Court Opinion

ID: 9740647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:39:29.665849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.457015
License: Public Domain

*208AMUNDSON, Justice
(concurring in part and concurring in result in part).
I agree with the majority’s holding on Issues I, II, III and IV.
The last issue raises a contention that Attorney Rice rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to perfect an appeal from the judgment of conviction. This court addressed a similar contention in Loop v. Solem, 398 N.W.2d 140 (S.D.1986), and quoted extensively from the United States Supreme Court decision of Anders v. State of California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), reh’g denied 388 U.S. 924, 87 S.Ct. 2094, 18 L.Ed.2d 1377. The Anders court held that an attorney who finds an appeal frivolous after undertaking or being appointed to represent a convicted felon should advise the court of same and move to withdraw. Further, such a motion “must be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses.” 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d at 498.
In this case, it is not clear whether or not Attorney Rice was retained or appointed counsel, but there is no question that Attorney Rice was still attorney of record for the appeal, otherwise there would have been no need for filing of a motion to withdraw. The defendant did not appear at the hearing on the motion and whether or not he filed anything with the court or Attorney Rice in resistance to same is somewhat nebulous from this record. (It should come as no surprise that defendant did not personally appear since, at the time of the hearing, he was incarcerated in the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, some 250 miles from Aberdeen, South Dakota, and it is fair to assume, generally, that a person who has been so incarcerated loses a certain degree of freedom of movement.)
The Rice motion filed with the court states that the principal issue which could have been raised on a direct appeal had already been decided by this court on an intermediate appeal and, having discussed all aspects of an appeal with defendant which included the status of the law and risks involved, that the best interest of defendant would be served by not perfecting an appeal. The motion further states that defendant concurred with counsel. Also, attached to the motion was a letter which counsel sent to defendant at the penitentiary. No brief or other data was submitted to the trial court which set forth any information regarding the first four issues addressed in this appeal and why they were deemed meritless or frivolous by counsel.
Attorney Rice, while being examined at the habeas hearing, testified that he filed the motion to withdraw because of his experience in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Hence, he was extremely conversant with the absolute right of appeal that a convicted felon possesses but responded that he was not familiar with the Loop decision handed down by this court about one month before the motion to withdraw was heard in this case.
This court further stated in Loop:
The procedure outlined in Anders comports with our Code of Professional Responsibility. DR 2-110(A)(2) states: “A lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client.” That section further requires that a lawyer give notice to his client that will allow time for employment of other counsel. In any future cases involving similar questions of compliance with DR 2-110(A)(2), we suggest that the issue of the reasonableness of counsel’s steps should be viewed in accordance with our directions as adopted from Anders.
398 N.W.2d at 143. The handling of the motion to withdraw in this case falls far short of our directions.
The United States Supreme Court again addressed this withdrawal of counsel issue in Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), where appellate counsel had filed a motion to withdraw, which stated:
*209“MOTION
Appellant’s attorney respectfully requests a Journal Entry permitting him to withdraw as appellant’s appellate attorney of record in this appeal thereby relieving appellant’s attorney of any further responsibility to prosecute this appeal with the attorney/client relationship terminated effective on the date file-stamped on this Motion.”
488 U.S. at 78, 109 S.Ct. at 348-49. The motion to withdraw was granted and the case came before the Supreme Court on a grant of certiorari after his appeal had been dismissed in state court. The Supreme Court in discussing the right to counsel on appeal stated:
Approximately a quarter of a century ago, in Douglas v. California, 372 US 353, [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 S.Ct. 814] (1963), this Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal appellant the right to counsel on a first appeal as of right. We held that a procedure in which appellate courts review the record and “appoint counsel if in their opinion” the assistance of counsel “would be helpful to the defendant or the court,” id., at 355, [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 S.Ct. 814,] is an inadequate substitute for guaranteed representation. Four years later, in Anders v. California, 386 US 738, [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396] (1967), we held that a criminal appellant may not be denied representation on appeal based on appointed counsel’s bare assertion that he or she is of the opinion that there is no merit to the appeal.
The Anders opinion did, however, recognize that in some circumstances counsel may withdraw without denying the indigent appellant fair representation provided that certain safeguards are observed. Appointed counsel is first required to conduct “a conscientious examination” of the case. Id., at 744, [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396]. If he or she is then of the opinion that the case is wholly frivolous, counsel may request leave to withdraw. The request “must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Ibid. Once the appellate court receives this brief, it must then itself conduct “a full examination of all the proceeding^] to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Ibid. Only after this separate inquiry, and only after the appellate court finds no nonfrivolous issue for appeal, may the court proceed to consider the appeal on the merits without the assistance of counsel. On the other hand, if the court disagrees with counsel — as the Ohio Court of Appeals did in this ease — and concludes that there are nonfrivolous issues for appeal, “it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” Ibid.
488 U.S. at 79-80, 109 S.Ct. at 349-50 (footnote omitted).
The casual procedure for withdrawal employed in this case certainly did not comport with this court’s previous directives. While the time for appeal was running, counsel for defendant moved to terminate the attorney/client relationship. The motion was totally inadequate under Anders and Loop. There was no signed waiver by defendant of his right to appeal nor even an acknowledgment that defendant had received the attorney’s correspondence and concurred in the recommendations. I cannot, in good conscience, place a stamp of approval on the withdrawal procedure implemented in this case since it certainly impacted the defendant’s absolute right to appeal. Further, the record is devoid of any consideration being given regarding potential prejudice to defendant’s absolute right to appeal, such as appointment of other counsel to assist in the appeal. This court cannot stress the importance of attorneys following the directions handed down by this court in circumstances where a defendant’s time for appeal is running after conviction and his attorney wants to abandon the ship.
In Loop, this court remanded the matter for resentencing so as to reinstate the appeal period. I do not deem that necessary *210in this case, since defendant has now had an opportunity to argue the grounds for appeal in this case in conjunction with his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and it is evident that he would not have prevailed on those claimed errors on a direct appeal, and concur in the result on the last issue.