Court Opinion

ID: 9620991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:50:14.853403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:56.790777
License: Public Domain

Barrow, J.,
dissenting,
In my opinion, the majority’s decision disregards the method chosen by the legislature to overcome unnecessary delay in criminal proceedings. While the General Assembly elected to eliminate delay by placing a disincentive on the Commonwealth attorney, the majority’s decision removes this disincentive by shifting the •burden to the criminal defendant who has little incentive for avoiding delay. Since the impact of this shift diminishes the effectiveness of the legislative scheme, I respectfully dissent.
While the goal of the “speedy trial” statute is obvious, its methodology is less apparent. The statute strives to expedite criminal proceedings by placing a disincentive on the Commonwealth attorney for the failure to do so. This disincentive is the dismissal of criminal charges, if not brought to trial within the requisite time.
Of the three major participants (judge, defendant and prosecutor) in the adverserial process, only the prosecutor can be effectively sanctioned to assure an expeditious trial. The judge, a neutral decision maker, although interested in avoiding unnecessary delay, has no greater interest in a dismissal than in an acquittal of criminal charges. A criminal defendant, while unequivocally interested in an acquittal, vacillates in his desire for a speedy trial. The adverse effect of delay on the defendant — his pretrial incarceration, his anxiety and the impairment of his defense — may be outweighed by the harm delay may cause the prosecution in prov*447ing its case. On the other hand, the prosecution’s interest should be, steadfastly, to obtain a conviction without unnecessary delay. Thus, the General Assembly wisely chose to burden the prosecution with the responsibility of assuring a trial without unnecessary delay.
Even so, the General Assembly did not overlook the possibility of justifiable delay. First, the statute recognizes, through the time it does allow, that both the defendant and the prosecution need time to adequately prepare for trial. See Code § 19.2-243; see Cantwell v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 606, 613, 347 S.E.2d 523, 525-27 (1986). Secondly, the statute expressly identifies five circumstances in which a delay excuses the failure to try an accused within the required time. Code § 19.2-243; see Cantwell, 2 Va. App. at 610, 347 S.E.2d at 525.
Additional exceptions have been judicially created. Stephens v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224, 231, 301 S.E.2d 22, 25-6 (1983). These exceptions, while not specifically provided for by statute, must be “in pari ratione” with the statutory exceptions, that is, they must have the same rationale as the statutory exceptions. Id. at 231, 301 S.E.2d at 26. The courts are not free to create exceptions merely because they may appear desirable but may do so only when the exception is consistent with the statutory rationale.
Judicially, only two such exceptions have been recognized. Where a federal court enjoined a “law officer of the state from proceeding with ... [a defendant’s] . . . trial, and . . . [prohibited] the use of certain books and records as evidence on behalf of the Commonwealth,” the predecessor to Code § 19.2-243 was held not to apply. Wadley v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 803, 805, 35 S.E. 452, 453 (1900). The time during which a trial judge takes under advisement a defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence also has been excepted from the statute’s time limits. Stephens, 225 Va. at 233, 301 S.E.2d at 27.
The rationale, common to both the statutory and the judicially recognized exceptions, is that, where the Commonwealth attorney is powerless to cause the matter to proceed, the statutory provisions do not apply. This underlying rationale is logical. If the Commonwealth attorney has no control over the proceedings, the disincentive has no effect and delay should not result in a dismissal. On the other hand, if the Commonwealth attorney has such *448control, even if it is shared with the defendant, the disincentive effectively encourages the Commonwealth to act to expedite the trial.
The underlying rationale of the statute is not, as the Commonwealth argues, whether the delay was reasonable. Unlike a constitutional claim to a speedy trial, a claim made under the provisions of Code § 19.2-243 involves no balancing or weighing of factors and no standard of reasonableness. Compare Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 763, 766-71, 240 S.E.2d 662, 664-67 (1978) with Godfrey v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 460, 463, 317 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1984); see also Holliday v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 612, 615-22, 352 S.E.2d 362, 364-67 (1987). Nothing in this statute authorizes a court to weigh the reasonableness of the Commonwealth’s conduct in causing or contributing to a delay. See Code § 19.2-243.
When applying the appropriate standard in this case, only two periods of time, those during which the defendant was being psychiatrically evaluated, should be excluded in determining compliance with the statute. The period of time between May 15, 1986, when he was sent to Central State Hospital for evaluation, and July 1, 1986, when he was returned from Central State Hospital to the jail for trial, is expressly excluded by statute. Code § 19.2-243(1). In addition, the period between February 4, 1986, when the court ordered his evaluation by a local psychiatrist or psychologist, and February 20, 1986, when this evaluation was received, should be excluded since it parallels the statutory provision for hospital confinement. The same reason, the Commonwealth’s inability to bring the matter to trial during this period, underlies both exclusions. These two periods of time consisted of seventy-six days which, when subtracted from the time between arrest and trial, leaves a total of 203 days, far in excess of the five month maximum permitted by statute. The remaining time between arrest and trial should not be excluded. None of the remaining time is excluded by a statutory exception, nor does the rationale underlying the statutory exceptions call for excluding any other time between arrest and conviction.
