Court Opinion

ID: 2964522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:56.672595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:57.336306
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1753
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                         ONE LOT OF U.S. CURRENCY ($36,634),
                                 Defendant, Appellee,
                                        _____

                               SALVATORE L. MELE, JR.,
                                      Claimant.
                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The opinion  of the court in  the above-captioned  case, issued on
        January 8, 1997, is corrected as follows:

        On the cover page, change the dollar figure in the title to "36,634"

        On the cover page, just beneath the  case caption, change "Lindsey" to
        "Lindsay"

        On page 8, line 3, insert "he" between "that" and "was"

        On page 14, line 1, replace "Degan" with "Degen"
                                     _____        _____

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1753

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                         ONE LOT OF U.S. CURRENCY ($36,634),

                                 Defendant, Appellee,
                                         ___

                               SALVATORE L. MELE, JR.,
                                      Claimant.

                                 ____________________

                       APPEAL FROM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ___________________

                                        Before

                                Cyr, Boudin, and Lynch,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   _______________

                                 ____________________

             Richard L. Hoffman,  Assistant United States Attorney, with  whom
             __________________
        Donald Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellant.
        ____________
            Terri Klug Cafazzo for claimant.
            __________________
                                 ____________________

                                   January 8, 1997
                                 ___________________

                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.   The  United States  appeals
                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            from the entry of  summary judgment against it in  its action

            to  forfeit  one lot  of  currency  totalling $36,634.    The

            currency was seized from Salvatore Mele, Jr. at Logan Airport

            in  Boston.   The district  court held  that while  there was

            adequate reason  to believe that  the money was  connected to

            some unlawful activity, there  was insufficient evidence that

            the unlawful activity involved drugs.  Accordingly, the court

            held that the currency  is not forfeitable under 21  U.S.C.  

            881(a)(6), which requires that the moneys be "in exchange for

            a  controlled  substance . . .,  proceeds  traceable  to such

            exchange . . . [or  moneys] used  or intended  to be  used to

            facilitate [a] violation of [federal drug laws] . . . ."  The

            court  reasoned that  the government  had shown  nothing more

            than that  Mele met the profile of  a drug courier, which was

            not enough.

                      Attempting to defend his victory, Mele argues  that

            certain of  the district  court's predicate rulings  were too

            favorable  to  the  government.   Contrary  to  the  district

            court's  holdings, Mele  says, he  was  detained at  Logan in

            violation of his  Fourth Amendment rights, and  so the entire

            forfeiture fails.   Alternatively, he  denies the  government

            has met its burden of  establishing probable cause to support

            the forfeiture.

                                         -2-
                                          2

                      We agree with the district court  that there was no

            Fourth  Amendment violation.   On  the forfeiture  issue, the

            evidence,   which   went   beyond  mere   profile   evidence,

            established a  sufficient  nexus  between  the  currency  and

            illegal  drug activity,  and it  provided probable  cause for

            forfeiture.    Accordingly, we  vacate  and  direct entry  of

            judgment for the government.

                                          I

                      Agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement  Agency ("DEA")

            seized the money from Mele on November 1, 1994.  Mele filed a

            motion under Fed.  R. Crim.  P. 41(e) seeking  return of  the

            money.  On March 2, 1995, the United States filed a complaint

            for forfeiture  in rem,  supported by three  affidavits which

            spelled out  the government's version of  the agents' airport

            encounter  with   Mele.    The  district   court  issued  the

            forfeiture warrant  and monition  on March 23,  and dismissed

            Mele's Rule 41(e) motion shortly thereafter.

                      Mele then filed his claim of ownership, accompanied

            by an affidavit which  asserted only that the  money belonged

            to him, that he had  kept it at his business, and that it had

            been  seized  illegally from  him.    The affidavit  did  not

            address any specific  factual allegations  about the  airport

            encounter.    Mele's  answer  to  the government's  complaint

            contained only general denials and admissions.

                                         -3-
                                          3

                      The government filed a motion  for summary judgment

            on August 14, supported by the three affidavits filed earlier

            and  one  additional  affidavit.     Mele  responded  with  a

            submission  captioned as  a "Motion  in Opposition  to United

            States'  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment,"1   which  contained

            neither a  statement of  disputed facts nor  any accompanying

            affidavit.

