Court Opinion

ID: 9668431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:12:59.721573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:45.416934
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). These cases, consolidated on appeal, concern related but distinct questions about a defendant’s right to a separate trial. The question presented in Hana is whether the trial court should have granted the defendants’ motions for severance under the circumstance that the defenses were so antagonistic that if the jury were to accept one of the defendant’s defenses, it would have to convict the other. I would hold that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defendants’ motions for separate trials:
The question presented in Rode/Gallina is whether the trial court’s administration of a dual-jury trial provided the defendants the same protections that they would have enjoyed had they been tried separately. I would hold that, on the facts of this case, the dual-jury procedure did not afford the defendants the same protection they would have enjoyed in separate trials.
i
Defendant Durid Hana was convicted of possession of over 650 grams of cocaine and delivery of over 255 grams but less than 650 grams of cocaine.
*364Hana’s conviction arose out of a controlled drug purchase in his Sterling Heights home in January, 1988. After the controlled purchase, the police obtained a warrant and searched Hana’s home. In a safe in the closet of a bedroom shared by Durid Hana and his brother Kafan, the police found a bag containing cocaine. Following the seizure of the cocaine from the safe, Hana was arrested and charged along with his brother Kafan.
Durid and Kafan were tried together before the same jury. Before the trial, the lawyers for both Hana brothers moved for separate trials. The lawyers submitted affidavits indicating that the brothers planned on pursuing mutually antagonistic defenses: each was going to claim to have been ignorant of the cocaine in the safe and that the other had sole possession of the cocaine. The trial court denied the motions.
At trial, the prosecution argued that its evidence tended to establish that both the Hana brothers knew that the cocaine was in the safe and, further, that both brothers jointly possessed the cocaine. Though neither defendant testified, through their attorneys’ opening and closing statements and cross-examination, each denied any knowledge of the cocaine and insinuated that the other had sole possession of the drugs.1
The jury convicted both brothers, and the trial court sentenced Durid Hana to ten to thirty years for the delivery conviction and to nonparolable life for the possession of over 650 grams conviction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.2
ii
Eric Rode and Aldo Gallina were charged with *365first-degree murder arising out of the death of Charles Schramek. As Schramek was riding in an automobile driven by his brother Edward, he was killed by a gunshot from a Chevrolet Camaro in which Rode, Gallina, and three of their friends were riding. Rode and Gallina were the only passengers in the Camaro who fired shots anywhere in the vicinity of the automobile in which Schramek was riding, and it was thus undisputed that either Rode or Gallina fired the fatal shot.
The prosecution’s theory was that Rode fired the fatal shot and that Gallina aided and abetted Rode either by handing Rode the gun with knowledge that Rode intended to shoot at the Schrameks or by providing bullets to Jimmy Kelly, who was seated next to Rode, so that Kelly could reload the gun for Rode.
Before the trial, the lawyers for both Rode and Gallina moved for separate trials pursuant to this Court’s decision in People v Hurst, 396 Mich 1; 238 NW2d 6 (1976), stating that they were going to present antagonistic defenses: both were going to deny firing the fatal shot, and each was going to claim that the other fired the fatal shot. The prosecution did not oppose these motions, and the trial court ruled that Gallina and Rode would be tried together but by separate juries.
Both defense attorneys also made the following requests:
1) that the juries be chosen from separate venires;
2) that the court remove one defendant’s jury from the courtroom while the other defendant’s lawyer was cross-examining the prosecution’s witnesses;
*3663) that neither jury be permitted to hear the testimony of the defendant in whose case they were not sitting (i.e., Gallina’s jury would not be permitted to hear Rode’s testimony and vice versa).3
The trial court refused to pick the juries from separate venires. It agreed that the juries could be excused during cross-examination as requested as long as each defendant’s lawyer gave notice that his cross-examination would incriminate the co-defendant. Later, in the course of the proceedings, the court ruled that each jury could hear the testimony of both defendants.
The juries were picked from a single venire. Rode’s jury heard the opening and closing statements of Rode’s lawyer but not Gallina’s lawyer, and vice versa. Both juries heard the testimony of both defendants who decided, after hearing the prosecution’s case, that they would testify. Each defendant denied firing the fatal shot, and each indicated that his codefendant must have shot Charles Schramek. All the prosecution witnesses testified before both juries.
Despite its pretrial ruling, the court refused to dismiss either defendant’s jury while his codefendant’s lawyer cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses. The court refused to dismiss the Gallina jury when Rode’s lawyer indicated that his cross-examination would elicit testimony that incriminated Gallina.4
At the close of the proofs, both defendants were convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
*367Ill
Appellate opinions concerning severance generally begin by stating that joint trials are favored because they are more efficient than separate trials, they enable a more accurate assessment of relative culpability, and they reduce the risk of inconsistent verdicts. New appellate courts, however, have taken the time to determine whether the assumptions underlying these rationales are valid.
A close examination of the rationales favoring joint trials indicates that they are not as sound as they may initially appear. In his authoritative article on joint trials, Joint trials of defendants in criminal cases: An analysis of efficiencies and prejudices, 77 Mich LR 1379 (1979), Professor Robert O. Dawson demonstrates that joint trials are not as beneficial as is often assumed.
Professor Dawson suggests that joint trials do not save a significant amount of prosecutorial or police resources. A joint trial "does not affect the police investigation, which is usually completed before the prosecutor decides on charging and joinder.”5 Nor would a more liberal rule in favor of severance affect pretrial proceedings "which may be held jointly, even when the trials are separate.”6
