Court Opinion

ID: 9470668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:12:31.694911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:02.375708
License: Public Domain

SKOPIL, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
The Parole Commission’s interpretation of “new information” adopted by the majority here has been approved in other circuits. See Fardella v. Garrison, 698 F.2d 208, 211 (4th Cir.1982); Iuteri v. Nardoza, 662 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir.1981); McClanahan v. Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir.1980). I am constrained to concur in the result here but I remain troubled by the inherent arbitrariness in parole decisions permitted under the rule. I find the record kept by the Parole Commission in this case inadequate to account for its statutory duties and to permit effective judicial review.
I agree with the majority that a sentencing judge’s parole comment form or a presentence report may be considered “new and significant adverse information,” within the meaning of 28 C.F.R. § 2.28(f) (1982), if it was not available to the hearing examiners when they made their decision. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1976) requires the Commission to consider, inter alia, the parole comment form if available and relevant.1 See also 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1982). I would also agree that a case could be reopened if the Commission discovers information listed in the statute which it should have considered but inadvertently did not consider. Yet it *1067is clear that information that was before the hearing examiners and considered by them is not new information and should not be the basis for reopening the case.
These principles require some means by which to determine on the record what information was or was not available and considered by the hearing examiners. In this case the district court could not objectively determine from the record, as we cannot, what was available and considered by the hearing examiners. The Commission simply took the position that the parole comment form was not available. The Commission argued that parole files are voluminous and it would be impossible to determine what information was considered or available and what was not. Accepting this argument means the Commission is practically unaccountable for its methods in carrying out the statutory requirements for its decision-making process.
I find this practice an unacceptable implementation of the provisions for reopening parole decisions. It is also unacceptable in view of our appellate obligation to review the record and determine whether the Commission’s actions are consistent with the statutes and not arbitrary. The majority is more willing than I to accept the assertion of the Regional Commissioner and to infer from hearing reports that the parole comment form and pre-sentence report were not available or not considered. At a minimum, I would require the hearing examiners to specify in the hearing report at least the documents and information contained in its file that it is statutorily required to consider. Otherwise, the rule is meaningless and review is ineffective.
This case demonstrates the inherent arbitrariness in parole decisions that may result when the Commission cannot show which information was before the hearing examiners. The “newly discovered” or “previously unavailable” information materialized when the sentencing judge and probation officer expressed their intense dissatisfaction with the parole decision. This practice does not effectively serve the congressional purpose to appropriately insulate parole decisions and to provide fair and equitable parole procedures. See S.Rep. No. 369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 19 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 335, 341.
I would affirm on the basis of the documents received by the Commission after the initial decision to reopen since Williams eventually waived the defects in disclosure. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.55(f) (1982); Ready v. United States Parole Commission, 483 F.Supp. 1273, 1277 (M.D.Pa.1980).

. The legislative history makes clear that availability and relevance should act as limitations on the Commission’s responsibility to consider these materials. “In terms of availability, for example, if a judge has not commented on the sentence or parole of the offender, the Commission is under no duty to solicit such commentary.” H.R.Rep. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 335, 360. Relevance and weight to be given any information is solely within the discretion of the Commission. Id.