Court Opinion

ID: 9765252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:57:11.115885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:07.063589
License: Public Domain

Acting Chief Justice PLEICONES:
I dissent in part and concur in part. I agree that the question of the existence of a duty is one for the Court, and that policy concerns must govern our decision to extend the duty of a diagnosing physician to a third party. I also agree that we must tread warily where the diagnosis sought to be challenged is that of sexual abuse of a child. Moreover, these concerns lead me to agree that negligence alone is not the *565appropriate standard for the duty. I would hold, however, that a professional owes a duty to third persons to refrain from examining and diagnosing a child as a victim of sexual abuse in a reckless manner.2 In finding such a duty, I have considered not only the stigma that attaches to a person accused of such abuse, but also of the suffering of a child falsely labeled a sexual abuse victim.
I would reverse the order of the circuit court as I find that appellant pled that respondent recklessly misdiagnosed sexual abuse, and thus alleged a breach of the duty that I would recognize today.

. That is, by consciously failing to exercise due care. E.g., McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Sys., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996).