Court Opinion

ID: 9565643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:25:03.185448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:48.584868
License: Public Domain

*108BeNHAM, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the second notice of appeal filed by appellants. I write separately to point out that, by necessity, the lengthy and complex majority opinion has but one reason for its existence — the trial court’s dismissal of the first notice of appeal. While the appeal before us is not in a posture to address the issue, I question the trial court’s authority to dismiss a notice of appeal on the ground that the order being appealed is not subject to direct appeal. OCGA § 5-6-48 sets out the grounds for dismissal of an appeal. Subsection (b) lists the three mandatory grounds for dismissal (untimely notice of appeal; the decision or judgment is not then appealable; and mootness), and “[a]ll three relate to dismissal by the appellate courts.” Young v. Climatrol Southeast Distrib. Co., 237 Ga. 53, 55 (226 SE2d 737) (1976). SeeBd. of Commrs. of Atkinson County v. Guthrie, 273 Ga. 1 (1) (537 SE2d 329) (2000) (“OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) lists three grounds for an appellate court to dismiss an appeal”); Sellers v. Nodvin, 262 Ga. 205 (1) (415 SE2d 908) (1992) (quoting Young v. Climatrol). Subsection (c) of OCGA § 5-6-48, “[t]he provision authorizing the trial court to dismiss an appeal” (Young v. Climatrol, supra, 237 Ga. at 55), permits the trial court to dismiss an appeal only when there has been an unreasonable delay in filing the transcript or in transmitting the record to the appellate court and, after notice and a hearing, the trial court has determined the delay was inexcusable and caused by the appealing party. Castleberry’s Food Co. v. Smith, 205 Ga. App. 859, 860 (424 SE2d 33) (1992). The trial court has very broad discretion when deciding whether an appeal should be dismissed for delay (Russell Morgan Landscape Mgmt. v. Velez-Ochoa, 252 Ga. App. 549, 550 (556 SE2d 827) (2001)), and the exercise of that discretion is subject to review by the appellate courts by means of a direct appeal from the order dismissing the appeal. See Gilman Paper Co. v. James, 235 Ga. 348, 349 (219 SE2d 447) (1975); Castleberry’s Food Co. v. Smith, supra, 205 Ga. App. at 860.
Under the statutory scheme, a trial court is limited in the circumstances in which it can dismiss an appeal and the appellate standard of review is whether the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. However, in Jones v. Singleton, 253 Ga. 41 (1) (316 SE2d 154) (1984), the trial court overstepped its statutory authority and dismissed a notice of appeal on the ground that the judgment was not then appealable. Without any discussion regarding the trial court’s authority to dismiss the appeal, this Court summarily affirmed the trial court’s action, observing that no final judgment had been entered. In so doing, the Court gave trial courts authority to dismiss appeals based on OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (2), and trial courts exercised the new authority. See, e.g., Northen v. Mary Anne Frolick *109& Assoc., 235 Ga. App. 804 (510 SE2d 122) (1998). The proverbial camel’s nose was in the tent, and the rest of the dromedary soon followed. While serving on the Court of Appeals, I authored an opinion which, after noting the lack of statutory authority for the trial court’s action, expressly followed this Court’s lead in Jones v. Singleton expanding the authority of the trial court to dismiss an appeal and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of an appeal for mootness under OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (3). Attwell v. Lane Co., 182 Ga. App. 813 (1) (357 SE2d 142) (1987). See also Dept. of Human Resources v. Chambers, 211 Ga. App. 763, 765 (441 SE2d 77) (1994) (“A trial court is empowered to dismiss a notice of appeal where the questions presented have become moot”). This Court endorsed that endowment of new authority on the trial courts in Grant v. Gaines, 265 Ga. 159 (454 SE2d 489) (1995). In Crumbley v. Wyant, 183 Ga. App. 802 (360 SE2d 276) (1987), the Court of Appeals completed the trifecta when, citing Jones v. Singleton and Attwell v. Lane Co., it addressed the merits of a trial court’s dismissal of a notice of appeal as untimely. OCGA § 5-6-48 (a) (1).
The judicially-sparked movement to empower trial courts with the same ability to dismiss cases as appellate courts has not been without pause. In addition to my expression of reservation in Attwell, the Court of Appeals has set out “the strictly limited circumstances” under which a trial court may properly dismiss an appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-48 (c), noted the appellate decisions allowing trial court encroachment on what was formerly the exclusive domain of the appellate courts, and declined “to divest [the appellate courts] of the responsibility for delineating the scope of appellate jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 and to place that authority on overburdened trial courts.” Castleberry’s Food Co. v. Smith, supra, 205 Ga. App. 860 (1) (holding the trial court was without authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the amount of the judgment required the appellant to file an application for discretionary review). See also Rodriguez v. Nunez, 252 Ga. App. 56 (2) (555 SE2d 514) (2001) (trial court erred in dismissing appeal on the ground that the case was a domestic relations matter which required the appellant to file an application for discretionary review). This Court has also questioned, without deciding, the extent of the authority given a trial court by OCGA § 5-6-48 to dismiss an appeal. In Seig v. Seig, 265 Ga. 384 (1) (455 SE2d 830) (1995), the cross-appellant appealed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the appellant. Noting that the appellant was entitled to a direct appeal from the trial court’s entry of an interlocutory injunction, this Court found no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the appeal, “even assuming, arguendo, that a trial court has the authority under OCGA § 5-6-48 to dismiss an appeal. ...” See also Riley v. State, 280 *110Ga. 267 (626 SE2d 116) (2006), in which we affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a notice of appeal as untimely and included a parenthetical reference to the assumption in Seig that the trial court has authority under OCGA § 5-6-48 to dismiss an appeal.
The case at bar is a prime example of how muddy the waters can become when we stray from the statutory path. If the trial court had not dismissed the appeal in November 2006 by using a ground statutorily reserved to the appellate courts, the appeal would have been docketed in the Court of Appeals which, in all likelihood, would have dismissed the direct appeal for failure to follow the procedure for obtaining interlocutory review. Instead, the trial court’s dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the decision was not then appealable (OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (2)), has caused an appeal from the dismissal order which requires this Court to determine whether the trial court’s order which is the subject of the dismissed appeal was a directly appealable judgment of contempt or merely an order imposing sanctions for discovery — just so this Court can decide that the appeal was properly dismissed by the Court of Appeals. It is not supposed to be that difficult. If we were to once again acknowledge and abide by the statutory delineation of authority to dismiss appeals, the appellate courts would decide if a notice of appeal were untimely, if a judgment were not yet appealable, or if a question were moot, and would review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s dismissal of an appeal for an unreasonable delay in filing a transcript or transmitting a record. The case at bar and the opinion it has wrought make me long for those days.25
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley joins this concurrence.

 I wholeheartedly endorse footnote 2 of the majority opinion. The question of whether the trial court’s order on contempt/discovery sanctions was directly appealable or interlocutory in nature was one to be resolved by the appellate court upon receipt of the appeal pursuant to the filed notice of appeal. Instead, the trial court improperly decided its order was interlocutory in nature and improperly dismissed the notice of appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (2).