Court Opinion

ID: 9879479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 18:20:14.630001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:55.197137
License: Public Domain

Kapsner, Surrogate Judge. [¶ 1] Black Hills Trucking, Inc., appeals from a judgment affirming an Industrial Commission order assessing a $950,000 civil penalty and costs and expenses against it for illegally dumping saltwater on roads in Williams County. We conclude the Commission regularly pursued its authority and its findings and conclusions are sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence. We affirm. I [¶ 2] Black Hills is a Wyoming corporation that is in the business of transporting crude oil, produced saltwater, petroleum products, oilfield equipment and other materials. During 2014 Black Hills owned and operated trucks in North Dakota for the purpose of transporting oilfield waste. On February 11, 2014, the Commission received a report from a security officer for Continental Resources, Inc., that he had photos and video of a Black Hills truck dumping substantial amounts of fluids onto roads near a saltwater disposal well in Williams County. Commission staff examined the affected roads and collected a soil sample. The Commission also collected logs from the well which indicated a Black Hills driver had transported saltwater to the well on February 8, 2014. [¶ 3] On February 14, 2014, a Commission field technician observed a Black Hills truck leave the same well site and stop on the road. The driver opened the valves on the tractor trailer and drove away discharging produced fluids on the road. The technician followed the truck until it pulled off of the highway and into a truck yard where it continued to discharge fluids on the ground that pooled under the open valves. The technician took a sample directly from the discharging fluids and took soil samples from the road. Commission staff then requested a meeting with Black Hills to discuss the incident, and a meeting was held on February 28, 2014. [¶ 4] At the meeting, Commission staff discussed Black Hills’ understanding of the February 14 incident and the company’s response to it. The February 8 incident was not discussed because the Commission was continuing to investigate .what occurred. Black Hills placed the truck driver on probation and reprimanded him through the loss of his safety award and bonus. [¶ 5] On March 3, 2014, the Commission confirmed through lab analysis that the soil sample from the February 8 incident contained elevated levels of electrical conductivity and chlorides consistent with saltwater. On the same day the Commission received another report of a Black Hills truck improperly dumping fluids. Employees at the same well site observed the truck unloading saltwater and exiting, leaving a trail of saltwater from the disposal well, continuing off the well site and onto a county road until it intersected a highway. One of the employees confirmed that the discharged fluids contained saltwater. On March 6, 2014, the Commission received the lab analysis of the samples related to the February 14 incident which also indicated high levels of electrical conductivity and chlorides consistent with saltwater. Black Hills did not file a spill report, test to determine the extent of contamination, develop a remediation plan or take any further actions to clean up or remediate the areas affected by the improper discharge of saltwater from the three incidents. [¶ 6] On March 13,. 2014, the Commission issued an administrative complaint against Black Hills for the three incidents and requested penalties in the amount of $950,000 and costs and expenses of $1,526. Counts one through three of the complaint claiméd violations of N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-19.2 for'dumping the produced fluids on three occasions. Counts four through six alleged violations of N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-30.1 for allowing the fluids to infiltrate the soils on three occasions. Counts ’seven through nine alleged • violations of N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-30.1 for failing to properly remove the discharged fluids from the roads. Count 10 sought the Commission’s investigative costs and expenses under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-26. The Commission sought fines of $12,500 per day for each violation. The vast majority of the Commission’s proposed fine related to the violations alleged in counts seven through nine. [¶ 7] On March 19, 2014, the Department of • Health issued a notice of violation against Black Hills concerning the three incidents and its failure to report them, as well as its failure to have a valid waste transporter’s permit for the previous six years. The Department