Court Opinion

ID: 9373903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:10:25.062042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:49.719725
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                    DEC 16 2022
                                                                               SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
                                                                                  U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
                          NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                     OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

          UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
                    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

 In re:                                             BAP No. CC-22-1114-FTL
 ROBERT JACOB KULICK,
              Debtor.                               Bk. No. 9:21-bk-10017-RC

 ROBERT JACOB KULICK,
              Appellant,
 v.                                                 MEMORANDUM*
 LEISURE VILLAGE ASSOCIATION,
 INC.,
              Appellee.

               Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
                     for the Central District of California
              Ronald A. Clifford III, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: FARIS, TAYLOR, and LAFFERTY, Bankruptcy Judges.

                                 INTRODUCTION

      After debtor Robert Jacob Kulick obtained dismissal of his third

chapter 131 case, creditor Leisure Village Association, Inc. (“Leisure

      *
        This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential
value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
      Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
      1

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532.
Village”) sought a two-year refiling bar. The bankruptcy court agreed in

part and barred Mr. Kulick from refiling a bankruptcy petition through the

end of 2022, a period of about ten months.

       Mr. Kulick appeals the bankruptcy court’s refiling bar. We discern no

error and AFFIRM.

                                         FACTS 2

A.     Mr. Kulick’s prior litigation

       In 2013, Leisure Village filed a breach of contract lawsuit against

Mr. Kulick and obtained a state court judgment for approximately

$430,000. Mr. Kulick paid that judgment in full but then sued Leisure

Village and others in state court for defamation. The defendants eventually

prevailed against Mr. Kulick in the superior court and on appeal and were

awarded attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $504,965 plus interest. Leisure

Village holds a judgment lien against Mr. Kulick’s residential real property

located in Camarillo, California.

       During the second lawsuit, Mr. Kulick filed two chapter 13 petitions.

He filed his first petition in January 2018, which the court dismissed on his

motion in April of that year. He filed another petition in October, which he

       2
         Mr. Kulick did not provide us with any excerpts of record, other than the
hearing transcript. We exercise our discretion to review the court’s docket, as
appropriate, see Woods & Erickson, LLP v. Leonard (In re AVI, Inc.), 389 B.R. 721, 725 n.2
(9th Cir. BAP 2008), but we have not “scour[ed] the record to try to make [appellant’s]
case[,]” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Loop 76, LLC (In re Loop 76, LLC), 465 B.R. 525, 545 (9th
Cir. BAP 2012), aff’d, 578 F. App’x 644 (9th Cir. 2014).

                                              2
again voluntarily dismissed a month later.

      Additionally, Mr. Kulick filed at least five complaints against Leisure

Village in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California

between 2018 and 2020. The district court dismissed each of those cases in

short order.

B.    Mr. Kulick’s current chapter 13 case

      In January 2021, with the aid of counsel, Mr. Kulick filed another

chapter 13 petition. He filed a chapter 13 plan (and an amended plan) to

which the chapter 13 trustee (“Trustee”) and Leisure Village objected.

      Just before the third hearing on plan confirmation, Mr. Kulick filed a

motion for voluntary dismissal. The bankruptcy court granted the motion

and dismissed the case.3

C.    Leisure Village’s motion to impose a bar on refiling

      On May 5, 2022, Leisure Village filed a motion to bar Mr. Kulick from

refiling a bankruptcy petition for two years (“Motion”), pointing to his

“history of bankruptcy filings, misrepresentations of assets and liabilities,

and egregious conduct . . . .”

      Leisure Village characterized Mr. Kulick as a “serial chapter 13 filer,

who has demonstrated no intent to reorganize his financial affairs and

instead only abuses the bankruptcy process to hinder and delay [Leisure

Village’s] judgment collection efforts.” It pointed out various misleading or

      3
       Two days after the bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss, the case
was reassigned from Judge Saltzman to Judge Clifford.

                                          3
untrue statements, as well as an undisclosed apartment lease and

unscheduled assets such as cash and jewelry. It also outlined his attempts

to avoid any inquiry into his assets and frustrate the § 341 meeting of

creditors and Rule 2004 examination. It argued that, based on the totality of

the circumstances, Mr. Kulick abused the bankruptcy process and should

be barred from refiling a bankruptcy petition for at least two years.

