Court Opinion

ID: 9779436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:50:37.158037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:26.421067
License: Public Domain

*848CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant was convicted of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated. Article 670U-l(e), V.T.C.S. In order to prosecute the instant cause as a felony offense in the district court, the State alleged appellant had twice previously been convicted of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated. Apparently finding this allegation to be true, and finding that appellant again operated a motor vehicle upon a public road while intoxicated on April 16,1984, the jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at one year in the county jail and a fine of $2000.00.
On appeal the Waco Court of Appeals reversed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. Human v. State, No. 10-84-177-CR (Tex.App. — Waco, delivered November 7, 1985). The Waco Court found that the State’s evidence failed to establish appellant was the same person as had been convicted in either of the prior offenses of driving while intoxicated that had been alleged in the indictment. Consequently, the cause was remanded to the district court “with an instruction to transfer, if necessary, the cause to a court of appropriate jurisdiction where [ajppellant may be tried for the primary offense as a misdemean- or.”
In reversing appellant’s conviction in this cause the court of appeals relied in large measure upon this Court’s panel opinion in Daniel v. State, 585 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and upon our en banc opinion in Bullard v. State, 533 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). In its petition for discretionary review, the State now contends that under a correct interpretation of Bullard the evidence in this cause should have been found sufficient to identify appellant as the person twice previously convicted of felony D.W.I. as alleged, that Daniel “appears to be in conflict with” Bullard, and that therefore Daniel should be overruled. We granted the State's petition for discretionary review under Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 200(c)(3) in order to examine the State’s contentions.
I.
After alleging the primary offense of driving while intoxicated on April 16, 1984, the indictment alleges in subsequent paragraphs that appellant had twice previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated, once “on the 20th day of March, 1979 in the 204[th] Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, in Cause No. F-78-8690IQ,” and then again “on the 7th day of November, 1980 in the 195th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, in Cause No. F-80-11997-MN.” At trial the State introduced certified copies of judgments and sentences against one “James Daniel Human,” bearing respective cause numbers in the same courts as thus alleged.
In order to establish appellant was the “James Daniel Human” previously convicted as reflected in the judgments and sentences, the State relied upon expert comparison between fingerprints of appellant taken at the time of trial, and those appearing on jail records of the Dallas Police Department and Dallas County Sheriff’s Office, containing, inter alia, cause numbers that are almost, though not entirely identical to those appearing on the judgments and sentences.
Through the custodian of records of the Dallas Police Department the State introduced State’s exhibit no. 1, consisting of a master fingerprint card made upon the arrest of “James Daniel Human” on March 17, 1975, for criminal mischief, two photographs presumably taken at that time, and what the custodian identified as “a transcript of the record from the Dallas Police Department Criminal Docket Section.” Appearing on the transcript are several charges brought against this individual, including one for “Inv. DWI” dated “08-27-80,” for which the disposition shown reads:
“Fid. 195th
F80-11997-N
$750.00
10-24-80”
*849The judgment in cause number F-80-11997-MN1 is in fact dated October 24, 1980. It indicates that sentence was assessed on that day at a fine of $750.00, and that the offense had been committed on August 27, 1980.
Next to testify was a Dallas County Deputy Sheriff who was an “expert fingerprint identification analyst” and a custodian of records. Through him the State introduced fingerprints of appellant taken only minutes before, as State's exhibit no. 2, and also, as State’s exhibit no. 4, a “Dallas County Jail bookin card.” This card contains the right index fingerprint and a general description of a “James Daniel Human,” who it seems to show was arrested on “102878” for “DWI 2ND.” It also lists an “indictment” number “F780869O,”2 but reflects no particular disposition of that cause. The Deputy Sheriff testified that his comparison revealed that the fingerprints on both jail cards (State’s exhibit nos. 1 and 4) were identical to those known to be appellant’s (State’s exhibit no. 2).
In order to find appellant was the same “Human” as the one the judgments and sentences reflect was convicted in cause numbers F-78-8690 IQ and F-80-11997MN, the jury must first have found that the jail records of the police department and sheriff's office were those of appellant. The fingerprint identification clearly established this fact. However, the court of appeals considered the link established between the jail records and the judgments and sentences to be too tenuous to support a jury finding that appellant was also the “Human” whose convictions are reflected in the latter documents. Observed the court of appeals:
“Neither identical cause numbers nor identical names are sufficient to establish the identity of a defendant as the person convicted in a prior offense. Daniel, 585 S.W.2d at 691; Bullard v. State, [supra]. Establishing [a]ppellant’s connection by his fingerprints with one exhibit does not automatically establish his connection with another exhibit merely because the two exhibits happen to reflect identical or similar details relating to a prior offense.”
The State now asserts that, properly construed, Bullard v. State, supra, does not support the conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to tie appellant to the prior offenses — in fact, the very opposite. To an extent, I agree.
II.
In Bullard v. State, supra, two separate jail cards were admitted into evidence “containing official records and fingerprints of one Charles Edwin Bullard made upon conviction” for two Dallas County causes respectively alleged for enhancement under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42(d), for which certified judgments and sentences were subsequently introduced. A fingerprint expert from the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office testified that fingerprints from one of the jail cards matched those known to be the defendant’s, but failed to reveal the result of his comparison of prints on the second jail card with those of the defendant. Accordingly, this Court held that while the evidence was sufficient to identify the defendant as the “Bullard” convicted in the first alleged prior conviction, absence of testimony that the prints on the second jail card were the defendant’s rendered the evidence insufficient to connect *850him to the second prior conviction.3
