Court Opinion

ID: 9868880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:03:09.442937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:56.704751
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The motion states that our construction of Art. 5539a “is not only contrary to the ordinary and accepted meaning of the words used in the statute, but is also contrary to the construction that has been placed upon the statute in previous decisions.”
In support of the latter statement three of the four cases listed in our original opinion (Binge v. Gulf; Chalmers v. American; Garrett v. Hartford) are cited. In view of the statement we will briefly review these cases.
In the Binge case the suit had been filed in 93rd district court for $500 plus interest. It was later voluntarily dismissed and another suit on the same claim was filed in the 92nd district court within 60 days after dismissal. Each of these courts manifestly had jurisdiction, and the dismissal from the 93rd being voluntary and not for want of jurisdiction, it was plain that limitation was not tolled by its pendency under the Article.
In the Chalmers case the two suits were filed in the same court. The first was dismissed for improper joinder of parties and causes of action, the issue being raised by plea in abatement. The decision appears to be in conflict with the earlier case of Wood v. Dittmar, where the dismissal was of a cross-action on account of improper joinder. However that may be, and regardless of one’s views as to which decision is correct, there is a clear distinction between dismissal for improper joinder in the same suit of parties or causes of action and dismissal upon declination to take jurisdiction because another court for reasons of comity or otherwise is the appropriate tribunal; the distinction being between the manner in which suit was brought in a proper court, on the one hand, and the court (an improper one) in which the suit was brought, on the other. In neither of the two cited cases was writ of error applied for; and the question they present can hardly arise again, since under Rule 41, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal may be avoided by severance in improper joinder cases.
The Garrett case is clearly not in point here. That was a suit to set aside an order of the Industrial Accident Board, the time limit for filing which was 20 days after notice of appeal from the Board’s order. The first suit was for an amount in excess of $3,000, and was removed to the federal court upon application of defendant on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit in the federal court, and refiled it in the state court within 60 days after dismissal for an amount below $3,000, for the manifest purpose of defeating federal court jurisdiction. The federal court evidently had jurisdiction of the original suit, otherwise the proper procedure was to move to remand to the state court.
Appellants have also cited Fielder v. Hansborough, 195 Ky. 574, 242 S.W. 832, 833. That was a damage suit for false arrest occurring June 27, 1918, as to which a one-year limitation statute applied. Two suits were filed, one on June 9, 1919, in J. circuit court, and the other on June 10, 1919, in S. circuit court. The S. court had jurisdiction and after issue was joined on the merits in that court, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit October 9, 1919. The J. court suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction November 15, 1919. A third suit was filed in the F. circuit court December 9, 1919. In construing the Kentucky statute, somewhat differently worded than our own, the court held: “* * * if it is made to appear, as in this case, that the litigant has already proceeded in the proper court, and of his own motion has dismissed the suit after the action was barred by limitation, the statute does not apply, and the bar is complete, although another action in another court was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.) The point is made that the same principle applies here, where suit was first brought in the state court and voluntarily dismissed, and a second suit brought in the federal court. As stated the Kentucky statute is differently worded than ours, which may call for a different construction. An inquiry into that question we regard as unimportant here. The two statutes do have the same general objective, that is, to toll limitation during the .period of pendency of a suit brought in good faith in the wrong court. Independently of the wording differences of the two statutes, there are two essential factual differences in the two cases: (1) in the Kentucky case the first *317two suits were brought practically simultaneously and remained on the docket until long after expiration of the limitation period, when the suit which had been brought in a proper court was voluntarily dismissed after issue joined upon the merits; whereas the state court suit here was dis-mitted shortly after its institution (in fact premature) and before resort to the federal court; (2) the state court suit here involved only a part (if any) of the cause of action (the order granting one well) involved in the federal court suit (the later order granting all four wells) ; whereas all the suits in the Kentucky case involved the same subject matter.
