Court Opinion

ID: 9616349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:45:55.232586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:57.447584
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
KOBAYASHI, J.,
WITH WHOM
CIRCUIT JUDGE SODETANI JOINS
I dissent.
As the majority correctly declares, this court will not interfere with a trial judge’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. However, in view of three factors, namely, the questionable circumstances under which the trial judge accepted the defendants’ guilty pleas, the plausibility of the defendants’ explanation of their mistaken beliefs in making their pleas, and the timeliness of defendants’ motion, I believe that the trial judge clearly abused his discretion in denying defendants’ motion to withdraw their pleas.
I. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH TRIAL JUDGE ACCEPTED DEFENDANTS’
GUILTY PLEAS
At the motion hearing defendants Dicks and Hedgepeth *55called attention to the questionable circumstances leading up to and surrounding the acceptance of their guilty pleas. The circumstances of this case which I view with greatest concern are: the swiftness of the entire proceeding from arrest to acceptance of pleas; the fact that defendants were without counsel; and the relatively perfunctory explanation of the charges given to the defendants.
The swiftness with which defendants’ pleas of guilty were accepted was striking. Arrest took place shortly after midnight. Before noon of that same day, after a virtually sleepless night, each defendant had signed a waiver of indictment and a written plea of guilty to a felony. Shortly thereafter, they appeared before the trial judge for arraignment and soon thereafter the trial judge accepted their pleas of guilty. The entire proceeding took only thirteen hours.
In view of the felony charges, the gravity of a guilty plea and the attendant waivers of constitutional rights,1 I believe that the thrust of Section 1.3(b) of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for CRIMINAL Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty is applicable to situations such as this one. This section provides in part:
1.3 Aid of counsel; time for deliberation.
(b) A defendant without counsel should not be called upon to plead to a serious offense until a reasonable time, set by rule or statute, following the date he was held to answer. When a defendant without counsel tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a serious offense, the court should not accept the plea unless it is reaffirmed by the defendant after a reasonable time for deliberation, set by rule or statute, following the date the defendant received the advice from the court required in section 1.4.
*56The commentary which accompanied the proposed draft of Section 1.3(b) reads in part:
The thrust of the above standard ... is that even if the defendant has effectively waived counsel he nonetheless should not be hurried through the plea of guilty process without sufficient time to consider his decision. [ABA Standards at 23]
A number of appellate courts have expressed this same concern about “too swift” acceptances of guilty pleas, especially from young, inexperienced defendants. De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Walker v. State, Okla. Cr., 501 P.2d 218 (1972); Hoag v. State, Okla. Cr., 483 P.2d 753 (1971). These appellate courts cited the haste, in which a defendant’s guilty plea was accepted, as a significant factor contributing to the reversal of the trial court’s acceptance of, or refusal to allow withdrawal of, defendant’s guilty plea. Likewise, I am deeply concerned about the hasty manner in which the guilty pleas were accepted from these young, inexperienced and unrepresented defendants. My deepest concern, however, is this court’s sanctioning such a practice.
The fact that defendants were without counsel, by itself, should have alerted the trial judge to the substantial possibility that the guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and understanding^. The extremely critical nature of pleading guilty to a serious crime without assistance of counsel is well expressed by legal commentators.21 believe that to be consistent with our American principles of ordered liberty, justice and fairness, considerable leeway, in favor of allowing withdrawal of pleas entered without benefit of counsel, must be given.3 Some jurisdictions have, in fact, enacted laws which *57give statutory protection to defendants who, like defendants Dicks and Hedgepeth, so entered their guilty pleas.4
Additionally, considering the highly technical nature of the specific-intent element of burglary, the trial judge’s efforts, to insure that defendants entered their guilty pleas understandingly, were inadequate. See Carvalho v. Olim, 55 Haw. 336, 519 P.2d 892 (1974); Wong v. Among, 52 Haw. 420, 477 P.2d 630 (1970). The specific intent involved is “... intent to commit therein a crime against . . . property rights.” To one unfamiliar with the law, this could easily be misunderstood to include the intent to trespass or to break into the building. In fact this is the precise misconception that defendants Dicks and Hedgepeth now claim to have had at the time of their arraignments. The transcripts of the arraignments and pleas give* no indication that the ambiguous phrase, “crime against property rights ’ ’, was clarified by the judge or understood by the defendants.
II. PLAUSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS’ EXPLANATION OF THE MISTAKEN BELIEFS THEY HAD WHEN THEY MADE THEIR PLEAS
It is basic to our system of criminal justice that judicial discretion should always be exercised in favor of innocence and liberty and of giving the accused a trial upon the merits. See People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 107 N.E.2d 721 (1952); People v. Hancasky, 410 Ill. 148, 101 N.E.2d 575 (1951). Accordingly, where it appears that a plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, the court should permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea. People v. Morreale, supra; People v. Hancasky, supra.
*58In the instant case, I found defendants’ “story”, as presented at the motion hearing, very plausible. At a minimum, I believe, it creates doubt of the guilt of the defendants, and gives the appearance that their guilty pleas were entered on misapprehensions of fact and of law.
In essence defendants’ “story” was as follows: that they entered the Landing Restaurant for reasons other than to steal food or anything else; that the reason defendant Dicks told the police they had entered for food was because the police were punching him and grabbing defendant Hedgepeth and he thought that that answer would appease them (the police); that he did not realize the gravity nor the implication of entering for food and so stuck with that story; that shortly after their arrest, defendant Hedgepeth wrote out a “full confession” of what occurred that night; that in that confession, Hedgepeth insisted that there was never any intention to steal anything; that they (defendants) trusted the detectives and the State’s attorney and just accepted what was told to them; that their primary concern prior to the arraignment was to get the whole thing over with as quickly as possible; that they signed written waivers of indictment and pleas of guilty even prior to the arraignment; that Hedgepeth thought that the State’s attorney and the judge had read her confession and thus she assumed that the charges brought accurately reflected what they had done; that they misunderstood the phrase “crime against property rights” and thought that their breaking into the building and their trespass met that requirement.
The logical consistency between the above explanation and the record of the events leading up to defendants’ pleas is undeniable. For example, Hedgepeth’s claim that they did not enter to steal anything but rather did so to “make love” is quite believable. Nothing in the restaurant was touched or taken. Had they broken in to eat because of hunger, they would naturally have gone directly to the food. They did not. Instead, as Hedgepeth wrote in her confession and later testified, they made love.
As to Dicks’ explanation on why he fabricated the story *59about going into the restaurant for food, I find it also credible. It is entirely reasonable for a young, inexperienced layman, who was at the time he made the statement being allegedly intimidated by the police, to think that breaking into a building to eat because of hunger would be less serious and more sympathy provoking than breaking in to make love. At any rate, such a story would be less embarrassing.
And finally, the inconsistency between Hedgepeth’s written confession and their pleas of guilty substantiates their subsequent claim that they did not understand the charges that they pleaded to. At the motion hearing, Hedgepeth explained that after she wrote out a full confession of what they had done, she thought, perhaps naively, that the State’s attorney would conform the charges accordingly. Furthermore, she claims that she thought, out of ignorance of criminal procedure, that the trial judge had read the written confession before the arraignment and was therefore aware of all of the relevant facts when he accepted their guilty pleas. Therefore, she claims, they mistakenly believed that the charges that were brought accurately reflected their conduct; they mistakenly thought that they were guilty.5
III. TIMELINESS OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS
“A swift change of heart is itself a strong indication that the plea was entered in haste and confusion; furthermore, withdrawal shortly after the event will rarely prejudice the Government’s legitimate interests.” United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
In the case at hand, defendants began having a “change of heart” about their pleas within a few days after their arraignment. More significantly, they filed their motions, to withdraw their pleas prior to sentencing. According to the *60weight of authority, therefore, the trial judge should have exercised his discretion liberally in favor of permitting the withdrawal of the pleas. See Note, 112 U. OF Pa. L. Rev., supra; also see e.g. United States v. Barker, supra; United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1970); People v. Case, 340 Mich. 526, 65 N.W.2d 803 (1954); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 353, 220 S.W. 846 (1949).
In Barker, Judge Skelly Wright aptly states the federal view, which several leading jurisdictions have adopted:6
While Rule 32(d) permits post-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea only to prevent “manifest injustice,” the rule lays down no particular standard for deciding withdrawal motions filed prior to sentencing. However, the federal courts, relying on Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S. Ct. 582, 71 L. Ed. 1009 (1927), have uniformly ruled that presentence motions should be granted wherever such would be “fair and just.” . . . Though even presentence motions are addressed to the sound discretion of the District Court,. . . with appellate reversal uncommon, . . . the “fair and just” standard is obviously more lenient than that of “manifest injustice,” .... (Citations omitted.) United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 218-19 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
CONCLUSION
Perhaps at the time of the arraignment, without benefit of all the facts or the opportunity to deliberate on the matter, the trial judge justifiably believed that he could properly accept defendants’ pleas. At the subsequent motion hearing, however, how the trial judge could in fairness deny the defendants their motion, and thus their day in court, bewilders me. I am convinced that, in light of the herein record, the trial judge clearly abused his discretion.
I am saddened by the results of this case — for the record herein cries out for reversal for the promotion of justice.

