Court Opinion

ID: 9750469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:00:01.759845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:10.791608
License: Public Domain

*121KELLY, Judge:
Appellant, Ronald M. Carelli, appeals from an order denying his petition for post-conviction relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. Appellant contends that prior counsel was ineffective in failing to seek suppression of all the evidence against him based upon an alleged illegal search and in failing to challenge the admissibility of certain statements alleged to be hearsay. We find no merit in the contentions, and accordingly affirm the order denying post-conviction relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At 8:30 p.m. on March 2, 1984, Mr. Gerald Shriver reported that his recently purchased, used Ford pickup truck had been stolen from the Washington County Mall sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 8:20 p.m. on March 2, 1984. Mr. Shriver gave a description to the police indicating that the stolen vehicle was a 1979 blue Ford, 150F, four wheel drive pickup with a white cap, fog lights, and a blue bug visor on the front. (N.T. 6/14/84 at 19, 23-24).
At approximately 10:15 p.m. a report was transmitted to Officer Dean Casciola from the police control center that an anonymous caller reported following the stolen truck from the Washington Mall to a garage located at a residence in Hickory, Pennsylvania approximately one half hour (driving) from the Washington Mall. (N.T. 6/14/84 at 30; see also Affidavit of Probable Cause attached to the March 19, 1984 Arrest Warrant). Officer Casciola went to the address indicated to investigate; he discovered appellant in the garage with the stolen truck. Appellant was arrested and charged with theft, conspiracy and receiving stolen property-
Appellant was tried, on June 14, 1984, before the Honorable Thomas D. Gladden, President Judge of the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, and a jury on a charge of receiving stolen property. At trial, appellant acknowledged that the stolen truck was in his garage and that he was in the garage when it was discovered by the police. His *122defense was that he had been helping his brother and sister-in-law move all day, he had returned home to get some tools from the garage only minutes before the police arrived, and, he had no idea that the truck in his garage had been stolen. He explained further that he often let others use his garage to work on their cars and when he arrived home on the evening in question his wife told him that his friend, Mr. Frank Mullaney, had left a vehicle in the garage and indicated that he would be back for it the next day. (N.T. 6/14/84 at 52-71). Significantly, appellant testified (contrary to Officer Casciola’s testimony) that he had left the garage door open approximately two feet when he entered the garage and when he came out to speak to the police officer, the officer was able to see almost the whole truck. (N.T. 6/14/84 at 64, 69). The clear import of appellant’s testimony was that he had nothing to hide and that he made no attempt to do so.
Appellant presented corroborative testimony from Mr. James Allen and his sister-in-law, Mrs. Kathleen Carelli. Mr. Allen testified that appellant permitted him, and others including Mr. Mullaney, to use appellant’s tools and to work on their vehicles in appellant’s garage. (N.T. 6/14/84 at 41-44). Mrs. Carelli testified that appellant had been helping her and appellant’s brother Larry move and that appellant left at about 9:30 p.m. to go to his garage for some tools so that he could reassemble some beds. (N.T. 6/14/84 at 47-48). Appellant’s wife did not testify at trial. Mr. Mullaney’s whereabouts were alleged to be unknown. (N.T. 6/14/84 at 46, 66-68).
The jury found appellant guilty of receiving stolen property. In post-verdict motions, appellant contended: the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict; the prosecution improperly and prejudicially stated that appellant was operating a “chop shop;” and two jurors were unduly influenced by the jury foreman. Post-verdict motions were denied. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a county facility of ten to twenty months; this court affirmed judgment of sentence by Per Curiam Order *123and Memorandum. See Commonwealth v. Carelli, 353 Pa.Super. 642, 506 A.2d 1334 (1985) (Per Curiam; Brosky, and Watkins, JJ., join; Cavanaugh, J., concurring).
Subsequently, appellant filed a pro se PCHA petition, and an amended pro se PCHA petition. Counsel was appointed for appellant and an amended counselled PCHA petition was filed. The counselled PCHA petition was later amended.
On October 8, 1986, a motion to set a date for an evidentiary hearing was filed on behalf of appellant; on that same date, the trial court entered an order scheduling an evidentiary hearing on the petitions for December 10, 1986. However, on December 10, 1986, appellant through counsel declined to present any evidence in support of the petition, electing instead to submit his case to the trial court based upon the record (which was stipulated to by the parties) and the arguments in the briefs submitted by the parties. The court noted on the record its receipt of appellant’s brief and directed the Commonwealth to file a response brief within ten days. The court also indicated its intent to review the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, and then to render a decision. (N.T. 12/10/86 at 1-2). On January 6, 1987, the trial court entered the following order:
AND NOW, this 6 day of January, 1987, upon consideration of the record, the Briefs and Arguments of counsel we find that defendant was at all times represented by competent counsel during the pre-trial and trial stages of this litigation. The search by Officer Casciola was made in plain view and the failure to make objections to alleged hearsay statements is without merit as it relates to competency of counsel. Defendant’s petition for Post Conviction Relief is denied.
