Court Opinion

ID: 9946730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 12:12:04.158934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:18.078566
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                        TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                               No. 10-22-00267-CR

JOSEPH MICHAEL HALEY,
                                                         Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                         Appellee

                         From the 249th District Court
                            Johnson County, Texas
                        Trial Court No. DC-F202200582

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found Appellant Joseph Michael Haley guilty of the offenses of (1)

manslaughter with a deadly weapon and (2) accident involving personal injury or death.

See generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04; TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.021. The jury

then assessed Haley’s punishment, enhanced by prior felony convictions, to which he

had pleaded “true,” at life imprisonment for each offense. The trial court sentenced

Haley accordingly and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. This appeal ensued.

We affirm.
                                       Background

        At around 6:30 p.m. on November 14, 2018, Kimberly Norris was traveling on

Farm-to-Market Road 1434 when she came upon a Dodge pickup truck facing sideways

in the middle of the roadway. The truck’s doors were open, its air bags had deployed,

and it had sustained heavy damage to its front end. Kimberly did not see anyone in or

around the truck at that time, but she did see beer cans in the back floorboard of the truck

and smelled alcohol and marijuana in the truck.

        Kimberly’s husband, Scott Norris, was also traveling on Farm-to-Market Road

1434 that evening and arrived at the scene a few minutes after Kimberly. Once Scott

arrived, he and Kimberly discovered a second vehicle down in the ditch beside the

roadway. Scott made his way down to the vehicle and determined that the driver of that

vehicle was deceased. Scott then made his way back up to the roadway where his

attention was drawn to the other side of the road where a dog was approaching. Scott

then noticed a person, later identified as Haley, moving beneath a tree against the barbed-

wire fence on the other side of the roadway.

        Scott retrieved a flashlight and started walking toward Haley, whom he could then

see was wrapped in a blanket underneath the tree. When Scott asked Haley if he was

hurt or needed help, Haley began swearing at Scott and told Scott to leave him alone

because he was trying to sleep. Haley then started walking toward Scott. It appeared to

Scott that Haley was intoxicated or high.

        Dana Hackler, who had also been traveling on Farm-to-Market Road 1434 that

evening and had arrived at the scene by that time, testified that Haley was “definitely

Haley v. State                                                                        Page 2
staggering around.” Like Scott, she thought that Haley either had been drinking or was

on drugs. When emergency personnel then began arriving at the scene, Haley ran down

the fence line, jumped over the barbed-wire fence, and ran into the pasture. Haley was

not seen again that night.

        Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Brenden Helton responded to the

crash scene that evening and observed the severely damaged Dodge pickup truck in the

roadway. Haley was no longer at the scene when Trooper Helton arrived. When Trooper

Helton began looking inside the truck, he found a partial Johnson County Corrections ID

bracelet with Haley’s name on it, an open container of Bud Light Lime-A-Rita, a small

bag of marijuana, and a marijuana pipe. An open whiskey bottle was also found near the

truck. As part of his investigation into the driver of the truck, Trooper Helton also ran

the truck’s license plate and discovered that it did not correspond with the truck. The

truck’s registration sticker likewise did not correspond with the truck. Trooper Helton

then ran the VIN number on the truck and learned that the truck had been reported stolen

out of Johnson County just days before.

        The next morning, Hackler was again traveling on Farm-to-Market Road 1434

when she encountered Haley standing in the middle of the road. When Hackler pulled

over and asked Haley if he needed help, Haley responded that he had been in a car

accident and that he needed a ride to Glen Rose. Hackler told Haley that she could not

help him and drove off, but after calling 911, she returned to ensure that Haley did not

leave before law enforcement arrived. While Hackler and Haley were talking, Haley

repeatedly asked Hackler not to call the police. Later in the conversation with Hackler,

Haley v. State                                                                     Page 3
Haley also recounted that he thought he had “had a car accident last night and [he] might

have killed somebody.” Haley said that he thought the accident was his dog’s fault. The

police eventually arrived, arrested Haley, and took him to the hospital to have his injuries

treated.

