Court Opinion

ID: 9931363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 20:07:44.848365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:31.122068
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v.
Robinson, 2024-Ohio-455.]
                            COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                             :

               Plaintiff-Appellee,         :             No. 112853

               v.                          :

SHERMAN ROBINSON,                          :

               Defendant-Appellant.        :

                             JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

               JUDGMENT: REVERSED; VACATED
               RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 8, 2024

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-21-656630-A

                                     Appearances:

               Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
               Attorney, and Megan Helton, Assistant Prosecuting
               Attorney, for appellee.

               Jonathan N. Garver, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

                 Defendant-appellant, Sherman Robinson (“Robinson”), appeals his

conviction for gross sexual imposition following a jury trial. He contends that his

conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion

and violated his right of confrontation by allowing two of the state’s witnesses to

testify by Zoom and by allowing the state to play a video of a social worker’s forensic

interview of the alleged victim for the jury. Robinson further contends that the trial

court denied him due process and violated his right to a fair trial by (1) resuming

trial, in his absence, after Robinson failed to return following a court recess and (2)

making “improper comments” to the jury. For the reasons that follow, we reverse

the trial court and vacate his conviction.

Factual Background and Procedural History

               On February 26, 2021, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted

Robinson on one count of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4),

a third-degree felony. The indictment alleged that Robison had sexual contact, “to

wit: touched bottom,” with Z.H., who was not his spouse and who was less than 13

years old at the time of the sexual contact. Robinson pled not guilty to the charge.

               The case proceeded to a jury trial on June 30, 2022. Although he was

due in court at 10 a.m., Robinson (who was out on bond) did not arrive until 10:45

a.m. The trial court told Robinson, “Don’t let it happen again.”

               The trial court then proceeded with jury selection. At approximately

1:40 p.m., after the jury was empaneled and sworn, the trial court recessed for lunch.

Everyone was instructed to return to the courtroom at 2:25 p.m. Robinson left the

courtroom at the recess but never returned. Defense counsel requested that the case

be discharged and a mistrial declared, or, in the alternative, that court adjourn for
the day, stating that he would attempt to secure Robinson’s reappearance for trial

for the following day. Defense counsel argued that Crim.R. 43(A) required the

presence of the defendant “at every stage of the trial” and that he needed Robinson

to be available to assist in his defense to try the case effectively. A capias was issued

for Robinson’s arrest on July 1, 2022.

               The state requested that the trial proceed, indicating that its witnesses

had been in court since 11:00 a.m., “waiting to get started.” She argued that

Robinson’s “voluntary absence” did not prevent the trial court from “continuing the

trial to and including the verdict” under Crim.R. 43.

               The trial court denied defense counsel’s request, finding Robinson’s

absence to be “voluntary” and reasoning as follows:

           So the record shall demonstrate that, in fact, I addressed this
      Defendant and issued a warning to him about his tardiness this
      morning because I think he was at least 45 minutes late.

             He also, as I mentioned on the record earlier, was apparently
      using drugs and had to be Narcan’d before one of his court
      appearances. * * * So even after all this and my warning today, now he’s
      not here again. So it’s an absence that’s voluntary on his part. * * * It’s
      really regrettable not only for his case, but I regret, [defense counsel],
      that you have to sit there without a client.

             I know it’s not good, but there’s really nothing I can do about it.
      And the counterbalancing interest that I’m weighing is the obvious not
      only inconvenience, but repeated trauma to the alleged victims in this
      case, the mother of the daughter who have been in this court repeatedly
      and have been down here all day.

            I don’t wish to, you know, constantly put them through yet
      another trial date and yet another pretrial. You know, we’ve spent a
      considerable amount of time * * * selecting the jury. All of this would
      have to be redone. And unless he’s arrested, there’s no way to
      guarantee he’s going to cooperate at that point, so we’re going to go
      forward.

              At trial, the state presented testimony from five witnesses: Z.H., the

alleged victim; her sister, O.H.; her grandmother, Gertrude McCullum; social

worker Tanya Kraus, who formerly worked for the Cuyahoga County Division of

Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”); and Cleveland Police Detective Theresa

Cavett. McCullum and Kraus testified via Zoom.

