Court Opinion

ID: 9890619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 18:04:17.308539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:50.346775
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 P. v. Hubbard CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B319272

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. TA153015)
           v.

  DAQUAN TYRESE HUBBARD,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.
      Patricia J. Ulibarri, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _________________________
      A jury found Daquan T. Hubbard guilty of murder and
found true a gang enhancement. At sentencing, the trial court
struck the gang enhancement under Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), which changed the
law on gang enhancements and enacted Penal Code1 section 1109
to require bifurcation at trial of gang enhancements. On appeal,
Hubbard contends that his conviction must be reversed because
admitting gang evidence rendered his trial fundamentally unfair
under section 1109. He also contends that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of its discretion when it sentenced him
to a 25-years-to-life term under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
We reject both contentions and affirm the judgment.
                        BACKGROUND
I.    The murder of Hugo Zuniga
      At Hubbard’s trial, the trial court admitted video footage
depicting relevant events. The videos were from a law
enforcement officer’s dashcam and video surveillance from
cameras near and at the Nickerson Gardens apartment complex.
      Those videos showed that at about 7:07 p.m., on September
16, 2020, Hubbard was on Lou Dillon Avenue in Nickerson
Gardens. An Infiniti and Honda were nearby. The Infiniti was
registered to Francisco Gonzalez, Hubbard’s friend and fellow
gang member. Hubbard, wearing red shorts and a white shirt,
got into the Honda’s front passenger seat.2 A second man, who

1
      All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
      As we later discuss, Hubbard admitted at trial that he was
in the Honda but denied he was the shooter.

                                 2
has never been identified, wearing a yellow shirt got into the
Honda’s driver’s seat.
       Around this time, Deputy Sheriff Gustavo Castaneda was
at 105th Street and Lou Dillon in Nickerson Gardens conducting
surveillance for an unrelated matter. The deputy had started
following a suspect in that unrelated matter when a Honda
followed by an Infiniti pulled in front of him. The Infiniti in front
of the deputy stopped, and the Honda in front of the Infiniti
slowed. Video showed a gun with a silver slide being pointed
from the Honda’s front passenger seat at a man on the street, and
a white or light-colored shirt can be seen on the front passenger
side. Ten to 15 gunshots were fired from the Honda at the man
on the street, Zuniga, who died, having been shot eight times.
Zuniga was shot about 90 seconds after the Honda left Nickerson
Gardens.
       The deputy maneuvered around the Infiniti and followed
the Honda to the area of 112th Street and Compton Street, near
Nickerson Gardens, where the deputy lost sight of the Honda.
       Minutes after the shooting, the Honda returned to
Nickerson Gardens and parked in a lot on Parmalee Street,
where Hubbard’s friend Drecore Dodson lived. Hubbard, still
wearing a white shirt and red shorts, got out of the Honda’s front
passenger seat and walked to Dodson’s residence, appearing to
hold his right hand close to his side. Hubbard soon exited
Dodson’s residence and returned to the Honda, but he was no
longer holding his right hand close to his side. The Honda then
drove to nearby Hooper Street, also in Nickerson Gardens.
There, Hubbard and the driver searched the Honda’s front
passenger seat area. Holding a cellphone, Hubbard extended his
right arm in a shooting motion and fell to the ground.

                                 3
II.    Physical evidence
       From the area where Zuniga was shot, law enforcement
recovered 13 casings. From Dodson’s Parmalee residence, they
recovered a silver nine-millimeter semiautomatic gun inside a pot
filled with uncooked beans. The casings were fired from the gun
recovered from Dodson’s residence. Dodson told a police officer
during an interview that Hubbard called and asked Dodson to
hold a gun for him. However, at trial, Dodson would not identify
who gave him the gun, responding “No comment” when asked if
the person who gave him the gun was in the courtroom.
       Officers recovered red shorts, a gun, gun magazines, and
ammunition from Hubbard’s girlfriend’s home. In an interview
with detectives after his arrest, Hubbard said the red shorts were
his.
       Cell site analysis of phone records showed that Hubbard’s
cellphone was in the area of the crime scene and Nickerson
Gardens when Zuniga was shot. Hubbard’s and Dodson’s
cellphones were in contact during the events.
III.   Gang evidence
       Officer John Byun testified as the People’s gang expert. He
described gang culture, saying that gangs thrive on respect and
gain it by having a violent reputation. To earn respect and
status, gang members “put[ ] in work,” meaning commit crimes
for the gang, and gang members commonly commit crimes
together. Gang culture forbids snitching, giving information to
law enforcement. Snitching can result in a beating or getting
killed.
       Fudge Town Mafia Crips originated in the mid-1970’s as a
dance crew called Foe Tha Money. Fudge Town Mafia’s territory