                      Six  months later,  on March  4, 1996,  the parties

            argued  the  summary  judgment  motions.     Mele's  attorney

            attempted for the  first time  to contradict  several of  the

            government's asserted facts, and offered to have Mele testify

            on the  spot as to  his version of  the facts.   The district

            judge declined to permit either of these efforts because Mele

            had  not properly put his version of the facts into evidence.

            He also denied counsel's oral motion for leave  to supplement

            the  record  because Mele  had  had adequate  time  to submit

            evidence.   The judge, consequently, decided  the case solely

            on  the basis of the facts in the government's affidavits and

            Mele's initial  affidavit.   Despite Mele's failure  to offer

            any  rebuttal evidence,  however, the  judge ordered  summary

            judgment in his favor.

                      Mele  has not  argued on  appeal that  the district

            court erred in denying his motion for leave to supplement the

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Although  Mele did  not file  a cross-motion  for summary
            judgment, the district court treated the case as if he did.

                                         -4-
                                          4

            record.   Such  an  argument would  fail in  any event.   The

            decision whether to allow a motion for leave falls within the

            district  court's discretion,  Manzoli  v. Commissioner,  904
                                           _______     ____________

            F.2d  101, 103  (1st Cir. 1990),  and there  was no  abuse of

            discretion here.

                      After  losing on  summary judgment,  the government

            filed a motion to reconsider, which Mele opposed.  Along with

            his  opposition,  Mele  filed  a new  affidavit  in  which he

            contested  many  of  the   facts  presented  in  the  earlier

            government affidavits.  The  district court did not expressly

            rule  on the admissibility of this new affidavit.  In denying

            the government's  motion, on the grounds  that the government

            had  failed to show probable cause to forfeit, the court made

            no reference to Mele's  proffer.  Given this and  the court's

            earlier  rulings, we  believe  the court  did  not allow  the

            affidavit.

                      Mele  has not  argued on  appeal that  the district

            court erred in refusing  to consider his late-filed affidavit

            or that it was  required to consider it.2   Such an  argument

            too would fail.  District court rulings pertaining to motions

            for  reconsideration are  reviewed for  abuse of  discretion,

            Gross v.  Summa Four, Inc.,  93 F.3d  987, 996 n.9  (1st Cir.
            _____     ________________

            1996),  and there was no abuse here.  Accordingly, on appeal,

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Nor does  he  argue  that  the  court  did  consider  the
                                                       ___
            affidavit.

                                         -5-
                                          5

            we take the facts as presented to the court before the motion

            for reconsideration and the opposition were filed.

                                          II

                      On  November 1, 1994, DEA Transportation Task Force

            Agents Peter  McCarron and  Michael Cauley were  stationed in

            Boston's  Logan  Airport.   They  were  observing  passengers

            checking  in for a 10:20 p.m. "red-eye" flight to Los Angeles

            at the America West Airlines ticket counter.  They observed a

            man, Salvatore Mele,  Jr., pay  for his ticket  with $972  in

            cash, mostly twenty dollar bills.  The man seemed nervous and

            "continuously  scanned" the  area.   He  was carrying  only a

            nylon bag, which appeared to be mostly empty, and  he did not

            check any luggage.

                      After   Mele  purchased  his   ticket,  the  agents

            approached him and asked if they could speak with him.   Mele

            agreed,  trembling  and with  a look  of  panic on  his face.

            Agent McCarron asked to  see Mele's ticket.  It was  a round-

            trip  ticket from Boston to Los Angeles, with a brief middle-

            of-the-night layover in Las Vegas on the outbound part of the

            trip.  The return trip was for four days later, on a Saturday

            night red-eye flight, America West flight 68.

                      Seeing the name "Sal  Mele" on the ticket, McCarron

            recognized Mele  as an associate  of Anthony Bucci  and Ralph

            Penta, two  men known  to McCarron as  marijuana traffickers.

            Bucci and Penta  had been  arrested six weeks  earlier, on  a

                                         -6-
                                          6

            Sunday morning in September,  at Logan Airport for possession

            of  thirty pounds  of  marijuana with  intent to  distribute.

