Court Opinion

ID: 9947511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 22:02:29.127809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:30.854571
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/4/24
                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION THREE

    SAFETY-KLEEN OF CALIFORNIA,
    INC.,
         Plaintiff and Appellant,
    v.                                        A166575
    DEPARTMENT OF TOXIC
    SUBSTANCES CONTROL,                       (Alameda County
                                              Super. Ct. No. RG20050077)
         Defendant and Respondent.

         Safety-Kleen of California, Inc. (Safety-Kleen) appeals from the denial
of its petitions for writ of mandate seeking to compel the Department of Toxic
Substances Control (the Department) to set aside final inspection violation
scores concerning Safety-Kleen’s oil and hazardous waste treatment facility.
Safety-Kleen argues the Department abused its discretion under the
Hazardous Waste Control Law (Health and Safety Code, § 25100 et seq. 1;
hereafter “HWCL”) by classifying certain violations found at Safety-Kleen’s
facility as Class I violations or by reclassifying several prior “Class II”
violations as more serious “Class I” violations. We disagree.
         Applying settled rules of statutory construction, we conclude that
section 25110.8.5 sets forth independent bases under subdivisions (a)(1),
(a)(2), and (b), for categorizing a violation as a Class I violation and that

1        All further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.

                                         1
violations under subdivisions (a)(2) and (b) may be classified as Class I
without meeting subdivision (a)(1)’s requirement that a violation pose a
“significant threat to human health or safety or the environment.”
Accordingly, the Department did not abuse its discretion in determining
Safety-Kleen’s final inspection violation scores, and we shall affirm the
judgment.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A. The Department and its “Violations Scoring Procedure”
      The Department is generally responsible for enforcing the HWCL and
for adopting and enforcing regulations implementing the law. (§ 25180;
Athletics Investment Group LLC v. Department of Toxic Substances Control
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 953, 960.) The HWCL authorizes the Department to
issue permits for the operation of hazardous waste facilities, without which a
hazardous waste facility cannot accept, treat, store, or dispose of hazardous
waste. (§§ 25200, subd. (a), 25201, subd. (a).) These permits are for fixed
terms not exceeding 10 years. (§ 25200, subd. (c)(1).) The owner or operator
of a facility holding a hazardous waste facilities permit must comply with the
conditions of its permit, the HWCL, and the Department’s regulations,
including regulations that become effective after the issuance of the permit or
grant of interim status. (§ 25202, subd. (a).)
      To ensure compliance with all operating requirements, the Department
inspects facilities where hazardous wastes are stored, processed, or disposed
of. (§ 25185, subd. (a)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22 (hereafter “Regs.”),
§ 66271.50, subd. (a)(1).) “At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector
shall deliver to the operator of the facility or site a written summary of all
violations alleged by the inspector.” (§ 25185, subd. (c)(1).) The HWCL
classifies violations into three primary categories: Class I violations; Class II

                                         2
violations; and minor violations, which are a subset of Class II violations.
(§§ 25110.8.5, 25117.6.)
      Effective January 1, 2019, and prompted by legislation requiring the
adoption of “regulations establishing or updating criteria used for the
issuance of a new or modified permit or renewal of a permit,” including
criteria such as the “[n]umber and types of past violations that will result in
a denial” (§ 25200.21, added by Stats. 2015, ch. 611, § 1), the Department
implemented new regulations governing the “Violations Scoring Procedure”
(or “VSP”) for hazardous waste facility operations. (Regs., § 66271.50–
66271.57.) This scoring procedure refers to “the totality of the criteria and
steps . . . that govern the consideration of a facility’s compliance history by
the Department in making specified permit decisions and the remedies
available to an owner or operator in response to decisions proposed or made
by the Department.” (Id., § 66271.50, subd. (a)(4).)
      Facilities undergo VSP scoring on an annual basis, and the scoring
considers only Class I violations as regulatorily defined. (Regs., §§ 66271.50,
subd. (c), 66271.54, subd. (c).) The Department begins the scoring process by
determining a facility’s initial score for all Class I violations in the preceding
10-year period; this entails consideration and categorization of the potential
harm to the public or the environment that a violation poses and the extent of
the violation’s deviation from the hazardous waste management
requirements. (Id., § 66271.51, subds. (a)–(c).) The Department utilizes a
regulatory matrix to determine the initial score for each violation, which can
be adjusted upwards for repeat violations. (Id., §§ 66271.51, subd. (d),
66271.52.)
      Next, the Department issues a “provisional inspection violation score”
(provisional score) (regs., § 66271.53, subd. (a)), which may be

                                         3
administratively disputed by a facility owner or operator (id., § 66271.53,
subd. (c)). If the owner or operator does not file a timely dispute, then the
provisional score becomes the final inspection violation score. (Id.,
§ 66271.53, subd. (d)(1).) When a timely dispute is filed, the provisional score
will become the final inspection violation score “consistent with the dispute
resolution official’s written decision.” (Id., § 66271.53, subd. (d)(2).)
      Thereafter the Department calculates the Facility VSP Score, which
“consists of the sum of the provisional or final inspection violation scores for
each compliance inspection conducted during the preceding ten (10) year
period, divided by the number of such inspections.” (Regs., § 66271.54,
subd. (a).) At the conclusion of the VSP, the Department assigns a facility to
one of three “compliance tier[s]” based on its Facility VSP Score: the
“acceptable” tier (a Facility VSP Score of less than 20); the “conditionally
acceptable” tier (a Facility VSP Score equal to or greater than 20 and less
than 40); and the “unacceptable tier” (a Facility VSP Score equal to or greater
than 40). (Id., § 66271.54, subd. (b).)
      B. The Newark facility and the underlying proceedings
      Safety-Kleen owns and operates a facility in Newark, California (“the
facility”), where it engages in the commercial collection, treatment, and
transfer of used oil and other hazardous wastes. Safety-Kleen acquired the
facility in 2013, and the facility operates under a permit issued by the
Department pursuant to the HWCL.
      In April and May 2019, the Department inspected the facility and
documented two Class I violations. The Department issued a provisional
score of 26.25 in June, which Safety-Kleen administratively disputed. The
Department’s dispute resolution officer made no adjustment, and in
December 2019, the Department adopted the provisional score as the final

                                          4
inspection violation score. In January 2020, Safety-Kleen filed a petition for
mandamus challenging its final inspection violation scores, which it alleged
impacted its facility VSP score and compliance tier assignment. In an
amended petition, Safety-Kleen again challenged its final inspection violation
scores, alleging those scores impacted the Facility VSP score which was 17.36
in 2019 (which is in the “acceptable” compliance tier). More specifically,
Safety Kleen alleged that the Department counted minor violations against
the Facility which “contribut[ed] inaccurately, disproportionately and
unfairly to the Facility’s subsequently issued Final Facility VSP Score of
17.36, and mov[ed] the Facility closer to the ‘conditionally acceptable’
category and the imposition of additional regulatory requirements in the next
compliance period.” Safety-Kleen sought a writ of mandate compelling the
Department to set aside the final inspection violation scores. Safety-Kleen’s
petition was also labeled as a complaint seeking a declaration that the
Department’s administration of the VSP program violated Safety-Kleen’s due
process rights.
      In November 2020, Safety-Kleen filed a second petition for mandamus
challenging the final inspection violation scores that the Department issued
between January 2009 and December 2018. Safety-Kleen alleged it
administratively disputed the various Class I violations documented during
these earlier inspections, and though the Department’s dispute resolution
officer reduced two individual violation scores to zero (violation nos. 8 and
12), the other challenged individual violation scores remained unadjusted or
only somewhat reduced. As a result of the dispute resolution process, Safety-
Kleen’s Facility VSP Score was 14.86, placing the facility in the “acceptable”
compliance tier. Safety-Kleen sought a writ of mandate to set aside the final
inspection violation scores and “if not ordered to be reduced to zero in their

