Court Opinion

ID: 9658180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:50:12.551448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:52.537824
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 144. (concurring). During the last several decades, technological advancements have revolutionized document storage and electronic communication. Prior to these advancements, an employee's personal communications, whether by note, letter, or telephone call, would not have been kept by an authority and therefore would not have been subject to disclosure under the public records law.
*634¶ 145. As a result of changing technology, however, many personal communications that are unrelated to the affairs of government and the official acts of officers and employees may now be "kept by an authority" because they are stored on a government server. This fact presents new challenges to record custodians who are required to determine whether particular documents are records subject to disclosure.1
¶ 146. This case presents an important issue that has far- reaching effects. It involves what I call a "bread and butter" issue of Wisconsin law. Record custodians around the state in public entities large and small are called upon day in and day out to respond to public records requests.
¶ 147. Although the various briefs submitted in this case take different positions as to the analysis and the answer, there emerges a unified theme — what is needed is clear direction to record custodians for this important everyday task.
¶ 148. Much like the various briefs submitted, the opinions authored in this case also offer different approaches. Lest there be any doubt, however, a clear rule has emerged: a custodian should not release the content of an email that is purely personal and evinces no violation of law or policy.2
*635I
¶ 149. At issue in this case is the content of emails that the School District and the Teachers agree is personal and evinces no violation of law or policy. I begin by determining whether the content of such an email is a record under the public records law.
¶ 150. Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2) defines "record" as follows:
"Record" means any material on which written, drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics, which has been created or is being kept by an authority. "Record" includes, but is not limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, charts, photographs, films, recordings, tapes (including computer tapes), computer printouts and optical disks. "Record" does not include drafts, notes, preliminary computations and like materials prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared by the originator in the name of a person for whom the originator is working; materials which are purely the personal property of the custodian and have no relation to his or her office; materials to which access is limited by copyright, patent or bequest; and published materials in the possession of an authority other than a public library which are available for sale, or which are available for inspection at a public library.
¶ 151. The Teachers'emails are materials, kept by an authority, on which written or electromagnetic information is recorded and preserved. The emails are not "drafts, notes, preliminary computations" or "like materials prepared for the originator's personal use." Further, they are not "materials which are purely the personal property of the custodian."
*636¶ 152. I do not consider the declaration of policy found in Wis. Stat. § 19.31 when evaluating the definition of record in Wis. Stat. § 19.32. Nothing in the definition distinguishes between content that is personal and content that is work-related when that content is prepared by an originator (here, the Teachers) and in the possession of the custodian (here, the School District). Given this definition and unlike the lead opinion, I conclude that the Teachers' personal emails are records.
II
¶ 153. Although I agree with the dissent and with Justice Gableman's concurrence that the Teachers' personal emails are records, I do not join them. I determine that the dissent fails to acknowledge the important policy reasons supporting nondisclosure of the content of personal emails. I do not join Justice Gableman's concurrence because it embarks upon addressing a statute that is not implicated in this case. Further, in the wake of the discussion, it leaves confusion rather than clarity in the law because it misconstrues the lead opinion.
¶ 154. The dissent concludes that there is a strong public interest in disclosure of the content of all of the Teachers' emails, even those that are personal and evince no violation of law or policy. Dissent, ¶ 224. "Given the significant role that teachers play in our society," the dissent explains, "the public has a very strong interest in all of their activities in the workplace." Dissent, ¶ 209.
¶ 155. The trouble with this analysis, as I see it, is that the public interest in monitoring the content of the Teachers' personal emails cannot be as absolute as the *637dissent contends. The dissent acknowledges that disclosure would not extend to personal email accounts, such as email services offered by gmail or Yahoo, which may have been accessed by the teachers on their work computers during the school day. Dissent, ¶ 188 n.l. Under the dissent's interpretation of the public records law, it is the accident of the emails' location on the District's server — rather than anything intrinsic about the content of these emails — that would make them subject to release.
¶ 156. If the dissent is right, then a government employee could subvert the purpose of the public records law in seconds and with several strokes on a keyboard simply by logging onto a free personal email account. I conclude that the policy underlying the public records law is not so ephemeral and its mandates are not so easily circumvented.
¶ 157. Likewise, I am concerned that Justice Gableman's concurrence adds confusion rather than clarity to the law. This case was initiated by record subjects — not record requestors. Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1), created by 2003 Wis. Act 47, provides record subjects with limited rights of judicial review that differ from the rights of judicial review that apply when a requestor brings an action under Wis. Stat. § 19.37.
¶ 158. Five teachers of the Wisconsin Rapids School District who were the subjects of a records request commenced this action. The records requestor, Don Bubolz, did not initiate this or any other action. Nevertheless, the concurrence reaches out and addresses the statute governing actions by record requestors, Wis. Stat. § 19.37, a statute not before the court. It discusses cases decided under that statute and offers *638advice to Bubolz on how to proceed as a requestor of public records under that statute. Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶¶ 184-186.
¶ 159. I am hesitant to respond to the concurrence's discussion of Wis. Stat. § 19.37 because, as explained above, it is extraneous to this case. Nevertheless, I do so briefly because I fear that in misconstruing the lead opinion, the concurrence's discussion may leave confusion in the law.
