Court Opinion

ID: 9947783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 17:13:46.876926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:33.824808
License: Public Domain

J-S02026-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ERIC PATTERSON                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 186 EDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 6, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0008949-2018

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED MARCH 5, 2024

       Eric Patterson (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

       This Court previously detailed the underlying facts:

               On the afternoon of October 31, 2018, Officer Anthony
       Hurley, an eleven-year veteran of the Philadelphia police force,
       received a radio call that there was an individual wearing a black
       jacket and blue pants with a gun in the area of a drug treatment
       facility on 2558 North Front Street in Philadelphia. When Officer
       Hurley arrived on the scene, a security guard and two other
       individuals were pointing at [Appellant], who was walking nearby
       on Huntingdon Street, and informed Officer Hurley that
       [Appellant] had pointed his gun at the security guard. Officer
       Hurley approached [Appellant], who was wearing a black jacket
       and blue pants, in his police vehicle and asked [Appellant] to come
       over to his vehicle. [Appellant] complied, and Officer Hurley
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S02026-24

       patted [Appellant] down in order to determine whether he had a
       gun on his person. Office[r] Hurley asked [Appellant] what had
       happened, to which [Appellant] responded that he had gotten into
       an argument with the security guard because the drug treatment
       facility had refused to give him treatment.

             Officer Hurley then placed [Appellant] in the backseat of the
       police vehicle so that he could go to speak with the witnesses.
       Before leaving to speak with the witnesses, however, Officer
       Hurley noticed [Appellant] fidgeting in the back seat of the vehicle.
       Officer Hurley then opened the door to the police vehicle and
       observed [Appellant] attempting to hide a gun magazine under
       the back seat. Officer Hurley recovered the magazine, which
       contained seven live rounds of .9mm bullets, and then handcuffed
       [Appellant].   Subsequently, Officer Hurley noticed a firearm
       holster on the sidewalk approximately 15 to 20 feet from where
       Officer Hurley had originally stopped [Appellant]. Officer Hurley
       also discovered a loaded firearm on top of a box in a trashcan
       approximately 5 feet from where the firearm holster was
       recovered. The ammunition in the magazine fit and functioned in
       the gun that was recovered. Thereafter, [Appellant], who had
       previously committed an enumerated felony that prohibited him
       from possessing a firearm, was placed under arrest.

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 256 A.3d 1, 1252 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super.

2021) (unpublished memorandum at 1-3) (citation and brackets omitted).

       The Commonwealth charged Appellant with persons not to possess

firearms1 (firearms prohibited), as well as two other firearms offenses that the

Commonwealth subsequently withdrew. On April 29, 2019, Appellant filed a

pre-trial motion to suppress (suppression motion) the physical evidence and

Appellant’s statements to Officer Hurley, claiming the Officer subjected him to

an unlawful stop and frisk, and improperly questioned him without first

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a).

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providing the required Miranda2 warnings.3           The trial court denied the

suppression motion after a hearing on May 31, 2019.

       As we discuss further below, Appellant rejected the Commonwealth’s

pre-trial guilty plea agreement offer (proposing a sentence of two to four years

in prison) on the record, after an oral colloquy. See N.T., 8/20/19, at 11-14.

During the colloquy, Appellant confirmed that 1) he takes prescription Zyprexa

for “anxiety, depression”; and 2) this medicine would not influence his ability

to understand the proceedings and make knowing decisions. Id. at 10-11.

The trial court found that Appellant had rejected the plea offer knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. at 14.

       A jury convicted Appellant of firearms prohibited on August 21, 2019.

The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered the preparation of a pre-

sentence investigation report (PSI) and a mental health evaluation.4

____________________________________________

2See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements
obtained from defendants during a custodial interrogation, without full
warning of constitutional rights, are inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment).

3 Appellant was represented by several attorneys with the Defender
Association of Philadelphia prior to trial, at trial, and in post-trial proceedings.
We collectively refer to these attorneys as “trial counsel.”

