Court Opinion

ID: 9778516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:10:56.530862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:11.056215
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DUNN, Justice.
Appellant, Earnest Kizzee, was charged by information with the offense of carrying a weapon. The jury found appellant guilty of the offense, and assessed punishment at six months confinement in the Harris County jail.
On January 3, 1989, Officer Cheek was on patrol at a low-income housing project on Jensen Drive in Houston. He testified that, at approximately 10:00 p.m., he and Officer Williams noticed two females, and after having a conversation with them, walked toward the parking lot of the complex and observed two black males talking. As the officers approached, one of the males, Winfred Earl Jones, tossed a pistol into a parked car. Cheek and Williams drew their pistols and ordered Jones to put his hands on the car. During this episode, the officers observed appellant, standing in front of the automobile, and ordered him to come toward them. Cheek stated that appellant appeared intoxicated because he was mumbling, appeared unbalanced, had a strong smell of alcohol on his breath, and would not answer or look at him. Both officers approached appellant and confirmed that he was intoxicated, and decided to arrest him for public intoxication. Cheek stated that while performing a search for possible weapons, he touched appellant’s rear pocket and felt the shape of a pistol. Cheek removed a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol from appellant’s rear pocket, and informed him that he was under arrest for carrying a pistol. Cheek testified that appellant did not really respond, but said he was carrying the weapon for his protection.
Winfred Earl Jones testified that about an hour before they were arrested, he picked appellant up at appellant’s mother-in-law’s house to take him home; that on the way to appellant’s house they experienced car trouble, stopped at the housing project on Jensen at about 10:00 p.m., got out of the car to get a soda, and saw the officers. He further testified that prior to this incident, he had seen appellant in his home with the gun, and that appellant was not drunk on the night he was arrested.
Appellant testified that he kept the gun at home for protection. He stated that he had previously pawned the gun, and that on the date in question, at about 6:30 p.m., he was going to take it home because he had paid off his debt. He stated that he and Jones arrived at the housing project at about 10:00 p.m., and that he was sitting inside the car, when approached by the officers, and was not drunk although he had consumed two 16-ounce beers between 4:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.
In appellant’s sole point of error, he contends that he was denied his sixth amendment 1 right to effective assistance of counsel.
The standard for determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel requires that: (1) counsel’s performance be deficient; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error, the outcome would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The *415various allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are as follows:
Pre-Trial
(1)Failure to file a pre-trial motion to suppress appellant’s statement to Cheek that he carried a handgun for his own protection because it contradicted his testimony that he was carrying the gun home.
The failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2587, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Stafford v. State, 758 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. granted). Appellant urges that this statement was oral, made while in custody, and should have been suppressed pursuant to Tex. Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 38.22, sec. 3(a) (Vernon Supp.1990).2 Under the doctrine of “res gestae,” the State is entitled to elicit testimony as to the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of a charged offense. Lomas v. State, 707 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). However, where such evidence is inherently prejudicial and has no relevance to the case, then the doctrine does not apply. Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Furthermore, statements made while in the grip of violent emotion, excitement or pain, and which relate to an exciting event are admissible under the “res gestae” doctrine.3 Thigpen v. State, 701 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, pet. ref’d). The evidence established that after Cheek informed appellant that he was under arrest, he responded that he was carrying the gun for his protection. Cheek’s testimony was an important fact surrounding the commission of the offense of carrying a weapon. In addition, appellant’s statement was made while in the grip of excitement, and was not made in response to a custodial interrogation.4 Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to admissible evidence.
(2) Failure to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest.
In Ochoa v. State, 717 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref’d), this Court held that trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress evidence, following defendant’s arrest, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant committed a felony within a police officer’s view and the arrest was authorized. See Tex.Code Crim. P.Ann. art. 14.01(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1990). The evidence established that appellant committed the offense of public intoxication, and a gun was recovered during the search incident to the arrest for that offense.
Voir Dire
(3) During voir dire, trial counsel failed to explain and discuss, with the panel members, the following factors:
(A) Elements of the offense;
(B) Concepts of burden of proof;
(C) Presumption of innocence;
(D) Range of punishment;
(E) Jury’s personal feelings on weapons;
(F) Jury’s connection with law enforcement; and
(G) Jury’s views on probation.