The two periods of time excluded by the majority, occurring between the filing of motions for psychiatric evaluations and the entry of orders granting the motions, should not be excluded. The increment of time between the filing of each motion and the trial *449court’s ruling on each motion, consisting of four days in one instance and thirteen days in the other, was subject as much to the Commonwealth attorney’s control as to the defendant’s. Once either of the motions was granted, no trial could be held until complied with; however, until the motions were granted, the Commonwealth was free to move to proceed to trial or, if preferred, to a hearing on the motion. Similarly, during the time between the trial court’s rulings on these motions and the entry of orders effecting the rulings, the Commonwealth could have expedited the proceedings. The record does not explain why such long periods of time, twenty-nine days in one instance and thirty-seven days in the other, were required for the entry of the written orders carrying out the court’s decisions. The Commonwealth attributes these delays to a lack of a resident circuit judge in Clarke County. The statute does not authorize any exception for this reason, nor does it authorize an exception with a similar underlying rationale. Such an exception would cause the standard for a speedy trial to vary within the Commonwealth from locality to locality. More importantly, nothing prevented the Commonwealth’s attorney from promptly preparing and presenting orders implementing the judge’s decision and, thus, causing the matter to proceed.
In excluding these times from its consideration, the majority does not rely on any existing exceptions. None of this time is excluded by any of the statutory exceptions. See Code § 19.2-243. Nor is it excluded by any previously recognized judicial exception. See Stephens, 225 Va. at 233, 301 S.E.2d at 27; Wadley, 98 Va. at 805, 35 S.E. at 453.
Instead, the majority creates a new judicial exception to the statute. The rationale appearing to underlie this new exception is twofold: the defendant’s lack of cooperation with the psychologist, and the fact that the motion seeking his evaluation was brought by him for his own benefit. Neither of these reasons are “in pari ratione” with any of the statutory exceptions.
The defendant’s lack of cooperation with the psychologist did not. prevent the Commonwealth attorney from moving to bring the matter on for trial. Even though the defendant sought the examination and the trial judge may have found “probable cause to believe that the defendant’s actions . . . may have been affected by *450mental disease or defect,”1 the defendant had the burden to prove an insanity defense. Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 760, 769, 274 S.E.2d 305, 310 (1981). Therefore, the lack of evidence on this issue impaired only the defense. It did not retard the Commonwealth’s ability to proceed. The Commonwealth attorney could have sought to have the matter set for trial or, if preferred, he could have sought to have the defendant hospitalized for examination.
Similarly, the fact that the defendant moved the court for an evaluation did not prevent the Commonwealth attorney from pursuing a trial of the matter. Once the motion was granted and the defendant hospitalized for evaluation, the Commonwealth attorney was powerless to expedite the proceeding, but until then, the Commonwealth attorney was free to seek either to have the matter set for trial or to have the motion brought on for hearing. The ability of the Commonwealth to assure that the proceeding was advancing toward a trial remained intact until the defendant was sent for evaluation.
Had the General Assembly intended for criminal proceedings to come to a halt because a defendant seeks a mental evaluation, it could have readily provided for such an exception. It did not. Although it excluded the time during which a defendant is hospitalized for examination, the General Assembly did not exclude the time during which a motion for such hospitalization might be pending. Presumably, it recognized that the mere filing of the motion did not prevent the Commonwealth attorney from moving the matter forward for trial.
It may appear incongruous for the speedy trial statute to be used to vitiate a criminal conviction of an uncooperative defendant, but such a result will enhance rather than retard the fair administration of justice. Unless the speedy trial statute is construed to count delays such as occurred in this case a court’s criminal docket will effectively be placed in the hands of an uncooperative *451defendant. To propose that a court cannot proceed to try a criminal defendant who files a motion for a mental evaluation and then fails to cooperate with the evaluation effectively destroys a court’s ability to control its docket. Instead of discouraging delay, the result reached by the majority encourages it.
Although the majority does not expressly accept the reasonableness standard proposed by the Attorney General, it does so implicitly. The majority’s analysis weighs the relative fault of the defendant and the Commonwealth attorney, respectively, in causing the delay and concludes that the fault was the defendant’s. This is not the standard directed by the General Assembly. Under the General Assembly’s scheme, the only question is whether the requisite time has passed and, if so, whether any of that time should be excluded because the Commonwealth attorney was unable to cause the matter to proceed.
In short, the majority’s decision dismantles the General Assembly’s scheme for assuring a criminal trial without unnecessary delay. It removes the disincentive the legislature placed on the prosecution to take affirmative action to try criminal cases within required time periods. In doing so, the majority discards the General Assembly’s underlying standard and implicitly substitutes its own less-precise standard. For these reasons I dissent.

 Prior to July 1, 1986, the standard for requiring an evaluation was “probable cause to believe that the defendant’s actions during the time of the alleged offense may have been affected by mental disease or defect; however, since then the standard has been “probable cause to believe that the defendant’s sanity will be a significant factor in his defense.” See Code § 19.2-169.5.