4 Although the original certified record did not contain Appellant’s PSI or
mental health evaluation, the trial court included them in a supplemental
record filed in this Court on February 9, 2024.

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       On February 7, 2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 10 to 20

years in prison.5     Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion (PSM) for

reconsideration of sentence, which explained an incident that occurred at

sentencing:

       After [Appellant’s] allocution and as [the trial court] began to
       render the sentence, [Appellant] interrupted with an expression
       of disfavor, eventually completely lost his temper and proceeded
       to scream profanities at [the trial court,] while imitating the sound
       of gunshots. [The trial court] ordered [Appellant] to be removed
       from the courtroom.

PSM, 2/18/20, ¶ 11; see also N.T., 2/7/20 (sentencing), at 44 (trial court

responding to Appellant’s outburst by stating, “For the record[, Appellant] just

shouted repeated profanities at me, gave me the finger, and acted in a way

that I deem to be a threat.”).6 In the PSM, Appellant expressed remorse for

his outburst and asked the trial court to “interpret [Appellant’s] outburst as a

cry for help and not a reflection of his character or true potential.”         PSM,

2/18/20, ¶ 14; see also id. (stating Appellant “takes 15mg of Zyprexa at

night, which ‘should work’ through the next day” for his mental health

conditions, but clarifying that Appellant nevertheless “does not blame” his

____________________________________________

5 As we discuss further below, the sentence constituted an upward departure

from the sentencing guidelines range. See N.T., 2/7/20, at 49.

6 The trial court found Appellant in contempt of court and sentenced him to

three to six months in prison, consecutive to the sentence for firearms
prohibited, “for his outrageous behavior that he [] exhibited during this
sentencing hearing.” N.T., 2/7/20, at 44.

                                           -4-
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mental health conditions for his outburst at sentencing). The trial court denied

the PSM on June 9, 2020.

      Appellant timely filed a direct appeal, raising two claims: 1) the trial

court erred in denying Appellant’s suppression motion, where Officer Hurley

frisked and questioned Appellant without first providing Miranda warnings;

and 2) the court improperly permitted admission of certain out-of-court

statements into evidence that were inadmissible under the rule against

hearsay and did not meet any exception. Patterson, 256 A.3d 1 (unpublished

memorandum at 5-6). This Court rejected Appellant’s claims and affirmed the

judgment of sentence. Id. (unpublished memorandum at 6-18). Appellant

petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for allowance of appeal; the

Supreme Court denied the petition. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 265 A.3d

200 (Pa. 2021).

      On January 4, 2022, Appellant, pro se, filed the instant, timely PCRA

petition, his first. The PCRA court subsequently appointed Appellant counsel,

who filed an amended PCRA petition on May 4, 2022, raising four allegations

of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Amended PCRA Petition, 5/4/22, ¶ 32.

      The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the PCRA petition on

October 11, 2022, asserting all of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims lacked

merit. See Motion to Dismiss, 10/11/22, at 5-16. On November 3, 2022, the

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PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s

petition without an evidentiary hearing.7 Appellant did not respond.

       On January 6, 2023, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition,

without an evidentiary hearing. This timely appeal followed. Appellant and

the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents five issues for review:

       I.    [Whether] trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
             counsel for failing to advance a meritorious Miranda theory
             to suppress[?]

       II.   [Whether] trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
             counsel for failing to properly advise Appellant concerning the
             plea offer[?]

       III. [Whether] trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
            counsel for neglecting to do any investigation regarding
            Appellant’s mental health[,] which led to Appellant being tried
            while incompetent[?]

       IV. [Whether] appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance
           for failing to appeal [the] denial of Appellant’s [PSM] to
           reconsider Appellant’s excessive sentence[?]

       V.    [Whether] the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA
             petition without an evidentiary hearing on the issues
             presented in the amended PCRA petition[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (issues reordered; capitalization modified).

       “We review the denial of PCRA relief by examining whether the PCRA

court’s conclusions are supported by the record and free from legal error.”

