Court Opinion

ID: 9383050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 15:15:37.308894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.336634
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 23-0097
                               Filed March 29, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF N.G.,
Minor Child,

H.G., Mother,
      Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Steven J. Holwerda,

District Associate Judge.

       A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

       Nicholas A. Bailey of Bailey Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Altoona, for appellant

mother.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Dusty Clements of Clements Law & Mediation, Newton, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

       Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

          The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing the State

did not meet its burden to prove the statutory elements, termination is not in the

child’s best interests, and a permissive exception should preclude termination. We

affirm.

          I.    Background Facts and Proceedings

          When the child was born in spring 2020, both the mother and child tested

positive for marijuana. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services

(HHS) declined to remove the child then because the mother agreed to engage

with voluntary services. Within months, the mother was without stable housing

and asked HHS to place the child with relatives. HHS did as the mother asked,

and the State filed a child in need of assistance (CINA) petition based on the

mother’s drug use, lack of housing, lack of contact with the child, and failure to

engage with mental-health services and counseling.

          The child was returned to the mother’s care for a time, but in February 2021

HHS learned that the mother was still using illegal drugs and left the child with non-

relative adults for weeks at a time. The next month, the mother and child both

tested positive for marijuana, and the child was again removed and placed with

relatives. The drug-screen was prompted by an HHS home visit where workers

found the child “passed out on the floor face down and lethargic.”

          The mother pled guilty to child endangerment resulting in serious injury, a

class “C” felony, for which she remained on formal probation at the time of

termination.     In the factual basis for the plea, the mother admitted that she

“knowingly or recklessly exposed [her] child to a hazard or danger to the child’s
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health or safety” and that she “allowed [her] child to be in the care of people using

marijuana, which exposed [her] child to [THC] being inhaled.”

       The child has not been returned to the mother’s care since early 2021, and

there have been no trial periods at home. At the time of the termination trial, the

mother was only allowed supervised visits, but she had unsupervised visits at

earlier points in the case. The mother made her most significant progress in early

summer 2022, when HHS was making tentative plans to return the child to the

mother’s care.    However, shortly before the scheduled hearing, the mother

contacted HHS and asked to postpone the hearing until she found new living

arrangements, as she was the victim of domestic violence. Within hours, the

mother again contacted HHS, now claiming “everything’s fine” and the child “can

come home tomorrow.” The HHS worker explained to the mother that she “can’t

return [the child] to a situation where there could be domestic violence.” The

mother admitted at the termination trial that she lied when she told HHS everything

was fine, and she lied again at the courthouse when she denied the domestic

abuse.

       To quote the juvenile court, “things deteriorated from there.” HHS began

requiring supervised visits because the child would act inappropriately and call the

family member he was placed with gender-based slurs, which he presumably

learned from the mother. Around the same time, the mother demonstrated poor

judgment by having her new paramour (who the family members did not know and

failed to pass a background check) pick up the child.

       The mother was granted another six months to work toward reunification in

February 2022. Conditions of reunification included her obtaining stable housing
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and employment; not using illegal drugs and providing a substance-free

environment for the child; completing mental-health counseling and medication;

and cooperating with HHS services, including attending all available visitation. The

mother did not meet these conditions.

       During the life of the case, the mother has lived in at least twelve places,

had at least seven jobs, and been involved with at least four paramours. In the

three weeks preceding the termination trial, the mother was staying with her

mother. She seemingly had no other housing plans.

       The mother had a spotty employment record and was unemployed at the

time of the termination trial. She did not provide any financial support toward the

child while placed out of her care. The mother explained at trial that her reason

for not financially contributing to the child’s care was that the foster parents “get

paid for taking care of [the child] by the government.”

