Court Opinion

ID: 9930521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 01:00:41.111278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:11.852917
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10178        Document: 00517057599             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/06/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 23-10178
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                               February 6, 2024
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   Dare Matthews,                                                                     Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Detective E. Green, Individually; Stephanie Springer,
   Individually,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:22-CV-471
                     ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Dare Matthews appeals the district court’s dismissal of her civil rights
   and state law claims against Detective E. Green and Stephanie Springer.
   Because Matthews fails to plead facts sufficient to allege that Green or
   Springer violated her rights, we AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 23-10178

                                I.     Background
          A.     Matthews & Springer’s Troubles
          Springer owns and operates a gym, Texas Fitt, where Matthews
   trained for roughly one month. During this period, she states that she had
   only limited interactions with Springer, having only exchanged “courtesy
   hellos” on one occasion.
          Matthews and Springer’s relationship quickly changed from limited
   and pleasant to frequent and aggressive as the parties bickered with each
   other on numerous occasions from September 2019 to May 2020. These
   exchanges included: (1) phone calls to the Pantego Police Department and
   Arlington Police Department (“APD”), (2) a flurry of harassing phone calls
   and threatening emails, (3) harassment on social media, (4) a cease-and-
   desist letter “instructing [Springer] to stop” bothering Matthews, and (5)
   discussions of potential physical altercations.
          In April 2020, Springer contacted APD and her case was assigned to
   Green. Springer told Green that Matthews had engaged in a string of
   harassing and intimidating conduct over the last year. Specifically, she
   accused Matthews of: (1) sabotaging her businesses by leaving hundreds of
   one-star reviews on Google and Yelp; (2) following Springer and her husband
   around town; (3) repeatedly sending her derogatory, profane emails; and (4)
   taking pictures of her minor daughter and emailing them to her.
          Green decided that he had enough information to seek an arrest
   warrant for Matthews, completed an affidavit, and provided it to a magistrate
   judge. In the affidavit, he testified that Matthews sent several obscene and
   sexually provocative emails in violation of Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(1).
   The magistrate judge signed the warrant and Matthews was eventually
   arrested for “18 hours.” During her arrest, she claims that she was “subject

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   to excessive physical searches, injection with an unknown substance, extreme
   unsanitary conditions, and confinement in a bathroom.”
           Matthews was released the next day. As a condition of her release, she
   agreed to not possess any firearms or consume alcohol. This restriction lasted
   for two years, ending after the prosecution dropped all charges against her.
   Matthews sued Green, Springer, and the State of Texas 1 under 42
   U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.
           B.      District Court Proceedings
           At the district court, Matthews alleged that Green violated her Fourth
   Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause and triggering her
   prosecution without probable cause. She also claimed that Springer and
   Green conspired to cause her malicious prosecution. She coupled her federal
   claims with numerous state law claims, including: (1) false imprisonment; (2)
   false arrest; (3) assault; and (4) malicious prosecution. Finally, she sought a
   declaratory judgment “that the Texas harassment statute [was]
   [u]nconstitutional both facially and as applied to [Matthews].” Springer and
   Green moved to dismiss all of Matthews’s claims.
           The district court granted Springer and Green’s motions. As to
   Springer, it first held that Matthews did not plead sufficient facts alleging that
   she was a state actor for the purposes of a § 1983 claim. It then grappled with
   the many state law claims against Springer. Beginning with Matthews’s false
   imprisonment claim, the district court held that Matthews failed to plead
   facts demonstrating that she caused her false imprisonment under Texas’s

           _____________________
           1
             The State of Texas was dismissed without prejudice due to Matthews’s failure to
   serve the State as a defendant as required by Rule 4(m). Matthews does not challenge the
   district court’s decision, leaving only Green and Springer as Appellees properly before us
   now.

