Court Opinion

ID: 9757188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:23:07.262528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:35.805007
License: Public Domain

KELLY. Associate Judge
(dissenting) :
I cannot agree that the search and seizure in this case did not exceed reasonable bounds under the Fourth Amendment.
Officer Comeau testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he arrested appellee pursuant to a warrant charging him with operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his operator’s permit. Before transporting him to the station, Officer Comeau instructed appellee to place his hands against a wall, and began to pat him down.1 Upon feeling a bulge in the pocket of appellee’s trench coat, the officer reached into the pocket and discovered that it contained a leather pouch and an envelope. He squeezed both items, ascertaining to his own satisfaction that they contained no weapons. Admittedly no longer searching for concealed weapons, he nonetheless withdraw the envelope from appellee’s pocket since, in light of his prior experience, he suspected that it might contain narcotics. Investigation confirmed his suspicions and appellee was charged with unlawful possession of heroin.
The majority, in reversing the granting of the motion to suppress the heroin, has taken the position that it is constitutionally permissible to fully search the person of an arrestee, incident to a lawful custodial arrest, regardless of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. In my opinion, this holding is contrary to law.
In analyzing the constitutionality of a warrantless search of persons or places there are two questions which must be considered. The first is whether the search was justified at its inception, and the second is whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.2
Unquestionably, when an officer lawfully takes a person into custody there is some right to search incident to the arrest. *735The legitimate objectives of such searches have traditionally been stated as the need to seize fruits, instrumentalities and evidence which might be destroyed or concealed, and the necessity of removing any weapons that the arrestee might use against the officer or for the purpose of effecting an escape.3 Thus, the situation is markedly different from a Terry-type stop and frisk for weapons, which cannot be justified at its inception unless an officer who lacked probable cause to arrest can demonstrate that he had reasonable, articulable suspicions that he was dealing with an armed and dangerous man.
However, it is also clear that a search incident to a lawful arrest must be reasonable in scope to remain within constitutional bounds; that is, it “must have a reasonable relationship to the protection of the officer or the crime for which the accused was arrested.” 4
This scope limitation principle has been clearly set out by the Supreme Court. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court stated that “[t]his Court has held in the past that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope”, and that “[t]he scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Id. at 17-19, 88 S.Ct. at 1878.
In Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), a companion case to Terry involving a search incident to a lawful arrest, the Court made it apparent that the scope limitation principle applies to all searches, and is not limited to stop and frisk situation when it said:
[The officer] had the authority to search Peters, and the incident search was obviously justified “by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime.” . . . Moreover, it was reasonably limited in scope by these purposes. Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and thorough-going examination of Peters and his personal effects. ... 392 U.S. at 67, 88 S.Ct. at 1905. [Emphasis supplied.]
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court again applied the scope limitation principle to an arrest-based search and concluded that a far ranging search of the house of a man arrested for larceny was not “ ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” 395 U.S. at 762,5 89 S. Ct. at 2039.
This court has also recognized that the right to search must be reasonably limited in scope, and specifically “that there are limitations on the right to search incident to a traffic arrest”.6 In Dickerson v. United States, D.C.App., 296 A.2d 708 (1972), following an arrest for driving with outdated license tags, an officer searched under the seat of the car after the arrestee had been removed and discovered a gun. The search was held to be illegal because it
was not for fruits of the offense because there were none. It was not for evidence of the offense because the officers already had the altered tags and registration. It was not a protective search for weapons because appellant had already been removed from his car and placed in the police car. No action by appellant had indicated an attempt to conceal contraband in the car, and the *736officers had no reason to believe that the car contained weapons or other contraband. . . . Id. at 709.
Again in Watts v. United States, D.C. App., 297 A.2d 790, 792 (1972), we stated:
There is no right to make a general exploratory search incident to a traffic arrest. McGee v. United States, D.C. App., 270 A.2d 348, 349 (1970). When the search is made without a warrant, it must be with probable cause or bear some reasonable relationship to the crime for which the arrest is made or to the safety of the officer if it is to come within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement described in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969).7
Although the facts of the instant case can be distinguished from the aforementioned cases in that we are here concerned with a search of a person, rather than a place, taken into custody for one of the more serious types of traffic offenses, our reasoning should remain the same.8 Where an arrest is made for an offense for which there are no fruits, instrumen-talities, or evidence to be found it is my opinion that the only proper goal of an incident contemporaneous search is the removal of weapons and means of escape. Once this goal is accomplished, any further intrusion is exploratory and unreasonable. In the instant case, the arresting officer had completed his search for weapons in appellee’s pocket when he withdrew the envelope of narcotics. Absent probable cause to believe this envelope contained contraband, the officer had no right to examine it.
The cases relied on by the majority admittedly contain much general language supporting the right of an officer to make a full search of persons incident to lawful arrests. It must be pointed out, however, that none of those cases involve traffic offenses and only one addresses itself specifically to the problem of searching an arres-tee charged with an offense for which there are no fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence.9 That case is Worthy v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 409 F.2d 1105 (1968), where the validity of a search of a person arrested for vagrancy which uncovered narcotics was upheld. The majority regards this case as binding precedent under the principles enunciated in M. A. P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971), despite the fact that the court which decided it has stated its opinion that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have *737“[cast] grave doubts on the continuing validity of that holding.” 10
Additionally, I am disturbed by the suggestion of the majority that the discovery of a small manila envelope in appellee’s pocket was sufficient to give Officer Co-meau probable cause to believe appellee was in possession of narcotics. Although the officer testified that he had seen such envelopes used for carrying narcotics on other occasions, and that he had never seen such an envelope used on the street for any other purpose, he also admitted that it was a standard payroll envelope, the kind, in fact, which he himself received every payday. The suggestion that when an officer sees a person in possession of an ordinary payroll envelope he has probable cause, absent additional circumstances, to search that envelope for narcotics is, in my opinion, unsupported by the case law of this jurisdiction.11

