Court Opinion

ID: 9926996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 22:35:09.545332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:30.524251
License: Public Domain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                     FILED
                                                                                 January 25, 2024
State of West Virginia,                                                            C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
Plaintiff Below, Respondent                                                      SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                      OF WEST VIRGINIA

vs.) No. 22-0298 (Berkeley County CC-02-2019-F-352)

Antoine Lane,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner Antoine Lane appeals the Circuit Court of Berkeley County’s March 18, 2022,
conviction and sentencing order sentencing him to an aggregate sentence of eleven to twenty-five
years of incarceration for distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.1 Upon our
review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision is
appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. Proc. 21.

        In 2019, a grand jury indicted petitioner on multiple drug charges related to “multiple
controlled [drug] buys,” including a hand-to-hand transfer of cocaine from a drug supplier to a
confidential informant in September 2017. Petitioner entered into a plea agreement whereby he
pled nolo contendere to one count of the felony offense of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and one
count of the felony offense of distribution of cocaine. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the
remaining counts of the indictment and agreed not to file a recidivist action against petitioner.
Additionally, the State agreed not to pursue “as of yet uncharged criminal drug-related conduct”
by petitioner that occurred on specified dates in 2017 and 2018. The State further agreed to dismiss
charges against petitioner pending in an unrelated case. During petitioner’s plea hearing, following
a plea colloquy, the circuit court found a factual basis to support the entry of petitioner’s plea.

         Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State remained silent and made no sentencing
recommendation. Petitioner’s counsel also waived petitioner’s right of allocution. Petitioner’s
counsel argued in favor of a suspended sentence, which would result in seven years of supervised
probation. After considering the issues and the content of the pre-sentence investigation report, the
court sentenced petitioner to ten years of incarceration for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and one
to fifteen years for distribution of cocaine, said sentences to run consecutively. As the court stated
in its March 18, 2022, conviction and sentencing order, it voiced a number of reasons for its
decision, including petitioner’s “lengthy history of not incidental offenses;” employment prospects
that were “speculative at best;” suggestions that he will live with a woman who was charged with
felony drug-related offenses; and petitioner’s admissions that “he is addicted to selling rather than

       1
         Petitioner appears by counsel Patrick Kratovil. The State of West Virginia appears by
counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General R. Todd Goudy.
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using drugs, [] his primary vocation has been selling drugs, and [he] violated bond herein.”
Petitioner was given credit for time served and remanded to the custody of the WVDOCR.
Petitioner appeals from that order.2

         In his single assignment of error, petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in imposing
his sentence because his sentence was harsher than that of his codefendants. As we have stated,
“We review a sentencing order ‘under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order
violates statutory or constitutional commands.’” State v. Hoyle, 242 W. Va. 599, 611, 836 S.E.2d
817, 829 (2019) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997)).
In addition, we have long held that “‘[s]entences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory
limits and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.’ Syl.
Pt. 4, State v. Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982).” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Riffle, 247
W. Va. 14, 875 S.E.2d 152 (2002). That guideline is tempered, however, by the Eighth
Amendment’s “‘proportionality principle: “Penalties shall be proportioned to the character and
degree of the offence.”’ Syllabus point 8, State v. Vance, 164 W. Va. 216, 262 S.E.2d 423 (1980).”
Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State v. Booth, 224 W. Va. 307, 685 S.E.2d 701 (2009). We apply two tests to
evaluate the proportionality of a sentence. “The first is subjective and asks whether the sentence
for the particular crime shocks the conscience of the court and society. If a sentence is so offensive
that it cannot pass a societal and judicial sense of justice, the inquiry need not proceed
further.” State v. Cooper, 172 W. Va. 266, 272, 304 S.E.2d 851, 857 (1983). The second is an
objective inquiry, requiring us to give consideration “to the nature of the offense, the legislative
purpose behind the punishment, a comparison of the punishment with what would be inflicted in
other jurisdictions, and a comparison with other offenses within the same
jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Syl. Pt. 5, Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205
(1981)).

        Petitioner has not alleged that the court considered any impermissible factor, and the
transcript of the plea hearing does not evidence the consideration of any such factor. In addition,
petitioner has not alleged that his sentences are not within statutory limits, and the sentences
imposed are clearly within the respective statutory ranges for felony delivery of a controlled
substance and felony drug conspiracy. The transcript of the plea hearing evidences the fact that the
State intended to present evidence of drug deals between petitioner and a confidential informant
and that charges dismissed as part of the plea agreement included possession of marijuana and

       2
          This Court has extremely limited factual information in this case because the appendix
record contains only three documents: the signed plea agreement, the circuit court’s conviction
and sentencing order, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing. Despite the fact that this Court
granted petitioner’s request for additional time to perfect his appeal, petitioner failed to comply
with this Court’s amended scheduling order, necessitating a Notice of Intent to Sanction for failure
to timely perfect petitioner’s appeal. When petitioner’s counsel filed his dilatory brief in this case,
it fell woefully short of complying with the requirements of Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The deficiencies include the lack of citation to the record. Further,
petitioner’s “argument” is a mere three sentences, which begins with counsel’s contention that he
“was unable to find caselaw to support [p]etitioner’s positions . . . .” Therefore, we remind counsel
of his duty to comply with Rule 10(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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fleeing from an officer. During that hearing, the court also addressed petitioner’s lengthy criminal
history, including his involvement with drugs as both a user and seller, specifically noting it
appeared to the court that petitioner “will continue to keep his connections to those connected with
his drug lifestyle in this community.” Further, while petitioner does not argue that his sentence
shocks the conscience, we find that his aggregate sentence neither shocks the conscience nor is it
objectively disproportionate.

        While petitioner argues that he should have received probation because he believes his
codefendants did, this Court has no information as to the charges against the codefendants; the
codefendants’ criminal history; the codefendants’ plea agreement(s), if any exist; or any of the
other information necessary to determine whether petitioner and the codefendants were similarly
situated. The circuit court, however, noted during petitioner’s sentencing hearing that due to
petitioner’s “pretty long history of not incidental criminal charges,” petitioner was “not on the
same playing field as his co[]defendants,” going on to state that the codefendants “didn’t have this
kind of a record.” As this Court has found, “[t]he decision of a trial court to deny probation will
be overturned only when, on the facts of the case, that decision constituted a palpable abuse of
discretion.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Shaw, 208 W. Va. 426, 541 S.E.2d 21 (2000) (citation omitted). In
addition, “the decision as to whether the imposition of probation is appropriate in a certain case is
entirely within the circuit court’s discretion.” State v. Duke, 200 W. Va. 356, 364, 489 S.E.2d 738,
846 (1997). Importantly, we have further found that

               [d]isparate sentences for codefendants are not per se unconstitutional.
       Courts consider many factors such as each codefendant’s respective involvement
       in the criminal transaction (including who was the prime mover), prior records,
       rehabilitative potential (including post-arrest conduct, age and maturity), and lack
       of remorse. If codefendants are similarly situated, some courts will reverse on
       disparity of sentence alone.

Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Buck, 173 W. Va. 243, 314 S.E.2d 406 (1984). Based upon the limited record
before this Court, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s request
for an alternative sentence and, instead, imposing the statutory terms of incarceration.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

ISSUED: January 25, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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