Court Opinion

ID: 91142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:03:00+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:41.144612
License: Public Domain

111 U.S. 556 (1884)
CARROLL COUNTY
v.
SMITH.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued April 27th, 1884.
Decided May 5th, 1884.
IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI.
*560 Mr. J.Z. George for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Charles B. Howry for defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:
The provision in the charter of the railroad company *561 authorizing the issue of bonds in payment of subscriptions by municipal bodies to its capital stock, is based upon article 12, section 14, of the Constitution of the State, which declares that 
"The legislature shall not authorize any county, city or town to become a stockholder in, or to lend its credit to, any company, association or corporation, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city or town, at a special election or regular election to be held therein, shall assent thereto."
It is claimed, on behalf of the plaintiff in error, that the qualified voters referred to in the Constitution of Mississippi and the charter of the railroad company, are those who have been determined by the registrars to have the requisite qualifications of electors, and who have been enrolled by them as such, and that it requires a vote of two-thirds of the whole number enrolled as qualified to vote, and not merely two-thirds of such actually voting at an election for that purpose, to authorize the issue of such bonds as those in suit.
That presents the single question for our decision, for the averment in the last plea, that "the board of supervisors fraudulently and illegally issued and delivered the bonds and coupons," has reference merely to their being issued without the alleged requisite assent of two-thirds of the registered voters, and there is nothing alleged in the plea from which it can be inferred that the injunction bill, pending which the bonds, it is charged, were issued and delivered, was based on any other infirmity.
We do not think the plaintiff in error is precluded from raising this question by any recitals in the bonds. They contain no statement of any election called or held, or of the vote by which the issue of the bonds was authorized. They do not embody even a general statement that the bonds were issued in pursuance of the statutes referred to. The utmost effect that can be given to them is, that of a statement, that a subscription to the capital stock of the railroad company was authorized by the statutes mentioned, and that the sum mentioned in the bonds was part of it. They serve simply to point out the particular laws under which the transaction may lawfully *562 have taken place. They say nothing whatever as to any compliance with the requirements of the statute in respect to which the board of supervisors were authorized and appointed to determine and certify. They do not, therefore, within the rule of decision acted on by this court, constitute an estoppel, which prevents inquiry into the alleged invalidity of the bonds. Northern Bank of Toledo v. Porter Township, 110 U.S. 608; Dixon County v. Field, ante, 83; School District v. Stone, 106 U.S. 183.
On the other hand, we do not agree with the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that the pendency of the injunction bill, referred to in the last plea, affects the title of the defendant in error, as a bona fide holder of the bonds for value; or that this court is bound to follow and apply the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in that case, reported as Hawkins v. Carroll County, 50 Miss. 735, perpetuating the injunction, on the ground that the Constitution and laws of the State required a majority of two-thirds of those qualified to vote to be cast at the election, to support the validity of the bonds.
The defendant in error was no party to that suit, and the record of the judgment is therefore no estoppel. The bonds were negotiable, and there was, therefore, no constructive notice of any fraud or illegality, by virtue of the doctrine of lis pendens. County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U.S. 96. It is not alleged in the plea that the defendant in error had actual notice of the litigation, or of the grounds on which it proceeded, or that any injunction was served upon the board of supervisors; and, if he had, that notice would have been merely of the question of law, of which, as we have seen, he is bound to take notice, at all events, and which is now for adjudication in this case. There is nothing in the case of Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209, 224, to which we are referred by counsel on this point, inconsistent with these views.
The decision in Hawkins v. Carroll County, above referred to, is not a judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, construing the Constitution and laws of the State, which, without regard to our own opinion upon the question involved, we feel bound to adopt and apply in the present case. It is a decision *563 upon the very bonds here in suit, pronounced after the controversy arose, and between other parties. It was not a rule previously established, so as to have become recognized as settled law, and which, of course, all parties to transactions afterwards entered into would be presumed to know and to conform to. When, therefore, it is presented for application by the courts of the United States, in a litigation growing out of the same facts, of which they have jurisdiction by reason of the citizenship of the parties, the plaintiff has a right, under the Constitution of the United States, to the independent judgment of those courts, to determine for themselves what is the law of the State, by which his rights are fixed and governed. It was to that very end that the Constitution granted to citizens of one State, suing in another, the choice of resorting to a federal tribunal. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33.
