Court Opinion

ID: 9781338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:32:08.035967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:24.599813
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Judge,
concurring specially.
I believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion at the time it was presented with the motion to sever, and Brooks failed to renew the motion, or to make any objection whatsoever, when the State’s closing argument linked him to crimes charged only against Johnson. I agree, however, that the trial court had a responsibility to intervene when the jury returned an illegal verdict. I therefore concur only as to Division 2 and the judgment.
This record shows that the trial court granted Brooks’s pre-trial motion to sever four counts against Johnson connected to the armed robbery and carjacking of one victim on November 11, 2004. The trial court denied the motion as to the counts against Johnson for armed robbery, aggravated assault and other charges as to a second victim on November 13, 2004, because the facts underlying these counts, including the co-defendants’ use of a four-door sedan, were part of the res gestae concerning their rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated assault of a third victim on the same day. Brooks’s only defense to the charges of rape and aggravated sodomy concerning the third victim was that she was a prostitute who had consented to sex with both men and that she was not a credible witness. Johnson did not take the stand in his own defense, but likewise argued that the sex was consensual and that the victim was not credible.
The record also shows that the jury was presented with a conventional verdict form as to Johnson, but that the form as to *861Brooks consisted of a redacted and renumbered version of the original indictments, including counts against Johnson alone, behind a cover page with Johnson’s name crossed out. When the jury presented its verdict against Brooks, including the counts against Johnson alone, Brooks raised no objection. The jury was then dismissed.
Decided October 4, 2011.
As the majority holds, we review a denial of severance only for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 266 Ga. 312, 314 (2) (467 SE2d 325) (1996). Factors to be considered include “whether a joint trial will create confusion of evidence and law[,] whether there is a danger that evidence implicating one defendant will be considered against a co-defendant despite limiting instructions^] and whether the defendants are asserting antagonistic defenses.” Rhodes v. State, 279 Ga. 587, 589 (3) (619 SE2d 659) (2005).
At the time the trial court denied the motion to sever, it could not have known that the State would make an improper closing argument linking Brooks to Johnson’s crimes, and Brooks has not argued, let alone shown, that the trial court erred when it reasoned that the subject matter of the common counts was part of the res gestae as to crimes committed by both men. This case involved only two defendants, and Brooks has not argued or shown that evidence concerning the events of November 13 would have been admissible as to one of the men and inadmissible as to the other or that their defenses were antagonistic. I cannot agree, then, that the trial court abused its discretion at the time it denied the motion to sever. See Carson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 534, 535 (1) (431 SE2d 156) (1993) (affirming denial of motion to sever in case involving only two defendants when there was no danger of confusion of evidence and when their defenses were not antagonistic).
Brooks also raised no objection when the State’s closing argument linked him to offenses committed only by Johnson. “[A] defendant who, during trial, finds reasons for severance or supporting a motion for severance previously made and overruled, is under a duty to make or renew his motion for severance. He cannot sit silent and expect the trial judge to suggest severance to him.” (Emphasis supplied.) Hill v. State, 239 Ga. 278, 281 (3) (236 SE2d 626) (1977). Only at the end of a conversation after the jury had been excused, and in the midst of considering whether a police report should go out with them, did Brooks suggest in passing that the State’s argument had been improper.
For these reasons, I cannot join Division 1 of the majority opinion, but concur in Division 2 and in the judgment.
*862Dell Jackson, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Christopher M. Quinn, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.