Court Opinion

ID: 9414603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 06:11:59.634337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.134477
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed July 20, 2023

                                            S   In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                          Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                      No. 05-21-00626-CR

                       CURTIS TYRONE BULLOCK, Appellant
                                     V.
                         THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
                                Dallas County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. F19-14101-R

                                       OPINION
                    Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Kennedy1
                              Opinion by Justice Goldstein
        Appellant Curtis Tyrone Bullock appeals his judgment of conviction by jury

for the murder of his wife, Yvonne Perkins. In five issues, appellant contends that

the evidence was insufficient to prove the actus reus alleged in the indictment, the

evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s negative

finding on sudden passion, the trial court erred by including a definition of

    1
      The Honorable Justice David J. Schenck was originally a member of this panel. The Honorable Justice
Nancy Kennedy succeeded Justice Schenck when his term expired on December 31, 2022. Justice Kennedy
has reviewed the briefs and the record.
“reasonable doubt” in the jury charge, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction because

the cause was not transferred to its docket. We affirm.

                                    BACKGROUND

      Appellant was married to Perkins for fourteen years, and the couple lived

together with their three children in Cedar Hill, Dallas County, Texas. On the

morning of August 8, 2019, appellant called 9-1-1 and requested that someone be

sent to his address. He provided no other information. At around 7:35 a.m., officers

from the Cedar Hill Police Department arrived at the house, knocked on the door,

and were let in by one of appellant’s children about fifteen minutes later. The child

told the officers that his parents were not answering their bedroom door. The officers

knocked on the bedroom door, but there was no answer. One of the officers tried to

kick down the door but felt appellant “wrestling against the door” on the other side.

After a second kick, appellant fell away from the door, and the officers entered the

bedroom. Appellant, now on the ground, had a laceration on his neck and could not

speak. Perkins was on the bed, face down, in a pool of blood. The officers found a

bloody knife on the ground. Paramedics from the Cedar Hill Fire Department later

arrived on the scene and confirmed that Perkins was deceased. They examined

appellant, noting that he appeared to have self-inflicted wounds to his wrists, chest,

and throat. The officers later found a bloody hammer in the room as well.

      After an investigation, a grand jury empaneled by the 204th Judicial District

Court returned an indictment charging appellant for the murder of Perkins. The

                                         –2–
indictment stated, in relevant part, that appellant intentionally and knowingly caused

Perkins’s death “by stabbing deceased with a knife, a deadly weapon.” Appellant

was tried and found guilty by a jury in the 265th Judicial District Court.

      The issue of punishment was tried to the court. Appellant testified on his own

behalf about the events leading to Perkins’s death, which included details of a heated

argument. During closing argument, appellant’s counsel argued that the evidence

supported a finding of sudden passion. The trial court rejected the sudden-passion

defense and sentenced appellant to fifty years’ confinement. This appeal followed.

                                   DISCUSSION

I.    VARIANCE

      In his first issue, appellant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to

support the actus reus element of murder as charged in the indictment. Specifically,

appellant argues that there was a fatal variance between the allegations in the

indictment and the proof submitted at trial. The State responds that there was no

variance, and if there were, it was immaterial.

      When reviewing a conviction for legal sufficiency, we consider whether after

viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Liverman v. State, 470 S.W.3d 831,

835–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). We measure whether the evidence presented at

                                          –3–
trial was sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the

offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v.

State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury

charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does

not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the

State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which

the defendant was tried.” Id.

      “A ‘variance’ occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in

the charging instrument and the proof at trial.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The issue of variance is “subsumed” within the Jackson

legal-sufficiency standard. Id. at 246–47. Only material variances affect the

hypothetically correct charge. Hernandez v. State, 556 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017). A variance is material, and thus fatal to the conviction, if it prejudices

the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. In determining whether the defendant has been

prejudiced by the variance, we consider “whether the indictment, as written,

informed the defendant of the charge against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare

an adequate defense at trial, and whether prosecution under the deficiently drafted

indictment would subject the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the

same crime.” Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 257 (quoting United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d

845, 853 (5th Cir. 2000)).

