Court Opinion

ID: 9951152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 18:01:20.308076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:31.819160
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30163            Document: 72-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/15/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________
                                                                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit
                                    No. 23-30163
                                  Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                  ____________                                March 15, 2024
                                                                               Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America,                                                           Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                          versus

Jacob W. Barron,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 1:21-CR-292-1
                   ______________________________

Before Elrod, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       Jacob       Barron     appeals     his    convictions      for   possession          of
methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a), and for possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). He challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30163        Document: 72-1       Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/15/2024

                                  No. 23-30163

the evidence found as a result of the warrantless search of his home and
vehicle.
       On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the ultimate
constitutionality of the actions by law enforcement de novo. United States v.
Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2014). “A factual finding is not clearly
erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United States v.
Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 574 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party—here, the Government. United States v. Thomas, 997 F.3d
603, 609 (5th Cir. 2021). The district court’s ruling will be upheld “if there
is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” United States v.
Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
       The record shows that, as a term of his probation resulting from a
2020 Louisiana state conviction for possession with the intent to distribute
methamphetamine, Barron agreed to submit to warrantless searches of his
home and vehicles if probation officers reasonably suspected him of criminal
activity. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,
the district court did not clearly err in finding that the probation officers had
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the search at issue here.
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-21 (2001); Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). Probation Officer Datha Bustard testified
that she received credible information from Sargent Stephen Cloessner of the
Rapides Parish Sheriff’s Office (RPSO), who had regularly supplied her with
reliable information about probationers and parolees, that Barron was selling
methamphetamine from his residence and was believed to be in possession of
a pound of methamphetamine. As the district court found, Bustard was
independently aware that Barron was on probation for the same offense

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                                  No. 23-30163

conduct and was unemployed. Under a totality of the circumstances, the
probation officers reasonably believed a search to be necessary to the
performance of their duties. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879
(1987); United States v. Williams, 880 F.3d 713, 719–20 (5th Cir. 2018).
       Significantly, Barron does not assert that the probation officers in his
case lacked reasonable suspicion for a probation-compliance search. See
Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
arguments must be briefed to be preserved). To the extent that Barron
implicitly argues that the probation officers were prohibited from basing their
suspicion on a tip from another law enforcement agency that he was engaged
in drug trafficking, such argument is without merit. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at
879-80; Williams, 880 F.3d at 720.
       Barron’s primary argument is that, under Louisiana law, the
compliance search by the probation officers was a prohibited subterfuge for
an ongoing narcotics investigation by the RPSO, which had initiated the
probation search after failing to secure probable cause for a search warrant.
However, as the Government correctly points out, in determining the
admissibility of evidence in federal court, a violation of state law in obtaining
such evidence is irrelevant. See United States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409, 415
(5th Cir. 1992); see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988).
Furthermore, an individual officer’s subjective motive is irrelevant under the
Fourth Amendment. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006).
In any event, even if we were to consider whether the probation officers’
search violated Louisiana law, Barron has not shown that the district court’s
finding of no subterfuge was clearly erroneous. See State v. Wesley, 685 So.
2d 1169, 1175 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding parole officers’ search was not a
subterfuge when it was based on a tip from an officer that the defendant had
been seen at his residence with known felons and drug users); State v.
Shrader, 593 So. 2d 457, 460 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (holding parole officer’s

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                                   No. 23-30163

search was not a subterfuge when the defendant had a previous drug-related
conviction, the defendant was not observed working, and there were reports
from local law enforcement that the defendant was involved in illegal
activities).
       Finally, Barron did not raise in the district court his additional
argument that the probation officers exceeded the purpose of their
compliance search by contacting RPSO after finding evidence of probation
violations in the district court. Inasmuch as Barron now seeks to raise a new
theory of relief on appeal, i.e., that the probation officers had reasonable
suspicion and were authorized to conduct a compliance check at the outset
but then exceeded their authority by seeking outside assistance for a more
thorough search, this argument is not properly before us. See, e.g., Leverette
v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 341–42 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
party may not present a new theory for relief on appeal); Yohey, 985 F.2d at
225 (stating that, as a general rule, the court will not consider issues not raised
in the district court and declining to consider new claims for relief).
       In sum, the district court did not err in denying the motion to
suppress. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–21; see also Michelletti, 13 F.3d at 841.
The judgment of conviction is therefore AFFIRMED.

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