Court Opinion

ID: 9957909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 16:10:30.27928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:06.177787
License: Public Domain

J-S05017-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 OF: M.M.A., A MINOR                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
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 APPEAL OF: C.M.A., MOTHER               :       No. 1120 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered August 14, 2023
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
              Orphans’ Court at No(s): No.29 In Adoption 2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED: April 5, 2024

      Appellant, C.M.A. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the Erie

County Court of Common Pleas, which involuntarily terminated her parental

rights to M.M.A. (“Child”). We affirm.

      The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Mother and J.A. (“Father”) were never married although they lived together

between 2017 and 2019. Child was born in June 2018. When the parties

separated, Father and Child moved to paternal grandparents’ home. Mother

and Father initially shared custody.

      In 2020, Child exhibited several unexplained injuries.         A police

investigation ensued after authorities determined that at least one of the

injuries, “manifesting as severe bruising and pinch marks consistent with

being dragged by the ear,” had occurred when Child was in Mother’s exclusive
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physical custody. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/24/23, at 2). A medical

review board determined that the injuries were the result of child abuse and,

in August 2020, Mother was charged in connection with Child’s injuries.1

Father filed for a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) petition on behalf of Child,

which Mother consented to, and the court issued the PFA on November 5,

2020. Mother has not had any contact with Child since the PFA was issued,

nor has she filed for custody.

       On March 21, 2023, Father filed a private petition for involuntary

termination of Mother’s parental rights.         On March 27, 2023, the court

appointed Deanna Heasley, Esquire, to represent Child. On May 12, 2023,

A.F.A., Child’s stepmother (“Stepmother”) filed a petition for adoption. The

court originally scheduled the hearing on Father’s termination petition on May

18, 2023; however, after Mother retained counsel to represent her, the court

granted Mother’s motion for a continuance.

       The court ultimately held the termination hearing on August 8, 2023,

with the stated goal of determining “whether [Mother’s] admitted absence

from [Child’s] life for well over six months prior to the [termination] petition

was the result of one or more insurmountable obstacles such that [Mother’s]

failure to perform parental duties should be excused under Section

2511(a)(1).” (Trial Court Opinion at 2). The court also decided that Attorney

____________________________________________

1 Mother pled no contest to one count of harassment, a third-degree
misdemeanor, in August 2022.

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Heasley had no conflict of interest in representing Child’s legal and best

interests.2 At the close of the hearing, the court found that Father had proven

by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s conduct had evidenced a

settled purpose of relinquishing a parental claim, Mother’s inaction was not

caused by insurmountable obstacles, and it was in Child’s best interest to

terminate Mother’s parental rights.

       The court entered its final order terminating Mother’s parental rights on

August 14, 2023. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on September 13,

2023. She filed her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on

October 6, 2023.3

____________________________________________

2 During the termination hearing, Attorney Heasley stated that Child’s legal

and best interests were the same. She noted that Child stated to Stepmother,
“I want to call you real mama,” which Attorney Heasley explained, as a five-
year-old, is an indication of his legal interests. (See N.T. Hearing, 8/8/23, at
96). The court found Child’s interests did not conflict, and accordingly,
permitted Attorney Heasley to represent Child’s best and legal interests during
the termination hearing. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 663 Pa. 53, 240
A.3d 1218 (2020) (holding that trial court must determine in first instance
whether counsel can represent dual interests before appointing individual to
serve as guardian ad litem and legal counsel for child, and appellate court
review is limited to determining that counsel was appointed and that if same
counsel was appointed to serve both interests, that trial court made such
determination in first instance); In the Interest of H.H.N., 296 A.3d 1258
(Pa.Super. 2023) (holding where child’s legal and best interests do not diverge
in termination proceeding attorney-guardian ad litem representing child’s best
interests can also fulfill role of attorney under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) to
represent child’s legal interests).

3 Mother failed to file her concise statement of errors together with her notice

of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Nevertheless, we decline to
find waiver of Mother’s issues or dismiss the appeal on this basis. See In re
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Mother raises the following issues on appeal:

          1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding
          that [Mother] failed to perform parental duties for at least
          six months prior to the filing of the petition by failing to act
          in a reasonable manner to overcome the obstacles in place
          when considering her specific obstacles and analyzing the
          reasonable firmness by which [Mother] acted to overcome
          those obstacles?