            Penta had flown  in from  Los Angeles on  the same  overnight

            America  West flight  68 that  Mele intended  to take.   Upon

            Penta's  arrival  at  Logan  Airport, he  had  delivered  the

            marijuana to Bucci, who was waiting for him.  At his booking,

            Bucci  had said that he  lived at 500  Salem Street, Medford,

            Massachusetts  and that he  was a  business partner  of Mele.

            Penta  had told  his parole  officer that  he was  working in

            Mele's  pizza shop.  McCarron also recognized Mele as the man

            who had come that Sunday morning  to bail Penta out after the

            arrest, paying $10,000 in cash.

                      With   this   history  in   mind,   McCarron  began

            questioning  Mele about his trip.  Mele told McCarron that he

            was going to Las Vegas to visit his ex-wife and children.  He

            appeared  nervous and was sweating.  McCarron asked him if he

            was  carrying any  narcotics or  large sums  of money.   Mele

            responded  that he  was not,  but stuttered in  his response.

            McCarron repeated the question, and this  time Mele said that

            he had "some money."  When McCarron asked  him how much, Mele

            answered  "about $30,000."   McCarron  asked him  why he  was

            carrying so much money,  and Mele replied that he  planned to

            do some  gambling in Las  Vegas and look  around for  a pizza

            shop  to buy there.  McCarron had already seen Mele's ticket,

                                         -7-
                                          7

            which provided only a brief layover in Las Vegas  en route to

            Los Angeles.

                      McCarron  then asked  Mele if  he would  mind going

            with  them to the DEA's  airport field office  to discuss the

            money  further.   Mele  agreed, and  they  went to  the field

            office.  Agent Thomas G. Quin joined Mele and McCarron in the

            office  shortly after their arrival.  One of the agents asked

            Mele to  show them the money.  As Mele removed the money from

            a  fanny pack he wore around his waist, McCarron noticed four

            valium tablets in the plastic wrapper of a cigarette package.

            Mele  stated that he had been prescribed valium for his back.

            When asked why the valium was not in the prescription bottle,

            Mele said that he had brought just a few pills  for his trip.

            Quin told  Mele that  he was  going to  seize the  valium and

            summons  Mele to  court if  Mele did  not bring  evidence the

            following  day   to  prove  that  the   valium  was  properly

            prescribed.

                      The  agents then  counted the money  and questioned

            Mele more about his plans.  Mele reiterated his claim that he

            was going to Las Vegas to visit his  ex-wife and children and

            to look for  a pizza place.  He would  not provide the agents

            with  his ex-wife's  address  or with  any information  about

            hotel  reservations in Las Vegas.   When asked  the source of

            the money, Mele first said  he had gotten the money  from his

                                         -8-
                                          8

            pizza shop,  where he kept  it hidden, and  then said  it was

            from his savings and a court settlement.

                      The agents asked Mele where  he had been before his

            arrival at  the airport.  Mele stated  that a friend, whom he

            refused  to name, had driven  him to a  restaurant in Saugus,

            where  he had dinner with  his girlfriend.   After dinner, he

            had his girlfriend drive  him from the restaurant to  an Osco

            drugstore  on Salem Street in Medford and drop him off there.

            When asked  why  he had  her  drop  him off  at  the  Medford

            drugstore,  Mele replied that he  had to get  "a few things,"

            specifically,  a few packs of gum.  Mele was, however, unable

            to  produce  the gum.   Mele  stated  that after  leaving the

            drugstore, he flagged down a taxi and went to the airport.

                      Quin  knew  that  the   drugstore  in  Medford  was

            directly across the street from 500 Salem Avenue, the address

            Anthony  Bucci had given when arrested six weeks earlier.  At

            this point, Quin told Mele that his story was not believable.

            Quin  stated that he thought the money was from drug proceeds

            and  that  Mele was  going to  Los  Angeles to  purchase more

            drugs.  He informed  Mele that the money was  therefore being

            seized and he gave Mele a receipt.

