Court Opinion

ID: 9723866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:36:45.97502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:21.212454
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DAVIES, Judge.
The prosecution struck the only member of the venire panel who was an African-American. The trial court rejected the defense *268claim that the prosecution’s peremptory challenge was unlawful discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The jury convicted appellant Michael Weatherspoon, an African-American, of aggravated robbery and this appeal followed. We affirm.
FACTS
Weatherspoon was charged with aggravated robbery. The trial court called 21 persons for the venire panel, including one African-American, Johnny Alexander. In response to the prosecutor’s questions, Alexander revealed that he had worked for St. Paul Companies in St. Paul for one and one-half years, had lived in Minnesota for two and one-half years, was a high school graduate, and had attended college. He said he could be fair and impartial in judging the case.
Alexander also stated that one year earlier, along with all other residents of his apartment building, he had spoken to police officers about an alleged rape of a woman in the building. Alexander said he was satisfied the police were trying to do their job, and felt that the police treated him fairly and that nothing regarding that incident would make it hard for him to sit as a juror. When the prosecutor asked if any of Alexander’s relatives had been accused of crimes, Alexander explained that his younger brother, as a juvenile, had been accused in Illinois of selling drugs two or three years earlier. He said he felt his brother had been treated fairly and nothing about the process would make it hard for him to sit as a juror.
After the prosecutor used a peremptory strike to remove Alexander, the defense challenged Alexander’s removal based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The prosecutor offered four grounds to justify its striking of Alexander: (1) Alexander’s brother’s experience; (2) a certain rapport observed between Alexander and defense counsel; (3) Alexander’s answers to the prosecutor’s questions about the police investigation in his apartment-building; and (4) Alexander’s residence in the community for only two years.
In rejecting the challenge, the trial court concluded:
No more easily than anyone else am I able to look into someone’s head and determine motives and intentions. All I can go by is manifestations through a person’s mouth, or by a person’s behavior. I believe that [the prosecutor] has articulated racially neutral explanations for his challenge. I believe there is insufficient evidence to establish that his explanation was pretextual and that he instead was racially motivated in challenging Mr. Alexander. The challenge to the peremptory challenge I find must be denied based on my understanding of the law as it presently exists.
Following a trial, the jury — without Alexander’s presence — found Weatherspoon guilty of aggravated robbery. This, appeal followed.
ISSUE
Did the trial court err in determining that appellant’s constitutional rights were not violated when the prosecution removed the only African-American from the venire panel?
ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court developed a three-step process to decide whether a prosecutor used a peremptory challenge with racially discriminatory intent. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). This process has been summarized as follows:
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (citations omitted). Only the last two steps are at issue in this appeal.
Weatherspoon contends that the trial court erred by finding that the prosecu*269tor articulated race-neutral reasons for striking Alexander. We disagree. The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that a family member’s involvement with a criminal investigation constitutes a race-neutral explanation for striking a juror. State v. Scott, 493 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn.1992); see also United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.1987) (prospective juror’s brother’s robbery conviction sufficiently race-neutral), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928, 108 S.Ct. 295, 98 L.Ed.2d 255 (1987); People v. Hooper, 133 Ill.2d 469, 142 Ill.Dec. 93, 109, 552 N.E.2d 684, 700 (111.1989) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911, 111 S.Ct. 284, 112 L.Ed.2d 239 (1990). Hence, Alexander’s brother’s criminal charge is a facially race-neutral basis for a peremptory challenge. The prosecutor’s second reason, that Alexander had been in the community for only two years, is also a race-neutral explanation for striking a juror. In addition, the prosecutor’s concern that a “certain rapport” was developing between Weatherspoon’s attorney and Alexander, though troublesome, constitutes a facially race-neutral explanation. See State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn.1992) (juror’s demeanor and tone in responding may be factors in prosecutor’s decision to strike). The prosecutor’s final reason, Alexander’s answers about police procedure during an investigation at Alexander’s apartment complex, is also race-neutral. Cf. United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir.1988) (prosecutor’s “intuitive assumptions” upon confronting a potential juror are valid reasons for exclusion). Thus, the trial court did not err by finding that the prosecutor articulated race-neutral reasons for striking Alexander.
Once the prosecutor gives facially valid race-neutral explanations,
the trial court, considering all the relevant facts bearing on the issue, must make what the Court in Hernandez characterized as an essentially factual determination of whether the defendant has proven that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent or purpose. ⅜ * * As always, of course, considerable deference must be given by a reviewing court to the trial court’s finding on the issue of intent because the finding typically will turn largely on an evaluation by the trial court of credibility.
McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 254 (citations omitted). It is the trial court’s duty to assess the validity of the prosecutor’s explanations, and the reviewing court may not reverse unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Id.
Weatherspoon first argues that the trial court merely accepted the prosecutor’s proffered reasons as valid without evaluating whether the prosecution’s reasons were a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 257 (remanding when record shows trial court failed to determine whether articulated reason was actual basis for peremptory strike). We disagree. The record shows that the trial court recognized that its role was to examine whether the prosecutor’s reasons were “pretextual” and that this examination rested in part on judging the prosecutor’s credibility. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court followed the three-step process as enunciated in Hernandez.
We emphasize that the trial court’s inquiry into the legitimacy of the explanations is crucial; otherwise a Batson challenge amounts to a right without a remedy. If no genuine inquiry takes place, nothing prevents the prosecutor from removing jurors on racial grounds by inventing “neutral” reasons to justify the peremptory strike. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106, 106 S.Ct. at 1728 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror.”). We also note that some reasons, such as location of residence, prior involvement by juror or family member with the law, age, or level of education, provide objective and more easily verifiable race-neutral grounds for striking a juror. In contrast, more subjective reasons for striking jurors, such as a juror’s rapport with counsel, body language, or tone of voice — in short, reasons reflecting an attorney’s intuition— are less subject to verification and may alert a trial court to the attorney’s unconscious or conscious discrimination. See id. at 106, 106 S.Ct. at 1728 (a prosecutor’s “seat-of-the-pants instincts” may be another term for racial prejudice).
While we emphasize that inquiry into a prosecutor’s explanations is vital, we are also *270sensitive to the trial court’s difficult task. In discussing the problems faced by the trial court in deciding a Batson challenge, one commentator noted:
The requirement of a racially neutral explanation poses the conundrums that a requirement of nondiscriminatory purpose always poses. Whether the presence of one neutral reason is sufficient, whether the prosecutor must have been wholly uninfluenced by race, or whether the court must probe the prosecutor’s psyche deeply enough to determine how he or she would have treated a white juror who exhibited similar characteristics is uncertain.
Albert W. Alschuler, “The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts,” 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. 153, 174 (1989). The trial court’s concern about looking into the prosecutor’s “head” to “determine motives and intentions” reflects the trial court’s recognition of its responsibility as fact-finder. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court abdicated this role.
Weatherspoon argues that the trial court erred by not finding pretextual discrimination. We disagree. First, Weather-spoon argues that the prosecutor’s striking of Alexander is pretextual because the prosecutor ignored Alexander’s statement that his brother’s involvement with the law would not affect his ability to be a fair juror. But the prosecutor’s explanation does not have to rise to a level that justifies striking for cause. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1488 (7th Cir.1990) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723), cert.
Second, Weatherspoon contends that the prosecutor gave false or exaggerated reasons for striking Alexander from the jury. But the prosecutor’s minor inaccuracy in saying that Alexander had only lived in St. Paul for two years, when in fact he had lived there for two and one-half years, does not provide evidence of a discriminatory intent. See McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 257 (prosecutor’s exaggeration about the juror’s statements was not a sufficient race-neutral explanation).
Finally, Weatherspoon claims that the prosecutor’s reasons were pretextual because the prosecutor did not apply the same reasoning to white jurors. Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352,1362 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931, 111 S.Ct. 1337, 113 L.Ed.2d 268 (1991). The circumstances suggest he applied the same standard. Four jurors, including Alexander, answered that they had family members or friends who had been accused of crimes; and the prosecutor struck three of them (thus using all three of his peremptory strikes). Weatherspoon’s claim that the prosecutor should have removed the third and final white juror — instead of Alexander — is not persuasive. Similarly, the fact that jury members other than Alexander had been involved in police investigations of crimes, yet were not removed, does not by itself demonstrate discriminatory intent. Finally, Weatherspoon’s argument that the prosecutor’s form of questioning revealed conscious or unconscious discrimination is unconvincing. The types of questions asked of Alexander were also asked of the other jurors. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking Alexander were not discriminatory under Batson.
DECISION
The trial court properly applied Batson’s three-step inquiry for challenges to peremptory strikes. The trial court did not err in finding that the prosecutor offered race-neutral, nondiscriminatory grounds for striking Alexander.
Affirmed.