Court Opinion

ID: 9896224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 20:00:53.243256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:23.844697
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        NOV 9 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTINA JUNGBLUT, an individual,              No.    22-15508

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:19-cv-05837-DLR

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM *
SALT RIVER PROJECT AGRICULTURAL
IMPROVEMENT AND POWER
DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the
State of Arizona,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted November 7, 2023**

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

      Christina Jungblut appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment in

Jungblut’s action against her former employer, Salt River Project Agricultural

Improvement and Power District, alleging violations of the Americans With

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Samper v. Providence St.

Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1235 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

      The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jungblut’s ADA

and ACRA claims because Jungblut failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether

she was “a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of the job

with reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 1237 (explaining the requirements of a

prima facie case for failure to accommodate under the ADA) (citation and

alterations omitted); see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1461(12); id. § 41-1463(F)(4);

Fancini v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 937 P.2d 1382, 1388 (Ariz. App. 1996)

(“Because the ACRA is modeled after federal employment discrimination laws . . .

federal case law is persuasive in applying the ACRA.”).

      We decline to consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

      Jungblut’s Motion to Transmit Physical Exhibits, Dkt. Entry No. 18, is

denied.

      AFFIRMED.

                                          2