Court Opinion

ID: 9412823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 18:01:37.966475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:35.497209
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50102    Document: 00516841270        Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/01/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                                 FILED
                                                                       August 1, 2023
                                No. 22-50102                           Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                 Clerk

   Shanon Edmiston, Individually; Helen Holman, as dependent
   administrator of, and on behalf of, LISA WILLIAMS a/k/a LISA
   SCHUBERT, E.S., J.S. #1, J.S. #1; Shanon Edmiston, the
   ESTATE OF JOHN ROBERT SCHUBERT, JR., and JOHN
   ROBERT SCHUBERT, JR.’s heirs-at-law,

                                                         Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                     versus

   Oscar Borrego, Sr.; Oscar E. Carrillo; Peter E.
   Melendez,

                                         Defendants—Appellants.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:21-CV-132
                 ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, Circuit Judge:
         This opinion is rendered contemporaneously with the opinion for the
   appeal in 22-10360, Crandel v. Hall, consolidated on appeal with 22-10361,
   Crandel v. Hastings. The two opinions concern the suicides by two pretrial
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270           Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                     No. 22-50102

   detainees in two Texas jails and, inter alia, failure-to-protect claims.
   Moreover, the same counsel for plaintiffs appear in each appeal.
          At hand is an interlocutory appeal contesting the denial of motions to
   dismiss asserting qualified immunity against failure-to-protect claims
   concerning the pretrial detainee. Primarily at issue is whether the complaint
   plausibly alleges the three appellants possessed subjective knowledge of a
   substantial risk of suicide by detainee John Robert Schubert, Jr. This action
   under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of his death while in pretrial detention in
   the Culberson County, Texas, Jail. Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege appellants
   possessed the requisite subjective knowledge.               VACATED and
   RENDERED.
                                          I.
          Plaintiffs assert claims in district court under § 1983 against Oscar
   Borrego, Sr., Sheriff Oscar E. Carrillo, Deputy Peter E. Melendez, Adelaida
   Zambra, and Ernesto Diaz for failing to protect Schubert, claiming violations
   of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. They also have claims against
   individual defendants under a theory of bystander liability, and a claim
   against the Sheriff for supervisory liability. And, against Culberson County,
   plaintiffs assert a claim under § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social
   Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), on the basis that its policies
   related to jail-suicide prevention caused a violation of Schubert’s
   constitutional rights. But, this interlocutory appeal concerns only the failure-
   to-protect claims against Borrego, Sheriff Carrillo, and Deputy Melendez
   (appellants).
                                          A.
          Because denial of a motion to dismiss is at issue, the following
   recitation of fact is, unless otherwise noted, based on plaintiffs’ operative 75-
   page complaint. As done in the complaint, approximate times are used. And,

                                          2
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270          Page: 3    Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                    No. 22-50102

   for the statements, including by appellants, obtained on 7 July 2019, and
   contained in the Texas Rangers’ report, discussed infra, the district court
   relied on the statements in the report as included in the complaint; therefore,
   we do not distinguish between the report and the complaint.
          On 6 July 2019, in Van Horn, Texas, Borrego, a jailer with the jail,
   received a series of calls concerning a male—later identified as Schubert—
   needing assistance. In the first call, at 11:05 p.m., the male caller asserted
   someone was trying to kill him. In the second call, at 11:09 p.m., an off-duty
   trooper stated a man was at his door saying someone was trying to kill him.
   And, in the third and final call, at 11:12 p.m., someone at the El Capitan Hotel
   in Van Horn said a man told the hotel clerk someone was trying to kill him.
   Schubert, who had been wandering around Van Horn, was both the initial
   unknown caller and the subject of the second and third calls.
          Borrego directed Culberson County Sheriff’s Deputy Melendez to
   respond. The Deputy was dispatched initially to a location in Van Horn
   regarding Schubert’s knocking on a resident’s door, but Schubert was not
   present when the Deputy arrived. After being notified of the third call, the
   Deputy located Schubert at 11:15 p.m. at the El Capitan Hotel.
          The Deputy spoke with Schubert, later providing in a statement
   (included in the complaint) that Schubert “appeared nervous and said that
   people were trying to kill [him]”. The Deputy said Schubert: accurately
   stated the day of the week, the approximate time, and his location in Van
   Horn; provided his name and date of birth; but gave an incorrect year.
          The Deputy took Schubert to a Border Patrol Station to obtain
   information to identify him correctly. In doing so, the Deputy learned
   Schubert had an active warrant for parole violation.

