Court Opinion

ID: 9372122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 21:00:45.460501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:32.912434
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14081    Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 02/17/2023   Page: 1 of 21

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-14081
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        TIMOTHY JEROME RUSSELL,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cr-00023-JFD-JTA-1
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                21-14081

        Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               When Montgomery police officers saw that defendant Tim-
        othy Jerome Russell was driving a car with an expired registration,
        they initiated a traffic stop. During the traffic stop, they discovered
        that Russell was in possession of a firearm. He was subsequently
        charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation
        of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Before trial, Russell moved to suppress the
        gun and the ammunition, as well as statements he made, because
        he claimed the investigating officers violated his Fourth and Fifth
        Amendment rights. The district court granted in part and denied in
        part the motion. The court declined to suppress the physical evi-
        dence found in Russell’s car because the evidence was admissible
        under either the automobile exception or the inevitable discovery
        exception to the Fourth Amendment. It also declined to suppress
        some of the inculpatory statements that Russell made to the offic-
        ers. But the district court concluded that incriminating statements
        Russell made after he was handcuffed and detained in the officers’
        patrol car should be suppressed because the arresting officers failed
        to advise Russell of his Miranda1 rights.
             On appeal, Russell challenges the district court’s denial of his
        motion to suppress the physical evidence discovered during the

        1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
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        21-14081                   Opinion of the Court                              3

        traffic stop. After careful review, we conclude that the district court
        did not err. We therefore affirm.
                                   I.      BACKGROUND
               One evening in August 2018, Montgomery police officers
        Anphernee Canty and Luke Carey were patrolling near the Ann
        Street interstate exit, “riding around, looking for crime, looking for
        things that might be suspicious,” and found themselves driving be-
        hind a 2004 Mercury Grand Marquis. Doc. 41 at 36. 2 While driving
        behind the car, Officer Canty asked his partner to run a compliance
        check on the Grand Marquis. According to Canty, nothing in par-
        ticular drew his attention to the car—it just happened to be driving
        in front of the patrol car. The officers continued to follow the car
        while they ran the license plate through the state’s enforcement
        database, 3 which alerted them that the car’s registration was sus-
        pended. When the car pulled into a gas station and stopped at a gas
        pump, the officers followed. The officers then activated the patrol
        car’s emergency lights and began a traffic stop. 4

        2 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
        3 As explained by the magistrate judge, the local law enforcement system, Law
        Enforcement Tactical System (“LETS”), is a web-based search engine that
        searches Alabama state databases and provides information such as vehicle,
        driver, and violation data and driver’s license photos. Officers use the system
        on mobile devices in patrol cars.
        4 When the officers turned on the patrol car’s emergency lights, the patrol
        car’s dashboard camera began recording.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                      21-14081

                Canty exited the patrol car, approached the vehicle, and in-
        formed the driver, Russell, that he had been stopped because the
        car’s registration was suspended. Canty directed Russell to hand
        over his driver’s license and proof of insurance. Russell handed
        Canty his license, said he did not have insurance, and responded
        that he did not have anything in the car. At this point, Canty had
        decided that he was going to have to tow Russell’s car because Rus-
        sell did not have insurance. Canty also asked Russell whether there
        was “anything in the vehicle [Canty] should know about ahead of
        time.” Id. at 8.
                 Canty returned to the patrol car and ran Russell’s driver’s
        license through the state’s database, which alerted Canty that Rus-
        sell’s license had been suspended. Canty contacted police dispatch
        to have them search the National Crime Information Center
        (NCIC) database for alerts about Russell.
              While waiting for dispatch to return results from the search,
        Canty went back to Russell’s car. Canty told Russell that the vehi-
        cle was going to be towed and asked Russell to exit the car. 5 Russell
        complied and exited the car. Canty patted Russell down, found no
        weapons or drugs, and asked for a second time if he had anything
        in the vehicle that Canty needed to know about. At this point,

        5 Sometime during the traffic stop, after Russell was detained in the patrol car
        and the tow truck had been called, police dispatch informed Officers Canty
        and Carey that Russell had multiple outstanding warrants for failure to appear
        in court.
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        21-14081               Opinion of the Court                         5

