Court Opinion

ID: 9838951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 23:04:08.544579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:58.369363
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/8/23 P. v. Green CA1/3

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A166461
 v.
 JADEN JOSEPH GREEN,                                                    (Del Norte County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. CRF 20-9180)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Jaden Joseph Green appeals after the trial court executed a
previously suspended sentence following a probation violation. He contends
that the trial court failed to consider a recent statutory amendment affecting
his sentence, that it erred in failing to require an updated probation report,
and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in not calling these
matters to the trial court’s attention. We reverse and remand the matter for
resentencing.
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         Defendant was charged in April 2020 with felony second degree robbery
(Pen. Code, § 211),1 misdemeanor resisting a peace officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1)), and misdemeanor possession of nitrous oxide (§ 381b). At the

         1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                               1
time of the offenses, he was on misdemeanor probation. (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.1.)
      Defendant entered into a plea agreement under which he would plead
guilty to the robbery charge only and receive a grant of probation, and the
court could consider the dismissed counts in deciding whether to grant
probation and in selecting a prison term. On May 18, 2020, defendant pled
guilty to the robbery charge.
      As the factual basis for the plea, the prosecutor explained that on April
13, 2020, defendant entered a store in Crescent City and tried to buy Whip-
Its (canisters of nitrous oxide, used for getting high), but his credit card was
declined. Defendant told the store employee he would take the Whip-Its by
force if necessary. He reached over the counter and took a box of Whip-Its
worth more than $400 and left the store. He was caught by law enforcement
officers and resisted as they tried to detain him.
      On June 25, 2020 the trial court imposed, then suspended, the midterm
of three years for the robbery. (§ 213, subd. (a)(2).) It explained, “I agree that
the midterm would be appropriate. Looking at this, terms in aggravation and
mitigation, they’re—I think that they balance. . . . ¶ And so the midterm is
the appropriate term.” The court explained that it was imposing sentence
before suspending it because “the execution of sentence suspended is
probably a bigger hammer. ¶ What that means is if you violate your terms of
probation, you’re just going to go to prison. There won’t be any more chances.
This is it. And, hopefully, you can get that into your head. . . . Stay out of
trouble because the consequences to you are really, really serious.”
Defendant was placed on probation for three years. Among the conditions, he
was required to abstain from consumption of alcohol and marijuana and to
submit to drug and alcohol testing and provide clean test results.

                                        2
      A petition for revocation of probation was filed on February 14, 2022,
alleging that defendant complied with the terms of probation until November
2021, but that between November 9, 2021 and February 4, 2022, his drug
tests were positive for cocaine four times and he twice failed to submit to a
scheduled drug test.
      Defendant did not appear for a hearing on March 1, 2022, and a
warrant was issued for his arrest. He was arrested at his home on June 23.
An officer performed a pat-down search and found a bag of
methamphetamine. Drug paraphernalia and ammunition were found in
defendant’s bedroom.
      The People filed another petition to revoke defendant’s probation on
June 27, 2022, alleging that on the date of his arrest he unlawfully possessed
ammunition (§ 30305) and a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11377). The trial court found defendant in violation of his probation.2
      On September 29, 2022, the trial court terminated defendant’s
probation and executed the previously imposed three-year sentence for
robbery. This timely appeal ensued.
                                 DISCUSSION
   I. Legal Background
      When defendant was initially sentenced in 2020, section 1170 gave the
trial court discretion to select a term if a statute provided three possible
terms. (Former § 1170, subd. (b); People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459,
464.) Section 213 is such a statute, setting a sentencing triad of two, three,
or five years for second degree robbery. (§ 213, subd. (a)(2).) In the exercise

      2 At the same hearing, the court conducted a preliminary examination

on new charges stemming from the ammunition and drug possession and
held defendant to answer.