                      The next day  Mele arrived at  the DEA office  with

            his  attorney.     He   was  unable  to   provide  sufficient

            documentation to show that  the valium was validly prescribed

            to him,  as Quin  had demanded.   One  of the  agents noticed

                                         -9-
                                          9

            Bucci  waiting outside in the car while Mele and his attorney

            were  in the  office.  Later  that day, the  seized money was

            placed in a bag  and, along with several other  similar bags,

            was  presented  to a  narcotics-detection  dog.   To  use the

            jargon  of the genre, the dog "alerted" to the bag containing

            the money.

                                         III

                      Mele  mounts  two  separate  attacks.    First,  he

            contends that the government's  entire case must fail because

            the  initial seizure  of the  money, as well  as much  of the

            questioning,  was  tainted  by  a  violation  of  his  Fourth

            Amendment rights.3   Alternatively, he disputes the existence

            of  probable  cause  at   the  forfeiture  stage,  which  the

            government must show in order to forfeit the money.4

                      Review here  is  de  novo  for two  reasons.    The

            district  court's grant  of summary  judgment is  reviewed de

                                
            ____________________

            3.  While  evidence seized  or gathered  in violation  of the
            Fourth  Amendment   may  not  be  relied  on   to  sustain  a
            forfeiture, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
                        _______________________    ____________
            693, 702 (1965), it is not the case that Mele's  money itself
                                                             _____ ______
            is  immune  from  forfeiture  if  it  was  unconstitutionally
            seized.  See  United States v. $7,850, 7 F.3d 1355, 1357 (8th
                     ___  _____________    ______
            Cir. 1993) ("The fact that the monies may have been illegally
            seized does  not immunize them from  forfeiture.").  However,
            evidence  obtained from  the  money --  such  as the  precise
                               ____
            amount  Mele was  carrying or  the dog  reaction --  could be
            suppressed if the seizure was unconstitutional.

            4.   Probable cause is  a term with multiple offices.   Here,
            there is no  occasion to  consider the  standard of  probable
            cause for  arrest, because  Mele's Fourth Amendment  claim is
                       ______
            resolved  on  voluntariness  grounds.    Probable  cause  for
            forfeiture is considered later.
            __________

                                         -10-
                                          10

            novo.   Wood  v.  Clemons,  89  F.3d  922  (1st  Cir.  1996).
                    ____      _______

            Additionally, the Supreme Court held last term that review by

            the  courts of appeals of conclusions as to whether there had

            been a violation of the Fourth Amendment is de novo.  Ornelas
                                                                  _______

            v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
               _____________

            A.  Fourth Amendment

                      Mele argues  that his Fourth Amendment  rights were

            violated  because the agents  brought him to  the DEA airport

            field  office  from  the  ticket  counter,  transforming  the

            initially consensual encounter  into a stop.   This stop,  he

            says,   lacked  the  reasonable   and  articulable  suspicion

            necessary  to justify it.   See generally Terry  v. Ohio, 392
                                        ___ _________ _____     ____

            U.S.  1 (1968); United States  v. McCarthy, 77  F.3d 522 (1st
                            _____________     ________

            Cir. 1996),  cert. denied,  65 U.S.L.W.  3368 (U.S.  Nov. 18,
                         ____________

            1996) (No. 95-9302). Further, he contends, the stop  became a

            de  facto arrest because of  its duration and  because of the

            nature of the place to which he was taken by the agents.  The

            probable cause necessary to  uphold an arrest, he argues,  is

            similarly lacking.

                      The government  affidavits say that Mele  went with

            the  agents to the DEA  field office voluntarily  and that he

            was not told the money would  be seized until some time after

            they  had arrived  at the  office.   Mele, on  such evidence,

            plainly  consented to going to the DEA office, and his Fourth

                                         -11-
                                          11

            Amendment arguments  are baseless.5   There are  no colorable

            Fourth  Amendment concerns where an officer simply asks a few

            questions to a civilian, who voluntarily allows the encounter

            to  continue.  See, e.g.,  Florida v. Bostick,  501 U.S. 429,
                           ___  ____   _______    _______

            434 (1991) ("The encounter  will not trigger Fourth Amendment

            scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature."); Florida v.
                                                               _______

            Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
            _________                          _______    _____

            491,  497 (1983) (plurality  opinion).   Nor is  an otherwise

            consensual encounter stripped of its consensual nature by the

            mere act  of moving to  a police office.   See, e.g.,  United
                                                       ___  ____   ______

            States v. Mendenhall, 446  U.S. 544, 557-58 (1980) (plurality
            ______    __________

            opinion); United  States v.  Jodoin, 672  F.2d 232,  234 (1st
                      ______________     ______

            Cir. 1982).

