Court Opinion

ID: 9639543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:22:32.075363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.028111
License: Public Domain

GARDNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Finding myself unable to agree with my associates, I shall state as briefly as may bo the’ barriers which I am unable to cross. I am not unmindful that a dissenting opinion establishes no legal principle, but it is at least a consolation to, the dissenter and a medium of expressing his personal views. In this apologetic frame of mind, and with the deference which is due to the distinguished ability and ingenuity displayed in the majority opinion, I approach the questions involved in this case. To avoid needless repetition, the facts which I shall state will be supplemental only to those disclosed in the majority opinion.
The appellant, Genevieve A. Clark, summoned as a juror, was called for examination on the voir dire, whereupon the court administered to her the usual oath as follows: “You do solemnly swear that you will true answers make to such questions as may be put to you touching upon your qualifications and com-*710peteney to sit as a juror in this ease.” She had never served as a juror before. She was then interrogated by the court on the voir dire as follows:
“Q. Genevieve A. Clark, you live at Minneapolis, Minnesota? A. Tes, sir.
“Q. Are you married? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Have you any children? A. I have two.
“Q. What is your husband’s business? A. In the real estate business.
“Q. In what way is he in the real estate business, is he with some firm, or is he by himself? A. He is by himself.
“Q. Does he deal in city property? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Is he selling properly on commission —making a commission? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Does he have an office? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Where? A. 417 South Fourth Street.
“Q. How long has he'been in the real estate business? A. For about five years.
“Q. Was he in some business before that? A. Well, we were out of the city for two years,’ when he was not doing anything. Before that, he was in the real estate and insurance business.
“Q. Have you yourself ever been in any business of any kind? A. I have been a stenographer before my marriage, yes.
“Q. In what kind of business did you work? A. Well, I did some banking, and some real estate and insurance, and I was with an automobile concern, with a Nash agency.
“Q. Have you ever read about this ease— concerning this ease? A. Yes, sir, I have read some of it.
“Q. In what papers? A. The Minneapolis Journal.
“Q. Have you read about it lately? A. I have not read it lately — until just the last day or two.
“Q. Did you talk with people, including your husband, concerning it? A. Yes, sir— pardon me — only with my husband. I have not discussed it with others.
“Q. Only with your husband? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Was that some time ago, or just lately? A. Just lately.
“Q. Did you discuss it sometime ago at all with your husband? A. I don’t remember whether I did or not.
“Q. Well, did he express an opinion, to you concerning it — the guilt or innocence of these defendants? A. No, he never has.
.“Q. Well, have you expressed an opinion to him? A. No, I feel I have no opinion at all.
“Q. You have formed no opinion? A. No opinion.
“Q. Do you know any of the lawyers in this ease? A. No, I do not.
“Q. Or any of the defendants? A. No, I do not.
“Q. Have you ever bought or sold any stock in a corporation? A. No, sir.
“Q. Or any bonds? A. No, sir.
“Q. What schooling have you had? A. High school and business college.
“Q. You took bookkeeping there? A. No, I did not take bookkeeping.
“Q. You did not take bookkeeping? A. No.
“Q. Have you ever had any experience at all in bookkeeping? A. I have never been an actual bookkeeper, but I have had a little bookkeeping experience when I was doing the insurance work. I was not a bookkeeper at the time, but I had access to the books, and occasionally made entries, but that is all.
“Q. Well, do you feel that you are now — ■ that your mind is now open and free, and that you are not biased either one way or the other? A. Yes, I do feel that way.
“Q. Did you ever sit on a jury before? A. No, sir.
“Q. And you think, in the trial of this lawsuit, you could follow the evidence, or would try to follów the evidence, and base your judgment on that and the law as given to you by the Court? A. Yes, I do’.
“The Court: Any questions?
“Mr. Horowitz: No questions.
“Mr. Brill: No questions.”
The foregoing constitutes the entire examination of this juror and is the basis for this proceeding. She was accepted and served as a juror, and, as noted in the majority opinion, voted to acquit the defendants and persisted in so doing although all the other jurors voted to convict. The jury being unable to agree was discharged by the court, following which the special prosecutor in charge of the prosecution prepared and filed a complaint which is designated “criminal contempt.” In this complaint the special prosecutor charged the appellant with perjury substantially as follows: (1) That she falsely stated the nature of her husband’s business at the time of her examination; (2) *711that she falsely stated the nature of her husband’s business some six years and more pri- or to her examination; (3) that she falsely stated that she did not know any of the defendants in the criminal ease; (4) that she falsely stated the nature of her own previous employment; and (5) that she falsely stated that she was unbiased.
