Court Opinion

ID: 9952513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 21:00:54.922486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:01.925291
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 23-4250

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ABDUL INUSAH,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00070-1)

        Submitted: January 10, 2024                                       Decided: March 18, 2024

        Before WYNN, HARRIS, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judges Wynn
        and Quattlebaum joined.

        ON BRIEF: Shawn A. Morgan, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Bridgeport, West
        Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Holly J. Wilson,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:

               A jury convicted Abdul Inusah of multiple charges related to an international

        romance fraud scheme. On appeal, Inusah challenges both his conviction and his sentence

        of 24 months’ imprisonment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the

        district court.

                                                    I.

               Abdul Inusah moved from Ghana to attend graduate school in West Virginia.

        There, he began to act as a middleman in an international romance fraud scheme that

        functioned as follows: People in Africa would create false online personas and use them

        to offer love and affection to victims. After some invented crisis – the death of a parent,

        an emergency medical condition – the victims would be persuaded to send large sums of

        money, sometimes adding up to entire life savings, to their false online partners. But

        instead, their money went to middlemen or “money mules,” typically in the United States,

        who would accept the funds from the victims, keep a percentage as payment for their

        involvement, and then forward the rest of the money to the fraudsters abroad.

               The role of the middleman was critical to the scheme’s success. Large wire transfers

        to African countries can raise concerns at United States banks. By instructing victims to

        send money instead to domestic middlemen, the fraudsters sought to avoid suspicion. And

        by maintaining multiple accounts and quickly moving victims’ money from account to

        account, the middlemen sought to avoid fraud detection measures and frozen or closed

        bank accounts.

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                                                     A.

              A federal grand jury in the Southern District of West Virginia indicted Inusah on

        multiple counts for his role in the scheme, including wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343;

        receipt of stolen property, see 18 U.S.C. § 2315; and conspiracy to commit money

        laundering, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).       During a four-day jury trial, the government

        presented testimony from six victims and from a government financial analyst who

        summarized bank records showing transfers from the victims to Inusah’s multiple

        accounts. The government also called three of Inusah’s fellow middlemen, 1 who testified

        to Inusah’s role in the scheme and his knowledge of its unlawful nature.

              At the end of the government’s case-in-chief, Inusah moved for a Rule 29 judgment

        of acquittal, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, arguing that the government had not proven that he

        had the requisite intent to defraud or knowledge of the fraudulent scheme. The district

        court denied the motion:

              [The government has] produced direct evidence from the testimony of co-
              conspirators that Mr. Inusah knew, as they did, that this money was coming
              as a result of a fraudulent scheme. . . .

              The government has demonstrated that very substantial deposits were made
              into Mr. Inusah’s account, in his name . . . . The evidence is that the money
              originated from the victims of the fraud. They testified as to that. There
              were substantial amounts of money. The money was then handled by the
              defendant in a manner consistent with the testimony of the co-conspirators,
              that they attempted to do relatively rapid transactions, use multiple bank
              accounts, move the money among and through these various accounts as
              quickly as possible and keep some of it. And so I think all of that is sufficient

              1
                The other middlemen – Kenneth Emeni, John Nassy, and Kenneth Ogudu – were
        charged separately, pleaded guilty, and agreed to cooperate with the government.

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               to show the defendant’s knowledge and intent with respect to each of the
               counts.

        J.A. 446-47.

               Inusah then testified on his own behalf, contending that he was unaware that the

        tens of thousands of dollars deposited into his accounts were fraudulently obtained; instead,

        he said, he believed he was simply doing favors for Ghanaian acquaintances attempting to

        purchase cars. The next day, the jury convicted Inusah on four counts: two counts of wire

        fraud, one count of receipt of stolen money, and one count of conspiracy to launder money. 2

                                                     B.

               Before Inusah’s sentencing, the probation office prepared a presentence

        investigation report calculating an advisory sentencing range of 30 to 37 months’

        imprisonment. That range was based on an offense level of 19, which reflected a 10-level

        enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 for a total loss amount of more than $150,000 but

        not more than $250,000. Inusah objected to the loss calculation on multiple grounds.

