Court Opinion

ID: 9759593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:21:01.100315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:03.073852
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. The issue in this case is whether the warning on the Clorox container about hazardous toxic gases was conspicuous enough to draw a user’s attention — not whether Bushong actually read the label. If the warning on the label had been sufficiently eye-catching and had sounded some mental alarm, arguably the user would have read it. In any case, that is a question for the jury to decide. It is not a matter of law for the trial court on summary judgment. By holding as the majority does today, no matter how hidden or inconspicuous a notice of danger in the future may be, if the user fails to read a label in toto, he is foreclosed from recovery. I disagree that that is the law. We have not reviewed a summary judgment couched on failure to read a warning until this case. Other jurisdictions, however, have refused to hold that failure to read a warning in and of itself is determinative of the warning’s adequacy. See, e.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 306 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); East Penn Manufacturing Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113 (D.C. App. 1990); Jarrell v. Monsanto Co., 528 N.E.2d 1158 (Ind. App. 2 Dist. 1988); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (1978). In East Penn Manufacturing v. Pineda, supra, the issue involved an exploding battery and an injured mechanic who was an experienced user. The jury found for the mechanic, and the manufacturing company moved for judgment n.o.v. on failure-to-read grounds which the trial court denied. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals first noted that it had previously rejected the argument that adequacy of a warning label could be resolved as a matter of law. It then went on to discuss the mechanic’s failure to read the warning label on the battery, which was the size of a business card: In the failure to warn context, it is first necessary to distinguish between (1) failure to take adequate steps to ensure the warning was communicated to the ultimate user — issues involving the prominence and location of the label — and (2) failure to provide a warning that, if communicated to the user, would have been adequate to warn of risks — which involves the content of the warning. When the failure to warn is based upon the steps taken to communicate the warning, the fact that the plaintiff never read the warning is itself evidence that the label was inadequate, and should not bar recovery. See Rhodes v. Interstate Battery Systems of Am., 722 F.2d 1517, 1519 (11th Cir. 1984). But when the cause of action is predicated on the content of the warning, as in this case, the plaintiffs own failure to read it will be contributory negligence in some jurisdictions. Id. 578 A.2d at 1124. Concluding that failure to read the label was ot itself fatal, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict on failure to warn. In Shell Oil Co. v. Guiterrez, supra, a supposedly empty metal drum which had contained liquid xylene exploded because of welding work done within a few feet of the “empty” drum. Two men were injured. Neither had read the warning on top of the metal drum. In affirming the jury verdict in favor of the two men, Arizona Court of Appeals said: That the party who is injured might not have read or heeded warning is not always sufficient to disprove the existence of a causal relationship between the injury and the defect. Adequate warning could have actuated a policy in handling “empties” which would have prevented the accident. ... Furthermore, the adequacy of a warning label is not determined solely by reference to the words on the label but also by reference to the physical aspects of the warning, such as conspicuousness, prominence, and relative size of print. All of these physical aspects must be adequate to alert the reasonably prudent person. (Citing authority.) Here, the only label attached to the barrel was small in size, approximately 4” x 4”. The jury could have determined that the physical aspects of this label were inadequate in light of the foreseeable risk of injury, and that if a larger and more conspicuous label was attached, it would have been seen, read and heeded. There was substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the failure of the defendants to provide an adequate warning was a factor in producing the injuries. Cause in fact was an issue for the jury. Prosser, The Law of Torts, Sec. 41 (4th ed. 1971). 581 P.2d at 280-281. In a third case, the Indiana appellate court reversed summary judgment which had been entered in favor of a sulphur manufacturing firm. Jarrell v. Monsanto Co., supra. There, the injured user poured two fifty pound bags of sulphur into a storage bin which then exploded and burned the user. The worker had not read the warning label on the bags that sulphur dust in air ignites easily. Using this fact as well as others, the trial court entered summary judgment. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and said in part: In this case, [the user] admitted that warning labels appeared on the bags of sulphur but claims that he did not see any such warnings and did not read the labels. However, we cannot say as a matter law that the warnings on these labels, “WARNING!,” “SULPHUR DUST SUSPENDED IN AIR IGNITES EASILY!” and “Avoid creating dust in handling!,” sufficiently convey to a reasonable user the nature of the danger or the extent of the potential harm. 528 N.E.2d at 1163. Finally, in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., supra, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the estate of a deceased 14-month-old child who died of chemical pneumonia after ingesting a small quantity of furniture polish. The Fourth Circuit described the labelling: On the front part of the label appear the words “Old English Brand Red Oil Furniture Polish” in large letters; beneath this in small letters “An all purpose polish for furniture, woodwork, pianos, floors”. The reverse side of the label, the background of which is white, contains the following printed matter: at the top in red letters about 1 /8th of an inch in height all in capitals, “CAUTION COMBUSTIBLE MIXTURE”. Immediately beneath this in red letters 1 /16th of an inch high “Do not use near fire or flame”; several lines down, again in letters 1 /16th of an inch in height, in brown ink, all in capitals, the word “DIRECTIONS”; then follow seven lines of directions printed in brown ink in letters about 1 /32nd of an inch in height. On the eighth line in letters 1 /16th of an inch high in brown ink appear the words “Safety Note”; following this in letters approximately l/32nd of an inch in height: Contains refined petroleum distillates. May be harmful if swallowed, especially by children.” 308 F.2d at 82. The mother of the child testified that she had read the large colored letters “CAUTION COMBUSTIBLE” but not the directions because she knew how to use furniture polish. The court discussed the inadequacy of the warning relating to children: The notice here given was not printed on the label in such a manner as to assure that a user’s attention would be attracted thereto. Indeed, we think one might reasonably conclude that it was placed so as to conceal it from all but the most cautious users. It is located in the midst of a body of print of the same size and color, with nothing to attract special attention to it except the words “Safety Note”. Further, even if the user should happen to discover the warning it states only “contains refined petroleum distillates. May be harmful if swallowed especially by children.” The first sentence could hardly be taken to convey any conception of the dangerous character of this product to the average user. The second sentence could be taken to indicate to the average person that harm is not certain but merely possible. The expert medical evidence in this case shows that “harm” will not be contingent but rather inevitable, to young and old alike. Moreover, the 1st phrase of the sentence hardly conveys the thought that very small quantity of the polish is lethal to children. 306 F.2d at 86. The court then went on to conclude: [H]ad the warning been in a form calculated to attract the user’s attention, due to its position, size, and the coloring if its lettering and had the words used therein been reasonable calculated to convey a conception of the true nature of the danger, this other might not have left the product in the presence of her child. 306 F.2d at 87. The majority cites two cases to support its affirmance. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Baker, 515 So.2d 655 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Johnson v. Niagara, 666 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1981). Both cases are distinguishable. In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer of a . punch press due to the user’s failure to read the warning. Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1981). In affirming the district court’s decision, however, the Court observed in a footnote that the district court had found that the warning on the press was conspicuous and that the case did not involve an inadequate warning. The trial court in the case before us did not make similar findings on adequacy or conspicuousness. In Safeco Ins. Co., the user had failed to install a prefabricated fireplace correctly because he did not read all the pages in an installation booklet, and a fire to the home resulted. The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of the installer for fire damage to his home on causation grounds. In that case no hazardous substance was involved; nor did the appellate court have before it the issue of whether a warning label was conspicuous. A jury should decide if the warning on the Clorox bottle was in a form calculated to attract Bushong’s attention and if conspicuous, was the wording of the warning adequate. Larger letters in color or a logo indicating toxicity like a skull-and-bones might well have averted injury in this case. At least, this was a question for the jury to consider. While failure to read a label with what is arguably an inadequate warning of a hazard might have surface appeal for disposing of this case, it really does not stand up under scrutiny. I would reverse the summary judgment and remand for trial. Holt, C.J., and Newbern, J., join. [[Image here]]