Court Opinion

ID: 9885116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:30:42.661871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:44.065834
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Thompson, dissenting: I am unable to concur with the majority opinion that the notice given in this case was sufficient to cancel out the policy of insurance. The policy under consideration here contained the provision: “This policy may be cancelled at any time by the Insured by written notice to the Company at its home office at Chicago, Illinois, or may be cancelled by the Company by giving at least five (5) days notice, in writing, of such cancellation mailed to the insured at the address stated in the policy, which shall be sufficient notice.” The cancellation notice relied upon, sent to the insured, was a letter dated March 1, 1945, which read: “We acknowledge receipt of the estimated advance premium due to renew the above policy. You did not file a labor record as required in the policy and this policy cannot be continued unless you do furnish us with the information on the amount of labor you employed during the past six months. “We are enclosing a form to be used by you in reporting the labor used in the past six months. This is a simple form and should not be difficult at all for you to fill out and file. Please fill it out and return it to us at once. “This policy will be cancelled on Mar. 16, 1945 unless you furnish us a report of the amount of labor employed by you during the past six months period.” A further note on the bottom of the letter after the signature of the insurer, read, “give them to 4/1/45 to file.” If this letter meant anything, it was not a notice of cancellation, but merely a statement of the insurer’s intention to cancel at some time in the future. Further, there was no evidence that this notation was, in any way, brought to the attention of the insured employer by letter or in any other way. The letters introduced in evidence were copies of letters, and whether or not this notation as to a continuation of time for cancellation was brought to the attention of the insured is not clearly shown by the record, but, even if shown on the original letter and had been called to the attention of the insured, it would have only been confusing, and further information that the insurer would not strictly enforce the provisions of the policy would only tend to lull the insured into the belief that additional time would be granted and that the strict provisions of the policy would not be enforced. Also, confusion as to just what the insurer intended .to do is disclosed by his letter of April 6, five days after the notation showed the policy would be cancelled, where it was said, “we are cancelling this policy as of that date.” The letter of April 6 clearly shows that the insurer dated the cancellation back to April 1, and advised the insured that this would be the cancellation date. Certainly, the letter of April 6, 1945, was not a proper notice of cancellation and the insurer must rely upon his letter of March 1, 1945, as to the proper notice. Undoubtedly, this letter, under the terms of the policy was not a proper notice, especially under the rule that the construction to be placed upon the language of an insurance policy should be strictly construed in favor of the insured. It is clearly shown in the letter of March 1, that if the labor report called for had been sent in the policy would not have been cancelled. If there was any significance to the notation, it certainly shows that the insured did not expect to rely on his notice that the policy would be cancelled out as of March, 1945. I think the terms of this policy required actual notice of cancellation and not a mere notice threatening to cancel unless certain conditions were complied with. The letter acknowledged receipt of the premium with the advice that the insured had not filed a labor record which was a requirement of the policy, and enclosing a form to be used for that purpose. Further advice was that the policy would be cancelled on a date named if this was not done. Giving this letter its full import, it could only be considered as a conditional notice of cancellation. The policy does not provide for conditional notice. If the insured had desired to comply with the terms of its own contract, it would have been easy to have advised the insured, “Your policy will be cancelled (naming the date) under the terms and provisions provided therein, by reason of your failure to file a labor report.” This would have been a definite cancellation. If it is desired by the insurer that certain conditions must be met or the policy will be cancelled, the "date of cancellation should be fixed and the required time run after the qualifying period has expired. In the case of Fisher for use of Lucille Kiniry v. Associated Underwriters, Inc. 294 Ill. App. 315, the insurance policy there required that notice of cancellation was sufficient when mailed to the address of the named assured stated in the policy schedule. The notice there, as given under date of July 11, 1933, was made as follows: “You are Hereby Notified, That payment Has Not Been Made at This Office of the premium $36.00 for Policy No. 72229, * * * and unless Premium thereon shall be paid to us on or before 12 o’clock noon, of July 17, 1933, we shall cancel the Insurance under said Policy upon our books, for Non-payment of Premium, without further notice and terminate our liability thereunder from that date. You will be held liable for the pro rata earned Premium thereon.” In passing upon the sufficiency of that notice, the court said: “The letter to Fisher, dated July 11, 1933, upon which the garnishee relies as being a cancellation of the policy, and which we have quoted above, sets forth that some future action by the company would be taken. It is quite evident that the company did not intend to cancel the policy if the premium was paid within the time specified, but if it was not paid, the company would then take further steps to effect a cancellation ‘on the books’ for the letter says: ‘. . . unless Premium thereon shall be paid to us on or before 12 o’clock noon, of July 17, 1933, we shall cancel the Insurance under said policy upon our books . . ” That situation is exactly as it is here, where the cancellation relied upon was sent to the insured under date of March 1, 1945, which did not cancel out the policy, but advised that unless a labor record was filed, as required, the policy would be cancelled at a later date. In addition, there was a notice of April 6, advising they were cancelling the policy as of April 1, 1945, which further shows that the first notice was a notice of intention to cancel the policy. Also, in the instant case, the premium had been sent in to the company and they had accepted it. In the case of Newark Fire Insurance Co. v. Sammons, 110 Ill. 166, in affirming a judgment against the insurer, this court said: “As to the other instruction, it only declares that a mere notice of an intention to cancel a policy of insurance, and nothing more, is not a cancellation of a policy. This could not mislead, and under the testimony before the jury it was proper. The intention of the insurer to cancel a policy could surely have no effect upon the contract of insurance until carried into execution, — and such is the doctrine of the instructions.” It has been held that where a policy provides that it may be cancelled by giving five days’ notice of such cancellation, a notice that unless the premium is paid on or before a certain date the policy will be cancelled on that date, does not ipso facto work a cancellation on that date, especially where the premium has been paid or the insurer is chargeable with its receipt. American Fire Insurance Co. v. Brooks, 83 Md. 22, 34 Atl. 373. The notice here is similar to the notice in the Fisher case and comes within the classification of conditional cancellations. The notice as written could only be construed as an intention to cancel the policy if there was a failure to file a labor record. The majority opinion holds that from the facts and circumstances in evidence in the case, it appears that notice of cancellation was given to the insured in the manner provided in the policy. With this I cannot agree, neither can I agree that this case can properly be distinguished from the Fisher case, on which the majority of the Appellate Court rely. In my opinion, the judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District is correct and should be affirmed,