Court Opinion

ID: 9639888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:50:51.573659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:22.770947
License: Public Domain

CHASE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The discharge of the relator seems to have been put upon the ground that even though he may have had a thorough understanding of his constitutional and other rights he could not lawfully waive his right to a trial by jury because he acted without the assistance of an attorney. If my understanding is .correct, a limitation has been placed upon an accused’s right to act without counsel and conduct his own trial to the extent that he cannot agree to be tried without a jury, though the court may have advised him as to his rights and then have approved his choice, unless an attorney advises him also.
It is clear that we, bound to give effect to Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854, 70 A.L.R. 263, must take it for granted that the relator could waive a trial by jury. It seems to be equally clear that he could waive his right to have the assistance of counsel in so doing. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Glasser v. United States, 314 U.S. _, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. _.
He certainly made it abundantly clear that he did not want the assistance of counsel and that he did not want to be tried by a jury. If he was competent to reach such decisions in the sense that he had knowledge and intelligence enough to make them with understanding of the possible consequences, it is of no moment that he was, or became, competent without the assistance of counsel. Whether or not he was in fact competent was a matter for the court to determine and the order made on the waiver of a jury trial was, in the absence of any showing whatever to the contrary, sufficient evidence of such a de*777termination though an express finding would, perhaps, have been in order. However that may be, it is enough for present purposes that the relator has the burden, which he has not carried, “to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel” (Johnson v. Zerbst, supra [304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1025, 82 L.Ed. 1461]) before the lack of such assistance is held to invalidate his waiver of a jury trial and is made the basis of his discharge on this writ.
I would dismiss the writ