Court Opinion

ID: 9930411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 20:03:06.277283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:04:33.018480
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/6/24 In re O.E. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 In re O.E., a Person Coming Under                                   B329093
 the Juvenile Court Law.

                                                                     (Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                  Super. Ct. No. DK23763)
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 ORLANDO E. et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jennifer W. Baronoff, Juvenile Court Referee.
Conditionally affirmed with directions.
      Jacques Alexander Love, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Kimberly M.
      Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Orlando E.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
             ____________________________________

                        INTRODUCTION

      Kimberly M. and Orlando E., parents of six-year-old O.E.,
appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating their parental
rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 They
argue the court erred in ruling the parental-benefit exception to
adoption in section 366.26, subdivision (C)(1)(b)(i), did not apply.
They also argue the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services failed to comply with the inquiry
requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) and related California law. We conditionally
affirm the juvenile court’s orders terminating Kimberly’s and
Orlando’s parental rights and direct the court to ensure the
Department complies with the inquiry and, if necessary, notice
provisions of ICWA and related California law.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     The Juvenile Court Sustains a Petition Under
             Section 300 and Removes O.E.
       We described much of the factual and procedural
background of these proceedings in Kimberly and Orlando’s prior
appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating their parental
rights. (See In re O.E. (Sept. 14, 2022, B314713) [nonpub. opn.]
(O.E. I).) In August 2017, when O.E. was not quite two months
old, the Department detained him from Kimberly and Orlando
and filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b). The
Department alleged O.E. was at substantial risk of serious
physical harm because of, among other things, his positive
toxicology screen for marijuana after his birth, Kimberly’s history
of substance abuse, and Orlando’s history of illicit drug use. The
Department also alleged Kimberly’s current use of marijuana and
Orlando’s current use of amphetamine and methamphetamine
rendered them incapable of providing regular care and
supervision of O.E. (O.E. I.)
       At the detention hearing the juvenile court ordered O.E. to
remain detained and ordered monitored visits and weekly drug
testing for Kimberly and Orlando. In a jurisdiction and
disposition report the Department indicated that Kimberly and
Orlando had each missed two drug tests and that on another
occasion Kimberly tested positive for amphetamine,
methamphetamine, and cannabinoids. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
       At a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing the
juvenile court sustained all allegations in the petition, found O.E.
was a child described by section 300, subdivision (b), declared
him a dependent child of the court, and removed him from

                                 3
Kimberly and Orlando. The court ordered reunification services
for both parents, including a drug and alcohol program and
weekly drug testing. The court also ordered monitored visitation
for both parents. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)

      B.     The Juvenile Court Returns O.E. to Kimberly
      For the six-month review hearing, the Department reported
that Kimberly and Orlando were visiting O.E. consistently and
that the visits were “going well.” At the hearing, the juvenile
court found Kimberly and Orlando were in partial compliance
with their case plans and ordered family reunification services to
continue. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
      For the 12-month review hearing, the Department reported
that Kimberly was “progressing well” with her drug treatment
program and that the Department was allowing her to have
unmonitored and more frequent visits with O.E. Orlando
continued to have monitored visits two days a week. At the
hearing the juvenile court found that Kimberly’s compliance with
her case plan was “substantial, but not absolutely complete,” and
that Orlando’s was “partial.” (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
      For the 18-month review hearing, the Department reported
that Kimberly was living in a sober living home and had
six successful unmonitored overnight weekend visits with O.E.
The Department stated that Kimberly “demonstrate[d] the
parenting skills she [had] learned effectively” and that O.E.
appeared “to have a healthy attachment” to her. The
Department recommended placing O.E. with Kimberly at the
sober living home and providing her family preservation services.
The Department recommended against returning O.E. to Orlando
because, though Orlando was visiting O.E. consistently, he had

                                4
only partially complied with his case plan. At the hearing the
juvenile court returned O.E. to Kimberly and ordered family
maintenance services for Kimberly and enhancement services for
Orlando. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)

     C.      The Department Files a Supplemental Petition Under
             Section 387, and the Juvenile Court Detains O.E.
             from Kimberly
      For a section 364 review hearing in October 2019, the
Department reported Kimberly had “struggled with her sobriety
and relapsed twice,” testing positive for methamphetamine in
May and June 2019. Kimberly had moved out of the sober living
home and was “disconnected from her recovery supports.” She
and O.E. were living with Orlando’s father. Kimberly agreed to
participate in family preservation services to avoid having O.E.
removed from her again. The Department reported that Orlando
was not in compliance with his case plan and was not cooperating
with the Department, but that, according to Kimberly, he visited
O.E. weekly. At the hearing the juvenile court found Kimberly
and Orlando were in partial compliance with their case plans and
ordered O.E. to remain placed with Kimberly. (O.E. I, supra,
B314713.)
      In July 2020 the Department filed a supplemental petition
under section 387, asking the court to remove O.E. from
Kimberly. The Department alleged Kimberly was not capable of
providing O.E. with regular care and supervision because, among
other things, she was currently abusing marijuana,
methamphetamine, and alcohol; was not participating in a drug
program with weekly testing, as ordered by the court; and had

