Court Opinion

ID: 9793395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:46:51.093102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:44.175691
License: Public Domain

LUJAN, Chief Justice (dissenting). Appellees’ motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court on the ground that at the time of the injury appellant was upon the premises as a trespasser or bare licensee and, as such, the only duty owed to him was not to wilfully or wantonly injure him, and that there was no allegation of such wilful or wanton acts. The case was squarely presented to this court on the issue of the duty owed by a landowner or occupier to a licensee or trespasser in the conduct of active operations on the premises. Rather than answering what I feel is the determinative question in this case, the majority opinion states that since appellant was a “volunteer”, his status as a trespasser, licensee or invitee is of no consequence. The majority of this court admit, as they must, that appellant was a licensee prior to the time he came to the'assistance of foreman Rucker at the latter’s request. Once he came to Rucker’s aid, the majority say he lost his status as a licensee, and indeed even as a trespasser, purportedly because his act of giving aid constituted an excess of his permission to enter the premises. Yet the courts have historically classified a person on the premises of another as a trespasser, licensee or invitee in order to determine the standard of care owed by the land occupier to the particular person. Why should a person lose his status as a licensee simply because in response to a request by one acting for the land occupier he comes to such person’s aid? I do not feel that he should. In Davis v. Silverwood, 116 Cal.App.2d 39, 253 P.2d 83, a truck driver had completed the purpose for which he had been on defendant’s premises as an invitee and had started to return to his employer’s premises when he voluntarily returned to the defendant’s premises to assist the defendant’s employee in fixing an elevator.- The court held that at the time the driver gave such aid he was a licensee and that he was not entitled to recover for injuries received since the record showed no active negligence on defendant’s part. Thus we see that this licensee did not lose his status when he “volunteered” to assist the defendant’s employee. See Coulombe v. Horne Coal Co., 275 Mass. 226, 175 N.E. 631; Armstrong v. Bowman, 21 Tenn.App. 673, 115 S.W.2d 229. It seems patent to me that the decision in this case should turn upon the scope of the duty owed by a landowner or occupier to a licensee. Appellant does not challenge the oft-repeated general rule that an occupier of. land is under no duty to inspect his property in order to make the premises safe for the reception of a licensee. Prosser on Torts p. 625 (1941) ; 2 Harper and. James, The Law of Torts § 27.8 (1956). Pie urges, however, that in conducting active operations on the premises an occupier has a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep from injuring a licensee whose presence is known or reasonbly should be known, citing in particular the annotations in 49 A.L.R. 778 and 156 A.L.R. 1226. The ever present trend toward greater protection of individuals and thus wider accident liability could hardly have been expected to leave the land occupier’s citadel untouched. Nor has it. Such concepts as the “attractive nuisance” doctrine, the “dangerous activity” rule, and the “constant trespasser in a limited area” rule have stripped away much of the land occupier’s immunity. See Smith v. Boston & M. R. R., 87 N.H. 246, 177 A. 729; Barry v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 92 N.Y. 289, 44 Am.Rep. 377. As will be seen later, a majority of jurisdictions which have ruled on the question now hold that the duty of land occupier to a licensee, insofar as active operations are concerned, is the same duty which society generally places upon all of its members, namely, to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts § 27.10 (1956). In Prosser on Torts p. 630 (1941) this .principle is stated thusly: “Some courts have gone so far as to say that there is no duty to a licensee other than to refrain from inflicting wilful or wanton injury upon him. As in the case of trespassers, however, an increasing regard for human safety has led to a retreat from his position. It is nozo generally held that as to any active operations which the occupier carries on, there is an obligation to exercise reasonable care for the protection of a licensee(Emphasis added.) To hold that the duty which a land occupier owes to a licensee varies according to whether the injury results from a defective condition of the premises, or from an affirmative act of negligence arising in the course of active operations conducted on such premises by the occupier or by one acting in his behalf or for his benefit seems eminently reasonable. While society does not yet require the land occupier to take affirmative steps to make the condition of the premises safe for a licensee, it seems justifiable to require him to refrain from affirmative acts which endanger such licensee. Such a doctrine does not impose an unreasonable burden upon the use of land. The duty not to be negligent in conducting active operations is only a duty to exercise reasonable care. To confer upon an occupier of land a special privilege to be careless in active operations is quite out of keeping with the development of accident law generally. Appellees imply that such a rule is unwarranted since in a particular case the line