Severing the cases of two defendants often would "not even make a substantial difference in the time the prosecutor spends preparing for trial.”7 In separate trials, of course, the prosecutor would have to review the case file a second time, but, after learning the case for the first trial, he *368"would surely not need as much time as he would to prepare a new case.”8
It is far from clear that a strict rule against severance significantly conserves judicial resources more so than a rule favoring severance. Joint trials "are more complicated to conduct and take longer to complete than individual trials.”9 The trial judge in a joint trial must address complicated problems concerning jury selection, the order of the presentation of proofs, and the timing of arguments to the jury.10 There will often be more objections in a joint trial because "as the number of defense attorneys increases, it is less likely that all will decide for tactical reasons not to object when an opportunity is presented.” 11 Many of the objections may "require extensive arguments or lengthy testimony outside the presence of the jury.”12
Nor are joint and dual-jury trials the only means of preventing duplicative testimony. Lawyers could stipulate much "necessary but undisputed noncritical testimony.”13 For instance, "the testimony of the owner of burglarized premises could be stipulated if there were no dispute that the burglary took place.”14 Professor Dawson suggests that "[u]nder appropriate circumstances, the trial court could even condition severance on stipulations of such testimony.”15 Stipulations of this sort would conserve both judicial resources and the *369time of nonessential witnesses.16 In sum, separate trials need not be more consuming of judicial resources as is commonly assumed.
The "consistency of verdict” rationale ignores that "our society has made it clear by adopting the jury system that it values other considerations more than mere consistency of result.”17 In Professor Dawson’s words:
One does not have to acknowledge jury nullification to accept that a jury introduces greater uncertainty into all trials: this uncertainty is tolerated for the sake of greater procedural values. In separate, sequential trials, skilled attorneys will select juries best suited to the individual clients. Perhaps a defendant’s right through counsel to select a jury suited to try his particular case is an. important trial right, one which a joint trial with its inevitable "compromise jury” should not be able to override in the name of "consistency. ”[18]
I do not mean to suggest that the judicial system derives absolutely no benefit from joint trials and dual-jury trials. In some instances, joint trials undoubtedly save courts and witnesses both time and annoyance. The point, however, is that the rationales in favor of joint and dual-jury trials are not without their weaknesses. When a court is faced with claimed prejudice from joint or dual-jury trials, it should keep in mind that the case in favor of joint and dual-jury trials—against which claims of prejudice are to some degree balanced— is not as strong as is commonly assumed. A court *370should also keep in mind that even if joint and dual-jury trials are somewhat efficient, "[t]he first order of business of the criminal courts ... is justice, not economy or convenience . . . .” People v Ricardo B, 73 NY2d 228, 235; 535 NE2d 1336 (1989), in which the New York Court of Appeals, its highest court, affirmed a conviction following a dual-jury trial, but said that it shared "the reservations other courts have expressed” concerning the dual-jury procedure. Id. at 234.
IV
In these cases in which the defendants seek severance because of antagonistic defenses, the court rule and statute concerning severance, MCR 6.121 and MCL 768.5; MSA 28.1028, begin, but do not end, the inquiry. MCR 6.121 provides:
(A) Permissive Joinder. An information or indictment may charge two or more defendants with the same offense. . . . Two or more informations or indictments against different defendants may be consolidated for a single trial whenever the defendants could be charged in the same information or indictment under this rule.
(C) Right of Severance; Related Offenses. On a defendant’s motion, the court must sever the trial of defendants on related offenses on a showing that severance is necessary to avoid prejudice to substantial rights of the defendant.
(D) Discretionary Severance. On the motion of any party, the court may sever the trial of defendants on the ground that severance is appropriate to promote fairness to the parties and a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more of the defendants. Relevant factors include the timeliness of the motion, the drain on the parties’ resources, the potential for confusion or prejudice *371stemming from either the number of defendants or the complexity or nature of the evidence, the convenience of the witnesses, and the parties’ readiness for trial.
While MCR 6.121(C) establishes the standard for determining when severance is required—when it is necessary to avoid prejudice to substantial rights of the defendant—it does not elaborate on what constitutes either prejudice or substantial rights.19 It is thus our task to determine how the "substantial rights” of a defendant might be "prejudiced” in a joint trial in which he and his co-defendant present antagonistic or mutually exclusive defenses.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has provided the clearest exposition of how the presentation of antagonistic defenses can prejudice codefendants. In United States v Tootick, 952 F2d 1078, 1082-1083 (CA 9, 1991),20 the Ninth Circuit explained:
The joinder of defendants advocating mutually exclusive defenses can have a prejudicial effect *372upon the jury, and hence the defendants, in a number of ways.
Defendants who accuse each other bring the effect of a second prosecutor into the case with respect to their codefendant. In order to zealously represent his client, each codefendant’s counsel must do everything possible to convict the other defendant. The existence of this extra prosecutor is particularly troublesome because the defense counsel are not always held to the limitations and standards imposed on the government prosecutor. Opening statements, as in this case, can become a forum in which gruesome and outlandish tales are told about the exclusive guilt of the "other” defendant. In this case, these claims were not all substantiated by the evidence at trial. Counsel can make and oppose motions that are favorable to their defendant, without objection by the government.
Cross-examination of the government’s witnesses becomes an opportunity to emphasize the exclusive guilt of the other defendant or to help rehabilitate a witness that has been impeached. Cross-examination of the defendant’s witnesses provides further opportunities for impeachment and the ability to undermine the defendant’s case. The presentation of the codefendant’s case becomes a separate forum in which the defendant is accused and tried. Closing arguments allow a final opening for co-defendant’s counsel to portray the other defendant as the sole perpetrator of the crime.
