Court Opinion

ID: 9402864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-17 17:14:10.463063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.384284
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-21-00248-CV

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

DANIEL CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR,                                                   Appellant,

                                               v.

BERGSTROM, INC.,                                                              Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 343rd District Court
                          of Bee County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

      Appellant Daniel Christopher Taylor appeals from the trial court’s summary

judgment in favor of appellee Bergstrom, Inc. regarding an allegedly defective under-the-

seat heater in a bus that injured him. Taylor argues that the trial court erred in granting

the summary judgment because: (1) there were no substantial alterations to the heater;

(2) Bergstrom had a duty of warning; (3–4) there were material fact issues regarding (a)
Bergstrom’s design and marketing of the heater, and (b) Bergstrom’s gross negligence.

We affirm.

                                          I.      BACKGROUND

          Taylor was incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice McConnell

Unit (TDCJ). On January 10, 2018, Taylor began a three-day transfer by bus to another

unit for medical treatment. While being transported, Taylor sustained burn injuries to his

gluteal areas and legs when his bus seat reached excessive temperatures due to the

under-seat heater. Taylor suffered second- and third-degree burns that required a skin

graft.1

          The under-seat heater was manufactured by Bergstrom in its China facility and

then sold in 2007 to Blue Bird, a company that manufactures buses. Blue Bird then sold

the bus and heater to TDCJ. Employees from TDCJ’s mechanical shop department

directed and supervised inmates while inmates installed plastic seats in the bus and

heaters under the bus seats. Bergstrom did not install the heater on the bus or perform

any repairs or maintenance on the heater after it was sold to Blue Bird.

A.        Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment

          On January 4, 2021, Taylor sued Bergstrom, alleging negligence and gross

negligence in the design, manufacturing, and marketing of the heater.2 Bergstrom filed a

joint motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. In its traditional summary

          1Taylor is permanently disabled and paraplegic; he lacks sensation from his waist down due to a
spinal injury he sustained in his youth.

         2 Taylor also sued TDCJ, Blue Bird, and other defendants that are not parties to this appeal. The

trial court denied TDCJ’s plea to the jurisdiction, and we affirmed. See Tex. Dep’t Crim. Just. v. Taylor, 13-
21-00246-CV, 2021 WL ____ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 8, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

                                                      2
judgment motion, Bergstrom asserted it was not responsible for Taylor’s injuries because:

(1) Taylor’s injuries were caused by a substantial alteration by a third-party; (2) substantial

alterations to the heater were not foreseeable; (3) Bergstrom had no duty to warn of the

possibility of third-party replacing the heater with incompatible parts; and (4) the heater

was not defective when it left Bergstrom’s facility. As summary judgment evidence,

Bergstrom attached a deposition excerpt from TDCJ’s mechanical shop employee,

Clifford Pegoda, a declaration from Bergstrom’s Director of Supplier Quality Engineer,

Richard Knott, and a deposition excerpt from Taylor’s expert, Bradley Plank, P.E.

       In his declaration, Knott noted that upon completion of his inspection, the metal

cage surrounding the heater was not manufactured or supplied by Bergstrom and that the

grey plastic bus seats were not the “standard Blue Bird bus school seats for which

Bergstrom understands that its under[-]seat heaters are used.” Knott further asserted that

the heater, as designed and manufactured by Bergstrom, pulls air down through its core,

where it is heated, and then the heated air is expelled down and out through the bottom

and side openings. However, after testing the heater at issue, he discovered that this

heater was pulling ambient air in through the sides or bottom and then pushing the air

into the heater core. The warmed air was then being expelled through the top of the

heater. In other words, the airflow in the heater was backwards when compared to the

airflow as originally designed and manufactured by Bergstrom in 2007. Knott further

clarified that the motor inside this heater and the axial fan blade were not the original parts

that were installed in the heaters as manufactured and sold by Bergstrom in 2007, and

they were not original equipment manufacturer replacement parts. Knott attached pictures

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of his findings to his declaration.

