Court Opinion

ID: 9763231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:39:14.82426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:31.417683
License: Public Domain

COVINGTON, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result of the Court’s opinion but believe that the time has come for me to address the question of verification in terms different from those upon which I previously joined the Court.
In recent cases this Court has directly addressed the problem of failure to verify a Rule 29.15 motion. In Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. banc 1990), no motion had been verified. Movant requested leave of this Court to sign and verify the Rule 29.15 motion. In Malone v. State, 798 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Mo. banc 1990), no motion was verified. One month after evidentiary hearing movant requested leave to verify. In both Kilgore and Malone this Court held the motions nullities. The facts of the present case are distinguishable. Vinson filed a verified pro se motion. The trial court plainly had jurisdiction over the parties once movant filed his verified pro se motion. The pro se pleading stated a cause of action. The Court had authority to enter a judgment on the pro se motion. Only the amended motion remains unverified. In this regard Vinson’s case ' resembles State v. Oxford, 791 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Mo. banc 1990), where defendant failed to verify the amended motion.
It is proper to address the question of failure of verification of the amended motion in the context of the purposes of the postconviction proceeding. Rule 29.15(d) provides that the movant “shall verify the motion, declaring that he has listed all grounds for relief known to him and acknowledging his understanding that he waives any ground for relief known to him that is not listed in the motion.” Rule 29.15(e) then requires the Court to appoint counsel who is to prepare and file, when necessary to assert sufficient facts or additional grounds, an amended motion. Presumably for purposes identical to those of Rule 29.15(d), the amended motion is also to be verified by movant. Rule 29.15(f). The verification requirement is an essential element of the postconviction motion. Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d at 395. The purpose of Rule 29.15(d) is to “discover and adjudicate all claims for relief in a single proceeding.” Id. The language of Rule 29.15(h) further supports Kilgore’s statement of purpose by prohibiting successive motions.
Related to the purpose of the verification requirement is another of the postconviction rule’s purposes — to accomplish a timely adjudication of claims. The rule serves to avoid delay in the processing of claims and to prevent litigation of stale claims. Day v. State, 770 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Mo. banc 1989). The limitations of verification and timeliness place an increased responsibility on movant, counsel, and the courts to *450litigate claims promptly. Sloan v. State, 779 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Mo. banc 1989).
In the context of this case and the purposes of Rule 29.15, the question is thus: At what point should a court be deprived of authority to proceed with a Rule 29.15 motion so as not to undermine the purposes of the rule? The answer must be: At such time as all claims for relief could not be discovered and adjudicated in a timely, single proceeding.
So long as a movant does not also seek to add claims to his amended motion, to permit the movant to verify the amended motion at any time prior to hearing offends neither the purpose of the time requirements nor the purpose of the verification requirements. There is no detriment to the state in preparation for hearing and no delay in the proceedings. Such a line of demarcation would continue to serve to prohibit the Court from countenancing any additional claims that movant might seek to raise after filing of the amended motion, during the hearing, or at any time subsequent. If the state should later seek to raise a claim of perjury against movant upon movant’s attempt to file a successive motion, the state’s claim would not have been thwarted.
I would permit a movant the formality of leave to amend to verify a motion at any time prior to hearing so long as movant seeks only to verify and not to raise additional claims. Vinson did not do so, so I would affirm the judgments of the trial courts.
To the extent I joined in this Court’s earlier opinions where the Court may have invoked an underlying premise to support a holding that a trial court lacks “jurisdiction” ever to hear an unverified motion, I confess error. The question does not appear to me now as it did then. Claiming no equivalence of stature to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, I nevertheless take some solace in his words on one occasion: “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600, 69 S.Ct. 290, 293, 93 L.Ed. 259 (1949) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).