Court Opinion

ID: 9940199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:19:48.709486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:06.422325
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                            Washington State
                                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                                             Division Two

                                                                                           February 13, 2024

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                          DIVISION II
 JILL ROSENDAHL,                                                       No. 58300-3-II

                                 Appellant,

         v.                                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 GINA JUSTICE, and all other persons
 asserting an interest in Kitsap County Parcel
 No. 4268-000-001-0404

                                 Respondent.

       MAXA, P.J. – Jill Rosendahl appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in

favor of Gina Justice in her lawsuit against Justice relating to an alleged oral agreement to

convey property.

       Rosendahl conveyed property she owned to her sister Justice by quitclaim deed.

Rosendahl claims that there was an oral agreement that she would convey the property to Justice

so Justice could build a house on the property, but if Justice did not build a house on the property

she would convey the property back to Rosendahl. When Justice listed the property for sale,

Rosendahl filed a lawsuit against her.

       Rosendahl argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there

were factual issues regarding her claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, constructive

trust, and quiet title. Justice argues there are no genuine issues of material fact and that all of

Rosendahl’s claims are barred by the statute of frauds, RCW 64.04.010.
No. 58300-3-II

          We hold that (1) as a matter of law, Rosendahl cannot recover on her breach of contract

claim; (2) there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Rosendahl’s unjust enrichment and

constructive trust claims; and (3) Rosendahl’s quiet title claim remains viable depending on

resolution of the constructive trust claim. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Justice regarding the breach of contract claim, but we reverse the

trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Justice regarding the unjust enrichment,

constructive trust, and quiet title claims and remand for further proceedings regarding those

claims.

                                               FACTS

Background

          Rosendahl and Justice are sisters. In January 2015, Rosendahl conveyed by quitclaim

deed a parcel of property (“the property”) that she owned in Kitsap County to Justice. The

quitclaim deed stated that the consideration for the transfer was “love & affection.” Clerk’s

Papers (CP) at 119. Rosendahl filed a Real Estate Excise Tax Affidavit (REETA) in which she

claimed a tax exemption because the transfer was a “gift without consideration.” CP at 29.

          Rosendahl alleged that she transferred the property to Justice because Justice planned to

build a house on the property. And Rosendahl claimed that she and Justice had an agreement

that if Justice did not build a house on the property, she would convey the property back to

Rosendahl. However, Justice eventually purchased a house elsewhere and listed the property for

sale. Rosendahl then filed suit against Justice to recover damages regarding Justice’s breach of

the alleged oral agreement to transfer the property back to Rosendahl and to quiet title.

          Rosendahl’s original complaint asserted causes of action for breach of contract, breach of

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, conversion, and quiet title. She later filed an

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No. 58300-3-II

amended complaint in which she asserted additional causes of action for unjust enrichment and

constructive trust. In the amended complaint, Rosendahl alleged that she deeded the property to

Justice so Justice could obtain financing to build a house on the property. Rosendahl also

alleged that she and Justice agreed that if Justice did not build a house on the property, she would

convey the property back to Rosendahl.

Summary Judgment Motions

       After Rosendahl filed her original complaint, Justice filed a summary judgment motion

regarding the asserted claims. That motion was continued to allow Rosendahl to gather more

evidence. Rosendahl subsequently agreed to dismiss her claims for breach of the covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and conversion.

       After Rosendahl filed her amended complaint, Justice filed a second summary judgment

motion. Justice argued that she was the owner of the property based on the quitclaim deed, the

quitclaim deed was silent regarding any claimed agreement to convey the property back to

Rosendahl, and the statute of frauds barred any oral contract to convey the property back to

Rosendahl. Justice also argued that the statute of frauds barred Rosendahl’s unjust enrichment

and constructive trust claims and that the evidence did not support those claims.

       In support of her motion, Justice relied on the quitclaim deed and the REETA that

Rosendahl signed. She also relied on interrogatory answers that Rosendahl provided. In the

interrogatory answers, Rosendahl stated, “The agreement was that Ms. Justice was going to build

a home on the property for her to live in and, if she did not do so, she was to give the property

back to me.” CP at 101. However, Rosendahl admitted that “[t]here are no written agreements.”

