Court Opinion

ID: 9749390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:41:13.633506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:47.950281
License: Public Domain

JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
At the outset, let me be abundantly clear as to what the plan at issue in this case is not. It is not an attempt to effectively remedy decades of racially polarized voting in the particular legislative districts involved, as is the case in various pre-clearance jurisdictions. To the contrary, the reapportionment plan here is a scheme to contain, and will most assuredly limit, the voting power of black electors. The plan, which purports to strengthen black political potential, in a real sense, actually weakens it. The facts of record clearly demonstrate that state apportioning officials engaged in a ruse to limit black voter impact that used as a shield the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution. Because I cannot in good conscience endorse the misuse of these laws that were enacted to remedy the historic denial of voting rights to black Americans, I respectfully dissent.1 Manipulating the Voting Rights Act, as was done here to accomplish a purpose contrary to the true extension of black voting rights, al*1052though skillful and sophisticated, cannot be allowed to overwhelm the long line of precedents aimed at removing the barriers to minority voting and designed to remedy the effects of those barriers. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342, 81 S.Ct. 125, 127-28, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960) (holding that courts must strike down the “sophisticated” as well as “simple-minded” schemes that offend the Constitution); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872, 83 L.Ed. 1281 (1939).
The way in which the Apportionment Board used black voters in drawing the legislative districts at issue, without first showing polarized or bloc voting, was nothing short of doing a dance on the graves of Medger Evers, Harry T. Moore, Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, James Chaney, and the hosts of others who died in an effort to bring about the enactment of the Voting Rights Act. I write in dissent to further express my profound disagreement with this court’s effort, even in good faith, to make constitutional sense out of the Ohio reapportionment officials’ paternalistic exploitation of a civil rights remedial statute in order to achieve a dubious political objective. I am astonished at the way the state reapportionment officials dared to act under color of the Voting Rights Act in districts where the very objectives of that Act are already being fulfilled by rational voter conduct. Therefore, I feel obligated to set out with some specificity the reasons I part company with my distinguished colleagues.
I. Background
Pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, the State Apportionment Board, comprised of five members, must reapportion State House and Senate electoral districts for the state legislature every ten years.2 Following the 1990 federal census, a majority of the Apportionment Board3 appointed James R. Tilling to draft an apportionment plan on behalf of the Board. After conducting public hearings throughout the state, including meeting with some members of minority organizations, Tilling drafted a plan that included eight majority-minority districts, districts in which a majority of the population is a member of a specific minority group. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 149, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993).
Robert T. Bennett, the chairman of the Ohio Republican Party, then submitted the apportionment plan to the Board. He also attached a letter to the plan, which stated in pertinent part:
[W]e have made every possible effort to achieve maximum possible compliance with federal and state law and constitutions, especially the Voting Rights Act. It was not always possible to reconcile these laws however, and sometimes we were forced to make a choice. There were several occasions when we had to make elections between blind adherence to the Ohio Constitution’s dictate regarding population density and preservation of artificial boundary lines on the one hand, and the clear duty to reach out for all reasonably cohesive groups of minority voters. On each occasion, we opted to comply with the Voting Rights Act.
We have therefore sometimes departed from the Ohio Constitution’s rigid geographical requirements and mandatory population deviations____4
*1053On October 1, 1991, the Apportionment Board adopted the plan Tilling submitted by a 3-2 vote. Id. The Board later reconvened on October 3,1991, to make several technical amendments to the plan, and the plan, adopted on October 3, 1991, in the wake of these changes, was designated “Amendment C.”
On November 1, 1991, Barney Quilter and Thomas Ferguson, the two Board members who voted against the plan, and various other officials and legislators filed suit against the other members of the Apportionment Board and Tilling. Seeking invalidation of the plan, the Plaintiffs alleged that the redistricting plan violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article XI of the Ohio Constitution, which provided specific apportionment guidelines. Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F.Supp. 695, 695-96 (N.D.Ohio 1992). According to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants intentionally “packed minorities into certain districts where minorities historically were able to elect representatives of choice with crossover votes.” Id. at 698. The Plaintiffs contended that this packing resulted in a waste of minority votes in the packed districts and a dilution of minority voting strength in the surrounding areas where the “packed” voters could influence elections. Id. In response, the Defendants contended that the plan actually enhanced the strength of black voters by creating safe, minority-dominated districts. As justification for these changes, the Defendants cited compliance with the Voting Rights Act and federal ease law, which allegedly mandated the drawing of majority-minority districts. Id.
