Court Opinion

ID: 9539262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:01:15.457198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:40.016783
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13582    Document: 65-1      Date Filed: 08/07/2023   Page: 1 of 21

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13582
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        JIM C. BECK,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00184-MHC-JSA-1
                            ____________________
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                     21-13582

        Before BRANCH, GRANT, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,
        ∗ District Judge.

        SCHLESINGER, District Judge:
               Jim C. Beck was convicted of wire and mail fraud, money
        laundering, and aiding the filing of a false tax return. In this appeal,
        Beck makes many challenges to the district court’s judgment. Find-
        ing that most of the issues do not have merit, we affirm on those
        issues. However, we vacate and remand the district court’s deci-
        sion as to one issue.
                                          I.
               Before Jim Beck was the Georgia Insurance Commissioner,
        he was the general manager of Georgia Underwriting Association
        (GUA) and the Chief Financial Officer of the Georgia Arson Con-
        trol Program (GACP). GUA was created under Georgia law to in-
        sure high-risk properties so they could get insurance because pri-
        vate insurance companies would not cover them. GACP is a non-
        profit organization dedicated to fighting arson in Georgia, which is
        housed with and funded by GUA.
              In June of 2018, Beck learned that a grand jury issued a sub-
        poena to GUA. The subpoena sought documents related to Beck’s
        employment. Thereafter, he retained legal counsel. The Govern-
        ment was investigating an alleged invoicing scheme where Beck

        ∗ The Honorable Harvey Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Mid-
        dle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        21-13582                Opinion of the Court                           3

        formed several entities with friends and family and invoiced his em-
        ployer GUA for payment for work not performed. 1
           Before Beck’s indictment but after he retained counsel for the
        investigation, Matthew Barﬁeld, the co-founder of Green Tech,
        agreed to assist with the Government’s investigation as a covert
        witness. The FBI, the investigative agency, knew that Beck was rep-
        resented by an attorney for this investigation when agents asked
        Barﬁeld to make two recorded calls to Beck. Beck made incriminat-
        ing statements during these calls.
            The Government obtained a search warrant for Beck’s personal
        email account on April 25, 2019. On May 14, 2019, Beck was in-
        dicted on 38 counts for mail fraud, wire fraud, and money launder-
        ing. The grand jury issued a superseding indictment on August 14,
        2019, that again charged Beck with mail fraud, wire fraud, and
        money laundering in connection with the Invoicing Scheme. The
        superseding indictment added a count for mail fraud for paying for
        his insurance commissioner campaign signs with GACP funds and
        four counts of aiding the ﬁling of a false tax return.
           Beck moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search
        warrant because the warrant failed to specify a date range. Before
        the prosecution reviewed the results, the oﬃcer executed a second
        search warrant upon learning of the date range error. Beck moved

        1
          The schemes are identified as the Green Tech Scheme, Lucca Lu Scheme,
        Mitigating Solutions Scheme, and Paperless Solutions Scheme (collectively
        “Invoicing Scheme”).
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13582

        to suppress the evidence of the second warrant, arguing that it was
        tainted by the ﬁrst. Following a report and recommendation issued
        by the magistrate judge, the district court denied both motions.
        The district court denied the motion as moot as to the ﬁrst warrant
        and held the second warrant was valid under the independent
        source doctrine.
                Beck also moved to suppress the statements, alleging the
        prosecutor violated Georgia’s Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2
        that prohibits a lawyer from speaking to a person who the lawyer
        knows is represented by another lawyer (“no-contact rule”). The
        district court denied Beck’s motion.
               Following the Government’s case-in-chief, Beck moved for
        judgment of acquittal on: counts 26-39 charging Beck with money
        laundering, arguing that they merge with the mail and wire fraud
        counts; counts 40-43 charging Beck with aiding the filing of a false
        tax return, arguing that the indictment did not identify whom he
        aided and abetted; and count 25 charging Beck with mail fraud, ar-
        guing that it was not to further the alleged scheme to defraud GUA,
        but GACP. The district court denied the motion.
               Beck had proposed several jury instructions, such as defining
        “scheme to defraud” in the conjunctive “deceive and cheat” instead
        of the disjunctive “deceive or cheat.” He also proposed a theory of
        defense, highlighting that deceit alone does not satisfy the intent
        element and sought to include contested facts, including that he
        was an outstanding manager of GUA and there was no evidence
        that he cheated anyone out of money. The district court did not
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        21-13582                Opinion of the Court                          5

