Court Opinion

ID: 9954059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 17:01:10.61692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:48.733078
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 25 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONNIE LEE STANDLEY,                            No.    22-35824

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 4:21-cv-00022-BMM

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF MONTANA; MONTANA
STATE PRISON; CORE CIVIC CCA/CCC;
MONTANA STATE PRISON, Warden;
BLUDWORTH; JANE/JOHN DOE, No.2;
KANYA/ALSTAD; UNKNOWN GUARDS,
No. 1; UNKNOWN GUARDS, No. 2;
CRISTIANS; CROWDER,

                Defendants,

HENSON; HERKENHOFF; KLOOS;
MUNSON; SCARENTAVOS; SIMONS;
SMITHERMAN; STROMBERG,

                Defendants,

VINES; WANDLAR; WINNY D.; YORK;
DURHAM; JOHN/JANE DOE, No. 3;
JOHN/JANE DOE, No. 4; JOHN/JANE
DOE, No. 5; JOHN/JANE DOE, No. 6,

                Defendants,

and

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
DEVERA,

                Defendant-Appellee,

TILLMAN,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Montana
                    Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 21, 2024**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Donnie Lee Standley appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims and

grant of summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings to the defendants. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s

grant of summary judgment, grant of judgment on the pleadings and dismissal of

Standley’s claims in a screening order, construing Standley’s filings liberally. Soto

v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 869, 872 (9th Cir. 2018); Parker v. County of

Riverside, 78 F.4th 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2023) (per curiam); Nordstrom v. Ryan,

762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

                                          2
for further proceedings on Standley’s claim that prison officials destroyed mail

from his father.1

      1. Standley challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim that prison

officials seized legal documents and evidence from him upon his entry into

Montana State Prison (MSP) on December 20, 2017, then destroyed those

documents and evidence. Standley’s complaint, however, was not filed until

February 2021. His claim was subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See

Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for

personal injury claims); Mont. Code Ann. § 27–2–204(1) (providing a three-year

statute of limitations for most claims). The district court therefore appropriately

dismissed this claim as barred by the statute of limitations.

      Standley also submitted an amended complaint alleging that defendant

Kloos retaliated against him for filing his initial complaint by, among other acts,

destroying more legal documents and placing him in the Restricted Housing Unit.

1
  Standley moves for default judgment on the ground that the defendants did not
timely file their answering brief. The defendants timely filed their answering brief,
however, on May 24, 2023. Standley’s motion for default judgment (Dkt. No. 30)
is accordingly DENIED.

                                          3
By this point in the proceedings, however, Kloos was no longer a party.2 The

district court therefore appropriately declined to join Kloos to the action because

Standley’s claims do not seek liability “jointly, severally, or in the alternative”

against Kloos and do not arise out of the same “transaction” or “occurrence” as the

claims Standley initially stated. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A); see also George v.

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that, under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[u]nrelated

claims against different defendants belong in different suits”).

      2. Standley appeals the district court’s dismissal of and grant of judgment on

the pleadings to the defendants on his claims that the defendants violated his right

of access to the courts by failing to provide sufficient access to professional legal

assistance, a law library, legal research tools and a typewriter, among other alleged

deficiencies. To state a claim for deprivation of the right of access to the courts, a

plaintiff must “demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal

assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). “The hindered claim must also be ‘nonfrivolous,’ as

‘[d]epriving someone of a frivolous claim . . . deprives him of nothing at all . . . .’”

2
 Although Standley named Kloos as a defendant in his original complaint, the
district court dismissed Kloos in a screening order because the complaint contained
no allegations against Kloos that stated a claim. Standley does not appeal the
dismissal of Kloos from his original complaint or argue on appeal that this
complaint stated a claim against Kloos.

                                           4
Nasby v. Nevada, 79 F.4th 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at

353 n.3).

