Court Opinion

ID: 9548737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:08:05.380531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:22.810115
License: Public Domain

LUSK, J.,
dissenting.
The plaintiff testified:
“Q Now, as-you approached the intersection of 188th and Grlisan, did you see any traffic coming the other way?
“A Yes, I did.
“Q What did you see?
“A This is coming towards me ?
“Q Yes.
“A I seen two cars coming towards me.
“Q And about how far away were they when you first saw them?
“A Oh, probably a half a block.
“Q And how- far were you from the intersection when you first saw them?
“A I was right to the intersection, almost I mean.
*371“Q Do yon know what lane of travel these cars were in?
“A Yes. One was on the inside lane. The other was in the outbound lane.
“Q And did you let those cars pass you?
“A Yes, I did.
“Q And did you look again to see if there was any traffic?
“A Yes.
“Q Did you see anything?
“A No, I did not.
“Q And about how fast were you driving at that time?
“A When I got to the intersection I had slowed down to let the two automobiles that were coming towards me pass and I turned my blinker on. I was at a walking speed when I got to the intersection and after the two cars went by I made my turn and my nose of the vehicle was just about to the curb when I was struck.
“Q Did you ever see the other car that hit you?
“A No, I did not.
“Q Now, about how fast were you traveling as you entered the intersection, or started to enter 188th?
“A A walking speed when I started making my turn 'and then I accelerated when I started into my turn like you would when you are making any turn.”
Glisan street was illuminated by mercury vapor lamps and, as the opinion of the court points out, objects were visible at a distance of 800 feet; the headlights of defendant’s car were burning; the defendant was driving at a reasonable and lawful rate of speed. The plaintiff, in making a lefthand turn had a clear duty to keep a lookout for traffic approaching the intersection from the opposite direction — always the point of obvious danger for a motorist executing such a movement. The plaintiff testified he looked, but did not see the defendant’s car. The court’s opinion appar*372ently approves the rule that a motorist “cannot ,say that he looked, but failed to see what was dearly visible, or could have been seen by the exercise of ordinary care”: 2 Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice 271-272, § 104.4 (3d ed). The same principle has been otherwise stated as follows: “[W]here there is a duty to look, a failure to observe what is plainly visible constitutes negligence even if the defendant says he looked and did not see”: Wilkins v. Stuecken, 359 Mo 1047, 1052, 225 SW2d 131. See, also, Prentiss v. Johnston, 119 Colo 370, 203 P2d 733.
The opinion of the court states: “The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s automobile may have been masked by other automobiles proceeding in the same direction.” It is not indicated whether the court accepts this argument. I would not accept it, because the evidence does not support it. The plaintiff made no such claim in his testimony, but said that he let the two cars pass him, looked again to see if there was any traffic and saw nothing. I find nothing in the testimony to justify a belief that the defendant’s car was not plainly visible to anyone in the plaintiff’s position.
The court states a number of general propositions regarding the respective duties of motorists, with which there can be no disagreement. But general propositions do not decide concrete cases, and the simple facts here are that the plaintiff made a lefthand turn in the face of oncoming traffic and failed to see the defendant’s automobile, although it was there in plain sight, and a collision resulted. In my view this was contributory negligence as a matter of law.
I dissent.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Perry and Mr. Justice Holman concur in this opinion.