B.     No-Evidence Summary Judgment

       In its no-evidence summary judgment motion, Bergstrom asserted Taylor

produces no-evidence that Bergstrom was negligent in manufacturing, designing, or

marketing the heater, and it challenged each element accordingly. It further asserted

Taylor provided no evidence of a gross negligence claim on the elements of an extreme

risk and Bergstrom’s awareness of an extreme risk.

C.     Taylor’s Response and Bergstrom’s Reply

       Taylor responded to the traditional summary judgment claiming there was no

substantial alteration to the heater; Bergstrom was aware of aftermarket parts that were

used in its heaters; and Bergstrom had a duty to warn the public of any potential risks.

Regarding the no-evidence summary judgment, Taylor asserted that Bergstrom was

negligent because it failed to exercise ordinary care in the design, manufacturing, or

marketing of the heater. Regarding gross negligence, Taylor claimed there was an

extreme degree of risk due to the fact that the airflow was easily reversed, and the

temperature rose to over 200 degrees. Bergstrom replied that Taylor did not offer proof

of a product defect or a design or marketing defect.

D.     Trial Court’s Ruling

       The trial court granted Bergstrom’s joint motion for traditional and no-evidence

summary judgment, disposing of all Taylor’s claims. This appeal followed.

                                II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review the trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Mann

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Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). In

reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment motion, we must take as true all evidence

favorable to the nonmovant and draw every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts

in favor of the nonmovant. M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22,

23 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).

         A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is essentially a motion for a pretrial

directed verdict. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306,

310 (Tex. 2009). After an adequate time for discovery, a party without the burden of proof

may, without presenting evidence, seek summary judgment on the ground that there is

no evidence to support one or more essential elements of the nonmovant’s claim or

defense. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The nonmovant is required to present evidence raising

a genuine issue of material fact supporting each element contested in the motion. Id.;

Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310. A genuine issue of material fact is raised if the non-

movant produces more than a scintilla of evidence regarding the challenged element.

King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). When a party moves

for summary judgment on traditional and no-evidence grounds, we first review the no-

evidence motion. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). When,

as here, “a trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds

relied upon, [we] must affirm summary judgment if any of the summary judgment grounds

are meritorious.” FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex.

2000).

                                  III.   DESIGN DEFECT

                                             5
       First, we address Taylor’s third issue that there were material fact issues regarding

Bergstrom’s design of the heater because is it dispositive to the no-evidence summary

judgment. See Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600.

       Generally, “strict products liability and negligence are separate causes of action

with different elements.” Shaun T. Mian Corp. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 237 S.W.3d 851,

857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 141 S.W.3d 309, 315

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). However, when the plaintiff alleges no negligence

other than whether the product was unreasonably dangerous when it was sold, as Taylor

did here, the negligence theory is “encompassed and subsumed” in the defective product

theory. Shaun T. Mian Corp., 237 S.W.3d at 857 (providing that the plaintiff’s burden at

trial “would be to prove injury resulting from a product defect”). Here, Taylor’s negligence

theory is subsumed in the defective product theory because all of his arguments

encompass a design defect. See id. That is, his arguments in the trial court and on

appeal—that Bergstrom allegedly defectively designed the heater—are based on a strict

products liability claim. See id. Therefore, because the same analysis applies where both

theories of negligence and strict liability involve the underlying concept of a defect, absent

a defect, Bergstrom could not have been negligent. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S.W.3d at

315 (“It is not logical for a manufacturer to be held liable for failing to exercise ordinary

care when producing a product that is not defective because . . . if a product is not

unreasonably dangerous because of the way it was manufactured, it was not negligent to

manufacture it that way . . . . ”); see also Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d

867, 871, 872 (Tex. 1978) (providing that to recover on a negligence claim arising out of

                                              6
a product defect, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant failed to exercise ordinary

care in the design, manufacturing, or marketing of the product; and (2) the defendant’s

breach proximately caused the alleged injuries). 3 Accordingly, we consider whether

Taylor provided evidence of design defect. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S.W.3d at 315.

