Court Opinion

ID: 9966114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-05 07:12:37.583103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:12.318393
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 2, 2024.

                                 In The

                  Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                          NO. 14-22-00281-CR
                          NO. 14-22-00282-CR
                          NO. 14-22-00283-CR

          CHRISTOPHER DI-MATHEW ARREAGA, Appellant
                                    V.

                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
                         Harris County, Texas
           Trial Court Cause Nos. 1762750, 1685507 & 1685508

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

     A jury found appellant Christopher Di-Matthew Arreaga guilty of two
counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (trial-court cause number
1685507/appellate-court case number 14-22-00282-CR and trial-court cause
number 1685508/appellate-court case number 14-22-00283-CR) and one count of
“super” aggravated sexual assault of a child (trial-court cause number
1762750/appellate-court case number 14-22-00281-CR).1 See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(iii), (a)(B)(iv), (a)(2)(B), (f)(2). The jury assessed
punishment at imprisonment for 50 years in trial-court cause number 1762750, 35
years in trial-court cause number 1685507, and 35 years trial-court cause number
1685508.

       In what we construe as four issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred
by denying his motion for new trial because (1) the State presented false DNA
evidence; (2) there was prosecutorial misconduct—namely, the State’s failure to
deliver Brady material and the State’s avoidance of statutory notice requirements;
and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant also argues that
(4) the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he acted in concert with
others to plan the sexual assault. We overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the
trial court’s judgments.

                                   I.      BACKGROUND

       One night in July 2020, at approximately 1:00 a.m., the two complainants—
sisters A.R. (age 13) and E.R. (age 11)—snuck out of their house and walked to a
McDonald’s to meet up with a female friend—A.C. (age 12)—and hang out with
some boys A.C. had met online. The two complainants had never met the boys
before.

       A few minutes later, appellant, his brother Bryan, and his friends Daniel
Tellez and Jose Majano picked the girls up from the McDonald’s parking lot in a
black sedan and drove the girls to appellant’s home. The boys separated the two
sisters, telling E.R. to go into one bedroom and A.R. and A.C. into another; Bryan
       1
         “Commission of the offense under subsection (f)(2), which effectively replaces the ‘or’
between subsection (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B) with an ‘and,’ is . . . what the court and parties
referred to as ‘super’ aggravated sexual assault of a child.” Moreno v. State, 413 S.W.3d 119,
128 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.).

                                               2
and Majano entered the room with E.R. while appellant went into the room with
A.R. and A.C.

     Bryan and Majano asked E.R. to enter a closet. Majano removed E.R.’s
clothes and he and Bryan orally, anally, and vaginally penetrated her with their
penises. After roughly an hour, appellant entered the closet after Majano left the
closet. E.R. testified that appellant instructed E.R. to perform oral sex on his
brother, Bryan, who was still in the closet. E.R. claimed that after appellant and
Bryan left, Tellez then entered the closet and made E.R. perform oral sex on him.

     Bryan and Jose removed E.R.’s clothes and positioned her on her hands and
knees. Bryan and Jose then simultaneously put their penises inside E.R.’s mouth,
vagina, and anus; when she started bleeding, Bryan and Jose put a towel
underneath her. Appellant then came in and told E.R. to “suck his brother’s dick.”
Bryan’s penis touched E.R.’s mouth before she was able to move away and say
“no.” When appellant and Bryan left the room, Daniel entered the closet and
forced his penis into E.R.’s mouth. E.R. told the forensic nurse who interviewed
her that the boys were filming her and showing other people the sexual assault via
FaceTime.

     Meanwhile, in the other room, a baby was sleeping on the bed so appellant
put blankets on the floor and had A.R. lie down next to him. A.R. did not want to
lie next appellant, but she did not know what to do so she eventually laid down on
the blanket. Appellant then repeatedly asked A.R. to give him oral sex, and A.R.
repeatedly refused. Appellant then got on top of A.R., gave her a hickey on her
neck, took her pants and underwear off and put his penis inside of her vagina and
anus. A.R. kept telling appellant “no,” but he would not stop. A.R. noticed that
appellant was recording the assault.

     Eventually, the boys had the girls get back in the car. When the car stopped,
                                        3
the girls exited the vehicle and called the police from the nearest gas station
because the boys had taken their phones. The police found the girls’ phones in an
automated Walmart kiosk where they had sold the girls’ phones. Security footage
verified that all four of the boys walked into the Walmart later in the morning on
the day of the sexual assaults.

