Court Opinion

ID: 9964906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 14:01:05.094975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:47.654384
License: Public Domain

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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-12566
                           ____________________

        CARLOS ALBERTO CUENCA FIGUEREDO,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        YAURI DEL CARMEN ROJAS,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-01268-TJC-LLL
                           ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
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        2                       Opinion of the Court               23-12566

        GRANT, Circuit Judge:
               Eight-year-old C.R. and his parents are all citizens of
        Venezuela, where C.R. was born and where his father, Carlos
        Cuenca Figueredo (Cuenca), still lives. C.R.’s mother, Yauri Rojas,
        took C.R. from Venezuela three years ago without his father’s
        knowledge or permission and brought him to the United States.
        She and C.R. have lived in the same apartment near Jacksonville,
        Florida ever since.
               Twenty months after Rojas absconded with their only child,
        Cuenca filed a petition in the Middle District of Florida seeking the
        return of his son under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
        of International Child Abduction. The Convention and its
        implementing legislation generally require the immediate return of
        a child to his home country when the abandoned parent files a
        petition for return within one year of the wrongful removal of the
        child. But because Cuenca filed his petition more than a year after
        C.R.’s mother took him from Venezuela, the Convention allowed
        the district court to refuse his petition for return if it found that
        C.R. was settled in his new home in the United States.
               The district court did find that C.R. was settled in his new
        environment—after two years living in the same home, attending
        the same elementary school, and participating in various
        extracurricular activities in the same community in Florida—and it
        denied Cuenca’s petition for C.R.’s return. To resolve Cuenca’s
        appeal, we must decide whether and how the immigration status
        of a child and respondent affects child-settlement decisions under
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        23-12566               Opinion of the Court                         3

        the Convention. Along the way, we must also clarify our standard
        of review for the district court’s determination that a child is or is
        not “settled” within the meaning of the Convention.
                We conclude that immigration status is one factor among
        many that may be relevant when assessing the relative stability and
        permanence of the child’s connections to his new home. As with
        any other relevant factor, the weight assigned to immigration
        status will vary according to the child’s individual circumstances.
        And because identifying and weighing all the relevant factors to
        determine whether a child is settled in his new home is essentially
        a factfinding exercise, we review the district court’s determination
        on this issue only for clear error.
               The district court here correctly identified C.R. and his
        mother’s immigration status as a relevant—but not dispositive—
        factor in whether C.R. is settled in his home in Florida. The court’s
        finding that C.R. is settled in his new environment was not clearly
        erroneous, and its decision not to order C.R.’s return to Venezuela
        despite his settlement was not an abuse of discretion. We therefore
        affirm the denial of Cuenca’s petition.
                                          I.
                                         A.
               The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
        Child Abduction “was adopted in 1980 in response to the problem
        of international child abductions during domestic disputes.” Abbott
        v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 8 (2010); see generally Convention, Oct. 25,
        1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11. The
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12566

        Convention’s “core premise” is that children’s interests in custody
        matters “are best served when custody decisions are made in the
        child’s country of ‘habitual residence.’” Monasky v. Taglieri, 589
        U.S. 68, 72 (2020) (quoting Convention, pmbl.). In service to that
        principle, the Convention requires signatory nations to establish
        procedures for the rapid return of abducted children to the place
        where the child habitually resided before the abduction.
        Convention, pmbl., arts. 1–2, 6–12.
                The United States ratified the Convention, and Congress
        implemented it through the International Child Abduction
        Remedies Act (ICARA). See T.I.A.S. No. 11,670; 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et
        seq. ICARA allows the parent of an abducted child to file a petition
        for the child’s return in a state or federal court in the jurisdiction
        where the child is located, and directs courts to “decide the case in
        accordance with the Convention.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (a)–(b), (d).
        Consistent with the objects of the Convention, ICARA provides
        that “[c]hildren who are wrongfully removed or retained within
        the meaning of the Convention are to be promptly returned unless
        one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.”
        Id. § 9001(a)(4).
              One of the Convention’s “narrow exceptions” applies only
        when the parent seeking the child’s return files her petition more
        than one year after the child’s wrongful removal or retention. See
        Convention, art. 12. In that case, the court is not required to order
        the return of the child if the responding parent shows by a
        preponderance of the evidence that “the child is now settled in its
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        23-12566               Opinion of the Court                        5

