Court Opinion

ID: 9579754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:17.069495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:44.895200
License: Public Domain

*163Riley, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree that the state is immune from liability in the instant case, because I find that it may not be liable for damages arising from installations directly and integrally affecting vehicular safety on the improved portion of the highway unless the highway is unreasonably unsafe because of physical disrepair of the improved portion of the roadbed designed fo1" vehicular travel, I write separately.
i
At issue in the instant case is whether defendant may be held liable for injuries to a motorcyclist that allegedly occurred because of defendant’s failure to properly design, construct, and maintain a bridge railing. The majority holds that defendant is immune from liability from such allegations because bridge railings are neither installations physically located within the traveled or paved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel nor installations directly and integrally affecting the vehicular safety on the improved portion of the highway. Ante at 161. While I concur with this result, the majority impermissi*164bly expands liability by misconstruing the plain meaning of the statute at issue.
A
The State of Michigan and its subdivisions are not insurers of passengers on Michigan public highways. Salvati v Dep’t of State Hwys, 415 Mich 708, 716; 405 NW2d 850 (1982) (Coleman, J.). The culmination of nearly a century of legislative reform,1 MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) crafts a narrow exception to the general common-law principle that the government is immune for injuries arising from the use of public highways:
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property for reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages by him or her from the governmental agency. . . . The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any *165other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
This Court has long held that the fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to determine the intention of the Legislature in enacting the statute. Leoni Twp v Taylor, 20 Mich 148, 154-155 (1870). Because the Legislature is presumed to understand the meaning of the language it places into law, "[statutory analysis necessarily begins with the wording of the statute itself.” Carr v General Motors Corp, 425 Mich 313, 317; 389 NW2d 686 (1986). Hence, each word of ¡an act is "presumed to be made use of for some purpose,” and "so far as possible, effect must be’ given to every clause and sentence.” Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents v Auditor General, 167 Mich 444, 450; 132 NW 1037 (1911). Accordingly, the Court may not substitute or redefine a word, People v Crucible Steel Co of America, 150 Mich 563, 567; 114 NW 350 (1907), or assume that the Legislature mistakenly utilized one word or phrase instead of another. Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich 453, 456; 235 NW 217 (1931). Thus, "'[a] fundamental principle guiding this Court is that a clear and unambiguous statute leaves no room for judicial construction or interpretation.” Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993).2 In other words, "[a] statute is not open to construction as a matter of course, but only where the language used in the statute requires interpretation—where it is ambiguous or where 2 or more constructions can be placed upon it, where it is of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its *166meaning.” Lansing v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641, 649; 97 NW2d 804 (1959). These rules of statutory construction are especially appropriate in the instant case because, historically, Michigan has strictly construed statutes imposing liability on the state in derogation of the common-law rule of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Detroit v Putnam, 45 Mich 263, 265; 7 NW 815 (1881); Johnson v Ontonagon Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, 253 Mich 465, 468; 235 NW 221 (1931).
B
The majority finds that the statute permits liability when injuries arise from "(1) installations physically located within that traveled or paved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel, or (2) some installations, even those physically located beyond the traveled or paved portion of a highway, that directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on this improved portion.” Ante at 158. The majority reasons that such an interpretation of the statute is consistent with both precedent and the legislative intent of the statute. Id.
Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, the clear and unambiguous language of the statute imposes liability only when the physical highway is unreasonably unsafe because of physical disrepair of the improved portion of the road designed for vehicular travel. The language is not so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds need to search behind its words to find its meaning. This Court has explained:
[T]he duty imposed by the statute upon the state and county road commissions is restricted to the "improved portion of the highway designed for *167vehicular travel . . . In Roy [v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 339; 408 NW2d 783 (1987)], we observed that the limited scope of the term "highway” found in § 2 parallels the common understanding of the word. We are in accord with the conclusion reached in Roy. Therefore, we hold today that the phrase "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” refers only to the traveled portion, paved or unpaved, of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel. Roy, supra.
The purpose of the highway exception is not to place upon the state or counties an unrealistic duty to ensure that travel upon the highways will always be safe. Looking to the language of the statute, we discern that the true intent of the Legislature is to impose a duty to keep the physical portion of the traveled roadbed in reasonable repair. [Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619, 630-631; 456 NW2d 66 (1990).]
Hence, "compliance with the conditions and restrictions of the highway exception statute negates the inclusion of street lighting within the duty of the state because the physical structure of the lights falls outside the traveled or paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.” Id. at 633. Similarly, a county is not liable for obstructions of the highway caused by private hedges because it lacks any "connection to the traveled portion of the roadbed designed for public vehicular traffic.” Id. at 636.3
The plain language of the statute, therefore, simply does not permit liability for injuries arising from a bridge railing. A bridge railing is not an "improved portion of the highway designed for *168vehicular travel.” While a bridge railing is designed for vehicular safety, it is not a portion of the highway on which motor vehicles were designed to travel. Nor does the statute expressly impose liability for bridge railings. To the contrary, the bridge railings, separated from the roadbed by a raised curb and a paved shoulder, are akin to "sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other instal- ‘ lation outside the improved portion of the highway . . . .” Generally, bridge railings, not unlike lighting or vegetation, exist outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and are not a part of the roadbed. Nor are there allegations that this particular bridge railing posed a danger to those traveling on the improved portion of the highway. Thus, the unambiguous language of the statute excludes injuries arising from the bridge railing.4_
*169In Scheurman, supra at 632, the Court noted that necessity of lighting for safety purposes was not the issue before it, but whether lighting was an improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Similarly, contrary to the conclusion of the majority, the issue in the instant case is not whether bridge railings are necessary for safety, but whether an exception to common-law immunity has been provided for accidents arising from the failure to properly design, maintain, and repair such installations. The majority, however, ignores the narrow issue presented and expands - the sovereign immunity exception to include all injuries arising from any installation that "directly and integrally affecfjsj safe vehicular travel on” the improved portion of the highway in contradiction of the clear language of the statute. Ante at 158. While the obvious purpose undergirding the section is to compensate injured persons when the highway is unsafe for vehicular travel, it does so only in very limited circumstances. The statute does not provide blanket liability for all injuries that deprive drivers of conditions essential to safety on the highway itself. The statute only provides for liability if the injuries arise from the failure to repair or maintain the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.5 The majority attempts to reconcile this holding with precedent and legislative intent, but ignores the proper focus of the inquiry: the plain language of the statute.
Furthermore, the holding is inconsistent with Scheurman. The majority explains that liability may arise from those installations "deemed to integrally affect, those properties comprising 'the improved portion of a highway designed for vehi*170cular travel.’ ” Ante at 160. Thus, installations beyond the roadbed, but which affect traffic on it, may give rise to liability. This Court, however, has rejected liability arising from blocked vision caused by overhanging hedges or inadequate lighting, both of which are located outside the roadbed, but which also affect traffic on the roadbed. Id. In effect, the majority overrules Scheurman because hedges and lighting that block drivers’ vision certainly affect sí ,'efy on the highway. Indeed, adequate lighting and unobstructed views are more essential to the proper and safe flow of traffic because bridge railings, as the majority notes, have no "effect upon the safe and convenient passage of vehicles while on the improved portion.” Ante at 161.
The majority’s holding appears to be based on the conclusion that the Legislature could not have been so unwise as to have intended a result inconsistent with the majority’s. Yet, the wisdom, fairness, or incongruity of the statute is not our concern. The judiciary may not amend statutes to conform with its policy preferences. The Legislature, not the Court, is the lawmaking authority within our constitutional order of separate powers. Unless the constitution invalidates a legislative enactment, the propriety and wisdom of such enactments are not for this Court to question. Unwise legislative enactments must be rectified by the democratic safeguards and checks in the constitution: ballot box,6 initiative,7 referendum,8 or *171constitutional amendment.9 Finding itself wiser than the Legislature and the people, the majority reaches beyond the plain language of the act and crafts a new statute reflective of its sensibilities. Because this is not our role in the constitutional order, I concur solely with the result reached by the majority.
Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, J.

