Court Opinion

ID: 9955355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 14:08:01.392937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.696893
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1860-22
                                                                   A-2152-22

J.T.,1

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

A.S.A.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
___________________________

A.S.A.,

          Defendant-Appellant,

v.

J.T.,

     Plaintiff-Respondent.
____________________________

                   Submitted March 5, 2024 – Decided March 28, 2024

                   Before Judges Mayer and Enright.

1
  We refer to the parties by initials and pseudonyms to protect their privacy and
preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(9) and (10).
              On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
              Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
              Docket Nos. FV-12-1697-23 and FV-12-1730-23.

              Einhorn, Barbarito, Frost & Botwinick, PC, attorneys
              for J.T. (Bonnie C. Frost, Matheu D. Nunn, and Jessie
              M. Mills, on the briefs).

              Jardim, Meisner & Susser, PC, attorneys for A.S.A.
              (Jessica Ragno Sprague, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

       In these consolidated appeals2 involving the Prevention of Domestic

Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, J.T. (Jane) appeals from the

dismissal of her domestic violence complaint against A.S.A. (Art) and Art

appeals from the dismissal of his domestic violence cross-complaint against

Jane. Under the idiosyncratic facts presented, we affirm the orders dismissing

the parties' temporary restraining orders (TROs) and domestic violence

complaints.

       We recite the facts from the domestic violence trial. Jane and Art married

in December 2017. The parties have one child, D.A. (Dan), born in 2019. The

parties filed for divorce in 2020. One of the hotly contested issues in the divorce

2
    We consolidated the appeals in a May 8, 2023 order.

                                                                             A-1860-22
                                        2
action involved custody of Dan. 3 The Family Part judge handling the divorce

action issued an order granting Art parenting time "in his hotel suite . . . when

[Art] is in New Jersey,"4 with parenting time exchanges to occur at Art's hotel

in Somerset.     At the time of the domestic violence trial, there had been

approximately fifty days of trial testimony in the divorce action.5

        On January 17, 2023, Jane filed for a TRO against Art alleging the

predicate act of harassment. In her domestic violence complaint, Jane stated she

arrived at Art's hotel with her father (Grandfather) on January 17 for the

scheduled parenting time exchange. According to Jane, she "briefly put [Dan]

down[,] who then walked to . . . [G]randfather to be held." Jane claimed Art

"became angry and . . . began shoving" her and Grandfather in an "attempt[] to

take [Dan]." Jane explained she "attempted to grab [Dan] from [Grandfather]

and was again shoved by [Art]." In the portion of the TRO application stating

3
   After the parties filed their appellate briefs, but before the matter was
calendared, the judge handling the divorce action entered a final judgment of
divorce (JOD). In a July 27, 2023 order, we denied Jane's motion to supplement
the record with the JOD.
4
    According to the record, Art lived and worked in California at the time.
5
  The judge who handled the domestic violence matters was not the judge who
handled the divorce action.

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                                         3
the prior history of domestic violence, Jane claimed Art yelled and cursed at her

during a prior parenting time exchange on January 12, 2023.

      Several days later, Jane amended her domestic violence complaint to

include the following prior history of domestic violence: Art threw Jane's

"items" on the floor on July 7, 2018; Art threatened to kill himself on July 8,

2018 "if [Jane] didn't do what he said"; Art threw a bowl of mangoes at Jane in

October 2018; Art pushed Jane on May 18, 2019; Art "stood outside of [Jane's]

car" and shouted on June 4, 2020; Art "stood in front of [Jane's] car" and cursed

at her on December 27, 2020; and Art "repeatedly cursed at [Jane] . . . in front

of [Dan] during their [parenting time] exchange" on December 11, 2023. Jane

also asserted: Art "regularly call[ed] [her] names in front of [Dan]"; told Dan

to "kick" her, "throw things at" her, and "hit" her; and "refer[red] to [her with]

sexually abusive language" and "antagonize[d] [her] about their sex life in front

of [Dan]."

