Court Opinion

ID: 9746769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:36:47.31557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:16.695903
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because of a profound mental defect, appellant has been convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death without being accorded a fair trial. The record, replete with evidence of his self-destructive mental illness, stands as a mockery of our criminal justice system. I would reject the trial court’s finding of mental competency, vacate the guilty verdict obviously born of appellant’s mental illness, and remand for a new trial once appellant has attained the necessary lucidity for the just adjudication of his criminality.
Our system of criminal jurisprudence, founded as it is upon the belief that no man should be deprived of his life or liberty without first having been accorded the fair and impartial judgment of his peers, see Pa. Const. art. I § 9, should never be permitted to indulge a mentally ill defend*639ant, whether competent to stand trial or not, in the termination of his existence. Although the competency standard was designed to effectuate the constitutional principle of a fair trial, see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815, 818 (1966); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 456 Pa. 313, 319, 318 A.2d 724, 727 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 205 n. 1, 255 A.2d 519, 522 n. 1 (1969), the rule was by no means meant to encompass the entire right of an individual to a just proceeding. Thus, even though a defendant has been adjudged competent under the statutory definition of that term, the court’s duty is not at an end. Where defendant’s mental illness continues through trial, the court must review the record of the proceedings to determine whether the accused has been accorded a fair trial.
Under this procedure, our analysis must begin with the question of whether the trial court erred in finding appellant competent to proceed on criminal charges. The standard for competency is found in section 402(a) of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 P.S. § 7402(a). It states that
Whenever a person who has been charged with a crime is found to be substantially unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him or to participate and assist in his defense, he shall be deemed incompetent to be tried, convicted or sentenced so long as such incapacity continues.
This provision in essence codified the common law standard for incompetency first announced in Commonwealth ex rel. Hilberry v. Maroney, 424 Pa. 493, 495, 227 A.2d 159, 160 (1967), and employed by the Court up to its most recent decision in Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. 318, 340-341, 521 A.2d 1, 12 (1987).
[T]he test to be applied in determining the legal sufficiency of [a defendant’s] mental capacity to stand trial ... is not the M’Naghten “right or wrong” test, but rather his ability to comprehend his position as one accused of murder and to cooperate with his counsel in making a rational defense. Or stated another way, did he have *640sufficient ability at the pertinent time to consult with his lawyers with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
Commonwealth ex rel. Hilberry v. Maroney, 424 Pa. at 495, 227 A.2d at 160 (citations omitted).
See also, Commonwealth v. Martinez, 498 Pa. 387, 391, 446 A.2d 899, 901 (1982); Commonwealth v. Higgins, 492 Pa. 343, 349, 424 A.2d 1222, 1225 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 919, 101 S.Ct. 3057, 69 L.Ed.2d 424; Commonwealth v. Tyson, 485 Pa. 344, 349, 402 A.2d 995, 997 (1979); Commonwealth v. Melton, 465 Pa. 529, 534, 351 A.2d 221, 224 (1976); Commonwealth v. Davis, 459 Pa. 575, 577-578, 330 A.2d 847, 848 (1975).
The lower court in the instant matter accorded appellant two competency hearings, both of which resulted in a finding of mental competence under 50 P.S. § 7402(a). Appellant raises the argument on this direct appeal that the standard embodied in section 7402 should be applied in situations where, although able to comprehend the nature of the proceedings and to assist counsel in his defense, if he chose to do so, the defendant is unable to understand what is in his own best interest. In essence, what appellant is arguing is that, in some situations, an incompetent criminal defendant might be able to assist in his own defense, if he would so choose, but be unable rationally to make that choice because of his mental defect. The Commonwealth counters by arguing that this subjective evaluation does not speak to the question of competency and offers no insight into the defendant’s ability to participate in and understand the proceedings against him.
Appellant’s position is supported to a large extent by Dr. Gary M. Glass, a psychiatrist, who testified on behalf of appellant following numerous contacts with him. Following an examination of appellant one (1) day before the expert’s testimony during the competency hearing and two (2) days before the actual start of trial, Dr. Glass diagnosed appellant as suffering from manic-depressive illness or bipolar *641affective disorder. He testified that appellant was severely-depressed and suicidal, and that appellant had attempted suicide in the past. He further testified, in questioning by court-appointed defense counsel:
Q: Is Ronald in his present status able to co-operate with me in the preparation of his defense?
A: No, I don’t believe he can.
Q: Why is that?
A: Because he — while doctor Swartzman’s report is true in part that he is able to understand the proceedings — and I agree with that. He is able to understand the roles of the varying people in the scenario and comprehend that. He does have a complete understanding of what the possible outcomes are.
On the other hand, he is not able to process for himself what is in his own best interests and at this point in time, given his depressive status, likely in any way possible to act against his own best interests rather than on behalf of that.
