Court Opinion

ID: 9624656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:12:48.812179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:00.954365
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Presiding Judge,
dissenting. 1. In ray opinion the facts show such a major deviation from the normal procedure of driving from the place of employment to the home of the claimants as to demand a finding that the claimants were not within the scope of their employment at the time of the injuries. The facts show that the employees left their place of employment at or near 5 p.m. on a Friday before Labor Day; that the trip home, Marietta to Rome, normally took approximately one hour; that they did not proceed home but drove some 15 miles in another direction to a whiskey store where they purchased a supply of whiskey and wine; then returned on a course toward Rome and made at least two stops for food and drinks before the accident happened. The time of the accident is placed at sometime between 8 and 9 p.m., some three or more hours after leaving the place of employment. It is well settled in Georgia as elsewhere that minor deviations will not remove an employee from the scope of his employment. Also, that after a temporary departure the employee can re-enter the scope of his employment and responsibility reattaches. Atlanta Furniture Co. v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781 (1) (181 SE 498). But the facts here demand a finding that the deviation was substantial and to a degree in time so that a mere return to the correct route would not in and of itself return the employees to the scope of employment. Increasing the travel time from place of employment to home from approximately one hour to approximately three hours necessarily increased the hazards due to such factors as daylight or darkness, traffic and weather conditions. See 1 Larson, § 19.61. An employee does not have the right to unreasonably delay his trip homeward in order to extend .the time of his employment to cover a hazard which would never have reasonably occurred had he proceeded within a reasonable period of time. Dooley v. Smith’s Transfer Co., 26 N. J. Misc. 129 (57 A2d 554) (1948). It is my opinion that the evidence here demands a finding that the entire venture, based on personal detours and the time element, takes it *238out of the scope of the claimant’s employment.
2. The evidence further demanded a finding that the accident occurred through the wilful misconduct of some or all of the claimants. The driver Jenkins testified that he was sober. It is evident from the facts that the others were in varying degrees of drunkenness. The driver testifies that he was familiar with this road and of the curve where the accident happened he said, "I say this one here is the dangerous curve traveling . . . going back. Rest of the curves is not as bad as this one here.” In spite of this knowledge and in view of the maximum speed limit of 60 m.p.h. and the law requiring a driver to slow his speed when approaching a curve, he testified that his speed at this curve was "60 or 65, something like that.” When asked if he was going too fast to make the curve, he said, "Well, it was a little too fast.”
It is also clear that the wilful drunken condition of at least one of the claimants, Billy Smith, contributed to the accident. The driver testifies that there were 3 on the front seat including the driver and that "the boy sitting next to me went to sleep with his foot on mine. I couldn’t get him off mine.” This apparently accounts for the investigating officer’s testimony that there were no brake or skid marks at the scene of the accident. Code Ann. § 114-105 provides, "No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death due to the employee’s wilful misconduct, including intentionally self-inflicted injury, or growing out of his attempt to injure another, or due to intoxication or wilful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or perform a duty required by statute. . .”
Under all the facts of this case the trial court did not err in reversing the board’s order awarding compensation to the claimants. I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Judge Eberhardt concurs in this dissent.