Court Opinion

ID: 9579207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:52:32.205486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:34.817175
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in divisions V and VI of majority’s opinion, which decide this case. Of the remaining nine-tenths of the decision I am troubled by the dictum that,
“ * * * we are convinced the trial court in the 1968 modification hearing anticipated and took into consideration that the boys would grow older, get rougher and be tougher on clothes in fixing support payments.”
In its 1968 modification decree the district court wrote nothing which would indicate that when it ordered the decrease in child support to $12.50 per week it was anticipating a future increase in the expense of maintaining these boys. Nor has the majority pointed out what evidence its de novo review disclosed which “convinced” it the district court considered circumstances other than those then confronting it.
*520Of course, trial courts frequently provide for level support payments until the child reaches a stated age. But until now I did not suppose it followed the trial court was thereby specifically anticipating future economic conditions to the point a modification would not be considered even though the school, medical and other needs of the growing child significantly increased.
To the contrary, in modification proceedings we have consistently and recently “weighed the factors of increased school and medical expenses and needs of growing youths.” Dworak v. Dworak, 195 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Iowa 1972); McDonald v. McDonald, 183 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1971); Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa 142, 30 N.W.2d 748 (1948); see Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 7, 67-69 at § 22 (1963, Later Case Service, 1968, Supp.1973).
A parent with custody who came into district court claiming that although $100 per month would satisfy the present needs of a young child the court should nonetheless fix the amount at $200 because as the child grew older its requirements would ultimately increase to that sum, would probably (and rightly) receive a cold reception. See Martin v. Martin, 225 Ark. 677, 284 S.W.2d 647 (1955); Watson v. Watson, 135 Colo. 296, 310 P.2d 554 (1957). Yet this is the rationale majority adopts in surmising the district court in 1968 necessarily “anticipated” (and fixed child support to satisfy) the enlarged needs of 1971 and later years.
It may be conceded the district court must have anticipated the boys would grow older. It is another thing to say (on the basis of sheer speculation) the court necessarily anticipated future economic conditions by fixing a present sum which would meet their increasing needs over the next ten years.
The majority may subscribe to the above-quoted statement fearing otherwise we would invite a proliferation of modification proceedings based solely on age changes in the benefited child. The answer is continued adherence to our longstanding rule recognizing the court’s power to modify only when the applicant carries the burden of proving there has been a material and substantial change of circumstances to the point that enforcement of the decree or prior modification would be attended by positive wrong or injustice, McDonald v. McDonald, supra; Sandler v. Sandler, 165 N.W.2d 799 (Iowa 1969); Simpkins v. Simpkins, 258 Iowa 87, 137 N.W.2d 621 (1965); Welch v. Welch, 256 Iowa 1020, 129 N.W.2d 642 (1964).
The serious vice in the above-quoted dictum, if followed as a guide, would permit both district court and this court to assume a judge in fixing child support projected economic needs far into the future, in the absence of any factual basis or indication in the modification decree justifying such conclusion. Uncontrolled discretionary guesswork of this type should be neither sought nor condoned, and on appeal would leave us nothing to review.
MOORE, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, J., join in this special concurrence.