Court Opinion

ID: 2964635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:28:40.147455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:58.808144
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1885

                                 GIDEL RIVERA-FLORES,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                          v.

                       BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CARIBBEAN, ET AL.,
                                Defendants, Appellees.
                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The  opinion of this Court  issued on April  25, 1997 is corrected
        as follows:
            On  the cover  sheet, insert  prior to  date of  decision  "Jay A.
                                                                        ______
        Garcia-Gregory and Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez on brief for appellee
        ______________     _____________________________
        Prudential Insurance Company."

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1885

                                 GIDEL RIVERA-FLORES,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                          v.

                       BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CARIBBEAN, ET AL.,
                                Defendants, Appellees.
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                      [Hon. Jose A. Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________
                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________
                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________
                                 ____________________
            Octavio A.  Diaz-Negron, Idalia M. Diaz  and Peter  J. Porrata for
            _______________________  ______________      _________________
        appellant.

            Carl  Schuster,   with  whom  Maria   Santiago  de  Vidal,   Maria
            ______________                ___________________________    _____
        Maldonado-Nieves and  Schuster Usera Aguilo  & Santiago were  on brief
        ________________      _________________________________
        for appellees.
            Jay A. Garcia-Gregory and  Fiddler, Gonzalez &  Rodriguez on brief
            _____________________      ______________________________
        for appellee Prudential Insurance Company.

                                 ____________________

                                    April 25, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH,  Circuit  Judge. Gidel  Rivera-Flores worked
                      LYNCH,  Circuit  Judge.
                              ______________

            first as a machine cleaner  and later as a line  operator for

            Squibb Manufacturing  Inc. ("SMI") in  Humacao, Puerto  Rico.

            Some two years  after his employment  was terminated under  a

            severance program,  Rivera, who  wore a prosthetic  device in

            place  of his  lower  left leg,  sued  SMI and  its  insurer,

            Prudential   Insurance  Co.,   under   the   Americans   with

            Disabilities Act  ("ADA"),  42 U.S.C.    12101  et seq.,  the
                                                            __ ____

            Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"),  29 U.S.C.

               1001 et seq., and other federal and Puerto Rico employment
                    __ ____

            statutes.  The  employer countered with a waiver  and release

            which Rivera had executed  when his employment terminated and

            for  which he  received certain  benefits.   Rivera responded

            that the release  was invalid.  On  cross-motions for summary

            judgment, the district court entered summary judgment for the

            defendants.   Rivera appeals.   This case raises  an issue of

            first    impression   in   this    circuit   concerning   the

            enforceability  under  the ADA  of  waivers  and releases  of

            claims by employees.

                      We hold that the  general principles for evaluating

            such  waivers  and releases,  enunciated  by  this court  for

            claims arising under other  employment statutes, apply to the

            ADA as  well:  ADA  waivers and releases must  be knowing and

            voluntary, as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances.

                                         -3-
                                          3

                      Whatever  the  merits  of  any  claims  Rivera  had

            arising  out of  his employment,1  he presented  no competent

            evidence  that created a genuine issue of material fact as to

            whether his waiver and release were voluntarily and knowingly

            given,  and  whether  he had  the  capacity  to  give such  a

            release.  We affirm.

                                          I.

                      Rivera was  born  in 1953  and  has a  high  school

            education.  He  began working  for SMI in  June 1984;  before

            that he worked as  a police officer for ten  years.  Rivera's

            left leg had been amputated below the knee after a motorcycle

            accident  he suffered in 1982  when he was  a police officer.

            His  work  assignments  at  SMI,  despite  his  requests  for

            accommodation (which were partially met), caused his stump to

            become irritated  and bleed.   In pain,  he began  exhibiting

            symptoms  of, and eventually received  a letter from a doctor

            diagnosing him  with, post-traumatic stress  disorder and  an

            anxiety disorder.

                      Rivera  left  work  due to  disability  in December

            1992.  In the spring  of 1993, he received a letter  inviting

            him to participate in a voluntary separation plan.  He sent a

            letter accepting this invitation.  He also applied for  long-

                                
            ____________________

            1.  There is no indication in the record that plaintiff first
            presented  his  claim  to  the  Equal Employment  Opportunity
            Commission ("EEOC"), which is a prerequisite to bringing suit
            under the ADA.  Defendants never raised this issue and it was
            not argued before us.  We decline to address the matter.

