Court Opinion

ID: 9929428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 17:01:14.087744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:39.833094
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2054        Document: 010110994032   Date Filed: 02/02/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       February 2, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

       Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.                                                         No. 23-2054
                                                  (D.C. No. 2:21-CR-00890-MIS-1)
 ANDRES GERARDO AYALA-                                        (D. N.M.)
 BOJORQUEZ,

       Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Andres Gerardo Ayala-Bojorquez appeals his conviction for illegal reentry.

 His counsel has filed a motion to withdraw, together with a brief under Anders v.

 California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), based on counsel’s assessment that any argument on

 appeal would be frivolous. We agree Ayala-Bojorquez has no non-frivolous

 arguments, so we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2054    Document: 010110994032         Date Filed: 02/02/2024    Page: 2

 I.    BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Ayala-Bojorquez is a Mexican citizen who has repeatedly entered the United

 States without permission. Since 1999, he has been removed to Mexico eight times.

 His two most recent unlawful entries are relevant here.

       First, he was discovered in New Mexico in May 2016. He was charged with

 illegal reentry and pleaded guilty. He served a prison sentence and was removed to

 Mexico in August 2019.

       Next, he was found in New Mexico in March 2021, and was again charged

 with illegal reentry. He again decided to plead guilty. He executed a written plea

 agreement in which he admitted his prior removal in August 2019, his Mexican

 citizenship, and his unauthorized reentry in March 2021. His plea agreement also

 contained a prospective waiver of Federal Rule of Evidence 410, which normally

 prohibits introduction of, among other things, “a statement made during plea

 discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not

 result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea,” Fed. R. Evid.

 410(a)(4).

       The Rule 410 waiver soon turned out to be important. Before pleading guilty,

 Ayala-Bojorquez changed his mind and decided to go to trial. The government then

 successfully moved in limine to introduce the portion of his plea agreement admitting

 the factual basis for his crime, and, at trial, the government indeed introduced those

 admissions against him. The jury convicted and the district court imposed a

 78-month prison sentence. This appeal followed.

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 II.   ANALYSIS

       If, after conscientiously examining a case, defense counsel concludes any

 appeal would be frivolous, counsel may so advise the court and request permission to

 withdraw, but counsel must submit a brief highlighting any potentially appealable

 issues and provide a copy to the defendant. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. The defendant

 may then submit a pro se brief. Id. If the court determines the appeal is frivolous

 upon careful review of the record, it may grant the request to withdraw and dismiss

 the appeal. Id. “On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on

 their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the

 [defendant] the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.” Id.

       Ayala-Bojorquez’s counsel submitted the required brief, and Ayala-Bojorquez

 then submitted a letter offering four one-sentence arguments he hopes to make in this

 appeal. After reviewing these filings and independently reviewing the record, we

 conclude there are no available non-frivolous arguments, as explained below.

       A.     The 2016 Prosecution

       Ayala-Bojorquez writes, “The judge should have not allowed my case from

 2016 to be used in court.” Letter dated Aug. 29, 2023 (filed Sept. 5, 2023).1 We

 presume he means his 2016 illegal-reentry prosecution. The record shows the

 government was prepared to introduce certain documents from that prosecution, but it

 never actually introduced them. We therefore see no potentially meritorious issue.

       1
        All further direct quotations of Ayala-Bojorquez’s arguments are to this same
 one-page letter.
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        B.     The Plea Agreement

        Ayala-Bojorquez next argues, “The judge should have not allowed any other

 case that was a guilty plea.” As far as we are aware, the only “other case” he could

 be referring to (i.e., other than his 2016 prosecution) is this case, in which the judge

 allowed the jury to hear the admissions from the defunct plea agreement. We

 thus interpret this argument as a challenge to the judge’s decision on that issue.

 Ayala-Bojorquez’s counsel specifically raises this argument as one that is

 theoretically available, but, in counsel’s opinion, would be frivolous. We ultimately

 agree there is no chance of success here, but for different reasons than those offered

 by counsel.

        The Supreme Court has held that Rule 410 waivers are usually enforceable, at

 least for impeachment purposes. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204,

 207, 210 (1995). In Mezzanatto, the government obtained such a waiver from the

 defendant as a condition of his cooperation, and, after the cooperation broke down,

 the government used what he had divulged to impeach him at trial. Id. at 198–99.

 The Supreme Court said the waiver was enforceable “absent some affirmative

 indication that the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily.”

 Id. at 210.

