Court Opinion

ID: 4069452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-30 00:36:52.359473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:56.771690
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                                        01-15-00362-CV
                                                                             FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                     HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                                   9/18/2015 8:58:37 AM
                                                                                  CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                                                 CLERK

                           NO. 01-15-00362-CV

                                                                  FILED IN
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 1st COURT OF APPEALS
                                                      HOUSTON, TEXAS
                  FIRST COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
                                                  9/18/2015 8:58:37 AM
                           HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                            CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                                  Clerk

                              JEFF LEWIS,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

       AURORA LOAN SERVICES AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
                   REGISTRATION SYSTEMS,

                                Appellees.

                            On Appeal from the
                             201st District Court
                            Travis County, Texas
                   Trial Court Case No. D-1-GN-11-000618

TRANSFERRED TO THIS COURT FROM THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

                           APPELLEE’S BRIEF

J. Garth Fennegan                        SETTLEPOU
Texas Bar I.D. 24004642                  3333 Lee Parkway, Eighth Floor
gfennegan@settlepou.com                  Dallas, Texas 75219
Daniel P. Tobin                          (214) 520-3300
Texas Bar I.D. 24046978                  (214) 526-4145 (Facsimile)
dtobin@settlepou.com
Charles R. Curran                        ATTORNEYS FOR AURORA LOAN
Texas Bar I.D. 24076334                  SERVICES, LLC and MORTGAGE
ccurran@settlepou.com                    ELECTRONIC     REGISTRATION
                                         SYSTEMS, INC.

                                    -1-
                       IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

      The following is a complete list of all parties, as well as names and

addresses of all counsel:

Appellants:                                    Counsel:

Jeff Lewis                                     Stephen Casey
                                               Casey Law Office, P.C.
                                               595 Round Rock West Drive
                                               Suite 102
                                               Round Rock, Texas 78681
                                               (512) 257-1324 (Phone)
                                               (512) 853-4098 (Fax)

Appellees:

Aurora Loan Services, LLC and                  J. Garth Fennegan
Mortgage Electronic Registration               Daniel P. Tobin
Systems, Inc.                                  Charles R. Curran
                                               SettlePou
                                               3333 Lee Parkway, Eighth Floor
                                               Dallas, Texas 75219
                                               (214) 520-330 (Phone)
                                               (214) 526-4145 (Fax)

                                         -2-
                                             TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ..........................................................................2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................3 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...............................................................................................4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........................................................................................6 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ...............................................................7 
ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................................................8 
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................9 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................................................................................11 
ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................11 
Argument & Authorities ..........................................................................................11 
         A.       Standard for No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. ..............11 
         B.       The Trial Court Properly Granted Appellees’ No-Evidence
                  Motion for Summary Judgment. .........................................................12 
         C.       Because the Trial Court Properly Granted the No-Evidence
                  Motion, the Court Need Not Reach the Issue of Whether the
                  Traditional Motion Was Properly Granted. ........................................17 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................18 
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................19 
Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................19 

                                                           -3-
                                           INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases 
Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996) ....................................13
Beverick v. Koch Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.—Houston
      [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) .........................................................................17
Burns v. Canales, No. 14-04-00786-CV, 2006 WL 461518 (Tex.
     App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2006, pet. denied) ..............................15
Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) ........................................13
Catherman v. First State Bank, 796 S.W.2df 299 (Tex. App.—Austin
     1990, no writ).................................................................................................13
Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2004) .....................................17
Frazier v. Yu, 987 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 1999, pet.
      denied) ...........................................................................................................14
Jackson v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 05-12-01596-CV,
      2014 WL 3817085, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 4, 2014)....................17
King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2003) ..................................12
Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997) ......................12
Najera v. Recana Solutions, LLC, No. 14-14-00332-CV, 2015 WL
4985085, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston -14th Dist.], no pet.) .........................15
Nelson v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. App.—
      Dallas 2005, no pet.) ......................................................................................14
Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2009) .......................................12
Trilogy Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 452
      (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) .........................................................17
Walker v. Schion, 420 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
     2014, no pet.) .................................................................................................14
York v. Samuel, No. 01-05-00549-CV, 2007 WL 1018364, at *3 (Tex.
      App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 5, 2007, pet. denied) ..................................14
Statutes 
TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §§ 17.41-17.63 ..............................................................13

