Court Opinion

ID: 9402483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 19:12:11.130345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.044948
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                                                             FILED
                                 January 2023 Term                        June 15, 2023
                                                                          released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                      EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                      SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                           OF WEST VIRGINIA

                              Nos. 22-0139 and 22-0140

           COLLINGWOOD APPALACHIAN MINERALS III, LLC,
                         OXY USA, INC.,
          COLLINGWOOD APPALACHIAN MINERALS I, LLC, and
                   WACO OIL & GAS CO., INC.,
                    Defendants Below, Petitioners

                                         v.

                          RICHARD L. ERLEWINE,
                          Plaintiff Below, Respondent

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court of Wetzel County
                     The Honorable David W. Hummel, Jr.
                               Case No. 20-C-54

                        REVERSED AND REMANDED

                              Submitted: April 18, 2023
                                 Filed: June 15, 2023

Michael C. Cardi, Esq.                        Andrew R. Cutright, Esq.
Jordan C. Maddy, Esq.                         Roger L. Cutright, Esq.
Bowles Rice LLP                               Cutright Law PLLC
Morgantown, West Virginia                     Morgantown, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioners Collingwood           Counsel for Respondent
Appalachian Minerals I, LLC and
Collingwood Appalachian III, LLC

W. Taylor Frankovitch, Esq.
Bowles Rice LLP
Canonsburg, Pennsylvania
Counsel for Petitioner Oxy USA, Inc.

Richard W. Gallagher, Esq.
Stephen F. Gandee, Esq.
Robinson & McElwee PLLC
Charleston, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioner Waco Oil & Gas Co.,
Inc.

CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE HUTCHISON concurs, in part, and dissents, in part, and reserves the right to
file a separate opinion.
                             SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “‘A circuit court’s entry of a declaratory judgment is reviewed de

novo.’ Syllabus Point 3, Cox v. Amick, 195 W. Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995).” Syllabus

Point 1, City of Martinsburg v. Berkeley Cnty. Couns., 241 W. Va. 385, 825 S.E.2d 332

(2019).

              2.     “‘In case of two assessments of the same land, under the same claim

of title, for any year, one payment of taxes, under either assessment, is all the State can

require.’ Syllabus point 2, State v. Allen, 65 W. Va. 335, 64 S.E. 140 (1909).” Syllabus

Point 2, Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci, 246 W. Va. 26, 866 S.E.2d 91 (2021).

              3.     “‘A deed made pursuant to a tax sale under a void assessment is void.’

Syllabus point 4, Blair v. Freeburn Coal Corp., 163 W. Va. 23, 253 S.E.2d 547 (1979).”

Syllabus Point 3, Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci, 246 W. Va. 26, 866 S.E.2d 91 (2021).

              4.     “In order to create an exception or reservation in a deed which would

reduce a grant in a conveyance clause which is clear, correct and conventional, such

exception or reservation must be expressed in certain and definite language.” Syllabus

Point 2, Hall v. Hartley, 146 W. Va. 328, 119 S.E.2d 759 (1961).

              5.     “The term ‘ambiguity’ is defined as language reasonably susceptible

of two different meanings or language of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds

                                             i
might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.” Syllabus Point 4, Est. of Tawney v.

Columbia Nat. Res., L.L.C., 219 W. Va. 266, 633 S.E.2d 22 (2006).

                                          ii
WALKER, Chief Justice:

                 Petitioners and Respondent each participated in a tax sale in 1989 after a

delinquent taxpayer failed to pay taxes on 135 acres of property1 and twenty-five percent

of its subjacent oil and gas estate. 2 Respondent bought the 135-acre property, and, on the

same day, Petitioners bought the twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate.3 In

1993, Petitioners bought another twenty-five percent interest in the same oil and gas estate

after a tax sale resulting from a different taxpayer’s tax delinquency.4 Then, almost three

decades later, despite purchasing only the 135-acre property in the 1989 tax sale,

