Court Opinion

ID: 9686725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:03:54.378116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:21.821823
License: Public Domain

BOGUE, J.
I concur in this opinion with the exception of the reasons assigned for holding the assignment to the plaintiff valid. It is my opinion if the nonassignment clause in the contract could void the assignment under any circumstances we would be compelled to hold it void here. If this were a question of an assignment of a performance of duty where the skills and ability of the contractor were important I could understand how the personnel of the assignee might be material. Where, however, the assignment is of a right made after the contract has been fully completed on the part of the contractor and long after the obligor has breached the contract I cannot see where the personnel of the assignee is material. However, I agree that the nonassignability clause in this contract does not void the assignment.
I agree that we must interpret the nonassignability clause in the contract so that the legal effect given thereto will be *204such as to attain the intended factual result. Clearly, the language of said clause shows that the parties intended to prevent an assignment of both the performance of duties and of money due or to become due prior to the time that the contractor had fully and completely performed his part of the contract. In this case, however, the contractor fully and completely performed his part of the contract as shown by the architect’s certificate. So far as the record shows the defendant breached this contract in November of 1951 by failing to pay the balance due the contractor. The contract specifically provided that time was of the essence. The contractor made no assignment until April of 1954. The money due the contractor actually became a chose in action by reason of the breach of the contract on the part of the defendant. In this case if defendant had complied with the terms of the contract the situation of which it now complains could not have arisen.
The courts have had no difficulty in holding that a general nonassignability clause in a contract does not preclude an assignment of a chose in action for a breach of contract. Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 30 Cal.2d 335, 182 P.2d 182. The clause now before us contains the additional words of “Nor shall the contractor assign any moneys due or to become due to him hereunder, without the previous consent of the owner.” Defendant contends that these additional words make the assignment in this case void and therefore prevents plaintiff from bringing this action. AVhen these parties entered into this contract they certainly intended that each would comply with the terms thereof. AVe must assume that defendant at that time intended to pay the contractor in accordance with its agreement. If defendant had so paid there could have been no assignment to the plaintiff. It seems clear to me, therefore, that the parties never intended to prevent an assignment of a chose in action which arose by reason of defendant’s breach.
Defendant contends, however, that the language as used precludes any other interpretation than the one on which it is relying. I do not agree with this contention. The matter of language and its interpretation as used in non*205assignability clauses is well discussed in the case of Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp., 303 N.Y. 446, 103 N.E.2d 891, 37 A.L.R.2d 1245, cited in this opinion. The language as used in the clause now before us is similar to the language used in the cases of Manchester v. Kendall, 51 N.Y.Super. 460 and Sacks v. Neptune Meter Co., 144 Misc. 70, 258 N.Y.S. 254. Both cases are discussed in the Allhusen case, supra, wherein the court stated [303 N.Y. 446, 103 N.E.2d 892], “they are authority only for the proposition that, in the absence of language clearly indicating that a contractual right thereunder shall be nonassignable, a prohibitory clause will be interpreted as a personal covenant not to assign.” In the Allhusen case the nonassignability clause expressly made any assignment void. This language is clearly distinguishable from the language used in the clause now before us and the court in said case did so distinguish the language from that used in the Manchester and Sacks cases. I believe that the ruling as set out in the Manchester and Sacks cases is applicable here.
I believe that it could be said here from the language as used and from the plain intention of the parties that the nonassignability clause did not prohibit the assignment to the plaintiff. In any event, however, it is my opinion that the language as used does not clearly indicate that an assignment of the money due would be void. It is at most, therefore, a personal covenant not to assign and if defendant was harmed by breach of such covenant it could in a proper action recover damages from the contractor. However, in such case the breach by the defendant could be an issue.
I am authorized to say that Judge Hanson concurs in the foregoing opinion.