Court Opinion

ID: 9917121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 17:07:11.387188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:07.940433
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Vest, 2024-Ohio-62.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                :
                                              :    Case Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                   :
                                              :
        v.                                    :    DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                              :    ENTRY
BRYAN C. VEST,                                :
                                              :    RELEASED: 01/05/2024
        Defendant-Appellant.                  :

                                         APPEARANCES:

Christopher Bazeley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.

Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells,
Assistant Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.

Wilkin, J.

        {¶1} This is a consolidated appeal from two Ross County Court of

Common Pleas judgment entries in which the appellant, Bryan C. Vest, pleaded

guilty to the single counts charged in each case. In case number 21CR371, Vest

pleaded guilty to theft, a fifth-degree felony, and in case number 22CR100, he

pleaded guilty to possession of a fentanyl-related compound, a third-degree

felony. The trial court imposed the jointly recommended sentence of an

aggregate prison term of 18 months, and for the theft charge, the trial court also

ordered Vest to pay restitution of $1,059 payable to Lowe’s.

        {¶2} In his sole assignment of error, Vest is requesting we remand his

case for re-sentencing because the trial court did not advise him of all of the

consequences of violating postrelease control at the sentencing hearing. The
Ross App. Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33                                                                 2

state opposes any remand because under the totality-of-the-circumstances, the

record is clear that Vest was notified of the duration of postrelease control and of

the consequences of violating postrelease control.

        {¶3} We overrule Vest’s assignment of error. At the combined change of

plea and sentencing hearing, the trial court complied with the postrelease control

notification mandates pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B). The trial court advised Vest

of the discretionary two-year postrelease control and the consequences of

violating postrelease control. Moreover, the trial court incorporated the

notifications in the judgment of conviction entries. Accordingly, a remand for re-

sentencing is not required.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        {¶4} In August 2020, in case number 21CR371, Vest was indicted on one

count of theft, as a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.02. And in May

2021, Vest was subsequently indicted on one count of possession of a fentanyl-

related compound, a third-degree felony in case number 22CR100.1 The

arraignment for both cases, however, did not occur until March 2022. At the

jointly-held arraignment hearing, Vest pleaded not guilty to each count in both

criminal cases. Several pre-trial hearings were simultaneously held for the

cases, but the June 29, 2022 pre-trial hearing was continued and a warrant was

issued because Vest failed to appear. Vest was ultimately apprehended and in

August 2022, a plea agreement was reached.

1
 The indictment was amended to reflect Vest’s correct name, in which it incorrectly had his name
as Christopher B. Vest.
Ross App. Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33                                                         3

       {¶5} The guilty plea forms indicated that for 21CR371, Vest would plead

guilty to theft as a fifth-degree felony and for 22CR100, Vest would plead guilty to

possession of a fentanyl-related compound as a third-degree felony. In

exchange, there was a recommended sentence of an aggregate prison term of

18 months for both cases, and the state would not indict Vest for failing to appear

at the June 29, 2022 pre-trial hearing. Further, Vest agreed to pay restitution to

Lowe’s in the amount of $1,059 in 21CR371.

       {¶6} A change of plea hearing was held the same day Vest signed the

guilty plea forms. At the plea hearing, the agreements were placed on the

record, the trial court explained the maximum penalty Vest faced for each of his

offenses, including the possible imposition of two years of postrelease control,

and the financial sanctions. The trial court also questioned Vest if he reviewed

the guilty plea forms, understood them, and signed them. Vest stated he did.

Vest also indicated he understood the constitutional rights he waives by pleading

guilty after the trial court explained each right to him. Consequently, the trial

court inquired if Vest wished to proceed with pleading guilty to theft and

possession of a fentanyl-related compound, and he indicated he did. After

accepting Vest’s guilty pleas, the trial court asked the state and Vest’s counsel if

there was any reason not to directly proceed to sentencing. Both stated there

was no reason.

