Court Opinion

ID: 9642578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:03:30.959618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:49.774958
License: Public Domain

McGEE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. In my opinion, the Yowells’ pleadings do not plead loss of inheritance damages. These damages are “special damages” which under Tex.R.Civ.P. 56 must be specifically pled. Nowhere in their pleadings do the Yowells ask for “loss of inheritance” damages. The mere pleading for “lost earnings” is inadequate. Special damages of one type are not implied from the itemization of other dissimilar special damages. Weingartens, Inc. v. Price, 461 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.) The majority’s holding that “the Yowells have pled loss of inheritance damages sufficiently” clearly violates Rule 56. I fail to see how Piper had adequate notice of a measure of damages not specifically pled and never before recognized in the State of Texas.
Loss of inheritance damages are too speculative. The majority’s newfound damages can only be proven by stacking presumption upon a presumption. The jury is asked to speculate whether decedent would have or could have reasonably been expected to save and accumulate over the amount used for family support. The jury is then asked whether decedent would have passed a portion of the accumulation to his or her survivors. Twice, the jury is asked what the deceased would have done. Yet, the deceased is the only one who knows what he would have done in either instance.
Still, other problems exist. The jury is forced to speculate whether the survivors would outlive the deceased. Recovery for loss of inheritance results in a double recovery when considering recovery for lost contribution and lost earnings from the deceased.
Courts have denied recovery for loss of inheritance damages because they are too speculative. Consolidated Machines, Inc. v. Protein Products Corp., 428 F.Supp. 209 (D.C.Fla.1976); Marks v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 827 (E.D.La.1984); Alden v. Maryanov, 406 F.Supp. 547 (D.C.Md.1976); Baltimore and P.R. Co. v. Golway, 6 App.D.C. 143 (1895); Baker v. Slack, 319 Mich. 703, 30 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1948); Hodkinson v. Parker, 70 S.D. 272, 16 N.W.2d 924 (1944). In denying loss of inheritance damages, the court in Golway stated:
The jury should not be permitted to roam at will the whole field of speculation in the search for remote possibilities of damage that may be taken into account to swell the aggregate of their verdict.
Id. at 146. Likewise, the court in Parker stated: “[Loss of inheritance damages] present at most a remote possibility, and proof of a mere possibility is never sufficient to establish a fact.” Id. at 927. I would not adopt recovery for loss of inheritance damages in wrongful death cases.
In my opinion, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Yowells to add a *637new cause of action (the survival action) at the end of trial after the close of evidence. There is a distinction between making a trial amendment and adding a new cause of action. A trial amendment simply corrects defects in pleadings, usually to conform the pleadings to evidence already admitted at trial. Rule 66, Tex.R.Civ.P., allows the pleadings to be amended freely, provided the amendment does not prejudice the other party in maintaining his or her action or defense upon the merits. However, the Yowells added an entirely new cause of action. No additional evidence was introduced by the Yowells; instead, they relied on the mental anguish evidence already introduced in connection with the Yowells’ proof of lost society, companionship, et cet-era. It is this set of facts that denied Piper a fair trial on the survival claim resulting in an abuse of discretion by the trial court to proceed with the trial. Piper had no opportunity to object to the evidence when the Yowells introduced it, was denied the opportunity to cross-examine Yowells’ witnesses on the subject of mental anguish, and had no opportunity to put on evidence to rebut the mental anguish claim.
Additionally, the trial court abused its discretion in not granting Piper’s motion for continuance. Surprise is shown as a matter of law if the amendment asserts a new and independent cause of action or defense. Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Tex.1980) (Campbell, J. concurring). The technical rules for motions for continuance do not apply to this situation. The continuance should have been granted merely upon an oral request for continuance, stating the added cause of action as a reason. Rule 66 was violated in that the amendment prejudiced Piper in maintaining its action on the merits.
I would not recognize recovery for loss of inheritance damages. I would reverse and remand the cause to the trial court for a retrial since liability and damages must be tried together. At the very least, I would sever the survival claim for a retrial.