        give his proposed instructions, nor his proposed theory of defense.
        The district court did instruct the jury that “[p]roving intent to de-
        ceive alone, without the intent to cause loss or injury, is not suffi-
        cient to prove intent to defraud.”
               On July 27, 2021, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all
        counts. The district court imposed restitution on the tax convic-
        tions to be due and payable immediately.
                                        II.
               We review “a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
        evidence for clear error as to factual ﬁndings and de novo as to its
        application of the law.” United States v. Watkins, 760 F.3d 1271, 1282
        (11th Cir. 2014). We review de novo a district court’s determination
        that probable cause supported the issuance of a search warrant.
        United States v. Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d 409, 415 (11th Cir. 2016). Clear-
        error review is deferential, so “we will not disturb a district court’s
        ﬁndings unless we are left with a deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that
        a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279,
        1300 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
                We review “the legal correctness of jury instructions de
        novo” and their phrasing for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pra-
        ther, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Starke, 62
        F.3d 1374, 1380 (11th Cir. 1995). “Defendants are not entitled to the
        jury instructions using the precise language they request where the
        district court’s ‘charge adequately addresses the substance of the
        defendant’s request.’” United States v. Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1210
        (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386,
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13582

        1396 (11th Cir. 1984)). In other words, “[s]o long as the instructions
        accurately reﬂect the law, the trial judge is given wide discretion as
        to the style and wording employed in the instructions.” Starke, 62
        F.3d at 1380.
               In addition, a defense theory instruction is not required if
        the “charge given adequately covers the substance of the requested
        instruction.” United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1293 (11th Cir.
        2006). The district court’s refusal to give a speciﬁc instruction on
        defendant’s theory of defense is reversible error “only when (1) the
        proposed instruction is correct, (2) the instruction was not ad-
        dressed in the charge actually given, and (3) the failure to give the
        requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to
        present an eﬀective defense.” Id.
               The denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed
        de novo based on the suﬃciency of the evidence and questions of
        statutory interpretation. United States v. Gari, 572 F.3d 1352, 1359
        (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zuniga-Arteaga, 681 F.3d 1220, 1222-
        23 (11th Cir. 2012). And we “view the evidence in the light most
        favorable to the Government and draw all reasonable factual infer-
        ences in favor of the jury’s verdict.” Gari, 572 F.3d at 1359.
               We review a claim that the district court lacked the authority
        to impose restitution de novo. United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d
        1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004).
                                       III.
               Beck appeals his convictions on numerous issues. He alleges
        the district court erred by refusing to suppress evidence from an
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        21-13582               Opinion of the Court                         7

        alleged invalid warrant and recorded conversations of an under-
        cover call in violation of Georgia’s no-contact rule. He contends
        the district court erred because it did not give his proposed jury
        instructions and proposed theory of defense. He also alleges the
        district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal
        because: the charges for money laundering merged with the
        scheme to defraud; the aiding and abetting tax counts of the indict-
        ment failed to identify whom he aided; and a mail fraud count was
        for using GACP funds and were not in furtherance of a scheme to
        defraud GUA. Finally, he argues the district court erred in imposing
        restitution to the IRS to be paid immediately.
                             A.     The Search Warrants
              Beck asserts the ﬁrst search of his email violated the Fourth
        Amendment because the warrant failed to specify a time limit for
        responsive emails. The Government responds that the ﬁrst warrant
        is moot because it did not use any of the information collected
        from that search.
                As to the second warrant Beck asserts it is invalid because it
        bears the fruit of the poisonous tree having been tainted by the ﬁrst
        illegal search. Beck contends that because the ﬁrst search warrant
        produced results, the Government knew there were responsive
        emails when it sought the second warrant. The Government ar-
        gued that the oﬃcer viewed none of the produced materials. It also
        contends there were no diﬀerences between the ﬁrst and second
        aﬃdavits supporting the search warrant aside from the date range
        and an acknowledgment of the ﬁrst search warrant.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                21-13582

