Court Opinion

ID: 9686109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:30:12.310205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:35.732414
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). Contrary to the view of Justice Cavanagh, I believe that the Michigan statute precluding spousal testimony is not unambiguous and that the Court of Appeals correctly construed the statute.
*710I
We are presented in this case with a question of statutory interpretation. The statute involved provides that "[a] husband shall not be examined as a witness for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent . . . .” MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162. At issue is the correct construction of the exception to the statute in cases "where the cause of action grows out of a personal wrong or injury done by one to the other . . . .” Id. Justice Cavanagh has excluded from this exception crimes involving third persons which arise out of the same criminal transaction against the spouse pursuant to the authority of People v Quanstrom, 93 Mich 254; 53 NW 165 (1892). Quanstrom construed this exception narrowly on the basis that the statute codified the privilege at common law. It is well-established that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. People v Kramer, 225 Mich 35, 38; 195 NW 802 (1923). Therefore, it is not surprising that the Quanstrom Court refused to construe the exceptions to the statute any broader than was recognized at common law.
Since that nineteenth century decision, the privilege against adverse spousal testimony has been significantly criticized as "the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev), § 2228, p 221. Trammel v United States, 445 US 40, 45; 100 S Ct 906; 63 L Ed 2d 186 (1980).
As Justice Cavanagh notes, "The spousal privilege is a product of ancient common-law rules of incompetency.” Ante, p 698.
[The] spousal disqualification sprang from two *711canons of medieval jurisprudence: first, the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify in his own behalf because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the concept that husband and wife were one, and that since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that one. [Trammel v United States, supra, 44.]
Wigmore further posits that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony, as opposed to disqualification, has for its ancient rationale the natural and strong repugnance to "condemning a man by admitting to the witness stand against him those who lived under his roof, shared the secrets of his domestic life, depended on him for sustenance and were almost numbered among his chattels.”1 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev), § 2227, p 212, § 2228, p 217.
The United States Supreme Court in Trammel, supra, 52, aptly pointed out, however, that
the ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since disappeared. Nowhere in the common-law world — indeed in any modern society — is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being. Chip by chip, over the years those archaic notions have been cast aside so that "[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.” [Citations omitted.]
Given that the common-law basis for the statute is no longer viable, I would not hesitate to depart from the common-law construction of the excep*712tions to the statute, especially since such a construction will oftentimes result in the relevant testimony of the only witness being excluded. Therefore, I would apply the rule of construction set forth by the Trammel Court which requires that privileges "be strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.’ ” Trammel, supra, 50.
As Professor Wigmore explained, the fundamental maxim recognized for more than three centuries is that the public has a right to every man’s evidence, and that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving. 8 Wig-more, Evidence (McNaughton rev), § 2192, p 70. It follows, therefore, that
all privileges of exemption from this duty are exceptional, and are therefore to be discountenanced. There must be good reason, plainly shown, for their existence. In the interest of developing scientifically the details of the various recognized privileges, judges and lawyers are apt to forget this exceptional nature. The presumption against their extension is not observed in spirit. The trend of the day is to expand them as if they were large and fundamental principles, worthy of pursuit into the remotest analogies. This attitude is an unwholesome one. The investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges. They should be recognized only wdthin the narrowest limits required by principle. Every step beyond these limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an obstacle to the administration of justice. [Id., p 73. Emphasis in original.]
Applying these principles to the case at bar, I *713must concur with the Court of Appeals reasoning that,
"The spousal privilege in Michigan, like the modern common-law privilege, is narrow in its justification and ought to be correspondingly narrowly construed in its scope.”
The Legislature employed remarkably broad language in drafting the victim-spouse exception quoted above. Because the spousal privilege should be narrowly construed, the exceptions to the spousal privilege stated in the statute should be construed broadly. Therefore, we hold that a crime committed against a third person as part of the same criminal transaction as a crime committed against a spouse "grows out of a personal wrong or injury” done to the spouse and is therefore within the exception. This result is consistent with the policy behind the statute. Marital harmony will not be significantly decreased if the victim-spouse is required to testify on two charges arising from the same criminal transaction rather than merely one. [127 Mich App 596, 602; 339 NW2d 493 (1983). Citations omitted.][2]_
*714Unlike Justice Cavanagh, I do not believe this construction does violence to the words of the statute. To construe the statute otherwise in a situation like the one at bar would effectively secure "to every man, one safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for every imaginable crime.” Trammel, supra, p 52.
ii
I further disagree with Justice Cavanagh’s determination that where an exception to the statute is applicable, the spouse may not be compelled to testify. This construction does not flow from the statute.
Justice Cavanagh points out that by 1846, Michigan had statutorily removed the absolute disqualification of spouses, but retained the privilege of preventing spousal testimony. Ante, p 699. Justice Cavanagh, therefore, would describe the statutory bar against spousal testimony as a true privilege, and not a rule of incompetency.
At least one commentator has advised that the disability of a spouse as a witness for the party-spouse should be classified as a disqualification while the rule enabling the party-spouse to prevent adverse spousal testimony should be classified as a privilege. McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 66, p 161. I do not believe, however, that our statute retaining the spousal privilege can be so neatly divided. Section 2162 states in pertinent part that "[a] husband shall not be examined . . . for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent *715. . . MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162.3 In my view, by changing the common-law rule concerning the testimonial incompetencies of husband and wife, the Legislature did not make them competent witnesses for or against each other without restriction. Rather, the Legislature made the spouse conditionally competent, that condition being the consent of the other spouse. People v Knowles, 15 Mich 408, 413 (1867); People v Gordon, 100 Mich 518; 59 NW 322 (1894). Thus, §2162 cannot be classified as a "true privilege”; the statute is rather a rule of incompetency which vests in the party-spouse the ability to remove, the incompe*716tency, and permits the nonconsenting party-spouse to prevent the witness from being called to the stand. See People v Werner, 225 Mich 18; 195 NW 697 (1923).
It follows that in the exceptions to this rule, the Legislature intended to remove the conditional disability of the witness-spouse so that the witness-spouse is as competent and compellable as any other witness. MRE 601; MCR 2.506. No other legislative intent can be so clearly established. These exceptions include "cases of prosecution for a crime committed against the children of either or both, and where the cause of action grows out of a personal wrong or injury done by one [spouse] to the other . . . .” MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162. Contrary to the view of Justice Cavanagh that the exceptions were carved out for the benefit of the wife who wishes to testify, the exceptions have been created by the rule of necessity, "partly for the protection of the wife in her life and liberty, and partly for the sake of public justice,” People v Zabijak, 285 Mich 164, 176; 280 NW 149 (1938), and were recognized at common law. Trammel, supra, 46, n 7.4
The Court of Appeals in this case correctly noted that, "To create a common-law permissive privilege in such a situation broadens the impact of the spousal privilege rather than narrows it. Such a *717construction contravenes the principle that the court should employ all rational means for ascertaining the truth.” Love, supra, 604-605.
Finally, I would note that by placing the privilege in the testifying spouse who will most frequently be a married woman, Justice Cavanagh may have inadvertently created a situation which actually heightens the vulnerability of the victim of a crime or a witness to a crime against the child of either.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Riley, J., concurred with Boyle, J.
Archer, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 The justification for the privilege as it has evolved to this day, is "its perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship.” Trammel, supra. See also People v Wadkins, 101 Mich App 272; 300 NW2d 542 (1980).