Respondent sued Petitioners and claimed he owned the fifty percent interest in the oil and

gas estate Petitioners purchased at the prior tax sales. Respondent argued that he owned

the oil and gas interest Petitioners purchased at the 1989 tax sale because the tax assessor

assessed the former, delinquent taxpayer inappropriately. And Respondent contended that

he owned the other twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate purchased by

Petitioners in 1993 because the delinquent taxpayer had conveyed all of his oil and gas

        As used in this Opinion, “135 acres of property” or “135-acre property” means the
        1

property less its oil and gas estate.
        2
          The parties maintain, and the circuit court found, that all of the interests at stake
in this appeal are total of a fifty percent interest in the oil and gas. But, as noted in the facts
below, the deeds in the record prior to the 1991 and 1995 tax deeds refer to these interests
as interests in the “oil and gas royalty.” To avoid confusion, we will refer to these interests
as the parties did, rather than as the deeds provided.
        3
            These respective interests were conveyed to the parties by tax deeds issued in
1991.
        4
            This interest was conveyed to Petitioners by tax deed issued in 1995.
                                                1
interest years earlier and did not own the oil and gas interest for which his taxes were

delinquent. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Respondent.

              On appeal, we reverse the circuit court as to Petitioners’ 1991 deed because

Respondent, a fellow tax-sale purchaser, lacks grounds under the relevant statute to

challenge how the assessor assessed the delinquent taxpayer or the procedure by which the

sheriff sold the delinquent tax payer’s property interests. And we reverse the circuit court

as to Petitioners’ 1995 deed because the delinquent taxpayer clearly owned the twenty-five

percent interest in the oil and gas estate for which his taxes were delinquent. We remand

with directions that the circuit court enter summary judgment for Petitioners and to restore

the parties’ ownership interests to what they bargained for at the tax sales.

                I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

              In 1909, J.E. Huff conveyed a 135-acre tract known as Huff Ridge to James

W. Sivert. The deed reserved “one-half of all the oil and gas royalty” to Mr. Huff. So, Mr.

Sivert owned the 135-acre property and fifty percent of the oil and gas royalty underlying

it. Starting in 1930, the Wetzel County Assessor taxed Mr. Sivert’s unsevered oil and gas

interests separately from the remaining value of the 135-acre property.

              Next, Mr. Sivert conveyed the 135-acre property and twenty-five percent of

the oil and gas estate to Joseph and Myrtle Rogers by deed dated September 13, 1944; the

deed reserved to Mr. Sivert “one fourth of all the oil and gas royalty.” Then the Rogerses

                                              2
conveyed to Osburn Dunham, by deed dated September 8, 1945, the 135-acre property and

their twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas royalty. Mr. Sivert later conveyed “one-

fourth of all the oil and gas royalty” to Joseph Palmer by deed dated November 1, 1945.

And Mr. Palmer, by deed dated November 4, 1945, conveyed “the undivided 1/4 interest

of all the oil and gas royalty” to Mr. Dunham. So, as of November 1945, Mr. Dunham

owned the 135-acre property and fifty percent of the oil and gas royalty.5 He continued

paying separate tax assessments for the 135-acre property and subjacent oil and gas

interest.

              Then by deed dated April 22, 1968, Mr. Dunham conveyed to Russell F.

Stiles “the same land” the Rogerses conveyed to Mr. Dunham “by deed bearing the date

the 8th day of September, 1945 . . . [,]” and the deed states, “There is reserved and excepted

from this conveyance all exceptions and reservations contained in all prior deeds.” The

September 8, 1945 deed, which the 1968 deed cross-references states, “This deed is

executed subject to the reservation made by James W. [S]ivert and wife, which reads as

follows: the said parties of the first part in this deed reserves [sic] one fourth (1/4) of all

the oil and gas royalty.” After executing the 1968 deed, Mr. Dunham continued paying

taxes on his twenty-five percent interest in the oil gas estate,6 Mr. Stiles paid taxes on the

       5
         The fifty percent interest in the oil and gas estate Mr. Huff reserved in the 1909
deed is not at issue in this case.
       6
         As noted above, the parties and the circuit court refer to these royalty interests as
ownership of a percentage of the oil and gas. And for purposes of our analysis, we refer to
these interests using the parties’ and circuit court’s terminology.
                                                3
135-acre property and his twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate, and Mr.

