Court Opinion

ID: 9524955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:58:46.766263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:21.959803
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). The trial court found that the police officer had probable cause to arrest Cheers for armed robbery. The record does not support this finding and therefore I dissent. *407The error in this case appears to be the prosecutor’s not the police officer’s.
At Cheers’ suppression hearing the arresting officer testified that he had a description of the “age, height, weight and complexion” of the robber later identified as Cheers. The officer was not asked and did not state the age, height, and weight of the described suspect. The officer further testified that the description related to the 9th Street robbers; that Cheers matched the description of one of the robbers; and that the officer therefore arrested Cheers. Apparent from the arresting officer’s testimony is that he had no first-hand information as to the description of the robber and that he relied on information acquired from others. But the record does not reveal from whom the arresting officer obtained the description of the 9th Street robbers upon which he relied. Nor does the record indicate whether anyone within the police department had reliable knowledge or information from any source from which the description of the 9th Street robbers the arresting officer used might have been compiled, or what information as to the age, height, weight and complexion of the robber the police department had provided of the 9th Street robbery to the arresting officer prior to the arrest.
On review the majority of this court, in accordance with Schaffer v. State, 75 Wis.2d 673, 677-78, 250 N.W. 2d 326 (1977), examines the entire record including the preliminary examination, two suppression hearings and the trial in an attempt to show that the police department had a reliable description of Cheers which the arresting officer used in making the arrest. I conclude that the record is devoid of the necessary links of evidence which, if they existed, the prosecutor could easily have produced to support the arresting officer’s testimony.
I agree with the majority’s statement of the rules applicable to decide the validity of a warrantless arrest. *408The test for probable cause in a case of a warrantless arrest is whether on the basis of the information which impelled the arresting officer to act a warrant could have been procured for the defendant’s arrest. State v. Paszek, 50 Wis.2d 619, 627, 184 N.W.2d 836, 841 (1971). First, the majority correctly states that whereas in this case the officer does not have first-hand information, the arrest is valid if the facts constituting probable cause exist within the police department. Johnson v. State, 75 Wis.2d 344, 348-50, 249 N.W.2d 593 (1977). We explained this rule in Schaffer v. State, 75 Wis.2d 673, 676-77, 250 N.W.2d 326 (1977) as follows:
“. . . An arresting officer may rely on all collective information in the police department, and, acting in good faith on'the basis of such information, may assume at the time of apprehension that probable cause has been established. State v. Mabra, 61 Wis.2d 613, 625, 213 N.W. 2d 545, 551 (1974) ; State v. Taylor, 60 Wis.2d 506, 515, 210 N.W.2d 873, 878 (1973). . . .
“Such legal justification, however, cannot alone constitute probable cause for such an arrest, for it is necessary that the officer’s underlying assumption of probable cause be correct. State v. Taylor, supra at 515-16, 210 N.W.2d at 878. Where an officer relies upon a police communication in making an arrest, in the absence of his personal knowledge of probable cause, the arrest will only be based on probable cause, and thus valid, when such facts exist within the police department. Desjarlais v. State, 73 Wis.2d 480, 491, 243 N.W.2d 453, 459 (1976) ; State v. Shears, 68 Wis.2d 217, 253, 229 N.W.2d 103, 121 (1975) ; State v. Mabra, supra at 625, 213 N.W.2d at 551; State v. Taylor, supra at 515-16, 210 N.W.2d at 878. . . .”
Second, as the majority observes, the collective information of the police department, like all other hearsay information used to show probable cause, must satisfy the two-pronged test for assessing the trustworthiness of such hearsay set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 *409(1964). Aguilar requires that the officer establish (1) the underlying circumstances from which he concludes that the informant is reliable; and (2) that the underlying circumstances or manner in which the informant obtained his information is reliable.
