Court Opinion

ID: 9585286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:58:35.359891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:46.194968
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C. J.,
concurring in the result.
For reasons in part more particularly set out in my separate concurrence filed in Anderson v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 219 Neb. 1, 360 N.W.2d 488 (1985), I concur in the result in this case. While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that:
[Circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to sustain a verdict depending solely thereon for support, unless the circumstances proved by the evidence are of such nature and so related to each other that the conclusion reached by the jury is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom.
(Emphasis supplied.) I concede that there are cases to be found in Nebraska to support the statement made by the majority herein. I suggest, however, that there are cases to be found in Nebraska to support at least four different lines of authority. For a complete examination of the entire question, see Fenner, Circumstantial Evidence in Nebraska, 19 Creighton L. Rev. 236 (1986).
An examination of our previous decisions discloses that the rule that circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to sustain a verdict depending solely thereon for support, unless the circumstances proved by the evidence are of such nature and so related to each other that the conclusion reached by the jury is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom, appears to have had its inception in the case of Blid v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 89 Neb. 689, 131 N.W. 1027 (1911). Interestingly enough, Blid v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. was overruled in 1956 in the case of Davis v. Dennert, 162 Neb. 65, 73, 75 N.W.2d 112, 118 (1956), wherein we said:
“Negligence is a question of fact and may be proved by circumstantial evidence and physical facts. All that the law requires is that the facts and circumstances proved, together with the inferences that may be properly drawn therefrom, shall indicate with reasonable certainty the *24negligent act charged.”
We then said in Davis v. Dennert, supra at 74-75, 75 N.W.2d at 119, quoting from Duncan v. Fort Dodge G. & E. Co., 193 Iowa 1127, 188 N.W. 865 (1922):
“Appellant makes the point that, to sustain plaintiff’s charge of negligence by circumstantial evidence, the circumstances shown must be such as are wholly inconsistent with any other reasonable theory of the death of the deceased. It may be admitted that cases are to be found, and possibly some of our own, in which the rule is stated as quoted by counsel. It is, nevertheless, a misleading statement, as applied to disputed facts in a civil action. In its broadest sense, it has no proper application except in criminal cases where the evidence relied upon to establish the alleged crime is purely circumstantial.”
We then went on in Davis, supra at 75, 75 N.W.2d at 119, to say:
We think the rule as announced in Blid v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., supra, should only have application in criminal cases where the proof of guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt while the rule announced in Rocha v. Payne, supra, has application in civil cases where all that is required of plaintiff is to establish his cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Rocha v. Payne, 108 Neb. 246, 187 N.W. 804 (1922), we had said:
Negligence is a question of fact and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. All that the law requires is that the facts and circumstances proved, together with the inferences that may be legitimately drawn from them, shall indicate, with reasonable certainty, the negligent act complained of.
(Syllabus of the court.)
Even though Blid v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., supra, was overruled in Davis v. Dennert, supra, in 1964 the Blid rule appeared again in Wolstenholm v. Kaliff, 176 Neb. 358, 126 N.W.2d 178 (1964), as if it had always existed without question. In Wolstenholm, supra at 364-65, 126 N.W.2d at 182, we said: “The second rule is that circumstantial evidence sufficient to *25submit an issue of negligence to a jury must be such that a reasonable inference arises showing that the person charged was negligent and that such inference is the only one that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” In support of that statement the case of Bedford v. Herman, 158 Neb. 400, 63 N.W.2d 772 (1954), was cited. This, of course, was a case decided before Davis v. Dennert, supra, which overruled that rule of law. We, therefore, now have the strange anomaly that, while in Davis v. Dennert we eliminated the “only reasonable hypothesis rule” as it applied to civil cases and left it applicable only in criminal cases, we now have eliminated the rule in criminal cases, see State v. Buchanan, 210 Neb. 20, 312 N.W.2d 684 (1981), and reinstated the rule in civil cases.
To add to the problem, an examination of the case which gave birth to the “only reasonable hypothesis rule,” Blid v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 89 Neb. 689, 131 N.W. 1027 (1911), gives no analysis of why the rule is adopted, citing as its authoritative support three cases which, in effect, do not stand for the proposition created in Blid.
It occurs to me that if a judgment based solely upon circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to stand unless the conclusion reached by the jury is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom, then the party relying upon the circumstantial evidence is entitled to a directed verdict. See Wolstenholm v. Kaliff, supra (White, C.J., concurring).
As noted by Professor Fenner in his article on circumstantial evidence:
If the plaintiff’s contention is the only reasonable one, then a verdict should be directed for the plaintiff. If the plaintiff’s contention is not the only reasonable one, then the Blid rule says that the plaintiff cannot win; therefore, a verdict should be directed for the defendant; and therefore there will be no jury instructions. The Blid rule says that circumstantial evidence will not support a verdict unless it supports a directed verdict; it does not prove any essential element, unless it proves that the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict.
Fenner, Circumstantial Evidence in Nebraska, 19 Creighton L. *26Rev. 236, 245 (1986).
Professor McCormick, speaking about the “only reasonable hypothesis rule,” has said that such a rule “seems misplaced in civil litigation. It leaves little for the jury and far exceeds what is needed to prevent verdicts based upon speculation and conjecture.” McCormick on Evidence § 338 at 954 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
We appear to have further adopted a second line of cases which does not require that the circumstantial evidence be such that the conclusion reached by the jury is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom but, rather, requires that the circumstantial evidence indicate the ultimate fact with “reasonable certainty.” An example of this rule is Rocha v. Payne, 108 Neb. 246, 249, 187 N.W. 804, 805 (1922), wherein we said:
Negligence is a question of fact, and, like any other fact, may be established by circumstantial evidence. All that the law requires is that the facts proved, together with the inferences that may be legitimately drawn from them, shall indicate with reasonable certainty the existence of the negligence complained of.
It is this second line of cases which has given rise to the standard Nebraska jury instruction which reads as follows:
A fact may be proved either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, or both. Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances from which one may reasonably infer other related or connected facts which naturally and logically follow according to common experience of mankind.
Negligence is a question of fact and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. However, the law requires that the facts and circumstances proved, together with the inferences that may properly be drawn therefrom, indicate with reasonable certainty the negligent act charged.
NJI 1.31.
Nowhere in the standard jury instructions do we find an instruction on the “only reasonable hypothesis rule.”
I am inclined to believe that this is indeed the proper rule and *27provides, in effect, that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the party having the burden does not succeed.
A third line of cases appears to have begun with Markussen v. Mengedoht, 132 Neb. 472, 272 N.W. 241 (1937), and was most recently reannounced in the case of Chmelka v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 218 Neb. 186, 352 N.W.2d 613 (1984). The rule as announced in Chmelka, supra at 192, 352 N.W.2d at 618, is: “The burden of establishing a cause of action by circumstantial evidence requires that the evidence be of such character and the circumstances so related to each other that a conclusion fairly and reasonably arises that the cause of action has been proved.” This is not the same as requiring that the conclusion be the only one that can fairly and reasonably be reached.
There also appears to be a fourth line of cases, to some extent reflected by the majority opinion herein, which combines one or more of the other two rules.
Syllabus No. 3 herein correctly reflects what should be the rule of law regarding circumstantial evidence by providing that
if all the evidence is circumstantial and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are as equally consistent with the hypothesis that undue'influence was not exercised as they are with the hypothesis that such influence was exercised, the burden of proving the exercise of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence has not been met.
In effect, what this says is that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the party with the burden of proof has not met that burden. That is true even with regard to direct evidence. Unfortunately, however, the majority also cites the opposing rule from Anderson v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 219 Neb. 1,4-5, 360 N.W.2d 488, 491 (1985), to the effect that
circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to sustain a verdict depending solely thereon for support, unless the circumstances proved by the evidence are of such nature and so related to each other that the conclusion reached by the jury is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom.
This appears to me to be inconsistent.
In my view, circumstantial evidence should be afforded the *28same significance as direct evidence, and the jury should then be advised that the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove his or her case by a preponderance of the evidence. This means that if the evidence, as weighed by a judge or jury, is equally balanced, the plaintiff has failed. That is all that we do with regard to direct evidence, and, in my view, that is all we ought to do with regard to circumstantial evidence. In the instant case the evidence was equally balanced, and, therefore, the appellee failed to sustain her burden of proof.
Shanahan, J., joins in this concurrence.