Stiles collected royalties on only a twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate.

Also reflecting the twenty-five percent interest Mr. Dunham retained after the 1968 deed,

the 1968 land book contains a handwritten notation replacing Mr. Dunham’s “1/2” oil and

gas interest with a “1/4” interest.

              So, by 1988, Mr. Stiles owned the 135-acre property and twenty-five percent

of the subjacent oil and gas estate, and Mr. Dunham owned the other twenty-five percent

interest in the oil and gas estate at issue in this case. But that year, Mr. Stiles paid neither

the tax on the 135-acre property nor the tax on his twenty-five percent interest in the oil

and gas estate, which were separately assessed. So, upon Mr. Stiles’s tax delinquency, the

sheriff exercised his enforceable lien and sold the 135-acre property and the twenty-five

percent interest in the subjacent oil and gas rights separately at a tax sale in 1989.

Respondent Richard Erlewine bought the 135-acre property, and Petitioners Trio

Petroleum Corporation and Waco Oil & Gas Company bought Mr. Stiles’s twenty-five

percent interest in the oil and gas estate.7 The Clerk of the Wetzel County Commission

conveyed the 135-acre property to Respondent by deed dated April 1, 1991. By separate

deed dated April 1, 1991, the same Clerk of the Wetzel County Commission conveyed Mr.

Stiles’s twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate to Petitioners Trio Petroleum

       7
         Petitioners Collingwood Appalachian Minerals I, LLC, Collingwood Appalachian
Minerals III, LLC, and Oxy USA Inc. are successors in interest to Trio Petroleum
Corporation and Waco Oil & Gas Company. As used in this Opinion, “Petitioners”
includes the current petitioners and their predecessors.
                                              4
Corporation and Waco Oil & Gas Company. Then in 1992, Mr. Dunham, the owner of the

other disputed twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate, failed to pay taxes on

his interest. So, the sheriff sold it to Petitioners at a tax sale as well. The Clerk of the

Wetzel County Commission conveyed this twenty-five percent interest to them by deed

dated April 1, 1995. After the tax sales, Respondent owned the 135-acre property and

Petitioners owned fifty percent of the oil and gas estate.

              For decades following the tax sales, Respondent paid taxes on the 135-acre

property and Petitioners paid taxes on their fifty percent interest in the oil and gas estate

underlying it. Even so, on December 17, 2020, Respondent filed a complaint seeking a

declaratory judgment that he owned Petitioners’ fifty percent of the oil and gas estate. He

alleged that the 1991 Tax Deed that purportedly conveyed the twenty-five percent oil and

gas estate to Petitioners was void ab initio because the assessor lacked the authority to

separately assess the delinquent taxpayer for the 135-acre property and the unsevered

twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate. And Respondent alleged that the 1995

Tax Deed was also void ab initio because Mr. Dunham transferred his full fifty percent

interest in the oil and gas estate when he executed the 1968 deed to Mr. Stiles. So,

Respondent alleged, the Clerk of the Wetzel County Commission possessed no interest to

transfer in the 1995 Tax Deed.

              The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing on

the motions, the circuit court found the 1991 and 1995 Tax Deeds void ab initio and granted
                                              5
summary judgment for Respondent. Petitioners raise two assignments of error on appeal,

contending: (1) The 1991 Tax Deed conveyed to Petitioners a twenty-five percent interest

in the oil and gas estate because the delinquent property owner subjected his entire

ownership interest to a tax sale when he paid the taxes on neither the 135-acre property nor

the oil and gas estate, and (2) the 1995 Tax Deed conveyed to Petitioners a twenty-five

percent interest in the oil and gas estate because Mr. Dunham’s 1968 deed to Mr. Stiles

conveyed only the twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate that the Rogerses

conveyed in the 1945 deed.

                              II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

                Petitioners appeal an order granting declaratory relief to Respondent. We

apply a de novo standard of review to declaratory judgment appeals: “A circuit court’s

entry of a declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo.”8 A de novo review is anew and

unqualified.9

                                     III. ANALYSIS

A.     1991 Tax Deed

       8
         Syl. Pt. 1, City of Martinsburg v. Berkeley Cnty. Couns., 241 W. Va. 385, 825
S.E.2d 332 (2019) (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Cox v. Amick, 195 W. Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459
(1995)).
       9
           See Gastar Expl. Inc. v. Rine, 239 W. Va. 792, 798, 806 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2017).

                                             6
              The circuit court opined that “[t]he threshold issue underlying [the validity

of the 1991 Tax Deed] is whether an assessor is permitted to separately assess a sole owner

of both the surface estate and the unsevered mineral estate associated with that parcel.”

But this is not the dispositive issue as to the validity of the 1991 Tax Deed. We have held

that an assessor may not separately tax unsevered mineral estates: “In case of two

assessments of the same land, under the same claim of title, for any year, one payment of

taxes, under either assessment, is all the State can require.”10 We have also explained that

“[a] deed made pursuant to a tax sale under a void assessment is void.”11 Following this

rationale, we have voided tax deeds where the property owner paid one of two separate

assessments on his property and unsevered mineral estate. 12 But we have not voided a tax

deed where the delinquent property owner paid neither the tax on his property nor the tax

on his unsevered mineral estate. So, the threshold issue here is whether the separate,

unauthorized taxation of a mineral estate invalidates a tax deed conveying it when the

owner became delinquent on it and the tax assessed for the rest of his property interest.

       10
          Syl. Pt. 2, Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci, 246 W. Va. 26, 866 S.E.2d 91 (2021)
(quoting Syl. Pt. 2 State v. Allen, 65 W. Va. 335, 64 S.E. 140 (1909)).
       11
        Syl. Pt. 3, Id. at 26, 866 S.E.2d at 91 (quoting Syllabus point 4, Blair v. Freeburn
Coal Corp., 163 W. Va. 23, 253 S.E.2d 547 (1979)).
       12
          Bonacci, 246 W. Va. at 35, 866 S.E.2d at 100 (“the Assessor [erred when he
found] taxes to be delinquent when the erroneous, separate assessment was not timely
paid.”).

                                             7
                  The circuit court relied primarily on Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci when it

decided that separate taxation automatically voids a tax deed to a mineral estate.13 On

appeal, Petitioners argue that this case differs from Bonacci, and Respondent argues the

two cases are indistinguishable. Because we agree the case turns on Bonacci, we limit our

analysis to its application.

                  In Bonacci, the Marshall County Assessor taxed a property owner’s

unsevered oil and gas estate separately from the owner’s other property interests.14 The

owner paid the separate taxes for the first year but stopped paying the separate assessments

on the oil and gas estate after that, so the sheriff sold it at a tax sale.15 Years later, the

property owner’s successors in interest sued the tax-sale purchaser and claimed ownership

of the oil and gas estate.16 The circuit court voided the tax deed and granted summary

judgment for the property owner’s successors.17 On appeal, we clarified that under West

Virginia Code § 11-4-9 (1935), an assessor may not separately tax an unsevered mineral

estate. 18 We affirmed the circuit court’s decision to void the tax deed “because the

       13
            Id. at 26, 866 S.E.2d at 91.
       14
            Id. at 30, 866 S.E.2d at 95.
       15
            Id. at 30-31, 866 S.E.2d at 95-96.
       16
            Id. at 31, 866 S.E.2d at 96.
       17
            Id.
       18
            Id. at 34, 866 S.E.2d at 99.

