Court Opinion

ID: 9709599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:51:59.078572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.419516
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE RIZZI delivered this supplemental opinion: Defendant filed a petition for rehearing which was denied this day by separate order. In the petition, defendant claims that I should not have considered the constitutionality of section 65 of the Civil Practice Act because, according to defendant, the constitutionality of the statute was not raised by the parties. I disagree.  It is the undisputed duty of the court to protect its inherent judicial power from encroachment by legislative enactment and thus preserve an independent judicial department in our government. (Agran v. Checker Taxi Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 145, 149, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715.) Since the court has the duty to protect its own inherent judicial power, the parties obviously cannot by waiver or even by agreement preclude the court from exercising this duty once the legislative enactment is properly before the court and a determination of the constitutionality of the enactment is essential to a proper determination of the issues before the court. Here, defendant invoked the authority of section 65 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 65). Section 65 expressly provides that when the special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, “the former controls the latter.” The word “controls” requires no interpretation. Plainly, it means that judgment must be entered on the answer to the special interrogatory and that judgment cannot be entered on the general verdict; if judgment is entered on the general verdict, then the general verdict would control the answer to the special interrogatory. The latter is manifestly repugnant to the express language of the statute. True, section 65 also states, “and the court may enter judgment accordingly.” But this can only mean that judgment may be entered on the answer to the special interrogatory or no judgment can be entered and a new trial must be granted. If it were otherwise, the general verdict would control the answer to the special interrogatory. This analysis of the express language of section 65 comports with what is stated by Mr. Justice Underwood in Freeman v. Chicago Transit Authority (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 103, 109, 210 N.E.2d 191, 195-96 (Underwood, J., specially concurring): “I would grant a new trial because, once the special finding is set aside, there remains no verdict upon which judgment can be entered. That a jury’s special finding of fact controls an inconsistent general verdict is established law in this State. * * * In such cases the former is the verdict of the jury and judgment may be entered thereon; the latter is a nullity. * * * This renders the inconsistent general verdict of no force and effect whatsoever even though the special finding is subsequently vacated. * * * Once the special finding has been invalidated, a new trial must necessarily result, since, the inconsistent general verdict being a nullity, there then is no verdict before the court upon which it may act.” Mr. Justice Underwood’s reasoning is applicable here if section 65 is valid. The appellate court cases which hold that a judgment may be entered on the general verdict if the answer to the special interrogatory is set aside disregard the plain language of the statute by having the general verdict control the answer to the special interrogatory. Significantly, in the present case the defendant adopted the cases which accept the rationale of Mr. Justice Underwood in Freeman, and argued that as a result of section 65 this court had no authority to enter judgment on the general verdict. Thus, once the majority of this court decided that the answer to the special interrogatory had to be set aside and that judgment should be entered on the general verdict, we either had to give effect to a legislative enactment which encroached upon our inherent judicial power or exercise our undisputed judicial duty to protect this power from encroachment. At that time, a determination of the validity and constitutionality of the statute became essential to a proper determination of the issues before the court. At the same time, this court had the right, and indeed the duty, to consider the constitutionality of the statute. In his petition for rehearing, defendant also claims that the case should be remanded so that the trial judge may exercise “his discretion to decide what effect should be given to the general verdict,” and that the case should be remanded so that the defendant may now file a post-trial motion. Defendant does not make reference to any supposed error he may raise based upon this record or the trial. Supreme Court Rule 366 provides that a reviewing court may draw inferences of fact, give any judgment, make any order, and grant any relief that the case may require. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 366.) Moreover, the appellate court may exercise such original jurisdiction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any cause on review. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 32.1.) In the instant case, the majority of this court thoroughly examined and reviewed the record and concluded that this case should not be remanded since no useful purpose would be served, there being no presumption that the facts or the evidence will appear other or different at another trial, and that the general verdict is sufficiently supported by the evidence. (Bee Jay’s Truck Stop, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 7, 13, 407 N.E.2d 755, 760; Prill v. City of Chicago (1942), 317 Ill. App. 202, 215, 46 N.E.2d 119, 124.) On this point, an example of a case in which the appellate court set aside a special finding and entered judgment on the general verdict, without remandment, is Walls v. Hofbauer (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 394, 359 N.E.2d 1037. Also see Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R. R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504, where judgment in a jury trial was reversed without remandment, although the parties against whom the judgment was finally entered in the reviewing court had not filed post-trial motions because judgment had been entered in their favor in the trial court. I therefore find no merit in defendant’s contention. In addition, in Horvath v. Loesch (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 615, 620, 410 N.E.2d 154, 158, the court cited the present case with respect to the constitutional issue. The court stated that “Supreme Court Rule 1, not discussed in Albaugh, explicitly adopts the Civil Practice Act where not contrary to the Supreme Court Rules.” (Horvath, 87 Ill. App. 3d 615, 620, 410 N.E.2d 154, 158.) Supreme Court Rule 1 provides: “General rules apply to both civil and criminal proceedings. The rules on proceedings in the trial court, together with the Civil Practice Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure, govern all proceedings in the trial court * * Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 1. To the extent that Horvath may suggest that the supreme court has “adopted” all the provisions of the Civil Practice Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure as Supreme Court Rules or that all sections in those legislative enactments are constitutionally approved by the supreme court, I disagree. If the former is true, it would mean that any amendments made by the legislature to the Civil Practice Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure would be Supreme Court Rules. Thus, it would amount to an abdication of the rule-making power by the supreme court and a wrongful delegation of that power to the legislature. Moreover, how could the supreme court “adopt” the legislative amendments it has not yet seen? Also, Supreme Court Rule 1 existed at the time People v. Jackson (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602, and People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495, were decided. In both cases, the supreme court held sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional as being an encroachment by the legislature upon the power of the judiciary. To me, Supreme Court Rule 1 merely establishes for trial court proceedings the same standard for determining the applicability of the Supreme Court Rules as appears in section 1 of the Civil Practice Act. (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 1, Committee Comments (Smith-Hurd 1979).) In other words, both the Supreme Court Rules and the Civil Practice Act are applicable to trial court proceedings in the same kinds of actions. But this does not mean that the legislature can thereby encroach upon the judicial power of the court. Accordingly, I do not believe that Supreme Court Rule 1 is applicable to the constitutional question involved in this case. I adhere to my original opinion.