Court Opinion

ID: 9607235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:56:32.404476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:43.816182
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
dissenting:
I am not in accord with the majority opinion. Perforce, the pleadings and the evidence being what they were, the trial court was called upon to settle one issue: whether the wife was the legal and equitable owner of a Lincoln automobile. Such the wife charged in her motion; such in great measure she failed to prove.
Hercules Equipment Co. recovered a money judgment against Mr. Smith, had an execution issue thereon, and pursuant to the writ the sheriff levied upon and seized a 1955 Lincoln Capri automobile. Mrs. Smith sought by her motion to restrain the sheriff from acting further under the execution writ, and additionally to order undone the acts already performed by the sheriff in pursuance of the writ.
The only testimony relating to the purchase of, payments on, and transfers of record title in connection with said automobile was given by Mrs. Smith. At the conclusion of the evidence, in response to the contention of the judgment creditor, the trial court said, “If you are to prevail here, you must ask this Court to disbelieve everything the petitioner [Mrs. Smith] testified to. I have no reason to disbelieve it. Accordingly, I am going to grant the motion.”
What was the substance of the testimony of Mrs. Smith which the trial court had “no reason to disbelieve”? In pertinent part it follows:
Mr. Smith was credited with either $2000 or $3000 *465when he transferred an earlier model Lincoln car as a down payment on the car in question. Mrs. Smith paid the balance owing of $2000 or $2200. Title was registered originally in the name of Mr. Smith, although it should have been in her name, but in October 1957 title was placed in Mrs. Smith’s name. While the record title was in her name the car was subjected to the levy and seized by the sheriff.
In relation to the allegation that Mrs. Smith had the entire equitable and legal ownership of the car, her evidence revealed that she had the legal title but that she and her husband each owned a proportionate interest in the car.
It was proper to proceed by motion in the case in which judgment was rendered. Certainly, a separate suit in replevin or by injunction would not be necessary, nor should Mrs. Smith be relegated to an action for damages for conversion of property. Indeed, an injunction proceeding could under certain circumstances be of highly doubtful propriety. “[N]o proceeding to enjoin the execution of an order or judgment of one court may be brought in a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, but any relief must be sought in the court whose order or command is involved.” Wright v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. App. 2d 181, 110 P. (2d) 529.
Intervention may be de facto; “[o]ne who has not been made a party to a cause may make himself a party by moving to set aside the * * * order complained of, or by otherwise submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court.” Smith v. Mingramm, 104 Cal. App. 95, 285 Pac. 354. See Elliott v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. 501, 77 Pac. 1109, 103 Am. St. Rep. 102; Baca v. Catron, 24 N.M. 242, 173 Pac. 862. The failure to formally intervene was not made the basis of any objection; the motion of Mrs. Smith was heard, ruled upon, and final disposition made thereof without question by the court or by the parties as to the regularity of her being a party.
An execution is a process of the court; its mandate is *466carried out by an officer of the court; it is the means by which the court’s judgment is enforced. It is often spoken of as the last procedural step in a suit. “An execution is a judicial writ issuing from the court where the judgment is rendered, directed to an officer thereof, and running against the body or goods of a party, by which the judgment of the court is enforced.” (Emphasis supplied.) 23 C.J. 305, §1. It is the final process issued by the- court to carry out and enforce its judgment after an adjudication of the rights of the parties. Hurlbutt v. Currier, 68 N.H. 94, 38 Atl. 502; Dobbins v. Peoria First Natl. Bank, 112 Ill. 553.
It is by process that a person becomes amenable to court action- Mrs. Smith, although not a party to the original suit, became one to all intents and purposes when her property, or her interest in property, was subjected to the execution process. She was not a party in name, but she was one in fact. As well argue that, notwithstanding one is brought into court by the scruff of his neck pursuant to a body execution, he would be unable to present the fact that he was not the person described in the process, and this on the theory that he was not a party named in the pleadings. This is an absurd situation, but it frequently takes absurd applications to show the rightness or wrongness of the holding of a court. The fact is that whether execution is issued against the property or upon the body of a person, that person, although not named as a party in the suit, is willy-nilly in court.
It has been intimated that Geer, the ex-officio sheriff of Denver, filed no responsive pleading to Mrs. Smith’s motion. Geer was not a party to the action, and it was not incumbent upon him to file any pleading. In carrying out execution process the sheriff -is an officer of the court, and the court should not in effect be making itself a party to the action. This is made clear by C.R.S. ’53, 35-5-15:
“The sheriff in person, or by his undersheriff or *467deputy, shall serve and execute, according to law, all processes, writs, precepts and orders issued or made by lawful authority and to him directed, and shall attend upon the several courts of record held in his county.”
Notwithstanding the motor vehicle registration law, one may have an equitable interest in a car. And where the statute of frauds is not injected into the case, a showing of an equitable interest should be recognized by the court. Here the husband had an interest in the automobile made the subject of execution process. The husband’s creditor could reach his interest to the extent of his debt, if his interest was sufficient to satisfy the debt. Hearn v. Lander, 11 Bush (Ky.) 669; Wheeler v. Biggs, 15 So. 118 (Miss.); Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N. C. 301, 11 S.E. 460.
I would hold that an equity in personal property — in this case, the automobile — is subject to execution process to satisfy the judgment. Ellis v. Gibbons, 26 Colo. App. 454, 145 Pac. 285; Gordon v. Hillman, 107 Wash. 490, 182 Pac. 574. In this state, “All and singular the goods and chattels, lands, tenements and real estate of every person against whom any judgment shall be obtained in any court of record, either at law or in equity for any debt, damages, costs or any other sum of money, shall be liable to be sold on execution issued upon such judgment. * * * ” C.R.S. ’53, 77-1-2.
In construing a similar statute, the Supreme Court of Washington in the case of Gordon v. Hillman, supra, held:
“It is contended that Hillman’s interest in the note and mortgage, being an equitable one only, is not subject to sale on execution; and many authorities are cited to show that such was the rule at common law. Our statute has, however, removed this question from the realm of the common law. Rem. Code, §518, provides:
“ ‘All property, real and personal, of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, shall be liable to execution.’
“Under this statute, it was held in Calhoun v. Leary, 6 *468Wash. 17, 32 Pac. 1070, that an equitable interest in land will be divested by sale under execution; and we are not now disposed to limit the statute.”
To the extent that the trial court believed that Mr. Smith had an interest in the car in question (represented by his proportionate share of the purchase), it should have held the same subject to execution, and in this respect only the determination of the trial court should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Doyle joins in this dissenting opinion.