Court Opinion

ID: 9734803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:46:40.065374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:51.397305
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court: After a jury trial defendant was convicted of armed robbery and was sentenced to a term of seven to twelve years in the penitentiary. On appeal he contends: 1) He was deprived of due process of law by being required to choose between the right to the effective assistance of counsel and the right to a trial within 120 days; 2) The denial of his motion for a continuance in order to obtain different counsel was an abuse of discretion and was a denial of his right to have the assistance of counsel of his own choice; 3) It was error to deny his motion to suppress lineup identification evidence; and 4) The sentence imposed was excessive. Shortly past midnight on the morning of September 21, 1970, three men, subsequently identified as Isaac Snulligan, Timothy Williams and defendant, entered the Sparta Grill located at 331% N. Central Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Timothy Williams stood near the door. Snulligan and defendant walked to a position near the cash register. Defendant requested change for a dollar. The grillman, Nick Markos, complied with the request. Defendant then requested change for a quarter and was again accommodated. A customer entered and ordered soup. Mr. Markos went from the cash register to the end of the restaurant to procure the order. This action required him to turn his back to the patrons. He then heard a command, “Don’t move, I have a gun.” He raised his hands, turned around and observed Snulligan pointing a gun at him. Defendant opened the cash register and removed approximately $200. The three men fled from the grill. They had been in the restaurant for a period of five to seven minutes. The lighting was “very bright.” Joseph Muriullo observed Snulligan and defendant exit the grill and run on a northbound angle across Central Avenue. He observed defendant’s face for “a matter of seconds” when defendant was ten to fifteen feet from him. He also observed that defendant was wearing red or burgundy slacks and a yellow shirt. The lighting was described as “bright.” Officer James Nowdonski of the Chicago Police Department stopped two men running in the vicinity of Fulton and Central. They identified themselves as Timothy Williams and Isaac Snulligan and were thereafter released. Officer Nowdonski returned to his vehicle and received a radio report that the Sparta Grill had just been robbed by three men. He observed Snulligan enter an automobile parked about three blocks from the restaurant. He approached tire vehicle and observed Snulligan in the rear seat. Defendant and a female, Margaret Leonard, were in the front seat. Timothy Williams was walking westbound on Fulton. When defendant exited the automobile he was “breathing heavy.” The group was arrested and $192 was recovered from the rear seat of the automobile. A lineup consisting of Timothy Williams, Snulligan, defendant and two other men was conducted shortly after 1:00 A.M. on September 21, 1970. Nick Markos identified Timothy Williams, Snulligan and defendant as the men who had robbed him. Joseph Muriullo identified Snulligan and defendant as the two men he had observed running from the grill. On the morning of January 18, 1971 (the 119th day during which defendant had been in custody), defendant and Timothy Williams were arraigned and the Public Defender, without objection from either accused, was appointed to represent them. When the trial began that afternoon, the Public Defender told the court that he had informed defendant that he was unprepared to go to trial because he had not had time to investigate the case, but he also stated that defendant, however, said he was ready for trial. The court inquired as to defendant’s desire and defendant replied, “We demand trial now.” The Public Defender then presented pretrial motions to the court and jury selection commenced. After a panel of jurors had been interviewed the case was recessed to the next day. On January 19, 1971, the process of jury selection was continued. After the prospective jurors had been instructed as to voir dire procedures, they were excused until January 20, 1971. Defendant then indicated to the court that he desired to select his own jury and that he wanted an attorney other than the Public Defender. The court suggested that defendant give more consideration to his request for a different attorney and recessed the matter until January 20, 1971. On January 20, 1971, the corut explained to defendant that the Public Defender desired additional time to prepare the case, but that defendant could decide to go to trial immediately. The potential consequences of defendant’s decision were completely and exhaustively explained to him. Defendant stated that he understood the court’s admonitions as to the possible consequences but that he still wanted to proceed to trial. At this point the Public Defender stated that he nonetheless was requesting a continuance. Defendant again demanded trial. The process of jury selection was thereafter resumed without any ruling on the Public Defender’s motion for a continuance. On January 21, 1971, defendant requested a continuance