Court Opinion

ID: 9498943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:33:09.661229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:11.005870
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the order of the district court. Because the district court failed to abide by this Court’s previous remand instructions, this Court should again remand this case to the district court so that it may follow those previous remand instructions.
As an initial matter, because Petitioner filed his habeas petition before the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the pre-AEDPA standard of review applies. As a result, on federal habeas review, “the findings of a state court generally ‘shall be presumed to be correct.’ ” Giles v. Schot-ten, No. 97-3218, 1999 WL 519234, at *4 (6th Cir. Jul.16, 1999) (unpublished decision) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994)). This presumption applies to the factual findings of state trial and appellate courts. Id. (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-46, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981)). This presumption, however, is not tantamount to blind acceptance on the part of the federal courts; “the district court should not presume correct a particular factual finding if the petitioner establishes or it otherwise appears from the record that the record as a whole does not fairly support the State’s factual determination ....” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) and McMillan v. Barksdale, 823 F.2d 981, 983 (6th Cir.1987)). Thus, the federal courts are required to “ ‘examine the findings of the state judge to determine if they are adequate to support the presumption of correctness under § 2254(d).’ ” Id. (quoting Fowler v. Jago, 683 F.2d 983, 987-89 (6th Cir.1982)). Moreover, state court conclusions as to mixed questions of law and fact or pure questions of law are not entitled to the presumption of correctness under § 2254(d). Id. at *5 (quoting Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 379-80 (6th Cir.1982)).
The only issues that this Court should address in connection with this appeal are two unresolved errors of the district court. The district court committed the first of these errors in 1997, when it initially failed to properly analyze Petitioner’s claim for habeas relief. Id. at *3. At that time, Petitioner argued that the state trial court had violated his due process right to present a defense when it refused his request to conduct independent medical and psychological examinations of the alleged victims. Id. at *4. The district court presumed to be correct the factual finding of the state appellate court that Petitioner’s only purpose in seeking these examinations was “to challenge the veracity of [the alleged victim’s] trial testimony inculpating [Petitioner].” Id. (second alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court then deferred to the legal conclusion of the state appellate court that, under State v. *707Boston, 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 545 N.E.2d 1220 (Ohio 1989), an expert may not testify as to the veracity of a child witness’ testimony, so that the state trial court properly disallowed Petitioner’s requested examinations. Id.
This Court vacated the judgment of the district court on two grounds. First, the district court erred when it presumed the state appellate court’s factual finding to be correct, because the factual finding was not supported by the record. Id. at *5. The state appellate court found, and the district court presumed, that Petitioner’s sole purpose in seeldng the examinations was to challenge the veracity of the alleged victim’s testimony; however, “there [was] ample evidence in the record showing Petitioner sought the examinations to collect independent evidence to support his theory that the girls were not abused, and little evidence to fairly support the finding that Petitioner sought the examinations only to challenge their credibility.” Id. This evidence included: (1) the fact that Petitioner sought a medical examination of the alleged victims, which could be legally irrelevant in attacking the veracity of the alleged victim’s testimony; (2) the fact that Petitioner’s counsel specifically stated that the purpose of the examinations was to obtain independent evidence, arguing “[a]ll we have is what the State will produce. We have no access other than that and that is what we are asking for”; and (3) the fact that when rebutting the findings of the prosecution’s medical expert, Petitioner’s counsel again proclaimed Petitioner’s right to have an independent medical examination of the alleged victims. Id. (alteration in the original).
Second, the district court erred when it deferred to the erroneous legal conclusion of the state appellate court that Boston prevented an expert from testifying as to the veracity of a child witness’ testimony. In State v. Stowers, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that Boston only “excludes expert testimony offering an opinion as to the truth of a child’s statements (e.g., the child does or does not appear to be fantasizing or to have been programmed, or is or is not truthful in accusing a particular person).” 690 N.E.2d 881, 884 (Ohio 1998). Boston “does not proscribe testimony which is additional support for the truth of the facts testified to by the child, or which assists the fact finder in assessing the child’s veracity.” Id. (emphasis removed). Thus, even if Petitioner’s purpose in seeking the examinations was to find evidence that would assist the jury in determining whether the child was telling the truth, this purpose would be valid under Boston, so long as an expert did not testify as to the veracity of the child’s testimony.