Timely notice of appeal was filed, and this case is now properly before this Court for disposition.
I.
Initially, we note that in PCHA proceedings, the trial court sits as finder of fact. It is, therefore, the province of *124the trial court as finder of fact to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve all conflicts in the evidence; it is the prerogative of a finder of fact to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. See Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 449 Pa. 70, 73-74, 295 A.2d 282, 284 (1972); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 355 Pa.Super. 123, 131-32, 512 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1986). On review, we are bound by findings of fact which have support in the record, but not by the trial court's conclusions of law. See Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 319 Pa.Super. 115, 124-25, 465 A.2d 1256, 1261 (1983); citing Commonwealth v. May, 485 Pa. 371, 402 A.2d 1008 (1979); cf. Commonwealth v. White, 358 Pa.Super. 120, 123, 516 A.2d 1211, 1212-13 (1986) (review of findings of a suppression hearing).
Although appellant was granted an evidentiary hearing, he declined to present any witnesses, electing instead to submit the case to the trial court on the basis of the record and the briefs. Appellant contended, essentially, that prior counsel had been ineffective as a matter of law. Our review of some, but not all, of the claims raised in this case is substantially hindered by the failure of the trial court to comply with the dictate of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1506(5) which provides:
When a court grants a post-conviction hearing, it shall:
(5) Cause all evidence adduced at the hearing to be recorded, file a statement of record setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law,____
(Emphasis added). The order of January 6, 1987, contains conclusions of law but no findings of fact. Consequently, an order directing the trial court to file an opinion or memorandum setting forth the findings of fact upon which the January 6, 1987 order is based would ordinarily be appropriate. See Commonwealth v. Rohde, 485 Pa. 404, 402 A.2d 1025 (1979); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 319 Pa.Super. 521, 466 A.2d 666 (1983). It is not for this Court to review the record and substitute its assessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the finder of fact below. A reviewing court is *125bound to honor the right and obligation of the finder of fact to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented; and, is likewise constrained from speculating upon matters not in evidence. See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 512 Pa. 540, 546, 517 A.2d 1256, 1259 (1986). However, for the reasons which follow we find remand unnecessary in the instant case.
II.
In order to prevail upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant has the burden to establish: 1) by act or omission counsel was arguably ineffective; 2) the act or omission challenged could not have had an objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interest; and 3) appellant was prejudiced by the act or omission in that but for the challenged act or omission there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been more favorable to appellant. See Commonwealth v. Petras, 368 Pa.Super. 372, 374-78, 534 A.2d 483, 484-85 (1987) (collecting cases). If an appellant makes a sufficiently specific proffer to establish an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, then such an appellant will be entitled to an evidentiary hearing in which appellant will have the opportunity to support its claims and the Commonwealth will have the opportunity to rebut the claims. Id. At such a hearing, however, the burden remains upon appellant to translate arguable claims into actual proof of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
When, as in this case, an assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is based upon the failure to pursue a suppression motion, proof of the merit of the underlying suppression claim is necessary to establish the merit of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Kitrell v. Dakota, 373 Pa.Super. 66, 74-75, 540 A.2d 301, 305 (1988), citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). In Kimmelman, the United States Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, explained:
The essence of an ineffective assistance claim is that counsel’s unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial *126balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect. See e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 80 L Ed 2d 674, 104 S Ct 2052; United States v. Cronic, 466 US 648, 655-657, 80 L Ed 2d 657, 104 S Ct 2039 [2044-2046], (1984). In order to prevail, the defendant must show both that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Strickland, 466 US, at 688, 80 L Ed 2d 674, 104 S Ct 2052 [at 2065], and that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id., at 694, 80 L Ed 2d 674, 104 S Ct 2052 [at 2068]. Where defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Thus, while respondent’s defaulted Fourth Amendment claim is one element of proof of his Sixth Amendment claim, the two claims have separate identities and reflect different constitutional values.
477 U.S. at 374-75, 106 S.Ct. at 2583, 91 L.Ed.2d at 318-19. (Emphasis added). Cf. Commonwealth v. Kay, 330 Pa.Super. 89, 95, 478 A.2d 1366, 1369 (1984) (ineffectiveness claim based on failure to pursue suppression motion was without merit because the underlying suppression claim was without merit; counsel’s failure to pursue the meritless claim was deemed reasonable).
Thus, while presentation of an arguable omitted suppression claim may have entitled appellant to an evidentiary hearing, appellant was not entitled to relief unless he established at the evidentiary hearing that: his suppression claim would have prevailed at a suppression hearing; there was no objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interests for counsel’s failure to pursue a suppression motion; and, there was a reasonable probability that, if the *127evidence had been suppressed, the result of the trial would have been more favorable to appellant.
Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek suppression of all evidence derived as the result of Officer Casciola’s allegedly unconstitutional search of appellee’s garage. Despite the absence of findings of fact resolving certain conflicts in the evidence, we find that there is no merit in appellant’s underlying suppression claim. Moreover, an objectively reasonable tactical basis for not pursuing the suppression claim appears on the face of the record. Accordingly, we find no merit in appellant’s first ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Appellant’s second and third ineffectiveness claims lack underlying merit; moreover, there is no reasonable probability that had the challenged evidence been excluded the result of the trial would have been more favorable to appellee. Consequently, we affirm the order denying post-conviction relief.
III.
Appellant argues that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is violated when a police officer investigating an anonymous tip that a stolen truck was located in a garage on a particular residential property: proceeds to the address; enters the property; knocks on the front door of the house located on the property; speaks to the wife; asks to speak to the husband; is informed that the husband is in the garage; follows the wife to the garage; and, while standing outside the garage looks over the husband’s shoulder through the open garage door and sees the stolen truck. Appellant argues that the visual observation of the interior of the garage was a search of a protected area and that the plain view exception could not apply because: 1) the interior of the garage could not be seen by a passerby; and 2) the view was not inadvertent because the anonymous tip provided Officer Casciola with probable cause for a search and Officer Casciola knew that the evidence he sought was in the garage. We cannot agree.
*128A.
We note, initially, that the record does in fact contain evidence that: Officer Casciola was able to see the stolen truck inside the garage by looking over appellant’s shoulder as appellant opened, then quickly closed, the garage door (N.T. 6/14/84 at 32) (testimony of Officer Casciola); the only way into the garage was through a sliding garage door (N.T. 6/14/84 at 54); the garage windows were boarded up (N.T. 6/14/84 at 64); and, the property in question was zoned residential, was leased to appellant, and contained a small ranch house and a two to three car garage “adjacent” to the house. (N.T. 6/14/84 at 30, 36, 38, 42, and 53). From these isolated excerpts of the record, the dissent finds that the garage was part of the protected curtilage of appellant’s residence, and further finds that appellant took security measures and exposed the interior of his garage only when it became unavoidable to shield it from view, i.e. upon opening the garage in order to exit and respond to police questioning. The dissent concludes that these “facts” establish an unreasonable search.
While the transcript excerpts above could certainly support inferences that the garage was within the curtilage and that appellant took security measures to protect the privacy of the interior of the garage, we find those isolated excerpts to be inconclusive and misleading in material respects. We note that the following excerpt from appellant’s testimony clearly contradicts the testimony of Officer Casciola relied upon by the dissent:
Q. Your garage has windows, is that correct?
A. But they’re boarded up.
Q. And the garage door was open?
A. About two foot.
Q. And you opened it whenever you greeted him?
A. Chief Casciola, no. When I went in I opened them up and turned the lights on and walked over to my box and got my stuff and I was right where I was getting my stuff and my wife said, ‘Ron, there is a *129police officer out there who would like to see you.’ And I said, ‘Alright, I’ll be right out.’
Q. How long did you talk to him?
A. About three minutes, I guess, about that. He just shook my hand and he said there was a disturbance of noise and he was standing there and he shook my hand and he said there had been a disturbance of noise [sic] and I said, ‘It couldn’t be me, I just got here.’
(N.T. 6/14/84 at 64) (testimony of appellant). (Emphasis added). We also note appellant’s testimony that: he left the garage doors open about two feet when he went in to get his tools (N.T. 6/14/84 at 55, 64); while he was in the garage his wife called in and told him a police officer wanted to talk to him (N.T. 6/14/84 at 57-58, 64, 69); he did not have to move the garage doors to exit the garage (N.T. 6/14/84 at 55); he spoke with Officer Casciola for about three minutes (N.T. 6/14/84 at 64); and, Officer Casciola “saw almost like the whole truck____” (N.T. 6/14/84 at 69). Officer Casciola’s assertion that appellant opened and then quickly closed the door behind him is explicitly contradicted by appellant’s testimony.
Appellant contended, essentially, that he had no reason to think the truck was stolen and made no attempt to hide it from Officer Casciola’s view. Thus, the record contains conflicting evidence as to whether appellant in fact took security measures to preserve the privacy of the interior of the garage. It was for the fact finder, not this Court, to resolve that conflict.1
*130Moreover, the record is inconclusive as to whether the garage was within the curtilage of the house. From this record it is unclear how far the house was from the garage, or how far the garage was from the road. Similarly, the record is silent as to where Officer Casciola stood in relation to the road, the drive, the garage and the house. We are unable, therefore, to determine from the present record whether Officer Casciola was standing inside or outside the curtilage when he looked into appellant’s garage. Although there is evidence of record indicating that the lot was zoned residential, there is no indication of the size of the lot. The characterization of the garage as “adjacent” to the house only vaguely indicates proximity to the house.2 While the fact finder could have inferred from the present record that Officer Casciola and the garage were located within the curtilage, we do not believe it is appropriate for this Court *131to draw such inferences for itself on appeal, especially when, as here, the inference drawn goes against the party who prevailed in the court below. If these factual issues were dispositive of the instant appeal, we would be compelled to remand.
