Court Opinion

ID: 9691140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:13:21.91429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:11.476580
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, J„
dissenting.
The majority holds that the telephone harassment offense for which Appellant was previously convicted is not a lesser included offense of stalking. I must respectfully dissent to this holding. Tele*393phone harassment, under the facts of this case, is a lesser included offense of stalking because, as charged in the indictment, it is included within the proof necessary to establish the stalking offense.1
Section 42.07 of the Texas Penal Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another, he:
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(2) threatens, by telephone, in writing, or by electronic communication, in a manner reasonably likely to alarm the person receiving the threat, to inflict bodily injury on the person or to commit a felony against the person, a member of his family or household, or his property; [or]
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(4) causes the telephone of another to ring repeatedly or makes repeated telephone communications anonymously or in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another.2
Appellant placed threatening calls on or about December 18, 1999. Although he intended the calls for Susan Charles, Robert Reed received them. Appellant was convicted of telephone harassment of Reed, although Charles was his intended victim. It is undisputed that the indictment in the case relies in part on the calls Reed received. The majority points out, “The instruments charging Appellant with both telephone harassment in 1999, and stalking here, alleged the same conduct as the basis for both offenses.” (Emphasis added).
The State argues, and the majority holds, that because the misdemeanor information charging Appellant with telephone harassment of Reed alleged an offense under section 42.07(a)(4), while the stalking indictment charged an offense under sections 42.072(a)(1)(A) and (a)(3)(A) of the Texas Penal Code, the elements are completely different.3 The majority maintains that because the two charging instruments name different complainants, allege a different number of telephone calls (repeated versus one), and differ in the intent elements charged, that the common telephone call and message used to satisfy the conduct element for both the harassment and stalking offenses do not make harassment a lesser included offense of stalking. Respectfully, I cannot agree.
The harassment information alleges that Appellant, “on or about the 18th day of DECEMBER 1999, did THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY, WITH INTENT TO HARASS, ANNOY, ALARM, ABUSE, TORMENT OR EMBARRASS ANOTHER, MAKE REPEATED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS ANONYMOUSLY TO ROBERT REED.” The stalking indictment alleges that on the same date, Appellant did
KNOWINGLY ENGAGE IN CONDUCT, TO WIT: TELEPHONED AND LEFT A RECORDED MESSAGE FOR SUSAN CHARLES ... THAT WAS DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AT ANOTHER, NAMELY, SUSAN CHARLES, THAT THE DEFENDANT KNEW OR REASONABLY BELIEVED THAT THE SAID SUSAN CHARLES WOULD REGARD *394AS THREATENING BODILY INJURY OR DEATH FOR SUSAN CHARLES AND SAID CONDUCT CAUSED SUSAN CHARLES TO BE PLACED IN FEAR OF BODILY INJURY OR DEATH, AND SAID CONDUCT WOULD CAUSE A REASONABLE PERSON TO FEAR BODILY INJURY OR DEATH FOR HIMSELF....
The telephone harassment statute provides four different ways a person commits that offense.4 The legislature did not create four different offenses by describing multiple ways of committing telephone harassment. In the case before us, the misdemeanor information charging harassment describes a violation of section 42.07(a)(4), as the majority points out. The stalking allegation, however, describes the same act in terms of section 42.07(a)(2), a different manner and means of committing harassment. Allegation of a different manner and means of committing the same offense does not constitute allegation of a different offense.5 The harassment information and the stalking indictment allege the same December 18th offense, not two separate offenses. The fact that the State pled a different manner and means of committing harassment in the stalking indictment does not mean it pled a new offense.6 Analogously, if a defendant were charged and convicted under the “normal use” prong for driving while intoxicated (DWI), he could not subsequently be tried under the breath or blood alcohol concentration (BAC) prong for the same act.7
The harassment, as charged in the information, is a lesser included offense of harassment as charged in the stalking indictment. This fact is yet another reason that prosecution of Appellant under the stalking indictment is jeopardy barred. When Appellant committed harassment against Reed, he was attempting to commit the offense against Charles. The State argues that the December 18th offense is actually two separate offenses, although only a single act, because the harassment information names Reed as the complainant while the stalking indictment names Charles. When Appellant made the calls intended for Charles but received by Reed, his intent was to harass Charles. He had no way of knowing that Reed, not Charles, would receive the calls. That is, Appellant attempted to commit the harassment offense against Charles when he committed the offense against Reed.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.09 provides:
An offense is a lesser included offense if:
(1) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged;
(2) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest suffices to establish its commission;
(3) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less culpable *395mental state suffices to establish its commission; or
(4) it consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an otherwise included offense.8
The double jeopardy clause bars the State from putting a person in jeopardy twice for the same offense.9 “For double jeopardy purposes, ‘[t]he same offense means the identical criminal act, not the same offense by name.”’10 If an offense is a lesser included offense of the other, then the two offenses are also the “same” for double jeopardy purposes.11 A defendant may not be tried for the same offense in multiple prosecutions even though the State alleges a different manner and means of committing that offense.12
Not only does the fact that Appellant managed to commit the intended offense against the wrong person make him guilty of the lesser included attempt as described by article 37.09, his error implicates the transferred intent provisions of Texas Penal Code section 6.04(b). That section provides:
A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that:
(1) a different offense was committed; or
(2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected.13
Whether Appellant was convicted under a theory of transferred intent or whether the harassment offense is read in such a way that it does not require that the person actually injured be the person the actor intended to injure, Charles was the intended victim. While Appellant’s act was an offense against Reed, it was, at the same time, an attempted harassment of Charles. Under article 87.09(4), the attempt is included in the completed offense, even if the victims are not the same person.14 Similarly, evidence of a single telephone call is a lesser included element of the offense of harassment.15
Appellant was convicted of the December 18, 1999 telephone harassment, and further prosecution for that offense, even as a lesser included element of a greater offense, is jeopardy barred. I would so hold.

. See Lofton v. State, 45 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).

. Tex Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a) (Vernon Supp.2002).

. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 42.07(a)(4), 42.072(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A) (Vernon 1997 & Supp.2002).

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a).

. See Price v. State, 59 S.W.3d 297, 303 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd) (holding definition of "intoxicated” in the DWI statute sets forth alternative means of committing one offense and does not set forth separate and distinct offenses).

. Id.

. See id.; see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.01(2), 49.04(a) (Vernon Supp.2002).

. TexCode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09 (Vernon 1981) (emphasis added).

. U.S. CONST, amends. V, XIV.

. Ex parte Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (quoting Luna v. State, 493 S.W.2d 854, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)).

. Parrish v. State, 869 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Ex parte Granger, 850 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).

. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 2250, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998); Nickerson v. State, 69 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref' d).

. Tex Penal Code Ann. § 6.04(b) (Vernon 1994).

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09(4).

. See Tex Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(a).