      The day before the February 8, 2023 domestic violence trial, 6 Jane again

sought to amend her domestic violence complaint. On this occasion, she sought

to add the predicate act of assault. However, the requested amendment was not

6
  The original trial date scheduled for February 2 was adjourned at the request
of counsel for the parties.
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                                        4
processed by the court's staff in time for the trial scheduled to begin the

following day. Thus, the judge never received Jane's amended pleading. In

addition, there is no information in the record that Art received Jane's proposed

amended domestic violence complaint.

      On January 30, 2023, Art filed for a TRO against Jane, alleging the

predicate act of harassment. In his domestic violence complaint, Art explained

that immediately after the January 17 custody exchange, Dan walked to the

elevator in Art's hotel and cried out for Art. Art stated he "approached [Dan] to

console him" and Jane got between Art and Dan and "shoved [Art] with her

shoulder, causing [Art] to fall on [the] floor."

      In his domestic violence complaint, Art also provided a prior history of

domestic violence. The prior incidents related to Jane involved yelling, cursing,

and name calling.     Art also described prior incidents between himself and

members of Jane's family—specifically, Grandfather.

      On February 8, 2023, the Family Part judge held a one-day trial on the

parties' applications for the entry of final restraining orders (FROs). Because he

was in California, Art participated virtually.

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                                         5
      At the start of the trial, the judge stated he would first "hear the testimony

with regard to the predicate acts."7 He explained that he would hear testimony

regarding prior acts of domestic violence after "mak[ing] [a] determination on

the predicate acts." Neither party objected to proceeding in this manner.

      Three people testified at trial. Jane, Art, and a Franklin Township police

officer hired by Jane to work off-duty as "security detail for the [parenting time]

exchange" on January 17, 2023.

      During his testimony, the officer described the events he observed during

the January 17 parenting time exchange. According to the officer, the child ran

to Jane, but got "upset because he want[ed] to get on the elevator." When Jane

attempted to prevent her son from going on the elevator, the officer explained

Jane and Grandfather "got closer to [Art]," who was "standing in front of the

elevator." Art told Grandfather to back away or Art would call the police. Even

though the officer was a member of the police force in Franklin where the hotel

is located, the officer did not identify himself or intercede at that point. The

officer saw Jane pick up the child and walk toward the exit of the hotel.

7
  Harassment was the only predicate act asserted in the parties' timely filed
domestic violence complaints.
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                                         6
According to the officer, Art repeatedly shouted "[T]his is my lobby" and "I'm

going to call the police."

      The officer explained that, instead of exiting the hotel, Jane and

Grandfather "for some reason . . . just stop[ped]" and stared at Art. Although

the officer testified Dan ran toward Grandfather, the video introduced as

evidence during the trial showed Jane handing the child to Grandfather.

      According to the officer, Art "bum-rush[ed]" Grandfather and "push[ed]

him" while attempting to grab Dan from Grandfather. The officer described

Jane as getting "in the middle of it" and "g[ot] pushed as well." At that point,

the officer "intervene[d] and separate[d] everybody."

      Then, Jane testified regarding the parenting time exchange on January 17,

2023. According to Jane, after Grandfather took Dan from her in the hotel lobby,

Art shouted that he, not Grandfather, was Dan's father. According to Jane, Art

lunged at Jane and Grandfather, pushing and shoving them. Jane testified Art

"grabbed [Grandfather ] with . . . one arm," "grabbed . . . [her with] another

arm," and shoved the two away from the hotel exit and back toward the hotel

lobby. Jane explained Art "squeezed [her] in between" him and Grandfather,

causing her to lose her balance and "practically fall[] down." Jane also testified

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                                        7
Art "struck [her] on [her] chest" and "grabb[ed] and pull[ed] her," causing injury

to her chest and shoulder.

       On cross-examination, Jane conceded she knew there were "issues when

[Grandfather] and [Art] [we]re both at the dropoff" during parenting time

exchanges.      Jane also admitted Art filed motions in the divorce action to

preclude Grandfather from accompanying Jane to parenting time exchanges.

