Court Opinion

ID: 9401273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 17:09:30.975913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.909108
License: Public Domain

[Cite as John Soliday Fin. Group v. Moncreace, 2023-Ohio-1941.]

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                JEFFERSON COUNTY

                      JOHN SOLIDAY FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC,

                                        Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                                    v.

                   ANGEL MONCREACE AKA ANGEL MCSHAN,

                                      Defendant-Appellee.

                       OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                        Case No. 22 JE 0019

                                   Civil Appeal from the
                      Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, Ohio
                                   Case No. 08-CV-308

                                         BEFORE:
                 David A. D’Apolito, Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

                                             JUDGMENT:
                                               Affirmed.

 Atty. Jackson T. Moyer and Atty. Thomas R. Myers, Lyons, Doughty & Veldhuis, P.C.,
 495 Metro Place South, Suite 360, Dublin, Ohio 43017, for Plaintiff-Appellant and

 Angel Moncreace, aka Angel McShan, Pro Se, 509 Woodland Avenue, Steubenville,
 Ohio 43952, Defendant-Appellee.

                                        Dated: June 12, 2023
                                                                                        –2–

 D’APOLITO, P.J.

       {¶1}     Appellant, John Soliday Financial Group, LLC, appeals from the August 31,
2022 judgment of the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas, vacating a post-
judgment garnishment on wages in favor of Appellee, Angel Moncreace, aka Angel
McShan, following this court’s decision in John Soliday Fin. Group, L.L.C. v. Moncreace,
7th Dist. Jefferson No. 09 JE 11, 2011-Ohio-1471.
       {¶2}     This case originated as an action to recover money damages on an unpaid
consumer auto loan. Appellee borrowed money in 2004 to purchase a used car. Appellee
failed to make some payments on the loan. As a result, Appellant, a financial institution
and an assignee of the loan, filed an action to recover the outstanding debt. Appellee did
not respond to the complaint, and Appellant was awarded a default judgment. Appellee
subsequently obtained counsel and filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.
The trial court granted the motion.
       {¶3}     Appellant filed its first appeal, Case No. 09 JE 11, raising one assignment
of error: “The trial court abused its discretion by holding that Appellee’s failure to appear
or answer Appellant’s complaint was ‘excusable neglect’ that entitled Appellee to relief
from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.” Soliday,
supra, at ¶ 9. On March 22, 2011, this court found merit in Appellant’s argument, reversed
the judgment of the trial court sustaining Appellee’s motion for relief from judgment, and
reinstated the default judgment. Id. at ¶ 23.
       {¶4}     In the present appeal, Case No. 22 JE 0019, Appellant asserts the trial court
abused its discretion in vacating the post-judgment garnishment on wages and finding
the underlying judgment was paid and discharged, against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

                          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶5}     The material facts in this matter were summarized as follows in Appellant’s
first appeal:

       On October 14, 2004, Appellee purchased a 1997 Chrysler Cirrus from
       ProCar Auto Group in Steubenville. She signed a retail installment credit

Case No. 22 JE 0019
                                                                                      –3–

      contract with Atlantic Financial Services, Inc., with a principal amount of
      $7,996.55, plus interest at a rate of 24.95% per annum. She was required
      to make payments every two weeks in the amount of $147.87. Appellee
      failed to make payments on the loan, and [Appellant] Soliday, claiming to
      be the assignee of the loan, filed suit to collect the debt.

      The breach of contract complaint was filed on May 23, 2008. Appellee did
      not respond to the complaint. On August 1, 2008, [Appellant] Soliday filed
      a motion for default judgment in the amount of $4,653.91 plus interest in the
      amount of $1,891.03 through July 25, 2008, and future interest to accrue at
      24.95% per annum. The court scheduled a hearing for September 15, 2008,
      and sent notice to the parties. Again, Appellee failed to respond in any way
      and failed to attend the hearing. The trial court granted the motion on
      December 30, 2008, and entered judgment as [Appellant] Soliday had
      requested, approximately seven months after the complaint was filed. No
      appeal was taken of this judgment entry by Appellee.

      A certificate of judgment lien against land and tenements was entered on
      January 12, 2009.

