Court Opinion

ID: 9758602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:38:00.29883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:53.343932
License: Public Domain

WITTIG, Justice,
dissenting.
We join the majority to the extent it affirms on legal sufficiency. We would, however, reverse and remand for the unwarranted refusal to submit to the jury the requested defensive instructions on self defense and the lesser included offense of assault.
Lesser Included Offense
To be entitled to an instruction on the requested lesser included offense in this ease there must have been some evidence permitting a jury to find appellant did not know complainant was a police officer. The State argues that because appellant himself told Chaison, “you’re the law,” there is not even a scintilla of evidence to suggest that appellant did not know Chaison was an officer. However, the record also reveals that Chaison specifically and purposefully led appellant to believe he was not a police officer. He came to the scene in an unmarked pickup, presented himself to appellant in plain clothes, bought illegal drugs, and emphatically denied several times to appellant he was a police officer. Though we do agree that appellant’s statements are strong evidence that he did indeed know Chaison was an officer, we cannot ignore the evidence of Chaison’s efforts to dissuade him of the notion. See Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (in determining whether defendant is entitled to lesser-included offense, it does not matter if the evidence was strong or weak, unimpeached or contradicted). This constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence that appellant did not know Chaison was an officer. See Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). We note that when Chaison emphatically stated and reiterated he was not a police officer, that the mere words did not establish as a matter or law he was not a police officer. Equally true, appellant saying Chaison was police, did not establish by the mere words the mindset *363of the 17-year-old appellant.1 We believe the lesser assault issue is clearly raised; therefore, the trial court erred by not including the lesser included offense in the charge.
Because appellant properly objected to the absence of the lesser included offense in the charge, reversal is required if the error was calculated to injure the rights of the defendant. See Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) If the jury were to believe that appellant did not know Chaison was an officer, he would have been guilty of only a second degree felony, punishable by two to twenty years. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 12.33. He was convicted of a first degree felony punishable up to ninety-nine years, Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 12.32, and was assessed twenty-four years. Because of this, the failure to include the lesser included offense significantly affected appellant’s chance of receiving a fighter sentence. We would thus conclude the trial court’s error was calculated to injure appellant’s rights and sustain this issue.
Self-Defense
We agree with appellant that there was some evidence raising the issue of self-defense. The offense alleged in the indictment stated, in part, that appellant shot in the direction of complainant. During cross-examination, appellant elicited testimony from Chaison indicating that Chaison not only pulled his weapon first but also fired first. Appellant did not return fire until after he was shot by Chaison and had retreated behind a car. Thus, there is evidence in the record that the charged offense did not occur until after Chaison (still claiming not to be police) shot appellant in the leg and that appellant had fallen to the ground and retreated. In light of the requirement that we view the evidence from appellant’s point of view at the time of the offense, we would hold the jury could find that appellant reasonably believed the force he used was immediately necessary to protect himself against the use or attempted use of unlawful force when he returned Chaison’s fire. From appellant’s point of view (or from the perspective of a disinterested bystander), there was evidence that appellant was protecting himself against the use or attempted use of deadly force or greater force than necessary. Chaison was attempting a drug buy, not an arrest, although sometime during the melee he states he recanted and yelled he was a policeman after all. Unfortunately, this was only after shots had been first fired and, contrary to the majority’s apparent conclusion, it was not conclusively established that appellant even heard Chaison identify himself. In other words, the police played the role of drug buyers until so late in the episode that gunfire had already been initiated by the police.
The State argues that appellant was not entitled to a self-defense issue because, as a matter of law: (1) appellant provoked Chaison; (2) appellant was the aggressor; and (3) appellant could not have reasonably believed Chaison was using unlawful deadly force. See Tex.Pen.Code Ann. *364§ 9.31(b)(4). We disagree1 these points were conclusively established.
First, the State did not conclusively prove appellant provoked Chaison. The question of whether a defendant’s acts were reasonably calculated to cause an attack by the victim so as to trigger the provocation doctrine is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. See Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). The rule of law is that if the defendant provoked another to make an attack on him so that the defendant would have a pretext for killing the other under the guise of self-defense, the defendant forfeits his right of self-defense. Id. Here, appellant’s intent to provoke Chaison was not established as a matter of law. The events giving rise to appellant’s gunfire unfolded very rapidly out of an argument between two men whose paths had just crossed for the first time moments before. Appellant did not know Chaison from Adam, had not met or spoken until seconds before. Therefore, at best, there was a fact issue whether appellant had any premeditated intent to provoke Chaison into, firing at him. Appellant’s acts may have entitled the State to a charge on “provoking the difficulty” in response to defendant’s self-defense issue, but it did not as a matter of law preclude the self-defense issue. The State’s cases of Coble v. State, 871 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), and Dyson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) are not in point. In both cases, the court of criminal appeals held self-defense was precluded as a matter of law because the undisputed evidence showed the defendants had a premeditated intent to Mil or provoke confrontation with the victim. See Coble, 871 S.W.2d at 202; Dyson, 672 S.W.2d at 463-64. To all appearances this was a not a drug bust, but rather an ordinary drug buy. As discussed in the previous issue, there was evidence that appellant did not know Chaison was an officer because he portrayed himself as a drug buyer and user, not a law abiding citizen. Surely appellant would not have sold contraband to someone he knew was an officer. Further, when conducting the drug buy, Chaison testified unequivocally he only sought information, not an arrest. Chaison initiated the contact, the purchase, then continuously and vehemently denied he was a police officer.
There was also some evidence appellant was not the aggressor. As discussed, Chaison himself provided testimony that he fired at appellant first, wounded him, and that appellant did not return fire until after he had retreated behind the car. Thus, a reasonable jury could find that appellant was not the aggressor at the time he returned fire. For the same reasons, there was some evidence that, viewed from his perspective, appellant could have reasonably believed Chaison was using more force than necessary in the encounter. We therefore hold that there was some evidence to require a self-defense issue.
The majority reasons that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the force being used against appellant was unlawful, thus he was not entitled to a self-defense charge. However, we note that the relevant consideration is not whether the force used against appellant was, in fact, lawful, but whether there was some evidence the appellant reasonably believed it was unlawful. See Semaire v. State, 612 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (question not whether there is any evidence that complainant’s use of force unlawful; appellant entitled to self-defense instruction if any evidence he reasonably believed that complainant’s use of force unlawful). Additionally, despite the requirement we view the evidence in the *365light most favorable to the appellant, the majority opinion nonetheless goes on to analyze much of the evidence in a manner markedly inconsistent with this standard. For instance, the majority opinion views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State by incorrectly assuming, as a matter of law, that appellant heard Chai-son identify himself as a police officer. It implicitly makes this conclusion even though Chaison admitted at trial that the gunfire was “so very loud” and the two men were separated by a significant distance after they both retreated. Unequivocally, the record reveals the police identification came after Chaison had fired at appellant and appellant returned fire which hence materially undermines the cogency of the majority’s appraisal.2
We also note that the majority emphasizes the moment at which appellant initially revealed his weapon. However, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to appellant would indicate that appellant did not fire his weapon, and thus did not commit the offense, until after he had been shot and had retreated behind the car. Even though we believe appellant was unjustified in initially showing his weapon, appellant was not necessarily barred as a matter of law from defending himself in light of the events subsequent to his showing his gun. While the appellant hardly presents a sympathetic figure,3 in this context we are nonetheless mandated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to him. And if we do so by detached application of the required principles, we believe we have no choice but to conclude he was improperly denied a self-defense charge.
Because appellant properly objected to the absence of self-defense in the charge, reversal is required if the error was calculated to injure the rights of the defendant. See Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Appellant was positively implicated as the shooter at trial. Because of this, the failure to include self-defense foreclosed appellant’s only chance of an acquittal. We would therefore hold the trial court’s error was calculated to injure appellant’s rights and sustain appellant’s self-defense issue.

