Court Opinion

ID: 9916466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 01:07:17.106259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:29.293876
License: Public Domain

Stone v 321 W. 78th St. Corp.
               2024 NY Slip Op 30031(U)
                     January 4, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 161854/2015
                  Judge: Lynn R. Kotler
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                                                                                                            INDEX NO. 161854/2015
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 643                                                                               RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/04/2024

                            SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                      NEW YORK COUNTY
            PRESENT: HON.LYNN R. KOTLER, J.S.C.                                                   PART 8
            JENNIFER STONE, as Administrator of the Estate of                                     INDEX NO. 161854/2015
            MARGARITO HERNANDEZ-MORENO, Deceased
                                                                                                  MOT. DATE
                      -v-
                                                                                                  MOT. SEQ. NO. 5-10
            321 WEST 78TH STREET CORP. et al

            The following papers were read on this motion to/for sj (seq 5)
            Notice of Motion/Petition/O.S.C. — Affidavits — Exhibits                   ECFS Doc. No(s). 158-187
            Notice of Cross-Motion/Affirm in opp/Answering Affidavits — Exhibits       ECFS Doc. No(s). 369-370, 415-429, 505, 538-
                                                                                       541
            Replying Affidavits                                                        ECFS Doc. No(s). 566-567
            4/27/23 Interim Order                                                      ECFS Doc. No(s). 605
            6/14/23 Interim Order                                                      ECFS Doc. No(s). 623
            6/28/23 Transcript                                                         ECFS Doc. No(s). 629

            The following papers were read on this motion to/for sj (seq 6)
            Notice of Motion/Petition/O.S.C. — Affidavits — Exhibits                   ECFS Doc. No(s). 234-238,
            Notice of Cross-Motion/Affirm in opp/Answering Affidavits — Exhibits       ECFS Doc. No(s). 361, 430-444, 506, 517-518,
                                                                                       525, 536-537, 542-546
            Replying Affidavits                                                        ECFS Doc. No(s). 598
            4/27/23 Interim Order                                                      ECFS Doc. No(s). 606
            6/14/23 Interim Order                                                      ECFS Doc. No(s). 624
            6/28/23 Transcript                                                         ECFS Doc. No(s). 630

            The following papers were read on this motion to/for sj (seq 7)
            Notice of Motion/Petition/O.S.C. — Affidavits — Exhibits                   ECFS Doc. No(s). 305-346
            Notice of Cross-Motion/Affirm in opp/Answering Affidavits — Exhibits       ECFS Doc. No(s). 362-364, 377-398, 445-507,
                                                                                       519-520, 527-529
            Replying Affidavits                                                        ECFS Doc. No(s). 599
            4/27/23 Interim Order                                                      ECFS Doc. No(s). 607
            6/14/23 Interim Order                                                      ECFS Doc. No(s). 625
            6/28/23 Transcript                                                         ECFS Doc. No(s). 632

            The following papers were read on this motion to/for sj (seq 8)
            Notice of Motion/Petition/O.S.C. — Affidavits — Exhibits                   ECFS Doc. No(s). 195-228
            Notice of Cross-Motion/Affirm in opp/Answering Affidavits — Exhibits       ECFS Doc. No(s). 229-233, 460-474, 508, 521-
                                                                                       522, 533-535, 547-548

            Dated: 1/4/24
                                                                                            J/1
                                                                                       _____________________________
                                                                                       HON. LYNN R. KOTLER, J.S.C.

            1. Check one:                         □ CASE DISPOSED □ NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
                                                                                   X

            2. Check as appropriate: Motion is    □GRANTED □ DENIED □X GRANTED IN PART □ OTHER

            3. Check if appropriate:              □SETTLE ORDER □ SUBMIT ORDER □ DO NOT POST
                                                  □FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT □ REFERENCE
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            Replying Affidavits                                                    ECFS Doc. No(s). 580-588
            4/27/23 Interim Order                                                  ECFS Doc. No(s). 608
            6/14/23 Interim Order                                                  ECFS Doc. No(s). 626
            6/28/23 Transcript                                                     ECFS Doc. No(s). 632

            The following papers were read on this motion to/for sj (seq 9)
            Notice of Motion/Petition/O.S.C. — Affidavits — Exhibits               ECFS Doc. No(s). 239-277
            Notice of Cross-Motion/Affirm in opp/Answering Affidavits — Exhibits   ECFS Doc. No(s). 365, 475-489, 530-532, 549-
                                                                                   551,
            Replying Affidavits                                                    ECFS Doc. No(s). 595, 596-597
            4/27/23 Interim Order                                                  ECFS Doc. No(s). 609
            6/14/23 Interim Order                                                  ECFS Doc. No(s). 627
            6/28/23 Transcript                                                     ECFS Doc. No(s). 633

