Court Opinion

ID: 9648553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:26:31.824882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:02.802255
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
In their motion for rehearing, appellees insist that George F. LeBus did not keep books on the Whitaker, Miller and Lewis lease operations until September 1, 1947, after which he did keep the books under specific arrangements with John E. LeBus. We do not believe such would affect our holding in this case. It was undisputed that George F. LeBus kept the books on the Mangold lease at all times.
Appellees further point out that the statutes of limitation would apply to claims for compensation for personal services and that in instances where they were performed under an oral contract, the compensation for any services which was over two years in arrears would be barred upon the interposition of the two-year statute, Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 5526. Perhaps appellees have misunderstood our language. We do not intend to say the law is to the contrary. We hold only that *514tlie statute ‘ does not bar the right to the có'mpensátion in instances .where the person entitled thereto honestly believes he has received 'it from the person obligated to pay it' and had no notice or knowledge to the contrary, when in fact he has not received it 'and the fact that he has not been paid was never brought to his knowledge, and where at the same time his erroneous belief was legally excusable.
Appellees point out that it is undisputed that since September 1, 1947, until November of 1952, the appellees performed under the contracts made September 1, 1947, and that as many as 60 times, or for as many months, John E. LeBus received and cashed the separate checks mailed to him in appellees’ performance of the contracts. It is contended that John E. LeBus ratified the contracts under which the payments were made every time he received and cashed a check delivered to him under contractual provisions. Appellees insist that “nowhere does the Appellant by pleading or affidavit say that John E. LeBus was drunk or otherwise incompetent on the day he received and cashed the separate checks.”
We have pointed out in our opinion the sworn allegations of the appellant to the effect that John E. LeBus was incompetent on the date of execution of the contracts of September 1, 1947, because he was at that time “hard of hearing, his eyesight was weak, he was under the influence of intoxicating liquors and barbiturates.” We pointed out that appellant’s sworn pleadings were to the effect that appellees took advantage of the mental and physical condition of the deceased to defraud him. In view of the assertions of appellees in their motion for reheáring, we reexamined the record. We find from the appellant’s allegations that John E. LeBus was misled during the last five years of his life into, believing that he was being paid the money he was entitled to receive under the agreement of October, 1937, — not only because of the fiduciary relationship existent between him and his brother and which was a premise of such mistaken belief prior to the last five years of his life — but additionally because during such five-year period he was mentally incompetent as result of an addiction to alcohol and drugs. The pleadings in this respect were mentioned but not emphasized in our original opinion. It was during this period that the contracts in question were executed, and that appel-lees’ performance thereunder occurred. This covered the period during which each check was received and cashed.
It is indeed difficult to confine our views in this opinion to those views which we must take in light of the fact that the proceeding in the trial court was ■ a summary proceeding. We have so confined ourselves. Appellant is entitled to get his evidence before a jury for its consideration. Whether the evidence would be sufficient to support any judgment rendered for appellant on the merits of his case upon an appeal thereof to an appellate court, or whether appellant’s evidence might be so against the preponderance of all the evidence contrary thereto that it could not be supported on an appeal, is another question. Assuming on such an appeal that his judgment could not stand for either of such reasons, yet if there should be any evidence, this Court could never reverse and render such a judgment, but if so reversed, we would be compelled to remand the cause for another trial. For the same, reasons we cannot affirm this summary judgment. There is some evidence. It presents material fact issues.
Motion for rehearing is overruled.