The basis of the Court’s finding that the evidence as to the first prior conviction was sufficient is not clear from the face of the opinion, and no authority is cited. Presumably, though “identity of names was not sufficient[,]” id., at 816, nonetheless, identity of name, offense, cause number, county and court was.4
In Daniel v. State, supra, records of a theft conviction from Caddo Parish, Louisiana, Cause No. 92,803, by which one “Neil Douglas Daniel” was placed on probation, were admitted in evidence to show the defendant’s prior criminal record as authorized by Art. 37.07, § 3(a), V.A.C.C.P. A later jail card from the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office in the same name was then admitted, containing fingerprints shown to be Daniel’s. The offense noted on the jail card was “probation check” and the stated reason for release was “probation completed.” A space for “remarks” reflected the entry: “attempted felony theft #92803 Louisiana probationer.” A panel of this Court rejected the State’s contention that the identity of cause numbers on the jail card and the Louisiana judgment was sufficient to establish Daniel was the man convicted in Louisiana. Along the way it was observed that “[a] search of our cases reveals that fingerprints which have been used to provide independent identification of a person convicted have invariably been a part of the record of conviction, obtained from the same governmental entity.” 5 Id., at 691. Thus it was held, in effect, that a jail card out of Dallas County reflecting Daniel’s conviction and probation for a similar offense, under the same cause number but from some undesignated Louisiana court and parish, was not sufficiently linked to the Louisiana records of conviction to show that Daniel was the man then and there convicted.
I can perceive no irreconcilable conflict between the holdings of Bullard and Daniel, and thus would decline the State’s invitation to overrule the latter. In my view, the evidence in the instant case falls somewhere in between that found sufficient in Bullard, and that found irrelevant, and hence inadmissible, in Daniel. Therefore the Court should endeavor to draw the line more distinctly. Instead, a plurality of Judges today simply deems these cases “clearly inapplicable” to this cause, without elaboration. The plurality holds, somewhat paradoxically, both that the “circumstantial” evidence was sufficient here, and that the “variance” in the numbers did not work to the surprise and detriment of the accused. To straying so far from the express purpose of our grant of review in this cause, I dissent.
*851III.
Turning first to the jail card and transcript contained in State’s exhibit no. 1, as in Daniel, supra at 691, we accept the truth of the matters asserted in this exhibit because it was admitted by the trial court as an exception to the prohibition against hearsay evidence.6 Thus, State's exhibit no. 1 establishes that on “08-27-80” appellant was arrested for some manner of driving while intoxicated (“Inv.DWI”), was convicted for this offense under cause number “F80-11997 N” in the “195th” court on “10-24-80,” and his punishment assessed at $750.00. The judgment in cause number F-80-11997-MN, out of the 195th Judicial District Court of Dallas County and dated October 24, 1980, shows a conviction for felony D.W.I., states that the offense was committed on August 27,1980, and reflects that punishment was indeed assessed at a fine of $750.00. Though the cause numbers are slightly different, in my view the parallels are sufficiently definite to support a rational jury’s finding that the jail card, containing fingerprints known to be appellant’s, corresponds to the judgment and sentence admitted to prove up the alleged prior conviction in cause number F-80-11997-MN.7 Bullard v. State, supra; Jones v. State, 600 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). I agree that the court of appeals erred in finding they did not.
As for State's exhibit no. 4, however, I agree with the court of appeals that it failed to establish appellant was the same “Human” convicted in cause number F-78-8690-IQ, as alleged. The only correlation between the jail card in State’s exhibit 4 and the judgment and sentence in cause number F-78-8690-IQ is an identity of name and offense, and a similarity between “indictment” number listed on the jail card and cause number of the judgment and sentence. Though the discrepancy between these numbers was partially explained, see note 2, ante, the jury was not privy to this explanation. Neither the date of the offense, the court in which it was prosecuted, nor the ultimate disposition of the case appears on the jail card. On this state of the evidence a rational jury could not have found that the jail card, shown to be appellant’s, was sufficiently linked to the judgment and sentence as to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was the “Human” convicted. See Daniel v. State, supra; Rose v. State, 507 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
The plurality seems judicially to divine “that the cause numbers ‘F7808690’ and ‘F-78-8690-IQ’ are substantially the same.” At p. 840. That is not self evident to me. Nevertheless, having thus rendered the “indictment” number on the jail card “substantially similar” to the cause number in the prior conviction, the plurality then tacitly concludes what no case from this Court has yet held, viz., that identity (or near identity) of name and cause number is enough, without more, to link a jail card containing fingerprints of the accused to a prior judgment and sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if I agreed that the numbers here were identical, I join the court of appeals in its assessment that identity of name and cause number is not alone sufficient.
Because the evidence was insufficient to establish the earlier of the two alleged prior convictions for driving while intoxicated, the court of appeals was correct to *852“acquit” appellant of “the primary offense as a felony” under Art. 6701Z-l(e), supra. Cf. Carter v. State, 676 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Failure to prove up the defendant’s “habitual offender status” pursuant to § 12.42(d), V.T.C.A. Penal Code, during appellant’s first trial precluded State from retrying appellant as an habitual offender under the same primary offense.) Moreover, because the issue of pri- or convictions was submitted to the jury at the guilt/innocence phase of trial, appellant is entitled to a new trial on the issue of guilt and innocence as well as punishment on the primary offense, new Article 44.-29(b), V.A.C.C.P., notwithstanding. The judgment of the court of appeals should therefore be affirmed, remanding the cause to the district court, with instructions to transfer same to a court of competent jurisdiction. There appellant could be retried, and if convicted, resentenced, under the provisions of Art. 6701Z-l(b) and (c) or (d), V.T.C.S. Cf. Ex parte Bullard, 679 S.W.2d 12 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Though it was ultimately determined, contrary to our first holding at 533 S.W.2d at 816, viz; “the State may again attempt to prove the prior convictions for the purpose of enhancing punishment[,]” that Bullard could not be retried as an “habitual” under the provisions of Y.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42(d), he could nevertheless be retried as a “repeat” offender under § 12.42(a), supra, since the evidence had sufficiently proven one of the two alleged prior convictions.)
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
ONION, P.J., and DUNCAN, J., join.

