Court Opinion

ID: 2963802
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:15:21.192494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:46.816087
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1090

                   NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, ET AL.,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                               JOHN B. HARWOOD, ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Cyr and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                              _________________________

               John A. MacFadyen for appellants.
               _________________
               Jeffrey  B.  Pine,  Attorney  General, and  Alan  M.  Shoer,
               _________________                           _______________
          Special Assistant Attorney General,  on brief for State of  Rhode
          Island, amicus curiae.
               Amy  R. Tabor, with whom Hardy Wood Tabor & Chudacoff was on
               _____________            ____________________________
          brief, for appellees.

                              _________________________

                                  November 13, 1995

                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.    Over a  century ago,  Charles
                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.
                            _____________

          Dudley  Warner,  a  nineteenth-century   Connecticut  journalist,

          earned a  sliver of immortality  by coining the  phrase "politics

          makes  strange  bedfellows."     This  appeal,  which  forges  an

          improbable alliance  among such disparate groups  as the National

          Association of Social Workers,  the Rhode Island State Rifle  and

          Revolver Association, the Rhode  Island Affiliate of the American

          Civil Liberties  Union,  the Rhode  Island  State Right  to  Life

          Committee, Inc.,  the Coalition to Preserve  Choice, the National

          Education Association,  and Ocean  State Action, proves  that the

          aphorism still has force.

                    Here,  the improbable  allies (all  private, non-profit

          organizations) banded together  with others to bring an action in

          Rhode Island's  federal district  court against John  B. Harwood,

          Speaker of  the Rhode Island House of Representatives (the House)

          and  Guido   Petteruti,  the  House's  head   doorkeeper.1    The

          plaintiffs  challenged the constitutionality of House Rule 45   a

          rule  that purports to ban  both lobbyists and  lobbying from the

          floor of  the House while the  House is in session    on its face

          and  as  applied.   The  district court  found  for  most of  the

          plaintiffs and  ordered the House  to desist from  continuing its

          prevailing  practices  with  regard  to  the  interpretation  and
                              
          ____________________

               1Other  plaintiffs in the underlying action included several
          individuals registered as  lobbyists for non-profit organizations
          (Kate  Coyne-McCoy, Harvey  Press, Scott  Nova,  Barbara Baldwin,
          Susan  Closter-Godoy, Steven Brown,  Barbara Colt, Donn Dibiasio,
          Anna Sullivan, and Marti Rosenberg), and three elected members of
          the  House   (Edith  Ajello,  Barbara   Burlingame,  and  Francis
          Gaschen).

                                          2

          enforcement of Rule 45.  See National Ass'n of Social Workers  v.
                                   ___ ________________________________

          Harwood,  874  F.  Supp.  530 (D.R.I.  1995)  (Social  Workers).2
          _______                                        _______________

          Given the benefit  of briefing  and argument on  the doctrine  of

          legislative  immunity    a  benefit denied  to the  distinguished

          district judge,  since the defendants  inexplicably neglected  to

          raise the issue in the lower court   we reverse.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    We recount the  facts "in the light most  hospitable to

          the verdict-winner, consistent with record support."  Cumpiano v.
                                                                ________

          Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir. 1990).
          ____________________

                    In January 1993, the House, under fresh leadership that

          had pledged procedural reform, adopted several new rules.   Among

          them was Rule  45 (the full  text of which  is reproduced in  the

          appendix).  On its face, Rule 45 banishes  all lobbyists from the

          floor of the  House (and the House lounge) while  the House is in

          session.   Nonetheless, the rule permits members of the public to

          be on  the House floor  while the House  is in  session, provided

          that  "they remain seated along the sides of the chamber, refrain

          from conversation, and  maintain the decorum  of the House,"  and

          provided further that they do  not "directly or indirectly engage

          in the practice of lobbying."  Rule 45(b).
                              
          ____________________

               2The  district court  nonetheless  rebuffed the  legislator-
          plaintiffs,  who  claimed  that  Rule  45  violated  their  First
          Amendment  right to  receive  political information.   The  court
          ruled that, even if the legislators had been denied some level of
          access to lobbyists, the denial did not "rise[] to the level of a
          constitutional  deprivation."   Social Workers,  874 F.  Supp. at
                                          ______________
          542.     The   legislator-plaintiffs  have   not  appealed   and,
          accordingly, we confine  our discussion to the claims  brought by
          the other plaintiffs.

                                          3

                    Although Rule  45 does not define  the term "lobbyist,"

          it incorporates the statutory  definition of "lobbying" contained

          in  the Rhode Island  Lobbying Act, R.I. Gen.  Laws    22-10-1 to

          22-10-12 (the  Act).    The Act  defines  "lobbying"  as  "acting

          directly  or  soliciting  others  to  act  for   the  purpose  of

          promoting, opposing,  amending, or influencing in  any manner the

          passage  by the general assembly of any legislation or the action

          on that  legislation by the governor."   Id.   22-10-2.   The Act
                                                   ___

          requires  lobbyists for  private organizations  and interests  to

          register with the Secretary of State, see id.    22-10-5 &amp; 22-10-
                                                ___ ___

          6, and to wear identifying badges, see id.   22-10-8.  Government
                                             ___ ___

          officials  who lobby are given considerably more leeway.  The Act

          grants safe passage to  many elected officials, see id.    22-10-
                                                          ___ ___

          3(1), and other public employees, while required to register, are

          otherwise exempt from the Act's provisions.  See id.   22-10-4.1.
                                                       ___ ___

          Neither elected officials nor other public employees are required

          to wear identification badges.

                    The district court found that, prior to the adoption of

          Rule 45, the House provided two galleries overlooking the chamber

          which were  accessible to  all members  of the  public, lobbyists

          included.   In  addition,  "representatives of  both private  and

          governmental  organizations were  allowed  to be  present on  the

          floor of the House."  Social Workers, 874 F. Supp. at 535.  These
                                ______________

          lobbyists typically occupied seats  on the periphery, in an  area

          ranged alongside the  two outermost  aisles of  the House  floor.

          They  communicated with legislators in a variety of ways, such as

                                          4

          by whispered  conversations on the perimeter of  the House floor,

          written  notes, physical  gestures, and  other assorted  signals.

          See id.  This buzznacking took place even  while the members were
          ___ ___

          debating floor amendments.

                    After the adoption of Rule  45, access to the  overhead

          galleries remained unchanged.   But from that point forward,  the

          House  excluded  private  lobbyists (easily  recognized  by their

          obligatory identification badges) from  the House floor while the

          House  was in  session.    The  district  court  found  that,  in

          contrast,  "agents  or employees  of  governmental  bodies [were]

          allowed to be present on the floor of the House while it [was] in

          session,  as  [were]  members  of  the  general  public."     Id.
                                                                        ___

          Moreover,   the  "defendants  permitted  agents  of  governmental

          organizations to be present, to  speak, to respond to  questions,

          to  provide information,  and to  confer with legislators  on the

          House  floor  during  House   sessions  on  frequent  occasions,"

          notwithstanding  the  apparently unconditional  text of  Rule 45.

          Id. at 537.
          ___

                    The  plaintiffs struck back on April 27, 1993.  On that

          date, they filed  a civil action  under 42 U.S.C.    1983  (1988)

          against  Messrs.   Harwood  and  Petteruti  (as  the  individuals

          purportedly responsible for enforcing the House's rules) charging

          that   Rule  45,  on  its  face  and  as  applied,  violated  the

          plaintiffs'  rights  under the  First and  Fourteenth Amendments.

          The  defendants denied  the  allegations.   Following a  four-day

          bench  trial, the judge found  for the plaintiffs.   See National
                                                               ___ ________

                                          5

          Ass'n  of Social  Workers v.  Harwood, 860  F. Supp.  943 (D.R.I.
          _________________________     _______

          1994).   The defendants then moved to  alter the judgment.  While

          that motion was under advisement, we decided AIDS Action Comm. v.
                                                       _________________

          Massachusetts  Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).  The
          ________________________________

          judge then issued the opinion that is now before us, 874 F. Supp.

          530, modifying the original rescript in certain particulars.

                    In substance, the court found that  the presence of the

          general public on  the perimeter of the House floor    a presence

          expressly permitted  by Rule 45    constituted "communicative and

          expressive activity," id. at 540; that, due to the  communicative
                                ___

          possibilities inherent in physical presence, the  public's access

          to the perimeter  of the House floor rendered  the floor itself a

          limited-purpose public forum, see  id.; and that, therefore, both
                                        ___  ___

          Rule  45's exclusion  of lobbyists  and its  proscription against

          lobbying  on  the  House floor  constituted  impermissible  time,

          place, and manner restrictions on expressive activity, see id. at
                                                                 ___ ___

          540-41.3   On this basis,  the court  held that Rule  45, on  its
                              
          ____________________

               3In the court's  view, the  rule did not  "leave open  ample
          alternative  means of  communication  for the  lobbyists," Social
                                                                     ______
          Workers, 874 F. Supp. at 541, because "representatives elected to
          _______
          the  Rhode   Island  House  of  Representatives   are  part  time
          legislators . . .  [who] lack legislative office quarters  in the
          State House or elsewhere, [and who] lack legislative  staffs, and
          [who]  generally  have  full  time  jobs  in  addition  to  their
          legislative duties."  Id.   This meant, the court  reasoned, that
                                ___
          exclusion  of  the  lobbyists  denied  them  the  opportunity  to
          communicate  with  hard-to-find  legislators  by  way  of  silent
          presence.  See id.
                     ___ ___
                In condemning the ban on lobbying on the House floor during
          House sessions,  the court took a  similar tack.  It  found that,
          "with regard to  floor amendments, which  are often proposed  and
          voted on in the same House proceeding, the only timely and useful
          communication that can  take place  is that which  occurs on  the
          floor of the House, during the debate on the amendment."  Id. 
                                                                    ___

                                          6

          face, violated  the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.   See id.
                                                                    ___ ___

          at 541.

                    The  court  also  found  that   the  House  haphazardly

          enforced Rule 45, allowing lobbying by government officials while

          prohibiting others from lobbying.  See id. at 535-37.  Predicated
                                             ___ ___

          on  this finding,  the court  concluded that "the  application of

          Rule 45 amounts to a  content based restriction on speech."   Id.
                                                                        ___

          at   541.    Because  the  court  could  discern  no  "compelling

          government  interest" that  justified  the  exclusion of  private

          lobbying  while  sparing  governmental  lobbying,   it  held  the

          interpretation and enforcement of Rule 45 invalid under the First

          Amendment.  Id. at 541-42.
                      ___

                    In constructing a remedy, the judge, presaging an issue

          not  yet raised by  the parties,  voiced concerns  about judicial

          interference  in  legislative  affairs.   See  id.  at  542.   He
                                                    ___  ___

          therefore  declined  the   plaintiffs'  invitation  to   "require

          defendants  to return to  the pre-1993 practice  of admitting all

          lobbyists, public and private, onto  the floor of the House  on a

          first-come,  first-served  basis."   Id.   Instead,  he  opted to
                                               ___

          declare "the  current interpretation  and enforcement of  Rule 45

          unconstitutional,"  and  to  order  the  House  to  refrain  from

          "continuing  its current  practices with  regard to  this issue."

          Id. at  543.4  The House leadership responded on two levels:  the
          ___
                              
          ____________________

               4For  reasons  that are  not  readily  apparent to  us,  the
          plaintiffs never sued  the House  as a body  and, therefore,  the
          district court  plainly lacked jurisdiction to  enjoin the House.
          The plaintiffs  now  concede that,  insofar  as the  lower  court
          purported  to do  so,  its  order  cannot  stand.    Withal,  the

                                          7

          House  itself  passed  a  new  rule  barring  all  persons except

          legislators and legislative  aides from the House  floor, and the

          named defendants launched this appeal.

          II.  PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
          II.  PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

                    On appeal, the defendants, having engaged new  counsel,

          advance  a  point  that,   for  some  unfathomable  reason,  they

          neglected  to raise  below:  the  claim that, with  regard to the

          defendants'  actions anent  Rule  45, they  are safeguarded  from

          judicial interference  under the  federal common law  doctrine of

          absolute  legislative  immunity.    The State  of  Rhode  Island,

          through  its  Attorney  General,  as  amicus  curiae,  lends  its

          support.

                    It  is very late in the day  to bring a new argument to

          the  fore.   Ordinarily,  an appellant  who  has not  proffered a

          particular claim or defense in the district court "may not unveil

          it in  the court of appeals."   United States v.  Slade, 980 F.2d
                                          _____________     _____

          27, 30  (1st Cir. 1992).   This  rule is deeply  embedded in  our

          jurisprudence, see, e.g., Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
                         ___  ____  _______________________________________

          Helpers  Union, Local No. 59  v. Superline Transp.  Co., 953 F.2d
          ____________________________     ______________________

          17,  21 (1st  Cir. 1992) ("If  any principle  is settled  in this

          circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances,

          legal theories not raised  squarely in the lower court  cannot be

          broached for the first time on appeal."), and we have invoked  it
                              
          ____________________

          plaintiffs argue that  the court's underlying ruling    that Rule
          45  is  unconstitutional      may  endure,   as  the  court   had
          jurisdiction  over  the  individuals   charged  with  the  rule's
          enforcement.   For reasons  which more clearly  appear infra,  we
                                                                 _____
          need not unsnarl this tangle.

                                          8

          with a  near-religious fervor, see, e.g.,  McCoy v. Massachusetts
                                         ___  ____   _____    _____________

          Inst.  of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (collecting
          ____________________

          cases), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992).   Nor can this variant
                  _____ ______

          of the  raise-or-waive principle  be dismissed as  a pettifogging

          technicality or a trap for the indolent; the rule is founded upon

          important  considerations  of  fairness,  judicial  economy,  and

          practical wisdom.   See, e.g., Sandstrom  v. Chemlawn Corp.,  904
                              ___  ____  _________     ______________

          F.2d 83,  87 (1st Cir. 1990);  United States v. Miller,  636 F.2d
                                         _____________    ______

          850, 853 (1st  Cir. 1980).   Thus, parties must speak  clearly in

          the trial court, on pain that,  if they forget their lines,  they

          will likely be bound forever to hold their peace.  This is as  it

          should  be:  the rule fosters worthwhile systemic ends and courts

          will be the losers if they permit it to be too easily evaded.

                    But foolish consistency is  reputedly the hobgoblin  of

          little  minds,  see  Ralph  Waldo Emerson,  "Self  Reliance,"  in
                          ___                                            __

          Essays:   First  Series (1841),  and in  the last  analysis, this
          _______________________

          articulation  of the raise-or-waive  principle, though important,

          is a matter of discretion.   See United States v. La Guardia, 902
                                       ___ _____________    __________

          F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that "an appellate court

          has discretion, in an exceptional case, to reach virgin issues");

          accord  Singleton v.  Wulff,  428 U.S.  106,  121 (1976);  United
          ______  _________     _____                                ______

          States v. Mercedes-Amparo,  980 F.2d 17,  18-19 (1st Cir.  1992);
          ______    _______________

          United  States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 291-92 (1st Cir. 1982).
          ______________    ________

          Thus,  this rule  (like  most  rules)  admits  of  an  occasional

          exception.   "Occasional" is the key word.  Since exceptions must

          be  few and far  between, an appellate  court's discretion should

                                          9

          not  be  affirmatively  exercised  unless  the  equities  heavily

          preponderate in favor of such a step.

