Court Opinion

ID: 9464972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:31:49.389302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:54.457764
License: Public Domain

LOGAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting, with whom SETH, Chief Judge, and McKAY, Circuit Judge, join.
I cannot concur in Part I of the Court’s opinion, for the reasons stated in the dissent of Chief Judge Seth in United States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1978). Prior to trial defendant Fritz moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the government had not complied with the requirements of the Petite policy. R. Vol. IV at 4. The prosecuting attorneys did not receive authorization from the Attorney General to proceed under that policy until a few days before the first oral argument in this Court, long after briefs were filed asserting that such permission was not needed.
The convictions in federal court .were for transporting a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce and kidnapping its owner. Fritz entered a guilty plea in the Kansas state court to charges of- escape and two counts of burglary. A fourth charge, of aggravated robbery, was dropped in return for the *379guilty plea. These are different crimes and separate acts. The appellee’s brief, pp. 12-13, states their relationship from the government’s view:
About the only thing that can be said in the defendant’s favor on the double jeopardy issue is that the crimes he committed arose out of the same criminal episode and followed one another heel and toe. But, they did not overlap and were separate and distinct acts and crimes. From the record made in the District Court the cronology [sic] of the violations appears to be as follows:
(1) Escape from lawful custody, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3810(a);
(2) Burglary of a building (1709 Quincy, Leavenworth, Kansas), in violation of K.S.A. 21-3715;
(3) Burglary of a vehicle (a 1964 Ford xh ton Pickup truck), in violation of K.S.A. 21-3715;
(4) Robbery of Rick L. Simpson while armed with a dangerous weapon, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3427;
(5) Theft of Simpson’s 1964 Ford V2 ton Pickup truck (obtaining control over it by threat), in violation of K.S.A. 21-3701(c), [A crime committed by defendant but not charged by either sovereign.];
(6) Transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312;
(7) Kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201.
As indicated, the first four were charged in state court. Obviously theft of the pickup and kidnapping could have been charged under Kansas law as they are state crimes, K.S.A. 21-3420 and 21-3701(c), and the acts occurred in Leavenworth, Kansas.
Government’s counsel at the en banc hearing admitted to the court that the Petite policy applies not only to prosecutions for the same act or acts but to prosecutions arising out of the same “transaction,” which I construed as being used in the sense of the “episode” here involved. This seems to be recognized in Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 98 S.Ct. 81, 82 n. 5, 54 L.Ed.2d 207 (1977):
5. The Petite policy is most frequently applied against duplicating federal-state prosecutions. As stated by the Department of Justice, under that policy a federal trial following a state prosecution or [sic] the same act or acts is barred “unless the reasons are compelling.” A United States Attorney contemplating a federal prosecution in these circumstances is required to obtain authorization from an appropriate Assistant Attorney General. In this case, the Justice Department official who instructed trial counsel to insist upon a retrial had not obtained the requisite approval.
But as the Petite case itself illustrates, the policy also encompasses successive federal prosecutions arising out of the same transaction. In that case, the Solicitor General represented “that it is the general policy of the Federal Government ‘that several offenses arising out of a single transaction should be alleged and tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions, a policy dictated by considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and orderly law enforcement.’ The Solicitor General on behalf of the Government represents this policy as closely related to that against duplicating federal-state prosecutions, which was formally defined by the Attorney General of the United States in a memorandum to the United States Attorneys. (Department of Justice Press Release, Apr. 6, 1959).” 361 U.S. [529], at 530-531, 80 S.Ct. [490], at 451 [4 L.Ed.2d 490]. [Emphasis supplied.]
I believe the Petite policy was intended to apply to the situation we have here, where there might be different acts, but there is transactional continuity and the same victims and property are involved in both the state and federal prosecutions. Such a finding does not preclude the federal authorities from prosecuting for kidnapping, as here, when state officials did not charge it in state court. It merely requires that the Attorney General’s Office consider, before prosecuting, whether there is a com*380pelling reason to do so, considering both questions of fairness to defendant and the desirability of efficient and orderly law enforcement.