            The following papers were read on this motion to/for sj (seq 10)
            Notice of Motion/Petition/O.S.C. — Affidavits — Exhibits               ECFS Doc. No(s). 278-304
            Notice of Cross-Motion/Affirm in opp/Answering Affidavits — Exhibits   ECFS Doc. No(s). 366-368, 400—402, 490-
                                                                                   504, 510, 523-524, 526, 552-559,
            Replying Affidavits                                                    ECFS Doc. No(s). 600-603
            4/27/23 Interim Order                                                  ECFS Doc. No(s). 610
            6/14/23 Interim Order                                                  ECFS Doc. No(s). 628
            6/28/23 Transcript                                                     ECFS Doc. No(s). 634

                Motion sequence numbers 5 through 10 are hereby consolidated for the court’s consideration and
            disposition in this single decision/order.

                 In this action, plaintiff Jennifer Stone is suing in her capacity as the Administrator of the Estate of
            Margarito Hernandez-Moreno, deceased (the “decedent”), who died after he was struck by falling de-
            bris in the rear courtyard of a residential apartment building located at 321 West 78th Street, New York,
            New York (the “building”) on December 11, 2013. At the time of the decedent’s accident, there were two
            construction/renovation projects happening at the building simultaneously: an elevator modernization
            project and a Local Law 11 façade renovation. Despite this work, there was no overhead protection in-
            stalled in the rear courtyard which likely would have saved the decedent’s life.

                 In connection with the two ongoing projects. there are two sets of contractors, subcontractors, and
            consultants/engineers. In motion sequence 5, defendant P.S. Marcato Elevator Co., Inc. (“Marcato”),
            which was hired to perform work in connection with the elevator modernization project, moves for
            summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint asserted by defendants/third-party plaintiffs 321
            West 78th Street Corp.'s ("321 West"), the building owner, and Halstead Management Company
            (“Halstead” and together with 321 West, the “321 West Defendants”)), the property manager. Defendant
            Bellet Construction Co., Inc. (“Bellet”), which was hired to perform the façade renovation, and the 321
            West Defendants oppose Marcato’s motion

                 In motion sequence 6, defendant WLA Engineering, P.C. (“WLA”), which was retained to design
            engineering plans for the façade repair project, moves for summary judgment dismissing all claims
            seeking contribution and indemnity against it as well as on its crossclaims against Bellet for contractual
            indemnity and breach of contract for failure to procure insurance. Marcato opposes WLA’s motion to the
            limited extent that WLA asserts in ¶ 37 of its counsel's affirmation that Marcato was the "general con-
            tractor" for the elevator modernization project. Defendant LSQ Contracting Corp. (“LSQ”), a subcontrac-
            tor which was hired by Bellet to perform façade brickwork, opposes WLA’s motion for summary judg-
            ment “to the extent that WLA, the facade project engineer, attempts to avoid blame for the failure to
            recommend installment of a sidewalk shed in the rear courtyard by relying on testimony that is in sharp
            dispute, and almost completely ignores the testimony of its own project engineer, Mike Lopez.” Bellet
            opposes WLA’s motion to the extent that WLA seeks summary judgment on its claims against Bellet,
            dismissal of Bellet’s crossclaims for indemnification and/or contribution, issues concerning WLA’s negli-

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            gence, status as the owner’s agent and status as a proper Labor Law defendant. The 321 West De-
            fendants also partially oppose WLA’s motion to the extent that WLA asserts it was not responsible for
            the decedent’s injuries.

                 In motion sequence 7, the 321 West Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing all claims
            asserted against them or alternatively granting them contribution and indemnification against Bellet,
            Marcato and LSQ. Marcato opposes the 321 West Defendants’ motion to the extent that they seek relief
            against Marcato. New Accurate Const of NY Corp. (“New Accurate”), the decedent’s employer and ele-
            vator subcontractor hired by Marcato, also opposes the 321 West Defendants’ motion to the extent that
            the latter seeks summary judgment on their third third-party claims against New Accurate for common
            law indemnification. Second third-party defendant Sierra Consulting Group, Inc. (“Sierra”), a consultant
            on the elevator modernization project, opposes the 321 West Defendants’ motion to the extent that the
            latter seeks contribution and/or indemnification from Sierra. Plaintiff, LSQ and Bellet also oppose the
            321 West Defendants motion.

                 In motion sequence 8, Sierra moves for summary judgment dismissing the 321 West Defendants’
            second third-party Complaint against it as well as all crossclaims. Marcato opposes the motion to the
            extent that Sierra seeks summary judgment on its crossclaims against Marcato. Bellet opposes Sierra’s
            motion “to the extent Sierra’s motion relies on a finding that Bellet’s negligence or violations of New
            York’s Labor Law were proximate causes of the plaintiff’s decedent’s injuries and to the extent Sierra
            seeks a finding that it cannot be held liable as matter of law.” The 321 West Defendants also oppose
            Sierra’s motion.

