Court Opinion

ID: 9374344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 20:02:54.449349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:46.715428
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SOLIGENIX, INC.,                            )
                                            )
            Petitioner,                     )
                                            )
      v.                                    ) C.A. No. 2022-0880-PAF
                                            )
EMERGENT PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT                )
GAITHERSBURG, INC., and EMERGENT            )
MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS                    )
BALTIMORE LLC,                              )
                                            )
            Respondents.                    )

                                OPINION

                     Date Submitted: November 29, 2022
                      Date Decided: February 21, 2023

Richard L. Renck, Mackenzie M. Wrobel, Coleen W. Hill, DUANE MORRIS LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Frederick R. Ball, DUANE MORRIS LLP, Boston,
Massachusetts; Patrick C. Gallagher, DUANE MORRIS LLP, Boca Raton, Florida,
Attorneys for Petitioner.

Jon E. Abramczyk, Ryan D. Stottman, Grant Michl, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT
& TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Jake Goodelman, John Dougherty,
Thomas Wintner, Katherine Galle, MINTZ, LEVIN, COHN, FERRIS, GLOVSKY,
AND POMPEO, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts, Attorneys for Respondents.

FIORAVANTI, Vice Chancellor
         This opinion resolves the respondents’ motion under Court of Chancery Rule

5.1 for continued confidential treatment (the “Motion”).               The Motion seeks

confidential treatment of portions of the petitioner’s Verified Petition to Vacate

Arbitration Award (the “Petition”) and certain exhibits attached thereto (the

“Exhibits” and each an “Exhibit”).

I.       BACKGROUND

         This action arises out of an arbitration proceeding between petitioner

Soligenix, Inc. (“Soligenix”) and respondents Emergent Product Development

Gaithersburg, Inc. (“EPDG”) and Emergent Manufacturing Operations Baltimore

LLC (“EMOB,” and collectively with EPDG, “Emergent”). Soligenix initiated the

arbitration to resolve its claims against Emergent for breach of contract and

fraudulent inducement, which arose from a subcontract between Soligenix and

Emergent. The parties conducted the arbitration before the American Arbitration

Association. During the arbitration, the parties stipulated to a protective order

governing the proceeding, including the production of documents.1

         On July 6, 2022, a panel of arbitrators (the “Panel”) issued its award (the

“Award”) in favor of Emergent. On September 30, 2022, Soligenix filed its Petition

1
    The Stipulated Protective Order is attached as Exhibit C to the Motion.

                                              2
and 11 Exhibits as confidential filings pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 5.1.2

Thereafter, Soligenix filed a public version of the Petition, which contained

redactions proposed by Emergent. The redactions were substantial. None of the

Exhibits were filed publicly, even though they included an article from The New

York Times3 and a publicly available transcript of a Congressional Subcommittee

hearing.4

         Soligenix sent a letter to Emergent objecting to the redactions and maintaining

that the Exhibits should have been filed publicly. Emergent then agreed to narrow

its redactions to the Petition and to make several of the Exhibits available on the

public docket. Soligenix was not satisfied with Emergent’s revised public filings

and filed a Notice of Challenge to the continued confidential treatment of the

redacted portions of the Petition and Exhibits A through E.5 Emergent responded

with this Motion.6

2
  The Federal Arbitration Act and the Court of Chancery Rules govern this proceeding by
default because the parties did not provide for the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act
(“DUAA”) to apply. See 10 Del. C. § 5702(c). (“Unless an arbitration agreement complies
with the standard [providing] . . . for the applicability of the [DUAA], any application . . .
to vacate or enforce an arbitrator’s award shall be decided . . . in conformity with the
Federal Arbitration Act . . . . [S]uch cases . . . shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
Court of Chancery’s Rules of Procedure.”).
3
    Dkt. 1 Ex. F.
4
    Id. Ex. G.
5
    Dkt. 13.
6
    Dkt. 21.

