Court Opinion

ID: 9380259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 18:03:04.409344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.211835
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JB AND MARGARET BLAUGRUND            )
FOUNDATION,                          )
                                     )
                Plaintiff,           )
                                     )
           v.                        )   C.A. No. 2021-1094-NAC
                                     )
GUGGENHEIM FUNDS INVESTMENT          )
ADVISORS, LLC, TORTOISE CAPITAL      )
ADVISORS, L.L.C., RANDALL C.         )
BARNES, ANGELA BROCK-KYLE,           )
DONALD A. CHUBB, JR., JERRY B.       )
FARLEY, ROMAN FRIEDRICH III,         )
THOMAS F. LYDON, JR., RONALD A.      )
NYBERG, SANDRA G. SPONEM,            )
RONALD E. TOUPIN, JR., and AMY J.    )
LEE,                                 )
                                     )
                Defendants,          )
                                     )
and                                  )
                                     )
FIDUCIARY/CLAYMORE ENERGY            )
INFRASTRUCTURE FUND,                 )
                                     )
                Nominal Defendant.   )

             ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR
         CERTIFICATION OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
       WHEREAS:

       1.    Plaintiff is a former stockholder of the Fund. 1 The Amended Complaint

alleges unusual facts. According to the Amended Complaint and the public and

Section 220 documents incorporated into and integral to it:

    • The Fund’s governance structure did not include exculpation for breaches of
      the fiduciary duty of care;
    • The Trustee Defendants managed at least 150 entities, including the Fund;
    • A Trustee Defendant testified that the Trustee Defendants barely reviewed the
      Fund’s financial performance before meeting to discuss the Fund;
    • The Trustee Defendants did not oversee Guggenheim’s investment strategies;
    • Guggenheim increased the Fund’s leverage to a point that surpassed the
      leverage maintained by nearly all the Fund’s peers;
    • The Moving Defendants had no internal controls to stress test the Fund’s
      portfolio or reduce the Fund’s exposure to a liquidity crisis;
    • Guggenheim responded to a liquidity crisis by selling $45 million of the
      Fund’s equity securities, which reversed all the Fund’s historical returns;
    • The Trustee Defendants were not aware of Guggenheim’s securities sales;
    • After recommending that the Fund be liquidated and wound-up by a trustee
      (the “Liquidation”), Guggenheim discovered that the securities sales caused
      recognition of millions of dollars in tax recapture gains;
    • The Moving Defendants understood that the Liquidation, although
      economically advantageous for stockholders, would preserve breach of
      fiduciary duty claims for litigation by a liquidating trustee, including claims
      based on Guggenheim’s tax error;
    • The Moving Defendants opted instead for the Merger, at least in part, to
      eliminate their personal liability;

1
  Unless specified otherwise, capitalized terms have the meaning given them in my
February 22, 2023 oral ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss (the “Ruling”).

                                          2
     • To achieve the Merger, the Moving Defendants valued Plaintiff’s then-
       pending derivative claims at $0, despite contrary valuations from advisors,
       and selected a buyer who agreed to indemnify the Moving Defendants fully
       for all fiduciary liability;
     • Along with the Proxy Statement, the Moving Defendants publicized a
       redacted version of the Amended Complaint that concealed portions of 119
       paragraphs detailing their conceivably self-interested motivations for
       pursuing the Merger, which were gleaned from Section 220 documents;
     • The redactions seemingly caused Plaintiff’s claims to appear unfounded;
     • The Moving Defendants presented the Liquidation structure to stockholders
       as an option that would lead to uncertain returns, indefinite illiquidity, and
       incalculable tax expenses at the stockholder level;
     • Ten days before the Merger vote, the Moving Defendants issued
       Supplemental Disclosures indicating to stockholders that the Moving
       Defendants would pursue the Liquidation if the Merger were rejected;
     • To maintain the redactions to the Amended Complaint through the Merger
       vote, the Moving Defendants moved under Rule 5.1 for continued confidential
       treatment a few days before the Merger vote;
     • After the vote, and despite their Rule 5.1 arguments, the Moving Defendants
       then unredacted all but three allegations; and
     • One of those three allegations referenced an analysis by the Board’s financial
       advisor that calculated sizeable damages caused by Guggenheim’s tax error.

         2.     The Moving Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Count

VI of the Amended Complaint (the “Motion”). Count VI is styled under this Court’s

In re Primedia, Inc. 2 and In re Riverstone National, Inc. Stockholder Litigation3

decisions and challenges the fairness of the Merger process and price.

