Court Opinion

ID: 9774683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:29:41.066327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:13.275992
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing, appellant Manuel Lechuga argues we erred in (1) holding that the summary judgment evidence in support of appellee’s motion for summary judgment established proof in the record that appellant’s petition was not timely filed, and (2) failing to consider the applicability of Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated art. 8307b (Vernon 1967).
In his first point, appellant challenges our holding that the Rule 93 “of record” exception applies to summary judgment proceedings. Pointing out that Rule 93 is a pleading rule, he asserts a more reasonable interpretation of the phrase is that it applies only to the pleadings of the parties in the case in chief, excluding summary judgment pleadings, summary judgment evidence, or any other evidence in the record.
Acknowledging the lack of direct authority in support of his position, appellant cites *186as inferential authority, Weinberg v. American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co., 626 S.W.2d 555 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 639 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.1982), Turner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 592 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1979, no writ), and Baca v. Transport Ins. Co., 538 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In each of these cases summary judgments in favor of the workers’ compensation insurance carrier were reversed.
In Baca v. Transport Ins. Co., supra, the appellee filed only a general denial to the claimant’s petition. It then filed its motion for summary judgment asserting a lack of good cause for the claimant’s failure to timely file his claim. In general language, the motion recited that it was based upon the pleadings and depositions on file. In reversing the trial court, the appellate court noted appellant pled he had properly filed his claim to which the appel-lee had not filed a verified denial. Applying Rule 93, the court said under that circumstance, it was presumed that the filing was done and filed in legal time. Even so, the court went on to say it was also reversing the judgment because the evidence in the trial court was not sufficient to show as a matter of law that “good cause” did not exist for the late filing of the claim. Id. at 815-816.
In Turner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra, the appellate court, because the carrier had only filed a general denial, applied Rule 93 and, citing the Baca case, overturned a trial court summary judgment that the claimant did not have good cause for the late filing of her claim.
In Weinberg v. American Gen. Fire & Cos. Co., supra, the Court of Civil Appeals applied Rule 93 and, because the carrier had only filed a general denial, reversed a trial court summary judgment that the claimant had not timely filed his suit. However, the Supreme Court reversed the intermediate court’s action because that particular error and not been raised on appeal. Parenthetically, the Supreme Court, considering summary judgment evidence analogous to that in this case, held it sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial court. American General Fire & Cas. Co. v. Weinberg, 639 S.W.2d 688, 689-690 (Tex.1982).
The question of summary judgment pleadings and evidence in connection with the Rule 93 phrase “otherwise appearing of record,” or indeed the meaning of that provision, was not presented to, nor discussed by, any of the above courts. We do not agree that these cases inferentially support appellant’s position.
Appellant also cites Freedman v. Briarcroft Property Owners, 776 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ), for the proposition that lack of timely filing of a claimant’s suit may not be shown by summary judgment pleadings or evidence. That case was an appeal from a grant, after hearing, of a permanent injunction against the building of a parking lot. On appeal the appellants challenged the appellees’ standing (capacity) to bring the suit. Although they had not filed a verified pleading raising that question, the appellants argued that an affidavit attached to a motion for summary judgment filed by them during trial, raising that question, met the Rule 93 requirements.
It was in that context that the Freedman court made a statement that affidavits attached to summary judgment motions do not constitute part of the live pleadings in the case. As its support for that proposition, the court cited as analogous authority, Sugarland Business Center, Ltd. v. Norman, 624 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). However, the actual holding of the Sugarland court was that, since sworn pleadings are not summary judgment evidence, an affidavit attached to a pleading, but not attached to a motion for summary judgment, does not constitute summary judgment evidence. Id. at 642. Moreover, the question of the meaning and application of the “otherwise appearing of record” phrase of Rule 93 again was not presented to, nor discussed by, the Freedman court. The case is distinguishable from the instant one and its holding inapplicable here.
*187Additionally, it is well established that because the jurisdiction of a court is fundamental and may not be ignored, a court must notice, even sua sponte, the matter of its jurisdiction. Marshall v. Brown, 635 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). We remain convinced that the summary judgment evidence was sufficient to justify the trial court’s determination of its lack of jurisdiction. Appellant’s first point is overruled.
In his second point, appellant avers that we erred in applying Rule 93 in our determination of his case. In support of his argument, he points out that Texas Revised Civil Statute Article 8307b provides that in the trial of a case appealed from a Board award, the timely filing of the case is presumed unless denied by verified pleadings. He emphasizes that the statute does not have the “unless the truth of such matters appear of record” exception contained in Rule 93. He refers to that provision of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 2 which states that any statute in any special statutory proceeding which prescribes a rule of procedure different from the procedure set forth in the Rules of Civil Procedure controls unless that statute was not in effect prior to September 1, 1941, or was included in the list of repealed statutes. Pointing out that article 8307b was in existence on September 1, 1941, and was not included in the list of repealed statutes, appellant posits that proper application of Rule 2 requires that Rule 93 may not be used in determining whether an appeal from a Board award was properly made. As his sole authority for that proposition, he cites Green v. Texas Employment Commission, 675 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The Green case involved an appeal from a decision of the Texas Employment Commission. Texas Revised Civil Statute Article 5221b-4(i), the applicable statute in that case, provided that such an appeal must be filed in a proper court “[wjithin ten (10) days after the decision of the Commission has become final.” The tenth day for filing the appeal in the case fell on a Sunday, the next day was a legal holiday, and the appeal was not filed until a Tuesday, the twelfth day. The appellate court concluded that the ten day period specified in the statute was controlling and could not be extended by applying the provision in Rule 4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure extending the time for filing in such case until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, a Sunday, nor a legal holiday.
However, in cases involving an appeal from a Board award, including all of the cases cited by appellant, or found by us, the courts have consistently considered Rule 93 in connection with article 8307b in determining questions such as those in this case. Indeed, the author of the Green opinion wrote the court’s opinion in Baca v. Transport Ins. Co., supra, which applied and construed Rule 93 in determining whether the appeal in that case was properly filed. See also Le Beau v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 143 Tex. 589, 187 S.W.2d 73, 75 (1945); Freedman v. Briarcroft Property Owners, supra; Turner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra; Guzman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 564 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1978, no writ); Continental Fire & Casualty Ins. Corp. v. Snow, 213 S.W.2d 720, 721 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1948, no writ); Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Hinkle, 187 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1945, writ ref’d w.o.m.). Appellant’s second point is overruled.
In summary, we remain convinced that our disposition of this case is correct. Accordingly, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.