Court Opinion

ID: 9375494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 22:02:27.859333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.323657
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/23 P. v. Grizzle CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D079679

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCD267438)

ELLIOTT SCOTT GRIZZLE,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Laura W. Halgren, Judge. Affirmed.
         Nancy Olsen and Carl Fabian, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Eric A. Swenson, Alan L. Amann, and
Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      In 2016, Elliott Scott Grizzle participated in a home invasion that led to
the death of one of the home’s occupants. A jury convicted him of felony

murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), two counts of first degree robbery
in concert with two or more other people in an inhabited dwelling (§ 211) and
burglary (§ 459), and made several true findings. In 2021, Grizzle filed a
petition for resentencing, contending he was not the actual killer, did not aid,
abet, or assist the actual killer with the intent to kill, and he was not a major
participant or did not act with reckless indifference to human life. Following
an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the People met their burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Grizzle was a major participant in
the underlying felonies, and he acted with a reckless indifference to human
life. Accordingly, it denied his petition for resentencing.
      Grizzle contends that because he exercised his right to a jury trial, he
was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 (formerly section

1170.95)2 only if a jury and not the court found he was a major participant in
the underlying felonies and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
He separately contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial
court’s conclusion that he was a major participant who demonstrated a
reckless indifference to human life. We conclude his contentions lack merit,
and we affirm the denial of his section 1172.6 petition.

1     Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2     Assembly Bill No. 200 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10) renumbered
section 1170.95 to 1172.6, effective June 30, 2022.
                                        2
                                        I.
                BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
                             The Underlying Crime
      We take the following statement of facts from our opinion in Grizzle’s
direct appeal, People v. Grizzle (Feb. 27, 2019, D072975, [nonpub. opn.]):
      “On May 11, 2016, B.A. and his housemates, B.W., W.S., S.P., and J.P.
resided on Tommy Drive in San Diego (Tommy Drive residence). On the
afternoon of May 11, S.P. returned to the house after doing some grocery
shopping. His housemates were not at home. S.P. brought the groceries
inside the house, set them down in the kitchen, went into the ‘back living
room’ at the rear of the house, and checked his phone for a text message.
      “S.P. heard the front door open, and a group of three to five men walked
through the door in a single file. The man in front pointed a gun in S.P.’s
face and told him to lie down on the ground with his hands behind his back.
S.P. described the gunman as being in his late 30’s or early 40’s, six-feet tall,

not much hair on his head, and clean shaven.[3] He could not describe the
other men.
      “The men asked S.P. questions about everyone who lived in the house,
such as what their schedules were, what jobs they had, and what cars they
drove. The men were especially interested in B.A. The men also asked about
large amounts of money and marijuana. S.P. told them that he did not know
anything about drugs or money because he never saw anything like that in
the house.
      “S.P. could hear the men going through the house, ransacking it. He
knew there were at least three men in the house because he could hear two
men whispering to each other while someone else was going through the

3     “At trial, S.P. confirmed that Grizzle was not the gunman.”
                                        3
house. He heard the men taking the TV off the wall of the back living room.
At some point, the men took his cell phone and the keys to his car.
      “After about 45 minutes to an hour, the men stood S.P. up, covered his
face with some type of cloth, and moved him from the back living room to the
adjoining ‘front living room.’ S.P.’s hands were restrained with some
PlayStation cords and painter’s tape. After S.P. was moved, he heard the
men continue to go through the house. He heard the TV slam on the ground
and heard one of the men say, ‘We’re not going to be taking that with us.’
      “Eventually, B.W. came through the front door. When B.W. entered the
house, a man put a gun to his head and ordered him to get on the ground.
After B.W. went to the ground, he was hit in the back of the head with the
gun, and a T-shirt was placed over his head. B.W. believed there were four or
five men in the house although he only saw the gunman. The men
immediately asked B.W. where B.A. was, about the location of the money and
marijuana, and who lived there. The men took B.W.’s credit cards, his
identification, the keys to his Cadillac Escalade, and his cell phone. B.W. told
the men his ATM personal identification number (PIN), and then someone
left the house.
      “B.W.’s hands were bound with tape and a PlayStation cord. Initially,
B.W. was on the ground near the front door, but then he was moved several
feet into the front living room, close to a computer desk. He heard someone
at the computer desk, rummaging through the paperwork and asking

