Court Opinion

ID: 9900328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:04.429596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.497294
License: Public Domain

No. 558              October 25, 2023                  739

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                In the Matter of M. L. G.,
                          a Child.
          DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                  Petitioner-Respondent,
                              v.
                          J. A. G.,
                         Appellant.
              Jackson County Circuit Court
                  22JU06052; A180886

  David G. Hoppe, Judge.
  Argued and submitted September 6, 2023.
   Elena Cristina Stross, Deputy Public Defender, argued
the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Shannon Storey,
Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Tiffany
Keast, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense
Services.
   Brad Mullen, Certified Law Student, argued the cause for
respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jon
Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  MOONEY, J.
   Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment omitting
order for mental health assessment; otherwise affirmed.
740   Dept. of Human Services v. J. A. G.
Cite as 328 Or App 739 (2023)                              741

        MOONEY, J.
         In this juvenile dependency case, father appeals
from the judgment of jurisdiction and disposition in which
the juvenile court ordered father to undergo a mental health
assessment and follow any resulting recommendation.
Father raises two assignments of error, asserting that “the
juvenile court erred under ORS 419B.387 in ordering father
to submit to a mental health assessment,” and that “to
the extent the juvenile court relied on ORS 419B.337(2) as
a supplementary or alternative source of authority for its
order * * *, it plainly erred.” We conclude that there was
insufficient evidence under ORS 419B.387 for the court to
order father to submit to a mental health assessment. We
need not, and do not, reach father’s second assignment of
error because DHS has disclaimed any reliance on ORS
419B.337(2) as an alternative source of authority for the
juvenile court’s order. Thus, as presented by the parties, the
sole issue is whether the order to undergo a mental health
assessment was authorized by ORS 419B.387 on this record.
Dept. of Human Services v. F. J. M., 370 Or 434, 443, 520
P3d 854 (2022). We reverse the judgment and remand with
direction to enter a judgment omitting the order for a men-
tal health assessment; we otherwise affirm.
         We review whether a juvenile court’s order is autho-
rized by a particular provision of ORS Chapter 419B for legal
error. Dept. of Human Services v. J. R. F., 351 Or 570, 578-79,
273 P3d 87 (2012). If the order is authorized, we “view the
evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible
derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the
record was legally sufficient to permit that outcome.” Dept.
of Human Services v. N. P., 257 Or App 633, 639, 307 P3d
444 (2013).
         This was the second formal contact between the
Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) and father
regarding his daughter, M. The first contact was in 2021. At
that time, DHS filed its first dependency petition in the juve-
nile court. Jurisdiction was established following father’s
admission that his alcohol abuse interfered with his ability
to safely parent M and his failure to contest DHS’s allegation
742                      Dept. of Human Services v. J. A. G.

that he “subjected [M] to inappropriate physical discipline
and emotional mistreatment resulting in impairment of
[M]’s emotional well-being and functioning.” Jurisdiction
was ultimately dismissed and wardship was terminated
after a hearing on father’s uncontested motion to dismiss.
         DHS became involved with this family again when
it received a report that father’s wife and stepdaughter had
“physically assaulted” M, prompting a neighbor to call the
police. The assigned DHS caseworker testified that M sus-
tained physical injuries as a result of the altercation, includ-
ing a “pretty significant” bump on the back of her head.
Toward the end of the altercation, father tried to intervene
and pull his wife and stepdaughter away from M but indi-
cated in a later interview with DHS that he was aligned
with his wife and stepdaughter.
         DHS filed the current dependency petition with the
juvenile court, alleging that M was within the jurisdiction of
the court due to circumstances that endangered her welfare.
It initially alleged several bases for jurisdiction that con-
cerned father’s ability to safely parent M, but DHS later filed
an amended petition, reflecting a single, negotiated allega-
tion, which father admitted: that he was “unable to manage
[M]’s safety and behavior in the home, which interferes with
his ability to safely parent” M. The court accepted father’s
admission and asserted jurisdiction over M on that basis.
The court moved immediately to the dispositional hearing.
         DHS requested that the juvenile court order father
to participate in “mental health services” and it offered testi-
mony from its caseworker and a “Family Report” in support
of that request. The caseworker testified that the family was
facing the same “issues” that it had been facing in the pre-
vious dependency case. He testified that he thought father
was “a victim of domestic abuse” perpetrated by his current
wife. The caseworker testified that he had a second-hand
report from father’s mother that father had been exposed to
“significant trauma” as a child, and that he had not “dealt
with the trauma and how it affects him.” The caseworker
offered his belief that father’s trauma “manifest[ed] in [his]
being in a relationship that is not healthy for him. And is
not safe for [M].”
Cite as 328 Or App 739 (2023)                                  743

