Court Opinion

ID: 9776432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:35:33.950758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:38.833049
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent as I think the rule indicated with reference to reviewability of an order denying a motion for summary judgment is wrong. I agree that no appeal lies from an order denying a summary judgment, as such order is interlocutory. Douglas v. Citizens Bank, 244 Ark. 168, 424 S. W. 2d 532. I also agree that a motion for summary judgment should not be reviewed on appeal after a trial on the merits. See Bell v. Harmon, 284 S. W. 2d 812 (C. A. Ky. 1955); Safeway, Inc. v. Johnson, 311 F. 2d 387 (5th Cir. 1962); The Home Indemnity Company v. Reynolds & Company, 38 Ill. App. 2d 358 (1962). A motion for summary judgment is somewhat like a motion for a directed verdict. The theory underlying both is substantially the same, i. e., that there is no genuine issue of fact to be resolved and that the movant is entitled to judgment on the applicable law. Russell v. City of Rogers, 236 Ark. 713, 368 S. W. 2d 89; 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 56.04[2] p. 2066. In testing the propriety of granting a summary judgment, we have applied the rules by which we test the propriety of directed verdicts. Russell v. City of Rogers, supra. By the same analogy, we should deny review after a trial on the merits, just as we deny review of a motion for directed verdict made at the conclusion of a plaintiff’s proof, because deficiencies in the evidence may be supplied by the subsequent proceedings. Fort Smith Cotton Oil Co. v. Swift & Company, 197 Ark. 594, 124 S. W. 2d 1; Granite Mountain Rest Home, Inc. v. Schwarz, 236 Ark. 46, 364 S. W. 2d 306; Campbell v. Bastian, 236 Ark. 205, 365 S. W. 2d 249; Lytal v. Crank, 240 Ark. 433, 399 S. W. 2d 670. Following the analogy and for the same reasons, we should review the denial of a motion for summary judgment where a movant elects to stand thereon and let final judgment go against him. This is the same procedure we follow when a defendant elects to stand on an overruled demurrer to a complaint and have judgment rendered against him, or when he fails to offer evidence after denial of a motion for directed verdict. Nunez v. O. K. Processors, Inc., 238 Ark. 346, 381 S. W. 2d 754; Portis v. Board of Public Utilities, 212 Ark. 822, 208 S. W. 2d 772, 213 Ark. 201, 209 S. W. 2d 864; Hall v. Waters, 118 Ark. 427, 176 S. W. 699. The United States 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, in denying review of a motion for summary judgment after a trial on the merits, emphasized this analogy by pointing out that error in overruling a demurrer to the evidence or a motion for directed verdict might be cured by further proceedings or admission of additional evidence. Safeway, Inc. v. Johnson, 311 F. 2d 387 (5th Cir. 1962). The finality of an order denying summary judgment where the movant elected not to avail himself of an opportunity to offer testimony in support of his case was recognized in W. J. Dillner Transfer Company v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 506 (W. D. Pa. 1951). I can perceive no sound reason why one may not stand on his right to a summary judgment just as he can stand on his right to a directed verdict or to have a demurrer sustained. There is no question raised here as to the insufficiency of the affidavit or the credibility of the affiant or to his lack of personal knowledge of the content of the affidavit. The injustice of any other procedure was sharply pointed up by the Appellate Court of Illinois in The Home Indemnity, Company v. Reynolds, supra, in arriving at its holding that the result of denial of a motion for summary judgment was not appealable because it becairie merged in the subsequent trial on the merits. There it was said : " An incorrect, ruling.deprived the moving party of a judgment it should have had. It could not immediately appeal frqm the orders denying its motions because the orders were not final and appealable. * * * If it cannot appeal after judgment, if it does not come under the rule that an Appellate Court may review interlocutory orders (where a separate appeal did not lie from such orders, 2 I. L. P. Appeal and Error § 651), what remedy does it have? To deny a review seems to be unjust.” The reason for denying review of an interlocutory order is obviously because it is not final and does not conclude the action or determine the rights of the parties. The objective in all instances is to avoid piecemeal appeals and the hazard of delays that would unduly postpone a final judgment. When a judgment becomes final, however, the unsuccessful party who has elected to stand on the interlocutory determination should be entitled to a review thereof; On the basis of the summary judgment act as the record now appears, appellant was entitled to a summary judgment. Appellee in this case was confronted with an affidavit which completely set up a state of facts entitling appellant to relief, when considered along with the admissions of fact and answers to interrogatories hy ap-pellee. On a motion thus supported, appellee could not rest upon the allegations or denials of his pleadings. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 29-211,(6) (Supp. 1967). Its response must have been by counter-affidavits, depositions or answers to interrogatories setting forth specific- facts showing that there was a genuine issue of fact or hy affidavits showing reasons why it could not present by affidavits facts essential to justify its opposition. Ark. Stat. Ann. $ 29-211 (e); § 29-211 (f) (Repl. 1962); Mid-South Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Fort Smith, 241 Ark. 935. 410 S. W. 2d 873; Douglas v. Citizens Bank, 244 Ark. 168, 424 S. W. 2d 532; Scarboro v. Universal CIT Credit Corp., 364 F. 2d 10 (5th Cir. 1966). Appellee only filed an unverified response which did not set out any specific fact entitling it to the reformation of the note necessary to its counterclaim and defense. An unverified pleading does not meet the requirements of summary judgment procedure. Mid-South Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Fort Smith, supra. If the movant makes a case for summary judgment, the opposition is required to remove the shielding cloak of formal allegations and demonstrate a genuine issue as to a material fact. Deam v. Puryear & Sons, Inc., 244 Ark. 18, 423 S. W. 2d 554. What we said in Mid-South Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Fort Smith, supra, is applicable here: “* * * Mid-South would force the case to trial by merely contending that an issue exists, without any showing of evidence. This would defeat the whole purpose of summary judgment procedure.” I would reverse and enter judgment for appellant. I am authorized to state that George Rose Smith, J., joins in this dissent.