Court Opinion

ID: 9897576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:20.741104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:53.750650
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0913-21

JUSTIN CHERRY,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TUCKERTON BOROUGH
POLICE DEPARTMENT,

     Defendant-Respondent.
________________________

                   Submitted November 10, 2022 – Decided November 13, 2023

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-1072-20.

                   Law Offices of Riley & Riley, attorneys for appellant
                   (Tracy L. Riley, on the brief).

                   Levin Shea Pfeffer & Goldman, PA, attorneys for
                   respondent (Ian M. Goldman, on the brief).

          The opinion of the court was delivered by

DeALMEIDA, J.A.D.
      Plaintiff Justin Cherry appeals from the October 25, 2021 judgment of the

Law Division affirming his termination as a sworn law enforcement officer with

defendant Tuckerton Borough Police Department (TPD). We affirm in part and

reverse in part.

                                      I.

      The following facts were found by the trial court.     Cherry began his

employment as a TPD police officer in 2005. In January 2009, Cherry assumed

responsibility as the K-9 officer for the department and purchased a dog named

Gunner. He had previously been suspended for insubordination.

      At about 9:19 p.m. on January 29, 2014, Cherry, while on duty with

Gunner, responded to a domestic dispute together with Corporal John Sanzari.

The officers encountered L.H. who advised them that W.T., his fifty-eight-year-

old former girlfriend, was visiting his apartment, but refused to leave when

asked.1 The officers mediated the dispute and convinced W.T. to leave the

apartment. She intended to return to her home in Barnegat Township.

      During the encounter, L.H. informed the officers that W.T.'s driver's

license had been revoked. Sanzari checked W.T.'s driving record and confirmed

1
  We identify the persons involved in the domestic dispute by their initials to
protect their confidentiality. R. 1:38-3(a)(12).
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                                      2
that she was on the revoked list. The officers advised W.T. that she could not

operate her vehicle and had to find another method of transportation home. W.T.

appeared to follow their instructions and headed toward a bus stop at the

entrance to the apartment complex.

      At 9:31 p.m., the officers cleared from the domestic dispute.      While

Sanzari returned to road patrol, Cherry remained in the area, suspecting W.T.

would return to her vehicle and drive home once she thought the officers were

gone. At 9:45 p.m., W.T. returned to her vehicle and drove it north on Route 9

toward Barnegat.

      Cherry followed W.T.'s vehicle in his patrol car. He pulled up behind

W.T. and activated his emergency lights and siren. His intent was to issue W.T.

a summons for a motor vehicle infraction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3-40, driving

while on the revoked list. A motor vehicle violation of this type would not

normally justify a vehicle pursuit under TPD policy.

      W.T. did not pull over and continued northbound on Route 9. She made

a sharp left onto Cable Avenue without signaling. W.T. then proceeded on Cable

Avenue into Little Egg Harbor Township, where she made an abrupt right onto

Railroad Avenue without stopping at a stop sign, and headed north. Cherry was

pursuing W.T. with his emergency lights and siren activated.

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      At 9:47 p.m., Cherry transmitted over the police radio that W.T. "blew"

the stop sign at Railroad Avenue and Parkertown Drive in Little Egg Harbor. In

response, Sanzari, who was road supervisor that evening, transmitted over the

radio, "Justin, we know it's her. I mean, I would just let her go. We'll just mail

it to her if we have to." Cherry responded, "[w]ell now I got eluding too." At

around 9:49 p.m., Cherry reported that he terminated the pursuit for safety

reasons. He deactivated the emergency lights and siren on his patrol vehicle but

continued to pursue W.T. at what he reported to be a safe distance.

      Cherry followed W.T. back to Route 9, where she turned northbound.

Cherry reported that at 9:50 p.m. he was "totally off her" and was slowly

following behind W.T.'s vehicle. Cherry followed W.T. through Eagleswood

Township and into Stafford Township.

      At 9:53 p.m., Stafford Township police, who had been alerted to the

pursuit, asked if they should lay down spike strips to disable W.T.'s vehicle.

Sanzari refused to approve the use of spike strips, telling Cherry, "She's going

home. I would wait 'til she gets home and have Barnegat pick her up." Cherry

advised Sanzari that he was following W.T. at a safe speed. A Stafford officer

also tried unsuccessfully to stop W.T.

