Court Opinion

ID: 9898021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:52.180679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:43.770912
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                                                                                                       Filed
                                                                                                 Washington State
                                                                                                 Court of Appeals
                                                                                                  Division Two

                                                                                                  March 21, 2023
              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                DIVISION II
           JOSHUA PENNER and TODD McKELLIPS,                                 No. 57134-0-II
           individually and on behalf of a class of all
           persons similarly situated,

                                Appellants,

                  v.
                                                                        PUBLISHED OPINION
           CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGIONAL
           TRANSIT AUTHORITY and STATE OF
           WASHINGTON,

                                Respondents.

                 PRICE, J. — Joshua Penner1 appeals the superior court’s order granting summary judgment

       in favor of Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority and the State (collectively Sound

       Transit) based on the doctrine of res judicata as a result of previous litigation asserting the same

       claims. The superior court also decided, in the alternative, that stare decisis and the statute of

       limitations barred Penner’s claims. On appeal, Penner argues that res judicata does not apply

       because he was not a party to the previous litigation. He also claims the superior court’s alternative

       holdings were in error. We disagree and affirm.

       1
        Joshua Penner and Todd McKellips are both representatives in a proposed class action and will
       be referred to collectively as “Penner.”
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       No. 57134-0-II

                                                     FACTS

       I. BACKGROUND FACTS

              In 1992, the legislature authorized the most populous counties in this state to create a local

       agency to plan and implement a “high capacity transportation system.” Black v. Cent. Puget Sound

       Reg’l Transit Auth., 195 Wn.2d 198, 201, 457 P.3d 453 (2020) (Black I) (quoting ENGROSSED

       SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2610, at 2, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1992)). Using this authority, King,

       Pierce, and Snohomish Counties voted in 1993 to create Sound Transit “to address traffic

       congestion in the central Puget Sound region.” Pierce County v. State, 159 Wn.2d 16, 21,

       148 P.3d 1002 (2006) (Pierce County II); Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 202. In 1996, voters in those

       counties approved a motor vehicle excise tax (MVET) to fund bus services and rail lines through

       Sound Transit. Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 202. MVETs are calculated by a depreciation schedule

       based on the vehicle’s value, set out by statute. Id.; former RCW 82.44.041 (1990). Voters

       authorized a 0.3 percent MVET.

              At the time, the MVET utilized a depreciation schedule created by the legislature in 1990,

       which calculated the value of a vehicle based on its age. Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 216 (Gordon

       McCloud, J., dissenting). A depreciation schedule is a table that determines the MVET a vehicle

       owner must pay based on the years of service of the vehicle and the latest purchase price of a

       vehicle, which reduces as the vehicle ages. RCW 82.44.035. As detailed below, the legislature

       and voters have changed the depreciation schedule several times over the past twenty years, thus

       changing the MVET amount required to be paid by vehicle owners.

                                                        2
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       No. 57134-0-II

                In 1998, voters approved Referendum 49 (1999 depreciation schedule),2 which went into

       effect in 1999. The 1999 depreciation schedule repealed the then-effective 1996 depreciation

       schedule by reducing the taxable value of certain vehicles. Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 216 (Gordon

       McCloud, J., dissenting).

                The next year, in 1999, Sound Transit issued $350 million in bonds (Sound Transit Bonds)

       to initially finance its projects, pledging revenues from sales tax and the MVET in place in 1996,

       as modified by the 1999 depreciation schedule, for payment of the bonds. Id. at 202. The bonds

       will expire in 2028. Id.; see also Pierce County II, 159 Wn.2d at 25.

                Also in 1999, voters approved Initiative 695 (I-695),3 which was intended to reduce motor

       vehicle tabs to $30. Pierce County. v. State, 150 Wn.2d 422, 447, 78 P.3d 640 (2003) (hereinafter

       Pierce County I); Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 216 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting). The initiative

       purported to repeal all MVETs and corresponding depreciation schedules, including the 1999

       depreciation schedule. Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 216 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting). Our Supreme

       Court held I-695 was unconstitutional in its entirety in 2000. Amalg. Transit Union Loc. 587 v.

       State, 142 Wn.2d 183, 257, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608 (2000).

                But in 2000, before the Supreme Court’s opinion was finalized, the legislature enacted

       portions of I-695, including repealing the statewide MVET and allowing local entities to collect

       the MVET under specific conditions. Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 216 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting).

