Court Opinion

ID: 9947725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 16:02:34.029174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:31.630870
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12659    Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 03/05/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12659
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JAQUAN ERIC MELIK DOUGLAS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cr-60327-CMA-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12659

        Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Jaquan Eric Melik Douglas appeals his conviction and 163-
        month sentence for carjacking and brandishing a firearm during a
        crime of violence. First, Douglas argues that after Borden v. United
        States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), federal carjacking does not qualify as a
        crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Second, he contends
        that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district
        court did not consider his personal history, and that his carjacking
        offense was not a typical carjacking. Third and finally, he asserts
        that the district court procedurally erred because it failed to address
        specific arguments that he presented in support of his request for a
        downward variance.
                                           I
               We review de novo whether an oﬀense is a crime of violence
        under § 924(c). United States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.
        2020). When a defendant does not raise a relevant objection at the
        time of sentencing, however, we review only for plain error. United
        States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). To pre-
        serve an objection, it must be clear enough to inform the district
        court of its legal basis. United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819
        (11th Cir. 2006). To preserve an objection to his sentence for ap-
        peal, a defendant must raise the point in such clear and simple lan-
        guage that the district court cannot misunderstand it. Id. When
        the statement does not clearly inform the district court of the legal
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        22-12659                 Opinion of the Court                            3

        basis for the objection, the objection is not properly preserved and
        is reviewed for plain error. Id.
                The plain error standard requires the defendant to show that
        the district court committed a plain error that aﬀects substantial
        rights and that seriously aﬀects the fairness, integrity, or public rep-
        utation of the proceedings. Id. at 818. For an error to be plain, it
        must be one that is obvious and clear under current law. United
        States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2013).
                Our prior-panel-precedent rule mandates that “a prior
        panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until
        it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su-
        preme Court or [our] [C]ourt sitting en banc.” United States v.
        Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). “It does not matter
        whether a prior case was wrongly decided . . . whether it failed to
        consider certain critical issues or arguments; or whether it lacked
        adequate legal analysis to support its conclusions.” United States v.
        Lee, 886 F.3d 1161, 1163 n.3 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted)).
               The federal carjacking statute makes it a crime to, “with the
        intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, take[] a motor vehicle
        that has been transported, shipped or received in interstate or for-
        eign commerce from the person or presence of another by force
        and violence or by intimidation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2119. The intent ele-
        ment of the statute is satisﬁed if “at the moment the defendant de-
        manded or took control over the driver’s automobile the defendant
        possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary
        to steal the car . . . .” Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12659

                To qualify as a crime of violence, an oﬀense must meet the
        deﬁnition of § 924(c)(3)(A)’s “elements clause,” which deﬁnes a
        “crime of violence” as a felony oﬀense that “has as an element the
        use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
        person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). The def-
        inition is nearly identical to the deﬁnition of “violent felony” in the
        Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which deﬁnes a “violent fel-
        ony” as any crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceed-
        ing one year that “has an element the use, attempted use, or threat-
        ened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C.
        § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The Supreme Court has held that the term “use”
        means the “active employment” of physical force. Leocal v. Ashcroft,
        543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). Further, the Supreme Court has deﬁned “phys-
        ical force” as “violent force—that is, force capable of causing phys-
        ical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559
        U.S. 133, 140 (2010).
               We have held that carjacking under § 2119 satisﬁes
        § 924(c)(3)(A) because it has an element requiring that one take or
        attempt to take by force and violence or by intimidation. In re
        Smith, 829 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2016). Further, we have held
        that carjacking is a crime of violence because “§ 2119’s proscribed
        conduct where the defendant must take the car from a person by
        intimidation… and do so with the intent to kill or cause serious
        bodily injury necessarily entails at least threatened or attempted
        force and qualiﬁes under § 924(c)(3)(A).” Ovalles v. United States, 905
        F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2018).
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        22-12659               Opinion of the Court                          5

               In Borden, the Supreme Court held that a criminal oﬀense
        that requires only a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a
        crime of violence under the ACCA. Borden, 593 U.S. at 423–24. At
        the outset, the Court noted that it had concluded that only a statute
        conﬁned to purposeful or knowing conduct can count as a violent
        felony under the ACCA. Id. at 425 n.2 (citations omitted). The
        Court then held that, although oﬀenses with a mens rea of reck-
        lessness may involve the use of physical force, they do not require
        the force to be directed against another, and that the “against an-
        other” phrase in the ACCA sets out a mens rea requirement of pur-
        poseful or knowing conduct. Id. at 428–30. The Court held that
        oﬀenses with a mens rea of recklessness do not require, as the
        ACCA does, the active employment of force against another per-
        son. Id. at 437–442, 444. We have agreed. See United States v. Carter,
        7 F.4th 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2021).
                Here, Douglas’s claim is foreclosed by this Court’s prece-
        dent. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. His claim must be reviewed for
        plain error because he did not object at sentencing that federal car-
        jacking is not a crime of violence. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307. It
        fails for two reasons. First, Borden did not abrogate this Court’s
        case law. Both before and since Borden, this Court has held that an
        offense with a mens rea of recklessness cannot qualify as a crime of
        violence. Borden, 593 U.S. at 425 n.2; Carter, 7 F.4th at 1045. Even
        so, this Court has also held that federal carjacking is a crime of vio-
        lence under § 924(c)(3)(A), and that precedent remains binding.
        Smith, 829 F.3d at 1280; Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. Further, even if
        Douglas’s claim was not foreclosed by the prior-panel-precedent
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12659