        new environment.” Id.; see 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(B). Even then,
        the court has the discretion to order the child’s return—though
        “the return of a settled child should be an infrequent occurrence.”
        Fernandez v. Bailey, 909 F.3d 353, 363 (11th Cir. 2018); see
        Convention, art. 18.
                                         B.
               The parties here do not dispute that Rojas wrongfully
        removed C.R. from Venezuela in March 2021 in violation of their
        custody agreement and Cuenca’s parental rights under Venezuelan
        law. At the time, Cuenca and Rojas—who separated before C.R.
        was born and divorced two years later—shared custody of C.R. so
        that he spent his days with Cuenca at his paternal grandparents’
        home and his nights with Rojas. One morning, Rojas told the
        paternal grandfather that she was taking C.R. to a family farm in
        Venezuela; she took him across the border into Colombia and then
        to the United States. She called Cuenca a few days later and told
        him that she and C.R. were on vacation in the United States. She
        revealed that they were in Jacksonville, Florida, but did not provide
        a specific address.
               During the months that followed, Rojas repeatedly assured
        Cuenca that she would return to Venezuela with their son in time
        for him to start school there in the fall. But even while she
        attempted to placate Cuenca, she enrolled C.R. in the local
        elementary school after moving in with her boyfriend in Orange
        Park, Florida (a suburb of Jacksonville). She also applied for asylum
        in the United States for both herself and C.R. She was given a
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12566

        Social Security number, authorization for employment, and
        permission to remain in the United States for the duration of the
        asylum proceedings. She bought a car, got a full-time job, and
        enrolled C.R. in a YMCA program before and after school. In
        October 2021, she admitted to Cuenca that she intended to settle
        permanently in the United States with C.R.
               Two months later, Cuenca visited his son in Florida and
        attempted to persuade Rojas to send C.R. back to Venezuela. She
        refused. He returned to Venezuela and filed an action for custody
        of C.R. Rojas appeared in the Venezuelan custody proceedings
        through counsel, but ultimately the Venezuelan courts awarded
        full custody of C.R. to Cuenca and denied Rojas’s appeal.
               In the meantime, C.R. flourished in his new home. He and
        Rojas continued to live in the same apartment in Orange Park,
        Florida and took trips to visit a cousin in Orlando and family friends
        in South Carolina. He learned to speak and read English, earned
        good grades, and made friends in the neighborhood, at the YMCA,
        and at school. He took swimming lessons and karate classes. He
        won school awards for academics, good character, helpfulness,
        citizenship, and perfect attendance. At the YMCA, he won the
        “most friendly” award for making the most friends throughout the
        year.
               C.R. also maintained ties with his family in Venezuela. He
        spoke with his father, his paternal grandparents, and his uncle on
        the phone almost every day, and his father traveled to the United
        States to visit him three times between December 2021 and
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        23-12566                  Opinion of the Court                               7

        February 2023. According to Cuenca, C.R. initially said that he
        would like to return to Venezuela, but he didn’t want to leave his
        mother. But after nearly two years in the United States, according
        to Rojas’s uncontradicted testimony, C.R. preferred his life and his
        friends in the United States and said openly that he did not want to
        go back to Venezuela.
                                              C.
               Twenty months after Rojas left Venezuela with C.R.,
        Cuenca filed a petition in the Middle District of Florida seeking his
        son’s return under the Convention and ICARA. Rojas opposed the
        petition, arguing that even if it was wrong of her to take C.R. out
        of Venezuela, one or more of the Convention’s exceptions to the
        return remedy applied. In particular, Rojas argued that C.R. should
        not be returned to Venezuela because Cuenca had filed his petition
        more than a year after she removed C.R. from Venezuela and he
        had since become settled in his new home in the United States. 1
              The district court held an evidentiary hearing and heard
        testimony from Cuenca, Rojas, one of C.R.’s teachers, and an
        employee of the YMCA where C.R. attended before- and after-
        school programs. After the hearing, the district court instructed
        Rojas to file her asylum application under seal, which she did.

