Court Opinion

ID: 9743583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:37:22.900166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:42.257234
License: Public Domain

BARTEAU, Judge,
concurring in result.
In this case, the trial court entered specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. When a trial court makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we *1263are bound to review the same under the following standard: we first must determine whether the evidence supports the findings; then determine whether the findings support the judgment. Porter County Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bolde (1988), Ind.App., 530 N.E.2d 1212, 1215, reh. denied. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed if we conclude that the special findings support the judgment and are not clearly erroneous. ITT Industrial Credit Company v. R.T.M. Development Company, Inc. et al (1987), Ind.App., 512 N.E.2d 201, 103. A judgment is clearly erroneous where a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Porter County, supra.
I am unable to agree with the reasoning utilized by the majority because I believe it in essence reflects a reweighing of the evidence rather than a determination that either the findings of fact are erroneous or that they do not support the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court found that Donald brought the following assets to the marriage:
Date of Marriage
Marital Residence $43,907
1980 Chrysler LeBaron (per testimony/no value assigned) $ 1,200
1985 Chevy S-10 Truck (per testimony/no value assigned) $ 4,500
Savings Account $16,419
Checking Account $ 4,547
IRA_$ 2.500
Total $73,073
The trial court determined the value of the marital assets at the time of the final hearing to be:
Date of Final Hearing Marital Residence $46,000
1989 Olds Cutlass $ 8,600
1985 Chevy S-10 Truck $ 4,000
Savings Account $ 5,100
Checking Account $ 500
Certificate of Deposit_ $ 5.090
Sub-Total $69,290
(minus debts:
Medical bills — 8,800
Cutlass balance — 8,500)
$17.300
Total Assets
$51,990
Consequently, the net loss in marital assets was $21,083. Donald’s uninsured medical expenses accounted for $8,800 of that reduction, leaving a loss of $12,283. Further, the evidence reflected that improvements were made to the real estate, including rerocking the chimney, excavating work on the two ponds on the property ($2,700), work on the front porch ($800), installing a new deck ($1,500), installing sheet rock in the bathroom, dropping the ceiling in the kitchen, putting stucco on the bathroom ceiling, recarpeting the living room, installing congolium in the bathroom and kitchen and installing a new dishwasher. While these many improvements only increased the appraised value of the real estate by $2,093, they reflect necessary maintenance expenditures which will in the long run contribute to the value of the real estate. These substantial expenditures on the marital residence negate any inference that either party may have dissipated marital assets.
The trial court found that “the parties made equal contributions to the assets, Husband through monetary contributions and wife through contribuations [sic] of caring for her husband.” The majority opinion states that Donald’s financial contributions to the marriage far exceeded Molly’s financial contributions. In a strictly mathematical sense, it is true that Donald contributed more financially to the marriage. However, it would be perhaps more appropriate and more reflective of the trial court’s determination to state that each party contributed the total of their earnings to the marital pot and that Molly additionally contributed her labor around the house and care for her husband during his illness.
The trial court’s findings of fact stated that “because Wife gave up her employment to care for her Husband and the substantial contributions she made thereby, Husband is not entitled, as he requested, to walk away from the marriage with all he brought into it.” The majority interprets this statement by the trial court as follows:
[W]e believe the trial court awarded Molly $10,000 for leaving her employment *1264and taking care of her husband for the five months before she filed for dissolution of the marriage. In other words, the trial court sought to compensate Molly at a rate of $2,000 per month or $500 per week for assisting her husband during his illness. Her job before she quit, paid her only ‘eighty-five to ninety dollars per week.’ Compensation for care of an ill spouse is not one of the criteria listed in IC 31-1-13.5-11 for division of property where the presumption for equal division has been overcome. In that context, the $10,000 is a mere windfall for Molly. Such an award is not ‘just and reasonable’ under .the facts here, and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Contrary to the opinion expressed by the majority, I find nothing in the trial court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law which would indicate that it arrived at the $10,000 amount based entirely upon Molly’s five months of service caring for Donald.1
I further find reference to Molly’s “windfall” and the statement that she “brought practically nothing” to the marriage indicative that the majority engaged in a reweighing of the evidence and a reassessment of the credibility and character of witnesses rather than a review of the findings of the trial court.
However, I must concur in result in the majority opinion because I believe the trial court’s findings are insufficient to support the judgment. Specifically, the findings provide no guidance concerning how the trial court determined that a Chevy S-10 truck and $10,000, rather than $5 or $5,000, appropriately represented Molly’s fair share of the marital assets. Thus, this case should be remanded for reconsideration or for further explanation of the method of calculation employed by the trial court.

. The evidence reflected that Donald encouraged Molly to quit her employment and that she would have quit earlier in Donald’s illness, but because he was not yet receiving Social Security disability, they needed the income.