Court Opinion

ID: 9556122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 06:09:48.031596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:29.091514
License: Public Domain

REVERSE AND REMAND and Opinion Filed August 10, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00893-CV

  MATTHEW FULLER AND FULLER WEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC,
                        Appellants
                           V.
  CRAIG HAUSZ, MICHELLE HAUSZ, CMH ADVISORS, PLLC, AND
         CMH WEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellees

               On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 366-01154-2022

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

                Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Garcia

      Appellants sued appellees for breach of contract and defamation. Appellees

successfully moved to dismiss the suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act,

and appellants appealed. Concluding that appellees failed to carry their burden under

step one of the multi-step TCPA process, we reverse and remand.

                                I. BACKGROUND

A.    Factual Allegations

      Appellants alleged the following facts in their live pleading.
      In 2018, appellants and appellees entered an agreement relating to the joint

provision of investment advisory services. But disagreements soon arose among the

parties, and in April 2020 the parties signed a Confidential Settlement Agreement

(“Agreement”) to resolve their disagreements. The Agreement contained a mutual

confidentiality and non-disparagement clause.

      After the parties executed the Agreement, appellant Matthew Fuller applied

to become a member at Bent Tree Country Club. Fuller later learned that appellees

Craig and Michelle Hausz were “working against [his] interest in violation of the

Agreement” and that one or more appellees “openly discussed the disagreements

resolved by the Agreement with members of the Club.” Additionally, one or more

appellees “actively tarnished Mr. Fuller’s reputation to other members of the Club,

even describing Mr. Fuller as ‘blackballed’ at the Club.” Fuller’s application to join

the country club was denied.

B.    Procedural History

      Appellants sued appellees for breach of the Agreement and for defamation.

      Appellees answered and counterclaimed for their attorneys’ fees. Later they

filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011. Appellants responded to the dismissal

motion.

      After a hearing, the trial judge signed an order that granted appellees’ TCPA

motion, dismissed appellants’ claims with prejudice, and awarded appellees their

                                         –2–
attorneys’ fees. The judge did not state the basis for his ruling. Because the order

disposed of all of appellants’ claims and effectively granted all the relief appellees

sought by their counterclaim, it was a final judgment. See Lehmann v. Har–Con

Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001) (holding that a judgment is final if it “finally

disposes of all remaining parties and claims, based on the record in the case”).

      Appellants timely appealed.

                               II. ISSUES PRESENTED

      Appellants raise three issues on appeal, and their third issue has two parts. We

paraphrase the issues as follows:

      1.     Did the trial court err by concluding that appellees satisfied the
             TCPA’s “matter of public concern” requirement at step one of
             the TCPA analysis?

      2.     Did the trial court err by concluding that appellants failed to
             demonstrate that their claims are exempted from the TCPA by
             § 27.010(a)(5)(B)?

      3a.    Did the trial court err by concluding that appellants failed to
             present clear and specific evidence of every element of their
             claims?

      3b.    Did the trial court err by concluding that appellees proved an
             affirmative defense as a matter of law?

                                    III. ANALYSIS

A.    Overview of the TCPA

      The legislature enacted the TCPA both to encourage people to exercise certain

constitutional rights, such as the rights of association and free speech, and to protect

the right to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury. See CIV. PRAC. & REM.

                                          –3–
§ 27.002. To advance these goals, it created a new motion-to-dismiss procedure that

is augmented by features such as a discovery stay and a right to recover attorney’s

fees. See id. §§ 27.003(a), 27.003(c), 27.005, 27.009(a)(1).

       A TCPA motion to dismiss triggers a multi-step analysis. See § 27.005(b)–

(d). At step one, the movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the

nonmovant’s legal action is based on or in response to (1) the movant’s exercise of

the right of free speech, the right to petition, or the right of association, or (2) conduct

by the movant fitting the descriptions found in § 27.010(b). See id. § 27.005(b).

