Court Opinion

ID: 9952714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 16:07:01.689536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:44.381064
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Mar 20 2024, 9:34 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                           Osama Shibli,
                                        Appellant-Defendant

                                                   v.

                                         State of Indiana,
                                          Appellee-Plaintiff

                                           March 20, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          23A-CR-1339
                  Interlocutory Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court
                         The Honorable Stephenie K. Gookins, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                       29D06-2211-F6-7716

                               Opinion by Judge Bradford
                        Chief Judge Altice and Judge Felix concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024                           Page 1 of 8
      Bradford, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   After Osama Shibli moved back to Indiana, the State charged him with two

      counts of Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex or violent offender based on

      a prior conviction for child molesting in Indiana. Shibli moved to dismiss the

      charges, which motion the trial court denied. Shibli petitioned for interlocutory

      appeal, which the trial court granted and over which we accepted jurisdiction.

      Shibli argues that the sex-offender registration requirement, as applied to him,

      violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In 1998, Shibli was convicted of two counts of Class C felony child molesting in

      Indiana, for which the trial court sentenced him to eight years of incarceration.

      Shibli was released to parole and advised of his obligation to register as a sex

      offender under the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (the “SORA”). At

      the time of his conviction, Shibli was required by Indiana law to register as a

      sex offender for ten years.

[3]   In January of 2003, Shibli transferred his parole to Florida. Florida law

      required that Shibli register as a sex offender for life. In 2007, Shibli moved to

      Syria; however, prior to moving, he had signed a “Florida Department of Law

      Enforcement Predator/Offender Registration” form, in which he acknowledged

      that if he gained employment in another state, or became a resident of another
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024          Page 2 of 8
      state, he would also be required to register as a sex offender in that state.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 12.

[4]   In 2021, Shibli and his wife purchased a home in Fishers and Shibli obtained

      employment in Indianapolis. At this time, Shibli did not register as a sex

      offender. In November of 2022, the State charged Shibli with two counts of

      Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex or violent offender. On January 9,

      2023, Shibli moved to dismiss the charges. On March 16, 2023, the trial court

      conducted a hearing, after which it denied Shibli’s motion to dismiss.

      Discussion and Decision
[5]   Shibli argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because

      the sex-offender registration requirement, as applied to him, violates Indiana’s

      Ex Post Facto Clause. A defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the

      evidence, all of the facts necessary to support his motion to dismiss. Ackerman

      v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 177 (Ind. 2016). Because Shibli is appealing from the

      denial of a motion to dismiss, he is appealing from a negative judgment, which

      “we will reverse only if the evidence is without conflict and leads inescapably to

      the conclusion that [Shibli] is entitled to a dismissal.” Barnett v. State, 867

      N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[6]   We review whether the SORA violates Indiana’s ex post facto provision de

      novo, State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368, 369 (Ind. 2016), which it does “if it

      substantially disadvantages a defendant because it increases his punishment,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024           Page 3 of 8
      changes the elements of or ultimate facts necessary to prove the offense, or

      deprives a defendant of some defense or lesser punishment that was available at

      the time of the crime.” Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 2011)

      (cleaned up). The purpose of our prohibition against ex post facto laws “is to

      give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning

      of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Wallace v. State, 905

      N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind. 2009).

[7]   Shibli acknowledges that, after he had been convicted in 1998, Indiana law had

      required him to register as a sex offender in Indiana for ten years and that

      Florida law had required him to register for life. However, Shibli takes issue

      with the 2007 amendment to the SORA, which provides: “A person who is

      required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register

      [in Indiana] for the period required by the other jurisdiction.” Ind. Code § 11-8-

      8-19(f). Specifically, Shibli argues that this reciprocal-registration requirement,

      as applied to him, is an ex post facto punishment. We disagree.

