Court Opinion

ID: 9465179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:38:15.473169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:01.278371
License: Public Domain

ROSENN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I cannot, however, join them in holding that the district court may require the return of the seized property under the district court’s “powers to supervise law enforcement officials and the United States Attorney within its jurisdiction.” I believe this court, in formulating standards concerning the retention of goods and cash seized by the Government under a valid warrant, should not rely upon such undefined powers.
I recognize that federal courts do have certain inherent supervisory powers. The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its broad judicial powers of supervision of criminal justice in the federal courts, may formulate rules of evidence to be applied in criminal prosecutions, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322, 341, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1942), and courts of appeals have the power to supervise proceedings within their jurisdiction. See United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 7 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096, 95 S.Ct. 690, 42 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974); Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 1973). The district courts have supervisory powers to discipline attorneys subject to their jurisdiction. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 355, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931).
Under their authority to discipline attorneys and Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, district courts may order the return or the suppression of illegally seized evidence held by the United States Attorney, even when there are no other criminal or civil proceedings pending. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 450 F.2d 199, 207-08 (3d Cir. 1971) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972). But in those cases cited by the majority in which courts have exercised such authority, the orders for return or suppression have been based on a finding that the Government seized the evidence in violation of a statute or the Constitution. Go-Bart Importing Co., supra (violation of Fourth Amendment); United States v. Chapman, 559 F.2d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1977) (dictum, since criminal proceedings had already begun; court looks for “callous disregard” of constitutional rights); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, supra at 209 (violation of statute and Fourth’ Amendment); Lord v. Kelley, 223 F.Supp. 684, 690 (D.Mass.1963), appeal dism’d, 334 F.2d 742 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961, 85 S.Ct. 650, 13 L.Ed.2d 556 (1965) (violation of Fourth Amendment).1
Margolis concedes that the seizure of the goods and cash was lawful. If, therefore, the district court is to direct return of the goods and cash, the basis of the order must be that the continued retention by the United States Attorney deprives Margolis of property without due process.
I believe that the due process issue raised by appellant cannot be avoided. When upon remand the district court, applying the standards established by this court, decides whether further retention of the property is reasonable, it must decide whether *1306under the circumstances Margolis has been deprived of property without due process of law.

. An order to return the goods and cash would not fit within the supervisory power recognized in United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dism’d as improvidently granted, 436 U.S. 31, 98 S.Ct. 1873, 56 L.Ed.2d 53 (1978). Although there the appellate court imposed a sanction for the conduct of a Strike Force prosecutor, that sanction was a direction that the trial court suppress certain testimony in the proceedings before it. 547 F.2d at 776-77. The context of Jacobs, moreover, differed importantly from that of the case now before the court. In Jacobs the prosecutor had violated the Department of Justice’s own guidelines and the uniform practice of United States Attorneys within the circuit to advise a potential defendant appearing before the grand jury that he was a target of the investigation. In the instant case, we have no violation of rule or law unless it be due process.