                      The agents did not  violate Mele's Fourth Amendment

            rights during their Logan Airport encounter with him.  Mele's

            money was lawfully seized, and thus the forfeiture proceeding

            that followed  was not tainted  by unconstitutional  conduct.

            The  dispositive  issue  with  respect  to  the  government's

                                
            ____________________

            5.  The  voluntariness  of  Mele's  verbal consent  might  be
            called into question if  the agents had seized his  money, or
            told him they intended to seize  it, prior to his agreeing to
            accompany them to the DEA field office.  Cf. United States v.
                                                     ___ _____________
            $83,900, 774 F. Supp. 1305, 1317 (D. Kan. 1991) ("The seizure
            _______
            of  the  currency  by   [the  officer]  and  [the  officer's]
            expressed intention  to keep the currency  until its legality
            could  be  determined were  objective  reasons  rendering the
            encounter nonconsensual  from that  point on.   No reasonable
            person would voluntarily leave such a large sum of money with
            a law enforcement officer  with the promise that it  would be
            returned later if it  all checked out.").  This  issue is not
            presented here.

                                         -12-
                                          12

            forfeiture case,  then, is  whether there was  probable cause

            for forfeiture.

            B.  Probable Cause for Forfeiture

                      The district court  correctly found that  there was

            probable cause to believe that Mele was involved in some kind

            of illegal activity, but erred in finding that the government

            had  failed  to  establish  a sufficient  nexus  between  his

            suspicious  activity and  the illegal  drug trade,  which the

            forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C.   881, requires.

                      In civil forfeiture cases brought by the government

            under    881, U.S. Customs procedures  control the allocation

            of  the  parties'  burdens  of  proof.  21  U.S.C.     881(d)

            (incorporating by reference U.S.  Customs procedures).  Those

            procedures employ a burden shifting mechanism.  See 19 U.S.C.
                                                            ___

              1615; United States v. $5,644,540, 799 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th
                    _____________    __________

            Cir. 1986).  Under this mechanism, the government must at the

            outset demonstrate  that it  has probable cause  to institute

            the forfeiture  proceeding.  United States v. 255 Broadway, 9
                                         _____________    ____________

            F.3d 1000, 1003-04 (1st  Cir. 1993).  More  specifically, the

            government  must show that  it has probable  cause to believe

            "that the  property had  the requisite  nexus to  a specified

            illegal purpose."  United States v. $68,000, 927  F.2d 30, 32
                               _____________    _______

            (1st  Cir. 1991).6    When the  government  seeks to  forfeit

                                
            ____________________

            6.  This circuit has most recently described the government's
            burden as being one  of showing a "nexus."   See $68,000, 927
                                                         ___ _______
            F.2d  at  32.   Earlier  cases  used  the  term  "substantial

                                         -13-
                                          13

            money, the nexus can be shown by demonstrating probable cause

            to  believe either that the money represented the proceeds of

            a drug sale, see 255 Broadway, 9 F.3d at 1004, or that it was
                         ___ ____________

            intended  to be used in  the purchase of  drugs, see $68,000,
                                                             ___ _______

            927 F.2d at 32.   The government need not trace the  money to

            any particular  drug transaction.   255 Broadway,  9 F.3d  at
                                                ____________

            1004; United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 38  (1st
                  _____________    _______________

            Cir. 1990); United States v. $250,000, 808  F.2d 895, 899-900
                        _____________    ________

            (1st  Cir. 1987).   Once  the government  has made  the nexus

            showing,  the burden then shifts to the claimant to show by a

            preponderance  of  the  evidence  that the  property  is  not

            subject  to  forfeiture.    255 Broadway,  9  F.3d  at  1004;
                                        ____________

            $68,000, 927 F.2d at 32; $250,000, 808 F.2d at 897; cf. Degen
            _______                  ________                   ___ _____

            v.  United  States,  116  S.  Ct.  1777,  1781  (1996)  ("The
                ______________

            Government has shown probable  cause to forfeit the property,

            and [claimant] must refute the showing or suffer its loss.").

