Court Opinion

ID: 9402170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:07:35.322934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.086455
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023
                                                             TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                    2021-SC-0541-MR

MARK JOHNSON                                                          APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
V.                    HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, JUDGE
                               NO. 21-CR-0138

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                  OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE CONLEY

           AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART & REMANDING

      This case comes before the Court on appeal as a matter of right1 by Mark

Johnson, the Appellant, from the conviction and sentence of the Muhlenberg

Circuit Court. After a jury trial, Johnson was found guilty of theft by unlawful

taking, $500 - $1,000; and two counts of burglary in the third degree. The jury

then found him guilty of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree.

The jury recommended a consecutive sentence of five years each for the third-

degree burglaries, totaling ten years, with an enhanced sentence to twenty

years each for being a persistent felony offender. The total sentence imposed by

the trial court was twenty years.

      1   Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
      Johnson now appeals alleging four errors. First, that the greenhouse he

burglarized cannot be considered a building under KRS2 511.010(1); second,

that the instructions for both counts of burglary in the third degree violated his

right to a unanimous jury; third, during the penalty phase, the Commonwealth

elicited misleading testimony as to when Johnson would be eligible for parole

in order to convince the jury to impose the maximum sentence; and fourth,

also during the penalty phase, that the Commonwealth elicited testimony

about alleged crimes Johnson was charged with but subsequently were

dismissed or amended. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand for a new penalty phase to be conducted.

                                      I.   Facts

      Johnson was “friends with benefits” of Samantha Hall. Hall had a Chevy

Cobalt vehicle that she frequently used to drive Johnson where he wanted to

go. On January 12, 2021, Johnson asked Hall to drive him to a piece of

property located on Highway 2270 in Muhlenberg County, owned by Kenneth

Dillihay. He told her he wanted to go and steal things. At the Dillihay property,

Hall testified, she waited in the car and from there observed Johnson enter

multiple buildings, including a greenhouse. Dillihay testified this was a “high

tunnel” greenhouse and was being used to store farm equipment and house

goats. Specifically, among the farm equipment stored in the greenhouse, was a

tiller, grinding stone, miter saw, and a corn sheller. Johnson left the

      2   Kentucky Revised Statutes
                                           2
greenhouse and placed these items in the trunk of Hall’s car. The vehicle,

however, got stuck in the mud and grass. In the process of dislodging the car,

Hall took a photo of the items in her trunk and sent them to a Sheriff’s Deputy

with whom she worked as an informant. She told the deputy where they were,

that “he”—referring to Johnson—was stealing things, and that the car was

stuck. By the time the deputy arrived on the scene, Johnson and Hall had

dislodged the car, but the deputy testified his visual inspection of the scene

showed tire marks and tracks confirming Hall’s story. Hall testified she and

Johnson drove to his mother’s residence and stored the stolen property there.

The miter saw, at least, was eventually recovered at the residence by police.

      Later, on January 18, 2021, Johnson again asked Hall to drive him to

another property for the purpose of theft. This property was on Lonely Lane in

Muhlenberg County, and was owned by the Muhlenberg Alliance for Progress,

Inc. William Scott was the previous owner, and he had sold the property to the

Muhlenberg Alliance but had an agreement with it that he could continue to

use the land for farming purposes. Johnson had told Hall that he had

previously been to the property on January 16, 2021. Once again, Hall testified

to observing Johnson enter multiple buildings on the property, leaving one

building with gas cans and another building with milk cans.

      Between January 16 and 18, Scott was aware a theft had occurred

because he noticed some items missing, including a Marlin rifle. He owned

some trail cams and set those cameras up to observe the property. Photos from

the trail cameras taken on January 18 show Johnson carrying the gas jugs.

                                        3
The gas jugs were subsequently recovered at Johnson’s own residence. During

both thefts Johnson was wearing a GPS ankle monitor and records submitted

show that Johnson was indeed on the respective properties on the dates in

question.

      At trial, Johnson sought dismissal of the count for third degree burglary

related to the high tunnel greenhouse on the Dillihay property arguing it did

not qualify as a building under the controlling statute. That motion was denied.

A motion for directed verdict for the same reasons was made at the close of the

Commonwealth’s evidence and once more at the close of all evidence. Both

were denied. When the jury was instructed for the guilt phase, it was given

instructions for two counts of burglary in the third degree. No objection was

made to these instructions at trial, but Johnson now argues they violated his

right to a unanimous jury verdict by failing to require the jury to be unanimous

as to which building Johnson had unlawfully entered on either property. After

finding Johnson guilty of both counts of third-degree burglary, as well as a

misdemeanor count of theft by unlawful taking, a penalty phase was

conducted.

      During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth called Camron Laycock,

the Muhlenberg Circuit Clerk, to testify to eight other felonies Johnson had

previously committed. One of these was in fact a misdemeanor conviction.

Parole Officer Fouse was called to testify regarding parole eligibility and related

sentencing matters, as well as Johnson’s record while previously on probation

or parole. She testified to numerous parole violations as well as “charges”

                                         4
stemming from said parole violations. Johnson has identified three of these

charges as being incorrect, because they were later amended prior to a guilty

plea or dismissed altogether. Johnson did not object to any of this testimony

during the penalty phase. Regarding parole eligibility, Fouse had a colloquy

with the Commonwealth regarding good time credits, the difference between

two “calendar years” and “jail years,” and the impact this would have on

Johnson’s total sentence and minimum time served to be eligible for parole.

This testimony was also not objected to at trial.

      We will develop the facts further below in our analysis, but the law must

first be clarified before any fruitful consideration of the facts can be made.

                                  II.   Analysis

      A. Unanimous Verdicts
      The issues presented by this case are the two that have bedeviled this

Court for more than a decade in jury unanimity cases: defining precisely what

constitutes a juror unanimity issue and proper application of the palpable error

standard of review. Justice Cunningham once wryly observed, “we typically

spend page after page doing textbook analysis of this issue with almost every

jury unanimity issue we review.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.3d 439,

461-62 (Ky. 2009) (Cunnigham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Alas, we must venture “once more unto the breach[.]” William Shakespeare,

Henry V, act. III, sc. 1, l. 1. The dispositive questions we must answer are first,

whether the Commonwealth has presented multiple theories (alternative

means) of one burglary in the third degree for each count, or whether each

                                         5
instruction encompassed multiple, separate criminal acts (multiple acts) of

burglary in the third degree. If there has been an error in the jury instructions,

then we must secondarily determine whether it was palpable.

      We begin with a review of our recent precedent on what constitutes a

juror unanimity violation. In Harp v. Commonwealth, we held

      that in a case involving multiple counts of the same offense, a trial
      court is obliged to include some sort of identifying characteristic in
      each instruction that will require the jury to determine whether it
      is satisfied from the evidence the existence of facts proving that
      each of the separately charged offenses occurred.

266 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Ky. 2008). In Johnson v. Commonwealth, we held “a

general jury verdict based on an instruction including two or more separate

instances of a criminal offense, whether explicitly stated in the instruction or

based on the proof—violates the requirement of a unanimous verdict.” 405

S.W.3d 439, 449 (Ky. 2013).

      This type of unanimous-verdict violation occurs when a jury
      instruction may be satisfied by multiple criminal acts by the
      defendant. When that is the case, and the instruction does not
      specify which specific act it is meant to cover, we cannot be sure
      that the jurors were unanimous in concluding the defendant
      committed a single act satisfying the instruction.

Martin v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2015), abrogated on other

grounds by Sexton v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 227 (Ky. 2022). Finally, a

      third type of unanimity error also appears to exist in our
      jurisprudence—a potential violation of unanimity stemming from a
      ‘combination jury instruction.’ ‘A “combination” instruction
      permitting a conviction of the same offense under either of multiple
      alternative theories does not deprive a defendant of his right to a
      unanimous verdict, so long as there is evidence to support a
      conviction under either theory.’

                                        6
Brown v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 826, 839 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Robinson v.

Commonwealth, 325 S.W.3d 368, 370 (Ky. 2010)). This leads to the conundrum

of the present case as Johnson contends the Johnson rule is controlling—that

the proof for each count of burglary in the third degree actually supported two

separate unlawful entries into two buildings, i.e., multiple acts of the same

criminal offense. The Commonwealth contends that the rule cited in Brown is

controlling—that the two separate unlawful entries into a building for each

count are merely alternative theories of how a single crime was committed, and

that the proof for each theory was sufficient to support the convictions.

      No published authority addressing this precise issue exists in Kentucky.

In an unpublished case, however, the Court of Appeals did address it. In

Owens v. Commonwealth, it wrote

      it can be argued that two theories of guilt were submitted to the
      jury as to the charge of third-degree burglary. The first theory was
      that Owens burglarized one or both of Hensley's sheds which abut
      a locked outbuilding. The second theory was that Owens
      burglarized the locked outbuilding whose door was pried open.
      However, as previously discussed, since there is sufficient evidence
      to support conviction under both of these theories, there is no
      violation of Owens' right to a unanimous verdict.

No. 2008-CA-000711-MR, 2009 WL 2408382, at *4, (Ky. App. Aug. 7, 2009).

The unpublished decisions of an inferior court are not binding upon this Court,

and a close reading of Owens reveals that this passage was mere dicta and did

not actually address the jury unanimity argument advanced by the appellant.

Id.

                                        7
      With its ruling in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020), the

Supreme Court of the United States made the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of

a unanimous jury applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. That

changed little in the way of Kentucky law since our own constitution also

guarantees unanimous jury verdicts. Ky. Const. § 7. Moreover, the Johnson

case clearly looked to federal case law for guidance, noted previous instances of

the same, and held “certainly ‘unanimity’ has the same dictionary meaning in

any court.” Johnson, 405 S.W.3d at 455. In other words, the Sixth Amendment

and Section 7 are coterminous. Nonetheless, Supreme Court precedent is now

binding on this issue rather than merely persuasive. But federal case law offers

little in the way of guidance when it comes to differentiating between multiple

acts and alternative theories.

      The leading cases from the Supreme Court are Schad v. Arizona, 501

U.S. 624 (1991) and Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999).