On January 31, 1992, a majority of this three judge panel held that there was “no legal mandate or finding of a Voting Rights Act violation to justify Defendants’ creation of majority-minority districts wherever possible in the 1991 Apportionment Plan.” Id. at 701. Thus, the panel ordered the Board to *1054draft a new plan or demonstrate that it was remedying a section 2 violation.5 Id. at 702.
The Apportionment Board responded by establishing and adopting a record on February 18, 1992, that, in its view, justified the Board’s creation of minority-controlled state legislative districts. Furthermore at its February 18 meeting, the Board amended the 1991 plan to eliminate a series of technical errors in the plan that the Ohio Supreme Court had identified in its separate review of the plan, Voinovich v. Ferguson, 63 Ohio St.3d 198, 586 N.E.2d 1020 (Ohio 1992) (per curiam).- The resulting 1992 plan, “Amendment D,” created only five majority-minority districts, which constituted a reduction from the eight majority-minority districts in the 1991 plan, “Amendment C.”
On March 10, 1992, after the Board submitted its findings and conclusions, along with the new 1992 plan, this court held that the Board “failfed] once again to justify its wholesale creation of majority-minority districts, thus rendering the plan, as submitted, violative of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.” Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F.Supp. 756, 757 (N.D.Ohio 1992) (order). Furthermore, this court held that the 1992 plan also violated the Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. Nine days later, in response to Defendants’ motion for a stay of the March 10 order pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court, this court additionally held that both the 1991 and 1992 plans violated the Fourteenth Amendment because they departed from the requirement that all districts be of nearly equal population. Quilter v. Voinovich, No. 5:91CV-2219, 1992 WL 677145, at *10 (N.D.Ohio Mar. 19, 1992).
The Defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993), the Supreme Court reversed this court’s Quitter decisions. Denying two of the Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court held that the reapportionment plan at issue did not violate section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, nor did it violate the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. Nevertheless, the Court held that the Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that the population deviations between the districts violated the Equal Protection Clause, and the Court remanded “only for further proceedings on whether the plan’s deviation from equal population among districts violate[d] the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 152,113 S.Ct. at 1154.
Upon remand, this court held that the Ohio reapportionment plan survived scrutiny under the one-person-one-vote guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause because (1) the Defendants advanced a genuine, rational state policy to justify the deviations from population equality among the state legislative districts; (2) their plan reasonably furthered the rational state policy; and (3) the 13.81% and 10.54% total deviations fell within constitutional limits. Quilter v. Voinovich, 857 F.Supp. 579, 587 (N.D.Ohio 1994). Accordingly, judgment was entered for the Defendants on this issue.
While the latter decision was pending, however, the Plaintiffs moved this court for permission to amend their complaint in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). As a lower court, this court is bound to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno, where the Court held for the first time that a plaintiff could state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that a districting plan, “though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.” Id. at 649-50,113 S.Ct. at 2828. Thus, this court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion, and their complaint was accordingly amended.6 Quilter v. *1055Voinovich, 157 F.R.D. 86, 40 (N.D.Ohio 1994).
On August 11, 1995, this court found that the 1992 redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. Quilter v. Voinovich, 912 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D.Ohio 1995) (per curiam). Specifically, the panel found that when the legislature subordinates traditional race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations strict scrutiny applies. Id. at 1019. Thus, if the Plaintiffs offer proof “substantiating that race was the predominant factor motivating the state’s apportionment process, then this gives rise to a presumption that the plan is unconstitutional, and the burden shifts to the Defendants to demonstrate that their use of race in redistricting was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest____” Id. (citations omitted).
Having said this, the court then focused on the eight Ohio districts that were allegedly racially gerrymandered. The Defendants admitted that they considered race when redistricting, but argued that such considerations were mandatory under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 1023. After reviewing all of the evidence, the panel found that “race was the predominant motivating factor in the Defendants’ creation of House districts 21, 22, 30, 31, 38, 39, 44, and 49 in the 1992 plan because traditional districting principles were subordinated to or given less weight in the reapportionment process than racial considerations.” Id. at 1027. Thus, the court subjected the 1992 plan to strict scrutiny.
All of the foregoing were defended on the basis that the State had a compelling interest. The Defendants argue that they met strict scrutiny because a compelling interest existed — compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. Were that really the case, I would enthusiastically join the majority. However, even under the revised jurisprudence post -Shaw, the record does not support that argument. In order to show that section 2 is a compelling state interest the Defendants must have an adequate basis in evidence that race-based redistricting was necessary as a remedial measure to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 1028. This they have not done. To establish this, the Defendants had to show that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Id. (quoting Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. at 156-57, 113 S.Ct. at 1157 (other citations omitted)). The court found as a matter of fact that such race-based voting did not exist in Ohio with respect to the districts at issue. Id. In fact, the court *1056found significant cross over voting by white voters. For example, the percentage of white cross over votes in each of the challenged districts was as follows: Rep. Mallory — 50.66%; Rep. Roberts — 45.98%; Rep. Sykes — 48.76%; and Rep. Jones — 44.46%. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the 1992 plan expert, Dr. King, analyzed over 200 elections throughout Ohio and found that in 1984 56.7% of whites voted for black candidates. Id. at 1029. Even the election board recognized the existence of white cross over voting in the black districts where race-based remedial measures were utilized. Id. at 1029 (citing Board Findings ¶ 168). In light of the record, the explanations were suspect. Thus, this court found that no compelling interest existed for the race-based redistricting, and a majority of the panel struck down the plan. Id. at 1029-30. The Supreme Court then vacated this decision and asked us to consider it in light of its two new decisions Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996), and Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996).7
II. The Convergence of Race and Precedent
I take pains to write at this length and to place the issue of voting rights and race in a broader framework, because of the confusion that is obvious over the appropriate use of race in civil rights remedial contexts generally and in voting rights cases in particular. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 656, 113 S.Ct. at 2831-32 (1993). The confusion is based on the extent to which such remedies must be race sensitive. This confusion may grow from a mistaken notion that Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-564, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 1143-48, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896), with respect to the Constitution being colorblind, carried the day in 1896. However, Justice Harlan stood alone as the Supreme Court majority rejected his view. Justice Henry Billings Brown, writing for seven of his colleagues, asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause did not bar the segregation of black citizens so long as the separate treatment of them equaled that accorded to white citizens. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548-49, 16 S.Ct. at 1142-43. In dismissing the arguments of blacks against the validity of that proposition, Justice Brown declared that there was no stigma associated with segregation and to the extent that blacks felt demeaned and stigmatized, it was only because “the colored race [chose] to put that construction upon it.” Id., at 551, 16 S.Ct. at 1143.
Conceding that the ground has shifted somewhat in civil rights jurisprudence, this court can conclude, with no need for specific authority, that the harmful impact of Plessy misshaped America’s institutions. It was 58 years later, in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), that the Supreme Court got around to overturning that decision. Since Brown, through a series of decisions and statutory enactments, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965, efforts have been made, through the benign use of race, to root out the invidious vestiges of Plessy v. Ferguson. Nowhere have these vestiges been more deeply entrenched than in the area of voting rights. At the core of these remedial efforts was a principle that race had to be considered in any efforts to eliminate the effects of the generations of invidiously using race. “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.” Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2807-08, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (Blaekmun, J., concurring). What has led to the grossly mistaken turn in our jurisprudence, and the post-Shaw confusion, is the belief that the evils wrought by Plessy have been totally eradicated, and that any further remedies designed to address them must be color-blind. The record of coalitional cross over voting in the districts at issue is an encouraging measure of the extent to which the remedial laws have been effective. Nevertheless, in face of this small forward step, I cannot join in a solution that halts, and may *1057even reverse, the gains made. The record in this case, without question, is at sharp variance with the racial obstinacy in the various pre-clearance jurisdictions and requires a different analysis.
III. Analysis
It is the aforementioned that derails the train from the compelling purpose track. The majority erroneously concludes that strict scrutiny does not apply to the reapportionment plan in this case. The majority holds that in order for strict scrutiny to be triggered race must be the “substantial factor in the drawing of the challenged districts ... to which traditional districting principles were subordinated____” Maj. Op. at 1051. “[W]e will not apply strict scrutiny without the ‘necessary showing by the plaintiffs that the defendants neglected traditional districting criteria and that neglect is predominantly due to the misuse of race.” Id. at 1044.' It is of course, unfortunate, in my view, to be required in eases seeking to remedy ages-old discrimination, to prove the obvious about race. Under our prior jurisprudence, this plan would not even meet the intermediate scrutiny test due to its limiting effect on minority voting. Conceding what is required to be shown, I, nevertheless, do not believe that the majority’s position accurately states the law with respect to a plan that negatively impacts minority political potential. The recent cases require that even under the majority’s test, strict scrutiny applies to the state’s reapportionment containment plan.
A. The Test
In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (Shaw I), the Supreme Court first ruled actionable an equal protection claim that challenged districts which were drawn based on the race of the voters. Since then the Court has attempted to further define when states violate the Equal Protection Clause in redrawing their districts.
Of course, redistricting legislatures are always conscious of racial demographics; “but it does not follow that race predominates in the redistricting process.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16, 115 S.Ct. at 2488. Because it is difficult to distinguish between a legislature merely taking account of race and a legislature that is motivated by race, courts must exercise “extraordinary caution” in adjudicating such claims. Id.; see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, -, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1900, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (Shaw II). If race, however, is the predominant factor motivating a legislature to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district, then this court must apply strict scrutiny to the redistricting plan. Abrams v. Johnson, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 1925, 1936, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997) (“If race is the predominant motive in creating districts, strict scrutiny applies ____”) (emphasis added); Shaw II, 517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1900 (holding that the constitutional wrong occurs when race becomes the “dominant and controlling” consideration); Miller, 515 U.S. at 913-16, 115 S.Ct. at 2487-88.
Consequently, the court does not need to look at whether race trumped other districting principles, but instead must determine whether race was the main factor the legislature considered when drawing its district lines. I do not dispute that the districts are compact and contiguous in this casé, but that should not allow a legislature to shield its plan from review, especially where irrespective of the shape of the districts race remained the primary motivation. Compare Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16, 115 S.Ct. at 2488 (holding that in order for strict scrutiny to apply race must be the “predominant factor motivating the legislature’s [redistricting] decision”) with Bush, 517 U.S. at - — -, 116 S.Ct. at 1973-74 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating, that strict scrutiny should apply when race is a motivation for the drawing of districts). Indeed, the line of recent Supreme Court cases do not seem to abandon altogether benign considerations of race in the redistricting process. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1902 (“A State’s interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination may in the proper case justify a government’s use of racial distinctions”); Bush, 517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1969 (“so long as they do . not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for its own sake or as a proxy, States may otherwise take race into consideration, without coming under strict scrutiny”) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Bush, *1058517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1971 (“The State may not engage in districting based on race except as reasonably necessary to cure the anticipated § 2 violation, nor may it use race as a proxy to serve other interests”) (Kennedy, J., concurring). These cases attempt to define when racial considerations as such are appropriate. In my view, the discriminatory intent manifest in the development of this plan moved beyond benign considerations of race into invidious uses for containment purposes. To hold, as the majority does, that “subordination” can only be proven if a state abandons or violates traditional districting principles in favor of racial considerations constitutes a logical fallacy. Such a conclusion is fallacious because it is certainly possible, both logically and factually, that districts could be crafted within the confines of traditional districting principles and still be predominantly motivated by discriminatory racial considerations. See Abrams, 517 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1936 (stating that if race is the predominant motive strict scrutiny applies). Furthermore, to conclude otherwise accords a preclusive constitutional significance to a state’s compliance with traditional districting principles, which exceeds the significance accorded by the Supreme Court. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1900; Miller, 515 U.S. at 917-23, 115 S.Ct. at 2489-91.
Taken together, the sum of the Supreme Court’s decisions leads me to conclude that a plaintiff may satisfy the predominant factor test and prove that traditional districting principles were a subordinate motivation not only when a state violates or abandons traditional districting principles in favor of racial motivations, but also when a state substantially complies with traditional districting principles and there is nevertheless a strong discriminatory motivation.
B. Application
In the case at bar, the record is replete with evidence that race was the predominant motivation of the state officials when they drew the districts at issue. In fact, there is substantial evidence in the record indicating that back room decisions such as those outlawed in Gomillion v. Lightfoot have made a mockery of the substantial racial progress with respect to voting patterns in the districts at issue.
When the plan was submitted as a whole to the Board, the letter attached stated, “There are several occasions when we had to make election between blind adherence to the Ohio Constitution’s dictate regarding population density and preservation of artificial boundary lines on the one hand, and the clear duty to reach out for all reasonably cohesive groups of minority voters. On each occasion, we opted to comply with the Voting Rights Act.” Robert T. Bennett Letter (September 26, 1991). This letter declares in clear terms that when the districting board had to choose between race and traditional districting principles, they chose race. Were minorities shown to lack meaningful cross over support, such action by the Board would have been laudable. In the face of cross over voter evidence on the record, it stands to reason that the districting board made the wrong choice. Abrams, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1937.
