Court Opinion

ID: 9633713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:57:35.317771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:40.474750
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.
Are workers in Wyoming to be essentially unprotected from injurious acts which are culpably, willfully or criminally inflicted against them by co-workers by the barrier which has been applied legislatively to deny to them rights for civil justice to properly recover for resulting personal injury? Believing that the Wyoming Constitution says what it says and means what it was intended to provide in protection for citizens against a statist government, I respectfully dissent.
I.
UNSAFE WORK PLACE — RIGHT TO INJURE OR KILL
These cases come to this court to present a constitutional challenge to a statutory *399provision which deleted any rights of workers to recover for injury causing acts of co-employees. See Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363, 1366, n. 3 (Wyo.1988). As amended by the legislature in 1986, W.S. 27-14-104(a), the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation statutes eliminated an injured employee’s cause of action against a co-employee acting within his scope of employment. Consequently, regardless of culpable negligence, criminal behavior or intentionally tortious conduct, the statute completely eliminates the possibility of recovering damages as explicitly protected by Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4. W.S. 27-14-104(a) violates the constitutionally protected right of an injured person to redress a wrong, amounts to special legislation, and violates substantive due process. I do not accept this further denigration of guarantees of individual rights which the Wyoming Constitution was written to protect.
Contrary to the majority opinion, in which this court again fails to recognize that, with limited exceptions,1 immunity is “an outmoded anachronism of [questionable] history and parentage,” I would hold that the legislature is constitutionally foreclosed from extending absolute immunity to co-employees even when acting within the scope of their employment under the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act. White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1360 (Wyo. 1989), Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting. I write to express my unwavering conviction that the injured appellants in these cases are constitutionally entitled to their day in court. In addition, I write to continue my battle against the injustice which comes when liability is decoupled from criminal conduct, intentional misconduct or culpable negligence via legislative extension of absolute immunity in derogation of the Wyoming Constitution. See White, 784 P.2d at 1324, Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting and Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo.1990), Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting. In ef-feet, W.S. 27-14-104(a), as amended by the legislature in 1986 and as upheld by the majority of this court in this instance, creates a “right to kill” one’s fellow employee without risk or threat of civil liability.
In simplest terms, the end result of W.S. 27-14-104(a) and the majority holding in these cases is that everyone loses except the wrongdoer. The injured employee loses because he is denied the opportunity to recover damages for injuries caused by a culpably negligent or intentionally tortious co-employee. The employer loses because he is unable to minimize his premium contributions to the Worker’s Compensation fund and because employees protected with absolute immunity are less motivated to share responsibility for a safe work place. The Worker’s Compensation fund loses because it is unable to recover benefit payments otherwise due through the Act’s third-party recovery lien provision. Ultimately, the citizens of Wyoming lose because the legislature and the majority of this court abandon the Wyoming Constitution and extinguish protected rights. The only overt winner is a criminal, culpably negligent or intentionally tortious co-employee who escapes liability and receives opportunity carte blanche to act with impunity. The covert winner is the general insurance liability carrier whose claim costs are reduced and whose actual coverage is compressed.
I would find W.S. 27-14-104(a) unconstitutional and would reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment. By so doing, I would open the courthouse doors to employees injured at the hands of culpably negligent, criminal or intentionally tortious co-employees. It is constitutionally impermissible, in my opinion, to legislate a more dangerous work place by eliminating rights to justice for the laborers. We reverse a century of industrial effort to accomplish work place health and safety.2
*400II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
While I agree with the general statement of this court’s standard of review set forth in the majority opinion, I find the summary of applicable principles to be incomplete. I would add the following statutory and constitutionally determinative provisions previously adopted by this court for judicial ■review of Worker’s Compensation legislation.
In Seckman v. Wyo-Ben, Inc., 783 P.2d 161 (Wyo.1989), we identified the underlying purpose and application of the Act. We stated:
Unlike most statutes that abrogate common law rights and must, for that reason, be strictly construed * * *, the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act * * *, is to be interpreted in a reasonably liberal fashion so that the legislative goals that obviously are intended may be accomplished * * *. Whenever possible, the Act should be applied in favor of the workman * * *, so that industry, and not the individual employee, bears the burden of accident and injury occurring within the industrial setting.
Id. at 165. I find the result reached by the majority in these cases to be counterproductive to the underlying purpose of the Worker’s Compensation Act. In direct contrast to the stated legislative purpose, the majority does not apply the Act in favor of injured workmen. Instead, the majority reaches the result that a legislative grant of statutory immunity is a superior right to the constitutionally mandated right of an individual to recover damages for injuries. In recognition of an injured employee’s eligibility to collect modest Worker’s Compensation benefits and by upholding the constitutionality of W.S. 27-14-104(a), this court requires that an injured employee bear practically the full burden of his injuries without redress for damages.3
For example, in Bence v. Pacific Power and Light Co., 631 P.2d 13 (Wyo.1981), we held that immunity provisions in the Worker’s Compensation Act must be narrowly construed. In deciding whether immunity extends to a non-employer, we ruled that a non-employer “should not enjoy an immunity that it has not paid for.” Id. at 18. See also Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1989); Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974 (Wyo.1988); and Fis-cus v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 742 P.2d 198 (Wyo.1987). In light of our unequivocal analysis in these cases, I find no legislative authority to extend absolute immunity to co-employees who do not “pay” for the privilege.
III.
WHOSE QUID PRO QUO
