Court Opinion

ID: 9490226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:36:43.442431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:57.903149
License: Public Domain

SLOV1TER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I do not disagree with the proposition that a person aggrieved under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (“Title III”), should have the right to preclude the use of illegally intercepted communications at a criminal proceeding, whether or not the government was responsible for the interception. Nor do I disagree with the proposition that such a person should have the right at an appropriate time to quash a subpoena issued to a third person ordering production of such communications. However, I do disagree with the majority’s holding that a third party, such as a target or subject of a grand jury investigation, may move to quash the subpoena issued to a witness during the grand jury investigation. This holding runs counter to the well-established precedent disallowing procedures that would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings. While I share the majority’s disapproval of the .witness’s actions in illegally intercepting communications, I believe that the majority’s interpretation of Title III is contrary to the statutory framework and the prudential principles underlying the statute. -Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the intervenors’ motions to quash for lack of standing.
A.
My difference with the majority is narrow insofar as the scope of the substantive provisions of Title III are concerned, but fundamental insofar as its enforcement provisions are concerned. As the majority points out, § 2515 provides a categorical exclusionary remedy for violations of Title III, expressly proscribing the admission of illegally wiretapped evidence in various specified proceedings, including grand jury proceedings. But the exclusionary remedy of § 2515 is not self-executing. The legislative history of Title III explains that § 2515 “must, of course, be read in light of § 2518(10)(a) ..., which defines the class entitled to make a motion to suppress.” S.Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185 [“Senate Report”]. Significantly, § 2518(10)(a) does not list a grand jury investigation among the list of specified proceedings in which suppression motions may be filed.
It is this tension between the two sections that forms the basis of my difference with the majority. I believe that we are bound by the statutory language, and that what appears to be a paradoxical result — one section granting a right and the other withholding a remedy — is reconcilable by a literal reading *1080of the statute and the explanation given in the legislative history. Congress saw the two provisions as dependent and reflexive; Congress intended § 2518(10)(a) to restrict § 2515. The Senate Report states that § 2518(10)(a) “must be read in connection with sections 2515 and 2517, ... which it limits. It provides the remedy for the right created by section 2515.” Id. at 2195.
By relying on Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the majority glides over the fact that § 2518(10)(a), which gives aggrieved persons the right to file motions to suppress such intercepted communications at various proceedings, conspicuously omits proceedings before the grand jury. Rule 17(c) governs motions to quash subpoenas when “compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c). But a rule cannot trump a statute, and the majority’s solution undermines the clearly discernible policy goal of § 2518(10)(a)’s limitation on the filing of motions to suppress, namely, to prevent interference and delay with grand jury investigations. This policy applies with equal force to the filing of motions to quash.
The reason for the omission of grand jury proceedings from the suppression provision of § 2518(10)(a) is set forth in the Senate Report, which states:
Because no person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision the making of a motion, to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself. Normally there is no limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury, which is enforceable by an individual. (Blue [United States] v. United States [Blue], 384 U.S. 251, 86 S.Ct. 1416 [16 L.Ed.2d 510] (1965 [1966]).) There is no intent to change this general rule.
S.Rep. No. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2195 (emphasis added).
It was this policy and similar explanations in the legislative history commenting on the language of Title III that led the Supreme Court in Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972), a case on which the majority relies, to distinguish between a grand jury witness who seeks to stand on the illegality of the interception as a basis for refusal to answer and a nonwitness potential defendant who seeks to intrude into the grand jury proceedings. After undertaking a thorough analysis of the legislative history of Title III, the Court held that a witness in a grand jury proceeding who was cited for contempt for refusal to answer questions that were based upon illegally intercepted communications could use the suppression provision of § 2515 as a “just cause” defense. See Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 59, 92 S.Ct. at 2366-67. The Court concluded that a witness was not foreclosed from using § 2515’s remedy only because that witness was not a target of a grand jury investigation. See id. The Court stated in broad terms equally applicable here,
The congressional concern with the applicability of § 2518(10)(a) in grand jury proceedings, so far as it is discernible from the Senate report, was apparently that defendants and potential defendants might be able to utilize suppression motions to impede the issuance of indictments. ...
Id. at 59-60, 92 S.Ct. at 2367 (emphasis added).
