Court Opinion

ID: 9894950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 17:12:53.7072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:04.351179
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Bulger, 2023-Ohio-4004.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    SANDUSKY COUNTY

State of Ohio                                    Court of Appeals No. S-23-001

        Appellee                                 Trial Court No. 22CR147

v.

Stephon Bulger                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                Decided: November 3, 2023

                                             *****

        Beth A. Tischler, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Alexis M. Otero, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Loretta Riddle, for appellant.

                                             *****

        ZMUDA, J.

        {¶ 1} This matter is before the court on appeal of the judgment of the Sandusky

County Court of Common Pleas, finding appellant, Stephon Bulger, guilty of the offense

of aggravated assault in violation of R.C. 2903.12(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree,

imposing a prison term of 9 months, and granting 63 days of jail-time credit. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.
                                I. Facts and Procedural History

         {¶ 2} On October 21, 2021, appellant went to the home of his friend, Tiffany

Smith, to help remove Smith’s boyfriend, J.J., from her home. Smith’s nephew, Steven

Webb, also came to his aunt’s aid. The three entered the home and found J.J. asleep in

Smith’s bed. A beating ensued, with appellant arguing Webb was the main assailant,

delivering a vicious beating until Smith determined the assault was sufficient. As a result

of the assault, J.J. sustained serious injuries.

         {¶ 3} On February 18, 2022, appellant was charged by indictment with felonious

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D)(1)(a), a felony of the second degree.

A warrant issued for appellant’s arrest, and he was taken into custody several months

later.

         {¶ 4} On July 22, 2022, appellant appeared with counsel for arraignment and

entered a plea of not guilty.

         {¶ 5} On September 19, 2022, appellant withdrew his former not-guilty plea and

entered a plea of guilty to the amended offense of aggravated assault in violation of R.C.

2903.12(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree. The trial court accepted the plea, found

appellant guilty, and referred the matter for a presentence investigation report.

         {¶ 6} On December 28, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing.

Appellant’s trial counsel argued in favor of community control, noting appellant’s claim

he did not actively participate in the beating and was disabled, with his blindness

indicating it unlikely that appellant had the ability to participate in the assault, despite his

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guilty plea. The trial court considered the facts, and appellant’s criminal record that

included numerous community control violations, and found a community control

sanction was not appropriate. The trial court imposed a definite prison term of 9 months,

granting jail-time credit of 63 days “up to and including the date of sentencing and

excluding conveyance time.”

       {¶ 7} This appeal followed.

                                II. Assignments of Error

       {¶ 8} Bulger assigns three errors for appellate review, as follows:

              1.     Stephon Bulger received constitutionally ineffective assistance of

                     counsel when his trial counsel failed to pursue self defensne [sic.]

                     and/or defensne [sic.] of others resulting in Mr. Bulger failing to

                     make a knowingly, intelligently and voluntary plea.

              2.     The trial court errored by accepting Mr. Bulger’s plea without

                     ensuring that he was aware of his right to pursue self defensne [sic.]

                     and/or defensne [sic.] of others resulting in Mr. Bulger failing to

                     make a knowingly, intelligently and voluntary plea.

              3.     The trial court’s denial of jail time credit for any conveyance time, is

                     contrary to law.

                                        III. Analysis

       {¶ 9} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error concern the applicability

of self-defense or defense of others as a factor negating a knowing, intelligent, and

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voluntary plea. His third assignment of error concerns proper jail time credit. For ease of

discussion, we address the first two assignments of error together, followed by

consideration of error concerning jail time credit.

       A. Self-Defense

       {¶ 10} Appellant argues he could have pursued self-defense or defense of others,

and his trial counsel’s failure to address this with appellant, prior to his plea, constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel and rendered his plea defective. The viability of

appellant’s self-defense claim is dispositive as to these assignments of error.

       {¶ 11} Appellant argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to assert self-

defense, rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. Appellant

entered a guilty plea, and while this waived all error regarding the state’s ability to prove

the elements of the offense, the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel was not

waived by virtue of the plea. State v. Combs, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-20-003, 2021-

Ohio-982, ¶ 14, citing State v. Riddle, 2017-Ohio-1199, 88 N.E.3d 475, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).

“[A] guilty plea waives all appealable errors, including claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel, except to the extent that the errors precluded the defendant from knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entering his or her guilty plea.” Riddle at ¶ 26.

       {¶ 12} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show his

trial counsel’s performance was deficient, or below an objective standard of reasonable

representation, and he must show this deficient performance had a prejudicial effect, or

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s

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result would have been different.” State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426,

892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 204, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373

(1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. In this case, appellant’s claimed error fails on both

prongs, as appellant does not demonstrate deficient performance by his trial counsel or

that a failure to explore the affirmative defense of self-defense resulted in prejudice.

