Court Opinion

ID: 9742927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:22:49.419087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:37.901752
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY, specially concurring: While concurring in this decision, I must note my objection to McGovern v. Standish (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 54 (68 Ill. 2d at 407-08), which interprets the statutory words “in charge of” to require proof that “the defendantjnust have been in charge of the particular operations which involved the violation from which the alleged injury arose” (65 Ill. 2d 54, 67). This is contrary to the very language of the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 48, pars. 60-69), and to prior decisions of this court and other courts on the issue as to what constitutes “in charge of.” More than that, however, it violates the recognized principle that more than one party can be “in charge of” the work. The Act specifies: “Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having charge of the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any building, bridge, viaduct or other structure within the provisions of the act, shall comply with all the terms thereof ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 48, par. 69.) The objective of the Act is best described by its title, “An Act providing for the protection and safety of persons in and about the construction, repairing, alteration, or removal of buildings, bridges, viaducts, and other structures, and to provide for the enforcement thereof.” To accomplish these purposes, this court has avowed that the Act be liberally construed. “We have held on previous occasions that the Structural Work Act should be given a liberal construction to effectuate its purpose of protecting persons engaged in extra-hazardous occupations of working in and about construction, repairing, alteration or removal of buildings, bridges, viaducts, and other structures. (Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 121; Crafton v. Lester B. Knight & Associates, Inc. (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 533; Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Ry. Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 305.)” (McNellis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 146, 151.) To the same effect, see Louis v. Barenfanger (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 445, 447-48; Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 316, 322; Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co. (1914), 264 Ill. 156, 164-65. In Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry. Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 305, the first case to touch upon the issue “in charge of,” this court noted: “It is inescapable from these words [referring to the statute] that the legislature intended to hold . liable those named persons who are in charge of the work ***.” 22 Ill. 2d 305, 319. The admittedly leading case on the question of the meaning of the statutory words “in charge of” is Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 316. As late as 1975 it was quoted with approval by this court in Voss v. Kingdon & Naven, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 520, a decision which is inconsistent with McGovern. In Larson the defendant’s contention was that it could be liable only if it was “actively engaged in supervisory work” or if it “had something to do with the supervision and management of the job.” Defendant was successful in the trial court, but in a reversing opinion this court stated, as quoted in Voss v. Kingdon & Naven, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 520, 525-26: “The term ‘having charge of’ is a generic term of broad import, and although it may include supervision and control, it is not confined to it. As was said of the word ‘charge’ in People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 323: ‘The word does not necessarily include custody, control or restraint, and its meaning must be determined by the associations and circumstances surrounding itSL use. “To have charge of” does not necessarily imply more than to care for or to have the care of.’ Thus, while the actual exercise of supervision and control over the work and the persons doing it, or the retention of the right to so supervise and control, may be factors bearing on the ultimate factual question of whether an -owner is ‘in charge,’ they are not necessary or conclusive factors, nor is either made a sine qua non for liability under the statute. Rather, consistent with its beneficent purpose of preventing injury to persons employed in the extra-hazardous occupation of structural work, the thrust of the statute is not confined to' those who perform, or supervise, or control, or who retain the right to supervise and control, the actual work from which the injury arises, but, to insure maximum protection, is made to extend to owners and others who have charge of the erection or alteration of any building or structure. * * * The term ‘having charge of’ is one of common usage and understanding, and it is our opinion that further attempt at definition can only lead to confusion and error.” 