Court Opinion

ID: 9585101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:56:14.11494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:46.368958
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
On reconsideration I find it necessary to write a separate opinion because, although I agree with the judgment that the trial court order granting summary judgment must he vacated, I do so for a different reason than has been expressed by the majority.
1. The trial court rejected Hardin’s defense that the action to confirm the arbitration award was too late. Hardin contended that the one-year period of limitation provided by OCGA § 9-9-12 had expired. The trial court disagreed and concluded that Fuller’s expeditious pursuit of confirmation, albeit in the wrong court, was sufficient to meet the intention of the legislature that only one year be allowed to seek confirmation. Without saying so expressly, the trial court implied that the statutory period was tolled by court activity. The majority here agreed that there was some tolling but concluded it was not enough to make the second attempt in superior court timely. Instead, the court holds that the action was saved by the renewal statute, OCGA § 9-2-61. True, it is “a remedial statute and [is] to be liberally construed.” Chance v. Planters &c. Coop., 219 Ga. 1, 3 (131 SE2d 541) (1963). But “OCGA § 9-2-61 applies only if the original suit is a valid suit, but will not apply if the original suit is void.” (Citations omitted.) Hornsby v. Hancock, 165 Ga. App. 543, 544 (301 SE2d 900) (1983).
The original suit, filed in federal court, was void because the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. So ruled the district court and so held the appellate court. For that reason it was involuntarily dismissed. The action in federal court counted and cannot be ignored so as to consider the first superior court action as the one which is being renewed, for the first superior court action was filed *724after the one-year statute had run. OCGA § 9-2-61 (a) provides that “[w]hen any case has been commenced in either a state or federal court within the applicable statute of limitations ... , it may be recommenced in a court of this state or in a federal court either within the original applicable period of limitations or within six months after the discontinuance or dismissal, whichever is later. . . .” So the federal court action is recognized as the first one, but the one-year period of OCGA § 9-9-12 was not tolled because the federal suit was void.
Decided July 15, 1998
Reconsideration denied July 31, 1998
Smith & Fleming, Robert O. Fleming, Jr., for appellant.
McKinney & Salo, Sonja L. Salo, for appellee.
The time period in which Fuller could apply to the superior court for confirmation of the arbitration award of $29,115 plus $1,050.32 for administrative fees and expenses regarding the six-day arbitration expired about August 28, 1991, as the award had been made and entered in writing on August 28, 1990. The first suit in the proper court was not filed until September 26, 1991, too late.
2. This being the case, the issue of whether there was valid service on Hardin is moot and consequently I do not join in Division 2 of the majority opinion. I do concur in Division 3 insofar as it holds that the remaining enumeration is moot.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope joins in Division 1 of this special concurrence.