Court Opinion

ID: 9783523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:48:09.946583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:25.019277
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.,
concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority; the case must be reversed and remanded for the district court to apply the standard of review explicitly set forth in the applicable statute, i.e., “a trial de novo only on the issue of relocation benefits.” K.S.A. 58-3509(a). I write separately to express my frustration with the court-created confusion as to the meaning of the term “trial de novo,” which literally means “new trial.” I dare say that both lawyers and laypersons fully comprehend what it means to be granted a new trial. Simply using Latin phraseology should not change the term to mean whatever procedure the court deems appropriate under the circumstances.
I can understand the motivation for altering the meaning of trial de novo where the separation of powers doctrine is implicated because of the court’s duty to construe a statute in such a manner
*25that it will be constitutionally valid. See Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 629-30, 176 P.3d 938 (2008). However, even where the court is attempting to comport with that duty, it “may not rewrite a clear and unambiguous statute to make it pass constitutional muster.” 285 Kan. at 630; see also State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 538-39, 102 P.3d 445 (2004) (interpretive canon that ■statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature), rev cl on other grounds Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006). Arguably, in those prior cases where the legislature’s provision for a trial de novo review of an agency’s purely administrative action offended the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the “appropriate judicial solution” was to hold that the statute was unconstitutional and let the legislature resolve the matter. Marsh, 278 Kan. at 540 (citing Justice Davis’ dissent in State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1125, 40 P.3d 139 [2001]).
Nevertheless, as the majority acknowledges, the separation of powers doctrine is not applicable in this case, and we need not employ the “ ‘avoidance doctrine’ ” or the “ ‘rule of constitutional doubt.’ ” See Marsh, 278 Kan. at 538 (applying labels to the interpretive canon of construing a statute to avoid constitutional questions). Therefore, our first task is simply to “ascertain the legislature’s intent through the statutoiy language it employs, giving ordinary words their ordinary meaning.” State v. Stallings, 284 Kan. 741, 742, 163 P.3d 1232 (2007).
I submit that K.S.A. 58-3509(a) plainly says that Ben and Lavelle Frick get a new trial on the issue of relocation benefits. Moreover, the term “trial” is ordinarily understood to mean the presentation of evidence and witnesses before a factfinder, not a judicial review of a record of a prior proceeding. See Nurge v. University of Kansas Med. Center, 234 Kan. 309, 319, 674 P.2d 459 (1983) (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting; right to jury trial means a trial with live testimony, where possible). The majority finds precedent for departing from the ordinary meaning of new trial because of a perceived ambiguity created by the use of the term “appeal,” in conjunction with the term “trial de novo.” Under that rationale, an actual, commonly *26understood new trial should never be possible where the authorizing statute designates the subsequent procedure as an appeal. However, the word “appeal” appears in K.S.A. 22-3609(1), which grants a municipal court defendant “the right to appeal to the district court,” and in subsection (4), which speaks to “the trial of municipal appeal cases.” Yet, in that instance, the trial in district court starts from scratch; the evidence must be presented anew, live and in person. Granted, that statute addresses an appeal from a judicial action rather than an appeal of an agency’s action. However, the point is that the word “appeal,” alone, does not create any ambiguity in that context as to what is meant by the word “trial.”
Utilizing tire word “appeal” to create an ambiguity is even more curious with respect to the version of trial de novo manufactured by the Nurge majority and adopted by the majority in this case. Under that version, the term “trial de novo” means, inter alia, that the district court is to make independent findings of fact, but that such findings must be gleaned solely from the record of the administrative hearing examiner’s proceedings. Factfinding in appellate jurisprudence is an anathema. See LSF Franchise REO I v. Emporia Restaurants, Inc., 283 Kan. 13, 19, 152 P.3d 34 (2007) (an appellate court does not redetermine questions of fact). As pointed out by the dissent in Nurge, “[assessing the candor and credibility of witnesses is seriously handicapped without seeing the demeanor and hearing the live testimony of the witness.” 234 Kan. at 320 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting). “The reading of a cold written record does not permit the court or a jury to determine the credibility of witnesses.” 234 Kan. at 320 (same). Yet, that is precisely what we are asking the district court to do — malee independent findings of fact from a cold written record.
I would prefer not to continue the fiction of creating differing definitions of the plain and unambiguous term “trial de novo” based upon the appellate court’s belief as to what the procedure should be. If the legislature says that an appeal is to be a trial de novo, then the appellant should get a new trial as we all know and understand that to be. If the legislature wants an appeal to be a trial on the record of the agency proceeding, a substantial com*27petent evidence review of an agency record, or something other than a new trial, let it say as much.