Court Opinion

ID: 9725299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:39:54.146904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.558200
License: Public Domain

Stuart, J.
(dissenting) — I feel compelled to dissent from the majority opinion.
*426In this' ease the beneficiary ol the remainder interest in bank stock which had to be sold under an agreement with the bank permitted the life tenant to assume control of the funds. At the life tenant’s'death only part of the funds could be traced, although her estate was large enough and her income such that she did not have to spend any part of it for her support and maintenance. The remainderman was coexecutor of the Will with the life tenant and he signed the necessary papers, but left the'estate matters entirely up to the life tenant.
The opinion states it is the duty of an executor to know the business of the estate. I agree with this statement but I do not consider the fund of $10,404 derived from the sale of stock an estate matter. It was placed in the hands of the life tenant who was entitled to the income for life. It is the responsibility of the life tenant to account for funds entrusted to her. Heintz v. Parsons, 233 Iowa 984, 9 N.W.2d 355; 31 C. J. S., Estates, section 33, page 42.
The majority opinion is based upon the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel is founded upon the idea that one who has taken a certain position or made a certain representation should not thereafter be permitted to change his position to the prejudice of one who has relied thereon. Riggs v. Meka, 236 Iowa 118, 17 N.W.2d 101; Ames Trust and Savings Bank v. Reichardt, 254 Iowa 1272, 121 N.W.2d 200. There is no proof the remainderman did anything which would make the life tenant believe she could use these funds as she desired, or commingle them with her own and escape the responsibility of accounting for the funds entrusted to her. In my opinion none of the elements of estoppel is present. All remainderman did was to let the life tenant handle the funds, which she had a right to do under the will.
The majority relies upon the ease of Chirurg v. Ames, 138 Iowa 697, 707, 116 N.W. 865. The facts are not similar to the case at bar. In that case the expenses were largely for the benefit of the cestui que trust and were incurred at her insistence. The funds were not used by trustee for her own benefit. She was of full age at the time. She then demanded a strict accounting which the trustee was not in a position to make. The court said:
*427“Having led the mother into her extravagant notions, insisted upon a somewhat lavish expenditure of money, and asked no accounting at any time, she is not now in a .position to demand a scientific and accurate accounting from the mother. In general she knew of the expenditures made on her behalf at the time they were made, and she never made any protest until just before the bringing of this suit. The expenditures were many, most of them for small items, and it was impossible - at the time of trial for the defendant to have any distinct recollection of the different items. * * * We do not intend to modify in any respect the duties ordinarily owing by a trustee to his cestui que trust. Absolute good faith and a strict accounting is ordinarily required. But where the cestui is of full age, and induces the very conduct of which he complains, is satisfied with the methods adopted while they are progressing, interferes himself with the duties of the trustee, and keeps part of the accounts himself, no such strictness is required as in the ordinary case.”
There is no evidence in this case remainderman in his capacity as coexecutor or remainderman led the life tenant to believe she could convert these funds to her own use. Nor is any prejudice to the estate of the life tenant shown had there been such conduct.
Even accepting the court’s theory that the fraudulent result necessary to estoppel is requiring one to pay a second time an item previously paid where it eannot be determined the previous payment was improper. The only items which could possibly come within this requirement would be the $1000 paid to re-mainderman out of “taxes saved” and the inheritance tax on the inheritance from his stepbrother in the amount of $1107.05. This is all that the evidence shows could ever have been received by the remainderman. The land upon which the $1500 mortgage payment was made was land given to the stepbrother. Although remainderman later received it through the stepbrother’s will, there was no certainty it would go to him when the life tenant made payment.
In my opinion the majority opinion places a heavy burden upon the remainderman to make sure his fund in the hands of a *428life tenant remains intact, which burden he has never had before.
ThompsoN, J., joins in this dissent.