Court Opinion

ID: 9681932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:01:37.389156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:36.673550
License: Public Domain

*95McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree that the typewritten provision that “seller agrees to pay the agent at the act of sale the amount of commission in cash” constitutes a condition which has the effect of superseding the printed agreement between the parties that the commission is earned hy the agent at the time the agreement of sale and purchase is signed. In holding that a paradox was created hy these provisions of the agreement the majority simply fail to realistically appraise the difference between the two provisions. For, one has to do with the earning of a commission for services rendered and the other' relates solely to time of payment of the obligation. The latter should not, under the guise of interpretation, he converted into a so-called condition which operates to deprive the agent of the stipulated value of the services rendered by reason of the seller’s failure or inability to comply with his obligation. On the contrary, when this is done the Court rewrites the contract clause, which refers to the date on which payment is due on a previously incurred contractual obligation, to read that the debt does not exist .unless the sale is consummated no matter whether the breach of the .executory agreement is due to the fault of either party. Thus, by this erroneous edict, the agent is not to be paid for the services rendered notwithstanding another specific provision of the sale agreement that “Either party hereto who fails to comply with the terms of this offer, if accepted, * * * is obligated and agrees to pay the agent’s commission and all fees and costs incurred in enforcing collections and damages.”
Article 1945 of our Civil Code provides that “Legal agreements having the effects of law upon the parties, none but the parties can abrogate or modify them”; that the courts are bound to give legal effect to all such contracts according to the true intent of the parties and that “the intent is to be determined by the words of the contract, when these are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences”..
Application of this principle and the explanatory rules set forth in codal articles 1946, 1947, 1948, 1950, 1951 and 1955 is destructive of the majority’s strained conclusion that the typewritten clause — that the commission will be paid at the time of the sale — somehow abrogates entirely the obligation to compensate the real estate agent for his services (admittedly earned according to the printed stipulation) because the sale could not be consummated due to the obligor’s (seller’s) inability to furnish a merchantable title.
It seems evident, from a reading of the majority opinion, that the Court is much concerned with the confection of the second exclusive listing agreement whereby Ma*97trana agreed to reduce the list price of the property from $46,000 to $43,000 on the same day the agent secured an offer of $52,000 and, as a result thereof, the agent became entitled to a commission of $9,000 or $3,000 more than originally agreed. I, too, am concerned. And the dissenting judge of the Court of Appeal (see 178 So.2d 299), believed that the circumstances surrounding the transaction are so highly suspicious as to warrant a remand of the case in the interest of justice.
However, suspicion cannot supplant pleading and proof and the' case must be determined on the issues presented. Matrana does not claim fraud. In fact he did not even appear at the trial below and take the stand in his own behalf. Yet, the majority opine that “We believe Matrana understood the agreement in this fashion”, (meaning, of course, that he believed no obligation was incurred to pay a realtor’s commission if a sale was not consummated) even though he did not testify (and probably would not have been allowed over timely objection to testify) concerning his intent and belief that he was not liable. In fine, it is apparent that this deduction of the majority emanates from its own speculation and, surely, not from the evidence which, even if it had been elicited, would have been purely self-serving.
I respectfully dissent.