Court Opinion

ID: 9833692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:56:58.610851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:05.913962
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing.
As stated in our original opinion herein, the record in this case is voluminous. The transcript of the court proceedings contains 364 pages; the statement of facts 515 pages. The joint brief for appellants contains 221 pages; the separate brief of Bass, trustee,, and Bass Petroleum Company, -pages; additional brief for appellees 35 pages, supplemental brief for appellees 47 pages, and citation of additional authorities by appellees, and written argument thereon, filed by permission of the court, 18 pages. The motion for rehearing by appellants contains 66 pages; the motion for rehearing by appellees contains 14 pages. Besides these, numerous motions were filed during the progress of the case in this court. The defendants are numerous, namely, R. D. Durham, W. M. Campbell, T. B. Dewis, George G. Clough, August E. Borsum, T. I-I. Bass, trustee, the Bass Petroleum Company, the Cordell Mineral Association, the Cordell Petroleum Company, the Durfee Mineral Association, the Durfee Mineral Company, the Gypsy-Burk Petroleum Company, a Texas corporation, and the Gypsy-Burk Petroleum Company, a foreign corporation.
The appellants made a common fight against appellees’ cause of action in so far as it was sought to' cancel the deed to W. M. Campbell, under whom they all claimed; but in addition thereto they made separate defenses. We mention these facts in extenuation, if not as a valid excuse, for the confusion and consequent error into which we fell in our opinion on motion for rehearing, in affirming the judgment of the trial court against the Durfee Mineral Company. This error was discovered by the writer hereof when he was called upon by the clerk of this court to advise him as to the proper form of judgment herein. The opinion heretofore rendered herein on motions for rehearing is withdrawn, upon this court’s own motion, and *615this opinion is substituted therefor. The motions for rehearing by the parties hereto are granted, and the judgment, entered in conformity to our original opinion, is set-aside, to the extent indicated in this opinion, but not otherwise. To the extent, that our original opinion herein is not modified by this opinion, the respective motions for a rehearing are overruled.
Appellees insist that the judgment of the trial court, correcting the deed from them to Campbell, should be affirmed, instead of reversing the same, with instructions to the lower court to enter such judgment, for the reason that the evidence sustains the finding of the jury and the judgment of the court on this issue, and .that this issue is sever-able from other issues involved herein. We concede the correctness of this contention, and render judgment accordingly. Bule 62a (149 S. W. x) provides that, when the issues are severable, judgment may be rendered on appeal, affirming the judgment of the trial court in part, and in part reversing and remanding the same. This was the practice of appellate courts in this state before the adoption of said rule, and, has been consistently followed since. Wells v. Littlefield, 59 Tex. 556, 46 Am. Rep. 284; Schuster v. Bauman Jewelry Co., 79 Tex. 179, 15 S. W. 259, 23 Am. St. Rep. 327; Martinez v. Bruni (Tex. Com. App.) 235 S. W. 556; Needham v. Cooney. (Tex. Civ. App.) 173 S. W. 979; Johnson v. Conger (Tex. Civ. App.) 166 S. W. 407; Nona Mills Co. v. Jackson (Tex. Civ. App.) 159 S. W. 932; Donada v. Power (Tex. Civ. App.) 186 S. W. 872; Oil Co. v. Oil Co., 106 Tex. 94, 157 S. W. 737, 51 L. B. A. (N. S.) 268. Por a like reason, we also affirm the judgment of the trial court against B. L. Durham, W. M. Campbell, and the Cordell Petroleum Company, for $21,183.33, the same being ap-pellees’ proportion of the $200,000 received by said company for leases sold by it out of the lands conveyed by appellees to W. M. Campbell, after allowing an offset of $5,000 in favor of Campbell, for the purchase money paid by him to appellees.
It devolved upon the appellees to pfove what amount had been thus received by the Cordell Petroleum Company. This it sought to do by propounding interrogatories to W. D. Gordon, who testified that he was vice president of the Cordell Petroleum Company, a director thereof, and of counsel for said company in this cause. It was shown .that he was custodian of the books of the company. Mr. Gordon answered, among other things, as follows:
“In answer to the following question: ‘Please kindly examine the books and records of the Cordell Petroleum Company, and state from said books and your own knowledge: (a) How many sales, leases, or releases of any nature whatever have been secured by the Cordell Petroleum Company since' the 18th day of October, 1919, at 2 o’clock p. m.’ — I will say that I have already indicated in preceding answers that I do not propose to go into the books and papers of the Cordell Petroleum Company or Durfee Mineral Company, or any other company in my charge, and turn over the information disclosed thereby to litigant parties in this suit, simply because they propound interrogatories seeking to obtain that information. I shall do nothing of the kind, unless in the course of the administration of justice, upon the proper showing, the court shall hold that it is my duty to do so, in which event I would respond willingly to the order Of the court in this respect, but not otherwise. I make the same answer to all the subdivisions to this question, which are as follows: ‘(b) Give a concise, definite statement of each of the sales, leases, or releases, executed by the Cordell Petroleum Company since the 18th day of October, 1919, at 2 o’clock p. m., showing— (1) The acreage- involved in the transaction and the location thereof; (2) the name of the party to whom such sale, lease, or release was made or executed; (3) the amount of the consideration accruing to the Cordell Petroleum-Company by virtue of such transaction, and the nature of such consideration; that is, whether cash, notes, or whatever else such consideration may have consisted of.’ ”
When this cause was’ called for trial in the district court, appellants sought a continuance. This was agreed to by appellees in consideration of the agreement of appellants that they would produce, at the next term of the court, such of the books of defendants as should be requested' by appellees. Appel-lees duly requested appellants to produce the books of the Cordell Petroleum Company. This they refused to do.
