Court Opinion

ID: 9906503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 11:23:36.524964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:34.684878
License: Public Domain

In the
             Court of Appeals
     Second Appellate District of Texas
              at Fort Worth
           ___________________________

                No. 02-19-00069-CR
           ___________________________

    JEFFREY DWAYNE BLANKENSHIP, Appellant

                           V.

                THE STATE OF TEXAS

         On Appeal from the 271st District Court
                  Jack County, Texas
                 Trial Court No. 4839

     Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion on Remand by Chief Justice Sudderth
                  MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND

      Appellant Jeffrey Blankenship appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery.

See Texas Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a). On appeal, Blankenship argues in two issues

that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred

by denying his motion for directed verdict. We will affirm.

                             I. Procedural Background

      After the briefs were filed in this appeal, Blankenship entered into a plea

bargain with the State to which he pleaded guilty to nonaggravated robbery. The trial

court issued a new judgment, and—on Blankenship’s request— we dismissed his

appeal. Blankenship v. State, No. 02-19-00069, 2020 WL 1057322, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Blankenship later filed an application for postconviction habeas relief in the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals. That court held that the postconviction plea bargain was

void, and it reformed the trial court’s judgment to reinstate the aggravated robbery

conviction. Ex parte Blankenship, No. WR-93,001-01, 2023 WL 2670554, at *1 (Tex.

Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2023) (not designated for publication). The Court of Criminal

Appeals further reinstated Blankenship’s appeal as of February 21, 2020, when both

Blankenship’s and the State’s briefs had been filed. Id. On May 1, 2023, we reinstated

Blankenship’s appeal of his conviction for aggravated robbery. Although given an

opportunity to file supplemental briefing, Blankenship’s counsel informed this court

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that no additional briefing would be filed. Therefore, we will address the issues in

Blankenship’s brief filed on November 5, 2019.

                             II. Factual Background

        Blankenship testified that he drove Damien Hooten to Shakeel Ahmed’s

property to help Hooten with a fencing job. Ahmed, who was 68 years-old at the

time of trial, testified that when the men knocked on his door, Hooten stated that he

was the nephew of Ahmed’s neighbor, and they just wanted to stop by and say hello.

Ahmed invited them in for a beer. Once inside the home, Hooten related that he

knew Ahmed’s nephew, Faraz Anwar (Fugi), and that Hooten had helped Fugi

remove some guns from Ahmed’s home while Ahmed was out of town.1

        At some point, Hooten went outside to smoke, and when he returned, Ahmed

heard a “click” that he recognized as a handgun “dry firing” on an empty chamber.

As Ahmed turned toward Hooten, Hooten chambered another round. According to

Ahmed, during this episode, Blankenship remained focused on Ahmed, “cover[ing]”

him and preparing to “pounce” if he made a move. Hooten ordered Ahmed to stand

up, put his hands up, and walk toward the sofa. Ahmed complied. As Ahmed walked

to the sofa, he asked Blankenship if he was “a part of all this.” According to Ahmed,

Blankenship replied “yes”; according to Blankenship, he did not answer. At trial,

Blankenship did admit, however, that at the very least, he did not answer “no” to the

        Ahmed testified that he collects guns and that Fugi knew where he kept his
        1

guns.

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question. Ahmed believed that Blankenship was definitely “in on the whole gun

thing.”

      After Hooten demanded all of Ahmed’s guns, Ahmed offered to give him his

guns but asked that Hooten not hurt him. Hooten kept his gun pointed at Ahmed as

he and Blankenship escorted Ahmed to the room where he kept his guns. Along the

way, Hooten told Blankenship to grab Ahmed’s phone. According to Ahmed, not

only did Blankenship take his phone but he also took $1,900 in cash from Ahmed’s

wallet that was sitting next to his phone. At some point along the way, Ahmed

managed to get to the back door, open it, and take off running. Although Hooten

shot at him several times, Ahmed was able to get to his ATV and drive to an area

where he called 911 to report the incident.