CP at 101.

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No. 58300-3-II

          In opposition to summary judgment, Rosendahl submitted a declaration in which she

stated:

          It was my goal and intention to create an area where a bunch of us family could live
          in close proximity. My sister Gina expressed eagerness to join in this if she could.
          She explored building a house on the property and told me she could only do it if
          the parcel was in her name, and to have my name even partially still on it would
          cause issues with getting the financing she needed. I discussed with her that I was
          perfectly fine doing that so long as she built there – and if at any point she decided
          not to build there, she would transfer the parcel back to me. She stated that this was
          her agreement. After the transfer was complete, she told me she needed time to
          work on financing to be able to build. For the next several years, it was my
          understanding based on my conversations with her that she was still pursuing this.

          Once she purchased a different home elsewhere and indicated definitively she was
          not going to be building there, I started trying to get her to transfer it back to me.
          Once she indicated she was going to list it for sale, I had no choice but to file this
          action to enforce our agreement.

CP at 42 (emphasis added).

          Regarding the REETA, Rosendahl stated:

          I did sign the supplemental statement stating no consideration was given. In my
          transfer to Gina, no money changed hands. Gina did promise to give back the
          property if she didn't build on it, and no, I would not have transferred it to her
          without that promise. However, there is no way to place a value on her promise to
          do so. Her promise isn’t something I could sell or cash in for value. My statement
          above my signature was accurate, as no money changed hands. The only thing I
          received in exchange for this property was a promise, by my sister, to return the
          property if she ended up not building – a promise that had no way of being valued.

CP at 43.

          Rosendahl also submitted a declaration from Celia Rosendahl, Rosendahl’s daughter and

Justice’s niece. The declaration stated:

          I spoke with my aunt Gina several times during that year and the following year.
          Aunt Gina was making plans to build, but said the property needed to be in her
          name to build. Her conversations were all consistent: she knew the property
          belonged to my mother, she would accept a transfer of the property into her name
          so she could build on it, and if anything were to not work out, she would transfer it
          back to my mother to use for a different family member.

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No. 58300-3-II

CP at 47 (emphasis added).

        After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor

of Justice and dismissed all of Rosendahl’s claims.

        Rosendahl appeals the trial court’s summary judgment order dismissing her claims.

                                             ANALYSIS

A.      SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

        We review summary judgment orders de novo. Mihaila v. Troth, 21 Wn. App. 2d 227,

231, 505 P.3d 163 (2022). We view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, including reasonable inferences. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine

issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if reasonable minds can come to different conclusions on

a factual issue. Id.

        The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Sartin v. Est. of McPike, 15 Wn. App. 2d 163, 172, 475 P.3d 522 (2020). A

moving defendant can meet this burden by demonstrating that the plaintiff cannot support their

claim with any competent evidence. Id. If the defendant makes such a showing, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

“Summary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to show sufficient evidence that creates a

question of fact about an essential element on which he or she will have the burden of proof at

trial.” Id.

B.      BREACH OF CONTRACT

        Rosendahl argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims for breach of contract

because there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the existence of an oral agreement

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No. 58300-3-II

for Justice to convey the property back to Rosendahl. We conclude that the statute of frauds bars

this claim.

       1.     Legal Principles

       The statute of frauds provides that conveyances of real property must be by deed. RCW

64.04.010. “Every deed shall be in writing, signed by the party bound thereby, and

acknowledged by the party before some person authorized . . . to take acknowledgment of

deeds.” RCW 64.04.020. An oral agreement that does not comply with the statute of frauds

generally is unenforceable. See Firth v. Lu, 146 Wn.2d 608, 614–15, 49 P.3d 117 (2002) (stating

that an agreement is enforceable only if executed in the form of a deed).