I reject the majority’s analysis of and conclusion that a quid pro quo relationship *401exists between co-workers.4 I would hold that when constitutionally protected rights are violated by legislative enactment, the underlying policy justification is always relevant to judicial review and particularly so when crafted as special interest legislation. See Grantham v. Denke, 359 So.2d 785, 787 (Ala.1978); Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1305 (Colo.1982); and see generally, Note, Massey v. Selensky: Workers’ Compensation and Coemployee Immunity in Montana, 46 Mont.L.Rev. 217, 224-28 (1985). Recognizing a legislative grant of absolute immunity to co-employees for culpably negligent or intentionally tortious conduct eviscerates the intent and clear language of Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4 as well as overrules sub silentio this court’s holdings in Bence. Additionally, since this is purely special interest legislation, we now ignore the preclusion implicit in most sections of Wyo. Const, art. 1 and explicit in Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 27, special and local laws prohibited.
In Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 641 P.2d 1247 (Wyo.1982), a case decided the same day as Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo.1982), we considered the quid pro quo relationship between an employer covered under the Act and his employees.
It is the employer who contributes to the fund and it is the employer’s contributions which fund payment to workers for those injuries not occasioned by the employer’s fault or negligence. In return for that contribution, the employer is granted immunity from suit. Neither the injured employee nor the co-employee contribute to the fund. A rational basis thus exists for treating the employer differently from his employees with respect to the extent of immunity.
Mauch, 641 P.2d at 1251. In this case, this court recognized the existence of a rational basis for treating contributing employers and co-employees differently with regard to immunity. I find nothing has changed with the passage of time or over the course of events which now justifies treating contributing employers and co-employees identically.
IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
“While it is our duty to give great deference to legislative pronouncements and uphold constitutionality when possible, it is likewise our equally imperative duty to declare a legislative enactment invalid if it transgresses the state constitution.” Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100, 1114, reh’g denied 577 P.2d 1386 (Wyo.1978). See Brenner v. City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558, 560 (Wyo.1986). The majority decision in this case fails to recognize the constitutional transgressions of W.S. 27-14-104(a). “The State Constitution is a limitation, not a grant, of power, and, as a result, the legislature possesses all legislative authority except as restricted by the State Constitution, either expressly or by clear implication.” Witzenburger, 575 P.2d at 1146 (citing State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of Goshen County v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 P. 771 (1923) and 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 70 (1984) and emphasis in original), Rose, Justice, dissenting. I would conclude, as Chief Justice Rose did in his dissent in Kendig, that Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4, expressly precludes the legislature from extending immunity to co-employees.
I would also hold that Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 8,5 when read in conjunction with Wyo. *402Const, art. 10, § 4, forbids unlimited legislative discretion to close the doors of the courts in this state to workers intentionally injured by co-employees.6 Similarly, I would apply Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 277 and Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 8 to assure citizens of Wyoming access to the state’s courts as this court did in Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo.1980). Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 27 specifically limits legislative power, and I would construe this provision as evidence that the framers of the Wyoming Constitution intended this court to exercise a substantial checking function over legislative authority which infringes on constitutionally protected rights. See Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, XXI Land & Water L.Rev. 527, 556 (1986).
The majority states that the test for whether or not substantive due process has been infringed is “if a statute is arbitrary and fails to promote a legitimate state objective by reasonable means.” (Citing Moreno v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 775 P.2d 497 (Wyo.1989).) The majority opinion dismisses appellants’ substantive due process arguments in a single sentence and concludes without analysis that, “this particular application of the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Act does not meet those criteria so that a conclusion that substantive due process is violated is justified.”
I would conclude otherwise. I find that the legislative extension of immunity to co-employees, without regard to the degree of negligence or the qualitative distinction between negligence and intentionally tor-tious conduct, is an arbitrary deprivation of the appellant’s right to recover damages for injuries. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.1973). Legislation which limits damages cannot pass the rational basis test. Such legislation, on its face, discriminates against a more seriously injured victim since Worker’s Compensation benefits will quite often fail to cover all economic losses, to say nothing of compensating for pain, suffering, and other related damages. More significantly, I recognize no state objective, legitimate or otherwise, which is promoted by the extension of immunity to co-employees.
V.
OUR HISTORY IN KENDIG
In Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, this court found a rational relationship between the statute (which provided immunity to co-employees acting with less than culpable negligence) and the classification of immunized co-employees. The Kendig objectives, which are reiterated by the majority here, are: (1) harmony among employees; (2) maintenance of a sound compensation fund; and (3) continuance of the overall purpose and philosophy behind the Worker’s Compensation Act. The same legislative objectives set forth by this court in Kendig are still applicable today. All are viewed in the context of the underlying legislative goal of “saving” the Worker’s Compensation program when it underwent revision in 1986. Unfortunately, any realistic factual relevance of those “goals” to what the provision actually does exists somewhere between unrefined imagination and a total non sequitur.
Relying on Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4 and Markle v. Williamson, 518 P.2d 621 (Wyo. *4031974), appellants contend that a constitutional amendment is required to extend absolute immunity to co-employees. Absent a constitutional amendment, appellants argue that the legislature is precluded from enacting legislation immunizing co-employees for their negligent and/or intentionally tortious acts.
The majority agrees with appellees’ response that this court’s holding in Kendig recognizes legislative authority to immunize co-employees from liability so long as the co-employee allegedly causes an injury while acting within the scope of his employment. Thus, without specifically distinguishing between various types of intentional and negligent conduct, the legislature and the majority of this court provide absolute immunity from liability to all co-employees regardless of whether their conduct is negligent, grossly negligent, culpably negligent, intentionally tortious or abjectly criminal. Before the 1986 revision in W.S. 27-14-104(a), (i.e., when an employee could recover damages from a culpably negligent co-employee; see Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo.1989); Wessel, 752 P.2d 1363; and Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 (Wyo.1987)), we imposed a heavy burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate a co-employee’s culpable negligence.8 The line between culpable negligence and intentionally tor-tious conduct may not be great, but the qualitative distinction between the two is still significant.
