Court Opinion

ID: 9953613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 15:05:52.003056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:18.163792
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,768

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                          LARRY D. EDMOND,
                                              Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; TYLER J. ROUSH, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed March 22, 2024. Affirmed.

        Larry D. Edmond, appellant pro se.

        Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., PICKERING, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, S.J.

        PICKERING, J.: This is an appeal following a series of other postconviction
appeals. In this case, Larry D. Edmond, who had been convicted of serious violent crimes
against his girlfriend, argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury to make
the necessary findings that Edmond had committed domestic violence offenses. He
claims that without this designation, the court lacked jurisdiction and he should receive a
new trial. We are not swayed by Edmond's argument and affirm the district court's denial
of his motion.

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                     EDMOND'S PAST AND PRESENT APPELLATE CASES

       In 2012, a jury convicted Edmond of attempted second-degree murder, aggravated
kidnapping, robbery, and aggravated battery, for crimes committed in October 2011. For
purposes of this appeal, we note that Edmond committed all but the robbery charge
against the same victim, his live-in girlfriend at the time. At sentencing, the district court
ordered all of Edmond's sentences to run concurrent for a controlling prison term of 586
months.

       In the ensuing years, Edmond has challenged the legality of his convictions and
resulting sentences several times. A short review of these postconviction actions provides
a foundation for understanding the posture of this case.

       Edmond first filed a direct appeal, raising several trial errors and challenging the
use of his criminal history at sentencing. Another panel of this court affirmed his
convictions and sentences in May 2014. State v. Edmond, No. 109,617, 2014 WL
2402001, at *12 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion). The Kansas Supreme Court
denied a petition for review, and the mandate issued in July 2015.

       In May 2014, while his direct appeal was pending, Edmond filed a pro se motion
to correct illegal sentence, basing his argument on State v. Murdock, 299 Kan. 312, 323
P.3d 846 (2014) (Murdock I), overruled by State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 357 P.3d 251
(2015). Edmond argued that the district court erred in characterizing his pre-1993 Kansas
conviction as a person felony for criminal history purposes, which the district court
summarily denied. Edmond appealed. Another panel of this court affirmed the denial in
an order summarily disposing of the appeal under Keel. State v. Edmond, No. 113,336
(order filed November 25, 2015).

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       In May 2019, Edmond filed a second pro se motion to correct illegal sentence,
arguing that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score based on the
Kansas Supreme Court's decision in the second Murdock case, State v. Murdock, 309
Kan. 585, 439 P.3d 307 (2019) (Murdock II). The district court denied the motion, and
another panel of this court summarily affirmed that ruling in March 2020. State v.
Edmond, No. 121,901 (order filed March 5, 2020).

       In April 2020, Edmond filed two pro se motions—one which he characterized as
an "Emergency Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence"—arguing that the COVID pandemic
rendered his prison sentence unreasonable and illegal. Later that same month, Edmond
filed an amended motion to correct illegal sentence, arguing his convictions were invalid
because the most severe crime he could have been convicted of was domestic battery.
The district court denied relief. On appeal, a panel of this court affirmed, finding that
Edmond could not challenge his underlying convictions in a motion to correct an illegal
sentence. State v. Edmond, No. 123,087, 2021 WL 4352534, at *2 (Kan. App. 2021)
(unpublished opinion).

       While that appellate case was pending, Edmond filed the pro se motion that is the
subject of this appeal. Edmond's motion, purportedly filed "pursuant to K.S.A. 22-
3504(b)," requested the district court enter "an order Nunc Pro Tunc designating his case
a domestic violence case as required by K.S.A. 22-4616(a)," asserting that the evidence
and the jury's verdict supported a domestic violence designation. The motion added that
without such designation, "the court will have operated without subject matter
jurisdiction over the subject matter for its lack of strict compliance with K.S.A. 22-4616.
Cf. Harris v. Christy, 166 Kan. 395, 400, 201 P.2d 1067 (1949)."

