Court Opinion

ID: 9765043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:48:53.743542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:54.100230
License: Public Domain

*87
Davidson, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that a State’s attorney should be disqualified from participating in a trial because of "an appearance of impropriety.” To this extent, I concur. I do not agree with the majority, however, that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined, in the absence of findings of an actual impropriety or an improper motive for initiating the criminal prosecution, that the indictment should be dismissed. Accordingly, I dissent.
In Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 244, 363 A.2d 468, 469-70 (1976), this Court considered the question whether Maryland’s public policy requires a criminal charge to be dismissed if a State’s attorney initiates or participates in a prosecution "when he has a conflicting private interest in a civil matter.” There, we enunciated the controlling principle that:
"[fifia prosecutor has, or would clearly appear to a reasonable person having knowledge of the pertinent facts to have, any pecuniary interest or a signifícant personal interest in a civil matter which may impair his obligation in a criminal matter to act impartially toward both the State and the accused, then he is, on the basis of this State’s public policy, disqualiñed from initiating or participating in the prosecution of that criminal cause. The corollary to this principle is that if a prosecutor who should have been disqualiñed is involved in his official capacity in the bringing of charges (by way of indictment or information) against the defendant, then upon timely objection the charges will be dismissed, or if such a prosecutor participates in his official capacity in the prosecution of the case, then upon timely objection any resulting conviction will be reversed and a new trial ordered.” [Sinclair, 278 Md. at 254-55, 363 A.2d at 475 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).]
*88Clearly encompassed in this principle is the following principle:
"[I]f a prosecutor . . . would clearly appear ... to have ... a significant personal interest in a civil matter which may impair his obligation in a criminal matter to act impartially ... he is ... disqualified from initiating ... the prosecution of that criminal cause.... [I]f a prosecutor who should have been disqualified is involved ... in the bringing of charges (by way of indictment ...) the charges will be dismissed....” [Sinclair, 278 Md. at 254-55, 363 A.2d at 475.]
In adopting this principle, we recognized that the impartial exercise of the prosecutor’s functions is essential to the fair and equal administration of justice. We quoted from State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 1019-20, 171 So. 108, 112 (1936), as follows:
" 'In conducting a criminal case the prosecuting attorney must be fair and impartial, and see that defendant is not deprived of any constitutional or statutory right, because he is a quasi judicial officer.
He represents the State, and the State demands no victims. It seeks justice only, equal and impartial justice, and it is as much the duty of the district attorney to see that no innocent man suffers as it is to see that no guilty man escapes. Therefore he should not be involved or interested in any extrinsic matters which might, consciously or unconsciously, impair or destroy his power to conduct the accused’s trial fairly and impartially.’ ” [Sinclair, 278 Md. at 256-57, 363 A.2d at 476 (emphasis added).]
More particularly, we recognized that both the seeking of an indictment and the filing of an information require a prosecutor to decide whether to bring charges and therefore constitute an exercise of "the State’s Attorney’s most *89awesome discretionary power.” Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 495, 348 A.2d 837, 848 (1975). In concluding that a prosecutor is unable to exercise this discretionary power impartially if he has a conflict of interest, we quoted from In re Ridgely, 48 Del. 464, 471-72, 106 A.2d 527, 531 (1954), as follows:
" 'Now, the exercise of [discretionary] power by the prosecuting officer — the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute . . .— involves the performance of one of the most difficult and delicate functions of his office. It requires the weighing and balancing of interests that may, and often do, confíict — those of the public and those of the victim. . . . One thing is certain. The prosecuting officer cannot perform this function — he cannot discharge his public obligation — if his personal interests are involved. And his representation of the [victim] at once gives him a personal interest in the matter that disables him from the proper performance of his official duty.’ ” [Sinclair, 278 Md. at 257-58, 363 A.2d at 477 (emphasis added).]
