Court Opinion

ID: 9899581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 23:07:10.816616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:40.286464
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                           STATE OF LOUISIANA

                               COURT OF APPEAL

                                FIRST CIRCUIT

wIL
      i                         NO. 2023 KA 0402

                           STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                     VERSUS

                          GLENN DAVID MILLS, JR.

li   a                                      Judgment Rendered.
                                                                 Nov 16 2023

                                Appealed from the
                          22nd Judicial District Court
                      In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
                                State of Louisiana
                               Case No. 2604- F-2019

              The Honorable Richard A. Swartz, Judge Presiding

 Warren L. Montgomery                 Counsel for Appellee
 District Attorney                    State of Louisiana
 Matthew Caplan
 Assistant District Attorney
 Covington, Louisiana

 Holli Herrle-Castillo                Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
 Marrero, Louisiana                   Glenn David Mills, Jr.

            BEFORE. GUIDRY, C. J., CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.
LANIER, J.

       The defendant, Glenn David Mills, Jr., was charged by amended grand jury

indictment with one count of first degree rape of a victim under the age of thirteen

 count one),   in violation of La. R.S. 14: 42( A)( 4), and one count of molestation of a

juvenile ( count two), in violation of La. R.S.         14: 81. 2, to which he pled not guilty.

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged on both counts.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of probation, parole,

or suspension of sentence on count one, and fifty years imprisonment without the

possibility of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count two, to be

served concurrently. The defendant now appeals, assigning as error the trial court' s

limiting of defendant' s cross- examination and its admission of hearsay statements.

For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

                                                FACTS

       The victim, S. S.,'      began living with her aunt and uncle ( M.M. and the

defendant) when she was five -years -old.             Due to an intellectual disability and

cerebral palsy, S. S. needed more care than her mother was capable of providing,

since her mother worked and M.M. stayed at home.

       On July 10, 2019, M.M. returned from a doctor' s appointment to her home

at 528 Legendre Drive in Slidell. Upon entering the home, she saw her husband,

the defendant, downstairs with their son, their two nephews, and their nine- year-

old niece, S. S.

       M.M.     then received a text that her prescription was ready,                 and   she

immediately left her home to go to the pharmacy to pick it up. When she returned

home the second time, she saw her son and two nephews playing downstairs. They

told her that the defendant and S. S. were both upstairs.

1 Because these charges involve sex offenses, we reference the victim and their family members
by their initials. See La. R.S. 46: 1844( W),

                                                  2
       Upon walking into the upstairs bedroom, M.M. saw the defendant and S. S.

standing in the doorway to the bathroom, facing one another. The defendant did

not see M.M., but S. S. looked in her direction. The defendant then whispered

something to S. S., and M.M. observed S. S. perform oral sex on the defendant.

When the defendant noticed M.M. standing in the room, he immediately stopped

and pulled up his pants. An argument between the defendant and M.M. ensued,

part of which M.M. recorded on her cell phone.         In the recording, the defendant

can be heard saying, among other things: " I don' t know what the f*** I was

thinking. It was stupid[,]"   and "   Wow, I just threw my whole f***ing life away."

The defendant later left the home and M.M. called 911.        Shortly after the incident

occurred,   M.M. also received text messages from the defendant in which he

apologized for the pain he caused, and asked if he could give their son one last

hug.

       After the police arrived, M.M. was instructed to bring S. S. to Children' s

Hospital in New Orleans where a rape kit was performed on July 11, 2019.             The

defendant was arrested in Jefferson Parish on July 12, 2019, On July 22, 2019,

S. S.' s mother, M.M.' s sister, took S. S. to Hope House Children' s Advocacy Center

for a forensic interview. However, due to S. S.' s intellectual deficits and difficulty

talking to strangers, they were unable to conduct an interview.

       On September 2, 2022, the State filed a " Second Notice of Additional

Information," wherein it alleged that two days after the crime in question was

committed,   S. S.' s mother asked S. S.    why her aunt and uncle ( M.M. and the

defendant) were fighting. S. S. replied that it was because the defendant " punched

her in the face with his d***."   S. S.' s mother asked her to clarify, and S. S. pointed

between her legs.     The defendant then filed a " Motion to Exclude Hearsay

Statement from Witness who has Never Been Competent,"               arguing that S. S.' s

statement was inadmissible under both the initial disclosure of sexual assault

                                             3
exception embodied by La. Code Evid. art. 804( B)( 5) and under La. Code Evid.

art. 403. The trial court denied the defendant' s motion.

      The defendant did not testify at trial.