                                        3
of its discretion, the trial court imposed the middle term of three years after
finding aggravating and mitigating factors were in balance.
      While defendant was on probation, the Legislature amended section
1170, effective January 1, 2022, to limit the trial court’s sentencing discretion
in certain circumstances. (Stats. 2021, ch. 371, § 1.3 (Sen. Bill 567);
Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5 (Assem. Bill 124); People v. Flores (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038–1039 (Flores).) As relevant here, section 1170 now
provides that, “unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice [sic],” the court must impose the
lower term if any of three enumerated circumstances was a factor in the
commission of the offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)3 Two of those factors are
that the defendant was a youth at the time of the offense and that the
defendant has experienced psychological trauma. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A)
& (B).)
      Defendant was 20 years old when he committed the robbery, qualifying
as a youth under the amendments to section 1170. (§§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B),
1016.7, subd. (b) [youth means under age of 26 at time of offense].) And, he
argues, there is evidence he has suffered trauma from a substance abuse
disorder. As a result, he contends he was entitled to the benefit of the
ameliorative amendments to section 1170 when the trial court executed his
previously imposed sentence.

      3 An earlier version of Assembly Bill 124 said, “unless the court finds

that the aggravating circumstances so far outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice,” but the words “so far” were deleted in an August 26, 2021
amendment to the bill. (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) Aug. 26, 2021, italics added.)

                                        4
      The Attorney General properly concedes that these ameliorative
amendments apply retroactively to cases that were not yet final when they
went into effect. (Flores, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039; People v. Achane
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1041–1042 (Achane); see In re Estrada (1965) 63
Cal.2d 740, 742–748 [when legislation reduces punishment for offense, we
presume it applies to cases not yet final].) And our high court has ruled that
a case—like the one before us—in which “a defendant is placed on probation
with execution of an imposed state prison sentence suspended is not yet final
for this purpose if the defendant may still timely obtain direct review of an
order revoking probation and causing the state prison sentence to take
effect.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 (Esquivel).)
      Based on these principles, defendant argues he was entitled to the new
lower-term presumption, and he argues the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to consider his youth and other relevant factors. He asks us,
therefore, to remand the matter so the trial court may resentence him in light
of section 1170’s new standards. The Attorney General asks us not to
consider this claim because defendant forfeited the argument by not raising it
below, and he also contends it fails on the merits.
   II. Forfeiture
      As a general matter, we do not consider claims of error that could have
been, but were not, raised in the trial court. (People v. Saunders (1993)
5 Cal.4th 580, 589–590.) This rule applies to claims that a trial court did not
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices. (People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353–355.) The rule encompasses “ ‘cases in which
the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in
which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular
sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any

                                       5
reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.’ ” (People v. De Soto
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.) The rationale is that counsel is responsible for
“ ‘understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at
the hearing, [and] [r]outine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are
easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.’ ” (Ibid.)
Counsel is obligated not only to object generally to a sentence but to call
specific objections to the trial court’s attention to allow it to correct any
sentencing errors. (Id. at pp. 8–9.)
      After the respondent’s brief in this case was filed—and apparently too
late for defendant to have its benefit before submitting his reply brief—our
colleagues in Division Two of this appellate district decided Achane, a case
with a similar posture to the one before us. As pertinent here, the trial court
in Achane imposed an upper term sentence on the defendant in 2020, then
suspended execution and placed him on probation. (Achane, supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1039–1040.) In July 2022, the trial court revoked
probation and imposed the previously suspended aggravated term, as well as
imposing additional terms for two additional offenses the defendant
committed in the interim. (Id. at pp. 1040–1041.)
      On appeal, the defendant in Achane argued he fell within the scope of
the amendments to section 1170. Our colleagues concluded the defendant
forfeited his claim by failing to raise it below. At the time sentence was
executed, the amendments had been effect for almost seven months, and
Esquivel had already established that ameliorative amendments of this sort
were to be applied retroactively when sentence had been imposed but not yet
executed. (Achane, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1042–1043, 1045–1047;
Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 673.)

