Court Opinion

ID: 9447517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:36:59.268691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:04.800982
License: Public Domain

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In Dean v. Century Motors, Inc., 1946, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 154 F.2d 201, we said:
“ * * * The doctrine [of last clear chance] presupposes a perilous situation created or existing through the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant, but assumes that there was a time after such negli*930gence had occurred when the defend-ánt could, and the plaintiff could not, by the use of means available, avoid the accident. It is not applicable if the emergency is so sudden that there is no time to avoid the collision, for the defendant is not re-q.uired to act instantaneously.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case the trial judge said, inter alia, in his charge to the jury:
“The doctrine of last clear chance presupposes a perilous situation created or existing through the negligence of both plaintiff and the defendant, but assumes there was a time when the defendant could and plaintiff could not, by means available, avoid the accident.
“It is not to be applied if the emergency is so sudden that there is no time to avoid the collision. The burden of proof is upon plaintiff to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence these four elements: First, that plaintiff was in a position of danger; second, that plaintiff was oblivious of danger or unable to extricate himself from the, position of danger; third* that the defendant was aware or by the exercise of reasonable care should have been aware of plaintiff’s danger .and obliviousness or inability to extricate himself from.the danger; and, fourth, that the defendant, with means available to him, was by the exercise of reasonable care able to avoid striking plaintiff after he became aware or should have become aware of the latter’s danger and inability to ex-trícate himself from danger, and failed to do so.
■ “If any one or more of these four elements are wanting then the doctrine has no application and it is your duty to disregard it.
******
“Plaintiff asserts that even assuming that he was negligent that he has proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he was in a position of danger and unable to extricate himself therefrom, and that the defendant, by the exercise of reasonable care, should have seen plaintiff and have been aware of plaintiff’s danger and inability to extricate himself therefrom, and with the means available to him was, by the exercise of reasonable care, able to avoid striking plaintiff after he became aware or should have become aware of plaintiff’s danger but failed to do so.
“Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the last clear chance doctrine has no application to the facts in this case. He asserts that because he was in the regular line of traffic closest to the centerline on Constitution Avenue in the exercise of ordinary care he was unable to see plaintiff until after the automobile in front of defendant suddenly swerved to the right and then plaintiff was such a short distance away that defendant, even by the exercise of reasonable care, was unable to avoid striking plaintiff.
“Defendant asserts further that he was faced with a sudden emergency so that there was no time to avoid a collision. Whereas plaintiff contends that there was no emergency ; in any event, it was not so sudden as to prevent the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, to avoid striking the plaintiff.
“So you see there is a conflict here in this issue and it is for you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, to resolve this conflict and, if you reach this issue, to determine whether the last clear chance doctrine applies.”
It is thus seen that, after the trial judge had correctly defined last clear chance, he made it quite clear that the doctrine does not apply if the defendant “was faced with a sudden emergency so that there was no time to avoid a collision.” Whether there was such a sudden emergency which would prevent the application of the last clear chance doctrine, the judge left to the jury.
*931Judge Washington says, “Here * * an instruction on ‘last clear chance’ was 1 appropriate * * Judge Fahy says, “According to some of the evidence the accident occurred in circumstances which led the court, I think justifiably, to instruct the jury on the doctrine of the last clear chance.” Thus both my brothers are saying the doctrine of last clear chance was applicable here and that there was no sudden emergency which prevented its application. There was conflicting evidence as to that, however, which led the trial judge to let the jury say whether there was such a sudden emergency: if it should decide there was none, then it should apply the doctrine of last clear chance as defined by the court; if the jury should decide there was such a sudden emergency, then the doctrine of last clear chance was inapplicable and should not be considered. I see no reason why this simple proposition should have produced confusion in the minds of the jurors, as Judge Washington fears it may have done.2
Judge Fahy says, “When an instruction on each of the two theories [last clear chance and sudden emergency] is appropriate, special care is necessary to avoid intertwining one with the other.” This implies, I think, that in this case the District Court somehow incorrectly intertwined instructions on the two theories. I do not see such intertwining. Here, I repeat, the question whether the facts justified an instruction on last clear chance depended upon whether there was a sudden emergency which made the doctrine inapplicable. There was evidence tending to show such a sudden emergency; there was also evidence to the contrary. I think the trial court was clearly correct in submitting that question of fact to the jury. It was a preliminary question upon which the applicability of the doctrine of last clear chance depended. For, as I have said before, if the jury should decide there was no such sudden emergency, it should apply the doctrine of last clear chance which the court had clearly and correctly defined; but if the jury should decide there was such a sudden emergency, it should disregard the doctrine of last clear chance as inapplicable.
This was consistent with the above quoted excerpt from the Dean opinion, which holds the last clear chance doctrine is not applicable if the emergency is so sudden that there is no time to avoid a collision; this language clearly contemplates adding to the last clear chance instruction an admonition to that effect. That is what the District Court did.
Being of the view that the charge was correct, I dissent from the reversal of the District Court’s judgment.

. Judge Washington's emphasis.

. Judge Washington says “the court’s mention of ‘sudden emergency’ may well have produced confusion in the minds of the jurors.”