        The juvenile court, at the conclusion of the hearing
and as pertinent here, made the following oral findings and
comments:
  “[THE COURT]: * * * The State has met their burden. I
  don’t believe that [the DHS caseworker] is doing this in any
  way shape or manner to harass [father]. In fact, if anything
  [the caseworker has] been protective of [father]. Did not get
  into the family history and background regarding why
  he believes a mental health assessment needs to be done
  regarding significant or substantial unresolved trauma or
  unprocessed trauma. And his opinion was [that father] was
  not the domestically abusive or physically abusive [par-
  ent], but in fact is the one being abused. So, given all those
  issues, I think it would be a great benefit to [father] and to
  assist in his ability to parent [M]. * * * If he goes through
  the assessment in a protective and careful way and is able
  to deal with some of the trauma and learn how to better
  parent [M], then maybe [M] a year or two from now will
  want to engage with her [f]ather. And not engage in text
  battles a week before a hearing. So, I am going to find it’s
  absolutely [ ] rational and related. It would be a benefit to
  [M]. I didn’t hear much about the particular treatment
  program or the components, however, my understanding is
  that the agencies will be flexible regarding the release of
  information. The type of assessment. What * * * needs may
  be found. But given what I’ve heard I absolutely believe
  that it is necessary going forward if we’re going to make
  any attempt to preserve this relationship between [f]ather
  and [d]aughter to have the mental health assessment done.
  And if recommended a treatment program that is narrowly
  tailored on his issues. So, that he can deal with his own
  trauma and be a better parent toward [M]. So, I will make
  the necessary findings [ ] regarding the action agreements
  and regarding the case as presented to me * * *.”
         The juvenile court later signed and entered its
judgment of jurisdiction and disposition which, among other
things, ordered father to:
  “comply with the terms of the Action Agreement / Letter
  of Expectation submitted to the court and adopted to
  the court’s written findings as part of the Supplemental
  Confidential Exhibit and comply with any orders of this
  court as stated on the record at this hearing.”
744                      Dept. of Human Services v. J. A. G.

The pertinent language contained in the action agreement
provides:
   “[Father] will complete a Mental Health Assessment. He
   will follow any recommendations made by the mental
   health provider. He will engage in any and all treatment
   recommended by the mental health provider. He will learn
   to identify and understand his mental health needs and
   get the treatment he needs to become a safe parent to his
   child.”
Father’s appeal of that judgment is before us now.
         In his first assignment of error, father asserts that
the juvenile court erred under ORS 419B.387 in ordering
the mental health assessment, arguing that DHS failed to
offer sufficient evidence to “prove that father ‘needed’ a men-
tal health evaluation and any recommended treatment,”
and that it failed to connect any need that it did prove to
father’s ability to “correct the circumstances that resulted
in the wardship * * *.” In particular, father argues that “[t]he
department’s evidence did not establish that father’s trauma
had any relation to ‘domestic abuse,’ and without such evi-
dence there is no link” between father’s purported mental
health needs and his alleged inability to protect M from his
wife. DHS disagrees and points to the caseworker’s testi-
mony that father had “significant trauma,” that an assess-
ment and subsequent treatment would help father address
that trauma, and that the caseworker was unaware of “any
other services that would help father address his issues.”
         ORS 419B.387 provides that a juvenile court may
order a parent to participate in treatment or training if,
after an evidentiary hearing, it finds that the “treatment or
training is needed by a parent to correct the circumstances
that resulted in wardship or to prepare the parent to resume
the care of the ward[.]” The use of the word “needed” in ORS
419B.387 signifies an intent of the legislature to “prevent a
court from ordering evaluations and testing in every case to
determine if a parent has a need for treatment.” F. J. M., 370
Or at 447 (emphasis in original). Although the statute does
not impose a “requirement of absolute need,” to qualify as a
“needed” treatment, the treatment “must be connected more
than tenuously to the jurisdictional bases” the treatment is
Cite as 328 Or App 739 (2023)                                  745

