Court Opinion

ID: 9738171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:43:55.701087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.107257
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: The majority engages in a protracted discussion of the legislative intent behind the Consumer Fraud Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1992)). It is axiomatic, however, that the best indication of the legislature’s intent is the language it employed in drafting the law. People v. Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill. 2d 360, 364 (1994). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court should not resort to other tools of statutory interpretation. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). The court’s only legitimate function is to enforce the law as written. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 391 (1995). Section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact *** in the conduct of any trade or commerce ***.” 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1992). The terms “trade” and “commerce” are defined by the law to mean “the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.” 815 ILCS 505/l(f) (West 1992). Pursuant to section 10a(a) of the Act, “[a]ny person who suffers actual damage as a result of a violation of this Act committed by any other person may bring an action against such person.” 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1992). The term “person” “includes any natural person or his legal representative, partnership, corporation (domestic and foreign), company, trust, business entity or association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestui que trust thereof.]” 815 ILCS 505/l(c) (West 1992). These provisions, which must be liberally construed to effect the Act’s purposes (815 ILCS 505/11a (West 1992)), clearly and unambiguously embrace the sort of billing fraud claims advanced in counts I and IV of plaintiffs complaint. Accordingly, defendants cannot be removed from the Act’s coverage without holding that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute says. No rule of construction authorizes us to do that. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994). Had the General Assembly intended to exclude attorneys from the scope of the Act, it could easily have done so, just as it excluded real estate salesmen and brokers, newspaper and periodical publishers, and individuals associated with television and radio stations. 815 ILCS 505/10b (West 1992). Attorneys, however, are nowhere mentioned. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the expression of certain exceptions in a statute should be construed as an exclusion of all others. State of Illinois v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 250 (1990). Courts are not at liberty to depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 534 (1997). Accordingly, the absence of attorneys from the detailed exclusions enumerated in the statute is fatal to the majority’s analysis. Holding attorneys to the same standards of honesty and fair dealing that apply to other business people will inevitably affect the practice of law. In my view, the results can only be positive. Unlike my colleagues, I am not concerned about encroachment on this court’s authority. While it is true that responsibility for regulating the legal profession and disciplining attorneys is vested in our court, the General Assembly has made specific provision in the Consumer Fraud Act to avoid separation of power problems. Section 10b(1) of the Act exempts from coverage “[ajctions or transactions specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this State or the United States.” 815 ILCS 505/10b(1) (West 1992). Accordingly, if an attorney’s conduct were permissible under the rules we have enacted and the standards we have set, it would not be actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act. The conduct alleged in this case, if proven, would not be permissible under the rules of our court. Although the attorneys involved might ultimately be subject to discipline, that is no reason to deny plaintiff her right to bring a statutory damage action against them. If what the attorneys did constituted a crime, we would surely not say that they are exempt from prosecution merely because they are subject to disbarment by us. The same principle applies here. For the foregoing reasons, counts I and IV of plaintiffs complaint should not have been dismissed, and the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed. I therefore dissent.