Court Opinion

ID: 9856547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:50:12.052644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:12.847921
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting on denial of Petition for Rehearing.
First, it is noted that the plea bargaining is viewed as a contractual transaction — out of which “Ballard received immediate benefits which constituted fair consideration for his plea.” (At 804, 761 P.2d at 1156). Part of the supposed consideration running to the state was the state’s retained threat to request a longer sentence in the event that Ballard failed to appear for sentencing. This by the majority is perceived to be a “reserved right” of the state — one which it proceeded to exercise.
My inability to agree is based on notions of what is wrong and what is right. I do understand plea bargaining. I do not understand that an integral part in reaching a plea bargain includes the right of the state to threaten the defendant with a more severe sentence based upon nothing but prosecutorial vindictiveness should the defendant not present himself for sentencing. The state had no right in its superior bargaining position to exact from Ballard such a reserved right. There simply is no such right, and it was a pure case of unconscionable overreaching. As Justice Huntley has previously pointed out, when a defendant fails to show up for sentencing — as ordered —the state has adequate remedies. One is reminded of State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 618 P.2d 759 (1980), wherein Justice McFadden joined my dissenting opinion in a case which, although not exactly the same as this, had the same overtones of unconscionability. There the defendant was sentenced, but being a college student, requested and was granted a few days’ reprieve to get his affairs in order before turning himself into the sheriff’s custody for transportation. As I remember it, Johnson was a black youth, and probably not overly enthusiastic about serving even a three year indeterminate term in the Idaho penitentiary. At any rate, Johnson did as Ballard has done — he betook himself elsewhere — notwithstanding that the judge at sentencing warned him, “Now you understand that if you do run, you are going to be brought back and if that happens, I can promise you I am going to bring you in for resentencing, and the sentence will be much more severe ... if you do not show up, you are going to be returned here and the full sentence allowable under the law will be imposed.” 101 Idaho at 582-83, 618 P.2d at 760-61. Although the terminology wasn’t used, this “reserved right” was utilized and Johnson’s sentence, after being apprehended, was increased to the maximum, five years determinate. A majority of three upheld this display of vindictiveness, notwithstanding two dissenting views which pointed to strong authority, much of it from the Supreme Court of the United States, holding that it could not be done. 101 Idaho 585-590, 618 P.2d at 763-68.
When that formidable array of law did not change any votes, I put it aside, and relied upon reasoning. Much of what I wrote then is as applicable to Ballard’s case as it was to Johnson’s. I cannot hope to improve upon it, and repeat it in bringing Ballard’s case to a close.
Even were there not the abundance of law on the issue which should guide the Court today in the correct direction, or were there no law at all, the monstrosity *806of the proposition, as viewed by laymen, is such that an appellate court should have no trouble in reaching a correct resolution. A defendant has pleaded guilty, and has gone before the court to receive his sentence. The court gives thorough consideration to his crime, and to the particular offender, and searchingly reaches a decision that three years of imprisonment is appropriate. Judgment is so entered. The court minutes are promptly drawn to show the proceeding and the sentence imposed.
In what has to be considered a commendable display of leniency (and without any statutory authority to which reference might be made) the court, in furthering sentence imposed, places on defendant the duty of delivering himself to the jail house door — but allows defendant three days of “travel-time” in which to do so.
Now, where that defendant fails in the trust placed in him, should he be handed another two years of penal time for his human frailty? I think not, and were there no law to guide us, I would so hold.
In that thought I am also guided by considerations of our 120 day retained jurisdiction statute. The obvious purpose of this benevolent provision is to allow district courts the option of retaining jurisdiction over a sentenced felony defendant for the salutary purpose of withdrawing a person deemed a suitable recipient of beneficence from the maw of the penitentiary.
Here, however, the trial court made it quite clear that 120 day jurisdiction was retained in order to increase defendant’s sentence should he fail his trust. That statute was never intended for that purpose. As a result of the Court’s holding today, defense counsel may well think twice before requesting that their criminal defendants be placed on 120 day retained jurisdiction.
101 Idaho at 591, 618 P.2d at 769.
HUNTLEY, J., concurs.