       2
        In 1998, the legislature passed Engrossed House Bill (EHB) 2894, (LAWS OF 1998, ch. 321);
       EHB 2984, § 4 was referred to the voters as part of Referendum 49.
       3
           LAWS OF 2000, ch. 1, § 3.

                                                        3
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       No. 57134-0-II

              Two years later, in 2002, voters approved Initiative 776 (I-776), which was also intended

       to limit motor vehicle tabs. Pierce County I, 150 Wn.2d at 427. However, I-776 also purported

       to repeal the use of MVETs for transit funding, repeal the depreciation schedule used to calculate

       the MVET, and deny Sound Transit’s authority to collect and levy MVETs, which were central to

       funding the bus and rail systems and repaying its bonds. Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 202.

              In 2006, in Pierce County II, our Supreme Court declared these portions of I-776 related

       to Sound Transit unconstitutional, holding the portions violated article I, section 23 of the

       Washington Constitution through the improper impairment of contracts, specifically the contracts

       with the bondholders. 159 Wn.2d at 27, 51.

              Also in 2006, just prior to the Pierce County II decision, the legislature passed SUBSTITUTE

       S.B. 6247, codified as RCW 82.44.035 (2006 depreciation schedule), to provide statutory guidance

       to all local jurisdictions with authority to use MVETs to calculate the correct values, since I-776

       had purported to repeal the MVETs. FINAL B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE S.B. 6247, at 1, 59th Leg. Reg.

       Sess. (Wash. 2006). This legislation enacted new depreciation values used to calculate the

       MVETs. Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 218 (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting).

              In 2010, in an attempt to “streamline and make technical amendments” to the vehicle

       registration statutes and in response to Pierce County II, the legislature passed Senate Bill 6379,

       which amended RCW 81.104.160 (2010 statute). LAWS OF 2010, ch. 161, § 1; Black I, 195 Wn.2d

       at 202. The previous 2006 depreciation schedule still applied to the MVET. See FINAL B. REP.

       ON S.B. 6379, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010).     However, because of the Pierce County II

       holding, the 2010 statute apparently attempted to exclude the Sound Transit Bonds from the

       application of the 2006 depreciation schedule. See former RCW 81.104.160 (2010). But instead

                                                       4
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       No. 57134-0-II

       of referring to the 1999 depreciation schedule then being used by Sound Transit, the statute referred

       to the repealed 1996 schedule. See former RCW 81.104.160 (2010).

               In 2015, the legislature again amended RCW 81.104.160 (2015 statute) and still generally

       imposed the 2006 depreciation schedule on MVETs but, once again, attempted a carve out for the

       Sound Transit Bonds. But like the 2010 statute, the 2015 statute referred to the 1996 laws, not the

       1999 depreciation schedule. Former RCW 81.104.160(1) (2015).

       II. BLACK LITIGATION

               In 2018, a group of taxpayers, including Taylor Black (Black), filed a complaint against

       Sound Transit and the State, arguing the 2015 statute was unconstitutional under article II, section

       37 of the Washington Constitution because it did not restate in full any depreciation schedules

       referenced in the statute. Black I, 195 Wn.2d at 203. Shortly before oral argument, the State filed

       a notice that Sound Transit had been applying the 1999 depreciation schedule instead of the

       depreciation schedule in place in 1996 that was referenced in the 2015 statute. Id. at 204. The

       Black I court determined Sound Transit’s notice was irrelevant to the case, stating, “[B]ecause

       Sound Transit’s actions d[id] not have any bearing on the constitutionality of the MVET statute

       itself, this notice d[id] not impact [their] holding.” Id.

               The court then concluded that the 2015 statute did not violate article II, section 37 of the

       Washington Constitution because it was a complete act and “d[id] not render [] other existing

       statutes erroneous . . . .” Id. at 214.

               In 2020, after the Black I decision, Black filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing Sound

       Transit’s admitted use of the 1999 depreciation schedule in face of the 2015 statute’s requirement

       to use the 1996 depreciation schedule violated article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution.

                                                          5
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       No. 57134-0-II

       Black asked the court to vacate its decision in Black I and remand the case for consolidation with

       Black’s second complaint, which was to be filed imminently. The court denied the motion for

       reconsideration.

