Court Opinion

ID: 9449312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:07:54.142166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:29.136620
License: Public Domain

J-S15019-23

                                   2023 PA Super 147

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOSEPH EDWARD WILLIAMS                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 993 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 20, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No:
                           CP-40-CR-0002417-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:                                FILED: AUGUST 4, 2023

       Appellant, Joseph Edward Williams, appeals from the January 20, 2022

judgment of sentence imposing 5 to 10 years of incarceration followed by one

year of probation for possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”) a controlled

substance1 (fentanyl) and possession of cocaine.2 The jury found Appellant

not guilty of possession of fentanyl. We affirm.

       The record reveals that William Davis was apprehended after a

controlled buy on June 27, 2019. Davis agreed to cooperate with police, led

them to an apartment he shared with his fiancé, Pamela Obitz, and consented

to a search of the premises. Within seconds of entering Davis’s apartment,

police observed Appellant at the apartment’s kitchen table. On the table in

____________________________________________

1   35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

2   35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
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front of Appellant was a scale, and at his feet was a blender with a white

powdery residue in it. Police recovered 171 baggies of fentanyl from the table

in front of Appellant. The parties stipulated that the 171 baggies of fentanyl

weighed 2.7 grams. In a search incident to Appellant’s arrest, police found

one bag of marijuana, one bag of crack cocaine, and $526 in Appellant’s

pockets. A Commonwealth witness testified that the amounts of drugs, cash,

and paraphernalia found on or near Appellant were indicative of drug

distribution.3 Davis explained that he and Obitz, in exchange for drugs for

their personal use, sold drugs for Appellant and allowed him to use their

apartment.

       On October 19, 2021, a jury found Appellant guilty of PWID (fentanyl)

and guilty of possession of cocaine, but not guilty of possession of fentanyl,

possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a gun with an altered

serial number. The trial court sentenced Appellant as set forth above and

denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration by order of June 28, 2022. This

timely appeal followed.

       Appellant presents three questions:

       I.     Whether the Commonwealth proved by sufficient evidence
              that the Appellant was guilty of [PWID]?

____________________________________________

3 We have culled the relevant facts from pages two through nine of the trial
court’s October 25, 2022 opinion. Except as noted below in connection with
Appellant’s challenge to his conviction for cocaine possession, the pertinent
facts are not in dispute.

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       II.    Whether the Commonwealth proved by sufficient evidence
              that the Appellant was guilty of possession of [cocaine]?

       III.   Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed
              an error of law in sentencing the Appellant in applying an
              incorrect Offense Gravity Score?

Appellant’s Brief at 1.

       We begin with Appellant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence,

which we review as follows:

             We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial,
       and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a
       light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
       support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there
       is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every
       element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable
       doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.

             The evidence established at trial need not preclude every
       possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all,
       part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the
       province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our
       judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s burden
       may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt
       about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder
       unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter
       of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
       circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 806 (Pa. Super. 2017).

       Section 780-113(a)(16) prohibits knowing possession of a controlled

substance.4 Appellant argues that the following testimony is not sufficient to

support a conviction for knowing possession of cocaine:

____________________________________________

4 Section 780-113(a)(16) prohibits “Knowingly or intentionally possessing a
controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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              Q.      Were there any other drugs on the defendant that
       day?

             A.    That day we located an amount of marijuana and I
       believe also an amount if I’m not mistaken crack cocaine.

N.T. Trial, 10/19/21, at 110. On cross examination, defense counsel asked

one question:

              Q.      Where did you find the cocaine?

              A.      I don’t recall the location of the cocaine.

Id. at 121.        In addition, the Commonwealth produced the cocaine as an

exhibit. The parties stipulated that the exhibit contained .21 grams of cocaine.

       Appellant argues the Commonwealth’s evidence is so “weak and

inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from

the combined circumstances.” Izurieta, 171 A.3d at 806. Appellant asserts,

in conclusionary fashion, that “the Commonwealth did not meet their burden

of proof.” Appellant’s Brief at 7.

       Appellant’s argument rests on one aspect of our standard of review but

neglects several other important principles of law. We have explained, for

example,      that    even   where     witnesses   contradict   themselves,   these

“inconsistent or contradictory statements may be used to attack the witness’

credibility.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 434 A.2d 717, 719 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board,
unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid
prescription order or order of a practitioner, or except as otherwise authorized
by this act.” 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).

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1981). Contradictory testimony does not, of itself, require the jury to resort

to speculation. Id. Similarly in the instant case, the witness’s testimony,

while equivocal, stated that police recovered crack cocaine from Appellant’s

person. The jury was free to assess the credibility and weight to be assigned

to this testimony and believe all, part, or none of it regardless the

equivocation. Further, the Commonwealth produced .21 grams of cocaine as

an exhibit. The jury reasonably could have found that this exhibit bolstered

the witness’s testimony, as Appellant cites no evidence that cocaine was

recovered from elsewhere in the apartment. This Court is required, on appeal

from a conviction, to draw all reasonable inferences in the Commonwealth’s

favor, and we are forbidden to substitute our judgment for that of the jury.

Izurieta, 171 A.3d at 806. For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s argument

does not merit relief.

      Next, Appellant argues his conviction for PWID (fentanyl), must fall

because the jury acquitted him of possession of fentanyl, a lesser included

offense. Controlling case law refutes Appellant’s argument:

             We note first that inconsistent verdicts, while often
      perplexing, are not considered mistakes and do not constitute a
      basis for reversal. Consistency in verdicts in criminal cases is not
      necessary. When an acquittal on one count in an indictment is
      inconsistent with a conviction on a second count, the court looks
      upon the acquittal as no more than the jury’s assumption of a
      power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were
      disposed through lenity. Thus, this Court will not disturb guilty
      verdicts on the basis of apparent inconsistencies as long as there
      is evidence to support the verdict. The rule that inconsistent
      verdicts do not constitute reversible error applies even

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      where the acquitted offense is a lesser included offense of
      the charge for which a defendant is found guilty.

Commonwealth v. Burton, 234 A.3d 824, 829 (Pa. 2020) (emphasis

added).

      Furthermore, Appellant’s reliance on Double Jeopardy principles is

misplaced. He relies on § 109 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code:

      When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the
      statutes and is based upon the same facts as a former
      prosecution, it is barred by such former prosecution under the
      following circumstances:

            (1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal. There
      is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty
      by the trier of fact or in a determination that there was insufficient
      evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser
      included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive offense,
      although the conviction is subsequently set aside.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 109(1). Section 109 does not apply because Appellant was not

acquitted of a lesser included offense in a former prosecution. Rather, the

jury returned an inconsistent verdict during a single prosecution for the lesser

and greater offenses, as is permissible under Burton.         Appellant’s second

argument fails.

      In his final argument, Appellant asserts that the trial court’s sentence

violated the holdings of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) because the weight of the

fentanyl (2.7 grams), which resulted in an offense gravity score (“OGS”) of

ten rather than nine, was stipulated to by the parties and not found by a jury.

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The OGS of ten resulted in a standard sentencing guideline range of 60 to 72

months; it would have been 48 to 60 months with an OGS of nine.

      Appellant misapplies Apprendi and Alleyne. In Apprendi, the United

States Supreme Court held that any fact, other than a prior conviction, which

increases the statutory maximum penalty for an offense must be submitted

to the fact finder and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.        Similarly, the

Alleyne Court held that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum

sentence must be submitted to the fact finder and proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. But where the fact in question does not affect the maximum sentence

and the minimum sentence remains within the discretion of the sentencing

court, Apprendi and Alleyne do not apply.           The trial court’s “broad

sentencing discretion, informed by judicial fact finding,” does not implicate

Alleyne or Apprendi. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247, 262 n.5

(Pa. 2015). We have explained, therefore, that a fact resulting in an increased

sentencing guideline range, such as the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon,

need not be submitted to the factfinder and proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.   Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1270 n.10 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014). Here, the

weight of the fentanyl enhanced the sentencing guideline range; it did not

change the statutory maximum or trigger a mandatory minimum. And the

trial court retained discretion to impose a minimum sentence below, within,

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or above the guideline range. Appellant’s reliance on Apprendi and Alleyne

is misplaced.

     Because we have found no merit to any of Appellant’s arguments, we

affirm the judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 08/04/2023

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