Court Opinion

ID: 9726596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:59:07.921364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:29.011686
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 28. (concurring). I agree with the mandate *669because this case has come to us on summary judgment based on stipulated facts. I write separately because I am concerned that rules of law might be mistakenly drawn from the broad language in the majority opinion.
¶ 29. First, it is a mistake for the majority opinion to rely on the "captain of the ship" metaphor. This phrase has taken on various meanings beyond the cases that spawned it.
¶ 30. The majority opinion defines the "captain of the ship" doctrine merely as a theory of vicarious liability that is "similar to respondeat superior."1 The majority opinion does not explain precisely what theory of liability it is rejecting when it rejects a "captain of the ship" doctrine.
¶ 31. "Captain of the ship" cases can be analyzed as applying traditional agency concepts of the surgeon's supervision and control.2 Let's forget the picturesque language, look at the facts of each case, and apply traditional principles of tort and agency law.3
¶ 32. Second, it is a mistake to conclude from the decision that a surgeon can never be held liable for the negligence of a hospital nurse. This issue is not before *670the court. The majority opinion carefully states what Lewis is and is not contending. In particular, it states that Lewis is not relying on the "borrowed servants" doctrine.4 The majority opinion's conclusion that "the surgeon cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the two hospital nurses" applies only to the stipulated facts and narrow issues presented in this case.5
¶ 33. A surgeon can be vicariously liable for the negligence of hospital nurses if the nurses are under the surgeon's control and supervision. Whether hospital nurses are under the surgeon's control and supervision would ordinarily be a question of fact for the fact-finder. The stipulation is silent about the surgeon's supervision and control of the hospital nurses in the present case. The facts of each case would determine whether the surgeon has exercised supervision or control over the hospital nurses.
¶ 34. Third, it is a mistake to conclude from the decision that a hospital procedure or the administrative code controls the law of negligence or liability.
¶ 35. The majority opinion appears to rely on the hospital procedure that the nurses have responsibility for counting and overseeing the count of laparotomy pads and on the administrative code that the circulating nurse ensures that the counts have been done *671according to hospital procedure to absolve the surgeon from liability. Reference to the hospital procedure and administrative code may be misleading.
¶ 36. Regardless of what hospital procedure or the administrative code says about a hospital nurse's obligations, a surgeon's failure to exercise supervision and control over hospital nurses might constitute negligence, and the nurses' negligence might then be imputed to the surgeon. Under certain circumstances, a fact-finder might conclude that a surgeon should have, or did exercise, control or supervision. Hospital procedure and the administrative code might constitute customary medical practice, but customary medical practice does not necessarily constitute reasonable due care in an action for medical malpractice.6
¶ 37. Furthermore, an issue raised at oral argument was whether the duty to put in and remove the pads was a nondelegable duty of the surgeon. The concept of nondelegable duty is that the surgeon's duty of due care cannot be delegated and that the surgeon is liable for the negligence of the hospital nurse even though the surgeon has done everything that could be reasonably required of the surgeon. If the duty is non-delegable, the person with the nondelegable duty is *672vicariously liable.7 The parties have not briefed or argued this theory of liability, and the majority opinion does not directly address this issue.
¶ 38. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
¶ 39. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 See majority op. at ¶ 22.

 See, e.g., Franklin v. Gupta, 567 A.2d 524, 537 (Md. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that a careful analysis of "captain of the ship" cases generally reveals that courts have applied traditional agency concepts).

 See Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1977) (quoting Justice Frankfurter writing that "A phrase begins life as a literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas.").

 See majority op. at ¶ 10.
The court of appeals concluded that the surgeon did not employ as borrowed servants those hospital nurses who were negligent.
The majority opinion makes no similar declaration. If the hospital nurses were "borrowed employees" of the surgeon, the surgeon was vicariously hable for their negligence. See Borneman v. Corwyn Transp., Ltd., 219 Wis. 2d 346, 580 N.W.2d 253 (1998) (setting forth law of borrowed employees).

 See majority op. at ¶¶ 1, 3, 9,10,19.

 The standard of reasonable care for a physician is that degree of care, skill, and judgment that reasonable specialists would exercise in the same or similar circumstances having due regard for the state of medical science at the time the plaintiff was treated. A doctor who fails to conform to this standard is negligent. See Wis JI — Civil 1023 (1998). Evidence of the usual and customary conduct of other physicians under similar circumstances is ordinarily relevant and admissible as an indication of what is reasonable care. See Nowatske v. Osterloh, 198 Wis. 2d 419, 438, 543 N.W.2d 265 (1996).

 W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 71, at 511-12 (5th ed. 1984).