       The mother has been offered extensive services, including substance-

abuse and mental-health evaluation and treatment, safety planning, crisis

intervention services, family team meetings, gas cards, and visitation. The mother

took advantage of some of these services and made some intermittent progress

toward sobriety. She has been “very open” with HHS about having issues with

depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. She more reluctantly

admitted to problems with manic depression, split personality, and borderline

personality disorder. She also has a history of hospitalization for self-harm and

suicidal ideation. As of termination, the mother was only attending half of her

scheduled appointments.
                                           5

       The mother exercised most of her visits, but she made a number of choices

that reflect disinterest in the child. For example, as the juvenile court found, “when

given the opportunity to live in the same city as the child and to make visits and

contact and bonding more convenient and more accessible, the mother chose to

live elsewhere until three weeks [before trial].” In other words, “For almost two

years, [the mother] chose to live in a variety of places, with a variety of people, in

settings admittedly inappropriate for the child.”

       The child, who has been placed outside the mother’s care for nearly two

years or two-thirds of the child’s life, is doing well. The current placement is willing

to adopt the child.

       At trial, the father failed to appear, and the mother resisted termination of

parental rights. The State, the child’s guardian ad litem, and HHS recommended

termination. The HHS worker also opined that the child could not be returned to

the mother’s care at the present time or within six months, and that a guardianship

was not appropriate because the child “needs permanency” and the mother has

been combative or “volatile” toward the existing placement.

       The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both parents. Only the

mother appeals.

       II.     Standard of Review

       “We review termination proceedings de novo.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489,

492 (Iowa 2000). “The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best

interests of the child.” Id.
                                          6

       III.    Discussion

       On our de novo review, we find the evidence supports termination on at

least two different statutory grounds, we find termination is in the best interests of

the child, and we reject any permissive exception that could preclude termination.

              A. Statutory Elements

       The juvenile court found terminating the mother’s rights was warranted

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), and (h) (2022). We elect to affirm

based on paragraphs (d) and (h).

       First, section 232.116(1)(d) allows the juvenile court to terminate parental

rights after finding two elements:

               (1) The court has previously adjudicated the child to be a child
       in need of assistance after finding the child to have been physically
       or sexually abused or neglected as the result of the acts or omissions
       of one or both parents, or the court has previously adjudicated a child
       who is a member of the same family to be a child in need of
       assistance after such a finding. This paragraph shall not be
       construed to require that a finding of sexual abuse or neglect requires
       a finding of a nonaccidental physical injury.
               (2) Subsequent to the child in need of assistance adjudication,
       the parents were offered or received services to correct the
       circumstance which led to the adjudication, and the circumstance
       continues to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.

The CINA adjudication in this case stemmed from issues related to parental drug

use, the mother’s mental-health issues, and the lack of consistent housing and

overall stability. On each of these grounds, the mother has made one step forward

and two steps backwards. She pled guilty to a class “C” felony for exposing the

child to illegal drugs. She attended only half of her mental-health appointments.

And she has had at least seven jobs, four paramours, and twelve housing

situations during the life of the case. She was also offered extensive services over
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the course of more than two years, and the concerns that led to the original CINA

adjudication persisted. The State met its burden on section 232.116(1)(d).

       Second, section 232.116(1)(h) has four elements:

               (1) The child is three years of age or younger.
               (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
       assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
               (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
       the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months,
       or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home
       has been less than thirty days.
               (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
       cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided
       in section 232.102 at the present time.

There is no serious dispute over the first three elements—that the child at issue is

three years of age or younger, was adjudicated as a CINA, and was removed from

the home for more than six consecutive months without a trial period at home. The

only possible dispute is over the fourth element, whether the child could be

returned to her custody at the time of the termination trial. See In re D.W., 791

N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “at the present time” to mean “at the

time of the termination hearing”). We agree with the juvenile court that the child

could not be returned. The mother’s only serious progress toward reunification

came in the three weeks before termination, and we agree with the juvenile court

this is “too little, too late.” Throughout the life of the case, the mother failed to

obtain safe and stable housing or consistent employment.           She made only

intermittent progress regarding mental health and maintains unhealthy

relationships. And her visits with the child were fully supervised at the time of

termination. On this record, we agree the child could not be returned the mother’s

custody.
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       On appeal, the mother does not clearly set forth which elements of either of

these statutory bases she challenges. The gist of her argument is that she made

enough progress toward reunification to negate the statutory grounds.            We

disagree and reject the rose-colored characterization of progress made in the

mother’s petition on appeal, largely based on the evidence set forth elsewhere in

this opinion. We also note that, even at the termination trial, the mother had

problems with honesty.      She simultaneously denied that she “ever” smoked

marijuana near her child but admitted that she smoked marijuana while pregnant.

