Court Opinion

ID: 9706768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:51:09.322855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.840009
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that there should be a remand to determine whether Roach’s sentence is unjustifiably disparate when compared with that of co-defendant Jackson. Ante at 233, 680 A.2d at 646.
*235I begin with the recognition that “[t]he paramount goal of sentencing reform [under the Code] was greater uniformity.” State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 369, 471 A.2d 370 (1984).
State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 498 A.2d 1239 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1193, 89 L.Ed.2d 308 (1986), sought to make sentencing uniform by requiring that the aggregate custodial sentence imposed at one time for multiple offenses should not “exceed the sum of the longest terms (including an extended term, if eligible) that could be imposed for the two most serious offenses.” Id. at 644, 498 A.2d 1239. Yarbough further instructs that “there can be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime.” Id. at 643, 498 A.2d 1239. Although the Yarbough outer limit rule on consecutive sentences was superseded by L. 1993, c. 223, § 1, effective August 5, 1993, the majority maintains that Roach’s consecutive life terms with sixty years of parole ineligibility do not violate the Code or any sentencing guidelines. The effect of concurrent sentences in this case would be to give defendant a free murder, the essence of which was condemned by both this Court in Yarbough and the Legislature.
The thrust of defendant’s argument is that his sentence is more severe than that of Jackson. When two or more codefendants, such as Roach and Jackson, have engaged in substantially similar criminal conduct but are sentenced separately by different judges, the sentence of one defendant that otherwise adheres to the Code and sentencing guidelines, as has occurred here, does not become excessive or erroneous merely because the co-defendant’s sentence is lighter. State v. Tyson, 43 N.J. 411, 417, 204 A.2d 864 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987, 85 S.Ct. 1359, 14 L.Ed.2d 279 (1965); State v. Brunetti, 114 N.J.Super. 57, 62, 274 A.2d 830 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 58 N.J. 340, 277 A.2d 397 (1971).
When disparity of sentence is alleged, the scope of appellate review is identical to that applied when exeessiveness of sentence is asserted. State v. Tango, 287 N.J.Super. 416, 422, 671 A.2d 186 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 585, 677 A.2d 758 (1996); State *236v. Lee, 235 N.J.Super. 410, 414, 563 A.2d 51 (1989). The test “is not whether a reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion on what an appropriate sentence should be; it is rather whether, on the basis of the evidence, no reasonable sentencing court could have imposed the sentence under review.” State v. Ghertler, 114 N.J. 383, 388, 555 A.2d 553 (1989). I believe the majority has violated that standard of review.
That Roach and Jackson were not sentenced by the same judge is not a sufficient basis for declining to adhere to the proper standard of review. I agree that all defendants in a single indictment, or a series of indictments relating to a specific criminal episode, should be sentenced by the same judge. I disagree, however, that a.reviewing court in the name of correcting sentence disparity should reduce one co-defendant’s sentence, though that sentence complied with all appropriate sentencing guidelines, to make it consistent with another co-defendant’s lesser sentence, which the trial court believes was erroneously imposed. My review of the record convinces me that the judge who sentenced defendant was correct when she concluded that Jackson’s sentence was too lenient and perhaps the result of a mistake that should not be compounded. In view of that sentencing record, there is nothing more the trial court could have been expected to do; it had very little discretion.
The judges in the present case were limited with respect to the sentence they could impose; their only options were either a concurrent or a consecutive term on the second felony murder. The statutory minimum sentence for felony murder is thirty years without parole eligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b. Although the maximum sentence under that statute can range anywhere from thirty years to life, a thirty-year term of parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b is required. Further, a judge may not impose partially concurrent and partially consecutive sentences for two felony murders. State v. Rogers, 124 N.J. 113, 118-19, 590 A.2d 234 (1991). As noted previously, a concurrent term means a free murder. Consequently, a court is constrained in a double felony *237murder case to a choice of either thirty or sixty years of real time. Id. at 120, 590 A.2d 234.
The sentencing judge explained why a free murder was inappropriate. Among those reasons was the fact that Lavoura was shot inside the office almost immediately. Suarez was shot thereafter in the back by two guns while he was running for his life. Those facts suggest that Lavoura was killed inside the office to compel Suarez to give up the money, and Suarez was shot outside of the office to prevent his escape. Under those circumstances, each of the murders can be viewed as virtually independent of one other, occurring at different times and different places. This Court has acknowledged that even when murders occur in close sequence, consecutive sentences are not improper. State v. Brovm, 138 N.J. 481, 560, 651 A.2d 19 (1994).
Statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the Courts reveal that in multiple murder and multiple felony murder cases, defendants are usually sentenced to consecutive rather than concurrent terms. Thirteen eases were studied, and of the twelve in which defendants were tried, eleven were sentenced to consecutive terms. Although the sampling was not extensive, the results comport with my own judicial experience as well.
The issue of sentence disparity under the Code has existed since the Code has been in effect. See State v. Hubbard, 176 N.J.Super. 174, 179, 422 A.2d 471 (Resen.P.1980) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (stating that a sentence must be excessive before reaching disparity issue). In Hubbard, I explained that unjustifiable disparity results from “the sentencing judge abusing his [or her] discretion or depriving a defendant of his [or her] constitutional rights---A justifiable disparity may result from the sentencing judge giving proper consideration to the law ... and all other proper guidelines for sentencing.” Id. at 185, 422 A.2d 471. I adhere to the view that “a sentence of one defendant not otherwise excessive is not erroneous merely because a co-defendant’s sentence is lighter.” State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391, 255 A.2d 264 (1969) (citations omitted). Because I agree with the majority that defendant’s *238sentence is not excessive, I find no basis to request that the trial court decide whether unjustifiable disparity exists. I find that the sentences are not unjustifiably disparate as a matter of law because Roach’s sentence is not excessive. The remand essentially directs the trial court to undertake the impossible task of proving a negative. See Williams v. Topps Appliance City, 239 N.J.Super. 528, 532, 571 A.2d 1311 (App.Div.1989) (noting that the law rarely imposes upon a litigant the burden of proving a negative).
Even where unjustifiable disparity is found to exist, the better way to correct it is through the Court’s supervisory power, rather than its adjudicatory power, on a case-by-case basis. We recently reaffirmed that position, providing that “[t]he issue of sentence disparity is most appropriately addressed on a comprehensive basis rather than considered and resolved in the narrow context and under the procedural constraints of an adversarial proceeding.” State v. Gerns, 145 N.J. 216, 232, 678 A.2d 634, 642 (1996). Thus this is the type of case that is better handled on an administrative level to avoid the problems that occur when multiple judges sentence multiple defendants for a single criminal transaction.
I concur in the Court’s decision to affirm defendant’s convictions, but dissent from the Court’s decision to remand for reconsideration of the sentence.
Justice GARIBALDI joins in this opinion.
GARIBALDI and COLEMAN, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For affirmance in part and reversal in part — Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and STEIN — 4.