Court Opinion

ID: 9514078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:44:11.383035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:11.517231
License: Public Domain

MARING, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 37] I concur in parts II and III of the Majority opinion concluding that the district court did not err in its custody award and that Christopher Lindberg’s constitutional right to parent his children was not violated. I respectfully dissent *265from part IV of the Majority opinion. I would affirm the district court’s decision in its entirety. The district court’s findings of fact are supported by the evidence and its conclusions of law reflect it complied with the law and considered Sherri Lind-berg’s need for spousal support and Christopher Lindberg’s ability to pay spousal support.
I
[¶ 38] The Majority concludes the district court did not analyze Sherri Lind-berg’s need for spousal support and its findings on spousal support are not supported by the evidence. I disagree.
[¶ 39] First, the district court properly considered Sherri Lindberg’s need for spousal support. The Majority, at ¶31, concludes the district court “did not provide analysis of Sherri Lindberg’s ... need for spousal support.” I am of the opinion that the Majority is misconstruing the district court’s findings. In its findings of fact, the district court stated:
Monthly Living Expenses for Sherri. The Court finds that Sherri is currently living in her parents [sic] home and has no expenses relating to mortgage payments, utilities, etc. However, Sherri testified that she plans on moving out of her parents [sic] home once the divorce is finalized. Therefore, the Court finds Sherri’s anticipated monthly living expenses to be $2,915.00 as listed on Exhibit # 9 — Anticipated Monthly Living Expenses for Sherri Lindberg and Three Minor Children.
We have previously explained that when a district court awards spousal support, it must consider the needs of the spouse seeking spousal support. Overland v. Overland, 2008 ND 6, ¶ 16, 744 N.W.2d 67. The district court’s finding of fact clearly illustrates that the district court considered Sherri Lindberg’s need for spousal support when it awarded her spousal support.
[¶ 40] Second, the Majority, at ¶ 32, concludes the district court’s finding that Sherri Lindberg was going to move out of her parents’ home was not supported by the evidence. I disagree. The evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that Sherri Lindberg will need spousal support because she will be moving out of her parent’s home.
[¶ 41] At trial, Sherri Lindberg entered into evidence an exhibit entitled, “Anticipated Monthly Living Expenses for Sherri Lindberg and Three (3) Minor Children.” This exhibit provided that Sherri Lindberg expected she would incur expenses of $2,915 a month. Sherri Lindberg testified that the $2,915 monthly expenses were based on costs after she moves out of her parents’ home. Those expenses include $900 a month in rent for housing for Sherri Lindberg and the three children. Sherri Lindberg explained that $900 a month for housing would be at the “low to medium end” for cost of housing for four people. When asked if she would need spousal support, Sherri Lindberg answered, “Yes, should I move out, which I will be doing eventually.” Sherri Lindberg was then asked what amount of spousal support she would need based on her anticipated living expenses, her current earnings, and her future plans. She responded that she would need $750 a month “[u]ntil the kids are gone or until [she] remarries].” Sherri Lindberg testified regarding the future home she would provide for the children when she moved out of her parents’ home. After inquiring about the living arrangements at Sherri Lindberg’s parents’ home, her attorney asked, “And understanding that’s not forever, but do you think that any environment you move the children into in the future will provide the same sort of stability?” Sherri Lind-*266berg answered that it would. As the Majority indicates, Sherri Lindberg was then cross-examined about her plans to move out of her parents’ home. The Majority declines to mention, however, that on redirect, Sherri Lindberg indicated that she was uncertain about her future living arrangements because she was unable to make any plans with any certainty until the divorce was over.
