Court Opinion

ID: 9557444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:50:14.827712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:50.434481
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ADAIR
dissenting:
I dissent.
Ernest Monforton, without warning, while driving a pick-up truck, was run down and seriously injured by a Northern Pacific passenger train at a railroad crossing on a country road near Belgrade, Montana. This is a suit to recover damages for the injuries and loss so occasioned.
In its answer, the defendant Railway Company pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff Monforton. At trial, the district judge, presumed to be a reasonable man, held that the question of the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff Monforton, if any, was properly a question for the determination of the jury.
The jury, presumed to be composed of reasonable persons, unanimously found and determined that the plaintiff Monforton was not guilty of any contributory negligence and that the defendant Railway Company is liable for injuries and loss suffered by Monforton and assessed his damages at the sum of $53,650. From the judgment given and entered, in conformity with the jury’s verdict, the defendant Railway has appealed to this court.
The majority opinion herein fails and omits to set forth all the essential facts as presented to the jury at the trial, hence, *213it becomes necessary to here set forth certain material facts that have been overlooked by and omitted from the majority opinion.
The Facts. The railroad tracks and the country road intersect at the crossing, forming a measured 36 degree angle between the railroad tracks and the country road. As the train and the truck approached the crossing, the passenger train was traveling at the speed of 46 miles per hour, and the truck driven by the plaintiff Monforton was traveling at the speed of 25 miles per hour. Simply stated, the passenger train was moving approximately twice as fast as the truck. Both train and truck were traveling in the same general direction. The truck had a stock rack on the back. In operating his truck, Monforton could see to his left, to his front, to his rear by use of a rear view mirror, and also to his right at an approximate 90 degree angle from the country road along which the truck was proceeding. However, the plaintiff Monforton had a blind spot at the right rear of his truck.
Competent, credible and uncontroverted evidence, which in determining defendant’s motions for nonsuit and for a directed verdict, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was introduced which was to the effect that Monforton looked and listened as he approached the crossing where the country road crossed the railroad tracks.
The statement in the majority opinion to the effect that the plaintiff did not look is contrary to the evidence submitted by the plaintiff Monforton, who testified, that up to a point within one hundred feet of the crossing, he was keeping a lookout in all directions, and that he looked to his right through the window in the right-hand door of his truck. Here the testimony, given in person by the plaintiff, is interrupted and ends for a reason not mentioned in the majority opinion but which is most relevant, namely, that the terrific shock accompanying the collision of the train and the truck completely blotted out from plaintiff Monforton’s memory all events which occurred after he reached the above-mentioned point about one hundred feet *214from the crossing. The evidence is that Monforton’s memory was so affected by the impact that he conld not recall or remember passing an automobile, which the evidence shows was proceeding along the country road in the opposite direction from that in which plaintiff was traveling, and which automobile safely crossed the railroad tracks but seconds before Monforton’s truck reached the crossing and which automobile of necessity had to pass, the Monforton truck, immediately prior to the collision.
The driver of another automobile that was following plaintiff’s truck observed the latter meet and pass the above-mentioned automobile that was proceeding in the opposite direction from that traveled by plaintiff’s truck. Monforton had no recollection or memory of meeting or passing such automobile, which event would surely have attracted his attention.
Monforton’s testimony to the effect that as he proceeded down the country road he was looking and observing in all directions stands uneontroverted and must be accepted as evidence of the fact that he kept a proper lookout.
The plaintiff further testified that he did not hear any noise or sounds made by the moving train and such testimony stands uncontradicted in the record. There was no evidence whatever that even tends to show that such moving passenger train, by merely proceeding along the tracks, made sufficient noise or racket to attract the attention of or to be heard by the occupants of the other two automobiles.
The fact that plaintiff did not hear the operating noise of the moving train directs attention to another important element of this case which has been completely ignored by the majority opinion herein, namely, that in approaching this established crossing the moving train wholly failed to ring a bell, blow a whistle or give or sound any warning signal at all, and that the train entered the crossing at a speed of 46 miles per hour, and that the front end of the engine struck the right rear end of the truck at a time when the truck was almost completely across the railway tracks and crossing. The evidence is clear that the *215plaintiff Monforton did not run into the train, but that the front end of the defendant Railway Company’s engine ran into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck. In other words, plaintiff’s truck was struck from behind by defendant’s train. The train ran into the truck and the train was still behind Monforton’s truck when the collision occurred.
