Court Opinion

ID: 9925244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 06:06:12.012644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:48.068486
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

ROGELIO RUIZ,                                                        UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     January 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 362051
                                                                     Kalamazoo Circuit Court
BENTELER AUTOMOTIVE CORP, JENNIFER                                   LC No. 2018-000387-NP
PIOTROWICZ, and JOAN TALBOT,

               Defendants-Appellees.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MARKEY and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Plaintiff appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order denying his motion to amend the
complaint to include a claim of battery under a respondeat superior theory against defendant,
Benteler Automotive Corp. We reverse and remand.

                 I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       This appeal is the second time this case has been before this Court. In the earlier appeal to
this Court, we summarized the underlying facts as follows:

               Plaintiff worked for Benteler as a contract employee before Benteler
       officially hired plaintiff on June 19, 2017. Three days later, plaintiff was involved
       in an accident in which a heavy bin fell on his foot, causing severe injury. Christy
       Elmer, a team leader and machine operator, attempted to assist plaintiff and then
       requested the help of Joan Talbot, a production unit leader whom Benteler
       identified as a first responder. Talbot moved plaintiff from the production floor
       using a wheelchair to the “tool crib”—an enclosed area that kept tools and first-aid
       materials. The amount of time that plaintiff spent in the tool crib is disputed along

1
 Ruiz v Benteler Auto Corp, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 21,
2022 (Docket No. 362051).

                                                -1-
       with what occurred in the tool crib. However, it is undisputed that someone
       eventually called plaintiff a taxi, and Elmer and Talbot moved plaintiff to the
       plant’s front lobby where he waited for the taxi.

               The taxi eventually arrived and took plaintiff to Borgess clinic where he had
       to wait for assistance. After a doctor finally looked at plaintiff’s foot, the doctor
       realized that plaintiff was in the wrong place and needed care in the emergency
       room. Plaintiff’s bones were sticking out of his left, crushed foot, which was
       bleeding heavily. Hospital staff cut off plaintiff’s boot, wrapped his foot, and sent
       him to the emergency room for x-rays. Some days later, plaintiff had surgery on
       his foot, and following recovery from the surgery, he was sent to Borgess Rehab
       Center where he stayed until September. In October, he was approved for light-
       duty work, and Benteler continued to employ him through its Off-Site Light Duty
       Program at a nonprofit. While plaintiff was working at the nonprofit, Benteler had
       to layoff over 30 employees on May 4, 2018, due to workforce reduction cuts. On
       May 15, 2018, plaintiff signed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
       (EEOC) charge of discrimination against Benteler. Plaintiff was cleared to return
       to full-duty work on June 15, 2018, but plaintiff never returned to his position at
       Benteler because Benteler laid him off on the day that he was permitted to return.
       [Ruiz v Benteler Auto Corp, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
       September 16, 2021 (Docket No. 353038), pp 1-2 (Ruiz I).]

        Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging in relevant part, a claim of battery against
       2
Talbot. After the trial court denied summary dismissal of this claim, defendants filed an
interlocutory appeal to this Court. In upholding the trial court’s denial of summary disposition of
plaintiff’s battery claim, we concluded:

               The benefits that the WDCA provides are an employee’s exclusive remedy
       against an employer or coworker for work-related personal injuries. MCL
       418.131(1); Johnson v Detroit Edison Co, 288 Mich App 688, 695-696; 795 NW2d
       [161 (2010)]. “The only exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort,”
       which “shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act
       of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury.” MCL
       418.131(1). “Thus, a plaintiff may recover from his employer where he establishes
       what is generally regarded as a ‘true intentional tort,’ that is, one in which the
       employer ‘specifically intended an injury.’ Graham v Ford, 237 Mich App 670,
       673; 604 NW2d 713 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted).[] This also
       applies to alleged intentional torts committed by coworkers. Id. To establish a true

2
  Plaintiff made additional claims against all defendants in this case. These claims were: false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), racial discrimination in violation
of Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2201 et seq., and violations of
Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq. In Ruiz I, this Court
concluded that the trial court should have granted summary disposition of these claims. Ruiz I,
unpub op at 5-9.

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         intentional tort, “the employer must deliberately act or fail to act with the purpose
         of inflicting an injury upon the employee.” Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453
         Mich 149, 172; 551 NW2d 132 (1996) (opinion by BOYLE, J.). “[W]hen the
         employer is a corporation, a particular employee must possess the requisite state of
         mind in order to prove an intentional tort.” Id. at 171-172. Courts must “determine
         as a matter of law whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to sustain the
         intentional tort claim.” Johnson, 288 Mich App at 696.

