Court Opinion

ID: 9677106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:43:35.87776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:53.808274
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because even under the notice pleading rules the complaint does not state a cause against the individual defendant, and consequently, the circuit court’s dismissal of the individual was correct.
Smith pleads that negligence in the execution of corporate duties creates a cause of action against a corporate officer in his individual capacity. The corporate shield of statutory law protects individuals from responsibility in the management of a corporation in the absence of extraordinary circumstances which are specific and unusual. White v. Winchester Land Development Corp., Ky.App., 584 S.W.2d 56 (1979); Morgan v. O’Neil, Ky., 652 S.W.2d 83 (1983). No extraordinary circumstances have been pled. Smith did not state a cause of action against Shields individually with the bare allegation that he was negligent in the conduct of his corporate management responsibilities. Smith must do more than assert the bare allegations that Shields was careless, reckless and negligent in the operation, management and supervision of the corporation in order to state a cause of action against the defendant individually.
Notice pleading has been the rule in Kentucky for over 45 years. The proper application of CR 8.01 does not require a claimant to set out all details of the facts upon which he relies, but only those that are sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and its basis. A pleading which merely suggests that the party have a right of action is insufficient and does not provide the fair notice of a primary right of the claimant or the wrong of the defendant. The complaint here does not conform to the standards of the civil rule. See Bertelsman and Philipps Vol. 6 Kentucky Practice Rules of Civil Procedure pp. 145-146, discussing Civil Rule 8.01.