       {¶7} Vest’s counsel informed the trial court that an affidavit was submitted

requesting the waiver of the mandatory fines associated with the possession

charge. The state then notified the trial court of the jail-time credit that should be
Ross App. Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33                                                        4

granted to Vest, and that an order for restitution payable to Lowe’s should be

included as part of the sentence. Vest’s counsel re-iterated this was a negotiated

plea with a jointly recommended aggregate prison sentence of 18 months. The

trial court honored the negotiated agreement and imposed the jointly

recommended sentence. In 21CR371, the trial court sentenced Vest to 12

months in prison, and in 22CR100, it imposed a prison term of 18 months. The

trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently and advised Vest of

the discretionary postrelease control. Additionally, the trial court ordered

restitution payable to Lowe’s for $1,059, which is the agreed amount, and the trial

court did not order Vest to pay any fines. Vest was granted jail-time credit of 121

days.

        {¶8} It is from these two judgment entries that Vest now appeals.

                             ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVISE VEST OF ALL THE
        POSSIBLE PENALTIES FOR A VIOLATION OF PRC.

        {¶9} In his sole assignment of error, Vest argues the trial court failed to

inform him of all the consequences he faces if he violates postrelease control.

Vest maintains that the trial court failed to advise him that a violation of

postrelease control could result in more restrictive sanctions, a longer period of

supervision or that he could be sent back to prison even if he completed his 18-

month prison term. Based on this, Vest requests we remand the matter to the

trial court for re-sentencing.

        {¶10} The state asserts Vest was advised in the guilty plea forms, and at

the plea and sentencing hearing, of the duration of postrelease control and the
Ross App. Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33                                                         5

consequences of violating postrelease control. Based on the totality-of-the-

circumstances, Vest was well-informed of postrelease control and the

consequences of violating it, thus, the state maintains that a re-sentencing

hearing is not required.

                                  Law and Analysis

       {¶11} “Because a trial court has a statutory duty to provide notice of

postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, any sentence imposed without

such notification is contrary to law.” State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-

Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23. “As a general rule, if an appellate court

determines that a sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law, it may

remand for resentencing.” Id.

       {¶12} R.C. 2929.19 is the statutory provision outlining a trial court’s duty to

inform a defendant at sentencing of specific notifications. This includes

postrelease notifications. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e) mandates that at the sentencing

hearing, the trial court must inform a defendant who is sentenced to a prison term

for a fifth or third-degree felony, as is the case here, that he could be subject to

postrelease supervision after his release from prison. Pursuant to R.C.

2967.28(C), the duration of this discretionary postrelease control is two years. In

addition, at the sentencing hearing, a defendant must be notified that if he

violates a condition of postrelease control,

      the parole board may impose a prison term, as part of the sentence,
      of up to one-half of the definite prison term originally imposed upon
      the offender as the offender’s stated prison term or up to one-half of
      the minimum prison term originally imposed upon the offender as
      part of the offender’s stated non-life felony indefinite prison term.
R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f).
Ross App. Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33                                                        6

       {¶13} R.C. 2929.19 has no provision mandating a trial court to notify a

defendant that a violation of postrelease control could result in more restrictive

sanctions, a longer period of supervision or that he could be sent back to prison

even if he completed his stated prison term. Thus, contrary to Vest’s assertion,

pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B), the trial court is not required to provide these three

notifications at a sentencing hearing. A similar argument was recently rejected

by the Twelfth District Court of Appeals:

       the trial court was not required to orally advise him of the “possibility
       that a violation could result in other penalties including more
       restrictive sanctions, a longer period of supervision, or that he could
       be sent back to prison even if he completed all of his sentenced
       prison time as required by R.C. 2967.28(F)(3)” as such advisements
       are not required by the express language of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). Had
       the legislature intended for defendants to be provided with additional
       notifications about postrelease control, it would have included those
       notifications and requirements in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). It chose not to
       do so.

State v. Demangone, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2022-11-081, 2023-Ohio-2522,
¶ 25.

       {¶14} The trial court is required to incorporate the postrelease

notifications and the potential consequences for violating postrelease control into

its journal entry imposing sentence. State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-

Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 22, overruled on other grounds, State v. Harper,

160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248.

       [T]he sentencing entry must contain the following information: (1)
       whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) the
       duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the
       effect that the Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) will administer the
       postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that any violation
       by the offender of the conditions of postrelease control will subject
       the offender to the consequences set forth in that statute.
Ross App. Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33                                                        7

State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 1,
overruled on other grounds by Harper.

