Court Opinion

ID: 9910869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 19:00:56.339377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:43.832389
License: Public Domain

In the

     United States Court of Appeals
                   For the Seventh Circuit
                       ____________________
No. 22-3275
KIMBERLY BARNES-STAPLES,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                    v.

ROBIN CARNAHAN, * Administrator,
General Services Administration,
                                                    Defendant-Appellee.
                       ____________________

          Appeal from the United States District Court for the
            Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
           No. 20-cv-03627 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
                       ____________________

 ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2023 — DECIDED DECEMBER 18, 2023
                ____________________

   Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and LEE, Circuit
Judges.
   FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Kimberly Barnes-Staples applied for
a Real Estate Director position with the General Services

    * The Court has substituted Robin Carnahan, the current Administra-

tor for the United States General Services Administration, for the original
defendant, Emily W. Murphy. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
2                                                 No. 22-3275

Administration (GSA), but the GSA hired a different candi-
date. Staples sued, alleging that the GSA’s interview process
discriminated against her because of her race and sex in vio-
lation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the GSA, and for the
following reasons, we affirm.

                        I. Background

    A. Factual Background
    In March 2019, the GSA announced a job opening for a re-
gional Real Estate Director. As the job posting explained, the
position was at the GS-15 pay grade, and applicants needed
“at least one year of specialized experience equivalent to the
GS-14 level or higher in the Federal service” to be considered.
No additional educational or professional accreditations were
listed in the vacancy announcement. Rather, as the posting
explained, candidates would be evaluated based on their re-
sponses to job-related interview questions.
   The GSA began its hiring process by screening applicants
through written applications. From there, it advanced five
candidates to a first round of interviews: Kimberly Barnes-
Staples, a Black woman; Matt Poisson, Russell Riberto, and
Joseph Skach, all White men; and Shery Wittstock, a White
woman.
   The GSA uses an internal document referred to as the
Guideline when interviewing candidates. Included in the
Guideline are procedures that seek to help prevent unlawful
discrimination in the GSA’s hiring process. To accord with
these procedures, a three-person panel conducted the first-
round interview for the five candidates. Candidates were all
No. 22-3275                                                                3

asked the same questions and given equal time to answer. The
interviewers independently scored the candidates’ answers
on each question from one to five. The panelists then collabo-
rated to create consensus scores for each candidate’s answers
to each question, which were in turn used to calculate overall
scores for the five candidates. Their overall scores were as fol-
lows: (1) Wittstock, 3.9; (2) Riberto, 3.8; (3) Staples, 3.15; (4)
Poisson, 3.1; and (5) Skach, 2.85. At the time of the interviews,
Poisson was the Real Estate Division’s Acting Director, so the
panel designed the scoring cutoff to advance all candidates at
or above his score to the second and final round.
    A new set of three panelists conducted the second-round
interviews. Before discovering who advanced to that round,
the second panel devised three new interview questions
aimed at assessing the candidates’ decision-making and prob-
lem-solving skills. Just as in the first round of interviews, the
second panel agreed that Wittstock had the strongest second-
round interview performance. As a result, the GSA offered
her the Real Estate Director position.
    B. Procedural Background
   Staples attributed the GSA’s decision to hire a different
candidate to sex and race discrimination, so she filed an EEOC
complaint. After the EEOC dismissed it, Staples filed suit for
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 1 The GSA moved

    1 In addition to her race and sex discrimination claims, her complaint

also alleged a retaliation claim. The district court dismissed this claim be-
cause Staples did not exhaust her administrative remedies. Barnes-Staples
v. Murphy, No. 20 C 3627, 2022 WL 4534686, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2022).
She does not press her retaliation claim on appeal, so we decline to enter-
tain it further. Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005).
4                                                     No. 22-3275

for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Sta-
ples now appeals.

