Court Opinion

ID: 9705433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:06:09.621523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:11.231579
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I believe that K.J. has properly raised, and preserved, the issue of whether the clear and convincing evidence standard is the appropriate standard for meeting the burden of proof in proceedings to maintain or expunge an indicated report of child abuse under section 6341 of the Child Protective Services Law (Law).1 After considering this issue, I conclude that the Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) violated KJ.’s constitutional rights by utilizing a lesser standard. Thus, I would reverse DPW’s order denying KJ.’s request to expunge an indicated report of child abuse.
I. Waiver of the Issue
In J.S. v. Department of Public Welfare, 528 Pa. 243, 248 n. 2, 596 A.2d 1114, 1116 n. 2 (1991), our supreme court stated:
Although the Appellant did not question the standard ... required by the Appel-lee in order to maintain the indicated report [of child abuse], this Court is quite troubled by the use of any standard less than requiring clear and con*614vincing evidence. Even though the statute requires substantial evidence, it is quite possible that such a standard does not adequately protect the rights of the accused given the nature of these proceedings. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 [102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599] (1982). However, since the issue has not been raised, we will defer consideration until such time as it is properly briefed and argued.
The majority here -states that “the concerns voiced by our Supreme Court in this dictum have logic and strength, [but,] like the appellant in J.S., K.J. has failed to properly preserve the issue of the appropriate standard of evidence. K.J. failed to raise the issue before any proceeding at the agency level and has set forth the argument for the first time in this appeal.”2 (Majority op. at 612.) However, under Pa. R.A.P. 1551(a)(1) and section 703(a) of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 703(a), K.J. was not required to raise the issue before DPW, and K.J. is allowed to set forth the argument for the first time in this appeal.
Rule 1551(a)(1) states that “[n]o question shall be heard or considered by the [appellate] court which was not raised before the government unit except ... [questions involving the validity of a statute ....”3 Pa. R.A.P. 1551(a)(1) (emphasis added). Moreover, section 703(a) of the Administrative Agency Law specifically states that a “party who proceeded before a Commonwealth agency under the terms of a particular statute shall not be precluded from questioning the validity of the statute in the appeal_” 2 Pa.C.S. § 703(a) (emphasis added).
Here, K.J. proceeded before DPW under the terms of the Law, and the question raised by K.J. is whether the provisions of the Law purportedly setting forth the standard for the burden of proof in proceedings to maintain or expunge an indicated report of child abuse are valid. Because this is a question involving the validity of a statute, the matter is not waived simply because it was not raised before DPW. Thus, unlike the majority, I will address the issue.
II. Statutory Construction
A. Burdens of Proof
In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (citation omitted), the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The function of a [burden] of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of fact-finding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.
*615The court explained that the evolution of this area of the law has produced three burdens to satisfy the needs of due process in different types of cases. Id. In a typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties, where the litigants share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion, the plaintiffs burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. Id. In a criminal case, where the interests of the defendant are much greater, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In cases where the defendant runs the risk of having his reputation tarnished erroneously or where the proceedings threaten the individual involved with stigma, an intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence is used. Id.; Santosky.
B. Statutory Language
The Law defines an “indicated report” as a child abuse report that is based on an investigation showing “substantial evidence” of the alleged abuse.4 Section 6308(a) of the Law, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a). The Law defines “substantial evidence” as “[ejvidence which outweighs inconsistent evidence and which a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
I begin by pointing out that this statutory definition of “substantial evidence” does not state specifically which of the three burdens of proof is appropriate in a proceeding to “maintain or expunge” an indicated report of child abuse.5 The definition merely states that, to maintain an indicated report, there must be substantial evidence, or, in other words, evidence that “outweighs” inconsistent evidence.6 A preponderance of the evidence is sometimes described as evidence that is weighty enough to tip the scale in favor of a burdened party. See Se-Ling Hosiery v. Margulies, 364 Pa. 45, 70 A.2d 854 (1950). Clear and convincing evidence is weightier evidence, which tips the scale further in a burdened party’s favor than does a mere preponderance of the evidence.7 Beyond a reasonable doubt is the weightiest evidence, and it tips the scale the furthest and most convincingly when weighed against opposing evidence.
Because the Law is ambiguous with respect to the proper burden of proof to satisfy due process needs in an expunction proceeding, we must rely on sound principles of statutory construction to ascertain the intention of the General Assembly in this regard. First and foremost, we presume that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania Constitution. Section 1922(3) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3). Thus, where a statute can be given two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitution*616al, we must invoke the former construction. Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch, 397 Pa. 114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959).
With these principles in mind, I conclude that the word “outweigh” in the statutory definition of “substantial evidence” refers to the clear and convincing burden of proof, and not the preponderance of the evidence standard because, only by adopting this conclusion can the Law protect a person’s fundamental right to his or her reputation.8 If I were to conclude that the General Assembly intended for the word “outweigh,” as used in the Law, to refer to the lowest possible burden of proof, then I also would have to conclude that the General Assembly intended to deprive accused persons of a fundamental right without due process. As explained, I must presume that the legislature’s intent was otherwise because, quite simply, where fundamental rights are involved, the lowest burden of proof does not suffice to afford due process. Cf. Santosky (holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights). Thus, to the extent that DPW applied a lesser burden of proof than the clear and convincing evidence standard in determining whether to maintain or expunge an indicated report, I conclude that DPW deprived K.J. of a fundamental right without due process and committed an error of law.9 Although I recognize the need to protect children from abuse, and understand that this goal must zealously be pursued, I cannot accept a situation where we allow that zeal to deprive persons of their constitutionally protected rights.
*617Because, here, DPW violated KJ.’s constitutional right to due process, I would reverse.

. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6341.

. The majority cites S.T. v. Department of Public Welfare, 681 A.2d 853 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), appeal denied, 547 Pa. 747, 690 A.2d 1165 (1997), for the proposition that "when a party fails to raise an issue, even one of a constitutional dimension, in an agency proceeding, the issue is waived and cannot be considered for the first time in a judicial appeal.” (Majority op. at 612.) However, this is not the holding in S.T. In that case, we held that the appellant waived a particular issue because the appellant did not raise it in his petition for review to this court. Here, K.J., unlike the appellant in S.T., raised the issue in his peti-lion for review. (See Petition for Review, para. E(3).)

. The rationale for the exception in Pa. R.A.P. 1551(a)(1) is set forth in Barbour-Knight v. Civil Service Commission of City of Philadelphia, 703 A.2d 572 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), appeal denied, 555 Pa. 746, 725 A.2d 1223 (1998). In Barbour-Knight, this court explained that administrative agencies, like DPW here, do not possess the authority to pass upon the validity of acts of the General Assembly. Thus, where a party fails to raise such a validity challenge before an administrative agency, it is not waived. Barbour-Knight.

. An indicated report of child abuse may be based on available medical evidence, a child protective service investigation or an admission by the perpetrator. Section 6303 of the Law, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303.

. To properly deny a request for expunction of an indicated report of child abuse, the county agency must prove by substantial evidence that child abuse has occurred. See 23 P.S. § 6341(c).

. It is important to keep in mind that, whatever the burden of proof in a particular case, substantial evidence is the quantity of probative, credible and competent evidence that is sufficient to meet that burden.

. In the case of In re Trust Estate of LaRocca, 411 Pa. 633, 640, 192 A.2d 409, 413 (1963) (quoting Broida v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 316 Pa. 444, 175 A. 492 (1934)), our supreme court stated with regard to clear and convincing evidence:
[That the] witnesses must be found to be credible, that the facts to which they testify are distinctly remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly and in due order, and that their testimony is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the jury to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.... It is not necessary that the evidence be uncontradicted ... provided it 'carries conviction to the mind’ ... or carries 'a clear conviction of its truth.... ’

. Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that all persons have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those "of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation ...Pa. Const, art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). In addition, this court has held that reputation is a fundamental right "in the same class with life, liberty and property.” Pennsylvania Bar Association v. Commonwealth, 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 351, 607 A.2d 850, 856 (1992).

. I note that a person's fundamental interest in protecting his reputation is in danger under the Law even before DPW begins em ex-punction proceeding. Pursuant to the Law, a person with "reasonable cause to suspect” child abuse files a report. 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6311 and 6312. A county caseworker investigates the report by interviewing designated persons. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6368; see 55 Pa.Code §§ 3490.55(d) and 3490.55(g). The investigating caseworker then, in effect, determines the credibility of those persons, the competency of their statements, the weight of the evidence and whether the weight is substantial enough to support an indicated report of child abuse. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303. Where the investigating caseworker decides that a person has committed child abuse, an indicated report of child abuse is entered on the statewide child abuse register. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6338. The person named as a perpetrator, i.e., a person who has committed child abuse, has forty-five days to seek expunction of the report. 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6303 and 6341(a)(2). In the meantime, DPW may release the information on the statewide register to many individuals and entities for various purposes. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6336, 6338 and 6340.
Thus, the Law allows a person’s name to be entered on the statewide register based solely on the investigating caseworker’s determination that there is "substantial evidence” of child abuse. However, “substantial evidence” is that quantum of evidence sufficient to meet a particular burden of proof, and, as indicated above, the Law does not specifically set forth a burden of proof to guide the caseworker, generally an individual untrained in the law, in deciding whether a person has committed child abuse. Thus, the investigating caseworker makes a report of child abuse without applying any particular burden of proof.
It shocks my conscience that the Law would allow the investigating caseworker to render a de facto adjudication that is adverse to an individual’s reputation without an independent adjudicator having had the opportunity to consider the investigator’s evidence of child abuse in accordance with established procedures of due process. This is particularly so because unless, or until, the alleged abuser timely requests an expunction hearing, the names of the falsely accused may nevertheless be released to physicians, child advocates, courts, the General Assembly, the Attorney General, federal officials, county officials, law enforcement officials, the district attorney and others. Thus, by the time DPW orders the expunction of an indicated report, a person's reputation already may be tarnished erroneously.