Court Opinion

ID: 9950118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:10:56.852931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:41.281932
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1655-22

J.B.,1

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.V.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted February 13, 2024 – Decided March 13, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County,
                   Docket No. FM-01-0493-19.

                   J.V., appellant pro se.

                   Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

1
     We utilize initials to refer to the parties pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(10).
      In this one-sided post-judgment dissolution matter, self-represented

defendant/ex-husband appeals from the October 20, 2022, Family Part order

denying his motion to vacate a December 10, 2020, final judgment of divorce

(FJOD). Defendant also appeals from the January 3, 2023, order denying his

motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

                                           I.

      We glean these facts from the record. Plaintiff/ex-wife and defendant

married in 2013. A daughter was born of the marriage in 2017. On January 16,

2019, plaintiff obtained a final restraining order (FRO) against defendant

stemming from a domestic violence incident during which defendant drove

plaintiff's car through the parties' garage door and sent a text message to his

stepmother threatening to "take a hatchet to his whole family."

      Nine days later, on January 25, 2019, plaintiff filed a divorce complaint,

seeking dissolution of the marriage, sole custody of the parties' daughter, child

support, and equitable distribution of the marital assets. About one month later,

plaintiff moved for pendente lite relief, seeking, among other things, sole

possession of the marital home pending sale, payment of fifty percent of the

mortgage by defendant until the home was sold, sole custody of the parties'

daughter, child support, modification of the parenting time order entered in the

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domestic violence matter, defendant's completed Case Information Statement

(CIS), and continued insurance for plaintiff and the child.

      At the ensuing motion hearing conducted on March 22, 2019, defendant

did not appear. Plaintiff's attorney informed the judge that Sheriff's officers had

attempted to personally serve defendant at the marital home with the summons,

complaint, and pendente lite motion papers.         However, the officers were

unsuccessful because "the power [was] turned off" and "they believe[d] the

house [was] vacant." Although neighbors had seen defendant "coming and

going from the property" on occasion, plaintiff's attorney informed the judge

that she was unsure whether defendant was "staying there full-time" and, after

conducting a records search, could not "f[in]d another address for [defendant]."

      The judge inquired whether counsel had an email address for defendant

and whether defendant could receive "calls or texts." Plaintiff responded she

had defendant's "prior email" but was unsure whether it was still "active."

Plaintiff also confirmed that defendant received text messages. The judge then

directed plaintiff to send the "documents along with today's court order" to

defendant via email. The same day, the judge entered a pendente lite order

granting plaintiff the requested relief "without prejudice to [d]efendant's right

to seek a review of th[e] order."

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      Among other things, the order granted plaintiff "sole possession of the

property" to "inhabit or continue with the sale . . . at her discretion"; directed

defendant to pay "[fifty percent] of the mortgage"; granted plaintiff "[s]ole

[l]egal [c]ustody" of the parties' child, "subject to the [existing] parenting plan";

directed defendant to pay plaintiff "$182 weekly for child support" "pursuant to

the New Jersey Child Support Guidelines," effective the date the complaint was

filed; and ordered defendant to file a completed CIS within thirty days and

maintain all insurance for plaintiff and the child.

      The order further stated:

             Plaintiff shall attempt service through regular and
             certified mail, by e-mail, and through text message,
             sent by [p]laintiff's father, within two days of the date
             of this order, and shall provide proof of service and/or
             the attempts of service to the court. Plaintiff shall also
             continue to attempt personal service on [d]efendant of
             the summons and complaint.

The order was amended on May 16, 2019, granting limited power of attorney to

plaintiff to sell the marital home.

      On July 11, 2019, through counsel, defendant filed an answer and

counterclaim, admitting most of the allegations in plaintiff's complaint.

Although defendant disputed his address as alleged in the complaint, he

acknowledged the entry of the March 22, 2019, pendente lite order. In his

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counterclaim, defendant asserted that he resided at a "confidential address" that

had been disclosed to the court in his "[c]onfidential [l]itigation [i]nformation

[s]heet."     Defendant's counterclaim also demanded, among other things,

dissolution of the marriage, "rehabilitative and permanent alimony," "shared

legal custody" of the parties' child, child support, and designation as the parent

of primary residence.

