Court Opinion

ID: 9554573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 15:07:10.265138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:12.161052
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                 No. 22-1077
                             Filed August 9, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ASHLIE DANIELLE ROSALES,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Jeffrey L. Poulson,

Judge.

      Ashlie Rosales challenges her convictions for possession and delivery of

methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.

      Joel E. Fenton of the Law Offices of Joel E. Fenton, PLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

       Following a bench trial, the district court found Ashlie Rosales guilty of

delivery of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. The charges

stemmed from allegations that a confidential informant (CI) working with law

enforcement purchased methamphetamine from Rosales in a “controlled buy.”1

       Rosales appeals. She contends there is insufficient evidence establishing

that she was the person who sold methamphetamine to the CI. She also contends

her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate the allegations

and to secure expert testimony about controlled-buy protocols.

       We address the second issue first and make quick work of it. We are

without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct

appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.7 (2022) (“An ineffective assistance of counsel

claim in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an application for

postconviction relief pursuant to chapter 822. . . . [T]he claim shall not be decided

on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.”); State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d

140, 154 (Iowa 2021) (“[B]ecause we have just upheld the constitutionality of

section 814.7, this court is without the authority to decide ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claims on direct appeal.”). As a result, we decline to address Rosales’s

claims that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.

       As for Rosales’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review for

correction of errors at law. See State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa

1 Although there are alternative definitions, one definition of a controlled buy is

“when a confidential informant or undercover agent uses money from the
government to buy drugs as part of an investigation.” See United States v.
Chisholm, 940 F.3d 119, 121 n.1 (1st Cir. 2019).
                                           3

2022). We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges following a bench trial

the same as we do following a jury trial. State v. Myers, 924 N.W.2d 823, 826

(Iowa 2019). That means we affirm if the verdict is supported by substantial

evidence. Id. In determining whether substantial evidence supports the verdict,

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. Id. at

826–27.     This includes giving that decision all legitimate inferences and

presumptions that can be deduced fairly and reasonably from the evidence.

Crawford, 972 N.W.2d at 202. Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to convince

a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

       The CI testified at trial that he used forty dollars given to him by law

enforcement to buy methamphetamine from Rosales.              The crux of Rosales’s

argument is that her convictions are based entirely on the credibility of the CI’s

testimony, as law enforcement did not adequately monitor the controlled buy.

Rosales claims the CI’s testimony is not corroborated and the testimony alone is

insufficient to find her guilty of the charges.

       We reject Rosales’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge for several

reasons. First, the testimony of the CI alone is sufficient to support the convictions.

See State v. Arne, 579 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Iowa 1998) (finding that testimony from

an informant amounted to sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s

conviction); State v. Keys, No. 15-1991, 2017 WL 1735617, at *10 (Iowa Ct. App.

May 3, 2017) (“While Keys denied he was the one who sold methamphetamine,

direct testimony from a confidential informant is sufficient to establish the elements

of the crime.”).
                                            4

       Second, Rosales’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is, at its core,

a challenge to the CI’s credibility. But disputes over credibility of witnesses are for

the fact finder to sort out, not us. See State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa

2006) (“It is not the province of the court, in determining [a] motion [for judgment

of acquittal], to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of

witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence;

such matters are for the [fact finder].” (first two alterations in original) (quoting State

v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 28 (Iowa 2005))). The fact that the witness was a CI

does not impose a different standard, as a CI is treated like any other witness, with

the determination of the credibility of that witness being up to the fact finder. See

Arne, 579 N.W.2d at 328 (“This court has never applied a higher standard of proof

when weighing the testimony of an informant witness in a criminal trial, and we

decline to do so now. The witness’s status as a paid informant is merely one fact

that the jury may consider in deciding whether to believe the witness’s testimony.”).

And here, the district court expressly found the CI credible. So, we reject Rosales’s

argument based on credibility of the CI.

       Third, any challenge based on law enforcement’s failure to adequately

monitor the controlled buy raises credibility issues that are for the fact finder to

resolve. See id. (“Arne also claims that no reasonable [fact finder] could believe

[the CI] because [the CI] may have used drugs, he was paid for his services, the

police did not adequately supervise the drug buys, and [the CI]’s testimony was

contradicted by other witnesses. These arguments are insufficient to discredit [the

CI]’s testimony as a matter of law.”). The district court resolved this credibility issue

against Rosales by finding Rosales guilty.          We do not get to substitute our
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judgment for that of the fact finder, so Rosales’s challenge on this basis fails. See

Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 761.

       Finally, although corroboration is not required, there is corroborative

evidence. Uncontested evidence at trial established that the CI began working

with law enforcement to conduct controlled buys in order to favorably resolve his

own drug charges. The CI set up a meeting with Rosales through a messaging

app. Law enforcement officers saw the message exchange on the CI’s phone

before the controlled buy occurred.      While the messages could have meant

something else, they were consistent with a drug sale being set up and thus

corroborative of the CI’s testimony. The CI and Rosales agreed to meet in an alley

a few blocks from Rosales’s residence—a location they had used for prior drug

transactions. They agreed to walk toward each other in the alley until they ran into

each other. Before heading out to meet with Rosales, a law enforcement officer

conducted a pat-down search of the CI from head to toe and found nothing on him

before giving him forty dollars in cash. An audio recording device was then placed

on the CI, and the CI began walking in the direction of Rosales’s known residence.

While the CI left the sight of law enforcement officers, the audio recording reveals

the CI moving at a walking pace with gravel crunching under his feet. Evidence

established the alley in which the CI was to meet Rosales was gravel. A short time

later the CI is heard speaking with a female. The conversation ended with the CI

saying, “Later, Miss Ashlie.” Crunching gravel can then be heard as the CI made

his way back to the officers immediately after the conversation. The CI was

searched again and found to have no cash on him, but he did have a package of

methamphetamine.       While not dispositive in and of itself, this evidence is
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corroborative of the CI’s testimony that he used the cash provided by law

enforcement to purchase methamphetamine from Rosales.

       For all of the reasons noted, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the district court’s ruling, we conclude substantial evidence supports Rosales’s

convictions. As a result, we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.