Court Opinion

ID: 9789198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:30:26.018472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:20.554533
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, J.,
Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part.
T1 I coneur in part and dissent in part. First, I concur in affirming the First Degree Murder convictions and sentences in Counts I and II. I also agree that we must reverse McCarty's first-degree murder conviction for the death of the unborn fetus (Count III). However, I write separately to explain my reasoning as I believe we should be very clear in setting forth our resolution of the issue of viability. In Hughes v. State,1 this Court abandoned the "born alive" rule and determined that an unborn fetus, viable at the time of injury, is a human being and may be the subject of a homicide prosecution. In order to sustain a prosecution for first-degree murder, the State must show the unborn child was viable. I agree with the majority's conclusion that "viable" means the fetus is able to live separately and apart from the mother, with or without artificial aid.2 Following Hughes, we continue to use a strict viability standard to determine criminal culpability. The Oklahoma abortion statutes create a rebuttable presumption that a fetus is viable at 24 weeks.3 As a presumption, however, it may be overcome by evidence showing, for example, that 26-weelw-old in utero twins are not developed enough to survive for any significant time outside the uterus, or by showing that a 22-weelw-old fetus is viable. In either case, the question is whether the fetus is capable of survival after birth. I agree with the majority that no evidence was presented suggesting the 22-week-old fetus here was viable. As there *988was nothing to suggest the fetus could sustain life outside the womb, and it was 22 weeks old, the State failed to rebut the presumption that the fetus was not viable. I therefore agree with the majority that McCarty's conviction for first degree murder cannot stand.
12 The opinion then turns to Section 7183,4 a statute providing that the "willful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury committed upon the person of the mother" is first degree manslaughter. The majority applies this statute to the facts before us. In doing so, this Court onee again creates a special category of general intent homicide.5 As I set forth below, I do not believe Section 718 can be applied in this case. I therefore dissent to the portion of the opinion modifying McCarty's conviction to one of first degree manslaughter under Section 718.
18 The early Oklahoma - legislature adopted Section 718 from the Dakota Territory penal code. Section 718 was originally part of a series of statutes designed to prohibit abortion, although no published cases show any prosecutions for that reason.6 In my view, this statute no longer has anything to do with the constitutionally protected right to abortion. It expresses the legislative intent to punish as criminal a homicidal attack on an unborn child. The State has a vital interest in protecting the lives of unborn children, and in punishing those who would injure them. In Hughes we cited Section 713 as allowing for the punishment of one who commits violence against a pregnant woman and destroys the fetus within her.7 In fact, without Section 718, there would be no protection for quick, nonviable unborn children.
1 4 Section 718 prohibits the willful killing of an unborn quick child. The word "quick" is not as easy to define as it seems. Research shows that fetal homicide discussions refer to "quick", "quick with child", and "quickening", often apparently interchangeably. As the majority notes, "quick child", while not defined by statute, is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "able to move within the womb."8 The Sloane Dorland medical dictionary defines "quick child" as a fetus with discernible movement so far developed and matured as to be able to survive the trauma of birth with the aid of medical care-the characteristics we use to define a viable fetus.9 Sloane Dorland also defines "quick" as "pregnant and able to feel the fetal movements," and notes that a fetus normally becomes "quick" at about four and a half months.10 Several recent medical die-tionaries define "quick" as pregnant and able to feel fetal movement, "quickening" as the first recognizable fetal movement, and have no definition for "quick child".11 "Quickening" is generally used to denote the first motion of the fetus in the womb felt by the mother.12 - "Quick with child" as a legal term *989means "having conceived".13 However, its earliest use was to mean the state of pregnancy in which the movement of the fetus was felt-i.e., quickening.14