 At common law, local governments were immune from suits arising from the negligent upkeep of highways. Nile Twp Hwys Comm’rs v Martin, 4 Mich 557 (1857). With the passage of 1879 PA 244, 1 How Stat 1442, however, the Legislature provided for broad liability for bodily injury arising from the negligent upkeep of public highways, bridges, crosswalks, and culverts. 1887 PA 264, 3 How Stat 1446c, expanded liability to include sidewalks. Liability remained essentially the same until 1964 PA 170 restored governmental immunity in some areas and expanded it in others; the act also provided greater uniformity. For a thorough history of sovereign immunity with regard to public highways, see Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 336-338; 408 NW2d 783 (1987).

 As Justice Cooley explained, "the courts have nothing to do but to obey” a clear statute. People ex rel Twitchell v Blodgett, 13 Mich 127, 167 (1865).

 Similarly, the Court has rejected the imposition of liability for bicycle paths that are detached from, but parallel to, the traveled portion of the highway, Roy, supra at 331, while imposing liability for such paths that are part of the paved portion of the highway. Gregg v Dep’t of State Hwys, 435 Mich 307, 316; 458 NW2d 619 (1990).

 Justice Levin, however, finds:
In providing, in the fourth sentence of the highway exception, that the duty "to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor” shall not extend to "any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel,” the Legislature did not relieve the moot of its duty, and liability therefor, under the first two sentences of the highway exception, to repair and maintain the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, including installation of guardrails reasonably necessary to maintain the improved portion reasonably safe and fit for travel. [Post at 193-194.J
Yet, Justice Levin’s conclusion that the first and second sentences of the provision impose duties and liabilities for damages beyond the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” is belied by the language of the statute. While the first two sentences of the statute impose general duties and liability on defendant to "maintain the highway in reasonable repair,” the fourth sentence explicitly limits such liability "to-the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” and exempts from liability "sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for. vehicular travel.” While Justice Levin repeatedly criticizes members of the Court for ignoring statutory language and for so-called "myopic” interpretations of the statute at issue, his *169interpretation blatantly misconstrues the statute by making meaningless the fourth sentence of the provision.

 Thus, injuries arising from crumbling roads or collapsing bridges, for instance, are clearly compensable.

 Art 2, § 8 ("Laws shall be enacted to provide for the recall of all elective officers except judges of courts of record”); art 4, § 2 (senators are to be elected every four years); art 4, § 3 (representatives are to be elected every two years); art 5, § 21 (the Governor is to be elected every four years).

 Art 2, § 9 ("The people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and to enact and reject laws, called the initiative”).

 Id. ("The people reserve to themselves . . . the power to approve or reject laws enacted by the legislature, called the referendum”).

 Art 12, §§ 1-3 (outlining three methods to amend the state constitution).