Court Opinion

ID: 9559966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:39:47.897854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:55.877045
License: Public Domain

DEITS, C. J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that defendant is not foreclosed from raising the question of whether ORS 135.765 required the dismissal of the earlier complaint to be “with prejudice” and therefore bars the present prosecution. However, I do not agree with the majority’s answer to that question.
ORS 135.765 contains no express provision as to whether the dismissals that it requires are to be with prejudice, or without prejudice, or subject to the discretion of the court. The majority concludes that the text and context of the statute are inconclusive, but that the legislative history and earlier case law indicate that a dismissal under the statute must be with prejudice.
*295I do not find the legislative history that the majority describes to be instructive. It is sparse and, insofar as it contains any substance at all, the majority makes a sizeable leap in concluding that the dismissal of a pending charge against an inmate must be with prejudice in order to effectuate the intent that the inmate will have a “clean record” after released, whenever that might occur. In any event, because I think the meaning of the statutory term is ascertainable from the text and context, the legislative history is irrelevant under the rubric of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).
I agree with the majority that the word “dismissal,” in itself, can refer to either a temporary or permanent inactivation (or both). In my view, however, the statutory context is far more instructive than the majority regards it to be. ORS 136.130 provides, in relevant part:
“If the court orders the accusatory instrument to be dismissed and the instrument charges a felony or Class A misdemeanor, the order is not a bar to another action for the same crime unless the court so directs.”
In other words, a dismissal of a felony or Class A misdemeanor charge under ORS 136.130 is without prejudice unless the court directs otherwise.
However, the majority does not regard ORS 136.130 to be analogous to ORS 135.765. It explains:
“In State v. Ibkheitan, 115 Or App 415, 419 n 5, 838 P2d 1091 (1992), we noted that ‘[t]he dismissal of subsequent charges pursuant to ORS 136.130 requires that the dismissal of the original charges be pursuant to ORS 136.120,’ citing State v. Carrillo, 311 Or 61, 66, 804 P2d 1161 (1991) (emphasis added). ORS 136.130 is not directly applicable to a prisoner’s right to a speedy trial. Rather, that statute applies specifically to cases that are dismissed because the district attorney is not ready to proceed on the appointed trial date and has not demonstrated to the court ‘any sufficient cause for postponing the trial.’ ORS 136.120.” 163 Or App at 291.
It is correct that ORS 136.130 applies directly only to dismissals that are required by ORS 136.120. However, I do not agree with the majority that ORS 136.120 and ORS *296136.130 are not concerned with speedy trial rights or, therefore, that they are not analogous to ORS 135.765, the statute involved in this case. In State v. Ibkheitan, the case on which the majority relies, we indicated that the opposite was so, stating that “ORS 136.120 and ORS 136.130 are mechanisms for courts to effectuate the speedy trial provisions of Article I, section 10 [of the Oregon Constitution.]” 115 Or App at 419. Given the similarity of the purposes of the statutes and of the remedies they provide, no reason occurs to me why the unmodified word “dismiss” in ORS 135.765 should contemplate the opposite of what it means in the relevant part of ORS 136.130, i.e., a dismissal that is without prejudice unless the court affirmatively directs otherwise.
Given the similarities between ORS 136.130 and ORS 135.765, I find it unnecessary to seek additional “contextual” insight in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). I nevertheless note that the majority’s use of the IAD is somewhat perplexing. It dismisses the fact that the IAD dismissal provision expressly uses the term “with prejudice,” while ORS 135.765 does not, because the IAD was the later enacted statute “and it cannot now serve as context for interpreting ORS 135.760 et seq.” 163 Or App at 292. The majority nevertheless reasons that the IAD does provide a basis for concluding that ORS 135.765 should be interpreted, consonantly with the IAD, as implicitly containing the phrase “with prejudice,” because “the IAD is a very similar statute that serves the same purpose as ORS 135.760 et seq.; therefore, it should have the same effect.” Id. (footnote omitted). It would appear that the majority understands “context,” in the PGE sense, to be very much where one chooses to find it.
I do not believe that the case law the majority cites, beginning with State v. Kent, 5 Or App 297, 484 P2d 1109 (1971), and continuing through State v. Easton, 103 Or App 184, 797 P2d 373 (1990), is on point. Those cases stand for the proposition that the state cannot frustrate the process under ORS 135.760 et seq. by unilaterally substituting a new accusatory instrument for the stale one after receiving a speedy trial request. In my view, they do not stand for the proposition that, after that process has culminated in a dismissal *297pursuant to ORS 135.765, the dismissal necessarily precludes a new prosecution.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.