of demarcation between aclive negligence and passive negligence may be shadowy and indistinct. Yet the distinction between misfeasance (active negligence) and non-feasance (passive negligence) is recurrently drawn in the field of tort law. Restatement, Torts (§§ 329-350 (1934) (throughout these sections a distinction is made between condition of the premises and active operations) ; see McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 Yale L.J. 1272 (1949). My research discloses that judicial statements to the effect that an occupier of land owes a licensee no greater duty than to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring him are too broad. Most of such statements appear in cases which were dealing with a condition of the premises as opposed to active operations thereon. As the court stated in Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19, 22, 156 A.L.R. 1221: “ * * * it is now generally held that in cases involving injury resulting from active conduct, as distinguished from condition of the premises, the landowner or possessor may be liable for failure to exercise ordinary care toward a licensee whose presence on the land is known or should reasonably be known to the owner or possessor.” In a similar vein is the following statement by the North Carolina court in the case of Brigman v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., 192 N.C. 791, 136 S.E. 125, 128, 49 A.L.R. 773: “The rule established by the authorities in this and other jurisdictions is that, while the owner of the premises is not liable to a * * * bare or permissive-licensee * * * unless the injury results from the willful and wanton negligence of the owner, yet the rule is usually restricted to injuries resulting from existent conditions upon the premises, or what is termed passive negligence. Upon the other hand, the owner is liable for any injuries brought about and caused by active negligence in the management or operation of the business or control of the premises which zvould increase the hazard to the licensee.” (Emphasis added.) The active negligence-passive negligence distinction was stated quite succinctly by the Pennsylvania court in Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 80 A.2d 76, 78, as follows: “The legal status of Jones was that of a gratuitous licensee, — that is, a person permitted to enter upon the land of another solely for his own purposes, in this case in search of a job. What is the duty of the possessor of land to such a licensee? Although the distinction may not be entirely clear under every given set. of circumstances) the authorities uniformly ■ differentiate in that connection between what, for want apparently of a better terminology, they designate as ‘passive’ negligence and ‘active’ negligence. Generally speaking, the term ‘passive negligence’ denotes negligence which permits defects, obstacles or pitfalls to exist upon the premises, in other words, negligence which causes dangers arising from the physical condition of the land itself. ‘Active negligence’, on the other hand, is negligence occurring in connection with activities conducted on the premises, as, for example, negligence in the operation of machinery or of moving vehicles whereby a person lawfully upon the premises is injured.” Statements and holdings to the same effect from at least twenty-three jurisdictions are legion. The following are a representative sample from the hundreds of such cases: Polston v. S. S. Kresge Co., 324 Mich. 575, 37 N.W.2d 638; Bennett v. Boney, 367 Pa. 249, 80 A.2d 81; Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Nolton, 58 Nev. 133, 71 P.2d 1051; Brigman v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., 192 N.C. 791, 136 S.E. 125; Yamauchi v. O’Neill, 38 Cal.App.2d 703, 102 P.2d 365; Krause v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 119 Colo. 73, 200 P.2d 387; Schmidt v. Michigan Coal & Mining Co., 159 Mich. 308, 123 N.W. 1122; Warner v. Lieberman, 7 Cir., 253 F.2d 99; Petrol Corp. v. Curtis, 190 Md. 652, 59 A.2d 329; Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash & Door Works, Inc., La.App., 68 So.2d 159; Twine v. Norris Grain Co., 241 Mo.App. 7, 226 S.W.2d 415; Mayer v. Temple Properties, 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909; Brady v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 265 Wis. 618, 62 N.W.2d 415; Banks v. Watts, 75 Ga.App. 769, 44 S.E.2d 510; Roadman v. C. E. Johnson Motor Sales, 210 Minn. 59, 297 N.W. 166; Radio Cab v. Houser, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 128 F.2d 604; Hill v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 7 Cir., 153 F.2d 91; Ryan v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 315 Ill.App. 65, 42 N.E.2d 128; Chekanski v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co., Tex.Civ.App., 306 S.W.2d 935; Grahn v. Northwest Sport, Inc., 210 Or. 249, 310 P.2d 306; Gay v. Cadwallader-Gibson Co., Inc., 34 Cal.App.2d 566, 93 P.2d 1051; Mathias v. Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co., 137 Colo. 224, 323 P.2d 624; Tesone v. Reiman, 117 Cal.App.2d 211, 255 P.2d 48; Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 A. 502; Nelson v. F. W. Woolworth & Co., 211 Iowa 592, 231 N.W. 665; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Page, 203 Ky. 755, 263 S.W. 20; Le Compte v. Wardell, Mont., 333 P.2d 1028; Eddy v. Oklahoma Hotel Building Co., 10 Cir., 228 F.2d 106. In addition, some courts which do not make a distinction between injuries resulting from a condition of the premises and those resulting from active operations, and which may even purport to follow the “wilful-wanton” rule, actually reach the same result in a circuitous manner. They simply hold that to he actively negligent in the presence of a known trespasser or licensee amounts to wilfulness and wantonness. See Cox v. Terminal R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 331 Mo. 910, 55 S.W.2d 685; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land, 63 Yale L.J. 144, 177 (1953); Prosser on Torts, note 95, p. 630 (1941); 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts § 27.6 (1956); Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harvard L.Rev. 725, 737. Assuming the majority opinion is correct in holding that when a licensee or invitee volunteers aid to a land occupier or his employee upon request, he loses his licensee or invitee status, what category does he then fall in? For the purpose of determining the standard of care which the occupier owes to him he is classified as a trespasser. The following quotation from 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, p. 767, a text which the majority cite frequently, recognizes this principle: “A licensee who exceeds the permission given him becomes a trespasser.” In 4 Thompson, Negligence, § 4680, written in 1904, the author recognizes that a person who volunteers to assist the servant of another without being employed to do so can recover for injuries received only if a trespasser or “bare” licensee could recover. Marshall & E. T. Ry. Co. v. Sirman, Tex.Civ.App., 153 S.W. 401; Reaves v. Catawba Mfg. & Electric Power Co., 206 N.C. 523, 174 S.E. 413; Southern Ry. Co. v. Duke, 16 Ga.App. 673, 85 S.E. 974. What then is the duty owed by a land occupier to a known trespasser in the conduct of active operations as distinguished from a condition of the premises ? The majority rule in this country holds land occupiers liable for injuries caused by active negligence to known trespassers. Prosser on Torts, p. 436, (1955 Ed.) states this enlightened principle as follows: “The great majority have discarded ‘wilful or wanton’ entirely as a limitation, and have said outright that once the presence of the trespasser is discovered, or the owner is otherwise notified of his danger, there is a duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him, as in the case of any other human being. The defendant is required to govern his active conduct, such as running a train, conducting a -circus, or operating an elevator, with the caution of a reasonable man for the trespasser’s safety.” (Emphasis added) In 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, p. 1464, (1956), the authors state that under one form or another, the above rule has been adopted by a vast majority of American jurisdictions. Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers, 27 Harv.L.Rev. 403, (1914); Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 Temple L.Q. 32 (1937); Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 80 N.W. 117, 81 N.W. 333; Krause v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 119 Colo. 73, 200 P.2d 387. Ryan v. State, 13 Misc.2d 282, 177 N.Y.S.2d 922; Friedman’s Estate v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 209 La. 540, 25 So.2d 88, 163 A.L.R. 1228. So we see that even if the appellant was transformed into a trespasser when he came to Rucker’s aid, the majority opinion is still incorrect. Most of the reported cases which either support, or appear at first glance to'support, the'position taken by the majority of this court have turned on principles of law governing master and servant. A person, by merely volunteering his services to another, or by assisting the servants of another when such servants have’no authority to employ assistance, ‘cannot establish the relation of máster and servant, and thereby create liability' fo'r' injuries under the rules of law governing master and servant. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Jackman, Tex.Civ.App., 217 S.W. 410. But the legal question in this case does not involve" master-servant law. The issue is the duty owed by a landowner or occupier to 'a licensee, or perhaps to a known trespasser,'in the'cohdúct-of'active operations on the premises. In this regard the following statement by the court in Daugherty v. Spuck Iron & Foundry Co., Mo.App., 175 S.W.2d 45, 55, seems quite appropriate: “ * * * while a volunteer may not recover on the basis of being a servant, ‘he yet may be entitled to the exercise of that degree of care owed to persons rightfully on the premises of the employer and may found his right of recovery on the general principles of negligence.’ ” Rook v. Schultz, 100 Or. 482, 198 P. 234. The conclusion reached by the majority that appellant assumed the risk as a matter of lavo is not only erroneous, it is quite superfluous under the majority’s rationale of this case. If, as held by the majority, appellant is precluded from recovery regardless of whether appellees were negligent, the defense of assumption of risk has no bearing on the case whatsoever. The majority of the court have purported to ground their decision on the “volunteer” aspect and have stated that appellant’s status as a trespasser, licensee or invitee is of “no consequence”. Under such circumstances, I strongly feel that neither Chavez v. Torlina, 15 N.M. 53, 99 P. 690, nor Snider v. Town of Silver City, 56 N.M. 603, 247 P.2d 178, should be cited with approval. Neither case involved any so-called “volunteer” question. Being convinced that the majority opinion is retrogressive, wrong in law, and wrong in principle, I herewith register an emphatic dissent.