Court Opinion

ID: 9723688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:27:29.925415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:51.088172
License: Public Domain

ARABIAN, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority has concluded that triable issues of fact exist respecting petitioner’s control over property owned by another and the foreseeability of a criminal assault which occurred there.
They would allow this matter to proceed against petitioner who claims no duty of care exists on behalf of a person who parks his vehicle, as a matter of personal convenience, on an unowned adjoining vacant lot where he is attacked by unknown assailants. The umbilicus of their reasoning is that inadequate parking existed and Spencer, who has never parked in the spaces provided, had a subjective and reasonable belief that Southland controlled the unpaved lot. They speculate as to increased sales from this off-premises parking and a realization of commercial benefit.
Unrealistically, they comment that petitioner did not erect signs or fences1 to discourage customer parking in an adjacent area open to all citizens. In any event, the record reflects that in a seven-year period prior to this event no claim for a similar incident, no other crimes or other injuries *670had been reported as concerns Southland’s business operation. So much for the triable issue of foreseeability on the question of a reasonably perceived risk.
Most sadly, the fact that the store manager would ask loitering juveniles to clear the area and, on occasion, would summon law enforcement to preserve the calm and safety of the community, is now used against petitioner on the question of control. “Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief.”2
A caring society is ennobled and enriched when citizen observers sound the alarm which seeks a protective response. The majority view has the practical effect of discouraging activities which benefit the victims amongst us. Do they seek to sanction the deafening silence which responded to the cry of Kitty Genovese?
As one cannot generally be held liable for a dangerous condition of non-owned, nonpossessed or noncontrolled property, this elastic extension of exposure under the guise of triability represents a costly and unwarranted imposition of legal burden.
I would grant the writ.
On September 1, 1988, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Petitioners’ application for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 27, 1988. Lucas, J., and Eagleson, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.

While good fences make good neighbors, none existed here. Nevertheless, there is an abundance of hedging in the majority opinion.

Cardoza, J., Wagner v. International Ry. (1921) 232 N.Y. 176, 180 [133 N.E. 437, 19 A.L.R. 1].