        rule, the mens rea for federal carjacking is not recklessness, as it
        requires intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, and, thus, Bor-
        den would still not support his claim. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 12;
        Ovalles, 905 F.3d at 1304. Thus, the district court did not plainly err
        when Douglas was convicted and sentenced for carjacking and
        brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence.
                                          II
               We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of dis-
        cretion. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1321–22 (11th Cir.
        2008). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of show-
        ing that the sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 1322. Although we do
        not automatically presume a sentence falling within the guideline
        range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect it to be. United States v.
        Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008).
                On substantive-reasonableness review, we may vacate the
        sentence only if we are left with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction
        that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
        weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to arrive at an unreasona-
        ble sentence based on the facts of the case. United States v. Irey, 612
        F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A district court abuses
        its discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were
        due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to an improper
        or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by
        balancing the proper factors unreasonably. Id. at 1189. We con-
        sider whether a sentence is substantively unreasonable under the
        totality of the circumstances and in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
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        22-12659               Opinion of the Court                         7

        factors. Williams, 526 F.3d at 1322. The district court is required to
        evaluate all of the § 3553(a) factors, but the weight given to each
        factor is within the sound discretion of the district court. United
        States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d 1267, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2014).
               The district court does not have to give all of the factors
        equal weight and is given discretion to attach great weight to one
        factor over another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249,
        1254 (11th Cir. 2015). However, a district court’s unjustiﬁed reli-
        ance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be indicative of an unreason-
        able sentence. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir.
        2008). The district court’s imposition of a sentence well below the
        statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of reasonable-
        ness. United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
                The factors the district court is to consider include the na-
        ture and circumstances of the oﬀense and the history and charac-
        teristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to re-
        ﬂect the seriousness of the oﬀense, to promote respect for the law,
        and to provide just punishment for the oﬀense as well as to aﬀord
        speciﬁc and general deterrence; and the need to avoid unwarranted
        sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who
        have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a). While the district court should consider and properly
        calculate the advisory guidelines range, it is permitted to give
        greater weight to other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Rosales-Bruno,
        789 F.3d at 1259. The district court may also “consider facts that
        were taken into account when formulating the guideline range for
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12659

        the sake of a variance.” United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353,
        1362 (11th Cir. 2014).
               One of the purposes of the Guidelines is to provide certainty
        and fairness in sentencing, and “avoiding unwarranted sentencing
        disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
        found guilty of similar criminal conduct.” United States v. Docampo,
        573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Alt-
        hough we have never speciﬁed the defendant’s burden in these con-
        texts, we have stated that the district court is required to avoid the
        unwarranted disparities between similarly situated defendants, in-
        dicating that the court should be aware of any potential for this
        issue at sentencing. See id. at 1101–02.
               Here, the district court did not impose a substantively un-
        reasonable sentence because, based on the totality of the circum-
        stances, the court properly weighed all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
        factors. First, it imposed a sentence within the advisory guidelines
        for count one. Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746. Douglas’s sentence for count
        one was 79 months—which was below the 15-year maximum
        term—and his sentence for count two of 84 months was well below
        the statutory maximum of life. Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1310. Second,
        the court properly considered the impact that the incident had on
        Douglas’ victim, S.W.—including that S.W. is now unemployed,
        suffers from PTSD, and cannot see out of his left eye.
               The court correctly noted that S.W. was trying to be kind by
        offering Douglas a ride home and that Douglas responded by hit-
        ting S.W. and stealing his car. And it also considered evidence from
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        22-12659               Opinion of the Court                        9

        the PSI that showed that Douglas attempted to use S.W.’s credit
        cards to purchase jewelry days after the crime. What’s more, the
        court properly considered Douglas’s criminal history including his
        unscored criminal history—as well his personal history, noting that
        Douglas grew up in a broken home and that his life experience was
        “pretty bad.”
               There is no evidence from the sentencing transcript that
        Douglas ever argued that his carjacking was not a typical carjacking
        or that he was not a typical offender. Additionally, Douglas did not
        point to any similarly situated defendants who received a below
        guidelines sentence. Docampo, 573 F.3d at 1101. Specifically, he
        didn’t point to a defendant with a similar criminal history and/or
        similar facts surrounding their carjacking.
               In sum, then, the court’s sentence is substantively reasona-
        ble because the court properly weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac-
        tors when it determined that Douglas should receive a guidelines
        sentence as his victim is left permanently blind in his left eye.
                                         III
               Where a defendant challenges a sentence as procedurally er-
        ror-based on the adequacy of the district court’s explanation, we
        review de novo, even in the absence of a timely objection at sen-
        tencing. United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1265 (11th Cir.
        2023).
               While a district court must consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
        factors in determining a sentence, it is not required to state in its
        explanation that it has evaluated each factor individually. United
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12659

        States v. Ortiz-Delgado, 451 F.3d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2006). An ac-
        knowledgment by the district court that it has considered the 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors is suﬃcient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d
        1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). Ultimately, the court must explain the
        sentence with enough detail to satisfy the appellate court that it has
        considered the arguments of the parties and has a reasoned basis
        for its decision. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
               Here, the court did not commit procedural error because it
        did consider Douglas’s rough childhood, his mental health and ad-
        diction struggles, his criminal conduct, and his remorse for his ac-
        tions. Indeed, all the court had to do to demonstrate that it consid-
        ered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors was to explicitly assert that it
        had done so. Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281. The court properly made
        this assertion, and it correctly explained that the sentence it im-
        posed was to promote respect for the law and deter Douglas from
        future conduct.
                Additionally, as already explained, Douglas did not argue be-
        fore the court at sentencing that his case was not a typical carjack-
        ing case. Therefore, the court did not err when it did not discuss it
        in its explanation of Douglas’s sentence. Thus, the court’s explana-
        tion is sufficiently compelling and provides enough detail that
        shows that the court considered the parties’ arguments. Rita, 551
        U.S. at 356.
               AFFIRMED.