Court Opinion

ID: 9626182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:04:39.281194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:22.706482
License: Public Domain

Reed, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the result only because we are bound to follow State v. Striker, 87 Wn.2d 870, 557 P.2d 847 (1976). I am confident the changes in CrR 3.3 were intended to start speedy trial time periods from arraignment. I cannot say convincingly that they have done so, however, in light of Striker's reading of CrR 3.3 in conjunction with CrR 2.2, 4.1 and unadopted ABA standards.
I confess I always have had difficulty with the concept that delay between filing an information and defendant's arrest in some way harms the defendant or society and must result in dismissal with prejudice. Our speedy trial rules are tough enough on the prosecution as it is, without making them more so.
In my view a defendant should be made to prove actual prejudice from any delay before dismissal is considered. In the real world, it is nearly always the defendant who seeks to delay his day of judgment.
Some strictures on the prosecuting attorney are called for, but none so drastic as prescribed by Striker and its progeny.