Court Opinion

ID: 9836712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:52.899595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:18.410595
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(concurring in the result):
I agree with the majority and the court below that Ms. Rodarte’s statement to appellant, “There seems to be some AAFES merchandise that has not been paid for,” did not constitute an interrogation. Unlike the majority, I would accept the Government’s proposal to revisit United States v. Quillen, 27 MJ 312 (CMA 1988).
In Quillen, the majority of the three-Judge Court focused on whether the store detective was “an instrument of the military,” citing United States v. Penn, 18 USCMA 194, 199, 39 CMR 194, 199 (1969). Penn predated Mil.R.Evid. 305(b)(1). This Military Rule of Evidence defines the term “person subject to the code” as including “a person acting as a knowing agent of a military unit or of a person subject to the code.” Accordingly, the analysis in Quillen should have turned to the question whether a store detective was “a knowing agent of a military unit or of a person subject to the code.” It did not.
Trial counsel committed no error in his cross-examination of appellant, even if we were to view this cross-examination as an attack on appellant’s silence. Appellant was not in custody and no Article 31(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 831(b), warnings were necessary or given. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits use, for the purposes of impeachment, of an accused’s silence prior to arrest or after arrest if no Miranda warnings are given. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). As Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), has been interpreted and explained, comment on accused’s silence constitutes error only when that accused remains silent in reliance on a government inducement, e.g., Miranda or Article 31(b) warnings. See Splunge v. Parke, 160 F.3d 369, 372-73 (7th Cir.1998); cert. denied, 528 U.S. 833, 120 S.Ct. 91, 145 L.Ed.2d 77 (1999); Pitts v. Anderson, 122 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir.1997); United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 439 (3d Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. DeJesus v. United States, 519 U.S. 1011, 117 S.Ct. 517, 136 L.Ed.2d 406 (1996); Vick v. Lockhart, 952 F.2d 999, 1002-03 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275, 1279 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037, 107 S.Ct. 892, 93 L.Ed.2d 844 (1987). Cf. United States v. Cook, 48 MJ 236, 241 (1998)(Crawford, J., with whom Cox, S.J. joins, dissenting).
Once a defendant elects to testify, “his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness.” Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958); see generally Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 1125, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000). “The safeguards against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those who do not wish to *145become witnesses in their own behalf and not for those who do.” Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926); see Jenkins v. Anderson, supra. Use of silence for impeachment can add to the truth-finding objectives of a criminal hearing and promote the reliability of the entire process. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (6th Cir.2000). Trial counsel’s questioning of appellant in this case was proper cross-examination, as was trial counsel’s argument, which properly ensued from this cross-examination.