Court Opinion

ID: 9388718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 16:00:46.569134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.108725
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 21 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAMELA RAE BENNETT; JAMES DAVIS No. 21-55550
BENNETT,
                                 D.C. No. 3:19-cv-02131-WQH-
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, BLM

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
CIELO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of California
                   William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted April 20, 2023**

Before: WALLACE, D. NELSON, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Pamela Rae Bennett and James Davis Bennett appeal pro se from the district

court’s order dismissing their action alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and state law arising from the collection of their

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
homeowner’s association fees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

       The district court dismissed the Bennetts’ claims as barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. However, the state judgment that formed the basis for the

district court’s application of Rooker-Feldman had been vacated, and thus, the

doctrine did not apply. See Mothershed v. Justs. Sup. Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1

(9th Cir. 2005) (“Proceedings end for Rooker-Feldman purposes when the state

courts finally resolve the issue that the federal court plaintiff seeks to relitigate in a

federal forum . . . .”).

       The Bennetts’ federal claims were properly dismissed because the claims

alleging misrepresentations in the state court complaint were time-barred and the

remaining federal claims failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants

made any material misrepresentation in connection with their collection of the

homeowner’s association fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (establishing that a civil

action under the FDCPA may be brought “within one year from the date on which

the violation occurs”); Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360–61 (2019) (“The

FDCPA limitations period begins to run on the date the alleged FDCPA violation

actually happened,” not “on the date an alleged FDCPA violation is discovered.”);

Afewerki v. Anaya L. Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]alse but non-

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material representations are not likely to mislead the least sophisticated consumer

and therefore are not actionable under § 1692e . . . . Material false representations,

then, are those that could cause the least sophisticated debtor to suffer a

disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to the collection effort.”

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

      Because the district court previously declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction after dismissing the Bennetts’ federal claims, we hold that remand to

address Bennetts’ state law claims is unnecessary here.

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Bennetts’

motion for reconsideration because the Bennetts failed to set forth any basis to alter

or amend the judgment. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS,

Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and

grounds for reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60). Even if

the district court erred in not reconsidering the dismissal of the Bennetts’ FDCPA

claims on the basis of Rooker-Feldman, any such error was harmless because the

claims failed on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61.

      The district court properly denied the Bennetts’ motion for partial summary

judgment as moot.

      Finally, we do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and

argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time

                                           3                                     21-55550
on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      All pending motions are denied.

      AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

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