                                        5
entirety, to reconsider the Inspection Violation Scores as directed by and
under the continuing supervision of [the] Court.” Like the first petition, this
second petition was also styled as a complaint seeking a declaration that the
Department’s administration of the VSP program violated Safety-Kleen’s due
process rights, as well as a declaration of the parties’ rights and duties.
      Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the trial court consolidated the two
cases. At issue in the cases were 16 violations that the Department classified
as Class I violations. In short, the violations were based on actual releases of
hazardous waste (violation nos. 2, 4, 7, 11); deterioration of protective coating
on secondary containment structures (violation nos. 3, 16, 18); use of
unauthorized areas for storage and/or treatment of hazardous waste
(violation nos. 10, 13, 14, 17); installation of fixtures or equipment without
notice or approval (violation no. 15); failure to install a secondary
containment structure or to maintain a secondary containment structure
without cracks (violation nos. 1, 5); failure to provide documentation
regarding inspections (violation no. 6); and failure to annually review its
training plan (violation no. 9).
      Aside from violation no. 15, the Department classified all of these
violations as Class I violations pursuant to section 25110.8.5,
subdivision (a)(2)(B), because they involved deviations from operating
requirements that were significant enough that they could result in the
failure to prevent releases of hazardous waste or constituents to the
environment during the active period of facility operation. Violation no. 9
was additionally classified as a Class I violation because the deviation was
significant enough that it could result in a failure to perform emergency
cleanup operations or other corrective actions for releases (§ 25110.8.5,
subd. (a)(2)(F)) and because the violation was chronic (id., subd. (b)). Finally,

                                        6
violation no. 15 was classified as a Class I violation pursuant to
section 25110.8.5, subdivision (a)(2)(E), because the deviation was significant
enough that it could result in a failure to ensure adequate financial resources
to pay for facility closure.
      During the trial court proceedings, Safety-Kleen argued that Class I
violations under section 25110.8.5, subdivision (a)(2), must pose a significant
threat to human health or safety or the environment, and that the
Department improperly classified a number of violations as Class I violations
even though they posed only a low potential for harm. Safety-Kleen also
contended a number of violations that the Department had originally
classified as Class II violations posing a low potential for harm were
improperly reclassified as Class I violations, even though the Department
had made no determination that the violations were chronic or that Safety-
Kleen was recalcitrant as required to elevate a violation under
section 25110.8.5, subdivision (b). In addition, Safety-Kleen claimed the
Department assigned excessive and unsupported scores to violations and
violated its due process rights.
      The Department countered that Safety-Kleen failed to correctly identify
and rebut the Department’s bases for classifying the challenged violations as
Class I. Specifically, the Department indicated it relied on section 25110.8.5,
subdivisions (a)(2) and (b), which set forth independent bases for a Class I
violation in which a violation need not represent a significant threat to
human health or safety or the environment. As for the allegedly improper
reclassification of the Class II violations, the Department contended its
“scoring team” determined these violations met the definitional requirements
of Class I violations set out in subdivisions (a)(2) and (b) of section 25110.8.5,
and so they were properly considered in the VSP. The Department further

                                        7
contended that the individual violation scores were reasonably and factually
supported, that Safety-Kleen failed to address the specific findings made by
the Department to support the scores, and that Safety-Kleen’s due process
rights were not violated.
      The trial court denied Safety-Kleen’s petitions for mandamus and
requests for declaratory relief and entered judgment in favor of the
Department. The court agreed with the Department that section 25110.8.5
contained three independent bases for classifying a violation as a Class I
violation, that a Class I violation need not necessarily represent a significant
threat to human health or safety or the environment, and that Safety-Kleen
failed to rebut the actual bases for the Department’s classifications. The
court also found the Department acted within its authority in determining
that previously classified Class II violations were Class I violations. Finally,
the court determined that the individual violation scores were reasonable and
supported and that Safety-Kleen’s due process arguments were without
merit. Safety-Kleen filed a notice of appeal.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Safety-Kleen contends the judgment must be reversed, claiming the
trial court erroneously interpreted and applied the statutory law concerning
the VSP scoring. Safety-Kleen first argues section 25110.8.5 requires that all
Class I violations must be found to pose a “significant threat to human health
or safety or the environment.” Safety-Kleen further asserts that a Class II
violation can be reclassified as a Class I violation only where the violation is
chronic or committed by a recalcitrant violator. Based on this understanding
of the statutory definitions of Class I and Class II violations, Safety-Kleen
contends the Department abused its discretion by improperly classifying
several violations (nos. 10 through 11, 13 through 15, 17, and 18) as Class I