                      Burden   shifting   aside,   probable   cause   for

            forfeiture may be measured by what the government knew at the

            time of  the institution  of the forfeiture  proceedings, not

                                
            ____________________

            connection."  United States v. 28 Emery  St., 914 F.2d 1, 3-4
                          _____________    _____________
            (1st Cir. 1990) (citing cases).  We need not resolve whether,
            as  some cases  suggest,  "nexus" means  something less  than
            "substantial  connection."   Cf. United  States v.  West Side
                                         ___ ______________     _________
            Building  Corp., 58  F.3d  1181, 1188  n.13  (7th Cir.  1995)
            _______________
            (comparing the two standards and endorsing "nexus" standard);
            United States v. Daccarett,  6 F.3d 37, 55-56 (2d  Cir. 1993)
            _____________    _________
            (same), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 and 510 U.S. 1192 (1994).
                    ____________                ___
            The  facts adduced here are more than adequate to establish a
            "substantial connection." 

                                         -14-
                                          14

            just what it knew at the time of the seizure.   255 Broadway,
                                                            ____________

            9 F.3d at 1004; United States v. $191,910, 16 F.3d 1051, 1066
                            _____________    ________

            (9th  Cir. 1994); United States v. $12,390, 956 F.2d 801, 806
                              _____________    _______

            n.5 (8th Cir. 1992).

                      Probable cause for the  purpose of   881 forfeiture

            means  a "reasonable ground" for believing  that the money is

            connected with  illegal drug  transactions.  255  Broadway, 9
                                                         _____________

            F.3d at 1004; 28 Emery St., 914 F.3d at 3; $250,000, 808 F.2d
                          ____________                 ________

            at 897.  This  standard requires more than "mere  suspicion,"

            but less than "prima  facie proof."  255 Broadway,  9 F.3d at
                                                 ____________

            1004; 28 Emery St., 914 F.3d at 3; $250,000, 808 F.2d at 897.
                  ____________                 ________

            And "'[b]ecause there  are so many variables  in the probable

            cause equation,  probable cause  findings are  not invariably

            bound  by precedent.'"  255 Broadway, 9 F.3d at 1004 (quoting
                                    ____________

            United  States v. Maguire, 918 F.2d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 1990),
            ______________    _______

            cert. denied, 499 U.S. 950 and 501 U.S. 1234 (1991)).
            ____________               ___

                      The evidence  shows the government  met its  burden

            for establishing a nexus to drug activity:

                      (1) Mele  is associated  with two persons  known to

            the  agents  as  accused   drug  traffickers,  Bucci  (Mele's

            business  partner)  and  Penta  (Mele's  employee).    Mele's

            nonsensically roundabout route to Logan Airport the night his

            money  was seized -- from Saugus, via Medford, to East Boston

            -- indicated  that he probably  stopped at  Bucci's house  en

                                         -15-
                                          15

            route.7   Further,  Bucci accompanied  Mele and  his attorney

            when  they returned to the DEA field office the morning after

            the seizure.   And Mele  had bailed out  Penta after  Penta's

            earlier arrest for drug trafficking;

                      (2) Mele was carrying $36,634 in cash;

                      (3)  He  purchased a  cash  ticket  on a  "red-eye"

            flight to a  "source city"  and traveled with  only a  nearly

            empty carry-on bag;

                      (4) He appeared to be very nervous as he bought his

            ticket, and became even  more nervous when questioned  by the

            agents,  to  whom he  gave  evasive,  implausible, and  false

            answers as to what he planned to do on his trip;

                      (5)   Mele's  associate  Penta  had  recently  been

            apprehended at  Logan Airport after arriving  with drugs from

            the same city  on the same  flight on which Mele  intended to

            return; and

                      (6) A trained narcotics-detection dog  "alerted" to

            Mele's money the day  after the money was seized,  indicating

            that the money had come into contact with illegal drugs.