        Russell told Canty there was a small amount of marijuana in the
        car in the glove compartment inside the passenger’s side. Canty
        handcuffed Russell and escorted him to the backseat of the patrol
        car.
               Canty searched Russell’s car. He found “narcotics” in the
        glove compartment, where Russell had said the marijuana would
        be. Canty returned to the patrol car, where Russell was in in the
        backseat, handcuffed. Canty asked Russell if he had previously
        been arrested or spent time in jail for marijuana. Canty then asked
        for the third time, whether there was anything else in the car. Rus-
        sell admitted: “There’s a gun in there.” Doc 40-4 at 21:08:45–
        21:08:50 (Camera 2).
               Canty and Carey searched the area of the car where Russell
        said the gun was located, immediately found it, and returned to the
        patrol car. At this point, they did not tell Russell that he was under
        arrest or advise him of his Miranda rights. Canty said something to
        Russell, and Russell twice stated, “don’t talk to me, man.” Id. at
        21:10:06–21:10:23 (Camera 2).
               A few minutes later, Canty tried to prompt Russell to speak
        again, saying, “[h]elp yourself out, you had a round and a maga-
        zine,” referring to the ammunition found in Russell’s car. Id. at
        21:12:00–21:12:04 (Camera 2). After a few more minutes, Canty
        told Russell he was “[l]ooking at like four charges right now.” Id. at
        21:14:14–17 (Camera 2). By this time, Russell had been sitting in
        the backseat handcuffed for a little more than 10 minutes. He be-
        gan to complain about feeling hot in the back of the patrol car. He
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-14081

        was sweating and asked for more air in the car or for a window to
        be opened. Canty responded that they had turned the air up all the
        way and told Russell he could not lie down with his head on the
        seat.
               About 25 minutes after the stop began, the tow truck ar-
        rived. By then, neither Canty nor Carey had told Russell that he
        was under arrest or advised him of his Miranda rights. Shortly after
        the tow truck arrived, Canty asked Russell, “[h]ow long you been
        selling, man?” Id. at 21:26:29–21:26:31 (Camera 2). When Russell
        responded that he did not really sell marijuana, Canty retorted,
        “how long you been selling, don’t play with me.” Id. at 21:26:35–
        21:26:45 (Camera 2).
               At that point, Canty told Russell he was under arrest and re-
        cited his Miranda rights. At the end of the admonition, Canty ap-
        pended the question, “are you willing to answer any questions
        without an attorney present?” Id. at 21:27:55–21:28:08 (Camera 2).
        Russell responded, “no.” Id. at 21:28:13–14 (Camera 2). But Canty
        pressed forward, advising: “It’s simple man, like if you don’t wanna
        talk you ain’t gotta talk; if you want to talk you can; I’m not gonna
        force you,” and went on to say, “I’m gonna ask you a question. If
        you don’t want to answer you ain’t got to answer.” Id. at 21:28:18–
        21:28:36 (Camera 2). Russell stated that he did not want to speak
        with Canty.
               Canty nevertheless continued to question Russell. He asked
        Russell how much marijuana he had in the car, whether he sold
        part-time, and whether he used the gun to assist him in selling
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        21-14081               Opinion of the Court                        7

        drugs. In response, Russell admitted that he sold drugs sometimes,
        but mostly used the marijuana. Russell was then transported to the
        county jail.
               A grand jury indicted Russell on one count of possession of
        a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony of-
        fense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
                Before trial, Russell moved to suppress the physical evidence
        seized during the stop, as well as his statements made during the
        stop. He argued that the warrantless search of his car violated the
        Fourth Amendment and that neither the automobile exception nor
        the search incident to arrest exception applied. He urged the court
        to suppress the gun and ammunition as the fruits of an illegal
        search. He further argued that his statements indicating that there
        were drugs and a gun in the car should be suppressed because
        Canty failed to advise Russell of his Miranda rights. He also argued
        that the statements made after Canty advised him of his rights, in-
        cluding admitting that he sold drugs, should be excluded because
        they were improperly elicited after he invoked his right to remain
        silent.
               The government opposed the motion to suppress. It argued
        that the initial stop was a lawful traffic stop, and the warrantless
        searches of the car were legal under the automobile exception to
        the Fourth Amendment because Canty had probable cause to be-
        lieve there was contraband in the vehicle based on Russell’s admis-
        sion that he had marijuana. The government also argued in the al-
        ternative that even if the search was unlawful, none of the evidence
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                      21-14081

        should be suppressed because it would have been discovered inev-
        itably during an inventory of the car once it was towed. In addition,
        the government initially argued that Russell was not in custody
        when he told Canty that there was marijuana and a gun in the car
        so there was no Fifth Amendment violation at any point before the
        Miranda warning was given. 6
                The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on Rus-
        sell’s motion to suppress. At the hearing, the judge reviewed the
        dashboard camera footage 7 and heard Canty’s testimony about the
        stop. Among other things, Canty testified that, consistent with Al-
        abama’s Safe Streets Act, the police department’s policy mandated
        that any vehicle operated by an unlicensed or uninsured driver be
        towed. Canty explained that once he learned that Russell had no
        insurance, he “knew” that he was going to have Russell’s car
        towed. Doc. 41 at 8–9. He also testified that department policy re-
        quired officers to inventory and document all items found inside a
        car before releasing it to a tow company. When pressed about how
        he implemented the statute and policy during his time as an officer,

        6 Notably, the government did not try to defend Canty’s questioning of Rus-
        sell after he had advised Russell of his Miranda rights and seemed to concede
        that Russell’s statements were elicited in violation of his Fifth Amendment
        rights.
        7 At the suppression hearing, Canty testified that he was wearing a body cam-
        era that recorded the traffic stop. But the body camera footage was not part of
        the record in the case because it apparently was not preserved after Russell’s
        arrest.
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        21-14081                Opinion of the Court                         9

        he testified that at the time of the stop, he had been a patrol cop for
        only one year but estimated he had stopped people without valid
        driver’s licenses or insurance “[m]ore times than [he could] count,
        probably,” and in those instances, he had the person’s car towed 95
        percent of the time. Id. at 34.
               After the hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that
        Russell’s motion to suppress the physical evidence found in his car
        be denied, but that some of his statements should be suppressed.
        The magistrate judge found that the gun and ammunition were ad-
        missible under the automobile exception. The magistrate judge
        also concluded that, even assuming the search had been unlawful,
        the evidence would have been discovered eventually during an in-
        ventory search and was therefore covered by the inevitable discov-
        ery doctrine.
               As to the statements, the magistrate judge recommended
        that Russell’s statements outside the patrol car—including the ad-
        mission that he had marijuana in his car—were admissible because
        he was not yet in custody for the purposes of Miranda. But the
        magistrate judge recommended that all of Russell’s statements that
        he made while handcuffed inside the patrol car should be sup-
        pressed. With regard to Russell’s statements made in the car before
        the Miranda warning—including his admission that there was a
        gun in the car—the magistrate judge found that Russell was in cus-
        tody at this point, and Canty had failed to advise him of his rights
        before eliciting incriminating statements. And the magistrate judge
        determined that the statements Russell made after he was arrested
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                21-14081

        and advised of his Miranda rights should also be suppressed. The
        magistrate judge found that “Canty did not cease his questioning
        of Russell once the invocation of rights occurred.” Doc. 44 at 25.
        Although Canty testified that Russell waived his Miranda rights be-
        fore making these statements, the magistrate judge observed that
        Canty’s testimony was inconsistent with the dash cam’s recording
        of the stop and that Russell invoked his right to remain silent. No-
        where in the recording did Russell waive his rights.
               Russell objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
        arguing that the district court should suppress the physical evi-
        dence. He argued that the gun and ammunition were found based
        on his statements that Canty elicited illegally and that no exception
        to the Fourth Amendment could excuse the warrantless search of
        his car. He also said that the magistrate judge erred in concluding
        that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied, arguing for the first
        time that Canty’s testimony that Alabama’s Safe Streets Act and
        police department policy required him to tow the vehicle were in-
        correct. He reasoned that there was “no way” Canty could have
        known that Russell’s car would be towed before he conducted any
        search of the car because it was not required to be towed under the
        Safe Streets Act—contrary to Canty’s testimony. Doc. 51 at 5.
               He further objected to the magistrate’s recommendation
        that his statements outside the patrol car should not be suppressed.
        He renewed his argument that Canty was required to advise him
        of his Miranda rights prior to any of this questioning.
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        21-14081               Opinion of the Court                       11

