Court Opinion

ID: 9765009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:47:52.743404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:03.455312
License: Public Domain

J. CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse and render. The majority interprets the “private person” language in section 101.021(2) to provide an exception to the waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity when a government employee is found to be officially immune. The majority supports its construction of 101.021(2) with the “unique policy grounds supporting official immunity for police officers” and by analogizing the “private person” language in section 101.021(2) of the Texas Tort Claims Act to “private person” language in section 1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act. I agree with the majority’s discussion of official immunity as applied to Officer Huckeba. However, I fail to see the relevance of the policy reasons supporting official immunity in determining whether the legislature has waived sovereign immunity. I also believe that 101.-021(2) of the Texas Tort Claims Act and 1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act are too dissimilar to be comparable.
Section 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims Act provides as follows:
A governmental unit in the state is liable for:
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if:
(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally hable to the claimant according to Texas law; and
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be hable to the claimant according to Texas law.
Tex.Civ.PRAc. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986).
Subsection (1)(A) waives sovereign immunity in suits arising out of “use” or “operation” of a motor vehicle or motor driven equipment. Id. 101.021(1)(A). However, the liability of the governmental unit is contingent upon the employee being personally liable for the loss. Id. 101.021(1)(B). Therefore, a governmental entity will retain its sovereign immunity if the employee is found to be officially immune. City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.1993); Carpenter v. Barner, 797 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex.App.—Waco 1990, writ denied).
Subsection (2) provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for injury caused by a “condition or use of tangible personal or real property.” The interpretation of subsection (2) has been the subject of much consternation among Texas courts. Most of the confusion has been centered around the determination of what is a “condition or use” of property. See, e.g., Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tex.1976) (Greenhill, C.J., concurring) (encouraging legislature to express more clearly its intent regarding waiver of governmental immunity); Hatley v. Kassen, 859 S.W.2d 367, 376-77 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, writ granted) (joining other *108courts in urging legislature to clarify extent of waiver of sovereign immunity); Lowe v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 809 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ) (noting that it is technically possible to characterize any imaginable action as a case involving use of tangible property); Beggs v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 496 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd) (stating the area of coverage created by the predecessor of 101.021(2) is “rather vague, and the extent of liability created thereby is far from clear”). Relatively few courts have interpreted the second part of section 101.021(2). See City of Houston v. Newsom, 858 S.W.2d 14, 19 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); Wyse v. Department of Public Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tex.App.—Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The second part of section 101.021(2) states that sovereign immunity is waived only if the governmental unit would be liable “were it a private person.” Tex.Civ.PRAc. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1986).
The majority holds that “as a matter of law the governmental unit cannot be held liable under 101.021(2) when the employee of the governmental unit enjoys official immunity because the ‘private person’ language in this section precludes appellees’ interpretation insofar as it applies to the unique policy grounds supporting official immunity for police officers.” The majority notes that police officers are given official immunity because “public policy demands that they be able to carry out their duties without fear of personal liability.” The majority concludes that to impose liability on the government upon finding the employee officially immune would, in effect, ignore the official immunity finding. The majority resolves this supposed problem by limiting the waiver of immunity in 101.-021(2) to governmental entities that have comparable providers in the private sector.
I agree with the majority’s discussion of the reasons for official immunity. However, I do not agree with using those same reasons to construe the Tort Claims Act. Official immunity and the waiver of sovereign immunity are two distinct doctrines created to further very different public goals. Official immunity developed in the common law and applies to a government employee’s individual liability. As stated by the majority, the purpose of official immunity is to allow police officers discretion in performing their duties without incurring personal liability. Official immunity has no bearing on determining whether the government has waived sovereign immunity except where the legislature has expressly incorporated official immunity into the Tort Claims Act, as in section 101.-021(1)(B). See Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d at 812.
Sovereign immunity also was developed in common law to protect the government from “endless embarrassments, difficulties, and losses which would be so subversive to the public interest as to compel it to abandon all but the bare essentials of public government.” State v. Brannan, 111 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1937, writ ref'd). The legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act to provide a waiver of sovereign immunity in certain circumstances and to grant permission to all claimants to bring suit against the state for all claims arising under the Act. Brown v. Owens, 674 S.W.2d 748, 750 (Tex.1984). The societal interest furthered by the waiver of sovereign immunity is that “society as a whole, rather that the injured individual or family, ... bear[s] the risk of loss for injuries caused by the negligence of public employees performing services for the entire community.” Joe R. Green-hill, Should Governmental Immunity for Torts Be Re-examined, and, If So, by Whom?, 31 Tex.B.J. 1036, 1068 (1968). The legislature expressly recognized that different policy reasons support the waiver of sovereign immunity, as opposed to those supporting official immunity, by leaving a government employee’s individual immunity intact regardless of the government’s liability under the Tort Claims Act. See Tex.Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.026 (Vernon 1986).