      Mr. Kulick opposed the Motion and argued that he filed the petition

in good faith with the intent to save his home from foreclosure. He said

that he had no plans to file another bankruptcy petition. He explained that

his deceased wife owned the unscheduled jewelry and that he could not

locate it. He also said that he had not resided at the rental apartment since

2000 and kept it only as a “safe house” in the event of a natural disaster. He

argued that his conduct was not so egregious as to warrant a lengthy

refiling bar. He pointed to his medical disabilities and his good faith efforts

to save his home from foreclosure.

      Before the hearing on the Motion, the bankruptcy court issued a

tentative ruling and published it on its public calendar. The court did not,

however, place the tentative decision on the docket.

      At the hearing, Leisure Village pointed out that Mr. Kulick had filed

approximately seven district court cases and three bankruptcy court cases,

which showed egregious conduct that called for an extended bar on

refiling. Mr. Kulick’s counsel countered that Mr. Kulick had filed the

present chapter 13 case in good faith and intended to use exempt assets to

                                       4
fund his chapter 13 plan. Speaking for himself, Mr. Kulick echoed his

counsel’s statements and explained his learning and medical disabilities to

the court. He also told the court that, if “you still will permit me to have my

six months’ bar date, well, then I would accept that, Your Honor, but I

don’t think it’s fair that I should be barred for a year.”

      The bankruptcy court ruled from the bench. It adopted the reasoning

of its tentative ruling but revised the length of the refiling bar. It stated that

it did not believe that “Mr. Kulick is without fault here or that the

allegations made hold no merit[,]” but it was “of the mindset that there do

seem to be some factors here that seem to at least weigh into some of the

things that Mr. Kulick has done including his age and what appear to be

serious health issues . . . .” It thus granted the Motion and imposed a bar on

refiling a bankruptcy petition under any chapter from the date the case was

dismissed (February 16, 2022) through the end of the year.

D.    The appeal to the BAP

      Mr. Kulick, proceeding pro se, timely appealed. The notice of appeal

requested a stay of the bankruptcy court’s order, which was “in

retaliation/an abuse of judicial court authority & Unconstitutional.”

      Additionally, Mr. Kulick filed numerous motions before the BAP. In

one motion, he argued that Leisure Village was not a proper appellee and

that only the bankruptcy court should be a party to the appeal. In another,

he sought an injunction to stay foreclosure of his property.

      On July 8, 2022, the BAP motions panel entered an order (the “July 8

                                        5
Order”) that denied Mr. Kulick’s motions and required him to complete the

record on appeal and pay certain fees by a deadline. The July 8 Order

provided that, if Mr. Kulick did not comply, the BAP would dismiss the

appeal “without further notice to the parties.” Mr. Kulick complied with

the Panel’s order.

                              JURISDICTION

      The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and

157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

                                    ISSUE

      Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in granting the

Motion and barring Mr. Kulick from refiling a bankruptcy petition through

December 31, 2022.

                         STANDARD OF REVIEW

      We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s decision

to impose a refiling bar following dismissal. In re Bayati, BAP No. CC-16-

1072-KiTaKu, 2016 WL 5848892, at *3 (9th Cir. BAP Oct. 5, 2016) (“The

decision to dismiss a bankruptcy case with prejudice and impose a filing

bar is also reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).

      To determine whether the bankruptcy court has abused its discretion,

we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the

bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief

requested” and (2) if it did, we consider whether the bankruptcy court’s

application of the legal standard was illogical, implausible, or without

                                       6
support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.

United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

                                     DISCUSSION

      Mr. Kulick filed three informal briefs that identify the bankruptcy

court’s order granting the Motion as the basis for the appeal. His

substantive arguments are difficult to understand, but they seem to focus

on naming the bankruptcy court as an appellee, asserting undefined bias

by the court and the Trustee, and referencing matters presented in district

court cases. None of his arguments suggest reversible error.

A.    The bankruptcy court did not err in imposing a limited bar on
      refiling.

      Although the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the

bankruptcy court to bar a debtor from refiling a petition for a particular

amount of time, we have previously stated that “[s]ection 349(a)4 is not

ambiguous, and plainly provides that the bankruptcy court may, at its

discretion and for cause, bar the discharge of existing debt. Inherent in this

authority is the power to bar subsequent bankruptcy petitions that seek to

discharge such debt.” Leavitt v. Soto (In re Leavitt), 209 B.R. 935, 942 (9th Cir.