2
    67 A.3d 455 (Del. Ch. 2013).
3
    2016 WL 4045411 (Del. Ch. July 28, 2016).

                                           3
         3.     The Motion relied heavily on Corwin. Plaintiff countered that, as a

doctrinal matter, Corwin does not apply to “Primedia/Riverstone” claims. Plaintiff

alternatively argued that Corwin cleansing would be unavailable on these facts

because the Merger vote was “structurally coerced” and not fully informed.

         4.     Plaintiff presented its doctrinal argument as an open question of law.4

The Moving Defendants characterized that framing as “perplexing” and insisted that

“[n]othing distinguishe[d] the application of Corwin” to Count VI. 5

         5.     Consistent with this position, the Moving Defendants never argued that

the concept of structural coercion was unsettled. Instead, they argued that the vote

was not structurally coerced because the proxy materials gave stockholders the

option to choose between the Merger and “the status quo.”6                 Based on that

presentation of the concept, the Moving Defendants depicted the proxy materials as

offering “a simple up or down vote” based on full information about the economic

differences between the Merger and the Liquidation.7 Plaintiff, by contrast, argued

the proxy materials forced the stockholders to make an “all or nothing” choice.8

4
    Dkt. 120 at 36–37 (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss) (“Opp’n Br.”)
5
    Dkt. 122 at 21 (Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss) (“Reply”).
6
 Reply at 16–18; Dkt. 133 64:1–5 (Tr. of Hr’g on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss) (“Hr’g Tr.”).
See also Ruling at 27–29 (discussing this argument).
7
 Dkt. 114 at 25 (Defs.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss) (“Opening Br.”); Hr’g
Tr. at 54:17–19.
8
 Opp’n Br. at 38. See also Hr’g Tr. at 49:23–50:1 ([Pl.’s Couns.]: “Contrary to what [the
Moving Defendants] argue in their brief, the status quo isn’t a real alternative here.”).

                                              4
         6.      I denied the Motion (the “Ruling”).9 The Ruling assumed, without

deciding, that Corwin applied to Count VI. In other words, the Ruling accepted (for

analytical purposes) the Moving Defendant’s articulation of Corwin. The Ruling

then concluded that the unusual facts of this case supported a reasonable inference

of structural coercion. 10 In reaching that conclusion, the Ruling applied traditional

coercion principles. Those principles were cited in the parties’ cases.

         7.      The Moving Defendants have applied for certification of an

interlocutory appeal (the “Application”). The Application seeks review of the

Ruling’s pleading-stage coercion conclusion. Plaintiff opposes the Application. 11

         8.      The Application does not argue that the Ruling misconstrued the record.

Nor does the Application accuse the Ruling of applying the incorrect standard. And

the Application does not identify a case that examined the same or similarly unusual

facts. Nevertheless, the Application contends that the Ruling resolved a novel

question of law and conflicts with precedent.

9
 See Dkt. 136 (Tr. of Oral Ruling Resolving Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss) (“Ruling”). The
Ruling separately granted motions to dismiss filed by Tortoise and the Former Trustees.
The grounds for granting those motions are not relevant to this decision.
10
   Id. at 17–31. The parties did not present argument on the concept of “situational
coercion,” even though the Moving Defendants cited the leading case. See Opening Br. at
25 n.79 (citing In re Saba Software, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2017 WL 1201108 (Del. Ch. Mar.
31, 2017)); see also Dkt. 139 at 13 n.39 (Moving Defs.’ Appl. for Certification of
Interlocutory Appeal) (“Appl.”) (citing Saba Software again). Although not before me, it
would not seem unfounded for a reviewing court to conclude that this case’s unusual facts
also lend themselves to a pleading-stage determination of situational coercion.
11
     Dkt. 149.

