Court Opinion

ID: 9940576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 19:12:53.450461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:02.557199
License: Public Domain

J-A25037-23

                                   2024 PA Super 27

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  EMAEDIONG UMOH                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1464 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 8, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-MD-0006278-2022

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED: February 14, 2024

       Appellant, Emaediong Umoh, appeals from a judgment of sentence that

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County imposed for direct criminal

contempt.1     On direct review, he asserts that the lower court abused its

discretion by holding him in contempt and erred by proceeding to sentence

him without first announcing his guilt for contempt. Upon careful review, we

remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing the sentencing court to

correct a clerical error in the sentencing order and affirm Appellant’s judgment

of sentence in all other respects.

       The lower court summarizes the relevant facts as follows:

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 As discussed infra, the order at issue incorrectly states that Appellant was

sentenced pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S § 4137(a)(1).
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     [Appellant] was originally charged with sexual assault crimes.
     Immediately prior to the jury’s entering the courtroom to deliver
     the verdict, this Court gave explicit instructions to everyone in the
     courtroom that they could not act out in any way in reaction to
     the verdict. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on all counts.
     Upon the verdict being read in open court, [Appellant] loudly
     slapped counsel table four times in the presence of the entire
     courtroom including, but not limited to, the jury, the alleged
     victim, the prosecutor, defense counsel, the gallery[,] and this
     Court. This Court convened a summary hearing as to whether
     [Appellant] was guilty of contempt.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/23, 1.

     At the start of the summary hearing, the lower court remarked:

     THE COURT: Mr. Umoh, let me make a record here. While we
     were hearing -- right after the jury announced its verdict of not
     guilty on all counts you started slapping the table very loudly,
     acting in a manner as though you were, in my view, at some
     sports stadium, showing total disrespect to the jury, to the victim
     who was sitting in this room, whether you consider her a victim or
     not, to the Court. That’s not the way we do things in this room.

     You have been here multiple days. I told everybody to stay seated
     for certain decorum. You are a law student and that’s the way
     you acted. It is not all about you. I am going to sentence you to
     some jail time for your conduct. That’s the Court’s intention.

N.T. 12/8/22, 2-3. In response, defense counsel spoke to the court about

Appellant’s entitlement to a hearing on the contempt charge and the court

explained that it was providing its outlook at the start of the hearing before

any formal ruling was lodged:

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I believe he is entitled to a
     hearing on it.

     THE COURT: He is having one right now in the presence of the
     Court. He is having his hearing.

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     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:        Your Honor, you indicated it was a
     summary contempt proceeding, and I think my client should have
     an opportunity to express himself.

     THE COURT: I’m telling him -- I am giving him fair notice of how
     I see it before I do anything.

     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:       I thought you were making a ruling.      I
     misunderstood you.

     THE COURT: That’s why I had him sworn in. He can certainly
     present. You can too.

N.T. 12/8/22, 3.

     Appellant, when given an opportunity to speak, apologized for his

actions addressed by the court:

     [Appellant]: First off, I want to express my apologies. What I did
     was completely -- it was unacceptable. Not only, Judge, as a
     defendant but somebody -- as you said, as a law student --
     somebody who plans on in a few years being in front of you as an
     attorney. I need to hold myself to a higher standard. I was raised
     better than that. I am better than that in terms of my conduct.
     And, like you said, in terms of the prosecution and in terms of the
     victim, regardless of whether I view the victim or not, I need to
     hold myself to a higher standard, as well as the jury who spent
     hours deliberating on this verdict and listening to your
     instructions. I should hold myself to the same standards as
     everybody in this room in terms of holding myself to the same
     standards and conduct. There is no excuse. There is no reason.
     There is no explanation. All I can do is look you in the eyes the
     best I can and tell you as a man I apologize. And whatever
     decision you make I will have to hold myself accountable to,
     because this is a court of accountability.