____________________________________________

7 In the Rule 907 notice, the PCRA court detailed its reasons for concluding

each of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims lacked merit.        Rule 907 Notice,
11/3/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

                                           -6-
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 979 (Pa. 2023) (citing

Commonwealth v. Housman, 226 A.3d 1249, 1260 (Pa. 2020)). The scope

of our review is “limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of

record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial

level.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa. 2011) (citation

omitted).

      Appellant raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. “[W]e begin,

as we    must, with the      presumption that counsel       acted effectively.”

Johnson, 289 A.3d at 979 (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 82 A.3d

998, 1005 (Pa. 2013)); see also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345,

380 (Pa. 2011) (“When evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” (citation and quotation

marks omitted)).

      A PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by a
      preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
      resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the
      circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
      determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
      innocence could have taken place.”

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (quoting 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)).

     In order to establish a claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner must

plead and prove:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) he
      suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice

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      measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result
      of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v.
      Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (employing ineffective
      assistance of counsel test from Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
      A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)). … Additionally, counsel cannot be
      deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Finally,
      because a PCRA petitioner must establish all the Pierce prongs to
      be entitled to relief, we are not required to analyze the elements
      of an ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if a claim
      fails under any required element, we may dismiss the claim on
      that basis.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (citations

modified).

      Here, Appellant argues in his first issue that the PCRA court improperly

denied relief on his claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “failing to

advance a meritorious Miranda theory to suppress under both the functional

equivalent of an arrest and functional equivalent of an interrogation theories.”

Appellant’s Brief at 17 (capitalization modified); see also id. at 17-25.

Appellant concedes that trial counsel filed a suppression motion claiming that

(1) “[Appellant] was subjected to a custodial interrogation, and [police] failed

to give him Miranda warnings”; and (2) police “lacked probable cause to

arrest Appellant at the scene….” Id. at 18; see also Suppression Motion,

4/29/19. Nevertheless, Appellant claims he is entitled to relief on his instant

claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to raise a “meritorious” claim

in the suppression motion respecting the Miranda issue.          See Appellant’s

Brief at 17-18, 24. Specifically, Appellant contends that the theories of relief

he presently contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise in the

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suppression motion (i.e., “the functional equivalent of an arrest and functional

equivalent of an interrogation theories” id. at 17), are distinct from the

“frivolous” theory that trial counsel actually litigated.   Id. at 24 (“During

Appellant’s suppression hearing, trial counsel’s argument focused solely on

the fact that Officer Hurley lacked probable cause to place Appellant in the …

patrol car, and once Appellant was placed in the patrol car, he should have

been read his Miranda warnings.”); see also Memorandum of Law in Support

of Amended PCRA Petition, 5/4/22, at 15, 20-21.

      To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must show that

“the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.”       42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).     “An issue is previously litigated if ‘the highest

appellate court in which [appellant] could have had review as a matter of right

has ruled on the merits of the issue.’” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d

287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2)).          Notably, our

Supreme Court has stated that a PCRA petitioner “cannot obtain post-

conviction review of claims that were previously litigated by alleging

ineffectiveness of prior counsel and presenting new theories to support

the previously litigated versions of the claims.”           Commonwealth v.

Lambert, 797 A.2d 232, 240 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis added; citations omitted);

see also Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 39 (Pa. 2002) (“a PCRA

petitioner cannot obtain review of claims that were previously litigated by

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presenting new theories of relief, including allegations of ineffectiveness, to

relitigate previously litigated claims.”).

      Here, trial counsel’s suppression motion raised a claim that police

subjected Appellant to a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings.

See N.T., 6/3/19 (suppression hearing), at 4 (trial counsel stating that the

grounds for suppression of evidence was “that it was a custodial interrogation,

and that [Appellant’s] Miranda rights were not read to him.”). Appellant’s

appellate counsel challenged the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion

on direct appeal, see Patterson, 256 A.3d 1 (unpublished memorandum at

6), and this Court rejected the claim.       Id. at 10 (holding “Officer Hurley’s

initial questioning of Appellant … was not a ‘custodial interrogation’ such that

the officer was required to first administer [Appellant] his Miranda

warnings.”); see also id. (additionally holding, “we do not find that when

Officer Hurley placed [Appellant] in his police cruiser that the investigative

detention transformed into a custodial arrest, and thus, required the

suppression of all evidence seized thereafter.” (footnote omitted)).