Richardson’s application outside of its specific statutory context, however, “has

been expressly—and consistently—rejected.” State v. Gardner, 118 Ohio St. 3d

420, 431, 889 N.E.2d 995, 1008 (2008). Richardson is readily distinguishable

because the crime there focused on a federal statutory crime regarding a

“series of violations” thus, it has nothing to offer us in the context of this case.

Indeed, it must be noted at this point that the Commonwealth has not argued

Johnson was engaged in a continuous course of conduct. Schad is more

helpful but only in the abstract. It reiterated “there is no general requirement

that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie

                                          8
the verdict.” 501 U.S. at 632. It then extended that rule to the element of mens

rea. Id. In other words, where two culpable mental states would satisfy the

finding of guilt for one crime, the jury need not agree unanimously on the

mental state. Apart from that, however, the plurality opinion of Schad is more

an explanation of what the law is not, rather than what it is. As Justice Scalia

noted in his concurrence, “the plurality approves the Arizona practice in the

present case because it meets one of the conditions for constitutional validity.

It does not say what the other conditions are, or why the Arizona practice meets

them.” Id. at 651.

      Despite this, Schad has proven helpful in the past. For example, in

Brown, we followed the Supreme Court in applying the rule that “[a] . . . jury

need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of

underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several

possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime.” 553

S.W.3d at 839 (quoting Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817, citing Schad, 501 U.S. at

631-32). Applying that rule, we held that the jury did not have to agree which

pieces of jewelry the defendant stole in one, singular act of robbery; only that

the jury had to agree that movable property was taken. Id. at 840.

      The case law in Kentucky most instructive on the issue of distinguishing

between multiple acts and alternative theories is that which defines how to

distinguish multiple acts from a continuous course of conduct. The difference

between multiple, independent criminal acts and one continuous course of

criminal conduct generally is “a sufficient break in the conduct and time so

                                        9
that the acts constituted separate and distinct offenses.” Wellborn v.

Commonwealth, 157 S.W.3d 608, 612 (Ky. 2005). This break need only be “a

cognizable lapse in his course of conduct during which the defendant could

have reflected upon his conduct, if only momentarily, and formed the intent to

commit additional acts.” Kiper v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 736, 745 (Ky.

2012). These two cases illustrate the principle well. In Wellborn, the defendant

shot a state trooper three separate times in three different areas of the body. All

three shots were fired after a cognizable lapse in time occurred that allowed the

defendant time to reflect upon his conduct. Wellborn, 157 S.W.3d at 611. In

contrast, the defendant in Kiper shot one person in a drive-by shooting. But

given the “rapid rate of the gunfire . . . the evidence does not support a

reasonable conclusion that some of the shots were fired with the intent to

wound while others were fired with the intent to kill.” 399 S.W.3d at 746.

      Though there is an obvious conceptual difference between “alternative

theories” and a “continuous course of conduct,” we fail to see why

distinguishing multiple acts from the latter category is not applicable to

distinguishing multiple acts from the former category. If there is a break in

time and conduct that allows for the defendant, even momentarily, to pause

and reflect, and form or reform intent to commit an additional act, then the

Commonwealth has not presented two alternative theories for the perpetration

of one crime; it has presented proof of two separate criminal acts.

      Statutory law and case law does not support the argument that the two

separate unlawful entries on each property in this case are merely brute facts

                                        10
which make up a particular element of burglary in the third degree. Cf. Brown,

553 S.W.3d at 840. “A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when,

with the intent to commit a crime, he or she knowingly enters or remains

unlawfully in a building.” KRS 511.040(1). A building is defined as

      in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any structure, vehicle,
      watercraft or aircraft:
      (a) Where any person lives; or
      (b) Where people assemble for purposes of business, government,
          education, religion, entertainment or public transportation.
      Each unit of a building consisting of two (2) or more units separately
      secured or occupied is a separate building.

KRS 511.010(1). The General Assembly’s declaration that where there are two

or more units in one building that are separately secured or occupied, then

each unit constitutes a distinct building is obviously meant to facilitate

multiple charges for burglary even when those units are attached to one

another and physically constitute one structure. This is precisely what we

ruled in Ordway v. Commonwealth, where the defendant burglarized nine

different storage units at one storage facility, but the jury instructions did not

differentiate between the individual units. 352 S.W.3d 584, 592-93 (Ky. 2011).

It only stands to reason then that two separate physical structures which are

in no way connected must also be considered two distinct buildings. In other

words, unlawful entry into two separate buildings cannot be treated as a brute

fact or merely presenting alternative means for one crime because the statute

itself provides for treating both unlawful entries as separate crimes. It may be

that prosecutorial discretion allows for the Commonwealth to not separately

                                        11
charge each unlawful entry individually. But if that course is chosen, then the

Commonwealth must steer away from introducing evidence regarding the

uncharged unlawful entry.

