Court Opinion

ID: 9741659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:00:17.458424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.361423
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
{dissenting). This controversy involves the interpretation and application of certain provisions of the labor mediation statute of Michigan, PA 1939, No 176, as amended.* It was the claim of plaintiff, as set forth in its bill of complaint, that defendants have violated said statute by improper interference with the rights of employees with reference to self-organization, and that they have wrongfully refused to engage in collective bargaining. Defendants denied the charges made against them, contending specifically that no duty rested on them to engage in collective bargaining with the plaintiff. It was their position in the trial court, and likewise on appeal, that the obligation to engage in collective bargaining, not having been specifically imposed by the statute, may not properly be implied from the language of the act, and that their conduct did not constitute prohibited interference with employees with reference to affiliation with plaintiff union, or otherwise in any attempt to obtain a bargaining agency.
Defendant corporation is, and for several years past has been, engaged in conducting a cleaning business in the city of Grand Rapids. The individual defendants are its officers in charge of its operations. Among other employees, it had at the time of the controversy in question here 9 men who were designated as driver-salesmen. Said employees were solicited to join the union and signed applications to that end. Apparently defendants did not approve such action and, in consequence, an election was held under the direction of the State mediation board, at which a majority of the 9 driver-salesmen, by secret ballot, *228indicated their desire to become affiliated with the plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, however, they undertook by written notice to withdraw from such membership," and, in consequence, defendants refused to recognize plaintiff as the representative of said employees.
On the trial in circuit court it was the claim of the plaintiff that the withdrawal, or attempted withdrawal, of the driver-salesmen of defendant corporation from the union was the result of the conduct of defendants, that undue pressure was brought to bear on the driver-salesmen, that they were urged to sign the withdrawal petition, and that in the aggregate the acts of the defendants constituted improper interference with the employees in the exercise of their right of self-organization and, hence, amounted to an unfair labor practice. The trial judge concluded from the proofs before him that plaintiff had sustained the burden of proof on such issue and held, as appears from his opinion, that the right to injunctive relief against such conduct had been established. "Without discussing the testimony in detail, it is sufficient to say that the record supports the holding of the circuit judge with reference to this phase of the controversy. The provisión of the decree granting relief to plaintiff against improper and forbidden interference with the rights of the employees in question with reference to self-organization and the selection of a bargaining agency is affirmed.
The attempted withdrawal of the driver-salesmen from plaintiff union having resulted from improper methods of persuasion, the conclusion follows that plaintiff union is entitled to represent said employees, or at least a majority of them, in negotiations with the employer. This brings us to a consideration of the principal question at issue in the case, namely, whether the pertinent provisions of the labor mediation-act of this State impose on. the defendant *229employer the duty to bargain with the plaintiff as the representative of the employees concerned. No claim is made that interstate commerce is in any way involved or that the provisions of the Federal labor relations act * are applicable. It is also conceded that the Michigan statute contains no specific provision imposing on an employer subject thereto the duty to engage in collective bargaining with the representative of its employees. Neither does it impose such duty on employees or their representatives.
Plaintiff relies on section 8 of the statute (CL 1948, §423.8 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.454(8)]) which reads as follows:
“It shall be lawful for employees, to organize together or to form, join or assist in labor organization, to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective negotiation or bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, or to negotiate or bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own free choice.”
It is argued, in substance, that the statutory recognition of the enumerated rights on the part of employees, including the right to bargain collectively, imposes a correlative duty on employers with respect to collective bargaining. It may be noted in this regard that a declaration of the right to bargain on the part of employees is not equivalent to creating a duty to do so. As before suggested, defendants insist that such duty may not be thus implied, the legislature having failed to specifically declare it. The circuit judge accepted the plaintiff’s interpretation of the provisions of the act and held that defendant corporation owed a statutory duty to bargain with plaintiff as the representative of a majority of the driver-salesmen. Accordingly the decree entered *230provided for a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to engage in collective bargaining.
As indicated at the outset, the problem is one of statutory interpretation. On behalf of plaintiff attention is directed to the declaration of policy, in the first section of the mediation statute, referring to the public interest in labor disputes and declaring further that “the voluntary mediation of such disputes under the guidance and supervision of a governmental agency will tend to promote permanent industrial peace and the health, welfare, comfort and safety of the people of the State.” The mediation act may properly be regarded as remedial legislation. There is no dispute in this regard, but in construing said act it must be borne in mind that it rests with the legislature to indicate the means and methods by which the purposes of the enactment are to be accomplished. Obviously the Michigan act is not of the same character as the Federal labor management relations act of 1947, or the previous act of Congress of 1935. As the circuit judge remarked in the course of his opinion:
“The Michigan legislature created a mediation board, but not a labor board.”
The declaration of policy suggests that the legislature had in mind the protection of the public welfare through the adjustment of labor disputes by mediation.
There is much force to the argument of defendants that if the legislature of Michigan had intended in the enactment of the mediation act to impose on employers the duty of collective bargaining it would have done so in specific terms. It has been repeatedly declared by courts throughout the country that the primary purpose of statutory construction is to discover the legislative intent. To that end recourse must be had primarily to the language employed. In *231Ellis v. Boer, 150 Mich 452, 455, the question was presented whether the legislature in amending an act providing for primary elections in Kent county and the city of Grand Rapids had abolished such elections within the city. In determining that such was the result, it was said, in part:
“From the act itself and from the legislative journals the legislative intent must he ascertained. People, ex rel. Hart, v. McElroy, 72 Mich 446 (2 LRA 609); Attorney General v. Rice, 64 Mich 385. It is clear from reading the act — and there is nothing whatever claimed to he contained in the legislative journals to the contrary — that the legislative intent was not to re-enact the provisions of the section relative to primary elections of elective city officers in the city of Grand Rapids. It is a distinct and direct amendment of the section by an orderly and constitutional legislative enactment, substituting the section as amended for the section as it stood in the law before this amendment.
“The provision not re-enacted was the only one in the entire act which authorized and fixed a primary election of city officers in Grand Rapids. It is not the province of the Court to inquire why the legislature struck such provision out of the law. It is the province of the Court to construe the legislative enactment. There is now no provision in this law for holding such primaries. The action of the council in fixing a day for holding such primary election was therefore without authority and of no force or effect.”
In City of Detroit v. Detroit United Railway, 156 Mich 106, the question before the Court involved the interpretation of a statute providing for the payment of damages sustained by property owners in the making of improvements for the public benefit. In the opinion we find the follow significant comments (pp 110, 111):
*232“Counsel entertain widely differing opinions about the scope and effect of this legislation, for which they find reasons, in the meaning they give to the words, in the general purpose of the law and in the previous state of the law. As would be expected, these opinions favor on the one hand a liberal construction of what is denominated a ‘remedial statute,’ on the other hand a construction which will not expand or enlarge the meaning which the words employed will bear. Without setting out the arguments, by which we have profited, we state the conclusions we have reached and the reasons therefor. This is a remedial statute, in essence a declaration of the right of the individual to compensation for damages sustained by him for the public benefit. A rule often stated is that a remedial statute should be construed liberally for the advancement of the remedy; but neither this rule nor the one of strict construction is a warrant for disregarding the language of a statute, or for amending the law to conform to a judicial conception of what should have been the legislative conception in passing it.”
The national labor relations act, as amended, provides in section 8 (29 USCA, § 158) that:
“(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
“(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title ;
“(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it; Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay;
“(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any *233labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made and has at the time the agreement was made or within the preceding 12 months received from the board a notice of compliance with section 159(f), (g), (h) of this title, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within 1 year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmember-ship in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (.B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ;
“(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
“(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.”
*234A comparison of the provisions of the Federal act with those of the State mediation act clearly indicates that in the enactment of the latter measure consideration was given to the language of the act of Congress. Section 16 (CL 1948, §423.16 as amended by PA 1949, No 230 [CLS 1956, § 423.16, Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.454(17)]) of the State statute provides as follows:
“It shall be unlawful for an employer or any officer or agent of an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, (2) to initiate, create, dominate, contribute to, or interfere with the formation or administration of, any labor organization; (3) to discriminate in regard to. hire, terms or other conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization; (4) to encourage membership in, or initiate, create, dominate, or contribute to, a company union; or (5) to discriminate against any employee because he has given testimony or instituted a proceeding under this act. Violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor and punishable as such.”
It will be noted that the State statute is substantially identical with the Federal act in several respects in its provisions as to unfair labor practices on the part of an employer. There is, however, a significant omission of the requirement as to collective bargaining. In view of the similarity of the language used in the 2 acts, such omission suggests the intentional rejection by the Michigan legislature of language imposing the specific duty here in question. Had such requirement been intended, the inference may not be avoided that the State legislature would have incorporated in the mediation act the language of the Federal law or some analogous provision. Declaring the right on the part of employees to organize and to engage in collective bargaining *235through their chosen representatives may not be regarded as imposing the duty in question on the employer, particularly so in view of the specific nature of the enactment in question.
With reference to the issue of interpretation the recent decision of the supreme court of Missouri in Quinn v. Buchanan (Mo), 298 SW2d 413, is of interest. The facts there involved were analogous to those in the case at bar. Plaintiffs represented a labor union to which driver-salesmen of the defendant employer belonged. It was claimed that defendant refused to enter into collective bargaining with the union as the representative of said employees. There, as here, mandatory injunctive relief was sought to compel defendant to negotiate and bargain. The action was based on a constitutional provision of the State of Missouri (art 1, § 29) declaring:
“That employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.”
It will be noted that said provision is analogous to the section of the Michigan mediation act on which plaintiff relies in the instant case. In denying the right to the injunctive remedy sought, the court, construing the language of the constitutional provision on which the plaintiffs relied, said (pp 418, 419):
“This provision is a declaration of a fundamental right of individuals. It is self-executing to the extent that all provisions of the bill of rights are self-executing, namely: Any governmental action in violation of the declared right is void. As between individuals, because it declares a right the violation of which surely is a legal wrong, there is available every appropriate remedy to redress or prevent violation of this right. However, the constitutional provision provides for no required affirmative duties concerning this right and these remedies can only apply to *236their violation. As stated in Quill v. Eisenhower, 5 Misc 2d 431, 433 (113 NYS2d 887, 889): ‘It is evident that the constitutional provision guaranteeing employees the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing does not cast upon all employers a correlative obligation. The constitutional provision was shaped as a shield; the union seeks to use it as a sword. * * * The constitutional provision was intended to protect employees against legislation or acts which would prevent or interfere with their organization and choice of representatives for the purpose of bargaining collectively.’ Thus implementation of the right to require any affirmative duties of an employer concerning it is a matter for the legislature.”
It was accordingly held that while plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief against defendant to restrain him from coercing employees into withdrawing from the union, they were not entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring defendant to bargain with the union. The decision in Quill v. Eisenhower, 5 Misc 2d 431 (113 NYS2d 887), cited by the Missouri court, is in accord.
Decisions of the Federal courts dealing with questions of alleged unfair labor practices under the labor management relations act, and involving specific provisions thereof, are of little assistance in the construction of the Michigan statute providing for mediation of labor disputes. Counsel have called attention to a number of cases of such character, of which National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1 (57 S Ct 615, 81 L ed 893, 108 ALR 1352), is fairly typical. Among other questions there involved was the provision of the. Federal act specifically declaring it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights recognized by the act. Specifically involved *237was the right of seif-organization. It was recognized that under the law employees were entitled to act through representatives of their own choosing. As above indicated, a like situation exists under the State enactment in question here, which statute does not refer to collective bargaining. Specific reference to other Federal cases would serve no useful purpose in determining the issue of statutory interpretation involved in the instant proceeding.
It may be noted, also, that the decision of this Court in Service Drivers & Helpers, Car Washers & Garage Employees Union, Teamsters Local 985, A. F. L., v. Labor Mediation Board, 342 Mich 295, involved the right of the mediation board to refuse to conduct an election for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff union represented a majority of the employees of an employer. It appears that the employer in question had refused to recognize the plaintiff as the representative of such employees. It was held that the showing made on behalf of the plaintiff was sufficient to permit the jurisdiction of the board to be invoked, and the language used in the opinion, to which attention has been directed, had reference to the right of employees to select “representatives of their own free choice.” In declaring that it was the duty of the defendant mediation board to take jurisdiction in accordance with petitions filed by the plaintiff union and a majority of the employees, it was recognized that an employer could not defeat the jurisdiction of the board, or the right of employees to invoke it, by refusing to recognize the chosen representative of the employees. Obviously the case did not involve the question presented in the instant controversy.
In determining the legislative intent in the passage of the mediation act at the 1939 session, and in its subsequent amendment 10 years later, we may properly look to the legislative history in each instance. *238Judicial notice may be taken of the journals of the house and senate. Wilson v. Atwood, 270 Mich 317. We find from the House Journal of the session of 1939 that Bill #109, which ultimately became the-mediation act, was introduced early in the session. At the time of its introduction it contained a provision (section 26 of the bill) declaring it to be unlawful for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively.” The bill passed the house and was transmitted to the senate for action thereby. In the senate-there was a substituted bill which did not include the provision of the house bill, as introduced, imposing the duty to bargain collectively.
In accordance with the usual legislative practice conference committees were appointed, and a measure was agreed on thereby and adopted by both houses, the provision with .reference to collective bargaining being omitted. It thus appears that the legislature in the adoption of the mediation act at the session of 1939 rejected the provision the inclusion of which would support plaintiff’s claim in the instant case. It may be noted also that at the same session Senate Bill #43 was introduced on January 19, 1939, and Senate Bill #76 a few days later. Each of these bills declared it to be an unlawful labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of their employees. Neither measure received favorable action. The journals of the house and senate for the session of 1939 indicate beyond question that the legislature declined to accept a provision relative to collective bargaining analogous to that found in the national labor relations law.
At the session of 1949 the mediation act was amended by Act No 230 of that year. Senate Bill #236 as introduced proposed the amendment of section 16 of the mediation act, above quoted, in such way as to make it unlawful for an employer to refuse *239to bargain collectively with the duly recognized representative of his employees. Other proposed amendments in the bill, if adopted, would have tended to change the Michigan statute from a mediation measure to a labor board act analogous to the Federal statute. Obviously the bill as drafted rested on the premise that the original mediation statute, passed 10 years earlier, did not impose the duty on the employer to bargain collectively. Following committee hearings conducted in both house and senate, the provisions of Senate Bill #236 were modified, and there was omitted from section 16 thereof the provision, taken in substance from the Federal act, with reference to collective bargaining.
It may be noted, also, in connection with the legislative history of the mediation act that the legislature, while refusing to accept an amendment to the mediation act requiring all employers to bargain collectively with the representatives of their employees, undertook, in section 13a of PA 1949, No 230 (CLS 1956, § 423.13a [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.454 (14.2)]) to impose such obligation in labor disputes involving hospital or public utility employees. For reasons not material, based on the procedure specified in the handling of such disputes, these amendments relating to disputes of the character indicated were held invalid in Local 170, Transport Workers Union of America v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 322 Mich 332. However, the provision enacted with reference to collective bargaining in the special classes of cases mentioned must be taken to indicate that the legislature did not consider that any general obligation as to collective bargaining by employers was contemplated by the act. Any such general provision would of course have rendered it unnecessary to incorporate the special requirement as to hospital and public utilities.
*240The rejection by the legislature in 1939, and again in 1949, of a proposed statutory requirement imposing on employers the duty of collective bargaining leaves no question as to the legislative intent. In Wayne County v. Auditor General, 250 Mich 227, there was involved the interpretation of PA 1927, No 150, relating to the apportionment of highway funds. After indicating that the act should be construed in connection with PA 1925, No 1, it was said (pp 235, 236):
“If there is any occasion to support the conclusion here reached as to the proper statutory construction by further reasons, such reasons will be found in the following:
“(1) Legislative History. The legislative history of the 1927 act reveals the fact that while it was pending in the legislature, a proposed amendment was-rejected which, if embodied in the act, would have-rendered it subject to plaintiff’s interpretation and not to that of the defendant (see House Journal, 1927, page 965). Surely this gives rise to the inference that the legislature did not intend the act should he subject to the interpretation now urged by plaintiff. 36 Cyc, p 1147, citing many cases.”
The above decision was cited with approval in People v. Adamowski, 340 Mich 422, 429. In determining the matter of statutory construction involved, it was there said:
“When the legislature affirmatively rejected the statutory language which would have supported the State’s present view, it thereby made its intention crystal clear. We should not, without a clear and cogent reason to the contrary, give a statute a construction which the legislature itself plainly refused to give.”
