Court Opinion

ID: 9454909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:03:32.405289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:22.463814
License: Public Domain

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
(dissenting):
I join in Parts A and B of Judge Leventhal’s opinion, but because I cannot agree with Part C I must dissent from the judgment of affirmance.
Judge Leventhal would have us depart from the established principle that “a person who has waived his privilege of silence in one trial or proceeding is not estopped to assert it as to the same matter in a subsequent trial or proceeding.” In re Neff, 3 Cir., 206 F.2d 149, 152 (1953). His premise is that compulsion of testimony which does not enhance the risk of prosecution or conviction invades no interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.
On the contrary, I believe the Fifth Amendment not only protects against the risk of prosecution on evidence extorted from the defendant, but also establishes a right to abstain from the demeaning ritual of public self-accusation. In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, “The Fifth Amendment protects the conscience and the dignity of the individual, as well as his safety and security, against the compulsion of government.” Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 449, 76 S.Ct. 497, 512, 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
Thus here the witness Izzard chose to waive his right to silence in the privacy of the grand jury hearing. He chose to assert that right rather than recite the evidence of his guilt in open court. The different circumstances of the two proceedings make his decision entirely explicable in terms of those considerations of human dignity which the Fifth Amendment was designed in part to protect.
It is true that compelled self-accusation has not been absolutely barred by the Fifth Amendment. Congress has judged, and a divided Supreme Court has acquiesced in the judgment, that the necessities of public justice allow the compulsion of self-incriminating testimony for the proof of certain serious crimes when immunity from prosecution is granted in return. Ullmann v. United States, supra (6-2 decision); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 *809L.Ed. 819 (1896) (5-4 decision). The requirement that immunity be granted at least gives some insurance that the witness’ Fifth Amendment interests will not be overridden lightly. Judge Leventhal’s opinion would allow those same interests to be overridden without legislative provision of the same protective quid pro quo. I cannot agree.
I respectfully dissent.