Court Opinion

ID: 9600533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:28:05.20868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:29.801131
License: Public Domain

*619WARREN, J.
Plaintiffs filed an action in circuit court for a declaratory judgment, seeking to overturn the decision of Clatsop County (County) that Sports Acres, Inc., Milton Brown, and Raymond Kittleson (defendants) had a vested right to continue a nonconforming use. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint, because the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) had exclusive jurisdiction to review the County’s nonconforming use decision. We affirm.
In 1978, defendants purchased Sports Acres, a 50-acre complex consisting of a swimming pool, tennis courts, tracks and athletic fields. Shortly thereafter, defendants acquired an option to purchase 228 additional acres to develop for recreational vehicle and tent camping sites. After the Clatsop County Planning Commission determined that defendants’ intended use was permitted under the then existing zoning ordinance, defendants purchased and began developing the property. In 1980, the County adopted a new zoning ordinance that prohibited defendants’ intended use of the property. Defendants sought a resolution from the County that they had a vested right to their nonconforming use of the property. Plaintiffs, owners of property across the river from Sports Acres, opposed the resolution. After a public hearing, at which the County Commission heard arguments and received exhibits, it issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and determined that defendants had a vested right to continue their nonconforming use.1
Plaintiffs appealed the County’s resolution to LUBA and also initiated this action for declaratory judgment in circuit court. LUBA dismissed the appeal on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, because the circuit court had primary jurisdiction to decide vested rights issues. Plaintiffs did not appeal LUBA’s decision. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that LUBA had exclusive jurisdiction to review vested rights determinations of local governments.
The issue here is what forum has jurisdiction to determine the existence of a vested right to a nonconforming use. *620We hold that LUBA was the only forum in which plaintiffs could have contested the County’s determination that defendants had a vested right to continue their nonconforming use.
LUBA has “exclusive jurisdiction to review any land use decision of a local government * * Or Laws 1979, ch 772, § 4(1) (as amended). ORS 197.015 defines the term “land use decision”:
* * * *
“ (10) ‘Land use decision’ means:
“(a) A final decision or determination made by a local government or special district that concerns the adoption, amendment or application of:
£<$ * * * *
“(C) A land use regulation;
* * * ifc
“(11) ‘Land use regulation’ means any local government zoning ordinance, land division ordinance adopted under ORS 92.044 or 92.046 or similar general ordinance establishing standards for implementing a comprehensive plan. ‘Land use regulation’ does not include small tract zoning map amendments, conditional use permits, individual subdivision, partitioning or planned unit development approvals or denials, annexation, variances, building permits and similar administrative-type decisions.” (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no question that the decision was final and was made by a local government. Further, the County’s determination that defendants had a vested right to continue a nonconforming use was a “land use decision” within the meaning of ORS 197.015. The decision concerned the application of a land use regulation, because the purpose of the County’s vested right determination was to resolve whether the local government zoning ordinance would be applied to bar defendants’ intended use of the property. The County decided that a vested right exists, so it did not apply the ordinance and allowed defendants to continue their nonconforming use. Lastly, the County’s decision was not similar to those administrative-type decisions excluded from the definition of a “land use regulation.” To determine whether defendants had a vested right to continue a nonconforming use, the County made findings of fact and applied those facts to a set of judicially-established guidelines. See Cook v. Clackamas County, *62150 Or App 75, 622 P2d 1107, rev den 290 Or 853 (1981). The substance of the County’s vested right determination was quasi-judicial rather than administrative.
Plaintiffs rely on three cases for the propositions that local governments lack the power to declare the existence of a vested right to a nonconforming use and that the circuit court has primary jurisdiction over vested right issues: Eagle Creek Rock Prod. v. Clackamas Co., 27 Or App 371, 556 P2d 150 (1976), rev den 278 Or 157 (1977); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Clackamas Co. Comm., 29 Or App 617, 564 P2d 1080 (1977); Eklund v. Clackamas County, 36 Or App 73, 583 P2d 567 (1978). These cases were decided before the creation of LUBA. Even before LUBA was established, we recognized that the local government’s vested right determination was “not a nullity” but was “valid and binding unless and until a contrary decision [was] made by some other tribunal, such as the circuit court.” 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Clackamas Co. Comm., supra, 29 Or App at 620. When it created LUBA, the legislature infused the vested rights decisions of local governments with more vitality by establishing “some other tribunal,” LUBA, to review land use decisions and by providing for judicial review of LUBA decisions by this court. Or Laws 1979, ch 772 § 6a (as amended). Therefore, the circuit courts no longer have “primary” jurisdiction over vested rights issues.
 Nothing in the legislation creating LUBA expressly or impliedly precludes the circuit courts from exercising original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions to decide vested rights issues raised initially in that forum. The circuit courts’ decisions are reviewable by this court. However, when a vested rights issue is submitted to and finally decided by a local government, LUBA has exclusive jurisdiction to review that issue arising in that forum. The original vested right determination can be made by either the the local government in the context of determining the application of a zoning ordinance or by the circuit court but not both.
Here, once the County decided the vested rights issue, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ suit for a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs’ remedy after an adverse decision from the Board was to appeal to LUBA, which they did, and to appeal an adverse decision from LUBA to us, which they failed to do. To the extent that Eagle Creek Rock Prod. v. *622Clackamas Co., supra, 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Clackamas Co. Comm., supra, and Eklund v. Clackamas County, supra, are contrary to this decision, they are overruled.
Affirmed.

 No issue has been raised as to whether the procedures employed by the County in making its vested right determination complied with the requirements of due process.