Court Opinion

ID: 9778591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:13:23.702065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:11.990876
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ONION, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in the result reached, but feel compelled to explain my position in so doing, particularly in the event of a retrial. The majority reverses this case upon the rule stated in 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 745, p. 427,1 which was cited by this court in Ysasaga v. State, 444 S.W. 2d 305 (No. 42,067). This rule, as I understand, has application only where the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the State is obviously weak. In applying this rule in the case at bar the majority does so without any mention or discussion of the incriminating oral statement by the appellant which they later hold admissible or its effect upon the rule in question. I would have preferred that the majority had done so.
My primary reason for agreeing to a reversal in this case is my conclusion that the appellant is correct in his claim that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the incriminating statement allegedly made by the appellant to a police officer after indictment and at a time when appellant had employed an attorney.2 As authority *175for his contention appellant relies upon Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246.
The statement in question was introduced after a hearing in the absence of the jury to determine its voluntariness and admissibility.
The record reflects that such incriminating statement was made during a conversation initiated by Deputy Sheriff Jake Bo-gard of Hockley County when he knew that appellant was under indictment in Parmer County and on bail and after he learned appellant had employed counsel in the case at bar. Bogard testified he observed appellant in a service station on Main Street in Anton, Texas, and began the conversation by inquiring about the possible sale of appellant’s pickup truck. He related that during their three to four hour discussion of various subjects he turned the conversation to the case at bar and the incriminating statement followed. Bogard’s purpose, he revealed, was to trap the appellant into saying something, while pretending to be a friend, to get him to incriminate himself so he (Bogard) could testify against him. Bogard admitted that no warnings as to appellant’s rights were given. He testified the appellant was not under arrest and left when the conversation terminated.
Testifying in absence of the jury, appellant acknowledged the conversation but denied making the incriminating statement attributed to him. He testified his lawyer had told him not to make a statement to anyone; that he knew any statement made when not under arrest was admissible against him; that he knew Bogard was an officer and “wasn’t my friend”; that he engaged in the general conversation to “get along” so Bogard would not arrest him every time he came to Anton.
In Massiah v. United States, supra, the defendant was indicted with other persons for violating the federal narcotic laws, retained an attorney, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While free on bail Massiah had a conversation in the absence of counsel with one Colson, a co-defendant, while sitting in Colson’s automobile, unaware that with Colson’s cooperation a recording device had been placed in the automobile by means of a federal agent nearby who listened to the conversation and subsequently testified to incriminating statements made by the defendant.
Finding that Massiah had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, the Court said:
“We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.3
⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅝ ⅜ ⅜
“We do not question that in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted. *176All that we hold is that the defendant’s own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally he used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.”
Massiah thus reiterated the specific guarantee of the Sixth Amendment that one is entitled to the aid and assistance of counsel not only during the trial but also during the critical period immediately preceding from the time of indictment to time of trial.
It has been said that no uniformity now exists in the case law as to the exact meaning of the Massiah opinion. See People v. Milani, 39 Ill.2d 22, 233 N.E.2d 398 (Ill.). This is perhaps an understatement of some proportion.
Some federal courts of appeals interpret Massiah as establishing an exclusionary rule only for incriminating post-indictment statements by a defendant which are induced or deliberately elicited by police officers or their agents in the absence of counsel. See United States v. Accardi, 342 F.2d 697 (2nd Cir.); United States v. Gardner, 347 F.2d 405 (7th Cir.); Stowers v. United States, 351 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.); United States v. Garcia, 377 F.2d 321 (2nd Cir.).
None of these decisions appear to have given any consideration to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 1556, 14 L.Ed. 2d 682, which tersely reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio (State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349) citing Massiah. Ohio’s Supreme Court had earlier been told to reconsider McLeod in light of Massiah (378 U.S. 582, 84 S.Ct. 1922, 12 L.Ed.2d 1037). When they did they attempted to limit the scope of Massiah to statements which are deliberately elicited from an accused by an informer who has agreed to cooperate with the prosecution.4 This narrow interpretation was reversed with Mas-siah cited as authority for excluding the spontaneous, voluntary, post-indictment oral confession which was made, before counsel was retained or appointed, to the sheriff and a prosecuting attorney while the indicted defendant McLeod was riding in their automobile looking for the gun used in the holdup.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, taking note of the earlier federal decisions, interpreted the Supreme Court action in McLeod, however, to mean that the Messiah rule is not limited to Massiah “circumstances,” “but applies to exclude post-indictment incriminating statements of an accused to government agents in the absence of counsel even when not deliberately elicited by interrogation or induced by misapprehension engendered by trickery or deception.” Hancock v. White, 378 F.2d 479, 482 (1st Cir.). The defendant White, while in custody, had volunteered incriminating statements to the sheriff and county attorney when he knew, by his own admission, that he did not have to talk to the officers. White admitted initiating the conversation to get a “deal” if he pleaded guilty, but like the appellant Anders here, he denied making the incriminating statement. The Court felt the case, however, was indistinguishable from McLeod on the facts and that the prediction of the dissenting justices in Massiah had come true — that the rule of that case applies more broadly than the facts of Massiah would suggest — even to cases involving neither interrogation nor any form of deceit or deception.