                                       4
questions about B.A.’s papers. He also heard rummaging throughout the

whole house and the garage.[4]
      “At one point, one of the men said something like, “Larry said it’s
wrong” regarding the ATM PIN number. When the man or men who left the
house returned, a gun was put to B.W.’s head again because the men thought
that B.W. had given them the wrong PIN number. B.W. insisted that he gave
them the right number and suggested that they had tried to take out too
much money. Someone asked B.W. if he had ever dug a ditch.
      “S.P. heard the men eating cereal and opening candy. The men asked
S.P. if the beer in the refrigerator was nonalcoholic. S.P. heard a beer bottle
being opened and heard somebody drinking liquid. B.W. heard the opening of
beer bottles (perhaps two) and heard the men say that they had never had
that type of beer before. Both S.P. and B.W. also heard someone ‘roasting’
drugs. There was no smell of marijuana. S.P. thought the men were smoking
methamphetamine. B.W. thought that the man doing drugs was at the
computer desk.
      “About an hour after B.W. arrived at the house, B.A. walked through
the front door. There was a struggle, and a man said, ‘Hey, [B.A.], how you
doing? We’ve been waiting for ya.’ The men then asked about money, the
‘grow,’ and whether B.A. had any storage units. B.A. said that all he had was

4      “Photographs taken inside the Tommy Drive residence show that the
house was ransacked: throughout the house and garage, cabinet doors were
left open, drawers were pulled out, and items were strewn all over the floor.
Multiple pieces of luggage were left in the kitchen. A garment bag full of
clothes was found on a couch in the back living room. A large flat screen TV
was resting on a couch in the front living room. Under a pile of items in the
hallway, officers discovered a pillowcase that contained a couple of clear
plastic baggies of marijuana, a cell phone, an iPad, several credit cards
belonging to B.A., and a credit card and California identification belonging to
B.W. A bag of marijuana was left behind the front door.”
                                       5
the little sprouts in the backyard and what was in a shoebox. The men
questioned B.A. for several more minutes. Then there was another struggle,
followed by four to six gunshots.
      “S.P. did not hear any noise after the gunshots, and, after a moment,
took the cover off his eyes. He found B.W. and helped him get free of his
restraints. S.P. and B.W. searched the inside of the house and then went
outside, where they saw B.A. lying face first on the side of the driveway. S.P.
turned B.A. over and saw that he had been shot, blood was pumping out
everywhere as B.A. was gasping for breath. S.P. tried to render aid while
B.W. went to find a neighbor to call 911. Eventually, a police officer arrived
at the house.
      “A neighbor, who lived one block away from the house, heard two pops
that sounded like gunshots a little before 3:00 p.m. He walked into his
backyard to investigate but did not see anything. He turned around to go
back in his house and then he heard somebody scream, ‘Help me.’ He looked
down over his fence and saw a man without a shirt roll another man over
onto his back on the driveway. The neighbor ran back into his house to call
911. The neighbor saw another man in a blue shirt come out of the house and
saw one of the men performing CPR on the man on the ground. The police
arrived three to four minutes later.
      “B.A. was shot three times. He suffered scrapes on the left side of his
face, right arm, left wrist and hand, left shoulder, and left knee. B.A. died
from a gunshot wound to his thorax.
      “Four bullet casings were recovered from the Tommy Drive residence.
One casing was in the threshold of the front doorway, another was just inside
the front door, and two were found in the front living room. Two bullets were
identified at the crime scene: one was in the wall of the entryway, and the

