Court Opinion

ID: 9789226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:30:49.676423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:38.566748
License: Public Domain

Chief Judge SCHWARTZMAN,
Specially Concurring.
I write separately in this case, just as I did in State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 17-18, 27 P.3d 873, 876-77 (Ct.App.2001), to again voice my “constitutional concern” that domestic violence eases do not, ipso facto, give the police carte blanche to conduct a general exploratory search or protective sweep of the entire premises in every case as a matter of standard operating procedure. Indeed, even the State, at oral argument, conceded that it was NOT asking for or advocating any such bright-line rule, despite the fact Officer Cotter testified that it was his Chiefs “standing policy” to do so in every 911 hang-up case.
But as I also noted in Wiedenheft, the police there (and here) had reasonable grounds to lawfully detain and further question the alleged “victim” (now defendant) on the rational suspicion and exigency that she was connected with a domestic altercation and violence of some kind and needed help. Whether this investigation should continue on the threshold of Pearson-Anderson’s mobile home or inside the front door/living room is not a matter of constitutional imperative for me: either would suffice and not offend the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. After all, it was Pearson-Anderson herself who attempted to call the police and ask for assistance; as such, she impliedly or implicitly consented to a limited initial entry/intrusion into her jointly occupied mobile home for police to complete an investigation and calm the situation. Once over the threshold, the officer quickly detected the chemical stench and plain view apparatus of drug manufacturing equipment.
Where I would draw the constitutional line, here as well as in Wiedenheft, is in prohibiting police from trooping through every room in the household at any hour of the day or night in the absence of articulable, reasonable suspicion involving “officer safety” or searching for other “victims.” By analogy, I would advocate a Buie I/Buie II type analysis in each case. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). Thus, where police are called upon to investigate a case of domestic violence, I would permit the police, incident to that investigation and as a precautionary measure, to conduct a Type I Buie cursory search of the immediate area adjoining the place of investigation. However, in order to conduct a more expansive Type II Buie search, there must be articulable facts which, when taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonable and prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the scene or harbors an additional victim or victims. See State v. Slater, 133 Idaho 882, 886, 994 P.2d 625, 629 (Ct.App.1999) (quoting Buie, 494 *852U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. at 1098, 108 L.Ed.2d at 286).
Given the fact that a Buie I search in this case would have turned up the same incriminating evidence leading to the issuance of a search warrant, and the resulting evidence of drug trafficking, I concur in the result reached by this Court and would affirm the denial of Pearson-Anderson’s motion to suppress.