       When an agreement does not comply with RCW 64.04.010 and RCW 64.04.020 because

it is not in writing, it may be proved and specifically enforced if there is sufficient part

performance of the agreement. Berg v. Ting, 125 Wn.2d 544, 556, 886 P.2d 564 (1995). There

are three factors for part performance: “(1) delivery and assumption of actual and exclusive

possession; (2) payment or tender of consideration; and (3) the making of permanent, substantial

and valuable improvements referable to the contract.” Id.

       2.     Analysis

       Here, Rosendahl relies only on an oral agreement that Justice would convey the property

back to Rosendahl if Justice did not build a house on the property. This agreement does not

comply with the statute of frauds. In addition, Rosendahl acknowledges that she cannot satisfy

any of the three elements of the part performance exception to the statute of frauds. But

Rosendahl argues that the three factors for part performance merely are guiding parameters and

that application of part performance must rest on the facts and circumstances of the case.

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No. 58300-3-II

       However, Rosendahl has not identified any evidence in addition to the three elements that

would support a finding of part performance here. Therefore, we conclude that the statute of

frauds bars her breach of contract claim. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in

granting summary judgment in favor of Justice on Rosendahl’s breach of contract claim.

C.     UNJUST ENRICHMENT

       Rosendahl argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on her claim

for unjust enrichment. Rosendahl claims that questions of material fact remain regarding the

existence of an oral agreement with Justice, which support an unjust enrichment claim. Justice

argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the unjust enrichment claim and that the statute

of frauds bars the claim. We agree with Rosendahl.

       1.   Legal Principles

       An unjust enrichment claim is based on an implied contract between the parties.

Lavington v. Hillier, 22 Wn. App. 2d 134, 143, 510 P.3d 373, review denied, 200 Wn.2d 1010

(2022). “The cause of action allows a plaintiff to recover for the value of a benefit the defendant

retained even though there is no formal contractual relationship, based on equity and fairness.”

Id. at 143-44. An unjust enrichment claim has three elements: “ ‘(1) the defendant receives a

benefit, (2) the received benefit is at the plaintiff's expense, and (3) the circumstances make it

unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment.’ ” Id. at 144 (quoting Young v.

Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484-85, 191 P.3d 1258 (2008)). The first element requires the plaintiff

to confer a benefit on the defendant. Lavington, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 144.

       However, enrichment alone is not enough – it is essential that the enrichment be unjust

both under the circumstances and as between the parties to the transaction. Norcon Builders,

LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474, 490, 254 P.3d 835 (2011). The mere fact that

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No. 58300-3-II

the defendant has benefitted from the plaintiff does not justify recovery. Id. Unjust enrichment

applies only if the circumstances make it unjust for the defendant to keep the benefit without

compensation. Id.

       2.   Existence of Oral Agreement

       The summary judgment materials created a genuine issue of fact as to whether Justice

orally agreed to convey the property back to Rosendahl if Justice did not build a house on the

property. Rosendahl’s interrogatory answers outlined the agreement: “The agreement was that

Ms. Justice was going to build a home on the property for her to live in and, if she did not do so,

she was to give the property back to me.” CP at 101. Rosendahl elaborated in her declaration:

       [Justice] explored building a house on the property and told me she could only do
       it if the parcel was in her name, and to have my name even partially still on it would
       cause issues with getting the financing she needed. I discussed with her that I was
       perfectly fine doing that so long as she built there – and if at any point she decided
       not to build there, she would transfer the parcel back to me. She stated that this
       was her agreement.

CP at 42 (emphasis added). And Celia Rosendahl stated that Justice’s conversations with her

consistently stated that “if anything were to not work out, [Justice] would transfer [the property]

back to my mother.” CP at 47.

       Justice argues that the declarations of Rosendahl and Celia Rosendahl cannot create a

question of fact regarding the existence of an oral agreement because they are conclusory and are

not sufficiently detailed. However, the declarations present evidence, not conclusions. Both

Rosendahl and Celia Rosendahl stated that Justice told them that she agreed to convey the

property back to Rosendahl if she did not build a house on the property. Both have first-hand

knowledge of these conversations and are competent to testify about them. And Justice does not

explain what more detail would be required to establish the alleged oral agreement.

