Court Opinion

ID: 9785571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:13:20.19006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:57.545143
License: Public Domain

*142KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I join the majority in affirming the judgment. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s analysis of two issues, one pertaining to financial motive to kill, the other involving the prosecutor’s biblical references.
I
At the guilt phase of defendant Mary Ellen Samuels’s capital trial for the murders of her estranged husband and an accomplice who, she feared, would report the killing of her husband to the police, the prosecution presented this evidence: As a beneficiary of her husband’s life insurance policy defendant received more than $240,000 in proceeds; she got $70,000 for selling a sandwich shop that she and her husband had owned; and she obtained $160,000 by refinancing the family home. She then spent the money on such things as an expensive sports car, a large television, limousine service, property in a Mexican resort, and clothing from a store called Trashy Lingerie.
Defendant challenges the trial court’s admission into evidence of how she spent the money, contending it was inadmissible character evidence. The majority brushes the contention aside with this cursory comment: “[Tjhere was no error. The evidence was relevant to prove defendant’s financial motive for killing Samuels. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 313 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433].)” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 112.) The majority’s citation of Sapp is puzzling; no issue in that case bears the faintest resemblance to the merry widow’s spending spree at issue here.
In Sapp, a jury convicted the defendant of murdering three people. Thereafter, in closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor referred to evidence at the penalty phase that the defendant had also killed his mother (a crime for which he was not convicted), and argued that like the other murders, the defendant had a financial motive to kill his mother, because he owed her $60,000. On appeal, the defendant in Sapp contended that the trial court should have instructed the jury that in determining whether he had killed his mother (a prerequisite for using that fact against him as an aggravating circumstance at the penalty phase), the jurors should not infer, based on his commission of the charged murders, that he had a propensity toward criminal behavior. This court held that the evidence did not warrant such an instruction. (People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 312-313.)
Sapp is inapposite. (1) At issue there was the trial court’s failure to give a particular jury instruction; at issue here isthe admissibility of evidence. *143(2) Sapp involved the penalty phase of a capital trial; this case involves the guilt phase. (3) In Sapp, the prosecutor tried to use evidence of three murders to prove the commission of a fourth murder; here, the prosecutor used evidence of defendant’s spending spree after her husband’s death to prove that she killed him.
The only aspect of Sapp that remotely resembles this case is the prosecutor’s reference in Sapp to evidence that the defendant had a “financial motive” (People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 312) to kill his mother because he owed her money. But that evidence is wholly unlike the evidence of financial motive at issue here, which pertains to how defendant spent the inherited money; in any event, this court’s opinion in Sapp did not address the admissibility of that evidence. Thus, Sapp has no bearing on the issue here: Whether, as the majority holds, the manner in which defendant spent the money she inherited from the murder victim shows that she had a financial motive to kill him. The issue ought to be resolved by applying established principles on the admissibility of evidence.
Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.) Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) “The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends ‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish material facts . . . .” {People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 111 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664].) Motive is a material fact. {Ibid.)
Evidence that a defendant charged with murder inherited property or collected life insurance benefits from the victim is relevant, and therefore admissible, when the defendant knew of the policy’s existence at the time of the victim’s death. {People v. Goedecke (1967) 65 Cal.2d 850, 860 [56 Cal.Rptr. 625, 423 P.2d 777].) Such evidence would tend to show that the defendant had a motive for the murder. Thus, here the prosecution was entitled to introduce evidence that defendant collected life insurance benefits and inherited property on the death of her estranged husband, because it is reasonable to infer that she knew she would be entitled to them when her husband died. But what she did with those assets has no bearing on her motive to kill. How one disposes of inherited money or property differs from person to person. Some may choose to invest in the stock market or to support a favorite charity. Others may decide to use the inherited wealth to indulge in a buying spree largely for their own benefit and enjoyment, as occurred here. In either situation, how the inheritance is spent has no “tendency in reason” (Evid. Code, § 210) to establish a motive for the killing by which the funds were obtained. *144Thus, the evidence of defendant’s spending habits after her husband’s death served only to show, as defendant puts it, that she was outside “the norm of middle class women,” and that she was “a person of poor judgment” who was “loose with money.” Assuming, as does the majority, that defendant objected with sufficient specificity to preserve the issue, the trial court erred by admitting, at the guilt phase of defendant’s capital trial, evidence of how she spent the money she inherited from her murdered husband.
The error, however, was harmless, because there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Three witnesses (Heidi Dougall, Celina Krall, and Marsha Hutchison) testified that defendant told them that she wanted her husband dead, and another witness (David Navarro) testified that defendant had solicited him to kill her husband. Defendant’s close friend, Anne Hambly, testified that defendant told her she had persuaded James Bernstein to hire a “hit man” to kill defendant’s husband. Defendant also told Hambly that she later had Bernstein killed because she was afraid that he would tell the police of her involvement in her husband’s death. Paul Gaul, who killed Bernstein with the assistance of an accomplice, testified that defendant had asked him to commit the murder because Bernstein was blackmailing her by threatening to tell the police of her role in her husband’s murder. Given the strength of this evidence, it is not “reasonably probable” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]) that the outcome of defendant’s trial would have been different if the trial court had excluded the evidence of how she spent the money she inherited after his death.1
I now turn to the prosecutor’s biblical references at the penalty phase.
II