                                                           -4-
TEX. FIN. CODE § 392.202 ........................................................................................13
TEX. FIN. CODE § 392.403 ........................................................................................13
Rules 
TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1 ...................................................................................................7
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) ...................................................................................... 11, 12

                                                          -5-
                           STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the proceeding

      On September 12, 2014, Appellees Aurora Loan Services, LLC (“Aurora”)

and Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) filed their Motion

for Final Summary Judgment.       C.R. 158.   The Motion for Final Summary

Judgment contained both traditional and no-evidence components. C.R. 158-168.

Appellant Jeff Lewis (“Lewis” or “Appellant”) filed a Motion to Strike Summary

Judgment Affidavit of Fay Janati and Response to Summary Judgment. C.R. 221-

24. The Court struck the affidavit of Fay Janati. R.R. 22. Summary judgment was

thereafter rendered in favor of Aurora and MERS and against Lewis on December

16, 2014. C.R. 225-26.

      On January 14, 2014, Lewis filed a Motion for New Trial. C.R. 230. On

March 2, 2015, Lewis filed a Notice of Appeal. C.R. 233.

Trial Court

      The underlying proceeding was assigned to the Honorable Amy Clark

Meachum of the 201st Civil District Court of Travis County, Texas. Appellees’

Motion for Final Summary Judgment and Appellant’s Motion to Strike and

Response were heard by the Honorable Orlinda Naranjo. R.R. 1.

                                      -6-
                   STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

      Appellees do not believe that oral argument will significantly aid the Court

in determining the legal issues presented in this appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1.

                                         -7-
                               ISSUES PRESENTED

Issue No. 1 (Appellant’s Issues 1 & 2):       The Trial Court properly granted

Appellees’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment because Appellant did not

produce any evidence to support the challenged elements of his claims.

                                       -8-
                               STATEMENT OF FACTS

      Appellant’s Statement of Facts goes well afield of the summary-judgment

record and consists of nothing more than the unsupported argument of counsel.

Appellant’s Statement relies on purported facts not presented to the Court in

connection with the summary judgment proceedings and that cannot aid this Court

in its resolution of Appellant’s appeal.

      Lewis’s Claims. Lewis filed suit against Aurora and MERS on March 1,

2011. C.R. 3. Lewis filed his First Amended Petition on December 2, 2011. C.R.

141. In his First Amended Petition, Lewis asserted claims against Aurora and

MERS for violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act and the Deceptive Trade

Practices Act and sought injunctive and declaratory relief. C.R. 146-48.

      The Summary Judgment Proceedings. On September 12, 2014, Appellees

filed their Motion for Final Summary Judgment (“MSJ”). C.R. 158. The MSJ

sought traditional summary judgment on Lewis’s claims for violation of the Texas

Debt Collection Act and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act as well as his request

for declaratory relief. C.R. 161-66. The MSJ also sought a Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 166a(i) no-evidence summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for

violation of the Texas Debt Collection Act and Deceptive Trade Practices Act and

his requests for injunctive and declaratory relief. C.R. 166-68. In support of the

traditional portion of the MSJ, Appellees attached the Affidavit of Fay Janati of

                                           -9-
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. C.R. 171-73.

      Lewis filed a Motion to Strike Summary Judgment Affidavit of Fay Janati

and Response to Summary Judgment (“Motion to Strike and Response”) on

October 22, 2014. C.R. 221. The Motion to Strike and Response contained no

summary judgment evidence. See C.R. 221-24.

