Court Opinion

ID: 9761482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:43:52.52277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:23.943248
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with my colleagues that the jury was entitled to find that appellee was injured while on the train platform.1 *394Since they differ so sharply on what the jury was entitled to find on the issue of the driver’s negligence, I venture here to express my own view, taking as my point of departure the principle that on an appeal from an order denying a motion for judgment n. o. v., we must regard the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. See Community College of Beaver County v. Soc’y of Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 589, 375 A.2d 1267, 1273 (1977).
There was testimony that a driver driving a work train through a station was to proceed at low speed — 18 to 20 miles per hour — and “be alert for anyone who may go near the ends of the platform mistaking them for a train in passenger service,” and that if the driver saw someone too close to the edge of the platform or on the tracks, he was either to brake or sound a warning, or both, as the circumstances required. The driver in this case testified that he was proceeding at the required low rate of speed. He also testified that the light on his train enabled him to see some three to four car lengths ahead, or 180 to 240 feet; that the track was straight; and that the station was well lit, with the lighting such that he admitted that he “could see whatever there was to see on the platform.” He further testified that as he approached the station he was looking out of the front window, and thus was in a position to view the platform.
Despite this testimony, the driver also testified that he did not see appellee, and did not know that he had hit him. The first question, therefore, is whether the jury was entitled to find that the driver should have seen appellee. If appellee was in a position where he should have been seen, the driver’s failure to see him could be regarded by the jury as evidence of negligence. See Kmetz v. Lochiatto, 421 Pa. 363, 219 A.2d 588 (1966); Peden v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 324 Pa. 444, 188 A. 586 (1936).
Given the evidence with respect to the location of appellee’s blood stains, and the police officer’s testimony that appellee was found on the platform directly across from pole number 2872, the jury could have found that appellee was *395standing approximately 175 feet from the southern end of the station as the northbound train approached the station. In addition, appellee testified that he was standing only twelve inches from the edge of the platform, and that when he first saw the train approaching, it was some 400 feet away. Given this additional evidence, the jury could have found that appellee was in a position where he should have been seen by an alert driver.
In dissent Judge LIPEZ raises the possibility that appellee was hidden from the driver’s view by a pillar. I grant this possibility, but I respectfully suggest that whether it materialized is speculation. In any case, I think the jury was entitled to find that a pillar did not hide appellee from the driver’s view from the driver’s admission that he could see “whatever there was to see on the platform,” and the photographs of the station, which seem to me to show clearly enough (I put it this way because there is no scale or other proof of dimension) that the pillars were much more than twelve inches from the edge of the platform.
The next question is whether the jury was also entitled to find that an alert driver would have seen appellee in sufficient time to stop the train. The driver testified that he could bring the train to a complete stop within 80 to 90 feet. He also testified that the distance made visible by the train’s headlight was 180 to 240 feet. From this evidence the jury could reason that an alert driver would have seen appellee when he was 180 to 240 feet away. The jury could further reason that this would give the driver up to five seconds to decide whether to apply his brake and 2 to 3 additional seconds to bring the train to a stop.2 Suppose we assume that the driver could not see appellee until the train first entered the station — an assumption the jury did not have to make. From the evidence of the blood stains it would follow that an alert driver could have seen appellee when he was 175 feet away. That would still give the driver approxi*396mately 3 seconds to decide whether to apply his brakes and 2 to 3 additional seconds to bring the train to a stop.
For these reasons I agree that we should affirm the lower court’s order denying appellant’s motion for judgment n. o. v.

. Therefore the issue of whether a different duty of care is owed to a person on the tracks as opposed to a person on the platform is not pertinent to this appeal. I note, however, that the idea that “duty of care” should be defined differently, according to whether the injured person was a trespasser, invitee, or licensee, is questionable and should be reappraised. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-631, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 352 N.E.2d 868 (1976).

. This approximation is based on a calculation that a speed of twenty miles per hour amounts to just under a speed of thirty feet per second.