N.T. 12/8/22, 3-4.   His counsel then argued that his acts of slapping the

counsel table were involuntary given his circumstances at the time of the

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reading of the verdict. Id. at 6 (“And I think that it has been bottled up inside

him for three years and when he heard those words of not guilty he couldn’t

control those emotions from coming out.”), 8 (“But I think it is -- it has

happened as a result of the pressure he has been under in trying to keep

himself composed. And he was unable to do that. And I believe the act was

involuntary.”), 9 (“…it was not a knowing, intelligent or voluntary act on his

part but more of an emotional response to his situation and predicament.”).

      The lower court issued its ruling and sentence at the conclusion of the

summary hearing, as follows:

      THE COURT: All right. Mr. Umoh, you took the stand in your own
      behalf. You did, I thought, a very, very good job. You have a
      very good lawyer. I’m sure he spent time prepping you. But one
      of the things you said is, I’m in law school, I’m doing this, I’m
      doing that. And now your lawyer says, [“]Well, Judge, think of
      the pressure. He is trying to finish law school.[”] Well, if you are
      so confident about yourself, if you are so understanding of the
      process because of your unique position of being a law student
      while in a trial, it is not unreasonable, I think to hold you to a
      standard that comports with your education, your position. What
      you did there, you made this -- you turned this into Acrisure
      Stadium, PNC Park[,] or whatever other arena you want to --
      sports arena. You are a sports guy. It is in vogue now for
      everybody in the NFL -- they score touchdowns, they do dances,
      they go sit up in the stands with the fans. Even when they are
      losing 30 to nothing if they happen to score it is, [“]Oh, [l]ook at
      me, [l]ook at me, [l]ook at me.[”] A defensive lineman makes
      one sack, gets up and does a celebration even if his team is losing
      by four touchdowns. [“]Look at me. Look at me.[”] That’s what
      you did. You did a [“]Look at me. I won. Look at me, I won,[”]
      in the face of the prosecutor, in the face of the victim. Again,
      that’s a term that I am using generically because you were
      acquitted. But in the face of the jury that struggled with this, that
      at one point, as you know, was at an impasse. And this is your
      reaction.

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       The last time somebody acted out in this room in an inappropriate
       way I found them in contempt[,] and I sentenced them [to] 5 to
       10 days in the county jail. That’s the same sentence you are
       getting today.

       You are hereby sentenced to a sentence of 5 to 10 days in the
       county jail effective immediately.

N.T. 12/8/22, 10-12; see also Sentencing Order, 12/8/22, 1.

       Appellant filed a counseled notice of appeal and a request for nominal

bond pending appeal on the date of the contempt hearing.2 On the next day,

he filed, through counsel, an amended notice of appeal and a post-sentence

motion for reconsideration.3 This Court later directed counsel for Appellant to

show cause as to why the instant appeal should not be quashed as premature,

as there was no indication on the trial court’s docket that Appellant’s post-

sentence motion was ever decided. Rule to Show Cause Order, 2/27/23, 1-2.

Appellant responded, proffering a copy of an order denying the post-sentence

motion on December 12, 2022, and notifying this Court that the trial court

had updated its docket to reflect the denial of the post-sentence motion.
____________________________________________

2 The trial court’s docket and the record certified for this appeal do not indicate

a ruling on the bond motion.

3 Appellant asserted in the post-sentence motion that the lower court did not

announce a verdict or make any statement formally finding him in contempt
prior to entering the judgment of sentence. Post-Sentence Motion, 12/9/22,
¶ 7. He also alleged that “his conduct did not rise to the level that it ‘created
an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court,’ or showed ‘flagrant
defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public that, if not
instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority
w[ould] follow.’” Id. at ¶ 10, citing Commonwealth v. Moody, 125 A.3d 1,
9 (Pa. 2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Garrison, 386 A.2d 971, 976 (Pa.
1978) (plurality).

                                           -5-
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Response to Rule to Show Cause Order, 3/7/23, 1-2. As a result, this Court

discharged the rule to show cause order. Order, 3/9/23, 1-2.

       Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

       1.     Did the trial court err in finding Appellant in summary direct
              criminal contempt where there is no evidence that Appellant
              acted with intent to obstruct the proceedings, or that
              Appellant’s actions obstructed the administration of justice
              when he spontaneously hit counsel table four times in quick
              succession after being fully acquitted of rape charges?

       2.     Whether the trial court erred by sentencing Appellant
              without pronouncing a verdict or making a finding of guilt
              on the record?

Appellant’s Brief at 2.4

       In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for

contempt. Appellant’s Brief at 8-16. He concedes that his conduct constituted

misconduct in the presence of the trial court, but he argues that the evidence

did not demonstrate that he acted with the intent to obstruct the proceedings

by repeatedly slapping the counsel table upon the reading of the acquittal

verdict in his prior criminal matter. Id. at 10-13. In the alternative, he argues

that the     evidence     did not support        that his actions   obstructed   the

administration of justice. Id. at 13-16.

____________________________________________

4 Although the record certified for this appeal does not contain an order
directing the filing of a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the trial court’s docket indicates that a Rule
1925(b) order was issued on May 15, 2023, and Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)
statement indicates that it was filed “pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and this
Court’s Order.” Rule 1925(b) Statement, 6/5/23, 1. Accordingly, we find
timely compliance for purposes of Rule 1925(b).

                                           -6-
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      “The determination of whether sufficient evidence exists to support the

verdict is a question of law; accordingly, our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 177 A.3d

963, 969 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Upon sufficiency review, we

evaluate “whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial [ ] in the light

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the

fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 981 (Pa. Super. 2016) (brackets in

original; citation omitted).   This Court may not reweigh the evidence and

substitute our own judgment for that of the finder of fact.        Id. (citation

omitted). “Moreover, a conviction for criminal contempt requires proof beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Kolansky, 800 A.2d 937, 940 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

      “In reviewing an appeal from a contempt order, we place great reliance

on the discretion of the trial judge. We review the record to determine if the

facts support the trial court’s decision and will reverse the trial court only if

there is a plain abuse of discretion.” In re Arrington, 214 A.3d 703, 707

(Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court

has previously stated:

      The ability to raise a criminal contempt citation empowers a trial
      judge with the ability to maintain command over his or her
      courtroom. Effectively, the criminal contempt sanction gives
      credence to a judge’s status as commander in chief over his or her
      courtroom. If we continually carve away at this power, the
      sanctity and balance of the courtroom may be in jeopardy. In

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      connection with this sentiment, however, this Court has also noted
      that a trial court should not use the drastic sanction of finding a
      person in criminal contempt when a lesser measure will suffice.

In re C.W., 960 A.2d 458, 466 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

      As we first address the sufficiency of the evidence, we note that the trial

court’s   sentencing   order   indicates   that   Appellant   was   convicted   of

“Contempt/Misbehavior in Presence of Court” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §

4137(a)(1). Order 12/8/22, 1. The citation to Section 4137 appears to be a

clerical error as that statute only pertains to the contempt powers of

magisterial district judges. Appellant, on the other hand, was convicted of

contempt by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, and thus his

contempt conviction should have been listed on the sentencing order as a

violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132, which addresses contempt power of “the

several courts of this Commonwealth.” Assuming arguendo that Appellant’s

instant claims do not mandate a reversal of the charge at issue, we would

need to remand this matter for the limited purpose of allowing the sentencing

court to correct its order to properly reflect the contempt as a violation of

Section 4132. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2020 WL 7692793,

*2 (Pa. Super., filed Dec. 28, 2020) (remanding for the limited purpose of a

correcting a sentencing order where the Court of Common Pleas of

Philadelphia County stated that it was convicting a defendant of contempt in

violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4137(a)(1)) (unpublished memorandum cited for its

persuasive value). In turn, we analyze Appellant’s sufficiency claim as if his

conviction was properly identified as a violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132.

