Court Opinion

ID: 9773332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:42:27.021922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:52.254608
License: Public Domain

Conley Byrd, Justice, dissenting. As I read the majority opinion, it must stand or fall upon the majority’s assertion that “The Workmen’s Compensation Commission is an administrative agency which exercises some quasi-judicial functions and makes awards which are considered judgments.” Since I do not understand how this statement can stand under what I consider to be the clear language of Amendment No. 26, I am setting forth the pertinent language of the Amendment with my emphasis as follows: “The General Assembly shall have power ... to provide the means, methods, and FORUM FOR ADJUDICATING CLAIMS arising under said laws, and for securing payment of same. . . .” Now if we ignore for the moment the positional phrase “FOR ADJUDICATING CLAIMS ARISING UNDER SAID LAWS” and concentrate on the word “FORUM” we find it defined by all of the authorities as follows: Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 2d Ed.: “A Court; a tribunal; a jurisdiction; a place where justice is administered; the place of jurisdiction.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.: “A court of justice; or judicial tribunal; a place of jurisdiction; a place where a remedy is sought; a place of litigation.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. (Unabridged): “Tribunal; court; a judicial body or assembly.” Thus we see that whether we consult legal dictionaries or dictionaries used by just plain ordinary people, the noun “FORUM” is defined as “A court of justice.” When we look at the prepositional phrase “FOR ADJUDICATING CLAIMS” we note that it is used as an adjective to modify the noun “FORUM” to denote a quality — i.e. to denote that the “FORUM” is to adjudicate the claims arising under the Workmen’s Compensation laws that the General Assembly is empowered to enact. To give emphasis to the pertinent language of Amendment No. 26 which we are here construing, I again quote fromAmendment No. 26 as follows: “The General Assembly shall have power ... to provide the . . . FORUM FOR ADJUDICATING CLAIMS arising under said laws, and for securing payment of same. ...” By substituting the definition of the word “FORUM” taken from the dictionaries, supra, we find that Amendment No. 26 would then read: “The General Assembly shall have power ... to provide the . . . [COURT OF JUSTICE] FOR ADJUDICATING CLAIMS arising under said laws Now, since l am unable to see the position of the majority, and if they are still of the view that my construction of Amendment No. 26 is overly simple and wrong, I trust that the majority will take the time to demonstrate to the citizens of this State, not as simple as I, why my construction of the Amendment is not acceptable. It must be remembered that a number of ordinary people like myself voted for the adoption of Amendment No. 26. Under the Arkansas Constitution Art. 7 § 4, it is provided: “The Supreme Court, except in cases otherwise provided by this Constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only . . . under such restrictions as may from time to time be prescribed by law. . . .” The review which is provided for in Ark. Acts 1975, No. 1227, here involved, does not substantially differ from the appellate review that we have already been applying to Workmen’s Compensation cases. Neither do I interpret the majority opinion as holding that the Act, supra, requires us to exercise anything other than appellate jurisdiction. An example of the restrictive type of construction which the majority is giving to the term “FORUM FOR ADJUDICATING CLAIMS’” can be seen by its reasoning “The Commission cannot enforce its own orders.” I have only to point out that the General Assembly was given plenary power to provide for the payment of said claims — i.e. “The General Assembly shall have power ... to provide the means, methods ... for securing payment of same. ” From that Constitutional authority the General Assembly could have provided that an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission would have constituted a judgment lien against the property of the employer. Fortunately for the security of financial transactions, the General Assembly only provided that such an order would only become a lien when it was filed in the circuit clerk’s office — otherwise every abstractor in the state would have been required to keep a complete list of the more than 65,000 claims disposed of by the Commission each year.1_ Why do I challenge the majority to explain that my sin-pie approach to the construction of Amendment No. 26 is wrong? The reason is that under the appellate procedure adopted for appeals from the Commission prior to Act 1227, an injured workman whose claim is denied by the Commission and the dependents of the workman must languish on welfare while his appeal makes its way through the courts to a final determination. Likewise, when the Commission awards the claimant compensation, the awards are held in abeyance while the employer takes his appeal through the courts. Now, obviously, it would be unjust to deny a right of appeal or to force an employer to make payments while his appeal is pending — consequently, some delay in the appellate process is inevitable. However, the public became aware that some of the Workmen’s Compensation appeals were being unduly delayed in the circuit courts — in some cases for periods in excess of two years. To avoid this unnecessary delay, the General Assembly by Act 501 of 1967 provided that when an appeal from the Commission was held by the circuit court for a period in excess of 60 days “the order or award of the Commission shall be deemed to be affirmed by law and the [circuit] court shall enter its order to that effect.” In Sands v. Albert Pike Motor Hotel, 245 Ark. 755, 434 S.W. 2d 288 (1968), we held Act 501 of 1967 unconstitutional as a legislative encroachment upon the powers of the judiciary. Notwithstanding some rather strong language in the Sands case stressing that due diligence should be given to the handling of Workmen’s Compensation appeals, the General Assembly has again by Act 1227, supra, thought it necessary to expedite the final determination of appeals in Workmen’s Compensation cases. I sincerely suggest that it is to those injured workmen and their dependents who must settle for welfare handouts and mortgage their homes to pay accruing medical bills while their appeals are stalled in the circuit courts, that the majority owe an explanation of why their representatives in the General Assembly cannot give them any relief from such onerous delays. To take the concurring view, the second sentence of Amendment No. 26 must be treated as complete surplusage. If the Workmen’s Compensation Commission is only an administrative tribunal on the same level of the “State Medical Board,” “Public Service Commission” or the “Employment Security Division,” then those who drafted Amendment No. 26 should have quit after providing: “The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws prescribing the amount of compensation to be paid by employers for injuries to or death of employees, and to whom said payment shall be made.” However, the people did not stop at that point with the powers given the General Assembly, but went further and provided: “It [The General Assembly] shall have power to provide the means, methods, and FORUM for adjudicating claims arising under said laws, and for securing payment of same.” The Constitution does not even mention the “State Medical Board,” the “Employment Security Division” or the “Public Service Commission,” all of which are set up under the general powers delegated to the General Assembly. Even Art. 17 § 10, with respect to railroads, only provides: “7’he General Assembly . . . shall provide for the creation of such offices and commissions and VES7' in them such authority as shall be necessary to carry into effect the powers hereby conferred.” It no where uses the language found in Amendment No. 26, supra. In reading the concurring views, one would believe that all of the authorities are contrary to my views. However, the cases of Baggett Transportation Co. v. Barnes, 108 Ga. App. 68, 132 S.E. 2d 229 (1963) and Mulhearn v. Federal Shipbuilding in Dry Dock Co., 2 N.J. 356, 66 A. 2d 726 (1949), do not involve a constitutional provision containing language anything like Amendment No. 26. It looks to me that the majority in construing Amendment No. 26 has approached it in much the same manner that Naaman, the leper, in seeking relief from his malady approached the prophet Elisha, II Kings, Ch. 5 — i.e. they were looking for something prestigious and complicated. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.   A similar problem arose with judgments in the Federal Courts and by Federal and State Law those judgments only become a lien when tiled in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1962 and Ark. Stat. Ann. § 29-130 (Repl. 1962).