                                             5
         NOW, THEREFORE, the Court, having carefully considered the Application

and the parties’ arguments, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, this 17th day of March

2023, as follows:

         1.      Supreme Court Rule 42 governs certification of interlocutory appeals.

“The purpose of Rule 42 is to prevent wasteful piecemeal litigation from

overwhelming the docket of the Supreme Court.”12 As a result, Rule 42 “is not an

appropriate vehicle for re-litigating unsuccessful arguments preserved for direct

appeal.” 13 “Otherwise, interlocutory review would be appropriate in every case in

which a losing party contends the Court committed legal error.”14

         2.      Interlocutory appeals are “generally not favored.” 15 They “disrupt the

normal procession of litigation, cause delay, and can threaten to exhaust scarce party

and judicial resources.” 16 So a Rule 42 application cannot be certified unless it clears

two “rigorous” hurdles. 17 First, the order must have “decide[d] a substantial issue

12
  In re Del. Pub. Schs. Litig., 2022 WL 1220075, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 2022) (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal refused, 277 A.3d 296 (Del. 2022) (TABLE).
13
   Elutions Cap. Ventures v. Betts, 2022 WL 17075692, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2022)
(cleaned up), appeal refused, 2023 WL 164300 (Del. Jan. 12, 2023) (TABLE).
14
  Legion P’rs Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyds London, 2020 WL 6875211, at
*3 (Del. Super. Nov. 23, 2020), appeal refused, 242 A.3d 601 (Del. 2020) (TABLE).
15
     Supr. Ct. R. 42 cmt.
16
     Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii).
17
  TowerHill Wealth Mgmt., LLC v. Bander Fam. P’ship, L.P., 2008 WL 4615865, at *2
(Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2008), appeal refused, 962 A.2d 256 (Del. 2008) (TABLE).

                                             6
of material importance that merits appellate review before a final judgment.”18

Second, there must be “substantial benefits” to granting the application that “will

outweigh the certain costs that accompany an interlocutory appeal.”19

The Substantial Issue Requirement

         3.      “The ‘substantial issue’ requirement is met when an interlocutory order

decides a main question of law which relates to the merits of the case . . . .” 20 The

substantial issue requirement is not met where “no final determination was . . . made

on the merits of plaintiff’s claims, but only that plaintiff would be afforded the right

to pursue discovery related to the allegations of the complaint.” 21 Consistent with

this paradigm, this Court has reasoned that an order denying a motion to dismiss a

stockholder claim generally does not raise a substantial issue.22

18
     Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(i).
19
     Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii).
20
  Sprint Nextel Corp. v. iPCS, Inc., 2008 WL 2861717, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 22, 2008),
appeal refused, 956 A.2d 31 (Del. 2008) (TABLE).
21
     Fuqua Indus. v. Lewis, 1986 WL 16292, at *1 (Del. Jan. 24, 1986) (ORDER).
22
  See, e.g., Fannin v. UMTH Land Dev., L.P., 2020 WL 5198356, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 28,
2020) (determining that the order did not decide a substantial issue of material importance
because the order “merely decided, applying the liberal standard of [] Rule 12(b)(6), that
the [c]omplaint stated a claim against the Appealing Defendants for breach of fiduciary
duty”), appeal refused sub nom. Etter v. Fannin, 238 A.3d 193 (Del. 2020) (TABLE); In
re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 12711, at 6–8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2018) (Dkt.
137) (determining that the order did not decide a substantial issue of material importance
where the plaintiff met its “minimal pleading-stage burden” to demonstrate controlling
stockholder status and discovery could show otherwise), appeal refused sub nom. Musk v.
Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys., 184 A.3d 1292 (Del. 2018) (TABLE); 2 Donald J. Wolfe, Jr. &
Michael A. Pittenger, Corporate and Commercial Practice in the Delaware Court of
Chancery § 18.04(d), at 18-12 (2d ed. & Sept. 2021 Supp.) (“[R]ulings found not to have

                                             7
         4.     The Ruling denied a motion to dismiss. In doing so, the Ruling was

required to accept Plaintiff’s unusual, but well-pleaded, allegations as true. The

Ruling was not permitted to draw defendant-friendly inferences from the allegations

or the Proxy Statement or Section 220 materials incorporated into the Amended

Complaint. Under these constraints, the Ruling concluded that the stockholder vote

failed to cleanse the Merger. 23 It did not adjudicate the merits of Count VI.

         5.     The Ruling emphasized that its pleading-stage coercion determination

was not a finding that the Moving Defendants breached their fiduciary duties.