                      The  government aptly  likens probable  cause to  a

            wall,  each of whose bricks represents a piece of evidence in

            the overall  probable cause  equation.  Courts  "'review each

            piece of evidence only to  determine whether it is probative,

                                
            ____________________

            7.  A  traveler taking  a  normal route  from  Saugus to  the
            airport, which is southeast of Saugus, would not pass through
                                   ____
            Medford, which is southwest of Saugus.
                                   ____

                                         -16-
                                          16

            not whether it  establishes probable cause standing  alone.'"

            255  Broadway,  9 F.3d  at  1004  (quoting  United States  v.
            _____________                               _____________

            $67,220, 957 F.2d 280, 285 (6th  Cir. 1992)).  Even where "no
            _______

            particular   circumstance  is   conclusive,"   it   is   "the

            'aggregate' of  the facts" that  is examined.   $250,000, 808
                                                            ________

            F.2d at  899 (quoting United  States v. $93,685.61,  730 F.2d
                                  ______________    __________

            571,  572 (9th Cir.), cert.  denied, Willis v. United States,
                                  _____________  ______    _____________

            469 U.S. 831  (1984)).   Mele attacks each  brick alone,  but

            fails  effectively  to attack  the  wall  of probable  cause.

            Taken as a whole, the facts here are more than adequate.

                      We  start  with Mele's  ties  to  Bucci and  Penta.

            Association  with  known  criminals,  without  more,  is,  of

            course, not  enough to establish probable cause.   See United
                                                               ___ ______

            States  v. Coggins, 986 F.2d  651, 655 (3d  Cir. 1993) ("Mere
            ______     _______

            association  with a  known criminal  cannot on  its own  be a

            basis  for  a  'reasonable  suspicion.'"  (citing  Ybarra  v.
                                                               ______

            Illinois, 444  U.S.  85, 91  (1979))); 2  LaFave, Search  and
            ________                                          ___________

            Seizure,    3.6(c), at 308  n. 100 (3d  ed. 1996).   But here
            _______

            there are additional facts that deepen the probative value of

            Mele's association  with the  accused drug  traffickers Bucci

            and Penta:  Mele's  strange route to the airport;  Mele's and

            Penta's nearly identical itineraries; Bucci's appearance with

            Mele at the DEA office; and Mele's bailing out  of Penta with

            a large  sum of cash  when banks were  closed.  This  is more

            than  "an incidental or fortuitous connection," United States
                                                            _____________

                                         -17-
                                          17

            v. 1933 Commonwealth Avenue,  913 F.2d 1, 3 (1st  Cir. 1990),
               ________________________

            to known drug trafficking activity.

                      Mele was  also carrying  an extremely large  sum of

            cash.8   See United States v. $37,780,  920 F.2d 159, 163 (2d
                     ___ _____________    _______

            Cir. 1990) ("Hernandez was carrying an extremely large sum of

            cash [$37,780] in small  denominations, demonstrating that he

            was  either  inordinately  carefree  with his  money  or  was

            involved in illegal  activity."); United States v.  $175,260,
                                              _____________     ________

            741 F.  Supp 45,  47 (E.D.N.Y.  1990)  (carrying $175,000  in

            airport contributes to probable cause for forfeiture  because

            that is far more than the average person carries).  Given the

            other  facts here, it is  not fatal to  the government's case

            that Mele was not carrying drugs or drug paraphernalia at the

            time the  money was seized  from him.   See United  States v.
                                                    ___ ______________

            $215,300,  882 F.2d  417,  419 (9th  Cir. 1989)  ("Carrying a
            ________

            large  sum of cash is  'strong evidence' of  [a connection to

            illegal drug activity] even without the presence  of drugs or

            drug  paraphernalia." (quoting  United States  v. $83,310.78,
                                            _____________     __________

            851 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 1988))), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
                                                   ____________

            1005 (1990).

                      Indeed, Mele's behavior at the airport only deepens

            the  probable cause.     See  generally  2 LaFave,  supra,   
                                     ___  _________             _____

                                
            ____________________

            8.  Contrary to  the government's argument, however, there is
            little  significance  in  the   fact  that  Mele's  cash  was
            "concealed," i.e., that  it he  carried it in  a fanny  pack.
            Few people  carry money,  especially large sums,  in any  way
            other than "concealed."