               At sentencing, the district court found that the government had provided sufficiently

        reliable evidence of loss and adequately supported a total loss amount of $152,000. The

        court rejected Inusah’s argument that a $20,000 deposit into one of his bank accounts

        should be excluded because the government had not established “venue” by proving the

        account was in the Southern District of West Virginia. J.A. 825-26 (explaining that there

               2
                The jury acquitted Inusah of two counts of unlawful monetary transactions, see 18
        U.S.C. § 1957, and one charge of aggravated identity theft, see 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, in
        connection with his creation of a bank account in the name of his ex-girlfriend.

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        is no venue requirement for loss amounts at sentencing). And the court also denied

        Inusah’s objection to including $24,000 in funds related to conduct for which he was

        acquitted, citing the “current state of the [G]uidelines and the law.” J.A. 822.

               That left the district court with the same offense level of 19 and Guidelines range of

        30 to 37 months calculated by the PSR. But the court, noting challenges to the use of

        acquitted conduct at sentencing, used its discretion to vary downward as if the $24,000 in

        loss from acquitted conduct had been excluded. This “prophylactic exercise,” J.A. 823,

        led to an alternative range of 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment. The district court ultimately

        sentenced Inusah to 24 months in prison – the bottom of its alternative Guidelines range –

        along with restitution and a term of supervised release.

               This timely appeal followed.

                                                     II.

                                                     A.

               In challenging his conviction, Inusah focuses primarily on the sufficiency of the

        evidence against him, arguing that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion

        for a judgment of acquittal. He also takes issue with certain evidentiary determinations by

        the district court and a jury instruction on willful blindness. Finding the evidence more

        than sufficient and no error by the district court, we affirm Inusah’s conviction.

                                                     1.

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               “We review de novo the denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.”3

        United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 387 (4th Cir. 2012). “A defendant challenging the

        sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233,

        245 (4th Cir. 2007). We review the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it in the

        light most favorable to the government. United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021

        (4th Cir. 1982). And Inusah can prevail only if no “rational trier of facts could have found

        [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

               Inusah admits that there is record evidence showing fraud victims’ money entering

        his bank accounts. His claim on appeal – as before the district court on his Rule 29 motion

        – is that the government did not prove he acted with the specific intent to defraud or that

        he knew the money entering his account was stolen or otherwise illegally derived, as all

        agree was required to sustain his convictions. 4 But like the district court, we conclude that

               3
                 We note that Inusah, after moving for acquittal at the close of the government’s
        case in chief, did not renew his Rule 29 motion at the close of all evidence or after trial
        This raises the question of whether we should instead review Inusah’s sufficiency claim
        only under a “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard. See United States v. Fall, 955
        F.3d 363, 374 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 200 &
        n.10 (4th Cir. 2012)). The government does not address this issue and instead urges us to
        apply de novo review. Because we conclude below that Inusah cannot prevail even under
        the usual de novo standard, we do not further address this issue.
               4
                There is no dispute that Inusah’s convictions for wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343
        required the government to prove “specific intent to defraud,” see United States v. Harvey,
        532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008); his conviction for receiving stolen property under 18
        U.S.C. § 2315, that he knew the property was stolen, see United States v. Jones, 797 F.2d
        184, 186 (4th Cir. 1986); and his conviction for money laundering conspiracy under 18
        U.S.C. § 1956(h), that he knowingly entered into the conspiracy and knew the laundered
        money was illegally derived, see United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693-94 (4th Cir.
        2005).

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        there is ample evidence – both “direct evidence from the testimony of co-conspirators” and

        “strong circumstantial evidence” – to support Inusah’s convictions. J.A. 446-47.

               First, this is the somewhat unusual case in which the government was able to present

        direct evidence of the requisite state of mind. Cf. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507,

        521 (2008) (explaining that government customarily proves knowledge with circumstantial

        evidence). As the district court emphasized, three cooperating middlemen gave testimony

        speaking directly to Inusah’s knowledge of the fraudulent scheme. One witness, for

        instance, testified that when he asked Inusah to accept a victim’s funds because his own

        bank account was closed, Inusah “knew it was a fraudulent transaction.” J.A. 274-75.

        Another testified that when he was approached about joining the scheme, he went to Inusah

        for advice as one of “the people who [was] involved . . . . in these schemes” who “seemed

        to know more about the whole scheme and how money got into our bank,” and then

        received Inusah’s guidance on how to protect himself from law enforcement. J.A. 214-16.