          2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when the trial
          court treated a [PFA] Order protecting a child the same as
          a [PFA] Order protecting a coparent?

          3. Did the trial court err in concluding that the Father did
          not create obstacles impeding Mother’s ability to maintain a
          relationship with the Child when the Father failed to contact
          Mother about Counseling or therapy services provided to the
          Child?

          4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding
          that it is in the Child’s best interest to terminate the
          relationship with Mother?

(Mother’s Brief at 4-5).

       In her first three issues combined,4 Mother asserts that she initially

stopped exercising her custodial time with Child during the pendency of the

child abuse investigation because Mother felt that it would be in Child’s best

interest to remain with Father rather than to have him placed in foster case.

Thereafter, Mother claims there were numerous obstacles which impeded her

____________________________________________

K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745 (Pa.Super. 2009) (explaining that failure to file Rule
1925 statement concomitantly with notice of appeal in children’s fast track
case is considered defective notice of appeal, which this Court can overlook).

4 In her brief, Mother grouped her discussion of these issues into one argument

section. We similarly address these issues together.

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involvement with Child including the child abuse investigation, criminal

charges that were filed against her, and the PFA order. Mother maintains that

“[a]ddressing the criminal charges became the focal point” until August 30,

2022, when she entered a no contest plea in that case. (Mother’s Brief at 7).

Mother emphasizes that she attended anger management and parenting

courses, and that her plea of no contest does not indicate her as a perpetrator

of child abuse. (Id. at 14). After addressing the criminal charges, Mother

contends that she sought to hire an attorney to address the PFA and custody

situation, but she could not afford one. Moreover, Mother highlights that the

attorneys with whom she spoke told her that she could not do much about

custody until the PFA terminated in November 2023.

      In addition, Mother argues that Father created some obstacles for

Mother by failing to contact her and keep her appraised of Child’s

appointments and medical treatment.      Mother claims that the PFA did not

preclude contact between Father and Mother relating to her legal custody, and

Father should have kept her apprised of appointments and treatments so that

she could have taken part in Child’s welfare. Mother concludes that her failure

to perform parental duties was caused by insurmountable obstacles, and the

court erred and abused its discretion when it terminated her parental rights.

We disagree.

      Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the

following principles:

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       A parent’s right to make decisions concerning the care,
       custody, and control of his or her children is among the
       oldest of fundamental rights. The time-tested law of the
       Commonwealth requires that we balance this intrinsic
       parental interest within the context of a child’s essential
       needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support. We
       readily comprehend the significant gravity of a termination
       of parental rights, which has far-reaching and intentionally
       irreversible consequences for the parents and the child. For
       these reasons, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking
       termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence
       the existence of the statutory grounds for doing so. [C]lear
       and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so
       clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier
       of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
       the truth of the precise facts in issue. Because of this
       serious impact attending the termination of parental rights,
       it is important that a judicial decree extinguishing such
       rights be based solely on competent evidence.

       In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental
       rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of
       whether the decree of the termination court is supported by
       competent evidence. This standard of review corresponds
       to the standard employed in dependency cases, and
       requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
       credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
       supported by the record, but it does not require the
       appellate court to accept the [trial] court’s inferences or
       conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are
       supported, we must determine whether the trial court made
       an error of law or abused its discretion. An abuse of
       discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
       court might have reached a different conclusion; we reverse
       for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
       manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill
       will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law,
       or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
       decision, the decree must stand. We have previously
       emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have
       first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
       hearings.     However, [w]e must employ a broad,
       comprehensive review of the record in order to determine
       whether the trial court’s decision is supported by competent

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         evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., ___ Pa. ___, ____, 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (2021)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Father filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s

parental rights to Child on the following ground:

         § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

         (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a
         child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
         following grounds:

         (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
         six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
         either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
         parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
         parental duties.

                                  *    *    *

         (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
         rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
         developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
         of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
         solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
         inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
         medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
         With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
         (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
         the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
         are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
         filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), and (b).

         To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
         moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
         of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the
         filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled
         intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or

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            failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

               Section 2511 does not require that the parent
               demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
               parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
               perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights
               may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if
               the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
               relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
               perform parental duties.

            Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
            duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
            the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
            parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-
            abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
            consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
            on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations

omitted).      Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination

petition:

            [T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given
            case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
            provision.     The court must examine the individual
            circumstances of each case and consider all explanations
            offered by the parent facing termination of …her parental
            rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of
            the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary
            termination.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted).