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   “instigation standard.” It then held that Matthews failed to establish the
   requisite intent for an assault charge. Finally, it rejected the malicious
   prosecution claim because Matthews did not plead facts showing that
   “Springer’s desire to pursue prosecution was the determining factor in the
   official’s decision to commence the prosecution.”
           The district court addressed Green next, granting him qualified
   immunity on each of Matthews’s claims. It began with federal conspiracy,
   holding that Matthews had not pleaded that Green and Springer ever came
   to an agreement to violate her Fourth Amendment rights. It moved on to false
   arrest, rejecting the claim because Matthews did not “assert facts that Green
   knew that” Springer’s complaints were baseless. Finally, it rejected
   Matthews’s malicious prosecution claims against Green because she offered
   no caselaw establishing Green’s conduct as violative of clearly established
   law. Matthews timely appealed.
           On appeal, Matthews asks us to reverse the district court’s dismissal
   of her: (1) § 1983 claims against Green for allegedly arresting and forcing the
   prosecution of her without probable cause; and (2) § 1983 and state law
   claims against Springer. 2

           _____________________
           2
            Notably, Matthews has considerably narrowed the number of claims advanced on
   appeal. “Our court routinely dismisses arguments as abandoned when parties fail to brief
   them.” Faciane v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 931 F.3d 412, 423 (5th Cir. 2019). We
   do so here, as well.

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                                         No. 23-10178

                            II.     Standard of Review
          We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Bass
   v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2012). While we accept a
   plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true at this stage, she must allege “more than
   unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Ashcroft v.
   Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Her complaint must contain “enough facts
   to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
   Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
                                  III.      Discussion
          A.     Green
          Matthews argues that Green violated her Fourth and Fourteenth
   Amendment rights by subjecting her to an arrest and subsequent prosecution
   without probable cause. She further avers that Green is not entitled to
   qualified immunity because his conduct is a clearly established violation of
   her constitutional rights. We disagree.
          Qualified immunity protects public officials from civil liability when
   they lack notice that their conduct is unlawful. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
   739 (2002). “When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on
   the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” Ramirez v.
   Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation and citation
   omitted). This requires a plaintiff to allege: “(1) the violation of a federal
   constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the right was clearly established
   at the time.” Id. (citation omitted).
          “The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be
   secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures and that
   no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919
   F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Thus, “[a] constitutional claim

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   for false arrest . . . ‘requires a showing of no probable cause.’” Id. (quoting
   Club Retro, LLC v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009).
          A claim of malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to demonstrate
   that: (1) “the suit or proceeding was ‘instituted without any probable
   cause’”; (2) “the ‘motive in instituting’ the suit ‘was malicious,’”; and (3)
   “the prosecution” terminated in favor of the accused.” Armstrong v. Ashley,
   60 F.4th 262, 278 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332,
   1338 (2022)).
          Probable cause is established by the “facts and circumstances within
   the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or
   one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the
   suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”
   Piazza v. Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotation and citation
   omitted). The probable cause analysis “‘does not demand any showing that
   the belief that an offense was committed be correct or more likely true than
   false.’” Id. at 246 (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)
   (alteration omitted)). Rather, it requires us to “find a basis for an officer to
   believe to a ‘fair probability’ that a violation occurred.” Id. (quoting United
   States v. Antone, 753 F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985)).
          Matthews’s arguments regarding Green turn on whether the
   detective violated her constitutional right to be free from false arrests and
   malicious prosecution. Each contention requires Green to have acted in the
   absence of probable cause. Accordingly, our first and only inquiry is whether
   Green had probable cause when seeking and obtaining a warrant for
   Matthews’s arrest. We hold that he did, so he is entitled to qualified
   immunity.
          Matthews primarily asserts that Green did not have probable cause
   supporting a warrant for her arrest because he “did no corroboration or