On trial tho lower court, consisting of two judges neither of whom had sat in the trial of tho criminal case, found her not guilty of the first three charges, and, among other things, said that: “In fairness, however, to the defendants in the Eoshay case, and their counsel, it should be stated that there is not one scintilla of evidence that would justify a conclusion that any of them had attempted to improperly influence Mrs. Clark.” She was found guilty of having falsely stated tho nature of her previous employment, and of having falsely stated that she was unbiased.
Before passing to a consideration of the evidence which it is claimed sustains these two charges, a word may properly be said with reference to the nature of the proceeding.
I agree with the majority opinion that the contempt in this ease, if any, is a constructive contempt. I also agree that a contempt proceeding is proper-ly referred to as being in its nature sui generis. Within that description, however, proceedings for contempt are of two classes: (1) Those prosecuted to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court, and (2) those instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parlies to suits, and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made to enforce such rights. Bessetto v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 S. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997. The contempt hero charged is directed against the power and dignity of the court, and hence, is in its nature criminal or quasi criminal. Bessetto v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 S. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997; New Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co., 20 Wall. 387, 22; L. Ed. 354; People v. Stone, 181 Ill. App. 475; Bridges v. State, 9 Okl. Cr. 450, 132 P. 503; In re Kahn et al. (C. C. A.). 204 F. 581; Merchants’ Stock, etc., Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago (C. C. A.) 201 F. 20; In re Rice et al. (C. C.) 381 F. 217; Clay v. Waters (C. C. A.) 178 F. 385, 21 Ann. Cas. 897; In re Nevitt (C. C. A.) 117 F. 448. The proceedings for the punishment of such a contempt should conform as nearly as possible to proceedings in criminal eases. Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 537, 45 S. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767; Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 S. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997; Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co. (C. C.) 191 F. 208; Nichols v. State, 8 Okl. Cr. 550, 129 P. 673; People v. Stone, 183 Ill. App. 475; Bates’ Case, 55 N. H. 325; Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 157 S. W. 794.
The government has recognized the proceedings as being criminal in character, and the special prosecutor in initiating them designated the complaint as “criminal contempt.” As in a criminal prosecution, to warrant conviction, a mere preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient, but it must be such as to convince beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove, etc., Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874; Hanley v. Pacific Live Stock Co. (C. C. A.) 234 F. 522.
I have referred to the nature of the proceeding because I am impressed with the thought that its character was not appreciated by the trial judges who heard the evidence in this proceeding.
While the defendant was on the witness stand under cross-examination by the special prosecutor, the following proceedings occurred :
“Q. Yes, she was drawn first. Do you remember talking to her?
“Mr. Ueland: This is objected to as not proper cross-examination. I would like to be heard on that objection.
“Judge Nordbyc: Oh, I don’t think we will just go by the rules of evidence, Mr. Ueland, which we recognize in ordinary matters. Objection overruled.
“Mr. Ueland: Exception.”
The trial was conducted under this misapprehension that the defendant was not entitled to invoke the protection of the ordinary rules of evidence, and though the proceeding, as has been noted, was in the nature of a criminal one, the rules of evidence in so far as they were invoked on behalf of the defendant were avowedly brushed aside.
I shall later have occasion again to refer to some of the rulings of the court on the admissibility of evidence. My purpose in making this statement at this point is simply to indicate ihe conception which the lower court had as to the nature of the proceeding.
But not only did the lower court avowedly disregard the ordinary rales of evidence, but the rules of criminal pleading were so strained as to deprive the appellant of the rights guaranteed her under the Constitution. A glance at the complaint convinces that it *712was the intention of the pleader to charge the appellant with a contempt of court by the commission ‘ of perjury on the voir dire. This complaint sets out with particularity the administering of the oath by competent authority, the substance of the questions asked, the answers to those questions, and then charges that these answers were false and knowingly false. It sets out what the true answers would have been, and it distinctly alleges willful perjury. Not only does it distinctly allege willful perjury, but it makes no mention whatever of concealment, and the complaint closes by alleging that the due administration of justice was thereby corruptly and unlawfully impeded and obstructed. Confessedly, justice might be impeded and obstructed in innumerable ways, and under proper eharge might be punished as a contempt, but the particular contemptuous act charged in the complaint- in this proceeding was perjury. In the opening paragraph of the lower court’s findings, it is recited that the charge was “contempt of court for having committed perjury upon her examination as to her qualifications as a juror.”
