Court Opinion

ID: 9646636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:05:46.369376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:40.277050
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
DICE, Judge.
In his motion for rehearing appellant challenges the sufficiency of the allegations of the indictment as to- the ownership of the property alleged to have been stolen and the description of the money alleged to have been stolen and the description of the money alleged to have been taken.
The sufficiency of the indictment was questioned by appellant in the trial court by exceptions filed thereto, which were by the court overruled.
As stated in our original opinion, the indictment alleged ownership of the money in the estate of Mary E. Rose, deceased, and possession in W. C. Shandley, as one of the heirs of Mary E. Rose, deceased.
*393We think that, under the peculiar facts in this case, that ownership of the money at the time it was charged to have been taken could be alleged in the estate of Mary E. Rose, deceased. Under the evidence it is shown that the money was taken from her body at the funeral home before her will had been read and long before it had been probated. At the time of the taking, the money had not come into the custody of the executor, legatees or heirs of her estate. We are not unmindful of the provisions of Articl 402, V. A. C. C. P., which provides that when the property belongs to the estate of a deceased person, the ownership may be alleged to be in the executor, administrator or heirs of such deceased person, or in any one of such heirs. A review of the cases, which hold that under this statute ownership of property belonging to an estate may be alleged in the executor, administrator or heirs of the deceased person, shows that some person named in the statute had taken control over the property of the estate after the death of the deceased. Such were not the facts in the case at bar at the time the money was taken.
The money alleged to have been taken was described in the indictment as “money of the value of $580.00.” This was a sufficient description of the money. See Campbell v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 504, 135 S. W. 548, and Guyon v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 287, 230 S. W. 408.
We remain convinced that there was not a fatal variance between the allegation and proof of the possession of the money alleged to have been taken, and again overrule appellant’s contention that the possession of the money should have been alleged in A. C. Gilmore, the executor of the estate.
Under the provisions of Article 3314, Vernon’s Ann. R. C. S., upon the death of Mrs. Rose all of her estate immediately vested in the devisees or legatees under her will, subject to the payment of debts and except such as may be exempt by law, and upon the issuance of letters testamentary upon the estate the executor had the right to possession of the estate as it existed at the time of her death.
Until the will of Mrs. Rose was. probated, Gilmore had no authority to act as executor of her estate. Roberts v. Stewart, 80 Tex. 379, 15 S. W. 1108; Coleman v. Texas Produce Company, 204 S. W. 382; and Willis et al v. Harvey, 26 S. W. (2d) 288.
*394At the time the money was taken, the will had not been probated and Gilmore as the executor named therein had no right to the possession of the money stolen from the body of Mrs. Rose.
We overrule appellant’s contention that the evidence shows possession of the money in the Dunn Funeral Home and that the act of taking the money could not constitute theft but would be embezzlement or theft by bailee. The money on the body of the deceased did not belong to the funeral home, and appellant’s act, as its employee, in converting it to his own use, could not be embezzlement from his principal. The taking of custody of a body by a funeral home for the purpose of preparing it for burial does not constitute a contract to borrow or hire the body for its own use and benefit and is therefore not a bailment.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion approved by the court.