Court Opinion

ID: 9385814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 08:08:41.483204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.070883
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 4, 2023

                                       In The

                                 Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                           First District of Texas
                                 ————————————
                                 NO. 01-22-00559-CV
                             ———————————
                      CLARENCE K. GIBSON, Appellant
                                         V.
                 TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 61st District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2021-78594

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant, Clarence K. Gibson, proceeding pro se, challenges the trial court’s

order granting the plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss1 of appellee, Texas

Southern University (“Texas Southern”), in Gibson’s suit against Texas Southern

1
      See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.
for defamation, libel, slander, and retaliation. He presents the following five issues

for our review: (1) “[W]hether the [trial] court properly permitted the substitution

and withdrawal of [Texas Southern’s] counsel without notice, motion, affidavit or

orders permitting the change”; (2) “[W]hether the [trial] court erred in conducting a

hearing without the assurance of proper service by the opposing party”;

(3) “Whether the nonsubjective generalized objections with no evidence were

sufficient to satisfy rule 26, [Texas Southern] claims”; (4) “[W]hether [Texas

Southern’s] process of service was proper and sufficient”; and (5) “[W]hether the

trial court erred as [Texas Southern’s] acts frauded [Gibson] and the [trial] court.”

      We affirm.

                                    Background

      In his second amended petition,2 Gibson alleged that he was forty-three years

old and unemployed. He had been previously employed as “Assistant Director of

Bands/Instructor of Music” at Texas Southern. In November 2015, he was appointed

“Interim Director of University Bands,” and in January 2017, he was appointed the

“Marching Band Director” at Texas Southern. He was then “placed out of the music

department and worked in Student Services until his resignation on October 1[,]

2
      Gibson titled his second amended petition, filed on June 2, 2022, as “Plaintiff’s
      Second Amended Original Complaint.”

                                          2
2019.” Gibson brought claims against Texas Southern for defamation, libel, slander,

and retaliation.3

      Texas Southern answered, generally denying the allegations in Gibson’s

petition, and asserting, among other defenses, that sovereign immunity barred

Gibson’s claims against it, Gibson failed “to exhaust administrative remedies,” and

Gibson failed “to state claims for which relief [could] be granted.”

      Texas Southern then filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion to

dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction over certain claims alleged by Gibson because Texas Southern was

entitled to sovereign immunity, which had not been waived, and Gibson had “failed

to exhaust [his] administrative remedies.” Texas Southern further asserted that

Gibson’s claims against it had no basis in law or fact.

      In response, Gibson filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Partial Motion of

Summary Judgment – No Evidence and Motion for a Decision Without a Hearing or

Trial and Motion for Ex Parte Financial Relief by Written Submission to Case

Docket,” stating:

3
      An amended petition completely replaces and supersedes the previously filed
      petition. Anderson v. Waller Cnty. & Waller Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No.
      01-20-00097-CV, 2021 WL 3042677, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July
      10, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Once a petition is amended and filed, the prior
      petition is no longer part of the pleadings in the case. Id. The amended petition
      becomes the controlling petition. Id.

                                           3
       The plaintiff has suffered irreparable damage and harm and most
       importantly, denied his right to due process and right to a speedy and
       fair trial through the causations of binding use of emergency procedures
       by defendant[’]s counsel without service to plaintiff. The plaintiffs
       [sic] affirms this court has the jurisdiction to enforce matters in this case
       as there is no genuine dispute to ANY of the claims/matters presented
       and the plaintiff should be granted this motion with absolutely no delay.

He requested that Texas Southern’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss be

denied.

       After Texas Southern filed a supplement to its plea to the jurisdiction and

motion to dismiss, Gibson filed another response, asserting that Texas Southern did

not qualify for sovereign immunity because he was an employee of Texas Southern.

Gibson also asserted that “exhaustion of administrative remedies ha[d] been

satisfied.”

       The trial court granted Texas Southern’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to

dismiss. In its order, the trial court dismissed all of Gibson’s claims against Texas

Southern with prejudice.