               We need not decide whether the ﬁrst warrant with no date
        range violated the Fourth Amendment “because even if a Fourth
        Amendment violation occurred, the independent source doctrine
        allow[s] the admission of the evidence found during . . . ” the sec-
        ond search. United States v. Bush, 727 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir.
        2013).
                 The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people
        to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eﬀects, against
        unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
        warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend.
        IV. The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction of evidence that
        the police obtained unconstitutionally. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
        655 (1961). But this rule has exceptions. Relevant here is the inde-
        pendent source doctrine, which holds that unlawfully obtained ev-
        idence is admissible if the government also obtains that evidence
        through an independent legal source. See Murray v. United States,
        487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988) (holding that evidence found in plain sight
        during an illegal entry would be admissible if the second, legal,
        search would have occurred even if the ﬁrst search had not hap-
        pened); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (allowing the ad-
        mission of evidence found in a home ﬁrst entered illegally, but later
        entered based on a search warrant “wholly unconnected” to the
        initial, illegal entry).
               The independent source doctrine recognizes that the goal of
        the exclusionary rule is to put “the police in the same, not a worse,
        position that they would have been in if no police error or
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        21-13582               Opinion of the Court                         9

        misconduct had occurred.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984);
        see also Murray, 487 U.S. at 537. A warrant obtained after an unlaw-
        ful search is not an independent source if either the illegally ob-
        tained evidence aﬀected the court’s decision to issue the warrant
        or the illegally obtained evidence aﬀected the government’s deci-
        sion to apply for the warrant. Murray, 487 U.S. at 542.
                The Eleventh Circuit applies Murray by ﬁrst “excis[ing] from
        the search warrant aﬃdavit any information gained during the ar-
        guably illegal initial [search] and determine whether the remaining
        information is enough to support a probable cause ﬁnding.” United
        States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2012) If the remain-
        ing information establishes probable cause, then, we “determine
        whether the oﬃcer’s decision to seek the warrant was ‘prompted
        by’ what he had seen during the arguably illegal [search].” Id. (quot-
        ing Murray, 487 U.S. at 542). So “[i]f the oﬃcer would have sought
        the warrant even without the preceding illegal search, the evidence
        seized under the warrant is admissible.” Bush, 727 F.3d at 1316.
                Beck’s sole basis for suppression of the evidence is the ﬁrst
        warrant failed to specify a time range for responsive emails. The
        only information in the second warrant application that needs to
        be excised is the fact that the ﬁrst search produced responsive re-
        sults. Beck does not dispute the warrant application otherwise con-
        tained suﬃcient information to establish probable cause. And even
        if he had, the search warrant application contained plenty of un-
        tainted evidence to establish probable cause. FBI Special Agent
        Dunn’s aﬃdavit for the second warrant detailed that he saw email
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13582