                                          –4–
      Here, the indictment alleged that appellant caused Perkins’s death by

“stabbing [her] with a deadly weapon, a knife.” The evidence at trial included the

testimony of Dr. Jessica Dwyer, a forensic pathologist in the Dallas County Medical

Examiner’s office. Dr. Dwyer conducted the autopsy of Perkins’s body. She testified

that Perkins’s body showed both blunt-force and sharp-force injuries, multiple of

which could have been lethal. Dr. Dwyer concluded that the combination of blunt-

and sharp-force injuries caused the death. She explained that the blunt-force injuries

could have been caused by the hammer found in appellant’s bedroom. Appellant

asserts that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and proof. Appellant

argues that the actus reus element of the offense was the stabbing and the State failed

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Perkins died as a result of stabbing only.

We reject this argument.

      In Johnson v. State, the court of criminal appeals explained that there are two

types of variances: those involving the statutory language that defines the offense

and those relating to a non-statutory allegation that describes the offense in some

way. 364 S.W.3d 292, 294–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The Court explained that in

murder cases, each victim is the allowable unit of prosecution. Id. at 295. Thus, if

the indictment alleges that the defendant killed person A and the evidence at trial

proves the defendant killed person B, then the variance is fatal because “the murder

of one individual is a different offense from the murder of a different individual.”

Id. at 296. However, a variance involving “a non-statutory allegation that has

                                         –5–
nothing to do with the allowable unit of prosecution . . . cannot be a basis for saying

that the proved offense is different from the one that was pled.” Id. at 297. In

explaining the difference, the Court used the following example:

      “Stabbing with a knife” and “bludgeoning with a baseball bat” are two
      possible ways of murdering Dangerous Dan, but they do not constitute
      separate offenses. These methods of committing murder do describe an
      element of the offense: the element of causation. But murder is a result-
      of-conduct crime. What caused the victim’s death is not the focus or
      gravamen of the offense; the focus or gravamen of the offense is that
      the victim was killed. Variances such as this can never be material
      because such a variance can never show an “entirely different offense”
      than what was alleged.

Id.; see also Zuniga v. State, 393 S.W.3d 404, 411 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012,

pet. ref’d) (concluding that variance between indictment, which alleged death by

stabbing, and proof at trial, which the defendant characterized as death by

bludgeoning, was immaterial).

      The complained-of variance in this case is precisely the kind that the courts in

both Johnson and Zuniga considered as being immaterial. Whether appellant stabbed

Perkins to death with a knife, bludgeoned her to death with a hammer, or killed her

via a combination of the two is immaterial. The allowable unit of prosecution was

the murder of Perkins, and any variance between the indictment and proof at trial

regarding the means of committing the murder of Perkins cannot be a basis for

overturning the conviction. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

                                         –6–
II.   SUDDEN PASSION

      In his second and third issues, appellant contends that the evidence was legally

and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s negative finding on sudden

passion.

      Murder is typically a first-degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(c).

It may, however, be reduced to a second-degree offense if, during the punishment

phase, the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he caused the

victim’s death “under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from

adequate cause.” Id. § 19.02(d). The murder statute defines both “adequate cause”

and “sudden passion.” Id. § 19.02(a). “Sudden passion” means “passion directly

caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another acting

with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely

the result of former provocation.” Id. § 19.02(a)(2). A defendant raising sudden

passion to mitigate a murder conviction must prove that a “passion or an emotion

such as fear, terror, anger, rage, or resentment existed[;] that the homicide occurred

while the passion still existed and before there was reasonable opportunity for the

passion to cool; and that there was a causal connection between the provocation, the

passion, and the homicide.” McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005). “Adequate cause” means “cause that would commonly produce a degree

of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to

render the mind incapable of cool reflection.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(1).

                                          –7–
Neither ordinary anger nor fear alone raises an issue of sudden passion arising from

adequate cause. Moncivais v. State, 425 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d).

      Although the issue of sudden passion may be raised only in punishment, it is

“analogous to an affirmative defense because the defendant has the burden of proof

by a preponderance of the evidence.” Gaona v. State, 498 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2016, pet. ref’d). As such, a negative finding on sudden passion may

be reviewed for legal and factual insufficiency. Id.

      When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a negative

finding on sudden passion, the standard of review is “the same as the legal

sufficiency standard utilized in civil cases.” Id. First, we review the record for a

scintilla of evidence to support the negative finding and disregard all evidence to the

contrary unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. If we find no evidence that

supports the finding, we then consider whether the contrary proposition was

established as a matter of law. Id. We defer to the factfinder’s determinations as to

the credibility of the testimony and the weight to give to the evidence. Id.