¶ 160. The concurrence incorrectly concludes that the approach of the lead opinion would give record custodians under Wis. Stat. § 19.37 the final say on whether withheld documents should be released. In essence it warns that record requestors would simply be out of luck and could not challenge the withholding of documents under the lead opinion's approach because they would not be records. Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶ 186 n.12.
¶ 161. Regardless of whether the approach of the lead opinion is taken (the content of a purely personal email is not a record) or the approach of the concurrences is taken (the content of a purely personal email is a record), it is really the same question and yields the same result. The custodian must either "fill the request" or notify the requestor of the denial and "the reasons therefor." Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(a).
¶ 162. Further, under either approach, if the decision of the custodian is to withhold requested documents, that decision can be challenged under Wis. Stat. § 19.37 and is subject to review by the circuit court. If the custodian determines that the requested document is not a "record," that determination is subject to judicial review. See Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Shorewood, 186 Wis. 2d 443, 450 n.3, 521 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1994) (reviewing the custodian's *639determination that a "Memorandum of Understanding" was a "draft" and therefore not a "record"); Stone v. Bd. of Regents, 2007 WI App 223, 305 Wis. 2d 679, 741 N.W.2d 774 (reviewing whether a copy of a record is a "record"). Likewise, if the custodian determines that the requested document is a record but its purely personal content will not be released under the balancing test, that determination is also subject to review. In either event, the record custodian does not have the final say.
Ill
¶ 163. Before releasing a record, the record custodian must apply a balancing test, which weighs the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in nondisclosure. This case requires the court to provide direction to custodians on how to apply the balancing test to the content of an email that is purely personal and evinces no violation of law or policy.
¶ 164. The Teachers have stated that they have no objection to the disclosure of statistical information about their email use or to the disclosure of their personal emails with the content fully redacted. See lead op., ¶ 28. This information would allow the requestor to determine how often the Teachers sent and received personal emails from their work accounts. It is the disclosure of the content of personal emails that is the basis of the Teachers' objection.
¶ 165. The public policy underlying the public records law is set forth in the statute and informs the application of the balancing test. "[I]t is declared to be the public policy of the state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those officers and employees who represent them." Wis. Stat. *640§ 19.31. "To that end," the statute provides that the public records law "shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of governmental business. The denial of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied." Id.
¶ 166. When a record provides "information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of [] officers and employees," including information that would permit the public to evaluate the use or misuse of public resources, access to that record is presumed. Denial of public access to such records is "generally contrary to the public interest."
¶ 167. Disclosure of the contents of personal emails, however, does not keep the electorate informed about "official acts" and "the affairs of government" when the contents of the emails evince no violation of law or policy. Disclosure of the contents of such emails would not further the public policy declaration found in Wis. Stat. § 19.31.
¶ 168. I agree with Justice Gableman that there is little public interest in disclosure of the content of emails when that content is purely personal and evinces no violation of law or policy. See Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶ 182. I also agree with Justice Gable-man that there is a public interest served by nondisclosure. Unlike Justice Gableman, however, I conclude that the balance always weighs in favor of nondisclosure.
¶ 169. The public has an interest in hiring and retaining skilled employees. As the lead opinion explains, "[stripping a public employee of his or her privacy in the contents of personal emails simply because he or she works for the government might. . . *641negatively impact employee morale, and undermine recruiting and retention of government employees." Lead op., ¶ 85.
¶ 170. The public also has an interest in government employee productivity. Like private employees, public employees often have to address personal or family issues that arise while they are at work, and email is an effective means by which employees can quickly address these issues. See lead op., ¶¶ 84-85. If public employees believe that their personal email communications will be subject to disclosure upon a records request, public employees will likely use other less efficient means of communication, reducing their productivity.
¶ 171. In the years since the advent of email and the resulting changes in the way that we communicate, many jurisdictions have been asked to address whether personal emails should be disclosed in response to a records request. Every single one of the jurisdictions has concluded that the policies underlying public records laws do not support the disclosure of purely personal emails that evince no violation of law or policy. See lead op., ¶ 130 n.63 (collecting cases).
¶ 172. For the reasons set forth above, ! conclude that whenever the content of an email is purely personal and evinces no violation of law or policy, the public interest in nondisclosure will always outweigh the public interest in disclosure. Therefore, once the custodian determines that certain emails are purely personal and evince no violation of law or policy, the custodian does not undertake a balancing of each request. Like the lead opinion and Justice Gableman's concurrence, I determine that the content of such emails should not be released. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

 The public records law was recently amended by 2003 Wisconsin Act 47. The prefatory note to the bill explains that the Joint Legislative Council's Special Committee on Review of the Open Records Law was directed to "recommend changes in the open records law to accommodate electronic communications[.]" Nevertheless, the 2003 amendments did not address technological advancements in document storage and electronic communication.

 Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Crooks, Justice Prosser, Justice Gableman, and I all reach this result.