Court Opinion

ID: 9732408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:19:25.614418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:25.843397
License: Public Domain

Quinn, P. J.
(dissenting). I suppose what I am about to write can aptly be termed an exercise in futility. It is contrary to what I agreed to in People v. Whisenant (1968), 11 Mich App 432, and, prima facie, contrary to the rule of Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), 384 US 719 (86 S Ct 1772, 16 L Ed 2d 882), as interpreted by Jenkins v. Delaware (1969), 395 US 213 (89 S Ct 1677, 23 L Ed 2d 253). I trust my sincerity in expressing my dissent from the majority opinion will be measured by the fact that in order to do so, I must confess personal error in signing Whisenant, supra.
In Whisenant revisited, I concur with the majority that section 3501 of the crime control act of June 19, 1968 (Public Law 90-351, 82 Stat 210, 211, 18 USCA, § 3501) does not apply to state trials and does not support the admission in evidence of Whisenant’s confession at his retrial.
If I still concurred with People v. Whisenant (1968), 11 Mich App 432, I would agree with the majority that the trial judge was bound by that decision and that it was error for him to admit Whisenant’s confession at a retrial. For reasons presently to be expressed, I have concluded that Whisenant’s confession was admissible at his first trial and that reversal of his conviction because the confession was not obtained under Miranda standards was erroneous. If the confession was admissible at the first trial, it was not error to admit it at the retrial.
February 2, 1966, defendant confessed. He was convicted by a jury June 27, 1966. In People v. Whisenant (1968), 11 Mich App 432, we reversed *191that conviction, holding that Whisenant’s confession was inadmissible because he was not advised of his right to have counsel, retained or appointed, present during interrogation. That decision was planted squarely on Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 US 436 (86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974) and gave no consideration to Johnson v. New Jersey, supra.
The latter case made the Miranda doctrine applicable to “trials commenced” and “cases commenced” after decision date of Miranda (June 13, 1966). It hardly seems necessary to cite authority for the proposition that “trials commenced” is not synonymous with “cases commenced,” but lest there be doubt that this is true, reference is made to Carpenter v. Winn (1911), 221 US 533 (31 S Ct 683, 55 L Ed 842) and to Post v. United States (1896), 161 US 583 (16 S Ct 611, 40 L Ed 816) at the federal level, and to Crane v. Reeder (1874), 28 Mich 527, and People v. Clement (1888), 72 Mich 116, at the state level. In addition, the United States Supreme Court recognized the confusion created by this language variance by reviewing and deciding Jenkins v. Delaware, supra.
It is conceded that Jenkins contains language which supports the “trials commenced” language of Johnson, but I do not find Jenkins controlling in Whisenant for 4 reasons. First, the precise issue of Whisenant was not before the Jenkins court. In Jenkins, the question was whether the Miranda standards applied to a retrial of a defendant whose first trial was pre-Miranda. If the first trial was pre-Miranda, that case was necessarily commenced pre-Miranda. In the first Whisenant case, the issue was whether the Miranda standards applied to a case commenced pre-Miranda but the trial of which was post-Miranda.
*192Secondly, Jenkins was afforded a retrial for reasons unrelated to the admissibility of Ms incriminating statements.
Thirdly, the gratuitous statement in Jenkins, referring to Johnson, that
“But in an effort to extend the protection of Miranda to as many defendants as was consistent with society’s legitimate concern that convictions already validly obtained not be needlessly aborted, we selected the commencement of the trial”,
is not supported by the reasoning of Johnson.
Fourthly, the statement in Jenkins that
“Implicit in this choice was the assumption that, with few exceptions, the commission and investigation of a crime would be sufficiently proximate to the commencement of the defendant’s trial that no undue burden would be imposed upon prosecuting authorities by requiring them to find evidentiary substitutes for statements obtained in violation of the constitutional protections afforded by Miranda”,
is factually inaccurate, at least in Michigan.*
Returning to Johnson in an effort to resolve the ambiguity arising from the use of “trials commenced” and “cases commenced” as the starting point for the application of the Miranda doctrine, I find the answer to be in the reasoning used by the Johnson court to sustain its prospective application of Miranda. After explaining why some constitutional rules of criminal procedure' should be ap*193plied retroactively and some prospectively, the court chose the latter application for Miranda because:
(a) “Law enforcement agencies fairly relied on these prior cases, now no longer binding, in obtaining incriminating statements during the intervening years preceding Escobedo and Miranda.,
* # &
(b) “Future defendants will benefit fully from our new standards governing in-custody interrogation, while past defendants may still avail themselves of the voluntariness test.,
(c) “Law enforcement officers and trial courts will have fair notice that statements taken in violation of these standards may not be used against an accused.,
(d) “Authorities attempting to protect the privilege have not been apprised heretofore of the specific safeguards which are now obligatory. Consequently they have adopted devices which, although below the constitutional minimum, were not intentional evasions of the requirements of the privilege.”
To me, all of the assigned reasons for making the application of Miranda principles prospective relate to the investigatory process rather than to trial, and use of “cases commenced” prior to Miranda as the starting point for the application of Miranda seems more logical to me than “trials commenced”.
For these reasons, I find our conclusion in People v. Whisenant (1968), 11 Mich App 432, erroneous and I vote to affirm this latest case of Whisenant.

 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, table D6, p 270,. indicates a median time lag from filing to disposition of criminal defendants in the Eastern District of Michigan of 19.5 months for court trial and 9.8 months for jury trial. The last available report (1967) from the Michigan Court Administrator indicates the mean statewide lag.to be 4.8 months for court trial and 5.2 months for jury trial. Neither report reflects the time lag between investigation and the filing 'of charges.