alleged Black Hills “placed wastes where they may cause pollution of waters of the state” in violation of N.D.C.C. § 61-28-06(1). To resolve that proceeding, Black Hills entered into an administrative consent agreement with the Department under which Black Hills admitted responsibility for the oilfield waste illegally discharged during the three incidents. Black'Hills-agreed to an administrative penalty of $459,000, with $259,000 of that amount suspended. [¶ 8] An evidentiary hearing on the Commission’s administrative complaint was held in December 2015 before an' administrative law judge' (“ALJ”). In February 2016, the ALJ recommended that the complaint against Black Hills be dismissed with prejudice. The ALJ’s decision was presented to the Commission at its March 2016 meeting, and after an executive session with its legal counsel, the Commission rejected most .of the ALJ’s recommendations and directed its legal counsel to draft an alternative order for consideration. At its April 2016 meeting, the Commission approved an alternative decision by unanimous vote finding Black Hills violated the regulations and assessing against it, a $950,000 civil penalty and $1,526 in costs and ^expenses. The district court affirmed the Commission’s order. II [¶ 9] On appeal, Black Hills challenges the Commission’s order on numerous grounds.  [¶ 10] Our standard of review of Commission orders is very limited. In Langved v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2017 ND 179, ¶ 8, 899 N.W.2d 267, we explained: The standard of judicial review of Commission orders is set forth in N.D.C.C. § 38-08-14(3), which provides that “[o]rders of the commission must be sustained by the district court -if the commission has regularly pursued its authority and- its findings and conclusions are sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence.” This Court applies the same standard of review in appeals from district court involving orders of the Commission. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. North Dakota Indus. Comm’n, 307 N.W.2d 839, 842 (N.D. 1981). The “substantial evidence” test “is something less” than the greater weight of the evidence and the preponderance of the evidence tests, and differs from the usual standard of review for administrative decisions under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46. Hanson v. Industrial Comm’n, 466 N.W.2d 587, 590 (N.D. 1991). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support- a conclusion,” .and we “accord greater deference to Industrial Commission findings of fact than we ordinarily accord to other administrative agencies’ findings of fact.” Id. The Commission’s decisions on questions of Jaw are fully reviewable on appeal. See Imperial Oil of North Dakota, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 406 N.W.2d 700, 702 (N.D. 1987). (quoting Gadeco, LLC v. Indus. Comm’n, 2012 ND 33, ¶ 15, 812 N.W.2d 405). A  [¶ 11] Black Hills argues the Commission lacks jurisdiction over a discharge of produced saltwater on a public road occurring away from an oil and gas well site, disposal site, treatment plant, or other facility.  ' [¶ 12] “Under N.D.C.C. ch. 38-OS, the Commission'has extremely broad and comprehensive powers to regulate oil and gas development in the state.” Langved, 2017 ND 179, ¶ 12, 899 N.W.2d 267; see also Envtl. Driven Solutions, LLC v. Dunn Cty., 2017 ND 45, ¶ 9, 890 N.W.2d 841; GEM Razorback, LLC v. Zenergy, Inc., 2017 ND 33, ¶ 10, 890 N.W.2d 544. “ ‘The Commission’s powers are continuous .., and are exclusive.’ ” Dunn Cty., at tí 9 (quoting Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169, ¶ 11, 616 N.W.2d 861). Section 38-08-04, N.D.C.C., provides in relevant part: The commission has continuing jurisdiction and authority' oyer all persons and property, public and private, necessary to enforce effectively the provisions of this chapter. The commission has authority, and it is its duty, to make such investigations as it deems proper to determine whether waste exists or is imminent or whether other facts exist which justify, action by the commission. The commission has the authority: [[Image here]] 2. To regulate: a. The drilling, producing, and plugging of wells, the restoration of drilling and production sites, and all other operations for the production of oil or gas.