Court Opinion

ID: 9627914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:58:45.332582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:23.911443
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(dissenting):
I agree with the basic approach employed by the majority. I dissent only because I do not believe that in the posture of this case “receiving” stolen property is a crime distinct from “concealing” stolen property, and because I believe that State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984), is controlling.
The statute in question, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (1986), defines as constituting the crime of theft a number of closely related post-theft activities sometimes collectively referred to as “receiving” stolen property. These activities are manifestations of a single wrong condemned in law, namely that of dealing with stolen property, knowing or believing it was stolen, with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property. I believe the statute defines a single crime — theft in violation of the statute. That § 76-6-408(1) defines a single crime is a conclusion supported by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(6) (1978), which equates the term “offense” with “a violation of any penal statute of this state.”
If the majority is correct that this single statute defines more than one crime, I see no reason why it defines only two, “receiving” and “concealing,” since several other methods of dealing with stolen property are mentioned. Indeed, under the majority’s logic the run-of-the-mill “fence” might be guilty of a multitude of “crimes” every time he effected a sale of a single item of stolen property. He would be guilty of one crime when he received the stolen item. He would be guilty of a second if he retained it, guilty of a third if that retention took the form of concealment, and neces*1064sarily guilty of a fourth since that retention, whether in the form of concealment or not, would constitute the withholding of property. He would be guilty of a fifth crime when he disposed of the property and of a sixth if the disposal was in the form of a sale. We would rightfully have little patience with a prosecutor who brought a six-count information against such a perpetrator in the routine case. Our rationale would be that the fence had really committed only one crime, namely theft or “receiving” in violation of § 76-6-408(1).
The majority’s conclusion that the statute describes more than one crime is mainly premised on the cases of State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 1980) and State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980). I concede those cases, by providing slightly different itemizations of “elements,” are not altogether inconsistent with the majority’s conclusion. However, I believe those cases are fully consistent with my conclusion that the statute defines a single crime, one which admittedly can be established by alternative avenues of proof. When both cases are read and considered, there is no escaping the conclusion that Murphy’s crime would have been “theft” in violation of § 76-6-408(1), as was Lamm’s.1 Nor does the embellishment made by State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1985), in which the majority takes further comfort, require a different conclusion. In practical terms, Pappas is irrelevant to this case since the property in question here was clearly stolen. Insofar as Pappas bears indirectly on our analysis, it is quite neutral. Pappas recognizes that several of the avenues of proof available to the prosecution under § 76-6-408(1) are appropriate where property has not actually been stolen but where the perpetrator believes it has been, as in the case of the now familiar “sting” operation. Nothing in Pappas elevates these alternative avenues of proof to distinct offenses. When the dust settles, it is clear that Pappas’s crime was also “theft” in violation of § 76-6-408(1).
While this aspect of my disagreement with the majority may seem largely seman-tical, I believe that in all events the case is controlled by State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984). In Peterson, the amended information included an additional phrase from the aggravated assault statute, the statute under which defendant was originally charged. In the instant case, the amendment did no more than add additional language from the “receiving” statute under which defendants were originally charged. In Peterson, as here, “the amendment to the information did not change the basic charge.” Id. at 1221. In Peterson, as here, defendants were charged by title and section, “which certainly apprised [them] of the statutory offense.” Id. It is clear to me, semantics aside, that if the amendment in Peterson was appropriate, so was the amendment in this case.
As no actual prejudice resulted from permitting the amendment, I would affirm defendant Ramon’s conviction. I also believe there is sufficient evidence in the record to support Riedman’s conviction, and would therefore also affirm her conviction.

. It is true that Lamm's wrongful dealing with stolen property was in the form of aiding in its concealment while Murphy’s allegedly wrongful dealing with stolen property was in the form of retaining it, although the prosecution failed to prove the charge against Murphy. Unlike the majority, I do not see a world of difference between the first phrase in the statute, what the majority refers to as an offense containing “a triplet of culpable conduct," and the second phrase/triplet. On the contrary, I see considerable overlap between them. "Retaining,” for example, is in the first triplet, while "concealing” and “withholding,” which I regard as mere varieties of retaining, are in the second. Meanwhile, "disposing” of stolen property is in the first triplet while "selling,” simply a disposal in exchange for valuable consideration, is grouped with concealing and withholding in the second.
Indeed, if the various "culpable conducts” in § 76-6-408(1) were to be logically grouped into separate crimes, receiving stolen property would be one; concealing, retaining, or otherwise withholding it from its owner would be a second; and selling or otherwise disposing of it would be the third. While such a scheme even makes some sense, our Legislature has chosen to lump all of these culpable conducts into the single statutory offense set forth in § 76-6-408(1).