(N.T. 2/22/82, p. 19)
A: ... I do not believe that he is capable of cooperating except in one direction and that is against his own best wishes. We know very commonly that people when they are depressed often act or most often act in ways that maintain depression that are self-punitive, that are self-destructive in many ways and I believe that Ronald at this point in time cannot make a rational decision as to whether he wants to help himself or hurt himself. I think that — that is, his condition — has him predisposed to self destructive behavior.
(N.T. 2/22/82, p. 20)
On cross-examination, Dr. Glass again restated his opinion as to appellant’s competency:
Q: You said you disagreed that he’s mentally capable of cooperating with his attorney in assisting his defense if he chooses to.
A: What I said was that he is not free to make a rational and independent choice independent of his emo*642tional disturbance. He will do anything at this point. He will be highly co-operative with any process whether it be court, the streets or anyplace else that is destructive to him personally or in other ways. He is not free from his mental illness such that he can make a fully self determined decision.
(N.T. 2/22/82, p. 24)
Q: Now, you are saying that — you’re not saying that he’s not capable of assisting his attorney, are you?
A: I am saying that he is not capable of making an unemcumbered choice as to whether he wants to assist his attorney or not.
(N.T. 2/22/82, p. 25)
Immediately subsequent to this testimony, the lower court rendered its decision finding appellant competent to stand trial. It thus rejected the testimony of Dr. Glass in favor of that of Dr. Richard Swartzman, appellant’s treating physician. Dr. Swartzman had previously submitted a report wherein he opined that appellant, despite his mental illness, was competent to stand trial.1 At this point it was proper for the court to find appellant competent, and I would not fault the court for beginning the trial. A determination of competency is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. at 341, 521 A.2d at 12; Commonwealth v. Hart, 501 Pa. 174, 177, 460 A.2d 745, 747 (1983); Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 356, 329 A.2d 258, 269 (1974).
The error of that court which demands a reversal of appellant’s conviction instead occurred in not declaring appellant incompetent, despite repeated requests by defense counsel, when during the course of trial it became apparent that appellant was unable to cooperate with his trial counsel and to act in a manner which might ultimately win his *643acquittal.2 This error has been compounded by the strict construction of the competency standard employed by the majority. Even if I were to adopt such an unjustifiable interpretation of section 402 of the Mental Health Procedures Act, and thus hold that appellant was competent to stand trial, I would further review the record with an eye toward determining whether appellant’s mental illness, although not impeding his ability to comprehend the proceedings or to assist counsel, nevertheless deprived him of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial.
Notwithstanding the expert testimony, the sole evidence cited by the majority to support its affirmance of the competency finding was appellant’s aiding in the' selection of the jury empaneled in his case.3 His actions during the lucid moments, however, do not negate the clear import of his bizarre behavior at other times before and during the trial. How this Court, after reviewing the entire record as we are required to do in all capital cases, see Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 26 n. 3, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), can ignore the plethora of evidence which shows complete incompetency on the part of defendant, and the unfairness in permitting the adjudication of his fate while in a diseased mental state, is beyond my comprehension.
Appellant suffered from mentaHllness for at least two (2) years prior to the homicide. Appellant’s father, Melvin *644Logan, testified that appellant was initially admitted for treatment to Misc.icordia Hospital in 1978 suffering from a nervous breakdown. He was subsequently admitted to the Philadelphia State Hospital, referred to as “the Byberry”, sometime in 1979 for a period of eight to nine months. During his stay, appellant exhibited nervous behavior, such as “pacing the floor, not able to hold a conversation---Most of the things he did was laugh and grin.” (N.T. 3/1/82, p. 65). Appellant was released to the custody of his aunt, but was again hospitalized on October 16, 1980, this time at the Philadelphia Psychiatric Center. According to Dr. Seung Kim, appellant’s treating psychiatrist at the Center, he was admitted with preliminary diagnoses of chronic schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness, and inadequate personality. Upon admission, he exhibited severe psychomotor agitation and fast, continuous talking to himself. Against medical advice, he was discharged on November 1, 1980, still suffering from schizoaffective disorder. (N.T. 3/4/82, pp. 6, 7, 11-13, 25). The discharge predated the homicide by only forty (40) days.
Appellant’s conduct during and immediately subsequent to the homicide further evinced a diseased mind. The nature of the attack, an unprovoked, gruesome attack upon an unfamiliar victim which ended only after the weapon became imbedded in the victim’s skull, indicated that the mental illness had not subsided but was prevalent. After police arrived and restrained appellant, he told police “execute me, shoot me, beat me, whatever you want to do.” (N.T. 2/25/82, p. 17-18; 2/26/82, p. 30).
