Court Opinion

ID: 9893393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 20:04:19.173622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:00.773986
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/26/23 P. v. Long CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B325409

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. MA078020)
           v.

 ROBERT KEVIN LONG,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
      Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      A jury found defendant Robert Kevin Long guilty of five
counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (counts 1, 4, 6, 7,
& 9; Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a)) and three counts of continuous
sexual abuse (counts 3, 5, & 8; § 288.5, subd. (a)). The jury
further found true allegations that the crimes involved multiple
victims. (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e).) The court sentenced
defendant to prison for 120 years to life.
      Defendant contends (1) the court erroneously admitted
evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
(CSAAS); and (2) he was denied his right to effective assistance
of counsel. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
      A.      Prosecution Evidence
              1.   T.C.2
      T.C. testified to the following.
      In September 1990, when T.C. was 10 years old, T.C.’s
mother began a dating relationship with defendant. The three
of them and T.C.’s brother lived together in a house in Carson.
      On numerous occasions over a two-year period, defendant
would enter T.C.’s bedroom at night, pull down T.C.’s pants and
rub his penis on T.C.’s “butt” until he ejaculated. The contact
was “skin to skin.” He told T.C., “Don’t tell your mother.”
Defendant sometimes engaged in similar conduct during the

      1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
      2 The prosecution did not allege any crime committed
against T.C. Her testimony was introduced pursuant to Evidence
Code section 1108, subdivision (a).

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daytime, after T.C. came home from school. On one occasion,
defendant tried to penetrate T.C. vaginally, but stopped when she
screamed. He then tried to penetrate her rectum. Other times,
defendant would rub T.C.’s breasts and her vaginal area with his
hand. Defendant told T.C. that if she told her mother, “he would
hurt [her] mother.” T.C. took these threats seriously.
      Defendant’s sexual abuse of T.C. occurred between 50 and
100 times. The abuse ended when defendant and T.C.’s mother
ended their relationship in early 1992. Soon afterward, T.C. told
her mother about the abuse.
      On cross-examination, T.C. said that she had not told her
mother earlier because she “didn’t want anything bad to happen
to her.” She had talked with a friend about the abuse throughout
the time it was occurring because the friend “was experiencing
the same thing.” She did not report the abuse to “an authority.”

      2.    K.S.
       K.S. was born in December 1993. She was 28 years old
when she testified at trial.
       In 1998, K.S.’s mother and defendant began a dating
relationship. They married in 2000 or 2001, when K.S. was
seven years old. K.S., her mother, an older brother, and
defendant lived together in a house in Lancaster.
       K.S. testified that she “had a pretty good relationship”
with defendant “when [she] was a kid,” and considered him
her “dad.” Their relationship changed one night when she was
sleeping on her stomach in bed and awoke to feel defendant
on top of her “grinding” his penis against her “butt area.” Both
of them were clothed. When K.S.’s mother called for defendant,
he stopped and left the room. This occurred when K.S. was in
kindergarten and about six or seven years old.

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       Similar conduct thereafter “happened repeatedly,” “maybe
five times a month” over a three or four-year period. The conduct
usually took place “on top of [K.S.’s] clothing.” Once, however,
defendant pulled down K.S.’s pants and rubbed his erect penis on
K.S.’s “vagina area” and her “butt area.” K.S. was eight years old
when this occurred. Another time, defendant engaged in “the
same type of gyration,” but it ended with defendant ejaculating
on her “butt” and “arm.” Once, defendant put his hands inside
K.S.’s pants and touched her “vagina.” Another time, he took
K.S.’s hand and put it down his pants until K.S.’s hand touched
his penis.
       K.S. testified that she did not tell anyone about defendant’s
sexual abuse as a child because she was “[s]cared of getting in
trouble, punished, nobody believing [her]. A lot of things. Losing
the relationship with [her] family.” She thought that if she said
something, defendant might harm her or her mother. She also
feared that if others did not believe her she would be “outcasted
or something like that.” She was also afraid that she would lose
her “relationship with the only father [she] knew.”
       After defendant and K.S.’s mother ended their relationship,
defendant married the mother of R.M., another victim of
defendant’s sexual abuse. K.S. and R.M. became friends. K.S.
did not talk to R.M. about defendant’s sexual abuse of her. K.S.
explained at trial that she thought defendant might have done
that to her only, and if she spoke to R.M. about it, R.M. might
“look at [her] weird.”
       In 2012 or 2013, K.S. communicated with defendant
through Facebook, and told him: “I never forgot what you did
to me.” She had no further contact with him.

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        While attending college in 2017, K.S. spoke to others for the
first time about defendant’s sexual abuse. Later that year, K.S.’s
mother told her that “something happen[ed]” to R.M. K.S. knew
she was referring to sexual abuse and told her mother that she
believed R.M. “because it happened to me.” In August 2017, K.S.
reported the matter to law enforcement.
        On cross-examination, K.S. admitted that she told an
investigating officer that the abuse occurred 10 to 15 times—
far less often than her testimony during trial. She also stated
that, prior to talking to fellow students in college when she
was 23 years old, she had never told anyone in her family, law
enforcement, doctors, or nurses about the abuse.

      3.    C.W.
       C.W. was born in July 1996. She was 26 years old at the
time of trial.
       K.S.’s maternal grandmother adopted C.W. when C.W. was
five years old. C.W. was thus the sister of K.S.’s mother, but two
years younger than K.S. Around the year 2000, C.W. visited with
K.S. at K.S.’s house about two times each week and sometimes
stayed overnight.
       C.W. testified to five specific incidents of sexual contact
involving defendant. When C.W. was four years old, defendant
took her to a bedroom where he laid her on the bed and pulled
her pants down. Defendant rubbed his penis “against [her]
vagina” for a couple of minutes. When he finished, there was
fluid on her “private areas.” Defendant told C.W. not to tell
anyone, and C.W. felt that if she did, she “would get in trouble.”
       In the second incident, defendant took C.W. into the
backseat of a car parked in defendant’s garage, where he rubbed
his penis against C.W.’s genitals. A third, similar incident

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occurred in a bathroom, and a fourth in a closet. The last
incident occurred when C.W. was eight years old. As she
prepared to go swimming in a pool with other children, defendant
took C.W. to his room and started rubbing his penis against her.
He stopped when C.W. told him, “No. No. No.”
      C.W. testified that there were “at least ten” incidents
involving defendant rubbing his penis, “skin to skin,” against
her genitals.
      C.W. did not tell anyone about the sexual abuse when
she was a child primarily because she “thought [she] would get
in trouble.” When she was 18 years old, she told her “birth mom,”
and soon afterward, her adoptive mother. She also spoke with
K.S. and R.M. about the incidents. Later, C.W. told a detective
who had contacted her in response to K.S.’s report of defendant’s
abuse toward her.
      On cross-examination, C.W. testified that she never told
anyone at school or doctors about the incidents.

      4.    R.M.
      R.M. was born in December 1995. At the time of trial,
she was 26 years old.
      R.M.’s mother married defendant when R.M. was about
seven or eight years old. R.M., her mother, defendant, and
R.M.’s three siblings lived together in an apartment in Lancaster.
R.M. called defendant, “Dad.”
      R.M. described five specific instances of sexual abuse
by defendant that took place from approximately 2003 until
approximately 2008. The first occurred when R.M. was eight
years old. R.M. was sitting on defendant’s lap as defendant
drove a “quad”—a vehicle that is “like a motorcycle, but [with]

                                6
four wheels.” As they rode the quad, R.M. could feel defendant
“grinding” his penis against her “butt.”
       The second occasion occurred when R.M. was sleeping
on a couch on her stomach and awoke when defendant was on
top of her “grinding his penis area on [her] butt.” Both of them
were clothed. R.M. got up off the couch and went to her room.
Neither said anything to the other.
       In the third and fourth instances, defendant took R.M. into
his room and rubbed his exposed penis against R.M.’s clothed
buttocks until he ejaculated onto her pants.
       During the fifth incident, defendant locked R.M. inside a
room. He pulled R.M.’s pants and underwear down and rubbed
his penis against her genitals.
       Defendant committed acts of rubbing his penis against
R.M.’s “butt” more than 40 times over the course of about
five years and “about 85 [percent] of the time [she] had [her]
clothes on.” The other times, his penis was exposed and the
contact “was skin-to-skin.” On other occasions, defendant
touched her “vagina” with his fingers. On one occasion, when
R.M. was 10 or 11 years old, defendant lifted R.M.’s shirt
and sucked on her breasts.
       In early 2009, R.M. told her sister’s friend about
defendant’s sexual abuse. She also told her physical education
coach. In March 2009, she reported the matter to law
enforcement. An investigation ensued that resulted in her and
her sisters being placed in foster care. Around this time, she
expressed her thoughts in a diary, in which she wrote of wanting
“to kill [her]self,” to “cut [her]self,” and “to die.”
       About three weeks after reporting the conduct to law
enforcement, R.M. told a deputy sheriff that she had “lied about

                                7
everything.” During trial, she testified that she did so because
she knew that her report “would not only affect [her], it would
affect [her] sister, [her] brother, [her] mom; and [she] didn’t want
anything to happen to [them].”

      5.    Monica Borunda (CSAAS expert)
       Monica Borunda is a child forensic interviewer, who
testified as an expert regarding CSAAS. She described CSAAS
as “a model that helps clinicians understand the way children
will respond when they have been sexually abused.” She
explained that the syndrome has five components. The first is
secrecy: The child victim of abuse may want to keep the abuse
secret because of express or implied threats of harm to the victim
or others, or because of fear of “get[ting] in trouble” or of how
family members will react.
       The second component is helplessness. A child who is
abused by a family member may be confused about the incidents,
and not know how to get help or articulate what occurred.
       The third component is “entrapment accommodation.” The
child may learn a variety of strategies for coping with ongoing
abuse, including showing affection toward the abuser.
       The fourth component is delayed disclosure. It is common,
Borunda stated, for persons abused as children not to tell anyone
until they are an adult, and to make disclosure incrementally.
The victim may also recall more incidents over time. It is also
common to have different interviews of the victim yield variations
of what occurred.
       The fifth component is retraction or recantation. The
child may see negative consequences to the family as a result
of reporting the conduct and think, “If I take it back, I can undo
everything.”

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       Lastly, Borunda explained that every child responds
differently to abuse and not every child experiences each of
the five components.
       On cross-examination, Borunda stated that children
sometimes falsely assert sexual abuse claims. A child might
make a false claim if an adult tells the child to do so, or if the
children assert a false claim out of anger directed at the alleged
abuser. When the prosecutor asked her about such claims on
redirect, Borunda stated that “[t]he statistics put it at around
two to ten percent.”

      B.    Defense
      Defendant testified in his defense and denied any sexual
conduct with his accusers. He said that when K.S. was a
teenager, she asked defendant to buy her a car. When defendant
declined, K.S. became upset. He said he allowed R.M. to sit on
his lap when they rode quads to teach her how to drive them.
He did not, however, “do anything like mov[e] [his] pelvis against
[R.M.’s] buttocks.”

      C.    CSAAS Instruction
       The court instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 10.64 as
follows: “Evidence has been presented to you concerning child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. This evidence is not
received and must not be considered by you as proof that the
alleged victim's molestation claim is true. [¶] Child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome research is based upon an approach
that is completely different from that which you must take to
this case. The syndrome research begins with the assumption
that a molestation has occurred, and seeks to describe and
explain common reactions of children to that experience. As

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distinguished from that research approach, you are to presume
the defendant innocent. The People have the burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] You should consider the
evidence concerning the syndrome and its effect only for the
limited purpose of showing, if it does, that the alleged victim’s
reactions, as demonstrated by the evidence, are not inconsistent
with her having been molested.”

                         DISCUSSION
      A.    Admissibility of CSAAS Expert Testimony
      Defendant contends that the court erred in allowing
Borunda to testify as to CSAAS because such evidence is—
or should be—generally inadmissible. He acknowledges that
California courts have consistently approved the use of CSAAS
evidence when offered to rehabilitate the credibility of victim-
witnesses when the defendant suggests that the witness’s
conduct after the incident is inconsistent with his or her
testimony. (See, e.g., People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
231, 245; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744;
People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394 (Bowker).)
He further concedes that our Supreme Court in People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289 (McAlpin) approved of the
use of expert testimony regarding CSAAS.
      In McAlpin, a nine-year-old child informed her mother that
the defendant—a man the mother was dating—sexually molested
her. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1295–1296.) The mother,
however, did not immediately terminate her relationship with
the defendant or report the incident to police. Law enforcement
got involved only after the child reported the incident to
school authorities a year later. During trial, the prosecution

