Court Opinion

ID: 9836926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:33.115289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.355376
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(dissenting):
This is not a case of waiver. It is one of duty. Duty not done, rather than an act of knowing waiver. The laws and the rules that make up the justice system are based on the twin assumptions that everyone with responsible duties in the system will do their duty described by law and that everyone will tell the truth. If someone makes a false statement in the judicial process, it is the duty of the judge or the attorneys to point out that false statement. Silence is not an option for an officer of the court when facts that are false are being presented in a court of law and that officer has the duty to act.
In the instant case, appellant pled guilty to a single specification of absence without leave (AWOL). At trial, the reason why appellant went AWOL came out (to help a widow with 7 children), and appellant expressed “extreme remorse.” In sentencing appellant, the trial judge did a very unusual thing. He stated:
I’m going to make a recommendation to the convening authority at this point that he suspend your BCD so you would be separated administratively instead of getting out with a bad-conduct discharge.
The judge obviously did not want appellant to suffer all the effects of a federal felony conviction for the rest of his life for helping a widow with 7 children, a widow connected to his tribe and who raised appellant when his own mother kicked him out of his home.
During the posttrial review of this case, the staff judge advocate (SJA) made the following affirmative misstatement to the convening authority in his posttrial recommendation:
Clemency recommendation by the court or the military judge: None.
This was obviously a false statement,1 since the trial judge had taken the unusual step of recommending an administrative discharge instead of a BCD. Not only was it false, but RCM 1106(d)(3)(B), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.),2 was clearly violated.3 It is here, in my view, that the error was made, when the SJA made this statement and the defense remained silent and allowed the convening authority to be misled by the false statement in the SJA’s recommendation. See generally United States v. Lewis, 38 MJ 501, 516-17 (ACMR 1993) (duty of candor in the military justice system).
The majority says that the error was waived since this young appellant wanted a BCD at trial (according to the record) and immediately after trial but before the clemency process (according to the defense counsel’s affidavit). To that I say two things. *59First, there can be no waiver here because there is nothing in the record or in the posttrial affidavit which shows that appellant was informed of the SJA error and knowingly waived it. Second, when is it ever justified to allow a false statement to be made to a court or a convening authority? The saying “the end justifies the means” cannot be applied to the giving of false statements in the judicial process. Here, the means (allowing a false statement to be made to the convening authority) can never be justified by the end (at trial, appellant said he wanted a BCD, and the silence of defense counsel can help accomplish this goal). No, I am afraid that the duty I was talking about at the beginning of my opinion will not allow false statements to be made to a convening authority.
What should have been done in this case is that defense counsel should have told his client of the false statement by the SJA, and if the client approved, should have further told the convening authority that even though the trial judge recommended an administrative discharge, his client still wanted a BCD. Then the convening authority would be acting with full knowledge of the case before him.
To summarize, the decision of a convening authority to approve or not approve a punitive discharge is extremely important. See United States v. Sumrall, 45 MJ 207, 211A-211B (1996). The SJA in this case clearly erred in his affirmative misstatement to the convening authority in his posttrial recommendation. “Clemency recommendation by the court or military judge: None.” I further conclude that defense counsel was not free to remain silent and allow the convening authority to be misled simply because his client may not have desired suspension of his punitive discharge. See generally United States v. Lewis, supra (duty of candor in military justice system). Accordingly, I conclude that the SJA committed plain error which was not affirmatively waived on the record. See United States v. Parks, 46 MJ 114 (CMA 1996), cited in United States v. Wiley, 47 MJ 158,160 (1997).
I would remand this case for a new posttrial recommendation and action. See United States v. Wheelus, 49 MJ 283, 291 (1998) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).

. There is no hint that the SJA intentionally made a false statement.

. This provision is unchanged in the 1998 Manual.

. United States v. Lee, 50 MJ 296 (1999); United States v. Clear, 34 MJ 129 (CMA 1992).