Court Opinion

ID: 9955838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 16:07:52.195324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:26.577036
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

                                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        PICKAWAY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                       : CASE NO. 23CA4

        v.                                        :

DARRELL LEE NETTER,                               : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellant.                      :

_________________________________________________________________

                                             APPEARANCES:

Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jayme
Hartley Fountain, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Circleville,
Ohio, for appellee.

Elizabeth N. Gaba, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.
________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:3-20-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is an appeal from a Pickaway County Common Pleas

Court judgment of conviction and sentence.                  Darrell Netter,

defendant below and appellant herein, assigns the following errors

for review:

                 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF
                 DEFENDANT AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
                 DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
                 ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE
                 UNLAWFUL PURSUIT, UNLAWFUL STOP AND UNLAWFUL
                                                                        2
PICKAWAY, 23CA4

            SEARCH OF HOSTETTER’S VEHICLE, VIOLATED THE 4TH
            AND 14TH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
            CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I SECTIONS 14 AND 16
            OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

            SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF
            DEFENDANT AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
            IMPOSED A SENTENCE MORE THAN 50% LONGER THAN
            THE STATE’S RECOMMENDATION, AND THE COURT’S
            SENTENCE WAS OPPRESSIVE AND AN ABUSE OF
            DISCRETION IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHTS
            UNDER THE 8TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
            CONSTITUTION.”

     {¶2}   During a March 2022 traffic stop, Ohio State Highway

Patrol Trooper Spencer Large discovered cocaine in a vehicle that

transported appellant.    A Pickaway County Grand Jury returned an

indictment that charged appellant with (1) one count of trafficking

in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), and (2) possession

of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), both first-degree

felonies.    Appellant entered not guilty pleas.

     {¶3}   Subsequently, appellant filed a motion to suppress the

evidence discovered during the traffic stop.       At the suppression

hearing, Trooper Large testified that on March 28, 2022 around

10:24 p.m., while he drove home from the patrol post after his

shift in his marked patrol cruiser, he observed a Toyota Camry

traveling south on U.S. 23.    Large noticed that an obstruction,

later determined to be leaves, partially blocked the Camry’s
                                                                        3
PICKAWAY, 23CA4

license plate and validation sticker.     The first time Large checked

the license plate, it “didn’t match the * * * Camry.”     The second

time he checked the plate, Large changed one letter, found a match,

and learned that the tags “expired back in December of last year.”

     {¶4}   Less than two miles after Trooper Large began to follow

the vehicle, he stopped the Camry based on the expired validation

sticker and obstructed plate violations.     Large approached the

passenger side of the vehicle at minute 2:04 of the dash camera

video and spoke with the driver (Hostetter), the front seat

passenger (appellant), and the backseat passenger (Karshner).

Large explained the reason for the stop and requested Hostetter’s

driver’s license and vehicle information.    During the exchange,

Large “smelled the odor of raw marijuana coming from the vehicle.”

When Large knelt down to again speak to the driver, he could only

smell cigarette smoke which, he explained, is often used to mask

the scent of other drugs.     Appellant and Karshner “were both

avoiding eye contact with me,” and “I could see that [appellant]

was breathing heavily.”     Hostetter also acted nervously, “avoiding

eye contact, giving me short answers, hands trembling.”

     {¶5}   Trooper Large had seen Pickaway County Sheriff’s Deputy

and Canine Handler Seth Thomas “less than three miles” back in the

median, so Large asked dispatch to call Thomas to the scene.        Large
                                                                        4
PICKAWAY, 23CA4

removed Hostetter from the vehicle at minute 4:36, about three

minutes after he first approached the vehicle, to obtain

Hostetter’s information because Large intended to “give him a

citation for expired tags.”     In addition, Large explained that he

removed Hostetter “based on everything that went on when I first

approached, the avoid eye contact, the odor of marijuana, and then

there was no odor.”    Large noted that the group traveled from

Columbus, “a major area for crime, drugs, guns, stuff like that” to

Chillicothe, and “Chillicothe is the same.    U.S. 23 pipeline is the

fastest route from Columbus to Chillicothe.”     Large acknowledged

that Hostetter did not smell like marijuana when he removed him

from the vehicle.

