Court Opinion

ID: 9786136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:48:25.147475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:42.013254
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Vice Presiding Judge:
dissenting.
11 The Court's opinion cites to Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 103 S.Ct. 394, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), and Young v. State, 1983 OK CR 126, ¶ 13, 670 P.2d 591, 594 in reversing Appellant's conviction. This is curious, for Wyrick v. Fields and Young do not further Appellant's cause on appeal. Had thede cases been properly applied, Appellant's conviction for indecent exposure, after former convictions for lewd molestation and making lewd or indecent proposals to a child under sixteen, would surely stand.1
*1252T2 The opinion acknowledges Appellant waived his right to counsel during the polygraph exam, but then states, "nothing in this record indicates that Wood agreed to post-polygraph interrogation without counsel." This precise issue was raised and rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Wyrick v. Fields.
T3 In Wyrick v. Fields, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously reversed the defendant's conviction on the basis that the State had failed to prove the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to have counsel present at the post-polygraph interrogation. The Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals had failed to examine the "totality of the circumstances." The Supreme Court reversed the case, stating: «
The Court of Appeals relied on two facts indicating the need for a new set of warnings: the polygraph examination had been discontinued, and Fields was asked if he could explain the test's unfavorable results. To require new warnings because of these two facts is unreasonable. Disconnecting the polygraph equipment effectuated no significant change in the character of the: interrogation. The CID agent could have informed Fields during the examination that his answers indicated deceit; asking Fields, after the equipment was disconnected, why the answers were bothering him was not any more coercive. The «Court of Appeals stated that there was no indication that Fields or his lawyer anticipated that Fields would be asked questions after the examination. But it would have been unreasonable for Fields and his attorneys to assume that Fields would not be informed of the polygraph readings and asked to explain any unfavorable result. Moreover, Fields had been informed that he could stop the questioning at any time, and could request at any time that his lawyer join him. Merely disconnecting the polygraph equipment could not remove this knowledge from Fields' mind.
Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. at 47-48, 108 S.Ct. at 396. The same logic applies here.
T4 Here, the record reveals Appellant requested the polygraph examination. His attorney consented to this procedure, and Appellant signed a Miranda waiver prior to the interview. Appellant was advised of his right to have counsel present during the examination. He did not request counsel to be present, nor did his counsel ask to be present. Thus, Appellant's counsel was not "excluded" from the examination room, as the opinion suggests. The record reveals the polygraph examiner had allowed the presence of counsel during other tests, upon request from counsel. '
15 Appellant did not merely initiate a meeting. He initiated an interrogation. That is, he "waived not only his right to be free of contact with the authorities in the absence of an attorney, but also his right to be free of interrogation about the crime of which he was suspected." Id., 459 U.S. at 47, 103 S.Ct. at 396. Furthermore, in light of Wyrick v. Fields and Young, it was unreasonable for Appellant's attorney to simply assume the examiner would not apprise Appellant of the results and ask him to explain an unfavorable result.2
T 6 There is no allegation here, much less proof, that the examiner went beyond the parameters of his agreement for a polygraph *1253examination. The Court should restrain itself by applying the law to the facts in this case rather than assuming an in loco paren-tis role for the benefit of the Appellant and his attorney. Applying the law to the facts, I must therefore dissent to the Court's decision to reverse Appellant's conviction .and remand for a new trial.

. See also Fields v. Wyrick, 464 U.S. 1020, 104 S.Ct. 556, 78 LEd.2d 728 (1983), in which the Court denied certiorari of the same case, on remand, after the Eighth Circuit found the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment rights in conjunction with his post-polygraph interrogation. See also, Fields v. Wyrick, 706 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.1983). Furthermore, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 LEd.2d 424 (1977), decided five years *1252prior to Wyrick v. Fields, is clearly distinguishable.

. The examiner's post-examination interrogation was not coercive in nature, as the techniques used in Young were. See 10-10-96 Tr. at 18. In Young, the examiner apparently told the defendant that he could get detectives "working for him", that he could "get the people on his side", ie., the jury, and that he could receive "sympathy" and forgiveness by confessing. He also appears to have told the defendant that, absent a confession, the detectives would work against him "trying to build up a case of cold-blooded murder." Young, 1983 OK CR 126, ¶ 16, 670 P.2d at 594. In addition, it should be noted the facts in Young are unique. The defendant in Young was taken into custody as a material witness. The police failed to comply with the statutory requirements for taking a material witness before a district judge "without unnecessary delay," and this failure was a relevant factor in adjudicating the voluntary nature of the interrogation. Further, Young is a case relating to the Fifth Amendment right to counsel rather than Sixth Amendment rights. And, in the present case, Wood's attorney agreed to the interrogation.