Court Opinion

ID: 9551303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:51:03.019043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:30.207644
License: Public Domain

Fatzer, J.,
dissenting: In my judgment the court improvidently issued its order of mandamus on October 31, 1967, here confirmed by the majority opinion, and I must respectfully dissent. Although time presses, I feel compelled to state my views.
The issues presented in the cases in the district courts of Grant, Stanton and Morton Counties were identical, and all reference to Grant County, the county clerk, and the district court, applies as well to Stanton and Morton Counties. The plaintiffs in the instant action are referred to as the private plaintiffs.
The court has unnecessarily, and I think mistakenly, injected itself into the long existing controversy between the land and royalty owners in the Hugoton Gas Field, on the one hand, and the owners of the leasehold interests or the producing companies, on the other hand. This “running fight” is extraordinary and has raged from the hearing rooms of the State Corporation Commission to the cloistered chambers of the Supreme Court of the United States. It has drawn in this court, the Federal Power Commission, state and federal district courts, members of the Legislature, leading members of our Bar, and the county attorneys of most every county in the Hugoton Gas Field. The controversy has flared *245for many years and the end is not yet. Actions by land and royalty owners are presently pending in the federal district court of Kansas over the proceeds of the sale of helium to the United States government extracted from gas produced in that area of our state, which, according to some experts, amount to many millions of dollars, not to mention the hundreds of cases pending in our district courts to recover the price differential for the sale of gas involving orders of the FPC, the contract price, and the .11 cent wellhead price order issued by the State Corporation Commission which was sustained by this court in Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 180 Kan. 454, 304 P. 2d 528, and reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, without formal opinion, in Cities Service v. State Comm'n, 355 U. S. 391, 2 L. Ed. 2d 355, 78 S. Ct. 381, rehearing denied 355 U. S. 967, 2 L. Ed. 2d 542, 78 S. Ct. 531.
The majority opinion states the court issued its order of mandamus on October 31, 1967, primarily for the reason that “time . . . was the essence” since on the following day (November 1, 1967), the 1967 ad valorem taxes would be certified by the county clerk and become due and become a lien upon the properties involved, and, further, that if the order were not issued on that date, the private plaintiffs herein “would have had to resort to the payment of taxes under protest (79-2005, supra)” which “would have resulted in a substantial handicap to the operation of government in these three counties, or jeopardized the operation of such county governments,” and produce a situation “so extraordinary and of such concern to the public of this state and to the operation of the county governments . . . as to require immediate attention by this court.” But this explanation does not let the court off the horns of the dilemma, since it is reasonable to expect that countless land and royalty owners in Grant County have paid and will pay their 1967 taxes under protest pursuant to K. S. A. 79-2005, causing the alleged illegal taxes to be impounded in a separate fund and unavailable for the operation of county government until a court of law has determined the validity of those protests. As a result of the “running fight,” the financial structure of Grant County will doubtless be impaired, and the reasons advanced by the majority opinion in support of the court’s issuance of the order of mandamus are unavailing.
Moreover, this court issued its order of mandamus despite the *246allegations of the private plaintiffs that they “commenced no proceedings ... in the district court of Grant County for the reason that . . . any such action would be futile and useless.” (Emphasis supplied.) The allegation is totally unsupported and is an insult to our judicial system. Be that as it may, the district court of Grant County has jurisdiction in mandamus actions concurrent with that of the supreme court. While the supreme court has original jurisdiction in mandamus in certain instances and under certain circumstances, it also has appellate jurisdiction over all district courts, including the district court of Grant County. I regret to say, and I do so with deference — that the majority’s broadside at the mandatory injunction decree of the district court creates confusion in the administration of justice and violates well settled rules of orderly procedure relating to appellate review of judgments of district courts based upon statutory laws and decisions of this court construing them, all of which tends to belittle and degrade our district court system. Our original jurisdiction should not be perverted by the issuance of orders in mandamus actions commenced by private citizens to compel public officials to perform their duties, and more specifically, the remedy should not be made available to review judgments of district courts of this state. In Bishop v. Fischer, 94 Kan. 105, 145 Pac. 890, Mr. Justice Burch said: “The action of mandamus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, nor in any case where a plain and adequate remedy at law exists.” (Emphasis supplied.) In State, ex rel., v. Norton, 20 Kan. 506, Mr. Justice Brewer said: “. . . The writ [of mandamus] never attempted to correct errors in the rulings of judicial officers, but only to compel them to make a ruling . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, sometime between September 7, 1967, the date the mandatory injunction decree was entered in Grant County, and October 16, 1967, the date the instant action was filed in this court, the private plaintiffs were advised of the nature of the judgment entered in Grant County. Under those circumstances, and pursuant to Moyer v. Board of County Commissioners, 197 Kan. 23, 415 P. 2d 261, the private plaintiffs should have made “timely application” to intervene in that action. (K. S. A. 60-224 [a] [2].) As the majority opinion indicates, the private plaintiffs not only had an adequate remedy at law available to them by paying their taxes under protest, but, as I understand the Moyer case, they had the right to *247intervene and appeal the judgment of the district court of Grant County and to have that judgment reviewed by this court in the manner provided by law. Failing in those respects, this court should not have issued its order of mandamus.