       At trial, Jane introduced a January 17, 2023 video recording from the

hotel's surveillance camera.8 The trial judge admitted the video recording as

evidence and considered the video as part of his decision on the parties' domestic

violence complaints. We describe the events captured on the video recording in

detail because the recording presented an untainted and unbiased depiction of

the parenting time exchange on January 17.

       In the video recording, Jane and Grandfather entered the hotel lobby. Art

approached Jane and Grandfather and placed a white plastic bag on the ground.

Dan moved toward Jane and Grandfather and dragged them in the direction of

Art, who stood in front of the elevator. Dan appeared to want to play on or near

the elevator.

8
    The video recording had no accompanying audio.
                                                                            A-1860-22
                                        8
       Jane then lifted Dan and carried him toward the hotel's exit doors. Before

exiting the hotel, Jane stopped and faced Art. Art stepped toward Jane, Dan,

and Grandfather, and took out his cellphone. Jane continued to hold Dan. Dan

reached for Grandfather, who took Dan from Jane.

       Art moved toward Grandfather but Jane inserted herself between the two

men.    Art grabbed Grandfather's arm.      Jane grabbed Art's arm.    All three

stumbled several steps.     At this point in the video recording, the officer

interceded and separated Art, Jane, and Grandfather.

       Jane also presented an audio recording of the January 17 parenting time

exchange. Grandfather made the recording on his cellphone. Portions of the

audio recording were garbled.

       In the audio recording, Dan greeted Grandfather. Dan next said, "Come

here" and "Let's go." Jane asked where Dan wanted to go, and Dan stated he

wanted to go to the elevator. Art said, "Do not come near me," "Please go," and

"Do not come near me anymore." Dan started crying.

       The audio recording captured Art telling Jane and Grandfather to "get out"

and exclaiming Dan is his son. Several raised voices are heard. The officer then

identified himself as "police," stated he saw the entire incident, and asked Art

to sit down.

                                                                           A-1860-22
                                        9
         Art also testified at trial. During his testimony, Art explained he became

upset during parenting time exchanges because Dan referred to Grandfather as

"Daddy." Art further stated he was scared and afraid of Grandfather. Art

testified he repeatedly asked Jane to keep Grandfather outside the hotel lobby

during parenting time exchanges.

         Although Art testified Jane shoved him to the floor, the hotel's

surveillance video showed otherwise.

         Jane's attorney sought to play the hotel's surveillance footage during

cross-examination of Art.         However, counsel had not made any prior

arrangement with the court to share the video evidence despite knowing Art was

appearing virtually at trial. The judge advised Art would be unable to see the

video because counsel had not made arrangements with the court's technical

staff. Jane's attorney did not request an adjournment to make the necessary

arrangements for Art to see the hotel's surveillance video. Understanding Art

was unable to see the video, the judge explained he saw the video and would

make "the final determinations" based on his review of that evidence. Even

though Jane's attorney was unable to show the hotel's surveillance video to Art,

her counsel cross-examined Art regarding Jane purportedly pushing him to the

floor.

                                                                             A-1860-22
                                         10
      Art also testified he called 9-1-1 on January 17 because he was "scared

for [his] safety and [Dan's] safety."       Art claimed he approached Jane and

Grandfather because Dan "called" to him, and Art wanted to "pacify" his son.

Art testified he "had zero intentions [to] go near [Jane] or [Grandfather]."

