Court Opinion

ID: 9499337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:45:05.84375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:25.710992
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion’s holding that Lyell’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be granted as a result of the trial court’s expressions of bias which denied Lyell a fair trial, but write separately with respect to the trial court’s apparent coercion of the jury as a result of the trial court’s improper polling of the jury. I would find that the trial court’s improper polling and inadequate Allen charge are also bases for granting Lyell’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The instant case arguably represents the most objectionable form of polling conceivable prior to a court giving an Allen *1190charge, and constitutes the kind of inquiry impliedly disproved of by Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 449, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926) and Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 240, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). In Brasfield, the Supreme Court held that a federal court of appeals must overturn any verdict obtained after a trial court inquires into the numerical breakdown of a jury. 272 U.S. at 449. 47 S.Ct. 135. In Lowenfield, the Supreme Court declined to apply this per se rule to state court convictions, but held that “other combinations of supplemental [Allen] charges and polling” might be coercive and therefore require reversal. Id. at 241, 108 S.Ct. 546. I would find that the instant case represents the very situation which the Supreme Court alluded to in Lowenfield when it noted that “other combinations of supplemental charges and polling” might require a due process reversal. Id. at 241, 108 S.Ct. 546.
The majority incorrectly concludes that Brasfield applies only to cases where the trial court inquires into the numerical division of a deadlocked jury. Admittedly, in Brasfield, the trial court inquired as to the numerical division of a jury that “failed to agree after some hours of deliberation,” 272 U.S. at 449, 47 S.Ct. 135, and in Lowenfield, the jury stated that it “was unable to reach a decision.” 484 U.S. at 234, 108 S.Ct. 546. However, nothing in Brasfield or Lowenfield narrows the holding to deadlocked jury cases. The majority’s approach oversimplifies and misconstrues the holding in these cases. What the Supreme Court was substantively concerned with, in both Brasfield and Lowenfield, was the trial court’s inquiry into and the possible disclosure of the numerical division of a jury, regardless of whether a jury is deadlocked, at an impasse, or in a different stage of jury deliberations. In the instant case, the trial court improperly inquired into and discovered the numerical division of the jury during polling. The harm done by the court’s conduct is not minimized by the mere fact that the inquiry occurred during jury polling because the court ultimately succeeded in discovering the numerical division of the jury. In Lowen-field, the Supreme Court indicated that
on these facts the combination of the polling of the jury and the supplemental instruction was not “coercive” in such a way as to deny petitioner any constitutional right. By so holding we do not mean to be understood as saying other combinations of supplemental charges and polling might not require a different conclusion.
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 241, 108 S.Ct. 546 (emphasis added). By holding that “other combinations of supplemental charges and polling” may be coercive, the Supreme Court expressly left open the possibility that polling for a different purpose, in a different manner or style, or at a different stage of jury deliberations may be coercive. It makes sense that the Supreme Court did not limit its holdings because polling can take place at different times during the course of jury deliberations. The majority’s insistence in limiting Bras-field and Lowenfield to deadlocked jury cases, plainly contradicts and undermines the Supreme Court’s express holding. At least one circuit court of appeals has found Brasfield applicable to non-deadlocked jury cases. See United States v. Spitz, 696 F.2d 916 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that “continuing the poll for no reason at all, was to establish how the jury stood numerically. To do so was per se error.”) Michigan state courts have also recognized that continued jury polling is “improper because of the potentially coercive effect.” People v. Echavarria, 233 Mich.App. 356, 362, 592 N.W.2d 737 (Mich.App.1999). In the instant case, I would find that the *1191polling was coercive under Brasfield and Lowenfield, as well as Michigan case law.
In the instant case, the jury had returned to announce its verdict, in the course of which the polling revealed that one of the jurors did not agree with the guilty verdict. After a single juror expressed her disagreement with the verdict, no conceivable purpose was served by continuing to poll the jurors except to ascertain where the remaining jurors stood in relation to the jury being unable to reach an unanimous verdict, which of course was not information that the trial court required. The court’s continued inquiry was coercive in that it revealed that there was an eleven to one split in favor of conviction, and indicated that a single juror was the lone holdout for acquittal. The failure to cease polling when a juror repudiated the guilty verdict placed undue pressure on the dissenting juror by revealing to everyone in the courtroom not only that juror’s position, but the fact that she alone held it.