       If the movant carries its step-one burden as to a claim, the burden shifts to the

nonmovant to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each

essential element of that claim. See id. § 27.005(c). If the nonmovant does not carry

its burden, the claim must be dismissed. See id. § 27.005(b), (c). And even if the

nonmovant carries its step-two burden, the movant can still win dismissal by

establishing an affirmative defense or other grounds on which it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Id. § 27.005(d).

       The nonmovant can avoid the three-step process and defeat a TCPA motion

to dismiss by showing that a statutory exemption applies. See id. § 27.010(a); Temple

v. Cortez L. Firm, PLLC, 657 S.W.3d 337, 346 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.)

(holding that courts may consider exemptions before addressing the first step of the

three-step process).

                                           –4–
      In determining whether a legal action is subject to or should be dismissed

under the TCPA, a court shall consider the pleadings, evidence the court could

consider under the summary-judgment rule, and supporting and opposing affidavits

stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

§ 27.006(a); cf. Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (stating, in

connection with step one, that the plaintiff’s petition is the best and all-sufficient

evidence of the nature of the action). We consider these materials in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant. Temple, 657 S.W.3d at 342.

      We review de novo the trial judge’s determination that the parties met or failed

to meet their respective burdens under the TCPA. Garcia v. Semler, 663 S.W.3d 270,

279 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.).

B.    Issue 1: Did appellees carry their burden at step one of the TCPA
      analysis?

      Appellees successfully argued in their TCPA motion that appellants’ claims

were based on or in response to appellees’ exercises of their right of free speech or

their right of association. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(2), (3) (defining those

rights for TCPA purposes). Appellants argue that the trial judge erred by granting

the motion because (1) both of those rights require the movant to have said or done

something involving a matter of public concern and (2) none of appellees’ acts at

issue involve a matter of public concern. We agree with appellants.

                                         –5–
      1.     Applicable Law

      The TCPA defines the two rights that appellees invoked in their dismissal

motion as follows:

      (2)    “Exercise of the right of association” means to join together to
             collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common
             interests relating to a governmental proceeding or a matter of
             public concern.

      (3)    “Exercise of the right of free speech” means a communication
             made in connection with a matter of public concern.

Id. § 27.001(2), (3). Both definitions use the phrase “matter of public concern,” and

the TCPA further defines that phrase, in relevant part, as follows:

      (7)    “Matter of public concern” means a statement or activity
             regarding:

             ...

             (B)     a matter of political, social, or other interest to the
                     community; or

             (C)     a subject of concern to the public.

Id. § 27.001(7)(B), (C).

      Because the meaning of the phrase “matter of public concern” is pivotal to

appellants’ first issue, we review its legislative evolution and judicial glosses. The

2019 amendments to the TCPA substantially revised the definition of “matter of

public concern.” Before those amendments took effect, the TCPA defined the phrase

by referring to a list of general topics:

      (7)    “Matter of public concern” includes an issue related to:

             (A)     health or safety;

                                            –6–
             (B)    environmental, economic, or community well-being;

             (C)    the government;

             (D)    a public official or public figure; or

             (E)    a good, product, or service in the marketplace.

Citizens Participation Act, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961,

962 (H.B. 2973) (amended 2019) (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 27.001(7)). At first, the Texas Supreme Court read the old definition

expansively, holding that a communication related to a matter of public concern even

if it had only a tangential relationship to a listed topic. See ExxonMobil Pipeline Co.

v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam). But it later retreated

from this expansive reading. See McLane Champions, LLC v. Houston Baseball

Partners LLC, No. 21-0641, 2023 WL 4306378, at *6 n.9 (Tex. June 30, 2023)

(stating that ExxonMobil’s tangential-relationship test had been “cabined” in

Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 137 (Tex.

2019)).

