Court Opinion

ID: 9643768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:40:16.730364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:03.240328
License: Public Domain

GREENHILL, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The question is not one of scope of employment of the driver of the vehicle, So-telo, or whether their conduct in drinking beer was anti-social. The question is whether the vehicle was insured, or uninsured as to innocent third parties who were struck by the vehicle driven by Sotelo. Further reduced, the question is whether there is any evidence that Sotelo had the implied consent or permission of his employer to be using the vehicle when he did.
As the court’s opinion states, the omnibus clause of the policy issued White Well Service, Inc. covers the use of a company vehicle by an employee with the company’s consent and permission, express or implied. Royal Indemnity Company v. H. E. Abbott & Sons, Inc., 399 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.1966).
The parties agreed that Sotelo, the driver, had no express permission to use the vehicle to drive himself and his crew to drink at bars after work. An issue was, however, submitted to the jury which inquired whether Sotelo was driving the vehicle within the scope of the permission granted him by White Well Service, Inc. The issue contained instructions about implied permission and the minor deviation rule. The jury found that Sotelo was operating the vehicle within the scope of the permission of White Well Service, Inc. The trial court then granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
To sustain the action of the trial court, it must be determined that there was no evidence of implied permission and that any deviation from the permission was so gross as to avoid coverage under the omnibus clause of the policy.
All evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to support the jury verdict. “Only the evidence and inferences therefrom that support the jury finding should be considered, with all contrary evidence and inferences being rejected.” Dodd v. Texas Farm Products Co., 576 S.W.2d 812, 814-15 (Tex.1979).
The evidence which supports a finding of implied permission is that Hubert Harris, one of the two supervisors at White Well Service, Inc., came into Wally’s one evening before the collision. Harris found Sotelo and his crew drinking beer. He sat down and had a beer with them. The company truck entrusted to Sotelo was parked in plain view outside the bar so that it is reasonable to infer that Harris knew that Sotelo drove his crew in the pickup to drink beer at Wally’s before taking them home. Harris never reprimanded Sotelo nor said that such conduct was improper. On at least two other occasions when Sotelo and his crew were detained on the road or at the worksite due to problems with machinery at night, Harris brought them beer which he drank with them.
At another time Sotelo and his crew were drinking beer at the Matador in the afternoon. Robert White, a supervisor and president of White Well Service, Inc., came there looking for Sotelo and his crew. The *507evidence most favorable to the jury verdict is that White was standing in a position to see the beers the crew was drinking when talking with Sotelo. From that evidence the jury could infer that White knew Sotelo had, during working hours, gone with his crew to drink beer. White made no comment about drinking beer. This constitutes some evidence from which the jury could draw the inference that the lack of objection under the circumstances signified assent to the conduct. In other words, this is legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Sotelo had the implied permission of White Well Service, Inc. to drive his crew to a bar in the company vehicle to drink beer before taking the crew home.
Once such a finding of implied permission is permitted, the question of deviation arises. The deviation between Sotelo’s actions on the night of the accident and his actions on the night Harris drank with the crew at Wally’s is that on the night of the accident Sotelo and the crew probably drank more beer longer than at the earlier occasion at Wally’s. Whether such a deviation destroys permission is a question of degree which, in my opinion, was within the province of the jury to decide.
McGEE and CAMPBELL, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.