                                        8
violations in the first instance because they posed only a minimal potential
for harm to public health or to the environment. Safety-Kleen also claims the
Department abused its discretion by improperly reclassifying eight Class II
violations (nos. 1 through 7 and 16) as Class I violations despite the lack of
evidence satisfying Class I criteria. We address these contentions in order.
      A. The criteria for a “Class I violation”
      This issue turns on the interpretation of section 25110.8.5 and its
criteria for classifying a violation as a Class I violation. We review issues of
statutory interpretation de novo. (Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848,
857.) “We begin our inquiry by examining [the statute’s] words, giving them
a plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] In doing so, however, we do
not consider the statutory language in isolation. [Citation.] Rather, we look
to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and
purpose of the provision . . . .’ [Citation.] We avoid any construction that
would produce absurd consequences.” (Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th
572, 577–578.)
      We proceed bearing in mind that “[a]lthough the final responsibility for
interpreting a statute or regulation rests with the court, judicial deference
must often be accorded to the construction applied by an agency charged with
the law’s administration and enforcement. [Citations.] ‘ “The appropriate
degree of judicial scrutiny in any particular case is perhaps not susceptible of
precise formulation, but lies somewhere along a continuum with
nonreviewability at one end and independent judgment at the other.”
[Citation.] Quasi-legislative administrative decisions are properly placed at
that point of the continuum at which judicial review is more deferential
. . . .’ ” (Diablo Valley College Faculty Senate v. Contra Costa Community
College Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1034.)

                                        9
      As relevant to Safety-Kleen’s first contention, section 25110.8.5
provides: “ ‘Class I violation’ means any of the following: [¶] (a) A deviation
from the requirements of this chapter, or any regulation, standard,
requirement, or permit . . . that is any of the following: [¶] (1) The deviation
represents a significant threat to human health or safety or the environment
because of one or more of the following: [¶] (A) The volume of the waste.
[¶] (B) The relative hazardousness of the waste. [¶] (C) The proximity of the
population at risk. [¶] (2) The deviation is significant enough that it could
result in a failure to accomplish any of the following: [¶] (A) Ensure that
hazardous waste is destined for, and delivered to, an authorized hazardous
waste facility. [¶] (B) Prevent releases of hazardous waste or constituents to
the environment during the active or postclosure period of facility operation.
[¶] (C) Ensure early detection of releases of hazardous waste or constituents.
[¶] (D) Ensure adequate financial resources in the case of releases of
hazardous waste or constituents. [¶] (E) Ensure adequate financial resources
to pay for facility closure. [¶] (F) Perform emergency cleanup operations of,
or other corrective actions for, releases.” (§ 25110.8.5, italics added.) 2
      Applying settled rules of statutory construction, we give effect to the
plain language of section 25110.8.5, which explicitly articulates independent
bases—under subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2)—for categorizing a violation as a
Class I violation. Under subdivision (a)(1) of section 25110.8.5, a Class I
violation consists of “any” deviation from statutory, regulatory, or other
requirements that represents a significant threat to human health or safety
or the environment for enumerated reasons. Under subdivision (a)(2), a

2      Section 25110.8.5 provides that a Class I violation also includes “a
Class II violation which is a chronic violation or committed by a recalcitrant
violator.” (§ 25110.8.5, subd. (b), italics added.) This category of Class I
violations will be discussed in part B, post.

                                        10
Class I violation also consists of “any” deviation that is significant enough
that it could result in various enumerated failures. Notably, the language of
subdivision (a)(2) neither incorporates nor even alludes to “a significant
threat to human health or safety or the environment.” Rather, that
descriptive phrase is integral but particular to the definition of a Class I
violation only under subdivision (a)(1).
      “When one part of a statute contains a term or provision, the omission
of that term or provision from another part of the statute indicates the
Legislature intended to convey a different meaning. [Citation.] A court may
not rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting language, to make it
conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed.” (Cornette v. Department
of Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73–74.) Here, the statutory language
plainly evinces the Legislature’s intent that section 25110.8.5,
subdivision (a)(2), captures a different type of deviation from operational
requirements than subdivision (a)(1). Accordingly, we cannot and will not
graft language from one subdivision into the other. 3
      Our construction does not produce absurd consequences. But requiring
proof of a significant threat to human health, safety, or the environment
could hamper advancement of section 25110.8.5, subdivision (a)(2)’s
objectives, including its aim to ensure that operators of hazardous waste
facilities maintain adequate financial resources to meet liability and other

3
       A recent practice guide, while certainly not determinative, supports
this interpretation: “Class I violations are defined by statute to include
deviations from the requirements of the HWCA that represent a significant
threat to health, safety, or the environment . . . . They also include
significant deviations from requirements designed to accomplish [various
enumerated objectives]” and Class II violations “which are chronic violations
or committed by a recalcitrant violator.” (Manaster & Selmi, Cal.
Environmental Law & Land Use Practice (2023) ch. 54, § 54.20[2][a], italics
added.)