      Accordingly, as Appellant’s underlying claim was previously litigated and

rejected, he is not entitled to relief on his instant claim of trial counsel’s

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ineffectiveness.8 See Lambert, 797 A.2d at 240 (PCRA petitioners cannot

obtain PCRA relief on previously litigated claims by “presenting new theories

to support the previously litigated versions of the claims.”); 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9543(a)(3). Thus, Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief.

       In his second issue, Appellant argues the PCRA court improperly denied

relief on his claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “fail[ing] to properly

advise Appellant” with respect to the Commonwealth’s pre-trial guilty plea

agreement offer. Appellant’s Brief at 25. Appellant asserts that, but for trial

counsel’s failure to adequately advise about the plea offer and the

consequences of proceeding to trial, Appellant would have accepted the plea

agreement. Id. at 26-27. According to Appellant, trial counsel (1) “gave no

advice as to whether [Appellant] should accept the plea offer or not”; (2) “had

no reasonable basis for going to trial”; and (3) “should have had a

conversation [with Appellant] about the likelihood of conviction and the

potential sentence length before rejecting the [plea] offer and presenting an

____________________________________________

8 Moreover, we are persuaded by the Commonwealth’s following argument:

         [Appellant] claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not
     arguing in his suppression motion that [Appellant] was subjected to
     the “functional equivalent” of an arrest and interrogation. Brief for
     Appellant at 19. However, in arguing that interaction was the
     “functional equivalent” of an arrest is legally indistinguishable from
     arguing that the interaction was an “actual” arrest, which trial
     counsel did.

Commonwealth Brief at 7.

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implausible defense at trial.” Id. at 27. Appellant claims that if he “had the

benefit of adequate advice of counsel, Appellant would have understood that

… [the Commonwealth’s plea] offer was a very favorable offer, and that he

was likely to be convicted at trial.” Id.; see also id. at 25 (noting the plea

offer proposed a sentence of 2 to 4 years in prison and Appellant received a

sentence of 10 to 20 years).

      The Commonwealth counters that the PCRA court properly denied relief

on Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim, where the “record clearly establishes that

[Appellant] was aware of the plea offer, discussed it with his attorney, and

made his own knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to reject that plea.”

Commonwealth Brief at 10.      The Commonwealth further argues Appellant

“cannot invalidate his guilty plea by claiming that he lied to the [c]ourt when

he testified that no promises were made [to Appellant] in exchange for his

open guilty plea.” Id. at 10-11.

      “The right to effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining

process has been recognized for decades.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano,

69 A.3d 1270, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing, inter alia, Padilla v. Kentucky,

559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (“Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a

defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.”

(citation omitted)); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012)

(“Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends

to the plea-bargaining process.” (citations omitted)).

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     A PCRA petitioner seeking relief on the basis that ineffective assistance

of counsel caused him or her to reject a guilty plea must demonstrate that

     [b]ut for the ineffective advice of counsel[,] there is a reasonable
     probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the
     court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and
     the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening
     circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and
     that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms
     would have been less severe than under the judgment and
     sentence that in fact were imposed.

Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 832 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting

Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164).

     Instantly, the trial court colloquied Appellant on the record as follows

with respect to the Commonwealth’s plea offer:

     THE COURT: [] I don’t know your whole record. I know you had
     three prior [convictions of possession of a controlled substance
     with intent to deliver]….        But … for some reason the
     Commonwealth is offering you a [guilty plea agreement that
     constitutes a] departure below the [sentencing] guidelines. If
     you get convicted, the lowest standard range sentence I
     can give you is … [6] to 12 years [in prison]…. That’s a
     guideline sentence. And 7 and a half to 15 years would be within
     the standard range of the guidelines. The low end of the mitigated
     range of the guidelines, if I were to for some reason decide to go
     down to the bottom of the mitigated range, that would be five to
     ten years.