      4   Section 349(a) provides:
      Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case under
      this title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of debts
      that were dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a
      case under this title prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a
      subsequent petition under this title, except as provided in section 109(g) of
      this title.
                                             7
BAP 1997), aff’d, 171 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999). In other words, the

bankruptcy court may “dismiss a bankruptcy case with a bar preventing a

debtor from re-filing in cases of abuse. . . . [T]he issue of the length of the

bar is a matter for the Court’s discretion.” In re Craighead, 377 B.R. 648, 657

(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); see also TICO Constr. Co. v. Van Meter (In re Powell),

644 B.R. 181, 187 (9th Cir. BAP 2022) (recognizing that a chapter 13 debtor

has a right to dismiss his petition, but the bankruptcy court can prevent

abuse by “impos[ing] a bar on refiling or other conditions under § 105”).

      The bankruptcy court did not place its findings on the record at the

hearing on the Motion. It largely adopted its tentative ruling that was part

of the court’s calendar but never docketed. It directed counsel not to attach

a copy of the tentative ruling to the order. As a result, the tentative ruling is

not formally part of the record and not readily accessible to the public or to

litigants who are unfamiliar with this bankruptcy court’s practices.

      We frequently affirm orders where the appellant fails to provide an

adequate record for us to review. See Goldstein v. Weeks St., LLC, No. 16-CV-

00856-BLF, 2017 WL 567254, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2017) (“[A] lack of an

adequate record does not mandate an automatic dismissal but rather,

provides this Court the discretion to dismiss the appeal on this basis.”),

aff’d sub nom. In re Weeks St., LLC, 764 F. App’x 602 (9th Cir. 2019); see also

McCarthy v. Prince (In re McCarthy), 230 B.R. 414, 417 (9th Cir. BAP 1999)

(stating that the requirement to provide an adequate record on review is

“mandatory, not optional”); Burkhart v. FDIC (In re Burkhart), 84 B.R. 658,

                                        8
660 (9th Cir. BAP 1988) (“The responsibility to file an adequate record also

rests with the Appellants.”). We will overlook this point for three reasons.

First, Mr. Kulick is proceeding pro se and may not have understood the

importance of placing the tentative ruling in the record. Second, the

bankruptcy court took an affirmative step to keep the tentative ruling out

of the formal record (when it told appellee’s counsel not to attach the

tentative ruling to the order). Third, we are aware that the bankruptcy

court sometimes places tentative rulings on its online calendar and not on

its docket. Therefore, we are able to access it. (A copy of the tentative ruling

is attached to this memorandum.)

      The reasons given in the tentative ruling are sufficient to justify a

refiling bar. Mr. Kulick’s conduct clearly supported a finding of bad faith

or abuse of the bankruptcy process. He filed three bankruptcy cases for the

express purpose of frustrating Leisure Village’s attempts to enforce its

judgment lien. He never seriously tried to confirm a chapter 13 plan;

instead, he voluntarily dismissed each case when Leisure Village and the

trustees began to scrutinize his schedules and the details of his plan.

Furthermore, Leisure Village and the Trustee pointed out his failure to

provide information about his income and assets and his multiple false

statements in his schedules; he does not dispute that he failed to schedule

valuable assets such as jewelry and cash and a long-term lease of another

property. The record establishes his egregious conduct and his attempts to

manipulate the bankruptcy process. A refiling bar through the end of 2022

                                       9
was not an abuse of discretion.

      On appeal, Mr. Kulick does not take issue with anything related to

the bar on refiling. This is a sufficient basis to affirm the bankruptcy court’s

order. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Generally, an issue is waived when the appellant does not specifically

and distinctly argue the issue in his or her opening brief.”).

      Construing his briefs liberally, Mr. Kulick argues that the bankruptcy

court (specifically, Judge Saltzman) and the Trustee exhibited bias toward

him and denied him due process; that he has debilitating health issues, and

the bankruptcy court and the parties violated the Americans with

Disabilities Act; and that he is a veteran who loves the United States of

America and its Constitution. None of these arguments demonstrate any

error in the bankruptcy court’s decision to impose a refiling bar. He offered

no evidence that the bankruptcy court was biased against him. He said that

he could tell that Judge Saltzman hated him by the way she looked at him;

but this is not evidence and, in any event, Judge Saltzman did not enter the

order on appeal. The Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to the

federal courts. See Roman v. Jefferson at Hollywood LP, 495 F. App’x 804, 806

(9th Cir. 2012) (“While the [ADA] requires state courts to make disability

accommodations, the ADA does not apply to federal courts.”). Mr. Kulick’s

military service, while laudable, does not exempt him from the

consequences of his failure to pay his debt to Leisure Village. He was not

denied due process.

