Court Opinion

ID: 9861241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:50:25.540993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:49.723993
License: Public Domain

ARGUELLES, J .
I concur in the decision to affirm the order of dismissal on the ground that section 647, subdivision (d) is unconstitutionally vague. This result appears compelled by the recent pronouncement of our nation’s Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352 [75 L.Ed.2d 903, 103 S.Ct. 1855], Writing for a seven-person majority, Justice O’Con-nor found section 647, subdivision (e) “unconstitutionally vague on its face *1169because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute.” (Id., at p. 361 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 911]; fn. omitted.) The court emphasized that the crucial safeguard from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is the establishment of ‘“minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” Stated otherwise, the issue is whether the statute vests overbroad discretion in the arresting officer. (Id., at p. 358 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 909].)
The nagging problem with section 647, subdivision (d) is that, despite our scrutiny, it fails to provide any concrete guidelines for a law enforcement officer to ascertain when and under what circumstances he may properly arrest for loitering in a public restroom with the specific intent (“purpose”) to solicit or engage in the prohibited conduct. A trained police officer may have a good intuition as to who is loitering for that purpose, and, indeed, certain behavior may amount to some circumstantial evidence of the prohibited intent. However, as ascertained from Kolender v. Lawson, supra, 461 U.S. 352, even such uncertainty as the Supreme Court found in the term “credible and reliable” identification is sufficient to invalidate a statute on the ground that it permits arbitrary enforcement. Loitering with a prohibited “purpose” proves even more difficult to define in terms of specific behavior.1
Our research has disclosed two decisions involving statutes prohibiting loitering for the purpose of prostitution, which are helpful and persuasive in the analysis of the present case.
In Gates v. Municipal Court (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 309 [185 Cal.Rptr. 330], the First District of this state’s Court of Appeal concluded that a local ordinance prohibiting loitering for the purpose of soliciting an act of prostitution, by a person known to be a prostitute or panderer, was void on its face because it permitted arbitrary enforcement. By contrast, in People v. Smith (1978) 44 N.Y.2d 613 [407 N.Y.S.2d 462, 378 N.E.2d 1032], the New York Court of Appeals upheld a statute prohibiting loitering in a public place by one who “repeatedly beckons to, or repeatedly stops, or repeatedly attempts to stop, or repeatedly attempts to engage passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles, or repeatedly interferes with the free passage of other persons” for the purpose of prostitution, because the statute was sufficiently specific about what acts would constitute circumstantial evidence of the specific intent to engage in acts of *1170prostitution. (Id., 407 N.Y.S.2d at p. 466.) Section 647, subdivision (d), like the local ordinance in Gates v. Municipal Court, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d 309, and unlike the statute in People v. Smith, supra, 407 N.Y.S.2d 462, does not set forth or describe conduct.
“The judiciary bears an obligation to ‘construe enactments to give specific content to terms that might otherwise be unconstitutionally vague.’ ” (Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 253 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636], quoting Associated Home Builders, etc., Inc. v. City of Liver-more (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582 at p. 598 [135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473, 92 A.L.R.3d 1038].) If any fair and reasonable interpretation of a challenged statute can sustain the constitutional validity of that statute, a reviewing court must adopt this interpretation. (Pryor v. Municipal Court, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 253; Braxton v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 138, 144-145 [109 Cal.Rptr. 897, 514 P.2d 697].) However, such attempts at interpretation may not be extended so as to engage in the strained process of creating previously nonexistent provisions in a criminal statute.
Section 647, subdivision (d) was intended to serve the useful social objective of preventing loitering by those with lewd or lascivious motives in the limited and confined area in or near public restrooms, thus reserving the restrooms for the basic purpose for which they were constructed. All persons who must use the public facilities often, including the elderly, the infirm, and young children, have the need for and right to expect such protection. However, the deterrence of socially prohibited activities in public restrooms can be met by enforcement of existing sections 647, subdivision (a) (prohibiting commission or solicitation of a lewd act), section 314 (prohibiting indecent exposure), and similar statutes which prohibit specific conduct.

 Our efforts to describe conduct which would constitute circumstantial evidence of loitering with the prohibited purpose have been hindered in the case at bench because the record fails to contain any information about respondent’s behavior which led to his arrest. However, the case properly comes before us on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.