B.
As indicated above, we find that the stipulated record contains sparce, vague, and contradictory evidence as to the precise circumstances of Officer Casciola’s view of the interior of appellant’s garage. Despite the lingering uncertainties, however, we find that the present record nonetheless establishes the absence of an unconstitutional search.
1.
The officer’s view of the interior of appellant’s garage could only be found to violate appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights if appellant exhibited an actual expectation of privacy which society is willing to accept as objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See California v. Greenwood, — U.S. —, —, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1628, 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 35 (1988) (citing cases). While it is axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)), the determination of whether an actual and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy existed requires some reference to place. Id., 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Generally, a subjective expectation of privacy as to that which is located in an area of common access will be deemed to be unreasonable; and therefore, visual observation of evidence located in open view in an unprotected area does not constitute a search so as to trigger Fourth Amendment protections. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (no search occurred when police standing outside the curtilage of a house looked into a barn which was also located outside the curtilage of the house); Commonwealth v. Chiesa, 329 *132Pa.Super. 401, 406-07, 478 A.2d 850, 853 (1984) (no search when police officer shined flashlight and looked into car which was parked unattended in a driveway shared with visitors and fellow tenants); see also I LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 2.2(a) at 322-23 (2nd Ed.1987); Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine, 26 Mercer L.Rev. 1047, 1097-98 (1975).
Likewise, mere observation of evidence located in a protected area, from a lawful vantage point outside the protected area, is generally deemed not to be a search. See United States v. Dunn, supra; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-15, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1812-13, 90 L.Ed.2d 210, 216-17 (1986) (aerial observation of evidence located within the curtilage of a home from a vantage point within the public airspace was not a search); Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2, 6, 493 A.2d 1346, 1348-49 (1985) (dicta)-, Commonwealth v. Weik, 360 Pa.Super. 560, 563-65, 521 A.2d 44, 46-47 (1987) (dicta); Commonwealth v. Busfield, 242 Pa.Super. 194, 198-99, 363 A.2d 1227, 1228-29 (1976) (observations of evidence inside a residence, viewed from adjacent property through a sheer curtain was not a search); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 914, 91 S.Ct. 886, 27 L.Ed.2d 813 (1971) (observation of evidence inside print shop, viewed with binoculars from ladder on adjacent property through an open second floor window was not a search).3
As noted above, absent mechanical assistance, the mere observation of evidence from a lawful vantage point is generally deemed not to invade a reasonable expectation of *133privacy and therefore not to constitute a search. Because there is no search, there is no need for an exception to permit admission of testimony relating to the observation. Hence, such cases may properly be distinguished as relying on an open view or plain view doctrine, rather than the plain view exception as formulated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971) (plurality) reh. den. 404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971), and refined in its progeny. See I LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a) at 320-23; Moylan, supra, at 1097-98; Note, “Plain View,” Anything But Plain, 7 Loyola L.R. 489, 489 n. 3 (1974).
The plain view exception is ordinarily applicable where there has been a physical intrusion into a protected area prior to the observation of the evidence, or where physical intrusion for a search or seizure follows an initial (non-search) observation from outside a protected area. The orthodox statement of the plain view exception is, that before the police may conduct a warrantless search or seizure of evidence in plain view: the police must be lawfully present at the vantage point from which the evidence is discovered; the discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent; and, the probable evidentiary value of the evidence must be immediately apparent.4
2.
The uncertainties which remain unresolved in the instant case as to where the garage and Officer Casciola were located in relation to the curtilage of appellant’s house cloud our inquiry as to whether the plain view doctrine or *134the plain view exception apply. If either Officer Casciola or the garage were physically located outside the curtilage of appellant’s house, then we would find that Officer Casciola’s brief unassisted observations of the stolen truck inside the garage fell within the plain view doctrine, no search occurred, and that our inquiry was at an end. Nonetheless, we will assume for the purpose of discussion (as the dissent finds) that both Officer Casciola and the garage were located within the curtilage of appellant’s house at the time of Officer Casciola’s observation of the stolen truck inside appellant’s garage, and that, technically speaking, Officer Casciola was trespassing.
Undeniably, one of the primary sources of a reasonable expectation of privacy is the right to exclude trespassers which attaches to property rights. Cf. Commonwealth v. Lemanski, 365 Pa.Super. 332, 346, 529 A.2d 1085, 1091 (1987), citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 401 n. 12 (1978). However, the right to exclude trespassers and the existence of an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy are not co-extensive. For example, observations made by a person trespassing in an open field are not deemed to invade the property owner’s reasonable expectations of privacy. See Annotation, Supreme Court’s Development of “Open Fields Doctrine” with Respect to Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Protections, 80 L.Ed.2d 860 (1986 & 1987 Supp.).
