Court Opinion

ID: 9607941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:03:49.56333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:41.964474
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
concurring.
The outcome of this case does not turn on the trial court’s refusal to instruct on attractive nuisance. As the court correctly points out, the jury was allowed to hear all the tendered evidence of landowners’ negligence. Since none was excluded, nothing could be added on retrial.1
Decisive of today’s review is whether new trial is the parent’s due because of an “inadequate” damages award in the § 651(4) sense.2 There is here no indication of “passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption”3 in the jury’s concededly conservative assessment of the pecuniary and emotional loss from the child’s death.
It is peculiarly within the province of the fact trier to consider and weigh the impact of negligent parental supervision and to evaluate the child’s ill health as a depreciating factor in computing both the pecuniary and emotional loss. If the jury system is to stand “inviolate”, as commanded by Art. 2, § 19, Okl. Const.,4 judges must resist the temptation of injecting into the process their individual concept of “justice”.
Athough I agree that the verdict is quite small, I cannot view it as a product of some legal error or condemn it as dehors the jury’s constitutional authority.5 I hence join in affirming the nisi prius judgment on the verdict.
KAUGER, Vice Chief Justice, with whom SUMMERS, Justice, joins, dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion for two reasons. The first is that although the result *794might not be altered, I would find that a residential swimming pool which meets the test outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 3391 is an attractive nuisance.2 However, it is more likely that had the attractive nuisance instruction been given, the ratio of the comparative negligence computation would have resulted in a more appropriate verdict. Basically, this case is on appeal because of the overbroad interpretation by the trial court of our precedents in Lohrenz v. Lane, 787 P.2d 1274 (Okla.1990) and Dennis v. Spillers, 199 Okla. 311, 185 P.2d 465 (Okla.1947). Failure to address this problem will only continue this misapprehension and invite future error. Nevertheless, the majority opinion should not be read to imply that this Court would not find a swimming pool an attractive nuisance in a subsequent case.
The second reason for my dissent is that I find the damages awarded to the mother of $4,200, reduced by her comparative negligence to an amount barely sufficient to pay the costs of a cheap funeral, statutorily inadequate under the wrongful death statute, 12 O.S.1991 § 1055.3
It does not require a mathematician to determine what happened in the jury room. The jury determined one of two things: 1) either this mother was so negligent that she did not deserve to recover anything personally for the death of her child; or 2) this child’s life, because he suffered from an attention deficit disorder and learning disabilities, should be valued less than some other child who was not so affected. In either case, the jury calculated an award which, once reduced by the mother’s comparative negligence, would barely meet the burial expenses. The mother’s gross award was $2,100.00 — the burial expenses were $2,096.00.
The wrongful death statute pertaining to children, 12 O.S.1991 § 1055, provides the elements for damages for which a parent is to be compensated. A parent is to receive damages for: 1) medical and burial expenses, 2) loss of services and support, 3) loss of love and companionship, 4) destruction of the parent-child relationship, and 5) loss of monies expended for support, maintenance and education of the child.
*795The mother was found to be 50% negligent and she netted $4.00 from the damages award. However, § 1055 does not base the extent of a parent’s loss at the death of a child on the quality of the individual’s parenting.4 Instead, it lists the elements for which a parent is to be recompensed. The mother had a personal right, under § 1055, independent of all others, to recover for the other elements of loss enumerated in the statute.5 On September 20,1995 — less than two weeks ago, this Court denied rehearing in Strubhart v. Perry Memorial Hosp. Trust Auth., 903 P.2d 263 (Okla.1995). Although Strubhart was remanded for a new trial, we noted that $800,000 was not outrageous or wholly unreasonable for the wrongful death of a newborn child. Today, this Court refuses to grant a new trial finding that $4.00 (a 200,000% difference or, at the most optimistic, $2,100 a 400% difference in the earlier approved $800,000 award) is sufficient because of the “sanctity” of the jury verdict under the Okla. Const., art. 2, § 196 — and the lack of evi*796dence to support an award for the mother’s loss of services and support, destruction of the parent-child relationship, loss of love and companionship, and loss of monies expended for support, maintenance and education of the child.
One could take judicial notice that $4.00 wouldn’t cover the cost of a couple of “Happy Meals” much less the money the mother spent on the support, maintenance and education of a six-year old. The award, leaving nothing for grief, solace and loss of companionship is shocking to the conscience, inadequate as a matter of law,7 and cries out for a new trial.8

. Common-law jurisprudence before the birth of attractive nuisance disallowed recovery for landowner’s negligence vis-a-vis a trespassing child. Unintentional harm was not actionable. Kar-sten, Explaining the Fight Over the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine: A Kinder, Gentler Instru-mentalism in the “Age of Formalism”, 10 Law and History Review 45, 52 (1992).

