Court Opinion

ID: 3579617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:30:57.853452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:43:01.683699
License: Public Domain

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A railroad company is under no obligation to establish offices for the sale of tickets. If ticket offices are not established, passengers must pay their fares to the conductor on the cars. Such a system would throw great responsibility and labor on conductors, cause loss to the company, and be the source of annoyance to the passengers. All these consequences are avoided in a great degree, by the establishment of ticket offices, but the benefit is derived mainly by the company.
When, therefore, the legislature authorized the defendant to demand five cents, in addition to the usual fare, of every passenger not purchasing a ticket at a ticket office before getting on to the cars, the object was to compel, as far as such a provision could compel, travelers to purchase tickets, and thereby benefit the company.
If the law had stopped by giving the power to impose five cents on each passenger not procuring a ticket, it is quite clear that the effect of it would be merely to add five cents to the established fare, because it would be for the interest of the company to embarrass, and as far as possible to prevent the purchase of tickets at its offices.
To prevent such an abuse of a power given for the accommodation of the company, it was provided that the five cents should be exacted only of those who failed to purchase tickets at places where a ticket office is established and open.
This provision might be evaded. In order, therefore, to secure the public against liability to imposition, it was further provided that the defendant should keep its offices open one hour for the sale of tickets, prior to the departure *Page 516 
of each passenger train from such station, between certain hours specified in the act.
Had the departure of the train on which the plaintiff traveled from Utica to Albany, at the time of the demand for the fare for which this action is brought, occurred during the hours the defendant's ticket offices are required to be kept open, and the one at Utica was not open, it could not be seriously claimed that a demand for the extra fare would have been justified, or that the penalty would have been incurred. But the plaintiff left at one o'clock in the morning, at which time the defendant was not required to open any of its ticket offices; and it is insisted that because the plaintiff did not do what it was impossible for him to do — to wit: buy a ticket before leaving Utica — he became liable to pay the extra fare. It seems to me, the proposition has but to be stated to be rejected as utterly unsound. To compel a passenger to pay a penalty because the company had deprived him of the power to travel for the regular fare, would be so oppressive and unjust that it would require a positive provision of a legislative act to induce any tribunal to sanction it. The statute is open to no such construction. The extra fare can only be demanded when the passenger fails to purchase his ticket at an established ticket office that is open. If it is not open no ticket can be procured, and no right exists to demand the extra fare.
It is urged that the word "open," in the 2d section of chapter 228, means open at the hours ticket offices are required to be kept open by the first section of that chapter. But it is quite clear that the first section was intended to protect the public against any evasion of the duty to afford a reasonable opportunity to purchase tickets, and to relieve the company from keeping its offices open at all its stations during the whole night. The legislature in effect say to the company, you shall keep your offices open one hour before the departure of each passenger train from each station, from five in the morning till nine in the evening, except in the larger towns they shall be kept open till *Page 517 
11 P.M. If you do this, and if passengers shall neglect to purchase tickets, you may charge each one five cents additional fare. But if your offices are not open you can get only the regular fare.
The Utica office was not open, as admitted by the demurrer, and hence there was no pretense for demanding extra fare.
The five cents which the defendant may charge is in addition to the usual rate of fare. By these words I understand the legislature to mean that the five cents is taken by the company as fare, and not as a penalty for omitting to buy a ticket. The legislature never permits parties to enforce the collection of penalties given by law to themselves. It was proper to permit the defendant to demand a higher rate of fare from one not complying with a regulation of the company than from those who conformed to it.
The complaint alleges and the demurrer admits that the distance from Utica to Albany is ninety-five miles, and that the fare is $1.90. I am unable to understand how, in view of these admissions, the defendant's counsel can claim that the defendant is entitled to charge three cents per mile, or any other sum greater than two cents per mile. If the law did permit a charge of three cents, it would not help the defendant, after the admission that the fare was, in fact, two cents per mile. For the purposes of this case, we must act on the allegations and admissions in the pleadings, whatever the law may be on the subject. The pleadings make the law, by which the rights of the parties must be determined.
When, therefore, the defendant assumed to demand five cents in addition to the legal fare, it "asked and received a greaterrate of fare than that allowed by law," and is thus brought within the provisions of the first section of chapter 185 of the laws of 1857, and is liable to the consequences of such violation of the provisions of the statute.
The defendant's counsel insists that the complaint should have set out the various enactments, consolidating the *Page 518 
several companies which make up the New York Central, so as to show that defendant is restricted to two cents per mile for carrying passengers over its road. I can perceive no more reason for setting out these statutes than there is for setting out the proceedings by which the several companies consolidated into the Central were incorporated and organized. It is enough to allege that the defendant has been duly organized, and that it is entitled to demand and receive of passengers traveling over its road, a certain rate of fare; and that it has demanded and received a higher rate. The acts of the legislature, and the proceedings of the separate companies, and of the defendant after consolidation, would be the evidence to establish the facts upon which the limitation of the fare which the defendant may charge, depends.
The court by taking judicial notice of these acts and proceedings could not relieve the defendant from the effect of its admission, deliberately made, that the fare was but two cents per mile — though by the act it might be six cents.
The order and judgment appealed from must be affirmed, with costs.
SELDEN and INGRAHAM, JJ., did not sit in the case. All the other judges being for affirmance.
Judgment affirmed. *Page 519