In her closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor said: “Genesis chapter 9, verse 6; Exodus chapter 21, verse 12; and the Book of Numbers chapter 35, verse 31 all repeat the same basic message: ‘Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for in his image did God make man.’ ” Defendant raised an objection, which the trial court overruled. The prosecutor then continued, “ ‘He who fatally strikes a man shall be put to death.’ [][] *145Exodus even answers a common defense argument that only God can take a life. [][] ‘It is not [szc] man, not God, who is to execute murders. By man shall his, the murderers [szc] blood be shed.’ [f] Although some look to the New Testament and quote, ‘Vengeance is mine, I will repay saith the Lord,’ in the very next chapter, Romans, Paul calls for capital punishment by saying, ‘The ruler bears not the sword ... in vain for he is the minister [of] God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.’ ”
The prosecutor followed those biblical quotations with these comments: “Now that’s enough said. And please understand I’m not telling you to use the Bible. I’m telling you not to use the Bible. The Bible is not the law of the land. H[] I only read those brief quotes for any of you who may have personal reservations against the death penalty because you believe that it is against your own beliefs, [f] Please don’t misunderstand because there was no other reason for reading those sections other than that, [f] Ladies and gentlemen, ... a free society requires of its citizen jurors strength and vigilance and courage and resolve in making the tough decision that is before you now. []Q It is much easier to beg you to spare a life than to ask you to take a life. That’s because those of us who live within the norms of society have a natural compassion, a natural reference [íz'c] for life. [][] It would be very easy for you to . . . walk away, to say that [defendant] will spend the rest of her life in prison. [][] But there is a greater principle here. If you believe that the death penalty is appropriate, then to walk away and to take the easy road because it was convenient or because it’s easy to live with, I submit you are ignoring the laws of the land that capital punishment should be applied when you decide it is appropriate.” (Italics added.)
Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s biblical references violated her rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. The majority does not resolve the issue. It simply concludes that even if improper, the prosecutor’s argument did not prejudice defendant. The majority explains: “The prosecutor’s biblical argument was only a small part of her argument, the bulk of which focused on arguing to the jury why it should find that the statutory aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 134.)
If I were to find that the prosecutor’s biblical references in this case were improper, I would conclude that they prejudiced defendant. The majority is wrong when it says that a prosecutor’s improper reliance on religious authority is harmless if it is only a “small part” of the prosecutor’s closing argument. I explained why in my dissenting opinion in People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262], There, this court used reasoning identical to that used by the majority here to find that the prosecutor’s improper biblical references in his closing argument at the *146penalty phase of a capital case were harmless. I dissented, with these comments: “The majority’s assertion that the prosecutor’s improper argument must be considered harmless because it was ‘part of a longer argument that properly focused upon the factors in aggravation and mitigation’ . . . makes little sense. Under that logic, prosecutors may freely refer to biblical authority when making their penalty arguments to juries in capital cases, secure in the knowledge that this court will never reverse a resulting death judgment for this misconduct, provided only that the prosecutors also present an argument focusing on the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. Appeals to divine authority in jury arguments in capital cases are prejudicial when jurors for whom the aggravating and mitigating factors appear closely balanced use religious considerations to resolve their doubts, as the prosecutor’s improper argument invites them to do.” (Id. at p. 1228 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); see also People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 309 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.2d 990] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) The majority here employs the same faulty logic used by the majority in Slaughter.
Because, in my view, an impermissible reliance on religious authority by the prosecutor may be prejudicial even when, as here, the biblical references are only a short part of the prosecutor’s argument, I must decide whether the prosecutor’s biblical references in this case were improper. On point here is this court’s decision in People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432], in which I joined. There the prosecutor, as in this case, quoted several biblical passages supportive of the death penalty in his closing argument at the penalty phase of a capital trial. But he went on to explain to the jury that he was not trying to argue that the Bible provided a basis for imposing the death penalty, but only to show that the Bible was “ ‘not an impediment to imposing the death penalty.’ ” (Id. at p. 391.) This court held the comments were permissible: “The prosecutor’s references were part of a straightforward argument that jurors should not be persuaded either way by biblical and religious teachings, and that the ultimate penalty decision was an individual determination. The prosecutor did not imply or suggest that another, higher law should be applied instead of the court’s instructions . . . .” (Id. at p. 392.)
“Because any use of biblical references in argument must be carefully scrutinized, cautious prosecutors will choose to avoid such references” (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 248 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 106 P.3d 895]); “[a] prosecutor who mentions the Bible in closing argument runs a grave risk that a reviewing court will . . . reverse the defendant’s conviction” (ibid.). *147But here, as in Hughes, the prosecutor’s biblical references “were part of a straightforward argument that jurors should not be persuaded either way by biblical and religious teachings . . . {People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 392), but should instead base their penalty decision on “the laws of the land.” Thus, under this court’s decision in Hughes, the prosecutor’s argument did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 21, 2005, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. George, C. J., did not participate therein.

 Defendant also argues that in addition to violating state law, admission of the evidence showing how she spent her inheritance violated her right to due process under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. She cites authority holding that the “admission of bad act testimony violatefs] due process” where “ ‘the admission of the testimony was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’ ” (Terrovona v. Kincheloe (9th Cir. 1988) 852 F.2d 424, 428, 429.) Assuming for the sake of argument that this standard, which pertains to the admission of prior criminal conduct by the defendant, is applicable here, I perceive no violation of defendant’s constitutional rights. The trial court’s admission of the evidence in question, although erroneous under state law, was not so damaging as to make the trial fundamentally unfair.