Court Opinion

ID: 9751734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:56:11.742526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:58.250690
License: Public Domain

STEADMAN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
Appellants in their brief summarize their principal argument to us as follows: “The trial court’s negligence instruction erroneously equated the standard of reasonable care with the prevailing industry practice.”1
It is long-established doctrine that “in evaluating the propriety of a court’s instructions, the reviewing court must look upon the charge as a whole without selecting and comparing separate phrases for literal content.” Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984). I do not think that, taking into account the totality of the instruction and reinstruction of the trial court, the jury here could have thought that if the American Red Cross’s screening practices were the same as those followed generally by professional blood collectors, the American Red Cross had perforce thereby met the requisite standard of care. I see no reason to think that the jury would simply ignore that portion of the instructions which made it quite clear that the prevailing practices of blood collectors did not necessarily set the standard of care, that tiie ultimate standard was “what reasonable and prudent blood banking would do under the same or similar circumstances,” and that it, the jury, could well determine that the prevailing practices were themselves unreasonably deficient and impose liability on that basis.2 Within this concept, appellants also had full rein to develop their argument of the vulnerability of the American Red Cross in its position as a dominant force in setting those prevailing practices.
In sum, I would conclude that, while not without flaws, the instructions fairly provided a framework within which the jury could assess appellants’ theories of liability presented at trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. The American Red Cross argues that in professional fields, the standard of care is indeed that set by the profession itself, which ought not to subject to second-guessing by a jury even through expert testimony. For present purposes, without reaching the issue, I accept appellants’ contrary assertion as presented to the trial court.

. In reinstructing, the trial court again correctly pointed out that at the very least, the American Red Cross had to meet the prevailing practice by professional blood bankers in the same or similar circumstances. But again, the trial court repeated that this "doesn’t necessarily set the standard of care,” and made clear to the jury that it could determinate that this practice of the industry was not necessarily adequate.