Court Opinion

ID: 9492265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:36:34.887351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:12.885480
License: Public Domain

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the part of the majority opinion which holds that the plaintiff does not have a claim for injunctive relief. I dissent from that part of the opinion which declares that the plaintiff may have a cause of action for monetary damages. The pleadings are insufficient to raise a *698claim of negligence. Moreover, the district court had it right-the city is immune from tort liability for delivering safe drinking water to the public.
I.
It is true that Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the relevant facts. Nonetheless, the plaintiff must set forth the theory of the case “with enough detail to guide discovery.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.1996). In McHenry, the court cited with approval a standard negligence complaint that attempted to offer at least a bare statement describing how the defendant struck and injured the plaintiff. Id. Here, AlliedSignal offers not even one fact to allege how the City of Phoenix breached its duty to provide “non-defective” water. AlliedSignal merely alleges that its water contained corrosion-inducing bacteria, that the water caused injury to its pipes, and that the city owed various duties of care to the company that were breached by the presence of the bacteria. But the mere presence of bacteria in its water does not establish a breach. Nowhere does Allied-Signal provide even a bare allegation that the bacteria in the water supply had no business being there, thus violating the city’s duty of care.
Ample case law supports the proposition that more than conclusory allegations are needed to give the defendant the requisite notice of the plaintiffs claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir.1985) (upholding district court’s determination that a con-clusory complaint did not comply with Rule 8). See also Kyle v. Morton High School, 144 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir.1998) (sufficient facts must be alleged to allow the court and defendants to understand the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint); Maljack Productions, Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, Inc., 52 F.3d 373, 375 (D.C.Cir.1995) (inferences cannot be accepted if they are unsupported by the alleged facts, nor can the court accept purely legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations); Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1990) (each general allegation must be supported by a specific factual basis and pleadings are not sufficient where they rest on unsubstantiated conclusions). AlliedSignal has not identified any specific conduct that would subject the City of Phoenix to liability-
II.
More importantly, as even the majority opinion concedes, the water AlliedSignal complains about “comes from the same water distribution system that provides drinking water to the City’s residents.” Slip Op. at 694. AlliedSignal’s lawsuit does nothing more than challenge the city’s delivery of this water, which the company has not alleged violates any federal safe drinking water standards. The City of Phoenix, in order to make the water it delivers fit and pure for human consumption, treats its water pursuant to a water disinfection policy. However, the plaintiff, a commercial user, claims that the water which is treated for human consumption is destroying its pipes. That is all that the complaint alleges, and it is simply silly.
It is this kind of case which fosters the clamor for tort reform. The State of Arizona already has acted. Under Arizona law, a city within the state which exercises “an administrative function involving the determination of fundamental governmental policy” is absolutely immune from liability. A.R.S. § 12-820.01(A)(2). A city’s decision regarding how to treat water for safe human consumption is a quintessential exercise of fundamental policymaking in which public entities engage. See Fidelity Sec. Life Ins. v. Arizona Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 954 P.2d 580, 583 (1998) (if the element of fundamental governmental policy is present in the decision making process, then the exercise of discretion is presumed). The plaintiff, therefore, cannot make the city pay for the alleged damage *699to its water pipes merely from drinking water that the city has determined must contain some bacteria in order to be safe for human consumption.
Even if Arizona had not adopted its immunity rule, Phoenix would not be hable under the common law. In 1928, Justice Cardoza, then writing for the New York Court of Appeals, adopted a sensible tort reform rule. Simply stated, the rule is that in tort law there is no liability if the damage was not foreseeable. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
Our Supreme Court has adopted a similar principle in cases involving qualified immunity for public officials alleged to have acted under color of law in Section 1983 actions. They are not hable unless their conduct clearly was prohibited at the time of the alleged injury, and a reasonable person would have known of this prohibition. Wilson v. Layne, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1696, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). In this case, there is not even a hint anyplace that treating water for human consumption creates an action for damages when the water which is beneficial to humans is destroying the pipes that carry it.
Judge Rosenblatt was correct in dismissing this frivolous litigation. I respectfully dissent.