Court Opinion

ID: 9897271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:30.498698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:48.813135
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                 Sep 29 2023, 9:55 am

                                                                                     CLERK
                                                                                 Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                    Court of Appeals
                                                                                      and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Linda L. Harris                                            Theodore E. Rokita
Kentland, Indiana                                          Attorney General of Indiana
                                                           Evan M. Comer
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           David P. Dekold
                                                           Erika N. Helding
                                                           Certified Legal Interns
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Israel Hernandez,                                          September 29, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CR-219
        v.                                                 Appeal from the
                                                           Pulaski Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Crystal A. Kocher, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           66D01-2207-CM-164

                                Opinion by Judge Foley
                        Chief Judge Altice and Judge May concur.

Foley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-219 | September 29, 2023                        Page 1 of 7
[1]   Israel Hernandez (“Hernandez”) moved to dismiss a charging information for

      invasion of privacy, claiming that the information is facially defective because

      the facts stated therein do not constitute a criminal offense. The trial court

      denied the motion, and Hernandez now brings this interlocutory appeal.

      Concluding that the charging information is not facially defective, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On July 12, 2022, the State charged Hernandez with Class A misdemeanor

      invasion of privacy, alleging that Hernandez “did knowingly violate an order

      issued under I.C. 35-33-8-3.2 by the Jasper Circuit Court under cause number

      37C01-2204-F3-000324” (“the 324 cause”). Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17.

[3]   The associated probable cause affidavit incorporates a police report prepared by

      Deputy Matthew Scott (“Deputy Scott”) of the Pulaski County Sheriff’s Office.

      See id. at 11. In the police report, Deputy Scott stated that he went to a

      residence on July 11, 2022, meeting with a person (“Father”) who contacted

      Jasper County about the violation of a protective order issued in the 324 cause

      (“the Protective Order”). The protected person was Father’s daughter (“the

      Protected Person”). Deputy Scott reported that, according to the INcite system,

      the Protective Order was served on Hernandez on April 12, 2022. He further

      reported that the Protective Order contained the following language:

              [Hernandez] is ordered to have no contact with [the Protected
              Person] in person, by telephone or letter, through an
              intermediary, or in any other way, directly or indirectly, except
              through an attorney of record, while released from custody
              pending trial. This includes, but is not limited to, acts of
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-219 | September 29, 2023        Page 2 of 7
              harassment, stalking, intimidation, threats, and physical force of
              any kind.

      Id. at 14. According to the police report, Father told Deputy Scott that the

      Protected Person has multiple social media accounts, including an account on

      Instagram. Deputy Scott then spoke to the Protected Person, who related that

      the Protected Person and Hernandez “are not ‘friends’ on Instagram,” such

      that, for Hernandez “to view [the Protected Person’s] account, he has to search

      it every time he wants to view it.” Id. She also said that, when she “creates a

      post,” the Instagram platform “shows who is viewing the post.” Id. The

      Protected Person reported that Hernandez had been viewing her Instagram

      posts, and she “was alarmed to find out . . . Hernandez has been watching her

      posts on a platform that informs the user of who’s viewing the posts.” Id.

[4]   On October 19, 2022, Hernandez moved to dismiss the charging information.

      The trial court held a hearing on November 7, 2022, and eventually denied the

      motion on November 21. Hernandez then perfected this interlocutory appeal.

      Discussion and Decision
[5]   According to Hernandez, the charging information should have been dismissed.

      Hernandez directs us to Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-4(a)(5), which provides

      for dismissal of the charging information, upon motion, where “[t]he facts

      stated do not constitute an offense.” In general, “[w]e review a ‘ruling on a

      motion to dismiss a charging information for an abuse of discretion, which

      occurs only if a trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-219 | September 29, 2023         Page 3 of 7
      facts and circumstances.’” State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 440 (Ind. 2022)

      (quoting Gutenstein v. State, 59 N.E.3d 984, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans.

      denied.). To the extent the motion turns on a pure question of law, we review

      that question of law de novo. See id. Moreover, where, as here, the defendant’s

      motion to dismiss alleges the charging information is factually deficient under

      Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-4(a)(5), the motion tests the facial adequacy of

      the charging information, ultimately presenting a pure question of law. See id.;

      cf. Tanoos v. State, 137 N.E.3d 1008, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

[6]   As our Supreme Court recently explained: “The purpose of the charging

      information is to provide a defendant with notice of the crime of which he is

      charged so that he is able to prepare a defense.” Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 441

      (quoting State v. Laker, 939 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.

      denied). For the charging information to be sufficient, the information generally

      need “only contain a statement of the essential facts constituting the offense

      charged, as well as the statutory citation, the time and place of the commission

      of the offense, [and] the identity of the victim.” Id. (alteration in original)

      (quoting Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.

      denied.). “A court may dismiss a charging information if the ‘facts stated do not

      constitute an offense,’ but this only occurs when the information is facially

      deficient in stating an alleged crime.” Id. (quoting I.C. § 35-34-1-4(a)(5)).

[7]   “In deciding whether a charging ‘information fails to state facts constituting an

      offense, we take the facts alleged in the information as true.’” Id. (quoting

      Pavlovich, 6 N.E.3d at 974). We may also take as true the facts alleged in the
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-219 | September 29, 2023        Page 4 of 7
      supporting probable cause affidavit. Tanoos, 137 N.E.3d at 1015; see also I.C. §

      35-34-1-8 (setting forth procedures on a motion to dismiss the charging

      information, contemplating consideration of “documentary evidence”). To

      assess the facial adequacy of the charging information, we compare the factual

      allegations to the substance of the criminal statute cited in the information. See,

      e.g., Tanoos, 137 N.E.3d at 1015. The charging information is facially deficient

      when the factual allegations do not map onto a criminal statute. See, e.g., State

      v. Isaacs, 794 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). For example, in Isaacs,

      we affirmed an order dismissing a criminal count where (a) the State alleged the

      defendant violated a statute that prohibited operating a vehicle with a schedule

      I or II controlled substance in the body, but (b) the substances alleged to be in

      the defendant’s body were not schedule I or II controlled substances, and (c) it

      was not a crime to operate a vehicle with the alleged substances in the body. Id.

[8]   Here, the State alleged that Hernandez committed invasion of privacy by

      violating Indiana Code Section 35-46-1-15.1(a)(11). Under this statute, a

      person who knowingly or intentionally violates “an order issued under IC 35-

      33-8-3.2” commits Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Ind. Code § 35-

      46-1-15.1(a)(11). The statute referenced therein, Section 35-33-8-3.2, sets forth

      procedures for bail in criminal cases, allowing a court to impose conditions for

      pre-trial release. One permissible condition is that the defendant “refrain from

      any direct or indirect contact with an individual[.]” I.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(a)(4).

[9]   The charging information in this case, together with the probable cause

      affidavit, states that Hernandez was subject to a protective order issued under

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-219 | September 29, 2023      Page 5 of 7
       Section 35-33-8-3.2 that prohibited him from contacting the Protected Person

       “in person, by telephone or letter, through an intermediary, or in any other

       way, directly or indirectly, except through an attorney of record, while released

       from custody pending trial[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 14. The State alleged

       that Hernandez violated the protective order by viewing public content that the

       Protective Person posted “on a [social media] platform that informs the user of

       who’s viewing the posts.” Id. The State further alleged that, through the

       platform, the Protected Person became aware that Hernandez viewed her posts.

[10]   Hernandez points out that he was prohibited from direct or indirect contact

       with the Protected Person. According to Hernandez, there is no way that

       viewing a public post on social media could constitute contact, so the State

       failed to allege facts constituting an offense. We disagree. The State does not

       allege that Hernandez simply viewed the Protected Person’s social media posts.

       Rather, the State alleges that Hernandez knowingly or intentionally contacted

       the Protected Person by viewing her posts on the Instagram social media

       platform in such a manner that Hernandez caused a notice to be created that

       informed the Protected Person that he was viewing her posts. At trial, the fact-

       finder will be tasked with determining whether Hernandez knew about the

       technical workings of the platform or the way the Protected Person used the

       platform such that Hernandez acted with the requisite mens rea. See Katz, 179

       N.E.3d at 441 (noting that “an evidentiary question for the jury” is “not

       properly raised by a motion to dismiss”). But as to the facial validity of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-219 | September 29, 2023       Page 6 of 7
       charging information, we are not persuaded the State failed to allege adequate

       facts regarding contact. 1

[11]   Because the charging information sufficiently states a criminal offense, the trial

       court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hernandez’s motion to dismiss.

[12]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and May, J., concur.

       1
        Concluding as such, we do not address the parties’ alternative arguments regarding whether the alleged
       conduct could amount to stalking or harassment, which were also acts prohibited by the protective order.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-219 | September 29, 2023                            Page 7 of 7