Court Opinion

ID: 9549486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:19:26.757222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:23.523199
License: Public Domain

*767Hamilton, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part) —I concur with the majority view that this court, in State v. Partridge, 47 Wn.2d 640, 289 P.2d 702 (1955), held that the offense of negligent homicide, as defined in RCW 46.61.520, could be committed in three rather than two ways, i.e., by operating a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, (2) in a reckless manner, or (3) with disregard for the safety of others. Also, I agree with the majority to the effect that the Partridge case stands for the proposition that the third method of commission contemplates something more than ordinary negligence. Furthermore, it would appear to me that the majority’s determination that the Partridge interpretation of RCW 46.61.520 should continue to be the law, until changed by the legislature, is justifiable despite the logic of Judge Donworth’s dissent. Particularly would this appear to be so when one considers the fact that between 1937 and the Partridge decision ordinary negligence was deemed sufficient to sustain a charge under the statute, and that the delimit of Partridge became the law and has remained the law since 1955.
In this latter respect, I feel that trial courts and trial counsel, as well as the public, are entitled to some stability in this court’s interpretative decisions, especially when such are en banc decisions and reflect the unanimous agreement of the members of the court as does the Partridge opinion. Certainly, this court should not periodically, and without the most compelling and convincing of reasons, innovate changes in a former and otherwise established decision placing a given construction upon a given statute simply because the statute may be susceptible of more than one logical interpretation. If, however, this case is to form and constitute the platform for alteration of the Partridge holding, it would be my thought that reasonable judicial consistency would suggest a reversion to our former holdings whereby we determined that ordinary negligence would support a negligent homicide charge under the pertinent statute. This, however, a majority of this court is *768not willing to do, thus leaving Partridge intact, albeit with the phrase “disregard for the safety of others” dangling in the rather obscure area of something greater than ordinary negligence yet less than recklessness.
Assuming then the validity of the majority’s position up to this point, I am, nevertheless, unable to agree with its view that instruction No. 6, as given by the trial court, adequately, fairly, and constitutionally submitted the issue of appellant’s felonious culpability to the jury. As pointed out by Judge Donworth, in his dissent, the instruction as given leaves it entirely up to each juror to place his own independent and unrestrained interpretation upon the words “disregard for the safety of others” in the light of the evidence as the individual juror sees it. If in the context of the Partridge concept of the negligent homicide statute, the phrase “disregard for the safety of others,” standing as a yardstick of proscription in a criminal statute and/or alone in a criminal instruction, is not unconstitutionally vague, it is most assuredly insufficient by itself to intelligibly carry to a jury of laymen the proposition that the conduct proscribed by the third phase of the pertinent criminal statute must amount to some form of misbehavior which is less than reckless but greater than ordinary negligence. In my view, something more must be added to accomplish the objective of a proper jury instruction.
It follows, then, that I cannot subscribe to the majority holding that appellant’s proposed instruction No. 6 is so erroneous as to warrant the trial court’s complete refusal thereof. If nothing else could be said of the proposed instruction, it did emphatically and markedly emphasize the desirability and necessity for an instruction clarifying the grey area lying between the legal concept of ordinary negligence and reckless behavior. Particularly is this so when one contemplates the generality of the statutory phrase in question, the fact that appellant was charged with “negligent homicide,” and the fact that the trial court by the instructions specifically included and then withdrew from the jury the allegations that appellant operated his car in a *769reckless manner. These factors, it seems to me, fairly imposed upon the prosecuting attorney, if not the trial court, an obligation, if not a duty, to undertake to propound an instruction which more clearly described the nature of the pertinent conduct proscribed by the negligent homicide statute as interpreted by Partridge. Otherwise, the trial court should have given appellant’s proposed instruction, rather than leave the jury without meaningful guidance concerning the alleged criminal misconduct it was about to consider.
Finally, it seems to me that the majority pointedly avoids undertaking to spell out a practical and reasonably descriptive definition of the phrase “disregard for the safety of others” as that phrase is used in the third phase of the negligent homicide statute under Partridge. This may be a necessary result of its disposition of the case, but, unfortunately, the minimal guidelines the majority suggests would seem to do aught but pile vagueness upon vagueness, and leave the trial bench, the trial bar, and trial jurors without a workable yardstick by which to measure the proscribed conduct. In this vein, and without prolonging this opinion by further discussion, it is my view, in substance, that a minimally acceptable definition and jury instruction would be one which would define ordinary negligence, advise the jury that the state must prove greater than ordinary negligence, and assert that the phrase “disregard for the safety of others” contemplates an act or omission on the part of the accused which, by its character and the surrounding circumstances, manifests a heedless indifference to the probability that injury to others will flow from such conduct.
For the reasons stated, it is my opinion that the convictions now before us should be set aside and the cause remanded for a new trial with appropriate instructions.