Court Opinion

ID: 9894413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 19:04:58.970903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:44.246363
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/1/23 SMS Financial XIX v. Stromberg CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION ONE

 SMS FINANCIAL XIX, LLC,                                 B313902

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                      (Los Angeles County
                                                         Super. Ct. No. BC417394)
          v.

 RICHARD R. STROMBERG,

          Defendant,

 LEA STROMBERG,

          Claimant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Susan Bryant-Deason, Judge. Affirmed.
     Kaplan, Kenegos & Kadin, Jerry Kaplan for Claimant and
Appellant.
     Aires Law Firm, Timothy Carl Aires for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
             ___________________________________
      When a judgment creditor levied against the debtor’s
property, the trustee of the debtor’s irrevocable family trust
contested the levy on the ground that the trust, not the debtor,
owned the property. The trial court found for the creditor, and
the trustee appeals, contending the trust obtained a complete
interest in the property before the creditor obtained its interest.
      We disagree, and therefore affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
      The issue in these third-party claimant proceedings is
whether a judgment creditor or the debtor’s irrevocable family
trust possesses a superior interest in real property located at
4821 Berryman Avenue in Culver City (the Berryman property).
A.    Trust
      Richard Stromberg and his wife, Mary Jo Stromberg,
acquired the Berryman property in 1990. The grant deed stated
the property was granted to “RICHARD R. STROMBERG AND
MARY JO STROMBERG, husband and wife as Joint Tenants.”
      On January 1, 2005, Richard, a real estate broker, self-
described as “separated from marriage,” created the irrevocable
Berryman Family Trust (Family Trust) “for the benefit of his
          1
children.”
      The trust was created by a trust agreement between
Richard and Lea Stromberg, his 16-year-old daughter.
      Under the heading “Definition of Trust Estate,” the
agreement provided:
            “All property subject to this instrument from time to
            time, referred to as the ‘trust estate,’ which was

      1
      We will hereafter refer to the Strombergs by their first
names for clarity and ease of reference.

                                 2
            contributed by the settlor and was the separate
            property of the settlor, shall be held, administered,
            and distributed as provided in this instrument. The
            trustee shall hold, administer, and distribute the
            property described in Schedule A (which is attached
            and made a part of this trust instrument), any other
            property that may become subject to this trust, and
            the income and proceeds attributable to all such
            property, in accordance with the provisions of this
            instrument.”

      Appended to the Family Trust was “Schedule ‘A,’ ” which
gave a bare legal description of the Berryman property.
(Schedule A employed no prefatory language, e.g., “asset” or
“estate.”) Neither the trust nor Schedule A ever listed any asset
other than the Berryman property.
      Pursuant to the trust agreement, the trustee was
empowered to “sell . . . , convey, exchange, partition, and divide
trust property; grant options for the sale or exchange of trust
property . . . [¶] . . . [m]anage, control, improve, and maintain all
real and person trust property . . . [¶] . . . [s]ubdivide or develop
land; make or obtain the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries,
or adjust differences in valuation on exchange or partition . . . ,
and dedicate land or easements to public use . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
[and] encumber any trust property by mortgage, deed of trust,
pledge, or otherwise . . . .”
      Lea executed the agreement as trustee, stating it was
“Agreed to and accepted this 1st day of January 2005.”
      The trust agreement made no mention of Mary Jo, and she
was not a signatory.

                                  3
      In 2011, the Family Trust was amended. The amended
trust stated that the trust estate was described in a Schedule A,
but the amended trust itself contained no Schedule A or list of
trust assets.
B.    Subsequent Transactions Involving the Property
      After creation of the Family Trust, the Stromberg family
took several actions with respect to the Berryman property that
were inconsistent with the trust’s ownership.
      In 2006, Richard secured a loan from Washington Mutual
Bank using the Berryman property as collateral.
      On November 26, 2012, as part of marital dissolution
proceedings, Mary Jo quitclaimed her interest in the Berryman
property to Richard.
      Also on November 26, 2012, Richard executed a grant deed
transferring the Berryman property to Lea as trustee of the
Family Trust.
      On July 1, 2013, Richard, facing a loan default, entered a
“home affordable modification agreement” in which he described
the Berryman property as his “sole and separate property.”
      On November 18, 2013, Lea recorded the November 26,
2012 grant deed, noting in the recordation that Richard had
conveyed the Berryman property to the Family Trust “pursuant
to a deed dated November 26, 2012.” Lea attached the 2011
amended Family Trust to the recordation, which contained no
separate Schedule A or list of assets.
      In 2019, Richard encumbered the Berryman property to
secure a $162,094 home equity line of credit (HELOC).