         On September 6, 2019, with the consent of both parties, a second judge

entered a case management order setting a schedule for completion of discovery

within 120 days and ordering defendant to submit a completed CIS by

September 15, 2019. On November 8, 2019, on plaintiff's motion, a third judge

entered an order requiring defendant to transfer possession of the parties' vehicle

to plaintiff, and directing plaintiff's attorney to sell the car and, after expenses,

deposit the proceeds in the parties' escrow account. The motion arose from

defendant's inaction after the vehicle was ticketed while in his possession,

resulting in plaintiff being issued a drivers' license suspension notice. The

November 8 order also granted plaintiff $700 in attorney's fees. Defendant

represented himself at the November 8 hearing and has represented himself

since.

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      On December 18, 2019, both parties attended a case management

conference conducted by a fourth judge. During the conference, defendant

asked the judge to "vacate" the March 22, 2019, pendente lite order "for lack of

service."   Defendant explained "[t]here was absolutely no diligence made

whatsoever in serving the . . . notice of the hearing." The judge responded that

defendant would "have to file the appropriate motion" with notice to plaintiff

for the judge to decide whether defendant was properly served.           In turn,

plaintiff's counsel pointed out that defendant had not provided "an actual

residential address," only a post office box, and counsel "[could not] send

certified mail to [a post office box]."

      As a result, following the conference, the judge issued an order directing

defendant to "immediately" report to the Probation Office to "provide his

address." The order also permitted plaintiff to serve defendant "by first class

U.S. mail and email." The order further directed defendant to file his CIS on

the same date, December 18, 2019, inasmuch as defendant "ha[d] represented

that it [was] currently in his possession." Additionally, defendant was ordered

"to respond to . . . plaintiff's discovery requests by January 15, 2020." Finally,

a case management conference was scheduled for February 12, 2020, and the

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parties were directed to attend a matrimonial early settlement panel (MESP)

conference on March 11, 2020.

        On February 11, 2020, plaintiff moved to strike defendant's pleadings and

enter default, citing his "failure [to] respond to discovery in accordance with

[Rule] 4:23-5." In support, plaintiff submitted a certification averring that

following the entry of the March 22, 2019, pendente lite order, her attorney had

sent the complaint, summons, and pendente lite order and motion papers to

defendant "via regular and certified mail" as well as to two different "email

addresses." Additionally, plaintiff's father had "sent . . . the documents to

[d]efendant's last known cell number" via text message. According to the

certification, "the [p]roof of [m]ailing and [a]cceptance indicated that the return

receipt (green card) from the certified mailing was returned as signed" and "the

text message indicated [the documents were] delivered." In her certification,

plaintiff also recounted numerous communications between her attorney and

defendant using the same email address to which the documents had been sent.

        The judge heard oral argument on the motion on March 6, 2020.

Defendant did not appear. In an order entered on October 22, 2020, 2 the judge

2
    The delay is unexplained in the record.

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granted plaintiff's motion, "dismiss[ing]" defendant's pleadings and listing the

matter for a default hearing on December 10, 2020.

      Prior to the hearing date, plaintiff filed a Notice of Proposed Final

Judgment (Notice), in accordance with Rule 5:5-10.3             In a supporting

certification, plaintiff's counsel averred:

             On November 19, 2020, I attempted to hand-deliver a
             copy of [p]laintiff's Notice . . . and accompanying
             documents to . . . . [d]efendant's last known address as
             he represented in [c]ourt on December 18, 2019,
             however I was advised by staff at the UPS store [on]
             this date, that [defendant] has not maintained this
             address since December 12, 2019.

             . . . Therefore, on November 19, 2020, I sent
             [p]laintiff's Notice . . . via email to [defendant].

      On December 10, 2020, the judge conducted the scheduled default hearing

via telephone. Defendant did not appear. Following the hearing, the judge

entered an FJOD. Among other things, the FJOD granted plaintiff "sole legal

and sole physical custody" of the parties' child; suspended defendant's parenting

time until further court order; continued defendant's $182 weekly child support

obligation; added $4,246.77 to defendant's child support arrears for

3
  Where a default has been entered, Rule 5:5-10 provides for the entry of default
judgment in matrimonial litigation involving issues of equitable distribution,
alimony, and child support, and sets forth the requirements, including notice, for
a party filing for default judgment.
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unreimbursed educational and medical expenses; and ordered defendant to

maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy with the child as the beneficiary until

her emancipation. The FJOD also directed defendant to pay plaintiff a total of

$47,917.17 as equitable distribution, and awarded plaintiff the lion's share of t he

proceeds from the sale of the marital home.

      Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the December 10, 2020, FJOD. In

an unpublished decision, we dismissed defendant's appeal without prejudice.