                The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommenda-
        tion and issued an order denying Russell’s motion as to the physical
        evidence and granting Russell’s motion as to his statements in the
        patrol car. The district court’s order did not directly address Rus-
        sell’s argument that Canty’s flawed understanding of the Safe
        Streets Act or department policy meant that the physical evidence
        would not inevitably have been discovered.
                Before trial, Russell moved in limine to preclude the govern-
        ment from introducing into evidence any drugs or drug parapher-
        nalia found in the car. The district court granted the motion. At
        trial, the government showed the jury the dash cam video, but be-
        cause of the motion to suppress, the version it introduced had no
        audio—and therefore included none of Russell’s statements from
        before or after he was detained in the patrol car. And Canty’s testi-
        mony at trial omitted any mention of Russell’s statements about
        the marijuana, or Canty’s finding any marijuana or other drugs in
        the car. Instead, he testified only about initiating the stop, ap-
        proaching Russell’s car, and informing Russell the car was going to
        be towed because of the suspended tag. He then skipped to finding
        and retrieving the gun from the car. The jury convicted Russell for
        being a felon in possession of a firearm.
              Russell now appeals the district court’s order denying in part
        his motion to suppress.
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                21-14081

                           II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
               A district court’s “denial of a motion to suppress involves
        mixed questions of fact and law.” United States v. Barber, 777 F.3d
        1303, 1304 (11th Cir. 2015). This Court reviews the district court’s
        factual findings for clear error, viewing “the evidence in the light
        most favorable to the prevailing party,” and reviews de novo the
        application of the law to the facts. Id.
               We may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any
        ground that the record supports. United States v. Caraballo,
        595 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010). We afford substantial defer-
        ence to the district court’s explicit and implicit credibility determi-
        nations. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir.
        2012). We will only reverse a factual finding if it is “contrary to the
        laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that
        no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Cavallo,
        790 F.3d 1202, 1227 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks
        omitted).
               We review for plain error arguments that a criminal defend-
        ant raises regarding an objection that he should have raised below
        but did not. United States v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1231–32 (11th
        Cir. 2013).
                “We review for abuse of discretion the treatment by a dis-
        trict court of a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge.”
        United States v. Franklin, 694 F.3d 1, 6 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal
        quotation marks omitted).
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        21-14081                   Opinion of the Court                               13

                                     III.    DISCUSSION
               Russell argues on appeal that the district court erred by
        denying his motion to suppress the gun and ammunition over his
        Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments. 8 The district court pro-
        vided two alternate grounds for denying the motion. First, it ex-
        plained that the search of Russell’s car was legal under the automo-
        bile exception to the warrant requirement. Second, it concluded
        that, even if the automobile exception did not apply, the physical
        evidence was nevertheless admissible under the inevitable discov-
        ery doctrine. We address each of these grounds, and Russell’s re-
        lated arguments on appeal, in turn.
               Russell first contends that the officers did not have probable
        cause to search his car, so they violated his Fourth Amendment
        rights when they did so. 9 The government responds that the

        8 As we noted above, the district court denied the motion to suppress Russell’s
        statement that there was marijuana in the car because it found there was no
        Miranda violation as to this statement. But before trial, the district court
        granted Russell’s motion in limine to exclude all evidence related to the drugs
        found in his car, so neither the statement nor the physical drug evidence was
        introduced at trial.
        9 Russell did not challenge the initial traffic stop in the district court or on
        appeal—nor could he have been successful if he had. Such “seizures” are “con-
        stitutional if [they are] either based upon probable cause to believe a traffic
        violation has occurred or justified by reasonable suspicion in accordance with
        Terry.” United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008). Here,
        Russell’s suspended tag registration was sufficient probable cause for the offic-
        ers to initiate the stop.
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                      21-14081

        automobile exception allowed the officers to conduct the search
        because Russell’s admission that he had marijuana in the car pro-
        vided Canty with the requisite probable cause. In response, Russell
        argues that there was no probable cause because his statement
        about the marijuana was elicited in a custodial interrogation and
        the officers failed to advise him of his Miranda rights, so the only
        basis for the search was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amend-
        ment rights. 10
                The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the
        people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
        against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
        and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”
        U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence obtained as a direct result of an
        illegal search or seizure is subject to exclusion, as is “evidence later
        discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or fruit of the
        poisonous tree.” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)
        (internal quotation marks omitted).
               The automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment per-
        mits a warrantless search of an automobile if (1) it is readily mobile,
        and (2) there is probable cause to believe that it contains

