Court Opinion

ID: 9632289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:08:38.241879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:52.786264
License: Public Domain

SHADUR, Senior District Judge,
dissenting:
When this case was submitted to our panel, we were well aware that just over *677two weeks earlier — on the second day of the Supreme Court’s October 2008 Term— the Court had heard oral argument in Herring v. United States. Because it seemed likely that the Fourth Amendment issue as posed in Herring might cast light on the issue in this case, we elected to hold off our opinion here until we learned of the Supreme Court’s resolution in Herring.
That decision came down in mid-January, and although Herring produced a five-to-four split in the Court, that division has proved remarkable in terms of our case. Both the five-Justice majority and the four-justice minority, I believe, have stated principles that call for reversal here. Let me explain why.
Vigilantism — whether manifested by group action such as that of a lynch mob or by individual rogue activity — is the enemy of orderly law enforcement. It is infinitely worse when practiced by a law enforcement officer such as Detective Beene, for such officers are cloaked with authority that can too readily turn the wheels of justice into wheels of constitutional injustice.
Yet Beene, no doubt prompted by defendant Noster’s unsavory past, seized on his delinquency in payments on the 2001 GMC Sierra truck to distort that delinquency into a nonexistent “theft” of the truck. Never mind that Noster had not only made the initial down payment but had regularly made the first seven monthly payments on the vehicle before he went delinquent. Never mind that GMAC Financial Services, which had financed the transaction and was thus the creditor directly interested in getting repaid for the credit that it had extended (and having ample resources at its command), had taken no steps to label Noster a thief. Instead its efforts had been devoted exclusively to seeking an orderly repossession of the truck, just as it would with any other buyer in default on his payments. Noster was a delinquent purchaser, yes— but a thief? Decidedly not.
To be sure, the majority is correct in observing that Beene — like the officer in the Wallace case — “was not taking the bar exam” when he then performed his sleight of hand, somehow converting Noster’s assertedly “unlawful” (the majority’s word) retention of the vehicle when he went delinquent after having made the first seven payments into a purported “theft” of that vehicle. But having said that, the majority has itself had to strain in an effort to place Noster’s post-delinquency retention of the vehicle under a “theft by false pretenses” rubric (what “false pretenses” were made by Noster, pray tell, when he bought the vehicle and thereafter proceeded to make a substantial series of the required installment payments?).
Essentially the majority seeks to transmute base metal into gold by transforming Detective Beene’s unequivocal' statement that the vehicle was stolen into some notion of “criminal fraud” or the like. With all due respect, I believe that such revisionist history regrettably whitewashes Beene’s own unlawful conduct, effectively creating a kind of asserted “probable cause” when in fact Beene was totally lacking in probable cause to label the vehicle as “stolen.”
In any case, Beene did indeed go about creating a scenario to convert Noster’s payment delinquency — a civil matter — into a purported theft. To that end Beene first went to Thorson GMAC Pasadena owner' — president Tom George (“George”), and he said in his later report that George signed a CHP 180/Stolen Vehicle Report. That version of events is certainly questionable, for George later filed this declaration with the district court:
I would not fill out nor sign a stolen vehicle report in any case where a buyer *678failed to make payments (to the finance company) on a car that was purchased through Thorson GMC. Nor would I call the police regarding a situation where the buyer failed to make such payments. I would not have the authority to report a vehicle stolen in that circumstance because the dealership would not be considered the owner of the vehicle. I did not call the police to report that Mr. Noster stole his truck and I did not fill out a stolen vehicle report relating to Mr. Noster or his truck. However, I do know Detective Beene because he has been at my dealership related to vehicles that have been stolen off the lot.
But whoever signed the report in fact, there is no question that Beene at least instigated the “stolen” characterization. In any event, Beene then spoke with Bill McLean (“McLean”), who had sold two motorcycles to Noster the year before only to find that the check for final payment of the purchase price (which McLean had verified through Noster’s bank as supported by sufficient funds) turned out later to be returned for insufficient funds.
It was then McLean who later spotted the GMC Sierra truck with a Lance Camper and reported it to the police. With Beene away on vacation, other officers responded to McLean’s call and were told that the information he had obtained from Beene was that the truck and camper were stolen. That was confirmed by the officers by tracking down the stolen-truck report, and they then obtained orders to impound the truck and undertook the search at issue in this case.
That is the backdrop against which the decision in Herring may appropriately be viewed. Speaking for the five-Justice majority there, Chief Justice Roberts rejected a bright-line rule in which one law enforcement officer’s good faith reliance on another officer’s unconstitutional misdeed would automatically be constitutionally tainted as well. Instead the majority opinion summarized its holding in these terms (129 S.Ct. 695, 702 (2009)):
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.
Just a bit later the majority opinion went on to say (id. at 703):
If the police have been shown ... to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation.
Those holdings aptly describe Detective Beene’s misconduct. Surely his actions were both deliberate and culpable and caused a knowingly false entry, so that I submit adherence to the Herring majority rule plainly calls for reversal here. And as for Herring’s four-Justice minority, it urged the retention of a bright-line standard under which reliance by non-culpable law enforcement personnel on errors (even negligent errors) made by other law enforcement people would trigger the operation of the exclusionary rule. That stance of course also calls for reversal here, this time on an a fortiori basis.
In sum, I believe that the Herring opinions, fairly read, call unanimously for reversal. By contrast, the majority in this case — fully aware (as I am too) that Noster is a very bad man indeed — has opted to ignore Beene’s obvious belief that when it comes to dealing with someone he views as among the dregs of society, the ends somehow justify illegal means. We are entitled *679to expect — and to get — better than that from the personnel to whom we entrust the powers of law enforcement, not of law breaking. Accordingly I respectfully dissent.