                                       6
other was found underneath B.A. when he was turned over for examination.
During B.A.’s autopsy, a damaged bullet was recovered from B.A.’s left
buttock, and an additional bullet was recovered from B.A.’s left arm.
      “Criminalist Lisa Wilson examined the four casings and concluded that
all the cartridges were 9-millimeter Luger caliber and were all fired by the
same gun, a pistol. Wilson also performed examinations of the three bullets
and concluded that they were fired by the same gun as well.
      “Criminalist Adam Dutra inspected the crime scene and performed a
firearm trajectory test. Dutra determined that one bullet originated from
inside the living room, struck the north wall of the front living room, traveled
downwards in a northeast direction, exited the adjacent west wall of the
entryway, crossed the entryway, and entered the east wall of the entryway,
where it became lodged. Another bullet impacted the edge of the front door
just above the strike plate and entered the door, tearing apart the wood and
exterior surface of the door. The door had to have been open for that damage
to occur. The trajectory of the bullet was from the interior edge of the door to
the exterior edge of the door, as if it was exiting the home.
      “Dutra concluded that at least three shots occurred inside the house.
Two shots were likely fired in the front living room, and a third one was fired
either toward the east side of the living room or in the entryway. Based on
the position of the bullet wound to B.A.’s hip/buttock area and the damage to
the bullet that was removed from his buttock, the bullet that struck his
hip/buttock was the same one that went through the edge of the door. B.A.
would have been in the threshold of the door when he was struck.
      “Police obtained surveillance footage from a U.S. Bank location less
than a mile away from the Tommy Drive residence. The footage, which was
captured at about 2:00 p.m. on May 11, showed a man driving B.W.’s black

                                        7
Escalade through the drive-thru and using the ATM machine but not taking
out any money. Records for B.W.’s Discover card show that the card was
used three times on May 11; each transaction was a failed attempt to
withdraw $500. Records for B.W.’s Bank of America card show three failed
transactions for $503 each on May 11. B.W.’s Bank of America card was also
used at a nearby 7-Eleven that same day in an attempt to complete a
transaction for $202.95. Video surveillance at the 7-Eleven captured images
of a white male wearing a brown jacket and a black hat, but the man’s face
was not visible.
      “Records from a Days Inn & Suites in La Mesa show that Grizzle
checked into the motel on May 10, 2016 and checked out on May 12, 2016.
According to the registration papers, two adults stayed in the room. The car
registered to the room was a Chevy Monte Carlo with the license plate
number 7NNC272.
      “On May 16, 2016, Sergeant Rick Turvey was involved in a high speed
chase and eventually arrested the driver, Lawrence Johnson. Johnson was
driving the same Monte Carlo registered by Grizzle at the Days Inn & Suites.
When the Monte Carlo was processed for evidence, two folders were removed
from the pocket of the front passenger seat. One of the folders contained
hospital documents for someone named Rachelle Stewart.
      “On May 19, 2016, Detective Dennis Josse was engaged in a high speed
chase. The vehicle Josse was following eventually crashed, and the driver,
Toren Nieber, was arrested. Detective Timothy Norris, who was
investigating the Tommy Drive case, recognized Toren Nieber as the man
captured on the U.S. Bank surveillance footage.
      “On June 16, 2016, Grizzle was arrested while driving in the parking
lot of The Suites motel in Las Vegas. Inside the car Grizzle was driving,

