Court Opinion

ID: 9465454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:46:59.979295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:11.441169
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As I read the record, Judge Van Pelt allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea because of his policy permitting guilty pleas to be withdrawn if: (1) they are made within a reasonable period of time after sentencing; and (2) if cause for the withdrawal is shown. I have no dispute with that policy and, indeed, there is much to be said for Judge Van Pelt’s argument that handling cases in this manner results in judicial economy.
Cause was shown here for the withdrawal of the plea in that the state did not adhere to the spirit of its commitment not to object to a two-year sentence. Instead of maintaining a “neutral position” with respect to the defendant’s recommendation in sentencing, the state stressed aspects of the defendant’s activities which highlighted the seriousness of what he had done. The pros*416ecutor also emphasized the fact that the defendant had a record which dated back twenty years. He further noted that at the time the defendant violated the law, he was a successful businessman who was earning $1,200 a month and did not need the money from the counterfeit bills. In addition, the prosecutor did not inform Judge Van Pelt that the defendant had cooperated with the state in the manner proscribed by the bargaining agreement until a specific inquiry was made by the defendant’s attorney.1
The question before us is whether it is proper, after the initial plea has been vacated on the defendant’s motion, for a court to increase a defendant’s prison sentence upon his being sentenced a second time under an indictment solely because he was required to plead guilty to additional counts of the indictment the second time. Although two Circuits agree with the holding of the majority on this issue,2 I disagree. If the spirit and intent of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974), are to be followed, it is necessary to conclude that it is a denial of due process for a person under these circumstances to receive a heavier sentence. Plea bargaining is a fact of life in the federal system. It will only work if pursued in the utmost good faith. To permit a prosecutor to rise additional counts when a plea is set aside in whole or part because the prosecutor failed to live up to his part of the bargain would result in defendants being punished for having succeeded in having the plea set aside.
The Supreme Court first expressed these concerns with respect to courts when, in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, it stated that:
[i]t can hardly be doubted that it would be a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a * * * court to follow an announced practice of imposing a heavier sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside. * * * [“] [I]t is unfair to use the great power given to the court to determine sentence to place a defendant in the dilemma of making an unfree choice.” Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (1 Cir.). See Short v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 165, 167, 344 F.2d 550, 552.
Id. 395 U.S. at 723-724, 89 S.Ct. at 2080.
Later in Blackledge, these same principles were applied to prosecutorial conduct. The Court noted:
The lesson that emerges from Pearce, Colten, [Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)] and Chaffin [Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973)] is that the Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of “vindictiveness.” * * The question is whether the opportunities for vindictiveness * * * are such as to impel the conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case.
Blackledge v. Perry, supra 417 U.S. at 27, 94 S.Ct. at 2102.
The Court expressly pointed out that the rationale of the Pearce case was the “fear of vindictiveness.” To paraphrase Black-ledge, a person who has pled guilty to an offense is entitled to pursue his right to set aside that plea without apprehension that the prosecutor will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus, subjecting him to a significantly increased potential of incarceration. Id. at 28, 94 S.Ct. 2098.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), is not inap*417posite. There, the prosecutor stated before the plea was taken that unless Hayes pled guilty to the charge of forgery, he would be charged as a habitual criminal which would mandate a life sentence. The Supreme Court refused to declare that practice violative of the due process clause but, in doing so, noted that it was not dealing with a requirement that a prosecutor’s plea bargaining agreement must be kept. Id. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 667, 54 L.Ed.2d at 610. The Bordenkircher Court recognized that what is to be avoided is government retaliation against an accused for lawfully attacking a conviction. It stated: “To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort[.]” Id. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 610. What the government seeks to do here is to punish Osborne because he saw fit to exercise his right to have his plea of guilty set aside for the prosecutor’s failure to keep his side of the bargain.
I agree that the record demonstrates that Judge Urbom did not demonstrate any vindictiveness. But the prosecutor did, and this is the evil to guard against.
Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, and LAY, HEANEY, BRIGHT, ROSS, STEPHENSON, HENLEY, and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges, En Banc.

. The prosecutor noted that it was his understanding that this information was adequately covered in a letter from the defendant’s attorney to Judge Van Pelt.

. United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Rines, 453 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1971).