Court Opinion

ID: 9404466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 05:07:02.420903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:14.134613
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

MERRITT ARCHER III,                                                  UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     June 22, 2023
                Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 359693
                                                                     Muskegon Circuit Court
JONAH BUNCE,                                                         LC No. 20-003478-NI

                Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MURRAY and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant, Jonah Bunce, appeals as on leave granted1 the trial court’s order denying his
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of plaintiff, Merritt Archer, III.
We reverse and remand.

                 I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        In 2019 plaintiff was severely injured while playing in a high-school lacrosse game.
Plaintiff was attempting to prevent a shot on goal, when defendant launched a ball from his lacrosse
stick, striking plaintiff in the side of his face with the ball. Game officials did not penalize
defendant for taking this shot.

       Plaintiff later filed suit, alleging in part reckless conduct against defendant. Defendant
moved for summary disposition, contending there was no genuine dispute of fact that his actions
did not rise to the level of reckless conduct. The trial court agreed that plaintiff’s injury was
inherent to the game of lacrosse, and was therefore reasonably foreseeable. However, it denied
the motion for summary disposition because there was a genuine question of fact whether
defendant’s actions amounted to reckless conduct. This appeal followed.

1
    Archer v Bunce, 980 NW2d 712 (Mich, 2022).

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                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         We review de novo motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The purpose of a (C)(10) motion for
summary disposition is to test the factual sufficiency of a complaint. El-Khalil v Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Summary disposition under this
subsection is proper where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine question of fact.
Maiden, 461 Mich at 120. Our review of such a motion considers “affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties . . . in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion.” Id. (citation omitted). Under the burden-shifting framework
of this rule:

       [T]he moving party has the initial burden of supporting its position by affidavits,
       depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. The burden then shifts to
       the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Where
       the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a nonmoving party, the
       nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must
       go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of
       material fact exists. If the opposing party fails to present documentary evidence
       establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly
       granted. [Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362-363; 547 NW2d 314
       (1996) (citations omitted).]

                                   III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

        Participants in recreational sports accept the risks “inherent in that activity.” Ritchie-
Gamester v Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 87; 597 NW2d 517 (1999). “[P]layers participate with the
expectation that no liability will arise unless a participant’s actions exceed the normal bounds of
conduct associated with the activity.” Id. at 94. As such, participants in recreational activities
may recover in tort for injuries sustained from a coparticipant’s reckless misconduct. Id. at 94-95.
A rule violation is not by itself sufficient to show reckless conduct. Id. at 91-94; Behar v Fox, 249
Mich App 314, 319; 642 NW2d 426 (2001). Rather, reckless conduct places the actor in a “class
with the wilful doer of wrong.” Behar, 249 Mich App at 319 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

       The only respect in which his attitude is less blameworthy than that of the
       intentional wrongdoer is that, instead of affirmatively wishing to injure another, he
       is merely willing to do so. The difference is that between him who casts a missile
       intending that it shall strike another and him who casts it where he has reason to
       believe it will strike another, being indifferent whether it does so or not. [Id.
       (quotation marks and citations omitted.]

        The question here is whether there was evidence of reckless conduct sufficient to create a
genuine question of fact. In his motion for summary disposition, defendant presented evidence
establishing that his shot on goal was not reckless. This included testimony from the coaches who
observed the play at issue and from lacrosse officials who reviewed the video of the play. Each of

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these witnesses opined that there was nothing improper about defendant’s shot on goal that led to
plaintiff’s injury.

        Defendant also submitted video evidence depicting the play. The video footage shows
defendant signaling that he was open to his teammate who was proceeding up the opposite side of
the field. The teammate passes the ball to defendant, but the ball grounded. Defendant scoops up
the ball and then takes a shot on goal. The video shows plaintiff defending near the goal at the
time of the pass. As defendant scoops up the ball, plaintiff races toward defendant. Defendant
was on the outside and wound up his shot, which a witness testified was normal conduct for an
attacker on the outside. As defendant fires his shot, plaintiff stops directly in front of him and was
struck in the face. The force of the impact broke plaintiff’s jaw in several places.

       The video evidence is not conclusive of certain facts. The videographer took the video
from the stands. Both plaintiff and defendant appear at a distance and at varying angles from the
videographer. Therefore, the video does not show defendant’s point of view when he decided to
shoot. It also does not establish whether defendant saw plaintiff’s position on the field or,
obviously, the intent of either player. But the video evidence does conclusively establish that
defendant had already squared up with the goal and was winding up for his shot when plaintiff had
begun to close him out. The video also established that the entire event lasted no more than two
seconds.