The record affirmatively discloses the county clerk of Grant County complied in all respects with the orders of the State Board of Equalization by extending the assessment valuations therein established upon the private plaintiffs’ leasehold interests. Thus, it cannot be said the county clerk arbitrarily failed or refused to perform a clear-cut legal duty imposed upon her by law. Hence, the only obvious purpose of this court’s order of mandamus is to collaterally attack the judgment of the district court of Grant County under the guise that the judgment was absolutely void. As hereafter noted, it should be borne in mind there is a clear legal distinction between a void judgment and an erroneous judgment.
Is the remedy of mandamus available to the private plaintiffs? In my judgment it is not. In the first place, the instant action is essentially one which questions the validity of assessments of real and personal property in Grant County and the levy of taxes thereon. In the second place, the issuance of the order of mandamus was based entirely upon the conclusion that the mandatory injunction decree of the district court of Grant County was absolutely void. I will discuss the points in the order stated after two primary matters are dealt with.
First, I briefly refer to our new statutes pertaining to mandamus. I do not understand that the new code of civil procedure, which repealed our prior statutes relating to mandamus (G. S. 1949, 60-1701-60-1712) and enacted K. S. A. 60-801-60-803, made any change in substantive rights with respect to the extent of the reach of the remedy and who are proper parties plaintiff in a given situation. The Advisory Committee Notes expressly state no substantive rights were affected and in his Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, Judge Gard states the prior case law of Kansas will continue to have authoritative impact under the new code. (Sec. 60-802, p. 610.) Under our prior law, the action was required to be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. (State v. County of Jefferson, 11 Kan. * 66.) While mandamus is now defined (K. S. A. 60-801), the change of the name from "writ” to “order” did not change the traditional character of the remedy, and the provision that the remedy is obtainable "under the same procedure as relief in other civil actions” (K. S. A. 60-802 [a]), simply means *248that the petition for the remedy, the answer to the petition, and perhaps the reply, constitute the pleadings on which the issue is tried. (5 Vernon’s Kansas Statutes Annotated Code of Civ. Proc. [Fowks, Harvey, Thomas], § 803.) Hence, mandamus still remains unusual relief (an extraordinary, discretionary remedy), but granted in the usual manner of civil actions.
Second, we were told in oral argument that the private taxpayer action in Grant County was commenced pursuant to K. S. A. 60-907 and 60-223. The briefs of the defendants and the intervenors make the same claim. That action had all the appearance of what purports to be a class action, but named only Frank R. Collins as plaintiff. Both statutes were referred to in Schulenberg v. City of Reading, 196 Kan. 43, 410 P. 2d 324 (p. 48), but it was unnecessary to determine whether the provisions of 60-223 authorized a class action for injunctive relief against an illegal assessment or levy of taxes. The point is here mentioned only because the majority opinion implies that this action was commenced by the plaintiff as a class action pursuant to 60-223, and comprised all the taxpayers in Grant County, other than the private plaintiffs. Hence, I deem it appropriate to make the following observation with respect to the application of both statutes.
Sec. 60-223 (3) states the general rule of bringing a class action where the right sought to be enforced for the class is several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought. (2 Vernons Kansas Statutes Annotated Code of Civ. Proc. [Fowks, Harvey, Thomas]; Law Review, and other commentaries.) Sec. 60-907 authorizes the bringing of an action to enjoin an illegal assessment or levy of a tax or charge, or any proceeding to enforce it, and deals with that specific matter, and with that alone. The statutes should be construed harmoniously, so that each has a field for its operation, if that reasonably can be done. Following the general rule that a statute pertaining to a specific thing takes precedence over and controls the application of a general statute which might be construed to relate to it (Wulf v. Fitzpatrick, 124 Kan. 642, 261 Pac. 838; Sherman County Comm’rs v. Alden, 158 Kan. 487, 148 P. 2d 509; Cutrel v. Best, 169 Kan. 16, 217 P. 2d 270), it is clear to me that 60-907 is valid and applicable to the specific subject matter to which it relates, and that 60-223 is inapplicable for injunctive relief to restrain an illegal assessment, tax or charge. The conclusion logically *249follows since 60-907 provides that any number of persons whose property is or may be affected may join in the petition for injunction. This requirement complements K. S. A. 79-2005, providing in effect that any person may pay his taxes under protest, and timely pursue the remedies provided. The procedure and actions authorized by that statute are clearly individual.
It follows that since Frank R. Collins was the only named plaintiff in the private taxpayer action, the judgment of the district court entered on September 7, 1967, should be construed as being applicable only to his property in Grant County.
Turning now to the first point with respect to the availability of the remedy. Our cases are legion that mandamus will not lie at the instance of private citizens to compel the performance of a public duty, and that such actions must be brought in the name of the state on the relation of the county attorney or the attorney general. In Smith v. City of Prairie Village, 175 Kan. 469, 471, 264 P. 2d 1053, Mr. Chief Justice Harvey collected and cited a few of our many cases on the point. There are cases holding that where an individual shows an injury or interest specific and peculiar to himself, and one not shared with the community in general, the remedy of mandamus may be available. However, an exception to that rule has been engrafted in the remedy with respect to original actions in mandamus in the supreme court by aggrieved taxpayers. In Weigand v. City of Wichita, 111 Kan. 455, 207 Pac. 651, it was held:
“Taxpayers specially aggrieved by the action of public officials in levying taxes against their property have a right of action provided by the code to enjoin such levy or assessment, if such remedy is promptly invoked; but they have no general legal right to question the validity of such levy or assessment by instituting an original action in mandamus in the supreme court to compel the public officers to perform their official-duty.
“An action to compel public officials to perform their duty should be brought in the name of the state on the relation of the county attorney or attorney-general, and such action cannot ordinarily be maintained by a private citizen.” (Syl. ¶¶ 2, 3.) (Emphasis supplied.)
See, also, Smith v. City of Prairie Village, supra.
It would have been improper for the county attorney to have commenced mandamus in this court in the name of the state for and on behalf of the private plaintiffs. As counsel of record for the county clerk in the district court (K. S. A. 19-702, 19-704), the county attorney would have violated his duty as an attorney to commence such an action. See American Bar Association Com*250mittee on Legal Ethics, Canon Nos. 6 and 37. See, also, State v. Leigh, 178 Kan. 549, 289 P. 2d 774, and Wilson v. Wahl, 182 Kan. 532, 537, 322 P. 2d 804, where the attorney-client relationship insofar as here applicable, is discussed. But that did not excuse the private plaintiffs from alleging they requested the attorney general to institute an original action in mandamus in the supreme court, or that such official refused, particularly where the original mandamus action sought to collaterally attack the judgment of the district court of Grant County as being void.
The majority opinion states the court has been cited to no case holding mandamus to be an improper remedy in the situation confronting the court. Perhaps so. Counsel for the defendants were afforded little time to brief the legal questions presented, and were not afforded copies of the private plaintiffs’ brief prior to oral argument on October 30, 1967. Syllabus paragraph 16 of the majority opinion states in effect that the legal remedy available to the private plaintiffs would be clearly inadequate notwithstanding a collateral attack is made upon a void mandatory injunction decree entered by a district court where the plaintiffs were not parties to such action and are clearly entitled to relief. The opinion cites and quotes from A. T. & S. F. Rld. Co. v. Comm'rs of Jefferson Co., 12 Kan. 127, to the effect that mandamus will not ordinarily be issued to command the doing of an act enjoined by the decree of a competent court, particularly when one not a party to that decree had rights which could be secured only by a writ of mandamus. Justice Brewer’s opinion expressly recognizes that mandamus will not lie where there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary proceeding of the law, but where the ordinary remedies of law are insufficient for a proper enforcement of the right claimed, the writ may be available. There, the plaintiff sought to compel the issuance of railroad aid bonds by the county and Justice Brewer stated it was difficult to say by what proceedings other than mandamus the bonds could be obtained. Be that as it may, that opinion was properly labled as an exception to the rule in State v. Hornaday, 62 Kan. 334, 62 Pac. 998.
In the Hornaday case the state on the relation of the attorney general commenced an original action in mandamus in the supreme court to compel the members of the Board of Trustees of the charitable institutions of this state to comply with an act of the Legislature *251and proceed in the performance of their duties. Mr. Chief Justice Doster, speaking for the court, said:
“Two principal defenses are stated in the return to the writ: (1) That the members of the board, before the service of the writ, had been enjoined by the district court of Clay county, in an action instituted against them by the state of Kansas, upon the relation of the county attorney, from doing the required act; (2) that no statutory authority exists for its performance by them. The matter alleged in the first of the above claims of defense is admitted to be true, and we are of the opinion, without doubt, that such defense is a valid one.
“ ‘The rule is well established that the writ will not be granted to compel the performance of an act which has been expressly forbidden by an injunction in the same court or in another court of competent jurisdiction, or whose performance would be in direct violation of an existing injunction, even though the person seeking relief by mandamus is not a party to the injunction suit. Courts will not compel parties to perform acts which would subject them to punishment, or which would put them in conflict with the order of writ of another court, nor will the court, in such cases, to which application is made for a mandamus, inquire into the propriety of the injunction.’ (High, Extr. Leg. Rem. § 23.)
“The case of Ohio & Indiana R. R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Wyandot County, 7 Ohio St. 278, and many other like cases, support the quoted text. There are occasional apparent exceptions to this rule, one of which is A. T. & S. F. Rld. Co. v. Comm’rs of Jefferson Co., 12 Kan. 127, but the general doctrine is as stated. The ground of the decision in that case was that the one seeking relief by mandamus had been denied admission as a party to the injunction proceeding, and, besides, had rights which could be ultimately enforced only by mandamus. Therefore, while the district courts are courts of jurisdiction inferior to the supreme court, we cannot arbitrarily ignore their judgments and orders and command the doing of an act which they, within the undoubted limits of their jurisdiction, have enjoined. We may reverse or otherwise revise their judgments and orders, but we can only do so when brought to us in a formal way for such purpose.” (l. c. 335, 336.) (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule stated in Hornaday was reaffirmed and applied in State v. Snelling, 71 Kan. 499, 80 Pac. 966, which was an original action in mandamus in the supreme court commenced in the name of the state on the relation of the county attorney to compel the judge of the Court of Coffeyville to issue warrants for the arrest of certain persons. The answer to the writ pleaded an injunction issued by the district court against the county commissioners, the sheriff and his deputies, and the county attorney, from arresting the employees of a gas company who were engaged in laying mains and pipe across the roads and highways of the county. It was held that to have issued a writ of mandamus would violate the terms of the injunction of the district court and that the supreme court will not, by manda*252mus, require the magistrate to issue warrants in violation of the injunction. I have no doubt but that the rule stated in Hornaday is the law of this state.
It is true the private plaintiffs were not parties to the action in the district court of Grant County. No substantial reason was alleged why the private plaintiffs could not have applied to be made parties, or to intervene in that action, and set up every claim which has been set up in the petition for this order. They only alleged it would have been futile and useless to commence proceedings in that court. As indicated, they had at least two adequate remedies at law available to them: First, to have timely intervened pursuant to 60-224 (a) (2), and, as construed and applied in Moyer, supra, to have perfected an appeal from that judgment, and second, to have paid their taxes under protest and commenced actions in the district court of Grant County to recover the alleged illegal taxes. See our recent cases of Cities Service Oil Co. v. Kronewitter, 199 Kan. 228, 428 P. 2d 804, and Cities Service Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 199 Kan. 235, 428 P. 2d 456. In either instance, and in tire event of an adverse judgment, the question could have been presented to this court in accordance with well established rules of appellate procedure. It has been consistently held that the remedy of mandamus will not lie where there is an adequate remedy by appeal. (Brockman v. Bayman, 135 Kan. 238, 10 P. 2d 31; Gray v. Jenkins, 183 Kan. 251, 326 P. 2d 319). To entitle the private plaintiffs to an order of mandamus, the record must disclose affirmatively that there was no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and in the absence of such a showing, the court should not have issued its order of October 31, 1967.
The majority opinion states that the private taxpayer action in the district court of Grant County is construed “. . . as tantamount to an appeal from an order of the State Board of Tax Appeals to the district court”; that the order of the State Board of Equalization was “conclusive not only upon the county officials, but upon all other taxpayers in Grant County — the plaintiffs in the private taxpayer action” (emphasis supplied), and “that the district court in the private taxpayer action in Grant County, Kansas, was simply an interloper”; that the district court “had no jurisdiction to hear the private taxpayers action,” and that the court’s judgment “granting injunctive relief to the plaintiffs therein is a nullity and absolutely void.”
*253The statements are too broad and sweeping. I cannot agree that any of our district courts are “interlopers” in any judicial matter pending before them. Neither can I agree that the action in the district court of Grant County was “an appeal from an order of the State Board of Tax Appeals.” No such right of appeal exists. (Board of County Commissioners v. Brookover, 198 Kan. 70, 422 P. 2d 906.) Moreover, there is nothing sacrosanct about an order of the State Board of Equalization, and when questioned in litigation, it is the judiciary which must pass upon its validity. Of course, such an order is binding on the county clerk as to the valuations certified in the particular order (K. S. A. 79-1409 and 79-1803), since its regularity is presumed, based upon the presumption the Board acted honestly and in good faith. The rule assumes that proper methods have been followed and an under or over valuation, if any, is a matter of the exercise of judgment. (Hitch Land & Cattle Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 179 Kan. 357, 364, 295 P. 2d 640.) However, courts may inquire into the validity of orders issued by the State Board of Equalization. In Salt Co. v. Ellsworth County, 82 Kan. 203, 107 Pac. 640, it was held:
“While the decision of the tax commission in fixing and equalizing the assessment of property is plenary and final when honestly, although erroneously, made, the petition of a taxpayer for an injunction, in which it was alleged that the tax commission had fixed an exorbitant and excessive valuation upon plaintiff’s property, one which the commission knew to be grossly excessive, and that it had placed a valuation on plaintiff’s property much higher [or much lower] than it had placed on similar property owned by others, stated a good cause of action for equitable relief, and the demurrer thereto should have been overruled.” (Syllabus.)
In the opinion it was said that mere error of judgment of the assessing officer is no reason for interference by a court, but a taxpayer is entitled to the honest judgment of the assessing officers, and if an assessment is fraudulently made excessive, or if it is arbitrarily or capriciously made and is so out of proportion to the actual value as to give reasonable assurance that the officers could not have been honest in fixing the valuation, courts of equity are justified in enjoining the enforcement of the tax. It was further said the fact that the State Board of Equalization did not obtain the best evidence of value or adopt the best plan in estimating the value of the property does not necessarily entitle the plaintiff to an injunction; it must appear that the theory in its practical operation was hurtful to the plaintiff and that through the arbitrary, capricious *254and fraudulent action of the taxing officers, an unjust assessment was made. The case was reaffirmed and quoted from in Bank v. Lyon County, 83 Kan. 376, 379, 111 Pac. 496.
In Hitch Land & Cattle Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, supra, the plaintiff-appellee pursued the administrative remedies available and presented its assessment grievance to the County-Board of Equalization. The county board denied the relief sought and the company appealed to the State Commission of Revenue and Taxation, sitting as the State Board of Equalization. The State Board of Equalization issued its order that the facts did not justify a reduction of the valuation and assessment and sustained the county board. The plaintiff, having paid its taxes under protest (79-2005), commenced an action in the district court. Despite the fact the plaintiff had pursued administrative tax assessment remedies, including the issuance of an order by the State Board of Equalization, the court entered judgment sustaining the plaintiff in all respects, and upon appeal, this court affirmed. Directing its attention to the contention the district court was without power to place a valuation on the plaintiff’s land and compute the tax, the court, speaking through Justice Thiele, said:
“. . . While viewed from one angle it might be said the trial court had to fix a valuation in order to determine the issue, it is more nearly correct to say that under the facts stipulated the valuation was too high in an amount equal to the valuation placed on the severed mineral interests, and all that was involved was a mere calculation.” (1. c. 364.)