In addition, we recognized that because the impartial exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion is essential to the fair and equal administration of justice, a prosecutor must not only be impartial in the exercise of his duty, but also must appear to be so. We quoted from The American Bar Association Project On Standards For Criminal Justice, Standards Relating To The Prosecution Function, § 1.2(a) and its Commentary, (Approved Draft, 1971), as follows:
" 'A prosecutor should avoid the appearance or reality of a conffict of interest with respect to his official duties.’ ... 'It is of the utmost importance that the prosecutor avoid participation in a case in circumstances where any implication of partiality may cast a shadow over the integrity of his office.’ ” [Sinclair, 278 Md. at 259, 363 A.2d at 478 (emphasis added).]
*90We further recognized that a prosecutor’s motive for participating in a case in which he has an apparent conflict of interest is irrelevant. We quoted from Derlin v. Derlin, 142 Md. 352, 364, 121 A. 27, 31 (1923), which itself quoted with approval language from 2 R.C.L. 974 ¶ 51:
" 'An attorney at law who has once been retained and received the confidence of a client, is thereafter disqualified from acting for any other person adversely interested in the same general matter, however slight such adverse interest may be. Nor does it matter that the intention and motive of the attorney are honest. This rule is a rigid one, and designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties, or be led to an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than to enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest which he should alone represent.’ ” [Sinclair, 278 Md. at 253-54, 363 A.2d at 474-75 (emphasis added).]
Moreover, we recognized that even in the absence of an actual impropriety or an improper motive, an indictment must be dismissed if the prosecutor has an apparent conflict of interest arising out of a significant personal interest in a related civil matter. We further recognized that a prosecutor has a significant personal interest in not violating a confidential relationship established during his prior representation of a criminal defendant in a related civil matter. We relied on State v. Detroit Motors, 62 N.J. Super. 386, 163 A.2d 227 (1960), a case in which the apparent conflict of interest arose out of the prior representation of the criminal defendant in a related civil master. There the indictment issued at a time when the prosecutor was a member of a law firm in which another member was representing the accused in a related civil matter. The trial court found that in seeking the indictment, the prosecutor *91did not have any improper intent or motive and had not engaged in any improper conduct.1 It concluded that public policy dictated that criminal prosecutions must be free of any imputation of improper influence or motive, and that it was necessary to avoid the prejudicial atmosphere inherent in the circumstances affecting the indictments. Accordingly, the indictments were dismissed. We quoted from Detroit Motors as follows:
" 'The principle long ago was recognized that no man can adequately or properly serve two masters, and this is the chief subject of Canon 6 [(now Canon 5)] of the Canons of Professional Ethics. It is inconsistent with the public interest and welfare for any law enforcement officer directly or indirectly to represent any person involved in a criminal matter, except the State.. .. The books are replete with cases indicating that any appearance of evil in connection with the administration of public office should and must be avoided; and particularly is this true of those offices involved in the enforcement of the law.
" 'To permit a prosecuting attorney to have an interest of any nature whatsoever in any civil proceedings, directly or indirectly, and which proceedings involve similar facts or the same subject matter as a criminal prosecution then pending or thereafter initiated, can only give rise to suspicion concerning and relating to the motives of the prosecuting attorney involved, and bring such *92office into disrepute with the public.’ ” [Sinclair, 278 Md. at 255-56, 363 A.2d at 476 (emphasis added).]
I am persuaded that the controlling principle enunciated in Sinclair, when read in the context of the authorities and concepts relied upon, requires that an indictment be dismissed if a prosecutor’s ability to act impartially may be impaired by an apparent conflict of interest arising out of his prior representation of a criminal defendant in a related civil matter. I am not persuaded that that controlling principle is limited to cases in which there is an actual impropriety or an improper motive. In my view, the majority has radically departed from the controlling principle in Sinclair. In the absence of any expressed rationale, I decline to join in this departure. I believe now, as I believed then, see Sinclair v. State, 27 Md. App. 207, 340 A.2d 359 (1975) (Davidson, J., dissenting), that that principle is sound. I am still convinced that a prosecutor who exercises his discretion in a manner contrary to applicable ethical standards creates a fatal defect in the accusatory phase of the criminal prosecution. T adhere to my previously expressed view that:
"Continuation of the American concept that we are to be governed by the rules of law requires that the people have faith that justice can be obtained through our legal system. That faith is justified and can exist only when the people are convinced that justice is administered evenhandedly. The exercise of a State’s Attorney’s broad prerogative to determine whom, what and how to prosecute must adhere rigidly to the standards of conduct established by law. Any act not in accordance with those standards, because it impairs the confidence of the people in the integrity of the exercise of the State’s sovereign power to indict and prosecute, tends to destroy the people’s faith in the fair and equal administration of justice. Such acts are not to be sanctioned or condoned by the courts.” [Sinclair, 27 Md. App. at 230-31, 340 A.2d at 373 (Davidson, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).]
