Court Opinion

ID: 9895871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:14:06.151619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:16.187422
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                September 2023 Term                                  FILED
                                 _______________
                                                                           November 8, 2023
                                   No. 22-0111                                   released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                            EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                 _______________                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                 OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                 NORM LAUNI, II,
                              Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

                                          v.

THE HAMPSHIRE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S OFFICE and COUNTY
               OF HAMPSHIRE, WEST VIRGINIA, et al.,
                   Defendants Below, Respondents

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mineral County
                         The Honorable James Courrier, Jr.
                                 Case No. 19-C-15

                                     AFFIRMED

                             Submitted: October 10, 2023
                              Filed: November 8, 2023

Christian J. Riddell, Esq.                     Tracey B. Eberling, Esq.
The Riddell Law Group                          Steptoe & Johnson PLLC
Martinsburg, WV                                Martinsburg, WV
Counsel for Petitioner                         Counsel for Respondent Nazelrod

                                               James W. Marshall, III, Esq.
                                               Adam K. Strider, Esq.
                                               Bailey & Wyant, PLLC
                                               Martinsburg, WV
                                               Counsel for Respondents James and Ours
CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE BUNN, deeming herself disqualified, did not participate in this decision.

JUDGE TERA SALANGO, sitting by temporary assignment.
                              SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “‘Appellate review of a circuit court’s order granting a motion to

dismiss a complaint is de novo.’ Syllabus point 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan

Pontiac–Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995).” Syllabus Point 1, Albright

v. White, 202 W. Va. 292, 294, 503 S.E.2d 860, 862 (1998).

              2.     “The trial court, in appraising the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).” Syllabus Point

3, Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., 160 W. Va. 530, 530, 236 S.E.2d 207, 208 (1977)

                                               i
WALKER, Chief Justice:

                Petitioner Norm Launi II was working as a Detective with the Hampshire

County Sheriff’s Department until he was prosecuted in 2017 for domestic battery and

domestic assault, of which he was eventually acquitted at trial. He then brought claims of

malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy against certain officials involved in his

prosecution – Respondents Dan James, John Ours, and Scott Nazelrod – and a claim for

abuse of process against Nazelrod. The circuit court dismissed the claims against

Respondents James and Ours on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity. As to

Respondent Nazelrod, it found that Mr. Launi failed to state valid claims of malicious

prosecution, abuse of process, or civil conspiracy. On appeal, Mr. Launi challenges all of

these rulings as defective, but we concur with the circuit court’s findings and affirm.

                  I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                Mr. Launi’s allegations of civil conspiracy and malicious prosecution are

asserted against three respondents: West Virginia State Police Corporal Scott Nazelrod,

special prosecuting attorney John Ours, and Dan James, prosecuting attorney in Hampshire

County at all times relevant to our analysis of these claims. 1 Mr. Launi also asserts a claim

for abuse of process against Cpl. Nazelrod.

       1
           Dan James is currently the prosecuting attorney in Morgan County.

                                              1
              The antagonistic relationship between the parties that would later form the

basis of these claims began with Mr. Launi’s own conduct in November 2013. Mr. Launi

and then-fellow Hampshire County law enforcement officials placed a bear carcass in the

back of Prosecutor James's truck as a practical joke. Several years after that incident,

Prosecutor James accused Mr. Launi of playing a role in the death of his then-partner,

Captain Eckerson, despite Prosecutor James’s knowledge that Mr. Launi was out of town

on scheduled leave at the time. 2 Cpl. Nazelrod became involved when the West Virginia

State Police assigned him to investigate the circumstances surrounding Capt. Eckerson’s

death.

              Tensions escalated in January of 2017, when Prosecutor James received a

call from Mr. Launi’s previous live-in girlfriend, Penny Hartman, alleging that she had

video recordings showing Mr. Launi committing domestic violence against her. Mr. Launi

alleges that after receiving the call from Ms. Hartman, Prosecutor James “directed” Cpl.

Nazelrod to investigate the claims.

