Court Opinion

ID: 9472359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:58:00.064221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:53.601545
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the affirmance of appellant’s mail fraud convictions. I agree with Judge John R. Gibson’s fourth amendment analysis and write separately only to explain why I disagree with the “standing” analysis set forth in note 2.
I would hold that appellant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the mailbox and its contents. In my opinion the fact that the mailbox was unlocked, was in somewhat dilapidated condition, located in a rural area accessible to the public, bore a fictitious name and address, was regularly opened by postal employees to deliver mail, and was used by appellant in furtherance of his fraudulent credit card scheme, even when considered together, do not diminish appellant’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the mailbox.
This analysis is not inconsistent with the burglar in the summer cabin hypothetical cited by Justice Stevens in United States v. Jacobsen, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1661 n. 22, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430-31 n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Like the burglar who breaks into a summer cabin during the off season, appellant would not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the mailbox if he had stolen it or had broken into it. However, it was undisputed that the mailbox belonged to appellant. In my view appellant’s understanding that access to his mailbox would be limited (or at least that police officers could not lawfully open it or inspect its contents without a search warrant) is clearly one recognized and permitted by society. This understanding is not affected by the fact that appellant used the mailbox in furtherance of his fraudulent credit card scheme. As noted by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. at 1670 (citations omitted):
In determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated, we have always looked to the context in which an item is concealed, not to the identity of the concealed item. Thus in cases involving searches for physical items, the Court has framed its analysis first in terms of the expectation of privacy that normally attends the location of *925the item and ultimately in terms of the legitimacy of that expectation____ [T]he “Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view.” The fact that a container contains contraband [or, in the present case, evidence of mail fraud], which indeed it usually does in such cases, has never altered our analysis.
I would hold that appellant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the mailbox and its contents and would affirm the district court’s order granting appellant’s motion to suppress all testimony about the search of the mailbox and the opening of the tax bill. However, I also agree that there was sufficient information in the search warrant affidavit, independent of the unlawful search of the mailbox, to support the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the first search warrant. Accordingly, I concur in the affirmance of appellant’s convictions.