        Defendant also provided evidence that his shot on goal was within the bounds of a normal
game of lacrosse. Left unrebutted, his evidence would demonstrate that his “actions did not rise
to the level of reckless misconduct.” See Ritchie-Gamester, 461 Mich at 90 n 10. Therefore,
plaintiff had the burden to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that defendant’s conduct went beyond the ordinary conduct of the game, see Quinto, 451 Mich at
362-363; indeed, he had to present evidence that defendant went so far beyond the ordinary
conduct that it amounted to a willingness to injure plaintiff. See Behar, 249 Mich App at 319.

       Plaintiff instead relied in part on testimony that, generally speaking, players should not
take shots that the player knows will hit another player and that all players should avoid actions
that might lead to unnecessary injuries. That testimony did not establish that defendant’s legal
shot amounted to reckless conduct under the circumstances of the play at issue.

        For example, Todd Kamstra, defendant’s coach, testified that attackers sometimes attempt
a shot even when there is a defender in the way in the hope that it can be directed around the
defender. He stated that defendant was in a good position to make a shot on the goal and that shots
under those circumstances were ordinary. Kamstra also opined that there was nothing about the
play that demonstrated that an injury was bound to occur. Indeed, he related that that “ball could
have easily whistled over a right shoulder or a left shoulder alongside the ear . . . .” In Kamstra’s
opinion plaintiff’s injury was nothing more than a “tragic, tragic result of an everyday lacrosse
play.” Plaintiff’s coach, Robert Walters, also agreed that an attacker might try and rip a shot by a
defender as the defender closed out on the attacker. The two officials who officiated the match
similarly stated that there was nothing improper about defendant’s decision to attempt the shot on
goal.

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         Plaintiff relied on his own testimony to suggest that defendant’s shot was reckless. He
testified that defendant had to have seen him coming, so, in plaintiff’s view, defendant had an
obligation not to take the shot. As already noted, the video evidence is not helpful to either party
as to whether defendant had a sufficiently clear lane to the goal for his shot. Therefore, the video
evidence does not conclusively debunk plaintiff’s opinion testimony on this point. As such,
drawing the inferences in favor of plaintiff, see Maiden, 461 Mich at 120, a reasonable jury could
infer that defendant saw plaintiff and knew that plaintiff obstructed his path to the goal. But that
inference does not permit a further inference that the shot would necessarily injure plaintiff such
that it amounted to reckless misconduct.

        The video evidence established that defendant committed to the shot at the same time that
plaintiff decided to close the distance between the players. Given the undisputed safe distance
between the two players initially, it cannot be said that it was inevitable that defendant’s shot
would strike plaintiff or that it was a particularly dangerous shot to take. There was also no
evidence that defendant had a duty to attempt to check his shot after he was aware that plaintiff
had run into the path of his shot. As plaintiff himself agreed, the rules did not prohibit such a shot,
and plaintiff’s opinion that it was not a smart shot did not make it a reckless one.

        Plaintiff’s father’s testimony about the play also did not permit an inference of
recklessness. Plaintiff’s father opined that defendant’s shot was forced and unnecessary, but there
was testimony that attackers routinely try to force shots through to the goal in the same way. The
fact that the shot had a low probability of scoring a goal with an onrushing defender obstructing
the goal did not establish a genuine issue of material fact that defendant’s decision to take the shot
constituted reckless misconduct.

        Even when considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence established
that—at worst—defendant’s shot was negligent. Defendant made a split-second decision to
attempt a shot on goal during a fast-paced, aggressive contact sport. It is simply not plausible to
accept plaintiff’s contention that no reasonable lacrosse player attempts a shot when there is a
possibility that it will hit another player. The undisputed evidence was that players are permitted
to make such shots, that players do so regularly, and that defensive players sometimes get hit as a
result. Plaintiff failed to rebut defendant’s evidence. On the evidence before the trial court on the
motion for summary disposition, no reasonable jury could find that defendant’s decision to take
the shot exceeded the normal bounds of conduct associated with the game of lacrosse. See Ritchie-
Gamester, 461 Mich at 90 n 10, 94. Consequently, the trial court should have granted defendant’s
motion for summary disposition.

     Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                               /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                               /s/ Michael F. Gadola

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