                                              3
       Exhibit A is the subcontract between Soligenix and Emergent that was the

subject of the arbitration. Exhibits B and C are Quality Agreements between

Soligenix and Emergent, which were exhibits in the arbitration. Exhibit D is the

Award, and Exhibit E is a report reflecting Emergent’s responses to a Soligenix audit

of Emergent’s quality systems. Exhibits A, B, C, and E were designated as

confidential in the arbitration pursuant to the Stipulated Protective Order. 7 Emergent

notes that Soligenix itself, despite its objections in this action, designated Exhibits

A and E as confidential in the arbitration. Except for the Award, Emergent possessed

all of these five challenged documents prior to the commencement of the arbitration.

       Emergent’s Motion rests on three propositions: (1) arbitration is inherently

confidential; (2) the Stipulated Protective Order governing the arbitration

proceeding requires confidential treatment of the information that Emergent seeks

to shield from public view; and (3) the information qualifies as confidential

information under the Court of Chancery Rules.

7
  With one small exception, none of the terms of Exhibits A through E indicate that they
are confidential or contain confidential information. That exception is found in Exhibit A,
which consists of several documents. One of them—Emergent’s 2015 response to a
Soligenix request for proposal—contains a legend at the bottom of each page indicating
that it is confidential. Soligenix, not Emergent, designated this information as confidential
in the arbitration.

                                             4
II.   ANALYSIS

      This dispute highlights the tension between the public policy that judicial

proceedings are open to the public and the general expectation of privacy between

litigants that chose alternative dispute resolution. The former is not open to debate.

The Delaware Constitution of 1897 provides that “all courts shall be open.” Del.

Const. Art. I, § 9. “Open litigation is the default in the Court of Chancery.

Confidentiality is the exception, and not the rule.” GKC Strategic Value Master

Fund, LP v. Baker Hughes Inc., 2019 WL 2592574, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 25, 2019)

(citations omitted). The extent of the expectation of confidentiality in arbitral

proceedings, however, is not so clear.

      A.     Arbitration Is Not Inherently Confidential.

      Arbitration is inherently a private process of adjudicating disputes outside the

public setting of a courtroom. But “private” does not equate with “confidential.”

See Laudig v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 2022 WL 18232706, at *5 n.5 (N.D. Ga. Dec.

16, 2022) (“[C]onfidentiality is not an inherent aspect of arbitration . . . .”); Amy J.

Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1211,

1211 (2006) (hereinafter “Schmitz, Untangling”) (“Arbitration is private but not

confidential.”); Mitch Zamoff, Safeguarding Confidential Arbitration Awards in

Uncontested Confirmation Actions, 59 Am. Bus. L.J. 505, 514–15 (2022)

(hereinafter “Zamoff, Safeguarding”) (“Contrary to the mistaken assumptions of

                                           5
many (even lawyers) that arbitrations are confidential by their very nature, the reality

is that absent an agreement among the parties, there are no laws (at least in the United

States) that require the parties to keep arbitration decisions confidential.”) (footnote

omitted); Bert K. Robinson, Arbitration: The Quest for Confidentiality, 58 La. B.J.

180, 181 (2010) (dispelling the mistaken assumption of “most legal professionals”

that “arbitration, ipso facto, has some confidentiality attached to it”). 8

         Nothing in the FAA requires confidentiality. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16; Laudig,

2022 WL 18232706, at *5 n.5 (“[N]othing in the FAA requires confidentiality.”).

Nor do the commonly used arbitration rules. See Schmitz, Untangling, at 1219

(“The commonly used American Arbitration Association (AAA) Commercial

Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures for example, do not address

confidentiality of general arbitration proceedings.”); Statement of Ethical Principles,

Am. Arb. Ass’n (hereinafter “AAA Statement”) (“The parties always have a right to

8
    As one scholar described the distinction:
         The privacy of the proceeding refers to the ability of uninvited third parties—
         such as former spouses, business partners, and the media—to access and
         observe the proceedings, and perhaps disclose those observations, without
         the consent of the disputing parties, and possibly the arbitrator. The
         confidentiality of the proceeding, however, refers to the ability of the
         disputing parties, the arbitrator, witnesses, and others who attended the
         arbitration to disclose publicly oral statements made in arbitration,
         documents tendered in arbitration, or observations of conduct by parties,
         witnesses, and arbitrators during the course of the arbitration.

Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev.
1255, 1260 (2006).