                                          3
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270          Page: 4   Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                    No. 22-50102

          Based on the warrant, the Deputy arrested Schubert and transported
   him to the jail. They arrived at 12:14 a.m. on 7 July, and Schubert was placed
   in the booking area.
          Culberson County Sheriff Carrillo heard Borrego’s dispatch to
   Deputy Melendez and followed up to check on the situation involving
   Schubert. After learning that the Deputy arrested Schubert, the Sheriff
   “decided to go to the jail and check on [Schubert] and jail personnel”.
   Arriving at the jail after 12:59 a.m., the Sheriff was advised Schubert had a
   warrant for parole violation.
          With Borrego present, Schubert told the Sheriff: “he had hitchhiked
   from El Paso and was in a half-way house in Horizon, Texas”; “he had left
   the Horizon facility without permission and was not allowed to stay at the
   facility once he returned”; and “they were mean to him at the facility,
   and . . . he had had enough”. Throughout the interview, Schubert was not
   wearing a shirt, because, as he explained, it was wet.
          Schubert appeared to be cooperative and truthful in his responses.
   Borrego and the Sheriff did not complete a “Screening Form for Suicide and
   Medical/Mental/Developmental Impairments”, which plaintiffs allege is
   required by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards (TCJS).
          After the Sheriff spoke with Schubert, Borrego, at 1:35 a.m., provided
   Schubert jail-issued clothing pursuant to the Sheriff’s instruction. Deputy
   Melendez and Borrego escorted Schubert to a cell at 1:42 a.m. Schubert
   repeated to the Deputy that someone was trying to kill him. Borrego,
   pursuant to the Sheriff’s instruction, provided Schubert with a mattress. He
   was not placed on suicide watch.
          The Sheriff and Borrego left the jail at 1:48 a.m. The Deputy went
   back on patrol at about the same time.

                                         4
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270           Page: 5    Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                     No. 22-50102

          When Borrego went to the dispatch office at 1:48 a.m. to clock out, he
   asked Zambra, another jail employee, to run a driver’s-license and criminal-
   history check on Schubert. (Zambra, a defendant in this action, is not a party
   to this interlocutory appeal on qualified immunity. The district court granted
   her motion to dismiss, based on such immunity.)
          Zambra printed a copy of Schubert’s driver’s license and criminal
   history at 2:17 a.m.; and, at 2:28 a.m., she requested a medical-history report:
   a “Continuity of Care Query” (CCQ). It was later noted by the TCJS, in its
   8 August 2019 report (a copy of the report summary is included in the body
   of the complaint), that the CCQ came back as “no match”.
          At 2:42 a.m., Zambra “manually” checked on the jail’s detainees.
   When she checked Schubert’s cell, she could see him “half-kneeling with a
   white sheet mangled on his neck and tied to a top grey shelf”. She went to
   the “catwalk hallway” to get a better view of Schubert and called out to him
   through the jail bars, but he did not respond. Next, she “called Deputy
   Melendez and Sheriff Carrillo [at 2:44 a.m.] and asked that they come to the
   jail as soon as possible”.
          The Sheriff, after hearing Zambra’s radio call at 2:47 a.m., arrived first
   and removed the sheet from Schubert’s neck, laid him on a bunk, and began
   CPR. Upon the Sheriff’s instruction, Zambra called the rescue team at 2:50
   a.m. EMTs were dispatched at 2:56 a.m., and arrived at the jail at 2:59 a.m.
   Upon their arrival, Schubert was not breathing and did not have a pulse. He
   was pronounced dead, with his autopsy report listing his cause of death as
   suicide through asphyxia due to hanging.
                                          B.
          This action was filed in June 2021. Although additional claims were
   added, at issue in this interlocutory appeal, as discussed supra, are only
   plaintiffs’ claims under § 1983 against Borrego, Sheriff Carrillo, and Deputy