      Following the testimony, the judge entered a February 8, 2023 order

vacating both parties' TROs and dismissing both parties' domestic violence

complaints. In his statement of reasons placed on the record, the judge declined

to find "a predicate act by either party demonstrating that the other party ha[d]

committed harassment." The judge explained:

                   We have a version of what transpired by [Jane]
            as being different from the version of what
            transpired . . . according to [Art]. [Jane] says that
            during this interaction . . . she was hit in the chest, in
            the back. Of course[,] there's no . . . action for assault
            that's listed in her complaint for domestic violence, nor
            is there any mention at all about being struck in the
            chest or the back area. In addition, we have [Jane],
            when being asked, well, you were aware that
            [Grandfather] being present was an issue—and an
            extremely long pause on her part before . . . admitting
            that it did.
                   I find that [Jane]'s testimony also at point[s] in
            time[] . . . was rambling and unresponsive to questions.
            The fact that she hire[d] a[n] . . . out-of-uniform officer
            for the exchange . . . and ha[d] her father present belies
            the fact of a fear of her husband. And I don't find her
            testimony to be credible on the issue of being able to
            establish that there was harassment committed upon her
            by [Art], in large part [because] there is also a

                                                                               A-1860-22
                                       11
             requirement that . . . the harassment [be] done with the
             purpose . . . to harass another.
                    The video shows the following. There's a
             dropoff. The child goes to [Jane].
                    And does [Art] go back to his hotel room? No.
             He goes in the opposite direction, toward[] . . . an
             elevator.
                    [Jane] has the child. Does she leave? No. She
             doesn't leave. She stays there.
                    And then [Grandfather]'s there as well . . .
             recording this, which speaks volumes of the intent . . .
             of [Jane] trying to get some information, perhaps, to be
             able to use . . . against her husband.
                    [W]e have the credibility of [Art], which goes
             completely out the window when his complaint for
             domestic violence says that . . . [Jane] shoved him with
             her shoulder, causing him to fall to the floor. It never
             happened. . . . And so I don't find [Art] to be a credible
             witness either so that I don't find that he has been able
             to demonstrate that there was harassment on the part of
             [Jane] . . . .
                    What we have and clear to the [c]ourt is a Peranio
             v. Peranio [9] issue of domestic contretemps between
             these parties . . . .

Because he determined Jane and Art lacked credibility, the judge found

"[n]either party [could] obtain[] a final restraining order on harassment because

neither party ha[d] proven harassment."

       After Jane appealed, the judge issued a seven-page, single spaced, March

21, 2023 amplification of decision pursuant to Rule 2:5-1, supplementing his

9
    280 N.J. Super. 47 (App. Div. 1999).
                                                                           A-1860-22
                                        12
February 8, 2023 oral statement of reasons. In explaining his decision to forego

further testimony regarding the parties' prior history of domestic violence , the

judge wrote:

            As both parties failed to establish the presence of a
            defined predicate act [of harassment] through their
            [c]omplaints or testimony, this [c]ourt found it
            unnecessary to hear testimony on any prior acts of
            domestic violence. The parties were informed at the
            outset that the focus of the trial was going to be the
            predicate acts. Neither counsel objected to that
            directive.    The [c]ourt has recently witnessed a
            movement by some litigants and attorneys to attempt to
            bootstrap a finding of [a] predicate act by relying
            heavily upon prior acts of domestic violence. This
            often follows a pattern of filing amendments to the
            Temporary Restraining Order and including a whole
            host of prior events going back over several years.
            Courts have a duty to promote efficiency and judicial
            economy. . . . Allowing testimony of the parties'
            extensive prior history would take time and would be
            counterproductive when the first element of [N.J.S.A.]
            2C:25-17 had not been met.

      The judge also explained "both parties were not credible for different

reasons." The judge found "[Jane] added verbal testimony that was not included

in her written [c]omplaint, while [Art] blatantly contradicted what was in his

[c]ross-[c]omplaint with verbal testimony."      After reiterating the statutory

requirements for proving harassment, the judge stated Jane "did not provide

                                                                           A-1860-22
                                      13
testimony establishing that [Art] committed harassment, let alone had the

required purpose to harass her."

      Additionally, the judge addressed Jane's allegation of disparate treatment

by the judge during the trial. The judge allowed Art to appear at trial virtually

because he lived in California. On the other hand, because Jane lived in New

Jersey, the judge explained there was "no compelling reason as to why she could

not appear in person, nor did she ask to appear virtually." Regarding periodic

instructions to Jane's attorney to move on during direct examination of Jane, the

judge explained he did so "when [Jane] began to monologue unnecessarily,

straying from the answer to the question asked."

