Court Opinion

ID: 9621779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:06:38.14611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:13.905492
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice GRAY,
dissenting.
It is my view that disposition- of the question of jurisdiction renders unnecessary discussion of other points raised by the petitioner. The majority, in disposing of the question of jurisdiction, has in my opinion invoked an anachronism of the common law that forms no part of the body of law of this state insofar as it is said to relate to jurisdiction rather than venue. The common-law rule was a rule of necessity that grew out of subtle niceties made in felony cases between principals and accessories before the fact in order that such accessories not present in the jurisdiction where the felony such as murder was actually committed would not go unpunished. That distinction was removed by the legislature of this state both before and after statehood and no recent authority has come to my attention indicating resort to the doctrine under the circumstances presented in this case. The significance of the removal of the distinction lies in the fact that under common law no distinction was made between principals and accessories in cases involving misdemeanors. All participants were considered as principals and could be *817proceeded against as such. State v. Weekley, 40 Wyo. 162, 275 P. 122, 64 A.L.R. 420. Consequently when the distinction in felony cases was removed the commission of a felony was on the same plane as the commission of a misdemeanor and as a result such a perpetrator was punishable where the felony occurred, whether a principal or an accessory, Annotation 42 A.L.R. 272, 277-278.
Furthermore, if the common-law rule were applicable in this jurisdiction we were obviously in error when we declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus in an original proceeding brought here previously by Goldsmith in Case No. 3699 (unreported). In that case the facts were that Goldsmith, along with Linn, Lucas and Lindblad, was charged by the State of Nevada as a principal for the murder in that state of Stacker and Olinger. One of the points relied upon by Goldsmith was that Nevada had no jurisdiction over Goldsmith inasmuch as he was only an accessory before the fact, and in connection with that point it was stipulated that Goldsmith was not present in Nevada before or at the time of the murders. Nevertheless, we unanimously and summarily rejected that contention, and I think properly so. Clearly Nevada under 'our law and the law of Nevada had jurisdiction of the entire transaction and of the criminal offenses growing out of that transaction. When Nevada acquired jurisdiction of the persons of the participants therein, which it did, their jurisdiction was complete.
It is also my view that the majority by extending the reach of § 6-14 to embrace a felony committed beyond the borders of this state has violated a fundamental rule of construction of a criminal statute. The rule of strict construction must be applied and no statute is to “be extended by implication or construction to persons or things not expressly brought within its terms, nor to cases not within the letter of the statute; and also that ‘all doubts as to the construction are resolved in favor of the defendant,’ ” State v. Thompson, 15 Wyo. 136, 87 P. 433, 434. Certainly it must be conceded as a general proposition that our criminal laws do not reach a crime committed beyond the borders of this state. Unlike statutes in several other states, as mentioned in the majority opinion, the statute here under consideration does not purport to make it a crime under Wyoming law to aid and abet the commission of a felony in any other state. Although the statute embraces such elements as counselling, encouraging, hiring or otherwise procuring the commission of a felony, it is not a criminal conspiracy statute wherein the crime is held to have been consummated when the conspirators reach agreement to commit a felony in this or any other state. See State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334, 348, certiorari denied 377 U.S. 978, 84 S.Ct. 1884, 12 L.Ed. 2d 747. This, I think, was made manifest by the adoption in 1969 of a Criminal Conspiracy Statute, § 1, Ch. 164, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1969 (§ 6-16.1, W.S.1957, 1969 Cum.Supp.). This statute clearly and specifically makes it a crime to conspire to commit an act which constitutes a felony under the laws of this state whether the felony is committed in Wyoming or beyond the borders of this state. Keeping in mind that the conspiracy here was alleged to have been entered into in late 1967 and the matter was before this court in No. 3699 in April 1968, can it fairly be questioned that the legislature in 1969 was aware of the doubt cast upon the reach of § 6-14, the aiding and abetting statute, to confer jurisdiction upon the courts of this state to try participants in a conspiracy entered into in this state for commission of a felony in another state? I think not, Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States v. Thulemeyer, 49 Wyo. 63, 52 P.2d 1223, rehearing denied 54 P.2d 896, 897, appeal dismissed Ham v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 299 U.S. 505, 57 S.Ct. 24, 81 L.Ed. 375. As a matter of statutory construction, if the legislature had doubt in such a serious matter we ought to concur, Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States v. Thulemeyer, supra, 52 P.2d at 1234. Otherwise *818we in effect would be holding, as the majority is doing in substance, that the legislature engaged in, an exercise of futility.
I would order petitioner’s release.