
       In his written objections to the PSR, Barrera broadly requested that
the district court not impose any “fine or special assessment fee assessed
because he is indigent and unable to pay any fines.” However, at the
sentencing hearing, Barrera did not specifically object to the district court’s
pronouncement of the $35,000 AVAA special assessment as “mandatory”
or “required.” “To preserve error, an objection must be sufficiently specific
to alert the district court to the nature of the alleged error and to provide an
opportunity for correction.” United States v. Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th
Cir. 2009).    Here, Barrera’s broad objection to any “fine or special
assessment fee” is insufficient to preserve his specific argument in this court
that the district court erred in imposing the AVAA special assessment
because it mistakenly believed that a $35,000 assessment was mandatory.
Therefore, plain error review applies.
       The AVAA specifies that, in addition to “any other criminal penalty,
restitution, or special assessment,” the district court is required to assess
“not more than $35,000 on any person convicted of any other offense for

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trafficking in child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2259A(a). To determine the
amount assessed, the AVAA mandates that the court consider the factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3572. Id. § 2259A(c).
       The district court here alluded to the § 3553(a) factors of the PSR,
which showed that Barrera had the ability to pay a “reduced fine.” In
addition, the district court specifically did not impose certain fines on Barrera
due to “the amount of restitution and the mandatory special assessment.”
Thus, even if the court erred in stating that the AVAA assessment was
“mandatory” or “required,” the court balanced Barrera’s assessments in
such a way that we cannot find either an effect on his substantial rights or that
the error “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135, 129 S. Ct. at 1429 (quoting
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993)).
       The sentence and the AVAA assessment are AFFIRMED.

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King, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
       Defendant-Appellant Oscar Barrera Jr. alleges that the district court
made two errors during his sentencing. First, the district court denied
Barrera an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction based on the mistaken
belief that the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) mandate
that a defendant admit the conduct of his offenses during a presentence
interview, and thereby categorically excluded from its consideration
admissions Barrera made during his plea hearing. Second, the district court
imposed a $35,000 special assessment under the Amy, Vicky, and Andy
Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018 (“AVAA”) based on the
erroneous belief that an assessment of $35,000—the maximum penalty
permitted by statute—was mandatory.
       With respect to my colleagues, in my view, the district court
committed errors that should not be overlooked. I accordingly would vacate
in part Barrera’s sentence and remand for resentencing on these narrow
issues to ensure that Barrera is subjected to a fair sentencing process. I
therefore respectfully dissent.
                                       I.
       As the majority notes, our “without foundation” standard of review
in addressing a district court’s decision to not award an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 is highly deferential. See
United States v. Leontaritis, 977 F.3d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 2020). Still, we have
previously vacated sentences where the district court refused to grant an
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction for a reason not supported by the
sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Patino-Cardenas, 85 F.3d
1133, 1136 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court’s refusal to grant an
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction based on the defendant’s failure to
admit additional conduct not charged in the indictment was without

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foundation); United States v. Fells, 78 F.3d 168, 171–72 (5th Cir. 1996)
(vacating the defendant’s sentence where the district court refused to grant
an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction based on the defendant asserting
his constitutional right to trial); United States v. Santos, 537 F. App’x 369,
370, 374, 376 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that there was no foundation for the
district court to deny an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction based on the
defendant’s objection to the lack of evidence supporting a sentence
enhancement).
       Barrera’s case, like the aforementioned cases, presents a circumstance
in which a defendant seemingly was a viable candidate for an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction based on U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, but was denied such a
reduction for a reason that is not supported by the sentencing guidelines.
Barrera pleaded guilty to the charges levied against him without a plea
agreement. As the majority acknowledges, Barrera then admitted the
conduct contained in the factual basis for his plea—which included details
regarding his possession and distribution of child pornography—at his plea
hearing. At the end of this hearing, the district court plainly told Barrera that
he would be a likely candidate for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction
as long as he did not engage in misconduct before his sentencing.
       However, at Barrera’s sentencing hearing nine months later, the
district court changed its tune. As the United States explains, “the district
court explicitly rejected any statements made by Barrera at his guilty plea as
insufficient to qualify as an admission of the elements of the offense.”
Reasoning that there exists “that whole part of the guidelines of giving that
statement to probation in their interview,” the district court concluded that
Barrera’s admissions at his plea hearing are “not part of the acceptance.”
       The district court erred in reaching this conclusion. Section 3E1.1
contains no provision mandating that a defendant’s truthful admission of