        correspondence turned over by Barﬁeld and Sonya McKaig,
        founder of Lucca Lu, which showed Beck used his personal email
        in the Invoicing Scheme. Presented with the amount and nature of
        evidence, the magistrate judge would have issued the search war-
        rant without the discussion of the ﬁrst warrant. This conclusion is
        further supported because the magistrate judge issued the ﬁrst
        warrant with almost identical information.
               Next, we address the second step of Murray: did the ﬁrst war-
        rant with no date range aﬀect the government’s decision to apply
        for the second warrant? Nothing in the record suggests Agent
        Dunn’s decision to seek the second search warrant was prompted
        by the information gleaned from the results of the ﬁrst. He viewed
        none of the content pulled from the ﬁrst search. It was the ﬁling of
        the Motion to Suppress by Beck that alerted Agent Dunn to the
        error. Only a preliminary ﬁlter team started an initial review for
        privileged information. Nothing in the record suggests the prelim-
        inary ﬁlter team communicated anything to Agent Dunn regarding
        the content of the emails obtained by the ﬁrst search. The district
        court found there were no meaningful diﬀerences in the aﬃdavits
        except for the date range. Beck urges us to reconsider the district
        court’s resolution, but there is no evidence to the contrary.
               Beck’s protests do not show that the district court’s factual
        determinations were clearly erroneous. Bush, 727 F.3d at 1315 n.3.
        The district court faithfully applied the standards laid out in Murray
        to determine the government’s motives in ﬁling the second search
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        21-13582               Opinion of the Court                         11

        warrant application. It carefully weighed the evidence from both
        sides.
              The district court closely examined the aﬃdavits supporting
        the warrants and determined the warrants were nearly identical,
        tracked the issue with its superior vantage point, and presided over
        the presentation of all the evidence. This decision was well-rea-
        soned and well-supported, so we should not reverse it.
              Though the government should not proﬁt from its mistakes,
        neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would other-
        wise have occupied. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 542. Thus, we aﬃrm.
                        B.     Georgia’s No-Contact Rule
                Beck argues the district court erred in failing to suppress the
        recorded conversations with him and the cooperating witness, Bar-
        ﬁeld. He asserts the conversations are inadmissible because the
        Government violated Georgia’s no-contact rule. The Government
        knew Beck was represented by a lawyer for the investigation, but
        still used Barﬁeld to solicit incriminating statements from Beck be-
        fore his indictment.
               Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 provides:
               RULE. 4.2 COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON
               REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
               (a) A lawyer who is representing a client in a matter
                   shall not communicate about the subject of the
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                    21-13582

                                                  2
                   representation with a person the lawyer knows to
                   be represented by another lawyer in the matter,
                   unless the lawyer has the consent of the other law-
                   yer or is authorized to do so by law or court order.
               (b) Attorneys for the State and Federal Government
                   shall be subject to this Rule in the same manner as
                   other attorneys in this State.
        The Georgia Bar’s no-contact rule “imposes restrictions that go be-
        yond” the federal constitutional provisions. Rule 4.2 of the Georgia
        Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule 4-102, Comment 2.
                We need not reach whether the Government violated Geor-
        gia’s no-contact rule because we have held that “a state rule of pro-
        fessional conduct cannot provide an adequate basis for a federal
        court to suppress evidence that is otherwise admissible.” United
        States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1124 (11th Cir. 1999). And “we are
        bound to follow a prior binding precedent unless and until it is over-
        ruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.” In re Burgest,
        829 F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Vega-
        Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008)). Beck presented no
        other basis for suppressing the recordings other than an alleged vi-
        olation of Rule 4.2. Thus, the district court did not err in denying
        the motion to suppress Beck’s statements made to an undercover
        informant pre-indictment.

        2
         Because the rule uses “person” rather than “party” the protection extends
        beyond the Sixth Amendment and attaches pre-indictment. See e.g., United
        States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir. 1990).
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        21-13582                 Opinion of the Court                           13

