Court Opinion

ID: 9883925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:26:03.124087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:33.182056
License: Public Domain

FOLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Minn.R. Crim.P. 5.02. This rule does not require the trial court to appoint standby counsel when the defendant refuses to be examined to determine if he is ari indigent entitled to court-appointed counsel. Here, appellant voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel, including court-appointed counsel.
The court used its best efforts to determine whether appellant qualified under rule 5.02, subd. 1 for appointment of counsel. Rule 5.02, subd. 1 provides:
If the defendant is not represented by counsel and is financially unable to afford counsel, the judge or judicial officer shall appoint counsel for him.
Thus, rule 5.02, subd. 1 provides for appointment where (1) “defendant is not represented by counsel,” and (2) “is financially unable to afford counsel.” Here, appellant repeatedly indicated that he would obtain counsel.
Appellant was ringwise. He had an extensive criminal background, having been convicted of six felonies before the date of this trial. Appellant knew he had the right to appointed counsel if he were found indigent.
A defendant has a duty to cooperate in a court’s examination to determine if he qualifies for court-appointed counsel because (1) he is not represented by counsel, and (2) is financially unable to afford counsel. Here, appellant misled the court by stating that he would obtain counsel. However, appellant also indicated he would represent himself until counsel was retained. Appellant refused to submit to the type of financial inquiry required by rule 5.02, subd. 4 to determine if he met the indigency standard of rule 5.02, subd. 3. His submission to an inquiry relative to obtaining a private investigator and a waiver of subpoena fees is not of the scope which would determine if he met the indigency standard of rule 5.02, subd. 3.
Appellant never raised the issue of whether he could afford counsel despite his extensive experience with the criminal justice system and the court’s repeated inquiries as to whether he wanted court-appointed counsel. Appellant chose to proceed pro se. This decision was voluntarily and intelligently made. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court recognized that the sixth amendment “implies a right of self-representation.” Id. at 821, 95 S.Ct. at 2534. “But the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Adams v. United States, ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 241, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) (cited with approval in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 814-15, 95 S.Ct. at 2530-31).
The trial court had the option of appointing standby counsel. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). “A defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are not violated when a trial judge appoints standby counsel — even over the defendant’s objection — to relieve the judge * * Id. at 136, 104 S.Ct. at 954. However, the trial court was not re*487quired to appoint standby counsel. See Faretta; State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706, 711 n. 1 (Minn.1978) (trial court is strongly urged to liberally use its authority to appoint standby counsel as authorized in rule 5.02, subd. 2 before accepting a waiver of counsel); Burt v. State, 256 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Minn.1977).
The court was eminently fair in its attempts to inquire whether appellant had been able to retain private counsel, intended to do so, and whether he was willing to submit to the required financial inquiry which would determine whether he was entitled to court-appointed counsel. See Minn.R.Crim.P. 5.02, subd. 3, 4. At several of the pre-trial appearances, the court inquired whether appellant had been provided with adequate access to the telephone so that he could obtain out-of-town counsel, if he desired. When appellant first appeared before the court, he was advised that the court would consider appointing out-of-town counsel if appellant felt he could not afford counsel. Arraignment was postponed one week in order that appellant could have more time to retain counsel.
When the State indicated that it believed appellant was entitled to court-appointed counsel, the court attempted to inquire of appellant whether he might qualify as one “financially unable to obtain adequate representation without substantial hardship for himself or his family.” See Minn.R. Crim.P. 5.02, subd. 3. Appellant refused to cooperate with the court’s financial inquiry. Rule 5.02, subd. 4 requires such an inquiry. Further, he stated that he had funds through his family with which he could hire his own counsel. This statement alone indicates he would not meet the financial indigency standard of rule 5.02, subd. 3.
We should not reward appellant here with a new trial where he has done everything he could to thwart the court’s attempt to determine whether he would be represented by counsel at future court appearances and whether he was “financially unable to afford counsel.” I would affirm the conviction.