Court Opinion

ID: 9580478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:05:17.299823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:17.890077
License: Public Domain

Justice HUSKINS
dissenting.
The purpose of the “Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act,” G.S. 108-75.1, et seq., is to “protect the general public and public charity in the State of North Carolina” and “to prevent deceptive and dishonest statements and conduct” in the solicitation of funds for charitable purposes. G.S. 108-75.2. In pursuance of this con-cededly valid legislative goal the General Assembly has determined that only those religious organizations whose “financial support is derived primarily from contributions solicited from persons other than its own members, excluding sales of printed or recorded materials”, G.S. 108-75.7(a)(1), need be subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act. The majority holds that such a qualified exemption, which excludes some but not all religious organizations from the licensing provisions of the Act, per se works an unconstitutional establishment of religion. The majority reasons that the Establishment Clause does not permit the state, in enacting valid secular legislation which affects religious *417organizations, to make any classification “which on its face, for whatever reason” (emphasis supplied) excludes some but not all religious groups from a regulatory scheme. In my view, the conclusion reached by the majority finds no support in the jurisprudence of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.
Carefully read, the Establishment Clause cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that the state, when enacting valid secular legislation, may not make distinctions which prevent some but not all religiously motivated conduct from falling within the ambit of state regulation. See generally, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359, 44 L.Ed. 2d 217, 228, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 1760 (1975); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771, 37 L.Ed. 2d 948, 962, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2965 (1973); 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 467; Annot., 37 L.Ed. 2d 1147, § 3(b) (1974). Indeed, the only two Establishment Clause cases dealing with attacks on regulatory legislation founded on disparate legislative treatment of “religious claims” uniformly hold that such distinctions do not invariably work an establishment if there is a rational, neutral, secular basis for the lines the government has drawn and if claimant is unable to demonstrate that the facially valid classifications in effect constitute religious gerrymanders. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 28 L.Ed. 2d 168, 91 S.Ct. 828 (1971) (8-1 decision) (In granting an exemption for conscientious objectors, the government may distinguish between religious beliefs which oppose participation in all wars and religious beliefs which oppose participation in only unjust wars.); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 6 L.Ed. 2d 393, 81 S.Ct. 1101 (1961) (8-1 decision) (Government may establish Sunday as a secular day of rest.).
The holdings in Gillette and McGowan are premised on the sound notion that the freedom of religion guaranteed by state and federal constitutions does not withdraw the government’s authority to act in areas where secular interests happen to coincide with religious interests. The freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment embraces both the freedom to believe and the freedom to act on the basis of one’s religious belief. However, while the freedom to believe is virtually immune from intrusion by the state, the right of action may be subject to reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulation designed to safeguard valid secular interests. Such regulation of conduct cannot infringe unduly upon *418the exercise of protected activities. Accordingly, a statute which regulates religiously motivated conduct will be upheld (1) if it furthers an important governmental interest; (2) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of religion; (3) if the incidental restrictions on protected activities are no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940). See generally, Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 97 L.Ed. 1105, 73 S.Ct. 760 (1953); 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 473.
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, has indicated that the solicitation of funds by religious organizations is an area of valid secular concern and has established standards by which to judge the validity of legislation in this area. With respect to the government’s interest in regulation the Court states:
“Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the public. Certainly penal laws are available to punish such conduct. Even the exercise of religion may be at some slight inconvenience in order that the state may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt a state may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The state is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience.”
310 U.S. at 306-07. With respect to the standards to be applied to determine the validity of regulation in the area the Court states:
“The general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.”
