Court Opinion

ID: 9382366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 15:06:18.622563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.177780
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Church, 2023-Ohio-986.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                  NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                           C.A. No.    22CA0035-M

        Appellee

        v.                                              APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                        ENTERED IN THE
RODNEY CHURCH                                           COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                        COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
        Appellant                                       CASE No.   21CR0569

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 27, 2023

        FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.

        {¶1}     Rodney Church appeals his sentence from the Medina County Court of Common

Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}     A grand jury indicted Mr. Church on three counts of gross sexual imposition in

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1), all of which were fourth-degree felonies under R.C.

2907.05(C)(1). The charges stemmed from three separate incidents wherein Mr. Church had

unlawful sexual contact with three separate victims. In the first incident, Mr. Church approached

the victim, who was a minor, in a Walmart parking lot, “squeezed her butt[,]” and then ran away.

In the second incident, Mr. Church approached the victim from behind on a sidewalk, grabbed her

by the hips, and then attempted to insert his fingers into her vagina over her clothing. The victim

screamed, and Mr. Church quickly walked away. In the third incident, Mr. Church approached the

victim, who was a minor, in a Target parking lot, grabbed her inner thigh, and then groped her
                                                 2

vaginal area until the victim broke free and walked into the store where she reported the incident.

The first incident occurred on June 29, 2021, and the second and third incidents occurred two days

later on July 1, 2021.

       {¶3}    After initially pleading not guilty, Mr. Church pleaded guilty to all three counts and

the trial court ordered a presentence investigation (“PSI”). The PSI report indicated that Mr.

Church has a criminal history that includes two OVI offenses (one as a juvenile and one as an

adult), and misdemeanor convictions for criminal trespass and disorderly conduct. The PSI report

also included Mr. Church’s version of the events wherein Mr. Church claimed that: (1) he

accidentally ran into the first victim at Walmart; (2) someone else touched the second victim on

the sidewalk; (3) he never touched the third victim at Target; and (4) he only pleaded guilty because

he made a deal with the prosecutor.

       {¶4}    The trial court then held two sentencing hearings. At the first hearing, the State

informed the trial court that, pursuant to an agreement it made with Mr. Church, the State

recommended a one-year prison sentence. The trial court indicated that it was not bound by that

agreement, that the PSI report indicated that Mr. Church refused to take responsibility for his

actions, and that it did not intend to impose only a one-year prison sentence. The trial court then

rescheduled the sentencing hearing for the next week to allow the parties to consider the fact that

the trial court would not be imposing their agreed upon one-year prison sentence.

       {¶5}    A week later, at the second sentencing hearing, Mr. Church’s defense counsel

acknowledged that the PSI report reflected that Mr. Church was not taking responsibility for his

actions. Mr. Church’s defense counsel maintained, however, that Mr. Church consistently

expressed remorse to her, and that he wished to apologize to the victims. The trial court then

addressed Mr. Church, who indicated that he wished to apologize to the victims for what he had
                                                   3

done. When the trial court asked Mr. Church what he had done, Mr. Church began by stating that

he “allegedly * * * touched” the victims before the trial court interrupted Mr. Church about his use

of the word “allegedly[.]” Mr. Church then admitted that he “touched” the victims and apologized

for his actions.

        {¶6}       The trial court then read portions of the PSI report to Mr. Church, including the

portion where Mr. Church claimed he accidentally touched the first victim at Walmart, claimed

someone else touched the second victim on the sidewalk, and denied touching the third victim at

Target. The trial court also read the portion of the PSI wherein Mr. Church indicated that he

pleaded guilty because it was part of the deal he reached with the prosecutor. Mr. Church told the

trial court that he was nervous when he was talking to the probation department during the course

of the PSI, but admitted to making the statements contained within the PSI report.

        {¶7}       One of the victims then spoke in open court. The victim stated that she did not

accept Mr. Church’s apology, that the incident caused her life to “turn upside down[,]” and that

she struggled daily to cope with being a victim of sexual assault. After the victim made her

statement, the trial court informed Mr. Church of his responsibility to register as a Tier I sex

offender and sentenced him to 18 months of imprisonment on each of the three counts. The trial

court ordered each 18-month sentence to run consecutively for a total of 54 months of

imprisonment. Mr. Church now appeals his sentence on the basis that the trial court erred by

imposing the maximum sentence available.

                                                   II.

