Court Opinion

ID: 9668385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:11:09.350262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:45.116294
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
Finding myself in disagreement with a majority of this honorable Court, I respectfully dissent.
The record reflects that the order granting the motion to set aside the indictment was signed on November 16, 1990. The order was filed by the clerk on November 20, 1990. The State’s notice of appeal was filed by the clerk on December 4, 1990.
Relying on Rosenbaum v. State, 818 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), the majority concludes the State’s notice of appeal was not timely. In Rosenbaum the Court reconciled any conflict between Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.01(d) and Tex. R.App.Pro. Rule 41(b)(1) by interpreting the phrases “entered by the court” and “signed by the trial judge” as being synonymous.
However, as I stressed in my concurring opinion in Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d at 403-05 (Baird, J., McCormick, P.J., concurring), I do not believe “entered” is synonymous with “signed.” Rather, I believe the term “entered,” as used by the Legislature in art. 44.01(d), is a legal term of art which means the clerical act of entry into the record. In Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), we specifically held, “the term ‘entered,’ [as applied to judg*59ments] is not synonymous with the term ‘signed,’ but has a definite fixed legal meaning and refers to the ministerial act of the clerk in spreading the court’s judgment in the minutes of the court.”1 Wilson, 677 S.W.2d at 522. Hopkins v. State, 151 Tex.Crim. 304, 207 S.W.2d 626 (1948) (“Entered of record means entered in the minutes of the court.”); Ex parte Logan, 151 Tex.Crim. 129, 205 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1947) (Entry of record means the recording of the notice of appeal in the minutes of the court.). Accordingly, the appellate timetable for the State to file notice of appeal began on November 20, 1990.
Under this interpretation there is no conflict between art. 44.01(d) and Rule 41(b)(1) if the appealable order is “signed” and “entered” on the same day. However, in situations where this interpretation creates a conflict between Art. 44.01(d) and Rule 41(b)(1), I believe the former takes precedence over the latter for two reasons. First, art. 44.01(d) is a statute which controls over a rule promulgated by this Court. Laws passed by the Legislature are binding on this Court, and we are not at liberty to adopt rules inconsistent with the laws passed by the Legislature.2 Second, art. 44.01(d) is a specific statute governing the State’s right to appeal. However, Rule 41, entitled “Ordinary Appeal — When Perfected,” includes references to civil appeals, criminal appeals, extensions of time, and even includes a subsection entitled “Prematurely Filed Documents.” Rule 41(c) Tex.R.App.P. Therefore, art. 44.01(d) is a specific statute which takes precedence over the general provisions of Rule 41. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026.
Because the order in the case at bar was not “entered” until November 20,1990, and the State filed its notice of appeal on December 4, 1990, which was not “later than the 15th date on which the order [was] entered by the court” I would conclude Respondent has a ministerial duty to file the State’s appeal.
With these comments, I respectfully dissent.
McCORMICK, P.J., joins this opinion.

. Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis herein is supplied by author.

. The Texas Constitution provides that the legislature may delegate to the Supreme Court the power to promulgate "rules of administration not inconsistent with the laws of the state." Tex. Const. Art. V § 31(a). The Legislature has empowered the Supreme Court to do so in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.024. Before the Supreme Court adopts rules affecting the administration of criminal justice, the Supreme Court shall request the advice of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.024(b).