Court Opinion

ID: 9831960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:30:21.274054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:40.008772
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Upon further consideration we have reached the conclusion that we erred in holding, in effect, that if the appellee’s labor foreman, Jenkins, negligently assured appellant that the generator had been properly cleaned out and was entirely free of gas, and if such assurance was relied on by appellant, and induced him to begin work on the generator, and if the assurance so given by Jenkins was the proximate cause of appellant’s injury, then appellee would be liable for such negligence on the part of Jenkins.
We are now of the opinion that, by reason of all the facts set out in the original opinion and the authorities cited, Jenkins, as well as defendant’s other employes who actually cleaned the generator, should be held to be legally appellant’s own servants with respect to the entire undertaking of cleaning the generator, and that the appellee was not legally chargeable for any injury suffered by appellant as a proximate result of the negligence of any of those servants, even though they continued to be in the general employment of appellee. With respect to the undertaking on the part of the appellant to repair the generator, Jenkins and all other employés of the defendant were under his control and direction, and such persons were in effect loaned to appellant for the purpose of assisting him to accomplish a work which he had undertaken as an independent contractor. And since all of those persons were legally his immediate servants for the purpose of performing the work so undertaken by him, appellee was not liable to him for damages resulting from the negligence of any of them.
And under such circumstances the rule that the master owes the duty to exercise *958ordinary care to furnish his servant a reasonably safe place to wort has no application, as settled by such authorities as C., C. & S. F. Ry. v. Clement (Tex. Civ. App.) 220 S. W. 407; Id. (Tex. Com. App.) 236 S. W. 714; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Ray (Tex. Civ. App.) 187 S. W. 1085.
Accordingly, appellee’s motion for rehearing is granted, the judgment heretofore rendered by this' court reversing the judgment of the trial court is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.