Court Opinion

ID: 9460159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:43:23.772738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:30.484949
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
In Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,1 Mr. Justice White, writing for a majority of the Court, reviewed the legislative history of one section of the Freedom of Information Act, that which exempts from disclosure “matters that are (1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy.” 2 On the basis of the legislative history and the explicit statutory language, the majority concluded that “Congress chose to follow the Executive’s determinations in these matters Rather than follow some vague standard, the test was to be simply whether the President has determined by Executive Order that particular documents are to be kept secret.” 3
In this case, appellant Weisberg seeks the following information:
Spectrographic analysis of bullet, fragments of bullet and other objects, including garments and part of vehicle and curbstone said to have been struck by bullet and/or fragments during assassination of President Kennedy and wounding of Governor Connally.
*1204In response to Weisberg’s request for this information, the Justice Department stated:
. that the work notes and raw analytical data on which the results of the spectrographic tests are based are part of the investigative files of the FBI and are specifically exempted from public disclosures as investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7). The results of the spectrographic tests are adequately shown in the report of the Warren Commission where (Volume 5, pages 67, 69, 73 and 74) it is specifically set forth that the metal fragments were analyzed spectrographi-eally and found to be similar in composition.
Thus, we deal in this case, not with Section . 552(b) (1), but with Section 552(b)(7). The latter provision exempts from disclosure “matters that are investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency.” I have no doubt that, as Judge Danaher’s majority opinion concludes, the information sought in this case is lodged in a file originally compiled for law enforcement purposes. I cannot, however, agree with the majority that this fact automatically brings the information within the ambit of Section 552(b)(7). There remains the question whether such information is to be considered as resting solely within an “investigative file” when the results of the spectrographic tests have been made public in the Warren Commission report and when there is no indication that the Government contemplates use of the information for law enforcement purposes.
The reasons that support my position are fully stated in Judge Frank Kaufman’s4 majority opinion for the panel that originally heard this case, an opinion in which I concurred and which was withdrawn when the case was ordered to be reheard en banc. I set forth here the central part of Judge Kaufman’s opinion: 5
In Bristol-Myers Company v. F. T. C. [138 U.S.App.D.C. 22], 424 F.2d 935, 939-40 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 [91 S.Ct. 46, 27 L.Ed.2d 52] (1970), Chief Judge Bazelon, in reversing the grant of a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Freedom of Information Act complaint, and in commenting upon the 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) exemption, wrote:
* * * [T]he agency cannot, consistent with the broad disclosure mandate of the Act, protect all its files with the label “investigatory” and a suggestion that enforcement proceedings may be launched at some unspecified future date. Thus the District Court must determine whether the prospect of enforcement proceedings is concrete enough to bring into operation the exemption for investigatory files, and if so whether the particular documents sought by the company are nevertheless discoverable.
In the within case, no criminal or civil action relating to the death of President Kennedy is pending nor is it indicated by the Government that any such future action is contemplated by anyone. Nor is Weisberg the subject of any investigation. He simply asks for information which he alleges he is entitled to have made available to him under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). The language of Section 552, supported abundantly by the legislative history of the Freedom of Information Act,6 places the burden on the Government to show, why non-revelation *1205should be permitted, and requires that exemptions from disclosure be narrowly construed and that ambiguities be resolved in favor of disclosure. See generally Getman v. N. L. R. B. [146 U.S.App.D.C. 209], 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David [151 U.S.App.D.C. 144], 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Company v. F. T. C., supra at 938-40; M. A. Shapiro & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 339 F.Supp. 467, 469, 470 (D.D.C.1972); cf. LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.). In Wellford v. Hardin, supra at 25, Judge Butzner commented that 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) provides that the Act “ ‘does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated’ ” and noted Professor Davis’ emphasis upon “ ‘[t]he pull of the word “specifically” .’” K. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary. Analysis, 34 U.Chi.L.Rev. 761, 783 (1967).
* * -x- * * *
. The Court below granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, not its motion for summary judgment. Thus, it seemingly accorded no weight to the affidavit of Agent Williams.7 But even if that affidavit is given full consideration, it is a document which is most general and conclusory and which in no way explains how the disclosure of the records sought is likely to reveal the identity of confidential informants, or to subject persons to blackmail, or to disclose the names of criminal suspects, or in any other way to hinder F.B.I. efficiency.8 The conclusion that the disclosure Weisberg seeks will cause any of those harms is neither compelled nor readily apparent, and therefore does not satisfy the Department’s burden of proving under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), as the Department must, some basis for fearing such harm.9 Neither the F.B.I. nor *1206any other governmental agency can shoulder that burden by simply stating as a matter of fact that it has so done, or by simply labelling as investigatory a file which it neither intends to use, nor contemplates making use of, in the future for law enforcement purposes, at least not without establishing the nature of some harm which is likely to result from public disclosure of the file. Something more than mere edict or labelling is required if the Freedom of Information Act is to accomplish its “primary purpose, i. e., ‘to increase the citizen’s access to government records.’ ” 10
The above was, of course, written in the context of the facts of this case. In most cases perhaps, the Government may satisfy its burden of proof simply by establishing that the information sought was compiled for investigatory purposes and rests in an investigatory file, none of the contents of which have ever been made public. But that is not the case here.
I continue to agree with Judge Kaufman that the purpose of the Act should not be defeated if there is available a judicial technique for advancing it and at the same time ensuring that no harm comes to the interests Congress intended to protect. In camera inspection, as required by the remand order of the withdrawn opinion, is such a technique. The fact that, in Mink, the Supreme Court determined that the language and legislative history of the Section (b)(1) exemption did not permit the use of in camera inspection does not mean that the technique is unsuitable in every case involving the Section (b) (7) exemption.11 Indeed, its use seems most suitable in this case. Without it, the public will have to rely entirely upon the Justice Department’s opinion that “[t]he results of the spectrographic tests are adequately shown in the report of the Warren Commission. . . . ” 12
I suggest that Congress, in enacting the Freedom of Information Act did not intend that the public would so have to rely.
*1207Accordingly, I dissent, and continue to adhere to the views on this issue expressed by Judge Kaufman in his majority opinion for the panel.