                                         -4-
                                          4

            term disability benefits  available through the employer  and

            submitted   a  statement  in   support  from   his  attending

            physician.   The  insurer  denied the  request for  long-term

            disability   benefits;   Rivera  sought   reconsideration  in

            September of 1993 and  submitted further documentation to the

            insurer.   Rivera pursued his claims  for disability benefits

            throughout 1993 and thereafter.2

                      In  the fall of  1993, faced  with the  shutdown of

            certain  of  its  operations,   SMI  sent  Rivera  and  other

            employees a  letter of  dismissal stating that  all employees

            who wished  to receive  voluntary separation benefits  had to

            sign a waiver agreement.   Under the terms of  the Separation

            Agreement and  General Release Form (the  "Agreement"), dated

            October 18, 1993, the  employee agreed that he would  make no

            legal  claims  against  the  company  or  its  insurer.3   He

            received,  in  turn, certain  benefits  beyond  those he  was

            otherwise entitled to receive.  The Agreement stated that the

                                
            ____________________

            2.  In  response to  his claim  for disability  benefits, the
            Social Security Administration  found in September  1994 that
            Rivera was disabled  and suffered  from pain,  post-traumatic
            stress disorder and dysthymic disorder.

            3.  The Agreement provided in relevant part that the employee
            agreed that "he shall file no action against the Company, nor
            against  any entity  or  person associated  with the  Company
            . . . before any  agency or administrative  instrument, board
            or  court,  federal  or local,  which  might  be  directly or
            indirectly related to his employment with the Company or with
            the  termination of  the  same."   The Agreement  encompassed
            causes of action including but not limited to the "'Americans
            with  Disabilities  Act,'  or  the  local  legislation   that
            protects persons with physical and/or mental impairments."

                                         -5-
                                          5

            signatory  acknowledged  that he  was  signing  the Agreement

            voluntarily, that he fully  understood the Agreement, that he

            had been advised to consult  with a legal representative, and

            that he had seven days to revoke his consent.  On December 1,

            1993, Rivera  executed the Agreement.   He never  revoked his

            consent.  He now  claims that he signed the  Agreement, which

            he did  not read at the  time, under duress and  while he was

            suffering under a psychiatric disability.

                                         II.

                      Rivera challenges  the validity of  the release  on

            three  grounds:   that enforcement  of  the release  would be

            contrary to the policies animating the ADA, that the evidence

            raised a dispute as  to whether the execution of  the release

            was  knowing and  voluntary,  and that  he  should have  been

            permitted to take additional discovery.  The first two issues

            are intertwined.

                      Courts   have,  in  the   employment  law  context,

            commonly upheld  releases given  in  exchange for  additional

            benefits.    Such  releases  provide  a  means  of  voluntary

            resolution of  potential and actual legal  disputes, and mete

            out a type  of industrial  justice.  Thus,  releases of  past

            claims have been honored under the laws prohibiting race  and

            gender  discrimination.   Warnebold v.  Union Pac.  R.R., 963
                                      _________     ________________

            F.2d  222, 223-24 (8th Cir. 1992);  cf. Alexander v. Gardner-
                                                ___ _________    ________

            Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52  (1974).  Such releases have also
            __________

                                         -6-
                                          6

            been   honored   under   the   ADEA,  which   prohibits   age

            discrimination in  employment, e.g., Pierce v.  Atchison T. &
                                           ____  ______     _____________

            S.F. Ry. Co., -- F.3d -- (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 1997), as well as
            ____________

            under ERISA, e.g., Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability
                         ____  _____    _________________________________

            Plan, 70  F.3d 173, 181  (1st Cir. 1995);  Rodriguez-Abreu v.
            ____                                       _______________

            Chase  Manhattan Bank,  N.A.,  986 F.2d  580,  587 (1st  Cir.
            ____________________________

            1993).

                      Where  Congress  has  wanted  to  insure particular

            protections for the employees in the procedures for obtaining

            releases,  it has done so,  for example in  the Older Workers

            Benefits  Protection Act amendments  to the ADEA.   29 U.S.C.

              626(f).   No such special  procedures are set  forth in the

            ADA.

                      The   protection  Congress  wished   to  afford  to

            disabled workers is  consistent, we believe, with  permitting

            those workers to  resolve their claims by executing a release

            in exchange  for benefits  they would not  otherwise receive.

            The ADA clearly  encourages private resolution  of employment

            disputes, such as by requiring that employers attempt to make

            reasonable  accommodations and  that the  EEOC try  to settle

            disputes informally.    See, e.g., Hodges,  Mediation and the
                                    _________           _________________

            Americans with  Disabilities Act,  30  Ga. L.  Rev. 431,  437
            ________________________________

            (1996).  The ADA also expressly provides that its enforcement

            procedures  shall  be the  same as  those  for Title  VII, 42

            U.S.C.   12117(a),  and releases  have long been  accepted in

                                         -7-
                                          7

            that  context.    In  addition,  although  claims  concerning

            employment arise under Title  I of the ADA, it  is noteworthy

            that  the EEOC Regulations under Title III of the ADA (public

            accommodations) expressly provide for settlement of disputes.