Joinder can provide the individual defendants with perverse incentives. Defendants do not simply want to demonstrate their own innocence, they want to do everything possible to convict their codefendants. These incentives may influence the decision whether or not to take the stand, as well as the truth and content of the testimony.
The joint trial of defendants advocating mutually exclusive defenses produces fringe benefits for the prosecution. Joinder in these cases can make a complex case seem simple to the jury: convict them both.
The government’s case becomes the only unified *373and consistent presentation. It presents the jury with a way to resolve the logical contradiction inherent in the defendants’ positions. While the defendants’ claims contradict each other, each claim individually acts to reinforce the government’s case. The government is further benefited by the additive and profound effects of repetition. Each important point the government makes about a given defendant is echoed and reinforced by the codefendant’s counsel.
Joinder of defendants who assert mutually exclusive defenses has a final subtle effect. All evidence having the effect of exonerating one defendant implicitly indicts the other. The defendant must not only contend with the effects of the government’s case against him, but he must also confront the negative effects of the codefendant’s case.
Justice Stevens, concurring in Zafiro v United States, 506 US 534, —; 113 S Ct 933; 122 L Ed 2d 317, 328 (1993), also recognized the unfairness in forcing a defendant to face two prosecutors:
The burden of overcoming any individual defendant’s presumption of innocence, by proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rests solely on the shoulders of the prosecutor. Joinder is problematic in cases involving mutually antagonistic defenses because it may operate to reduce the burden on the prosecutor, in two general ways. First, joinder may introduce what is in effect a second prosecutor into a case, by turning each codefendant into the other’s most forceful adversary.
Mutually exclusive defenses in a joint trial may also prejudice a defendant’s substantial rights when the acceptance of one defendant’s defense would necessarily require the conviction of his codefendant. This dilemma arises when at least one of two defendants on trial must have committed the charged offense and the defendants each *374deny culpability and blame the other.21 A defendant is prejudiced by a joint trial in this situation because the prosecution may be relieved of proving its case against that particular defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor can simply rely on the process of elimination to secure at least one conviction. In Justice Stevens words:
[JJoinder may invite a jury confronted with two defendants, at least one of whom is almost certainly guilty, to convict the defendant who appears the more guilty of the two regardless of whether the prosecutor has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to that particular defendant. [122 L Ed 2d 328.]
A number of federal and state courts have recognized the prejudice to defendants in a trial in which the jury "must” find at least one of the two defendants guilty. In Tootick two defendants were jointly tried and convicted of assault (a stabbing) resulting in serious bodily injury under 18 USC 113(f). There was no question that one of the two defendants had stabbed the victim because the stabbing occurred when the two defendants and the victim were alone in an isolated area. Each defendant claimed that the other had stabbed the victim and that he had nothing whatsoever to do with the crime.22 Only one of the defendants testified, but each defense clearly implicated the other.
*375The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants had been prejudiced by the joint trial, in part, because "[e]ach defense theory contradicted the other in such a way that the acquittal of one necessitates the conviction of the other.”23 The contradictions in the defenses hindered the jury’s ability "to assess the guilt or innocence of each defendant on an individual and independent basis.” Id. at 1082.24
Similarly, in United States v Rucker, 915 F2d 1511 (CA 11, 1990), the Georgia Highway Patrol stopped the two defendants for speeding, and, after *376searching the vehicle, the officers found crack cocaine in the front passenger floorboard. Each of the defendants denied knowing that the cocaine was in the automobile, and each insisted that, because he did not know about the drugs, the cocaine must have belonged to the codefendant.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision not to grant the defendants separate trials. The court said:
We have two related codefendants, one of whom owns the vehicle, both asserting their ignorance of the contraband, even though it was quite literally right under foot. No reasonable juror could believe both of their stories, for to do so would mean that the contraband had been placed there by some unknown third party, and that neither defendant had thought to investigate this mysterious parcel. The unlikely juxtaposition of the co-defendants’ protestations of innocence would make each defendant "the government’s best witness against the other.” [915 F2d 1513. Citations omitted; emphasis in original.]
The Eleventh Circuit thus shared the Ninth Circuit’s view that a defendant is prejudiced if the jury must convict him if it believes his codefendant’s story.
In Commonwealth v Moran, 387 Mass 644; 442 NE2d 399 (1982), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the denial of a motion to sever was an abuse of discretion where the Commonwealth introduced evidence that "at least one defendant, but not necessarily both of them” had committed the crime and where "[t]he only realistic escape for either defendant was to blame the other.”25 The court said:
*377Where there is convincing evidence that a crime has been committed by at least one of the defendants, a jury, disinclined for any reason to convict a particular defendant, may be inclined to find the other guilty. There is a danger that the jury will feel compelled to choose between defendants rather than to assess the proof against each defendant separately.[26] Finally, with one defendant pitted against the other, there is a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer from the conflicting defenses alone that both defendants are guilty. [Id. at 659. Citations omitted.][27]
In sum, when confronted with defendants seeking severance on the ground of antagonistic defenses, our task (and that of trial courts considering motions for severance) is to determine whether the defendant will be prejudiced in any of the afore*378mentioned ways. If a defendant demonstrates28 that he will be so prejudiced by a joint trial, his trial should be severed from that of a codefendant.
I note that even when a defendant is unable to meet the requirement for severance under MCR 6.121(C), a trial court has the discretion to order severance if it "is appropriate to promote fairness to the parties and a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more of the defendants.” MCR 6.121(D).