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No. 58300-3-II

       Justice also argues that the conveyance of the property to her was a gift, not the subject of

an oral agreement. She relies on the language of the quitclaim deed, which stated that the

consideration for the conveyance was “love & affection.” CP at 119. However, if Rosendahl’s

testimony is true – which we must assume on summary judgment – the conveyance of the

property was not an unconditional gift. Justice agreed that she would convey the property back

to Rosendahl if she did not build a house on the property.

       Finally, Justice argues that Rosendahl’s statement on the REETA that the conveyance of

the property was made without consideration precludes her from arguing that the conveyance

was conditioned on the alleged oral agreement. Justice relies on the general rule that a party

cannot create a question of fact by submitting a declaration that contradicts, without explanation,

previous clear testimony. Haley v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 25 Wn. App. 2d 207, 227, 522 P.3d

80 (2022).

       However, even if this rule applies to a sworn document like a REETA, for the rule to

apply the declaration must directly contradict the previous testimony. Id. at 228. And if the

declaration provides an explanation for the apparent inconsistency, the rule is inapplicable and

the trier of fact must determine the plausibility of the explanation. Id.

       Here, the REETA was not directly contradictory to Rosendahl’s claim in her declaration

that Justice agreed to convey the property back to her. And Rosendahl did provide an

explanation for why she stated “gift without consideration” on the REETA. Rosendahl stated

that the statement was accurate because no money changed hands, and there was no way to place

a value on Justice’s agreement to convey the property back to Rosendahl if Justice did not build

a house on the property. Whether this explanation is plausible is for the trier of fact to decide.

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No. 58300-3-II

        We conclude that questions of material fact exist as to whether Rosendahl had an oral

agreement that Justice would convey the property back to Rosendahl if Justice did not build a

house on the property.

        3.   Effect of Statute of Frauds

        Justice argues that even if the evidence is sufficient to establish the elements of unjust

enrichment, the statute of frauds bars Rosendahl’s unjust enrichment claim. We disagree, under

the specific facts of this case.

        We agree that a promisee [here, Rosendahl] generally cannot use unjust enrichment to

obtain the benefit of a unilateral oral agreement to convey real property. If a promisor [here,

Justice] orally agrees to convey real property to the promisee without receiving any

consideration from the promisee and then breaches that agreement, as stated above that oral

agreement would be unenforceable under the statute of frauds. See Firth, 146 Wn.2d at 614–15.

And unjust enrichment would not apply because the promisee has not conferred a benefit on the

promisor at the promisee’s expense, two of the elements of unjust enrichment. Lavington, 22

Wn. App. 2d at 144.

        But here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Rosendahl, there was more

than a mere unilateral oral agreement. Rosendahl conveyed the property to Justice contingent on

Justice’s oral agreement that she would convey the property back to Rosendahl if she did not

build a house on the property. This means that Rosendahl did confer a benefit on Justice at

Rosendahl’s expense – she conveyed the property that she owned to Justice to allow Justice to

build a house on the property. Therefore, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

Rosendahl, the first two elements of unjust enrichment are satisfied.

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No. 58300-3-II

       Section 31(1) of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Am. L.

Inst. 2010) states, “A person who renders performance under an agreement that cannot be

enforced against the recipient by reason of . . . (b) the failure to satisfy an extrinsic requirement

of enforceability such as the Statute of Frauds, has a claim in restitution against the recipient as

necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.” A comment to that section states, “Restitution is the

traditional recourse of persons who have performed contracts that are unenforceable . . . for lack

of a signed writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION

AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. f.1

       We conclude that the statute of frauds does not bar an unjust enrichment claim under

these circumstances, where a person has conferred a benefit on someone subject to that person’s

contingent oral agreement.

       4.    Unjust Enrichment Analysis

       Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rosendahl, the first two

elements of unjust enrichment are satisfied. Rosendahl conferred a benefit on Justice at

Rosendahl’s expense – she conveyed the property that she owned to Justice to allow Justice to

build a house on the property. The only issue here involves the third element – whether it would

be unjust for Justice to keep the property without payment when Justice did not build a house on

the property.

