Court Opinion

ID: 9378466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 17:01:56.176392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.498619
License: Public Domain

Rel: March 10, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

 ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                                _________________________

                             CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677
                                _________________________

                                                    M.A.

                                                       v.

                                             C.S. and A.S.

                           Appeals from Lee Juvenile Court
                            (JU-20-227.01 and JU-20-227.02)

PER CURIAM.

        In these consolidated appeals, M.A. ("the father"), the father of B.A.

("the child"), appeals from identical judgments that the Lee Juvenile

Court ("the juvenile court") entered in each of two dependency actions

pertaining to the child. Those judgments vested the father with custody
CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

of the child but found that the child remained dependent as to the father

and granted C.S. and A.S. ("the maternal grandparents"), the child's

maternal grandparents, visitation with the child. On appeal, the father

challenges the juvenile court's judgments insofar as they found that the

child remained dependent as to the father and granted the maternal

grandparents visitation with the child. Because we conclude that the

juvenile court could not reasonably have been clearly convinced from the

evidence that the child remained dependent as to the father when it

entered its final judgments, we dismiss the appeals with instructions to

the juvenile court to vacate its judgments, to dismiss the actions in which

it entered the judgments, and to allow custody of the child to be returned

to the father.

                               Background

     T.S. ("the mother"), the child's mother, is deceased. Before her

death, the mother and the father were in a romantic relationship and

lived together but were never married. The child was born in November

2018. After the child's birth, the child was in the custody of the mother

and the father until the mother's death in August 2020.

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

     In May 2020, the father was hospitalized because of a drug

overdose. Subsequently, in July 2020, the father was hospitalized a

second time because of a drug overdose. During this second hospital stay,

the father's physicians discovered that he had a brain lesion. On August

29, 2020, while the father was still hospitalized, the mother used illicit

drugs and died as a result. When the father had recovered from his

second drug overdose, he underwent successful surgery to remove the

brain lesion.

     In September 2020, the maternal grandparents filed a dependency

petition regarding the child in the juvenile court. In their petition, they

alleged that the child was dependent because, they said, the mother had

died and the father was unable to discharge his parental responsibilities.

The maternal grandparents' petition sought custody of the child if the

juvenile court found that the child was dependent but did not seek

visitation if the juvenile court did not find the child dependent. A few

days after the maternal grandparents filed their petition, E.A. ("the

paternal grandmother"), the father's mother and the paternal

grandmother of the children, also filed a dependency petition regarding

the child in the juvenile court. The juvenile court assigned the maternal

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grandparents' action ("the .01 action") a .01 designator and assigned the

paternal grandmother's action ("the .02 action") a .02 designator.

     The juvenile court ordered the father and the child to submit to

DNA testing, and the results of the DNA testing confirmed that the

father is the child's father. On September 29, 2020, the juvenile court

held a hearing regarding both the maternal grandparents' petition and

the paternal grandmother's petition. On September 30, 2020, the juvenile

court entered identical orders in both the .01 action and the .02 action.

Those September 30, 2020, orders stated that the father had agreed at

the hearing that the child was dependent, granted the maternal

grandparents pendente lite custody of the child, granted the father

supervised visitation, and required the father to satisfy the requirements

of a to-do list that was attached to the order. The to-do list attached to

the September 30, 2020, order required the father to refrain from using

drugs and alcohol; to submit to hair-follicle drug testing before

modification of the September 30, 2020, order; to submit to a substance-

abuse assessment as soon as possible; to follow the recommendations

made in the substance-abuse assessment; to obtain and maintain stable

housing; to obtain and maintain stable employment; to submit to a

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

mental-health assessment as soon as possible; and to comply with the

recommendations made in the mental-health assessment.

        On October 19, 2020, the East Alabama Mental Health Center

performed     a    substance-abuse     assessment   and   a    mental-health

assessment        on   the   father.   The   substance-abuse     assessment

recommended that the father receive substance-abuse treatment. The

father subsequently completed an outpatient substance-abuse-treatment

program on April 8, 2021. The mental-health assessment did not

diagnose the father as suffering from a mental illness; however, he

voluntarily participated in individual counseling and followed a

physician's suggestion that he take buspirone and citalopram for anxiety

and depression. He testified that he was not receiving counseling for

anxiety and depression. He said that he was in a good mood most of the

time.

        The father submitted to hair-follicle drug tests in December 2020,

April 2021, June 2021, and March 2022. The results of all his drug tests

were negative for the presence of illicit drugs.

        After the father recovered from the surgery to remove his brain

lesion, he obtained and maintained employment. When the juvenile court

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

held the final dispositional hearing, the father had been working for the

same employer for five months.

     When the hospital discharged him following his brain surgery, the

father initially lived with the paternal grandmother, her husband, and

the father's brother; however, two months before the final dispositional

hearing, the father rented and moved into his own three-bedroom, two-

bathroom house ("the rental house").

     Following a review hearing, the juvenile court, on June 29, 2021,

entered identical orders in both the .01 action and the .02 action that

granted the father unsupervised visitation with the child and ordered

him to pay the maternal grandparents child support in the amount of

$359 per month.

     On March 30, 2022, the juvenile court held a final dispositional

hearing. At that hearing, the father testified that he had satisfied all the

requirements listed on the to-do list attached to the juvenile court's

September 30, 2020, order. He testified that he had most recently

submitted to a hair-follicle drug test on March 16, 2022, two weeks before

the final dispositional hearing and that the result of that test indicated

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

that he did not have any illicit drugs in his system. He introduced the

written March 16, 2022, drug-test result into evidence.

     The father testified that he was the only occupant of the rental

house except when the child stayed there during visits. Both the father

and the paternal grandmother testified that the paternal grandmother

had cosigned the lease with the father but that she did not provide him

with any financial assistance. The father testified that the child has his

own bedroom and his own bathroom in the rental house. He introduced

photographs of the interior and exterior of the rental house. The

photographs depict a house that would be suitable for the child to live in.

The father testified that the exterior of the rental house is brick, that the

rental house has a fenced-in backyard, that it is in a good neighborhood,

and that a park, a playground, and baseball fields were within walking

distance of the rental house.

     The father testified that his income from his employment was

sufficient to pay his and the child's living expenses. The father admitted

that he and the mother had been substance abusers when the maternal

grandparents filed their dependency petition, but he said that he had

refrained from using drugs or alcohol since July 2020, that he had

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

changed for the better since then, and that he had become a different

person. He further said that he wanted to be the best father to the child

that he could be and that he would never engage in substance abuse

again.

     The paternal grandmother testified that she did not have any

concerns about the father's ability to care for the child independently.

She testified that, in her opinion, the father was doing well both mentally

and emotionally. She said that the father has been sober for a significant

period and that his behavior has improved substantially since he has

been sober. She said that he no longer drinks any alcohol of any kind,

that he no longer has any contact with the people he knew who were

using illicit drugs, and that his life now consists of going to work, going

to the grocery store, going to the gym, and going home.

     The father testified that he and the maternal grandparents are civil

to each other but that he does not trust them. He said that they have

repeatedly asked him to discuss the circumstances of the mother's death

and that he has declined to do so. He said that the maternal grandparents

had refused to allow the child to visit him at any time that was not

specified in his visitation schedule. On Halloween, the father asked the

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

maternal grandfather to allow the father to take the child trick-or-

treating, but the maternal grandfather refused. The father asked if he

could accompany the maternal grandparents and the child when they

took him trick-or-treating, but the maternal grandfather told him that he

could not.

     The father testified that, if the juvenile court vested him with

custody following the final dispositional hearing, he would want the

maternal grandparents to have continued contact with the child but that

he did not want them to have the same rights as a parent.

     The father testified that, as a precaution against relapsing into

substance abuse, he had terminated all contact with anyone that he knew

who was using drugs. He said that he deals with stress by exercising at

a gym and by talking about his problems with his family, who constitute

his support group. The father testified that the mother's death because

of drugs and his own overdoses had scared him so badly that he would

never again use illicit drugs.

     The maternal grandfather testified that the child was "doing great."