                                 Inadequate Briefing

       In his “Summary of the Argument” section of his brief, appellant lists the

following “issues”: (1) “[W]hether the [trial] court properly permitted the

substitution and withdrawal of [Texas Southern’s] counsel without notice, motion,

affidavit or orders permitting the change”; (2) “[W]hether the [trial] court erred in

conducting a hearing without the assurance of proper service by the opposing party”;

                                            4
(3) “Whether the nonsubjective generalized objections with no evidence were

sufficient to satisfy rule 26, [Texas Southern] claims”;4 (4) “[W]hether [Texas

Southern’s] process of service was proper and sufficient”; and (5) “[W]hether the

trial court erred as [Texas Southern’s] acts frauded [Gibson] and the [trial] court.”

      “An appellate brief is meant to acquaint the court with the issues in a case and

to present argument that will enable the court to decide the case.” Schied v. Merritt,

No. 01-15-00466-CV, 2016 WL 3751619, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

July 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotations omitted). Texas Rules of

Appellate Procedure control the required contents and organization of an appellant’s

brief. Id.; see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. The appellate briefing requirements are

mandatory.     M & E Endeavors LLC v. Air Voice Wireless LLC, Nos.

01-18-00852-CV, 01-19-00180-CV, 2020 WL 5047902, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Aug. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Garrett v. Lee, No.

01-21-00498-CV, 2021 WL 5702177, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2,

2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (pro se litigant must comply with Texas Rules of

Appellate Procedure). “Only when [an appellate court is] provided with proper

briefing may [it] discharge [its] responsibility to review the appeal and make a

decision that disposes of the appeal one way or the other.” Bolling v. Farmers

4
      Gibson appears to reference Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which does not
      apply to this proceeding. See Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266,
      272 (Tex. 1992).

                                          5
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.);

see also Roberts for Roberts v. City of Tex. City, No. 01-21-00064-CV, 2021 WL

5702464, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston Dec. 2, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellate

court may not “abandon[] its role as judge and assum[e] the role of advocate for a

party”); Tucker v. Fort Worth & W. R.R., No. 02-19-00221-CV, 2020 WL 3969586,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 18, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[The

appellate court is] not obligated to become [an] advocate[] for a particular litigant

by performing research and developing argument for that litigant. It is the appealing

party’s burden to discuss his assertions of error, and [the appellate court] ha[s] no

duty—or even right—to perform an independent review of the record and applicable

law to determine whether there was error.” (internal citations and quotations

omitted)).

      Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires that an appellant’s brief

“contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). “This is not done

by merely uttering brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations.”

Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); see also Barham v. Turner Constr.

Co. of Tex., 803 S.W.2d 731, 740 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ denied) (appellant

bears burden of discussing his assertions of error). The failure to provide substantive

                                          6
analysis of an issue or cite appropriate authority waives a complaint on appeal.

Marin Real Estate Partners, L.P. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2011, no pet.); Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2006, no pet.); see also In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2008, no pet.) (“We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold

pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to

comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure.”).

      Appellant, in his brief, does not provide this Court with any appropriate

argument, analysis, discussion, or citations to legal authority or to the record about

his five purported issues on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Richardson v.

Marsack, No. 05-18-00087-CV, 2018 WL 4474762, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept.

19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Our appellate rules have specific requirements for

briefing,” including requiring “appellants to state concisely their complaints, to

provide succinct, clear, and accurate arguments for why their complaints have merit

in law and fact, to cite legal authority that is applicable to their complaints, and to

cite appropriate references in the record.”); Huey, 200 S.W.3d at 854 (“We have no

duty to brief appellant’s issue for [him]. Failure to cite to applicable authority or

provide substantive analysis waives an issue on appeal.”); see also Mansfield State

Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978) (“Litigants who represent

themselves    must    comply    with    the   applicable    procedural    rules . . . .”);

                                          7
Hopes-Fontenot v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., No. 01-12-00286-CV, 2013

WL 4399218, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 15, 2013, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (pro se litigant must properly present his case on appeal; we “may not make

allowances      or    apply    different      standards     for    litigants   appearing

without . . . counsel”).

      Accordingly, we hold that Gibson has waived his five issues for appellate

review due to inadequate briefing. See Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676,

678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (appellate court cannot remedy

deficiencies in appellant’s brief for him).

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                  Julie Countiss
                                                  Justice

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.

                                              8