*419310 U.S. at 305.1
In the Establishment Clause cases, the principles enunciated above find expression in the uniformly followed rule “that a law protecting a valid secular interest is not invalid as one ‘respecting an establishment of religion’ merely because it also incidentally benefits one or more or all, religions, or because it incidentally enhances the capability of religion, or religious institutions to survive in society.” 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 467. Accord, Meek v. Pittenger, supra, 421 U.S. at 359; Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at 762; Gillette v. United States, supra; McGowan v. Maryland, supra; Annot., 37 L.Ed. 2d 1143, § 3(b) (1974). It is clear then, that the requirement of neutrality imposed on government by the Establishment Clause does not absolutely preclude it from distinguishing between religious claims when enacting secular regulations in areas of valid governmental concern. Neutrality requires only that the classifications made by the government bear a substantial relation to the secular purposes advanced by the legislation. Gillette v. United States, supra. Otherwise put, the decision to exempt some but not all religious activities from a regulatory scheme must be “secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary impact.” Id., 401 U.S. at 450. The mere fact that an otherwise valid regulatory scheme exempts some but not all religious activities from the burden of regulation does not “in mechanical fashion” compel the conclusion that the scheme “works an establishment of religion.” Id., 401 U.S. at 449.
Finally, it should be noted that when enacting regulatory legislation in areas where secular interests happen to coincide with religious interests, it is not impermissible under establishment doctrine for the legislature to attempt to accommodate free exercise values by exempting from regulation those religious activities the regulation of which isn’t absolutely necessary to accomplish the legislative scheme. Gillette v. United States, supra, 401 U.S. at 453. Such accommodation is in line with “ ‘our happy tradition’ of ‘avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of conscience.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). “ ‘Neutrality’ in matters of *420religion is not inconsistent with ‘benevolence’ by way of exemptions from onerous duties, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. at 669, 25 L.Ed. 2d at 701, so long as an exemption is tailored broadly enough that it reflects valid secular purposes.” Id., 401 U.S. at 454.
Application of these principles to the instant case compels the conclusion that the legislative exemption under attack is secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary impact. At the outset, it should be reemphasized that unquestionably, the state has a valid secular interest in regulating the public solicitation of funds by religious organizations, even though the collection be for religious purposes. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at 305-07. In terms of the Establishment Clause this means that when regulating religiously motivated conduct in this area, the state may make distinctions among religious organizations if those classifications are substantially related to the secular interests advanced by the legislation. Gillette v. United States, supra.
The purpose of the legislation in question is to “protect the general public and public charity in the State of North Carolina; to require full public disclosure of facts relating to persons and organizations who solicit funds from the public for charitable purposes, the purposes for which such funds are solicited, and their actual uses; and to prevent deceptive and dishonest statements and conduct in the solicitation of funds for or in the name of charity.” G.S. 108-75.2. In essence, the regulatory goal is to remedy the special problems created by public charities, religious or otherwise, “who solicit funds from the public for charitable purposes.” Id. The exemption from regulation granted by G.S. 108-75.7(a)(l) to certain religious organizations comports precisely with this valid secular interest by subjecting to regulation only those religious organizations “whose financial support is derived primarily from contributions solicited from persons other than its own members . . . .” Moreover, in section 75.7(a)(1), distinctions among religious organizations are made solely in terms of the precise conduct which the state is seeking to regulate, viz., whether financial support is derived primarily from public solicitations. On its face, section 75.7(a)(1) simply does not distinguish on the basis of religious affiliation or religious belief. It is clear, then, that the preference accorded in section 75.7(a)(1) *421to religious organizations which are primarily member-funded is not made for the purpose of putting “an imprimatur on one religion, ... or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization.” Gillette v. United States, supra, 401 U.S. at 450. Rather, the purpose of the exemption is to subject- to regulation only those religious organizations which clearly present the problems which the Act seeks to remedy. Such a classification is rational and clearly related to the purposes of the Act. .
