Court Opinion

ID: 9406683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-03 04:10:10.875434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:32.477502
License: Public Domain

In the Court of Criminal
           Appeals of Texas
                           ══════════
                           No. PD-0008-22
                           ══════════

         MAXIE D. GREEN D/B/A A TO Z BAIL BONDS,
                               Appellant

                                   v.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
        On State’s Petition for Discretionary Review
            From the Second Court of Appeals
                      Wichita County
   ═══════════════════════════════════════
      YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

      The Court decides that “conclusive proof” that the defendant’s
name was distinctly called at the door of the courtroom door establishes
“conclusively” the statutory element that his name “shall be called
                                                                GREEN – 2

distinctly at the courthouse door[.]” Majority Opinion at 1 & 15; TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 22.02 (emphasis added). 1 This is true, the Court
                                                  0F

decides, not only as a matter of proof at the trial of a bond forfeiture
case, but even for purposes of a summary judgment proceeding. But the
Court’s premise is flawed. The cases upon which it relies do not even
stand for the proposition that evidence that the name was called at the
courtroom door will categorically prove (even as a matter of “substantial
compliance”) that it was called at the courthouse door for purposes of
trial, much less for purposes of a summary judgment proceeding. I
respectfully dissent.
      Typically, the judgment nisi will serve to establish at least a
prima facie case in a bond forfeiture proceeding, including evidence of
the necessary element that the defendant’s name was “called distinctly
at the courthouse door[.]” Tocher v. State, 517 S.W.2d 299, 300−01 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975). It is then up to the defendant or surety to rebut that
prima facie case with evidence that the defendant’s name was not, in

      1 Substantively unchanged since its appearance as Article 408 of the
1856 “Old Code,” present Article 22.02 reads:

             Bail bonds and personal bonds are forfeited in the
      following manner: The name of the defendant shall be called
      distinctly at the courthouse door, and if the defendant does not
      appear within a reasonable time after such call is made,
      judgment shall be entered that the State of Texas recover of the
      defendant the amount of money in which he is bound, and of his
      sureties, if any, the amount of money in which they are
      respectively bound, which judgment shall state that the same
      will be made final, unless good cause be shown why the
      defendant did not appear.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 22.02 (emphasis added).
                                                                    GREEN – 3

fact, called at the courthouse door. Id. at 301. If he cannot, then the trial
court does not err to grant a State’s motion for summary judgment.
       But that assumes that a judgment nisi actually recites that the
defendant’s name was called at the courthouse door, as in Tocher itself.
Id. at 300; see Swaim v. State, 498 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973) (uncontested judgment nisi recital that the defendant’s name was
called at the “courthouse door” served as conclusive proof). Here, the
judgment nisi does not. Instead, it recites that the defendant’s name was
called out at the courtroom door. And that is functionally the only
evidence the State had to offer relating to this element of its bond
forfeiture case—or, at least, it was all that the State did offer for
purposes of its motion for summary judgment. 2       1F

       In my view, such a recitation in a judgment nisi may only serve
to shift the burden of proof to the defendant with respect to the statutory
element requiring proof of calling a name at the “courthouse” door if the
words “courtroom” and “courthouse” are synonymous, or if evidence of
“courtroom” will always, without more, prove “courthouse.” The Court
today does not declare the two terms to be synonymous—presumably
because, manifestly, they are not. 3 But it does effectively declare that
                                       2F

       2The two unanswered requests for admissions, to the extent they prove
anything at all, also refer to whether Appellant’s name was called at the
“courtroom door,” not the courthouse door. Majority Opinion at 3.

       3 Given the statute’s long lineage, see note 1, ante, it might be thought
that for this Court to construe the word “courthouse” in Article 22.02 to mean
courtroom door would make it more functional in the modern age of multistory
courthouses. After all, it seems even to me that a defendant is more likely to
be found waiting in the common area outside the courtroom door than in the
common area (if any) outside the main door of a large modern courthouse. But
that is not a choice for this Court to make, consistent with separation of powers,
                                                                    GREEN – 4

calling a defendant’s name at the courtroom door will always suffice to
prove his name has been called at the courthouse door—categorically—
as a matter of “substantial compliance.” 4 And from this premise the
                                               3F

TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1, and I am gratified that the Court today does not take
such an approach to construing the statute.

