Court Opinion

ID: 9885629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:08:31.006993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:55.405663
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
dissenting.
¶ 17 Because there are substantial separation of powers issues associated with judicial review of Legislative Council drafting under A.R.S. § 19 — 124(B), see Fairness and Accountability in Ins. Reform v. Greene, 180 Ariz. 582, 593, 886 P.2d 1338, 1349 (1994) (Moeller, V.C.J., dissenting), we of necessity adopted a very deferential standard of review. In Arizona Legislative Council v. Howe, 192 Ariz. 378, 965 P.2d 770 (1998), we distilled three formulations of the standard:
(1) “[t]he question is whether reasonable minds could conclude that the Council met the requirements of the law, not whether we believe the judicial system could itself devise a better analysis.” Id. at 383, 965 P.2d at 775.
(2) “We cannot settle each of these disputes; our function is only to ensure that a challenged analysis is reasonably impartial *75and fulfills the statutory requirements defined in Greene.” Id.
(3) The “analysis” [must] “substantially complfy] with the requirement of A.R.S. § 19-124(B).” Id. at 384, 965 P.2d at 776.
¶ 18 In Greene, Justice Moeller warned us that our “majority opinion invites the routine challenge in this court of Legislative Council analyses over the very subjective meaning of the words ‘impartial analysis’ in section 19-124(B).” 180 Ariz. at 597, 886 P.2d at 1353. We took heed of this warning by adopting a deferential standard and by noting that while “proponents and opponents are often dissatisfied with the Council’s analyses,” “[w]e cannot settle each of these disputes.” Howe, 192 Ariz. at 383, 965 P.2d at 775.
¶ 19 I fear that today, in this case and in the companion ease of Healthy Arizona Initiative PAC v. Groscost, No. CV-00-0274SA, we have given credence to Justice Moeller’s prediction and have enmeshed this court in the unwholesome and unhealthy process of second guessing drafting minutiae.
¶ 20 I would not parse through Legislative Council’s analysis paragraph by paragraph and word by word. Nor are we equipped to do so under the very tight deadlines imposed by cases of this sort. In the best of all worlds, paragraph one might have been more impartial than it is. But under our standard, we must take the Council’s analysis as a whole, not bit by bit. As a whole, I would conclude, that “reasonable minds could conclude that the Council met the requirements of the law.” Howe, 192 Ariz. at 383, 965 P.2d at 775. Taken as a whole, Legislative Council’s analysis is “reasonably impartial.” Id. I would thus conclude that the Council’s analysis “substantially complies with the requirements of A.R.S. § 19-124(B).” Id. at 384, 965 P.2d at 776.
¶ 211 therefore respectfully dissent.