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“the conduct comprising the offense of conviction” only counts if it is done
at a presentence interview, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 3; in fact, § 3E1.1 does not
mention presentence interviews at all. Nor does this court impose a rule that
a presentence interview is the defendant’s only shot at admitting the conduct
comprising his offenses. See, e.g., Santos, 537 F. App’x at 374 & n.3 (finding
that the defendant “truthfully admitted the conduct comprising the offense”
by pleading guilty and admitting to a factual resume). Even in cases where we
have upheld the district court’s denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility
reduction, we have still at least considered the defendant’s admission to the
factual basis for his guilty plea. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 521 F. App’x
332, 333 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Lopez, 371 F. App’x 461, 461–62 (5th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Loma, 592 F. App’x 329, 330 (5th Cir. 2015); see
also United States v. Harris, 304 F. App’x 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A]
guilty plea is a factor to be considered in determining the adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility . . . .”).
       The majority acknowledges that comment 3 of § 3E1.1, which clarifies
that entering a guilty plea does not entitle a defendant to an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction as a matter of right, “does not mean that admitting
conduct during a guilty plea is categorically irrelevant in an acceptance-of-
responsibility determination.” Yet it concludes that the district court’s
decision to categorically exclude from consideration Barrera’s admissions
during his plea hearing was an acceptable exercise of discretion. Like the
United States, the majority cites United States v. Perez, 915 F.2d 947 (5th Cir.
1990), to support this conclusion.
       But Perez is distinguishable. In Perez, the defendant pleaded guilty,
stated to the court, “I’m sorry for what I did and I am guilty of what I did,”
and acknowledged “the basic factual elements of the offense.” Id. at 950.
However,     the    district   court      adopted    the   presentence   report’s
recommendation to deny an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, agreeing

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that the defendant’s explanation of his conduct “[left] out significant facts,”
“include[d] no remorse for conduct,” and “fell short of clear recognition and
affirmative acceptance of the nature and extent of his involvement in the drug
conspiracy.” Id.
        The district court in Perez considered that the defendant admitted the
conduct comprising his offense, but nevertheless concluded that his
admission was insufficient for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.
That is an acceptable exercise of discretion, assuming that there are
legitimate grounds to believe that the defendant did not genuinely recognize
and affirmatively accept responsibility for his criminal conduct. But that is
not what occurred here. The district court here explicitly stated that
admissions made during a plea hearing are categorically excluded from the
court’s consideration of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, leading to
the erroneous—and without foundation—conclusion that Barrera did not
admit to distribution of child pornography at all.
        While the district court has discretion to take admissions of criminal
conduct into consideration and ultimately conclude that they are insufficient
for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, the district court did not have
discretion in this case to categorically and arbitrarily turn a blind eye to
admissions made as part of the factual basis for a guilty plea, and manufacture
a rule that only statements made in a presentence interview can be
considered.1 Our cases make clear that a defendant’s admissions of criminal

        _____________________
        1
          Of particular concern is the fact that the district court imposed this rule without
warning Barrera of the rules of the game ahead of time, then declined to provide Barrera
the opportunity to reinterview once Barrera was made aware of the rule. In fact, Barrera
arguably received the opposite of a fair warning. After he admitted to the factual basis for
his plea, the district court informed Barrera that he was in a good position to receive an
acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. It would be reasonable for Barrera to conclude
under these circumstances that the district court was satisfied with his admissions.

