Court Opinion

ID: 9698394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:49:18.760695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:40.585105
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice,
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority opinion has disregarded essential and elementary constitutional principles surrounding the district court’s acceptance of a plea of guilty when that plea is made pursuant to a plea agreement that provides that the guilty plea may be withdrawn if the district court does not sen*328tence in accordance with the agreement.1 The plea agreement in this ease, promised by the prosecutor and agreed to by the court, allowed Rhodes to withdraw his guilty plea if the sentence exceeded 105 months of confinement.
Before accepting a plea of guilty, the district court must assure through advice and inquiry that the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the consequence of the plea, including any sentencing provisions, and the relinquishment of constitutional rights. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). When a defendant enters a plea of guilty based upon a promise or agreement, the court must assure that the promise is fulfilled or the defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); see also State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 526 (Minn.2003). Allowing the state to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process. State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn.2000). “The tender of a guilty plea, once accepted by a court, ‘is and must be a most solemn commitment.’ ” Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d at 526 (quoting Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 16, 162 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1968)).
In this case, the promise made by the prosecuting attorney to Rhodes was recited in the Rule 15 petition, and further clarified during the plea hearing. The Rule 15 petition, which Rhodes signed and said he understood, provided:
I have been told by my attorney and understand: That my attorney discussed this ease with one of the prosecuting attorneys and they agreed that if I entered a plea of guilty, the prosecutor will do the following: (Give substance of plea agreement)
P[lead] to charge, 120 months
C[ourt] has said 105.
The prosecutor clarified that in return for Rhodes’ plea of guilty, the prosecutor promised to recommend the sentence that the district court had agreed to impose during in-chambers plea discussions, noting:
[T]he State had originally, in terms of the negotiations in this matter offered 120 months. However, during the process of discussion with the Court in chambers, the Court had offered 105 months — or that is actually what Mr. Schnech [defense counsel] caused the Court to agree to — and where we are at this point, the State would indicate that we would not in any way be opposed to that and would be going along with 105 months.
No one, not even the majority, contends that the addition of 60 months of conditional release was a part of the sentence that the prosecutor promised to recommend and the district court agreed to impose in the plea agreement. Absent withdrawal of the plea agreement, the prosecutor is bound to keep the promise he made and to recommend to the court a sentence that does not exceed the sentence agreed to in that agreement. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495. The prosecutor’s failure to do so constitutes a violation of due process. United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir.1996).
*329Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.01(12) requires the court to ask the defendant “[wjhether defense counsel has told the defendant and the defendant understands that if the court does not approve the plea agreement, the defendant has an absolute right to withdraw the plea of guilty and have a trial.” (Emphasis added.) As the commentary to Rule 15 indicates, “[wjhenever the court rejects the plea agreement, whether on tender of plea or after receipt of the pre-sentence report, or after plea, the court shall so inform the defendant and give the defendant an opportunity to affirm or withdraw the plea, if entered.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 15 cmt. Here, the district court accepted Rhodes’ plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement which provided “that if the court does not approve this agreement I have an absolute right to then withdraw my plea of guilty and have a trial.” The plea agreement, which the district court expressly facilitated and agreed to, provided that Rhodes would be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 105 months and provided Rhodes the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea if the court intended to exceed that sentence.
Under these circumstances, when the district court accepted Rhodes’ guilty plea, the court was bound by the plea agreement that induced the plea and its sentence could not exceed the sentence provided for in the plea agreement. State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Minn.2000); State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.1998). “It is well settled that an unqualified promise which is part of a plea arrangement must be honored or else the guilty plea may be withdrawn.” Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn.1979). If the district court did not intend to follow the plea agreement, the court should have notified Rhodes and allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea or accept, following supplemental Rule 15 advice and inquiry, the sentencing modifications the court intended to impose.
Never before have we said, as the majority does today, that a prosecutor can violate the plea agreement by recommending a sentence greater than he agreed to recommend in the plea agreement; and never before have we said, as the majority does today, that the district court is allowed to impose a sentence greater than the sentence provided for in a plea agreement which allows withdrawal of the guilty plea if the court intends to sentence in excess of the agreed sentence.
If the prosecutor intends to recommend a sentence greater than the sentence he promised to recommend in the plea agreement, or if the district court intends to impose a greater sentence than that promised in the plea agreement, both the prosecutor and the district court must inform the defendant of their intent and, as promised in the plea agreement, allow withdrawal of the guilty plea. Kochevar, 281 N.W.2d at 687. A defendant, particularly a 17-year-old juvenile like Rhodes, who enters a guilty plea pursuant to an agreement providing for a maximum sentence or plea withdrawal, should be entitled to rely upon the prosecutor and the district court to honor the agreement, or else permit him to withdraw his plea.
Finally, the majority would “infer” that Rhodes knew that an additional 60 months of conditional release was part of the plea agreement. Such an inference, however, is not permitted because both the U.S. Constitution and Rule 15 require a precise inquiry into the defendant’s understanding of the terms of the plea agreement in order to assure that the plea is voluntary and not induced by false promises. See U.S. Const. amends.V, XIV; Minn. R.Crim. P. 15 (state equivalent of Fed. R.Crim.P. 11); Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44, *33089 S.Ct. 1709; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (construing Fed. R.Crim.P. 11). A plea agreement providing for 105 months of confinement cannot be interpreted, by inference on a silent record, to include an additional 60 months of conditional release.
I would reverse and remand as required by our decision in State v. Wukawitz.

. We have recognized that some plea agreements contemplate recommendations by the parties without binding the court to a specific sentence and that in such cases the court’s failure to follow the recommendation does not violate due process. State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 522 n. 3 (Minn.2003). That is not the case here, however, for Rhodes’ plea was made pursuant to an agreement providing for a sentence of 105 months, which, if not followed, would permit withdrawal of the plea.