Court Opinion

ID: 9637270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:01:54.500233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:54.949152
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result).
1. The opinion holds that American copyright is secured by publication abroad without the notice of copyright admittedly required for publication here. This novel conclusion, here suggested for the first time, seems to me impossible in the face of the statutory language that the person *489thereto entitled “may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this title,” § 9 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 9, and § 18, defining the “notice of copyright required by section 9 of this title,” with the provision that as to a work of the character here involved “the notice shall include also the year in which the copyright was secured by publication.” It is against the view of such expert copyright judges as Hough, J., in Italian Book Co. v. Cardilli, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 273 F. 619, and Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 212 F. 301, affirmed 2 Cir., 218 F. 577, certiorari denied 235 U.S. 704, 35 S.Ct. 209, 59 L.Ed. 433, and Woolsey, J., in Basevi v. Edward O’Toole Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 26 F.Supp. 41,1 and apparently the universal assumption of text writers. See Howell, The Copyright Law, 1942, 73; Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, 1938, 698; Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property, 1944, 217; Copyright Protection in the Americas (Law & Treaty Series No. 16) 66; 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property, § 66, p. 190.
While the ground of the decision is not made clear, apparently it is based upon the second part of § 9, reading as follows: “and such notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United States by authority of the copyright proprietor, except in the case of books seeking ad interim protection under section 21 of this title.” But this deals with the preserving of the copyright after the original publication lias secured it, Sieff v. Continental Auto Supply, Inc., D. C.Minn., 39 F.Supp. 683; Fleischer Studios v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 2 Cir., 73 F.2d 276, certiorari denied Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc. v. Fleischer Studios, 294 U.S. 717, 55 S.Ct. 516, 79 L.Ed. 1250; Basevi v. Edward O’Toole Co., supra; Record & Guide Co. v. Bromley, C.C.E.D.Pa., 175 F. 156; 18 C.J.S., Copyright and Litefary Property, § 71, p. 193, and is indeed the only direct requirement for notice of the already acquired copyright. Other sections rest upon such a requirement, e.g., § 18 as to the form of notice, § 19 as to its location on the publication, and § 20 dealing with the effect of accidental omission of notice from a copy or copies. The second part of § 9, therefore, does not destroy the effect of what is said in the first part of the same section.
There is nothing in § 12 to support the stated thesis. That section requires deposit of copies before an action of infringement is brought, but explicitly applies only “after copyright has been secured by publication of the work with the notice of copyright as provided in section 9 of this title.” Hence its amendment in 1914, to require only one copy (instead of two) of a work by a citizen of a foreign state published abroad, while perhaps affording some additional evidence that § 9 was intended to include publication abroad, 18 C.J.S., Copyright and Literary Property, § 66, p. 191, contains nothing to suggest the exception here read into § 9.2 Moreover, the reference in § 9 to hooks seeking ad interim protection under § 21 is significant; the latter section affords protection to a limited class of publications — books first published abroad in the English language — under a special procedure; all others must follow the general procedure and preserve their copyright in America by affixing the required notice to copies published or offered for sale. The provision does include, at least by implication, the rule settled by United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 28 S.Ct. 290, 52 L.Ed. 478, that notice of copyright must be carried only on copies published or offered for sale here; but it does not suggest an exception, operating against American authors, in the process of originally securing the copyright by publication.3
*490The opinion seeks further support because the requirement would achieve “no practical purpose.” There perhaps may be some doubt as to the utility of any notice; it is said not to be required in “most foreign countries.” Howell, 73. But if Congress thought it a necessary requirement for the literary monopoly it granted, common fairness would seem to suggest that it apply also to publication abroad, or at least that foreign publication be not made notoriously easier and more profitable than domestic publication. And the required notice does furnish a certain amount of information and warning to competitors and possible infringers, perhaps enough-to warn them away from infringement in many an obvious case. That more drastic requirements might have accomplished more does not justify elimination of those which were specifically retained.
Since, therefore, the record shows incorrect dating of the Hungarian publication, we must face the decision in Baker v. Taylor, C.C.S.D.N.Y., Fed.Cas.No. 782, that statement of a later than the actual date invalidates a copyright, and the general view that it still represents the law. See, e.g., American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 2 Cir., 282 F. 829, 836; Howell, 66; Ladas, 746; Shatter, 98. True, in Baker v. Taylor,. supra, there was more than a mistake, for the error was persisted in after it was discovered. But it is difficult to get away from the rationale suggested in the cases that stating a later date is a more serious mistake than stating an earlier date, for the former may be a wrong to the public as extending the term, while the latter at most only penalizes the copyright owner. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 654, 657, 9 S.Ct. 177, 32 L.Ed. 547. Sec. 20 of the Act does not help, for this is not the case of omission of the notice by accident or mistake “from a particular copy or copies,” but a mistake in the publication by which the original copyright was secured. The liberalizing trend shown by the Act of 1909 does not appear to have extended to this requirement, and I fear that on the authorities we must hold the copyright invalid. On that ground alone, and with some hesitation, I would support the judgment below.