The majority opinion places considerable emphasis upon the fact that the field, situate between the railroad tracks and the country road was flat and open and thus completely visible. This situation obtains only while the driver of a vehicle is in a place on the road where he is facing the field prior to approaching the railroad crossing. While proceeding along the country road the driver of a vehicle must be constantly leaving a portion of the wide open field behind him. Monforton in driving his truck toward the crossing was able to look straight ahead and to his left and to his right, but he was wholly unable to look or observe to his right rear from which direction the train approached and bore down upon him. When plaintiff looked to his right he did not and could not see the train because of the simple physical fact that at the time the train was not there to he seen.
From the plat presented in evidence, and the other physical facts the following can be demonstrated:
Fifteen seconds prior to the collision, when the train was then 1012.5 feet from the crossing, which point was approximately the first point at which the plaintiff’s moving truck was observed from the approaching train across this wide open, flat field, plaintiff’s truck was then 551.25 feet from the intersection. Ninety degree vision to the right from plaintiff’s truck at the point 551.25 feet from the crossing would intersect the railroad tracks at a point 687.5 feet from the crossing. The plaintiff Monforton could see and keep under observation only the 687.5 feet from that point to the crossing. At such time the approaching train was then 1012.5 feet from the crossing, being some 325 feet to Monforton’s rear, where such train could not *216be seen by plaintiff. It is not negligence to fail to see and observe that which is not visible.
When plaintiff’s truck reached a point 100 feet from the intersection the approaching train then had 185 feet of track to traverse before reaching the crossing. Ninety degree vision to the right from Monforton’s truck would intersect the tracks 123 feet from the crossing. The train at such time was not within Monforton’s range of vision. One second away from the point of the crash, Monforton’s truck was 36.75 feet from crossing. The train was then 67.5 feet from the crossing and bearing down upon him at a speed of 46 miles per hour. With but 90 degree vision to his right, the oncoming train was not visible to Monforton. As Monforton was proceeding through the crossing he was hit from behind by the engine which at the moment o£ impact was at his right rear and behind his truck.
In examining the relative position of plaintiff’s truck and defendant’s train as they approached the crossing, it is interesting to note how rapidly the train was gaining upon the truck. The omission from the majority opinion of these most important facts of plaintiff’s case is demonstrated by the discussion therein of the speed of the passenger train which would lead one to believe that there was some doubt as to the precise speed of the train. The matter of speed was not and cannot be in dispute. The evidence clearly shows that the train was equipped with a speedometer, with a tape attached, which accurately recorded the actual speed traveled. Following the accident, the tape was detached and removed from the engine and later such tape was introduced in evidence. The portion of the tape which showed the actual speed of the train at the time of the impact was before the jury, and it is now before the supreme court on this appeal.
Contrary to what is said in the majority opinion, the brakes on the train were not applied at any time prior to the actual impact, and collision. The engineer was stationed and sat on the right side of the cab of the engine at which point it was *217impossible for him to see the Monforton truck. The fireman occupied a seat at the left side of the cab, where he had a clear view of the Monforton truck traveling along’ the country road to the fireman’s left. The engineer operating the defendant’s passenger train testified as follows:
“A. Well that’s when I noticed the truck going up in the air in front of the diesel, that’s the first thing I realized of the accident. * * * There was nothing said at all until I seen — first thing there was when I seen the truck going in the air.
“Q. Then what did you do? A. I applied the brakes.”
The speed of the train with brakes applied is not relevant because the brakes were not applied until after the engine had struck the truck.
The speedometer tape introduced in evidence shows the miles per hour at which the train was traveling. This tape clearly shows that the train was going- between 40 and 50 miles per hour. The measured distance between the 40 miles per hour and the 50 miles per hour indicated on the tape is 6/16 of one inch. The halfway point on the tape, being the 45 miles per hour reading, would be 3/16 of an inch above the 40 miles per hour line on the tape. Yet the line on the tape indicating the train’s speed at the time of the collision is a measured 4/16 of an inch above the 40 mile per hour line on the tape. Thus the train was traveling in excess of 45 miles per hour, but not quite 47 miles per hour. The undisputed physical evidence clearly shows the train was going at least 46 miles per hour when it crashed into the rear end of plaintiff’s truck.
The actual physical evidence was the best evidence and it removed all doubt as to the train’s speed.
Again, and contrary to what is said in the majority opinion, the plaintiff did not base the claimed negligence of the defendant Railway Company upon the speed of the passenger train per se. The importance of the train’s actual speed is either overlooked in the majority opinion or the author thereof fails *218to- grasp' the point of plaintiff’s contention. Conceding that, as the majority opinion states “a railroad crossing as a matter of law is a place of known danger”, such quoted statement does not cover the entire problem before the court.
The record before this court clearly shows that it was a physical fact that defendant’s train was not in Monforton’s view as he approached the railroad crossing. There is no evidence whatever in the record before us that indicates that Monforton was disregarding the potential danger attendant upon crossing the tracks; that plaintiff recognized care should be exercised in approaching the crossing is clearly shown by the fact that plaintiff testified, without contradiction, that from the time he headed his truck toward the crossing and continuing thereafter up to a point one hundred feet distant from there, and for as long prior thereto as he could remember he repeatedly looked along* the railroad tracks. As to what transpired from and after reaching the point 100 feet from the crossing, Monforton could not testify because the shock of the collision blotted out his memory of those events. The testimony stands uneontradicted that Monforton did not see the train and the physical facts show that the train was not visible to plaintiff. Thus was plaintiff a person proceeding toward a railroad crossing, who, recognized it as a place of danger, and who kept a lookout to all sides, as was his duty, and who testified that notwithstanding these precautions he did not see the train. The physical fact was that when Monforton looked directly to his right the train could not be seen. This is obvious also because of the fact that if the train had been visible to the plaintiff at any time that Monforton looked, then because of the disparity of speed between the train and Monforton’s truck, the train would have reached the crossing first and the collision would not have occurred.
It was shown that the freight trains which customarily used these tracks traveled thereon at an average speed of about 31 miles per hour. Therefore, if a person approaching this intersection were to see the average train directly opposite him on *219the track he would know the train would have to travel farther to reach the intersection than a vehicle on the road, and that the train would catch or hit such moving vehicle only if it were traveling at a greater speed than such moving vehicle.
The testimony shows that it was only on extremely rare occasions that passenger trains were ever run on these particular tracks here involved. When a train is not visibile to a traveler on the country road because it is behind his vehicle then the speed of the train overtaking the vehicle becomes a very important factor in determining what constitutes the reasonable care on the part of the driver under the circumstances. In addition, the speed is important in determining the duties of the railroad toward the general traveling public along and across its railroad tracks. The speed of the train is also an important factor in determining whether the railroad exercised that degree of care required of it toward the public.
Monforton knew that a train moving in the same direction had to travel a greater distance than he to reach the crossing. Monforton also knew the customary speed of the trains ordinarily operating over these particular tracks. Thus when a train was not in sight or hearing, he was entitled in the exercise of reasonable care to rely upon looking and listening.
Here the majority opinion places all the burden of care and caution upon the general traveling public and none upon the railroad. This was not the law of this jurisdiction prior to the majority decision herein.
The speed of this train is an important factor when determining the question of negligence and proximate cause. What did the members of defendant’s train crew do when faced with the situation of their passenger train approaching the crossing and rapidly gaining upon the plaintiff’s truck, also approaching the same crossing, but at a slower pace and in such manner that, if one or the other did not change its rate of speed or stop, a collision was bound to occur ? The engineer seated on the right side of the diesel engine pulling the train took no action for the *220reason that the collision had occurred and plaintiff’s truck had been wrecked before the engineer knew or even suspected what had happened. He did not ring the bell nor sound the horn, nor give any warning whatever that the train was approaching the crossing, notwithstanding he had observed one automobile approach and pass over the railroad crossing directly in front of him. So far as the plaintiff Monforton was concerned the engineer did absolutely nothing for the reason that he, at no time, saw the Monforton truck until after his engine had collided with and wrecked it.
