Court Opinion

ID: 9562366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:27:06.776935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:18.483322
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority holds that plaintiffs have pled and proven a violation of ORS 659.030(1)(b), and that the trial court erred when it denied damages to plaintiffs because they had not made a reasonable effort to work out their problems with defendant Klamath Pacific (KP). Accordingly, the majority remands for the trial court to consider what “equitable relief’ to which plaintiffs are entitled.
First, the majority errs by remanding. There is no reason why, on de novo review, this court can’t make that decision. Second, there are substantive reasons why the majority’s opinion is wrong. Those reasons break down into two major classifications: (1) The majority incorrectly analyzes the legal import of uncontradicted facts; (2) the majority erroneously construes the applicable statutes and their underlying policies in light of the nature of the claims made by plaintiffs. Thus, I find myself dissenting in part not because I condone Pearce and Mahoney’s behavior, but because I believe that the majority’s result is not a just result for the parties and sends the wrong legal signals to the bench and Bar.
THE FACTS
The picture painted by the majority is of two female workers who were sexually harassed by a male supervisor and a male worker over a prolonged period of time until they were forced to quit rather than endure more of the same treatment. If there is one thing that I agree with the majority about, it is that workers of either sex should not have to endure the kind of conduct in the work place perpetrated by Pearce and Mahoney to the extent that it is unwanted and unsolicited by coworkers.1 No person should have to endure that kind of uninvited harassment and abuse in any work place, including male-dominated construction sites. As the trial court found, there is evidence of sexual harassment. However, when the entire record in this case is considered, it *458is evident that this case is about more than a sexually hostile work environment. The majority’s failure to consider the “rest of the story” results in a distorted legal analysis that is painfully oblivious to the reality of what occurred in this case.
This case is also about an employer’s good faith attempt to eliminate a sexually hostile environment once it became aware of it, the plaintiffs’ disagreement with those efforts, and whether it is consistent with the policy of the law to reward plaintiffs with an award of back pay or any other equitable relief when they were unwilling to discuss their concerns further after the employer took remedial action. That means that the proper analysis must consider not only the nature of the work environment, but also what remedy is commensurate with what occurred factually. The majority attaches its label of approval on plaintiffs’ disagreement with how the employer chose to address the discrimination in the work place that allegedly led them to quit their jobs. The trial court correctly recognized what the majority has not; the bottom line of this case is that it is inequitable to award plaintiffs any relief on their ORS 659.030 claims because they walked off the job without giving the employer a chance to explain its reasons for the reinstatement of Mahoney.
There are certain uncontroverted facts in this case that when considered together make the majority’s result inequitable. The first is that, before August 10, 1989, plaintiffs had never made any complaint to Klamath Pacific (KP) about sexual harassment even though it had been ongoing allegedly for two construction seasons. The second is that there is persuasive evidence that before August 10, 1989, plaintiffs had condoned and participated in the conduct which they now claim created a sexually hostile environment. Third, none of the principals of KP was aware of any purported discrimination against plaintiffs until August 10, 1989. The fourth is that KP took remedial action as soon as it found out about plaintiffs’ complaints. The fifth is that plaintiffs never gave KP’s remedy a chance to work. These facts are important because they lend understanding to what prompted the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs were not entitled to damages on their claims based on sexual harassment.
A proper understanding of all of the facts begins with the plaintiffs. The evidentiary record does not portray them *459as easily intimidated by dominating male coworkers. In fact, the antithesis is true. It is evident that plaintiffs are assertive, confident, even combative people who functioned well in the robust environment of the construction world. While that fact does not justify uninvited sexual harassment, it is one fact to consider in assessing the credibility of plaintiffs’ claim that they were forced to quit by the way in which KP responded to their complaints. Moreover, plaintiffs were not shy about making complaints to their immediate supervisors about other work conditions before August 10. Plaintiffs worked almost two full construction seasons with Mahoney and Pearce before they quit. They drank beer with Mahoney and Pearce after work, participated in food and water fights with them, physically scuffled with them in an amiable fashion, and engaged in other activities of general camaraderie apparently considered as appropriate by all involved. On some occasions, Ballinger’s husband was present during these activities. By all accounts, plaintiffs were friends with Pearce and Mahoney even though sexual banter was an ongoing aspect of the work place. They were the “dirt crew” or as Stewart called them, his “A Team”; perhaps named after a popular television show involving male and female characters who participated in paramilitary activities.
