Court Opinion

ID: 9680570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:34:14.067291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.385800
License: Public Domain

LOWENSTEIN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Without overtly overruling law proclaimed by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Missouri, which established an exception to the hearsay rule as a constitutional right, the majority opinion serves to emasculate that right by declining to apply precedential mandates to the facts at bar.
In Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), *549the U.S. Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the general rule of excluding hearsay testimony against penal interest where three indicators of reliability of that evidence are established. Chambers was first recognized in Missouri in State v. Turner, 623 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Mo. banc 1981), as noted in the majority opinion. The testimony is admissible if under Chambers each confession: 1) “was in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest”; 2) “was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the [crime] had occurred”; and 3) “was corroborated by some other evidence in the case.”1 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01; State v. Davidson, 982 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Mo. banc 1998). In addition, in Missouri the declarant must be unavailable. Davidson, 982 S.W.2d at 242.
The testimony of each of the four witnesses excluded here by the trial court meets all of these prongs. The proposed testimony of the appellant’s mother, Char-leen Robinson, mostly closely meets the Chambers and Turner requirements. Ms. Robinson was the first witness to testify about Johnson’s out-of-court statement. She had known Johnson for five years, since Johnson was nine years old; Johnson and the appellant were best friends. Ms. Robinson testified that one day in late September or early October 1998, she visited her son at Johnson’s apartment, and the declarant, Johnson, made a statement to several witnesses about the shooting:
Q: What did he [Johnson] tell you about this incident?
A: He said he didn’t really shoot the woman, the woman grabbed his hand and really shot herself.
Q: Okay. Did you know what he was talking about?
A: Not at first.
Q: Did he go any further than that? Did he tell you any more details than that?
A: Said him and Tremayne had walked to the store to go get some cigarettes and he said that he pulled a gun to rob her. And I asked him, <cWhy would you do something like that?”
Q: How did he respond?
A: He said he really didn’t know.
Q: Did he tell you anything more than what you’ve told the Court?
A: First he said he shot the bitch.
As the majority concedes, this statement meets the first prong as it is unquestionably against Johnson’s interest: he “shot the bitch .” Davidson, 982 S.W.2d at 242. This prong is not met unless the statement exonerates the defendant. See State v. Williams, 958 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Mo.App.1997). Though the declarant told Ms. Robinson that the appellant was at the scene, there is no indication from her testimony nor from any of the other testifying witnesses that the shooting was part of a conspiracy. Thus, the statement was against Johnson’s interest, and there is no evidence that the confession would not exonerate the appellant.
This case also meets the second requirement of Chambers, that the statement be made “spontaneously” to a “close acquaintance” of the declarant shortly after the crime. Davidson, 982 S.W.2d at 242; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300. As to the “close acquaintance” requirement, Ms. *550Robinson is the appellant’s mother, and she has known Johnson since he was nine years old because he was best Mends with her son. Another witness, Tosheda Myrick (the appellant’s cousin), lived with the appellant and the declarant. Myrick testified that Johnson told a group of people (“me, Tremayne, Tremayne’s mama, Carlos, their two cousins, Carlos and his girl-Mend and some dudes”) that Johnson “robbed a lady and said he wasn’t trying to shoot her but she wouldn’t trying [sic] to give her valuables, so he said he just shot her.” Again, though Myrick is the appellant’s cousin, she lived with the declarant and thus can be considered a close acquaintance. Johnson also made the statement to the appellant’s younger brother and sister on a later occasion as noted in the majority’s recitation of the facts.
It is not the trial court’s responsibility to assess the credibility of the potential witnesses in deciding whether to invoke the Chambers exception. See e.g. Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (“Any motive on the part of [defendant’s mother] to lie in an effort to exonerate her son is not a valid consideration in determining trustworthiness of the statement, but is a matter to be tested before the jury on cross examination.”); United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir.1977) (where the record revealed substantial corroborating circumstances of the trustworthiness of the declarant’s statement, the trial court erred in considering the credibility of the minor witness); United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir.1978) (“A test for admissibility of hearsay statements based on the credibility of the witness who testifies about the statement is unrelated to the purpose of the general rule against hearsay.”) The fact that all of the witnesses are the appellant’s relatives is a trial matter for the prosecution to note and the jury to weigh.