*93Here the record shows that the State’s attorney exercised his prosecutorial discretion when he decided to go before the grand jury to seek an indictment against an individual whom he had formerly represented with respect to a legal separation. There was evidence to indicate that at the time the separation agreement was drafted, the former client was living with the man she was later accused of assaulting, and that he had in fact accompanied her to her attorney’s office. Manifestly, the State’s attorney was in a position to have obtained confidential information related to the criminal prosecution. Such information could have influenced him in deciding what to investigate, whether to seek an indictment, and what evidence to present to the grand jury. These circumstances are sufficient to create an apparent conflict of interest between the prosecutor’s duty to his former client and his duty to the public.2 Thus, these circumstances are *94sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that there was an appearance of impropriety on the part of the prosecutor arising out of his previous representation of his former client in a related civil matter. Because of the apparent conflict of interest, the prosecutor’s ability to act impartially toward both the State and the accused in the criminal matter may well have been impaired. On the basis of this State’s public policy, the prosecutor should have been disqualified from initiating this prosecution, and the charges which he brought by way of indictment should have been dismissed. Finally, a special prosecutor should have been appointed to determine, on a fair and impartial basis, whether the public interest required either that a new criminal prosecution be instituted, or that the prosecutor’s former client be discharged. Only by so doing can public confidence be maintained in the impartial exercise of the State’s sovereign power to indict and prosecute, and, therefore, in the fair and equal administration of justice.
A trial court, like all courts, has the responsibility of safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the interests of the public in the administration of justice. It has the obligation to remedy actual or apparent improprieties which undermine public trust in the legal system. See People v. Krstovich, 72 Misc. 2d 90, 338 N.Y.S.2d 132, 137-38 (1972); Ward v. State, 33 Okla. Crim. 182, 184, 242 P. 575, 576 (1926). Under the present circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the indictment. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judge Cole authorizes me to state that he joins me in the views expressed herein.

. With respect to improper intent or motive, the Superior Court of New Jersey said:
"The above rules (prohibiting attorneys from prosecuting former clients] appear to be inviolate regardless of intent or motive. This is apparently so because in any given case, except a very unusual one, it would not be possible for the defendant to prove any such breach of confidence or resulting prejudice. The circumstances by their very nature give rise to possibilities and inferences which should be avoided in the enforcement of the law.” (Detroit Motors, 62 N.J. Super, at 394, 163 A.2d at 231 (emphasis added).]

. Md. Rule 1230, and Appendix F, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4, provides:
"A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client.”
EC 4~1 provides in pertinent part:
"Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer....” (Emphasis added.)
EC 4-5 provides in pertinent part:
"A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client... (Emphasis added.)
EC 4-6 provides in pertinent part:
"The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client continues after the termination of his employment. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Canon 9 provides:
"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.”
EC 9-6 provides in pertinent part:
"Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to . . . strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.” (Emphasis added.)
The ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to *94the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, (Approved Draft 1971, Supp.) § 1.2, provides in pertinent part:
"A prosecutor should avoid the appearance or reality of a conñict of interest with respect to his official duties.” (Emphasis added.)
The commentary to § 1.2 provides in pertinent part:
"A conñict of interest may arise when, for example ... a former client or associate is a defendant in a criminal case.... It is of the utmost importance that the prosecutor avoid participation in a case in circumstances where any implication of partiality may cast a shadow over the integrity of his office.” (Emphasis added.)