      If the evidence is legally sufficient, we then turn to factual sufficiency. See

Beltran v. State, No. 05-19-00017-CR, 2020 WL 4047964, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas

July 20, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Smith v.

State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 147–48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d)).

In reviewing the factual sufficiency of a finding rejecting an affirmative defense, we

                                         –8–
examine all of the evidence in a neutral light. Id. (citing Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d

662, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). A negative finding on sudden passion cannot be

overturned unless, after setting out the relevant evidence supporting the verdict, the

court clearly states why the verdict is so against the great weight and credibility of

the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or clearly biased. Id.

(citing Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671–72).

      At the punishment phase, the trial court heard testimony from appellant about

the events of the morning of August 8, 2019. During direct examination, appellant

gave the following testimony: Perkins woke him up at around 6:00 a.m. to talk about

money issues and the two began arguing. In the midst of that argument, he asked her

about a man who had been calling her, and she got upset. The couple was yelling at

each other, and it was one of the worst fights they had ever had. She told him that

she was planning on leaving him and that “she had someone already lined up, just in

case I didn’t want to act right.” At that point, appellant “lost it.” He went to her side

of the bed; she had stood up and was holding a knife that she kept nearby. She poked

him with the knife and he grabbed the hammer. After that, everything was “a blur.”

When shown photographs of Perkins’s injuries taken during her autopsy, appellant

could not remember causing any of them. Appellant argues that this evidence

conclusively establishes sudden passion and there is no contravening evidence. We

disagree. Appellant’s testimony conflicts with the testimony of at least three other

witnesses.

                                          –9–
      Appellant’s middle child, N.B., testified to the following. On the evening of

August 7, N.B. was not hungry, so he skipped dinner and went to bed at around 8:00

p.m. The next morning, he woke up, brushed his teeth, and went to his parents’ room

to ask for his cell phone. When he knocked, his dad answered the door and N.B. saw

Perkins lying on the bed. She was on her side, which was how she usually slept.

After a while, N.B. became hungry and went back to his parents’ room to ask if his

dinner from the night before was in the fridge. Appellant said it was. Appellant

“looked like he was okay.” N.B. went downstairs to heat up his food when his

younger sister came downstairs. He made her some cereal, at which point he heard

“a fall” from his parents’ room. N.B. thought it was appellant’s “controller or

something.” N.B. then went up to his parents’ room a third time to ask appellant

what setting he should use on the microwave. He said appellant looked normal and

happy. This time, he saw his mother lying on her stomach. He asked appellant if he

was okay, and appellant said yes. N.B. then went and heated up his food. He went

back to his parents’ room a fourth time to ask if his food was hot enough to eat. This

time, nobody answered the door. N.B. said that he did not hear his parents arguing

that entire time.

      Kelly Goffney, appellant’s neighbor, testified that on the evening of August

7, he and his daughter went for a walk. They encountered appellant and Perkins, but

the couple was not as cordial as usual. Goffney said that appellant was being

“standoffish.” Goffney also said that in the early morning of August 8, at around

                                        –10–
2:00 or 3:00 a.m., he was awakened by his dog barking. Goffney went outside and

heard a loud argument coming from appellant’s house.

      Dr. Dwyer testified about Perkins’s injuries. Relevant here, Dr. Dwyer

described, and through photographs taken during the autopsy showed, the location

of the blunt- and sharp-force injuries on Perkins’s head. Perkins had numerous deep

wounds on her right ear and the right side of her head. Dr. Dwyer explained that “all

of the stab wounds are directed leftward” and “[t]hey’re all traveling right to left.”

      On cross-examination during the punishment phase, the State confronted

appellant with the above testimony. Appellant testified that he did not know whether

N.B. was awake when appellant and Perkins were arguing. When asked why N.B.

did not hear his parents yelling at each other, appellant said that “the door was

closed.” Appellant was also asked about Goffney’s testimony that the argument

happened several hours earlier. Appellant said that it was not true and that the

argument did not begin until 6:00 a.m. Regarding Dr. Dwyer’s testimony, the State

asked whether appellant was right-handed or left-handed. Appellant testified that he

was right-handed, and this exchange followed:

      Q. Okay. Because if you’re right-handed, she would have had the
      injuries on her left side, right, if she was facing you?