      Appellee subsequently obtained counsel, and on February 17, 2009, she
      filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. The motion alleged that
      Appellee did not know what to do when she received the complaint and that
      this inaction constituted excusable neglect. The motion also presented a
      number of possible defenses to the action, including [Appellant] Soliday’s
      failure to prove the assignment of the loan, failure to attach a copy of the
      delinquent account to the complaint, failure to provide proper notice of
      repossession, and failure to act in a commercially reasonable manner. The
      motion did not allege that Appellee failed to receive the complaint or failed
      to receive any other court notice or document.

      On March 9, 2009, [Appellant] Soliday filed a memorandum contra [to]
      defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. [Appellant] Soliday argued that

Case No. 22 JE 0019
                                                                                            –4–

          Appellee was required to establish excusable neglect, a meritorious
          defense, and timeliness of the motion, in order for the court to grant the
          motion. [Appellant] Soliday argued that Appellee simply ignored the
          complaint. Inaction is not a legally acceptable form of excusable neglect.
          [Appellant] Soliday also argued that the motion was untimely and that no
          meritorious defense was established.

          Appellee filed a further reply on March 12, 2009. The court held a hearing
          on the motion on March 16, 2009. Most of the hearing dealt with whether
          Appellee had any meritorious defenses. [Appellant] Soliday presented little
          challenge to the alleged defenses, but did emphasize that, as a threshold
          matter, Appellee presented no excusable neglect because Appellee simply
          ignored the complaint, as well as all the other court filings. * * * Appellee’s
          counsel argued that Appell[ee] did not know of the possible legal defenses
          she might have had because she was not a lawyer, and did not realize her
          car could be repossessed simply by failing to pay her loan installments. * *
          * She supposedly understood her possible defenses only after she obtained
          counsel. The trial court appear[ed] to have accepted this reasoning as
          excusable neglect and granted the motion for relief from judgment on March
          18, 2009. [Appellant’s] timely appeal followed.

Id. at ¶ 3-8.

          {¶6}    As stated, on March 22, 2011, this court found merit in Appellant’s
argument, reversed the judgment of the trial court sustaining Appellee’s motion for relief
from judgment, and reinstated the default judgment. Id. at ¶ 23.
          {¶7}    Thereafter, beginning in June of 2011, Appellant pursued post-judgment
enforcement.1 In 2015, Appellant obtained a garnishment on Appellee’s wages. Appellee
filed an objection. The trial court held a hearing on August 10, 2015.
          {¶8}    At that hearing, Appellee appeared pro se. Appellee stated, “after the
judgment was made of 11,800 I’ve been paying them [Appellant] on time and every time

1   At that time, the amount due was $10,629.88.

Case No. 22 JE 0019
                                                                                         –5–

since 2012.” (8/10/2015 Hearing Tr., p. 4). Appellee experienced some family issues
with her sister getting almost killed and either missed a payment or sent it to the wrong
place. (Id.) Appellee said, “[s]o, they [Appellant] withdrew the agreement. I paid them
over $8,000. I only owe them a little over 3,000.” (Id.) Appellee apologized to Appellant
but Appellant revoked their initial $200 monthly agreement because she was late. (Id. at
p. 4, 6).
       {¶9}   Appellant revealed the foregoing was “essentially accurate.” (Id. at p. 5).
The trial judge responded, “So, what’s the matter with you people?” (Id.) Appellee
asserted she does not owe Appellant for the car because Appellant took the car and
resold it. (Id. at p. 6). Appellee stressed she had never been late since 2012. (Id.) The
judge asked Appellee, “So, as we stand here right now are you behind or not?” (Id. at p.
7). Appellee replied, “No[.]” (Id.) Appellee explained by saying, “I’m not behind but I
missed this payment because my lawyer said, ‘Wait till the hearing[.]’” (Id.) Appellee and
her legal aid attorney at the time requested Appellant “put her back on the budget” as
“she got this payment down to a little over 3,000 from 11,800.” (Id.)
       {¶10} The court also heard from Appellant’s counsel revealing that this
garnishment had to be reset a couple times and that this matter was taken to the Court
of Appeals which reinstated the default judgment. (Id. at p. 5).
       {¶11} After considering the statements, the court took Appellee’s objection to the
garnishment “under advisement” and told her, “[i]n the meantime make your regular
payments.” (Id. at p. 7). No ruling was made on the 2015 objection.
       {¶12} On May 25, 2022, Appellant filed a subsequent wage garnishment.
Appellee filed an objection. The trial court held a hearing on August 22, 2022.
       {¶13} At that hearing, Appellee appeared pro se. Appellant’s counsel asked the
trial court to permit the garnishment to proceed. (8/22/2022 Hearing Tr., p. 4). Appellant’s
counsel said he spoke with Appellee, indicating “she thought there was an agreement
that if she paid a certain amount, the interest would be waived.” (Id. at p. 3-4). Appellant’s
counsel stated, “I asked her if she brought any of those records in, and she indicated she
doesn’t have any proof that she paid this off or that there was an agreement to waive the
balance.” (Id. at p. 4). Appellee merely stated, “I paid everything.” (Id. at p. 7). The court
concluded the hearing by indicating, “I’ll take it under advisement” and “I’m going to dig

