Court Opinion

ID: 9736606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:00:54.485186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:07.531686
License: Public Domain

Ciparick, J.
(dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that plaintiffs’ challenge to the one year/six month rule has been rendered moot. However, because I believe that the Commissioner’s imposition of a “legal presence” requirement in order to be eligible for a driver’s license was outside the scope of his authority and, in any event, violated the State Administrative Procedure Act, I respectfully dissent.
Under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, an applicant for a driver’s license “shall furnish such proof of identity, age, and fitness as may be required by the commissioner . . . [T]he commissioner also shall require that the applicant provide his or her social security number” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 502 [1]). Similar requirements are in place for non-driver identification card (NDID) applicants (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 490 [3]). The Commissioner has the authority to promulgate regulations in furtherance of these requirements (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 508 [4]). As relevant here, in order to obtain or renew a driver’s license or NDID, the applicant “must submit his or her social security number or provide proof that he/she is not eligible for a social security number” (15 NYCRR 3.9 [a]). The failure to provide a Social Security number (SSN) or proof of ineligibility will result in disqualification from procuring or renewing a license or NDID (see 15 NYCRR 3.9 [b]).
The DMV has developed new procedures regarding proof of identity, date of birth and ineligibility for a Social Security number which, in effect, impose an additional requirement on applicants — “legal presence,” or proof consistent with lawful presence in the United States. An internal document dated April 19, 2002 known as a “Mailbag,” states that
“[Requiring proof of date of birth documentation is the single most important tool for preventing applicants, who do not have legal presence, from obtaining NYS driving privileges or NYS photo docu*623ments . . . [T]he only legitimate document that (s)he can present as proof of date of birth is [a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)] document.”1
As proof of ineligibility for a SSN, the DMV under the old scheme would accept a form issued by the Social Security Administration (SSA), the SSA-L676, that lists several reasons why a person may be ineligible for a SSN, including that the individual has not produced the necessary documentation to establish identity or citizenship/lawful alien status. Recent internal DMV documents indicate that it will only accept a letter of ineligibility issued because the applicant’s “[DHS] documents show that [he or she does] not have work authorization and . . . [has] not provided a current valid non-work reason and supporting documentation for needing a social security number or replacement card.” In addition, DMV now requires applicants to provide current DHS documents in support of the ineligibility determination.
According to the Commissioner, these types of requirements are within his statutory authority. In particular, the Commissioner notes that it is important to be able to determine an applicant’s identity so that licenses and NDIDs are not used for fraudulent or criminal purposes. Moreover, the Commissioner asserts that the SSA-L676 form can be easily forged and that requiring current DHS documentation provides additional security since those documents can now be verified through the online SAVE (Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements) system made available to the DMV through DHS.
Contrary to the Commissioner’s argument, it seems that the DMV has effectively added a requirement for license eligibility not authorized by statute. Through this policy the Commissioner is effectively setting immigration policy — an act well outside the scope of his authority — in the guise of verifying identity, which is clearly within his powers. “ ‘Even under the broadest and most open-ended of statutory mandates, an administrative agency may not use its authority as a license to correct whatever societal evils it perceives’ ” (Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Serio, 100 NY2d 854, 865 [2003], quoting Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d 1, 9 [1987]).
*624In Matter of Jones v Berman (37 NY2d 42, 52-53 [1975]), the Court held that although the Social Services Commissioner may have promulgated a regulation in order to prevent fraud, the regulation imposed a requirement that was not found in the statute. “Administrative agencies can only promulgate rules to further the implementation of the law as it exists; they have no authority to create a rule out of harmony with the statute” (Jones, 37 NY2d at 53).