      The supreme court has not addressed the new definition of “matter of public

concern,” but we have concluded that the legislature intended to narrow the phrase’s

scope with the 2019 amendments. See Vaughn-Riley v. Patterson, No. 05-20-00236-

CV, 2020 WL 7053651, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 2, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

We also concluded that the legislature intended for the courts to construe the new

definition consistently with First Amendment jurisprudence, under which

                                          –7–
      communications are matter[s] of public concern when they can be fairly
      considered as relating to any matter of political, social or other concern
      to the community or when [they address] a subject of legitimate news
      interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern
      to the public.

Id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011)) (internal quotations omitted).

      More recently, we opined that the 2019 amendments both narrowed the scope

of “matter of public concern” and repudiated the tangential-relationship test. Beard

v. McGregor Bancshares, Inc., No. 05-21-00478-CV, 2022 WL 1076176, at *5

(Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 11, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Chesser v.

Aucoin, No. 01-20-00425-CV, 2020 WL 7391711, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (opining that the 2019 definition more

strongly emphasizes the “public” component of “matter of public concern”). But see

Kadow v. Grauerholz, No. 02-20-00044-CV, 2021 WL 733302, at *3 n.6 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Feb. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that 2019

amendments actually broadened the definition of “matter of public concern”). See

generally Laura Lee Prather & Robert T. Sherwin, The Changing Landscape of the

Texas Citizens Participation Act, 52 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163, 167 (2020) (observing

that the amended definition “provides a more generalized approach to determining

whether something is a matter of public concern”). We further held that private

disputes that affect only the fortunes of the litigants are not matters of public concern.

Beard, 2022 WL 1076176, at *6; see also McLane Champions, 2023 WL 4306378,

                                          –8–
at *7 (concluding that the former definition of “matter of public concern” required a

communication to “have some relevance to a public audience”).

      2.     The Communications or Conduct in Question

      Next, we identify the specific communications or conduct that, in appellees’

view, constituted exercises of the rights of association and free speech under the

2019 definitions discussed above.

      At the outset, we note that appellees denied in their TCPA motion that they

made “disparaging statements of any kind.” Their denial did not bar them from

seeking a TCPA dismissal because at step one the defendant can rely on the

plaintiff’s pleadings to show the basis for the plaintiff’s legal action. See Hersh, 526

S.W.3d at 467. Accordingly, we turn first to appellants’ petition and then to the

relevant evidence. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a) (listing materials a court shall

consider when ruling on a TCPA motion).

      In their petition, appellants alleged that appellees “work[ed] against Mr.

Fuller’s interest” when Fuller applied to join the Bent Tree Country Club. Appellants

pleaded two specific examples of appellees’ misconduct:

             19. For example, one or more of [appellees] openly discussed
      the disagreements resolved by the Agreement with members of the
      Club. . . .

             20. Further, one or more of [appellees] actively tarnished Mr.
      Fuller’s reputation to other members of the Club, even describing Mr.
      Fuller as “blackballed” at the Club.

                                          –9–
Appellants also filed a declaration by Fuller in response to appellees’ TCPA motion,

but that declaration added few details to the foregoing allegations. Specifically,

Fuller said that club member Shelby Ricketts refused to endorse him “because he

had heard from Mr. and Mrs. Hausz that we had been involved in a business dispute.”

Fuller also said that Craig Hausz sent another club member, Michael Bailey, a text

message saying that Fuller “was blackballed from the country club.”

      From the foregoing, we conclude that appellees’ alleged communications for

step-one purposes were:

      1.     statements discussing the business disagreements that were
             resolved by the Agreement;

      2.     statements (possibly the same ones identified in point 1) that
             Fuller and the Hauszes had been involved in a business dispute;
             and

      3.     a statement by Craig Hausz to another club member that Fuller
             was blackballed from the country club.

Next we consider whether appellees demonstrated that these communications

involved a matter of public concern so as to make them exercises of the rights of free

speech or association. See id. § 27.005(b).

      3.     Analysis of the Right of Free Speech

      The communications were exercises of the right of free speech if appellees

made them “in connection with a matter of public concern.” Id. § 27.001(3).

