Court Opinion

ID: 9491667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:20:09.43316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:52.588469
License: Public Domain

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
As this court has observed, “The ADEA only bars discrimination on account of age; it does not place on employers an affirmative obligation to retain older workers whenever a reduction in staff becomes necessary.” Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 517 (6th Cir.1991). Rather, when age discrimination is alleged in the context of a reduction in the work force, a plaintiff must come forward with “direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons.” Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir.1990). In proving a ease, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1082 (6th Cir.1994) (citing Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). Because I do not believe that plaintiff has come forward with either circumstantial or statistical evidence sufficient to establish Goodyear’s discriminatory intent, I respectfully dissent.
The majority bases its decision upon a statistical study submitted by plaintiff and comments by two Goodyear employees that imply age bias. The district court considered this evidence, but deemed it insufficient to support plaintiffs claim.
With respect to the statistical study, the majority concedes that “the statistics were not as probative as they perhaps may have been.” The district court explained the study’s shortcomings in these terms:
Plaintiffs statistical analysis compares the group of the eliminated employees with a group comprised both of non-eliminated employees and employees whose positions were not affected by the reorganization. As 66 of those employees included in the “redeployed” group were never considered for redeployment since their positions were not in jeopardy, the presumption that the sample was representative of all candidates for redeployment is false. Since Scott’s prima facie case depends on the premise that age motivated Goodyear’s redeployment decision, “appropriate statistical data” must be limited to the pool of employees eligible for reassignment.
Statistical evidence is notoriously susceptible to manipulation. Consequently, Barnes cautions us that the data relied upon must be gathered from an appropriate source in order to support an inference of discrimination. Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1466. Here, the reliability of the study is called into question because it included individuals outside the category of redeployed employees that plaintiff alleges received discriminatory treatment. In Barnes, we noted that it was proper to exclude from a statistical study individuals who were “apparently not considered in the restructuring,” id. at 1467, which is precisely what the study now before us failed to do. In sum, the district court correctly concluded that the probative value of the statistical evidence offered by plaintiff is of such limited value that, standing alone, it cannot support an inference of age discrimination on the part of defendant.
The majority does not base its decision upon statistical evidence alone. It also relies upon statements contained in an affidavit submitted by Goodyear employee Edward Ereegovich. This affidavit attributes statements of age bias to Goodyear managers Gordon Hewitt and Ed Gallagher.
Ereegovich, who is currently pursuing his own age discrimination claim against Goodyear, states that he heard Gallagher make the statement about “white haired old men waiting to retire” and heard Hewitt state *1131that those who lose their jobs in the reorganization would be replaced by “young college graduates at less money.”
In my view, these statements are the strongest evidence that plaintiff musters in support of his contention that Goodyear acted with discriminatory animus. However, standing alone, they are not enough to survive summary judgment. As the district court pointed out, Goodyear came forward with substantial rebuttal evidence that plaintiff was not as well-qualified as other candidates for the positions awarded during redeployment. For instance, plaintiff did not possess either recent field experience or computer programming skills, which were required for two of the available positions. Thus, even if we assume that the statements attributed to Gallagher and Hewitt were sufficient for plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, Goodyear has come forward with evidence that it used legitimate criteria in its decision making process.
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.