James Tilling’s (the state expert who drew up the plan) actions in developing the plan are direct evidence of the apportionment board predominantly using race. The record clearly establishes that Tilling first set out to draw minority districts. He testified, without equivocation, that his first goal was to gather data on his computer on black populations and black voting age population by district, ward, or precinct. He then drew the black districts first by aggregating black populations on his computer and drawing lines around those populations. Deposition of James Tilling, Docket # 102, at *84-91, *97-106 (11/20/91). He further admitted that the black population was needlessly added to districts already represented by black legislators. This was to “ensure that black persons would be elected in the future.”
All of these tactics are further buttressed by Tilling’s hand-written notes. Finally, throughout his report Tilling relies upon the untenable and prejudicial presumption that all blacks have similar income, education, housing values, health, and criminal justice concerns. Tilling’s Report at ¶70. Tilling never advanced a claim, statistical evidence or a mere guess that discriminatory voting patterns necessitated his actions. Evidence of black candidates being rejected by white *1059voters in the legislative districts under review would have provided justification, indeed, would have compelled the affirmative use of race.
The Board’s justification for the districts in question highlight that race was not only the primary motivation, but the only motivation in drawing these districts. Again, I emphasize that race was used here in a way to contain, not enhance, black political empowerment. Racial voting patterns in the following four legislative districts powerfully demonstrate the cynical restraint placed on the ability to strengthen and broaden minority political potential and also show an absence of an appropriate predicate for invoking the Voting Rights Act remedies.
1.House District 31 (House District 23 in 1981) — Hamilton County
Board Finding ¶ 182 states that this district’s black population was increased to insure a black candidate was elected when Representative Mallory retired. Furthermore, the Board Findings indicate that Floyd Johnson, the man purporting to represent the NAACP, gave his approval for these racially gerrymandered districts. Id. at ¶ 8.8
A cursory glance at the Board Findings exemplifies that race was the most important factor in redrawing the districts. These Findings were adopted in support of the 1992 Plan now at issue.
Tilling’s notes further indicate that prior to drawing this district he displayed the minority population on his computer screen and he drew this district first to emphasize a heavily populated black district. While this relates to a draft of the finished version, it indicates Tilling’s and the Board’s intent when drawing this district.
The Board should not have taken race into account at all in this district. In 1990, 50.66% of the white voters voted for the black representative. Quilter, 1992 WL 677145, at *10 n. 2. Furthermore, 28.23% of the white voting age population voted, while only 12.63% of the black population did so. Board Finding at ¶ 168. The black voting age population was. only 39% of the population in this district. Therefore, the black representative could have run in an all white district and won.
2. House District 39 (House District 37 in 1981) — Montgomery County
Paragraphs 191 to 193 of the Board’s findings indicate that their primary concern in drawing new House District 39 was to circumscribe black voters. In fact, these findings seem to indicate that race was the Board’s only concern.
The Board considered Old Districts 36 and 37 simultaneously, when they attempted to redraw the districts in Montgomery Country. Board Findings at ¶ 191-93. Both of these districts had minority representatives, and in both districts minorities had been elected with less than a majority-minority population. Id. at ¶ 191. Yet, the Board found it imperative to increase the minority population in these districts. Id. at ¶ 193 (“But in order to barely give her the majority black voting age population, 50.7, which is, we felt, the least that we needed to do ... if we didn’t increase it now, it would fall dangerously low and possibly jeopardize her chances for reelection.”). The Board did this and ignored the fact that in Old House District 37, 45.98% of the white voters crossed-over and voted for the black candidate. Quitter, 1992 WL 677145 at *10 n. 2.
3. House District 44 (House District 42 in 1981) — Summit County
Again, the Board found it necessary to first consider race in District 44. In fact, both Floyd Johnson and the Black Elected Democrats of Ohio (“BEDO”) participated in reconfiguring this district. Board Findings at ¶ 194. The Board, Floyd Johnson, and BEDO all agreed that the district needed to be reconfigured so as to have a larger black voting age population. Id. This was their sole and primary purpose in drawing District 44.