     [Appellant]: Yes, sir.

     THE COURT: The Commonwealth is offering you two to four
     years [in prison], which would be a departure well below
     the [sentencing] guidelines and something you would not
     be, as [trial] counsel I’m sure explained to you, not be likely to
     get ordinarily after a conviction by a jury.             But you
     understand all of that; right?

     [Appellant]: Yes, sir.

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     THE COURT: Have you had a full and fair opportunity to consider
     this offer and to talk to your lawyer about it?

     [Appellant]: Like the reason why — like usually I take full
     responsibility and plead guilty and all that, but in this case I’m not
     guilty. So like I feel like I shouldn’t plead guilty to something that
     I’m not [] guilty for. So that’s the reason why I didn’t accept the
     offer that I was offered.

     THE COURT: You won’t get an argument from me about that. If
     you didn’t do it, you absolutely should not plead guilty.

     [Appellant]: Yes, sir.

     THE COURT: I mean, there’s no law that would prevent you from
     doing that, but I would certainly understand why you wouldn’t
     want to take your case to a jury.

     [Appellant]: Yes, sir.

                                    ***

     THE COURT: Okay. … But you had a full chance to talk to
     your lawyer about it and having done that it’s your decision
     to reject the offer and proceed to trial?

     [Appellant]: Yes, sir.

     THE COURT: Has anybody promised you anything or used any
     kind of force against you or threatened you in any way or coerced
     you in any way to get you to reject this deal?

     [Appellant]: No, sir.

     THE COURT: Okay. I’m satisfied that’s a knowing, intelligent, and
     voluntary rejection of the offer. We’ll proceed to a jury trial. …

N.T., 8/20/19, at 11-14 (emphasis added).

     Moreover, immediately prior to the above colloquy, the trial court stated

to Appellant:

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       I’m not going to put any pressure on you to take this [plea offer]
       deal. That’s up to you. … If there was so much [inculpatory]
       evidence that you had zero chance [of acquittal], you still have a
       right to have a jury listen to your case and make a decision.

Id. at 9.

       Based on the foregoing, the record belies Appellant’s claim that trial

counsel provided him inadequate advice with respect to the plea offer. 9 See

id. at 9, 11-14. It is well settled that “one is bound by one’s statements made

during a plea colloquy, and may not successfully assert claims that contradict

such statements.” Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 21, 794 A.2d 378, 384

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 1167

(Pa. Super. 1996)). Accordingly, we conclude the PCRA court did not abuse

its discretion in      denying Appellant’s instant claim of trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness based on the plea offer.           See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Cappelli, 489 A.2d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. 1985) (en banc) (holding PCRA court

properly denied relief on appellant’s claim that his “trial counsel was

ineffective for promising appellant that he would receive a lesser sentence” if

he chose to accept the Commonwealth’s guilty plea offer, where the trial court

thoroughly colloquied appellant with respect to the plea offer). Appellant’s

second issue does not merit relief.

____________________________________________

9 The record further belies Appellant’s claim that “the trial court’s colloquy
concerning the plea offer was defective….” Appellant’s Brief at 28.

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      In his third issue, Appellant contends the PCRA court improperly denied

relief on his claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for “neglect[ing] to do any

investigation regarding Appellant’s mental health[,] which led to Appellant

being tried while incompetent.”        Appellant’s Brief at 30 (capitalization

modified). Appellant claims that had trial counsel

      conducted      a   thorough    investigation    into   Appellant’s
      hospitalizations and medical records, he would have found that
      Appellant is bipolar and schizophrenic. Trial counsel should have
      requested a competency hearing to present Appellant’s mental
      health issues and assess Appellant’s competency to stand trial.

Id. at 31. According to Appellant,

      [p]rior to trial, Appellant informed his trial counsel that he had
      mental health issues, had been institutionalized for such issues,
      and was currently taking medication. Despite this knowledge, trial
      counsel failed to conduct any investigation of those
      hospitalizations beyond asking him what institution he went to.