[8]   We conclude that Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016) controls. In that

      case, Ammons had been convicted of child molesting in 1989, prior to the

      passage of the SORA. Id. at 144. In 2009, after being released and completing

      parole, Ammons moved to Iowa, where he was required to register as a sex

      offender for ten years. Id. In 2013, Ammons returned to Indiana and the State

      informed him that he was required to register as a sex offender. Id. Ammons

      sought removal from the registry, which motion the trial court denied. Id. The

      Indiana Supreme Court concluded that there was no ex post facto violation and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024           Page 4 of 8
       “statutes requiring an Indiana resident to register were non-punitive in intent

       and effects when applied to an offender already required to register in another

       jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d at 369–71). The Court reasoned that

       when Ammons had moved back to Indiana in 2013, “Indiana law required […]

       that offenders who are under a registration obligation in another state must

       register when they move to Indiana[,]” so requiring registration in Indiana

       imposed no additional punishment. Id. at 144.

[9]    Shibli attempts to distinguish Ammons from his case. In doing so, Shibli argues

       that Ammons had been charged with another crime in Iowa—namely, failing to

       register—whereas Shibli has never been convicted of any other offense requiring

       registration outside of his Indiana conviction. Shibli also notes that, unlike

       Ammons, he had moved out of Indiana before the reciprocal-registration

       amendment had been enacted and that Florida, unlike Iowa, imposed a

       lifetime-registration requirement. Additionally, Shibli points out that he did not

       simply move from state to state, but out of the country and back. These unique

       facts, Shibli argues, differentiate his case from Ammons and necessitate an

       intent-effects test analysis.

[10]   We fail to see how any of these factual distinctions remove this case from

       Ammons’s holding that “statutes requiring an Indiana resident to register were

       non-punitive in intent and effects when applied to an offender already required

       to register in another jurisdiction.” Ammons, 50 N.E.3d at 144 (citing Zerbe, 50

       N.E.3d at 369–71). Shibli, like Ammons, had been required to register in a

       different state based on his Indiana conviction for child molesting. Both

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024        Page 5 of 8
       Shibli’s and Ammons’s requirements to register in Indiana ultimately were

       based on their Indiana convictions, not additional child-molesting convictions

       in other states. Florida law, moreover, required Shibli to register for life and,

       while Shibli had moved out of Indiana before the reciprocal-registration

       amendment was enacted, he is presumed to have known upon his return to

       Indiana that Indiana law would require him to register. Cain v. State, 36 Ind.

       App. 51, 51, 74 N.E. 1102, 1104 (1905) (“All residents and citizens of the state

       are presumed to know its law, both civil and criminal.”). Shibli’s moving from

       Florida to Syria before returning to Indiana did not undercut his obligation to

       register.

[11]   Moreover, Shibli argues that his registration requirement is “based solely on

       Florida law, and not on any additional registerable offense.” Appellant’s Br. p.

       12. However, it “is immaterial to the analysis whether Indiana law is

       maintaining, extending, or modifying its own duties or those of another state.

       Likewise, it is irrelevant where or when the conviction occurred, as long as

       another state imposed a lawful registration obligation on the offender[.]” Hope

       v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 523 (7th Cir. 2021). The Indiana

       Supreme Court has also held that “[m]aintaining a registry requirement across

       state lines does not amount to a punitive burden.” Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88,

       90 (Ind. 2016); see also Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 392 (Ind. 2009)

       (concluding there was no “greater burden on Jensen” in extending his

       registration requirement where the burden of registering had already been

       imposed). Consequently, we cannot say that requiring Shibli to register based

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024          Page 6 of 8
       on his Florida obligation imposes an additional criminal penalty in violation of

       Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause.

[12]   In any event, Shibli signed a “Florida Department of Law Enforcement

       Predator/Offender Registration” form, in which he acknowledged that if he

       gained employment in another state, or became a resident of another state,

       including Indiana, he must also register as a sex offender in that state.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 12. This strikes us as “contractual in nature,”

       similar to a plea agreement, “binding the defendant, the state, and the trial

       court.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004) (noting the contractual

       nature of plea agreements). Because Florida law had already required Shibli to

       register for life, and he had signed an agreement with the State of Florida

       agreeing to register in any other state if he became a resident of another state,

       we conclude that Indiana’s reciprocal-registration requirement does not result in

       additional punishment on Shibli, there is no ex post facto violation, and we

       need not proceed with an analysis of the SORA under the intent-effects test.

[13]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Amanda C. Price
       Baldwin Perry & Wiley, P.C.
       Franklin, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024          Page 7 of 8
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024   Page 8 of 8