Court Opinion

ID: 9722859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:53:18.80374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:40.989856
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: In my view the judgment of the circuit court is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and to the law principally because of the misapplication of the parol evidence rule. Properly applied that rule makes it apparent as to which of the conflicting versions of the testimony must be accepted. In the construction of an integrated written contract, the parol evidence rule requires only the exclusion of extrinsic proof which adds to, modifies, or alters the substantive obligations expressed or implicit in the meaning of the language used. (30 Am. Jur. 2d 1967 Evidence §1016, at 151 et seq. (1967).) It does not authorize the exclusion of extrinsic proof of circumstance attending the agreement by which the court can place itself in the'situation occupied by the parties when the agreement was made, and thereby avail itself of the same knowledge the parties possessed so as to judge the correct application of the language to the things described. (17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §272 (1964).) The importance of considering such extrinsic proof is more apparent where the language is ambiguous, but no proof should be considered even in that circumstance which would import any meaning of which the language used is plainly not susceptible. (17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §272 (1964).) (The agreement appears below.1  The handwritten agreement here evidences not only a sale of a “house trailer” but also of a cabana and carport for a total sum of *5000 which was paid. It recites the further understanding of the parties that the “trailer” may be left on location at no parking charge for a period expiring March 1,1971. Nothing is said about a right to park the cabana or carport which plaintiff also bought. Finally, the writing contains a curious and ambiguous recitation that “This unit may be sold if agreed by both parties.” (Emphasis added.) It is ambiguous because it is not clear whether word “unit” refers to the trailer only, or to all the “chattels” plaintiff bought and paid for. It is curious in the sense that it imposes a restraint on plaintiffs right of alienation as to items he purchased — a restraint which from all appearances, would follow the “chattels” even if plaintiff were to have removed them from location pursuant to defendant’s notice to quit.2  Considering the record with the foregoing understanding of the parol evidence rule, it becomes plain that plaintiff s testimony does not purport to add, modify or alter the written agreement in any respect whatever. It sheds light as to attending circumstances, eliminates ambiguity, and brings the meaning of the written words into clear focus. The cabana and carport, although attached to the trailer, were also affixed to the realty and were not moveables as one might have wrongly supposed. Plaintiff was a New York resident attending the University of IUinois, and was purchasing “the unit” for temporary housing. Before signing the agreement, he was shown the premises by defendant and observed it was served by electricity on a separate meter, by bottled gas, and by water supplied from defendant’s weU. He assumed from this inspection, that the electricity and gas expenses were his, and paid them; later he altered the gas supply by making, at his expense and with defendant’s acquiescence, a connection to the city main. Both parties agree it was intended that plaintiff should live there and considering the ordinary usages of the property purchased, such right may be fairly implied from the writing itself. Plaintiff denied that there were any oral agreements about water, utilities, insurance, weeds, or anything else that was not in the writing. With this evidence, it is legally and reasonably inferable from the written contract, that the parties intended that the trailer, cabana and carport would never be moved at all, that plaintiff was to have the right of occupancy without ground rents until March 1, 1971, and could then, at the conclusion of his schooling perhaps, or before, resell the facility, if defendant would approve the new occupant. Such a housing arrangement could reduce plaintiff’s schooling expense. The restraint in alienation acquires meaning under this construction. Defendant would have a legitimate interest in who the new buyers, dwelling on his land, might be, and might expect to require ground rents. This construction also supports the conclusion that plaintiff acquired a right expiring not sooner than March 1,1971, to an existing, visible water supply from defendant’s well, and that defendant’s water shut-off was, indeed, actionable. An examination of defendant’s testimony against the same understanding of the parol evidence rule reveals that most of it must be excluded from consideration. It does not shed light on the meaning of the written words, but requires acceptance of the proposition that there were many additional oral covenants undertaken besides those in the writing which he admits to be in his own hand. The fact alone requires that doubtful issues should be construed against him. Nonetheless, he asserts the existence of contemporaneous oral covenants for liability insurance, for maintenance, and that plaintiff promised to find an alternative water supply by spring, or April. It is for violation of these covenants, none of which are in his writing, even by implication, that he asserts plaintiff came in breach. It is not wholly insignificant that the oral covenants described in his later written notice to quit, given under date of May 12, states nothing even then about plaintiffs duty to find an alternative water supply. And the notice to quit does not purport to be a release of the restraint on plaintiff’s alienation of the “chattels”; with that restraint, anything that might have been moveable was of doubtful value. I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court, enter judgment for plaintiff and remand the cause for further determination of damages.   “Kaufman’s Clear Lake 2500 West Springfield Champaign, Illinois 61820 Agreement Oct. 1-1968 Sold to Richard Lippman & Araceli Lippman — a 1957 — 10 Y 45 Travelo House Trailer with Cabana & Carport for a total of *5,000 on or before Oct. 15th 1968. *1,000 on Oct. 4th *4,000 by Oct. 15th It is understood by all Parties that the above Trailer may be left at the same location until March 1st 1971 at no parking charge. This unit may be sold if agreed by both Parties. Richard A. Lippman Wally Harrell”    The record contains some proof that plaintiffs purchase of the cabana, carport and trailer was privately financed by him at a local bank, and that having been disposed of all or part of the items he was paying for, through defendant’s interference, he became in default, that the bank then repossessed and resold. There is some indication that defendant was the purchaser.