Court Opinion

ID: 9492814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:51:13.765731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:30.557589
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I agree with the majority that the district court’s construction of “disposal” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) is overly expansive, the majority’s interpretation is too narrow. The majority limits “disposal” to “spills occurring by human intervention.” Ante at 705. This language seemingly restricts “disposal” to occasions where property owners release toxic substances themselves, or actively participate in exacerbating existing spills. The result is to potentially provide unjustified cover for spectator polluters, who are aware of past and ongoing toxic releases, yet do nothing to remedy them. Accordingly, I construe “disposal” under § 9601(35)(A) to encompass spills produced by human agency, including those precipitated by willful neglect. This construction conveys the “active” component of “disposal,” yet still provides room for actions that are not affirmatively interventionist, but sufficiently assertive to fall outside the bounds of the CERCLA defense regime. I concur in the court’s judgment and in all other aspects of Judge Boggs’ opinion.