Court Opinion

ID: 9814565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 23:56:36.082862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:53.233923
License: Public Domain

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
Decided Oct 25, 1938
By THE COURT
Submitted on application for rehearing in which it is suggested for the first time that the money in this case, which defendant Olive Guthridge claimed to be exempt, was “representative of her interest in real estate under the last will and testament of Fannie N. Crouch, deceased, who in said will, among other things, decreed that the real estate be sold and the proceeds divided equally among four distributees, one of whom was Mrs. Guthridge.”
It is said in the application that:
“The point we desire to emphasize especially to this court is that the money arising from the sale of the real estate was real estate in the eyes of the law because Mrs. Guthridge had no power to urge the sale, or defeat the sale, or do anything about the money arising from said sale;
. We are again cited to Dennis v Smith et, 125 Oh St 120.
Our decision was’-rendered upon the language of the journal entry of the Common Pleas Court, wherein it is expressly found that the money involved was the “distributive share” of Olive Guthridge in said estate and decrees that said sum “being her distributive share in - said- estate;”, she is -entitled to have' the money set .off. to her in lieu of homestead as exempt from execution thereunder by virtue of §11738, GC.
In the assignment of error counsel for appellant ended their statement of the proposition for determination in our court and treated the money involved as follows:
“Money due the defendant as a distributive share of an estate coming only by virtue of a bequest made by the testator and not by descent or operation of law.” Further along in the brief it is stated that the interest of appellant under consideration came to her by a bequest in the will of Fannie N. Crouch, deceased, in which, appellant was given % interest in any moneys that remain out of the sale of certain real estate.
We can not properly consider as a part of the record the statements of counsel in their respective briefs. Upon the language employed in the journal entry we are led to believe that the money which the executor had in his hands payable, to appellant upon distributive share was that which she would take of the personal estate under the statutes of descent and distribution after the debts of the decedent had been paid. There is nothing whatever in the journal entry to indicate, that the money which the executor held for appellant came to her by bequest or as proceeds of a devise or in any way other than would be contemplated in the expression, “distributive share”. However, upon a full consideration of that which is now before us in both briefs, it seems fair to say that the money involved is not and was at no time impressed- with the character of real estate. It was bequeathed to appellant as money, namely, “proceeds of the sale of real estate.” It was not contemplated that it passed to her as realty but only. when and after real estate was sold. This could in no wise be held to be real property at any time, j
The demand of appellant for exemption is grounded upon §§11725 and 11738, GC, and states that money sought to be exempted was “derived from my distributive share, of the estate .of Fannie N. Crouch, deceased.” ’ The share of appellant was treated in the motion as money and there is nothing whatever to indicate that it was claimed exempt as homestead or as real estate. .
Upon the most liberal interpretation which can be placed upon\aU, that is before us on the record and dehors the record, conceding that the money held. .by. the executor,-..payable to the appellanty,íw.a&'a bequest, it,.is in our judgment, “money * .’:* * *238due to her from a person” under §11738, GC, and is not exempt. We refer to our opinion, wherein the rule is announced that money due from an executor to a distributee, legatee or beneficiary is an attachable debt.
We adhere to our former opinion.
BARNES, PJ, HORNBECK and GEIGER, JJ, concur.