The evidence being confessedly insufficient to sustain the charge of perjury, the lower court took the position that concealment could be considered, although it was not mentioned in the complaint, and that it was not necessary that perjury be established. The court, after quoting from Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 39 S. Ct. 337, 63 L. Ed. 656, 11 A. L. R. 333, said: “Prom this statement, it would appear that untrue answers to questions asked on the voir dire might be of such a character as to obstruct justice and constitute a contempt of court', although the person giving the answers might not be guilty of perjury in the strictest sense.”
This, it seems to me, is quite aside from the question. Doubtless the statement is correct, but the authority cited does not sustain the proposition that a party may be charged with being in contempt of court by willful perjury and on trial of such charge be convicted by proof of some other kind of eon-; tempt of court.
The statement in the decision of the lower court, to the effect that the information “specifically informed Mrs. Clark -that she was guilty of contempt on account of her failure to disclose the fact of her employment with the Poshay Company,” is not sustained by the record. She was charged with contempt not for having concealed, but for having committed perjury. She was acquitted of perjury, but convicted because she had concealed certain facts, a matter with which she was not charged. So I agree with appellant’s counsel that appellant has been convicted of something with which she was not charged in the complaint.
The majority opinion, and the opinion of the lower court, concede that perjury was not established by the testimony. In a case of criminal constructive contempt, the alleged contemner is entitled to all the safeguards imposed by “due process of law.” She was entitled to all the protection afforded in eases of indictment, except the right of trial by jury. Certainly, she was entitled to know the nature of the offense. Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 45 S. Ct. 390, 395, 69 L. Ed. 767; Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co. (C. C.) 191 F. 208, 210; Boyd v. Glucklich (C. C. A.) 116 F. 131, 134; In re Clark, 208 Mo, 121, 106 S. W. 990; 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 389; Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 157 S. W. 794.
In Cooke v. United States, supra, the rule applicable to criminal contempt is thus stated: “Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation. We think this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant either to the issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation, of the penalty to be imposed.”
And in Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co., supra, the court said: “While the nicety and precision of an indictment may not' be required, the pleading or affidavit must not only specify clearly the) acts which the contemnor will be-called upon to meet, but it must quite as clearly, in some form, advise him that the judgment sought against him is one of a puni-tory character'.”
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the Bates Case, supra, in an opinion by Chief Justice Poster, said: “It seems to be more appropriate, and at the same time safe enough for the protection of the court, to adhere as closely as possible to the plan and method of criminal procedure, except in the matter of a jury trial. The attachment should be substantially like an indictment, at least to the extent of giving the respondent sufficient information concerning the nature and the particulars of the offence charged; and the rules of evidence and the presumptions of law applied in criminal eases should be observed.”
*713This court, in Boyd v. Glucklich, supra, said: “In proceedings involving the liberty of a citizen, he has a right * * * to bo informed of the precise claim against him.”
In this case there was no ambiguity in the complaint. It specifically charged a contempt of court by the commission of perjury. There was no occasion for defendant to demand a bill of particulars. Whether or not she had “deliberately and intentionally concealed her employment with the Foshay Company when she was examined by the court” was not charged and was not in issue.
The ease was presented in the lower court, both on behalf of the government and on behalf of the defendant, on the theory that if her answers did not constitute perjury as charged, she was entitled to an acquittal. The offense of which she was found guilty was one constructed by the trial court from the evidence and was not charged in the information or eomplaint. It is stated in the majority opinion that: “The Government hero elected to proceed for contempt and not for perjury — doubtless having in mind the difficulty of conviction of perjury.” I am unable to find anything in the record to support this statement. The government proceeded against the defendant for perjury, and if any election was made it was by the lower court after the evidence had sill been presented and arguments made, and not by the government.
There was a, total failure of proof of the charge made against appellant, and finding her guilty of an offense not charged was vio-lative of the fundamental principles of fair play, and resulted in depriving appellant of her liberty and property without due process of law. In sustaining this holding of the lower court, my associates, in my opinion, have fallen into the same error. There was a material and fatal variance between the charge and the proof.
In reviewing the evidence I shall first refer to the charge that the appellant falsely stated the nature of her previous employment.
So far as experience in court was concerned, appellant was a novice. Jury service for a woman in a case so notable as the, Fo-shay criminal case was in the nature of a great adventure, finding no parallel in the background, traditions, or history of her sex; the duty of jury service having' but recently been imposed upon women. Shei was sworn, not as an ordinary witness “to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,” but the oath which she took was a restricted one and obligated her only to make true answers to such questions as might be put to her, touching her qualifications and competency to serve as a juror.