Was the judgment of the district court of Grant County void? The crux of this case is the court’s failure to distinguish between the exercise of its power to review a case on its merits formally before it for appellate review pursuant to K. S. A. 60-2101 (b), and the limitation of its power to determine the validity of a judgment rendered by a district court which is collaterally attacked in an original proceeding in mandamus as being void. It is unnecessary to pass upon the merits of the mandatory injunction decree since that judgment is not before the court for appellate review. I cannot agree that the district court of Grant County did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the Collins’ private taxpayer action. As hereafter indicated, the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and any error affecting a decision of a court is of practical importance in that where a court has jurisdiction, an erroneous decision is not void, and is therefore, not subject to collateral attack. (20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 90, pp. 450, 451.) Time does not permit the *255research of all our decisions on the point, but a few of them include: Bradford v. Larkin, 57 Kan. 90, 45 Pac. 69; Eberhardt Lumber Co. v. Lecuyer, 153 Kan. 386, 110 P. 2d 757; Bitzer v. Smith, 158 Kan. 83, 145 P. 2d 148; Bindley v. Mitchell, 170 Kan. 653, 228 P. 2d 689, and In re Estate of Johnson, 180 Kan. 740, 308 P. 2d 100.
Our statute (K. S. A. 60-907) expressly gives the district court jurisdiction to hear and determine suits brought by private taxpayers to obtain injunctive relief against an illegal assessment or an illegal levy of any tax or charge, or any proceeding to enforce the same. The purpose of the private taxpayer action was to enjoin the assessment of plaintiff Collins’ land and mineral interests alleged to be at a rate in excess of 27 percent of the assessed valuation of the private plaintiffs’ properties. The action was not only authorized by 60-907, but by many decisions of this court. (C. B. & Q. Rld. Co. v. Comm'rs of Atchison Co., 54 Kan. 781, 39 Pac. 1039; Bank of Garnett v. Ferris, 55 Kan. 120, 122, 123, 39 Pac. 1042; Bank v. Lyon County, supra; Railroad Co. v. Mitchell County, 110 Kan. 582, 584, 204 Pac. 729; Patterson v. Montgomery County Comm’rs, 145 Kan. 559, 66 Pac. 2d 400; Hitch Land & Cattle Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, supra; Kansas City Southern Rly. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 183 Kan. 675, 331 P. 2d 899.) See, also, Union Pac. Rld. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 145 Kan. 715, 68 P. 2d 1, holding that a district court has the power to determine whether the assessment valuation was arbitrarily or unreasonably made by the State Tax Commission. See, also, Linder v. Board of County Commissioners, 186 Kan. 107, 348 P. 2d 815, where the petition alleged the action was brought under G. S. 1949, 60-1121 (now K. S. A. 60-907), and it was said that the ultimate relief sought was precisely that mentioned in the statute, and the plaintiff was entitled to bring the action.
It has been uniformly held that where a court has jurisdiction of the parties to an action and of the subject matter and renders a judgment within its competency, even if erroneous, that judgment is final and conclusive unless corrected or modified on appeal, or by such other method as may be prescribed by statute, and it may not be attacked collaterally otherwise. A few of our many cases on the point are: Rennolds v. Guthrie, 103 Kan. 829, 177 Pac. 359; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 144 Kan. 359, 58 P. 2d 1158; Middendorf v. Kansas Power & Light Co. 166 Kan. 610, 203 P. 2d 156; Farmer v. Farmer, 177 Kan. 657, 281 P. 2d 1075, and In re *256Estate of Burling, 179 Kan. 687, 298 P. 2d 290. In In re Estate of Johnson, supra, it was held:
“Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and decide a matter, and the test of jurisdiction is not a correct decision but a right to enter upon inquiry and make a decision; it is not limited to the power to decide a case rightly, but includes the power to decide it wrongly.” (Syl. ¶ 3.)
Jurisdiction of a court to render a valid judgment depends upon three things: (1) The statutory authority of a court to entertain and decide questions which arise in the kind of action which was brought, and in the Collins’ taxpayer action, means statutory authority of tire court to hear and decide an action by a taxpayer in Grant County who feels himself aggrieved and seeks to enjoin an alleged illegal assessment or levy of any tax or charge. There can be no contention the district court lacked such authority. The statute specifically grants it. (2) Jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. This may depend upon whether he is properly named as party-defendant, and served with summons in a manner provided by law, or enters his voluntary appearance in the case. In the taxpayer action, the county clerk entered her appearance in the action and no summons was issued. (3) In order to render a particular judgment, the pleadings should present the question to be determined as an issue and contain sufficient facts to challenge the attention of the court as to its merits. (Sheridan County Comm’rs v. Acre, 160 Kan. 278, 160 P. 2d 250.)