        10 The district court ruled that all of Russell’s statements made inside the pa-
        trol car—including the statements Russell made before Canty issued the Mi-
        randa warning—were inadmissible. Thus, the only statements about which
        Russell complains on appeal are the statements he made while outside the pa-
        trol car, before he was handcuffed and detained. But as we observed above,
        supra at 11, none of these statements were admitted at trial.
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        21-14081                Opinion of the Court                         15

        contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Lanzon,
        639 F.3d 1293, 1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2011). The first prong is satis-
        fied if the car is operational. United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285,
        1293 (11th Cir. 2007). “Probable cause . . . exists when under the
        totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contra-
        band or evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle.” Id. (inter-
        nal quotation marks omitted). If officers have probable cause to be-
        lieve a car contains evidence of criminal activity, they may search
        every part of the car that may conceal this evidence. California v.
        Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569–70 (1991).
               Miranda guarantees a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right
        against self-incrimination by requiring law enforcement officers to
        warn individuals subjected to custodial interrogation before any
        questioning that they have the right to remain silent, the right to
        have an attorney present during any questioning, and the right to
        appointed counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
        The “custodial interrogation” definition is a limiting principle—an
        officer is only required to advise a suspect of his Miranda rights
        when he is “in custody” and “subjected to either express question-
        ing or its functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
        291, 300–301 (1980). To give teeth to Miranda’s prophylactic re-
        quirement, statements in a custodial interrogation “are inadmissi-
        ble unless the suspect is specifically informed of his Miranda rights
        and freely decides to forgo those rights.” New York v. Quarles, 467
        U.S. 649, 654 (1984). But it is well-settled law that “Miranda does
        not require the exclusion of physical evidence that is discovered on
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                      21-14081

        the basis of a voluntary, although unwarned, statement.” United
        States v. Jackson, 506 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2007).
               In his appeal—as in the district court—Russell clings to his
        Miranda argument because, in his view, his statement that he had
        marijuana in his car was the key to the government’s case. He con-
        tends that the officers lacked probable cause to believe there was
        contraband in the car until Canty elicited incriminating statements
        from him. Under this theory, Russell was subjected to a custodial
        interrogation without Miranda warnings when he told Canty
        about the marijuana, and without that violation, Canty would not
        have discovered the marijuana, would not have detained Russell in
        the patrol car, and would not have found the gun and ammunition.
               This argument fails for two reasons: One, it disregards the
        well-settled rule that suppression of physical evidence is not a rem-
        edy for a Miranda violation, and two, even assuming there was a
        constitutional violation, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies.
              First, Russell’s purported Miranda claim is flawed because
        he seeks to suppress physical evidence under the guise of suppress-
        ing a statement. 11 Id. To be sure, the rule set forth in Jackson

        11 Because the government never introduced at trial any of Russell’s state-
        ments outside the patrol car, Russell argues on appeal only that the district
        court should have granted his motion to suppress “the physical evidence.” Ap-
        pellant’s Br. at 75. We thus understand Russell to be raising a Miranda-related
        argument only as it pertains to the physical evidence and whether the officers
        violated his constitutional rights when they searched the car.
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        21-14081                Opinion of the Court                        17

        applies only if the unwarned statement that led to the discovery of
        physical evidence was voluntary, but for the purpose of his appeal,
        conducting the ordinary Fifth Amendment inquiries—including
        whether Russell’s statements were voluntary—is unnecessary be-
        cause of the district court’s second ground for denying Russell’s
        motion to suppress the physical evidence: the gun and ammunition
        would have inevitably been discovered regardless of Canty’s ques-
        tioning of Russell and Russell’s statements in response to those
        questions.
               As to the second ground, Russell contends that the district
        court erred by ruling that, even if the search of the car was not legal
        under the automobile exception because the officers lacked valid
        probable cause, the gun and ammunition were admissible under
        the inevitable discovery doctrine. Russell says that Canty would
        not have found the evidence had he not elicited incriminating state-
        ments from Russell in violation of Miranda. He argues that because
        Canty was not pursuing a separate path to discovering the evidence
        that did not rely on Russell’s unwarned statements, the inevitable
        discovery doctrine does not apply, and the district court erred by
        denying his motion to suppress. We agree with the district court.
               When it adopted the inevitable discovery doctrine, the Su-
        preme Court observed that there is no rational basis to suppress
        evidence obtained by unconstitutional methods “if the govern-
        ment can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inev-
        itably.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984). Under the “inev-
        itable discovery” or “ultimate discovery” exception, the
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                21-14081