        There is more, and while Inusah suggests that the testimony of his fellow middlemen was

        not credible, that was a determination squarely for the jury. See Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 387

        (“In our review of a Rule 29 motion, we remain cognizant that it is the jury’s province to

        weigh the credibility of the witnesses.”).

               Second, we agree with the district court that strong circumstantial evidence also

        supported the jury’s determination that Inusah acted with the requisite knowledge and

        intent. Inusah’s bank records showed that he handled the victims’ funds in a manner

        consistent with middlemen techniques: He had multiple accounts at multiple banks, into

        which victims transferred their funds; he quickly moved and shuffled the funds through his

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        multiple accounts; and he asked his ex-girlfriend to open a bank account on his behalf that

        was used to receive funds from victims. A jury crediting that evidence could find that

        Inusah was using these tactics to further the goals of the conspiracy.

               In short, crediting the government’s witnesses and drawing all reasonable inferences

        in the government’s favor, we conclude that the government presented ample evidence

        from which a jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Inusah had the knowledge

        and intent necessary to support his convictions. See United States v. Ali, 735 F.3d 176,

        188-91 (4th Cir. 2013). The district court did not err in denying Inusah’s motion for

        judgment of acquittal.

                                                      2.

               Inusah also raises two evidentiary challenges, which we review for abuse of

        discretion if preserved at trial, or plain error if not preserved. United States v. Walker, 32

        F.4th 377, 394-95 (4th Cir. 2022).

               The first involves admission into evidence of a summary chart compiling various

        financial records showing transfers to and from Inusah’s multiple bank accounts. Under

        Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, a summary chart may be used “to prove the content of

        voluminous” records that “cannot be conveniently examined in court.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006.

        To comply with this rule, a chart must be an “accurate compilation” of the records it

        summarizes, and the underlying records must be made available to opposing counsel

        reasonably in advance. See United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 272 (4th Cir. 2004); Fed.

        R. Evid 1006. Although the underlying records must be admissible in evidence, they need

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        not actually be introduced at trial; rather, the “chart itself is admitted as evidence in order

        to give the jury evidence of the underlying documents.” Janati, 374 F.3d at 273.

               The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the chart at issue here.

        On appeal, Inusah argues only that the chart was “inaccurate and misleading” because it

        shows wire transfers from two victims to Inusah’s accounts without citing to admitted trial

        exhibits as support. But as described above, Rule 1006 does not require that documents

        underlying a chart themselves be admitted as trial exhibits. Indeed, the whole point of Rule

        1006 is to “reduce the volume of written documents that are introduced into evidence” by

        admitting a summary chart instead of the documents. Janati, 374 F.3d at 272. Apart from

        this misplaced argument, Inusah does not challenge the factual accuracy of the chart, and

        he does not dispute that the underlying records were produced to him in discovery. The

        district court properly admitted the chart at trial. 5

               Inusah next challenges the testimony of a government analyst which, he argues,

        extended beyond the analyst’s personal knowledge, imputing certain financial transactions

        involving Inusah’s accounts to Inusah himself without support.           This is an unusual

        appellate contention in that the district court agreed with Inusah at trial, sustaining an

        objection on this ground and cautioning the government to “avoid having [the witness]

               5
                 The government asks that we review this claim for plain error only because Inusah
        did not object to the chart’s admission on this ground before the district court. We are
        inclined to agree that Inusah forfeited this claim in the district court. But it matters not to
        the disposition of this appeal, because we find no error, plain or otherwise, in admission of
        the chart.

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        attribute these transactions directly to the defendant unless you’ve got some other evidence

        . . . that specifically ties the actual transaction to the defendant himself.” J.A. 352-53.

               Undeterred, Inusah argues on appeal that the district court later overruled a similar

        defense objection. But in that instance, there was indeed evidence “specifically [tying] the

        actual transaction to the defendant himself,” id., in the form of a signed withdrawal slip,

        and so the objection was unfounded. Inusah also points to testimony in which the witness,

        asked whether Inusah used his debit card on a certain date, answered that he did. But

        Inusah did not object to that question by the government – and when he did object to the

        government’s follow-up question, the district court sustained that objection, as well. On

        this record, we find no reversible error by the district court.

                                                      3.

