Court Opinion

ID: 9687805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:49:39.476792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:50.411124
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
The appeal requires a further discussion of the principles treated in the foregoing-opinion. Supplementing the facts stated in that opinion, the following are material.
The lease from Hastings to Logan em~. braced five or six acres of land in a rural wooded section, not suitable for cultivation and not used for any purpose, nor close to-a dwelling or other houses.. The lease ex*591tended to January 29, 1954, with no right to a further extension. (The final judgment was rendered February 2, 1952.) The lease provided in substance that if a proposed roadway is built through the premises, and the lessee (Logan) considers that it would cause the property to be unsuitable for the purpose for which it is to be used, he would have the right to terminate the lease. While it is not expressly stated in the lease, Logan intended to and did construct a cement block house on the tract near the road: the house to be used as a recreational lodge or retreat. The lease further provided that upon its termination, the lessor should have a right to purchase the improvements made by Logan at a price to be agreed on, otherwise the lessee would have a right to remove such improvements.
In 1950, the exact date not given, the county started condemnation proceedings in the probate court. The date of the probate court’s judgment is not given. An appeal to the circuit court -was taken on December 23 (26), 1950. On February 20, 1951, Hastings (the lessor) executed a right of way deed to lands described, which included the five or six acres under the lease to Logan and was made subject to the lease. There is an agreement that the proceedings bad in the probate court be omitted from the transcript on this appeal, but that they were regular and that the circuit court acquired jurisdiction by an appeal to it. The transcript does not show what the amount of the 'award was, nor that on the appeal to the circuit court by Logan the county paid said amount into court and executed the bond authorized by law, section 18, Title 19, Code.
In May or June 1951, before the cause went to trial in the circuit court on September 28, 1951, Logan elected to terminate the lease under the clause referred to above, and agreed with Hastings for him to buy the improvements he had made for a consideration of $1,500 and a return to bim of $35, the amount stipulated in the lease as the annual rental for the tract. The cause then came on for hearing in the circuit court before the judge without a jury, in which the county was the petitioner and Logan was the sole defendant. Hastings was not a party. Judgment of condemnation was rendered on February 2, 1952 by the circuit court, as heretofore stated. The county was in possession of a conveyance by Hastings and had no controversy with him at the time of the condemnation judgment. The record does not show, as stated above, that the county on the appeal by Logan to the circuit court deposited the amount of the award and executed the bond as authorized by section 18 et seq., Title 19, Code, nor that the county entered upon the land to reconstruct and relocate the road before Logan terminated the lease. We assumed in the original opinion that the county did make the deposit and execute the bond and took possession, and that that was done after the appeal to the circuit court by Logan on December 23, 1950, and prior to the termination of the lease by Logan in May or June 1951. But there is nothing in the record to support an inference as to the time when this was done or whether it was done at all. We could just as well infer that the county took possession after Logan terminated the lease, and at a time when he had no interest in the land.
 In the former opinion we applied the principle that if after a condemnation proceeding is begun, the alleged owner, the sole defendant in that proceeding, sells and conveys his interest before the final judgment of condemnation without reserving the right to the compensation to be awarded, the purchaser owning the land at the time of the final condemnation, which is the time of the taking, is entitled to the amount of the award. But upon more careful study of the question, we have concluded that such theory does not apply here for the reason that Logan, the sole defendant to the petition, owned only a leasehold interest and it is therefore only that interest which could be condemned, and that after the appeal was taken to the circuit court, where the cause must be tried de novo, and before the trial was had in that court, the leasehold interest was terminated by the voluntary act of the defendant. Under those circumstances, when the condem*592nation proceeding came on for 'hearing there was nothing on which it could operate. There was then no leasehold interest. It simply had merged into the reversion, which was not before the court. City of St. Louis v. Rossi, 333 Mo. 1092, 64 S.W.2d 600 (syl. 22-23); United States v. 26, 699 Acres of Land, etc., 5 Cir., 174 F.2d 367; United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729.
 If the foregoing correctly states the facts the subject matter of the petition became moot and the petition was subject to be dismissed. If before the lease was terminated petitioner paid into the probate court the amount of the award, and executed the bond on appeal to the circuit court and entered upon the land, and thereby damaged the value of the leasehold, the bond conditioned ’as required by law “to pay such damages as the property owners may' sustain”, section 18, Title 19, Code, would, protect defendant and a suit on the bond would lie, although the lease terminated before the' petition was heard. But if before -the lease was terminated, petitioner, without, paying into court the amount of the award assessed in -the probate court and without executing the bond authorized by the statute, supra, entered upon the land and'thereby depreciated the value of the leasehold interest of the defendant and without defendant’s consent, it would be without 'legal authority and an action at law would lie by the defendant in a separate suit against the county for such wrongful act. Cf. Hunter v. City of Mobile, 244 Ala. 318, 13 So.2d 656. But such claim for damages, whether or not bond was given, would not have the effect of recreating an interest which had terminated in the land and make it subject to be condemned. Without something to condemn the amount of the defendant’s damages by reason of such entry could not be assessed 'in this proceeding. But such claim would not pass out of the defendant by virtue of the termination of his lease. Of. course if the lease terminated before the county entered upon the land the defendant would have no cause to complain. '
The judgment of the trial court was properly reversed and the cause remanded, but the trial should be conducted in accordance with this modified opinion.
The foregoing opinion was prepared by FOSTER, Supernumerary Justice of this Court, while serving on it at the request of the Chief Justice under authority of Title the Court as its opinion.
13, section 32, Code, and was adopted by
Opinion modified and application for rehearing overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, STAKELY, GOODWYN and MERRILL, JJ-, concur.
LAWSON, J., dissents.
MAYFIELD, J., not having participated in the original consideration did not participate on the rehearing.