Id.   Appellant claims that his “incompetency is demonstrated through his

[above-described hostile] behavior at sentencing.” Id. at 32.

      The Commonwealth counters that “[b]ecause [Appellant] has offered no

evidence that he was, in fact, incompetent at trial, he failed to show that he

was prejudiced by trial counsel’s decision not to investigate his mental health.”

Commonwealth Brief at 11. “To the contrary, the trial record reflects that

[Appellant] clearly understood the proceedings and actively participated in

steering his own defense.” Id. at 12. The Commonwealth emphasizes that

although Appellant informed the trial court during the plea offer colloquy that

he took prescription Zyprexa for his mental health conditions, Appellant

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confirmed that the medication did not impact his decision making or ability to

understand the proceedings. Id.; see also N.T., 8/20/19, at 10-11.

     Preliminarily, we acknowledge Appellant did not raise on direct appeal a

challenge to his competency to stand trial. However, our Supreme Court has

explained:

     While an [a]ppellant’s failure to raise a claim on direct appeal
     generally results in waiver of that claim under the PCRA, “[a]
     failure to raise on direct appeal a claim that the appellant was
     incompetent at the time of trial does not constitute a waiver of
     that claim for purposes of the PCRA.”

Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1194 (Pa. 2014) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Brown, 872 A.2d 1139, 1153 (Pa. 2005) (plurality)).

     “A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial” and it is the

defendant’s burden to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that he was

incompetent to stand trial.” Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 236

(Pa. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Uderra, 862

A.2d 74, 88 (Pa. 2004) (stating a trial court is only required to order a

competency    hearing   if   there   “is   reason   to   doubt   the   defendant’s

competency.”). In order to prove incompetence, a defendant “must establish

that he was either unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against

him or to participate in his own defense.” Rainey, 928 A.2d at 236; 50 P.S.

§ 7402(a) (incompetence to proceed on criminal charge); see also

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 752 (Pa. 2014) (“Competency

to stand trial is measured by the relationship between counsel and client: To

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be deemed competent, the defendant needs to have the ability to consult with

counsel with a reasonable degree of understanding, in order to participate in

his defense, and he must be able to understand the nature or object of the

proceedings against him.”).

      In the instant case, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s ineffectiveness

claim based on trial counsel’s failure to challenge Appellant’s competency to

stand trial, reasoning as follows:

             Here, [Appellant] proffered no expert evidence to establish
      that he was incompetent at the time of his trial. Instead,
      [Appellant] cited his previous hospitalizations and disorders,
      which, at most, support an argument that an evaluation should
      have been done; not that [Appellant] would have been found to
      have been incompetent. Accordingly, no relief is due. See
      Rainey, 928 A.2d at 236-37 (“even if counsel had no reasonable
      basis to decline to pursue a competency evaluation, [defendant]
      fails to articulate how he was prejudiced because he cannot
      establish that had counsel requested an evaluation and hearing,
      the outcome of the [proceedings] would have changed”).

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/27/23, at 8-9 (footnote omitted).

      Our review reveals the PCRA court’s foregoing reasoning is supported

by the record and the law. See id. Even if trial counsel “had no reasonable

basis to decline to pursue a competency evaluation, [Appellant] fails to

articulate how he was prejudiced because he cannot establish” that the trial

court would have found Appellant met his burden of proving his incompetency,

had trial counsel raised a competency challenge. Rainey, 928 A.2d at 236-

37; see also Commonwealth v. Tyson, 402 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. 1979)

(superseded by statute on other grounds) (“Even though one has a history of

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mental illness that person may, at a given time, be competent to stand trial

and may have been legally sane at the time of the commission of the crime.”).

Accordingly, we conclude the PCRA properly denied relief on Appellant’s

instant claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Appellant’s third issue fails.

      In his fourth issue, Appellant argues the PCRA court abused its discretion

in denying relief on his claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing

to challenge on direct appeal the denial of the PSM seeking reconsideration of

Appellant’s purportedly excessive sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 34-38.