Appellants’ argument is straightforward: the alleged communications involved

nothing more than private disputes affecting no one but the disputants, so they did

                                        –10–
not involve a matter of public concern and were not exercises of the right of free

speech. For the reasons that follow, we agree with appellants.

              a.     Communications About the Parties’ Business Dispute

       The first two alleged communications identified above amount to statements

(1) disclosing that appellants and appellees had been involved in a business dispute

and (2) discussing to some unknown extent the disagreements that the Agreement

resolved. Appellees bore the burden of demonstrating that these communications

involved a matter of public concern. See id. §§ 27.001(3), 27.005(b)(1)(A).

Appellees argue that they carried their burden, urging that appellants’ petition and a

cease-and-desist letter they sent to appellees demonstrate that the communications

involved matters of “interest to the community.” Id. § 27.001(7)(B). We discuss the

petition and the letter in turn.

       First, appellees argue that their alleged statements about the parties’ past

business disputes involved a matter of public concern because appellants alleged in

their petition that these statements created a “rumor mill” that harmed appellants’

reputations and abilities to obtain new clients. We disagree with this argument. The

petition alleges or at least implies that the communications cast appellants in a

negative light, but precedents show that negative comments do not automatically

implicate a matter of public concern. For example, we recently held that

communications about a bank’s poor business practices did not involve a matter of

public concern, in part because such matters potentially affected at most only the

                                        –11–
bank’s investors, customers, and vendors. Beard, 2022 WL 1076176, at *10–11. The

same reasoning applies here: even if the business disputes and disagreements

revealed in the communications put appellants in a negative light, there is nothing to

suggest that the communications would affect anyone but appellants’ clients and

potential clients. Other authorities also support our conclusion. See Ojala Partners,

LP v. Driesse, No. 05-22-00009-CV, 2023 WL 1878881, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Feb. 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (communications accusing a former employee of

stealing confidential information did not involve a matter of public concern because

the communications were “non-specific and . . . of interest only to the parties

involved”); Box v. PetroTel Oman LLC, No. 05-21-00951-CV, 2022 WL 3151974,

at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (alleged disclosure of

confidential information did not involve a matter of public concern because it

affected only the fortunes of the private parties involved).

      Second, appellees point to appellants’ cease-and-desist letter to the Hauszes

in which appellants’ attorney said the following:

      Your disparagement and interference has caused at least one member
      to withhold or withdraw their endorsement of Fuller’s membership
      application and has negatively impacted Fuller’s personal and business
      relationships with other members at the Club. In addition, because your
      disparaging statements have been directly or indirectly communicated
      to longtime clients of Fuller’s who are closely associated with members
      of the Club, your actions have damaged his relationship with such
      clients and within the community.

Appellees argue that this letter shows that appellees’ alleged communications had

wide-ranging effects and therefore must have involved a matter of public concern.
                                     –12–
Again, we disagree. Taken as a whole, the letter asserts that the Hauszes’

“disparagement and interference” damaged Fuller’s relationships with country-club

members, non-members, and people “within the community.” But the letter, viewed

in the light most favorable to appellants, does not show that the Hauszes’

communications were of interest to the community. Rather, the letter suggests only

that the communications were of interest to people—club members or not—who

already had relationships with Fuller. Nothing in the record suggests that those

people amounted to a community.1 See Community, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (1981)

(defining “community” as “a body of individuals organized into a unit or manifesting

usu. with awareness some unifying trait”); Community, THE NEW OXFORD

AMERICAN DICTIONARY (2001) (defining “community” as “a group of people having

a religion, race, profession, or other particular characteristic in common”). We

conclude that individuals united only by the fact that they had relationships with

