Court Opinion

ID: 9895362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 21:03:34.962181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:12.154199
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/6/23 P. v. Un CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097474

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. Nos. STK-CR-FE-
                                                                                 2020-5121 & STK-CR-FE-
           v.                                                                           2021-12827)

 TOEUR UN,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Following the denial of his suppression motion, defendant Toeur Un was found
guilty by a jury of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a
felon. The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years in state prison
for firearm possession and imposed and stayed a three-year term for ammunition
possession.
         On appeal, defendant raises the following three contentions: (1) the motion to
suppress should have been granted; (2) the trial court improperly failed to impose the
lower term where defendant experienced trauma that was a contributing factor to the

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crimes; and (3) the abstract of judgment must be corrected. We agree only with the third
contention and affirm.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The sole witness who testified at the suppression hearing was Deputy Sheriff
Anthony Ancrile. Deputy Ancrile testified that just before midnight on December 1,
2021, he was patrolling the west side of Stockton. Ancrile saw defendant riding a
skateboard in the middle of the street. Defendant rode up to the sidewalk and began
walking eastbound.)
       Deputy Ancrile pulled his patrol car over to the right shoulder. He positioned his
car with its front close to the curb. The car’s red and blue emergency lights were not on.
Ancrile did not use the siren.
       The street had streetlights but was not well lit. Deputy Ancrile shined the patrol
car’s spotlight in the direction his headlights were facing. He did this for safety reasons:
the area was dark; many cars were parked there; and he was not sure what else was
happening on the side of the road. Ancrile did not put the spotlight on defendant.
       Defendant walked up to the patrol car. Deputy Ancrile and his partner Deputy
Ryan Cortez got out and asked defendant if they could speak to him. Defendant stopped
to talk to the deputies. The deputies did not block defendant’s way.
       Deputy Ancrile spoke to defendant in a casual manner. Ancrile asked, “For my
safety and yours, do you mind if I search you for any weapons?” Defendant said he had a
BB gun in his back right pants pocket. Ancrile asked if he could retrieve it and defendant
said yes.
       Deputy Ancrile asked defendant his name and if he was on probation or parole.
Defendant took out his identification. He said he was on probation.
       Deputy Ancrile testified that before defendant said he was on probation; defendant
could have left if he wanted to. Once defendant said he was on probation, Ancrile
intended to hold him.

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         After defendant said he was on probation, Ancrile asked if he could search him.
Defendant agreed. During the search, defendant said that he had a firearm on his right
side. Ancrile removed a loaded nine-millimeter handgun from defendant’s right jacket
pocket.
         The officers put defendant in the back of their patrol car. The records division
confirmed that defendant was on probation for possession of a firearm by a felon with
conditions allowing for him to be searched and prohibiting possession of firearms and
ammunition.
         Deputies Ancrile and Cortez were the only witnesses at trial. Their testimony
regarding the search was consistent with Ancrile’s testimony at the suppression hearing.
And as noted, the jury found defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and
possession of ammunition by a felon.
         After the jury was excused, the prosecutor confirmed his intention to establish
aggravating circumstances in sentencing solely based on records of defendant’s prior
felony convictions. Four exhibits consisting of certified records of conviction were
admitted. The court reviewed the records and determined beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant had been convicted of these felonies.
         The People filed a sentencing brief requesting the upper term of three years, based
on defendant’s prior convictions proved beyond a reasonable doubt and found true by the
court.
         Defense counsel filed a sentencing brief arguing that defendant should receive the
middle term of two years. Counsel cited three mitigating circumstances under California
Rules of Court, rule 4.423 (further rule references are to the California Rules of Court):
defendant never harmed or threatened anyone (rule 4.423(a)(6)); carrying a weapon in a
high-crime area was partially excusable (rule 4.423(a)(4)); and defendant was suffering
from a mental condition that reduced his culpability and the current offense was
connected to his mental illness (rule 4.423(b)(2), (4)).

