Court Opinion

ID: 9664471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:19:31.206949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:06.523808
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
concurring specially.
In Petition of Dengler, 246 N.W.2d 758 (N.D.1976), this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dengler’s application to change his name to “1069.” We declined to adopt the rule that there should be a substantial reason to justify a refusal to grant a name change, because the change of name was to a number. I do not agree with the Court’s exception in Dengler but that is beside the point because in the case before us, Mees is not seeking to change his name to a number and so the rule of substantial reason should apply.
In Petition of Dengler, supra, we said that our name-change statute is not exclusive but instead supplements the common law. Id. At common law, one has a general right to change one’s name, absent a fraudulent purpose: “There is nothing in the common law requiring a showing of a compelling need to justify a change of name and any such requirement is inconsistent with the common-law principle that names may be changed in the absence of a fraudulent purpose.” 57 Am.Jur.2d Name § 17 at 665. Thus, although it is discretionary with the trial court to grant or deny a name change, there must be a fraudulent purpose to justify denying the change or some equally substantial reason. See Re Application of Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637 (Minn.1979).
I think the district court found that Mees had a fraudulent purpose in seeking a name change but I am not sure why. If it *175concluded that a convict’s pursuit of a fresh start via a change of name is impermissible as a matter of law, I am skeptical. If it determined as a matter of fact that Mees had a fraudulent purpose, I would like to know why. Therefore, I concur in remanding for an explication and if the trial court deems it appropriate, for a hearing.