Court Opinion

ID: 9545120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:06:30.738154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:06.522009
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice
(dissenting):
The majority opinion in order to affirm the judgment of the trial court relies upon the sole ground that the railway crossing in question was maintained in such a condition that an approaching train was not visible to one traveling on the highway approaching the crossing. All other alleged grounds of negligence are thereby conceded to be insufficient to sustain the judgment.
Despite the limiting of recovery to the lack of visibility, the court endeavors to feebly justify the exclusion of the defendants’ nineteen photographs which were the only ones showing an approaching train by saying that they were “substantially the .same” as other pictures which were admitted. This statement is correct, except that there was no train shown. This important item is the very crux of the matter. The sole question is whether an approaching train was visible from the railway crossing. It is not enough to say that because other pictures showed growing weeds that it was not error to exclude pictures showing an approaching train.
In Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Waters, 120 Okl. 1, 249 P. 742, we said:
“The defendant has the right to offer in evidence photographs which are a reproduction of the objects as they existed at the time of the accident. The defendant may offer in evidence photographs which are an accurate reproduction of the grounds at the time of the accident, if these matters become material questions for consideration in the trial of the cause. The extent to *73which the underbrush and peach orchard affected plaintiff’s visibility of the approaching train was a material question in the trial of the case. Photographs of the orchard and grounds would have been helpful to the jury in determining the questions.
“The court committed reversible error in excluding the evidence. Patrick v. Siliskis, 105 Okl. 51, 222 P. 543; St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Dale, 36 Okl. 114, 128 P. 137; St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Nichols, 39 Okl. 522, 136 P. 159; Smith v. Territory, 11 Okl. 669, 69 P. 805; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Horn, 168 Ark. 191, 269 S.W. 576; Faatz v. Sullivan, 199 Iowa, 875, 200 N.W. 321; Braelow v. Klein, 100 N.J. Law, 156, 125 A. 103; Bretall v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo.App.) 239 S.W. 597; Griggs v. K. C. So. Ry. Co. (Mo.Sup.) 228 S.W. 508.”
It is attempted to justify this obvious error by citing American Jurisprudence and C.J.S. to the effect that in offering evidence competent only for a particular purpose that the offer must be limited. The case before us does not fall within such rule. The sole and only issue in this case, the gist of the whole matter, is the visibility of a train approaching the crossing in question, and for this purpose such evidence is admissible generally. There is no comparable case cited to sustain the text cited which holds that under certain circumstances that a limited offer must be made.
If evidence is competent for any purpose, it is admissible. See Curtin v. Benjamin (Mass.) 26 N.E.2d 354.
In case it is admitted for one purpose only, it is the duty of the judge to limit its application by his instructions. As was said in Sprinkle v. Davis, 4 Cir., 111 F.2d 925, 128 A.L.R. 1101:
“ * * * In such a situation, the established rule is that the evidence should be accepted and the only question to be determined is what precaution should be taken to prevent, as far as possible, the misuse of the evidence. The instruction of the court, given either upon its own motion or at the request of the opposing party, suffices for this purpose. Wigmore on Evidence, 2d Ed. § 13. * * * ”
By analogy, this rule is sustained by a former decision of this court. In the case of Chowins v. Gypsy Oil Co., 185 Okl. 630, 95 P.2d 586, the first paragraph of the syllabus by the court reads:
“Admission in evidence of an instrument of writing competent for some purposes and incompetent for others does not constitute reversible error, where the trial court by its instruction limits the scope of the instrument to a purpose for which same is competent.”
I am of the opinion that the exclusion of the defendants’ evidence offered in the form of the nineteen photographs constituted reversible error. The paramount issue was the visibility of the train, and nothing could have much greater probative value than pictures of an approaching train taken from the crossing.
The exhibits, if they had been admitted in evidence, would have enabled the jury to determine whether the view of the train was obstructed from the highway. They could have determined whether plaintiff’s decedent could have seen the train had he looked in its direction at any time after he drove upon Highway 33. This is true regardless of the color of the locomotive (a point made in the majority opinion) and whether he could have stopped his automobile in plenty of time to avoid the collision with the train. The rejected exhibits were taken within nine days after the accident on and around the scene of the collision, just as were the pictures that were admitted by stipulation of the parties. They were taken at the same season of the year, and the only physical changes at the scene involved were the absence of the truck driven by Jack Furnace, the automobile driven by plaintiff’s decedent and the parked automobile of the Herndons. The pictures showed all the area and the physical surroundings, including the vegeta*74tion, trees, highway, railway cut and other points as disclosed from the evidence — all except the particular train involved, hut another freight train of the same type was shown on the tracks at various points.
An examination of these pictures clearly demonstrates that the jury could have found that a freight train was plainly visible at all times on the tracks approaching the highway crossing. The pictures were not offered to re-enact the occurrence of the collision, but merely to show the topography of the area and visibility of the train to one on the highway approaching the crossing, which, as heretofore stated, is the decisive question involved in this opinion.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
I respectfully dissent.