Court Opinion

ID: 9833239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:33:24.736441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:00.814431
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
Appellee has filed a motion for rehearing in this cause, in which it is insisted that he should have been permitted to show a waiver of the conditions of the policy with reference to proofs of loss, under his allegation that such conditions had been performed. In support of the motion, he cites 2 May on Insurance, section 589, which says that the weight of authority seems to be that proof of waiver is admissible under allegation of performance of a condition in a policy of insurance.
We have taken occasion to examine carefully the authorities cited by this author in support of this proposition. We find that some of the authorities hold directly that proof of waiver is proof of performance. The principal line of authorities, however, holding this doctrine are the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri. These cases, however, the latest of which is McCullough v. Insurance Company; 21 Southwestern Reporter, 307, recognize that this is an exception which they have adopted only in insurance cases; and the courts of that State do not seem to be altogether satisfied with their holding upon this subject, as appears from the following, taken from the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the ease of Roy v. Boteler, 40 Missouri Appeals, 226:
“The plaintiff’s further contention is that, even if the production of the architect’s certificate was a condition precedent, the defendant could waive it, and that the proof of waiver sustains the allegation of performance. It seems that this construction finds some support in the cases of Insurance Company v. Kyle, 11 Missouri, 278; O’Key v. Insurance Company, 29 Missouri Appeals, 110; Travis v. Insurance Company, 32 Missouri Appeals, 101.
“The cases cited by plaintiff, and others which might have been cited, *260assert the doctrine for which he contends only in insurance cases. Why the rules of pleading and practice should be different in actions in insurance contracts from other actions, is quite difficult to understand. The rule invoked by plaintiff seems to have so far been only made applicable to actions arising on insurance policies. Why so limited is nowhere made to appear. However this may all be, the cases cited by plaintiff can have no application to a case of this kind, or if so, then the same are not in harmony with the last utterance of the Supreme Court, by which we must be governed in this case [citing Lanitz v. King, 93 Missouri, 518, and other cases]. It is not pretended that the plaintiff has pleaded a waiver by defendant of the performance of any of the conditions precedent. If the plaintiff’s offer of evidence tended to show a waiver of a condition precedent of the contract, or an excuse on h'is part for nonperformance, it was inadmissible and properly rejected, unless the petition had alleged such waiver or excuse for nonperformance, of which there is no pretense.
“In view of the rule declared in Lanitz v. King, and the other cases to the same effect which we have cited, it is quite clear that under the general allegation of performance of all the conditions of a contract, evidence of waiver of performance of such conditions is inadmissible.”
It is perhaps true that none of the decisions of our State are precisely in point; but we think that the rule established by our Supreme Court in similar cases is sufficiently plain to indicate that an allegation of waiver is necessary to admit proof. In the case of Insurance Company v. La Croix, 45 Texas, 158, a question somewhat similar was presented; and appellees in that case contended that their plea of waiver was sufficient, and said: “So far from observing so strict a rule, other courts have held it unnecessary for the pleader to aver waiver, and that proof of waiver may be adduced under the general allegation of performance.” And in support of this proposition, they cited all of the authorities cited by May on Insurance, including the Missouri cases. Our Supreme Court, however, sustained the objections to the plea of waiver, and in effect overruled their contention.
In the case of Dennison v. League, 16 Texas, 400, it is said: “There is no rule that has been so stringently enforced in this court as the rule that the allegata must be broad enough to let in the proof; and that no evidence not supported by the allegata can sustain a verdict. This rule has always been considered essential to our system of jurisprudence and giving harmony to the system. It was commented on and enforced in the case of Mimms v. Mitchell, 1 Texas, 443, and in Hall and Jones v. Jackson, and in fact by a train of decisions without ever having been relaxed in a single instance.”
This rule has since been strictly adhered to by our Supreme Court; and, in view of this tendency, we do not feel authorized to follow the decisions of the Missouri courts and those other courts which permit proof of a waiver under the general allegation of performance. It cer*261tainly violates the rule that the proof must correspond to the allegations; and, as we have seen, the courts which have adopted the rule are now plainly manifesting dissatisfaction with their rulings.
The motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.

Motion overruled.

Opinion delivered December 24, 1902.