Court Opinion

ID: 9810161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:41:48.067533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:26.530134
License: Public Domain

Stacy, J.,
dissenting: The trial judge placed his judgment squarely upon the decision of this Court in S. v. Cline, 150 N. C., 854, which contains our latest expression on the subject. In this, I think he was right. That case was well considered. It' is in line with the overwhelming weight of authority, and we Should be slow to overrule it.
In an indictment for perjury, the materiality of the alleged false oath, to my mind, is not merely a matter of form, but rather an essential element of the offense. It certainly would be necessary for the State to prove it on the hearing in order to make out the charge. Then what becomes of the settled maxim of the law that “proof without allegation is as unavailing as allegation without proof?” Dixon v. Davis, 184 N. C., p. 209; Green v. Biggs, 167 N. C,, p. 422; McCoy v. R. R., 142 N. C., p. 387. Why subject the defendant to the inconvenience of a trial if the State cannot prove the materiality of the alleged false oath and will not allege it? Every essential element of a crime must be charged in the bill of indictment, and any defect in this respect is not subject to be cured by a bill of particulars. C. S., 4613; S. v. Van Pelt, 136 N. C., 633. This is not a technicality; it is a matter of substance. I think the present bill is defective. The judgment below should be affirmed and the solicitor allowed to send another bill, if so advised.