                               C.      Jury Instructions
                Beck contends the district court committed reversible error
        because (1) the court used the disjunctive “deceive or cheat” in de-
        ﬁning “scheme to defraud”; (2) omitted “and cheat” in the good
        faith instruction; and (3) failed to give his theory of defense instruc-
        tion. He asserts these instructions misled the jury into believing it
        could convict Beck of mail and wire fraud for only intending to
        deceive GUA without harming it and so he must have a new trial.
               The district court gave the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury In-
        struction for wire and mail fraud. The district court instructed:
               The term “scheme to defraud” means any plan or
               course of action intended to deceive or cheat some-
               one out of money or property by using false or fraud-
               ulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . . to
               act with “intent to defraud” means to act knowingly
               and with the speciﬁc intent to use false or fraudulent
               pretenses, representations, or promises to cause loss
               or injury. Proving intent to deceive alone, without the in-
               tent to cause loss or injury, is not suﬃcient to prove intent
               to defraud.” (emphasis added).
        Then the district court instructed:
               “Good Faith” is a complete defense to a charge that
               requires intent to defraud . . . [b]ut an honest belief
               that a business venture would ultimately succeed
               does not constitute good faith if the Defendant in-
               tended to deceive others by making representation
               the Defendant knew to be false or fraudulent.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  21-13582

               “On appeal, we examine whether the jury charges, consid-
        ered as a whole, suﬃciently instructed the jury so that the jurors
        understood the issues and were not misled.” Starke, 62 F.3d at 1380
        (quoting Wilkinson v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 920 F.2d 1560, 1569
        (11th Cir. 1991)).
               Our precedent does instruct that mail and wire fraud require
        a defendant to intend to deceive the victim and harm or injure it.
        United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2016). But
        Beck fails to show that the district court committed a reversible er-
        ror because the district court addressed the substance of the in-
        struction in its charge.
                Here, when the instructions are viewed in context, the dis-
        trict court’s charge did not permit the jury to ﬁnd intent proved
        solely by an intent to deceive. The jury was speciﬁcally instructed
        that, “proving intent to deceive alone, without the intent to cause
        loss or injury, is not suﬃcient to prove intent to defraud.” The dis-
        trict court did not err in omitting “and cheat” in its good faith in-
        structions for the same reasons—when the jury instructions are
        viewed in context and considered as a whole—the district court’s
        instruction properly addressed the mens rea requirement. Notably,
        we recently found no reversible error in using the “intent to de-
        fraud” pattern good faith instructions because “the jury could not
        have convicted [the defendant] without ﬁnding that his misrepre-
        sentations were made with an intent to cause loss or injury to the
        individuals from whom he solicited money, i.e., to obtain money to
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        21-13582                   Opinion of the Court                                15

        which he was not entitled.” United States v. Watkins, 42 F.4th 1278,
        1287 (11th Cir. 2022).
               Beck’s contention that the district court committed reversi-
        ble error by failing to give his theory of defense also fails. A court
        need not give a theory of defense instruction “when the charge
        given adequately covers the substance of the requested instruc-
        tion.” Ndiaye, 434 F.3d at 1293. Neither is a district court obligated
        to give a proposed theory-of-defense instruction that is partisan, ar-
        gumentative, or seeks to place the defendant’s “desired factual find-
        ings into the mouth of the court.” United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d
        1266, 1287 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Barham, 595
        F.2d 231, 245 (5th Cir. 1979)); 3 see also United States v. Feldman, 936
        F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2019).
               Beck’s theory of defense included contested facts such as
        that Greentech and Paperless Solutions actually worked for GUA,
        that there was no evidence that Beck intended to harm GUA, that
        Beck was an outstanding general manager of GUA, that and there
        was no evidence that Beck cheated anyone out of money. Because
        the proposed instruction was more of a jury argument than a
        charge, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Paradies, 98
        F.3d 1266 at 1287.

