Court Opinion

ID: 9713616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:18:52.083659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.609538
License: Public Domain

Henderson, J.,
filed the following concurring opinion, in which Markell, J., concurred.
I accept the court’s rather broad interpretation of the word “entering”, as used in the policy, to cover the case of Mrs. Kronau, who was certainly not touching the parked automobile but had finished her approach to *134it. Since the physical facts show unmistakably that all of the plaintiffs were at least as close as she was to the parked car, I think the contradiction in the evidence becomes immaterial. However, I do not agree with the court’s interpretation of the rules of court, as applied, to the facts in the case, and I think it may lead to misunderstanding and confusion in subsequent cases.
While the rule requiring a trial judge to state the grounds of his decision* does not contemplate an elaborate, formal or extensive review of the law or the facts, if it is to serve a useful purpose the opinion must state the findings in more detail than a general verdict, and must at least indicate whether the decision is based on law or fact. The opinion in the instant case does not comply with the rule and I think we should say so. On the other hand, the fact that the opinion does not measure up to the rule cannot enlarge or diminish the scope of our review. If that were so it would be within the power of the trial court to shift its burden to this court, or deprive one party or the other of the kind of review they have a right to expect when they elect trial by the court.
In the instant case, I think the trial court might properly have found the door of the parked car was still closed at the moment of impact. The police officer, an expert in such matters, gave that as his considered opinion, based upon an examination at the scene of the accident. In Acme Poultry Corp. v. Melville, 188 Md. 365, 53 A. 2d 1, we held that testimony of that character was sufficient to take a case to the jury, even where there was no eye-witness to the accident. Here the testimony of the eye-witnesses was contradicted by the physical facts and also by inconsistencies in statements made shortly after the accident. If the trial court had found that the door was shut, and disbelieved the eye-witnesses, I think we could not say he was clearly wrong. But this court’s finding as to the law makes the fact immaterial. Judge Markell concurs in the view here expressed.