In Beatty v. United States, 389 U.S. 45, 88 S.Ct. 234, 19 L.Ed.2d 48, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (377 F.2d 181) citing Massiah. The Beatty facts are remarkably similar to Massiah except that the defendant had initiated the meeting and conversation with *177the informer cooperating with the government and was not induced or encouraged by the informer to talk. Such action seemingly confirms the interpretation given Massiah by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Hancock. See People v. Milani, supra; People v. Lagardo, 39 Ill.2d 614, 237 N.E.2d 484 (Ill.).
A number of states have found the Mas-siah rule violated when applied to the facts presented. State v. Witt, 422 S.W.2d 304 (Mo.); Williams v. State, 188 So.2d 320 (Fla.App.) citing numerous authorities; State v. Longmore, 178 Neb. 509, 134 N.W.2d 66 (Neb.); Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 348 Mass. 7, 200 N.E.2d 264; State v. Gallagher, 97 Ariz. 1, 396 P.2d 241 (where after charges filed, officers told the accused they were in his hospital room strictly on a friendly, social level) ; State v. Herman, 3 Ariz.App. 323, 414 P.2d 172. See also Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 140 S.E.2d 688.
In 1964 this court in Turner v. State, 384 S.W.2d 879, held admissible a confession obtained after indictment in absence of counsel, distinguishing Massiah. Appellant urges that Turner is no longer controlling. It is true that much water has passed under the bridge and many of the underpinnings of that decision have been stripped away.
While Massiah was a federal prosecution, its doctrine has now been held applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. McLeod v. Ohio, supra. See also Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840; Williams v. State, 188 So.2d 320 (Fla.App.) ; Commonwealth v. Coyle, 427 Pa. 72, 233 A.2d 542 (Pa.); Elliott v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 243 Md. 627, 222 A.2d 55; State v. Blanchard, 44 N.J. 195, 207 A.2d 681. See also 79 Harvard Law Review 935, 999 (1966). And, it does not now appear that Massiah can any longer be restricted to its particular facts.5
Further, we now know that when the constitutional right of counsel arises a request therefor is not essential. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, at p. 471, 86 S.Ct. 1602, at p. 1626, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; See also Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 87 S.Ct. 996, 18 L.Ed.2d 33; People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal.2d 618, 43 Cal.Rptr. 699, 401 P.2d 4; Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.).
And Lyles v. Beto, 329 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.) cited as support for the conclusion reached in Turner, was reversed for reconsideration in light of Massiah. 379 U.S. 648, 85 S.Ct. 613, 13 L.Ed.2d 552. See now Lyles v. Beto, 363 F.2d 503.
Only this year the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that in light of the Supreme Court’s action in McLeod that Massiah commands an absolute right to counsel after indictment and all oral communications between defendant and the police made after indictment in absence of counsel are inadmissible. United States ex rel. O’Connor v. State of New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632. See also State v. Green, 46 N.J. 192, 215 A.2d 546.
In United States ex rel. O’Connor v. State of New Jersey, the Court stated:
“Massiah left three important questions unanswered: (1) Was it applicable only to federal prosecutions? (2) Was it restricted to special ‘circumstances’ or did it confer an absolute right to counsel in all cases following indictment? (3) Was it to be applied retroactively?
“The first of these questions was answered in Lyles v. Beto, 379 U.S. 648, 85 S.Ct. 613. 13 L.Ed.2d 552 (1965). The defendant in Lyles had been convicted of burglary in a state prosecution. His ex*178trajudicial confession given after indictment while not represented by counsel was introduced at trial. Relying on Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959), Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 (1958) and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 507, 78 S.Ct. 1297, 2 L.Ed.2d 1523 (1958), the Fifth Circuit held that there was no absolute right to counsel after indictment which, absent a showing of special circumstances, vitiated the validity of voluntarily-given statements by the accused.