Vanderwall v. Vanderwall, No. A-1211-20 (App. Div. May 18, 2022) (slip op.

at 2). We explained:

                   Defendant primarily argues that the judge
            violated his constitutional rights by conducting the
            proceeding without his presence. Before the hearing
            that led to the FJOD, defendant did not move to vacate
            the order suppressing/dismissing his pleadings. By not
            doing so, his answer and counterclaim remain
            suppressed and dismissed. After the Zoom hearing,
            defendant did not move to vacate the FJOD. Although
            the judge was within his discretion under Rule 5:5-10,
            on this record, we decline to assess the merits of
            defendant's appeal, which we dismiss without
            prejudice.

                   If desired, defendant can file motions in the trial
            court seeking to vacate the suppression/dismissal order
            and the FJOD. We take no position on the merits of
            those motions, or any other motions defendant might
            file in the trial court.

            [Id. at 2-3.]

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      Thereafter, on July 22, 2022, defendant moved in the trial court to

"vacate" the March 22, 2019, pendente lite order as well as "all orders issued

after March 22, 2019[,]" pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(e). Defendant asserted that the

March 22, 2019, order and all subsequent orders were "void" because he was

not properly served in violation of his "[c]onstitutional [r]ight to [d]ue

[p]rocess." Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for various relief not

pertinent to this appeal. On October 14, 2022, with both parties present, the

judge conducted oral argument. During the initial colloquy, defendant admitted

under oath that he had received the Notice but failed to appear at the December

10, 2020 default hearing because he "didn't see much purpose in wasting time."

      Although the judge questioned the propriety of entering the March 22,

2019, pendente lite order when there was an "acknowledge[ment] on the record

that there had been no service of process," the judge rejected defendant's

challenge to the pendente lite order and all subsequent orders, explaining that

defendant "should have made the appropriate motion" if he "thought . . . there

was a problem with the service." According to the judge, although defendant

had multiple opportunities to seek correction of the orders, he failed to "file[] a

motion or . . . do[] anything" despite being advised by two different judges that

he "could file a motion and seek relief" from the orders.

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      The judge continued:

            [Defendant] did not avail [him]self of any of the
            remedies available to [him] prior to the
            divorce . . . pleading and . . . [he] did not file a motion
            ....

                   [Defendant] candidly admitted here [he] decided
            just not to show up at the equitable distribution hearing
            because [he] felt that it wouldn't be a good use of time.
            That's okay and I understand it, but . . . these issues
            have consequences and the consequence is that a[n]
            [FJOD] was entered and I'm not going to disturb that.

                   [I find] that [defendant] waived [his] opportunity.
            [Defendant is] estopped from vacating [the FJOD].
            First of all, [he is] more than a year away. I understand
            that [he] filed the appeal so . . . a strong part of my
            decision . . . is . . . that [he] had the opportunity to ask
            this [c]ourt . . . [and other judges] to amend [the]
            decision and [defendant] didn't. It's called . . . sleeping
            on your rights.

The judge entered a memorializing order on October 20, 2022.

      Defendant moved for reconsideration.             Following oral argument

conducted on December 8, 2022, the judge denied the motion substantially for

the same reasons. In an oral opinion on the record, the judge relied on Mallamo

v. Mallamo, where we stated that "pendente lite support orders are subject to

modification prior to entry of final judgment" and "at the time of entry of final

judgment." 280 N.J. Super. 8, 12 (App. Div. 1995). The judge reiterated his

qualms about the prior judge having entered the pendente lite order "where, quite

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                                       11
candidly, [defendant] didn't have notice of that proceeding." However, because

defendant did not file a motion prior to the entry of the FJOD, "to address

whatever unfairness he deemed occurred" when the pendente lite order was

entered, and did not appear at the default hearing despite admitting that he

received notice, the judge concluded:

            That is express waiver. By telling this [c]ourt that he
            had no intent on participating because he thought it was
            a waste of time, well, then he suffered the collateral
            consequences of not being involved in the litigation.

                  Again, if he had filed an application with this
            [c]ourt, the [c]ourt would have made some type of
            determination one way or another with regard to the
            prior orders that were pendente lite and before the
            [FJOD]. But I find there has been a waiver of that
            remedy.

