Court Opinion

ID: 9567542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:55:11.863234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:39.755200
License: Public Domain

JACOBSON, Presiding Judge,
specially concurring:
I agree that this matter must again be remanded for resentencing. However, in my opinion, this result is only mandated because of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Mahler, 128 Ariz. 429, 626 P.2d 593 (1981). In Mahler, the court stated:
Subsection C [of A.R.S. § 13-702] directs that a lower or upper term other than the presumptive sentence may be imposed only if the circumstances in aggravation or mitigation are found to be true by the trial judge, and factual findings and reasons in support of the findings must be set forth on the record at the time of sentencing. A plea agreement cannot be substituted for the requirements of the statute, (emphasis in original)
128 Ariz. at 431, 626 P.2d at 595. Obviously here, the trial judge did not comply with this requirement. However, the circumstances of this case highlight the inflexibility and “justice by rote” aspects of this rule. In this case, the trial judge was originally of the opinion that the agreed-upon sentence was too harsh. The Supreme Court, by special action, in essence informed the trial judge that it must either accept the agreed-to sentence or allow the state to withdraw from the plea agreement.
On remand to the same trial judge, both parties agreed to proceed with the plea agreement, including the stipulated sentence which exceeded the presumptive term. Under the “you must find aggravating circumstances” rationale of Mahler, the trial court was placed in the dilemma of either being intellectually dishonest (he originally being of the opinion that aggravating circumstances did not exist), or rejecting the plea agreement and forcing the parties to a trial which neither desired.
In my opinion, A.R.S. § 13-702 does not require this anomaly. It appears that one of the basic purposes to be served by the legislative presumptive sentencing structure is to assure, as much as possible, equality in sentencing and avoid the social and mental problems associated with disparate sentences under an indeterminate sentencing structure. The statutory requirement that the judge make specific findings if something other than the presumptive term is assessed furthers that “equality in sentencing” goal by requiring the judge to focus in on those aspects of the defendant’s case which would set the defendant apart from the norm.
While presumptive sentencing is a benefit both for the public (to assure a minimum punishment) and for the defendant (to avoid arbitrary treatment), both of these interests are represented in the courtroom by the signators to the plea agreement. *414The ultimate arbiter of the results of the negotiations of the representatives of these interests is the trial judge who has the power to approve or reject the agreement.
However, once having placed its stamp of approval on the agreement, to require the trial court to further justify that approval where the sentence is other than the presumptive in terms of “mitigation” or “aggravation” under A.R.S. § 13-702(D) and (E) is to ignore the realities of plea negotiations which culminate in agreed-to sentences.
Agreed-to sentences may have no or little relationship to the particular defendant or the circumstances of the crime to which he is pleading guilty. Usually such negotiated sentences are based upon factors unrelated to those listed in A.R.S. § 13-702(D) and (E). From the state’s standpoint, such factors might include the unavailability or lack of credibility of a key witness which mitigates in favor of a term less than the presumptive sentence. From the defendant’s standpoint, such factors might include the dropping of more serious charges, the pleading to a lesser serious charge or obtaining an agreement on site of incarceration which justify a willingness to accept more than the presumptive term.
In my opinion, a trial court may properly consider these factors in determining the “justness” of a plea agreement containing an agreed-to sentence other than the presumptive term. However, none of these factors are listed in A.R.S. § 13-702(D) (aggravating circumstances) or (E) (mitigating circumstances).
In my opinion, locking prosecutors, defense counsel and trial courts into the straitjacket of A.R.S. § 13-702 when negotiating agreed-to sentences other than the presumptive serves neither the purpose of presumptive sentencing nor the ends of justice.
Except for the dictates of State v. Mahler, supra, I would affirm the sentence in this case.