Court Opinion

ID: 9543714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:48:32.156234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:59.590768
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint. This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ action.
The question, determinative of this decision, is whether the plaintiffs have capacity to maintain this action under .the facts alleged.
The facts, as we state them, appear in the complaint.
*913In the summer of 1950, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, each applied to defendant Jack Taylor, commissioner of public lands, for a lease on less than forty acres of certain land, lying below extreme low tide in the bed of navigable waters, to be used to plant and cultivate oysters. Since the commencement of this action, Otto A. Case has been substituted as a party respondent in place of Jack Taylor.
Oyster-bed lease No. 143 expired July 21, 1950. It had previously been issued to another party, but, at the date of its expiration, it stood in the name of defendant Bendiksen by assignment. July 25, 1950, plaintiff husband applied to the commissioner of public lands to have this lease issued to him.
August 9, 1950, defendant Bendiksen applied for a renewal of the lease. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7797-145, provided in part:
“. . . Upon the expiration of any lease for the purpose of planting and cultivating artificial oyster beds, . . . the lessee shall have the right to make application to release the lands covered by his former lease within thirty days from the expiration of such former lease.” (This section has since been repealed. Laws of 1951, chapter 271, § 47, p. 913.)
Hence, the application for a renewal of the lease of defendant Bendiksen was timely made.
RCW 79.20.050 [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7797-146] provides that:
“The commissioner may, upon the filing of an application for a renewal lease, cause the lands to be inspected, and if he deems it for the best interests of the state to re-lease said lands, he shall issue to the applicant a renewal lease . . . ” (Italics ours.)
Thus, the commissioner of public lands had two lease applications before him for the same oyster land: one was for a renewal of the existing lease.
Under RCW 79.20.050 [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7797-146] (quoted supra), the commissioner had the discretionary power to renew the lease of defendant Bendiksen “if he *914deems it for the best interests of the state.” The lease was issued to Bendiksen.
To circumvent the discretionary power of the commissioner to renew Bendiksen’s lease, it is alleged in the complaint that he did not have a preferential right by statute (RCW 79.20.050; Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7797-146) to re-lease the land because, at the time of issuance,
“ . . . defendant E. H. Bendiksen was the actual owner of other deep sea oyster leases exceeding 40 acres and had no preferential right nor any right to lease or hold the said land in question ...”
In support of this statement, it was alleged that on August 8, 1950 (the day prior to Bendiksen’s application to re-lease), Bendiksen was .the record owner of oyster-bed lease No. 107, expiring in 1959, and oyster-bed lease No. 108, expiring in 1956; that on that day, he assigned these leases, with the approval of the commissioner, to confidential employees who, in fact, held the same solely for the benefit of the said E. H. Bendiksen.
Oyster-bed lease No. 140 expired July 26, 1950. It had previously been issued to defendant Myron T. Heuston, by him assigned to the Long Island Oyster Company, a corporation, and by it assigned to defendant Bendiksen.
July 28, 1950, plaintiff wife made application to the commissioner for a lease upon the same land. August 10, 1950 (within thirty days of expiration), defendant Heuston, having an assignment from defendant Bendiksen and the Long Island Oyster Company, applied for a renewal of the lease.
The commissioner rejected the application of plaintiff wife and issued the lease to defendant Aeuston. With the commissioner’s approval, Heuston assigned the- lease to Betty J. Esveldt, wife of Bendiksen’s cannery superintendent, who “is acting solely for the benefit of the defendant E. H. Bendiksen.”
It was alleged that defendant Heuston,
“ . . . for more than 10 years past had no interest in the cultivation, farming, or production of oysters and was acting solely for and on behalf of the said defendant E. H. Bendiksen.”
*915It is not necessary, for the purpose of discussing the questions determinative of this action, to detail the allegations of the lease transactions of defendants Lafromboise and Farmer who later intervened in the action.
The theory of plaintiffs’ complaint is that defendant Bendiksen
“. . . evolved a scheme or plan to obtain and own some six leases totaling much more than 40 acres, and induced the above-named defendants, except A. A. Lafromboise and L. L. Farmer, to enter into a conspiracy with him to carry out the said scheme or plan, and the said defendants did aid and assist him in so doing ...”
It is further alleged that defendant Taylor, as commissioner of public lands of this state, was fully advised as to the facts constituting this “scheme” and had agreed to hold a public hearing thereon
“. . . but thereafter arbitrarily, capriciously, and fraudulently approved the applications [of defendants] . . . without any public hearing or investigation, all as a part of the same general plan and conspiracy . . . ”
All of the defendants, except Taylor, Farmer, and Lafromboise, demurred to the complaint. Farmer and Lafromboise filed an answer and petition in intervention. The state attorney general filed an appearance for the commissioner of public lands. The demurrer having been sustained, this appeal is from a judgment dismissing the action.
