Court Opinion

ID: 9793550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:49:52.313473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:59.987012
License: Public Domain

LATOUEETTE, J.,
dissenting.
It is axiomatic that the charter of a city is in effect the constitution of the city, and, if the provisions of an ordinance conflict with the provisions of the charter, that part, at least, of the ordinance must fall. Keeping in mind this principle, I now approach the simple question involved in this appeal: whether or not the ordinance in question complies with the charter of the city of Portland in the respect that it does “ ‘specify with distinctness the facts and reasons constituting such emergency.’ ”
The emergency clause of the ordinance is as follows :
“ ‘Section2. Inasmuch as this ordinance is necessary for the immediate preservation of the *188public health, peace and safety of the City of Portland in this: In order that the police problems caused by punchboards may be relieved without delay; therefore an emergency hereby is declared to exist and this ordinance shall be in force and effect from and after its passage by the Council.’ ”
Prom the foregoing, we see that the claimed emergency is created by “police problems’ ’. It is my opinion that “police problems” is a mere conclusion and is not a distinct statement of the facts and reasons for the claimed emergency and certainly is not specific.
The word, “specify”, is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed) as: “To mention or name in a specific or explicit manner; to tell or state precisely or in detail; # *
In Herrin v. Erickson, 90 Mont 259, 2 P2d 296, 300, it is found that the constitution required the legislature, in creating a debt, to “specify the purpose to which the funds so raised shall be applied.” The court, in defining “specify”, said:
“ ‘To “specify” means “to mention specifically; state in full and explicit terms; name expressly or particularly.” Standard Dictionary; Peters v. Banta, 120 Ind. 416, 22 N. E. 95, 23 N. E. 84, 85. It is an ordinary word used in common speech and generally understood; it must be given the understanding which the people who voted for the Constitution would give it. Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 434, 117 A. 440. “Specific” is the very opposite of “general.” Smith v. McCoole, 5 Kan. App. 713, 46 P. 988, 989. This act of assembly is anything but specific; it is general in its terms. # # # ? 5?
In Independent Highway Dist. No. 2 v. Ada County, 24 Idaho 416, 134 P 542, 545, we find the following definition: “ ‘Specify’ is defined to mean: To mention *189specifically; to state in full and explicit terms; to point out; to particularize, or to designate by words one thing from another.”
In A. M. Dillow & Co. v. City of Monticello, 145 Iowa 424, 124 NW 186, 189, we read:
n * * * ‘Specify,’according to the lexicographers, means to mention specifically or explicitly, to state in full and explicit terms or explicitly and in detail, name expressly distinctly and particularly. In Stewart v. Jacques, 77 Ga. 365, 3 S. E. 283, 4 Am. St. Rep. 86, it is said to mean ‘to point out, to particularize, to designate by words one thing from another.’ ”
. Adverting to the language of the charter, I find that the ordinance must specify, among other things, the reasons for the emergency. In McKenna v. White, 287 Mass 495, 192 NE 84, 85, where a statute required that a statement of the reason or reasons for the removal of civil service officers be given, the court held that the statement, “ ‘for the good of the service’ ”, was an inadequate statement of the reason or reasons therefor, saying: “A statement of the reason or reasons for removal must be somewhat definite and detailed. ’ ’
In the case of Joplin v. Ten Brook et al., 124 Or 36, 39, 42, 263 P 893, an ordinance of the city of Astoria was under consideration. An emergency clause was attached, based on the following: “ ‘the objects of this ordinance will be of great benefit to the people of the City of Astoria.’ ” The charter of Astoria contained the following provision:
“ ‘An emergency ordinance’ may be enacted upon the day of its introduction, providing it shall contain the statement that an emergency exists, and specify the reason constituting such emergency.’ ”
*190In nullifying the ordinance, we said:
“* * * The mere fact that a law will be of great benefit states no urgent reason for its going into effect immediately, as every valid law or ordinance is presumed to be passed because of its prospective benefit to the community.”
Likewise, every ordinance passed by a city under the police power, such as is the ordinance under consideration, presupposes a police problem, and the insertion in the emergency clause of the ordinance of “police problems”, adds nothing to that which is already presumed.
It will be observed that the charter of the city of Portland goes much further than the charter of the city of Astoria by requiring the ordinance to “specify with distinctness the facts and reasons constituting such emergency.”, while the Astoria charter merely requires the ordinance to “specify the reason constituting such emergency.”
The principal involved in the instant case is one of paramount importance to the people of Oregon. They labored and pioneered the Home Eule amendment to the constitution. The electors of the city of Portland, in enacting the charter granting to them the right of referendum, placed certain safeguards in the charter. They permitted an emergency clause to be attached to an ordinance but only under certain specific conditions. I do not believe that such conditions were inserted to keep the city officials morally honest. The presumption is, of course, that official duty will be legally and properly performed. Such limitations were inserted for the benefit of the people and for the people alone. When an emergency clause is to be attached to an ordinance, the people want to know precisely the rea*191sons for the emergency and the facts supporting such reasons.
If the prevailing opinion is permitted to stand, the right to an ordinance referendum has been to all intents and purposes destroyed, and the Home Eule amendment to the constitution emasculated. Whether a ease involves pinballs or pincushions, to prevent a referendum, it will only be necessary for the city fathers to insert willy-nilly in the emergency clause of an ordinance that the ordinance involves “police problems”.
In my opinion, the charter in the case at bar has not been complied with.
For the above reasons, I dissent.