The majority suggests that no rational distinctions can be drawn between member-funded and nonmember-funded religious organizations for the purposes of regulating the public solicitation of funds by charitable organizations. Such a conclusion overlooks the fact that the purpose of the Act is rather specialized. The Act is concerned with the integrity and operating efficiency of public charity. The primary goal of the Act is to preserve public confidence in public charity by means of a permit system which stresses full disclosure of facts relating to the collection and application of funds and which establishes certain minimum standards of operating efficiency. In sum, the concern of the legislature is not with organizations who raise their funds internally, but rather with the specialized problems presented by organizations who solicit charitable contributions from the public. Given the legislative intent, it is eminently reasonable for the legislature to subject to regulation only those religious organizations “whose financial support is derived primarily from persons other than its own members . . . .” G.S. 108-75.7(a)(l). These are the organizations which clearly present the regulatory problems which the legislature is trying to address.
I note, moreover, that the legislative decision to exempt from coverage those religious organizations whose financial support is derived primarily from their members constitutes a creditable attempt by the legislature to accommodate free exercise values. For while the legislature has the authority to regulate public solicitation by religious organizations, it must take care not to unnecessarily hamper such activities, which are protected by the First Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra. The legislative exemption in the instant case skillfully balances free exercise values with the valid need for state regulation by subjecting to regulation only those religious organizations which clearly present the problems sought to be remedied by the legislative *422scheme, viz., those organizations whose financial support is derived primarily from the public. Such benevolent exemption from onerous duties does not violate the constitutional command of state neutrality in matters of religion when, as here, the exemption is tailored broadly enough to reflect valid secular purposes. Gillette v. United States, supra; Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 25 L.Ed. 2d 697, 90 S.Ct. 1409 (1970).
The majority cites a number of cases for the general proposition that any legislative benefit or exemption to religion which is not all-inclusive is highly suspect and likely to constitute an establishment. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra; Public Funds for Public Schools of N. J. v. Byrne, 590 F. 2d 514 (3d Cir.), aff’d mem., 99 S.Ct. 2818 (1979); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff’d mem. sub. nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). The cases cited by the majority, however, deal exclusively with the application of the Establishment Clause in the wholly different context of financial aid by the state to private education. In such cases the legislative purpose is to provide aid to a particular sector of private education.2 Consequently, the state’s capacity to make classifications among the private schools or pupils attending such schools within the particular sector being aided is necessarily circumscribed. In order to pass muster under the Establishment Clause the state aid must go to virtually all private schools or pupils in the sector being aided. Thus, in this factual context, the state is for the most part limited to an “all or none” choice in terms of the classifications it may make. I note moreover that in the context of government aids to private education it is easier to establish that an appropriation constitutes a religious gerrymander or has an invalid primary effect of establishing religion. Thus, a facially neutral bill to aid all private schools in a state where virtually all recipients of aid would be “church-related or religiously affiliated” would violate the Establishment Clause. See Meek v. Pittenger, supra; Committee of Public Education v. Nyquist, supra. The elevation *423by the majority of the results in these cases into fixed principles of general application fails to heed Chief Justice Burger’s admonition in Walz v. Tax Commission, supra:
“The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution. The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calculated; but the purpose was to state an objective, not to write a statute. In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the Court’s opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general principles on a case-by-case basis. The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general principles.”
397 U.S. at 668.
The majority suggests that the primary impact of the classification made by the state “is to accord benign neglect to the more orthodox, denominational, and congregational religions while subjecting to regulation those religions which spread their beliefs in more evangelical, less traditional ways.”3 It is true that the Establishment Clause “forbids subtle departures from neutrality, ‘religious gerrymanders,’ as well as obvious abuses.” Gillette v. United States, supra, 401 U.S. at 452 (citations omitted). Still, a claimant alleging that a facially neutral regulatory scheme constitutes a gerrymander “must be able to show the absence of a neutral, secular basis for the lines government has drawn.” Id. (Emphasis supplied.) My analysis of the exemption provided by G.S. 108-75.7(a)(l) has demonstrated that its purpose is to relieve from regulation those religious organizations whose methods of financing do not clearly present the regulatory problems in the area of public solicitation which the legislature is seeking to address. Additionally, the classification attempts to ac*424commodate free exercise values by exempting from regulation as much religious solicitation as is consistent with the state’s con-cededly valid interest in preserving the integrity and operating efficiency of public charity. Thus, G.S. 108-75.7(a)(l) “serves a number of valid purposes having nothing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, religion, or cluster of religions.” Id. Since the classifications are clearly related to the advancement of a valid state interest, any benefits accorded to one or more religious institutions are incidental and do not constitute an establishment.