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      At 9:59 p.m., Cherry reported that W.T. turned left onto West Bay Avenue

in Barnegat Township and immediately thereafter pulled into the parking lot of

the Barnegat Township police station. Two Barnegat Township police officers

who arrived almost immediately effectuated a stop of W.T. in the parking lot.

      W.T. initially resisted arrest by the two Barnegat Township officers, but

was eventually removed from her vehicle and placed face down on the ground.

A video recording confirmed that W.T.'s hands were in view and not underneath

her body. The Barnegat officers did not request Cherry's assistance or motion

to him to use Gunner to apprehend W.T.          Without giving a warning and

opportunity to stop resisting, as required when possible, by TPD's canine policy,

Cherry released Gunner on W.T. while she was on the ground. Gunner bit at

W.T.'s arm and back, although the dog did not cause physical injuries.

      For approximately twenty-eight seconds, Cherry stood by and did not call

the dog off W.T., although she was no longer resisting the officers. Cherry

called off Gunner only after a Barnegat Township officer said, "enough with the

dog." Contrary to TPD policy, Cherry did not take photographs of W.T. after

Gunner was removed from her.

      Cherry contacted an assistant prosecutor, who advised him to charge W.T.

with third-degree eluding and resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3).

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      Cherry subsequently filed police reports stating that he terminated his

pursuit of W.T. while in Little Egg Harbor Township, approximately 1.9 miles

from where he first attempted to stop her in Tuckerton. He reported that he did

not exceed the posted speed limit while pursuing W.T. In addition, Cherry

reported that when he released Gunner at the Barnegat police station W.T. posed

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers because she was resisting arrest

and it was unknown if she had a weapon. 2

      After an internal affairs investigation was opened by TPD, Cherry was

suspended with pay by order of the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office (OCPO),

which undertook its own investigation of the incident. Ultimately, Cherry was

suspended without pay after he was indicted by a grand jury on several criminal

counts. Ultimately, a superseding indictment charged Cherry with second-

degree official misconduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, for using Gunner to commit

simple assault on W.T. In May 2019, after a bench trial, the court acquitted

Cherry of the criminal charge.

      During the five years that the criminal charge was pending, TPD took no

action with respect to departmental discipline against Cherry for the events of

2
  W.T. subsequently pled guilty to third-degree eluding and resisting arrest,
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b).
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                                        6
January 29, 2014. After resolution of the criminal charge, the Chief of the TPD

personally conducted a disciplinary investigation. As part of his investigation,

the Chief reviewed the investigative files of the OCPO.

      On June 28, 2019, TPD served Cherry with a Preliminary Notice of

Disciplinary Action setting forth fifteen charges:

            Charge 1: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Vehicle
            Pursuit Policy . . . II. Policy: It shall be the policy of
            the [TPD] to limit vehicular pursuits by officers and to
            evaluate their decision to initiate a pursuit, or continue
            or terminate a pursuit based upon the risk posed to the
            public, the occupant(s) of the suspect vehicle and the
            police officer(s). When the risk of (sic) human life
            and/or property outweighs the benefits of capture,
            officers should refrain and/or disengage from pursuits.
            The threat of injury, death and property damages is
            borne by innocent bystanders, the peace officer
            involved in the pursuit, the fleeing driver and the
            occupant(s) of the escaping vehicle.

            Charge 2: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Vehicle
            Pursuit Policy . . . VI.A.4.a: an officer will immediately
            disengage any attempt to stop a violator for a motor
            vehicle violation. It further states that no officer shall
            make additional attempts to stop or reengage the
            vehicle while in motion, based on the original reason
            for the attempt to stop.

            Charge 3: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Vehicle
            Pursuit Policy . . . VI.A.3.d: Officers shall immediately
            terminate a pursuit when the pursuit enters into another
            jurisdiction and exceeds one mile into the neighboring
            jurisdiction.

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Charge 4: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Vehicle
Pursuit Policy . . . IX.A.3: Pursuing officer(s) will
terminate pursuit when the violator is identified and
failure to apprehend poses no immediate threat of death
or serious bodily injury to another person.

