Court Opinion

ID: 9964727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 17:11:56.224563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:40.143593
License: Public Domain

J-A06019-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KING EDWARDS                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1154 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 19, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006312-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                           FILED: April 30, 2024

       King Edwards appeals from his judgment of sentence entered on April

19, 2022, for his convictions of third-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy

to commit robbery.1 Edwards challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. We affirm.

       On February 21, 2017, Edwards, along with three co-defendants,

assaulted the victim, a taxicab driver, and robbed him. The victim died on

February 24, 2017, due to the injuries caused by Edwards and his co-

defendants. On July 9, 2017, Edwards was charged with homicide, robbery,

and two counts of conspiracy.2

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 903, respectively.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2501(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 903, respectively.
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       Edwards cooperated with police and testified against one of his co-

defendants at his trial. Based on Edwards’ cooperation, the Commonwealth

agreed to amend the homicide charge to third-degree murder and withdraw

one count of conspiracy. There was no agreement as to sentence. Edwards

pled guilty on April 19, 2022, and immediately proceeded to sentencing. The

trial court sentenced Edwards to 15 to 30 years’ incarceration for third-degree

murder, a consecutive 4 to 8 years’ incarceration for robbery, and 5 years of

consecutive probation for conspiracy.

       On April 29, 2022, Edwards filed a post-sentence motion claiming the

trial court imposed a manifestly excessive sentence. On August 31, 2022, the

trial court denied Edwards’ post-sentence motion.3 Edwards timely appealed

and complied with the trial court’s order to file a 1925(b) statement. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

       Edwards raises one claim:

____________________________________________

3  A post-sentence motion is denied by operation of law when not decided
within 120 days. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). In this case, the trial court
had until August 29, 2022, to file a decision regarding the post-sentence
motion. The clerk of courts is required to enter an order on the 120th day
denying the motion by operation of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). That
did not occur in this case, and the trial court entered an order denying the
post-sentence motion two days later. We have consistently found an appeal
timely when filed within 30 days of the order denying the post-sentence
motion even though entered beyond the 120-day limit. See Commonwealth
v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2022); Commonwealth v.
Perry, 820 A.2d 734, 735 (Pa. Super. 2003). As such, we find there was a
breakdown in court operations and deem this appeal timely filed, as it was
filed within 30 days of the order denying his post-sentence motion.

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        Did the lower court abuse its discretion by imposing a term of 19
        to 38 years’ imprisonment, where it failed to account for the
        significant mitigating evidence presented at sentencing, as well as
        Edwards’ timely and significant cooperation in his codefendants’
        cases?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4. This is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of

sentencing and, therefore, is a petition for permission to appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 2010).

        An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
        must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
        (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
        Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
        preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
        sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has
        a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
        substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
        appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

and brackets omitted).

        Edwards met the first three requirements by filing a timely notice of

appeal, raising the claim in a post-sentence motion requesting a modification

of his sentence, and including a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Therefore, we will determine if Edwards has raised a

substantial question that his sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing

Code.

        [T]he appellant must show that there is a substantial question that
        the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing
        Code. That is, [that] the sentence violates either a specific
        provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing
        Code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing
        process. We examine an appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement

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      to determine whether a substantial question exists. Our inquiry
      must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in
      contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary
      only to decide the appeal on the merits.

Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 359, 363-64 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations

and emphasis omitted). “We cannot look beyond the statement of questions

presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a

substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Crawford, 257 A.3d 75, 78-

79 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). “A Rule 2119(f) statement is

inadequate when it contains incantations of statutory provisions and

pronouncements of conclusions of law.” Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180

A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

      Edwards claims the trial court failed to consider “significant mitigating

evidence” and his cooperation against his co-defendants. Appellant’s Brief, at

4. However, within his Rule 2119(f) statement, Edwards does not enumerate

what mitigation evidence was not considered. See id. at 16-19. In fact,

Edwards’ Rule 2119(f) statement is solely “incantations of statutory provisions

and pronouncements of conclusions of law.” Radecki, 180 A.3d at 468

(citation omitted); see Appellant’s Brief, at 16-19. “In addition, this Court

repeatedly has held that a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating

factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.” Crawford, 257

A.3d at 79 (citations omitted); see Commonwealth v. Clary, 226 A.3d 571,

580 (Pa. Super. 2020); Radecki, 180 A.3d at 469; Commonwealth v.

Cannon, 954 A.2d 1222, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2008). Based on Edwards’ Rule

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2119(f) statement, we conclude that he has failed to raise a substantial

question for this Court’s review.