. 12 O.S.1991 § 651(4).

. See Park v. Security Bank & Trust Co., Okl., 512 P.2d 113 (1973).

. See Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., Okl., 824 P.2d 1105, 1116 (1991) (Opala, J., concurring in part).

. The provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 78 are:
"The court, in every stage of action, must disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse part; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect." (Emphasis mine.)
The terms of 20 O.S.1991 § 3001.1 are:
"No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted by any appellate court of this state in any case, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury or for error in any matter of pleading or procedure, unless it is the opinion of the reviewing court that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right." (Emphasis mine.)

. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965), see note 2, infra.

. Five conditions must be met under the Restatement Second standard before a cause of action will exist for trespassing children. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965) provides:
"Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the damage or otherwise to protect the children.”
Comment (b) to this section notes that the rule as stated is followed in the majority of states in this country. In comment (j) it is stated that the rule generally does not apply to dangers of fire, falling from heights, and water. These are said to be normally understood by children absent other factors creating additional risks of harm or foreseeable dangers to children who cannot appreciate the nature of the harm. A swimming pool in a residential setting is often found to be a condition which could present issues of negligence and foreseeable risk of injury. Gregory v. Johnson, 249 Ga. 151, 289 S.E.2d 232, 234 (1982). See, Annot., "Liability of Owner of Private Residential Swimming Pool for Injury or Death Occasioned Thereby,” 20 A.L.R.3rd 1395, 1402-05 (1968). See also, Annot., "Liability of Swimming Facility Operator for Injury to or Death of Trespassing Child," 88 A.L.R.3d 1197, 1204-1214 (1978).

.Title 12 O.S.1991 § 1055 provides:
"In all actions hereinafter brought to recover damages for the death of an unmarried, un-emancipated minor child, the damages recoverable shall include medical and burial expense, loss of anticipated services and support, loss of companionship and love of the child, destruction of parent-child relationship and loss of monies expended by parents or guardian in support, maintenance and education of such minor child, in such amount as, under all circumstances of the case, may be just.”

. See, Matter of the Estate of Lovely, 848 P.2d 51, 54 (Okla.App.1993); Williams v. Cover, 74 Or. App. 711, 704 P.2d 548 (1985).

. Gaither v. City of Tulsa, 664 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Okla.1983).

