Court Opinion

ID: 9925691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 19:03:10.352885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:23.410305
License: Public Domain

FIRST DIVISION
                                BARNES, P. J.,
                             LAND and WATKINS, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                    January 22, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1429. THOMPSON v. THE STATE.

      WATKINS, Judge.

      Jason Thompson seeks reversal of the denial of his amended motion for new

trial following his conviction for several charges resulting from his act of shooting his

ex-girlfriend in her head. Thompson argues that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain most of his convictions, that the trial court erred in charging the jury, and that

he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons that follow, we

discern no error, and we affirm.

             On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the
      light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, with the defendant no longer
      enjoying a presumption of innocence. We neither weigh the evidence nor
      determine witness credibility, which are tasks that fall within the
      exclusive province of the jury, but only determine if the evidence was
       sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the
       charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.1

       So viewed, the evidence shows that Thompson and the victim were in a volatile

on-again-off-again relationship for years. The victim specifically described her

relationship with Thompson as “toxic” and “violent,” while even Thompson

described it as “toxic” and “intense.” In fact, the victim told a friend at one point

that she was too scared to leave Thompson. As we discuss in more detail below,

Thompson was violent towards the victim on several occasions.

       The violence against the victim culminated on June 4, 2013. At that time,

Thompson was living with the victim, but she had expressed to him that she wanted

him to move out. Thompson was not financially contributing to household expenses

and, as a result, the victim had to obtain a title loan to pay her bills. After receiving the

funds from the title loan, the victim called Thompson, who was at her house, to

request her bank account number so that she could deposit the money. Thompson

refused to provide the information and instead insisted that she come home.

       1
           (Citations omitted.) Allison v. State, 356 Ga. App. 256 (846 SE2d 222) (2020).
                                             2
      Once the victim returned home, Thompson had her sit on the couch.

Thompson started yelling at the victim that he was tired of her blaming everything on

him, and he pulled out a gun. Afraid that Thompson would strike her with the gun, the

victim covered her face with a pillow from the couch. Then the victim felt Thompson

pointing the gun to her left temple. Using the pillow, the victim tried to move the gun

away from her head. Thompson then yelled at her “look at me.” Once Thompson

took the gun away from her head, the victim looked at him. Then Thompson put the

gun in his mouth, and the victim closed her eyes and covered her face with the couch

pillow. Thompson took the gun out of his mouth and the victim grabbed at the barrel

of the gun, but Thompson shot the victim in the head.

      The victim never lost consciousness, but she was unable to speak after being

shot. The victim thought to herself, “he finally got me, that son of a b*tch got me.”

Thompson called 911 and the victim was taken to the hospital. Because she was unable

to speak, officers who met her at the hospital had to communicate with her by having

her blink and squeeze their hands. At the time of trial the bullet was still in the

victim’s brain, and, as a result of her injuries, the victim had to relearn how to do

                                           3
many life skills, including talking. After being shot she also suffered from epilepsy and

could not be left alone in case she had a seizure.

      Thompson was indicted on charges of attempted murder, aggravated battery

family violence, aggravated assault family violence, possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A jury found

Thompson guilty of all charges, except for possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, to which Thompson pled guilty. At sentencing, the trial court merged

Thompson’s convictions for aggravated battery and aggravated assault into his

conviction for attempted murder. Following the trial court’s denial of his amended

motion for new trial, Thompson appealed.

      1. Thompson first argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

conviction for attempted murder of the victim. We disagree.

      Georgia law provides that “[a] person commits the offense of murder when he

unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death

of another human being.”2 “Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to

take the life of another human being which is manifested by external circumstances

      2
          OCGA § 16-5-1 (a).
                                           4
capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears

and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant

heart.”3 “‘[I]mplied malice,’ as employed in OCGA § 16-5-1 (b), is a term which has

been defined to mean conduct exhibiting a reckless disregard for human life.”4

Specifically, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that

      extremely negligent conduct, which creates what a reasonable man would
      realize to be not only an unjustifiable but also a very high degree of risk
      of death or serious bodily injury to another or to others – though
      unaccompanied by any intent to kill or do serious bodily injury – and
      which actually causes the death of another, may constitute murder.
      Reckless disregard for human life may be the equivalent of a specific
      intent to kill. Evidence that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for
      human life is, for purposes of demonstrating his guilt of the crime of
      malice murder, as equally probative as evidence that he acted with a
      specific intent to kill.5