                                                6
disclose details of the proceeding, unless they have a separate confidentiality

agreement.”); id. (“[I]ndividual arbitrations are confidential if the parties so

determine”) (emphasis added); Galleon Syndicate Corp. v. Pan Atl. Gp., 637

N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“There is no confidentiality privilege

precluding disclosure of the material requested as the parties to the arbitration

proceeding governed by the Rules of the American Arbitration Association are, in

the absence of a confidentiality provision, not prohibited from disclosing documents

generated or exchanged during the arbitration and since evidentiary material at an

arbitration proceeding is not immune from disclosure.”); Lyons v. NBCUniversal

Media, LLC, 2019 WL 6703396, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2019) (observing that

the operative confidentiality provision in the JAMS Rules “requires the Arbitrator

to maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration, not Plaintiffs”); Brown v.

DIRECTV, LLC, 2013 WL 3273811, at *10 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2013) (“JAMS Rule

26 . . . only requires confidentiality on the part of the arbitrator and JAMS, not the

parties themselves.”).9 Thus, if parties to an arbitration desire confidentiality, they

9
  As previewed in the parentheticals above, the AAA Rules and the JAMS Rules do impose
confidentiality obligations on the arbitrator. See AAA Statement (“AAA staff and AAA
neutrals have an ethical obligation to keep information confidential.”); JAMS
Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures 26(a) (“JAMS and the Arbitrator shall
maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration proceeding and the Award, including
the Hearing, except as necessary in connection with a judicial challenge to or enforcement
of an award, or unless otherwise required by law or judicial decision.”). Those
confidentiality obligations do not extend to the parties, nor could they bind a court.

                                            7
must do so by contract. But even then, as discussed below, once the parties bring

their dispute to court, their agreement does not control these proceedings.

      Emergent quotes various state and federal decisions for the broad proposition

that arbitration is confidential. Mot. ¶¶ 16–17, 24. A careful review of those cases

reveals otherwise. For example, Emergent relies on the quotation from Guyden v.

Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 2008), that “confidentiality is a paradigmatic

aspect of arbitration.”    Mot. ¶ 17.   Guyden did not cast a cloak of inherent

confidentiality over arbitration proceedings. Guyden involved a challenge to an

arbitration agreement that expressly provided for confidentiality of the proceedings;

it did not hold that arbitration proceedings are inherently confidential.

      Barkley v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 2016 WL 409611 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 3,

2016) (ORDER), is also inapposite. In Barkley, the parties presented an unopposed

motion to approve a settlement and for leave to file documents under seal (including

some relating to arbitration) or, alternatively, to file redacted versions. The court

rejected the application to seal the entire filing, observing that the court “may not

rubber stamp a stipulation to seal the record.” Id. at *1 (internal quotation and

citation omitted). The court did, however, permit a redacted filing. In doing so, the

court stated:     “Courts generally keep arbitration proceedings and awards

confidential, particularly because: (1) parties often enter into them to maintain

confidentiality; and (2) confidentiality promotes the voluntary execution of private

                                           8
arbitration agreements, which courts consider a sound public policy objective.” Id.

To support this seemingly broad proposition, the Barkley decision cited three cases,

none of which supports an arbitration exception to the fundamental precept that court

proceedings are open.

      The first cited case, Century Indemnity Co. v. Certain Underwriters at

Lloyd’s, London, 592 F. Supp. 2d 825 (E.D. Pa. 2009), was an application to confirm

an arbitration award, accompanied by an uncontested motion to seal the award. The

parties to the arbitration expressly agreed to keep all arbitration information

confidential, including the final award, and that all submissions of arbitration

information to a court would be sealed, subject to court approval. Id. at 826. In that

circumstance, and after applying a multi-part test developed by the Third Circuit, the

court agreed to seal the arbitration filings in the confirmation proceeding. The

second cited case, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westchester Fire Insurance

Co., 2009 WL 275561 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 4, 2009), was also an uncontested

application to seal an arbitration award in a confirmation proceeding “in an effort to

comply with a confidentiality order entered by the [arbitration] panel.” Id. at *1. In

the third case, ITT Industries, Inc. v. Rayonier, Inc., 2005 WL 1744988 (S.D.N.Y.

