Court Opinion

ID: 9592606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:15:43.700525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:53.694821
License: Public Domain

DuBOIS, District Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but write separately to address the due process standard applicable in civil contempt cases involving coercive confine*521ment. In my view, such confinement, while indefinite, is not limitless. To the contrary, I am persuaded that when a civil contempt order ceases to have a coercive effect, it loses its remedial purpose and becomes punitive. Under those circumstances, because “it is well established that criminal penalties may not be imposed in civil contempt proceedings,” the contemnor must be released and, if deemed appropriate, prosecuted separately for criminal contempt. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Appeal of Braun), 600 F.2d 420, 423-24 (3d Cir.1979). As we held in Braun, the burden of establishing that there is “no substantial likelihood” that continued confinement would accomplish its coercive purpose falls to the contemnor. Id. at 425 (internal quotations omitted).
In rejecting the existence of due process limitations on the continuation of civil contempt confinement, the majority relies in large part on the reasoning of Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir.2002), and on Chadunck’s interpretation of International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994), the Supreme Court’s most recent decision concerning the differences between civil and criminal contempt. I believe this reliance to be misplaced.
The majority takes Chadwick’s lead in focusing on the following language in Bag-well:
The paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction ... involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative command such as an order “to pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a conveyance.”
512 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911)) (emphasis added); Chadwick, 312 F.3d at 608; Majority Op., supra, at 518. In Chadwick, we rejected the petitioner’s contention that the phrase “indefinitely until he complies” means “indefinitely until he complies or it becomes apparent that he is never going to comply.” 312 F.3d at 608. We further described the meaning of the “indefinitely until he complies” phrase as “perfectly clear,” concluding that the language “sets the point in time at which confinement must cease.” Id. Although Chadwick seems to construe Bagwell’s “until he complies” language as setting the only point at which civil contempt confinement must cease, that analysis was not necessary to the holding in Chadwick. Moreover, Chadwick, itself, recognized a second point at which civil contempt confinement must terminate — when the contemnor proves that he is unable to comply. Chadwick, 312 F.3d at 609-11 (analyzing Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68 S.Ct. 401, 92 L.Ed. 476 (1948)).
In Chadwick we reviewed the contemnor’s petition for habeas corpus under the restrictive standard set forth in the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which precludes federal relief unless the petitioner can prove that the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Chadwick, 312 F.3d at 606-07. Applying that standard, we denied relief to Chadwick on the ground that Bagwell did not “clearly establish ]” the existence of a due process limitation on civil contempt confinement and that no other Supreme Court case had “endorsed the proposition that confinement for civil contempt must cease when there is ‘no substantial likelihood of compliance.’ ”13 Id. at 608, 613. Chadwick ex*522pressly reserved ruling on whether Bag-well undermined Braun’s due process holding. Id. at 613.
When read in context, the language in Bagwell does not mean that civil contempt can continue indefinitely without raising due process concerns. In fact, Bagwell neither endorses 'nor precludes the existence of due process limitations on the continuation of civil contempt confinement because that issue was not before the Court. Bagwell dealt with the characterization of a contempt sanction as civil or criminal at its imposition; the issue was not the termination of an otherwise lawful coercive contempt sanction. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 823, 114 S.Ct. 2552. Moreover, Bagwell addressed the imposition of fines, not incarceration, and discussed coercive incarceration for comparative purposes only. Id. at 823, 828, 114 S.Ct. 2552. The Bagwell Court had no occasion to consider whether there existed any limitations — due process or otherwise — on the continuation of indefinite civil contempt confinement.
Although the Supreme Court has not considered this issue, the Third Circuit has done so. In Braun, we recognized that due process imposes an outer limit, albeit a variable one, on the length of indefinite civil contempt confinement. “Because the contemnor’s imprisonment is said to be justified as a coercive measure, [the rule is] that when the confinement has lost its coercive force it essentially becomes punitive, and the contemnor must then be released since it is well established that criminal penalties may not be imposed in civil contempt proceedings.” Braun, 600 F.2d at 423-24, 425 (citations omitted). To obtain release, “the contemnor must ... establish ] that there is no ‘substantial likelihood’ that continued confinement would accomplish its coercive purpose.” Id. at 425. The contemnor’s burden is not satisfied where he does no more than “boldly assert[ ] that he will never comply with the court’s order” or where his obstinacy “can be rationally attributed to considerations other than an adamant refusal to purge himself of contempt despite the consequences.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Braun is, as the majority notes, a recalcitrant witness case, which was governed by the eighteen-month limit on civil contempt confinement provided in the Recalcitrant Witness Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). For this reason, the majority states that the due process holding on which I rely is dicta. I disagree with that conclusion. The analysis in Braun clearly has three parts, all of which are necessary to the holding in that case. First, we stated the due process standard — that civil contempt confinement must terminate when it loses the remedial coercive effect that justified its imposition. Id. at 423-25. We observed, however, that applying the standard in practice was a “perplexing task” because “the point at which coercive imprisonment actually ceases to be coercive and essentially becomes punitive is not readily discernible.” Id. at 425. For that *523reason, we ruled that it was appropriate for the contemnor to bear the burden of establishing that there was no substantial likelihood that continued confinement would accomplish its coercive purpose. Id.
In the next part of the opinion, we discussed the relevance of the eighteen-month limit imposed by the Recalcitrant Witness Statute and determined that “Congress has, in effect, addressed essentially the same problem that courts must tackle under a due process analysis, and has thereby filled the void that existed under prior practice, where there was a possibility that unconscionable, indeterminate periods of confinement might be imposed for civil contempt.” Id. at 427. We held that this legislative determination regarding the point at which the continued confinement of recalcitrant witnesses becomes punitive must be accorded substantial deference. Id. We did not, however, exempt recalcitrant witnesses from due process protection. Instead, we specifically stated that “a court may not abdicate its responsibilities under the Constitution simply because Congress has legislated in a particular area.” Id.
In the final part of the opinion, and in accordance with the pronouncement that a court may not abdicate its responsibilities under the Constitution, we considered the merits of Braun’s due process challenge to his continued incarceration. The ultimate holding in Braun was that “Braun ha[d] not alleged any facts that would warrant a departure, at least at [that] time, from the eighteen-month benchmark laid down by Congress.” Id. at 427. In other words, we applied the due process standard to the facts presented and concluded that Braun had not met his “heavy” burden of establishing that his continued confinement had “no substantial likelihood” of coercing his testimony. Id. at 425, 427-28. For this reason, I do not believe Braun’s due process holding to be dicta.
The due process standard articulated and applied in Braun has not been overruled by the Third Circuit sitting en banc, and there is no basis for arguing that the Supreme Court abrogated the standard in Bagwell. In civil contempt cases not covered by the Recalcitrant Witness Statute, such as this one, due process is the only existing limitation on the continuation of “unconscionable, indeterminate periods of confinement,” id. at 427, and there is no reason to deny due process protection to a civil contemnor merely because he “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.”
There remains the troubling prospect of permitting “a contemnor’s insistence on continuing his contumacious conduct [to] inure[ ] to his benefit.” Majority Op., supra, at 520. I firmly agree with the majority that an individual should not be allowed to “thumb its nose” at the district court’s authority. Id. However, civil contempt confinement may not be continued indefinitely on that ground alone. The purpose of civil contempt is remedial; vindicating the authority of the court is a punitive interest that falls primarily within the ambit of criminal contempt. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827-28, 114 S.Ct. 2552; Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 72, 78 S.Ct. 128, 2 L.Ed.2d 95 (1957); Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-42, 31 S.Ct. 492. Moreover, any termination of Harris’s civil contempt confinement does not limit the District Court’s ability to vindicate its authority through criminal contempt proceedings. See Yates, 355 U.S. at 74-75, 78 S.Ct. 128; Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 594, 67 S.Ct. 918, 91 L.Ed. 1117 (1947); United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 298-300, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947). Thus, although the court has a legitimate interest in vindicating its authority, I do not view that interest to be a proper independent basis for continuing civil contempt confinement *524where the confinement has lost its remedial coercive effect.
Applying the due process standard in this case does not lead to a different result than that reached by the majority because Harris did not carry his burden of establishing that there was no substantial likelihood that continued confinement would accomplish its coercive purpose. Harris relied solely on the length of his confinement — almost four years when the District Court ruled on Harris’s motion to terminate his contempt — to demonstrate the futility of further confinement.14 (App.175.) While the length of a contemnor’s confinement is relevant for determining its ongoing coercive effect, it is not dispositive. Braun, 600 F.2d at 425 & n. 17, 428 (citing Catena v. Seidl, 65 N.J. 257, 321 A.2d 225 (1974)). Further, the applicable standard of review in such cases is highly deferential. See Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that a district court has “virtually unreviewable discretion” in deciding “whether a civil contempt sanction has lost any realistic possibility of having a coercive effect”). On the present state of the record, there is no basis for concluding that the District Court abused its discretion in deciding to continue Harris’s civil contempt confinement.
Although the majority and I reach the same result, I am concerned that the majority goes too far- — -it completely shuts the due process door to a person confined for civil contempt merely because he “carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.” In my view, the better approach, and the approach mandated by our precedential opinion in Braun, is to leave the due process door open and to rely on the sound judgment of district courts in determining whether, in a particular case, civil contempt confinement continues to have a coercive effect. The fact that a contemnor possesses the keys to his own jail cell justifies the imposition of an indefinite civil contempt sentence, but it does not justify life-long confinement.

. I note that on July 10, 2009, Judge Joseph P. Cronin, Jr., President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, granted *522H. Beatty Chadwick's most recent petition for writ of habeas corpus and released him after more than fourteen years of civil contempt confinement. In an opinion issued that date, Judge Cronin found, based on the record in the case and the evidence presented at a hearing on July 7, 2009, that Chadwick had the present ability to comply with the underlying order which required him to deposit approximately 2.5 million dollars in an escrow account under the jurisdiction of the court. Judge Cronin nevertheless released Chadwick, concluding that Chadwick’s continued refusal to comply with the contempt order despite fourteen years of incarceration "demonstrates that the [contempt order] ... has lost its present coercive effect and that it is unlikely that the continued incarceration of Petitioner Chadwick will result in his compliance with [that order].” Chadwick v. Green, Civ. No. 09-2134 (Del. County Ct. Com. PL July 10, 2009).

. On this issue, although there is evidence in the record concerning Harris's beliefs, his mental state, and his attacks on the jurisdiclion of the District Court, that evidence was not presented to establish the improbability of future compliance.