      The MSJ and Lewis’s Motion to Strike and Response were heard on

November 10, 2014. R.R. 1, 22-31. At the hearing, the Court struck the Affidavit

of Fay Janati. R.R. 22.

      On December 16, 2014, the Trial Court granted Final Summary Judgment to

Appellees. C.R. 225-26. The Final Summary Judgment Order stated that the MSJ

“should be granted on all grounds stated therein,” that “Plaintiff take nothing from

Aurora in this action,” “that Plaintiff take nothing against MERS in this action,”

and that “[t]his judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is

appealable.” C.R. 225-26.

      The Motion for New Trial and Appeal. On January 14, 2015, Lewis filed a

Motion for New Trial solely complaining that the Trial Court should not have

granted the MSJ after it struck the affidavit of Fay Janati. C.R. 230. No order was

issued on this Motion for New Trial. See generally C.R. On March 2, 2015, Lewis

filed his Notice of Appeal. C.R. 233.

                                        -10-
                          SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

       Appellees’ MSJ was a hybrid motion, containing both traditional and no-

evidence components. In order to obtain the denial of the MSJ in the Trial Court,

Appellant needed to produce competent summary judgment evidence raising a

genuine issue of material fact on each element of each claim which Appellees

challenged.    Appellant failed to produce any summary-judgment evidence

concerning the challenged elements of Appellant’s claims. Accordingly, the Trial

Court properly a no-evidence granted summary judgment to Appellees.

                                    ARGUMENT

                      Issue No. 1 (Appellant’s Issues 1 & 2)

          THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEES’
      NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
     APPELLANT DID NOT PRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
               CHALLENGED ELEMENTS OF HIS CLAIMS.

                             Argument & Authorities

A.     Standard for No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment.

       When a party challenges the evidentiary support for essential elements of the

non-moving party’s claim or defense under Rule 166a(i), the non-movant is

required to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact on each

challenged element of its claim. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Timpte Indus., Inc. v.

                                        -11-
Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009) This Court reviews a no-evidence motion

for summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency standard used to review a

directed verdict. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 310. Thus, the

Court “review[s] evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most

favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered,

crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and

disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Gish, 286
S.W.3d at 310 (internal citations omitted); Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc. v. Havner,

953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997).              A trial court must grant a no-evidence

summary-judgment motion unless the non-movant brings forth more than a

scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. TEX. R.

CIV. P. 166a(i); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).

B.     The Trial Court Properly Granted Appellees’ No-Evidence Motion for
       Summary Judgment.

       Appellees’ MSJ, which was filed more than three years after Lewis first filed

suit, C.R. 3 (suit filed March 1, 2011) & C.R. 158 (MSJ filed September 12,

2014)1, contained both traditional and no-evidence motions, C.R. 161-68. The no-

evidence motion challenged the following elements of each of Lewis’s claims:

1
 Appellees alleged in their MSJ that Appellant had adequate time for discovery since the action
had been pending for more than three years before Appellees filed their MSJ. C.R. 166.
Appellant did not indicate otherwise in the Motion to Strike and Response, the Motion for New
Trial, or in his opening brief. C.R. 221-24, 230.

                                             -12-
            Injunctive Relief2: Appellant has no evidence that he has a probable

               right to relief on the causes of action stated in his petition and his

               allegation that MERS is not a mortgagee entitled to foreclose on the

               Property pursuant to the Texas Property Code. C.R. 166-67.

            Texas Debt Collection Act3: Appellant has no evidence that Aurora

               committed a violation of section 392.202 of the Texas Debt Collection

               Act and that Plaintiff was injured as a result of any such violation.

               C.R. 167.

            Deceptive Trade Practices Act4: Appellant has no evidence that he is

               a consumer, that Appellees could be sued under the Deceptive Trade

               Practices Act, that Appellees committed violations under section

               392.202 of the Texas Debt Collection Act, that Appellees committed a

               violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, or that Appellant

2
  The elements of injunctive relief are: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable
right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.
Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). C.R. 166.
3
  The elements of Appellant’s Texas Debt Collection Act claim are: (1) defendant is a debt
collector; (2) defendant committed a wrongful act in violation of Texas Finance Code § 392.202;
(3) the wrongful act was committed against the plaintiff; and (4) and the plaintiff was injured as
a result of the wrongful act. Catherman v. First State Bank, 796 S.W.2df 299, 302 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1990, no writ) (Plaintiff must prove injury); TEX. FIN. CODE § 392.403 (requiring a
violation of the Act against Plaintiff for civil remedies); TEX. FIN. CODE § 392.202 (requiring a
third party debt collector). C.R. 167.
4
  The elements of Appellant’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim are: (1) Plaintiff is a
consumer; (2) Defendants can be sued under the DTPA; (3) Defendants violated a specific
provision of the Act; (4) Defendant’s violation was a producing cause of Plaintiff’s damages.
TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §§ 17.41-17.63; Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 649
(Tex. 1996). C.R. 167.

                                               -13-
              suffered injury as a result of any alleged violation of the Deceptive

              Trade Practices Act. C.R. 167.

            Declaratory Relief5: Appellant has no evidence to support at least one

              element of every cause of action and no evidence to support his claim

              that MERS is not entitled to foreclose. C.R. 168.

       Lewis produced no summary-judgment evidence with his Motion to Strike

and Response. C.R. 221-24. The only summary-judgment evidence before the

Court was the affidavit of Fay Janati. C.R. 174-220. The Court, however, struck

the affidavit of Fay Janati and thus there was no summary-judgment evidence

before the Trial Court. R.R. 22. Walker v. Schion, 420 S.W.3d 454, 457 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (court cannot consider evidence

excluded by the trial court unless the ruling is challenged on appeal) (citation

omitted); York v. Samuel, No. 01-05-00549-CV, 2007 WL 1018364, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 5, 2007, pet. denied) (memo. op.) (same); Frazier

v. Yu, 987 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 1999, pet. denied) (where

affidavit stricken and ruling not challenged on appeal, appellate court cannot

consider the excluded evidence).

       Because the only summary-judgment evidence was excluded by the Trial

5
  To be entitled to declaratory relief, Appellant was required to prove a justiciable controversy
within the trial court’s jurisdiction. Nelson v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 858, 863
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). C.R. 168.

                                              -14-
Court and because Lewis failed to produce any competent summary-judgment

evidence in support of the challenged elements of his claims, Lewis failed to carry

his burden in responding to Appellees’ no-evidence motion.           Moreover, in

Appellant’s Motion to Strike and Response, he entirely failed to point out to the

court any evidence raising any fact issue as to any the challenged elements of his

claims. E.g., Najera v. Recana Solutions, LLC, No. 14-14-00332-CV, 2015 WL
4985085, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston -14th Dist.], no pet.) (memo. op.) (failure to

point out evidence raising a fact issue in a response fatal to no-evidence motion);

Burns v. Canales, No. 14-04-00786-CV, 2006 WL 461518 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2006, pet. denied) (memo op.) (“the party seeking to avoid the

effects of a well-pleaded no-evidence motion for summary judgment bears the

burden to file a written response that raises issues preventing summary judgment,

and that points to evidence supporting those issues”) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Trial Court properly granted Appellees’ MSJ.

      Appellant’s attempt by his opening brief in this matter to make arguments

based on evidence not before the trial court is both disingenuous and improper. In

fact, by entirely failing to address the no-evidence portion of the MSJ, Appellant

waives any complaint as to the trial court granting the no-evidence MSJ. The trial

court did not have the benefit of any of the evidence Appellant purports to offer

this Court, nor was it presented with the bankruptcy documents of which Appellant

                                        -15-
asks this court to take judicial notice. See Tab B of Appellant’s Appendix.

