Court Opinion

ID: 9644280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:51:58.541507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:10.908132
License: Public Domain

ON appellant’s motion for rehearing.
WOODLEY, Judge.
As stated in our original opinion, the sole question presented on this appeal is the admissibility of the evidence as to what occurred between appellant and the prosecuting witness at appellant’s home about April first, the acts relied upon having occurred at the Boys’ Club on May 6.
In our original opinion we held that the evidence as to these separate acts was admissible to show the unnatural attitude of appellant toward the boy and the probability of the charged act having occurred as testified by the prosecuting witness.
We also called attention to the fact that the confession of*616fered in evidence admitted the prior act, but though mentioning having sat next to the boys at the Boys’ Club on May 6, appellant did not tell of the fondling here charged.
It is apparent that through the procedure employed the state would be in position to try an accused upon a subsequent disputed act and by proving an admitted prior fondling of the same child secure a conviction and severe punishment for both the disputed act and the admitted act.
With the rule in mind that the state is not bound by the allegation of the indictment as to the date of the offense “on or about” which it allegedly occurred, but may rely upon any date within the limitation period, we were impelled to remark that an attempt under such circumstances to secure a second conviction might constitute former jeopardy. We said in this connection:
“In the absence of an election having been made, we see nothing to prevent the jury from basing their conviction upon the incident at the appellant’s home (on or about April 1st). Therefore, in the event the state attempted to prosecute for such incident, the question of jeopardy would arise.”
This observation in no way affected our holding as to the admissibility of the testimony of the prior fondling for the purpose for which it was admitted.
If the quoted paragraph of our original opinion is not favorable to appellant, it does him no harm.
We remain convinced that there is no reversible error. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.