                                          6
      Another recent case from this appellate district points in a different
direction. In People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984 (Fredrickson),
our colleagues in Division Five considered a youthful defendant’s claim that
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to treat the lower term as the
presumptive term when it imposed sentence after revoking probation. (Id. at
p. 987; § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B).) Although affirming the judgment on the
merits, the court explained the appellant did not forfeit her claim by failing to
raise it below because she challenged not “ ‘the manner in which the trial
court exercised its sentencing discretion but rather its apparent
misapprehension of statutory sentencing obligations.’ ” (Fredrickson, at
p. 994, fn. 8, citing People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 840 (Panozo).)
That is the challenge defendant makes here.
      The Attorney General points out correctly that the amendments to
section 1170 had been in effect for more than nine months, when the trial
court executed sentence without anyone addressing whether they applied to
him. (See People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042 [absent contrary
evidence, trial court is presumed to know and follow the law].) But what
distinguishes this case from Ramirez and Achane is that the record here
affirmatively indicates the trial court did not understand the now more
limited scope of its discretion, if youth or another relevant factor contributed
to the commission of the offense. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) When originally
imposing the middle term on June 25, 2020, the trial court expressly found
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to balance, and there is no
dispute defendant was well within the age treated as youthful for purposes of
the statute. (§§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B), 1016.7, subd. (b).) The same judge
presided over the September 29, 2022 hearing at which the sentence was
executed. At that hearing, the court emphasized the importance of making

                                        7
defendant face the penal consequences of failing to comply with his probation
and address his drug addiction. But there was no discussion of what term
would be appropriate, or of whether the court had changed its views in
weighting aggravating and mitigating factors; rather, the court simply asked,
“it was the three-year term?” and the probation officer replied that it was, to
which the court responded, “[t]he middle term.” The court then said it was
imposing “[t]he previously suspended sentence,” without further explanation.
Bearing in mind defendant’s youth and the court’s earlier finding that the
aggravating and mitigating factors balanced, on this record it appears the
trial court was unaware of the changes to the scope of its discretion in
sentencing a youthful offender. In these circumstances, we will not treat
defendant’s claim as forfeited. (See Panozo, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 840.)
   III.   The Merits
      The Attorney General argues that defendant’s challenge fails on the
merits because he did not make the showing necessary to trigger the
statutory amendment’s presumption that the low term is proper; that is, he
did not show his youth or trauma “was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6), italics added.)
      As the court in Fredrickson explained, “The statute does not mandate a
presumption in favor of the lower term in every case in which the defendant
was under age 26 at the time the crime was committed. . . . [I]n order to
trigger the presumption, there must be some initial showing that the
defendant’s youth was a contributing factor, and only then must the record
affirmatively show compliance with the statute.” (Fredrickson, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at pp. 991–992.) That showing may be established “when the
record and/or arguments are sufficient to put a trial court on notice that a
defendant’s youth may have been a contributing factor in commission of the

                                        8
underlying offense.” (Id. at p. 994.) And “[n]otably, the initial showing need
not be made by the defendant; the showing could be made by the prosecution
or by facts or recommendations in a probation officer’s report. And the
defendant need not specifically request application of the lower term
presumption if the record shows youth contributed to commission of the
underlying offense.” (Id. at p. 994, fn. 8.) The court in Fredrickson declined
to remand for resentencing because the defendant conceded there was no
indication in the record that her youth was a contributing factor in the
offense. (Id. at p. 994.)
      On the facts of this case, by contrast, we conclude remand is
appropriate. At the initial sentencing hearing in 2020, defense counsel
argued that defendant’s actions were “very stupid. But he is young. And,
hopefully, he does learn from this.” The probation officer then told the court,
“We actually understand that Mr. Green is young. He is making some poor
decisions at a very young age.” Similarly, in its 2020 presentence report, the
probation department recommended that defendant be placed on probation,
explaining as it did so that despite the seriousness of the offense, “the
Probation Department also recognizes that the defendant is very young, and
as such there is substantial hope for him to get back on the correct path.”
      Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Fredrickson in that here the
trial court had already imposed sentence and suspended execution, whereas
in Fredrickson the trial court had previously suspended imposition of
sentence. (Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 987.) That is significant,
because the California Rules of Court provide that “[i]f the execution of
sentence was previously suspended, the judge must order that the judgment
previously pronounced be in full force and effect and that the defendant be
committed . . . for the term prescribed in that judgment.” (Cal. Rules of

                                        9
Court, rule 4.435(b)(2).)4 If unaware that it should apply the new standards
of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), the court would have simply executed the
previously-imposed three-year term without considering the sentence
further—as the record indicates it did.
      Another point is worth noting in this context. Defendant’s second claim
of error is that the trial court neglected to require a supplemental probation
report before revoking probation and executing sentence. Before terminating
probation, a court is required to review and consider a written report from
the probation officer. (§ 1203.2, subd. (b).) And “if a significant period of time
has passed since the original report was prepared,” the probation officer must
prepare a supplemental report, unless the parties stipulate to waive it either
in writing or in open court and the court consents to the waiver. (Rule
4.411(a)(2) & (b).) The Advisory Committee comment to this rule suggests six
months might constitute a substantial enough period to require a
supplemental report, and the court in People v. Dobbins (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 176, 180–181, concluded that on the facts before it, the trial
court erred in sentencing the defendant eight months after the initial report
without the benefit of an updated report.
      Here, more than two years had elapsed between the time of the initial
report and the termination of probation, and the Attorney General does not
dispute it was error to proceed in the absence of a supplemental report. He
urges only that the error was harmless, a contention we reject because in the
intervening time there had been a significant change in the sentencing law.
If a supplemental report had been prepared, it would have been required to
consider “[f]actors listed in section 1170(b)(6) and whether the current offense
is connected to those factors.” (Rule 4.411.5(a)(6)(B).) That discussion might

      4 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                       10
well have provided additional useful insights and informed the trial court’s
consideration of whether defendant’s youth or any other relevant factor
contributed to the robbery. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); see Flores, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 1039 [defendant’s youth alone sufficient to require remand
where trial court did not have opportunity to consider section 1170,
subd. (b)(6)(B) at original sentencing]; see also Fredrickson, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 992, fn. 5 [explaining Flores].) And in any event it would
have reminded the court of its obligation to revisit the previously imposed but
suspended sentence, in light of the amendments to section 1170 and Esquivel,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 673.
   IV.   Harmless Error
      Finally, we are unpersuaded by the Attorney General’s argument that
any error in the trial court’s failure to address amended section 1170 was
harmless because the record shows the court would have imposed the same
sentence in any event. Because “ ‘[d]efendants are entitled to sentencing
decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing
court,’ ” where the court was “unaware of the scope of its discretionary
powers” we must “remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly
indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion,” had
it been fully informed. (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.)
      We conclude that standard is not met here. The Attorney General
points to the trial court’s comment to defendant at the time it imposed and
suspended his original three-year sentence that he would get no more
chances to avoid prison if he violated his probation, as well as its statements
at the 2022 hearing that members of the community needed to understand
that when execution of sentence is suspended, “that means there are going to
be serious consequences if you don’t follow through.” While these statements

                                       11
show the trial court’s intent to send defendant to prison after a probation
violation, they do not show the court would not have imposed the lower term,
rather than the midterm, if it had considered subdivision (b)(6) of amended
section 1170.
         The Attorney General also points to defendant’s poor behavior on
probation to argue that the factors in aggravation are strong. But the
Attorney General has not established that events after the initial sentencing
may be taken into account when setting a base term when probation is
revoked. (See rule 4.435(b)(1) [when imposing sentence after termination of
probation, court may not consider events that occurred subsequent to grant of
probation in setting base term].)
         In these circumstances, we shall remand the matter for the trial court
to consider defendant’s sentence under the correct legal standards. It shall
do so only after considering a supplemental probation report, unless the
parties expressly waive the report with the court’s consent. Because we
reach this result, we need not consider defendant’s contention that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel.
                                  DISPOSITION
         The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for the trial court
to hold a new sentencing hearing in a manner consistent with this opinion.

                                              TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.
PETROU, J.

People v. Green (A166461)

                                        12