                          II. Discussion

    We review the district court’s summary judgment ruling
de novo and “construe all facts and draw all reasonable infer-
ences in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Lewis v. Ind. Wesleyan
Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th Cir. 2022). “[T]he moving party
may prevail by showing an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s claims.” Id. (citation and internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
    Title VII prohibits employers from “refus[ing] to
hire … any individual … because of such individual’s race
[or] … sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “[T]o hold the [GSA] li-
able, [Staples] must show that her race [or sex] ‘played a part’
in” the hiring decision. Crain v. McDonough, 63 F.4th 585, 591
(7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). “She can do so through di-
rect or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” Id. In eval-
uating Staples’s claims, we ask whether “a reasonable jury
[could] find based on all available evidence that a discrimina-
tory … motive caused” the GSA to select a different candidate
for the Real Estate Director job over Staples. Grant v. Trs. of
Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 569 (7th Cir. 2017).
    Staples brings her claims under the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802–07 (1973); see also Ferrill v. Oak Creek-Franklin
Joint Sch. Dist., 860 F.3d 494, 499–500 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying
the McDonnell Douglas framework). The GSA concedes that
Staples has stated a prima facie case of discrimination, but it
presents a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for hiring
No. 22-3275                                                         5

another candidate: Wittstock was more qualified. See Lewis, 36
F.4th at 760.
    Consequently, “the burden shifts back to [Staples] to sub-
mit evidence that the [GSA’s] explanation is pretextual,”
McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc., 940 F.3d 360, 368 (7th
Cir. 2019), meaning it is a “lie” or a “phony reason.” Ferrill,
860 F.3d at 500. If the GSA “honestly believed” it made the
correct employment decision—even if its decision was “inac-
curate[,] unfair[,] … foolish, trivial, or baseless”—Staples’s
claims cannot succeed. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 852–
53 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
   A. Race Discrimination
    Staples advances multiple arguments supporting her ra-
cial discrimination claims. She argues that the GSA did not
follow its internal antidiscrimination procedures, which al-
lowed it to hire an inferior candidate. Staples further contends
that she was the superior candidate, so the GSA’s offered hir-
ing justification—that Wittstock was the better candidate—
was pretextual. Operating in the background, Staples asserts,
is a GSA practice of discrimination against Black candidates
and employees.
       1. Failure to Follow Procedures
    According to Staples, one of the GSA’s second-round in-
terview questions violated the Guideline because it was “tai-
lored to a specific candidate.” She further contends that the
question also contravened the Guideline’s suggestion to not
ask questions that assess competencies learned on the job. 2

   2 Although the parties dispute whether the Guideline applied during

the GSA’s second-round interviews, we assume for the sake of this
6                                                         No. 22-3275

These shortcomings, she explains, evince the GSA’s pre-
textual representation that it hired the best candidate in Witt-
stock. The question asked about the following scenario: “The
Commissioner has increased the leasing performance stand-
ards for the Region by 50%. How would you address this chal-
lenge?”
    The first stumbling block for Staples’s argument is that the
panel drafted the question before it knew the identities of the
second-round candidates. On the contrary, the person who
wrote the question did not know that Wittstock would make
it to the second round. Still, Staples speculates that the GSA
created this question for Wittstock because she could answer
it well based on her experience. Nothing she points to in the
record, however, suggests that the second panel tailored the
question to Wittstock. Consequently, there is no evidence that
the second question violated the Guideline’s prohibition
against questions that give a specific candidate an unfair ad-
vantage over others.
    The question also did not violate the Guideline by asking
about a competency expected to be learned on the job. The
Guideline’s examples of on-the-job competency questions—
such as those relating to a candidate’s familiarity with an in-
ternal company policy or procedure—go to information
uniquely accessible to only internal candidates. Answering
the leasing performance question did not depend on this type
of Real Estate Division-specific prior knowledge. Rather, it is
an expertise-based hypothetical question routinely asked

opinion that it does because its application does not affect our ultimate
conclusion.
No. 22-3275                                                     7

