Court Opinion

ID: 9584281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:46:16.883295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:23.410793
License: Public Domain

Bell, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in Division 1 but I dissent from Division 2 of the majority opinion. The trial court, which had jurisdiction over the offenses, placed the cases on the court’s dead docket. Code §24-2714 (7). The time factors involved are of significance. Both warrants were issued on June 20, 1968. The orders placing the cases on the dead docket were dated July 16, 1968, and both state: "It appearing that the within defendant being in the common jail of DeKalb County and due to her proverty [sic] she is unable to make an appearance bond, and further in view of the fact that she has been in jail some twenty-seven (27) days it is of the opinion of the court that the ends of justice would best be met by placing said case upon the dead docket until further order *586of the court, and it is so ordered.” Plaintiff filed her complaints in June, 1970; answers were filed in July of 1970. Motions for summary judgment were filed in January, 1971, in case No. 46676 and in June, 1971, in case No. 46604. Both motions were supported by accompanying affidavits of counsel for respective defendants and state in part that a diligent search of the records of the trial court having jurisdiction of the cases reveals that the last action taken in either case was the order of July 16, 1968, placing the cases on the dead docket. Accordingly, this part of the defendant’s proof shows that more than two years elapsed since the dead docketing of the cases and that no further action was taken. Merely placing a criminal case on the dead docket does not necessarily of itself show that the prosecution has or has not ended insofar as malicious prosecution purposes are concerned. Thus, the question is does the dead docketing of the criminal proceedings along with evidence of abandonment of the prosecution permit the conclusion that the case has terminated in the accused’s favor authorizing the action of malicious prosecution? In Hartshorn v. Smith, 104 Ga. 235, 237 (30 SE 666), the Supreme Court stated: "if a criminal prosecution has been dismissed with no intention of commencing it again, or if delay has been made in commencing the prosecution again, so as to lead the accused to believe that it has been finally terminated, and if he then and at once commences his action for a malicious prosecution, he might probably maintain the same.” Abandoning the prosecution before the committing magistrate amounts to a termination of the prosecution when no further action is taken. Page v. Citizens Banking Co., 111 Ga. 73 (5) (36 SE 418, 51 LRA 463, 78 ASR 144). In Price v. Cobb, 60 Ga. App. 59 (3 SE2d 131), a nolle prosequi was entered to an indictment and shortly thereafter an action for malicious prosecution was brought. We held that the action could not be maintained as there was neither a showing that the six months statute of limitation under Code § 27-601 (4) had run nor a showing in the petition that defendants or the solicitor general had abandoned any *587further prosecution. The six months limitation on obtaining a new indictment where a nolle prosequi has been entered cannot apply to a proceeding which has been placed on the dead docket. Nonetheless, based upon the above authorities, dead docketing coupled with a lapse of an unreasonable length of time with no further action taken by anyone towards a view to recommencing the prosecution, would authorize the conclusion that the proceedings have been abandoned and thus a favorable termination so as to permit a malicious prosecution suit. The defendants as movants have the burden of proof on summary judgment and the opposing party is given the benefit of all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1 (126 SE2d 442). From defendants’ proof that no further action has been taken in the criminal cases in more than two years since the dead docket entries, it can at the very least be justifiably inferred that the criminal proceedings have been abandoned and consequently terminated in plaintiff’s favor. The denial of the motions as to Count 1 of the complaints was proper as defendants have not sustained their burden of proof on motion for summary judgment. I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Judges Deen and Evans concur in this dissent.