        3
         In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
        adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down
        prior to October 1, 1981.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13582

               The rest of Beck’s theory of defense which includes defining
        “intent to defraud” was adequately covered in the district court’s
        instructions. In fact, the jury instruction given matches Beck’s pro-
        posed language verbatim. United States v. US Infrastructure, Inc., 576
        F.3d 1195, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Indeed, the words they claim the
        court should have used are virtually identical to the words the
        court actually used.”).
                And finally, Beck was not seriously impaired in his ability to
        present an effective defense. Beck presented evidence that “GUA
        made a profit for the first time in 30 years and that Mr. Beck would
        not have been paid money from any of the vendors, like Greentech,
        Lucca Lu, Mitigating Solutions, or Paperless Solutions, if those ven-
        dors did not provide a revenue uplift for GUA.” Accordingly, the
        district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give Beck’s
        proposed instructions.
                                   D.     Merger
               Beck contends that the charges for money laundering merge
        with the scheme to defraud because the transactions are part of the
        “core scheme” or a “central component” of the underlying criminal
        activity. In other words, he argues that because the money charges
        were part of the overall scheme to defraud, that the underlying
        crime was not a completed crime. He avers that mail and wire
        fraud are not complete until the overall scheme is complete. In sup-
        port, Beck relies on the plurality opinion of United States v. Santos,
        for the proposition that “proceeds” cannot mean “receipts” and in-
        stead “proceeds” means “profits.” 553 U.S. 507, 525-26 (2008)
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        21-13582               Opinion of the Court                         17

        (Stevens, J., concurring). Holding otherwise would create a merger
        problem as identified in Justice Scalia’s opinion. Id. at 515.
               While some circuits, like the Sixth and Ninth, apply a broad
        view of Santos’s “profits” definition to all underlying offenses, the
        Eleventh Circuit does not. Our circuit has routinely held that San-
        tos has “limited precedential value” and Santos’s “profits” definition
        of “proceeds” only applies to those cases in which the underlying
        specified unlawful activity is a gambling enterprise. United States v.
        Jennings, 599 F.3d 1241, 1252 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. De-
        marest, 570 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009). In Jennings, the court
        held there was no error when the defendant was charged with wire
        and mail fraud and money laundering. 599 F.3d at 1244. The de-
        fendant relied on Santos, arguing that the conviction for money
        laundering must be overturned because “the government cannot
        prove the money at issue was the profits of illegal activity as op-
        posed to receipts.” Id. The court held that the definition of proceeds
        including receipts and profits binds the court. Id.
               Further, our precedent forecloses Beck’s argument that
        money laundering charges only occur once the scheme is com-
        plete. United States. v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1334–1335 (11th Cir.
        2005) (mail fraud is completed upon the mailing of the fraudulent
        checks). Mail and wire fraud “punishes not the creation of a scheme
        to defraud, but each execution of that scheme by use of interstate
        wire transmissions” or mailings, so the crime is complete when the
        mailing or wire is sent, not when the fraudulent scheme comes to
        an end. United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir.
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        18                      Opinion of the Court               21-13582