                               5
been arrested for bringing controlled substances into a prison, in
violation of Penal Code section 4573. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
       The Department reported that law enforcement had
executed a search warrant for methamphetamine and related
paraphernalia at the home of Orlando’s father and had arrested
Kimberly for smuggling drugs to Orlando, who was in jail for
drug-related offenses. Kimberly’s roommate at the home of
Orlando’s father said Kimberly had “not been honest” about her
drug use and knew “how to manipulate the system,” for example,
by getting high only immediately after her drug tests. The
roommate stated that when Kimberly used drugs she would keep
O.E. in the room with her all day and not let him out, though
O.E. cried and said, “I want out.” (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
       In July 2020 the juvenile court held a detention hearing on
the supplemental petition. The court detained O.E. from
Kimberly and ordered family reunification services for her and
Orlando. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)

      D.     The Juvenile Court Sustains the Supplemental
             Petition and (Again) Removes O.E.
      In a September 2020 jurisdiction and disposition report, the
Department indicated O.E. was again living in the home of his
previous foster parents, where he appeared happy, comfortable,
and affectionate toward his caregivers. Kimberly and Orlando
remained incarcerated. The Department reported that, in
searching the home of Orlando’s father, law enforcement found
methamphetamine, scales, and baggies, which resulted in
Kimberly’s arrest. A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
report reflected that Kimberly admitted smuggling
methamphetamine into a jail facility for Orlando. Kimberly was

                                6
released shortly after her June 2020 arrest, but she was arrested
again in July 2020, this time for violating probation conditions
related to a previous offense. She was now serving a three-year
sentence, with a scheduled release date of (as the Department
later reported) October 2021. Orlando was scheduled for release
on March 6, 2021. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
       In March 2021 the juvenile court held a jurisdiction
hearing on the supplemental petition and sustained all the
allegations. The court continued the disposition hearing for the
Department to file a last minute information report regarding
Kimberly’s and Orlando’s progress in their programs. The
Department did so, reporting that Kimberly was participating in
several programs where she was incarcerated. The Department
also reported that, after Orlando was released from incarceration
on March 6, 2021, the Department monitored a visit between him
and O.E., during which both appeared “very happy.” Three days
after the visit, Orlando tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
       At the disposition hearing, held later in March 2021, the
juvenile court removed O.E. from Kimberly, declined under
section 361.5, subdivision (a)(3)(A), to order family reunification
services for her or Orlando, and ordered monitored visitation for
both parents. The court set the matter for a selection and
implementation hearing under section 366.26. (O.E. I, supra,
B314713.)

      E.   The Juvenile Court Terminates Kimberly’s and
           Orlando’s Parental Rights, and We Reverse
     In a July 2021 report for the section 366.26 hearing, the
Department indicated O.E. was having weekly monitored visits

                                 7
with Orlando and weekly monitored telephone visits with
Kimberly. The Department reported that Orlando’s visits with
O.E. were “appropriate and productive” and that O.E. appeared
“happy and comfortable around” Orlando. In the one telephone
visit between Kimberly and O.E. that the Department described,
O.E. appeared reluctant to talk with his mother. When his
caregivers prompted him to speak with her on the telephone, he
said, “I don’t want to. Do I have to?” When told he did, O.E. and
Kimberly had a short conversation where Kimberly “inquired as
to his wellbeing.” O.E. answered her questions with “yes” or “no”
and did not appear “engaged” in the conversation. The
Department recommended the court terminate Kimberly’s and
Orlando’s parental rights. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
       Orlando, for his part, filed a section 388 petition, asking the
court to return O.E. to his care, reinstate Orlando’s family
reunification services, or have his visits with O.E. liberalized.
Stating he had completed parenting classes and a 12-step
recovery program, Orlando argued O.E. had “developed a close
bond with” him and loved to spend time with him. In a
declaration, Orlando described his progress in parenting and
substance abuse programs and his current weekly visits with
O.E.: “Our weekly monitored visits are great and productive.
The social worke[r] has observed that my son and I have a strong
bond and that we enjoy spending time together. My son
demonstrates how much he wants me in his life, as well as how
much he looks up to me.” Orlando also requested a bonding
study for him and O.E., which the juvenile court denied. (O.E. I,
supra, B314713.)
       On August 31, 2021 the juvenile court held an evidentiary
hearing on Orlando’s section 388 petition and the hearing under

