Court Opinion

ID: 9543471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:45:49.370173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:21.907358
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
Although I agree with the result obtained in this decision, I do not agree with all that my colleagues say in the decision.
With respect to Issue I, I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was no evidence which indicated the probability of negligence on the part of the defendant. There was such evidence. However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur became inapplicable in the light of other evidence which concerned the power shortage, for which the hospital was responsible, as a likely cause.
I must also disagree with my colleagues insofar as they equate exclusive control with causation. As we stated in Shull v. *467B.F. Goodrich Co. (1985) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 477 N.E.2d 924, 931:
“In some situations ‘control’ is simply the wrong word and the courts should determine whether the evidence reasonably eliminates explanations other than the defendant’s negligence.”
In my view, this is such a case.
I therefore concur in the affirmance of this judgment because the evidence does not demonstrate that the event was more probably occasioned by the negligence of the defendant than by some other cause.
Here, what might well have been an otherwise appropriate inference of negligence through application of res ipsa loquitur was rendered inappropriate by the testimony concerning the power deficiency as the likely cause of the malfunction.
With respect to Issue II, I believe that the defendant’s direct examination of witness Stuard opened the door for plaintiff’s proffered evidence concerning the occurrence of September, 1982. Accordingly, I believe it was error for the trial court to exclude that testimony. However, I conclude that such error was harmless in that defendant was permitted to fully explore the circumstances of the occurrence in cross-examining Stuard. The only aspect of the occurrence not thereby covered, was the fact, vel non, of injury to the then occupants of the elevator. This uncovered aspect of the September, 1982 event was not relevant to the case before us.
With respect to Issue III, I agree that the trial court correctly refused to give plaintiffs’ tendered Instruction Nos. 1 and 10. In my view, tendered Instruction No. 1 was defective because it stated that plaintiff was in fact injured on the elevator. Quite clearly, and with good reason, this issue was in genuine dispute. Instruction No. 10, as tendered, erroneously advised the jury to give more weight to one class of evidence than to another.
With the exception of the matters herein stated, I can and do agree with the decision and agree that the judgment should be affirmed.