v
The trial judge erred in refusing to sever Durid Hana’s trial from that of his brother, Kafan Hana. Kafan’s lawyer correctly observed that the brothers’ defenses could not have been any more antagonistic.
The police found three kilograms of cocaine in a safe in Durid Hana’s house. The evidence showed that both Durid and Kafan Hana had access to the safe, and there was no evidence indicating that anyone other than the two brothers had access to the safe. It was thus evident before the trial that *379the jury would surely conclude that at least one of the brothers placed the cocaine in the safe.
During the trial, the prosecutor invited the jury to make just such a deduction. In her closing statement, she said:
The position that Durid Hana and Kevin [sic] Hana had taken in this trial is saying that the drugs did not belong to them, but they were in their bedroom and they were in a safe that they both had access to, and if you believe both Durid Hana and Kevin Hana, the good fairy must have delivered those drugs and locked them in the safe. [Emphasis added.]
This statement indicates the prejudice of a joint trial—it made clear to the jury that it had to convict at least one of the defendants.
The prosecutor’s comment invited the jury to find the defendant guilty on the basis of the discrepancies between their stories. The clear implication of the prosecutor’s comment was that neither of the defendants was presenting a truthful defense, and, on the basis of the conflicting defenses, the jury should infer that both defendants were guilty. By inviting the jury to draw the inference of guilt from the conflicting defenses, the prosecutor relieved herself of the burden of proving the defendants’ individual guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.29 See Tootick, supra; Zañro, supra (Stevens, J., concurring).
Each defendant was further prejudiced by the actions of his codefendant’s lawyer. In his opening statement, Kafan Hana’s attorney lamented that *380the trial had "brother pitted against brother.” His words proved to be prophetic.
When Kafan Hana’s lawyer cross-examined the police officer who took Durid Hana’s statement, the answers elicited by his testimony emphasized that Durid Hana "owned the safe and it was his [Durid’s] safe.” Kafan’s lawyer twice induced the witness to state that Durid owned and used the safe. Then, in his closing argument, Kafan Hana’s lawyer argued that because Kafan did not own the safe, he did not have the right to control the drugs found by the police in the safe. Considered in light of the earlier questions that emphasized that Du-rid owned the safe, the implication is clear: Durid, the owner of the safe, controlled the drugs.
The counterattack of Durid Hana’s lawyer was just as strong, if not stronger. In his opening statement, Durid Hana’s lawyer said that "there will be no testimony, that will indicate that Durid Hana had directly any contact, that he knew of or had any contact with the three kilos of cocaine.” He then observed that "[tjhere certainly will be testimony that will indicate that Kafan Hana had access to the safe where the cocaine was found.” Then, in his cross-examination of the officer who took the statement of Mr. Alsarih,30 Durid Hana’s lawyer emphasized that Mr. Alsarih mentioned only Kafan, and not Durid, as his cocaine connection.
In his closing statement, Durid Hana’s lawyer fully assumed the role of prosecutor vis-á-vis Kafan Hana.31 The following are excerpts from the closing statement:
You heard testimony from both Officer Putnam *381and Mr. Alsarih that they went to the house looking for Kevin and he wasn’t there. They came back looking for Kevin, and he wasn’t there. They came back a third time looking for Kevin, and while they were there, Kevin arrived.
I would ask you to think back on the testimony as you heard it. There was a contact midday with Kevin, 12 ounces of coke, no problem. There was a contact attempted with Kevin.
Kevin arrives home. They come inside, flip on the light. Kevin comes up with three and a half ounces of cocaine out of the bag in his pocket. He goes right into the closet, comes out with the bag of cocaine. A total of 12 ounces, mixes them together. . . . Now, at the time that he [Kevin] gives Mr. Alsarih this 12 ounces, he’s delivered the 12, it’s over and done, the delivery is made. . . .
[Then,] Kevin said, "This is on the house,” and threw that in on the deal.
This deal was set up between two people [Kevin and Alsarih].
[Mr. Alsarih] testified he set out to and put the deal together with Kevin Hana.
The testimony is the safe was in a closet. The testimony is that when Kevin and Alsarih came in, Kevin went into the closet. Alsarih testified Derek was asleep in bed, but Kevin went into the closet. Kevin, apparently, had a hard time opening the safe, but he opened it with no assistance, no comments from Derek .... Kevin opened the safe. Kevin took out some drugs, apparently.
You’re being asked to make leaps of faith that because one brother was in that safe and presumably would know what was in it when he opened the door and took out the cocaine, that the other *382brother must know what’s in the safe. [Emphasis added.]
As these excerpts demonstrate, the defendants each suffered prejudice when his lawyer took on the role of the prosecuting attorney.32 Each defendant had to defend against the prosecutor and the other’s lawyer, and, in many instances, the defense lawyers seem to have done a more effective job than the prosecution of demonstrating each defendant’s guilt.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court’s denial of the severance motion, and grant a new trial.
VI
Before addressing the merits óf the Gallina and Rode appeals, it is important to clarify the question presented. The question presented is not whether these defendants should have had completely separate trials. The prosecutor waived that argument when he did not object to the defendants’ motions for severance and when, in the Court of Appeals, he did not argue that severance was not required.33 The only question presented is, *383assuming that the defendants were entitled to at least partial severance through the use of dual juries,34 whether that solution provided the defendants "the same protections as [they] would have enjoyed through . . . separate trial [s].” People v Brooks, 92 Mich App 393, 395; 285 NW2d 307 (1979) (emphasis added). This inquiry should be made with great care because the use of multiple juries "can involve substantial risks of prejudice to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v Corsi, 86 NJ 172, 178; 430 A2d 210 (1981).35
The manner in which the trial court administered the dual-jury procedure in this case did not afford the defendants the same protection that they would have enjoyed through separate trials.
