Court Opinion

ID: 9379152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 20:02:24.412809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.099406
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/23 P. v. Reyes CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084388
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. DF013968A)
                    v.

    JOSE REYES,                                                                           OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David Wolf,
Judge.
         Gordon B. Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri, and
Clifford E. Zall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Levy, J. and Detjen, J.
       Defendant Jose Reyes pled no contest to possession of drug paraphernalia in
prison and admitted having suffered a prior felony “strike” conviction within the meaning
of the “Three Strikes” law. Defendant also entered a waiver pursuant to People v. Cruz
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247, whereby he was permitted to remain free of custody until his
sentencing and the trial court indicated that, if defendant obeyed all laws and appeared
for sentencing, it would grant him a term of probation. Defendant failed to appear for
sentencing and was convicted of another offense. Roughly three years four months later,
the trial court imposed the upper term of six years in prison, consecutive to the sentence
for the offense defendant committed while released on the Cruz waiver, and imposed a
$10,000 restitution fine. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
(1) imposing a fully consecutive six-year term and (2) imposing a $10,000 restitution fine
based on defendant’s violation of the Cruz waiver (rather than the facts of the offense).
The People agree on both accounts. We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for
resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
                             PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       On December 6, 2018, the Kern County District Attorney filed a criminal
complaint charging defendant with possession of heroin while incarcerated in state prison
(Pen. Code, § 4573.6;1 count 1) and possession of a “hypodermic syringe and/or spoon”
while incarcerated in state prison (§ 4573.6; count 2). The complaint further alleged as to
both counts that defendant had suffered a prior felony strike conviction within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
       On December 17, 2018, the prosecutor moved to amend the complaint to also
charge defendant with possession of drug paraphernalia in prison (§ 4573.8; count 3). On
the same date, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to
count 3 and admitted the prior strike conviction, in exchange for dismissal of counts 1

1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                             2.
and 2. The plea agreement further provided that defendant would be released on his own
recognizance, pursuant to a Cruz waiver, and would be granted probation if he returned
on the date scheduled for sentencing and had committed no new crimes. The trial court
advised defendant that if he failed to comply with the terms of the Cruz waiver, he could
be sentenced to six years in prison.
       On January 17, 2019, defendant failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for
sentencing. The trial court issued a bench warrant.
       On January 22, 2019, defendant made his first appearance after issuance of the
bench warrant. He was again released on his own recognizance and the matter was
continued for sentencing until January 29, 2019. On January 29, 2019, defendant again
failed to appear, and a bench warrant was issued.
       On February 10, 2022, defendant made his first appearance after issuance of the
January 19, 2019 bench warrant. His appearance followed the trial court’s order that he
be transported from High Desert State Prison for sentencing in this matter.
       On May 6, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to six years (the upper term,
doubled due to the prior strike conviction) on count 3. The court directed that the
sentence run consecutive to the six-year sentence for assault with a firearm defendant was
already serving in Los Angeles County Superior Court case No. VA151384-01. The
court also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b)
and a $10,000 suspended parole revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45.
       On May 20, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.

                                            3.
                                        DISCUSSION2
I. Section 1170.1 and Consecutive Imposition of the Upper Term
          Defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing the upper term on count 3
consecutive to the sentence in Los Angeles County Superior Court case
No. VA151384-01. The People agree, as do we.
          Section 1170.1 controls a trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences.
Subdivision (a) explains that “when any person is convicted of two or more felonies,
whether in the same proceeding or court or in different proceedings or courts … the
aggregate term of imprisonment for all these convictions shall be the sum of the principal
term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed for applicable
enhancements ….” (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) “The subordinate term for each consecutive
offense shall consist of one-third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each
other felony conviction for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed ….”
(Ibid.)
          Subdivision (c) of section 1170.1 creates an exception to the general rule set out in
subdivision (a) where “any person is convicted of one or more felonies committed while
the person is confined in the state prison ….” In that situation, if the court imposes a
consecutive sentence, the consecutive sentence commences at “the time the person would
otherwise have been released from prison.” However, as the parties agree, “if the
defendant is no longer serving a prison term at the time of sentencing for his in-prison
crime, then subdivision (c) has no application.” (People v. Brantley (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 917, 922.) “[T]his provision does not apply once the prisoner has completed
the sentence he or she was serving when the in-prison crime was committed.” (Ibid.)
Again, the parties agree, as do we, that because, at the time of sentencing, defendant was

2      Because defendant raises only sentencing issues, the facts underlying the offenses
are not relevant and are omitted from this opinion.