According to Appellant, the sentencing court “unfairly reacted to Appellant’s

outbursts during sentencing, and as a result, Appellant received an excessive

sentence.” Id. at 38.

      Appellant’s claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness implicates the

discretionary aspects of sentencing.     Such a claim is cognizable under the

PCRA. Commonwealth v. Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 455 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(“claims implicating the discretionary aspects of sentencing raised in the

context of an ineffectiveness claim are cognizable under the PCRA.”).

      Sentencing “is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion.”   Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 122 n.9 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (en banc) (citation omitted). “Abuse of discretion is not merely

an error of judgment, but rather where the judgment is manifestly

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that

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the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Commonwealth

v. Young, 989 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

      The reason for … [our] deferential standard of appellate review is
      that the sentencing court is in the best position to measure various
      factors and determine the proper penalty for a particular offense
      based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances before
      it. Simply stated, the sentencing court sentences flesh-and-blood
      defendants and the nuances of sentencing decisions are difficult
      to gauge from the cold transcript used upon appellate review.
      Moreover, the sentencing court enjoys an institutional advantage
      to appellate review, bringing to its decisions an expertise,
      experience, and judgment that should not be lightly disturbed.

Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 27 (Pa. 2014) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

      “In every case where a sentencing court imposes a sentence outside of

the sentencing guidelines, the court must provide in open court a

contemporaneous statement of reasons in support of its sentence.”

Commonwealth v. Shull, 148 A.3d 820, 835-36 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted). When doing so,

      a trial judge … [must] demonstrate on the record, as a proper
      starting point, its awareness of the sentencing guidelines. Having
      done so, the sentencing court may deviate from the guidelines, if
      necessary, to fashion a sentence which takes into account the
      protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant,
      and the gravity of the particular offense as it relates to the impact
      on the life of the victim and the community, so long as it also
      states of record the factual basis and specific reasons which
      compelled it to deviate from the guideline range.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

and brackets omitted); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (“[g]eneral standards” to

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consider in imposing sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Snyder, 289

A.3d 1121, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2023) (emphasizing the sentencing guidelines

are “purely advisory in nature” (citation omitted)). Indeed, this Court has

explained the sentencing guidelines

      have no binding effect, create no presumption in sentencing, and
      do not predominate over other sentencing factors – they are
      advisory guideposts that are valuable, may provide an essential
      starting point, and that must be respected and considered; they
      recommend, however, rather than require a particular sentence.

Commonwealth v. Holiday, 954 A.2d 6, 13 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted). But see also Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 216 (Pa.

Super. 1999) (en banc) (holding the record must demonstrate “with clarity

that the court considered the sentencing guidelines in a rational and

systematic way and made a dispassionate decision to depart from them.”).

      Finally, where a PSI report exists, this Court will “presume that the

sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory

factors.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citing Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (holding

where the sentencing court considered all relevant factors and was “fully

informed by the [PSI], the sentencing court’s discretion should not be

disturbed.”)).

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      Here, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim based

on appellate counsel’s failure to challenge on appeal the denial of Appellant’s

sentencing challenge, reasoning as follows:

      [I]n fashioning an appropriate sentence, the court explicitly
      considered everything presented throughout the history of
      the case and during the sentencing hearing. N.T., 2/7/2020,
      at 45. The court considered the sentencing guidelines, as well as
      the prior record score []. Id. at 45. The court also considered
      all of the mitigating evidence that was submitted on behalf
      of [Appellant], including the information submitted by
      defense counsel and the testimony of [Appellant’s] two
      relatives. Id. at 45-46. In addition, the court reviewed and
      analyzed the required statutory sentencing factors, including the
      need for the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense in
      relation to the impact on the victim and on the community, and
      [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs. Id. at 46-47. In addition, the
      court delineated and weighed both the mitigating and aggravating
      factors in the case. Id. at 47-49.

