Court Opinion

ID: 9411040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 17:26:11.516561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.414528
License: Public Domain

J-S19019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN RE: J.L.R., A MINOR                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: B.B., MOTHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 159 MDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered December 30, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Orphans' Court at
                           No(s): 2022-00012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:              FILED: JULY 25, 2023

      B.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree terminating her parental rights

as to her minor child, J.L.R. (“Child”). We affirm.

      Huntington County Children’s Services (the “Agency”) became involved

with the family in March 2021. Child, who was five years old at the time, had

been living with his maternal grandmother (“Maternal Grandmother”) since

infancy. N.T., 12/30/22, at 13. Maternal Grandmother was Child’s legal

guardian and primary caretaker. Id. at 3, 6. She was arrested for causing a

house fire in which Child was present and she pled no contest to arson. Id. at

3, 24. There were also reports of ongoing sexual abuse of Child by Child’s

cousin in Maternal Grandmother’s home. Id. at 3. Child was adjudicated

dependent on April 5, 2021. Child was removed from Maternal Grandmother

and was placed in a kinship foster home. Id. at 24.
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      On September 30, 2022, the Agency filed a petition for involuntary

termination of Mother’s parental rights. The court held a hearing on the

petition on December 30, 2022.

      At the hearing, the Agency presented the testimony of case worker

Christi Shawley. Shawley testified that Mother’s goals were to address her

drug use, maintain stable housing, complete a parenting program, avail

herself to services, and attend visitation. Id. at 26-27. Shawley stated that

out of all her goals, Mother only completed the parenting program, albeit after

the filing of the termination petition. Id. at 34-35. With respect to visitation,

Shawley said that Mother had nine scheduled visits with Child during the life

of the case, but she only attended one in-person visit and three virtual visits

via Zoom. Id. at 29. Shawley testified that Mother’s last in-person visit was

in December 2021, over one year before the termination hearing. Id. Mother’s

visits were suspended by the court in March 2022 because Child did not want

to see Mother and would become extremely upset after visits with her. Id.

Shawley testified that after the Zoom visits, she had to call the foster mother

to help her deescalate Child who was “overturning chairs, throwing things,

screaming and yelling and kept saying that he doesn’t want to see” Mother.

Id.

      Shawley further testified that Mother did not have stable housing. Id.

at 32. She also stated that Mother had only sporadic contact with the Agency,

and that there were periods of time where the Agency was unable to reach

her or where she did not avail herself of the Agency’s services. Id. at 32-33.

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Shawley also testified that Mother tested positive for methamphetamines on

March 23, 2022. Id. at 36. Lastly, Shawley testified that Child’s foster parents

are ready and willing to adopt him. Id. at 33.

      The Agency also presented the testimony of Dr. Kristen Hennessey. Dr.

Hennessey testified that she is a licensed psychologist specializing in the

treatment of children with complex trauma and that Child had been under her

care since April 2021. Id. at 2-3. Dr. Hennessey testified that Child was

referred to her due to his exposure to the house fire and sexual abuse by his

cousin. Id. at 3. Child also had a lot of trauma connected to Maternal

Grandmother. Id. Dr. Hennessy stated that Mother has never been Child’s

primary caretaker and Child had lived with Maternal Grandmother since

infancy. Id. at 13. Dr. Hennessey testified that Mother was not consistent with

visits with Child. Id. She previously recommended suspending visits because

when Child was on the way to his visits with Mother, he would be in “a state

of crisis” and would become dangerous in the car en route to the visits. Id. at

6, 14. Dr. Hennessey testified that “the idea of having visits [with Mother] was

horrible for him and would lead to symptoms.” Id. at 14. She stated Child

would feel unsafe if he lived with Mother because Child believed that Mother

would take him to Maternal Grandmother’s house, which “means being hurt.”

