Court Opinion

ID: 9378463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 17:00:48.419447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.467119
License: Public Domain

FILED
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                              MAR 10 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EVERARDO CAMACHO-CASTRO,                         No.   17-72979

              Petitioner,                        Agency No. A092-787-671

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted March 6, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: KLEINFELD, WATFORD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

      To be granted a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture

(CAT), an applicant must show that “it is more likely than not that he or she would

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(2). Here, the immigration judge (IJ) found that Camacho-Castro had

not proved that he was more likely than not to be tortured if he were removed to

Mexico. “We review only the BIA’s decision except to the extent the decision

adopts or relies on the IJ’s reasoning, in which case we review both the IJ’s and the

BIA’s decisions.” Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019).

      Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s factual findings, so the facts of the

case do not compel us to reverse the IJ’s decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);

Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e may reverse

only if the evidence in the record compels a contrary result.”). To prove that it is

more likely than not that the petitioner will be tortured if removed, the petitioner

must provide more than “generalized evidence of violence and crime,” but

evidence of a risk that is “particular” to the petitioner. Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder,

600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).

      Although Camacho-Castro argues that his accent, demeanor, dress, and other

signs that he lived away from Mexico, or in the United States specifically, for a

time makes him a likely target for kidnapping, torture, extortion, and other harms if

he is returned to Mexico, Camacho-Castro’s fears are, as the IJ found, a speculative

“series of worst-case scenarios.” Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1348

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(9th Cir. 2013). Although the IJ noted that Camacho-Castro had presented some

evidence of “crime directed at recent deportees,” the agency permissibly concluded

that the overall risk that respondent would personally be subjected to torture was

too “speculative” and that Camacho-Castro had therefore failed to carry his burden

to show that he was entitled to CAT relief. Camacho-Castro offers no evidence

that he specifically is more likely to be targeted than most others who came to

Mexico after spending a long time in the United States. Because substantial

evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Camacho-Castro did not provide

sufficient evidence that he would be tortured if returned to Mexico, we must deny

Camacho-Castro’s petition for review.

      PETITION DENIED.

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