Court Opinion

ID: 9475008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:14:44.92082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:27.378551
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that Specter’s right to due process was violated by the government’s use of a witness whose agreement with the government was contingent upon the successful prosecution of crimes, and by the government’s failure to produce Jencks material.
Although an agreement granting government favors to a prosecution witness in return for truthful testimony is not per se improper, see United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939, 97 S.Ct. 354, 50 L.Ed.2d 308 (1976), there must be some limits to the scope of such agreements. In 1962, the Fifth Circuit held that without some “justification or explanation, we cannot sanction a contingent fee agreement to produce evidence against particular named defendants as to crimes not yet committed.” Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir.1962). Judge John R. Brown stated in his concurrence that “[w]hat we hold is that, recognized as is the role of informer in the enforcement of criminal laws, there comes a time when enough is more than enough — it is just too much.” Id. at 445 (Brown, J., concurring specially). I believe that the government’s contingent agreement with Adams was “just too much.”
In United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2138, 85 L.Ed.2d 496 (1985), a panel of this Court held that the government cannot offer favorable treatment to a witness contingent upon the success of prosecution. . Although this Court, sitting en banc, vacated that decision, we, “by ultimately dividing evenly, * * * served notice that benefits made contingent upon subsequent indictments or convictions skate very close to, if indeed they do not cross, the limits imposed by the due process clause.” United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 201 n. 9 (1st Cir.1985).
In the case now before us, however, it is apparent that the government has decided not to heed this notice, as its arrangement with Adams went even further than the one in Waterman. In Waterman, the government’s witness only provided testimony regarding accomplished facts, whereas, in this case, Adams not only testified regarding accomplished facts, but also set up the underlying criminal activities.1 Ad*940ditionally, the interest Adams had in Spec-tor’s conviction was much greater than the witness’s interest in Waterman. In the latter case, the witness agreed to testify in return for a mere recommendation of a two-year sentence reduction. In this case, in exchange for him “providing truthful information to and complete cooperation with United States law enforcement agencies in any matter in which he is asked about,” the government agreed to provide immunity for Adams, his parents, his children, and his girlfriend from criminal charges arising out of information Adams provided or out of any other investigations currently being conducted. The government also agreed to limit Adams’s maximum penalty exposure for indictments arising from current or previous investigations to forty-five years.2 Most importantly, the government stated that it would consider reducing or foregoing entirely even this limited exposure after reviewing “the extent and value of Mr. Adams’ information and cooperation as it relates to successfully solving and prosecuting crimes. The more important we deem that information and cooperation, the more likely the reduction of charges and his sentencing risk.”3 Tr. at 3-42 (emphasis added). I, along with the First Circuit, “can think of no instance in which the government would be justified in making a promised benefit contingent upon the return of an indictment or a guilty verdict.” See Dailey, 759 F.2d at 201.
Given the serious credibility questions raised by the contingent nature of Adams’s agreement with the government, it is especially troubling that Spector was denied access to the taped diaries Adams made of his activities for the government.
In my opinion, the tapes were Jencks material. The district court, after an in camera review of one of the tapes, stated that “[t]he tape has been turned over in its entirety as Jencks material of the witness Adams.” Tr. at 3-11. There was apparently nothing to distinguish the tape turned over to Spector from the other tapes. The tape produced was, like the others, a daily diary of Adams’s activities on the government's behalf. It was neither the first nor the last tape made. The only difference appears to be that, although the government knew Adams was recording a daily *941diary,4 see Tr. at 3-123, it only requested the tape containing a particular telephone conversation between Adams and Kelly. See Tr. at 3-10.
The government argues that the attorney-client privilege shields the tapes from production, in spite of the fact that it admitted the “possibility that the tapes would be disclosed” to the government, Brief of Appellee at 25, and that one, in fact, has been disclosed. As the government acknowledges,
A communication is “confidential” if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client.

Id.

