Court Opinion

ID: 9644926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:08:49.391337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:20.207069
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On October 23, 1987, we delivered our original opinion in this cause. Both parties have filed motions for rehearing.
Appellees English and Gene Musick claim we erred in our analysis of certain provisions of the 1985 Texas Election Code, and in holding that Judge Morgan’s November 13, 1986, appointment of Rice as County Commissioner for a term of office extending from January 1, 1987, to the 1988 General Election was valid. We are persuaded that our decision is correct. Ap-pellees’ Motion for Rehearing is overruled.
Appellant Rice asserts that we erred in refusing to address his second point of error reading, “The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment.”
*445Rice’s argument is, that the decisions in Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 316 S.W.2d 396, 400-401 (1958), Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Rw. Co. v. McBride, 159 Tex. 442, 322 S.W.2d 492, 496 (1958), Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Galveston, Inc. v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111, 115 (1960), and Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex.1980), mandate a ruling on his second point of error.
The prayer set forth in Rice’s motion for rehearing reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays that this Court grant this Motion for Rehearing and reform its prior Judgment by sustaining his second point of error that the Trail [sic] Court erred in overruling his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Appellant further prays that this Court enter the Judgment that the Trial Court should have entered:
(1.) A declaratory Judgment of entitlement to the office of County Commissioner, Precinct 2, of Houston County, Texas, from November 13, 1986, to the general election in 1988, and until his successor shall have been elected and qualified.
(2.) A Writ of Mandamus to Defendants to reinstate Rice to that position with all salary and other benefits of such position retroactive to January 1, 1987.
(3.) Remanding to the Trial Court for trial the issues in Rice’s suit not covered by his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Alternatively, Appellant prays that after this Court has sustained his Second Point of Error, this Court remand this cause to the Trial Court with instructions to enter such Declaratory Judgment, to issue such Writ of Mandamus, and to proceed to trial on the issues not covered by his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Rice is urging us to sever his cause of action for damages and attorney’s fees from a nonexistent adverse judgment on his entire case, remand that cause of action for trial on the merits, and render judgment declaring his entitlement to the office of county commissioner, the emoluments thereof from January 1, 1987, and to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Commissioners’ Court to reinstate Rice and Pay him the salary and other benefits appertaining to the office.
Alternatively, Rice urges this court to sustain his second point of error and remand the case “to the Trial Court with instructions to enter such Declaratory Judgment, to issue such Writ of Mandamus, and to proceed to trial on the issues not covered by his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.”
In Tobin v. Garcia, 316 S.W.2d 396, the court, overruling an earlier precedent,1 wrote:
If the only order in a trial court is one overruling a motion for summary judgment, then that order is interlocutory and no appeal will lie therefrom. But when, as in this case, both parties file motions for summary judgment and one such motion is granted, then the trial court’s judgment becomes final and ap-pealable, and on appeal the [appellate court] should determine all questions presented. If reversible error is found, the court should render such judgment as the trial court should have rendered, Rule 4342 ....
As we understand Tobin, where all parties at interest file motions for summary judgment on the entire case, and one or more is denied and one or more is granted, and an “appealable” summary judgment rendered, then on appeal if that judgment rendered is reversed, the appellate court should render under Rule 81(c) “such judgment ... as the court below should have rendered.” See Ackermann v. Vordenbaum, 403 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex.1966). In Ackermann, the court stated that Tobin’s rule is limited to the facts presented in that case. Ackermann, 403 S.W.2d at 365. *446Judge Pope, writing for a unanimous court in Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex.1980), carefully stated that where both parties in a cause filed motions for summary judgment “on the entire case,” and one party’s motion is granted, but reversed on appeal, that the narrow exception to the general rule that a denial of a summary judgment motion is interlocutory, and not subject to review, enunciated in Tobin applies, and the appellate court should then render the proper judgment in the case. Novak, 596 S.W.2d at 849.
Rice’s motion for summary judgment was admittedly3 not a motion for summary judgment on the entire case. By its language Rice sought only an interlocutory order. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A(a), (d) (hereinafter referred to as Rule 166-A).
The question here is whether this court has the authority under Tobin’s rule to sever the issues presented in Rice’s motion for partial summary judgment in a case where the trial judge not only did not order a severance but was not even requested to do so.
If Tobin’s “rendition” rule applies, then we must render a summary judgment that the trial court could not have rendered in the absence of severance because the amount of actual damages sustained by Rice was not an issue subject to his motion. Good sense dictates that such a result is not even contemplated by Tobin’s rule, and we reject Rice’s contention that Tobin requires us to render a summary judgment in his favor. Our opinion and judgment reversing the summary judgment granted appellees, and remanding the cause for trial with instruction, provides Rice with the relief to which he is entitled in this cause.
We conclude that the trial court’s denial of Rice’s motion for partial summary judgment is an interlocutory order not subject to appellate review in this summary judgment case. Ackermann, 403 S.W.2d 362.
Rice’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

. Rogers v. Royalty Pooling Co., 157 Tex. 304, 302 S.W.2d 938 (1957).

. Now Tex.R.App.P. 81.

. The motion, in part, reads:
Comes now Thomas L. (Larry) Rice, Plaintiff in this cause ... and moves the court to enter a Partial Summary Judgment in his favor and against the Defendants, declaring his right to the office of County Commissioner, Precinct 2, Houston County, Texas, until the general election in November 1988, and issuing a Writ of Mandamus restoring him to that position, reserving the fact issues of damages and attorney’s fees for later proceedings, and in support of such motion would show unto the court as follows:
_ Wherefore, Plaintiff requests ... the Court grant Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, declaring his right to the office of County Commissioner, Precinct 2, and issuing a Writ of Mandamus to Defendants to restore him to that position, reserving for further proceedings the issues of damages and attorney's fees, together with his cost.... (Emphasis ours.)