Court Opinion

ID: 9728911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:18:59.402664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:52.975467
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I.
This is a most unfortunate case. Dickerson was bom on September 11, 1967. He was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it (PWID) on May 3, 1988, more than sixteen months before his twenty-second birthday. As a result of a number of troubling incidents, which included the loss by the government of its case file, the consequent dismissal of the indictment for lack of prosecution, a four-month delay before reindictment, and the postponement of two scheduled trial dates because the prosecutor learned after the fact that government witnesses would be on committed leave, Dickerson’s trial did not begin until May 4, 1990, two years after his arrest and eight months after he became ineligible for sentencing pursuant to the District of Columbia Youth Rehabilitation Act (DCY-RA), D.C.Code §§ 24-801 et seq. (1989).
According to the report of the Pretrial Services Agency, Dickerson had no prior convictions, tested “clean” for drugs, and was employed at the Department of Justice. Under a discretionary sentencing scheme, he would have been a viable candidate for work release, for probation, and for sentencing as a youthful offender pursuant to the DCYRA. Because he went to trial after his twenty-second birthday, however, Dickerson received a mandatory minimum sentence; with DCYRA sentencing no longer a legally permissible option, the judge was powerless to consider any less severe sanction.
Much (though not all) of the delay in Dickerson’s trial was attributable to the government. If the prosecutor had not lost the file, and if the government had not belatedly sought continuances from previously unopposed trial dates, Dickerson’s trial could have been completed before his twenty-second birthday, and he would thus have been eligible for sentencing pursuant to the DCYRA, which authorizes penalties less severe than the mandatory minimum term prescribed for adult offenders. The loss of the opportunity for sentencing as a youthful offender has been held to constitute severe prejudice for speedy trial purposes, even where the defendant did little, if anything, to assert the right. United States v. Roberts, 515 F.2d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1975).
I recognize that dismissal of an indictment for lack of a speedy trial is a drastic remedy which can provide an undeserved windfall to a guilty defendant.1 Such relief should be confined to situations in which there has been a long delay, substantially attributable to the government, in which the defendant has requested a timely trial, and in which he has been significantly prejudiced by its denial. Such cases are rare, but in my opinion this is one of them. I would therefore reverse Dickerson’s conviction because he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
II.
In assessing Dickerson’s speedy trial claim, we must consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) Dickerson’s assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). I address each of these factors in turn.

A. Length of the Delay.

Dickerson’s trial began two years and one day after his arrest. As the government acknowledges in its brief, “[t]his court has frequently held prejudice sufficient to trigger inquiry will be presumed when, as in the instant case, the delay exceeds one year.” See, e.g., Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 814, 88 L.Ed.2d 788 (1986). Indeed, a delay of more than a year “gives prima facie merit to a claim that an *689accused has been denied the right to a speedy trial, creates a presumption of prejudice, and shifts the burden to the government to justify the delay.” Id. (footnotes omitted). In the present case, the chronological delay was twice that long, and the government’s burden increases proportionally. Id. (citations omitted).
I agree with the majority that we should not attach too much significance to the length of the delay standing alone. Dickerson was not incarcerated. Under these circumstances, one part of the two-year period — the four months between the dismissal of the initial indictment in September 1988 for want of prosecution and Dickerson’s reindietment in January 1989 — is not counted for speedy trial purposes, although it would be relevant to due process analysis. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8-10, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502-03, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); Givens v. United States, 644 A.2d 1373, 1374-75 (D.C.1994) (per curiam); cf. Wynn v. United States, 538 A.2d 1139, 1142 n. 7 (D.C.1988). Moreover, the delay in bringing Dickerson to trial after September 11,1989, though unfortunate, did not contribute to the only substantial prejudice of which he complains, namely, his ineligibility for sentencing pursuant to the DCYRA; it is therefore the delay before Dickerson’s twenty-second birthday that is critical to the analysis. Nevertheless, the length of time that passed between arrest and trial was substantial and “presumptively prejudicial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192.
Moreover, the length of any permissible delay is closely related to the danger of prejudice. In Roberts, supra, a case with facts remarkably similar to those before us, the court explained the relationship as follows:
At the time of Roberts’ motion to dismiss, the postindictment delay was considerably shorter than others countenanced by this court. (Citations omitted). On the other hand, as the Court made clear in Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2182, a delay not patently unreasonable in length may nonetheless be intolerably long in light of “the peculiar circumstances of the case.” And a peculiarity of the instant case highly relevant in this regard was the government’s ability to predict with great certainty that Roberts would be seriously prejudiced in the event that he was not permitted to plead guilty prior to his 26th birthday. After that date, Roberts lost his right, see Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443-44, 94 S.Ct. 3042 [3052-53], 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974), to be considered by the sentencing judge for youthful offender treatment.
Id., 515 F.2d at 646. In the present ease, the delay between arrest and trial was unusually long, and the reasoning of Roberts applies a fortioiH.

