Court Opinion

ID: 9759164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:07:56.36801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:59.948246
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, Judge,
concurring:
While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I do not subscribe to both of the reasons set forth to achieve the result.
I fully agree that counsel for the appellant should not be permitted to withdraw from this case because of counsel’s failure to timely inform the appellant of his right either to proceed in propria persona or to request appointment of new counsel. However, I do not adopt the position that court-appointed counsel should be bound to file and brief an appeal which counsel believes is totally without merit.
*50In 1968, our Supreme Court, in the case of Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 Pa. 209, 239 A.2d 201, held that before counsel may withdraw from the case he must file a brief referring to anything in the record “that might arguably support the appeal.” See also, Commonwealth v. Perry, 464 Pa. 272, 346 A.2d 554 (1975).
However, in the 1981 case of Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185, in an Opinion by Justice Nix, the Supreme Court stated the following:
The dilemma created by the Perry reasoning becomes apparent when we consider the definition of the term “wholly frivolous” adopted by this jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Greer, (citations omitted). If the Greer definition of “wholly frivolous” means that there are no points present that “might arguably support an appeal” counsel is saddled with an impossible burden, if he is nevertheless required to file a brief containing arguments that are nonexistént. If on the other hand, there are claims of arguable merit, even though counsel may not have any confidence in them, under Greer the appeal is not “wholly frivolous” and counsel is not entitled to seek leave to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Greer. Thus following the Perry rationale to its logical conclusion the right of counsel to seek leave to withdraw would be illusory. We do not believe that such a result was ever intended by the United States Supreme Court.
495 Pa. 472-73, 434 A.2d at 1188.
Where an accused is entitled to a counselled appellate review, that right should not be denied or diminished solely because of indigency. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). However, Anders does not require that counsel be forced to pursue a wholly frivolous appeal just because his client is indigent. Commonwealth v. McClendon, supra, 495 Pa. 472-73, 434 A.2d at 1188. If a skilled trial lawyer, in his considered judgment, holds the good faith conviction that an appeal is frivolous or that the filing of an appeal would offend his conscience, he can do no more. The courts should not then force him *51to do that which privately-hired defense counsel would not be required to do, simply because the lawyer has been appointed by the court. It should not be the policy of the judicial system to encourage groundless appeals which merely waste the courts’ time.
The basis for caution in permitting court-appointed counsel to withdraw from a case is the need to assure that the appellate rights of a defendant are not waived without his knowledge. As long as withdrawing counsel informs the defendant of his appellate rights, including the right to request new court-appointed counsel, the actual filing and briefing of an appeal is unnecessary to preserve the defendant’s rights.