                  In motion sequence 9, LSQ moves for summary judgment dismissing all claims and crossclaims
            against it. Against, Marcato only opposes LSQ's motion “to the extent that LSQ asserts in ¶¶ 5 and 45
            of its counsel's affirmation that Marcato was the "general contractor" for an elevator modernization and
            maintenance work at the subject site.” Plaintiff opposes LSQ’s motion as to her complaint. Bellet op-
            poses the motion to the extent that LSQ seeks summary judgment on LSQ’s crossclaims over Bellet
            and dismissal of LSQ’s crossclaims for indemnification and/or contribution. The 321 West Defendants
            also oppose LSQ’s motion.

                 Finally, in motion sequence 10, Bellet moves for summary judgment in its favor. Marcato opposes
            Bellet’s motion to the extent that Bellet seeks common law indemnification and contribution against
            Marcato. New Accurate opposes Bellet’s motion to the extent that Bellet seeks common law indemnifi-
            cation against New Accurate. Plaintiff, LSQ and the 321 West Defendants also oppose Bellet’s motion.

            Relevant facts

                 The relevant facts, many of which are not in dispute, are as follows. In or about 2013, 321 West
            undertook renovation work at the building. 321 West retained Bellet to renovate the building façade, in-
            cluding pointing work and removing/replacing loose bricks. 321 West also retained Marcato to modern-
            ize the elevators inside the building.

                 New Accurate, an elevator subcontractor, was contracted by Marcato for the elevator moderniza-
            tion project. Moments before the underlying accident, the decedent, who was employed as a mechanic,
            was performing elevator pit excavation in the basement of the building. The decedent’s accident oc-
            curred after he entered the rear courtyard, through an accessible door close to where he was working.
            Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that the decedent entered the courtyard to dispose of excavation debris cre-
            ated by his work, pointing to deposition testimony from the decedent’s boss. The date of the accident
            was the decedent’s first day working at the project.

                The decedent’s accident was unwitnessed. According to New Accurate’s witness, the decedent’s
            coworker stated that there was a brick next to the decedent’s body when he discovered him lying in the
            courtyard. Further, plaintiff’s counsel points to evidence that the decedent was struck by a falling brick
            such as the police report, autopsy report, medical records, and “the uncontradicted expert opinion of

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            plaintiff’s forensic pathologist, who opines that decedent’s extensive skull fractures ‘were most con-
            sistent with a high energy head trauma from a fallen object, such as a brick, from a significant height
            above.’”

                 There is no dispute that the rear courtyard of the building did not have a sidewalk bridge or similar
            overhead protection to guard against injury from falling objects. The parties dispute whether overhead
            protection was required in the rear courtyard before the accident. Nor was access to the rear courtyard
            blocked off to prevent entry by the decedent or anyone else not performing brickwork, although there is
            a dispute about what specific steps Halstead and/or 321 West took to warn/prohibit entry into the rear
            courtyard.

                After the accident, both OSHA and the New York City Department of Buildings issued violations to
            the West 321 Defendants and Bellet for the lack of overhead protection and/or failure to block off ac-
            cess to the courtyard while the brickwork was being performed.

                   In connection with both ongoing projects at the building, the 321 West Defendants hired Sierra as a
            consultant on the elevator modernization Project. Sierra helped prepare plans, specs and project man-
            uals, as well as assisted with the selection and bid process in connection with the elevator project, only.
            The 321 West Defendants also hired WLA, an engineering firm, to plan, manage and supervise the Lo-
            cal Law 11 facade work. There is a dispute about whether it was Halstead or WLA that advised the oth-
            er that a sidewalk shed was not required in the rear courtyard. The 321 West Defendants maintain that
            it followed WLA’s recommendation to not install a sidewalk shed. Meanwhile, WLA claims that since the
            rear courtyard was not a public area, overhead protection was not required and therefore not part of
            WLA’s prepared scope of work.

                 In relation to Bellet’s work, which included pointing work, removing and replacing loose bricks in
            the building’s façade, and repairing the building’s chimney, Bellet in turn hired LSQ as subcontractor.
            There is a dispute about the precise work, supervision and general scope of responsibilities attributable
            between Bellet and LSQ. Finally, there is a dispute about whether Halstead directed Marcato/New Ac-
            curate to remove debris from the building and place in the rear courtyard.

            Discussion

                 The court will first consider the motions as to plaintiff’s claims. On a motion for summary judgment,
            the proponent bears the initial burden of setting forth evidentiary facts to prove a prima facie case that
            would entitle it to judgment in its favor, without the need for a trial (CPLR 3212; Winegrad v. NYU Medi-
            cal Center, 64 NY2d 851 [1985]; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). If the pro-
            ponent fails to make out its prima facie case for summary judgment, however, then its motion must be
            denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d
            320 [1986]; Ayotte v. Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062 [1993]).