       {¶ 13} As to the first prong, appellant must demonstrate deficient performance by

demonstrating his trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonable representation. Strickland at 668. Our scrutiny of counsel’s performance is

“highly deferential,” and we “indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Bradley at 142, citing

Strickland at 689. As to the second prong, prejudice is shown by demonstrating that “but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id., citing Strickland at 694.

       {¶ 14} To merit consideration of the affirmative defense of self-defense, appellant

first had “the burden of producing legally sufficient evidence of self-defense to trigger

the state’s duty to overcome that evidence.” State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227,

2022-Ohio-4562, 216 N.E.3d 653, ¶ 19. While the burden is not onerous, and may be

demonstrated with the state’s evidence, a claimant must satisfy this burden and present

evidence “that tends to support” a self-defense claim. State v. Baker, 2023-Ohio-241,

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207 N.E.3d 6, ¶ 28 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Greer, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1082,

2023-Ohio-103, ¶ 20-22; 25.

       {¶ 15} Appellant argues that, had he been informed that he could assert self-

defense to the charge of aggravated assault, he would not have entered a plea to the lesser

assault charge. In support, he argues that Smith gave him permission to enter the

residence to commit the offense, which he claims was in defense of Smith who “was

being subjected to domestic violence at her residence.” Once inside the home, he argues

he did not start the attack, and because he is 85% blind, he had a possible complete

defense to the charge because his disability prevented him from committing the act

alleged.

       {¶ 16} Based on these facts, appellant asserts a complete defense to the charged

offense, and not an affirmative defense. “An affirmative defense is any defensive matter

in the nature of a confession and avoidance. It admits that the plaintiff has a claim (the

‘confession’) but asserts some legal reason why the plaintiff cannot have any recovery on

that claim (the ‘avoidance’).” (Citation omitted) State ex rel. The Plain Dealer Publishing

Co. v. Cleveland, 75 Ohio St.3d 31, 33, 661 N.E.2d 187 (1996). An acquittal based on

self-defense differs from an acquittal based on negating the elements of the offense. Self-

defense is a type of affirmative defense, or a defense that will defeat the charge even if

the allegations are true. (Citation omitted) State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Bureau of Sent.

Computation, 166 Ohio St.3d 497, 2022-Ohio-236, 187 N.E.3d 526, ¶ 18; R.C.

2901.05(B). In contrast, a defense that negates part of the state’s prima facie case is not

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an affirmative defense. Bey at ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Todd v. Canfield, 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 11 MA 209, 2014-Ohio-569, ¶ 14.

       {¶ 17} At appellant’s plea hearing, the trial court addressed appellant regarding his

willingness to enter a plea, and conducted a complete and thorough Crim.R. 11 colloquy.

Appellant does not argue that the trial court failed to explain any aspect of his plea and

potential sentence. Instead, the record demonstrates that appellant acknowledged his plea

constituted a complete admission of guilt regarding the facts alleged. Additional facts

were also noted, including provocation by the victim and the seriousness of the injuries

sustained by the victim. The trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea, found him

guilty, and referred the matter for a presentence investigation.

       {¶ 18} At the sentencing hearing, the state remained silent regarding sentence, as

agreed in the plea agreement. Appellant’s trial counsel addressed the trial court, relying

on the information contained within the presentence investigation report. Trial counsel

argued that appellant had a difficult childhood, was born to very young parents and raised

by his father and step-mother, and his father had a domestic violence conviction. He also

argued that appellant is essentially blind, and working with an attorney to apply for

disability. As to the incident leading to appellant’s charge, trial counsel argued the

following:

              In this situation, Mr. Bulger was summoned by a friend of his to try

       to get her boyfriend out of an apartment. He believed that his friend was the

       victim of domestic violence; he went in to try to reason, to try to get the

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          person to leave voluntarily. He indicates that his vision is limited, but, at

          the time, the co-defendant did attack the victim. The victim then kicked Mr.

          Bulger, also kicked the co-defendant. Mr. Bulger was not the – by any

          means, the lead aggressor. I believe – I think the evidence does show that,

          that the other co-defendant probably was the person who did most of the

          alleged damage in this matter.

          {¶ 19} Appellant’s trial counsel acknowledged that appellant entered the residence

to engage the victim, and although the victim acted provocatively, appellant should have

known the situation was likely volatile and could lead to violence. As a result, trial

counsel argued in favor of community control over a prison sanction.