                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

      In his first assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court

abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right of confrontation by

limiting his cross- examination of M.M. as to her possible motive for fabricating

allegations against the defendant.

      In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to be confronted

with the witnesses against him. See U.S. Const. amend. Vl; La. Const. art. I, § 16.

Confrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.

The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure the opportunity of

cross- examination. A witness may be cross- examined on any matter relevant to

any issue in the case, including credibility. La. Code Evid. art. 611( B). The

exposure of a witness' s motivation in testifying is a proper and important function

of the constitutionally protected right of cross- examination. State v. Henderson,

2013- 0074 ( La. App. I st Cir. 9/ 13113), 135 So. 3d 36, 50; writ denied, 2013- 2327

La. 3121114), 135 So. 3d 617; see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315- 16, 94

S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed. 2d 347 ( 1974).

      However, the Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial judge from

imposing limits on the defendant' s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution

witness. To the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable

limits on such cross- examination based upon their concerns regarding harassment,

prejudice,   confusion of the   issues,   witness   safety,   and interrogation   that is

repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,

679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 ( 1986); see also State v. Gautreaux,

2014- 594 ( La. App. 3d Cir. 1115114),    153 So. 3d 1232, 1239, writ denied, 2014-

                                              4
2521 ( La. 9118115),   178 So. 3d 144. The ruling of the trial court as to the scope and

extent of cross- examination should not be disturbed absent an abuse of the court' s

broad discretion. State v. Draughn, 2005- 1825 ( La. 1117107), 950 So. 2d 583, 616,

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S. Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 ( 2007).

      In the instant case, the defendant sought to cross- examine M.M. as to

potential issues in their relationship, which would give rise to a motive for M.M.

 to be less than candid about the allegation[.]"         During cross- examination, the

following exchanges occurred:

      DEFENDANT:            More generally speaking, you guys had had a pretty
                            difficult time in your relationship?
      STATE:                Objection to vagueness.
      COURT:                Sustained.
      DEFENDANT:            At the time of this —in July 2019, were you -all fighting?
      STATE:                Objection to vagueness and relevance.
      COURT:                Sustained.

      DEFENDANT:            Was there an incident involving a woman at a Wal -mart
                            gas station ... about jealousy there?
      STATE:                Objection to relevance and to vagueness. No context as

                            to when or why.
      COURT:                Rephrase your question. Sustained.
      DEFENDANT:            Had there been some issues with jealousy in the past with
                             the defendant]?
      STATE:                Objection to relevance and vagueness again, Your Honor.
      DEFENDANT:            It would go to motive and what we talked about, previous
                            objection.

      At this time, the following discussion was held at the bench:

      COURT:                If you' re trying to impeach your witness, this is not the
                            proper way to impeach.

      DEFENDANT:            I think what we' re doing is exploring whether or not
                             M.M.] has a motive to be less than candid about the
                            allegation, Your Honor ...      No, I don' t know, but until
                            she answers the question we won' t know that, and she' s
                            the only available witness. I don' t know that we have the
                            obligation   to    have   positive   witnesses   in   order   to

                            effectively cross- examine the motive.
      COURT: - -               because she was jealous?
      DEFENDANT:            I don' t know that we have to formulate the question
                            exactly that, Judge. Because, clearly, if you telegraph that
                            that' s where you' re going, then obviously you' re going to
                            get the pretty expected response of no.
      COURT:                I would sustain the objection.

                                              5
          DEFENDANT:         Please note our objection and the obstruction to our right
                             to cross- examination, Your Honor.

          Courts have routinely upheld a defendant' s right to cross- examine witnesses

against him in order to establish their bias or interest. See, e. g., State v. White,

2017- 0308 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 15/ 17), 228 So. 3d 213, 219- 20 ( trial court erred in

precluding the defendant from cross- examining witnesses regarding their guilty

pleas);    see also State v. Rankin, 465 So. 2d 679, 681 ( La. 1985).   However, cross-

examination may be properly limited where there is no basis beyond speculation

that a witness is biased. See State v. Mills, 2018- 0047 ( La. App. lst Cir. 9124118),

259 So. 3d 1045, 1047, writ denied, 2018- 1686 ( La. 4115/ 19), 267 So. 3d 1128;

State v. Grace, 94- 295 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 9127194), 643 So. 2d 1306, 1308 ( trial

court correctly refused to allow cross- examination on witness' s pending charges

where there was no evidence of a deal or any other indicia of bias or prejudice).

          Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion by limiting the defendant' s cross- examination of M.M. Initially, we note

that the defendant was not prohibited from introducing relevant information

regarding M.M.' s possible ulterior motive; he was merely precluded from

engaging in a " fishing expedition" for problems in M.M.' s relationship with the

defendant. Furthermore, the record contains no information to suggest that M.M.

fabricated the allegations. Finally, the defendant herein failed to demonstrate what

evidence he sought to introduce or what further infonnation he hoped to glean

from his questioning of M.M., particularly where he admitted that he was merely

 exploring" the issue. See State v. Shaw, 00- 1051 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 2/ 14/ 01), 785

So. 2d 34, 46, writ denied, 2001- 0969 ( La. 2/ 8102),     807 So. 2d 861 ( defendant

questioning victim about an inadmissible document was otherwise allowable for

impeachment,       even   though   the   document   should not have     been   admitted).

Therefore, we find that there was no basis beyond mere speculation that M.M.' s

                                             R
testimony was motivated by her allegedly troubled relationship with the defendant,

and the trial court did not err in limiting the defendant' s cross- examination of

M.M. See Mills, 259 So. 3d at 1047.

      This assignment of error is without merit.

                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

      In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court

erred in allowing S. S.' s out-of-court statement, made to her mother shortly after

the incident, to be admitted into evidence. Specifically, the defendant contends that

the trial court failed to consider that the probative value of the statement was far

outweighed by its prejudice.

      Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying

at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted. La. Code Evid. art. 801( C). Hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise

provided by the Code of Evidence or other legislation. La. Code Evid. art. 802.

Pursuant to La. Code Evid.     art.   804( B)( 5),   a statement is not excluded by the

hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable and it is " made by a person under the

age of twelve years and the statement is one of initial or otherwise trustworthy

complaint of sexually assaultive behavior." A declarant can be " unavailable as a

witness"   when the declarant cannot or will not appear in court to testify due to a

then existing physical or mental illness, infirmity, or other sufficient cause. La.

Code Evid. art. 804( A)(4).

      However, such a statement is still subject to the balancing test provided by

La. Code Evid. art. 403, where, "[ a] lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury[.]" See State v. Brown, 562 So. 2d

8681 878 ( La. 1990). A trial court' s determination regarding the relevancy and

admissibility of evidence will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of

                                              7
discretion. State v. Freeman, 2007- 0470 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 14/ 07), 970 So. 2d

621, 625, writ denied, 2007- 2129 ( La. 3/ 14/ 08), 977 So. 2d 930.

          When S. S. was brought to the Children' s Advocacy Center for a forensic

interview shortly after the incident occurred, two professionals determined that

S. S. was " currently unable to understand simple commands/ questions as well as

communicate effectively." Moreover, S. S.' s mother reported to the interviewers

that     S. S. "   confuses `   yes/ no',   has   a       difficult   time   comprehending   simple

tasks/questions, and sometimes has to be ` led to the right answer when asked."'

Because these deficits " would              inhibit the interviewer from adhering to best -

practice protocol[,]"      no forensic interview was conducted.

         During an August 23, 2022 meeting between S. S. and the State, S. S. was

able to give accurate answers when asked about people and things in the room.

However, S. S. was unable to verbalize the difference between a truth and a lie.

When asked if the defendant ever asked her to put parts of his body in her mouth,

she became seemingly uncomfortable and responded in the negative.                            When

specifically asked if the defendant showed her his penis, she said yes. On the drive

home from the meeting, S. S.' s aunt informed the State that S. S. had just disclosed

to her that the defendant put his penis in her mouth on the date that her aunt found

S. S. and the defendant in the bathroom. S. S. and her aunt then returned to the

District Attorney' s Office, where S. S. stated that she remembered being in the

bathroom of her aunt' s house with the defendant. When asked what occurred in the

bathroom, S. S. stated that the defendant put his " bird" in her mouth. When shown

a diagram of a man and asked to identify the " bird," S. S. pointed to the man' s

penis.     The State then memorialized these statements in the " State' s Notice of

Additional Information," which was provided to the defendant.

