Court Opinion

ID: 9716681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:47:56.551197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.752429
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result because I agree with the majority that the case should be remanded to make a custody determination. I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority's reason for doing so.
The majority asserts that the parties' stipulation to paternity does not satisfy the statutory requirement that paternity be established in a proceeding other than the adoption proceeding. When IND.CODE 31-8-1-6 was amended in 1988 to add the language "other than the adoption proceeding," I believe the legislature intended the statute to require a separate proceeding to establish paternity in order to facilitate a separation of the adoption and paternity issues. When a stipulation is entered, however, there is no need to conduct a hearing on the stipulated fact. All the court need do is accept or reject the parties' stipulation. It would be a waste of judicial resources to require Vaughan to interrupt the adoption proceedings to run next door to the juvenile court to establish paternity through stipulation when the circuit court is just as able to accept the stipulation. I believe separate proceedings are required only if the parties intend to present evidence to the court on the issue of paternity.1
The record indicates that the trial court gave custody to Vaughan based on an erroneous understanding of the status of the natural mother's consent to the baby's adoption by the proposed adoptive parents. On April 7, 1989, the natural mother filed a *953motion to intervene that stated in pertinent part:
8. That it is necessary for counsel to intervene on behalf of said Barbara L. Dzuroveak in the captioned adoption proceedings in the event that the motion to contest the adoption is granted, the adoption is denied and the issue of custody is to be resolved by the Court as between the alleged natural father of Baby Boy Dzuroveak and the natural mother.
4. That in the event that the motion to contest the adoption is granted and the adoption is dismissed, Barbara L. Dzuroveak would seek leave of Court to withdraw her consent to the adoption and proceed with the filing of a petition seeking custody of the aforesaid minor child.
Record at 28. The trial court granted the motion on April 7, 1989.
Following the hearing held on Vaughan's motion to contest the adoption and dismiss the adoption petition, the trial court made the following finding:
6. That the natural mother of said infant male child has filed her written consent to the adoption of said child and [has] not requested that said consent be withdrawn.
Record at 254. This finding is erroneous because the natural mother did in fact request to withdraw her consent in her motion to intervene and the motion was granted.
The natural mother withdrew her consent to adoption and the natural father, whose paternity was properly established, refused to provide his consent to the adoption. Accordingly, I would remand the proceedings to the trial court for a determination of who, between the two natural parents of the child, is entitled to custody in accordance with the best interests of the child.

. This case is unique because Lake County's court system vests its superior court with juvenile jurisdiction to decide paternity cases and its circuit court with probate jurisdiction to conduct adoption proceedings. On the other hand, most other courts vest its circuit courts with both probate and juvenile jurisdiction. If the parties in this case were in one of the latter court systems, the same judge would have jurisdiction to conduct the adoption proceedings and to accept the parties' stipulation to paternity. I do not think an exercise in form over substance should dictate a different result in the case before us.