Case No. 22 JE 0019
                                                                                       –6–

up that last hearing [(from August 10, 2015)], and we’ll see what that does.” (Id. at p. 7-
8).
       {¶14} On August 31, 2022, the trial court vacated the post-judgment garnishment
on wages in favor of Appellee. The court stated, “Pursuant to the Transcript of Hearing
of August 10, 2015 the Court finds that the Judgment has been paid in full and discharged.
The wage garnishment is vacated and all funds shall be returned to Defendant
[Appellee].” (8/31/2022 Judgment Entry).
       {¶15} Appellant filed the current appeal, Case No. 22 JE 0019, and raises two
assignments of error.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

       THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN VACATING ITS
       ORDER OF GARNISHMENT OF PERSONAL EARNINGS AT THE
       JUDGMENT DEBTOR’S REQUEST IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
       EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT THE JUDGMENT HAD BEEN PAID,
       OR THAT THE GARNISHMENT ORDER WAS IN ANY WAY IMPROPER.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

       THE TRIAL COURT’S DETERMINATION THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS
       PAID AND DISCHARGED WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
       EVIDENCE WHERE THERE WAS NO TESTIMONY OR DOCUMENTS
       PRESENTED TO THE COURT TO PROVE PAYMENT.

       {¶16} In its first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court abused its
discretion in vacating the garnishment and finding the judgment was paid and discharged.
In its second assignment of error, Appellant alternatively contends the court’s finding that
the judgment was paid and discharged was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Because Appellant’s assignments are interrelated, we will address them together for ease
of discussion.
       {¶17} An order vacating a garnishment and finding that the judgment was paid
and discharged is a final appealable order. See R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) and (3).

Case No. 22 JE 0019
                                                                                           –7–

          {¶18} Civ.R. 60, “Relief from judgment or order,” applies where a court entertains
a judgment debtor’s request to declare a judgment paid and discharged, and states at
(B)(4):

          On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
          or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the
          following reasons:

          ***

          (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior
          judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
          or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
          application[.]

Civ.R. 60(B)(4).

          The standard of review used to evaluate the trial court’s decision to grant or
          deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is abuse of discretion. Ohio Dept. of Job &
          Family Servs. v. State Line Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 7th Dist. Mahoning
          No. 15 MA 0067, 2016-Ohio-3421, ¶ 12. An abuse of discretion connotes
          conduct which is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel.
          Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. Of Edn., 72 Ohio St.3d 106, 107,
          647 N.E.2d 799 (1995).

Paczewski v. Antero Resources Corp., 7th Dist. Monroe No. 18 MO 0016, 2019-Ohio-
2641, ¶ 27.

          {¶19} “It has long been the law in Ohio that, ‘(a) party who is entitled to an entry
of an order of satisfaction of a judgment previously rendered against him may obtain an
order for such entry on motion and proof of payment.’” Youngstown Buick Co. v. Hayes,
7th Dist. Mahoning No. 98-CA-159, 2000 WL 1635710, *8 (Oct. 26, 2000), quoting
Edwards v. Passarelli Bros. Automotive Services, Inc., 8 Ohio St.2d 6, paragraph one of
the syllabus (1966).

Case No. 22 JE 0019
                                                                                       –8–

      The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that the manifest weight of the
      evidence standard set forth in State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387,
      678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), a criminal case, also applies in civil cases. Eastley
      v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 17-
      23. As explained in Thompkins:

      The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all
      reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
      determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact]
      clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
      the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

      Thompkins, supra, at 387. However, in weighing the evidence, “the court of
      appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of
      fact.” Eastley at ¶ 21.