In the second part of its opinion the majority additionally concludes that the exemption granted under G.S. 108-75.7(a)(l) constitutes an establishment because it fosters an excessive government entanglement in religion. This conclusion is clearly incorrect. The pertinent inquiry in an establishment case is whether the aid or benefit granted by the state to religion in general or particular religions is of a type which violates the constitutional command of state neutrality with respect to religion. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commission, supra. In terms of the entanglement test the pertinent inquiry is whether the aid or benefit being granted by the state to religion is of a type which cannot be administered without excessive government involvement in the affairs of religion or religious organization. Thus, even though a program of state aid to private schools is secular in purpose and primary effect, it may nonetheless foster government entanglement in the affairs of sectarian schools because of the complex state surveillance necessary to ensure proper application of the funds being given by the state. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed. 2d 745, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1971). Analysis of the benefit granted by the state in the instant case compels the conclusion that the benefit granted by the exemption in section 75.7(a)(1) does not carry with it the seeds of an extensive and continuing government entanglement. Quite to the contrary, the benefit accorded by the exemption is one of freedom from further state regulation. The only state involvement connected with the benefit granted is that of determining whether an organization qualifies for an exemption. Thus, once a religious organization qualifies, it is not subject to any further regulation by the state. Clearly then, the exemption or benefit granted does not foster excessive government “entanglement” with religion as that term is used in the jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause.
*425The majority’s conclusion in Part II that the Act fosters an excessive entanglement with religion is based on the regulatory burdens that would be imposed on plaintiffs were they to be denied an exemption under section 75.7(a)(1). The majority reasons that exposure to the regulatory mechanisms of the Act would unduly burden plaintiffs’ religious activities. In effect, the majority’s analysis focuses on the extent of the burden imposed by other sections of the Act on plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion. Thus, the issue raised by the majority in Part II of its opinion is not whether the exemption in section 75.7(a)(1) constitutes an establishment; rather, the true issue raised is whether the provisions of the act impermissibly infringe upon the free exercise of religion.
“Untangling” the lines of analyses in this manner permits examination of the free exercise problems raised by the Act in their proper context. Thus, my analysis of the free exercise problems raised by the Act proceeds on the assumption that in section 75.7(a)(1) the General Assembly may, consistent with establishment principles, subject to regulation some but not all religious organizations when legislating in the field of public solicitation. Such a conclusion, however, is not determinative of the extent to which the state may regulate these organizations. “For despite a general harmony of purpose between the two religious clauses of the First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause no doubt has a reach of its own.” Gillette v. United States, supra, 401 U.S. at 461. Thus, while the exemption granted in section 75.7(a)(1) withstands constitutional challenge on establishment grounds, it may well be that sections of the Act, as applied to plaintiffs, are invalid on free exercise grounds. The key point to be kept in mind is that the constitutional problems posed by the exemption in section 75.7(a)(1) are separate and distinct from the problems which may be posed by other sections of the Act. The invalidation of other sections of the Act on free .exercise grounds does not, ipso facto, compel invalidation of the exemption granted in section 75.7(a)(1).
That the state has a compelling interest in regulating the public solicitation of funds by religious and secular organizations is conclusively established in Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra. Moreover, Cantwell suggests that the inclusion of religious organizations in a general scheme for the licensing of such *426organizations is a permissible means of advancing the state’s interest in protecting its citizens from fraudulent solicitations and in preserving the integrity and fiscal responsibility of public charity. “The general regulation in the public interest, of solicitation which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection he for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at 305. (Emphasis supplied.) See also, id. at 306-07. Thus, according to Cantwell, a properly drafted licensing scheme is a less restrictive means of achieving the state’s compelling interest in regulating the public solicitation of funds by religious and secular organizations.
With a few exceptions, the provisions of the Act comport with the standards articulated in Cantwell and hence, are not open to constitutional objection on free exercise grounds. The primary burden imposed on religious organizations by the Act is the completion of an application for a license to solicit. See G.S. 108-75.6. The information which religious organizations must supply on their application relates clearly to the state interest in preserving the integrity and fiscal responsibility of public charity and in protecting its citizens from fraudulent solicitations. Thus, a religious organization, like any other organization which intends to solicit funds, must give its name, address, names and addresses of key personnel, a copy of an audited balance sheet which conforms to the “Audit Guides” published by the American Institute of Public Accountants, location of financial records, method of solicitation, use of professional fund-raising counsel and solicitors, length and areas of solicitation, purpose of solicitation, names of individuals responsible for the final distribution of funds. Id. Moreover, the only inspection authority retained by the state is over the financial records maintained by the soliciting organization: “Upon demand, such records shall be made available to the Department, the Commission or the Attorney General for inspection.” G.S. 108-75.12.
Such requirements are general in nature, do not involve a religious test, and do not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds. The most intrusive requirement imposed on *427religious organizations is the submission of an audited financial statement. G.S. 108-75.6(6). The impact of this requirement is considerably softened by a proviso which permits simplified reporting by organizations that raise less than $25,000 in the preceding fiscal year. Id. The compilation of a financial statement, audited or simplified, has at best a tenuous impact on matters of religious practice or belief. The primary effect of such disclosure is to reveal the flow of money into and out of the organizational structure. To the extent that management of solicited funds constitutes a religious practice or belief it must yield to the state’s interest in seeing that reasonable amounts of solicited funds are used for the purposes for which they are solicited. Moreover, it would seem that sound accounting practices would in the long run tend to advance rather than retard an organization’s ability to solicit funds.
Equally important in the statutory scheme are the standards by which the Secretary of Human Resources is to revoke, suspend or deny issuance of a license to a charitable organization. G.S. 108-75.18. These standards must be carefully scrutinized for imposition of an invalid religious test. Free exercise of religion precludes the denial, revocation or suspension of a license from being based on a determination that the purpose of the solicitation is not “religious” in nature or that funds are not being used for “religious” purposes. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra. Such a grant of power improperly sets up the state as an arbiter of religious practice in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. Thus, absent circumstances of outright fraud, collusion or other specific illegality, the state must accept at face value the assertion that the purposes for which funds are solicited are “religious” in nature. However, the state may, consistent with free exercise values, revoke, suspend or deny issuance of a license on the grounds that funds solicited are not being applied or will not be applied for the purposes, “religious” or otherwise, listed in the application. Such a standard limits the state to the neutral inquiry whether funds solicited will be applied to the purpose or purposes represented in the application.