Finally, as the majority correctly states, the prosecutor bears the burden of showing that the Schaffer and Aguilar standards are met. “Where a violation of the fourth amendment right against an unreasonable search and seizure is asserted, the burden of proof upon the motion to suppress is upon the state.” State v. Taylor, 60 Wis.2d 506, 519, 210 N.W.2d 873, 880 (1973). “When an arrest is made without a warrant, the burden is on the state to show the existence of probable cause.” Leroux v. State, 58 Wis.2d 671, 682, 207 N.W.2d 589, 596 (1973).
Both the arresting officer, and Officer Rodgers, one of the officers who had participated in the investigation of the two robberies, testified at various hearings during the course of these proceedings. The prosecution could easily have satisfied the Schaffer and Aguilar tests by having the officers testify that the police department had a description of the suspect at the time of the arrest and by having the officers set forth the specific description on which the arresting officer relied, the manner in which the information was transmitted to the arresting officer, and the sources from wrhich the police department had received the description.
Officer Rodgers testified at the Cheers’ suppression hearing and at the trial. He was not asked to state what description of the robbers he or the police department had received. His testimony was not concerned with events prior to arrest. His testimony related to the identifications made by the victims after the arrest. Thus his testimony is inadequate to furnish the required information.
*410The arresting officer, testifying on direct examination at the Cheers’ suppression hearing, stated that he had a description of the 9th Street robber which served as the basis for his arrest of Cheers:
“Q. Had you received information concerning the method of operation of those robberies, what was taken in those robberies and the description of the possible suspects in those robberies? A. Yes, I had.
“Q. Did you see anyone approach the residence? A. Yes. I did.
“Q. What happened after you saw that person [Cheers] approach the residence? A. I observed that the subject that approached the residence from the alley matched the description of one of the hold-up suspects from the robbery at 3250 North 9th Street on the 15th of December.
“Q. In what particular way did Mr. Cheers fit the description of one of the suspects in the robberies? A. The age, height, weight and the complexion of Mr. Cheers.”
The arresting officer did not state the specific age, height or weight of the suspect whose description he said he had. Nor did he state from whom he had received the description of the possible suspect.
On cross-examination the arresting officer testified as to Cheers’ complexion, as follows:
“Q. What complexion attitude did he fit of what was publicized to you on December 15th? A. Well, that he was medium complected and that he had a bumpy face.”
The officer never described what he meant by “bumpy face,” and no other testimony even suggests what this term means. The majority, without explanation, construes this description to mean pockmarked.
Noticeably missing from the record is any testimony by the victims of the 9th Street robbery of the descriptions of the robbers they gave the police. In fact the victims *411of the 9th Street robbery never testified that they had given descriptions of the robbers to the police. Only the victims of the West Lisbon Avenue robbery testified that they had given descriptions of the robbers to the police.
At trial the arresting officer said he had received basic information in his duties as police officer about the West Lisbon Avenue robbery, including the descriptions of possible suspects of that robbery. The arresting officer did not, however, state on the record that he had received the descriptions of the West Lisbon Avenue robbery at roll call or from a fellow police officer. Nor did the arresting officer state what the descriptions of the West Lisbon Avenue suspects were or that he based Cheers’ arrest on the descriptions of the suspects of the West Lisbon Avenue robbery.
The arresting officer’s failure to state that he relied on the description of the West Lisbon Avenue robber to arrest Cheers makes no difference in view of the testimony of the victims of the West Lisbon Avenue robbery. The West Lisbon Avenue victims’ testimony as to the descriptions they gave the police is not sufficient to form the basis for any valid identification or arrest. Netterville, a victim of the West Lisbon Avenue robbery who was not able to identify Cheers at the line-up or at trial, said at the preliminary examination that she gave the police the following description;
“I described one as being sort of tall. He had on an old saggy hat on his head, gold and the other two, they was about, oh, about five/two and they were black.”
She also said that she told the police the weight of the robbers. She did not however say what estimate of weight she had given the police. She also testified that she told the police that one of the robbers was wearing glasses. At trial she testified that the tall black man *412with the hat and glasses was Crockett. Thus her description of Cheers, as far as the record shows, is that he was about five/two, black and weighed an undisclosed amount.
