Court Opinion

ID: 9589870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:49:48.41565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:12.008544
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Bobbitt
concurring.
The dissenting opinion in the present case, and the dissenting opinions of Justice Lake in State v. Hill, 279 N.C. 371, 183 S.E. 2d 97; State v. Atkinson (rape), 279 N.C. 385, 183 S.E. 2d 105; State v. Atkinson (murder in the first degree), 279 N.C. 386, 183 S.E. 2d 106; State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 388, 183 S.E. 2d 106; State v. Sanders, 279 N.C. 389, 183 S.E. 2d 107; State v. Roseboro, 279 N.C. 391, 183 S.E. 2d 108, to the effect that a new trial should be awarded in each of these cases, are based on grounds set forth at greater length in his dissenting opinion in State v. Hill, supra. In each of these cases, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree or a verdict of guilty of rape and did not recommend that the punishment be imprisonment for life. These dissenting opinions take the position that a judgment of imprisonment for life is permissible only if the jury so recommends and that, in the absence of this recommendation, a new trial must be awarded in respect of both guilt and punishment. As support for this position, State v. Ruth, 276 N.C. 36, 170 S.E. 2d 897 (1969), is cited. In respect of the point under consideration, State v. Ruth, supra, is based on State v. Spence and Williams, 274 N.C. 536, 164 S.E. 2d 593 (1968).
When State v. Spence and Williams, supra, and State v. Ruth, supra, were decided, the Supreme Court of the United States had not decided whether its decisions in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 20 L.Ed. 2d 138, 88 S.Ct. 1209 (1968), and in Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1317, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (1968), invalidated the death penalty provisions *583of our North Carolina statutes with reference to capital offenses committed prior to the repeal of G.S. 15-162.1. This statute permitted a defendant to avoid the risk of a death sentence by pleading guilty to the capital crime, thereby receiving a sentence of imprisonment for life.
In State v. Spence and Williams, 271 N.C. 23, 155 S.E. 2d 802 (1967), this Court upheld the conviction of these defendants for murder in the first degree and the judgments' pronouncing death sentences. Thereafter, upon consideration of their petitions for certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgments and remanded the cases for reconsideration in the light of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L.Ed. 2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770 (1968). Spence and Williams v. North Carolina, 392 U.S. 649, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1350, 88 S.Ct. 2290 (1968). Witherspoon had held “that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Id. at 522, 20 L.Ed. 2d at 784-85, 88 S.Ct. at 1777. Thereafter, this Court, in State v. Spence and Williams, supra (274 N.C. 536), held (1) that the jury which convicted Spence and Williams “was not selected according to their constitutional rights as set forth in Witherspoon,” and (2) that Spence and Williams were entitled to new trials both as to guilt and as to punishment. In State v. Ruth, supra, upon the defendant’s appeal from his conviction for murder in the first degree and the judgment pronouncing a death sentence, this Court awarded a new trial both as to guilt and as to punishment solely on the ground the jury had not been selected as required by Witherspoon.
When Spence-Williams and Ruth were decided, the members of this Court were divided in opinion as to whether, prior to the repeal of G.S. 15-162.1, the death penalty provisions relating to murder in the first degree, rape, burglary in the first degree and arson (G.S. 14-17, G.S. 14-21, G.S. 14-52 and G.S. 14-58, respectively) were invalidated by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Jackson and Pope. The majority were of opinion that Jackson and Pope did not invalidate the death penalty provisions of our North Carolina statutes. Under this prevailing view, the award of a new trial recognized the possibility that a jury selected in compliance with *584Witherspoon might return a verdict upon which a valid sentence of death could be imposed. The dissenting opinions were based on the view that Jaekson and Pope did invalidate the death penalty provisions of the North Carolina statutes and therefore a new trial could not result in any verdict upon which a valid death sentence could be imposed.
Since Spence-Williams and Ruth were decided, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the death penalty provisions of our North Carolina statutes in force when the crimes involved in this case and in Hill, Atkinson, Williams, Sanders and Roseboro, were committed, were invalidated by Jackson and Pope. If there were a new trial of any one of these defendants and he (she) was found guilty again of the crime of murder in the first degree or of rape, it would not be within the discretion of the jury to determine whether the punishment should be death or imprisonment for life. So far as these cases are concerned, there is no possibility of a verdict upon which a valid sentence of death could be imposed.
North Carolina statutes in force when these crimes were committed envisioned two possible punishments for murder in the first degree and for rape. While those statutes were in force, and in respect of the cases now under consideration, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the death sentence may not be imposed. Imprisonment for life is the only alternative. A judgment which pronounces a sentence of imprisonment for life accords to a defendant the full benefit of a jury recommendation that this should be his punishment. The course suggested in these dissenting opinions would be a new trial at which a defendant convicted of murder in the first degree or rape could not be sentenced to life imprisonment unless the jury in addition to its verdict volunteered a recommendation that the punishment be imprisonment for life or unless the jury added such words to its verdict under explicit directions of the judge so as to conform to the letter of the North Carolina statutory provisions. Under this suggested course, if the jury should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree or a verdict of guilty of rape and say no more, no judgment could be pronounced and therefore the defendant would be entitled to his discharge. In my opinion, no sound principle of law requires such an unrealistic and futile course.
*585Justice Higgins votes to dismiss the appeal.
The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of rape and burglary in the first degree. The death sentences were affirmed by this Court. Thereafter the defendant, by writ of habeas corpus, obtained a review in the Federal Courts. The Supreme Court of the United States issued a directive to the Superior Court of Buncombe County commanding that the death sentences be vacated and sentences of life imprisonment substituted. The Superior Court of Buncombe County proceeded as ordered by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In my opinion the Supreme Court of North Carolina is without power to act in the premises. I vote to dismiss the appeal.