      Certain aspects of Blankenship’s testimony were consistent with Ahmed’s.

However, Blankenship claimed that he knew nothing about Fugi and Hooten having

taken guns from Ahmed’s home prior to that day. Blankenship also testified that he

was unaware that Hooten had brought a gun with him, but he agreed that after

Hooten returned inside from smoking, he pointed a gun at Ahmed and told Ahmed

to get up and put his hands up. Blankenship also testified that he did not want to be

involved and that he contemplated leaving. After Ahmed escaped and took off

running, Blankenship claimed that he left Hooten behind, got into his pickup, drove

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away, but then hit a big ditch that disabled his pickup.2 At that point Blankenship

claims he fled on foot, and when he finally reached an area that had cell service, he

sent text messages to his friends asking for help.

      The State introduced as evidence Blankenship’s phone records, and portions of

those text messages were read to the jury. Included in the phone records were text

messages between Blankenship and some of his friends.               In the messages,

Blankenship texted that he was “f - - ked” and that he was going to prison for the rest

of his life. In those messages, Blankenship also stated that he needed an attorney and

that he had $1,100.3 And although Blankenship testified at trial that he did not know

Fugi, his phone records revealed that Blankenship also tried to call Fugi after the

robbery and that Fugi would not talk to him.

                          III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

      Blankenship argues in his first issue that the evidence is insufficient to support

his conviction. In his second issue, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion for directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support the

required mens rea. Because a motion for directed verdict is essentially an evidentiary-

      2
       Blankenship’s pickup was recovered on Ahmed’s property.
      3
       Blankenship’s niece testified that it was not normal for Blankenship to have
that much money.

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sufficiency challenge, we will analyze both issues together. See Madden v. State, 799

S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

A. Standard of Review

      In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and

substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we

determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the cumulative

force of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514

S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review

must not engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative

force of all the evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any

conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution.

Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608.

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B. Applicable Law

       A person commits the offense of aggravated robbery if he (1) unlawfully

appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of the property, (2) and with

intent to obtain or maintain control over the property, he intentionally or knowingly

threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and (3) either

causes serious bodily injury to another, uses or exhibits a deadly weapon, or causes

bodily injury to another person or threatens or places another in fear of imminent

bodily injury or death, if the person is 65 years of age or older. Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§§ 29.02(a), 29.03(a), 31.03(a).

       A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of

another if “acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he

solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the

offense.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02(a). Section 7.02(b) provides:

       If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony,
       another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators
       are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to
       commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful
       purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the
       carrying out of the conspiracy.

Id. at 7.02(b).

                                   IV. Discussion

       Blankenship argues that there is no evidence he intended to commit a felony,

because Hooten, not Blankenship, was the primary actor in the offense. But the jury

                                          7
was authorized to convict Blankenship of aggravated robbery if they found that

Hooten committed the offense and that Blankenship acted as a party to it.

      Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to

show that Blankenship acted with intent to assist Hooten in the commission of

aggravated robbery. The record shows that Hooten and Fugi had previously taken

guns from Ahmed and that Hooten was there to get the remaining guns. And

although Blankenship claimed that he did not know Fugi, there was cell phone

evidence to the contrary.

      The jury heard Ahmed’s testimony that Blankenship aided Hooten by

providing “cover” to prevent Ahmed from moving and by standing between Ahmed

and the front door and thus blocking Ahmed’s escape. And, according to Ahmed,

when asked if he was “a part of all this,” Blankenship replied “yes.” Finally, Ahmed

testified that Blankenship took his phone and his money. Although Blankenship

disputed Ahmed’s testimony, the factfinder judged the credibility of the evidence and

was not obliged to believe him. Martin, 635 S.W.3d at 679. Therefore, we hold that

the evidence is sufficient to support Blankenship’s conviction for aggravated robbery.

We overrule Blankenship’s first and second issues.

                                  V. Conclusion

      Having overruled Blankenship’s two issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                          8
                                   /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                   Bonnie Sudderth
                                   Chief Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: November 30, 2023

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