Court Opinion

ID: 9396088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 15:00:38.668629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:13.986566
License: Public Domain

21-6192
     Qin v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                            Navarro, IJ
                                                                          A 202 049 598
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 19th day of May, two thousand twenty-
 4   three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                    JON O. NEWMAN,
 8                    GERARD E. LYNCH,
 9                    RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   HUABIN QIN,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                    v.                                        21-6192
17                                                              NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                      Aleksander Boleslaw Milch, The Kasen Law
 2                                        Firm, PLLC, Flushing, NY.
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 5                                        General; Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation
 6                                        Counsel; Rosanne M. Perry, Trial Attorney,
 7                                        Office of Immigration Litigation, United States
 8                                        Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

9             UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

10   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

11   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

12            Petitioner Huabin Qin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of

13   China, seeks review of March 12, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming a February 4,

14   2019 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

15   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

16   (“CAT”). In re Huabin Qin, No. A 202 049 598 (B.I.A. Mar. 12, 2021), aff’g No. A

17   202 049 598 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Feb. 4, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity

18   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19            Because the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision, we review the

20   decision of the IJ directly. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 543 (2d Cir.

21   2005).    We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence and

22   questions of law de novo. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.
                                               2
 1   2009); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are

 2   conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

 3   the contrary.”). Applying those standards, we conclude that the IJ did not err in

 4   finding that Qin did not establish that a political opinion was one central reason

 5   that the police arrested and beat him or that he would more likely than not be

 6   tortured if removed to China.

 7         I.     Asylum and Withholding of Removal

 8         An applicant for asylum or withholding or removal has the burden to show

 9   either past persecution or a fear of future persecution and that “race, religion,

10   nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or

11   will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”         8 U.S.C.

12   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b);

13   Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 109–14 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that the “one

14   central reason” standard applies to both asylum and withholding of removal). To

15   demonstrate that persecution (past or prospective) bears a nexus to an applicant’s

16   political opinion, “[t]he applicant must . . . show, through direct or circumstantial

17   evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from the applicant’s

18   political beliefs.”   Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 545.     “[W]here the applicant’s

                                              3
 1   political belief takes the form of opposition to a government policy or practice that

 2   is visited on the population at large, mere subjection to that policy or practice will

 3   not itself qualify as persecution on account of political opinion.” Id. (internal

 4   quotation marks omitted). The applicant “must establish a fear of reprisal that is

 5   different in kind from a desire to avoid the exactions (however harsh) that a

 6   foreign government may place upon its citizens.” Id. (internal quotation marks

 7   omitted). “[O]pposition to . . . government practices or policies[] may have a

 8   political dimension when it transcends mere self-protection and represents a

 9   challenge to the legitimacy or authority of the ruling regime.” Id. at 547–48. A

10   political opinion can be actual or imputed; “[a] political opinion is imputed when

11   an individual has a political opinion attributed to him—correctly or incorrectly—

12   on account of his beliefs, actions[,] or associations.” Ruqiang Yu v. Holder, 693 F.3d

13   294, 299 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

14         Qin testified that he refused to sign an agreement for the demolition of a

15   factory he developed on his land because the head of the demolition and relocation

16   bureau offered him only a tenth of the factory’s replacement cost, and he believed

17   the offer was low because the officials were corrupt. He repeatedly told officials

18   that he objected to the demolition order because the government did not offer him

                                               4
 1   adequate compensation.      Although he called police “running dogs” of the

 2   Communist Party, he did so only after he was arrested and detained when he

 3   physically resisted their attempt to enforce the demolition order. See Certified

 4   Admin. Record at 68–69; see also id. at 232. He did not join protests against the

 5   government or the policy, rally other property owners to protest the policy,

 6   establish himself as a leader of any general protests, or show that the police

 7   arrested him for any reason other than his resistance to the demolition order.

 8   Accordingly, he did not establish that his actions or words “transcend[ed] mere

 9   self-protection.” Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 547–48 (explaining that objections to

10   extortion attempts became political when the applicant “decided to marshal

11   support from similarly afflicted business owners and to attempt to publicize and

12   criticize endemic corruption extending beyond his own case”).          Nor did he

13   establish that the authorities had or would impute a political opinion to him. See

14   Ruqiang Yu, 693 F.3d at 299. His single verbal attack on police expressed his

15   unhappiness with the fairness of the process as applied to him, not a general

16   opposition to the Chinese government or the Communist Party, particularly as it

17   was a reaction to his arrest and detention for resisting the demolition order on his

18   own property. The lack of nexus to a political opinion is dispositive of asylum

                                              5
 1   and withholding of removal.       See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i),

 2   1231(b)(3)(A).

 3         II.    CAT Relief

 4         Unlike asylum or withholding of removal, CAT relief does not require a

 5   nexus to a protected ground, but instead requires the applicant to establish that he

 6   will “more likely than not” be tortured. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture is

 7   defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,

 8   is intentionally inflicted,” id. § 1208.18(a)(1); it “is an extreme form of cruel and

 9   inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or

10   degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture,” id.

11   § 1208.18(a)(2). In assessing whether an applicant is more likely than not to be

12   tortured in the proposed country of removal, the agency shall consider, among

13   other factors, “[e]vidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant” and “[o]ther

14   relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal.”             Id.

15   § 1208.16(c)(3)(i), (iv). “[A]n alien will never be able to show that he faces a more

16   likely than not chance of torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to be

17   more likely than not to occur. It is the likelihood of all necessary events coming

18   together that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain of events

                                              6
 1   cannot be more likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119,

 2   123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Matter of J–F–F–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (A.G.

 3   2006)).

 4         The record supports the IJ’s decision, given Qin’s lack of evidence that his

 5   past harm rose to the level of torture, that Chinese officials continue to look for

 6   him, or that he would oppose government action in the future. See Savchuck, 518

 7   F.3d at 123; see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2008)

 8   (“[W]hen a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his failure to adduce evidence can

 9   itself constitute the substantial evidence necessary to support the agency’s

10   challenged decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

11         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

12   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

13                                          FOR THE COURT:
14                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
15                                          Clerk of Court

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