Court Opinion

ID: 9540353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:14:57.629086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:38.552206
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand the decision of the trial court. A prisoner may file a complaint for mandamus to compel DOC officials to perform as required under the rules adopted by the DOC. West v. Gramley, 262 Ill. App. 3d 552, 557, 634 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (1994). Where a complaint for mandamus alleges that plaintiff has filed grievances which were required to be addressed, dismissal of the complaint is error, even though defendants assert plaintiff in fact failed to submit any grievances. West, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 556-58, 634 N.E.2d at 1265-66 (reversing dismissal of mandamus complaint). The majority does not fault the reasoning of West, only its result. In West, the defendants entered their appearance and filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the trial court. The majority cites no case authorizing the extraordinary procedure employed here, sua sponte dismissal before service of process or an entry of appearance. The trial court broadly held that whenever an inmate complains of the results of disciplinary hearings he fails to state a cause of action and the petition will be dismissed. The majority’s holding is less clear. Is the majority saying that revocation of good-time credit issues can never be raised by mandamus? 332 Ill. App. 3d at 839. This court held to the contrary eight years ago, in West. Or is the majority saying that while a good cause of action could be stated, this petition failed to do so? The majority suggests that sua sponte dismissal is appropriate in this case, because this case is one where the court is “dealing with ‘professional litigants’ who inappropriately burden the court system with nonmeritorious litigation, stemming from their unhappiness as DOC inmates.” 332 Ill. App. 3d at 842. The trial court did not get far enough into the case to form such a conclusion, and the basis on which the majority comes to its own is unclear. Certainly many petitions filed by inmates are frivolous and without merit. Plaintiffs petition, however, alleges the revocation of six months of good-time credit. As opposed to the calculation and awarding of good-time credit, or the classification of prisoners resulting in potential loss of the opportunity to earn good-time credit, the revocation of previously earned good-time credit as a sanction for serious misconduct “is unquestionably a matter of considerable importance.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 954, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2977 (1974) (not as important as the revocation of parole or probation). Due process requires that an inmate faced with the possible revocation of good-time credits be afforded a hearing and the right to call witnesses in his defense. Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380, 385 (7th Cir. 1998). Due process requires that the revocation of good-time credit be supported by some evidence in the record. Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1992). As with other administrative decisions, reviewing courts may not reweigh the evidence supporting revocation of good-time credit but may determine whether the findings are supported by some evidence. Board of Education of Rich Township High School District No. 227 v. Brown, 311 Ill. App. 3d 478, 484, 724 N.E.2d 956, 961 (1999). The revocation of good-time credit can be reviewed under habeas corpus, at least where the inmate at the time of the petition has been detained past the time when he would have been released if the credit had not been revoked. Hill v. McGinnis, 224 Ill. App. 3d 658, 662, 587 N.E.2d 44, 47 (1992); Robinson v. Schomig, 326 Ill. App. 3d 447, 449-50, 760 N.E.2d 572, 574 (2001); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439, 449, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1835 (1973) (even if restoration of good-time credits did not require immediate discharge “their suits would still have been within the core of habeas corpus in attacking the very duration of their physical confinement itself’). The revocation of good-time credit can also be reviewed in a section 1983 action (see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)), so long as the inmate seeks relief such as damages or injunctive relief, and not simply restoration of the credit. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554-55 n.12, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 949-50 n.12, 94 S. Ct. at 2973-74 n.12; Whitlock, 153 F.3d at 389. The federal courts, however, are anxious not to bypass the state courts and want to give “the [sjtates the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the internal administration of their prisons.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 492, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 452, 93 S. Ct. at 1837-38. Where it is alleged that DOC, in a good-time-credit-revocation case, has failed to perform some specific duty which the plaintiff is entitled to have performed, mandamus will lie. West, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 557, 634 N.E.2d at 1265. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he did not receive a written statement by the grievance committee of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Such a statement is required by due process and the Code. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 955-56, 94 S. Ct. at 2978-79; Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 344; 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.80(1) (Conway Greene CD-ROM June 2001). Plaintiff also asserts the action taken was not supported by “some evidence.” “Some evidence” is required by due process and by the Code. 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.80(j) (Conway Greene CD-ROM June 2001); see also Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 346 (in a section 1983 action, court reviewed record to determine whether any evidence would support revocation of good-time credits). Plaintiff has at least alleged specific duties which he was entitled to have performed. The suggestion that dismissal of a case for failure to state a cause of action is a way to summarily terminate litigation is mistaken. Rulings on motions to dismiss generally do not dispose of actions; the courts allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints unless it becomes apparent that no set of facts could be pleaded that would entitle a plaintiff to recover. Neptuno Treuhand-Und Verwaltungsgesellschaft Mbh v. Arbor, 295 Ill. App. 3d 567, 575-76, 692 N.E.2d 812, 819 (1998). Even if the plaintiff has sought the wrong remedy, where a motion directed to the pleadings is granted “the court shall permit the pleadings to be amended.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 617 (West 2000). In 1994, this court concluded that it had no creative solution to the problem of increasing inmate litigation. West, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 557-58, 634 N.E.2d at 1265; see also Whitlock, 153 F.3d at 387 (“growth in the number of prisoners obviously cuts both ways”). The legislature has some options, such as the procedure it has enacted for the summary dismissal of postconviction petitions, when “the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122 — 2.1(a)(2) (West 2000). The federal government has enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104 — 134, 110 Stat. 1321 — 71, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. 1996); see Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2002)). Some states provide for judges to sit on a regular basis at the state’s correctional facilities. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 492, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 452, 93 S. Ct. at 1837. The legislature has provided for revocation or reduction of good-time credit for prisoners filing frivolous lawsuits against DOC or others. 730 ILCS 5/3 — 6 — 3(d) (West 2000). We, however, are not the legislature. Dismissing every lawsuit where an inmate complains of the results of disciplinary hearings, throwing the good cases out with the bad, does not appear to be a satisfactory solution.