B. Reasons for the Delay.

“The flag all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason for delay.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315, 106 S.Ct. 648, 656, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986). Because of the nature of the prejudice claimed in this case, I will primarily focus once again on the reasons for the delay prior to Dickerson’s twenty-second birthday. This is the key inquiry in determining the government’s role in the events that led to the loss of Dickerson’s eligibility for sentencing pursuant to the DCYRA.
Dickerson was arrested on May 3, 1988. He was indicted on May 25, 1988, and arraigned on June 8 of that year. The indictment was dismissed in September, 1988, after the government was unable to provide discovery because the prosecutor could not locate the file.
Dickerson and his codefendant were rein-dicted on January 11,1989, four months after the dismissal of the original indictment. Solely as a result of the mishandling of the file, the prosecution was no further along in January, 1989 than it had been in June, 1988.
At a status hearing on February 28, 1989, the judge set trial for June 12, 1989. The prosecutor interposed no objection, thus implicitly representing that the government would be ready on June 12. Nevertheless, on April 17, 1989, seven weeks after it had agreed to go to trial on June 12, the government filed a motion for a continuance, alleging that two police witnesses were scheduled for committed leave on that date. If this *690information had been provided to the court at the status hearing, a mutually acceptable alternative date might have been available, and the delay might have been minimized. Dickerson opposed any continuance, but the judge granted the government’s motion over defense objection.
At another status hearing on May 16,1989, the judge rescheduled the trial for August 2, 1989. Once again, the prosecution made no timely objection. On June 15,1989, however, a full month after the status hearing, the prosecutor requested a second continuance, again because government witnesses were scheduled to be on leave on the previously agreed upon date. Counsel for Dickerson again objected, pointing out that his client would be twenty-two years old on September 11, 1989 and would lose his eligibility for DCYRA sentencing if the case extended beyond that date. On August 2, 1989, the judge granted the government’s motion and set a new trial date for September 5, 1989, six days before Dickerson’s approaching birthday.
On September 5,1989, the prosecution and Dickerson announced ready, but counsel for Dickerson’s codefendant was in trial. A new judge who had taken over the calendar continued the case until January 24, 1990, and Dickerson’s hopes, if convicted, of being sentenced pursuant to the DCYRA were now history. On May 4, 1990, after further delays, the trial began before a third judge. Dickerson, now well into his twenty-third year, was found guilty of PWID. On June 22, 1990, the judge imposed the mandatory minimum sentence required by law.
The foregoing recitation demonstrates the obvious; most, though not all, of the delay prior to September 11,1989, was attributable to the prosecution. Seven months — the period between June 1988 and January 1989— were lost because the prosecutor could not find the file, and because a second indictment was therefore required to replace the first. The government then agreed to two successive proposed trial dates, but subsequently sought continuances on the basis of witnesses’ plans for leave. It was the prosecutor’s responsibility to learn of these leave plans in advance and to inform the judge before the trial date was set. See also Roberts, supra, 515 F.2d at 647 (the delay in similar case was not of government’s “active making,” but attributable to prosecution’s inactivity in bringing the case towards trial).
A portion of the delay prior to September 11, 1989 — not very much — was attributable to court congestion or other ordinary institutional factors which weigh less heavily against the government than do delays directly attributable to the prosecution. Graves, supra, 490 A.2d at 1092; see also Miller v. United States, 479 A.2d 862, 866 (D.C.1984). The principal causes of the delay, however, were the loss of the government’s file and the successive prosecution motions to continue previously accepted trial dates.

