Court Opinion

ID: 9638002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:29:18.028281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:00.129089
License: Public Domain

MATHEWS, Circuit Judge
(Concurring).
This suit was brought by appellants, Twin Harbor Stevedoring & Tug Company and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, against appellees, William A. Marshall, as Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission, and Otto Hugo, in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington, under § 21(b) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.1
The suit was brought in the right court, but on the wrong side of the court. It was brought in equity. It should have been brought in admiralty. The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is part of the maritime law of the United States. The jurisdiction conferred by § 21(b) is admiralty jurisdiction. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 36-65, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598;2 Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Pillsbury, 9 Cir., 93 F.2d 761, 762. See, also, Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Pillsbury, 301 U.S. 174, 175, 57 S.Ct. 682, 81 L.Ed. 988.3
That the court may, in a suit under § 21(b), issue an injunction, mandatory or otherwise, does not make the court an equity court or the suit an equity suit. Injunctions may be issued in admiralty as well as in equity. Crowell v. Benson, supra, 285 U.S. page 49, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598. By providing for injunction proceedings, Congress “contemplated a suit as4 in equity” (Id., 285 U.S. page 63, 52 S.Ct. page 297, 76 L.Ed. 598), but it did not contemplate a suit in equity. It did contemplate a suit in admiralty.
Appellants’ libel — called a bill of complaint — alleges, in substance, that, after a hearing pursuant to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,5 appellee Marshall, as Deputy Commissioner, made findings of fact and a compensation order whereby compensation, to be paid by appellants, was awarded to appellee Hugo for claimed disability found to have resulted from an accidental injury sustained by him while employed by appellant Twin Harbor Stevedoring & Tug Company in maritime employment upon navigable waters of the United States.
The libel states, in effect, that the Deputy Commissioner’s findings are not supported by evidence, and that, therefore, the compensation order is not in accordance with law. This, however, is a mere conclusion, and not a correct one. A certified copy of the findings and a transcript of the evidence taken at the hearing were filed in the District Court and were, by reference, made a part of the libel. The evidence amply supports the findings.
Appellee Marshall excepted6 to the libel on the ground, among others, that the facts therein stated were not sufficient to entitle appellants to any relief. The exception was well founded, but, as a court of equity, the District Court was not empowered to sustain the exception. Attempting to do so, it erred.
The decree should be vacated, and the case should be remanded with directions to transfer it to the admiralty docket7 and to enter a decree in admiralty, sustaining the exception and dismissing the libel.

 44 Stat 1436, 33 U.S.C.A. § 921(b).

 Affirming Crowell v. Benson, 5 Cir., 45 F.2d 66, which affirmed Benson v. Crowell, D.C., 33 F.2d 137; Id., D.C., 38 F.2d 306.

 Reversing Pillsbury v. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 9 Cir., 78 F.2d 587; Id., 9 Cir., 85 F.2d 758.

 Emphasis supplied.

 Sections 19, 23 (44 Stat. 1435, 1437, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 919, 923).

 The exception was called a motion to dismiss.

 Compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 37, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598.