     The girls were taken to the hospital to undergo sexual assault examinations;
the nurse observed a bruise on A.R.’s neck and noted several injuries to E.R.’s
genitals, which were actively bleeding at the time of the examination. The police
obtained a search to collect appellant’s DNA, but claimed they could not obtain a
search warrant for Bryan or his DNA because he was a minor. They compared
appellant’s DNA to the DNA discovered on the towel that was placed under E.R.
during the sexual assault. The DNA analysis showed that it was seven times more
likely that DNA recovered from the towel originated from E.R. and appellant
rather than E.R. and an unknown individual and three times more likely that the
DNA recovered from a swab of E.R.’s genitals and underwear originated from
appellant and an unknown individual rather than two unknown individuals. The
DNA expert explained that these results only offered limited support for the
proposition that appellant was the contributor to the DNA associated with E.R.;
the DNA expert also admitted that biological siblings share a higher percentage of
DNA compared to other individuals. The DNA evidence linking appellant to
A.R.’s underwear, however, was incredibly strong: it was approximately three
trillion times more likely that the DNA mixture from the sperm fracture recovered
from A.R.’s underwear originated from A.R. and appellant rather than from A.R.
and an unknown individual.

     Appellant argued that he did not participate in the sexual assault; instead, his
DNA simply transferred to both complainants from objects in the house. The jury

                                         4
implicitly rejected appellant’s theory and found him guilty on all three offenses:
two offenses of aggravated sexual assault against A.R., and one offense of super
aggravated sexual assault committed against E.R. by forcing E.R.’s mouth to
touch Bryan’s penis and by acting in concert with Majano or Tellez, who engaged
in conduct that would constitute the offense of sexual assault of E.R. during the
course of the same criminal episode. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021.

       During the punishment phase of trial, the State presented evidence that
appellant assaulted C.R.—a different twelve-year-old girl—approximately two
weeks before assaulting A.R. and E.R. C.R. testified that appellant drove her to
his house and sexually assaulted her; she eventually ran out of the house and
walked for three hours to the nearest gas station.

       Appellant was sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment on the super aggravated
sex assault conviction and 35 years’ imprisonment on both of the aggravated
sexual assaults; the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.2 See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(f)(2).

       Appellant filed a motion for new trial and requested a hearing. In support of
his motion, appellant attached several affidavits, including one from his DNA
expert claiming that the DNA mixtures recovered from E.R.’s genitals likely
originated from appellant’s brother Bryan and not from appellant. Appellant also
complained that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State’s
actions regarding the DNA evidence constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

       2
           After reviewing the reporter’s record, we concluded that appellant was not properly
sentenced. We abated the appeals so that the trial court could pronounce sentence in open court
in each cause. See Meachum v. State, 273 S.W.3d 803, 805–06 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2008, order) (“Following the Court of Criminal Appeals decision in Thompson [108 S.W.3d 287
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003)], we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over appellant’s appeal based on
the trial court’s failure to pronounce the sentence in appellant’s presence.”).

                                              5
       After holding a hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court signed an
order denying appellant’s motion for new trial. Appellant appealed.3

                                       II.    ANALYSIS

A.     Legal sufficiency

       In what we construe as his fourth issue, which we address first, appellant
argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he
acted “in concert” with co-defendants. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence for his two convictions of aggravated sexual assault against A.R.,
nor does he challenge the other elements of his super aggravated sexual assault
conviction.

       1.      Standard of review and applicable law

       We apply a legal-sufficiency standard of review in determining whether the
evidence supports each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19
(1979); see Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Under
this standard, we examine all the evidence adduced at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether a jury was rationally justified in
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360. We consider
all evidence in the record, whether admissible or inadmissible. Winfrey v. State,
393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We also consider both direct and
circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn
from the evidence. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

       3
          Appellant filed three separate notices of appeals, one for each conviction. Trial court
cause number 1762750, appellant’s conviction for super aggravated sexual assault against E.R.,
correlates to appellate case 14-22-00281-CR. Trial court cause numbers 1685507 and 1685508,
appellant’s convictions for aggravated sexual assault of A.R., correlate to appellate cases 14-22-
00282-CR and 14-22-00283-CR, respectively.

                                                6
2007). We will uphold the jury’s verdict unless a rational fact-finder must have had
reasonable doubt as to any essential element. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
      We do not, however, re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence
or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d
742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Because the jury is the sole judge of the
witness’s credibility and the weight given their testimony, we resolve any
evidentiary conflicts or inconsistencies in favor of the verdict. See Isassi v. State,
330 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“As long as the jury’s finding of a
culpable intent ‘is supported by a reasonable inference, it is within the province of
the fact-finder to choose which inference is most reasonable.’”).
      Sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge and as authorized in the indictment. Malik v.
State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct
jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment,
does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict
the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.” Id.