                                                * * *

                 According to plaintiff, after the bin shattered his foot, Talbot repeatedly
         tried to force plaintiff to stand and walk using his shattered foot. She eventually
         got plaintiff a wheelchair and wheeled him into the tool crib. Plaintiff testified that
         in the tool crib, Talbot wanted to assess plaintiff’s injury, but he told her not to
         touch his foot because it hurt. According to plaintiff, Talbot nevertheless tried to
         take his boot off, and the pain made plaintiff scream. Plaintiff testified that Talbot
         tried to take his boot off several more times—possibly up to 10 times—while
         plaintiff screamed and told her to stop.[]

                 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable
         juror could conclude that Talbot committed a battery and specifically intended an
         injury. According to plaintiff, he told Talbot not to touch his boot, but she did it
         anyway, and he screamed. Then she did it up to 10 more times, all while plaintiff
         was screaming and asking her to not grab his boot. From this—the evidence viewed
         in the light most favorable to plaintiff—a reasonable juror could conclude that
         Talbot committed a battery and specifically intended an injury as required by MCL
         418.131(1).[] [Ruiz I, unpub op at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).]

This Court further noted: “Talbot’s alleged boot pulling is the most clear-cut claim of battery,
which is why it is addressed in this opinion. This opinion should not be read as foreclosing plaintiff
from presenting other theories of battery.” Id. at 4 n 5. Ultimately, this Court affirmed the trial
court’s order denying summary disposition of plaintiff’s battery claim against Talbot. Id. at 9.

       This case returned to the trial court where plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to
include a battery claim against Benteler under a respondeat superior theory. The trial court denied
the motion. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which the trial court also denied. This appeal
followed.

                                      II. MOTION TO AMEND

         Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend. We
agree.

                                   A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        A trial court’s decision on a motion to amend a pleading is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Zwiker v Lake Superior State Univ, 340 Mich App 448, 474; 986 NW2d 427 (2022).
“[T]he appellate court must review the discretionary determination for an abuse of discretion and

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cannot disturb the trial court’s decision unless it falls outside the principled range of outcomes.”
Herald Co, Inc v Eastern Mich Univ Bd of Regents, 475 Mich 463, 472; 719 NW2d 19 (2006). “A
trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Kostadinovski v
Harrington, 511 Mich 141, 149-150; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

        This case also involves issues of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo.
Id. at 150. “When interpreting a statute, we follow the established rules of statutory construction,
the foremost of which is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Whitman v
City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311; 831 NW2d 223 (2013). “If the language of the statute is
unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute
must be enforced as written. No further judicial construction is required or permitted.” Sun Valley
Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).

                                    B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

       Under MCR 2.118(A)(2), “[l]eave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Courts
generally have discretion to grant or deny a motion to amend, but “[l]eave to amend should
ordinarily be denied only for particularized reasons such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive, repeated failures to cure by amendments previously allowed, or futility.” In re Kostin,
278 Mich App 47, 52; 748 NW2d 583 (2008). Defendants cited two reasons opposing plaintiff’s
motion to amend. First, they argued that amendment would cause undue delay; and second, they
claimed the amendment was futile because Talbot’s alleged actions were for her benefit and not
her employer’s. The viability of each of these arguments is discussed below.

                                        1. UNDUE DELAY

         “Delay, alone, does not warrant denial of a motion to amend.” Weymers v Khera, 454
Mich 639, 659; 563 NW2d 647 (1997), 454 Mich at 659. “[A] court may deny a motion to amend
if the delay was in bad faith or if the opposing party suffered actual prejudice as a result.” Id.
“ ‘[P]rejudice’ exists if the amendment would prevent the opposing party from receiving a fair
trial.” Id. For example:

       [A] trial court may find prejudice when the moving party seeks to add a new claim
       or a new theory of recovery on the basis of the same set of facts, after discovery is
       closed, just before trial, and the opposing party shows that he did not have
       reasonable notice, from any source, that the moving party would rely on the new
       claim or theory at trial. [Id. at 659-660.]

        Defendants claimed below that they would be prejudiced were the trial court to grant the
motion to amend. They argued that plaintiff could have raised a battery claim against Benteler “at
the beginning of the case . . . but deliberately chose not to do so . . . .” They noted that discovery
had closed, Benteler had sold the plant where the accident occurred, and, after an appeal to this
Court, all claims against Benteler were dismissed.

        Contrary to these assertions, one of the prerequisites of actual prejudice is “that opposing
party shows that he did not have reasonable notice, from any source, that the moving party would
rely on the new claim or theory at trial.” Weymers, 454 Mich at 659-660. Defendants’ arguments

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opposing the motion to amend did not explain how they lacked reasonable notice that plaintiff
would offer a new claim at trial. Thus, they failed to meet their burden of proof showing prejudice
as a result of a delay.