For the reasons above indicated, we are not in accord with the holding of the circuit judge in the instant case as to the duty of defendant employer to *241engage in collective bargaining with the plaintiff. A reading of the statute does not support the construction contended for by plaintiff, and the legislative history of the Michigan act and its amendments is conclusive on the issue of intent. We cannot read into the act a provision that the legislature expressly rejected in the original enactment of the measure and in its subsequent amendment.
As before noted, an election was held under the direction of the State mediation board for the purpose of determining if the employees of the defendants desired to be represented by plaintiff in their dealings with their employers. Apparently defendants rejected the claim that the employees had previously indicated their choice in the matter, and desired a definite expression of opinion on the subject. Precedent to the election an agreement was entered into, for the holding of the election, in accordance with the procedure of the mediation board. The result of the election as certified by the board indicated that 9 votes were cast, of which 6 favored the selection of the plaintiff and 3 were opposed. Defendants, however, refused to enter into collective bargaining with plaintiff, apparently relying on the claim that the employees did not desire such action.
On behalf of plaintiff it is asserted by counsel in their brief that the agreement for the holding of the election, which provided that the parties thereto should be bound by the result, imposed the duty of collective bargaining and that such agreement should be specifically enforced. We cannot agree with such interpretation of the written contract for the election. It contained no provision requiring either, party thereto to bargain collectively. Such being, the case it is not subject to specific enforcement in a court of equity. The purpose of the election was to determine whether plaintiff should act for and on behalf of the employees in dealing with problems; *242arising from the employment relation. Unquestionably the parties might voluntarily have carried on collective bargaining, in which event defendants could not have objected to the representation of their employees by the plaintiff. The agreement, being a part of the mediation board’s customary procedure in such cases, must be construed in connection with the statute under which the board acted. For the reasons above set forth the duty of collective bargaining was not imposed by the statute, and it is equally true that the contract did not require it.
It is significant that the bill of complaint filed by plaintiff, seeking relief-by way of mandatory injunction, was not based on the election agreement. Specific performance was not asked on the ground that defendants had thereby assumed a binding and irrevocable obligation to engage in collective bargaining, with plaintiff acting on behalf of the employees. While the record indicates that mention was made of such contract by counsel for plaintiff during the course of the trial in circuit court, it is apparent from the record before us that it was not urged as the basis of a decree for specific performance. The trial judge did not refer to it in his opinion. Apparently he did not consider it as involved in the determination of the case. It is a fair conclusion also that plaintiff’s failure to plead the contract as a possible basis for equitable relief fully justified the finding that reliance was not placed thereon. In any event, the contention now advanced in this Court is without merit.
Specific performance of a contract may not be sought in equity in the absence of clear and specific provisions in the undertaking of the parties imposing a duty that the court may properly require to be performed, and performance of which may be, as a practical proposition, adequately supervised by the court granting such a decree. In Blanchard v. De *243troit, L. & L. M. R. Co., 31 Mich 43 (18 Am Rep 142), a contract was entered into between the plaintiff and the predecessor of the defendant providing that in consideration of the conveyance of certain land to the railroad company it would construct thereon and maintain a depot or station house suitable for the convenience of the public, and that freight and passengers should be regularly taken to and from such station. In considering the situation it was said in the opinion of the Court (pp 52, 53):
“Supposing it to be admitted that the provision in the grant is susceptible of being understood in a promissory sense, and is capable of being considered as in the nature of an agreement by the defendants with the complainant, is it capable of specific enforcement by the court? Setting aside the objection founded on public policy, which is not examined, are the requirements in the writing of such a nature, ancl so fully and clearly marked out, defined, identified, or indicated, as to make specific execution by the court practicable ? We had occasion in the recent case of Buck v. Smith, 29 Mich 166 (18 Am Rep 84), to submit some observations respecting the power and duty of the court to execute agreements for the performance of an indefinite number and variety of future acts within the scope of a business not distinctly and exactly mapped out and particularized, and what was there stated has some application here.
“The jurisdiction of equity in specific performance proceeds on the supposition that the parties have not only agreed, as between themselves, upon every material matter, but that the matters so agreed on are of such a nature, and the subjects of enforcement so delineated or indicated, either directly or by reference to something else, or so raised to view, by legitimate implication, that the court can and may collect, and in their proper relations, all the essential elements, and proceed intelligently and practically in carrying into execution the very things agreed on and standing to be performed.