15 When Section 718 was first adopted in the late nineteenth century, "quick child" and "quickening" were, for all practical purposes, the same thing. The only reliable way to tell whether a fetus was capable of movement in the womb was by waiting until the mother felt it move. As this usually happens between 16 and 20 weeks into a pregnancy, by the time a child was "quick" enough for movement to be felt, it was already relatively close to our modern parameters of viability. Technology has advanced to the point where we can determine movement in the womb well before the mother feels movement. Many pregnant women who have sonograms at 11 to 15 weeks are amazed at the sight of the fetus kicking, swimming and jumping, often vigorously, even though they have felt no sensation of movement. For this reason, while the definition of "quick"-whatever that is-may not have changed since Section 713 was adopted, its practical meaning is very different. Taking the most common definition, that a quick child is one capable of movement within the womb, we leave open the possibility that Section 718 applies to the killing of a fetus as early as eleven weeks, if that fetus is proved to be capable of movement.15
T6 In order to resolve the issue of the applicability of Section 718 when a fetus is "quick", we look at the remaining language. The statute's first requirement is that the killing be willful. The penal code defines "willfully" as "simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or the omission referred to", without any intent to injure another.16 However, the act or omission referred to in Section 713 is an act resulting in the killing of an unborn quick child by injury to its mother. In Tarver v. State,17 we determined the element, "willful killing of an unborn quick child," refers to the perpetrator's subjective state of mind, and requires that he injure the mother with the awareness that the death of an unborn quick child is likely to result. The statute requires no specific intent to kill the unborn child, but the attacker must be aware that such a result could ensue. This necessarily implies that the perpetrator knows that the woman he is attacking is pregnant.18 - Such knowledge could be proven by direct or cireumstantial evidence. Section 718 cannot apply unless the defendant knows of the existence of the unborn child.19
*99017 Recognizing the inescapable conclusion that § 713 as interpreted in Tarver cannot support a conviction in this case, the majority, in a footnote, overrules Tarver. Without analysis, the majority concludes that § 718 does not require a defendant know the woman against whom he acts is pregnant. Instead, the majority suggests the companion abortion statute, § 714, provides an intent requirement for prosecutions for the intentional death of an unborn quick child. This completely disregards both the statutory history and case law surrounding the statutes and the language of § 714 itself. That statute prohibits as manslaughter any person from administering, prescribing, advising a woman or procuring a substance for her, or using any instrument with an intent to destroy an unborn quick child. This contains very different elements from the simple prohibition against killing an unborn child by attacking a pregnant woman found in § 7183.
T8 Rather than giving meaning to both statutes, the majority decision renders them meaningless. Under this reading, § 718 refers to a general intent homicide. If, in the course of committing a crime, a defendant attacks a complete stranger whose pregnancy is not immediately apparent by eye, and her fetus dies, the defendant is automatically liable for manslaughter. This does not further the legislative purpose of punishing a homicidal attack on an unborn child. How can it, where the defendant does not know the child exists? Furthermore, the specific nature of § 714 is diluted. The majority states, "which statute the State elects to proceed under will depend upon the extent of the defendant's specific intent." 20 This is the case only if the overall intent of § 714 is disregarded. That statutory language, taken as a whole, refers to ways in which a person advises or assists a woman in destroying a viable fetus-iLe., abortion. By reading one phrase in isolation, the majority renders the remainder of the statute useless.
19 Other states with statutes similar to § 713 have recognized the knowledge requirement we described in Tarver. Nevada and Washington have homicide statutes which, like Oklahoma's, punish the willful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother.21 Five other states make an act criminal where the unborn quick child is willfully killed by any injury to the mother which would be murder if it resulted in her death.22 Arizona prohibits as manslaughter knowingly or recklessly causing the death of an unborn child at any stage by physical injury to the mother which would be murder if the mother were to die.23 South Dakota prohibits intentionally killing a human fetus by causing injury to its mother.24 Illinois prohibits "the intentional homicide of an unborn child" where the defendant knows the woman is pregnant.25 - Several jurisdictions have no reported cases under these statutes, or the cases deal with criminal abortion prosecutions. Of the cases involving convictions for homicide of an unborn child, most do not *991touch on issues of intent. However, as in Tarver, courts have held that these types of statutes may require awareness of the pregnancy.26 In contrast, California has determined that a person may be liable for malice murder of a fetus by injury to the mother at any time after the embryonic stage, or about eight weeks, without being aware that the mother is pregnant.27 However, the California statute is considerably broader than Seetion 713, as it requires neither a willful act nor specifies the victim must be an unborn quick child.28
110 This requirement that the defendant have knowledge of the pregnancy separates criminal liability for manslaughter under Seetion 713 from other homicide statutes, including other manslaughter statutes.29 The Arizona Supreme Court bas noted that the transferred intent doctrine is not available for this crime, as the statute requires a specific finding of the defendant's mental state toward the unborn child.30 I agree. If you act with malice, intending to kill a particular person, and your action kills a third person you did not intend to harm, you are liable for that person's death.31 Unlike malice murder, Section 713 does not require any intent to harm any particular person. It does not even require, like other types of homicide, that the perpetrator act recklessly. However, under Section 718 an attacker must know that the mother of the unborn child is pregnant. That state of mind is specific to the particular unborn child who is the victim of the attack-the attacker must be aware that particular unborn child exists and may be killed as a result of his attack on the mother. Of course, the majority reading turns § 713 into a simple codification of the transferred intent rule. An attack on a mother which results in the unintended death of her unknown unborn child is manslaughter. Again, this cannot serve the legislative purpose of preventing homicidal attacks on unborn children.
111 A defendant charged under the homicide statutes may also be Hable for an unintended homicide if it is charged as felony murder. The willful killing of an unborn quick (but not viable) child is not listed within the enumerated erimes authorizing a felony murder charge.32
112 Applying all the elements of Section 713 to the facts of this case, I agree that evidence supports the finding that Felicia Chisholm's unborn child was a quick child under the statute. However, I find no evidence McCarty knew Ms. Chisholm was pregnant. Indeed, there is no evidence McCarty knew Ms. Chisholm at all or had ever seen her, This tragic murder occurred when McCarty set a fire intended for one set *992of victims, and killed another. He is certainly liable for the murders of Ms. Chisholm and Mr. LeBleu, but no evidence suggests McCarty willfully killed Ms. Chisholm's unborn quick child. Consequently I cannot agree to modify McCarty's conviction to reflect a conviction under Section 713.
T13 Finally, I would clarify the majority holding setting forth when a prosecution for murder or manslaughter is appropriate. The majority states liability for manslaughter under Section 713 may be imposed where (1) a fetus is not viable and/or is less than 24 weeks in gestation (so first degree murder is not appropriate) and (2) evidence shows the unborn child is quick. Tarver also requires that, for liability under Section 713, the defendant is aware the woman is pregnant. The majority then describes eligibility for first degree murder by adding a third category, where the unborn child has reached the 24th week of pregnancy and medical testimony states it is viable. I would clarify this language because in some cases prosecution for first-degree murder would be appropriate where an unborn child is viable even if the pregnancy has not reached 24 weeks, or where the fetus has reached the 24th week of pregnancy and no evidence rebuts the presumption of viability. Following Hughes, I would hold that first degree murder charges are appropriate where the unborn child is viable, which may be proved through evi-denee that the fetus has reached 24 weeks or is capable of life outside the womb, with or without artificial aid.

. 1994 OK CR 3, 868 P.2d 730, 731. The Oklahoma Supreme Court earlier ruled there was a cause of action under the wrongful death statute for the death of a viable unborn child. Evans v. Olson, 1976 OK. 64, 550 P.2d 924, 925.

. - Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160, 93 S.Ct. 705, 730, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Oklahoma case law regarding the meaning of "viable" is ambiguous. Without explicitly defining the term, this Court has cited a South Carolina case which defined "viable" as living without artificial aid. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 733 (without the aid of artificial support). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has cited definitions which provide for artificial support. Spencer v. Seikel, 1987 OK 75, 742 P.2d 1126, 1130 (sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also referred to viability as the capacity to live outside the uterus without determining whether the fetus must survive unaided. Nealis v. Baird, 1999 OK 98, 996 P.2d 438, 447 (the moment when the unborn child can survive independently of its mother); Davis v. Fieker, 1997 OK 156, 952 P.2d 505, 509 n. 17 (citing the American Heritage dictionary definition "live and develop outside the womb"); Evans, 550 P.2d at 928, n. 3 (citing Webster's dictionary definition of "living outside the uterus"). Black's defines fetal viability as life which continues "indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." Black's Law Dictionary 1404 (5th Ed.).

. 63 O.S.Supp.1998, § 1-732(B) ("if more than 24 weeks have elapsed since the probable beginning of the last menstrual period").

. 21 O.S.1991,§ 713.

. See, e.g., Fairchild v. State, 1999 OK CR 49, 998 P.2d 611, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1039, 121 S.Ct. 2002, 149 L.Ed.2d 1004 (2001) (first degree child abuse murder is general intent crime). The Court appears to be creating a special category of homicide: any killing of a child or fetus may be punished without regard to intent.

. The Dakota statutes originally indexed these crimes under "Abortion". Compiled Laws of the Territory of Dakota, 1289 (1887). Pinzel, Henrie v. Derryberry and the Current Status of the Oklahoma Abortion Laws, 10 Tulsa Law Journal 273 (1974) (discussing a decision under the companion statute, Section 714, which punished as manslaughter prescribing, procuring, or administering any substance to a pregnant woman with the intent to destroy the child).

. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 733 n. 3.

. - Black's Law Dictionary 1247 (6th Ed.)

. - Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 597 (1987). Following the Sloane Dor-land definition, the Rhode Island legislature has defined "quick child" as one so far developed and matured as to be able to survive the trauma of birth with the aid of medical care. R.L.Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-23-5, 13.

. Id.

. Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 1618 (18th Ed.1997) (estimating "quickening" occurs from 18th to 20th week of pregnancy, but noting it may be as early as 10th week); Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1479 (26th Ed.1995) (estimating "quickening" occurs from 16th to 20th week of pregnancy); Dorland's Mustrated Medical Dictionary 1399 (28th Ed.1994) (estimating "quickening" occurs from 16th to 20th week of pregnancy).

. Black's Law Dictionary 1247 (6th Ed.); Webster's New Explorer Medical Dictionary 579 (1999); Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1399 (28th Ed.1994); Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 597-98 (1987) (from 16th to 18th week of pregnancy); American Med*989ical Association Encyclopedia of Medicine 842 (1989) (from 16th to 20th week of pregnancy); Melloni's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 401 (1979) {about fourth or fifth month of pregnancy); Oxford English Dictionary Vol. XII 19 (2nd Edition 1989) ("'quicken'" defined as the stage of pregnancy at which the child shows signs of life; "quickening" defined as first sensation of movement of the fetus). However, one author suggests that early common law held quickening occurred: between the sixth and eighth week of pregnancy. Wasserstrom, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child, 64 ALR 5th 671, 686, 1998 WL 1032152.

. Black's Law Dictionary 1247 (6th Ed.)

. Oxford English Dictionary Vol XIII 14 (2nd Edition 1989) (use first noted in 1450).

. See Brinkley v. State, 253 Ga. 541, 322 S.E.2d 49 (1984) (terms "quick" and "unborn child" not void for vagueness using common-law definitions, where mother told defendant she was pregnant, fetus was 16 weeks old, and mother had already felt fetal movement). The Eleventh Circuit later found the Georgia statute did not violate this defendant's equal protection rights. Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386 (11 Cir.1987).

. 21 O.S.1991, § 92.

. 1982 OK CR 156, 651 P.2d 1332, 1334-5. My conclusion that Tarver requires no specific intent to kill but does mandate awareness of the pregnancy, does not conflict with the Court's analysis of general and specific intent in Fairchild v. State, 1999 OK CR 49, 998 P.2d 611.