Id. 6-7, 13. Dr. Hennessey also testified that Child does not see Mother as his

protector. Id. at 12-13. Dr. Hennessy said that Child told her that Mother

witnessed episodes of his abuse and he also told Mother about the abuse. Id.

at 13. Dr. Hennessey stated that Mother told her that she “was aware of the

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things that were going on but that she didn’t know what to do because she

did not have custody.” Id.

         Dr. Hennessey further testified that Child does not have a bond with

Mother, and they do not have a mother/child relationship. Id. at 7, 11. She

said he barely speaks about Mother, and Mother is “not on his radar.” Id. at

7. On the other hand, Dr. Hennessey stated that Child has a good bond with

his foster parents, and he wants to continue to live with them. Id. at 8-9. Dr.

Hennessey opined that Child would experience trauma if his bond with his

foster parents was severed. Id. at 9. She stated that Child’s mental health

would be in a better position if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Id.

at 10.

         The Agency also presented the testimony of Maddie Sell. Sell testified

that she is a therapist employed by Sara Jefferson, LCSW, and assists in

completing parenting attachment assessments. Id. at 15. She stated that

Mother completed approximately half of the testing required for her

attachment assessment. Id. at 17. Sell testified that Mother did not complete

the testing because Mother said she was going to test positive for Percocet

and morphine. Id. Mother was not able to produce a prescription for those

drugs. Id. at 21. Mother was a no-show at the rescheduled testing date and

did not respond to Sell’s attempts to reschedule the testing. Id. at 18, 20. Sell

stated that Mother was not able to care for Child. Id. at 20. Sell testified that

there is a “disengagement” by both Mother and Child in their relationship and

Child does not refer to Mother as “mom” but rather refers to her by her first

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name. Id. at 18, 19-20. Conversely, she stated that Child has a “great bond”

with his foster mother and they have “a very natural sort of interaction.” Id.

at 19.

         Mother did not appear at the termination hearing or produce any

evidence.

         After the hearing, the trial court found that the Agency proved by clear

and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated

under sections 2511(a)(5) and (8) and section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act.

Mother filed a notice of appeal and raises the following issue:

         Whether the evidence was insufficient to support the termination
         of the parental rights of [Mother] as related to [Child] if the
         termination was premised, either in whole or in part, on, inter alia,
         purely hearsay evidence of continued drug abuse, and an
         incomplete attachment assessment?

Mother’s Br. at 5.

         We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an

abuse of discretion. In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa.Super. 2018). In

termination      cases,   we   “accept   the   findings   of   fact   and   credibility

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47

A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings have support in the record,

we then determine if the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of

discretion.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 2018).

We will reverse a termination order “only upon demonstration of manifest

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unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” In re Adoption of

S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.

      A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden of

establishing grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re

Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473. Clear and convincing evidence means

evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is controlled by section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under this

provision, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to

terminating parental rights:

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
      termination delineated in [s]ection 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b): determination of the
      needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
      of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citations omitted). To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court

need only affirm the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection of section

2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).

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      Here, the court found termination proper under sections 2511(a)(5) and

(8), as well as under section 2511(b). As only one basis for termination under

2511(a) is necessary, we will focus on the court’s termination of Mother’s

parental rights under section 2511(a)(8). That section provides that a parent’s

rights to a child may be terminated if:

      The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
      court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months
      or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
      conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
      continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best
      serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

      Section 2511(a)(8) “sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy

the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In re A.R.,

837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period has been

proven, the court “must next determine whether the conditions that led to the

children’s removal continue to exist.” Id. “As a result, the relevant inquiry in

this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied

and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of

the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2009). “Termination under

[s]ection 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement

or the availability or efficacy of Agency services.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108,

1118 (Pa.Super. 2010).

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       Here, Child has been in placement since March 2021. Therefore, Child

has been in care in excess of 12 months. We next focus our inquiry on whether

the conditions that led to Child’s removal continued to exist at the time the

court terminated Mother’s parental rights.

