Court Opinion

ID: 9471169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:26:12.479876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:17.709259
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority, but believe that certain issues raised by the dissent merit additional comment.
At bottom, this case turns on the relationship between an administrative agency’s internal procedures and the standard of review by an appellate court. Because judicial review provides an inappropriate occasion for the imposition of court-crafted rules regulating intra-agency procedures, I join the majority in ruling that the order of the National Labor Relations Board must be enforced.
Undoubtedly, arguments may be advanced, perhaps even persuasively, for the use of full adversarial proceedings rather than agency investigations when representation election impropriety is alleged. Unless procedural preference rises to the level of constitutional imperative, however, the decision whether to utilize an investigation or to employ a full hearing is best left to the discretion of the NLRB. There can be no mistaking the Supreme Court’s instruction that “absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1202, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978).
We may not deny enforcement of a bargaining order merely because we would pre*70fer another result, or even because we believe that the NLRA could be read to support a conclusion contrary to that adopted by the Board. Rather, we are mandated to enforce orders of the Board so long as “the Board’s construction ..., while it may not be required by the Act, is at least permissible under it” NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2475, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983), citing NRLB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 266-67, 95 S.Ct. 959, 968, 43 L.Ed.2d 171 (1975). See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1149, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963); Giacalone v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 427, 430 (3d Cir.1982).
My dissenting colleagues, particularly in section III A of their opinion, seek to substitute the summary judgment standard drawn from Rule 56 of the Fed.R.Civ.Pro. for the NLRB’s discretionary approach to evidentiary hearings of this nature. Such a standard would require a full evidentiary hearing whenever a colorable claim of an election interference is raised before the Board. The Board’s amended regulation, to which the dissent ascribes great importance, provides only that the NLRB’s regional director “may act upon the basis of an administrative investigation or upon the record of a hearing before a hearing officer” and that such discretion is left to the regional director’s determination whether the allegations “raise substantial and material factual issues.” 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(d) (1982). In the situation here, there is no claim that the alleged threats were made by the union or its representatives, and the investigation makes it clear that neither the union nor its representatives were involved.
Although hearings frequently serve a useful purpose, requiring a hearing regardless of the factual setting promotes undue delay in the administrative process at the expense of the freedom of choice of the workers. Season-All Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 932, 942 (3d Cir.1981) (Adams, J., dissenting). Almost four years have now passed since the employees of ARA sought to avail themselves of the right to collective bargaining guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act. Given the sparseness of the factual challenge and the fact that an independent investigation disclosed nothing to augment the unverified statement of one employee, I decline to join in an endeavor that would make this already cumbersome process any more protracted. Appellate courts must be mindful of the capacity of legal and administrative delay to frustrate the statutory rights afforded employees under the NLRA.