Court Opinion

ID: 9749867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:01:15.467731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:58.842691
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree with most of the majority’s analysis in resolving the issues raised in this appeal and agree the judgment of conviction should be affirmed. However, I diverge from my colleagues on the proper interpretation of the intent required for a finding of habitual offender status under Penal Code section 667.7.1 Like the majority, I believe the language of the statute is key. However, I disagree with the *1592majority’s conclusion general intent is sufficient under the second clause of section 667.7, subdivision (a). I would hold a finding of habitual offender .status under section 667.7, subdivision (a) requires a finding of specific intent to cause great bodily injury. Consequently, I would hold the trial court erred in instructing general intent was sufficient and reverse the finding of habitual offender status.
Section 667.7, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part:
“Any person convicted of a felony in which the person [1] inflicted great bodily injury as provided in Section 12022.7, or [2] personally used force which was likely to produce great bodily injury, who has served two or more prior separate prison terms as defined in Section 667.5 for [specified crimes] is a habitual offender and shall be punished as follows:
“(1) A person who served two prior separate prison terms shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life and shall not be eligible for release on parole for 20 years, . . .”
Our Supreme Court has declared a great bodily injury enhancement under section 12022.7 requires a finding a defendant both personally and intentionally inflicted such injury.2 (People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 579 [183 Cal.Rptr. 350, 645 P.2d 1182]; People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 109 [192 Cal.Rptr. 748, 665 P.2d 520].) This requirement has been consistently upheld by the vast majority of the Courts of Appeal which have considered the question. (See, e.g., In re Sergio R. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 588, 599-602 [279 Cal.Rptr. 149]; People v. Phillips (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1123-1124 [256 Cal.Rptr. 654]; People v. Superior Court (Duvall) (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1121, 1133 [244 Cal.Rptr. 522]; People v. Simpson (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1360, 1365 [237 Cal.Rptr. 910]; cf. People v. Bass (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 448 [195 Cal.Rptr. 153] [interpreting “intent to inflict great bodily injury” as “intent to commit a violent act”]; People v. Martinez (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 727 [217 Cal.Rptr. 546].)
Section 667.7, subdivision (a) incorporates this definition by referring to the infliction of great bodily injury “as provided in Section 12022.7.” For this reason the majority are willing to assume a finding of habitual offender status under clause [1] requires a finding the defendant personally and intentionally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim.
*1593A finding of habitual offender status under the alternative clause of section 667.7, subdivision (a), is allowed where the defendant used force likely to produce great bodily injury. The second clause does not refer to section 12022.7. For this reason the majority contend, while the first clause may require specific intent to inflict great bodily injury, the plain language of tiie second clause does not, and may be satisfied by a finding a defendant merely intended to use force. I would reject this reading of the statute and adopt instead the Santos court’s (People v. Santos (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 723 [271 Cal.Rptr. 811]) holding specific intent is required under both alternatives of the statute.
As the Santos court recognized, in interpreting statutory provisions “ ‘ “ [a]ll the parts of a statute must be construed together, and harmonized, so far as it is possible to do so without doing violence to the language or to the spirit and purpose of the act, so that the statute may stand in its entirety. For the purpose of harmonizing apparently conflicting clauses, each should be read with direct reference to every other which relates to the same subject, and so read, if possible, as to avoid repugnancy.” ’ ” (People v. Santos, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 742, citing People v. Moroney (1944) 24 Cal.2d 638, 642 [150 P.2d 888].)
Although the alternative clauses of section 667.7, subdivision (a) may appear conflicting, they can be harmonized by requiring specific intent for each. Requiring specific intent for each is appropriate because both clauses relate to the same subject matter. Moreover, both clauses are part of the same subsection of the statute.
I agree with the Santos court a defendant who inflicts great bodily injury will invariably have a general intent to do the acts likely to produce such injury. Thus, if only general intent was required under clause [2], the alternative provision of intentional infliction of great bodily injury would become useless and superfluous. However, under recognized principles of statutory construction, any interpretation which renders some word or portion of the statute superfluous should not be adopted. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1010 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154].)
