Court Opinion

ID: 9671153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:32:04.519291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.397081
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 32. (dissenting). The majority opinion concludes that the statute of limitations began to run in March 1990 upon the child's diagnosis of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), because at that time the Nierengartens would have incurred "extraordinary expenses, the unexpected expenses resulting from [the child's] special needs." Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y., 149 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 437 N.W.2d 532 (1989).
¶ 33. I conclude that in this case a court cannot determine on summary judgment whether the Nierengartens' claims were barred by the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations provided in Wis. Stat. § 893.54.1 I would therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals on this issue.
*703¶ 34. To determine when a cause of action accrues, we must examine the cause of action alleged. The Nierengartens sued for negligent misrepresentation of the health of their adopted child.
¶ 35. Before the adoption the Nierengartens told Lutheran Social Services they wanted to adopt a healthy child with no serious mental or physical handicaps. After the child was placed with the Nierengartens but before the adoption was completed, the child exhibited behavioral difficulties. Lutheran Social Services reassured the Nierengartens that the child's behavior was "normal adjustment behavior" that "would go away." Based on these representations, the Nierengartens proceeded to finalize the adoption in 1987.
¶ 36. In 1990 the child was diagnosed with ADHD. From that time on he was treated with various prescribed medications for ADHD. In 1994 the University of Minnesota Hospital diagnosed the child with bipolar disorder and mathematics disorder.
¶ 37. After the child was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, the Nierengartens spent $20,000 of their savings on the child's treatment between June 1994 and December 1994. The Nierengartens allege that as a result of negligent misrepresentation by Lutheran Social Services, they are ineligible for a federal financial assistance program for adopted children with special needs. Under this assistance program, an application for financial assistance must be filed before an adoption is finalized.
¶ 38. In this case, two disputed questions of material fact exist, namely: (1) Does the diagnosis and treatment of ADHD require extraordinary expenses resulting from the child's special needs? and (2) On what date did the Nierengartens discover or in the *704exercise of reasonable diligence should they have discovered that their child's disorder would result in extraordinary expenses? (Only "extraordinary expenses" are actionable under Meracle.)
¶ 39. The disputed issues of fact in this case must be resolved before the circuit court can determine as a matter of law whether the statute of limitations bars the Nierengartens' action. When evidence raises a factual question involving the application of a statute of limitations, the question should be submitted to a fact finder. See Robinson v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 137 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 402 N.W.2d 711 (1987).
¶ 40. According to the majority opinion's interpretation of Meracle, the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation did not accrue until the Nierengartens had "a compensable claim," that is, until they could demonstrate "with reasonable medical certainty" that their child "would need extensive future medical care." Meracle, 149 Wis. 2d at 29-30.
¶ 41. The majority opinion states that "the child in this case has been diagnosed with ADHD — a special need that the Nierengartens did not expect when they expressed a desire to adopt a healthy child." Majority op. at 701. According to the majority opinion, the Nierengartens began incurring extraordinary expenses on the day the child was diagnosed with ADHD. See majority op. at 689, 701-02. The majority opinion thus assumes as a matter of law that ADHD is a serious physical or mental handicap requiring significant future medical expenses.
¶ 42. I question whether this view of ADHD is correct. A more reasonable view is that ADHD has varying degrees of severity, different manifestations and symptoms, and various courses of treatment among people diagnosed with it. According to Psychol*705ogy Today, in severe cases of ADHD a person can barely function due to rampant disorganization or uncontrollable impulsivity, as well as low self-esteem or depression. However, very mild cases of ADHD can be barely noticeable, especially in bright persons who adapt well.2 The Nierengartens themselves reported that in addition to their adopted son, they have two other children with ADHD but that these children do not present the same degree of behavioral problems as their adopted son does. According to the majority opinion, the severity of ADHD is irrelevant. See majority op. at 701-02.
¶ 43. Contrary to the majority opinion's conclusion that ADHD is not a common disorder,3 many experts believe that ADHD is the United States' Number One childhood psychiatric disorder.4 According to an estimate by the National Institute of Mental Health, approximately one student in every classroom has ADHD, which comes to more than two million children (or 3 to 5 percent).5
¶ 44. The majority opinion treats the diagnosis of any child with ADHD as automatically signaling the beginning of extraordinary expenses. Yet nearly half of *706pediatricians surveyed for a report in the Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine said they routinely send ADHD children home in an hour with a prescription.6 The majority opinion concludes nonetheless that with respect to determining the accrual of the cause of action, the amount of expenses is irrelevant. See majority op. at 701-02. To the majority opinion, it does not matter whether the Nierengartens "may have incurred $500 in expenses or $500,000 in expenses." Majority op. at 701-02. Any money spent on treating the child's ADHD qualifies as "extraordinary expenses" under the majority opinion.
¶ 45. The majority opinion is silent about the nature and extent of any extraordinary expenses arising from ADHD because the record is silent about the specific nature of the child's ADHD, as well as the projected course of his disorder and its projected treatment regimen. The record contains limited information about doctor visits and drug prescriptions, but it contains no information about actual or estimated costs associated with treating the child's ADHD.
¶ 46. I agree with the court of appeals that the question whether the child's ADHD requires extraordinary expenses is a disputed issue of material fact that must be proved with reasonable medical certainty. I further agree with the court of appeals that the record does not support a conclusion as a matter of law that the treatment of ADHD requires extraordinary expenses:
The record does not suggest that expenses associated with treating ADHD in an adopted child would *707be unexpected or extraordinary. There is no showing of any reasonable medical certainty in 1990 that the Nierengartens would incur any extraordinary medical expenses. Thus, there is no showing that the Nierengartens suffered a pecuniary injury before 1994 that would support a cause of action.
[T]he record indicates that the extraordinary expenses were not incurred or foreseen until the bipolar diagnosis in 1994.
Nierengarten v. Lutheran Soc. Serv., 209 Wis. 2d 538, 552-53, 563 N.W.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
¶ 47. Even if I were to accept as a matter of law that all children diagnosed with ADHD incur extraordinary expenses, a factual issue remains about when the Nierengartens knew or should have known that their child's ADHD would require extraordinary expenses.
¶ 48. Whether the diagnosis of ADHD results in extraordinary expenses and on what date the Nierengartens discovered or should have discovered that they would incur extraordinary expensés are predicate factual questions that must be determined by a fact finder, be it the circuit court or a jury, before the circuit court can determine as a matter of law that the statute of limitations has run. Accordingly I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court.
¶ 49. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
¶ 50. I am authorized to state that Justice Ann Walsh Bradley joins this dissent.

On summary judgment a court must examine the record and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (the Nierengartens) and determine if the moving party (Lutheran Social Services) is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If any genuine issue of material fact exists, the case should not be decided on summary judgment and must be submitted to a fact finder.

 Edward M. Hallowell, What I've Learned from A.D.D., 30 Psychology Today 3, May 15,1997, at 40.

 The majority opinion writes that the Nierengartens "contend that the only thing extraordinary about ADHD is the 'extraordinary commonness of its diagnosis and treatment.' We disagree." Majority op. at 699 (internal citation omitted).

LynNell Hancock, Mother's Little Helper (Ritalin: Miracle Cure for Attention Deficit Disorder or Overprescribed Dangerous Drug?), Newsweek, March 18,1996, at 51.

LynNell Hancock, Mother's Little Helper (Ritalin: Miracle Cure for Attention Deficit Disorder or Overprescribed Dangerous Drug?), Newsweek, March 18,1996, at 51.

LynNell Hancock, Mother's Little Helper (Ritalin: Miracle Cure for Attention Deficit Disorder or Overprescribed Dangerous Drug?), Newsweek, March 18,1996, at 51.