Court Opinion

ID: 9625741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:50:05.893874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:14.501787
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
concurring specially. Plaintiff received injuries *322and damages in an automobile mishap. He contended the mishap occurred as a result of negligence of Jackson, who was driving the automobile of his employer, Harry White Ford, Inc. Plaintiff sought to hold Harry White Ford, Inc. liable on the theory of negligent entrustment in that the employer should have known defendant Jackson was an incompetent, dangerous and negligent driver; and also because the employer had furnished a mechanically defective automobile to Jackson.
Summary judgment was granted by the lower court in favor of defendant, and the majority affirms as to negligent entrustment and reverses as to furnishing a mechanically defective automobile. I specially concur because I am in agreement with the majority as to the reversal, but I am partly in disagreement in that I feel the reversal should have been on both theories, to wit, negligent entrustment as well as furnishing a defective vehicle.
The majority states: "Unknown to employer Jackson had been found guilty of criminal offenses. These involved larceny of an automobile, wife beating and bastardy. None of these crimes has any relevancy concerning competency in driving an automobile. Nor would such convictions prevent one from holding a valid driver’s license. ” The majority errs in the foregoing statement because larceny of an automobile is an absolute ground and mandatory requirement for revocation of a driver’s license. Code Ann. § 92A-404 (Ga. L. 1966, p. 12). It is true that in 1972 the General Assembly amended Ga. L. 1937, p. 322, "as amended” (Ga. L. 1972, p. 1078), but this cannot be construed to amend Ga. L. 1966, p. 12, because no reference, designation, or specification of Ga. L. 1966, p. 12, is therein made. The loose, general, and ambiguous term used in the 1972 act, in amending or repealing Ga. L. 1937, p. 322, "as amended,” at best would be an attempt to amend or repeal by implication, and such repeals are not favored. Moore v. Baldwin County, 209 Ga. 541, 545 (74 SE2d 449); Mayor &c. of Athens v. Wansley, 210 Ga. 174 (1) (78 SE2d 478). Such repeal is only effective when the two laws are clearly and indubitably contradictory, or in irreconcilable conflict with each other, which is not the case here. The Constitution of Georgia (Code Ann. § 2-1916) provides that the amending or repealing act shall distinctly describe the law to be amended or repealed. Thus, as the revocation of license for auto theft is contained in the 1966 Act, and not in the 1937 Act, an attempt to amend the Act of 1937 "as amended” does not accomplish the striking down or amending of the Act of 1966.
In order for the employer to prevail in its motion for summary *323judgment, inasmuch as it was clearly proven that he turned the automobile over to one who had a criminal record of larceny of an automobile, wife beating, and bastardy, it was essential that he show that he was without knowledge of these convictions, because it was shown that otherwise Jackson would not have been employed. It was especially necessary to show he did not know Jackson was a car thief, because that knowledge would carry with it a presumption that Jackson did not have a valid license to drive an automobile (Code Ann. § 92A-404, supra).
The record shows the employer and Jackson both resided in Fulton County and the convictions were in that county. All the employer had to do was to go to the court records, and then he would have learned the truth. It is quite clear that if he looked at the records at all, he did not make a thorough search of the police and criminal court records because he did not find Jackson’s record. The inference arises that he did not search the records at all. The employer admits he would not have employed Jackson had he known the truth. Then what kept him from knowing the truth about Jackson?
"Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry shall be notice of everything to which it is afterwards found such inquiry might have led. Ignorance of a fact, due to negligence, shall be equivalent to knowledge in fixing the rights of the parties.” (Emphasis supplied.) Code § 37-116. Here the defendant says he went to the records, and he is chargeable with notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. He cannot excuse himself by saying that he did not make a very careful search and through lack of diligence failed to discover the prospective employee was a car thief.
The motion for summary judgment is supported by an affidavit attached thereto made by the secretary-treasurer of defendant corporation. Attention is invited to the very vague and ambiguous language in one of defendant’s affidavits respecting the search of the records. In paragraph 4 it is asserted: "... Harry White Ford, Inc. caused a search to be made of local police records and also requested and received a credit report from a local credit reporting agency. Said reports failed to turn up any derogatory information concerning said applicant. ” (Emphasis supplied.) Who made the search of local police records? What records were searched? Did the searcher investigate the records of the Criminal Courts of Fulton County, or just those of the "police”? How thorough was the search — how much time was spent in making it? Was the searcher *324reliable and trustworthy? Was it made by one who knew how to look up records of the courts in Fulton County? What does he consider to be "derogatory information”?
Of course, vague and ambiguous assertions by one who seeks a summary judgment must be construed most strongly against the movant. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 4 (126 SE2d 442); McCarty v. National Life &c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 179 (129 SE2d 408).
Said paragraph four of the above affidavit asserts that, "Said reports failed to turn up any derogatory information concerning said applicant.” The only report referred to in the paragraph is "a credit report from a local credit reporting agency.” Nothing is asserted as to what the search of the local police records turned up. This ambiguity must be construed most strongly against movant.
Paragraph 5 of said affidavit recites: "Further, Harry White Ford, Inc. determined to its satisfaction that applicant David McKinley Jackson had in effect at the time of such application a valid Georgia driver’s license . . .”
What does the above mean? It is not alleged that the employer determined as truth and fact that the driver had a valid driver’s license, but it determined "to its satisfaction.” How did it make this determination? We are left wondering how hard or how easy it was to satisfy the employer, especially when it overlooked three convictions on the records, and would not have hired him if it had found them, and one of them involving a mandatory requirement for revocation of Jackson’s driver’s license?
Movant had the burden in this case of proving it was entitled to a summary judgment under the strict requirements of the summary judgment law, including the strict construction of vague and ambiguous evidence against movant, under said law.
There was thus a jury issue as to whether the employer had knowledge that Jackson was ineligible for employment at the time he was employed, as a result of which employment he was entrusted with the automobile. A jury issue was made as to whether a careful search, or any search, was made of the various criminal court records in Fulton County where the employer and employee both reside.
I, therefore, respectfully disagree with the majority opinion holding that negligent entrustment has been properly eliminated from this case; but I agree with the majority in holding that whether the employer furnished a mechanically defective automobile to Jackson must be decided by a jury.