Court Opinion

ID: 9856824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:59:36.917362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:47.568389
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The convictions should be reversed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2132(a). That statute requires the trial court to instruct the jury on “all matters of law necessary for their information.” In my view, the common law defense of necessity was a matter of law necessary for the fair resolution of the cause by the jury.
Not wishing to rain on the majority’s parade of horribles, it nevertheless must be noted that their claim that “[t]he defendant’s argument would mandate the trial court to instruct the jury upon any defense theory possible” is a distortion of the appellant's argument. Eastman’s argument would only require the trial court to instruct the jury on any defenses necessary for the jury’s information. The district court would not have to instruct the jury on theoretical defenses unsupported by any evidence; such are not necessary for the jury’s information.
Notwithstanding the majority’s protest to the contrary, there is ample authority to support Eastman’s position. This Court has long recognized that it is “the duty of the court in criminal actions to give to the jury instructions on the general principles of law pertaining to the case at trial.” State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 77, 88 P.2d 493, 497 (1939), quoting People v. Curran, 24 Cal.App.2d 673, 75 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Cal.1938). Ironically, State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 275, 506 P.2d 1340, 1348 (1973), a case cited by the majority, lends further support to Eastman’s position. There, we interpreted I.C. § 19-21322 as follows:
This provision requires that the trial court give, on its own motion, pertinent instructions by which the jury may be correctly informed with respect to the nature and elements of the crime charged and to the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been admitted. (Emphasis in original.)
We also said in Beason that “[t]he court should instruct the jury upon every material question upon which there is evidence deserving consideration.” 95 Idaho at 276, 506 P.2d at 1349. As it is undisputed in this case that the defense of necessity was “applicable to the evidence that [was] admitted” and therefore “deserving [of] consideration,” it is impossible to see how the majority can conclude that I.C. § 19-2132(a), as interpreted in Beason, does not require reversal.
Requiring the court to instruct on all defenses necessary for the jury’s information would not place an undue burden upon the trial court. Unlike the majority, I have the highest confidence in the trial judges of this state and I am sure that they are all aware of the applicable defenses to criminal charges. The Legislature apparently shares my confidence that the trial judges will know when the jury will need an instruction setting forth a particular defense and accordingly required the district court to instruct on all matters of law necessary to fairly resolve the case. This obligation *92necessarily includes applicable defenses to the charge, not just the prosecution’s theory of the case as the majority would have us believe.
Moreover, most defenses do not need specific instructions. The most common ones — “it wasn’t me” and “what I did wasn’t a crime” — are usually adequately covered by the standard instructions setting forth the elements of the crime. On the whole, only affirmative defenses will need specific instructions and the number of affirmative defenses in a criminal case which go to the jury are few (e.g. entrapment, duress, self-defense, defense of others or property, necessity).
The majority’s reliance on the analysis found in State v. Boyenger, 95 Idaho 396, 509 P.2d 1317 (1973), is utterly misplaced. Our statement there, at 95 Idaho 399 and 509 P.2d 1320, that the district court was not required to sua sponte instruct the jury as to lesser-included offenses was based upon the “recognition] that a defendant as a trial tactic may not desire any instructions regarding lesser included offenses____” That logic is inapplicable to this case. While a defendant might choose to forego an opportunity to be convicted of a lesser included offense in order to roll the dice in the hope that the jury might acquit him/her on the greater charge, there is absolutely no tactical reason why a defendant would not desire an opportunity for acquittal on the basis of necessity. A review of the record here shows that defense counsel’s trial theory was based upon the necessity defense. Thus, the deference we showed in Boyenger to the defendant’s choice of trial tactics has no application here.
Eastman’s reading of subsection (a) is also supported by the amended language of subsection (b)(1) which requires the court to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses only if “[e]ither party requests such an instruction____”3 If the Legislature had intended subsection (a) to place the burden upon defense counsel to propose instructions on all affirmative defenses necessary for the jury’s information, it would have said so explicitly as it did in subsection (b)(1). It did not and accordingly one can only conclude the Legislature intended to put the burden of completely instructing the jury on the court, with the singular exception of lesser included offenses.
In sum, the evidence supports the giving of a necessity defense instruction — that is, the appellant’s testimony, if believed, would entitle her to an acquittal. Thus, it clearly appears that the defense of necessity was an essential legal principle upon which the jury should have been instructed. State v. Beason, 95 Idaho at 275, 506 P.2d at 1349. Given our long history of requiring the district court to instruct the jury on all essential legal principles, State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho at 77, 88 P.2d at 497, I dissent from the majority’s ruling to the contrary.

. Prior to 1977, I.C. § 19-2132 was identical to today’s I.C. § 19-2132(a). In 1977, the Legislature amended the statute by designating the old statute as subsection (a) and adding a subsection (b). Act of March 28, 1977, 1977 Idaho Laws ch. 154, § 7 pg. 395.

. In 1988 the Legislature amended I.C. § 19-2132(b) to require the court to instruct the jury upon lesser included instructions only if "[e]ither party requests such an instruction----” Act of April 6, 1988, 1988 Idaho Laws ch. 328, pg. 989-990. From 1977 to 1988, the statute stated the court "shall instruct the jury on lesser included offenses when they are supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.”