               Finally, Inusah argues that the district court erred when, over his objection, it gave

        a willful blindness instruction to the jury. Inusah is correct that “caution must be exercised

        in giving a willful blindness instruction,” which “is appropriate only in rare

        circumstances.” Ali, 735 F.3d at 187. But one is merited when “evidence supports an

        inference of deliberate ignorance” by tending “to show that (1) the defendant subjectively

        believes that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant took

        deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.” United States v. Miller, 41 F.4th 302, 314

        (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). We review the district court’s decision to give this instruction

        for abuse of discretion, id., and find none here.

               First, we note that the court carefully tracked the applicable standard in its

        instruction, informing the jury that it could treat “deliberate avoidance as the equivalent of

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        knowledge” only if it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the “defendant deliberately

        and consciously avoided confirming [a] fact so he could deny knowledge if apprehended.”

        J.A. 551. And it expressly cautioned that knowledge could not be inferred from mere

        “negligence, carelessness, or a belief in an inaccurate proposition,” id. – a caution we have

        relied on to sustain the giving of a willful blindness instruction in the past. See Ali, 735

        F.3d at 188.

               Second, there was indeed evidence from which Inusah’s jury could draw an

        inference of deliberate ignorance. Inusah contended that he was unaware of the fraudulent

        nature of the tens of thousands of dollars entering his bank accounts. But that could have

        been so only if Inusah “ignored warning signs” that something was badly amiss, see id.,

        including, most obviously, the fact that banks closed several of his accounts and that he

        needed to have someone else (his then-girlfriend) open an account on his behalf. And

        Inusah’s failure to investigate the source of the huge sums of money flowing into his

        accounts, or even to speak to the individuals sending the money, could be viewed by a

        reasonable jury as a deliberate effort to avoid confirming what Inusah suspected –

        especially in light of a fellow middleman’s testimony that “[i]n this situation, the less you

        ask, the better it is for you.” J.A. 230. Under these circumstances, the district court did

        not abuse its discretion in giving a willful blindness instruction.

                                                      B.

               With respect to his sentence, Inusah argues that the district court erred in

        determining his Guidelines sentencing range by applying a 10-point loss enhancement

        under § 2B1.1(b), based on a total loss calculation of $152,000.              See U.S.S.G.

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        § 2B1.1(b)(1)(F) (providing for 10-point enhancement for losses greater than $150,000 but

        not greater than $250,000). We review the calculation of a Guidelines range de novo, but

        the underlying “determination of loss attributable to a fraud scheme is a factual issue”

        reviewed for clear error. United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451, 467 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting

        United States v. Keita, 742 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2014)).

               Measured by dollar amount, Inusah’s primary argument is based on the adequacy

        of the evidence bearing on loss: According to Inusah, the government failed to prove by a

        preponderance of the evidence a total of $95,000 in losses connected to four victims. But

        the district court carefully considered the evidence related to these victims, holding the

        sentencing hearing in abeyance for supplemental briefing regarding the loss calculations.

        The court then determined that the government’s evidence – including the summary chart

        discussed above, the records underlying the chart, and memoranda from victim interviews

        – was sufficiently reliable and adequately supported a loss calculation of $152,000. We

        find no error, let alone a clear error, in the district court’s loss calculation.

                Inusah also argues, as he did before the district court, that $20,000 should be

        excluded from the loss amount because the government failed to establish “venue” over

        the bank account that received those funds. The district court rejected this argument, and

        properly so. A sentencing court may broadly consider “relevant conduct,” including acts

        “willfully caused by the defendant” and “all harm” resulting therefrom. U.S.S.G. §1B1.3.

        There is no venue requirement for related conduct. See United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d

        305, 312-15 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming Guidelines calculation that included weight from

        out-of-state drug buy as “relevant conduct”).

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               Finally, noting ongoing debates about the propriety of basing sentencing

        enhancements on acquitted conduct, see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 408-

        09 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Millett, J., concurring), Inusah contends the district court erred by

        including in its loss calculation $24,000 related to counts of which he was acquitted. But

        this panel is bound by precedent holding that a court may consider such conduct if proved

        by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Lawing, 703 F.3d 229, 241 (4th

        Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997)). Inusah has preserved

        the issue, but it is not one on which we may grant relief. 6

                                                     III.

               For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

               6
                 The government argues that any error in this respect would in any event be
        harmless, given the district court’s discretionary decision to sentence Inusah consistent
        with an alternative and lower Guidelines range that excluded loss associated with acquitted
        conduct. Because we hold that no error occurred, we need not address this alternative
        argument.

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