                                      8
police found a keychain holding a key to a motel room as well as a key to a
Volkswagen Jetta. There was a phone in Grizzle’s pocket as well as an
iPhone on the front passenger floorboard.
      “The motel room matching the key in Grizzle’s possession was
registered under the name ‘Karen Gonzalez.’ A receipt found in the room had
the name ‘Gonzalez’ on it. A female, Rachelle Stewart, was in the room.
      “Officers found the Volkswagen Jetta close to the motel room. The car
had a Nevada license plate. An investigation revealed that a man named
Charles Elliot rented the car from Payless Car Rental in San Diego on May
12, 2016. At the time the car was rented, it had a valid California license
plate. Payless reported the car stolen after it was not returned.
      “After Grizzle was taken into custody and placed in Officer Brian
Redsull’s vehicle, he asked if the officers were from San Diego. Later, Redsull
listened to a jail phone call between Grizzle and a woman. During the
telephone conversation, Grizzle asked the woman how she knew that he had
a warrant, and the woman explained that she checked two or three times a
week. Grizzle said that he looked for the warrant as soon as he hung up but
could not find it, and then 20 minutes later, he left the hotel room and ‘they
smashed me.’
      “On January 5, 2017, Deputy Gregory Ward conducted a search of
Grizzle’s jail cell. He found a piece of paper with the name Charles Elliot
written on it.
      “Dutra performed DNA analysis on several items of evidence found at
the crime scene. Reference samples were taken from Grizzle, Johnson,
Nieber, B.A., B.W., S.P., Jesse, and W.S. Grizzle’s DNA was found on several
items in the Tommy Drive residence.

                                       9
      “For example, Grizzle’s DNA was found on the mouth area of an open
beer bottle on the kitchen counter. The bottle was two-thirds full. Grizzle’s

DNA also was found on the exterior of the bottle.[5] A black knit mask with
eyeholes was found on the computer console in the front living room.

Grizzle’s DNA was found on the mask.[6] A glass pipe and green lighter were
next to each other on a couch in the front living room. The pipe was the type
of pipe used to smoke methamphetamine and appeared to have
methamphetamine residue on it. DNA from Grizzle, Johnson, and Nieber
was found on the pipe. Grizzle’s DNA also was found on the lighter.
      “In addition, a black glove was discovered in the street in front of a
home, which was across the street and diagonal from the Tommy Drive
residence. Grizzle’s DNA was found on the glove as well as inside it.
      “There was a Guess bag on one of the couches in the front living room.
The Guess bag contained various items, including a box of disposable gloves
and what appeared to be a used disposable glove. Grizzle’s DNA was found
on one of the disposable gloves.
      “A plastic glove was found on top of a toolbox on the floor of the front
living room. Grizzle’s DNA was found on this glove.
      “Finally, there was a bloodstain on the inside doorknob of the front
door. A swab of the bloodstain indicated that the DNA came from a single
individual, Grizzle. All the other individuals were excluded.

5      “An open beer bottle was found on the floor by the green recliner in the
front living room. The bottle was two-thirds full. Nieber’s DNA was found on
the mouth area of the bottle.”

6     “Initially, the computer running the analysis ran out of memory and
could not interpret the results. As such, Dutra removed one of the DNA
markers from the interpretation so that the computer would have to do fewer
computations and an interpretation could be achieved.”
                                       10
      “A criminalist extracted the telephone number and the carrier
information from the iPhone found in the car Grizzle was driving when he
was arrested. Sprint business records showed that the phone was registered
to Mary Grizzle.
      “From May 10 through May 19, all the location data for the cell phone
was in the San Diego region. On May 11, three times between 1:00 and
3:00 p.m., the phone utilized a cell tower 500 feet from the Tommy Drive
residence. Between 3:00 and 6:00 p.m., there were multiple cell site
activations in the La Mesa/Lemon Grove area. From 6:00 to 9:00 p.m., there
were no cell site activations. From 9:00 p.m. to midnight, there were multiple
cell site activations in the National City area.
      “The last cell site activation in San Diego was on May 19 at 4:46 a.m.
After that, until May 23, all the cell site activations were in Buena Park
(Orange County). On May 23, the phone activated a cell site in Lake Elsinore
at 2:11 p.m. and a cell site in Corona at 9:42 p.m. On May 24 at 9:28 p.m.,
the phone activated a cell site in Nevada. On May 26 at 10:44 p.m., the
phone activated a cell site in the Las Vegas metropolitan area.
“Defense
      “The defense presented witnesses to impeach B.W. To this end, J.N.
testified that she dated and was engaged to B.W. from 2009 through early
2015. In early 2011, she learned that B.W. was growing and selling
marijuana with other individuals out of his rented home. She witnessed
hundreds of marijuana plants in his house and materials for growing and
cultivating the marijuana. She observed him selling the marijuana from the
home in large quantities and having it shipped via FedEx to various
locations. She also saw him at other locations where he was growing
marijuana. B.W. continued the above efforts at least through 2014. During