. 410 U.S. 73, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973).

. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1970).

. 410 U.S. at 81-82, 93 S.Ct. at 833.

. United States District Judge for the District of Maryland; Judge Kaufman sat in this case by designation pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 292(d) (1970).

. The footnotes of Judge Kaufman’s opinion have been renumbered.

. S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), hereinafter cited as Senate Report. House Report at 5.

. Weisberg contends that certain parts of the Williams’ affidavit do not qualify for consideration under Federal Civil Rule 56. Those contentions, on remand, should, if Weisberg desires, be brought to the attention of the District Court.

. An F.B.I. investigatory file may generally relate to organized or other crime and may not have been originally intended for use in the prosecution of any named individuals, or, even if so originally intended, may no longer be intended for such use. The data contained in such a file may, however, require the protection of secrecy so as not to dry up future sources of information or to pose a danger to the persons who supplied the information or to prevent invasion of personal privacy. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) would appear sufficiently flexible to include within its protection such an investigatory file when and if such protection is required. Frankel v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972); Evans v. Department of Transportation, 446 F.2d 821, 823-824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918, 92 S.Ct. 984, 30 L.Ed.2d 788 (1972); Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F.Supp. 726, 727 (N.D.Calif. 1971). In such instances, in camera inspection by the District Court might be appropriate. See discussion infra at n. [11].

. “The burden of proof is placed upon the agency which is the only party able to justify the withholding.” House Report at 9. And see the specific wording of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) .... While it may be that the introductory words of Section 552(b) make the burden of proof provisions of Section 552(a)(3) inapplicable in determining whether the Section 552(b) exceptions apply {but see the contrary approach taken in all opinions, majority, concurring and dissenting, in Environmental Protection Agency et al. v. Mink et al., 410 U.S. 73, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973), and the Ninth Circuit’s seeming assumption to the contrary in Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1970)), that contention in no way compels any different conclusions than those expressed in this opinion. The underlying philosophy of Section 552 favors disclosure. See Senate Report at 3. Section 552(c) provides that Section 552 “does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section.” See the decision supra at pp. 7-8 re Well-ford v. Hardin, supra. The thrust of Section 552(c) is that exceptions from the disclosure provisions of Section 552 are to be carefully construed. See House Report at 11; Senate Report at 10. To place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove the *1206nonapplicability of a Section 552(b) exception when the Government as a rule has knowledge of nearly all the facts relevant to such an exception would be contrary to the disclosure philosophy of all of Section 552 and specifically of Section 552(c). Moreover, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff would also seemingly run contrary to the underlying philosophy set forth in the House Report which, in explaining why the burden of proof was placed on the agency to justify the withholding of information in Section 552(a)(3), stated (at 9): “A private citizen cannot be asked to prove that an agency has withheld information improperly because he will not know the reasons for the agency action.” See also Senate Report at 8. That same reasoning would seem equally applicable in determining the relationship among 552(a)(3), 552(b)(7) and 552(c). * * * * ¡¡!

. Getman v. N. L. R. B., 450 F.2d supra at 672, in which Judge Wright quoted from Judge Bazelon’s opinion in Bristol-Myers. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Department of H. & U. D., 343 F.Supp. 1176, 1180 (E.D.Pa.1972); Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, supra, 325 F.Supp. at 727.
“For the great majority of different records, the public as a whole has a right to know what its Government is doing” (emphasis supplied), Senate Report at 5-6. And see also the “conclusion” in House Report at 12: “A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies. A danger signal to our democratic society in the United States is the fact that such a political truism needs repeating. * * »

. As Judge Kaufman observed in note 8 of the withdrawn opinion,
[I]n this ease no Executive order, and no matter of national defense or foreign policy, is asserted to be involved. Further, it is to be noted that in remanding in connection with the application of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) exempting “inter-agency or in-tra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency”, Mr. Justice White in the Environmental Protection Agency case placed the burden of showing entitlement to the (b) (5) exemption upon the Government.

. Emphasis supplied.