Court Opinion

ID: 9666764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:27:12.787471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:32.620994
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s disposition of point of error number one. Appellant brought a cause of action wherein he alleged that he had been prevented from fulfilling a contract between himself and Livingston Savings and Loan. This contract was actually the note between himself and the savings and loan. The jury was given an extremely broad issue based upon such cause of action. This issue has *772not been attacked on appeal. The majority somehow intertwines this issue with the issue on alter ego. This is unnecessary. The majority goes on to find that First Texas Equities has the absolute right under the partnership agreement to refuse to sell. However, the attorney for appellees characterized the issue more accurately in his closing argument. He stated:
Number six says, ‘Did the officers, directors and agents unreasonably prevent Chester Anderson from performing his obligations.’ And if you want to believe that, then you have to believe that people are unreasonable when they say let’s try to get some more money; and you remember the example I asked Mr. Knauss, if he and I were partners and I came in and said I had a fifty-five thousand dollar offer, and you said no, go get some more money, were you being unreasonable, and he said no, no, I wouldn’t be unreasonable at all on that. You will remember the question about that. I submit to you that that should be answered, ‘We do not.’
The jury found the actions of both First Texas Equities and Livingston Savings and Loan to have unreasonably prevented Anderson from repaying his loan. The majority concedes that the law concerning this is settled and states it has no quarrel with it being well settled. Apparently, they do have a quarrel with the jury’s finding, a finding, however, which is unchallenged. Therefore, the trial court need to look no further than the stipulations to determine that the amount of the loan at the time of the foreclosure was $587,000. The parties previously stipulated “that this suit involves a loan secured by a Deed of Trust on a tract of land and the improvements located thereon more commonly known as the Sundown Motel_” (emphasis added). Therefore, under the fact found by the jury, and the well settled Texas law, I believe the payment of the note was excused. Consequently, when Jasper Federal Savings and Loan sold the motel for $425,-000, Anderson was, under the Limited Partnership Agreement, entitled to one half of the proceeds.
I would hold the trial judge erred in not entering judgment for Anderson based upon the jury’s answer to issue number 6 and would reverse and render judgment for appellant in the amount of $212,500 plus attorney’s fees as found by the jury.
This finding makes the alter ego finding superfluous. While the partnership agreement gave First Texas Equities the right to refuse to sell, it did not give the creditor, Livingston Savings and Loan, the right to unreasonably prevent the debtor, Anderson, from repaying the loan. Since the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.