 Carvalho v. Olim, 55 Haw. 336, 343, 519 P.2d 892, 897 (1974), citing Wong v. Among, 52 Haw. 420, 425, 477 P.2d 630, 634 (1970):
A plea of guilty in itself is a conviction and a simultaneous waiver of several important constitutional guarantees — the privilege against self-incrimination, a trial by jury, and the confrontation of one’s accusers. . . .

 See eg. Note, Pre-Sentence Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in Federal Courts, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 759, 767 (1965), and Note. Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, ) 12 U. Pa. L. Rev. 865, (1964).

See generally Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316; Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1957); cf. United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1970).

 E.g. California Penal Code § 1018 (Supp. 1976) provides in part:
On application of the defendant at any time before judgment the court may, and in case of a defendant who appeared without counsel at the time of the plea the court must, for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. . . . (Emphasis added.)

 In Note, Pre-Sentence Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in Federal Court, supra at 765, the author states: “. . . When the innocent defendant mistakenly pleads guilty because he thinks he is guilty and is later held to his plea, conviction is, of course, unjust.....” See also United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276, 1279 (3d Cir. 1970); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).

 E.g. People v. Superior Court of City & County of San Francisco, 114 Cal. Rptr. 596, 523 P.2d 636 (1974); Commonwealth v. Santos, 450 Pa. 492, 301 A.2d 829(1973); People v. Bencheck, 360 Mich. 430, 104 N.W.2d 191 (1960); see also People v. Riebe, 40 Ill.2d 565, 241 N.E.2d 313 (1968).