C. Assertion of the Right.

Following his client’s initial indictment, Dickerson’s attorney sought discovery. When the prosecutor could not provide it, counsel successfully moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of prosecution; there was no occasion to request a trial date. For the four months following the dismissal, no charges were pending, and no request for a speedy trial could be made.
On January 11, 1989, Dickerson was re-indicted, and on February 28, the trial was set for June 12, 1989, well in advance of his birthday. There was no reason why this date should not be satisfactory to Dickerson, and his attorney understandably made no protest. As soon as the prosecution switched gears and requested a continuance, defense counsel filed an opposition in which he stated:
Defendant Dickerson opposes the Government’s motion for a continuance. Defendant has already missed numerous days from work. The ease has already been dismissed because the Government was not ready, and Defendant is anxious to resolve this case.
(Emphasis added). Although counsel did not use the term “speedy trial,” he made it plain in the italicized phrase that he was asking to be tried on the scheduled date, not later.
*691The June 12 date was scratched, and the trial was re-set for August 2, 1989. Once again, the prosecutor requested a continuance. Dickerson again filed an opposition, which was substantially identical to the opposition filed in response to the earlier government motion, except that on this occasion Dickerson’s attorney added that “Defendant will be 22 in September and if convicted would be ineligible for DCYRA.” Dickerson thus not only apprised the court of his wish to be tried without further delay, but also explicated the urgency of the matter in light of the court’s potential loss of sentencing options in the event he was convicted.2
The invocation of the right to a speedy trial “is not dependent on the uttering of court-ordered incantations.” Graves, supra, 490 A.2d at 1098. I agree that Dickerson’s trial counsel should have been more forceful, and that a direct request for a speedy trial, using the language of the Constitution, would have been preferable, but ideal phraseology was not required. Id. In regard to the adequacy of the assertion of the right, this case is more favorable to the defense than Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1377-79 (D.C.1989), in which the court found sufficient a defendant’s less than zealous opposition to prosecution requests for continuances. Here, Dickerson made at least reasonable efforts to move this case to trial before his twenty-second birthday, and I do not believe that his counsel’s use of nontechnical phraseology should count heavily in the court’s calculus.3

