Court Opinion

ID: 9859884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:54:12.443115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:09:11.302473
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The supreme court has made it abundantly clear that the appellate court does not have the power on an appeal from a denial of a postconviction petition to address issues not raised in the postconviction petition. People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 821 N.E.2d 1093 (2004). The supreme court specifically rejected the notion that the appellate court can, on the basis of fundamental fairness, address an issue not contained in a dismissed postconviction petition and yet raised for the first time on appeal. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d at 507, 821 N.E.2d at 1098. If we cannot address these issues on the basis of fundamental fairness, we cannot address them for the sake of “judicial efficiency.” The majority opinion suggests that Supreme Court Rule 615 is a grant of supervisory authority to the appellate court. It is not. We do not have the authority to correct every mistake. Implicit in Rule 615 is the fact that any issue decided by the appellate court is properly before it. The majority cites People v. Wren, 223 Ill. App. 3d 722, 585 N.E.2d 1216 (1992), for the proposition that we have authority to address the sentencing credit issue here on appeal from a dismissal of a postconviction petition. I believe that Wren was wrongly decided in light of the admonitions the supreme court issued in Jones. Wren quotes People v. Scott, 43 Ill. 2d 135, 143, 251 N.E.2d 190, 194 (1969), for the proposition that “ ‘in the interest of an orderly administration of justice,’ ” an appellate court can address a sentencing credit issue on denial of a postconviction petition, notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing credit issue was never raised in the postconviction petition. People v. Wren, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 731, 535 N.E.2d at 1222. I believe that Jones makes it clear that Wren's reliance on People v. Scott was misplaced. It seems clear from reading Scott that the supreme court relied on its supervisory authority to address an issue not properly before the court because “we feel that in the interests of an orderly administration of justice, the claim is properly considered on this appeal rather than to put the defendant and the State to the expense and delay of the exercise of a different remedy.” Scott, 43 Ill. 2d at 143, 251 N.E.2d at 194. Because I believe we lack the authority to correct this error, I would affirm.