Court Opinion

ID: 9482267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:45:01.843274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:52.210114
License: Public Domain

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Although I concur in the majority opinion, I am concerned that the Department of Labor’s position, which has shifted with the tides of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985), abrogates any notion of federalism in a situation implicating “an integral operation in areas of traditional government function[ ].” Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530, 105 S.Ct. at 1007. Citing a perceived judicial inability to fashion parameters of “traditional governmental functions,” Garcia declined to check the flexing of federal muscle in the domain of state and local government. Id. at 531, 105 S.Ct. at 1007. Federalism, the Court concluded, is adequately expressed in restraints exercised through elected federal political officials.
However, as the Garcia dissent noted, federal politicians possess “an underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint” in encroaching upon state sovereignty. Id. at 588, 105 S.Ct. at 1037 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). One need only consider the tenuous constitutional precipice upon which Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority rests, as well as notable changes in membership of the Court, to recognize that the Court may now be disposed to “again assume its constitutional responsibility.” Id. at 589, 105 S.Ct. at 1037 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Id. at 580, 105 S.Ct. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
But even though we cannot now question the Department of Labor’s position based directly on the Tenth Amendment, it remains worthwhile to observe in what a quandary these counties have been placed by the Department’s chosen means of FLSA enforcement. The Department has not taken the straightforward path of rule-making, which would have facilitated comment and negotiations between the federal and local sovereigns. Instead, it has chosen to use individual enforcement actions and interpretive letters that are non-binding on third parties, leaving both the scope and consistency of federal policy in doubt. The Department’s method also raises the spectre that a non-complying probation department could be held liable for extra “willfulness” damages. Compare Dybach v. Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1991). This process mocks *961federalism and disserves local taxpayers, who deserve to know the budget claims against their local governmental agencies. The Department should exercise its authority more judiciously against state and local governments.