                                      -8-
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       Appellant reviews in his brief whether the evidence was sufficient to

support contempt under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3), which addresses “[t]he

misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing

the administration of justice.”5 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3). To sustain a conviction

for direct criminal contempt under Section 4132(3), “there must be proof

beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) of misconduct, (2) in the presence of the

court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) that

obstructs the administration of justice.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 753

A.2d 856, 861 (Pa. Super. 2000). The last two elements are the focus of

Appellant’s sufficiency argument. Appellant’s Brief at 11-16. He argues that

the conduct that was the focus of the contempt conviction was involuntarily

committed in an “emotional, celebratory outburst,” it was not committed with

any intent (let alone an intent to obstruct the proceedings at his former trial),

and it “f[ell] far short of significantly disrupting the proceedings.” Id.

       As for the mens rea element, we disagree with Appellant. As we have

previously held, “[t]here is wrongful intent if the contemnor knows or should

reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” Williams, 753 A.2d at

862, citing In re Adams, 645 A.2d 269, 272 (Pa. Super. 1994), appeal

denied, 653 A.2d 1225 (Pa. 1994); accord Commonwealth v. Meehan,
____________________________________________

5 While the trial court did not address any particular subsection of Section
4132 during the summary contempt hearing, the court only addresses the
sufficiency of the evidence with respect to 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3) in its advisory
opinion. Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/23, 3-4. The parties thereafter only
reviewed the sufficiency of evidence with respect to Section 4132(3) in their
briefs and their arguments before this panel.

                                           -9-
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235 A.3d 1284, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2020); Arrington, 214 A.3d at 707;

Commonwealth v. Mutzabaugh, 699 A.2d 1289, 1292 (Pa. Super. 1997).

In this instance, Appellant’s statement to the trial court readily supported that

he was aware that his conduct was wrongful. He expressed “apologies” for

the actions and admitted that it was “completely … unacceptable.” N.T.

12/8/22, 3. Moreover, he told the court that he needed to “hold [himself] to

a higher standard” and admitted that he “was raised better than that.” Id.

From these admissions, the trial court as fact finder could reasonably conclude

that Appellant knew or should have been aware that his pounding on the

counsel table – in direct defiance of the trial court’s order to refrain from

“acting out” – was wrongful conduct. It was also reasonable to infer from

Appellant’s experience as a law student that Appellant knew or should have

been aware that his defiance of the court’s directive not to act out was

wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Arrington, 214 A.3d at 708 (noting that an

appellant’s experience as a probation officer who would often appear in court

permitted the reasonable inference that the defendant knew or should have

known that his defiance of a court’s order to put away his cellphone was

wrongful conduct, supporting the third element of contempt under Section

4132(3)).   Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the third

element of contempt under Section 4132(3).

      As for the fourth element of contempt under Section 4132(3) – actual

obstruction of the administration of justice – there needed to be proof that

Appellant’s conduct significantly disrupted judicial proceedings.     Williams,

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753 A.2d at 863. To satisfy that condition, there had to be “actual, imminent

prejudice to a fair proceeding or prejudice to the preservation of the court’s

orderly procedure and authority.” Id. “The requisite ‘significant disruption’

can be met in varied in circumstances, including those occurring ‘even [after]

the judicial proceeding has concluded.’” Commonwealth v. Outlaw, --- A.3d

---, 2023 WL 8441712, *3 (Pa. Super., filed Dec. 6, 2023), citing

Commonwealth v. Falana, 696 A.2d 126, 129 (Pa. 1997) (holding that

evidence was sufficient for contempt where a defendant, upon being removed

from a courtroom after sentencing, told a victim, “I’ll be out one day”); see

also Williams, 753 A.2d at 859 (holding that evidence was sufficient to

sustain contempt for conduct that occurred after a court had finished

sentencing where a defendant, as he was being led from the courtroom,

“apparently elected to express his dissatisfaction” with his sentence “by raising

his middle finger and stating, ‘F--k You’” to the judge).

