Court Opinion

ID: 9671020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:29:36.787761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.758143
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In doing so, I concede that the majority’s analysis in this case employs a logical method in defining the phrase “directly interested,” as used in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-628(d) (Reissue 1978). My difficulty arises from the fact that the question is not an open one; this court in A. Borchman Sons v. Carpenter, 166 Neb. 322, 89 N.W.2d 123 (1958), adopted a contrary definition by an equally logical analysis.
For almost 25 years the law in this jurisdiction has been that nonstriking union members are “directly interested” in a work stoppage produced at their place of employment by another union. During this period the Legislature has seen fit to allow our prior construction of its statute to stand. Where a statute has been judicially construed and that construction has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s expository analysis of the legislative intent. The People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840 (1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 972, 91 S. Ct. 1658, 29 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971); Santanelli v. City of Providence, 105 R.I. 208, 250 A.2d 849 (1969); Nevada Indus. Comm’n v. Strange, 84 Nev. 153, 437 P.2d 873 (1968); Hewett v. Garrett, 274 N.C. 356, 163 S.E.2d 372 (1968); Chart v. Gutmann, 44 Wis. 2d 421, 171 N.W.2d 331 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 973, 90 S. Ct. 1089, 25 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1970); Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. Uniontown H. Assn., 432 Pa. 146, 247 A.2d 621 (1968); Magreta v. Ambassador Steel Co., 380 Mich. 513, 158 N.W.2d 473 (1968). See, also, Lincoln Woman’s Club v. City of Lincoln, 178 Neb. 357, 133 N.W.2d 455 (1965); State v. Standard Oil Co., 100 Neb. 826, 161 N.W. 537 (1917). If there is to be a change in the ex*142isting law it is not incumbent upon this court to make it. Lincoln Woman’s Club v. City of Lincoln, supra.
The employer in this case was entitled to rely on the rule announced in Borchman, supra. Had the employer been operating under the rule announced today it might well not have caused the removal of its equipment from the employment site in, as it testified, anticipation of the customary refusal of the members of one union to cross the picket line of another union.
One of the values of legal precedent in a society governed by laws is that the certainty created allows a member of that society to accurately and safely anticipate the consequences of specific conduct. While we do not slavishly adhere unnecessarily to precedent for its own sake, the doctrine of stare decisis is based on public policy, is entitled to great weight, and should be adhered to unless reasons therefor do not exist, are clearly erroneous or mischievous, or unless more harm than good will result from doing so. Lincoln Woman’s Club v. City of Lincoln, supra; Nebraska Conf. Assn. Seventh Day Adventists v. County of Hall, 166 Neb. 588, 90 N.W.2d 50 (1958). Indeed, that we are generally mindful of the disorder which follows sudden departure from clearly established precedent is illustrated by our recent refusal to apply retrospectively the modification of an evidentiary rule. Langfeld v. Department of Roads, ante p. 15, 328 N.W.2d 452 (1982).
There is nothing in this record to justify judicial disruption of what has been the settled policy and law of this state for two and one-half decades. By affirming the actions of the Department of Labor and the court below, the majority has permitted an arbitrary administrative usurpation of legislative power.
I would reverse the court below and dismiss the employee’s claim.