so that he could seek other counsel. The State opposed the request. The court inquired of codefendant Timothy Williams whether or not he too desired a continuance. Timothy Williams stated that he preferred to go to trial. Defendant inquired as to the court’s decision regarding his request for a continuance and was told, “Sit down. We are going to trial.” Timothy Williams pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Thereafter the Public Defender reported that he thought he had located a necessary witness for the alibi defense, Margaret Leonard, and he was withdrawing motion for a continuance, since he was adequately prepared to argue the pretrial motions and would be adequately prepared for the evidentiary stage of the trial when that stage would be reached on the 25th of January. The court indicated that it would continue the matter until January 25, 1971, if the Public Defender needed the time. After a hearing on pretrial motions the case was recessed until January 25, 1971, on which date the taking of evidence commenced. Defendant initially contends that he was denied due process of law by being required to choose between the right to the effective assistance of counsel and the right to a trial within 120 days. Defendant’s argument proceeds as follows: He asserts that the Public Defender was not appointed to represent him until he was arraigned and the State did, therefore, delay the appointment of counsel by delaying the arraignment, over which it had complete control, without any explanation whatever. When the arraignment, and the appointment of counsel, was delayed until the 119th day of the 120 day statutory period in which the State must try a defendant, appointed counsel could not be prepared to effectively assist his client at the trial which the State caused to begin that same afternoon, since there was no time for preparation. If defendant desired the effective assistance of counsel, he would have been forced to request a continuance so that appointed counsel could investigate the case, but such request would have extended the period in which the State could bring him to trial. Conversely, by electing to exercise his right to a trial within 120 days, he was thereby forced to forfeit his right to the effective assistance of counsel since counsel could not properly prepare for trial on such short notice. Defendant concludes by asserting that he was deprived of due process of law by being required to make this choice. We disagree. In People v. Johnson, 45 Ill.2d 38, 43-44, 257 N.E.2d 3, it was said: “To argue that he was forced to choose as he did is to argue technicalities. The right to a speedy trial and the right to avoid a precipitous trial are separate but related rights. Both are designed to assure an accused a fair trial, to prevent undue delay in one instance and undue haste in the other. He can demand action or avoid action as the exigencies of his situation may dictate. But fairness and justice are not a one-way street. Society is likewise entitled to a fair administration of justice and the measure of right and wrong must always be that which is fair, not that which is technically astute or contrived. The fact that on occasion the accused might have to jeopardize the legislative benefits of the four-month rule by asserting his right to a continuance does not entail a denial of his right to a speedy trial.”  Defendant nonetheless asserts that the recent case of People v. Carr, 9 Ill.App.3d 382, 292 N.E.2d 492, requires a reversal of the instant case. Carr merely holds that, where appointed counsel, as a bench trial was about to begin, requests a continuance on the ground that he requires more time for preparation, it is not an abuse of discretion for the court to grant the request notwithstanding defendant’s repeated strenuous objections and notwithstanding that the continuance is chargeable to defendant so as to extend his four-term period. In the case at bar the Public Defender did not request a continuance when the proceedings began. He merely informed the court that he had indicated to defendant that he would not be prepared to go to trial and concluded his remarks by stating that defendant was ready for trial. Furthermore, in Carr there was no indication that defendant therein was aware of the possible consequences of an immediate bench trial. The court merely granted counsel’s request for a continuance. In the case at bar, however, the record clearly reflects that defendant was more than adequately apprised by the court, in a lengthy and detailed explanation, of the possible consequences of proceeding to trial before his appointed counsel could further investigate the case. Defendant stated that he understood the potential consequences and nonetheless persisted in his demand for an immediate trial. We are convinced that defendant knowingly and intelligently elected to proceed to trial with full knowledge of the possible consequences of this choice. Defendant next contends that the denial of his motion for a continuance to enable him to secure private counsel was an abuse of discretion and a denial of his constitutional right to have the assistance of counsel of his own choice. In People v. Solomon, 24 Ill.2d 586, 589-590, 182 N.E.2d 736, it was said: “The granting of a continuance to permit preparation of a case, or for the substitution of counsel, necessarily depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the request, and is a matter resting within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] Before a judgment of conviction will be reversed because of the denial of such a motion, it must appear that the refusal of additional time in some manner embarrassed the accused in preparing his defense and prejudiced his rights. [Citations.] # # # While an accused in a criminal case does indeed have the constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing, it is likewise true that such right may not be employed as a weapon to indefinitely thwart the administration of justice, or to otherwise embarrass the effective prosecution of crime. [Citations.]”  