      Instantly, Child has not had contact with Mother since November 2020.

Father filed his involuntary termination petition approximately 28 months

later, on March 21, 2023. During the 28-month period, Mother did not file a

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child custody action seeking custody of or visitation with Child.         Although

Mother claims that she thought she was precluded from filing for custody while

there was an active PFA order, the trial court explained:

         There is no law preventing a PFA defendant from filing a
         child custody action, regardless of who is the protected
         party under the order or whether the order is entered by
         consent or after a hearing on the merits. In fact, the Child
         Custody Act expressly contemplates that parties with PFA,
         abuse, and/or criminal records may be parties to custody
         actions. For example, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(2) requires
         the custody court to consider “[t]he present and past abuse
         committed by a party or member of the party’s household,
         whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an
         abused party and which party can better provide adequate
         physical safeguards and supervision of the child.” Section
         5329 of the Custody Act requires the court to specifically
         “consider [certain enumerated criminal offenses] and
         determine that the party does not pose a threat of harm to
         the child before making any order of custody to that party.”
         23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329. And Section 5329.1 requires the trial
         court to determine whether and to what extent a child or
         child custody litigant has been involved with child protective
         services. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329.1. Further, the PFA rules
         specifically require temporary and final PFA orders to include
         language to the effect that: “The custody provisions of
         Paragraph 5 of this order are temporary. Either party may
         initiate custody proceedings pursuant to the custody statute
         at 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5321-5340. Any valid custody order
         entered after the final Protection from Abuse order
         supersedes the custody provisions of this order.”
         Pa.R.Civ.P. 1905(c) and (e), form ¶ 5.

         Nothing in these laws distinguishes between consent and
         contested PFA orders. Further, the above cited portion of
         Rule 1905(c) and (e) directly contradicts [Mother’s]
         argument by declaring, without limitation, that custody
         provisions within temporary and final PFA orders are
         temporary and can be modified by filing a custody action.

         Thus, while the circumstances underlying a party’s PFA,
         abuse and/or criminal history may have serious, even

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       determinative effects on the outcome of a custody action,
       there is nothing in the law that requires, or even permits,
       per se disqualification of a child custody action based on the
       filer’s PFA, abuse, and/or criminal history. Instead, the
       Custody Act affords the trial court with broad discretion to
       fashion appropriate custody orders to protect children from
       potentially dangerous parties, such as court-ordered
       therapeutic intervention, supervised visitation, and
       professionally guided reunification counseling to name just
       a few.

       Regarding the second component to [Mother’s] argument,
       that regardless of the law [Mother] believed she was
       precluded from filing for custody for various reasons, the
       court heard all of her testimony and did not find her credible.
       [Mother] testified that she believed she could not have any
       contact with [Child] until the PFA expired in 2023, and that
       was the reason, or one of the reasons, she did not pursue a
       child custody action over the past two and a half years.
       (See e.g. [N.T. Hearing, 8/8/23, at] 70). But, she also
       contradicted herself by admitting that she consulted with an
       attorney about initiating custody proceedings “before I had
       gotten my public defender for my criminal cases” and that
       the attorney she talked to “wanted a thousand dollars to do
       the custody paperwork and modification and I couldn’t
       afford it.” ([Id. at] 65). A temporary PFA Order was granted
       October 29, 2020.         The final PFA order was entered
       November 5, 2020. Thereafter, [Mother] had no further
       custodial time with the child. ([Id. at] 43-44). A public
       defender was assigned in her criminal case on November
       23, 2020, according to the criminal docket at No. 2445 of
       2020.      Accordingly, [Mother’s] testimony reveals that
       sometime after the PFA Orders were entered in late October
       and early November 2020, but before her public defender
       was appointed later in November of 2020, [Mother] was
       aware through contact with an attorney that she could
       pursue a child custody action, and she declined those
       services for strategic and financial reasons.

       Also, when confronted on cross-examination with the PFA
       Order’s instruction that “[e]ither party may initiate custody
       proceedings...[and] [a]ny valid custody order entered after
       the final [PFA] order supersedes the custody provisions of
       this order,” [Mother] responded that she did not “bother” to

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       read the orders ([id. at] 70), and regardless, she elected to
       pursue a different “plan of attack” by defending against her
       criminal charges first, then resuming her role as mother.
       ([Id. at] 70; Concise Statement [at ¶] 2). Thus, the true
       obstacle in this case was [Mother’s] choice to prioritize
       favorable resolution of her criminal matters over pursuing a
       place of importance in [Child’s] life, which obstacle was of
       [Mother’s] own making.

