Court Opinion

ID: 9578487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:45:44.955544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.797970
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The issue in this case cries out for an answer. There are a number of ways for this court to provide one.
The majority states that the parties here have no adverse legal interests. ERS asserts that it must continue to pay benefits as it has in the past based on its interpretation of the 1961 amendment and the opinions of the Attorney General mentioned in the trial court’s order. Plaintiffs contend that their interests are harmed by unjustified payments from retirement funds. I find adverse legal interests.
Since the majority is closing its eyes to the problem in this case, one of two things will happen. ERS could continue to pay involuntary separation benefits to the people who gained those benefits by virtue of the transfer from LRS to ERS in 1971. ERS could, on the other hand, halt all payments of involuntary separation benefits to anyone who gained those benefits by virtue of the transfer. .
In the first situation, someone will refile this lawsuit and the issue will find its way to this court again. We will then make a decision on this issue. ERS and those receiving benefits will be placed in an ambiguous position in the interim. Everyone will face greater legal costs, and the courts will be unnecessarily burdened due to the additional lawsuit.
In the second scenario, retirees will sue ERS for the reinstatement of their pensions. In the meantime, they will lose a source of income, that they may have heavily relied upon, on the basis of a *560superior court decision that did not necessarily rely upon the holding. that caused the cut-off of payments. Once again, there will be two trials and two appeals. There will be great uncertainty for all, and someone will lose far more than they would have if this court had faced the issue today.
This controversy is quite “definite and concrete.” The day after this opinion is released, the issue will prove far from “abstract” in the eyes of those who will be forced to decide whether they should continue payments, and in the eyes of those whose benefits will either stop or serve as lightning rods for lawsuits. “The danger or dilemma of the plaintiff [and here, the defendant]” is clearly present, and is “not contingent on the happening of hypothetical future events.” City of Nashville v. Snow, 204 Ga. 371, 377 (49 SE2d 808) (1948). Indeed, the danger to all parties in this case will continue to grow until this court faces up to this issue.
The majority states that it will not give advisory opinions. This court has, however, ruled upon declaratory judgments in which the controversy was based on fewer facts, and events far more hypothetical than this case presents. See Monte Carlo Parties, Ltd. v. Webb, 253 Ga. 508 (322 SE2d 246) (1984). The courts in this state have no constitutional “case or controversy” requirement as a justiciability threshold, as federal courts do. I would conclude, from cases such as Monte Carlo, supra, that there is either a more relaxed standard in our courts than in the federal courts, or that our law provides for exceptions to the normal justiciability standards.1
If we do have a generally more relaxed standard, this case, as shown above, clearly fits within justiciability standards. If there is only a declaratory judgment exception to the justiciability standard, I would expand that exception to fit cases such as this which present issues of great public interest and are based upon serious conflicts. See Arrington v. State ex rel. Parsons, 422 S2d 759 (Ala. 1982); State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 295 SE2d 633 (S.C. 1982).
The United States Supreme Court has, on occasion, reached the merits of cases which were factually moot. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724 (94 SC 1274, 39 LE2d 714) (1974). This court has recognized that in some such instances, the construction of a statute, and an analysis of the statute relative to the constitution, “will have the effect of simplifying future challenges,” so that the need for judicial economy allows the court to reach the merits. Poythress v. Moses, 250 Ga. 452, 453 (298 SE2d 480) (1983). This court can walk places where *561a superior court cannot tread when, in addition to the factor of greater judicial economy, “the public interest will be served.” Brown v. Housing Auth., 240 Ga. 647, 653 (242 SE2d 143) (1978). “Because the rights of the public are involved, we [should] proceed to the merits, including consideration of the Constitution, to the extent possible.” Id.
I believe that this court is not only entitled, but is also obligated, to reach the merits of this case. I would not leave ERS, the taxpayers, and the retirees twisting in the wind as the court does today.

 Much of the holding of Monte Carlo, supra, was based upon depositions explaining the financial transactions involved in parties as they might have taken place, or as they might take place in the future, [i.e.] “The second format used by Monte Carlo would violate the law.” Id. at 509. (Emphasis supplied.)