Court Opinion

ID: 9894576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 08:09:55.849724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:03.521838
License: Public Domain

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                         No. 07-23-00072-CV

                          STEPHEN PATRICK BLACK, APPELLANT

                                                    V.

                             CHARLES P. WOODRICK, APPELLEE

                            On Appeal from the 154th District Court
                                    Lamb County, Texas
                 Trial Court No. DCV-20106-19, Honorable Scott Say, Presiding

                                         November 1, 2023
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       Appellant, Stephen Patrick Black, appeals from the trial court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Charles P. Woodrick, which dismissed his libel

suit with prejudice.1 Appellant challenges the summary judgment as follows: (1) collateral

estoppel does not apply; (2) Woodrick did not establish statutory immunity as a matter of

law; (3) Woodrick is not entitled to derived judicial immunity; and (4) Woodrick is not

entitled to the judicial proceedings privilege. We affirm.

       1 Black proceeded pro se in the trial court but is represented by counsel in this appeal.
                                            BACKGROUND

        Black is civilly committed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predators Act. TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.151. Woodrick is a licensed psychologist under

contract with the Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO) to perform psychological

evaluations under chapter 841 of the Act.

        In 2018, Woodrick performed a biennial review of Black and filed his written report

entitled “Biennial Risk Assessment for Civil Commitment.” Black contends the report is

libelous because it inaccurately recites he has five counts for indecency with a child

instead of the one count for which he was convicted. According to Black, he requested

correction of the alleged inaccuracy to no avail. He sued Woodrick for libel based on the

alleged incorrect recitation in the report.2

        Woodrick moved to dismiss Black’s suit under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure and chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. A hearing

was held on July 5, 2019, but the trial court did not sign an order of dismissal until January

16, 2020. On appeal, this Court reversed the order of dismissal because the time in which

to grant a dismissal under either Rule 91a or chapter 27 expired and the case was

remanded for further proceedings. See Black v. Woodrick, No. 07-20-00083-CV, 2021

Tex. App. LEXIS 2197, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

        On remand, Woodrick filed two separate motions for summary judgment asserting

Black’s libel suit was barred by issue preclusion/collateral estoppel, statutory immunity,

derived judicial immunity, and the judicial proceedings privilege. As summary judgment

        2 The record of the hearing shows that although Black had been charged with various other sexual

offenses, he pleaded to only one count of indecency with a child.
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evidence, Woodrick included a certified copy of the Final Judgment and Order of

Commitment finding Black to be a sexually violent predator and ordering his civil

commitment, a copy of section 841.147 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

providing for statutory immunity from liability for good faith conduct to a person under

contract for services under chapter 841, and a copy of the opinion in Black v. Turner, 779

Fed. Appx. 231 (5th Cir. 2019), in which the Court found Turner, an expert, immune from

suit under section 841.147.         Black responded to the summary judgment motion by

alleging a material fact issue existed. He further alleged Woodrick had not proven

entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law under any of the affirmative defenses

raised in his motion.3

                                       STANDARD OF REVIEW

        We review a grant of a traditional summary judgment de novo. Trial v. Dragon,

593 S.W.3d 313, 316–17 (Tex. 2019). In conducting our review, we take as true all

evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and

resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164

S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d

211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and judgment should be granted in favor of the movant as a matter

of law. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858, 865 (Tex. 2018); Diversicare

Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005).

        3 Woodrick did not raise any of his affirmative defenses in his original answer. Although Black
asserts those defenses may have been waived, we disagree. An unpleaded affirmative defense may serve
as a basis for summary judgment when it is raised in the summary judgment motion and the opposing party
does not object. See Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, 813 S.W.3d 492, 494 (Tex. 1991). Black did not object
prior to rendition of the summary judgment.
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         A defendant moving for traditional summary judgment bears the burden of

negating at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action or conclusively

establish all the elements of an affirmative defense and that it is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015). If the

movant meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue

precluding summary judgment. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.

1995).

         When, as here, the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds for summary

judgment, we must affirm the judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court

and preserved for appellate review are meritorious. Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 216. When the

trial court’s summary judgment does specify the ground on which it was granted, we

generally limit our review to that ground. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d

623, 625–26 (Tex. 1996).

         We address Black’s issues in a logical rather than sequential order.

ISSUE FOUR—JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE

         Texas recognizes an absolute privilege to communications made as part of a

judicial proceeding. Shell Oil Co. v. Writt, 464 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. 2015). “Any

communication, oral or written, uttered or published in the due course of a judicial

proceeding is absolutely privileged and cannot constitute the basis of a civil action in

damages for slander or libel.” See Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 166

S.W.2d 909, 912 (1942). See also Johnson v. Tepper, No. 07-23-00146-CV, 2023 Tex.

App. LEXIS 5858, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 7, 2023, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (finding

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sworn statements made by defendant during a hearing before an appraisal review board

were privileged communications made as part of a judicial proceeding and could not form

the basis of a defamation suit). The privilege attaches to all aspects of the proceeding

including pleadings or other papers in the case. James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916–

17 (Tex. 1982) (finding doctor’s report to a probate judge in mental health proceeding was

absolutely privileged because it was written in contemplation of a judicial proceeding).

         Section 841.101(b) of the Act provides for an expert’s report of the biennial

examination to be provided to the judge in preparation of judicial review. § 841.101(b).

The Order of Commitment recites that TCCO shall provide the expert report of the biennial

examination to the trial court pursuant to section 841.101. Although Woodrick is not

appointed by the trial court, the statute mandates that his report be provided to the trial

court to assist in the judicial review process. § 841.101(b).

         Relying on Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co., 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987),

Black maintains Woodrick is not shielded from liability under the judicial proceedings

privilege because he did not provide any evidence he testified as a witness in a judicial

proceeding. Black also contends Woodrick is not immune from suit because he did not

directly provide his report to the trial court as was done in James; rather, Woodrick

provided his report to TCCO who acted as an intermediary between Woodrick and the

court.

         Black’s arguments fail.    The judicial proceedings privilege extends to “any

statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses, and attaches to all

aspects of the proceedings, including statements made in open court, pretrial hearings,

depositions, affidavits and any of the pleadings or other papers in the case.” James, 637
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S.W.2d at 916–17 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF TORTS § 588)). See also W. Mktg. v.

AEG Petroleum, LLC, 616 S.W.3d 903, 917 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021), modified on

reh’g, 621 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. App—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied). Although Woodrick was

not a witness at the time he prepared his report, he could have potentially been a witness

if the trial court had set a hearing under section 841.102(c) after determining at the

biennial review that Black’s conditions of commitment should be modified.           Thus,

Woodrick’s report is a communication made in connection with and related to a judicial

proceeding, and is therefore absolutely privileged. See IBP, Inc. v. Klumpe, 101 S.W.3d

461, 470 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied).

      The summary judgment evidence established Woodrick’s report was subject to the

judicial proceedings privilege. Thus, Woodrick established an affirmative defense as a

matter of law which shifted the burden to Black to raise a fact issue which he did not

satisfy. Because the trial court’s summary judgment did not specify the ground on which

it was granted, we may affirm on any viable theory presented. Issue four is overruled and

we need not address issues one, two, or three.

                                      CONCLUSION

      The trial court’s Order Granting Second Motion for Summary Judgment is affirmed.

                                                       Alex Yarbrough
                                                           Justice

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