                                                 8
[successors’] predecessors in interest had paid the property taxes assessed on the subject,

undivided oil and gas estate [by paying the tax on the other, unsevered interest]; the taxes

thereon were not delinquent; and no tax lien attached to the mineral estate that could be

sold at a tax sale.”19 We reasoned that because the predecessors in interest paid the tax on

the surface estate, “which includes all of its constituent parts[,]” the predecessors remained

current on the taxes for value of the mineral estate.20 We considered the payment of the

single tax “one full payment of taxes on the entirety of [the] property.”21 We deemed the

tax deed invalid because there was no tax delinquency, and we reiterated that “[a]ctual

delinquency is a condition precedent to the right to sell land under a tax assessment. There

is no such delinquency when the taxes have in fact been paid, by the owner himself or by

any other person entitled to make such payment.”22

                  This case materially differs from Bonacci because Mr. Stiles, the former

property owner, paid neither the tax on the 135-acre property nor the oil and gas estate tax

before the sheriff sold both at a tax sale; the property owner did not make the “one full

payment” on the entirety of the property to prevent the sheriff from possessing an

       19
            Id. at 29, 866 S.E.2d at 94.
       20
            Id. at 35, 866 S.E.2d at 100.
       21
            Id.
       22
            Id. (quoting State v. Allen, 65 W. Va. 335, 339, 64 S.E. 140, 142 (1909)).

                                              9
enforceable tax lien. So, unlike Bonacci, the condition precedent of actual tax delinquency

existed before the tax sale.

               The tax on an undivided property includes “all of its constituent parts,” and

when the assessor assessed the 135-acre property, a lien attached to Mr. Stiles’s entire

property interest—including the value of the property’s subjacent minerals.23 When Mr.

Stiles became delinquent on both taxes, West Virginia Code § 11A-2-1 (1941) required the

sheriff to enforce the lien, and the sheriff possessed the authority to sell the 135-acres of

property and its unsevered oil and gas estate.24 The sheriff’s separate sale of the 135-acre

property and oil and gas estate and the Clerk of the Wetzel County Commission’s

severance of title to the two through issuance of separate tax deeds proved harmless to the

former landowner who subjected the entire property to a tax sale when he paid no taxes.

As it related to the tax-sale purchasers, the process represented, if anything, an

“irregularity, error or mistake” in the “procedure leading up to and including delivery of

the tax deed[s]” to the tax-sale purchasers.25

       23
          W. Va. Code § 11A-1-2 (1961) (“There shall be a lien on all real property for the
taxes assessed thereon . . . .”).
       24
          W. Va. Code § 11A-2-1 (“Whenever any taxes become delinquent, it shall be the
duty of the sheriff to take immediate steps to enforce payment . . . .”).
       25
            W. Va. Code § 11A-3-63 (1994).

                                             10
                  Under West Virginia Code § 11A-3-63, no such irregularity, error, or mistake

invalidates a tax-sale purchaser’s tax deed unless the Legislature created a specific cause

of action allowing it:

                          No irregularity, error or mistake in respect to any step
                  in the procedure leading up to and including delivery of the tax
                  deed by the deputy commissioner shall invalidate the title
                  acquired by the purchaser unless such irregularity, error or
                  mistake is, by the provisions of section forty-nine of this article
                  or section two, three, four or six, article four of this chapter,
                  expressly made ground for instituting a suit to set aside the sale
                  or the deed.[26]

The Legislature established grounds for a person to invalidate a tax-sale purchaser’s deed

for procedural errors such as, among other reasons, when (1) a prohibited purchaser bought

the property at the tax sale, (2) all taxes were paid before the sale, (3) a tax-sale purchaser

violated specified post-sale procedures, (4) the State Auditor failed to notify certain persons

of the tax sale, or (5) a person under disability at the time of the tax sale later redeemed the

property.27 The Legislature did not specify a cause of action that allows a third party such

as Respondent, not related to the delinquent owner, to challenge a tax deed on the grounds

that the delinquent owner was improperly taxed or that the tax sale severed a mineral estate.

