Court Opinion

ID: 9409686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 06:07:35.494539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:52.631232
License: Public Domain

Reversed and Remanded and Opinion Filed July 11, 2023

                                     In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                              No. 05-22-01018-CV

            JOSE ROSARIO MENDOZA JR., Appellant
                             V.
   MILKSHAKE, LLC; MILKSHAKE CONCEPTS, LLC; MILKSHAKE
   CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC; SP RESTAURANT HOLDINGS, LLC;
             AND CITIZEN UPTOWN, LLC, Appellees

                On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. CC-22-02551-C

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION
              Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Miskel
                           Opinion by Justice Reichek
      Jose Rosario Mendoza Jr. appeals the trial court’s order granting appellees’

Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Mendoza contends the trial court erred in determining

that his claims had no basis in law or in fact. We agree that appellees’ motion did

not set out any meritorious reasons for dismissal under Rule 91a and reverse and

remand.
                                    Background

      As alleged in Mendoza’s petition, on January 16, 2022, Mendoza was a patron

at a Dallas nightclub called “Citizen” when a fellow patron, Eric Lozano, shot and

critically injured him. Mendoza sued six limited liability companies—Citizen

Dallas, LLC, and the five appellees, Milkshake, LLC, Milkshake Concepts, LLC,

Milkshake Capital Partners, LLC, SP Restaurant Holdings, LLC, and Citizen

Uptown, LLC—seeking damages for his injuries. The petition states Mendoza sued

any business entity “whose name contains the words or who does business under or

as ‘Citizen,’ ‘Citizen Nightclub,’ or ‘Citizen Dallas’ located at 2511 Swiss Avenue”

in Dallas. Each defendant has its registered office at the same address on Main Street

in Dallas. The petition named Imran Sheikh as the registered agent for appellees

Milkshake, LLC and Milkshake Capital Partners, LLC and named Milkshake, LLC

as the registered agent for the other four defendants.

      In his pleading, Mendoza referred to the six defendants collectively as

“Defendants” and alleged that each defendant was an agent of the others. Mendoza

alleged defendants owned and controlled the club and undertook to provide security

there. They searched, patted down, or used a metal detector wand on some, but not

all, patrons. Defendants allowed Lozano to enter the premises with a gun. After

Lozano shot Mendoza, security guards “scooped” Mendoza up and “threw him

outside onto the concrete like trash.” Mendoza alleged defendants were negligent

                                         –2–
in failing to provide appropriate and reasonable security services once they

undertook to provide such services. Among other things, he alleged defendants

failed to: reasonably inspect those entering the premises for concealed firearms,

provide rules and regulations for prevention of firearms being carried onto the

premises, enforce such rules and regulations, and properly train employees.

Mendoza alleged defendants’ conduct involved an extreme degree of risk and that

they had actual awareness of the risk, but proceeded with conscious indifference to

the rights, safety, and welfare of others. He sought actual and exemplary damages.

      All defendants were represented by the same attorney. Citizen Dallas was the

only defendant to file an answer. The five appellees filed a short, joint motion to

dismiss Mendoza’s claims pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 91a.

Appellees asserted Mendoza’s claims have no basis in law or fact because (1)

appellees are entities that are not related to Citizen nightclub; (2) appellees are

parties solely for the purposes of harassment; and (3) Mendoza did not plead any

legal or factual basis to justify appellees being named as defendants.

      After Mendoza responded that appellees’ stated reasons for dismissal were

either outside the scope of Rule 91a or incorrect, appellees filed a reply in support

of their motion. Under the heading “Verified Denial,” the reply stated, “Defendants

are not liable in the capacity in which they were sued . . . [and] are entirely separate

entities from the entity Plaintiff alleges committed the acts/omissions within

Plaintiff’s petition.” Attached to the reply was a sworn and notarized verification

                                          –3–
from Sheikh, who identified himself only as “an authorized representative of the

Defendants.” Sheikh said the statements contained in the verified denial are within

his personal knowledge and are true and correct.

      A visiting judge sitting by assignment held a hearing on the motion to dismiss.

The sole argument made at the hearing was that appellees were the wrong parties.

The visiting judge granted the motion, dismissed appellees as defendants, and left

the issue of appellees’ attorney’s fees under Rule 91a to be determined. After

Mendoza filed a notice of nonsuit of his claims against Citizen Dallas, the district

judge signed an order which dismissed Mendoza’s claims against Citizen Dallas

without prejudice and “dispose[d] of all remaining claims and all remaining parties.”

      Mendoza argues the trial court erred in granting the Rule 91a motion because

none of the three grounds asserted in appellees’ motion warranted dismissal of his

claims. We agree.

                                   Applicable Law

      Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a provides that a party “may move to dismiss

a cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P.

91a.1. A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together

with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief

sought. Id. A cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person could

believe the facts pleaded. Id. A motion to dismiss must state specifically the reasons

the cause of action has no basis in law, no basis in fact, or both. Id. 91a.2. The trial

                                          –4–
court may not consider evidence in ruling on the motion and must decide the motion

based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together with any pleading

exhibits permitted by Rule 59. Id. 91a.6; see id. 59 (“[n]otes, accounts, bonds,

mortgages, records, and all other written instruments, constituting, in whole or in

part, the claim sued on . . . may be made a part of the pleadings”).

      Rule 91a permits motions to dismiss based on affirmative defenses, if the

plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from

them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought. Bethel v. Quilling, Selander,

Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Tex. 2020). Because Rule

91a does not allow consideration of evidence, only affirmative defenses that are

conclusively established by the facts in a plaintiff’s petition are a proper basis for a

91a motion to dismiss. See id.; Frankel v. Butler, No. 05-21-01122-CV, 2022 WL

17883798, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion de novo. Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at

654; City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).