The maternal grandfather confirmed that he had not allowed the father

to have any time with the child that was not specified in the visitation

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

order. He said that he did not think that it was in the child's best

interests to spend more time with the father. The maternal grandfather

testified that he thought it was too soon for the juvenile court to transfer

custody of the child to the father because, the maternal grandfather said,

he did not think that the father had demonstrated that he had changed

for a long enough period. The maternal grandfather testified that he had

not received any counseling regarding the mother's death because, he

said, he did not think he needed any.

     After the parties rested at the final dispositional hearing, the

juvenile court asked the guardian ad litem if he had a recommendation.

The guardian ad litem stated that, in his opinion, the father had

demonstrated for a substantial period that he could maintain sobriety

and stability and that the juvenile court should transfer custody of the

child to the father and grant visitation to the maternal grandparents.

      On April 11, 2022, the juvenile court entered identical judgments

in both the .01 action and the .02 action. In pertinent part, those

judgments stated that "while the child remains dependent until further

observation can occur, the Court can no longer say that this child needs

to remain removed from his father"; vested the father with sole legal and

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

physical custody of the child; and granted the maternal grandparents

visitation with the child.

     On April 25, 2022, the father filed identical postjudgment motions

in both the .01 action and the .02 action. Those postjudgment motions

asserted that the juvenile court should alter, amend, or vacate the

judgments for three reasons. First, the father asserted that the juvenile

court should alter, amend, or vacate the judgments insofar as they found

that the child remained dependent because, the father said, no evidence

indicated that the child remained dependent. Second, the father asserted

that the juvenile court should alter, amend, or vacate the judgments

insofar as they granted the maternal grandparents visitation because, he

said, they had not made a claim for visitation with the child. Third, he

asserted that the juvenile court should alter, amend, or vacate the

judgments insofar as they contained clerical errors.

     On April 26, 2022, the maternal grandparents filed postjudgment

motions. 1 In their motions, the maternal grandparents asserted that the

juvenile court should vacate the judgment insofar as it vested the father

     1The  maternal grandparents had until April 26, 2022, to file their
postjudgment motions because April 25, 2022, the fourteenth day after
the entry of the final judgment, was a State holiday.
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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

with sole legal and physical custody because, they said, the father had

lived in his own house for only two months and because, they said, the

only treatment the father had received for his substance-abuse and

mental-health problems was a few teleconference visits with East

Alabama Mental Health Center regarding his substance-abuse problem.

In the alternative, the maternal grandparents asserted that the juvenile

court should amend the judgments to vest the father and the maternal

grandparents with joint legal and joint physical custody of the child, to

correct clerical errors in the judgments, and to state that the times

specified in the judgments were eastern time.

     On April 28, 2022, the juvenile court entered orders granting the

father's and the maternal grandparents' postjudgment motions in part

and denying them in part. On May 6, 2022, the juvenile court entered an

amended judgment in the .01 action only. The amended judgment

corrected the clerical errors in the original judgment and specified that

the times in the amended judgment were eastern time but made no other

changes to the original judgment.

     On May 20, 2022, the father filed postjudgment motions in both the

.01 action and the .02 action that challenged the May 6, 2022, amended

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

judgment insofar as it granted visitation to the maternal grandparents.

Also on May 20, 2022, the father filed notices of appeal in both the .01

and the .02 actions; however, Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. App. P., suspended the

operative effect of those notices because the father's May 20, 2022,

postjudgment motions remained pending. On May 25, 2022, the juvenile

court entered in the .02 action the same amended judgment that it had

entered in the .01 action. The juvenile court did not rule on the father's

May 20, 2022, postjudgment motions within fourteen days after he filed

them; consequently, they were denied by operation of law. See Rule 1(B),

Ala. R. Juv. P. Thereafter, the father's notices of appeal became operative

pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5).

                            Standard of Review

     In a dependency case in which the juvenile court has received

evidence ore tenus, an appellate court presumes that the juvenile court's

factual findings are correct. See J.C. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,

313 So. 3d 1137, 1139 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). This is so because the

juvenile court, unlike an appellate court, can directly observe the

witnesses and assess their demeanor and credibility. Id.

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

     Clear and convincing evidence must support a finding of

dependency. Id. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that, "when

weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the

trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim

and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." § 6-11-

20(b)(4), Ala. Code 1975. "Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires

a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the

substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable

doubt." Id. An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather,

determines whether the juvenile court's findings of fact are supported by

evidence that the juvenile court reasonably could have found to be clear

and convincing. See K.S.B. v. M.C.B., 219 So. 3d 650, 653 (Ala. Civ. App.

2016).

                                 Analysis

     The father first argues that the maternal grandparents did not

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child remained

dependent at the time of the custody disposition and that, therefore, the

juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than to dismiss the

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

dependency actions pertaining to the child and to allow the custody of the

child to be returned to the father. We agree.

     A juvenile court may either hold its adjudicatory and dispositional

hearings on the same date or it may hold them on different dates. See 12-

15-311(a), Ala. Code 1975, ("If the juvenile court finds … that a child is

dependent, the juvenile court may proceed immediately, in the absence

of objection showing good cause or at a postponed hearing, to make proper

disposition of the case."); Rule 25(a), Ala. R. Juv. P. (stating that in

dependency actions, among other proceedings, "the juvenile court may

proceed immediately to a dispositional hearing after adjudication or may

set a dispositional hearing for a later date"). If the juvenile court holds

the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings on different dates, the

juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to make a custody disposition of a child

in a dependency action unless the child is in fact still dependent at the

time of the disposition. See K.C.G. v. S.J.R., 46 So. 3d 499, 502 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2010).

     The maternal grandparents alleged that the child was dependent

because the mother was dead and the father was unable to discharge his

parental responsibilities to the child. See § 12-15-102(8)2., Ala. Code 1975

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

(providing that a child who is without a parent, legal guardian, or legal

custodian willing and able to provide for the care, support, or education

of the child is dependent). The undisputed evidence at the final

dispositional hearing established that the father had not used illicit

drugs or alcohol since July 2020, which was approximately twenty

months before the final dispositional hearing; that he had maintained

employment for five months before the final dispositional hearing; that

he had maintained stable housing at the rental house for two months

before the final dispositional hearing; that he did not have any mental-

health problems that would prevent him from properly parenting the

child; and that the child had been safe during his unsupervised visits

with the father. Therefore, we conclude that the juvenile court could not

have reasonably been clearly convinced from the evidence introduced at

the final dispositional hearing that the child was still dependent. See

H.A.S. v. S.F., 298 So. 3d 1092, 1106 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019) (holding that

the evidence at a final dispositional hearing held five months after the

adjudicatory hearing was insufficient to clearly convince a juvenile court

that the child remained dependent). Therefore, the juvenile court did not

have jurisdiction to do anything other than to dismiss the dependency

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

actions pertaining to the child and allow custody of the child to be

returned to the father. See J.A. v. C.M., 93 So. 3d 953, 955 (Ala. Civ. App.

2012) ("The only thing the juvenile court had jurisdiction to do after

finding that the children were not dependent was to dismiss the

dependency petition and to allow the custody of the children to be

returned to the mother and the father.").

     The dissent asserts that the juvenile court reasonably could have

been clearly convinced that the child was dependent at the time of the

dispositional hearing, because, the dissent says, (1) the father had a

history of substance abuse, (2) the child had been in the custody of the

maternal grandparents for eighteen months prior to the final

dispositional hearing because of the father's substance-abuse problem,

(3) the juvenile court could have found that the father's denying that East

Alabama Mental Health Center had recommended that he undergo

inpatient substance-abuse treatment was not credible, (4) the father had

not attended any Narcotics Anonymous meetings for several months

before the final dispositional hearing, and (5) the ore tenus rule cloaks

the juvenile court's judgments with a presumption of correctness.

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

     Although the father has a history of substance abuse, the

undisputed evidence established that the father had not used illicit drugs

or alcohol for twenty months before the final dispositional hearing. The

undisputed evidence established that the father had been sober for two

months before the juvenile court held that initial hearing regarding the

maternal grandparents' dependency petition on September 29, 2020, but

had agreed at that hearing that the child was dependent at that time.