While the curtilage area surrounding a house is, of course, a protected area which lies outside the ambit of the open fields doctrine, Commonwealth v. Cihylik, 337 Pa.Super. 221, 230-31, 486 A.2d 987, 992 (1985), this Court has held in several cases that evidence was reasonably and therefore constitutionally acquired despite the fact that the investigating officer was technically trespassing upon the curtilage of the property when the evidence was discovered. See Commonwealth v. McKeirnan, 337 Pa.Super. 403, 487 A.2d 7 (1985) (police officer’s trespass on private land was reasonable in order to investigate possible shooting and to *135speak with particular person thought to be present at the property and the evidence obtained while trespassing was therefore admissible, collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Shannon, 320 Pa.Super. 552, 467 A.2d 850 (1983) (police officer’s entry into curtilage area was reasonable in response to a “fight in progress” radio report, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa.Super. 278, 421 A.2d 721 (1980) (police officer’s approach to apartment, then “consensual” entry into apartment was reasonable in response to anonymous tip of an abduction in progress, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); Commonwealth v. Cubler, 236 Pa.Super. 614, 346 A.2d 814 (1975) (police officer’s entry into curtilage area was reasonable to retrieve black bag suspiciously discarded or hidden by suspect in a doghouse, the evidence obtained while trespassing was admissible); accord People v. Home, 425 Mich. 82, 92 & n. 1, 387 N.W.2d 807, 811 & n. 1 (1986) (police officer’s entry into curtilage area to look into a garage through a window was reasonable to investigate anonymous tip concerning a stolen car, collecting cases); Pistro v. State, 590 P.2d 884, 886-87 (Alaska 1979) (police officer investigating an anonymous tip that a stolen truck was in a particular garage, who could not see into garage from street, reasonably walked up the driveway to look into the garage, and, therefore, was lawfully in a position to see the stolen truck in the garage when the garage door was opened).5 Indeed, “the presence or *136absence of an accompanying trespass is merely a factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of a visual intrusion.” Commonwealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa.Super. 458, 462, 289 A.2d 119, 122 (1972).
In light of the above cases and the minimal trespass involved in the instant case, we find that, even assuming that Officer Casciola and the garage were located within the curtilage, Officer Casciola’s presence in front of the garage door was reasonable. Succinctly, it was reasonable for Officer Casciola to investigate the anonymous tip by going to appellant’s home and knocking on his front door; and, upon learning that appellant (with whom he wished to speak) was in the garage, it was reasonable for Officer Casciola to follow appellant’s wife to the garage door in order to speak with appellant. Hence, his presence in front of the garage door must be deemed to be legitimate and lawful.
3.
We are not of the opinion that consent was required for Officer Casciola to follow Mrs. Carelli from the front porch to the garage door when she indicated her husband was in the garage. We note, however, that this Court has implied consent to follow in similar circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, supra, 421 A.2d at 723 (suspect who did not answer an investigating officer’s question but silently re-entered apartment was deemed to have impliedly consented to the entry of the police officers into the apartment in order to continue the questioning) (per Brosky, J.).
Even assuming consent was required, the fact that Officer Casciola did not disclose to appellant’s wife his primary reason for wanting to speak with appellant, and in fact deceived her in this regard, would not render her implied consent invalid and his presence in front of the garage door *137unreasonable. Appellant contends that under Commonwealth v. Poteete, 274 Pa.Super. 490, 418 A.2d 513 (1980), Officer Casciola’s deception as to why he wanted to speak to appellant vitiated any implied consent by appellant’s wife for Officer Casciola to follow her to the garage. We cannot agree.
The divided panel in Poteete held that a uniformed police officer who ostensibly entered appellant’s home to continue an investigation of the theft of appellant’s car was not legitimately in appellant’s home (in order to meet the requisites of the plain view exception) when he failed to disclose prior to his “consensual” entry that an alternate reason for his visit was to confirm his suspicion that appellant was in possession of stolen furniture. 418 A.2d at 516-17. The Poteete panel majority specifically relied upon Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 85-86, 190 A.2d 709, 711 (1963) (“consent may not be gained through stealth, deceit, or misrepresentation, and that if such exists this is tantamount to implied coercion”). We are unpersuaded that Commonwealth v. Poteete, 274 Pa.Super. 490, 418 A.2d 513 (1980) , remains valid precedent or that it is applicable to the instant case.