[¶ 42] The evidence also reflects that Christopher Lindberg believed that Sherri Lindberg would move out of her parents’ home. When Christopher Lindberg discussed the children’s residences, he acknowledged that the children’s residence at Sherri Lindberg’s parents’ home was only a “temporary residence.” Furthermore, Christopher Lindberg’s written final argument to the district court acknowledges that Sherri Lindberg may move from her parents’ home. In his argument to the court, he asserted that best interest factor (d) favored him because Sherri Lindberg was “claiming monthly expenses which assumes that she will be moving.” He also argued that “Sherri’s situation regarding housing is less certain,” again implying that Sherri Lindberg would be moving out of her parents’ home.
[¶ 48] The district court was presented with evidence of Sherri Lindberg’s anticipated monthly living expenses after she moves out of her parents’ home. She testified that she will eventually be moving out, she was unable to make certain plans about moving out until after the divorce was finalized, and Christopher Lindberg testified that her residence with her parents was merely a “temporary residence.” The evidence indicates that both parties believed Sherri Lindberg’s parents’ residence was only a temporary residence and she would not be living there indefinitely. We review a district court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Hitz, 2008 ND 58, ¶ 10, 746 N.W.2d 732. Under that standard of review, “[t]his Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, and the district court’s findings of fact are presumptively correct.” Id. In other words, if there are two permissible views of the district court’s findings of fact, we hold in favor of the district court’s findings. See Gillmore v. Morelli, 472 N.W.2d 738, 740 (N.D.1991) (“[A] choice between two permissible views of the evidence is not clearly erroneous.”). “[W]e do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.” Jelsing v. Peterson, 2007 ND 41, ¶ 11, 729 N.W.2d 157. The district court heard the testimony, assessed the witnesses’ credibility, and weighed the evidence. The district court accomplished its task and evidence in the record supports its findings. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if there is no evidence to support it. Id. On appeal, the Majority is reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for the district court’s. Our Court does not reverse a district court merely because we may have reached a different result. See Solem v. Solem, 2008 ND 211, ¶ 5, 757 N.W.2d 748 (“We will not reverse the trial court merely because we may have viewed the evidence differently.”).
II
[¶ 44] The district court properly considered Christopher Lindberg’s ability to pay Sherri Lindberg $750 per month in spousal support for a forty-eight-month period. The Majority, at ¶ 31, asserts that the district court “did not provide analysis of Chris Lindberg’s ability to pay spousal support.” As a result, the Majority, at ¶ 33, remanded to the district court for further proceedings regarding Christopher Lindberg’s ability to pay spousal support. The Majority ignores the district court’s findings on Christopher Lindberg’s ability *267to pay Sherri Lindberg $750 per month in spousal support. The Majority declines to mention the district court found “Christopher[’s] monthly living expenses to be $2,510.00 as Christopher testified to at trial”; “Christopher is employed by Phoenix International ... and has gross earnings of approximately $4,584.00 per month”; and “Christopher is also a member of the Army National Guard and has gross earnings of approximately $1,036.00 per month.” Thus, Christopher Lindberg’s total gross income is $5,620 per month. Under the child support guidelines, the district court ordered Christopher Lindberg to pay Sherri Lindberg $1,368 per month for child support for the parties’ three children. Adding the child support, spousal support, and Christopher Lindberg’s monthly living expenses together, his monthly obligations would be $4,628. In addition, he will not pay income tax on the $750 per month of spousal support and he contends his monthly expenses are $2,381 per month, not $2,510 per month. I cannot agree with the Majority that the district court did not provide any analysis to support its conclusion that Christopher Lindberg has the ability to pay. Rather, it appears that the district court’s findings on Christopher Lindberg’s monthly living expenses, child support obligation, and monthly earnings are precisely the findings a district court should make in analyzing whether a party has the ability to pay spousal support.
[¶ 45] I am uncertain as to what further rationale the district court must give pertaining to Christopher Lindberg’s ability to pay spousal support. Based on the evidence in the record and the district court’s findings, I am of the opinion that the district court did not clearly err in finding Christopher Lindberg has the ability to pay $750 per month in spousal support for a forty-eight-month period.
