Court Opinion

ID: 9747693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:28:10.238231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.680539
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the Majority’s conclusion that our Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, even though the lower court did not dismiss appellants’ complaint without an oportunity to amend. However, I must dissent from the Majority’s holding that appellants have failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, I would reverse the order of the lower court sustaining appellees’ preliminary objections to appellants’ complaint.
Restatement of Torts (Second) § 46 (1965) provides, in pertinent part: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress, to another i% subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.” Comment d elaborates upon the standard enunciated by § 46: “. . . Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in. which the recitation of facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ ” Cf. Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 (1970).
*386The Majority states that appellees’ conduct was not “extreme and outrageous” within the meaning of § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, even if we assume that appellees knew that execution proceedings could not be completed absent a hearing pursuant to Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F.Supp. 1091 (E.D.Pa.1970), aff’d 405 U.S. 191, 92 S.Ct. 767, 31 L.Ed.2d 138 (1972), and a revival of judgment. See at pg. 383 of 244 Pa.Super., at pg. 773 of 368 A.2d. I believe, however, that it would be outrageous and unconscionable for appellees to threaten an imminent sheriff’s sale of appellants’ property without further notice if they knew that the sale could not possibly be held or completed.1 Appellants allege that appellees knew that Swarb v. Lennox, supra, precluded execution on appellants’ property absent a prior hearing on the merits of appellees’ claim.2 Appellants also allege that *387appellees knew that a sheriff’s sale could not be held until appellees complied with the requisite procedures, including notice to appellants, for reviving confessed judgments.3 Nevertheless, appellee, according to appellants’ complaint, threatened an immediate sheriff’s sale which could only be delayed by contacting appelleé law firm or by paying the alleged debt; appellants would receive no other notice or opportunity to prevent the sale. In short, appellants aver that appellees intentionally used the threat of an immediate execution as a means of intimidation and harassment, despite the knowledge that such an execution would not be available unless appellees further complied with procedures designed to safeguard appellants’ rights.4 Assuming that all of appellants’ above allegations are true, Eckborg v. Hyde-Murphy Co., 442 Pa. 283, 276 A.2d 513 (1971); Shumaker v. Lear, 235 Pa.Super. 509, 345 A.2d 249 (1975), I believe that such an abuse of the legal system is outrageous and extreme conduct, actionable under § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, if it proximately causes severe emotional distress.
I find additional support for my position in Comment A to § 46 which provides as follows: “. . . It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct *388has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.” At the very least, reasonable people may differ as to whether appellees’ conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. The order of the lower court should be reversed.
SPAETH, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. It would be especially outrageous and unconscionable for appellee law firm and appellee law clerk to threaten action that they knew had no basis in law. Canons of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(l) and (2) provide: “In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.- (2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”

. The Majority questions whether Swarb v. Lennox, supra, would prevent an execution absent a hearing in those cases in which a confessed judgment was entered prior to 1970. See at pgs. 383-384 of 244 Pa.Super., at pgs. 773-774 of 368 A.2d. The court in Swarb specifically addressed this problem and held that those people with incomes under $10,000 who have signed consumer credit transaction documents or leases with confession judgment clauses “are entitled, prior to execution on confessed judgments entered prior to [November 1, 1970 or the expiration of the next session of the Pennsylvania General Assembly if the 1970 session had permanently adjourned by that date] to the opportunity of a hearing on such claims conducted in accordance with the procedural guarantees of the due process clause.” Swarb, supra, at 1102. At such a hearing, appellees would bear the burden of proving default, execution of the obligation, the amount due, and other elements necessary to execution. If appellees sustained this burden, the judgment would be effective, for lien purposes, from the date of its entry. Appellants allege that they each earn less than $10,000 per year and that they each engaged in a consumer credit transaction.

. See Rule 3025 Pa.R.C.P.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 3025. See also Rule 3033, Pa.R.C.P.; 42 Pa.C.S. § 3033.

. Contrast Comment g to § 46 of the Restatement, Second, of Torts. Comment g states that, “[t]he actor is never liable, for example, where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress.” In the case at bar, appellants assert that appellees impermissibly threatened immediate resort to a remedy not then available.