              Z.H. and O.H. testified on the first day of trial. Z.H. testified that on

September 27, 2020, she was in her grandmother’s living room, braiding her

grandmother’s hair, while her grandmother sat in a recliner. Her sister O.H., her

younger brother, two young nephews and Robinson were also present. She stated

that Robinson, also known as “Stank,” was a man her aunt had “brought * * * in[to]

the family,” that she had known Robinson since she was little and that she referred

to him as “uncle.” She indicated that Robinson had come back from a funeral with

a beer can in his hand and was drunk.    Z.H. was shown a picture of Robinson and

identified him for the record.

              Z.H. testified as she was standing in the corner, braiding her

grandmother’s hair, Robinson sat on the floor next her and “rubbed on my leg.” Z.H.

explained that Robinson’s hand started at her feet and went “all the way up”

“stop[ping]” at “[t]he corner of my butt.” At the request of the assistant prosecuting

attorney, Z.H. showed the jury the location on her body where Robinson’s hand had

stopped, indicating with her hands that “[h]e went all the way up here to right here,”
“[r]ight here, all the way up to right here.”1 After Z.H. showed the jury where

Robinson had touched her, the assistant prosecuting attorney continued with her

direct examination of Z.H., seeking to clarify exactly where Robinson had touched

Z.H.:

        Q. * * * Did his hand touch your butt?

        A. No.

        Q. No? Where do you refer to as your butt?

        A. By my thigh.

        Q. By your thigh. Is it above your thigh?

        A. No.

        Q. Do your pants cover your butt?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Were you wearing clothes that day?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. Did his hands touch the part that covers your butt?

        A. No.

                  Z.H. testified that when Robinson touched her, she looked over at him

and saw him rub his fingers against his thumb, making a “money” sign, then place

his index finger to his lips, making a “shh” sign.

        1 There is no indication in the record what Z.H. demonstrated to the jury, e.g., no

one stated, “let the record reflect that Z.H. touched or pointed to x” or otherwise
documented for the record the location of “right here,” where Z.H. indicated Robinson’s
hand had stopped.
                Z.H. stated that she immediately moved away from Robinson and

told her grandmother what had happened, i.e., “[t]hat he rubbed on my leg.” Z.H.

explained that her mother had taught her that if someone touches her, she should

say something right away and that that is exactly what she did. She indicated that

she felt she had to speak up “[b]ecause it was right to speak when something

happens on your body that don’t supposed to happen.”

                Z.H. stated that her grandmother told Robinson to leave and called

the police. Z.H. testified that she later spoke with police and a social worker and told

them what had happened:

      Q. Okay. [Z.H.], when you were speaking with the police and the social
      worker, do you remember telling them that Sherman had rubbed your
      butt?

      A. Yes.

      Q. Yes. Okay. And when you say the bottom of your butt, are you
      referring to the part of your body that your clothes — your pants cover?

      A. Yes.

      Q. Okay. And so when we — when the jury’s deciding and listening to
      the testimony, did Sherman touch your butt?

      A. No.

      Q. No. Did he make it up that far?

      A. No.

      Q. Okay. Did you say something before he got that far?

      A. Yes.

                On cross-examination, Z.H. further testified:
      Q. * * * You told the prosecutor that your uncle did not touch your
      bottom, is that correct?

      A. Yes.

      Q. Okay. Is that true?

      A. Yes.

      Q. I know that you’ve talked to a lot of adults throughout this process
      and I know that probably all of them or most of them have told you how
      important it is to tell the truth. Is that fair? Is that correct?

      A. Yes.

      Q. And you want to tell the truth, don’t you?

      A. Yes.

      Q. You want to make sure everybody who is listening to what you had
      to say knows how it happened the way it happened, don’t you?

      A. Yes.

      Q. And do you think that you’ve done that today? Have you told the
      truth?

      A. Yes.

                At the time of the incident, Z.H. was nine years old. At the time of her

trial testimony, Z.H. was 11 years old.