                                  8
section 366.26. The court began by addressing the section 388
petition, admitting into evidence, among other items, Orlando’s
petition and attachments. Orlando testified about his progress in
his parenting and substance abuse programs and his recent
weekly visits with O.E. He testified that at the start of these
visits O.E. would smile and run to him, give him a hug, and
remain by him, not letting Orlando out of his sight. During the
visits O.E. also invited Orlando to his house and wanted to show
Orlando “things in his room.” Orlando said O.E. looked up to him
“as a strong male role model.” The court denied Orlando’s
petition. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
       Turning to the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court
heard testimony from Kimberly, who stated she was scheduled
for release on September 12, 2021. She said that, before she was
incarcerated, O.E. lived with her for “about a year and a half.”
She also testified that, while incarcerated, she visited with O.E.
twice each week by telephone and that, during these visits, O.E.
would tell her that he loved her and missed her. Counsel for
Kimberly and counsel for Orlando argued the court should not
terminate their clients’ parental rights because the parental-
benefit exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)
applied. (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
       The juvenile court terminated Kimberly’s and Orlando’s
parental rights, finding no exception to adoption applied. The
court found: “The court notes that mother’s and father’s
visitation has been seemingly appropriate and pleasant. No
issues with the visitation. But the court also finds that, as to
father, he has not served a parental role in this minor’s life. . . .
Since the minor was two months old, when this case started, the
father has not been, really, a father to the minor. But the court

                                  9
does note that recently father’s visits have been appropriate. But
the court cannot find that the father’s bond with the child is more
than just an emotional bond. The court cannot find that he
serves [a] parental role in this child’s life.” (O.E. I, supra,
B314713.)
       The juvenile court continued: “As to mother, the court is
very concerned with what happened when the child was in the
mother’s care. Mother had an opportunity, a very great
opportunity, to keep the child in her care when child was
returned to her. But she squandered that when she diced by
bringing narcotics to the father while in custody while the child
was in her care. I think that decision is revealing as to how
committed she is to the child’s welfare.”2 (O.E. I, supra,
B314713.)
       The juvenile court concluded: “The court cannot find that
terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child,
when the child is in a safe home with caregivers that love him
and want to give him stability. And the court cannot find that
the child would be greatly harmed by terminating parental
rights. . . . [The] court finds that any benefit to the child from the
relationship with mother and father is outweighed by the
physical and emotional benefit of adoption and stability and
permanency of the adoption and that adoption is in the best
interests of the child.” (O.E. I, supra, B314713.)
       Kimberly and Orlando appealed from the juvenile court’s
order terminating their parental rights. We reversed, concluding
that the juvenile court failed to consider whether O.E. would
benefit from continuing his relationship with Kimberly and

2    The juvenile court appeared to use the word “diced” to
mean “gambled” or “gambled away.”

                                 10
Orlando, as required by In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614
(Caden C.), and that neither the Department nor the juvenile
court complied with ICWA’s inquiry requirements. (O.E. I,
supra, B314713.)

      F.     On Remand the Juvenile Court Again Terminates
             Kimberly’s and Orlando’s Parental Rights
       In September 2022 the juvenile court reinstated Kimberly’s
and Orlando’s parental rights and ordered monitored visitation.
The court also ordered a bonding study for both parents.
Regarding ICWA, the court ordered the Department to
“investigate American Indian heritage with both sides of the
family” and to report on “who [the Department] interviewed and
who was available.” The court set the matter for a selection and
implementation hearing under section 366.26.
       In a December 2022 report for the section 366.26 hearing,
the Department stated that in October 2022 O.E. had resumed
weekly monitored visits with Kimberly and Orlando for the first
time in three months. The visit was “appropriate and
productive,” O.E. appeared “content and comfortable,” and
Kimberly, Orlando, and O.E. were “engaged” as they played
together.
       In November and December 2022, however, O.E.’s
caregiver cancelled two visits because O.E. “refused to attend”
and “threw a big tantrum.” When O.E. arrived for the next
weekly visit, he told the social worker he did not want to see his
parents. When the social worker asked why, O.E. said he wanted
to visit Orlando but not Kimberly because, when O.E. lived with
Kimberly, she would not let him out of the room. Nonetheless,
O.E. visited with Kimberly and Orlando that day, and the

                               11
Department reported that O.E. “appeared very comfortable being
in close proximity with his parents,” that Kimberly, Orlando, and
O.E. “had lots of laughs together,” and that O.E. “enjoyed the
visit as much as the parents.” The following week, Kimberly and
Orlando greeted O.E. with hugs, which O.E. “reciprocate[d],” and
“the family remained engaged during the visit time and displayed
laughs and joy.”
       In a March 2023 report the Department described the
family visits as “positive and productive.” At the start of one
visit, O.E. “appeared to be happy and came in on his own to see
his parents.” The Department described a January 2023 visit as
“full of positive energy and much fun” and stated the “parents’
efforts are successful to entertain the child and create fun
memories.” The Department similarly described other visits as
“very positive” and stated the “bonding of the family is observed
to grow stronger with each visit.”
       In April 2023 the Department reported that, when asked
where his home was, O.E. said his caregivers’ home was his home
and that O.E. nodded “yes” when asked whether he wanted to
stay in the caregivers’ home. The Department submitted the
court-ordered bonding study performed by Dr. Alfredo Crespo.
Dr. Crespo reported that O.E. was “understandably primarily
attached to [his] caregivers,” that O.E. “did not appear
particularly attached to” Orlando or Kimberly, and that, in
Dr. Crespo’s opinion, O.E.’s “best interests are better served” by
adoption rather than legal guardianship.
       On April 28, 2023 the juvenile court held a hearing under
section 366.26. The court received into evidence the
Department’s reports. Counsel for Kimberly objected to portions
of the bonding study containing psychological evaluations of

                               12
Kimberly and Orlando and one paragraph in the “Summary of
Evaluations, Opinions and Recommendations” section discussing
Kimberly’s and Orlando’s “highly troubled personal histories.”
The court sustained the objections, excluded those portions, and
admitted the remainder of the study.
       The court heard testimony from Kimberly, who stated she
had been visiting with O.E. weekly during the previous year. She
testified that during recent visits they had gone to a trampoline
park, seen a movie, played games, and worked on O.E.’s writing
and counting. Kimberly said that when they play, O.E. is
“engaged” and “enjoying himself.” Regarding the bonding study,
Kimberly stated Dr. Crespo observed her and Orlando with O.E.
for about 10 minutes. Kimberly testified that the “whole visit
was choreographed” and that Dr. Crespo told Kimberly and
Orlando “exactly how to visit with [O.E.] and what to say and
how to say it. And it was basically very awkward.” Kimberly
said Dr. Crespo directed her to ask O.E. what O.E. had discussed
with Dr. Crespo before Kimberly and Orlando entered the room
and that O.E. said “I don’t know” and “I don’t remember.”
       Counsel for Kimberly and counsel for Orlando argued the
parental-benefit exception under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), applied. Counsel for Orlando argued that,
according to the Department’s reports, O.E. was “well attached or
bonded to his parents and has positive interactions and emotions
towards them.” Counsel asked the court to give “little weight” to
the bonding study because Dr. Crespo observed O.E. with his
parents for only 10 minutes and Dr. Crespo’s conclusions
contradicted what Department social workers observed during
Kimberly and Orlando’s visits with O.E.

                                13
       The juvenile court again terminated Kimberly’s and
Orlando’s parental rights, finding they had not proved the
parental-benefit exception applied. The court found: “Without a
doubt, it is in [O.E.’s] best interest to remain with his [caregivers]
who have raised him and for him to be adopted by them.”
Applying the three-part test under Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
614, the court found Kimberly and Orlando had satisfied the first
element by regularly visiting with O.E. The court then turned to
the second element—“a relationship, the continuation of which
would benefit the child, meaning a substantial positive emotional
attachment.” The court stated that, although O.E. said in
December 2022 he did not want to visit with Kimberly, “things
have gotten better with regard to the visits,” and “it seems like
there’s a lot of fun that [O.E.] has on the visits. He’s happy at the
visits. But I don’t know that I can say that there is enough for a
beneficial relationship.” The court also stated that O.E. was
almost six years old and that, “with the exception of about a year,
he has been in the care of his prospective adoptive parents” for
his entire life.
       Addressing the third element, the court stated: “Assuming
a beneficial relationship exists, then I need to look at the benefits
of adoption. . . . And I can’t see that severing the relationship
that he has with his parents would be so detrimental to him that,
you know, spending these times at play areas and reading and
having fun with people who love him but are essentially
playmates, that severing that would be so detrimental that it
would outweigh the security and permanency that adoption
would offer him.” The court also cited Dr. Crespo’s conclusion
adoption was in O.E.’s best interests.

                                 14
      Concerning ICWA, the juvenile court found that the
Department had interviewed additional relatives, that there was
no one else the Department needed to interview, and that the
court had “no reason to know or believe that the Indian Child
Welfare Act applies.” Kimberly and Orlando timely appealed
from the orders terminating their parental rights.

                          DISCUSSION

      A.    The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Ruling the
            Parental-benefit Exception Did Not Apply

              1.   Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       The purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is “‘to select and
implement a permanent plan for the child’” after reunification
services have been terminated. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 630; see In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, 268.) If the
court determines “the child is likely to be adopted,” the court
must “terminate parental rights to allow for adoption.”
(Caden C., at p. 630; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re I.E. (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 683, 690.) “But if the parent shows that
termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one
specifically enumerated reason, the court should decline to
terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan.”
(Caden C., at pp. 630-631; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi),
(4)(A); In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 846.) One of those
reasons, the parental-benefit exception, requires the parent to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) “the parent has
regularly visited with the child,” (2) “the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship,” and (3) “terminating the

                                 15
relationship would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., at
p. 629; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); D.M., at p. 268.)
       “The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; see In re A.L.
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1151.)
       To establish the second element, “the parent must show
that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment
to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; see In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
833, 852.) The “focus is the child,” and “the relationship may be
shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Caden C., at p. 632;
see J.D., at p. 854.) In assessing the attachment, “courts often
consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk
about their parents.” (Caden C., at p. 632; see J.D., at p. 854.)
Bonding studies by “expert psychologists who have observed the
child and parent and can synthesize others’ observations” often
will be “an important source of information about the
psychological importance of the relationship for the child.”
(Caden C., at pp. 632-633; see In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 317.)
       “Concerning the third element—whether ‘termination
would be detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship—the
court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to
sever the relationship and choose adoption. [Citations.] Because

                               16
terminating parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the
parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume
that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.
[Citations.] What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the
child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in
effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home
without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633; see In re I.E., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 692; In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151.)
       We review the juvenile court’s findings on the first two
elements for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 639-640; In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 317.) “The third element—whether termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child—is somewhat different.
As in assessing visitation and the relationship between parent
and child, the court must make a series of factual
determinations. . . . [¶] Yet the court must also engage in a
delicate balancing of these determinations as part of assessing
the likely course of a future situation that’s inherently
uncertain. . . . The court makes the assessment by weighing the
harm of losing the relationship against the benefits of placement
in a new, adoptive home. And so, the ultimate decision—whether
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child
due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary
and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., at
p. 640; see In re I.E., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.)

                               17
            2.      The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Terminating
                    Kimberly’s and Orlando’s Parental Rights
       The juvenile court found, and the Department does not
dispute, Kimberly and Orlando carried their burden on the first
element of the parental-benefit exception—regular visitation.
Kimberly and Orlando argue the juvenile court erred in finding
they did not prove the second and third elements: that O.E.
would benefit from continuing the parental relationship and that
terminating the relationship would be detrimental to O.E.
       As discussed, although on a few occasions O.E. said he did
not want to visit with Kimberly, the evidence showed O.E.
generally enjoyed his visits with Kimberly and Orlando.
Kimberly and Orlando brought O.E. toys and games; O.E.
appeared comfortable, happy, and engaged; and the three of them
laughed and had fun. According to the Department, the bonds
between O.E. and his parents grew stronger with each visit. But
as the juvenile court stated in analyzing whether Kimberly and
Orlando had met their burden on the second element of the
parental-benefit exception, “there’s always going to be some
incidental benefit, and frequent and loving contact is not
enough.” (See In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25 [“Friendly
or affectionate visits are not enough.”]; In re Katherine J., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318 [“the beneficial relationship exception
demands something more than the incidental benefit a child
gains from any amount of positive contact with her natural
parent”]; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575
[parental-benefit exception “applies only where the court finds
regular visits and contact have continued or developed a
significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to
parent”].)

                                18
       And however positive O.E.’s relationship with Kimberly
and Orlando was, there was little evidence that terminating that
relationship would be detrimental to O.E. Although O.E. enjoyed
the visits, there was no evidence he looked forward to them or
was sad when they ended. As even the testimony of Kimberly
and Orlando reflected, O.E. was primarily interested in seeing
what toys Kimberly and Orlando brought, and neither Kimberly
nor Orlando said O.E. was sad when visits ended. Although
Orlando testified that at the beginning of visits O.E. would smile,
run to Orlando, and give him a hug, Kimberly testified O.E.
“barrels right through and wants to start doing whatever we
have, wants to see what’s in the bag.” Kimberly also testified
that, rather than offering hugs at the start of visits, O.E. would
hug her and Orlando when they “ask[ed] him for a hug” and that
O.E. hugged them because he was “prompted.” And although,
according to Orlando, O.E. invited him to his house and said he
wanted to show Orlando items in O.E.’s room, O.E. did not
appear sad at the end of visits and never said he wanted to spend
more time with Orlando. In sum, while the evidence indicated
O.E. enjoyed the visits, it did not show that ending them would
be harmful to O.E. (See In re I.E., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 692 [evidence the child “experienced no distress at the end of
visits” supported the juvenile court’s finding “the relationship
was not so substantial that its severance would be detrimental to
the child”]; In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1158-1159
[though the child viewed the father as “‘a fun, friendly person’ to
have visits with,” the child “had no difficulty separating from
father at the end of visits” and “was easily redirected when father
had missed scheduled video visits”]; cf. In re D.M., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 271 [children had lived with father for two to

                                19
eight years, wanted to return to him, and cried when visits
concluded]; In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 857-858 [child
frequently expressed a desire to go to his mother’s house, told her
he loved her, and sought her attention during visits]; In re B.D.
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1229, fn. 4 [children looked forward
to seeing their parents, greeted them with hugs, and expressed
sadness at the end of visits].)
       In contrast, the evidence O.E. would benefit from adoption
by his foster parents was significant. O.E. was placed with his
foster parents when he was seven weeks old and, at the time of
the hearing, had lived with them for approximately five of his
nearly six years. According to the Department, O.E. was “bonded
to [his caregivers] and identifies them as his parents.” O.E.
called one of his caregivers “mom.” O.E. described his caregivers’
home as his home and nodded “yes” when asked whether he
wanted to stay there. (See In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1158 [child “told social workers that she was very happy living
with the caregivers,” called them “‘“mommy,” “mom,” “dad,” and
“daddy,”’” and said “she loved them”].) The juvenile court did not
err in ruling the benefits of adoption outweighed any harm from
ending O.E.’s relationship with his parents.

            3.     The Juvenile Court Did Not Prejudicially Err in
                   Relying on the Bonding Study
       Kimberly and Orlando argue that Dr. Crespo’s bonding
study was flawed and that the juvenile court “relied almost
exclusively” on the study in finding that severing O.E.’s
relationship with his parents would not be detrimental. While
there were some problems with the bonding study, any error by
the court in relying on it was harmless.

                                20
       First, Kimberly and Orlando contend “Dr. Crespo’s
conclusions and recommendations . . . were premised on his
observation that [O.E.] was ‘highly integrated’ into the
caregivers’ blended family, and the ‘imminent removal’ of the
minor from their home would cause him ‘significant emotional
distress.’” They argue it was inappropriate for Dr. Crespo to
consider how O.E. would react to removal from his caregivers
because that was not a possibility, even if the court found the
parental-benefit exception applied. (See Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 634 [“Nothing that happens at the section 366.26
hearing allows the child to return to live with the parent.”]; In re
J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 860 [same].)
       While the court did refer to Dr. Crespo’s conclusion
“imminent removal from [the caregivers’] home would likely
cause [O.E.] significant emotional distress” (an inappropriate
consideration under Caden C.), the court did not appear to base
its decision on that conclusion. Indeed, before the juvenile court
mentioned Dr. Crespo’s report, the court stated that O.E. had
“spent almost his entire life with his prospective adoptive moms,”
that Kimberly and Orlando were “essentially playmates” for O.E.,
and that any harm from severing O.E.’s relationship with
Kimberly and Orlando was outweighed by “the security and
permanency that adoption would offer him.” These were
appropriate factors for the court to consider in determining
whether O.E.’s relationship with his parents was “so important to
the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t
outweigh its loss.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
       It was only after making these findings that the court
discussed Dr. Crespo’s report. Although the court mentioned
Dr. Crespo’s (irrelevant) conclusion O.E. would suffer emotional

                                21
distress if removed from his caregivers, the court also referred to
several relevant conclusions by Dr. Crespo, including that O.E.’s
contact with Kimberly was “emotionally taxing.” Dr. Crespo
appeared to base that conclusion on a report from O.E.’s
caregiver that her “main concern” about O.E. was his behavior
before and after seeing Kimberly and that O.E. was “fearful
vis-à-vis his ‘visits with [Kimberly and Orlando].’” How O.E. felt
about visiting his parents was an appropriate consideration for
the court. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [in deciding
whether a child would benefit from continuing the relationship,
the juvenile court should consider “‘the “positive” or “negative”
effect of interaction between parent and child’”]; In re M.V. (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1185 (M.V.) [same].)
       The court also stated that, according to Dr. Crespo, O.E.
“did not appear particularly attached” to Kimberly or Orlando
and that he “resisted their displays of affection, in contrast to his
acceptance of similar displays of affection initiated by one of his
prospective adoptive moms.” While Kimberly and Orlando did
not have to prove O.E. was primarily bonded to them rather than
to his caregivers (see In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 859),
they did have to show O.E. had a substantial, emotional bond
with them, and one way of assessing that bond was by observing
how O.E. responded to his parents’ displays of affection. That
was also an appropriate matter for Dr. Crespo to observe and for
the juvenile court to consider. (See In re L.A.-O. (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 197, 204 [“at the beginning of visits, the children
were happy; they would run to [their mother] and hug her”]; see
also In re M.G., supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 850 [bonding study’s
failure to “informatively analyz[e] the parent-child interactions”
was “a fatal lack of information”].)

