Court Opinion

ID: 9443785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:30:41.239837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:36.333606
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, Judge
(dissenting).
Appellee appropriated “Omatic,” the dominant feature of appellant’s widely advertised mark, and combined that suffix with the descriptive prefix “Hot” to form the compound trade-mark “Hotomatic,” under which he sells automatic gas-burning hot water heaters. The late Judge Hatfield branded procedure of that kind as illegal in the case of Bon Ami Co. v. McKes-son & Robbins, Inc., 93 F.2d 915, 916, 25 C.C.P.A., Patents, 826, where he pointed out:
“If all that a newcomer in the field need do in order to avoid the charge of confusing similarity is to select a word descriptive of his goods and combine it with a word which is the dominant feature of a registered trade-mark so that the borrowed word becomes the dominant feature of his mark, the registered trade-mark, made valuable and outstanding by extensive advertising and use, soon becomes of little value, and, of course, each of the subsequent imitating trade-marks (and there would bemany) is of value only to the extent that its users are trading on the good will of the owner of the original registered trade-mark.”
“Warm-Ever,” a term used in the sale of hot water heaters, was denied registration as a trade-mark merely descriptive of the heater, its character, use, or quality1 in the case of In re Locke Stove Co., 154 F.2d 200, 33 C.C.P.A., Patents, 934, where this court hnanimously affirmed the concurring decisions of the tribunals of the Patent Office, and in so doing Judge Jackson stated:
“We think it clear that the term sought to be registered in relation to its application to the heater can have no other meaning but that one could have warm or hot water whenever one wished, and that it is not necessary to remake the fire as often as the water is needed. This, it seems to us, is the immediate and obvious impression- to be derived from appellant’s mark as he is using it. It does not require any par*159ticular mental effort or reasoned thinking to arrive at such impression.”
There is a controlling stipulation here to the effect that the goods of the parties are goods of the same descriptive properties. Judge Garrett pointed out, when this court early rejected “Coal-O-Matic” as confusingly similar to appellant’s “Oil-O-Matic” in Cross v. Williams Oil-O-Matic Heating Corp., 48 F.2d 659, 660, 18 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1192, 1193, that in such a case “the issue is not whether oil and coal are of the same descriptive properties, but whether the devices that feed them into the furnaces are.”
Moreover, our recent decision in the case of Eureka Williams Corp. v. Willoughby Machine & Tool Co., supra, should be controlling here despite the discussion to the contrary in the prevailing opinion. Inherent in the court’s failure to follow that precedent is the implication that appellant is entitled to no monopoly with respect to its long and extensively used mark “Oil-O-Matic” or any part thereof.
During the hearings leading to the enactment of the Act of 1946, the proposition was advanced in certain quarters that any concern owning a trade-mark of world-wide reputation for forty or fifty years has had the mark long enough and should be required to share it with competitors.2 That concept was wholly rejected by Congress, but the same result might well be effected by refusal to acknowledge the validity of a proper trade-mark. B. W. Pattishall, writing on Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 Mich.Law Rev. 967 (1952) made this contribution to current trade-mark literature :
“ * * * the ‘restrictionist’ trends and the contradictions found in many recent trade identification decisions are often traceable to misconceptions derived from the current ‘monopoly phobia,’ which have no logical relation to the true rights and considerations involved. Abetting this misguided and destructive reasoning are the false ‘sign posts’ provided by the traditional words and phrases such as ‘infringement,’ ‘property’ and ‘ownership’ as well as the deep seated ‘intrinsic value’ notion. Yet the problem presented in almost any trade identification case is the simple one: Has there been or is there likely to be an invasion or violation of an individual trade identity ? If so, decency and the public interest demand that it be prevented insomuch as deception is likely; that is, within the scope of likelihood of confusion. No more is needed — no more should be sought; but too often today these simple fundamentals are lost in a maze of semantic analysis and unwarranted concern for wrongful monopoly or special privilege.
