Court Opinion

ID: 9755511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:40:50.398248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:06.825999
License: Public Domain

COHEN, Justice,
concurring.
I agree the judgment should be affirmed. Appellants, who are subtenants, received all they were entitled to under their contract with the original tenant — a right to enjoy the full term of any extension option exercised by the original tenant. They got that when they retained the possession under the sublease until April 30, 1997. Appellants had no right to force their lessor, Grasso, to exercise its second option to extend for another ten years until 2007. On the contrary, Grasso had a right not to exercise its second option to extend, and it exercised its right not to extend by entering the new contract in 1991.
I understand appellants’ crucial contention in this ease to be that Grasso “surrendered” its lease during its term, i.e., before the lease expired. Grasso did “surrender” its option to renew, but that is different from surrendering a lease during its term, before the term is expired. That, I believe, is another distinguishing factual difference between this case and Doyle v. Scott, 134 S.W. 828 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1911, no writ). The Doyle court never mentioned any option or extension provisions, which leads me to conclude that the subtenant’s lease in Doyle was terminated during its term, not at the end of the primary term or one of several option terms. None of the authorities cited in appellants’ excellent brief dealt with facts like those here. Those cases that held for the subtenant correctly held that the original tenant could not prejudice the subtenant by surrendering a lease during its term. They did not require the original tenant to exercise all extension options desired by the subtenant, absent a specific contractual obligation to do so.
Appellant’s crucial contention that Gras-so surrendered its lease is based on the arguments that Grasso had a 30-year lease, rather than a 10-year lease with two options to renew for 10 years each. The difference is decisive in this case. If this lease was for 30 years, then Grasso surrendered it early. Otherwise, Grasso did not surrender it early.
Appellants rely on Hampton v. Lum to argue this was a 30-year lease. 544 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ). In my opinion, Hampton does not control this case. As the majority opinion states, Hampton did not construe the rights of a subtenant. The same is true of all the cases cited in Hampton. See Haddad v. Tyler Prod. Credit Ass’n, 212 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1948, writ ref'd); Stewart v. Kuskin & Rotberg, Inc., 106 S.W.2d 1074 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1937, no writ); Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Republic Ins. Co., 262 S.W. 814 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1924, writ dism’d). In addition, the *19tenant in each case cited in Hampton renewed its option, something Grasso never did for the period of 1997-2007. See Haddad, 212 S.W.2d at 1007-08 (express renewal); Stewart, 106 S.W.2d at 1076 (implicit renewal by two-month holdover); Springfield Fire, 262 S.W. at 816 (express renewal). Finally, the language appellants rely on in Hampton appears unnecessary to the court’s holding because the issue in Hampton was not the length of the lease, but whether the tenant gave timely notice of intent not to renew 30 days before the end of the primary term. 544 S.W.2d at 841.
With these additional remarks, I concur in the judgment.