                                         -18-
                                          18

            3.6(e), at 327-33 (false, evasive, or misleading responses to

            officers' questions  can contribute  to probable cause).   In

            particular,  his claims  that he  intended to  gamble in  Las

            Vegas and look for a pizza shop to buy there made no sense in

            light  of the  fact that  his ticket  provided only  a brief,

            middle-of-the-night  layover in  that  Nevada city.   As  the

            Second Circuit  has rightly  observed, an  "evasive, confused

            explanation  for carrying such  a large  sum" serves  only to

            "further arouse[] . . . suspicion[]."   $37,780, 920  F.2d at
                                                    _______

            163.9

                      Mele's obvious nervousness, evident both before the

            agents approached him and  during the interview, although not

                                
            ____________________

            9.  We  do  not, however,  agree  with  the Second  Circuit's
            suggestion that  "[i]t may well be that through the byzantine
            world  of  forfeiture law,  [C]ongress  and  the courts  have
            implicitly   created  a   rebuttable  presumption   that  the
            possession of large  amounts of  cash is per  se evidence  of
            illegal activity."  $37,780, 920 F.2d at 162.
                                _______
                As  for  Mele's cash  purchase  of the  ticket,  this has
            limited probative value.   But see United  States v. Sokolow,
                                       ___ ___ ______________    _______
            490  U.S. 1, 8-9  (1989) ("Most  business travelers,  we feel
            confident, purchase  airline tickets by credit  card or check
            so as to have a record  for tax or business purposes, and few
            vacationers  carry  with them  thousands  of  dollars in  $20
            bills.").  The designation  by the government of  Los Angeles
            as  a "known  source city"  for narcotics  is also  of little
            importance.  See United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1017
                         ___ _____________    ______
            (2d  Cir.  1992) (Oakes,  C.J.,  dissenting)  ("As cases  too
            numerous  to  cite  have  pointed out,  'source  cities,'  as
            testified to  by law enforcement officers,  include virtually
            every city in the  United States of any size. . . .   'Source
            city' is essentially a meaningless term.").
                Like the factors discounted by  the Supreme Court in Reid
                                                                     ____
            v. Georgia, 448  U.S. 438  (1980), these two  factors do  not
               _______
            meaningfully "relate[]  to [Mele's] particular  conduct," and
            they are also evident in "a very large category of presumably
            innocent travelers."  Id at 441.
                                  __

                                         -19-
                                          19

            alone of much probative value, see Jones v. DEA, 819 F. Supp.
                                           ___ _____    ___

            698, 702  (M.D. Tenn.  1993) (noting that  air travelers  are

            "often  nervous about  their trip  and the  dangers, real  or

            imagined, which air  travel poses to  them"), does have  some

            probative value when seen in combination with the rest of the

            story.  See 2 LaFave, supra,   3.6(f), at 327-33 & n.160.
                    ___           _____

                      Finally, the dog's reaction, indicating that Mele's

            money  had at some  point come  into contact  with narcotics,

            weighs some, but not a great  deal, on the scale.  See United
                                                               ___ ______

            States  v.  $30,060,  39  F.3d  1039, 1042  (9th  Cir.  1994)
            ______      _______

            (declining   to   find   probable   cause   where  government

            essentially based entire case on dog reaction).  "Even though

            widespread  contamination of  currency  plainly  lessens  the

            impact of  dog sniff  evidence, a  trained dog's  alert still

            retains some probative  value.  Ordinary experience  suggests

            that currency used  to purchase narcotics is more likely than

            other currency to have come into contact with drugs."  United
                                                                   ______

            States  v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 777 (1st Cir. 1995), cert.
            ______     _________                                    _____

            denied, 116 S. Ct. 1322 (1996).
            ______

                      Thus,  both Mele's  conduct  and  the money  itself

            provide  probable   cause  for   the  government   to  obtain

            forfeiture of the money.

                      The judgment  of the district court  is vacated and
                                                              _______

            the case is remanded with instructions to enter  judgment for
                        ________

            the United States.

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                                          20