Court Opinion

ID: 9892752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 19:10:27.911961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:39:30.875221
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hashman, 2023-Ohio-3853.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                  :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             :           Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186,
                                                            22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189,
v.                                              :           22AP-190, & 22AP-191
                                                            (C.P.C. Nos. 19CR-6512, 21CR-873,
Irvin H. Hashman,                               :           21CR-1587, 21CR-1790, 21CR-3100,
                                                            21CR-3137, & 21CR-4429)
                Defendant-Appellant.            :
                                                             (REGULAR CALENDAR)
                                                :

                                          D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on October 24, 2023

                On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L.
                Gilbert, for appellee. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.

                On brief: Siewert & Gjostein Co. LPA, and Thomas A.
                Gjostein, for appellant. Argued: Thomas A. Gjostein.

                 APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BOGGS, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Irvin H. Hashman, appeals from the judgments of
conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, after
Hashman entered guilty pleas to charges of possession of cocaine, a fifth-degree felony;
receiving stolen property, a fourth-degree felony; receiving stolen property, a fourth-degree
felony; receiving stolen property, a fifth-degree felony; theft of a motor vehicle, a fourth-
degree felony; vandalism, a fourth-degree felony; theft of a motor vehicle, a fourth-degree
felony; and possession of a fentanyl-related compound, a fifth-degree felony. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189,                                    2
22AP-190, & 22AP-191

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶ 2} Hashman was indicted in seven cases between December 17, 2019 and
October 22, 2021: (1) Franklin C.P. No. 19CR-6512 for possession of cocaine a fifth-degree
felony and for possession of drugs a fifth-degree felony, (2) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-873 for
receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, (3) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-1587 for
receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, (4) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-1790 for
receiving stolen property a fifth-degree felony, (5) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-3100 for
breaking and entering a fifth-degree felony, for theft of a motor vehicle a fourth-degree
felony, for receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, and for vandalism a fourth-
degree felony, (6) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-3137 for theft of a motor vehicle a fourth-degree
felony and for breaking and entering a fifth-degree felony, and (7) Franklin C.P. No. 21CR-
4429 for receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, and for possession of a fentanyl-
related compound a fifth-degree felony.
       {¶ 3} On January 10, 2022, Hashman entered guilty pleas in each of the seven
cases. Hashman pled guilty as follows: in case No. 19CR-6512 for possession of cocaine a
fifth-degree felony, in case No. 21CR-873 for receiving stolen property a fourth-degree
felony, in case No. 21CR-1587 for receiving stolen property a fourth-degree felony, in case
No. 21CR-1790 for receiving stolen property a fifth-degree felony, in case No. 21CR-3100
theft of a motor vehicle a fourth-degree felony, and vandalism a fourth-degree felony, in
case No. 21CR-3137 for theft of a motor vehicle a fourth-degree felony, and in case No.
21CR-4429 for possession of a fentanyl-related compound a fifth-degree felony.
       {¶ 4} Prior to Hashman entering his guilty pleas, the trial court engaged in a
Crim.R. 11 colloquy wherein the trial court informed Hashman of the various rights he was
waiving by pleading guilty and of the maximum penalty for each count. With respect to
case No. 21CR-3100, the only case in which Hashman was pleading guilty to more than one
count, the court also informed Hashman that his sentences for the two fourth-degree felony
counts could be ordered to be served consecutively, for a maximum penalty “on that case”
of 36 months. (Jan. 10, 2022 Tr. at 7.) Hashman confirmed that he understood the
maximum possible penalty for each count and that he understood he was waiving certain
rights in pleading guilty.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189,                                                     3
22AP-190, & 22AP-191

        {¶ 5} On February 23, 2022, the trial court sentenced Hashman to the following
prison terms in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction: in
case No. 19CR-6512, 12 months; in case No. 21CR-873, 12 months; in case No. 21CR-1587,
18 months, plus payment of restitution in the amount of $5,684; in case No. 21CR-1790, 6
months; in case No. 21CR-3100, 18 months for both counts to run concurrently; in case No.
21CR-3137, 12 months; and in case No. 21CR-4429, 9 months. The trial court ordered that
the sentences in case Nos. 21CR-873, 21CR-1587, 21CR-3100, and 21CR-3137 run
consecutively to each other, for an aggregate prison sentence of 60 months. The trial court
found that “consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crimes
or punish the offender” and that consecutive sentences were “not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the Defendant’s conduct and the danger imposed to the public.” (Feb. 23,
2022 Tr. at 12.) Hashman now submits this appeal.1
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        {¶ 6} In his appeal, Hashman asserts the following sole assignment of error:

                THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS PLEA COLLOQUY WITH
                THE APPELLANT PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL RULE NOS.
                11(C)(2)(b) & 11(C)(3)2 OF THE OHIO RULES FOR FAILING
                TO STATE THAT POTENTIAL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
                COULD BE IMPOSED OVER ANY OF THE SEVEN
                SEPARATE CASES.

(Appellant’s Brief at 6.)

III. ANALYSIS

        {¶ 7} Hashman argues that the trial court did not fully inform him of the potential
sentences under Crim.R. 11 (C)(2) prior to entering his guilty pleas because the trial court
did not adequately inform him that his sentences could be imposed consecutively.
        {¶ 8} A felony defendant is entitled, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), to be informed
of various constitutional and non-constitutional rights prior to entering a plea of guilty or

1 On April 6, 2023, this court sua sponte issued a stay pending the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State

v. Tancak, case No. 2022-0515. On August 1, 2023, however, the Supreme Court dismissed Tancak for being
improvidently accepted. On September 1, 2023, this court reactivated these appeals.
2 We note that Hashman’s assignment of error references Crim.R. 11(C)(3), which applies to a defendant

charged with aggravated murder. Because Hashman was not charged with aggravated murder and because
he does not make an argument with respect to Crim.R. 11(C)(3), we decline to address it.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189,                                         4
22AP-190, & 22AP-191

no contest. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 6. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)
provides:
              In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or
              a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no
              contest without first addressing the defendant personally
              either in-person or by remote contemporaneous video in
              conformity with Crim.R. 43(A) and doing all of the following:

              (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
              voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges
              and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that
              the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition
              of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

              (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
              defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
              contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
              proceed with judgment and sentence.

