Court Opinion

ID: 9404747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-24 21:00:31.628271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:16.915242
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1511

        VIOLA MAE BRITTNER,

                             Debtor - Appellant,

                      v.

        BEACH ANESTHESIA, LLC,

                             Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
        Joseph Dawson, III, District Judge. (4:21-cv-01917-JD)

        Submitted: December 1, 2022                                        Decided: June 23, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and TRAXLER, Senior
        Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Matthew M. Breen, LOWCOUNTRY LAW, LLC, Mount Pleasant, South
        Carolina; David H. Breen, BREEN LAW FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for
        Appellant. Richard R. Gleissner, GLEISSNER LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South
        Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Viola Mae Brittner filed an adversary proceeding against Beach Anesthesia, LLC,

        alleging a violation of the automatic stay in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy

        court assumed Beach had violated the stay but held that Brittner failed to establish or

        mitigate damages. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. Brittner

        appeals. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

               “[W]e review the factual findings of the bankruptcy court for clear error and the

        legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court and the district court de novo.” In re Pfister, 749

        F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 2014). The Bankruptcy Code imposes a stay on “any act to collect,

        assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before” the filing of a bankruptcy

        petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). “[A]n individual injured by any willful violation of” the

        stay “shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate

        circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). The parties agree

        that Brittner needed to satisfy a five-part test to establish a violation of the automatic stay:

               (1) that a bankruptcy petition was filed, (2) that the debtors are individuals
               under the automatic stay provision, (3) that the creditors received notice of
               the petition, (4) that the creditor’s actions were in willful violation of the stay,
               and (5) that the debtors suffered damages.

        In re Warren, 532 B.R. 655, 660 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2015) (cleaned up).

               We conclude that Brittner failed to establish damages. Her damages center on two

        categories—emotional distress and attorney’s fees and costs. “An award of compensatory

        emotional distress damages requires evidence establishing that the plaintiff suffered

        demonstrable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently articulated; neither conclusory

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        statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress nor the mere fact that a violation

        occurred supports an award of compensatory damages.” Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 180

        (4th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up); see also Lodge v. Kondaur Cap. Corp., 750 F.3d 1263, 1271

        (11th Cir. 2014) (applying similar standard for debtor seeking emotional distress damages

        for creditor’s violation of automatic stay). Thus, “[a] plaintiff’s own conclusory allegations

        that [s]he felt embarrassed, degraded, or devastated, and suffered a loss of self-esteem, will

        not suffice.” Doe, 306 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, we

        have found that “a plaintiff [who] can produce evidence that emotional distress caused

        chest pains and heart palpitations, leading to medical and psychological treatment which

        included a formal diagnosis of major depressive disorder, as well as necessitated

        prescription medication” was entitled to emotional distress damages.            Id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that Brittner did not establish

        emotional distress damages. Brittner testified that she was anxious and suffered increased

        heart palpitations. But as the bankruptcy court emphasized, she suffered from a preexisting

        heart condition, and she did not see her cardiologist for two months. And Brittner provided

        no medical documentation to support her assertions.

               Turning to the issue of attorney’s fees and costs, we agree with the bankruptcy court

        that Brittner’s counsel’s conduct caused most of her damages and ratcheted up the amount

        of costs and fees. Brittner should not be entitled to a windfall based on her attorney’s

        actions, whether awarded under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) or 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). See, e.g., In

        re Preston, 333 B.R. 346, 351 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (finding the only damages—attorney’s

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        fees and costs associated with the request for sanctions—were manufactured by counsel

        and “could have easily been mitigated”); In re Sammon, 253 B.R. 672, 681-82 (Bankr.

        D.S.C. 2000) (holding a debtor could have mitigated damages by engaging in timely

        corrective action with creditor); In re Craine, 206 B.R. 594, 597-98 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.

        1997) (holding damages not appropriate when only damages were costs associated with

        filing contempt motion and matter could have been resolved without court intervention).

              Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s

        order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                    AFFIRMED

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