Court Opinion

ID: 9384967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 17:07:36.703614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.936634
License: Public Domain

J-A07004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 NICOLE L. BROOKS                         :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 MUHAMMAD I. BILAL                        :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :    No. 1489 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered May 9, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Domestic Relations
                           at No(s): 1912V7965

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                FILED APRIL 5, 2023

      Appellant, Muhammad I. Bilal, appeals from the May 9, 2022 order that

granted the petition for protection from abuse (“PFA petition”) that Appellee,

Nicole L. Brooks, filed against Appellant pursuant to the Protection From Abuse

(“PFA”) Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-22. Upon review, we affirm.

      The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. Appellant and

Appellee were in an intimate relationship for approximately five years and

engaged to be married. During the relationship, Appellant lived in New York

City with his ex-wife while Appellee lived in Philadelphia.

      On January 3, 2020, Appellant flew to Chicago to spend time with his

daughters and other family members. While Appellant was in Chicago, the

parties’ relationship ended via text message. On the same day, Appellant flew

from Chicago to New York City, then drove to Philadelphia, to arrive at

Appellee’s house at 2:00 AM on January 4, 2020. Appellant woke up Appellee,
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demanded money from her, and threatened to send naked pictures of Appellee

to her employer and her ex-husband, with whom she was currently in a

custody dispute, if Appellee refused. Appellee complied and sent Appellant

money through Cash App, a mobile payment service.

      Appellant asked Appellee to perform oral sex on him, and, when

Appellee refused, he pushed her head down to force her. Appellee became

very upset and told Appellant that she had a headache and needed to go to

the hospital. Appellee would not let her go and physically held Appellee down

until she fell asleep.

      The next morning, Appellant would not let Appellee leave the house

without him. The parties went to Starbucks, and while Appellant was paying

for coffee, Appellee went to the bathroom and secretly called her mother,

Angela Jones-Brooks, to tell her what was happening. The parties briefly went

to a movie theater, but Appellant expressed that he was concerned that

Appellee was going to “run off” so they left and went to T.G.I. Fridays. N.T.

Hearing, 5/9/22, at 25. While at the restaurant, Appellant briefly left the table

to call his daughter and told Appellee if he could not get in touch with his

daughter, that Appellee would “have to pay[.]” Id. at 25. Appellee believed

that Appellant meant that he would “harm [her] physically and financially”

because Appellant had “done it before.” Id. at 26.

      The parties returned to Appellee’s home, where Appellee hid in the

bathroom to text her mother. Appellee was so worried that Appellant would

discover the messages that she deleted them immediately after sending them.

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Appellee’s mother was concerned for her daughter’s safety and contacted

Appellee’s father.   Appellee’s father called the police, who responded to

Appellee’s home and arrested Appellant.

       On January 5, 2020, Appellee filed a PFA petition against Appellant.

After an ex parte hearing, the trial court issued a temporary PFA order against

Appellant directing that:   1) Appellant shall not harass, stalk, threaten, or

attempt to threaten to use physical force against Appellee; 2) Appellant shall

not contact Appellee; and 3) Appellant shall be excluded from Appellee’s

residence.

      On January 10, 2020, the trial court continued the matter due to a

related pending criminal case against Appellant. On July 7, 2020, the case

was administratively cancelled and rescheduled due to the COVID-19 judicial

emergency. The trial court continued the case on seven subsequent listings

due to Appellant’s pending criminal matter.

      On May 9, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the PFA petition. The

court heard testimony from Appellee, Appellee’s mother, and Appellant.

      Appellee testified to the above events. Additionally, Appellee testified

that there were previous incidents of physical abuse between the parties.

Appellee testified that Appellant would smack her, strangle her, punch her in

the eye, and beat her in the head causing concussions and requiring a visit to

the hospital. Appellee further testified that in 2018, she went to a domestic

violence shelter, but Appellant tracked her down and found her.          Appellee

explained that the staff at the shelter helped her file a PFA petition on July 17,

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2018, but that she did not pursue the petition because Appellant informed her

that he was sick with cancer. Appellee decided to reconcile with Appellant,

but explained that “it got worse.” Id. at 28.

      Appellant admitted into evidence text messages from December 2019

which demonstrated that Appellant texted Appellee fifteen naked photographs

of Appellee and expressed that “you think you can disobey and get a good

outcome,” and “you’re starting a war.”      Id. at Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1.   When

Appellee failed to respond, Appellant typed, “Does that mean you will comply

or nah?”     Id.   When asked about the picture text messages, Appellant

explained, “[i]t’s nude photos that he would use if I wasn’t doing something

that he wanted me to do.” Id. at 16.

      Appellee’s mother testified that, on the day in question, she became

concerned for Appellee’s safety because some of Appellee’s text messages

were incoherent, and the way Appellee was acting concerned her enough to

contact Appellee’s father and tell him that Appellee needed help.

      Appellant testified to a different set of events. Appellant stated that he

was visiting his daughters and his ex-fiancé in Chicago when Appellee became

jealous and threatened to trash Appellant’s belongings, including a hard drive

of a thesis film that Appellant needed to submit to finish film school. Appellant

testified that when he arrived at Appellee’s house, he told her that he wanted

to end their relationship and Appellant started throwing stuff around the

house.     Appellant showed Appellee the movie “Marriage Story” about a

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divorced couple that ended up being amicable and suggested that they go to

sleep.

         Appellant further testified that the next morning, Appellee was still

angry and he took her to Starbucks, the movies, T.G.I. Fridays restaurant,

CVS, and Wendy’s because Appellee seemed calmer out in public. Appellant

explained that he noticed Appellee was acting strangely and texting a lot, and

he asked her repeatedly if she was ok and if she had something else she would

rather be doing. Appellant stated that when the parties returned home, they

decided to go to sleep. Appellant testified that the next morning, Appellee

tried to be intimate with him, but he refused. As he was starting to leave, the

police arrived and arrested him.

         At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court placed on the record that

exhibits P-1, D-2, and D-3 had been admitted into evidence. The court found

Appellee’s testimony regarding the abuse to be credible and granted

Appellee’s PFA petition.

         Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

         Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

         1. Whether the trial court erred in finding the testimony of
            [Appellee] to be credible.

         2. Whether the trial court erred in not ensuring that an exhibit
            used for impeachment be entered into evidence, an issue[]
            only discovered post-hearing when [Appellee]’s counsel
            advised that it was never entered into evidence and was
            immediately destroyed.

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Appellant’s Br. at 7 (renumbered).

      In a PFA action, it is well settled that we review a trial court's legal

conclusions for an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Kaur v. Singh, 259

A.3d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2021).      “A trial court does not abuse its discretion

for a mere error of judgment; rather, an abuse of discretion occurs where the

judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where

the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill

will.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). On appeal, this Court will

defer “to the credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who

appeared before it.” Karch v. Karch, 885 A.2d 535, 537 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(citation omitted).    Moreover, “the trier of fact while passing upon the

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to

believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d

613, 619 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). Finally, we review the evidence

of record in the light most favorable to, and grant all reasonable inferences

to, the party that prevailed before the PFA court. Snyder v. Snyder, 629

A.2d 977, 982 (Pa. Super. 1993).

      In Appellant’s first issue, he avers that the trial court abused its

discretion when it found Appellee’s testimony to be credible. Appellant’s Br.

at 11.   Specifically, Appellant argues that there were inconsistencies in

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Appellee’s testimony regarding who ended the parties’ relationship and the

cause of Appellee’s headaches. Id. at 12. This argument fails.1

          On appeal, this Court will not revisit the trial court’s credibility

determinations.       Woods v. Cicierski, 937 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. Super.

2007).      As stated above, “[a]ssessing the credibility of witnesses and the

weight to be accorded to their testimony is within the exclusive province of

the trial court as the fact finder.” S.G. v. R.G., 233 A.3d 903, 907 (Pa. Super.

2020) (citation omitted). “In reviewing the validity of a PFA order, this Court

must . . . defer to the lower court’s determination of the credibility of witnesses

at the hearing.” C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272, 1276-77 (Pa. Super. 2019).

“[T]his Court has no authority to overturn the trial court’s credibility

determinations” in PFA matters. Karch, 885 A.2d at 537.

          Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. Because we

defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations, this issue fails to garner

relief.

          In his second issue, Appellant avers that the trial court abused its

discretion when it failed to order Appellee to enter Exhibit P-2, which Appellee

had used to refresh Appellant’s recollection, into evidence. Appellant’s Br. at

____________________________________________

1 Appellant also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court erred
when it “called out that D-1 was not authenticated” but “completely ignored”
this issue when Appellant admitted Exhibit P-1. Appellant’s Br. at 14. This
argument is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial
court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”)

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14. Appellant failed to raise this issue during the hearing and, therefore, failed

to preserve this issue for our review.

      It is well-settled that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”        Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).    To

preserve an issue for this Court’s review, a party must object in a timely and

specific fashion at the appropriate stage of the proceedings and failure to do

so will result in waiver of that issue. Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d

474, 475–76 (Pa. Super. 2008).         “On appeal the Superior Court will not

consider a claim which was not called to the trial court's attention at a time

when any error committed could have been corrected.” Id. at 476 (citation

omitted). “In this jurisdiction one must object to errors, improprieties[,] or

irregularities at the earliest possible stage of the adjudicatory process to afford

the jurist hearing the case the first occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly

avoid an unnecessary appeal to complain of the matter.”              Id. (citation

omitted). To be sure, “if appellate courts were to consider issues not raised

in the trial court, then the trial would become a dress rehearsal[.]”

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 695 A.2d 409, 411 (Pa. 1997).

      In the instant case, the trial court aptly opined:

      It is not the trial court’s responsibility to “ensure” exhibits, that
      were never moved for admission, be admitted into evidence.
      Appellee’s counsel marked the text messages as P-2, and
      presented them to Appellant for him to review, but never moved
      to admit the text messages into evidence. Appellant did not
      challenge the use of P-2 during the [hearing] and did not ask that
      P-2 be admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing,
      the undersigned judge stated, “I will note again that P-1, D-2, and
      D-3 have been admitted into evidence.” The court reminded the

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      parties which exhibits had been admitted into evidence, thus
      rendering Appellant’s claim that they “only discovered” P-2 had
      not been admitted into evidence until after the [hearing]
      concluded to be disingenuous and without merit. Since Appellant
      neither objected to the exhibit not being moved into evidence nor
      did he ask that the exhibit be moved into evidence, Appellant’s
      claim is waived.

Trial Ct. Op., filed 8/3/22, at 12 (internal citations omitted). We agree and

find this issue waived.

      In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found

Appellee’s testimony of abuse to be credible and Appellant failed to preserve

his evidentiary claim for our review.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/05/2023

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