      For the offense of aggravated sexual assault, the hypothetically correct jury
charge requires the jury to find that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the
penetration of the anus of another person, or caused the sexual organ of another
person to contact the sexual organ of appellant, and that the victim is under the age
of 14. See Tex. Penal Code 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i), (iii), (a)(2)(B). For the offense of
super aggravated sexual assault, the hypothetically correct jury charge requires the
jury to find that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the mouth of a child
under the age of 14 to contact the sexual organ of another person, and that

                                          7
appellant acted in concert with another who engaged in conduct that would
constitute an offense of sexual assault during the course of the same criminal
episode. See Tex. Penal Code 22.021(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(A)(v), (a)(2)(B), (f)(2).

      2.      Application

      Appellant acknowledges that the statute does not define “in concert.”
Appellant and the State both agree that being “in concert” can be generally defined
as “an agreement in design or plan” or a “union formed by mutual communication
of opinion and views.” See Arredondo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 676, 680 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2008, no pet.) (defining “in concert). Using this definition, appellant
argues that the record does not support the conclusion that he acted in concert with
Majano or Tellez because he was not in the closet when they were sexually
assaulting E.R. and the record does not indicate that he ever verbally encouraged
the assault or facilitated the assault by restraining E.R.

      However, a defendant’s intent can be established by circumstantial evidence.
See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The present
case contained sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that
appellant acted in concert with Majano or Tellez, including but not limited to the
following evidence:

           • all four co-defendants arrived together in the same car to pick
             up the complainants;
           • appellant and his co-defendants separated A.R. and E.R. prior
             to sexually assaulting them;
           • appellant placed his penis inside A.R.’s vagina and anus in his
             room while Bryan and Jose simultaneously placed their penises
             inside E.R.’s mouth, vagina, and anus;
           • appellant was aware that E.R. was in Bryan’s room during the
             assault and could hear her being assaulted;

                                           8
         • appellant entered Bryan’s room after hearing a knock on his
           door and then instructed E.R. to put Bryan’s penis in her mouth;
         • appellant kicked E.R. in the head when she pulled her head
           away from Bryan’s penis;
         • Daniel was in the room when appellant instructed E.R. to put
           Bryan’s penis in her mouth;
         • Daniel entered the closet after appellant ordered E.R. to put her
           mouth on Bryan’s penis and made E.R. put her mouth on his
           penis;
         • Jose and Bryan entered A.R.’s room together with their penises
           exposed and attempted to make her put their penises in her
           mouth;
         • Bryan took the complainants’ phones after the sexual assault
           and refused to return them;
         • all four co-defendants drove the complainants away from the
           scene of the offense;
         • the co-defendants made fun of the complainants after sexually
           assaulting them;
         • all four co-defendants traveled to Walmart together to sell the
           complainants’ phones.
      In sum, the testimony established that all four co-defendants were working
together to plan and execute the sexual assaults. They took turns with each
complainant and often there were multiple co-defendants in the room together
during the various assaults. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the
jury’s finding that appellant acted in concert with the co-defendants by planning
the sexual assault in advance and working together with the co-defendants to
achieve their common goal. We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

B.    False DNA evidence and prosecutorial misconduct

      In his first and second issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred by

                                         9
failing to grant his motion for new trial because: (1) the State presented false DNA
evidence at trial; and (2) the state committed prosecutorial misconduct by (a) not
disclosing the underlying DNA testing records, and thus violating its Brady
obligations; and by (b) failing to provide actual notice of its intent to introduce
evidence of extraneous offenses. We will address these claims separately. These
arguments pertain to all three of the underlying convictions.

      1.     False DNA evidence claim

             a.     Standard of review and applicable law

      An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial for
an abuse of discretion. Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Under this standard, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and only reverse if no reasonable view of
the record could support the court’s ruling. Id.

