Court Opinion

ID: 9687240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:19:57.452288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:25.083743
License: Public Domain

T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
(concur in part, dissent in part). Although I fully agree with the Per Curiam construction and application of the doctrine of "inherently dangerous activity,” I am unwilling to foreclose, by exclusive and restrictive reliance upon this doctrine, the applicability to this or future cases of other rules of tort law which affix liability upon the landowner who, for economic benefit or otherwise, engages an independent contractor and then negligently injures an employee of the independent contractor. To base liability of negligent landowners upon a single doctrine ignores the innumerable factual circumstances giving rise to the cause of action and varying relationships of the parties.
The doctrine of "inherently dangerous activity,” as relevant to the type of action brought against a landowner by an injured employee of an independent contractor,1 has, of course, been recognized in Michigan jurisprudence for nearly 100 years. As concluded by Chief Justice Campbell in Lake Superior Iron Co v Erickson, 39 Mich 492, 502-503 (1878):
"Under such circumstances it is very plain that the company being the owners of the dangerous property, *448and inviting men to work on it, their responsibility for its protection cannot be changed by the fact that the work is done by the ton instead of by the day, or by the fact that the men who contract with them have laborers of their own. By employing men to act for them in either way they hold out the assurance that they can work in the mine on the ordinary conditions of safety usually found in such places. They guarantee nothing more than is usual among prudent owners, and they do not insure against that which is purely accidental. But they do tacitly represent that they have not been and will not be reckless themselves.”
The fact that Erickson arose before the advent of the workmen’s compensation laws, as noted by Justice T. E. Brennan’s opinion, is of no consequence.2 The law and logic of Erickson has, if anything, gained force and recognition with the passage of time and irrespective of enactment of remedial and protective legislation. In Clark v Dalman, 379 Mich 251 (1967), we reiterated that the general duty of a contractor who under the facts of that case was constructively in possession and control of the property, "to act so as not to unreasonably endanger the well-being of employees of either subcontractors or inspectors, or anyone else lawfully on the site of the project, is well settled.” Cf. also 2 Harper and James, Torts, § 27.12, p 1481.
There is little room for argument with that part of Justice T. E. Brennan’s statement that ."[t]he rule [of inherent dangerous activity] is not designed, nor was it ever intended to benefit the contractor * * * .” But, it violates logic and established law to conclude that the independent con*449tractor’s employee — who after all derives no personal economic benefit, other than that of any ordinary employee, from the contractual relationship between the landowner and his employer — is relegated to a class outside the protection of negligence law or that the rule of liability is so restrictive as to only "protect innocent third parties”. To capsulize Clark v Dalman, supra, the rule protects everyone lawfully on the site of the project. Thus, where evidence is adduced demonstrating that work to be done involves "special danger” or is "inherently dangerous,” the rule advanced in the Per Curiam opinion and its supporting authorities, e.g., 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 427, is fully applicable.
On the other hand, I find as quite cogent the reasoning of Justice T. E. Brennan’s opinion, relating to reliance upon the independent contractor’s and likewise his employees’ expertise to perform the job and/or repairs for which they were hired. It is fair to assume that the landowner retains the independent contractor because of the latter’s expertise to perform the task properly and carefully. Absent special factors, such as supervening control by the landowner, the method and means of executing the task are entrusted to the independent contractor and his employees. Thus, there is little basis for shifting liability upon the landowner where for example, and modifying Justice T. E. Brennan’s analogy slightly, the landowner engaged the independent contractor to remove a tree stump and the latter’s employee, while using a chain saw — certainly a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of the inexperienced —injures himself or another lawfully on the premises. Whether the contractor uses a double-edged ax or cross-cut saw or chain saw, one can presume, *450leaving aside the factors of landowner’s control and direction, that the contractor not only has the familiarity and experience with his tools, but also will use them in such fashion as to avoid injury to himself or others.
The inherently dangerous activity doctrine, however, does not encompass the factual situations presented by the majority of the cases. More typically, the employee of an independent contractor is injured by some cause not arising out of or related to the contractual relationship. This brings to bear the general rule stated in 31 ALR2d 1375 at 1381-1384:
"There is a line of cases supporting the proposition that, as an exception to the general rule requiring the owner or occupier of premises (contractee) to furnish a safe place of work to an independent contractor and the latter’s employees, the owner or occupier is under no duty to protect them against risks arising from or intimately connected with defects of the premises, or of machinery or appliances located thereon, which the contractor was undertaken to repair.
"Closely related to the exception stated above is the rule that the owner is not liable for death or injury of an independent contractor or one of his employees resulting from dangers which the contractor, as an expert, has known, or as to which he and his employees 'assumed the risk.’
"In support of the exception to the 'safe place’ doctrine, it has been pointed out that, before repairs of any kind can be made to a structure or thing, it is first necessary to find out what is wrong with it, that it is the responsibility of the repairman to determine what that defect is, that the contractor, under his contract to repair, has the duty of discovering any latent defect, and if he fails to do so he fails not only to fulfil [sic] his contract but also to perform his duty to his employee, and that the contractor has an equal or even a better opportunity to discover any defects than has the contractee. * * *
*451"On the other hand, where a risk separate and distinct from those created by the defects to be repaired under the contract resulted in the injury or death of a contractor or an employee of the latter, it has been held that a contractee cannot successfully invoke the defense of assumption of risk, and that the general rules (which are not the same in all jurisdictions) governing the extent of his duty to furnish an independent contractor and his employees a safe place of work and to warn them of hidden dangers are applicable.”
Under this rule, and continuing Justice T. E. Brennan’s analogy, if the independent contractor is hired to remove a stump but in the process is electrocuted by a high voltage line negligently left lying on the ground by the landowner, then the landowner cannot escape liability simply because he turned the premises and job over to the contractor. Of course, the determination of whether the risk is in fact separate and distinct from those created by the defects to be repaired must be resolved by the jury.
Under the facts of the instant case, sufficient proofs arid reasonable inferences therefrom were presented and give rise, at least, to a jury submissible question of whether the work to be performed by plaintiff’s decedent’s employer is an inherently dangerous activity, and whether that degree of care was used which an ordinarily prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances. I agree that the judgment and opinions below must be reversed and the causé remanded for new trial.
Adams, J., concurred with T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.

 Precise analysis necessitates recognition of the fact that the concept of an inherently dangerous activity or object will take on different shades of meanings in differing contexts.

 The workmen’s compensation law has never abrogated an injured employee’s common-law right to bring an action against a third-party wrongdoer. See Albert A. Albrecht Co v Whitehead & Kales Iron Works, 200 Mich 109 (1918); Smith v Port Huron Gas & Electric Co, 217 Mich 519, 522 (1922).