      In this case, Samantha Hall testified that she observed Johnson, at each

property, enter multiple buildings—two greenhouses at the Dillihay property

and a garage and barn at the Muhlenberg Alliance property. There is no

argument that for either property the buildings were connected and not

separately secured or occupied. Instead, the evidence shows they were distinct

buildings and Johnson would obviously have had more than a momentary

lapse of time while proceeding to the buildings to reflect on what he was doing

and form a specific intention to unlawfully enter that particular building. We

therefore hold that the instructions in this case were erroneous because the

proof at trial demonstrated “two or more separate instances of a criminal

offense[.]” Johnson, 405 S.W.3d at 449. “When that is the case, and the

instruction does not specify which specific act it is meant to cover, we cannot

be sure that the jurors were unanimous in concluding the defendant

committed a single act satisfying the instruction.” Martin, 456 S.W.3d at 7.

      B. No Palpable Error
      Having concluded the instructions were erroneous we must now

determine whether the error was palpable. Throughout our recent cases, a

minority of this Court has consistently charged that we were weakening our

standard for palpable review. In Johnson, it was Justice Cunningham, joined

by Justice Scott, who concluded

                                       12
      Our trial judges are being ambushed by such decisions as this one
      when we so lightly deem palpable error when the mistake has not
      been preserved. We are watering down our palpable error standard
      with holdings such as this to the point that it behooves the defense
      lawyer not to object on jury instructions and just allow the trial
      court to walk—unwarned—onto the unanimity land mine.

405 S.W.3d at 461 (Cunningham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part). In Ordway, Justice Cunningham, also joined by Justice Scott, once again

concluded no palpable error occurred “where there is sufficient evidence to

convict a defendant on all of the identical instructions and the jury does, in

fact, convict.” 352 S.W.3d at 594 (Cunningham, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). In King v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 343, 374-76 (Ky.

2018), Justice Keller addressed the issue. She was joined by Justices

Cunningham and Wright in that opinion.

      It is true enough that this Court has taken our palpable error standard

of review to the limits when it comes to jury unanimity. For example, in Martin

we wrote “that without regard for the probability of a different result an ‘error

so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law’

will also constitute manifest injustice under RCr 10.26.” 456 S.W.3d at 8

(quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006)). Based upon

Johnson and Kingery v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 824 (Ky. 2013), we held

      violation of the right to a unanimous verdict is reversible palpable
      error. To reach that conclusion, both cases relied solely on the
      substantial nature of the unanimous-verdict right coupled with the
      due-process impingement resulting from its violation. Nowhere in
      either case did this Court weigh the strength of the evidence or the
      probability of a different result.

                                        13
Id. at 9. Indeed, we have even noted “that this Court has taken a minority view

by regarding this instructional error, in certain instances, as structural error

beyond the reach of harmless error or palpable error analysis.” King, 554

S.W.3d at 355.

      Last year, however, this Court ruled in Sexton v. Commonwealth, that

“reversal is not the universal, essential result of a unanimous verdict error.”

647 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Ky. 2022). In that case, “Sexton, through counsel,

acknowledged guilt; the jury agreed that he was guilty of two counts each of

rape and incest. Such an error, to the extent that it occurred, cannot have

resulted in manifest injustice.” Id. Such circumstances demonstrated “the

necessity for cabining our precedent . . . [because] we cannot hold that any

potential unanimity error would have resulted in a manifest injustice.” Id.

Beyond the fact-specific ruling of Sexton, there are two underlying principles

that must be true for Sexton to have any validity—that jury unanimity errors

are not structural errors and when unpreserved the correct standard of review

is palpable error. We specifically distinguished Sexton from the holdings of

Martin and Johnson in order to remove the effect of their precedential

compulsion. We believe this case also provides another opportunity to cabin

our precedent. Justice Cunningham spoke of trial courts being ambushed by

the unanimity land mine. That proverbial land mine has, unfortunately, been

laid by this very Court. Our decision today should be understood as clearing

the minefield.

                                        14
      The error can be traced to Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.

2006). In that case we explained the defendant’s burden under RCr 10.26—

"the required showing is probability of a different result or error so

fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law.” Id.

at 3. “To discover manifest injustice, a reviewing court must plumb the depths

of the proceeding . . . to determine whether the defect in the proceeding was

shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.” Id. But a key misapplication of

Martin I, as explained in Martin II,3 is largely responsible for our Court’s lax

application of the palpable error standard in recent years. In Martin II we

adopted the view that Martin I had “outlined a clear, dichotomous test allowing

manifest injustice to be found in two distinct ways.” 456 S.W.3d at 8.

Elucidating further, we wrote

      First, we reaffirmed the then-prevailing palpable-error standard,
      acknowledging that manifest injustice may be found upon a
      showing of “a probability of a different result” absent the
      error. Second, the Martin court expanded the definition of palpable
      error by explaining that without regard for the probability of a
      different result an “error so fundamental as to threaten a
      defendant's entitlement to due process of law” will also constitute
      manifest injustice under RCr 10.26.

Id. (quoting Martin I, 207 S.W.3d at 3). A close reading of Martin I, however,

does not support the conclusion that we created two classes of manifest

injustice, one focusing on the probability of a different result and the other

      3  Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006) and Martin v.
Commonwealth, 456 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2015) did not share the same appellant. But the
similitude of names can make it confusing to understand which case we refer to, so we
adopt the distinction Martin I and Martin II, respectively, solely for purposes of
clarifying our discussion.
                                         15
focusing on a fundamental error threatening a defendant’s right to due process.

