Court Opinion

ID: 9707551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:15:32.198679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:34.986701
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
On the basis of the circuit court’s non-clearly erroneous findings of fact, we are reviewing judgments entered in a money damages action filed against a police officer who presented a truthful Application for Statement of Charges to a District Court Commissioner. Each of those judgments should be affirmed because at the time appellee filed the Application for Statement of Charges, (1) the Application was simply not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable;” (2) the constitutional right to “blow the cover” of an undercover officer has not been “clearly established” in Maryland or anywhere else; and (3) the circuit court was not clearly *89erroneous in finding that the facts asserted in the Application were true.
The 1983 Claims
When this case returned to the circuit court, the complaint was amended to include an assertion that appellee’s Application contained false and misleading statements. That assertion made summary judgment inappropriate, and required that the trier of fact decide whether appellee had lied to the Commissioner. The issue of qualified immunity, however, was not postponed until the plaintiff proved a constitutional violation. Appellee began the trial “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as [her] conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
The following transpired when appellant’s counsel made his closing argument:
THE COURT: As to how [appellant] learned or from who he learned that these officers were actually officers and when he learned it, we went round and round on that. His testimony changed on numerous occasions the bottom line being, that I have a problem with his credibility. I don’t have a problem with Sergeant DiPino’s credibility, and I don’t have a problem with Trooper Brumbley’s credibility.
So what I’m telling you is, there is a divergence as to what actually occurred here, and I’m going to base my decision on the testimony of Sergeant DiPino and Trooper Brumbley, because I find them to be the credible witnesses.
So if you want to make your arguments based on that testimony, I’ll hear you.
MR. WIMBROW: ... But once again, I think in the best light of the Defendants’ case, you know, she never had probable cause to believe he’d committed a crime.
THE COURT: Why not?
MR. WIMBROW: Why not?
*90It’s not a crime to say — to say the truth. It’s not a crime to say, “That person’s a lawyer”. “That person’s a judge”. “That person is a police officer.” That’s not a crime.
THE COURT: Well, according to the Sibiga — I don’t know how you say that name, but at 65 Md. Appellate 69: “The elements for obstructing or hindering are a police officer engaged in the performance of his duties.”
You would concede that, in fact, they were engaged in the performance of their duties as undercover officers attempting to make a drug buy.
MR. WINBROW: I will concede that. But there is no proof that Mr. Davis knew that they were so engaged at that time. There is absolutely no evidence that he knew they were so engaged at that time.
They have plain clothes on. You can’t tell me they’re engaged in buying drugs and investigating drugs every minute that they have a pair of jeans and a tee shirt on.
THE COURT: Well, what we’re talking about is probable cause.
MR. WINBROW: Oh, I understand.
THE COURT: We’re not talking about proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Certainly, Wicomico Street and the Cork Bar are areas where it’s well known that drug transactions take place.
MR. WIMBROW: Well known to her. That was her testimony, well known to her. No evidence that Mr. Davis knew that.
And I want to point—
THE COURT: Well, there is evidence that he was familiar with drug transactions ...
MR. WIMBROW: Assuming all that’s true, that doesn’t mean — there is no evidence that Mr. Davis knew that she was working that night or even that he knew that Wicomico Street was a high drug area. If it was a high drug area, that does not give any credence to the proposition that she was working.
*91There’s absolutely no evidence — and I know we’re talking about probable cause — but there’s no evidence at all that she was working.
THE COURT: I think that’s sufficient evidence.
* * *
THE COURT: Well, the way I read the case as I got the testimony before me, I have explained to you why I think which testimony is believable to me, and I got the elements of what hindering are. I’ve already gone through 1 and 2. 3: “Acknowledged (sic)by the accused of facts comprising element number 1 which is that they were police officers.” And I know you have to concede that. And 4 was, “Intent to obstruct or hinder the officer by the act or omission constituting element number 2.”
The facts as stated by the officers, with several people outside the Cork Bar, numerous people on the street, a conversation with Mr. King who may have been involved because of a confidential report that she read about Kingie’s—
MR. WIMBROW: But he doesn’t know that. There’s no evidence that he knows that. So how can he have an intent to obstruct her investigation of something about which he knows nothing?
THE COURT: Why would he have said it in such a loud voice to do other than that?
MR. WIMBROW: He said it. Well, that’s not-you know, he said it because he was having a conversation with King. They said that it was all this noise. Maybe if you accept their testimony—
THE COURT: And I do.
MR. WIMBROW: — he had to talk over this noise.
THE COURT: No. I think that’s a stretch.
I agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that appellee’s Application did establish probable cause for the issuance of a Statement of Charges. I am also persuaded, however, that *92appellant’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish either (1) that the right to “blow the cover” of an undercover officer had been “clearly established” when appellee filed her Application, or (2) that no reasonable law enforcement officer would believe that the information contained in the Application was sufficient to establish probable cause for appellant’s arrest.1
I
According to the majority, “knowledge” is an element of the offense with which appellant was charged, and there was no proof of appellant’s knowledge that appellee was on duty when they encountered one another; thus appellant should never have been charged because the State would never be able to establish a prima facie case of hindering. As the circuit court pointed out, however, the issue was whether the Application established probable cause. “Only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity, is the standard for probable cause.” Collins v. State, 17 Md.App. 376, 384, 302 A.2d 693 (1973).
