Court Opinion

ID: 9538115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:30:50.06154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:31.316236
License: Public Domain

DONALDSON, Justice.
The facts of the present case are undisputed. The testator Ira D. Kerlee died on September 11, 1974 at 6:50 p.m. Margaret Fogg, testator’s sister and the primary beneficiary under the will, died on September 14, 1974 at 8:55 p.m., approximately 74 hours after the death of her brother. The testator named the Children’s Home Finding and Aid Society as the conditional beneficiary of his estate. If Margaret Fogg did not survive the testator, the estate would go to the Children’s Home Finding and Aid Society, hereinafter referred to as the North Idaho Children’s Home.
Both parties agree that if it were not for I.C. § 15-2-601, the testator’s estate would have passed immediately upon his death to the primary beneficiary, Margaret Fogg, because she actually survived the testator. Idaho Code § 15-2-601 provides as follows :
“A devisee who does not survive the testator by one hundred twenty (120) hours is treated as if he predeceased the testator, unless the will of the decedent contains some language explicitly dealing with simultaneous deaths or deaths in a common disaster, or requiring that the devisee survive the testator or survive the testator for a stated period in order to take under the will.” (emphasis added)
The critical issue on appeal is whether the 120 hour survivorship requirement of I.C. § 15-2-601 applies. The district court concluded that I.C. § 15-2-601 required as a matter of law that Margaret Fogg survive the decedent by 120 hours in order to take under his will. Since Margaret Fogg failed to satisfy the 120 hour survivorship requirement, the court held that the decedent’s estate passed to the North Idaho Children’s Home. George W. Fogg, hereinafter referred to as appellant, is the husband and sole surviving heir of Margaret Fogg. He appeals the decision of the district court.
Appellant argues that I.C. § 15-2-601 allows the testator’s will to supersede the statutory survivorship requirements in certain designated circumstances, one of which is when the will contains explicit language requiring only that the “devisee survive the testator” in order to take. Clause 3 of the decedent’s will is the relevant portion of the will. It reads as follows :
“I hereby give, devise, and bequeath all my property and estate whatsoever nature and kind, and wheresoever situated to my sister, Margaret Fogg, whose present address is 10017 — 3rd Ave. S.W., Seattle, Washington 98146.
“If my sister above-named, does not survive me, then I give, devise, and bequeath all my property and estate to the Children’s Home Finding and Aid Society of Lewiston, Idaho, commonly known as the North Idaho Children’s Home which is situated at 1720 — 18th Avenue, Lewiston, Idaho.” (emphasis added)
Appellant contends that Clause 3 of the testator’s will contains explicit language allowing Margaret Fogg to inherit by merely surviving the decedent in that it provides that “if my sister above-named does not survive me” then the contingent beneficiary should take. The converse of that statement is that Margaret Fogg is to take if she does survive the testator.
We agree with appellant that such language falls under a statutory exception to the 120 hour survivorship requirement. The will effectively states that all Margaret Fogg had to do in order to take under the will was to survive the testator. Having done so, Margaret Fogg became entitled to inherit even though she did not survive for 120 hours.
*7Counsel for North Idaho Children’s Home argues that the reference to survival was merely a condition or limitation on North Idaho Children’s Home’s rights under the will and is in no way a condition upon the rights of the primary beneficiary under the will. The testamentary gift to Margaret Fogg under this line of reasoning was absolute. There was no qualifying language conditioning the gift on her surviving the testator, so the 120 hour survivorship requirement would apply. We cannot acquiesce in such a strained construction.
The statute in question provides that the 120 hour survivorship requirement will apply “unless the will of the decedent contains some language dealing explicitly * * * requiring that the devisee survive the testator ... in order to take under the will.” (emphasis added) The statute looks to the entire will, not a particular paragraph.
Similarly, case law provides that a testator’s intent is to be gathered from the entire document, not just one particular paragraph. Wilson v. Linder, 18 Idaho 438, 110 P. 274 (1910). The effect of the conditional beneficiary clause is to allow Margaret Fogg to take under the will merely by surviving the decedent. The Court finds that this is sufficiently explicit to supersede the 120 hour survivorship requirement.
Respondent cites authority from the State of Ohio for the proposition that in order to render inapplicable the statutory requirement that a devisee or legatee survive the testator for a stated period of time in order to take under the will, the will must “specifically” or in “unmistakeable language” state that the devisee or legatee is entitled to take under the testator’s will even though he fails to meet the statutory survivorship requirement. Alten v. Barnecut, 168 N.E.2d 9 (Ohio 1959). This court is not persuaded by the Ohio authority. Although the Ohio statute contains a survivorship clause, the statutory language of the Ohio statute differs materially from that of I.C. § 15-2-601. Section 2105.21, Revised Code of Ohio, in relevant part reads as follows:
“ * * * When the surviving spouse or other heir at law, legatee or devisee dies within thirty days after the death of the decedent, the estate of such decedent shall pass and descend as though he had survived such surviving spouse, or other heir at law, legatee or devisee * * * . This section shall not apply in the case of wills wherein provision has been made for distribution of property different from the provisions of this section. In such case such provision of the will shall not prevail over the right of election of the surviving spouse.” (emphasis added)
In interpreting the Ohio statute, the Ohio Court of Appeals focused on the specific language of the statute:
“Now in order that the last paragraph of Section 2105.21, Revised Code, above quoted comes into being and operation, the will must say specifically or in unmistakeable language that the devisee or legatee shall take under the will even though he or she does not survive the testator for a period of thirty days. That is the meaning of different from the provisions of this section ’ ” 168 N.E.2d at 11. (emphasis added)
Idaho Code § 15 — 3—601 does not contain language that mandates such specificity. Accordingly, we do not demand it. Judgment reversed. Costs to appellant.
McFADDEN, C. J., and SHEPARD and BAKES, JJ., concur.