Court Opinion

ID: 9964224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 14:10:36.578879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:14.533444
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1717-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AL WHITE,
a/k/a ALQUAN WHITE, AL-
QUAN WHITE, WOHEED
MUHAMMAD, HASSAN COOK,
ALI HAKIM, IKE MUHAMMAD,
WOHEED ROLLINS,
ALFUQUAN WHITE,

     Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________

                   Submitted April 8, 2024 – Decided April 29, 2024

                   Before Judges Sabatino and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 10-05-1368
                   and 10-05-1369.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated
                   Counsel, on the briefs).
            Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor,
            attorney for respondent (Matthew E. Hanley, Acting
            Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Al White, who was convicted of murder and other offenses at

a ten-day jury trial in 2011, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for

post-conviction relief ("PCR") without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

      We incorporate by reference the facts detailed in our 2015 opinion

affirming defendant's conviction on direct appeal. State v. White, No. A-2320-

11 (App. Div. Jan. 9, 2015). Briefly stated, the State's proofs established that,

after a fight broke out at an Irvington bar, defendant shot and killed a victim

named Bryon Lockett and shot and wounded a second victim named Latiff

McCleod. The shootings occurred outside the bar.

      The key disputed issue at trial was the identity of the shooter. Defendant

claimed he left the Irvington bar before the shootings and was at a different club,

in Newark, during the shootings. A bouncer working at the Irvington bar named

Frederick Ellis initially told police he saw defendant shoot Lockett, but he

declined to confirm that at trial and his statement to police was admitted after a

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Gross1 hearing. Ellis's brother, Antonio Jones, testified for the defense. Jones

said he initially saw defendant at the Irvington bar and later saw him at the

Newark club around 1:30 a.m. "acting normal." The jury found defendant guilty

of the murder of Lockett, aggravated assault of McCleod, and multiple weapons

offenses.

      The trial court imposed a lengthy aggregate sentence of seventy-five

years, subject to certain parole disqualifiers. Defendant appealed his conviction,

raising eight arguments through his counsel and several more points in a pro se

brief. He did not appeal his sentence. In our January 2015 opinion, we affirmed

defendant's conviction. Ibid. Certification was denied. 221 N.J. 567 (2015).

      One of the many issues presented in defendant's ensuing PCR petition, as

it was revised, is that he was denied a fair trial because his defense witness,

Jones, testified before the jury in handcuffs. This point was not raised on direct

appeal. Defendant's multi-issue petition was initially denied by the trial court

in October 2017 for lack of merit and procedural deficiencies. We substantially

affirmed the denial, but remanded the matter solely with respect to the handcuffs

1
  State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 (1990) (detailing standards for the admissibility of
a prosecution witness's prior inconsistent statements).
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                                        3
issue and directed the trial court to give it further consideration. State v. White,

No. A-4187-17 (App. Div. Jan. 31, 2020).

      Relying on State v. Artwell, 177 N.J. 526, 536 (2003), defendant argues

he was likely prejudiced by the jurors seeing Jones in handcuffs. He contends

that the trial court should have conducted a hearing to ascertain if handcuffs

were needed during Jones's testimony.         He further contends his trial and

appellate counsel were ineffective by not raising this handcuffs issue. 2

      The parties dispute whether, in fact, Jones was handcuffed, and if so,

whether the jurors likely saw the handcuffs. Defendant submitted to the PCR

judge a notarized statement from Jones, stating that he was in handcuffs during

his testimony, and that at one point a sheriff's officer needed to move Jones's

microphone closer to the witness stand for him. Defendant also submitted his

own supplemental certification, which states that he observed Jones was

handcuffed.3

      2
         Defendant relatedly argued that Jones was forced to wear clothing that
resembled prison garb, but that is belied by the trial transcript, in which the
judge observed Jones was wearing a "very nice" white shirt and pants. We deem
that clothing issue to be without merit and focus our discussion on the handcuffs
issue.
      3
         The trial transcript reflects that before Jones testified, the trial judge
stated on the record that he was "un-cuffed." We need not resolve here whether

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                                         4
      In his written opinion dated November 14, 2022, denying defendant's

petition, the PCR judge (who was the same judge who had presided over the trial

eleven years earlier), concluded that, even assuming Jones was handcuffed, it is

"speculative" the jurors could have seen the handcuffs from their seats. The

judge found that Jones was already in the witness box when the jurors entered

the courtroom, and that Jones was ordered to keep his hands in his lap at all

times. The judge was "skeptical" that the prosecutor and defense counsel could

remember, more than eleven years after the trial, whether Jones testified in

handcuffs visible to the jury. The judge further underscored the strength of the

evidence against defendant.

      In his brief on the present appeal, defendant presents the following

arguments:

             POINT I

             AS DEFENDANT HAS SHOWN THAT HE WAS
             DENIED A FAIR TRIAL THE ONLY DEFENSE
             WITNESS WAS COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN
             RESTRAINTS IN FRONT OF THE JURY, HE IS
             ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.

the judge's statement was mistaken or mis-transcribed, given the inadequacies
of defendant's arguments.
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                                       5
            POINT II

            APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BY
            FAILING TO RAISE A MERITORIOUS CLAIM
            UNDER STATE V. ARTWELL ON DIRECT
            APPEAL.

            POINT III

            AS THERE WAS A GENUINE ISSUE OF
            MATERIAL FACT IN DISPUTE, THE PCR COURT
            ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S PCR
            PETITION  WITHOUT     AN    EVIDENTIARY
            HEARING.

Defendant amplified these arguments in his reply brief:

            REPLY POINT I

            AS THERE REMAINS A GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO
            WHETHER JONES WAS IN RESTRAINTS WHEN
            HE TESTIFIED AND WHETHER THE JURY
            COULD VIEW THOSE RESTRAINTS WHEN HE
            TESTIFIED, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS
            REQUIRED.

            REPLY POINT II

            APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BY
            FAILING TO ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
            FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE HOLDING IN
            ARTWELL DENIED HIM DUE PROCESS.

      Having considered these arguments, we affirm the PCR judge's ruling,

substantially for the cogent reasons set forth in the judge's written opinion. We

add the following comments.

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                                       6
      Defendant contends he was deprived of a fair trial when jurors allegedly

saw Jones testify in handcuffs, and because his former counsel was ineffective

by not pressing the claim.     The guiding principles were expressed by the

Supreme Court in Artwell. 177 N.J. at 536. The Court recognized in that case

the general principle that the appearance of a defense witness in restraints can

undermine the credibility of that witness's testimony. Ibid. However, the Court

also recognized that trial courts may require restraint of a defense witness "when

it has reason to believe [restraints are] necessary to maintain the security of the

courtroom." Id. at 537 (quotation omitted).

      Although no hearing was held in this case to address the need for restraints

before Jones testified, the PCR judge correctly noted that Artwell did not

mandate such a hearing in every case; the Court instead ruled that such a hearing

"should" be performed. The PCR judge also observed that when Jones testified,

he was serving a State prison sentence for weapons possession, which supports

the reasonable necessity for physically restraining Jones in the courtroom.

      The PCR judge also noted that defendant has not refuted that Jones's

alleged handcuffs would have been out of the jurors' sight for most of his

testimony. The judge found that, "at worst, the visual impression of Jones in

physical restraints was infrequent." The judge reasonably expressed doubt that,

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                                        7
given the lengthy passage of time, an evidentiary hearing more than a decade

after the trial would not be likely to yield definitive evidence of whether

handcuffs were visible to jurors during Jones's testimony.

      We also concur with the trial court that defendant failed to demonstrate

sufficient actual prejudice stemming from the handcuffs issue to justify vacating

his conviction.   See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)

(requiring proof of actual prejudice to obtain relief because of the alleged

ineffectiveness of trial counsel); see also State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367

(2008) (noting Strickland's requirement that the defendant demonstrate "a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different").

      As the judge noted, the weight of the State's evidence against defendant

was overwhelming, as defendant "was caught on video tape shooting the victim

and was identified by several witnesses as the shooter." The judge concluded

that, "[c]onsidering the totality of circumstances and the strength of the State's

case, the [c]ourt cannot find that, even if the jury may have at some point seen

Jones' handcuffs, that this would have been a deciding factor or could have

changed their verdict." We accept that assessment, coming from the same judge

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                                        8
who presided over the trial and observed the testimony and other evidence first-

hand.

        Further, we note the Supreme Court in Artwell did not mandate the

reversal of all convictions in which a defense witness testified in restraints. See

State v. Dock, 205 N.J. 237, 252 (2011) (observing that Artwell did not impose

"an absolute bar on defense witnesses testifying in restraints").

        We also agree with the judge that there was no need for an evidentiary

hearing, in light of the circumstances presented. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451,

462 (1992).

        To the extent we have not addressed them, defendant's arguments lack

sufficient merit to be discussed in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

        Affirmed.

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