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                                           No. 23-10178

   independent policework whatsoever to validate his warrant affidavit.” She
   insists that Green’s decision to simply trust Springer’s side of the story when
   drafting and submitting his affidavit disqualifies him from having probable
   cause. But whether Green investigated Springer’s claims to her satisfaction
   is not the standard. The probable cause standard sounds in reasonableness
   and is entirely objective. United States v. Walden, 707 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir.
   1983) (“Probable cause is an objective standard.”). In other words, our task
   is not evaluating whether Green could have gathered more facts to
   Matthews’s liking. Instead, it is simply to gauge whether he had enough facts,
   from any source, to reasonably conclude that Matthews violated Texas Penal
   Code § 42.07(a)(1). 3
           Here, the record is replete with more than enough facts to seek a
   warrant for Matthews’s allegedly “obscene” emails, phone calls, and social
   media messaging exchanges. 4 For example, Springer brought Green emails
   indisputably from Matthews that were vulgar, offensive, and sexual-in-
   nature, repeatedly referring to Springer’s genitalia and posing sexually
   provocative questions to her. That fact, along with the others contained in
   Green’s affidavit, was enough for any reasonable officer to believe that a
   crime occurred.
           Matthews takes issue with the fact that Green didn’t ask if she
   “initiate[d]” the communication, as required by § 42.07(a)(1). But she offers

           _____________________
           3
            Texas Penal Code § 42.07(a)(1) provides that a “person commits an offense if,
   with intent to harass, annoy, . . . torment, or embarrass another, the person . . . initiates
   communication and in the course of the communication makes a comment . . . that is
   obscene.”
           4
             Texas Penal Code § 42.07(b)(3) defines “obscene” “as [a] patently offensive
   description of or a solicitation to commit an ultimate sex act, including sexual intercourse,
   masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anilingus, or a description of an excretory function.”

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   no caselaw supporting her position that Green was required to do so before
   seeking a warrant. And given the sheer number of emails, texts, and social
   media messages, we agree that it was reasonable for Green to proceed on the
   information he obtained from Springer at the time. At bottom, Green
   “believe[d] to a fair probability that a violation occurred.” Piazza, 217 F.3d
   at 246. Because Matthews pleaded facts establishing Green’s probable cause
   for arresting her under state law, he did not violate her Fourth or Fourteenth
   Amendment rights and is therefore entitled to qualified immunity from
   Matthews’s suit. See Ramirez, 3 F.4th at 133 (explaining that a plaintiff must
   plead a constitutional or statutory violation to overcome a public official’s
   qualified immunity defense).
          B.     Springer
                 1.      Section 1983 Claims
          Despite Matthews’s arguments to the contrary, the district court
   determined that Springer could not be liable in a § 1983 suit under well-
   established state-action principles. We agree.
          “To plead a constitutional claim under § 1983, [Matthews] must
   allege that a state actor violated a constitutional right.” Torres v. Livingston,
   972 F.3d 660, 662 (5th Cir. 2020). We have repeatedly explained that private
   parties do not qualify as state actors in § 1983 suits absent allegations that the
   “the challenged conduct may be fairly attributable to the State.” Bass v.
   Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999); Rundus v. Dall., 634 F.3d
   309, 312 (5th Cir. 2011). Moreover, this court has consistently held that
   merely communicating with police officers, without something more, hardly
   brings an otherwise private actor into the State’s orbit for § 1983 purposes.
   Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Police reliance in
   making an arrest on information given by a private party does not make the
   private party a state actor.”).

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           Here, Matthews fails to allege that Springer’s conduct is in any way
   attributable to Green or any other State entity. At best, Matthews alleges that
   Springer provided Green with misleading, potentially false information in
   hopes that he would arrest her. But, as the district court explained, she fails
   to allege facts demonstrating that Springer acted “under color of state law.”
   James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). Absent some
   “fairly attributable” conduct, Springer is not a state actor and thus cannot be
   the subject of a § 1983 suit. Bass, 180 F.3d at 312. We therefore affirm the
   district court’s dismissal of Matthews’s conspiracy claim against Springer. 5
                   2.      Texas Tort Law Claims
           Matthews also maintains her argument that Springer is independently
   liable for a bevy of tort violations under Texas law, including: (1) false
   imprisonment; (2) assault; (3) malicious prosecution; and (4) conspiracy. We
   address each claim in turn.
                           i.      False Imprisonment & Assault
           Matthews asserts that Springer caused her false arrest by Green,
   which she insists amounts to false imprisonment and assault under Texas
   law. We disagree.
           False imprisonment has three “essential” elements: “(1) willful
   detention; (2) without consent; (3) without authority of law.” Rodriguez, 92
   S.W.3d at 506. The Texas Supreme Court has explained that “liability for
   false imprisonment extends beyond those who willfully participate in
   detaining the complaining party to those who request or direct the
   detention.” Id. at 507 (footnote omitted). This theory is commonly referred
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           5
            It is unclear whether Matthews also attempts to advance her state law claims and
   theories against Springer under § 1983. To the extent that she endeavors to do so, our
   holding that Springer is not a proper defendant similarly applies to those efforts.