                                                4.
no longer serving the sentence he was serving when he committed the possession of
paraphernalia in prison offense, subdivision (c) did not apply. The court was bound to
impose the sentence in this case in compliance with section 1170.1, subdivision (c).3 It
did not do so.
       The trial court cited People v. Masloski (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1212 and People v.
Casillas (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 445, for the proposition that a trial court may impose a
full consecutive sentence after a defendant violates a Cruz waiver. Neither Masloski nor
Casillas stand for that proposition. Both merely confirm that a trial court may impose a
higher term of imprisonment without permitting a defendant to withdraw their guilty or
no contest plea if the defendant voluntarily violates a Cruz waiver after having been
properly advised. (See Masloski, at pp. 1222–1224; Casillas, at pp. 449, 452.) Those
cases do not authorize departure from the mandates of section 1170.1.
II. Restitution Fine and Parole Revocation Restitution Fine
       Defendant argues that the trial court erred in considering his failure to appear and
commission of a new offense while released pursuant to a Cruz waiver in setting his
restitution fine and suspended parole revocation restitution fine. The People agree, as do
we.
       A. Additional Background
       The trial court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine pursuant to subdivision (b) of
section 1202.4 and a suspended $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine pursuant to

3      The trial court relied upon People v. Nick (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 141, People v.
McCart (1982) 32 Cal.3d 338, and In re Curl (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 236, in the context
of imposing a consecutive sentence greater than one-third the middle term. In none of
those cases involving approval of a consecutive sentence exceeding one-third the middle
term did it appear that the defendant had completed the sentence they were serving at the
time the sentence on the in-custody offense was imposed. None of those cases therefore
addressed the issue of whether subdivision (c) of section 1170.1 applies when a defendant
had completed the sentence they were serving when the sentence on the in-custody
offense was imposed.

                                             5.
subdivision (a) of section 1202.45. The court explained the reasons for setting the fine in
that amount:

               “The question is what is the appropriate fine in something like this
       where someone has committed a new felony strike offense while out on a
       Cruz [w]aiver. I’ve only given a $10,000 fine twice in my career. The
       last—one of them was for a more significant assault. The one—the
       second one was for a Cruz [w]aiver violation where it was a new felony
       strike. [¶] … [¶]

             “[I]f the violation [of the Cruz waiver] had been minor or a
       misdemeanor or the [failure to appear], I think the fine should be
       comm[ensu]rate with the level of the violation.

               “In this case the defendant took the Court’s trust and created a new
       felony victim. I think $10,000 is the only possible punishment that would
       deter the defendant and hopefully deter others when they are talking …
       about getting a Cruz [w]aiver. They’ll be telling him don’t mess up, you’re
       going to get the max and slammed on the fine.

              “I am going to give him a $10,000 fine under [section] 1202.4[,
       subdivision ](b). That is also what I have done on a very identical case. In
       that case it was Cruz [w]aiver for eight and the defendant committed a
       robbery. So they’re both very similar new crimes.”
       B. Analysis
       In every case where a person is convicted of a crime, a trial court is required to
impose a restitution fine, and a suspended parole revocation restitution fine in the same
amount, between $300 and $10,000, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons
not to do so. (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.45, subd. (a).) The court has discretion in
setting the amount of the restitution fine and suspended parole revocation restitution fine,
but they must be “commensurate with the seriousness of the offense.” (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b).) The “seriousness of the offense” refers to the offense for which defendant is
being sentenced. “In setting the amount of the fine pursuant to subdivision (b) in excess
of the [$300] minimum fine …, the court shall consider any relevant factors, including,
but not limited to, the defendant’s inability to pay, the seriousness and gravity of the

                                              6.
offense and the circumstances of its commission, any economic gain derived by the
defendant as a result of the crime, the extent to which any other person suffered losses as
a result of the crime, and the number of victims involved in the crime.” (§ 1202.4,
subd. (d).)
       We review the determination of the amount of the fine for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1321.) A trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)
       In this case, the trial court’s stated reasons for imposition of a $10,000 restitution
fine and suspended parole revocation restitution fine were not related to the offense for
which defendant was being sentenced, possession of drug paraphernalia in prison.
Instead, the court focused exclusively on conduct entirely unrelated to the offense for
which defendant was being sentenced and which occurred subsequent to defendant’s
offense—his violation of the Cruz wavier, failure to appear, and commission of a new
felony offense. While we do not conclude that considering factors unrelated to the
offense of commission are inappropriate in setting a defendant’s restitution fine (for
instance, a trial court “shall consider” a “defendant’s inability to pay” (§ 1202.4,
subd. (d)), the restitution fine must be “commensurate with the seriousness of the
offense.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) It cannot be based exclusively upon conduct which
occurred after the commission of the offense and which is unrelated to the offense. In
this case, the court noted that “if the violation [of the Cruz waiver] had been minor or a
misdemeanor or [simply] the [failure to appear],” it would have imposed a restitution fine
“comm[ensu]rate with the level of the violation.” Because it found the violation of the
Cruz waiver to be more serious, it imposed a restitution fine and a suspended parole
revocation restitution fine that were not commensurate with the seriousness of the

                                              7.
offense. For that reason, we conclude the court abused its discretion in setting the
restitution fine.4
                                      DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for
full resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.

4     Defendant also contends that the court erred in imposing a restitution fine without
considering his ability to pay. Because we vacate the restitution fine on another ground,
we need not consider that issue. Defendant may raise any inability to pay contention on
remand.

                                             8.