       4  I am somewhat troubled by the ease with which some courts—in this
case and in others—decide that “substantial compliance” with a statutory
mandate is all that is necessary to show what a legislative enactment
manifestly requires. When the Legislature permits “substantial compliance”
with a procedural mandate to be sufficient, it knows how to say so. E.g., TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13(c) (“In admonishing the defendant [during a
guilty plea proceeding], substantial compliance by the court is sufficient[.]”)
(emphasis added). It has not explicitly said so in Article 22.02. The Court also
points to “numerous decisions from the intermediate appellate courts
upholding grants of summary judgment when the facts conclusively
demonstrated substantial compliance with the pertinent statute.” Majority
Opinion at 11, n.9. But at least some of the intermediate court opinions pointed
to by the Court address statutes that themselves appear to contain legislative
authorization to apply at least the equivalent of a substantial compliance
standard. See, e.g., United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boring & Tunnelling Co. of Am.,
321 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (applying
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2253.041, which in part provides: “(c) The notice must be
accompanied by a sworn statement of account that states in substance: . . .”)
(emphasis added); Richardson v. Mid-Cities Drywall, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 512
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (applying TEX. PROP. Code § 53.054,
which in part provides: “(a) The affidavit must be signed by the person claiming
the lien or by another person on the claimant’s behalf and must contain
substantially: . . .”) (emphasis added). Again, the statute at issue here contains
no such language. And all of this leads me to question whether a court may
properly, consistent with the constitutional mandate of separated powers,
declare “substantial compliance” with a law sufficient when the Legislature
itself has not authorized it to do so.
        I agree that there may be some ineluctable wiggle room within which
courts must determine what it means to conduct a required procedure “at” the
courthouse door. See note 5, post. Must the defendant’s name be called out
literally on the threshold of the courthouse door, or will two feet in front of or
behind the threshold suffice? In any event, here, even assuming the
applicability of the cases that the Court says permit substantial compliance,
the State’s summary judgment evidence was deficient, for the reasons
                                                                  GREEN – 5

Court reasons that a judgment nisi that recites “courtroom door,” if not
refuted by the defendant, will always serve “conclusively” to prove
“courthouse door,” even for purposes of a summary judgment
proceeding.
       But still, the cases that the Court cites in support of its premise
do not say what the Court suggests they do. Majority Opinion at 8−10.
They do not hold that proof of calling the defendant at the “courtroom
door” will categorically constitute at least substantial compliance with
the State’s burden to show calling the defendant at the “courthouse
door.” Instead, each of those cases looks to the specific facts presented to
determine, circumstantially, whether what the State showed to have
happened constituted the functional equivalent of calling the
defendant’s name “at the courthouse door[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
22.02 (emphasis added). The cases do not hold that proof of calling at
the “courtroom door” will always serve as proof of calling “at the
courthouse door,” no matter the circumstances—even for purposes of a
bond forfeiture trial, much less of a summary judgment proceeding.
       In Deem v. State, 342 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961), the
earliest case cited by the Court today, the judgment nisi recited that the
defendant’s name “was called distinctly at the door of the court house.”
The defendant’s sureties argued that the judgment nisi was incorrect in
this regard, and testimony was adduced from a deputy district clerk that
the defendant’s name “was called . . . outside the court room door, but
that he did not know if it was also called at the main door of the court

developed in the text post. For the present, therefore, I will say no more about
the propriety of a “substantial compliance” construction of Art. 22.02.
                                                                GREEN – 6

house.” Id. (emphasis added). In rejecting the sureties’ claim, the Court
simply stated: “It is concluded that there was a substantial compliance
with the requirement that the name of the principal be called distinctly
at the court house door. Caldwell et al. v. State, 136 Tex.Cr.R. 524, 126
S.W.2d 654.” Id. The opinion in Deem does not say exactly how far
“outside the court room door” the defendant’s name was called, but its
reliance upon Caldwell suggests that this would have been a relevant
consideration.
      In Caldwell, the judgment nisi recited that the defendant’s name
was called “at the door of the court house[,]” but facts adduced at the
trial to determine whether the judgment nisi should be made final made
it clear that this recitation was not literally accurate. 136 Tex.Cr.R. 524,
525, 126 S.W.2d 654, 655 (1939). The facts in Caldwell did not show that
the defendant’s name was called at the door of the courtroom either.
Instead, the deputy sheriff stood at a cigar stand in the large lobby
(“seventy-five feet long and twenty or thirty feet wide”) outside of the
courtroom, but “within four steps (12 feet) of the outer door of the court
house[,]” and called the defendant’s name from there. Id. In determining
whether this would satisfy the statutory mandate that the name be
called “at the court house door[,]” the Court invoked an even earlier case
from the Texas Supreme Court construing the word “at” in the context
of the phrase “at the door of the court house[.]” Id. 136 Tex.Cr.R. at
526−27, 126 S.W.2d at 655−56 (quoting Howard v. Fulton, 79 Tex. 231,
236, 14 S.W. 1061, 1062 (1891)). 5 The Caldwell Court concluded: “The
                                   4F

      5 The question in Howard was whether a notice of trustee sale of land,
which by the terms of the mortgage instrument was to be posted “at the court-
house door,” was properly situated when it was literally posted on a bulletin
                                                                   GREEN – 7

place from which appellant’s name was called when the forfeiture was
taken on his bond was within such reasonable distance of the court
house door as under the circumstances to be in substantial compliance
with the law requiring that his name be called at the door.” Id. 136
Tex.Cr.R. at 656, 126 S.W.2d at 527. 6   5F