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conduct can be outweighed by other factors indicating that the defendant has
not genuinely accepted responsibility for his actions. Still, under these
circumstances, Barrera should not have been denied an acceptance-of-
responsibility reduction on the sole basis that he did not admit the conduct
comprising his offenses. At the very least, he met that threshold.
Accordingly, I would vacate Barrera’s sentence in part and remand to ensure
that the district court properly considers the fact that Barrera pleaded guilty
and admitted the conduct comprising the offenses of conviction.
                                       II.
       In addressing Barrera’s claim regarding the district court’s imposition
of the AVAA special assessment, the majority correctly concludes that plain-
error review applies. Therefore, Barrera must show: (1) a forfeited error; (2)
that is “clear or obvious”; and (3) affected his substantial rights. Puckett v.
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes this showing, we have
discretion to remedy the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
       Barrera has convincingly shown that plain error occurred. The AVAA
requires the district court to assess “not more than $35,000 on any person
convicted of any other offense for trafficking in child pornography,” taking
into consideration the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3572. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2259A(a), (c) (emphasis added). At Barrera’s
sentencing hearing, the district court stated multiple times that the $35,000
amount for the AVAA assessment was “mandatory” and “required,” which
contradicts the statutory language of the AVAA. See id. § 2259A(a). I find it
implausible, under these circumstances, that the district court imposed a
$35,000 special assessment—the maximum possible amount—due to
independent consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and
18 U.S.C. § 3572. The presentence report concluded that Barrera only had

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“the ability to pay a reduced fine,” and the probation officer recommended
an AVAA special assessment of $1,000. The district court’s references to
“the required 35,000-dollar special assessment” indicate that the district
court committed “clear or obvious” error by concluding that the upper
bound of an AVAA special assessment is a mandatory amount.
       Furthermore, this error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights,”
because it prejudiced Barrera and “affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). The majority holds otherwise, concluding that even if
the district court committed a clear or obvious error, this error did not affect
Barrera’s substantial rights because the district court may have offset this
significant penalty by reducing other fines. While it is true that the district
court specifically did not impose certain fines on Barrera due to “the amount
of restitution and the mandatory special assessment,” the district court
ultimately imposed on Barrera financial penalties (totaling $80,200) that
were significantly greater than the financial penalties recommended by the
probation officer (totaling $59,200). I therefore find highly suspect the
notion that the district court’s mistaken imposition of the maximum special
assessment under the AVAA did not prejudice Barrera.
       The fourth plain-error factor is discretionary and fact-intensive; “we
look to ‘the degree of the error and the particular facts of the case’ to
determine whether to exercise our discretion.” United States v. Prieto, 801
F.3d 547, 554 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Avalos-Martinez, 700
F.3d 148, 154 (5th Cir. 2012)). Because the district court made a mistake of
law, resulting in a $35,000 assessment that constitutes nearly half of the total
financial penalties imposed on Barrera, I would vacate Barrera’s sentence in
part and remand to ensure that the district court assesses this fine while
properly taking into account the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and
18 U.S.C. § 3572. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259A(c) (mandating that the district court

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consider these factors); United States v. Myers, 198 F.3d 160, 169 (5th Cir.
1999) (concluding that the district court plainly erred by ordering immediate
payment of over $40,000 in restitution, and remanding); see also United
States v. Gonzales, 620 F.3d 475, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2010) (declining to
definitively conclude that plain error occurred, but remanding for the district
court to clarify whether it considered the defendant’s financial resources
before ordering the immediate payment of a $4,000 fine).
                                       III.
       The record indicates that the district court sentenced Barrera based
on misunderstandings of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and the AVAA, which is cause for
concern. I disagree with the majority’s decision to let these errors stand—I
would vacate in part and remand to ensure that Barrera is subjected to a fair
sentencing procedure. At the very least, we should remand for the district
court to clarify whether it properly applied U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and the AVAA.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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