Court Opinion

ID: 9763671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:51:57.337946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:20.423819
License: Public Domain

OPINION
GONZALEZ, Justice.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment proceeding. Appellant Joseph Bailey was plaintiff and Gulfway National Bank of Corpus Christi was defendant. Bailey filed suit against the Bank for cancellation of a $10,000.00 promissory note, and for libel and slander. The Bank then brought suit against Bailey for collection of the note. The two cases were consolidated for trial. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted the Bank’s motion and entered a take nothing *72judgment on Bailey’s suit against the Bank. We affirm.
In February 1977, Bailey signed a promissory note in the principal amount of $10,-000.00. The note provided for interest at the rate of 8% per annum and was a single payment note. Bailey was induced by Robert Hillin, a Vice President of the Bank, to sign the note. Hillin took the funds and then executed and delivered his own personal note telling Bailey that he would repay him and then Bailey could in turn pay the Bank. This note provided for interest at the rate of 10% per annum. When the note to the Bank became due, Bailey did not pay it but Hillin twice induced Bailey to renew it. Hillin disappeared1 and Bailey then, on his own, renewed it.
Thereafter, Bailey filed suit against the Bank claiming that he had not received the money, that he had been told by Hillin that he would not have to pay the note, that he had been tricked by Hillin to sign the note, and that his reputation had been damaged. The Bank then filed suit for collection of the note and moved for summary judgment.
The summary judgment evidence consisted of an affidavit by Bailey and Bailey’s deposition. By agreement of the parties, a copy of the note in question was attached to Bailey’s deposition.
Bailey contended that the pleadings, depositions and affidavits on file gave rise to genuine material fact issues with respect to his liability to the Bank. The trial court disagreed and rendered a summary judgment for the Bank. Bailey appealed.
In his appeal, Bailey complains that the trial court committed error because, among other things, the evidence was insufficient for the court to grant the summary judgment. Bailey alleges that there was not proper evidence of the note before the court, that the action brought by the Bank against Bailey was not based upon a sworn petition, and that there was no affidavit of any officer of the Bank swearing that the note in question was owned by the Bank, supported by consideration, funded, past due and unpaid. No exceptions or objections were made in the trial court about these matters, nor were these matters raised in his motion for a new trial. Bailey raises these matters for the first time on appeal.
These alleged defects might easily have been cured had they been timely pointed out in response to the motion for summary judgment. Bailey is further hampered on appeal because Rule 166-A(c) of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides ... “Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.” See: City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979).
Where unverified or uncertified copies are attached to pleadings on a motion for summary judgment and no exception is taken, the party thereby waives the requirement under Rule 166-A(e) and the copies are sufficient basis to grant a motion for summary judgment when it fairly appears there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 863 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.1962); Roland v. McCullough, 561 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e.). See also, Jones v. McSpedden, 560 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1977, no writ).
McDonald, in discussing the matters that the court may take into consideration in summary judgment proceedings, states: “The court may take into account admissions in whatever form they appear: for example, in exhibits, pleadings, stipulations, evidence on a prior trial of the action or on a separate trial of an issue or claim in the action, responses (or implied admission arising from failure to reply) to formal demands under Rule 169, recitations in pretrial orders, statements under oath in another preceeding,...” 4 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 17.2611 (rev. 1971).
*73In his sworn pleadings and in his deposition, Bailey admits signing the note and the renewal notes, and admits that he never paid the note. He also agreed that photocopies of these notes be attached to his deposition. These facts constitute a judicial admission and are construed against Bailey. Yelverton v. Brown, 412 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1968, no writ); McCormick v. Stowe Lumber Co., 356 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1962, writ ref’d n. r. e.). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the court to grant the summary judgment.
Appellant’s other points of error relate to the court granting the summary judgment when the plaintiff contended that the pleadings, deposition and affidavit raised material fact issues before the court.
In an action on a promissory note by a plaintiff who is not a holder in due course, parol evidence is admissible to show that the maker was induced by the fraudulent representations of the payee to sign the note. See: Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 3.306(2) (Tex.U.C.C.) (Vernon 1968); Town North Nat. Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.1978); However, “[T]he mere representation by a payee to the maker that the maker will not be liable on the note does not constitute fraud in the inducement so as to be an exception to the parol evidence rule.... ” Broaddus, supra, at 492. “[Tjhere [must] be a showing of some type of trickery, artifice, or device employed by the payee in addition to the showing that the payee represented to the maker he would not be liable on such a note.” Broaddus, supra, at 494.
In this case Bailey was not tricked or deceived into signing the promissory note in question, nor the renewal notes. He was interested in helping a friend and also helping himself by charging a higher rate of interest to Hillin than the Bank was charging him. In renewing the notes, he was interested in not damaging his credit. It is also plainly shown that Hillin, the Bank officer, was acting entirely in his own behalf and that the Bank advanced funds to Hillin as Bailey understood that it would. We hold that Bailey’s allegations of fact, even if true, do not constitute fraud in the inducement so as to support an exception to the parol evidence rule. Therefore, Bailey is left in the position of having offered no summary judgment proof to meet the burden imposed upon him to show the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact. Appellant’s points of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

. Hillin was later indicted in Federal Court for misapplication of funds by a bank officer. He plead guilty and was assessed a fine and ordered to make restitution.