        government may introduce evidence that it obtained through an
        illegal search if it shows: (1) “by a preponderance of the evidence
        that if there had been no constitutional violation, the evidence in
        question would have been discovered by lawful means,” and
        (2) “that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were
        being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal con-
        duct.” United States v. Watkins, 13 F.4th 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021)
        (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). To meet the prepon-
        derance-of-the-evidence standard, the government need not show
        an “[a]bsolute certainty” that the evidence would have been dis-
        covered, just “that it is more likely than not the evidence would
        have been discovered without the violation.” Id. And to meet the
        “active pursuit” prong, the government only must show “that the
        police would have discovered the evidence by virtue of ordinary
        investigations of evidence or leads already in their possession.” Id.
        (internal quotation marks omitted).
               After considering the briefing, testimony, and oral argument
        on Russell’s motion, the magistrate judge concluded that the gov-
        ernment carried its burden of proof that the gun and ammunition
        “eventually would have been discovered by lawful means pursuant
        to an inventory search because Canty was actively pursuing the im-
        poundment of the vehicle at the time of the search.” Doc. 44 at 19.
        Specifically, the magistrate judge found that Canty was actively
        pursuing a lawful means of discovery because the officers had con-
        tacted a tow truck and that there was a reasonable probability the
        officers would have found the gun and ammunition in an inventory
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        21-14081                Opinion of the Court                        19

        search that was required by department policy. From the moment
        the officers learned Russell had no proof of insurance, they had
        probable cause to believe Russell was violating traffic laws by driv-
        ing his car, and they were authorized to initiate the traffic stop. The
        magistrate judge found credible Canty’s testimony that as soon as
        he discovered that Russell lacked valid insurance, Canty knew he
        was going to have Russell’s car towed. The magistrate judge also
        determined that Canty understood the Safe Streets Act to mean
        that officers were required to have cars without valid insurance
        towed, and that department procedures required officers to inven-
        tory a vehicle’s contents before it was towed and impounded.
        Canty testified that in only one year working as a patrol cop, he had
        already pulled over cars for suspended tags “[m]ore times than [he
        could] count,” Doc. 41 at 34, and estimated that he had the cars
        towed in 95 percent of cases.
               Even if we assume the search was unlawful under the
        Fourth Amendment because Russell’s statements outside the pa-
        trol car were elicited in violation of Miranda, the district court cor-
        rectly concluded that the evidence would have been discovered in-
        evitably through a lawful inventory search and thus properly de-
        nied the motion to suppress. The district court’s factual findings or
        credibility determinations were not clearly erroneous, inconsistent
        or improbable such that reversal would be proper. Indeed, the
        “demonstrated historical facts” discussed in Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5,
        show that Russell’s registration, license, and insurance were sus-
        pended or invalid, and the officers did in fact have the car towed
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                21-14081

        and impounded. Therefore, there is no plausible version of events
        in which the gun and ammunition—recovered from just inside the
        center console—would have eluded discovery in an inventory
        search.
                Russell raises a related argument, that discovery of the gun
        and ammunition was not inevitable because Canty misunderstood
        the Safe Streets Act and the department’s policy, which did not re-
        quire the towing of Russell’s car. Russell raised this argument for
        the first time in his objection to the magistrate judge’s recommen-
        dation, despite the government having argued the inevitable dis-
        covery theory in its response to the motion to suppress, and at the
        evidentiary hearing. Notably, the district court’s order adopting the
        recommendation did not address Russell’s argument about the
        Safe Streets Act or the department’s policy.
                We have held that “a district court has discretion to decline
        to consider a party’s argument when that argument was not first
        presented to the magistrate judge.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d
        1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, the district court did not abuse
        its discretion by declining to address Russell’s arguments about the
        statute and policy that he had both notice of and an opportunity to
        raise at the evidentiary hearing.
               Nor did the court err by adopting the recommendation over
        Russell’s objection. Russell contends that Canty was wrong when
        he said the statute and policy required him to have Russell’s car
        towed and that because Canty did not fill out an inventory sheet,
        “[w]e cannot know” whether Canty would have had the car towed,
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        21-14081               Opinion of the Court                        21

        or whether Russell would have asked someone else to come get
        the car, or whether some other version of events could have un-
        folded that would have prevented the evidence from being discov-
        ered. Appellant’s Br. at 54. But these hypotheticals do not compel
        the conclusion that the district court erred by crediting Canty’s tes-
        timony and concluding based on that testimony that Canty was go-
        ing to have Russell’s car towed and the gun and ammunition would
        have been found.
                The district court did not err in determining that the doc-
        trine of inevitable discovery permitted the admission of the gun
        and ammunition at Russell’s trial. Accordingly, we affirm the dis-
        trict court’s order denying in part Russell’s motion to suppress.
               AFFIRMED.