Court Opinion

ID: 9493938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:24:01.783699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:07.238545
License: Public Domain

SILER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in most of the conclusions reached by the majority in this case. However, I disagree with the conclusion that the district court clearly erred in denying recovery under the Jones Act. Although the majority makes out a good case for concluding that defendant was negligent in failing to provide adequate safety precautions, this is a finding of fact. There was a basis for the district court to find that the ship owner was not negligent by failing to have safety ropes or handrails. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Similarly, I would not find that the vessel and the barge were unseaworthy because there was not adequate safety equipment as the failure to have certain safety equipment was also a finding of fact, which I think was not clearly erroneous.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority in its conclusion that the vessel and barge were unseaworthy because the ratchet was not reasonably fit for its intended use. Truly, like negligence, seaworthiness is usually a finding of fact. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 98, 64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed. 561 (1944). However, the malfunction of the ratchet shows that it was not reasonably fit for its intended use, so the vessel was not seaworthy. See Hubbard v. Faros Fisheries, Inc., 626 F.2d 196, 199 (1st Cir.1980). Therefore, the *607malfunction of the ratchet was a substantial and direct cause of the injuries to Perkins.
In conclusion, I would also reverse and remand but only on a narrower basis than determined by the majority.