                                4
C.     Creditor Proceedings
       In 2009, SMS Financial XIX LLC (SMS Financial) sued
Richard for failure to pay a line of credit, obtaining a judgment
that after renewal stood at $735,533.81.
       On August 20, 2010, SMS Financial recorded an abstract of
judgment on the Berryman property.
       On December 6, 2019, six years after Lea recorded the
November 26, 2012 grant deed, SMS Financial obtained a writ of
execution against Richard in the amount of $721,710.06.
       On January 13, 2020, SMS Financial levied execution on
the property to satisfy its judgment. The Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Office issued a Notice of Sale.
       On February 3, 2020, Lea, as trustee of the Family Trust,
filed a third-party claim to contest the levy, claiming the trust,
not Richard, owned the property. In support of the claim, Lea
declared that the Berryman property “was transferred to [her], as
trustee of the Trust, pursuant to a deed dated November 26,
2012, and recorded November 8, 2013.” (In litigation, Lea
claimed Richard transferred the property to the Family Trust in
2005, not 2012.)
       On April 17, 2020, SMS Financial renewed the judgment
for ten more years.
D.     Court Proceedings
       SMS Financial filed a petition with the Los Angeles
Superior Court to contest Lea’s third-party claim. The matter
was tried in Department 52.
       Lea contended: (1) The Family Trust owned the property
as of 2005; (2) the validity of the trust was not at issue; (3)
Department 52, being a non-probate department, was not the
proper venue to challenge the validity of the trust; (4) SMS

                                5
Financial was guilty of laches for waiting over six years to
challenge the trust’s ownership of the property; and (5) there was
insufficient equity in the property to satisfy the judgment,
rendering the Notice of Sale invalid.
       SMS Financial contended: (1) No transfer of real property
to a trust is effective against third parties unless the trust is
recorded; (2) the trust was invalid because the designated trustee
was a minor at the time of the trust creation; (3) the purpose of
the trust was to defraud creditors; (4) the trust recorded on
November 18, 2013, was invalid because it lacked a schedule
describing the trust assets.
       At trial, Lea argued that Richard believed he and Mary Jo
held the Berryman property in joint tenancy, and Richard’s
intent in creating the trust was to sever the joint tenancy and
thereby transfer a one-half, undivided separate property interest
to the trust. “[I]t’s not the whole property that was put in trust
in 2005,” Lea’s counsel argued; only “half the property was put in
the trust.” In support of the argument, Richard testified that
Mary Jo did not sign the Family Trust instrument in 2005
because “there was no need for her to sign it.”
       At the conclusion of trial, which had been plagued with
remote communication problems, closing arguments were
submitted by written brief. Lea contended the superior court’s
probate department had excusive jurisdiction over issues
involving the validity of the Family Trust, and the homestead
exemption would exhaust any equity in the property. SMS
Financial contended for the first time that the Berryman
property did not become a part of the Family Trust in 2005
because the trust could accept only Richard’s separate
property, and the property was community property. It