       Depending on the evidence presented at trial, Justice’s retention of the property may be

unjust. But we cannot make that determination on this record. We conclude that questions of

material fact exist regarding whether Justice’s retention of the property would be unjust under

1
 The Supreme Court cited to comment f of section 31 in Kofmehl v. Baseline Lake, LLC, 177
Wn.2d 584, 596 n.2, 305 P.3d 230 (2013).

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No. 58300-3-II

the circumstances of this case. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment and dismissing Rosendahl’s unjust enrichment claim, and we remand to the trial court

for further proceedings regarding that claim.

D.     CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

        Rosendahl argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on her claim

for constructive trust. She claims that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding the existence

of an oral agreement and that a claim for constructive trust does not require compliance with the

statute of frauds. Justice argues that the constructive trust claim is barred by the statute of

frauds. We agree with Rosendahl.

       1.   Legal Principles

       Under certain circumstances, courts will intervene and impose a constructive trust to

compel the legal owner of property to convey title to another person who justly deserves it.

Baker v. Leonard, 120 Wn.2d 538, 547, 843 P.2d 1050 (1993). “ ‘A constructive trust arises

where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on

the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.’ ” Dave Johnson

Ins., Inc. v. Wright, 167 Wn. App. 758, 773, 275 P.3d 339 (2012) (quoting Baker, 120 Wn.2d at

547-48). Unjust enrichment exists when a person retains money, property, or benefits “that in

justice and equity belong to another.” Dave Johnson Ins., 167 Wn. App. at 773.

       Generally, imposition of a constructive trust is based on “fraud, misrepresentation, bad

faith, or overreaching.” Baker, 120 Wn.2d at 547. However, courts can impose constructive

trusts in broader circumstances, including when the title to real property has been obtained

through “ ‘undue influence, duress, taking advantage of one’s weakness or necessities, or

through any other similar means or under any other similar circumstances which render it

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No. 58300-3-II

unconscientious for the holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest.’ ”

Baker, 120 Wn.2d at 547 (quoting Kausky v. Kosten, 27 Wn.2d 721, 728, 179 P.2d 950 (1947)).

       The court in Baker suggested that there must be some type of wrongdoing on the part of

the defendant to support a constructive trust. Baker, 120 Wn.2d at 548. However, the Supreme

Court earlier had stated, “A constructive trust may arise even though acquisition of the property

was not wrongful. It arises where the retention of the property would result in the unjust

enrichment of the person retaining it.” Scymanski v. Dufault, 80 Wn.2d 77, 89, 491 P.2d 1050

(1971) (emphasis added). Division One of this court quoted that language in In re Marriage of

Lutz, 74 Wn. App. 356, 368, 873 P.2d 566 (1994). And in Dave Johnson Insurance, this court

cited Baker for the following proposition: “Although constructive trusts are most appropriate in

situations involving fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence, courts can impose them in

broader circumstances not involving wrongdoing.” 167 Wn. App at 774 (emphasis added).

       An earlier case stated as follows:

       [A]lthough evidence of the oral contract is not admissible for the purpose of
       enforcing the contract, it is admissible to show the circumstances under which the
       transferee received the land and to show that he would be unjustly enriched if he
       were permitted to keep it. The transferor is entitled to specific restitution, and the
       transferee holds the land transferred to him upon a constructive trust for the
       transferor. This is true whether or not the transfer was procured by fraud of the
       transferee.

Engler v. Tucker, 60 Wn.2d 780, 783, 375 P.2d 497 (1962).

       Constructive trusts arising in equity can be imposed only when supported by clear,

cogent, and convincing evidence. Dave Johnson Ins., 167 Wn. App. at 774. Under this standard,

the evidence must show that the fact at issue is highly probable. Id.

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No. 58300-3-II

       2.    Existence of Oral Agreement

       As discussed above, the summary judgment materials created an issue of material fact as

to whether Justice orally agreed to convey the property back to Rosendahl if she did not build a

house on the property. The existence of this alleged oral agreement provides the basis for

Rosendahl’s constructive trust claim.