                  Granting a motion for summary judgment is the functional equivalent of a trial, therefore it is a dras-
            tic remedy that should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue
            (Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223 [1977]). The court’s function on these motions is limited to
            “issue finding,” not “issue determination” (Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 3 NY2d 395 [1957]).

                Plaintiff has asserted Labor Law and common law negligence claims against the 321 West De-
            fendants, Bellet and LSQ. The first question of law the court must address is whether the decedent is a
            proper worker protected by the Labor Law and whether the 321 West Defendants, Bellet and LSQ are
            proper Labor Law defendants.

                 The court rejects the 321 West Defendants’ contention that the decedent was not a proper worker
            protected by the statute as a matter of law. Rather, the record reveals that the decedent was working at
            the time of his accident and thus was both employed and an employee within the meaning of the Labor
            Law. The decedent’s presence in the rear courtyard is not dispositive to his Labor Law claims, as testi-

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            mony and evidence in the record supports the factual determination that the decedent was removing
            debris from the elevator excavation to the rear courtyard as he and/or New Accurate was directed and
            the 321 West Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing otherwise. Thus, it remains a
            triable issue of fact as to whether the decedent was authorized to work in the rear courtyard at the time
            of the accident and thus was a protected worker under the Labor Law (Hoyos v. NY-1095 Avenue of the
            Americas, LLC, 156 AD3d 491 [1st Dept 2017] [the Labor Law should be “construed with a com-
            monsense approach to the realities of the workplace at issue” citing Salazar v Novalex Contr. Corp., 18
            NY3d 134, 140 (2011)]; cf. Yagauchi v. Park City 3 and 4 Apartments, Inc., 185 AD3d 645 [2d Dept
            2020]).

                Further, the 321 West Defendants have failed to show that they are not proper Labor Law defend-
            ants. 321 West is a building owner and apart from a conclusory paragraph in its memorandum of law
            submitted in support of motion sequence 7, Halstead has not shown that it was not an agent of the 321
            West for purposes of liability under Section 240[1] as a matter of law (Walls v. Turner Constr. Co., 4
            NY3d 861 [2005]).

                   As for Bellet, which argues that it too is not a proper Labor Law defendant, plaintiff maintains that it
            is nonetheless liable thereunder “as the contractor with authority to control the facade work, enforce
            safety standards and choose subcontractors”. A party is a “contractor” for purposes of Labor Law liabil-
            ity if it has the power to enforce safety standards and choose responsible contractors (Yagauchi, su-
            pra). Whether a party is a contractor under the Labor Law may depend on the terms of the relevant
            contract (Bart v. Universal Pictures, 277 AD2d 4 [1st Dept 2000]). Bellet was contractually obligated to
            “take all steps necessary to protect tenants, guests and all other persons from injury” and to protect
            “openings, access and walkways” . . . “to avoid personal injury” to those present near the work site. Bel-
            let also hired a subcontractor to install a sidewalk shed in front of the building. On these facts, Bellet is
            thus a proper Labor Law defendant.

                  LSQ also argues that it is not a proper Labor Law defendant, whereas plaintiff contends there are
            triable questions of fact as to whether LSQ was Bellet’s statutory agent. The court agrees with plaintiff.
            Pursuant to its written subcontract with Bellet, LSQ agreed to “supervise and direct the Work, . . . [and]
            be solely responsible for all labor, materials, equipment, tools, taxes, expenses and other facilities used
            to accomplish or incurred in connection with the Work.” LSQ also agreed “to observe and comply with .
            . . all applicable federal, state and local laws, ordinances, regulations bearing on the performance of the
            Work . . . including . . . any laws relating to health, safety, and the environment.” Further, a jury must re-
            solve issues of fact raised by conflicting deposition testimony from Bellet and LSQ’s witnesses regard-
            ing each entity’s role at the building and supervisory control over the façade work. Therefore, LSQ’s
            motion on this point is denied.

            Section 240[1]

                 Labor Law § 240[1], which is known as the Scaffold Law, imposes absolute liability upon owners,
            contractors and their agents where a breach of the statutory duty proximately causes an injury (Gordon
            v. Eastern Railway Supply, Inc., 82 NY2d 555 [1993]). The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:

                        All contractors and owners and their agents, … in the erection, demolition, repair-
                        ing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a premises or structure shall furnish
                        or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor,
                        scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons,
                        ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as
                        to give proper protection to a person so employed.

                Labor Law § 240 protects workers from “extraordinary elevation risks” and not “the usual and ordi-
            nary dangers of a construction site” (Rodriguez v. Margaret Tietz Center for Nursing Care, Inc., 84
            NY2d 841 [1994]). “Not every worker who falls at a construction site, and not every object that falls on a

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            worker, gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1)” (Narducci v. Manhasset Bay
            Associates, 96 NY2d 259 [2001]).