                                6
contended the property became part of the trust only in
November 2012, at the earliest, and the homestead exemption
would not apply because as of 2012 Richard had no ownership
interest in the property, having conveyed it to the trust.
         On May 18, 2021, the court issued a minute order
denying Lea’s claim. The court found that the trust property
was limited to property that “was the separate property of the
settlor, Richard Stromberg.” However, the court found, because
Richard and Mary Jo obtained the Berryman property while
married and held title as joint tenants, it was presumed to be
community property pursuant to Family Code section 760. There
was no transmutation to separate property within the meaning of
Family Code section 852 until November 26, 2012, when Mary Jo
quitclaimed her interest to Richard as part of the marital
dissolution. Therefore, the property was community property
until November 26, 2012.
         The court found it was “reasonable to draw an inference
from the manner by which the Family Trust was created and
from the trust’s terms that Richard Stromberg was attempting to
. . . . hinder Mary Jo Stromberg’s ability to make a claim to
Richard Stromberg’s interest in the Berryman property.”
         The court found that the Family Trust could accept only
Richard’s separate property, and no transfer to the trust in 2005
could include the Berryman property notwithstanding its listing
in the trust’s Schedule A because at that time he held no separate
interest in the property.
         On the contrary, the court found, the Berryman property
entered the Family Trust either in November 2012, when
Richard acquired his separate interest, or November 2013, when
Lea recorded a grant deed conveying the property to herself as

                                7
trustee. Either way, the trust acquired the Berryman property
only after SMS Financial recorded its abstract of judgment on
August 20, 2010.
       Therefore, the court concluded, SMS Financial’s interest in
the Berryman property was superior to the Family Trust’s
interest. Accordingly, the court denied Lea’s third-party claim.
       On June 17, 2021, before any judgment was entered, Lea
appealed from the May 28 order denying her claim.
       We stayed appellate proceedings pending entry of a
judgment, which Lea obtained on October 20, 2021.
       After briefing was complete, we requested and received
further briefing from the parties on issues relating to the validity
of the Family Trust.
                            DISCUSSION
       Lea contends the Berryman property cannot satisfy the
SMS Financial judgment against Richard because the Family
Trust obtained a complete interest in the property in 2005, when
Richard transferred it to the trust, five years before SMS
Financial recorded its abstract of judgment on August 20, 2010.
       Lea argues the trial court erred in relying on Family Code
section 852 to find the transfer was ineffective, because that
section does not apply to third-party creditor claims. Instead, she
argues, ownership of the property was governed by Evidence
Code section 662, which provides that title to property is
presumed to describe ownership interests. Lea also contends
SMS Financial had no standing to challenge the validity of the
Family Trust or the way title to the property was held, and the
trial court erred in failing to consider the issues of estoppel and
laches.

                                 8
A.     Preliminary Matters
       1.     SMS Financial’s Motion to Dismiss is Denied
       SMS Financial moves to dismiss the appeal because it
arises from the May 2021 order, which is nonappealable, not from
the October 2021 judgment.
       Code of Civil Procedure section 720.390 provides that “[a]t
the conclusion of the hearing [on a third-party claim], the court
shall give judgment determining the validity of the third-party
claim and may order the disposition of the property or its
proceeds in accordance with the respective interests of the
parties. Subject to [appeal pursuant to] Section 720.420, the
judgment is conclusive between the parties to the proceeding.”
“An appeal may be taken from a judgment given pursuant to
Section 720.390.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 720.420.)
       Here, Lea appealed not from any judgment but from the
May 2021 order denying her third-party claim. Therefore, the
appeal was premature.
       However, we “may treat a notice of appeal filed after the
superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before it
has rendered judgment, as filed immediately after entry of
judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2).) “In exercising
our discretion, we liberally construe a premature notice of appeal
in favor of its sufficiency.” (In re Marriage of Ankola (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 369, 375.)
       Here, it is clear from the notice of appeal that Lea intended
to challenge the trial court’s impending judgment to deny her
third-party claim, and it does not appear SMS Financial was
misled or prejudiced by her appeal from a nonappealable order.
We will therefore treat the premature notice of appeal as being
filed immediately after entry of the judgment.

                                 9
       SMS Financial’s motion to dismiss the appeal is therefore
denied.
       2.    Jurisdiction
       As a further preliminary matter, Lea argues that
Department 52 of the Los Angeles County Superior Court lacked
jurisdiction to decide this matter because jurisdiction relating to
internal trust disputes resides exclusively in the probate
department. We disagree.
       “In each county there is a superior court of one or more
judges.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4.) The superior court has
jurisdiction to determine the interests of parties in real property
located within the State of California. (Capra v. Capra (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 1072, 1082-1083.) It also has jurisdiction to hear
claims concerning the enforcement of judgments. (Goldman v.
Simpson (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 255, 263.) The instant matter
concerns the enforcement of judgments and contested interests in
real property, and therefore falls squarely within the jurisdiction
of the superior court at large, even if the probate department
would also have jurisdiction over trust issues.
       Jurisdiction of a probate department over trust issues is
nonexclusive. Probate Code section 17000 provides that the
“superior court” has jurisdiction in proceedings relating to trusts,
including “[a]ctions and proceedings to determine the existence of
trusts” and “actions and proceedings involving trustees and third
persons.” (Prob. Code, § 17000, subds. (a) & (b).)
       “There is but one Los Angeles Superior Court.” (People v.
Dependable Ins. Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 871, 874.) “ ‘The
jurisdiction of causes is vested by the constitution in the
[superior] court, not in any particular judge or department
thereof.’ ” (Magallan v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th

                                 10
1444, 1453.) “ ‘Transferring a cause for trial or disposition from
one of those departments to another does not effect a change or
transfer of the jurisdiction of that cause; that remains at all times
in the court as a single entity.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1453-1454.) This is so
because the superior court is divided into departments, including
the probate department, only as a matter of convenience, “but the
subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court is vested as a
whole.” (Estate of Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 695.)
       Thus, although the Los Angeles Superior Court maintains
a probate department, no authority vests that department with
exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters. On the contrary, the
California Constitution vests the superior court as a unified
entity with plenary jurisdiction. As applicable here, even if the
probate department has jurisdiction over internal trust affairs,
that jurisdiction is nonexclusive. The superior court as a whole,
which indisputably enjoys jurisdiction over actions involving
contested interests in real property and the enforcement of
judgments, also enjoys jurisdiction over ancillary issues that may
arise in those actions, including issues relating to internal trust
affairs.
       Lea argues that the Law Revision Commission Comment to
Probate Code section 17000, which states “it is intended that the
department of the superior court that customarily deals with
probate matters will exercise the exclusive jurisdiction relating to
internal trust affairs” (italics added), indicates the Legislature
intended to vest probate jurisdiction only in a superior court’s
probate department. (See Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 54A
West’s Ann. Prob. Code (1991 ed.) § 17000, p. 182.) We disagree
for several reasons.
       First, the language of Probate Code section 17000 is clear,
and the conclusion is inescapable that it vests probate

                                 11
jurisdiction in the superior court as a whole, not in any particular
department. We thus have no occasion to supplement the text of
section 17000 with the Law Revision Commission’s explanatory
comment, which itself carries no weight of law. (See People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 849 [“an uncodified statement of
purpose cannot substitute for operative statutory language”].)
      Second, Law Revision commentary is persuasive evidence
only of “the intent of the Legislature in subsequently enacting its
recommendations into law.’ ” (Conservatorship of Wendland
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 542, italics added.) Here, the text of
Probate Code section 17000 preceded the 1990 Law Revision
Commission comment. Although both Probate Code section
17000 and Law Revision Commission comment were drafted in
1990, section 17000 reenacted former Probate Code section
17000, operative 1987, which itself drew from Section 7–201(a) of
the Uniform Probate Code (1987). (Stats. 1986, ch. 820, § 40,
operative July 1, 1987, and repealed Stats. 1990, ch. 79, § 13,
operative July 1, 1991; Prob. Code, § 17000 (Deering, Lexis
Advance through the 2023 Ex. Sess., ch. 1; 2023 Reg. Sess., ch.
133; Law Rev. com.).) Thus, Probate Code section 17000
preceded the Law Revision Commission comment by at least
three years.
      Moreover, nothing suggests Section 7–201(a) of the
Uniform Probate Code (1987) was intended to differentiate
between a court and a department in a unified court system. In
2010, Section 7-201(a) of the Uniform Probate Code (1987) was
superseded and replaced by the Uniform Trust Code (which
California has not adopted).
      Section 2-203 of the Uniform Trust Code provides
(analogous to Probate Code section 17000) that “(a) The
[designate] court has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings in this