Charge 5: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Vehicle
Pursuit Policy . . . VIII.A.4: No pursuit shall be
conducted where the violator is known and poses no
immediate continuing threat to the safety of the public.

Charge 6: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Vehicle
Pursuit Policy . . . IX.A.9: Cherry continued to follow
the suspect vehicle after he was advised to disengage
by the [Officer In Charge].

Charge 7: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Canine
Policy and Procedures . . . III.C.3: It is imperative that
the handler fully understands that they may only use
that amount of force necessary to effectuate a lawful
arrest. Therefore the deployment of the police canine
to effectuate lawful arrests should only be considered
when the use of force would be justified in effectuating
the arrest.

Charge 8: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Canine
Policy and Procedures . . . III.D.4.c: Whenever
possible, the handler shall afford the suspect(s) the
opportunity to surrender by giving the following
warning announcement prior to releasing the K-9 for an
apprehension. "Police, you are under arrest. Stop or I
will release my dog."

Charge 9: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Canine
Policy and Procedures . . . III.D.4.f: The handler will
immediately advise the suspect to stop fighting and/or
resisting the K-9, and the handler will command the K-
9 to release.

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                            8
Charge 10: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Canine
Policy and Procedures . . . III.D.4.g: Once the suspect
has complied and submits to the arrest, the handler will
immediately command the K-9 to release the
apprehension and call the K-9 into a watch position.

Charge 11: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Canine
Policy and Procedures . . . . Complete documentation,
including photographs and explanation of the
circumstances surrounding the physical apprehension.

Charge 12: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Rules
and Regulations . . . 3:5.7 Truthfulness: Employees
shall not knowingly lie, give misleading information, or
falsify oral or written communications in any official
report when it is reasonable to expect that the
information may be relied upon because of the
employee's affiliation with this department.

Charge 13: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Rules
and Regulations . . . 3:5.7 Truthfulness: Employees
shall not knowingly lie, give misleading information, or
falsify oral or written communications in any official
report when it is reasonable to expect that the
information may be relied upon because of the
employee's affiliation with this department.

Charge 14: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Rules
and Regulations . . . 3:5.7 Truthfulness: Employees
shall not knowingly lie, give misleading information, or
falsify oral or written communications in any official
report when it is reasonable to expect that the
information may be relied upon because of the
employee's affiliation with this department.

Charge 15: Violation of Tuckerton Borough's Rules
and Regulations . . . 3:5.7 Truthfulness: Employees

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                           9
            shall not knowingly lie, give misleading information, or
            falsify oral or written communications in any official
            report when it is reasonable to expect that the
            information may be relied upon because of the
            employee's affiliation with this department.

      Cherry pled not guilty to the disciplinary charges. An independent hearing

officer held a hearing over ten days, at which various participants in the events

of January 29, 2014, testified, as did a traffic accident reconstruction expert,

trained on the Attorney General's vehicular pursuit guidelines. The expert

examined radio transmissions, the report created by the dispatching agency of

the times those transmissions were made, with accompanying notes, the records

of the officers involved, and traveled the route taken by Cherry as he pursued

W.T. The expert opined that Cherry had to have pursued W.T. at speeds greatly

in excess of those he reported in order to have traveled between the locations he

stated in his radio transmissions, given the times that those transmissions took

place. The expert opined that Cherry was averaging seventy-six miles per hour

during the pursuit, and had reached up to 103 miles per hour. He also opined

that the fact that Cherry turned off his emergency lights and siren, but continued

to follow W.T. at high speeds elevated the risk of the pursuit to the public and

that Cherry violated the TPD vehicle pursuit policy.

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                                       10
      The hearing officer issued a ninety-four-page written decision finding

Cherry guilty of all charges, relying in part on the hearing officer's finding that

the expert's testimony was credible. The hearing officer recommended Cherry's

termination. TPD adopted the recommendation and terminated Cherry.

      Cherry subsequently filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ in the

Law Division seeking a de novo review of the hearing officer's findings and his

termination.

      On October 25, 2021, after a review of the record compiled by the hearing

officer, the trial court issued a written opinion finding that: (1) with respect to

violations of the vehicle pursuit policy, TPD had proven by a preponderance of

the evidence charges 1, 2, 3, and 4; but not charge 6, and that charge 5 was

duplicative of charge 4; (2) with respect to violations of the canine policy, TPD

had proven by a preponderance of the evidence charges 7 through 11; and (3)

with respect to violations of the truthfulness policy, TPD had proven by a

preponderance of the evidence charges 12 through 14, and that charge 15 was

duplicative of charge 14. As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the

hearing officer as to all charges except 5, 6 and 15.

