Court Opinion

ID: 9564097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:54:17.886496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:13.602037
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting):
For the following reasons I dissent.
The main opinion says, “By defendant’s view, the trial court, upon adopting the parties agreement as part of the decree of divorce, became bound by its terms and may not now modify such terms. We agree.”
Such a statement, in my view, does not express the law in this jurisdiction. Our statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 30-3-5, states:
“30-3-5. Disposition of property— . — When a decree of divorce is made, the court may make such orders in relation to . property . as may be equitable. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to ... or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary. . . . ”
Any property settlement agreement, stipulation, etc. made by the parties to an action for divorce, must necessarily be made with the foregoing statute in mind. That statute becomes a part, albeit an unwritten part, of any agreement entered into by the parties.
Moreover, we do not look to the terms of the property settlement agreement once it has become a part of the decree. Its independent existence is destroyed, and thereafter the rights of the parties are determined solely by the decree.
By statute, and for obvious reasons, the Court has continuing jurisdiction and the unquestioned power to adjust the actions between the parties, in accordance with the equities of the matter. Also see my dissenting opinion in Chandler v. West, Utah 1980, 610 P.2d 1299.
In addition, for the foregoing reasons, I believe this Court’s opinion in Land v. Land, Utah 1980, 605 P.2d 1248, is in error.
STEWART, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.