                                          5
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270             Page: 6   Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                     No. 22-50102

   Melendez for failure to protect, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
   Amendments. All individual defendants filed motions to dismiss, asserting
   qualified immunity.
          The district court in January 2022 denied in part appellants’ motions,
   concluding they were not entitled to qualified immunity against the failure-
   to-protect claims. In doing so, the court concluded the complaint plausibly
   alleged: each of the appellants possessed the requisite subjective knowledge
   of a risk of suicide or serious harm; and, they failed to take action to abate
   that risk. The court concluded the “risk was obvious”, based on: Schubert’s
   fragile psychological state; his statements regarding an unidentified assailant;
   and appellants’ knowledge about the risk of jail suicides. The court further
   concluded it is clearly established that, when an official is subjectively aware
   of the risk of suicide and responds by giving the detainee loose bedding, an
   obvious ligature, he acts with deliberate indifference and is not entitled to
   qualified immunity.
          Regarding plaintiffs’ other claims, the district court, inter alia,
   dismissed the bystander-liability claims against the three appellants and the
   supervisory-liability claim against the Sheriff.
                                          II.
          This interlocutory appeal by Borrego, the Sheriff, and the Deputy
   (again, appellants) followed. Such an appeal from the denial of qualified
   immunity is permitted pursuant to the collateral-order doctrine. E.g., Club
   Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009). Along that line,
   our court has jurisdiction to “review a district court’s order denying a motion
   to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity only to the extent that the appeal
   concerns the purely legal question of whether the defendants are entitled to
   qualified immunity on the facts”. Bevill v. Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 274 (5th
   Cir. 2022) (alteration omitted) (citation omitted).

                                          6
Case: 22-50102       Document: 00516841270           Page: 7     Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                      No. 22-50102

          “On interlocutory appeal, we review [de novo the] denial of a qualified-
   immunity-based motion to dismiss . . . .” Benfield v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336
   (5th Cir. 2019). At this stage, we must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
   drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor”. Id. “We
   do not, however, accept as true legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or
   naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 336–37
   (alteration omitted) (citation omitted).
          “A plaintiff seeking to overcome a motion to dismiss because of
   qualified immunity . . . must plead facts that allow the court to draw the
   reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm alleged.” Bevill,
   26 F.4th at 274 (citation omitted). That is, “a plaintiff must plead factual
   allegations that, if true, ‘raise the right to relief above the speculative level’”,
   meaning that the relief is “plausible, not merely possible”. Benfield, 945 F.3d
   at 337 (first quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); then
   citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
          Plaintiffs, in response to questioning at oral argument, submitted a
   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) letter maintaining that, under
   Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010), we may
   consider documents attached to a dismissal motion that “are referred to in
   the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim”. This is an
   exception to the general rule that, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court
   may not go outside the complaint and any attachments to it. Collins v. Morgan
   Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
   P. 12 (b)(6)). Sullivan relies on our decision in Scanlan v. Texas A&M
   University, 343 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2003). Scanlan in turn relied on Collins,
   which promulgated this “limited exception” for when our court may go
   outside the complaint, including attachments to it, in reviewing a motion to
   dismiss. Scanlan, 343 F.3d at 536; see Collins, 224 F.3d 496.

                                            7
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270           Page: 8     Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                     No. 22-50102

          We need not consider this narrow exception’s application vel non,
   however, because, as noted supra and explained below, the district court
   relied on the statements as included in the complaint. In denying dismissal,
   the court stated: “All facts are taken as true from the allegations in Plaintiffs’
   Complaint. . . . Defendants Borrego, Zambra, Melendez, Diaz, and Carrillo
   attached their sworn statements to their respective Motions. . . . These
   statements are effectively identical to those alleged in the Complaint upon
   which the Court relies.” (Emphasis added.) Cf. Scanlan, 343 F.3d at 536
   (citing Collins, 224 F.3d at 496) (explaining that, in Collins, our court
   “approved the district court’s consideration of documents attached to the motion
   to dismiss” and “that the plaintiffs did not object to, or appeal, the district
   court’s consideration of those documents was central to this Court’s
   approval of that practice” (emphasis added)).
          “Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct
   violates a clearly established [statutory or] constitutional right.” Converse v.
   City of Kemah, 961 F.3d 771, 774 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mace v. City of
   Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003)). In our court, plaintiffs assert,
   solely for the purpose of preserving the issue for further review, that qualified
   immunity should be “abolished or modified so that it is inapplicable here”.
   For this appeal, we proceed with the qualified-immunity doctrine intact.
          When, as in this instance, defendants assert qualified immunity as a
   basis for dismissing a complaint, “plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified
   immunity must [plead facts allowing us to draw a reasonable inference]: ‘(1)
   that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the
   right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct’”. Id.
   (quoting Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016)); Bevill, 26
   F.4th at 274. We have discretion to elect which of the two prongs for this
   analysis should be addressed first. E.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
   236 (2009).

