Court Opinion

ID: 9632687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:21:51.484732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:21.274147
License: Public Domain

WOLFF, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe Alis Ben (Joe) Johns was deprived of a fair trial with respect to his self-defense theory, I would grant him a new trial and, accordingly, I dissent from the principal opinion’s upholding of the finding of guilt.
*119The Trial Court Erred on Self Defense
Johns raises two issues of trial court error regarding his claim of self-defense. The first issue is the trial court’s refusal to allow evidence of the shooting victim’s reputation for violence or aggressiveness when drinking. The second issue asserts trial court error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the defense argument that Johns and Tedder were being chased by the shooting victim, Thomas Stewart. As I believe the trial court erred in its rulings on both issues, I would grant Johns a new trial.
Stewart’s Reputation for Violence
After his arrest, Johns made a statement to Deputy Robin Peppinger of the Pulaski County sheriffs department. Johns said that on the date of the shooting, October 1, 1996, he was with Deborah Tedder, the girlfriend of the man he later shot, Thomas Stewart, for several hours. Stewart confronted Johns and Tedder, and then Stewart and Tedder argued. Later that night, Stewart saw Tedder and Johns together again. Johns said that Stewart chased them and that the chase ended on Highway KK. On the blacktop of Highway KK, another fight occurred between Stewart and Tedder. Johns said that Stewart smashed the windows of Tedder’s car and that Stewart hit Tedder. When Johns attempted to help Tedder, Stewart knocked Johns to the pavement and said something to the effect of, “That’s my old lady ... stay out of it.”1 Then — though it is not clear from Deputy Peppinger’s brief interview2 with Johns as to when he received the gun from Tedder — Johns said that he received the gun used to shoot Stewart while inside Tedder’s car. Johns said that a shot may have gone off while in the car and that he shot Stewart one time in the heart in self-defense. Johns also said that Stewart was standing in front of Tedder’s car when he shot Stewart and that Johns shot Stewart because he was reaching into his pocket. Johns said that he was drunk at the time of the shooting and that Stewart was intoxicated. Johns fled the scene with Tedder.
An analysis of Stewart’s blood alcohol content indicated that he was intoxicated, with a blood alcohol reading of 0.265, over two-and-a-half times the level of intoxication recognized for driving while intoxicated. Section 577.012.3
At trial, Johns did not testify on his own behalf. His defense counsel did, however, attempt to introduce evidence of Stewart’s reputation for violence in the defense cross-examination of Deputy Peppinger. After the trial court sustained an objection as to Stewart’s reputation for fighting when drinking, defense counsel made an offer of proof, through the testimony of Deputy Peppinger, out of the presence of the jury.
On offer of proof, Deputy Peppinger testified that he knew Stewart before participating in the investigation of this incident, that he knew a number of different people whose names came up in the investigation, and that he had lived in the area for quite some time. Furthermore, Deputy Pepping-er had reports of Stewart’s reputation for violence or aggressiveness and noted that he was known to fight when drinking. In Peppinger’s words, “he [Stewart] was known to fight when drinking, sir.” Deputy Peppinger testified that he knew this from both law enforcement officers as well as civilians. During the offer. of proof, Deputy Peppinger also testified that Johns said he, in fact, knew Thomas Stewart for approximately seven months. Additionally, Deputy Peppinger testified that he knew Johns “ran around in the same crowd with Stewart.”
*120In defense counsel’s cross-examination of Deputy Peppinger — which precipitated the offer of proof regarding Stewart’s reputation for violence while drinking — -Deputy Peppinger testified that he had lived in the area for a long time and that he was familiar with quite a few of the people involved in the case. Specifically this included, among others, Alis “Joe” Johns, Deborah Tedder, and Thomas Stewart. Deputy Peppinger testified that all of the people hung around in the same crowd and frequented an area known as Madden Ford, which he described as a “hang-out” and party location for drinking. Counsel then asked about Stewart’s reputation for drinking. The court, however, sustained the prosecutor’s relevancy objection as to Stewart’s reputation.
The prosecutor’s objection to the offer of proof was sustained on the grounds that it was irrelevant, because defense counsel had not shown that Johns was aware of Stewart’s reputation for violence when drinking.
Where self-defense is an issue, competent evidence may be produced that shows the deceased possessed a reputation as a violent person. State v. Harden, 823 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Mo.App.1991) (citation omitted); see also William A. Schroeder, Missouri Practice-Missouri Evidence, sec. 404.3(b) (2d ed.1999). A defendant, however, must put forth evidence that he was aware of the decedent’s reputation for violence, or the defendant “must show that he was aware of the specific act or acts of violence.” State v. Waller, 816 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Mo. banc 1991). This can be done by the defendant testifying that he or she knew of the deceased’s reputation for violence. But this principle has never1 required that the defendant personally testify to such knowledge.
While Johns did not personally testify that he knew of Stewart’s reputation for violence when drinking, there was a reasonable inference that Johns had such knowledge because, as Peppinger testified, Johns frequently drank with Stewart over a seven-month period. Moreover, Johns knew that Stewart claimed Tedder as his girlfriend; Stewart had confronted Johns and Tedder earlier that evening; and Johns knew that Stewart was drunk. Contrary to the state’s argument, this inference is not a huge leap. That Johns knew of Stewart’s reputation for fighting when drinking is a rational inference that the jury should have been free to make or not to make based on the evidence in this case.4
Defense Counsel’s Closing Argument
On the self-defense issue, the trial court erred in sustaining the state’s objection to the defense argument that Johns was being chased by Stewart. First, there was evidence to support the defense argument. Second, Johns was prejudiced by the court sustaining the objection because it sent the jury a message that there was no chase. Moreover, the subsequent argument by the defense counsel did not cure or overcome the prejudice.
Defense counsel “has the right to make any argument to the jury that is essential to the defense of the accused and is justified by evidence and the reasonable inferences that might be drawn therefrom.” State v. Barton, 936 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Mo. banc 1996). “It is an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to preclude any such argument.” Id. (emphasis added). As in State v. Barton, it is our job to examine the closing argument attempted by defense counsel to determine if it was warranted by the evidence. Id. The argument and objection are as follows:
[Defense Counsel]: Don’t know-maybe-could have been-not sure. Those are all words from the State’s Prosecutor in their closing statement, and that’s what *121this case is about. This case can be summed up this way-on a dark night on a windy highway, when someone has chased you down-and I submit to you there is evidence that that was a possibility. (Emphasis added.)
[Prosecutor]: Objection, Your Honor. There is no evidence in this case of that chase. (Emphasis added.)
[The Court]: Sustained.
Here, it is clear that the state’s own witness, Deputy Peppinger, testified that, according to Johns, when Stewart confronted Johns and Tedder the second time, “a vehicle chase ensued.”5 And Deputy Peppinger reiterated that a “chase” occurred in defense counsel’s cross-examination of him.6 The evidence was that Stewart chased Johns and Tedder in his truck on Highway KK. When they stopped, Stewart broke out the windows on Ted-der’s car and knocked Johns to the ground. Thus, clearly there was evidence of a chase. And when the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection, the jury was in effect told that there was no chase.
The state contends that the prosecutor’s objection occurred because the prosecutor thought that Johns’ attorney was talking about a foot chase. Perhaps the trial court was under the same impression when it sustained the objection. In any event, it is irrelevant what their impression was, because the evidence supported the argument that there was indeed a chase.
The state also contends that there was no prejudice to Johns for this apparent mistake over whether a chase occurred, because Johns was still permitted to argue to the jury about his statement to the police on the subject of Stewart chasing Johns and Tedder in a truck, forcing them to stop, and the facts of the case that were consistent with Johns’ statement. The portion of defense counsel’s final argument that the state says cures the prejudice is as follows:
Mr. Johns said in his statement that the State introduced as evidence that Mr. Stewart was behind them and made them stop and the car was parked at that angle. The question is-if someone who-on a dark highway like that, is it unreasonable to be afraid of serious physical injury to yourself or someone else with you-or death? Is that unreasonable? Was it unreasonable of the people out there to think that some harm might come to them? Maybe they would get ran off the road. Maybe Mr. Stewart would do something like Mr. Johns said-breaking windows. There’s evidence to support that.
What the State has done is they’ve presented you a scenario where you could come up with a hundred different possible things that could happen on the physical evidence that has been presented to you. They want you to make-take the evidence and make inferences from that evidence, which you are absolutely allowed to do. But they only want you to make one possible inference.
Despite the state’s claim that Johns’ counsel was able to cure any possible prejudice due to this follow-up statement, Johns’ counsel was clearly not able effectively to argue that Stewart “chased them down.” To the contrary, the jury heard from both the prosecution and the judge *122that a “chase” did not happen. Instead the jury received a much softer version-that “Mr. Stewart was behind them and made them stop and the car was parked at that angle.” This is not the equivalent of being “chased down.” Worse yet, this all occurred at the beginning of John’s counsel’s closing argument, which might have left an even stronger impression in the jurors’ minds that a chase did not occur.
In summary, Johns was precluded from introducing evidence that was critical to his self-defense theory, and his counsel’s argument to the jury was contradicted by the trial court’s ruling as to the fact of a chase. The error occurred, and it was certainly prejudicial. Accordingly, I would grant a new trial and, thus, dissent from the principal opinion.