. Although the OHa. Const., art. 2, § 19 provides that “(t)he right to jury trial shall be and remain inviolate,” this section of the Constitution has not kept this Court from reducing jury verdicts in sixty-two cases since 1945. See, e.g., Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105 (Okla.1991); Protest of Flint Resources, 780 P.2d 665 (Okla.1989); Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855 (Okla.1987); LeFlore v. Reflections of Tulsa, Inc., 708 P.2d 1068, 64 A.L.R.4th 1001 (Okla.1985); Root v. Kamo Elec. Co-op., Inc., 699 P.2d 1083 (Okla.1985); Gaither By and Through Chalfin v. City of Tulsa, 664 P.2d 1026 (Okla.1983); Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907 (Okla.1982); Hobbs v. Watkins, 481 P.2d 746 (Okla.1971); Basden v. Mills, 472 P.2d 889 (Okla.1970); Devon Drilling Co. v. Ginder, 467 P.2d 470 (OHa. 1970); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Drumb, 454 P.2d 308 (Okla.1969); Smith v. Davis, 430 P.2d 799 (Okla.1967); Sandlin Oil Service, Inc. v. Dull, 398 P.2d 813 (Okla.1964); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 398 P.2d 92 (Okla.1964); City of New Cordell v. Lowe, 389 P.2d 103 (Okla.1963); John A. Brown Co. v. Shelton, 391 P.2d 259 (Okla.1963); Carraco Oil Co. v. Morhain, 380 P.2d 957 (Okla.1963); City of Henryetta v. Runyan, 370 P.2d 565 (Okla.1962); Paul Hellman, Inc. v. Reed, 366 P.2d 391 (Okla.1961); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Kilgore, 366 P.2d 936 (Okla.1961); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McBride, 376 P.2d 214 (Okla.1961); Venable v. Burton, 363 P.2d 224 (Okla.1961); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Edwards, 361 P.2d 459 (Okla.1961); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Edwards, 361 P.2d 474 (Okla.1961); Pratt v. Womack, 359 P.2d 223 (Oklla.1961); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Fox, 359 P.2d 710, 83 A.L.R.2d 1318 (Okla.1961); Superior Oil Co. v. Griffin, 357 P.2d 987 (Okla.1960); Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591 (Okla.1959); Hembree v. Southard, 339 P.2d 771 (Okla.1959); Roussel v. Russell, 339 P.2d 522 (Okla.1959); Ruth v. Reeves, 340 P.2d 452 (Okla.1959); Beckman, Inc. v. May, 331 P.2d 923 (Okla.1958); Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Eberwein, 333 P.2d 561 (Okla.1958); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677 (Okla.1958); Oklahoma State Union of Farmers' Educational & Co-op. Union of America v. Folsom, 325 P.2d 1053 (Okla.1958); Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Marrow, 326 P.2d 817 (Okla.1958); Moran v. Young, 325 P.2d 1065 (Okla.1957); Franklin Cas. Co. v. Bradley, 316 P.2d 860 (Okla.1957); Mikel Drilling Co. v. Dunkin, 318 P.2d 435 (Okla.1957); City of Tulsa v. Pearson, 296 P.2d 788 (Okla.1956); Strieker v. Vahldick, 293 P.2d 367 (Okla.1955); Gutowsky v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 287 P.2d 204 (Okla.1955); Wilcox Oil Co. v. Walters, 284 P.2d 726 (Okla.1955); Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rogers, 267 P.2d 572 (Okla.1954); Burke v. Thomas, 313 P.2d 1082 (Okla.1957); Copeland Oil Co. v. Parker, 306 P.2d 714 (Okla.1957); Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Hancock, 306 P.2d 330 (Okla.1957); Waddle v. Gammel, 305 P.2d 559 (Okla.1956); National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Watson, 298 P.2d 762 (Okla.1956); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Appel, 266 P.2d 442 (Okla.1953); Fruechting v. Gilley, 259 P.2d 530 (Okla.1953); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sutton, 208 Okla. 488, 257 P.2d 307 (Okla.1953); Gilliland v. Clark, 204 Okla. 608, 233 P.2d 288 (Okla.1951); Moyer v. Cordell, 204 Okla. 255, 228 P.2d 645 (Okla.1951); Tollett v. Clay, 207 Okla. 283, 249 P.2d 412 (Okla.1952); Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Turner, 206 Okla. 340, 243 P.2d 673 (Okla.1952); City of Henryetta v. Runyan, 203 Okla. 153, 219 P.2d 220 (Okla.1950); Reinhart & Donovan Co. v. Dunlap, 200 Okla. 512, 197 P.2d 958 (Okla.1948); Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Home, 201 Okla. 643, 207 P.2d 931 (Okla.1949); Thompson v. Minnis, 201 Okla. 154, 202 P.2d 981 (Okla.1949); Greenlease-Ledterman, Inc. v. Hawkins, 199 Okla. 331, 186 P.2d 318 (Okla.1947); Hancock v. Myers, 198 Okla. 126, 176 P.2d 820 (Okla.1946); Smith v. Ogle, 196 Okla. 295, 164 P.2d 992 (Okla.1945). See also, American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Sapulpa v. BIC Corp., 880 P.2d 420 (Okla.App.1994), cert. denied (1994); McManus v. Gourd, 873 P.2d 1060 (Okla.App.1994); Nalley v. Kellwood Co., 867 P.2d 1336 (Okla.App.1993), cert. denied (1994); Scribner v. Hillcrest Medical Center, 866 P.2d 437 (Okla.App.1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 288, 126 L.Ed.2d 238 (1993); State v. Van Lear, 813 P.2d 555 (Okla.App.1991).

. Hall v. Hall, 240 Va. 360, 397 S.E.2d 829 (1990). See, Annot., ‘'Excessiveness & Adequacy of Damages for Personal Injuries resulting in Death of Minor,” 49 A.L.R.4th 1076, 1113-17 (1986).

. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 651 provides in pertinent part:
"A new trial is a reexamination in the same court of an issue of fact, or of law, either or both, after a verdict by a jury, the approval of the report of a referee, or a decision by the court. The former verdict, report or decision shall be vacated, and a new trial granted, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, affecting materially the substantial rights of such party:
... Fourth. Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice....”
Park v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 512 P.2d 113, 116 (Okla. 1973).