                                       11
obligations. (E.g., § 25110.8.5(a)(2)(D) [in case of releases of hazardous waste
or constituents]; § 25110.8.5(a)(2)(E) [to pay for facility closure].) Other
HWCL statutes confirm the importance of this objective: “It is the intent of
the Legislature, in enacting this article, . . . to ensure that new hazardous
waste facilities are not sited unless the facility operator provides financial
assurance that the operator can respond adequately to damage claims arising
out of the operation of the facility.” (§ 25199, subd. (c).) Similarly,
section 25200.1 precludes the Department from issuing a hazardous waste
facility permit unless “the facility operator is in compliance with regulations
adopted by the department pursuant to this chapter requiring that the
operator provide financial assurance that the operator can respond adequately
to damage claims arising out of the operation of the facility or the facility is
exempt from these financial assurance requirements . . . .” (Italics added.)
      Safety-Kleen points to no case law supporting its contrary
construction, 4 and instead resorts to legislative history to make its case.
Generally, courts do not consult the legislative history where, as here, the
relevant statutory language is unambiguous. 5 (Diamond Multimedia
Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1055.) Safety-Kleen,

4     The Department requests that we take judicial notice of a superior
court judgment in an unrelated case. Safety-Kleen opposes this request.
Because the judgment has no precedential value, we deny that request for
judicial notice. (SHR St. Francis, LLC v. City and County of San Francisco
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 622, 642.)
5     Though Safety-Kleen’s opening brief did not contend the statutory
language was ambiguous, its reply brief belatedly suggests the phrase
“significant enough” in subdivision (a)(2) of section 25110.8.5 is ambiguous.
We need not address this claim of ambiguity, as it comes too late. (Benach v.
County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852, fn. 10.) In any event,
as discussed below, we have reviewed the legislative history and find it does
not compel Safety-Kleen’s proposed construction.

                                        12
however, argues the legislative history is relevant to “ ‘determining whether
the literal meaning of a measure comports with its purpose or whether such a
construction of one provision is consistent with other provisions of the
statute.’ ” (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276.) For the sake of
completeness, we have reviewed the legislative history and conclude it does
not compel Safety-Kleen’s strained interpretation of section 25110.8.5. 6
      Section 25110.8.5 was enacted in 1994 by Senate Bill No. 1899 (Senate
Bill 1899). (Stats. 1994, ch. 1217, § 2.) The law was intended to “define the
terms ‘Class I violation’ and ‘minor violation’ ” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen.
Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.)) and to codify the then-existing
regulatory definitions of Class I and Class II violations (Sen. 3d reading
analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 22, 1994 [stating
Senate Bill 1899 “[e]nacts the definitions of Class I and Class II Violations
now in the regulations into statute”]). The regulatory definition of a Class I

6      Before proceeding, we pause to address the parties’ remaining requests
for judicial notice. We grant the Department’s unopposed request for judicial
notice of the California Environmental Protection Agency’s and the California
Certified Unified Program Agency (CUPA) Forum’s Violation Classification
Guidance for Unified Program Agencies (Rev. Mar. 6, 2020), as well as Safety-
Kleen’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the Department’s Final
Statement of Reasons, Hazardous Waste Facility Permitting Criteria (Sept.
2018) (hereafter “FSOR”).
       Over the Department’s objection, we grant Safety-Kleen’s request for
judicial notice of Senate Bill No. 1899 and three related legislative reports.
In addition to these reports, we have reviewed several additional legislative
reports concerning Senate Bill 1899. (See Sen. Floor Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 29, 1994; Assem. Com. on Ways and
Means, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 17, 1994;
Sen. Com. on Toxics and Pub. Safety Management, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 25, 1994; Sen. Com. on Toxics and Pub.
Safety Management, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.)
Apr. 11, 1994.)

