Court Opinion

ID: 9794646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:09:02.70533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:20.388406
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
I agree with the result in this case and with the majority’s holding that the trial court did not err in suppressing the evidence on the ground that defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the officer’s failure to “knock and announce.” However, I would also hold, as the majority apparently does not, that under these circumstances the statutory violation itself also mandates suppression. The majority has determined:
“[T]he record supports the trial judge’s conclusion that the circumstances of the officer’s entry [1] violated both interests intended to be protected by the rule, thereby constituting a constitutional violation and also [2] that the circumstances were particularly aggravated [thereby constituting a statutory violation warranting suppression].” (Emphasis supplied.)
If the circumstances were such that suppression on statutory grounds alone was justified, and I agree that they were, then we should so hold. Furthermore, “aggravated” in this context has been given little, if any, content in the past, see, e.g., State v. Bishop, 288 Or 349, 605 P2d 642 (1980), thus, more clarity on our part in this case would be helpful to trial courts in the future.
Therefore, I would hold that on constitutional and statutory grounds, the evidence was properly suppressed. As the trial court stated in its comprehensive and helpful analysis:
“All right. I will expressly find that ORS 133.575, in my judgment, carries out a constitutional requirement. I think both on a constitutional ground and on the grounds of the statute, and in the sound administration of justice, that evidence should be suppressed when a search of this kind is made — two separate grounds. As a matter of public policy expressed in that statute, evidence should be suppressed.” (Emphasis supplied.)