                                 12
State brought by a trustee or beneficiary concerning the
administration of a trust. [¶] (b) The [designate] court has
concurrent jurisdiction with other courts of this State of other
                               2
proceedings involving a trust.”
       The commentary to this section states, “This section
provides a means for distinguishing the jurisdiction of the court
having primary jurisdiction for trust matters, whether
denominated the probate court, chancery court, or by some other
name, from other courts in a State that may on occasion resolve
disputes concerning trusts. . . . The topic . . . need not be
addressed in States having unified court systems.” (Italics
added.)
       The current commentary thus refers to primary rather
than exclusive jurisdiction and excludes unified court systems
from the ambit of Section 2-203 altogether. Therefore, even the
uniform code affords no occasion to vest exclusive jurisdiction in
subdivisions or departments of the California Superior Court
(which is part of a unified court system). (See People v. Hoffman
(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1, 2 [discussing court unification].)
       The trial court therefore had jurisdiction to decide the
merits of Lea’s third-party claim to the Berryman property, even
if that claim raised issues concerning internal affairs of the
Family Trust.

      2

https://dta0yqvfnusiq.cloudfront.net/fifel38841394/2018/12/Unifor
m-Trust-Code-5c12a36374cd4.pdf, pp. 48-49, accessed November
1, 2023.

                                   13
B.   General Principles
     1.    Enforcement of Judgments
     The Enforcement of Judgments Law, Code of Civil
Procedure section 680.010 et seq., “is a comprehensive scheme
governing the enforcement of all civil judgments in California.”
(Imperial Bank v. Pim Electric, Inc. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 540,
     3
546.) Under it, a money judgment may be enforced for 10 years
from the date of its entry, and may be renewed for an additional
10 years. (§§ 683.020, 683.120, 683.130.)
       The Enforcement of Judgments Law “includes procedures
for determining the claims of third persons, i.e., those other than
the judgment debtor and creditor. (§ 720.010 et seq.) The
purpose of third party claims is to give a quick and effectual
remedy to third parties whose property has been levied upon by
mistake. [Citation.] [¶] The third party claims procedure is
available to a person claiming a superior ownership or possessory
right in real property that is subjected to attachment or execution
to satisfy a money obligation.” (Regency Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. v. Carolina Lanes, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1329.)
       The creditor may petition the court for a hearing to
determine the validity of a third-party’s claim and the correct
disposition of the property. (§ 720.310, subd. (a).) At any hearing
on such a claim, the third-party has the burden of proof. (§
720.360.) Once the third-party establishes its entitlement to the
property, the burden shifts to the creditor to establish that its
claim is superior. (Oxford Street Properties, LLC v.

         3
        Undesignated statutory references will be to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

                                14
Rehabilitation Associates, LLC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 296, 307
(Oxford).)
      There is no requirement for a jury trial in third-party claim
proceedings, and no findings are required. (§§ 720.400, 720.410.)
In ruling on a third-party claim, the trial court renders
“judgment determining the validity of the third-party claim and
may order the disposition of the property or its proceeds in
accordance with the respective interests of the parties.” (§
720.390.)
      2. Community vs. Separate Property
      Spouses may hold property as community or separate
property. (Fam. Code, § 750.) Each spouse holds an equal
interest in community property (Fam. Code, § 751), but neither
owns an interest in the separate property of the other (Fam.
Code, § 752). The community estate is liable for debt incurred by
either spouse. (Fam. Code, § 910.)
      Separate property of a married person includes property
owned before marriage, acquired after marriage by gift or
inheritance, or held in joint tenancy. (Fam. Code, §§ 750, 770.)
All property acquired during marriage is presumed to be
community property unless otherwise provided by statute. (Fam.
Code, § 760.) For example, property acquired by spouses as joint
tenants is presumed to be community property. (In re Brace
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 903, 927, 938-939.) This is so regardless of the
way a married couple takes title. (Id. at p. 927.)
      Spouses may transmute community property to separate
property by agreement or transfer. (Fam. Code, § 850.) For a
transmutation to be valid, it must be “made in writing by an
express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or
accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is