                    In  the La Guardia and Krynicki  opinions, we set forth
                            __________     ________

          guidelines  that suggest when it may be appropriate to invoke the

          exception,  and we  need not  rehearse the  litany.   Instead, we

          explain  why  those  criteria are  satisfied  here,  and,  in the

          process, explicate the criteria themselves.

                    First,  this is not a  case in which,  by neglecting to

          raise an issue  in a timely  manner, a litigant has  deprived the

          court of appeals of useful factfinding.   The court below made  a

          number of findings as to  the appellants' conduct in interpreting

          and enforcing Rule 45, and addressing the omitted  issue requires

          only that we determine whether the described conduct, giving full

          deference to these factual findings, falls within the established

          boundaries  of legislative immunity.  Thus, it can fairly be said

          that  the  omitted issue  is purely  legal  in nature,  and lends

          itself to satisfactory resolution  on the existing record without

          further  development of the facts.  These attributes ease the way

          for invoking  the exception.  See  La Guardia, 902 F.2d  at 1013;
                                        ___  __________

          Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 291-92.
          ________

                    Second, appellants' belated proffer "raises an issue of

          constitutional   magnitude,"  a   factor   that   favors   review

          notwithstanding the procedural default.  La Guardia,  902 F.2d at
                                                   __________

          1013.   Third,  the  omitted  argument  is  "highly  persuasive,"

          Krynicki,  689 F.2d at 292, a circumstance that "often inclines a
          ________

          court  to  entertain a  pivotal argument  for  the first  time on

                                          10

          appeal,"  La  Guardia,  902   F.2d  at  1013,  particularly  when
                    ___________

          declining to reach the  omitted argument threatens "a miscarriage

          of justice,"  Krynicki,  689 F.2d  at 292.5   Fourth,  we see  no
                        ________

          special prejudice  or inequity  to the  plaintiffs.  The  omitted

          defense is law-based, not fact-based.   In addition, the  parties

          have  joined issue; the claim of legislative immunity was made in

          full  in  the  appellants'  opening  brief  in  this  court,  the

          plaintiffs responded to  it in extenso, and both  sides addressed
                                      __ _______

          the point during oral argument.  The absence of unfairness  has a

          definite  bearing  on  a  decision  to  overlook  this  type   of

          procedural default.   See United  States v. Doe,  878 F.2d  1546,
                                ___ ______________    ___

          1554  (1st Cir. 1989); cf. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120 (discussing
                                 ___ _________

          importance,  in determining  whether to  reach the  merits  of an

          omitted  issue, of ensuring  that the  opposing party  "ha[s] the

          opportunity to present whatever  legal arguments he may have"  to

          the  court  of  appeals).   Fifth,  the  omission seems  entirely

          inadvertent  rather  than  deliberate;  although  withholding the

          argument had  the regrettable effect of  blindsiding the district

                              
          ____________________

               5In this  context, "miscarriage of justice"  means more than
          the  individualized  harm   that  occurs  whenever  the   failure
          seasonably to raise  a claim or defense  alters the outcome  of a
          case.   Rather, courts  ordinarily will relax  the raise-or-waive
          principle on this basis only if a failure to do  so threatens the
          frustration of some broadly important  right.  See Schlesinger v.
                                                         ___ ___________
          Councilman,  420  U.S.  738,   743  (1975)  (holding  that,  when
          __________
          "jurisdictional  and  equity  issues  . .  .  [are]  sufficiently
          important," courts  may consider issues  on appeal that  were not
          raised below);  Krynicki, 689  F.2d at  292 (explaining  that the
                          ________
          interest at stake  must be  "legitimate and  significant").   For
          this reason, courts often  are more prone to make  the infrequent
          exception in  cases that  involve a discernible  public interest,
          and less prone to do so in disputes between private parties.

                                          11

          judge  and needlessly  prolonging the  litigation, it  yielded no

          tactical advantage to the defendants.

                    Sixth    and perhaps most  salient   the  omitted issue

          implicates  matters  of great  public  moment,  and touches  upon

          policies as  basic  as federalism,  comity, and  respect for  the

          independence  of  democratic   institutions.    Courts   must  be

          sensitive to such concerns.  See Stone v. City and  County of San
                                       ___ _____    _______________________

          Francisco,  968 F.2d  850, 855  (9th  Cir. 1992)  (explaining the
          _________

          court's  election to  address  a matter  first  raised on  appeal

          because  "[i]ssues  touching  on  federalism and  comity  may  be

          considered sua  sponte"), cert. denied,  113 S. Ct.  1050 (1993).
                                    _____ ______

          We believe that this sensitivity is appropriately expressed  by a

          frank recognition  that,  when  institutional  interests  are  at

          stake,  the  case  for  the  favorable  exercise   of  a  court's

          discretion is  strengthened, and  waiver rules  ought  not to  be

          applied  inflexibly.6  See, e.g.,  Hoover v. Wagner,  47 F.3d 845
                                 ___  ____   ______    ______

          (7th  Cir. 1995)  (suggesting that  "when  matters of  comity are

          involved, the ordinary doctrines of  waiver give way"); Jusino v.
                                                                  ______
                              
          ____________________

               6Our belief  that the defendants should not be strictly held
          to a waiver of  their absolute legislative immunity in  this case
          is fortified by  our recognition  that a primary  purpose of  the
          immunity is to prevent courts from intruding into  precincts that
          are   constitutionally  reserved   to  the   legislative  branch.
          Overlooking  a waiver  in order  to further  this policy  of non-
          interference  is  analogous to  our  settled  rule that,  because
          federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the absence of
          federal subject matter jurisdiction can be raised on appeal  even
          if  the  issue  was  not  raised  below.    See,  e.g.,  American
                                                      ___   ____   ________
          Policyholders Ins.  Co. v.  Nyacol Prods.,  Inc., 989  F.2d 1256,
          _______________________     ____________________
          1258 (1st  Cir. 1993), cert. denied,  114 S. Ct. 682  (1994).  In
                                 _____ ______
          both situations, looking past the waiver has the  salutary effect
          of  ensuring that federal courts  do not poach  on preserves that
          the Constitution reserves to other forms of oversight.

                                          12

          Zayas, 875  F.2d 986,  993  (1st Cir.  1989) (discussing  court's
          _____

          reluctance to  apply waiver rules  concerning "a line  of defense

          that  calls  into  play  the  Commonwealth's  Eleventh  Amendment

          immunity");  cf. Granberry  v. Greer,  481 U.S.  129,  134 (1987)
                       ___ _________     _____

          (explaining  that, when a  state fails  to raise  a nonexhaustion

          claim  in  a  federal  habeas proceeding,  the  federal  tribunal

          nonetheless should consider "whether  the interests of comity and

          federalism   will  be   better  served   .   .  .   by  requiring

          [exhaustion]").

                    Here, an important  issue of  public concern  confronts

          us.  It is presented belatedly, but in a posture that permits its

          proper  resolution on  the  existing record  and works  no unfair

          prejudice  to the opposing parties.  Failure to address the issue

          may  well result in an  unwarranted intrusion by  a federal court

          into the internal operations of a state legislature.  Under these

          exceptional circumstances, we follow the course of perceived duty

          and  proceed, in  the exercise  of our  discretion, to  weigh the

          legislative  immunity argument.7   See  La Guardia,  902 F.2d  at
                                             ___  __________
                              
          ____________________

               7The dissent's principal response to this reason seems to be
          that  overlooking  the  waiver  "eliminates  any  incentive"  for
          legislators to raise  the immunity  defense in  a timely  manner.
          Post at 39-40.   This reasoning strikes us as  triply flawed.  In
          ____
          the first place, that argument can be used with equal force as to
          virtually all omitted defenses; its logical extension is that all
          waivers should rigorously  be enforced.   That view  has much  to
          commend it as a  matter of case  management, but, as La  Guardia,
                                                               ___________
          Krynicki,  Mercedes-Amparo, Hoover,  and Stone illustrate,  it is
          ________   _______________  ______       _____
          simply not the law.
                In  the  second  place,  the  argument  underestimates  the
          capabilities  of appellate  courts.    There  is  no  hint  of  a
          deliberate  bypass in  this  case    the  belated tender  of  the
          defense is the product  of a change in counsel  (coupled with the
          appearance  of  Rhode Island's  Attorney  General  as an  amicus)

                                          13

          1013 ("Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the

          ends  of  justice,  not  to defeat  them.")  (quoting  Hormel  v.
                                                                 ______

          Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)).
          _________

          III.  THE MERITS OF THE OMITTED DEFENSE
          III.  THE MERITS OF THE OMITTED DEFENSE

                    We bifurcate  our analysis of  the legislative immunity

          defense,  first discussing  the general  nature and scope  of the

          doctrine  and  then  addressing  the  specific  contours  of  the

          appellants' claim.

                        A.  Legislative Immunity:  In General.
                        A.  Legislative Immunity:  In General.
                            _________________________________

                    The  Speech or  Debate  Clause commands  that "for  any

          Speech or Debate in  either House, [Senators and Representatives]

          shall not be questioned in any other place."  U.S. Const. art. I,

             6, cl. 1.  The Clause is,  by its terms, limited to members of

          Congress.   See Lake  County Estates  v. Tahoe  Regional Planning
                      ___ ____________________     ________________________

          Agency,  440   U.S.  391,   404  (1979).     Nevertheless,  state
          ______

          legislators and  their surrogates enjoy a  parallel immunity from

          liability for their legislative acts.

                    While this immunity is derived from federal common law,

          it is  similar in  scope and  object to  the immunity  enjoyed by

          federal  legislators under the Speech or Debate Clause.  When the

          Justices  initially recognized  state legislative  immunity  as a
                              
          ____________________

          rather  than a change in  tactics or a  reassessment of political
          costs   and,  if sandbagging  were to occur,  we have  confidence
          that  this court  would see it  for what  is was,  and decline to
          exercise discretion in favor of the sandbagger.
                Finally,  if we assume that the dissent is correct and that
          our  ruling today may  encourage legislator-litigants to withhold
          immunity defenses for political reasons, that is still the lesser
          evil,  far preferable in our view to the unwarranted insertion of
          the federal court's nose into the state legislature's tent.

                                          14

          component of federal  common law,  they turned to  the Speech  or

          Debate Clause  for guidance anent  the contours of  the doctrine.

          See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376-79 (1951).  Later, the
          ___ ______    _________

          Court  acknowledged that  the immunities  enjoyed by  federal and

          state legislators are essentially coterminous.  See Supreme Court
                                                          ___ _____________

          of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732-33
          ______    _________________________________

          (1980).   Hence, our  exploration of the  appellants' legislative

          immunity claim begins with a distillation of principles extracted

          from federal constitutional jurisprudence.

                    The  Speech or Debate Clause has its roots in a similar

          provision found in  the English  Bill of  Rights of  1689.8   See
                                                                        ___

          United States  v. Johnson, 383  U.S. 169, 177-78  (1966); Tenney,
          _____________     _______                                 ______

          341 U.S.  at 372.    The Clause  is modeled  to  ensure that  the

          Legislative  Branch  will  be   able  to  perform  without  undue

          interference the whole of the legislative function ceded to it by

          the Framers.   See Eastland v.  United States Serviceman's  Fund,
                         ___ ________     ________________________________

          421 U.S.  491, 502 (1975).   To that end, the  Clause operates to

          shelter   individual  legislators   from  the   distractions  and

          hindrance  of civil  litigation, see id.  at 503,  and "immunizes
                                           ___ ___

          [them]  from suits  for  either prospective  relief or  damages,"

          Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 731.
          _______________

                    While  the  core  protection conferred  by  the  Clause

          concerns speech or debate by a member of Congress on the floor of

                              
          ____________________

               8The British version provides:  "That the Freedom of Speech,
          and  Debates  or  Proceedings  in  Parliament,  ought  not to  be
          impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament."
          1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. II (1689).

                                          15

          either the Senate or the House, see Gravel v. United States,  408
                                          ___ ______    _____________

          U.S. 606, 625  (1972), the  penumbra of the  Clause sprawls  more

          broadly.   This breadth of  application, which draws  its essence

          from the Supreme Court's  espousal of a "practical rather  than a

          strictly literal reading" of  the Clause, Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
                                                    __________    ________

          443 U.S.  111, 124 (1979), is made manifest in two ways.  For one

          thing,  the Clause's  prophylaxis extends  to any  act "generally

          done in a session of the House by one  of its members in relation

          to the business before it."  Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103  U.S. 168,
                                       ________    ________

          204 (1880).   So  read, the Clause  protects not only  speech and

          debate  per  se,  but  also   voting,  see  id.,  circulation  of
                                                 ___  ___

          information  to other legislators, see Doe  v. McMillan, 412 U.S.
                                             ___ ___     ________

          306,  312  (1973),  participation  in  the  work  of  legislative

          committees, see Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624; Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378-
                      ___ ______                   ______

          79, and a host of kindred activities.

                    For  another thing,  because the  applicability of  the

          Speech or Debate Clause necessarily focuses on particular acts or

          functions,  not  on  particular  actors  or   functionaries,  the

          prophylaxis  of  the  Clause  also extends  to  legislative  acts

          performed  by non-legislators.   See  Eastland, 421  U.S. at  507
                                           ___  ________

          (refusing  to  draw  a  distinction  between  the  members  of  a

          congressional  subcommittee and  the subcommittee's  counsel when

          the  latter's  actions  were  within  the  sphere  of  legitimate

          legislative activity); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 618 (holding that "the
                                 ______

          Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member  but also to

          his aides  insofar  as  the conduct  of  the latter  would  be  a

                                          16

          protected legislative  act if performed by  the Member himself").

          This extension evinces a recognition that, as a practical matter,

          legislators cannot be expected to  perform their constitutionally

          allocated tasks without staff support.

                    This is not to say that the protections afforded by the

          Speech  or Debate  Clause  are limitless.    They are  not.   See
                                                                        ___

          Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.  Although the Court has  read the Clause
          ______

          generously,  its  protections  must  match  its  purposes.    See
                                                                        ___

          Eastland, 421  U.S. at 501-02.   When all  is said and  done, the
          ________

          absolute immunity conferred by the Clause is not afforded "simply

          for the personal or  private benefit of Members of  Congress, but

          to  protect the integrity of the  legislative process by insuring

          the independence  of individual  legislators."  United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972).
          ________

                    The key limitation    which applies both to members  of

          Congress  and  to congressional  staffers    is  that  the Clause

          protects "only purely legislative activities."  Id. at 512.  If a
                                                          ___

          legislator (or  his surrogate)  undertakes actions that  are only

          "casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs," id. at
                                                                     ___

          528, or  which fall outside the  "legitimate legislative sphere,"

          Eastland,  421  U.S.  at  503  (citation  omitted),  no  immunity
          ________

          inheres.  By the same token, the mere fact that a legislator or a

          legislative  aide performs an  act in his  official capacity does

          not automatically  confer protection  under the Speech  or Debate

          Clause.  See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.  For example, when a member
                   ___ ______

          of Congress disseminates press releases to the public, the Clause

                                          17

          does not attach  because such documents  are "primarily means  of

          informing those outside the  legislative forum."  Hutchinson, 443
                                                            __________

          U.S.  at 133.   So, too, activities that  are more political than

          legislative in nature  do not come within the legislative sphere,

          and, hence,  do not implicate the  Speech or Debate Clause.   See
                                                                        ___

          Brewster,  408 U.S.  at  512.    These  activities  include  such
          ________

          familiar    fare   as   "legitimate   `errands'   performed   for

          constituents,   the  making   of  appointments   with  Government

          agencies,  [and] assistance  in  securing Government  contracts."