                                 22
       Second, Kimberly and Orlando contend “the bonding study
was really a psychological evaluation of the parents.” It is true
that 13 pages of Dr. Crespo’s 23-page report consisted of
psychological evaluations of Kimberly and Orlando, including
psychological test results and descriptions of their appearances,
substance abuse, and past relationships, which were beyond the
scope of Dr. Crespo’s assignment. But the juvenile court
sustained an objection by counsel for Kimberly to that part of the
report and stated it would “not be considering those portions of
the bonding study.” Kimberly and Orlando do not argue the
court relied on any portion of the study not in evidence.
       Kimberly and Orlando also argue that, to the extent the
bonding study assessed O.E.’s bond with them, the study was
unreliable because Dr. Crespo observed Orlando, Kimberly, and
O.E. together for only 10 minutes and spent some of that time
directing Kimberly and Orlando to ask O.E. questions about the
child’s earlier conversation with Dr. Crespo. Had the court relied
exclusively on this 10-minute interaction as evidence of O.E.’s
relationship with his parents, Kimberly and Orlando might have
a point. But there was considerable additional evidence of O.E.’s
relationship with Kimberly and Orlando, including the
Department’s reports of monitored visits for the two-year period
from March 2021 to March 2023. And the court reviewed those
reports.
       Kimberly and Orlando cite M.V., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
1155, where the court held the juvenile court erred in relying on
an “inadequate, nonresponsive assessment” performed by
Dr. Crespo. (Id. at p. 1182.) In M.V. the Department alleged the
parents sexually exploited their child. (Id. at p. 1162.) The court
described the “extremely troubling, high-conflict proceedings,”

                                23
where “the adults in [the child’s] life gave difficult-to-reconcile
accounts of her behavior, attachments, and relationships,” as
“exactly the kind of case in which a bonding study is valuable.”
(Id. at p. 1180.) Dr. Crespo, participating by video call rather
than in person, observed the six-year-old child interacting with
each parent for only a few minutes, and rather than watching the
child interact with her parents, he spent the time questioning
them. (Id. at pp. 1172, 1180.) Although the record showed the
child “repeatedly expressed a desire to live with [her parents] and
to continue her relationship with them,” was “upset and
sometimes cried when she was unable to visit with them in
person,” and “experienced distress when separating from her
parents and questioned why they could not live together” (id. at
pp. 1179-1180), the juvenile court in M.V. terminated parental
rights, stating it “‘gave much weight to Dr. Crespo’s analysis’” (id.
at p. 1173). The juvenile court also denied the parents’ request
for a supplemental report addressing the impact on the child of
severing the relationship. (Id. at p. 1168.) The court in M.V. held
that, “under the very specific circumstances of this case, we
conclude it was an abuse of discretion not to order a
supplemental bonding study in response to Crespo’s inadequate,
nonresponsive assessment.” (Id. at p. 1182.)
       Although Dr. Crespo’s bonding study in this case shared
some of the same deficiencies as his study in M.V.,3 other aspects
of the bonding study here were more relevant and reliable.
Dr. Crespo observed Kimberly, Orlando, and O.E. in person, not

3     As in this case, the “majority of Crespo’s report concerned
his observations and psychological evaluations of the parents,”
and he “offered unsolicited opinions about the best permanent
plan.” (M.V., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1177, 1181.)

                                 24
on a video call, and, at least briefly, watched them interact
naturally, playing “hangman” and “tic-tac-toe,” which, Dr. Crespo
reported, “O.E. enjoyed as suggested by frequent, joyous,
laughter.” In addition, while the juvenile court in M.V. “‘gave
much weight to Dr. Crespo’s analysis’” (M.V., supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1185), the juvenile court here relied
primarily on evidence of O.E.’s relationship with his parents from
sources other than the bonding study, including the length of
time O.E. had spent with his caregivers and the Department’s
descriptions of O.E.’s visits with his parents over several years.
Finally, the record in this case does not contain evidence, as there
was in M.V., the child wanted to continue his relationship with
his parents.
       Kimberly and Orlando’s reliance on In re M.G., supra,
80 Cal.App.5th 836 is also misplaced. In that case the juvenile
court ordered a bonding study to assess the relationship between
a non-verbal three-year-old and his developmentally disabled
parents. (Id. at p. 850.) Rather than analyze parent-child
interactions, the bonding study focused on the child’s numerous
developmental, psychological, and medical needs. (Ibid.) The
court in In re M.G. held the study did “not provide substantial
evidence to support a ruling that no emotional bond exists.” (Id.
at p. 851.)

      B.     Remand Is Required for the Department and the
             Juvenile Court To Comply with ICWA
      “ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.101 et seq.) set minimal procedural protections for state
courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing
them in foster care or adoptive homes” (In re Rylei S. (2022)

                                25
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316), including “‘ask[ing] each participant “at
the commencement” of a child custody proceeding “whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child”’” (In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500,
review granted July 26, 2023, S279743; see 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a);
In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 77). California law “‘more
broadly imposes on social services agencies and juvenile courts
(but not parents) an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire”
whether a child in the dependency proceeding “is or may be an
Indian child.”’” (J.C., at p. 77; see § 224.2, subd. (a); In re A.R.
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 237.)
       “[S]ection 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the child
protective agency to ask ‘the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and
where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’”
(In re J.C., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 77; see In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 437; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)
Although this duty is “commonly referred to as the ‘initial duty of
inquiry,’ it ‘begins with the initial contact’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and
continues throughout the dependency proceedings.” (J.C., at
p. 77; see Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) 599 U.S. 255, 268,
[143 S.Ct. 1609, 1623] [when a state court adjudicates a foster
care or adoption proceeding, “ICWA governs from start to finish”];
In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 319.) In addition, the
“‘juvenile court “has a responsibility to ascertain that [the child
protective agency] has conducted an adequate investigation”’
[citation], and must determine whether ICWA applies to the
child’s proceedings [citation].” (In re G.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th

                                  26
at p. 31; see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); J.C., at p. 78; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.481(b)(3).) The court may not “find that ICWA does
not apply when the absence of evidence that a child is an Indian
child results from a [child protective agency] inquiry that is not
proper, adequate, or demonstrative of due diligence.” (In re
Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 408; see In re L.S. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198.)
       In O.E. I, supra, B314713 we held the Department had not
complied with its duty of inquiry because, although Kimberly and
Orlando denied Indian ancestry, the Department failed to ask
known and readily available members of O.E.’s extended family
about whether O.E is or may be an Indian child, including O.E.’s
paternal grandfather, a paternal aunt, and two maternal aunts.
At the April 28, 2023 selection and implementation hearing after
remand, the juvenile court found that the Department had
interviewed O.E.’s parents and extended family members and
that ICWA did not apply. Kimberly and Orlando argue the
Department’s additional inquiry was inadequate because the
Department failed to interview a maternal aunt.4
       Kimberly and Orlando are correct. The Department
conducted an adequate investigation on the paternal side of the
family by interviewing the paternal grandfather and the paternal
aunt, neither of whom believed O.E. had any Indian ancestry.
But the only effort the Department made to contact the maternal

4      Although the parties’ briefs and our opinion in In re O.E. I
refer to two maternal aunts, it appears there is only one maternal
aunt whom the parties refer to alternately by her full first name
and a nickname.

                                27
aunt was to call and leave a voicemail message. That was not
enough.
      The Department argues it “substantially complied” with
our directions in O.E. I. The Department contends ICWA did not
require it “to conduct further inquiry” if the maternal aunt was
“unreachable or refuses to speak with the social worker.” But
because the Department did not make a second attempt to reach
the maternal aunt when she did not call back, it is unclear
whether she was unreachable or refused to speak to the
Department. It is equally likely the maternal aunt didn’t get the
message or simply forgot to call back.
      Finally, we cannot say the Department’s failure to follow
up with the maternal aunt was harmless. Given the
Department’s failure to interview any maternal family members
(other than Kimberly), “the information in the hands of [the
maternal aunt was] likely to be meaningful in determining
whether [O.E.] was an Indian child.” (In re Antonio R. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 421, 435.)5

5      The Department argues Kimberly and Orlando forfeited
their challenge to the juvenile court’s ICWA findings by not
objecting at the section 366.26 hearing. However, “the law allows
a parent to raise failure to comply with ICWA on appeal, even if
the issue was not raised in the trial court, because ‘[t]he parent is
in effect acting as a surrogate for the tribe in raising compliance
issues on appeal.’” (In re A.R., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 204;
see In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706.)

                                 28
                        DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s orders terminating Kimberly’s and
Orlando’s parental rights under section 366.26 are conditionally
affirmed. The juvenile court is directed to ensure the
Department complies fully with the inquiry and, if necessary,
notice provisions of ICWA and related California law, including
asking the maternal aunt about the children’s possible Indian
ancestry.

                                    SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                 FEUER, J.

                 MARTINEZ, J.

                               29