In Commonwealth v. Morrison, 275 Pa.Super. 454, 418 A.2d 1378 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Morrison v. Pennsylvania, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 863, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981) , filed two months after Poteete, an en banc panel of this Court found that an undercover police officer’s use of a ruse to gain entry into a barn to confirm suspicions that the barn was being used to store large quantities of marijuana did not vitiate consent and render the intrusion an illegal search. The en banc panel expressly distinguished Commonwealth v. Wright, supra, as having been decided prior to the announcement of the constitutional standard for Fourth Amendment waivers in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). We find Poteete to be equally distinguishable based upon its reliance on pre-Schneckloth precedent. We note that in Commonwealth v. Markman, 320 Pa.Super. 304, 313, 467 A.2d 336, *138341 (1983), a panel of this Court, citing Morrison and not Poteete, stated unequivocally, “[cjonsent may be deemed voluntary even when procured by a police officer who misrepresents both his identity and purpose for making the search.” We note that Judge Hoffman, who authored the majority opinion for the divided panel in Poteete, joined the opinion in Markman.
The en banc panel in Commonwealth v. Morrison did not, as the dissent suggests, improperly overrule our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wright. Review of the decision in Wright reveals that no state constitutional claim was presented and that the case was decided entirely and exclusively upon application of federal case precedent. Commonwealth v. Wright, supra, 190 A.2d at 710-711. Thus, the en banc panel in Morrison acted within its authority in following subsequent federal cases rather than Wright’s previous construction of the federal law. We note that in Commonwealth v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879 (1970), decided after Wright but prior to Schneckloth or Morrison, our Supreme Court declined to apply Wright’s total proscription on the use of deception, acknowledged that police had been granted broad but not unlimited powers to use deception in gaining consent to search, and specifically held that whatever the limits on the use of ruse and deception may be, it did not require suppression of a murder weapon acquired by a uniformed police officer from a suspect by means of deceit as to the purpose for wanting the gun. Though Wright has not been expressly overruled, its vitality as precedent has been substantially eroded if not eliminated.
Moreover, we note that in the context of Miranda waivers and confessions, the United States Supreme Court has recently explained that:
This Court has never held that mere silence as to the subject matter of an interrogation is “trickery” sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights, and we expressly decline so to hold today.
*139‘[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.’... Hence, the additional information could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essential voluntary and knowing nature.
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 575-77, 107 S.Ct. 851, 858-59, 93 L.Ed.2d 954, 967 (1987); accord Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523-524, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). We find that an appropriate analogy may be drawn to the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights by appellant’s wife’s initial implied consent to permit Officer Casciola to follow her to the garage.
We also find Poteete distinguishable from the instant case in that Poteete involved permission to enter a home, while the instant case involves, at most, silent consent to follow appellant’s wife from the front door of a home to the garage door (assuming, of course, that any consent was required).
With regard to whether valid consent was given by appellant’s wife for the later search of the garage and seizure of evidence, we note that the only references to the consent given by Mrs. Carelli (appellant’s wife) which appear in the record are as follows:
Q. Okay, you had a consent to search the garage, is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And in the garage you found the vehicle owned by Mr. Shriver, is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
(N.T. 6/14/84 at 28) (cross-examination of Officer Lawrence Garner); and:
Q. Did you eventually locate the registration certificate?
A. No, not at this point. Not until Officer Garner came over to the scene and we proceeded into the house to talk with Mrs. Carelli who is the only one available at *140that time. She stated her husband was not there and we talked to her and she gave us a consent to search the garage. Myself, Officer Garner, and two state troopers went into the garage and removed this vehicle from the garage.
(N.T. 6/14/84 at 32) (direct examination of Officer Casciola). Thus, the only statements of record upon this subject are the unchallenged assertions of two Commonwealth witnesses that consent to search was given. The assertions were not contested at trial; and no evidence has since been adduced to suggest the consent was not given or that it was invalid; and therefore, the vague suggestion of possible coercion must be rejected. Cf. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 235 Pa.Super. 299, 302-03, 341 A.2d 141, 143 (1975) (coercion would not be implied based solely upon request for consent by a uniformed police officer). Appellant has clearly failed to meet his burden to establish the merit of his underlying suppression claim in this respect. See Kitrell v. Dakota, supra. It may well be that we could imagine quite easily evidence which would have brought the unchallenged assertions into doubt; nonetheless, it is not for an appellate court to speculate upon matters not in evidence. Commonwealth v. Griscavage, supra.
4.
The appellant argues that in light of the detailed anonymous tip and Officer Casciola’s deliberate effort to look over appellant’s shoulder into the garage, the inadvertence requirement cannot be met. We cannot agree.