Because dismissal on the pleadings is a harsh remedy, courts must strictly construe

the requirements of Rule 91a. Renate Nixdorf GmbH & Co. KG v. TRA Midland

Props., LLC, No. 17-00577-CV, 2019 WL 92038, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 3,

2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

                                       Analysis

                                          –5–
      In their motion to dismiss, appellees first asserted Mendoza’s claims should

be dismissed because appellees “are entities that are NOT related to the

establishment [in] which the Plaintiff purports the incident occurred.” In their

appellate brief, appellees argue the trial court was entitled to dismiss the case based

on the affirmative defense that they were not proper parties. Neither appellees’

motion to dismiss nor their reply used the term “affirmative defense.” See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 91a.2 (motion to dismiss must state specifically reasons cause of action has

no basis in law or fact). Assuming appellees’ motion sufficiently raised this

affirmative defense as grounds for dismissal, the defense was not a valid reason for

dismissal in this case.

      Appellees contend that in determining whether they were proper parties, the

trial court was entitled to consider the verified denial contained in their reply. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 93 (requiring pleading setting up defect of parties to be verified by

affidavit). We reject appellees’ assertion that Mendoza’s claims against them can

be dismissed due to the verified denial. Assuming the verified denial conclusively

proved appellees were improper parties, it cannot be included in the Rule 91a

analysis. The trial court was required to decide the motion based solely on the

pleading of the cause of action. See id. 91a.6. This is not a case in which the

affirmative defense is conclusively established by the facts in the petition. Cf.

Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 658 (plaintiff’s pleadings established affirmative defense of

attorney immunity because complained-of actions were the kind taken in connection

                                         –6–
with representing client in litigation). Whether appellees are improper parties is not

something that can be determined solely from Mendoza’s petition. Mendoza alleged

appellees owned and controlled the club, and we must accept his allegations as true.

There is nothing in the petition to establish that appellees are not related to Citizen

nightclub.1

         As their second ground for dismissal, appellees asserted that Mendoza named

them as parties solely for the “purposes of harassment.” Appellees do not mention

this argument on appeal. Nothing in Mendoza’s petition demonstrates that appellees

were sued solely for purposes of harassment. The dismissal cannot be upheld on this

basis.

         Finally, appellees asserted Mendoza did not plead any legal or factual basis to

justify appellees being parties to the suit. Appellees did not specify in their motion

why there is no legal basis to justify their being named as defendants. The motion

merely stated “Plaintiff’s causes of action against Defendants for: Negligence/Gross

Negligence have no basis in law.” We assume this is another reference to the

         1
          In the trial court, appellees relied on Drew v. Belver, No. 04-20-00483-CV, 2021 WL
3518541 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 11, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.), for the proposition
that the court could consider the verified denial. Drew is not a Rule 91a case; it is a Texas Citizens
Participation Act (TCPA) case. When ruling on a motion to dismiss under the TCPA, a trial court
is permitted to consider evidence it could consider in a summary judgment proceeding. TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.006(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). The holding in Drew was that it
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider certified documents attached to a reply
in ruling on a TCPA motion. Drew, 2021 WL 3518541, at *3. Drew does not stand for the
proposition that a trial court can consider evidence in ruling on a Rule 91a motion, and appellees
do not cite Drew on appeal.

                                                –7–
argument that appellees are not related to the nightclub where Mendoza was shot.

We have already rejected that basis for dismissal.

      Appellees argued Mendoza’s claims had no basis in fact because Mendoza

did not plead any facts “that relate to any action and/or inaction on behalf of the

Defendants.” But Mendoza did allege appellees’ action or inaction. He alleged that

appellees (and Citizen Dallas) owned and controlled the nightclub and undertook to

provide security services at the club. He specified various ways in which appellees

failed to adequately perform security services and alleged the negligent acts or

omissions proximately caused his injuries. Mendoza alleged facts that, if true, could

support negligence claims against appellees.

      In their brief, appellees present additional grounds for dismissal not included

in their motion to dismiss. For example, they argue Mendoza’s claims lacked any

basis in law because he did not distinguish between the conduct of the six defendants

and lacked any basis in fact because no reasonable person could believe six entities

engaged in a conspiracy to be negligent. A motion to dismiss must state specifically

the reasons the cause of action has no basis in law or in fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.2.

Because these arguments were not made in the trial court, we do not consider them.

See Renate Nixdorf GmbH, 2019 WL 92038, at *9 n.12. Appellees’ motion to

dismiss did not present any valid grounds for dismissal under Rule 91a, and therefore

the trial court erred in granting the motion. We sustain Mendoza’s sole issue.

                                         –8–
      We reverse the trial court’s order granting appellees’ motion to dismiss and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                          /Amanda L. Reichek//
221018f.p05                               AMANDA L. REICHEK
                                          JUSTICE

                                       –9–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

JOSE ROSARIO MENDOZA JR.,                     On Appeal from the County Court at
Appellant                                     Law No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. CC-22-02551-
No. 05-22-01018-CV          V.                C.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice
MILKSHAKE, LLC; MILKSHAKE                     Reichek. Justices Partida-Kipness
CONCEPTS, LLC; MILKSHAKE                      and Miskel participating.
CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC; SP
RESTAURANT HOLDINGS, LLC;
AND CITIZEN UPTOWN, LLC,
Appellees

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s August
16, 2022 order granting appellees’ motion to dismiss is REVERSED and this cause
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

       It is ORDERED that appellant Jose Rosario Mendoza Jr. recover his costs of
this appeal from appellees Milkshake, LLC, Milkshake Concepts, LLC, Milkshake
Capital Partners, LLC, SP Restaurant Holdings, LLC AND Citizen Uptown, LLC.

Judgment entered this 11th day of July, 2023.

                                       –10–