      The trial court found that the testimony of the accident reconstruction

expert was credible and that Cherry pursued W.T. at speeds in excess of seventy-

                                                                             A-0913-21
                                       11
six miles per hour at various points in the pursuit. The trial court based its

conclusion on its finding that there was "overwhelming" evidence that Cherry's

patrol car "could only have reached" the locations stated in the reports "if it was

travelling greatly in excess of" the thirty-five-mile-per-hour posted speed limit

on the roads Cherry travelled.

      The court rejected as lacking in credibility Cherry's testimony that he

never exceeded the speed limit or engaged in a high-speed pursuit of W.T., as

well as his claims that he was confused about the names of the streets in

neighboring municipalities when he completed his reports and had inadvertently

submitted draft reports, rendering those reports unreliable as evidence of the

speed at which he traveled.

      In addition, the trial court found that Cherry's written reports conflicted

with the independent reports of other police officers who participated in the

incident. For example, a Stafford Township officer who attempted to stop W.T.

in that municipality at 9:56 p.m., reported that he observed both the W.T. and

Cherry vehicles traveling at speeds in excess of 70 miles per hour and in a

reckless manner on Route 9 and that the lights and siren on Cherry's vehicle

were not activated. The Stafford officer reported that after he abandoned his

attempt to stop W.T., Cherry continued to follow her at high rates of speed. The

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                                       12
trial court concluded that in his reports Cherry misrepresented the circumstances

of the pursuit and the speed at which he pursued W.T. in order to justify his

behavior.

      In addition, the trial court concluded that despite Cherry's transmission

that he was abandoning the pursuit in Little Egg Harbor, approximately 1.9 miles

from the point that the pursuit began, he continued to pursue W.T. for a total of

thirteen miles through five municipalities to Barnegat Township. The trial court

concluded:

             Clearly, for whatever reason, Officer Cherry was not
             truthful in completing his report of this incident. The
             court finds by overwhelming evidence the pursuit of the
             [W.T.] vehicle was conducted at high vehicular speeds
             and was not consistent with the policy and guidelines
             imposed upon this officer relative to high[-]speed
             vehicular pursuits. The evidence presented to the
             hearing officer and reviewed by this court fully
             supports the conclusion that Cherry exhibited a lack of
             candor and truthfulness relative to the nature of this
             pursuit, the veracity of the reported vehicle speeds and
             the conflict with the reports filed by . . . Cherry. This
             charge is sustained by a preponderance of the evidence.

      The court concluded, however, that TPD did not prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that Cherry intentionally disobeyed a direct order from Sanzari

to terminate the pursuit. The court found that "[t]he nature of the interchange

between Cherry and Sanzari clearly did not rise to the level of a direct order ."

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                                       13
The court found that its conclusion on this point was corroborated by the direct

order Sanzari gave regarding the use of spike strips to stop W.T.'s vehicle.

      The trial court rejected Cherry's argument that he cannot be disciplined

for the pursuit because TPD did not conduct twice yearly training on the

department's vehicle pursuit policy. The court found that there was no dispute

that Cherry was aware that a pursuit was not authorized for a motor vehicle

offense and could be instituted where an officer reasonably believes a subject is

engaged in second-degree eluding that creates a risk of death or injury to any

person.

      The court also found that accepting Cherry's version of events, there is no

support for his contention that he reasonably believed W.T. was engaged in

second-degree eluding. Cherry reported that he followed W.T. at low speed

once he terminated the pursuit in Little Egg Harbor. In addition, the court found,

if it considered instead that W.T. was engaged in a high-speed pursuit of W.T.,

then Cherry's actions violated the pursuit policy because he did not terminate

the pursuit to avoid the risk of harm posed by the pursuit, given that he knew

W.T.'s identity and address and that she was likely heading home, where he or

Barnegat officers could apprehend W.T. that night or at a later date.