III
[¶ 46] In addition, I am of the opinion that the district court’s findings of fact support its award of spousal support in this case, even if the Majority’s interpretation of the evidence is accepted and the inference drawn that Sherri Lindberg is never moving out of her parents’ home. The Majority mentions, but then ignores that any spousal support award is to be based on a consideration of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. See Overland v. Overland, 2008 ND 6, ¶ 16, 744 N.W.2d 67; Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845 (N.D.1966); Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952). Factors to consider under the guidelines include:
[T]he respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material.
Ingebretson v. Ingebretson, 2005 ND 41, ¶ 7, 693 N.W.2d 1. “The district court’s decision should be rationally based, but it is not required to make specific findings on each factor.” Id. Our Court no longer requires separate proof of “disadvantage” for an award of spousal support. Sack v. Sack, 2006 ND 57, ¶ 11, 711 N.W.2d 157. In addition, our Court has said:
This court has looked favorably upon awards of “rehabilitative” spousal support ... rehabilitative awards are typically limited in duration and are designed to afford disadvantaged spouses the opportunity to gain the education, training, and experience necessary to *268become self-sufficient. We have noted that there are no rigid rules for determining whether or not to award alimony and the amount of such an award. The determination of a just award is within the discretion of the trial court and will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Beals v. Beals, 517 N.W.2d 413, 416 (N.D.1994) (citations omitted); N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24.1 (“Taking into consideration the circumstances of the parties, the court may require one party to pay spousal support to the other party for any period of time.”).
[¶ 47] In the present case, the district court addressed the majority of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and found that Christopher Lindberg is thirty-seven years of age and Sherri Lindberg is thirty-nine years of age. The district court found the parties were married on February 4, 1994, and therefore were married fourteen years. See Wold v. Wold, 2008 ND 14, ¶ 17, 744 N.W.2d 541 (upholding a district court’s finding that a fifteen-year marriage was a “long-term marriage”). The court found the parties had three children, ages ten years, eight years, and three years and awarded physical custody to Sherri Lind-berg. The court considered the health of the parties finding Christopher Lindberg is in good health and able to work and Sherri Lindberg is in good health and able to work. The court considered the earning ability of each of the parties. The court found Sherri Lindberg is capable of earning $10 to $13 per hour or slightly over $20,000 per year; Sherri Lindberg is employed by Fargo Moravian Church and has gross earnings of $240 per month; and Sherri Lindberg has an associate degree in nursing, but has not been employed as an LPN for approximately thirteen years. With regard to Christopher Lindberg, the court found he had held several jobs. He was in the Army full time, then a National Guard member, and then worked at Phoenix International in Fargo, North Dakota, as an engineer. Christopher Lindberg has a four-year degree in electrical engineering. The court found he is also pursuing a Master’s degree in business administration through the University of Mary. With regard to his current earnings, the court found his gross income from his employment and the National Guard is $5,620 a month. This totals approximately $67,440 a year compared to Sherri Lindberg’s earning capacity of $20,000 a year. We have said that a large disparity in income is an appropriate consideration in awarding spousal support. Wiege v. Wiege, 518 N.W.2d 708, 711 (N.D.1994). The property and its income-producing capacity are also to be considered. Id. The court divided the property equally between Christopher Lindberg and Sherri Lindberg. A review of the property division reveals Sherri Lindberg did not receive any income-producing assets. Only if Christopher Lindberg took the option of paying Sherri Lindberg a lump sum of $20,044 to equalize the property division rather than executing a Qualified Domestic Relations Order from his 401 (k) plan in favor of Sherri Lindberg would she receive some interest income from her assets. Sherri Lindberg received a vehicle, some personal property, $2,700 cash, and a Roth IRA. She has no home for herself or her children. The court can also take into consideration the parties’ conduct during the marriage and their station in life. Id. The district court found that Christopher Lind-berg had pursued a full-time military career and had been deployed overseas or stationed at various locations in the United States resulting in him living with his family for “approximately five (5) of the ten (10) years of marriage.” Sherri Lindberg was allowed to accompany Christopher Lindberg for short periods to Fort Hood, *269Texas, Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The court found that “[djuring all their military separations, Sherri [Lindberg] and the children would move back to Fargo, North Dakota and live with her parents as they didn’t own a home.” Sherri Lindberg was a homemaker and the primary caretaker of the parties’ three young children during the marriage, deferring always to her husband’s career.
