Court Opinion

ID: 9564599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:03:54.232374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:33.057590
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Judge,
dissenting.
Because our courts have not consistently held that an action forming the basis of a Woodson claim is an intentional tort “in the true sense of that term,” I respectfully dissent.
The one-year statute of limitations as prescribed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54(3) (1999) is inapplicable even if a Woodson claim is 99.9% an intentional tort. The standard is not flexible under any circumstances — it must be an intentional tort in every sense of the word, absolutely, or there is no room in that section for Woodson.
Statutes of limitation are inflexible and unyielding and the trial court has no discretion when considering whether a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Congleton v. City of Asheboro, 8 N.C. App. 571, 174 S.E.2d 870 (1970).
In Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991), our Supreme Court held there is an exception to the exclusivity clause of *496the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act where an employer had knowledge that an injury was substantially certain to occur under the circumstances. The Woodson court allowed a separate civil action, stating:
the legislature did not intend to relieve employers of civil liability for intentional torts which result in injury or death to employees. In such cases the injury or death is considered to be both by accident, for which the employee or personal representative may pursue a compensation claim under the Act, and the result of an intentional tort, for which a civil action against the employer may be maintained.
Id. at 338-39, 407 S.E.2d at 227. The Woodson court held that
when an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is seriously injured or killed by that misconduct, . . . [s]uch misconduct is tantamount to an intentional tort, and civil actions based thereon are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act.
Id. at 340-41, 407 S.E.2d at 228. (Emphasis added). See also Daye & Morris, North Carolina Law of Torts § 2.31, at 6 & n.10 (2d ed. 1999).
However, in Owens v. W.K. Deal Printing, Inc., 339 N.C. 603, 453 S.E.2d 160 (1995), our Supreme Court explained that a Woodson claim is not an intentional tort “in the true sense of that term.” Id. at 604, 453 S.E.2d at 161. In Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc., 333 N.C. 233, 424 S.E.2d 391 (1993), our Supreme Court stated that a Woodson claim involved a “higher degree of reckless negligence than willful, wanton and reckless negligence[,]” but did not say the claim involved an intentional tort. Id. at 240, 424 S.E.2d at 395. (Emphasis added).
This evolving characterization ranging from an “intentional tort,” to “tantamount to an intentional tort,” to an extremely high level of “negligence,” to not an intentional tort “in the true sense of that term,” clearly removes Woodson from the necessarily seamless definition needed for inclusion in section 1-54(3). The “substantial certainty” test set forth in Woodson is one of the tests utilized in establishing intent for an intentional tort, yet its description appears to originate in negligence theory.
There is in fact a continuum of tortious conduct, with actual intent on one end and mere recklessness and negligence on the other. *497See Woodson, 329 N.C. at 341, 407 S.E.2d at 228-29; Logan & Logan, North Carolina Torts § 17.20 (1996). It is generally clear where substantial certainty is on that continuum. However, it is unclear precisely where a Woodson claim is on the continuum and how it should be procedurally treated.
In Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981), our Supreme Court held that because no statute of limitations addressed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the general three-year statute of limitations pursuant to section 1-52(5) must govern. There is no specific limitation set forth in our General Statutes for a Woodson claim. Unlike Michigan, as cited in the majority opinion, our General Assembly has not acted to establish the statute of limitations at one year and has not adopted what the majority refers to as a “more rigorous true intentional tort test.” If that “true intentional tort test” is indeed “more rigorous,” then by the majority’s own description section 1-54(3) is not applicable. Therefore, this claim, as with intentional infliction of emotional distress, must be controlled by the catch-all three-year statute of limitations in section 1-52(5). See also Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Inc., 571 F.Supp. 433 (M.D.N.C. 1983) (holding that absent other specific limitation, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5) is applicable).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.