The judge entered a memorializing order on January 3, 2023, and this appeal

followed.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

            POINT [I]

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
            RIGHTS, PROCEDURE, AND LAW, BECAUSE IT
            FOUND THAT THE MARCH 22, 2019 HEARING
            WAS CONDUCTED EX-PARTE, WITHOUT
            SERVICE OF PROCESS, AND WITHOUT
            JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT, AND FOUND
            THE FJOD WAS ISSUED WITHOUT VALID

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                                        12
SERVICE OF NOTICE, BUT CONCLUDED THAT
BOTH WERE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE.

POINT [II]

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
RIGHTS, RULE, AND LAW, BECAUSE IT
NEGLECTED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, INCLUDING THE COURT'S OWN
FINDINGS, WHILE UNDULY CONSIDERING
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE COURT DURING
A PROHIBITED EX-PARTE HEARING.

POINT [III]

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW AND FACT BECAUSE IT APPLIED
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE IN DEFENSE OF BAD-
FAITH ACTORS.

POINT [IV]

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY, PROCEDURE, AND
RIGHTS BECAUSE IT PRESENTED A LEGAL
ARGUMENT FOR WAIVER, ADVOCATING FOR
PLAINTIFF, WITHOUT NOTICE TO DEFENDANT,
NOR GIVING DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO
RESPOND.

POINT [V]

THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, RIGHT, AND FACT, BECAUSE IT ISSUED A
FINAL ORDER, DERIVATIVE OF A VOID ORDER.

POINT [VI]

                                            A-1655-22
                   13
            THE TRIAL COURT AND ADVERSE PARTIES
            ACKNOWLEDGED      ON   RECORD   HAVING
            KNOWINGLY     ENGAGED    IN   ACTS   OF
            PROFESSIONAL, JUDICIAL, LEGAL, AND
            ETHICAL MISCONDUCT, WHICH IS CONTRARY
            TO JUSTICE, HONESTY, AND MORALITY. (NOT
            RAISED BELOW.)

                                           II.

      Our consideration of this appeal is guided by well-established principles.

Under Rule 4:50-1, a party may move for relief from a judgment or order based

on six enumerated grounds. Defendant relied on subsection (e) of the Rule,

which affords relief if "the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or

discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed

or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order

should have prospective application." R. 4:50-1(e). "In essence, the rule is

rooted in changed circumstances that call the fairness of the judgment into

question." DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 265-66 (2009). Under

Rule 4:50-2, a Rule 4:50-1 motion citing subsection (e) must be made "within a

reasonable time."

      Rule 4:50-1 "[was] designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of

judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should

have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case."        BV001 REO

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Blocker, LLC v. 53 W. Somerset St. Props., LLC, 467 N.J. Super. 117, 123

(App. Div. 2021) (quoting Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. Park Comm'n,

74 N.J. 113, 120 (1977)). As such, a motion for relief under Rule 4:50-1 should

be granted "'sparingly [and only] in exceptional situations . . . in which, were it

not applied, a grave injustice would occur.'" Badalamenti by Badalamenti v.

Simpkiss, 422 N.J. Super. 86, 103 (App. Div. 2011) (alterations in original)

(quoting Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 289 (1994)). Under

the rule, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating his or her entitlement to

relief. See Jameson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425-26

(App. Div. 2003).

      A motion to vacate under Rule 4:50-1 "is a determination left to the sound

discretion of the trial court, guided by principles of equity." F.B. v. A.L.G., 176

N.J. 201, 207 (2003).     That said, the "[trial] court's judgment will be left

undisturbed 'unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion.'" Id. at 207-08

(quoting Little, 135 N.J. at 283). A court abuses its discretion "'when a decision

is "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established

policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."'" Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v.

ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting

Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

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                                       15
      Likewise, "[a] motion for reconsideration . . . is a matter left to the trial

court's sound discretion." Lee v. Brown, 232 N.J. 114, 126 (2018) (quoting

Guido v. Duane Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87 (2010)). A party may move for

reconsideration of a court's decision pursuant to Rule 4:49-2, on the grounds that

(1) the court based its decision on "a palpably incorrect or irrational basis," (2)

the court either failed to consider or "appreciate the significance of probative,

competent evidence," or (3) the moving party is presenting "new or additional

information . . . which it could not have provided on the first application."

Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria

v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401-02 (Ch. Div. 1990)). The moving party

must "initially demonstrate that the [c]ourt acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable manner, before the [c]ourt should engage in the actual

reconsideration process." D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401.

      We also review orders entered by the Family Part under a deferential

standard of review. Landers v. Landers, 444 N.J. Super. 315, 319 (App. Div.