The trial court failed to excuse Gallina’s jury when Rode’s counsel impeached a key prosecution witness with his prior statement that implicated Gallina. The prosecution called Edward Schramek, the driver of the car in which the victim was riding, as a witness in its case in chief. On direct examination, Schramek testified that he did not know which of the passengers in the Camaro had fired the shot that killed the victim, and the *384prosecutor did not press Schramek on this point. Rode’s attorney then began to cross-examine Schramek. After asking Schramek a few questions, Rode’s attorney informed the court that he was going to impeach Schramek with Schramek’s earlier statement that implicated Gallina, and he asked the court to excuse the Gallina jury. The court refused.
Rode’s attorney then asked Schramek the following question:
Now did you not indicate to Officer Brennan, a Police Officer Brennan at the police station shortly after you arrived, that the person who shot your brother was the front passenger of the red vehicle [i.e., Gallina]?
Shortly thereafter, Gallina’s attorney objected that this line of questioning "is being presented in front of my jury.” The court ruled that Gallina’s lawyer had no standing to object.36
On recross-examination, Rode’s lawyer again impeached Schramek with his earlier statement that implicated Gallina. Counsel showed Schramek a copy of the police report that contained the statement in question and asked Schramek:
Does that refresh your recollection as to whether or not you told Officer Brennan that the front passenger in the red vehicle [i.e., Gallina] shot your brother Charles?_
*385Had Gallina been tried separately, his jury would not have learned of Schramek’s prior statement that implicated Gallina. The prosecutor did not question Schramek concerning his earlier statement and presumably would not have done so in a separate trial because the inconsistency betwéen Schramek’s earlier statement and his testimony undermined his credibility. Gallina’s lawyer, moreover, would never have questioned Schramek concerning his earlier statement because to do so would have undermined his own client’s position. Thus, because Gallina’s jury learned of certain evidence that it would not have learned in a completely separate trial, the dual-jury procedure in the instant case did not provide Gallina "the same protection he would have had in a separate trial.”
Rode was similarly denied the protection he would have enjoyed had he been tried in an entirely separate trial when Gallina’s lawyer cross-examined Brad Andrews, one of the back-seat passengers, concerning his ability to see the shooting. On direct examination, Andrews testified that he could not see whether Eric Rode leaned out the automobile window and fired the gun because his view was blocked by Jimmy Kelly, the middle passenger in the back seat.
On cross-examination, Gallina’s lawyer twice suggested that Kelly was blocking Andrews’ view because he was leaning over to hold Eric Rode’s legs so that Rode would not fall out of the car as he shot at the Schramek vehicle. Andrews did not deny that Kelly was holding Rode’s legs. Andrews and Gallina’s lawyer had the following exchange:
Q. He was blocking your view because he was doing something with his hands back there, wasn’t he, when he had his back turned to you?
*386A. I’m not sure.
Q. In fact, he was holding the legs of Eric Rode so he wouldn’t fall out the window, wasn’t he?
A. I don’t know. I’m not sure.
Q. Jim Kelly was the closest one to Eric Rode, wasn’t he, Mr. Andrews?
A. Yes.
Q. And somebody had to hold him so he wouldn’t fall out the window; is that correct?
Had Rode been tried separately, his jury would not have heard this damaging questioning. The prosecutor did not pursue this line of questioning at trial, and presumably would not have done so at an entirely separate trial, because the prosecutor used Andrews’ statement to police that he, Andrews, saw Rode lean out the window and fire at the other automobile. It would not have been in the prosecutor’s interest to establish that Andrews did not have a clear view of Rode. And Rode’s lawyer surely would not have asked questions that implied that his client leaned out the window and fired shots at the other automobile. Thus, the dual jury procedure did not provide Rode with the same protection that he would have enjoyed in an entirely separate trial.
In affirming convictions returned following a dual-jury trial, a number of courts have noted that neither defendant’s jury observed cross-examination by the other defendant’s lawyer.37_
*387The effect that the exchanges between Rode’s lawyer and Schramek, and between Gallina’s lawyer and Andrews, may have had on the respective juries should not be underestimated. By the time these cases were submitted to the juries, the dominant issue had become essentially the credibility contest between Gallina and Rode. Two of the other passengers in the vehicle had testified for the prosecution and one other passenger for Rode, but none clearly identified either of the defendants as the shooter of the fatal shot.38 Each defendant provided the strongest evidence that the other had fired the fatal shot,39 but inconsistencies in the testimony of both defendants were brought out on cross-examination.40 In short, the evidence did not *388clearly indicate who fired the fatal shot. In light of the lack of convincing evidence concerning which of the defendants fired the fatal shot, the exchanges adverted to above were prejudicial because they may well have influenced each jury to find that the defendant in whose case it was sitting in judgment had fired the fatal shot.41
VII
Gallina and Rode also argue that they were prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to pick the juries from separate venires. While the defendants correctly note that a trial court should pick the juries from separate venires in a dual-jury trial, I do not believe that the defendants suffered prejudice as a result of the trial court’s failure to do so in the instant case.
The juries in a dual-jury trial should be chosen from separate venires to prevent one form of prejudice that the dual-jury procedure is meant to avoid: the exposure of one defendant’s jury to the antagonistic defense of his codefendant. If a jury *389learns of a codefendant’s antagonistic defense, there is a danger that the jury will conclude that each defendant is lying and convict on the basis of the conflicting defenses alone. See Tootick, supra.
When separate juries in a dual-jury trial are chosen from a single venire, there is a substantial risk that the voir dire questions from defense lawyers and the court will apprise all the jurors of the conflicting defenses. For this reason, the juries in a joint trial should be chosen from separate venires.42
In the instant case, however, the voir dire procedure did not substantially inform the prospective jurors of the defendants’ mutually antagonistic defenses. Both lawyers’ questions focused primarily on the potential jurors’ views of youthful offenders and on their ability to focus on the intent element of the charge. Neither lawyer mentioned the conflicting defenses. Thus, in this case, the defendants did not suffer prejudice as a result of the trial court’s failure to pick the juries from separate venires.43
I would reverse and remand for separate new trials.
Cavanagh, C.J., concurred with Levin, J._