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                                       14
      With respect to Cherry's use of Gunner, the trial court found that the

evidence, including the video recording of W.T.'s arrest, established that Cherry

failed to give the warnings required by TPD's canine policy prior to releasing

Gunner, although he had an opportunity to do so. In addition, the court found

that Cherry released the dog when W.T. was face down on the ground and being

handcuffed by the Barnegat officers. The court found that Cherry allowed

Gunner to remain on W.T. for twenty-eight seconds while she was fully subdued

by the Barnegat officers. The court concluded,

            based upon the evidence and testimony presented below
            . . . the court finds credible that the use of the dog was
            in conflict with the policies and procedures adopted by
            the department, that . . . K-9 Officer Cherry was in
            violation of these rules when he failed to warn the
            suspect [W.T.] that he would release the dog unless she
            submitted to the arresting officers, and that the
            subsequent encounter, if not the direct cause of any
            personal injury was the direct cause of extreme
            emotional distress. As to the charges based upon a
            violation of the K-9 policies, this court must conclude
            that the charge has been proven by a preponderance of
            the evidence.

            In addition, the use of the dog for an extended period
            after the suspect no longer resisted the officers
            effectuating the arrest constituted an excessive and
            unnecessary use of force.

      As to Cherry's failure to take photographs of W.T., the court found that

although Cherry testified that he was unable to take photographs, the video

                                                                           A-0913-21
                                       15
recording depicts Cherry uttering an expletive to a Barnegat officer when he

discovered that the video recorder on a Barnegat police vehicle was recording

the event. The court found that Cherry was visibly upset when he was advised

that the recorder had captured the entire event and inferred from that reaction

that Cherry did not want the incident to be recorded.

      The trial court also found that Cherry's reports of the incident were false

and designed to portray his actions in a favorable light. The court concluded

that Cherry falsely described both the pursuit and the circumstances in which he

released Gunner at W.T.'s arrest.

      The trial court rejected Cherry's argument that the TPD Chief lacked the

authority to conduct the investigation. The court found that the Chief had the

authority to assign the investigation to any officer, including himself. The trial

court also found unconvincing Cherry's arguments that the Chief was precluded

from relying on the OCPO's investigation and that his investigation had a

predetermined outcome. The trial court also found no evidence of bias on the

part of the OCPO and rejected Cherry's argument that the hearing officer was

not impartial because her daughter was appointed as an OCPO Assistant

Prosecutor after the hearing had started or because her spouse was a retired

Superior Court Judge who sat in the Ocean vicinage.

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                                       16
      The trial court also agreed that termination was an appropriate sanction

for Cherry. The court reasoned that Cherry's violations of the pursuit policy

were serious in light of the history of calamitous results to innocent members of

the public as the result of high-speed police pursuits. In addition, the trial court

found that despite Cherry's acquittal on criminal charges arising from the release

of Gunner, there was clear evidence that he violated TPD's canine policy.

      The court found that the pursuit and canine policy violations, considered

alone, might warrant a lesser penalty than termination. However, the court

concluded, Cherry's falsifications in his reports about the incident "can only be

described as intended to obscure rather than disclose the truth." The court found

that "[o]nce the truthfulness of an officer is called into question in the

community, his ability to serve his . . . role in the criminal justice process is

seriously compromised." The court found that Cherry's "continued service as a

police officer has been substantially compromised by this conduct surrounding

this incident" and the "only appropriate discipline, in order to restore and

maintain public trust in the police department, is to regrettably terminate his

employment and to remove him as a police officer."

      An October 25, 2021 judgment memorializes the trial court's decision.

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                                        17
      This appeal follows. Cherry argues: (1) because the evidence reveals that

Cherry had a reasonable belief that W.T. was engaged in second-degree eluding,

and TPD's policy allows pursuits in such circumstances, charges 1 through 4

must be dismissed; (2) the TPD pursuit policy only prohibits the pursuit of a

stolen vehicle in certain circumstances, warranting dismissal of charges 1

through 4; (3) the accident reconstruction expert was not qualified to offer an

opinion on whether Cherry violated the TPD pursuit and canine policies; (4) the

trial court made conclusions with respect to charges 7 through 11 that are

contrary to the evidence in the record; (5) charges 12 through 14 are not

supported by the record because TPD produced no evidence Cherry knowingly

provided false information in his reports; (6) the absence of an independent

investigation by the TPD internal affairs unit and reliance on the OCPO's

investigation violated Attorney General guidelines and TPD's internal policy;

(7) the hearing officer precluded Cherry from challenging the adequacy of the

OCPO investigation; (8) the trial court precluded Cherry from supplementing

the record with evidence of bias; and (9) termination was an excessive sanction.

                                      II.

      Because the borough is a non-civil service jurisdiction, the statutory

framework for disciplinary proceedings against police officers is governed by

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                                      18
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 to -151. Ruroede v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 214

N.J. 338, 343 (2013). That statutory scheme requires TPD demonstrate "just

cause" for any suspension, termination, fine, or reduction in rank. Id. at 354

(quoting N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147). Just cause includes "incapacity, misconduct, or

disobedience or rules and regulations." N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147.

      The Supreme Court has recognized "misconduct" under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-

147 "need not be predicated on the violation of any particular department rule

or regulation," but may be based merely on the "implicit standard of good

behavior which devolves upon one who stands in the public eye as the upholder

of that which is morally and legally correct." In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 576

(1990) (quoting In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 140 (App. Div. 1960)).

Because "honesty, integrity, and truthfulness [are] essential traits for a law

enforcement officer," the Court has upheld termination where an officer acted

in a manner calling those principles into question. Ruroede, 214 N.J. at 362; see

also State v. Gismondi, 353 N.J. Super. 178, 185 (App. Div. 2002) ("[T]he

qualifications required to hold [a law enforcement] position require a high level

of honesty, integrity, sensitivity, and fairness in dealing with members of the

public.").

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                                      19
      Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150, a police officer convicted of any

disciplinary charge may seek review in the Superior Court. Ruroede, 214 N.J.

at 355. The trial court's review is de novo. Ibid. The court must conduct "an

independent, neutral, and unbiased" review of the disciplinary action, making

its own findings of fact and "reasonable conclusions based on a thorough review

of the record." Id. at 357 (quoting Phillips, 117 N.J. at 580). "Although a court

conducting a de novo review must give due deference to the conclusions drawn

by the original tribunal regarding credibility, those initial findings a re not

controlling." Ibid. (quoting Phillips, 117 N.J. at 579).

      We exercise a "limited" role in our review of the de novo proceeding.

Phillips, 117 N.J. at 579. "[W]e must ensure there is 'a residuum of legal and

competent evidence in the record to support'" the court's decision. Ruroede, 214

N.J. at 359 (quoting Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972)). "The residuum

rule does not require that each fact be based on a residuum of legal and

competent evidence but rather focuses on the ultimate finding or findings of

material fact." Ibid. We do not make new factual findings, but merely "decide

whether there was adequate evidence before the . . . [c]ourt to justify its finding

of guilt." Phillips, 117 N.J. at 579 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161

(1964)).

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                                       20
      The court's de novo findings should not be disturbed, absent a finding that

"the decision below was 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable' or '[un]supported

by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ibid. (quoting Henry

v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 580 (1963)). However, we review the trial

court's legal conclusions de novo.     Cosme v. Borough of E. Newark Twp.

Comm., 304 N.J. Super. 191, 203 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Manalapan Realty,

L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

      We have carefully reviewed the record in light of these principles and

conclude that there is substantial credible evidence in the record supporting the

trial court's determination that TPD established that Cherry committed charges

1, 4 and 7 through 14. We conclude, however, that there is insufficient evidence

in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that TPD established Cherry

committed charges 2 and 3.

      We begin with the two charges we find are not supported by the record.

Charges 2 and 3 are based on Section VI of the TPD vehicle pursuit policy.

Section VI of the policy provides, in relevant part:

            A.     Tuckerton police officers in a police vehicle may
            initiate a pursuit when the following criteria are met:

            ....

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                                       21
2.    When the officer reasonably believes that the
violator has committed one of the second[-]degree
offenses listed below:

....

f)    Eluding pursuant to the provisions of 2C:29-2b
where the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of
death or injury in any person . . . .

....

