Court Opinion

ID: 9654132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:07:19.455776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:05.921969
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing or to' Modify
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs say that in considering the rights of the discharged employees we have overlooked the provision of Section 507.040 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., permitting joinder of plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly or severally “in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action.” However, in the petition herein, there is no claim made for damages for wrongful discharge by the individual employees and plaintiffs now say in their motion for rehearing “that these individual employees had no contract of employment for a definite term.” Thus it does not appear that such an action was intended, or what action, if any, could be maintained by these employees, so it is not necessary to decide whether they have individual claims which would be determined in this class action; and we make no ruling on it. Actually the relief asked in plaintiffs’ petition concerning these employees is not for damages for wrongful discharge but for rein-¡ statement and for pay they might have j earned and is part of the mandatory in- S junctive relief sought. As authority for such relief plaintiffs cite Texas & N. O. R. *420Co., v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034. However, in that case the employees involved were discharged after an injunction had ¡been issued against the employer and they were required to be reinstated in a contempt proceeding against the employer. In the Texas cases cited, Local Union No. 324, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A.F.L. v. Upshur-Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., Tex.Civ.App., 261 S.W.2d 484 and Lunsford v. City of Bryan, Tex., 297 S.W.2d 115, the decisions were based on a Texas statute, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. § 5207a, which provided: “No person shall be denied employment on account of membership or .non-membership in a labor union.” Of course, if we had such a statute we would have a different case.
-Plaintiffs’ .further argument concerning the right to compel an employer to bargain overlooks the fact that Sec. 29, Art. I of our Constitution, VA..M.S., does not purport to require collective bargaining by either employees or employers. The right it gives to employees is the right to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 543. Whether or not employers and organized employees can bargain or reach an agreement depends upon the willingness of both just as in the case of 'bargaining for any kind of contract between other persons who have the right to make contracts. Perhaps modern industrial conditions make desirable more than that for best labor relations but that is a matter for the Legislature. As to plaintiffs’ right to recover the damages claimed in this class action, they cite no authority and have not properly briefed this question for determination at this time. Therefore, this is a matter to be decided upon such proof as may be adduced; we make no ruling on it now.
The motion for rehearing or to modify opinion is overruled.
All concur.