Following his arrest, appellant was placed in the Detention Center and was referred for psychiatric treatment within hours of his arrival. He was later admitted to the psychiatric unit of prison where he remained up until the time of his trial. Appellant’s bizarre behavior continued throughout his stay, and included an attempt at suicide in September of 1981.
During trial, appellant repeatedly behaved inappropriately and indicated a complete inability to allow his fate to be *645justly adjudicated. For example, in the middle of defense counsel’s questioning of appellant, he stated, not in response to anything asked by his counsel:
[The Defendant:] I have something to say now. I’m pleading guilty anyway. You know, I’m not really guilty of this. You know, incident. But I am — because I really was, you know, at the time really tripping and whatnot like that. Really sick and whatnot.
But I’m pleading guilty anyway of all the charges I have been charged with. This killing that I have done will be repeated. My death is the only way to stop the same thing from happening again. I am unhappy with life and wish to die. So I’m not worried about anything that, you know, comes out of this or nothing like that. See, life imprisonment — I’ll run the jail for real. That’s no bullshit. Only reason I am not running it is because I’m on a lot of medication and as far as dying, that’s something I want to do anyway. So, nothing at all. (N.T. 3/3/82, p. 24)
Also during his direct testimony, appellant responded, when asked about the identity of Lester Johnson, one of the passengers on the bus:
[Mr. Tatum:] Do you know who Mr. Johnson is?
[The Defendant:] Yeah, I know. The liar that pulled the pistol on me. I would have crashed him, too if he had pulled a pistol on me. He didn’t pull a pistol on me. He knows better than that. I’ll kill that mother fucker. (N.T. 3/3/82, p. 10)
Appellant’s bizarre behavior was not limited to his own testimony. On the third day of trial, he made several outbursts during the testimony of Detective Lawrence Roantree which precipitated a reprimand of appellant by the court before the jury. (N.T. 2/25/88, pp. 97-98). Throughout the testimony of defense witness Roosevelt Dosier, appellant’s grandfather, appellant laughed for no apparent reason, which prompted defense counsel to invoke his client to “shut up.” (N.T. 3/1/88, pp. 91-94, 98). Defendant conducted himself in a similar fashion during the testimony *646of Carla Morgan (N.T. 3/1/88, pp. 108, 111) and Clayton Martin (N.T. 3/1/88, p. 136, 138).
Even more revealing were appellant’s outbursts during the sixth day of trial. In rebuttal to appellant’s insanity defense, the Commonwealth called several witnesses who had observed appellant’s behavior in confinement while court was in recess. Immediately following the testimony of one of these witnesses, Sheriff Ernest Hopkins, appellant shouted:
The Defendant: What the fuck you talking about. I ain’t cool with that guy over there. I don’t want to hear that kind of shit.
Lying son of a bitch. Talking that dummy — he don’t speak to me, nothing. Talking bullshit.
(N.T. 3/4/82, p. 44)
During the testimony of Sergeant William Shaw, the following exchange between appellant and the trial judge occurred:
The Defendant: How in the fuck this mother fucker knows what’s going on with me and my father? He ain’t worth shit. Me and my father ain’t cool either.
The Court: You will have to remain quiet while the witness is testifying.
The Defendant: He’s talking shit. That’s what he’s doing.
The Court: Keep quiet, Mr. Logan.
Mr. King: Your honor, may I have a moment? The thought trend was broken.
The Defendant: Listening into my conversation and all that shit. How would you feel if he was watching while you were talking to your family?
The Court: You have to remain quiet, Mr. Logan. (N.T. 3/4/82, p. 51)
Once Sergeant Shaw had been excused, the following transpired:
*647The Defendant: Fucker, listening to what I’m saying to my family. That’s why I’ll kill you, you mother fucking ass; get smart. Mother fucker.
The Court: Sheriff, come forward.
The Defendant: Smart ass mother fucker. What’s he listening to what I’m saying to my father, when I’m on trial? How’s that sound?
The Court: We’ll recess for 5 minutes.
Mr. King: Thank you, Judge.
The Defendant: How does that sound?
(Jury leaving.)
The Defendant: I want to die anyway. That don’t got nothing to do with it. I don’t like that shit. Mother fucker. Me and my father ain’t even cool. I don’t give a fuck.
I want to die. I’ll take you out, too. I’ll hurt you, too. The Court: Everybody else is free to leave the room also. I’m going to leave the room.
(Witness excused and jury left.)
(N.T. 3/4/82, p. 53-54)
The jury convicted appellant of all charges following a little over two hours of deliberation, obviously based to a large extent upon appellant’s complete inability to conform his conduct to 1;hat appropriate in a trial setting. But that did not end appellant’s misbehavior. Subsequent to the court crier announcing the verdict and the jury being polled, appellant exclaimed, “I will'kill that mother fuckers, too.” (N.T. 3/6/82, p. 4). Similarly, when permitted to address the jury upon allocution, appellant stated:
The Defendant: I’ll give you one chance to kill me. You better take it now because if I ever get out I’ll kill everyone of you mother fuckers. That’s my statement. Punk mother fuckers.