Geo. A. Smoot testified by deposition that he was secretary of the Cordell Petroleum Company; that he did not have the books of the company in his possession, but that he knew approximately the amount of money received by said company for leases; and that the same was about $200,900.' Mr. Clough, a stockholder in the Cordell Petroleum Company, testified that he talked with Mr. Barkley and Mr. Smoot with reference to the amount of money received by the Cor-dell Petroleum Company, and that “they told me something about what amount of money the Cordell Petroleum Company had on hand. I believe Mr. Smoot said approximately $209,000; that they had settlements with parties, and had received in those settlements some $200,000.” Mr. Barkley was vice president of the compány, and Mr. Smoot was its secretary. This testimony was sufficient to make a prima facie case that the Cordell Petroleum Company had received $200,000. If this was not correct, it could have shown by its books what amount it had received, and what amount, if any, it had paid out to its stockholders before receiving notice of the claim of the appellees herein. This information was peculiarly within the knowledge of the Cordell Petroleum Company. Having not only failed to produce its books, but flatly refusing to do so, in violation of its agree-*616meat, the evidence adduced was sufficient to sustain the verdict of. the jury in this regard, and to justify the court in rendering judgment against said company as hereinbefore stated.
 The judgment against the Durfee Mineral Company rests upon grounds different from the judgment against the Cordell Company. The Cordell Company held title under the deed from appellees to Campbell. Under that title it leased a part of the land conveyed by said deed. That deed' having been obtained by fraud, .appellees were entitled to receive their pro rata of the money so received by the Cordell .Company, without reference to the state of their title, or whether the land is in Tesas or in Oklahoma. If it should subsequently be made to appear that some one else has title to said land, or a part thereof, such owner could not recover from the Cordell Company the money received for leases thereon. A sufficient answer to such claim would be:
“In executing such lease we committed no trespass on your land, and did not injure you. If our lessees have trespassed on your land and extracted oil therefrom, they are responsible . to you therefor. The fact that they had a lease from us, who had no title, would be no defense.” i
Presumably, but for the possession of the Cordell Company under the fraudulent deed to Campbell and their claim of title thereunder, appellees could have leased said land upon terms equally as advantageous as those executed by the Cordell Company. By reason of said deed having been obtained by fraud, the .Cordell Company was a trustee for appellees.
The judgment against the Durfee Company and Campbell, the Bass Petroleum Company and Durham, for $22,851 was entered, upon the -finding of the jury that the Bass Petroleum Company, the lessee of the Dur-fee Company, had taken from the land so leased oil of the value of $225,000, and that the Bass Petroleum Company was not an innocent purchaser. Independent of the issue as to the Bass Petroleum Company being an innocent purchaser, this part of the judgment of the trial court must be reversed, for the reason that it appears from the record herein that all of the land leased by the Bass Petroleum Compahy is claimed to be in the state of Oklahoma. That this issue of fact can be adjudicated qnly by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which court a suit to determine that issue is now pending.
If, upon another trial, it should be shown that the oil taken from the land leased by the Bass Petroleum Company was taken in whole or in part from land in Oklahoma, and the owners of such land should sue to recover the value of same, it would be no answer for the Bass Petroleum Company to say:
“We have paid for this oil under a judgment in favor of appellees herein.”
A sufficient reply would be:
“Such parties had no title to the land; as I was not a party to that suit, it is in no wise binding upon me.”
Under such circumstances, the judgment herein would not be admissible in evidence. The same is true, also, as to the Durfee Mineral Company and Durham and Campbell, if it should be shown, under proper pleadings upon another trial hereof, that the Durfee survey was embraced within the field notes of a prior patented survey, thus showing that appellees never had any title thereto. While such evidence was not permissible as a defense to appellees’ suit to cancel the deed made by them to Campbell, being induced so to do by the fraudulent representations and concealments of Durham and Campbell, it will be admissible upon another trial hereof as against appellees’ claim for damages by reason of oil being taken from said land.
The unavoidable length of our original opinion herein, as well as of this opinion, precludes a full discussion on our part of the errors complained of as to the admission and rejection of evidence, and the giving and refusal of charges. A careful re-examination of the record, in the light of the motions for rehearing, fails to convince us that we committed error as to any of these issues. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court herein is affirmed, except as to the Bass Petroleum Company and the Durfee Mineral .Company, and Durham and Campbell, for oil taken from the land, as to which appellants the judgment on this issue is reversed and remanded, with the following instructions :
In our original opinion herein, we found that the undisputed evidence showed that Bass, trustee, was an innocent purchaser to the' extent of the costs paid by him. We reaffirm this finding. ■ Where a party is an innocent purchaser to the extent of having .paid a part of the purchase money without notice, a court of equity may adjust the equities between such purchasers and the true owner, either by allowing such owner to pay back the purchase money so paid and re* cover the land, or permit the purchaser to retain title to all of the land by paying the balance due to the owner, or may adjudge them to be tenants in common pro tanto. There is no hard and fast rule as to this, but each case will depend upon its particular facts. 2 Pom. Eq. § 750; Durst v. Daugherty, 81 Tex. 650-654, 17 S. W. 388; Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 427, 90 S. W. 485, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 381.
We could n,ot adjudge the Bass Petroleum Company and the appellees herein to be tenants in common pro tanto under the facts of record, for the reason that it is uncertain how much is or will be due by the Bass Com*617pany under its contract with the Durfee Company. That will depend upon how much oil it takes from land belonging to appellees. The trial court is instructed to adjust the equities between appellees and the Bass Petroleum Company in such manner as the evidence upon another trial will indicate will do justice to all of said parties.
The motions for rehearing are granted in part, and in part overruled, as indicated .in this opinion.
Granted in part and overruled in part.