          {¶ 20} Appellant does not dispute any of his trial counsel’s statements at

sentencing, and he does not claim his counsel withheld information or evidence from

him, affecting his decision to enter a plea. Appellant also does not indicate which facts,

within the record, would have supported a self-defense claim. “To support a claim of

self-defense involving the use of non-deadly force, a defendant must show that ‘(1) he

was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) he had reasonable

grounds to believe or an honest belief that he or she was in imminent danger of bodily

harm, and (3) he did not use more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against

the imminent danger of bodily harm.’” Greer, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1082, 2023-

Ohio-103 at ¶ 33, quoting State v. Paskins, 200 N.E.3d 684, 2022-Ohio-4024, ¶ 48 (5th

Dist.).

8.
       {¶ 21} Upon a thorough review of the record, we find no evidence was adduced in

appellant’s case supporting any reasonable inference that appellant acted in self-defense.

Instead, the facts recited in the record demonstrated that appellant went to the victim’s

home and confronted the victim as he slept in his bed, subjecting the victim to a beating

with the aim of forcing the victim to leave the home of appellant’s friend. Based on this

record, appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to assert a self-defense

claim to the charge, and appellant’s plea was not deficient based on lack of understanding

of the affirmative defense, which was unavailable to him. Accordingly, we find

appellant’s first and second assignments of error not well-taken.

       B. Jail-Time Credit

       {¶ 22} In his third and final assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court

erred by awarding jail-time credit “up to and including the date of sentencing and

excluding conveyance time.” The applicable statute, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) requires

the trial court to “include in the sentencing entry the total number of days, including the

sentencing date but excluding conveyance time, that the offender has been confined for

any reason arising out of the offense for which the offender is being sentenced[.]”

(Emphasis added.). Appellant argues the use of the word “and” in place of “but” in the

sentencing entry means he will not receive credit for conveyance time, and the trial court

erred in failing to include this time as part of his jail-time credit.

       {¶ 23} We recently addressed this same argument in State v. Heidelburg, 6th Dist.

Sandusky No. S-23-002, 2023-Ohio-3408. In that case we noted:

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              A trial court's jurisdiction to grant jail-time credit is limited to the

       days the offender served leading up to sentencing as well as the day of the

       sentencing hearing. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i). After the date of sentencing,

       the [Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC)] takes over, and

       the ODRC is statutorily required to give jail-time credit to an offender for,

       among other things, “confinement while awaiting transportation to the

       place where the prisoner is to serve the prisoner's prison term.” R.C.

       2967.191(A).

              Likewise, the regulation governing jail-time credit directs the ODRC

       to give jail-time credit for days an offender served “between the date of the

       sentencing entry and the date committed to the department” in addition to

       the days specified in the sentencing entry. Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-04.

       Accordingly, jail-time credit for conveyance time is calculated by the

       ODRC independent of the sentencing entry. State v. Davis, 2d Dist.

       Montgomery No. 27495, 2018-Ohio-4137, ¶ 14. See also State v. Reed, 2d

       Dist. Clark No. 2022-CA-28, 2023-Ohio-2612, ¶ 15.

Heidelburg at ¶ 8.

       {¶ 24} In Heidelburg, we found the trial court properly excluded conveyance time,

post-sentencing, from its calculation of jail-time credit, finding the trial court has no

authority to grant credit for conveyance time. Id. at ¶ 9. We further found the use of

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“and” instead of “but” without consequence, noting the word choice “has no effect on

ODRC’s obligation to give appellant credit for his conveyance time.”1

       {¶ 25} Here, the trial court imposed a prison sentence of 9 months. As to jail-time

credit, the trial court stated, “The Defendant is to receive 63 days of credit in this case up

to and including the date of sentencing and excluding any conveyance time.”

Considering the record, we find no error in the trial court’s calculation or award of jail-

time credit. We therefore find appellant’s third assignment of error not well-taken.

                                      IV. Conclusion

       {¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Sandusky County

Court of Common Pleas. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to

App.R. 24.

                                                                          Judgment affirmed.

1
 As we noted in Heidelburg, the proper mechanism for recalculation of the release date,
should ODRC miscalculate the date by failing to include conveyance-time credit, is a
declaratory action. Heidelburg, ¶ 9, fn 1, citing Hinton v. Ohio Bureau of Sentence
Computation, 2018-Ohio-237, 105 N.E.3d 457 (10th Dist.); State ex rel. Earl v. Shafer,
85 Ohio St.3d 370, 708 N.E.2d 714 (1999); Nicholson v. North Central Correctional
Institution, 3d Dist. No. 9-02-44, 2003-Ohio-303.

11.
                                                                              State of Ohio
                                                                         v. Stephon Bulger
                                                                        C.A. No. S-23-001

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J.                         ____________________________
                                                         JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                               ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                    JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                         JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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