Court Opinion

ID: 9518157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:45:19.931812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:36.077944
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion. I write separately only to make clear the analogy by which Mazaika v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 439 Pa.Super. 95, 653 A.2d 640 (No. 0231 Philadelphia 1993, filed December 14, 1994) (en banc) applies to this case.
In Mazaika, the defendants were national banks, and as such were governed by the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (“NBA”). The NBA authorizes the exportation of the national bank’s home state “interest” to other states such as Pennsylvania. In our decision in Mazaika we held, however, that federal law — the NBA — did not preempt all state consumer protection and usury laws limiting the charging of penalties and late fees. Instead, the term “interest” as used in the NBA means the percentage rate of interest charged to the loan and nothing more, notwithstanding any broader meaning the national bank’s home state may allow. Mazaika, supra at 101, 653 A.2d at 646.
*216In this case, the defendants are federally insured state chartered institutions, and as such are governed by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (“DIDA”). The usage of the term “interest” in this federal statute is the same as in the NBA. By analogy to our preemption analysis in Mazcdka, then, DIDA’s exportation authority preempts Pennsylvania’s definition of “interest” only narrowly. Notwithstanding the existence of broader home state definitions of “interest,” Pennsylvania’s laws on penalties and late charges still control these banks when they do business in Pennsylvania.
I therefore would reverse the lower court’s decision to the contrary.