              Within days of filing his motion for reconsideration based on Sound Transit’s use of the

       1999 depreciation schedule, Black filed his second complaint, a proposed class action, against

       Sound Transit and the State (Black II),4 alleging 19 causes of action, including seeking to recover

       tax refund payments and an injunction to prevent Sound Transit’s use of the 1999 depreciation

       schedule, as well as challenging the constitutionality of the 2010 and 2015 statutes.

              Sound Transit moved for summary judgment at the superior court, arguing Black’s

       complaint was barred by the holdings in Black I and Pierce County II. Sound Transit also argued

       res judicata applied to the constitutionality claims in Black II since the Black I court’s denial of

       Black’s motion to reconsider was a final judgment. Finally, Sound Transit argued the three-year

       statute of limitations had run on any refund claims that were based on the 2010 and 2015 statutes.

              Black responded that his claims were not barred by Black I and Pierce County II, nor did

       the statute of limitations apply to his claims.

              The superior court in Black II granted Sound Transit’s motion for summary judgment,

       agreeing with Sound Transit that the lawsuit was precluded by Black I and Pierce County II5 and

       4
        Black alleged he had standing because he was a taxpayer of the region where Sound Transit
       operated and paid, at some point, the MVET.
       5
         In Black II, the superior court specifically stated, “I am going to grant the motion for summary
       judgment from [Sound Transit] . . . . I do accept and agree with your argument that the lawsuit is
       precluded by the [Black I] case, as well as the case referred to as Pierce County II . . . .” Clerk’s
       Papers (CP) at 664.

                                                         6
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       No. 57134-0-II

       res judicata applied to the constitutionality claims. The superior court also ruled that the tax refund

       claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the reasoning of Black I also applied to bar

       those claims. The superior court further ruled that Black was not entitled to an injunction. Given

       its rulings, the superior court in Black II ruled any discovery issues were moot.

              Black initially appealed the Black II summary judgment dismissal to this court, but then

       later voluntarily dismissed the appeal.

       III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              Following Black’s voluntary dismissal of the Black II appeal, Penner,6 with representation

       from the same attorneys who represented Black, filed a new proposed class action lawsuit against

       Sound Transit in 2021. Penner’s complaint was identical to Black II’s complaint, including the

       identical causes of action; only the names of the parties changed. The lawsuit alleged the same

       exact 19 causes of action as Black did, including seeking a return to the taxpayers of tax proceeds

       obtained by Sound Transit’s misapplication of the MVET depreciation schedule (causes of action

       1, 8, 16, and 17), challenging the constitutionality of the 2010 and 2015 statutes and the 2015

       statute ballot title (causes of action 2-7, 9-15), and seeking an injunction to bar Sound Transit from

       applying the 1999 depreciation schedule (causes of action 18-19).

              Sound Transit again moved for summary judgment. Pointing to the superior court’s

       decision in Black II, Sound Transit argued Penner’s complaint should be dismissed due to res

       judicata because Penner and Black shared a “unity of interest” as taxpayers with identical claims

       and Black II was binding precedent. CP at 734-35. Alternatively, Sound Transit argued that the

       6
        Like Black, Penner alleged he has standing because he is a taxpayer and a resident of the region
       where Sound Transit operates and, accordingly, paid the MVET at some point.

                                                         7
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       No. 57134-0-II

       tax refund claims were moot and nonjusticiable; res judicata, collateral estoppel, and stare decisis

       (from Pierce County II and Black I) barred the constitutionality claims; and the ballot title claim

       was untimely and nonjusticiable.

              Penner responded that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because Penner

       was not a party to the Black II litigation and no taxpayer “unity of interest” doctrine existed in this

       context. CP at 759. As for the alternative arguments, Penner responded that the subject matter

       and causes of action in the Penner litigation differed from the Black I litigation because Black I

       only challenged the constitutionality of the statute under article II, section 37 of the Washington

       Constitution. Penner finally argued that stare decisis from Black I and Pierce County II did not

       apply, nor was Black II binding, and he was entitled to discovery.

              The superior court granted Sound Transit’s motion for summary judgment, finding all

       claims were barred under res judicata because of the final decision in Black II. The court further

       ruled, apparently in the alternative, that the tax refund and 2015 constitutionality claims were

       precluded by stare decisis from Black I and Pierce County II, the tax refund claims were barred by

       the statute of limitations,7 and the 2010 constitutionality claims were time barred and moot. The

       court also determined the ballot title claims were nonjusticiable and untimely, and that Penner

       forfeited his claim because he did not defend the merits.