                                10
was permitted to introduce “an expert on child molestation
investigations,” who testified as to why a parent might not report
a known child molestation. (Id. at p. 1298.) The Supreme Court
upheld the admissibility of the testimony in part by relying
on decisions approving of the use of CSAAS evidence. (Id. at
pp. 1300–1301.) “Courts of Appeal,” the McAlpin court stated,
have held that “expert testimony on the common reactions of
child molestation victims is not admissible to prove that the
complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused; [but] . . .
is admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the
defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—
e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation.” (Id. at p. 1300.) The court
further stated: “ ‘Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse
jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse,
and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s
seemingly self-impeaching behavior. [¶] The great majority of
courts approve such expert rebuttal testimony.’ [Citation.]” (Id.
at p. 1301.) Although CSAAS evidence addresses the behavior
of children after being molested, the court applied its rationale
to permit “expert testimony” that “dealt with the failure . . . of
the child’s parent . . . to report the molestation.” (Ibid.)
       Because McAlpin involved the use of expert testimony to
explain the victim’s parent’s behavior, the court’s statements
regarding CSAAS are arguably dicta. When, however, the
Supreme Court writes approvingly of principles that support
its holding, it “does not make much difference” whether the
court’s statement on the issue has been “elevate[d] . . . to a
holding or whether it is a dictum that we must follow”; in either
case, “[w]e follow.” (People v. Trice (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 984,

                               11
987; accord, Hubbard v. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th
1163, 1169.) Indeed, defendant concedes that we have an
“obligation to apply McAlpin to this case,” citing Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455. He
argues, however, that we should “exercise [our] authority to
record disagreement with that decision.”
       We see no reason to depart from the Courts of Appeal
who have addressed and upheld, generally, the admissibility of
CSAAS evidence or to disagree with the Supreme Court’s implicit
approval of its use in McAlpin. We therefore reject defendant’s
broad-based challenge to the admissibility of such evidence.
       Defendant appears to assert only one challenge to any
particular testimony by Borunda. During cross-examination,
defense counsel questioned Borunda as to whether children
will make false claims about sexual abuse. On redirect, the
prosecutor asked Borunda: “[E]arlier you testified . . . about
false sexual allegations. And you testified that that’s actually
very uncommon?” Borunda responded: “Yes. The statistics put
it at around two to ten percent.” Defendant made no objection
to the prosecutor’s question or Borunda’s response during
trial. On appeal, defendant contends that Borunda’s “specific
quantification, combined with Borunda’s assurances to the jury
that neither adults nor children falsely report their childhood
sexual abuse violated [defendant’s] right to due process.” The
contention is forfeited by the failure to object. Even if Borunda’s
reference to the statistical probability of a false claim was
improper (see People v. Julian (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 878, 886
(Julian)), it was harmless. The reference was isolated and brief,
and the prosecutor immediately moved on to another subject
area. Based on our review of the entire record, there is not a

                                12
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different in the absence of the statistical reference. (See
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
       Lastly, defendant argues that Borunda’s testimony
regarding CSAAS components of delayed disclosure and
recantation “improperly permitted the jury to apply ‘the
syndrome to the facts of the case and conclude the child was
sexually abused.’ ” (Quoting Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d
at p. 393.) Defendant points to the prosecution’s closing
argument where counsel used Borunda’s testimony about
CSAAS components to explain the victims’ delay in making
their disclosures and other behavior. The defendant did not
object to the summation during trial and therefore forfeited
the argument on appeal. Even if it was preserved for appeal,
we do not read the prosecutor’s argument as an impermissible
attempt to prove that the witnesses were abused because they
exhibited some of the components of CSAAS; but rather, as a
permissible explanation as to how the children’s CSAAS-like
behavior was “not inconsistent with being sexually abused.”

      B.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Defendant contends that his trial counsel was
constitutionally deficient for failing to object or move to strike
Borunda’s testimony that “statistics put [the instances of children
making false claims of abuse] at around two to ten percent.” The
claim is without merit.
       “To establish a violation of the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his
counsel’s performance was deficient when measured against the
standard of a reasonably competent attorney, and that counsel’s
performance was prejudicial in the sense that it ‘so undermined

                                13
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ ” (People v.
Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 783–784 (Mayfield), quoting
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 (Strickland).)
       Even if Borunda’s reference to the false claims statistic
was improper and might have been stricken if counsel raised the
issue (see Julian, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 886), counsel may
have decided as a tactical matter not to do so because raising it
might have served only to draw the jury’s attention to the brief
statement. Such tactical decisions do not establish counsel’s
incompetence. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 165;
People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1140.)
       Defendant has also failed to show that counsel’s failure
to object was prejudicial. To establish prejudice, defendant
is required to “ ‘show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’ ” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217–218,
quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693–694.) Defendant
makes no such showing here. The comment he complains of is
isolated, brief, and in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt
in the record, insignificant. There is no reasonable probability
that it had any effect on the outcome in this case. (See Mayfield,
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 789; People v. Rodriguez (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 816, 821.) We therefore reject defendant’s ineffective
assistance argument.

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                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                BENDIX, J.

                WEINGART, J.

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