A.      Applicable Law

        To recover for strict liability alleging a design defect, a plaintiff must prove that: (1)

the product was defectively designed, rendering it unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer

alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a producing cause of the injury for which

the plaintiff seeks recovery. Timpte, 286 S.W3d at 311; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 82.005(a). “A safer alternative design is one that would have prevented or

significantly reduced the risk of the injury, would not substantially impair the product’s

utility, and was economically and technologically feasible at the time.” Genie Indus., Inc.

v. Matak, 462 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2015); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 82.005(a)–(b). A plaintiff complaining of a defective design has “the burden of

demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that a safer alternative design existed

at the relevant time.” Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Norman, 104 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Additionally, the plaintiff must show that the

safety benefits from this alternative design are foreseeably greater than the resulting

costs. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 337 (Tex. 1998). “[T]hat

        3 “To establish breach of duty, the plaintiff must show that the defendant did something an ordinarily
prudent person exercising ordinary care would not have done under those circumstances, or that the
defendant failed to do that which an ordinarily prudent person would have done in the exercise of ordinary
care.” Dewayne Rogers Logging, Inc. v. Propac Indus., Ltd., 299 S.W.3d 374, 385 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009,
pet. denied).

                                                      7
is, that the alternative design not only would have reduced the risk of harm in the instant

case, but also would not, under other circumstances, impose an equal or greater risk of

harm.” Honda, 104 S.W.3d at 605 (internal citations omitted).

B.     Analysis

       Taylor’s evidence of a safer design alternative for the heater came from one

source: deposition testimony from his retained expert, Plank. When questioned about a

potential safety device on the heater, Plank stated:

       One thought I had was putting some sort of a (unintelligible) around it and
       putting the fuses on that (unintelligible) so it would blow air elsewhere into
       the bus to distribute the air better . . . . [O]ne thing you could do if you didn’t
       turn it upside, you could at least fix it so the fan runs in the opposite
       direction. You’d have to change the direction of the motor and change the
       design of the fan blades to pull air down through the—the heater core
       instead of blowing it up. You can do that. That would be safer and put air
       along the floor . . . . You know, in the event that there’s someone on a bus
       that’s not cooperating in turning down the heat you’ve got a rear heater
       that’s, you know, wildly out of control. So you do have to have some sort of
       an automatic shut[-]down. Again, it would take some experimentation to
       determine what temperature that could be—the thermal switch should be
       set at and where it should be located in order to protect someone sitting on
       a seat like that. But given all the facts we got here that someone could
       reverse the fan direction, someone could not turn down the heat at the
       request of the people that are closest to it, there has to be some sort of
       protection there, like some sort of a thermal switch that would shut the
       system down.

       On appeal, the extent of Taylor’s argument regarding the evidence of a safer

alternative design is as follows: “[Plank] stated that there were safer alternative designs

with respect to terminating excessive heat.” Taylor does not cite to any legal authority or

provide a legal analysis of how that authority is applicable to the facts here. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.1(i). Taylor does not explain how Plank’s testimony is evidence that a safer

alternative design existed. See id.; Honda, 104 S.W.3d at 605. Plank makes a reference

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to the heater possibly having an “automatic shut down”; however, he admits that he does

not “know exactly where to put a switch if we have that kind of thing.” See Genie Indus.,

Inc., 462 S.W.3d at 7 (providing that a plaintiff show that an alternative design was

capable of being developed); see also Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. 1999)

(“An expert’s simple ipse dixit is insufficient to establish a matter; rather, the expert must

explain the basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts.”).

       Nonetheless, in Plank’s deposition, Plank did not provide any details about this

alternative design, how this alternative would have prevented Taylor’s injury, that this

alternative was economically and technologically feasible at the time it left Bergstrom’s

control, or that the alternative design would not impose an equal or greater risk of harm.

See Honda, 104 S.W.3d at 605 (requiring plaintiffs to prove “that an economically and

technologically feasible alternative seat belt and release system was available and would

have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of Karen’s death without substantially

reducing the utility to the ‘intended users’ of the product—namely, all automobile drivers”).

Furthermore, Taylor presented no evidence of the costs of such an alternative design.

See id. at 607 (providing that without evidence concerning the cost of incorporating an

alternative design, there is no evidence of its economic feasibility); see also Martinez, 977

S.W.2d at 337 (“The safety benefits from its proposed design are foreseeably greater

than the resulting costs, including any diminished usefulness or diminished safety.”).

