Court Opinion

ID: 9704886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:49:15.433507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:06.281180
License: Public Domain

Fairchild, C. J.
{dissenting'). The welfare of the child is, of course, the prime consideration of a court in granting or changing the custody of any child. Hamachek v. Hamachek, ante, p. 194, 70 N. W. (2d) 595. Sec. 247.24 of the Wisconsin statutes confers upon the court the power to change the care and custody of a child only “whenever the welfare of any such child will be promoted thereby;” and sec. 247.25 says that, after a judgment of divorce and awarding custody has been made, the court from time to time at any time thereafter may make such new judgment concerning custody as “the benefit of the children shall require.”
The decision of the trial court, and the decision in the majority opinion here, is based on the reasoning that since the Winnipeg juvenile and family court found the father a fit person for having custody of the children and made no specific finding as to the mother’s fitness, it, in effect, found the mother an unfit person; that circumstances have changed since the time of the trial in the Canadian court, with the result that the mother can now be found to be a fit person; and that the importance of the natural love and affection of a mother demands that the children should now be placed in her custody.
In awarding custody of the children to their father, judge Heaney of the Winnipeg juvenile and family court based his decision on:
“1. The paramount interests of the children.
“2. The relatively more stable financial situation of the father.
*485“3. The sincere interest of the father in the children.
“4. The relatively greater interest of the natural father as compared to the stepfather plus the likelihood that the stepfather would have his own children.
“5. The court’s doubts as to the veracity of the mother:
“(a) As to the furnishing of a home for her by the father.
“(b) As to her claim that the father denied her medical attention.
“(c) As to her explanation of a ‘secret’ marriage to Mr. Eisler.
“(d) As to the purchase and consumption of liquor by members of her household.
“6. That there was too much liquor purchased by members of the mother’s household.
“7. The court’s satisfaction as to the honesty and trustworthiness of the testimony of the father.”
The only one of the above items which can truly be said to have changed since the decision of Judge'Heaney is No. 4. It has been established that because of her illness Mrs. Eisler can no longer bear children.
The only testimony Mrs. Eisler was able to give with respect to liquor in the home was that it had “far decreased . . . becmise a number of the people living there have removed.” Mr. Eisler testified that the drinking done by both himself and his wife is about the same as it was in August, 1953 (the date of the judgment granted by Judge Heaney). Margaret Campbell (a sister of Mrs. Eisler) testified that the drinking habits of the Eislers have not changed.
The fact that the Eislers have moved from one home, heavily mortgaged, to a comparable but slightly less desirable home, also heavily mortgaged, in another district, is not a substantial change in circumstances such as to justify a change in custody. The fact that Mrs. Eisler’s sisters moved from her house and that the Eislers thereafter lived alone was known to Judge Heaney at the time of trial and is not *486a change which has taken place since the judgment of August, 1953.
The facts with respect to Mrs. Eisler’s “secret marriage” and her marriage made public on May 16, 1953, were the same at the time of the Canadian trial and at the time of the trial in the Wisconsin lower court. The Canadian court was aware of both marriages at the time of granting judgment.
There has been no change in the veracity of Mrs. Eisler. The record contains numerous instances of sworn statements by Mrs. Eisler which are in conflict with statements of nonpartisan witnesses as well as contrary to other statements made at both trials. The Wisconsin circuit court has indicated its own distrust of Mrs. Eisler in the judgment granted by it, for that judgment specifies that the support payments to be made by Mr. Hannon be made only to the clerk of the court, and that they cannot be collected by Mrs. Eisler unless and until she returns the children to the custody of their father in June of each year. ’
There has been no change on the part of the father which would nullify the opinion of Judge Heaney as to the sincere interest of the father in the children, as to the honesty and trustworthiness of his testimony, and as to his relatively more stable financial situation. The Wisconsin trial court found: “That Mr. Hannon has been a good and kind father and is also a fit and proper person to exercise the care and custody of these children. I find that the home in which he has had the children, both at Lakewoods and also at the Hendrickson home — both homes have been fine for the raising of those children, they have been happy, contented, and well cared for.”
' I see no new circumstances which have arisen since the judgment of the Winnipeg court and on account of which a change of custody would be required or justified for the welfare of the children. They are happy and contented, well *487provided for, and adjusted to their present living arrangements. Their father is admittedly a proper and fit person to have them in custody and his fitness has never been in question. Another uprooting would only be a hardship for the children. The Winnipeg court found that it was for the welfare of the children that they be placed in their father’s care. In Hill v. Hill, 257 Wis. 388, 391, 43 N. W. (2d) 455, the rule is stated that “In matters relating to custody, ... in the absence of a substantial change in the premises on which the original determination was made, a modification or revision is an abuse of discretion.” The trial in the Canadian court spread out over three months, and that court had before it much evidence not before the Wisconsin trial court. The matter was fully litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction. There has been no substantial change of facts, and the Wisconsin trial court cannot substitute its opinion for that of a court of competent jurisdiction merely on the grounds that the custody of children of tender years is ordinarily awarded to the mother. As said in Hamachek v. Hamachek, supra (p. 201), “The influence capable of inspiring wholesome ideals and purposes in a growing child is not completely encompassed in the relationship of mother and child,” and “the importance of the natural love and affection of a mother may be outweighed by other elements.” I am convinced the order transferring custody should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Currie concurs in this dissent.