Court Opinion

ID: 9670879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:27:40.06665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.001134
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). This Court granted leave to appeal to resolve a controversy concerning the construction of the provision of the workers’ compensation act providing that police or fire department employees, or their dependents, in municipalities or villages "having charter provisions prescribing like benefits, may waive the provisions of this act and accept in lieu thereof such like benefits as are prescribed in the charter but shall not be entitled to like benefits from both.” MCL 418.161(1)(a); MSA 17.237(161)(l)(a). (Emphasis supplied.)
In Vasser v City of Muskegon, 415 Mich 308, 311; 329 NW2d 690 (1982), this Court was evenly divided on the question whether duty disability pension benefits provided under Muskegon’s ordinance were encompassed within the meaning of *391"having charter provisions prescribing like benefits.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The opinion of the Court in the instant case adopts the view of three justices in Vasser that benefits are not prescribed by the charter "even though the ordinance was enacted pursuant to the charter”; "the like benefits must be prescribed in the charter itself.” Vasser, supra, pp 321, 313 (Williams, J.). We adhere to the view we expressed in Vasser that where, as in Vasser and here, the charter provided that a "complete retirement system shall be provided for policemen and firemen of the city by general ordinance”1 (emphasis supplied), benefits provided in an ordinance, adopted pursuant to such a charter direction to provide therefor, are prescribed by the charter although the details of the benefits are set forth in an ordinance and not in the charter itself.
We would construe the words "charter provisions prescribing like benefits” (emphasis supplied), as meaning benefits authorized, provided for, or directed to be provided for in the charter. "We believe this construction is consistent with and implements the apparent legislative purpose of barring double recovery.” Vasser, supra, p 326 (Levin, J.).
Within seven months after our 3-3 indecision in Vasser, the Legislature clarified its intention by amending the statute to eliminate the word "charter”; the operative language is now "providing like benefits.”2_
*392Our 3-3 division in Vasser indicated an unresolved controversy concerning the construction of the statute. In such circumstances, a legislative change has been regarded as a "clarification,” and the meaning resulting from the clarification as the originally intended meaning. See Detroit Edison Co v Dep’t of Revenue, 320 Mich 506, 520-521; 31 NW2d 809 (1948), where this Court said:
"In 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3d ed 1943), p 418, § 1931, it is said:
" 'If the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act — a formal change— rebutting the presumption of substantial change.’
"See, also, Attorney General v Lewis, 151 Mich 81 [1908]; Hambel v Lowry, 264 Mo 168 (174 SW 405) [1915]; John Morrell & Co v Unemployment Compensation Commission, 69 SD 618 (13. NW [2d] 498) [1944].
"In view of the factual situation existing at the time of the amendment it is a logical conclusion that the primary purpose of the legislature was, as above indicated, to clarify the statute because of the differences of opinion existing between the department of revenue and the board of tax appeals. Plaintiff’s claim as to the force and effect to be given the amendment is not tenable. The presumption on which such claim is based does not obtain.”
The parties have not discussed whether the 1983 amendment, which substituted the amendatory *393language for the former language, has retroactive effect.
The conclusion of the opinion of the Court that benefits provided in an ordinance are not within the intendment of the statute makes it unnecessary for the majority to address the question whether the benefits in the instant case are "like benefits.” Since the majority does not reach that question, we also express no opinion thereon.
Kavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Saginaw City Charter, Ch XVI, § 1. In Vasser, the words "of Muskegon” follow the word "city.” See Vasser v Muskegon, 415 Mich 308, 326; 329 NW2d 690 (1982) (Williams, J.). Muskegon City Charter, Ch XIX, § 1.

 1983 PA 162, approved July 24, 1983, with immediate effect; MCL 418.161(l)(a); MSA 17.237(161)(l)(a) reads in relevant part:
"Police officers, fire fighters, or employees of the police or fire departments, or their dependents, in municipalities or villages of this *392state providing like benefits, may waive the provisions of this act and accept like benefits that are provided by the municipality or village but shall not be entitled to like benefits from both the municipality or village and this act; however, this waiver shall not prohibit such employees or their dependents from being reimbursed under section 315 for the medical expenses or portion of medical expenses that are not otherwise provided for by the municipality or village. This act shall not be construed as limiting, changing, or repealing any of the provisions of a charter of a municipality or village of this state relating to benefits, compensation, pensions, or retirement independent of this act, provided for employees.”