                 Section 240[1] was designed to prevent accidents in which the scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other
            protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the
            application of the force of gravity to an object or person (Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 13
            NY3d 5999 [2009] quoting Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494 [1993]). The protective
            devices enumerated in Labor Law § 240 [1] must be used to prevent injuries from either “a difference
            between the elevation level of the required work and a lower level or a difference between the elevation
            level where the worker is positioned and the higher level of the materials or load being hoisted or se-
            cured” (Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509 [1991]).

                 Here, plaintiff claims that the decedent was fatally struck when a brick fell during the course of on-
            going façade work and struck plaintiff, and that the lack of appropriate overhead protections was a
            proximate cause of the accident. As plaintiff’s counsel points out, it is undisputed that there were no
            overhead protections in place to protect plaintiff from the foreseeable risk of a brick or other debris em-
            anating from the ongoing façade work falling down into the courtyard. On these facts, plaintiff has
            demonstrated a prima facie cause of action under Section 240[1]. The parties’ arguments to the contra-
            ry are rejected.

            Section 241[6]

                 Labor Law § 241[6] imposes a non-delegable duty on all contractors and owners, in connection
            with construction or demolition of buildings or excavation work, to ensure that:

                        [a]ll areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being per-
                        formed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged, operated
                        and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to
                        the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places.

                 The scope of the duty imposed by Labor Law § 241[6] is defined by the safety rules set forth in the
            Industrial Code (Garcia v. 225 E. 57th Owners, Inc., 96 AD3d 88 [1st Dept 2012] citing Ross v Curtis-
            Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494 [1993]). Plaintiff must allege violations of specific, rather than
            general, provisions of the Industrial Code (Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contracting Co., Inc., 91 NY2d 343
            [1998]). Plaintiff asserts that Industrial Code §§ 23-1.7[a][1] and [2] were violated as a matter of law. At
            the outset, plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned all alleged Industrial Code violations other than Sec-
            tions 23-1.7[a][1] and [2] by failing to oppose defendants’ motions on these claims.

                Industrial Code § 23-1.7[a], entitled “Overhead hazards”, states in pertinent part as follows:

                        (1) Every place where persons are required to work or pass that is normally ex-
                        posed to falling material or objects shall be provided with suitable overhead pro-
                        tection. Such overhead protection shall consist of tightly laid sound planks at
                        least two inches thick full size, tightly laid three-quarter inch exterior grade ply-
                        wood or other material of equivalent strength. Such overhead protection shall be
                        provided with a supporting structure capable of supporting a loading of 100
                        pounds per square foot.

                        (2) Where persons are lawfully frequenting areas exposed to falling material or
                        objects but wherein employees are not required to work or pass, such exposed
                        areas shall be provided with barricades, fencing or the equivalent in compliance
                        with this Part (rule) to prevent inadvertent entry into such areas.

                 Defendants argues that the decedent was not authorized to be in the rear courtyard and/or was in
            the accident area through mere inadvertent entry. For the reasons already stated herein, there is a tria-

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            ble issue of fact as to whether the decedent was authorized to work in the rear courtyard at the time of
            the accident. If so, a jury may properly find that Sections 23-1.7[a][1] and/or 23-1.7[a][2] were violated.
            Further, the precise nature of the doors leading to the courtyard, whether they were closed/locked and
            had proper signage indicating access was prohibited has also not been established on this record. Ac-
            cordingly, the defendants’ motion as to the plaintiff’s § 241[6] claims is granted only to the extent that all
            alleged Industrial Code violations other than Sections 23-1.7[a][1] and [2] are severed and dismissed.

            Section 200 and common law negligence

                 Labor Law § 200 codifies the common law duty of owners and general contractors to provide
            workers with a reasonably safe place to work (Comes v. New York State Elec. And Gas Corp., 82 NY2d
            876 [1993]). There are two categories of Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence claims: injuries
            arising from dangerous or defective premises conditions and injuries arising from the manner or means
            in which the work was performed (Cappabianca v. Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 99 AD3d 139 [1st Dept
            2012]). To demonstrate a prima facie case under the former category, a plaintiff must prove that the
            owner or general contractor created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it (Mendoza v.
            Highpoint Asoc., IX, LLC, 83 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2011]). Where the injury was caused by the manner of
            the work, the owner or general contractor will be liable if it exercised supervisory control over the work
            performed (Foley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 84 AD3d 476 [1st Dept 2011]).