Intentionally tortious conduct is “different in kind” from other classifications of negligent behavior and the distinction is not simply a difference in the “degree” of knowledge.
The law of intentional torts constitutes a separate world of legal culpability. It is a system that balances specific rights and obligations, and imposes liability on the basis of a party’s intent, rather than the moral blameworthiness of that party’s conduct by societal standards. The real qualitative distinctions between intentional torts and other forms of culpable conduct share a single origin — the “duty” concept. Intentional torts are dignitary by nature. They are designed to protect one’s right to be free from unpermitted intentional invasions of person or property. Alternatively, the duty underlying an action in negligence or strict products liability is to avoid causing, be it by conduct or by product, an unreasonable risk of harm to others within the range of proximate cause foreseeability. These distinct worlds of culpability cannot be reconciled.[9]
Gallub, Assessing Culpability in the Law of Torts: A Call for Judicial Scrutiny in Comparing “Culpable Conduct" Under New York’s CPLR 1411, 37 Syracuse L.Rev. 1079, 1112 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Thus, relying on Kendig for the proposition that the legislature has authority to abolish co-employee liability for all actions within the scope of employment is misplaced. It is not enough to assume that intentionally tortious co-employees will be held accountable for their misconduct based on a showing that they acted outside the scope of their employment. Rather, it is likely that many intentional tortfeasors will enjoy full immunity from liability.
I believe the legislature and the majority of this court mistakenly blur the qualitative distinction between intentional misconduct and other types of negligent behavior. Ex*404tension of the holding in Kendig to immunize culpably negligent or intentionally tor-tious co-employee conduct is an invalid and unjustified violation of constitutionally protected rights within our state’s constitution.
While it is arguable that a higher level of scrutiny is mandated by the statutory infringement of constitutionally protected rights at stake in these cases, I find that W.S. 27-14-104(a) fails even the lowest level of scrutiny. See White, 784 P.2d at 1332, 1335, Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting and Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 785 (Wyo. 1988), Thomas, Justice, specially concurring, with whom Urbigkit, Justice, joined. The statute is not reasonably related to the legislative objectives. Extending absolute immunity to co-employees does not reduce injuries, promote safety or preserve the economic integrity of the Worker’s Compensation fund.
First, it is purely speculative, if not actually spurious, to opine justification for constitutionality on ascertainment of whether or not co-employee immunity creates a more harmonious work environment. I contend that both logic and statistical evidence reveal that a grant of absolute immunity to co-employees serves only to create a less-safe workplace. It follows that a less-safe workplace is, by its very nature, a less-harmonious workplace, since employees must be more cautious of their co-workers. Since co-employees are no longer threatened with liability for their culpable negligence or intentionally tortious conduct, they are, unfortunately, more likely to endanger both themselves and their fellow employees in the workplace. This conclusion is supported by employment and work force injury data generated by various state agencies since the 1986 legislative revision of W.S. 27-14-104(a). The data indicates that between 1987 and 1989 there have been approximately twenty-two percent more Worker’s Compensation injuries reported by a Wyoming work force with approximately 12,000-15,000 fewer workers in 1988 than there were in 1986. This is compelling support for the argument that workers and employers are exercising less caution in the workplace in part because they have less incentive to do so. This adverse workplace safety result was clearly illustrated by appendices attached to the amicus curiae brief of the Wyoming AFL-CIO.
This case is illustrative of the analysis of thoughtful scholars and concerned jurors determining why immunities from responsibility for wrongful conduct are characterized as anachronistic and dinosaurs in this modern world in its complex and compressed society. Immunities by providing absolution from responsibility invite, approve and pamper harmful, slothful, malicious and just bad conduct. Protection from misconduct grows and cultivates that approved, invited and justified misconduct. The real quid pro quo from the legislative enactment, taking away rights of the employees, was that the something the worker lost from the immunity foreclosing rights was the doubtful benefit he achieves of exposure to harm, damage, and possible death caused by wrongful conduct.
Similarly, in light of Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 22, Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 34 10 and this court’s decision in Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67 (Wyo.1978), I find an abject flight from fact or logic in the “harmonious workplace” argument provided as justification for these loss of rights for injured workers. A negligently maintained or a culpably inflicted dangerous workplace is seldom found to be inclined to create harmony. Broken bones and dead bodies do not make good music. A more thoughtful thesis is found in Nehring, where this court found no rational relation between the state’s “guest statute” and ascribed legislative purposes. Consequently, the “guest statute” was declared unconstitutional because, in effect, it eliminated a cause of action (the right of a non-paying passenger to recover for injuries inflicted by ordinary negligence). Comment, The Constitutionality of Automobile Guest Statutes: A *405Roadmap to the Recent Equal Protection Challenges, 1975 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 99 (1975).
Second, W.S. 27-14-104(a) eliminates a significant source of reimbursement for the coffers of the Worker’s Compensation fund. Under W.S. 27-14-105(a),11 the Worker’s Compensation fund is entitled to reimbursement for payments made to an injured employee covered under the Act (up to one-third of the total proceeds recovered from a third party). Since this source of potential revenue is no longer available under the 1986 amendment to W.S. 27-14-104(a), it is obvious the legislature did not adopt W.S. 27-14-104(a) to protect the financial solvency of the Worker’s Compensation fund.
Third, from the outset, Worker’s Compensation has always been considered a form of industrial insurance rather than damages. Hotelling v. Fargo-Western Oil Co., 33 Wyo. 240, 238 P. 542 (1925).12 This court irrefutably established the proposition that Worker’s Compensation stems from contract and not from tort. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235; Markle, 518 P.2d 621; Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918). “An insurance policy does not protect the policy holder from the consequences of his intentional tortious act. Indeed, it would be against public policy to permit insurance against the intentional tort.” Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, 577, cert. denied 459 U.S. 857, 103 S.Ct. 127, 74 L.Ed.2d 110 (1982). By denying an injured employee the opportunity to recover damages from an intentionally tortious co-employee, the injured employee is forced to bear the brunt of his injuries while the intentionally tortious co-worker escapes liability. I fail to see how the elimination of co-employee liability in tort serves to enhance any public purpose premised on the concepts of insurance and contract.
