Court Opinion

ID: 9831153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:51:42.389435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:31.930727
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee is in error in supposing that we did not consider and pass on all assignments of each party, for we did. We sustained the assignment challenging as error the refusal of the court to grant a new trial.
The reference to the excellent map was based upon appellee’s statement in his brief, “Witness made a plat of the scene of the accident, showing the'street, right of way, double car track, flagman's station,” etc., and that his claim for damages was based upon the injuries appellee says he received, viz.:
“His arm was set and apparently has healed, but has no strength, and still pains Mm very much, especially at night; is larger and has a knot or a lump at the breaking; is sore, indicating a rising or an abscess condition, with little or no strength in it. The index finger on his left hand was amputated, the middle finger is larger and stiffer, and the other finger stiff. The wounds are not only permanent, but have been very severe and inflict much pain. He is a farmer, or day laborer, not capable of doing other work, and his capacity to do work and earn wages is much less than before the injury, and was caused by the injuries received at the time of the -collision, leaving him practically a one-handed man.”
The execution of the map would seem to show him “capable of doing other work.” This statement in our opinion was merely an incidental statement of a fact in the record, not having any bearing in the case, but merely referred to again because appellee seems to level so much criticism at this statement, and seems to wish to place the writer in a-false position. We know there is no higher obligation or more honorable one than in honest labor. There are many highly educated men in civil engineering no doubt engaged in labor as farmers or artisans. And it may be that appellee is capable of doing what it is said he did, and can now still do that kind of work for his living. However that may be, although it seemed to have impressed appel-lee much, it is beside the question — only an incident.
[4] Appellee has filed a very able brief in connection with his motion, with which we are much impressed. It is confined largely to a challenge to our holding on the alleged question of discovered peril. In support of that position, among other authorities, he cites the case of Wilson v. Southern Traction Co. (Tex. Sup.) 234 S. W. 663, as conclusive and s.eems to think that case should control this and that if we do not conclude this case is one of discovered peril then we are over*603ruling tlie Supreme Court. There is nothing new decided in that case, because, as said, the rule therein followed that contributory negligence is no defense in cases of discovered peril, in consequence of the great number of decisions on the subject. There is nothing different in our holding in the law on the subject, for it is still left to determine how far the facts in any case bring it under that doctrine. Ofttimes the cases differ in facts, more so than “one pea from another.” If the danger here to appellee, who seemed to be riding to the very jaws of death, was actually imminent, and was discovered by appellant, and could have been averted by the means at the engineer’s command, consistent with the safety of the train, duty to avoid the injury was absolute, the failure to do so partook of the nature of a wanton wrong against which no act on the part of appellee would have been a defense. We thoroughly agree with Mr. Justice Greenwood in what he says in the above case:
“For, we do not see how conduct can be characterized otherwise than as exhibiting reckless indifference to destroying human life or causing human suffering where it consists in failure to use ordinary care to avoid the infliction of death or serious bodily injury on another in a position of imminent peril, after it is realized that the imperiled person cannot or will not save himself. Railway Co. v. Shetter, 94 Tex. 199, 59 S. W. 533. And the civil consequences of such conduct should be the same as for a willful or wanton act. 2 Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) p. 1442.” 234 S. W. 665.
We have the testimony of the engineer undisputed saying he was watching the sign of the flagman, giving him the right of way as he was backing and signifying to the public to stop, and before he discovered anything unusual the tender was about 15 or 20 feet across the street, perhaps beyond the crossing, the bell was ringing continuously and he was looking back towards the crossing all the time, right at the crossing — saw the flagman all the time — as soon as he saw that ap-pellee was not going to stop and turned and started down the track, “saw there was going to be an accident, and I turned around just as quickly as I could, you know, to get hold of my brake valve and release. I threw the engine in the forward movement to make a quick stop. I stopped in about 12 or 15 feet, anyway.” He could have done no more, for he was required to act only after the discovery of the peril — not before. There was no evidence of “reckless indifference to destroying human life or causing human suffering * * * after it is realized that the imperiled person cannot or will not save himself.” We are not overlooking the modification of that doctrine, which had its inception perhaps in the last clear chance — or to wait, look, listen at railroad crossings, etc., holding the injured party to his contributory negligence, which step by step has deprived a defendant of the right to urge against the recovery because it was the injured party’s own fault, until it is now said:
“The pronouncements of this court (Sup.) denying the defense of contributory negligence in discovered peril cases have been progressively more and more emphatic.”
So contributory negligence is no defense in discovered peril eases and this has become the settled law. Still, Mr. Justice Greenwood said, in Wilson v. Southern Traction Co., supra:
“For, in order for an act or an omission of a plaintiff to constitute contributory negligence in any personal injury case, it must not only amount to a want of ordinary care, but it must, in concurrence with a negligent act or omission of a defendant, become the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”
[5] The defendant had a right to suppose under the circumstances, and to rely upon what seemed so plainly obvious to him, that appellee would obey the signal as others did, as well as see the engine and would stop as any sane or reasonable man would. This the engineer has shown he relied on, and when he saw appellee’s real danger used all the means in his power to stop his engine and thus avert the danger. He uses some foolish words in his testimony that do not contradict the fact that he promptly acted when he discovered appellee’s real danger and -his utter disregard of all surrounding facts obviously within his knowledge and under his observation, but was nevertheless not going to stop.
There is nothing new presented in the motion that was not before urged, and the motion is overruled.