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         At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that, as aggravating factors,
defendant had multiple prior convictions and prison terms, including three convictions for
the same offense as his current conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. (Pen.
Code, § 29800, subd. (a); further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.)
         Defense counsel maintained the middle term was the presumptive term based on
the mitigating circumstances briefed, including that defendant was diagnosed with
schizophrenia in section 1368 competency proceedings.
         The court concluded that there was evidence that defendant had a mental disease.
As to the significance of that evidence, the trial court noted that section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) provides that the lower term is required if a person has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma. The trial court also noted that defendant’s
youth was a basis for the lower term.
         Defense counsel stated that he briefed defendant’s mental illness as a mitigating
factor under rule 4.423 in favor of the middle term.
         In imposing sentence, the court observed that the aggravating factors were the
prior convictions that had been found true, including a 2021 conviction for the same
firearm possession offense defendant committed in this case. As for defendant’s
schizophrenia diagnosis, the trial court found it was not a significant factor in defendant’s
commission of the current crimes. The trial court found that aggravating factors
outweighed mitigating factors and imposed the upper terms.
         Defendant timely appeals.
                                        DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                     Suppression Motion
         Defendant contends the facts at the suppression hearing showed that he was not
free to leave, and the encounter was not consensual. Defendant maintains that Deputy

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Ancrile intended to detain him immediately. Defendant concedes that the spotlight used
did not constitute a detention but argues it was a factor that combined with Ancrile’s
questioning, indicated an intent to detain.
       We conclude the search was consensual.
A. Legal Principles
       “ ‘An officer may approach a person in a public place and ask if the person is
willing to answer questions. If the person voluntarily answers, those responses, and the
officer’s observations, are admissible in a criminal prosecution. [Citations.] Such
consensual encounters present no constitutional concerns and do not require justification.
[Citation.] However, “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” the officer effects a seizure of that
person, which must be justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. [Citations.] In situations involving a show of authority, a person is seized
“if ‘in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave,’ ” or “ ‘otherwise terminate the
encounter’ ” [citation], and if the person actually submits to the show of authority.’ ”
(People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 241 (Tacardon), quoting People v. Brown
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974.)
       The court “consider[s] the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a
detention occurred. [Citations.] Relevant circumstances may include: the presence of
multiple officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, the use of siren or overhead
emergency lights, physically touching the person, the use of a patrol car to block
movement, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with
the officer’s request is compelled.” (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 241-242.)
B. Analysis
       Almost none of the circumstances relevant to detention in Tacardon were present
here. While there were two deputies present, they did not activate their emergency lights

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or siren, display weapons, block defendant’s movement, or use a commanding tone of
voice. Deputy Ancrile used the spotlight only because the street was dark, and he did not
shine the spotlight on defendant. An officer’s use of a spotlight, standing alone, is not
enough to effect a detention. (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 247.)
       Defendant’s assertion that he was unlawfully detained essentially boils down to
whether Deputy Ancrile’s asking defendant for permission to search him for weapons
constituted a detention. It did not.
       “Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of
unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public
places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen. [Citations.] Even when
law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may
pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage—provided
they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.” (United States v. Drayton (2002)
536 U.S. 194, 200-201.)
       Deputy Ancrile did not use any coercive means when he asked defendant for
consent to search him for weapons. Merely making such a request does not constitute a
detention. (United States v. Drayton, supra, 536 U.S. at pp. 200-201.)
       Defendant argues this case is comparable to People v. Garry (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 1100 (Garry) and People v. Kasrawi (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 751
(Kasrawi), where courts found the defendant was unlawfully detained.
       In Garry, a detention was found after the officer “bathed defendant in light, exited
his police vehicle, and, armed and in uniform, ‘briskly’ walked 35 feet in ‘two and a half,
three seconds’ directly to him while questioning him . . . about his probation and parole
status,” disregarding in the process the defendant’s explanation that he was merely
standing in front of his house. (Garry, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111.)
       In Kasrawi, a detention was found when the officer “flooded him with his
spotlight, parked his marked police vehicle close to [the defendant’s] car, and

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immediately approached him while asking a pointed question.” (Kasrawi, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at p. 760.)
       This case is unlike Garry and Kasrawi. Deputy Ancrile did not walk rapidly up to
defendant; defendant approached the patrol car. Ancrile did ask if he could search
defendant for safety reasons, but his tone was conversational. Ancrile did not accuse
defendant of anything, and his manner did not suggest he suspected defendant of
anything.
       We conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s suppression motion.
                                            II
                                Penal Code Section 1170
       Defendant argues that, given his mental illness diagnosed in section 1368
proceedings, this case should be remanded for resentencing in compliance with
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).1 Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) requires the trial
court to impose the lower term if the defendant experienced psychological, physical, or
mental trauma that contributed to the commission of the offense, unless the court finds
that the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice because aggravating
factors outweigh mitigating factors. The People contend that defendant forfeited this
challenge. We agree.
       Defendant claims his counsel requested a lower term sentence because of his
history of mental illness documented in section 1368 proceedings. We have reviewed the
pages of the reporter’s transcript defendant cites, and nowhere does defense counsel
mention the lower term. Defendant’s sentencing brief also does not mention the lower

1 Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) was included in a number of amendments to section
1170 enacted by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3).
These amendments went into effect on January 1, 2022. Defendant was sentenced on
November 28, 2022. Section 1170 was further amended by Assembly Bill No. 960
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022, ch. 744, § 1) effective January 1, 2023, which made
no changes to the text of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).

