Court Opinion

ID: 9760678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:08:14.548747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:15.659071
License: Public Domain

J. Seaborn Holt, Associate Justice, dissenting. It is my view that this case should be reversed and dismissed for the reason that I find no substantial evidence in this record to support the verdict. The record reflects that appellee, J. C. Cox, as father and next friend of his 16-year-old daughter, Oma Lee, and individually, sued appellant, G. W. Harkrider, to recover damages sustained by Oma Lee while she was riding as a guest in a pick-up truck operated by appellant. The complaint alleged that “the sole cause of the accident was due solely to the defendant’s wanton and willful negligence in driving the truck at a high and dangerous rate of speed at a time when it was so foggy that the visibility was only a short distance and attempting to pass the stock truck at a time when it was very dangerous to do so and he knew of the danger; . . . ” Punitive damages were not sought. Appellant answered with a general denial. Trial to a jury resulted in a verdict for damages to Oma Lee in the amount of $3,000 and from the judgment is this appeal. The facts, considered in the light most favorable to appellee — as we must do, are to the following effect. Oma Lee Cox, a 16-year-old girl, had known appellant for some time and had frequently ridden with him as his guest in his truck to Arkadelphia where she was in school and employed in a store on Saturdays. On the morning of November 16, 1957, she got in appellant’s truck at Curtis Junction and they drove north on U. S. Highway 67 towards Arkadelphia. At a point about four miles south of Arkadelphia and two miles south of the collision point, L. G. Taylor drove a truck onto the highway in front of appellant and continued on towards Arkadelphia. A heavy fog enveloped the road, heavier in places than in others, and was so dense as to curtail visibility to less than 100 feet, requiring lights being used on vehicles on the highway. Appellant’s truck and others that he met before the mishap had their lights on. Appellant followed the Taylor truck for about one mile when he attempted to pass to his left, and upon observing approaching headlights returned to his previous position. He then continued to follow behind this truck for about another mile when he, again on attempting to pass the Taylor truck — and at a point where his front wheels were about even with the rear wheels of the truck and to his right, first observed the lights of an approaching car some 25 feet away, driven by Mr. Thomas and traveling from 40 to 45 miles per hour, and as this car pulled to his right he saw the dim lights of a second approaching car driven by Mr. Raines and at a speed of about 45 miles per hour. There was also a third approaching car driven by Mr. Driggers, which had been following the Raines car for about two miles. The first car (Thomas) passed appellant’s truck without mishap, but the left front of appellant’s truck collided with the left front of the second approaching car (Raines) and the third approaching car (Driggers) collided with appellant’s truck and Raines’ car. In determining the correctness of the trial court’s refusal to instruct a verdict in favor of appellant here, we re-announced our rule in this language in McAllister, Adm. v. Calhoun, 212 Ark. 17, 205 S. W. 2d 40: “In determining on appeal the correctness of the trial court’s action in directing a verdict for either party, the rule is to take that view of the evidence that is most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is directed, and where there is any evidence tending to establish an issue in favor of the party against whom the verdict is directed, it is error to take the case from the jury. See also Scott v. Wisconsin & Ark. Lbr. Co., 148 Ark. 66, 229 S. W. 720.” Harkrider had been driving automobiles since in 1923 and this was his first mishap. He had been driving along the highway in question for more than a year and was familiar with it. He was employed at a college in Arkadelphia, commuting back and forth from his home, which was three miles west of Curtis Junction. Miss Cox testified that she was a senior in high school and had been working on Saturdays for about two years. Harkrider is her friend and neighbor and she had ridden to Arkadelphia with him on about four other occasions (thus saving her bus fare). She considered him a careful driver, that she did not pay any attention to his driving but he never did anything to indicate he was reckless. There is absolutely no testimony that Miss Cox on the occasion that she was injured, or on any other trips with appellant, ever complained or ever had occasion to warn or admonish him about his driving. Our rule is well established in a long line of cases that before a guest may recover under our guest statutes, Sec. 75-913 Ark. Stats. 1947, there must be some substantial evidence showing that the operator of the vehicle was operating it willfully and wantonly in disregard of the rights of others. Sec. 75-913 Ark. Stats, provides: “No person transported as a guest in any automotive vehicle upon the public highways or in aircraft being flown in the air, or while upon the ground, shall have a cause of action against the owner or operator of such vehicle, or aircraft, for damage on account of any injury, death or loss occasioned by the operation of such automotive vehicle or aircraft unless such vehicle or aircraft was willfully and wantonly operated in disregard of the rights of the others.” In the very recent case of Steward, Adm. v. Thomas, 222 Ark. 849, 262 S. W. 2d 901, we said: “Willful misconduct, or to operate an automobile in willful and wanton disregard of the rights of others, means something more than gross negligence. Splawn, Adm. v. Wright, 198 Ark. 197, 128 S. W. 2d 248.” We also said in Splawn, Adm. v. Wright, 198 Ark. 197, 128 S. W. 2d 248: “Willful negligence means a failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another. Herein, we think, lies the distinction between gross and willful negligence as intended by the statute. Gross negligence falls short of being such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong. . . . Willful negligence involves the element of conduct equivalent to a so-called constructive intent. . . . Cases will rarely arise in which it can be shown to a court’s satisfaction that collisions or upsets of automobiles, with resultant injury to guests, occur because of ‘willful misconduct’ of the operator. Those who operate automobiles should have (and when mentally normal, do have) a conscious desire to avert injury to themselves in such operation, at least co-extensive with that not to injure their guests; and since to operate a car in a willfully negligent manner offers a threat to security from injury as great to the operator as it does to the guest, evidence to prove that grade of negligence should be unusually strong and convincing before the operator can and will be convicted of such. ’ ’ In Cooper v. Calico, 214 Ark. 853, 218 S. W. 2d 723, where damages were denied to a guest under the provisions of our guest statute above, we used this language: “. . . we find this driver (accepting appellee’s testimony) suddenly on the paved highway, in the path of an oncoming car. No one could successfully deny that his conduct was careless. Certainly he was negligent in not stopping and looking in each direction before placing his Chevrolet and his passengers in a position of peril. But even gross negligence, under the guest statutes, is not enough. There must be a willfulness, a wantonness, an indifferent abandonment in respect of consequences, applicable alike to self and guests.” So here, I think the most that can be said of appellant’s negligence, in the circumstances, is that it was gross, but there was no substantial evidence in this record that it was wanton and willful in the sense required by the statute supra, as we have construed it, in order to recover damages. Justice George Bose Smith joins in this dissent.