Court Opinion

ID: 9718765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:33:23.027567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:02.297684
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: The majority opinion recognizes that there were collective-bargaining agreements between the employers and the unions covering the employees involved in these consolidated cases. The majority also recognizes that these agreements require “just cause” before an employee may be discharged, and establish grievance procedures, cumulating in final and binding arbitration for such grievances. However, using the same rationale of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which was rejected in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 105 S. Ct. 1904, the majority of this court finds in these cases that a tort cause of action arising out of a wrongful discharge is separate and distinct from the “just cause” discharge provisions of the collective-bargaining agreements. The majority finds support for its conclusion from language in Allis-Chalmers which states that not every dispute concerning employment is preempted by the provisions of Federal labor law. It may well be that the Supreme Court, in Allis-Chalmers, left the preemption door ajar insofar as permitting certain State causes of actions arising from employment-related disputes. However, the Supreme Court, in Allis-Chalmers, expressed no uncertainty as to claims such as are now before us, because that opinion specifically mentioned claims arising out of “unfair discharge” as an example of claims which should not bypass the Federal labor-law scheme by way of a State law tort action. The majority opinion in our case failed to quote the following language from Allis-Chalmers, which I find directly addresses the issue before us. In explaining its rationale in Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court stated: “Since nearly any alleged willful breach of contract can be restated as a tort claim for breach of a good-faith obligation under a contract, the arbitrator’s role in every case could be bypassed easily if section 301 is not understood to pre-empt such claims. Claims involving vacation or overtime pay, work assignment, unfair discharge — in short, the whole range of disputes traditionally resolved through arbitration — could be brought in the first instance in state court by a complaint in tort rather than in contract.” (Emphasis added.) Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 219-20, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 220-21, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1915-16. Despite this seemingly unambiguous description of the intended scope of the Allis-Chalmers rule, the majority insists that this particular species of “unfair discharge” falls outside its preemptive limits. I find no meaningful basis upon which to distinguish the instant claim from that deemed preempted in Allis-Chalmers. As the majority correctly notes, the pertinent aspect of the test for preemption articulated in Allis-Chalmers asks “whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” (Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 213, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 216, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912.) A tort claim is preempted if its resolution is ‘ ‘substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of he collective-bargaining] agreement.’ ” Bartley v. Uniersity Asphalt Co. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 318, 332, quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 220, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 221, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1916. The claim for retaliatory discharge must necessarily assert that the employee was wrongfully discharged or, as stated in the collective-bargaining agreement, discharged without just cause or, as phrased by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers, unfairly discharged. I do not understand how the majority can conclude that the tort claim of retaliatory discharge in this case is not inextricably intertwined with the terms of the labor contract. The cause of action for retaliatory discharge confers no new right of action against the employer independent of those grievances covered by the collective-bargaining agreement. If Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, and its progeny, which created in this State the tort cause of action for retaliatory discharge, had never been decided, an employee discharged for filing a workers’ compensation claim still would have had a grievance against his employer under the “just cause” provision of the collective-bargaining agreement, and this grievance would have been handled pursuant to the procedures established in that agreement. The tort claim for retaliatory discharge does not exist independent of facts covered by the employment agreement. It is another cause of action grafted onto and arising out of the same set of facts that give rise to a grievance under the “just cause” provision of the collective-bargaining agreement. Consistent with these principles, Prestress contended that a claim of retaliatory discharge is preempted because it necessarily implicates and requires interpretation of the “just cause” provision of the labor contract. In rejecting this assertion, the majority states, “that, however, is not the law in Illinois.” I take this statement to mean that, as a matter of State law, the term “just cause” does not necessarily encompass retaliatory dismissals. Therein lies the flaw in the majority’s reasoning. Whether or not one agrees that as a matter of State law “just cause” includes retaliatory discharge is simply irrelevant in my view. The point of Allis-Chalmers is that in any case the determination may not be limited by or dependent upon State law. The Supreme Court stated that the question of whether a State tort claim is “sufficiently independent of federal contract interpretation to avoid preemption is, of course, a question of federal law.” (Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 214, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 217, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1913.) Thus, a State court lacks authority to declare that as a matter of State law a given claim is or is not within the scope of the “just cause” provision. See Comment, Midgett v. Sackett in the Aftermath of Allis-Chalmers: The Impact of Federal Labor Law on Retaliatory Discharge Claims, 6 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 347, 375 (1986). In conclusion, I believe the majority violates the clear command of Allis-Chalmers by placing a State law gloss on the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. In so doing, it opens the door to the precise mischief condemned in Allis-Chalmers: end runs around the grievance and arbitration processes, and varying interpretations of ostensibly universal terms in labor contracts. If Illinois is free to decide what “just cause” means or does not mean, any and all contract provisions are apparently fair game. I dissent. JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.