Court Opinion

ID: 9484035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:38:45.835374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:56.066133
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join the majority’s opinion as it relates to Bush’s first three claims. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that Bush received effective assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In my view, Mus-chott’s total failure to investigate Bush’s mental health, family, and penal background, as well as his decision not to introduce certain mitigating evidence of which he was aware, rendered his performance constitutionally deficient. A reasonable probability exists that but for this constitutionally inadequate performance Bush would not have been sentenced to death. I thus respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the denial of Bush’s petition for habeas corpus relief as to sentencing.
I.
To investigate and develop available mitigating evidence is a basic and unshakable obligation of defense counsel in all capital cases. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (holding that counsel must “make reasonable investigations or ... make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary”); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1500 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2282, 119 L.Ed.2d 207 (1992), and cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2290, 119 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1462 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1516, 117 *1094L.Ed.2d 652 (1992); Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 493 (11th Cir.1988). At least since Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2605, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the importance of presenting mitigating evidence has been a prominent feature of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1234, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2951, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989)); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1670-71, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12, 102 S.Ct. 869, 874-75, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). Making the sentencer aware of all relevant mitigating circumstances is necessary to give practical meaning to the bedrock Eighth Amendment principle that “ ‘respect for humanity ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender’ ” in capital cases. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)). Reasonable investigation, therefore, (which includes making reasonable decisions not to pursue certain inquiries) is an absolute prerequisite for constitutional assistance of counsel. When counsel breaches the duty of reasonable investigation, even strategic or tactical decisions regarding the sentencing phase, which normally are entitled to great deference, must be held constitutionally deficient. See, e.g., Horton, 941 F.2d at 1462.
In my opinion, Muschott failed to conduct even a minimally adequate search into Bush’s background. At the evidentiary hearing in the district court, Muschott conceded that he prepared no mitigating evidence whatsoever to present at sentencing. Dist.Ct.Tr. at 402. He never looked into Bush’s psychological history. He never sought Bush’s school or prison records. Id. at 319. He never developed evidence of the hardships of Bush’s abusive and tragic life growing up in a family of seasonal farmworkers. Id. at 321. He never developed any evidence that might have explained or softened the effect on the jury of Bush’s 1974 conviction.1 Id. at 344. These items were not hidden facts, discoverable only through substantial effort. They were basic background facts and records which the most cursory investigation and preparation would have revealed. And, significantly, Muschott admitted that he did not have a reasonable, tactical reason for not seeking or developing much of this evidence. See, e.g., id. at 319. He simply did not do it.
Had Muschott conducted a competent investigation he would have discovered information that certainly would have informed, and might very well have altered, his decision not to present any evidence in mitigation. A 1974 report that was included in Bush’s incarceration records, for example, stated that Bush had an obsessive-compulsive personality with an incipient pathology, uncertain control of his impulses, and sometimes loosened ties to reality. The reporting doctor worried that Bush was primed for a “possible future psychosis” which might be hastened by “any stress situation.”2 This warning is consistent with the testimony in the district court of Dr. Carbonell, who reported that Bush possesses borderline intellectual functioning and possibly suffers from brain damage and other mental health problems. It suggests that Bush may have suffered from a severe emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide in this case, a statutory mitigating circumstance under Florida law, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(6)(b). Even if Bush’s mental health problems did not rise to the level of a severe emotional disturbance, the 1974 report identifies some mental health problems which could have been introduced at the penalty phase as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. At the very least, the report would have placed Muschott on notice that further investiga*1095tion into Bush’s psychological state was necessary.
Muschott had every chance to develop mental health mitigation but neglected to do so. At Muschott’s request, the state trial court appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Tingle, and a psychologist, Dr. Sobel, to assist the defense. Yet Muschott met with Dr. Tingle only once, for approximately thirty minutes, no more than ten minutes of which were spent talking about potential mitigating evidence.3 He did not meet with Dr. Sobel at all. He did not have either doctor examine or evaluate Bush. Nor did he provide either doctor with Bush’s previous psychological reports. Indeed, he could not provide the doctors with Bush’s records because his failure to conduct a basic documentary investigation left him ignorant of their existence. Based solely on his own relatively cursory and wholly untrained observations that Bush had no problems communicating, had demonstrated the ability to weigh options and make his own decisions, and was “calm, cool, and collected,” Muschott abandoned a potentially life-saving sentencing strategy.
The majority holds that “[gjiven what Muschott could readily observe about Bush, what Muschott knew of Bush’s background and the advice of Dr. Tingle, Mus-chott acted within the wide range of reasonable professional judgment.” Ante at 1092. “[WJhat Muschott knew,” however, was crucially limited by his failure to conduct a reasonable documentary investigation. Had Muschott obtained Bush's easily obtainable incarceration records, as he should have, he would have been aware of Bush’s earlier psychological reports and surely would have realized the importance of Bush’s court-appointed doctors examining him and reviewing his records. Furthermore, Muschott must have known that nothing could be determined reliably about Bush’s mental health status without psychological testing and that a mental health strategy should not be abandoned until Dr. Sobel performed those tests. See Dist.Ct. Exh. 8, attach. 5 (Dr. Tingle’s notes); Exh. 14(d) (Muschott’s notes). Dr. Sobel was available to test Bush. Muschott simply declined to have her do the tests.
Muschott likewise was inexcusably unaware of information that would have explained or softened the impact on the jury of Bush’s 1974 conviction and thirty-year sentence for rape and robbery. This failure tainted two important defense strategy decisions. First, Muschott decided not to attempt to mitigate the effect on the jury of evidence presented by the State that Bush had been convicted of rape and robbery and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment.4 Even more significant, Muschott chose not to present any evidence of Bush’s difficult family background or positive character traits.5 He made these decisions because he feared that the State, in rebuttal, would reveal .the details of the 1974 crime. Because of his complete failure to investigate, however, Muschott did not know that Florida officials, whose opinion likely would have carried great weight with the jury, were on record as stating that Bush’s conduct had been far from the cold act of a heinous criminal. Bush’s 1974 presentenee investigation report found that he “does not impress one as being a hard nosed street kid. Instead he impresses one as being a youth who has inadvertently involved himself in a very serious adult crime.” The report concluded that Bush should suffer the minimum amount of retribution allowable by the court. Bush’s sentencing judge went further. He stated that he did not believe that Bush’s conduct warranted even the minimum sentence imposed by Florida law, though of course he could not sentence Bush to less than the statutory minimum. If Muschott had been *1096aware of this information, he might very well have chosen to introduce humanizing evidence of Bush’s family background and character traits, knowing that if the State attempted to countermand that evidence with the 1974 crime, he could surrebut with the statements of the Florida officials.
In sum, Muschott’s investigative effort in preparing for the penalty phase of Bush’s trial amounted to one short conversation with Dr. Tingle based solely on Mus-chott’s own inconsiderable and untrained observations and a few conversations with Bush’s father, brother, and girlfriend, most of which were initiated by them. In my view, Muschott failed to discharge his duty of reasonable investigation. Consequently, his strategy at sentencing — doing nothing more than asking the jury to listen to the one of Bush’s four statements in which he sounded most remorseful — was constitutionally tainted.
Muschott also failed to render constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel when he chose not to introduce mitigating evidence that could not reasonably have opened the door to damaging evidence in rebuttal. Muschott feared that if he introduced mitigating evidence, including Bush’s sympathetic background and intellectual and mental health deficiencies, the State would introduce statements by Bush’s codefendants that his involvement in the murder had been extensive, as well as details of the 1974 crime. Much of the mitigating evidence that might have persuaded the jury to vote for life, however, was completely distinct from this potential rebuttal evidence. That Bush is the loving father of a daughter with Down’s Syndrome or once saved a drowning child, for example, has nothing to do with the details of the 1974 crime or the extent to which Bush participated in the murder, and cannot reasonably have given rise to the fear of rebuttal. The same goes for Bush’s mental health problems and for the hardships Bush endured as an abused child in a family of seasonal workers, with a disabled and alcoholic father and a mother who died when he was just a boy.6
I agree with the majority that Muschott acted reasonably when he asked the jury to listen to the statement in which Bush sounded most remorseful. The Sixth Amendment problem in this case is not with what Muschott did but what he did not do. He did not conduct a constitutionally adequate investigation into Bush’s background and he did not introduce significant evidence that could not reasonably have given rise to damaging rebuttal. That counsel made many competent decisions does not preclude a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. The right to effective assistance of counsel may be violated “by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial.”7 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); accord Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-69; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046 n. 20, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Muschott’s abdication of his responsibility to investigate and present mitigating evidence was a significant error, in my view, more than sufficiently egregious to implicate Bush’s right to constitutionally effective counsel. The range of professional judgment acceptable under the Sixth Amendment is wide, but not boundless.
II.
The majority also errs in holding that Bush does not satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Contrary to the majority’s summary conclusion, a reasonable likelihood does exist that but for Muschott’s constitutionally deficient performance Bush’s jury would have rejected the death penalty. All that is necessary to satisfy *1097the prejudice prong in this case is a reasonable probability that one additional juror would have voted for life. A reasonable probability is simply a likelihood sufficient to undermine confidence in the jury’s death recommendation, not even proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Notwithstanding Muschott’s constitutionally inadequate performance, the State could muster only seven votes for death. Under Florida law a six-six split constitutes a recommendation against the death penalty. See Harich v. State, 437 So.2d 1082, 1086 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1329, 79 L.Ed.2d 724 (1984). The sentencing judge can override such a recommendation only if the facts suggesting a death sentence are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person can conclude that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. See Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975). That standard could not have been met in this case.
Abundant mitigating evidence was available to humanize Bush in the eyes of the jury, including his loving devotion to his child suffering from Down’s Syndrome and his borderline intellectual functioning (if not more serious mental health problems). If only some of that evidence had been introduced, the State would not have been able to emphasize to the jury, as it did, that “[tjhere has been no testimony concerning the character of the defendant other than the fact that he was previously convicted of a serious crime.” Sentencing Hearing Tr. at 155. Because no mitigating evidence whatsoever was introduced, the jury was left with only the prosecution’s view: that John Earl Bush possessed no positive human qualities worth sparing.
In Blanco v. Singletary, supra, we wrote:
Given that some members of Blanco’s jury were inclined to mercy even without having been presented with any mitigating evidence and that a great deal of mitigating evidence was available to Blanco’s attorneys had they more thoroughly investigated, we find that there was a reasonable probability that Blan-co’s jury might have recommended a life sentence absent the errors.
943 F.2d at 1505. Likewise, in this case, nearly half of Bush’s jurors were inclined to mercy notwithstanding Muschott’s defective performance. Substantial mitigation was available if Muschott had only conducted a basic investigation. There is far more than a mere reasonable probability that John Earl Bush today faces execution because of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the denial of habeas relief as to sentencing.

. In fact, Muschott admitted he never even obtained the transcript of, or the Division of Youth Services records about, that case. Dist.Ct.Tr. at 296.

. Bush's subsequent years in prison where, as a teenager, he apparently was raped and assaulted would undoubtedly constitute a “stress situation."

. In an affidavit, Dr. Tingle stated that “[n]o one discussed mitigating circumstances with [him] or asked [him] to conduct an evaluation in that regard.”

. Under Florida law, prior conviction of a violent crime is a statutory aggravating circumstance. See Fla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)(b).

.Several witnesses would have testified, for example, that Bush is a loving and devoted father to his daughter, who has Down’s Syndrome, and that he once saved the life of a young child who was drowning. See, e.g., Affidavits of Debora Mitchell, Denise Bush & Janie Nicholson.

. In addition, the judge had ruled that Bush’s inability to cross-examine the codefendants at sentencing rendered their statements about the extent of Bush’s participation in the crime inadmissible. See Sentencing Hearing Tr. at 48-49.

. For the same reason, the fact that Bush took the stand at the sentencing phase is not determinative of the Sixth Amendment issue in this case. That Bush himself made a tactical error when he insisted on testifying does not render Muschott’s independent failure to prepare for sentencing any more constitutionally palatable.