Illustrative of the relationships among the dirt crew is this finding made by the trial court:
“18. At the end of July or early in August, 1989, Mahoney and Sutfin started a food fight in which most members of the crew participated during their lunch hour. During the food fight, Sutfin held on to Mahoney and rubbed a handful of cherries onto his shoulder. Defendant Pearce threw yogurt in Plaintiff Sutfin’s hair. A few days later Ballinger concocted an elaborate practical joke on Mahoney to get revenge for the food fight. She purchased the same brand yogurt he regularly ate, cooked a gelatin mixture to replace the yogurt, and placed it in the container along with a number of leeches which she had asked [another person] to catch on the job site. She surreptitiously replaced his yogurt with this concoction and reported the joke that morning to the other crew members and county employees. Mahoney was angry at the joke and later referred to Ballinger one time as the ‘leech tornado bitch.’ ”
*460Other findings by the trial court portray a similar sense of relationship among the crew members. On one occasion, Sutfin supplied the beer for the evening, and the dirt crew and some of their spouses engaged in the telling of adult or sexual jokes. On another occasion, Ballinger distributed pieces of candy in the shape of sexual organs to Pearce, Mahoney and Sutfin.
The overriding factual inquiry in this case is whether plaintiffs were forced to quit on August 16, 1989, to avoid future sexual harassment or whether they quit for other reasons. Before August 10, the trial court found that during 1989, Sutfin had become “dissatisfied because her vehicle incurred paint scratches when she used it to move signs. ’ ’ She believed that she should receive additional pay because of the damage to her car. Also, both plaintiffs were unhappy about their rate of compensation for moving signs and wanted to be paid more. In early August 1989, Mahoney, acting in the absence of Pearce, refused to allow plaintiffs to charge for an extra half hour for the moving of signs. As a result, both plaintiffs became angry and considerable friction had developed on the dirt crew by August 10.
The trial court tells us what happened on August 10 that triggered plaintiffs’ decision to quit:
“28. August 10, 1989, was a hot day and tempers were frazzled on the dirt crew by the end of the day. A blow-up ensued when a County inspector approached Pearce to talk about sign placement. Pearce was angry that Sutfin had gone to the County without talking to him about the signs. Sutfin believed that Mahoney had instructed her to talk to the County. Pearce and Sutfin both became angry and argued with raised voices. While they were arguing, Ballinger came up and joined the arguments. At one point, both plaintiffs called Pearce a liar. Ballinger encouraged Sutfin to leave the area because they had an appointment to meet with Stewart. Pearce cautioned the flaggers not to leave or they ‘wouldn’t be back.’ The plaintiffs left believing they had been fired.
“29. Plaintiffs did not go directly to the Klamath Pacific office. They made a stop at a local store where Ballinger bought a beer. By the time the plaintiffs reached the Klamath Pacific offices, Pearce and Mahoney had already spoken with Stewart and Pearce had told him he did not want the plaintiffs on his crew because they fought him and complained and did not want to move the signs.
*461“30. Prior to August 10,1989, Stewart had never heard of any problems or friction among the dirt crew members. He was surprised at Pearce’s report because his past experience with the crew had been such that he called the crew his ‘A’ team. Pearce had never before fired anyone. He listened to Pearce’s report and trusted Pearce’s assessment (in light of Pearce’s experience and work record), and determined to affirm Pearce’s decision to remove the plaintiffs from the dirt crew. Removal from the crew would normally mean termination of employment.
“31. Shortly after Stewart spoke to Pearce, the plaintiffs arrived at his office. Stewart was aware that one of them had been drinking, although he did not know which. Plaintiffs spoke to him in an agitated fashion, complaining about money. They said that they did not want to move signs for free, to which Stewart responded, ‘Why not?,’ a question he intended to be a joke since he did not believe they were moving signs for free. Sutfin then began complaining about moving the signs in her vehicle because it was damaging the paint job. After several minutes of complaint about money, both plaintiffs began to complain about Mahoney. Plaintiffs complained in general terms about Mahoney’s alleged sexual misconduct on the job. Initially, Stewart believed Plaintiffs were angry about losing their jobs, and were making the allegations merely to harm Mahoney. Stewart at first did not believe the allegations by Plaintiffs.
“32. In the course of the conversation, Sutfin asked Stewart if he knew what Mahoney said to [a county employee]. Stewart did not, and Sutfin repeated a comment about Mahoney sleeping with [a county employee’s] teenaged daughter. Stewart was angry about the comment. He sent both plaintiffs to pick up the radio chargers that were at Sutfin’s home. While they were gone, he telephoned [the county employee] and confirmed that Mahoney had made an offensive comment to him.
“33. After speaking to [the county employee], Stewart decided he would reinstate both plaintiffs if they were willing to accept reinstatement, and he contacted Pearce to notify him that Mahoney was terminated.