Moreover, nothing in Cover v. State requires that the State must prove “direct or actual” knowledge in a hindering case. In “receiving stolen goods” prosecutions (now prosecuted as theft under our consolidated theft statute), the “knowledge” element can be established by proof that the defendant “could reasonably have suspected that the property ... was stolen.” McGlothlin v. State, 1 Md.App. 256, 262, 229 A.2d 428 (1967). There is no valid reason why the knowledge element in a hindering case cannot be established by proof that the defendant reasonably suspected that he or she was hindering an on duty officer.
In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), the Supreme Court held that police offi*93cers seeking arrest warrants are entitled to qualified immunity, and
that the same standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon, supra, defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest. Only where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable, Leon, supra, at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, will the shield of immunity be lost.
475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. at 1098.
It has been “clearly established” that police officers cannot present false or misleading affidavits to magistrates. The law quite properly imposes civil liability on the person who submits an affidavit that either contains a false statement of fact, or omits a material fact in order to create a false impression. Never before now, however, has any court imposed 1983 liability against an officer who presented an affidavit that is true. In the twelve years since the Supreme Court stated that 1983 liability would be imposed on an officer whose request for a warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” no appellate court anywhere has imposed liability under this theory.2
If a criminal defendant is arrested on a warrant based on an affidavit that did not establish probable cause for the arrest, (1) any contraband or incriminating evidence found on the defendant’s person will be inadmissible at trial, Collins v. State, 17 Md.App. 376, 382-383, 302 A.2d 693 (1973); and, absent proof of attenuation and a finding that his or her statement was not “the tainted fruit of the poisonous tree,” any incriminating statement made by the defendant will be excluded as well. Ryon v. State, 29 Md.App. 62, 82, 349 A.2d 393 (1975), affd., State v. Ryon, 278 Md. 302, 363 A.2d 243 *94(1976). Had appellant been in possession of contraband at the time he was arrested, would that contraband be inadmissible under Collins? If, upon reading the warrant, appellant had blurted, “I was sure DiPino was just about to arrest a good Mend of mine, and I’m delighted that I screwed up her investigation!” would that incriminating statement be inadmissible under Ryon? According to the majority, the answer to each of these questions is “yes.” I cannot agree with either answer.
“A close question of probable cause (or the admissibility of information from an informant bearing on probable cause) might be submitted to twenty fair and knowledgeable judges with ten finding one way and ten finding the opposite way and none of them being unreasonable or clearly erroneous. What happens when such a ruling comes to us, or to a suppression hearing judge, for review? Do we simply monitor the system for “error” (which is the basic, though limited, appellate function)? Do we extend due deference to any reasonable conclusion arising out of the gray area or broad discretionary range as something not “clearly erroneous” or a “clear abuse of discretion,” even where we ourselves might have concluded otherwise from the same ambiguous predicate? Or do we make a de novo determination on these issues?
... Illinois v. Gates leaves no room for doubt that reviewing courts, at the appellate level or at the suppression hearing level, have no business second-guessing the probable cause determinations of warrant-issuing magistrates by way of de novo determinations of their own. Unless the finding of the magistrate in this regard is “clearly erroneous” or represents “a clear abuse of discretion,” it is unassailable. Illinois v. Gates makes it equally beyond dispute that this is not a change in the law, but a declaration of preexisting law.
Ramia v. State, 57 Md.App. 654, 658-659, 471 A.2d 1064 (1984).
In this case, both the District Court Commissioner and the circuit court concluded that the affidavit was sufficient to *95establish probable cause. Under these circumstances, there is a presumption that probable cause existed. Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870-871 (2nd Cir.1991). That presumption can be overcome by proof that the affidavit contains a false statement that was necessary to the finding of probable cause. Id. Such a presumption, however, has never been overcome in a damage action arising out of an affidavit found to be truthful.
When a factual situation presents a close question of probable cause, the benefit of the doubt belongs to the police officer who submits the close question for a magistrate’s decision.
Jennings v. Joshua Independent School District, 877 F.2d 313, 318 (5th Cir.1989). The imposition of 1983 liability on a law enforcement officer who presents a truthful affidavit to a judicial officer is contrary to the Supreme Court’s preference for warrants, and contrary to sound public policy as well.
II
The constitutional right that appellee allegedly violated has never been “established,” “clearly” or otherwise. We are not dealing with the abstract right of “free speech,” but rather with the particularized right to “blow the cover” of an undercover officer.
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that a fact specific constitutional right has been “clearly established.” Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1027 (10th Cir.1992). This issue is an issue of law, and requires that we examine the law on *96that subject as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1498 n. 32 (11th Cir.1991), Wegener v. City of Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir.1991).