                O.H., Z.H.’s 13-year-old sister, testified that on September 27, 2020,

she was sitting on the couch in her grandmother’s living room. She indicated that,

at first, Robinson was over by her, but that after Z.H. shifted from one side to the

other as she was braiding their grandmother’s hair, Robinson moved towards the

recliner and “act[ed] like he was plugging up his phone, but he wasn’t.” O.H. stated
that, at that point, her grandmother was facing away from Robinson and could not

see him or Z.H. O.H. testified that she observed Robinson gesture towards Z.H.,

making the “money” sign and the “ssh” sign, which she interpreted as him telling

Z.H. to be quiet and he would give her money. O.H. testified that her grandmother

then cursed, told Robinson to leave and called their mother.

              Robinson remained absent on the second day of trial.          Defense

counsel stated that he had “reached out to every contact number I have” but had still

“not established contact” with Robinson. Before witness testimony resumed, the

state made an oral motion to amend the indictment under Crim.R. 7(D), requesting

that the “to wit portion of the charge” be amended to state “to wit: touched bottom

and/or thigh.” (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel objected to the proposed

amendment, arguing that (1) it deprived Robinson of his due process rights “by

virtue of this evidence not having been signed off on by a Grand Jury,” (2) it would

be prejudicial given that the evidence came out after Robinson’s absence, changing

the case “significantly,” when Robinson was not present to assist in his defense and

(3) the evidence did not support an amendment because the word “thigh” was not

“used, whatsoever, in the testimony.”

              After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court indicated

that, “normally,” it would permit such an amendment but that because the

defendant was not present to assist his counsel, “who has to now continue on” at “an

extreme disadvantage,” the trial court denied the motion.
                McCullum, Kraus and Cavett testified on the second day of trial.

McCullum testified that when the incident occurred, she was in the living room of

her Cleveland apartment with Z.H., O.H., two of her young male grandchildren and

Robinson. McCullum stated that she was sitting in a recliner and that Z.H. was

standing to her right side, combing and braiding her hair. She indicated that, at

first, Robinson was on her left side. After claiming that his phone would not charge

in the outlet on her left side, Robinson then moved to another outlet on her right

side, closer to Z.H. She stated that from her vantage point she could see both Z.H.

and Robinson.       McCullum testified that, “after a while,” Z.H. “screamed,”

“[G]randma, he put his hand up my leg. He putting his hand up my leg,” then ran

“from the right to the left.” She stated that Z.H. was “panicked,” “scared” and

“upset.”

                McCullum testified that she asked Robinson, “[W]hat did you do to

my * * * granddaughter?” and that Z.H. then looked Robinson “straight in the eyes”

and told him, “[M]y mama told me if anybody touched me inappropriate to let

somebody know. My grandma right here and I done told my grandma what you was

doing to me.”

                McCullum testified that she then “put [Robinson] out of [her] house”

and called Z.H.’s mother. She indicated that when Z.H.’s mother arrived, she told

her what had happened.

                On October 13, 2020, Kraus, who was then a child protection service

worker in CCDCFS’ sex abuse unit, conducted a videotaped forensic interview of
Z.H. at the Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”).          Kraus explained that a forensic

interview is conducted in a “good environment, safe environment” and that the

interviewer (who has specialized training) asks open-ended questions to “giv[e] the

child the opportunity to say what has actually happened.” She stated that when

conducting a forensic interview, she attempts to determine whether a child may

need medical or psychological treatment as a result of the trauma they have

experienced and that she will make referrals for medical or psychological treatment

if warranted. Kraus explained her reports are shared with law enforcement and that

the interviews are characterized as “forensic” interviews because “they’re going to be

used in court.” Kraus could not recall whether she made any referrals following her

forensic interview of Z.H.

               Over defense counsel’s objection, a four-minute “clip” from Kraus’

forensic interview of Z.H. was played for the jury during Kraus’ testimony. The video

was not included in the record forwarded to this court on appeal2 and any dialogue

captured in the recording was not transcribed as part of the trial transcript.

               Cavett, a detective in the Cleveland Police Department’s sex crimes

and child abuse unit, conducted an investigation of the incident. She testified that

after she was assigned this case, she conducted a background check on Robinson,

then contacted CCDCFS, where she learned the case had been assigned to Kraus to

conduct a forensic interview of Z.H. She stated that, when investigating a case

      2 The video was not admitted as an exhibit. The only exhibit admitted into evidence

was the picture of Robinson the state showed to Z.H. and O.H.
involving a child, she does not interview the child herself but, instead, waits for the

“CAC interview” because such interviews are conducted by “trained forensic

interviewer[s]” and “putting a child through one interview versus multiple

interviews by different people is perhaps less traumatic for them.” Cavett stated that

as part of her investigation, she also brought Robinson in for an interview and spoke

with Z.H.’s mother and grandmother, who informed her that they “didn’t witness

anything.”