                                       11
2013 and 2014, B.A. joined B.W. in the business and J.N. saw them
packaging and shipping marijuana together. J.N. also heard B.W. talking to
Jesse about the marijuana business. B.W. told J.N. that he was still selling
marijuana in 2015.
      “J.N. also detailed various incidents of domestic violence by B.W. in
2014 and 2015. In one of the final incidents, B.W. told her that he was going
to take all her belongings while physically hitting her. B.W. repeatedly
threatened her and eventually took her possessions from the house they were
living in. J.N. recorded several conversations with B.W. during which he
violently threatened her, and those recordings were played for the jury. B.W.
lied to the police about these incidents.
      “I.S. testified that he was partnered with B.W. in a retail business from
2003 through 2013, but separated from B.W. because he learned that B.W.
was growing and distributing marijuana, including shipping it with FedEx.
      “Conviction
      “A jury convicted Grizzle of felony murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189;
count 1); two counts of first degree robbery in concert with two or more other
people in an inhabited dwelling (§ 211; counts 2, 3); and burglary (§ 459;
count 4). As to counts 2 and 3, the jury found true that the robbery occurred
in an inhabited dwelling within the meaning of section 212.5, subdivision (a)
and Grizzle committed the robbery voluntarily while acting in concert with
two or more other people inside an inhabited dwelling within the meaning of
section 213, subdivision (a)(1)(A). As to count 4, the jury also found true that
the burglary occurred in an inhabited dwelling within the meaning of
section 460 and another person other than an accomplice was present in the
residence during the commission of the burglary within the meaning of
section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21).

                                       12
      “In a bifurcated proceeding, Grizzle admitted he suffered probation
denial priors (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)), a prison prior (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668),
and two prior strikes (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)).
      “The trial court sentenced Grizzle to 159 years to life, consisting of:
(1) 75 years to life plus 10 years for the serious felony priors for count 1;
(2) 27 years to life plus 10 years for the serious felony priors for count 2;
(3) 27 years to life plus 10 years for the serious felony priors for count 3. The
court struck the prison prior and stayed the sentence on count 4 pursuant to
section 654.”
                         Additional Procedural History
      Following Grizzle’s direct appeal, we vacated the sentence and
remanded the matter for resentencing to allow the superior court to
resentence Grizzle consistent with changes to the law that amended
sections 667, subdivision (a) and 1385 but otherwise affirmed the judgment.
      On March 23, 2021, Grizzle filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The court appointed counsel to represent Grizzle, and the
People filed an initial response to Grizzle’s petition. On June 9, 2021, Grizzle
filed a reply to the People’s response. The same day, the trial court found
that Grizzle made a prima facie showing, and it issued an order to show
cause.
      At the evidentiary hearing on October 15, 2021, the trial court noted
that the prosecution bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that Grizzle was ineligible for resentencing. It denied Grizzle’s petition,
finding that the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Grizzle was a
major participant in the underlying felonies, and he acted with reckless
indifference to human life.

                                        13
      In reaching this conclusion, the court gave great weight to the factors
detailed in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). It detailed each factor individually, applied it
to the facts of Grizzle’s case and concluded Grizzle was “not eligible for
vacatur for his murder conviction.”
      Grizzle timely appealed.
                                        II.
                                  DISCUSSION
                 A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775
      Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) was
enacted to “ ‘amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)”
(People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.) Senate Bill 1437 did this
by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which
defines the degrees of murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2 & 3.) Amended
section 188 states: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in
order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Amended section 189
states: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder
only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.
[¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the

                                        14
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] [or] (3) The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
      Senate Bill 1437 also established resentencing relief for eligible
defendants. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-
708.) Under subdivision (a), “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition” with
the sentencing court to have his or her murder conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts “when all of the following conditions
apply: [¶] (1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶]
(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder
following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder. [¶]
(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019”
under Senate Bill 1437. After receiving a petition containing the required
information, “the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ” (Strong, at p. 708, citing
§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).)
      Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 775) amended section 1172.6 to clarify certain aspects of the law,
including that (1) the burden of proof at a resentencing hearing under this

                                        15
section is “on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder” under California law as amended by Senate
Bill 1437 and (2) “[a] finding that there is substantial evidence to support a
conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see
also Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (c).)
              B. The Trial Court Acts as an Independent Factfinder
      We first address Grizzle’s contention that section 1172.6 does not place
the trial court in the role of an independent factfinder and instead requires
the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury made factual
findings necessary for conviction under current law.
      The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, subject to de novo
review. (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332.) We give words
their “plain and commonsense meaning” absent a special meaning provided
by the statute itself. (Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 577-578.) If
the statutory text “is unambiguous and provides a clear answer, we need go
no further.” (Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 750,
758.) When the language supports more than one reasonable construction,
we may look to extrinsic aids like legislative history and ostensible objectives
in evaluating the meaning. (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975.)
      Grizzle contends that the absence of a specific reference to whom the
People must prove their case means “whatever [evidence] the prosecutor
chooses to rely on, the prosecutor must show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the jury found one of the required elements under section 189, subdivision (e),
if the defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder.” Not only is this
inconsistent with the defense attorney’s comment to the court at the
evidentiary hearing that the hearing was “essentially a bench trial that

                                         16
starts with the presumption of innocence and requires proof of each element
beyond a reasonable doubt,” but it is nonsensical in the context of the statute
and in light of Senate Bill 775.

      As we explained in People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46 (Basler),7
section 1172.6 permits presentation of new and additional evidence at the
evidentiary hearing, and it places on the People the burden to show a
defendant is not eligible for resentencing. Because it is the People’s burden
to present evidence of the elements of murder that make a defendant guilty
under current law, factfinding is a necessary part of the hearing. (Basler, at
p. 61.) Because new evidence could not have been the basis for a jury finding,
the statute cannot limit the People to proving only what the jury found.
      Moreover, restricting the lower court’s review to what the jury in the
original trial found would amount to an appellate standard. (People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 294-295 (Clements).) That is
inconsistent with the Legislature’s express repudiation of a substantial
evidence standard to evaluate whether the People meet their burden of proof
at the evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [“A finding that there is
substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing”]; see Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 61.) “If the
Legislature had intended trial judges to review the record of conviction and
grant relief only in an absence of substantial evidence to support a still-valid
theory, they knew how to enact that standard and would have done so
explicitly.” (Clements, at p. 295.)

7      We published Basler on May 25, 2022, after Grizzle filed his opening
brief but before he filed his reply brief. Grizzle did not discuss this case in his
briefing.
                                        17
      We also reject Grizzle’s contention that the court acting as a factfinder
violates his constitutional right to a jury trial. As we explained in Basler,
Grizzle “is not a defendant charged anew with murder and constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial.” (Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 61-62.)
Section 1172.6 petitioners have already been convicted of murder, and their
convictions are final; “[t]he termination or suspension (by whatsoever means
effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to
the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed
in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar
such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an
applicable provision of law.” (Gov. Code, § 9608.) Grizzle was properly
convicted of murder under the law in effect at the time he participated in the
robbery and burglary. “Section [1172.6] is ‘an act of leniency’ that requires,
under specified circumstances, reduction of the offense for which he was
properly convicted. The constitutional right to a jury trial does not require a
jury determination in those circumstances.” (People v. James (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 604, 609.) In other words, an act of lenity like the one provided
by Senate Bill 1437 does not implicate Grizzle’s Sixth Amendment rights.
(People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156-1157.)
      Here, the court acted as an independent factfinder at the evidentiary
hearing at which it concluded the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Grizzle acted as a major participant in robbery and burglary, and he did
so with a reckless indifference to human life. Thus, it complied with the
statutory requirements set forth in section 1172.6.
            C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Petition Denial
      Grizzle contends that he is not ineligible for relief on the basis of the
felony-murder conviction because insufficient evidence supports the trial