As to the “spontaneous” element, though the majority notes that the Johnson made the statement to the appellant’s siblings in response to a question, there is no evidence to suggest that the statement was coerced from Johnson, nor a rehearsed statement he planned to make. Skillicorn v. State, 22 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Mo. banc 2000). Even if the majority is correct in stating that the response was not “spontaneous” as to the siblings, it clearly was spontaneous according to Ms. Robinson’s testimony: the above excerpt indicates that Ms. Robinson did not know at first what Johnson was talking about when he confessed to shooting the victim. As such, there is substantial evidence that Johnson’s statement, at least to Ms. Robinson, was not a coerced or rehearsed or responsive statement.
Also in order to meet the second prong of Chambers, the confession must have been made “shortly after the [crime] occurred.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300. Ms. Robinson testified that this statement was made either in the later part of September or the early part of October 1998. The crime occurred on September 11, 1998. Courts have held that six weeks is too long of a period of time to be meet this prong. State v. Skillicorn, 944 S.W.2d 877, 885 (Mo. banc 1997). This confession likely was made within two to four weeks after the crime, and I would decline to hold as a matter of law that two weeks does meet the Chambers qualification of “shortly after the crime.” Thus, because the statement was made spontaneously within a short period of time to close acquaintances of the declarant, this case meets the second prong of the Chambers exception.
The third prong of the Chambers exception requires that the confession be corroborated by some other evidence in the case. Davidson, 982 S.W.2d at 242. Again, the confession in this case meets that prong. *551First, the victim’s purse was found across the hall from the apartment that Johnson and the appellant shared. Second, there is evidence that Johnson, not the appellant, wore braids at the time of the crime. Indeed, the appellant questions how well the victim really remembered her assailant-for example, she did not recall whether he had facial hair and she was unsure of his skin color other than that it was black. The facts indicated that the victim was discontent with the sketch published in the Kansas City Star because the assailant’s nose was portrayed as bigger than it actually was, and the assailant’s braided hair was not portrayed exactly as it appeared to her. Excluded testimony by the appellant’s mother indicated that Johnson had no facial hair, while the appellant regularly maintained a mustache, a goatee and sideburns and had that facial hair at the time of the robbery and shooting. That testimony also indicated that Johnson had braids “like twigs,” while the appellant had a “short afro.”
Third, the jury requested exhibits and asked the court for guidance on several occasions. Although not “corroborative evidence,” the jury’s difficulty in reaching a verdict is noteworthy in considering close cases involving out-of-court confessions. State v. Carroll, 629 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo.App.1981). The Carroll court reversed and remanded for a new trial under Chambers, noting that the jury had difficulty returning a verdict. In remanding, the Carroll court noted: “Of course the jury need not believe any of [the hearsay] testimony; but nevertheless the jury was entitled to hear the declaration and give it appropriate consideration. This is especially true in a close case.” Id. (emphasis added).
Fourth, Johnson made his confession to several witnesses, four of whom testified. According to Chambers, the “sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each.” 412 U.S. at 300. In Chambers, the declarant confessed four times. In the present case, the declarant confessed on at least two occasions, once to a large group, and four witnesses were available to testify. I would find these facts, taken together, to be sufficient, corroborative facts that meet the third Chambers prong.
Finally, as noted above, Missouri law requires unequivocally that the declarant be unavailable. Davidson, 982 S.W.2d at 242. Unavailability can be shown “where due diligence to secure the witness’s attendance by compulsory process has failed.” State v. Hester, 801 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Mo. banc 1991). In this case, Johnson was unavailable because the police were unable to execute a pick-up warrant for his arrest.
I appreciate the danger of inviting extrajudicial admissions into evidence. However, as was the case in Carroll, the facts here present a very close call under the standard of review. When an unavailable witness makes a declaration against penal interest, “where substantial indicia of reliability appear and declarant’s complicity if true would exonerate the accused, declar-ant’s averments against an interest penal in nature may not be excluded.” Carroll, 629 S.W.2d at 485 (emphasis added).
Under the majority, it appears that testimony is deemed automatically unreliable if the witness is young or if the witness is related to the defendant. The majority’s opinion closes the door on Missouri courts ever allowing a statement normally recognized under the Chambers exception.
The appellant was sentenced to thirty-nine years of imprisonment. The indicia of reliability set forth in Chambers and Turner provide a litmus test that a court must consider in ruling on whether testimony is unreliable. Whether or not a *552court believes the testimony, it must let the jury reign where the indicia of reliability are present. Because this case substantially meets both the Chambers and Turner indicia of reliability, I would reverse and remand this case for trial to ensure that this criminal defendant’s constitutional rights are honored by allowing the jury to exercise its function to hear and then decide the credibility of the out-of-court declarations.

. In Chambers, the evidence was the declar-ant’s sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, the testimony that the declarant was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, and proof of his prior ownership of a .22 caliber revolver and subsequent purchase of a new weapon. Also the sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration.