Court Opinion

ID: 9658481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:01:19.446851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:54.988832
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the lower court’s holding that the Department of Public Health was estopped from revoking the exemptions given to the petitioner under 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.22101 et seq.; MSA 14.15(22101) et seq.
The majority sets forth in its opinion a scholarly analysis of the law pertaining to exhaustion of administrative remedies and the scope of judicial review under § 63 of the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act (APA). MCL 24.263; MSA 3.560(163). However, I have two problems with the conclusion of the majority.
First, the jurisdictional argument of the majority, in so far as it applies to the lower court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claim under 1978 PA 368, concerns a question that is not before this Court because it was not raised *568in a brief of the respondent Department of Public Health. After several readings of the respondent’s brief, I fail to find any argument therein that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the department’s ruling under 1978 PA 368. Rather, the respondent’s jurisdictional argument concerns only the department’s § 1122 decision.
By failing to brief this issue or to cite relevant authority pertaining to it, the respondent has waived any claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s 1978 PA 368 ruling. People v Slager, 105 Mich App 593; 307 NW2d 376 (1981), People v LaPorte, 103 Mich App 444; 303 NW2d 222 (1981), Smith v Saginaw Savings & Loan Ass’n, 94 Mich App 263; 288 NW2d 613 (1979). Therefore, the decision of the trial judge that the department’s revocation of the petitioner’s exemption under 1978 PA 368 was improper must stand even if it is determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s § 1122 claim, a question that was raised and discussed in the respondent’s appellate brief.
The second reason why I cannot subscribe to the opinion of the majority is that I believe it amounts to an overly technical interpretation of the applicable law.
Section 63 of the Michigan APA does not require an agency’s response to a request for a ruling to be a "final decision” of the agency and, in fact, states that "[a] declaratory ruling is subject to judicial review in the same manner as an agency final decision or order in a contested case”. This language leads me to believe that a "declaratory ruling” is something other than that rendered by an agency as a "final decision”. This interpretation comports with the general rule of statutory construction that no word or portion of a statute *569should be read to be of no effect. Dussia v Monroe County Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244; 191 NW2d 307 (1971), Melia v Employment Security Comm, 346 Mich 544; 78 NW2d 273 (1956), Chrysler Corp v Washington, 52 Mich App 229; 217 NW2d 66 (1974).
The majority argues that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over this case under § 63 of the APA because the petitioner had not obtained a declaratory ruling from the respondent Department of Public Health pursuant to 1979 AC R 325.1211. That administrative regulation requires parties seeking declaratory rulings to file their request on a form provided by the Department of Public Health and delivered either by mail or in person to the office of the director of the department. The majority notes that the petitioner never sought such a formal declaratory ruling and opines that, as a result, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case under § 63 of the APA. The majority fails to give due regard to the fact that the case before us involves a matter of equity. In Dimmitt & Owens Financial, Inc v Realtek Industries, Inc, 90 Mich App 429, 433; 280 NW2d 827 (1979), this Court noted that a party is estopped from asserting a position where that party:
"1) * * * [B]y representations, admissions or silence, intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe facts, 2) the other party justifiably relies and acts on this belief, and 3) the other party would be prejudiced if the first party is permitted to deny the existence of the facts.”
The petitioner was informed by the respondent on February 5, 1979, that it would be exempt from the requirements of 1978 PA 368 if it had "an *570enforceable contract [of construction] dated prior to 10-1-78”. The petitioner fulfilled this requirement. Prior to December 29, 1980, the respondent never called into question the petitioner’s exempt status under 1978 PA 368 despite the fact that the parties had numerous communications. Further, the respondent was aware that throughout this period of time the petitioner was attempting to secure financial commitments that would permit it to complete construction on its new facility. In fact, the petitioner expended over $12,000 in securing a mortgage commitment.
Whether the letters and communications from the respondent to Greenbriar were merely "advisory” as the respondent argues, or "declaratory rulings” as the petitioner argues, it is clear that upon a reading of them one is left with the firm conviction that the petitioner was justified in believing that it would be permitted to complete construction of its new facility. The petitioner complied with all explicit directions and requirements of the department.
While it is true that the petitioner did not seek a formal declaratory ruling from the department pursuant to 1979 AC R 325.1211, the instant case presents a situation in which application of that administrative regulation can do nothing other than unnecessarily frustrate the speedy administration of justice. This case does not present any questions that are so technical that they require the unique expertise of the agency for resolution. Within the context of the relief sought by the petitioner in this case, further administrative fact-finding would serve no purpose. Either the letters and statements of the department are of such a nature as to give rise to a claim of estoppel, or they are not. The courts of this state, and not an *571administrative agency, are better equipped to handle this question. Finally, it must be emphasized that the respondent department has suffered no detriment or burden due to the unavoidable delay in the construction of the petitioner’s new facility. The mere passage of time under facts such as those of this case would not extinguish a party’s exemption from obtaining a certificate of need. Therefore, because the facts of this case clearly support the lower court’s ruling that the respondent department is estopped by its actions and communications from halting the petitioner’s construction on its new facility, I would affirm.
With respect to the respondent’s argument that the lower court erred in restoring the petitioner’s exempt status under § 1122, I note that the petitioner’s initial application for exemption did not state a total construction cost. Therefore, to the extent that any overruns have occurred, they could be compensated under the construction contract which provided for total payment by the petitioner of $638,000 plus 100 percent of all additional approved work orders. It was the contract itself, and not its price, that was approved by the respondent. Therefore, the fact that the contract price had changed in no way effects the petitioner’s exemption under § 1122. Certainly, this is true at least to the minimum stated contract price of $638,000. Although § 63 of the APA cannot be invoked to vest jurisdiction over this claim in the circuit court, neither can the revocation of the petitioner’s exemption under § 1122 result in stopping construction. Further, whether certain construction expenses were reasonable such that they entitle the petitioner to reimbursement can largely be determined after the fact.
Finally, I would affirm the lower court’s ruling *572that denied the motion of the intervening respondent Livingston Care Center, Inc., to intervene. Under the applicable court rule, GCR 1963, 209.1(3), intervention of right is allowed only where the "representation of the applicant’s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant may be bound by a judgment in the action * * The interest of the intervening respondent in this action was represented adequately by the department. Therefore, the lower court did not err in denying its motion to intervene.
I dissent and would affirm the lower court’s ruling that restored the petitioner’s exemption under 1978 PA 368 and that denied Livingston Care Center’s motion to intervene.