Court Opinion

ID: 9745316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:48:28.667946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:59.055167
License: Public Domain

PRENTICE, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the Defendant's conviction.
With respect to the sentence of death, I am of the opinion that there was a rational basis for its imposition and that it should, therefore, be affirmed under our rules.1 For the reasons expressed in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Schiro v. State (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 1047, 1068, I agree with Justice DeBruler that Defendant's history of mental disturbance may not be disregarded in the weighing process; and I, therefore, believe that the trial court's statement, "I can find no factor that mitigates in your favor in this case" was an unfortunate choice of words that, standing alone, would suggest error. In context, however, it is apparent to me that the court did not ignore that history. He previously made a finding that Defendant was not suffering from a mental condition that reduced his capabilities. I take this statement to mean that Defendant's mental disability was not so extensive as to have been a substantially contributing factor to his crimes. Also, the court found specifically: "There is nothing in this record to indicate that you were under the influence of any mental or emotional disturbance when you committed these murders and attempted murder."
I also note that counsel has not argued that no consideration was given to the Defendant's unfortunate history of mental disturbances. For these reasons, I am comfortable in my belief that the trial judge did, in fact, give some consideration to this matter, although his statement, first above quoted, suggests otherwise. The weight that he accorded to that circumstance is reserved to his discretion.

. "RULE 2. SCOPE OF REVIEW
'(1) The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized by statute except where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
(2) A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate to the particular offense and offender for which such sentence was imposed."
Ind.R.App.Rev.Sen. 2.