        This court has extended Mezzanatto to allow admission of statements made in

 plea agreements during the government’s case-in-chief. United States v. Mitchell,

 633 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th Cir. 2011). The defendant in Mitchell waived his Rule 410

 rights through a plea agreement, and he actually pleaded guilty, but later successfully

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 moved to withdraw the plea. Id. at 999. We held the government permissibly

 used his plea admissions against him as part of its case-in-chief at the ensuing trial.

 Id. at 1004.

       Ayala-Bojorquez’s counsel says these cases control here.2 In Mezzanatto and

 Mitchell, however, the defendants entered into the agreement and went through with

 the actions contemplated in the agreement (cooperating with the government and

 pleading guilty, respectively). Ayala-Bojorquez, in contrast, entered into the

 agreement but he did not go through with the plea. This may be a distinction without

 a difference, but it is still a distinction, and one we have never addressed.

       Rather than resolving the issue through an Anders proceeding like this one, we

 take a narrower approach here. Even assuming the district court should have

 excluded the admissions Ayala-Bojorquez made through his plea agreement, the error

 would be harmless.

                A nonconstitutional harmless error is one that does not
                have a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial;
                nor does it leave one in grave doubt as to whether it had
                such effect. Thus, where there is an abundance of
                evidence regarding the defendant’s guilt, the
                nonconstitutional error will be deemed harmless.

 United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1238 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation

 marks and citations omitted). In this case, the jury heard abundant evidence of

 Ayala-Bojorquez’s guilt, aside from the admissions contained in his plea agreement.

       2
         Counsel also cites United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802 (10th Cir. 2015), as
 controlling, but Jim is merely an example of upholding a Rule 410 waiver after
 concluding the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. See id. at
 805–13. Jim adds nothing to the holdings of Mezzanatto or Mitchell.
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       The crime of illegal reentry comprises four elements: (1) the defendant is a

 noncitizen (2) who has previously been removed from the United States (3) and

 thereafter intentionally reenters the United States (4) without permission from the

 U.S. government. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a); United States v. Sierra-Ledesma, 645 F.3d

 1213, 1221–22 (10th Cir. 2011). In this regard, the jury heard testimony from:

             the border patrol officers who handled Ayala-Bojorquez’s removal in
              August 2019, one of whom actually watched Ayala-Bojorquez walk
              back into Mexico;

             the border patrol officers who discovered Ayala-Bojorquez in the
              New Mexico desert in March 2021;

             the border patrol officer who interviewed Ayala-Bojorquez that day, and
              to whom Ayala-Bojorquez admitted—after waiving his Miranda
              rights—that he was a Mexican citizen and had recently reentered the
              United States without permission by climbing a border fence
              (essentially the same statement he made in his plea agreement);

             a fingerprint analysis expert who testified that Ayala-Bojorquez’s
              fingerprints match those of the person who had been removed in August
              2019; and

             a government records specialist who found nothing when he searched
              government databases for any record that Ayala-Bojorquez had
              requested lawful entry.

       Ayala-Bojorquez’s trial attorneys did not cross-examine some of these

 witnesses. For others, they brought up issues that have no relevance to the elements

 of the crime, as we explain below in Parts II.C (regarding Ayala-Bojorquez’s border

 crossing card) and II.D (regarding his age when he was first removed). The only

 relevant cross-examination involved pointing out that agents had not video- or audio-

 recorded their encounters with Ayala-Bojorquez.

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       Finally, the government did not introduce the admissions from

 Ayala-Bojorquez’s plea agreement until late in its case, and the jury was told that

 the admissions were part of a signed statement, not part of a plea agreement.

 In closing arguments, the government pointed to the signed statement only as a

 fallback position, should the jury have any doubt about the witnesses’ testimony.

       In short, the evidence against Ayala-Bojorquez was overwhelming, and the

 hypothetically erroneous admission of his statements in the plea agreement—the

 substance of which was already in evidence through other means—had no

 “substantial influence on the outcome of the trial,” Solomon, 399 F.3d at 1238

 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, any Rule 410 error would be

 harmless. We therefore see no potentially meritorious challenge on this account.

       C.     Ayala-Bojorquez’s “Passport” or Border Crossing Card

       Ayala-Bojorquez’s next argument is, “I wasn’t allowed to present a copy of

 my passport in [sic] which makes it legal for me to be in the United States.” We

 have not found any dispute over Ayala-Bojorquez’s passport in the record. At trial,

 however, two government witnesses testified they saw a copy of Ayala-Bojorquez’s

 border crossing card in his official file (i.e., his “A-file”). One witness remembered

 that the picture on the card was of a child, and the other witness said the picture was

 of a baby. No party sought to introduce the document itself. Ayala-Bojorquez’s

 attorney, however, asked the jury to keep the border crossing card in mind while

 deliberating because, in the attorney’s view, it was relevant to intent.