          Id.
          ___

                      B.  Legislative Immunity:  In Particular.
                      B.  Legislative Immunity:  In Particular.
                          ____________________________________

                    We  now turn  to  the merits  of appellants'  assertion

          that, under federal  common law, the  instant action founders  on

          the  shoals of  absolute  legislative immunity.   The  plaintiffs

          brought  suit, as  we have  said,  under 42  U.S.C.    1983.   In

          actions invoking  federal civil  rights statutes,  federal courts

          customarily  "equate[]  the legislative  immunity to  which state

          legislators are entitled . . . to that accorded Congressmen under

          the Constitution."   Consumers Union,  446 U.S. at  733.   Viewed
                               _______________

          against  this backdrop,  it is  unsurprising that  the courts  of

          appeals  historically  have relied  on  Speech  or Debate  Clause

          precedents   to  define   the  doctrinal   boundaries  of   state

          legislative  immunity under the  federal common law.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Schlitz  v. Commonwealth  of Va.,  854 F.2d  43, 45-46  (4th Cir.
          _______     ____________________

          1988); Agromayor v. Colberg, 738 F.2d 55, 58-59 (1st Cir.), cert.
                 _________    _______                                 _____

          denied,  469 U.S. 1037 (1984); Colon Berrios v. Hernandez Agosto,
          ______                         _____________    ________________

                                          18

          716 F.2d 85, 89-90 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Green v. DeCamp,
                                                           _____    ______

          612 F.2d 368, 371-72 (8th Cir. 1980).  Thus, our mode of analysis

          dovetails with the Speech or Debate Clause cases.

                    At the  heart  of  our inquiry  lies  the  question  of

          whether  appellants' acts  in respect  to Rule  45 are  "part and

          parcel of the legislative process."  Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626.  If
                                               ______

          so, appellants  are protected.  See id.  To answer this question,
                                          ___ ___

          we must understand the nature of the acts.9   We can look at them

          in one of two ways.

                    In a general  sense, the defendants    the Speaker  and

          the head doorkeeper   did nothing more  or less than to interpret

          and enforce Rule 45.  Where, as here, a legislative body adopts a

          rule,  not invidiously discriminatory on  its face, see infra pp.
                                                              ___ _____

          26-28,  that  bears  upon  its  conduct  of  frankly  legislative

          business, we think that the doctrine of legislative immunity must

          protect legislators and  legislative aides  who do  no more  than

          carry out the will of the body by enforcing the rule as a part of

                              
          ____________________

               9In   certain  types  of  cases,  the  legislative  immunity
          analysis centers on function,  attempting to ascertain whether an
          action  by   one  or   more  legislators  is   administrative  or
          legislative   in  nature.     See,  e.g.,   Negron-Gaztambide  v.
                                        ___   ____    _________________
          Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that
          ________________
          legislators' decision  to discharge librarian  was administrative
          in nature, and did not give rise to legislative immunity).  Here,
          however, we are dealing with a procedural rule adopted by a house
          of  the legislature  as a  whole for  the management  of  its own
          business.   Hence, we are not concerned with whether the adoption
          of the rule comprises  a legislative act   that  is transparently
          clear   but, rather, with whether that act is more than "casually
          or  incidentally   related"   to  core   legislative   functions.
          Brewster, 408 U.S. at 528.
          ________

                                          19

          their  official duties.10   See  Consumers Union  of the  U.S. v.
                                      ___  _____________________________

          Periodical Correspondents'  Ass'n, 515  F.2d 1341,  1348-50 (D.C.
          _________________________________

          Cir. 1975) (holding congressional employees' actions in enforcing

          Congress's  internal seating regulations  immune under  Speech or

          Debate Clause),  cert.  denied, 423  U.S. 1051  (1976); see  also
                           _____  ______                          ___  ____

          Davids  v. Akers, 549 F.2d  120, 123 (9th  Cir. 1977) (dismissing
          ______     _____

          action  challenging  internal  rules  for  committee  assignments

          brought  by  members  of  the Arizona  House  of  Representatives

          against the Speaker);  cf. R.I.  Const. art. VI,    7  (expressly
                                 ___

          authorizing the  House to  "determine its rules  of proceeding").

          The short of  it is  that the doctrine  of legislative  immunity,

          like  the Speech or Debate Clause,  attaches when solons' actions

          are  "an  integral part  of  the  deliberative and  communicative

          processes  by which  Members participate  in committee  and House

          proceedings  with respect  to  the consideration  and passage  or

          rejection  of  proposed  legislation  or with  respect  to  other

          matters  [committed to their jurisdiction]."  Gravel, 408 U.S. at
                                                        ______

          625.

                    In a more  specific sense,  it might be  said that  the
                              
          ____________________

               10We  reject  the plaintiffs'  attempt to  differentiate the
          Speaker from the doorkeeper, based on the fact that the latter is
          not  a legislator.   The  case law  teaches that,  as long  as an
          aide's conduct would  be covered by legislative immunity were the
          same conduct performed by the legislator himself, the aide shares
          the immunity.  See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 507; Gravel, 408 U.S. at
                         ___ ________                   ______
          616; Consumers  Union of  the U.S. v.  Periodical Correspondents'
               _____________________________     __________________________
          Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1348-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 123
          _____                                           _____ ______
          U.S. 1051 (1976).  Petteruti's actions in keeping the House floor
          unsullied were performed  by virtue of  an express delegation  of
          authority  to him as part of the House's staff support apparatus,
          under the auspices of  the Speaker and the legislative  body as a
          whole.  No more is exigible.

                                          20

          district  court granted  relief because  it found  Rule 45  to be

          fatally deficient in three particulars:  (1) on its face, Rule 45

          transgressed the First Amendment by banning lobbying on the floor

          of the House while the House is in session; (2) on its face, Rule

          45 transgressed  the First  Amendment by banishing  all lobbyists

          from  the   perimeter  of  the  House;  and  (3)  the  appellants

          interpreted, applied, and enforced  Rule 45 to allow governmental

          lobbyists onto the House floor while denying comparable access to

          private  lobbyists.    Assuming  for argument's  sake  that  this

          narrower  perspective is  relevant, the  question of  whether the

          appellants are entitled to  legislative immunity would be reduced

          to a question of whether the acts which the district court  found

          problematic  fell within  or without "the  legitimate legislative

          sphere."  Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503.
                    ________

                    The  first   area  of   inquiry  can   celeritously  be

          dispatched.  We think it is beyond serious dispute that enforcing

          a duly enacted  legislative rule which prohibits lobbying  on the

          House floor during House sessions  is well within the legislative

          sphere.   Such  a restriction necessarily  affects the  manner in

          which  the  House conducts  its  most characteristic  legislative

          functions, e.g., debating  and voting.   A rule  that colors  the
                     ____

          very conditions  under which legislators engage  in formal debate

          is  indubitably part and  parcel of the  legislative process, and

          the acts of House  officials (whether or not elected  members) in

          enforcing  it  are  therefore  fully  protected against  judicial

          interference by the  doctrine of legislative immunity.   See id.;
                                                                   ___ ___

                                          21

          see also Doe, 412 U.S. at 312-13; Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378-79.
          ___ ____ ___                      ______

                    At  first blush, the next area of inquiry   whether the

          exclusion of all  lobbyists from  the perimeter of  the House  is

          within  the legislative  sphere    appears more  murky.   Seating

          arrangements for  non-legislators arguably are  less integral  to

          the legislative  process than  the regulation of  lobbying during

          House  sessions.   As  the trial  testimony  in this  case  amply

          demonstrates, however,  when lobbyists  are present on  the House

          floor (even on the perimeter), they often become embroiled in the

          legislative  process either through self-initiated or legislator-

          initiated  contacts.  And, even if lobbyists are able to maintain

          stoic  silence on the perimeter, their  mere presence affects the

          legislative   environment.11     We  conclude,   therefore,  that

          regulation of admission to the House floor comprises "an integral

          part  of the  deliberative and  communicative processes  by which

          Members  participate in . .  . House proceedings  with respect to

          the   consideration   and  passage   or  rejection   of  proposed

          legislation."    Gravel, 408  U.S.  at  625.   Consequently,  the
                           ______

          doctrine of legislative immunity pertains.

                    We are not alone  in our view of a  legislature's House

                              
          ____________________

               11The plaintiffs  themselves have argued, in  the context of
          their First Amendment claim,  that they should at least  be given
          the opportunity to  sit silently  on the perimeter  of the  House
          floor  so  that  they  may  communicate  through  their  physical
          presence.  The district court accepted this argument, and made it
          a  cornerstone of  the  ensuing First  Amendment  analysis.   See
                                                                        ___
          Social Workers, 874 F. Supp. at 539-41.   The importance that the
          ______________
          plaintiffs attach to admittance  to the perimeter indicates their
          own  recognition  that,  by  mere  physical  presence,  they  can
          influence ongoing legislative business.

                                          22

          as its castle.  In Periodical Correspondents', the court  reached
                             __________________________

          a  similar conclusion.    There,  the Periodical  Correspondents'

          Association, which  issues credentials to the  press galleries of

          Congress,   denied  accreditation  to  a  particular  periodical,

          Consumer Reports, on  the ground that it had ties  to an advocacy

          organization.  Consumers Union  sued the sergeants-at-arms of the

          House  and  Senate, among  other  defendants,  alleging that  the

          exclusion  violated the First Amendment.  The court held that the

          sergeants-at-arms were  immune under the Speech  or Debate Clause

          because  arrangements  for seating  the  press in  the  House and

          Senate galleries were "integral" to "the  legislative machinery."

          515 F.2d  at 1350.   In  a later case,  the court  elaborated its

          rationale,  explaining  that the  seating  "immediately concerned

          House   consideration  of   proposed  legislation"   because  the

          arrangements "were  intended to  shield members of  Congress from

          press members' use of  their House access to  lobby legislators."

          Walker  v.  Jones, 733  F.2d  923,  930  (D.C. Cir.)  (discussing
          ______      _____

          Periodical Correspondents'), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).
          __________________________   _____ ______

                    Like the  seating arrangements at  issue in  Periodical
                                                                 __________

          Correspondents', the  seating arrangements  dictated  by Rule  45
          _______________

          involve the "regulation of the very atmosphere in which lawmaking

          deliberations occur."   Walker, 733  F.2d at 930.   Moreover,  if
                                  ______

          there is a distinction between Periodical Correspondents' and the
                                         __________________________

          instant case, it does  not advantage the present plaintiffs;  the

          Rhode  Island  House is  seeking to  regulate  access to  its own

          floor, rather than to galleries located above the floor.

                                          23

                    We come now to the third area of inquiry, involving the

          significance,  if   any,  of  the  plaintiffs'   claim  that  the

          appellants  interpreted and  enforced  Rule 45  in a  manner that

          allowed  lobbying on  the House  floor by  governmental,  but not

          private,  lobbyists.    This  as-applied  exclusion  of   private

          lobbyists, at  its most primitive level,  involves regulating the

          legislative environment  by controlling access to  the seating on

          the perimeter of  the House  floor.  Because  such regulation  is

          "done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation

          to  the business  before it,"  Kilbourn, 103  U.S. at 204,  it is
                                         ________

          within the legislative sphere.

                    To  be  sure, both  our  dissenting  colleague and  the

          plaintiffs  protest  that  the  House  treats  private  lobbyists

          differently (and less hospitably) than public lobbyists, and that

          this differential  treatment offends the First  Amendment.  These

          charges  lack  sufficient  force  to  strip away  the  shield  of

          absolute legislative immunity.

                    We  believe that  the  body of  our opinion  adequately

          rebuts the  dissent's views, and we decline  to repastinate well-

          ploughed ground.  We do add, however, our belief that the dissent

          seriously  misconstrues  the  Court's  Speech  or  Debate  Clause

          jurisprudence beyond all  recognition.  To the extent that Powell
                                                                     ______

          can be read to hold that legislative immunity does not extend  to

          legislative  employees, the  Court in  later cases  has routinely

          confined it to its unique facts.  See, e.g., Gravel,  408 U.S. at
                                            ___  ____  ______

          621 (specifically identifying Kilbourn, Powell, and Dombrowski v.
                                        ________  ______      __________

                                          24

          Eastland, 387 U.S.  82 (1967),  and stating that  none "of  these
          ________

          cases   adopted  the   simple  proposition   that  immunity   was

          unavailable to congressional or committee  employees because they

          were not  Representatives or  Senators").   Rather, the case  law

          "reflect[s]  a decidedly  jaundiced  view towards  extending  the

          Clause  so as  to privilege  illegal or  unconstitutional conduct

          beyond  that   essential  to   foreclose  executive  control   of

          legislative  speech  or debate  and  associated  matters such  as

          voting and committee  reports and proceedings."   Id.  We  see no
                                                            ___

          reason why judicial  control of legislative  speech or debate  is

          any  less  pernicious  than  executive control.    Moreover,  the

          decision  not to  extend  legislative immunity  to  congressional

          employees in cases such as Powell turned on whether "relief could
                                     ______

          be afforded without proof of a legislative act  or the motives or

          purposes underlying such an  act," thereby avoiding impermissible

          encroachment on "legislative independence."   Id. at 620.   Under
                                                        ___

          that standard, judicial review of House Rule 45   as the tortured

          course  of  the  proceedings  below  graphically   illustrates   

          unquestionably required a substantial judicial intrusion into the

          legislative domain.  Finally, we recognize, as the dissent points

          out,  that the  Court  has remarked  an exception  to legislative

          immunity for the exercise  by legislators of punitive enforcement
                                                       ________

          authority outside  the ambit  of purely  legislative proceedings.

          See Consumers  Union, 446 U.S. at  736.  But the  Court has never
          ___ ________________

          suggested, much less held, that the enforcement of a rule adopted

          by an entire legislative  body designed to govern the  conduct of

                                          25

          legislative  proceedings falls  within that  exception.   If that

          were the rule, legislative  immunity would be little more  than a

          rumor, and the Speech or Debate Clause would be easily skirted.

                    Similarly, the plaintiffs'  "as-applied" arguments  are

          unavailing.   In  Eastland  v. United  States Servicemen's  Fund,
                            ________     _________________________________

          supra, the plaintiffs asseverated  that "once it is alleged  that
          _____

          First Amendment  rights may be infringed  by congressional action

          the Judiciary may intervene to protect [First Amendment] rights."

          421  U.S. at 509.   The Court flatly  rejected this asseveration,

          warning that the effort  to carve out such an  exception "ignores

          the  absolute nature of the speech or debate protection and [the]

          cases which have broadly construed that protection."  Id. at 509-
                                                                ___

          10.  The Court added:  "Where we are presented with an attempt to

          interfere with an ongoing activity by Congress, and that activity

          is found to be  within the legitimate legislative sphere,  [First

          Amendment] balancing plays no part."  Id. at 510 n.16.  The Ninth
                                                ___

          Circuit put matters  even more bluntly, writing that  "nothing in

          the First  or Fourteenth Amendments or in 42  U.S.C.   1983 . . .

          can justify [an] attempt to inject the Federal Judiciary into the

          internal  procedures of a House of a state legislature."  Davids,
                                                                    ______

          549 F.2d at 123.

                    The  plaintiffs'  also  assert  that  the  differential

          treatment  of public  and  private lobbyists  violates the  Equal

          Protection  Clause.  This assertion does not derail the engine of

          legislative immunity.   Activities that comprise  part and parcel

          of the legislative process are protected by legislative immunity;

                                          26

          that immunity is not forfeited simply because the activities,  if

          unprotected,  might violate a  plaintiff's constitutional rights.

          See Doe, 412 U.S. at 312-13;  see also Colon Berrios, 716 F.2d at
          ___ ___                       ___ ____ _____________

          91.  Thus,  in Doe, the  Supreme Court ruled  that the Speech  or
                         ___

          Debate   Clause   shields   legislators'   actions   "within  the

          legislative sphere,  even though  [the] conduct, if  performed in

          other   than   legislative   contexts,   would   in   itself   be

          unconstitutional."   412  U.S. at  312-13 (internal  citation and

          quotation marks omitted).

                    For obvious reasons, the  plaintiffs chafe at the broad

          sweep of the doctrine of legislative immunity, and, in struggling

          to make their point, they marshal a parade of horribles.  To cite

          a  typical  example, they  raise  the specter  of  a hypothetical

          legislature that votes to allow access to its chambers to members

          of only one race or to adherents of only one religion.

                    The  plaintiffs  have the  right  to  march, but  their

          parade  is  on  the  wrong  route.    The  Court  has  explicitly

          recognized  that  there may  be  some  conduct, even  within  the

          legislative   sphere,  that   is   so  flagrantly   violative  of

          fundamental constitutional protections  that traditional  notions

          of legislative  immunity would  not deter judicial  intervention.

          See, e.g., Kilbourn, 103  U.S. at 204 (leaving open  the question
          ___  ____  ________

          of whether "there may not be things done, in the one House or the

          other, of an extraordinary  character, for which the members  who

          take part in the act may be held  legally responsible"); see also
                                                                   ___ ____

          Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379 (Black, J., concurring) (recognizing that
          ______

                                          27

          the  Court's jurisprudence  "indicates that there  is a  point at

          which  a  legislator's  conduct  so far  exceeds  the  bounds  of

          legislative power that he may be held personally liable in a suit

          brought  under the Civil Rights Act").  Whatever may be the outer

          limits  of the doctrine  of legislative immunity,  however, it is

          clear that  the instant case  is not so  extreme as to  cross (or

          even closely approach) the border.

                    Taking the  district court's  factual findings  at face

          value, Rule 45, as applied, may  arguably be wrong as a matter of

          policy  and as  a matter of  constitutional law    but  it is not

          invidiously discriminatory.  To the contrary, the differentiation

          between private and public  lobbyists appears to be based  on two

          factors  that  bear  some  rational  relationship  to  legitimate
                               ____

          legislative  purposes.    First, the  House  leadership explained

          that,  in its view, the  exclusion of private  lobbyists from the

          floor  was  a  useful  tool  to   bolster  public  confidence  in

          legislative   independence   and   integrity.12      Second,  the
                              
          ____________________

               12In  a  debate over  a motion  to  reconsider Rule  45, the
          Majority Leader, Representative George Caruolo, stated:

                    This  isn't trying  to retard  lobbyists from
                    pursuing their vocation  . . .   It's a  rule
                    that says, quite simply, this is the people's
                    chamber, the  public  is invited.    But  the
                    business of the people should be conducted by
                    the people's representatives.   It should not
                    be  in any  way  affected by  people who  are
                    registered to  advocate particular positions,
                    whether they are paid or unpaid . . . .

                    Later,  Representative Caruolo explained why he thought
          that  governmental lobbyists  on the  floor of  the House  do not
          trigger the same public perceptions as private lobbyists:

                                          28

          defendants consistently  have taken the position  that government

          lobbyists  act in  effect  as support  staff  for legislators  by

          giving them neutral statistical and  factual information relevant

          to pending  legislation.  These justifications  for the continued

          presence of government lobbyists, found by the  district court to

          be authentic (if asthenic),  see Social Workers, 874 F.  Supp. at
                                       ___ ______________

          541-42, afford a sufficiently rational basis  to persuade us that

          this case  does not  give rise  to the  question reserved  by the

          Kilbourn Court.13
          ________

                    Thus,  we  conclude  that,  insofar as  the  appellants

          enforced  Rule 45's prohibitions  against private  lobbyists, but

          spared governmental  lobbyists from exclusion,  they acted within

          the  legislative   sphere  and   are   protected  from   judicial
                              
          ____________________

                    [A]ny  general  officer  or   any  government
                    employee  who   is  here,  working   in  this
                    building  [the  State  House]  on  government
                    policy   they're paid  by the government.  We
                    are the government.  That's the distinction .
                    . .   Let's not have private groups  out here
                    trying to  manipulate this floor while we are
                    taking votes.

          In  the  same  vein,  Edward  Clement,  the  House's  legislative
          coordinator,  testified  that  he  did  not  consider  government
          lobbyists to be lobbyists per se, but, rather, "people called [to
          the floor] by members  of the House for  informational purposes."
          Speaker Harwood echoed the  same themes, describing the principal
          spokesman  for the  state Budget  Office as  "a dollars-and-cents
          guy.  . . .  a resource  factual guy," in contradistinction to "a
          lobbying, influence guy."

               13This  conclusion is  not undermined  by the  lower court's
          determination that these reasons  were insufficient to warrant an
          infringement on the First  Amendment rights of private lobbyists.
          See  Social Workers,  874  F. Supp.  at  541-42.   Such  rigorous
          ___  ______________
          testing, appropriate  in the First  Amendment context, is  out of
          place  in the context of legislative immunity.  See Eastland, 421
                                                          ___ ________
          U.S. at 509 n.16.

                                          29

          interference by the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity.

          IV.  CONCLUSION
          IV.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need go  no further.14   In our  republican system,

          different  institutions of  government occupy  different spheres.

          Within  its  own  domain,  the  legislative  branch  of  a  state

          government is entitled to a reasonable measure of independence in

          conducting its  internal affairs.    As a  rule, a  legislature's

          regulation  of  the atmosphere  in  which  it conducts  its  core

          legislative activities    debating, voting,  passing legislation,

          and  the like    is part and  parcel of  the legislative process,

          and,  hence, not subject to  a judicial veto.   See Eastland, 421
                                                          ___ ________

          U.S. at  509.  Because  Rule 45,  and the defendants'  actions in

          interpreting  and  enforcing it,  fit  within the  sweep  of this

          generality,   the  doctrine  of   absolute  legislative  immunity

          requires that the federal courts refuse to entertain the suit.

          Reversed.  No costs.
          Reversed.  No costs.
          ________   ________

                Appendix follows; Dissenting opinion follows appendix  
                Appendix follows; Dissenting opinion follows appendix  

                              
          ____________________

               14We  do not reach and, accordingly,  express no opinion on,
          the soundness  of the  district court's First  Amendment analyses
          and rulings.

                                          30

                                       APPENDIX
                                       APPENDIX

                                   Text of Rule 45
                                   Text of Rule 45
                                   _______________

                         SIXTHLY - OF ADMISSION TO THE FLOOR

                    45(a) The following persons shall be entitled
                    to admission to the floor of the House during
                    the  session  thereof:   The  Governor,   the
                    Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary  of State,
                    the Attorney General, the  General Treasurer,
                    the  state  controller,  and members  of  the
                    Senate,  judges and  ex-judges of  the United
                    States  court and  of  the state  courts, ex-
                    governors,  ex-Speakers  of  the  House,  ex-
                    members    of     the    General    Assembly,
                    representatives  of the  legislative council,
                    legislative staff, director of the department
                    of   administration,   the  budget   officer,
                    assistant  in charge  of  law  revision,  and
                    clerks  of the  Senate and  House committees,
                    superintendent  of  public  buildings,  state
                    librarian, and the authorized representatives
                    of the  press, as  provided in the  rule next
                    following, and such other persons as shall be
                    admitted to the floor by the Speaker.  At the
                    discretion  of the  Speaker,  members of  the
                    public may  be admitted to  the House  floor,
                    provided,  however, that all such persons may
                    not stay  in the  House  chamber unless  they
                    remain seated along the sides of the chamber,
                    refrain from conversation,  and maintain  the
                    decorum of  the House.   All persons  who are
                    unable  to  access  the  House  galleries  by
                    reason of physical handicap shall be entitled
                    to admission to the House floor.

                    (b)   Lobbyists    including   former   state
                    legislators  who are  lobbyists shall  not be
                    entitled to  admission  to the  floor of  the
                    House during the session  thereof.  No person
                    entitled  to admission  to  the floor  of the
                    House  during  the  session   thereof,  shall
                    either directly or  indirectly engage in  the
                    practice  of  lobbying  as defined  in  Rhode
                    Island General Laws (22-10-2).

                    (c) Admission to the  House Lounge is limited
                    to  House  members  and  persons  invited and
                    accompanied  by a  House member  who will  be

                                          31

                    responsible  for  them while  in  the lounge.
                    Such  persons when  no longer  accompanied by
                    the  House  member  with  whom  they entered,
                    shall leave the  lounge.  No  lobbyists shall
                    be admitted to  the House  lounge during  the
                    House session.

                                          32

                      LYNCH,  Circuit  Judge,   dissenting.    When   the
                      LYNCH,  Circuit  Judge,   dissenting.
                              ____________________________

            government chooses to  listen only  to its own  voice in  the

            political  process   by  excluding  the   voices  of  private

            citizens, core  First Amendment values are violated.   At the

            heart of  this case  is not the  ability of the  Rhode Island

            House  to  promulgate  rules  for  the  conduct  of  its  own

            business,  but  the  defendants'  actual  practice,  directly

            contrary to  the  Rule adopted  by  the House,  of  excluding

            speakers  unless  they  represent  the  government  and  thus

            express the government's own  viewpoint.  While, in  my view,

            the House  could have  legitimately closed the  floor of  its

            Chamber to all  who sought to influence  its work, defendants

            may  not permit  government lobbyists to  lobby on  the House

            floor   while  prohibiting   private  citizens   and  private

            lobbyists  from doing the same.  The First Amendment does not

            permit the government to put its  thumb on the scale in  this

            way and favor itself in the arena  of political speech.  With

            respect, I dissent.

                      Unlike  the   majority,  I   would  not  take   the

            extraordinary   step   of   affording   defendants   absolute

            legislative immunity, thus preventing the court from reaching

            the First Amendment issue.  The  majority does so in the name

            of federalism and comity,  important values to be sure.   But

            naming  those values  may obscure  the issues  involved here.

            This  case   does  not   implicate   traditional  issues   of

                                         -33-
                                          33

            "federalism"  at  all,  such  as  the  limits  on  enumerated

            congressional  powers, see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
                                   ___ _____________    _____

            1624 (1995), or the  relative allocation of legislative power

            between state and federal  governments, see U.S. Term Limits,
                                                    ___ _________________

            Inc. v. Thornton,  115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).  Rather, this case
            ____    ________

            raises  thorny issues  of  the  constitutional allocation  of

            powers  between the  people  and those  elected to  represent

            them,  and  of  the  appropriate role  of  federal  courts in

            resolving such issues. 

                                        Facts
                                        _____

                      Rule  45 on its face does not permit any lobbyists,

            government or private, to be on the House floor and prohibits

            lobbying  on  the  floor  by  anyone,  private  citizen15  or

            professional  lobbyist, while the House is in session.  It is

            that Rule which reflects the decision of the House as  to the

            running of  its affairs.  Permitting  government lobbyists to

            lobby on the floor of the House violates the House Rule.  

                      The defendants  claimed that  such  were not  their

            practices.  But the district court, after trial, found to the

            contrary  and  the defendants  have  not  appealed from  that

            factual determination.   The  record amply  demonstrates that

            government lobbyists were regularly plying their trade on the

                                
            ____________________

            15.  Under the terms of Rule 45, certain government officials
            including  the  Governor, the  Secretary  of  State, and  the
            Attorney  General  have  access  to  the  floor.    The  Rule
            nonetheless prohibits anyone from lobbying.

                                         -34-
                                          34

            floor after adoption of the House  Rule which ostensibly kept

            them out.    And, as  the  district court  found,  defendants

            "flagrantly permitted" such activities.

                      The Rhode Island  House presents a  factual setting

            perhaps unique in this country.  Unlike    many   legislative

            bodies,  including the  United  States  Congress, most  Rhode

            Island legislators are part-time and have neither offices nor

            staff.  The House meets for six months or less in a year, and

            then only for three  or four afternoons and evenings  a week.

            Once  the  session  starts,  it  rarely breaks  until  it  is

            concluded.  Legislators typically arrive just in time for the

            session and leave immediately on its conclusion.  Legislators

            have no  desks other  than their  desks on the  floor of  the

            Chamber.   Often there is no  other place  but  the floor for

            direct  communication   with  the  legislators,   apart  from

            disturbing  legislators  in   their  capacities  as   private

            citizens where they live or work.

                      Amendments  to bills  are often introduced  for the

            first  time on the floor.  They  are often unavailable to the

            public  before being introduced and are available only in the

            House Chamber after being introduced.  Frequently, especially

            toward the close  of the session, the House votes  on such an

            amendment on the  same day, and sometimes  within minutes, of

            the amendment being introduced.  

                                         -35-
                                          35

                      Around  the perimeter  of  the floor  of the  House

            Chamber  are approximately  eighteen chairs.   Some  of those

            chairs  have  been filled  on  a  daily basis  by  government

            lobbyists  since  Rule 45  was  enacted.   The  remainder are

            filled  by members  of  the public.    Private lobbyists  are

            relegated to balcony seating.

                      Government officials sitting in the perimeter seats

            have  and  use  a  decided advantage  in  communicating  with

            legislators and in  collecting and disseminating information.

            Individual legislators frequently walk over to the  perimeter

            to speak with the government lobbyists.  These lobbyists send

            notes to legislators indicating that they would like to speak

            and  they  get the  attention  of  individual legislators  by

            signalling them.   People seated  along the perimeter  of the

            floor receive more  information than others concerning  floor

            amendments, which  are  distributed to  the legislators  only

            when they are introduced.  Thus, government lobbyists who are

            sitting on the floor  can see copies of floor  amendments and

            have the  opportunity to  communicate their views,  including

            pertinent information,  to the legislators.   It is virtually

            impossible  for those who are not permitted onto the floor to

            learn the exact language of an offered amendment because  the

            text of  floor amendments is  not distributed outside  of the

            Chamber.

                                         -36-
                                          36

                      Government  lobbyists  have  actively  lobbied  for

            their  positions both from  the perimeter seats  and from the

            floor  itself.  They have  done so on  bills which government

            officials  have  supported  and  which  private  groups  have

            opposed.  Those bills often concerned matters of great public

            debate.  For example, the topic of public funding of abortion

            was  taken up by the  legislature.  Agents  of the Governor's

            office,  which supported such  funding, sat on  the floor and

            talked  to  legislators while  the  lobbyist  from the  Rhode

            Island  State Right  to Life  Committee, Inc.,  which opposed

            such funding, was  relegated to the balcony.   Similarly, the

            Attorney  General  of  Rhode  Island  introduced  a  bill  to

            reinstate the  death penalty and he and his staff were on the

            floor during debates on  the bill, speaking with legislators.

            Private group lobbyists opposed  to the bill, including those

            from  the  Rhode  Island  Affiliate  of  the  American  Civil

            Liberties Union, could only watch  from the balcony and  were

            precluded from the floor and from lobbying.