                                       10
B.      The BAP motions panel did not deprive Mr. Kulick of any due
        process or constitutional right in denying his motions on appeal.
        Mr. Kulick’s three informal briefs challenge the BAP motions panel’s

July 8 Order. We see no reason to alter that order. The bankruptcy court

was not a proper appellee: the court before which an action is pending is

never a party to the action; and the court that entered an order is never a

party to an appeal from that order. Mr. Kulick did not satisfy the standard

for a stay pending appeal. And the Panel did not deny him due process

when it warned that, if he did not comply with the order, the Panel would

dismiss the appeal without further notice. Notice is of course an essential

attribute of due process, but the Panel gave him notice when it entered the

July 8 Order. Due process did not require us to give him a second notice

when he failed to comply. More importantly, however, Mr. Kulick

complied with the July 8 Order, so we did not dismiss his appeal. His

challenge to the “without notice” provision of the order is hypothetical at

best.

                               CONCLUSION

        The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion. We AFFIRM.

                                      11
                            United States Bankruptcy Court
                             Central District of California
                                     Northern Division
                               Ronald A Clifford III, Presiding
                                 Courtroom 201 Calendar

Thursday, May 26, 2022                                                       Hearing Room      201

11:00 AM
9:21-10017    Robert Jacob Kulick                                                        Chapter 13

    #3.10     Hearing
              RE: [77] Motion - NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO IMPOSE REFILING
              BAR; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF
              HOWARD I. CAMHI AND JEFF F. TCHAKAROV IN SUPPORT THEREOF

                                  Docket       77

  Tentative Ruling:
      May 26, 2022

      Appearances required.

      Background
      Debtor Robert Jacob Kulick ("Kulick") and the movant, creditor Leisure Village
      Association, Inc. ("Leisure Village"), have been engaged in litigation since Leisure
      Village filed a breach of contract lawsuit against Kulick in November 2013 (the "First
      State Court Action"). Leisure Village is the homeowners’ association for Kulick’s
      real property located at 38122 Village 38, Camarillo, CA 93012 (the "Camarillo
      Residence"). In February 2016, the Debtor filed a defamation lawsuit against Leisure
      Village and several individual defendants in the Ventura County Superior Court, (the
      "Second State Court Action"). See Tchakarov Decl., ¶ 4. Leisure Village ultimately
      obtained a judgment against Kulick in the First State Court Action for approximately
      $430,000.00, (the "First Judgment"). See Docket No.77, Declaration of Jeff
      Tchakarov, Esq. (the "Tchakarov Decl."), ¶ 3. On January 29, 2018, Kulick filed a
      Chapter 13 case with this Court, Case No. 9:18-bk-10119, which he voluntarily
      dismissed on April 12, 2018 (the “First 2018 Case”). On October 1, 2018 Kulick filed
      Chapter 13 Case No. 9:18-bk-11609, (the “Second 2018 Case”), which he voluntarily
      dismissed on November 8, 2018.

      In December 2019, Kulick paid the First Judgment in full. See Docket No.77, Ex. A.
      In July 2020, Leisure Village obtained a judgment against the Debtor in the Second
      State Court Action for $504,965 (the "Second Judgment"). See Tchakarov Decl. ¶ 5,
      Ex. B. On August 18, 2020, Leisure Village subsequently recorded the abstract of
      judgement with the Ventura County clerk resulting in a judgment lien (the "Judgment

5/26/2022 9:21:06 AM                        Page 6 of 47
                              United States Bankruptcy Court
                               Central District of California
                                       Northern Division
                                 Ronald A Clifford III, Presiding
                                   Courtroom 201 Calendar

Thursday, May 26, 2022                                                           Hearing Room       201

11:00 AM
CONT...        Robert Jacob Kulick                                                        Chapter 13
       Lien") against the Camarillo Residence. See Tchakarov Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C. On January
       9, 2021 Kulick filed the instant Chapter 13 case (this “Third Case”). On February 15,
       2022, Leisure Village filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Conversion to Chapter 7. See
       Docket No. 62. On the same date, Kulick filed Debtor’s Motion for Voluntary
       Dismissal of Chapter 13 Case (the “Motion to Dismiss”). See Docket No.63. The
       order dismissing this Third Case was entered on February 16, 2022. See Docket No.
       64.

