Court Opinion

ID: 9581710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:17:43.220195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:12.235114
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I concur in the majority’s affirmance of appellant’s conviction, I write separately to address appellant’s second and third assignments of error.
The majority rejects appellant’s second assignment, wherein he claims the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance at preliminary hearing, because he failed to follow 12 O.S.1981, § 668. Section 668 is found in a chapter on trials, and concerns continuances requested “on account of the absence of evidence.... ” The rule in Rogers v. State, 721 P.2d 805, 807 (Okla.Crim.App.1986), cited by the majority, was applied to the trial stage, not preliminary hearing, and is thus distinguishable. Defense counsel requested a continuance at preliminary hearing on the ground of surprise and not on account of the absence of evidence; therefore, application of the requirements of Section 668 is at least questionable, if not erroneous. I believe the proper standard of review on appeal is whether the accused suffered prejudice resulting from a clear abuse of discretion in the granting or denying of a continuance at preliminary hearing. See Fisher v. State, 668 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Okla.Crim.App.1983).
Here, defense counsel requested a continuance to prepare for cross-examination of newly endorsed State witnesses. Insofar as the magistrate granted defense counsel wide latitude on cross-examination, counsel succeeded in dismissing one count, and the amended Information was filed nine (9) days prior to the preliminary hearing, appellant has failed to show a clear abuse of discretion with resulting prejudice.
Turning to appellant’s third assignment, “joinder of offenses is proper where the counts so joined refer to the same type of offenses occurring over a relatively short period of time, in approximately the same location, and proof as to each transaction overlaps so as to evidence a common scheme or plan.” Glass v. State, 701 P.2d 765, 768 (Okla.Crim.App.1985). Here, appellant passed one check in Tuttle, Oklahoma, on June 7, 1984, and the remaining checks in Chickasha, Oklahoma; some six weeks later. The majority holds that because the checks were passed “in two towns located within the same county, they may be said to have occurred in approximately the same location.” I cannot subscribe to the rationale that two series of criminal acts committed six weeks apart in two different towns satisfies the Glass requirements for proper joinder. Here, the criminal acts simply were not sufficiently connected by time, geographical proximity, and evidence to make joinder proper. Cf. Vowell v. State, 728 P.2d 854, 857 (Okla.Crim.App.1986); Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 838 (Okla.Crim.App.1986); Dyke v. State, 716 P.2d 693, 697 (Okla.Crim.App.1986); Glass, 701 P.2d at 768. Mere similarity of offenses does not justify joinder. Glass, 701 P.2d at 768. Although I would not grant a new trial because of the mis-joinder, see 20 O.S.1981, § 3001.1, I would modify appellant’s five sentences to run conéurrently. Therefore, I concur in affirming appellant’s convictions, but dissent to the majority's refusal to modify his sentence.