The majority reject this conclusion. First, the majority contends a defendant who uses force likely to produce great bodily injury will not always actually inflict such injury. The example the majority uses to demonstrate this point is so extreme and extraordinary the effect is to demonstrate the weakness of the argument.
Next, the majority reject the notion clause [1] which requires specific intent will become superfluous when prosecutors forego its use in favor of *1594only a finding of general intent in clause [2], In support of its argument the majority point to the fact the information in this case mentioned both clauses. However, had both clauses in fact been used in the present prosecution the jury would have been instructed on both. They were not. Instead the jury was only instructed on general intent and only asked to find whether the defendant with general criminal intent used force which was likely to cause great bodily injury for a finding defendant was a habitual offender. Thus, any claim clause [1] was “used” in this case lacks support in the record.
On the other hand, this case presents a perfect example of the situation the Santos court warned against: when á victim suffers an injury, clause [1] with its specific intent requirement will be abandoned in favor of the less stringent finding of general criminal intent. Thus, this case demonstrates that as a practical matter the majority’s interpretation renders irrelevant the first clause of section 667.7, subdivision (a). Courts should not adopt an interpretation which renders some portion of a statute superfluous. (People v. Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1010.)
To counter this argument the majority conclude requiring specific intent for clause [2] would render meaningless the word “likely” in the phrase “personally used force which was likely to produce great bodily injury.” On the contrary. A finding under that clause requires a finding a defendant, with the intent to inflict such injury, personally used force which was likely to produce great bodily injury. Under this construction the word “likely” remains a critical element.
The majority also adopt the People’s argument the phrase “force likely to produce great bodily injury” should be interpreted in section 667.7, subdivision (a) consistent with section 245, subdivision (a) for an assault “by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.” This language in the context of assault only requires a general criminal intent to commit the act. (See, e.g., People v. Covino (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 660, 666-667 [161 Cal.Rptr. 155].)
This argument may have merit if the Legislature had made reference to section 245, subdivision (a). It did not. Instead the only statutory reference the Legislature drafted into section 667.7, subdivision (a) was to section 12022.7, which as noted, requires specific intent.
Finally, the majority contends requiring specific intent for both findings under section 667.7, subdivision (a) would not cure the anomaly of the alternative clauses. The majority suggests if both clauses require specific *1595intent prosecutors will still refrain from using clause [1] because it will require proof the other will not, i.e., that the victim suffered great bodily injury. However, the majority’s solution would make clause [1] even more useless. Under the majority’s interpretation, clause [1] would require proof of both specific intent and injury whereas a finding under clause [2] would require neither. I respectfully suggest the majority’s solution is both imbalanced and inequitable.
Any interpretation of the statute which would broaden rather than narrow the class of criminals deemed eligible for habitual offender status would seem to run counter to the purpose of the statute to severely punish only those truly dangerous and violent criminals. The Legislature’s reference in section 667.7, subdivision (a) to section 12022.7 indicates an intent to reserve this punishment only for those who intend to inflict a violent injury on a person. Under the majority’s interpretation, however, a person whose acts of force are possibly involuntary, inadvertent or accidental warrants the same punishment as a person who specifically intends to cause great bodily injury and does so.
Requiring specific intent for both alternatives is a step toward ensuring defendants subject to the habitual offender statute are equally culpable and deserving of such harsh punishment. Therefore, I would hold the trial court erred in instructing the jury general criminal intent for a finding under section 667.7, subdivision (a) was sufficient. I would further reverse the finding of habitual offender status under section 667.7, subdivision (a) based on the jury’s finding the allegation defendant specifically intended to inflict great bodily injury was not true.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 14, 1994. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Section 12022.7 provides in pertinent part: “Any person who, with the intent to inflict such injury, personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission or attempted commission of a felony shall, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be punished by an additional term of three years, unless infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense of which he or she is convicted. . . .”