What Martin I actually held was

      The language “[a] substantial possibility does not exist that the
      result would have been different” is at best confusing, and it falls
      short of the required standard. A better understanding is gained
      from an examination of RCr 10.26 with emphasis on the concept of
      “manifest injustice.” While the language used is clear enough, we
      further explain that the required showing is probability of a
      different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a
      defendant's entitlement to due process of law.

207 S.W.3d at 3 (emphasis added). While use of the disjunctive “or” supports

Martin II’s understanding, the surrounding context does not. Martin I used the

language of “fundamental error threatening a defendant’s entitlement to due

process of law” to explain and clarify the manifest injustice standard—an

explanation deemed necessary because of ambiguity in the phrasing of a

“substantial possibility of a different result.” This is because the substantial

possibility of a different result language “fails to adequately describe the

necessary degree of prejudice associated with the unpreserved question in the

context of the whole case.” Id. Thus, Martin I clarified the manifest injustice

standard. Martin I’s further comments on the palpable error standard only

spoke of it in the singular, and not as two distinct categories. "When an

appellate court engages in a palpable error review, its focus is on what

happened and whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental and

unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 5

(Emphasis added). Or “[a] claim of palpable error presupposes a lack of

preservation and such claims are held to the standard described herein.” Id.

                                        16
(Emphasis added). It is strange indeed that having found the language

“substantial possibility of a different result” wanting, the Court would seek a

curative by creating an entirely separate class of palpable errors that have even

less evidentiary rigor than the original standard. After a properly contextualized

understanding of Martin I, we can conclude that the Court was only seeking to

clarify the singular manifest injustice standard in RCr 10.26; not create an

entirely new category of palpable error.

      As stated before, Martin II relied on our holdings in Johnson and Kingery.

Kingery does say “the right to a unanimous verdict is a substantial right; the

violation of which we have held requires reversal.” 396 S.W.3d 824, 831-32 (Ky.

2013). But Kingery cited to Miller v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 696 (Ky.

2009) for that statement. Miller, however, in concluding palpable error existed,

stated “that is not to say that every error in jury instructions rises to the level

of palpable error.” Id. at 696. Instead, prejudice is presumed, and the

Commonwealth may rebut that presumption to show no prejudice resulted

from the error. Id. Nonetheless, Johnson and Kingery have been read to support

the proposition that all that is necessary to reverse on a jury unanimity issue is

“the substantial nature of the unanimous-verdict right coupled with the due-

process impingement resulting from its violation.” Martin II, 456 S.W.3d at 9.

And Martin II clearly held that “even in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt”

the law still compelled reversal under that standard. Id. Such a review eschews

any consideration of “the strength of the evidence or the probability of a

different result,” and “the factual idiosyncrasies contemplated as part of the

                                         17
palpable-error analysis.” Id. Thus, despite ostensibly applying a palpable error

standard of review, we frankly admitted in King that such a review treats “this

instructional error, in certain instances, as structural error . . .” 554 S.W.3d at

355.

       At this point, it is worth noting that the federal appellate courts do not

consider jury unanimity errors as structural errors. United States v. Newell,

658 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Although we have concluded that the failure to

provide a specific unanimity instruction was error and violated the appellants'

right to a unanimous jury verdict, this alone is not sufficient to satisfy the

rigors of plain error review.”); United States v. Gaddy, 174 Fed.App’x. 123, 125

(3rd Cir. 2006) (unpreserved error for failure to give specific unanimity

instruction reviewed for plain error); United States v. Tragas, 727 F.3d 610,

616-17 (6th Cir. 2013) (assuming a jury instruction was erroneous for duplicity

and the error was plain, yet holding defendant could not satisfy third prong of

plain error analysis, “that the error affected her substantial rights”); United

States v. Arreola, 465 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Where a defendant fails

to object to an indictment as duplicitous before trial and fails to object to the

court's jury instructions at trial, we review for plain error[.]”); United States v.

Deason, 965 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2020) (unpreserved error for failure to

give an unanimity instruction to cure duplicitous indictment subject to plain

error analysis). Federal appellate cases are only persuasive authority but given

the Supreme Court has incorporated the unanimous jury requirement to the

states under the federal constitution, there is a strong incentive to align

                                         18
Kentucky law with the federal circuits.4 And because we can trace our

misalignment to a misreading of Martin I, there is an additional incentive to a

correct course. See Beaumont v. Zeru, 460 S.W.3d 904, 909 (Ky. 2015) (“The

doctrine of stare decisis does not commit us to the sanctification of ancient or

relatively recent fallacy.”) (internal quotation omitted). In fact, Martin I held “the

plain error test of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), [is] the federal

counterpart of RCr 10.26.” 207 S.W.3d at 3. And despite linguistic differences

between FRCP 52(b) and RCr 10.26, Martin I further declared the Supreme

Court’s explanation of FRCP 52(b) in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,

631-634 (2002), to be “a valuable guide in the application of our palpable error

rule.” Id. at 4.