But aside from the effect of applying the reasoning in the Kentucky decision to the Texas statute and case at bar, we are clear in the view that the filing and voluntary dismissal of the state court suit could have no bearing upon the case other than upon the issue of bona fides in bringing the federal court suit, an issue which under Art. 5539a must be raised by plea in abatement, a feature not present in the Kentucky statute. The factual situation here was this: Original application to the Commission for 4 wells filed 7/22/38; denied 9/2/38; new application filed 1/9/39; granted as to No. 2 well, denied as to other three 3/25/39; suit in state court to set aside said order filed 4/25/39; temporary injunction denied 4/26/39; meantime both Burford (4/5/39) and Sun (4/6/39) had filed motions for rehearing with the Commission; both motions granted 4/29/39; 6/2/39 Burford granted permit to drill all four wells; 6/22/39 Sun filed rehearing motion with Commission, which was denied 7/10/39; state suit voluntarily dismissed and federal suit filed 7/20/39. It will be noted that when the state suit was filed there were then pending before the Commission motions for rehearing by both the Sun and Burford, which motions were later granted and a later order entered granting permit for four wells. The state suit was therefore prematurely brought; and would have to be rebrought either by amendment or by filing a new suit so as to cover the order of June 2, 1939. From the date of the rehearing order (4/29/39) until 7/10/39 there was no effective order granting any permit to drill any well. The 6/2/39 order granted permit to drill all four wells, and was the only effective order in the premises. In this situation the Sun and Magnolia followed the procedure of dismissing the pending suit which related only to an order which had been set aside, and filed a new suit, this time in the federal court, which was the first suit filed1 contesting the 6/2/39 order, no suit thereon having ever been filed in the state court other than the instant suit. Under these circumstances it seems plain that there was no prior suit filed in the state court involving the same subject matter as the instant suit; the inclusion of the superseded order granting one well being mere surplusage. But even had there been we think clearly the result would have been the same, absent a showing under plea in abatement that the federal court suit “filing” was “in intentional disregard of jurisdiction.” Under our practice no deleterious consequences attach to the mere filing and dismissal of a suit, other than the payment of costs.
As to the first above-quoted statement in the motion — that our interpretation is “contrary to the ordinary and accepted meaning of the words used in the statute” — our views thereon are quite elaborately expressed in the original opinion. There is, however, one phase of the subject that was not therein directly touched upon.
As therein stated, in so far as concerns state law questions, the FDC suit was modeled along the same lines as Rule 37 cases in the state courts under Art. 6049c, § 8, that section being expressly invoked, and violation of our conservation laws being alleged. The relief sought (besides injunction) was cancellation of the orders and denial of the right to drill thereunder. It has been repeatedly held that the gist of the cause of action created by Art. 6049c, § 8, is the judicial' determination of the validity of the order involved (see Corzelius v. Harrell, Tex.Civ. App., 179 S.W.2d 419, 426) and “that in-junctive relief is merely an enforcement remedy ancillary to a judgment cancelling an order of the Commission.” Allen v. Gulf Oil Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 139 S.W.2d 207, error refused. Under our practice, if for any reason the equitable injunctive reliéf should not be deemed appropriate in a given case, the court’s jurisdiction to determine the validity of the order and cancel it would be in nowise affected. In event of cancellation further production under the order would be illegal, and a variety of enforcement measures could be resorted to other than injunction. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following *318section 723c, effective September 1, 1938, prescribing one form of civil action applicable to both law and equity cases, we apprehend that so far as procedure is concerned there is no essential difference between the federal and Texas courts in the particular here involved; and that a suit in the former seeking relief both at law and in equity would not be dismissed solely because the right to the sought equitable relief should fail. This consideration adds another difficulty in arriving • at a conclusion of which one may feel entirely confident as to the proper analysis of the FSC's decision in the Sun case. At most, however, a three horned dilemma is presented: either (1) the fact that equitable relief (injunctive) was sought characterized the suit as one in equity, and since adequate and appropriate relief could be had in another court, the entire case was dismissed and the 'parties relegated to that other court; or (2) the court for reasons of comity or public policy would not assume jurisdiction over state law issues involved in administering the conservation laws; or (3) the right of action created by Art. 6049c, § 8, in so far as it concerns such administration, is • appellate and jurisdiction thereof cannot be conferred by state law upon a federal trial (non-appellate) court. There is some basis for adopting horn 2 or 3 or both, in expressions in some of the FSC’s opinions which refer to the relation between the state courts and the Commission in the administration of the conservation laws under Art. 6049c, § 8, as a partnership. We merely pose the issues involved in - the proper analysis of the FSC decision. Whichever horn of the posed dilemma one takes the result ⅛ the same in so far as concerns our present inquiry. The effect, the governing factor in determining whether Art. 5539a applies, is the same in any event — appellees were denied the right to litigate their suit as to state law issues in the federal court because the state courts afforded the appropriate remedy. The effect of the order as one of dismissal for want of jurisdiction cannot be obviated by means of nomenclature. And this is true in the instant case regardless of the distinction in a proper case between want of jurisdiction and refusal to exercise it. If the FSC intended the effect of their decision to be that the federal courts may not assume jurisdiction of questions of state law affecting the administration of the state conservation laws arising in suits brought under Art. 6049c, § 8, regardless of whether equitable relief is sought; one may welcome the decision as a practical solvent of the confusion arising from concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction, however difficult it may be for one to follow the course of reasoning by which that decision is arrived at.
The motion is overruled.
Overruled.