Court Opinion

ID: 9566403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:38:54.407983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:24.201556
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority holds that the defendant appellant’s second written statement and the tape recordings of his oral statements were properly admitted into evidence. It is my conclusion that the tape recorded oral statements were taken in violation of his rights under I.C. § 19-615, I.C.R. 5(a) and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. I also believe that these statements and the second written statement, to the extent they were self-incriminatory, were introduced into evidence in violation of the defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Because the defendant’s arguments in connection with these rights can only be understood by reference to the circumstances of his arrest and detainment, a re*494view of the events of December 1 and 2, 1972, is necessary. The defendant left for work on Friday morning, December 1, 1972, and put in a twelve hour shift ending at approximately 10:30 p.m. After that, he and the deceased, June Diggs, returned to the trailer, where they stopped only long enough for the defendant to change his shoes. They then went to a Garden City bar where they stayed until the 1:00 a.m. closing time. While they were at the bar, the defendant had nothing to eat, but drank five bottles of beer and three or four shots of whiskey. He and June Diggs returned to the trailer, where the defendant began to prepare some food, but he was unable to cook the meal or eat because of an argument with June Diggs. Following the shooting, the defendant called the telephone operator, told her there was an emergency and asked her to send help. The police officers and the ambulance operators arrived shortly thereafter. According to the testimony of one of the officers, the defendant was “distraught” and “shook up,” and the officer asked the defendant to lie down because he thought the defendant was going to faint. In spite of the commotion in the trailer, the defendant continued to lie down until he was requested to stand up by another officer.
At approximately 3:00 a. m. the defendant was taken to the Garden City police station. At approximately 5:00 a.m. the Garden City police began questioning him. During this interrogation, the defendant gave the statement set forth in footnote 2 of the majority opinion, 97 Idaho at 488, 547 P.2d at 533, in which he denied being in the trailer when June Diggs was shot. After the defendant had given the officers this statement, Thomas Sheffield, the officer in charge of the investigation, took the other officers who had been working on the case to breakfast. While they were away from the police station the defendant was locked in a cell, but according to the defendant’s testimony he did not sleep during that time. When the officers returned from breakfast they brought the defendant a breakfast of steak or steak and eggs. Although the defendant was offered the food, he was apparently upset and, according to his testimony, “couldn’t eat.”
At this time, approximately 7:00 a.m., questioning resumed. Officer Sheffield told the defendant, in accusations laced with expletives, that he thought the defendant’s statement concerning the shooting was a lie and that they wished to know more about the incident. The defendant testified that he asked to see a lawyer at this time, but the police officers testified that he did not make this request. (In his tape recorded statements made later in the day, the defendant was asked if he wanted to see a lawyer, but answered that he did not.) Some time later the defendant made his second written statement, the one set forth at footnote 4 of the majority opinion, 97 Idaho at 489, 547 P.2d at 534. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was returned to a cell. He remained there until approximately 11:30 a.m., when he was taken to be given polygraph tests.
The defendant was questioned intermittently by the polygraph operator or by a Garden City police officer for the next four to five hours. During this time tape recordings were made of two different question and answer sessions. These recordings, which included both the statements of the defendant and the questions and arguments of the police officers and polygraph operator, were admitted into evidence as exhibits 31, 32 and 33. At approximately 4:30 p.m., the defendant was returned to the Garden City jail and placed in a cell. At 7:30 p.m. on Saturday evening, December 2, 1972, he was formally arrested for first degree murder. He was not taken before a magistrate until Monday, December 4, 1972, even though there was a magistrate available in Ada County twenty four hours a day.
In the meantime, the efforts of the defendant’s wife and of the defendant’s employer to find out what had happened to him were rebuffed. Lavina Wyman, the *495defendant’s wife, testified at the preliminary hearing that she had called the Garden City police station at 10:00 a.m., 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, December 2, and that she had been told that the defendant had not been charged with any crime and would probably be released between 5:00 and 7:00 that evening. Jack Landers, the defendant’s employer, testified at the preliminary hearing that he had called the police station to ask if he could speak with the defendant, but was told that he could not. He had also asked if it was possible to post bond for him and was told that the defendant would probably be on the street that afternoon.
Although the defendant was not formally placed under arrest until the evening of December 2, from approximately 3:00 a.m. that morning he was always physically restrained by a Garden City police officer or the polygraph operator, during which time he was being questioned or confined to a cell. His liberty was certainly restricted during this time, even though he had not been formally placed under arrest. Indeed, at the preliminary hearing, Garden City police officer Ralph Snell testified that when the defendant was in custody at the Garden City police station after 5:00 a. m. he was not free to leave.