                The state rested, and Robinson moved for acquittal pursuant to

Crim.R. 29. The trial court denied the motion. Robinson rested without presenting

any witnesses, then renewed his Crim.R. 29 motion. Once again, the trial court

denied the motion.

                On July 1, 2022, the jury found Robinson guilty of gross sexual

imposition.

                Robinson was arrested on the outstanding capias on December 16,

2022.

                On January 4, 2023, the trial court sentenced Robinson to four years

in prison and five years of mandatory postrelease control. Robinson was also

required to register as a Tier II sexual offender/child offender.

                Robinson appealed, raising the following seven assignments of error

for review:

        Assignment of Error I: The trial court violated Appellant’s right to due
        process of law and a fair trial by resuming trial in his absence when
        Appellant failed to return on time after a noon recess.
      Assignment of Error II: The trial court violated Appellant’s right of
      confrontation by allowing prosecution witnesses to testify at trial by
      zoom.

      Assignment of Error III: The trial court abused its discretion and
      violated Appellant’s right of confrontation, by allowing the state, after
      the alleged victim had testified, to play a video of an out-of-court
      interview of the alleged victim, conducted for investigatory purposes,
      where it was undisputed that the alleged victim was 9 years [old] at the
      time of the interview; the video contained “some splicing * * * and some
      muted audio”; and where the jury was not given access to the video
      during its deliberations.

      Assignment of Error IV: The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient
      to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant engaged in sexual
      conduct by touching the alleged victim’s butt.

      Assignment of Error V: Appellant’s conviction is against the manifest
      weight of the evidence.

      Assignment of Error VI: The trial court denied Appellant due process
      of law and a fair trial and by making improper comments to the jury.

      Assignment of Error VII: The cumulative errors committed by the trial
      court violated Appellant’s right to due process of law and a fair trial.

              Because it is determinative of this appeal, we first address Robinson’s

fourth assignment of error first.

Law and Analysis

      Sufficiency of the Evidence

              In his fourth assignment of error, Robinson argues that there was

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for gross sexual imposition because

Z.H. “repeatedly testified” that Robinson “did not touch her butt” and none of the

other witnesses who were present at the time of the incident testified that Robinson
“touched Z.H.’s ‘bottom’ or buttocks.” The state responds that there was sufficient

evidence to support Robinson’s conviction — even though Z.H. “did not explicitly

state that [Robinson] touched her buttocks or butt” — because (1) during her

testimony, Z.H “described the area he touched as the ‘corner of’ her buttocks,” “an

area of the body * * * that * * * is an erogenous zone,” (2) she showed the jury where

Robinson had touched her and (3) Z.H. “disclosed the sexual assault” to her

grandmother and the social worker, Kraus. We agree with Robinson.

               A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction

requires a determination of whether the state has met its burden of production at

trial. State v. Hunter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86048, 2006-Ohio-20, ¶ 41. The

relevant inquiry in a sufficiency challenge is “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in

a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.

Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

The court examines all the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such

evidence, if believed, would convince a reasonable juror of the defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.      State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111922,

2023-Ohio-2296, ¶ 81, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997) (Cook, J., concurring); see also State v. Bankston, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 08AP-668, 2009-Ohio-754, ¶ 4 (noting that “in a sufficiency of the

evidence review, an appellate court does not engage in a determination of witness
credibility; rather, it essentially assumes the state’s witnesses testified truthfully and

determines if that testimony satisfies each element of the crime”). Whether the

evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict is a question of law. Thompkins at

386.

               Robinson was convicted of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C.

2907.05(A)(4). R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) states, in relevant part: “No person shall have

sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender * * * when * * * “[t]he

other person * * * is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender

knows the age of that person.” “Sexual contact” is “any touching of an erogenous

zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic

region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or

gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B). As indicted, Robinson was charged with

“sexual contact, ‘to wit: touched bottom,’ with Z.H.” The trial court denied the state’s

request, after the conclusion of Z.H.’s testimony, to amend the “to wit” portion of

the charge to state “to wit: touched bottom and/or thigh.”