                      The same duality  characterized the influencing  of

            bills  on  welfare reform.    Government  lobbyists from  the

            Department of  Human Services were present  for floor debates

            on  an  amendment  which   would  restore  a  General  Public

            Assistance  program  cut from  the  Governor's  budget.   The

            Department  favored elimination  of  the program.   Lobbyists

            from the National Association of Social Workers (NASW), which

                                         -37-
                                          37

            opposed eliminating the program, were excluded.  There was no

            break in  the  session between  the  time the  amendment  was

            introduced and it was voted upon.  Similarly, in  debate over

            an amendment to an AFDC program, lobbyists for the Department

            in the perimeter seats attempted to influence the vote, while

            a NASW lobbyist in the balcony ineffectively tried  to convey

            the NASW's  position by  waving hands.   Prison-related bills

            received  the  same  treatment.   Department  of  Corrections

            officials were  on the  floor with legislators  during debate

            while ACLU  lobbyists who opposed  the Department's  position

            watched ineffectively from the  balcony.  There were numerous

            other  instances  where  the  Governor's  Office,  the  State

            Police, the  Department of Economic Development,  the Banking

            and  Insurance  Department,  the Fire  Marshal,  the  General

            Treasurer's Office and the Department  of Business Regulation

            lobbyists  spoke  directly  with  legislators  on  the  floor

            regarding pending legislation.16

                      Nor  were   the  advantages  given   to  government

            lobbyists   limited  to   lobbyists  from   state  government

            agencies.   The lobbyist for  the Mayor of  Providence was on

            the floor of the House  every day, frequently conversing with

            legislators.  She spoke with legislators on issues as  varied

                                
            ____________________

            16.  The ability  of government employees  to sit in  the few
            perimeter seats may have been used  to advance their personal
            interests as well.  For example, during debates  on incentive
            pay  for  court clerks,  two court  clerks  sat in  the aisle
            seats.

                                         -38-
                                          38

            as a proposed  gun court,  the Providence  water supply,  and

            funding for the city.

                      Lobbying  by  government  lobbyists at  times  took

            place  among  the seats  of  the legislators,  even  with the

            knowledge of the Speaker.  For example, when the House was in

            session, the Providence lobbyist  was on a cellular telephone

            and walked  in between  the rows  of the legislators'  seats,

            passing  the telephone to  certain members of  the House, who

            listened  and spoke  into the  telephone.  The  telephone was

            eventually passed  to the  Speaker, who also  listened, spoke

            and chuckled.   Only  when a  member of  the House  raised an

            objection  did  the Providence  lobbyist  move  to the  outer

            aisles.  But she was not asked to leave the floor and was not

            asked to refrain from speaking to the legislators.

                                       Immunity
                                       ________

                      I  respectfully disagree  with the  decision of  my

            very able colleagues to  afford absolute legislative immunity

            to both  of the defendants.  Not only was the defense waived,

            but  even if  it had  been properly  raised, the  doctrine of

            legislative  immunity  does  not,  in my  view,  foreclose  a

            judicial  determination  of  the  constitutionality   of  the

            defendants'  practices.   The  challenged  practices  do  not

            constitute the  kind of "purely legislative  activities" that

            have  traditionally   triggered   the  protections   of   the

            legislative immunity bar.   Raising that bar in this  case is

                                         -39-
                                          39

            not  necessary  to vindicate  the  vital  interests that  the

            doctrine was  intended  to safeguard,  and  indeed  undercuts

            those interests.

                      This case does not  present the kind of exceptional

            circumstances  that would  even permit  consideration  of the

            defendants'  legislative  immunity  arguments, because  those

            arguments  were  not raised  in  the  district  court.    Cf.
                                                                      ___

            Eastland v.  United States  Servicemen's Fund, 421  U.S. 491,
            ________     ________________________________

            510  n.17 (1975)  ("[T]he Speech  or Debate Clause  has never

            been read so  broadly that legislators  are 'absolved of  the

            responsibility of  filing a  motion  to dismiss.'"  (citation

            omitted));  Powell  v.  McCormack,  395 U.S.  486,  505  n.25
                        ______      _________

            (1969).   Here,  the immunity doctrine  -- hardly  an obscure

            legal  concept -- was never raised as a defense to liability,

            even when the distinguished  trial court was solicitous about

            minimizing   the  intrusion  of   the  litigation   into  the

            functioning of  the state legislature.   Defendant Harwood is

            himself an attorney and both defendants were ably represented

            in  the district  court.   I see  no reason  not to  hold the

            defendants to  their waivers.   See Singleton  v. Wulff,  428
                                            ___ _________     _____

            U.S. 106, 121 (1976)  (reversing court of appeals in  a civil

            case for deciding issues not argued in the district court).

                      In  reaching the immunity  issue, the majority sets

            up   a  virtually   no-lose   proposition  for   legislators.

            Legislators  are certainly cognizant of the public perception

                                         -40-
                                          40

            that  raising an immunity defense is tantamount to a claim of

            being above  the Constitution.   Thus, raising  a defense  of

            legislative  immunity  at the  outset  of  litigation is  not

            without its political costs.   The majority's approach, which

            permits  the  defense to  be  raised  after trial,  virtually
                                                  _____

            eliminates  any incentive to raise  it sooner.   If the trial

            were  to  produce  an unfavorable  outcome,  the  legislator-

            defendant could simply  assert immunity  on appeal,  claiming

            that  the  failure  to raise  the  defense  earlier  had been

            inadvertent.  Because there rarely will be direct evidence to

            counter such a claim of inadvertence, and because the defense

            of absolute  legislative immunity will always  present a law-

            based,  potentially  dispositive  question of  constitutional

            magnitude,  a  court  of   appeals  applying  the  majority's

            approach would almost  inevitably consider the defense,  even

            though raised for the first time on appeal.

                      Moreover, to the extent  that one of the rationales

            underlying  legislative  immunity  is  to  prevent  vexatious

            litigation  against legislators, that rationale is undermined

            where  (as here)  the legislator-defendant  goes through  the

            entire trial and  raises the  defense only on  appeal.   "The

            purpose  of the  protection  afforded legislators  is not  to

            forestall judicial review of legislative action but to insure

            that  legislators are not distracted from  or hindered in the

            performance of  their legislative tasks by  being called into

                                         -41-
                                         -41-

            court to defend  their actions."   Powell, 395  U.S. at  505.
                                               ______

            Denials  of legislative  immunity are  immediately appealable

            because the immunity is not simply a defense to liability but

            is also an immunity from suit.  Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S.
                                            _________    ______

            500, 508  (1979).  Appellate  courts are unable  to vindicate

            that  interest where  defendants  wait until  after trial  to

            raise the immunity  defense.  See  id.  There  thus may be  a
                                          ___  ___

            greater systemic  interest in  ensuring that the  interest is

            raised early.

                      Much  of  what  the  immunity  protects  cannot  be

            remedied  here.   Because  the  defendants  never asserted  a

            defense of  immunity, the action  was fully tried  before the

            question  was ever  put to the  district court.   Legislators

            have  already   testified.    Deciding  the   merits  of  the

            constitutional  question  entails  no  additional  burden  or

            inconvenience upon the  defendants.  The  need to ignore  the

            defendants' waiver in order to  reach the immunity issue  is,

            as a result, greatly reduced.17

                                
            ____________________

            17.  Even if one could  overlook defendants' waiver, we could
            not  reach the immunity issue absent a showing of plain error
            by the  district court.  Cf.  United States v. Olano,  113 S.
                                     ___  _____________    _____
            Ct. 1770, 1776-78 (1993); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d
                                      _____________    _________
            754, 790 (1st Cir. 1995).  Plain error analysis does apply in
            the civil context.   See,  e.g., Consolo v.  George, 58  F.3d
                                 ___   ____  _______     ______
            791,  793  (1st Cir.  1995)  (jury instructions  to  which no
            objection lodged  subject only to plain  error review); Lewis
                                                                    _____
            v.  Kendrick, 944  F.2d 949,  953 (1st  Cir. 1991)  (district
                ________
            court's  failure to grant  qualified immunity reviewable only
            for plain error where defense was not timely raised); Javelin
                                                                  _______
            Investment, S.A. v. Municipality of Ponce, 645 F.2d 92, 94-95
            ________________    _____________________
            (1st Cir. 1981) (same,  for a sufficiency-of-evidence claim).

                                         -42-
                                         -42-

                      Even overlooking the defendants' waiver, however, I

            believe that  their  claim of  absolute legislative  immunity

            fails.  The  Supreme Court's case law  demonstrates that even

            if a suit asserting individual rights could not be brought to

            challenge  a  legislative act  per se,  it  is not  barred by
                                           ___ __

            legislative immunity  if it  merely seeks  prospective relief

            against  a legislative employee for  his role in carrying out

            or  enforcing the  directives of  that same  legislative act.

            That is precisely what the plaintiffs seek here.

                      There  is no  immunity  for practices  that  simply

            relate to legislative  activities.  See Doe v.  McMillan, 412
                                                ___ ___     ________

            U.S.  306, 313  (1973)  ("Our cases  make perfectly  apparent

            . . . that everything a [legislator] may regularly do is  not

            a  legislative act  within the  protection of  the Speech  or

            Debate Clause.");  United States  v. Brewster, 408  U.S. 501,
                               _____________     ________

            515  (1972)  ("In no  case has  this  Court ever  treated the

            Clause as protecting all  conduct relating to the legislative
                                              ________

            process." (emphasis in  original; footnote omitted)); Powell,
                                                                  ______

            395 U.S. at 503  ("Legislative immunity does not,  of course,

            bar all  judicial review  of legislative acts.").   Moreover,

            "[t]hat [legislators] generally perform certain acts in their

                                
            ____________________

            Whatever  difference of  opinion the question  of legislative
            immunity  might  allow,  the  district court's  "failure"  to
            afford such immunity to defendants sua sponte was not clearly
                                               ___ ______
            in error, and certainly  did not produce a  gross miscarriage
            of  justice or  seriously affect  the fairness,  integrity or
            public reputation  of the  judicial proceedings.   See Olano,
                                                               ___ _____
            113 S. Ct. at 1779.  There was no plain error.

                                         -43-
                                         -43-

            official capacity as [legislators] does  not necessarily make

            all such  acts  legislative in  nature."   Gravel  v.  United
                                                       ______      ______

            States,  408 U.S. 606, 625  (1972).  Rather,  as the majority
            ______

            agrees, the doctrine  of legislative immunity  protects "only

            purely legislative  activities."  Brewster, 408  U.S. at 512;
                                              ________

            Chastain v.  Sundquist, 833 F.2d  311, 314  (D.C. Cir.  1987)
            ________     _________

            (quoting Brewster), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988).
                     ________   ____________

                      The basic protection of the doctrine of legislative

            immunity  attaches   to   actual  "speech   or   debate"   by

            legislators.  Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.  The Supreme Court has
                          ______

            made clear that

                      [i]nsofar  as  [legislative  immunity]  is
                      construed to  reach  other  matters,  they
                                                            ____
                      must   be   an  integral   part   of   the
                      __________________________________________
                      deliberative  and  communicative processes
                      __________________________________________
                      by  which   [legislators]  participate  in
                                                              __
                      committee   and  House   proceedings  with
                      ____________________________________
                      respect to the  consideration and  passage
                      or rejection  of proposed  legislation  or
                      with  respect to other matters [within the
                      legislature's               constitutional
                      jurisdiction].

            Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 126 (1979) (emphases in
            __________    ________

            original) (quoting Gravel,  408 U.S. at  625).  The  majority
                               ______

            does  not dispute this definition of the scope of legislative

            immunity.

                      It is important  to recognize  that the  plaintiffs

            here seek only to enjoin Rule 45's enforcement.   In my view,
                                               ___________

            legislative immunity does not  reach enforcement of the House

            Rule because such enforcement is not "an integral part of the

                                         -44-
                                         -44-

            deliberative   and  communicative  processes"  of  the  state

            legislature.

                      Of course,  the regulation of the  admission of the

            public  to the House's floor  has an important  impact on the
                                                            ______

            legislative process  -- that is  what this lawsuit  is about.

            But  it belies  common  usage, I  believe,  to say  that  the

            defendants' practices relating to  the admission or exclusion

            of  classes of persons  from the  House floor  constitute "an

            integral   part  of   the   deliberative  and   communicative

            processes" of the legislature.  Certainly, such practices are

            not  part and parcel of  the legislative process  in the same

            fashion as are  the kinds  of legislative acts  to which  the

            Supreme Court has  previously extended legislative  immunity:

            e.g., voting for a resolution, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
            ____                           ________    ________

            168,  204 (1881), making a speech on the floor, United States
                                                            _____________

            v. Johnson,  383 U.S. 169, 180  (1966), circulating documents
               _______

            to other  legislators,  McMillan, 412  U.S.  at 312,  or  the
                                    ________

            gathering  of information for a committee hearing, Dombrowski
                                                               __________

            v.  Eastland, 387  U.S. 82,  84 (1967)  (per curiam).18   See
                ________                                              ___

                                
            ____________________

            18.  An action challenging any  of these immunized activities
            would  have required  proof, as  this case  does not,  of the
            substance of a legislator's act  -- e.g., how the  legislator
                                                ____
            voted,  or  the  content  of  a  speech  or  the  content  of
            communications to other legislators.  See Gravel, 408 U.S. at
                                                  ___ ______
            618-21  (drawing this  distinction); see  also  Brewster, 408
                                                 ___  ____  ________
            U.S. at 526 (holding that act of bribery  was not immune from
            prosecution  if  government  did   not  need  to  prove  "how
            [defendant]  spoke, how he debated, how he voted, or anything
            he did in the chamber or in committee").

                                         -45-
                                         -45-

            Brewster, 408 U.S.  at 516  ("In every case  thus far  before
            ________

            this Court, the Speech  or Debate Clause has been  limited to

            an  act which was clearly a part of the legislative process."
                              _________________________________________

            (emphasis added)).

                      It is  not enough,  as the majority  suggests, that

            the   practice  challenged   here  "affects"   the  way   the

            legislature  conducts   its  affairs  or  "colors   the  very

            conditions  under  which  legislators"  do their  work.    In

            Hutchinson  v. Proxmire,  the Supreme  Court, in  refusing to
            __________     ________

            extend legislative  immunity to certain statements  made by a

            senator  in a  press release,  acknowledged that  a senator's

            ability to  make such  statements was arguably  "essential to

            the  functioning  of  the  Senate"  and  conceded  that  such

            statements affected the legislative environment.  443 U.S. at

            130, 131 ("We may assume that a Member's published statements

            exert  some  influence on  other  votes in  the  Congress and

            therefore  have   a  relationship  to   the  legislative  and

            deliberative process.").   Yet,  the Court concluded  that no

            legislative  immunity attached  to  such  statements.19    In

            doing  so, it observed that  it had, in  the past, "carefully

            distinguished  between  what  is  only 'related  to  the  due
                                                    _____________________

                                
            ____________________

            19.  Similarly, in Bond  v. Floyd, 385  U.S. 116 (1966),  the
                               ____     _____
            Supreme  Court allowed  a suit  to go forward  challenging on
            First  Amendment  grounds  the  constitutionality  of certain
            legislative resolutions preventing the seating of Julian Bond
            in  the Georgia legislature that had  been passed in response
            to  political   statements  by  Bond   that  had   apparently
            displeased his fellow legislators.

                                         -46-
                                         -46-

            functioning of the legislative process,' and what constitutes
            ___________                                       ___________

            the  legislative  process  entitled  to  immunity  under  the
            _________________________

            [Speech  or Debate]  Clause."   Id. at  131 (emphases  added;
                                            ___

            citation   omitted).     Here,  the   defendants'  challenged

            practices, while  perhaps "related to the  due functioning of

            the  legislative process,"  simply do  not "constitute[]  the

            legislative  process"  in  the  sense  necessary  to  trigger

            absolute legislative immunity.   Cf. United States v. McDade,
                                             ___ _____________    ______

            28  F.3d  283,  299  (3d  Cir.  1994)  (declining  to  extend

            legislative   immunity  for   acts  which,   "although  [they

            comprised]  a necessary  precondition for the  performance of

            [legislative] acts,"  could not  be said  to be  "an integral

            part   of   Congress's    deliberative   and    communicative

            processes"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1312 (1995).
                         ____________

                      That the  defendants' challenged practices  are not

            "legislative" in the sense  necessary to trigger immunity and

            that  the  plaintiffs' claim  for  injunctive  relief is  not

            barred -- most clearly as it names the House doorkeeper -- is

            established by  a venerable line of  Supreme Court authority.

            In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), the Court found
               ________    ________

            that  members  of  the  U.S. House  of  Representatives  were

            entitled to legislative immunity in a lawsuit arising from an

            unconstitutional House  resolution  that had  authorized  the

            arrest of  the plaintiff.   However, the Court  permitted the
                                                            _________

            suit  to go forward against the House's Sergeant at Arms, who

                                         -47-
                                         -47-

            had merely executed the unconstitutional arrest warrant.  See
                       ________                                       ___

            id.  at 202.    As the  Supreme  Court later  summarized  the
            ___

            holding  of Kilbourn:  "That  the House  could with  impunity
                        ________

            order an unconstitutional  arrest afforded no  protection for

            those who  made the arrest."   Gravel, 408 U.S. at  618.  The
                                           ______

            unconstitutional "resolution was subject to judicial review,"

            the Court explained,  "insofar as its execution impinged on a

            citizen's rights."  Id.
                                ___

                      Some ninety  years  after Kilbourn,  in  Powell  v.
                                                ________       ______

            McCormack, the Court reaffirmed the principle that a suit for
            _________

            injunctive relief brought  against a legislative  employee in

            an  enforcement-type capacity  is not  barred  by legislative
                                              ___

            immunity.   395 U.S. at 504-05.   There, the  Court held that

            the  defendant  congressmen  were  entitled   to  legislative

            immunity  for  their unconstitutional  refusal  to  seat Adam

            Clayton   Powell  as   a  Member   of  the   U.S.   House  of

            Representatives.  See id.  at 506.  Applying the  teaching of
                              ___ ___

            Kilbourn,  the Court  went on  to hold  that the  doctrine of
            ________

            legislative immunity did not  bar a judicial determination of
                                     ___

            the  merits  of  plaintiffs' constitutional  claims,  to  the

            extent   that  those   claims  were   asserted  against   the

            legislative  employees  who had  merely been  responsible for

            enforcing the  House's  resolution, namely,  the Sergeant  at
            _________

            Arms, the Clerk, and the Doorkeeper.  See id. at 504-06.  The
                                                  ___ ___

            Court added that those officials could not assert legislative

                                         -48-
                                         -48-

            immunity  on  the ground  that they  had simply  been "acting

            pursuant  to express  orders of  the House."   Id.  at 504.20
                                                           ___

            The  Court  in  Powell  thus "reasserted  judicial  power  to
                            ______

            determine  the validity  of legislative actions  impinging on

            individual  rights"  in  an  action  for  prospective  relief

            brought  against the  legislative functionaries  charged with

            implementing   the   allegedly   unconstitutional   activity.

            Gravel, 408 U.S. at 620.
            ______

                      The   Court  had   applied  similar   reasoning  in

            Dombrowski  v. Eastland,  387  U.S. 82  (1967) (per  curiam),
            __________     ________

            decided shortly before Powell.  In that case, which arose out
                                   ______

            of an allegedly illegal raid, the Court sustained the defense

            of  legislative immunity  with respect to  the Chairman  of a

            subcommittee  of  the  U.S. Senate  Judiciary  Committee  for

            issuing  subpoenas  to gather  information,  but  declined to

            extend  immunity  to  the  subcommittee's  counsel,  who  had

            allegedly participated  in the execution of  the illegal raid

            to obtain the  same information.  See id.  at 84.  Dombrowski
                                              ___ ___          __________

            thus supports the principle  that a legislative employee sued

            for  his role  in carrying  out  or executing  an (immunized)

                                
            ____________________

            20.  I respectfully disagree,  therefore, with the majority's
            suggestion  that the  legislative immunity  doctrine protects
            any  legislative officials "who do no more than carry out the
            will of  the body by enforcing  [Rule 45] as a  part of their
            official  duties."    To  the extent  that  the  decision  in
            Consumers   Union  of  United   States,  Inc.  v.  Periodical
            _____________________________________________      __________
            Correspondents' Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975), can be
            _____________________
            read  for a contrary  proposition, I would  decline to follow
            it.

                                         -49-
                                         -49-

            legislative directive may be  answerable to a private citizen

            whose rights have  been violated.   See Gravel,  408 U.S.  at
                                                ___ ______

            619-20.

                      More  recently,  in Supreme  Court  of Virginia  v.
                                          ___________________________

            Consumers  Union of  the United  States, Inc.,  446 U.S.  719
            _____________________________________________

            (1980),  the  Supreme  Court  was presented  with  an  action

            brought under  42 U.S.C.    1983 asserting a  First Amendment

            challenge  against certain  attorney disciplinary  rules that

            had  been  enacted  by  the  Virginia  Supreme  Court.    The

            plaintiffs sought declaratory  and injunctive relief,  naming

            the  Virginia Court and  its Chief Justice  (among others) as

            defendants.   The Supreme  Court concluded that  the Virginia

            Court, in propounding the disciplinary rules, had acted in  a

            legislative (not judicial) capacity.   The Virginia Court was

            held  entitled  to  absolute  legislative immunity  for  acts

            pertaining to the enactment  of the disciplinary rules, e.g.,
                                                                    ____

            refusing to amend the rules to comport with the Constitution.

            See  id. at  733-34.   The  Supreme  Court further  observed,
            ___  ___

            however,  that  the  Virginia  Court  performed  not  only  a

            legislative role with respect  to the disciplinary rules, but

            also had enforcement authority.   See id. at 734.   The Court
                     ___________              ___ ___

            concluded  that to  the extent  that the  plaintiffs' section

            1983  action sought prospective  relief against  the Virginia

            Court   in  its   enforcement   capacity,  the   doctrine  of
                              ___________

            legislative immunity did not bar the suit.  Id. at 736 ("[W]e
                                                        ___

                                         -50-
                                         -50-

            believe  that  the  Virginia  Court  and  its  chief  justice

            properly  were held liable  in their  enforcement capacities.

            . . . For this reason the Virginia Court and its members were

            proper defendants  in a  suit for declaratory  and injunctive

            relief,  just as  other  enforcement  officers  and  agencies

            were.").
                                
            ____________________

            21.  Moreover, the defendants'  actions in restricting access
                      The   Supreme   Court's   decisions  in   Kilbourn,
                                                                ________
            to the  floor and  lobbying can be  viewed as  administrative
            (rather than legislative) in nature, and thus not entitled to
            Dombrowski, Powell, and  Supreme Court of Virginia  establish
            __________  ______       _________________________
            immunity  on that  additional  ground.   Because immunity  is
            defined by the functions it  serves, Forrester v. White,  484
                                                 _________    _____
            that the  doctrine of  legislative immunity  does  not bar  a
            U.S.  219, 227  (1988), even  legislators themselves  are not
            immune for actions taken  in an administrative capacity.   In
            judicial  determination of a plaintiff's constitutional claim
            Forrester, a  state court judge enjoyed  no judicial immunity
            _________
            for  the administrative  acts  of demoting  and dismissing  a
            to the extent that the claim is one for injunctive relief and
            probation officer.  Even though the acts "may have been quite
            important in  providing the  necessary conditions of  a sound
            is  asserted  against a  defendant  simply  for his  role  in
            adjudicative  system," the decisions underlying the acts were
            generic in nature, not intrinsically adjudicative or peculiar
            enforcing  a  legislative directive  that  affects individual
            _________
            to the  judicial function.   See id.  at 229.   A "judge  who
                                         ___ ___
            hires or  fires a probation officer  [could not] meaningfully
            rights.  See  Gravel, 408  U.S. at 618-21.   The  plaintiffs'
                     ___  ______
            be distinguished from a district attorney who hires and fires
            assistant  district  attorneys,  or  indeed  from  any  other
            action  here -- most clearly as it names the House doorkeeper
            Executive Branch official who  is responsible for making such
            employment  decisions."   Id.; see also  Negron-Gaztambide v.
                                      ___  ________  _________________
            -- comprises precisely  such a claim: the doorkeeper is being
            Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1994) (legislators
            ________________
            not protected  by legislative immunity for administrative act
            sued  solely  for  his   role  in  enforcing  the  challenged
            of  dismissing  librarian), cert.  denied,  115  S. Ct.  1098
                                        _____________
            (1995).
            exclusion of  all but  government lobbyists from  lobbying on
                      Under  this  functional  analysis,   the  defendant
            doorkeeper's   acts   in   determining   whether   particular
            the  House floor,  and the  claim seeks  only to  enjoin such
            individuals were authorized to enter the House chamber are of
            an  "administrative"  nature within  the  meaning  of Negron-
                                                                  _______
            enforcement.  The defendant doorkeeper is not distinguishable
            Gaztambide.   See id.   These acts  constitute determinations
            __________    ___ ___
            concerning  admission and exclusion,  no different  in nature
            in  any meaningful  way from  the doorkeeper  whose claim  of
            than those that might be made by an official in the executive
            branch  entrusted with  controlling  access to  a  Governor's
            absolute legislative  immunity was  rejected in Powell.   See
                                                            ______    ___
            press conference or, indeed,  a doorkeeper standing outside a
            privately-owned building.    The  doorkeeper's  acts  do  not
            Powell, 395 U.S. at  504.  I would conclude,  therefore, that
            ______
            entail any peculiarly  legislative decisionmaking -- in  this
            case, those  decisions were  already embodied in  the House's
            the  defendant  doorkeeper  is  not entitled  to  assert  the
            adoption  of  Rule  45.    The  acts  of  the  doorkeeper  in
            administering Rule 45 to particular persons seeking access to
            defense of  absolute  legislative  immunity,21  and  I  would
            the   House   chamber   are   thus   not   legislative,   but
            administrative and not entitled to absolute immunity.

                                         -51-
                                         -51-

            accordingly proceed to a determination of the First Amendment

            question presented.22

                      Reaching the merits  of plaintiffs'  constitutional

            claim, importantly,  does no injury to  the classic interests

            protected by  the legislative immunity doctrine.   The common

            law  immunity that  state  legislators enjoy  is "similar  in

            origin and  rationale to that accorded  Congressmen under the

            Speech  or Debate Clause."   Supreme  Court of  Virginia, 446
                                         ___________________________

            U.S.  at  731.    The actions  of  members  of  the  House in

            speaking,  debating, or  voting on  matters before  the Rhode

            Island   House  are  not  being  challenged.    There  is  no

            infringement  on the  "fullest  liberty of  speech" of  House

            members, nor does this  case raise the need to  protect House

            members "from the resentment  of every one, however powerful,

            to  whom the exercise of that  liberty may occasion offense."

            Tenney  v.  Brandhove, 341  U.S.  367,  373 (1951)  (citation
            ______      _________

            omitted).

                      The  legislative immunity doctrine is not meant for

            the protection of the legislators for their own benefit, "but

            to  support  the rights  of  the  people,  by enabling  their

                                
            ____________________

            22.  As far  as the record  shows, the defendant  Speaker did
            not participate  in the  exclusion of private  lobbyists from
            the legislative floor.  There  is no need to decide,  at this
            time,  whether,  if  the  Speaker did  participate  in  other
            aspects of  Rule 45's  enforcement, he  would be  entitled to
            legislative immunity in an  action brought against him solely
            for  his  role  in  such  enforcement.    Relief against  the
            doorkeeper's enforcement  of the Rule  may provide plaintiffs
            with all the relief necessary.

                                         -52-
                                         -52-

            representatives  to  execute the  functions  of  their office

            without fear  of prosecutions,  civil or criminal."   Id.  at
                                                                  __

            373-74 (citation omitted); see also Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507
                                       ________ ________

            ("The immunities  of the  Speech  or Debate  Clause were  not

            written  into the  Constitution  simply for  the personal  or

            private benefit  of Members of  Congress, but to  protect the

            integrity  of   the  legislative  process  by   insuring  the

            independence  of  individual  legislators.").    Reaching the

            merits of the constitutional question presented here poses no

            threat  to  the  independence   of  the  Rhode  Island  state

            legislators.23

                      Historically,  the  privileges  of  the  Speech  or

            Debate Clause emerged from a need to protect the  legislature

            from executive  intimidation and  harassment.  See  Robert J.
                                                           ___

            Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate,  Legislative Privilege and
                                                _________________________

            the  Separation of  Powers, 86  Harv. L.  Rev.  1113, 1120-44
            __________________________

            (1973).  Indeed, the purpose underlying the  Speech or Debate

            Clause, that is, to enable speech critical of the government,

            also  underlies the  First  Amendment's  protection  of  free

            speech.    Cf.  Akhil  R.  Amar,  The  Bill of  Rights  as  a
                       ___                    ___________________________

            Constitution, 100 Yale L.J.  1131, 1151 (1991).  It  would be
            ____________

            ironic  indeed  to  permit  the defendants  to  invoke  those

                                
            ____________________

            23.  Davids  v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1977), does not
                 ______     _____
            support  the proposition that  the defendants'  practices are
            immune from constitutional scrutiny.  The court there in fact
            reached  the merits  and  scrutinized the  plaintiffs'  First
            Amendment claims, but found them wanting.

                                         -53-
                                         -53-

            immunities  to benefit  communications between  the executive

            branch (government lobbyists) and the legislative  branch, to

            the  exclusion  of  communication  from  groups  of   private

            citizens.   Judicial illumination  of the immunity,  as James

            Madison said, must be guided by "the reason and the necessity

            of  the privilege."    Letter from  James  Madison to  Philip

            Doddridge  (June 6, 1832), in 4 Letters and Other Writings of
                                       __   _____________________________

            James Madison 221 (1884).  That reason  and necessity dictate
            _____________

            that  this court not credit the immunity defense on the facts

            of this case.

                                   First Amendment
                                   _______________

                      Is the First Amendment violated by  the defendants'

            practice  of admitting  government  lobbyists onto  the House

            floor  to  lobby while  excluding those  not employed  by the

            government?   The answer,  I believe, is  that the defendants

            have violated the First Amendment.  

                      Several   interrelated    and   fundamental   First

            Amendment  interests   are   offended  by   the   defendants'

            practices.   The  defendants have  excluded  the  plaintiffs'

            political speech and have done so in a discriminatory manner.

            The defendants'  practices have  resulted  in viewpoint-  and

            content-based  discrimination,  favoring government  speakers

            and  government  viewpoints   and  excluding   non-government

            speakers and non-government viewpoints.   The restrictions on

            speech posed  by the practices  are severe in  their effects.

                                         -54-
                                         -54-

            Defendants'   discriminatory   practices   also  permit   the

            government  unchecked  power to  act  in  its self  interest,

            rather than in the  interest of the citizens.   These effects

            strike  at  the heart  of  the First  Amendment,  and subject

            defendants'  practices to  the highest  level of  scrutiny, a

            scrutiny  defendants  cannot  withstand.24   Those  practices

            are  not  narrowly  tailored   to  meet  a  compelling  state

            interest, and therefore fail to pass constitutional muster.