Thus, when the defendant was questioned at 7:00 a.m. on the morning of December 2, and gave the written statement set forth in footnote 4, ante, he had not slept for twenty or twenty-one hours, he had not eaten during this period, he had drunk five beers and three or four shots of whiskey, and he had suffered through a highly emotional experience that earlier in the morning had caused him to be so distraught and upset that police officers had asked him to lie down because they feared he would faint. When he was questioned by the polygraph operator between 11:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. on that day, during which time the tape recordings admitted into evidence were made, he had gone without sleep for between twenty-six and thirty-one hours, and still had not eaten during that time. Although his liberty had been restrained since approximately 3:00 a.m. that morning when he was taken to the Garden City police station, his wife and his employer had been told that he would probably be free later in the afternoon, and his employer had been told that it would be unnecessary to post bond for him. And finally, the defendant was not taken before a magistrate until Monday, December 4, 1972, over two days after he was taken into custody.
The lengthy custodial questioning before bringing the defendant before a magistrate. The continued questioning of the defendant which led to the two tape recordings which were admitted into evidence was done in violation of the defendant’s rights under I.C. § 19-615 and I.C.R. 5 and of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. I.C. § 19-615 provides the following:
“19-615. Procedure upon arrest without warrant. — When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or private person the person arrested must, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest is made, and an information, stating the charge against the person, must be laid before such magistrate.” (Emphasis added).
I.C.R. 5 provides the following:
“I.C.R. 5. Initial appearance before the magistrate. — (a) IN GENERAL. . . . If a person is arrested without a warrant, he shall be brought before a magistrate, and a complaint shall be filed forthwith. When a person appears initially before a magistrate, the magistrate shall comply with the applicable subdivisions of this rule.
“(d) INITIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE. If the defendant was arrested without a warrant, the magistrate shall, after the complaint is laid before him, determine whether *496there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. . . .” (Emphasis added).
The defendant was not taken forthwith before a magistrate after he was taken into custody at 3:00 a.m. Instead, he was alternately questioned or confined in a cell for the following sixteen hours, at which time he was then formally arrested. He was not presented before a magistrate then, either, but waited approximately another 40 hours before he was brought before a magistrate. Thus, I think it is clear that although the defendant had not been formally arrested before 7:00 p.m., December 2, he had been under arrest since 3:00 a.m. that morning, and under the terms of the statute and the rule he was entitled to be brought before a magistrate, whose duty under I.C.R. 5(d) would have been to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime, and to advise the defendant of his rights and provide him with counsel to advise him concerning those rights.
Furthermore, the defendant had a right under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to be brought before a judicial officer to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that he had committed an offense. This right was explained in the recent case of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). In that case, the Court began by discussing the standard for arrest.
“The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.’ Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). This standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the individual’s right to liberty and the State’s duty to control crime.
“ ‘ . . . Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. . . .’ Brinegar v. United States, [338 U.S. 160] at 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 [93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)].
“To implement the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The classic statement of this principle appears in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948):
“ ‘ . . . [The Fourth Amendment’s] protection consists in requiring that [the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” 420 U.S. at 111, 95 S.Ct. at 862.
The Court recognized that police officers will often be confronted with ambiguous situations and that the Constitution permits them to arrest persons in such situations, i. e., that “room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part.” But, once the defendant is arrested, whether the officer has made a mistake or not, the Fourth Amendment requires that the defendant be taken before a magistrate. Furthermore, our rule and statute require that it be done and a complaint filed “forthwith” and “without unnecessary delay.”
“[A] policeman’s on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment evaporate. *497There no longer is any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State’s reasons for taking summary action subside, the suspect’s need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. . . . When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on liberty following arrest.” 420 U.S. at 113, 95 S.Ct. at 863 (emphasis added).
Thus, while the police officers were certainly justified in taking the defendant into custody, the defendant’s prolonged detention without being brought before a magistrate was a violation of his rights under I. C.R. 5, I.C. § 19-615, and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The majority opinion recognizes this violation and scolds the police for failure “to comply with I.C. § 19-615 and I.C.R. rule 5(a).”
The question then which we must decide is: what is the appropriate remedy ? The Supreme Court of the United States did not answer this question in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54. The majority in this case proposes the following as the answer to this question:
“A majority of states have rejected a per se application of the federal ‘Mc-Nabb-Mallory’ rule which would render inadmissible a confession of statement obtained from an accused during an unlawful detention — unlawful because he was not brought before a magistrate ‘without unnecessary delay’ — even though the statement was voluntarily given. Instead, such delay is merely regarded as a factor, to be considered with other circumstances, in determining whether the statement was involuntary and therefore inadmissible under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We find this to be the more well-reasoned approach.” 97 Idaho at 491, 547 P.2d at 536 (footnotes omitted).