      Further, the judge disputed Jane's claim he "ruled that there was no need

to cross[-]examine [Art] on the video" from the hotel. The judge explained:

            [Art] was testifying on cross-examination to facts that
            were in direct contradiction to what was shown on the
            video . . . during [Jane]'s testimony. The video was
            shown on [Jane]'s attorney['s] laptop. Counsel wanted
            to show the video to [Art] by holding it up to the Zoom
            camera in the courtroom. The [c]ourt indicated that
            [Art] would not be able to see the video that way.
            [Jane]'s attorney wanted some other way to show the
            video, which the courtroom was unable to [support] at
            that time. . . . Had [Jane's attorney] notified the [c]ourt
            before the trial date that he wanted the ability to share
            his screen, arrangements could have been made to have
            his laptop connected on Zoom with [Art]. The [c]ourt
            never said there "was no need to cross[-]examine [Art]

                                                                           A-1860-22
                                       14
            on the video." Rather[,] it was said by the [c]ourt that[]
            "[Art] won't be able to see the video . . . [but the court]
            was able to see the video[,] and [the court would] be the
            one making a final determination."

      In his written amplification, the judge reiterated:

            both parties failed to describe predicate acts that
            align[ed] with the statutory definition of harassment.
            As such, there was no need for the [c]ourt to continue
            on to an analysis of the second prong of the Silver test.
            This in addition to issues of credibility demonstrated by
            both parties led to the [c]ourt's decision to deny [f]inal
            [r]estraining [o]rders and instead dismiss both the
            [c]omplaint and [c]ross-complaint.

      On appeal, Jane and Art contend the judge erred in precluding testimony

regarding the prior history of domestic violence. Jane additionally argues she

submitted sufficient proofs to support a finding of the predicate act of

harassment, and the judge treated the parties differently during the trial. In his

appeal, Art asserts his TRO should be reinstated and his domestic violence

complaint be remanded to the Family Part if Jane's TRO is reinstated and her

domestic violence complaint is remanded. We reject both parties' arguments.

      Our review of a Family Part judge's decision is limited. Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). A Family Part judge's findings should be affirmed if

supported by "adequate, substantial, [and] credible evidence." Id. at 411-12

                                                                            A-1860-22
                                       15
(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974)).

      We accord deference to Family Part judge's when the evidence is "largely

testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Id. at 412. "[B]ecause it has

the opportunity to make first-hand credibility determinations about the witnesses

who appear on the stand[,] [the trial court] has a 'feel of the case' that can never

be realized by a review of the cold record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs.

v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).

      We may reject the Family Part judge's findings only if "we are convinced

that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,

relevant, and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."

R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 218 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Cesare, 154

N.J. at 412). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

deference" and are reviewed de novo. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190,

194 (App. Div. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v.

Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

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                                        16
      The purpose of the PDVA is to "'assure the victims of domestic violence

the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.'" G.M. v. C.V., 453

N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492,

504 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. The PDVA is "intended to

address matters of consequence, not ordinary domestic contretemps." Peranio,

280 N.J. Super. at 57.

      A party seeking protection under the PDVA must prove the allegations in

the domestic violence complaint by a preponderance of the evidence. N.J.S.A.

2C:25-29(a). Among the factors to be considered under the PDVA, judges "shall

consider . . . [t]he previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff

and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse." N.J.S.A.

2C:25-29(a)(1).

      When a Family Part judge considers whether the entry of an FRO is

appropriate, the judge must first "determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by

a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J.

Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 2006). The judge should construe any such acts in

light of the parties' history to better understand the totality of the circumstances

of the relationship and give context to otherwise ambiguous behavior. See J.D.