                      The  parties have framed  the First Amendment issue

            in  terms of  whether the  House Chamber  floor is  a "public

            forum."     But   the   "public   forum"   doctrine,   itself

            problematic,25 is  particularly ill-suited to this  case.  It

                                
            ____________________

            24.  There  are  additional   reasons  to  apply   heightened
            scrutiny.   In  footnote  4  of  United  States  v.  Carolene
                                             ______________      ________
            Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,  152 (1938), oft-quoted for other
            ____________
            language, the Court noted the possibility that:

                      legislation    which   restricts    those
                      political processes  which can ordinarily
                      be  expected  to  bring about  repeal  of
                      undesirable   legislation    [might]   be
                      subjected   to  more   exacting  judicial
                      scrutiny  under the  general prohibitions
                      of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
                      other types of legislation.

            The   defendants'  practices  are   analogous  to  just  such
            restrictive  legislation.   See  John H.  Ely, Democracy  and
                                        ___                ______________
            Distrust 76-77 (1980).
            ________

            25.    At best,  the public forum doctrine is  an "analytical
            shorthand  for the  principles that  have guided  the Court's
            decisions."  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
                         _________    ___________________________________
            Fund,  Inc., 473  U.S. 788,  820 (Blackmun,  J., dissenting).
            ___________
            "Beyond  confusing  the issues,  an  excessive  focus on  the
            public  character of  some  forums, coupled  with  inadequate
            attention  to  the precise  details  of  the restrictions  on

                                         -55-
                                         -55-

            is peculiar  to attempt to  fit the doctrine to  the floor of

            the chamber  of a legislative body at work.  Indeed, the very

            language of "public forum" masks the issues at stake.

                      As recognized by  the district court,  the approach

            taken   by   this  Court   in   AIDS   Action  Committee   of
                                            _____________________________

            Massachusetts,  Inc.  v.  Massachusetts   Bay  Transportation
            ____________________      ___________________________________

            Authority, 42 F.3d 1  (1994), is more  apt.  This court  held
            _________

            that where the government was the proprietor  of the property

            it was inappropriate to  analyze under the "relatively murky"

            public  forum doctrine  a discriminatory  government practice

            affecting First  Amendment rights.   Id. at  9.  At  issue in
                                                 ___

            AIDS Action Committee was the MBTA's practice of refusing, on
            _____________________

            the  grounds  that its  policy was  not  to run  any sexually

            suggestive advertisements, to  display condom  advertisements

            in its subway and trolley cars, while it was at the same time

            running sexually suggestive movie advertisements.  This court

            analyzed  and  rejected  the  government's  claim  that   its

            practices  were  viewpoint  neutral, finding  the  government

            practice  gave  rise  to   an  impermissible  appearance   of

            viewpoint   discrimination.       Because   this    viewpoint

            discrimination disposed  of the case,  there was no  need for

                                
            ____________________

            expression, can leave  speech inadequately protected  in some
            cases, while unduly hampering  state and local authorities in
            others."  Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 992-
                                         ___________________________
            93  (2d  ed. 1988)  (footnotes omitted);  see also  Daniel A.
                                                      ___ ____
            Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
                                    _____________________________________
            Analysis:     Content   and   Context  in   First   Amendment
            _____________________________________________________________
            Adjudication, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1219 (1984).
            ____________

                                         -56-
                                         -56-

            the  court to determine whether the cars were a public forum.

            For similar reasons, I do not use conventional "public forum"

            terminology.

                      The  discrimination  in  speech  practiced  by  the

            defendant must be understood against those interests that the

            First Amendment  has repeatedly  been recognized  as serving.

            The  First Amendment  reflects a  distrust of  the government

            making   judgments   about   what   speech   is   worthwhile,

            particularly  where  political  speech  is  involved.26     A

            central commitment of the First Amendment  is that "debate on

            public  issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."

            New York Times  Co. v.  Sullivan, 376 U.S.  254, 270  (1964).
            ___________________     ________

            "The  maintenance  of  the  opportunity  for  free  political

            discussion to  the end that  government may be  responsive to
                       __  ___ ___ ____  __________ ___ __  __________ __

            the will of  the people and  that changes may be  obtained by
            ___ ____ __  ___ ______

            lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the

            Republic, is  a fundamental principle  of our  constitutional

            system."  Stromberg v.  California, 283 U.S. 359, 369  (1931)
                      _________     __________

                                
            ____________________

            26.  "An insistence that government's burden  is greatest for
            regulating political  speech is based  on a sensible  view of
            government's  incentives.    It   is  in  this  setting  that
            government is most likely to be biased or to be acting on the
            basis  of  illegitimate,  venal, or  partial  considerations.
            Government is rightly distrusted when it is regulating speech
            that might harm  its own  interests; and when  the speech  at
            issue is  political, its own  interests are almost  always at
            stake.  It follows that the premise of distrust of government
            is strongest when politics is at issue.  And when the premise
            of  distrust is  strongest,  the burden  of justification  is
            highest."   Cass R.  Sunstein, Democracy and  the Problem  of
                                           ______________________________
            Free Speech 134 (1993).
            ___________

                                         -57-
                                         -57-

            (emphasis  added).     "'[T]here  is  practically   universal

            agreement  that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment [is]

            to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs' . . .

            .  'For speech  concerning public affairs is more  than self-

            expression; it  is the essence of  self-government.'"  Burson
                                                                   ______

            v. Freeman,  504  U.S.  191,  196 (1992)  (quoting  Mills  v.
               _______                                          _____

            Alabama, 384 U.S.  214, 218 (1966) and Garrison v. Louisiana,
            _______                                ________    _________

            379 U.S. 64, 74-75  (1964)).  Political expression is  at the

            center of the rights  protected by the First Amendment.   See
                                                                      ___

            id.;  Robert  H.  Bork,  Neutral Principles  and  Some  First
            ___                      ____________________________________

            Amendment  Problems,  47 Ind.  L.J.  1,  29  (1971); Cass  R.
            ___________________

            Sunstein,  Free Speech  Now,  59 U.  Chi.  L. Rev.  255,  301
                       ________________

            (1992). 

                      The defendants' practices in excluding the voice of

            private, but  not government, lobbyists from  the House floor

            imposes  a severe burden on  political speech.  Lobbying aims

            at  influencing  the votes  of  legislators;  it attempts  to

            affect the outcome of  the political processes.  Such  speech

            is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection."  First
                                                                    _____

            National  Bank  of Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435  U.S. 765,  776
            _________________________      ________

            (1978).  More specifically,  lobbying involves the attempt by

            groups  of  citizens  to  have  their  hired  representatives

            persuade legislators to legislate  in ways that are favorable

                                         -58-
                                         -58-

            to the interests of  those citizens.27  "In  a representative

            democracy such as  this, these branches of government  act on

            behalf of the  people and, to a very large  extent, the whole

            concept  of representation  depends upon  the ability  of the

            people to make their  wishes known to their representatives."

            Eastern  Railroad Presidents  Conf. v.  Noerr Motor  Freight,
            ___________________________________     _____________________

            Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961); see also  Meyer v. Grant, 486
            ____                            ___ ____  _____    _____

            U.S.  414, 421 (1988) ("[B]oth the expression of a desire for

            political  change  and  a discussion  of  the  merits  of the

            proposed  change" are  "core  political speech.").   Where  a

            challenged  practice, as  here,  imposes a  severe burden  on

            political expression,  courts must  review the practice  with

                                
            ____________________

            27.  Lobbying may be  protected not only as speech,  but also
            as  an  exercise  of the  right  to  petition.   That  right,
            explicitly  embodied in the  First Amendment, encompasses the
            right  of  citizens  to communicate  with  their  legislative
            representatives.   See Eastern Railroad  Presidents Conf.  v.
                               ___ __________________________________
            Noerr Motor  Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961) (stating
            __________________________
            that  the right  of  petition protects  "the  ability of  the
            people to make their wishes known to their representatives").
            As lobbying constitutes an  important means by which citizens
            can collectively make their  wishes known to the legislature,
            lobbying  itself may fall under  the coverage of the Petition
            Clause.   See id. at  137-38; United States  v. Nofziger, 878
                      ___ ___             _____________     ________
            F.2d 442,  453 (D.C. Cir.) (reading  Supreme Court precedents
            for the proposition that lobbying, "insofar as it constitutes
            self-representation,"  is protected  by  the First  Amendment
            right to petition),  cert. denied, 493 U.S.  1003 (1989); see
                                 ____________                         ___
            generally Amar, Bill of Rights, supra, at 1155-56 (suggesting
            _________       ______________  _____
            that  part of  the  purpose of  the  Petition Clause  was  to
            guarantee  that  citizens would  have  a  means of  informing
            representatives of their needs and concerns).

                                         -59-
                                         -59-

            strict scrutiny.  Cf.  Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.  428, 434
                              ___  _______    _______

            (1992).28

                      The  private  lobbyist  restriction is  subject  to

            strict  scrutiny  not   only  because  it   severely  burdens

            political speech,  but also because it  discriminates both on

            the basis of viewpoint and  content.  See Burson, 504 U.S. at
                                                  ___ ______

            197.        The    restriction   constitutes    content-based

            discrimination  because  it  targets  a  particular  kind  of

            speech.  It is also viewpoint-based discrimination because it

            excludes  a  particular set  of messages.    The result  is a

            speaker-based  ban  and   a  content-based  bar   that  gives

            advantage   to    the   government's   viewpoint.29       The

            discrimination   practiced   by   defendants   thus   permits

            expression  of   the  "particular  message  favored   by  the

            government"  and  stifles  all  other  speech.    See  Turner
                                                              ___  ______

            Broadcasting  System,  Inc. v.  FCC,  114 S.  Ct.  2445, 2458
            ___________________________     ___

            (1994);  id. at 2477  (O'Connor, J.,  concurring in  part and
                     ___

                                
            ____________________

            28.  Lobbying  is   not  subject  to  a   lower  standard  of
            protection  even  if the  hired representatives  do it  for a
            profit.  See Board of Trustees  of the State Univ. of N.Y. v.
                     ___ _____________________________________________
            Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989).
            ___

            29.  That the  non-governmental viewpoint  may in fact  be an
            entire  class  of  varying   viewpoints  does  not  make  the
            restriction   any  the  less  viewpoint  discrimination.  See
                                                                      ___
            Rosenberger v. Rector and  Visitors of the Univ. of  Va., 115
            ___________    _________________________________________
            S.  Ct.  2510,  2518  (1995)  (rejecting  argument  that  "no
            viewpoint  discrimination  occurs  because   the  [challenged
            rules] discriminate  against an entire class  of viewpoints",
            and saying that the "declaration that debate is not skewed so
            long as multiple voices are silenced is simply wrong").

                                         -60-
                                         -60-

            dissenting in part) ("The First Amendment does more than just

            bar government from intentionally suppressing speech of which

            it disapproves.   It also generally  prohibits the government

            from  excepting  certain  kinds  of  speech  from  regulation

            because it thinks the speech is especially valuable.").

                      The   defendants'   practices   thus    cannot   be

            constitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to achieve a

            compelling state interest. Id. at 2467 ("[S]peaker-based laws
                                       ___

            demand strict  scrutiny  when they  reflect the  Government's

            preference  for the  substance of  what the  favored speakers

            have to say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have

            to  say).");  First Nat'l  Bank of  Boston,  435 U.S.  at 785
                          ____________________________

            (First  Amendment  forbids  government  from  "dictating  the

            subjects about which  persons may speak and  the speakers who

            may  address  a public  issue.").    The government  lobbyist

            preference as applied here fails that test.

                      The  dangers  of  the  defendants'   practices  are

            plain.30  By simply  excluding all voices save the  voices of

            government lobbyists, the government could easily

                                
            ____________________

            30.  In  the franchise  cases, corollary  concerns about  the
            representative nature of government  led the Supreme Court to
            invalidate  laws which  resulted in  groups of  persons being
            frozen  out of the decision  process.  Reynolds  v. Sims, 377
                                                   ________     ____
            U.S.  533 (1964);  Harper v.  Virginia Bd. of  Elections, 383
                               ______     __________________________
            U.S.  663 (1966);  Carrington  v. Rash,  380  U.S. 89  (1965)
                               __________     ____
            (invalidating Texas  statute  denying franchise  to those  in
            military who  moved into the  state where Texas  attempted to
            justify  the  statute  by  arguing  military  personnel might
            otherwise start influencing elections).

                                         -61-
                                         -61-

                      suppress  support for a minority party or
                      an unpopular cause, or  . . . exclude the
                      expression of certain points of view from
                      the marketplace of ideas.

            Members  of the City  Council v.  Taxpayers for  Vincent, 466
            _____________________________     ______________________

            U.S.  789,  804  (1984).    These  effects  are  "so  plainly

            illegitimate  that  they  would  immediately  invalidate  the

            rule."    Id.   "[Rhode Island]  has no  .  . .  authority to
                      ___

            license one  side of [the]  debate to fight  freestyle, while

            requiring the  other to follow Marquis  of Queensbury Rules."

            R.A.V.  v. City  of St. Paul,  Minn., 112  S. Ct.  2538, 2548
            ______     _________________________

            (1992).  

                      Nor is  this risk  hypothetical.  The  Rhode Island

            House is  singular  in the  lack of  opportunity for  private

            citizens  to  have   direct,  effective  communications  with

            legislators.    The  ability  to communicate  directly  is  a

            considerable advantage.  The situation created by the private

            lobbyist ban is that akin to a monopoly over a single channel

            of communication,  where the government has  discriminated in

            providing  access to  that  channel and  also determined  the

            content of what flows through the channel.  

                      Against   this   panoply  of   dangers31   must  be

                                
            ____________________

            31.  Defendants' argument  poses yet  other dangers too.   If
            the   legislature  gets  information  from  nowhere  but  the
            executive   branch,   the   legislature's  ability   to   act
            independently,  and thus  to be  a check  and balance  to the
            executive  is  undercut.     This  corollary  danger  of  the
            undercutting  of the separation of powers  at the state level
            is  keenly  illustrated by  the  amicus  brief  filed by  the
            executive   branch,   urging   strongly   its   interest   in

                                         -62-
                                         -62-

            measured  the interests  attributed to  the defendants.   The

            majority  finds, in the immunity analysis, that there are two

            such interests32 and that the interests would pass a rational

            basis  test, at least for determining whether to carve out an

            exception to the immunity it  would grant.  Without accepting

            the  premise  that  the   only  exceptions  to  immunity  are

            irrational legislative  acts, neither  of those  interests is

            sufficient  to  withstand  strict  scrutiny.33   Indeed,  the

                                
            ____________________

            communicating  with   the  legislature  and   supporting  the
            exclusion of private voices.

            32.  To  the extent  that  the House  Rule  on its  face  was
            justified  as an effort to maintain decorum and control noise
            to a level which did not interfere with the members work, the
            record shows  instances in which government  lobbyists on the
                                             __________
            floor were objected to  by members as causing problems.   The
            defendants  accordingly   do   not  try   to  justify   their
            discriminatory distinction on such grounds.

            33.  Defendants'  practice  does  not   even  meet  the  less
            rigorous  test   of  intermediate  scrutiny.     Intermediate
            scrutiny of restrictions  has traditionally  been applied  to
            commercial  speech that  concerns  unlawful  activity  or  is
            misleading, see  Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
                        ___  ___________    _________________
            2371, 2375  (1995), and to content-neutral  restrictions that
            impose   an  incidental   burden   on  speech,   see   Turner
                                                             ___   ______
            Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.  The test has three related
            ____________
            prongs: first,  the  government  must  assert  a  substantial
            interest in support of the regulation; second, the government
            must demonstrate that the restriction directly and materially
            advances  that interest;  and third,  the regulation  must be
            "narrowly drawn."   Florida Bar,  115 S.  Ct. at  2376.   The
                                ___________
            government's asserted interest in having government lobbyists
            on  the floor  of  the House,  to  the exclusion  of  private
            lobbyists, is  to have  them  provide information.   But  the
            government has  not shown  why the  interest  in having  only
            government provide  information, and  not private groups,  is
            "substantial."   Relatedly, the  restriction is not "narrowly
            tailored" to  meet the information provision  goal because it
            is overbroad and serves  to exclude valuable information that
            private lobbyists might provide.  

                                         -63-
                                         -63-

            defendants' bedrock argument is different again, and it, too,

            is insufficient.

                      The   majority   credits   reasons  of   bolstering

            legislative independence and  of having government  lobbyists

            act to provide information.  But legislative independence was

            proffered as a reason for Rule 45 on its face, which excludes

            all lobbyists, and not  to the distinction between government

            and non-government lobbyists.34

                      Defendants  argue  that allowing  only governmental

            lobbyists access to the  floor of the legislature  serves the

            goal of allowing legislators to receive valuable information.

            Defendants,   however,   have  established   no  demonstrable

            interest in receiving information  from the government to the

            exclusion of private sources.  The state's purported interest

            in limiting the information available to legislators to those

                                
            ____________________

            34.  A goal  of legislative independence is quite legitimate.
            But the interest distinctively served by the private lobbyist
            restriction  is to  display to  the public  the legislature's
            special hostility  towards the private  interest groups  that
            attempt to influence their  votes. "The politicians of [Rhode
            Island] are  entitled to  express that  hostility --  but not
            through  the  means  of  imposing   unique  limitations  upon
            speakers who (however benightedly) disagree."  R.A.V., 112 S.
                                                           ______
            Ct.  at 2550.   "The  point of  the First  Amendment is  that
            majority preferences must be  expressed in some fashion other
            than  silencing speech on the basis  of its content."  Id. at
                                                                   ___
            2548.  "[T]he First Amendment as we understand it today rests
            on  the  premise that  it  is government  power,  rather than
            private power,  that is the  main threat to  free expression;
            and  as a  consequence,  the  Amendment  imposes  substantial
            limitations on the Government even when it is trying to serve
            concededly praiseworthy  goals." Turner Broadcasting,  114 S.
                                             ___________________
            Ct.  at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
            in part).

                                         -64-
                                         -64-

            sources  controlled   by  its  own  interests   is  hardly  a

            compelling  one.35   "A State's  claim  that it  is enhancing

            the  ability  of its  citizenry  to  make wise  decisions  by

            restricting the flow  of information to  them must be  viewed

            with some skepticism. . . . '[I]t is often true that the best

            means  to that end is  to open the  channels of communication

            rather than to close them.'" Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
                                         ________    __________

            780, 798 (1983) (quoting  Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia
                                      _______________________    ________

            Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
            ________________

                      Further,  the private  lobbyist restriction  is not

            narrowly   tailored  to  serve   the  legislature's  asserted

            interest in receiving information.  Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
                                                ______________________

            Members of the New York  State Crime Victims Bd., 112  S. Ct.
            ________________________________________________

                                
            ____________________

            35.  Defendants  attempt  to  liken  their  private  lobbying
            restriction to  the restrictions on lobbying  imposed by Rule
            XXXII  of  the   United  States  House  of   Representatives.
            Defendants'   analogy,  however,   works  against   them  and
            demonstrates  that  there is  no  "compelling"  need to  give
            government  lobbyists  access to  the  floor  to lobby  while
            excluding others.  Unlike the defendants' practices, the U.S.
            House  of  Representatives  Rule does  not  allow  government
            lobbyists to  lobby while excluding private  lobbyists.  Rule
            XXXII  is  neutral and  excludes all  lobbyists.   Even those
            normally  afforded the courtesy of admission  to the floor --
            former Members of the House, former  Parliamentarians, former
            elected officers,  and former  elected minority  employees of
            the  House  --   are  denied  admission  if   they  or  their
            organizations have any interest  in matters before the House.
            Similarly, staff  of a Member are not allowed to lobby on the
            occasions  they are admitted to  the House.   That the United
            States House of Representatives has chosen neutrality and not
            to   grant  preference  to   the  government   lobbyists  and
            information providers (if there is any distinction) undercuts
            any argument by  defendants that they have a  compelling need
            to give preference to the government.

                                         -65-
                                         -65-

            501,  511 n.** (1991).  In this case the restriction excludes

            valuable information  from the  legislative purview.   As the

            majority points  out, lobbying groups  have vastly  different

            interests  and  perspectives.     Access to  such  varied and

            independent  sources of  information, far  from  impeding the

            legislature's access to  useful information, surely functions

            to  increase both the quality  and the quantity  of the total

            set of information available.   

                      The provision of  information from executive branch

            agencies to members of  the legislature is a  very legitimate

            interest of  government.   The majority suggests  there is  a

            distinction between mere  information providing and lobbying,

            but that  distinction is  contradicted  by the  record.   The

            factual findings  of the district  court leave no  doubt that

            the court considered the contention that government lobbyists

            were engaging in mere "information-providing" and rejected it

            as a factual matter.  

                      Even if  the distinction were tenable  on the facts

            here, as it is not, it does not provide refuge from the First

            Amendment.     There  is  plainly  value  to  the  speech  by

            government lobbyists, whether it  be heavy-handed lobbying or

            more lightly  dexterous provision of information.   See Block
                                                                ___ _____

            v. Meese,  793 F.2d 1303,  1312-14 (D.C. Cir.)  (Scalia, J.),
               _____

            cert.  denied,  478  U.S. 1021  (1986).    But  the value  of
            _____________

            government speech is  not the  point.  Rather,  the point  is

                                         -66-
                                         -66-

            that  the  government has  permitted  itself  to speak  while

            prohibiting non-government speech.  

                      Speech  from   non-government  speakers,  including

            lobbyists, is  also valuable.  Indeed, while  lobbying may be

            subject to  registration and  disclosure,36 no case  has ever

            suggested that lobbying, including  its information-gathering

            and providing component,  could be banned entirely.  But that

            issue need not be reached here, for what is clear is that the

            government must keep the playing field level.37

                      Moreover,  even if  there  were greater  reason  to

            credit  the distinction  between "information  providing" and

            "lobbying," First Amendment "due  process" type issues  would

            still  preclude reliance  on the  distinction to  justify the

            restriction  of  First  Amendment   rights.    See  Henry  P.
                                                           ___

            Monaghan,  First Amendment  "Due Process",  83 Harv.  L. Rev.
                       ______________________________

                                
            ____________________

            36.  This  case  does not  involve  any  issue of  government
            subsidy, creation of a government  program, or of the taxable
            status of organizations involved in  lobbying.  Cf. Regan  v.
                                                            ___ _____
            Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
            ____________________________

            37.   It  is recognized  in the political  science literature
            that  much  of  what modern  day  lobbyists  do involves  the
            gathering and  provision of information to  legislators.  Cf.
                                                                      ___
            Edward  O. Laumann et al., Washington Lawyers and Others: The
                                       __________________________________
            Structure of Washington Representation, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 465,
            ______________________________________
            495 (1985);  James Q. Wilson,  Political Organizations xix-xx
                                           _______________________
            (1995); Jeffrey S. Banks &  Barry R. Weingast, The  Political
                                                           ______________
            Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information, 36 Am.
            _____________________________________________________
            J.  Pol. Sci.  509 (1992).   Political scientists  have found
            that  lobbyists' primary strategy  in influencing legislators
            is to  provide information to counteract  the similar efforts
            of other  groups, not  to achieve influence  through pressure
            tactics.     See  David   Austen-Smith  &  John   R.  Wright,
                         ___
            Counteractive Lobbying, 38 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 25 (1994).
            ______________________

                                         -67-
                                         -67-

            518,  519  (1970) ("If  the  Constitution  requires elaborate

            procedural  safeguards in the  obscenity area,  a fortiori it

            should  require  equivalent  procedural protection  when  the

            speech involved - for  example, political speech - implicates

            more central first amendment concerns.").  Even if there were

            a  discernible distinction,  the "difference  between factual

            statement and advocacy  may turn upon the debatability of the

            facts described as true, or the pertinency of facts omitted."

            Block, 793 F.2d at  1313.  The distinction between  providing
            _____

            information and acting for the purpose of "influencing in any

            manner the  passage  of  legislation"  is  exceedingly  fine.

            Here, legislators  testified that "information"  provided did

            in  fact influence  them  on  how to  vote.   The  House  has

            recognized that information may influence  votes.  Rule 45 on

            its face provides that "no person . . . shall either directly
                                                                 ________

            or indirectly" engage in the practice of lobbying.  The House
            _____________

            has  thus  drawn  the  line to  preclude  any  activity, even

            indirect, to influence votes.   The First Amendment puts  the

            burden on the  government to finely  tailor its practices  to

            permissible goals,  and no  such fine tailoring  was done  by

            defendants' practices here.  See  Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
                                         ___  _____    _________________

            115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593 (1995).

                      The   real  argument   that  the   defendants  have

            articulated  to justify  their  actions is  their claim  that

            government   lobbyists  represent   the  people   while  non-

                                         -68-
                                         -68-

            government lobbyists do not.  Accordingly, they say, there is

            no  cause to worry.   That is an  inversion of constitutional

            values.  While there may be value to the government voice, it

            cannot be the only  voice.  To permit that to be  so would be

            to stifle discussion.  See Buckley  v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,  14
                                   ___ _______     _____

            (1976) ("Discussion  of public issues  . . .[is]  integral to

            the operation of  the system of government established by our

            Constitution.    The  First  Amendment affords  the  broadest

            protection to  such political expression in  order 'to assure

            [the] unfettered interchange of  ideas for the bringing about

            of  political and  social  changes desired  by the  people.'"

            (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957))).
                    ____    _____________

                      There  is  another danger,  and  that  is that  the

            government's voice will not  truly represent the interests of

            the  public.38    Government should  theoretically  represent

                                
            ____________________

            38.  Defendants  express a legitimate concern that government
            may  be captured by "special interests."  Apart from the fact
            that  the government  itself  is frequently  its own  special
            interest group,  the solution to the problem  of a government
            captured by "special interests"  would hardly be to have  the
            government speak only to itself.
                      Moreover, many of  the plaintiff groups may  hardly
            be  characterized  as  the   centers  of  wealth,  power  and
            privilege.  Citizens,  who themselves may not be  affluent or
            powerful, band  together in  groups to lobby  the government,
            whether  the groups be, to  give but two  examples, the Rhode
            Island State  Right  To Life  Committee, Inc.,  or the  local
            chapter of the ACLU.  These groups may be thought to be a way
            to avoid the capturing  of government by "special interests."
            Defendants' practices may thus  thrust them headlong into the
            dangers  they profess to wish to avoid.  Central to effecting
            a system  of democratic  self-governance is  enabling private
            interests to be able  to act in concert.   Without collective
            action it  may be  impossible to alter  the status quo.   See
                                                                      ___

                                         -69-
                                         -69-

            the  people  and not  represent itself.   Theory  and reality

            often depart.  The government  is not always a mirror  of the

            people.    Government  employees  today  are  recognized   as

            constituting their own interest group.  See E. Nordlinger, On
                                                    ___                __

            the Autonomy of the Democratic State (1981).
            ____________________________________

                      The  Framers  had  a  fear  that,  once  in  power,

            legislators had an  obvious incentive to  use "that power  to

            perpetuate  themselves or their  ilk in  office."   U.S. Term
                                                                _________

            Limits,  Inc. v.  Thornton, 115  S. Ct. 1842,  1911-12 (1995)
            _____________     ________

            (Thomas, J., dissenting) (pointing out numerous instances  of

            modern day legislation and rulemaking that produce the effect

            of perpetuating incumbents in office).  T h e   F r a m e r s

            recognized this would happen and intended the First Amendment

            to act as  a check.  James Madison identified  the problem of

            government acting  in its  self-interest, in contrast  to the

            interests of those it  purported to represent, as one  of the

            two   fundamental  problems   of   the  republican   form  of

            government.39  "It is  of great importance in a  republic not

                                
            ____________________

            Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, supra, at
                      ________________________________________  _____
            245-46.

            39.  In a seminal immunity case, Justice Black recognized

                      Unfortunately,    it    is   true    that
                      legislative  assemblies,  born to  defend
                      the liberty of the people,  have at times
                      violated their sacred  trusts and  become
                      the  instruments of  oppression.  .  .  .
                      Those  who  cherish  freedom  [under  the
                      First  Amendment] here  would do  well to
                      remember  that  this freedom  cannot long

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                                         -70-

            only  to  guard the  society  against the  oppression  of the
                  _______________________________________________________

            rulers,  but  to  guard  one  part  of  society  against  the
            ______

            injustice of the other part."   The Federalist No. 51, at 161
                                            _____________________

            (James  Madison) (Roy  P.  Fairfield 2d  ed. 1981)  (emphasis

            added).  Madison feared that government might choose to serve

            itself instead of the citizens, saying:

                      In framing  a government  which is  to be
                      administered by  men over men,  the great
                      difficulty lies in this:   you must first
                      enable  the  government  to  control  the
                      governed; and in the next place oblige it
                      to control  itself.  A dependence  on the
                      people  is, no doubt, the primary control
                      on government; but experience  has taught
                      mankind   the   necessity  of   auxiliary
                      precautions.

            Id. at  160; see  also Amar, The  Bill of  Rights, supra,  at
            ___          ___  ____       ____________________  _____

            1132-33.   Central  among  those "auxiliary  precautions"  in

            obliging  the government to control itself from self-interest

            and self-dealing are the  protections afforded to citizens by

                                
            ____________________

                      survive the legislative  snuffing out  of
                      freedom . . . to speak.

            Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.  367, 380-81 (1951) (Black, J.,
            ______    _________
            concurring).
                      Justice Black echoed concerns voiced earlier by one
            of the Framers of the Constitution and advocates for adoption
            of  the  Bill of  Rights:   "No  legislative  act, therefore,
            Contrary to the  Constitution, can  be valid.   To deny  this
            would be  to affirm  . . .  that the  representatives of  the
            people  are   superior  to  the  people   themselves."    The
                                                                      ___
            Federalist  No.  78,  at  228 (Alexander  Hamilton)  (Roy  P.
            ___________________
            Fairfield 2d ed. 1981) (reply to "Brutus").

             

                                         -71-
                                         -71-

            the  First  Amendment.    Defendants'  actions  violate  this

            essential purpose of the First Amendment.

                      Accordingly, I would affirm the declaration by  the

            district  court  that the  practices  of  the defendants  are

            unconstitutional.40   In my view, the  defendants must either

            adhere to the House  Rule and exclude all from its  floor who

            speak  to influence its vote  or the House  must equally open

            its floor,  and  not prefer  the  government's voice.    That

            choice  belongs to  the House.   Under the  Constitution, the

            choice of  preferring the government voice  and excluding the

            non-government voices does not.

                                
            ____________________

            40.  The injunction entered by the District Court against the
            House, which was not a party to the suit, was in error.

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