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term, but rather requests the middle term.) In the brief, defense counsel referred to the
report of a doctor who examined defendant and concluded that defendant suffered from
schizophrenia. Counsel argued that rule 4.423(b)(2) states as a mitigating circumstance
that defendant was suffering from a mental condition that lessened culpability, and, more
specifically, rule 4.423(b)(4) identified as a mitigating circumstance that commission of
the current offense is connected to mental illness that includes schizophrenia. (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(5).)
          At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel reiterated that defendant was diagnosed
with schizophrenia “and the legislature has specifically directed the Court to mitigate
cases – to use that as a factor in mitigation beyond just the rules of court, which also
instructs the Court to do that from the supreme court.” This did not put the trial court on
notice that defendant sought a lower term sentence under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6).
          In fact, only the trial court mentioned section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) at the
sentencing hearing, observing that this provision “says that low term is required if the
person has experienced psychological, physical or childhood trauma, including but not
limited to abuse, neglect, exploitation or sexual violence.” However, defense counsel
responded he had briefed that “Rule of Court 4.423 subdivision B, subdivision 4, that
points to [section] 1385[, subdivision] (c)(5) as allowable diagnoses.” Thus, defense
counsel steered the trial court away from considering that provision as a basis for
imposition of a lower term.
          Further, counsel never asserted that defendant suffered psychological trauma due
to mental illness or that psychological trauma contributed to the offense. (See People v.
Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241 [“Psychological trauma must attend the illness,
and that trauma must contribute to the crime under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)”].)
          We conclude that defendant’s failure to raise the applicability of the lower term
provision of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) in the trial court forfeited the argument on

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appeal. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.)2
                                              III
                                    Abstract of Judgment
       The People contend, and defendant agrees, that the abstract of judgment must be
corrected to reflect the three-year stayed term imposed for the possession of ammunition
by a felon on count 2 in case No. STK-CR-FE-2021-12827. The trial court orally
imposed a three-year term for the possession of ammunition by a felon and stayed the
term. The abstract reflects that the sentence on count 2 is stayed under section 654 but
does not show any term imposed.
       We disagree that the abstract of judgment must show the length of a term stayed
under section 654. An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction. (People v.
Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070.) The delivery of an abstract of judgment
prescribed by sections 1213 and 1213.5 “commences the execution of judgment.”
(People v. Hong (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1076.)3 “Abstracts of judgment in matters
imposing imprisonment in state prison are orders sending the defendant to prison and
imposing the duty upon the warden to carry out the judgment.” (Hong, at p. 1076.)
Since the warden does not “carry out” a stayed sentence, the abstract need not include the

2 Defendant offers a cursory alternative claim that the trial court should have imposed
the middle term, because the only aggravating factor was defendant’s record of
convictions. This assertion is made without citation of authority or reasoned argument.
Accordingly, we will not consider it. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.) If we were to consider the issue, we would find no error.
(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 [“Only a single aggravating factor is
required to impose the upper term . . . .”].)
3 Section 1213 provides in relevant part that “if the judgment is for imprisonment in the
state prison . . . a copy of . . . an abstract of the judgment as provided in [s]ection 1213.5,
certified by the clerk of the court . . . shall be forthwith furnished to the officer whose
duty it is to execute the . . . judgment . . . .” Section 1213.5 provides that: “The abstract
of judgment provided for in Section 1213 shall be prescribed by the Judicial Council.”

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length of a term that will not be executed. To be sure, a sentence stayed under section
654 must be imposed, i.e., the trial court must select and sentence the defendant to a term
of imprisonment before staying the sentence. (People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th
1463, 1468-1469.) However, it is sufficient that trial court specify the term imposed and
stayed at the sentencing hearing. This information need not be included in the abstract of
judgment.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                  /s/
                                                 MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

 /s/
EARL, P.J.

 /s/
HULL, J.

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