Lornell Reid, a victim of the West Lisbon Avenue robbery, testified at the preliminary examination as to the description of the robber (later identified as Cheers) that he gave the police as follows:
“Q. How did you describe the first man into the house [Cheers] to the police department? What was he wearing? A. Well, he was wearing — he was wearing a heavy coat. I didn’t really get quite the color of the coat, but he had on a flop cap.
“Q. Was he wearing glasses ? A. No.”
At trial Lornell Reid said that Cheers was wearing a long coat and flop cap, and Lornell Reid also testified as follows as to the description of Cheers’ height which he gave to the police:
“Q. And how tall did you say he was to the police department? A. Well, I don’t know whether I gave a definite size that he were, but I said he was somewhere between five feet some, I don’t know. I can’t quite recall the other what I said, because I wasn’t really paying too much attention to his height.”
Thus Lornell Reid’s total description of Cheers which he gave the police is that Cheers was perhaps “five feet some” and that he wore a long coat and flop cap. He was unable to describe the coat. Apparently he only got a look at Cheers’ head and face, but he did not testify as to any description he gave to the police of Cheers’ head and face.
David Reid, also present at the West Lisbon Avenue robbery, testified at the preliminary examination as to the description he gave the police. He testified as follows :
“Q. Did you give a description of any of the men to the police? A. I did.
*413“Q. What did you tell them ? A. I told them how they appeared to look.
“Q. I’m sorry? A. I told them what they looked like short time that I got to look at them.”
At trial David Reid described Cheers’ clothing, saying he “had on a brown looking coat and some sort of dark looking cap, kind of flopped down cap.” This testimony is David Reid’s entire testimony as to Cheers’ description.
Thus, the total description possessed by the police department which appears on the record in this case was that the robber later identified as Cheers was a black man who on the day of the West Lisbon Street robbery wore a long coat and floppy cap, was perhaps five feet some or five/two tall, and weighed an undisclosed amount. The victims’ descriptions are “so general that [they fit] a very large group of ordinary young men.” State v. Lee, 97 Wis.2d 679, 685, 294 N.W.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1980). The record shows that Cheers is black; his age, height, weight or complexion are not a matter of record.
The arresting officer testified that he relied on a description of the robber’s age, height, weight and complexion to identify Cheers and as the basis for the arrest, yet the record reveals that the victims gave the police very vague descriptions which did not contain all the information which the arresting officer claimed to have. No victim testified that he or she described Cheers to the police as having a bumpy face or as being a particular age. Neither the victims nor the police officers set forth in the record the robber’s described or actual age, height or weight. Absent such a description, the trial judge could not determine whether Cheers matched the description the arresting office said he had.
Not only was the description insufficient to serve as the basis for identifying Cheers, it was also apparently insufficient to immunize from arrest any of the four *414black males found at the Fond du Lac Avenue address. All four black men, in addition to Cheers and Crockett, were arrested and presented to the victims of the robberies in a line-up on the morning following the arrest. The men not identified by the victims were released.
If Cheers and the other four men were arrested only for investigatory purposes as these circumstances suggest, the arrest was illegal. As the United States Supreme Court said in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975): “The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged in their testimony that the purpose of their action was for investigation or for questioning.” See also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980). The arresting officer’s own testimony indicates that he did not rely on the description of any robbery suspect in arresting Cheers. The arresting officer testified that he arrested Cheers for carrying a 31/2" folded pocket knife which the officer characterized as a concealed weapon. The officer testified that he never advised Cheers that the arrest was for armed robbery.
The majority’s assessment of probable cause avoids focus on these problems and instead emphasizes the totality of all the facts and circumstances available to the police at the time of arrest. I agree that the totality of circumstances is important. Of course, to sustain a showing of probable cause each circumstance must, when examined independently, be sufficiently reliable to contribute to the weight of the evidence in support of a finding of probable cause.