“Without opinion, the Supreme Court remanded the case ‘for reconsideration in light of Massiah v. United States’. The clear implication of this action was that Massiah applied to both federal and state prosecutions.
“Whether Massiah would be applied selectively to special ‘circumstances’ was a question that remained, but one which was to find an answer in McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 1556, 14 L.Ed.2d 682 (1965). Convicted in an Ohio prosecution, McLeod challenged the admission of his extrajudicial statements made voluntarily after indictment without counsel. The incriminatory remarks were unsolicited by the police without any element of trickery, deception or subterfuge.
“The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as presenting ‘no debatable constitutional question’. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, as it had done in Lyles, remanded the case for ‘consideration in light of Massiah v. United States’.
“On remand, the Ohio court, with two justices dissenting, determined that because McLeod’s statements were volunteered without police solicitation, there being no circumstances of trickery or subterfuge present, the rule of Massiah was not controlling. The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and reversed the conviction without opinion ‘on the authority of Massiah v. United States’. 381 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 1556.
“By its disposition of McLeod the Court has said, in effect, that Massiah commands an absolute right to counsel after indictment, thereby vitiating the validity of all oral communications between the defendant and the police made in the absence of counsel. The ‘investigatory v. accusatory’ test of Escobedo and the ‘in custody’ test of Miranda, employed to determine when the right to counsel attaches, have no application once the indictment has formally stamped the suspect as the defendant; only a clear, explicit, and intelligent waiver may legitimate interrogation without counsel following indictment.”
It seems clear from the above discussion that whether one adopts a strict interpretation, takes a liberal view or seeks the middle ground the admission into evidence of the incriminating statement allegedly made by appellant and related by Officer Bogard was in violation of the Massiah rule. By his own candid admission Bogard pre-meditatively approached the appellant with the intention and design to induce him to make incriminating statements relative to the charge for which he was under indictment while unaided by counsel.
Massiah is not to be construed as immunizing a defendant from normal investigative technique after indictment, United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853, 873 (2nd Cir., 1966). Its rule is aimed at protection against deliberate efforts of law enforcement agents which are specifically designed at eliciting incriminating statements relative to the crime under indictment.
It is true that Massiah is not violated when if the person hearing the statement is not a government agent at the time the statement is made, Paroutian v. United States, 370 F.2d 631, cert. denied 387 U.S. 943, 87 S.Ct. 2077, 18 L.Ed.2d 1331, and no police inspired conversations are involved, People v. Milani, supra; or if a government agent is unaware of the indictment, United States v. Garcia, 377 F.2d 321 (2nd Cir., 1967), or if the government agent is present *179on other business and the defendant makes spontaneous or voluntary statements, United States v. Accardi, supra, or if the statement is an isolated one as to past crime gratuitously made while not under interrogation in connection with statements relative to fresh criminal activities which undercover officers are properly pursuing. Gascar v. United States, 9 Cir., 356 F.2d 101.
The fact that Deputy Bogard was an out of county peace officer and not prompted in this action by prosecutorial authorities does not by virtue of that fact bring him within any of the foregoing categories.
It would appear that the special aspect of counsel in Massiah is subject to waiver along with the waiver of Miranda rights. Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371 (9th Cir., 1968). Cf., however, People v. Vella, 21 N.Y.2d 249, 287 N.Y.S.2d 369, 234 N.E.2d 422, which refused to accept such a waiver theory.
I cannot, however, conclude that the State has here demonstrated an affirmative waiver, even under the “totality of the circumstances” rule discussed and applied in McCandless v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 636. It is well established that the “waiver” referred to may be defined as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461. Further, waiver of constitutional rights will not be “lightly inferred” and courts will “ ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against [the] waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. Miranda teaches, of course, that a heavy burden rests upon the prosecution to demonstrate a “voluntary, knowing and intelligent” waiver of an accused’s constitutional rights.
Naturally the determination of whether there has been an affirmative waiver must depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra; Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329-330 (5th Cir.) ; United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir.); McCandless v. State, supra.
Most important here, however, despite some evidence of appellant’s knowledge of some of his rights, is the statement in Miranda that “ * * * any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege” against self-incrimination, (emphasis supplied)
The State calls to our attention Hill v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.2d 481, and Gunter v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 421 S.W.2d 657. Both of these cases, however, involved pre-indictment custodial interrogation after Miranda warnings were given and valid waivers were demonstrated. There was no evidence that the defendants had been threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver. It is true that Gunter held admissible, under circumstances there presented, a confession taken in absence of and without notification of the accused’s court appointed counsel in view of the clear cut affirmative waiver. There this writer, in a concurring opinion, cautioned against the use of such as authority that an accused’s counsel need not be notified or called prior to interrogation. I do not deem Hill and Gunter as here controlling.
Finding no valid waiver here demonstrated and the rule in Massiah violated, this writer would reverse on this ground alone.
I cannot agree with the suggestion in Judge Woodley’s concurring opinion that the statement in question was not incul-patory or incriminating or an admission of guilt or a confession. I call attention to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, wherein the Supreme Court said:
“No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to ‘admis-missions’ of part or all of an offense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being com*180pelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely 'exculpatory.’ If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.” (emphasis supplied) See also Terry v. State, 420 S.W.2d 945.
I do not agree that “[the] question is whether Massiah should be extended in this state to exclude the statement whether incriminating or not, and whether obtained by trickery or deception or not.” Massiah has already been thus extended in all of the United States. McLeod v. Ohio, supra. See United States ex rel. O’Connor v. State of New Jersey, supra. To pretend otherwise is to ignore everything that has transpired since the rendition of the Mas-siah opinion.
It is the duty of this court to follow the holdings of the Supreme Court. I respectfully suggest we do so and follow McLeod v. Ohio, supra. Further, it is our duty to pass upon federal constitutional questions properly presented to this court. For us to affirm every such case, unless there is a proverbial “white horse” case by the Supreme Court where the facts can be perfectly color-matched and coordinated, so not to prevent review by appeal or certiorari, is in my opinion an abdication of our duty as the highest appellate court in this state dealing with the life and liberties of its citizens. To adopt such an attitude means that we will use the rubber stamp marked “affirmed” on all federal constitutional questions where the Supreme Court has not clearly resolved the question involved to the satisfaction of the majority. I cannot agree that such attitude is correct. Nor can I agree that we should omit a discussion of a constitutional question merely because the case is being reversed on other grounds. This might easily result in the waste of precious judicial time. The district attorney in the case at bar stated in his oral argument before this court that if a reversal resulted, there would be a second trial and that the statement in question would again be used unless this court clearly informed him it was error to do so. I would so inform him.
For the reasons stated, however, I concur in part and dissent in part.
MORRISON, J., joins in this opinion.

. In 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 745, p. 427, it is written:
“Where the circumstantial evidence relied on by the prosecution is obviously weak, and where the record on appeal affirmatively shows not only that other testimony which would have cast additional light on the facts was available to the prosecution, but also that the prosecution did not introduce such other evidence or satisfactorily account for its failure to do so, the appellate court will treat the case as one showing reasonable doubt of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.”
See also Hollingsworth v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 419 S.W.2d 854; King v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 396 S.W.2d 409; Ramirez v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 109, 289 S.W.2d 251.

. Deputy Sheriff Bogard related that during the conversation the following occurred : “So I said, ‘Pat, are they going to convict you?’ And he says: T don’t see how they can there in Parmer County, because they will have to have some farmers there on the jury, and I don’t see how them farmers can eon-*175vict me for taking something from somebody that was actually stealing from them and selling it to them for what it was worth.’ ”
The foregoing is the statement testified to before the jury and thus in my opinion, is the controlling version.

. One of the cases cited by the majority in Massiah was Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265. There the court unanimously overturned a conviction based on a confession the court found to be involuntary. Spano’s confession was obtained after extensive interrogation; a policeman acquaintance also participated in a way which the court denominated as deceptive. The concuring justices believed that interrogation by police in absence of the indicted person’s attorney itself directly impaired his constitutional right to counsel and required exclusion of the confession on that basis alone. This rationale was in fact invoked by the majority in Massiah.

. The Ohio Supreme Court said: “A decision which would extend such a rule (Massiah) beyond where it has already been extended would be required in order to reverse the judgment in this ease.” The United States Supreme Court evidently did not agree.

. In addition to McLeod, Beatty and others, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 348 Mass. 7, 200 N.E.2d 264, said: “In the Massiah case the defendant did not know that his remarks to a confederate who was cooperating with the authorities were being overheard. But we do not understand the holding to turn on that point. The court in general terms stated a rule against interrogation after indictment in the absence of counsel. This is now a constitutional principle applicable to these cases.”