Court Opinion

ID: 9721828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:10:40.514556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:28.859160
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the views of my colleagues. I believe the judgment revoking the defendant’s probation and sentencing him on the original offense should be reversed and that the defendant’s other conviction for theft should be reversed and remanded for new trial. This case presents a somewhat related problem to that decided by this court in People v. Vahle (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 391, 376 N.E.2d 766, in which I dissented, believing that the principles of estoppel and double jeopardy precluded a criminal conviction based on the same facts resulting in a probation revocation and sentence. I will not restate my views in this opinion, but I would note that People v. Bone (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 972, 389 N.E.2d 575, illustrates an interesting application of the rules announced in People v. Grayson (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43, cert. denied (1975), 421 U.S. 994, 44 L. Ed. 2d 484, 95 S. Ct. 2001, and People v. Gray (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 44, 370 N.E.2d 797, cert. denied (1978), 435 U.S. 1013, 56 L. Ed. 2d 395, 98 S. Ct. 1887, which tend to offer some further support for my belief in that a single act violative of a criminal statute may not be the basis both for an independent criminal action and a probation revocation proceeding. Either an acquittal or conviction in one proceeding bars another prosecution. In People v. Vahle, referred to above, the defendant’s probation was revoked and sentence imposed in the original offense prior to the defendant’s conviction of the offense in an independent criminal action. In Vahle, evidence was introduced in each proceeding concerning the same act requiring, in my judgment, the interposition of the bar of double jeopardy. The procedure invoked in the instant case demonstrates even more conclusively that the same act or conduct is the basis for each action. Having been convicted of the theft in the instant case, the conviction irrefutably established the defendant’s violation of his probation, and in fact the court was able to take cognizance of the violation of the criminal statute by taking judicial notice of the defendant’s conviction for theft. Once having been found of theft in an independent criminal action, defendant’s violation of his probation was conclusively established. Defendant’s conduct in exercising unlawful possession of stolen property was the cause and the only cause of his criminal conviction and probation revocation. But for this conduct neither jail sentence would have been imposed. To say that the single act did not precipitate both sentences is to exalt form over substance. The difficulty of supporting the dual punishment aspect of double jeopardy is illustrated by the majority’s comment that the trial court’s “lecture” would have been more properly given as a part of the sentencing hearing after defendant’s probation had been revoked. Since each sentence is grounded on a single violation of the Criminal Code, refining language does not create a difference when no distinction exists. This brings me to the issue related to the instruction given to the jury based on the unexplained possession of the recently stolen property. My views on this subject were also expressed in my dissent in People v. King (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 879, and no useful purpose would be served in reiterating those views in this dissent. Where an issue of nonexplanation or explanation arises as it does in this case, it is my belief that the presumption should disappear and the issues of guilt or innocence should be resolved by the jury giving due weight to the inference which may be drawn from the evidence presented without the additional force of a presumption. Alternatively, I think an instruction should be given if the presumption is to be used indicating that where the crime is based solely on the presumption, the underlying fact should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As is disclosed by the majority opinion, whether the defendant’s possession of the motorcycle was explained or unexplained was the sole issue in the case, since the defendant was not charged with stealing the motorcycle and his possession of the property under the circumstances was the only evidence of the guilty knowledge required. Even though the conclusion to be drawn from the presumption may be characterized as permissive, there are no standards contained in the instructions indicating to the jury on what basis their discretionary authority should be exercised. Merely characterizing the instruction as permissive does not avoid the problem that each juror or the jury as a whole may apply the presumption instruction in any manner which they or it feels appropriate. Even in civil cases we do not permit a jury this license. Wherever there has been an allegation of the violation of a statutory duty as the basis for negligence, we direct not only that the violation of the statute or the act of negligence is one of the issues required to be proved by the plaintiff, but also in a separate instruction indicate that such violation must be considered with all of the other evidence before liability can be established. In summary, I believe the principles of estoppel and double jeopardy require the defendant’s sentence in the offense of burglary be reversed and that the defendant is entitled to a new trial on the charge of theft.