        1 Initially, Rojas also argued that C.R.’s return to Venezuela would expose him

        to physical or psychological harm, and that C.R. wished to remain in the
        United States and was old enough and mature enough that his wishes should
        be considered. See Convention, art. 13. She has since abandoned those argu-
        ments.
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                23-12566

        Based on all the evidence before it, the district court determined
        that Cuenca had established a prima facie case for C.R.’s return
        under the Convention by showing that the child was less than 16
        years old and that Rojas had wrongfully removed him from
        Venezuela, his place of habitual residence. But the court also
        concluded that the Convention did not require C.R.’s return
        because Cuenca had filed his petition more than a year after the
        child’s wrongful removal from Venezuela, and C.R. had become
        settled in his new environment.
                In making its finding that C.R. was settled in Florida, the
        district court considered his uncertain immigration status as one
        factor, but noted—without making any judgment on the merits of
        Rojas’s immigration case—that the application for asylum was
        detailed and not frivolous, and that Rojas had been granted
        authorization to remain and work in the United States while the
        petition remained pending. The court also noted that eligible
        Venezuelan citizens enjoyed Temporary Protected Status due to
        poor humanitarian conditions in that country. This meant that
        Rojas and C.R. probably would not be removed from the United
        States for at least another year even if Rojas’s application for
        asylum were eventually denied.
               Finally, the district court acknowledged that it had the
        discretion to return C.R. to Venezuela under the Convention even
        though he was settled in the United States. See Convention, art. 18;
        Fernandez, 909 F.3d at 362. But the court declined to exercise that
        discretion, concluding that C.R.’s interest in settlement
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        23-12566              Opinion of the Court                        9

        outweighed his father’s interest in C.R.’s return and the general
        need to discourage wrongful conduct like his mother’s.
               On appeal, Cuenca argues that the district court failed to
        adequately consider Rojas and C.R.’s immigration status in
        determining that C.R. was settled in the United States. And he
        argues that even if C.R. is settled, other equitable considerations
        outweigh the interest in settlement and should have led the district
        court to order C.R. returned to Venezuela.
                                        II.
                Before reaching the merits of Cuenca’s appeal, we must
        clarify the standard of review for a district court’s determination
        that a child is or is not “settled” in his new home within the
        meaning of the Convention—a question we have not explicitly
        answered in previous cases. Generally, in deciding an appeal under
        the Convention and ICARA, we review a district court’s legal
        conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Gomez
        v. Fuenmayor, 812 F.3d 1005, 1007 (11th Cir. 2016). The
        determination of whether a child is settled in his new environment
        presents, at least to some extent, a mixed question of law and fact.
        The standard of review for such questions depends on “whether
        answering it entails primarily legal or factual work.” Monasky, 589
        U.S. at 83–84 (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset
        Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387, 396 (2018)).
               Like the analogous concept of a child’s “habitual residence,”
        the determination of whether a child is settled begins with the
        selection of the appropriate legal framework: a case-speciﬁc
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 23-12566

        totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Fernandez, 909 F.3d at 361;
        see Monasky, 589 U.S. at 84. “Once the trial court correctly identiﬁes
        the governing totality-of-the-circumstances standard, however,
        what remains for the court to do in applying that standard” is classic
        factﬁnding work. Monasky, 589 U.S. at 84; see Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d
        927, 946 (11th Cir. 1998) (describing the district court’s
        determination on the issue of settlement as a ﬁnding of fact). The
        court must “marshal and weigh evidence, make credibility
        judgments,” and consider “multifarious, ﬂeeting, special, narrow
        facts” speciﬁc to the child’s circumstances. Vill. at Lakeridge, 583
        U.S. at 396 (quotation omitted). The assessment of whether a child
        is settled “thus presents a task for factﬁnding courts, not appellate
        courts, and should be judged on appeal by a clear-error review
        standard deferential to the factﬁnding court.” Monasky, 589 U.S. at
        84. “A factual ﬁnding is clearly erroneous when a review of the
        entire record leaves us with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that a
        mistake has been committed.” Berenguela-Alvarado v. Castanos, 950
        F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). But even if
        the district court ﬁnds, as it did here, that the wrongfully removed
        child is “now settled in its new environment,” the court has the
        discretion to order the child returned to the country where he or
        she habitually resided at the time of the removal. Convention, art.
        12; Fernandez, 909 F.3d at 362–63. We then review the district
        court’s ultimate decision whether to return a child for abuse of
        discretion. Fernandez, 909 F.3d at 363.
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        23-12566               Opinion of the Court                        11