      Even if we were to find Edwards raised a substantial question, we would

find he is not entitled to relief.

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 592-93 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).

      Edwards claims his sentence is manifestly excessive because the trial

court did not give enough consideration to the mitigating circumstances,

including Edwards’ young age, lack of a criminal record, the environment he

was raised in, and his cooperation with the Commonwealth and testimony

against his co-defendants. See Appellant’s Brief, at 22. Further, Edwards

claims the trial court was biased because he referenced his own upbringing in

a bad neighborhood and poor community. See id. at 22-23. Finally, Edwards

asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a sentence

considering “conduct Edwards didn’t plead guilty to[.]” Id. at 34. Edwards

believes these errors require a new sentencing hearing. See id. at 37. We

disagree.

      At sentencing, the trial court explained that it:

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      reviewed the arguments of counsel, considered the arguments of
      counsel. Considered your statement, as well as your mother's
      statement, as well as the victim impact statements, and the
      arguments of [the Commonwealth]. I've also taken into
      consideration the fact that you did cooperate and assist with
      prosecuting Mr. Russell. So, Mr. Edwards, I have to tell you,
      actions create consequences. You have to be accountable. And
      there is, even with this sentence, there's no way you can make
      this situation right with [the victim] or his family. You can't fix it.
      But at the end of the day, you do have to be accountable.

N.T. Plea and Sentencing Hearing, 4/19/22, at 47.

      Further, based on a thorough review of the plea and sentencing hearing,

it is clear it supports the trial court’s sentence. First, the record reflects the

trial court considered Edwards age, lack of criminal record, environment he

was raised in, and his cooperation before imposing sentence. See N.T. Plea

and Sentencing Hearing, 4/19/22, at 38-40. Further, the sentence was not

manifestly excessive. The trial court discussed the guidelines and sentenced

Edwards in the middle of the guidelines for both third-degree murder and

robbery and, in fact, Edwards received a significant downward departure from

the guidelines for the conspiracy conviction. Id. at 46-47. Therefore, Edwards’

claim that his sentence is manifestly excessive because the trial court failed

to consider mitigating factors does not merit relief.

      Edwards’s assertion that the trial court’s reference to his own upbringing

in a bad neighborhood evidences he was biased against Edwards likewise lacks

merit. See Appellant’s Brief, at 34-35. Our review of the record does not

reveal any degree of bias against Edwards. See N.T. Plea and Sentencing

Hearing, 4/19/22, at 38-43. Nor do we find the trial court’s comment that

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growing up in a bad neighborhood or poor community did not excuse Edwards’

criminal conduct to be an impermissible or irrelevant factor for the court to

consider. We could not find a case, nor did Edwards point us to any, which

holds that a judge’s comments similar to the comments made by the

sentencing judge here are impermissible. Furthermore, the record reflects

this comment, even if it were impermissible, was not a significant factor in the

trial court’s sentence where the court properly considered multiple factors as

described above, particularly where Edwards’ sentence was well within the

sentencing guidelines. See Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 192

(Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that “[e]ven if a sentencing court relies on a factor

that should not have been considered, there is no abuse of discretion when

the sentencing court has significant other support for its departure from the

sentencing guidelines.”); Commonwealth v. Durazo, 210 A.3d 316, 324

(Pa. Super. 2019) (same). This claim does not merit relief.

      In his last claim, Edwards asserts the trial court erred in considering

conduct that he did not plead guilty to while sentencing Edwards. This claim

is belied by the record. Edwards pled guilty to third-degree murder, robbery,

and conspiracy and admitted to participating in a conspiracy to commit

robbery and his assistance in committing the robbery. See Appellant’s Brief,

at 8; N.T. Plea and Sentencing Hearing, 4/19/22, at 11-12. Edwards admitted

to punching the victim and that the victim died as a result of the attack by

Edwards and his three co-defendants. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9; N.T. Plea

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and Sentencing Hearing, 4/19/22, at 12. Based on the facts Edwards admitted

during his plea, the trial court correctly noted that a jury would likely find him

guilty of second-degree murder and he would face the remainder of his life in

prison. See N.T. Plea and Sentencing Hearing, 4/19/22, at 39 (“But your

charges were also reduced. You were looking at a life sentence before those

things occurred. Your sentence would've been life without parole.”).

      The trial court was free to consider the facts that Edwards pled guilty to

and fashion a sentence around those facts. This claim does not merit relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 04/30/2024

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