I do not dispute that fraud prevention is an important public purpose. However, as the trial court found, “evidence in the record indicates that DMV’s primary motivation has little to do with the identity of the applicants and more to do with national security issues” (2005 NY Slip Op 30091[U], at *10). If policy procedures requiring lawful presence in this country are to be implemented before the issuance of a driver’s license or a non-driver identification card, they should be implemented by the Legislature rather than the Motor Vehicles Commissioner. The Commissioner simply has not been vested with the authority to determine immigration or national security policies.2
But even assuming the Commissioner’s authority is as broad as the majority implies and that the Commissioner is authorized to act in this regard, the requirement imposed is a rule in violation of State Administrative Procedure Act and the State Constitution. The Constitution provides that “[n]o rule or regulation made by any state department, board, bureau, officer, authority or commission, except such as relates to the organization or internal management of a state department, board, bureau, authority or commission shall be effective until it is filed in the office of the department of state” (NY Const, art IV § 8). In addition, under the State Administrative Procedure Act, “no rule shall become effective until it is filed with the secre*625tary of state . . . (State Administrative Procedure Act § 203 [1]; see also § 202 [1] [requiring notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunity for public comment]; Executive Law § 102 [1] [a].) We have previously held “that only a fixed, general principle to be applied by an administrative agency without regard to other facts and circumstances relevant to the regulatory scheme of the statute it administers constitutes a rule or regulation” (Matter of Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v New York State Dept. of Health, 66 NY2d 948, 951 [1985]).
Here, the legal presence requirement is applied rigidly and without consideration for the circumstances of individual applicants (see Matter of Schwartfigure v Hartnett, 83 NY2d 296, 301-302 [1994]). The record does not support DMV’s assertion that its supervisors have the ability to make exceptions to this policy. Nor can the policy be deemed to relate to the “internal management” of the agency such that it would be excluded from the filing requirement under the State Constitution (see NY Const, art IV, § 8). Instead, it applies only externally, to persons seeking licenses or identification cards.
Certainly, the requirement to submit homeland security documents proving lawful presence in the United States constitutes “a fixed, general principle,” as it has become a prerequisite for obtaining a license or NDID that is contained neither in the statute nor in existing regulations. Thus, the Commissioner is not merely interpreting the statute or filling in the interstices (see Matter of Medical Socy., 100 NY2d at 866), but is rulemaking without the requisite filing and notice to the public in violation of the State Administrative Procedure Act. Those applicants who cannot adequately establish their lawful presence in the United States will not be issued a driver’s license or NDID in New York. The Commissioner’s argument that this is not “a fixed, general principle” due to the evolving nature of what is considered acceptable identification documentation is unconvincing. Those who are unable to satisfy the documentation requirements are foreclosed from obtaining a license or NDID, a result that is clearly not mandated by statute or duly promulgated existing regulations.
As a result, I would modify the order of the Appellate Division by granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction to the extent that the Commissioner should be enjoined from imposing a legal presence requirement by requiring the production of DHS documents as a condition precedent to the issuance or renewal of a driver’s license, learner’s permit or NDID.
*626Judges Graffeo, Read, Pigott and Jones concur with Judge Smith; Judge Ciparick dissents in part in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Kaye concurs.
Order modified, etc.

. Although the majority notes that this document actually refers to proof of date of birth (or age), it clearly reflects the intent to preclude those without legal presence from obtaining a driver’s license or NDID.

. It should be noted that Congress has enacted the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Pub L 109-13 division B, 119 US Stat 302, 312). Title II, § 202 of this Act imposes “minimum document requirements and issuance standards for federal recognition” of driver’s licenses and identification cards. The Act states that “a Federal agency may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver’s license or identification card issued by a State to any person unless the State is meeting the requirements of this section” (tit II, § 202 [a] [1]). The Act requires a state to verify an applicant’s “lawful status” in the United States (§ 202 [c] [2] [B]). States have until May 2008 to comply with the Act, unless they apply for and receive an extension from DHS until December 31, 2009 (see Department of Homeland Security, REAL ID Proposed Guidelines: Questions and Answers, <http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/laws/gc_1172767635686.shtm> [last mod Mar. 1, 2007]). New York has yet to amend the Vehicle and Traffic Law to comply with this legislation.