Court Opinion

ID: 9586492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:12:05.644549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:29.556549
License: Public Domain

Grice, Justice,
concurring specially. I agree with all that is stated in Divisions 1, 2, and 4. I also agree with the result, but I reach it by a different route.
I have no disagreement with the authorities cited by the majority. None of these involves actions by charitable trust beneficiaries seeking to enforce performance by the trustees of the purpose of the trust.
I disagree with what is stated in Division 3 as to no charitable trust being present here. Such a trust is apparent for several reasons. In view of the importance and possible consequences of this decision upon the law of charitable trusts, I deem it necessary to elaborate somewhat.
The petition for charter of Atlanta Baptist College, Inc., *70clearly manifests a charitable intent or purpose. It alleges, in material part, that the corporation "will be an educational, eleemosynary and religious institution with no capital stock and will not be conducted for pecuniary gain or profit to anyone, but its purpose will be to provide, promote and extend under Christian influence and under Baptist auspices, instruction and education in the arts, sciences and humanities, including theology and the professions, and to encourage and promote research and study in all branches of learning.”
Our Code also recognizes this. Code § 108-203 provides that "every educational purpose” is a subject of charity for equity jurisdiction. Code Ann. § 22-5503 declares that corporations created pursuant to Chapter 22-55 (which includes colleges and universities) "are authorized to act in their corporate capacity as trustees to administer and carry into effect any charitable trust. . .”
The authorities agree that no particular form of words or conduct is necessary to show the intent to create a charitable trust; that one may be created without using the words "trust” or "trustee”; and that the principles and rules governing charitable trusts apply equally to charitable corporations. See in this connection, 15 AmJur2d 11, Charities, § 5; 14 CJS 410, Charities, § 1; Restatement of the Law of Trusts 2d 210, 215, §§ 348, 351 (b); 3 Encyclopedia of Georgia Law 614, Charities, § 2.
In view of the uncertainty as to the identities of beneficiaries of charitable trusts, it is often difficult to determine whether alleged beneficiaries have the capacity to sue for the enforcement of the trusts. However, this court has been lenient in allowing this type of action.
For example, in Harris v. Brown, 124 Ga. 310 (52 SE 610, 2 LRA (NS) 828), where a trust had been set up for the erection and maintenance of a school and for a place of worship for the members of a named church, this court stated: "To authorize the plaintiff to enforce such a trust by proceedings in equity, she must have some pecuniary interest in it or show that she is a beneficiary who may attend *71the school herself or send members of her family to it, or in some way avail herself of its educational advantages . . .” (Emphasis supplied). Also, in Dominy v. Stanley, 162 Ga. 211 (133 SE 245), the patrons of a school erect ed and maintained by a charitable trust were recognized as having standing to sue to protect the trust property from sale or diversion.
From the foregoing, it seems clear that the plaintiff and his class are beneficiaries of a charitable trust.
However, for this type of action by beneficiaries of a charitable trust, the General Assembly, since the decisions in the Harris (124 Ga. 310), Dominy (162 Ga. 211) and other such cases, has authorized and directed that the Attorney General, or appropriate district attorney, shall represent their interests instead of allowing them to file suits to redress what they claim are wrongs of this nature.
In this connection, Code Ann. § 108-212 (Ga. L. 1952, p. 121; as amended, Ga. L. 1962, p. 527) provides, insofar as essential here, as follows: "In all cases in which the rights of beneficiaries under a charitable trust shall be involved, the Attorney General of the State of Georgia shall, in his official capacity, or the [district attorney] of the circuit wherein the major portion of trust res lies, represent the interest of such persons and the interests of the State of Georgia as parens patriae in all legal matters pertaining to the administration and disposition of such trusts; and, in this capacity, he may sue or be sued . . . Any judgment determining rights under any charitable trusts shall be binding on the beneficiaries when the Attorney General or the [district attorney] of the circuit wherein- the major portion of trust res lies is a party and is served as herein provided.” (Emphasis supplied).
A number of states have enacted similar statutes. Some have not, but rely upon the common law for the same result. See as to this subject: 15 AmJur2d 125 et seq., Charities, §§ 119, 120, 126, 128; 14 CJS 524, Charities, §§ 62 (b), 528, 586; IV Scott on Trusts (2d Ed.) 2753, § 391 et seq; Bogert on Trusts (2d Ed.) §411 et seq; Anno. 62 ALR 881; *72Anno. 124 ALR 1237.
This Georgia statute (Code Ann. § 108-212) is broad in scope, declaring that in all such cases the Attorney General or district attorney shall act. It is applicable to the class alleged to exist here, the plaintiff and 107 others. They constitute a substantial group of present students, as well as countless other persons who may enroll in the college in the future. Hence, this is not the situation of a "special interest” group, composed of a few students, to which this type statute does not apply, according to some of the foregoing authorities.
Furthermore, this Georgia statute, as we construe it, vests in the Attorney General or the district attorney, as the case may be, sole and exclusive power and duty to represent. There is no mention of any joint or subordinate representation with any other person or persons. Significantly, this statute says that the Attorney General or district attorney shall represent the named interests "as parens patriae.” The authorities cited above show that in early English history the King acted as parens patriae for the protection of the interest of beneficiaries of charitable trusts and that it was later that this responsibility was placed upon the English Attorney General, or other legal official. That this function was originally in the King, a sovereign, is indicative that formerly he alone possessed and exercised it, and the reference in our Georgia statute to "parens patriae” clearly manifests its sole and exclusive character.
A quotation from Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (2d Ed.) §411, p. 324, is fitting here. "The purpose of vesting in some public official like the Attorney General the exclusive power to begin proceedings to enforce charitable trusts is obvious. The persons affected by such trusts are usually some or all of the members of a large shifting class of the public. If any member of this class who deemed himself qualified might begin suit, the trustee would frequently be subjected to unreasonable and vexatious litigation. Often no given individual can prove that he will necessarily benefit from the charity. All may be prospective or possible gain*73ers, but no one a certain recipient of aid. In ultimate analysis it is the public at large which benefits, and not merely the individuals directly assisted. Obviously, there is good reason for vesting in a single authority the discretion and power incident to the enforcement of such trusts, rather than in leaving the matter to the numerous, changing, and uncertain members of the group directly to be aided.”
In view of this power and duty being solely and exclusively in the Attorney General, or district attorney, by virtue of our Georgia statute, it follows that the suit here was brought contrary to law and for this reason alone cannot be maintained. Therefore, the complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted, and was properly dismissed upon the motions of the defendants.
A different result is not required by Code Ann. § 81A-117. That section provides, among other matters, that "no action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ... joinder or substitution of the real party in interest . . .” That provision is not applicable here. In this situation, the real party in interest is not the Attorney General or district attorney, but the class of beneficiaries, which is required by Code Ann. § 108-212, supra, to be represented by the Attorney General or district attorney alone.
Except for the foregoing as to charitable trust and the right of action, I concur in the rulings of all other divisions of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Justice Undercofler and Justice Felton join me in this concurring opinion.