The polling in this case was plainly coercive. In Brasfield, the polling revealed only how the jury was numerically divided. 272 U.S. at 449, 47 S.Ct. 135. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found the polling coercive even though the trial court did not know the number of jurors or the identity of the jurors who favored a conviction. Id. In Lowenfield, although the polling revealed the jurors’ names, it was not deemed coercive because it was limited to determining how the jury stood on the question of whether further deliberations might assist them in returning a verdict. 484 U.S. at 240, 108 S.Ct. 546. In Camel v. Sowders, although the numerical division of the jury was revealed to the court, the polling was not deemed coercive because the jury volunteered the information. No. 90-6083, 1991 WL 225563, at *1-2, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS 26537, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 1991) (unpublished case). The facts in this case are unique in that the trial judge’s inquiry revealed not only the jury’s numerical division, but the inclination of the majority and the identity of the holdout juror. On these unique facts, the polling was plainly coercive. Indeed, the cases cited by the majority simply do not contain the egregious facts presented in this case, which clearly compel a finding that the polling here was coercive.
The majority arbitrarily invokes Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 31(d) to legitimize the polling in the instant case. Neither party raised this argument in their submissions to this Court. The majority erroneously asserts that jury polling has no express limitation under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 31(d). Since Lyell was convicted in Michigan state court, the federal rules are simply not applicable to or relevant in this case. The trial court in this case was obligated to either declare a mistrial or send the jury back for further deliberations as soon as any juror revealed that the verdict was not unanimous. See Michigan Court Rules (“M.C.R.”) 6.420(D). In pertinent part M.C.R. 6.420(D) provides that:
[i]f polling discloses the jurors are not in agreement, the court may (1) discontinue the poll and order the jury to retire for further deliberations, or (2) either (a) with the defendant’s consent, or (b) after determining that the jury is deadlocked or that some other manifest injustice exists, declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.
M.C.R. 6.420(D).1 Under this Michigan statute, jury polling has express limitations. See, e.g., People v. Echavarria, 233 *1192Mich.App. 356, 362, 592 N.W.2d 737 (Mich.App.1999). Indeed, in this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals “conclude[d] that the trial court erred in continuing to poll the final two jurors after [a] juror ... stated she disagreed with the verdict.” People v. Lyell, No. 214100, 2001 WL 671474, at *1 (Mich.App. May 4, 2001) (unreported case). Admittedly, a violation of M.C.R. 6.420(D) is not a basis for this Court to grant Lyell’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. However, the majority cannot invoke Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 31(d) to legitimize the polling because the polling procedure in the instant case is simply not governed by the federal rules. In fact, Respondent concedes that M.C.R. 6.420 governs the polling procedure used in this case. See Respondent’s Final Br. at 6.
The majority finds that the trial court has broad discretion to conduct polling. However, in affording discretion to the trial court, this Court should be “convinced that [the trial court’s] inquiry was essentially neutral rather than calculated to affect (the jurors’) judgment.” United States v. Brooks, 420 F.2d 1350, 1354 (D.C.Cir.1969) (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). In addition, the facts and circumstances of each case are important. United States v. Gambino, 951 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir.1991). In the instant case, the trial court abused its discretion because, as the majority concedes, the trial court demonstrated a profound bias in favor of the prosecution which resulted in a guilty verdict.
This Court has recognized that the circumstances of an Allen charge, standing alone, can render even the giving of a textbook Allen charge coercive. See United States v. Nichols, 100 Fed.Appx. 524, 528 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished case). Other courts have held that a minority juror’s fear of exposure is enough to produce coercive pressure on that juror to change his or her vote. Minority jurors “always know their minority status, and if fearfully inclined, may presumably suspect a disgruntled judge can find them out.” United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir.1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In the instant case, the trial judge exposed the holdout juror in open court as the jury’s sole dissenter. After being exposed in front of the entire court, the holdout juror was sent back with her fellow jurors to resume deliberations after the jury was given only a flawed and abbreviated Allen charge:
I really would ask you to go back and, you know, discuss with each other where you are and what processes you’re involved in to see if you can arrive at a verdict. I don’t urge anyone to give up their ideas or their thoughts, but I do think it is very important to, you know, talk with each other and to see what it is that you disagree upon. If you would be kind enough to do that, I would be appreciative.
