Court Opinion

ID: 9916828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 18:05:44.056991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:02.641972
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 23-1752
                               Filed January 10, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF J.R.,
Minor Child,

J.C., Father,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Harrison County, Justin R. Wyatt,

District Associate Judge.

       A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

       William T. Early, Harlan, for appellant father.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Abby L. Davison of Public Defender Office, Council Bluffs, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

       Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
                                          2

BADDING, Judge.

       A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child—born

in 2022—under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2023).1 He raises a

mishmash of claims in his petition on appeal, most of which we find to be

insufficient to allow appellate review.

       For starters, at the end of the “material facts” section of the petition on

appeal, the father mentions “that a continuance of the hearing for termination of

parental rights should have been granted,” “[r]easonable efforts have not been

made,” and “it is not in the best interest of his son to terminate parental rights, as

[the father] and his son are bonded.”

       From there, the father does not expand upon his reference to reasonable

efforts. While the father alludes to the child’s best interests and their “strong bond”

under “Issue II” in the petition on appeal, he does not offer any substantive

arguments or legal analysis under Iowa Code section 232.116(2) or (3) about those

issues. In fact, the heading of the argument section for that issue is: “Did the trial

court err in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the father’s

parental rights as to the child should be terminated pursuant to section

232.116(1)(e), and (h) . . . ?” Despite that label, the father makes no challenge to

either of the grounds for termination in the body of his argument. Because the

father did not supplement his passing references to reasonable efforts, sufficiency

1 The mother’s parental rights were also terminated.    She does not appeal.
                                            3

of the evidence, best interests, or the bond exception with any substantive

arguments, we do not consider these issues.2

        This leaves us with the focal point of the father’s appeal: “that a continuance

of the hearing for termination of parental rights should have been granted.” Under

“Issue I” of his petition, the father questions: “Did the trial court abuse its discretion

in denying a continuance of the termination hearing?” But he does not explain how

the court abused its discretion. Despite that deficiency, we—like the juvenile

court—interpret his claim to be a request for additional time to work toward

reunification. Jumping back to “Issue II” in the petition on appeal, the father

contends “that no harm at all would come to his son from granting an additional 3

months to him to establish himself and demonstrate to the [Iowa Department of

Health and Human Services] and juvenile court that he is capable of parenting his

son.”

2 See State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 650 n.1 (Iowa 2010) (“[P]assing
reference to an issue, unsupported by authority or argument, is insufficient to raise
the issue on appeal.”); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (1996) (“[W]e will not
speculate on the arguments [a party] might have made and then search for legal
authority and comb the record for facts to support such arguments.”); Soo Line R.
Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Iowa 1994) (“[R]andom
mention of this issue, without elaboration or supportive authority, is insufficient to
raise the issue for our consideration.”); Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215
N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974) (“To reach the merits of this case would require us
to assume a partisan role and undertake the appellant’s research and advocacy.
This role is one we refuse to assume.”); cf. Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3)
(requiring arguments in briefs to contain reasoning, citations to authorities, and
references to pertinent parts of the record).
        Unlike other cases when we have given parents with skimpy arguments the
benefit of the doubt, here the father was not strapped for space with his eleven-
page petition on appeal and gave us no sign that he had meaningful arguments to
make on the issues he passively mentioned. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.201(1)(c)
(setting a limit of twenty pages for petitions on appeal).
                                          4

       Yet, at the termination hearing, the father’s counsel only asked for one more

month, asserting: “We believe that if we could get him into a proper treatment

facility, he might be able to make some progress that would obviate this entire

proceeding.”   On appeal, the father does not present any “specific factors,

conditions, or expected behavioral changes which [would] comprise the basis for

the determination that the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of”

an extension of time. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). “It is not our role to

advocate what potential circumstances would warrant an extension on the father’s

behalf, and we decline to do so.” In re A.H., No. 20-1660, 2021 WL 1399743, at *4

(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021). Even if we could, the record does show that any

more time—whether it be one, three, or six months—would alleviate the need for

removal.

       Simply put, the father was in a state of regress, not progress. Though his

urinalysis screenings were negative for drugs from January through April 2023, he

stopped all drug testing after the department asked him to start wearing sweat

patches. With the department’s help, when he reported a “slip up in his sobriety”

in June, he entered inpatient treatment in mid-July. But he left against medical

advice after only a few days. So by the termination hearing in August, the father

had not participated in a drug screen since April or had a visit with the child since

June. He was no closer to reunification with the child after ten months of services

than he was when the child was removed.

       We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

       AFFIRMED.