Initially, we note that the applicability of the inadvertence requirement to the instant case is uncertain. It is clear that the inadvertence requirement applies when a warrantless seizure of evidence located within a protected area is to be made and ordinarily does not apply when an unassisted observation of a protected area is made from outside a protected area. However, it is unclear whether the requirement applies to mere observation of evidence made by a police officer reasonably located at a vantage point within a protected area. See LaFave, supra, 10 Crim.L.Bull. at *14125-26 (the purpose of the inadvertence requirement is to safeguard possessory interests, not privacy). But see Commonwealth v. Adams, 234 Pa.Super. 475, 479, 341 A.2d 206, 208 (1975) {dicta, if “view” takes place after physical intrusion then objects will be admissible only if view was inadvertent).
Nonetheless, we find that, assuming “inadvertence” is required, it is present in the instant case. While Officer Casciola had reasonable suspicions that evidence of a crime might be discovered on the basis of the anonymous tip, he did not know that evidence was located in the garage nor did he have probable cause for a search of the garage. Cf. Commonwealth v. Sorrell, 319 Pa.Super. 103, 465 A.2d 1250 (1983). The deliberate observation of an area in which a police officer has reasonable suspicions, but not probable cause, to believe evidence of a crime might be discovered, is “inadvertent” as that term is used in the context of the plain view exception. See Commonwealth v. Casuccio, 308 Pa.Super. 450, 469, 454 A.2d 621, 630-31 (1982); Commonwealth v. Terra, 292 Pa.Super. 250, 260, 437 A.2d 29, 34 (1981); accord Moylan, supra, at 1083.
5.
Finally, we note that the third component of the orthodox statement of the plain view exception — that the probable evidentiary value of the evidence be immediately apparent — does not apply to cases involving mere observation as opposed to a search or seizure of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Weik, supra, 360 Pa.Superior Ct. at 564, 521 A.2d at 46; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (movement of stereo to reveal the serial number constituted a search rather than mere observation based upon movement of the stereo); Commonwealth v. Norris, 498 Pa. 308, 316, 446 A.2d 240, 250 (1982) (police executing an arrest warrant were lawfully in position to view items laying about in the bedroom but not to search, by lifting a mattress, and seize evidence not in plain view).
Thus, we find that even assuming, arguendo, that Officer Casciola trespassed on the curtilage and looked deliberately *142into a private area (the interior of the garage), his presence in front of the garage door was nonetheless reasonable and his view of the stolen truck was constitutional under the circumstances of this case. Hence, appellant’s ineffectiveness claim is without merit.
IV.
Moreover, regardless of the underlying merit of the suppression claim, appellant’s ineffectiveness claim must fail based upon the existence of an objectively reasonable tactical basis for counsel not to have pursued the suppression claim. Succinctly, counsel reasonably chose between two basically contradictory theories of defense.
In this case, counsel could seek to establish that Officer Casciola violated appellant’s actual and reasonable expectation of privacy as to the inside of the garage, or he could seek to establish that the stolen truck was put in the garage by appellant’s erstwhile friend, Mr. Mullaney, and that appellant did not know the truck was stolen. While counsel could have arguably pursued both theories (a man can undoubtedly have nothing to hide and still actively seek to preserve his privacy), to forcefully present one claim in this case would necessarily weaken the other.
We disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that counsel had nothing to lose and everything to gain by pursuing a suppression motion. Appellant’s suppression testimony could be used for impeachment purposes at trial. See Commonwealth v. Sparrow, 471 Pa. 490, 370 A.2d 712 (1977); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 271 Pa.Super. 206, 215, 412 A.2d 886, 890 (1979). By pursuing a suppression motion, counsel would have risked undermining appellant’s theory of defense on the merits of the charges. In order to fully support the theory of defense, counsel sought to establish free access by Mr. Mullaney to the garage, and the absence of any conduct suggesting that appellant knew that the truck was stolen, e.g. appellant quickly closing the garage door to prevent Officer Casciola from seeing the stolen truck. Any evidence suggesting that appellant tried *143to preserve the privacy of the garage could have been construed by the jury as evidence that appellant knew that the truck was stolen.
Moreover, disclosure by appellant during a suppression hearing that he permitted free access to the garage by numerous persons, he left the garage door open two feet when he entered the garage on the night in question, and that the door remained open while he talked with Officer Casciola for three minutes (facts to which he testified at trial), would have substantially undermined any assertion of an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy as to the interior of the garage, thereby substantially reducing any likelihood of success on a suppression motion.
The existence of the above objectively reasonable tactical basis for counsel’s decision to forego the suppression claim requires that appellant’s ineffectiveness claim regarding the suppression motion must fail. See Commonwealth v. Petras, supra.
V.
Finally, we find no merit in appellant’s claims of ineffectiveness predicated upon counsel’s alleged error in failing to object to testimony by the police officer witnesses concerning out-of-court statements alleged to have been inadmissible hearsay. Specifically, appellant objects to Officer Garner’s testimony regarding the police radio report announcing the theft and the content of the anonymous tip and appellant’s wife’s statement to Officer Casciola that appellant was in the garage.
