Court Opinion

ID: 9889843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 17:10:40.085248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:01.442729
License: Public Domain

J-S25012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID RILEY                                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2166 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 15, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0007669-2017

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID RILEY                                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2167 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 15, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0007670-2017

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                            FILED OCTOBER 11, 2023

       Appellant David Riley appeals from the order denying his timely first

Post-Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition without a hearing.         Appellant

argues that prior PCRA counsel was ineffective for filing a deficient

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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Turner/Finley2 letter and failing to address additional claims that Appellant

raised in his pro se PCRA petition. We vacate the PCRA court’s order and

remand for further proceedings.

       Briefly, Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and related

offenses in 2018. On August 24, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to

an aggregated term of ten to twenty years’ incarceration followed by five

years’ probation. This Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction on appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Riley, 265 EDA 2019, 2021 WL 223534 (Pa. Super. filed

Jan. 22, 2021) (unpublished mem.).

       On August 4, 2021, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The

PCRA court subsequently appointed Douglas L. Dolfman (prior PCRA counsel),

who filed a Turner/Finley letter concluding that Appellant was not entitled to

PCRA relief. On July 19, 2022, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice

of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. The PCRA court

issued an order dismissing Appellant’s petition on August 15, 2022.

       Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal at both trial court docket

numbers.3 Thereafter, the PCRA court issued an order removing prior PCRA

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

3 We note that Appellant was still represented by prior PCRA counsel when he

filed his notices of appeal. However, this Court has held that because the
filing of a notice of appeal protects a petitioner’s constitutional right to an
appeal, such a pro se filing from a litigant who is represented by counsel does
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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counsel and appointing William A. Love, Esq. (current counsel) for purposes

of appeal.    Appellant subsequently filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P 1925(b)

statement, and the PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

       On appeal, Appellant raises three claims, which we have reordered as

follows:

       1. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for filing a Finley letter in the
          situation where defense counsel allowed a hearsay
          identification of police officer Jason Troccoli to be read into the
          record at the preliminary hearing without requiring the
          presence of the police officer?

       2. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for filing a Finley letter in the
          situation where the Commonwealth at trial brought up “drugs
          and paraphernalia” in its closing argument when no such items
          were found on [Appellant’s] person or in his residence and no
          limiting instruction was issued by the trial court and this issue
          was not raised on appeal?

       3. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for failing to investigate
          [Appellant’s] claim that exculpatory videotape evidence was
          withheld by the Commonwealth?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.

____________________________________________

not offend the considerations of hybrid representation. See Commonwealth
v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Additionally, Appellant complied with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d
969 (Pa. 2018) by filing separate notices of appeal at each docket number,
each containing both trial court docket numbers with one number specifically
marked on each notice of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236
A.3d 1141, 1148, (Pa. Super. 2020) (approving the filing of separate but
identical notices of appeal as compliant with the dictates of Walker).

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       In all three of his claims, Appellant argues that prior PCRA counsel was

ineffective for filing a Turner/Finley letter and failing to litigate additional

claims that Appellant raised in his pro se PCRA petition.4              Specifically,

Appellant argues that prior PCRA counsel failed to address whether trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge a hearsay identification at the

preliminary hearing or object to comments during the Commonwealth’s

closing argument.       Id. at 18-25.      Additionally, Appellant argues that prior

PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Appellant’s claim

concerning exculpatory video evidence withheld by the Commonwealth or

address the merits of that issue. Id. at 12-18. Therefore, Appellant concludes

that prior PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley letter was deficient as a matter of

law. Id. at 25.

       Our review of the denial of PCRA relief is limited to “whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s

decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).           “[W]e apply a de novo standard of

review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell,

105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

4 We note that although Appellant raised his ineffectiveness claims for the first

time in his Rule 1925(b) statement, our Supreme Court has held that PCRA
petitioners may “raise claims of ineffective PCRA counsel at the first
opportunity, even if on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381,
405 (Pa. 2021).

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      It is well-established that a petitioner has a rule-based right to counsel

in litigating a first PCRA petition which must be honored even when the claims

appear on their face to lack merit. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C); Commonwealth v.

Cherry, 155 A.3d 1080, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2017). Appointed counsel has a

duty to either amend the pro se petition and litigate the claims on the merits

or seek to withdraw by complying with the mandates of Turner/Finley. Id.

at 1083. “If appointed counsel fails to take either of these steps, our courts

have not hesitated to find that the petition was effectively uncounseled.” Id.

      We have previously set forth counsel’s obligations in filing a no-merit

letter under Turner/Finley as follows:

      The no-merit letter must set forth: 1) the nature and extent of
      counsel’s review of the case; 2) each issue that the petitioner
      wishes to raise on appeal; and 3) counsel’s explanation of why
      each of those issues is meritless. Where PCRA counsel’s no-merit
      letter does not discuss all of the issues that the convicted
      defendant has raised in a first PCRA petition and explain why they
      lack merit, it does not satisfy these mandatory requirements and
      dismissal of the PCRA petition without requiring counsel to file an
      amended PCRA petition or a further, adequate no-merit letter is a
      deprivation of the right to counsel on the PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 206 A.3d 1135, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted).

      Finally, this Court has noted that “a PCRA court’s independent review of

the record is no substitute for the right to counsel in litigating a first PCRA

petition.” Commonwealth v. LeClair, 137 WDA 2022, 2022 WL 10225177

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at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 18, 2022) (unpublished mem.).5 Indeed, “a PCRA

court cannot act as counsel to a petitioner, and competent counsel advancing

the petitioner’s interests may reframe or identify new issues that were not

articulated in legally adequate terms by a pro se litigant.” Id.

       Here, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition raising multiple claims

including, but not limited to, issues with the Commonwealth’s closing

argument at trial and the identification evidence presented at the preliminary

hearing. See Pro Se PCRA Pet., 8/4/21, at 4. However, prior PCRA counsel

did not include those claims in his Turner/Finley letter. See Turner/Finley

Ltr., 9/9/21, at 1-2 (unpaginated). Additionally, although prior PCRA counsel

referred to Appellant’s pro se claim concerning the existence of exculpatory

video evidence, PCRA counsel ultimately failed to address that issue or explain

why it was meritless. See id. Therefore, we conclude that prior PCRA counsel

failed to comply with the mandates of Turner/Finley. See Kelsey, 206 A.3d

at 1139. We note that the Commonwealth argues that even if prior PCRA

counsel’s Turner/Finley response is arguably deficient, Appellant is not

prejudiced because his pro se claims are impossibly vague and clearly

meritless. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 6-7. Further, we recognize that the

PCRA court independently addressed Appellant’s pro se claims in its Rule

1925(a) opinion, however, the PCRA court’s review does not remedy the

____________________________________________

5 We may cite to non-precedential memorandum decisions filed by this Court

after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

                                           -6-
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defect caused by prior PCRA counsel’s deficient representation. See LeClair,

2022 WL 10225177 at *3; see also Kelsey, 206 A.3d at 1139.

      For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant was deprived of his right

to counsel in litigating his first PCRA petition. See Kelsey, 206 A.3d at 1139.

Accordingly, we vacate the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition

and remand for current PCRA counsel to either file an amended petition or an

adequate no-merit letter in the PCRA court within thirty days.

      Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: October 11, 2023

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