July 20, 2005), the court observed, in a footnote, that it had previously signed an

uncontested order sealing the arbitration award. Id. at *2 n.4. In each of these cases

the application to seal was uncontested. As such, they are not persuasive in

                                          9
circumstances where, as here, an award is contested and the court is required to

adjudicate the dispute. 10

       Emergent’s reliance on cases from this court and the Superior Court fare no

better. These decisions cannot carry the burden that Emergent asks them to bear. In

Schwaber v. Margalit, C.A. No. 2021-1038-LWW (Del. Ch. July 13, 2022)

(ORDER), the court granted a motion to stay the action in favor of a prior-filed

arbitration proceeding. That same day, the court granted the defendants’ motion for

continued confidential treatment during the pendency of the arbitration. The court

observed that requiring public disclosure while the arbitration was ongoing “would

deprive the defendants of the bargained for privacy of arbitration in accordance with

the mandatory arbitration provisions that apply.” Id. The court made clear, however,

that the plaintiff could renew his challenge to confidential treatment if the stay were

later lifted.   Id.   Schwarber did not suggest that all arbitration materials are

confidential.    Rather, the court essentially deferred consideration of a party’s

challenge to confidential treatment until after the conclusion of the arbitration. This

court took a similar approach in SCLiquor, LLC v. D’Usse LLC, C.A. No. 2022-

0931-PAF (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2022) (ORDER), observing that “it is appropriate to

10
  Professor Zamoff makes the case for honoring the arbitral parties’ agreement to maintain
the confidentiality of an arbitral award in very limited circumstances. He suggests a rule
that would “deny [motions to seal] when the losing party challenges the underlying award
and grant the motions when the award is uncontested.” Zamoff, Safeguarding at 505.

                                           10
deny the challenge to continued confidential treatment pending final resolution of

the arbitration proceedings.” Id.; cf. Early v. Trend Cap. Mgmt. LP, C.A. No. 2019-

0064-KSJM (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2020) (Minute Order) (denying a request to seal the

entire record and requiring compliance with Rule 5.1 after dismissing the action in

favor of arbitration).11

       Emergent argues that “‘Delaware public policy favors arbitration, and

confidentiality is vital to that process.’” Mot. ¶ 3 (quoting Legent Gp., LLC, v. Axos

Fin., Inc., 2021 WL 4593775, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2021)). Legent did not establish

that all arbitrations are inherently confidential. Mot. ¶ 3. Nor did the case involve

a Rule 5.1 challenge. The decision focused on a discovery dispute in which plaintiffs

sought to enforce a subpoena to obtain information relating to a Financial Industry

Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) arbitration proceeding. The requested information

was subject to a protective order that had been entered in the arbitration. In resolving

the motions, the court emphasized that “the mere fact that the FINRA Arbitration

materials are confidential does not immunize them from discovery.” Id. at *3. The

court ultimately denied the motion to enforce the subpoena and granted the motion

to quash without prejudice. Similarly, Continental Casualty Co. v. BorgWarner,

11
   Notably, these cases involved challenges to confidential treatment filed by a party to the
litigation and the arbitration proceeding. Nothing said here should be interpreted as
suggesting the result would or should be the same if a Rule 5.1 challenge had been made
by a non-party to the arbitration agreement, such as a member of the news media.

                                             11
2016 WL 1169107 (Del. Super. Mar. 15, 2016), involved motions to compel and to

quash a subpoena for arbitration materials that were governed by a confidentiality

agreement. Id. at *3. The case did not involve a Rule 5.1 challenge, and it did not

establish that arbitration itself is inherently confidential.

      Thus, Emergent cannot justify its Motion for continued confidential treatment

based on the notion that all arbitration is inherently confidential.

       B.     The Parties May Not Prevent Public Access by Private Contract.

      Emergent contends that continued confidential treatment is warranted because

the information Emergent seeks to keep from the public is confidential under the

terms of the Stipulated Protective Order entered in the arbitration proceeding.