during job interviews to assess candidates’ problem-solving
skills—as described in the vacancy announcement.
    Staples also asserts that the GSA’s failure to employ a
ranked scoring system during the second-round interviews
violated the Guideline. The lack of an objective scoring sys-
tem, she contests, allowed the panel to “manipulate[] the pro-
cess” to her disadvantage and in favor of Wittstock. This
Court, however, “has … never held that a job interview must
be scored according to some sort of objective criteria” to avoid
triggering Title VII liability. Blise v. Antaramian, 409 F.3d 861,
868 (7th Cir. 2005). Indeed, “nothing in Title VII bans outright
the use of subjective evaluation criteria.” Sattar v. Motorola,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1998).
    Still, it is true that an employer’s divergence from its
standard hiring practices can establish, or at least be evidence
of, pretext and defeat summary judgment. Rudin v. Lincoln
Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 727 (7th Cir. 2005). We have
placed a particular emphasis on this principle when an em-
ployer has applied its policies differently between protected-
class and non-protected-class members. Baines v. Walgreen
Co., 863 F.3d 656, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding summary
judgment improper where manager made “highly unusual”
deviation from standard rehiring procedures with respect to
a Black candidate); Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496,
508 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The disparate treatment of similarly-sit-
uated employees who were involved in misconduct of com-
parable seriousness, but did not have a similar disability,
could establish pretext.”). In those cases, “[e]vidence that the
employer selectively enforced a company policy … would go
to … the pretext analysis.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 858.
8                                                     No. 22-3275

    This is not such a case. The lack of a scoring system af-
fected all candidates equally. In any event, the record shows
that Wittstock performed the best during both the numeri-
cally scored first round and the unscored second round.
Nothing in the record suggests the second panel thought an-
ybody other than Wittstock was the best candidate at any
point. Sattar, 138 F.3d at 1170–71 (holding that subjective cri-
teria did not support inference of pretext absent evidence that
criteria were “a mask for discrimination”). The GSA’s failure
to abide by its policy is “insufficient, without more, to cre-
ate … an inference” of pretext. United States ex rel. Hamrick v.
GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 814 F.3d 10, 22 (1st Cir. 2016).
       2. Credentials and Interviews
    Next, we turn to Staples’s contention that the GSA tailored
its hiring criteria to hire the less-qualified Wittstock instead of
Staples.
    Staples was not “clearly better qualified” than Wittstock
for the Real Estate Director position, at least when evaluated
under the GSA’s criteria. Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Schs., 829 F.3d
886, 894 (7th Cir. 2016). The job posting’s “qualifications” sec-
tion only required candidates to have “at least one year of spe-
cialized experience equivalent to GS-14 level or higher.” Both
Staples and Wittstock met this requirement. Beyond that,
when the GSA hired Wittstock, although Staples had an MBA
(whereas Wittstock did not), Wittstock had more recent and
total experience within the Real Estate Division than Staples
did.
    The GSA’s job posting indicated that it would evaluate
candidates based on their responses to competency-related
interview questions. However, since “both candidates
No. 22-3275                                                     9

presented attractive qualifications” and the GSA selected
Wittstock based on interview performance, Staples’s “own
opinions about [her] … qualifications [do not] give rise to a
material factual dispute.” Robertson v. Dep’t of Health Servs.,
949 F.3d 371, 380–81 (7th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (ci-
tation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Since the GSA evaluated candidates based on their an-
swers to interview questions, Staples argues her second-
round interview answers were better than Wittstock’s. The
panelists’ depositions, affidavits, and interview notes refute
that assertion. Instead, they illustrate the panel’s belief that
Wittstock provided the strongest responses to their questions.
While Staples might believe Wittstock’s answers were unim-
pressive, what matters is whether the GSA believed they were
unimpressive and then lied about it. See Coleman, 667 F.3d at
852–53 (explaining that what matters is what the GSA “hon-
estly believed” in a pretext analysis).
    Staples’s only substantiated support is a statement from a
panelist explaining that Wittstock’s answer to one question
did not discuss what the Division was doing well. That fact
does not render pretextual the GSA’s professed belief that
Wittstock was impressive and the best candidate. See Cichon
v. Exelon Generation Co., 401 F.3d 803, 814 (7th Cir. 2005) (hold-
ing that, “in choosing between different candidates, all of
whom are qualified, an employer may legitimately use sub-
jective qualifications” assessed through interview perfor-
mance). Although Staples disagrees with the GSA about
whether she or Wittstock gave the best interview, her disa-
greement does not give rise to an inference of pretext.
   Staples’s claims that the GSA pretextually tailored the Real
Estate Director job requirements to suit Wittstock also lack
10                                                  No. 22-3275