3.    Pursuits for stolen vehicles shall be restricted.
Officers shall immediately terminate the pursuit when;

a)     The identity of the violator is known

b)     The violator's operation of the stolen vehicle is
such that the violator is substantially increasing the
likelihood of collision with another vehicle or
pedestrian

c)     It is evident that the violator will not stop

d)   The pursuit enters into another jurisdiction and
exceeds one mile into the neighboring jurisdiction.

e)     The pursuing officer is the only officer on duty,
the officer shall not exceed outside the boarders [sic] of
the borough.

4.    When the pursuit is for the sole offense of a
stolen vehicle and where the violator may flee onto a
dead[-]end or cul-de-sac area, officers will not pursue
the violator down the roadway. Officers shall consider
the violator is attempting to escape, and where
permitted to do so on foot there are other resources and
options available (I.E. Canines, Perimeters, Area

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                            22
            Searches). Where the majority of dead[-]end streets
            and cul-de-sac areas within the borough are surrounded
            by water and/or wooded areas, the violator shall be
            afforded an opportunity to abandon the vehicle.
            Therefore officers shall;

                  a)     When an officer makes an attempt to stop
            a violator for a motor vehicle violation utilizing the
            emergency lighting and audible warning device of the
            patrol car and where the violator willfully ignores the
            signals accelerating as to elude the attempt to stop,
            officer will immediately disengage the attempt. No
            officer shall make additional attempts to stop or
            reengage the vehicle while in motion, based on the
            original reason for the attempt to stop. Officers shall
            conduct an investigation as to pursue criminal and
            motor vehicle charges against the violator.

      Charge 2 was based on Section VI.A.4.a. The specification for the charge

states that after W.T. willfully ignored Cherry's attempt to stop her with his

emergency lights and siren, he failed to stop the pursuit. The plain language of

Section VI.A.4.a, however, applies only where the pursuit is for the sole offense

of a stolen vehicle. There is no evidence in the record that W.T. stole the vehicle

she was driving during the pursuit. Thus, the directive in VI.A.4.a, which

appears to be intended to give suspects an opportunity to abandon stolen vehicles

in order to reduce the risk to public safety from a vehicle pursuit, does not apply

to the events of January 29, 2014.

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      Charge 3 was based on Section VI.A.3.d. The plain language of that

provision also applies only to the pursuit of stolen vehicles. It is, therefore, not

applicable to the January 29, 2014 incident.

      We find sufficient credible evidence in the record for the trial court's

conclusion that TPD established charges 1 and 4 arising from Cherry's violation

of the TPD vehicle pursuit policy. Those charges are based on Cherry's failure

to terminate the pursuit, based on the risk it posed to W.T., himself, and innocent

members of the public. Even if Cherry believed W.T. was engaged in second-

degree eluding, a supposition contradicted by Cherry's reports which stated that

he was following W.T. at a safe distance at thirty-five miles per hour, the

credible evidence established that Cherry was engaged in a high-speed pursuit,

exceeding seventy-six miles per hour, at times with no emergency lights and

siren, for thirteen miles through five municipalities. Yet, it is undisputed that

he knew the identity of the driver and where she lived and suspected that she

was heading home.

      The only dangerous activity in which W.T. engaged during the pursuit was

as a result of the pursuit. Presumably, had Cherry ended the pursuit, W.T. would

have had no incentive to drive recklessly for the remainder of her trip home to

Barnegat, where Cherry or a Barnegat officer could have served her with a

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                                        24
summons for eluding or motor vehicle violations without further endangering

the public. As the trial court aptly found, the fact that Cherry misrepresented

the circumstances of the pursuit, making it appear that it posed less of a threat

to the public than is actually did, corroborates the conclusion that Cherry

engaged in a high-speed pursuit he knew was not justified. Cherry violated the

vehicle pursuit policy provisions applicable to all pursuits that require an officer

to terminate a pursuit when the danger to the public outweighs the need to

immediately apprehend the offender.

      We find sufficient support in the record for the trial court's decision

affirming charges 7 through 11 relating to the TPD canine policy. The record

demonstrates that Cherry used more force than necessary to subdue W.T., who

was face down on the ground with her hands visible and being arrested by

Barnegat officers when he released Gunner. The Barnegat officers, whom the

trial court found looked surprised when the dog subdued W.T., did not ask

Cherry to release Gunner. In addition, the video recording demonstrates that

Cherry had an opportunity to warn W.T. that he was going to release Gunner

and to stop resisting, but failed to do so. In addition, there is sufficient evidence

in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that Cherry failed to cal l

Gunner off W.T. for a longer period than necessary, given that W.T. was no

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                                        25
longer resisting arrest by the Barnegat officers. We reach the same conclusion

with respect to the trial court's finding that Cherry failed to take photographs of

W.T. because he did not want to document the event.