In the instant case defendant did not object when the Public Defender was appointed to represent him. Only after a jury selection had commenced did he voice his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel and a desire to “have [his] own lawyer.” Defendant had previously stated that he did not have funds to procure counsel on his own and he never indicated that arrangements for private counsel had been or would be made. The facts of this case disclose neither an abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s request for a continuance nor a denial of his right to have counsel of his own choice. The cases cited by defendant (People v. Ritchie, 66 Ill.App.2d 417, 213 N.E.2d 306; People v. Cohen, 402 Ill. 574, 85 N.E.2d 19; People v. Green, 42 Ill.2d 555, 248 N.E.2d 116; People v. Willis, 6 Ill.App.3d 980, 286 N.E.2d 72.) are inapposite. In each of those cases arrangements had been made for the assistance of counsel other than the one who had been appointed. No such facts are present in the case at bar.  Defendant next contends that it was error to deny his motion to suppress identification evidence. It is well established that suppression .of identification evidence is required only when it appears that the procedures employed, considering all the circumstances of the pretrial .identification, were so unnecessarily suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. People v. Jones, 7 Ill. App.3d 820, 288 N.E.2d 918.  Two witnesses provided identification testimony in the instant case. Nick Markos testified that defendant was in the Sparta Grill for five to seven minutes under “very bright” lighting conditions. Markos gave defendant change twice and observed him remove money from the cash register when the robbery was perpetrated. Joseph Muriullo testified that he observed defendant run from the grill. The fighting was described as “bright.” He observed defendant’s face for “a matter of seconds” when defendant was ten to fifteen feet from him. Both witnesses identified defendant in a five-man lineup within an hour after the robbery. Under these circumstances we will not disturb the implicit finding of the trial court that tire identification testimony was based upon observations independent of and uninfluenced by any identification procedures utilized by the police. Defendant finally contends that the sentence imposed was excessive. He argues that his sentence of seven to twelve years in the penitentiary is clearly excessive in view of the fact that his co-defendant, Timothy Williams (who pleaded guilty), received a sentence of five years probation, the first year of which was to be served in the Cook County Jail.  It is well established that imposition of a sentence is within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and will not be interfered with on review absent an abuse of discretion. Our legislature has indicated that the possibility of rehabilitation is a proper consideration of the court in determining the sentence to be imposed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 1 — 2(c).) In the instant case the different sentences imposed upon codefendants were justified inasmuch as the court could properly have determined that Timothy Williams showed greater promise of rehabilitation than defendant. Timothy Williams was eighteen years of age, married, and was cooperative with court and counsel throughout the proceedings. Defendant, on the other hand, was twenty-three years of age and unmarried. He had eight prior convictions between the years 1965 and 1969. The only evidence offered in mitigation was his “youthfulness” and the environment in which he was raised. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence that it did.  We further note that modification of the sentence is not required under the sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections which became effective January 1, 1973. Armed robbery is a class 1 felony (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 38, par. 18 — 2) for which the maximum sentence is required to be any term in excess of four years and the minimum term is required to be four years unless the nature of the offense and the history and character of defendant warrant the imposition of a higher minimum term. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—1.) In the instant case the history and character of defendant' and the nature of the offense justified the sentence imposed. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. HAYES, J., concurs.