- [[Image here]] e. Disposal of saltwater and oilfield wastes. (1) The commission shall give all affected counties written notice of hearings in such matters at least fifteen days before the hearing. (2) The commission may consider, in addition to other authority granted under this section, safety of the location and road access to saltwater disposal wells, treating plants, and all associated facilities. [¶ 13] Section 38-08-04(2)(a) and (e), N.D.C.C., unambiguously give the Commission authority to regulate “all other operations for the production of oil or gas” including “[disposal of saltwater and oilfield wastes.” We have interpreted these provisions broadly in recognizing the Commission’s statutory authority to regulate “the disposal of saltwater and oilfield wastes.” Dunn Cty., 2017 ND 45, ¶ 13, 890 N.W.2d 841. The Commission has promulgated a regulation governing disposal of waste material which provides “[a]ll waste material associated with exploration or production of oil and gas must be properly disposed of in an authorized facility in accord with all applicable local, state, and federal laws and regulations,” and “[a]ll waste material recovered from ‘ spills, leaks, and other such events shall immediately be disposed of in an authorized facility, although the remediation of such material may be allowed onsite if approved by the director.” N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-19.2. Although Black Hills suggests on appeal that saltwater does not qualify as oilfield waste, Black Hills admitted in the administrative proceedings that “produced water is included within either ‘saltwater and oilfield wastes’ [under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-04(2)(e) ] or Vaste material associated with the exploration or production of oil and gas’ [under N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-19.2].” See also Ñ.D. Admin, Code § 43-02-03-19.3. (“no saltwater, drilling mud, crude oil, waste oil, or other waste shall be stored in earthen pits or open receptacles”).  [¶ 14] Black Hills argues ' that N.D.C.C. § 38—08—04(2)(e) does not support the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction because Williams County was not provided written notice of the hearing in this cáse and because its jurisdiction is limited to saltwater disposal wells, treating plants, and facilities. First, Williams County is the entity entitled to complain about lack of notice in this case, and it has not done so. Black Hills has not alleged prejudice from the county’s lack of notice. A party “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and -cannot rest his claim to relief' on the legal rights 'and interests of third parties.” Flatt ex rel. Flatt v. Kantak, 2004 ND 173, ¶ 38, 687 N.W.2d 208 (internal citation omitted). Second, Black Hills’ narrow interpretation-of N.D.C.C. § 88-08-04(2)(a) and (e) conflicts- with, our recognition of the- broad and unambiguous authority the legislature has given the Commission to “regulat[e] the disposal of saltwater arid oilfield wastes.” Dunn Cty., 2017 ND 45, ¶ 13, 890 N.W.2d 841. Black Hills’ argument limiting the Commission’s •jurisdiction over saltwater or other oilfield waste disposal to only the physical location of the facilities themselves, and not to any property- between the site the waste is generated and the sité-the waste is disposed, ignores the plain language of the statute and -reality. Saltwater and other oilfield wastes by’ necessity must often be transported to a'disposal site. The Commission has the1 authority to regulate the disposal of saltwater and-oilfield waste and has continuing jurisdiction “over all persons and property, public and private, necessary to, enforce, effectively the provisions” of N.D.C.C. eh. 38-08. N.D.C.C. § 38-08-04; see also Dunn Cty., at ¶ 13. [¶ 15] Black Hills contends the Commission’s jurisdictional claims over the cleanup of a produced water spill occurring away from a well site or disposal facility are contradicted by N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-30.1, which in 2014 provided: At no time shall any spill or leak be allowed to flow over, pool, or rest on the surface of the land or infiltrate the soil. Discharged fluids must be properly removed and may not be allowed to remain standing within or outside of diked areas, although the remediation of such fluids may be allowed onsite if approved by the director. Operators must respond with appropriate resources to contain and clean up spills. [¶ 16] Black Hills contends that the regulation imposes spill containment and cleanup responsibilities only on “operators,” and an “operator” is defined by the regulations as “the principal on the bond covering a well and such person shall be responsible for drilling, completion, and operation of the well, including plugging and reclamation of the well site.” N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-01(37). Because Black Hills is a hauler of produced saltwater and not a principal on a bond covering a well, Black Hills argues it did not violate any duty to contain and clean up spills. Furthermore, because N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-30.1 has since been amended to read “Operators and responsible parties must respond with appropriate resources to contain and clean up spills” (emphasis added), Black Hills argues the amendment evidences that no duties were imposed upon non-operators when the spills occurred. The Commission argues the amendment merely clarified its intention that all culpable parties are responsible for remediation and cleanup.  [¶ 17] “Administrative regulations are derivatives of statutes and are construed under rules of statutory construction.” Gadeco, LLC v. Indus. Comm’n, 2013 ND 72, ¶ 10, 830 N.W.2d 535. We have often said “ ‘[t]he principles of statutory construction do not prevent a court from looking to subsequent enactments and amendments as an aid in arriving at the correct meaning of a prior statute.’ ” N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Valley Farmers Bean Ass’n, 365 N.W.2d 528, 546-47 (N.D. 1985) (quoting State v. Novak, 338 N.W.2d 637, 640 (N.D. 1983)); see also City of Bismarck v. Santineau, 509 N.W.2d 56, 58 n.1 (N.D. 1993); State v. Thomas, 420 N.W.2d 747, 753 n.5 (N.D. 1988); Slawson v. N.D. Indus. Comm’n, 339 N.W.2d 772, 775 n.2 (N.D. 1983). The first sentence of N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-30.1 contains a general prohibition against spills or leaks regardless of where they occur. The second sentence requires that discharged fluids be “properly removed” regardless of where the discharge occurs, ie., “within or outside of diked areas.” The third sentence speaks only of an operator’s duty to respond “with appropriate resources” to contain and clean up spills. Black Hills’ argument that only “operators” are responsible for cleanup ignores the first two sentences of the regulation. We agree with the Commission that the third sentence’s silence regarding the “resources” non-operators should apply to contain and clean up spills does not relieve non-operators from their duty to properly remove any spill or leak that occurs beyond a well site. The amendment to the rule merely requires all responsible parties to respond with appropriate resources to clean up spills.  [¶ 18] Black Hills’ reliance on N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-30.1 is solely for the purpose of attacking the Commission’s jurisdiction, which clearly exists under N.D.C.C. § 38-08-04(2)(a) and (e). We recognize a defendant’s reasonable interpretation of and reliance on an ambiguous regulation may be a successful defense based on lack of notice in an administrative enforcement proceeding. See, e.g., Elgin Nursing and Rehab. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 718 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 653 F.Supp.2d 87, 97 (D.Ct. D.C. 2009). But Black Hills is not claiming a lack of notice because it believed the regulation only applied to “operators” in an oil and .gas sense. In other words, Black Hills does not assert that during the February 28, 2014 meeting with Commission staff it disclaimed responsibility for remediation because it was not an “operator” under the regulation. Instead, Black Hills disciplined the driver of the truck. This is not a notice issue.  [¶ 19] Although we generally defer to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of its governing statutes and rules, see, e.g., Indus. Contractors, Inc. v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 157, ¶ 6, 772 N.W.2d 582; St. Benedict’s Health Ctr. v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2004 ND 63, ¶ 9, 677 N.W.2d 202, no deference is required to support the Commission’s jurisdiction in this case. We conclude the Commission has jurisdiction over the illegal discharge of saltwater from the point it was generated to the point it is disposed, and Black Hills’ actions fall within the Commission’s jurisdiction. B [¶ 20] Black Hills argues that even if the Commission has jurisdiction over these incidents, its order unnecessarily encroaches on the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Health. [¶ 21] The Department has the statutory authority to supervise the administration and enforcement of N.D.C.C. ch. 61-28 relating to the control, prevention, and abatement of the pollution of surface waters. See N.D.C.C. § 61-28-04(1); N.D. Admin. Code art. 33-16. The Department also has the authority to administer N.D.C.C. ch. 23-29 relating to solid waste management and land protection. See N.D.C.C. § 23-29-04(1); N.D. Admin. Code art. 33-20. Black Hills argues the Department’s “comprehensive authority over the transportation of solid waste,” including liquids, gives the Department primary jurisdiction over the spills in this case. The Commission acknowledges that the agencies’ jurisdiction over oilfield waste may overlap to some degree, but argues this situation is not prohibited under the law.'  [¶ 22] The United States Supreme. Court has recognized that “Redundancies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy5 between two laws, ... a court must give effect to both.” Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198, 60 S.Ct. 182, 84 L.Ed. 181 (1939) (“When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible.”). There is no positive repugnancy between the authority granted to the Commission and the authority granted to the Department. [¶ 23] We conclude the Department does not have primary jurisdiction over this oilfield waste matter and both the Department and the Commission could exercise their regulatory jurisdiction. C  [¶ 24] Black Hills argues the penalties assessed against it are unconstitutionally excessive in violation of N.D. Const, art. I, § 11.  [¶ 25] The parties agree that, because of the similarities between the state and federal excessive fines clauses, this Court should analyze the issue under United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998), where the United States Supreme Court held the federal excessive fines clause is violated if the fine “is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” The two considerations identified by the Supreme Court for judging constitutional excessiveness are: 1) “judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first, instance to the legislature;” and 2) “any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise.” Id. at 336, 118 S.Ct. 2028.  [¶ 26] Here, the legislature through its enactment of N.D.C.C., § 38-08-16(1), has authorized a civil penalty “not to exceed twelve thousand five hun-’ dred dollars for each offense, and each day’s violation is a separate offense.” “Generally, a sentence within the statutory sentencing range is neither excessive nor cruel.” State v. Gomez, 2011 ND 29, ¶ 28, 793 N.W.2d 451; see also State v. Flohr, 310 N.W.2d 735, 738 (N.D. 1981) (where sentence was authorized by statute, it did not violate the state excessive fines clause). In imposing the penalty, the Commission ex-, plained in its order: Contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, the Commission believes the penalty it seeks to assess is appropriate and constitutional. The Commission is charged with the orderly control of the State’s oil and gas resources, which includes the protection of the State and its citizens from these types of reckless and detrimental violations to the environment. Although the hai-m from Black Hill’s illegal dumping may not be readily quantifiable, the illegal dumping of saltwater is a legitimate and, obvious harm and the levying of penalties against companies that damage the .environment but refuse to clean their illegal spills, may deter future illegal activities in' the future. See, e.g., Towers v. City of Chicago, 173 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 1999). A penalty is not unconstitutional simply because it may serve as a deterrent. The Commission takes these issues so seriously that the Commission sought a criminal conviction against [the truck driver] for the February 14,2014 incident. . [¶ 27] Black Hills argues there is no proportionality between the size of the fine and the harm suffered by the public. According to Black Hills,, this is evidenced by the Commission’s estimation of the spills to range “from a few gallons to a hundred gallons” and the lack of requests for remediation from the Department and local officials. Because the Commission did not quantify the volume of saltwater discharged and did not present evidence of the amount of harm to the environment caused by the discharges, Black Hills argues the fine is unconstitutional.  [¶28] The.party challenging the constitutionality of governmental actions bears the heavy burden of producing evidence showing why the actions are unconstitutionally defective. See, e.g., State v. Francis, 2016 ND 154, ¶ 18, 882 N.W.2d 270; Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 756 (N.D. 1978). The fine imposed by the Commission is authorized under N.D.C.C, § 38-08r16(l). If the volume of saltwater discharged and the resulting environmental harm are “minimal” in this case as Black Hills suggests, it had the burden to establish these facts. Black Hills presented no evidence on these issues, and consequently, it has not established the fine is unconstitutionally excessive. ... . . D  [¶ 29] Black Hills argues the Commission’s conduct during this case violated basic notions of fundamental fairness. •  [¶ 30] Due process requires that administrative proceedings conform with “[b]asic notions of fundamental fairness.” Morrell v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 1999 ND 140, ¶ 9, 598 N.W.2d 111. “[D]ue process is flexible and must be analyzed on a case-by-oase basis, balancing the competing interests and