                                        13
violation is the same now as it was when Senate Bill 1899 was passed, and as
Safety-Kleen acknowledges, the regulatory definition of a Class I violation is
substantially similar to the definition in section 25110.8.5.
      As relevant here, section 66260.10 of the regulations defines a Class I
violation as: “(a) a deviation from the requirements specified in Chapter 6.5
of Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code, or regulations, permit or
interim status document conditions, standards, or requirements adopted
pursuant to that chapter, that represents a significant threat to human health
or safety or the environment, because of (1) the volume of the waste; (2) the
relative hazard of the waste; or (3) the proximity of the population at risk, or
that is significant enough that it could result in a failure to accomplish the
following: [¶] (A) Assure that hazardous wastes are destined for and
delivered to an authorized hazardous waste facility; [¶] (B) Prevent releases
of hazardous waste or constituents to the environment during the active or
post closure period of facility operation; [¶] (C) Assure early detection of such
releases; [¶] (D) Assure adequate financial resources in the case of releases;
[¶] (E) Assure adequate financial resources to pay for facility closure;
[¶] (F) Perform emergency clean-up operation or other corrective action for
releases.” (Italics added; see Manaster & Selmi, Cal. Environmental Law &
Land Use Practice, supra, ch. 54, § 54.20[2][a] [statutory definition of Class I
violations “is identical to the existing regulatory definition for Class I
violations”].)
      Relying first on the legislative declarations accompanying the
enactment of section 25110.8.5, Safety-Kleen points to the declaration that
violations must receive enforcement attention and action “in relation to the
severity of the offense as measured by the danger to, or potential to
endanger, public health and safety and the environment.” (Stats. 1994,

                                        14
ch. 1217, § 1, subd. (a); see FSOR, supra, p. 89 [describing Class I violations
as “the most serious and significant types of hazardous waste management
violations”].) Safety-Kleen also notes the Legislature’s declaration that “[t]he
definition of a Class I violation includes, but is not limited to, the
requirement that the violation represent a significant threat to human health
and safety or to the environment,” while “Class II violations, by definition, do
not represent a significant threat to human health and safety or to the
environment and are not indicative of chronic violations or of violations that
are committed by a recalcitrant violator.” (Stats. 1994, ch. 1217, § 1,
subds. (b)–(c).) In Safety-Kleen’s view, these legislative declarations
demonstrate that “a Class I violation requires a threshold determination that
a violation represents a ‘significant threat’ but might also include other
requirements.” This is unpersuasive.
      Although the Legislature certainly intended Class I violations to
include those violations that represent a significant threat to human health
and safety or to the environment, the cited declarations reflect no intent to
exempt deviations that could result in the failure to accomplish the
enumerated objectives set out in subdivision (a)(2) of section 25110.8.5 from
the definition of Class I violations. The inclusion of the words “but is not
limited to” in section 1 of Senate Bill 1899 reasonably indicates that Class I
violations include more than those deviations that represent a significant
threat to human health and safety or to the environment. (People v. Arias
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 181 [“the proviso ‘including, but not limited to’
‘connotes an illustrative listing, one purposefully capable of enlargement’ ”].)
Moreover, section 1’s statement that Class II violations “do not represent a
significant threat to human health and safety or to the environment and are
not indicative of chronic violations or of violations that are committed by a

                                        15
recalcitrant violator” is not a clear expression of a legislative intent to limit
Class I violations to only those violations that pose a significant threat to
human health or safety or the environment. 7
      Safety-Kleen’s reliance on legislative reports fares no better. (E.g.,
Assem. Com. on Environmental Safety and Toxic Materials, Analysis of Sen.
Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) July 5, 1994; Sen. 3d reading analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 22, 1994; Sen. Floor 3d
reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) June 1, 1994.)
We acknowledge that these reports reflect the Legislature’s intent to
distinguish between Class I and Class II violations and to provide a different,
less severe enforcement mechanism for Class II violations. (See, e.g., Assem.
Com. on Environmental Safety and Toxic Materials, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) July 5, 1994; Assem. Com. on Ways and