                                           8
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270           Page: 9     Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                     No. 22-50102

          For this first prong, in order “[t]o overcome [appellants’] qualified
   immunity defense, [p]laintiffs must first demonstrate that each official
   violated [Schubert]’s statutory or constitutional right”. Converse, 961 F.3d
   at 775. “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees’ right to
   medical care and to ‘protection from known suicidal tendencies’”. Baldwin
   v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Garza
   v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2019)); see also Converse, 961
   F.3d at 775 (“We have repeatedly held that pretrial detainees have a
   Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from a known risk of suicide.”
   (emphasis added)).
          Where the claimed violation of that Fourteenth Amendment right
   turns on alleged acts or omissions of an official, as in this action, the question
   is whether the “official breached his constitutional duty to tend to the basic
   human needs of persons in his charge”. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633,
   645 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (explaining difference in episodic and
   conditions-of-confinement claims); see also Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 206–
   07 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2573 (2022). Officials breach their
   constitutional duty, violating a detainee’s rights, when “they had gained
   actual knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide and responded with
   deliberate indifference”.     Converse, 961 F.3d at 775 (emphasis added)
   (quoting Hare, 74 F.3d at 650).          It is undisputed that “[d]eliberate
   indifference is an extremely high standard to meet”. Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of
   Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001).
          Accordingly, an “official will not be held liable if he merely ‘should
   have known’ of a risk”. Converse, 961 F.3d at 775. Rather, to satisfy this high
   standard, plaintiff must plausibly allege both that the official was “aware of
   facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
   serious harm exist[ed]” and that he “also [drew] the inference”. Id. at 775–
   76 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). An official with

                                           9
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270             Page: 10     Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                       No. 22-50102

   such knowledge “shows a deliberate indifference to that risk ‘by failing to
   take reasonable measures to abate it’”. Id. (quoting Hare, 74 F.3d at 648).
          Plaintiffs, however, maintain this court should instead apply the
   objective-unreasonableness standard the Court adopted in Kingsley v.
   Hendrickson for claims of excessive force (not failure to protect) by officers against
   a pretrial detainee. 576 U.S. 389 (2015). But, we are bound by our rule of
   orderliness. E.g., Def. Distrib. v. Platkin, 55 F.4th 486, 495 n.10 (5th Cir.
   2022) (“The rule of orderliness means that one panel of our court may not
   overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in law, such
   as by statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our en banc court.”
   (citation omitted)).      This rule renders this objective-unreasonableness
   assertion meritless. See Cope, 3 F.4th at 207 n.7 (explaining Kingsley “did not
   abrogate [this court’s] deliberate-indifference precedent”); Alderson v.
   Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Because
   the Fifth Circuit has continued to rely on Hare and to apply a subjective
   standard post-Kingsley, this panel is bound by our rule of orderliness.”).
          Regarding the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis, for a
   right to be “clearly established” it must be “sufficiently clear that every
   reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
   right”. Est. of Bonilla v. Orange Cnty., 982 F.3d 298, 306 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Critically, courts
   “must not ‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality’”;
   rather, we must undertake the inquiry “in light of the specific context of the
   case”. Cope, 3 F.4th at 204 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).
          Pursuant to our above-discussed discretion to begin our two-prong
   qualified-immunity analysis with either prong, we elect to begin with the first.
   For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege a violation of a