assessing whether the basic due process requirement, of fairness has been satisfied.” Wahl v. Morton Cty. Soc. Serve., 1998 ND 48, ¶ 6, 574 N.W.2d 859. Black Hills relies upon an unréported decision, United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., No. C-1220, 1971 WL 596 *2 (D.Ct. Colo. Aug. 2, 1971), in which the court, in the context of a Federal Trade Commission proceeding, stated, “as obiter dictum, it would seem unreasonable to permit the Commission to knowingly let daily penalties accrue without giving notice of the Commission’s position at the earliest reasonable time.” Black Hills contends that when it met with Commission staff on February 28, 2014 to discuss the February 14, 2014 incident, the Commission “intentionally withheld the information” about the February 8, 2014 incident. Black Hills argues that if it had- been informed of the February 8 incident at the meeting, “the third incident on March 3, 2014 could have been prevented.” By failing to notify Black Hills of either the February 8 or March 3 incidents until it was served with the complaint, Black Hills argues the Commission, in the words of the ALJ, “was holding its aces -up its sleeve” by unnecessarily allowing the daily fines to accrue. Assuming for purposes of argument only that the ITT Cont’l Baking dictum is a correct statement of the law, Black Hills has not established that the Commission’s penalties were fundamentally unfair in this case. [¶ 31] In its order, the Commission cogently explained: The Commission has consistently taken the position that its computation of penalties was fair and reasonable and did not violate Black Hills’ due process rights. Regarding the February 8, 2014 illegal dumping, the record indicates the Commission promptly started its investigation and took soil samples on February 11, 2014.... The Commission did not receive the results of the sample analysis until March 3, 2014.... Regarding the February 14, 2014 spill, the Commission’s field technician witnessed the-dumping-of .produced fluids and promptly investigated the illegal activity by acquiring a water sample from the actual truck. The Commission results of the lab analysis of the water, received on March 6, 2014, confirmed the fluid was produced water.... Finally, regarding the March 3, 2014 spill, the Commission had eyewitness reports that a Black Hills truck had dumped produced water—it would have been impossible to inform Black Hills of this violation during its February 28 meeting as implied by.the ALJ. The Commission filed its complaint on March 13, 2014.... Although the Commission timely notified Black Hills of the February 14, 2014 illegal dumping witnessed by the Commission’s field technician, Black Hills did nothing except interview its. driver;, it did not do any testing, it did not fire [the driver] or provide him with further training, it did not contact the Commission to discuss remediation or file a spill report, and it did not perform any remediation. Black Hills admits that other than the two meetings it had with the Commission, it had no other interaction with the agency. As testified by [Commission staff], that is unusual. Other trucking companies that have had spill incidents have been proactive and contacted the Commission to determine what steps needed to be taken to remedy the violations. The record indicates the Commission did not immediately notify Black Hills of the saltwater dumping because the Commission was actively investigating the matter and trying to identify the truck driver responsible for February 8, 2014 and March 3, 2014 incidents. As [Commission staff] testified, spill violators are difficult to catch and the claims are difficult to prove. Furthermore, it would be inappropriate for an agency to issue a formal notice of violation or complaint before finishing its investigation. [¶ 32] We conclude the Commission’s conduct did not violate basic notions of fundamental fairness. Ill [¶ 33] It is unnecessary to address other arguments raised because they either are unnecessary to the decision or are without merit. We conclude the Commission regularly pursued its authority and its findings and conclusions are sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence. Because the Commission prevailed, Black Hills is not entitled to attorney fees under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-50(1). The judgment is affirmed. [¶ 34] Carol Ronning Kapsner, S. J. William A. Neumann, S.J. Lisa Fair McEvers Gerald W. VandeWalle, C. J. [¶35] The Honorable William A. Neu-mann, S.J., sitting in place of Tufte, J., disqualified. [¶ 36] The Honorable Jon J. Jensen was not a member of the Court when this case was heard and did not participate in this decision. Surrogate Judge Carol Ronning Kapsner, sitting.