Court Opinion

ID: 9580428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:52.490405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:16.470324
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although appellants in this case specifically prayed for both punitive damages and attorney fees, their complaint demanded judgment on both those claims only “in an amount to be determined at trial” rather than in a specific dollar amount. OCGA § 9-11-54 (c) (1) provides that “[a] judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.) “[T]his court has recognized that the reason for [OCGA § 9-11-54 (c) (1)] is that it would be fundamentally unfair to have the complaint lead defendant to believe that only a certain type and dimension of relief was being sought and then, should he attempt to limit the scope and size of the potential judgment against him by not appearing or otherwise defaulting, allow the court to give a different type of relief or a larger damage award.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Betts v. First Ga. Bank, 177 Ga. App. 359, 360 (339 SE2d 616) (1985). A plaintiff’s relief in a judgment by default “ ‘is strictly limited in nature and degree to that specifically demanded in the complaint, even though the allegations or the proofs, or both, would justify[] other, additional, or greater relief, as *794under a prayer for general relief.’ [Cits.]” Dempsey v. Ellington, 125 Ga. App. 707, 708 (188 SE2d 908) (1972). Because appellants failed to specify the amount of relief they sought but instead demanded a general, unspecified amount for the punitive damages and attorney fees in their complaint, an award of any amount of money for those claims would “exceed in amount that prayed for” under OCGA § 9-11-54 (c) (1). Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of First Union’s motion to prohibit appellants from presenting any evidence regarding these claims.
Decided March 20, 1992
Reconsideration denied April 3, 1992
James W. Wallis, Jr., Kenneth A. Smith, for appellants.
Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Herbert D. Shell-house, Wallace K. Askew, for appellee.