Absent more, Plank’s general statements are no evidence of a safer design alternative.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on

this basis.

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                                IV.    MARKETING DEFECT

      We next address the remaining part of Taylor’s third issue: whether he produced

evidence of a negligent marketing defect.

A.    Applicable Law

      To prevail on a negligent marketing claim:

      as opposed to a strict liability marketing defect claim, the appellee was
      required to establish four elements: (1) a duty by appellant to act according
      to an applicable standard of care; (2) a breach of the applicable standard of
      care; (3) an injury; and (4) a causal connection between the breach of care
      and the injury.

Cobb v. Dall. Fort Worth Med. Ctr.-Grand Prairie, 48 S.W.3d 820, 824–825 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2001, no pet.); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Gillies, 343 S.W.3d 205, 211 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). “[T]he existence of a duty to warn of the dangers of an

alleged defective product is a question of law.” Firestone Steel Prods. Co. v. Barajas, 927

S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. 1996). “A manufacturer generally does not have a duty to warn or

instruct about another manufacturer’s products, even though a third party might use those

products in connection with the manufacturer’s own product.” Id. at 614.

B.    Discussion

      Taylor asserts that Bergstrom’s failure to warn users of the dangers of reverse

airflow constituted a negligent marketing defect, and he generally directs us to the

deposition testimony of Knott as well as Bergstrom’s Vice President of Engineering, John

Bracy, as evidence to support his claim. After reviewing the testimony of Bergstrom’s

experts, we are unable to find any evidence that satisfy the elements of a negligent

                                            10
marking defect claim. Specifically, neither of Bergstrom’s experts addressed the standard

of care applicable to the marketing of the heater, or how Bergstrom violated that standard,

or that Bergstrom had a duty to warn users of the potential reversal of airflow. See

Ethicon, 343 S.W.3d at 211. Because Taylor failed to present evidence establishing a

negligent marketing defect claim, the trial court properly granted Bergstrom’s no-evidence

summary judgment on Taylor’s negligent marketing cause of action.

        To the extent that Taylor also argues that he raised a question of fact regarding

a marketing defect claim (in addition to a negligent marketing defect claim), neither

experts’ testimony addressed each element of a marketing defect claim that Bergstrom

challenged. See Ethicon Endo–Surgery, Inc. v. Meyer, 249 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (“A marketing defect cause of action consists of five elements:

(1) a risk of harm that is inherent in the product or that may arise from the intended or

reasonably anticipated use of the product must exist, (2) the product supplier must

actually know or reasonably foresee the risk of harm at the time the product is marketed,

(3) the product must possess a marketing defect, (4) the absence of the warning or

instructions must render the product unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user or

consumer of the product, and (5) the failure to warn or instruct must constitute a causative

nexus in the product user’s injury.”); see also DeGrate v. Exec. Imprints, Inc., 261 S.W.3d

402, 412–13 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2008, no pet.) (affirming the trial court’s no-evidence

summary judgment when the expert’s “testimony failed to address each challenged

element of the [plaintiff’s] marketing defect claim. Neither [the expert’s] affidavit testimony

nor the opinions set forth in his expert report support that the absence of a warning

                                              11
rendered the candle unreasonably dangerous or that such was a producing cause of [the

plaintiff’s] injuries”). We overrule Taylor’s third issue.

                                     V.         GROSS NEGLIGENCE

        By his fourth issue, Taylor contends that he raised a fact issue regarding gross

negligence. Other than in worker’s compensation cases, “a finding of ordinary negligence

is [a] prerequisite to a finding of gross negligence.” Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d

170, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Taylor has not raised a fact

issue as to Bergstrom’s negligence; therefore, he has not raised a fact issue as to a gross

negligence cause of action. See id. We overrule Taylor’s last issue.4

                                          VI.     CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                 JAIME TIJERINA
                                                                                 Justice

Delivered and filed on the
15th day of June, 2023.

        4 Because we concluded the trial court properly granted Bergstrom’s no-evidence summary
judgment, we need not determine Taylor’s first two issues as they relate to Bergstrom’s traditional motion
for summary judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

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