                                       18
court’s conclusion that he acted as a major participant with a reckless
indifference to human life based on factors detailed in Banks and Clark.
      We review the trial court’s finding on the question of whether a
defendant committed a murder under a still-valid theory for substantial
evidence. (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) We analyze the record
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and determine if there
is sufficient substantial evidence to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1028; People v.
Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1087.) In so doing, we examine the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment, looking for
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value that would support a rational
trier of fact in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Clements, at p. 298; People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657-658.)
“Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the
petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence,
evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to
credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to
support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Clements, at p. 298.) We will not reverse the petition denial unless there is
no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial evidence exists to support
the trial court’s decision. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We
must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51
Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard applies when the conviction rests
primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,
1053.) “An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [trier of

                                       19
fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
                      1. Grizzle Was a Major Participant
      “The ultimate question pertaining to being a major participant is
‘whether the defendant’s participation “in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death” [citation] was sufficiently significant to be
considered “major.” ’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.) To assist in
answering this question, the California Supreme Court in Banks
articulated the following considerations: “What role did the defendant
have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons?
What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the
nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the
other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing,
in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her
own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the
defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 803.) “No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of
them necessarily sufficient.” (Ibid.)
      Substantial evidence supports several of these factors. Grizzle invaded
the Tommy Drive residence in a group of three to five men entering single
file, with the person in front immediately pointing a gun in S.P.’s face. He
left behind a black knit mask with eyeholes on the computer console in the
front living room, as well as a black glove in the street in front of the home, a
box of disposable gloves in a bag on a couch in the front living room that
contained a used disposable glove, and a plastic glove on top of a toolbox on
the floor of the front living room. Police tied these items to Grizzle through

                                        20
DNA. The manner of entry and the type and number of items left behind
both indicate advanced planning, as well as ongoing presence at the crime
scene.
      Evidence also supports the conclusion that Grizzle was aware of the
dangers posed by the crime and of the weapons used. He was present when
the intruders entered the home forcefully, one pointing a gun at S.P.’s face.
He was also present when B.W. arrived home and the intruders put a gun to
his head and ordered him to the ground, then hit him on the back of the head
with a gun and placed a T-shirt over his face. And Grizzle’s blood was found
on the inside doorknob of the front door, suggesting he participated in a
physical struggle. Cell phone data placed him at the Tommy Drive residence
over the course of several hours, and DNA evidence on a glove placed him at
the computer desk sorting through papers, where he would have seen two
victims on the ground tied up. Witnesses testified they heard the intruders
rummaging and ransacking, and Grizzle’s DNA was found on a
methamphetamine pipe and the mouth of a beer bottle, indicating he was in
common areas with the other intruders and aware of the violence occurring.
His presence at the scene throughout the incident suggests he could have
deescalated tensions but chose not to.
      Moreover, Grizzle’s conduct “after the lethal force was used” (Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803) also supports the finding he was a major
participant. Not only did he not render aid to the murder victim, but he also
left behind S.P. and B.W., still bound with their faces covered. (See id. at
p. 807 [noting the defendant “did not see the shooting happen . . . and could
not do anything to . . . render assistance”].)
      Grizzle’s presence at, and participation in, the underlying felony
supports the trial court’s finding that he was a major participant. (See