. In Tarver, the defendant was aware that the mother (his wife) was eight months pregnant. In Burrows v. State, 1982 OK CR 6, 640 P.2d 533, 539, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011, 103 S.Ct. 1250, 75 L.Ed.2d 480, we held a defendant could not subsequently be prosecuted under Section 713 where evidence the victim (his wife) was 7 % months pregnant was introduced in the first stage of his capital trial for her murder. In Hooks v. State, 1993 OK CR 41, 862 P.2d 1273, cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1870, 128 L.Ed.2d 490, the defendant was aware that the victim (his girlfriend) was 24 weeks pregnant with his child.

. This awareness requirement does not conflict with the Oklahoma Supreme Court's conclusion in Nealis that a nonviable fetus born alive is a person. Nealis, 996 P.2d at 453-54. Nealis, a *990civil case, sought to determine who was a "person" under the wrongful death statutes. That context is far removed from the question of criminal liability under the various homicide statutes.

. Majority opinion at 984, n. 3.

. Nev. Rev. State, § 200.210; Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 9A.32.060. There are no reported cases from Nevada construing this statute. The only cases from Washington are old cases charging manslaughter where defendants performed or procured abortions.

. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 782.09; Ga.Code Ann. § 16-5-80; Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 750.322; Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-37; R.I.Gen.Laws Ann. § 11-23-5. Missouri also adopted this statute. Mo. State.Ann.1949 § 559.090. In 1986, Missouri deleted this statute and substituted a general statute defining "unborn child" (life beginning at conception), declaring the rights of unborn children, and applying the statute to all Missouri laws. In combination with the homicide statuies, an unborn child has subsequently been deemed a "person" for both manslaughter, State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo.1992), and first degree murder, State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Mo.App.W.D.1997).

. - Ariz.Rev.Stats. § 13.1103(A)(5).

. S.D.Codified Laws § 22~17-6. "Human fetus" is elsewhere defined as any individual homo sapiens from fertilization to live birth. S.D.Codified Laws § 22-1-2(50A). North Dakota, on the other hand, includes as manslaughter recklessly causing the death of an unborn child. N.D.Stats. 1987 ch. 166, § 12.1-17.1-03.

. IIl.Comp.Stats.Ann. ch. 720, § 9-1.2(@)(3), (b). The statute defines "unborn child" as any human from fertilization until birth.

. People v. Gillespie, 276 Ill.App.3d 495, 213 IIl.Dec. 382, 659 N.E.2d 12 (1995) (defendant must have knowledge of pregnancy); Willis v. State, 518 So.2d 667 (Miss.1988) (evidence showed defendant knew or should have known of pregnancy, as victim was obviously seven months pregnant, and defendant knew her personally); Brinkley v. State, 253 Ga. 541, 322 S.E.2d 49 (1984) (discussing whether statute void for vagueness trial court noted mother told defendant she was pregnant, fetus was 16 weeks old, and mother had already felt fetal movement); State v. Harness, 280 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.1955) (injury was not capable of causing death to the mother, who was carrying defendant's child); Passley v. State, 194 Ga. 327, 21 S.E.2d 230 (1942) (no injury capable of causing death to the mother, where defendant beat her with apparent intent to kill the unborn child). See also Taylor v. State, 795 So.2d 512, 2001 WL 723189 (Miss. June 28, 2001) (applies discussion of deliberate design necessary for malice murder to intent requirement for murder of unborn child); State v. Keller, 592 So.2d 1365 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991) (first-degree murder upheld where defendant intended to kill both the mother and her unborn child); State v. McCall, 458 So.2d 875, 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (feticide statute does not apply in vehicular homicide case where State did not allege defendant willfully killed the unborn child).

. People v. Davis, 7 Cal.4th 797, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 50, 872 P.2d 591 (1994).

. Cal.Stats.1970, § 187(a).

. Under the majority reading, of course, the statute becomes an expression of legislative intent that one is potentially liable for manslaughter for any attack on a woman of child-bearing age.

. State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 800 P.2d 1260, 1281, (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 929, 111 S.Ct. 2044, 114 L.Ed.2d 129 (1991).

. Short v. State, 1999 OK CR 15, 980 P.2d 1081, 1098, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 120 S.Ct. 811, 145 L.Ed.2d 683.

. 21 O.S.Supp.1998, § 701.7(B).