                 The court agrees with plaintiff that the decedent’s accident was caused by a defective premises
            condition vis-à-vis lack of overhead protection and the failure to close off entry to the rear courtyard.
            The duty to provide a safe place to work includes the detection of dangers discoverable by reasonable
            diligence (Lunde v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., 143 AD2d 816 [2d Dept 1988]; Caspersen v. La Sala
            Bros., 253 NY 491 [1930]). Ongoing façade work, including the removal and replacement of bricks, car-
            ries a reasonably foreseeable risk that one of the bricks might fall below. To the extent that the West
            321 Defendants have not otherwise shown the lack of notice, and indeed, plaintiff has come forward
            with proof on the contrary, the 321 West Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s Section
            200 claim.

                 As for Bellet and LSQ, neither is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the Section 200 claim ei-
            ther. In connection with each, the decedent’s injuries were also caused by the manner or means in
            which the façade work was performed, and neither has shown that they did not exercise supervisory
            control over the injury-producing work that was performed such that dismissal as a matter of law is war-
            ranted. The court cannot resolve the disputed issues of fact raised between the testimony regarding
            supervision of the façade project between Bellet and LSQ’s employees. Accordingly, defendants’ mo-
            tions on the section 200 claim are denied.

            Crossclaims and third-party claims

                 The court now turns to the crossclaims and third-party claims. The 321 West Defendants seek con-
            tribution and contractual and common law indemnification from Bellet pursuant to 321 West’s agree-
            ment with Bellet, which provides in pertinent part as follows.

                        To the fullest extent permitted by law, Contractor shall indemnify and hold harm-
                        less Owner and its agents and employees, Halstead Management Co., Inc., and
                        its agents and employees...from and against all claims, damages, losses and ex-
                        penses arising out of or resulting from the performance of the work, including but
                        not limited to....bodily injury...death and injury to persons or property, provided
                        that such claim, damage, loss or expense is caused in whole or in part by any
                        negligent act or omission of Contractor, any subcontractor, anyone directly or in-
                        directly employed by any of them.....

                 The 321 West Defendants also seeks contribution and contractual and common law indemnifica-
            tion from Marcato pursuant to 321 West’s agreement with the latter, which states in relevant part:

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 643                                                                       RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/04/2024

                        To the fullest extent permitted by law, Contractor shall indemnify and hold harm-
                        less Owner and its agents and employees, Halstead Management Co., LLC, and
                        its agents and employees....from and against all claims, damages, losses and
                        expenses arising out of or resulting from the performance of the work...provided
                        that such claims, damages, loss or expense is caused in whole or in the part of
                        negligent act or omission of Contractor, any subcontractor, anyone directly or in-
                        directly employed by any of them or anyone for whose acts any of them may be
                        liable.....

                 “Contribution is available where two or more tortfeasors combine to cause an injury and is deter-
            mined in accordance with the relative culpability of each such person” (Godoy v Abamaster of Miami,
            302 AD2d 57, 61 [2d Dept 2003], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 614 [2003] [internal quotation marks and cita-
            tions omitted]).

                  “A party is entitled to full contractual indemnification provided that the ‘intention to indemnify can be
            clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and
            circumstances’” (Drzewinski v Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co., 70 NY2d 774, 777 [1987], quoting Margo-
            lin v New York Life Ins. Co., 32 NY2d 149, 153 [1973]; see also Tonking v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 3
            NY3d 486, 490 [2004]). However, “General Obligations Law § 5-322.1 prohibits and renders unenforce-
            able any promise to hold harmless and indemnify a promisee which is a construction contractor or a
            landowner against its own negligence” (Kilfeather v Astoria 31st St. Assoc., 156 AD2d 428 [2d Dept
            1989]).

                “To establish a claim for common-law indemnification, ‘the one seeking indemnity must prove not
            only that it was not guilty of any negligence beyond the statutory liability but must also prove that the
            proposed indemnitor was guilty of some negligence that contributed to the causation of the accident’”
            (Perri v Gilbert Johnson Enters., Ltd., 14 AD3d 681, 684-685 [2d Dept 2005], quoting Correia v Profes-
            sional Data Mgt., 259 AD2d 60, 65 [1st Dept 1999]).

                  The 321 West Defendants’ motion is denied as to their crossclaims/third-party claims for contribu-
            tion and common law indemnification against Bellet and Marcato. Neither 321 West nor Halstead has
            shown that they are free from negligence insofar as there is a dispute about who decided whether to in-
            stall overhead protection in the rear courtyard prior to plaintiff’s accident while ongoing façade work was
            taking place and access to the rear courtyard was not properly restricted.

                 As for the 321 West Defendants’ claim for contractual indemnification against Bellet, that branch of
            the motion is also denied. Both Bellet and Marcato’s contractual indemnification provisions provide that
            Bellet and Marcato will indemnify and hold harmless the 321 West Defendants from and against all
            claims arising out of or resulting from the performance of their respective work provided that such
            claims are caused in whole or in part by any negligent act or omission of each contractor or any sub-
            contractor.