     {¶6}   At minute 5:15 of the video, Trooper Large patted

Hostetter down for weapons and placed him in the back seat of his

cruiser “until I could fill out the citation.”    Hostetter stated

that he had recently purchased the vehicle and had “pretty much * *

* forgot about the tags.”     Hostetter also told Large that the group

“had been up to see Mr. Netter’s cousin’s house in the Columbus

area, and they were heading back to Chillicothe.”     At approximately

8:30, Large requested Hostetter’s address and contact information.

Deputy Thomas arrived “about eight minutes” into the stop.      Large

briefed Thomas and watched traffic while Thomas conducted his
                                                                       5
PICKAWAY, 23CA4

canine walk-around.    Thomas approached the vehicle to explain the

canine sniff protocol to the remaining occupants at 10:00.     The

canine approached the vehicle at 11:10 and alerted to the presence

of drugs in the vehicle at 11:27 and 11:42.

     {¶7}   Based on the canine alert, Trooper Large removed the two

passengers, patted them down, and placed appellant in Large’s

cruiser and appellant’s girlfriend in Deputy Thomas’s cruiser.

When Large searched the vehicle, he began at the driver’s side,

“the floor area, I looked underneath the driver’s seat, and on the

back side, I saw a Wendy’s bag with different baggies in it, and

from there I could see that it was either trash or contraband.”

Large could not reach the bag from the front seat, so he went to

the back side of the seat and retrieved the Wendy’s bag with

cocaine inside.    Large also found raw marijuana in a blue bag in

the glove compartment.     Once Large found the contraband, he advised

appellant of his Miranda rights and placed him under arrest.

     {¶8}   Deputy Thomas arrived at the scene less than ten minutes

after the stop began.     After being briefed, Thomas approached the

vehicle, spoke to the occupants, and informed them about the canine

sniff protocol.     Thomas stated that the canine alerted “on the odor

of narcotics on the passenger’s side there and also again on the

trunk.”     After the canine alerted to the presence of drugs in the
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

vehicle, Trooper Large and Thomas removed the passengers from the

vehicle.         The officers’ search revealed “a large bag of white

powdery substance in the back seat.”              Ohio State Highway Patrol

Trooper Tazz Ashbaugh also assisted at the scene.

        {¶9}     After the trial court overruled the motion to suppress

evidence, appellant entered a no contest plea to Count Two,

possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a first-

degree felony.              The court accepted appellant’s plea, found him

guilty, and sentenced him to serve (1) an 8-year minimum up to 12-

year indeterminate term in prison, and (2) a mandatory post-release

control term.             This appeal followed.

                                             I.

        {¶10} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress

evidence. In particular, appellant argues that (1) an off-duty law

enforcement officer cannot stop a vehicle “for a perceived low-

level non-moving traffic infraction,” (2) it is not scientifically

appropriate to conduct a canine walk-around with vehicle occupants

who may have the residual odor of a drug like marijuana, (3) it is

not scientifically appropriate to conduct a canine walk-around with

a dog whose failure rate is unknown, and (4) the odor of “raw

marijuana” alone cannot constitute inherent evidence of criminal
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

activity because the Ohio General Assembly legalized hemp prior to

the stop and the odor of raw marijuana and odor of hemp cannot be

distinguished.

        {¶11} Generally, appellate review of a motion to suppress

evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact.                      State v.

Hawkins, 158 Ohio St.3d 94, 2019-Ohio-4210, 140 N.E.3d 577, ¶ 16,

citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797

N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8l, State v. Hansard, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 19CA11,

2020-Ohio-5528, ¶ 15.                   When ruling on a motion to suppress

evidence, a trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is

best positioned to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness

credibility.            State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665,

850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100.                      Thus, a reviewing court must defer to a

trial court's findings of fact if competent, credible evidence

exists to support the trial court's findings.                      Id.; State v.

Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v.

Debrossard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3395, 2015-Ohio-1054, ¶ 9.                       A

reviewing court must then independently determine, without

deference to the trial court, whether the trial court properly

applied the substantive law to the case's facts.                      See Roberts at ¶

100; Burnside, supra, at ¶ 8.

        {¶12} The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution

protect individuals from unreasonable governmental searches and

seizures.          State v. Shrewsbury, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3402, 2014-

Ohio-716, ¶ 14, citing State v. Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-

Ohio-5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15.               The exclusionary rule protects

this constitutional guarantee and mandates the exclusion of

evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure.                   Id.

