Court Opinion

ID: 9561077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:02:22.404894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:31.693853
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(concurring) — RCW 10.52.030 provides that conviction of a crime may be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of a witness’ testimony in a criminal case, and RCW 10.52.040 makes the provision applicable where an accused testifies in his own behalf. These statutes, relating as they do to the judicial process, may be superseded by rule of court. RCW 2.04.190-.200. State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674 (1974). To date, we have not seen fit to alter the rule set forth in these statutes.
The courts of this country, in permitting the prosecution to show prior felony convictions to impeach the credibility of a witness, have proceeded upon the assumption that there is a rational connection between felony conviction and lack of veracity. See State v. Harrison, 72 Wn.2d 737, 435 P.2d 547 (1967). We have reasoned that one who will steal, rape or commit murder will also lie and that the jury can rightly conclude from this proposition that the witness *171is lying at the moment. We have also noted at the same time we found this evidence competent to prove a present inclination to lie, that such a disclosure about a defendant in a criminal prosecution is bound to create prejudice in the minds of the jury. See State v. Beard, 74 Wn.2d 335, 444 P.2d 651 (1968). In a case where the prosecution’s evidence is weak, that prejudice may be the factor which convicts the defendant, even though the story he tells is true in every detail. We have also recognized that the threat of impeachment by introduction of prior convictions discourages the defendant from exercising his right to take the stand and testify in his own behalf. State v. Hill, 83 Wn.2d 558, 520 P.2d 618 (1974).
The supposition upon which this rule rests and its efficacy in producing justice has been repeatedly questioned. See R. .Spector, Impeaching The Defendant By His Prior Convictions And The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward And Three Steps Backward, 1 Loyola U.L.J. 247 (1970), and a later commentary in the same volume on this subject at page 362, entitled Evidence — Illinois Adopts Rule 609 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence on Impeachment of a Defendant-Witness by His Prior Crimes. Some of the numerous articles discussing this concept are listed in 1 Loyola U.L.J. supra at 248 n.3. In 1971 the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the trial court’s admission of a prior conviction, even for impeachment purposes, constituted an unreasonable burden upon the constitutional right of the defendant to testify in his own behalf and thereby denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971). See Case Note, Evidence —Impeachment—Admission of Prior Conviction To Impeach Defendant-Witness Violates Constitutional Right to Due Process, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 918 (1972).
I think both bench and bar should give serious thought to a possible restriction of the right to introduce evidence of prior convictions for impeachment purpose, by court rule. Further, I would be inclined to review and consider the *172validity of the statute permitting evidence of prior convictions, were the question to come before the court in a case where such evidence may well have been the determining factor in the mind of the jury. This is not such a case. The defendant’s admitted acts amounted to the crime of second-degree assault, at the very least, and that is the crime of which he was convicted. Consequently, this is not the case in which to reconsider the rule, and, in fact, the propriety of the doctrine is not challenged herein.
Upon the question which is presented and decided, I think the majority has reasoned correctly and reached the proper conclusion.