Court Opinion

ID: 9534946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:43:58.800044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:08.454959
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Hunter, J. (with Smith, J.)
Concurs.in Result Only —We cannot agree with the. language employed in the concomitant opinion of Bierly, J. for the reason that the above, opinion fails to apply and. harmonize the whole body of statutory law applicable to so-called “dog;.cases” as specifically exemplified by, the issues joined and the evidence' in the case, before us.
The appellant in this appeal affirmatively raised two indiana statutes as a defense by way of justification .for the killing of appellee’s dog, Ranger: they are as follows, to-wit;.Acts of 1897, ch. 1Í9, §8, p. 178, §16-203 (3707).Burns’1964 Replacement:'
“Any dog that is known-to have killed,-maimed,: chased or worried any sheep, cattle, horses, swine,, or other livestock or chickens, unless accompanied by' his master or some other person, may be killed by any person, and any person who shall own, keep or harbor any dog, after he knows that said dog has killed or maimed, chased, or worried any sheep, cattle,' horses, swine, other livestock or chickens shall be fined. . .”
and
§16-204 (3708). “If any dog shall be found roaming over the country unattended by his master or owner *193"“'dir MS bwribr?s agent, it shaíí be I'áwfái tb-kin'bucH dog.?’v§16-204,'. Burns?. 1964 Replacement !(Acts. f897,.ch.;119,:§14if.l7?),,; - : C,T>!Í /
/ The evidence' applicable to .the defense; ráísedl'by Buriis* §16i-203, supra', is in cbhflibt^ hbweV$? was: ample1 evidenee bf probative value,; from which the cóúrt. cbiilh haye directly found or Upon, which1 r4as.onablé. inferences, could have been bgsed that said dog -'neither. **. 'v killed, maimed, chaséd“ br worried■'] ". 'l’ the'-appellant’s chickens^'and thaVsaid dog; Was;inot “knóWn’’:tbháve-everdoñe sb.: - : no..:. n
The evidencé. as it applies to the/defehse.'raised.: by the appellant pufsharit to the terms of Burns’ ;§16:204, supra, is uncontradicted and the facts .thereunder may “be summarized as follows: thatthe; appellee’s dog, Ráhgér,7 had: escaped from'thé. custody of its.máste?; that said dog Was killed by the appellant While :.aWay fromtits kennel and While the dog. Was either ori'appel- . lant’s property or' upon -the Neighboring Cottingham property; • that the. dog- Was' “unattended”; that the appellant shot the; dbg;' and that said dog- was' intrinsically valuable. ,v v\:.".
It appears to US that-the evidentiary- facts aS;-stated in the ...two preceding paragraphs ai-e-the ultimate and salient’determinants applicable to §§16-203 and 16-204, supra, respectively.- - . •
It further appears to us that in order to apply the ■statutory law as well as'the.case law to the facts and issues in the case at-bar, we must'also take cognizance of the fact .that 'the Indiana .'.General Asseinbly .'has recognized since' 1923 that' a dog'is personal property and subject to-taxation. Acts of -1923, ch. 74, ,.§§l/and 2, p.'243,'Burns? : 1964 Replacement (Parti) §'§16-301 and 16-302. The two statutes-raised by way of defense in justification -for the killing' of the dog,/Ranger, *194Burns’ §§16-203 and 16-204, supra, quoted above were enacted in 1897 and thus for sixty-eight (68) years they have remained unchanged. We have no case law construing'the application of the said two sections to a factual problem as developed in the case at bar. In other words, we have no cáse law in Indiana defining the meaning of “roaming over the country . . . unattended” and we should define the import of such words, and properly relate them to the case before us. It appears to us that this .duty is evaded in the above concomitant opinion and as a court it behooves us to attempt to set up some guidelines and common sense rules as they apply to the issues and facts in the case at bar and similar eases. Therefore, the determination herein inust rely upon familiar rules of statutory construction and should be related in logical relevance to the conditions and problems of our time. •
It is a fundamental rule in the construction of statutes should be construed in a manner to ascertain, and give effect to the intention of the General Assembly expressed in the statute. See 26 I.L.E., Statutes, §113 and cases cited thereunder.