“34. When the plaintiffs returned to the office about 45 minutes later with the radio chargers, Stewart met them at the door of the office and asked if they would return to work with Pearce. He said they would not have to work with Mahoney. The plaintiffs accepted their jobs back. Sutfin questioned whether it might be uncomfortable working with *462Pearce since Mahoney was his friend. Stewart replied that he personally would run the grader if Pearce gave them any problems. Stewart also told them that they should come to him directly if they had any problems. He also stated that he did not consider moving a few signs to be a real problem, a reference to the incident that had generated the blow-up in the first place.
“35. That same evening Pearce notified Mahoney that he was terminated. Stewart told Pearce that the plaintiffs had been reinstated and directed him to stay away from them on the job.
“36. Prior to August 10, 1989, plaintiffs made no complaint whatsoever to Robert Stewart, Marilyn Stewart or James McClung [all principles or officers of KP]. They consistently reported to those persons that job conditions were fine.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the days following, plaintiffs returned to work and were supervised by Mike Voight. There is no evidence that the sexual banter that had been the daily fare of the dirt crew continued under the new supervisor. Even if a hostile work environment had existed insofar as plaintiffs were concerned, that was no longer the situation after August 10. On August 15, Mahoney met with Stewart and told Stewart that plaintiffs were complaining about conduct that they had participated in themselves. He asserted that it was unfair to fire him under those circumstances. Stewart also learned that Mahoney had apologized to the county employee. Stewart decided to reinstate Mahoney, but assigned him to work with Pearce at a work site that was five or six miles away from where plaintiffs were working and being supervised by Voight. The trial court found, “Stewart did not believe there would be any contact between the plaintiffs and Mahoney on the job due to the geographical distance and the topography of the working area.”
Mahoney returned to work. It is what happened next on August 16, 1989, that led the trial court to conclude that although plaintiffs had worked in a sexually hostile environment before August 10, they were not entitled to lost wages incurred after August 16. The trial court found:
“64. On the morning of August 16,1989, Ballinger had just arrived at the work site, but was not yet working. She saw Pearce drive by with Mahoney in his truck. No words or *463gestures were exchanged. Ballinger assumed that Mahoney had been rehired. She went to talk to Sutfin, and the two decided to leave work. Sutfin did not see Mahoney.
“65. The crew to which Mahoney had been assigned was involved in fine grading * * *. Pearce and Mahoney’s crew was following Voight’s crew (separated by a distance of five to six miles) moving in the same direction. The two crews would not have converged. Given the pace of the work, Pearce and Mahoney would have fallen even further behind Voight and the plaintiffs.
“66. Plaintiffs advised Voight they were leaving. He tried to convince them to stay on the job, or at least to talk to Robert Stewart and to give the company a chance. They responded that they would not talk to anybody and walked off the job. While Voight hoped they would return, plaintiffs left declaring they had no intent to talk to Stewart.
"* * * * *
“76. Stewart did not intend for any of the events to cause harm or injury, nor did he intend for the plaintiffs to quit their employment.
“77. Neither Defendant Klamath Pacific nor Defendant Robert Stewart intended that plaintiffs be discharged on August 16, 1989, nor did either defendant create working conditions with the intent that either plaintiff be forced to terminate her employment.” (Emphasis supplied.)
PLAINTIFFS’ LEGAL THEORIES AND THE APPLICABLE LAW
Plaintiffs’ unlawful employment practice claims are brought under ORS 659.030. ORS 659.121 provides the remedies for a violation of ORS 659.030. In 1977, the legislature enacted ORS 659.121 because the House Labor Committee was unhappy about the delay and backlog that had accrued in the handling of discrimination complaints by the Bureau of Labor and Industries, a state agency. Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Or 76, 92, 689 P2d 1292 (1984). During the consideration of the bill, a disagreement arose between the Attorney General’s office and the Bureau of Labor on the issue of remedies. The Attorney General argued that the statutory remedies for private causes of action should be consistent with federal Title VII remedies. The Labor Commissioner urged that the remedies be consistent *464with those available under the existing administrative process. As finally enacted, ORS 659.121(1) was intended to parallel federal Title VII remedies. The legislature did not intend to provide for the recovery of compensatory damages under ORS 659.030 and the relief for violations of that statute were limited to equitable relief including “back pay.” Id. at 99.
In this case, the majority on de novo review finds a violation of ORS 659.030(1)(b) and rules, “* * * [the trial court erred when it] barred recovery of lost wages on that basis [the reasonable effort requirement]” and “[o]n remand, plaintiffs may obtain equitable relief under ORS 659.121.” 135 Or App at 450. The majority makes the following errors in its analysis. (1) The majority errs in ordering a remand; (2) the majority errs in analyzing plaintiffs’ claims under ORS 659.030(1)(b); (3) the evidence does not establish a wrongful discharge under ORS 659.030(1)(a); (4) even if plaintiffs’ have demonstrated a violation of ORS 659.030-(1)(b), the trial court was correct in denying them “equitable relief.”
ORS 659.022(3) says,
“The purpose of ORS 659.010 to 659.110 * * * is to encourage the fullest utilization of available manpower by removing arbitrary standards of race, religion, color, sex, marital status, national origin or age as a barrier to employment of the inhabitants of this state; to insure human dignity of all people within this state, and protect their health, safety and morals from the consequences of intergroup hostility, tensions and practices of discrimination of any kind based on race, religion, color, sex, marital status or national origin. To accomplish this purpose the Legislative Assembly intends by [ORS 659.030] to provide:
“(1) A program of public education calculated to eliminate attitudes upon which practices of discrimination because of * * * sex are based.
“(2) An adequate remedy for persons aggrieved by certain acts of discrimination because of * * * sex * * *.
“(3) An adequate administrative machinery for the orderly resolution of complaints of discrimination through a procedure involving investigation, conference, conciliation and persuasion; to encourage the use in good faith of such machinery by all parties to a complaint of discrimination; *465and to discourage unilateral action which makes moot the outcome of final administrative or judicial determination on the merits of such a complaint.” (Emphasis supplied.)
ORS 659.121(1) provides, in part:
“Any person claiming to be aggrieved by alleged violations of* * * ORS 659.030 may file a civil suit in circuit court for injunctive relief, and the court may order such other equitable relief as may be appropriate, including but not limited to reinstatement or the hiring of employees with or without back pay * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)
ORS 659.030(1)(a) and (b) define, in part, what constitute in part “an unlawful employment practice” in Oregon. They provide, in relevant part:
“(1) * * * it is an unlawful employment practice:
“(a) For an employer, because of an individual’s * * * sex, * * * to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment such individual. * * *
“(b) For an employer, because of an individual’s * * * sex, * * * to discriminate against such individual in compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”
Subsections (a) and (b) are discrete statutes, the violation of which gives rise to the remedies under ORS 659.121(1). Subsection (a) makes a wrongful discharge an unlawful employment practice. Subsection (b) makes a hostile work environment an unlawful employment practice.
(1) The majority errs by remanding to the trial court for an award of equitable relief.
The majority’s disposition is perplexing. In their complaints, plaintiffs purport to allege violations of ORS 659.030(a) and (b) and as a result, claim entitlement to lost wages in the amount of $79,627 together with interest thereon and attorney fees. Plaintiffs do not seek equitable relief such as reinstatement of their employment or some kind of injunctive relief. In light of our de novo review of equitable claims under ORS 19.125(3), it is unclear to me what relief the majority expects the trial court to award and why with the entire record before it, the majority does not undertake to award the equitable relief to plaintiffs that it believes they deserve.
*466(2) Plaintiffs did not allege or prove claims under ORS 659.030(1)(b).
The majority’s analysis under ORS 659.030(1)(b) is erroneous because of a combination of two factors. First, plaintiffs do not seek any relief other than an award of wages for a two-year period beginning with August 16, 1989, the date that they consider to be their constructive discharge by KP. Second, the facts that they rely on as the basis for their claims demonstrate that their claims could not be under ORS 659.030(1)(b). Consequently, their claims are under ORS 659.030(1)(a) by operation of law rather than ORS 659.030-(1)(b) as the majority claims.
In their prayers for relief, plaintiffs do not seek reinstatement of their employment or a court-ordered increase in back pay for discrimination that arose out of the “terms, conditions or privileges of employment” before August 10 and during the time that they were employed. An employer’s violation of ORS 659.030(1)(a) and ORS 659.030(1)(b) could result in alternative claims for a “back pay” award for the period of time during which the employee was employed and for the period after he or she was discharged, but that is not the gist of plaintiffs’ claims. They seek only damages for lost wages for a period of time after August 16 or the day they walked off the job.
Although plaintiffs allege what they describe as “(Oregon civil rights violations under ORS chapter 659),” we do not assess the nature of legal theories based on their labels in pleadings, but on the operative facts that are pled. ORCP 18 A. Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 315 Or 57, 843 P2d 400 (1992). In the first eight paragraphs, plaintiffs describe how they were hired as traffic control persons, and the discriminatory conduct by Pearce and Mahoney that occurred before August 10, 1989. They allege that, as a result, “Klamath Pacific created a hostile and offensive working environment. ’ ’ The next three paragraphs allege the events that occurred on August 10. Thereafter, they allege specifically:
“12.
