Court Opinion

ID: 9545689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:17:41.053905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:21.199568
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the opinion adopted by the majority of the court. My reasons are as follows:
The Workmen’s' Compensation Act provides that every workman subject to the Act’ while employed by *27cm employer subject to the Act is entitled to receive from the Industrial Accident Fund compensation under appropriate circumstances. (ORS 656.152). In the present action the plaintiff contends that she was injured by an employer who was not subject to the Act. There is no question but that she would be permitted to maintain such an action in the same manner as if the Act were not in existence unless the Act in some way limits her right to proceed in this manner.
The Act is drawn into consideration because the plaintiff filed a claim for compensation under it. This, on its face at least, appears to involve an inconsistent stand on the plaintiff’s part because if the assertion which she now makes is true and the defendant was her sole employer then the defendant would not have been covered by the Act and this plaintiff would not have been entitled to receive compensation from the Fund. If the Commission’s determination that the plaintiff should receive compensation was an adjudication that the Rose White Estate was the plaintiff’s employer the filing of the action in the present case could present an additional question as to the conclusiveness of the Commission’s adjudication in a subsequent separate action in the circuit court. Although, as it will presently appear, we are not required to pass on that question in view of the peculiar facts of this case, it would seem clear that since the Commission sits as a quasi-judicial tribunal in passing upon the claims presented to it, an adjudication by it that the Rose White Estate was the sole employer of the plaintiff could not be collaterally attacked by the plaintiff in a subsequent action.
But in the instant case there is nothing in the record to show either that the plaintiff sought a determination that the Rose White Estate was her *28employer or that the Commission’s award was predicated upon that assumption. The award could have been based upon one of several findings as to the employment status of the plaintiff. The Commission could have decided that the defendant was the plaintiff’s sole employer, or that the Rose White Estate was the sole employer, or that they were joint employers, or it is possible that the Commission did not decide whether the Rose White Estate or the defendant was the employer but that compensation would be payable either because the Rose White Estate was a covered employer or, if not then, bécause the defendant was an employer engaged in a hazardous occupation who was in violation of the Act.
The brief of the amicus curiae, who is an attorney for the Commission, states that the award in this case was made on precisely this last alternative basis, and, although we cannot judicially recognize it as a fact it lends support to the conclusion that the Commission’s award is not necessarily an adjudication that the defendant was not the plaintiff’s employer. There is then no legal obstacle to the adjudication by the circuit court that under these circumstances the defendant was the plaintiff’s sole employer.
However, granting this, it is still necessary to decide whether the Act requires us to hold that the filing of the claim precluded the plaintiff from pursuing a separate action against her employer.
ORS 656.152(2) is relied upon by the majority as an expression of the legislative intent that the receipt of an award “is in lieu of all claims against his employer on account of such injury or death except as otherwise specifically provided in ORS 656.002 to 656.590,” and that since no provision is made for a separate action against an uncovered employer under *29circumstances such as those in the instant case, the award is the plaintiff’s exclusive compensation.
I do not interpret OES 656.152 to call for this conclusion. As already pointed out earlier in this opinion, subsection (1) of OES 656.152 is confined to “every workman subject to [the Act] while employed by an employer subject to [the Act] * *
The plaintiff here presents facts, which if true, involve a workman who is employed by an employer who is not subject to the Act. This section does not then apply.
The majority opinion takes the position that a claimant who has accepted benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is precluded from any other remedy unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions provided for in OES 656.312, i.e., by showing that he is a workman in the employ of an employer in default or in a hazardous occupation in violation of the Act, or that he was injured as a result of the negligent conduct of a third person who was not an employer of the claimant. Kowcun v. Bybee, 182 Or 271, 186 P2d 790 (1947) is relied upon for this conclusion. I am of the opinion that the conclusion is not sound and that Kowcun v. Bybee does not support it. I understand the Kowcun case to mean that in all cases which are covered, by the Workmen’s Compensation Law the workman is limited to compensation awarded to him by the Commission, unless he can bring himself within one of the exceptions referred to. But if the defendant was plaintiff’s employer and it was engaged in a nonhazardous occupation then it was not within the Workmen’s Compensation Act and OES 656.312 does not apply.
I do not think that it is reasonable to say that because the legislature provided a separate remedy in *30the special circumstances mentioned it intended to exclude all other cases where a separate remedy was sought. If the reasoning in the majority opinion is adopted, we must assume that the legislature intended to include a case where a workman seeks a separate recovery against a third person who is not the claimant’s employer but that it intended to exclude the case where a third person happens to be the claimant’s employer engaged in a nonhazardous occupation and who elected not to come under the Act. There is no more reason for permitting a separate action where the third person is not an employer than there is where he is a noncovered employer. In both cases the third person is not covered by the Act. Certainly from the standpoint of principle there is no reason for excluding the plaintiff from a separate action where the facts are such as we have here. We can give recognition to this principle by interpreting ORS 656.312 as a recitation of the exceptions which apply in those cases where the employe is entitled to compensation under the Act.
If, under circumstances such as we have here, a workman is not entitled to a separate action after filing his claim for compensation he may be placed in a very precarious position. He cannot be certain whether he is or is not covered by the Act because he will not know who his legal employer is until the question is resolved by a legal tribunal. In the present case the claimant did not know whether the Rose White Estate or the defendant was her employer, and she filed her claim in a manner which made clear her uncertainty. If she took the risk of resolving the uncertainty upon the basis of her own, or of her attorney’s understanding of the law of master and servant she could have ended up without any recovery what*31soever. Thus, if she had filed her claim with the Commission indicating that the Rose White Estate was her employer the Commission conld find that the defendant was her employer. If thereafter, an action were brought against the defendant the jury could find that the Rose White Estate was her sole employer. The claimant would be without recovery. This is why she filed her claim in the alternative. Now we say that the cost of making such an equivocal claim is that the claimant must be limited to the award made by the Commission in the present case. Strangely enough, we would have recognized her right to proceed with a separate action against the defendant if by happenstance the defendant was engaged in a hazardous occupation. To say that the plaintiff’s right to a separate action should be based upon such a technical interpretation of ORS 656.312 is to lose sight of the legislative intent to give the workman an opportunity to bring a separate action unless the employer is covered by the Act. As stated in Newell v. Taylor et al., 212 Or 522, 531, 321 P2d 294 (1958):
“The valuable common-law right of an injured workman whose interest in the result of the prosecution of his claim is now expressly recognized in the act should not be abolished in the absence of a clear and concise expression compelling that conclusion.”
The plaintiff should be permitted to maintain an action against the defendant under the circumstances of the present case. I dissent.