Court Opinion

ID: 9551752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:58:36.730936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:29.414767
License: Public Domain

*257THORNTON, J.,
dissenting in part.
For reasons which follow, I do not agree with the deletion from the decree of the provision for spousal support. Under the peculiar facts of this case, I believe that inserting this provision in the decree was proper.
The awarding of spousal support is authorized by ORS 107.105(l)(c)(C). One of the conditions enumerated in ORS 107.105(c) is:
<<* * * * *
“(C) Their health and conditions;
<<* ****’’
I submit that the trial court did not err in awarding token spousal support in order to permit wife to petition for increased spousal support in the event that wife failed to recover from her injury sufficiently to permit her to support herself. This amounted to a provision reserving the power of modification in anticipation of a possible change of the financial circumstances of the parties and at the same time avoiding the possibility that wife could in effect receive double compensation for that injury. The propriety of inserting such a provision in a decree has been recognized in a number of states. See Annot., 155 ALR 609, 613 (1945). Here the court had no assurance that wife would be able with reasonable effort to support herself or that a jury would award her any compensation on account of her injury and disability. In view of the circumstances I conclude that the anticipatory provision fashioned by the trial court was a reasonable exercise of the court’s broad equity power.
ORS 107.405 provides:
“When a court is sitting in proceedings for annulment or dissolution of a marriage, or for separation, it shall have full equity powers.”
A dissolution proceeding is governed by the principles and practices of equity. See 24 Am Jur2d, Divorce & Separation § 7.