      A. No, she was at an angle.

      Q. Okay. But if she was facing away from you with her back towards
      you, all her injuries are going to be on her right side because you’re
      right-handed, right, that make sense?

      A. No.
                                         –11–
      Q. You don’t know?

      A. No, it doesn’t make sense.

      Q. It doesn’t make sense?

      A. No.

      Q. But, now, you remember how she was facing you when you were
      stabbing and clawing her with a hammer?

      A. I remember her standing up in front of me, yes.

      Q. Okay. But you don’t remember what direction she was pointed at,
      towards you or away from you when you --

      A. Towards me.

      Q. Towards you? Okay. Now, you remember that. Okay. What was she
      saying to you when you started stabbing her with a knife?

      A. She was -- she was just yelling some curse words and stuff too.

Appellant then described the confrontation in more detail, including that he did not

punch Perkins and that at one point, he was holding both weapons at the same time.

      On this record, we cannot conclude that the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s negative finding on sudden passion.

Appellant’s statement that his argument with Perkins began at 6:00 a.m. conflicted

with the testimony of N.B. and Goffney. The trial court could have found that the

argument occurred several hours earlier in the morning and that the couple was no

longer arguing when N.B. was awake. Appellant’s testimony about a face-to-face

confrontation also conflicted with Dr. Dwyer’s testimony about the location of

Perkins’s injuries. Importantly, appellant’s detailed description of the killing—

including his positioning relative to Perkins, the fact that he was holding both the
                                       –12–
hammer and the knife at one point, and his testimony that he did not punch Perkins—

all conflicted with appellant’s own testimony during direct examination that the

confrontation was “a blur” and that he did not remember causing Perkins’s injuries.

As the factfinder during punishment, the trial court was free to find that appellant’s

version of events was not credible. See Gaona, 498 S.W.3d at 710. The trial court

could have reasonably found that appellant’s argument with his wife happened at

2:00 a.m., as testified by Goffney, and that the couple was no longer arguing at 6:00

a.m., as N.B.’s testimony indicated. Thus, the trial court could have reasonably

concluded that the murder did not occur “while the passion still existed and before

there was reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool.” See McKinney, 179

S.W.3d at 569.

       We conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support

the trial court’s negative finding on sudden passion and overrule appellant’s second

and third issues.

III.   JURY CHARGE

       In his fourth issue, appellant complains that the jury charge improperly

defined “reasonable doubt” in violation of Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The portion of the charge that is the subject of appellant’s

complaint states: “It is not required that the prosecution proves guilt beyond all

possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all reasonable

doubt concerning the Defendant’s guilt.”

                                        –13–
      In Geesa v. State, decided nine years before Paulson, the court of criminal

appeals adopted a six-paragraph instruction regarding “reasonable doubt” and held

that it “shall be submitted to the jury in all criminal cases.” 820 S.W.2d 154, 162

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The six paragraphs were:

      [1] All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be
      convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved
      beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that a person has been arrested,
      confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with, the offense gives
      rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require a
      defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The
      presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant,
      unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the
      defendant’s guilt after careful and impartial consideration of all the
      evidence in the case.

      [2] The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and
      it must do so by proving each and every element of the offense charged
      beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the
      defendant.

      [3] It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible
      doubt; it is required that the prosecution’s proof excludes all
      “reasonable doubt” concerning the defendant’s guilt.

      [4] A “reasonable doubt” is a doubt based on reason and common sense
      after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the
      case. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person
      hesitate to act in the most important of his own affairs.

      [5] Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such
      a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon
      it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.

      [6] In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt
      after considering all the evidence before you, and these instructions,
      you will acquit him and say by your verdict “Not guilty”.

                                        –14–
Id. The Paulson Court overruled Geesa, holding that the definitions in paragraphs

[4] and [5] were redundant and fallacious. See Paulson, 28 S.W.3d at 572–73. The

Court concluded that the better practice is to give no definition of “reasonable doubt”

but that it would not be reversible error to give the Geesa instruction if the State and

defense agreed to it. Id. at 573.

      Four years later, the Court expounded on its Paulson holding in Woods v.