                                                                              A-1860-22
                                        17
v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 479 (2011). Not every bothersome, offensive, or rude

behavior rises to the level of domestic violence. Id. at 483. Accordingly,

Family Part judges "have been specially trained to detect the difference between

domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between couples, and

. . . [because of that expertise,] their findings are entitled to deference." Id. at

482. "In performing that function, 'the [PDVA] does require that acts claimed

by            a           plaintiff            to           be            domestic

violence . . . be evaluated in light of the previous history of violence between

the parties.'" Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-26 (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402).

      Second, the judge must determine "whether a restraining order is

necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25 -

29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)](6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to

prevent further abuse." Id. at 127.

      Here, the judge did not consider the parties' prior history of domestic

violence in evaluating the evidence of harassment. However, counsel for the

parties failed to object to the judge's statement that he would first hear testimony

on the predicate act and, if either party proved a predicate act, would then

consider evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence. Because counsel did

not object, we review for plain error under Rule 2:10-2. Under the plain error

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                                        18
standard, we will reverse only if the error is "of such a nature as to have been

clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R.G., 449 N.J. Super. at 220

(quoting State v. Green, 447 N.J. Super. 317, 325 (App. Div. 2016)).

      In her domestic violence complaint, Jane alleged Art's conduct constituted

harassment. Harassment is defined as follows:

            [A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense
            if, with purpose to harass another, he:

            a. Makes, or causes to be made, one or more
            communications anonymously or at extremely
            inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language,
            or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

            b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or
            other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

            c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or
            of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or
            seriously annoy such other person.

            [N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.]

      Having reviewed the record, even if the judge considered the prior history

of domestic violence, we are satisfied the prior incidents identified in Jane's

domestic violence complaint could not support a finding of harassment under

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. None of the prior incidents stated in Jane's domestic violence

complaint established Art's purpose to harass, as required under the statute. Nor

did any of the prior incidents evidence that Art engaged in any conduct

                                                                           A-1860-22
                                      19
prohibited by the harassment statute. Jane's complaint was devoid of evidence

of communications that would have satisfied N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). In addition,

there was no proof Art offensively touched Jane consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:33-

4(b). Further, none of the prior incidents in Jane's domestic violence complaint

bore any relevance to harassing conduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). Although

the judge erred in excluding testimony regarding the parties' history of domestic

violence, there was no plain error in his decision to do so under these specific

facts.

         Similarly, we are satisfied none of the prior domestic violence incidents

alleged in Jane's complaint established Art acted with the purpose to harass her

on January 17, 2023. Not a single prior incident supported Jane's assertion that

Art's conduct on January 17, purportedly pushing Grandfather to remove Dan

from Grandfather's arms, was done with the purpose to harass Jane.

         As we previously describe, the record is devoid of any credible evidence

that Art struck, kicked, shoved, or offensively touched Jane on January 17

consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(b). While Jane alleged Art "shoved" her, the

judge found Jane's testimony not credible and belied by the hotel's surveillance

video.

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                                        20
      We defer to the judge's credibility determinations and his factual findings

based on the trial testimony and the hotel's surveillance video admitted as

evidence during the trial. See State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374-81 (2017) (stating

the deferential and limited scope of appellate review of factual findings based

on video evidence). The judge watched the hotel's surveillance video footage

and concluded Art never shoved Jane. Rather, the undisputed video evidence

showed Art rush toward Grandfather and Jane deliberately positioned her body

between Art and Grandfather. The video evidence also corroborated the officer's

trial testimony that Jane purposely inserted herself between Art and Grandfather.

      The hotel surveillance video was clear, and the events depicted in the

video were unequivocal. As such, the judge did not require the parties' alleged

history of domestic violence to determine whether Art's conduct on January 17

constituted harassment.

      Under the idiosyncratic facts in this matter, we discern no basis to question

the judge's credibility determinations. Based on the parties' testimony and other

trial evidence, no reasonable factfinder could conclude either party committed a

predicate act of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 on January 17, 2023.

Applying the plain error standard under Rule 2:10-2, the judge's decision to

proceed in this manner did not produce an unjust result.

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                                       21
      To the extent we have not addressed any of the parties' remaining

arguments, we are satisfied such arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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