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, had we held that the government was liable for the police officer’s negligence, the police officer’s official immunity would not be a nullity. This is exactly the type of situation contemplated by section 101.026. See Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.026 (Vernon 1986) *109(ensuring that a government employee retains her official immunity regardless of the government’s liability). In addition, by holding the government liable for the negligent torts of its police officers, the purpose of the tort claims act is furthered in that society, rather than the individual victim, bears the loss. This liability, however, is not unbridled. A court must still determine, as a matter of law, whether the loss was caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property. Id. 101.021(2).
The majority also compares the “private person” language of the Texas Tort Claims Act to similar language in the Federal Tort Claims Act. After an extensive analysis of federal ease law, the majority concludes that because police officers do not have a private analogue, the government is entitled to sovereign immunity when the police officer is found to be officially immune. However, I believe that section 101.021 of the Texas Tort Claims Act and 1346(b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act are too different on their faces to be analogous and that infusing federal courts’ interpretations of the “private person” language in the Federal Tort Claims Act into the construction of the Texas Tort Claims Act is both unprecedented and undesirable.
Section 1346(b) of the United States Code states that district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction for suits arising from:
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission took place.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 1993) (emphasis added). The Federal Tort Claims Act is purely jurisdictional and creates no substantive causes of action. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140-41, 71 S.Ct. 153, 156-57, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950); Jarrett v. United States, 874 F.2d 201, 203 (4th Cir.1989). The Federal Act provides jurisdiction in federal courts for claims against the United States for torts caused by an employee if a private person would be liable under similar circumstances based on the law of the state where the tort occurred. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 1993). Therefore, a federal court must look to state law to determine whether a cause of action exists. Aguilar v. United States, 920 F.2d 1475, 1477 (9th Cir.1990).
Conversely, the Texas Tort Claims Act creates a cause of action against the state by waiving sovereign immunity for injury caused by “a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the government unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.” Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added). The Texas Act actually makes the government a private person for liability purposes for losses arising from a condition or use of tangible personal or real property. Id. By using the language “were it a private person,” the legislature has placed the government into the shoes of a private person and has waived any right to hide behind the official immunity of its employees. In addition, the Texas Tort Claims Act differs from the Federal Tort Claims Act in its format. Unlike the Federal Act, the Texas Tort Claims Act is divided into two sections with the first part specifically retaining sovereign immunity when the employee is found to be officially immune. See id. § 101.021(1)(B); Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d at 812. Finally, the majority does not cite, nor have I found, any Texas cases that have relied ori a federal court’s construction of section 1346(b) of the Federal Act, a jurisdictional statute, to interpret the “private person” language of section 101.021(2) of the Texas Act. To adopt such a mode of construction would serve only to further confuse an already befuddled area of Texas law.
Even if the “private person” language in the Federal Tort Claims Act is relevant in interpreting the Texas Tort Claims Act, federal case law does not support the majority’s proposition that the government retains sovereign immunity when the employee is found to be officially immune. In fact, a case relied upon by the majority with similar facts as our case holds contrariwise to the position of the majority. See Aguilar, 920 F.2d at 1477. In Aguilar, the plaintiffs sued the United States government for the negligence of a *110federal officer in directing traffic around a disabled tractor-trailer on Hoover Dam. Id. at 1476. Applying a Nevada law that limited recoveries against police officers, the court found that the plaintiffs could recover up to fifty thousand dollars against the government. Id. at 1479. Recognizing that private persons do not direct traffic on public highways, the court held that under the Federal Tort Claims Act “the United States may ‘be liable for the performance of activities private persons do not perform.’ ” Id. at 1477. (quoting Doggett v. United States, 875 F.2d 684, 689 (9th Cir.1989)). In addition, in a recent case considering the liability of the United States for injuries caused by a federal officer’s negligence in a high speed chase, the ninth circuit held that “a finding of immunity for state employees under state law does not necessarily mean that the United States has no liability for injuries caused by its employees.” Stuart v. United States, No. 93-55229, 1994 WL 57850 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 1994). The United States Supreme Court also has rejected the argument that the government cannot be hable for the performance of “uniquely governmental functions.” Indian Towing Company v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65, 76 S.Ct. 122, 124-125, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955). Absent a statutory exception, such as the “discretionary function” exception in section 2680(a), the Court held that the government can be held hable for neghgence at the “operational level” of governmental activity regardless of whether private persons perform a similar activity. Id.
The Texas Tort Claims Act is to be construed so as “to give effect to the object ‘sought to be attained’ by the Act.” Robinson v. Central Texas MHMR Center, 780 S.W.2d 169, 170 n. 2 (Tex.1989) (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023 (Vernon 1988)). Every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex.1981). We cannot ignore the language of a statute unless it is necessary to give effect to the legislature’s clear intent. Id.