The only effective legislation to “save” the Worker’s Compensation fund would involve imposing greater deterrent measures on the work force — not eliminating viable incentives for safe practices.13 Absolute immunity creates a less-safe workplace and allows a tortious wrongdoer to escape re*406sponsibility and to act with impunity.14 No valid state objective is promoted by such a misguided legislative act.
Legislative extension of absolute immunity to co-employees absent an enabling constitutional amendment is an arbitrary limitation on an injured employee’s right to recover damages and is thus in contravention of Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4. The means employed by the legislature to “save” the Worker’s Compensation program are patently unreasonable and fail even the lowest standard of constitutional judicial review.15
VI.
EVEN WITH KENDIG, THIS DECISION IS STILL WRONG
We are first faced here with the consequences of this court’s wrong decision in Kendig. I would overrule Kendig for, as Chief Justice Rose pointed out in his dissent, “it is a holding not supported by the law and in derogation of the limitations on legislative power found in Art. 10, § 4.” Id. at 1246. Kendig should be overturned. If the majority of this court is unwilling to do so, then the legislature should, or in time a majority of this court will in another day be called to return to the application of basic constitutional protections which should be provided by the Wyoming Constitution and enforced by this tribunal.
Regardless of the semantic manipulations applied by the majority to conclude that a “plain reading of the first sentence of Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4,” when read in conjunction with the whole provision, “does not, * * *, prove that the elimination of co-employee suits is unconstitutional,” I strongly feel that the legislature cannot enact a statute that immunizes eo-employ-ees regardless of the degree or nature of their culpably negligent or intentionally tortious conduct without first amending Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4. See, generally, Note, Worker’s Compensation — Constitutionality of Wyoming’s Co-Employee Immunity Statute Under Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution. Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo.1982), XVIII Land & Water L.Rev. 355, 369-70 (1983). While Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4 has been amended on two previous occasions to accommodate Worker’s Compensation *407legislation,16 no constitutional amendment has been enacted to allow the legislature to extend absolute immunity to co-employees and, consequently, to circumvent the . clear language and intent of both the first sentence and the entire provision of Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4. The legislature had the opportunity to “constitutionalize” extension of absolute immunity to co-employees when it submitted Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4 to the voters in 1986. The legislature did not take advantage of this opportunity and I find no authority under which the legislature may unilaterally grant such immunity.
Even though Kendig was wrongly decided and is again upheld against the Wyoming Constitution by this court, in consideration of that present state of Wyoming law, I would further argue that Kendig is also distinguishable from the present case. As a further step beyond where this court had previously gone, Kendig does not mandate legislative authority to extend absolute immunity to co-employees in the absence of an authenticating constitutional amendment or elimination of the beneficial amendments presently existent. Although that earlier case might be excused constitutionally under the specific terminology of Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4, this case simply and directly cannot.17
Kendig held that co-employee immunity for acts of ordinary negligence was constitutional. However, in 1986, the legislature went far beyond the result in Kendig to eliminate culpable negligence or intentionally tortious acts from W.S. 27-14-104(a). While I struggle philosophically with the concept of granting immunity for any degree of negligence, I am willing to assume, arguendo, that immunity for acts of ordinary negligence may be justified. Ordinary negligence connotes acts of unconscious inadvertence, and allowing injured employees to sue co-workers for such “accidental” acts would not significantly reduce workplace injuries. Total basic rights are not squashed by the earlier legislation and the Kendig reasoning since only the standard for recovery was adjusted in the enactment.
The same cannot be said for intentional acts of co-employees, supervisors and bosses where the totality of any responsibility for conduct or rights of justice to the injured are identically eliminated. Extending immunity to intentional tortfeasors re*408moves liability from the shoulders of the responsible party and eviscerates all deterrent effect against future misconduct. “It would be a travesty of justice and logic to permit a worker to injure a co-employee through such conduct, and then compel the injured co-employee to accept moderate benefits under the Act.” Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (1985). An employee should not be required to contemplate the risk of an intentional tort as a natural risk of employment. Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 576. Not only should this court’s majority but also the membership of the Wyoming legislature be called to re-examine rights of the worker for redress when injured by culpable, criminal or willful misconduct effectuated against him by any one whose “employee status” creates the danger and causes the resulting harm.
Legislation which arbitrarily abolishes an entire cause of action and eliminates rights to redress for injury violates several constitutional guarantees.18 The legislature cannot actively or inactively “amend” the constitution by legislative action or inaction. As one court aptly observed, “ ‘[sjociety cannot escape its responsibility to provide justice by simply eliminating the rights of its citizens.’ ” Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (1980) (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 215, 304 A.2d 881, 888 (1973), Duncan and Grimes, Justices, dissenting).
Former Chief Justice Robert R. Rose, Jr., who was principal counsel for the worker in Markle, 518 P.2d 621, came on this court and dissented in Kendig and now appears as appellate counsel in the present companion case of Rodabaugh v. Ross, 807 P.2d 380 (Wyo.1991). In Rodabaugh, Chief Justice Rose provides his wisdom and dedication to justice by effective analysis in his appellate brief:
At common law, there was no prohibition against suit by one employee against a co-employee. This seed issue was resolved in Markle v. Williamson, [518 P.2d 621 (Wyo.1974)], where it was urged by the employer that one employee could not sue a co-employee in tort and that, in any case, the immunity of the employer inured to the benefit of its co-employee. In holding that the co-employee enjoyed no such immunity and that co-employees were possessed of rights of action against one another, the court said:
“[1] There is a pervading rule that valuable common law rights shall not be deemed destroyed by a statute except by clear language. See Bosel v. *409State, Alaska, 398 P.2d 651, 654; Saa-la v. McFarland, 63 Cal.2d 124, 45 Cal.Rptr. 144, 403 P.2d 400, 404; Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Columbia Basin Steel & Iron Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 471 P.2d 574, 548; Valdez v. State, 83 N.M. 720, 47 [497] P.2d 231, 133 [sic], aff’d. [83 N.M. 741], 497 P.2d 743; Smith v. United Properties, Inc., 2 Ohio St.2d 310, 209 N.E.2d 142, 144; and Southern Railway Company v. Maples, 201 Tenn. 85, 296 S.W.2d 870, 783 [sic].