       3.    Effect of Statute of Frauds

       As with unjust enrichment, Justice argues that even if the evidence is sufficient to

establish a constructive trust, the statute of frauds bars Rosendahl’s constructive trust claim.

However, the Supreme Court long ago held that the statute of frauds “do[es] not preclude the use

of parol evidence to establish a constructive trust.” Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn.2d 326, 333,

294 P.3d 393 (1956); see also Engler, 60 Wn.2d at 782-83. In other words, Justice’s oral

promise – parol evidence – may be used to establish a constructive trust. Therefore, we reject

this argument.

       4.   Constructive Trust Analysis

       Here, there is no evidence that Justice misrepresented her intent to build a house on the

property if Rosendahl conveyed it to her. As a result, even viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to Rosendahl, Justice’s acquisition of the property was not “wrongful.”

       However, we agree with this court in Dave Johnson Insurance and conclude that a court

can impose a constructive trust in circumstances not involving wrongdoing. 167 Wn. App at

774. As noted in Baker, the focus of the constructive trust remedy is avoiding unjust enrichment.

120 Wn.2d at 547-48. This conclusion is consistent with the Restatement: “If a defendant is

unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to identifiable property at the expense of the claimant

or in violation of the claimant’s rights, the defendant may be declared a constructive trustee for

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No. 58300-3-II

the benefit of the claimant, of the property in question.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION

AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1). Using the language of Baker, a constructive trust can arise

under “ ‘circumstances which render it unconscientious for the holder of the legal title to retain

and enjoy the beneficial interest.’ ” Baker, 120 Wn.2d at 547 (quoting Kausky, 27 Wn.2d at

728).

        Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Rosendahl, Justice orally agreed to

return the property to Rosendahl if she did not build a house on the property. And depending on

the evidence presented at trial, Justice’s retention of the property may result in unjust

enrichment. But as noted above, we cannot make that determination on this record. We

conclude that questions of material fact exist regarding whether the trial court can impose a

constructive trust under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, we hold that the trial court

erred in granting summary judgment and dismissing Rosendahl’s constructive trust claim, and

we remand to the trial court for further proceedings regarding that claim.

E.      QUIET TITLE CLAIM

        Rosendahl argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her quiet title claim. We agree

based on our holding above regarding the constructive trust claim.

        A quiet title action is equitable and is designed to resolve competing ownership claims to

property. Bavand v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 176 Wn. App. 475, 502, 309 P.3d 636 (2013). RCW

7.28.010 states,

     Any person having a valid subsisting interest in real property, and a right to the possession
     thereof, may recover the same by action in the superior court of the proper county, to be
     brought against the tenant in possession; if there is no such tenant, then against the person
     claiming the title or some interest therein, and may have judgment in such action quieting or
     removing a cloud from plaintiff’s title.

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No. 58300-3-II

RCW 7.28.120 further provides that in a quiet title action, “[t]he plaintiff . . . shall set forth in his

or her complaint the nature of his or her estate, claim, or title to the property, and the defendant

may set up a legal or equitable defense to plaintiff’s claims; and the superior title, whether legal

or equitable, shall prevail.”

        Rosendahl acknowledges that she is seeking only damages regarding her unjust

enrichment claim. Therefore, that claim does not implicate title to the property.

        However, one remedy for a constructive trust is a return of the property to the original

owner. The Restatement states, “The obligation of a constructive trustee is to surrender the

constructive trust property to the claimant, on such conditions as the court may direct.”

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(2).

        This means that if Rosendahl prevails on the constructive trust claim, one potential

remedy would be to require Justice to convey the property back to Rosendahl and quiet title in

Rosendahl. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and

dismissing Rosendahl’s quiet title claim, and we remand the quiet title claim to the trial court for

further proceedings.

                                           CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Justice regarding the

breach of contract claim, but we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Justice regarding the unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and quiet title claims and remand for

further proceedings regarding those claims.

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No. 58300-3-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                      MAXA, P.J.

 We concur:

 LEE, J.

 VELJACIC, J.

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