2016) (citing Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)). "The general rule is

that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by

adequate, substantial, credible evidence" in the record. Cesare v. Cesare, 154

N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's

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                                       16
findings of facts "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and

expertise in family matters." Id. at 413.

      Thus, while we owe no special deference to the trial judge's legal

conclusions, Manalapan Realty, L.P., v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.

366, 378 (1995), we will

            "not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions
            of the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so
            manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
            competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence
            as to offend the interests of justice" or when we
            determine the court has palpably abused its discretion.

            [Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div.
            2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J.
            at 412).]

      Guided by these deferential principles and our thorough review of the

record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the determinations made by the

judge to warrant our intervention. Thus, we affirm substantially for the cogent

reasons stated in the judge's oral opinions. As he argued in the trial court,

defendant reiterates that his due process rights were violated because he was not

provided proper notice of the March 22, 2019, motion hearing or the December

10, 2020, default hearing.

      "[I]nsufficiency of process" and "insufficiency of service of process" are

recognized defenses to a claim for relief. R. 4:6-2(c), (d). However, Rule 4:6-3

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                                       17
requires that defenses raised under Rule 4:6-2(c) and (d) "shall be raised by

motion within [ninety] days after service of the answer, provided that defense

has been asserted therein and provided, further, that no previous motion to which

[Rule] 4:6-6 [consolidation of defenses] is applicable has been made."

      Rule 4:6-7 further provides that Rule 4:6-2(c) and (d) defenses "are

waived if not raised by motion pursuant to [Rule] 4:6-3 or if omitted from a

previously made motion in which [Rule] 4:6-6 is applicable." Stated differently,

"[i]f not addressed by motion before filing an answer," a Rule 4:6-2(c) or (d)

defense "is waived if not raised in the answer and by motion within ninety days

pursuant to R[ule] 4:6-7." Byrnes v. Landrau, 326 N.J. Super. 187, 191 (App.

Div. 1999). "The use of such procedural rules to effect a waiver of an individual

right grounded in the Constitution 'does not in itself violate the defendant's due

process rights.'" Rosa v. Araujo, 260 N.J. Super. 458, 464 (App. Div. 1992)

(quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,

707 (1982)).

      Here, it is undisputed that defendant did not appear at the March 22, 2019,

motion hearing and plaintiff failed to provide definitive proof to the judge that

defendant had been served. However, defendant subsequently filed an answer

and counterclaim.      Absent from his pleadings were the defenses of

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                                       18
"insufficiency of process" or "insufficiency of service of process."       See R.

4:6-2(c), (d). Neither did defendant raise those defenses by motion in the ninety

days thereafter as required under the Rules. See R. 4:6-3; 4:6-7; see also Murat

v. Hutchinson, 16 N.J.L. 46, 46-47 (Sup. Ct. 1837) (holding that the defendant's

appearance without "object[ing] to the legality of the service" constituted "a

recognition by the defendant of the service of the process" and "a waiver of all

objection to the form and manner of service"); Leon v. Febbraro, 165 N.J. Super.

205, 207 (Law Div. 1978) (concluding that the defendant waived his right to

defend against the action for lack of jurisdiction or improper service under Rule

4:6-3 because he did not assert the defense in his answer nor file a motion within

ninety days, and appeared before the court, availing himself of the court's

jurisdiction).

      Further, defendant's answer expressly referenced the March 22, 2019,

pendente lite order, confirming that he had received the order. Additionally, as

the judge pointed out, despite being advised by two separate judges that he could

file a motion to vacate the March 22, 2019, order prior to the entry of the FJOD,

defendant failed to take any action. Instead, defendant failed to appear at the

December 10, 2020, default hearing, despite admitting under oath that he had

received notice of the hearing. By failing to appear at the default hearing,

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                                       19
defendant missed yet another opportunity to challenge the pendente lite order.

Then, approximately nineteen months after the FJOD was entered, on July 22,

2022, defendant filed the motion at issue in this appeal to vacate the judgment.

      We recognize that part of the delay in filing the motion may be attributed

to the filing of the prior appeal. However, throughout the litigation, defendant

has appeared and submitted to the court's jurisdiction at will, making

appearances at conferences of his choosing. Critically, defendant has also

continuously obscured his residential mailing address from plaintiff's counsel

and the court. Thus, we are satisfied the judge's decision to deny the motion

based on defendant's express waiver is supported by substantial, credible

evidence in the record and reflects a proper exercise of judicial discretion.

      Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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