Court Opinion

ID: 9627137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:35:27.154164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:09.066573
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
A movant should prevail on a Civil Rule 60(b)1 motion to set aside a default judgment when he satisfies one of the grounds listed in Civil Rule 60(b) and sets out a *1378meritorious defense.2 Here, these conditions are satisfied and, in my view, the default judgment should have been set aside.
First, Rapoport has satisfied one of the grounds listed in Civil Rule 60(b) by establishing a credible case of excusable neglect. Rapoport claims to have been suffering from a degenerating diabetic condition and mental depression aggravated by injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The testimony of his physician, Dr. Tiholiz, supports these claims and raises a substantial doubt as to whether Rapoport was physically and mentally capable of a reasonable response to the claims brought against him. At best, Rapoport had sporadic occasions of competence. In my view, one whose competence is only intermittent and unpredictable has a genuine and severe medical disability which may serve to establish excusable neglect.
Second, Rapoport has alleged a meritorious defense to the substance of Tesoro’s claim. Rapoport asserts that a written agreement among Chapados, IEC, and Te-soro was entered into on August 11, 1987. He argues that this agreement provides several defenses, including accord and satisfaction, release, illegality and fraud.
Further, several equitable factors favor setting aside the judgment. Tesoro will litigate the same issues involved in this case against a co-guarantor, Hayes, in a companion case.3 Since the same issues will be fully litigated in that case, setting aside the present judgment will probably not significantly add to Tesoro’s litigation burden, nor will it increase the work of the superior court.
Moreover, Rapoport will suffer total judgments in excess of $1.7 million as a result of the default.4 If his defense is truly meritorious, this will be a devastating sanction for his neglect. As we stated in Hertz, concerning a default judgment of $436,319.43, “[ujnless there are intervening equities, a controversy concerning damages of this magnitude should be resolved on its merits whenever possible.” 704 P.2d at 773.
Finally, there were alternatives less harsh than a default judgment that would have sufficiently protected Tesoro’s rights. Conditions could have been imposed to protect the judgment lien that Tesoro evidently has obtained in California, and Rapoport could be required to pay Tesoro’s costs in connection with obtaining and defending the default judgment. Judge Saveli recognized that these equitable alternatives could be fashioned in the event that this court were to set aside the default judgment.
In sum, in my view, Rapoport has sufficiently established excusable neglect and a meritorious defense to warrant relief under Civil Rule 60(b), and equitable factors support such a result. Therefore, I would set aside the default judgment, on conditions to be set and supervised by the trial judge.

. Alaska Civil Rule 60 states in relevant part:
(b) Mistakes — Inadvertence—Excusable Neglect — Newly Discovered Evidence — Fraud— Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;....

. See Hertz v. Berzanske, 704 P.2d at 771-772; Cleary Diving Service, Inc. v. Thomas, 688 P.2d 940, 943 (Alaska 1984); Gregor v. Hodges, 612 P.2d at 1009-1010.

. A default judgment was entered in this case in the amount of $375,530.71 by Judge Saveli. Judge Hodges, relying on Judge Saveli's holding, also denied Rapoport's motion to set aside a default judgment in the companion case on the grounds of collateral estoppel. See Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Interior Energy Corp., Case No. 4FA-87-1177 Civil. That judgment totalled $1,332,268.62. Judge Hodges noted, however, that “[e]xcept for the collateral estoppel issue as to the disability, this court would conclude that sufficient evidence has been raised as to Rapo-port’s disability. The court would" exercise its discretion in finding there are sufficient facts presented by Rapoport to conclude there may be a meritorious defense. The court concludes there is no prejudice to plaintiff, since these issues are in full litigation between plaintiff and defendant Hayes. Therefore, except for the collateral estoppel issue, [this court] would set aside the default judgment.”

.See footnote 3, supra.