According to the majority opinion, plaintiff Monforton was charged with the duty of constantly looking behind him in order to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonably prudent man, yet the defendant railroad, with impunity may operate its trains silently and without warning over and through crossings, which intersect widely traveled country roads.
The majority opinion herein implies that the defendant Eailway Company is not charged with a duty to look and malee effective their looking, or to ring a bell, sound a horn or otherwise give warning of its fast moving trains. The fireman whose duty it was to occupy a seat on the side of the engine’s cab and to there watch for danger and immediately pass warning thereof on to the engineer, did see the Monforton vehicle. The defendant fireman testified as follows:
“Q. When did you first see the Monforton truck? A. I first noticed the truck when we were approximately a train length from the crossing. * * *
“Q. When you say you saw the truck about a train length away do you know about how many feet you are talking about. A. Well I would say approximately a thousand feet.”
Here, the defendant’s engine crew approaching the plaintiff’s truck from the rear across this wide, open, unobstructed field did not see the truck until the truck was approximately 550 feet from the intersection. Monforton did not observe the *221train approaching from his rear yet he is held negligent as a matter of law without any determination made as to whether his failure to see the train to his rear was the proximate cause of the accident. The fireman never communicated the fact to the engineer that the Monforton vehicle was approaching the intersection on the engineer’s blind side. As to whether this would have been effective or not we have the testimony of the engineer as follows:
‘ ‘ Q. And had you taken the throttle off back a distance of not too far the train would have slowed down enough to have not hit the truck? A. No, I don’t think that would have made any difference. But I wouldn’t have any reason to have taken the throttle off because our time, we were late, and our time is fast on that train, and its my duty to make the best possible time on that class of train. ’ ’
Yet the defendant’s engineer also testified that if he had cut the throttle at a distance of 300 feet from the intersection his train would have slowed down 8 or 10 miles per hour or enough to have avoided colliding with plaintiff’s truck.
As a true mathematical fact it is apparent that 15 seconds elapsed between the time the defendant’s fireman testified he first saw the Monforton truck and the happening of the collision. In those 15 seconds the train could have been brought to a complete stop for the record shows that after the collision the brakes were applied, which stopped the train in approximately its own length being within about one thousand feet. However, the facts persist that the fireman did not warn the engineer of the impending accident for at least 15 seconds after he observed the plaintiff driving toward the crossing, and that the plaintiff was never warned by sound of bell, whistle or horn as he should have been by the defendant’s engine crew.
The negligence on the part of the Railway Company, and its engine crew, constituting the proximate cause of the crash were:
(1) Failure of the defendant’s engineer and fireman to keep a proper lookout;
*222(2) Failure of defendant’s fireman upon observing the plaintiff proceeding toward the crossing to warn the engineer;
(3) Failure of the defendant’s engineer to give any warning whatever at this established crossing of the approach of defendant’s fast moving passenger train.
This action is based upon the negligence of the Northern Pacific Railway Company and its locomotive engineer, Henry Morris, in the operation of the Railway Company’s passenger train as it approached and passed over an established railway crossing.
At and during the trial in the district court, and during the argument of the appeal before this court, the defendant Railway Company, and its locomotive engineer, admitted and conceded that they did not blow a whistle or ring a bell prior to reaching the crossing where the accident occurred, as required by the laws of the State of Montana, and by reason thereof, the defendants were guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
R.C.M. 1947, § 72-219, so far as pertinent here, provides:
“If any i-ailroad corporation within this state shall # * * fail to have upon any locomotive in use by it in this state a bell and whistle in fit condition for use thereon; or shall permit any locomotive to approach any highway, road, or railroad crossing, without causing the whistle to be sounded at a point between fifty and eighty rods from the crossing, and the bell to be rung from said point until the crossing is reached; * * * shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined for the first offense in the sum of one thousand dollars, and for the second violation of the same provision, two thousand dollars, and for every other and further violation of any provision of which it has been twice before found guilty, a sum not less than five nor more than ten thousand dollars.”
That which the majority opinion declares to be the rules and law governing railroad crossings in this state is indeed unique. *223Not content with applying clear visibility, right angle crossing law to the facts here, the majority opinion goes a step further. It now invokes and imposes upon the traveling public in this state, the often repudiated stop, look and listen doctrine.
As early as 1912, in the case of Mason v. Northern Pacific Ry., 45 Mont. 474, 481, 124 P. 271, 273, this court set out the duty imposed upon the general traveling public when, in considering instructions having to do with the duty to look for approaching trains, it said:
“Neither of these instructions correctly states the law. They imposed too great a burden upon the plaintiff. If such were the law, a person approaching a railroad track would either be obliged to keep a constant lookout in both directions, or it would be incumbent upon him, in order to avoid the imputation of contributory negligence, to stop, if necessary, and look for a train at the last available point and at the last moment of time, before crossing the track. The law is that one desiring to cross a railroad track must exercise reasonable care for his own safety. No other burden rests upon him.” Emphasis supplied.
This decision in the Mason case, supra, was followed in 1913 by the case of Walters v. Chicago, etc., Ry., 47 Mont. 501, 133 P. 357, 358, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 702, wherein this court said:
“The testimony of respondent tended to show that, while he looked and listened as he approached the crossing, he did not ‘stop, look and listen,’ and the question is presented by appellants whether the driver of an automobile, approaching a railway crossing is not charged with the absolute duty to ‘stop, look and listen.’ The appellants, conceding that as to other vehicles using a public highway the general rule upon approaching a railway crossing is to exercise such care and caution as might be expected of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances, insist that ‘the duty of an automobile driver approaching tracks where there is restricted vision, to stop, look and listen, and to do so at a *224time and place where stopping, and where looking, and where listening will be effective, is a positive duty.’ New York Central & H. R. Co. v. Maidment, 168 Fed. 21, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 794, 93 C.C.A. 413; Brommer v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 179 Fed. 577, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 924, 103 C.C.A.135.) Both of the decisions just cited emanated from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, speak- ■ ing through Judge Buffington, and they proceeded upon the mistaken ideas that a railroad has some sort of a paramount right to the use of a public highway crossing, and that whether a citizen using the highway on approaching such crossing must stop, look and listen, depends upon the motive power he is using and its amenability to control; whereas the true rule, as we understand it, is that the citizen has a/n equal right with the railway company to use the crossing, and the amenability to control of the motive power he is using bears more properly upon how near he may come to the place of danger before taking the precautions that common prudence generally requires. Of these cases nothing further need be said than this: If they are to be taken to hold, in the absence of express statute, that it is contributory negligence as a matter of law, for the driver of an automobile not to stop, look and listen before using a highway crossing, without regard to whether ordinary prudence would require such a course, they are contrary in spirit to the rule announced by the superior authority of the supreme court of the United States (Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 12 Sup.Ct. 679, 36 L.Ed. 485) are against the weight of general decision (Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hilgartner [Tex.Civ.App.], 149 S.W. 1091; Pendroy v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 17 N.D. 433,117 N.W. 531; Spencer v. New York Central & H. R. Co., 123 App.Div. 789, 108 N.Y.Supp. 245; Bonert v. Long Island R. Co., 145 App. Div. 552, 130 N.Y.Supp. 271; Hartman v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 132 Iowa 582, 110 N.W. 10; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. *225Lucas, 99 S.W. 959, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 539; Vance v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., 9 Cal.App. 20, 98 P. 41; Missouri, etc., Ry. Co., v. James, 55 Tex.Civ.App. 588, 120 S.W. 269; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Hawkins (Ky.), 124 S.W. 836), and are in conflict with the settled rule in this state. Mason v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 45 Mont. 474, 124 P. 271; Sprague v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 40 Mont. 481, 107 P. 412; Hunter v. Montana Central Ry. Co., 22 Mont. 525, 57 P. 140. In the Sprague Case appears the following: ‘Whether, in selecting the point which they did select to stop and listen for approaching trains, Nelson and Chappel exercised ordinary care to make their listening effective, and whether, in doing what they did from that point until the injury occurred, they exercised such care and prudence as reasonable men under like circumstances would have exercised, were questions of fact for the jury to determine.’ ” Emphasis supplied.
In the instant case, the majority opinion declares that the above rules of law were repealed by a statute enacted in 1919, being R.C.M. 1947, § 72-164, but that such is not the fact is shown by the case of Jarvella v. Northern Pacific Ry., 101 Mont. 102, 115, 116, 53 P.2d 446, 451, decided in 1935. In the Jarvella case, the plaintiffs had collided with a train which was standing on a crossing. Therein this court said:
“As we understand defendant’s further contention, it urges that any one who collides with a stationary train of cars on a crossing — a stationary train of cars on a crossing being itself a warning — is of necessity guilty of contributory negligence. Many cases may be found in the books holding, under varying circumstances, that plaintiffs colliding with a slowly moving train of ears or a train of ears which had been stopped on a crossing are guilty of contributory negligence. On the other hand, other cases under facts somewhat similar to those in question hold that the question of contribtctory negligence is one of fact for the *226jury. It was so held where the question was raised on the pleadings in the eases of Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Heard, 36 Ga.App. 332, 136 S.E. 533, and Elliott v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 227 Mo. App. 225, 52 S.W.2d 448; and a like result was declared where the question arose, as here, on a motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, in the cases of Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Nall, 236 Ky. 554, 33 S.W.2d 640; Spiers v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 174 S.C. 508, 178 S.E. 136, and Short v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 46 Ohio App. 77, 187 N.E. 737. See, also, 3 Blashfield’s Cyc. Automobile Law, Perm. Ed., p. 210.” Emphasis supplied.
Following the Jarvella case, supra, this court, in 1938, decided the case of Incret v. Chicago, M., St. P. Ry., 107 Mont. 394, 86 P.2d 12, wherein the plaintiff Incret collided with cars occupying a railroad crossing. The plaintiff actually hit a moving-train. This court held that the plaintiff Incret was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. A vigorous dissent was filed in that case in which it was pointed out that the rules applied by the majority opinion were amending the rules of law declared and adopted by this court in Walters v. Chicago, Milwaukee & Puget Sound Ry., supra.
Such was the status of the law until 1939 when this court decided the case of Walsh v. Butte, Anaconda, etc., Ry. Co., 109 Mont. 456, 466, 97 P.2d 325, 329. In that case the plaintiff’s intestate had collided with a slowly moving train of cars at a railroad crossing. There, as here, the defendant railway company contended that contributory negligence, as a matter of law, barred recovery.
However, this court held that the case was controlled by the rules of law set out in Jarvella v. Northern Pacific Ry., supra, and specifically stated: “Suggestion is made by plaintiff that we should overrule the statement appearing in the Incret case, supra, which seems to her to overrule the rule of the case of Walters v. Chicago, Mil. & P. S. Ry. Co., 47 Mont. 501, 133 P. 357, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 702. The Incret case does not overrule *227the Walters case. The rule in Montana, still is as announced in the Walter’s case.” Emphasis supplied.
Hard pressed for authority to sustain his position in the instant case District Judge H. B. Hoffman, author of the majority opinion, has seized upon a comforting quotation which his search revealed in the concluding words of section 72-164 of the Eevised Codes of Montana of 1947, originally enacted as Section 1 of Chapter 151 of the Montana Session Laws of 1919, which statute reads as follows, viz.:
"72-164 (3842) Railroad commission may order electric signal hells installed. Authority is hereby given to the board of railroad commissioners of the state of Montana upon petition in writing made to it by any board of county commissioners of the state of Montana, to order railroad companies to install and maintain an electrically operated bell or other signaling device at all points in the state of Montana where the main lines, spurs, or switches of any railroad in continuous operation and use, owned or operated by them, cross any public highway now lawfully established or hereafter laid out within the state of Montana, and where the contour of the country adjacent to said crossing is such that a person approaching same along said highway cannot, at a distance of twenty-five feet of said crossing, obtain an unobstructed view of said railroad track for a distance of one-half mile on either side of said crossing; provided, however, all persons driving motor vehicles upon the public highways of this state, outside of corporate limits of incorporated cities or towns, where the view is obscure, or when a moving train is within sight or hearing, shall bring said vehicle to a full stop not less than ten nor more than one hundred feet from where said highway intersects railroad tracks within this state, before crossing the same, at all crossings where a flagman or a mechanical device is not maintained to warn the traveling public of approaching trains or cars. ’ ’ Emphasis supplied.
*228For years the rules of the Walters ease, decided by this court ou June 14, 1913, have been the rules which obtained in Montana.
Judge Hoffman Changes the Buie. Now some forty seven (47) years after this court’s decision in the Walters case, District Judge Hoffman, speaking for a majority of this court, chooses to overrule the Walters case, and to change and abandon the long-established rules which govern in this jurisdiction, by wholly failing to recognize that section 72-164, supra, so enacted in 1919 does not change or alter the rules of the Walters case and that the provisions of section 72-164, supra, do not apply to the instant Monforton case, wherein the view was not obscure, nor was the moving train within the sight of the plaintiff Monforton being conditions precedent which must be found to exist before the portion of the provisions of section 72-164, quoted by District Judge Hoffman would or could become applicable.
One need only examine the particular factual situation which here obtained to discover that the instant Monforton case cannot be reconciled with those decisions wherein the plaintiff had been held to be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The majority opinion, in the instant case, has written new law in Montana and it is bad law.
What is being accomplished by such majority opinion, in the instant case, is to impose a much greater burden upon the plaintiff Monforton than is imposed upon the defendants, the Northern Pacific Railway Company, and its engineer, Henry Morris, whose negligence in not looking ahead, and not giving any warning whatever of the passenger train’s approach is clear and uncontroverted.
The Law of This Case. At the trial of this cause in the district court and after all the evidence had been introduced, the plaintiff Monforton offered an instruction designated as plaintiff’s proposed Instruction No. 16, at which time the trial judge *229inquired of defendant’s counsel, “Do you have any objections?” to which Mr. Toole of counsel for the defendants replied: “No objection.” Thereupon the trial judge announced: “It will be given without objection”. Such proposed instruction was given to the jury as the court’s Instruction No. 11.
Thus the court’s Instruction No. 11, so given without objection, became, was and is the law of this case, and as such it is binding upon the parties litigant both plaintiff and defendants, their counsel, the trial judge, the jurors in the district court, and the justices sitting in the supreme court on this appeal.The trial court’s Instruction No. 11, so given is in these words, viz.:
“You are instructed that the defendants in this action admit that they did not blow a whistle or ring a bell prior to reaching the crossing where the accident occurred, as required by the laws of the State of Montana, and you are therefore instructed that the defendants were guilty of negligence as a matter of law for failure to blow a whistle or ring a bell as required by the laws of the State of Montana.
“If you find that such negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the collision, then, in that event, unless you find that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as defined in these instructions and further, that such contributory negligence was a proximate cause of the collision, then you must return a verdict for the plaintiff and against the defendants.”
The two district judges, and the three duly elected justices who sat on this appeal, sat as lawyers and judges, and not as jurors. The jury of twelve in the district court found that Monforton was not guilty of contributory negligence and the two district judges and two justices sitting on the appeal have the power, but not the right to overturn the jury’s verdict on the question of contributory negligence.
In conclusion, and as said by Mr. Justice Smith of the Su*230preme Court of Michigan, in Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 349 Mich. 387, 84 N.W.2d 840, 841 :
“In other words, we apply the doctrine of contributory negligence to shield the very person whose prior reckless acts caused the crisis which gave rise to negligence ‘as a matter of law’ on the part of plaintiff’s driver. This is poor morals, poor government, and poor law all rolled into one, and while we have no primary jurisdiction in the first two fields, we have ample with respect to the third, and I urge that we use it.”
I would affirm the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the district court.