       {¶15} In the matter at bar, the trial court informed Vest of the postrelease

control notifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e) and (f) and incorporated

the notifications in the judgment entries. We previously adopted the totality-of-

the-circumstances approach, in which we review the record of the case as a

whole, in determining whether a trial court sufficiently complied with the statutory

postrelease control notifications. State v. Conn, 2020-Ohio-370, 151 N.E.3d 974,

¶ 20, 22 (4th Dist.).

       {¶16} The guilty plea forms that were reviewed and signed by Vest

included the following postrelease notifications:

               For all other felonies, it is discretionary Post Release Control
       for up to 2 years. If I violate conditions of supervisions while under
       post release control, the parole board could return me to prison for
       up to nine months for each violation, for a total of fifty percent (50%)
       of my originally stated term. If the violation is a new felony, I could
       receive the time remaining on post release control plus a prison term
       for the new crime.

       {¶17} At the combined change of plea and sentencing hearing, the trial

court addressed Vest and advised him as follows regarding postrelease control

before accepting his guilty plea:

              The Court: Do you understand that you’re going to have in
       each of these cases a discretionary, up to a two-year period of post-
       release control as part of your sentence?
              Mr. Vest: Yes, Your Honor.
              The Court: And do you understand that if the Adult Authority
       decided to place you on post-release control and you violate their
       term of supervision they can return you to prison for up to one-half of
       your stated prison sentence; and then if you were you convicted for
       a new felony, in addition to being punished for the underlying
       conduct, the sentencing judge in that case can give you an
Ross App. Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33                                                      8

       additional, consecutive prison term for up to one year or whatever
       time remains on your post-release control term?
              Mr. Vest: Yes, Your Honor.

       {¶18} A few minutes later after imposing the 18-month aggregate prison

term, the trial court re-iterated “Keep in mind that you’re going to have that

discretionary, up to two year period of post-release control under Ohio Revised

Code Section twenty-nine sixty-seven point two eight that I just explained to you.”

       {¶19} We find persuasive the holding in other appellate district courts that

               [w]hen the trial court provides proper post-release control
       notification before accepting the defendant’s guilty plea and then
       proceeds immediately to sentencing, the plea hearing and the
       sentencing hearing cannot, for purposes of the post-release control
       statutes, reasonably be deemed to have been conducted separately.
       State v. Dardinger, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160467, 2017-Ohio-
       1525, ¶ 13; State v. Russell, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-108, 2016-
       Ohio-3349, ¶ 9.

State v. Renne, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2020 CA 00036, 2021-Ohio-2648, ¶ 18.

       {¶20} What is more, even though the trial court did not notify Vest at the

sentencing hearing of the consequences of more restrictive sanctions, or longer

period of supervision or that Vest could be sent back to prison even if he

completed his stated prison term, these consequences were included in the

judgment of conviction entries. The entry in each case had the duration of the

discretionary postrelease control and an exhaustive list of the consequences for

violating postrelease control:

               It is the further order of the court that as part of his sentence
       in this matter, defendant is subject to a discretionary period of post-
       release control imposed by the parole board of two (2) years after
       defendant’s release from imprisonment. If defendant were to violate
       any post release control rule or condition, he is subject to a more
       restrictive rule or condition, a longer duration under supervision, or
       could be sent back to prison, even though he had done all the time
Ross App. Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33                                                     9

       to which he has been sentenced. The total for all rule violations
       cannot be any more than one-half of the sentence that he has been
       given, unless the rule violation is for committing a new felony, in
       which case he could receive a prison term of the greater of one year
       or the time remaining on post release control in addition to any time
       that he received for that new felony. This term must be served
       consecutively to any sentence on the new felony.

       {¶21} As the record clearly demonstrates here, the trial court at

sentencing complied with R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e) and (f)’s mandates when it

notified Vest of the two-year discretionary postrelease control sanction and that if

he violated postrelease control he could be returned to prison for half of his

stated prison term. Furthermore, the judgment of conviction entries included the

postrelease notifications in accordance with the Supreme Court’s mandate in

Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700.

       {¶22} We therefore overrule Vest’s assignment of error and affirm his

sentence.

                                  CONCLUSION

       {¶23} Having overruled Vest’s assignment of error, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment entries.

                                                         JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. Nos. 22CA32 & 22CA33                                                       10

                                JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay
the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS
COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to
file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency
of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at
the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to
file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to
expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                        For the Court,

                                    BY: ____________________________
                                       Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

                               NOTICE TO COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.