Court Opinion

ID: 9496097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:18:04.777669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:22.272096
License: Public Domain

GRABER, Judge,
concurring in part:
I agree with the majority opinion’s theoretical discussion but agree only in part with its application of our standard of review.
A. Standard of Review
The majority opinion employs the proper standard of review. Although the independent examination rule applies at the summary judgment stage, it does not require us to abandon all the usual summary judgment procedures. Instead, we are required to examine independently the entire record in determining whether the non-moving party has presented evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to con-elude, by clear and convincing evidence, that a public figure has proven actual malice. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Kaelin v. Globe Communications Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir.1998).
At the summary judgment stage, the independent examination rule does not allow us to end our analysis by noting that there is “some” or “any” evidence in the record giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact, as we would be permitted to do in a run-of-the-mill civil action. The First Amendment requires us to graft the more demanding “clear and convincing” standard onto our traditional summary judgment analysis and requires us to consider independently whether the non-moving party has presented sufficient evidence to satisfy this demanding standard. But we still are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party, and we are prohibited from deciding questions such as credibility, which remain reserved exclusively for the factfinder. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The dissent points out that the “clearly erroneous” standard of Rule 52(a) does not apply to some findings of fact made after a full trial in a First Amendment case. 292 F.3d at 1206-07 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984)). Rather, in First Amendment cases, reviewing courts undertake an independent examination of the record to determine whether the judgment constitutes “a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The dissent argues incorrectly that we ig*1140nore this directive in our application of the summary judgment standard.
The dissent’s interpretation of the independent examination rule would require us to abandon a fundamental tenet of summary judgment procedure, namely, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. None of the cases cited by the dissent requires us to take this drastic step. In fact, the Supreme Court’s post-Sose decisions clearly illustrate that, whatever the independent examination rule means in the summary judgment context, it does not mean that we must abandon our practice of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (“On summary judgment, we must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence.”); see also Kaelin, 162 F.3d at 1039, 1041 (holding that the court “must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of [the nonmoving party], including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence,” and that the court is required to “[v]iew[ ] the facts in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, it is clear that “at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
There are good reasons why courts must apply the independent examination rule differently in the summary judgment context than when reviewing a judgment entered after a full trial. The evidence presented at trial often differs markedly from that which is offered in a party’s summary judgment papers. The propositions claimed in affidavits may or may not be proved at trial. Some witnesses turn out to be credible; some do not.1 Some inferences that seemed tenuous at summary judgment appear quite reasonable in fight of the evidence at trial. Even in the First Amendment context, therefore, summary judgment cannot serve as a complete substitute for trials on the merits in all cases. As the Supreme Court stated in Anderson:
Our holding that the clear-and-con-vineing standard of proof should be taken into account in ruling on summary judgment motions does not denigrate the role of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is *1141ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.
477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added). Accordingly, when reviewing a summary judgment ruling on the question of actual malice, we must apply the independent examination rule differently than we would if we were reviewing an actual-malice finding made after a full trial.
B. Actionable Statements
I must part company with the majority opinion, however, on the question of which statements are actionable. There are dozens of allegedly actionable statements in this case. Both the majority and the dissent analyze these statements as a whole, using an all-or-nothing approach. I believe that each statement must be considered separately against the standard outlined above.
Under this analysis,2 only two of the statements withstand CU’s motion for summary judgment.
1. The first of these appeared in an August 20, 1996, CU Background Paper: “In 1988, we developed the “short course” because we discovered that the Suzuki Samurai, then undergoing testing, showed a propensity to roll over during our long course AM maneuver.” (Emphasis added.) The evidence detailed in the majority opinion is sufficient to allow a rational jury to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that CU developed the short course before discovering a rollover “propensity” and in order to create a rollover propensity, not because of it.
2. The second potentially actionable statement appeared in CU’s January 1996 anniversary issue: “1986 CU buys its own auto test track in rural Connecticut. Two years later, based on tests conducted there, CONSUMER REPORTS discovers that the Suzuki Samurai easily rolls over in turns and rates it Not Acceptable.” (Emphasis added.) The evidence in the summary judgment record would allow a reasonable jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that what CU discovered was that the Suzuki Samurai did not roll over “easily” in turns, but had to be coaxed.
For the reasons explained here and in the majority’s opinion, Suzuki has presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that CU made those two statements with actual malice. Summary judgment with respect to those statements was inappropriate.

. In this case, the credibility of a number of CU’s employees is of paramount importance to the "actual malice" inquiry. Further, were the jury at trial to disbelieve those employees’ explanations of statements made during the testing process, this court could not question the jury's finding. See Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir.1997) (noting that the independent examination rule "does not mean we give jury findings no weight; on questions of credibility, which the jury is uniquely qualified to answer, we defer.”); see also Bose, 466 U.S. at 498, 499-500, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (noting that the independent examination rule is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)’s mandate that " ‘due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses' ”). Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party at summary judgment is particularly important in cases such as this one, where the jury could choose to disbelieve the testimony of the moving party’s witnesses.

. Suzuki’s claims are untimely with respect to many statements. Others fail to meet the exacting summary judgment standard used in a First Amendment case.