        Law enforcement interviewed Haley at the hospital. During the interview, Haley

admitted that he had been driving the Dodge pickup truck the prior evening when the

crash occurred. Haley acknowledged that, except for his dog, he had been alone in the

truck. Haley also admitted that he had been driving the truck even though his license

was expired and even though he had no insurance on the truck. Haley explained that he

had purchased the truck in Fort Worth as a salvage vehicle about one week before. He

stated that he had not yet transferred the truck into his name but that the bill of sale and

the title were in the truck. Haley then explained that the crash had occurred because the

other vehicle had come into his lane and hit him, leaving him dazed and dizzy. A woman

had then arrived and said that the driver of the other vehicle was dead. Haley explained

that he had therefore decided to just walk off. He had had some marijuana and had

wanted to go smoke it. Haley stated that he had not, however, had any alcohol or smoked

any marijuana before the crash. He stated that he did smoke marijuana in the evenings

but that he did not smoke and drive. Haley then explained that after the crash, he had

walked several hundred yards into the woods and that he had been so dizzy that he had

fallen and stayed there.

        Haley’s hospital medical records showed that Haley has a past medical history of

narcotic abuse and a social history of alcohol use that includes fifteen shots of liquor and

Haley v. State                                                                        Page 4
ten cans of beer per week. Haley’s hospital medical records further showed that about

fourteen hours after the crash, a urine drug screen was performed, and a blood specimen

was collected from Haley. The results from the urine drug screen were positive for

amphetamines and cannabinoids.      Testing of the blood specimen was negative for

alcohol, but Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Brian Yeager testified that there

was enough time between the crash and the blood collection for any alcohol to have

dissipated from Haley’s system.     Erin Casmus, a forensic scientist with the Texas

Department of Public Safety, further testified that, along with another unknown

individual who was a much lower contributor, Haley’s DNA was on the mouth of the

whiskey bottle that was found near the truck. Finally, Kelsi Miller, another forensic

scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified that Haley had 0.06

milligrams per liter of methamphetamine in his blood about fourteen hours after the

crash. She noted that this amount is above the initial therapeutic range and could cause

impairing effects.

        Trooper Yeager ultimately explained that, based on the partial Johnson County

Corrections ID bracelet, law enforcement determined that Haley had been released from

the Johnson County Jail on November 9, 2018. The Dodge pickup truck was then

reported stolen on November 10, 2018, from a motel across the street from the Johnson

County Jail, and the crash occurred on November 14, 2018. Trooper Yeager testified that,

after investigating the accident, he determined that Haley had caused the collision

because he was driving the Dodge pickup truck on the wrong side of the road, i.e.,

northbound in the southbound lane. Trooper Yeager testified that, given the totality of

Haley v. State                                                                    Page 5
the circumstances in this case, he considered Haley’s traveling on the wrong side of the

roadway to be reckless. Similarly, accident reconstructionist Timothy Lovett testified that

the collision occurred because the Dodge pickup truck left its lane of travel and

encroached into the oncoming lane of travel. Lovett further agreed that Haley was

reckless in driving northbound in the southbound lane, which caused the wreck that

killed the driver of the other vehicle.           Finally, the defense’s expert, accident

reconstructionist Dr. Mike Andrews, agreed with Lovett’s conclusion that the Dodge

pickup truck encroached into the opposite lane and collided with the oncoming vehicle

but stated that, in his opinion, it was unknown what occurred to cause Haley to drive

into the opposite lane.

                                           Issue

        In his sole issue, Haley contends that the trial court erred in allowing the

prosecution to introduce extraneous-offense evidence that the pickup truck that he was

driving at the time of the offenses was stolen.

        A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed under an abuse-

of-discretion standard. Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

Under that standard, we affirm an admissibility ruling when it is within the zone of

reasonable disagreement. See id.; Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005). “Furthermore, if the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct on any theory of law

applicable to that ruling, it will not be disturbed even if the judge gave the wrong reason

for his right ruling.” De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Haley v. State                                                                        Page 6
        Rule of Evidence 404(b) precludes the admission of evidence of a crime, wrong, or

other act to prove a person’s character in order to show that the person acted in

conformity with that character on a particular occasion, but the rule allows for such

evidence to be admitted for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” TEX. R.

EVID. 404(b).     The listed purposes “are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively

exhaustive.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343. Therefore, although Rule 404(b) limits

character evidence, it is a rule of inclusion. Id.; see Gaulding v. State, No. 02-21-00096-CR,

2022 WL 17986026, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 29, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).

