Court Opinion

ID: 9690591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:25:00.163706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:59.830732
License: Public Domain

Karen R. Baker, Judge, dissenting. I agree with all parts of the majority’s decision except the $1,600 reduction in the trial court’s award to Renita that resulted from Arthur’s gifts to Vema Bell during the marriage. As the majority acknowledges, we have found the unequal division of property justified by a spouse’s diversion of marital assets to a paramour. Williams v. Williams, 82 Ark. App. 294, 108 S.W.3d 629 (2003). However, the majority distinguishes that case by stating that “we are asked not to uphold an unequal division of property but to uphold a direct reimbursement to the marital estate of funds that were spent for improper purposes.” The fact that the trial judge in this case refers to the unequal distribution as a reimbursement to the marital estate, rather than awarding an unequal distribution of marital property pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315 (Repl. 2002), should make no difference in our analysis. The majority first determines that the reduction was warranted because the gifts were made to Miss Bell before the parties reconciled. However, the majority’s decision on that point invades the province of the trial court. On appeal, we do not reverse a trial court’s determination as to the division of marital property unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Williams v. Williams, supra. That standard dictates that it is the trial court’s place to determine whether improper gifts are so remote in time that they should not be considered in the division of marital property. The trial court in this case obviously concluded that these gifts, made less than four years before the divorce complaint was filed, should be reimbursed to the marital estate. The majority fails to give the trial court the deference to which it is entitled on this point. The other basis for the majority’s reduction of the trial court’s award is the fact that when Renita reconciled with Arthur she was aware of his nefarious expenditures. A marital reconciliation, which may occur for any number of reasons, does not equate with a ratification of the financial expenditures made by a spouse to purchase gifts for a paramour. A reconciliation does not change the fact that marital funds were misused in a manner that did not benefit the marriage. Thus, the trial court was correct in finding that the funds should be returned to the marital estate for division. Additionally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Renita expressly approved, sanctioned, or consented to the gifts Arthur made to his paramour. The majority appears to liken the reconciliation to condonation as a defense in a divorce action. While the doctrine of condonation is not applicable to the division of marital property, even applying the doctrine by analogy would require this court to affirm the trial court. Condonation is a conditional, rather than an absolute remission of the offense, the implied condition being that the offense will not be repeated and that the guilty party shall not in the future commit any marital offense but will treat the injured party with kindness. If the forgiven party resumes the prior conduct, the doctrine does not apply. Bell v. Bell, 15 Ark. App. 196, 691 S.W.2d 184 (1985). See also Coffey v. Coffey, 223 Ark. 607, 267 S.W.2d 499 (1954). To constitute a revival of the condoned offense, the offending spouse need not be guilty of the same character of offense as that condoned; any misconduct is sufficient which indicates that the condonation was not accepted in good faith and upon the reasonable conditions implied. Longinotti v. Longinotti, 169 Ark. 1001, 277 S.W. 41 (1925). Therefore, applying the analogy in this case, Arthur repeated the offense of gifting to other women. But even cohabitation after marital misconduct, while evidence of condonation, is not conclusive evidence of condonation, standing alone. See Hodges v. Hodges, 27 Ark. App. 250, 770 S.W.2d 164 (1989). Likewise, the reconciliation alone in this case should not be conclusive evidence of Renita’s approval of Arthur’s gifting marital property to other women. Under the facts of this case, had the trial court determined that an equal distribution of marital assets was equitable, I would have voted to affirm the court’s ruling out of deference to the clearly erroneous standard. However, the court did not so find, and therefore, I would apply the clearly erroneous standard with equal effect to affirm the trial court’s order that Arthur reimburse the marital estate for the amounts he spent on gifts to his girlfriends during the marriage I respectfully dissent.