As the court commented in United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 2675, 53 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977), Gelbard “drew a careful distinction between a witness before the grand jury, who it held may refuse to answer questions based upon illegal interceptions, and a defendant or potential defendant.”
The “general rule” referred to in the Senate Report and incorporated into the statute was described in United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966), a case in which a defendant sought pretrial dismissal of his indictment on tax fraud charges on the ground that it was procured in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. The district court granted the motion, but the Supreme Court reversed. It explained that because criminal defendants have an opportunity to vindicate their rights at trial, they should not be permitted to interrupt the normal progress of a grand jury investigation. Id. at 255, 86 S.Ct. at 1419 (commenting that because tainted evidence is admissible in grand *1081jury proceedings a defendant would only be able to suppress such evidence or “its fruits if they were sought to be used against him at trial”).
The Senate Report accompanying Title III cited to Blue, a reference that was noted by the Supreme Court in Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 60, 92 S.Ct. at 2367. Gelbard affirmed our decision in In re Grand Jury (Egan), 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.1971), where we stated:
The reference in the legislative history [of Title III] to Blue demonstrates at most a congressional intent to preclude an attack on a grand jury investigation by one whose interest in such investigation is not as a witness, but as a defendant, and instead to require such person to move for the exclusion of the questionable evidence after the indictment or at a time designated by the rules of criminal procedure.
Egan, 450 F.2d at 205. We held that Sister Egan, a witness who refused to answer questions in a grand- jury proceeding, could invoke the § 2515 remedy because she was not a prospective defendant, and thus was “not attempting to block an indictment that might be returned by the grand jury, but rather is asserting her right as a citizen to vindicate her privilege.” Id. at 205-06.
The structure of the relevant provisions of Title III and its legislative history show that Congress intended to prevent targets and subjects of grand jury investigations, who would have the opportunity to challenge illegally intercepted communications at trial, from filing any motions that would inhibit the functioning of the grand jury.
It is true, as the majority notes, that motions to quash are not expressly proscribed by Title III. However, in light of Congress’s emphasis on protecting the uninterrupted functioning of the grand jury, we must interpret Title III in a way that channels motions to quash a subpoena duces tecum, like motions to suppress, to trial proceedings, rather than to grand jury proceedings. The inclusion of grand jury proceedings in the exclusionary remedy of § 2515 entitles a grand jury witness, but not third parties, to rely on that provision.
■ The congressional intentions behind Title III flow from the unique role occupied by the grand jury. It conducts an inquisitorial proceeding that seeks, to determine if a crime has been committed or if criminal charges should be brought against any person, rather than an adversarial proceeding in which guilt or innocence is determined. See United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297, 111 S.Ct. 722, 725-26, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991).
Consistent with this function, numerous procedures are permitted in the grand jury that would not be acceptable in a criminal trial. The grand jury “paints with a broad brush,” id., and the scope of its investigative power is necessarily very broad. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2667, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (“A’grand jury investigation is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.” (internal quotations omitted)). It conducts its investigation in the absence of a judge, deliberates in secret, and is not restrained by the technical rules of procedure and evidence that govern criminal trials. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344, 94 S.Ct. 613, 618, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).
As the Supreme Court said of the grand jury nearly eighty years ago:
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282, 39 S.Ct. 468, 471, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919) (witness not entitled to make objections based on irrelevance or incompetence); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364, 76 S.Ct. 406, 409, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (hearsay rules inapplicable to grand jury proceedings because strict observance of such rules “would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial”); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 350, 78 S.Ct. 311, 318, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958) (indict*1082ment not open to challenge on ground that it was procured in violation of Fifth Amendment).
Solicitude for the proper and efficient functioning of the grand jury has made the Court reluctant to authorize procedures that would allow “protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings.” Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 70, 92 S.Ct. at 2372-73 (White, J., concurring). Thus, in Calandra, the Court held that the exclusionary rule for alleged Fourth Amendment violations would not be available at the grand jury stage because the hearings necessitated by such a rule “would halt the orderly progress of an investigation and might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand jury’s primary objective.” 414 U.S. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 620-21.