      The record also supports the trial court's findings regarding charges 12

through 14. The trial court found that Cherry made material misrepresentations

in his reports concerning his termination of the pursuit, the speed at which he

pursued W.T. and the need to release Gunner at W.T.'s arrest. Each of those

findings is based on substantial credible evidence in the record.

      We have carefully considered Cherry's remaining arguments concerning

the investigation, independent hearing officer, trial court proceedings, and

evidentiary support for the sustained charges, and conclude they lack sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      We also affirm the sanction imposed on Cherry. Progressive discipline

"generally requires a progression of steps to address the employee's deficiencies

before removal." Klusaritz v. Cape May Cnty., 387 N.J. Super. 305, 312 (App.

Div. 2006). While an officer's past record cannot prove a current charge based

on habitual misconduct, it may present "guidance in determining the appropriate

penalty for the current specific offense." In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 484 (2007)

(quoting Town of W. New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500, 522-23 (1962)).

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Progressive discipline is not necessary, however, "when the misconduct is

severe, when it is unbecoming to the employee's position or renders the

employee unsuitable for continuation in the position, or when application of the

principle would be contrary to the public interest." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J.

182, 197 (2011) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 33 (2007)).

      To determine whether a disciplinary action is appropriate, we assess

whether the "punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the

circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." Herrmann, 192 N.J.

at 28-29 (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). Our Supreme Court has

warned "courts should take care not to substitute their own views of whether a

particular penalty is correct for those of the body charged with making that

decision." Carter, 191 N.J. at 486.

      Courts routinely eschew progressive discipline and terminate police

officers for severe misconduct. See, e.g., Ruroede, 214 N.J. at 362-63 (positing

termination appropriate for police officer who displayed a weapon during an off-

duty altercation and made dishonest and "inconsistent statements during the

course of the internal affairs investigation"); McElwee v. Borough of

Fieldsboro, 400 N.J. Super. 388, 397 (App. Div. 2008) (finding progressive

discipline "need not be imposed" for officer's continued refusal to patrol as

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                                       27
instructed); Cosme, 304 N.J. Super. at 207 (holding termination warranted for

officer who took unauthorized vacation). Further, actions "that subvert good

order and discipline in a police department 'constitute conduct so unbecoming a

police officer as to warrant dismissal.'" Herrmann, 192 N.J. 35 (quoting Cosme,

304 N.J. Super. at 205-06).

      In considering whether the imposed penalty is appropriate, we note police

officers are "constantly called upon to exercise tact, restraint and good judgment

in [their] relationship with the public" and "must present an image of personal

integrity and dependability in order to have the respect of the public." Twp. of

Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965). Police

officers are held to a higher standard as "one of the obligations [they undertake]

upon voluntary entry into the police service." Phillips, 117 N.J. at 577 (quoting

Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. at 142).

      Despite the fact that we reverse the trial court with respect to two of the

disciplinary charges, we find sufficient support in the record for the sanction

imposed. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that Cherry engaged

in a high-speed pursuit for thirteen miles through five municipalities that he

should have terminated because of the threat it posed to public safety. In

addition, at the conclusion of the pursuit, Cherry released a canine on a suspect

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                                       28
that was face down on the ground with visible hands and being arrested by two

officers. The seriousness of Cherry's infractions were magnified by his failure

to properly document the use of the dog and the numerous misrepresentations

he made in his reports of the incident intended to obscure the true circumstances

of the pursuit, which Cherry likely knew was not justified. Even though two of

the charges related to the pursuit have been reversed, the charges relating to his

dishonesty have not. The record contains sufficient evidence establishing that

Cherry's position of trust as a police officer has been irreparably harmed by his

dishonesty, warranting his termination.

      The October 25, 2021 judgment is affirmed in all respects, apart from the

trial court's decisions to uphold charges 2 and 3, which are reversed.

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                                       29