Court Opinion

ID: 9373749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:07:06.500861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:43.378717
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MAGAN MCLEAN,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                Appellant,                           DC-315H-16-0900-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: April 21, 2022
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Magan McLean, Asheville, North Carolina, pro se.

           Monique Smart, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction . Generally, we grant
     petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision
     contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
     the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review.     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and
     AFFIRM the initial decision, except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify that the
     appellant held an excepted-service position at the time of her termination and to
     apply the statutory provisions applicable to individuals in the excepted service in
     finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The record reflects that, effective October 4, 2015, the agency appointed the
     appellant, a preference eligible, to an excepted-service position as a GS-6
     Advanced Medical Support Assistant under the authority of 38 U.S.C. § 7401(3).
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 19-20.        The Standard Form 50 (SF-50)
     documenting    her   appointment    indicated   that   she    was   appointed   to   a
     competitive-service position and that her appointment was subject to completion
     of a 1-year trial period. Id. at 20. The agency subsequently issued a corrected
     SF-50 reflecting that the position was in the excepted service. Id. at 19.
¶3         Prior to the end of her 1-year trial period, the agency informed the appellant
     that she would be terminated from her excepted-service position effective
     September 16, 2016, due to her inability to meet performance expectations. Id.
     at 14. The SF-50 documenting her termination indicates that she was terminated
     from a competitive-service position pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 315.804, which
                                                                                             3

     pertains to the termination of probationers in the competitive service for
     inadequate performance or conduct. Id. at 13. She appealed her termination to
     the Board. IAF, Tab 2.
¶4         In an order on jurisdiction, the administrative judge notified the appellant of
     the applicable law and her burden of proof to establish the Board’s jurisdiction
     over her appeal as a probationary employee in the competitive service.              IAF,
     Tab 5.   The appellant did not respond to the order on jurisdiction.             Without
     holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     finding that it was undisputed that the appellant had less than 1 year of service at
     the time of her termination and, therefore, did not meet the statutory definition of
     an “employee” with adverse action appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A).
     IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 3. The administrative judge further f ound
     that the appellant did not have a regulatory right of appeal under 5 C.F.R.
     § 315.806(b) because she had not alleged that her termination was based on
     partisan political or marital status discrimination. ID at 3-4. Accordingly, the
     administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 4.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, and the
     agency has responded in opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. 2

     2
       On May 4, 2017, the Board issued a show cause order informing the parties that the
     record contained conflicting information about whether the appellant held a
     competitive- or excepted-service position and ordering the agency to clarify the nature
     of the appellant’s appointment. PFR File, Tab 4 at 1-2, 4. The Board’s order also
     notified the appellant that her position appeared to be in the excepted service, set forth
     the applicable law and burden of proof to establish Board jurisdiction over her
     termination as an excepted-service appointee, and afforded her an opportunity to
     respond. Id. at 3-4. Neither party responded to the show cause order. Approximately
     4 months past the filing deadline and without any explanation for the delay, however,
     the agency submitted a response to the order indicating that the appellant was an
     excepted-service appointee. PFR File, Tab 5. We have reviewed the untimely response
     and find that it does not change the outcome of this appeal.
                                                                                      4

                                        ANALYSIS
     We modify the initial decision to         clarify that the appellant held an
     excepted-service appointment.
¶6         As noted above, the SF-50 documenting the appellant’s appointment and the
     termination letter reflect that she held an excepted-service position, and the
     SF-50 documenting her termination reflects that she held a competitive -service
     position. IAF, Tab 7 at 13, 19. While an SF-50 is relevant evidence regarding an
     employee’s status, it is not dispositive. See Scott v. Department of the Air Force,
     113 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 8 (2010) (finding that an SF-50 is not a legally operative
     document that controls an employee’s status and rights but is merely the
     customary documentation for a Federal personnel action). Here, we find that the
     appellant, who was appointed to an Advanced Medical Support Assistant position
     under the authority of 38 U.S.C. § 7401(3), held an excepted-service position
     because appointments in the Veterans Health Administration under 38 U.S.C.
     § 7401 are in the excepted service.      See Graves v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 114 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 11 (2010); see also Barrand v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 9 (2009) (explaining that individuals
     appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(3) are not excluded from filing appeals under
     chapter 75 of title 5); PFR File, Tab 5 at 4. Therefore, we modify the initial
     decision to clarify that the appellant was terminated from an excepted -service
     position.