       The court found that the conditions that existed at the time of Child’s

placement continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing. See Trial

Court Decree, dated 12/30/22, at Conclusions of Law ¶ 4. The court found

that Mother did not maintain sobriety or complete court-ordered drug and

alcohol counseling, failed to complete a parenting program prior to the filing

of the termination petition, failed to maintain stable housing, had not been

cooperative with the Agency, and was inconsistent with visits with Child prior

to visits being suspended. Id. at Findings of Fact ¶ 2. As a result, the court

concluded that Mother failed to remedy the issues that necessitated Child’s

placement. Id. at Conclusions of Law ¶ 3.

       We discern no abuse of discretion. The record supports the court’s

finding that the conditions that led to Child’s removal continue to exist. Mother

was never Child’s primary caretaker nor ever parented Child in any significant

way. Mother was sporadic with visits with Child and the visits caused Child so

much distress that the court ordered that the visits be suspended. Although

Mother eventually completed the parenting program,1 she wholly failed to

____________________________________________

1 Mother argues that the court erred by not considering the fact that she
eventually completed the parenting program in November 2022,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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complete any of her other goals. The court’s findings are supported by the

record and it did not abuse its discretion in determining that the requirements

of section 2511(a)(8) were satisfied.

       In addition to generally arguing that the evidence was insufficient to

support termination of her parental rights, Mother also argues that the court

impermissibly relied on hearsay evidence of Mother’s continued drug use and

an incomplete attachment assessment. However, Mother concedes that these

issues are waived since they were not raised in the trial court. See Mother’s

Br. at 21. We agree that the issues are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues

not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time

on appeal”). We also note these specific issues were not included in Mother’s

Rule 1925(b) statement and we therefore find waiver on this additional basis.

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

       We next determine whether termination was proper under section

2511(b). However, since Mother failed to present any argument concerning

section 2511(b) in her brief, she waived any challenge related to that section.

See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa.Super. 2017).

____________________________________________

approximately two months after the filing of the termination petition. Mother’s
Br. at 20, 25. Citing In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at1121, she contends that a court
“may consider post-petition efforts if the efforts were initiated before the filing
of the termination petition and continued after the petition date.” Id. at 25.
However, the court cited many other factors in support of its decision to
terminate Mother’s parental rights. Moreover, the court did, in fact, hear
testimony that Mother completed the program. N.T. at 34-35.

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       Even if Mother had preserved her challenge to section 2511(b), we

would conclude that it lacked merit. Under section 2511(b), the trial court

must consider “the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child” to determine if termination of parental rights is in the best interest

of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This inquiry involves assessment of

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability[.]” In re C.M.S.,

884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005). The court must also examine the

parent-child bond, “with utmost attention to the effect on the child of

permanently severing that bond.” Id. The trial court must consider whether

severing the bond “would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial

relationship.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation

omitted).2 The court must also examine any pre-adoptive home and any bond

between the child and the foster parents. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

       Here, there was ample evidence that Child has no bond with Mother and

they do not have a parent-child relationship. Child calls Mother by her first

name and Mother has never been a caregiver to Child. Child stated that he

____________________________________________

2 See also In the Interest of K.T., --- A.3d ----, Nos. 37 & 38 WAP 2022,

2023 WL 4092986, at *18 (Pa. filed June 21, 2023) (stating that in addition
to determining whether the parental bond is necessary and beneficial to the
child, “[t]he [s]ection 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration of other
important factors such as: the child’s need for permanency and length of time
in foster care consistent with 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9) and federal law [the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997], 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(5)(C), (E); whether
the child is in a preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and
whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety,
and stability”).

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would feel unsafe if he went to live with Mother and he does not see Mother

as a protector. Indeed, Mother was aware that Child was being abused at

Maternal Grandmother’s home and failed to do anything to protect him.

Conversely, the evidence demonstrated that Child is strongly bonded to his

foster parents who are eager to adopt him and provide him with permanency.

We perceive no reasonable basis on which to challenge the conclusion that

termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in Child’s best interests.

      Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 07/25/2023

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