Court Opinion

ID: 9752707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:29:32.206505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:21.159348
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with part one of the Majority Opinion holding judicial intervention by the Commonwealth Court was appropriate in this case. I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds the Commonwealth Court erred in authorizing the hospital to use the C.T. Scanner pending final disposition of its certificate of need application *54or the final disposition of its petition for review seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on constitutional grounds.
As the majority accurately states:
“In order to sustain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs right to relief must be clear, the need for relief must be immediate, and the injury must be irreparable if the injunction is not granted.”
At 439 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).1
The majority also recognized that, the determination as to whether this standard is met is vested in the sound discretion of the Chancellor. See, supra at 439. On appeal from a decree granting or refusing a preliminary injunction, the appellant has a very heavy burden to overcome; such a decree will not be interferred with upon appellate review in the absence of a plain abuse of discretion by the court below. McDonald v. Noga, 393 Pa. 309, 141 A.2d 842 (1958). If we find the Chancellor’s actions were reasonable we do not proceed to a consideration of the merits of the case unless reasons for the action of the court below do not exist or the rules of law relied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable. Id. 393 Pa. at 311, 141 A.2d at 843 (citing Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 385 Pa. 342, 123 A.2d 626 (1956)). See Bell v. Thornburgh, 491 Pa. 263, 420 A.2d 443 (1980); Intraworld Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 336 A.2d 316 (1975).
In the present case, the Chancellor, Judge Craig, concluded the purchase price of the C.T. Scanner was below the minimum of $600,000.00 established under the Federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 and that while the hospital may be penalized by the Department for purchasing the equipment prior to the federal amendment, it was no longer in violation of Section 35 P.S. 448.701(a)(2) and (d). Moreover, the Chancellor concluded the purchase was not a *55new “health service” within the meaning of 35 P.S. 5448.-701(a)(3).2
An injunction may be granted where substantial legal questions must be resolved to determine the rights of the respective parties. Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare, 497 Pa. 267, 439 A.2d 1172 (1982); Valley Forge Historical Society v. Washington Memorial Chapel, 493 Pa. 491, 426 A.2d 1123 (1981). This Court need not decide whether the Chancellor’s conclusions of law are erroneous at this stage of review. We need only find they were “reasonable”. Since I believe his conclusions of law were reasonable, we should dismiss the Department’s appeal without further consideration or expression of opinion upon the merits of the controversy as such review is appropriate only after a final hearing and decree in the Commonwealth Court. See generally 9 Standard Pa.Practice § 78, p. 393 (1962).
That majority also concludes there is no basis for equitable intervention because the hospital lacks “clean hands.” The majority bases its conclusion on inferences drawn from the hospital’s notice of intent to purchase the C.T. Scanner filed with the Department on August 4, 1981, in which the hospital failed to mention the contract, and from the hospital’s letter of September 29, 1981, withdrawing its letter of intent without notifying the Department the contract had been entered into and substantially performed at that time. The two letters represent the only evidence the hospital deliberately attempted to mislead the Department. Based on these same letters, the chancellor declined to attribute an evil intent to the hospital’s actions.
While this Court is able to draw its own inference, deductions and conclusions based on the facts of record, see W. Penn Twp. School District v. I.B. of E.W., 396 Pa. 408, 145 A.2d 258 (1958), I do not believe we should find the Chancellor was unreasonable in reaching a different conclusion.
*56Finally, although I am troubled by the hospital’s unilateral efforts to acquire the C.T. Scanner without a certificate of need prior to the increase in the threshold, the integrity of the statutory scheme could be preserved by the imposition of penalties pursuant to 35 P.S. § 448.603 for the period between July 29, 1981, when the purchase order was signed, until October 1, 1982, the effective date of the increased threshold.
LARSEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. This is not a mandatory preliminary injunction which commands the performance of some positive act and which requires a much stronger case than that of an injunction which is imposed merely to preserve the status quo. See Roberts v. School District of Scranton, 462 Pa. 464, 341 A.2d 475 (1975).

. “Health service” is defined in the Act as constituting clinically related diagnostic treatment or rehabilitative services. See 35 P.S. 448.103. The chancellor determined the C.T. Scanner was merely a new tool for an existing diagnostic and/or treatment service. Commonwealth Court Slip Op. at 3 (filed April 14, 1982).