merit: The job posting never required a specific kind of edu-
cational background or a technical license. Staples cannot
fault the GSA for staying true to its job posting by not giving
those kinds of credentials significant weight in its hiring pro-
cess.
    Additionally, Staples contests that the GSA did not offer
her interviews for other positions due to her lack of technical
expertise. Her argument does not provide evidence as to
whether those positions required technical expertise from the
start of the application process or instead added it in later in
the game. As such, Staples lacks the factual support needed
to illustrate that the GSA changed its hiring criteria for those
positions after Staples applied as a pretext for not interview-
ing her. See Lavite v. Dunstan, 932 F.3d 1020, 1029 n.2 (7th Cir.
2019) (“Our review cannot include facts outside of the sum-
mary judgment record, so we do not consider these asser-
tions ….”).
       3. Statistical Evidence
    Staples next offers data on the GSA’s promotion and em-
ployment rates for the premise that the GSA “fails to provide
growth or leadership opportunities in … higher-level posi-
tions” for Black women. In other words, she tries to use evi-
dence of systemic discrimination to bolster her individual
claims.
    For statistical “evidence of a pattern or practice” to sup-
port a claim of discrimination brought by an individual (as
opposed to a class action), it must be coupled with “evidence
of specific discrimination against the plaintiff herself.” Mat-
thews v. Waukesha County., 759 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 2014).
Indeed, data alone cannot get Staples over the hump, as it
No. 22-3275                                                    11

“must be coupled with other evidence, which does most of
the work.” Baylie v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank, 476 F.3d 522, 524 (7th Cir.
2007).
    It is also not enough to present raw data. Staples must
draw statistical inferences from a similarly situated “group”
within the workforce to provide the factual context necessary
to show a pattern of discrimination. Matthews, 759 F.3d at 830.
For example, the data must be sufficiently comparable to the
“population in the relevant labor market.” Id. Here, much of
the data Staples cites originates from the GSA’s nationwide
pay distribution statistics, but Staples attacks the GSA’s hiring
practices in Region 5. Accordingly, the nationwide data does
not advance her claim because of its overbroad scope.
    Staples also turns her attention to the GSA’s Region 5, GS-
15 level promotion and hiring practices since 2010, claiming
they illustrate an underrepresentation of Black candidates in
the GSA’s hiring processes. Staples does not provide evidence
about the makeup of the candidate pool for those positions
over that timeframe. We do not know how many total candi-
dates applied to Region 5, GS-15 positions since 2010, much
less how many Black candidates applied. We cannot draw
conclusions from this data because Staples does not “support
her claim that [the GSA’s] alleged failure to promote any”
Black candidates “with sufficient information about the rele-
vant applicant pool.” Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d
731, 739 (7th Cir. 2006); see Baylie, 476 F.3d at 526 (plaintiff
could not use evidence that she was passed over for promo-
tions as evidence of discrimination when she provided “no
details about who received the promotions, after what pro-
cess”).
12                                                    No. 22-3275

   In sum, none of Staples’s evidence indicates race discrim-
ination, even when considered “as a whole.” Crain, 63 F.4th at
591. The district court correctly granted summary judgment
on that claim.
     B. Sex Discrimination Claim
    The district court found that Staples abandoned her sex
discrimination claim because she did not argue it in her brief
opposing summary judgment. Barnes-Staples, 2022 WL
4534686, at *6. On appeal, Staples frames her sex discrimina-
tion claim as an “intersectional claim” inextricably tied to
race.
    We agree with the district court. Even assuming “a[n in-
tersectional] theory of discrimination” can produce a viable
claim, Staples did not “provide evidence … that the [GSA]
took an adverse employment action at least in part on account
of sex.” Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 564 (7th
Cir. 2009). She made only a passing mention to the lack of
Black women in GS-15 positions since 2010 within Region 5,
and she did not illustrate how she was personally discrimi-
nated against because of her sex. Since Staples did not de-
velop her sex discrimination argument before the district
court, she waived it. Reck v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 27
F.4th 473, 485 n.30 (7th Cir. 2022).

                         III. Conclusion

   For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the GSA.