7      In a similar vein, Safety-Kleen relies on non-exclusive language in the
Department’s “Official Enforcement Response Policy DTSC OP-0006” stating:
“Examples of potential Class I Violations include the following: [¶] 1. A
release or serious threat of a hazardous waste to the environment, or
violation that causes a release or serious threat . . . .” Safety-Kleen also
relies on a document prepared by the California Environmental Protection
Agency and CUPA Forum, stating that “Class I violations . . . include . . .
violations that pose a significant threat of harm to the environment or
human life.” (Cal. Environmental Protection Agency and CUPA Forum,
Violation Classification Guidance for Unified Program Agencies, p. 4, italics
added.) This non-exclusive language does not support Safety-Kleen’s
position.
       Notably, a separate example of a Class I violation in the Department’s
“Official Enforcement Response Policy” is “[a] violation that involves the
failure to assure that proper closure and post closure activities will be
undertaken, for example: [¶] Failure of an owner/operator to develop closure
or post closure plans.” (Bullet point omitted.) As such, this document is
consistent with the Department’s position that section 25110.8.5
subdivision (a)(2), sets out an independent basis for categorizing violations as
Class I violations. (§ 25110.8.5, subd. (a)(2)(E).)

                                        16
Means, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 17, 1994.)
But contrary to Safety-Kleen’s suggestion, these reports evince no clear
legislative contemplation that Class I violations exclude any deviation that
does not pose a significant threat to human health or safety or the
environment, even if the deviation meets the criteria enumerated in
subdivision (a)(2) of section 25110.8.5.
      Moreover, Safety-Kleen fails to acknowledge that two of the legislative
reports contain statements acknowledging section 25110.8.5’s provision of
alternative independent bases for determining a violation is a Class I
violation. These two reports state in relevant part: “Class I violations . . . are
violations that (1) represent ‘a significant threat to human health or safety or
the environment’ or (2) increase the likelihood that certain requirements
(delivery of hazardous wastes to authorized facilities, prevention or detection
of releases, emergency cleanups, financial assurance of cleanup or closure)
will not be met.” (Assem. Com. on Environmental Safety and Toxic
Materials, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) July 5, 1994,
italics added; Sen. 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg.
Sess.) Aug. 22, 1994, italics added.) Though other legislative reports may be
read as defining a Class I violation in line with Safety-Kleen’s position (e.g.,
Sen. Floor 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1899 (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.)
June 1, 1994), the perceived inconsistency across these legislative reports is
insufficient to override the plain language of the statute.
      B. Reclassification of prior violations
      Safety-Kleen next contends the Department cannot reclassify a
facility’s Class II violation as a Class I violation based solely on a
determination that the violation satisfies the definition of a Class I violation.
In Safety-Kleen’s view, whether or not a previously determined Class II

                                        17
violation meets the definition of a Class I violation, the violation cannot be
reclassified as such without evidence of the criteria in subdivision (b) of
section 25110.8.5, which defines a third category of Class I violations, as
follows: “The deviation is a Class II violation which is a chronic violation or
committed by a recalcitrant violator.” (See fn. 2, ante.) This statutory
definition adopts the regulatory definition of “Class II violation,” which, in
short, means a deviation “that is not a Class I violation.” (Regs., § 66260.10.)
Whether a violation is chronic or a violator is recalcitrant requires evidence
that “the violator has engaged in a pattern of neglect or disregard.”
(§ 25117.6, subd. (b)(2).)
      We readily agree that section 25110.8.5 does not permit reclassification
of a true Class II violation—i.e., a deviation that does not meet the definition
of a Class I violation (Regs., § 66260.10)—as a Class I violation absent proof
that the violation was chronic or the violator recalcitrant. But Safety-Kleen’s
argument is not limited to true Class II violations. Instead, Safety-Kleen
contends that no deviation previously classified as a Class II violation and
later found to meet the definition of a Class I violation under subdivision
(a)(1) or (a)(2) of section 25110.8.5 can be reclassified as a Class I violation
absent additional evidence that the violation is chronic or the violator
recalcitrant as referenced in subdivision (b). We cannot agree.
      Safety-Kleen points to no authority restricting the Department’s
authority to reevaluate Class I or Class II violation determinations during
the VSP process. To the contrary, the regulatory scheme explicitly permits
the Department to consider any violation as a Class I violation for purposes
of the VSP, as long as it fits within the Class I definition: “For purposes of
the Facility VSP Score, the Department may not consider any of the
following: [¶] (1) Class II violations,’ as defined in section 66260.10, unless the

