Court Opinion

ID: 9454752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:57:58.158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:17.474609
License: Public Domain

MATTHES, Circuit Judge, with whom Chief Judge VAN OOSTERHOUT and Judge MEHAFFY join,
concurring in the result.
For reasons stated in the dissents in Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (1968), I adhere to the view that the Iowa alibi instruction was not subject to any vital constitutional infirmities and did not deprive Stump of due process. However, I consider myself bound by the decision of the majority in Stump.
Although I believe, for reasons stated below, that the new concept promulgated in Stump should be applied to Johnson, I disagree with the majority’s approach to and disposition of the retroactivity issue.
The majority in Stump rationalized that the instruction “in its procedural application was arbitrary and oppressive to the defendant’s basic constitutional rights,” 398 F.2d at 122, and that the court was not directly faced with “issues of retroactivity” because “an oppressive shifting of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant violates due process [and] is not a new doctrine within constitutional law.” Id.
Although the constitutional guaranty forming the premise for Judge Lay’s opinion in Stump is as old as the Constitution itself, the decision that the Iowa alibi instruction had the effect of oppressively shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in derogation of his constitutional rights had its genesis in Stump.
Precedent supports Stump in holding that “retroactivity” was not an issue in that case, even though Stump was before the court on habeas corpus rather than direct appeal and even though his trial had been held 7 years before. See, e. g., cases cited in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628-629 n. 13, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). When a court decides that previously sanctioned practices are unconstitutional, it does so in the context of a “case or controversy” and must be able to offer concrete relief rather than an advisory opinion. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254-255 n. 24, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 56, 60-61 (1965). Thus, the new rule must receive retrospective application in the initial case (here Stump) promulgating it; however, it does not follow that it cannot be given prospective effect in all other cases. Desist v. United States, supra 394 U.S. at 254-255, n. 24, 89 S.Ct. 1030; Stovall v. Denno, supra 388 U.S. at 301, 87 S.Ct. 1967. This has been recognized doctrine since Linkletter v. Walker, supra 381 U.S. at 629, 85 S.Ct. at 1737, “that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires restrospective effect.” Although this view has received severe criticism, e. g., dissent of Justice Black in Linkletter, supra at 640, 85 S.Ct. 1731, and dissent of Justice Douglas in Desist, supra 394 U.S. at 255-256, 89 S.Ct. 1030, it has also been approved by those critical of the method by which *59the Court makes its determination of retroactivity, dissent of Justice Harlan in Desist, supra at 263, 89 S.Ct. 1030 and Mishkin, supra at 87.
Turning now to the majority opinion in this case, I believe the issue of retroactivity — that is, whether Johnson should receive the benefit of the holding in Stump—should be determined by application of the criteria enunciated in decisions of the Supreme Court, e. g., Desist v. United States, supra at 249, 89 S.Ct. 1030; Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. at 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967; Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 410, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. at 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, and not on the premise relied upon by the Stump majority in fashioning the new concept.
That the majority has placed this case at this time in the same posture as Stump when it was decided and has failed to recognize the distinguishing factors between Stump and this ease as to retroactivity is implicit from the following:
“4. As pointed out in Stump, 398 F.2d at 122, our holding there that an oppressive shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant violates due process is not a new constitutional doctrine. Thus we were not ‘directly faced with issues of retroactivity.’ * * * We adhere, however, to the majority view in Stump that we are not faced in Johnson’s case with an issue of retroactivity. Even if we were, it would perhaps suffice only to note that Johnson’s ease, with its alibi instruction issue, reached us before Stump’s.”
The foregoing leads me to conclude that we are today deciding that every conviction in a trial in which the alibi instruction was given is infected with fatal error.
I do not think it is necessary to go that far in this case. We have here the simple question of whether Johnson’s conviction must be set aside, not because of the long-standing constitutional prohibition against shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, but because of the new rule promulgated in Stump. In my view the majority should confine its opinion to that issue, and should not by clear implication open the doors to every Iowa prisoner whose case involved the alibi instruction.
I feel that a decision on the retroac-tivity of Stump should be withheld until we have a case squarely presenting that issue. It may be that Stump should be applied only to cases tried in the Iowa courts after our decision in Stump became final.
However, because of the history of this case in this court, I agree that the Stump rule should govern in this instance. Johnson’s appeal was docketed here on February 14, 1967, and our decision was filed on November 28, 1967. Stump’s appeal reached us on July 3, 1967. The panel which heard the case disagreed with our decision in Johnson, and Stump was transferred to the court en banc. The result of that hearing appears from the majority opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Johnson, and later vacated our prior decision and remanded for further consideration in light of our opinion in Stump.
Considering that Johnson was the first to challenge the alibi instruction in this court, and that our first decision never became final, I believe that fairness dictates that the rule of Stump be applied here.
In summary, I concur only in the result.