It is further a fundamental rule of statutory construction, as determined by the Courts of this state, that the intention of the General Assembly must be determined primarily from the language used in the statute, and such language must be reasonably and fairly interpreted so as to give it efficient operation, and to give effect, if possible, to the expressed intention of the General Assembly. See 26 I.L.E., Statutes, §113 and cases cited thereunder. It is also basic that
“. . . surrounding circumstances and situations, occurring after the enactment of the statute may be of great or even conclusive assistance in determining a meaning which was intended to be conveyed. Legislative standards are generally couched *195in terms which have considerable breadth. Therefore a statute may be-interpreted to include circumstances or situations which were unknown or did not exist at the time of the statute. Contemporaneous and practical construction may shed valuable light upon statutory meaning ...”
It-is further basic that
"... And so it is a general rule of statutory construction that a statute, expressed in general, terms and words of present or future tense, will be applied, not only to situations existing and known at the time of the enactment, but also prospectively to things and conditions that come into existence thereafter ...” 2 Horack, Sutherland-Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition, pp. 508-509. (my emphasis)
Applying these general principles of statutory contraction to the statutes quoted above, the question to be determined is just what the General Assembly intended by the use of the phrase “roaming over the country . . . unattended”. The statute itself does not attempt to specifically define such phrase and, because of the lack of a specific definition, it becomes necessary to judicially determine from the language of the statute just what the General Assembly intended in the usage of the phrase “roaming over the country.. .,. unattended”.
In a determination of this legislative intent, we are permitted to examine the apparent reasons which give rise to such legislation and why the General Assembly deemed it necessary to enact if. At the timé the statutes were enacted in 1897 the economy of the state ■was largely agrarian. It was a state of many farms of small acreage. On these farms the owners raised live'-, stock, including sheep. The farms were hot Usually fenced and there was nothing to protect thg,. stock from marauding dogs traveling in packs. We think^lt *196ean . reasonably be said that the real intent of the two statutes was to give to the owners of livestock raised on these small farms some protection from dogs trespassing on their land. In other words, these two statutes gave to the owner of livestock the right to kill any dog found trespassing on his land if unattended by its master or owner and to kill any trespassing dog which was known to have killed, maimed, chased or worried any livestock unaccompanied by its master.
Ample justification for the enactment of Burns’ §16-203, supra, may be found the expression of the nature of the dog in the case of Wilson v. Wilmington & M. R. Co. (1856), 10 Rich. Law 52 in which case the court alluded to the dog as an animal whose nature is carnivorous, and who is prompted by instinct or appetite to roam at large in the forest in pursuit of game, or upon a sheep-killing expedition; ánd finally-stigmatized him as a yelping cur. (cited as support in Patton v. State (1894), 93 Ga. 111, 19 S. E. 734.)
It further seems to us that Burns’ §16-203 and 16-204, supra, are implementive of each other and that we should so construe them. Such a construction is a logical interpretation of said statutes and gives relevant weight to their application as a remedy of protection for farmers engaged in the raising of livestock and fowl for market purposes. Such interpretation should be limited to the obvious reasons for their enactment as practical and logical implementary statutes.
The economy of Indiana has changed from one largely agrarian to one that is largely, industrial. The small farms are rapidly disappearing. Livestock raised on the larger farms are being carefully protected by. adequate fencing. Today, there are very few dogs that are turned loose by their owners or masters to “roam over the country”.
*197Upon a review of the record in this appeal we are aware of no reason why such a rule of logical implementation is not necessary as a matter of statutory interpretation as it applies to the facts and issues of the ease at bar.
We are however, seriously disturbed by the omission in the concomitant opinion, of the applications of well established rules of statutory construction. We should recognize rules of guidance which lead us. to an expression that all of the statutes protective of the property right of all our citizens must be accorded full weight and consideration in their application. This is not only an imperative necessity — but indeed a duty that we as a court should, not evade. Therefore it is our duty as a court to apply such rules.