Thus, the undisputed evidence established that the father had not used

illegal drugs or alcohol during the eighteen months the child had been in

the pendente lite custody of the maternal grandparents. The fact that the

father has a history of drug use before August 2020 does not prove that

the child was dependent on the date of the dispositional hearing when

the undisputed evidence established that the father had been sober for

the twenty-month period immediately preceding the final dispositional

hearing. If a parent's history of substance abuse ipso facto renders his or

her child dependent, then no parent who has a history of substance abuse

could ever regain custody of his or her child no matter how long he or she

maintained sobriety.

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

     With regard to the possibility that the juvenile court could have

found that the father's denying that East Alabama Mental Health Center

had recommended that he undergo inpatient substance-abuse treatment

was not credible, the undisputed evidence established that he had been

sober for twenty months when the juvenile court held the dispositional

hearing; that undisputed evidence included the results of the father's

drug tests and, therefore, did not rest solely on the testimony of the

father. Hence, a credibility issue regarding the father's testimony that

East Alabama Mental Health Center had not recommended that he

undergo   inpatient   substance-abuse   treatment    would   not   have

constituted a basis for disregarding the undisputed evidence that the

father had been sober for the twenty-month period immediately

preceding the dispositional hearing. Moreover, inpatient substance-

abuse treatment is a means of achieving sobriety, but it does not

guarantee that a patient will not relapse into substance abuse. The

undisputed evidence in this case establishes that the father achieved

sobriety and maintained it for twenty months without undergoing

inpatient substance-abuse treatment. The undisputed evidence also

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CL-2022-0676 and CL-2022-0677

established that the father had maintained sobriety despite his failing to

attend several Narcotics Anonymous meetings.

     Finally, with respect to the dissent's contention that the ore tenus

rule mandates an affirmance of the juvenile court's judgments, we note

that the ore tenus rule does not apply when undisputed evidence

establishes the material facts. See Lawson v. Harris Culinary Enters.,

LLC, 83 So. 3d 483, 491 (Ala. 2011). In the present case, the material fact

was whether the father had achieved and maintained sobriety, and the

undisputed evidence established that he had. Therefore, the ore tenus

rule does not afford the juvenile court's judgments a presumption of

correctness in this case.

     Turning now to the question of the award of visitation to the

maternal grandparents, although this court has held that a juvenile court

has jurisdiction to grant grandparent visitation despite a finding that the

child is not dependent when the grandparents have made a claim for

grandparent visitation that is sufficient to invoke the juvenile court's

subject-matter jurisdiction to grant grandparent visitation pursuant to §

12-15-115(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975, see M.G.D. v. C.B., 203 So. 3d 855, 859

(Ala. Civ. App. 2016), the maternal grandparents did not make such a

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claim in this case. When such a claim is not made and a child is not found

dependent, a juvenile court's judgment is void insofar as it purports to

grant grandparent visitation. See L.M. v. G.S., 243 So. 3d 822, 826 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2017). Accordingly, the juvenile court's judgments now before

us are void in their entirety. Because a void judgment will not support an

appeal, we dismiss the father's appeals with instructions to vacate its

judgments, to dismiss the dependency actions pertaining to the child, and

to allow the custody of the child to be returned to the father. Id.

     CL-2022-0676 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

     CL-2022-0677 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

     Moore, Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy JJ., concur.

     Thompson, P.J., dissents, with opinion.

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THOMPSON, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

      I disagree with the main opinion's holding that the evidence did not

support the judgment of the Lee Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")

finding that the child remained dependent. The evidence indicates that

M.A. ("the father") has a history of abusing heroin, methamphetamine,

cocaine, and prescription medications. Because of that drug use, the

child, who was only four-and-a-half years old at the time of the March 30,

2022, hearing, had been in the custody of the maternal grandparents

since September 30, 2020, i.e., approximately 42 months by the time of

that hearing. The father's medical records indicate that he refused in-

patient, residential substance-abuse treatment and instead attended

outpatient treatment. The father insisted that his medical records are

incorrect and that, in spite of the nature of the substances he abused and

his repeated hospitalizations, he was told that he did not need in-patient

treatment. The father also disputed that part of his medical records that

stated that he had minimized the severity of his substance-abuse

addiction. The juvenile court was in the best position to observe the

witnesses as they testified and to evaluate their demeanor and

credibility. It is the province of the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to

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resolve factual disputes in the evidence. Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d 631,

633 (Ala. 2001).

     "Because appellate courts do not weigh evidence, particularly
     when 'the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
     involved,' Knight [v. Beverly Health Care Bay Manor Health
     Care Ctr.], 820 So. 2d [92,] 102 [(Ala. 2001)], we defer to the
     trial court's factual findings. 'The ore tenus rule reflects this
     deference; it accords a presumption of correctness to the trial
     court's findings because of that court's unique ability to
     observe the demeanor of witnesses.' Id.; see also Fitzgerald v.
     Jeter, 428 So. 2d 84, 85 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983), and Ex parte
     Fann, 810 So. 2d 631, 633 (Ala. 2001)."

J.C. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 986 So. 2d 1172, 1185 (Ala. Civ. App.

2007). See also J.P. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 222 So. 3d 1177,

1179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (" 'The juvenile court heard ore tenus evidence

regarding dependency; therefore, its judgment is accorded a strong

presumption of correctness.' " (quoting A.M.W. v. A.G.M., 189 So. 3d 75,

77 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015))); and A.T. v. A.G., 81 So. 3d 385, 389 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2011) (" ' "[B]ecause the trial court has the advantage of observing

the witnesses' demeanor and has a superior opportunity to assess their

credibility, this Court cannot alter the trial court's judgment unless it is

so unsupported by the evidence as to be clearly and palpably wrong." ' "

(quoting Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d 631, 636 (Ala. 2001))).

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     In addition to the disputed facts discussed above, the record

indicates that at the time of the hearing in this matter, the father had

been living independently for only two months. He also admitted at the

hearing on the merits that he had not attended a Narcotics Anonymous

meeting since October or November 2021, i.e., four to five months earlier.

The juvenile court was not required to believe the father's assertions that

he was capable of independently caring for this very young child, and it

was free to consider all of the evidence presented to it. " 'In ore tenus

proceedings, the trial court is the sole judge of the facts and of the

credibility of the witnesses, and it should accept only that testimony

which it considers worthy of belief.' " Ex parte R.E.C., 899 So. 2d 272, 279

(Ala. 2004) (quoting Clemons v. Clemons, 627 So. 2d 431, 434 (Ala. Civ.

App. 1993)). Although the main opinion might have reached a different

result than did the juvenile court, the record contains evidence

supporting the juvenile court's dependency determination. Montgomery

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. T.S., 218 So. 3d 1252, 1268 (Ala. Civ. App.

2016); L.R.M. v. D.M., 962 So. 2d 864, 873 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). Given

the evidence in the record and the fact that this court may not reweigh

the evidence that was presented to the juvenile court, I conclude that the

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main opinion has impermissibly reweighed the evidence presented to the

juvenile court and that it errs in reversing the judgment in this matter.

See Ex parte R.E.C., 899 So. 2d at 279 (" '[A]n appellate court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. To do so would be to

reweigh the evidence, which Alabama law does not allow.' Ex parte Foley,

864 So. 2d 1094, 1099 (Ala. 2003) (citations omitted)).

     I note that the father has not argued that the juvenile court's

dependency determination is inconsistent with an award of custody to

him. In fact, the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act (" t h e AJJA" ), § 12-15-

101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, allows the juvenile court to make any

custodial disposition that is in the best interests of a dependent child. §

12-15-314, Ala. Code 1975. One of the goals of the AJJA is, in part, to

reunite a parent and a child "as safely as possible." § 12-15-101(b)(3), Ala.

Code 1975. "The power to declare a child dependent, once exercised by

the juvenile court, carries with it the authority to dispose of the custody

of the child in any manner the juvenile court deems in the best interests

of the child, see Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-314(a)(3)c., …." G.H. v. Cleburne

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 62 So. 3d 540, 551 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (Moore,

J., concurring in the result). In its judgment, the juvenile court stated

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that "the child remains dependent until further observation can occur."

(Emphasis added.) The child is only four-and-a-half-years old, and, with

regard to his being placed in the father's home, the evidence supports a

conclusion that the child still needs "the care and protection of the State."