. Out of the presence of the jury the police custodian testified the letter at the end of the cause number was for purposes of identification of the court, and that any variance in the letters could be attributed to a change of courts. He asserted that it was unlikely there would ‘be one case number like that with an N on it and the same case number with an MN" — in other words, as we understand him, the discrepancy in letters probably would not indicate different causes.

. Again out of the presence of the jury, the difference between the cause number “F-78-8690 IQ” appearing on the judgment, and the indictment number “F7808690” on the jail card was explained by the absence of a dash in the computer system of the Dallas County Sheriff's Department.
(All emphasis supplied unless otherwise indicated.)

. In so holding, the Court observed: "The identity of names was not sufficient.’’ Id., at 816. Ironically, independent review of the record in Bullard now reveals that both the jail card and the judgment and sentence corresponding to the second alleged prior conviction in that cause relate to one "Charles Ed ward Bullard.”

. In Jones v. State, 500 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), the State introduced judgment and sentence and a docket sheet for a prior conviction in proof of the criminal history of the defendant as authorized by Art. 37.07, § 3(a), V.A.C.C.P. Additionally, the State introduced a jail card which a deputy sheriff testified had been made upon the defendant’s arrest on a motion to revoke probation in the same cause, containing fingerprints shown to be the defendant’s. This Court held that the deputy sheriff’s testimony, the identity of cause numbers, and notations appearing on the jail card showing the date of filing of a motion to revoke, and the date and amount of a later bond, which corresponded to dates and amount reflected on the docket sheet in the prior conviction, were sufficient to link the jail card to the judgment and sentence, and thus to prove the defendant was the man earlier convicted. See also Anderson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). But see Rose v. State, 507 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), in which it was held that a jail card containing the defendant’s fingerprints, dated some months prior to the date of a judgment in the defendant’s name for theft, and reflecting that at the time of arrest he was "charged" with theft, was not shown to be "a part of the record of the prior conviction,” and thus its admission into evidence "constituted reversible error.” Id., at 548. No mention is made in the Court’s opinion as to whether the jail card contained a cause number corresponding to that of the judgment of conviction for theft.

.Emphasis in the original.

. See former Art. 3731a, § 1, V.A.C.S., now Tex. Cr.R.Evid.Rule 803(6) and (8).

. Of course, strictly speaking, the Dallas Police Department and the Dallas County District Clerk’s Office tire not part and parcel of the "same governmental entity,” Daniel, supra, at 691. However, it is certainly within common knowledge that the City of Dallas is located in Dallas County, and that a felony D.W.I. committed in the City of Dallas would likely be prosecuted in a district or criminal district court of Dallas County. We judicially know these facts. Bell v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 340, 313 S.W.2d 606 (1958), and Arts. 4.01 and 13.18, V.A.C.C.P. Given the parallels in name, offense, cause number, court, relevant dates and disposition, I am satisfied that a rational jury could readily infer that the jail card, though a record of the Dallas Police Department, corresponded to the judgment and sentence which was a record of the Dallas County District Clerk's Office.