Court Opinion

ID: 9494138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:30:10.247563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:14.243481
License: Public Domain

PAUL KELLY, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Given that neither the facts nor the law have changed, I respectfully dissent from the opinion on rehearing. The initial panel opinion correctly held that application of post 1993 amendment guidelines to the two counts occurring before that amendment violates the ex post facto clause. United States v. Sullivan, 242 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir.2001); accord United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1404 (3rd Cir.1994). Despite the Sentencing Commission’s approval of this practice in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(3), we are dealing with three discrete failure-to-file counts where guilt was determined by a jury on each count, rather than a sentencing enhancement on a post-amendment count or a sentence for a continuing offense spanning an amendment.
The ex post facto clause prohibits application of a law that increases the punishment for an offense after that offense has been committed. Rogers v. Tennessee, — U.S. —, ——, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 1697, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001). The ex post facto clause is concerned with notice and governmental restraint-increasing the punishment for an offense beyond what was available when the crime was committed does not comport with either value. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997). Here, application of the amended guideline to pre-amendment offenses satisfies both requirements of an ex post facto prohibition: it is both retrospective-it applies to failure-to-file offenses occurring before its enactment-and it disadvantages Mr. Sullivan by increasing the punishment for those pre-amendment offenses. See id.
The court determines that Mr. Sullivan had sufficient notice to avoid ex post facto concerns because he would be deemed to know that (1) his sentence would be determined based upon the guidelines in effect at sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A); U.S.S.G. § lBl.ll(a); (2) any sentence would be based upon total tax loss, U.S.S.G. §§ 2T1.2, 2T4.1 (Tax Table) (Nov. 1992) (pre-amendment); and (3) offenses stemming from similar conduct will be grouped, U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.1 & 3D1.2, or *1266considered relevant conduct, U.S.S.G. §§ lB1.3(a)(2) & (a)(3).
Of course, the only notice this provides at the time of commission of the first two, pre-amendment offenses is that the sentence could be determined in accordance with guideline provisions that may or may not be amended. Even if the notice is sufficient to inform a defendant that the last offense could determine the sentence, only a defendant with the prescience of a clairvoyant could anticipate an actual sentence based upon a yet-to-be amended guideline.
This plainly is not sufficient notice under Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). Miller involved post-offense amendments to state sentencing guidelines that raised a defendant’s presumptive sentence to 5.5 to 7 years, from 3.5 to 4.5 years. The trial court applied the guidelines in effect at sentencing and imposed a 7-year sentence. The Supreme Court determined that application of the amended guidelines to the defendant violated the ex post facto clause. Id. at 435-36, 107 S.Ct. 2446. In rejecting the state’s argument that the guidelines scheme provided fair notice that it might be amended, the Court stated:
Here ... the statute in effect at the time petitioner acted did not warn him that Florida prescribed a 5lh -to 7-year presumptive sentence for that crime. Petitioner simply was warned of the obvious fact that the sentencing guidelines law-like any other law-was subject to revision. The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws cannot be avoided merely by adding to a law notice that it might be changed.
Id. at 431, 107 S.Ct. 2446. Likewise, in this case, the pre-amendment guidelines simply did not provide adequate, quantitative notice of the post-amendment penalty associated with the pre-amendment counts.
Because of this problem, it is necessary to view the penalty as originating from the third, post-amendment offense, as enhanced by the first two, pre-amendment offenses. But for the ex post facto problem, such an artificial construction (which ignores that Mr. Sullivan was convicted by a jury of three discrete counts and sentenced on each count) would be unnecessary. See United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 547 (9th Cir.1997).
Finally, the notion that Mr. Sullivan might be under-punished were the pre-amendment guidelines applied to all three offenses is misplaced. The narrowly tailored solution to the ex post facto problem, applying the pre-amendment guideline to the two pre-amendment offenses, and the post-amendment guideline to the post-amendment offenses, obviates the notion that he will receive a windfall not mandated by ex post facto concerns. Sullivan, 242 F.3d at 1254.