      Generally, to preserve error for appellate review, the record must show that a
complaint was made known to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or
motion with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint.
See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). The defendant must also show that the trial court
ruled on the objection or that the defendant objected to the trial court’s refusal to
rule on the objection. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2).

             b.     Application

      Appellant’s motion for new trial did not allege that the State presented false
DNA evidence at trial. Instead, appellant asserts that the issue was preserved for
appellate review because it was discussed during the hearing on the motion for new
trial. However, although the issue was discussed, appellant never clearly raised this
objection to the trial court for a ruling nor did the trial court rule on the issue. See

                                          10
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992) (“As regards specificity, all a party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of
a complaint on appeal is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks
himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at
a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.”).
Because appellant’s trial objections do not comport with the issue he raises on
appeal, we conclude that appellant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate
review. See Tex. R. App. 33.1. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

      2.     Prosecutorial misconduct

      In his second issue, appellant complains of prosecutorial misconduct,
alleging the State violated its Brady violations by not giving him the underlying
DNA data and by not giving him actual notice of the extraneous offenses it
intended to introduce at trial.

             a.     Applicable law

      “Under Brady, nondisclosure of favorable evidence violates due process
only if it is ‘material’ to guilt or punishment.” Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 812
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
“Evidence is material to guilt or punishment ‘only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’” Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698, 727
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682
(1985)). “A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown
when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.’” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).

      “Brady and its progeny do not require prosecuting authorities to disclose

                                         11
exculpatory information to defendants that the State does not have in its possession
and that is not known to exist.” Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 810. Similarly, the State does
not have such a duty if the defendant was actually aware of the exculpatory
evidence or could have accessed it from other sources. Id.

             b.    False DNA evidence

      We first note that contrary to appellant’s assertion, appellant’s expert did not
identify any actual errors in the original analysis of the DNA in appellant’s case or
reveal any benefit that would have accrued to appellant if the data generated from
the DNA analysis had been turned over to him. Instead, appellant’s expert testified
that based on a new DNA analysis using Bryan’s recently-acquired DNA sample,
the testing shows that it was more likely that the DNA evidence recovered from
E.R.’s genitals was deposited by Bryan and equally likely that the DNA evidence
recovered from E.R.’s underwear was left by either Bryan or appellant. Because
the State was not in possession of Bryan’s DNA sample, the conclusions of
appellant’s DNA expert were largely based on data that was not available to the
State at the time of trial. The new analysis performed by appellants’ DNA expert
also supports the State’s theory that appellant caused E.R. to have sexual contact
with Bryan. Thus, there was no Brady violation relating to the analysis of Bryan’s
DNA. See id.

      Appellant also complains that the State did not give him the entire 850 pages
of DNA testing records regarding his results; he claims that having such data
would have allowed him to better rebut the State’s theory of the case. However,
before trial, appellant was given the lab reports that summarized all the data, and
he was given the technician’s conclusions that appellant could be excluded from
the majority of the DNA comparisons with E.R. In the two instances that appellant
could not be excluded as a possible donor—the sample from the towel and from

                                         12
E.R.’s genitals—the data appellant was given only offered limited support for the
proposition that appellant was the contributor of the DNA associated with E.R.
Appellant was already aware of that information and made that argument at trial.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that had the 850 pages of the underlying DNA data
been given to appellant, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See
Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d at 727. Accordingly, the evidence was not material,
and there was no Brady violation regarding the underlying DNA data.

              c.     Lack of notice of extraneous offenses

        On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant his
motion for new trial because he never received actual notice of which extraneous
offenses the State intended to introduce at trial. However, appellant’s motion for
new trial makes no mention of the State’s alleged evasion of notice requirements.
During his closing argument at the hearing, appellant claimed that the State gave
insufficient notice of its allegations against him, but he never explained why this
purported notice violation entitled him to a new trial. Keeter, 175 S.W.3d at 760.
And the trial court never ruled on this objection. Therefore, we conclude that
appellant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. See Tex. R. App.
33.1.

        In summary, we conclude that appellant did not preserve his claim of lack of
actual notice for appellant review. Additionally, we conclude that there were no
Brady violations concerning the DNA evidence. Accordingly, we overrule
appellant’s second issue.

C.      Ineffective assistance of counsel

        1.    Applicable law

        Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee an accused the right to

                                            13
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 10 (Tex.
Official). This right necessarily includes the right to reasonably effective assistance
of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Hernandez v.
State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (applying Strickland standard to
ineffective-assistance claims under Texas Constitution). To prevail on his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must prove (1) counsel’s representation
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there was a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88; Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d at
55. In considering an ineffective-assistance claim, we indulge a strong presumption
that counsel’s actions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional
behavior and were motivated by sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689;
Duncan v. State, 717 S.W.2d 345, 347–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

      To evaluate the effectiveness of counsel’s performance, we look at the
totality of the representation. See Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 483 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Any claim for ineffectiveness of counsel must be firmly founded in the record, and
the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. See
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. Because “the record is generally underdeveloped,”
direct appeal is usually an inadequate vehicle for claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). For that
reason, “we commonly assume a strategic motive if any can be imagined and find
counsel’s performance deficient only if the conduct was so outrageous that no
competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98,
101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

                                          14
      2.     Application

      In his third appellate issue, appellant argues that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to: (1) retain a DNA expert and
failed to gather and review the lab files; (2) object to the State’s untimely motion to
consolidate the three cases tried; (3) object to the State’s allegedly improper notice
of extraneous offenses; and (4) thoroughly investigate and prepare mitigation
evidence. This argument relates to all 3 of his underlying convictions.