D. Prejudice.

I view the prejudice to Dickerson in this case as devastating. Because the government “blew it” on the administrative side, Dickerson, who was only twenty years old at the time of the offense, had to serve a mandatory minimum term of twenty months to five years, without being considered for DCYRA sentencing. To me, this represents a breakdown of the statutory scheme and an unintentional but nevertheless real miscarriage of justice. Nobody intended to deny Dickerson his rights,4 but “it is of no consolation to [Dickerson] that it was done in good faith.” Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S.Ct. 856, 861, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961).
This court stated in Graves, 490 A.2d at 1101, that
[t]he final factor, prejudice to the defendant, is to be assessed in the light of the interests which the speedy trial right was designed to protect, namely: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193.
Of these three interests, prevention of the impairment of the defense is the most important. Id. at 1101-02. In the present case, at least insofar as sentencing is concerned,5 the delays did more than “impair” one aspect of the defense; they destroyed it. Perhaps the most important sentencing option available to *692the defense in the case of a twenty-year-old offender — the DCYRA — was rendered inoperative in this case largely as a result of delays created by the government.
When a similar situation arose in Roberts, the court was emphatic in its articulation of the prejudice suffered by the defendant:
As a result of the delay, Roberts lost an excellent opportunity to be given, upon pleading guilty, a youthful offender probationary sentence and the chance to have the conviction expunged from his record. Deference to the district court’s view on Roberts’ probable qualification for youthful offender status, furthermore, also has the effect of making the length of delay factor a weighty one in Roberts’ favor. To allow the more than seven months between Roberts’ indictment and his birthday to pass was egregious delay in light of the virtual certainty that serious harm would befall Roberts as a consequence.
515 F.2d at 646 (emphasis added). The delay in this case was much longer than seven months.6
Dickerson was a first offender. His urine test at the time of arrest was favorable.7 He was employed. I cannot read the mind of the trial judge, but sentencing pursuant to the DCYRA would surely have been a reasonable option if the case had been completed on time.
If the DCYRA had been available, the sentencing judge would not have been required to impose a twenty-month mandatory minimum sentence. On the contrary, a number of alternatives could have been considered. First, the judge could have ordered a “Youth Act” study pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-803(e), and might well have learned a great deal about Dickerson. If Dickerson proved to be an appropriate candidate for probation — many young, employed first offenders are — a probationary term might have been imposed. If probation turned out to be an unacceptable risk, work release, which would have enabled Dickerson to retain his job, would surely have been a possibility. Even if the judge concluded that incarceration was appropriate, perhaps three months or six months or nine months or a year would have been sufficient, rather than twenty months to five years. Moreover, incarceration pursuant to the DCYRA would have been served with other young offenders, and Dickerson would (or at least should) have received “corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting the antisocial tendencies of youth offenders.” D.C.Code § 24-801(5). Finally, an offender sentenced pursuant to the DCYRA has the right to apply to have his conviction unconditionally set aside. D.C.Code § 24-806. None of these opportunities was made available to Dickerson. The prejudice to him was severe and palpable and, as in the Roberts case, altogether unacceptable.
III.
The government writes in its brief that
[f]or appellant to assert that his conviction should be overturned because the trial court sentenced him after his twenty-second birthday is patently frivolous.
The government did not mention Roberts; the defense did not cite it either.
As I see this case, Dickerson has had to serve a mandatory minimum sentence primarily because someone lost or mislaid the file, and because the prosecutors agreed to two separate trial dates without first ascertaining whether their witnesses would be on leave. In my view, the loss of appropriate sentencing options for such reasons did not afford Dickerson equal justice under law. To mock Dickerson’s plea for justice in the man*693ner quoted above does the government little credit.
I respectfully dissent.8

. I agree with the majority that the evidence against Dickerson was sufficient to support his conviction, although the case is not the strongest that has come across my desk.

. The majority points out that, so far as we can determine from the record, Dickerson did not again object on September 5, 1989 to a further continuance. Although this is true, the court had denied his motion for a severance a few weeks earlier. In the absence of counsel for the code-fendant, the trial could not proceed without a severance. Dickerson's trial attorney doubtless should have been more forceful and specific in asserting his client’s rights, but in this instance a further request would probably have been futile.

. In Roberts, supra, the court assigned little weight to the defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial because it opined that he probably did not personally know that he would no longer be eligible for sentencing as a youthful offender after his twenty-sixth birthday. 515 F.2d at 647-48. In this case, Dickerson was substantially more forceful than Roberts was in opposing further delay in his trial.

. Most of the delay in this case was "less culpable than deliberate foot-dragging to gain tactical advantage but more culpable than the neutral category exemplified by failure to advance trial dates due to court congestion.” Graves, 490 A.2d at 1092.

. It has long been settled that prejudice to the defendant in relation to available sentencing options is a legitimate part of the speedy trial calculus. "[Tjhe possibility that a defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed.” Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378, 89 S.Ct. 575, 577, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969).

. In Roberts, as my colleagues point out, the comparatively brief delay in processing the defendant's plea came about in part because prosecutors wanted his testimony against another defendant but did not attempt to accelerate the other defendant’s trial date. In the present case, the government prolonged an already long delay for its own benefit by opposing Dickerson’s motion for severance and thus avoiding the need to present its evidence twice. The two situations, in my view, are not qualitatively different.

. Ironically, being no addict, Dickerson was ineligible for the "addict exception” from mandatory minimum sentencing. See Dupree v. United States, 583 A.2d 1000, 1004 n. 5 (D.C.1990); see also id. at 1004-05 (concurring opinion).

. The prejudice suffered by Dickerson as a result of prosecution-induced delay related to his sentence, rather than to the question of guilt or innocence, and it would therefore be more logical to remand for resentencing than to dismiss the indictment. In light of the mandatory-minimum sentencing scheme and the age limit for DCYRA eligibility, however, I know of no way in which relief directly solely to the sentence could legally be fashioned.