      3
          OCGA § 16-5-1 (b).
      4
       (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Burney v. State, 309 Ga. 273, 277 (1) (a)
(845 SE2d 625) (2020).
      5
       (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 277-278 (1) (a) (finding sufficient
evidence to sustain malice murder conviction when the evidence showed that
defendant bound an elderly man to a chair and left him there despite knowledge of his
advanced age and having been informed of his need for life-saving medications).
                                           5
Moreover, “[a] person commits the offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to

commit a specific crime, he performs any act which constitutes a substantial step

toward the commission of that crime.”6 Intentionally shooting someone can be a

substantial step toward the commission of the crime of murder.7

               When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of due
      process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
      Constitution, the proper standard of review is whether a rational trier of
      fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
      [The reviewing court] views the evidence in the light most favorable to
      the verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of the weight and
      credibility of the evidence.8

      Thompson contends that the evidence presented at trial did not demonstrate

beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to shoot the victim as opposed to her

accidentally being shot during a struggle over the gun when he attempted to take his

own life. We hold, however, that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury

      6
          OCGA § 16-4-1.
      7
          See Wright v. State, 365 Ga. App. 415, 420 (1) (878 SE2d 751) (2002).
      8
          (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Burney, 309 Ga. at 277 (1) (a).
                                           6
could find express or implied malice to kill the victim.9 With regard to express malice,

the record contains extensive evidence of Thompson’s prior intentional acts of

violence against the victim.

      9
      See Mills v. State, 287 Ga. 828, 830-831 (2) (700 SE2d 544) (2010). The
Supreme Court held in Mills that

      [t]he evidence supported a finding of both express and implied malice.
      [The defendant] had threatened to kill the victim in the past if he caught
      her cheating on him and had cut her while holding a knife to her throat.
      [The defendant] again threatened to kill the victim just hours before the
      shooting. Later, while high and drunk, [the defendant] complained that
      the victim had another man coming to their residence too frequently,
      and, to show he was serious, [the defendant] climbed into bed with the
      victim holding a loaded 9mm handgun with his finger on the trigger,
      pointed the gun at her, and shot her in the head while her two-year-old
      son was on the bed next to her. He then failed to seek medical aid and
      instead sought to dispose of the murder weapon. This evidence was
      sufficient to show from the external circumstances that [the defendant]
      caused the victim’s death with deliberate intention, thereby establishing
      express malice. In addition, there was no “considerable provocation” for
      the shooting even under [the defendant’s] own version of events, and a
      rational jury could find that the circumstances surrounding the killing
      showed that [the defendant] had an abandoned and malignant heart,
      thereby establishing implied malice.
                                           7
      For example, one of the victim’s friends testified that she heard Thompson

threaten to kill the victim over the phone and tell the victim that he wished she was

dead. Also, the victim and a mutual friend testified about a disturbing incident in 2012.

Thompson invited a mutual male friend over to the victim’s house, but when

Thompson arrived, severely intoxicated, and found the male friend there, he became

enraged and tried to fight the friend after accusing the victim of cheating with this

friend. Thompson lunged at the victim and had to be physically restrained by another

person. As Thompson was being forcibly removed from the victim’s residence, he

punched a hole in the hallway, but when he returned a while later, he was angry that

the male friend was still at her house. Thompson threw his motorcycle helmet at the

victim, which struck her in the face and then bounced off a window sill. The helmet

then struck the victim’s dog who was sitting in her lap, splitting the dog’s head open

severely enough that the victim could see the dog’s brain. Despite the victim taking

the dog immediately to an emergency veterinarian, the dog died of this injury.

Thompson largely corroborated the victim’s and the friend’s accounts of this

incident.

                                           8
       The victim also testified that a few months before the shooting she told

Thompson to leave her home, and he responded by pinning her down, holding her by

her neck, and choking her. Based on this extensive history of intentional violence

directed at the victim, the jury would have been authorized to find actual malicious

intent to kill the victim.10

       Moreover, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer malice as well.