33 Ill. 2d 316, 321-23. In Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 273, the key aspect of control of the supervising architects was the right to stop the work if it was being done in a dangerous or unsafe manner. This sufficed to make a factual issue whether they were persons having “charge of” the work within the meaning of the statute. Other cases consistent with Larson are McInerney v. Hasbrook Construction Co. (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 93, 101; McNellis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 146, 151-52; Buehler v. Toynan Construction Co. (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 214, 217; Huckabee v. Bell & Howell, Inc. (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 153, 157-58; Kobus v. Formfit Co. (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 533, 537-38. Appellate court authorities following Larson, to name a few, are: Getz v. Del E. Webb Corp. (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 880; Turner v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 331; Fandrich v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1974), 25 Ill. App. 3d 301; Scrimager v. Cabot Corp. (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 193; Long v. Duggan-Karasik Construction Co. (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 812; Rooney v. Morton Salt Building, Inc. (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 962; Daniels v. Weiss (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 294; Able v. Pure Oil Co. (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 558; Isabelli v. Cowles Chemical Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 888; Jacobson v. 190 North State Street, Inc. (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 256; Scully v. Otis Elevator Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 185; Bruen v. Burton Auto Spring Corp. (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 477; Wrobel v. Trapani (1970), 129 Ill. App. 2d 306; Kaspar v. Clinton-Jackson Corp. (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 364; Jones v. S. S. & E. Corp. (1969), 112 Ill. App. 2d 79; Pantaleo v. Gamm (1969), 106 Ill. App. 2d 116; Etheridge v. Cooley (1968), 101 Ill. App. 2d 348; Spiezio v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1968), 91 Ill. App. 2d 392; Moroni v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. (1967), 86 Ill. App. 2d 426; Dinschel v. United States Gypsum Co. (1967), 83 Ill. App. 2d 466; Sola v. City of Chicago (1967), 82 Ill. App. 2d 266; Palier v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co. (1967), 81 Ill. App. 2d 1; Crotty v. High-Low Foods, Inc. (1966), 78 Ill. App. 2d 237; Vykruta v. Thomas Hoist Co. (1966), 75 Ill. App. 2d 291; Carlson v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1965), 64 Ill. App. 2d 331. The Seventh Circuit has relied upon the teachings of Larson and its progeny. As illustrative, see Schroeder v. C. F. Braun & Co. (7th Cir. 1974), 502 F.2d 235, 241; Bail v. Cunningham Brothers, Inc. (7th Cir. 1971), 452 F.2d 182, 183. As noted, McGovern v. Standish (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 54, is contrary to the principle that more than one person may have “charge of” the work. This principle is announced in the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions thus: “Under the statute I have just read to you, it is possible for more than one person to ‘have charge of’ the work. One or more persons can have charge of the overall work, and other persons can have charge of the phase of the work in connection with which an injury occurs. In that event, all of them would ‘have charge of’ the work within the meaning of the statute. Who had charge of the work under the particular facts of this case is for you to decide.” (IPI Civil No. 180.02 (2d ed. 1971).) In support of this instruction are Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 273, 291; Li Petri v. Turner Construction Co. (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 597; Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 316; Dinschel v. United States Gypsum Co. (1967), 83 Ill. App. 2d 466, 476; Rovekamp v. Central Construction Co. (1964), 45 Ill. App. 2d 441, 449; Yankey v. Oscar Bohlin & Son, Inc. (1962), 37 Ill. App. 2d 457, 468. Under the terms of McGovern, the person having charge of the overall work would not be a party having “charge of” the work. The only person in “charge of” the work would be he who was “in charge of the particular operations which involved the violation from which the alleged injury arose.” McGovern v. Standish (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 54, 67. The effect of the interpretation of the statute accorded by McGovern could be to defeat the objectives of the Act. A casual reading of the Structural Work Act cases reveals that in multiple instances the injured is an employee of a subcontractor whose action is most frequently against the general contractor, or the owner, and sometimes against the architect. While the general contractor, owner or architect may be in control of the overall job and responsible for a violation of the Act, he does not, as a rule, supervise the particular operation from which the injury arose. The subcontractor hires and fires his employees, directs the methods in which they do their work, and performs those innumerable functions common to employer and employee. Realistically speaking, the general contractor, owner or architect who had charge of the overall work could defend a violation of the Act by urging that he was not “in charge of the particular operation which involved the violation from which the alleged injury arose.” (McGovern v. Standish (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 54, 67.) This could emasculate the Act, since the employee has no right of action under the Structural Work Act against his employer if the Workmen’s Compensation Act applies. (See Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry. Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 305, 318.) Yet, by circumscribing the meaning of the words “in charge of,” those violating the Act would be insulated from exposure to the statute, and, correspondingly, those for whom the Act was passed would be deprived of its benefits.