Once again, however, in Old District 42, the black representative received 48.76% of the white population’s votes. Quitter, 1992 *1060WL 677145, at *10 n. 2. Furthermore, in that district blacks only made up 32.01% of the voting age population. Board Findings at ¶ 168. Thus, once again it was whites who elected a black candidate (the black representative had been elected to five terms by a two-to-one margin). Race should not have been considered here, but obviously was the primary consideration. Moreover, the Summit County districts showed population shifts that were constitutionally insignificant. See filling’s Report at ¶ 49.
4. House District 49 (Old House District 45) — Lucas County
Mr. Tilling testified to the Board that in this district they did not need to increase the minority population to protect the incumbent black representative, “but because down the road in this decade whoever is his successor needs the opportunity to give minorities a clear chance to elect a candidate of their choice.” Board Findings at ¶ 177. There obviously was a strategy to increase percentages based on race with no predicate existing for doing so. Id. at ¶ 195.
In 1990, the black representative received 44.46% of the white vote in Old District 45. Quitter, 1992 WL 677145, at *10 n. 2. Blacks only made up 37.61% of the voting age population. Board Findings at ¶ 168. Finally, this district had very little shift in population. filling’s Report at ¶ 49. The only reason it was changed was to increase the number of minority voters.
C. Strict Scrutiny
The record establishes a simple fact: Ohio voters in these state legislative contexts have demonstrated a “general willingness” to look beyond race in electing public officials. Abrams, ■ — • U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1937. With a well-established record of non-polarized voting in the challenged districts, the Apportionment Board’s drawing of racially-packed legislative districts can only be the result of a predominant motivation to do so. Consequently, I would subject the plan to strict scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, the Defendants must show “not only that its redistricting plan was in pursuit of a compelling state interest, but also that ‘its districting legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve [that] compelling state interest.’ ” Shaw II, 517 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1902 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2490). In this ease, the state asserts that compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court has “assumed, without deciding, that compliance with § 2 can be a compelling state interest.” Abrams, — U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1936. I believe that when the Supreme Court ultimately decides this issue, the Court will find that compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest. See Bush, 517 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1968-70 (O’Connor, J., concurring).; Maj. Op. at 1044.
However, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not justify the eompartmentalization of racial minorities into separate voting districts unless it is demonstrated that such action would promote their meaningful participation in the political process. Thus, section 2 is far from a blind justification for race-based redistricting. Rather, the state must have an adequate basis in evidence to conclude that race-based redistricting is necessary to correct bigoted voting patterns so as to comply with the Voting Rights Act. See Abrams, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1935 (“A violation of § 2 occurs if ‘it is shown that the political process leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of [a racial minority] ... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
Generally, to establish a prima facie case that a single-member redistricting plan violates section 2, three things must be shown: (1) that the minority group “is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district”; (2) that the minority group “is politically cohesive”; and (3) “that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2767, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) (referred to hereinafter as “Gingles *1061factors”). Consequently, when a state has rehable information that indicates the, relevant minority group could establish a prima facie challenge under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to the existing districting plan, then it has a strong basis in evidence for concluding that it must engage in race-based redistricting to comply with section 2, and it has established a “compelling interest” for the remedial measures.
In this case, even if the court were to assume that the Defendants possessed information suggesting that a minority group could satisfy the first two Gingles factors, the Defendants could not satisfy the racial-bloc voting prong in the relevant districts. In fact, both this court and the Supreme Court previously held that on the basis of all the evidence that racially polarized voting generally did not exist in Ohio’s legislative elections. The Court noted the following:
[A]ppellees [Plaintiffs in this case] have failed to demonstrate Gingles’ third precondition — sufficient white majority bloc voting to frustrate the election of the minority group’s candidate of choice. The District Court specifically found that Ohio does not suffer from “racially polarized voting.” Even appellees agree. Here, as in Gingles, “in the absence of significant white bloc voting it cannot be said that the ability of minority voters to elect their chosen representatives is inferior to that of white voters.”