       What Sexton implicitly began, we now explicitly finish. There is no

separate category of palpable error review for “errors so fundamental as to

threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law.” Martin I, 207 S.W.3d

at 3. Instead, that language is an explanation as to the “degree of prejudice”

that must be demonstrated in order for a court to determine there is a

“substantial possibility” a different result would have resulted but for the

unpreserved error. Id. In all cases presenting an unpreserved error regarding a

unanimous jury, the courts must “plumb the depths of the proceeding” and

scrutinize the factual idiosyncrasies of the individual case. Id. That includes a

       4 We emphasize this is an incentive only—"neither federal supremacy nor any

other principle of federal law requires that a state court's interpretation of federal law
give way to a (lower) federal court's interpretation.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364,
376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
                                            19
consideration of the weight of the evidence. Only if, upon review, a court can

conclude “the error is so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it

threatens the integrity of the judicial process,” will reversal be warranted. Id. at

5. ““It should be so egregious that it jumps off the page ... and cries out for

relief.” Chavies v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 313, 323 (Ky. 2012) (quoting

Alford v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 240, 251 (Ky. 2011) (Cunningham, J.,

concurring)). To the extent that Johnson, Kingery, Martin II, and King, can be

read to the contrary they are overruled.

      Having settled what the law is, we may now consider the facts of

Johnson’s case. Instruction No. 1 given to the jury reads,

         You will find the Defendant guilty of Burglary in the Third-Degree
      under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence
      beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
      A. That in this county on or about January 12, 2021, and before the
         finding of the Indicitment herein, he entered or remained in a building
         owned by Kenneth Dillihay without the permission of Kenneth
         Dillihay or any other person authorized to give such permission;
      AND
      B. That in so doing, he knew he did not have such permission;
      AND
      C. That he did so with the intention of committing a crime therein.
Instruction No. 3 is identical with the exception of Part A, which reads,

      A. That in this county on or about January 18, 2021, and before the
         finding of the Indictment herein, he entered or remained in a building
         owned by the Muhlenberg Alliance for Progress, Inc. without the
         permission of the Muhlenberg Alliance for Progress, Inc. or any other
         person authorized to give such permission;

                                        20
      This was a one-day trial and the evidence presented to prove these

crimes was straight-forward and simple. Johnson had an ankle-monitor

attached to his person and the GPS logs showed that Johnson was at the

properties on the respective dates mentioned in the instructions. Several tools

and other equipment from the Dillihay property were taken, including a miter

saw. Samantha Hall testified that she and Johnson drove to his mother’s

residence and left the items there. Law enforcement subsequently recovered the

miter saw from his mother’s residence. Finally, Hall’s testimony was that she

drove Johnson to the respective properties on the dates described in the

instructions. She testified she saw Johnson enter buildings to take tools and

specifically that he entered a greenhouse on the Dillihay property. She also

sent a photograph of said tools lying in the trunk of her car to a Sheriff’s

Deputy while she and Johnson were on the Dillihay property to inform him of

the thefts. She testified those tools in the photograph were taken from the

greenhouse. Mr. Dillihay testified that all the items stolen were located in the

high-tunnel greenhouse. For the Muhlenberg Alliance property, Hall testified

that she once again drove Johnson to the property and observed him enter

multiple buildings, leaving one building with gas jugs and another building

with milk cans. Trail camera photos from the Muhlenberg Alliance property

from January 18 showed Johnson stealing gas jugs. Those gas jugs were

subsequently recovered by law enforcement at Johnson’s residence.

      After reviewing this evidence, we conclude the instructional error here is

not “so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity

                                        21
of the judicial process.” Martin I, 207 S.W.3d at 5. Johnson was well aware of

the charges against him and the underlying facts that predicated those

charges. There is hardly any chance this evidence was confusing to the jury.

The GPS location evidence irrefutably placing Johnson at the properties on the

dates in question; the testimony of Hall that she saw Johnson enter buildings

on the properties on the dates in question; and the photographic and physical

evidence of items taken from the property and subsequently recovered either at

Johnson’s residence or his mother’s residence; and the fact that none of this

evidence is confusing nor complex, combine such that we cannot say that but

for the instructional error, there is a substantial possibility of a different result.

Therefore, there was no palpable error.

      C. Penalty Phase Errors
      Johnson alleges two errors that occurred during the penalty phase of the

trial. First, that Camron Laycock, the Circuit Court Clerk for Muhlenberg

County, testified about eight prior felony convictions for Johnson. One of these

was an indictment of theft by unlawful taking over $300 in 2007. That charge,

however, was amended to unauthorized use of a motor vehicle at the time of

conviction, typically a misdemeanor.5 The Order on A Plea of Guilty in that

case, included in Johnson’s briefing because of an apparent error in not

      5 The pertinent statute reads, “Unauthorized use of an automobile or other
propelled vehicle is a Class A misdemeanor unless the defendant has previously been
convicted of this offense, or of violation of KRS 514.030 for having stolen an
automobile or other propelled vehicle in which case it shall be a Class D felony.” KRS
514.100(2).