We have, however, considered the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in its opinion in the case of Hawkins v. Carroll County, with the respect which is due to the highest judicial tribunal of a State speaking upon a topic as to which it is presumed to have peculiar fitness for correct decision, and, while we are bound to admit the carefulness and fulness of its examination of the question, we are not able to adopt its conclusions. On the contrary, we are constrained to follow the decision in St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644, and adhere to the views expressed by this court in County of Cass v. Johnston, 95 U.S. 360, in deciding the same question upon the construction of a provision of the Constitution of Missouri, which is identical with that of the Constitution of Mississippi under consideration. It was there declared and decided, that "all qualified voters, who absent themselves from an election duly called, are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting, unless the law providing for the election otherwise declares. Any other rule would be productive of the greatest inconvenience, and ought not to be adopted, unless the legislative will to that effect is clearly expressed," page 369. In Missouri, as in Mississippi, there was *564 a constitutional provision requiring a registration of all qualified voters. State v. Sutterfield, 54 Missouri, 391.
Much stress in the argument was laid by the Supreme Court of Mississippi upon the registration record, as furnishing the standard by which to ascertain the proportion of qualified voters, whose assent was required by the Constitution. On this point, they say, 50 Miss. 761: "There exists, therefore, in each county a registration of the list of voters, which ought to show, with approximate accuracy, the names of those entitled to vote, `at any election.' In ascertaining, therefore, the result of an election requiring two-thirds of the qualified voters of the county to assent thereto, we think that the registration books are competent evidence on the point of the number of qualified voters in the county. It would be open to proof to show deaths, removals, subsequently incurred disqualifications, &c. When the Constitution uses the term `qualified electors,' it means those who have been determined by the registrars as having the requisite qualifications by enrolling their names, &c. It would be a fair construction of the 14th section to hold that the `two-thirds' meant that number of the whole number whose names had been enrolled as legal voters. That furnished official evidence of those prima facie entitled to vote. But, in this case, in addition to the information contained in the registration books, it is admitted that there were from 2,000 to 2,500 qualified voters in Carroll County at the date of this election. The proposition submitted did not have the assent of two-thirds, as required by the Constitution. The difficulty of proving the number of voters in the county has been obviated by this admission."
But this reasoning, as it seems to us, does not meet, much less overcome, the difficulty of the argument. The Constitution of Mississippi, although it does not recognize any voters as qualified, except such as are registered, does not make all persons, registered as such, qualified. And yet, if it is to be construed, in the clause in question, as referring to the registration as conclusive of the number of qualified voters, then no proof is competent to purge the list of those who never were qualified, or have died, removed, or become otherwise disqualified, *565 thus obliterating the distinction between registered and qualified voters; and if, on the other hand, it is to be construed as meaning voters qualified, in fact and in law, without reference to the sole circumstance of registration, then the body of electors is as indefinite as though there were no registration, and the determination of the whole number, if an actual enumeration is required to determine how many are two-thirds thereof, is completely a matter in pais, and must be inquired of and ascertained, in each case, by witnesses. The difficulty, if not the impossibility, of reaching results by such methods, amounts almost to demonstration, that such could not have been the legislative intent, or the meaning of the Constitution. The number and qualification of voters at such an election, is determinable by its result, as canvassed, ascertained and declared by the officers appointed to that duty, or as subsequently corrected by a contest or scrutiny in a direct proceeding, authorized and instituted for that purpose; it cannot be contested in any collateral proceeding, either by inquiry as to the truth of the return, or by proof of votes not cast, to be counted as cast against the proposition, unless the law clearly so requires. In our opinion, the Constitution of Mississippi did not mean, in the clause under consideration, to introduce any new rule. The assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters of the county, at an election lawfully held for that purpose, to a proposed issue of municipal bonds, intended by that instrument, meant the vote of two-thirds of the qualified voters present and voting at such election in its favor, as determined by the official return of the result. The words "qualified voters," as used in the Constitution, must be taken to mean not those qualified and entitled to vote, but those qualified and actually voting. In that connection a voter is one who votes, not one who, although qualified to vote, does not vote.
We are consequently, of opinion, that there is no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court, and it is accordingly
Affirmed.