              Penner sought discretionary review of the superior court’s ruling with our Supreme Court,

       which the court denied. Penner then appealed to this court.

       7
         The superior court expressly adopted the reasoning for the stare decisis and statute of limitation
       rulings from the Black II oral hearing.

                                                         8
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       No. 57134-0-II

                                                   ANALYSIS

       I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

              We review summary judgment rulings de novo. M.E. v. City of Tacoma, 15 Wn. App. 2d

       21, 31, 471 P.3d 950 (2020), review denied, 196 Wn.2d 1035 (2021). “Summary judgment is

       appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions demonstrate the absence of

       any genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

       Id. The reviewing court should view “the facts and the reasonable inferences from those facts in

       the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Michak v. Transnation Title Ins. Co., 148 Wn.2d

       788, 794, 64 P.3d 22 (2003). We may affirm the superior court’s summary judgment ruling on

       any ground supported by the record. Pac. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 181 Wn. App. 730,

       737, 329 P.3d 101 (2014).

       II. RES JUDICATA

              Penner argues res judicata does not apply to his case because he was not in privity with any

       party to the Black II litigation as required for the doctrine to apply. Sound Transit responds that

       Penner and Black share a common public interest as taxpayers; therefore, they are in privity for

       res judicata purposes. We agree with Sound Transit.

       A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

              We review an application of res judicata de novo. Lynn v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 130 Wn.

       App. 829, 837, 125 P.3d 202 (2005). “ ‘The doctrine of res judicata rests upon the ground that a

       matter which has been litigated, or on which there has been an opportunity to litigate, in a former

       action in a court of competent jurisdiction, should not be permitted to be litigated again. It puts an

       end to strife, produces certainty as to individual rights, and gives dignity and respect to judicial

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       No. 57134-0-II

       proceedings.’ ” Marino Prop. Co. v. Port Comm’rs, 97 Wn.2d 307, 312, 644 P.2d 1181 (1982)

       (quoting Walsh v. Wolff, 32 Wn.2d 285, 287, 201 P.2d 215 (1949)).

               Res judicata attempts to prevent piecemeal litigation and supports the finality of judgment.

       Spokane Rsch. & Def. Fund v. City of Spokane, 155 Wn.2d 89, 99, 117 P.3d 1117 (2005); see also

       Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 395, 429 P.2d 207 (1967) (“Res judicata [is] . . .

       designed to . . . curtail multiplicity of actions and harassment in the courts . . . .”); In re Recall of

       Fortney, 199 Wn.2d 109, 124, 503 P.3d 556 (2022) (“[W]e will not subject an elected official to

       answer the same charges each time a different citizen is willing to put their name on a recall

       petition.”).

               Res judicata requires a valid and final judgment on the merits in a previous suit. Hisle v.

       Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 865, 93 P.3d 108 (2004). Summary judgment is a

       final judgment on the merits. DeYoung v. Cenex Ltd., 100 Wn. App. 885, 892, 1 P.3d 587 (2000),

       review denied, 146 Wn.2d 1016 (2002). The party asserting res judicata bears the burden of proof.

       Hisle, 151 Wn.2d at 865.

               “Res judicata prevents relitigation of the same claim where a subsequent claim involves

       the same (1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties, and (4) quality of persons

       for or against the claim made.” Harley H. Hoppe & Assocs. v. King County, 162 Wn. App. 40, 51,

       255 P.3d 819, review denied, 172 Wn.2d 1019 (2011); see also Weaver v. City of Everett, 194

       Wn.2d 464, 480, 450 P.3d 177 (2019).

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               Penner focuses on the third element, arguing res judicata does not apply because he was

       not a party nor was he in privity to a party in the Black II litigation.8

               A review of the caselaw shows that there is an exception to this third element that may be

       applicable in certain cases for plaintiffs that share a common public interest.

               Generally, for a party to be the same persons or parties for res judicata purposes, they must

       have the same identities as the parties from the previous litigation. See Neighbors v. King County,

       15 Wn. App. 2d 71, 79, 479 P.3d 724 (2020) (finding the parties in both litigations were the same

       because “[t]he four identities here are the same”). Although identity of the parties is typically

       strict under this element, “ ‘nominally different parties’ ” may be precluded from bringing

       subsequent claims if the parties “ ‘have sufficiently identical interests to satisfy the identity of

       parties’ inquiry’ because they possess ‘the same legal interests as all citizens of the state.’ ” In re

       Election Contest Filed by Coday, 156 Wn.2d 485, 501, 130 P.3d 809 (2006) (internal quotation

       marks omitted) (quoting In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 261, 961 P.2d 343

       (1998)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 976 (2006). “ ‘Identity of parties is not a mere matter of form, but

       of substance. . . . [P]arties nominally different may be, in legal effect, the same.’ ” Rains v. State,

       100 Wn.2d 660, 664, 674 P.2d 165 (1983) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks

       omitted) (quoting Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402, 60 S. Ct. 907,

       84 L. Ed. 1263 (1940)).

               Historically, even if the plaintiffs were not the same persons, Washington courts have

       applied res judicata to cases involving common public rights if the plaintiffs shared identities as

       8
         Penner does not argue on appeal that the superior court erred in finding this case and Black II had
       the same subject matter, cause of action, or quality of persons for or against the claim made.

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       No. 57134-0-II

       taxpayers. See State ex rel. Forgues v. Superior Ct. of Lewis County, 70 Wash. 670, 673-74,

       127 P. 313 (1912). In Forgues, a relator filed suit against the Centralia city clerk, alleging a

       petition prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages was void because certain elector voters who

       signed a petition did not properly state where they lived or their post office addresses. Id. at 671.

       The court stated,

              “A judgment for or against a municipal corporation, in a suit concerning a matter
              which is of general interest to all the citizens or taxpayers thereof, as the levy and
              collection of taxes, or public contracts or other obligations, or public property, its
              title, character or boundaries, is binding, not only on the municipality and its
              officers, but also upon such citizens or taxpayers, in so far as concerns their rights
              or interests as members of the general public . . . . [A] judgment between certain
              residents or taxpayers and the municipality may be conclusive on all other citizens
              similarly situated, and where an action between individuals concerns public
              interests or rights, and the municipality is represented in the litigation by its proper
              officers and takes part in the prosecution or defense of the action, it is estopped by
              the result”.

       Id. at 673-74 (quoting, 23 CYC. Judgments 1269 (1906)). The court determined the issues in the

       relator’s case were previously determined in an earlier case, both plaintiffs sued in their capacity

       as taxpayers, and any remedies would be common to both relators. Id. at 674-75. Therefore, the

       Forgues court barred the relator’s claim on the basis of res judicata. Id.

              But res judicata in this context only applies if the cause of action is common to all taxpayers

       and is not dependent on rights particular to the specific plaintiff. In In re Assessment for Local

       Improvement Sewer Dist. No. 1 of City of Chehalis, 84 Wash. 565, 147 P. 199 (1915) (Summersett),

       a constructor of sanitary sewers appealed a decision which set aside and cancelled special

       assessments levied on certain properties—levies which the constructor claimed he was due. Id. at

       566. The appellant argued that the decision was error because a previous suit found the city was

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       No. 57134-0-II

       required to pay the levies and res judicata should have compelled the same result in his case. Id.

       at 569-70. The court rejected the argument, stating:

               [A] final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction for or against a
               municipality, adjudicating a matter of general concern to its citizens and taxpayers,
               is binding alike upon the municipality and all of its citizens and taxpayers in so far
               as there is thereby adjudicated such matter of general concern . . . . [I]t must be
               remembered that he is not by such a judgment precluded from asserting any right
               which he holds as an individual peculiar to himself, and which he does not share
               with the public.

       Id. at 571.

               Accordingly, the Summersett court decided property owners were not barred by res judicata

       to challenge certain assessments because they each had individual rights to have their property

       valued, which they did not share in common with others.          Id. at 576 (“We conclude that the

       judgment of the superior court for Lewis County, which was affirmed by this court in the

       mandamus case requiring the city commission to proceed with the levying of assessments, was

       not, and could not have been, res judicata of the rights of Summersett . . . in so far as the question

       of benefits and apportionment thereof is concerned.”).