. Deputy Peppinger did not recall the exact quotes used by Johns here, but agreed with defense counsel that the wording was "something to ... [this] effect.”

. Deputy Peppinger characterized his interview of Johns as being brief. Further, he agreed that it was not a "complete” interview, and in fact the interview was ended because Johns required some form of medical attention.

.Unless otherwise noted, all references are to RSMo 1994.

. It should also be noted that this offer of proof was “extracted” during the cross-examination of one of the state’s witnesses, and there is a less exacting requirement for such offers of proof. State v. Joiner, 823 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Mo.App.1991). This requirement is less exacting because defense counsel cannot be certain how the adverse witness will respond.

. Under direct examination by the state, Deputy Peppinger testified that Johns “had been with Ms. Tedder for several hours and made contact somewhere throughout the evening with Mr. Stewart and a vehicle chase ensued thereafter, sir.” (Emphasis added.)

. The colloquy between Johns’ defense counsel and Deputy Peppinger is as follows:
[Defense Counsel]: And that Debbie Tedder didn’t stop her vehicle when Mr. Stewart wanted her to.
[Peppinger]: Right, sir.
[Defense Counsel]: And they had a chase down the back roads in Pulaski County.
[Peppinger]: Yes, sir.
[Defense Counsel]: And at a point, Mr. Stewart pulled his car in front of their [Johns’ and Tedder’s] car and essentially made them stop.
[Peppinger]: Yes, sir.