Court Opinion

ID: 9691784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 08:10:06.425835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:12.886152
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-22-00315-CR
                              __________________

               DOMINIQUE RAMONE JOHNSON, Appellant

                                        V.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

                 On Appeal from the 9th District Court
                     Montgomery County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. 22-03-03390-CR
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Dominique Ramone Johnson appeals his conviction for aggravated

assault against a public servant.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(b)(2)(B). A

grand jury indicted Johnson for aggravated assault against a public servant, as

follows:

      Johnson, . . . did [] then and there, while using or exhibiting a deadly
      weapon, to-wit:[ ]a motor vehicle, intentionally or knowingly threaten

      1
         The jury also found Johnson guilty of evading arrest in a motor vehicle in
trial cause number 22-03-03391-CR, but that conviction is not part of this appeal.
                                        1
      K. Parker, a public servant lawfully discharging an official duty, with
      imminent bodily injury, and the defendant knew K. Parker was a public
      servant[.]

The indictment included an enhancement paragraph alleging that Johnson had been

previously convicted of a felony offense. Johnson waived his right to counsel and

pleaded not guilty.

      During his jury trial,2 after the State rested its case but prior to the defense

presenting its evidence, and outside the jury’s presence, the trial court and the parties

discussed the jury charge and Johnson requested the inclusion of a jury instruction

on reckless driving as a lesser-included offense. The State argued that reckless

driving was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault against a public

servant. After looking at section 545.401 of the Texas Transportation Code

(“Reckless Driving; Offense”), the trial court stated that “[r]eckless driving includes

some elements that are not present in either of the charged offenses, namely that you

operate the vehicle with willful and wanton disregard for public safety.” After

Johnson presented his case, the trial court asked for requested changes to the

proposed charge. Standby counsel for pro se Johnson asked if the trial court had the

      2
       Because, as explained herein, our analysis does not depend on the evidence
produced at trial, we do not discuss the details of the evidence from the trial. Briefly,
the law enforcement officers who testified at trial described a traffic stop for
speeding, that turned into a high-speed chase, and at some point the defendant
attempted to use his vehicle to run over a police officer.
                                           2
“lesser included request” on the record, to which the trial court responded, “Yes, it’s

on the record.”

      The jury found Johnson guilty of aggravated assault against a public servant.

After Johnson pleaded true to the enhancement allegation, the trial court sentenced

Johnson to thirty years of imprisonment for aggravated assault against a public

servant. Johnson filed this appeal. We affirm.

                                   Appellate Issue

      In one appellate issue, Johnson argues the trial court erred in denying

Johnson’s request for a jury charge instruction of the lesser-included offense of

reckless driving. According to Johnson:

             Common sense dictates that any activity involving a motor
      vehicle that intentionally threatens a person with injury necessarily
      involves driving the vehicle willfully and/or wantonly at or near that
      person without regard to that person’s safety. K. Parker, regardless of
      his occupation, is certainly a person.
             Furthermore, even looking to the Court’s definition of reckless
      driving requiring “willful or wanton disregard for public safety,” K.
      Parker, as a purported public servant, is certainly, and by definition, a
      member of the public.
             Here, the Court was required to look not only to the statutory
      elements of the crime charged, but also the facts pled in the indictment
      to find the lesser included offense of reckless driving.

      The State argues that Johnson failed to preserve error because he requested

the instruction for the lesser-included offense after the State had rested and prior to

any of Johnson’s evidence even arguably showing that Johnson, if guilty, was guilty

only of reckless driving. Also, the State argues that Johnson failed to point to
                                          3
evidence supporting reckless driving as a valid, rational alternative to aggravated

assault against a public servant. Furthermore, the State contends that, even if

Johnson preserved error, reckless driving was not a lesser-included offense of

aggravated assault against a public servant as indicted, and there was no evidence

that Johnson, if guilty, was only guilty of reckless driving.

                      Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      We review a trial court’s refusal to submit a lesser-included instruction for an

abuse of discretion. Chavez v. State, 666 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

We employ a two-part analysis to determine whether a trial court abused its

discretion in denying a requested charge on a lesser-included offense. Id.; Ritcherson

v. State, 568 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Bullock v. State, 509 S.W.3d

921, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Rice v. State, 333 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09 (defining the

requirements for a lesser-included offense).

      First, we compare the statutory elements as alleged in the indictment with the

statutory elements of the requested lesser-included offense to determine whether the

lesser-included offense is included within the proof necessary to establish the

charged offense. Ritcherson, 568 S.W.3d at 670-71; Bullock, 509 S.W.3d at 924-25.

This is a question of law and does not depend on the evidence to be produced at trial.

Rice, 333 S.W.3d at 144. An offense is a lesser-included offense (sometimes referred

                                           4
to as an LIO) if the greater-inclusive offense either alleged all the elements of the

LIO or alleged elements plus facts (including descriptive averments) from which all

of the elements of the LIO may be deduced. Id. (citing Ex parte Watson, 306 S.W.3d

259, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007)). “If proof of the lesser offense is included within proof of the greater

offense, the first step has been satisfied.” Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776.

      Second, we review the entirety of the record to determine if there exists “more

than a scintilla” of affirmative evidence, regardless of whether controverted or

credible, from which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty of only the lesser

offense. Roy v. State, 509 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Cavazos v. State,

382 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“While it is true that the evidence

may be weak or contradicted, the evidence must still be directly germane to the

lesser-included offense and must rise to a level that a rational jury could find that if

Appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense.”). This

requirement is met if there is affirmative evidence of a factual dispute that raises the

lesser offense and rebuts or negates other evidence establishing the greater offense.

Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at 776 (citing Roy, 509 S.W.3d at 319).

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                                       Analysis

      Assuming without deciding that Johnson preserved error, the first step of the

lesser-included-offense analysis requires us to determine if reckless driving is a

lesser-included offense of aggravated assault against a public servant as charged.

Under this step, we do not consider the evidence that was presented at trial. Rice,

333 S.W.3d at 144. Rather, we consider only the statutory elements of aggravated

assault against a public servant as they were modified by the particular allegations

in the indictment. Id. The indictment alleged that:

      (1) Johnson
      (2) intentionally or knowingly
      (3) threatened K. Parker, a public servant lawfully discharging a duty, with
          imminent bodily injury
      (4) while using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle
      (5) and the defendant knew K. Parker was a public servant.

We then compare them with the elements of the lesser offense of reckless driving:

      (1) Johnson
      (2) drove a vehicle
      (3) in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.401(a). Finally, we ask whether the elements of the

lesser offense are “‘established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required

to establish the commission of the offense charged’?” Rice, 333 S.W.3d at 145

(citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.09(1); Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 524)). “‘[T]he

elements of the lesser-included offense do not have to be pleaded in the indictment

if they can be deduced from facts alleged in the indictment.’” Lang v. State, 664
                                           6
S.W.3d 155, 164-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting State v. Meru, 414 S.W.3d

159, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). “When applying the cognate-pleadings approach,

reviewing courts may employ the functional-equivalence concept.” Id. When

utilizing the functional-equivalence concept, the reviewing court examines the

elements of the lesser offense and decides whether they are functionally the same or

less than those required to prove the charged offense. Id. (citing Meru, 414 S.W.3d

at 162; Rice, 333 S.W.3d at 144-45).

      We find the discussion in Rice particularly instructive here because it also

involved an examination of whether reckless driving was a LIO of aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon, “to-wit: a motor vehicle[.]” See 333 S.W.3d at 143-48. In

Rice, when applying the first part of the lesser-included-offense analysis, the Court

of Criminal Appeals compared the elements of the charged offense of aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon (a motor vehicle) 3 as alleged in the indictment in that

case with the elements of reckless driving to determine whether the elements of

      3
         The Court in Rice listed the statutory elements of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon as they were modified by the particular allegations in the indictment
as follows:
       (1) the appellant
       (2) intentionally and knowingly
       (3) threatened [the victim] with imminent bodily injury
       (4) used and exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a motor vehicle
       (5) that in the manner of [the motor vehicle’s] use and intended use
           was capable of causing death and serious bodily injury.
Rice v. State, 333 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
                                           7
reckless driving were included within the facts required to establish aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon. See id. at 145. The Court concluded that the elements

of reckless driving are not established by proof of the same or less than all the facts

required to establish the commission of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (a

motor vehicle) “because the facts required to prove . . . reckless driving include one

that is not the same as, or less than, those required to establish the offense charged:

driving.” See id. The Court explained that the indictment included no indication that

the appellant was driving, and the element of driving could not be deduced from the

charging instrument. See id. The Court noted the following:

             There are many ways in which a vehicle could be used or
      exhibited as a deadly weapon. An individual may commit a statutorily
      distinct species of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon by locking
      the victim in a hot car, slamming the victim’s head against the car
      frame, rigging the car’s gas tank to explode, placing the car in neutral
      and allowing it to run into the victim or a building, suffocating the
      victim in the trunk, or running the car in an enclosed area to cause
      carbon monoxide poisoning. We have stated that “when the greater
      offense may be committed in more than one manner, the manner
      alleged will determine the availability of lesser-included offenses.”
      And in such a situation, the “relevant inquiry is not what the evidence
      may show but what the State is required to prove to establish the
      charged offense.”
             ....
             In this case, as noted previously, the indictment includes the
      phrases “did use and exhibit a deadly weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle”
      and “that in the manner of its use and intended use,” but there is no
      allegation, express or implied, that Appellant was driving. As the State
      correctly points out, driving might be the most common manner in
      which aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, namely a motor
      vehicle, may occur, but it is certainly not the only one. Although the
      State could have proven driving at trial, it could also have proven a
                                          8
      variety of other means by which the car was used or exhibited that
      would also be classified as aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
      Therefore, . . . the State was not required to prove the facts of the traffic
      offense, and . . . there was not a functional equivalent alleged in the
      indictment from which the element of driving could be deduced.
      Consequently, reckless driving is not a lesser-included offense of the
      charged offense [of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon].

Id. at 145-47 (citations omitted).

      In the present case, Johnson was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon, “to-wit:[ ]a motor vehicle,” and his indictment also included the element

that the victim was a public servant. As noted in Rice, aggravated assault with a

motor vehicle may occur by more than one manner, so we must look at the

indictment to determine the availability of reckless driving as a lesser-included

offense by determining what the State was required to prove to establish aggravated

assault against a public servant as alleged in the indictment. See id. And, similarly

to the indictment in Rice, here the indictment alleges that Johnson “used or exhibited

a deadly weapon: to-wit:[ ]a motor vehicle[.]” The indictment does not allege that

Johnson was “driving” and the indictment does not give rise to a deduction that

Johnson committed all of the constituent elements of the lesser-included offense of

reckless driving. See id. at 147-48. Accordingly, reckless driving is not a lesser-

included offense of the offense charged here.

      Because we find that reckless driving is not a lesser-included offense of

aggravated assault against a public servant as alleged in the indictment, we need not

                                           9
consider the second step in the two-step analysis. See id. at 148. Finding the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s request because reckless

driving is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault against a public servant

as alleged in the indictment, we overrule Johnson’s issue. We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                     _________________________
                                                         LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                               Justice

Submitted on July 21, 2023
Opinion Delivered August 23, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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