. An Officer Jenks came upon the scene and assisted in the arrest.

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Robinson, U.S.App.D.C., 471 F.2d 1082 (No. 23,734, Oct. 31, 1972), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3378 (U.S.Dec. 27, 1972) (No. 72-936).

. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964).

. United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055, 1058 (10th Cir. 1969).

. For a lengthy discussion of this point see United States v. Robinson, supra note 2.

. Dickerson v. United States, D.C.App., 296 A.2d 708, 709 (1972).

.On the related question of station house searches see United States v. Mills, 472 F.2d 1231 (D.C.Cir., decided en banc May 10, 1972), where the court held that the right to search incident to arrest “does not mean that [the person arrested] is subject to any and all searches that the arresting officer may wish to conduct.” At 1234. Mills had been arrested for a minor traffic offense and, without being advised of his right to post collateral, he was forced to empty his pockets at the station house for a prelockup inventory. Contraband thus disclosed was held to be inadmissible in evidence against him since, had he been told he could post collateral, he would have been able to do so thus avoiding the need for an inventory search. Accord, Carpio v. Superior Court, County of Santa Barbara, 19 Cal.App.3d 790, 97 Cal.Rptr. 186 (1971); People v. Overlee, 174 Colo. 202, 483 P.2d 222 (En Banc, 1971).

. Obviously, driving after revocation is not a “mere” traffic offense. It is a serious offense for which one may be fined or imprisoned or both. However, this does not change the fact that it is a crime lacking fruits and instrumentalities.

. Although this court has long relied on the general language of Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831, 81 S.Ct. 46, 5 L.Ed.2d 59 (1960), to support its decisions, it is interesting to note that the Ninth Circuit, absent special circumstances, disapproves of a protective search in routine traffic arrests. United States v. Davis, 9 Cir., 441 F.2d 28 (1971).

. United States v. Robinson, supra note 2, 471 F.2d at 1108 n. 47.

. Cf. McWilliams v. United States, D.C. App., 298 A.2d 38 (1972).