Court Opinion

ID: 9845483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:22:59.544417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:09.404910
License: Public Domain

*642HOWARD, Judge,
(dissenting):
I respectfully disagree with the majority as to the sufficiency of the indictment. The body of the indictment does not allege that Reddick is an inmate, nor does the indictment allege his status as an inmate in any similar language. Consequently, I would hold that the court did not have jurisdiction to try Reddick for this offense.
The caption of the indictment cannot be used to expand or contract the allegations, because it is not a part of the findings by the grand jury. State v. Lark, 64 S.C. 350, 353, 42 S.E. 175, 176-77 (1902); State v. Knuckles, 348 S.C. 593, 597-98, 560 S.E.2d 426, 429-30 (Ct.App.2002).
Furthermore, in my opinion the cases relied upon by the majority are inapposite. In each of the cases in which our courts have examined the language in the indictment with a practical eye in view of the surrounding circumstances, the question presented was whether or not there was prejudice to the defendant. In State v. Crenshaw, the defendant challenged the indictment, alleging that it failed to charge the crime of bribery substantially in the language of the statute. 274 S.C. 475, 477, 266 S.E.2d 61, 62 (1980). The Court found the indictment sufficient, stating that an indictment charging a statutory crime “need not use the precise language of the statute in describing the offense, if the words used are equivalent to those employed by the statute. ” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, Crenshaw does not aid the majority, because identifying the defendant by name in the body of the indictment is not equivalent to identifying his status as an inmate.
In State v. Hiott, the indictment charged the defendant with armed robbery by “feloniously tak[ing] ... goods or monies of the said John Nates Druggist, Inc., such goods or monies being described: a toothbrush.” 276 S.C. 72, 79, 276 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1981) (alteration in original). Factually, the attempted escape of the pharmacist had thwarted the robbery before completion. At trial, the allegation that a toothbrush was the target of the robbery was stricken from the indictment by the trial court because of a lack of evidence. On appeal, the defendant challenged the indictment, arguing the phrase “goods or monies” was insufficient. The supreme court disagreed, viewing the indictment with a practical eye. Id. at 82, *643276 S.E.2d at 168 (stating “[i]t is not necessary ... to describe the property the accused intended to take” (quoting 17 C.J.S. Robbery § 68)). Again, unlike this case, the indictment in Hiott contained a general allegation of the element in question.
In State v. Adams, the defendant was charged in an indictment with breaking and entering a house “with intent to commit a crime therein.” 277 S.C. 115, 125, 283 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1981). He was also separately indicted for murder and armed robbery in connection with the same incident. On appeal, he argued the indictment was insufficient because it did not allege the crime he was accused of intending to commit upon breaking and entering. Our supreme court dismissed this argument, viewing the indictment and all of the circumstances with a practical eye and noting that he admitted his intentions in his statement to police, he was indicted for the accompanying crimes of murder and armed robbery, and he was afforded a preliminary hearing. Id. at 125-26, 283 S.E.2d at 588. Here again, the indictment alleged the element of intent to commit a crime; it simply did not identify the specific crime.
In State v. Gunn, the indictment charged that the defendant, along with other named defendants, did
knowingly, unlawfully and willfully conspire, confederate, agree and have tacit understanding with each other and/or other persons, whose names are both known and unknown to the State Grand Jurors, for the purpose of selling, delivering, or bringing into this State in Cherokee and York counties, or providing financial assistance or otherwise aiding and abetting the sale, delivery or bringing into this State in Cherokee and York counties, or the knowing actual or constructive possession in Cherokee and York counties of more than 28 grams of Dilaudid, a narcotic, a derivative of morphine, which is a controlled substance under provisions of Section 44-53-210, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), as amended, such conduct not having been authorized by law.
313 S.C. 124, 129, 437 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1993).
On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the indictment because it set forth few facts in support of the *644allegations. Once again, the supreme court reviewed the sufficiency of the indictment by looking at the issue with a practical eye in view of the surrounding circumstances. The court noted that in a statewide grand jury proceeding, the testimony before the grand jury is recorded and may be accessed by the defendant. Thus, the court found the indictment sufficient. Id. at 130, 437 S.E.2d at 78.
In each of these cases, the question before the court was whether or not there was prejudice to the defendant as a result of insufficient factual allegations contained within the indictment. See State v. Hamilton, 344 S.C. 344, 543 S.E.2d 586 (Ct.App.2001) (ruling the word “contraband” in the indictment was sufficient to allege that the defendant possessed an item pre-determined by the Director of the Department of Corrections to be contraband). This is a different question than that which is presented in this case.
Our supreme court has made it clear that an indictment is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court if it does not allege each of the elements of the offense. See State v. Owens, 346 S.C. 637, 649, 552 S.E.2d 745, 751 (2001). To say that the element of Corey Reddick’s status as an inmate is sufficiently alleged by identifying him by name is to totally engraft an allegation of the element into the body of the indictment and essentially nullifies this fundamental inquiry. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion on this point and would vacate the conviction based upon the fatally flawed indictment.