Section 75.18 sets out the seven grounds upon which the Secretary shall revoke, suspend, or deny issuance of a license. The fourth ground of disqualification is that “[a]n unreasonable percentage of the contributions solicited, or to be solicited, is not *428applied, or will not be applied to a charitable purpose.” G.S. 108-75.18(4). The term “charitable purpose” as defined in the Act encompasses any “religious purpose.” See G.S. 108-75.3(2). Thus, as applied to religious organizations, subsection four improperly sets up the Secretary as an arbiter over religious practice. Accordingly, I would hold that subsection four as applied to plaintiffs constitutes an impermissible prior restraint over religion in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. The regulatory goal improperly advanced by subsection four is accomplished in a constitutionally permissible manner by subsection five which permits disqualification upon a neutral determination that “the contributions solicited or to be solicited, are not applied, or will not be applied to the purpose or purposes as represented in the license application.” G.S. 108-75.18(5). The remaining grounds of disqualification limit the state to neutral, nonreligious inquiries such as the truth of statements made in the license application, whether an applicant has engaged in a fraudulent transaction, whether an undue percentage of solicitations are being absorbed by fund-raising expenses. See generally, G.S. 108-75.18.4
The only other free exercise problem posed by the Act is the definition of the term “member” in the proviso which denies the exemption from regulation to those religious organizations whose “financial support is derived primarily from contributions solicited from persons other than its own members, excluding sales of printed or religious materials . . . .” G.S. 108-75.7(a)(l). The Act does not specifically define what constitutes membership in a religious organization. Without a narrow, technical definition *429of this term, the state is left free to determine what constitutes membership in a religious organization. Such power vested in the state would constitute a form of religious censorship prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra. Accordingly, to avoid this constitutional infirmity I would hold that the term “member” is to be defined in accordance with the rules, regulations, or rituals of the particular religious organization under scrutiny; provided, however, that the term “member” shall not include those persons who are granted a membership upon making a contribution as the result of solicitation; provided further, that the term “member” shall include only those persons who are in a position to reasonably ascertain whether contributions solicited by the organization will be applied to the purpose or purposes as represented in the license application. See generally, G.S. 108-75.3(12); 108-75.18(5). Such a definition permits the state to advance its secular interest in the charitable solicitations of religious organizations without unnecessarily infringing on the free exercise of religion.
In its discussion of the Act the majority suggests that there might be less restrictive means of achieving the state’s compelling interest in preserving the integrity and efficiency of public charity. I note first that Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, conclusively establishes that a permit system is a constitutionally permissible means of achieving this end. I note further that the purpose of the Act, in addition to protecting the general public from fraud, is to preserve public confidence in public charity. See G.S. 108-75.2. Fraud statutes alone are not sufficient to advance this interest. A permit system which stresses public disclosure of facts relating to the collection and application of funds and which establishes certain minimum standards of operating efficiency is better suited to the advancement of the dual state goals of preventing fraud and preserving the valuable services rendered to society by the institution of public charity. I note finally by way of comparison that fraud legislation may in fact be a more restrictive means of advancing the state’s interest in preventing fraudulent solicitations by religious organizations. This is so because as applied to a “religious” defendant, the element of “fraudulent intent” necessarily involves deeper scrutiny of a defendant’s religious beliefs. See generally, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L.Ed. 1148, 64 S.Ct. 882 (1944). In com*430parison, the legislative scheme in the instant case limits its scrutiny to the essentially neutral inquiry of whether solicited funds are being applied in reasonable amounts to the purposes represented in the license application.
The majority suggests that state surveillance of the audited financial statements to be submitted by religious organizations which solicit in the state impermissibly infringes upon the free exercise of religion. Compare G.S. 108-75.4 with 108-75.6(6). In my view, such impositions are no more onerous for a religious organization than filing a state or federal income tax return or filing for tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code. Additionally, the majority raises the possibility that a disgruntled contributor or advocate of an opposing doctrine might cause the Secretary to unnecessarily investigate a religious organization for violations of the Act. However, the same potential for abuse exists in any valid state regulation or criminal statute. If such potential for abuse is invariably a matter of constitutional import, then no valid state regulation which affects religion can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
G.S. 108-75.20(h)(2) prohibits solicitation of charitable funds in North Carolina by a person who has been enjoined from such solicitation in any other state. This section is violative of due process and for purposes of this dissent requires no further discussion. G.S. 108-75.7(a)(7) exempts from regulation veteran’s organizations, organizations of volunteer firemen, and certain others if all of their fund-raising activities are carried on by members and such members receive no direct or indirect compensation therefor. This section is violative of equal protection and for purposes of this dissent requires no further discussion.
In Section 3 of Chapter 747 of the 1975 Session Laws the General Assembly enacted a severability clause for the “Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act” which provides as follows:
“If any provision of this act, or the application of such provision to any person or under any circumstances shall be held invalid, the remainder of this act, or the application of such provisions to persons or under any circumstances, other than those as to which it shall have been held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.”
