Court Opinion

ID: 9679686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:02:21.410016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:18.071810
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting in part, concurring in part.
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which reverses the *146judgment of conviction because of the denial of a challenge for cause against a single juror.
It was not reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to excuse prospective juror Veech for cause because of his views on capital punishment as expressed in the pretrial examination. His candid statements would not have prevented or substantially impaired his performance as a juror in accordance with his oath. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
The juror did not serve, but Grooms argues that he was required to exercise a peremptory challenge against juror Veech when the court did not excuse him for cause.
■ The standard to determine whether a prospective juror should be excluded because of personal views on capital punishment is whether such views would prevent or impair the performance of the juror’s duties in accordance with his instructions and oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844 at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Witt, supra, clarifies the holding of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The determination of whether a juror should serve or not must be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. It cannot be reduced to a question and answer session such as the majority recites here at great length.
Bias, whether for the death penalty or against it, remains an unacceptable position for a prospective juror to possess. It is the primary responsibility of the trial judge to make such a decision. A reviewing court should be extremely cautious in substituting its evaluation of the juror for that of the trial judge. Jurors cannot be expected to invariably express themselves carefully or even consistently. Every trial judge understands this, and under our system, it is that judge who is best situated to determine the ability to serve impartially. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 at 1039, 104 S.Ct. 2885 at 2893, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984).
Juror Veech, when asked about the death penalty responded by indicating that there should be one and he felt strongly about it. However, when asked if he would consider a lesser penalty, he responded that he would. When the trial judge questioned the juror and explained each stage of the criminal trial, including the potential sentence that could be imposed, the juror indicated that he would consider “all of it.”
In view of the fact that the majority intends to reverse this case for a new trial, it is my advisory opinion that the infinitely better practice would be to permit unlimited peremptory challenges to avoid the situation that has arisen in this case. Here there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in my view.
Under all the circumstances, Grooms received a fundamentally fair trial. I would affirm both convictions.
STEPHENSON, J., joins in my dissent.