                                     ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SENTENCING APPELLANT [TO] THE
        MAXIMUM SENTENCE AVAILABLE CONTRARY TO THE RELEVANT
        SENTENCING FACTORS.
                                                 4

       {¶8}    In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Church argues that the trial court erred by

imposing the maximum sentence available. For the following reasons, this Court disagrees.

       {¶9}    In reviewing a felony sentence, “[t]he * * * standard for review is not whether the

sentencing court abused its discretion.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “[A]n appellate court may vacate or

modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence” that:

(1) “the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes[,]” or (2) “the

sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶

1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm

belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469

(1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶10} A sentencing court has “full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the

statutory range” and is not “required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing * * *

more than the minimum sentence[].” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, paragraph

seven of the syllabus. “[N]evertheless, * * *, the court must carefully consider the statutes that

apply to every felony case. Those include R.C. 2929.11, which specifies the purposes of

sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which provides guidance in considering factors relating to the

seriousness of the offense and recidivism of the offender.” State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54,

2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38. “Unless the record shows that [a] court failed to consider the factors, or that

the sentence is ‘strikingly inconsistent’ with the factors, the court is presumed to have considered

the statutory factors if the sentence is within the statutory range.” State v. Fernandez, 9th Dist.

Medina No. 13CA0054-M, 2014-Ohio-3651, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Boysel, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013-

CA-78, 2014-Ohio-1272, ¶ 13.
                                                 5

       {¶11} R.C. 2929.14(A)(4) provides that the maximum penalty for a fourth-degree felony

is 18 months. As previously noted, the trial court sentenced Mr. Church to 18 months of

imprisonment on each count and ordered each sentence to run consecutively for a total of 54

months of imprisonment. As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated:

       In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required to
       make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and
       incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to state
       reasons to support its findings. Nor is it required to give a talismanic incantation of
       the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the
       record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.

State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 37. “[A]s long as the reviewing court can

discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record

contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” State v.

Bennett, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28842, 28843, 2018-Ohio-3935, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Blackert,

9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27314, 27315, 2015-Ohio-2248, ¶ 10.

       {¶12} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides:

       If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple
       offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively
       if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from
       future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not
       disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the
       offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

       (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender
       was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section
       2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release
       control for a prior offense.

       (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more
       courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses
       so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
       offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the
       seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
                                                  6

        (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
        sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

        {¶13} Here, the trial court stated at the sentencing hearing that it considered the principles

and purposes of sentencing, as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12.

The trial court stated, in part, that:

        The Court’s going to make a finding in this particular case to impose consecutive
        sentences because they are necessary to protect the public and punish the offender.
        They are not disproportionate, and the Court further finds that the harm in this case
        was so great and unusual that a single term would not adequately reflect the
        seriousness of the conduct.

        {¶14} In its sentencing entry, the trial court indicated that it considered the record, oral

statements, victim impact statements, the PSI report, and the principles and purposes of sentencing

under R.C. 2929.11. The trial court also indicated that it considered the seriousness and recidivism

factors under R.C. 2929.12. Regarding the seriousness factors, the trial court found that a more

serious factor existed in this case because “the victim of the offense suffered serious physical,

psychological, or economic harm as a result of the offense.” Regarding the recidivism factors, the

trial court found that Mr. Church was more likely to commit future crimes because he has a history

of criminal convictions, and he showed no genuine remorse for the offenses.

        {¶15} In ordering Mr. Church’s 18-month sentences to run consecutively, the trial court

indicated that it considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court noted that

Mr. Church has a significant criminal history and found that consecutive prison terms were

necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the offender. The trial court also

found that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Mr. Church’s

conduct and to the danger he posed to the public. The trial court further found that the harm caused

by the three offense was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
                                                 7

committed as part of any of the courses of conduct would adequately reflect the seriousness of Mr.

Church’s conduct.

       {¶16} Mr. Church has not established that the record does not support the trial court’s

findings under the relevant statutes, or that his sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Marcum,

146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, at ¶ 1. The trial court specifically indicated that it considered

the relevant sentencing statutes, including R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, and explained its

reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court had full

discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range, including a maximum sentence,

and Mr. Church has not established that the trial court erred by doing so. As a result, Mr. Church’s

assignment of error is overruled.

                                                III.

       {¶17} Mr. Church’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina County

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
                                                8

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                     JILL FLAGG LANZINGER
                                                     FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

YU MI KIM-REYNOLDS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.