Court Opinion

ID: 9410801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 17:01:10.855103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:00.411492
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          JUL 24 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELMER ONELEO PEREZ-CHAMALE,                     No. 22-412
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A213-082-812
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted July 20, 2023**
                            San Francisco, California

Before: SILER,*** WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

      Elmer Oneleo Perez-Chamale, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions this court

to review a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying him

asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. We deny the petition for review.

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
      We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s factual finding that a

purported particular social group (PSG) lacks social distinction within a society,

as well as its factual finding that a petitioner’s persecution lacks a nexus to a

protected ground. See Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th

Cir. 2021). Under the substantial-evidence standard, “administrative findings of

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

      1.     Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Perez-

Chamale’s purported PSG of “business owners” lacks social distinction within

Guatemalan society. In Macedo Templos, our court affirmed the BIA’s rejection

of the similar purported PSG of “wealthy business owners” after concluding that

“[t]he record does not include evidence that Mexican society perceives wealthy

business owners as a distinct group.” 987 F.3d at 882. Perez-Chamale identifies

no evidence in the record here that would compel the opposite conclusion as to

“business owners” in Guatemalan society.

      2.     Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that no nexus

existed between Perez-Chamale’s past persecution and his political opinion. See

Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357–61 (9th Cir. 2017) (nexus

requirement); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(C)

(withholding of removal). The record establishes that gang members extorted

Perez-Chamale because of his ability to pay, not because of his connection to the

mayor. See Macedo Templos, 987 F.3d at 883 (affirming a no-nexus finding

                                        2                                   22-412
because “[t]he evidence proves that [the petitioner’s persecutors] . . . will target

anyone they believe can pay, regardless of . . . background”). Perez-Chamale

testified that he owned “three . . . [m]otorcycle taxis” and that the gang members

extorted him “[b]ecause of the money that [he] would earn.” He further testified

that the gang members extorted “a lot of other individuals,” including “all owners

of motorcycle taxis.” When asked whether the gang members “indicated that

they were threatening [him] due to any type of political belief,” he responded that

“[t]hey never indicated that” but instead “always indicated [the extortion] was

because of the moto[rcycle] taxis that [he] had.” And when asked whether the

gang members had any other motivation besides economic gain, Perez-Chamale

responded: “No. Basically, it was just for my economic stability.”1

      3.     Remand is not needed in light of Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307

(A.G. 2021). Perez-Chamale’s opening brief argues that decision changed the

analysis of “claims that revolve[] around domestic violence” against women, but

Perez-Chamale asserts he was extorted based on his family membership, status

as a business owner, and political opinion.

      The petition for review is DENIED.

      1
             To the extent Perez-Chamale argues that the extortion he suffered
had a nexus to the PSG of his family, that argument also fails. He failed to
exhaust that argument before the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). And in any
event, the BIA’s determination that the gang members were motivated solely by
“financial gain” precludes any nexus to Perez-Chamale’s family-based PSG.

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