                                15
adversely affected.” (Fam. Code, § 852, subd. (a).) An “express
declaration” need not use the terms “transmutation,” “community
property,” or “separate property,” but it must “expressly state[]
that the characterization or ownership of the property is being
changed.” (Estate of MacDonald (1990) 51 Cal.3d 262, 272-273
[no particular locution required].) For example, the language “I
give to the account holder any interest I have in the funds
deposited in this account,” would suffice to establish
transmutation. (Id. at p. 273.) “The express declaration must
unambiguously indicate a change in character or ownership of
property. [Citation.] A party does not ‘slip into a transmutation
by accident.’ ” (In re Marriage of Starkman (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 659, 664.)
        3. Standards of review
        “The interpretation of a trust instrument, like any written
document, is a question of law. [Citations.] Under applicable
rules of interpretation of written instruments, where there is no
conflicting evidence, the reviewing court must independently
interpret the document.” (Estate of Cairns (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 937, 944.)
        “The primary duty of a court in construing a trust is to give
effect to the settlor’s intentions.” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8
Cal.5th 822, 826.) The settlor’s intent “ ‘ “must be ascertained
from the whole of the trust instrument, not just separate parts of
it.” ’ ” (Estate of Cairns, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 944.)
        We review a trial court’s factual findings regarding
ownership of property for substantial evidence. (Oxford, supra,
206 Cal.App.4th at p. 307.) When the facts are undisputed, we
review questions of law de novo. (Diamond Benefits Life Ins. Co.
v. Troll (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) For example, whether

                                 16
property is separate or community property is a question of law
that is subject to de novo review when the facts are undisputed.
(Ibid.) Whether a written instrument effects a transmutation is
also subject to independent review. (In re Marriage of Starkman,
supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 664 [“In deciding whether a
transmutation has occurred, we interpret the written
instruments independently, without resort to extrinsic
evidence”].)
C. Application
       1. The Berryman Property was Community Property
       Here, the 1990 grant deed conveyed the Berryman property
to Richard and Mary Jo, “husband and wife as Joint Tenants.”
Under Family Code section 760, the property was presumed to be
community property despite the form of title. (In re Brace, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 927.) Lea offered no evidence rebutting this
community property presumption.
       There was no transmutation until November 26, 2012,
when Mary Jo quitclaimed her interest in the Berryman property
to Richard as part of their marital dissolution proceedings.
       In 2005, therefore, the Berryman property was community
property.
       2.    The Nature of the Trust Estate
       Whether Richard’s purported transfer of the Berryman
property to the Family Trust was effective depends on the nature
of the trust estate.
       The trust instrument defines the trust estate in two
sentences: “All property subject to this instrument from time to
time, referred to as the ‘trust estate,’ which was contributed by
the settlor and was the separate property of the settlor, shall be
held, administered, and distributed as provided in this

                                17
instrument. The trustee shall hold, administer, and distribute
the property described in Schedule A (which is attached and
made a part of this trust instrument), any other property that
may become subject to this trust, and the income and proceeds
attributable to all such property, in accordance with the
provisions of this instrument.” Schedule A sets forth a legal
description of the Berryman property without reference to the
nature of Richard’s interest in the property.
       The trust instrument’s direction that the trustee “hold,
administer, and distribute the property described in Schedule A,”
along with the Berryman property description in Schedule A,
plainly establishes that the Berryman property was subject to the
Family Trust.
       However, the trial court relying primarily on the first
sentence of the trust estate definition, determined that the trust
property was limited to property that “was the separate property
of the settlor, Richard Stromberg.”
       This interpretation, which Lea advanced at trial, is
reasonable. (The trust estate language admits another
interpretation—that Richard intended to transmute the
Berryman property from community to separate property by
transferring it to the trust. However, as Lea denied this
construction at trial, we may disregard it.) Therefore, Lea, as the
party with the burden of proof on her third-party claim, was
required to show that the trust estate, or at least the trust estate
that Richard intended, consisted of that interest in “the property
described in Schedule A” which Richard held as his “separate
property,” and which could thus be “contributed by [him]” to the
trust. To the extent the property described in Schedule A was