        {¶13} First, appellant contends that an off-duty police officer

cannot intervene in a minor traffic infraction and conduct a

pursuit, stop, and detention.                As a threshold matter, we observe

that appellant cites no authority for this assertion.                It is

axiomatic that the failure to cite case law or statutes in support

of an argument, as App.R. 16(A)(7) requires, constitutes grounds to

disregard the assigned error pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2).

Moreover, officers are called upon to enforce the laws of the State

of Ohio at all times, and other Ohio courts have determined that a

police officer is always on duty, even for other purposes.                   See,

e.g., State v. Horton, 12th Dist. No. CA2000-04-024, 2000 WL

1875803 (Dec. 26, 2000)(off-duty officer has a continuing right and

obligation to enforce the law); Cleveland v. Floria, 121 Ohio

Misc.2d 118, 2002-Ohio-7456, 782 N.E.2d 1257 (a police officer, not

in uniform, can testify in court about a traffic violation observed
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

while not officially on traffic duty); Warrensville Hts. v.

Jennings, 58 Ohio St.3d 206, 569 N.E.2d 489 (1991) (off-duty drug

involvement is valid reason for dismissal of police officer because

officer has continuing duty to obey and enforce the criminal law,

even when off duty).                  It does appear, however, that an off-duty

officer in an unmarked vehicle may not execute an investigatory

stop.       This is not the situation here as Trooper Large drove a

marked cruiser.

        {¶14} Second, appellant asserts that Trooper Large did not

possess probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle,

detain the occupants, or search the vehicle.                  A traffic stop

initiated by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure within

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.                   Whren v. United States, 517

U.S. 806, 809–810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).                  Thus, a

traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment's general

reasonableness requirement.                  Id.   An officer's decision to stop a

vehicle is reasonable when the officer has probable cause or

reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has

occurred.          Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (citations omitted); accord

State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204,

¶ 23; Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11–12, 665 N.E.2d 1091

(1996).        Law enforcement officers also may stop a vehicle if they
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

have reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity “ ‘may be afoot.’

” ”     United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151

L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,

7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); accord State v.

Tidwell, 165 Ohio St.3d 57, 2021-Ohio-2072, 175 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 19

(officer may “make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop,

of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that

the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity”).

        {¶15} Relevant to the case at bar, a police officer who

observes a de minimis violation of traffic laws may stop a driver.

State v. Debrossard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3395, 2015-Ohio-1054, ¶

13, citing State v. Guseman, 4th Dist. Athens No. 08CA15, 2009-

Ohio-952, ¶ 20, citing State v. Bowie, 4th Dist. Washington No.

01CA34, 2002-Ohio-3553, ¶ 8, 12, and 16, citing Whren; see also

Harper at ¶ 24.              Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held,

“Where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause

that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is

not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution even if the officer had some ulterior motive for

making the stop[.]” Dayton at paragraph one of the syllabus.

        {¶16} In the case sub judice, we believe that the evidence
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

supports the view that Trooper Large articulated sufficient facts

that gave him reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the

vehicle.         As evidenced by both testimony and the video, leaves

obstructed Hostetter’s license plate in violation of R.C. 4503.21

(A)(2) [“The license plate * * * shall not be covered by any

material that obstructs its visibility.”] and Hostetter’s

validation sticker had expired in violation of R.C. 4503.11[“No

person who is the owner * * * of a motor vehicle * * * shall fail

to file annually the application for registration or to pay the tax

therefor”].           Thus, Large possessed a sufficient lawful basis for

the traffic stop.

        {¶17} Third, appellant asserts that, even if the initial stop

complied with the Fourth Amendment, Trooper Large improperly

expanded the scope of the stop when he conducted a canine walk-

around.        We recognize that courts have concluded that the use of a

drug detection canine does not constitute a “search” and an officer

is not required, before a canine sniff, to establish probable cause

or a reasonable suspicion that drugs are concealed in the vehicle.

See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d

842 (2005).           Consequently, an officer needs no suspicion or cause

to run a dog around a stopped vehicle if performed

contemporaneously with legitimate activities associated with the
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

traffic violation.                 Id.       Thus, a canine walk-around of a vehicle

that occurs during a lawful traffic stop does not violate an

individual’s constitutional rights.                      Id.   However, absent

reasonable suspicion an officer may not extend an otherwise-

completed traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff.                      Rodriguez v.

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492

(2015).