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       If “I wasn’t allowed to present a copy of my passport” is a reference to this

 border crossing card, we see no potentially meritorious issue, for two reasons.

       First, no one moved to put the border crossing card into evidence. Thus,

 Ayala-Bojorquez’s only hope on appeal would be to show it was plainly erroneous

 for the district court not to sua sponte order that the card be put into evidence. See,

 e.g., United States v. Perez-Perez, 992 F.3d 970, 974 (10th Cir. 2021) (stating that

 arguments not raised below are reviewed for plain error). We are confident there is

 no hope of a successful plain-error argument on this issue.

       Second, contrary to Ayala-Bojorquez’s attorney’s argument to the jury, the

 existence of the border crossing card was not relevant to intent. His attorney’s

 argument implied Ayala-Bojorquez thought he had permission to enter the country,

 thus cutting against any inference of intent to violate the law. However, the

 only intent the government must prove in an illegal-reentry prosecution is intent

 to enter the United States, as distinct from being brought here involuntarily. See

 Sierra-Ledesma, 645 F.3d at 1221–22. Intent to break the law is not necessary.

 United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 519 F.3d 1236, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2008).

       For these reasons, we see no basis to allow this appeal to proceed on the issue

 of the border crossing card. And if Ayala-Bojorquez genuinely meant to refer to a

 dispute over his passport (not the border crossing card), we see no potentially

 meritorious issue because the record contains nothing about his passport.

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       D.       Ayala-Bojorquez’s Age at the Time of His First Removal

       Ayala-Bojorquez’s final argument is, “I was not allowed to present my birth

 certificate because I was a minor.” In context, it is clear he means the district court

 did not allow him to argue that his original removal (in 1999) had been invalid

 because he was supposedly a minor at the time of that removal and the government

 had not employed procedures specific to removing minors.

       The district court did not completely disallow this argument. Rather, the

 district court held that Ayala-Bojorquez could pursue this argument only if he was

 prepared to “put on witnesses to talk about fundamental unfairness, showing [of]

 prejudice.” R. vol. 3 at 242. The court appears to have been alluding to the last part

 of the statutory standard for collaterally attacking a removal order:

                In a criminal proceeding [for illegal reentry], an alien may
                not challenge the validity of the [underlying] deportation
                order . . . unless [he] demonstrates that—

                (1) [he] exhausted any administrative remedies that may
                have been available to seek relief against the order;

                (2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was
                issued improperly deprived [him] of the opportunity for
                judicial review; and

                (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.

 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). Ayala-Bojorquez did not put on a defense case about this or any

 other issue.

       His appellate counsel identifies the allegedly invalid original removal order as

 a potential, but ultimately frivolous, argument. Counsel says the validity of the

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  original order is irrelevant in light of the admissions from the plea agreement that

  were introduced into evidence.

        As before, we prefer not to rely on the plea agreement in these circumstances.

  And, as before, there is a reason, apart from the plea agreement, to conclude there is

  no potentially meritorious issue here—specifically, Ayala-Bojorquez did not attempt

  to satisfy the § 1326(d) requirements. Thus, we see no basis to allow this appeal to

  proceed on this issue.

        E.     The 78-Month Sentence

        Counsel (although not Ayala-Bojorquez himself) suggests one more issue

  that theoretically could be presented on appeal, regarding Ayala-Bojorquez’s

  sentence. His sentencing guidelines calculation showed a total offense level of

  20 and a criminal history category of V, for an advisory range of 63–78 months.

  Ayala-Bojorquez did not dispute the calculation, but he moved for a downward

  variance, arguing that the calculation overrepresented his criminal history because

  most of his prior criminal offenses were non-violent immigration violations. He

  suggested a range of 30–37 months (corresponding to offense level 17 and criminal

  history category III) would satisfy the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The district court

  disagreed and imposed a 78-month sentence—the high end of the guidelines

  calculation—because the court believed the most important factor under the

  circumstances was deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). Specifically, the

  court noted Ayala-Bojorquez had nine prior convictions, including a 2010 conviction

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  for which he received a 70-month sentence. Thus, the court concluded that a

  78-month sentence was the best option to deter further criminal conduct.

         Appellate counsel notes that Ayala-Bojorquez could try to challenge the

  district court’s denial of his motion for a variance, but counsel believes the challenge

  would be frivolous. We agree. “This court reviews a district court’s decision to

  grant or deny a request for variance under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.”

  United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2009). The district court

  provided a cogent and reasonable explanation for its decision. We see no colorable

  claim that it abused its discretion.

  III.   CONCLUSION

         We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss this appeal as frivolous.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Gregory A. Phillips
                                              Circuit Judge

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