       Even if the court were inclined to merit [Mother’s] “plan of
       attack as obstacle” argument, that argument was gutted by
       the fact that after [Mother’s] criminal case eventually
       concluded in a favorable plea agreement in mid-2022,
       [Mother] still did not file a child custody action or otherwise
       pursue a place of parental importance in [Child’s] life until
       she was forced to defend herself in this action initiated by
       [Father] more than six months after her plea and
       sentencing.     [Mother] tried to justify her inaction by
       asserting variously that she could not afford custody
       litigation ([id. at] 64-65, 71); she believed the PFA
       prevented her from pursuing custody ([id. at] 61-62); she
       was told by countless unidentified attorneys that she could
       file for custody while the PFA Order was pending, but only
       with the assistance of an attorney ([id. at] 64-65), which
       circled back to she could not afford legal counsel, and that
       basically the best solution for her would be to wait until the
       PFA Order expired before filing for custody. (Id.) The trial
       court considered all of [Mother’s] excuses, but did not find
       any of them to be valid.

       While surely custody litigation can be expensive, [Mother]
       made no effort to explain why she was not able to amass
       sufficient funds to pursue custody over the course of two-
       plus years, yet was able to retain private counsel for the
       [termination] hearing. The court does not believe that
       several local attorneys told [Mother] she could not pursue a
       custody action pro se, as such advice would be untrue and
       unethical. Self-represented parties are commonplace in Erie
       County family court, as all members of the family bench and
       bar are aware, and user-friendly forms and instructions are
       readily available on Erie County’s Custody Conciliation public
       web page.

       Based on the totality of [Mother’s] testimony, the trial court

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       concluded that [Mother’s] delay in filing a custody action for
       over six months prior to the [termination] petition, as well
       as her absence from [Child’s] life for over [28] months, were
       not occasioned by any insurmountable obstacle, but rather
       were the result of [Mother’s] considered choice to put her
       legal and financial interests ahead of her responsibility to
       parent [Child]. Thus, even if the court were to believe that
       [Mother] sincerely planned to return to fully performing
       parental duties at some point in the future, when her legal
       and financial circumstances were more suitable, “the court
       cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely the Child’s need
       for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
       and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901
       A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006)….

       Regarding [Mother’s] companion assertion that the trial
       court failed to consider her efforts to overcome the
       aforementioned obstacles, and leaving aside the fact that
       the trial found that there were no insurmountable
       obstacles—especially during the six months preceding the
       filing of the [termination] petition, the trial court did not find
       any of [Mother’s] alleged efforts to be either credible or
       sufficient, for all of the reasons stated above. Specifically
       regarding the parenting and anger management courses
       referenced in her Concise Statement, she admitted that
       those were completed as part of her plea deal in July of 2022
       ([N.T. Hearing at] 62), so even if she intended for them to
       double as proof of “efforts to overcome parenting
       obstacles,” the remoteness in time and lack of sustained
       effort thereafter rendered them inconsequential in these
       proceedings.

       Also, the trial court did not credit [Mother’s] argument that
       [Father] is to blame for her absence from [Child’s] life for
       over [28] months. In her Concise Statement, [Mother]
       argues: “Father neglected to contact Mother about any
       counseling or therapy appointments to allow her to be a part
       of the treatment for the outbursts or behavioral problems
       with the Child, and thus, deprived Mother the opportunity
       for a behavioral health professional…to evaluate the
       relationship between Mother and son. Father has failed to
       update Mother on anything regarding the Child, and thus,
       manufactured a hardship for Mother to be present and
       involved in Child’s life.” (Concise Statement [at ¶] 7). This

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         argument appears to suggest that [Father] had an
         affirmative duty to provide unsolicited parenting information
         to Mother. There was no custody order in place at the time
         the PFA Order was entered. One could argue that it would
         have been desirable for [Father] to volunteer information
         about [Child], but he was under no legal obligation to do so.