Appellant contends, and the majority agrees, that section 101.021(2) mandates that once the governmental employee is found to be officially immune, the government will also be immune. Such a construction would make 101.021(2) indistinguishable from 101.-021(1)(B) rendering the “private person” language in section 101.021(2) meaningless. The language of section 101.021(2) unequivocally provides a different standard than that of section 101.021(1) with regard to the governmental entity’s liability. Section 101.-021(2) states that the governmental unit’s liability is contingent upon its liability if it were a private person. Section 101.021(1) requires that the employee be personally liable in order for a waiver of sovereign immunity by the state. Had the legislature intended to have the same standard for both subsections (1) and (2), they would have used identical language. As different language was used, I must conclude that the legislature intended a different meaning in subsection (2) than in subsection (1).
Appellant contends that the Texas Supreme Court has expressly approved of its construction of section 101.021(2) in Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d at 812. However, in Kilbum, the Supreme Court made no mention of section 101.021(2). Id. The court, in dicta, used section 101.021(1) as an example of when a governmental entity may appeal interlocutory orders on questions of sovereign immunity under section 51.014 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code. Id. at 812. The Supreme Court decided Kilbum on procedural grounds without examining whether the plaintiffs claim properly fell under either section 101.021(1) or section 101.021(2) of the Tort Claims Act. Id. Similarly, the court in Wyse v. Department of Public Safety stated, in dicta, that the government would not be hable if its employees were found to be officially immune after holding that the plaintiffs claim was outside the purview of the Tort Claims Act. Wyse, 733 S.W.2d at 228. The other cases cited by appellant in its Motion for Rehearing and its brief also involve courts deciding cases on grounds other than the construction of section 101.021(2). See, e.g., Huddleston v. Maurry, 841 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (interpreting section 101.021(1)); Eakle v. Texas Dept. of Human Services, 815 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, no writ) (finding liability excepted under section 101.056 while expressly not deciding whether a cause of *111action was valid under section 101.021(2)); Carpenter v. Barner, 797 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.App.—Waco 1990, writ denied) (construing section 101.021(1)); Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 1272, 99 L.Ed.2d 483 (1988) (holding traffic accident was caused entirely by the negligence of a fleeing suspect, thereby not implicating the Texas Tort Claims Act). This court relied on Wyse, Carpenter, and Kilbum to incorrectly conclude that a governmental entity retains its sovereign immunity under subsection 101.021(2) solely because an employee is found to be officially immune. Newsom, 858 S.W.2d at 19. I, therefore, would overrule Newsom with regard to this issue.
When liability is waived by the Texas Tort Claims Act, the doctrine of respondeat superior will apply to the state. University of Texas Med. Branch v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex.1994); Driskill v. State, 787 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex.1990). Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee committed within the scope of the employee’s general authority. Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex.1971). ‘Were it a private person,” the government would be the employer of a negligent employee. See Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1986). As we have found Officer Huckeba officially immune, we also necessarily have determined that he was acting within in the scope of his authority. However, before we can apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold the County liable for the negligence of its employee under section 101.021(2), the appel-lees’ injuries must arise out of a condition or use of tangible personal or real property. Tex.Civ.PRAc. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1986).
We were unable to address whether appel-lees’ claims arose out of a condition or use of property because that issue was not before us on appeal. A point of error is not properly briefed and presents nothing for review where appellant cites no authority and makes no argument. See Tex.R.App.P. 74(f); Sierra Stage Coaches, Inc. v. La Porte Sch. Dist., 832 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ). Appellant did not allege, nor did it provide any argument, that appellees’ claims were not caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property.
Appellant’s sole point of error was that the trial court erred in ruling that Harris County was not entitled to immunity. Appellant made two arguments in support of its point of error: 1) the County cannot be held liable for the actions of an employee found to be immune; and 2) the County owes no duty to persons travelling on state roads. I have rejected the appellant’s first argument and its second argument is irrelevant in determining whether a waiver occurred under section 101.021(2). Section 101.021(2) only requires that the injury be caused by a use or condition of tangible personal property and that the governmental unit, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant under Texas law. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.-021(2). The County’s liability was derived solely from its employee’s negligence. Whether the County owes a duty to persons traveling on state-owned roads is immaterial to the determination of whether sovereign immunity has been waived by section 101.-021(2). It is enough that the County’s employee owed a duty to the public to direct traffic in a non-negligent maimer.
Having rejected both of appellant’s arguments and without any argument that appel-lees’ claims were not caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property, I would not disturb the trial court’s finding that liability existed under the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, I would overrule appellant’s point of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
ELLIS and LEE, JJ., joined.