        {¶18} In general, an investigative stop may last no longer than

necessary to accomplish the initial goal of the stop:

        Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police
        inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the
        seizure's “mission”—to address the traffic violation that
        warranted the stop, Caballes, 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct.
        834 and attend to related safety concerns, infra, at 1619
        – 1620. See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
        685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Florida v.
        Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229
        (1983) (plurality opinion) (“The scope of the detention
        must   be    carefully   tailored   to    its   underlying
        justification.”). Because addressing the infraction is the
        purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is
        necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Ibid. See also
        Caballes, 543 U.S., at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. Authority for
        the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic
        infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.
        See Sharpe, 470 U.S., at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (in
        determining the reasonable duration of a stop, “it [is]
        appropriate to examine whether the police diligently
        pursued [the] investigation”).

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348 at 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609.                      Therefore, the

pertinent question is not whether a canine sniff occurs before or

after an officer issues, or could have issued, a traffic citation,
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

but whether the canine sniff extends the stop.             Id.

        {¶19} Law enforcement tasks generally associated with traffic

infractions include (1) determining whether to issue a traffic

citation, (2) checking the driver’s license, (3) determining the

existence of outstanding warrants, (4) inspecting the vehicle’s

registration, and (5) examining proof of insurance.              “These checks

serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code:

ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and

responsibly.”             State v. Farrow, 2023-Ohio-682, 209 N.E.3d 830, ¶ 14

(4th Dist.), citing Rodriguez at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609; State v.

Aguirre, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 03CA5, 2003-Ohio-4909, ¶ 36 (during a

traffic stop, motorist may be detained for a period of time

sufficient to issue a citation “and to perform routine procedures

such as a computer check on the motorist’s driver’s license,

registration, and vehicle plates”).

        {¶20} After a reasonable time for the purpose of the original

traffic stop to elapse, an officer must then have “‘a reasonable

articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue the

detention.’”            State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-561, 185 N.E.3d 131, ¶ 22

(4th Dist.), quoting State v. Ramos, 155 Ohio App.3d 396, 2003-

Ohio-6535, 801 N.E.2d 523, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.).

        When a police officer’s objective justification to continue
        detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation for
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

        the purpose of searching the person’s vehicle is not
        related to the purpose of the original stop, and when that
        continued detention is not based on any articulable facts
        giving rise to a suspicion of some illegal activity
        justifying an extension of the detention, the continuing
        detention to conduct a search constitutes an illegal
        seizure.

State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997),
paragraph one of the syllabus.

        {¶21} Thus, if after talking with a driver a reasonable police

officer would be satisfied that no unlawful activity had occurred,

the driver must be permitted to continue on his way.            State v.

Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 656, 645 N.E.2d 831, 835 (4th

Dist.1994).           However, if the officer “ascertained reasonably

articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity,

the officer may then further detain and implement a more in-depth

investigation of the individual.”            Robinette at 241, 685 N.E.2d

762.      The detention of the motorist may last as long as the

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity continues.           “However, the

lawfulness of the initial stop will not support a ‘fishing

expedition’ for evidence of another crime.”            Venham, supra, at 655.

        {¶22} Consequently, “[t]he detention of a stopped driver may

continue beyond [the normal] time frame when additional facts are

encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion

of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop.”
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

State v. Batchilli, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.S.2d

1282, ¶ 15, citing State v. Myers, 63 Ohio App.3d 765, 771, 580

N.E.2d 61 (2d Dist.1990); Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655, 645

N.E.2d 831, State v. Howard, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA 2006-02-002,

CA 2006-02-003, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶ 16.                       The “reasonable and

articulable” standard applied to a prolonged traffic stop

encompasses the totality of the circumstances.”                       Id. at ¶ 16,

citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744,

151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).                      However, Rodriguez v. United States,

supra, prohibits seizures that result from inquiries unrelated to

the purpose of a traffic stop that “measurably extend[s] the

duration of the stop.”                       Id. at 1615.