. According to his mother at the punishment hearing, this 17-year-old youth had a ninth-grade education, was a patient at the Vernon State Hospital, and, at one time, had been pronounced brain-dead. This inarticulate minor's words “you are the law” are equally consistent as a rhetorical question. The youth could as well have intended or said "You are a liar!? Aren’t you?" "You say you are not a cop, but you really are!?” The undercover agent responds: "Don’t put that jacket on me!" The youth replies he isn’t afraid of the law. ' While this street banter should be considered in a sufficiency review, it is hardly the basis to rule out defensive issues as a matter of law.

. The majority takes as gospel the officer's subjective opinions — "no doubt that appellant was going to shoot” — in its assessment and contemporaneously resolutely refuses to consider facts and rational inferences that support the defensive issues. Were the tables turned and the officer put in appellant’s position, would the majority say the undercover agent had no right to defend himself? We note that in the companion case of State v. Lavern, No. 14-99-00728-CR (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] ), appellant received the lesser-included offense and self defense instructions that were denied in this case.

. Like the majority, we deplore the grievous and paralyzing injury sustained by Officer Higgins. Every day, hundreds of brave and dedicated officers and deputies risk their lives and limbs. These outstanding people fight crime on our behalf and ultimately to uphold the rule of law. The rule of law itself and therefore all of society suffers grievous injury when objective standards are not equally applied to society’s lowest and meanest. Cf. Mt 25:40, 2Ki 18:24.