First, the statements were not hearsay as none of the statements were admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein; rather, they were properly admitted for the purpose of establishing the reasons for the police officers’ courses of conduct during their investigation. Commonwealth v. Ryan, 253 Pa.Super. 92, 384 A.2d 1243 (1978). Alternately, we find no reasonable probability that but for the admission of those statements or the absence of a limiting instruction regarding those statements, the out*144come of the trial would have been more favorable to appellant; consequently, appellant’s ineffectiveness claims must fail. See Commonwealth v. Petras, supra.
CONCLUSION
Because appellant failed to meet his burden to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the order denying post-conviction relief.
BROSKY, J., files dissenting opinion.

. The dissent suggests that appellant’s testimony, which clearly supports inferences in favor of the Commonwealth on the Fourth Amendment claim, must be ignored because it is directly contradicted by the testimony of Officer Casciola, a Commonwealth witness. As the dissent notes, it is commonly stated that "in determining whether the findings of fact are supported by the record, we are to consider only the evidence of the appellee and so much of the appellant which, as read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted.” See e.g. Commonwealth v. White, 358 Pa.Super. 120, 123, 516 A.2d 1211 (1986), citing Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 215-16, 469 A.2d 137, 139 (1983).
*130However, it is axiomatic that a finder of fact is free to believe all, part or none of each witness’ testimony. Commonwealth v. Arms, 489 Pa. 35, 39, 413 A.2d 684, 686 (1980). Thus, the PCHA court, acting as finder of fact in this case, could have credited appellant’s testimony over Officer Casciola’s on this one issue, yet still have rejected the remainder of appellant’s testimony. Accordingly, in a case such as this, the standard for determining whether a finding is supported by the record would be more appropriately expressed as follows — in determining whether the findings of fact are supported by the record, we are to consider all the evidence of record which supports the finding, from whatever source, and only such evidence of record which negates the finding which, as taken in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Moreover, with respect to “uncontradicted” evidence, due regard would have to be given to the fact that a trial court may simply reject evidence offered as "not credible," even where direct contradiction is not present.
To suggest that the general dictum must be applied on appeal so as to require consideration of evidence which negates a finding, and rejection of other evidence which supports a finding based upon which party offered the evidence, is to ignore the right of the fact finder to find that a witness’ testimony contains some truth and some fiction; this we find contrary to law and common sense. Consequently, we reject the dissent’s overliteral construction of the general dictum stated above.

. See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, at 56 (1986) (distinguishing “adjacent," “adjoining,” “contiguous,” and "juxtaposed”). The fact that "adjacent” may imply the absence of similar structures between the house and the garage does not resolve the uncertainties indicated above.

. However, some mechanically aided observations have been deemed to be unreasonable intrusions despite the fact that the observer was located at a vantage point outside the protected area. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500, 431 A.2d 964, 966 (1981) (use of "startron” by police to conduct extended nighttime surveillance through uncurtained third floor apartment window was unreasonable where surveillance involved observation of intimate acts of persons who were not properly a focus of the surveillance; but, observations with naked eye and ordinary binoculars were not unreasonable ); see also Nicholson, Mechanically Aided Observations Under the Fourth Amendment, 11 Search and Seizure L.R. 1, 1-7 (1984).

. See generally I LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2 at 320-350; Hall, Search and Seizure, §§ 3.9-3.16 at 62-71 (1982 & 1987 Cumm. Supp.); Annotation, Validity of Seizure Under Fourth Amendment “Plain View” Doctrine — Supreme Court Cases, 75 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1985 & 1987 Supp.), superceding 29 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1972), 14-31 L.Ed.2d Later Case Service 451 (1983); Note, Recent Cases — Justification of a Warrantless Seizure Under the Plain View Doctrine, 88 Dickinson L.Rev. 549, 549-64 (1984); Cintron, The Plain View Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 10 Search and Seizure L.Rep. 173, 173-80 (1980); Moylan, supra; Note, "Plain View” — Anything But Plain, 7 Loyola L.Rev. 489 (1974); LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court, 8 Crim.L.Bull. 9, 9-30 (1972). *136387 N.W.2d at 811 n. 1 (Cavanaugh, J., concurring; Riley, J., joins). (Citations omitted); accord California v. Greenwood, supra (the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public).

. In People v. Houze, supra, Justice Cavanaugh of the Michigan Supreme Court noted:
It is not objectionable for an officer to come upon that part of the property which ‘has been opened to public common use.’ The route which any visitor to a residence would use is not private in the Fourth Amendment sense, and thus if police take the route ‘for the purpose of making a general inquiry’ or for some other legitimate reason, they are ‘free to keep their eyes open,’ and thus ‘it is permissible for them to look into a garage or similar structure from that location.’ 1 LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 2.3, p. 318.
Courts have upheld police entries onto driveways, carports, front walks, and porches as nonintrusive____ In each case, the courts found that the officers’ observations were made from a normal means of ingress or egress.