                                         21
Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 805 [finding, by contrast, that the defendant
was not a major participant in a robbery felony murder because he was
absent from the scene during the robbery and the murder].) Because
substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion, whether the remaining
considerations are neutral or favor Grizzle has no effect here. (See id. at
p. 803 [no single consideration necessary; no one consideration necessarily
sufficient; all may be weighed].)
           2. Grizzle Showed Reckless Indifference to Human Life
      “Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective
element. [Citation.] As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be
aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular
offense is committed,’ and he or she must consciously disregard ‘the
significant risk of death his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the
objective element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor’s situation.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable
risk of death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish
reckless indifference to human life; ‘only knowingly creating a “grave risk of
death” ’ satisfies the statutory requirement.” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th
667, 677 (Scoggins), brackets in original.)
      In Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, the California Supreme Court
articulated the following considerations for determining whether a defendant
acted with reckless indifference to human life: “Did the defendant use or
know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons were
ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did he

                                        22
or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What
was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony
and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her
confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the
felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [listing factors set forth in
Clark, at pp. 618-623].)
      The factors for evaluating reckless indifference “ ‘significantly overlap’ ”
with several factors defining a major participant, “ ‘for the greater the
defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 615.) As with the major participant factors, “ ‘[n]o one of [the reckless
indifference] considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.’ ” (Id. at p. 618.) “We analyze the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether [the defendant] acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
      The United States Supreme Court has “stressed the importance of
presence to culpability.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619, citing Tison v.
Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 158.) Where “the murder is a culmination or a
foreseeable result of several intermediate steps . . . , ‘the defendant’s presence
allows him to observe his cohorts so that it is fair to conclude that he shared
in their actions and mental state . . . . [Moreover,] the defendant’s presence
gives him an opportunity to act as a restraining influence on murderous
cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a restraining influence, then the
defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting murders.’ ” (Clark, at
p. 619.)

                                        23
      Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the court’s conclusion here. As we detailed ante, Grizzle
was present for and participated in the burglary and robbery over the course
of several hours. Witnesses heard the intruders ransacking the house and
taking the TV off the wall of the back living room. The intruders took S.P.’s
cell phone and the keys to his car, and they took B.W.’s credit cards,
identification, the keys to his Cadillac Escalade, and his cell phone. Police
found materials from the home gathered up, including a garment bag full of
clothes on the couch in the back living room, a pillowcase containing plastic
baggies of marijuana, a cell phone, an iPad, and several credit cards. Grizzle
was present for all of it.
      Additionally, the record supports a reasonable inference that Grizzle
did not intervene to prevent the murder. He did not render aid at the scene
to the murder victim, who intruders left lying face down in a pool of blood,
and he did not help the robbery victims, who were left tied up inside. (See
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 619 [noting the United States Supreme
Court and “[o]ther appellate courts have considered relevant a defendant’s
failure to provide aid while present at the scene”]; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at p. 672 [finding no reckless indifference where, “[a]fter the shooting, [the
defendant] walked over to [the victim] and checked if he was still breathing,”
and then remained at the scene and was “cooperative” with law
enforcement].) These considerations strongly support a finding Grizzle acted
with reckless indifference to human life.
      The duration of the felony also weighs against Grizzle. After he
entered the Tommy Drive residence and S.P. was subdued, the intruders
ransacked the home. The evidence supports a conclusion that Grizzle took

                                       24
the time to drink beer and smoke methamphetamines. This was a prolonged
robbery, during which the intruders waited for B.A. to arrive.
      There is no evidence that Grizzle had knowledge of factors bearing on
his cohorts’ likelihood of killing, but he was aware they brought a weapon,
which they were using. He heard the threats made to B.W., which evidenced
escalating violence. He was present for the struggle with B.A., and his blood
at the scene suggests he engaged in some violence himself. Even if he did
not, he did not take any steps to diffuse the situation or minimize the risks of
violence.
      In sum, “nonkiller felony murderers fall on a continuum, a spectrum of
culpability.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 811.) We are satisfied that
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Grizzle was a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference for human life. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying his
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order denying Grizzle’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                                                 HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

                                       25