      Leisure Village has now filed the Motion to Impose a Refiling Bar (the “Motion’) in
      which they allege that Kulick’s history of bankruptcy filings, misrepresentations of
      assets and liabilities, and egregious conduct with respect to this Court, Leisure Village
      and its counsel constitute good cause to set a bar on the Debtor’s refiling of a
      bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 349(a) and applicable case law for no less
      than two (2) years. See Docket No.77, p.2, lines 10-14.
      Legal Standard
      Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 349(a), "[u]nless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the
      dismissal of a case under this title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this
      title, of debts that were dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of
      a case under this title prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a subsequent
      petition under this title, except as provided in section 109(g) of this title." "Section
      349(a) is not ambiguous, and plainly provides that the bankruptcy court may, at its
      discretion and for cause, bar the discharge of existing debt. Inherent in this authority is
      the power to bar subsequent bankruptcy petition that seek to discharge such debt." In
      re Leavitt, 209 B.R. 935, 942 (9th Cir. BAP 1997).

      For Chapter 13 cases, Section 1307(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “[o]n
      request of the debtor at any time, if the case has not been converted [], the court shall
      dismiss a case under this Chapter.

      While the Motion to Dismiss was approved as required by the Court, the Order and
      Notice of Dismissal Arising from Debtor’s Request for Voluntary Dismissal of
      Chapter 13 specifically provides that “the court retains jurisdiction on all issues
      involving sanctions, any bar against being a debtor in bankruptcy, all issues arising
      under Bankruptcy Code §§ 105, 109(g), 110, 329, 349 and 362, and to any additional
      extent provided by law.” See Docket No. 64. Courts in this Circuit have dismissed

5/26/2022 9:21:06 AM                          Page 7 of 47
                             United States Bankruptcy Court
                              Central District of California
                                      Northern Division
                                Ronald A Clifford III, Presiding
                                  Courtroom 201 Calendar

Thursday, May 26, 2022                                                         Hearing Room        201

11:00 AM
CONT...         Robert Jacob Kulick                                                          Chapter 13
       cases, as requested by the debtor, but have also retained jurisdiction on issues related
       to, inter alia, bars to refiling. In re Leavitt, 209 B.R. at 937.

      “‘Cause’ under § 349 has not been defined by the Code. A review of the case law
      indicates that ‘egregious’ conduct must be present, but that a finding of bad faith
      constitutes such egregiousness.” Id. at 939. At bottom, the Ninth Circuit instructs
      bankruptcy courts to conduct a totality of the circumstances test in determining bad
      faith. In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit has held
      that the factors the bankruptcy court should consider in this totality of the
      circumstances test are: (1) whether the debtor "misrepresented facts in his [petition or]
      plan, unfairly manipulated the Bankruptcy Code, or otherwise [filed] his Chapter 13
      [petition or] plan in an inequitable manner;" (2) "the debtor's history of filings and
      dismissals;" (3) whether "the debtor only intended to defeat state court litigation;" and
      (4) whether egregious behavior is present. Id.
      Analysis
             Whether the Debtor Misrepresented Facts in His Petition or Plan, Unfairly
      Manipulated the Bankruptcy Code, or Otherwise Filed His Chapter 13 Petition or
      Plan in an Inequitable Manner
      Leisure Village alleges that the Petition and Schedules filed in this case were
      incomplete and far less than forthright due to misrepresentations and omissions
      committed by Kulick. Specifically, Leisure Village argues that Kulick failed to
      disclose that he leases an apartment located at 1377 S. Beverly Glen Blvd., Apt. 405,
      Los Angeles, CA 90024 (the “Los Angeles Residence”) for $1,874.00 per month on
      Schedule G and that Schedule J listed a peculiar “Savings” expense of $2,200.00 until
      counsel for the Leisure Village inquired about the lease obligations at the initial
      341(a) meeting held on March 10, 2021. See Docket No. 12; Camhi Decl. ¶ 3.
      Leisure Village also alleges that Kulick misrepresented the status of his business
      entities and also had undisclosed assets and income. See Tchakarov Decl. ¶ 20. The
      Petition states that Kulick has not used any business names or EINs in the last 8 years
      (Petition, Part I, Q. 4) and Kulick is not a sole proprietor (Petition, Part III, Q. 12).
      However, Schedule A/B discloses that Kulick has a 100% ownership interest in six
      (6) business entities [Docket. No. 12] and Kulick sued Leisure Village in the Second
      State Court Action as “Robert J. Kulick dba Leisure Village News.” Leisure Village

5/26/2022 9:21:06 AM                          Page 8 of 47
                             United States Bankruptcy Court
                              Central District of California
                                       Northern Division
                                 Ronald A Clifford III, Presiding
                                   Courtroom 201 Calendar

Thursday, May 26, 2022                                                          Hearing Room       201

11:00 AM
CONT...        Robert Jacob Kulick                                                          Chapter 13
       further asserts that Kulick has undisclosed assets and income from his involvement in
       jewelry inventory and sales through his businesses East Asia Gems, Ltd and Jewelry
       Club of America. Docket No. 77, p.12, lines 4-14. Specifically, Leisure Village
       claims that Kulick’s prior Chapter 13 case (Case No. 18-11609), Schedules A/B
       [Docket. No. 1] lists jewelry inventory of another one of his deceased wife’s
       businesses, Jewelry Club of America worth $69,442. However, Kulick could not
       recall the location of said proceeds or records of the jewelry sales. See Ex. K,
       Deposition transcript, 54, 58-59. Leisure Village also alleges that Kulick failed to
       disclose “residual” income from “Ginnie Mae certificates of deposit, in addition to his
       Social Security income and VA benefits in the schedules. Ex. K., p. 59, and Dkt. No.
       12. When asked about the approximate amount of the undisclosed residual income,
       Kulick could not recall. Ex. K., p. 60. Furthermore, Leisure Village claims that
       Kulick admitted to being actively involved in Leisure BRK Enterprises CA-1, which
       is the Debtor’s “dba” and a pass-through entity for proceeds from real estate
       investments to be diverted to tax-exempt third parties. Ex. K Depo Tr., pp. 24-29.
      In opposition of Leisure Village’s claims regarding the undisclosed jewelry inventory,
      Kulick asserts that he failed to list the jewelry because he does not believe it is in his
      possession since he has trouble locating where his now deceased wife stored the
      inventory.    See Docket No. 79, p. 3, lines 8-19. Regarding the Los Angeles
      residence, Kulick states that he signed the lease agreement in 1979 and that he and his
      wife lived there until the year 2000. Id. at lines 21-22. Although he retained the
      apartment after moving to the Camarillo residence Kulick asserts that his failure to
      disclose the lease in his schedules was an oversight, which he corrected once the
      discrepancy was brought to his attention. Id. at lines 21-28; p.3 lines 1-3.
      It is clear that the Kulick’s disclosures in his bankruptcy schedules have been
      inaccurate, at best. There appears to the Court to have been a pattern of filing
      inaccurate schedules by Kulick with this Court in the prior Chapter 13 cases. The
      inaccurate disclosures when viewed singularly may not rise to the level of bad faith or
      egregious conduct, but when viewed as a whole, the Court views this factor as
      breaking in favor of the Motion.
              The Debtor's History of Filings and Dismissals
      Throughout the course of litigation with Leisure Village, Kulick has filed three (3)

5/26/2022 9:21:06 AM                          Page 9 of 47
                             United States Bankruptcy Court
                              Central District of California
                                      Northern Division
                                Ronald A Clifford III, Presiding
                                  Courtroom 201 Calendar

Thursday, May 26, 2022                                                        Hearing Room         201

11:00 AM
CONT...         Robert Jacob Kulick                                                          Chapter 13
       Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases in the Central District of California, Northern Division
       since January 2018, all of which he has dismissed. Regarding the First Case, Kulick
       asserts that he requested dismissal when it became clear that he would not be able to
       propose a feasible plan. Id. at p. 2, lines 14-15. He further asserts that he received a
       $223,722 award from the VA for past due disability compensation after the First Case
       was dismissed which he believed would allow him to be able to propose a feasible
       plan. Id. at lines 22-23. Kulick filed the Second Case approximately six (6) months
       after dismissal of the First Case, which required him to file a motion to impose the
       automatic stay. However, Leisure Village opposed the motion and the court ultimately
       denied Kulick’s request to impose the stay. Kulick dismissed the second case because
       "without the protection of the stay, he concluded that there would be no benefit of
       continuing the case." Id. at lines 19-25.
      On January 9, 2021 Kulick filed this Third Case. On February 15, 2022, Leisure
      Village filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Conversion to Chapter 7. See Docket No. 62.
      On the same date, Kulick filed the Motion to Dismiss.
      In support of the Court’s authority to dismiss a case with a bar to refiling, Leisure
      Village cites a number of cases (i.e., In re Craighead, 377 B.R. 648 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
      2007); In re Duran, 630 B.R. 797 (BAP 9th Cir. 2021); In re Ross, 858 F.3d 779 (3d
      Cir. 2017); In re Sinischo, 561 B.R. 176 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2016) and In re McInnis,
      No. BAP NC-17-1336-FBKU, 2018 WL6565413 (BAP 9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2018)). The
      Court finds this Third Case distinguishable from the cases cited regarding the number
      of filings and the succession of the repeated filings. In this case, Kulick has filed
      three (3) Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases between January 2018 and January 2021. Two
      (2) of the three (3) cases were filed in the year 2018, however, Kulick filed this Third
      Case over two (2) years after the Second Case. In Craighead the Debtor and his
      family filed twenty-two cases in the prior decade with six (6) being filed by the debtor
      himself. See In re Craighead, 377 B.R. 648, 651 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007). In
      Sinischo, the debtor made numerous omissions and filed “several Plans in bad faith.”
      In that case, the court only imposed a 180-day bar to refiling. What is more, here,
      Kulick paid the Judgment from the First State Court Action in full in December 2019.
              Whether the Debtor Only Intended to Defeat State Court Litigation
      Leisure Village alleges that Kulick filing the third case shortly after they obtained

5/26/2022 9:21:06 AM                         Page 10 of 47
                              United States Bankruptcy Court
                               Central District of California
                                       Northern Division
                                 Ronald A Clifford III, Presiding
                                   Courtroom 201 Calendar

Thursday, May 26, 2022                                                         Hearing Room         201

11:00 AM
CONT...         Robert Jacob Kulick                                                           Chapter 13
       their judgement in the Second State Court Action was a clear attempt to frustrate their
       collection efforts. In the Opposition to the Motion (the “Opposition’) Kulick contends
       that he filed this case in good faith and to retain his home. Docket No.79, p.1, line 26.
       According to the Opposition, Kulick intended to completely avoid a senior judgment
       lien and partially avoid the Leisure Village’s lien, pursuant to § 522(f) and the
       remaining amount that could not be avoided would be paid in full through the
       [Debtor’s] plan. He further stated that he intended to devote largely exempt funds into
       the plan to pay creditors. Id. at p.2, lines 1-5.
       On February 1, 2021, Kulick filed a Chapter 13 plan which proposed to pay Leisure
       Village approximately $115,000 of its $504,965.00 claim in Class 3B. Docket No.15,
       p.6-7. Kulick also included his intent to file a separate motion to avoid creditor,
       Leisure Village’s judgment lien pursuant to under 11 U.S.C. section 522(f) in section
       4 of the plan. Id. at p.12. On May 5, 2021, Kulick filed an amended plan which
       proposed to increase the payment of Leisure Village’s claim to $125,000.00. Docket
       No. 28, p. 6-7.
       Utilizing 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) to avoid any portion of Leisure Village’s Judgment that
       affected Kulick’s homestead exemption was certainly an aim of Kulick’s filing of this
       Third Case, and he assuredly planned on using Chapter 13 to seek a discharge of
       certain of his debts, including, perhaps, a portion of the Leisure Village Judgment.
       The Judgement was just that, however, a judgment. The only issue to defeat was
       collection efforts on the Judgment, which prompts many debtors to file bankruptcy.
       Kulick was not only seeking to reduce the amount of the Judgment he would need to
       pay, but also to reorganize his affairs.
              Whether Egregious Behavior is Present
       Leisure Village claims that Kulick unscrupulously hindered and delayed his Rule
       2004 examination by cancelling it [twice] at the last moment due to alleged
       unspecified health issues and that he purposefully used his alleged health issues as a
       means to circumvent being subjected to the standard oath of affirmation to tell the
       truth under the penalty of perjury. See Tchakarov Decl. ¶ 12-13. Additionally,
       Leisure Village alleges that Kulick’s refusal to be sworn under oath is [yet another]
       indication that he has no intention of making full disclosures with regard to his
       financial affairs. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 20.

5/26/2022 9:21:06 AM                         Page 11 of 47
                             United States Bankruptcy Court
                              Central District of California
                                      Northern Division
                                Ronald A Clifford III, Presiding
                                  Courtroom 201 Calendar

Thursday, May 26, 2022                                                        Hearing Room      201

11:00 AM
CONT...        Robert Jacob Kulick                                                        Chapter 13
       On November 12, 2021, the court entered an order approving the stipulation in which
       Kulick agreed to appear for a Rule 2004 Examination by Leisure Village. See Docket
       Nos. 44-45. According to the stipulation, the parties agreed to initially conduct the
       examination on September 15, 2021, however on the evening of September 14, 2021,
       Kulick advised Leisure Village that he was unable to appear due to medical issue. See
       Docket No. 44, p. 2, lines 20-13. The examination was rescheduled to October 27,
       2021. Id. On October 13, 2021, Kulick notified counsel for Leisure Village via fax
       that he was canceling the scheduled examination due to a medical issue. Ex. E- fax
       correspondence from Debtor. However, on October 13, 2021, Kulick also file a
       Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. Ex. F-
       A. Thereafter the parties stipulated that the Rule 2004 examination will be conducted
       remotely on November 19, 2021. Docket No. 46. The November 19 examination was
       not completed, and the parties agreed to reschedule the examination for January 18,
       2022. Docket No. 77, p.26, lines 8-10. On February 7, 2022, the 2004 examination
       was conducted however, the examination could not be completed in the allotted time
       and the parties agreed to coordinate an agreeable to date to reconvene. Ex. K
       Deposition Transcript. On February 15, 2022, Leisure Village filed a Notice of Intent
       to Seek Conversion to Chapter 7. Docket No. 62. On the same date, Kulick filed a
       Motion to Dismiss, and the order dismissing the case was entered on February 16,
       2022. See Docket No. 64.
      Kulick asserts that his medical issues severely impacted his ability to attend the 2004
      Examination and that any apparent obfuscation in his answers was not in bad faith but
      rather due to these medical conditions and the side effects of the medications. See
      Docket No. 79, p.3, lines 1-6. However, he does not address the filing of the
      Supreme Court Writ on the same date that he claimed to be unable to appear at the
      examination due to illness.
      The Court notes that Kulick’s health impairments due to his age and his medical
      conditions have made completing the 2004 examination difficult for Leisure Village
      but the Court also notes that Kulick has provided some proof to support his health
      conditions. That is not to say that Kulick has completely clean hands, but Leisure
      Village has not proven that Kulick’s actions in this case warrant a two-year bar to
      filing.

5/26/2022 9:21:06 AM                        Page 12 of 47
                             United States Bankruptcy Court
                              Central District of California
                                      Northern Division
                                Ronald A Clifford III, Presiding
                                  Courtroom 201 Calendar

Thursday, May 26, 2022                                                       Hearing Room      201

11:00 AM
CONT...      Robert Jacob Kulick                                                         Chapter 13
       Conclusion
      In weighing the Leavitt factors, and analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the
      Court does not believe that a two-year bar to re-filing is appropriate in this case.
      However, the Court does find that some bar to re-filing is appropriate, and will enter
      an order barring a further bankruptcy filing by Kulick from the date that this Third
      Case was dismissed, through 180 days from the date the order approving the Motion
      is entered.
      The Movant is to file a conforming order within 7 days.

                                     Party Information
  Debtor(s):
       Robert Jacob Kulick                        Represented By
                                                    Reed H Olmstead
  Movant(s):
       Leisure Village Association, Inc.          Represented By
                                                    Howard Camhi
  Trustee(s):
       Elizabeth (ND) F Rojas (TR)                Pro Se

5/26/2022 9:21:06 AM                        Page 13 of 47