Court Opinion

ID: 9520199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:33:10.897571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:42.936643
License: Public Domain

Wenke, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the holding of the majority of the court that the “Certificate of Deposit” No. 4624, issued by The Farmers State Bank, Aurora, Nebraska, on December 5, 1919, is barred by the statute of limitations.
The certificate is as follows:
“THE FARMERS STATE BANK $ 700.00
AURORA, NEBRASKA, 12/5/1919 No. 4624 George Starkey has deposited in this Bank
seven Hundred Dollars only only only Dollars,
payable to the order of himself
on the return of this Certificate properly endorsed. 6 or 12 months after date with interest at the rate of 4 percent per annum for the time specified only.
George Wanek Cashier.
CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT Not Subject to Check.”
(Emphasis is mine.)
This court has held in Citizens’ Bank of Humphrey v. Fromholz, 64 Neb. 284, 89 N. W. 775, that: “* * * as between a depositor and a bank, the statute of limitation *194does not begin to run until a demand is made for the money on deposit.” And the same is true as to a demand certificate. Sharp v. Citizens Bank of Stanton, 70 Neb. 758, 98 N. W. 50. As stated in Sharp v. Citizens Bank of Stanton, supra: “As between a bank and its customers, .either on a check and deposit account or as holders of demand certificates, there is no promise to pay until demand is made, and consequently a demand is necessary to put the statute in operation.” Consequently, if the deposit here involved falls into either of these classes the statute of limitations would not have started to run until demand for payment was made on December 24, 1954. On the other hand, if the certificate of deposit matured at the end of either 6 or 12 months from the date of its issuance, as the majority holds it did, then the statute of limitations would apply. Jacoby v. Dvorak, 111 Neb. 683, 197 N. W. 428. As stated therein: “A bank certificate of deposit payable 12 months after date upon return of the certificate properly indorsed matures at the expiration of the 12 months, and the cause of action thereon then accrues so as to start the statute of limitations.”
The time fixed for the payment of a certificate of deposit must necessarily depend upon the terms thereof but is payable on demand unless a time for payment is expressly provided for therein. See Section 62-107, R. R. S. 1943. As therein provided: “An instrument is payable on demand (1) where it is expressed to be payable on demand or at sight or on presentation; (2) in which no time for payment is expressed.”
If any doubt exists as to the meaning of the language used in the certificate such doubt should be resolved in favor of the appellant as it was prepared by the appellee and appellant had no part in selecting the language used therein. People’s State Bank v. Smith, 120 Neb. 29, 231 N. W. 141; Flory v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 98 Neb. 160, 152 N. W. 295. This principle is particularly applicable since appellee is authorized to deal with the *195general public and accept the deposit of their funds, a public service.
To me the certificate expressly provides that it is payablé on demand to George Starkey, or his successors, upon, return of the certificate to the bank properly endorsed subject, however, to the condition that the bank is not obligated to pay interest at 4 percent in excess of 12 months no matter how long the money may be left with it. See language of the certificate that I have emphasized. If this construction is correct then appellant’s cause of action did not arise until December 24, 1954, when demand was made upon the bank and it refused to pay.
With the possible exception of Kirkwood v. First Nat. Bank of Hastings, 40 Neb. 484, 58 N. W. 1016, 42 Am. S. R. 683, 24 L. R. A. 444, I do not think the cases of this court, cited in the majority opinion, support the conclusion therein reached for the terms thereof are not the same as that of the certificate here involved. In First Nat. Bank of Rapid City v. Security Nat. Bank, 34 Neb. 71, 51 N. W. 305, 33 Am. S. R. 618, 15 L. R. A. 386, the certificates expressly provided: “ ‘This certificate payable 3 months after date with 6 per cent interest per annum for the time specified’ in Jacoby v. Dvorak, supra, the certificate was “payable 12 months after date”; and in Diss v. State Bank, 141 Neb. 146, 3 N. W. 2d 89, the certificate issued contained the following language: “* * * with interest at 4 per cent per annum if left 6 months. Nov. 30, 1923. No interest after maturity.” By their express terms the certificates involved in those cases were payable at a certain date or length of time after the date of their issuance. That, to me, is the meaning of the quoted language from each of those cases but such is not the situation here for no comparable language is contained in the certificate issued by appellee to George Starkey.
This dissent does not mean the author thereof would necessarily arrive at a different conclusion that that *196reached by the majority, for appellee has raised the defenses of presumption of payment, laches, and estoppel. Whether or not any or all of those defenses are maintainable I do not decide. I only disagree with the majority in their construction of the language used in the certificate of deposit which was issued by appellee to George Starkey on December 5, 1919.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.