Appellant has failed to discuss how the above allegations are material to the outcome of the trial. Allegations of ineffective counsel will be sustained only if they are firmly founded. Mercado v. State, 615 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). The record indicates that during voir dire, trial counsel did discuss most of *416the legal concepts alleged.5 However trial counsel did not discuss the range of punishment, the panel members’ connection with law enforcement, and the panel members’ feelings on probation. Because appellant has failed to discuss what effect these un-discussed concepts would have on the outcome of the trial, it cannot be determined if trial counsel was ineffective.
Trial On Guilt
(4) Trial counsel failed to object to inadmissible evidence material to the outcome of the trial such as:
(A) Hearsay;
(B) Post arrest silence by appellant;
(C) Custodial statements by appellant; and
(D) Evidence obtained as a result of the search.
In regards to the first two allegations, appellant’s brief fails to adequately inform this Court which statements in the record form the basis of his complaint. However, the failure to object to the last two allegations would not support a finding of ineffective counsel because, as previously discussed, we determined that the custodial statement would come in as a “res gestae” statement, and the gun would be admissible as resulting from a search incident to a legal arrest.
(5) Trial counsel was ineffective during cross-examination for attempting to discredit Cheek’s testimony regarding appellant’s arrest, because evidence obtained from the arrest came in, without objection, on cross-examination.
Appellant argues that counsel should have requested a jury instruction on inadmissible evidence. As stated above, the evidence was admissible pursuant to article 14.01.
(6) Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena a witness who could have supported his defensive theory that appellant was transporting his gun home.
In King v. State, 649 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), the court held that trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses at the guilt/innocence and punishment stages is irrelevant absent a showing that such witnesses were available and appellant would benefit from their testimony. Appellant’s complaint is unwarranted because the record does not show that witnesses were available, or that appellant would benefit from the testimony.
(7) Counsel failed to request an instruction which have allowed the jury to disregard the evidence of the weapon if they believed that it was obtained in violation of Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 38.-23.
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to request an instruction because, as discussed above, the evidence obtained was incident to a legal arrest and was thus admissible.
Punishment
The Strickland standard is not applicable to ineffective assistance claims at the punishment stage. Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The test to be applied is whether or not counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 516 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
(8) At the punishment stage, counsel called appellant to the stand and failed to qualify him for probation.
During the punishment phase, an affidavit qualifying appellant for probation was offered into evidence, after the court brought the failure to introduce the affidavit into evidence to trial counsel’s attention. Although the evidence was offered upon the trial court’s urging, trial counsel’s actions were not ineffective.
(9) Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call other witnesses in support of appellant’s request for probation.
Appellant argues that the failure to call other witness indicates trial counsel’s lack of preparation. As discussed above, there *417is no indication that the witnesses were available, or that appellant would have benefited from the testimony. See King, 649 S.W.2d at 44.
(10) Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s argument at punishment.
The final argument that the State made is as follows:
Now, I bet you if I asked these officers right here who have to go into projects like this and have to deal with people who carry .25 calibers in their pocket that are good for one thing only and that is killing people, they would probably say to give him a year and to make him hurt, make him understand that we in Harris County are not going to put up with this kind of behavior. We are not going to allow people to carry guns when they walk around the city where it’s already a problem with people getting shot every day. There are too many people carrying guns.
The State contends that the jury argument was a plea for law enforcement. In Lopez v. State, 628 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), the court held that, in a prosecution of a student for the murder of a school principal, that jury argument was a plea for law enforcement and not improper because defendant’s conduct threatened the structure of the community. See also Fisher v. State, 681 S.W.2d 202, 207 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d) (prosecutor’s comments were a proper plea for law enforcement).
In this case the prosecutor focused on the fact that the officers were not going to put up with persons walking around the city carrying guns. He asserted in his argument that “these officers ... they would” probably say “to give him a year” and make him understand “that we” (the prosecutor and the officers in Harris County) “are not going to put up with this kind of behavior.” We hold that this is a plea for law enforcement and is not improper argument.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
COHEN, J., dissenting.

. U.S. Const, amend VI.

. “No oral or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding...."

. See Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 803(2).

.The State is also correct in its assertions that appellant’s statements would be admissible as an admission against interest. Fontenot v. State, 708 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. dism’d). Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 801(e)(2).

. At one point during the voir dire examination, the court clarified for the panel members the concept of burden of proof.