Court Opinion

ID: 9793965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:55:56.288675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:10.711676
License: Public Domain

ERWIN, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree that appellant suffered no deprivation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial in the proceedings below. I also agree that this court has jurisdiction to consider the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury in this case, notwithstanding appellant’s earlier failure to pursue his appeal from a habeas corpus ruling on the identical issue. I disagree, however, with the view of the majority that such evidence was insufficient to support an indictment.
In State v. Parks, 437 P.2d 642, 644 (Alaska 1968), this court stated that an indictment would be subject to dismissal if no evidence were presented which rationally established a factual basis for indictment.1 The test to be employed is whether the evidence presented to the grand jury
is adequate to persuade reasonable minded persons that if unexplained or uncon-tradicted it would warrant a conviction of the person charged with an offense by the judge or jury trying the offense, (footnote omitted)
Id. The Parks court held that in meeting this test the state is not confined to evidence' admissible at trial. Since hearsay evidence has persuasive force and may furnish a logical basis for a valid conclusion of fact, the court held that such evidence may be sufficient to support a grand jury indictment.
Subsequently, in Burkholder v. State, 491 P.2d 754 (Alaska 1971), we had occasion to test the sufficiency of hearsay evidence presented to the grand jury under the Parks rule and we found the evidence to be lacking. In Btirkholder the only witness appearing before the grand jury was an Alaska State Trooper who testified that a criminal informant had bought 27 grams of hashish from Burkholder for $100, that the informant’s reliability was known to the police, and that the informant knew the identity of the appellant. We stated:
Under the Parks standard the hearsay testimony presented to the grand jury in the present case is insufficient to support an indictment. At best, only a modicum of credibility can be attributed to the informant-declarant in this case. The name of the informant was not disclosed, the nature and extent of his relationship with the police and the appellant were not revealed, and the circumstances relating to the purchase of hashish from appellant were not explored. Briefly stated, the hearsay testimony presented lacked the probative value required by Parks. In such circumstances the hearsay testimony presented cannot ‘ra*245tionally establish facts’ sufficient to support an indictment as required by Parks.
491 P.2d at 758. In short, the evidence before the Burkholder grand jury insufficiently detailed the alleged criminal conduct.
My brethren concede that, in the case at bar, the evidence before the grand jury “presented a sufficiently detailed account of criminal activity and the defendant’s participation in this activity . . . .” Maj. Op. at 242. Yet the majority concludes that the indictment must be dismissed and a conviction reversed because of “the complete lack of evidence by which the grand jury could evaluate the trustworthiness of the hearsay informant’s testimony.” Maj. Op. at 243. In none of our previous cases have we required that hearsay evidence presented to the grand jury be corroborated or the hearsay declarant’s credibility independently established. Because I believe such a requirement to be both undesirable and unworkable, I dissent.
The requirement of credibility evidence established today is similar to the requirement under the fourth amendment in probable cause hearings where the state relies on an informant’s statements to obtain a search or arrest warrant.2 However, the analogy is not appropriate. The grand jury is a body of laymen, with no judicial officer presiding. That body simply lacks the training and competency necessary to determine legal corroboration. Of necessity the determination of the sufficiency of the credibility evidence will be made by trial court judges upon motions to dismiss an indictment. Such motions will undoubtedly be forthcoming whenever hearsay evidence is presented to the grand jury. The potential for delay is obvious.
More basically, it seems to me that my brethren have misconceived the essential function of the grand jury as an accusatory body. In Alaska, the grand jury is not charged with determining probable guilt. Rather, as we stated in Parks, the grand jury must determine whether the state has presented evidence which, if believed, would warrant a conviction. Questions of reliability and credibility should be left to the crucible of an adversary trial.3
In the case at bar I conclude that appellant has not overcome the presumption that the grand jury acted on sufficient evidence 4 and would affirm the challenged conviction.

. We thus rejected the broad declaration made in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 409, 100 L.Ed. 397, 402-403 (1956), that “[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury ... if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.”

. B. g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).

. The grand jury would, of course, be justified in refusing to indict if the incriminating hearsay declarations were incredible or inherently unbelievable. In this case, however, the grand jury was informed that the informant was the same undercover agent who had been used in a whole series of narcotics cases. AVe have supplemented the record on our own motion in order to examine the grand jury minutes for the entire grand jury session. That examination reveals that the same informant was used by the police in ten drug cases in which indictments were issued. Therefore, the grand jury was aware, at least to a degree, of the nature and extent of the informant’s relationship with the police. I would find this evidence of a “working relationship” and the state- . ment of reliability of the informant by the police officer sufficient to satisfy the minimal test of believability.

.Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d 252, 261 (Alaska 1969) ; Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686, 695 n. 37 (Alaska 1967) ; State v. Shelton, 368 P.2d 817, 819 (Alaska 1962).