Although Adams claimed that he did not know why he was recording the diaries, his testimony made the purpose apparent:
Q. Would it be fair to say that during this investigation and work that you were doing, that you were very, very concerned that you’d get full credit for all the — for successfully solving crimes? You didn’t want to solve a crime that you didn’t get credit for so you — somehow you would report it, didn’t you, as soon as you did something?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Didn’t you keep a personal log of this, because you probably couldn’t trust the government necessarily?
A. I don’t trust the government, I trust Tom Dittmeier.
Tr. at 3-118.
Even if the tapes were originally protected by the attorney-client privilege, any privilege was waived when Adams told the government about the tapes and delivered one to it. In United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir.1972), this Court stated:
Notwithstanding our recognition that the attorney-client privilege attached to the information contained in the accountant’s workpapers under the circumstances existing here, we find that by filing the amended returns the taxpayers communicated, at least in part, the substance of that information to the government, and they must now disclose the detail underlying the reported data. A client may waive the privilege which protects what he earlier confided to his attorney or his attorney to him. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2327 (McNaughton Rev. 1961). Here, Cote, the accountant, testified that the information on his workpapers was later transcribed onto the amended returns which were filed by the taxpayers with the government. This disclosure effectively waived the privilege not only to the transmitted data but also as to the details underlying that information. As stated in United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 448 (2 Cir.1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821, 79 S.Ct. 33, 3 L.Ed.2d 62: “[T]he privilege attaches to the substance of a communication and not to the particular words used to express the communication’s content.” See also United States v. Shibley, 112 F.Supp. 734, 742 (S.D.Cal.1953). Cf. Rule 5-11, Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note 2 [disclosure of “any significant part” of a communication waives the privilege]; 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2327 at 638 [the “doctrine of completeness” is analogous to this principle]; McCormick, Law of Evidence § 93 (1954).
Cote, 456 F.2d at 144-45 (footnotes omitted).
*942Even assuming, arguendo, that the tapes were privileged, and that there was no waiver, I would reverse on this issue. “It is clear that government witnesses have a right to assert the attorney-client privilege on cross-examination. However, where assertion of the privilege unduly restricts a defendant’s cross-examination, the witness’ direct testimony may have to be stricken.” United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 170-71 (2d Cir.1981) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916, 102 S.Ct. 1771, 72 L.Ed.2d 176 (1982).
I believe that Adams’s testimony should not have been allowed under any circumstances, given the great incentive to fabricate evidence that the contingent agreement provided. To compound this failure, the district court severely restricted Spec-tor’s ability to attack Adams’s credibility on cross-examination, by denying access to tapes which dealt with the exact matters about which Adams testified. Accordingly, I would reverse.

. The panel in Waterman pointed out that it was not faced with the situation of a paid informant who might be more likely to entrap a defendant because of the contingent nature of her or his compensation. Nor do the facts before us resemble government participation in illegal activity with a defendant prior to trial through undercover agents or paid infor*940mants which, although not technically entrapment, is so outrageous as to deny the defendant due process of law.
Waterman, 732 F.2d at 1530 (citations omitted).

. The government agreed to limit any indictments to:
1) Two charges of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), with a maximum exposure of fifteen years per charge. (The usual exposure for a violation of this statute forbidding persons to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or to possess with intent to manufacture distribute, or dispense a controlled substance would be up to twenty years imprisonment or a fine of up to $250,000, or both. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).)
2) A maximum exposure of ten years for any charges under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201 (tax evasion) or 7206(1) (perjury). (The standard exposure for a violation of § 7201 is not more than five years or a fine of not more than $100,000, or both. The standard exposure for a violation of § 7206(1) is up to three years or up to $100,000, or both.)
3) A maximum exposure of five years for any charges brought within the above indictments pursuant to Title 31 (Money and Finance). The fact that limiting his criminal exposure to forty-five years could be considered a bargain is not surprising considering Adams's recent activities. Adams testified that he had been working as a "collector” and bodyguard for drug dealers. He stated:
Specifically I was a man tracker and investigator. If they had a collection problem where somebody might have skipped town without paying for a large amount of drugs or their life was in a situation due to the drug wars among themselves, I would handle the investigation myself, track down the people all over the country and provide security also in Miami in case there was a life threat by the dealers.
Tr. at 3-33.
He also admitted that he bought and sold cocaine himself.

. Although the agreement required Adams to provide only truthful information, this requirement was largely meaningless considering the great incentive to fabricate evidence. Additionally, there were, practically speaking, no real means of verification — the corroborating witnesses were required under their own plea agreements to cooperate with the prosecution.

. It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that Adams testified that the government’s agents knew during the investigation that he had been taping daily notes, the government claims to have only found out about the tapes ‘‘[d]uring the course of Adams’ cross-examination." Brief of Appellee at 22. This claim would not explain how the government obtained the one tape. Either the government asked Adams for the tape, or Adams handed it over out of the blue. If the former were the case, the government would have had prior knowledge of that tape and, presumably, of the others. If Adams just handed them the tape, it only seems logical that the government would have asked why it had been made and would have learned of the others.
Adams’s testimony also disposes of the government's argument that the tapes are not within the Jencks Act because Adams’s diary was "not disclosed to government agents and attorneys.” Id. at 24.