[¶ 48] The district court’s findings clearly provide the basis for the award of spousal support of $750 a month for 48 months. Sherri Lindberg has need for spousal support. She has monthly living expenses currently and, should she leave her parents’ home, will incur even higher expenses. The argument that she does “not need” spousal support is meritless. I find it offensive that because she is not paying rent and utilities to her parents that fact somehow relieves Christopher Lindberg of his responsibilities. Sherri Lindberg testified that her parents had not asked her to pay rent and utilities. It is obvious why they had not on these facts, which establish she has no money with which to pay them. Indeed, she cannot move out of her parents’ home or even plan to until she has received spousal support. This Court has never held spousal support is dependent on whether a party’s parents demand payment for rent and utilities. Sherri Lindberg is the custodial parent of three young children, who need her physical and emotional care. She has no home. Sherri Lindberg has not been in the workforce since 1996. Prior to 1996, she had only worked as an LPN for about four years. She has been a homemaker and a mother during her marriage to Christopher Lindberg. Through this role, she has supported his career throughout the marriage. The court found the most she can earn is approximately $20,000 per year, whereas Christopher Lindberg can earn $67,440 per year. This is a large disparity in earning ability. Even if Sherri Lindberg is able to go back to work full time, she will earn only one-third of what Christopher Lindberg earns. In fact, four years of spousal support will do little to balance the burden on her reduced standard of living. See Weir v. Weir, 374 N.W.2d 858, 864 (N.D.1985) (holding a consideration in awarding spousal support is balancing the burdens created by the divorce when it is impossible to maintain two households at the pre-divorce standard); see also Wold, 2008 ND 14, ¶ 14, 744 N.W.2d 541. Under the facts of this case, even if Sherri Lindberg was able to step into the workplace and earn today enough to meet her minimal needs, she is entitled to spousal support under the district court’s application of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. We have upheld rehabilitative spousal support when the recipient is working full time. See, e.g., Wiege v. Wiege, 518 N.W.2d 708, 710 (N.D.1994); Wahlberg v. Wahlberg, 479 N.W.2d 143, 145 (N.D.1992); Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 758 (N.D.1981). In Wahlberg, this Court stated, “The need which evidences that one spouse has been disadvantaged by the divorce and that rehabilitative support is, therefore, appropriate is not limited to the prevention of destitution.” 479 N.W.2d at 145 (emphasis added).
[¶ 49] The findings of the district court in this case are not clearly erroneous and support the award of spousal support.
[¶ 50] Finally, if the district court reconsiders the award of spousal support on remand, it may also reconsider its division of property. Awards of spousal support and property distributions are considered together and an adjustment of one may impact the other. See Meyer v. Meyer, 2004 ND 89, ¶ 16, 679 N.W.2d 273 (“[A] trial court cannot consider issues of prop*270erty division and spousal support separately in a vacuum, but must examine those issues together.”); Stoppler v. Stoppler, 2001 ND 148, ¶ 21, 633 N.W.2d 142 (“The trial court may reconsider the issue of spousal support when it redetermines the property distribution.”). If the district court finds Sherri Lindberg does not need rehabilitative spousal support or Christopher Lindberg does not have the ability to pay spousal support, it may consider whether Sherri Lindberg is entitled to a greater property distribution.
IV
[¶ 51] I am of the opinion that the district court’s order contains findings of fact that support its conclusion that Sherri Lindberg was in need of rehabilitative spousal support and Christopher Lindberg had the ability to pay. Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s decision in its entirety.
[¶ 52] Mary Muehlen Maring