By stating that “delay is ... a factor, to be considered ... in determining whether the statement was involuntary,” the majority has confused the interests sought to be protected by the requirement of I.C.R. 5 and of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States that an arrestee must be presented before a magistrate forthwith or without unnecessary delay. The purpose of I.C.R. 5 and of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent an arrestee from being held in an extended illegal confinement by determining whether there is probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed an offense. The arrestee’s constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to a probable cause hearing following a warrantless arrest cannot be protected if the admissibility of statements the arrestee has given during the illegal confinement which are a product of the illegal confinement is tested solely against the Fifth Amendment’s test of voluntariness. The United States Supreme Court, which we are required to follow, has chosen not to evaluate violations of Fourth Amendment rights purely on the basis of voluntariness. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). By analyzing the admissibility of statements taken during an unlawful detention solely in terms of the arrestee’s Fifth Amendment interests, the majority has failed to consider the critical questions before us.
In footnote 8 to its opinion, the majority cites eight cases and an annotation to bolster its contention that a confession obtained from an accused during an unlawful detention is not necessarily inadmissible, but the delay is merely a factor to be considered in determining voluntariness and *498admissibility. All of the cases predate Gerstein v. Pugh. Four of these cases and the annotation predate the landmark Miranda decision, and all but one of these four also predate Mallory, so I do not believe that those older cases are of any precedential value. Neither do I believe that all of the more recent cases the majority has cited in that footnote stand for the majority’s proposition. State v. Perez, 7 Ariz.App. 567, 442 P.2d 125 (1968), did not involve a statement given during an unlawful detention; it involved a statement given at the time of arrest and a claim that a subsequent alleged unlawful detention would make that statement inadmissible. Luttrell v. Freeman, 444 P.2d 857 (Okl.Cr.1968), was a habeas corpus proceeding, not a criminal trial, and the admissibility of a confession taken during an alleged unlawful detention was not discussed in that opinion. In People v. Hosier, 525 P.2d 1161 (1974), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the admission of a confession given by an arrestee who had not been taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay was not grounds for reversal unless the arrestee could show he had been “denied some basic constitutional right by reason of the failure to comply with the rule.” 525 P.2d at 1164. Hosier predated Gerstein v. Pugh, which clearly states that prolonged deprivation of liberty without presentation before a magistrate for a probable cause determination is a violation of an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, the rationale for the Hosier decision has been undermined by Gerstein v. Pugh because Hosier was implicitly based in part upon a holding that prolonged detention without a probable cause determination by a magistrate is not a denial of a basic constitutional right. In People v. Weaver, 179 Colo. 331, 500 P.2d 980 (1972), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a statement taken during an unnecessary delay was not inadmissible “if the record also shows, as it does here, that there was no studied attempt to avoid taking the defendant before a county judge.” 500 P.2d at 982. While I do not believe such a rule can survive in light of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gerstein v. Pugh, even if this were the proper rule to be applied, it cannot be said upon this record that there was no studied attempt to avoid taking the defendant before a magistrate, because those who sought to contact the defendant that morning to obtain his release were apparently rebuffed, and the defendant was not taken before a magistrate until Monday morning, December 4, over two days after his arrest. Therefore, Weaver is in-apposite to this case. Furthermore, both Hosier and Weaver were also based upon the premise that compliance with the requirements of Miranda would render an ensuing admission or confession admissible, i.e., that the Miranda warnings given to protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights would also protect his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful arrest or unlawful restraint of his liberty. That was the basis upon which the majority of this Court wrote its original opinion in this case which it withdrew after rehearing, apparently recognizing that the rationale of the Hosier and Weaver cases was incorrect in view of the recent decision of Brown v. Illinois, supra. In Brown the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Miranda warnings were not a cure-all which made statements taken following an illegal arrest admissible into evidence. In Brown, the Supreme Court of the United States characterized the lower court holding in the following manner:
“The court, in other words, appears to have held that the Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the causal chain so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by the continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible so long as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 422 U.S. at 597, 95 S.Ct. at 2258.
*499The Court then went on to hold that a confession or statement obtained by the exploitation of an illegal arrest is not admissible merely because it follows a Miranda warning and a waiver of Miranda rights.
“[T]he Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession. They cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited.
“While we therefore reject the per se rule which the Illinois courts appear to have accepted, we also decline to adopt any alternative per se or ‘but for’ rule. . The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. . . . The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement. . And the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.” 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62 (footnotes omitted).
