Court Opinion

ID: 9580198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:03:04.067181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:07.949057
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
As noted, appellant’s “motion to reopen” was in effect a motion made pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (g), which allows corrections “arising from oversight or omission.” Subsection (g) does not give a name for a motion seeking such relief, but in Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147, 148 (1) (269 SE2d 426) (1980), the Supreme Court called it an “action,” the purpose of which is to set aside the earlier judgment. Thus I fully agree that the case is properly before us.
However, I respectfully dissent with respect to the merits. In Cambrón the Supreme Court construed OCGA § 15-6-21 (c) as requiring that notice be sent “by the trial court or by the clerk to the losing party.” It is a duty, the ninety-year-old statute states, and the Court so recognized in expressing that it is not merely directory. One reason fulfillment of the duty is so crucial is that its entry sets the time running for appeal. That is precisely what concerned the Court in Cambron and is the situation here. See also Barthell v. State, 174 Ga. App. 459 (330 SE2d 180) (1985).
A lack of the statutorily mandated notice compels re-entry of the judgment and a resetting of the timeclock from that point so that the losing party has a fair opportunity to appeal. Of course, if he did have actual notice of the decision and entry, he has no cause to complain that the statute was not complied with exactly. So says Cambron. In such an instance, he would have had that fair opportunity and cannot ignore it else thereby forfeiting the right to appeal.
In the instant case the statute was not complied with and there is no evidence whatsoever that the losing party received notice. The court’s shifting of its duty to the winning party gains sufficiency of compliance with the statutory command, so as to avoid the necessity to re-enter, only where the losing party receives actual notice.
*838Decided July 10, 1987
Rehearing denied July 28, 1987
John L. Tracy, for appellant.
Hilliard P. Burt, Terry J. Marlowe, for appellee.
The facts compel reversal.
It is to be noted that we have pretermitted the problem of the record being improperly supplemented, see OCGA §§ 5-6-41 (d) and 5-6-48 (d); State v. Pike, 253 Ga. 304 (320 SE2d 355) (1984); Taylor v. Bentley, 166 Ga. App. 887 (305 SE2d 617) (1983); and Continental Fin. & Loan Co. v. Crystal Laundry & Cleaners, 214 Ga. 528, 531 (105 SE2d 727) (1958).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Pope join in this dissent.