This is consistent with the Legislature’s stated intent “[t]o provide for the speedy and

expeditious enforcement of the tax claims of the state and its subdivisions . . . [and] reduce

the expense and burden on the state and its subdivisions of tax sales so that such sales may

       26
            Id.
       27
            See W. Va. Code §§ 11A-3-49, 11A-4-2 to 4, 6.

                                                  11
be conducted in an efficient manner while respecting the due process rights of owners of

real property . . . .”28

               We have effectuated the Legislature’s concern with maintaining efficient tax

sales and have explained the importance of their finality: “confidence in one’s title to land

is of paramount importance. As we have remarked previously, ‘certainty above all else is

the preeminent compelling public policy to be served.’” 29            Indeed, “finality and

predictability are of the utmost importance to the tax-sale process.”30 And we balance our

concern with finality with the due process rights of the former, delinquent owner.31

               We have no such due process concerns in this case where Respondent, a

fellow tax-sale purchaser, seeks to set aside Petitioners’ tax-sale deed.          Where no

countervailing due process or statutory rights of a delinquent taxpayer exist, the finality

and predictability of the tax sale are the State’s primary concerns. The circuit court ignored

       28
            W. Va. Code § 11A-3-1 (2022) (emphasis added).
       29
          Mingo Cnty. Redevelopment Auth. v. Green, 207 W. Va. 486, 491, 534 S.E.2d
40, 45 (2000) (quoting Hock v. City of Morgantown, 162 W. Va. 853, 856, 253 S.E.2d 386,
388 (1979)).
       30
            Lexington Land Co., LLC v. Howell, 211 W. Va. 644, 651, 567 S.E.2d 654, 661
(2002).
       31
           See, e.g., Lilly v. Duke, 180 W. Va. 228, 233, 376 S.E.2d 122, 127 (1988) (“If
one’s property has been wrongfully taken because of a constitutional due process violation,
it is hardly an answer to say that such person cannot bring suit because he now lacks an
interest in the property.”).

                                             12
those concerns when it disturbed Petitioners’ 1991 Tax Deed more than thirty years later

and after Petitioners and Respondent paid their taxes on and exercised dominion over their

respective interests for all that time.

               Petitioners purchased a valid tax deed to the oil and gas estate because, unlike

Bonacci, the former landowner subjected the mineral estate to tax sale when he paid no

taxes on the 135-acre property or the separately assessed oil and gas estate. And § 11A-3-

63 protects Petitioners’ title from a challenge by Respondent, a fellow tax-sale purchaser

who lacks grounds to challenge Petitioners’ tax-sale deed.

B.     1995 Tax Deed

               By its terms, Mr. Dunham’s 1968 deed to Mr. Stiles conveyed the same

property that the Rogerses conveyed to Mr. Dunham: the 135-acre property and a twenty-

five percent unsevered interest in the oil and gas estate, and the deed contained a general

exception clause that “reserved and excepted from th[e] conveyance all exceptions and

reservations contained in all prior deeds.” Even so, the circuit court found that in the 1968

deed, Mr. Dunham conveyed his entire fifty percent interest in the oil and gas estate to Mr.

Stiles. So, the circuit court reasoned that Mr. Dunham owned no interest in the mineral

estate that the 1995 Tax Deed could convey.

               On appeal, Petitioners argue that the 1968 deed’s plain language conveyed

the same twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate that the Rogerses conveyed

                                              13
to Mr. Dunham in the 1945 deed. They reason that the 1968 deed conveyed “the same

land” as the 1945 deed between the Rogerses and Mr. Dunham which reflected Mr.

Dunham’s intent to replicate that conveyance and convey the same 135-acre property and

twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate that the Rogerses conveyed to him. In

other words, they argue the 1968 deed cross-referenced the 1945 deed to explain the

conveyance and to incorporate its express reservation of a twenty-five percent interest in

the oil and gas estate. They also argue that Mr. Dunham’s and Mr. Stiles’s conduct after

executing the 1968 deed reflects their intent for Mr. Dunham to convey only a twenty-five

percent interest in the oil and gas estate.