                                        18
Class II violation meets the definition of a Class I violation as specified in
section 66260.10.” (Regs., § 66271.50, subd. (d)(1), italics added.)
      Safety-Kleen argues the Department’s interpretation of this regulation
should not be given deference because the Department has taken inconsistent
positions on the matter, as evidenced by the Department’s FSOR. 8 This
contention, however, rests on a portion of the FSOR that is taken out of
context.
      The Department drafted the FSOR to provide “a description of, and a
statement of necessity for, each provision of the final regulatory text.”
(FSOR, supra, p. 4.) Notably, and as relevant here, the FSOR describes the
regulatory definition of a Class I violation in a manner that aligns with our
construction of section 25110.8.5. (FSOR, supra, at p. 89.) The FSOR then
explains that a Class II violation is not a Class I violation. (Ibid.)
      What follows is the language on which Safety-Kleen relies: “However,
Class II violations that meet the definition of a Class I violation as specified
in [regulation] section 66260.10 may be considered by DTSC for purposes of
calculating a Facility VSP Score. Section 66260.10 provides that a Class II
violation becomes a Class I violation when ‘[t]he violation is a Class II
violation which is a chronic violation or committed by a recalcitrant violator.’
The upgrading of a Class II violation to a Class I violation is done when
DTSC determines that an administrative enforcement response is
appropriate. This subsection does not impact how DTSC determines that a

8     In its reply brief, Safety-Kleen makes a similar argument also relying
on a document prepared by the California Environmental Protection Agency
and CUPA Forum, stating that chronic violations and or minor violations by
recalcitrant violators can become Class I violations. (Cal. Environmental
Protection Agency and CUPA Forum, Violation Classification Guidance for
Unified Program Agencies, p. 4.)

                                        19
Class II violation should [be] classified as a Class I violation. This regulatory
text is needed to explain how Class II violations are considered, to avoid
future disputes caused by lack of clarity during implementation of this
regulation.” (FSOR, supra, p. 90.)
      Safety-Kleen’s reliance on this passage is misplaced, as it contains no
indication the Department was taking a position contrary to
section 66271.50, subdivision (d)(1), of the regulations. To the contrary, the
passage is consistent with the Department’s position here that for purposes of
calculating a facility’s VSP score, any violation meeting the definition of a
Class I violation as set forth in regulation section 66260.10 (or Health &
Safety Code section 25110.8.5, subd. (a)) may be considered, as well as any
Class II violation that becomes a Class I violation if the violation is chronic or
the violator recalcitrant. 9
      In sum, we reject Safety-Kleen’s contentions that the Department
abused its discretion.
      C. Substantial evidence claim
      Safety-Kleen asserts in passing that there was no substantial evidence
supporting the Department’s Class I determinations. The claim, however, is
not captioned under a specific argument heading, and it largely is
unsupported by record citations and a fair discussion of the evidence in the

9     The day before oral argument, Safety-Kleen filed a letter pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.254, citing for the first time the
Department’s Initial Statement of Reasons, Hazardous Waste Facility
Permitting Criteria (Sept. 2017) (hereafter “ISOR”). As Safety-Kleen
conceded at oral argument, the ISOR is not new authority that was
unavailable when it filed its appellate briefs. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.254(a).) In any event, the ISOR’s discussion of regulation
sections 66260.10 and 66271.50, subdivision (d)(1), is materially similar to
the FSOR’s discussion of those regulations and fails to assist Safety-Kleen’s
position for the reasons stated above.

                                        20
administrative record. As the claim is not properly presented, we decline to
consider it further. (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 547, 557; Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 239, 248, fn. 6.) In any event, Safety-Kleen’s claims are
dependent on its erroneous interpretation of section 25110.8.5; Safety Kleen
makes no showing that the challenged Class I violations do not meet
requirements of section 25110.8.5, subdivision (a)(2), as construed herein.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. The Department is entitled to costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)

                                    _________________________
                                    Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Petrou, J.

                                      21
Trial Court:                Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge:                Hon. Frank Roesch

Counsel:                    Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, Mark E. Elliot and
                               Margaret N. Rosegay, for Petitioner and Appellant

                            Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Edward H.
                              Ochoa, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jeremy M.
                              Brown, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David
                              Zaft, Deputy Attorney General and Taylor Wetzel,
                              Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent

Safety-Kleen v. Department of Toxic Substance Control (A166575)

                                                           22