       Moreover, defendants did have reasonable notice that plaintiff would seek a respondeat
superior theory against Benteler for the battery claim. For instance, plaintiff’s complaint alleged:

              9.       Seriously injured, laying on the cement floor of the Defendants’
       production facility, partially still under the load and weight of the heavy metal cart
       and parts that had just knocked him down, Roger Ruiz was in severe pain from the
       impact of the crushing injuries when he was ultimately confronted by plant
       management in the person of Defendant, Joan Talbot.

                                              * * *

              11.     Instead of doing the humane and the required thing, [s]eeking
       [m]edical [a]ttention [n]ow . . . Defendants’ management on the spot, Defendant
       Joan Talbot, told Roger Ruiz to . . . “Get Up.”

                                              * * *

               16.    With Roger Ruiz in desperate need of immediate medical attention,
       unable to move or be moved, production at a standstill, Defendant Talbot did not
       call for medical assistance of any kind. No Benteler management level personnel
       called 911, nor for an ambulance. No Benteler management level personnel called
       for in-house medical responder/nurse. No medical evaluation or assistance was
       provided to Roger Ruiz. (Emphasis added.)

       Further, in response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition, plaintiff asserted:

       Roger Ruiz obviously needed immediate, intensive medical care, starting with an
       ambulance with lights and sirens. Instead, what Roger Ruiz received from
       defendants was nothing short of inhumane behavior, behavior and conduct so bad
       that it would arguably violate Michigan’s Animal Cruelty Statute.[] Those
       behaviors included physically pulling Roger up off the ground where he lay to force
       him to try to stand; physically dragging Roger along forcing him to try to walk;
       physically putting Roger in a wheelchair, wheeling it into a locked room, the Tool
       Cage; physically pulling at Roger’s work boot on his crushed foot while he
       screamed in pain, then pulling repeatedly on his wet work boot, Roger urging that
       he was bleeding, that he needed to go to the hospital . . . that he needed an
       ambulance; confining Roger in the wheelchair, in the locked Tool Cage in the
       wheelchair while the Defendants took their time preparing paperwork to send
       Plaintiff . . . in a taxi . . . for drug testing and to be examined; confining Roger
       without his phone to call out on his own, as it was strict company written policy
       that employees have no phones while working[] . . . . There was no consent from
       Roger for any of this horrific behavior from Defendants. (Emphasis added.)

                                                -5-
        These arguments suggest that plaintiff’s claim of battery originated from defendants’
actions, and not solely from Talbot’s behavior on the day of the accident. A finding of actual
prejudice includes situations where the opposing party lacked notice “from any source, that the
moving party would rely on the new claim or theory at trial.” Weymers, 454 Mich at 659-660
(emphasis added). Defendants plainly had notice that plaintiff might later assert a claim of battery
against all defendants. Because they were on notice of these possible claims, defendants would
not suffer prejudice as the result of this amendment.

       Even so, the trial court sided with defendants, reasoning:

       Bottom line then is that while I do believe there were opportunities for Plaintiff to
       raise these issue during the process of this litigation they chose to . . . identify count
       one strictly in terms of Ms. Talbot and to now expand that to Ms. Talbot acting on
       behalf of the other Defendants, I think, is inappropriate.

        In other words, the trial court thought that because the respondeat superior theory could
have been raised earlier in the proceedings, plaintiff’s present request to add this claim would
cause delay. But, as noted above, “[d]elay, alone, does not warrant denial of a motion to amend.”
Weymers, 454 Mich at 659. In considering plaintiff’s motion, the trial court should have analyzed
whether a delay caused by the amendment would have prejudiced defendants. Had it done so, it
would have concluded that the amendment would not cause prejudice. The trial court’s denial of
the motion to amend on the basis of timeliness was an error of law, and it, therefore, abused its
discretion in this regard.

                                            2. FUTILITY

        Defendants’ other argument in opposition to the motion to amend was that plaintiff’s claim
against Benteler was futile. Generally speaking, when an employee makes a claim against an
employer or coworker for a work-related injury, their exclusive remedies are the benefits provided
by the WDCA. Johnson, 288 Mich App at 695-696; see also MCL 418.131(1). An exception to
this general rule exists where the employee alleges an intentional tort. MCL 418.131(1). But an
injured employee’s burden of proof is distinguished from that of a “classic intentional tort.”
Johnson, 288 Mich App at 696. Rather,

       An intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a
       deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury. An
       employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual
       knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that
       knowledge. [MCL 418.131(1).]

Therefore, “to recover under the intentional tort exception of the WDCA, a plaintiff must prove
that his or her injury was the result of the employer’s deliberate act or omission and that the
employer specifically intended an injury.” Bagby v Detroit Edison Co, 308 Mich App 488, 491;
865 NW2d 59 (2014).