      We note that in his motion for new trial, appellant did not raise the second
and third rationales mentioned above; he only specifically raised the first and
fourth rationales—failing to retain a DNA expert and failing to thoroughly prepare
mitigation evidence. At the hearing on his motion for new trial, the second and
third rationales were hardly discussed; accordingly, the record is generally
underdeveloped regarding his trial counsel’s strategic motives for not objecting to
the State’s motion to consolidate and not objecting to the State’s notice of the
extraneous offenses.

             a.     Failure to retain a DNA expert

      Appellant’s first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel asserts that his
trial counsel was deficient by failing to retain a DNA expert. At the hearing,
appellant’s trial counsel testified that based on his experience of trying cases with
DNA evidence, he felt sufficiently well-versed in DNA evidence to interpret the
DNA results and explain them to the jury. He further explained that he was
concerned that if he hired a DNA expert, it could open the door for the State to
admit evidence showing that appellant assaulted a third juvenile just two weeks
before the assault of A.R. and E.R. While that extraneous evidence was introduced
eventually in the punishment phase, the State was prevented from introducing that
evidence during the guilt/innocence stage of trial.
                                          15
      Appellant claims that a DNA expert could have been able to analyze the data
and present evidence that Bryan was the source of the DNA associated with E.R.,
not appellant. However, the record does not reflect that Bryan’s DNA profile was
available before trial; in fact, the record gives no indication of when Bryan’s DNA
profile became accessible. Additionally, evidence that Bryan was the source of the
DNA found on E.R.’s underwear and genitals still supports the State’s theory
because appellant was charged with causing E.R. to have sexual contact with
Bryan. We cannot conclude that appellant’s trial counsel was deficient for failing
to retain a DNA expert in this case.

             b.     Failure to object

      We have previously concluded that there are legitimate reasons for not
wanting to sever criminal cases. See Adekeye v. State, 437 S.W.3d 62, 72 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (concluding trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to sever cases because trying the cases separately would give
the State “two shots of getting a guilty verdict”). Because we can assume a
strategic motive, we cannot conclude that appellant’s counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the State’s motion to consolidate.

      Regarding appellant’s complaint that his trial counsel failed to object to the
State’s allegedly improper notice of extraneous offenses, appellant has not
demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged deficiency,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. The extraneous offenses of
which appellant complains are merely the acts the State alleged appellant
committed during the underlying offense. Appellant received notice of the alleged
facts through the indictments. There is no evidence suggesting that appellant was
surprised by the evidence at trial or generally unaware of the offenses alleged
against him. We cannot conclude that appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective for

                                          16
failing to object to the State’s notice of extraneous offenses.

             c.     Failure to prepare mitigation evidence

      Appellant lastly argues that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to
adequately prepare mitigation evidence; specifically, appellant asserts that his
counsel waited too long to hire a mitigation expert, which led to the expert not
having sufficient time to find relevant mitigation evidence. The mitigation expert
testified that although she typically prefers to begin mitigation work on a case one
year before trial begins, she was hired to work on appellant’s case three days
before trial. Thus, appellant claims she was unable to conduct an adequate risk
assessment, discover evidence of appellant having a potential learning disability, or
find out why appellant had dropped out of school.

      However, regardless of how late the mitigation expert was hired, mitigation
evidence was still presented at trial through appellant’s mother, girlfriend, aunt,
and stepfather. They collectively testified that appellant was negatively affected by
his parents’ divorce, that appellant moved a lot as a child and was often bullied,
appellant’s school requested that he be tested for a learning disability while he was
in the sixth grade but his mother refused and so he was never tested, appellant is
currently the caring father of a five-month-old baby, and that he is a hard worker.
Nothing in the record suggests that the result of the proceeding would have been
different had the mitigation expert been hired earlier in the case; therefore, we
cannot conclude that appellant’s conduct was deficient concerning the mitigation
expert. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.

      In summary, appellant has not demonstrated that his counsel’s representation
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s
alleged deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. We overrule appellant’s third issue.
                                          17
                                III.   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.

                                       /s/    Charles A. Spain
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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