Court Opinion

ID: 9488277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:40:59.920963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:48.117100
License: Public Domain

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting.
I would reverse the denial of Dennis L. Stephens’ petition for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, I dissent.
As the majority note, an accused has “a fundamental right to be clearly informed of the nature and cause of the charges in order to permit adequate preparation of a defense.” Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir.1989). Thus, “Due process entitles an accused to know the charges against which he must defend in order to have a reasonable *937opportunity to prepare and present a defense and not be taken by surprise at trial.” Usher v. Gomez, 775 F.Supp. 1308, 1313 (N.D.Cal.1991), aff'd, 974 F.2d 1344 (1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1007, 122 L.Ed.2d 156 (1993). In this ease, the State of California denied Stephens his right to due process by ambushing him with a request for a felony-murder instruction after charging him not with the underlying offense of burglary, but instead with petty theft, and after inducing him to plead guilty to the petty theft count.
The State chose to indict Stephens on three counts: a generic charge of murder under CaLPenal Code § 187 and attempted murder under Cal.Penal Code § 245, and a charge of petty theft with a prior conviction under Cal.Penal Code § 666. It decided not to charge Stephens with burglary, the only potential predicate offense, under the facts presented by the prosecution, permitting a felony-murder conviction under Cal.Penal Code § 187, and instead elected to charge him with the less serious petty theft (shoplifting), an offense that by statute may not serve as the basis for a felony-murder conviction. Although Stephens could have been charged with burglary as well, he could not have been punished for both offenses, which arose from a single act of taking some meat from a market. See People v. Bernal, 22 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1458, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 (1994). The indictment as fashioned by the prosecution lulled Stephens into believing burglary was not part of the case and, consequently, that felony-murder was not a viable hook on which the prosecution could hang its hat. By waiting until Stephens pleaded guilty to shoplifting before springing its burglary felony-murder theory, the State violated Stephens’ rights assured by the due process clause. After proceeding on a premeditated murder theory, the prosecution changed horses in the midst of the jurisprudential stream and proceeded to rely on felony-murder as well, with burglary constituting the predicate offense. This is more than dirty pool; this is a violation of the Constitution.
It is important to clear the air and emphasize what is not before us. Here we do not have a mine-run California case with a generic charge of murder. Under California’s “short form” of criminal charging, as prescribed by Cal.Penal Code §§ 951 and 952 the prosecution may play its cards close to its vest. It need not reveal its theory, nor must it elect to proceed to the jury on any particular concept of murder. See, e.g., People v. Bernard, 27 Cal.App.4th 458, 470, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 486 (1994) (“it is not necessary to separately charge a defendant with either a felony-murder theory or the underlying felony”). First-degree murder in California includes a killing that is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated,” or that is committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, certain felonies, including burglary, and not including the petty offense of shoplifting. Cal.Penal Code § 189.
Had Stephens been charged only with murder, uniform state and federal case law suggests a generic murder charge would have been constitutionally adequate to place him on notice that all theories of murder may be pursued. However, in this case Stephens was affirmatively charged with the underlying offense of petty theft, which can never serve as the predicate to a felony-murder conviction. This is a critical distinction.
Second, this is not merely a case alleging late notice of the particular theory of murder. Generally, where a defendant is prosecuted on a generic murder charge and the prosecution seeks a felony-murder instruction prior to closing argument, the ambush situation is avoided. Morrison, 981 F.2d at 428. Here, although the majority is correct in stating that the State requested a felony-murder instruction while Stephens was putting on his case in chief, the request came after Stephens pleaded guilty to petty theft. This is a distinction with a difference. The record suggests that he pleaded guilty to this count in part to negate any inferences of premeditated murder. However, Stephens’ admission to shoplifting incriminated him under a felony-murder theory. It assisted the prosecution in proving burglary and, consequently, felony-murder. See Calderon v. Borg, 857 F.Supp. 720, 725 (N.D.Cal.1994) (“[T]he point in this ease is not the period of time that *938elapsed. The point is the fact that petitioner had already testified without knowing that he would be confronted with [another theory of murder], and gave testimony which incriminated himself under that theory”).
A murder trial is not one of the “games that people play.” The due process clause does not serve as an innocent bystander. It acts as the umpire and referee all rolled into one and calls “foul” where rules of fair play are broken. As Justice Scalia noted, paraphrasing the felicitous expression of Justice Holmes seventy years earlier, due process requires the government to “turn square corners.” Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 396, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Society is obliged to prosecute those who break its rules, but society may not break its own rules in the prosecution process. That is precisely what the State of California did here. It did not turn square corners. As a result, the defendant became the victim of what was known in old California as an ambuscado1 and was denied the protection of the due process clause.
This is vividly made clear in the declaration by Stephens’ trial counsel asserting that he was “never afforded any notice whatsoever that the prosecutor intended to ask for a jury instruction on first degree burglary murder,” and that he “prepared and conducted the defense at trial with the understanding that burglary was not an issue.” Specifically, he stated: “I would have reevaluated the tactic of pleading guilty prior to trial to the petty theft. Perhaps most important, I would definitely have had appellant testify to his lack of intent to steal at the time of entering the store, thus providing the jury with evidence negating an essential element of burglary.” ER 22-23.
The State of California’s concession on rehearing before the court of appeals in Sheppard, apparently made in an effort to remove the Sixth Amendment issue from that case and save its “short form” murder charge from judicial invalidation, holds true in this case as well:
[T]he difficulty in this case arises not because California’s murder pleading practice furnishes inadequate notice, but because a pattern of government conduct affirmatively misled the defendant, denying him an effective opportunity to prepare a defense. ‘The defendant was ambushed.’
909 F.2d at 1236 (quoting Gray v. Raines, 662 F.2d 569, 575 (9th Cir.1981) (Tang, J., specially concurring)).
I would reverse the judgment of the district court and grant the writ.

. Shakespeare was no stranger to the expression:
"And then dreams he.... Of breaches, ambuscadoes, Spanish blades."
Romeo and Juliet, I iv. 53.1.