P.N. v. A.M., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 20 MA 0033, 2021-Ohio-1163, ¶ 34.

      A judgment supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all
      the essential elements of the case will not be reversed for being against the
      manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Const. Co., 54
      Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), syllabus. Moreover, the trier of fact
      is in the best position to weigh the evidence presented and judge the
      credibility of witnesses by observing their gestures, voice inflections, and
      demeanor. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461
      N.E.2d 1273 (1984). The finder of fact is free to believe some, all or none
      of the testimony presented by each witness and can decide between
      credible and incredible parts of witness testimony. State v. Mastel, 26 Ohio
      St.2d 170, 176, 270 N.E.2d 650 (1971). When presented with two fairly
      reasonable perspectives regarding the evidence or with two conflicting
      versions of events, neither of which can be ruled out as unbelievable, we
      will not choose which one is more credible. State v. Gore, 131 Ohio App.3d
      197, 201, 722 N.E.2d 125 (7th Dist.1999).

Case No. 22 JE 0019
                                                                                      –9–

Vaughn v. Oliver, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 20 MA 0080, 2021-Ohio-3595, ¶ 38.

       {¶20} As stated, in the appealed August 31, 2022 judgment, the trial court held,
“Pursuant to the Transcript of Hearing of August 10, 2015 the Court finds that the
Judgment has been paid in full and discharged. The wage garnishment is vacated and
all funds shall be returned to Defendant [Appellee].” (8/31/2022 Judgment Entry).
       {¶21} At the August 10, 2015 hearing, Appellee appeared pro se. Again, Appellee
stated, “after the judgment was made of 11,800 I’ve been paying them [Appellant] on time
and every time since 2012.” (8/10/2015 Hearing Tr., p. 4). Appellee experienced some
family issues with her sister getting almost killed and either missed a payment or sent it
to the wrong place. (Id.) Appellee said, “[s]o, they [Appellant] withdrew the agreement.
I paid them over $8,000. I only owe them a little over 3,000.” (Id.) Appellee apologized
to Appellant but Appellant revoked their initial $200 monthly agreement because she was
late. (Id. at p. 4, 6).
       {¶22} Appellant revealed the foregoing was “essentially accurate.” (Id. at p. 5).
The trial judge responded, “So, what’s the matter with you people?” (Id.) Appellee
asserted she does not owe Appellant for the car because Appellant took the car and
resold it. (Id. at p. 6). Appellee stressed she had never been late since 2012. (Id.) The
judge asked Appellee, “So, as we stand here right now are you behind or not?” (Id. at p.
7). Appellee replied, “No[.]” (Id.) Appellee explained by saying, “I’m not behind but I
missed this payment because my lawyer said, ‘Wait till the hearing[.]’” (Id.) Appellee and
her legal aid attorney at the time requested Appellant “put her back on the budget” as
“she got this payment down to a little over 3,000 from 11,800.” (Id.)
       {¶23} Upon consideration, this court stresses Appellee purchased the car at issue
back in 2004 with a principal amount of $7,996.55. At oral argument, Appellant revealed
that with accrued interest at the rate of 24.95 percent per annum, Appellee owes
$21,068.53 for a vehicle that Appellant repossessed and resold to another buyer back in
2008. Appellee admitted to owing some $3,000 at the time of the August 2015 hearing.
However, Appellee revealed during oral argument that that amount has since been paid.
Appellee stressed she is a financially struggling mother of three children and did not keep
all of her money order receipts. Appellee also noted that her legal aid attorney only kept
documents and receipts for seven years and, thus, has since purged her records.

Case No. 22 JE 0019
                                                                                    – 10 –

      {¶24} Thus, based on the facts presented and in the interests of justice, we
determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the garnishment and
finding the judgment was paid and discharged. The court’s judgment is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.

                                   CONCLUSION

      {¶25} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error are not well-
taken. The August 31, 2022 judgment of the Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas
vacating the post-judgment garnishment on wages in favor of Appellee is affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.

Case No. 22 JE 0019
[Cite as John Soliday Fin. Group v. Moncreace, 2023-Ohio-1941.]

         For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
 are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of
 the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed
 against the Appellant.
         A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
 in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that
 a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into
 execution.

                                       NOTICE TO COUNSEL

         This document constitutes a final judgment entry.