                                            10
Case: 22-50102     Document: 00516841270            Page: 11    Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                     No. 22-50102

   statutory or constitutional right. Therefore, we do not reach the second
   prong (whether clearly-established).
          To overcome appellants’ motions to dismiss based on qualified
   immunity, plaintiffs must, as stated supra, have pled facts permitting our
   court to draw a reasonable inference that Borrego, Sheriff Carrillo, and
   Deputy Melendez “(1) had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
   serious harm and (2) responded to that risk with deliberate indifference”. Id.
   at 210 (citation omitted). In the context of detainee suicide, the requisite
   substantial risk of serious harm must be specific; plaintiffs must allege
   defendants “were aware of a substantial and significant risk that the detainee
   might kill himself”. Id. at 207 (alteration omitted) (citation omitted).
          For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege appellants
   had the requisite subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide.
   Accordingly, whether they responded to that putative risk with deliberate
   indifference does not come into play.
                                          A.
          We first address plaintiffs’ blanket allegation that appellants “were
   aware of the excessive risk of [Schubert’s] health and safety and were aware
   of facts from which an inference could be drawn of serious harm, suffering
   and death. Moreover, they in fact drew that inference”. As stated supra, we
   must carefully discern factual allegations from legal conclusions in plaintiffs’
   complaint. This statement about appellants’ state-of-mind merely restates
   the standard required to demonstrate the requisite subjective knowledge;
   therefore, we do not accept it as a well-pleaded allegation when evaluating
   the sufficiency of the complaint. See Doe v. Robertson, 751 F.3d 383, 388 (5th
   Cir. 2014) (observing allegation that defendants “exhibited deliberate
   indifference” was “merely a legal conclusion”, even if it “might have ‘been
   couched as a factual allegation’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).

                                           11
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270           Page: 12   Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                     No. 22-50102

          Regarding plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations concerning the lack of
   mental-health screening, plaintiffs allege appellants ignored TCJS’
   instructions and put Schubert at risk. These allegations fail. Our court has
   acknowledged there is no independent constitutional right to suicide
   screening. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 307 (citing Taylor v. Barkes, 575
   U.S. 822, 826 (2015)) (“No decision of this Court establishes a right to
   proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols.              No
   decision of this Court even discusses suicide screening or prevention
   protocols.”).
          The well-pleaded allegations do not give rise to a plausible inference
   that Schubert had previously experienced suicidal tendencies, nor that he
   acted in a way to alert officials of a substantial risk of suicide. Further,
   plaintiffs do not allege he had documented instances of mental illness, as the
   earlier-discussed CCQ came back as “no match”. (Therefore, even if
   plaintiffs could assert a right to suicide screening, allegations “of inadequate
   screening or a violation of facility procedure would not raise an issue of
   deliberate     indifference”   without      additional   allegations   plausibly
   demonstrating appellants subjectively knew Schubert was at risk for suicide.
   Id. at 305.)
          Additionally, plaintiffs allege the following. Culberson County had
   been previously cited by the TCJS for violating jail standards relating to the
   completion of the screening form and prevention of jail suicides. The TCJS
   had also cited the county’s jail for being non-compliant with various
   requirements, including requirements to ensure that all jailers were up-to-
   date on their licensing, that only jailers with the proper training perform
   inmate-classification duties, that jailers make sure to log that they have
   searched for whether the inmate has previously received mental-health
   treatment, and that jailers attend the required suicide-prevention training.
   Plaintiffs further allege a prior suicide at the jail put appellants “on notice”.

                                          12
Case: 22-50102       Document: 00516841270           Page: 13   Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                      No. 22-50102

