Court Opinion

ID: 9789949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:44:21.456191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.321995
License: Public Domain

McInturff, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part)—I concur in the majority's holding that Charlotte Pfleghar unduly influenced the decedent. However, I do not think the trial court abused its discretion by awarding her executrix and attorney's fees. Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the opinion.
The assessment of costs and attorney's fees in will contests is governed by RCW 11.24.050:
If the probate be revoked or the will annulled, assessment of costs shall be in the discretion of the court. If the will be sustained, the court may assess the costs against the contestant, including, unless it appears that the contestant acted with probable cause and in good faith, such reasonable attorney's fees as the court may deem proper.
(Italics mine.)
This statute has been consistently interpreted to require an executrix to take all reasonable steps to uphold the testamentary instrument. As long as the executrix exercises that duty in good faith, she is entitled to an allowance out of the estate for the costs and reasonable attorney's fees necessarily incurred by her regardless of whether she is successful in her defense against the contest of the will. In *850re Estate of Reilly, 78 Wn.2d 623, 665, 479 P.2d 1 (1970); In re Estate of Kleinlein, 59 Wn.2d 111, 115, 366 P.2d 186 (1961); In re Estate of Esala, 16 Wn. App. 764, 772, 559 P.2d 592 (1977).
The majority holds that because Charlotte unduly influenced the decedent in executing the will, it is not possible for her to have acted in good faith in defending it. I disagree.
The seminal case is In re Estate of Kleinlein, supra. There, a deposed executor was awarded $10,000 attorney's fees from the estate. The trial court entered findings that the executor knew the decedent was suffering from insane delusions, that he knew the decedent was mentally incompetent and did not have testamentary capacity, that he knew he was exerting undue influence upon her, and that he did not defend the will contest in good faith. The court stated the sole test in determining whether the executor is entitled to recover his costs out of the estate is whether the deposed executor acted in good faith in defending the will. Kleinlein, at 115-17. Relying on the finding that the executor did not defend the will in good faith, it held he was not entitled to costs or fees as executor, and likewise, his attorneys were not entitled to their fees from the estate. Kleinlein, at 115.
In In re Estate of Jennings, 6 Wn. App. 537, 494 P.2d 227 (1972), the trial court found the decedent signed the will under the undue influence of the executor and his wife. A rule was enunciated, citing Kleinlein, that if attorney's fees are incurred in defending a will which the executor has, by fraud or undue influence, caused to be executed, then those fees may not be paid from the funds of the estate. Jennings, at 538-39. I disagree with this holding insofar as it establishes a per se rule that an executor who has unduly influenced a testator cannot, as a matter of law, defend a will in good faith. This rule misapplies the holding in Kleinlein and eliminates all of the trial court's discretion. It would preclude a trial court from finding, as the trial court in the instant case did, that an executor unduly influenced *851the testator but still, in the exercise of his duty to defend the will, defended the will in good faith. Whether a person has acted in good faith is a factual question which should be decided by the trial court that viewed the witnesses and heard their testimony.2
The majority opinion denies Charlotte her recovery of executrix and attorney's fees because the record does not contain a specific finding on the issue of good faith. I have difficulty with this analysis. The trial court was empowered under RCW 11.24.050 to make the award if it found Charlotte acted in good faith. The court exercised its discretion and made the award. Obviously, the court was aware of its statutory authority and concluded she acted in good faith. To assume otherwise requires a presumption that the court found bad faith but nevertheless proceeded to make the award in direct contravention of the statute.
This is an instance in the law where the actions of the court, i.e., granting a judgment for executrix and attorney's fees under a statute authorizing the same in the discretion of the court, speak louder than omitted words, i.e., a specific finding of good faith.
I recognize my position may appear facially inconsistent. However, upon further reflection, I can envision many circumstances where this could happen. To prove undue influence, it is not necessary to prove the party intended to unduly influence the decedent. See Dean v. Jordan, 194 Wash. 661, 671, 79 P.2d 331 (1938). Because intent need *852not be shown, it would be possible for a relative, friend, or neighbor with a dominant personality to assist an elderly person with his or her affairs and later, based on the totality of the circumstances, which include the testator's age, health and mental condition, have it adjudged that undue influence was exerted.
When the trial court exercises its discretion in awarding executor and attorney's fees, the sole test is whether the executor acted in good faith in defending the will. Kleinlein. This is a factual determination to be made after weighing the evidence and considering the totality of the circumstances. The determination that the executor exerted undue influence is one factor, but not the controlling factor, in determining whether the will was defended in good faith.
Because the award was a discretionary decision, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding executrix and attorney's fees to Mrs. Pfleghar and affirm the entire judgment.
Reconsideration denied November 3, 1983.
Review denied by Supreme Court January 6, 1984.

The trial court heard testimony from the attorney who drafted the will and was present in the hospital room when it was executed. When questioned regarding the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, the attorney stated:
The only thing is that I looked at him, and to me I've known him for nine to ten years, and he knew what he was doing. He looked good to me, and there's no question in my mind at all that he was capable of signing that will.
... I was there, and I saw him. As far as I knew him, he was a strong-willed man, and he was strong in that bed that morning there. . . .
... I was there and looked at him. I feel after my thirty years of experience as a lawyer dealing with a lot of people that have been ill, it's my duty to my client, and if I feel he should have that will, he should have it, because I know that's what he wanted to leave.