 See part v for a detailed discussion of the conflicting defenses.

 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 20, 1992 (Docket No. 119380).

 This request was made later in the trial, after the defendants both decided to testify.

 For a detailed discussion of the instances in which one defendant’s cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses unfairly implicated his codefendant, see part vi.

 Id. at 1383.

 Id.

 Id.

 Id. at 1384.

 Id. at 1386.

 Id.

 Id. at 1387.

 Id.

 Id. at 1385.

 Id.

 Id.

 Witnesses could also be spared the trouble of giving duplicate testimony through the use of videotaped deposition testimony. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel could jointly take the deposition of certain noncritical witnesses, and then this testimony could be presented in front of the juries at separate trials.

 Id. at 1392.

 Id.

 The staff comment to MCR 6.121 implicitly recognizes that the rule does not provide guidance concerning what constitutes "prejudice” or "substantial rights.” The comment explains that, in a joint trial, a codefendant’s testimony that squarely places the blame for the offense on the defendant is an example of prejudice to the defendant’s substantial rights.

 Tootick is fully consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zafiro v United States, 506 US 534; 113 S Ct 933; 122 L Ed 2d 317 (1993). In Zafiro, the Court refused to adopt a rule that a joint trial is improper per se where two codefendants present mutually exclusive defenses. The Ninth Circuit did the same in Tootick. As Zafiro instructs, the court in Tootick required the defendant to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to sever his trial from that of his codefendant. 952 F2d 1083.
Zafiro requires defendants to show prejudice where the trial court denies a motion to sever in a case in which the defendants present mutually antagonistic defenses. Tootick enunciates specific examples of prejudice.

 In some instances, we can be certain that at least one of the defendants must have committed the charged offense. For example, if the two defendants on trial are the only two persons who have access to a certain restricted area or to certain classified information (i.e., a computer database), we can be sure that a crime occurring in the restricted area or involving the restricted information must have been committed by at least one of those with access (the defendants). Thus, the conclusion that one of the defendants is innocent in effect requires the conviction of the other defendant.

 One of the defendants claimed that he had passed out in an alcohol-induced stupor when the stabbing occurred, and the other claimed that the first defendant stabbed the victim as he (the second defendant) looked on in horror. 952 F2d 1081.

