Court Opinion

ID: 9701333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:15:55.058733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:22.527731
License: Public Domain

TOM GLAZE, Justice, dissenting. The parties’ “Offer and Acceptance” form contract provided the buyers several potential grounds for terminating the contract. These provisions are fully set out in the excerpts from the Offer and Acceptance, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4, attached to this opinion. Under paragraph 16(B) of the Offer and Acceptance, the buyers had a right to inspect the property within ten business days after acceptance of the contract. Upon inspection, if the buyers discovered items needing repair, and provided timely written notice of that fact to the sellers, the seller agreed to repair those items up to a repair limit of $2,000.00. If sellers refused to make repairs beyond the repair limit, one of the buyers’ options would be to declare the contract null and void. Under paragraph 17(C), the sellers agreed to provide the buyers with a statement disclosing the condition of the property within three business days of acceptance of the offer. Under this provision, the buyers could declare the contract null and void, “[i]f Seller fails to provide the disclosure in a timely manner, or if Buyer finds the disclosure unacceptable within three (3) business days after receipt....” Under the above provisions, the buyers could recover their earnest money if the sellers breached either of the provisions, 16(B) or 17(C). The buyers executed their Offer and Acceptance on August 4, 1994. The sellers accepted the offer on the same day. The court below found that the sellers failed to provide a disclosure statement. Instead of exercising their rights under paragraph 17(C), the disclosure statement provision, the buyers hired a home inspector who performed an inspection on August 9, 1994. After reviewing the resulting inspection report, on August 15, 1994, the buyers faxed two contract addenda to the sellers. The first addendum, marked Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6, is attached for the reader’s convenience. In Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6, captioned Inspection and Repairs, the buyers expressly invoked their rights under paragraph 16(B). That paragraph reads, “Buyer chose ... to perform the inspection ... allowed in Paragraph 16(B) [of] the Offer and Acceptance and to provide ... a list of repairs needed.” Additionally, Exhibit 6 notes that the buyers have inspected the property, attached relevant portions of the inspection report, and reserved their right to reinspect the property prior to closing. Exhibit 6 further reflects that the buyers requested release from the offer and acceptance. The sellers, pursuant to the terms in 16(B), had their engineer inspect the structural integrity of the house and the engineer stated that the suggested corrections could be made. The sellers said that they would make any repairs required in order to sell the property, and in fact, the sellers commenced work to do so. The buyers, however, refused to proceed to give the sellers the opportunity to perform the contract. The buyers’ second addendum merely requested that the sellers return the buyers’ earnest money through an agreed termination of the contract. Neither addendum invoked, or even.mentioned, the buyers’ rights under paragraph 17(C), the disclosure statement provision. By knowingly and intentionally invoking their rights to inspect the property, demand repairs and reserve their right to reinspect under 16(B), the buyers triggered a provision which allowed the sellers an opportunity to make repairs to the home consistent with the buyers’ inspection. The closing date on the contract was set for August 31, 1994. The record reveals that, by August 24, 1994, the sellers had hired a structural engineer and received his report on the needed structural repairs, which he concluded could be corrected. The sellers then expressed a willingness and in fact acted to complete all necessary repairs, as was their right under the inspection and repair provisions of paragraph 16(B) of the contract. Nevertheless, the buyers refused to close on the house. On September 9, 1994, in a letter from the buyers’ attorney to the sellers, the buyers for the first time attempted to assert their rights under disclosure statement provision 17(C). In other words, almost a month had passed since the buyers had invoked the inspection and repair clause, causing the sellers to commence repairs to the property. The buyers breached the contract through their adamant refusal to close on the deal.1  In conclusion, the most puzzling aspect of the majority opinion is its statement that, “although the buyers did not list the ‘sellers’ failure to deliver the sellers’ disclosure statement’ as a reason for terminating the contract in their August 15, 1994 notice, they were not estopped from raising the sellers’ breach of contract at a later time.” The majority merely rewrites the parties’ contract. Once again, the sellers had the right (and the buyers acknowledged that right) under Subsection 16(B) to cure any defects. The Pledgers cannot be estopped from doing what the parties’ contract authorized them to do. Because the record supports the chancellor’s finding that the buyers chose to proceed under provision 16(B) and thereby waived their rights under provision 17(C), I cannot say the chancellor was clearly erroneous. IMBER, J., joins this dissent. [[Image here]] [[Image here]]   The seller Bharodia denied being a sophisticated buyer of real estate, but the proof clearly established that he had purchased motels such as a Holiday Inn, a Comfort Inn, and a Ramada Inn. He also admitted to purchasing residential property and having been involved in litigation on prior occasions. In short, the buyers cannot take refuge as a new or unknowledgeable purchaser m the real estate market.