“Upon returning to the employment of Klamath Pacific on August 11, 1989, and continuing through August 16, 1989, [plaintiffs] were subjected to further harassment and a hostile work environment in one or more of the following ways:
*467* * * *
“13.
“Stewart failed to take prompt or effective remedial measures to protect [plaintiffs] from further harassment on the job at Klamath Pacific. Instead, Stewart placed [plaintiffs] back into a known hostile work environment under the supervision of Pearce.
li* ‡ ‡ ‡
“17.
“Klamath Pacific and Stewart intentionally and deliberately placed [plaintiffs] into a known hostile work environment, and all Defendants subjected [plaintiffs] to intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing [them] to terminate [their] employment with Klamath Pacific. [Plaintiffs’] forced resignation was wrongful, tortious, and retaliatory in that [plaintiffs], as [employees] of Klamath Pacific, [were] forced to resign for pursuing the important employee-related right to resist sexual discrimination in the form of harassment and discrimination by [their] supervisors.
“18.
“The above acts and omissions by Defendants amounted to discrimination against [plaintiffs] on the basis of [their] sex, and affected the terms, conditions or privileges of [their] employment with Klamath Pacific in violation of ORS 659.030(a) and (b).
“19.
“As a result of the above acts and omissions by Defendants, [plaintiffs are] entitled to recover lost wages * * *, and * * * reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred herein pursuant to ORS 659.121(1).” (Emphasis supplied.)
The two most salient allegations that express the gravamen on which plaintiffs’ claims are based are found in paragraph 12 and 17. In paragraph 12, they allege that when they returned to work on August 11 and through August 16, they were subjected to “further harassment and a hostile work environment.” In paragraph 17, they claim that they were forced to quit on August 16, because KP and Stewart “intentionally and deliberately” placed them into a known hostile work environment and that all defendants subjected them to “intolerable working conditions” with the intention *468of forcing them to terminate their employment. In other words, plaintiffs contend in their pleadings that they were forced to quit because a hostile work environment existed after KP reinstated Mahoney and that is also the gravamen of their evidence. There is no evidence that plaintiffs were sexually harassed after August 10. Having made no complaints to Stewart about sexual harassment by Pearce before August 10 and having agreed to return to work after that date, their pleadings and evidence confine the theory of their claims to the legal effect of the reinstatement of Mahoney. It was that act that triggered the quitting of their employment and their contention that they had been constructively discharged. Accordingly, their claims necessarily are under only ORS 659.030(1)(a), and they have requested no cognizable relief for a violation of ORS 659.030(1)(b).
(3) Plaintiffs are not entitled to prevail under ORS 659.030(1)(a).
In Bratcher v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 308 Or 501, 783 P2d 4 (1989), the Supreme Court set forth the elements required to prove a wrongful constructive discharge under ORS 659.030(1)(a). The court said,
“In sum, to establish a constructive discharge stemming from unacceptable working conditions, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the employer deliberately created or deliberately maintained the working conditions(s) (2) with the intention of forcing the employee to leave the employment, and (3) that the employee left the employment because of the working conditions.” 308 Or at 506.
It is apparent from the trial court’s findings and to me on de novo review that it was not the sexual banter or touching of plaintiffs by Mahoney and Pearce before August 10 that induced plaintiffs to quit. There are several circumstances that support that inference, including the fact that plaintiffs did not complain about sexual harassment until they were fired for insubordination. After all, according to plaintiffs, the discrimination had been ongoing and pervasive for two construction seasons. Second, plaintiffs made no effort to have Pearce disciplined or fired even though they claimed he had perpetuated the harassment along with Mahoney. The more reasonable inference to draw from all the evidence is that plaintiffs did not consider the conduct of *469Mahoney and Pearce to be objectionable personally until they were faced with their own dismissal for being insubordinate and argumentative with their supervisor. Moreover, there are other circumstances that lead to the same inference.
In their discussion with Stewart on August 10, the complaint about sexual harassment arose only after plaintiffs complained about the amount of wages that they were receiving and about being required to move the signs with Sutfin’s private vehicle. Specifically, the trial court found that “plaintiffs complained in general terms about Mahoney’s alleged sexual misconduct on the job.” Initially, Stewart did not believe their allegations because of the manner in which they were presented including the fact that he detected an odor of alcohol from one of the plaintiffs.2 Then at a later point, plaintiffs brought up the statement made by Mahoney about the county employee’s daughter. Stewart testified that he thought,
“their [plaintiffs’] natural reaction is going to be to tell — blame everybody but themselves. But now I got somebody I can call. I can verify this one. Okay? And maybe these girls are telling me the truth. At this point, I don’t know. Okay?”
*470Ballinger and Sutfin left the office at Stewart’s request to procure their radios and to return them. After he made a telephone call and confirmed the fact that Mahoney had made an offensive comment to a county employee, Stewart testified that “for the first time in our conversation, I’m dealing with something I know is real.” Stewart ordered Pearce to fire Mahoney. When plaintiffs came back to the office with the radios, Stewart asked them if they would like their jobs back. They said, “Well, we won’t work with Kevin [Mahoney].” Stewart replied, “You don’t have to work with Kevin. Don’t worry about that; but you’re going to work with Mike [Voight].” Stewart testified that prior to that time, plaintiffs had not complained about Pearce’s conduct. Plaintiffs readily agreed to return to work with the understanding they would still have contact with Pearce. Although the majority emphasizes that Pearce was a co-actor with Mahoney in perpetrating the alleged harassment, it is noteworthy that plaintiffs did not express concern to Stewart about further sexual discrimination from Pearce, but only that it might be “uncomfortable” working with him because he was Mahoney’s friend. Stewart assured plaintiffs that if there were any problems with Pearce, he would run the grader personally and they should come to him “directly.” Later, plaintiffs had contact with Pearce at work, but they made no complaint to Stewart. The obvious implication of these facts is that what had occurred in the past was not significant enough to plaintiffs to deter them from resuming their employment so long as they had no contact with Mahoney and the record is uncontradicted that after August 10, plaintiffs had no contact with Mahoney on the work site.
The evidence also shows that KP had eliminated any potential of a hostile work environment after August 10 by assigning plaintiffs to work at a work site six miles away from Pearce and Mahoney under a different supervisor, Voight. Moreover, there is no evidence of any sexual harassment of plaintiffs between August 10 and 16 as alleged. Although Pearce and Mahoney’s contact with Sutfin after August 10 may be actionable under other claims, those contacts were not in the nature of sexual harassment. Pearce made statements intended to induce Sutfin to withdraw her allegations of sexual harassment, and Mahoney threatened to commit *471suicide, but those actions do not constitute sexual harassment, nor are they evidence that Pearce intended to force plaintiffs to quit after Mahoney was reinstated.3 The only event that happened within the time period alleged by plaintiffs attributable to the direct actions of KP is the reinstatement of Mahoney.
There is no evidence that Stewart acted with the intent to force plaintiffs to quit when he reinstated Mahoney. The only evidence is that he thought Mahoney to have been a good employee in the past and that he desired to reemploy him in a work site apart from where plaintiffs worked. That evidence does not demonstrate that KP and Stewart intended to force plaintiffs to quit. The answer to plaintiffs’ claims under ORS 659.030 and to Ballinger’s claim of common law wrongful discharge is that tjiey did not prove what they alleged; that KP and Stewart deliberately placed them into a known hostile work environment with the intention of forcing them to terminate their employment with KP.
(4) Even if plaintiffs’ claims are considered under ORS 659.030(1)(b), they have not demonstrated an entitlement to “back pay” or other “equitable relief.”
The majority has failed to differentiate between proof of liability under ORS 659.030 and entitlement to relief under ORS 659.121 when analyzing the trial court’s decision. For the reasons mentioned, I disagree with the trial court’s conclusions about the legal import of plaintiffs’ allegations and their evidence. Nevertheless, if, in fact, a violation of ORS 659.030(1)(b) occurred before August 10 independent of a wrongful discharge and plaintiffs were discriminated against in the “terms, conditions, and privileges of their employment,” they have not demonstrated an entitlement to back pay or other equitable relief for that discrimination.
A discriminating employer is liable under Title VII when the discrimination is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victims’] employment and [to] create an abusive working environment.” Meritor Savings *472Bank v. Vinson, 477 US 57, 67, 106 S Ct 2399, 91 L Ed 2d 49 (1986). See also Mains v. II Morrow, Inc., 128 Or App 625, 877 P2d 88 (1994). Under federal law, KP would be liable if after it knew or should have known of the abusive work environment, it failed to prevent the discrimination or take prompt and corrective action against it. See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F2d 1311 (11th Cir), reh’g den 874 F2d 821 (1989). Moreover, prompt remedial action upon being notified of the discrimination relieves an employer of liability for damages. For instance, in Barrett v. Omaha National Bank, 726 F2d 424 (8th Cir 1984), the employer avoided liability when it immediately investigated claims by employees of harassing conduct and reprimanded the offenders within four days of the report, informed them that their conduct would not be tolerated, and told one harasser that he would be fired for any further misconduct. Similarly, in Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F2d 307, 309 (5th Cir 1987), the court held that the employer’s remedial action was adequate when the employer told the complainant that the sexual harasser would only work with her one and one-half more days.
