Court Opinion

ID: 9468534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:16:59.446105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:54.425409
License: Public Domain

HENLEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
While I concur in the majority’s affirmance of Petschen’s conviction, I would affirm as well the conviction of Knotts.
First, it is not clear that monitoring a beeper which only broadcasts location is a “search,” as opposed to a mere visual aid such as binoculars, search lights, or trained dogs. See United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1196 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1978). Assuming, however, that monitoring the beeper in this case was a search, and further assuming that Knotts had standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge, the issue becomes whether *519Knotts had a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in the location of the barrel of chloroform on his property.
As the majority notes, the cases are inconsistent in this area, in terms of both result and analysis. One analysis focuses on the location of the item containing the beeper. Under this analysis, items may generally be monitored in public places, e. g., United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Bobisink v. United States, 435 U.S. 926, 97 S.Ct. 533, 50 L.Ed.2d 614 (1978), but monitoring may be prohibited after the items are withdrawn from public view, e. g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980). Another analysis focuses on the nature of the item containing the beeper. Under this analysis, contraband items may be monitored regardless of location, e. g., United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976), whereas most noneontraband items may be monitored under the former analysis only if they are in a public location, e. g., United States v. Moore, supra. Cf. United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846, 97 S.Ct. 129, 50 L.Ed.2d 118 (1976) (beeper placed in television received in exchange for heroin). The rationale underlying the “contraband exception” is that one cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in ‘‘property which he has no right to possess,” United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d at 889-90, or in property which is a direct part of a negotiated illegal transaction. United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d at 863.
The facts in this case arguably support Knotts’ conviction under either analysis. As the majority observes in note 3, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 350-51 (10th Cir. 1978), apparently suggested that one does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a clandestine laboratory. See United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d at 1195-96 n.11. The facts in this case indicate that the beeper led agents to a clandestine laboratory on Knotts’ property.
A more persuasive argument may be made in support of Knotts’ conviction, however, pursuant to the second analysis. Under this approach, the issue as stated in United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d at 944, is whether the contraband exception should be expanded to include precursor chemicals such as the chloroform in the present case. The majority concludes that such an expansion “would be a limitless expansion of police power [allowing] warrantless tracking of lawful goods wherever an illicit use was suspected.” The majority’s concern with limitless police power is certainly a valid one, and the distinction between contraband and noncontraband may be convenient. Nevertheless, such an inflexible rule might prohibit a true determination of the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy in items intended for use in the illegal manufacture of controlled substances.
The rationale and policy considerations underlying the contraband exception can safely be applied to certain non-contraband items. For example, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Perez, supra, suggested in dictum that “a person who accepts an item of personal property in exchange for heroin has no reasonable expectation that it is cleansed of any device designed to uncover the tainted transaction or identify the parties.” Id. at 863. See United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d at 944; United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d at 111. If society would not legitimize an individual’s expectation of privacy in a television received in exchange for heroin, it seems that an expectation of privacy in the location of chemicals intended for use in the manufacture of illegal drugs should enjoy no higher status, and that when chemicals are purchased for such intended illegal use, the familiar warning cited by the majority in note 2, caveat emptor, might be well-taken.
The majority express a concern that expansion of the contraband exception would result in unbridled use of electronic devices to track legally possessed items based on a mere suspicion that such items are destined for illegal use. Such a result is certainly to be avoided, but it is not the necessary consequence of refusing to legitimize an expectation of privacy in precursor chemicals. *520One aspect apparently not considered' by the courts is the effect of the forfeiture provision of the Controlled Substances Act on an individual’s possessory interest in precursor chemicals. 21 U.S.C. § 881. Subsection (a)(2) provides for the forfeiture of “[a]ll raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, [or] processing . . . any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.” Although the forfeiture provision does not make possession of precursor chemicals illegal per se, it clearly affects the right to possess such chemicals, and diminishes one’s legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to these items.
Furthermore, in the circumstances of this case, the expansion of the contraband exception to include precursor chemicals subject to forfeiture would not allow the government to act on mere suspicion. From the moment Armstrong loaded the beeper-laden drum of chloroform into his automobile, that chloroform became dedicated to use in the very illegal conspiracy of which defendants were convicted and, so dedicated, that chloroform immediately became subject to forfeiture. Although the government agents did not at that time know all of the persons who might be engaged in the illicit operation, they had probable cause to believe that the chloroform was intended for illegal use, as indeed it was.1 Thus, I conclude that Knotts had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the location of the chloroform that was violated by monitoring the beeper.
As indicated, I concur in the affirmance of the conviction of Petschen; I dissent from the reversal of the conviction of Knotts.

. Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) and (b) warrantless seizure of the chloroform on probable cause was authorized and where such a seizure is authorized attendant warrantless search of the vehicle containing the forfeitable material is permissible. United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979), citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1966).