Court Opinion

ID: 9794376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:04:47.770466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:14:57.717853
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring and specially concurring.
But for the majority upholding the district court ruling that it could and would consider Brown’s juvenile records in sentencing him, in Part III of the Court’s opinion, I would fully concur in Justice Johnson’s opinion. These juvenile records consist of several reports from mental health professionals on Brown’s mental health and amenability to treatment. The majority concludes I.C. § 16-18161 did not bar the district court from considering Brown’s juvenile records. I do not see that
*395any of these reports were the least bit necessary.
Idaho Code § 16-1816 prohibits dissemination of such information without the express order of the juvenile court.2 That statute provides in relevant part that:
All information obtained and social records prepared in the discharge of official duty by an employee of the court shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the court or others entitled under this act to receive such information, unless and until otherwise ordered by the court.
1.C. § 16-1816 (emphasis added). The statute allows dissemination of the “facts contained in such reports” to be released to “persons and governmental and private agencies and institutions conducting pertinent research studies or having a legitimate interest in the protection, welfare or treatment of the child.” On the order of the district court, pursuant to motion of the prosecutor, the reports were released to the adult court, the prosecutor and the presentence investigator, none of whom were entitled under the act to that information and none of whom were conducting “pertinent research studies” or had “a legitimate interest in the protection, welfare and treatment of the child.” Their interest was in determining the appropriate punishment for Brown the adult and the necessary measure of the protection for the public. The day had long passed by for any consideration of rehabilitating Brown the child.
Unfortunately, the majority opinion shows no concern for the deleterious effect Part III of the opinion will have on the juvenile courts of the State. Although the version of I.C. § 16-1816 at issue here has been repealed, the version effective until July 1, 1993, is similar to the former statute and the majority’s opinion may be looked to for guidance in interpreting the current statute. Thus, when defense attorneys realize that their juvenile clients’ social and clinical studies will probably be available to those outside the juvenile system, they may advise their clients to not participate in those evaluations. It would be malpractice, in the view of some, for attorneys to fail to at least advise their juvenile clients of this possibility and some children may decide not to participate in those studies even though their attorneys think it may be in the child’s best interest to obtain such an evaluation. Further, it will only be a matter of time before this Court will have to decide whether such studies are the functional equivalent of interrogation requiring Miranda3 warnings. The United States Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), held that psychological evaluations used to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed must be preceded by Miranda warnings.
Children who now fully cooperate with the mental health professionals will be running the risk of increased confinement, should they commit an offense when they become adults. Those who do not cooperate will risk having juvenile jurisdiction waived. One of the factors used in deciding whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction is “[t]he likelihood of rehabilitation of the child____” In other words, the majority places children in a Catch-22 by discouraging them from being honest and forthright with those who have their best interest at heart for fear that their confidences will be automatically accessible to those who may later seek to punish them.
Because it will reduce the rehabilitative options available to the juvenile courts, the opinion for the Court is capable of producing a result contrary to what the legislature contemplated. On the other hand, a reading of I.C. § 16-1816 which prohibited the dissemination of information for sentencing purposes without the permission of the juvenile court would be in harmony with the legislative policy set out in the Youth Rehabilitation Act. One of the pri*396mary purposes of the YRA is to provide for “professional assistance to courts handling children’s cases, through a coordinated program of rehabilitation____” I.C. § 16-1801. Children will be more likely to fully and honestly participate in the studies if they know their records are not automatically accessible by the adult system. This will increase the chances that a youthful offender will be successfully handled within the juvenile system.
Such an interpretation is also in keeping with the dictates of I.C. § 16-1844 which requires the YRA to be “liberally construed to the end that the legislative policy expressed herein is achieved.” An interpretation which maximizes the amount of information deemed confidential would further the rehabilitative purpose of the YRA.
There is no need to address the admissibility of the records under the facts of this case for as the Solicitor General noted in his brief, “the juvenile records played little, if any, role in the defendant’s sentencing. His post-juvenile behavior and the facts and circumstances of the crime were far more damning than anything appearing in the juvenile records. The court essentially ignored the juvenile records, and reversible error [cannot] be predicated upon them.”
In light of the above discussion, this author would not have reached the issues of whether I.C. §§ 54-2314, 54-3213 or I.R.E. 503(b)(2) barred the production of the records. The majority should have shown the same amount of judicial restraint.
Although this Court is in unanimous agreement that Brown is a bad character, one who is in more need of incarceration than the average person who has committed a crime, a genuine concern of this one Justice is the adverse effect upon juveniles generally, who otherwise might cooperate more openly with Health and Welfare officials attempting to help them. Although Brown’s future is fixed, it would be so even if this Court did not approve the district court’s ruling making juvenile records readily available at sentencing, a result the majority need not reach under the harmless error doctrine and a result not supported by law or public policy.

. Brown’s case falls under the former version of I.C. § 16-1816. This statute was twice amended in 1990. One amendment became effective on July 1, 1990, and is effective until July 1, 1993. The second amendment is effective after that expiration of the first. Brown’s sentencing hearing was held in 1989.

. To avoid any confusion, the district court sitting in juvenile jurisdiction will be called "juvenile court” and the district court sitting in general jurisdiction will be called "adult court.”

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).