. . . “Unless every statute relating to the same subject is taken to constitute collectively one system, or construed as constituting one general statute or law, a uniform system would be impossible, and hopeless inconsistencies would exist, and it would be impossible for one to know what the law was under a given set of circumstances.
We must presume that the legislature passes each and evéry statute with a knowlege of existing law. If such a presumption could not be indulged in, it would be difficult, if not utterly impossible, to justify the resort to previous legislation. Moreover, it would be impossible without such a presumption to maintain a harmonious system of law, which is so essential to a workable and equitable system of jurisprudence. Crawford, Statutory Construction, §232, pp. 435-436.
We are of the opinion that we should adapt the doctrine of para materia logically and with specific and pertinent relevancy to the matter at bar, and. in such a case.relate the doctrine to the obvious intent of the legislature as it relates to a part of, the whole general *198statutory body of the law. Such a position recognizes the general rule that enactments relating to the same general subject matter are a part of one legislative policy and that all together they constitute one harmonious .and ■ uniform system of statutory law and should be construed to the end that each may be afforded "complete consideration' to the establishment of the right's sought to be protected as an integral part of the whole body’ óf the general statutory law dealing with the same, general subject. Therefore'- it appears logical that this court should construe that all statutes dealing with one general subject matter (i.e., persons’ rights that are expressive ;of classified property rights in. animals), are complementary of each . ..other and should be .accorded e<iual weight as related to the specific "object Or- intent ..of 'each and this- is particularly ■true where "such specifically accorded weight aná 'construction. will, not conflict with the general intent'*of the body of law as,it deals, with'all facets, of the'general subject matter.
Prior to §§16-203 and 16-204, supra, our case law established the rule of the intrinsic, value of a-dog. This ■ rule was later supported by the •. 1923 ’• statutes which declare dogs to be* personal property and making them, subject to taxation. Acts of 1923, ch. 75,- §§1 and 2,„p.'243 being Burns’ §§16-301 and 16-302.
Our Indiana'Courts have recognized-that,one. may be prosecuted for the killing of a dog under,the malicious trespass statute and a conviction and fine has been upheld in’ such a case by our Supreme Court in, the case of Springer v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 241, 66 N. E. 2d 529. Upon a'close examination of-that case, it . appears that prosecution for malicious trespass under Burns’ 1942 Replacement §10-4509, Acts of 1905, ch. 169, §407, p. 584; 1949, ch. 24, §1, p. 43 is a recognition of a property right that exists in the ownership *199of a dog and lends, credence to the statutory enactments of our Indiana General Assembly which are declarative of the rule that a dog is personal property. It should further be noted in that case the rule is upheld that all the state need prove' in order to obtain a conviction is proof that the killing was done maliciously or mischievously in the language of the criminal statute. A study of Springer v. State, supra, reveals therein that there was no evidence that the dog was vicious or roaming”. It then appears to be abundantly clear that one may not be justified in the killing of a dog without proof of more than the cold, hard language of the statute §16-204, supra, i.e., when a dog is found “... roaming... unattended”.
We judicially know that in addition to their intrinsic value that dogs, as pets and as companions to the elderly and the blind, may have an extrinsic value of far more worth to their owners than their intrinsic value. In this regard, we agree with the above opinion. The nature of such extrinsic value is evidenced by the following quotations:
“. . . Lo, the poor Indian! whose untutored mind Sees God in clouds, or hears him in the wind;
To be content his natural desire; He asks no Angel’s wings, No seraph’s fire; But thinks, admitted to that equal sky, His faithful dog shall hear him company.” Epistle. 1, Alexander Pope’s, Essay on Man. (my emphasis)?