               Recent Washington courts have used similar rationale to Forgues to bar claims on res

       judicata grounds in cases involving voters, even though the parties in the second litigation were

       not identical to the parties in the previous litigation. See Coday, 156 Wn.2d at 502-03; Pearsall-

       Stipek, 136 Wn.2d at 261 (court applying res judicata to a nonparty claim in an election recall

       case); Fortney, 199 Wn.2d at 124-26 (court applying res judicata to a nonparty claim in election

       recall case); Snyder v. Munro, 106 Wn.2d 380, 721 P.2d 962 (1986) (court applying res judicata

       to nonparty claims because, as citizens of the state, plaintiffs had their interests properly

       represented in previous litigation that included major political parties and state officials).

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       No. 57134-0-II

               In the case of Coday, our Supreme Court held that a plaintiff was barred by res judicata in

       an election contest claim because “her interest [was] identical to that of the [previous suit she was

       not a party to] and of all citizens of the state: ensuring a fair, just, and accurate election. She [was],

       therefore, an identical party . . . for res judicata purposes.” 156 Wn.2d at 502. The Coday decision

       discussed four different plaintiffs who were challenging the election of Governor Gregoire on four

       different grounds. Id. at 488. Of the four plaintiffs, only one, Karr, was barred by res judicata

       because her asserted grounds were identical to previous litigation against the governor’s election.

       Id. at 501-02. Notably, the Coday court explained it only applied res judicata against Karr’s claims

       because the parties in the previous litigation had adequate representation and a “significant stake

       in the outcome of the contest and invest[ed] significant resources in pursuing all viable grounds

       for the contest.” Id. at 502 n.4. In other words, res judicata applied only in “substantially identical

       contests.” Id. The court specifically cautioned that res judicata should not apply if the previous

       litigants did not have adequate representation. Id.

               Washington courts have applied Coday’s reasoning in other contexts, such as public

       records requests. See Hoppe, 162 Wn. App. at 51-53. In Hoppe, a company, Harley H. Hoppe &

       Associates, Inc., filed a public records request, which King County refused to fulfill. Id. at 46-47.

       The case ended when the superior court granted King County’s summary judgment motion. Id. at

       47. Later, Hoppe’s employee, who was also the daughter of Hoppe’s owner, filed an identical

       public records request, and was again denied. Id. at 48. Although Hoppe and the employee were

       not identical parties, the Hoppe court applied res judicata, stating, “[T]he same reasoning [as

       Coday] applies here in the public records act context; any member of the public has standing to

       bring such a public records request. We hold that . . . [Hoppe’s employee] is in sufficient privity

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       No. 57134-0-II

       with Hoppe to satisfy the concurrence of identity inquiry and thus meets the third and fourth

       elements of a res judicata analysis.” Id. at 51-52.

              But courts have been careful to limit the reach of Coday’s holding. For example, Division

       Three of this court did not extend Coday’s reasoning to two different Eastern Washington Growth

       Management Hearings Board (Board) claims because the interests of the two plaintiffs were not

       sufficiently similar. Stevens County. v. Futurewise, 146 Wn. App. 493, 505, 192 P.3d 1 (2008),

       review denied, 165 Wn.2d 1038 (2009). There, a county resident filed a petition for review of

       Title 13 of a Stevens County ordinance. Id. at 500-01. Futurewise then later filed its own petition

       with the Board for review of Title 13. Id. at 501. The court found that the “various citizens and

       citizen groups challenged Title 13 as it affected their particular interests,” and therefore, “[t]hese

       various parties, including Futurewise in the most recent petition, did not have sufficiently identical

       legal interests to trigger the [Coday] voter exception to the privity requirement.” Id. at 505

       (emphasis added).

       B. APPLICATION

              Penner argues that applying the Coday exception to cases outside of the election context is

       an unprecedented expansion unsupported by the case law and is inferior to class action litigation

       under CR 23.

              As seen above, Coday’s reasoning has already extended beyond election recall cases. But

       the reasoning should be only applied in limited situations. Combining Forgues, Summersett, and

       Coday with their progeny, we hold that the common public interest exception for res judicata

       should only apply when the interests of the parties are both identical and of a clearly public nature

       and, importantly, there has been adequate representation.