Both the victim and Thompson agree that he waved a loaded and cocked weapon close

to her head. This is “extremely negligent” conduct which carried “a very high degree

of risk of death or serious bodily injury” to the victim even if it was “unaccompanied

by any intent to kill or do serious bodily injury[.]”11 Accordingly, the evidence was

sufficient to sustain Thompson’s conviction for attempted murder.12

       10
        Evidence of prior acts of domestic violence are relevant to establish that the
defendant’s conduct was not accidental. See Merritt v. State, 311 Ga. 875, 889 (6) (860
SE2d 455) (2021) (defendant was unable to show plain error for admission of evidence
of prior acts of domestic violence against the victim because such evidence
contradicted his accident defense).
       11
            Burney, 309 Ga. at 277-278 (1) (a).
       12
         See Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 729 (15) (739 SE2d 332) (2013)
(superceded by statute on other grounds) (holding that the defendant “acted with
criminal negligence when he pointed the loaded gun at [the victim], rendering the
defense of accident inapplicable.”)
                                             9
       2. In three claims of error, Thompson contends that his convictions for

aggravated battery and aggravated assault must be reversed and that the trial court

incorrectly charged the jury as to aggravated battery. These claims of error are moot.

       The jury found Thompson guilty of attempted murder, aggravated battery

family violence, and aggravated assault family violence; however, the trial court

merged the battery and assault convictions into the attempted murder conviction for

purposes of sentencing. We have affirmed Thompson’s attempted murder conviction;

accordingly, Thompson’s claims of error with regard to his merged battery and assault

convictions are moot.13

       3. Thompson contends that his conviction for possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony cannot stand. This argument was waived by Thompson’s

failure to raise it in the trial court.

       13
        See Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 888-889 (1) - (2) (700 SE2d 399) (2010)
(holding that a claim of insufficient evidence and a contention regarding an erroneous
jury charge on a conviction that has been merged into another conviction for
sentencing purposes was moot).

                                          10
      Thompson was indicted for possession of a firearm during the commission of

the felony of aggravated battery. With regard to his charge for aggravated battery,

Thompson was indicted for “maliciously caus[ing] bodily harm to [the victim] by

depriving her of her ability to speak” by “discharging a firearm at the head of [the

victim.]” Thompson contends that the indictment is void as to the aggravated battery

count which required an allegation that Thompson “depriv[ed the victim] of a

member of [] her body, by rendering a member of [the victim’s] body useless, or by

seriously disfiguring [the victim’s] body or a member thereof.”14 Thompson alleges

that the victim’s voice is not a member of her body.

      Thompson’s attack in this regard is not to the sufficiency of the evidence of his

possession of a firearm, rather it is to the form of the indictment.

      In Georgia, a defendant has a right to be tried upon an indictment which
      is perfect in form and substance. However, this right can, under certain
      circumstances, be waived if a defendant fails to timely challenge the
      indictment. A challenge to an indictment is typically made through a
      demurrer to the indictment. A demurrer to an indictment may be general
      or special. A general demurrer challenges the very validity of the
      indictment and may be raised anytime; the special objects merely to its
      form or seeks more information and must be raised before pleading to the

      14
           OCGA § 16-5-24 (a).
                                           11
indictment. A special demurrer is waived if not raised before pleading to
the merits of the indictment. On the other hand, because a general
demurrer attacks the legality of an indictment, it is permissible to raise
this ground after verdict by a motion in arrest of judgment even if there
was no earlier objection. A motion in arrest asserts that the indictment
contains a defect on its face affecting the substance and real merits of the
offense charged and voiding the indictment, such as failure to charge a
necessary element of a crime. Likewise, an oral objection or motion to
quash based upon the same grounds as a general demurrer can be
asserted anytime during the trial. A motion for directed verdict of
acquittal is not the proper way to contest the sufficiency of an
indictment. A motion for a directed verdict of acquittal addresses the
sufficiency of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the underlying
indictment. When an indictment is absolutely void in that it fails to
charge the accused with any act made a crime by the law and, upon the
trial, no demurrer to the indictment is interposed and the accused is
convicted under the indictment and judgment is entered on the verdict,
the accused’s proper remedy is a motion in arrest of judgment or habeas
corpus. A motion for new trial is not the proper method to attack the
sufficiency of an indictment and does not provide a basis for this Court
to review the indictment. Based on the above, it is clear that objections
to defects in an indictment can be waived, except when the defects are
so great that the accusation is absolutely void. However, when a claim
that an accusation or indictment is absolutely void is not properly

                                    12
      asserted in the trial court, it can be reviewed on appeal only through a
      habeas corpus proceeding.15

      Here, Thompson’s trial counsel did not file a general demurrer or a motion in

arrest of judgment objecting to the form of the indictment; accordingly this claim of

error leaves nothing for us to review.