                                4
extends from 103rd Street and Santa Ana Boulevard in the
south, to Wilmington Avenue in the west, and Weigand Avenue
to the east. The gang has at least three sets: 105th, 107th, and
T-Funk Ridaz. It has about 100 members in the Watts area of
Los Angeles, 15 of whom are active members. Officer Byun
identified places Fudge Town Mafia gang members hang out in
public, drinking and double-parking their vehicles to intimidate
the public. And on October 7, their “hood day” (a sort of birthday
for gangs), they hang out on 107th Street, drinking and taking
over the streets. Fudge Town Mafia has been involved in
murders, shootings, burglaries, robberies, vehicle theft,
carjackings, narcotics sales, and weapons possession.
      The Bounty Hunter Bloods gang primarily claims
Nickerson Gardens as its territory. However, it and Fudge Town
Mafia have common rivals: Watts Varrio Grape Street and
Grape Street Crips. Although there was no evidence the victim
Zuniga was a gang member, the area in which he was shot was in
Watts Varrio Grape Street territory.
      Fudge Town Mafia has a hand sign, which Officer Byun
demonstrated for the jury. The gang uses the color brown.
      In Officer Byun’s opinion, Gonzalez (to whom the Infiniti
was registered), Dodson, and Hubbard were active Fudge Town
Mafia gang members. Dodson and Hubbard have admitted to
another officer that they were members of Fudge Town Mafia.3
Photographs were admitted, and in one, Dodson, Gonzalez,
Hubbard, and a fourth man are throwing Fudge Town Mafia
gang signs. (Peo. Ex. 61.) In another photograph, Gonzalez
makes a “C” with his hand to indicate Crips; Dodson makes a

3
     At trial, Dodson admitted that he was a Fudge Town Mafia
gang member.

                                5
gang sign with his hand that means “Fuck Pedaroll Mafia” (a
Grape Street Crips set and Fudge Town Mafia rival); and
Hubbard holds a brown bandana and wears “Foe Tha Money”
clothing brand. (Peo. Ex. 63.) Video clips of Hubbard using gang
vernacular and referencing his gang were played for the jury. A
video from Dodson’s social media account shows a group of men
that included Hubbard assaulting someone. Dodson’s,
Gonzalez’s, and Hubbard’s Instagram usernames—respectively,
ten7boskie, forthemoney107, and lofas107st—refer to 107th
Street. Text messages from Hubbard’s cellphone were also
introduced. In one text, Hubbard referred to himself as “Penny,”
his gang moniker, and another text said, “ ‘Oh, okay, okay, That’s
Maftia.’ ” As the gang expert explained, the “f” and the “t” refer
to Fudge Town. Hubbard, as well as Dodson, have tattoos
associated with Fudge Town Mafia, with Hubbard having “M” for
Mafia on his shoulder and hand.
       In January 2016, an officer saw Dodson, Hubbard, and
Gonzalez smoking marijuana and drinking in the area of 110th
Street and Lou Dillon. Later that year in December, another
officer had contact with Hubbard, who was again with Gonzalez.
       The People introduced evidence of two predicate crimes.
First, Gonzalez was convicted in October 2018 of being a felon in
possession of a gun. Second, Dodson was convicted of gun
possession in this case.
       Based on a hypothetical modeled on the facts of this case,
Officer Byun opined that such a crime would be committed to
benefit Fudge Town Mafia’s criminal enterprise.
IV.   Hubbard’s testimony
       Hubbard testified in his defense. On the day Zuniga was
killed, Hubbard was smoking marijuana and drinking. A friend

                                6
picked him up to get food. His friend, whose name Hubbard
refused to give, drove; Hubbard sat in the front passenger seat;
and a third man sat behind the driver. All that Hubbard knew
about the man in the backseat was he sold drugs. A child’s car
seat was in the back passenger seat immediately behind
Hubbard. They started driving and had turned onto 105th Street
when the man in the backseat yelled, “ ‘Oh, that’s dude right
there,’ ” shoved Hubbard, and started shooting a gun through
Hubbard’s window. They drove away, and at Anzac Street, the
shooter got out of the car, leaving the gun. Hubbard called
Dodson and told him he was going to drop something off. They
drove to Dodson’s residence and gave him the gun. After,
Hubbard and the driver searched the car for casings. When
shown the video that appeared to show him mimicking or
reenacting the shooting, Hubbard said he was dancing.
V.    Verdict and sentence
      A jury found Hubbard guilty of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) with true findings on gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C))
and personal gun use (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d))
allegations.
      On January 18, 2022, the trial court found that Hubbard
had a prior strike within the meaning of the Three Strikes law
and sentenced him to 25 years to life, doubled to 50 years to life
based on the strike, plus 25 years to life for the gun enhancement
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Based on Assembly Bill 333, the trial
court did not sentence Hubbard on the gang enhancement.

                                7
                          DISCUSSION
I.    Admission of gang evidence
       Hubbard contends that admitting gang evidence violated
his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial under recently
enacted section 1109, which applied retroactively to him. After
discussing Assembly Bill 333, which added section 1109, we
reject Hubbard’s contention, finding any error in admitting gang
evidence harmless.
      A. Assembly Bill 333
        Assembly Bill 333, which became effective on January 1,
2022 (see Stats. 2021, ch. 699), changed the law on gang
enhancements. “First, it narrowed the definition of a ‘criminal
street gang’ to require that any gang be an ‘ongoing, organized
association or group of three or more persons.’ (§ 186.22, subd.
(f), italics added.) Second, whereas section 186.22, former
subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members ‘individually
or collectively engage in’ a pattern of criminal activity in order to
constitute a ‘criminal street gang,’ Assembly Bill 333 requires
that any such pattern have been ‘collectively engage[d] in’ by
members of the gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Third,
Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed the definition of a ‘pattern of
criminal activity’ by requiring that (1) the last offense used to
show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three
years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to
have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or
more gang ‘members,’ as opposed to just ‘persons’; (3) the offenses
commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses
establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than
the currently charged offense. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2).)

                                  8
Fourth, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed what it means for an offense
to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any
‘common benefit’ be ‘more than reputational.’ (§ 186.22, subd.
(g).) [¶] Finally, Assembly Bill 333 added section 1109, which
requires, if requested by the defendant, a gang enhancement
charge to be tried separately from all other counts that do not
otherwise require gang evidence as an element of the crime. If
the proceedings are bifurcated, the truth of the gang
enhancement may be determined only after a trier of fact finds
the defendant guilty of the underlying offense.” (People v. Tran
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran).)
       Courts of Appeal are divided on whether section 1109
applies retroactively, and the issue is pending review in the
California Supreme Court. (See e.g., People v. Burgos (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 550, 566–567, rev. granted July 13, 2022,
S274743 [§ 1109 applies retroactively]; People v. Ramos (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1131 [same]; contra, People v. Ramirez
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 65, rev. granted Aug. 17, 2022,
S275341 [§ 1109 does not apply retroactively]; People v. Perez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 207, rev. granted Aug. 17, 2022,
S275090 [same].) The California Supreme Court declined to
decide the retroactivity issue in Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at page
1208. Instead, the court found that any error in not bifurcating a
gang allegation under section 1109 is subject to harmless error
analysis under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (Tran, at
p. 1209.) The court also recognized that evidentiary errors result
in a due process violation only where they render the trial
fundamentally unfair. (Ibid.)
       As did the court in Tran, we decline to address whether
section 1109 is retroactive. Instead, we find that any error in not

                                 9
bifurcating the gang enhancement for trial was harmless and did
not render Hubbard’s trial fundamentally unfair.
      B. Any error in admitting gang evidence was harmless
       Assembly Bill 333 does not limit the introduction of gang
evidence where it is relevant to the underlying charges. (People
v. Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132; see People v.
Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049.) Thus, “[e]vidence of
the defendant’s gang affiliation— including evidence of the gang’s
territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices,
criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove
identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of
applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to the guilt of the
charged crime.” (Hernandez, at p. 1049.)
       Here, gang evidence was relevant to motive, intent, and
credibility. (See generally People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1,
32 [“motive can illuminate intent”].) Gang evidence explained
why Hubbard would kill Zuniga, an apparent stranger. The
evidence showed that Hubbard is a Fudge Town Mafia gang
member: photographs showed Hubbard wearing Fudge Town
Mafia gang attire and making gang signs with his hands, video
showed him using gang vernacular, and he associated with Fudge
Town Mafia gang members. The evidence further showed that
Grape Street is one of Fudge Town Mafia’s rivals, and Zuniga
was shot in Watts Varrio Grape Street territory. The gang
evidence thus tended to show that Hubbard, a Fudge Town Mafia
member, deliberately went into rival gang territory to kill
someone.
       Evidence that Gonzalez and Dodson were Fudge Town
Mafia gang members was also relevant to establishing a motive
for the murder and identity. Two cars were involved in the

                                 10
shooting: the Honda that Hubbard was in and the Infiniti
registered to Gonzalez. Because the Infiniti was registered to
Gonzalez, it is reasonable to infer he was in that car or allowed it
to be used for the shooting. That a car connected to Gonzalez was
used in the crime, coupled with evidence that Gonzalez and
Hubbard were both Fudge Town Mafia gang members, buttressed
the prosecution theory that there was a gang-related motive for
the crime. As the gang expert testified, gang members often
commit crimes together. That two cars, and at least three people
(two men in the Honda and at least one person in the Infiniti)
were involved in the shooting suggested the murder was a
group—a gang effort.
       Similarly, after Zuniga was shot, Hubbard called his friend
Dodson, also a Fudge Town Mafia gang member. As a fellow
gang member, Dodson could be relied on to hide the gun.
Further, Dodson was a fellow gang member and, as such,
forbidden from snitching on Hubbard, which explained why, at
trial, he retreated from prior statements identifying Hubbard as
the man who gave him the murder weapon. (See, e.g., People v.
Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 137 [evidence a witness is afraid to
testify admissible]; People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
1148, 1169 [gang evidence admissible to explain difference in
witness’s pretrial and trial testimony].)
       Thus, while we acknowledge the prejudicial nature of gang
evidence generally, we cannot agree that it was so here, where
the evidence was relevant to the underlying charge of murder.
       And even if some gang evidence—for example, the
predicate crimes and evidence of the pattern of crimes Fudge
Town Mafia engaged in—should not have been admitted at the
guilt phase of Hubbard’s trial under section 1109, the nongang

                                11
evidence of Hubbard’s guilt was overwhelming and compelling.
(See, e.g., People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 480 [where
evidence of guilt on underlying charge is overwhelming, unlikely
that trial format harmed defendant].) Hubbard admitted he was
in the car from which the fatal shots were fired. Although he
denied being the shooter, the evidence showed otherwise. Video
showed Hubbard, wearing red shorts and a white shirt, get into
the Honda’s front passenger seat. Not long after leaving
Nickerson Gardens, video showed the Honda stopped alongside
Zuniga and an arm extending out of the Honda’s front passenger
window, pointing a silver gun at Zuniga. The shooter wears what
appears to be a white shirt. (Peo. Ex. 42.)
       Officer Castaneda followed the Honda after the shooting for
several blocks, losing sight of it at 112th and Compton Streets.
During that time, the officer did not see anyone exit the Honda.
At Dodson’s, only two men exited the car, with Hubbard exiting
the front passenger seat still wearing a white shirt and walking
awkwardly, the reasonable inference being to conceal the gun,
which he gave to Dodson. This evidence suggested that only two
people were ever in the Honda, contrary to Hubbard’s story that a
third man was in the car but exited before they arrived at
Dodson’s residence. Hubbard also can be seen in video footage
after the shooting and while hanging out at Nickerson Gardens
moving in a way that could be reasonably interpreted as
reenacting the murder, that is, pretending to shoot a gun and
falling to the ground. This nongang evidence accordingly
severely undercut Hubbard’s story that the shooter was in the
backseat behind the driver, and yet was able to shove Hubbard
aside, shoot Zuniga out of the front passenger window, and exit
the car unseen by Deputy Castaneda and surveillance cameras.

                               12
      We therefore conclude that it is not reasonably probable
Hubbard would have obtained a more favorable result in the
absence of any gang evidence. (See generally Tran, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 1209–1210.)
      For similar reasons, admitting gang evidence did not
render Hubbard’s trial fundamentally unfair. As we have said,
the prosecution relied primarily on video evidence to establish
Hubbard’s guilt on the underlying charge of murder. That
evidence was compelling, especially given Hubbard’s admission
he was in the front passenger seat and video showing the gun
pointing out of the front passenger window. In contrast, gang
evidence was used to establish a motive for the murder and the
identity of the participants, including Dodson. Because gang
evidence was relevant to the underlying murder charge but was
not the primary evidence of guilt, its admission did not render
Hubbard’s trial fundamentally unfair. (See, e.g., Tran, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 1208–1209; see generally People v. Partida
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.)
II.   The section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement
        Hubbard was charged with and the jury found true
personal gun use allegations under section 12022.53, subdivisions
(b), (c), and (d). The trial court sentenced Hubbard to 25 years to
life under subdivision (d) of that section. Hubbard now contends
that the trial court misunderstood that it could either strike the
section 12022.53 enhancement or sentence him to a lesser term
under subdivisions (b) and (c). We disagree that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion.
        A defendant is entitled to a trial court’s exercise of
informed discretion at sentencing. (People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688, 694 (Tirado).) If a court acts unaware of the

                                13
scope of its discretion, the court will have abused its discretion.
(Ibid.) Absent evidence to the contrary, however, we presume the
trial court knew and applied governing law. (People v. Gutierrez
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.)
       When sentencing a defendant before 2018, trial courts had
to impose a section 12022.53 enhancement. (Tirado, supra, 12
Cal.5th at p. 695.) The Legislature then enacted Senate Bill
No. 620 to give trial courts discretion to strike the enhancement
in the interest of justice. (Tirado, at pp. 695–696; § 12022.53,
subd. (h).) In Tirado, at page 692, the court held that under the
new law, trial courts have discretion either to strike the
enhancement or to impose an uncharged lesser enhancement
under subdivisions (b) or (c) of section 12022.53.
       Here, Hubbard argues that the trial court was unaware it
could impose a 10-or-20-year term under subdivisions (b) or (c)
because Tirado was issued on January 20, 2022, two days after
Hubbard was sentenced on January 18. Tirado, however,
resolved a split in the Courts of Appeal about whether a trial
court could strike a greater enhancement and sentence a
defendant on an uncharged lesser enhancement not found true by
a jury. Here, the lesser enhancements were charged, found true
by the jury, and were stayed by the trial court in favor of
imposing the most severe enhancement. Even before Tirado,
courts had discretion under section 1385 to strike the greater
enhancement and impose the charged, lesser one. (See People v.
Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217, 222 [where jury returned
true findings on lesser enhancements under § 12022.53,
subds. (b) & (c), striking subd. (d) enhancement would “leave
intact the remaining findings”]; accord, People v. Wang (2020)

                                14
46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1091.) Thus, when Hubbard was sentenced,
there was no uncertainty in the law that Tirado resolved.
      Hubbard nonetheless argues that statements the trial court
made at sentencing show it thought it had the binary choice of
striking the section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement or
imposing it. The trial court said it had read the People’s
sentencing memorandum and repeated that it understood that
“with changes in the law,” it had discretion to strike certain
allegations.4 Then, after the trial court sentenced Hubbard to 75
years to life, which included a sentence under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), the trial court clarified that it understood it had
the discretion to strike that allegation and was not required to
impose 25 years to life. Continuing, the trial court explained it
was imposing 25 years to life under that section because the
evidence established that Hubbard shot multiple times at an
unarmed Zuniga, who was “minding his own business” and was
not a threat.
      The trial court’s failure to expressly note it also had the
discretion to sentence Hubbard to a lesser enhancement does not
evidence its ignorance of that discretion. The trial court said it
had read the People’s sentencing memorandum, which requested
that Hubbard be sentenced to a 10-years-to-life term under
subdivision (b) of section 12022.53. The trial court therefore was

4
       The trial court had similarly noted at a pretrial conference,
that Hubbard was facing a “mandatory minimum” of 75 years to
life in prison in part based on the section 12022.53, subdivision
(d), enhancement. When the deputy district attorney pointed out
that the trial court would have discretion to strike the
enhancement, the trial court agreed and clarified it was stating
Hubbard’s maximum, not minimum, exposure assuming it did
not strike the enhancement if found true.

                                 15
informed of that option and rejected it. Instead, the trial court
made the informed, discretionary choice to impose the most
severe firearm enhancement and to stay all the lesser firearm
enhancements, explaining in detail why it was doing so.
                         DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                        EGERTON, J.

                        ADAMS, J.

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