                 Dropping a brick constitutes negligent performance of Bellet and/or LSQ’s façade work, and there
            is no other evidence in this record that anyone but a Bellet or LSQ employee dropped the brick. Bellet,
            however, argues that the 321 West Defendants’ claim for contractual indemnification should be dis-
            missed because the relevant contractual provision violates GOL § 5-322.1[1], which provides as fol-
            lows:

                        A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in connection with or col-
                        lateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair or
                        maintenance of a building, structure, appurtenances and appliances including
                        moving, demolition and excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify
                        or hold harmless the promisee against liability for damage arising out of bodily in-
                        jury to persons or damage to property contributed to, caused by or resulting from

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                        the negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, or indemnitee, whether
                        such negligence be in whole or in part, is against public policy and is void and
                        unenforceable.

                 It remains an issue of fact as to whether the 321 West Defendants are negligent in the happening
            of the decedent’s accident, insofar as there is evidence that 321 West decided not to install overhead
            protection in the rear courtyard and Halstead directed that debris be placed in the rear courtyard and/or
            failed to condone the accident area off. Since these issues of fact remain, the question of whether the
            321 West Defendants’ contractual indemnification provision violates GOL § 5-322.1[1] cannot be de-
            termined at this juncture, since a jury could reasonably determine that the 321 West Defendants were
            not negligent and their liability is only statutory, rather than arising from a negligent act. Therefore, the
            321 West Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claim
            from Bellet nor is Bellet entitled to summary judgment dismissing same.

                 The court also agrees with Marcato that the 321 West Defendants have failed to establish as a
            matter of law that Marcato improperly instructed the decedent and/or New Accurate to place debris in
            the rear courtyard or otherwise failed to prevent the decedent from accessing same. Since the 321
            West Defendants have otherwise failed to establish that Marcato and/or New Accurate committed a
            negligent act or omission from which plaintiff’s accident arose, the 321 West Defendants’ motion as to
            their contractual indemnification crossclaim against Marcato is also denied.

                 To the extent that the 321 West Defendants seek contribution and/or common law indemnification
            against New Accurate, which they do not specifically argue in their motion but which New Accurate of-
            fers substantive opposition, the motion is denied for the reasons already stated herein.

                 Next, Marcato and Sierra seek summary judgment dismissing the 321 West Defendants third-party
            complaint against it. Marcato’s motion is granted. The only allegedly negligent act asserted by the 321
            West Defendants is Marcato and/or its subcontractor’s failure to advise the decedent to not use the rear
            courtyard to store debris and/or direction to use the rear courtyard. The court agrees with Marcato that
            the failure to advise decedent to not use the rear courtyard does not support a claim for contribution or
            common law indemnification as such an act is too attenuated from the alleged acts of negligence at is-
            sue (see i.e. Anton v. West Manor Constr. Corp., 100 AD3d 523 [1st Dept 2012]). Assuming arguendo
            that PS Marcato did owe a duty of care, no act or omission on its part caused the accident. Marcato
            was not involved with the façade work. Marcato did not have responsibility or exercise control over the
            rear courtyard. Rather, it was the worker who dropped the brick and lack of overhead protection which
            caused the decedent’s accident.

                 The 321 West Defendants’ contract-based claims against Marcato are also severed and dismissed.
            The relevant indemnification provision limits Marcato’s obligation to accidents “caused by” a contractor
            rather than “arising out of”. The court agrees that the facts on this record do not support a determination
            that Marcato caused the decedent’s accident. Finally, Marcato has demonstrated without opposition
            that it obtained the requisite insurance; therefore it is entitled to dismissal of the 321 West Defendant’s
            breach of contract for failure to procure insurance claim.

                  Sierra, a consultant on the elevator modernization project which helped prepare plans, specs and
            project materials, as well as helped with the selection and bid process, has shown that it did not super-
            vise New Accurate employees, including the decedent, nor did it have any role in connection with the
            façade work. Further, Sierra was not contractually obligated to indemnify the 321 West Defendants and
            it has otherwise established that it played no role in debris removal. To the extent that the 321 West De-
            fendants argue Sierra’s responsibility to ensure site safety should have encompassed debris removal
            fails. As Sierra’s counsel pointed out at oral argument, Sierra’s contract did not include day-to-day site
            safety monitoring. Sierra was an architect and/or consultant on the elevator modernization project. If the
            321 West Defendants wanted a site safety inspector, they should have hired one. Just because Sierra
            had a role in connection with the project does not make it necessarily responsible for day-to-day site
            safety including monitoring where debris from the elevator pit excavation was being stored. Therefore,

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            Sierra’s motion is granted and the second third-party complaint against it is severed and dismissed.
            However, Sierra’s catchall request seeking dismissal of all other unspecified crossclaims is denied. It is
            not the court’s responsibility to sift through the pleadings to determine the specific crossclaims that Si-
            erra would like to have dismissed, nor does such a provision provide appropriate notice to party against
            which Sierra would seek relief. Accordingly, Sierra’s motion is granted only to the extent that the second
            third-party complaint against it is severed and dismissed.