      Moreover, Appellant has failed to point this Court to any evidence

supporting the challenged elements of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has not cited to:

          evidence that he has a probable right to relief on the causes of action

             stated in the petition or evidence that MERS is not a mortgagee

             entitled to foreclose (injunctive relief);

          evidence that Aurora committed a violation of section 392.202 of the

             Texas Debt Collection Act or that Plaintiff was injured as a result of

             any such violation (Texas Debt Collection Act);

          evidence that Appellant was a consumer, that Appellees could be sued

             under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, that Appellees committed

             violations under section 392.202 of the Texas Debt Collection Act,

             that Appellees committed a violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices

             Act, or that Appellant suffered injury as a result of any alleged

             violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Deceptive Trade

             Practices Act);

          or evidence to support at least one element of every cause of action or

             evidence to support his claim that MERS is not entitled to foreclose

             (declaratory judgment).

In sum, Appellant’s unfocused attack solely on the traditional motion for summary

                                          -16-
judgment does nothing to show that the no-evidence motion was not properly

granted.

C.    Because the Trial Court Properly Granted the No-Evidence Motion, the
      Court Need Not Reach the Issue of Whether the Traditional Motion
      Was Properly Granted.

      If a trial court grants summary judgment without specifying the grounds for

granting the motion, this Court must uphold the trial court’s judgment if any of the

grounds are meritorious. E.g., Beverick v. Koch Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 148

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Trilogy Software, Inc. v.

Callidus Software, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet.

denied). When the moving party files both a no-evidence and traditional motion

for summary judgment, the Court generally addresses the no-evidence motion first.

See Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

      The Trial Court’s Final Summary Judgment does not specifically identify

whether Appellees’ MSJ was granted as to the traditional motion or the no-

evidence motion. C.R. 225 (identifying that MSJ granted on “all grounds stated

therein”). Because the no-evidence motion was properly granted, this Court must

uphold the Final Summary Judgment in favor of Appellees. E.g., Jackson v. Am.

Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 05-12-01596-CV, 2014 WL 3817085, at *1-2

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 4, 2014) (memo. op.) (upholding grant of no-evidence

portion of hybrid motion for summary judgment when the summary judgment

                                        -17-
order recited summary judgment was granted on “all the grounds stated therein.”).

                                   CONCLUSION
      Appellant wholly failed to address Appellees’ no-evidence MSJ at the trial

court level and has further entirely failed to address Appellees’ no-evidence MSJ

on appeal. Accordingly, Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the

Trial Court’s Final Summary Judgment in favor of Appellees, tax all costs of this

appeal against Appellant, and grant all other relief to which Appellees are entitled.

                                                /s/ Daniel P. Tobin
                                                J. Garth Fennegan
                                                Texas Bar I.D. 24004642
                                                gfennegan@settlepou.com
                                                Daniel P. Tobin
                                                Texas Bar I.D. 24046978
                                                dtobin@settlepou.com
                                                Charles R. Curran
                                                Texas Bar I.D. 24076334
                                                ccurran@settlepou.com

                                                SETTLEPOU
                                                3333 Lee Parkway, Eighth Floor
                                                Dallas, Texas 75219
                                                (214) 520-330 (Phone)
                                                (214) 526-4145 (Fax)

                                                ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

                                         -18-
                            Certificate of Compliance

      I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft

Word 2010 and contains 2,447 words, as determined by the computer software’s

word-count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).

                                     /s/ Daniel P. Tobin
                                     Daniel P. Tobin

                              Certificate of Service
       This certifies that on September 18, 2015, this document was served in
accordance with Rule 9.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, by first class
mail to:

      Stephen Casey
      Casey Law Office, P.C.
      595 Round Rock West Drive, Suite 102
      Round Rock, Texas 78681

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

                                     /s/ Daniel P. Tobin
                                     Daniel P. Tobin

                                       -19-