“[2] We find nothing in ... the 1914 constitutional amendment ... which expressly says that a co-employee shall be immune from suit. Having said the employer shall be immune, the legislature surely would have used similar language to say co-employees were immune — if it had so intended.
“The general rule seems to be that where there is no expressed legislative mandate to the contrary, a co-employee or fellow servant is a third party tort-feasor within the meaning of a workmen’s compensation act like ours. Annotation 21 A.L.R.3d, § 3, p. 850; 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, §§ 72 and 72.10, p. 174; 58 Am. Jur., Workmen’s Compensation, § 61, p. 617; 101 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation, § 985(e), p. 481.”
Id., at 623.
Following Markle, supra, the legislature undertook to amend the statutes to adjust the degrees of negligence that would need to be proved against co-employees before recovery could be accomplished. These amendments were upheld as not violating Article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. The court held that, for the legislature to adjust the degree of proof imm ordinary negligence to gross negligence to culpable negligence, was not to enact laws “limiting the amount of damages_” Art. 10, § 4, supra. In other words, the damages against co-employees always remained recoverable, provided the degrees of negligence and culpability established by the legislature were satisfied in the proof process. In Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo.1982), the court held that § 27-12-103(a) granting immunity to all employees but the culpably negligent “does not limit the amount of damages to be recovered. It limits the cause of action available for recovery." (See p. 1239).
The effect of this opinion is to establish that the first sentence places limitations upon causes of action, which the legislature has the power to do, providing the cause of action itself is preserved. The reasoning behind the holding seems corroborative of this conclusion where the court, in Kendig, supra, goes on to say that if the first sentence of Art. 10, § 4 of the Constitution were to be held to provide that the legislature did not have limitation powers to fix degrees of proof in causes of action involving injury and death, then it would also be without the authority to legislate in such areas as “comparable negligence, statutes of limitation, contribution among joint tortfeasors, etc.” (see p. 1239). •
By observing that the legislature was indeed possessed with the power of adjustment in these areas, the court was not, of course, saying that the legislature would have the ultimate authority to use them to eradicate causes of action by, for example, adjusting statute of limitations timeframes down to zero, or adjusting comparable negligence statutes in such a burdensome way as to prevent parties from bringing tort actions under any circumstances.
Again, in its Kendig opinion, the court reiterates the proposition which holds that the statute under consideration was not violate of Art. 10, § 4, supra, because it only sets a standard of proof which must be followed where one employee asserts his or her cause of action against a co-employee. In this context, the court was considering plaintiff’s contention that Art. 1, § 8 was being abridged by reason of the legislature’s adjustment of the degree of negligence in W.S.1977, § 27-12-103(a). In response to this contention, the court said:
*410“Section 27-12-103(a) only sets a standard to be applied by the courts in an action by an employee against a co-employee for negligence resulting in a work-related injury. Such is not viola-tive of Art. 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution.”
Kendig, supra, at 1241.
Therefore, it seems clear that when the court looked at the legislature’s fixing of a degree of negligence or culpability proof, the court was simply fixing a standard of proof as between the parties, but it wasn’t even intimating that this kind of authority extended to the legislature's ability to do away with the cause of action altogether. In fact, the court in Kendig used a comparison between the first and second sentences of Art. 10, § 4 of the Constitution to fortify its view when it observed that the second sentence spoke to “right to recover damages,” which the court interpreted to mean no contract whatever could be entered into which would inhibit common-law rights of action, while the first sentence spoke to the legislature’s inability to enact legislation “limiting the amount of damages” as being language which, while not permitting the doing away with a right to recover damages, did permit adjustment and control of the degrees of negligence. In this regard, the court said:
“[4] Appellee argues that the first sentence of Art. 10, § 4, Wyoming Constitution, prohibits the legislature from granting immunity to co-employees for negligence, regardless of degree. She acknowledges the propriety of immunity granted to employers because of the subsequent language in Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. Such first sentence states that ‘no law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered * * * ’ (emphasis added). Section 27-12-103(a) does not limit the amount of damages to be recovered. It limits the cause of action available for a recovery. The fact that the first sentence of Art. 10, § 4 relates only to the amount of damages is exemplified by the second sentence which pertains to the ‘right to recover.’ A ‘limitation in amount’ and a ‘right to recovery’ were regarded as separate issues and treated separately by the framers of the Wyoming Constitution. See Journal and Debate of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, pp. 443-454 and 614-616 (1889). The plain language of such first sentence and its ordinary meaning reflects its prohibition to be against laws limiting the ‘amount of damages.’ Section 27-12-103(a) does not do that.” (Emphasis [Rose].)
Kendig, supra, at 1239.
(Emphasis in original and footnote omitted.) With accuracy, the author concluded:
We conclude this argument by allowing that Kendig does not address the constitutionality of a statute granting immunity to a co-employee in a worker’s compensation case. It only holds that a worker’s compensation statute which adjusts the degree of negligence or culpability which must be met in actions between co-employees is not in violation of Article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. We further urge that, since the legislature felt impelled to submit the Worker’s Compensation Amendment for adoption before enacting worker’s compensation statutes in the nature of industrial accident insurance, so that the first sentence of Article 10, § 4 would not be violated, it follows that a statute doing away with the common-law co-employee cause of action altogether must also fail in the face of the “limiting the amount of damages” language of the first sentence of Article 10, § 4, supra.
VII.
CONCLUSION
An employee injured at the hands of his criminal, culpably negligent or intentionally tortious co-employee constitutionally should be given an opportunity to recover damages for his physical harm. Because W.S. 27-14-104(a) clearly violates protected rights within the Wyoming Constitution, I *411dissent in anguish for this compulsion exclusion of justice and near intentional invitation for death or serious injury to stand at the shoulder of employees who are engaged in service in the extrahazardous Wyoming work places.19

. "Immunity beyond that necessary for ministerial, discretionary, legislative, or judicial functions is no more than a reincarnation of past mistakes * * *.” White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313, 1339 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).

. The majority result in this case is reminiscent of the In re Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 U.S. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1872). Such action emasculates the grandest ambitions of the framers of the Wyoming Constitution. See also White v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 307, 5 S.Ct. 923, 29 *400L.Ed. 199 (1885); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 5 S.Ct. 903, 29 L.Ed. 185 (1885); and Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of SlaughterHouse: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 Vand.L.Rev. 409 (1990). The nullification of constitutional rights by legislative enactment and by judicial absolution is unconscionable.

. It should not be forgotten that the basic law of Wyoming was stated by the drafters of our constitution in Wyo. Const, art. 19, § 7:
It shall be unlawful for any person, company or corporation, to require of its servants or employes as a condition of their employment, or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby such person, company or corporation shall be released or discharged from liability or responsibility, on account of personal injuries received by such servants or employes, while in the service of such person, company or corporation, by reason of the negligence of such person, company or corporation, or the agents or employes thereof, and such contracts shall be absolutely null and void.
and Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 22:
The rights of labor shall have just protection through laws calculated to secure to the laborer proper rewards for his service and to promote the industrial welfare of the state.
The purpose of the 1913 legislative resolution from which the Worker’s Compensation amendment came was not to legitimize yellow dog contracts by state legislative enactment, which is now the effect of this legislation here under review. This court takes the carefully considered and presented progressive plan for compensation insurance involving employer and employee, see Governor Joseph M. Carey’s Address to the Twelfth Wyoming State Legislature, 6 House Journal at 40 (1913), and, for political purposes of whatever persuasion, creates a kind of yellow dog contract between fellow employees by governmental fiat.