      Standley does not explain how the issues he complains of prevented him

from bringing a potentially meritorious claim. Standley argues that, because of

these issues and his learning disability,3 he was unable to bring a successful state

post-conviction petition. He emphasizes that Montana courts rejected some of his

claims because the claims were “not support[ed] . . . with legal analysis, legal

citations, or evidence.” Standley v. State, 524 P.3d 75, 2023 WL 1989058, at *3

(Mont. Feb. 14, 2023). But Standley does not explain what successful claims he

could have brought or how additional access to legal resources would have enabled

him to bring an arguably meritorious challenge. See Nasby, 79 F.4th at 1056. The

district court therefore appropriately dismissed these claims.

      3. Standley appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claim that he was

unable to call on the prison phone a witness material to his post-conviction

challenges, because the witness’s phone number was blocked. A claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, however, only lies against a defendant acting “under color of state

3
 Although Standley’s complaint requests “assistance” for his disability, he does
not bring a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Rehabilitation Act
for reasonable accommodations, alleges no facts describing his disability, and
points to no request for a reasonable accommodation made to the prison in which
he describes his disability. Any claim for an accommodation is therefore
unexhausted. See Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005).

                                          5
law.” Pasadena Republican Club v. W. Justice Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir.

2021) (quoting Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir.

2020)). And Standley does not identify any state actor responsible for blocking the

phone number.4 The district court therefore appropriately dismissed this claim.

      4. Standley appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claim that the

defendants unlawfully read his “legal mail” outside of his presence. None of the

mail identified in the record, however, includes “legal mail”—i.e., confidential

communications from an attorney. See Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204,

1210 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a prisoner has a right to have “confidential

legal mail” opened in his presence because he might otherwise “be wary of

engaging in future communication about privileged legal matters”). Standley

therefore had no right to have that mail opened only in his presence. See id.

      Standley also appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claim that prison

staff confiscated photographic and documentary evidence his father sent him

through the mail. Standley’s complaint alleges that, when he complained to mail

room staff, they told him that they could restrict any non-legal mail for any reason.

The district court dismissed this claim because this mail did not constitute legal

4
 Although Standley alleges that Fire Chief York failed to sufficiently investigate
why the phone number was blocked, he does not explain why Fire Chief York had
any constitutional obligation to do so. An exhibit attached to Standley’s complaint,
moreover, reveals that Fire Chief York determined that the phone number had been
blocked by its owner.

                                          6
mail. But prisoners “enjoy[] a First Amendment right to send and receive mail,”

even when the mail is not sent to or from an attorney. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d

264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). And although this right is subject to

reasonable regulations, see id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)), the

defendants identify no such regulations on appeal, instead resting solely on the

ground that the relevant mail was not “legal mail.” We therefore reverse the district

court’s dismissal of this claim and remand for further proceedings.5

      5. Standley appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his

claim that he was unlawfully denied access to mail stamped with adhesive postage.

The district court found that the MSP’s policy prohibiting adhesive postage stamps

was “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” under Turner, 482 U.S.

at 89, because it prevented inmates from smuggling contraband under adhesive

stamps, and because mail could instead be sent via prepaid envelopes or metered

mail from the post office. Undisputed evidence in the record supports the district

court’s determination, and Standley makes no argument to the contrary on appeal.

5
  Standley also submitted a letter to the district court stating that he attempted
receive by mail a book (which the prison blocked), and that he “suspected” the
prison did not mail out his tax return because the tax return did not appear on a list
of his mail produced in discovery. Standley did not raise any claims based on these
incidents, however, even though the district court provided him with the
opportunity to bring a claim if he determined that his tax return had not been sent.

                                          7
We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim.6

         AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.7

6
  Standley has expressly waived his challenge to the district court’s decision not to
appoint him counsel. And though he requests review of the district court’s decision
not to grant him an order of protection, he has forfeited his request by failing to
make any argument in support of it. Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th
Cir. 1992) (deeming an issue abandoned when a pro se litigant did not support the
issue with argument in his brief).
7
    The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

                                            8