Court Opinion

ID: 9685448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:38:14.746554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:06.220515
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
(dissenting).
¶ 52. I join in all of the Majority's opinion except Part II.C., where the Majority holds that the failure to instruct the jury that the crime of disorderly conduct while armed requires a nexus between the "disorderly conduct" and the "while armed" is ipso facto prejudicial. I disagree.
¶ 53. The Majority relies on State v. Krueger, 2001 WI App 14, 240 Wis. 2d 644, 623 N.W.2d 211, for imposition of an ¿pso-/acío~prejudicialper se rule. But in Krueger, the trial court did not instruct the jury that the defendant could not be found guilty of attempting to have sexual contact with a person under the age of thirteen years unless the purpose of the touching was for sexual arousal or gratification, or for degrading or sexually humiliating the victim. Id., 2001 WI App 14 at ¶ 2. Although Krueger does not tell us what the facts were in that case, here there can be no doubt but that there was the requisite nexus between the knives and Gordon's conduct. Thus, Gordon has not satisfied his burden to show that his lawyer's failure to request a nexus instruction was prejudicial.
*739¶ 54. I do not read Krueger as establishing a per se rule. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part II.C. of the Majority's opinion.