       The State responded to Edmond's motion, arguing he was not entitled to relief
because the case was not charged as a domestic violence offense and the jury had not
made a finding that Edmond committed a domestic violence offense. The State also

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argued that any error was harmless because Edmond suffered no prejudice by not having
a domestic violence designation on his case and, alternatively, that a nunc pro tunc order
was not an appropriate remedy because there were no clerical errors or omissions to
correct. The district court summarily denied Edmond's motion in July 2021, adopting the
reasoning and legal conclusions stated in the State's response.

       Edmond then moved pro se for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law
under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-252 and Supreme Court Rule 165 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. at
230) or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-
259(f). Expanding on the arguments made in his original motion, Edmond added that the
district court's failure to give a domestic violence instruction to the jury deprived the
court of subject matter jurisdiction and violated due process.

       The State responded, asking the district court to deny Edmond's motion as
successive and under the doctrine of res judicata. The State also contended that Edmond
failed to show that the civil statutes cited in his motion applied to his criminal case. The
district court summarily denied Edmond's motion.

   EDMOND ARGUES THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY

       On appeal, Edmond abandons his nunc pro tunc argument made in his original
motion. Instead, he continues with his expanded argument that the district court's failure
to give a domestic violence instruction to the jury deprived the court of subject matter
jurisdiction and violated due process.

       Essentially, Edmond is appealing the district court's failure to seek a domestic
violence designation under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4616 for his crimes that involved his
live-in girlfriend. After consideration of the proper standard of review, we agree with the
State and find that our standard of review is unlimited because interpretation of K.S.A.

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2011 Supp. 22-4616 is a question of law. See State v. Betts, 316 Kan. 191, 197, 514 P.3d
341 (2022).

Failing to instruct the jury to consider a domestic violence designation does not
invalidate the underlying convictions.

       Edmond contends that his convictions are invalid because the district court
engaged in improper judicial fact-finding to determine that he did not commit a domestic
violence offense. In response, the State agrees that a domestic violence designation might
have been proper if the jury had been asked to make that determination but contends
Edmond cites no authority to show that failing to request a domestic violence designation
somehow invalidates the underlying convictions.

       The relevant statute is K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4616(a), which states: "On and after
July 1, 2011, in all criminal cases, if there is evidence that the defendant committed a
domestic violence offense, the trier of fact shall determine whether the defendant
committed a domestic violence offense." See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5111(i) and (j)
(defining "'[d]omestic violence'" and "'[d]omestic violence offense'").

       Once a determination of a domestic violence offense has been made, the statute
then provides that "the court shall place a domestic violence designation on the criminal
case and the defendant shall be subject to the provisions of subsection (p) of K.S.A. 21-
6604." K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4616(a)(1); see K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6604(p) (requiring
district to order "the defendant to undergo a domestic violence offender assessment and
follow all recommendations unless otherwise ordered by the court or the department of
corrections."). The statute further provides that the court need not place a domestic
violence designation on the case if certain exceptions apply, including when "[t]he
defendant has not previously committed a domestic violence offense or participated in a
diversion upon a complaint alleging a domestic violence offense" and "the domestic

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violence offense was not used to coerce, control, punish, intimidate or take revenge
against a person with whom the offender is involved or has been involved in a dating
relationship or against a family or household member." K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4616(a)(2).

       In State v. Gordon, 50 Kan. App. 2d 1177, 337 P.3d 720 (2014), another panel of
this court addressed a defendant's due process challenge based on the district court
applying the domestic violence designation without making specific findings that no
exceptions applied. In that case, the defendant entered a plea agreement, and the court
agreed to apply a domestic violence designation at the State's request and over the
defendant's objection. The panel upheld the court's order on appeal, rejecting the
defendant's argument that the district court needed to make specific findings that the
exceptions in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-4616(a)(2) did not apply. Gordon, 50 Kan. App. 2d
at 1183.

       In reaching that conclusion, the panel held that the proper procedure to apply a
domestic violence designation is as follows: (1) The trier of fact must "determine
whether the offense is indeed one of domestic violence; (2) if that determination is made,
the district court shall place a domestic violence designation on the case"; and (3) if the
court applies the designation, "the defendant shall be subject to a domestic violence
assessment and shall follow its recommendations as part of his or her sentence." 50 Kan.
App. 2d 1177, Syl. ¶ 2. Another panel of this court later extended Gordon to hold that
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-4616 does not require a district court to make specific findings
ruling out an exception following a jury's determination that a domestic violence
designation should apply. State v. Larsson, No. 111,233, 2015 WL 1782672, at *4 (Kan.
App. 2015) (unpublished opinion).