              (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
              defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is
              waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against
              him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
              in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the
              defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which
              the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or
              herself.

       {¶ 9} To be valid, a defendant’s plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 25. “ ‘ “[F]or a guilty
plea to be voluntarily and intelligently entered, the defendant must be informed that he is
waiving” ’ the constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).” State v. Miller, 159 Ohio
St.3d 447, 2020-Ohio-1420, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-
5200, ¶ 25-26, quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 477-78 (1981). When a trial
judge fails to explain to a defendant the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c),
the defendant’s guilty or no-contest plea is invalid “ ‘under a presumption that it was
entered involuntarily and unknowingly.’ ” Clark at ¶ 31, quoting Griggs at ¶ 12. “[A] trial
court’s failure to notify a defendant of his constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)
amounts to plain error. Miller at ¶ 13, citing Veney at ¶ 24, citing Ballard at 476-77.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189,                                     5
22AP-190, & 22AP-191

       {¶ 10} For the non-constitutional rights set out in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b), the
trial court need only substantially comply with the mandates of Crim.R. 11. State v. Nero,
56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). “Substantial compliance” means that, under the totality of
the circumstances, the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and
the rights he is waiving. Veney at ¶ 15, citing Nero at 108. A defendant who challenges his
guilty plea on the basis that the advisement for the non-constitutional rights did not
substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) must also show a prejudicial effect, meaning
the plea would not have been otherwise entered. Id.
       {¶ 11} While Hashman does not allege constitutional violations during his plea
colloquy, we now turn to Hashman’s argument that the trial court committed prejudicial
error under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by not informing Hashman that his individual sentences
could be ordered to run consecutively. The mandate that the defendant must understand
the maximum penalty is a non-constitutional right. State v. Draughn, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-
632, 2016-Ohio-1240, ¶ 7. In State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 133 (1988), the Supreme
Court concluded, “neither the United States Constitution nor the Ohio Constitution
requires that in order for a guilty plea to be voluntary a defendant must be told the
maximum total of the sentences he faces, or that the sentence could be imposed
consecutively.” While Crim.R. 11 has been amended since the court’s holding in Johnson,
the analysis of the Supreme Court in State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132,
suggests that the court did not view the amendments as abrogating the basic holding from
Johnson. In Bishop, the court distinguished Johnson and held that, unlike the failure to
tell Johnson that his sentences could run consecutively, which did not violate Crim.R.
11(C)(2), the failure to inform Bishop that he was subject to a separate and additional
consecutive 12-month sentence for violation of his post-release control was a violation of
Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Bishop at ¶ 16.
       {¶ 12} Unless consecutive sentences are statutorily required, the imposition of
consecutive or concurrent sentences is a matter of judicial discretion. “Only after the judge
has imposed a separate prison term for each offense may the judge then consider in his
discretion whether the offender should serve those terms concurrently or consecutively.”
State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 9, citing State v. Foster, 109 Ohio
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189,                                     6
22AP-190, & 22AP-191

St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, paragraph seven of the syllabus, ¶ 100, 102, 105; R.C. 2929.12(A);
State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, paragraph three of the syllabus.
       {¶ 13} Here, the trial court informed Hashman of the maximum sentence for each
count and therefore substantially complied with the requirements under Crim.R.
11(C)(2)(a). Hashman directs this court to Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, which instructs trial
judges to only accept a plea of guilty after they have addressed the defendant personally
and “[d]etermine[ed] that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding
of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved.” Id. at ¶ 27. However,
the maximum penalty involved as interpreted in Johnson is the maximum penalty for each
count, rather than the maximum penalty over all sentences.
       {¶ 14} We note that Ohio trial judges must consider each count separately when
imposing sentences rather than packaging all sentences together. “Instead of considering
multiple offenses as a whole and imposing one, overarching sentence to encompass the
entirety of the offenses as in the federal sentencing regime, a judge sentencing a defendant
pursuant to Ohio law must consider each offense individually and impose a separate
sentence for each offense.” Saxon at ¶ 9. When a defendant is engaging with a trial court
in a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, the judge would be considering each offense separately, rather
than as a package. Here, the trial court properly informed Hashman of the maximum
sentence for each count, and following its acceptance of Hashman’s guilty pleas, the court
then properly exercised its discretion in ordering some of Hashman’s sentences to run
consecutively. Accordingly, we overrule Hashman’s sole assignment of error.
       {¶ 15} We are not unsympathetic to Hashman’s argument that defendants should
have a full picture of the charges and potential sentences they face when deciding to enter
a guilty plea. However, we recognize the law here is clear against levying additional plea
colloquy duties upon trial court judges beyond substantial compliance with the non-
constitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Nevertheless, we urge trial judges, as a
best practice, to inform defendants during a plea colloquy of the maximum, cumulative
total of the various individual sentences the defendant would face should the court
subsequently order sentences to run consecutively rather than concurrently.
Nos. 22AP-185, 22AP-186, 22AP-187, 22AP-188, 22AP-189,                        7
22AP-190, & 22AP-191

IV. CONCLUSION
      {¶ 16} Having overruled Hashman’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the
judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                            Judgments affirmed.
                       EDELSTEIN and LELAND, JJ., concur.