Court Opinion

ID: 9892375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 18:00:59.005417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:48.541367
License: Public Domain

FILED
                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                            OCT 23 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCIS YACKELIN VARELA                          No. 22-106
MARTINEZ; FAVIANA VARELA
MARTINEZ,                                        Agency Nos.
                                                 A202-162-916
              Petitioners,                       A202-162-917

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted October 2, 2023**
                              San Francisco, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, CALLAHAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

      Francis Varela Martinez petitions for review of a decision by the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal from the denial of her

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de

novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. J.R. v. Barr, 975 F.3d 778,

781 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny the petition.

      Varela Martinez argues that the BIA erred in finding the Honduran

government able and willing to prevent the domestic violence and abuse that

prompted her to leave Honduras. Her testimony and declaration indicate that when

she called the police to protect her from her ex-partner Cardona, the responding

officer told Cardona to stay away from her and remained with him while Varela

Martinez left the area. The threat of police involvement also stopped the attempted

assault by Wuester that immediately preceded her departure from Honduras. In

addition, Varela Martinez testified that restraining orders are available to victims of

domestic violence and that her “worst mistake” was not reporting Cardona’s abuse

earlier. We must conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding

unless “‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary’ based on the evidence in the record.” J.R., 975 F.3d at 781–82 (quoting

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)). In

light of the above, we cannot say that the record as a whole “compels the

conclusion” that the agency’s finding was erroneous. Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d

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1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Cordon-Garcia v. I.N.S., 204 F.3d 985, 990

(9th Cir. 2000)).

      The record also does not compel a finding that relocation within Honduras

would be unsafe or unreasonable. Varela Martinez argues that the BIA erred by

placing the burden on her to prove she could not safely relocate, but that burden is

appropriate when an asylum applicant has not shown past persecution. Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). Varela Martinez testified

that her abusers would be able to find her “through acquaintances or friends” if she

returned to Honduras, but she also testified that she did not know how they could

find her unless she disclosed her new location to people whom her abusers knew.

She was able to avoid Cardona for five years and Wuester for several months

before leaving Honduras.

      We deny the petition as to Varela Martinez’s CAT claim for similar reasons.

“Torture must be inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or

acquiescence of, a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”

Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2020). Just as the record

does not compel the conclusion that the Honduran government has been unable or

unwilling to protect Varela Martinez, it also does not compel the conclusion that

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the Honduran government has been “willfully blind” to the domestic violence and

assaults she has faced. Id.

      Finally, Varela Martinez argues that her case should be remanded because

Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021), has changed the standard for

evaluating a particularized social group. Because the Government has not

contested on appeal Varela Martinez’s claim that she is a member of a cognizable

particularized social group, and because the BIA did not rely on the “complete

helplessness” standard for a government’s unwillingness or inability to prevent

violence that was called into question by A-B-, remand is unnecessary. See A-B-,

28 I. & N. Dec. at 309; see also Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G.

2018), overruled by A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307.

      PETITION DENIED.

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