Because the district court failed to examine the record to determine whether it supported the state appellate court’s factual finding, and because the district court failed to examine Ohio case law with respect to Boston, this Court ruled in 1999 that the district court erred when it failed to properly analyze Petitioner’s habeas application. In order to correct this error, the Court
vacatefd] the judgment below and re-mandad] to the district court to make specific findings or to conduct an eviden-tiary hearing on the relevant factual issues in this case, and, if ultimately appropriate, to address the legal issue of whether the State denied Petitioner his constitutional right to present a defense in denying him the opportunity to obtain physical and psychological examinations of the witnesses against him.
Giles, 1999 WL 519234, at *6.
Instead of following the unambiguous instructions of this Court, the district court compounded its initial error by explicitly *708deciding not to make any findings or to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the relevant factual issues to address the legal issue of whether Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to present a defense, in unmistakable disregard of this Court’s instructions. Moreover, not only did the district court ignore our instructions, but it also went beyond the scope of this Court’s instructions by proceeding to entertain a summary judgment motion against Petitioner. This open disregard of this Court’s instructions is not only baffling, it is a direct violation of the mandate rule, which “ ‘compels compliance on remand with the dictates of the superior court.’ ” United States v. O’Dell, 320 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.2001)). The mandate rule also states that “ ‘a district court is bound to the scope of the remand issued by the court of appeals.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Campbell, 168 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir.1999)). In short, the district court’s error in its treatment of this case is two-fold: first, the district court erred when it improperly analyzed Petitioner’s habeas application; and second, the district court erred when, on remand, it did not resolve the initial error according to the directive of this court.
The majority opinion sets forth the novel and unusual position that a district court can simply ignore remand instructions from the Court of Appeals if, in the district court’s opinion, the district court believes that it is confronted with changed circumstances. The practical import of implementing the majority’s views is to encourage the few district judges who may on occasion wish to circumvent the remand instructions of the Court of Appeals. In the instant case, contrary to the majority’s contention, there were no changed circumstances which could have justified the district court’s failure to follow the remand instructions from the Court of Appeals. Certainly, no such change in circumstances resulted from the warden’s filing of a motion for summary judgment following remand. The district judge should have simply followed the remand instructions and deferred consideration of any dispositive motions until the district court had complied with the instructions it received from the Court of Appeals.
The examples the majority lists with respect to changed circumstances that allow the district court to stray from remand instructions are highly distinguishable. If, for example, a party dies, there is the possibility that a district court has no jurisdiction because there is no case or controversy. Likewise, if a claim becomes moot, a district court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the claim because there is no case or controversy. And when a party amends its pleading, then by nature that alters the case or controversy before the district court. There was simply no such change in the instant case; the warden merely filed a motion for summary judgment.
The principal difficulty with the majority’s opinion is that its contention that the examinations were not necessary reveals the majority’s disagreement with the remand instructions of the prior Court of Appeals panel which considered the appeal of this case in 1999. By asserting that those remand instructions were inappropriate and signaling its disagreement with the prior panel, the majority for all practical purposes is advocating that our panel sit as a reviewing court over the prior panel’s decision. By doing so, not only is it violating the rule that no panel of our Court can overrule a prior panel, see LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1105 n. 2 (6th Cir.1995), but it is also usurping the role of the en banc Court. Compliance with the prior remand instructions is therefore required out of *709respect for the prior panel’s decision and the rules of this Circuit. Moreover, such compliance would not be difficult to achieve; after following the remand instructions from the 1999 appeal, the district court could proceed with the litigation as it normally would. Because the district court completely disregarded the instructions of our prior opinion, I would simply remand the case to the district court so that it may conduct proceedings consistent with that prior opinion.
The majority’s highly questionable views regarding the obligation of district courts to follow remand instructions, if they become widely accepted, could have the untoward result of encouraging some obstinate district courts to search for creative ways to avoid complying with remand instructions with which they disagree; and could also have the untoward result of encouraging parties to engage in “judge shopping” or “panel shopping” by encouraging parties to take multiple appeals until they find a Court of Appeals panel which will release them from the remand requirements of a prior panel. It is not hyperbole to state that the implementation of the majority’s views, in addition to being contrary to the policy and procedures of the federal courts, could ultimately jeopardize the ability of the superior courts to supervise the lower courts in the federal system.
I therefore respectfully dissent.