*244“If, however, it appears, either that the things to be performed are in their nature incapable of execution by the court, or that needful specifications are omitted, or that material matters are left by the parties so obscure or undefined, or so in want of details, or that the subjects of the agreement are so conflicting or incongruous, that the court cannot say whether or not the minds of the parties met upon all the essential particulars, or if they did, then cannot say exactly upon what substantial terms they agreed, or trace out any practical line where their minds met, the case is not one for specific performance.”
In accordance with the general conclusions indicated in the language quoted, it was held that the agreement was not one that was subject to specific performance and the decree of the trial court dismissing the bill of complaint was affirmed. The principles recognized by the Court have been repeatedly stated and followed in subsequent decisions, among which are Diamond Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 216 Mich 71; Sword v. Aird, 306 Mich 14; Steketee v. Steketee, 317 Mich 100; McDonald v. Scheifler, 323 Mich 117; Sobczak v. Kotwicki, 347 Mich 242.
Inasmuch as the contract for the holding of the election among the employees of the defendants did not by its terms impose the duty of collective bargaining it would seem to be unnecessary to emphasize the well-established rule that specific performance of a contract will not be granted in any case unless the performance decreed may be, as a practical proposition, directed and supervised by the court. The cases above cited, including Blanchard v. Detroit L. & L. M. R. Co., recognize the general rule in this respect. See, also, O’Melia v. Berghoff Brewing Corp., 304 Mich 471, 476 (145 ALR 679).
A provision requiring collective bargaining may not be read into the agreement here under considera*245tion. Had it been expressly stated tbe situation would scarcely permit of practical supervision of the carrying out of a decree for specific performance. Obviously many matters may be involved in collective bargaining between an employer and the representative of employees. It is true, also, that opinions may well differ as to the subjects for consideration. Involved also is the essential element of good faith on both sides and due consideration of issues of a material nature. Such a situation would clearly fall within the rule that:
“Specific performance is generally refused where enforcement of the contract would be difficult or inconvenient.” 81 CJS, Specific Performance, § 17, p 442.
Of like import is 49 Am Jur, Specific Performance, § 70, p 85.
In support of their argument that the decree of the trial court providing for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction should be upheld on the theory of specific performance counsel for plaintiff cite no relevant authority. Attention is directed to General Magnetic Company v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 937, CIO, 328 Mich 542. The contract there involved between the plaintiff employer and the defendant union as the representative of employees prescribed certain grievance procedure and prohibited any sort of work stoppage until compliance therewith had been wholly exhausted. It was held by this Court that the defendant had breached its contract and was, in consequence, liable for resulting damages. The case involved the disregard of a negative covenant against work stoppages rather than the specific performance of an. affirmative undertaking. It may not be regarded as relevant to any possible issue involved, in the present controversy.
*246It may be noted, also, that section 22 of the mediation act, as amended (CLS 1956, § 423.22 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.454(23)]), does not support the claim of right to specific performance advanced in the present case. Subdivision (c) of said section provides that:
“The hoard, the attorney general, or any prosecuting attorney, on behalf of the people, or any individual or person, may pursue any appropriaté legal or equitable remedy or other relief in any circuit court having jurisdiction with respect to any act or conduct in violation of any of the provisions of this act. The existence of a criminal penalty with respect to any such act or conduct shall not be deemed to preclude appropriate equitable relief.”
It will be noted that the language of the statute refers to “any act or conduct in violation of any of the .provisions of this act.” If the election contract, which plaintiff claims should be specifically enforced, had actually imposed the. duty of collective bargaining, it is.obvious that refusal to comply therewith would not constitute a breach of the statute. In consequence the language above quoted, designed to facilitate enforcement of the provisions of the mediation. act, would have no bearing.
The practical situation presented here is that neither the statute, the Michigan mediation act, nor the agreement for the holding of an election to determine the right of plaintiff to represent defendants’ employees, imposes the duty of collective bargaining. The decree of the circuit court, insofar as it authorizes the issuance of a mandatory injunction, should be vacated. Questions of statutory construction being involved, no costs are allowed.
. Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, ,J., concurred with Carr, J.

 CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq. (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.454 [1] et seq.).

 29 USCA, § 141 et seq., the labor management relations act of 1947, which was amendatory of the prior act of 1935.