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       No. 57134-0-II

              Applying this standard here, Penner’s claims are properly barred by res judicata. First, the

       interests involved here are both public and identical. In Black II, Black asserted standing because

       he was a taxpayer of the region where Sound Transit operated and paid, at some point, the MVET.

       Penner alleges standing on the exact same basis. In addition, they both allege the same common

       public interest: to ensure the constitutionality of the statutes enacted in this state and a return of

       proceeds “to taxpayers.” Indeed, there is nothing unique or different between Penner’s interests

       and Black’s interests, unlike the litigants in Summersett and Futurewise. Penner also asserts the

       exact same issues and claims as Black as a taxpayer in the Sound Transit region—in fact, Penner’s

       complaint is substantively identical to Black’s complaint, with only differences in the formatting

       of the document.

              Second, neither party has alleged that Black had inadequate representation in the earlier

       Black II litigation. Without question, Penner cannot reasonably make such an argument because

       the lawyers for both parties are the same. Thus, the two aspects of Coday’s reasoning, identical

       common public interest and adequate representation, are met.

              Moreover, applying res judicata in this context is appropriate. For example, its application

       prevents “serial litigation” that is of concern in the Coday line of cases. Similar to election recall

       petitions at issue in Coday, unless it has the doctrine of res judicate available, Sound Transit could

       be forced to defend multiple cases with the exact same claims where plaintiffs’ interests were

       adequately represented previously. This would waste not only public funds but also court

       resources.

              Penner contends applying res judicata here would erode many of the safeguards that exist

       in class action litigation, relying on due process concerns discussed in the federal case, Taylor v.

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       No. 57134-0-II

       Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). For example, Penner argues

       that a class action would allow individual members to determine for themselves whether they

       choose to be bound by the outcome of the litigation, whereas a common public interest exception

       for res judicata would unfairly bind those individuals.

              But class actions are only appropriate if it “is superior to other available methods for the

       fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” CR 23(b)(3). And here, it has not been shown

       that a class action is necessarily a superior form of litigation to a declaratory judgment action with

       application of the common public interest exception for res judicata. Indeed, the doctrine of res

       judicata in this context has its own elements that provide protection for future litigants, like

       requiring the same cause of action, same subject matter, and a final decision. And the additional

       requirements derived from Coday of identical common public interest and adequate representation

       provide further protection to the taxpayers who are not actual litigants.9

              Here, looking at the four requirements for res judicata—(1) subject matter, (2) cause of

       action, (3) persons and parties, and (4) quality of persons for or against the claim made—the

       doctrine appropriately bars Penner’s claims after the final decision in Black II. With identical

       9
          Penner’s reliance on Taylor for its position is unpersuasive. Taylor is a federal case that does
       not discuss or apply Washington law. Further, in a portion of its decision, the Taylor court rejected
       the application of a federal “public law” exception to privity of parties for res judicata for the
       Freedom of Information Act requests based, in large part, on the fact that the relief was specific to
       individuals and would not have inured to the benefit of the public. 553 U.S. at 902-03. But here,
       as previously explained, a successful challenge to the 2015 statute would likely result in relief to
       all persons who paid the Sound Transit MVET in Washington, not just individual refunds to Penner
       or Black. The Taylor court also explained that in claims involving the “public law” exception in
       federal law (conceptually similar common public interest issues discussed in Coday), “ ‘the States
       have wide latitude to establish procedures [limiting] the number of judicial proceedings that may
       be entertained.’ ” Id. at 902 (alteration in original) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala.,
       517 U.S. 793, 803, 116 S. Ct. 1761, 135 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1996)).

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       No. 57134-0-II

       complaints between Penner and Black, the subject matter and causes of action are the same. The

       defendant, Sound Transit, is the same. And, consistent with the reasoning in Coday, because Black

       was adequately represented, had a significant stake in the outcome of the litigation, and invested

       significant resources in pursuing all viable grounds for the litigation, the common public interest

       taxpayer exception to the same party requirement is met. See Coday, 156 Wn.2d at 502 n.4. The

       superior court did not err by applying res judicata to bar Penner’s claims.

                                                CONCLUSION

              Penner’s claims are barred by res judicata from the Black II litigation. Accordingly, we do

       not reach Penner’s remaining arguments. We affirm the superior court’s decision granting

       summary judgment to Sound Transit.

                                                            PRICE, J.
        We concur:

        MAXA, P.J.

        VELJACIC, J.

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