 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals found very-persuasive the decision in State v Briley, 53 NJ 498; 251 A2d 442 (1969). Under almost identical factual circumstances, the Briley court held:
If there is a single criminal event in which she and others are targets or victims of the husband’s criminal conduct in the totality of the integrated incident surd formal charges are made against the husband for some or all the offenses committed (one of which charges is for an offense against the spouse), the wife should be a competent and compellable witness against her husband at the trial of all the cases regardless of whether they are tried separately or in one proceeding. And, in this connection, it should be immaterial that the offense against the wife does not reach the same dimensions of criminality as it does against the third-party victim. [Id., 507.]
Justice Cavanagh distinguishes Briley from the instant case and rejects its rationale largely on the basis of the statutory language involved in that case which is different from that involved in this case. This distinction makes the rationale of Briley no less persuasive.
*714In both cases, the language of the statutes are capable of more than one construction and the intents of the respective legislatures are elusive.
Moreover, the view expressed by Briley is representative of the view in the majority of states notwithstanding the variations in statutes. 127 Mich App 602-603.

 Section 2162 provides in full:
A husband shall not be examined as a witness for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in suits for divorce and in cases of prosecution for bigamy, in cases of prosecution for a crime committed against the children of either or both, and where the cause of action grows out of a personal wrong or injury done by one to the other, or grows out of the refusal or neglect to furnish the wife or children with suitable support, and except in cases of desertion or abandonment, and cases arising under section 6 of chapter 83 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, as amended, relating to marriage, and cases where the husband or wife shall be a party to the record in a suit, action, or proceeding, where the title to the separate property of the husband or wife so called or offered as a witness, or where the title to property derived from, through or under the husband or wife so called or offered as a witness, shall be the subject matter in controversy or litigation in such suit, action or proceeding, in opposition to the claim or interest of the other of said married persons, who is a party to the record in such suit, action or proceeding; and in all such cases, such husband or wife who makes such claim of title, or under or from whom such title is derived, shall be as competent to testify in relation to said separate property and the title thereto without the consent of said husband or wife, who is a party to the record in such suit, action or proceeding, as though such marriage relation did not exist; nor shall either, during the marriage or afterwards, without the consent of both, be examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage, but in any action or proceeding instituted by the husband or wife, in consequence of adultery, the husband and wife shall not be competent to testify.

 Indeed, the necessity for parental testimony in prosecutions for child abuse is indicated by the estimate that "over ninety percent of reported child abuse cases occurred in the home, with a parent or parent substitute the perpetrator in eighty-seven and one-tenth percent of these cases.” United States v Allery, 526. F2d 1362, 1366 (CA 8, 1975), quoting Evidentiary problems in criminal child abuse prosecutions, 63 Geo L J 257, 258 (1974). This necessity is also reflected in the Child Protection Law, MCL 722.631; MSA 25.248(11), which abrogates all legally recognized privileges except that between attorney and client as grounds for excusing a report of suspected child abuse otherwise required by the act or for excluding evidence in a civil child protective proceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to the act.