Court Opinion

ID: 9881077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:03:56.486523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:02.028571
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 In re C.C. CA1/5

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

In re C.C., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,                                            A166068
      Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
                                                      (Humboldt County
C.C,                                                  Super Ct. No. JV190058)
        Defendant and Appellant.

       C.C. appeals from an order transferring him from juvenile
court to the adult criminal court pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code former section 707.1 (Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2017-
2018 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.) He
contends reversal is required under In re Estrada (1965) 63
Cal.2d 740 (Estrada) for the juvenile court to reconsider its ruling
in light of recent changes to section 707 enacted by Assembly Bill
No. 2361 ((2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1, eff.
Jan. 1, 2023). The People concede the amendments to section 707
apply retroactively, but they contend remand is unwarranted
because C.C. was not prejudiced by the court’s application of the
then-current law. We reverse and remand for the juvenile court
to reconsider the transfer motion under the amended statute.

        1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

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                         BACKGROUND

     C.C. allegedly committed three forcible rapes and related
sexual offenses between the ages of 15 and 17.

       The People filed a wardship petition alleging three counts
of forcible rape, one count of forcible oral copulation on a minor
14 years of age or older, and one count of sexual battery by
restraint. They then moved to transfer the case to adult court.

       At the conclusion of the transfer hearing the court found
that most, but not all, of the five factors set forth in section 707,
subdivisions (a)(3)(A)-(E) favored transfer. It found the first and
second factors, the degree of C.C.’s criminal sophistication and
whether he could be rehabilitated while under juvenile court
jurisdiction, favored transfer. The third and fourth factors, C.C.’s
previous delinquent history and his success on previous
rehabilitation attempts were a “mixed bag” in that he
successfully completed his diversion program but continued to
offend. The fifth factor, the circumstances and gravity of the
alleged offenses, weighed in favor of transfer. Based on its
assessment of these factors, the court found by a preponderance
of the evidence that C.C. should be transferred to adult criminal
court.

                          DISCUSSION

       C.C. contends the amendments to section 707 that took
effect after the ruling in his case require remand for a new
transfer hearing. The People concede the amended law applies
retroactively to C.C.’s case, but they contend reversal is
unwarranted because it is not reasonably probable the court
would reach a different result under the amended law. We
decline to apply the People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
(Watson) standard in these circumstances, and therefore reverse.

      At the time of C.C.’s transfer hearing, the governing statute
required the prosecutor to prove by a preponderance of the

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evidence that the minor “should be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction.” (Former § 707, subd. (a)(3); see Kevin P. v.
Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 186.) As in its current
form, the statute required the juvenile court to consider five
criteria in making that decision: (1) the minor’s criminal
sophistication; (2) whether the minor could be rehabilitated
before juvenile court jurisdiction expired; (3) the minor’s previous
delinquent history; (4) the success of previous attempts at
rehabilitation; and (5) the circumstances and gravity of the
alleged offense(s). (Former § 707, subds. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) The court
was also required to state in its order the basis for its ultimate
finding that the juvenile should be transferred. (Former § 707,
subd. (a)(3).)

       Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2361 amended
section 707, subdivision (a)(3) in three relevant ways. First, it
raised the People’s burden of proof from a preponderance to clear
and convincing evidence. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2022, ch. 330,
§ 1.) Second, an order transferring the juvenile to adult criminal
court now requires an ultimate finding, based on the same five
factors as before, that “the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation” while under juvenile court jurisdiction. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1; see In re S.S. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 1277, 1286-1287.) Third, the court must state in its
order its reasons for finding the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation under juvenile court jurisdiction. (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3); Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.)

      The parties correctly agree these amendments are
ameliorative and, therefore, apply retroactively to C.C.’s case.
(See People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 304
(Lara); Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744-748.) As stated in
Lara, “The possibility of being treated as a juvenile in juvenile
court—where rehabilitation is the goal—rather than being tried

                                 3
and sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically different
and more lenient treatment.” (Lara, at p. 303.)

       Where the parties differ is on whether the recent
amendments require remand in this case. The People contend
remand is unnecessary because it is not reasonably probable the
court would have reached a different result under the clear and
convincing standard of proof. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p.
836.) C.C., on the other hand, asserts harmless error analysis is
inapplicable because the new amendments heightened the
burden of proof and changed the ultimate finding required for a
transfer to adult criminal court.2

      We conclude C.C. is entitled to a new transfer hearing at
which the juvenile court is aware—as it could not have been at
the original hearing—that it may order him transferred to adult
criminal court only if it makes the ultimate finding, based on
clear and convincing evidence, that he is not amenable to
rehabilitation under juvenile court jurisdiction. (See In re F.M.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 712-716 [harmless error analysis
inappropriate where record did not show court was aware of its
discretion to treat wobbler offense as a felony or misdemeanor].)
As the Court observed in In re F.M., where the court
misapprehended its discretion in the first instance, attempting to
discern the likelihood of a more favorable decision is more
speculative than when there were errors in a decision the court
actually rendered. (Id. at p. 716.) Accordingly, in the former
situation reviewing courts have consistently remanded for
reconsideration “[i]nstead of hypothesizing what decision the

      2 Although C.C. raises this argument for the first time in

his reply brief, we exercise our discretion to address it in light of
the weighty impact of the ruling for C.C. Under other
circumstances we will not be so forgiving to an appellant whose
opening brief fails to address a critical issue. (See People v.
Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 254, fn. 5.)

                                  4
juvenile court would have made if it had understood the extent of
its lawful authority.” (Ibid.; see also In re E.P. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 409, 416-417 [under section 707 as amended, court
has discretion to conclude one or more of the five factors
predominate so as to determine the result even if others point the
other way].)

       We find it inappropriate in view of this authority to
speculate how the juvenile court might apply the new legal
standards. It may well be that, upon remand, it will reach the
same conclusion under the amended law; we express no opinion
on that. But, pursuant to Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 304, C.C. is
entitled to have that decision made under current law.

                         DISPOSITION

      The order is reversed and the matter remanded to the
juvenile court for a new transfer hearing.

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                                   ______________________
                                   BURNS, J.

We concur:

____________________________
SIMONS, ACTING P.J.

____________________________
CHOU, J.

A166068

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