Court Opinion

ID: 9777629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:17:21.741316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:57.627615
License: Public Domain

CADENA, Justice
(concurring).
I would dismiss the appeal solely on the ground that the order of which appellant complains is not a final judgment under the holding in Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 295 S.W.2d 890 (1956).
*922In this case appellee’s motion, after reciting appellant’s failure to make the child support payments which he was obligated to make under the prior final divorce decree, prayed that appellant be jailed ifntil he paid the arrears. The order of the court below merely requited that appellant pay such arrears in monthly installment^, “failing which, Louis Qardia is to be incarcerated in the Bexar County Jail until further orders of this Court.”
It is clear that, under this order, the incarceration of appellant would have to be preceded by a hearing in order to determine whether he had complied with the order in question. The order does not finally preclude further proceedings in the trial court, nor does it dispose of all of the issues before the court. It merely imposes on appellant the same obligations which were imposed by the divorce decree, although it, in effect, increases the time within which appellant may comply with the divorce decree. Under the Wagner holding, to be final “a judgment must determine the rights of the parties and dispose of all the issues involved so that no future action by the court will be necessary in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.” (295 S.W.2d at 892).
Since, as the majority opinion points out, appellant is placed under no restraint whatever by the order in question, and since such order is not appealable under rules applicable to judgments generally, I think it is unappropriate to add another opinion to those supporting the questionable rule that a person who has been punished for contempt of court cannot seek direct appellate review of the punitive order but must qssume the heavier burden which is imposed on those who attack a judgment collaterally.1

. The original common law notion was that each court was the sole judge of whether or not specific conduct constituted a contempt of that court and that, therefore, contempt convictions were not subject to review by any other court. Crosby’s Case, 95 Eng.Rep. 1005 (1771). Today, in practically all jurisdictions, a judgment of contempt may be collaterally attacked by habeas corpus proceedings, and in some jurisdictions such a judgment may be attacked directly by appeal or writ of error. Note, 33 Tex.L.Rev. 143 (1954).
In 1851 the Supreme Court of Texas held that a person held in contempt in a criminal case has no right of appeal. However, this holding was based on a specific statutory provision excepting contempt cases from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which, at that time, had appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. Floyd v. State, 7 Tex. 215. Despite a holding four years later that a contempt conviction in a criminal case could not be collaterally attacked by resort to habeas corpus, Jordan v. State, 14 Tex. 436 (1855), in 1870 it was held that a judgment of contempt is subject to review by habeas corpus. Holman v. Mayor of Austin, 34 Tex. 668 (1870). Since Holman, a person punished for contempt may resort to habeas corpus, but, as shown by the authorities cited in the majority opinion, the rule of non-appeal-ability has persisted.
The rule to the effect that contempt proceedings are reviewable solely by resort to habeas corpus places an unjustifiably heavy burden on a person who has been dejjrived of his liberty. A collateral attack on a judgment of contempt “can be sustained only after it is shown that the order is void; and the innocence vel non of relator is immaterial in the determination of its validity.” Ex parte Sentell, 153 Tex. 252, 266 S.W.2d 365, 366 (1954). Whether the relator committed the act charged is conclusively determined by the judgment of the court holding him in contempt. Ex parte Fisher, 146 Tex. 328, 206 S.W.2d 1000, 1003.
In Harbison v. McMurray, 138 Tex. 192, 158 S.W.2d 284 (1942) it was squarely held that a contempt of court case growing out of a civil proceeding is a civil case. In view of this holding, it is difficult to understand the mental processes which lead to the conclusion that a final adjudication of contempt growing out of a civil case is not included within the provisions of the statutes defining the appellate jurisdiction of Courts, of Civil Appeals. Significantly, the decisions denying appellate review of contempt convictions make no mention of these statutes. See the discussion of Articles 1819, 2249, 2265 and 2270, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann., in Harbison v. McMurray, 158 S.W.2d at 286-287.