State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The issue in Woods was

whether the trial court erred in submitting a charge to the jury that contained

paragraph [3] of the Geesa instructions. Id. The Court explained that in Paulson, it

had “overruled the portion of Geesa that required trial courts to instruct juries on the

definition of reasonable doubt.” Id. Specifically, the Court stated that Paulson

“criticized paragraphs [4] and [5] of the Geesa instruction as attempting to define

reasonable doubt.” Id. The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by including paragraph [3] in the charge. Id. The Court reaffirmed this

holding in Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

      Here, appellant complains about the inclusion of paragraph [3] in the jury

charge. He asserts that “whether Paulson was violated by the instant instruction

depends upon if it provided a ‘definition’ of reasonable doubt.” He acknowledges

that some courts, including this one, have held that paragraph [3] does not define

“reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2005, no pet.). He insists, however, that these holdings were erroneous

                                         –15–
because defining a word includes fixing or marking its limits, which he argues is

what paragraph [3] does with respect to “reasonable doubt.”

        We reject this argument, as we have on numerous occasions.2 As an

intermediate court, we are bound to follow the decisions of the court of criminal

appeals. Chatham v. State, 646 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, no pet.).

That Court held in Woods and Mays that a trial court does not err by including

paragraph [3] of the Geesa instruction in its charge to the jury. Appellant provides

nothing to distinguish the case before us from court of criminal appeals precedent.

    2
      Lane v. State, No. 05-21-01037-CR, 2022 WL 16706966, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 4, 2022, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Dickerson v. State, No. 05-20-00339-CR, 2021 WL
5410523, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Jackson v. State, No. 05-19-01043-CR, 2021 WL 791095, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 2, 2021, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d 214, 231 (Tex. App.—Dallas,
pet. ref’d); Gomez v. State, No. 05-19-00352-CR, 2020 WL 3046206, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 8,
2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Thomas v. State, No. 05-19-00347-CR, 2020 WL
2988639, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 4, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Benton v. State, No. 05-18-01024-CR, 2020 WL 2124179, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 5, 2020, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Wilson v. State, No. 05-18-00801-CR, 2019 WL 3491931,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 1, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Dickerson v.
State, No. 05-18-00949-CR, 2019 WL 2865273, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Backusy v. State, No. 05-17-01288-CR, 2018 WL 5730166, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Nov. 2, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Chapin v. State, No. 05-
15-01009-CR, 2016 WL 4421570, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 19, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Barroquin-Tabares v. State, No. 05-15-00794-CR, 2016 WL 3144160, at *3
(Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Finch v. State, No.
05-15-00793-CR, 2016 WL 2586142, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 4, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Jamison v. State, No. 05-15-00086-CR, 2016 WL 1725489, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Apr. 27, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Moran v. State, No. 05-15-
00606-CR, 2016 WL 748498, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication); Walker v. State, No. 05-14-01229-CR, 2016 WL 259577, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan.
21, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Carus v. State, No. 05-14-00272-CR, 2015
WL 9485951, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Paz v. State, No. 05-14-01127-CR, 2015 WL 6386424, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 22, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication); Barradas v. State, No. 05-14-01271-CR, 2015 WL 6157169, at
*6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Washington v.
State, No. 05-14-00604-CR, 2015 WL 4178345, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); Hargrove v. State, No. 05-11-00307-CR, 2012 WL 3553501, at *9
(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 20, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Mays, 318
S.W.3d at 389); O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695, 700–02 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. ref’d).
                                                 –16–
We again follow these holdings, as we must, and conclude that the inclusion of the

same paragraph in this case was not error. We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

IV.       JURISDICTION

          In his fifth issue, appellant contends that the trial court, the 265th District

Court, lacked jurisdiction over this case because the 204th District Court, which

empaneled the grand jury that returned his indictment, did not enter an order of

transfer. “When a defendant fails to file a plea to the jurisdiction, he waives any right

to complain that a transfer order does not appear in the record.” Keller v. State, 604

S.W.3d 214, 231 (Tex. App.—Dallas, pet. ref’d); see also Mills v. State, 742 S.W.2d

831, 834–35 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.).

