Court Opinion

ID: 9351784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-03 18:01:32.72262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:51.463492
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/3/23 P. v. Harvest CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 2d Crim. No. B320179
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. SB196743)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Santa Barbara County)

 v.

 DWAYNE DIENELL
 HARVEST,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      Dwayne Dienell Harvest appeals from the postjudgment
order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code section 1170.95 (renumbered as section 1172.6 without
substantive change).1 We affirm.
      In 1993, Harvest was found guilty in a court trial of
residential burglary of the home of Jane Doe (§ 459), assaulting
her with intent to commit rape (§ 220), and attempted murder of
her son, Joseph M. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)). The court found true

         1   Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                    1
enhancements that he personally used a deadly weapon (a knife)
in the attempted murder and burglary (§ 12022, subd. (b)), and
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Joseph M. during the
attempted murder with the intent to inflict such injury
(§ 12022.7).
       Harvest was sentenced to life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole for the attempted murder, plus one year for
the use of a deadly weapon and three years for inflicting great
bodily injury. He received a consecutive determinate sentence of
six years for assault with intent to commit rape, plus five years
for a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court
stayed a six-year sentence for residential burglary pursuant to
section 654. We affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v.
Dwayne Dienell Harvest (Nov. 23, 1994, B077842) [nonpub.
opn.].)
       In January 2022, Harvest filed a petition for resentencing
(§ 1172.6). The court appointed the public defender to represent
him. After a hearing, the court denied the petition. The court
found that Harvest did not make a prima facie case for relief
because he was the sole defendant in the case, he personally used
a knife in the commission of the crime, and there is no indication
the conviction was based on the now-invalid theory of natural
and probable consequences.
       We appointed counsel to represent Harvest in this appeal.
After examining the record, counsel filed an opening brief that
raises no arguable issues. (People v. Serrano (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 496, 503.) Harvest filed a supplemental brief in
which he raises several issues.
       Because this appeal is from an order denying
postconviction relief rather than a first appeal of right from a

                                 2
criminal conviction, Harvest is not entitled to independent review
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. (People v.
Delgadillo (Dec. 19, 2022, S266305) ___ Cal.5th ___ [2022 Cal.
LEXIS 7654 at *20-21] (Delgadillo).) We nevertheless evaluate
the arguments raised in Harvest’s supplemental brief. (Id. at p.
__ [2022 Cal. LEXIS 7654 at *21].) We conclude they do not raise
any arguable issue on appeal.
       Harvest contends there was no proof he intended to kill
Joseph M. We disagree. Section 1172.6 “was enacted ‘to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 967.) At the hearing, the court properly considered
the record of conviction. (Id. at pp. 970-972.) It showed that
Harvest was charged with attempting to murder Joseph M.
“willfully, unlawfully, and with a malice aforethought.” By
convicting Harvest of that offense, the court impliedly found he
had the intent to kill Joseph M. (People v. Bland (2002) 28
Cal.4th 313, 327.)
       The record refuted Harvest’s claim that the conviction
might have been based on a theory of natural and probable
consequences. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The
record established that Harvest was ineligible for relief as a
matter of law because he was the actual attempted killer and
acted with intent to kill. (Id. at p. 966; Delgadillo, supra, ___
Cal.5th at p. ___ [2022 Cal. LEXIS 7654 at *24] [“Delgadillo is not
entitled to any relief under section 1172.6” because he “was the
actual killer and the only participant in the killing”].) Harvest

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failed to meet his burden to establish a prima facie case for relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       Contrary to Harvest’s claim, this is not a case of
transferred intent. “To be guilty of attempted murder, the
defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone
else.” (People v. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 328.) Nothing in
the record supports a scenario where Harvest intended to kill
Jane Doe by stabbing Joseph M.
       Harvest also contends the court improperly relied on the
appellate decision from the direct appeal and the probation
report. The trial court’s ruling stated that it relied on the
appellate decision only for its procedural history and conclusions
of law. This complies with the law. (People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 988.) The record does not show that the trial
court relied on the probation report.
       Harvest contends the public defender’s office had a conflict
of interest because they previously represented the victim, and a
conflict attorney was appointed to represent Harvest at trial.
The record before us does not include this information. There
was no objection to appointment of the public defender in the
section 1172.6 proceedings. If a continuing conflict existed,
Harvest has not shown he was prejudiced by it. (People v.
Carrillo (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1039-1041; see People v.
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972-974 [failure to appoint
counsel before prima facie determination harmless].)

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                        DISPOSITION
     The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             YEGAN, J.

                               5
                     Monica Marlow, Judge
  (Retired Judge of the Shasta Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief
       Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
           Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

               ______________________________

    Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.