(J.A. at 18) Admittedly, this charge appears to include the requisite warning that jurors should not merely acquiesce to their brethren’s position. However, given the circumstances of this case, in which the trial judge, by her comments throughout the trial, had made clear to the jury that it should return a guilty verdict, the abbreviated instruction to the jury simply could not be expected to counteract the coercive pressure brought to bear on the holdout juror as a result of having been identified in open court as the lone dissenter. Although the majority engages in conjecture and speculation to the effect that the holdout juror changed her mind in open court, there is simply nothing in the record to support this conclusion. For all we know, based on the record before us, the dissenting juror may have never agreed to the verdict that was announced in open court. The circumstances should have indicated *1193to the trial court that the holdout juror was already susceptible to pressure from the other jurors because the jury had ostensibly returned with a “unanimous” verdict, possibly over the objection of the dissenting juror. The revelations in open court could only add to this pressure.
The majority maintains that Lyell’s defense counsel failed to object to the polling and that the lack of an objection suggests a non-coercive environment. It is unclear how the majority reaches this conclusion. The improper polling and flawed Allen charge came at the end of a four-day trial in which the trial judge had continuously and rudely interrupted, berated, criticized, ridiculed, undermined, and discredited Lyell’s defense counsel. (See, e.g., Day 1 at 56, 61, 63; Day 2 at 68, 95, 99, 109, 130-33, 136, 138, 140-42, 146, 166, 170-71; Day 3 at 22, 27, 43, 52; Day 4 at 42, 58)2 Since the trial judge’s abusive conduct culminated in Lyell’s defense counsel being sanctioned in front of the jury, it is no surprise that Lyell’s counsel did not object to the polling. In the hostile and oppressive environment in which defense counsel found himself, the lack of an immediate objection more than likely simply reflected defense counsel’s concern about the impact that further chastisement by the trial judge would have upon further jury deliberations. Contrary to the majority’s position, the record shows that defense counsel did not acquiesce in the polling. Immediately after the jury exited the courtroom, defense counsel moved for a mistrial:
I’m going to move for mistrial based on the grounds that I think the pressure upon the lone hold out juror now given what has just occurred is going to be overwhelming, and whatever, if she does cave in, it is only going to be based on pressure exerted on her having been put into the position where she is, in front of the Court.
(J.A. 204) Defense counsel’s arguments and the timing of the motion for a mistrial clearly indicate that the motion was in response to the improper polling. There is simply no factual basis for the majority’s contention that Lyell’s defense counsel acquiesced in the polling. It is unclear how the majority reconciles finding that the trial court’s expressions of bias infringed Lyell’s right to a fair trail, but that those same expressions of bias did not impact the polling. The majority’s attempt to divorce the polling from the abusive context of the entire case is simply incongruous. Again, instead of relying on the facts and evidence, the majority relies on speculation and conjecture in order to conclude that the environment of the courtroom was non-coercive.
The trial court’s reprehensible conduct throughout the trial revealed a profound bias in favor of the prosecution. In such a context, when the circumstances are viewed in their totality, the trial court’s polling and Allen charge appear to have been part of the court’s ongoing effort to sabotage the trial by coercing the jury into returning a guilty verdict. For these reasons, I would find the trial court’s improper jury polling and inadequate Allen charge violated Lyell’s due process rights and constitute additional bases for granting Lyell’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

. When the jury left the courtroom to deliberate, Lyell's counsel moved for a mistrial arguing that the holdout juror was placed under overwhelming pressure to convict. The trial court did not rule on Lyell’s motion.

. The trial transcript is indicated by the day and page number of the transcript because the transcript was not included in the Joint Appendix.