                                         III.
                                         A.
               Neither the Convention nor ICARA defines the term
        “settled” or provides any guidance on the factors courts should
        consider when determining whether a child is settled. In this
        circuit, a child is “settled” for purposes of the Convention “when a
        preponderance of the evidence shows that the child has significant
        connections to their new home that indicate that the child has
        developed a stable, permanent, and nontransitory life in their new
        country to such a degree that return would be to the child’s
        detriment.” Id. at 361. In making this determination, courts must
        “carefully consider the totality of the circumstances,” including
        evidence of the child’s “significant connections to the new country”
        as well as evidence of continuing “contacts with and ties to his or
        her State of habitual residence.” Id. (quoting State Dep’t Legal
        Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,509 (March 26, 1986)).
                Factors that may be relevant to whether a child is “settled”
        in his new environment include (1) whether the child is old enough
        to form attachments beyond the parent or guardian with whom he
        lives; (2) the duration and stability of the child’s residence in the
        new country; (3) whether the child has friends and relatives in the
        new environment; (4) whether the child regularly attends school
        or daycare; (5) the child’s participation in community or
        extracurricular activities; (6) the respondent’s employment and
        financial stability; and (7) the child and respondent’s immigration
        status. See da Costa v. de Lima, 94 F.4th 174, 179–80 (1st Cir. 2024);
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   23-12566

        Hernandez v. Garcia Peña, 820 F.3d 782, 787–88 (5th Cir. 2016); see
        also Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 17 (2014).
               Here, Cuenca does not contest the district court’s
        determination that most of the relevant circumstances weigh in
        favor of finding that C.R. is settled in his new environment. C.R.
        is now almost nine years old, and he has been living in the same
        apartment in Florida with his mother and her boyfriend since he
        arrived in the United States three years ago. He has made many
        friends and has developed close friendships with children his age
        who attend classes and after-school programs with him. He has
        attended the same elementary school since 2021. He has become
        fluent in English, is doing well in all his classes, and is well-liked by
        his teachers and other students. He loves participating in activities
        at the YMCA and is considered the leader of his group of friends
        there. He also enjoys the karate lessons he began taking last year.
        His mother has stable, full-time, “on-the-books” employment, is
        financially capable, and plans to remain permanently in the United
        States. In short, C.R. has acclimated well to his new home and has
        developed significant, enduring connections to his community.
                Despite these signs that C.R. has become established in his
        new life, Cuenca argues that his son’s lack of permanent legal status
        in this country means that he cannot be considered “settled” as that
        term is used in the Convention. More specifically, he argues that
        discrepancies between Rojas’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing
        and her application for asylum showed that the application was
        fraudulent and has no chance of success. He also argues that the
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        23-12566               Opinion of the Court                         13

        district court should not have considered the Secretary of
        Homeland Security’s extension of Temporary Protected Status for
        Venezuelans because Rojas and C.R. were not eligible for that
        protection at the time.
               We agree that a child’s lack of permanent legal status in the
        United States can have a negative impact on his ability to establish
        a “stable, permanent, and nontransitory life” in this country,
        especially if removal seems imminent. Fernandez, 909 F.3d at 361.
        But we decline to state categorically that a child without
        permanent legal immigration status cannot become “settled” in the
        United States within the meaning of the Convention. Instead, we
        join several of our sister circuits in holding that a child’s
        immigration status is one relevant factor that must be evaluated in
        the context of the child’s individual circumstances. See da Costa, 94
        F.4th at 180; Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2012); Alcala
        v. Hernandez, 826 F.3d 161, 171 (4th Cir. 2016); Hernandez, 820 F.3d
        at 787–88; In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 1009–14 (9th Cir. 2009).
        Whether the child and respondent are present illegally, whether
        they have a feasible path to permanent legal residence, and
        whether they are currently embroiled in removal proceedings will
        all be relevant to the court’s ultimate finding on the issue of
        settlement.
                When the respondent and child have a pending application
        for permanent legal status, an assessment of the facial validity of
        the application may be helpful. But we reject the suggestion that
        district courts should attempt to prejudge the merits of an
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 23-12566