             The sentence imposed by the court was manifestly
      reasonable.      Although the court departed above the
      guidelines, the sentence was well-justified for the reasons
      explained by the court during the sentencing hearing. The
      court emphasized [that Appellant’s] prior record score
      substantially understated [Appellant’s] criminality for several
      reasons. First, [Appellant] had 11 prior record score points, [but]
      the maximum that could be reflected in the prior record score was
      5. Id. at 47-48. In addition, he had 2 juvenile arrests, 13 adult
      arrests, and 8 probation violations with 6 revocations of probation,
      all by the age of 28. Id. at 48. The court noted his history of
      rapid recidivism, with [Appellant] repeatedly coming out of
      prison and immediately committing other crimes. Id. In
      addition, the court considered the pattern of escalation in
      [Appellant’s] criminal conduct, from being a career drug dealer to
      someone willing to carry and use a gun, as demonstrated by his
      conduct in this case. Id. at 48-49. The court also considered
      [Appellant’s] 11 prison misconduct violations as an aggravating
      factor. Id. at 49. Accordingly, the record establishes there were
      compelling reasons for the departure above the guidelines in this
      case.

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            Moreover, [Appellant’s] claim that the court “imposed an
      excessive sentence because of [Appellant’s] outburst at
      sentencing[,]” is without merit. Amended [PCRA] Petition[,
      5/4/22,] at p. 33. During [Appellant’s] allocution, he repeatedly
      shouted profanities, argued with the court, made obscene
      gestures, and proceeded to threaten the sentencing judge, which
      ultimately resulted in [Appellant] being forcefully removed from
      the courtroom. N.T., 2/7/2020, at 36-44. The court properly took
      into account [Appellant’s] statements and behavior during
      sentencing, as it reflected [Appellant’s] complete disdain for the
      rule of law. Id. at 45. However, as stated above, the court
      considered many factors in determining an appropriate sentence,
      with [Appellant’s] outburst only being one factor.

             Finally, there is no merit to [Appellant’s] argument that the
      court failed to properly consider [Appellant’s] mitigating factors.
      As stated above, the court explicitly considered [Appellant’s]
      mitigating circumstances in this case, including [Appellant’s]
      difficult home life and mental health issues. N.T., 2/7/2020, at
      47.

            Accordingly, the record establishes that there were
      compelling reasons for the departure above the guidelines in this
      case, and that [Appellant’s] sentence was fully commensurate
      with [Appellant’s] criminal conduct. Therefore, as [Appellant’s]
      sentence was well justified and would not have been
      changed, [Appellant] suffered no prejudice from appellate
      counsel’s failure to appeal the denial of [Appellant’s PSM]
      for reconsideration of sentence.

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/27/23, at 10-12 (emphasis added; footnote and some

citations omitted; some capitalization and citations modified).

      Our review confirms the PCRA court’s foregoing reasoning is again

supported by the record and the law. Thus, we conclude the PCRA court did

not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s claim of appellate counsel’s

ineffectiveness. See id.; see also Treiber, 121 A.3d at 445 (“counsel cannot

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be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim”).      Appellant’s

fourth issue does not merit relief.

      In his fifth and final issue, Appellant claims the PCRA court improperly

denied his PCRA petition without holding an evidentiary hearing “on the issue

raised in Appellant’s amended PCRA petition regarding the plea offer.”

Appellant’s Brief at 16.

      This Court has explained:

      A PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary
      hearing.    We review the PCRA court’s decision dismissing a
      petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. The right to
      an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is not
      absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold
      a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no
      support either in the record or other evidence.            It is the
      responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine each
      issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record … to
      determine if the PCRA court erred in its determination that there
      were no genuine issues of material fact in controversy and in
      denying relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 244 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citations   and   brackets   omitted;    formatting    modified);   see      also

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (where

there are no genuine issues of material fact that exist with respect to a claim

in a PCRA petition, the PCRA court is not required to hold an evidentiary

hearing).

      We have already determined the PCRA properly denied relief on

Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim implicating the guilty plea agreement offer.

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Therefore, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an

evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s PCRA petition. Williams, supra.

      Based on the foregoing, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying

Appellant’s first PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 3/5/2024

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