 952 F2d 1081.

 Zafiro does not diminish the persuasiveness of the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a defendant is prejudiced when the jury’s acceptance of a codefendant’s story would necessitate his conviction. In United States v Buena-Lopez, 987 F2d 657 (CA 9, 1993), decided after Zafiro, the Ninth Circuit cited Zafiro and Tootick. The court held that Tootick did not control the instant case because the jury could have believed each defendant’s story without necessarily convicting the other. 987 F2d 661. The court thus gave no indication that Zafiro undermined Tootick.
In an unpublished decision, United States v Mason, 26 F3d 134 (table), 1994 WESTLAW 266102 (CA 9, June 15, 1994), the Ninth Circuit said:
To obtain severance on the ground of antagonistic and mutually exclusive defenses, the codefendants must show that the acceptance of one party’s defense precludes acquittal of another defendant. United States v Sherlock, 865 F2d 1069, 1081 (CA 9, 1989). Antagonism between the defenses must rise to the level of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. Id. This typically occurs where each of two defendants claims innocence, while seeking to prove that the other committed the crime. United States v Tootick, 952 F2d 1081.
In a number of other post-Zafiro cases, United States Courts of Appeals have implied that a defendant is prejudiced when, as the result of conflicting defenses, the jury must convict him if it acquits his codefendant. See, e.g., United States v Yefsky, 994 F2d 885, 896-897 (CA 1, 1993) (noting that after Zafiro "mere antagonism of defenses does not require severance,” and that "the tension between defenses must be so great that a jury would have to believe one defendant at the expense of the other”); United States v Rivera, 6 F3d 431, 438 (CA 7, 1993) (the court found no prejudice to a defendant in a joint trial and noted that the jury could have acquitted the defendant even if it acquitted the codefendant).

 Id. at 659.

 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Zañro has not weakened this aspect of the Moran decision. Indeed, even after Zañro, Moran still seems to be "good law” in Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v Clarke, 418 Mass 207, 217; 635 NE2d 1197 (1994) (the court affirmed the decision not to sever in part because "[t]his is not a case, like Commonwealth v Moran, in which the defendants presented 'mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable’ defenses”); Commonwealth v Smith, 418 Mass 120, 125-126; 634 NE2d 1380 (1994) (the court affirmed a decision to sever and noted that "[u]nlike many other cases in which severance is sought, this case does not involve mutually antagonistic defenses, where the acceptance of one party’s defense necessarily precludes the acquittal of the other. See Commonwealth v Moran”).

 See also Hill v State, 481 So 2d 419, 425 (Ala Crim App, 1985), in which the court said:
We agree that, "antagonistic defenses do not per se require severance, even if the defendants are hostile or attempt to cast the blame on each other.” "Antagonism of defenses requires severance only where the defenses are so inconsistent that the jury would have to believe one defendant at the expense of the other; the conflict alone establishes the guilt of a defendant.” "[Severance is required because of 'mutually antagonistic defenses’ only when the defenses are so antagonistic that 'the acceptance of one party’s defense will preclude the acquittal of the other.’ ” [Citations omitted.]

 While a defendant’s conelusory claim that he will suffer prejudice in a joint trial because he and a codefendant have antagonistic defenses is clearly not sufficient to prevail on a motion for severance, a defendant should not be required to present too detailed a showing of prejudice in a pretrial motion for severance. As Professor Dawson explained, "predicting trial prejudice [in the joint trial context] before the trial begins is guessing at best.” Dawson, supra, p 1410. "Most often, the defense attorney may suspect prejudice from joinder, but be unable to foresee the exact events that will harm his client.” Id., p 1411.
Thus, while a court may properly demand from a defendant seeking severance more than mere conelusory statements concerning the conflicting defenses, a court should not require a detailed description of exactly how the conflict will play out at trial. An affidavit explaining the nature of the conflict (i.e., the defense that each defendant will offer, the witnesses that each will call, etc.) and demonstrating in a general manner how the conflict will cause prejudice, see text above, should suffice.

 This case is different from Zañro because there is no indication that the prosecutor in Zañro explicitly focused on the conflicting defenses. While conflicting defenses may not be prejudicial per se, the danger of prejudice from such defenses is much greater when the prosecutor highlights the conflict between the defenses as she did in the instant case.

 Mr. Alsarih was involved in the transaction. He agreed to testify for the prosecution.

 The attorneys at various times referred to Kafan as "Kevin” and to Durid as "Derek.”

 See Tootick, supra at 1084 (the defendant suffered prejudice where the opening statement by the codefendant’s attorney placed blame on the defendant and mentioned him "twenty-five times by name, and seventy-two times by the use of personal pronouns”).

 Cf. People v Hoffman, 205 Mich App 1, 19; 518 NW2d 817 (1994). The Court in Hoffman said:
We reject defendant’s contention that being tried jointly with his codefendant denied him a fair trial. This issue was not preserved for appellate review. Defendant neither sought a separate trial nor objected to a joint trial. Failure to move for a separate trial precludes appellate review.
In the instant case, the prosecutor did not object to the defendants’ *383motions for severance, did not object to the defendants’ request that the jury be chosen out of separate venires, and did not object to either lawyer’s request that his client’s jury be removed from the courtroom when the other defense lawyer was cross-examining certain witnesses.

 These defendants clearly were entitled to at least partial severance through the use of dual juries. One and only one of them could have fired the fatal shot. They each accused the other of firing that shot. Thus, if the jury accepted one of the defendants’ stories, it might have been obliged to convict the other. See discussion of Commonwealth v Moran, supra.