The majority opinion concludes the allegations of the taxpayer’s petition and the stipulation of facts failed to contain sufficient facts to state a cause of action for relief, thus rendering the judgment void, and subjecting it to collateral attack. Again, I do not agree the decree was void, though perhaps it was erroneous. In Eberhardt Lumber Co. v. Lecuyer, supra, it was said:
“Can appellant, under these eireumstances, collaterally attack the sufficiency of the petition to state a cause of action for the relief granted? This court has long been committed to the doctrine that a petition which states no cause of action will sustain a judgment, good against a collateral attack, ‘if it contains sufficient matter to challenge the attention of the court as to its merits.’ (Investment Co. v. Wyandotte County, 86 Kan. 708, 709, 121 Pac. 1097, and cases therein cited.) See, also, Head v. Daniels, 38 Kan. 1, 15 Pac. 911; Wyandotte County v. Investment Co., 80 Kan. 492, 103 Pac. 996; McPherson v. Martinson, 115 Kan. 828, 829, 224 Pac. 907.” (l. c. 390.)
Of course, as was stated in Investment Co. v. Wyandotte County, 86 Kan. 708, 121 Pac. 1097, “ . . if a mere blank paper is filed *257as a petition, jurisdiction would not attach, because there would be nothing for the court to act upon.’” (p. 709.) In In re Wallace, 75 Kan. 432, 89 Pac. 687, it was held:
“Where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon a fact which the court is required to ascertain and decide its judgment determining that the fact does exist is conclusive evidence of jurisdiction until set aside or reversed by a direct proceeding.” (Syl. ¶1.)
In the opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Johnston stated that where jurisdiction depends on a fact that is litigated in a suit, and is adjudicated in favor of the party who avers jurisdiction, then the question of jurisdiction is judicially decided and the judgment record is conclusive evidence of jurisdiction until set aside or reversed by a direct proceeding. See Shepard’s Kansas Citations for cases following In re Wallace.
On the face of the record in the instant case, the district court of Grant County had jurisdiction of the parties and, in my judgment, it had jurisdiction of the subject matter since the private taxpayer’s petition contained sufficient matters to challenge the attention of the district court as to its merits. Assuming, arguendo, the petition failed to state a cause of action, as the majority opinion concludes, nevertheless it was sufficient to sustain the judgment against a collateral attack. (Eberhardt Lumber Co. v. Lecuyer, supra.) It is of no moment that the judgment may have been erroneous; where jurisdiction exists, the court has power to decide the case whether its decision is right or wrong. If there was error, the private plaintiffs should have timely intervened under the doctrine proclaimed in Moyer, supra, and perfected an appeal to this court.
The majority opinion criticizes the county attorney for entering into stipulation of facts with counsel for Frank R. Collins in contravention of the findings of the State Board of Appeals. In my opinion, the court’s censure of the county attorney’s conduct is not justified. As the chief legal advisor to the county officials, the county attorney has a special interest in the equal and uniform taxation of all property in the county subject to taxation, in the retention of lawful taxes paid to the county treasurer, and in the prompt collection of lawful taxes due and payable. In the exercise of its functions, the State Board of Tax Appeals must, as a matter of necessity, interpret the tax laws, and such interpretations are prima facie binding. However, where the county attorney has cause to believe the orders of the state board are erroneous as a *258matter of law or result in lack of uniformity of taxation of the property in the county, he may properly defend against such orders. See Robinson v. Jones, 119 Kan. 609, 240 Pac. 957; Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co. v. Ford County Comm'rs, 138 Kan. 516, 27 P. 2d 229; Beacon Publishing Co. v. Burke, 143 Kan. 248, 53 P. 2d 888, and Kansas State Teachers Ass’n v. Cushman, 186 Kan. 489, 501, 502, 351 P. 2d 19.
Other matters could be mentioned, but this dissent has grown too long. I conclude my dissent with the statement by which it was commenced — the court improvidently issued its order of mandamus on October 31,1967.
Price, C. J., and Kaul, J., join in the foregoing dissent.