Here, the majority holds that consideration of whether an employee made a reasonable effort to resolve the conflict with the employer about sexual harassment within the work place before filing a lawsuit is improper under ORS 659.030(1)(b) even though the statute was intended by the legislature to track Title VII. Moreover, the majority’s holding ignores the language of ORS 659.121. The legislature has expressly authorized courts to award only “equitable remedies” for a violation of ORS 659.030(1). An “equitable remedy” always includes a consideration of the conduct of the injured party in light of the policy of the law. For instance, the invocation of the “clean hands” doctrine as an equitable maxim is based on conscience and good faith, not necessarily as a defense, but for the protection of public policy and the integrity of the court. Taylor et ux v. Grant et al, 204 Or 10, 24, 279 P2d 1037, 281 P2d 704 (1955). In light of the language of the statute, it can hardly be said that the legislature did not intend for courts to consider the conduct of plaintiffs in deciding whether to award relief for an unlawful employment practice.
*473At the heart of the majority’s remand is the belief that the trial court erred when it cited to Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F2d 459 (9th Cir 1983), cert den 469 US 979 (1984), as a basis for denying plaintiffs back pay even though it found a violation of ORS 659.030(1)(b). In Thorne, the court noted that the primary objective of Title VII is to ‘ ‘eliminate all vestiges of discrimination in the work place and to make persons whole who have suffered unlawful discrimination.” 802 F2d at 1133 citing Albermarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 US 405, 417, 95 S Ct 2362, 45 L Ed 2d 280 (1975). It held that Title VII remedies must be exercised in light of that objective, and that back pay should be awarded only in furtherance of that purpose. It said:
“An employee faced with an obstacle in the legal progression and development of a career should not quit at the first sign of institutional discrimination. Restricting back pay awards encourages the employee to work with supervisors within the existing job setting and employment relationship in an effort to overcome resistance within that work place and to eradicate the discrimination.” 802 F2d at 1134. (Emphasis supplied.)4
See also Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F2d 360 (9th Cir 1987). The trial court did not err when it relied on the policy expressed in Thorne to deny an award of back pay to plaintiffs.
Also, the majority says that requiring an employee to make reasonable efforts to resolve the conflict within the work place to be entitled to back pay conflicts with the court’s opinion in Bratcher. The majority confuses the standard for awarding equitable relief under ORS 659.121 with the elements of liability for a wrongful discharge under ORS 659.030(1)(a).5 There is nothing in the language of ORS *474659.030 or ORS 659.121 that prevents the consideration of an employee’s conduct in determining an equitable award. Moreover, the policies described in ORS 659.022 imply to the contrary.
The majority also reasons that under the circumstances, ‘ ‘a reasonable person could have concluded that there was no use in taking further action.” 135 Or App at 450. (Emphasis in original.) Sutfin concedes that she and Bal-linger had talked to Stewart “extensively about the situation” and ‘ ‘he told us if we had a problem — more problems on the job, come and talk to him.” Voight encouraged plaintiffs to talk with Stewart before they walked off the job. Nonetheless, they refused. Perhaps when plaintiffs saw Mahoney riding in the truck, they realized that they would be confronted by his wrath from causing him to be fired. Perhaps, they were mindful of his recent threat to commit suicide as a result of his being fired. Whatever their motivation in quitting was, there is no persuasive evidence that they walked off the job because of KP’s unwillingness to confront the issue of discrimination. In light of that evidence, the trial court did not err in refusing to award equitable relief to plaintiffs.
Even if a violation of ORS 659.030(1)(b) occurred, plaintiffs have suffered no damages in the form of “back pay,” the relief sought. As a remedy under Title VII, “back pay” is computed from the date of the discrimination until the date of the final judgment. When a plaintiff seeks “back pay” as a remedy, that person has an affirmative duty to mitigate damages by exercising “reasonable diligence” in finding other “substantially equivalent” employment. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 US 219, 102 S Ct 3057, 73 L Ed 2d 721 (1982). ORS 659.121(1) further qualifies the remedy by *475providing that, “[b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years * * * prior to the filing of the civil suit.”
