Court Opinion

ID: 9908306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:39.712119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:05.164300
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0430-MR

AARON M. ADAMS                                                        APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 18-CR-00604

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Aaron Adams appeals from an order of the Kenton

Circuit Court which denied his motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. We find no error and affirm.

                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On March 30, 2018, Appellant appeared at the residence of his ex-

girlfriend and assaulted, raped, and sodomized her. He was swiftly arrested at the

scene. On May 31, 2018, a grand jury indicted Appellant on the following
criminal counts: rape in the first degree,1 sodomy in the first degree,2 burglary in

the second degree,3 and assault in the fourth degree.4 On May 7, 2019, Appellant

entered a guilty plea to the rape, sodomy, and assault charges. He was later

sentenced to fifteen years in prison.5

                 On October 25, 2021, Appellant filed a motion pursuant to Kentucky

Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 in which he raised various allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion

without a hearing and this appeal followed.

                                 STANDARD OF REVIEW

                 In general, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

Appellant must show two things:

                 First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
                 performance was deficient. This requires showing that
                 counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
                 functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
                 the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
                 that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
                 This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
                 serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
                 whose result is reliable.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.040.
2
    KRS 510.070.
3
    KRS 511.030.
4
    KRS 508.030.
5
    Pursuant to the plea agreement, the burglary charge was dismissed.

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984). “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably

effective assistance.” Id.

                    An error by counsel, even if professionally
             unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
             judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
             effect on the judgment. The purpose of the Sixth
             Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a
             defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance
             on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any
             deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial
             to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance
             under the Constitution.

Id. at 691-92, 104 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (citations omitted). “It is not enough for the

defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of

the proceeding.” Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. “The defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.

Ct. at 2068. Additionally, “a hearing is required only if there is an issue of fact

which cannot be determined on the face of the record.” Stanford v.

Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993).

                    Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
             highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant
             to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or
             adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court,
             examining counsel’s defense after it has proved

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             unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission
             of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of
             attorney performance requires that every effort be made
             to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
             reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged
             conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
             perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties
             inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
             strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
             the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
             is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
             under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be
             considered sound trial strategy.” There are countless
             ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.
             Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not
             defend a particular client in the same way.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (citations omitted).

             We must also consider other issues due to Appellant’s guilty plea.

                          A showing that counsel’s assistance
                   was ineffective in enabling a defendant to
                   intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in
                   deciding to plead guilty has two
                   components: (1) that counsel made errors so
                   serious that counsel’s performance fell
                   outside the wide range of professionally
                   competent assistance; and (2) that the
                   deficient performance so seriously affected
                   the outcome of the plea process that, but for
                   the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable
                   probability that the defendant would not
                   have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted
                   on going to trial.

                   Evaluating the totality of the circumstances
             surrounding the guilty plea is an inherently factual
             inquiry which requires consideration of “the accused’s
             demeanor, background and experience, and whether the

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             record reveals that the plea was voluntarily made.”
             While “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong
             presumption of verity,” “the validity of a guilty plea is
             not determined by reference to some magic incantation
             recited at the time it is taken[.]” The trial court’s inquiry
             into allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
             requires the court to determine whether counsel’s
             performance was below professional standards and
             “caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would
             probably have won” and “whether counsel was so
             thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the
             hands of probable victory.” Because “[a] multitude of
             events occur in the course of a criminal proceeding which
             might influence a defendant to plead guilty or stand
             trial,” the trial court must evaluate whether errors by trial
             counsel significantly influenced the defendant’s decision
             to plead guilty in a manner which gives the trial court
             reason to doubt the voluntariness and validity of the plea.

Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted).

                     Where the trial court does not hold an evidentiary
             hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion, appellate review is
             limited to “whether the motion on its face states grounds
             that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which,
             if true, would invalidate the conviction.” An evidentiary
             hearing is only required “if there is a material issue of
             fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e.,
             conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of
             the record.”

Haley v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Ky. App. 2019) (citations

omitted).

                                    ANALYSIS

             While Appellant raised multiple ineffective assistance of counsel

issues before the trial court, he only argues one before this Court. Appellant

                                          -5-
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of

Appellant’s competency before allowing Appellant to enter into a guilty plea.

Appellant argues that on the night of the attack on the victim, he was under the

heavy influence of drugs and alcohol and does not remember most of what

transpired. He also alleges that he has anger issues that cause him to act out as

though a “switch has been flipped.” He also argues that he has other historical

mental health issues. Appellant claims that all of these factors should have caused

trial counsel to move to have Appellant tested for competency to stand trial.

             The trial court found that trial counsel was not ineffective as to this

issue and we agree.

                     The prosecution of a criminal defendant who is
             incompetent to stand trial is a violation of due process of
             law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the
             competency to plead guilty and the competency to stand
             trial are identical. Incompetency to stand trial is defined
             as where, because of a mental condition, the defendant
             lacks the capacity to appreciate the nature and
             consequences of the proceedings against him or to
             participate rationally in his own defense.

Smith v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ky. App. 2008) (citations

omitted). Here, the trial court and Appellant entered into a thorough plea colloquy.

The trial judge asked Appellant whether he was content with his trial counsel’s

representation, aware of the charges against him, aware of possible defenses, and

aware of possible consequences. Appellant answered all these questions in the

                                           -6-
affirmative. In addition, during the sentencing hearing, Appellant took

responsibility for his crimes and recognized the harm caused to his victim.

Furthermore, we do not believe that temporary and voluntary intoxication on the

night of the criminal activity equates with incompetency to stand trial. Nor do we

believe that anger issues and unproven, past mental health issues equate to

incompetency.

                                  CONCLUSION

             All the evidence in the record before us indicates that Appellant was

competent to stand trial and was not under the influence of debilitating mental

conditions. Appellant’s trial counsel was not acting “below professional

standards” when he failed to request a competency evaluation. An evaluation was

unnecessary based on the facts before us; therefore, the trial court did not err in

denying Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Aaron M. Adams, pro se                     Daniel Cameron
 Burgin, Kentucky                           Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Stephanie L. McKeehan
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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