Court Opinion

ID: 9710286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:05:49.312181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.572255
License: Public Domain

Justice EAKIN,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant is not entitled to Post-Conviction relief, but write separately in order to express my view concerning “layered ineffectiveness” claims raised under the PCRA.
Appellant raises 23 issues, all of which pertain to trial error and trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. As I noted in my dissent in this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Ford, 570 Pa. 378, 809 A.2d 325 (Pa.2002), failure to raise an issue at trial waives the right to raise that issue on appeal; however, if trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue is proven under the standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Commonwealth v. *334[Charles] Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987), and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(4), then relief may be afforded on direct appeal. If, on direct appeal, appellate counsel fails to allege trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, then that issue is waived; yet this second waiver can also be overcome by alleging, in a PCRA petition, appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to challenge trial counsel’s stewardship. However, appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in this vein must be proven, not assumed, in order for a petitioner to be entitled to post conviction relief.
Here, appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness is only mentioned in issues 18, 20, 22, and 23,1 and appellant’s brief recites appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in a boilerplate paragraph preceding the argument section. See Appellant’s Brief, at 8-9. Appellant argues the merits of the underlying issues at the trial level, but does not develop the latter two prongs of the Strickland test with respect to appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness: lack of a reasonable basis for the omission of the issue, and resulting prejudice.
As I stated in Ford, appellate counsel’s stewardship must be appraised with the same consideration given trial counsel. See Ford, at 414 (Eakin, J., dissenting). Strategic choices not to advance an issue at trial are not unreasonable per se simply because the defendant was found guilty; likewise, appellate counsel’s decision to forego advancing an issue concerning trial counsel’s stewardship should not be held ineffective per se simply because trial counsel’s decision may have been unreasonable. Id. Proof is required, and a paragraph simply alleging ineffectiveness of every attorney from trial to date is not sufficient under Strickland.
Unlike the appellant in Ford, appellant’s PCRA petition was litigated after the abolition of “relaxed waiver” in PCRA capital appeals in Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998); therefore, he was required to plead and prove each prong of the ineffectiveness test with respect to appellate counsel. Having failed to do so, he is not entitled to *335a remand for a hearing, and no relief is due. Accordingly, although the majority addresses appellant’s issues on their merits and concludes they are meritless, I would hold appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to challenge trial counsel’s stewardship, and would deny relief on this basis.
Therefore, I dissent from the analysis of my learned colleagues.
Justice CASTILLE joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. As renumbered in the majority opinion.