I believe the same rule should be applicable during an extended confinement following an arrest without a warrant whenever the arrestee has not been brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay and would adopt the holding of Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972), a case cited by the majority in its footnote 8 for the proposition that unreasonable delay is a factor to be considered in the admissibility of a statement or a confession, but which said the following:
“We have held that failure to comply with [the rule providing that one arrested without a warrant must be taken without unnecessary delay before a judicial officer] does not ipso facto render inadmissible evidence obtained by the police during the ‘unnecessary delay’ and that it is incumbent upon defendant to show some prejudice from the delay. . While this Court has never articulated precisely what constitutes ‘prejudice’ in the context of ‘unnecessary delay’ proscribed by [the rule], we think it appropriate to follow the federal approach and exclude all evidence obtained during ‘unnecessary delay’ except that which . . . ■ has no reasonable relationship to the delay whatsoever.” 290 A.2d at 419.
While the written statement which the officers took at approximately 7:30 a.m. on Saturday could arguably not be characterized as the result of unnecessary delay, those tape recorded statements which were made between 11:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. in the afternoon were certainly made in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and his rights under the Idaho statute and rule to be taken before a magistrate without unreasonable delay and should have been held to be inadmissible for a violation of both the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho statute and rule.
The voluntariness of the confessions. The majority concludes that the defendant’s statements were admissible by the following reasoning:
“The record indicates none of the ‘third degree’ tactics that are the target of the ‘McNabb-Mallory’ rule were used by the police. Certainly no lengthy interrogations took place. Appellant was questioned for less than an hour from the time he was taken to the police station until the time of the polygraph test. Also during this interim the appellant was given, as he requested, time to lie down and rest. The polygraph test was administered by Bud Mason, who was not associated with the Garden City Police Force, but rather was a polygraphist for the state. The test did not take place at the police station but in Mason’s *500office in the Derr Building. Only one officer was present at the time the statements were taken, and no police officers were present during the administration of the polygraph tests. While the entire examination lasted approximately four hours, it was not continuous in that breaks were allowed. It is this Court’s opinion that appellant failed to show the coercion and involuntariness needed to justify the exclusion of the exhibits.” 97 Idaho at 492, 547 P.2d at 537.
I cannot agree that no lengthy interrogations took place. The defendant was regularly interrogated from 5:00 a.m. Saturday morning to 4:30 p.m. Saturday afternoon. He had not eaten or slept for nearly twenty hours before questioning began, and did not eat or sleep during the next twelve hours over which he was interrogated. The record indicates that he was bereaved at the loss of June Diggs, an intimate friend for five years. He had consumed five beers and three or four shots of whiskey on an empty stomach prior to the shooting. The appellant was in no condition to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and could easily be intimidated in such a situation. Assuming for the sake of argument that his statements had not been taken in derogation of his rights to be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay, nevertheless I think it is clear as a matter of law that the defendant did not give his statements after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. I believe the case of Commonwealth v. Eiland, 450 Pa. 566, 301 A.2d 651 (1973), which the majority has cited in footnote 9 of its opinion, points to the result which we should reach in this case.
“[Tjhis Court has emphasized that when ‘[t]he questions in the voluntariness area have passed beyond the physical coercion stage to the much more difficult area of psychological coercion . a close analysis of all the surrounding circumstances is necessary,’ Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, [429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968)], and that ‘the test for any involuntary confession, must concern itself with those elements impinging upon a defendant’s will.’ Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 315 n. 7, 237 A.2d 172, 177 n. 7 (1968). Thus in the instant case we must weigh all the factors influencing appellant’s will at the time he made his statement. The record evinces uncontradicted evidence that appellant, a 20-year-old with a tenth grade education, was isolated for several periods of time; that upon his initial interrogation he refused to admit involvement in the shooting; that eleven hours later when told by the police he would get more lenient treatment if he confessed, he signed an incriminating statement; and that he was not arraigned until some twenty-five hours after arrest.
“The combination of all these factors based on the Commonwealth’s uncontradicted evidence constituted a subtle but nonetheless powerful form of impermissible psychological coercion. . . . We conclude that appellant’s signed statement was involuntary and should therefore have been suppressed.” 301 A.2d at 654-655.
The reasoning of the Pennsylvania Court is applicable in this case. At the time of his arrest the defendant was bereaved and possibly in a state of intoxication; he was questioned and refused to admit any connection with the shooting; he was then told that his first story was a lie and that the truth was wanted; he was then intermittently questioned over a ten hour period during which time he had gone without food or sleep for up to thirty hours. The defendant was not a habitual arrestee familiar with the techniques of questioning and knowledgeable of his rights. Given all these factors, the circumstances were inherently coercing, and his waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Accordingly, I would hold that his written statements *501and the tape recorded oral statements were inadmissible.
For all of these reasons I would remand for a new trial.
McQUADE, C. J., concurs.