        Haley was charged with the offense of accident involving personal injury or

death. 1 Subsection 550.021(c) of the Transportation Code provides that a person commits

the offense of accident involving personal injury or death if the person does not stop or

does not comply with the requirements of section 550.021. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §

550.021(c). Subsection 550.021(a) states:

        The operator of a vehicle involved in a collision that results or is reasonably
        likely to result in injury to or death of a person shall:

            (1) immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the collision or as close
                to the scene as possible;

            (2) immediately return to the scene of the collision if the vehicle is not
                stopped at the scene of the collision;

        1  Effective September 1, 2023, the Legislature changed the term “accident” to the term “collision”
to describe transportation-related accidents, but the Legislature explained that the changes were
nonsubstantive and intended to clarify rather than change existing law. Act of May 26, 2023, 88th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 709. Accordingly, in this opinion, the terms are used interchangeably.

Haley v. State                                                                                      Page 7
            (3) immediately determine whether a person is involved in the collision,
                and if a person is involved in the collision, whether that person
                requires aid; and

            (4) remain at the scene of the collision until the operator complies with
                the requirements of Section 550.023.

Id. § 550.021(a). Section 550.023 provides:

        The operator of a vehicle involved in a collision resulting in the injury or
        death of a person or damage to a vehicle that is driven or attended by a
        person shall:

            (1) give the operator’s name and address, the registration number of the
                vehicle the operator was driving, and the name of the operator’s
                motor vehicle liability insurer to any person injured or the operator
                or occupant of or person attending a vehicle involved in the collision;

            (2) if requested and available, show the operator’s driver’s license to a
                person described by Subdivision (1); and

            (3) provide any person injured in the collision reasonable assistance,
                including transporting or making arrangements for transporting the
                person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment if it is
                apparent that treatment is necessary, or if the injured person
                requests the transportation.

Id. § 550.023.

        The complained-of testimony about the stolen truck helped explain why Haley

fled the scene of the collision without giving information or rendering aid. In other

words, the evidence helped prove motive. Haley argues that motive is not required to be

proven to convict, but Rule 404(b) expressly allows for extraneous-offense evidence to be

admitted to prove motive. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). We therefore conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the complained-of evidence about the

stolen truck.

Haley v. State                                                                            Page 8
        And even if it was error to admit the complained-of evidence, we cannot say that

Haley was harmed. Generally, the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is non-

constitutional error governed by Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) if the trial court’s

ruling merely offends the rules of evidence. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Rodriguez v. State,

546 S.W.3d 843, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Under Rule 44.2(b),

we disregard all non-constitutional errors that do not affect the appellant’s substantial

rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A

substantial right is affected when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Rich, 160 S.W.3d at 577; Johnson v. State, 43

S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).        In conducting a harm analysis, we consider

everything in the record, including any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the

jury’s consideration, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of

the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in

the case, the jury instructions, the State’s theory and any defensive theories, closing

arguments, voir dire, and whether the State emphasized the error. Rich, 160 S.W.3d at

577–78.

        Here, the evidence supporting guilt is overwhelming. See Motilla v. State, 78

S.W.3d 352, 356–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that overwhelming evidence of guilt

is factor to consider in Rule 44.2(b) harm analysis). Additionally, testimony concerning

the stolen pickup truck was brief within the context of the entire trial, and the State only

briefly mentioned it in its closing argument. See id. at 356 (recognizing that “whether the

State emphasized the error can be a factor” in a Rule 44.2(b) harm analysis). The fact that

Haley v. State                                                                         Page 9
the pickup truck had been stolen was not the focus of the trial; rather, the evidence at trial

centered on whether the crash was a reckless act. Furthermore, the guilt-innocence

charge contained a Rule 404(b) limiting instruction, which also mitigates any harm. See

Bezerra v. State, 485 S.W.3d 133, 144 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. ref’d) (concluding

that appellant was not harmed by erroneous admission of extraneous-offense evidence

because evidence of guilt was overwhelming and because trial court instructed jury to

limit consideration of extraneous-offense evidence to show appellant’s intent, motive, or

plan). Therefore, we conclude that any error in the admission of the complained-of

extraneous-offense evidence did not affect Haley’s substantial rights such that his

convictions should be reversed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Rich, 160 S.W.3d at 577.

        Based on the foregoing, we overrule Haley’s sole issue.

                                        Conclusion

        We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                           MATT JOHNSON
                                           Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed February 29, 2024
Do not publish
[CRPM]

Haley v. State                                                                         Page 10