     The administrative judge correctly determined that the Board lacks jurisdiction
     over the appellant’s termination appeal, but we modify the initial decision to
     clarify the basis for this finding.
¶7         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.       Maddox v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75,
     subchapter II, an individual who meets the definition of “employee” at 5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1) generally has the right to challenge her removal from Federal service
                                                                                               5

     by filing an appeal with the Board. Maibaum v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     116 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 9 (2011).
¶8           In the instant matter, the administrative judge found that the appellant did
     not meet the definition of an “employee” with appeal rights under 5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(A), which pertains to individuals in the competitive service.               ID
     at 3.     As discussed above, however, the appellant was serving in an
     excepted-service position, rather than a competitive-service position, at the time
     of her termination.      In addition, the record reflects that the appellant is a
     preference eligible. IAF, Tab 7 at 13, 20. Therefore, the applicable statutory
     provision is 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B), and we modify the initial decision
     consistent with the following analysis.
¶9           To be considered an “employee” for the purposes of Board jurisdiction, a
     preference-eligible individual in the excepted service must have completed 1 year
     of current continuous service in the same or similar positions. 3                5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(B); see Maibaum, 116 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 9.                   Here, the agency
     appointed the appellant to her excepted-service position on October 4, 2015, and
     terminated her appointment before the completion of her first year of service,
     effective September 16, 2016.        IAF, Tab 7 at 13, 19.        The appellant has not
     alleged that she had more than 1 year of service in her position or that there was

     3
       An appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an
     appealable jurisdictional issue. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d
     641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As noted above, the administrative judge notified the
     appellant of the requirements for proving jurisdiction over an appeal by an individual i n
     the competitive service under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). IAF, Tab 5. However, because
     the appellant was appointed to an excepted-service position and was a preference
     eligible, the Board’s jurisdiction over her appeal is governed by 5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(B). Although the administrative judge did not provide the appellant with
     the correct jurisdictional notice, the Board provided the correct information in a show
     cause order on review and afforded the appellant an opportunity to respond. PFR File,
     Tab 4. Therefore, the appellant was not prejudiced by this error. See Panter v.
     Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (holding that an adjudicatory
     error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal
     of an initial decision).
                                                                                        6

      any other service that could be counted towards completion of 1 year of current
      continuous service in a similar position.          IAF, Tabs 2, 9; PFR File, Tab 1.
      Therefore, we find that the appellant is not an “employee” with a statutory right
      to appeal her termination to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B).
¶10         As noted above, the administrative judge further found that the appellant
      did not have a regulatory right of appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 because she
      had not alleged that her termination was based on partisan political reason s or
      marital status discrimination. ID at 4. The Board has found, however, that an
      individual appointed in the excepted service has no regulatory right to appeal
      under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 because it applies only to individuals in the competitive
      service. Barrand, 112 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 13. Accordingly, we modify the initial
      decision to find that 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b) does not apply to the appellant and
      that she cannot establish jurisdiction by proving that her termination was based
      on partisan political reasons or marital status.
¶11         On review, the appellant argues that the agency failed to give her advanced
      notice of the separation pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 315.805 and failed to follow the
      requirements of the collective bargaining agreement in implementing her
      termination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-6. These arguments, however, provide no basis
      to find Board jurisdiction over this appeal.              Like 5 C.F.R. § 315.806,
      section 315.805 applies only to individuals in the competitive service.         See
      Barrand, 112 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 13. In addition, the appellant’s Board appeal rights
      are determined by the nature of her appointment—not by contract.          Id., ¶ 11.
      Therefore, alleged violations of the collective bargaining agreement are irrelevant
      to the jurisdictional issue. See id.
                                                                                      7

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

4
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         8

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative re ceives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
                                                                                  9

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     10

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           11

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.