Court Opinion

ID: 6327235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-03-28 12:01:32.714517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:22.179457
License: Public Domain

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              STATE v. TAVERAS—FIRST CONCURRENCE

   ROBINSON, C. J., concurring. I join the majority’s
well reasoned opinion in this case. I write separately
only to highlight the importance of factual context in
considering whether a statement, which facially may
be susceptible to varying interpretations, rises to the
level of a true threat, rendering it unprotected by the
first amendment to the United States constitution. See,
e.g., Haughwout v. Tordenti, 332 Conn. 559, 570–72,
211 A.3d 1 (2019); State v. Taupier, 330 Conn. 149,
193–94, 193 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied,          U.S.     ,
139 S. Ct. 1188, 203 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2019); State v. Krijger,
313 Conn. 434, 454–55, 97 A.3d 946 (2014). The thought-
ful analysis in the majority opinion aptly highlights how
a defendant’s conduct may provide the necessary con-
text for a reasonable understanding of the meaning of
his or her words. In my view, the majority opinion
furnishes a cogent example of the searching and inde-
pendent appellate review necessary to ensure that not
every public expression of anger or frustration may
be deemed to constitute criminal conduct, namely, a
breach of the peace in the second degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-181 (a).1 See also General
Statutes § 53a-181a (creating public disturbance is
infraction).2 I therefore join the majority’s reversal of
the judgment of the Appellate Court.
  1
    General Statutes § 53a-181 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is
guilty of breach of the peace in the second degree when, with intent to
cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof, such person: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or
threatening behavior in a public place; or . . . (3) threatens to commit any
crime against another person or such other person’s property . . . . For
purposes of this section, ‘public place’ means any area that is used or
held out for use by the public whether owned or operated by public or
private interests.’’
  2
    General Statutes § 53a-181a (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of creating
a public disturbance when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance
or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he (1) engages in fighting or
in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) annoys or interferes
with another person by offensive conduct; or (3) makes unreasonable noise.’’