Court Opinion

ID: 9643135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:20:30.025349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:57.765067
License: Public Domain

SHEA, Justice,
dissenting.
Ms. Cole’s answers to interrogatories and her testimony during a deposition confirm that the injuries complained of in this action are the same injuries for which she received compensation from Allstate Insurance Company in the arbitrator’s award. She also acknowledged that she was dissatisfied with the amount of that award because she felt her injuries and losses warranted a larger amount. She further admitted that she was looking for a second chance to prove her damages and was hopeful that this time she would obtain a higher award based on the same evidence presented to the arbitrator. The arbitrator was deposed also and stated that his award *962to Ms. Cole was not reduced by any consideration of contributory negligence on her part or by negligence on the part of any other party. He said he awarded her the full amount of her damages.
In this case, Ms. Cole seeks to recover a second time for the same injuries and damages she suffered in the accident of February 6, 1978, that had been previously adjudicated by arbitration. She submitted to the arbitration voluntarily. The award she now asserts is inadequate had been confirmed by a Superior Court judgment for which she herself had made application under G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 10-3-11.
A second adjudication of this issue must be barred by the principle of collateral es-toppel. All of the prerequisites for the application of collateral estoppel are present. There is identity of issues because the issue she seeks to litigate is the value of the damages she suffered in the accident of February 6, 1978. There was a final judgment on the merits after full arbitration, award, and confirmation by the Superior Court. The person against whom collateral estoppel is to be asserted is plaintiff, Ms. Cole, who was a party to the prior action.
Section 10-3-18 provides that a judgment confirming an arbitrator’s award, when entered,
“shall have the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action at law; and it may be enforced as if it has been rendered in an action at law in the court in which it is entered.”
The doctrine of collateral estoppel also applies to judgments entered by affirmance of an arbitrator’s award. Providence Teachers Union v. McGovern, 113 R.I. 169, 319 A.2d 358 (1974).
The plaintiff in this case could have brought suit against the present defendant, Greylawn Co., and could have joined the uninsured-motorist carrier, Allstate. She chose arbitration with Allstate only. Once the award was given, she could have sought to vacate it under § 10-3-12(d) or to modify it. Instead, she petitioned for a judgment confirming the award. She must be bound by that judgment.
The plaintiff here is in the same situation as a claimant who has coverage available under two uninsured-motorist policies. “[T]he insured may recover the full amount of each uninsured motorist coverage to which he or she is entitled as long as recovery does not exceed the insured’s actual loss.” Employers’ Fire Insurance Co. v. Baker, 119 R.I. 734, 743, 383 A.2d 1005, 1009 (1978). She is also in a situation similar to that of a plaintiff injured by two insured defendants. It is a basic premise that a claimant has no right to recover more than his or her actual loss. The fact that two parties may have exposure for payment does not give the claimant a right to recover more than the actual loss. The acceptance of satisfaction of judgment against one of several obligors bars any action against the others for the same debt or obligation. Washington Trust Co. v. Fatone, 106 R.I. 168, 172, 256 A.2d 490, 493 (1969).
It is a fundamental doctrine that an injured person is entitled to only one satisfaction for a tort even though two or more parties contribute to the loss. Augustine v. Langlais, 121 R.I. 802, 805, 402 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1979). This plaintiff’s damages were set at $4,750, and she has been paid that amount in full. She should not be allowed to maintain a second action for those damages.
The only issue that could still be litigated is Greylawn and Charron’s proportionate share of responsibility for Ms. Cole’s injuries. This would benefit Allstate only, who might be entitled to contribution from the joint tortfeasors. That action, however, would not benefit Ms. Cole in any way and *963certainly could not increase the damages to which she would be entitled.
For these reasons I believe we should affirm the action of the trial court that granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.