      4. Lastly, Thompson contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial

counsel in several regards. Again, we disagree.

      Georgia law is clear that

      [t]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
      must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
      deficient performance so prejudiced the defendant that there is a
      reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the
      trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington[16]. If an
      appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the
      Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the other
      prong. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we accept the trial court’s
      factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous,
      but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.

      15
        (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McKay v. State, 234 Ga. App. 556, 558-
560 (2) (507 SE2d 484) (1998).
      16
           466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LEd2d 674) (1984).
                                          13
      Furthermore, there is a strong presumption that the performance of
      counsel was within the wide range of reasonable professional lawyering,
      and we cannot reach a contrary conclusion unless defendant successfully
      rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Judicial
      scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. The test
      has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the
      test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether
      some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the
      circumstances, as defense counsel acted. In determining what constitutes
      ineffective assistance, a critical distinction is made between inadequate
      preparation and unwise choices of trial tactics and strategy. Particularly
      in regard to matters of trial strategy and tactic, effectiveness is not judged
      by hindsight or result. Indeed, decisions regarding trial tactics and
      strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were
      so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have
      followed such a course.17

We will address Thompson’s allegations of ineffective assistance in turn.

      (a) Motion for Directed Verdict as to Attempted Murder

      Thompson contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for

a directed verdict of acquittal as to his attempted murder charge because the evidence

was insufficient. For the reasons described in Division 1, however, the evidence was

      17
         (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Walker v. State, 349 Ga. App. 188, 192-
193 (4) (825 SE2d 578) (2019).
                                           14
sufficient to convict Thompson of attempted murder, so such a motion would have

been meritless. Accordingly, Thompson’s counsel was not ineffective in this regard.18

      (b) Motion in Arrest of Judgment for Charges of Aggravated Battery and Possession

of a Weapon During the Commission of a Felony

      Thompson’s allegation that his trial counsel should have filed a motion in arrest

of judgment19 centers around his claim that the indictment was fatally defective as to

the charge of aggravated battery for failing to identify a member of the victim’s body

which she was deprived of, which was rendered useless, or which was seriously

disfigured. Thompson claims that because depriving the victim of her ability to speak,

as alleged in the indictment, does not identify a member of her body, the indictment

      18
         See Range v. State, 289 Ga. App. 727, 731 (4) (658 SE2d 245) (2008) (“[T]rial
counsel’s failure to move for a directed verdict did not constitute ineffective
assistance. The standard of review for the denial of a motion for directed verdict of
acquittal is the same as that for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a conviction. [Because] the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain [the
defendant’s] conviction[,] he was not entitled to a directed verdict and counsel’s
failure to move for the same does not entitle him to a new trial.”) (citation omitted).
      19
        See OCGA § 17-9-61 (“When a judgment has been rendered, either party may
move in arrest thereof for any defect not amendable which appears on the face of the
record or pleadings. . . . A motion in arrest of judgment must be made during the term
at which the judgment was obtained.”).
                                          15
was void as to the charges of aggravated battery and possessing a firearm during the

commission of aggravated battery.

      Thompson makes an interesting point,20 nonetheless, Thompson’s argument

fails in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The parties have not

identified, nor has our research uncovered, any Georgia case law addressing whether

depriving a victim of her voice constitutes causing “bodily harm to another by

depriving . . . her of a member of . . . her body, by rendering a member of . . . her body

useless, or by seriously disfiguring . . . her body or a member thereof.”21

      Because existing precedent does not resolve whether [a voice] is
      included in the definition of bodily “member,” [Thompson] cannot
      show that trial counsel’s failure to file a [motion in arrest of judgment]
      claiming that the [voice] is not a bodily “member” amounted to deficient
      performance. Where [appellate courts] have not yet squarely decided an
      issue, trial counsel’s failure to raise a novel legal argument does not
      constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. There is no requirement for
      an attorney to prognosticate future law in order to render effective

      20
        The Supreme Court has previously held that “[t]he accepted definition of
bodily ‘member’ is ‘bodily part or organ[.]” Mitchell v. State, 238 Ga. 167, 168 (231
SE2d 773) (1977) (citation omitted).
      21
           See OCGA § 16-5-24 (a).
                                            16
      representation. Counsel is not obligated to argue beyond existing
      precedent.22

As a result, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion in arrest of

judgment.

