Court Opinion

ID: 9494554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:40:11.497609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:28.072574
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I conclude that the district court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, I dissent. The appeal should be dismissed.
To retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, a district court must either include a “separate provision [in the order of dismissal] (such as a provision ‘retaining jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement) or ... incorporate] the terms of the settlement agreement in the [dismissal] order.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). In this case, the majority argues that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement because it included a provision in its order of dismissal “ ‘retaining jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement.” Id.
The order of dismissal states:
IT IS ORDERED that the docket be marked, “settled and dismissed with prejudice.”
FURTHER, [a]ny subsequent order setting forth different terms and conditions relative to the settlement and dismissal of the within action shall supersede the within order.
By its plain meaning, the order gives the court the authority to alter the terms of the settlement agreement not the authority to enforce it. If the court wanted to retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, it could easily have so stated in the order. This appears clear on the face of the order.
But to the majority, a court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a settlement agreement if its order of dismissal contains “some sort of indication that the court has retained jurisdiction.” Thus, the majority appears to argue that a partial reservation of jurisdiction by the district court in its *651dismissal order really operates as a total reservation of jurisdiction. For example, apparently the majority would hold that a district court’s reservation of jurisdiction in a dismissal order over a settlement agreement for ninety days is actually a reservation of jurisdiction for an indefinite period of time or that a district court’s reservation of jurisdiction in a dismissal order over one provision in a settlement agreement is really a reservation of jurisdiction over the whole agreement. In other words, the district court’s dismissal order in this case does not mean what it clearly says but, instead, means what this court thinks it should have said.
I cannot accept this approach, nor is it consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The Court, reminding us that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, held in Kokkonen that there is a presumption against a determination of federal jurisdiction and that federal court jurisdiction should “not be expanded by judicial decree.” 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673. It further held that, while a district court may reserve jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, it must do so in its dismissal order. Id. at 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673. The majority opinion is contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kokkonen because it disregards the presumption against federal jurisdiction and expands the district court’s jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement beyond the plain meaning of the dismissal order.
The majority’s approach is also inconsistent with our own precedent. In McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir.2000), we held, citing our earlier decision in Caudill v. North American Media Corp., 200 F.3d 914 (6th Cir.2000), that we had “joined other circuits in strictly applying the holding in Kokkonen.” The majority argues that our previous rulings in McAlpin and Caudill are not binding because they address the scope of Kokkonen’s second basis for a court’s ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement-incorporation of the settlement agreement’s terms in the dismissal order-and not the first basis: the inclusion of a “provision ‘retaining jurisdiction’ over the settlement agreement” in the dismissal order. 511 U.S. at 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673.
I do not see, and the majority does not explain, why this distinction is meaningful. We have construed ancillary jurisdiction under Kokkonen narrowly because, as I stated, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. McAlpin 229 F.3d at 501 (quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673). This reasoning applies with equal force regardless of whether the district court incorporates the settlement agreement in the order of dismissal or includes a provision in the dismissal order reserving jurisdiction. If the majority opinion has not created a conflict among holdings in this circuit, it has created a conflict in the reasoning of its opinions.
Moreover, the holding in one of our earlier decisions is especially relevant to this case. In McAlpin, we outlined the contours of the second basis for a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement. We held that a “district court’s incorporation in its dismissal order of only one term of the Settlement Agreement ... is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the entire agreement.” 229 F.3d at 502 (emphasis added). It is true that in this case we are addressing the first basis for ancillary jurisdiction under Kokkonen and not the second. Yet we are really deciding the same issue: whether a partial reservation of jurisdiction over the enforcement of a settlement agreement really acts as a complete reservation. In its reliance upon a narrow distinction, the majority has eclipsed our ruling in McAl-*652pin and created an unnecessary conflict in our rulings.
The majority relies upon cases from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits when it argues that a district judge need not employ formulaic language in a dismissal order to retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement. I agree. But the majority goes well beyond this. It seeks to divine the district court’s intent different from the plain language of the order when there is no evidence of that intent contemporaneous to the dismissal order. It may be (although I have considerable doubt) that a look beyond the language of the dismissal order to the assumed district judge’s intent would be appropriate if the dismissal order were ambiguous and if there was strong circumstantial evidence at the time of the order that a district judge did, indeed, have a certain intent. But such is not the case here. The dismissal order’s language is unambiguous and there is no such circumstantial evidence. To the extent the cases of our sister circuits cited by the majority are inconsistent with this view, I would disregard them.
Federal jurisdiction is a precise doctrine. It does not exist here. I would rely upon the reasoning in Kokkonen and our own case law and hold that the district court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. RE/MAX should have brought a separate claim in state court.