            28 C.F.R.   36.506.

                      Certainly there  is nothing in the  ADA prohibiting

            such releases.   Indeed, as the  district court pointed  out,

            the  report of the conference committee on the ADA evinces an

            intent to  permit individuals to settle or waive claims under

            the  ADA by express, voluntary agreement.  H.R. Rep. No. 101-

            596  (1990),  reprinted   in  1990  U.S.C.C.A.N.   267,  598.
                          ______________

            Prohibiting  such waivers  under  the ADA  on policy  grounds

            arguably would display the  same stereotyping and patronizing

            attitudes toward the disabled  which Congress hoped to remedy

            in  enacting the  ADA.   We conclude  that such  releases are

            permissible under the ADA, and turn to whether the release at

            issue here was valid.

                      Waiver  and  release  are affirmative  defenses  on

            which  the employer bears the burden.   Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c);

            see Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529, 1543 (3d Cir.
            ___ ____    ___________________

            1997).  At  a minimum,  judicial review of  such waivers  and

            releases has  been designed to ensure that  they are "knowing

            and  voluntary."   Smart,  70 F.3d  at  181.   That  analysis
                               _____

            necessitates some  focus on the  rights being waived  and the

            congressional intention  to protect such rights.   This court

                                         -8-
                                          8

            has  endorsed  a  "totality  of  circumstances"  approach  to

            determining the validity of the  waiver.  Id.  We  have found
                                                      ___

            helpful, but not  exclusive, a set of  six factors identified

            by the Second Circuit in Finz v. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78, 82
                                     ____    ___________

            (2d Cir. 1992).4

                      And yet, a challenge  to a release by a  person who

            asserted to the employer that he was disabled at the time  of

            execution of  the release  may, on particular  facts, warrant

            heightened  judicial   scrutiny.5    While   certain  claimed

            disabilities may  inherently raise a  question about  whether

            the employee has the capacity to give a knowing and voluntary

            waiver, that is not the case  here.  It is not enough for  an

            employee simply to assert that he was disabled at the time he

            executed  the  release  and  the   employer  knew  it.    The

            definition   in   the  ADA   of  "disability"   covers  three

            categories, including  the  mere perception  that someone  is

            disabled.    42 U.S.C.    12102(2);  Soileau  v. Guilford  of
                                                 _______     ____________

            Maine, Inc.,  105 F.3d  12, 15  (1st Cir. 1997).   Nor  is it
            ___________

                                
            ____________________

            4.  The  six  factors  are:  (1)  plaintiff's  education  and
            business sophistication; (2) the respective roles of employer
            and employee in determining the provisions of the waiver; (3)
            the clarity of the  agreement; (4) the time plaintiff  had to
            study the  agreement; (5)  whether plaintiff  had independent
            advice, such as  that of counsel;  and (6) the  consideration
            for the waiver.  Smart, 70 F.3d at 181 n.3.
                             _____

            5.  Unlike waiver of pension  benefits under ERISA, waiver of
            welfare benefits such  as those at  issue here are not,  as a
            general matter,  subject to heightened  scrutiny.  Rodriguez-
                                                               __________
            Abreu, 986 F.2d at 587.
            _____

                                         -9-
                                          9

            enough  to  assert  that the  nature  of  the disability  was

            psychiatric.   Not all  disabilities and not  all psychiatric

            disabilities inherently involve a question about capacity  to
                         __________

            act  knowingly  and  voluntarily.     Cf.  United  States  v.
                                                  ___  ______________

            Schneider, -- F.3d -- (1st Cir. Apr. 15, 1997).
            _________

                      Thus, the operative question  is whether there is a

            genuine issue  as  to  whether Rivera  had  the  capacity  to

            execute  the  release  knowingly  and voluntarily.    Summary

            judgment  is appropriate  where "the  pleadings, depositions,

            answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,  together

            with  the affidavits, if any,  show that there  is no genuine

            issue as  to any material  fact and that the  moving party is

            entitled to  judgment as a matter  of law."  Fed.  R. Civ. P.

            56(c).    Here,  the  only  sworn  evidence  as  to  Rivera's

            condition  and  its  effects  is  the  statement  in his  own

            affidavit: "I was  very depressed because  I could no  longer

            work;  anxious   and  confused  and   was  under  psychiatric

            treatment."   Rivera failed to  submit an affidavit  from his

            treating psychiatrist or from any other medical expert.6  The

            court  was left with  no competent medical  evidence going to

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Rivera did submit a case summary prepared by his treating
            psychiatrist.   However, as  defendants pointed out  in their
            reply  memorandum  in support  of  their  motion for  summary
            judgment, this document constituted inadmissible hearsay.  It
            was not  supported by  an accompanying affidavit.   Plaintiff
            failed to remedy this evidentiary infirmity even after it was
            brought to his attention in this manner.