              When construing a deed, our goal is to effectuate the parties’ intent whenever

possible:

                      In construing a deed, will, or other written instrument,
              it is the duty of the court to construe it as a whole, taking and
              considering all the parts together, and giving effect to the
              intention of the parties wherever that is reasonably clear and
              free from doubt, unless to do so will violate some principle of
              law inconsistent therewith.[32]

The Legislature also directs us to look to the parties’ intent when we decide whether a

grantor reserved a specific property interest in a conveyance:

                     When any real property is conveyed or devised to any
              person, and no words of limitation are used in the conveyance
              or devise, such conveyance or devise shall be construed to pass

       32
         DWG Oil and Gas Acquisitions LLC, v. S. Country Farms, Inc., 238 W. Va. 414,
418-19, 796 S.E.2d 201, 205-06 (2017) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Maddy v. Maddy, 87 W. Va.
581, 105 S.E. 803 (1921) (emphasis removed).

                                              14
                the fee simple, or the whole estate or interest, legal or equitable,
                which the testator or grantor had power to dispose of, in such
                real property, unless a contrary intention shall appear in the
                conveyance or will.[33]

When applying this statute, we have explained, “[i]n order to create an exception or

reservation in a deed which would reduce a grant in a conveyance clause which is clear,

correct and conventional, such exception or reservation must be expressed in certain and

definite language.”34

                When a deed is unambiguous, we generally consider only its text to

determine the grantor’s intent. A deed is ambiguous when susceptible to differing or

doubtful meanings: “The term ‘ambiguity’ is defined as language reasonably susceptible

of two different meanings or language of such doubtful meaning that reasonable minds

might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.”35

                In this instance, the 1945 deed, which the 1968 deed cross-references,

clarifies that the conveyance is “subject to [Mr. Sivert’s] reservation” of “one fourth (1/4)

of all the oil and gas royalty.” Mr. Dunham later obtained the twenty-five percent interest

that Mr. Sivert reserved in the 1945 deed. So, when Mr. Dunham conveyed in the 1968

       33
            W. Va. Code § 36-1-11 (1931) (emphasis added).
       34
            Syl. Pt. 2, Hall v. Hartley, 146 W. Va. 328, 119 S.E.2d 759 (1961).
       35
         Syl. Pt. 4, Est. of Tawney v. Columbia Nat. Res., L.L.C., 219 W. Va. 266, 633
S.E.2d 22 (2006).

                                                15
deed the “same land” as the 1945 deed and subjected it to Mr. Sivert’s twenty-five percent

reservation, he expressly reserved that twenty-five percent interest.        Mr. Dunham

unambiguously expressed his intent to convey the “same land” as the 1945 deed and in the

very next sentence subjected the conveyance to the same twenty-five percent reservation

contained in it. So, we find the language reasonably susceptible to only one meaning: Mr.

Dunham conveyed to Mr. Stiles the same property interests that the Rogerses conveyed to

Mr. Dunham—not Mr. Sivert’s additional twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas

estate that Mr. Dunham later obtained and which was expressly reserved. By conveying

the “same land” as the Rogerses’ 1945 deed, the 1968 deed obviously did not convey Mr.

Dunham’s other twenty-five percent interest in the oil and gas estate because that would

be more than the Rogerses ever owned. Our interpretation of the 1968 deed is consistent

with § 36-1-11 because the deed demonstrates Mr. Dunham’s “contrary intention” to devise

less than his whole interest. We need not consider Mr. Dunham’s and Mr. Stiles’s course

of conduct to interpret the unambiguous deed.

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

              For these reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s January 21, 2022 order

granting summary judgment for Respondent. As the parties understood three decades ago

at the tax sales, the 1991 and 1995 Tax Deeds together conveyed a fifty percent interest in

the mineral estate to Petitioners. We remand for the circuit court to enter summary

judgment in their favor.

                                            16
     Reversed and Remanded.

17