The majority views the fact that Cheers was at the house where Crockett was thought to be as a significant factor. The arresting officer had a warrant for Crockett’s arrest that listed his address as 3336 N. 3rd Street, *415but he testified that he was told at roll call and by a squad officer that Crockett might be at the Fond du Lac Avenue address. The record does not indicate where the police department got this information. Again the prosecutor did not produce evidence as to the basis for the arresting officer’s belief that Crockett was at the Fond du Lac Avenue address. Without that evidence I have no way of determining if the information the arresting officer relied on as to Crockett’s whereabouts satisfied the tests for probable cause. Apparently recognizing this weakness, the majority attempts to shore up the record by saying that the officer saw Crockett in the kitchen of the Fond du Lac Avenue house before he arrested Cheers. But Crockett and Linda Metcalf (who was present in the house) testified at Crockett’s suppression hearing that Crockett was not in the kitchen when the arresting officer was at the door and that the arresting officer might not have been able to see into the kitchen from where he was standing. The trial court, having ruled that the arresting officer had been given consent to enter the house, made no finding as to whether the arresting officer saw Crockett in the kitchen before he arrested Cheers. This factual dispute as to whether the arresting officer knew Crockett was in the house cannot be resolved at the appellate level. Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis.2d 100, 108, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980).
Even if the state had proven that the arresting officer was justified in his belief that Crockett was at the Fond du Lac address, Cheers’ conduct of walking away from the officers and toward the house, of knocking on the door, and of putting his hand in his pocket are not acts sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Cheers for a robbery that Crockett is suspected of having committed. As the United States Supreme Court said in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979),
*416“Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be.”
See also Pritz v. Hacket, 440 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
The majority quotes Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968), as authority for the proposition that Cheers’ acts were proper factors to be considered in establishing probable cause for the arrest. The Sibron court said that “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong in-dicia of mens rea, and when cowpled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest.” (Emphasis added.) Regardless of whether Cheers’ actions were “furtive,” or “flight,” or “threatening,” the police in this case lacked “specific knowledge . . . relating” Cheers “to the evidence of crime.” If the requirement of specific knowledge is omitted, furtive or threatening action or flight will, as the majority does here, bootstrap such conduct to the level of probable cause in any case in which such conduct was said to have occurred. The characterization which these terms call for may be attached by the observer despite other explanations for the conduct. In this case Cheers was approached by several officers armed with shotguns and his conduct may be explained by these circumstances as well as his knowing his guilt of a crime. Accordingly on the basis of this record the state has not satisfied the Sibron test.
I conclude that the prosecutor failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the trial court *417that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Cheers. State v. Taylor, supra, 60 Wis.2d at 520; State v. Mordeszewski, 68 Wis.2d 649, 656, 229 N.W.2d 642, 646 (1975).
The illegality of the arrest deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The trial court’s jurisdiction is dependent on a lawful arrest or on the defendant’s voluntary appearance or on the defendant’s waiving the challenge of the legality of the arrest. Cheers did not voluntarily appear, and he carefully preserved his objection to the arrest by making special appearances to contest the illegal arrest and by objecting to the arrest and the court’s jurisdiction at various stages of the proceedings. If an arrest is illegal, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. La Follette v. Raskin, 30 Wis.2d 39, 137 N.W.2d 667 (1966) ; Laasch v. State, 84 Wis.2d 587, 590, 267 N.W. 2d 278 (1978). In Walberg v. State, 73 Wis.2d 448, 458, 243 N.W.2d 190, 195 (1976), we said :
“This court, . . . while holding that the illegality of an arrest does not affect the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, has held that personal jurisdiction is dependent upon the defendant’s physical presence before the court pursuant to a properly issued warrant, a lawful arrest or a voluntary appearance.”
The state urges the court to abandon this position to which this court has adhered for many years. The majority has not acceded to the state’s request.
Since I conclude that the record does not support the legality of the arrest, I would remand the case to the trial court to hold a supplementary evidentiary inquiry and to determine the validity of the arrest. United States v. Morris, 440 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Seay, 432 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1970).
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.