*431I have concluded that G.S. 108-75.18(4), as applied to religious organizations, violates the Free Exercise Clause; that G.S. 108-75.20(h)(2), on its face, is violative of due process; and that G.S. 108-75.7(a)(7), on its face, is violative of equal protection. Accordingly, I would discard these sections under the severability clause while preserving the sound sections of the Act as discussed above.
In effect, the majority’s interpretation of the Religion Clauses seems to accord with the interpretation of the United States District Court in Christian Echoes National Ministry Inc. v. United States, 470 F. 2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). In that case the District Court held that the federal government could not decide whether plaintiff’s activities were political or religious in nature for purposes of determining plaintiff’s exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code. “ ‘To do so’ ”, concluded the court, “ ‘would require an interpretation of the meaning of the church doctrine espoused by plaintiff and a determination of the relative significance of the religion of plaintiff to its activities.’ ” 470 F. 2d at 856 (quoting conclusions of law made by the District Court). My response to this interpretation accords with that of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed:
“We know of no legal authority supporting the conclusion set forth above. Such conclusion is tantamount to the proposition that the First Amendment right of free exercise of religion, ipso facto, assures no restraints, no limitations and, in effect, protects those exercising the right to do so unfettered.”
470 F. 2d at 856.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the exemption in G.S. 108-75(a)(l) establishes religion in violation of the First Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of the North Carolina Constitution. I also dissent from the majority’s holding that the exemption in section 75.7(a)(1) fosters an unconstitutional entanglement with religion.
Since I conclude that establishment principles do not preclude application of the Act in its entirety to these plaintiffs, I reach the questions discussed by the Court of Appeals relative to the' constitutionality of various sections of the Act. For the reasons stated in this dissent, I concur in the conclusion of the *432Court of Appeals that G.S. 108-75.18(4) is an impermissible prior restraint on plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion. Additionally, I would uphold the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that G.S. 108-75.20(h)(2) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that G.S. 108-75.7(a)(7) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals as to all other sections of the Act which it held to be void. With the exceptions noted above, I find no merit in the constitutional objections raised by plaintiffs.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Justices COPELAND and BROCK join in this dissent.

. The licensing scheme under attack in Cantwell was invalidated because it vested in a government official the power to determine what a religious cause was. However, in the language quoted in text, the Court stressed that a properly drafted licensing scheme could be applied to religious organizations.

. For purposes of this analysis I assume arguendo that the aid which the state seeks to give is of a type which may constitutionally be given to sectarian schools or their pupils. Compare Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).

. In fact, G.S. 108-75.7(a)(l) exempts from regulation those religious organizations whose nonmember funding is derived exclusively from the “sales of printed or recorded religious materials.” Thus, protection is accorded in the Act to the “age-old type of evangelism” which was held in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943), to have “as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types” of congregational practices.

. G.S. 108-75.18(4) permits the Secretary to revoke, suspend or deny issuance of a license to a charitable organization upon a finding that solicitation and fund-raising expenses have exceeded or will exceed 35% of the total funds solicited. This subsection, however, grants discretion to the Secretary to allow for higher expenses “[i]n the event special facts or circumstances are presented showing that expenses higher than thirty-five percent (35%) were not or will not be unreasonable.” This hardship clause protects the First Amendment free speech interests of organizations “whose primary purpose is not to provide money or services for the poor, the needy or other worthy objects of charity, but to gather and disseminate information about and advocate positions on matters of public concern.” Schaumburg v. Citizens For A Better Environment, 40 CCH S.Ct. Bull. p. 815, 830 (Filed February 20, 1980). Accordingly, the percentage limitation in subsection (4) is not subject to challenge on free speech grounds. See Id. at p. 831, n. 9. Accord, National Foundation v. Fort Worth, 415 F. 2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970) (cited approvingly by the Court in footnote nine of its opinion in Schaumburg).