Court Opinion

ID: 9707470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:12:42.269854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:33.419076
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I find that the majority has ignored case law which is squarely on point with the matter sub judice and instead relies upon case law which is inapposite, I must respectfully dissent.
Ten years ago, this court decided a case which is strikingly similar to the matter presently before us. Pawlosky v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 514 Pa. 450, 525 A.2d 1204 (1987). The claimant in Pawlosky suffered from a preexisting asthmatic condition which was exacerbated by exposure to chemicals in the work-place. Id. at 454, 525 A.2d at 1206. In considering whether the exacerbation of a preexisting condition could be deemed an “injury” under the Worker’s Compensation Act (“Act”), we held that the definition of “injury” is
broad enough in its scope to encompass all work-related harm to the employee ‘regardless of his previous physical condition.’ It may now be said, generally, that an employer takes an employee as he comes. Specifically included in the [present] conception of ‘injury’ is the job-related aggravation, reactivation or acceleration of a pre-existing disease, even if the underlying disease itself was not caused by a work-related injury.
Id. at 459, 525 A.2d at 1209 (emphasis supplied). We thus reasoned that the aggravation of the claimant’s pre-existing asthmatic condition was a compensable “injury”.
*666Pawlosky is unquestionably on point -with this matter: both the claimant in that matter and in the matter sub judice suffered from a pre-existing condition that was exacerbated by exposure to elements in the work place. This court in Pawlosky held that such exacerbation of the claimant’s pre-existing asthmatic condition was an “injury” within the meaning of the Act. So, too, should this court find that the exacerbation of Joseph Baxter’s pre-existing asthmatic condition is also an “injury”.
Curiously, the majority mentions Pawlosky only to note that the Commonwealth Court below relied upon it in making its determination. Rather than grappling with that case which is on point with this matter, the majority, as the main support of its opinion, relies upon Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 537 Pa. 32, 36, 640 A.2d 1266, 1268 (1994). I find the reliance on Republic Steel to be questionable as that case was not concerned with the issue of whether the claimant had sustained an “injury” as defined by the Act—the issue which is presented in the matter sub judice. Rather, the crux of that case was a wholly different issue: whether the claimant’s loss of earnings was due to the injury he sustained. Since Republic Steel presented no rationale on the issue of what constitutes an injury, I believe that it does not advance the analysis of the matter presently before the court.
Thus, for the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully dissent.
NIGRO, J., joins this Dissenting Opinion.