                                          22
making the document a part of the trial record, shows that Johnson’s plea of

guilty was as a Class A misdemeanor. Parole Office Fouse also testified about

Johnson’s probation and parole history, testifying to a litany of parole

violations and “charges.” Johnson identifies three instances of erroneous

testimony: (1) that he was charged with fleeing or evading the police, wanton

endangerment, and reckless driving but no mention subsequently of no

indictment returned on the wanton endangerment charge and the dismissal of

the reckless driving charge; (2) charged with first degree burglary but no

mention that it was subsequently amended to first degree criminal trespass;

and (3) charged and convicted with theft by unlawful taking “disposition or

auto”, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs,

aggravated third offense, with no mention that the actual conviction was for

attempted theft by unlawful taking of an automobile and operating a motor

vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs, aggravated, third offense.

      The Commonwealth has not argued for any of the above instances that

the testimony was in fact accurate. Under that circumstance, we have clearly

held, “[n]othing in KRS 532.055(2)(a) permits a jury to hear evidence during the

penalty phase of prior charges that have been amended . . . .” Blane v.

Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 140, 152 (Ky. 2012), abrogated on other grounds

by Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814, 828 (Ky. 2015). “[I]t is also well

settled that the Commonwealth cannot introduce evidence of charges that have

been dismissed or set aside.” Id. (quoting Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d

351, 365 (Ky. 2004)). Additionally, prior uncharged acts of misconduct are not

                                       23
admissible in the penalty phase. Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670 (Ky.

1991). But parole violations are admissible in the penalty phase. Garrison v.

Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 257, 260-61 (Ky. 2011).

      In Blane, we found the introduction of amended or dismissed charges to

be palpable error because “the Commonwealth not only elicited the testimony

from the deputy circuit clerk regarding the original charges, but it also

emphasized the prior amended charges in its closing argument to the jury.” Id.

Moreover, “Appellant received the maximum penalty on all counts for which he

was convicted.” Id. But we have not found palpable error where the maximum

sentence was not given and “the dismissed and amended offenses were never

pointed out to the jury by the trial judge, the Commonwealth, or the

Commonwealth's witness.” Chavies v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 103, 115

(Ky. 2011). We have also not found palpable error when, despite the maximum

sentence being given, “[i]n contrast to Blane, where there was testimonial or

argumentative reference to the originally charged, but later dismissed or

amended, offenses, in this case there is only the possibility that the jurors

might have gleaned that information if they looked at the judgments during

their deliberations.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Ky. 2013).

Finally, we have not found palpable error when evidence of prior uncharged

acts of misconduct was admitted but this was outweighed by “evidence of

Miller's three prior convictions on six counts of trafficking in a controlled

substance in the first degree, the fact that he had been granted and violated

parole on three separate occasions and evidence that he continued his illegal

                                        24
drug activity each time he was released on parole.” Miller v. Commonwealth,

394 S.W.3d 402, 408 (Ky. 2011).

      Here Johnson received the maximum sentence and direct testimony from

Laycock and Fouse was elicited regarding the erroneous and inaccurate

charges. The Commonwealth argues that Martin should be controlling because

that case distinguished Blane on account of the Commonwealth in Blane

emphasizing the erroneous charges in its closing argument. Id. at 348. In this

case though the Commonwealth did mention the 2007 conviction falsely

portrayed as a felony, along with the other accurately portrayed felony

convictions. The Commonwealth explicitly argued to the jury that “the time for

mercy is past” after reciting this history. Moreover, the dispositive factor in

Martin was not Commonwealth’s closing argument but rather that “the clerk

testified only to the actual charges for which a conviction was adjudged. There

was no mention of any dismissed charges or of the originally-charged higher

offenses that were amended to lesser offenses resulting in convictions.” Id. at

348. Consequently, we were “unable to ascertain from our review of the record

whether the jury actually saw the improper evidence; Appellant cites us to no

evidence that the exhibits went with the jury to the deliberation room, and our

viewing of the video record reveals none.” Id. But the decision of Miller that

inadmissible evidence can be outweighed by otherwise admissible evidence

precluding a finding of palpable error puts Johnson’s case in an awkward grey

zone. There is no doubt that there were several other qualifying felonies the

                                        25
jury might have relied upon to determine Johnson is a persistent felony

offender.

      The dispositive factor, the one which moves Johnson’s case out of the

grey zone, is the inclusion of the 2007 conviction in Instruction No. 3 of the

penalty phase as a qualifying felony offense. In Carver v. Commonwealth, we

reversed a first-degree PFO conviction because a misdemeanor charge was

listed in the instructions as a qualifying felony conviction. We stated

      We believe that palpable error occurred because of (1) the improper
      inclusion of a misdemeanor as a qualifying conviction in the PFO
      instruction; (2) our presumption that erroneous jury instructions
      are prejudicial, Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813, 818
      (Ky.2008); and (3) the fact that Carver was assessed the maximum
      possible penalty.