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1157-58, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993) (internal citations omitted); see also Quilter, 1992 WL 677145, at *4, *8 & n. 2, n. 3 (holding that Ohio has coalitional voting, where whites cross over and vote for black candidates, and not polarized voting, where whites only vote for white candidates and blacks vote for black candidates). By relying on these precedents, I am not saying that the Apportionment Board could not take race into account unless and until it had been proven in a court that a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act had occurred. A state is not required to await a judicial finding that it has committed past or present discrimination before it voluntarily takes remedial action to eradicate the discrimination, so long as it has a “ ‘strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.’ ” Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500, 109 S.Ct. 706, 725, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1848-49, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986)). My point, however, is to emphasize that which should have been reasonably apparent to the Defendants: racially polarized voting does not exist in the contested districts. In the four districts at issue, between 45% and 51% of the white voters voted for the black candidate. See Quilter, 1992 WL 677145, at *10 n. 2; see id. at *10 n. 3 (finding that in 1984 56.7% of white voters voted for the black incumbent, in 1988 60.2% of white voters voted for the black incumbent, and in 1988 67.8% of white voters voted for the black incumbent). Given the overwhelming evidence of coalitional voting in the challenged districts under the existing plan and given the fact that the Defendants had this information available to them before they adopted the 1992 plan, the Defendants could not reasonably conclude that the relevant minority group could establish a prima facie case of a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the four relevant districts.9 Consequently, the state does not have a compelling interest to use black voters as a proxy for its redistrieting, and the plan should be struck down.
IV. Conclusion
The policy of racial political containment in this case removes the plan from the same category of remedial attempts present in jurisdictions where white voters continue in their refusal to vote on an interracial coalitional basis for non-white candidates. Because of that difference, and the lack of an *1062adequate predicate, the Apportionment Board, therefore, lacks a compelling interest for its racial containment scheme. The four districts at issue, as drawn, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I dissent.

. I agree with the majority’s standing analysis. Consequently, only house districts 31, 39, 44, and 49 are at issue in this case.

.Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio provides:
The governor, auditor of state, secretary of state, one person chosen by the speaker of the house of representatives and the leader in the senate of the political party of which the speaker is a member, and one person chosen by the legislative leaders in the two houses of the major political party of which the speaker is not a member shall be the persons responsible for the apportionment of this state for members of the general assembly.
Such persons, or a majority of their number, shall meet and establish in the manner prescribed in this Article the boundaries for each of ninety-nine house of representatives districts and thirty-three senate districts. Such meeting shall convene on a date designated by the governor between August 1 and October 1 in the year [1971] and every tenth year thereafter. ...
Ohio Const., art. XI, § 1.

. The majority consisted of Defendants George V. Voinovich, Governor of the State of Ohio, Stanley J. Aronoff, President of the Ohio Senate, and Robert A. Taft, II, Secretary of the State of Ohio. In the minority were Plaintiffs Barney Quilter, Speaker Pro Tempore of the Ohio House of Representatives, and Thomas E. Ferguson, Auditor of the State of Ohio.

. This Court's previous findings of fact — still controlling in this case — indicate that the Tilling plan encompassed the same objectives as the Bennett plan:
*1053This court was not faced with mere race-conscious redistricting that sought to avoid the division of contiguous, cohesive concentrations of minorities. This Court was also not faced with a plan that simply created a substantial number of majority-minority districts without explanation. Finally, this Court was not faced with a state subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in which case the historical violation of minority has been conclusively established. Rather, this Court addressed an Apportionment Board that applied a rule mandating the creation of majority-minority districts wherever possible. The Board did not purport to devise this rule based on Ohio policy and law; rather, it contended that such a per se rule is mandated by federal law.
Quilter v. Voinovich, 1992 WL 677145, *2 (N.D.Ohio March 19, 1992) (emphasis added). The earlier finding of this Court squares with the spirit and letter of Robert Bennett, whose plan we previously found to have heavily influenced the ultimate Tilling plan. "Tilling states that, in the most populous counties, he drew boundaries in accordance with his understanding of the requirements of the Voting Rights Act first. Deposition of Tilling, 11/21/91, at 49, 199-206. There were times when he would cross Ohio political boundaries in order to comply with his understanding of the Voting Rights Act. If there had been no Voting Rights Act requirement to create majority-minority districts, he understood that he would not have had to cross Ohio political boundaries____ Tilling had the ‘Republican Opportunities’ document prior to his submission of the plan and while he was drawing the plan. Deposition of Tilling, 1/22/91, at 17-19.” Quilter, 1992 WL 677145, *10 n. 8-9. Thus, the Bennett letter says in an outward manner what we found to be the state of affairs based on testimony of the major players, including James Tilling. There were also other influential players and documents. The “Republican Opportunities” documents referred to above discussed 19 ways in which the Republican Party could advantage itself in the redistricting process. The document lists several counties as “opportunities” to "pack as many Demos as possible into 2 Black-majority inner-city [House Districts].” Deposition of Horn, 12/10/91, Ex. 1. The document concludes with a final shot: "Make good on 12 of these opportunities and you know the consequences.” Id. There were other documents and testimony relied upon by this court to make its factual determination that a racial containment strategy had been followed. Tilling himself — after initially characterizing deposition questioning as a "gross misrepresentation of his actions” — was forced to concede that he had changed districts in every instance in which blacks had been elected with white cross over support. Deposition of Tilling, 11/20/91, at 198-202; See also Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact, 12/17/91, ¶¶ 445-545; Deposition of David Horn, 12/10/91, at 44-58. At bottom, we found that, based upon this and other evidence, the engine of race motivated the containment districting strategy used here. Given the record of the case, my position is that strict scrutiny must apply.