Fuller that were damaged by appellees’ alleged communications are not a

    1
      Appellees argue that § 27.001(7)(B)’s phrase “the community” can refer to a relatively small group
of people. For support, they rely on cases construing the phrase “community well-being,” which was one
of the matters of public concern listed in the pre-2019-amendments version of the TCPA. See Adams v.
Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. 2018) (“[A]ny allegation of malfeasance and
criminality by the developer and the HOA likely concerns the well-being of the community [i.e., a small
residential community] as a whole.”); Patel v. Patel, No. 14-18-00771-CV, 2020 WL 2120313, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (allegations that member of non-profit
organization’s board of directors was mentally unfit and stole funds concerned “the well-being of the
community the Foundation seeks to serve,” which was apparently Indian-Americans). But the people
identified in appellants’ cease-and-desist letter were not a “community” akin to the residents of a specific
neighborhood or persons of a particular national origin.
                                                  –13–
“community” within the meaning of § 27.001(7)(B). Thus, the cease-and-desist

letter does not demonstrate that the alleged communications were of “interest to the

community.”

      Our Vaughn-Riley decision supports our conclusion. In that case, a

performance of a play in Tyler, Texas, was canceled, and actress Vaughn-Riley

commented about that cancellation on the internet. 2020 WL 7053651, at *2. She

was sued for her statements, she moved to dismiss under the TCPA, and the trial

judge denied her motion. Id. at *1. We affirmed that denial, holding that Vaughn-

Riley failed to show that her statements about the play’s cancellation involved a

matter of public concern. Id. at *3–4. We observed that although the people

associated with the play’s production and the people who had paid to see the play

were probably concerned about its cancellation, there was no evidence “that the

general public, or even the local Tyler creative community and art patrons at large[,]

were affected by or concerned with the cancellation of this single performance.” Id.

at *3. Thus, we implicitly concluded that the group of people united only by the

fortuity that they had bought tickets to the play did not themselves amount to a

“community” within the meaning of § 27.001(7)(B). See id. Similarly, in this case

the group of people who had relationships with Fuller that were allegedly damaged

by appellees’ alleged communications do not amount to a “community.”

                                        –14–
      For these reasons, we hold that appellees failed to demonstrate that the alleged

statements about the parties’ business disputes and disagreements were made in

connection with a matter of public concern.

             b.    The Statement that Fuller Was “Blackballed”

      Next we consider the alleged statement by Craig Hausz that Fuller was

“blackballed” from the country club. “Blackball” means “to prevent from becoming

a member of an organization by casting an adverse vote” and “to vote against : make

impossible by casting an adverse vote.” Blackball, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY.

      Although the rejection of Fuller’s membership application was plainly of

interest and concern to him, we see nothing in the pleadings or evidence to indicate

it was a matter of interest or concern to the community or the public. Appellees filed

Craig Hausz’s declaration in which he said that the country club had approximately

900 members and that members’ spouses and children brought the total club

“community” to over 2,000 people. However, the pleadings and other materials in

the record show that the decision to reject Fuller’s application was made by the

club’s board—not by its members as a whole. Hausz’s declaration says nothing

about whether any of the club’s other members or their families were interested in

the outcome of Fuller’s application. Thus, Hausz’s declaration does not demonstrate

that the “blackball” comment was a matter of interest to the club “community.”

                                        –15–
      The evidence also includes a declaration and an email by club member Shelby

Ricketts. In his declaration, Ricketts said that a friend asked him to help Fuller with

his application and that he did not agree to sponsor Fuller, but he said nothing about

whether any other club members were interested in the outcome of Fuller’s

application. And in his email, Ricketts explained to someone that he could not be a

sponsor for Fuller because he was a friend of the Hauszes and he had learned that

Fuller “had some sort of a business issue or disagreement” with the Hauszes. But

again, the email does not suggest that Fuller’s membership application was of

interest to the club’s other members or their families. Thus, we conclude that the

statement that Fuller was “blackballed” from the club did not involve a matter of

public concern.