                                18
not Richard’s separate property and thus could not be
“contributed by [Richard],” it was not part of the trust estate.
       Lea argued that Richard believed he and Mary Jo held the
Berryman property in joint tenancy, and Richard’s intent in
creating the trust was to sever that joint tenancy and thereby
transfer a one-half, undivided separate property interest to the
trust. “[I]t’s not the whole property that was put in trust in
2005,” Lea’s counsel argued; only “half the property was put in
the trust.”
       In support of Lea’s claim, Richard testified that Mary Jo
did not sign the trust document in 2005 because “there was no
need for her to sign it.” This statement makes sense if Richard
believed he was unilaterally severing a joint tenancy with Mary
Jo and transferring his separate interest, but not her interest, to
the trust. Richard, a real estate broker, appeared to understand
that if he was going to transfer the entire fee interest in the
Berryman property to the trust, he would “need for [Mary Jo] to
sign it.”
       We conclude Richard transferred no separate property
interest in the Berryman property because despite his belief to
the contrary, he never held such an interest. Notwithstanding
the form of title on his and Mary Jo’s 1990 deed, the married
couple held title as community property, not as joint tenants. (In
re Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 937-938; see also Tomaier v.
Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 758 [property held as community
property “cannot also be held in joint tenancy”]; accord, Raney v.
Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311, 320.) Therefore, Richard’s
attempt to sever what he believed was a joint tenancy into
unilaterally transferable separate property interests failed as a
matter of law.

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       Richard’s failure to transfer a legally cognizable interest in
property to the trust in 2005 did not necessarily invalidate the
trust. As Bogert explains, “the lack of trust property does not
mean that the trust instrument cannot create a valid trust. It
simply means that no trust under the instrument exists yet. A
valid trust may be created in the future at such time as property
becomes subject to the trust, as when the settlor transfers
property to the trustee at a later date and the trustee accepts the
property as property subject to the trust.” (2 Bogert on Trusts
(3d ed. 2007) § 111, p. 304 (fn. omitted).) Here, Richard
eventually obtained the fee interest in the Berryman property as
a result of the judgment dissolving his marriage in 2011 and
Mary Jo’s quitclaim deed to him in 2012. Thereafter he could,
and did, transfer by grant deed the entire fee interest in the
Berryman property to Lea, as trustee of the Berryman Family
Trust. By then, however, SMS Financial’s judgment lien had
attached to the community property interest in the Berryman
property.
       Because Lea failed to establish that Richard transferred
anything to the Family Trust before SMS Financial obtained an
interest in the Berryman property, the trial court properly denied
her third-party claim.
       Lea argues the trial court erred in failing to apply the
doctrines of estoppel and laches to foreclose SMS Financial’s
challenge to her third-party claim because the judgment creditor
took no action for more than six years after the deed from
Richard to the Family Trust was recorded in 2013. We disagree.
       Judgment enforcement is a comprehensive and detailed
statutory process, with clear deadlines. (Imperial Bank v. Pim
Electric Inc., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 546.) By statute, a

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money judgment may be enforced for 10 years from the date of its
entry and may be renewed, in which case it is enforceable for an
additional 10 years. (§§ 683.020, 683.120, 683.130; Kertesz v.
Ostrovsky (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 369, 372-373.) Estoppel and
laches are therefore not defenses to an action on a judgment.
(United States Capital Corp. v. Nickelberry (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d
864, 867 [an action based on a judgment is an action at law; “[a]n
action at law may be brought at any time within the period of the
statute of limitations”].)
                           DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. Respondent is to recover its costs on
appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                                CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

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