Court Opinion

ID: 9707567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:15:51.986562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:35.242056
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(concurring). I agree with the result in this case but differ in applying a test of “reasonable possibility that the error had a prejudicial effect upon a hypothetical average juror” (supra at 525) rather than the test stated in After Hour Welding v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734, 741, 324 N.W.2d 686 (1982), of “probable effect upon a hypothetical average jury.” My initial objection is that I do not believe there is any distinction between the two tests. It may be that a reasonable possibility rises to the quality of a probability. It is, however, an unnecessary distinction to make since the trial judge will decide whether there was a reasonable possibility or a probability and no miscroscopic aid can assist the judge in making a distinction. Trial judges for years have said in regard to questions containing the word “possibility” that anything is possible. But now this test speaks of a “reasonable possibility” which is most likely the same as a probability. I would have felt more comfortable for trial judges if the majority had stated the difference in the tests, if there is one, so the judges can recognize it when they see it. Not only does the majority change the test, but it places the burden on the state. I would leave the burden on the party challenging the verdict.
There is no need to have one test for civil cases, After Hour, and one test for criminal cases, such as this one. The majority’s analysis of Chapman, dealing with ex-*534elusionary evidence and the harmless error test of beyond a reasonable doubt and effect, adopts a similar test for nonevidence of extraneous matters coming' to the jury’s attention. This is an unnecessary intellectual exercise and one that only confuses rather than assists in solving the problem at the trial court level.
To keep the problem of extraneous factor effects on verdicts from expanding or occurring, there are several things trial courts can do.
First, by recording the voir dire, which is not now required, proper questions regarding prospective jurors' knowledge of the case, facts and the parties will be recorded. In After Hour there was no recording of the voir dire, and, therefore, this court and the trial court had to rely on an arguable reconstruction of it through the attorneys’ memories which differed. In this case, since there was no recording of the voir dire, any analysis of whether the defendant may have waived the harmful effects of the extraneous matters was foreclosed. A recorded voir dire may or may not have shown substantial grounds sufficient to set aside a verdict as a matter of law, which is the second issue of After Hour.
On voir dire, the attorneys or judge should develop any knowledge the jurors have obtained from outside the courtroom as to the case, its facts, the parties, the witnesses, and the participants in total, including the judge, so later extraneous information can be labeled as a violation of the oath taken by jurors1 and reported by *535other jurors immediately to the judge before the verdict is reached.
Secondly, the judge during preliminary instructions to the prospective jurors before the commencement of the voir dire can state that if during service as jurors in the case being considered, if anyone, including other jurors, brings any extraneous (outside) information to the jury’s attention, that should be reported to the judge. Also, the judge may wish to tell the jury that during the trial they may consider only the evidence received, the instructions of the judge and the knowledge the jurors bring with them from the every day affairs of life. However, if they have any knowledge at the voir dire of the case, facts or parties that should be disclosed during the questioning.
As was recently held by the United States Supreme Court in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, No. 82-958, filed January 18, 1984:
“The ruling of the Court of Appeals in this case must be assessed against this background. One touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact — ‘a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.’ Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). Voir dire examination serves to protect that right by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror being excused for cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may assist parties in- exercising their peremptory challenges. The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obvious.” McDonough. Slip opinion at 6.
*536As was said in After Hour, 108 Wis. 2d at 737-88, “While the rule against impeachment of a jury verdict is strong and necessary, it is not written in stone nor is it a door incapable of being opened. It competes with the desire and duty of the judicial system to avoid injustice and to redress the grievances of private litigants.” The balancing of these attitudes of the judicial system of finality and certainty of result with fairness, must begin at the voir dire and preliminary instructions so that a record will show the near impossibility of extraneous matters coming to jurors’ attention or that they reach the level of substantial grounds sufficient to set aside the verdict as a matter of law. After Hour.
I would also affirm the court of appeals but with the reasoning stated in this concurring opinion.

 Sec. 806.08(1), Stats., provides:
“805.08 Jurors. (1) Qualification, examination. The court shall examine on oath each person who is called as a juror to discover whether the juror is related by blood or marriage to any party or to any attorney appearing in the case, or has any financial interest in the case, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is aware of any bias or prejudice in the case. If a juror is not indifferent in the case, the juror shall be excused. Any party objecting for cause to a juror may introduce evidence *535in support of the objection. This section shall not be construed as abridging1 in any manner the right of either party to supplement the -court’s examination of any person -as to qualifications, but such examination shall not be repetitious or based upon hypothetical questions.”