Court Opinion

ID: 9778544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:12:05.404648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:11.461510
License: Public Domain

George Rose Smith, J., dissenting in part. I agree that the proof of Patton’s settlement with his insurer was properly excluded, although my reasoning is not quite that of the other members of the court. Dowell argues that Patton’s pecuniary interest in the case affected his credibility and that therefore the jury were entitled to know that Patton had only fifty dollars at stake. Even so, the exclusion of the evidence was favorable to Dowell as far as credibility is concerned, since proof that Patton had only a nominal interest in the verdict would increase rather than decrease the likelihood of his being believed. It is plain enough that the evidence was offered in the hope that the jury might have some bias against insurance companies, and it was rightly rejected for the same reason that proof of a defendant’s insurance protection is inadmissible. I think, however, that Instruction 13 should not have been modified. We have repeatedly held that an issue should not be submitted to the jury when the facts are undisputed. For example, when the uncontradicted evideuce shows that an employee was' warned of a certain danger, it is reversible error for the court to submit the failure to warn as a basis for a finding of negligence. El Dorado & Bastrop R. Co. v. Whatley, 88 Ark. 20, 114 S. W. 234, 129 Am. St. Rep. 93. The majority opinion recognizes this rule but avoids its application upon the premise that the evidence of Patton ’s excessive speed is not undisputed. I wholly disagree with this view. The speed limit was twenty-five miles an hour, and Patton admits that he was traveling at about forty-five when he saw that a collision was imminent and applied his brakes in a vain attempt to stop. The majority’s position is that if Patton’s last-minute efforts to stop succeeded in reducing his speed to the legal limit at the moment of impact, then the jury were warranted in disregarding altogether the undisputed fact that Patton was speeding when he realized that an accident was about to take place. The question, however, is that of proximate cause, and I think this instruction erroneous for the reason that it permitted the jury to ignore an element of causation as to which the evidence was not in conflict.