In § 1983 actions where qualified immunity is at issue, it has been the rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the fact-specific constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the incident since Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984), ...
Under the rule of Davis v. Scherer, a defendant is presumed to be immune from damages unless the plaintiff shows that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. 468 U.S. at 197, 104 S.Ct. at 3021.... If the plaintiff is not expected to make any “showing” except as to what happened factually, leaving it to the court to come up with the relevant universe of authority from which to find whether the law was clearly established, the Davis rule would be flipped on its head.
Elder v. Holloway, 975 F.2d 1388, 1392-1393 (9th Cir.1991).
Of the cases relied on by the majority, only Cover was cited in appellant’s brief. I point this out not to criticize appellant’s counsel (who has represented his client very well), but rather to show why the cases relied on by the majority do not “clearly establish” that Davis had a right to say what he said, the way he said it, on the occasion at issue. There is a very good reason why appellant’s counsel cited only one of the cases on which the majority relies: he recognizes that the others do not establish the law that we must apply.
State v. Jelliffe was decided by a judge of the Municipal Court of Cleveland, Ohio, whose opinion does not establish the law for Ohio or anywhere else. Westin v. McDaniel was decided by a federal district judge, whose opinion does not establish the law for any other district, Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 623 (2nd Cir.1993), and was affirmed in an unpublished opinion that does not establish precedent even for *97the 11th Circuit. Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir.1996).
The majority concludes that the circuit court misconstrued Cover v. State, 297 Md. 398, 466 A.2d 1276 (1983). I do not agree with that conclusion. Nothing in Cover, however, establishes — clearly or otherwise — that a citizen has the right to “blow the cover” of an undercover officer. The Court of Appeals did not reverse Cover’s conviction on the ground that a citizen has a constitutional right to warn a fellow citizen that he is under police surveillance. Reversal was based on the narrow ground that the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant ever made any such attempt. 297 Md. at 414-415, 466 A.2d 1276. Moreover, although it had the opportunity to do so, the Cover court did not reject the proposition that a hindering conviction can be based on proof that the defendant committed an intentional act that made it more difficult for the police to carry out their duty. Id. at 409-412, 466 A.2d 1276.
For qualified immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.
Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University, 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir.1994) (emphasis in the opinion). If there really is a specific, factually defined constitutional right to “blow the cover” of an undercover officer, it is certain that such a right had not been “clearly established” when appellee presented her Application to the Commissioner.
Ill
Even if the right to “blow the cover” of an undercover officer had been established when appellee presented her Application to the District Court Commissioner, and even if that Application did not establish probable cause for appellant’s arrest, this court should nonetheless affirm the judgments of the circuit court. To determine the issue of *98appellee’s 1988 liability, we ask “not whether the affidavit establishes probable cause, but rather whether the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that it established probable cause.” Thompson v. Renting, 968 F.2d 756, 760 (8th Cir.1992).
If the material facts and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts disclose that a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her actions did not violate the clearly established right, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment. See Pritchett [v. Alford,] 973 F.2d [307] 312-13 [(4th Cir.1992)].
Smith v. Reddy 101 F.3d 351, 357 (4th Cir.1996).
Because of the circuit court’s non-clearly erroneous factual finding that her testimony was truthful, appellee is entitled to immunity as long as officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether her Application was sufficient to establish probable cause. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096. Appellant was therefore required to prove that no reasonably well trained police officer would have attempted to obtain an arrest warrant on the basis of the facts contained in the Application at issue. Such proof cannot be inferred from the record before us. Whether no reasonably well trained officer would have done what appellee did is a complicated question that is not a matter of common knowledge or experience. Appellant’s failure to produce expert testimony on this issue is fatal to his 1983 claim.
The State Law Claims
To prevail on his Maryland law claims, appellant was required to prove that appellee lied to the District Court Commissioner. Under Maryland law, when a person presents truthful information in an Application for Statement of Charges, he or she is simply not liable in damages to the person who gets arrested and/or prosecuted on the basis of that truthful information. Malice is absent as a matter of law if the material facts asserted by the applicant are true and correct. Mertens v. Mueller, 122 Md. 313, 322-323, 89 A. 613 (1914), Wood v. Palmer Ford, 47 MdApp. 692, 701, 425 A.2d *99671 (1981), aff'd. in part and rev’d. in part on other grounds, 298 Md. 484, 471 A.2d 297 (1984), on remand 65 Md.App. 390, 500 A.2d 1055 (1985).
Because the circuit court found that the facts asserted in the Application were true, and that finding was not clearly erroneous, we should affirm each of the judgments entered on appellant’s state law claims.

. An appellate court has the authority to determine "that an issue was decided correctly, albeit for different reasons.” Davis v. DiPino, 337 Md. 642, 655, 655 A.2d 401 (1995). In appellant’s 1983 claim, the “issue” is whether appellee is entitled to qualified immunity.

. In the fourteen years since Leon was decided, there have been no reported appellate opinions holding that a criminal defendant was entitled to suppression of evidence under this theory.