       Likewise, in this case, the jury—the trier of fact—did not determine that Edmond
committed a domestic violence offense. As explained by the State, this is because the
case was not designated as a domestic violence offense by either the State or the district

                                              6
court. As such, the jury—the trier of fact—did not make such a finding. In fact, the State
agrees that a domestic violence designation might have been proper if the jury had been
asked to make that determination. But the failure not to designate a crime as a domestic
violence crime does not somehow invalidate the underlying convictions.

       Edmond provides no authority holding that a defendant can use K.S.A. 2022 Supp.
22-3504(b)—which merely allows for correction of arithmetic or clerical errors in a
journal entry of judgment—to attack his convictions. Failure to support a point with
pertinent authority or failure to show why a point is sound despite a lack of supporting
authority or in the face of contrary authority is comparable to failing to brief the issue.
State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan. 238, 246, 474 P.3d 761 (2020).

Even if the district court did err, the remedy is not to vacate Edmond's convictions and
remand for a new trial.

       As stated above, in terms of remedy, Edmond seeks to reverse his convictions and
remand for a new trial. He asserts that due to the district court's own finding that
Edmond's crimes should not have a domestic violence designation, the district court
lacked jurisdiction and violated his due process. Edmond, however, fails to provide
support for this assertion that the court did make such a finding.

       Although dealing with a different type of sentencing enhancement, the Kansas
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Obregon, 309 Kan. 1267, 1276-78, 444 P.3d 331
(2019), outlines the appropriate remedy here. There, the defendant pled no contest to drug
offenses, and the district court imposed a six-month sentencing enhancement at
sentencing after finding that the defendant possessed a firearm while committing the
offenses. On appeal, another panel of this court vacated the firearm enhancement because
the defendant had not validly waived his right to have a jury make that determination.
The panel's chosen remedy was to remand the case to the district court so the defendant

                                              7
could either be properly advised of his right to a jury trial or to have a jury decide the
factual bases for the enhancement. State v. Obregon, No. 117,422, 2018 WL 911215, at
*3 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion).

       The Kansas Supreme Court granted a petition for review and rejected the panel's
choice of remedy based on the general prohibition in Kansas law against special jury
verdicts in criminal cases. Obregon, 309 Kan. at 1277. Instead, because the district court
had already entered its judgment of conviction—and because "the Legislature has not
created a statutory exception to the general rule against special verdicts for a firearm
enhancement to be determined separately after the verdict"—our Supreme Court held that
the appropriate remedy was to remand for resentencing without the firearm enhancement.
309 Kan. at 1278.

       In State v. Hunter, No. 113,865, 2017 WL 383384 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished
opinion), another panel of this court determined a similar remedy as Obregon. In that
case, the district court made the domestic violence designation after failing to instruct the
jury on that point. Because the district court—who was not the trier of fact—determined
that the defendant had committed a domestic violence offense, the panel vacated the
domestic violence designation. Hunter, 2017 WL 383384, at *4. As a result, like the
defendant in Obregon, there was no enhancement added to the defendant's sentence.

       Importantly, both Obregon and Hunter explain what the consequence of the
district court's failure to instruct the jury to make a finding should be here: Edmond
should be sentenced without the enhancement triggered by a domestic violence
designation. Because that is what already occurred, there is no need for correction.
Edmond suffered no prejudice by not having a domestic violence designation on his case.
Any error was harmless.

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       Additionally, as the State points out, Edmond provides no authority to support his
assertion that failing to instruct the jury to consider whether he committed a domestic
violence offense somehow invalidates his convictions or deprives the district court of
subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we find Edmond has abandoned the issue for
improper briefing. See Meggerson, 312 Kan. at 246.

       To conclude, we find that the district court did not err in denying Edmond's
modified motion, wherein he asserted that the district court should have instructed the
jury regarding a domestic violence designation. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's ruling.

       Affirmed.

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