Court Opinion

ID: 9643005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:15:11.542182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:56.253978
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice LAMBERT.
I respectfully dissent. I am in agreement with Justice Wintersheimer’s view that neither Campbell nor KRE 404(b) prohibited Raines’ testimony from being admitted. The trial court determined that the Raines testimony was admissible and “the standard of review is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. The test *822for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”1 Thus, trial courts possess broad discretion with respect to the admission or exclusion of evidence, and appellate courts aré at liberty to reverse only upon a showing of abuse.2 Accordingly, when a jump-ball occurs, the arrow always points to the trial judge, but we have departed from that principle here.
The majority admits that the Hibberd testimony is admissible for purposes of impeachment, but no other. However, since it came in for impeachment purposes, it should have also been received substantively. While this is not a Jett v. Commonwealth3 case, it is closely analogous. If Hibberd had made an out-of-court statement that differed from his testimony in court, Jett would permit the impeachment of Hibberd on this basis, and the impeaching evidence could be used for substantive purposes. Accordingly, Hibberd’s testimony concerning the Raines’ case should have been admitted as both impeachment and substantive evidence.
SCOTT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999) (citing Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky.1996); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 695 (1995); cf. Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky.1994)).

. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky.2000).

. 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky.1969).