        2008). See also United States v. Gray, 367 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir.
        2004); Silvestri, 409 F.3d at 1334–35.
                Although our review is de novo, we are bound by a previous
        panel decision, unless “it is overruled or undermined to the point
        of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en
        banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
        Here, because Beck’s actions did not involve receipts from an unli-
        censed gambling operation and no Supreme Court opinion over-
        rules this circuits previous decisions, this court is bound by previ-
        ous Eleventh Circuit opinions. Because Beck’s sole argument is
        that there can be no proceeds until the whole scheme is complete,
        he has forfeited any argument that any particular money launder-
        ing count must be vacated because the mailing or wire has not yet
        occurred. So the district court’s denial of Beck’s motion for acquit-
        tal of the money laundering charges is affirmed.
                           E.      Aiding and Abetting
                Beck contends that because Counts 40-43 of the indictment
        fail to identify whom he aided in ﬁling of the false tax returns in
        violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), the counts must be dismissed. He
        asserts allowing evidence of him aiding his tax preparer is a con-
        structive amendment that is per se reversible error.
               A constructive amendment occurs when “the essential ele-
        ments of the offense contained in the indictment are altered . . . to
        broaden the possible bases for conviction beyond what is contained
        in the indictment.” United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1260
        (11th Cir. 2019). To be convicted under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), the
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        defendant must have “(1) willfully and knowingly aided or assisted
        (2) in the preparation or filing of a federal income tax return (3) that
        contained material statements that the defendant knew to be false.”
        United States v. Kottwitz, 614 F.3d 1241, 1269 (11th Cir. 2010), opin-
        ion withdrawn in part on denial of reh’g, 627 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (quoting United States v. Parker, 277 F. App’x 952, 957 (11th Cir.
        2008)). While “[o]ne cannot aid or abet himself” United States v.
        Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1407 (11th Cir. 1984), the preparer/filer of
        tax returns need not be charged in the indictment and can be an
        innocent party. United States v. Wolfson, 573 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir.
        1978). Further a defendant “does not have to sign or prepare the
        return to be amenable to prosecution. If it is proved . . . that he
        knowingly gave a false appraisal with the expectation it would be
        used . . . . on a tax return, it would constitute a crime” Wolfson, 573
        F.2d at 225.
               Here, there was no constructive amendment to the indict-
        ment at trial. The indictment identifies the federal income tax re-
        turns contained statements Beck knew to be false. The failure to
        allege how Beck willfully and knowingly aided or assisted does not
        alter an essential element so long as the indictment alleges that he
        did willfully and knowingly aid and assist. The government did not
        need to allege who actually filed the federal tax returns. Thus, we
        affirm.
                            F.     Mail Fraud on GACP
             Beck asserts that the district court erred in denying Beck’s
        motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count 25, which is a mail
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13582

        fraud charge for using GACP funds for his insurance commissioner
        campaign signs. He asserts the mail fraud was not in furtherance of
        a scheme to defraud GUA, as the indictment alleges, and the evi-
        dence did not establish a sufficient corporate link between GUA
        and GACP.
                While GUA and GACP are legally distinct entities, the evi-
        dence at trial showed a sufficient link between GACP and GUA to
        support the jury’s verdict. Beck was GUA’s general manager and
        GACP’s chief financial officer. Beck told a GUA employee to pay
        for his campaign signs with GACP funds. All of GACP’s funds come
        from GUA. GACP was also housed in GUA’s office. Because there
        is a sufficient corporate link, the jury could reasonably conclude
        that GUA was defrauded when Beck caused the GACP funds to be
        used for his campaign. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                  G.     Restitution
               Beck argues the district court erred by ordering that the res-
        titution on the tax charges was to be paid immediately. He argues
        that statute only permits restitution to the IRS to be payable as a
        condition of supervised release. The government agrees with
        Beck’s arguments on this claim.
               “A federal district court has ‘no inherent authority to order
        restitution, and may do so only as explicitly empowered by stat-
        ute.’” Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1335 (quoting United States v. Hensley,
        91 F.3d 274, 276 (1st Cir.1996)). 18 U.S.C. § 3583 allows restitution
        to the IRS for tax offenses to be imposed “as an explicit condition
        of supervised release.” See also United States v. Nolan, 472 F.3d 362,
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        21-13582                Opinion of the Court                         21

        382 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Restitution to the IRS may be imposed as a
        condition of supervised release under § 3583 . . . .”). But “‘a restitu-
        tion award due prior to the commencement of a term of supervised
        release is a component of the sentence, not a condition of super-
        vised release,’ and is therefore unauthorized.” United States v. Bol-
        ton, 908 F.3d 75, 97 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. West-
        brooks, 858 F.3d 317, 327 (5th Cir. 2017)). Here, the district court’s
        order imposing the restitution to be paid immediately to the IRS
        was impermissible, as it was not a condition of supervised release.
        We agree with both parties that the district court erred in doing so,
        and we vacate the district court’s decision on this point and remand
        for further proceedings.
                                        IV.
            The judgment of the district court is VACATED AND
        REMANDED IN PART and AFFIRMED IN PART.