      Appellant argues that the record was “devoid of any evidence that [his]

slapping the table in any way obstructed the verdict,” and notes that, following

“the outburst,” he “was taken into custody, [and] the court continued on to

poll the jury and conduct business as usual, without any sort of prolonged

pause or need to bring the courtroom to order.” Appellant’s Brief at 13-14.

Even if we agree with him on those points, Appellant fails to consider that

criminal contempt is available for “such conduct as created an open threat to

the orderly procedure of the court and such flagrant defiance of the person

and presence of the judge before the public that, if not instantly suppressed

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and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority will follow.” Outlaw, -

-- A.3d ---, 2023 WL 8441712 at *5 (citations omitted).

       Our Supreme Court has concluded that a challenge to “the preservation

of the court’s authority” is a “significant disruption in [a] judicial proceeding[

]” because it “obstructs the efficient administration of justice and demean[s]

the court’s authority.” Falana, 696 A.2d at 129; accord Arrington, 214 A.3d

at 708. In Arrington, we noted that while an appellant’s defiance of a court’s

directive to stop using a cellphone in the courtroom did not cause significant

delay in the judicial proceeding, the defiance itself was a challenge to the

court’s authority that satisfied the fourth element for contempt under Section

4132(3).6 Arrington, 214 A.3d at 708.

       Appellant Umoh’s pound-on-the-table outburst in defiance of an order

not to “act out” met the fourth element for contempt in the same manner as

the defiant cellphone use in Arrington. His actions demonstrated disrespect

for the court and its command of its courtroom and brazenly repudiated the

court’s authority to call for decorum in its courtroom. This challenge to the

court’s authority amply sustained the obstruction element even if there was

no prolonged interruption of the court’s conclusion of Appellant’s criminal trial.

See Outlaw, --- A.3d ---, 2023 WL 8441712 at *5 (holding that, even

assuming that there was no discernable break in a suppression proceeding
____________________________________________

6 While this Court reviewed the sufficiency of evidence pursuant to Section
4132(3) in Arrington, the trial court in that case, like the trial court in the
instant case, erroneously issued the contempt order pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §
4137(a)(1). Arrington, 214 A.3d at 706 n.2.

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caused by Outlaw’s act of standing up and yelling, “The judge is a cocksucker,”

upon an announcement of findings on a suppression motion, the evidence was

sufficient for contempt under Section 4132(3) because the action undermined

the court’s authority and did obvious harm to the court’s ability to conduct an

orderly proceeding).

      In our extensive research into our prior contempt decisions for this

matter, we have not uncovered a similar occasion in any precedential opinion

where we have addressed contempt resulting from defiant celebration upon

the announcement of a verdict that is done in violation of a verbal court order.

We sanction the use of contempt in these contexts because the reading of a

verdict is a solemn event at a time of high tension when one person’s

celebration in the courtroom, resulting from bottled emotions, can be seen as

a triggering event for intemperate responses from others with opposed bottled

emotions. Safety for jurors, parties, witnesses, attorneys, court officers, and

members of the public audience must be maintained through these tension-

filled moments.   The duty for ensuring that safety, while also protecting a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an open public trial, remains with the

trial court. See Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d 91, 102 (Pa. Super.

2019) (noting it “is the responsibility of the court to maintain not only the

control but also the security of the courtroom”) (citation omitted). When a

court verbally orders the persons present in their courtroom to maintain

decorum upon the reading of a verdict, the order should be heeded by all and

enforced through summary contempt proceedings when necessary.               We

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recognize that the appropriateness of contempt in these circumstances “gives

credence to a judge’s status as commander in chief over his or her courtroom.”

Kolansky, 800 A.2d at 942 (citations omitted).

