Court Opinion

ID: 9399157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 07:09:40.57269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:39.039429
License: Public Domain

In The

                                 Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                                __________________

                                NO. 09-23-00021-CV
                                __________________

                  IN THE INTEREST OF T.E., J.E., AND J.E.

 ________________________________________________________________

             On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
                     Montgomery County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. 21-09-13615-CV
__________________________________________________________________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her three

children—a four-year-old son J.E., a six-year-old daughter J.E., and a ten-year-old

son T.E.1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory

grounds existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination of

her parental rights would be in the best interest of the children. 2 See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (2). In a single issue, Mother argues that the trial court

      1
         To protect the identity of the children, we use pseudonyms to refer to the
parents and initials to refer to the children. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
       2
         The Order of Termination also terminated the children’s fathers’ parental
rights, but the fathers are not parties to this appeal.
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lost jurisdiction over the case because it failed to commence trial on the merits by

the deadline required by section 263.401 of the Family Code. As explained below,

we affirm.

                                     Background

      The Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) filed

an Original Petition for Protection of a Child, for Conservatorship, and for

Termination in a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship on September 30,

2021. An Affidavit in Support of Removal by a Department representative was filed

at the same time, and the affidavit stated that the Department had received a report

of neglectful supervision of the children and methamphetamine manufacturing in the

home. The Department was named temporary managing conservator of all three

children by an order signed on October 1, 2021.

      On September 30, 2022, the case was called for a bench trial. The trial court

stated that the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) was present. Mother’s

counsel told the court that Mother was “finishing up her 30 days” in a treatment

facility and could not get transportation to trial. The trial court stated, “due to some

scheduling issues and other issues, everyone has agreed to commence the trial today

and then come back to resume to its conclusion, correct?” On the record, the attorney

for the Department, the attorney for Mother, as well as the attorneys for Father and

for the children all agreed.

                                           2
      A witness for the Department was sworn in and then testified that she was an

investigator for Child Protective Services and that she was assigned to this case. She

stated that when she investigated this case, she had concerns that the children’s basic

needs were not being met.

      At that point, the trial court stated, “I think I’m just going to stop you since

we don’t have the parents here[.]” The trial court then stated that it would recess and

resume on December 8. The bench trial resumed on December 8, 2022, and it

concluded on December 16, 2022. After hearing testimony from the witnesses and

receiving evidence, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that

statutory grounds existed for termination of Mother’s and the fathers’ parental rights

and that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

The trial court also appointed the Department as permanent managing conservator

of all three children. The court signed the final Order of Termination on December

30, 2022, and Mother filed her notice of appeal on January 24, 2023.

                                         Issue

      In a single issue on appeal, Mother argues that the trial did not commence by

the deadline required under section 263.401 of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 263.401. According to Mother, the trial did not start within one year of the

trial court rendering a temporary order appointing the Department as the temporary

managing conservator, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, and the final

                                           3
Order of Termination is void. Appellant argues the trial court’s proceeding on

September 30, 2022, did not constitute commencement on the merits because “no

announcements were made, no pretrial matters were considered, and not a single

piece of evidence was offered,” citing In the Interest of D.S., 455 S.W.3d 750 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2015, no pet.). Appellant argues that because the trial court failed

to comply with the requirements of section 263.401 of the Family Code, the trial

court lost jurisdiction over the case, and this Court should reverse the trial court’s

Order of Termination and remand for a new trial.

                                          Analysis

          Issues that implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction raise questions of

law that we review under a de novo standard. See In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155

(Tex. 2018). The relevant portion of section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code

states,

          [] Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits or granted an
          extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1), on the first Monday after the
          first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order
          appointing the department as temporary managing conservator, the
          court’s jurisdiction over the suit affecting the parent-child relationship
          filed by the department that requests termination of the parent-child
          relationship or requests that the department be named conservator of the
          child is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed without a
          court order. Not later than the 60th day before the day the suit is
          automatically dismissed, the court shall notify all parties to the suit of
          the automatic dismissal date.

                                             4
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a). In other words, under the statute, a trial court

automatically loses jurisdiction in a termination of parental rights case brought by

the Department if the trial court does not commence a trial on the merits or grant an

extension by the statutory dismissal deadline. See id.; In re J.R.T., No. 09-21-00361-

CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 1781, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 17, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op.); In re N.F., No. 09-19-00435-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3650, at

*47 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 30, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re K.B., No.

09-19-00239-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 10570, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec.

5, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Appellant cites to In the Interest of D.S., 455 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2015, no pet.) and argues that the “minimal requirements for

commencement” include the parties making announcements and the trial court

ascertaining whether there are any pretrial matters. In D.S., no witnesses were sworn

or gave testimony before the statutory automatic dismissal date, and the Amarillo

Court of Appeals concluded that “a putative call of the case and an immediate

recess” was not a commencement of trial on the merits within the meaning of the

statute. See id. at 753. Here, Appellant contends no announcements were made, no

pretrial matters were decided, and “not a piece of evidence was offered.”

      We disagree with Appellant’s characterization of the record in this case and

find the facts in this case distinguishable from the facts in D.S. The record before us

                                          5
shows the trial court called the case for trial, and the attorneys for the parties

answered in agreement on the record that “due to some scheduling issues and other

issues, everyone has agreed to commence the trial today and then come back to

resume to its conclusion.” Mother’s attorney expressly agreed on the record. Then,

the Department called its first witness, and some testimony was offered and received

before the case was then recessed and later resumed on December 8th. So, the facts

here are distinguishable from D.S.

      We find the facts here more like the facts in In the Interest of R.F. Jr., No. 04-

17-00582-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1849 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 14,

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.), where the trial court addressed pretrial motions, and the

Department called a witness who testified briefly before the trial court recessed. Id.

at **3-4. The San Antonio Court of Appeals concluded that the record established

that the trial court timely commenced trial on the merits for purposes of section

263.401(a). See id. at *4; see also In re H.B.C., No. 05-19-00907-CV, 2020 Tex.

App. LEXIS 669, at *30 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (the

trial court called the case, counsel for all parties announced they were ready, pretrial

motions were addressed, and a witness was sworn in and gave brief testimony prior

to recess, and the appellate court concluded that such a proceeding constituted

commencement of trial on the merits and complied with section 263.401(a)); In re

R.J., 568 S.W.3d 734, 747 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (witnesses

                                           6
were sworn, the parties announced they were ready to proceed, and a witness for the

Department “briefly testified” before the trial court recessed, and the appellate court

concluded that such a proceeding was sufficient to establish that trial on the merits

had commenced that day).

      Our Court addressed a similar situation in In the Interest of N.F., where the

trial court called the case for trial before the statutory automatic dismissal date, the

parties made their announcements, the trial court heard the pretrial motions, and the

State called its first witness who was sworn in and testified. See 2020 Tex. App.

LEXIS 3650, at *50. The order of termination stated the dates on which the trial

court heard the case, which were dates before the statutory deadline. See id. In N.F.,

this Court concluded that trial on the merits commenced by the statutory deadline

imposed by section 263.401(a). See id. (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a);

In re H.B.C., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 669, at *30; In re R.J., 568 S.W.3d at 747; In

re R.F. Jr., 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1849, at **3-4).

      In this case, the trial court entered a temporary order appointing the

Department as temporary managing conservator of all three children on October 1,

2022. Therefore, the automatic dismissal date was the first Monday following the

first anniversary date, or October 1, 2022. See In re F.S., No. 09-22-00114-CV, 2022

Tex. App. LEXIS 7106, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 22, 2022, pet. filed)

                                           7
(citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a)); In re J.R.T., 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS

1781, at *9.

      The trial court called the case for trial on September 30, 2022, and the parties

announced their presence. The trial court stated that “due to some scheduling issues

and other issues, everyone has agreed to commence the trial today and then come

back to resume to its conclusion,” and all the parties agreed. A witness for the

Department was sworn in and gave brief testimony, and the trial court stated, “I think

I’m just going to stop you since we don’t have the parents here[.]” The trial court

recessed the proceeding and set December 8, 2022, as the date on which trial would

resume.

      The trial resumed on December 8, 2022, and at that time the trial court stated,

“we started this trial actually on September the 30th.” The trial concluded on

December 16, 2022. The final Order of Termination states, “[o]n September 30,

2022, December 16 [sic], 2022 and December 16, 2022, the Court heard and

rendered this case.”

                                     Conclusion

      Based on the entire record in this case and applicable law, we conclude that

trial on the merits commenced on September 30, 2022, and that the trial commenced

before the statutory automatic dismissal date imposed by section 263.401(a). See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a). Accordingly, the trial court did not lose

                                          8
jurisdiction over the case, and we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal. See In

re N.F., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3650, at *50.

      Having overruled Appellant’s issue, we affirm the trial court’s Order of

Termination.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                   _________________________
                                                       LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                             Justice

Submitted on May 22, 2023
Opinion Delivered June 1, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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