Mot. ¶¶ 6–7. This argument has been repeatedly rejected. “[A] confidentiality

provision, even when carefully negotiated, cannot form the basis for this Court to

treat contractual provisions as confidential under Rule 5.1, assuming that the Rule

itself does not provide such a basis.” Al Jazeera Am., LLC v. AT & T Servs., Inc.,

2013 WL 5614284, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2013); see Polychain Cap. LP v. Pantera

Venture Fund II LP, 2021 WL 5910079, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2021) (ORDER)

(“[P]arties cannot subvert Rule 5.1 by contract.”); Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d

                                            12
568, 608 (Del. Ch. 2004) (observing the risk to the public’s right of access if courts

were to permit sealing of filings based on confidentiality clauses). 12

       Emergent’s reliance on the Stipulated Protective Order fails in the first

instance because that order does not require confidential treatment of the Exhibits,

even though they were stamped as CONFIDENTIAL in the arbitration. Mot. ¶¶ 24–

25.    Exhibits A, B, C, and E were in Soligenix’s possession prior to the

commencement of the arbitration and, therefore, were not within the definition of

Confidential Information under the Stipulated Protective Order. See Mot. Ex.

C ¶ 3(e) (“Information is not Confidential if it . . . was known to the Recipient . . .

before the Producer produced it.”). As to the two Exhibits that Soligenix stamped

as confidential in the arbitration (Exhibits A and E), the Stipulated Protective Order

12
   Federal courts applying the FAA have reached the same result. See, e.g., Lohnn v. Int’l
Bus. Machs. Corp., 2022 WL 36420, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2022) (“It is black-letter law
. . . that the fact that information exchanged between private parties is subject to a
confidentiality agreement that binds them is not itself sufficient to deprive the public of the
right of access to that information when it is properly filed in support of a motion asking
the Court to take dispositive judicial action on a matter properly before that Court.”);
Dentons US LLP v. Zhang, 2021 WL 2187289, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2021) (“Here,
Petitioner contends that sealing is appropriate because the parties agreed to file under seal
any papers associated with an arbitration proceeding. Confidentiality agreements alone are
not an adequate basis for sealing, however.”); Jankula v. Carnival Corp., 2019 WL
8051719, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2019) (“While parties may contract to engage in
confidential arbitration proceedings, when they ask the Court to rule on the validity of those
proceedings, they choose a forum to which the public presumptively has a right of access.”)
(internal quotation omitted); Century Indem. Co. v. AXA Belg., 2012 WL 4354816, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (“[W]hile parties to an arbitration are generally permitted to
keep their private undertakings from the prying eyes of others, the circumstance changes
when a party seeks to enforce in . . . court the fruits of their private agreement to arbitrate.,
i.e., the arbitration award.”) (internal quotation omitted).

                                               13
permits a producer of confidential information to withdraw the designation. Id. ¶

4(e); see also id. ¶ 5(k) (“Nothing herein shall affect the right of the Producer to

disclose as it deems appropriate information the Producer has designated as

Confidential.”). In any event, the Stipulated Protective Order does not prohibit

Soligenix from raising a confidentiality challenge in this proceeding. Id. ¶ 6(b) (“A

Party’s failure to contest a designation of information as Confidential is not an

admission that the information was properly designated as such.”).

      There is also a strong argument that the Award itself is not confidential under

the terms of the Stipulated Protective Order. Emergent tries to shoehorn the Award

within the scope of the Stipulated Protective Order, which states that it applies “to

all aspects of [the] arbitration proceeding including any evidentiary hearing.”

Mot. ¶ 27 (quoting Stip. Prot. Ord. ¶ 2(d)).     The Stipulated Protective Order,

however, does not specifically designate the Award as confidential. If the parties

wanted to make the Award confidential, they could have expressly done so. See,

e.g., Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Everest Reinsurance Co., 2014 WL 5481107, at *1

(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2014) (discussing an arbitration agreement which stated that

the “final award and any interim decisions, correspondence, oral discussions and

information exchanged in connection with the proceedings will be kept

confidential”); Century Indem. Co. v. AXA Belg., 2012 WL 4354816, at *12

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (noting that the arbitration agreement provided for “all

                                         14
briefs, depositions, and hearing transcripts generated in the course of [the]

arbitration” as well as the “final award and any interim decisions” to be confidential).