               Thus, to support a guilty verdict for gross sexual imposition, the jury

needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Robinson engaged in sexual

contact with Z.H. by “[t]ouch[ing] [her] bottom,” (2) that Z.H. was not Robinson’s

spouse and (3) that Z.H. was less than 13 years old when the sexual conduct

occurred.    R.C. 2901.05(E) defines “reasonable doubt” and “proof beyond a

reasonable doubt” as follows:
      “Reasonable doubt” is present when the jurors, after they have carefully
      considered and compared all the evidence, cannot say they are firmly
      convinced of the truth of the charge. It is a doubt based on reason and
      common sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt, because
      everything relating to human affairs or depending on moral evidence is
      open to some possible or imaginary doubt. “Proof beyond a reasonable
      doubt” is proof of such character that an ordinary person would be
      willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of the person’s own
      affairs.

              The parties stipulated that Z.H. was not Robinson’s spouse and to her

date of birth as March 4, 2011. Accordingly, there is no dispute that Z.H. was under

13 years old at the time the alleged sexual contact occurred. The sole issue here is

whether the state presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Robinson

engaged in sexual contact with Z.H. by “[t]ouch[ing] [her] bottom.”

              In this case, although O.H. observed Robinson’s hand gestures and

McCullum testified to Z.H.’s comments and reaction after her interaction with

Robinson, they did not observe Robinson touching her. Z.H. was the only witness

who testified as to exactly where Robinson did (and did not) touch her.

              The state argues that it presented sufficient evidence to support

Robinson’s conviction based on Z.H.’s testimony that “[Robinson] touched the

corner of her buttocks after he ran his hand up her foot and leg.” However, a careful

reading of the transcript reveals that Z.H. testified that Robinson’s hand “stop[ped]”

at the corner of her buttocks, not that he “touched” the corner of her buttocks. Based

on the wording of the indictment, it was not sufficient for the state to prove that

Robinson had sexual contact with Z.H. by touching any erogenous zone. As charged,
the state needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson “touched

[Z.H.]’s bottom.”

               As detailed above, during her direct and cross-examination, Z.H.

answered many questions regarding exactly where Robinson did (and did not) touch

her. She testified repeatedly, consistently and unequivocally that Robinson never

touched her “butt,” her “bottom” or “the part [of her clothing] that covers [her] butt.”

               Although Z.H. twice demonstrated to the jury where Robinson

touched her, what Z.H. showed the jury was not documented in the record.

Accordingly, we have no way of knowing what Z.H. demonstrated to the jury.

However, immediately after her demonstration to the jury, when asked by the

assistant prosecuting attorney if Robinson had touched her “butt,” Z.H. responded

that he had not done so.

               Also, although the record reflects that Z.H. immediately told her

grandmother what had happened, there is no evidence that Z.H. told her

grandmother that Robinson touched her “butt” or “bottom.” Z.H. testified that she

told her grandmother “[t]hat he rubbed on my leg.” McCullum testified that Z.H.

screamed and told her that Robinson “put his hand up my leg.”

               Because it is not part of the record forwarded to us on appeal, we do

not know what Z.H. disclosed to, or showed, Kraus during her forensic interview

(even assuming it was properly shown to the jury). However, regardless of what

Z.H. may or may not have told or shown Kraus, the fact remains that Z.H.

repeatedly, consistently and unequivocally testified under oath at trial that
Robinson never touched her “butt” or “bottom.”          Although during her direct

examination, Z.H. acknowledged that she had previously told police and the social

worker that Robinson had “rubbed [her] butt,” upon further questioning, she made

it clear that, in fact, Robinson’s hand never made it to her “butt” because she spoke

out “before he got that far.”

               Following a thorough review of the record, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the state, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence

to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson touched Z.H.’s

bottom as charged. Accordingly, we sustain Robinson’s fourth assignment of error

and vacate his conviction for gross sexual imposition. Based on our resolution of

Robinson’s fourth assignment of error, his remaining assignments of error are moot.

               Judgment reversed; vacated.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR