Court Opinion

ID: 9575188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:20.647006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:05.079328
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING ORDER

Per Curiam:

Opinion No. 1423 was filed in the above case on December 4, 1989. This court granted Century’s petition for rehearing on the issue of the conversion claim.
As noted in the decision, the trial judge (1) directed a verdict for Century for $6,970 on its counterclaim and (2) directed a verdict for Young for $9,230.11 on her conversion claim.
Subject to the order granting Century’s petition for rehearing on the conversion claim, Century moved to supplement the record pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 8, Section 7. We grant this motion which involves the trial judge’s instruction to the jury relating to the conversion cause of action. We quote:
Now the third cause of action was in conversion, I have directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the conversion of the check, that is I am directing a verdict for actual damages in the amount of the check, and the defendant will own the check. [Emphasis ours.]
The record before us reflects the following verdict:
VERDICT
We find by direction of the Court, we find for the plaintiff on the third cause of action (conversion) nine thousand and two hundred thirty and 11/100 dollars actual damages; for defendant on counterclaim six thousand nine hundred seventy dollars actual damages. As to second cause of action (fraud & deceit) we find for the defendant. Unfair Trade Practice Act — we find for plaintiff thirty-five hundred dollars actual *330damages. We further find that the violation was willful. As to third cause of action (conversion) punitive damages, we find for plaintiff forty-five hundred dollars punitive damages.
The record does not disclose that Century made an objection to the form of the verdict. No exception relating to this is taken on appeal.
Until we granted Century’s motion to supplement the record which was made after this court’s order granting the petition for rehearing on the conversion issue, this court had no way of knowing that the trial judge intended that upon payment of the directed verdict that the defendant would own the check.
The courts of this state have not to our knowledge addressed this issue. For the enlightment of the Bar, we quote from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A comment c (1965).
c. Recovery of full value of chattel. The importance of the distinction between trespass to chattels and conversion, which has justified its survival long after the forms of action of trespass and trover have become obsolete, lies in the measure of damages. In trespass the plaintiff may recover for the diminished value of his chattel because of any damage to it, or for the damage to his interest in its possession or use. Usually, although not necessarily, such damages are less than the full value of the chattel itself. In conversion the measure of damages is the full value of the chattel, at the time and place of the tort. When the defendant satisfies the judgment in the action for conversion, title to the chattel passes to him, so that he is in effect required to buy it at a forced judicial sale. Conversion is therefore properly limited, and has been limited by the courts, to those serious, major, and important interferences with the right to control the chattel which justify requiring the defendant to pay its full value. [Emphasis ours.]
Of course the above rule is not applicable to the issue before us. The exact issue we deal with was not preserved for appeal by Century. We hold, however, that this court has inherent authority to amend, ex mero motu, in the case of a directed verdict, a judgment on appeal when it *331appears that the verdict does not conform with the intent of the trial judge in directing the verdict. In directing the verdict for Century for $6,970.75 (the amount of the original estimate) and for Young for $9,230.11, the trial judge obviously considered the insurance check as either so much cash or that upon the payment to Young of the judgment of $9,230.11, Young would endorse the check to Century. Without Young’s endorsement of the check, injustice is readily apparent.
In order to effectuate justice in this case, we amend the judgment by ordering that Young endorse the check so that it is payable to Century in order to effectuate the directed verdicts of the trial judge. See 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1520 (1958).
The decision heretofore issued in this case is, therefore, amended in the particulars set forth herein.
As to the other grounds contained in the petition for rehearing, this court is unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has either been overlooked or disregarded.
The decision is amended in the particulars mentioned and in all other respects the petition for rehearing is dismissed.