   In response to Schubert’s death, the TCJS, in its above-referenced 8 August
   2019 report, stated the jail: exhibited two violations of minimum standards;
   and was issued a notice of non-compliance.
                                           B.
            With these general allegations considered, we turn to specific
   allegations regarding appellants’ entitlement vel non to qualified immunity.
   When, as here, multiple government actors are defendants and assert
   qualified immunity, we “evaluate each officer’s actions separately, to the
   extent possible”. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir.
   2012).
            Again, because motions to dismiss are under review, we must consider
   the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. For the reasons that follow, we
   hold plaintiffs “have failed to [allege] that [Schubert’s] tendencies were
   known to anyone—let alone [appellants]”. Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305.
                                           1.
            Borrego, a jailer for the Culberson County Jail, received the three 911
   calls, one in which a male (later identified as Schubert) stated an unknown
   person was trying to kill him and two in which others reported a man was
   going around saying that someone was trying to kill him. Borrego also, with
   Sheriff Carrillo, witnessed Schubert’s explaining his history of drug abuse
   and his leaving a halfway house. Borrego did not complete a mental-health
   screening form for Schubert.
            Plaintiffs also allege Borrego “formed the opinion . . . that [Schubert]
   was mentally ill and needed immediate mental health treatment” and that
   “[Schubert] did not need to be jailed”. We do not accept this “conclusory
   statement”, however, because it amounts to a “naked assertion[] devoid of

                                           13
Case: 22-50102     Document: 00516841270            Page: 14   Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                     No. 22-50102

   further factual enhancement”.        Benfield, 945 F.3d at 336–37 (citation
   omitted).
          Accepting the well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing reasonable
   inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, we consider whether Borrego “had the
   requisite knowledge of a substantial risk”. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Benfield,
   945 F.3d at 336. Our court has repeatedly held officials have the requisite
   subjective knowledge when circumstantial evidence directs an official to the
   specific risk of suicide. E.g., Cope, 3 F.4th at 207–08 (official witnessed
   decedent attempt suicide the day before incident in question); Converse, 961
   F.3d at 776, 778–79 (official was present when decedent was pulled off bridge
   while he attempted to jump and where official heard decedent express that
   he should have jumped and would make another attempt to do so when
   released); Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 178 (5th Cir. 2016) (even though
   decedent stated he did not want to kill himself, official knew decedent
   suffered from depression, had recently attempted suicide, and his wife
   believed him to be suicidal).
          Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege Schubert did or said anything to
   indicate he was suicidal or otherwise intended to harm himself.            The
   allegations that Schubert told Borrego he had recently left a half-way house
   and may have abused drugs did not automatically impute knowledge to
   Borrego of a substantial risk of suicide. E.g., Est. of Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305
   (“[T]he fact of [the decedent’s] intoxication would not indicate that [the
   defendant] inferred [he] was a suicide risk”.). Additionally, the allegations
   do not plausibly show that Schubert’s prior or active drug use demonstrated
   to Borrego that Schubert faced a substantial risk of suicide. E.g., id.
          Because plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to plausibly show
   Borrego was subjectively aware of the risk of suicide, their allegations do not

                                          14
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270            Page: 15    Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                      No. 22-50102

   state a failure-to-protect claim against him. Cf. Converse, 961 F.3d at 778–80.
   Accordingly, Borrego is entitled to qualified immunity against the claim.
                                           2.
          Sheriff Carrillo was monitoring the radio when he heard the dispatch
   to Deputy Melendez. The Sheriff learned Schubert had been taken into
   custody after three 911 calls, one in which Schubert (again, unidentified at
   the time) called to say that an unknown person was trying to kill him and two
   others called to report that a man (Schubert) was going around saying that
   someone was trying to kill him. After Schubert was transported, the Sheriff
   “decided to go to the jail and check on [Schubert] and jail personnel”.
          Plaintiffs allege that, while interviewing Schubert, the Sheriff, as did
   Borrego, learned Schubert had a history of drug abuse and had recently left a
   halfway house. Although plaintiffs allege Schubert was cooperative and
   appeared truthful in his responses, plaintiffs also allege: the Sheriff was still
   required to conduct a mental-health screening form in accordance with
   TCJS; and, because “the form had not been completed”, the Sheriff “had to
   operate on the belief that [Schubert] was suicidal” and “was required to put
   [Schubert] on suicide watch”.
          Our court requires, as stated supra, defendant have “actual knowledge
   of the substantial risk of suicide”. Id. at 775. Plaintiffs fail to allege Schubert
   did or said anything to indicate he was suicidal.
          Because plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to plausibly show the
   Sheriff was subjectively aware of the risk of suicide, their allegations do not
   state a failure-to-protect claim against him. Cf. id. at 778–80. Accordingly,
   Sheriff Carrillo is entitled to qualified immunity against the claim.

