Court Opinion

ID: 9684390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:55:23.488494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:55.397832
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion disposes of this proceeding by sustaining respondent’s motion *724to quash. The respondent to whom a writ of habeas corpus is addressed can attack the petition if he desires by a motion to quash the writ. State ex rel. Chase v. Calvird, 324 Mo. 429, 24 S.W.2d 111, 114 (1930). But on a motion to quash the writ, the allegations of the petition are deemed admitted. 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 86, p. 650. A motion to quash tests the sufficiency of the petition for the writ. State ex rel. Stack v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 340, 143 S.W. 450, 454 (1911).
The principal opinion says the foregoing has no application because the motion to quash in this instance “asserts simply that petitioner’s claim is filed in the wrong forum”; that it must be asserted by motion under rule 27.26 “in the sentencing court.” In my view, this still is saying to petitioner that no matter whether everything you say is true, you cannot use habeas corpus. Suppose the judgment and sentence in this case had been entered in the circuit court of Cole county, which is also the location of respondent in charge of the state penitentiary. If petitioner under these circumstances were to file habeas corpus in the sentencing court, so that there could be no question of venue or jurisdiction, the state would continue to argue, I am sure, that habeas corpus was not available, that petitioner must resort to rule 27.26 in the same court. Venue has nothing to do with what we are discussing, in my opinion. The point is that even if everything petitioner says is true (whether by force of its being regarded that way on motion to quash, or whether by virtue of its making no difference even if it is true), it is the position of the principal opinion and the state that petitioner must nevertheless proceed by motion under rule 27.26.
If we take the allegations of the petition to be true, then there was only one valid conviction against petitioner under Sec. 564.440, the earlier convictions alleged in the information being invalid because petitioner was not represented by counsel and there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel in said cases, and the circuit court had no jurisdiction to try or hear the case against petitioner under which he is currently sentenced because he had previously filed a motion for change of judge which was never acted upon and was still pending.
If the foregoing is true, then petitioner could not legally have been convicted of a third offense, a felony, under Sec. 564.-440(3) and sentenced to three years in the custody of the department of corrections. The most he could have been convicted of would have been a misdemeanor, under Sec. 564.440(1), and the maximum imprisonment would have been six months in the county jail.
So if the facts alleged in the petition are true (as we must take them to be on a motion to quash), then the only adequate relief here is to sustain the petition, grant the writ, and remand petitioner to the custody of the sheriff of DeKalb County for delivery to the circuit court for sentencing under See. 564.440(1), after disposition of the application for change of judge.
To remand petitioner to the custody of respondent and leave petitioner to the procedure of filing a motion in the appropriate circuit court for relief under rule 27.26 is not adequate. It will take anywhere from one to three years for petitioner’s motion to work its way through the trial and appellate courts.1 During all this time petitioner *725will be imprisoned in the state penitentiary. It is self-evident this is not adequate relief for a man who, if what he alleges in his petition is true, could not be subject to imprisonment for more than six months and that in the county jail, not the state penitentiary. Under the allegations of the petition, petitioner cannot legally be held in the state penitentiary and respondent is illegally depriving petitioner of his liberty (or would be if petitioner were not on bail at the moment).
The question whether the rule 27.26 procedure is ineffective in general when a short sentence is involved is not before us (although it may well be that it is). Here the question is a six months sentence versus a three year sentence. Some would regard either as long; others would regard either as short. But short or long, if petitioner is correct in his claim (and at the moment the state’s position is that he can be, but if so, it is immaterial), only by resort to habeas corpus can he obtain the prompt relief which is essential if his right to be free of illegal confinement is to be more than a right in name only.
I am unable to see where permitting ha-beas corpus in this case would commit the courts to some sort of bifurcated procedure. If what the petitioner alleges is true, it does not require a hearing to realize that a motion under 27.26, with all its delay and litigation at all levels of the court system, is inadequate. The mere allegation that the 27.26 route is inadequate would, of course, be no more than a conclusion, and in many instances petitioner will not be able to state facts to support the conclusion. In such instances no factual hearing would be required, anymore than is the case in 27.26 motions where only conclusions are alleged, Parsons v. State, 528 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Mo.App.1975). But when the petitioner states facts, as here, which show the 27.26 method is inadequate, it will save time in the long run, not waste time, to let petitioner proceed in habeas corpus if he can establish his facts.
I therefore respectfully dissent and would overrule the motion to quash.
I do however, agree with what I take to be implicit in the final part of the principal opinion that only when the remedy provided by rule 27.26 is adequate can it be considered exclusive. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, which the principal opinion states has repeatedly been upheld, contains, it should be noted, an express provision allowing resort to habeas corpus when the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective. Where the remedy it provides is not adequate, then it follows that rule 27.26 cannot be exclusive, because otherwise it would be acting as a bar to resort to habeas corpus, in violation of Art. I, Sec. 12, Mo.Const. Ha-beas corpus . is a high prerogative writ, the vital purposes of which are to obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody. In other words, the writ was designed for the *726purpose of effecting a speedy release of persons who are illegally deprived of their liberty . . .”39 Am.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, Sec. 1, p. 179. Under the allegations of the petition, rule 27.26 is not adequate and the relief sought is not “encompassed” by the rule. As has oft been said, justice delayed is justice denied. Only ha-beas corpus can produce the speedy relief to which petitioner is entitled in this matter involving his individual freedom.

. I do not believe an estimate of from one to three years for petitioner’s motion to work its way through the trial and appellate courts is unrealistic. Time does not permit a more thorough survey, but of the 27.26 cases which appear in the last ten volumes of the Southwestern Reporter Second which contain facts sufficient to permit an accurate determination, the average time from filing of motion to disposition of appeal is over twenty five months. Of these cases, only one case took less than one year, three months and several took over three years. If we include time required for motions for rehearing and transfer to this court, the average would be increased another two or three months. I agree that if petitioner proves that he did not have two prior valid *725convictions, “we should and do assume that a trial judge would give relief.” But this does not mean the state will agree and will not appeal. The state has an absolute right to appeal under 27.26(j), whereas there is no appeal in habeas corpus. Jones v. State, 471 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. banc 1971). The principal opinion says appeals' by the state in 27.26 cases are infrequent, but this is probably due to the fact that it is infrequent that the petitioner prevails in the trial court, so that it is seldom that the state has occasion to appeal. Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri — Five Years Under Amended Rule 27.26, 38 Mo.L.Rev. 1 (1973).
Despite the provisions of rule 27.26 cited in the principal opinion calling for prompt disposition of 27.26 motions, we have seen a good many instances where such motions have moved rather slowly. Certainly there is no guarantee that petitioner can obtain a final disposition of his claim within six months by proceeding under rule 27.26. It seems to me the principal opinion does not meet the question of what if it does take more time to process the 27.26 motion than the maximum time petitioner must serve if he turns out to be right in his claim. How can such a remedy be adequate, when it cannot do what habeas corpus can do in a short time if petitioner’s claim is valid?