Court Opinion

ID: 9797564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:24:13.858063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:12.609232
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I write separately to address two points.
First, although I agree with the court’s decision, I rely on a somewhat different rationale. In today’s companion case, State, Department of Corrections v. Cowles,1 we construed Neakok2 to impose an actionable duty on parole officers only when the officer knew or reasonably should have known of a focused danger to an identifiable victim or class of victims — a present danger focusing on something “more than simply members of the general public.”3 As I indicated in my concurring opinion in Cowles, I would hesitate to conclude that the population of Anchorage qualifies as an identifiable class of victims under this standard.4
*385Because I doubt that the current record in this case establishes the focused danger needed to trigger an actionable Neakok duty, it seems possible that C.J. might ultimately be unable to meet the Neakok duty standard. I nonetheless believe that the record does raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Carter posed an obvious and present danger of committing a sexual assault. And since the state did not assert as a basis for summary judgment the absence of evidence showing that the danger was sufficiently focused — simply arguing, in relevant part, that Neakok was bad law and should be overruled — C.J. was never called upon to develop and offer evidence that might have established a particularized risk to an identifiable class of victim.
Given the state’s failure to demonstrate that it was entitled to summary judgment on the specific ground it asserted below, I agree that the superior court properly declined to grant the state’s motion for complete summary judgment; I further agree that the superior court’s ruling on the issue of summary judgment must be reconsidered on remand in light of our opinions here and in Cowles. But in addition to other questions today’s opinion identifies for consideration on remand, I would include the question whether C.J. can meet Neakok’s focused-danger requirement. I concur in Part IV.A. of today’s opinion on this basis.
Second, as to the opinion’s ruling on the issue of capping noneconomic damages, I adhere to my dissenting opinion in Evans v. State5 and thus dissent from Part IV.B. of the opinion.
I join the opinion in all other respects.
CARPENETI, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the court’s opinion in all respects except Part IV.B. For the reasons expressed in Justice Bryner’s dissent in Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State,1 in which I joined,2 I would conclude that AS 09.17.010, in capping noneconomic damages, violates the Alaska Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection,

. State, Dep't of Corr. v. Cowles, 151 P.3d 353, Op. No. 6082, 2006 WL 3691725 (Alaska, December 15, 2006).

. Div. of Corr. v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986).

. Cowles, 151 P.3d at 363 (quoting Neakok, 721 P.2d at 1129).

. Cowles, 151 P.3d at 367.

. Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1071-75 (Alaska 2002) (Bryner, J., dissenting).

. 56 P.3d 1046, 1071-75 (Alaska 2002).

. Id. at 1079 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting).