Court Opinion

ID: 9677289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:48:24.823998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:54.977636
License: Public Domain

GUILLOT, Justice,
dissenting.
While I agree with the result reached in Justice Akin’s dissent, I believe the compelling reasons for reversing and remanding this case are constitutional.
At the outset this court should be cognizant of the constitutional right of family integrity. The State’s severance of a parent/child relationship must receive strict judicial scrutiny. Roe v. Conn, 417 F.Supp. 769 (M.D.Ala.1976).
While many of the decisions dealing with the constitutional issues raised in parent/child proceedings deal with the rights of parents, nevertheless, the reasoning in those cases applies to children as well. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that a father had a constitutional right to a hearing before the State could take his children from him. I would hold the reverse is also true: children have a right to a hearing before one of their parents is taken from them. It is undisputed in this case that no such hearing took place.
The rights of juveniles have been protected in delinquency hearings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Gault held that a minor is entitled to, among other things:
(a) right to notice;
(b) right to counsel;
(c) right to confrontation and cross-examination; and
(d) right to a transcript of the proceedings.
I would apply these rights to minors who are subject to losing either of their parents. Testing the record vis-a-vis Gault with respect to notice, it reflects no notice of the amended pleadings was given to the children; with respect to right to counsel, there is no evidence that the court-appointed attorney served the children’s behalf between May 18, 1976, and the final motion for rehearing some four years later;1 with respect to the right to confrontation and to a transcript of the proceedings, the record reflects no hearing was ever had on the amended pleadings.
.Furthermore, the failure to serve amended pleadings on the children is not only constitutionally defective, it has long been the law that if an amended pleading asserts a new cause of action, service of process is necessary. Morrison v. Walker, 22 Tex. 18 (1858); Sanchez v. Texas Industries, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1972, writ ref. n.r.e.). There is no doubt that the real parties in interest in this case are the children. See C. v. C., 534 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, no writ). It necessarily follows that the amended pleadings should have been served on them.
Moreover, papers should have been served on the children because they are persons needed for just adjudication. See Rule 39 Tex.RUiv.P. 39.
In addition to being recognized in the federal court system, the constitutional rights of children are recognized in the State system also. See Ricketts v. Ricketts, 265 Ark. 28, 576 S.W.2d 932 (1979, en banc). I would hold that the children in the present case have a constitutional right to a termination hearing at which they may adduce evidence, examine witnesses, and conduct the trial in such a manner as to assist the trier of fact to determine what is in their best interest.
AKIN and STEPHENS, JJ., concur.

. At the first hearing the court refused to ter-ruinate.