. If there is a quid pro quo, it is that the worker gives up everything in return for nothing. If the idea presented by the majority is correct, we should give general immunity to the slothful criminal and intentionally harmful among our citizens and absolve all rights of recovery for damage sustained by the innocent victims. The quid pro quo in this case is enjoyed absolution of responsibility given to insurance companies who otherwise will be called to respond under insuring policies for wrongful conduct of those who are insured. The employee gains nothing and the law was in no way intended to provide employee benefits. It is an insurance company benefit enactment, except I am not so naive as to fail to recognize some benefit also in employer’s reduced premiums paid for general liability insurance which may cover officers, management and supervisors who determine the safety of the workplace.

. Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 8 states in part that "[a]ll courts shall be open and every person for an *402injury done to person, reputation or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”

. I cite with approval Mattson v. City of Astoria, 39 Or. 577, 65 P. 1066, 1067 (1901), a case interpreting Or. Const, art. 1, § 10. The clause, which states in part that “ ‘every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in person, property, or reputation,”’ was dispositive in the court’s holding that the constitutional provision guaranteeing a remedy for an injury allowed the legislature to change the remedy, attach conditions precedent to its exercise, and perhaps to abolish old and substitute new remedies, but it did not allow the legislature to deny a remedy entirely.

. Wyo. Const, art. 3, § 27 states in relevant part:
The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: * * * for limitations of civil actions; * * * [or] granting to any corporation, association or individual, the right to * * * any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever * * *.

. In Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128, 1136 (Wyo.1990), this court defined "culpable negligence” as
"willful and serious misconduct.” The term "willful” means "such as is done purposely, with knowledge — or misconduct of such a character as to evince a reckless disregard of consequences.” We distinguish "willful misconduct” from "ordinary negligence” by the aggravating factor of the tort-feasor's state of mind. We require a plaintiff to prove the tort-feasor acted with a state of mind that approaches intent to do harm. Since we appreciate that a plaintiff faces a difficult task in trying to prove the tort-feasor’s state of mind, we allow the plaintiff to demonstrate that a tort-feasor has intentionally committed an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow.

. Not all commentators accept the "different in kind” distinction. Cf. Dear and Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1 (1984).

. Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 34 states that "[a]II laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operátion.”

. W.S. 27-14-105(a) states:
If an employee covered by this act receives an injury under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than the employer to pay damages, the employee if engaged in work for his employer at the time of the injury is not deprived of any compensation to which he is entitled under this act. He may also pursue his remedy at law against the third party or the coemployee to the extent permitted by W.S. 27-14-104(a). If the employee recovers from the third party or the coemployee in any manner including judgment, compromise, settlement or release, the state is entitled to be reimbursed for all payments made, or to be made, to or on behalf of the employee under this act but not to exceed one-third (½) of the total proceeds of the recovery without regard to the types of damages alleged in the third-party action. All money received by the state under this section shall be credited to the worker’s compensation account and considered in computing the employer’s experience rating.

. Governor Joseph M. Carey in 1913, as the father of Wyoming’s Worker’s Compensation constitutional statutory law, enumerated the four important reasons for his recommendations:
First, to furnish certain prompt and reasonable compensation to the injured employee;
Second, to utilize for injured employees a large portion of the great amount of money wasted under the present system;
Third, to provide a tribunal where disputes between employer and employee in regard to compensation may be settled promptly, cheaply and summarily;
Fourth, to provide a means for minimizing the number of accidents in industrial pursuits.
Governor Joseph M. Carey’s Address to the Twelfth Wyoming State Legislature, supra, at 40.

.See Grantham, 359 So.2d at 788, where the court estimated that the ever-present threat of suit by an injured worker for negligent acts of a co-employee had a deterrent value; immunity would result in workers being less careful on the job. See, generally, 81 Am.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation § 67 (1976); Annotation, Willful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct of Coemployee as Ground of Liability Despite Bar of Workers' Compensation Law, 57 A.L.R.4A 888, 891 § 2 (1987). One law of nature is immutable and as old as "civilization" itself: Economic greed kills and maims. Society exists to limit or ameliorate uncontrolled greed of the individual, group or nation.

. Public policy arguments against co-employee immunity for intentionally inflicted injuries were considered in Newby v. Gerry, 38 Wash. App. 812, 690 P.2d 603, 607-08 (1984):
Sound public policy demands that an intentional wrongdoer not use the workers' compensation laws as a shelter from liability. A number of courts in other jurisdictions have relied on this rationale in allowing such suits to proceed. * * * Forbidding suit would allow an employee to bludgeon a co-worker with civil impunity, and the injured worker might be required to accept less than full compensation for his injuries. * * *
Moreover, barring suit would remove the deterrent effect of civil liability and damages. As the court noted in Bryan v. Utah Inti, [533 P.2d 892 (Utah, 1975) ] supra at 894:
"The policy of our law has always been to allow one injured through the intentional act of another, to seek redress from the one intending harm. That policy has the salutary effect of deterring intentional injury. It would serve no social purpose to allow an employee to intentionally injure another employee engaged in the same employment, then use an otherwise socially beneficial, remedial, statute as a shield for such wrongdoing.