              In his brief to this Court, Mr. Launi alleges that Prosecutor James filed a

petition to revoke Ms. Hartman’s bond from a late 2016 DUI charge “in order to force her

to pursue charges against the Petitioner for domestic violence.” The grounds for revocation

         It is not entirely clear from the record, but it appears that Captain Eckerson died
         2

of a drug overdose.

                                             2
were that Ms. Hartman had harassed Mr. Launi over the phone and then Mr. Launi pursued

charges against her. After her release, Ms. Hartman filed for a domestic violence protective

order, and Cpl. Nazelrod allegedly contacted Magistrate John Rohbaugh at home to

personally request that the protective order issue. Once it did, Mr. Launi was forced to turn

in his weapons and was no longer able to work as a detective with the Hampshire County

Sheriff’s office.

              In February of 2017, as part of his investigation of the domestic violence

charges, Cpl. Nazelrod conducted an interview with Mr. Launi regarding the pending

domestic violence charges against Ms. Hartman. Mr. Launi denied physical assault of any

kind and provided Cpl. Nazelrod with his side of the story. But at some point during that

interview, Mr. Launi became aware that Prosecutor James had been the source of

information relative to recordings of alleged domestic violence between Mr. Launi and Ms.

Hartman.

              In the criminal complaint Cpl. Nazelrod filed, Mr. Launi was charged with

three counts of domestic battery and one count of domestic assault. Mr. Launi alleges that

Cpl. Nazelrod’s criminal complaint “made no mention of the Petitioner’s statement or any

of the information obtained during that interview,” and that “much of the evidence claimed

to exist in the videos provided by Ms. Hartman was not present.” Mr. Launi also claims

that he reasonably believed that Prosecutor James drafted the complaint since “it does not

                                             3
follow the standard structure of complaint writing and it appears to have been drafted by

an individual with legal training.” 3

              Before the case proceeded to trial, the Mineral County Prosecutor recused

himself due to a perceived conflict, 4 and Prosecutor Ours was appointed as special

prosecutor. According to Mr. Launi, Ms. Hartman repeatedly requested that the domestic

battery and assault charges be dismissed, but Prosecutor Ours denied her request. Mr.

Launi, having recorded his February interview with Cpl. Nazelrod, also maintains that

thirty-six minutes of that interview had been withheld from discovery by Cpl. Nazelrod

and the prosecutor respondents.

              Mr. Launi argued in his criminal case that the missing portion of the February

statement amounted to falsifying evidence. While the court reprimanded Cpl. Nazelrod, it

ruled that the parties would proceed to trial and after the State’s case-in-chief, denied

       3
        Although the investigation began in Hampshire County, at some point, Cpl.
Nazelrod discovered that the alleged incidents of domestic violence had occurred in
Mineral County, so the complaint was filed there instead.
       4
        The recused Mineral County prosecutor is not named in the record, nor is there an
explanation of the basis for the recusal other than his “previous working relationship” with
Mr. Launi.

                                             4
Petitioner’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. After hearing all the evidence against the

Petitioner, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.

              Based on these events, Mr. Launi filed this civil action on October 29, 2019,

alleging civil conspiracy and malicious prosecution against Prosecutors James and Ours,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Prosecutor James. He also

alleges civil conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process against Cpl. Nazelrod.

Mr. Launi later amended his complaint to add additional factual allegations. All three

Respondents filed motions to dismiss the claims, arguing that they were immune as to the

alleged conduct or that Mr. Launi failed to state claims for which relief could be granted.

The circuit court dismissed all counts as to each Respondent except the intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim against Prosecutor James. 5

              Petitioner now appeals the dismissal orders.

       5
         On April 29, 2019, Petitioner filed a federal court action against multiple
defendants, including Respondents Ours, James, and Nazelrod. The allegations in the
federal complaint arise from the same arrest and prosecution at issue in this case. All
defendants moved to dismiss, and the United States District Court for the Northern District
of West Virginia granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner appealed and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. See Launi v. James, No.
20-2010, 2021 WL 5294933 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 2021).

                                               5
                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

                  This Court has held that “[a]ppellate review of a circuit court’s order granting

a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo.” 6         We have clarified that when this Court

reviews a case de novo, the Court “gives a new, complete and unqualified review to the

parties’ arguments and the record before the circuit court.” 7 And, this Court, like “the trial

court, in appraising the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should not

dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 8

                  Still, although “Rule 8 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure requires

‘only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’” 9

and although “[c]ourts are to construe ‘all pleadings … as to do substantial justice,’” 10

       6
         Syl. Pt. 1, Albright v. White, 202 W. Va. 292, 503 S.E.2d 860 (1998) (quoting Syl.
Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 461
S.E.2d 516 (1995)).
       7
         Doe v. Logan Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 W. Va. 45, 48, 829 S.E.2d 45, 48 (2019)
(quoting Gastar Exploration Inc. v. Rine, 239 W. Va. 792, 798, 806 S.E.2d 448, 454
(2017)).
       8
         Syl. Pt. 3, Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., 160 W. Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977)
(citation omitted).
       9
        W. Virginia Div. of Corr. & Rehab. v. Robbins, 248 W. Va. 515, 889 S.E.2d 88,
96 (2023).
       10
            Id.

                                                  6
                        Rules 8 and 9(b) do not countenance sloppy pleading;
                “a plaintiff may not fumble around searching for a meritorious
                claim within the elastic boundaries of a barebones complaint.”
                Instead, they require that “[e]ach averment of a pleading ... be
                simple, concise, and direct,” so that “a circuit court or an
                opposing party [may] understand whether a valid claim is
                alleged and, if so, what it is.” In other words, a complaint “must
                set forth enough information to outline the elements of a claim
                or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist.”[11]

                                         III. ANALYSIS

                Petitioner assigns three errors on appeal, each correlating to the circuit

court’s dismissal of his malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, and abuse of process

claims. We examine these errors in relation to each Respondent in turn.

      A.        Prosecutorial Immunity

                The circuit court dismissed Mr. Launi’s malicious prosecution and civil

conspiracy claims against Prosecutors James and Ours, concluding that those claims were

barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity.           On appeal, Mr. Launi argues that the

Prosecutors James and Ours are not entitled to prosecutorial immunity for their actions in

Mr. Launi’s prosecution because they were not acting in their prosecutorial capacities in

      11
           Id. (internal citations omitted).

                                                7
pursuing the domestic violence charges against him that caused him to lose his position as

a law enforcement officer.

                  Absolute prosecutorial immunity attaches to protect prosecutors from civil

liability that otherwise would often arise by virtue of the functions they perform for the

State: “[p]rosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for prosecutorial

functions such as, initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution, presenting a case at trial,

and other conduct that is intricately associated with the judicial process[.]” 12       And,

“absolute prosecutorial immunity cannot be defeated by showing that the prosecutor acted

wrongfully or even maliciously, or because the criminal defendant ultimately prevailed on

appeal or in a habeas corpus proceeding.” 13

                  Importantly, this Court has recognized that prosecutorial immunity is a

functional analysis. We have explained, “[t]he absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors

attaches to the functions they perform, and not merely to the office. Therefore, it has been

recognized that a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity when performing actions

in an investigatory or administrative capacity.” 14 With this background, we turn to

       12
         Mooney v. Frazier, 225 W. Va. 358, 370 n.12, 693 S.E.2d 333, 345 (2010) (citing
Franklin D. Cleckley, et al., Litigation Handbook on West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, 8(c), at 213 (3d ed. 2008)).
       13
            Id.
       14
            Id.

                                               8
Petitioner’s allegations against Prosecutor Ours, then Prosecutor James, to determine

whether the conduct on which Mr. Launi’s claims is based was prosecutorial in nature. 15

       1.     Prosecutor Ours

              The limited role of Prosecutor Ours in Mr. Launi’s narrative is prosecuting

Mr. Launi for domestic violence against Ms. Hartman. Mr. Launi acknowledges that

Prosecutor Ours had authority to prosecute the case against him but argues that Prosecutor

Ours orchestrated his appointment in bad faith. Mr. Launi further contends that Prosecutor

Ours moved forward with the prosecution with an improper purpose; he alleges that

Prosecutor Ours conspired with Prosecutor James in fabricating evidence—i.e., deleting

portions of Petitioner’s interview—and that Prosecutor Ours took Ms. Hartman’s

deposition under false pretenses. That conduct, Petitioner argues, removes him from the

protections of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

              Notably, Prosecutor Ours was not appointed as special prosecutor until after

charges were filed, that is, after the magistrate (who is not alleged to have participated in

this purported conspiracy) made a probable cause determination. So, Prosecutor Ours was

not present for any of the “investigatory” stages of the prosecution. His conduct, as alleged

       15
         We note that while this Court has discussed the availability of qualified immunity
to prosecutors who act in an investigative, rather than a prosecutorial capacity, the circuit
court did not perform a qualified immunity analysis, and, insofar as we agree that the
functions performed by Prosecutors James and Ours were prosecutorial in nature, we do
not discuss qualified immunity, either.

                                             9
by Mr. Launi as outside the realm of his prosecutorial function, is that he continued a

prosecution in bad faith.

                  In concluding that Prosecutor Ours was entitled to absolute immunity, the

circuit court relied on the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit in Springmen v. Williams. 16 There, the prosecutor did not sign the charging

documents, but was entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to initiate a criminal

prosecution. 17 The Springmen court held that whether and when to prosecute is clearly a

prosecutorial function for which she was afforded absolute immunity, finding “[i]t is

difficult to imagine conduct more intimately related to the judicial process than a

prosecutor’s decision to proceed with a prosecution.” 18

                  We agree with the rationale from Springmen. It is consistent with this

Court’s discussion in Mooney that “initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution, [and]

presenting a case at trial . . . is intricately associated with the judicial process.” 19 We find

no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that Prosecutor Ours, in continuing the prosecution

of Mr. Launi, was acting in his prosecutorial capacity. The answer is no different in light

       16
            122 F.3d.211 (4th Cir. 1997).
       17
            Id. at 213.
       18
            Id.
       19
            Mooney, 225 W. Va. at 370 n.12, 693 S.E.2d at 345 n. 12.

                                               10
of Mr. Launi’s allegations of bad faith and improper motives, because, as we discussed in

Mooney, absolute immunity protections do not dissolve even if Prosecutor Ours did not

pursue the prosecution in good faith. 20 So, we affirm the circuit court in this respect.

              As for Mr. Launi’s claim that Prosecutor Ours conspired with Prosecutor

James and Cpl. Nazelrod to “fabricate” evidence by deleting portions of the interview, the

circuit court held that Prosecutor Ours was entitled to prosecutorial immunity for his

actions in not disclosing portions of the interview, because “the decision of whether an

item of evidence is disclosable under Brady v. Maryland is a prosecutorial function which

is afforded absolute immunity.” 21

               In so deciding, the circuit court relied on another Fourth Circuit case, Carter

v. Burch. 22 There, the court held that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for

his decision to withhold testimonial evidence because the decision to turn over the evidence

would have occurred after the petitioner’s arrest but before his conviction, so it was clearly

        See Mooney, 225 W. Va. at 370 n.7, 693 S.E.2d at 345 n.7 (“absolute prosecutorial
       20

immunity cannot be defeated by showing that the prosecutor acted wrongfully or even
maliciously”).
       21
          See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)
(holding that prosecutors must turn exculpatory evidence over to a criminal defendant in
time for its effective use at trial).

        34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune
       22

for alleged Brady violations because the decision of whether to disclose evidence is
indisputably a prosecutorial function).

                                             11
part of the presentation of the state’s case. 23 In this case, like Carter, the interview of Ms.

Hartman was taken after the protective order issued, but before Mr. Launi’s acquittal. So,

Prosecutor Ours’s decision, if any, to withhold any portion of that interview can only be

viewed as part and parcel of presenting the state’s case against Petitioner. Clearly, a

prosecutor’s presentation of the case at trial is a prosecutorial function that falls under the

protective ambit of absolute immunity. So, we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion

that Prosecutor Ours’s decision to disclose (or not disclose) any portion of the February

interview with Petitioner is protected from liability for civil suit by absolute prosecutorial

immunity.

                 Mr. Launi also argues that the circuit court erred in characterizing his claims

as Brady violations because he is not making Fifth Amendment claims in this suit. Rather,

he is making claims of evidence tampering that go beyond that the evidence was not

disclosed. 24 We do not find this argument persuasive. In his complaint, Mr. Launi alleges

that Prosecutor Ours conspired to delete or suppress thirty-six minutes of the interview.

We agree with the circuit court that Mr. Launi’s allegations of deletion or suppression of

       23
            Id. at 263.
       24
          Petitioner references Wearry v. Foster, 33 F.4th 260 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied,
143 S. Ct. 2459, 216 L. Ed. 2d 432 (2023) to support this contention. We find that the facts
from that United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit case are not applicable to
those in this case because there, the prosecutor coerced a juvenile witness into testifying.
Here, no allegation of coercion has been made.

                                                12
portions of the interview are Brady-type allegations, however artfully Petitioner phrases

them.

                   Finally, as to Mr. Launi’s argument that Prosecutor Ours is not immune for

his actions in taking Ms. Hartman’s deposition under false pretenses, we find that taking

witness depositions in the process of prosecuting a case is a prosecutorial function for

which Prosecutor Ours is afforded absolute immunity. As the circuit court did, we note

that Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure is dispositive of this issue.

It expressly provides for the taking of depositions in criminal prosecutions. Prosecutor

Ours’s deposition of Penny Hartman, the complainant, can only be considered conduct that

is “intricately associated with the judicial process.” 25 We readily conclude that Mr. Launi

has alleged no set of facts showing Prosecutor Ours acted in any capacity other than his

prosecutorial one, and affirm the circuit court’s conclusion that he is absolutely immune

from Mr. Launi’s claims of malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy claims.

              2.      Prosecutor James

                   The circuit court also dismissed Mr. Launi’s malicious prosecution and civil

conspiracy claims against Prosecutor James, concluding those claims were barred by

absolute prosecutorial immunity. On appeal, Petitioner argues that Prosecutor James is not

entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for his actions in interviewing witnesses

        25
             Mooney, 225 W. Va. at 370 n.12, 693 S.E.2d at 345 n.12.

                                                13
associated with the case, directing law enforcement in the course of its investigation, and

procuring a prosecution devoid of probable cause because those actions were investigative

in nature and thus outside the scope of his function as a prosecutor.

                Specifically, Mr. Launi disputes that Prosecutor James had any prosecutorial

duties here because, as the prosecutor for Hampshire County, he had no role as a

“prosecutor” in the Mineral County prosecution, and, for that reason, cannot avail himself

of prosecutorial immunity. Mr. Launi further contends that Prosecutor James engaged in

investigative functions when he directed Cpl. Nazelrod to Ms. Hartman’s report of

domestic abuse, revoked Ms. Hartman’s bond for a prior DUI charge after she was charged

with telephone harassment, spoke with the press regarding the charges against Petitioner, 26

and involved himself in a conspiracy to suppress portions of the February interview from

Mr. Launi. Mr. Launi then relies on federal authority to argue that absolute immunity

should only apply to “actions that are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial

proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct.” 27

       26
          The circuit court determined that Petitioner’s claim that Prosecutor James spoke
with the press falls outside the scope of prosecutorial immunity and supports his allegation
of intentional inflection of emotional distress, and not any allegation of malicious
prosecution or civil conspiracy. So, we do not disturb the circuit court’s finding on this
matter and need not address any allegations regarding defamatory statements.
       27
            Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494 (1991).

                                             14
                As far as any claim that Respondent James was not entitled to the protections

of prosecutorial immunity because he was Prosecutor of Hampshire County and not

Mineral County, this Court has never held that a prosecutor’s geographic location is

determinative for immunity. Importantly, Mr. Launi’s argument in this respect ignores that

while Prosecutor James was not involved in prosecuting him for domestic violence against

Ms. Hartman, he was, at that same time, seeking to revoke Ms. Hartman’s bond based on

her harassment of Mr. Launi. We reiterate that whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute

immunity is a functional analysis; prosecutors are immune when taking actions in a

prosecutorial capacity. We turn, then, to the conduct alleged and perform that functional

analysis.

                 In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the Supreme Court of the United States held that

prosecutorial immunity includes not just actions taken within the courtroom, but also

“actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the

courtroom.” 28 But, the court in Buckley drew a distinction between “the advocate’s role

in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand,

and the detective’s role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him

probable cause to recommend a suspect be arrested, on the other.” 29 Upon receiving Ms.

       28
            509 U.S. 259, 272 (1993).
       29
            Id. at 273-74.

                                              15
Hartman’s complaint, Prosecutor James merely referred the complaint to Cpl. Nazelrod

with the State Police, which had jurisdiction to investigate it, and informed them that there

was sufficient evidence to pursue charges. Even taking the allegations in the light most

favorable to Mr. Launi, Prosecutor James conducted no independent investigation of the

domestic violence Ms. Hartman alleged, and, contrary to Mr. Launi’s assertions, was not

performing any functions that are typically reserved for police officers or detectives in

referring the complaint and giving his professional opinion about the sufficiency of the

evidence.   We agree with the circuit court that those functions are consonant with

Prosecutor James’s role as an officer of the court despite that no prosecution had yet begun.

              Likewise, Prosecutor James’s decision to file a petition to revoke Ms.

Hartman’s bond was nothing other than an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, since it is

a prosecutor’s duty to weigh the evidence in determining whether to pursue a bond

revocation. Mr. Launi’s contention that Prosecutor James interviewed witnesses associated

with the case and outside of his prosecutorial capacity is also infirm to defeat application

of prosecutorial immunity because it overlooks that Prosecutor James was actively seeking

to revoke Ms. Hartman’s bond based on her harassment of Mr. Launi. By virtue of the

overlap in allegations and witnesses, Prosecutor James acted consistently with a

prosecutor’s role in interviewing witnesses to prepare his own case. And, as we have

already determined in relation to Prosecutor Ours, the disclosure of evidence is

                                             16
indisputably a prosecutorial function entitled to absolute immunity, even if it was done in

bad faith. 30

                As alleged, Prosecutor James’s actions, even if proven, in referring the

domestic assault case to the appropriate authorities, interviewing witnesses, revoking Ms.

Hartman’s bond, and excluding evidence all constitute prosecutorial functions. And, as we

explained above, because Petitioner’s complaint alleges malicious prosecution and civil

conspiracy based on those prosecutorial functions, the circuit court appropriately dismissed

those claims. 31

        B.      Claims against Cpl. Nazelrod

                Though Cpl. Nazelrod is not entitled to prosecutorial immunity, the circuit

court concluded that Petitioner’s claims against him for malicious prosecution, civil

conspiracy, and abuse of process fail on their merits. Examining each cause of action

pleaded by Mr. Launi, we agree for the reasons explained below.

        30
           And, even if Prosecutor James did not have jurisdiction over the prosecution, we
reiterate that the immunity analysis is functional and does not consider geographic location.
        31
          We note that the circuit court also analyzed Petitioner’s malicious prosecution
and civil conspiracy claims against Prosecutors James and Ours. Because we hold that any
claims for civil liability against the Prosecutor Respondents are barred by prosecutorial
immunity, we need not discuss whether Petitioner can succeed on the merits of those
claims.

                                             17
       1.       Malicious Prosecution

                Mr. Launi argues that the circuit court erred in finding that his claims for

malicious prosecution must fail because there was a probable cause determination. We

have held that,

                        “[i]n an action for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must
                show: (1) that the prosecution was set on foot and conducted
                to its termination, resulting in plaintiff's discharge; (2) that it
                was caused or procured by defendant; (3) that it was without
                probable cause; and (4) that it was malicious. If plaintiff fails
                to prove any of these, he cannot recover.” Radochio v. Katzen,
                92 W.Va. 340, Pt. 1 Syl. [114 S.E. 746, (1922) ].” Syl. pt. 3,
                Truman v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 146 W.Va.
                707, 123 S.E.2d 59 (1961). [32]

The third element, that the prosecution was undertaken without probable cause, is

determinative here. 33

                We begin with the presumption that probable cause underlies every criminal

prosecution:

                       The public policy favors prosecution for crimes and
                requires the protection of a person who in good faith and upon
                reasonable grounds institutes proceedings upon a criminal
                charge. The legal presumption is that every prosecution for

       32
            Syl. Pt. 2. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Higginbotham, 228 W. Va. 522, 721 S.E. 2d 541
(2011).
       33
         See Bailey v. Gollehon, 76 W. Va. 322, 85 S.E. 556 (1915) (holding that a claim
for malicious prosecution cannot lie where probable cause exists).

                                                18
                crime is founded upon probable cause and is instituted for the
                purpose of justice.[34]

To overcome that presumption, Mr. Launi argues that his complaint alleges that Cpl.

Nazelrod conspired with Prosecutors James and Ours to procure a prosecution devoid of

probable cause, and that the complaint before the magistrate signed by Cpl. Nazelrod

omitted material facts. Those omissions, he claims, evince a lack of probable cause. Mr.

Launi further argues that this Court has previously held that prima facie evidence for

existence of probable cause only attached when a grand jury issues an indictment. 35

Because there was no grand jury finding of probable cause, he argues that this Court should

not presume that there was probable cause here.

                 This latter argument mischaracterizes our case law. Although we have held

that prima facie evidence for the existence of probable cause does attach when a grand jury

issues an indictment, we have never held that this is the only method for a reviewing court

       34
            Syl. Pt. 4, McNair v. Erwin, 84 W. Va. 250, 99 S.E. 454 (1919).
       35
          See Syl. Pt. 5, Jarvis v. West Virginia State Police, 227 W. Va. 472, 711 S.E. 2d
542 (2010) (In a claim for retaliatory prosecution in which a plaintiff alleges that he or she
was criminally prosecuted in retaliation for exercising a right protected by the state or
federal constitution, a grand jury indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause for
the underlying criminal prosecution, and a plaintiff may rebut this evidence by showing
that the indictment was procured by fraud, perjury, or falsified evidence.’).

                                              19
to make a determination on whether a probable cause finding was made. And, here,

probable cause was established despite that there was no grand jury finding to that effect.

                First, a magistrate found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant for

petitioner. Under Rule 4 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, an arrest

warrant issues upon a finding of probable cause. 36 Mr. Launi maintains this is not

dispositive as that magistrate was presented with a complaint that omitted material facts.

Even so, the magistrate presiding over the case was aware of Petitioner’s allegations that

the complaint omitted material facts, 37 and still denied Petitioner’s motion for judgment of

acquittal, finding that the state had produced enough evidence of the crimes charged, such

that the jury should be permitted to determine Petitioner’s guilt or innocence. Implicit in

that denial of the motion of judgment of acquittal is a finding of probable cause. That the

jury later acquitted Petitioner is not indicative that the state lacked probable cause to

prosecute. 38   The facts here, as alleged, cannot establish a lack of probable cause that

       36
         See R. Crim. P. for Magis. Cts. Of W. Va. 4 (“If it appears from the complaint, or
from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint, that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a
warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute
it.”)
       37
         Mr. Launi moved for a judgment of acquittal based on the state’s alleged
suppression of evidence at trial.

        This is particularly evident because when the State presented its case, Ms. Hartman
       38

recanted her prior statements to law enforcement.

                                              20
would support a malicious prosecution claim. So, we hold that the circuit court did not err

in dismissing the claim against Cpl. Nazelrod for malicious prosecution.

       2.       Abuse of Process

                Petitioner also challenges the circuit court’s decision to grant Cpl. Nazelrod’s

motion to dismiss on the abuse of process claim. To establish abuse of process in West

Virginia, the Petitioner must show that Cpl. Nazelrod engaged in “the willful or malicious

misuse or misapplication of [a] lawfully issued process to accomplish some purpose not

intended or warranted by that process. 39 Further, this Court has held that in order to

establish a claim for abuse of process “there must be … an intentional and willful

perversion” of lawful process resulting in an “unlawful injury of another.” 40

                Petitioner alleges that “by seeking a DVPO on behalf of Penny Hartman …

and by other acts as set forth in the allegations of fact above, [Cpl. Nazelrod] engaged in a

willing and knowing misapplication of lawfully issued process for a purpose not intended

or warranted by that process.” Taken with the factual allegations in the remainder of his

complaint, Mr. Launi argues that by participating in a prosecution he believes was

unfounded and by instructing Penny Hartman to seek a domestic violence protective order

       39
            Wayne Cnty. Bank v. Hodges, 175 W. Va. 723, 726, 338 S.E. 2d 202, 205 (1985).
       40
            Williamson v. Harden, 214 W. Va. 77, 80, 585 S.E. 2d 369, 372 (2003).

                                               21
for the purpose of harassing him, Cpl. Nazelrod misused and misapplied lawful process to

accomplish a purpose not intended by that process under Hodges. Stated differently, Mr.

Launi’s abuse of process claim is grounded in the allegation that Cpl. Nazelrod’s

investigation was ill-intended and that he veered outside of lawful process in pursuing the

domestic violence charges against him.

                We disagree and find that Mr. Launi’s allegations, even if true, cannot make

out a claim for abuse of process because we have held that “there is no liability [for abuse

of process] where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out [a lawful] process

to its authorized conclusion.” 41 It is not alleged that Cpl. Nazelrod, in conducting his

investigation that led him to compile evidence against and file the complaint against Mr.

Launi, committed any act outside lawful process. Rather, he followed standard practices

for law enforcement officers in domestic violence cases: he informed Ms. Hartman of her

right to file for a protective order, he contacted the magistrate to inform him that Ms.

Hartman was interested in filing for a protective order, and he served Ms. Hartman with a

subpoena. As the circuit court concluded, “even if [Cpl. Nazelrod] had bad intentions, he

did nothing more than use standard process to its natural conclusion.”

                It is clear that Mr. Launi has alleged no set of facts in support of his claim

for abuse of process that could support a claim against Cpl. Nazelrod for abuse of process

       41
            Preiser v. McQueen, 177 W. Va. at 279 n.8, 352 S.E.2d at 28 n.8.

                                              22
where the allegations establish that Cpl. Nazelrod followed the standard procedures when

addressing a domestic violence complaint. So, we find that the circuit court did not err in

dismissing Mr. Launi’s claim for abuse of process.

       3.     Civil Conspiracy

              Finally, Mr. Launi argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his claims

of civil conspiracy against Cpl. Nazelrod because, first, “to the extent this Court agrees

with Petitioner’s arguments [as to malicious prosecution and abuse of process], the circuit

court’s finding on this point should also be reversed,” and second, “there are other

allegations of civil conspiracy which are not dependent on a finding by this Court as to the

sufficiency of Petitioner’s malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims.”           To

substantiate this second argument, he asserts that his complaint contains other allegations

of unlawful conduct having to do with Cpl. Nazlrod’s tampering and destruction of

evidence.

              Because we find that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Petitioner’s

claims against Prosecutors Ours and James, we also affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of

his civil conspiracy claim against Cpl. Nazelrod. We find no merit in Petitioner’s argument

that the claim for conspiracy somehow goes beyond his claims for malicious prosecution

and abuse of process. Not only is this argument newly raised on appeal, it lacks support in

                                             23
the complaint itself, in which Petitioner bases the conspiracy claim on the same allegations

as malicious prosecution.

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

              For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the August 12, 2020 orders of the

circuit court of Mineral County.

                                                                                 Affirmed.

                                            24