Court Opinion

ID: 9898508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:10.879932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:18.351820
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of:
                                                   No. 82745-6-I
 the Parentage of E.Z.,
                                                   DIVISION ONE
                          a minor child.
                                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

       DÍAZ, J. — Appellant, the mother, appeals a court’s decision, following trial,

to grant a petition to place her child permanently in Texas with respondent, the

father. 1 The mother argues that the trial court improperly based its decision on

what she argues was essentially a short-term medical emergency, and that the

court improperly relied on the temporary parenting plan in forming its permanent

parenting plan. Further, she argues the trial court erred in placing RCW 26.09.191

restrictions on her but not on the father. Finding no error of law and concluding

that substantial evidence supports the court’s decision, we affirm.

                               I.     BACKGROUND

       The mother and the father are parents of a now six-year-old boy, E.Z., born

in May 2017. 2 On March 22, 2019, the trial court issued a final parentage plan,

1 To protect the privacy of E.Z., we refer to his mother as “the mother” and to his

father as “the father.”
2 The mother originally believed another person was the father of E.Z., but a

paternity test clarified that that person was not the father and the father’s paternity
was confirmed in February 2019.
No. 82745-6-I/2

ordering that the mother had custody of E.Z., and a child support order, ordering

the father to pay child support to the mother. The court did not approve a parenting

plan or residential schedule at that time because neither parent had requested

one.

       E.Z. lived with the mother in Washington State from his birth until Child

Protective Services (CPS) intermittently placed him with the father in Texas,

beginning in December 2019, because she experienced episodes of psychosis

three or four times from November 2019 to July 2020, in the following ways.

       In November 2019, the mother took E.Z. to a 13 Coins restaurant in the

middle of the night. While there, the mother met a man she did not know, took

E.Z. to his house, consumed alcohol and marijuana, and stayed the night there

with the child. She then refused to leave and was arrested for trespassing the next

morning (“13 Coins Episode”). She was admitted to Evergreen Hospital overnight

on an involuntary commitment due to continued erratic behavior. CPS placed E.Z.

in the temporary care of the mother’s sister.

       The 13 Coins Episode was the beginning of a manic episode that then

lasted up through a second hospitalization on December 2, 2019, during which

time she was disconnected from reality. On that date, the mother was admitted on

an involuntary basis to Fairfax Behavioral Health for 36 hours, after police received

several reports of child endangerment, involving allegations that the mother made

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No. 82745-6-I/3

threats to kill her sister and herself (“Fairfax Episode”). As before, there was

evidence of psychosis including paranoia and that her symptoms occurred in the

context of cannabis use. E.Z. was placed in the temporary care of relatives. While

she was in the hospital, the mother participated in a family meeting, after which it

was agreed that E.Z. temporarily would reside with his father in Texas.

       On January 17, 2020, the mother filed a motion for a parenting plan and

residential schedule, which had been lacking, and an ex parte motion for the father

to return E.Z. to her. On February 20, 2020, the court ordered the father to return

E.Z. to the mother, because there was “no evidence of a court order placing” E.Z.

with the father, and set up a visiting schedule. In March and April 2020, the parties

continued litigating cross-motions for temporary and permanent parenting plans.

In May 2020, the court ordered the mother to undergo a full mental health and

substance abuse evaluation, where the evaluators would have all necessary

records to inform their evaluation.

       On June 23, 2020, the mother took E.Z. to an active protest zone, known

as the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone or CHAZ, where she was found nude at or

about 4:00 a.m. after having smoked (perhaps involuntarily) a formaldehyde-

soaked cigarette. Her behavior caused bystanders to be concerned about E.Z.’s

safety and they took custody of him, despite her violent resistance (“CHAZ

Episode”). The mother was detained by Seattle Police for indecent exposure and

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No. 82745-6-I/4

involuntarily admitted to Swedish Medical First Hill overnight. CPS placed E.Z. in

temporary foster care, but returned him the next day to the mother.

       On or about July 13, 2020, the mother started calling law enforcement to

make various “persecutory” and “irrational” claims about her family and about the

father and posting aggressive social media messages. She would call police for

assistance, they would show up, and she would act erratically and refuse to let

them in the house. On July 18, 2020, the mother was arrested for assaulting her

sister and detained involuntarily. She was admitted to NAVOS for nine days

(“NAVOS Episode”).      CPS again temporarily placed E.Z. with the mother’s

relatives.

       On July 29, 2020, the father filed motions for a temporary family law order,

a restraining order, and a parenting plan, asking the court to place E.Z. with him,

place RCW 26.09.191 limitations on the mother, and make him the sole decision-

maker of E.Z. The father represented that CPS informed him that, if he did not

seek an order placing the child in his temporary custody, it would initiate a

dependency action in order to protect the child from risk of imminent harm in his

mother’s custody if/when she is released.

       In advance of the hearing on the motions, the Family Law CASA agreed

with the father and recommended that he be the primary residential parent and

sole decision-maker, and the mother’s residential time with E.Z. be restricted, per

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No. 82745-6-I/5

RCW 26.09.191, because of the mother’s “history of mental health and substance

abuse issues that place the child in potentially dangerous, high risk situations.”

        On August 13, 2020, the trial court issued a temporary parenting plan, which

placed E.Z. in the custody and decision-making authority of the father and limiting

the mother’s time with E.Z., finding that the mother had neglected, abused or

threatened to abuse E.Z. because of her behavioral health and substance abuse

challenges. The court set for trial the motion for a permanent parenting plan for

March 22, 2021.

        In February 2021, the mother’s forensic psychological evaluator, Dr.

Michael Stanfill, submitted an updated report. He diagnosed the mother with

bipolar disorder, severe with psychotic features, and found that her substance use

was more intense than initially understood. At trial, he testified that it was difficult

for him to say what the long-term prognosis was for the mother, but it was important

to address those significant risks to help prevent the next episode. The mother

further testified that, just before trial, the mother had followed the last of his

recommendations and joined a bipolar support group, which met once or twice per

week.

        The Family Law CASA submitted an updated report, indicating the ongoing

concern that, if E.Z. were placed back in the mother’s care, she could relapse due

to untreated triggers. At trial, the CASA reiterated those concerns and made the

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No. 82745-6-I/6

same recommendations for the father to maintain custody. This recommendation

included the CASA’s finding that there was no record that the father had domestic

violence charges filed against him, despite the mother’s claim that he raped her.

Indeed, the Bellevue Police Department investigated the rape allegations, but no

charges were pursued against the father.

       Following a five-day trial, the trial court orally ruled, on April 1, 2021, that

the father would be the permanent primary residential parent and the sole decision-

maker over E.Z. The court held that since the parentage order was entered on

March 22, 2019, there was a substantial change in the mother’s situation, and the

court concluded that the mother’s conduct adversely affected E.Z.’s best interests,

and constituted substantial nonperformance of parenting functions.

       In placing restrictions on the mother’s parenting time, the court specifically

recounted the 13 Coins Episode and the CHAZ Episode as the basis for its finding

of neglect. Furthermore, the court found that the mother has a long-term emotional

impairment which presently interferes with her ability to parent, crediting the Family

Law CASA and Dr. Stanfill’s conclusion that the mother suffers from bipolar

disorder, which, if not managed properly, could continue to impact her parenting.

The court also found that the mother has a “heavy” substance abuse problem,

which interferes with her ability to exercise appropriate judgment regarding the

child's welfare, again crediting the Family Law CASA and Dr. Stanfill.

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No. 82745-6-I/7

       The court entered its orders, findings, and parenting plan on April 16, 2021.

The mother timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. The

mother now appeals both rulings. The father filed no brief in opposition.

                                 II.    ANALYSIS

       The mother challenges each of the seven substantive decisions the trial

court made in its final parenting plan. However, she does not present substantive

argument on each. Instead, the mother argues fully only three to four of the seven

assignments of error. 3 Specifically, she claims that the trial court improperly based

its decision on, what she argues was, a short-term medical emergency, and that

the court improperly relied on the temporary parenting plan in forming its

permanent parenting plan. Further, she argues the trial court erred in placing RCW

26.09.191 restrictions on her but not on the father. We will address each in turn.

A.     Standards of review and Applicable Law

       Washington “recognizes the fundamental importance of the parent-child

relationship to the welfare of the child, and that the relationship between the child

and each parent should be fostered unless inconsistent with the child's best

interests.” RCW 26.09.002.

3 Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument are insufficient to

merit judicial consideration. Joy v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.,170 Wn. App. 614, 629,
285 P.3d 187 (2012). Accordingly, we will consider only the arguments
enumerated here.

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No. 82745-6-I/8

       The construction of a statute is a matter of law, and the construction given

a statute by a trial court is reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Hansen, 81 Wn.

App. 494, 498, 914 P.2d 799 (1996). While conclusions of law are reviewed de

novo, findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Zier,

136 Wn. App. 40, 45, 147 P.3d 624 (2006). “Substantial evidence” is evidence

sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted. In

re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012).

       “A trial court wields broad discretion when fashioning a permanent parenting

plan.” Id. On appeal, this court reviews a parenting plan for abuse of discretion,

which “occurs when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable

grounds or untenable reasons.” Id. The trial court’s findings of fact are treated as

verities on appeal, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Id.

       The Parenting Act requires that “the best interests of the child shall be the

standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties’ parental

responsibilities.” RCW 26.09.002 (enumerating factors).

B.     Finding of Long-Term Impairment

       The mother argues that the trial court erred in “focus[ing] on [the mother]’s

mental health diagnosis,” which she characterizes as a short-term medical

emergency, and she argues cannot be a basis for a custodial parent to lose legal

custody. She analogizes her challenges to those in In re Marriage of Thompson,

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No. 82745-6-I/9

32 Wn. App. 418, 647 P.2d 1049 (1982) and In re Marriage of Taddeo-Smith, 127

Wn. App. 400, 110 P.3d 1192 (2005).

       In both cases, the mother-appellant had temporarily placed the child with

the respondent father. Thompson, 32 Wn. App. at 419; Taddeo-Smith, 127 Wn.

App. at 402. In Taddeo-Smith, the mother suffered a physical injury in a car

accident, and asked the father “to look after the children temporarily, while she was

hospitalized.” 127 Wn. App. at 405-06. In both cases, neither party “consented”

to a permanent placement. Thompson, 32 Wn. App. at 420 (defining consent as

the “voluntary acquiescence to surrender of legal custody”); Taddeo-Smith, 127

Wn. App. at 406-07. The mother argues that, without consent to permanent

placement, a short-term medical emergency cannot justify the court’s decisions.

       The crux of the matter here is whether, under the substantial evidence

standard, the trial court’s conclusion that the mother suffers from a “long-term

impairment” is sufficiently founded. Zier, 136 Wn. App. at 45. If the conclusion is

sufficiently founded, then this matter is facially distinguishable from both

Thompson and Taddeo-Smith.

       It is an unchallenged verity that both the Family Law CASA and Dr. Stanfill

concluded that the mother suffers from severe bipolar disorder with psychotic

features, which is a long-term emotional impairment, and which has, and if not

managed properly would continue to, impact her parenting.          Dr. Stanfill also

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No. 82745-6-I/10

concluded, and the court also found, that the mother has a “heavy” substance

abuse problem, which has and could continue to interfere with her ability to

exercise appropriate judgment regarding E.Z.’s welfare.            Additionally, it is

important to highlight that the mother just had started attending a bipolar support

group very shortly before trial.

       The mother argues that the court “relied on incidents that had occurred

nearly ten months prior [to trial], within a discrete period of eight months.” In other

words, the mother argues that the court did not focus on the evidence she wished

it had. But, on the standard of review applicable here, that is not the inquiry. The

inquiry is whether at the time of the court’s orders there was sufficient evidence “to

persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” Katare, 175

Wn.2d at 35.     On the basis of the clear diagnosis, resulting behaviors, and

uncertain prognosis, that standard has been met here, even if it may be the case

that, with proper and on-going treatment, which had started shortly before trial, the

mother may be able to manage both of her disorders in the future.

       Finally, we need not reach whether the mother consented to a permanent

change in custody. Ultimately it was in the court’s “broad discretion” to fashion a

parenting plan seeking to achieve “finality,” to avoid “ping-pong” litigation over

custody, and to maximize “the stability of a child’s environment.” Katare, 175

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No. 82745-6-I/11

Wn.2d at 35; Thompson, 32 Wn. App. at 422. Stability appropriately was the

court’s focus.

C.     Reliance on Temporary Parenting Plan

       The mother next asserts that the trial court overly relied on the temporary

parenting plan, which “overshadowed” the best interests of E.Z. 4

       Indeed, RCW 26.09.060(10)(a) provides that a temporary order “[d]oes not

prejudice the rights of a party or any child which are to be adjudicated at

subsequent hearings in the proceedings.” And, RCW 26.09.191(5) provides that

“[i]n entering a permanent parenting plan, the court shall not draw any

presumptions from the provisions of the temporary parenting.”        Finally, “our

legislature has expressed a preference that permanent orders rest on evidence

presented at trial unprejudiced by temporary orders.” In re Marriage of Abbess, 23

Wn. App. 2d 479, 488, 516 P.3d 443 (2022). “This is because temporary orders

serve a different purpose than permanent orders and are issued based on different

criteria and evidentiary standards.” Id.

4 The mother mentions in passing that the court “premised its designation of the

father as primary residential parent based on the temporary parenting plan” and,
as such, compels this court to review this particular issue de novo. The mother
does not cite to any authority for that statement. Where a party fails to provide
citation to support a legal argument, we assume counsel, like the court, has found
none. State v. Loos, 14 Wn. App. 2d 748, 758, 473 P.3d 1229 (2020) (citing State
v. Arredondo, 188 Wn.2d 244, 262, 394 P.3d 348 (2017)).

                                           11
No. 82745-6-I/12

       In Abbess, the trial court “us[ed] stale and discredited evidence from a

negotiated temporary order that both parties planned to contest at trial and

ultimately deprived [the father] of a meaningful opportunity to litigate equal

residential time.” Id.

       The mother argues that the trial court’s following two statements

demonstrate the same overreliance on the temporary plan: (1) “Given that the child

has resided primarily with [the father] [. . .] [the father] has necessarily taken greater

responsibility for performing parenting functions for the daily needs of the child.”5

And (2) “what I’m doing is changing the parentage order, which was the only thing

that previously reflected that the child would live primarily with [the mother]. In fact,

the child has not lived primarily with [the mother] for some time.”

       The mother takes both statements out of context and the statements, in fact,

do not reference the temporary parenting plan. On the contrary, the trial court

prefaced these statements by finding that “returning the child primarily to [the

mother]’s care would be harmful to the child's physical, mental or emotional health,

and it would be better for the child to change the final parentage order to provide

the child reside primarily with [the father].” (Emphasis added). In other words, the

5 We accept how the mother chose to paraphrase the court’s remarks, although it

is telling that the full statement emphasizes the mother’s “neglect” and the
“bonding” that occurred between the father and E.Z. as a result.

                                           12
No. 82745-6-I/13

trial court was clear it was applying the “best interest of the child standard,”

required by RCW 26.09.002.

       Moreover, the statement that the child primarily resided with the father and

not the mother was a mere uncontested factual observation. And, indeed, such a

factual observation is an appropriate factor in the fashioning of a permanent

residential schedule. RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) (iii) (“the court shall consider . . .

whether a parent has taken greater responsibility for performing parenting

functions relating to the daily needs of the child”); Thompson, 32 Wn. App. at 421

(“‘While time spent with each parent is not determinative, it is a factor.’”) (quoting

In re Marriage of Timmons, 94 Wn.2d 594, 601, 617 P.2d 1032 (1980)).

       In short, we can locate nothing in the record that provided the father with an

“unfair advantage when the permanent parenting plan was entered” because of

the previously entered temporary plan. In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795,

808, 854 P.2d 629 (1993). In turn, there was no error.

D.     RCW 26.09.191 Restrictions

       Finally, the mother argues that the trial court erred in placing RCW

26.09.191 restrictions on her but not on the father.

       RCW 26.09.191 bars a trial court from precluding or limiting any provision

of the parenting plan “unless the evidence shows that ‘[a] parent’s . . . conduct may

have an adverse effect on the child’s best interest.’” In re Marriage of Chandola,

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No. 82745-6-I/14

180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014) (quoting RCW 26.09.191(3)) (alteration

in original).   “[E]vidence of actual damage is not required” before imposing

restrictions under RCW 26.09.191(3), and a court may impose restrictions where

substantial evidence shows “that a danger of . . . damage exists.” In re Marriage

of Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 872, 56 P.3d 993 (2002)) (analyzing RCW

26.09.191(3)(e)).

       The mother first claims that there was “no evidence” proffered that E.Z.

actually “experienced physical, mental, or emotional harm or that the danger of

damage currently continues to exist.” 6

       This is a significant overstatement. As testified to by the Family Law CASA,

CPS placed E.Z. temporarily with at least four different family members or friends

between November 2019 and July 2020, and E.Z. underwent a short stint at

temporary foster care.     The CASA further recommended that the mother’s

residential time with E.Z. should be restricted per RCW 26.09.191, because of the

6  The mother mentions in passing that the court’s decision to place “.191
restrictions upon the mother for her disability based on its interpretation of the
statute” compels this court to review this particular issue de novo. The mother
does not explain how the trial court “premised” that decision on an interpretation
of RCW 26.09.191. Neither the oral nor the written ruling delineated any
interpretation of RCW 26.09.191(3) which the mother argues is error. The court is
not required to search the record to locate the portions relevant to a litigant’s
arguments. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley,118 Wn.2d 801, 819, 828
P.2d 549 (1992). Thus, we will not consider this issue on that standard of review.

                                          14
No. 82745-6-I/15

mother’s “history of mental health and substance abuse issues that place the child

in potentially dangerous, high risk situations.”

       Without repeating all the facts reviewed above, these “high risk situations”

included being in the apartment of a strange man while his caretaker (the mother)

was drugged and belligerent (the 13 Coins Episode) and the CHAZ Episode, where

bystanders were so concerned about E.Z.’s safety that they tried to take him away

from the mother.

       When we combine this evidence with the substantial evidence that the

mother suffers from “long-term impairment,” we conclude a fair-minded person can

be persuaded that returning E.Z. primarily to the mother’s care, at a minimum,

“may have an adverse effect on the child's best interests.” RCW 26.09.191(3)

(emphasis added).

       Additionally, the mother argues that the court should have applied RCW

26.09.191 against the father because he engaged in “domestic violence” and in

the “abusive use of conflict.”

       As to the former allegations, the mother again points to evidence that she

wishes the trial court had credited more fully. Again, that is not the standard. The

inquiry is whether at the time of the court’s orders there was sufficient evidence “to

persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” Katare, 175

Wn.2d at 35.    Here, the CASA testified that a search of the relevant databases

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No. 82745-6-I/16

revealed that, while the mother had accused the father of rape, there was no record

of any law enforcement agency charging the father with rape, even after

conducting some investigation. There was no court or any tribunal that

substantiated that allegation. Finally, there was testimony that the rape allegation

occurred only after E.Z. was placed with his father, as a means to ensure his return.

Based on this standard of review, the trial court had ample evidence to not impose

restrictions against the father for domestic violence.

       As to the latter allegations, the mother also accused the father of both

demeaning her and “weaponizing” her mental health issues during the trial. She

claims that the trial court “completely ignored any evidence in support of [the father]

engaging in such conflict.” Tellingly, the mother provides no case law to support

her claims that a party’s statements made during trial could constitute an abusive

use of conflict. Where a party fails to provide citation to support a legal argument,

we assume counsel, like the court, has found none. State v. Loos, 14 Wn. App.

2d 748, 758, 473 P.3d 1229 (2020) (citing State v. Arredondo, 188 Wn.2d 244,

262, 394 P.3d 348 (2017)).

       Having reached only those assignments of error fully argued, we need not

reach the subsequent issues that depend on them (an order to pay child support

and her attorney fees), or those that were insufficiently argued.

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No. 82745-6-I/17

                              III.   CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s final parenting plan and

denial of the mother’s motion for reconsideration.

WE CONCUR:

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