In this case, plaintiffs quit in August 1989, and they filed their complaints in August 1990, after they worked as flaggers for other employers. The trial court found:
“After plaintiffs left Klamath Pacific, they both worked, as flaggers in the summer of 1990. Kay Ballinger quit her employment to join her husband in Alaska. She was aware there were only limited job opportunities in Alaska and disregarded advice from her husband’s employer that she delay her move. She took a job in a pizza parlor and thereafter, ceased looking for other work. Ballinger now permanently resides in Alaska. Sutfin voluntarily quit her employment with White in 1990 and has not made any attempt to find alternative employment. Sutfin has an emotional condition which affects her employment as a flagger. She has not sought non-flagging positions since leaving employment with White.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In light of the above facts, plaintiffs have suffered no loss of back pay caused by KP’s conduct.
It was merely fortuitous that on August 16 Ballinger saw Mahoney and Pearce riding in a pickup together going to a different work site. That fortuity does not give rise to liability under either ORS 659.030(1)(a) or (b) nor was KP’s remedy inadequate when it learned of what had occurred before August 10. Finally, the trial court did not err as a matter of equity when it denied plaintiffs back pay for a period of time that they never worked. There is no relief which plaintiffs seek that is available to them under the facts of this case. Under Title VII, the federal courts seek to encourage where possible that discrimination in the work place be attacked by maintaining the existing employer-employee relationship. We should follow their policy. Eradication of discrimination in the work place has its greatest potential of success when employers and employees work together. When employees file and recover on lawsuits before they have exhausted the potential remedial action, they frustrate the purpose of statutes like ORS 659.030. The majority’s myopic analysis does just that. In effect, it holds KP strictly liable for discrimination that occurred without its *476knowledge when in fact the discrimination could have been remedied in the work place had KP been given that opportunity. In sum, the majority’s result on plaintiffs’ unlawful employment practice claims and Ballinger’s common law discharge claim is unjust.
Otherwise, I agree with the majority regarding the analysis of plaintiffs’ other assignments of error and defendants’ assignments of error on cross-appeal.

 In this case, there is no evidence that plaintiffs invited any sexual touching.

 Stewart testified,
“When they first came, they came into the office, and they were both talking at the same time, and I think probably one of them wastalkingaboutone subj ect, the other one talking about another subject; but what they were trying to tell me was that we had a problem out there with the — Kevin especially, that — his name came up a lot. But I’m dealing with two employees that just lost their jobs, and they come into my office; and this is not uncommon, when an employee is fired, to come in and blame everybody but themselves for what they did or didn’t do.
* ** * *
“Well, I was kind of staying open-minded at this point. I don’t want to jump to any conclusions, so I’m sitting back, and I’m listening. And then pretty much generally, they said a lot of things about Kevin and how he talked dirty and filthy, and this is the first I knew about this sort of thing.”
When questioned about what his understanding was of the tenor of plaintiffs’ complaints, Stewart testified that he thought that the thrust of plaintiffs’ statements were, “Ifl’mgoingto be fired,by gosh,you’re goingto fire him, too.” Stewart was asked if it was his sense that plaintiffs were complaining about specific incidents of sexual harassment directed at them. He replied,
“Well, I don’t know if it was — could be, at that time, could be considered sexual harassment. I think they were making — telling me the remarks that Kevin had said in general, not in particular.”

 Pearce’s and Mahoney’s contact with Sutfin on August 11 was unknown to and unauthorized by KP. The trial court found that Pearce made the threats on August 11 to protect his own employment, to help Mahoney and to help KP avoid liability for what had occurred previous to August 11.

 In Thorne, the plaintiff voluntarily resigned from her clerk-typist position with the City of El Segundo police department after she applied unsuccessfully for a position as a police officer with the city. The court said that the doctrine of constructive discharge was inapplicable because the city’s actions were in the nature of a refusal to hire Thorne. However, it said that had this been a constructive discharge case, it would have applied the rule of Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F2d 1380 (9th Cir 1984).

 The majority asserts that the consideration of plaintiffs’ conduct in determining what is an equitable remedy is inconsistent with the court’s rejection in Bratcher of the argument that the employee must show that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would consider the working conditions so unacceptable as to force a resignation. 135 Or App at 448. In fact, the court in Bratcher said:
*474“We emphasized above that, underlying a discharge, direct or constructive, is a dismissal stemming from the employer’s intent to be rid of a specific employee or employees. We have imposed a substantial burden of proof on the employee, requiring proof of the employer’s subjective intention. If the employee must prove that the employer deliberately created or maintained working conditions known to be unacceptable with the purpose of forcing the employee to leave, and if the employee proves that this was the actual reason why the employee did leave when otherwise the employee would have remained, it is immaterial what some other hypothetical employee would have done; on those facts, the employer will have achieved the employer’s purpose to terminate the employment relationship.” 308 Or at 506. (Footnote omitted.)