      In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by not

announcing a guilty verdict for contempt before sentencing him. Appellant’s

Brief at 16-20, citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 454(D) (“The verdict and sentence, if any,

shall be announced in open court immediately upon the conclusion of the trial,

except as provided in paragraph (E).”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 621(A) (“When a jury

trial is waived, the trial judge shall determine all questions of law and fact and

render a verdict which shall have the same force and effect as a verdict of a

jury.”). Upon careful review, we discern that we are unable to address the

merits of this claim due to lack of preservation.

      Appellant did not preserve the instant claim after the imposition of his

sentence at the conclusion of his summary contempt hearing. N.T. 6/29/23,

12-13. He only addressed the issue of an unannounced verdict for the first

time in a post-sentence motion that was filed on the day after sentencing.

Motion to Reconsider, 12/9/22, ¶ 7 (“Prior to entering the judgment of

sentence, this Honorable Court did not announce a verdict or make a

statement formally finding Defendant in contempt.”). Even though the trial

court later issued an order denying the post-sentence motion, the trial court

was unable to entertain that motion because Appellant had already filed an

initial notice of appeal on the same day as his sentencing hearing. Notice of

Appeal, 12/8/22. See Commonwealth v. Klein, 781 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa.

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2001) (stating that “where a Notice of Appeal has been filed, the trial court

cannot act further in the matter”); Commonwealth v. Aaron, 615 A.2d 735,

740 (Pa. Super. 1992) (holding that a trial court properly refused to consider

a post-verdict motion concerning after-discovered evidence when an appeal

was already pending); Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (except as otherwise prescribed,

after an appeal is taken, the trial court may no longer proceed further in the

matter).

       By filing a counseled notice of appeal immediately after sentencing,

Appellant divested the trial court of any jurisdiction to consider any claims that

could be raised for the first time in a post-sentence motion.7 Any issue raised

for the first time after this appeal was filed – except for challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence for contempt or the legality of the sentence – are

waived and not properly before this Court.                    See Commonwealth v.

Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 666 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“issues, even those of a

constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court”) (citation

omitted); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived

and   cannot     be   raised    for   the      first   time   on   appeal.”);   see   also

____________________________________________

7 In Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d 994 (Pa. 2011), our Supreme Court

held that a premature pro se notice of appeal did not divest a trial court of
jurisdiction to act upon a timely post-sentence motion that was later filed by
a defendant’s counsel. 27 A.3d at 1006-07. The current case can be
distinguished from Cooper on the basis that there was no interplay of pro se
and counseled actions following the imposition of the sentence in this matter.
Counsel in this case filed both the notice of appeal and the subsequent post-
sentence motion.

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Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 609 (Pa. Super. 2018) (claim of

trial court error in connection with a motion filed after the filing of a notice of

appeal was without merit where the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to

consider the motion). Because Appellant failed to preserve his instant claim

with the trial court prior to filing his counseled notice of appeal, we are unable

substantively review it.8

       In this matter, the evidence was sufficient to support criminal contempt

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3) where Appellant, in defiance of a court order to

not “act out” upon the reading of a verdict, slapped a counsel table four times.

Appellant waived his challenge to the absence of a reading of his contempt

verdict in open court where he raised the claim for the first time in a counseled

post-sentence motion that was filed a day after counsel had already filed a

notice of appeal. While the claims raised on appeal provide no basis for relief,

we must remand for correction of Appellant’s sentencing order where the

contempt conviction is incorrectly listed as a violation of 42 Pa.C.S §

4137(a)(1). The trial court should reissue a sentencing order reflecting that

the contempt conviction was a violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).

____________________________________________

8 Notably, all the cases Appellant cites in support of his claim pre-date the
adoption of the first version of Pa.R.A.P. 302 which provides for the general
rule pertaining to issue preservation. The rule was first adopted on November
5, 1975, and became effective on July 1, 1976. The most recent opinion that
Appellant cites in support of his claim was issued on September 23, 1974.
Appellant’s Brief at 16-20, citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Wenyon,
326 A.2d 633 (Pa. Super. 1974).

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      Case remanded for correction of clerical error in sentencing order.

Judgment of sentence affirmed in all other respects. Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 2/14/2024

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