This action deals with the right of the commissioner of public lands to renew an oyster bed lease. Renewal of such leases is governed by Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7797-146 (Laws of 1927, chapter 255, § 146, p. 548), which provides:
“The commissioner of public lands may, upon the filing of an application for a renewal lease, cause the lands to be inspected, and if he deem it for the best interests of the state to re-lease said lands, he shall issue to the applicant a renewal lease for such further period not exceeding twenty years and under such terms and conditions as may be determined by the commissioner. In case of an application for a renewal lease it shall not be necessary for the lands to be inspected and reported upon by the director of fisheries and game.” [cf. RCW 79.20.050]
*916It follows that the statutes (Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 7797-143, 7797-144, 7797-145, 7797-147) which apply to original leasing of oyster bed lands do not apply to the instant case.
Do plaintiffs, as unsuccessful applicants, have the capacity to maintain this action to set aside renewal leases for oyster beds issued to the successful renewal applicants, on the ground of fraud?
In State ex rel. Clithero v. Showalter, 159 Wash. 519, 521, 293 Pac. 1000, we said:
“It is well settled law that a private citizen or taxpayer, as such, cannot maintain a suit to restrain or coerce a particular course of action on the part of a state officer or board, unless he shows a direct, special and pecuniary injury to himself, separate and distinct from that suffered by the general public, the Attorney General having the sole right to maintain such an action in the interests of the public. [Citing cases.]”
 In order to maintain an action such as this, the plaintiff must have some real, substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or contingent benefit; and must show that if the relief requested is granted, he will, of necessity, be benefited. Appellants (plaintiffs) cannot show this. Public wrongs or breach of public duty cannot be redressed in a suit in the name of an individual whose interests in the right asserted does not differ from that of the public generally. State ex rel. Gebhardt v. Superior Court, 15 Wn. (2d) 673, 131 P. (2d) 943.
Plaintiffs contend that they have a real and substantial interest sufficient to maintain this action because of their applications for the leases. However, plaintiffs are not in any different position under the oyster-bed lease statutes than is a lease applicant for any other type of state-owned land. In State ex rel. Pelton v. Ross, 39 Wash. 399, 408, 81 Pac. 865, we said:
“The mere filing of a written application for a lease of public lands does not confer upon the applicant any interest in the land other than that of the general public. Allen v. Forrest, 8 Wash. 700, 36 Pac. 971, 24 L. R. A. 606.”
*917Since the lands had already been leased as oyster beds, plaintiffs’ application was in fact a request for a renewal of the lease to them. This application gave them no right superior to any other applicant. Renewing the lease is still a matter of discretion with the commissioner.
The trial judge held that our decision in Powers v. Webster, 47 Wash. 99, 101, 91 Pac. 569, is determinative of this case. Therein, we said:
“The first object of the action is to set aside the deed from the state to respondent Croft. If the deed of the state is set aside the property reverts to the state. Therefore the state is a necessary party to such an action. The action cannot be maintained at the suit of a private person who has no interest in the property. [Citing authorities.]
“In the case of St. Louis Smelting Co. v. Kemp, supra, [104 U. S. 636, 26 L. Ed. 875], the court said:
“ ‘If in issuing a patent its officers took mistaken views of the law, or drew erroneous conclusions from the evidence, or acted from imperfect views of their duty, or even from corrupt motives, a court of law can afford no remedy to a party alleging that he is thereby aggrieved. He must report to a court of equity for relief, and even there his complaint cannot be heard unless he connect himself with the original source of title, so as to be able to aver that his rights are injuriously affected by the existence of the patent; and he must possess such equities as will control the legal title in the patentee’s hands. Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 363. It does not lie in the mouth of a stranger to the title to complain of the act of the government with respect to it. If the government is dissatisfied it can, on its own account, authorize proceedings to vacate the patent or limit its operation.’ ” (Italics ours.)
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the Powers case on the ground that these leases are void by virtue of Laws of 1927, chapter 255, § 60, p. 497 (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 7797-60), which provides:
“Any sale or lease of state lands, except capítol building lands, or of tide or shore lands, made by mistake, or not in accordance with law, or obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, shall be void, ...” [cf. RCW 79.12.280]
leaving to inference that the deed in the Powers case was not void. This is not a ground for distinction. Although *918not cited in the opinion, the statute in force when the facts alleged in the Powers case occurred, made such sales “void” when obtained by fraud. Rem. and Bal. Code § 6680 (1910). Our holding in the Powers case has been cited with approval in State ex rel. Clithero v. Showalter, supra.
Setting aside the renewal leases, as requested by plaintiffs, would still leave a subsequent renewal of the leases a matter of discretion with the commissioner of public lands. Plaintiffs are not the ones to maintain this action.
The judgment is affirmed.
Mallery, S chwellenb ach, Hill, Hamley, Donworth, Finley, and Olson, JJ., concur.