       There are two ways for a plaintiff to show that an employer specifically intended
       an injury. The plaintiff can provide direct evidence that the employer had the
       particular purpose of inflicting an injury upon his employee. In the alternative, an

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       employer’s intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence, i.e., that the employer
       has actual knowledge that an injury is certain to occur, yet disregards that
       knowledge. [Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

“In the case of a corporate employer, a plaintiff need only show that ‘a supervisory or managerial
employee had actual knowledge that an injury would follow from what the employer deliberately
did or did not do.’ ” Johnson, 288 Mich App at 697; quoting Fries v Mavrick Metal Stamping,
Inc, 285 Mich App 706, 714; 777 NW2d 205 (2009).

       In Ruiz I, this Court concluded plaintiff made the preliminary showing to sustain a battery
claim against Talbot. Ruiz I, unpub op at 3-4. Specifically:

       Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable juror
       could conclude that Talbot committed a battery and specifically intended an injury.
       According to plaintiff, he told Talbot not to touch his boot, but she did it anyway,
       and he screamed. Then she did it up to 10 more times, all while plaintiff was
       screaming and asking her to not grab his boot. From this—the evidence viewed in
       the light most favorable to plaintiff—a reasonable juror could conclude that Talbot
       committed a battery and specifically intended an injury as required by MCL
       418.131(1).[] [Ruiz I, unpub op at 4 (footnote omitted).]

For purposes of this appeal, this Court is bound to follow its earlier conclusions regarding Talbot’s
liability. See Higgins Lake Prop Owners Ass’n v Gerrish Twp, 255 Mich App 83, 91; 662 NW2d
387 (2003), quoting Ashker v Ford Motor Co, 245 Mich App 9, 13; 627 NW2d 1 (2001) (“The law
of the case doctrine holds that a ruling by an appellate court on a particular issue binds the appellate
court and all lower tribunals with respect to that issue.”).

        Thus, the only issue before this Court is whether, based on the facts presented, a reasonable
jury could conclude Benteler is vicariously liable for Talbot’s purported battery. Again, in regard
to the knowledge requirement for corporate employers, “a plaintiff need only show that a
supervisory or managerial employee had actual knowledge that an injury would follow from what
the employer deliberately did or did not do.” Johnson, 288 Mich App at 697 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). The discovery period included the deposition testimonies of several witnesses
whose testimonies demonstrate at the time of the incident Talbot was a “supervisory or managerial
employee.” For example, several witnesses explained that Talbot was employed as a “Production
Unit Leader.” Plaintiff also testified that as a Production Unit Leader, Talbot was “some kind of
manager. I don’t know the specific kind of manager it was, but she was a manager.” Elmer
reported that Talbot was “called a PUL, I am not exactly sure what it stands for but she is my
boss.” This information, together with our earlier conclusion that “a reasonable juror could
conclude that Talbot committed a battery and specifically intended an injury[,]” establishes the
knowledge requirement for corporate employers. See Johnson, 288 Mich App at 697.

       The trial court reasoned that an amendment was futile because it was:

       Unclear in this case whether the supervisory [sic], who[,] I believe[,] would testify
       that she was simply trying to assess the injury and minimize . . . whatever necessary
       mediation might have to occur. I don’t think that is going on beyond her

                                                  -7-
       representing the interest of the employer and certainly in that regard if the employer
       had known such behavior it could serve as the basis for employer liability if, in fact,
       it is shown that that kind of behavior exceeded the . . . protocol as set forth by the
       employer.

              That is a question that has not been answered and it is a question that would
       have to be answered in order to present it to a trier of fact.

        From this statement, it appears the trial court thought that to recover under MCL
418.131(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the tortfeasor’s actions were within the scope of their
employment. Although the trial court did not specify the legal basis for its conclusion, the trial
court appears to have confused statutory vicarious liability under MCL 418.131(1) with common-
law vicarious liability. Under the common law, “[a]n employer is generally liable for the torts its
employees commit within the scope of their employment. It follows that an employer is not liable
for the torts committed by an employee when those torts are beyond the scope of the employer’s
business.” Hamed v Wayne Co, 490 Mich 1, 10-11; 803 NW2d 237 (2011) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Contrary to common-law vicarious liability, MCL 418.131(1) does not require
a plaintiff to show a tortfeasor’s actions were within the scope of their employment. In reaching
its conclusion on the basis of an incorrect legal basis, the trial court committed an error of law that
necessitates this Court’s reversal. Kostadinovski, 511 Mich at 149-150.

        In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in concluding plaintiff’s proposed amendment
would cause undue delay. It also abused its discretion when it determined plaintiff’s amendment
was futile. Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is not futile because there is evidence showing plaintiff
could recover against Benteler under MCL 418.131(1). The trial court abused its discretion when
it based its analysis on whether Talbot’s actions were within the scope of her employment.

        Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                               /s/ Jane E. Markey
                                                               /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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