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   to as the “instigation of the false imprisonment.” Id. (footnote omitted).
   Under instigation theory, the willful detention element may be satisfied “by
   conduct that is intended to cause one to be detained, and in fact causes the
   detention, even when the actor does not participate in the detention.” Id.
   (footnote omitted).
          Regarding assault, the Texas Supreme Court has explained that “an
   assault occurs if a person . . . intentionally or knowingly causes physical
   contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe
   that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.” Loaisiga v.
   Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 256 (Tex. 2012) (citation omitted). Relevantly, false
   imprisonment and assault share a common element: intent.
          Here, Matthews failed to provide facts demonstrating that Springer
   intended for Green to falsely imprison or assault her. True, she repeatedly
   stated that Springer caused her arrest, assault, and imprisonment by going to
   Green and complaining about her conduct. But the instigation standard
   requires more than just that to establish causation. For her instigation theory
   to be successful, Matthews had to plead that Springer’s conduct was the
   equivalent of her exclaiming “Officer, arrest that man!” Rodriguez, 92
   S.W.3d at 507 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 45A
   cmt. c.). Matthews’s pleadings do not clear this high standard, so she has not
   demonstrated the requisite intent for false imprisonment. Id.
          The intent element is also lacking from Matthews’s assault claim. Her
   alleged assault directly stems from her arrest. Because we have determined
   that Matthews failed to plead facts establishing that Springer intended for her
   to be falsely imprisoned, we must also conclude that those same facts fail to
   demonstrate that Springer intended that the police officers assault her. Put
   differently, Springer did not control, direct, or influence the police officers to
   do anything—Green and APD used their own professional discretion in

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   deciding to arrest Matthews. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of both
   claims.
                        ii.     Malicious Prosecution
          Matthews also asserts that Springer is liable for malicious prosecution
   under Texas law. Not so. To prevail in a malicious prosecution claim, a
   plaintiff must establish seven elements:
              (1) the commencement of a criminal prosecution
              against the plaintiff; (2) causation (initiation or
              procurement) of the action by the defendant; (3)
              termination of the prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor;
              (4) the plaintiff’s innocence; (5) the absence of
              probable cause for the proceedings; (6) malice in filing
              the charge; and (7) damage to the plaintiff.
   Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997). Causation
   is particularly difficult to establish, like the “instigation” standard in false
   imprisonment cases. See Dangerfield v. Ormsby, 264 S.W.3d 904, 910–11
   (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008) (comparing instigation under false
   imprisonment to causation or procurement in malicious prosecution).
   Essentially, “the procurement of criminal proceedings requires a direction or
   request for the action taken.” Id. And “merely reporting a crime and the
   suspected criminal to law enforcement authorities does not constitute
   procurement of criminal proceedings when the authorities exercise
   discretion in deciding whether to prosecute.” Id.
          Matthews fails here for the same reasons that she did at the district
   court—she has provided no facts demonstrating that Springer caused or
   procured her prosecution. She merely asserts, in conclusory fashion, that
   Springer robbed Green of his independent decision to obtain the warrant that
   led to her eventual arrest and prosecution. But, by her own words, she never
   pleads that Springer did anything more than “wish[]” for her prosecution.

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   Simply wishing for someone’s prosecution does not equate to directly
   procuring the same. Dangerfield, 264 S.W.3d at 910 (explaining that the
   defendant’s explicit direction to prosecute an individual must be “the
   determining factor in the official’s decision to commence the prosecution”).
   Because Springer did not procure Matthews’s prosecution, Matthews fails to
   establish causation, and her malicious prosecution claim must be dismissed.
                                   IV.      Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal
   of Matthews’s claims in full.

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