She minimized the conduct leading to her guilty plea, essentially saying she pled

guilty just to avoid prison. And she lied about domestic violence, directly impacting

the safety of the home. This dishonesty or failure to accept responsibility weighs

against reunification and supports the statutory grounds for termination.

              B. Best Interests of the Child

       “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the

State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping

someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home

for the child.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 777 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted);

accord Iowa Code § 232.116(2) (requiring the juvenile court to “give primary

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-

term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs of the child.”).

       We agree with and adopt the juvenile court’s findings on best interests, as

they correctly summarize the evidence and also reflect our own assessment of the

record evidence:
                                            9

                The mother’s ability to care for the child is obviously affected
       by her lack of stability and consistency, her lack of stable housing
       and a stable job, and her lack of follow through with mental health
       counseling. It is also affected by her poor decision-making with
       housing situations, job opportunities, and relationships; as well as
       her nomadic lifestyle, coupled with her refusal to accept her mother’s
       offer to live closer to her child in a safer and more supportive
       environment. The mother has not been able to care for the child for
       over the past 20 months and will not be able to do so in the near
       future. Her problems, as recited above, have prevented her from
       providing for the child’s safety, long-term nurturing and growth, and
       physical, mental and emotional needs, and will continue to prevent
       her from doing so for the foreseeable future.
                In contrast, the child’s current relative placement, [the
       extended family members], have shown themselves capable of
       providing these things since March 2021 or two-thirds of the child’s
       life, and the child is doing well. It is in the best interest of the child to
       live in the care of [the extended family members] rather than remain
       in limbo until his parents can correct their problems, if ever.

In short, this is “one of those unfortunate cases in which a parent progresses and

regresses, the progress is not enough to have the children returned to their care,

and matters simply reach a point at which the child’s best interests command

permanency and stability.” In re I.S., No. 20-0976, 2020 WL 6481088, at *4 (Iowa

Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2020).

       In part, the mother’s petition on appeal seems to assert that a guardianship

would be preferable to termination. Our case law holds otherwise. In re A.S., 906

N.W.2d 467, 477 (Iowa 2018) (“Importantly, ‘a guardianship is not a legally

preferable alternative to termination.’” (quoting In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2017)). To the extent we need address this argument further, we find that

the mother’s antagonism toward the family members where the child was placed,

and the slurs repeated by the child concerning them, defeat the mother’s argument

about a guardianship.
                                         10

             C. Permissive Exceptions1

      In her petition, the mother relies on two permissive exceptions to

termination: her bond with the child and the child’s placement with a relative. See

Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a), (c). For both permissive exceptions, the mother bears

the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475–

76.

      First, as to the relative placement, this exception only applies when “[a]

relative has legal custody of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a). At the time of

termination, HHS had legal custody of the child—not the foster placement with

family members. This exception therefore does not apply. See In re A.B., 956

N.W.2d 162, 170 (Iowa 2021).

      Second, the mother argues that her bond with the child should preclude

termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). The juvenile court found the mother

failed to carry her burden to prove this exception, and so do we. We do not doubt

the mother loves her child.        But a parent’s love is not enough to prevent

termination, nor is the mere existence of a bond. See A.B., 956 N.W.2d at 169–

70; D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. Whatever bond may exist between mother and child

here, it does not outweigh the need to provide this child a permanent, safe, and

stable home. The mother’s history convinces us she cannot provide such a home

now or any time in the immediate future. We, like the juvenile court, decline to

apply this permissive exception.

1 The permissive-exception argument is intermingled with the best-interests
analysis of the mother’s petition. We address these issues separately.
                                      11

       IV.    Conclusion

       Having rejected all of the mother’s challenges on appeal, we affirm the

termination of parental rights.

       AFFIRMED.