      Our Vaughn-Riley opinion supports our conclusion that the “blackball”

communication did not involve a matter of public concern. As noted above, the

claims in Vaughn-Riley were based on comments that actress Vaughn-Riley made

about the cancellation of one performance of a play in Tyler, Texas. See Vaughn-

Riley, 2020 WL 7053651, at *1–2. We held that Vaughn-Riley failed to show that

her statements involved a matter of public concern, observing that nothing in the

record suggested that the play’s cancellation was a subject of general interest or of

value and concern to the public. Id. at *3–4. Although the people associated with the

play’s production and the people who had paid to see it were probably concerned

about its cancellation, there was no evidence “that the general public, or even the

                                        –16–
local Tyler creative community and art patrons at large[,] were affected by or

concerned with the cancellation of this single performance.” Id. (emphasis added).

Similarly, in this case appellees did not demonstrate that the “blackballing” of

Fuller’s application was a matter of interest to the club’s members or their families,

much less to the general public. Accordingly, we hold that appellees failed to

demonstrate that the alleged statement that Fuller was blackballed was made in

connection with a matter of public concern.

             c.     Other Arguments

      Appellees also argue that their alleged statements concerned a matter of

interest to the community because the statements affected club members and other

persons in the wider community. Appellees go so far as to contend that appellants’

position is that the statements “caused direct, continuing, and apparently irreparable

harm to those within a community of thousands, plus those outside the community

yet part of its larger network.”

      We reject these arguments. The record does not demonstrate that the alleged

statements affected club members or anyone else (except appellants) in any

meaningful way. Even if the statements influenced some country-club board

members to vote against Fuller’s application or influenced some people who already

had relationships with Fuller to distance themselves from him, it does not necessarily

follow that the statements were of general interest to the country-club “community”

or any other community. Appellees’ argument regarding “apparently irreparable

                                        –17–
harm” is also unpersuasive. Appellants alleged that they themselves were suffering

irreparable harm as a result of appellees’ conduct—not that third parties in the

community were suffering such harm.

      Appellees filed a post-submission letter brief citing a new case that they

contend supports their matter-of-public-concern argument, namely Hadimani v.

Hiremath, No. 14-22-00002-CV, 2023 WL 3596248 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] May 23, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). In that case, Hadimani was the president

of a nationwide nonprofit organization devoted to preserving the religious and

cultural identities of Indian-Americans. Id. at *1. He sued Hiremath, alleging that

Hiremath defamed him by accusing him of misconduct including forgery and

criminal fraud. Id. at *2–3. Hiremath prevailed on a TCPA motion to dismiss, and

Hadimani appealed. Id. at *1. The court of appeals held that Hiremath carried his

step one burden because his communications were exercises of the right of free

speech. Id. at *6. Specifically, the court held that the communications related to a

matter of public concern because (1) they were of interest to members of the

nonprofit “community” and (2) they involved both the management of a nonprofit

organization and alleged criminal activity on Hadimani’s part. Id. We conclude that

Hadimani is distinguishable for several reasons. First, appellees did not show that

their communications about Fuller accused him of criminal activity. Second,

appellees did not show that their communications about Fuller had anything to do

with the country club’s management. And third, appellees did not show that the

                                       –18–
communications made in connection with Fuller’s membership application held

general interest for the club’s members in the way that communications about the

club’s president would have. Thus, Hadimani does not support the premise that

appellees’ alleged communications were made in connection with a matter of public

concern.

             d.     Conclusion

      On de novo review, and reviewing the pleadings and evidence in the light

most favorable to appellants as the nonmovants, we hold that appellees failed to

demonstrate that appellants’ claims were based on or in response to appellees’

exercise of the right of free speech.

      4.     Analysis of the Right of Association

      Appellants’ public-concern argument also defeats appellees’ alternative

theory that their alleged communications were exercises of the right of association.

      Under the 2019 amendments, the exercise of the right of association means

“to join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common

interests relating to a governmental proceeding or a matter of public concern.” CIV.

PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(2). Thus, the public-concern aspect of the right of

association differs slightly from that aspect of the right of free speech. A movant

who invokes the right of free speech must demonstrate that a communication was

made in connection with a matter of public concern. Id. § 27.001(3). But a movant

who invokes the right of association must demonstrate the existence of “common

                                        –19–
interests” that relate to a matter of public concern (or to a governmental proceeding).

Id. § 27.001(2).

       In their TCPA motion, appellees argued that activities related to the country

club’s membership-application process “are a matter of public concern regarding the

community well-being” of the club’s members and their immediate families. On

appeal, we read appellees’ brief to argue that their alleged communications were

meant to promote the club members’ common interest in admitting only fit and

worthy applicants. Appellees argue that this common interest is a matter of public

concern because (1) the club is a “community” and so (2) a matter of common

interest to the club is a matter of public concern. See id. § 27.001(7)(B) (defining

“matter of public concern” to include matters of “political, social, or other interest

to the community”).

      We reject appellees’ argument because the asserted common interest—the

club members’ common interest in having only fit and worthy people join the club—

does not fit any of the three definitions of “matter of public concern.” It does not

involve a public official, public figure, or similar person, see id. § 27.001(7)(A), and

it does not rise to the level of “a subject of concern to the public,” id. § 27.001(7)(C).

The question, then, is whether the asserted common interest is “a matter of political,

social, or other interest to the community.” See id. § 27.001(7)(B). We conclude it

is not. A private country club’s common interest in screening applicants is not a

matter of political or social interest. See Political, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

                                          –20–
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (defining “political” as “of or relating to government,

a government, or the conduct of government affairs”); Social, id. (defining “social”

as “of or relating to human society”); Society, id. (defining “society” as “a

community, nation, or broad grouping of people having common traditions,

institutions, and collective activities and interests”). As for the catch-all phrase

“other interest,” the maxim of ejusdem generis instructs us to limit its meaning to

the same kind or class of categories expressly mentioned, i.e., political and social

interest. See City of Houston v. Bates, 406 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex. 2013) (explaining

and applying ejusdem generis). Thus, we construe the phrase “other interest” to

mean broad public interest akin to the interest raised by political or social issues. See

Chesser v. Aucoin, No. 01-20-00425-CV, 2020 WL 7391711, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (opining that the 2019

definition of “matter of public concern” more strongly emphasizes the “public”

component)

      Based on this construction of the TCPA, we conclude that appellees did not

demonstrate that this club’s common interest in membership decisions relates to a

matter of political, social, or other interest to the community. See Vaughn-Riley,

2020 WL 7053651, at *3–4 (although the cancellation of a performance of a play

affected the people involved in producing the play and the people who held tickets,

statements about the cancellation did not involve a matter of public concern for right-

of-association purposes); see also Beard, 2022 WL 1076176, at *5 (holding that the

                                         –21–
2019 amendments narrowed the meaning of “matter of public concern”).

Accordingly, appellees failed to demonstrate that appellants’ claims were based on

or in response to appellees’ exercise of the right of association.

      5.     Conclusion

      The trial judge erred by granting appellees’ TCPA motion to dismiss and by

awarding appellees their attorney’s fees. We sustain appellants’ first issue on appeal

and need not address appellants’ remaining issues.

                                 IV. DISPOSITION

      We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                            /Dennise Garcia/
                                            DENNISE GARCIA
                                            JUSTICE
220893F.P05

                                         –22–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

MATTHEW FULLER AND                             On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
FULLER WEALTH                                  District Court, Collin County, Texas
MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellants                    Trial Court Cause No. 366-01154-
                                               2022.
No. 05-22-00893-CV           V.                Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
                                               Justices Pedersen, III and Kennedy
CRAIG HAUSZ, MICHELLE                          participating.
HAUSZ, CMH ADVISORS, PLLC,
AND CMH WEALTH
MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellees

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion.

     It is ORDERED that appellants Matthew Fuller and Fuller Wealth
Management, LLC recover their costs of this appeal from appellees Craig Hausz,
Michelle Hausz, CMH Advisors, PLLC, and CMH Wealth Management, LLC.

Judgment entered this 10th day of August 2023.

                                        –23–