          In response to the State' s Notice, the defendant filed a " Motion to Bar

Witness Testimony for Lack of Competency," in which he alleged that S. S. was

                                                      8
not competent to testify at trial because she lacked the " proper understanding"

required by La. Code Evid. art. 601. At the hearing on the matter on August 30,

2022, S. S. was called to testify. When the trial court asked how she was doing, S. S.
responded with " Good."         When asked if she had been in a courtroom before, she

nodded affirmatively. S. S.       responded to each basic question asked by the trial

court,   such as how old she was,          what   school   she   attended,   and how she was

feeling; however, as the questions became more complex, S. S.' s answers became

vague, contradictory, and non-responsive. To illustrate, the following exchanges

occurred:

         COURT:      Have you ever talked with anybody about telling the truth or
                     not telling the truth? Do you understand me?
         S. S..      Yes.
         COURT:      Okay. Do you know what it means to tell the truth and not tell
                     a lie?
         S. S.:      It' s— I can' t take it off. There' s a string.
         COURT: [     S. S.]?
         S. S..      Yes.
         COURT:...    How about if I told you that the sky was green—
         S. S.:      The sky is blue.

S. S. was referring to a loose string on her pants.              As questions proceeded, her

answers become more focused on the string:

         COURT:      Do you know what it means to tell a lie? What would be a lie?
         S. S.:      I can' t take this string off.
         COURT:      That you could get the string off, would that be a lie?
         S. S.:      No, I can' t get the string off.

         COURT:      Do you think you could tell the truth to the people in this room?
         S. S.:      Yes. I can' t take the string off.

Counsel for the defendant then cross- examined S. S.:

         DEFENDANT: [           C] an you give me an example of someone— can you tell
                                me about someone telling a lie?
         S. S.:                 Yes. I can' t take the string off.
         DEFENDANT:             When have you heard someone tell a lie before?
         S. S.:                 I don' t know.
         DEFENDANT:             Have you ever heard someone tell a lie?
         S. S.:                 No.

                                                  0
         DEFENDANT:             You' ve been in a courtroom before?
         S. S..                No.

         At the hearing' s conclusion, the trial court ruled as follows:

         Based upon my attempt to communicate with [ S. S] and her responses,
         or lack of responses, and apparent inability to focus and respond; and
         based upon the fact that she has been interviewed at both the
         Children' s Advocacy Center and the District Attorney' s Office - - and
         I think they found the same thing; that she does not have the mental
         ability to communicate effectively, that she cannot respond as to
         whether or not something might be the truth or something might be a
         lie. Thus;     the   Court   finds    that    she   does not have the proper
         understanding to testify in a court of law and finds that she' s not a
         competent witness and grants the motion to bar her testimony.

         Thereafter, the State filed its " Second Notice of Additional Information."

The defendant then filed its " Motion to Exclude Hearsay Statement from Witness

who has Never Been Competent."                After a hearing, the trial court issued a ruling

denying the defendant' s motion and stating: " The Court finds that the declarant,

S. S.,   is unavailable to testify, and the statements are of initial complaints of

sexually assaultive behavior from a person under twelve years old. Accordingly,

said statements are excluded from the hearsay rule and are admissible."

         Prior to S. S.' s mother' s testimony testifying at trial, the State proffered her

testimony, wherein she recounted S. S.' s statement that the defendant " slapped her

in the face" with his penis.          The trial court again ruled that the testimony was

admissible,       finding that the " initial complaint is trustworthy, as a conversation

between       a child   and a    mother who has that bond             which allows them to

communicate about many things that she might not be able to communicate with

other people[.]"

         On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting S. S.' s statement under the hearsay exception set forth in La. Code Evid.

art. 804( B)( 5) and that the statement was unduly prejudicial under La. Code Evid.

art. 403. We agree.

                                                  10
      La. Code Evid. art. 804( B)( 5) permits the introduction of a statement made

by a person under the age of twelve who is unavailable to testify, if the statement is

one of initial or otherwise trustworthy complaint of sexually assaultive behavior.

Emphasis added).            S. S.' s statement was a disclosure of sexual assault by an

unavailable       witness    under   the   age   of    twelve.   However,     given   the   specific

circumstances presented herein and discussed infra, we find that the statement

lacked evidence of trustworthiness and thus was not admissible as an exception to

the hearsay rule under La. Code Evid. art. 804( B)( 5).

      The exceptions to the hearsay rule listed in La. Code Evid. art. 804 are based

upon the conclusion that when the qualifying circumstances are met, there are

usually sufficient grounds for crediting the trustworthiness of the out-of-court

statement to justify making an exception to the hearsay rule. See La. Code Evid.

art. 804, Comment ( a), Comments to Introductory Clause of Paragraph B — 1988.

With regard to art. 804( B)( 5),       the exception allowing an otherwise inadmissible

out-of-court complaint of sexually assaultive behavior is predicated on the

assumption that such a complaint is inherently trustworthy.

          Such an assumption cannot be made in the instant case. S. S. was unable to

complete      a   forensic interview in July            of 2019    because,    according to      the

interviewers, S. S. was unable to understand simple commands or communicate

effectively. It was further noted that S. S. confused yes and no, and, troublingly,

sometimes must " be         led to the right answer" when asked a question. This strongly

suggests that S. S. would be more susceptible than most to being coached or led

into making a statement, the veracity of which S. S. would have no capacity to

verify.

          The same concerns were further evidenced during S. S.' s testimony at the

competency hearing, wherein S. S. gave contradictory answers to rote, concrete

questions regarding whether or not she had been in a courtroom before and

                                                  11
whether or not she was able to read. Noting these same concerns, the trial court

found S. S. not competent to testify.

        Moreover, the State conceded S. S.' s unreliability as a narrator in its August

23, 2022 " Notice of Additional Information," wherein it stated that S. S. "                  was

unable to verbalize the difference between a truth and a lie." Finally, while the

State alleged in its September 2, 2022 " Second Notice of Additional Information"

that S. S. described the incident to her mother in July of 2019, this statement was

not disclosed by S. S.' s mother until over three years after it was purportedly made

and only a few days after S. S. was deemed not competent to testify. The length of

time between the disclosure and when it was reported bears directly on the

statement' s reliability.

        Given the facts presented herein, including the circumstances surrounding

the   timing    and    manner    in    which    S. S.' s    statement    was   disclosed,   S. S.' s

demonstrated and consistent inability to reliably convey information, and whether

or not S. S.' s statement could be considered an initial disclosure of sexual assault

under    La.    Code   Evid.    art.   804( B)( 5),   the    statement    lacked   the   inherent

trustworthiness upon which the exception is based and was therefore inadmissible.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court' s ruling that S. S.' s statement was

trustworthy because it was given to her mother was an abuse of discretion.

Moreover, because the statement was not trustworthy, its probative value was far

outweighed by its prejudice, and the statement was inadmissible under La. Code

Evid. art. 403.

        Despite the erroneous admission of evidence, however, the verdict will not

be reversed if the reviewing court determines that the error was harmless beyond a

2 We note that while a child such as S. S. may conceivably be able to more effectively
communicate with her mother than with a forensic interviewer or a judge, the trial court in this
case did not actually witness S. S.' s ability to communicate with her mother. Rather, the trial
court' s determination was based solely on S. S.' s mother' s assertion that such communication
was possible.

                                                 12
reasonable doubt. State v. Harris, 97- 0300 ( La. 4/ 14/ 98), 711 So. 2d 266, 269. The

test for determining whether an error is harmless is whether the verdict actually

rendered in this case was surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan v. Louisiana,

508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 20811 124 L.Ed.2d 182 ( 1993);                            State v.

Burton, 2019- 01079 ( La. 6130121), 320 So. 3d 1117, 1123; State v. Cowart; 2022-

1318 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/ 2/ 23),       369 So. 3d 887, 890. Factors to be considered

include the importance of the evidence to the State' s case, the presence or absence

of additional corroboration of the evidence, and the overall strength of the State' s

case. Harris, 711 So. 2d at 269.

      Considering this standard, we are convinced that the erroneously admitted

statement surely did not contribute to the verdict in this case, as the evidence

against the defendant was overwhelming. The defendant' s wife, M.M., personally

witnessed the defendant sexually abusing S. S.                   and    testified   as   to   what   she

observed.      S. S.' s brother, D.S.,   testified    at trial   as    well   and corroborated the

sequence of events set forth by M.M. D. S. confirmed that on the day of the

incident, S. S. and the defendant were upstairs when M.M. arrived home. D. S.

recounted that after M.M,          went    upstairs,     she began yelling.         Thereafter,      she

returned downstairs and ordered the children to put on their shoes and get in the

car, and that she seemed upset and sad. Moreover, M.M.' s 911 call, in which she

can be heard tearfully explaining what she witnessed, was played for the jury, as

were the videos of M.M. and the defendant immediately following the incident in

which the defendant can be heard saying " I don' t know what the f* * *I was

thinking[,]"    and "   Wow, I just threw my whole f***ing life away[.]" And finally,

the jury was shown the defendant' s text messages to M.M. in which he apologized

for the pain he caused and asked to hug their son one last time. Thus, given M.M.'s

eye -witness testimony and the defendant' s own statements immediately following

                                                 13
the incident,   the verdict was surely unattributable to the admission of S. S.' s

statement, and any error in the admission of this evidence was harmless.

      This assignment of error is without merit.

      CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

                                         14