303 S.W.3d 110, 123 (Ky. 2010). Thus, because Johnson did receive the

maximum sentence; and there was direct testimony elicited from two persons

regarding four charges which either had been amended or dismissed prior to

final disposition; and the Commonwealth did mention the 2007 conviction

erroneously portrayed as a felony conviction to argue to the jury during the

penalty phase that “the time for mercy is past”; and, finally, because of the

erroneous inclusion of the misdemeanor conviction on the jury instruction as a

qualifying felony conviction, we hold there was palpable error. Therefore, we

vacate the conviction as a persistent felony offender and remand the case for a

new penalty phase with instructions that indictments or charges for felonious

crimes that were subsequently amended to misdemeanors or dismissed not be

mentioned, and specifically that the 2007 conviction in Muhlenberg Circuit

                                        26
Court for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is not a qualifying felony

conviction.6

      D. Greenhouse is a Building
      Finally, Johnson argues the trial court erred when it failed to give a

directed verdict on the third-degree burglary charge pertaining to Dilliahy’s

greenhouse. Johnson argues the greenhouse does not qualify as a building

under the statute because the “high tunnel” greenhouse is typically, in

agricultural pursuits, only a temporary structure. Additionally, he cites the

dilapidated state of the greenhouse because most of its plastic sheeting over

the roof and walls was missing. Dillihay testified, and Johnson concedes, the

greenhouse at the time of the burglary was being used “to store either livestock

or a variety of farm-related implements.”

      The standard of review on appeal of a denial for a motion for directed

verdict is well-established—"the test of a directed verdict is, if under the

evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt,

only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.” Eversole v.

Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 209, 217-18 (Ky. 2020). The interpretation of

statutes is a legal question reviewed de novo. Commonwealth v. Love, 334

S.W.3d 92, 93 (Ky. 2011).

      6   As a consequence of our decision, we do not think it necessary to consider
Johnson’s second allegation of error in the penalty phase that the Commonwealth
elicited false or misleading testimony regarding good time credits and Johnson’s
eligibility for parole should he receive a maximum sentence, enhanced by a persistent
felony offender conviction.
                                         27
      This argument is controlled by our ruling in Soto v. Commonwealth, 139

S.W.3d 827, 870 (Ky. 2004). We held the “ordinary meaning” of a building per

KRS 511.010(1) is

      A constructed edifice designed to stand more or less permanently,
      covering a space of land, usually covered by a roof and more or less
      completely enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling, storehouse,
      factory, shelter for animals or other useful structure—distinguished from
      structures not designed for occupancy (as fences or monuments) and
      from structures not intended for use in one place (as boats or trailers)
      even though subject to occupancy.

Id. (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English

Language Unabridged 292 (Merriam–Webster 1993)). We further reiterated that

the “statute applies to every structure that meets the definition of a building as

used in common parlance, without regard to whether it is inhabited or

inhabitable.” Id. (quoting Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476, 482–83 (Ky.

1992)).

      Dillihay testified that the greenhouse had been standing for

approximately five years, thus it was “more or less” permanent. It was being

used to store farm tools and house goats; thus, it was a “storehouse” and a

“shelter for animals.” Although the photographic evidence does show that the

plastic covering of the greenhouse was significantly missing, and we may

presume was not particularly effective at storing the tools or sheltering the

animals from the natural elements, we do not think that is a dispositive factor.

Habitability is not a factor in determining whether a structure is a building. Id.

The uncontroverted evidence was that the greenhouse had been standing for

approximately five years and tools were being stored in the greenhouse, as well

                                        28
as goats. It was a more or less permanent structure currently in use, however

ineffective, as a storehouse and shelter for animals. The motion for directed

verdict was properly denied.

                                 III. Conclusion
      For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Johnson’s convictions for

burglary in the third degree. We reverse his conviction as a persistent felony

offender. We remand to the Muhlenberg Circuit Court to conduct a new penalty

phase trial.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Lambert, and Nickell, JJ., concur.

Keller, J., concurs in part and concurs in result only in part, by separate

opinion in which Thompson, J., joins.

      KELLER, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND CONCURRING IN RESULT

ONLY IN PART: I wholeheartedly concur with the Majority’s well-written

Opinion that the alleged unanimity violation in this case does not rise to the

level of palpable error. For years, a majority of this Court had “continue[d] to

weaken the palpable error analysis” when it came to unanimity violations. King

v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 343, 366 (Ky. 2018) (Keller, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part). The Majority has put an end to that today, and

with that holding I am in full agreement. I concur with the Majority’s decision

to overrule, at least in part, Johnson v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.3d 439 (Ky.

2013), Kingrey v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 824 (Ky. 2013), Martin v.

Commonwealth, 456 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2015), and King, 554 S.W.3d 343. It is a

                                        29
decision which I have long awaited and for which I have spilled much ink

advocating.

      However, I write separately because, consistent with my oft-stated

position, I do not believe that the instructions given to the jury in this case

present a unanimity violation. See Justice v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.3d 407,

420–21 (Ky. 2021) (Keller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); King,

554 S.W.3d at 365–74 (Keller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);

Gartin v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-SC-0628-MR, 2021 WL 1133625, *4–5 (Ky.

Mar. 25, 2021) (Keller, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result only in

part). As Justice Cunningham stated in his dissent in part in Johnson

v. Commonwealth, the Majority of this Court is “requiring juries to be

unanimous on matters that the unanimous verdict requirement never

anticipated.” 405 S.W.3d at 461 (Cunningham, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

      Thompson, J., joins.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Aaron Reed Baker
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Jenna M. Lorence
Assistant Solicitor General

Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General

                                        30