Court Opinion

ID: 9695659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:26:48.340683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:15.587752
License: Public Domain

JACOBS, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to open a judgment taken by default. For the reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the order of the court below.
[ 1] The cases are legion, the principles oft-cited, and the limitations of appellate inquiry well-defined. “Our review of the decision of the court below [on a petition to open a judgment by default] ... is guided by several well established principles, foremost of which is that ‘only when there has been an abuse of discretion by the court below in refusing to open a default judgment will this Court reverse . . . . ’ Kraynick v. Hertz, 443 Pa. 105, 109, 277 A.2d 144, 146 (1971). If the decision by the court below not to open the judgment was authorized by the law and supported by the facts, it will be sustained. Criscuolo v. Moore Farms, Inc., 222 Pa.Super. 323, 294 A.2d 895 (1972).
“The petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the equitable discretion [see Wenger v. Ziegler, 424 Pa. 268, 226 A.2d 653 (1967); Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Methods Research Products Company, 420 Pa. 407, 218 *10A.2d 244 (1966)] of the court which the court may exercise only when three factors coalesce: ‘(1) the petition to open must be promptly filed; (2) the failure to appear or file a timely answer must be excused; and (3) the party seeking to open the judgment must show a meritorious defense.’ McCoy v. Public Acceptance Corp., 451 Pa. 495, 498, 305 A.2d 698, 700 (1973).” Slott v. Triad Distributors, Inc., 230 Pa.Super. 545, 549, 327 A.2d 151, 153, allocatur refused, 230 Pa.Super. xxviii (1974).
Appellee instituted an action in assumpsit against appellant Claudia Harris and her spouse Harold Harris on July 16, 1974, to recover for an alleged breach of a written contract for the loan of money. Service of a properly endorsed complaint was made upon the appellant, Claudia M. Harris on July 17, 1974. Twenty-one days later, on August 7, 1974, at 9:45 a. m., a snap judgment in the amount of $1,030.40 was entered in favor of appellees and against appellant for her failure to file a responsive pleading to the complaint. On August 12, 1974, appellee filed a writ of execution for the purpose of selling appellant’s home to satisfy the judgment. Appellant’s home was sold at a sheriff’s sale on September 9, 1974. The record indicates that it was not until September 10, 1974, that the appellant sought the aid of Legal Services.
A petition to open judgment and set aside the sheriff’s sale was docketed in the court below on September 24, 1974. The court below found that “the defendant has failed to set forth a sufficient excuse for the default,”1 see Slott v. Triad Distributors, Inc., supra, and denied the petition.
The court below expressed the following considerations in its decision to deny the petition to open: “The defend*11ant has offered, as an excuse for the default, her failure to understand the consequences of the pleadings served upon her. The record demonstrates, however, that the defendant was forty-nine years of age, attended school to the eleventh grade, was able to read and was of average intelligence. At least three letters or documents in this motion were received before she was moved to consult with her social worker [who directed her to Legal Services]. In addition, it is also admitted that she never troubled to retrieve a registered letter at the Post Office after due notification thereof.
“This Court declines to accept the proffered excuse as constituting sufficient reason to open this judgment.” This Court has expressed its disapproval of “snap” judgments. “ ‘Snap’ judgments taken quickly after the expiration of an answer’s due date are viewed by the courts with disfavor. This view results both from the fact that prejudice to the party taking the judgment can rarely be shown, and from the fact that such action is thought to be contrary to the true purpose of the default judgment.” Slott v. Triad Distributors, Inc., supra at 548, 327 A.2d at 152 (footnote omitted). Moreover, in the context of appellant’s averred “meritorious defense,” to-wit, that her signature on the loan agreement was a forgery, the denial of the petition to open seems particularly harsh. Nonetheless, our scope of appellate review is distinctly delimited.
“In passing on a petition to open judgment, the trial court’s decision is basically an equitable determination made under all the circumstances. We should not reverse a decision of this kind absent a showing by the appellant that the trial court committed a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.2 It is not enough that *12we would decide differently were we the court of initial jurisdiction. There must be a demonstration that the trial court applied erroneous legal principles to the factual situation presented, or that the court was biased or prejudiced against the appellant.” Campbell v. Heilman Homes, Inc., 233 Pa.Super. 366, 373, 335 A.2d 371, 374 (1975) (dissenting opinion by HOFFMAN, J., in which JACOBS and SPAETH, JJ., joined) (footnote added).
The essence of the lower court’s opinion in this case is a finding that the appellant exhibited a total indifference to the various letters and documents she received, and, after an independent review of the testimony, it is clear that there are sufficient facts of record to support such a finding. Appellant’s “failure to file a timely answer is not excused by any reasonable cause but is merely explained by lack of diligence. Whereas such an excuse might be sufficient to justify a lower court in exercising its discretion to open a judgment, the failure of the lower court to do so could hardly be considered a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.” Sta-Rite Industries, Inc., v. Century Water Treating, 230 Pa.Super. 285, 289, 326 A.2d 425, 427 (1974) (dissenting opinion by JACOBS, J.).
Because the decision of the court below was authorized by law and supported by the facts, we are unable to find an abuse of discretion.
Order affirmed.
SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion in which PRICE and VAN der VOORT, JJ., join.

. The lower court concedes that the appellant has averred a meritorious defense, but intimates no opinion on whether the appellant has satisfied the requirement of promptly filing the petition to open.

. “When the court has come to a conclusion by the exercise of its discretion, the party complaining of it on appeal has a heavy burden; it is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court that it might have reached a different conclusion if, in the first place, charged with the duty imposed on the court below; it is neces*12sary to go further and show an abuse of the discretionary power. ‘An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.’ Mielcuszny et ux. v. Rosol, 317 Pa. 91, 93, 94, 176 A. 236, 237.” Garrett’s Estate, 335 Pa. 287, 292-93, 6 A.2d 858, 860 (1939).