Court Opinion

ID: 9547581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:49:11.931584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:52.353173
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
The majority’s interpretations of the consent judgment and the growth control ordinance are not merely unduly narrow, they are erroneous. As a consequence, Pardee is left without recourse to correct the blatant violation of its vested right to develop property in the manner guaranteed by the city. Indeed, after reviewing the conduct of the city, and the majority’s approval thereof, one wonders whatever happened to vested property rights. If parties cannot rely on a stipulated judgment, there is no certainty in any document.
I. The Inconsistency between the Ordinance and the Judgment.
The majority come to the conclusion that the growth ordinance does not run afoul of the stipulated judgment. They arrive at this strained interpre*474tation by picking and choosing among the provisions of each to discern any compatible language. Essentially, the majority decide that the growth ordinance regulates only the timing of development, while the judgment relates exclusively to zoning. However, a more objective examination of both documents reveals obvious inconsistencies between the ordinance and the judgment.
The ordinance discloses on its face a purpose to affect more than the timing of development. Section 20.04 (f) declares that “the City must be able to control the rate, distribution, quality and economic level of proposed development . . . .” (Italics added.) To achieve this control, the ordinance sets up a system whereby each developer must withstand extensive evaluation in order to obtain the allotments necessary for the issuance of building permits. (§§ 20.09 & 20.10.) The evaluation procedure is decidedly substantive. Developers must compete in such areas as the capacity of proposed water, sewer and drainage systems, the ability of the fire department to serve the new area without building a new station, the “design quality” of the proposed buildings in terms of size, height, color, and location, and the amount of open space provided in the plan. (§§ 20.09A & 20.09B.) If a developer does not obtain a certain number of “points,” awarded by the residential development evaluation board, that developer will not be allowed a single allotment. Thus, based on the board’s qualitative evaluation, a developer’s project could be completely frozen until 1995. With inflation pushing labor and material costs higher each year, it is naive to conceive that such a substantive delay is only a matter of timing.
The majority’s contention that the earlier judgment relates only to zoning, and not timing, overlooks the clear wording and intent of that document. A consent judgment is binding as to the issues in the stipulation. (Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 263 [155 Cal.Rptr. 516].) This does not mean, as the majority appear to believe, that only those issues in the underlying suit may be considered. It means that all subjects covered in the judgment are settled and binding as to the parties.
Paragraph 17 of the judgment provides that the city “shall issue to [Pardee] all necessary use, building and other permits and approvals upon [Pardee’s] request and compliance with all legal requirements . . . .” Further, paragraph 19 declares that the city shall not be precluded “in the proper exercise of its police power from adopting any ordinance ... so long as such ordinance is not inconsistent with the provisions of this judgment. ” (Italics added.) It is patently obvious that the ordinance, which allows the city to deny Pardee any building permits until 1995, and the judgment, which provides that Pardee is entitled to all building permits it requires upon its request, are inconsistent. It is also clear that paragraph 19 of the *475judgment thus prevents the city from enforcing as to this plaintiff the very species of ordinance at issue in this case.
The majority attempt to limit the judgment to its effect on the city’s power to change the zoning applicable to Pardee. But it is apparent that the judgment has a far broader purpose: i.e., to prevent the city from interfering in any significant way with Pardee’s development plans. This broad purpose is manifested in paragraphs 17 and 18, which bear no relation to zoning. Paragraph 18 declares that the “City shall take no action which is inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the settlement agreement and this judgment.” As quoted above, paragraph 17 requires the city to issue “all necessary use, building and other permits” to Pardee. Thus, city interference quite apart from zoning was considered by the parties and precluded by the judgment. The ordinance constitutes a direct violation of this mandate.1
II. The City’s Preclusion from Interfering with Pardee’s Vested Right.
The city is precluded from applying the growth ordinance to Pardee not only by the express terms of the judgment, but also because the judgment gave Pardee a vested right to develop its property with which the city may not interfere. “It has long been the rule in this state and in other jurisdictions that if a property owner has performed substantial work and incurred substantial liabilities in good faith reliance upon a permit issued by the government, he acquires a vested right to complete construction in accordance with the terms of the permit.” (Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 785, 791 [132 Cal.Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546].) “ ‘[T]he Legislature is without power to impair or destroy the obligations of contractual or vested rights . . . . ’” (Pardee Construction Co. v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 471, 479 [157 Cal.Rptr. 184], quoting Estate of Thramm (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 756, 765 [183 P.2d 97].)
In the past, a developer had to obtain a building permit and expend substantial sums in reliance thereon in order to invoke the vested rights doctrine. But “Several decisions intimate that a building permit may no longer be the sine qua non of a vested right if preliminary public permits are sufficiently definitive and manifest all final discretionary approvals required for completion of specific buildings.” (Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 965, 975, fn. 5 [137 Cal.Rptr. 699].) “In determining which governmental permits other than a building permit may possibly afford the developer a vested right, some courts have *476applied the final discretionary approval test while others have disregarded whether the final act is discretionary or ministerial and simply looked to the final governmental approval.” (Tosh v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 388, 394 [160 Cal.Rptr. 170]; see also Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Com., supra, 17 Cal.3d 785, 794; Billings v. California Coastal Com. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 729, 735 [163 Cal.Rptr. 288]; South Central Coast Regional Com. v. Charles A. Pratt Construction Co. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 830, 841-845 [180 Cal.Rptr. 555]; Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 534, 544 [122 Cal.Rptr. 315].)
Paragraph 17 of the judgment constitutes the city’s guarantee that upon request Pardee will receive any permits—for building and all other purposes—necessary for the completion of the development. The wording of paragraph 17 makes clear the parties’ intent to remove all discretion from the city by providing that the city “shall” issue all permits “upon [Pardee’s] request.” This guarantee—fully and fairly bargained for by parties in litigation—exemplifies governmental approval that is the equivalent of a building permit for the purpose of a vested rights inquiry. And plaintiff’s good faith expenditure of over $13.5 million for onsite and offsite improvements, incurred in reliance on the judgment, finishes the inquiry. Since Pardee thus had a vested right to complete its development, the city could not interfere.2
The order of the trial court should have been reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to issue the restraining order as prayed, thus preventing the application of the ordinance to Pardee.
Bird, C. J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 17, 1985. Bird, C. J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The plaintiff does not challenge the constitutionality of the growth ordinance, except as applied. Thus I do not reach that profound issue in this proceeding.

The city relies on the rule that “a builder must comply with the laws which are in effect at the time a building permit is issued, including the laws which were enacted after application for the permit” (Avco, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 795) to claim that regardless of Pardee’s vested right, it must comply with the ordinance whenever it seeks a building permit. But this reliance is misplaced. The judgment here acted as the equivalent of a building permit in order to create Pardee’s vested right. Thus, the relevant law is that in existence at the time the judgment was entered, seven years before the ordinance was enacted.