I have set out every question and every answer of her examination. No one; ever inquired of her whether she had ever been employed by the defendants, or either of them, nor by the Foshay Company. It is said that she must have had in mind that her temporary employment, which had occurred some two yea rs prior to her examination, would disqualify her to sit as a juror. As a matter of fact, such employment would not, of course, have disqualified her. But even conceding th.e possibility that she may have had the matter in mind, yet not having been interrogated with reference to it, this may well have disabused her mind of the thought that such employment was a disqualification or even material. She was sworn to answer questions. The questions were propounded by the court, and counsel for either side, including the special prosecutor, were given an opportunity to propound or suggest further interrogatories. Under our practice, even when an ordinary witness is sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, we still preserve what is thought by trial lawyers to be the almost sacred right of cross-examination. Why is such a procedure preserved? Every lawyer who ever‘had any experience at all in the trial of lawsuits, knows that it is necessary for the purpose of developing and ascertaining the truth, to cross-examine, and that a witness, though required to tell the whole truth, is not likely even if willing so to do> to be competent to determine all of the facts in his knowledge which may be material or competent; and if a witness makes a voluntary statement not responsive to a question, it is on motion promptly stricken from the record. This appellant, however, though by her oath only required to answer the questions propounded to her, has been convicted of criminal contempt because she did not voluntarily disclose further facts concerning' which she was not interrogated. This is applying to the juror, obligated only by a restricted oath, a more strict rule and imposes a. higher standard of intelligence, and visits upon her a Draconian severity not applied to any other human being connected with the trial of a lawsuit.
Supposing an ordinary witness were called and examined only by the presiding judge who knows presumably nothing as to what facts the witness may know, and who of necessity is not conversant with either the facts or issues involved in the ease. Then let us suppose neither party chooses to examine *714the witness, or is prevented by the presiding judge from so doing. It later develops that the witness in fact knew other facts which were material but concerning which he was not interrogated. Would any one contend, or could any court hold the witness guilty of contempt of court ? Such a determination by a court would be denounced as arbitrary, tyrannical, and cruel, and yet this appellant has been convicted because she has not made further disclosures about matters concerning which she was not interrogated, though she was obligated by her oath only to answer truly such questions as might be put to her.
The majority opinion fixes a standard of perfection which makes no allowance for the fallibility and frailties of the human intellect. The juror is held! bound to know and to disclose all matters which may have any possible bearing upon his fitness or competency to sit as a juror, and this he must do without assistance of either court or counsel under the penalty of being punished for contempt for his failure to disclose some matter which a special prosecutor, failing to seeure conviction, may think material to the qualification of the juror. The matter of this employment was, to my mind, of doubtful materiality in view of the finding that the juror knew none of the defendants, the temporary character of the employment, and its remoteness in time. In all the fields of human endeavor, the law neither assumes nor demands the perfect nor the ideal. The perfect and the ideal are abstractions. They are the imaginary standards toward which we strive, but which, confessedly, we never attain. The law, recognizing our limitations, only demands that we approximate the perfect or the ideal,, and requires reasonable care, reasonable skill, and reasonable restraints; in' fact, in the entire realm of jurisprudence we are governed by the rule, of reason. Even in the administration of justice the ideal is not required.
Let us suppose that this juror, instead of standing out against the other jurors, had in fact been an ardent advocate in the jury room for conviction, while certain of the other jurors were for acquittal but finally joined in a verdict of güilty, and defendants’ counsel had made application, for a new trial on the ground that this juror had not disclosed the fact that she had at one time been employed by the Poshay Company, arid that she had willfully concealed this' relation from the court. ■ What would then have been the attitude of'counsel- for the government? Would he not have urged, first, that the matter of employment was entirely immaterial, second, that the juror had not been asked with reference thereto, though counsel might have interrogated her, and, third, that in view of the finding of no corruption, this attack on the juror’s conduct in failing to disclose a remote and casual, employment by the Poshay Company, was so entirely wanting in substance as to be frivolous. Certainly, no court would have considered seriously such an application, and yet we are assured that the fact that she voted to acquit, is a matter of no materiality or concern whatever. I concede that it ought! not to be, yet in the final analysis I cannot escape the thought that she is being punished for contempt of court because she stood out for acquittal against eleven men convinced of the guilt of the defendants.
It is urged that the testimony of two women summoned as jurors showed that the appellant had in mind that her employment with the Poshay Company might disqualify her as a juror, and further that she was anxious to serve as a juror. The trouble with this testimony is that it proves too much. According to this testimony she said to one woman that she was certain that such employment would not disqualify her, while she is reputed to have said to the other woman that she wondered if it would disqualify her. She denies having had these conversations. One of these women, a Mrs. Passer, testified that Mrs. Clark had said- to her that she was simply praying to serve as a juror in that particular case, and that she had a very special reason but did not state it. This witness, after her alleged talk with Mrs. Clark with reference to this ease, was herself examined on voir dire as follows:
“Q. Have you ever talked with anyone about the case? A. I have never mentioned it to a soul.”
Yet, according to her testimony in this proceeding, she had talked about the ease with the appellant and with a Mrs. Johnson. This testimony would seem entirely to negative the theory upon which this conviction is sought to be sustained.
It is urged that she cleverly and cunningly concealed from the court and counsel the fact,- which is now magnified into great importance, that she at one time was employed for ten days by the Poshay Company. If she were practicing such cleverness and deceit, she would not have proclaimed to her associates in the court room that she feared her employment might disqualify her, and that she was anxious to serve on the jury. These circumstances are inconsistent with any *715such purpose as is now charged against her. As to her alleged desire to serve on the jury, that is a circumstance entirely consistent with her innocence. She may have had a woman’s ambition to attain the notoriety of serving on this notable ease, and, before noted, when she was not interrogated with reference to her employment, she may well have concluded that it was such a trivial and immaterial matter that she was not even asked with reference to it. The evidence adduced against her on this charge is purely circumstantial; but the charge, being perjury, could not he established by circumstantial evidence, hut must he proved by the sworn testimony of two living witnesses, or one witness and by corroborating circumstances. Hammer v. United States, 271 U. S. 620, 46 S. Ct. 603, 70 L. Ed. 1118; United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. 430, 10 L. Ed. 527; Clayton v. United States (C. C. A.) 284 F. 537; Allen v. United States (C. C. A.) 194 F. 664, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385. To establish guilt of any other criminal offense by circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must not only be consistent with and tend to prove her guilt, hut must; he inconsistent with any theory of innocence. Spalitto v. United States (C. C. A.) 39 F.(2d) 782; Beck v. United States (C. C. A.) 33 F.(2d) 107; Bishop v. United States (C. C. A.) 16 F.(2d) 410; Colbaugh v. United States (C. C. A.) 15 F.(2d) 929; Salinger v. United States (C. C. A.) 23 F.(2d) 48; Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States (C. C. A.) 173 F. 737; Van Gorder v. United States (C. C. A.) 21 F.(2d) 939. In view of this rule of law, I am of the view that there is no substantial evidence upon which the conviction in this case can stand.
The examination of this juror on voir dire was confessedly meager, and the result is, in my opinion, due largely to the proee-dure adopted in the examination of jurors. Counsel for either side should' be given ample opportunity, especially in an important criminal case, to make, under the supervision of the court, a searching examination of each juror. Without the privilege of an examination of jurors by counsel on either side other means of ascertaining facts with reference to jurors are resorted to. They are privately investigated by counsel on either side through various channels, which practice may well he looked upon, with suspicion because it may result in direct or indirect contact with jurors, whereas, if it be understood that counsel may have the opportunity of thoroughly examining each juror in open court under the supervision of the presiding judge, such situations as are presented in this case would not occur; nor would there be occasion for the practices to which reputable counsel find it necessary to resort in ascertaining, out of court, facts which they deem necessary to know with reference to the jury panel. Gideon v. United States (C. C. A.) 52 F.(2d) 427.
The other charge on which appellant was found guilty is that she falsely stated that she was unbiased. Here again she was specifically and with great particularity and formality charged with perjury. The only direct testimony as to the condition of her mind was her own. She testified that she had no bias or prejudice at the time she was examined as a juror. The charge being perjury, it could only he established by the testimony of two living witnesses, or by one witness and corroborating circumstances, and it could not be established by circumstantial evidence alone. Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 2049-2043; United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. 430, 10 L. Ed. 527; Hammer v. United States, 271 U. S. 620, 46 S. Ct. 603, 79 L. Ed. 1118; Clayton v. United States (C. C. A.) 284 F. 537; Allen v. United States (C. C. A.) 194 F. 664, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385; Sullivan v. United States (C. C. A.) 161 F. 253. The lower court, however, though confessing some difficulty “to’ ascertain with mathematical certainty the state of her mind when she was examined as a juror,” found that the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that her mind was not at the time free from prejudice and bias. What was the state of her mind at the time she was examined f With great deference I pause at the threshold of this inquiry. While we may say with the ancient Greek Philosopher that “The mind is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, of things that are not, that they are not,” or exclaim with Victor Hugo, “Add, if you can, anything to the human mind!” yet the field of psychological phenomena is a limitless undiscovered realm, which only prophets and oracles of the intellect may venture to explore.
It is here not only necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt that at the time appellant was examined on voir dire she was biased and prejudiced, hut it is also necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she at the time knew that she was biased and prejudiced. Rarely does the individual ever recognize or admit that he is biased or prejudiced or lacking in open-mindedness. The individ7 ual generally believes that he is unbiased and unprejudiced, and it is well understood among members of the bar that even the single juror *716who hangs a jury is thoroughly convinced that the other eleven members of the jury were biased and prejudiced and lacking in open-mindedness. No one realizes better than the trial lawyer that jurors rarely disqualify themselves upon the ground of bias or prejudice, and in the rare instances when this occurs it is usually because the juror adopts this means of avoiding service on the jury. There is no fixfed standard by which it can be determined whether one is biased and prejudiced, and certainly no standard by which the individual may himself determine this condition of mind. In fact, judges are often thought to be biased and prejudiced, but rarely are they conscious of any bias or prejudice, and if interrogated under oath would disclaim any such condition of mind. Only the rarest individual who subjects himself to self-examination is so] discerning as to recognize his own prejudices.
The utterances of the accused in the jury room some six or seven weeks subsequent to the time she testified on voir dire are relied upon as establishing perjury in her statement relevant to her condition of mind. These utterances were so' remote from the time she testified, and so many things had transpired during this trial which might have changed a perfectly unbiased mind into a biased and prejudiced one, that they lose all probative force and should not have been admitted. At most, these utterances in the jury room might be said to show that her mind was then biased, and her mind being biased at that time proves, or tends to prove, that it was biased at the time of the voir dire. Such reasoning is violative of the principle that one presumption cannot form the basis of another presumption. Brady v. United States (C. C. A.) 24 F.(2d) 399; General Reinsurance Corp. v. Southern Surety Co. (C. C. A.) 27 F.(2d) 265; Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Erickson (C. C. A.) 42 F.(2d) 997.
It must be borne in mind that the judges who sat in the instant proceeding did not sit in the criminal trial and had no personal knowledge of what transpired between the time the juror qualified and the time of her alleged utterances. The%e utterances are just as consistent with an honest belief based upon the evidence in the case, so far as this record shows, or on incidents that may have occurred during the trial, as they are with the conclusion that she had a biased and prejudiced mind. Certainly, the facts and circumstances proven are not inconsistent with the following theories of appellant’s innocence: (1) That she at the time of her examination was in fact unbiased, or, if biased, she was not conscious of it at the time of her examination; (2) that any subsequent statements made by her alleged to indicate bias, were the result of testimony, proceedings, and transactions occurring during the trial, or were the result of her sympathies influenced thereby; and (3) that she voted for an acquittal because she was not convinced that the evidence proved the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt, and that in so doing she was responding to her oath as a juror and her own conscience, rather than to some overpowering prejudice or mysterious dominating will.
There being no proof of corruption and no proof of any motive or reason calculated to induce wrongful conduct on her part, the circumstances relied upon fall far short of excluding every other hypothesis except that of guilt, and to my mind do not constitute substantial evidence proving the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
But quite aside from the probative value of the evidence of appellant’s utterances during the deliberations of the jury, I am of the view that this testimony was not admissible. It is fundamentally essential to the proper administration of justice that jurors should understand that their deliberations in the jury room are inviolable and that the reason for their verdict cannot be questioned. There are two grounds for this rule. The first may be said to adhere in the integrity of the jury as an institution, and the second is based upon the privilege of the individual juror. In Stephen’s History of the Criminal Law of England, volume I, at page 306, the author, in discussing the development of trial by jury, says:
“The right of the jury to return a verdict according to their own consciences, and without being subjected in respect of it to any penal consequences was finally established by Bushell’s Case [Yaughan, 135] in the year 1670. In some earlier instances and particularly in the celebrated ease of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton in 1554, the jurors were imprisoned and heavily fined for acquitting a prisoner. This, however, was regarded as a great stretch of power even in those days. Sir Thomas Smith says — ‘if they’ (the jury) ‘do pronounce not guilty upon the prisoner against whom manifest witness is brought in the prisoner eseapeth; but the twelve not only rebuked by the judg'esi but also threatened of punishment, and many times commanded to appear in the Star Chamber or before the Privy Council for the matter. But *717this threatening ehanceth oftener than the execution thereof, and the twelve answer with most gentle words they did it according to their consciences and pray the judges to be good unto them as they did as they thought right and as they accorded all, arid so it pass-eth away for the most part.’ He then refers to cases in which the jurors had been fined— no doubt having in his mind Throckmorton’s Case, and adds, ‘But these doings were even then of many accounted very violent, tyrannical, and contrary to the liberty and custom of the I’ealm of England.’ "
“Anciently, it may be, though the contrary seems as probable, jurors who returned a corrupt verdict in criminal cases were liable to what wasi called an attaint at the suit of the king, though not at the suit of the party. The attaint was a remedy for a corrupt verdict in civil eases, and was tried by a jury of twenty-four, who, if they thought proper, might convict the first jury of a false verdict.”
Dean Roseoe Pound, in his book Criminal Justice in America, at page 115, says: “Throughout the seventeenth century the power of juries to render general verdicts was a chief obstacle to the attempts of the crown to use criminal justice for political purposes. When Bushell’s Case established that jurors could not he punished for contempt in using this power as their own reasons and consciences dictated, the trial jury seemed to stand first among the common-law bulwarks of individual freedom.”
See, also, Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 9 Am. Rep. 49; In re Cochran, 237 N. Y. 336, 143 N. E. 212, 213, 32 A. L. R. 433; Jones on Evidence (2d Ed.) § 2212; Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 2346-2354; Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 32 S. Ct. 793, 56 L. Ed. 1114, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 614.
But it is said in the majority opinion that this proceeding is not for the purpose of punishing the juror for anything that she may have said or done during the deliberations of the jury, but for having falsely stated her state of mind at the time of her examination on the voir dire. In a qualified way this is correct, but having in mind the purpose and reason for the rule and the history and traditions upon which the rule is based, the distinction, it seems to me, is one going to form rather than to substance or principle. If the freedom and independence of the jury and the secrecy of their proceedings are to be maintained inviolate, then that principle is violated by permitting other jurors to disclose the proceedings of the jury on the prosecution of a juror for contempt for having falsely testified on his examination on voir dire. The result is the same. If, when a juror is unfortunate enough! to be in the minority, and we may assume that at least until the final vote no juror will know whether that is to be his status or not, he must act under restraint because he may later he prosecuted for having falsely stated his state of mind, then the freedom of expression in the jury room and the independence of the jurors will have been destroyed quite as effectively as if during their deliberations they are under the restraint of a possible prosecution for misconduct in their discussions and deliberations. The reason for the rule excluding such testimony is quite as cogent as where it is sought to punish the juror for utterances and arguments in the jury room. Jurors must, if the system is to be maintained, bo exempt from the liability of being questioned as to their motives and grounds of action while acting as jurors. The language of the Supreme Court in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 749; 49 S. Ct. 471, 476, 73 L. Ed. 938, 63 A. L. R. 1258, is significant. It is there said: “If those fit for juries understand that they may be freely subjected to treatment like that here disclosed, they will either shun the burdens of the service or perform it with disquiet and disgust.”
Mr. Hughes, in his Work on Evidence, at page 302, says: “On the ground of public policy, freedom of expression in the jury room is absolutely essential. It follows, therefore, that the rule of privilege is applicable in the full sense of the term to the deliberations of petit jurors.”
Mr. Jones, in his Commentaries on Evidence, section 2212, says: “It is essential to the due administration of justice that jurors should understand that their deliberations in the jury room are inviolable, and that the reasons for their verdict cannot be questioned.”
The Court of Appeals of New York, in Re Cochran, supra, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Andrews, says: “It is not alone as to the final result — the verdict — that they [jury] are protected. Public policy requires that they be given the utmost freedom of debate as it requires it in the ease of the Legislature.”
Underhill on Criminal Evidence (3d Ed.) at section 311, states the rule as follows: “As regards traverse jurors the rule seems now to be that they may testify only to facts or communications referring to their actions as individuals while separated from their associates. They may testify to what third persons said or did to them as individual jurors. *718But' the motives and reasons of the jury and the transactions and communications referring to the subject-matter under their consideration as an official body, and which were made in their capacity as jurors, are privileged, whether made in the jury room or elsewhere. Evidence from the jurors to show 'their ignorance, or misconduct, or to impeach their verdict for the purpose of obtaining a néw trial, cannot be received. The admission of such evidence is , contrary to public policy and injurious to the administration of justice.”
Mr. Wigmore, in his Work on Evidence, at section 2346, among other things says: “Under the parol evidence rule, the juror’s testimony is excluded only, when it is offered to prove facts nullifying the verdict, on a motion for a new trial. But under the privileged communications rule, the juror’s testimony would be excluded for any purpose whatever, — for example, where upon another trial he was a witness and his bias was offered to be shown by his expressions during retirement with the former jury. Thus the genuine privilege may have a larger scope than the parol evidence rule.”