                 WLA seeks dismissal of all claims for contribution and indemnity against it, as well as summary
            judgment in its favor on its crossclaims against Bellet for contractual indemnity and breach of an
            agreement to procure insurance. The 321 West Defendants’ contract-based claims are severed and
            dismissed, as WLA has established without opposition that WLA was not obligated to indemnify the 321
            West Defendants nor procure specific insurance. The balance of WLA’s motion must, however, be de-
            nied. Contrary to WLA’s contention, the record does not support a determination as a matter of law that
            the rear courtyard was not accessible to the public and thus did not require a sidewalk shed or other
            overhead protection. It remains a triable issue of fact whether WLA was advised by the West 321 De-
            fendants that the area was closed off and thus WLA had “no knowledge or reason to believe that work-
            ers would seek to access the rear courtyard.” Indeed, it was open knowledge that debris and garbage
            were stored in the courtyard before the project work was commenced.

                 LSQ seeks summary judgment dismissing the 321 West Defendants contractual claims against it.
            That branch of the motion is granted without opposition. LSQ further seeks summary judgment dismiss-
            ing Bellet’s claims for contractual indemnification and breach of contract for failure to procure insur-
            ance, arguing that there was no valid contract and even if there was, the contract would violate GOL §
            5-322.1[1]. Here, the court agrees with LSQ that it has met its burden and established that the service
            agreement between Bellet and LSQ is not valid and enforceable: Bellet’s witness admitted his secretary
            signed the agreement and otherwise did not recall specific facts about the execution of same or the
            contents thereof. Meanwhile, LSQ’s witness testified that he was not presented with the entire service
            agreement upon which Bellet’s contract-based claims are based, including the portions containing the
            relevant indemnification and insurance provisions. In turn, Bellet has failed to raise a triable issue of
            fact on this point. Accordingly, LSQ is granted summary judgment dismissing Bellet’s contract-based
            crossclaims against it. Finally, LSQ seeks summary judgment on the contribution and common law in-
            demnification claims as well, presumably those asserted by the 321 West Defendants and Bellet. This
            branch of the motion is denied for the reasons already stated herein. Relatedly, the court rejects LSQ’s
            argument that it should not be held liable for one of its workers dropping a brick simply because the de-
            cedent’s accident was also caused by the absence of overhead protection. There can be more than
            one negligent cause of an accident. Otherwise, the precise nature of the relationship between Bellet
            and LSQ remains to be determined at trial.

                 Bellet seeks summary judgment dismissing the 321 West Defendants’ crossclaim for failure to pro-
            cure insurance and the latter has failed to oppose this branch of Bellet’s motion. Therefore, the 321
            West Defendant’s crossclaim for breach of contract for failure to procure insurance is severed and dis-
            missed without opposition. Contrary to Bellet’s contention, it has not established that the 321 West De-
            fendants caused injury to the decedent arising out of Local Law 11 repair debris rather than Bellet.
            Therefore, Bellet’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the remainder of the crossclaims against it
            is denied.

            Since LSQ agreed to indemnify Bellet for losses arising out of their subcontract work, Bellet is entitled
            to indemnification. Bellet is also entitled to damages for LSQ’s breach of contract for failing to procure
            insurance.

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            CONCLUSION

                In accordance herewith, it is hereby:

               ORDERED that Marcato’s motion is granted to the extent that the 321 West Defendants’ third-party
            complaint against Marcato is severed and dismissed; and it is further

                ORDERED that WLA’s motion is granted to the extent that the 321 West Defendants’ contract-
            based claims against it are severed and dismissed; and it is further

                 ORDERED that the West 321 Defendants, Bellet and LSQ’s motions for summary judgment as to
            plaintiff’s claims are granted only to the extent that all alleged Industrial Code violations other than Sec-
            tions 23-1.7[a][1] and [2] are severed and dismissed; and it is further

                ORDERED that Sierra’s motion is granted to the extent that the second third-party complaint
            against it is severed and dismissed; and it is further

                ORDERED that LSQ’s motion is granted to the extent that the 321 West Defendants’ and Bellet’s
            contract-based crossclaims against it are severed and dismissed; and it is further

                ORDERED that Bellet’s motion is otherwise granted to the extent that the 321 West Defendant’s
            crossclaim for breach of contract for failure to procure insurance against Bellet is severed and dis-
            missed without opposition.

                Any requested relief not expressly addressed herein has nonetheless been considered and is
            hereby expressly rejected and this constitutes the decision and order of the court.

            Dated:      _________________
                        1/4/24                                         So Ordered:
                        New York, New York
                                                                       _______________________
                                                                       Hon. Lynn R. Kotler, J.S.C.

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