        {¶23} Ohio courts do not apply a bright-line test regarding a

specific amount of elapsed time to determine whether an officer has

unreasonably prolonged a traffic stop.                      The Supreme Court of Ohio

has held that “[a] traffic stop is not unconstitutionally prolonged

when permissible background checks have been diligently undertaken

and not yet completed at the time a drug dog alerts on the

vehicle.”          Batchilli at ¶ 14 (Emphasis added).               Instead, courts

look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if an

unreasonable prolonged delay occurred.                      The Second District Court

of Appeals observed:
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

        In the wake of Rodriguez, Ohio courts have continued to
        apply a duration-based standard for evaluating traffic
        stops such as the stop at issue in this case. See, e.g.,
        State v. Matheney, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26876, 2016-
        Ohio-7690, 2016 WL 6672805, ¶ 21–32; State v. Neal, 10th
        Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-771, 2016-Ohio-1406, 2016 WL
        1288000, ¶ 15–23; State v. Reece, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
        C-140635, 2015-Ohio-3638, 2015 WL 5257151, ¶ 15–25; but
        see State v. Hill, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26345, 2016-
        Ohio-3087, 2016 WL 2944821, ¶ 10–14 (describing Rodriguez
        as “arguably prohibit[ing] [a] seizure[ ] resulting from
        inquiries unrelated to the initial purpose of a traffic
        stop” if the unrelated inquiries measurably extend the
        stop's duration). These cases establish that to determine
        whether a police officer completes a traffic stop within a
        reasonable length of time, a court should evaluate the
        duration of the stop in light of the totality of the
        circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently
        pursued   the  corresponding   investigation.   (Citations
        omitted.) Matheney, 2016-Ohio-7690, 2016 WL 6672805, ¶ 22.

State v. Mee, 2017-Ohio-7343, 96 N.E.3d 1020, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.).

        {¶24} Some Ohio courts have found constitutional violations

that involve a relatively short stop duration.     See State v. Byrd,

2022-Ohio-4635, 204 N.E.3d 681 (8th Dist.)(although canine sniffed

within 15 minutes of traffic stop, officer acknowledged

investigation concluded eight minutes before canine’s arrival),

State v. Thomas, 2020-Ohio-3539, 154 N.E.3d 1074 (9th Dist.)

(traffic stop not completed within reasonable time given officer

normally takes 10-15 minutes to write warning, but evidence showed

“a pause of more than three minutes during the stop, before prior

to the arrival of the K-9 unit, where the officer was not

diligently conducting the investigation.”), State v. Neyhard, 11th
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

Dist. Ashtabula No. 2021-A-0005, 2022-Ohio-1098 (10 minutes

unreasonable when video and testimony did not “affirmatively

demonstrate that the officer was awaiting any information from

dispatch necessary to finishing the tasks reasonably related to the

purpose of the stop.”); State v. Green, 2016-Ohio-4810, 69 N.E.3d

59 (7th Dist.)(similar to Rodriguez, officer made the stop, then

called for canine officer, wrote and issued the warning in one to

two minutes, canine took 10 minutes to arrive and another 3 to

search the vehicle; dog did not complete the vehicle sniff until

11–12 minutes after warning issued, this improperly extended time

beyond time required for traffic stop).

        {¶25} However, other Ohio courts have concluded that a very

brief stop, similar to the duration of the stop in the present

case, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.                      See State v. Johnson,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20624, 2005-Ohio-1367 (no violation when

officer testified typical stop requires 15-20 minutes to complete

and sniff occurred 7 minutes into stop), State v. Blatchford, 2016-

Ohio-8456, 79 N.E.3d 97 (12th Dist.)(no violation when officer

testified normal traffic stop between 15-20 minutes, dog arrived

within ten minutes and alerted within 12 ½ minutes), State v. Cook,

65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521-522, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992) (15 minute

detention reasonable).                       See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.

675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (20 minute detention
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

reasonable); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410, 125 S.Ct.

834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (no constitutional violation when

canine sniff less than 10 minutes after initiation of stop,

defendant placed in cruiser and officer not yet issued a citation);

Batchilli, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, at

¶ 14 (no evidence to suggest detention for traffic violation of

sufficient length to make it constitutionally dubious when dog

alerted 8 minutes and 56 seconds into the stop and neither

background check nor traffic citation had been completed); State v.

Brown, 183 Ohio App.3d 337, 2009-Ohio-3804, 916 N.E. 2d 1138, ¶ 23

(6th Dist.)(no violation when canine sniff within 15 minutes of

stop, a reasonable time to process a traffic citation).

        {¶26} Turning to the case sub judice, we agree with the trial

court’s conclusion that Trooper Large possessed probable cause to

stop the vehicle based on the obstructed license plate and expired

validation sticker.                 Once stopped, Large diligently completed his

duties that corresponded with the traffic citation.                In fact,

evidence adduced at the suppression hearing showed that Large

continued to request and enter information from the driver at

minute 8:30 of the dash camera video and Deputy Thomas approached

the vehicle at 10:00 to explain the canine walk-around protocol.

By 11:10, the canine approached the vehicle, and by 11:27, alerted

to the presence of drugs in the vehicle.                 At that point, officers
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

possessed probable cause to search the vehicle and found nearly 250

grams of cocaine about 22 minutes into the stop.

        {¶27} Appellant characterized the extension of the stop as

keeping him “captive for 15 minutes until the K-9 arrived,” and

that Trooper Large did not attempt “to give the driver a ticket

regarding the two dried leaves on the plate.”                However, Large

testified, and the body camera video shows, that while he waited

for the canine to arrive, Large diligently checked the driver’s

license, registration, and criminal history.               At minute 8:30 of the

dash camera video, Large requested Hostetter’s address; at 9:39

Large exited his vehicle to brief Deputy Thomas; and by 11:10, the

canine walked around the vehicle.               Thus, we agree with the trial

court’s conclusion that the canine sniff did not unconstitutionally

prolong the stop.                See, e.g., Caballes, supra, 543 U.S. 405, 125

S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (no constitutional violation when canine

sniff less than 10 minutes after initiation of stop, defendant

placed in cruiser and officer not yet issued a citation);

Batchilli, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.S.2d 1282 (no

evidence to suggest detention for traffic violation of sufficient

length to make it constitutionally dubious when dog alerted 8

minutes and 56 seconds into the stop and neither background check

nor traffic citation had been completed.)
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

        {¶28} Finally, appellant asserts that no probable cause existed

for the search because “the dog sniff was fatally flawed.”

Appellant contends that because drug detection dogs are trained to

signal the presence of drugs and the residual odor of such items no

longer in the vehicle, their reliability is in question.           In

particular, appellant argues that since the legalization of hemp,

“a substance whose smell is indistinguishable from marijuana,” dogs

trained to sniff for marijuana cannot establish probable cause that

criminal activity is afoot because they cannot distinguish between

the scent of legal hemp and illegal marijuana.

        {¶29} Appellant cites United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 132

S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) and Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S.

1, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) for the proposition that

sometimes a dog’s sniff is a search and requires probable cause.

We find neither case relevant to our analysis.           Jones did not

involve a canine search, but instead held that when the government

attaches a Global–Positioning–System (GPS) tracking device to a

vehicle and uses that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on

public streets, the action constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.

Id. at 404.           In Jardines, the defendant moved to suppress evidence

seized pursuant to a search warrant obtained after a canine sniff

of the front porch of the defendant's home.           The Supreme Court held
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

that law enforcement officers' use of a drug-sniffing dog on the

front porch of a home to investigate an unverified tip that the

defendant grew marijuana in the home constituted a trespassory

invasion of the curtilage and, therefore, a Fourth Amendment

search.        Id. at 11-12.                 However, Jardines is distinguishable from

the case at bar because it involved a home rather than a car, and

the court explained, “When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the

home is first among equals.”                      Id. at 6.   Thus, neither Jones nor

Jardines affects our analysis in the case sub judice.

        {¶30} Finally, appellant cites Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237,

133 S.Ct. 1050, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) for the proposition that “a

detection dog recognizes an odor, not a drug.”                      In Harris, the

Supreme Court considered the reliability of canine officers and

what evidence the government must present to establish a dog’s

reliability.            The Florida court required comprehensive

documentation of a dog’s prior “hits or misses.”                      The Supreme Court

rejected a bright-line test and observed that “evidence of a dog's

satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can

itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert.”                       Id. at 246.

A defendant has the “opportunity to challenge such evidence of a

dog's reliability, whether by cross-examining the testifying

officer or by introducing his own fact or expert witnesses.”                       Id.

at 247.
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

        {¶31} In the case at bar, the trial court admitted into

evidence K-9 Kahn’s training records and certifications.

Therefore, because neither the initial traffic stop, the

investigatory detention, nor the search of appellant’s vehicle

violated the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that the trial court

properly overruled appellant’s motion to suppress.

        {¶32} Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.

                                             II.

        {¶33} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the trial court erred when it (1) imposed a sentence more than 50%

longer than the state’s recommendation, (2) that “was oppressive

and an abuse of discretion in violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights.”

        {¶34} First, we observe that appellant does not provide

authority for this assignment of error.            Appellant argues, however,

that the trial court “did not properly consider mitigating

circumstances of his mental health and substance use disorder

afflictions, and further did not sufficiently consider his

background as a long-time victim of abuse in foster care.”

Appellant contends that the trial court “should have at a minimum

followed the recommendation of the State, and in not doing so the
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

Court violated Defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights.”

        {¶35} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts apply

the standard of review outlined in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).                 State v.

Prater, 4th Dist. Adams No. 18CA1069, 2019-Ohio-2745, at ¶ 12,

citing State v. Graham, 4th Dist. Adams No. 17CA1046, 2018-Ohio-

1277, at ¶ 13.              Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), “[t]he appellate court's

standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its

discretion.”            Instead, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) specifies that an

appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or vacate and remand

a challenged felony sentence if the court clearly and convincingly

finds either:

        (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
        findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13,
        division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or
        division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
        whichever, if any, is relevant;

        (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

“[C]lear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof

which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not

to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable

doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought

to be established.”                 Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d

118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.                Thus, an appellate
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

court may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly and

convincingly contrary to law if the appellate court concludes, by

clear and convincing evidence, that the record does not support the

sentence.

        {¶36} The Supreme Court of Ohio has summarized the

applicability of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 as follows:

        In Ohio, two statutory sections serve as a general guide
        for every sentencing. First, R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that
        the overriding purposes of felony sentencing “are to
        protect the public from future crime by the offender and
        others and to punish the offender.” To achieve these
        purposes, the trial court “shall consider the need for
        incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and
        others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and
        making restitution.”      Id.     The sentence must be
        “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of
        the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim, and
        consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes
        committed by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B). * * *

        Second, R.C. 2929.12 specifically provides that in
        exercising its discretion, a trial court must consider
        certain factors that make the offense more or less serious
        and that indicate whether the offender is more or less
        likely to commit future offenses. * * *

        [A]n offender's conduct is considered less serious when
        there are “substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's
        conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute
        a defense.” R.C. 2929.12(C)(4). R.C. 2929.12(C) and (E)
        also permit a trial court to consider “any other relevant
        factors” to determine that an offense is less serious or
        that an offender is less likely to recidivate.

State v. Day, 2019-Ohio-4816, 149 N.E.3d 122, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.),

quoting State v. Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

890, ¶ 17–18.             This court has held that, generally, a sentence is

not contrary to law if a trial court considered the R.C. 2929.11

purposes and principles of sentencing, as well as the R.C. 2929.12

seriousness and recidivism factors, properly applied post-release

control, and imposed a sentence within the statutory range.

Prater, supra, at ¶ 20; Graham, supra, at ¶ 16; State v. Perry, 4th

Dist. Pike No. 16CA863, 2017-Ohio-69, ¶ 21; State v. Brewer, 2014-

Ohio-1903, 11 N.E.3d 317, ¶ 38 (4th Dist.).                Further, a trial court

is not required to discuss each of the seriousness and recidivism

factors of R.C. 2929.12 individually on the record during the

sentencing hearing.                 State v. Davis, 11th Dist. No.2002-L-188,

2004-Ohio-792, ¶ 8, citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215,

724 N.E.2d 793 (2000).

        {¶37} In the case sub judice, we first note that the trial

court adhered to the Crim.R. 11(C) provisions.                Before it accepted

appellant's no contest plea, the court determined that appellant

made his plea voluntarily, understood the nature of the charges

against him and understood the maximum penalty involved.                  Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a).            The court also informed appellant of, and determined

that he understood the effect of, his plea and that it could

proceed with judgment and sentence.                Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).    The

court also informed appellant, and determined that he understood,
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

that by entering a plea of no contest, he waived his constitutional

rights associated with a jury trial. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).

        {¶38} Our review of the record further reveals that in the case

at bar, both trial counsel and the state reviewed appellant’s

mental health and substance abuse diagnoses at sentencing and trial

counsel asked the court to consider appellant’s childhood and

history.         The court also considered appellant’s statement.      The

court concluded that appellant’s criminal record “speaks louder

than what you just spoke here today” and continued, “You’ve got a

lousy record.             You know it and I know it.”   Appellant replied,

“Yes, sir.”           The court indicated on the record that it considered

the presentence report, appellant’s criminal history, as well as

the principles and purposes of sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.11

and the seriousness and recidivism factors in accordance with R.C.

