Court Opinion

ID: 9577500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:35:33.411007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:42.078235
License: Public Domain

Smolenski, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I construe the phrase "within the period herein specified” in the second sentence of the second paragraph of § 73a of the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.73a; MSA 7.119, as providing for a five-year period. I disagree with the majority that such a construction renders this phrase surplusage or nugatory when read in conjunction with the second sentence of the first paragraph of § 73a.
The language of the first paragraph’s second sentence provides that a tax title purchaser is barred from asserting title if the purchaser fails to give the required notice within five years after becoming entitled to the tax deed. Nevertheless, such purchasers often assert such title and even go into actual possession of the property for more than five years. See, e.g., St Helen Resort Ass’n, Inc v Hannan, 321 Mich 536; 33 NW2d 74 (1948); Ritter v Corkins, 319 Mich 484; 30 NW2d 41 (1947); Adair v Bonninghausen, 305 Mich 137; 9 NW2d 35 (1943); Brousseau v Conklin, 301 Mich 241; 3 NW2d 260 (1942); Closser v Abraham, 284 Mich 272; 279 NW 509 (1938). Generally, a person claiming inadequate notice can challenge such a purchaser’s arguably void title at law or, if the purchaser made a bona fide attempt to give the required notice within five years, in equity at any time, i.e., six, eight, ten, or more, years after the purchaser claimed title or went into possession.1 *608See the first sentence of the second paragraph of § 73a; see also. St Helen, supra; Ritter, supra; Adair, supra; Brousseau, supra; Closser, supra. Construing the phrase "within the period herein specified” as referring to a five-year period simply means that a person who was properly served with notice but failed to redeem within five years could not thereafter challenge the sufficiency of such a purchaser’s notice to another and hence challenge the purchaser’s arguable title where the purchaser had claimed title or gone into possession for more than five years. Thus, such a construction does not cause the second paragraph’s second sentence to refer to a situation already covered by the first paragraph’s second sentence. Rather, so construing the second paragraph’s second sentence is in harmony with the first paragraph’s second sentence.
I believe that this construction of the second sentence of the second paragraph of § 73a is reinforced by the plain language of the sentence itself, which, to reiterate, provides as follows:
A person who has himself been properly served with notice and failed to redeem from a sale in accordance with this act, within the period herein specified, shall not thereafter be entitled to question or deny in any manner the sufficiency of notice upon the ground that some other person or persons entitled to notice was not also served. [Emphasis supplied.]
The words "in accordance with this act” refer to the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.1 et seq.; MSA 7.1 et seq., which generally provides that the redemption period in a case such as this is six months. See § 140, MCL 211.140; MSA 7.198. Construing the immediately following "within the period herein specified” as also meaning a six-month *609period renders this phrase itself surplusage. However, construing "within the period herein specified” as meaning a five-year period gives effect to every phrase, clause, and word in the second sentence, and is consistent with the entire tenor and context of § 73a.
This analysis is bolstered by the language of the sentence as originally enacted by 1939 PA 52, which then provided as follows:
No person who has himself been properly served with such notice and failed to redeem from such sale in accordance with the provisions of the general tax law, within the period herein specified, shall thereafter be entitled to question or deny in any manner the sufficiency of such notice upon the ground that some other person or persons entitled to notice was not also served therewith. [Emphasis supplied.][2]
Thus, I would hold that "the period herein specified” refers to a five-year period. I believe such a holding is consistent with Michigan law that strict compliance with the notice requirements of § 140 is required "because the effect of proceedings under the tax law is to divest the true owners of their title to property.” Andre v Fink, 180 Mich App 403, 407-408; 447 NW2d 808 (1989) (emphasis supplied). Such a holding is also consistent with this Court’s holding in Andre, supra.
Therefore defendant could properly challenge the sufficiency of . the redemption notice. I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in plaintiffs favor and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion._

 However, the issue of adverse possession may arise. See Adair, supra.

2 The present language of the second sentence of the second paragraph of § 73a was adopted by 1976 PA 385.