Instead, the Ruling further emphasized that discovery may reveal that the Moving

Defendants “were simply presenting the objective realities” of the Merger and the

Liquidation. 24 For now, I would deny the Application on the substantial issue

requirement alone.

determined a substantial issue include . . . the denial of a [] motion to dismiss a derivative
suit in response to the recommendation of a special litigation committee . . . .” (citation
omitted)). Cf. SDF Funding LLC v. Fry, 2022 WL 2165922, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 16, 2022)
(interpreting Rule 42(b)(iii)(A) to focus on the novelty of the issue decided, not the nature
of the argument rejected), appeal refused, 279 A.3d 829 (Del. 2022) (TABLE).
23
   Interlocutory review is not warranted merely because the Court has made a pleading-
stage determination on the appropriate standard of review. See, e.g., MS Pawn Corp. v.
Treppel, 133 A.3d 560 (Del. 2016) (TABLE) (refusing interlocutory review where this
Court determined on a motion to dismiss that entire fairness might govern challenged
transaction, even though there was an “arguable conflict” on that point); Reading Co. v.
Trailer Train Co., 1984 WL 21202, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 7, 1984) (denying certification
where order determined that business judgment rule applied at pleading stage, but did not
“foreclose[]”plaintiff from attempting to establish entire fairness “at a later stage”).
24
     Ruling at 30–31.

                                              8
           6.      The Application does not meaningfully resist this result.           The

Application claims that the Ruling “determined substantial issues of material

importance in the matter at hand[.]”25 But it says nothing more. Failure to explain

why the Ruling should be certified is at least one good reason to deny certification.

           7.      The Application otherwise suggests that Corwin cases are different.

They are not.26 Neither are structural coercion cases.27

           8.      Rather than decide a substantial issue, the Application asserts that the

Ruling “presents [a] substantial question[.]” 28 That question, according to the

Application, is whether

           stockholders of a Delaware corporation with no controller [are] structurally
           coerced into voting for a merger when the corporation’s Board provides full
           disclosures to stockholders about the company’s potential alternatives and
           recommends that stockholders approve the merger because the Board
           considers the merger to be preferable to what it views as the most viable
           alternative—a liquidation.29

25
     Appl. at 1–2.
26
  See, e.g., Tesla Motors, C.A. No. 12711, appeal refused sub nom. Musk, 184 A.3d 1292.
See also Levinson v. Conlon, 385 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1978) (“[T]he Court determined that
an affirmative defense was not available, and the consequence of the decision was that the
parties must proceed to trial, a ruling which our cases have held is not [a] basis for an
interlocutory appeal.”).
27
  See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 2002 WL 31357847, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct.
9, 2002) (Strine, V.C.) (determining that the order did not decide a substantial issue of
material importance because its decision to preliminarily enjoin a structurally coercive
tender offer did not establish a legal right, but merely prevented the offer to close before
the case was resolved on the merits), appeal refused, 812 A.2d 244 (Del. 2002) (TABLE).
28
     Appl. at 2.
29
     Id.

                                               9
Curating the question-presented this way may rhetorically advance the Moving

Defendants’ certification factors, all of which I consider—and reject—below. But

the reality is, the Ruling did not answer the Application’s question. The Ruling

considered whether it was reasonably conceivable that these stockholders were

structurally coerced into approving this merger given this Board’s presentation of

this liquidation as the only viable alternative.30 The Moving Defendants’ failure to

recognize the fact-sensitive nature of the Ruling dooms the rest of the Application.

The Multi-Factor Balancing

         9.      The Ruling did not address a substantial issue of material importance.

Even if it did, that would not necessarily mean that the Ruling “merits appellate

review before a final judgment.” 31 If the substantial issue requirement is met, the

Court next must consider whether the benefits of interlocutory review would

outweigh its costs. Rule 42(b)(iii) specifies eight factors to guide this assessment.32

30
  See Northrop Grumman Innovation Sys. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 772312, at *2
(Del. Super. Mar. 1, 2021) (The trial court may reject and reframe the question presented
for certification “especially where, as here, the ask in the application is imprecise.” (citing
Dow Chem. Corp. v. Blanco, 67 A.3d 392, 394 (Del. 2013))), appeal refused sub nom.
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Northrop Grumman Innovation Sys., 248 A.3d 922 (Del. 2021)
(TABLE).
31
     Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(i).
32
     See Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii)(A)–(H).

                                              10
         10.       The Application contends that four factors support certification.33

None does.

         11.       The Moving Defendants first invoke Rule 42(b)(iii)(A). This factor

considers whether the Ruling resolved a novel question of law for the first time in

Delaware. It did not. In fact, the Ruling declined to resolve a purportedly novel

issue. The Ruling instead applied settled coercion precedent to an unusual set of

facts. “The mere application of long-held precedent to new facts does not make an

order worthy of interlocutory appeal.” 34 Accordingly, Rule 42(b)(iii)(A) does not

support certification.

         12.       To portray the Ruling as novel, the Application asserts that the Ruling

“is the first that denies Corwin cleansing when stockholders are asked to vote on a

proposed merger, and are fully advised of the alternatives[.]” 35 That is inaccurate.

The Ruling concluded that coercion precluded cleansing. So it did not need to not

consider whether the stockholders were fully informed or “advised.”

         13.       Moreover, the coercion analysis, as framed by the parties, hinged on

whether the stockholders chose the Merger on its economic merits. That framework

33
   By selecting only four of eight factors, Defendants concede that the remaining four do
not support certification. See, e.g., In re Carvana Co. S’holders Litig., 2022 WL 4661841,
at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 3, 2022), appeal refused sub nom. Garcia v. Franchi, 285 A.3d 1205
(Del. 2022) (TABLE). So I do not discuss those.
34
     Elutions, 2022 WL 17075692, at *5 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
35
     Appl. at 3.

                                              11
implicated well-settled structural coercion precedent. The Ruling is not the only

post-Corwin decision to visit that precedent. Nor is it the first. The parties’ central

case applied that precedent too.36

         14.    The Application’s novelty theory is surprising. Throughout the case,

the Moving Defendants maintained that Count VI involved a straightforward

application of Corwin. Counsel stressed this point during oral argument:

         I don’t think we have to get anywhere near the philosophical question of could
         there possibly be a derivative claim that wouldn’t be subject to Corwin.
         [Count VI] is right down the fairway in terms of the types of claims that would
         fit under Corwin.37

         15.    Properly contextualized, the Application contains nothing “new”

except for its arguments. Recall, for example, that the Moving Defendants insisted

structural coercion does not exist where stockholders may freely choose between a

change of ownership and “the status quo.” Given that formulation, the Ruling was

required to examine whether the status quo was offered as an option. As explained

in the Ruling, the proxy materials disclosed that the Fund either would be liquidated

or sold. It would not have a status quo. Because the Moving Defendants themselves

tied structural coercion to the availability of a status quo, their own arguments

precluded cleansing here. Faced with that result, they have changed their tune.

 See Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., 2017 WL 2352152, at *20–24 (Del. Ch.
36

May 31, 2017); see also Ruling at 27–30 (discussing Liberty Broadband).
37
     Hr’g Tr. at 10:7–12 (Arg. of Moving Defs.’ Couns.).

                                             12
         16.       Now, the Application puts the Ruling “beyond current Delaware law,”

claiming it “eliminates a Corwin defense even when . . . the status quo was not a

realistic choice[.]”38 The Application thus decouples coercion and the status quo to

raise an argument that was not presented previously and to fault the Ruling for

resolving the one that was. 39         Even so, this new argument does not support

certification. Arguments presented for the first time on appeal are deemed waived.40

         17.       Shorn of the word “novel,” the Application reduces to a disagreement

with the Ruling’s reasoning. That is not a basis for interlocutory review.

         18.       The Moving Defendants next invoke Rule 42(b)(iii)(B). This factor

considers whether the Ruling conflicts with other trial court decisions “upon [a]

question of law.” “Generally, for court decisions to be ‘conflicting upon a question

of law,’ they must disagree about legal standards. Courts will not be found to have

made conflicting decisions on a question of law if they merely found factual

distinctions that dictated differing outcomes under the same legal standard.” 41

38
     Appl. at 7.
39
  The Moving Defendants’ shape-shifting approach is a recurring theme. For example,
before the Merger closed, the Moving Defendants took the position that the Merger would
not operate to preclude a “direct claim” available under Primedia. Dkt. 12 at 10 (Defs.’
Opp’n to Mot. to Expedite). Then, once the Merger closed, the Moving Defendants argued
Count VI was a “purported direct claim” barred under Corwin. Reply at 20. See Ruling at
48:15–24.
40
     Supr. Ct. R. 8.
41
   Roseton OL, LLC v. Dynegy Hldgs. Inc., C.A. No. 6689, at 8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2011)
(alteration omitted), appeal refused, 26 A.3d 214 (Del. 2011) (TABLE).

                                             13
       19.    The Moving Defendants do not contend that the Ruling applied the

wrong legal standard. Nor do they cite a case that applied a different legal standard.