 Other appellate courts have also recognized the risk of prejudice to a defendant’s right to a fair trial in a dual-jury trial. See, e.g., People v Ricardo B, 130 AD2d 213, 218-219; 518 NYS2d 843 (1987); State v Hernandez, 163 NJ Super 283, 287; 394 A2d 883 (1978) (in a dual-jury trial, "[tjhere are too many opportunities for error to take place which would end in a reversal if a conviction occurs, resulting in needless expense and a waste of judicial resources and counsels’ precious time”).

 The trial court’s refusal to remove the Gallina jury after being informed by Rode’s counsel that he [counsel] was about to impeach Schramek with a prior statement that incriminated Gallina, and after the appropriate objection by Gallina’s counsel is especially troubling in light of the court’s earlier promise that, as long as it was given notice by the lawyers, it would remove each jury in order to prevent this very type of harm.
The judge had earlier indicated to the lawyers that "I have no problem with excusing the other lawyer’s jury if it’s necessary, but I sure am going to have to rely on you two to give me a hint . . . I’ll only be ruling on it when you give me it.”

 See, e.g., Smith v DeRobertis, 758 F2d 1151, 1151 (CA 7, 1985) ("Both juries were present for the opening statements and for the state’s direct examination of the prosecution witnesses, but Smith’s jury was excused for Bell’s cross-examination of those witnesses and for Bell’s defense case [Bell testified], while Bell’s jury was excused for the corresponding portion of Smith’s trial”); People v Brooks, supra at 394 (“a procedure was arrived at in which both juries would be present for the prosecutor’s opening statement and the prosecutor’s direct examination of witnesses. At all other times only one jury would be present, each hearing the matters relevant to its own case”); State v Hernandez, n 35 supra at 286 ("Full direct and cross-examina*387tions were had of all witnesses, either before all three juries or an individual jury, as the circumstance required”).

 Jonathan Warmack, the driver of the automobile in which Gallina and Rode were riding, could not identify who fired the fatal shots, but he was certain that Gallina did not. On direct examination, he testified that Rode said, "I know I hit him,” after he fired the gun, but on cross-examination, Warmack conceded that Rode may have said, "I know I hit . . . ’em,” referring to the automobile in a more general sense rather than to one of the occupants of the automobile.
Brad Andrews, one of the back-seat passengers, testified that he did not see who was shooting the gun over the roof of the automobile, but that he did see Eric Rode inside the automobile at the time those shots were fired. The prosecutor impeached Andrews with his statement to the police that Eric Rode leaned out the window and fired the shots over the roof. Andrews also testified that he was extremely intoxicated on the night of the shooting.
James Kelly testified before the Rode jury alone that he did not know who fired the fatal shots.

 Rode testified that he fired at the tires of the other automobile and that he never fired at the body of the vehicle or at the occupants of the vehicle. He then testified that Gallina shot the gun at the other automobile as it drew alongside. Gallina testified that he shot the gun only in the air and that Rode took the gun from him because he, Rode, was frustrated that Gallina would not shoot directly at the other automobile. According to Gallina, after Rode took the gun, Rode fired shots directly at the other automobile and then said, "I know I got them, I know I got them.”

 On cross-examination, Eric Rode first testified that he did not see Aldo Gallina aim the gun or fire the first shot toward the other automobile, but, after the prosecutor showed Rode a copy of his *388statement to the police, Rode changed his story and testified that he saw Gallina aim the gun and fire the first shot at the other automobile. Also on cross-examination, Rode initially claimed that he could not remember whether Jimmy Kelly helped him reload the gun, but after seeing a copy of his statement he quickly recalled that Kelly had helped him reload. Finally, Rode testified that, although he was right-handed and had no experience with firearms, he tried to shoot out the tires of the other automobile with the gun in his left hand. He could not explain why he held the gun in his left hand.
On cross-examination, Gallina’s veracity was called into question when the prosecutor confronted Gallina with his statement to the police. Although Gallina had signed the statement and initialed every page of the statement to confirm its accuracy, he claimed that the statement did not accurately reflect what he told the police.

 While it is true that the prosecutor charged Aldo Gallina solely as an aider and abettor and did not argue that Aldo Gallina fired the fatal shot, Eric Rode testified that Gallina fired the fatal shot. Gallina’s jury might well have believed Rode and, in effect, found Gallina guilty as the principal even though he was charged as an aider and abettor.

 A number of appellate courts that have affirmed convictions in dual-jury trial have noted that the juries were chosen from separate venires. See, e.g., State v Hernandez, n 35 supra at 286 ("Three juries of 14 were picked from separate panels and instructed not to discuss the cases with each other”); People v Wardlow, 118 Cal App 3d 375, 384; 173 Cal Rptr 500 (1981) ("The two juries were chosen from venires that were mutually exclusive”); State v Lambright, 138 Ariz 63, 68; 673 P2d 1 (1983) ("Under this 'dual jury’ procedure, two juries were chosen from separate venires . . .”); People v Harris, 41 Cal 3d 1047, 1066; 255 Cal Rptr 352; 767 P2d 619 (1989) ("The two juries were separately selected”).

 The trial court refused the lawyer’s specific request to pick the juries from separate venires because "I don’t do it that way, counsel.” This is clearly an unacceptable reason for refusing to pick the juries from separate venires.