2. Except for the question as to the copyright I would think the plaintiff quite entitled to judgment, since, notwithstanding the apparently trifling value of the verse, as distinguished from the refrain, of popular music, the evidence is strong as to copying and access and defendants’ answering evidence is significantly weak. Franchetti’s verse was a “Chinese copy” of plaintiff’s song in its significant parts, and so similar in the others that, as the trial judge said, substantial identity does not appear to be seriously controverted. As to the reference to Dvorak’s “Humoreske,” since plaintiff’s song is quite different in rhythmic values, setting, and arrangement from the latter, the similar musical progression found in the midst of certain measures of the latter (in itself simple enough before touched by Dvorak’s genius) does not prevent copyright by plaintiff; and the only use of the material is in the attempt — clearly unsuccessful — to make Franchetti’s disclaimer of infringement seem “plausible.” Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 2 Cir., 81 F.2d 49, 54, certiorari denied Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Sheldon, 298 U.S. 669, 56 S.Ct. 835, 80 L.Ed. 1392; Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 298 F. 145.
Proof of access on the part of Pasternak was direct and immediate while both were in Hungary; and again there was direct evidence of submission of the song to him at the very time use of Franchetti’s song was becoming important in November, 1940. True, Franch'etti claims a somewhat indefinite date of composition which would be earlier, and shows a transfer of “Dancing Doll” to his lyricist in April, 1940. But defendants’ testimony is convincing on the point noted above, that the refrain is practically everything, the verse being essentially only filler for the sheet music trade. And Franchetti in his April, 1940/ transfer warranted in explicit detail that his song was original, which can be true' only on the assumption, supported by the surrounding circumstances, that his verse was not written until the need for it arose. In the light of this, the weak general denials of his interrogatories and the strange absence of supporting testimony from Pasternak and his lyricist seem to me pretty *491conclusive. Even though the judge did not see or hear the important witnesses, we cannot disregard his findings for that reason, Advisory Committee’s Note to F.R. 52(a) ; 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, 1945 Cum.Supp. 116; but I think we are entitled to reject his conclusion because he gave no weight to defendants’ failure, with the witnesses obviously available to them, to rebut plaintiff’s persuasive case.
I may add that if in Arnstein v. Porter, 2 Cir., 154 F.2d 464, copying could be suggested by mere sound in the case of dissimilar compositions, this exact reproduction, together with evidence of access, would seem to me to show copying a fortiori. This the opinion at first seems to accept, in its various steps refuting the grounds taken below — particularly the claimed defeat of copyright because of similarity to the “Humoreske” — and it supports this result with some intriguing historical allusions, which, however, have relevancy only in support of a reversal. But ultimately it comes to rest upon a point directly opposed to that taken below, the banality of the music, though the District Court had said of the melody shared between these composers, “There is no lack of ingenuity here.” 51 F.Supp. 233. Surely, if the Arnstein case teaches us anything, it must be that banality is no bar to a claim for plagiarism. That results at once so divergent and so musically astonishing as the decisions in these two cases can occur simultaneously I can attribute only to the novel conceptions of legal plagiarism first announced in the Arnstein case and now repeated here. By these the issue is no longer one of musical similarity or identity to justify the conclusion of copying — an issue to be decided with all the intelligence, musical as well as legal, we can bring to bear upon it — but is one, first, of copying, to be decided more or less intelligently, and, second, of illicit copying, to be decided blindly on a mere cacophony of sounds. Just at which stage decision here has occurred, I am not sure.

 Moreover, no such exception is hinted at in general discussions of the subject in eases such as Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 59 S.Ct. 397, 83 L.Ed. 470, United States v. Backer, 2 Cir., 134 F.2d 533, Advertisers Exchange v. Anderson, 8 Cir., 144 F.2d 907, and other cases cite'd below.

 Therefore the suggested distinction of Judge Hough’s decision in Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, supra, as applying to a copyright secured before 1914, is inadequate.

 This view is also supported by the legislative history of § 9, showing that the words “in the United States” originally appeared in the first, or crucial, part of the statute. Howell, loe. cit. supra. In that earlier form, restricting the securing of copyright to publication in the United States, the requirement of publication with notice was unambiguous. But the broadening of the provision as to place of publication was not accompanied by any change at all as to the requirement of notice. Of course there *490does now arise the question, not yet settled, whether faulty publication abroad may be superseded by later correct publication here. Cf. Howell, loc. cit. supra; Ladas, op. cit. supra at 696; Shafter, Musical Copyright, 2d Ed.1939, 118; 18 C.J.S., Copyright and Literary Property, § 25, pp. 166, 167; Italian Book Co. v. Cardilli, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 273 F. 619.