Court Opinion

ID: 9646381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:58:31.745045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:37.739351
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Upon rehearing, appellee urges that we erred in holding that there is no evidence that Dewhurst failed to keep a proper lookout. We have again examined the evidence bearing upon this issue, but adhere to our original conclusion that the jury’s finding thereon is based upon mere surmise and speculation.
We did not hold in our original opinion that the fact that Dewhurst had the right-of-way absolved him from maintaining a proper lookout. Such cases as Lewis v. Martin, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 910, and Stehling v. Johnson, Tex.Civ.App., 32 S.W.2d 696, are not controlling here. This case must be decided upon its own facts.
We think the difference between appel-lee’s view of the case and that expressed by us in our original opinion may be pointed up by quoting a summation of argument taken from appellee’s motion, wherein it is said that: “Munoz further testified that he never did stop, but that the Dewhurst car slowed down as if to stop, thus leading Munoz to believe that Dewhurst would *139stop. He testified On cross examination, ‘Q. How fast were you going when you last saw this man in this station wagon? A. That is when I slowed' down; that is when he slowed down, thought he would let me go by, that is when I speeded up my truck.’ Therefore, Dewhurst entered the intersection in the path of a moving vehicle, indicating that he kept no lookout. Heedlessly and without keeping a lookout, he put himself in a place of danger,”
According to Munoz, he brought his truck almost to a stop before he entered the intersection. His testimony on the point was as follows:
“Q. And to what speed did you slow? A. I slowed it pretty slow.
“Q. How fast? A. I slowed it nearly to stop.
“Q. Nearly to stop? A.- Yes, sir.”
Instead of saying, as does appellee, that the evidence shows that Dewhurst drove in front of the truck because he failed to keep a proper 'lookout and did not see the vehicle, it is as reasonable to say that Dew-hurst observed the truck, saw that it was slowing down almost to'stop, and then proceeded across the intersection because he was entitled to the right of way. Under this view of the case, Dewhurst’s action can not be characterized as negligent. The provisions of the law. relating to right of way are not without force or meaning and, as pointed out in the original opinion, the law will not denounce as negligent an act which may with equal reason be accounted for by a hypothesis based -upon due care and caution.
According to Munoz, the collision was caused by his unwarranted assumption that Dewhurst would not enter the intersection. He thereupon speeded up his truck and drove suddenly into the intersection without looking in the direction of the Dew-hurst car. If Munoz’s testimony be disregarded, there remains nothing substantial upon which a legitimate inference of negligence on the part of Dewhurst can be based. We are not willing to subscribe to the theory that the mere showing that a collision occurred at an open country road intersection, in itself, is sufficient to raise the issue of negligent failure to maintain 'a proper lookout.
' Other matters raised by appellee’s motion have been sufficiently discussed in our original opinion. We adhere to the holdings therein stated. Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.