                                         -10-
                                          10

            his capacity to  execute the  release.  Cf.  Garside v.  Osco
                                                    ___  _______     ____

            Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1990).
            __________

                      Rivera   did    submit   the   decision    of   the

            administrative law  judge who  presided  over his  collateral

            action seeking  disability benefits under the Social Security

            Act. The administrative law  judge found that Rivera suffered

            from  dysthymia as  well as  post-traumatic stress  disorder.

            Even giving  these findings some evidentiary  weight they are

            insufficient, without more, to create a genuine issue of fact

            as to Rivera's mental capacity.   Mere evidence of diagnostic

            labels without content  tying them to capacity to  give valid

            consent  is  inadequate   to  create  an  issue   as  to  the

            consequences of the disorders  on an individual's capacity to

            give valid consent.

                      Rivera  never  states  in  his affidavit  that  his

            condition  was  such that  he  could not  give  voluntary and

            knowing consent.   The social security  judge's decision says

            nothing  on these  points.   And,  as we  said, there  was no

            affidavit  from  any  doctor.     Furthermore,  despite   his

            diagnosed  dysthymia  and  post-traumatic   stress  disorder,

            during this  period he  was actively pursuing  his disability

            claim and did  not tell his employer and its  insurer that he

            lacked the  capacity to do so.   On this record,  there is no

            evidence  sufficient  to  establish  lack of  capacity.    In

            reaching this conclusion, we say nothing about the outcome in

                                         -11-
                                          11

            a  case involving similar facts in which the plaintiff put on

            competent medical evidence.

                      We  consider the  remaining circumstances.   Rivera

            had  42 days  to  examine  the  Agreement,7 discuss  it  with

            whomever  he chose  and ask  questions before  he signed  it.

            Rivera attempts  to raise a  dispute about  when he  actually

            received the Agreement.  However, the employer filed with its

            summary judgment papers a receipt for the release executed by

            Rivera.  Rivera has not  fairly met this evidence.  At  most,

            his  affidavit says that he did not recall if he received the

            release then.  That is insufficient to create a genuine issue

            of fact.  See Ayer v. United States, 902 F.2d 1038, 1045 (1st
                      ___ ____    _____________

            Cir. 1990);  cf. Perez de la Cruz v. Crowley Towing & Transp.
                         ___ ________________    ________________________

            Co., 807 F.2d 1084, 1086-87 (1st Cir. 1986).
            ___

                      The   district   court  sensitively   analyzed  the

            totality  of the circumstances  here, commenting  on Rivera's

            lack of business sophistication.  The court noted that Rivera

            was  given the Agreement and  release along with  a letter of

            termination,  which  suggested  there  was  little  room  for

            negotiation.  However, as the district court pointed out, the

            language  of the  release  is clear  and  unmistakable:   the

            waiver clause expressly mentions the ADA and states that  all

                                
            ____________________

            7.  The  Agreement  was  internally inconsistent  in  that it
            provided  for  at least  a  45-day period  for  examining the
            document but apparently expired 44 days after the date it was
            issued.   We need not reach this issue, however, as plaintiff
            never claimed that the Agreement was invalid for this reason.

                                         -12-
                                          12

            claims  for  disability are  released.    The district  court

            concluded that Rivera's sense that he was treated unjustly in

            this situation does  not mean that his  signing the Agreement

            was not voluntary or knowing.

                      Rivera argues  that the district court was required

            to rule first on  the merits of his liability  claims against

            the  employer  before reaching  the  issue of  waiver.   This

            argument  has the matter  exactly backwards.   Even if Rivera

            had valid claims under  the ADA and other statutes,  he could

            have  waived those claims.  It was both logical and efficient

            to take up first the matter of waiver.

                      As  for   Rivera's  argument  that  he  was  denied

            discovery, it is too little and too late.  Our  review of the

            district court's discovery-related decisions  is for abuse of

            discretion,  and "[w]e  will intervene  in such  matters only

            upon a clear showing  of manifest injustice."  Mack  v. Great
                                                           ____     _____

            Atl.  &  Pac. Tea  Co., 871  F.2d 179,  186 (1st  Cir. 1989).
            ______________________

            Here,   Rivera  never argued  to the  district court  that he

            needed additional discovery before  filing his opposition  to

            summary  judgment; nor did he file an affidavit under Fed. R.

            Civ. P. 56(f).   Indeed, he filed a cross-motion  for summary

            judgment.   Under these circumstances, there was  no abuse of

            discretion.

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      For these reasons, to  the extent (if at  all) that

            Rivera's  remaining non-ADA claims  have been  preserved, the

            waiver and release are valid as to them.

                      Affirmed.
                      ________

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