       In Bennett v. State, 394 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965),
the judgment nisi recited, as in Deem, that the defendant’s name was
called at the courthouse door. Testimony at trial showed that the bailiff
had been directed to call the name “outside in the hallway of the
courtroom on the fourth floor of the courthouse[.]” Id. Because the
judgment nisi recited that the defendant’s name had in fact been called
at the courthouse door, and no evidence showed that the bailiff did not
also do that, the Court suggested that the defendant and sureties failed
to rebut the State’s prima facie case. Id. The Court then remarked: “Be
that as it may, under the recent decision of this court in Deem, et al., v.
State, the record shows substantial compliance with the requirement of

board in the courthouse some forty feet away, but “in open view from the
door[.]” The Supreme Court determined that the word “at” was less precise in
terms of designating spatial relationships than the words “in” or “on” would be,
and opined that “[w]e do not think that the legislature meant, nor do we think
the parties to the mortgage under consideration intended, that the notice
should be posted on or in the door.” 79 Tex. at 236, 14 S.W. at 1062.

       6Who is to say whether the Court would have concluded in Caldwell
that the place from which the name was called would have been within a
“reasonable distance” of the courthouse door had the evidence been that the
deputy sheriff stood at the courtroom door? That door could have been as much
as seventy-five feet away from the courthouse door, and it is hard to imagine
the Court would so readily have found that distance to be “reasonable . . . under
the circumstances” so as “to be in substantial compliance with the law
requiring that [the defendant’s] name be called at the [courthouse] door.”
                                                                  GREEN – 8

Art. 425 [now Article 22.02], that the name of the principal be called,
distinctly, at the courthouse door.” Id. As in Deem, however, there was
no evidence that the name was called precisely “at the courtroom door.”
       Neither Deem nor Bennett may be read fairly to stand for the
proposition that calling the name merely from the courtroom door will
invariably constitute “substantial compliance” with Article 22.02, since
neither presents those facts, and both may have been resolved
alternatively on the basis that the prima facie showing from the
judgment nisi (reciting that the defendant’s name was called from the
“courthouse door”) was, in any event, unrebutted. 7 The judgment nisi in
                                                      6F

this case simply recites that the defendant’s name was called at the
courtroom door. Not in the hallway outside the courtroom door, and
certainly not within twelve feet (or some other “reasonable distance”) of
the courthouse door.
       The Court reads its precedents for the proposition that a
judgment nisi that recites the bare fact that the name was called at the
courtroom door will always constitute prima facie proof, at least by
substantial compliance, that the name was called at the courthouse door,
and reasons from that premise that when that prima facie proof goes

       7 The Court also cites Tocher for its observation that Bennett stands for
the proposition that the calling of the principal’s name outside in the hallway
of the fourth floor of the courthouse is in substantial compliance with the
requirement in Art. 22.02, V.A.C.C.P., that the name be called distinctly at the
courthouse door. Majority Opinion at 9. But substantial compliance was “not
an issue” in Tocher, as the Court there expressly recognized. Tocher, 517
S.W.2d at 300. Instead, the Court upheld the forfeiture because the judgment
nisi recited that the defendant’s name had been called out literally at the
courthouse door, and no evidence at the bond forfeiture hearing suggested
otherwise.
                                                                   GREEN – 9

unrebutted, then summary judgment is appropriate. But the cases do
not support the premise that proof of “courtroom door,” without more,
will invariably constitute proof of “courthouse door.” 8 It seems to me
                                                             7F

that a judgment nisi that recites no more than this bare fact fails to
satisfy the State’s burden of proof in the first place, and it does not
trigger any duty of rebuttal from a defendant or his sureties in order to
avoid summary judgment.
       By no means do I attempt here to resolve whether the statute at
issue in this case was complied with, substantially or otherwise. I only
object to the Court’s decision that this case was properly resolved by
summary judgment. I am persuaded that the Court misreads our
precedents. Moreover, whatever the Court may conclude about the
wisdom of our precedents (those that the Court reads today to invariably
allow calling a name at the courtroom door instead of the courthouse
door), I consider it my duty to apply deference to the legislative
determination to require calling that name at the courthouse door. To
the degree that the Court assumes that calling a name at a courtroom
door is the functional equivalent, always, of calling a name at a
courthouse door, its decision fails to defer to our Legislature’s own policy
decisions, as reflected in our statutory law.
       I respectfully dissent.

       8 I am not the only judge on this Court to have ever understood the cases
in essentially this way. As former Judge Overstreet observed: “When the
argument against the practice of calling the name at the courtroom door is
raised, this Court’s opinions have construed substantial compliance to mean
either: (1) reasonable distance to the courthouse door, as opposed to the
courtroom door; or (2) lack of evidence to show otherwise.” Alvarez v. State, 861
S.W.2d 878, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Overstreet, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
                          GREEN – 10

FILED:    June 28, 2023
PUBLISH