Court Opinion

ID: 9793260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:45:19.305001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:10.486391
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
In my view, the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury as it did on the theories of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 189) presented by the prosecution.
Let us briefly review the general principles that are applicable on the facts of this case.
A trial court must instruct the jury on every theory that is supported by substantial evidence. (E.g., People v. Glenn (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1461, 1465 [280 Cal.Rptr. 609]; see, e.g., People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685 (plur. opn. by Tobriner, J.); id. at pp. 686-687 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1] (conc. opn. of Richardson, J.).) Conversely, it may not instruct on any that is not. (See, e.g., People v. Flannel, supra, at pp. 684-685 (plur. opn. by Tobriner, J.); id. at pp. 686-687 (conc. opn. of Richardson, J.).) Evidence is “substantial” if it allows a reasonable jury to make a determination in accordance with the theory presented under the proper standard of proof. (See, e.g., People v. Flannel, supra, at p. 684 (plur. opn. by Tobriner, J.); id. at pp. 686-687 (conc. opn. of Richardson, J.).) As pertinent here, it *1148must permit the panel to find the elements of first degree murder under the theory in question beyond a reasonable doubt1
At the prosecution’s request, the trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder “perpetrated by means of . . . willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.” (Pen. Code, § 189.) I shall assume for argument’s sake that the evidence on this theory was substantial.
Also at the prosecution’s request, but over defendant’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder “perpetrated by means of . . . lying in wait.” (Pen. Code, § 189.) On this theory, however, the evidence was not substantial. Individually, the elements require waiting, watching, and concealment. (E.g., People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554-557 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].)2 Together, they call for the perpetrator to design and execute a “plan” to “put[] [himself] in a position of advantage” in order “to take the victim by surprise.” (People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 448, internal quotation marks omitted.) At trial, there were indeed isolated pieces of evidence that bore on “waiting,” “watching,” and “concealment” as discrete facts. But, viewed in its entirety, the evidence did not establish an underlying, and unifying, fatal plan. Quite the contrary, it revealed a tragic fortuity. The last encounter between defendant and the victim was similar to many that preceded it during the course of their stormy relationship. It was different in this: Maria Ortega spit a “nasty” remark at defendant. As a consequence, he immediately drew a gun and pointed it at her; she ran behind a tree; and he then turned the weapon against the victim.
*1149On such facts, a reasonable jury could not have found lying-in-waiting beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under the rule of People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]—to which I adhere (People v. Guiton, ante, p. 1116 at pp. 1131-1133 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.))—the trial court’s instructional error requires reversal of the judgment insofar as it convicts defendant on the jury’s general verdict finding him guilty of first degree murder. “[W]hen,” as here, “the prosecution presents its case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are legally correct and others legally incorrect, and the reviewing court cannot determine from the record on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested, the conviction cannot stand.” (People v. Green, supra, at p. 69.)
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 13, 1993. Mosk, J„ was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The question in this case involves instructional error, i.e., whether the theories set out by the trial court were supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the focus of review is on the court. Further, the standard is de novo. (Cf. 2 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review (2d ed. 1992) § 11.29, p. 11-120 [discussing federal appellate procedure as to whether a defense theory is supported].)
The question here does not concern the validity of the conviction, i.e., whether the verdict rendered by the jury was supported by substantial evidence. If it did, the focus of review would be on the jury. Also, the standard would be “highly deferential.” (Cf. 2 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review, supra, § 9.1, p. 9-3 [discussing federal appellate procedure].)
Inexplicably, the majority misapprehend the focus and standard of review. On the very first page of their opinion, they reveal their recognition that the question in this case involves instructional error. But they then proceed as though it concerned the validity of the conviction. As a consequence, they state inapplicable principles and cite inapposite decisions.

I have expressed my view that the element of concealment demands “actual physical concealment”: “concealment of purpose as distinguished from concealment of the person is not enough." (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 222-223, fn. 1 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) My colleagues, however, have not been persuaded. (See, e.g., People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 554-555; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273] [following Morales].) On this point I now concur—under compulsion. (See People v. Hardy, supra, at p. 223, fn. 1 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)