          We have rejected this issue in over seventy-five prior cases in which this

counsel represented an appellant.3 Each time, counsel’s brief acknowledged that his

position is against current authority.4 Here, counsel specifically cites Mills, 742

      3
       Just in the past few years, counsel raised the issue in the following cases: Lane, 2022 WL 16706966,
at *5; Rivera v. State, No. 05-20-00300-CR, 2022 WL 214098, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 25, 2022, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Dickerson, 2021 WL 5410523, at *1; Kessler v. State, No.
05-20-00221-CR, 2021 WL 5002423, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Canamargarza v. State, No. 05-20-00074-CR, 2021 WL 3729311, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Aug. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Pedroza v. State, No. 05-
19-01570-CR, 2021 WL 804416, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication); Jackson, 2021 WL 791095, at *6; Fajardo, 2021 WL 688444, at *3; Murphy, 2020 WL
7396009, at *4; Keller, 604 S.W.3d at 231; 2020 WL 3046206, at *3; Benton, 2020 WL 2124179, at *3;
Epps v. State, No. 05-19-00066-CR, 2019 WL 6799753, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 13, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication); Delarosa v. State, No. 05-18-01507-CR, 2019 WL 6317865, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Johnson v. State,
No. 05-18-01230-CR, 2019 WL 6317866, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
      4
     See, e.g., Antonio v. State, 05-13-00747-CR, 2014 WL 2583764, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 10,
2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Appellant did not file a plea to the jurisdiction.
Moreover, appellant admits the case law is well-settled against him and appears to ask us to revisit the issue

                                                     –17–
S.W.2d at 835, and Garcia v. State, 901 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d), as examples of cases holding that a challenge to the

lack of a transfer order must be raised in the trial court or be waived on appeal. He

argues, however, that all such cases “simply cite to their antecedents without any

Constitutional or statutory authority for the proposition that a jurisdictional defect

can be cured by procedural default.” This statement mischaracterizes not just the

holding of Mills and Garcia, but also the entire body of case law on this issue.

Neither Mills, Garcia, nor to our knowledge any other case in Texas, has held that

“a jurisdictional defect can be cured by procedural default” on these facts. Rather,

as we have held time and time again, there is no jurisdictional defect. See Jackson,

2021 WL 791095, at *6 (explaining that the “fallacy of appellant’s argument” is

absence of transfer order is a procedural, not a jurisdictional defect); Fajardo v.

State, No. 05-19-01277–01279-CR, 2021 WL 688444, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Feb. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he lack of a

transfer order ‘is a procedural matter, not a jurisdictional one.’”). Appellant failed to

file a plea to the jurisdiction in the trial court and, absent an equivalent objection,

waived the issue under our long-standing precedent. Mills, 742 S.W.2d at 835.

because the cases ‘simply cite to their antecedents without any Constitutional or statutory authority for the
proposition that a jurisdictional defect can be cured by procedural default.’ We decline his invitation to
revisit the issue.”) (citing Goff v. State, No. 05-13-00876-CR, 2014 WL 259668, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Jan.22, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (declining invitation to reconsider transfer
order issue for the same reasons)).
                                                   –18–
       Even if appellant’s fifth issue had been preserved, we would find no error

because the record unequivocally shows that the 265th District Court possessed

jurisdiction over this case. Jurisdiction lies in the court in which the indictment or

complaint is first filed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.16. “When two or

more courts have concurrent jurisdiction of any criminal offense, the court in which

an indictment or a complaint shall first be filed shall retain jurisdiction except as

provided in Article 4.12.”5 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.16; see also Mills,

742 S.W.2d at 834–35. The record reflects that although appellant was indicted by a

grand jury empaneled by the 204th District Court, the indictment was filed, and the

case tried, in the 265th District Court. Thus, even if appellant had preserved this

issue, the record would reflect no reversible error. Murphy v. State, No. 05-19-

00886-CR, 2020 WL 7396009, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (transfer order unnecessary where the

record reflected that the indictment was first filed in the court in which the case was

tried); Bourque, 156 S.W.3d at 678.

       We therefore overrule appellant’s fifth issue.

   5
    Article 4.12 is inapplicable here, as it governs jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.12.
                                                –19–
                                 CONCLUSION

      Having overruled appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                           /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
                                           BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
                                           JUSTICE

Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
210626F.P05

                                       –20–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

CURTIS TYRONE BULLOCK,                        On Appeal from the 265th Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. F19-14101-R.
No. 05-21-00626-CR          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Goldstein. Justices Reichek and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Kennedy participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 20th day of July, 2023.

                                       –21–