In R. Enterprises, the Court held that the standards set out in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3103-04, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), for relevancy and admissibility of documents sought by a subpoena duces tecum in the trial stage were not applicable at the grand jury stage because such rules would invite unacceptable “procedural delays and detours.” R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 298, 111 S.Ct. at 726-27. After noting that “We have expressly stated that grand jury proceedings should be free of such delays,” the Court quoted United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 764, 773, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973), for the proposition that: “‘Any holding that would straddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public’s interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws.’ ” Id. at 298-99, 111 S.Ct. at 727 (quoting Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 17, 93 S.Ct. at 773).
If intervenors were permitted to file motions to quash subpoenas duces tecum, the grand jury would be straddled with precisely the delay and disruption that Congress sought to avoid. There are numerous potential issues for side litigation in a statute as complex as Title III, such as whether an intervenor was an “aggrieved person” according to § 2510(11) or whether there was in fact a statutory violation under § 2511. The majority’s ruling would require adversarial hearings on matters peripheral to the grand jury’s investigation and could effectively transform the grand jury proceeding into a “preliminary trial[ ] on the merits” in a way that the Court in Calandra found unacceptable. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 621. The consequential appeal, as here, if an intervenor has standing will necessarily produce further unacceptable delays in the grand jury’s work.
I am not convinced that the delay and disruption to the grand jury proceedings that the majority’s holding will cause are offset by the benefits of the majority’s ruling. Allowing parties to exclude such evidence at the grand jury stage will do little to prevent future violations of the statute, particularly among private citizens. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. at 621 (“[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending the [exclusionary] rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best”). And Congress’s effort to protect an aggrieved person from the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications, repeatedly stressed by appellants, must be viewed in the context of Congress’s evident contemplation that such communications would indeed be disclosed in grand jury proceedings by its exclusion from § 2518(10)(a) of motions to suppress before the grand jury.
As a result, I believe that under Title III third-party motions to quash, like motions to suppress, are precluded at the grand jury stage in the interest of the efficient administration of the grand jury process.
B.
As the majority correctly notes, there have been cases in which third parties have been accorded standing to file motions to quash grand jury subpoenas where a privilege accorded by the Constitution, a statute, or common law was at stake. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972) (speech and debate clause privilege entitled U.S. Senator to quash subpoena directed at aide); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir.1979) (allowing client to intervene to challenge subpoena issued to attorney); see *1083also In re Grand Jury Matter (John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital), 802 F.2d 96, 99(3d Cir.1986) (third parties accorded standing where their property interests were jeopardized). In those situations, the protection afforded by the privilege is destroyed as soon as the privileged material is introduced, whether at the grand jury or at trial. Communications illegally intercepted are not in the same position because, as set forth in the prior section, Congress recognized that disclosure of those communications would occur at the grand jury stage when it limited the suppression remedy by omitting the grand jury in § 2518(10)(a).
The majority relies on dictum from In re Matter of Grand Jury (C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (3d Cir.1980), where there was reference in the majority opinion to “imagined” instances where other “valued rights” at stake would trigger third party standing to quash subpoenas. Id. at 1026; but see In re Subpoenas to Local 478, 708 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir.1983) (Schmidt “lacks a limiting principle”). In Schmidt, where we granted third-party standing, there were a variety of interests asserted by the third-party intervenor, including the contractual property interest in the service of employees who were subject to a subpoena ad testifi-candum, a property interest in the books and records previously subpoenaed, and, most fundamentally, the right not to be subject to abuse of the grand jury’s process. In the latter instance, a third-party motion to quash is the only mechanism available to challenge the potential abuse. None of these considerations is applicable here where there is no allegation of grand jury abuse. Therefore, the usual presumption accorded to the legitimacy of grand jury proceedings applies. See R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 300, 111 S.Ct. at 727-28.
Unlike the third parties hypothesized in Schmidt, the intervenors here will have an opportunity to challenge the statutory violation through a motion to quash or to suppress the resulting evidence at the start of their criminal trial should an indictment against them emerge from the grand jury. They also have the right, under the statute, to sue the interceptor of the illegal wiretap for civil damages whether or not they are ultimately indicted, see § 2520(a), and ■ can file a complaint leading to a criminal prosecution of the interceptor, see 2511(l)(c).
C.
In sum, I conclude that the statutory framework of Title III as well as congressional intentions regarding the appropriate mechanisms to redress violations of Title III foreclose the intervenors from filing motions to quash subpoena duces tecum issued as part of a grand jury investigation. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the intervenors’ motions.