Court Opinion

ID: 9917307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 21:12:58.910575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:13.056111
License: Public Domain

STATE OF VERMONT
 SUPERIOR COURT                                                    CIVIL DIVISION
 Washington Unit                                       Docket No. 507-11-19 Wnsc

 Jabbar Chandler,
        Plaintiff

       v.

 Martin Frink,
       Defendant

                Opinion and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

      Plaintiff is a Vermont inmate currently housed in Mississippi within a prison

run by a company called CoreCivic, which a Maryland company. Plaintiff has sued

the former warden of the prison based on an allegation that some of Plaintiff’s

personal property was lost or destroyed at the Mississippi prison. Defendant has

moved to dismiss, principally, on jurisdictional grounds. He maintains that he has

insufficient personal contacts with the State of Vermont to be called into court in

this jurisdiction. Indeed, he maintains that he is no longer even working at the

Mississippi prison. Defendant has submitted a number of facts in support of his

motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has not contested those facts.

      A pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction calls upon the

plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, which the court may

determine based on the pleadings and affidavits. See Roman Catholic Diocese of

Burlington, Inc. v. Paton Insulators, Inc., 146 Vt. 294, 296 (1985). The plaintiff’s

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burden is not heavy. Godino v. Cleanthes, 163 Vt. 237, 239 (1995). “In assessing

the submitted materials, the court eschews fact finding and simply accepts ‘properly

supported proffers of evidence’ as true and rules on the jurisdictional question as a

matter of law.” Schwartz v. Frankenhoff, 169 Vt. 287, 295 (1999). Generally, the

court will “take as true the allegations of the nonmoving party with regard to the

jurisdictional issues and resolve all factual disputes in his or her favor.” 5B Arthur

R. Miller et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1351 (3d ed.). On the other hand, where “a

defendant’s affidavit contesting jurisdiction is not refuted by a counter affidavit

filed by the plaintiff, the facts alleged in the defendant’s affidavit are accepted as

true.” Professional Group Travel, Ltd. v. Professional Seminar Consultants, Inc.,

483 N.E.2d 1291, 1295 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985).

      “Vermont’s long arm statute, 12 V.S.A. § 913(b), confers ‘jurisdiction over

nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.’”

Havill v. Woodstock Soapstone Co., 172 Vt. 625, 626 (2001) (citation omitted). The

Court has described the rudiments of due process limitations on personal

jurisdiction as follows:

      The Due Process Clause “protects an individual’s liberty interest in not
      being subject to the binding judgments” of a foreign state with which
      the individual has no meaningful contacts. A state court may assert
      jurisdiction and comport with due process where a nonresident
      defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such
      that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
      fair play and substantial justice.’” The critical consideration in
      determining if defendants’ activities satisfy the minimum contacts
      requirement is whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with
      the forum State are such that [the defendant] should reasonably
      anticipate being haled into court there.” This reasonableness
      requirement is met when the defendant purposefully directs activity

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      toward residents of a forum state and the litigation arises out of, or
      relates to, that activity. The reasonableness requirement also prevents
      a defendant from being subjected to jurisdiction on the basis of
      fortuitous, attenuated, or random contacts.

Dall v. Kaylor, 163 Vt. 274, 275–76 (1995) (citations omitted).

      The factual allegations of the Complaint and in Plaintiff’s response to the

motion to dismiss fail to show any conduct of Defendant that took place in or was

directed into Vermont. Plaintiff’s claim is that someone in the Mississippi prison

lost or destroyed his personal property, in Mississippi. The tortious conduct

occurred in Mississippi, while Plaintiff was in Mississippi. See Fallang v. Hickey,

532 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ohio 1988) (“A state has an especial interest in exercising

judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory. This is

because torts involve wrongful conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against

which it attempts to afford protection, by providing that a tortfeasor shall be liable

for damages which are the proximate result of his tort.”) (citation omitted)). The

sole fact supporting possible jurisdiction is that Defendant is employed by a

company that has contracted with Vermont to house some of its inmates. Without

more, though, that is insufficient to vest jurisdiction over an individual defendant in

this court.

      Even if this Court had jurisdiction over Corecivic,1 “jurisdiction over an

employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corporation which

1
 The Court makes no determination on that point. In Plaintiff’s response he also
requests that, if necessary, the complaint be amended to include CoreCivic. He has
provided no amended complaint, however, and the Court will not consider the
possible merits of such a claim until it is presented. Further, the Court does not
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employs him.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984);

Estabrook v. Wetmore, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (N.H. 1987) (“the acts of a corporate

employee performed in his corporate capacity generally do not form the basis for

jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity”). Instead, jurisdiction under such

circumstances focuses on the actual conduct of the individual and whether “the

officer knew or should have known his conduct could have a direct, substantial

effect in” the forum state. Estabrook, 529 A.2d at 958; see Escude Cruz v. Ortho

Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction appropriate if

individual corporate actor is “guiding spirit” or “central figure” behind the

misconduct in forum state); Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Industries, Inc., 204

F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2000) (jurisdiction appropriate over “corporate officers who

actively and personally involved themselves in [mis]conduct” in forum state). In

this instance, the Court concludes Defendant would not have been on notice that he

could be sued in Vermont in connection with the allegations of the present action.

        WHEREFORE, the action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the

Defendant.

        Electronically signed on March 23, 2020 at 02:12 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F.
7(d).

                                               ________________________
                                               Timothy B. Tomasi
                                               Superior Court Judge

know whether, after reviewing this ruling, Plaintiff will choose to proceed in
Mississippi or Vermont; and whether he intends to continue to pursue this
Defendant, CoreCivic, the Vermont Department of Corrections, or all of them.
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