      The court need not decide whether the Award is confidential under the terms

of the Stipulated Protective Order. Even if it were, this court is not bound by that

agreement. Where, as here, the court is asked to decide a challenge to an arbitration

award, the proceeding is public and any party seeking to keep any portion of the

record confidential must comply with Rule 5.1. See In re Boeing Co. Deriv. Litig.,

2021 WL 392851, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 2021) (“After the parties’ substantive

dispute is laid before the Court, confidentiality is no longer simply a matter to be

negotiated between the stockholder and the Company; it must yield to this Court’s

duty to conduct its proceedings with the highest possible degree of public access.”);

see also Istithmar World PJSC v. Amato, 2013 WL 66478, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,

2013) (“The Court concludes that it need not decide whether the confidentiality

stipulation covers the Award, because the Court is not a party to the stipulation and

is not bound to it.”); CAA Sports LLC v. Dogra, 2018 WL 6696622, at *1 (E.D. Mo.

Dec. 20, 2018) (“It is a stretch to say the requirement of confidentiality for the

arbitration also extends to a review of that arbitration by a court of law. There are

no clear indications that it should so extend; for example, the agreement does not

say ‘. . . judgment may be entered upon the award by any court, which shall also be

confidential.’”) (emphasis in original).

                                           15
      C.     The Requirements of Rule 5.1.

      To maintain continued confidential treatment, Emergent must satisfy Court of

Chancery Rule 5.1. Rule 5.1 embodies the fundamental principle that “proceedings

in a civil action are a matter of public record.” Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(a). The “proceedings”

include “[a]ll pleadings and other materials of any sort, including . . . exhibits.” Id.

The rule recognizes certain exceptions to the fundamental principle that all court

proceedings and filings are public.       Those exceptions are narrow.         “[M]ost

information presented to the Court should be made available to the public.” Sequoia

Presidential Yacht Gp. LLC v. FE P’rs LLC, 2013 WL 3724946, at *2 (Del. Ch. July

15, 2013).

      To obtain confidential treatment of a filing, a party must obtain an order of

this court “specifying the information or categories of information for which good

cause exists for Confidential Treatment.” Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(b)(1). Under Rule 5.1,

“good cause” exists “only if the public interest in access to Court proceedings is

outweighed by the harm that public disclosure of sensitive, non-public information

would cause.” Id. at (b)(2). “The public interest is especially strong where the

information is material to understanding the nature of the dispute.” Boeing, 2021

WL 392851, at *2 (internal quotations omitted). The party seeking confidential

treatment “always bears the burden of establishing good cause for Confidential

Treatment.” Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(b)(3).

                                          16
      Rule 5.1 identifies specific categories of information that may qualify as

Confidential Information:

      trade secrets; sensitive proprietary information; sensitive financial,
      business, or personnel information; sensitive personal information such
      as medical records; and personally identifying information such as
      social security numbers, financial account numbers, and the names of
      minor children.

Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(b)(2).

      Information is not entitled to confidential treatment merely because it is not

publicly available. See Ct. Ch. R. 5.1(b)(2). The non-public information must be

“sensitive” and the party must identify the specific information worthy of

confidential treatment. Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 608–09 (Del. Ch. 2004).

The movant must also proffer “tangible evidence of concrete damage” if that

information is made accessible to the public. Id. at 609. Generic statements of harm

are insufficient; “the harm must be particularized.” Manhattan Telecomms. Corp. v

Granite Telecomms., LLC, 2020 WL 6799122, at *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 2020)

(internal quotations omitted); accord Boeing, 2021 WL 392851, at *2. “Moreover,

that the information for which a party seeks confidential treatment may be

embarrassing or previously undisclosed does not alone warrant confidential

treatment.” Sequoia, 2013 WL 3724946, at *2.

      Emergent has not attempted to establish good cause under Rule 5.1. Emergent

merely points to the Stipulated Protective Order as controlling. Mot. ¶ 27 (“Thus,

                                        17
the Final Award is protected from disclosure by the Protective Order.”). Emergent

does not assert that disclosure of the Petition, the Award, or Exhibits A, B, C, or E

would cause any harm to Emergent, let alone offer tangible evidence of concrete

damage or particularized harm that would befall Emergent if the Motion for

continued confidential treatment were denied.

III.   CONCLUSION

       Emergent has not satisfied its burden to support continued confidential

treatment of the Petition or the Exhibits. Accordingly, the Motion for continued

confidential treatment is DENIED.

                                         18