In the case of State v. Harriman (1884), 75 Me. 562, 46 Am. Rep. 423, in a dissenting opinion where the question presented was whether a dog was a domestic animal Appleton, C. J., used the following language:
“He is a domestic animal. From the time of the Pyramids to the present day, from the frozen pole to the torrid zone, wherever man has been, there *200•...has been his dog. Cuvier' has ;asserted, that, theVo ... dog. was,:perhaps, necessary for the establishment.... ' of civil Society, and that a little reflection will con- ‘ - ^'ihédus thdt barbaróus nations'owe much of their ■ ■ ■.. civilization ;above the brute to the possession of ... the dog; He- is the friend, and companion of his master, accompanying him. in his walks; his servr.. ■ant,’ aiding him in his hunting; the playmate 'of •; his; children; and inmate of his house, protecting it v ' . .againstall.assailants.” : .' ..
AM.jater.opthe Chief Justice quoted approvingly the following poetic tribúte te dogs: , - >
“They arehonest creatures,
AM né’er bétray their masters, never fáVn
On any they Iove not.”
Senator Vest made a closing argument tq.the jury in a suit between two citizens, of the Statevof Missouri in j, damage suit for <?222 brought by one citizen against .another who had killed his. dog. In his repiarks to the jury, Senator Vest made no reference to thelaw;the. evidence, or the merits of the case but confined his remarks to a remarkable tribute to the dog which is as follows:
“The bést human friend'a man has in the world may turn against him and become his enemy. His son -or daughter that he has reared with loving care may prove ungrateful Those who are nearest .and.dearest to us, those whom we trust with our.-happiness and our good name may become tr'aitors to their faith.' The money that a man has he may lose. It flies away from him,.perhaps, when he needs it most. A . man’s reputation may he sacrificed in a moment óf ill-considered action. The people who are prone to fall on their .knees.. v -'to do 'us honor when- success is with us may be'",' the first to throw the stone of malice when failure- ■ settles its , cloud upon our he,ads. The one, .absolute- /, ly unselfish friend that a man can have in this selfish world, the-one that nevér deceives him, the one that. never ;■proves. 'ungrateful and treacherous, isliisdog.' i / ./ ’
*201A man’s dog stands by him in prosperity and in poverty, in health and in sickness. He will sleép on the cold ground where ..the wintry wind blows and the snow drifts fiercely, if only he may be near his master’s side. He will kiss the hand that has no food to offer. He will lick the wounds and sores that come in encounter with the roughness of the world. He guards the sleep of his pauper master, as if he were a prince. When all other friends desert he remains. When riches fake wings and reputation falls to pieces, he is as constant in his love as the.sun in its journeys through the heavens. If fortune drives the master forth an outcast in the world, friendless and homeless, the faithful dog asks no higher privilege than that of accompanying, to guard against -danger,5 to fight against his enemies, and when the last scene of all comes, and when death takes the master in its embrace and his body is laid away, in the cold ground, no matter if all other friends, pursue their way, there by the graveside may the' noble dog be found, his head between his paws, his eyes sad but open in alert watchfulness, faithful and true even in death.” 2 Classics of the Bar, p. 240.*
We therefore emphatically state that the indiscrlmi-. nate killing of a dog, without proof of more cannot be justified especially when such a dog is a child’s or a household pet or the companion of an elderly person or a seeing-eye dog of a blind person, which dog regularly h,as a place of abode and is regularly fed by a master and is^often; temporarily beyond the control of, or who momentarily escapes or eludes the custody of, its natural master: and .after a short absence will customarily return to the place of abode or custody of its master. We hold that neither should a dog, when in the pursuance of natural animal instincts, and is not vicious, or committing *202acts of injury, or a nuisance and is not a public health menace be considered “roaming” within the purview of Burns’ §16-204, supra.
In other words, a dog should not be judicially declared to be the object of target practice merely upon the whim of a person who would justify its killing simply on the grounds that it was outside the custody of, or momentarily and temporarily beyond the immediate recall command, of its master without proof of more than the strict- hard language of the statute Burns’ §1-6-204, supra.
For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. •
Judgment affirmed.
' Smith,. J. concurs in the above opinion as it applies to the merits. '

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. It is said that, although the suit was for only $200, the verdict of the jury was for $500, and that some of the jurors wanted to hang the defendant.