Court Opinion

ID: 9941034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 18:12:11.92661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:08.829154
License: Public Domain

[Cite as R.W.B. v. T.V., 2024-Ohio-584.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

R.W.B.,                                         :

                 Petitioner-Appellee,           :
                                                             No. 112883
                 v.                             :

T.V.,                                           :

                 Respondent-Appellant.          :

                                    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 15, 2024

                      Civil Appeal from Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                        Case No. CV-22-963292

                                           Appearances:

                 T.V., pro se.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

                 Respondent-appellant T.V. appeals from the trial court’s decision

granting a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO”) in favor of petitioner-appellee

R.W.B. After a review of the record and pertinent law, we conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in granting the CSPO pursuant to R.C. 2903.211.

We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background

              R.W.B. and T.V. are next door neighbors with a long history of

animosity dating back to 2015 due to their dispute relating to a flooding issue and

later over the property line. They have accused each other of trespassing, and both

have called the police on numerous occasions. On May 11, 2022, R.W.B. filed the

instant CSPO against T.V. based on multiple incidents in April and May 2022.

During this time period, T.V. had a CSPO in place against R.W.B.

             On September 28, 2022, the magistrate held a full hearing on R.W.B.’s

petition. R.W.B. represented himself and testified at great length at the hearing; he

also presented testimony from his wife. T.V. was represented by counsel; he did not

present testimony on his behalf, but R.W.B. and his wife were fully cross-examined

by his counsel.

             R.W.B. testified that, in June of 2021, T.V. installed several cameras

pointing at R.W.B.’s residence, including a front bedroom window. R.W.B. alleged

the cameras were installed “to stalk and cause mental stress” to him and his wife.

He testified that a buzzer emitting the sound of “whoo-hoo, whoo-hoo” would go off

whenever he was out in his yard. He specifically testified to an incident on May 5,

2022, where he was planting grass in his front yard. The buzzer was emitting the

sound the entire time he was in his yard, and at some point, T.V. returned home and

started yelling at R.W.B. and calling him vulgar names in an attempt to provoke him

and engage him in an altercation. R.W.B. testified that “I’m hysterically scared of

this guy” and that he called the police that day. R.W.B. also recounted incidents on
May 13, 18, and 27, 2022; June 5, 10, 15, 19, 21, 26, 27, 28, and 29, 2022; July 3, 4,

7, 8, 10, 17, and 31, 2022; August 1, 3, 10, 17, 23, and 24, 2022; and September 2,

2022, where the buzzer went off repeatedly when he was outside in his yard. On

some of these occasions, T.V. and his wife were not home. R.W.B. alleged that

whenever one of the cameras detected his presence in his yard, the buzzer would

emit the “whoo-hoo, whoo hoo” sound, sometimes persistently. R.W.B. testified

that, because of the cameras and the sound device employed by T.V. to harass him,

he could not go out in his front yard anymore.

             On cross-examination, when R.W.B. was asked if it was possible that

the sounds coming from T.V.’s security cameras were triggered by motion, he

answered in the negative, explaining that the buzzer did not always go off when he

was near the cameras, nor did it go off when T.V. or his wife were in their yard, which

indicated the sounds were not motion-triggered but rather intentionally set off by

T.V. or his wife when they observed his presence in the cameras.

               R.W.B.’s wife testified that she has lived at their home for 22 years

and, after T.V. and his wife moved in, she would not go outside anymore because

she did not want to deal with the conflict. T.V. constantly yelled profanities at her

husband. On one occasion, she was looking out the window when her husband was

working on the yard, T.V. saw her, and he “popped [her] the finger.” On another

occasion, T.V. filmed her husband when he was doing yard work, trying to agitate

him and get a reaction from him. She testified she “feels threatened” when she is

out in the yard.
              After the testimony presented by R.W.B., T.V.’s counsel moved for

directed verdict on the grounds that there was no testimony establishing mental

distress warranting a CSPO. In response to the motion, R.W.B. asked the court to

view a video from May 2022 obtained from his own security camera showing T.V.

acted menacingly, filming him with a camera, and yelling at him when R.W.B. and

his wife were out in the yard. The magistrate noted R.W.B. had already rested his

case. R.W.B. then went on to argue in response to the motion for directed verdict

that the testimony he presented proved by a preponderance of evidence the element

of mental distress, arguing that T.V.’s taunting and threatening behavior upset him

enough that his life “is totally ruined right now.”

              After T.V.’s counsel presented his closing argument, R.W.B. again

asked the court to play the video he referenced earlier. The court allowed R.W.B. to

reopen his evidentiary presentation and play the video, over T.V.’s counsel’s

objection.1

                After the hearing, the magistrate issued a decision granting the CSPO,

finding that the petitioner proved by a preponderance of evidence that the

1 The court’s permission for the video to be played after R.W.B.’s case-in-chief was

concluded is one of the issues raised by T.V. in this appeal. As we explain in the following,
T.V. did not cite any law for his objection to the additional presentation of the evidence
and, therefore, we decline to address it in accordance with the appellate rules. We note,
however, that Evid.R. 611 (“Mode and order of interrogation and presentation”) would
appear to govern the situation here. The rule states, in pertinent part: “(A) Control by
court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth * * *.”
respondent’s conduct constituted a “pattern of conduct” required by the statute and,

as demonstrated by the testimony of the petitioner and his wife, the respondent

knowingly acted in order to cause the petitioner mental distress. T.V. filed an

objection to the magistrate’s decision. The trial court overruled the objection and

adopted the magistrate’s decision. This appeal follows.

Appeal

               On appeal, T.V., pro se, does not present assignments of error as

required by App.R. 16. Rather, he presents five “issues” for our review. “Issue 1”

states: “[The magistrate] erred when considering the witness testimony. All of the

witnesses’ testimony should have been excluded.” “Issue 2” states: “Error in advice

given by the respondent’s counsel.” “Issue 3” states: “The case record does not

support by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner suffered Mental

Distress.” “Issue 4” states: “Magistrate gave the Petitioner a second chance after he

rested his case.” “Issue 5” refers to two other related cases that are not part of the

instant record, and it states: “[The magistrate] erred allowing the Petitioner two

additional opportunities to win his case [i]n the full hearing for [R.W.B.] v. [A.V.]

and [R.W.B.] v. [M.V.]. During these hearing[s] the petitioner used this time to

further testify against [T.V.]”

              Except for “Issue 3,” T.V. fails to cite any relevant legal authority to

support his argument for the “issues” he raises.     As such, we decline to address

them. App.R. 16(A)(7). See e.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112341,
2023-Ohio-1675 (it is not this court’s duty to construct legal arguments to support

an appellant’s appeal).2

Mental Distress

               The third “issue” raised by T.V. concerns the element of mental

distress in the menacing-by-stalking statute, R.C. 2903.211. T.V. contends the

record does not prove by a preponderance of the evidence the element of “mental

distress” required by the statute.

               R.C. 2903.214 governs protection orders to protect victims of

menacing by stalking. A petitioner can obtain a CSPO by filing a petition alleging

that the respondent violated R.C. 2903.211. Where there is a preponderance of the

evidence that the respondent committed a violation of R.C. 2903.211, the court is

empowered to issue a CSPO. M.J.W. v. T.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108014, 2019-

Ohio-3573, ¶ 22. “Preponderance of the evidence” is “the greater weight of the

evidence, or evidence that leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of a

contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio

St.3d 95, 102, 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his

purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or

will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when

2 We additionally note that pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law

and legal procedures and they are held to the same standard as litigants represented by
counsel. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 100 Ohio St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448, 800 N.E.2d
25, ¶ 10.
he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). The decision

whether to grant a CSPO is well within the sound discretion of a trial court, and we

will not reverse its decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Rufener v. Hutson,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97635, 2012-Ohio-5061, ¶ 12.

              The menacing-by-stalking statute, R.C. 2903.211 states, in pertinent

part: “No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another

person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or a

family or household member * * * or cause mental distress to the other person or a

family or household member * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).

              There is a “pattern of conduct” when there are “two or more actions

or incidents closely related in time.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). “In determining what

constitutes a pattern of conduct, courts must take every action of the respondent

into consideration, even if some of the actions in isolation do not seem particularly

threatening.” Lewis v. Jacobs, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25566, 2013-Ohio-3461,

¶ 10, citing Middletown v. Jones, 167 Ohio App.3d 679, 2006-Ohio-3465, 856

N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.).

              On appeal, T.V.’s claim relates solely to the element of “mental

distress.” “Mental distress” means any of the following:

      (a) Any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary
      substantial incapacity;

      (b) Any mental illness or condition that would normally require
      psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental
      health services, whether or not any person requested or received
          psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental
          health services.

R.C. 2903.211(D)(2).

                 To obtain a CSPO, a petitioner is required to establish, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent, by engaging in a pattern of

conduct, “‘caused the petitioner to believe he or she would cause [the] petitioner

mental distress or physical harm, not that the respondent did in fact cause physical

harm or mental distress.’”      J.A.C. v. A.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110999,

2022-Ohio-2275, ¶ 12, quoting L.J. v. M.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109403, 2021-

Ohio-312, ¶ 7. See also M.D. v. M.D., 2018-Ohio-4218, 121 N.E.3d 819, ¶ 98-99 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Spaulding, 151 Ohio St.3d 378, 2016-Ohio-8126, 89 N.E.3d

554, and State v. Horsley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-350, 2006-Ohio-1208, ¶ 48.

Nothing in R.C. 2903.211 “‘suggests that actual treatment by a professional is

required to prove mental distress.’” M.D. at ¶ 99, quoting Horsley at ¶ 46. Mental

distress need not be incapacitating or debilitating, and expert testimony is not

required to find mental distress. Rufener v. Hutson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97635,

2012-Ohio-5061, ¶ 17. Rather, the trial court “‘may rely on its knowledge and

experience in determining whether mental distress has been caused.’” Id., quoting

Smith v. Wunsch, 162 Ohio App.3d 21, 2005-Ohio-3498, 832 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 18 (4th

Dist.).

                 The magistrate here found the testimony showed that several

cameras installed by T.V. made loud and constant noises whenever R.W.B. was
outside in his yard, from which it can be inferred that the sounds were purposely

directed at R.W.B. The magistrate found that the constant emission of such a noise

whenever R.W.B. was outside has caused him mental distress, noting that R.W.B.

testified the noises have caused him such discomfort that he felt he can no longer go

outside on his own property. The magistrate concluded R.W.B. demonstrated that

T.V. knowingly acted in order to cause him mental distress.

               Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in finding that petitioner R.W.B. has demonstrated by a

preponderance of the evidence the element of mental stress required in the

menacing-by-stalking statute.      Mental stress need not be incapacitating or

debilitating, and actual treatment by a professional is not required to prove mental

distress. The trial court here was permitted to rely on its knowledge and experience

in determining whether mental distress has been caused. For these reasons, we

affirm the trial court’s decision granting the CSPO in favor of the petitioner.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR