Court Opinion

ID: 9691212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:16:55.872077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:13.133474
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, concurring. I agree wholeheartedly with the court’s decision to recall the mandate and reappoint the Masters; however, I write separately to address the separation-of-powers issues raised in the dissenting opinions. The separation-of-powers doctrine is set forth in Ark. Const, art. 4, §§ 1 and 2, as follows: § 1. Departments of government. The powers of the government of the State of Arkansas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of them to be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to-wit: Those which are legislative to one, those which are executive to another, and those which are judicial to another. § 2. Separation of departments. No person, or collection of persons, being one of these departments, shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. This court has recognized that judicial review of legislative action is not undertaken de novo by a trial court because that would be judicial legislating and violative of the separation-of-powers doctrine contained in Ark. Const, art. 4, § 2. City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc., 323 Ark. 332, 916 S.W.2d 95 (1996); Johnson v. Sunray Serv., Inc., 306 Ark. 497, 816 S.W.2d 582 (1991); Wenderoth v. City of Ft. Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971). However, in the 2002 Lake View decision, we rejected an argument that this court has “no role in examining school funding in light of the Arkansas Constitution.” In that opinion, this court wrote as follows: This court’s refusal to review school funding under our state constitution would be a complete abrogation of our judicial responsibility and would work a severe disservice to the people of this state. We refuse to close our eyes or turn a deaf ear to claims of a dereliction of duty in the field of education. Lake View School Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002). The court continued by noting that early on, this court announced that “[t]he people of the State, in the rightful exercise of their sovereign powers, ordained and established the constitution; and the only duty devolved upon this court is to expound and interpret it.” Id. at 54 (quoting State v. Floyd, 9 Ark. 302, 315 (1849)). We then quoted extensively from the Supreme Court of Kentucky, explicitly adopting the following language: [W]e must address a point made by the appellants with respect to our authority to enter this fray and to “stick our judicial noses” into what is argued to be strictly the General Assembly’s business. ... [In this case] we are asked — based solely on the evidence in the record before us — if the present system of common schools in Kentucky is “efficient” in the constitutional sense. It is our sworn duty, to decide such questions when they are before us by applying the constitution. The duty of the judiciary in Kentucky was so determined when the citizens of Kentucky enacted the social compact called the Constitution and in it provided for the existence of a third equal branch of government, the judiciary. To avoid deciding the case because of “legislative discretion,” “legislative function,” etc., would be a denigration of our own constitutional duty. To allow the General Assembly (or, in point of fact, the Executive) to decide whether its actions are constitutional is literally unthinkable. The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to apply, interpret, define, and construe all words, phrases, sentences and sections of the Kentucky Constitution as necessitated by the controversies before it. It is solely the function of the judiciary to so do. This duty must be exercised even when such action services as a check on the activities of another branch of government or when the court’s view of the constitution is contrary to that of other branches, or even that of the public. Lake View, 353 Ark. at 54-55 (emphasis added) (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 208-10 (Ky. 1989)) How cynical it would be for the court to don such a sweeping mantle, and then cast it aside at this juncture. If it were “not this court’s role” to interject itself into this particular fray, then we should never have done so in the first place. We accepted the role when we recalled our mandate in February of 2004, and for the dissenting justices to call upon us to reject it now, for fear of being viewed as an inappropriate “watchdog” is the height of hypocrisy. While it is certain that we cannot control the actions of the legislative branch, see Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W. 100 (1979), it nevertheless remains clear that the doctrine of separation of powers does not prevent the judicial branch from passing on the validity of legislative acts. See Riviere v. Wells, 270 Ark. 206, 604 S.W.2d 560 (1980). When, as here, we have taken upon ourselves the daunting task of ensuring compliance with our constitutional mandate for a “general, suitable, and efficient system of free public schools,” see Ark. Const, art. 14, § 1, we should not shrug off that extraordinary calling because we are suddenly afraid of how our actions might be perceived, or for some unfounded “separation of powers” concerns. In sum, if this court does not take all necessary steps to ensure that the General Assembly had complied with the clear terms of our Lake View ruling, who will? No one else has done so for twenty-two years, and it is incumbent that we do so now! Corbin and Dickey, JJ., joins this concurring opinion.