(N.T. 3/6/82, p. 18).
It is thus clear that appellant was not able to act in such a manner as to aid his cause. His bizarre behavior throughout trial did not indicate a man who sought to further his *648own best interests. Instead, it evinced a man who viewed the trial as a means of hastening his demise. To cooperate with counsel would have hindered the attainment of that end. Were defendant able to choose that end of his own unaffected volition, I would have no qualms with the majority’s resolution of this appeal. See Commonwealth v. Appel, 517 Pa. 529, 589 A.2d 780 (1988) (holding that a defendant could seek the death penalty where his choice was voluntary). But this certainly was not such a case. To permit the judicial system to now serve as a tool for allowing this defendant to attain his. demented goal of self-annihilation is violative of the moral and legal dictates of our society which abhors suicide in any manner, even in cases of terminally ill persons whose death is viewed as merciful. Because appellant could not rationally choose to aid in his defense, I would find that appellant was not competent to stand trial in 1982 in this matter. Moreover, I would find that he had been completely deprived of his right to a fair trial because of his profound mental illness.
It has been argued in contradiction to this position that a competency standard which would take into consideration the inability of a defendant to fathom his own best interest would be unmanageable. I must disagree. The inability of a defendant to act in such a way as to further his best interest, like the two recognized areas of incompetency, can only be found where a qualified mental health expert has testified in an unequivocal manner to the existence of this defect. For this reason, it will be no easier for a defendant to delay the criminal proceedings against him because of this mental defect than because of his inability to understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist counsel. This standard will simply add an additional inquiry to those presently demanded of a trial court in determining competency. I do not believe this to be an excessive burden in light of the grave constitutional ramifications of trying a mentally incompetent defendant.
Moreover, I do not believe that this standard is so general that any disagreement between counsel and client as to how *649to proceed at trial would necessitate a finding of incompetence. It can be said without argument that it is in the best interest of every man to live, and not to engage in conduct certain to bring about his own death. Although this proposition is general, I do not believe that that makes it impossible for a trial court to determine, during the course of the trial, that certain behavior on the part of the defendant would have no other effect than to assure him a sentence of death. Such was the case in the instant appeal. One cannot legitimately argue that appellant’s repeated outbursts, strewn with profanity and threats of violence to witnesses and jurors, would bring about any other sentence but death. The fact that the jury deliberated only 28 minutes on whether to enter a sentence which would deprive a man of his very life is clear testament to this.
Additionally, it is contended that if we permit appellant’s self-destructive allocution to serve as a basis for a finding of incompetence, we will be creating a device whereby any criminal defendant, faced with a certain verdict of guilty, can terminate the proceedings simply by threatening the jury and thus feigning incompetence. However, the credibility of a witness has always been in the province of the factfinder, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 443, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (1986), and we should not presume this defendant’s conduct contrived because some others’ might be. Moreover, where the record is devoid of any indication of incompetency up to that point, including expert testimony from mental health professionals, the trial court could be certain that this sudden destructive behavior was a product of fabrication, and could rule accordingly. That is not the instant case. Appellant’s threat to the jury was not an isolated incident, but was proceeded by a history of mental illness, numerous outbursts and instances of inappropriate behavior both during trial and at the time of arrest, a crime which manifested a very diseased mind, and the unequivocal testimony of a psychiatrist who had observed appellant on several occasions and predicted that this disruptive behavior would in fact occur.
*650Accordingly, I would reject the trial court’s finding of competency as contrary to law, hold that appellant was, denied a fair trial, vacate the conviction, and remand the case for a new trial once appellant has been properly adjudged competent to proceed to trial. See, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966).
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this opiiiion.

. A report by Dr. Gino Grasso, a court staff psychiatrist, .was also presented to the court. Although Dr. Grasso stated, in his opinion, appellant was not competent to stand trial, he deferred final judgment on the issue to Dr. Swartzman.

. We have previously stated that actual facts, proven by positive evidence, are entitled to far more weight than opinion evidence, even that of experts. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 260, 164 A.2d 98, 108 (1960); Commonwealth v. Lance, 381 Pa. 293, 113 A.2d 290 (1955); Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa. 368, 100 A.2d 472 (1953). Thus, in judging the mental competency of the defendant, it was error for the trial court to place greater weight upon the pre-trial opinion of Dr. Swartzman than upon his own observation of defendant's conduct and statements during trial.

. The majority also notes that the testimony of the defendant "evinced a sufficient degree of rationality to enable him to recognize the existence of his own illness,” as if his ability to recognize that he is sick makes the sickness any less real. This proposition is clearly absurd.