      (c) Objection to the State’s Closing Argument

      Thompson contends that the State made several objectionable comments

during closing argument. Specifically, Thompson complains about the following

remarks:

      “And what the indictment has the defendant charged with is what we
      believe he actually did. We believe his acts were intentional.”

      “And what I would like to do is go through what the State believed
      happened.”

      “And I can’t say it enough that the State believes that he had intention.”

      22
         (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Moss v. State, 311 Ga. 123, 129-130 (2)
(b) (856 SE2d 280) (2021) (discerning no ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to argue that the abdomen is not a member of the body because existing precedent did
not resolve that legal argument).
                                           17
       “But if I know a gun is loaded and the hammer is back, I’m not going to
       play around with this thing.”

       Regardless of whether these remarks violate the prohibition on a prosecutor

expressing personal opinions about the evidence as Thompson contends,23 Thompson

cannot establish that he was prejudiced as a result. The State presented strong

evidence of Thompson’s guilt, as recounted above. Moreover, the judge charged the

jury that the comments of counsel in closing argument were not evidence and that the

verdict must be based upon evidence. As a result, this claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel also fails.24

       23
            See, e. g., Wyatt v. State, 267 Ga. 860, 864 (2) (a) (485 SE2d 470) (1997).
       24
          See Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 366 (6) (b) (iv) (846 SE2d 57) (2020) (“In
order to prevail on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show
that counsel’s deficiency prejudiced him[.] He has not carried this burden. First, the
trial court instructed the jury that it was not permitted to be influenced by sympathy
for either party and that arguments of counsel are not evidence, and generally we
presume that juries follow the trial courts’ instructions. Second, despite the State’s
improper appeals to sympathy, . . . the State presented strong evidence of Appellant’s
guilt as a party to the crime for which he was convicted, and the jury was charged on
parties to a crime. Given the trial court’s instructions and the strong evidence of
Appellant’s guilt as a party to the charged crimes, we cannot conclude that there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had his
counsel objected to the State’s improper arguments. Accordingly, Appellant has failed
to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.”) (citations omitted).
                                             18
      (d) Failure to Object to the Jury Charge on Aggravated Battery

      Thompson contends that the trial court incorrectly charged the jury as to

aggravated battery and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. For

the reasons discussed above in Division 2, this argument is moot.

      (e) Failure to Request a Lesser Included Charge of Reckless Conduct

      Thompson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a

lesser included charge of reckless conduct25 for attempted murder and aggravated

battery. For the reasons explained in Division 2, this argument is moot as to

Thompson’s conviction for aggravated battery.

      As it relates to Thompson’s conviction for attempted murder, Thompson’s

argument fails because he cannot demonstrate prejudice. Even if there was some

evidence presented which could have supported a charge on reckless conduct as a

lesser included charge of attempted murder, the evidence of Thompson’s intent to

harm the victim was strong and the evidence that his conduct was accidental or merely

      25
         “A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of
another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his
act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable
person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor.” OCGA § 16-5-60
(b).
                                           19
reckless was weak. As recounted in more detail above, the jury heard significant

evidence of Thompson’s history of intentional violence against the victim as well as

evidence that she was attempting to finally cut him off financially shortly before the

crime. Consequently, Thompson has failed to establish a reasonable probability that

the result of the trial would have been different if his counsel had requested a reckless

conduct charge.26

      Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Land, J., concur.

      26
         See Hinton v. State, 304 Ga. 605, 607-608 (2) (820 SE2d 712) (2018) (“Even
assuming, dubiously, that some evidence was presented at [defendant’s] trial to
support a charge of voluntary manslaughter, that evidence was minimal. By contrast,
the State presented strong evidence that [defendant] was guilty of the predicate
felonies of attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault—the crimes on which his
felony murder counts were based. . . . Because the evidence of [defendant’s] guilt was
strong, and any evidence supporting a voluntary manslaughter theory was weak,
[defendant] has failed to establish a reasonable probability that the jury would have
reached a different result, even if it had been charged on voluntary manslaughter.”).
                                           20