                                           15
Case: 22-50102      Document: 00516841270          Page: 16   Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                    No. 22-50102

                                          3.
           The following allegations concern the third and final appellant,
   Deputy Melendez. He was dispatched to respond to the 911 calls in which
   Schubert was the subject. Borrego directed the Deputy to a location in Van
   Horn regarding an individual—unknown at the time—stating someone was
   trying to kill him. Upon the Deputy’s locating Schubert at the El Capitan
   Hotel at 11:13 p.m., he spoke with Schubert and described him as appearing
   nervous. Schubert also reiterated that “there was someone trying to kill
   him”. Schubert was oriented regarding time and place. He also “provided
   his correct name and a date of birth which was correct other than . . . off by
   two years”.
           The Deputy took Schubert to a Border Patrol station in order to
   identify him. After further investigation, the Deputy was able to identify
   Schubert and learned he “allegedly had an active warrant for an alleged
   parole violation”. Pursuant to the warrant, the Deputy took Schubert to the
   jail.
           The Deputy was dispatched to another call shortly after arriving at the
   jail with Schubert, but he later returned and assisted Borrego in escorting
   Schubert to his cell. During this time, Schubert repeated that someone was
   trying to kill him, but did not provide a name or description.
           Plaintiffs allege the Deputy “was well aware that [Schubert] was not
   in his right mind. He knew that [Schubert] was mentally ill. He likewise
   formed the belief that [Schubert] was a danger to himself and/or others”.
   Again, these are “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”,
   and they do not plausibly allege the requisite subjective knowledge. Benfield,
   945 F.3d at 336–37 (citation omitted).
           The key distinction between the Deputy and the other two appellants
   is plaintiffs’ assertion that the Deputy erred in his means and method of

                                         16
Case: 22-50102     Document: 00516841270            Page: 17   Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                     No. 22-50102

   taking Schubert into custody. Texas Health and Safety Code Chapter 573
   permits officers to take an individual into custody without a warrant if, inter
   alia, they “ha[ve] reason to believe and do[] believe that the person is a
   person with mental illness; and because of that mental illness there is a
   substantial risk of serious harm to the person or to others unless the person
   is immediately restrained”. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 573.001(a)(1).
   Plaintiffs concede that a violation of Chapter 573 is not per se a constitutional
   violation; accordingly, they offer any alleged violation as evidence that a
   constitutional violation occurred.
          In this court, plaintiffs maintain they alleged Schubert was taken into
   custody pursuant to this provision. Plaintiffs’ assertion stretches the bounds
   of the complaint.
          The complaint does not allege Schubert was taken into custody under
   this statute; rather, it alleges the Deputy “should have transported [Schubert]
   to the nearest-inpatient mental health facility” pursuant to Chapter 573.
   (Emphasis added.) Additionally, to the extent plaintiffs allege the Deputy
   was required to take Schubert into custody under Chapter 573, that chapter
   is permissive, not mandatory. See § 573.001(a) (“A peace officer, without a
   warrant, may take a person into custody . . . .” (emphasis added)).
   Accordingly, this allegation is without merit.
          We next consider whether the allegations about the facts known to the
   Deputy at the time plausibly provided the requisite subjective knowledge of
   a substantial risk of suicide. In addition to his initial knowledge from the
   dispatch, Schubert, while escorted to his cell, reiterated to the Deputy that
   someone was trying to kill him. Again, plaintiffs’ assertions do not plausibly
   allege the Deputy had actual knowledge that Schubert posed a substantial risk
   of suicide. E.g., Converse, 961 F.3d at 775.

                                          17
Case: 22-50102     Document: 00516841270           Page: 18   Date Filed: 08/01/2023

                                    No. 22-50102

          Because plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to plausibly show the
   Deputy was subjectively aware of the risk of suicide, their allegations do not
   state a failure-to-protect claim against him. Cf. id. at 778–80. Accordingly,
   Deputy Melendez is entitled to qualified immunity against the claim.
                                        III.
          For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denying Borrego,
   Sheriff Carrillo, and Deputy Melendez’ motions to dismiss the failure-to-
   protect claims is VACATED and judgment is RENDERED for them.

                                         18