Court Opinion

ID: 9945695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 14:07:40.542326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:37.868273
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Watts, 2024-Ohio-635.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                             HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                            :      APPEAL NO. C-230299
                                                  TRIAL NO. C-23TRD-5083
          Plaintiff-Appellee,              :

    vs.                                    :
                                                      O P I N I O N.
 RHONDA WATTS,                             :

          Defendant-Appellant.             :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 21, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

WINKLER, Judge.

       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Rhonda Watts appeals her conviction for driving

under an OVI suspension. Because we determine that the trial court erred in denying

Watts’s motion to suppress on the ground that Watts failed to meet her initial burden

to demonstrate that the state conducted a warrantless seizure, we reverse.

                                     Background

       {¶2}    A Springfield Township police officer initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle,

and as a result of that stop, the officer cited Watts for driving under an OVI suspension

in violation of R.C. 4510.14. Watts challenged the charge by filing a motion to

suppress. Watts argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause

to initiate the traffic stop, because Watts had been driving a vehicle registered to her

daughter, and the officer did not cite Watts with any other violations that day, except

the underlying driving under an OVI suspension. The trial court held a hearing on

Watts’s motion to suppress. At the hearing, the officer who had cited Watts testified,

but he could not provide any reason for the traffic stop. When asked whether he

stopped the vehicle in question that day, the officer testified, “I believe so.” When

asked if he recalled initiating a traffic stop of Watts’s vehicle, he responded, “Vaguely.”

       {¶3}    At the conclusion of the hearing, Watts’s counsel argued that the officer

had no reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on the officer’s inability

to recall the reason for the stop. The state argued that Watts had the initial burden to

prove that the officer conducted a warrantless seizure, and that Watts had failed to

meet that burden. The trial court overruled Watts’s motion to suppress. The matter

proceeded to a bench trial where the trial court found Watts guilty and sentenced her

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

to six days in the Community Alternative Sentencing Center, a $250 fine, court costs,

and a one-year driving suspension. Watts appeals.

                 Defendant’s Initial Burden on a Motion to Suppress

       {¶4}    In her first assignment of error, Watts argues that the trial court erred

in overruling her motion to suppress.

       {¶5}    When a defendant files a motion to suppress under Crim.R. 47 on the

ground that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by an

unreasonable search or seizure, the defendant has the initial burden to demonstrate

that the state lacked a warrant, and to state the grounds upon which the defendant

challenges the warrantless search or seizure. Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218,

524 N.E.2d 889 (1998). Once the defendant satisfies the initial burden under Crim.R.

47, the burden then shifts to the state to prove that it had justification to conduct the

warrantless search or seizure. Id. The defendant satisfies the initial burden under

Xenia where the defendant’s motion to suppress states the “legal and factual bases

with sufficient particularity to place the prosecutor and court on notice of the issues to

be decided.” State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 58, 636 N.E.2d 319 (1994). “Shindler

does not require that a defendant set forth the basis for suppression in excruciating

detail. Instead, the question is whether the language used provides sufficient notice

to the state.” State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691,

¶ 13. Whether a motion to suppress satisfies the minimum standards under Crim.R.

47 is a legal question. Id. at ¶ 8.

       {¶6}    In this case, the trial court overruled Watts’s motion to suppress,

reasoning that Watts had failed to meet her initial burden under Xenia. In doing so,

the trial court relied on State v. Newell, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-160453, C-160454,

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

C-160455 and C-160456, 2017-Ohio-4143, ¶ 13. In Newell, the defendant was charged

with various traffic-related offenses, including OVI. The defendant filed a motion to

suppress, arguing that any statements she made were the product of an

unconstitutional, warrantless search and seizure. The arresting officer failed to appear

for the motion-to-suppress hearing, and the trial granted the defendant’s motion to

suppress. The state appealed. The Newell court reversed the trial court’s decision

granting the motion to suppress, and held that the defendant failed to discharge her

initial burden under Crim.R. 47 to show that her seizure was warrantless, or that her

statements were the result of a custodial interrogation.

       {¶7}   This case is distinguishable from Newell. Here, Watts filed a detailed

motion to suppress challenging the officer’s basis for the initial traffic stop. In her

motion, Watts argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause

to initiate the traffic stop, because she had been driving a vehicle registered to her

daughter, and the officer did not cite Watts with any other violations, except driving

under an OVI suspension. Unlike Newell, where no evidence was presented to support

the motion to suppress, here the officer testified at the motion-to-suppress hearing.

The officer could not provide any reason for conducting the traffic stop involving

Watts. Based on the officer’s vague recollection of events and inability to remember

any reason for initiating the traffic stop, we determine that Watts sufficiently satisfied

her initial burden under Xenia to demonstrate that she was the subject of a warrantless

seizure.

                     No Evidence to Support Warrantless Seizure

       {¶8}   Because Watts satisfied her initial burden under Crim.R. 47 to show that

the officer conducted a warrantless seizure when he initiated the traffic stop of the

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

vehicle, and Watts’s motion to suppress sufficiently placed the state on notice of her

Fourth Amendment challenge, the burden then shifted to the state to show that the

warrantless seizure was justified. See Xenia, 37 Ohio St.3d at 220, 524 N.E.2d 889. A

police officer can initiate a traffic stop of a vehicle when: (1) the officer has reasonable,

articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed a crime, and the officer initiates

an investigatory stop of the vehicle, i.e., a Terry stop, or (2) the officer has a reasonable

belief that a motorist has committed a crime, i.e., probable cause. State v. Oliver,

2023-Ohio-1550, 214 N.E.3d 624, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.). The state did not provide any

evidence to show that the officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initiate

the traffic stop of the vehicle driven by Watts. The officer could not recall initiating

the traffic stop, and the officer did not cite Watts with any other violations, except

driving under an OVI suspension. Therefore, the state failed to meet its burden under

Xenia to prove that it did not violate Watts’s Fourth Amendment rights.

       {¶9}    We hold that the trial court erred in denying Watts’s motion to suppress,

and we sustain her first assignment of error.

                             Sufficiency and Manifest Weight

       {¶10} In her second assignment of error, Watts argues that her conviction was

based on insufficient evidence and was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

Based on our resolution of Watts’s first assignment of error, this assignment of error

is moot, and we decline to address it.

                                           Conclusion

       {¶11} Having sustained Watts’s first assignment of error, we reverse the trial

court’s judgment. We remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the motion to suppress, and for further proceedings consistent with the law and this

opinion.

                                                Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

BOCK, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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