. We declined to address the Plaintiffs' constitutional claims at this point because our analysis under the Voting Rights Act required the plan to be justified or revised. Likewise, because the Ohio Supreme Court, in Voinovich v. Ferguson, 63 Ohio St.3d 198, 586 N.E.2d 1020 (1992) (per curiam), was concurrently considering the Plaintiffs' claim under the Ohio Constitution, we abstained from addressing the pendent claim.

. The Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint revised the First Amended Complaint in only two respects. First, Count IV, entitled "Violation of the Equal Protection Clause — Segregation of Voters by Race Without Compelling Governmental Justification,” is added. Second, the prayer for relief was accordingly revised. In pertinent part, Count IV alleges the following:
*105552____ The reapportionment plan adopted by the Defendants on February 18, 1992 intentionally separated Ohio voters on the basis of race without regard for the traditional redistricting principles set forth in the Ohio Constitution and otherwise without any compelling governmental justification. To justify the creation of race-based districts in the urban centers of Ohio, Defendants asserted that there was widespread racial bloc voting throughout Ohio. The trial court specifically found, and the Supreme Court of the United States confirmed, that Ohio did not suffer from legally cognizable racially polarized voting____
53. The Defendants deliberately created race-based legislative districts in urban centers initially and then used the purported, but sham, necessity of creating such districts as the basis for ignoring the traditional anti-gerrymandering provisions of the Ohio Constitution throughout the state of Ohio. Absent the ripple effect of the racial gerrymandering in the urban centers of the state of Ohio, the Defendants would not have been forced to ignore on a wholesale basis the directives of Article XI, Section 7, of the Ohio Constitution to follow existing political and legislative boundaries wherever possible.
54. ... The decision to abandon the traditional districting mandates contained within the Ohio Constitution is neither compelled by the doctrine of federal supremacy, nor based on any lawful, organized, or rational districting criteria____
55. The Defendants have articulated no compelling governmental interest for the wholesale abandonment of the provisions of the Ohio Constitution. As a result, the Defendants have drawn irregular districts in numerous places throughout the state, districts which have no explanation other than the ripple effects caused by the racially drawn districts in the urban centers. In some instances, the racially drawn districts themselves have irregular shapes not required by the Ohio Constitution.
56. The districts which have been modified solely on the basis of race include House Districts 31, 30, 22, 21, 38, 39, 44, and 49. No evidence has been presented to the trial court that either legally cognizable remedial action was necessary to draw these racially gerrymandered districts, or that the creation of such districts was narrowly tailored to further any compelling governmental need.
Pis.’ Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52-56.

. Since the remand, the Supreme Court has also addressed this issue in Abrams v. Johnson, - U.S. -, at ---, 117 S.Ct. 1925, at 1933-34, 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997). A careful consideration of the multiple opinions in those cases do not provide any compelling interest validation of a "containment" plan such as this which threatens to impact so adversely on black political participation.

. While Mr. Johnson claims to have represented the NAACP’s wishes, the NAACP never officially sanctioned his work.

. The pending case is extremely similar to the facts of Abrams v. Johnson, supra. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged a section 2 violation. The plaintiffs, however, could not establish the three threshold Gingles conditions. Id. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1936. In Georgia, the district court found that the “average percentage of whites voting for black candidates ... ranged from 22% to 38%....” Id. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 1936. “Under these circumstances, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in finding insufficient racial polarization in voting to meet the Gingles requirements.” Id. If the Court found voting in Ohio, insufficient racial polarization in Georgia, I have no doubt that they will find insufficient racial polarization in voting in Ohio.