Court Opinion

ID: 9661906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:54:23.218473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.996237
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, dissenting. I am sympathetic to the statements of Justice Stroud. Since I have been a member of this Court, I have expressed similar sentiments regarding the law of search and seizure as it has been developed by the United States Supreme Court and other courts. See, Moore v. State, 261 Ark. 274, 551 S.W. 2d 185 (1977) (supplemental opinion on rehearing) (Hickman, J., dissenting). That law has become a legal maze difficult to understand and impossible to administer. We have allowed the police to enter a man’s house and arrest him without a warrant, but having done that, not allowed them to search the house. Moore, supra. The police may not search a suspect’s suitcase when found in a taxicab, Sanders v. State, 262 Ark. 595, 559 S.W. 2d 704 (1977), but they may search a defendant’s purse when both have been taken to the police station. Sumlin v. State, 266 Ark. 709, 587 S.W. 2d 571 (1979). A car stopped on the highway has been held the proper subject of a warrantless search sometime after the driver’s arrest, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970), while a car found in the defendant’s driveway has been held not to be. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 564 (1971). To me, while these cases can be subtly distinguished, they cannot be persuasively reconciled. The Constitution of the United States in its pure form, unadulterated by court decisions, is not difficult to understand nor to interpret. Amendment 4 reads: [Unreasonable searches and seizures.]—The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath and affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The majority in this case does not deny that the police could have gotten a search warrant later. In fact, according to the case law the vehicle could have been searched later if it were properly impounded by the police. See, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). The search was not unreasonable. The police violated no statute. There is no evidence of bad faith on their part. It is simply a case of the majority following a long line of precedents that seem to march forever into a technical maze that not even the judges can navigate with any confidence. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961) decided that the only way to enforce the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches was to forbid the use of any evidence obtained in such a search. This is called the exclusionary rule. There is no provision for such a rule in the United States Constitution. It is simply a device created by the United States Supreme Court to enforce the Constitution. The rule is based on the premise that evidence, tainted by an illegal search, should not be used against an individual. Furthermore, it is designed to deter the errant policeman from ignoring or willfully violating the law. While such reasons are valid and while such a rule can be defended logically and legally, the United States Supreme Court has failed to set forth reasonable guidelines on searches and seizures. It has become impossible to administer the law. Judges cannot agree on what the law is regarding search and seizure. In the case before us, three judges of the Court of Appeals found the search reasonable; three found it unreasonable. Both cite cases to support their judgment. We, too, are divided. What is the average policeman to think of such confusion? How is he to know when a search is lawful? There is no doubt that the exclusionary rule had had a therapeutic effect on the criminal justice system. Policemen today are well informed regarding individual rights and in Arkansas policemen must be qualified as they have never been required to be before. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-1005 et. seq. (Repl. 1977). I have come to the conclusion that the exclusionary rule must be abandoned, that rather than rewarding the guilty defendant, we should punish the guilty policeman. We should look at each case as to determine if there was prejudice to the individual, if there was a willful violation of individual civil rights, and, most of all, if the search was reasonable. The law of search and seizure, as it has developed, has been a paste-pot job of exceptions to exceptions without any reference to the language of the Constitution. The language is not absolute. The word is reasonable. Ironically, the law has become unreasonable. The dilemma to an appellate judge, a trial judge, or even a policeman, is what to do about it. Of course, each person must make their own decision and if they are in authority they must do their best to follow the law and comply with their oath of office. I have concluded that foremost in any search and seizure case, the plain language of the constitution should be applied to the facts before any effort is made to find a decision that might be exactly in point. The passion of appellate judges to find a case exactly in point, distinguish cases that cannot be reasonably distinguished, or extend the law ad infinitum, is what has led to the problem. There cannot be precedents for every conceivable case and we should not try to create them. There should, on the contrary, be general guidelines followed with reason. When I apply that approach to the case before us, I can only conclude that the search in this case was reasonable. It was late at night; the police had to act quickly. There was inclement weather and it, in fact, would not have been reasonable to do anything except search the vehicle. Our rules permit it. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 12.4. The idea that appellate judges can sit back in the comfort of their offices months later and suggest that the municipal judge should be rousted out, or found at some social gathering, and asked for a warrant is nonsense. It is not a question of what could have been done. It is a question of whether what was done was reasonable.