Court Opinion

ID: 9710110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:02:09.393925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.244011
License: Public Domain

*603JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I join so much of the Majority Opinion as finds that the Postnuptial Property Settlement Agreement is invalid because Wife did not receive full and fair disclosure of Husband’s worth. Majority opinion at 598-601. I also agree that Wife’s petition for special relief must be granted.
I am unable, however, to join my colleagues’ conclusion that there is no merit to Wife’s claim that the Agreement should be declared invalid on the basis of duress and/or misrepresentation. Id. at 598-599. While it is true that the trial court concluded that Wife was not under any duress nor did there exist any misrepresentation at the time the agreement was signed, we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law. Com. ex rel. Robinson v. Robinson, 505 Pa. 226, 236, 478 A.2d 800, 806 (1984) (appellate court not bound by deductions or inferences made by trial court from its findings of fact, nor must a reviewing court accept a finding which has no competent evidence to support it); Mumma v. Mumma, 380 Pa.Super. 18, 550 A.2d 1341 (1988), appeal denied, 524 Pa. 629, 574 A.2d 70 (1990) (same).
On this issue, the only finding of fact by the trial court was that “Mrs. Mormello had minimal time to review the Property Settlement Agreement.” The balance of the court’s assertions on this issue, contained in the Order dated July 18, 1995, are conclusions of law which are not supported by any findings of fact.
Husband made an unannounced visit to his daughter’s house, where Wife was babysitting twin one-year-old grandchildren. He presented Wife with a twelve-page, typewritten Agreement. On questioning by the trial court, Husband testified that he told Wife that he would try to help her pay for the attorney fees to go over the agreement “in case she didn’t like the agreement, if she wanted to go to an attorney, if she didn’t know what she was signing.” N.T., January 3, 1995, at 83, R.R. at 43a. Husband left his daughter’s home that day, after a visit that did not exceed twenty minutes, with both copies of the Agreement signed by Wife.
*604I note that the copy of the agreement included in the certified record bears the signature of Husband’s counsel as well as the affidavits of a notary public that both Husband and Wife had appeared before her and acknowledged execution of the agreement. At the hearing held January 3, 1995, Wife testified that no notary was present when Husband caused her to sign the copies of the agreement. Further exploration of this discrepancy was interrupted by objection by counsel for Husband which was not ruled on by the trial court. Id. at 15, R.R. at 18b.
Wife testified that she received a copy of the agreement a few days after she had signed it and that, after reading it three times, she called Husband and asked him to go over it with her. Id. at 17, R.R. at 19b. She further testified that when she raised matters with which she had a problem, Husband responded to the effect: “Don’t worry about it. It’s only if we get a divorce.” Id.
Without additional written findings of fact by the trial court, I am not prepared to accept that court’s conclusion that Wife was neither under any duress nor did there exist any misrepresentation. The matter was presented to her by her husband on the basis that she should first sign the agreement, and “in the event I file for divorce, if she files for divorce ...,” N.T., supra, at 83, R.R. at 43a, Wife could then take the already-signed agreement to an attorney. When Wife stated her concerns about the agreement after it had been returned several days following her signing it, she was told by Husband to not worry about it, that it would only be important if there was a divorce. There'is nothing in the record to even suggest that Wife was contemplating a divorce at the time the agreement was signed. I would not conclude that these circumstances were free from an intentional misrepresentation by Husband utilized for the purpose of lulling Wife into believing that review by an attorney would not be necessary. Nor would I conclude, as does the Majority, that full and fair disclosure of the parties’ statutory rights was made, given these uncontroverted facts.
*605Had Husband come to his daughter’s residence and sold Wife goods or services worth $25 or more, she would have had three days in which to avoid that contract. Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201-7 (1976). I would be reluctant to afford Wife less protection where, on these facts, she had first signed the agreement while principally concerned with the safety and welfare of her grandchildren and then made prompt protest on her first opportunity to examine the agreement more carefully. I would find both duress and misrepresentation on the particular facts presented here.
Finally, I agree with my colleagues that the petition for special relief must be granted. Therefore, Wife is entitled to all of her rights and remedies under the Divorce Code. The divorce complaint was filed by Husband on May 10,1994. The Petition for Special Relief was filed by Wife on November 30, 1994. Husband’s Petition for Bifurcation, filed September 11, 1995, was denied by the trial court on November 9, 1995 while this appeal was pending. No decree in divorce has been entered. I find nothing in the record to prevent Wife from pursuing any rights she might believe to be hers in the area of support or maintenance, alimony, alimony pendent lite, counsel fees, or costs and expenses. The Petition for Special Relief prayed that the Agreement dated and executed October 25, 1993, be declared a nullity, and that Wife be allowed to pursue all of her rights and remedies under the Divorce Code of 1990. In joining in my colleagues’ determination to reverse the order of July 18, 1995 and remand, I also agree that the total relief sought by Wife be granted.