2929.12, and concluded “that the appropriate sanction in this case

would be a period of eight to 12 years in prison, and that eight

years is mandatory.”

        {¶39} After our review of the record, we cannot say the trial

court abused its discretion when it imposed a sentence more severe

than the state’s recommendation.             It is the trial court’s duty to

determine an appropriate sentence.             Moreover, a jointly recommended

sentence does not bind a trial court.             State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 28.                     A “recommended” sentence is “a

nonbinding recommendation to the court, which the court is not

required to accept or comment on.”                     State v. Link, 5th Dist.

Licking No. 21CA0059, 2022-Ohio-2067, ¶ 54 quoting State v. Harvey,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107168, 2019-Ohio-715, ¶ 7; Davis, supra, at

¶ 10, citing State v. Palmer, 7th Dist. No. 99 CA 6, 2001 WL

1497097 (Nov. 19, 2001).                     Thus, a trial court may reject a plea

agreement and is not bound by a jointly-recommended sentence.                        Link

at ¶ 55 citing State v. Penrod, 5th Dist. Licking No. 16-CA-83,

2017-Ohio-7732, ¶ 16, citing State ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106

Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio-3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 6.                     Once again,

the decision to accept or to reject a plea agreement rests solely

within the trial court’s discretion.                     State v. Jefferson, 5th Dist.

Delaware No. 11 CAA 04 0033, 2012-Ohio-148, ¶ 50, citing State v.

Asberry, 173 Ohio App.3d 443, 2007-Ohio-5436, 878 N.E.2d 1082.

Thus, appellant could not have relied on any alleged state-

recommended prison term because a trial judge is not required to

follow such a recommendation.

        {¶40} In the case sub judice, the trial court informed

appellant at his plea hearing of the maximum possible penalty- 11

to 16 ½ years in prison-and a $20,000 fine.                     The sentence fell

within the statutory range, and nothing in the record suggests that
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

the trial court ignored the factors appellant identifies on appeal.

“Simply because the trial court did not find the factors identified

by Appellant to militate in favor of a less severe sentence does

not imply the sentence is contrary to law.”           State v. Miller, 11th

Dist. Lake No. 2018-L-133, 2019-Ohio-2290, ¶ 25; State v. Smith,

5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2022-0041, 2023-Ohio-598, ¶ 39.

        {¶41} In addition, appellant asserts that his sentence violates

the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.          That

provision states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments

inflicted.”           Accord Article I, Section 9, Ohio Constitution.   The

Eighth Amendment “prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also

sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.”            Solem

v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).

        {¶42} It is well established that sentences do not violate the

constitutional provisions against cruel and unusual punishment

unless the sentences are “so disproportionate to the offense as to

shock the moral sense of the community.”           McDougle v. Maxwell, 1

Ohio St.2d 68, 69, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964).           Nonetheless, “[a]s a

general rule, a sentence that falls within the terms of a valid

statute cannot amount to a cruel and unusual punishment.”           Id.;

accord State v. Stevens, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00024, 2017-
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

Ohio-8692, ¶ 10.               “Because the individual sentences imposed by the

court are within the range of penalties authorized by the

legislature, they are not grossly disproportionate or shocking to a

reasonable person or to the community's sense of justice and do not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”                 State v. Gwynne, 2021-

Ohio-2378, 173 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 30, citing State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio

St.3d 289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, ¶ 23.                Moreover, we

note that the record reveals (1) appellant’s prior trespass, heroin

possession, and cocaine possession convictions, (2) appellant’s

“significant rule violations [in prison],” and (3) appellant

“became a member of the Bloods in prison when he was 19 years old.”

        {¶43} After our review, we conclude that the trial court

complied with all pertinent sentencing requirements, reviewed and

considered the presentence investigation report and the sentencing

hearing testimony, and arrived at a sentence within the statutory

range.        Therefore, it cannot be said that the length of the

sentence is contrary to law.                 State v. Bass, 4th Dist. Washington

No. 16CA32, 2017-Ohio-7059, ¶ 7.                Consequently, because we believe

the record supports appellant’s sentence and the sentence is not

contrary to law, we overrule appellant’s second assignment of

error.

        {¶44} Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
[Cite as State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068.]

trial court’s judgment.

                                             JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
PICKAWAY, 23CA4

                                                                     31
                          JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed.   Appellee shall
recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.

     If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has
been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to
allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or
the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule
II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the
date of such dismissal.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

    BY:_____________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.