Neither is there anything in the dictum in McDonald v. Pless, 238 U. S. 264, 35 S. Ct. 783, 59 L. Ed. 1300, referred to in the majority opinion, inconsistent with the rule stated by the above authorities. The question in that case was whether misconduct in the jury room might be shown in cases where no attempt was made to impeach the verdict, and the question of privilege was not considered by the Supreme Court. In the instant proceeding the question is whether what was said by the juror in the jury room could be used against her toj prove an alleged wrongful' act committed at some other time and place.
The proceeding sanctioned by the majority opinion in the instant ease will go far to undermine the independence and freedom of the jury.
This testimony was also inadmissible because it was privileged. The majority opinion, by way of illustration, gives instances of acts of jurors which should be subject to punishment. Confessedly, not all the acts of a juror are privileged. Those acts which do not adhere in the verdict, but which are ministerial, are not privileged. This is pointed out in Re Cochran, supra, where it is said:
“In Bushell’s Case the distinction was clearly drawn between two kinds of misconduct, a breach of their ministerial duty and of their judicial. Probably a juror who concealed a reporter in the jury room might be held guilty of contempt as would be the reporter himself; or a juror who smuggled in intoxicating liquor and consumed it, or induced his fellows to do so. * * *
“In the case before us each one of the alleged second class of offenses relates to- arguments claimed to have been made in bad faith; statements of fact said to be false, and votes as to the verdict said to be knowingly perverse. Admitting all that is claimed, there is no basis for a finding that Cochran was guilty of criminal contempt. If in any of these respects he was guilty of corrupt conduct, the only remedy is by indictment and by trial before a jury.”
Finally it is said in the majority opinion that the fact that immaterial evidence may have been admitted does not necessarily require a reversal of the ease where the court sits without a jury, because there is a presumption that it acts only on the basis of proper evidence. There are two answers to this suggestion: First, if this evidence be excluded, there is no substantial evidence to sustain the| judgment of the trial court, and the evidence is not only immaterial but is incompetent; and, second, that while it will ordinarily be presumed that the court sitting without a jury considers only the material and competent evidence, yet this is only a presumption, and it affirmatively appears in this ease that the court did consider and did rely upon this very evidence. In the opinion of the trial court it is said: “During the deliberations of the jury, after the case was finally submitted, she announced that, since Mr. Horowitz had been unable to convince her of the guilt of the defendants, the other jurors could hardly expect to do so. She virtually closed her ears to the arguments of other jurors, and made a statement with respect to the government witness Cbbel, the effect of which was to charge him with having given perjured testimony in a ease in the South in an attempt to convict an innocent man. * * * Mrs. Clark, during the deliberations of the jury, expressed a wish that she might consult with her husband and secure his¡ advice. She also made statements to the effect that she could not vote to send seven men to the penitentiary. The jury were out for approximately one week, and stood eleven for conviction, and one (Mrs. Clark) for acquittal.” In another part of the opinion the court refers to the appellant’s “unyielding attitude” in the jury room.
This conclusively shows that the trial court did not disregard nor exclude this incompetent evidence, and it is elementary that *719when facts appear presumptions vanish. A presumption cannot he weighed in the balance as against facts. United States v. LeDuc (C. C. A.) 48 F.(2d) 789; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 36 F. (2d) 747; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Niemann (C. C. A.) 47 F.(2d) 1056.
It is a well-established and oft-repeated rule that the power to punish for contempt of court should be used sparingly and with great caution and deliberation. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove, etc., Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492, 502, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874; Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 45 S. Ct. 390, 396, 69 L. Ed. 767; Boyd v. Glucklich (C. C. A.) 116 F. 131.
In Gompers v. Buck’s Stove, etc., Co., supra, the Supreme Court said: “But the very amplitude of the power is a warning to use it with discretion, and a command neveii to exert it where it is not necessary or proper.”
In Cooke v. United States, supra, the court said: “But its exercise is a delicate one, and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.”
The power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly and with great caution, and after all, the authority, majesty, and dignity of the court and the respect which it may command depend more on the righteousness of its judgments than on the exercise of its power to punish for contempt.
Other questions involved invite discussion, but this opinion has already been unduly extended.
There is so much uncertainty and doubt as to the guilt of the appellant, and so much doubt as to the regularity of the proceedings leading up to her conviction, tha.t I am impelled to the view that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and the canse remanded for further proceedings.