         [Mother] knew she was not receiving information about
         [Child’s] health and well-being for over [28] months, and
         knew she could file a custody action to pursue involvement
         in [Child’s] life, but she elected not to do so in order to
         protect her own legal and financial interests. Accordingly,
         the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that [Mother]
         failed to exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles,
         actual or perceived, placed in the path of maintaining the
         parent-child relationship, such as the alleged obstacle
         created by [Father’s] silence.

(Trial Court Opinion at 7-11).

      The record supports the trial court’s determination.           The court

considered Mother’s circumstances and explanations before it determined that

involuntary termination was warranted. See In re B., N.M., supra. Likewise,

the record supports the court’s credibility determinations, which we will not

disturb. See Adoption of C.M., supra. As the trial court observed, Mother

prioritized resolving the criminal charges against her before seeking custody

of Child. We agree with the trial court that any obstacles posed by either the

PFA or her financial difficulty in hiring counsel to represent her in a custody

action were not insurmountable. On this record, we see no abuse of discretion

concerning the court’s decision that Mother failed to perform parental duties

under Section 2511(a)(1).

      In her final issue, Mother argues that Child’s behavioral issues did not

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manifest when he was in her custody early in his life, and Mother suggests

that it is possible that Child “has an attachment disorder and is in dire need

of an opportunity to be with his Mother.”      (Mother’s Brief at 18).    Mother

asserts that Colleen Pritty, Child’s blended case manager, stated that she

could not rule out that a potential relationship with Mother may aid in Child’s

long term well-being. (Id. (citing N.T. Hearing at 86)). Mother concludes

that it was not in Child’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights,

and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

      With respect to Section 2511(b), we consider whether termination of

parental rights will best serve Child’s developmental, physical and emotional

needs and welfare. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010). “[A]

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of...her child is

converted, upon the failure to fulfill...her parental duties, to the child’s right

to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856

(Pa.Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

      “In this context, the court must take into account whether a bond exists

between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing,

necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Z.P., supra at 1121. “When

conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not required to use expert

testimony.   Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well.

Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.”

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Id. (internal citations omitted). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security,

and stability are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the

child. The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child

bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing

the bond.” In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa.Super. 2006).

      “The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be

considered unfit and have…her rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d

1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:

         There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
         Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
         a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
         support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
         met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
         child.   Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
         obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
         performance.

         This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
         obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
         genuine effort to maintain communication and association
         with the child.

         Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
         requires that a parent exert [herself] to take and maintain
         a place of importance in the child’s life.

         Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
         good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
         problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
         to the best of…her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A

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         parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
         parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
         firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
         maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
         are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
         convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
         while others provide the child with…[his] physical and
         emotional needs.

In re B.N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted).

      Instantly, at the termination hearing, Attorney Heasley called Colleen

Pretty, Child’s blended case manager, as a witness. Ms. Pretty explained that

she started working with Child in November 2022 to receive services for some

behavioral concerns.    Ms. Pretty testified that Child knows that he has a

biological mother, but he refers to Stepmother as “mom.” (N.T. Hearing at

82). Ms. Pretty described a significant bond between Child and Stepmother

and explained that she is patient and proactive with his treatment. As a result,

Ms. Pretty explained that Child is progressing in his treatment. (Id. at 82-

83). Ms. Pretty opined that if Mother were introduced into his life at this point,

it would require intensive therapy and a significant amount of difficult work

for Child to re-establish a relationship with her. (Id. at 80).

      After considering all of the testimony and evidence introduced at the

hearing, the trial court found that Father met his burden of proving that

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests under

Section 2511(b).     The court noted that “[t]hough the testimony at the

[termination] hearing supported [Mother’s] contention that she once shared a

significant parental bond with [Child], it also revealed that [Child] no longer

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recognizes [Mother] as a true mother figure.” (Trial Court Opinion at 12).

The court found credible Ms. Pretty’s opinion that Child would likely require

“intensive therapeutic support over an extended period of time to successfully

adjust to [Mother’s] reappearance in his life as a mother figure after having

no contact with her for nearly three years, and after having understandably

replaced [Mother] with [Stepmother] as a mother figure.”        (Id.) (record

citations omitted).

      Upon review, we conclude that the record supports the court’s findings.

Child has been removed from Mother’s care for years, during which time he

has bonded with Stepmother, who initiated the instant adoption action. On

this record, we cannot say that the court erred or abused its discretion in

finding that termination is in Child’s best interests under Section 2511(b).

Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

 DATE: 04/05/2024

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