“Is it not past time to free the law of commercial identity from the error which threatens to engulf it, and to rec-gonize as well ‘that business should be conducted as games, are played among gentlemen ?’ ”
Members of the bar and of various legal and trade associations are not unaware of the fact that due to a fundamental change in the prevailing philosophy of the majority, this court, in general, has now reversed its former position with respect to similar or identical trade-marks the use of which by the newcomer has been challenged as deceptive and misleading for the purpose of trading on the good will built up at great expense by the owner of the original mark in issue. Appellant makes this notable assertion in his brief:
“While the Lanham Act was heralded as offering trade-mark owners unprecedented protection, an analysis of cases decided by this Court shows that in the approximately five and one-lialf years before the Lanham Act became effective, this Court sustained 48 out of 66 oppositions — over 70% — involving issues of similarity of the marks or similarity of the class of goods, whereas in the approximately five and one-half years since the Act became effec*160tive, this Court has dismissed 38 out of 57 oppositions involving such issues— about 66% of such cases.”
The Lanham Act by its explicit provisions intended that the law of unfair competition should be applied in trade-mark litigation in order to promote the ends of justice. The Supreme Court in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130, 67 S.Ct. 1136, 1139, 91 L.Ed. 1386, held that “the character of the conduct giving rise to the unfair competition is relevant to the remedy which should be afforded.”
Conduct which constitutes unfair competition may be remedied by injunction and/or the award of damages by courts of equity. Those remedies, however, do not eliminate the right of this court to apply the law in a proper case against an applicant, for registration. Robert, in the The New TradeMark Manual, at page 205 remarks:
“ * * * But in determining the right of an applicant to register his mark, it would not seem to be out of keeping with the purpose and intent of the Act for the tribunals to consider such acts of the applicant as would affect his right to register, including his own misconduct (or ‘unclean hands’) in the use of the mark. This is particularly true since the Act gives him new and substantive rights in his registration." (Italics supplied.)
“Generally speaking * * * in all cases of unfair competition it is the principles of old-fashioned honesty which are controlling.” Jewel Tea Co., Inc., v. Kraus, 7 Cir., 187 F.2d 278, 282; Sinico v. Snow-Craggs Corporation, 7 Cir., 105 F.2d 450, Sections 44(h) and (i) of the Act of 1946 provide that owners of trade-marks, foreign and domestic, shall be entitled to the benefits of the law of unfair competition.
Additional views expressed in the prevailing opinion have been thoroughly discussed by me in other cases and I rely upon them here as part of this opinion. See Eureka Williams Corp. v. Kres-Kno Oil Burner Mfg. Co., 202 F.2d 763, 40 C.C.P.A., Patents, -; Irma Hosiery Co. v. Schulman, 201 F.2d 891, 40 C.C.P.A., Patents, -; Continental Coffee Co., Inc., v. Continental Foods, Inc., 202 F.2d 759, 40 C.C.P.A., Patents, -. See also “The Right to Use and the Right to Register — The Trade-Mark Anomaly,” by Julius R. Lunsford, Jr., published in the January 1953 issue of “The Trade-Mark Reporter,” pp. 1-23.
If the recent decision and judgment of this court in Willoughby, supra, which held “Thermomatic” and “Oil-O-Matic” to be confusingly similar for automatic fuel burning devices, is not to be regarded here as a binding precedent because the judgment there was rendered by “a divided court,” what about the value as a controlling precedent here of the decision and judgment in the case of Cross v. Williams Oil-O-Matic Heating Corp., supra, in which this court held, unanimously, that “Coal-O-Matic” was confusingly similar to “Oil-O-Matic” when likewise concurrently used on automatic fuel burning devices?
For the reasons and authorities herein cited, the decision of the Commissioner of Patents should be reversed.

. See Estate of P. D. Beckwith, Inc., v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 40 S.Ct. 414, 64 L.Ed. 705; Burmel Handkerchief Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 127 F.2d 318, 29 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1024; Model Brassiere Co., Inc., v. Bromley-Shepard Co., Inc., 49 F.2d 482, 18 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1294; sec. 2 and 2 (e), Act of 1946; Robert, “The New Trade-Mark Manual,” page 60.

. See Alligator Co. v. Larus & Brother Co., Inc., 180 F.2d 532, 39 C.C.P.A., Patents, 939, 951; “Introduction,” by Edward S. Rogers, page xi, Robert, “TIio New Trade-Mark Manual.”