Court Opinion

ID: 9695437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:19:30.241346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:12.127105
License: Public Domain

Stuart, J.
— I respectfully dissent. I do not believe reasonable men could arrive at any conclusion except that plaintiff’s conduct was negligent and contributed to the accident.- At the risk of unduly extending this dissent, I intend to quote the very brief record to avoid any tendency to understate plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff was the only witness who testified on this issue.
Defendant had the directional right-of-way under section 321.319, Code of Iowa, quoted in the majority opinion. Plaintiff did not stop or yield the right-of-way. The question is whether the failure to comply with the statute constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law. He testified that as he approached the intersection from- the south he was going between 12 and 20 miles per hour. When he first looked to his right, the front of-*1047Ms car was 5 to 10 feet back of the south curbline and he could see a good block to the east. He testified:
“I saw a ear coming from my right traveling on Twelfth Street. * * * about one-half block away. * * * I observed it long enough to estimate its speed. I would say he was going between, thirty-five and forty. I proceeded into the intersection, I looked ahead and I- looked off and I looked back, I took a glance to my right again and there he was all at once, and I stepped on the gas to get out. As I was entering the intersection I was going about twenty and I looked and thought I. had plenty of time and I was going to proceed on through. * * * When the. other car entered the intersection the front end of my car was even with the north side of the curbline of Twelfth Street. As soon as the other car entered the intersection I kinda got alook and seen, and then I swung my wheels turned my ear to the left. The other car never changed its course from the time I first saw it until it struck my car, that I know of. It was speeding.”
Both doors of plaintiff’s car received the main force of the impact. Twelfth Street is 36 feet wide. The speed limit is 25 miles per hour.
On cross-examination he testified, from bumper to bumper, his car was 21 feet long. The front was 10 to 12 feet south of eurbline when he saw the car coming.
“At that time I saw this other ear half way down the block. I believe it would be 150 feet. That’s my best estimate. I didn’t pay too much attention to the car coming from the east, I saw him and that’s all. I couldn’t and didn’t estimate its speed, not at that time. The next time I saw the ear was just an instant before the collision. I had been looking straight ahead and glanced to the left but I was looking straight ahead up to that time. In the instance that I saw the car just before the collision I couldn’t estimate his speed. * * * The front end of my car proceeded 10 feet to the intersection plus 36 feet across Twelfth Street or 46 feet altogether before I was hit. During the same period of time the automobile of the defendant traveled 150 feet.”
He admitted he knew( the car was to his right and did not continue to watch it saying:
*1048“I figured I had plenty of time to get through the intersection.
“There wasn’t anything there to prevent me from looking to my right and watching that auto coming up the street toward the intersection. I didn’t see him again until just before the collision. He come on so fast that I thought I was out of there.
“From the time I first saw it until the point of impact the time elapsed was probably two seconds.”
Since plaintiff’s testimony is different on direct and cross-examination on his opportunity to estimate speed of defendant’s car, we will test each version to see if he can escape contributory negligence as a matter of law under either one.
On direct, his theory must have been that he saw defendant, knew he was speeding one-half block away but estimated the speed 35 to 40 miles per hour when in fact he was going fast enough to cover 150 feet in the time it took plaintiff to go 46 feet or about 65 miles per hour.
While estimates of speed, time and distance are not very reliable, they must be used to make plaintiff’s case and therefore should be used to test it. Conceding it is for the jury to test the credibility of an experienced driver who was not able to tell 35 miles per hour from 65 miles per hour at one-half block, we will use his figures as facts.
For plaintiff to clear the intersection from the time he first saw defendant’s car, the front end would have to travel 66 feet —10 feet to curb, 36 feet across street, 20 feet to clear rear end. At 20 miles per hour, his fastest speed, it would take 2.2 seconds. If we assume defendant was coming at the lowest estimated speed of 35 miles per hour, he would reach the intersection in about 2.9 seconds. In other words plaintiff would at best have seven-tenths of a second to get out of defendant’s way.
Let us assume plaintiff’s evidence on cross-examination is more favorable to him and assume further that a jury could find a reasonably prudent man would just glance at a car, not determine its rate of speed, and decide he has time to cross the intersection assuming that defendant is driving within the speed limit. We must then also assume defendant was driving 25 miles *1049per hour. Even using these figures, plaintiff would have slightly less than two seconds to clear the intersection.
These computations are not given as establishing indisputable facts, but to show that plaintiff was dealing in split seconds. In argument he says:
“It should be remembered, in this case, that from the time the plaintiff first saw the defendant until the collision occurred .the time lapse was only two seconds. (R. p. 14, lines 6-9.) This amount of time certainly does not allow plaintiff to enter into nice calculations in estimating speeds, and distances to be covered at those speeds, in determining whether he can safely pass through the intersection. His experience and judgment must govern in this regard and must make his assumption as whether to proceed, instantly. As stated above he may make an assumption and testify to his state of mind in making that assumption. If his assumption is erroneous, or his judgment faulty, or his split second timing inaccurate, a collision will occur.”
This is the very argument I would use in affirming. I do not believe a reasonably prudent man knowing this would attempt to cross an intersection in front of an oncoming car with the right-of-way when his safety depends upon a split second, or at most on two seconds, especially when his judgment is based on estimates of speed and distance arrived at in a glance.
I do not believe we should approve of plaintiff making such “nice calculations”. His mere conclusion that he thought he had time to cross when he obviously did not, in my opinion, is not sufficient to make his conduct under the circumstances that of a reasonably prudent man.
I would affirm.
ThompsoN, J., joins in this dissent.