Court Opinion

ID: 9725840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:15:10.891014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:20.526585
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The trial judge granted the defendant’s motion for judgment on the evidence in the following manner:
“The Court finds that there is insufficient credible evidence upon which reasonable minds might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of attempt to perform an illegal abortion, and that judgment on the evidence should be rendered for the defendant.”
In arguing that that trial court did not use the Trial Rule 50 standard, but rather the “thirteenth Juror” standard, the State relies upon the formulation of the latter rule in Huff v. Travelers Indemnity Co., (1977) 266 Ind. 414, 363 N.E.2d 985, which is:
“The trial judge in determining whether to grant a new trial sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’. He should grant a new trial when, after sifting and weighing the conflicting evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, he believes that a contrary result should have been reached in the minds of reasonable men.” 266 Ind. at 428, 363 N.E.2d 985 (Emphasis added by the State in its brief.)
The trial judge below does not state and I do not take his finding as indicating that the judge weighed conflicting evidence or judged the credibility of the witnesses. He states that “there is insufficient credible evidence”. In so doing, I regard his finding as the equivalent of a finding that there was insufficient “substantial” evidence. *1118Such a statement does not indicate that the judge weighed conflicting evidence or judged the credibility of witnesses. We have said many times at the appellate level in reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim that the conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to sustain each material element of the crime charged. Brown v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 161, 247 N.E.2d 76. This is the same standard to be applied in ruling upon a motion for judgment on the evidence.
The majority opinion makes much of what went on during the hearing upon the motion, but I see those events as consistent with the application by the judge of the proper legal standard. On appeal we have briefs which recite the evidence most favorable to the verdict. Even then, resort to the record of proceedings and the testimony is common. The trial judge does not have the benefit of such briefs. A trial judge in considering a motion for judgment on the evidence must conduct an initial investigation into the entire body of the evidence to identify and sort out that which supports the party having the burden of proof and that which does not. He will normally give vocal consideration to the meaning of words, phrases and entire testimonies, point out conflicts, and, yes, even give voice to a belief that the defendant should be found not guilty. How many times have appellate judges been heard to say: If I had been on that jury I would probably have voted to acquit, but since I sit on a court of appeals I am duty bound to affirm the conviction?
I am satisfied that the judge had the authority to grant the motion following a mistrial on the basis of a deadlocked jury, and used the proper standard. The defendant stands acquitted according to law. I therefore dissent.