Court Opinion

ID: 9652868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:33:57.654886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:54.717534
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge.
This is an action to quiet title to land.
On March 8, 1947, Lina A. Ulbright and Frank O. Ulbright, her husband, executed a deed which conveyed the property in question to Logan Mitchell Ulbright “and his bodily heirs.” The natural son, and only child, of Logan Mitchell Ulbright was Logan M. Ulbright, Jr. On October 4, 1950, Marion Y. Morris and Ruby N. Morris adopted Logan M. Ulbright, Jr. and his name was changed to Logan Marion Morris.
Linda A. Ulbright and Frank O. Ulbright are deceased.
On February 9, 1964, the heirs of Lina A. Ulbright conveyed to T. B. Alspaugh and Sara Jane Alspaugh.
On February 12, 1972, Logan Mitchell Ulbright died.
On January 24, 1973, the Alspaughs conveyed to Dorothy A. Ulbright and Ralph C. Ulbright.
Logan Marion Morris is plaintiff and claims title under the deed executed March 8, 1947. Dorothy A. Ulbright and Ralph C. Ulbright are defendants and claim title under the deed executed January 24, 1973.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff appealed to the Kansas City District of the Court of Appeals where the judgment of the trial court was reversed. The case was then transferred to this Court, by order of this Court, and will be decided here “the same as on original appeal.” Mo.Const. Art. V, § 10.
The parties agree that the deed of March 8, 1947, created an estate tail; that under the deed and Section 442.470, RSMo 1969, the first taker (Logan Mitchell Ulbright) *661took a life estate; and that the heir of the body (Logan M. Ulbright, Jr. — Logan Marion Morris) took a contingent remainder in the fee. Davidson v. Davidson, 350 Mo. 639, 167 S.W.2d 641 (1943). It is not seriously disputed that had Logan M. Ulbright, Jr., not been adopted on October 4, 1950, he would have taken in fee simple absolute upon the death of Logan Mitchell Ulbright on February 12,1972. Defendants contend, however, that because of the provisions of Section 453.090, RSMo 1969, the adoption of plaintiff on October 4, 1950, “acted to remove the Plaintiff from the bloodstream of his natural father Logan Mitchell Ulbright and with no exception ceased and determined all rights and duties between Plaintiff and his natural father.”
Section 453.090, RSMo 1969, provides that when a child is adopted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 453, “all legal relationships and all rights and duties between such child and his natural parents * * * shall cease and determine.”
The essential question in this case then becomes: Does plaintiffs interest, if any, in the land derive from Lina A. Ulbright and Frank O. Ulbright (grantors in the deed of March 8, 1947) or is plaintiff’s interest, if any, one of inheritance from his natural father Logan Mitchell Ulbright (life tenant under the deed of March 8, 1947)? If the latter, plaintiffs interest was cut off by the adoption. If the former, it was not.
In 1 H. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 48 at 70 (3rd ed. 1939), we find the following:
“On the death of a tenant in tail, the land passes to the next heir of the body of the original donee; but such heir, though he takes because he is the heir of the body, takes not by descent, but as a substituted purchaser from the original donor, per formam doni, as it is expressed * * * ii
This proposition finds express support in Pollock v. Speidel, 17 Ohio St. 439, 49 Am. Dec. 467 (1867) and implied support in Davidson v. Davidson, supra, and Byrd v. Allen, 351 Mo. 99, 171 S.W.2d 691 (1942). See also 31 C.J.S. Estates § 21, at 47 (1964).
In addition, Section 442.490, RSMo 1969, provides that when a remainder shall be limited to the heirs of the body of a person to whom a life estate is given, the remain-dermen who qualify as heirs of the body “shall be entitled to take as purchasers in fee simple, by virtue of the remainder so limited in them.” (Emphasis ours).
Accordingly, we are of the opinion that plaintiff derived his title as purchaser under the deed from Lina A. Ulbright and Frank O. Ulbright and not by inheritance from his natural father. Grimes v. Rush, 355 Mo. 573, 197 S.W.2d 310 (1946). We hold that his interest in the land was not extinguished by the adoption and provisions of § 453.090, supra, because his interest in the land does not derive from his natural father.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
MORGAN, C. J., and HENLEY, J., concur.
BARDGETT and SEILER, JJ., concur in result.
FINCH, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed.
RENDLEN, J., dissents and concurs in separate dissenting opinion of FINCH, J.