. Two recent Utah Statute of Repose cases in a nature similar to this court's decision in Phillips, 611 P.2d 821 demonstrates how far this court has strayed and how result-oriented this case becomes in constitutional protection and rights denigration terms. Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) and Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989) analyzed constitutional concepts when a statute, through a statute of repose, denied plaintiffs common law rights and remedies. In the two exhaustive opinions, the Utah court found legislative evisceration of an injured party’s rights to be constitutionally foreclosed by legislative failure to provide a fair substitute remedy, an arbitrary and capricious and unreasonable means employed to achieve a questioned objective. Constitutional protection of equal protection, due process and open court was tested and the statute was found wanting in validity. Here, like there, the open court provision of Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 8 is clearly violated. A substitute remedy of equal value is clearly not provided and the right which has existed for centuries to recover for harm done becomes unavailable with denied remedy.

. In Markle, 518 P.2d at 625, this court recognized that a constitutional amendment was necessary in order to eliminate a cause of action against an employer when the original Worker's Compensation Act was passed in 1914. We stated:
When Wyoming reached the time that it needed a workmen’s compensation law, there was an obstacle. * * *
******
Hence, if the contemplated law was to provide for limited compensation benefits and make those benefits sole and exclusive remedies, an amendment to Art. 10, § 4, was necessary. Therefore, the legislature proposed and the voters ratified the 1914 amendment. * * *
* * * It is entirely clear, however, that nothing was changed with respect to a fellow employee. The amendment being in 1914 when industrial suits were quite infrequent, it would appear the situation with respect to co-workers was not dealt with. The result is that common-law rights (such as the right of a worker to sue a fellow employee) remained unchanged; and that right continues to this time.
Id. at 625.
Similarly, in 1986 when the legislature sought to allow non-extrahazardous employers the option of participating in the Act, Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4 (1986 amend.) was again amended to add the last two sentences which read:
Subject to conditions specified by law, the legislature may allow employments not designated extrahazardous to be covered by the state fund at the option of the employer. To the extent an employer elects to be covered by the state fund and contributes to the fund as required by law, the employer shall enjoy the same immunity as provided for extrahazardous employments.

. Under the provisions of Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4, the employee loses his rights to benefits when the injury is "due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee.” Consequently, as the structure of the law is now approved by the majority, the employee has no rights to benefits if that employee is guilty of culpable negligence, but even so, that employee has no general rights of injury recovery when culpable negligence is committed against him by fellow workers or administrative personnel of the employer. Again, the quid pro quo is a right to receive nothing as a price of giving up everything.

. The specially concurring opinion relies on the Wyoming legislature’s adoption of the "Heart Balm" statutes, W.S. 1-23-101 through 1-23-104, enacted in 1941, for the proposition that the legislature can create or eliminate causes of action. Justice Cardine concludes, “The constitutional power of the legislature to abolish this cause of action is so clear, it has never been questioned.”
I disagree both as to the power of the legislature and as to "unquestioned clarity" of the premise. While he is correct that the constitutionality of the "Heart Balm" statutes has not been litigated, and while the constitutionality of legislation is presumed unless affirmatively shown to be otherwise, there is no justification for the resulting conclusion that the absence of a constitutional challenge in that instance and in a completely different context supports the proposition that the legislature has the authority to abolish a cause of action in contravention of explicit language in the Wyoming Constitution. See Wyo. Const, art. 10, § 4 and Stephenson v. Mitchell ex rel. Workmen’s Compensation Dept., 569 P.2d 95 (Wyo. 1977). The “Heart Balm" statutes were enacted to alleviate the effects of vexatious litigation, fraud and collusion. See Note, "Heart Balm " Legislation and the Constitution, 1 Wyo.L.J. 75, 81 (1947). There is nothing to suggest that the same or similar factors motivated the Wyoming legislature in 1986 to extend absolute immunity to co-employees under Wyoming’s Worker’s Compensation Act; rather, the legislature acted in response to the perceived threat of insolvency of the compensation fund.
The legislative reasoning cited by Justice Car-dine to the effect that it is the public policy of Wyoming that the " “best interests of the people of the state will be served by the abolition of [the “Heart Balm”] remedies’ ’’ is distinguishable and, in fact, provides compelling argument in favor of reversal in the case now before this court. The interests of the people of Wyoming, and particularly all employees covered by Worker’s Compensation, would be best served if co-employee immunity is abolished and intentionally tortious or culpably negligent wrongdoers are held responsible for their misconduct. Co-employee immunity discourages safety in the workplace and serves only to protect those who deserve no protection.

. The front page headlines in the Sunday, March 3, 1991 Casper Star-Tribune, Wyoming’s statewide newspaper states: “Workplace safety poor in Wyo — Job-related death, injury rate second worst in U.S." The story describes Wyoming as the second worst, better only than Alaska and about fifty percent higher than Montana which, with similar job characteristics, ranked third. Idaho, in fourth place, had only fifty percent of the number of fatalities per average number of workers. National statistics provided by the story by the National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety revealed deaths per 100,000 workers in a six year period were Alaska, 34.2; Wyoming, 32.5; Montana, 22.6; and Idaho, 18.6. Forty-five states had job-related deaths less than half of Wyoming. It can be statutorily said that we in Wyoming legislate and adjudicate to accept death and injury in the work place.