        immigration petition—in general, district courts have no role in
        immigration proceedings and are not in the best position to predict
        how an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals
        may rule. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
                Here, the district court appropriately considered that Rojas’s
        application for asylum was “detailed and non-frivolous” while
        declining to express an opinion on the merits of the application. It
        is true that Rojas’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing
        contradicted one of the statements in her application for asylum.
        But the essential parts of Rojas’s asylum claim—her history of
        serious conflicts with Venezuelan authorities and her fear of
        returning there—were consistent with her testimony in the district
        court. And because Cuenca failed to raise this issue until after the
        district court denied his petition and the record contained nothing
        from Rojas’s asylum proceedings except the initial application, the
        district court had no way of knowing whether Rojas would be able
        to correct her application or explain the inconsistency to the
        immigration judge.
               Considered in context with other details of C.R.’s
        immigration status, the uncertain fate of Rojas’s application for
        asylum does not necessarily outweigh the evidence of C.R.’s many
        lasting connections to his new community. As the district court
        noted, Rojas and C.R. were authorized to remain in the United
        States for the duration of the proceedings on their asylum claim.
        They had been living in Florida for two years already, and they had
        not yet had the first scheduling hearing in their immigration
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        23-12566                  Opinion of the Court                              15

        proceedings. And although Rojas and C.R. did not then meet the
        length-of-residency requirement for Temporary Protected Status,
        the Secretary’s formal declaration in September 2022 that “severe
        economic and political crises ongoing within Venezuela”
        prevented Venezuelans from returning in safety at least indicated
        that their removal to Venezuela would not be a priority in the near
        future. 2 Extension of the Designation of Venezuela for Temporary
        Protected Status, 87 Fed. Reg. 55,024, 55,026 (Sept. 8, 2022). In the
        circumstances, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in
        finding that C.R. is “now settled” in his new environment.
                                              B.
               Of course, the fact that C.R. is settled does not end the
        matter; the Convention gives courts the discretion to order the
        return of even a settled child. See Convention, art. 18. But that
        discretion should be exercised sparingly to avoid “swallow[ing] the
        text of Article 12’s stated exception” allowing settled children to
        stay where they are. Fernandez, 909 F.3d at 363. Sometimes,
        though, the objectives of the Convention—ensuring that child-
        custody decisions are made in the child’s home country and
        discouraging parents from absconding with children in search of a
        friendlier custody forum—will outweigh the child’s interest in

        2 In October 2023, Secretary Mayorkas re-designated Venezuela for Tempo-

        rary Protected Status, offering Rojas and C.R. protection from removal
        through at least April 2025. Extension and Redesignation of Venezuela for
        Temporary Protected Status, 88 Fed. Reg. 68,130 (Oct. 3, 2023), corrected by 88
        Fed. Reg. 80,327 (Nov. 17, 2023).
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12566

        settlement. See id. at 363–64. Factors that may be relevant in this
        inquiry include the child’s remaining ties to his home country, his
        “need for contact with the non-abducting parent,” “the non-
        abducting parent’s interest in exercising the custody to which he or
        she is legally entitled,” and “the need to discourage inequitable
        conduct” by abducting parents. Lozano, 572 U.S. at 20 (Alito, J.,
        concurring).
               Still, returning a settled child is the exception rather than the
        rule, and here the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        declining to order C.R.’s return to Venezuela. Rojas’s conduct in
        removing C.R. from his home in violation of his father’s custody
        rights was undoubtedly wrongful, as was her initial dishonesty in
        informing Cuenca that she planned to return with C.R. even as she
        applied for asylum. But she informed Cuenca almost immediately
        that she had taken C.R. to Jacksonville, and she has made no effort
        to conceal his location or keep Cuenca from speaking to C.R. or
        visiting him in Florida. And although the district court’s denial of
        Cuenca’s petition means that he will have to sue in Florida if he
        wishes to formalize a custody arrangement, the district court’s
        decision does not prevent the Florida court from awarding Cuenca
        whatever custody and visitation rights it deems suitable.
                                    *      *      *
               Carlos Cuenca Figueredo established that his ex-wife
        wrongfully abducted their only child from his home in Venezuela
        in violation of Cuenca’s custody rights. Ordinarily, the Hague
        Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
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        23-12566               Opinion of the Court                       17

        would mandate the “prompt return” of Cuenca’s son. But Cuenca
        waited more than a year to file his petition for the child’s return
        under the Convention, and in the meantime, his son developed
        stable, enduring ties to his new community. Under the
        circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in finding that
        Cuenca’s son was “settled” in his new home in the United States.
        And because the facts of this case did not present equitable
        considerations outweighing the child’s interest in settlement, the
        district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order his
        return to Venezuela. We therefore affirm the denial of Cuenca’s
        petition.
              AFFIRMED.