Court Opinion

ID: 9783633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:53:19.586594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:27.819541
License: Public Domain

VENTERS, J.,
Dissenting.
CR 53.02 and CR 55.01 authorize a circuit judge to refer certain matters to a commissioner. Other than post-judgment matters pertaining to a judicial sale or post-judgment matters pertaining to the *461assets of a judgment debtor, CR 53.02(2) expressly allows such a referral only in “special cases,” when the issues are complex or determining damages is difficult. CR 55.01 allows such referrals for default judgments when “it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter.”
State Farm’s underlying lawsuit is a simple insurance subrogation case, arising from an automobile collision. The damages are liquidated. State Farm either paid them under its policy, or it did not. The failure of the defendant to contest the claim stands as his admission of liability. This case does not present the kind of complexities that this Court had in mind when CR 53.02 and CR 55.01 were adopted. The referral of State Farm’s motion to a commissioner was clearly an abuse of discretion, with or without the $50.00 fee.
A one-time judicial error and a single $50.00 fee improperly assessed is a minimal claim and I would not disagree with a decision to overlook it. But State Farm alleges, and no one denies, that referrals in similar cases are a recurring practice with a charge of $50.00 each time. The order entered to refer this case to the commissioner is a generic preprinted form, with the style of the case written in by hand, suggesting some level repetitive use without case-specific findings to indicate the grounds for such referrals. We would closely scrutinize any erroneous court practice that imposed a $5,000.00 fee. I respectfully suggest that we should look just as closely upon a practice that charges a $50.00 fee a hundred times, or a thousand times.
The majority affirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion to deny the writ because State Farm has the remedy of appeal. Technically, I agree. State Farm can appeal; however, the vast majority of default judgment motions turn out favorably to the plaintiff, so we may fairly assume that State Farm will eventually obtain judgment and then take the awkward step of appealing from a judgment in its own favor, with the fees and costs associated therewith.
Notwithstanding the adequacy of an appellate remedy, I believe the Court of Appeals should have granted the writ under the kind of “certain special case” exception, as noted in Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. Chauvin, 316 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Ky.2010). State Farms’ allegations indicate a common practice that I believe violates our civil rules, and yet evades appellate review because of its de minimis effect in individual cases. I further believe the collective effect and pecuniary nature of the error casts a narrow, but negative shadow on the Court of Justice. I would reverse the Court of Appeals, or alternatively, issue a writ pursuant to § 110 of the Kentucky Constitution in exercise of our administrative responsibility over the Court of Justice, and therefore, I dissent.