Court Opinion

ID: 9644113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:48:15.153079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:08.790578
License: Public Domain

Judith Rogers, Judge, dissenting. By this decision today, this court is holding that appellant’s choice to disassociate herself from the presence of harmful chemicals in order to breast-feed her child disqualifies her from the receipt of unemployment compensation. I respectfully dissent. The appellant in this case is a trained chemist whose job admittedly exposed her to harmful chemicals. Given the potential for danger, precautionary measures were taken during her pregnancy to remove her from their presence. After careful consideration, appellant made an informed and educated decision to breast-feed her child. Desiring to continue this practice beyond her maternity leave, appellant made the request of her employer that she be permitted to work for a period of four months under the same restrictions put into effect while she had been pregnant. This request was made upon the advice of her physician who recommended that she avoid exposure to harmful chemicals while breast-feeding. Her employer denied this request, and thus appellant was faced with two alternatives. One, she could return to work without restriction, which would involve disregarding her physician’s advice and also placing her child at risk. Secondly, she could accept another position which, the employer acknowledged, was a demotion, without any assurance that her former position would remain available by the time she discontinued breast-feeding. Finding these choices unacceptable, appellant terminated her employment. The proper standard in determining good cause to leave one’s work is recognized as being a cause which would impel the average able-bodied, qualified worker to, in good faith, give up his or her employment. Calvin v. Director, 31 Ark. App. 74, 787 S.W.2d 701 (1990). In determining the existence of good cause for an employee to voluntarily leave work, it is necessary to consider, among other factors, the degree of risk involved to her health, safety and morals, her physical fitness and prior training, her experience and prior earnings. Morton v. Director, 22 Ark. App. 281, 742 S.W.2d 118 (1987); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-515(c) (1987). In reaching their decision, the majority cites Gilbert v. Everett, 1 Ark. App. 260, 647 S.W.2d 486 (1983), and Hunterv. Daniels, 2 Ark. App. 94, 616 S.W.2d 763 (1981). In Gilbert, the employer had an unwritten policy that its employees not intermarry, and the claimant quit her job in order to marry a co-employee. In Hunter, the employer had an unwritten policy that its employees not seek public office, and the claimant resigned when he became a candidate for county judge. In both cases, we affirmed the denial of benefits on the ground that the claimants’ voluntary decisions to quit their jobs was based on purely personal considerations which were in no way related to working conditions or other good cause connected with the work. In my opinion, these decisions do not preclude an award of benefits in this case. Here, while it cannot be denied that appellant’s decision to breast-feed her child was a matter of personal choice, her reason for terminating her employment was directly attributable to the conditions under which she was required to work, i.e. the exposure to harmful chemicals. Appellant’s good faith has not been questioned in this appeal; from all indications her decision to resign was sincere and based on the interests of her child. I submit that appellant was placed in an untenable position of having to make a choice between the Scylla of endangering the well-being of her child and the Charybdis of being demoted. By statute, good cause does encompass health risks. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-515 (1987). And, the suitability of an alternative job offer is recognized as an element for determining good cause. Ladish Co. v. Breashears, 263 Ark. 48, 563 S.W.2d 419 (1978). In my estimation, appellant demonstrated good cause for quitting her job and her reason for so doing was sufficiently compelling to merit an award of unemployment compensation. The important public policy consideration, of benefiting a child’s early start, which I also tacitly espouse in this dissent, should be adopted by the legislature if our court refuses to recognize this health consideration in its opinion. Robbins, J., joins in this dissent.