intended to correct, and it must be “supported by the eviden-
tiary record.” Id. at 447-48.
         To find that a treatment requested by DHS is more
than tenuously connected to the jurisdictional bases, a juve-
nile court must “engage in a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. at 447.
It must consider a variety of factors, such as
   “(1) the circumstances that resulted in wardship (e.g., sub-
   stance abuse, mental health issues, other circumstances);
   (2) the extent to which the treatment that the court is
   considering will correct those circumstances or other-
   wise prepare the parent to resume the ward’s care; (3) the
   availability of alternatives to the treatment that the court
   is considering that will correct the circumstances that
   resulted in wardship or otherwise prepare the parent to
   resume the ward’s care; (4) the effectiveness of a parent’s
   prior attempts, if any, to ameliorate those circumstances;
   and (5) the length of time over which those prior attempts
   were made.”
Id. The circumstances in each case will require an indepen-
dent analysis of those factors, id., and the weight that the
court gives to those factors will necessarily vary depending
on the circumstances of each case. The requirement that a
proposed treatment be connected more than tenuously to
the jurisdictional bases, however, seems to emphasize the
need for the juvenile court to critically assess the evidence
produced on the second F. J. M. factor—the extent to which
a treatment will correct the circumstances at issue—as it
determines whether to order the requested treatment. The
following admonishment in F. J. M. illustrates that point:
   “ORS 419B.387 requires a finding that the ordered treat-
   ment is needed by the parent. Although we are mindful
   of the press of court business, we encourage courts, when
   issuing orders under ORS 419B.387, to clearly explain why,
   based on the evidence, the ordered treatment is needed by a
   parent to correct the circumstances that resulted in wardship
   or to prepare the parent to resume care of the ward.”
Id. at 452 n 8 (emphasis in original); see also Dept. of
Human Services v. R. W. C., 324 Or App 598, 607, 526 P3d
1195 (2023) (concluding that a juvenile court did not err in
ordering a psychological evaluation where it specifically
746                     Dept. of Human Services v. J. A. G.

identified father’s needs, tied the evaluation to those needs,
and explained how the treatment would address them).
        We turn to the case at hand. The burden was on DHS
to support its request for a court order for a mental health
assessment with evidence sufficient to establish (1) the
need for the assessment, and (2) a more than tenuous con-
nection between the requested assessment and the jurisdic-
tional basis—father’s inability “to manage [M]’s safety and
behavior in the home.”
         The testimony of the DHS caseworker on which
DHS relies is essentially that the caseworker had received
third-party reports that father had suffered some sort of
trauma as a child, and that a mental health assessment
would benefit father in dealing with his childhood trauma
and, thus, in becoming a better parent for M. In the absence
of evidence about what the childhood trauma consisted of,
and without competent evidence that treatment for that
trauma is needed and that such treatment would be more
than tenuously connected to the jurisdictional basis in this
case, we conclude that the juvenile court erred in ordering
the requested mental health assessment and recommended
services. Notwithstanding the juvenile court’s comments
that the caseworker was being “protective” of father by not
getting “into the family history and background regarding
why he believes a mental health assessment needs to be done
regarding significant or substantial unresolved trauma or
unprocessed trauma,” DHS was required to meet its bur-
den of establishing the need for the assessment and its more
than tenuous connection to the jurisdictional basis through
evidence. The caseworker’s beliefs about what would be help-
ful, unsupported by competent evidence, is not enough.
         Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment omit-
ting order for mental health assessment; otherwise affirmed.