§ 12-15-102(8)8., Ala. Code 1975 (defining the term "dependent child").

The evidence supports a conclusion that the father has not been stable

for a sufficiently long period of time to ensure the safety of the child in

his care, and, therefore, that the child remains dependent. I would affirm

the juvenile court's dependency determination.

     If a juvenile court finds a child to be dependent, § 12-15-314(a)(1),

Ala. Code 1975, allows the juvenile court, when it makes a custodial

disposition, to " '[p]ermit the child to remain with the parent, legal

guardian, or other legal custodian of the child, subject to conditions and

limitations as the juvenile court may prescribe.' " J.W. v. T.D., 58 So. 3d

782, 790 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (quoting § 12-15-314(a), Ala. Code 1975).

In this case, the juvenile court imposed conditions and limitations upon

the award of custody of the child to the father pursuant to its dependency

determination. I believe the specification in the April 11, 2022,

dependency judgment that the child "remains dependent until further

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observation can occur" itself constitutes a limitation or condition on the

award of custody of the dependent child to the father. That condition or

limitation demonstrates that the juvenile court intends to continue to

supervise the matter to ensure the safety and best interests of the child.

Further, that limitation or condition on the award of custody to the father

is consistent with the well-settled law that the best interests of a child

are paramount in a dependency action, explaining:

     " '[I]t is the [juvenile] court's duty to scrupulously guard and
     protect the interests of children,' Ex parte Fann, 810 So. 2d
     631, 638 (Ala. 2001), and the stated purpose of the Alabama
     Juvenile Justice Act, codified at Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-101
     et seq., 'is to facilitate the care [and] protection ... of children
     who come under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.' § 12-
     15-101(a)[, Ala. Code 1975].' "

Ex parte M.J.W., 62 So. 3d 531, 536 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). See also W.T.M.

v. S.P., 889 So. 2d 572, 580 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (Murdock, J., with

Thompson and Pittman, JJ., concurring in the result) ("[W]e have long

stated in both child-custody and dependency cases that the primary

concern is the best interests and welfare of the child.").

     Moreover, in its April 11, 2022, judgment, the juvenile court set

forth other conditions and limitations on the award of custody to the

father. First, the juvenile court specified that if C.S. and A.S. ("the

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maternal grandparents") asked the father to submit to a drug screen "at

any time," the father was required do so within 48 hours. In addition, the

father was ordered to sign releases making the results of any drug

screens available to the maternal grandparents. In its April 11, 2022,

judgment, the juvenile court also ordered that if the maternal

grandparents were willing to pay for family counseling, the father was

required to "make reasonable efforts to attend and participate" in that

counseling. The conditions imposed by the juvenile court in its April 11,

2022, judgment provide further support for the conclusion that the

juvenile court did not err in finding the child dependent. I also note that

the father has not challenged on appeal the imposition of those conditions

and limitations set forth in the juvenile court's dependency judgment.

     The father also argued that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to

award C.S. and A.S. ("the maternal grandparents") visitation with the

child. The father contends that the maternal grandparents did not assert

a claim for visitation with the child. However, as this court did in M.G.D.

v. C.B., 203 So. 3d 855, 857 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016), I conclude that the issue

was sufficiently presented to the juvenile court during the hearing in the

matter. Moreover, where, as here, a child is determined to be dependent,

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a juvenile court "may make any other order as the juvenile court in its

discretion shall deem to be for the welfare and best interests of the child."

§ 12-15-314(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. I conclude that the evidence supports

the juvenile court's dependency finding, and, therefore, that the juvenile

court had jurisdiction to enter that part of its order awarding the

grandparents visitation with the child so as to allow the child to maintain

a relationship with the family members who had reared him since June

2020. 2 I would affirm the juvenile court's judgment.

     2In his appellate brief, the father raises arguments concerning the
Grandparent Visitation Act, § 30-3-4.2, Ala. Code 1975, and his rights to
refuse visitation to the child's grandparents. I do not reach those
arguments because I conclude that the juvenile court could properly
award the grandparents a schedule of visitation pursuant to its
dependency jurisdiction.
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