Quite the opposite: the Application cites the same cases cited in the Ruling.42 Given

all this, the Application is left to argue that the Ruling should have reached the

opposite outcome. Again, this is a mere disagreement with the Ruling’s reasoning.

Worse, it fails to account for this case’s well-pleaded allegations. The Moving

Defendants have not cited a coercion case involving the same or similarly strange

facts. And those “factual distinctions” are precisely what “dictated a different

outcome here.”43 Accordingly, Rule 42(b)(iii)(B) does not support certification.

       20.    As their third factor, the Moving Defendants invoke Rule 42(b)(iii)(G).

This factor considers whether reversal of the Ruling would terminate the litigation.

It may, depending on how the Delaware Supreme Court resolves the matter. 44 But

42
   See Appl. at 9–13 & nn.21–29, 31–38. The Application tries to distinguish Eisenberg v.
Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051 (Del. Ch. 1987). Even so, the Ruling did not
treat Eisenberg as dispositive. The Ruling invoked Eisenberg to illustrate the choice faced
by stockholders: approve the Merger or, by operation of the Liquidation, lose the power to
trade. The Application does not explain why framing the alternative to a merger as
imposition of an illiquid trust on stockholders is analytically different here from delisting
the company’s securities. It just baldly states that Eisenberg “is not like” this case. Appl.
at 10.
43
  Brown v. Wilm. Zoning Bd., 2007 WL 2122046, at *3 (Del. Super. July 23, 2007), appeal
refused, 947 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2007) (TABLE); accord Roseton, C.A. No. 6689, at 8 n.20.
44
  The Ruling did not reach the question of whether the Merger vote was fully informed.
So, unless the Supreme Court addresses that issue sua sponte, it is likely that the case would
be remanded for me to determine whether Corwin cleansing is precluded under the
disclosure prong. The Supreme Court also could conceivably remand for me to consider
the potentially novel question of the applicability of Corwin to Primedia claims.

                                             14
even if it would, this factor, standing alone, cannot be enough to obtain interlocutory

review of an unsuccessful motion to dismiss. Otherwise, Rule 42(b)(iii)(G) “would

validate routine appeals from most motion to dismiss decisions.” 45 That type of

appellate on-ramp would run contrary to the text and purpose of Rule 42.46 So even

if success on appeal would end the litigation, I still would not certify the Ruling. 47

         21.    Finally, the Moving Defendants invoke Rule 42(b)(iii)(H). This factor

considers whether interlocutory appeal would serve the public interest. It would not.

The Ruling is a fact-laden, pleading-stage analysis that applied settled law to resolve

sui generis issues unique to these parties. I therefore cannot say with any degree of

certainty that immediate review of the Ruling would promote clarity for the larger

business and legal communities or advance the common law of coercion.48 And if

the balance of factors is uncertain, I must deny the Application.49 So that is what I

will do. Accordingly, Rule 42(b)(iii)(H) does not support certification.

45
  US Dominion, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2022 WL 100820, at *7 (Del. Super. Jan.
10, 2022), appeal refused, 270 A.3d 273 (Del. 2022) (TABLE).
46
  See Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii) (instructing that interlocutory appeals should be “exceptional,
not routine”); see also Levinson, 385 A.2d at 720 (Rule 42 “is intended to minimize two
highly undesirable problems . . . the fragmentation of a case and a delay in its final
disposition.”); Castaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 301 A.2d 87, 87 (Del. 1973).
47
  See Supr. Ct. R. 42 cmt. (“[E]ven if an interlocutory appeal satisfies one or more of the
possible criteria set forth in the Rule, the Court may still refuse the appeal.”).
48
  See Supr. Ct. R. 42 cmt. (explaining that interlocutory review is intended to be “helpful”
to practitioners, litigants, and the court, and therefore should be limited to issues that, if
clarified, would “truly benefit” these constituents).
49
     See Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii) (hanging paragraph).

                                              15
         22.     In sum, the Moving Defendants’ attempt to bootstrap their

disagreement with the Ruling into a basis for interlocutory appeal ignores this case’s

unusual facts, contradicts their dismissal arguments, and is not supported by a

substantial issue or any of the certification factors.         Rule 42 instructs that

interlocutory appeal “should be exceptional, not routine[.]” 50 The Supreme Court

reserves interlocutory review for “extraordinary” cases. 51 This is not one of them.

Accordingly, I DENY the Application.

                                                       /s/ Nathan A. Cook
                                                Vice Chancellor Nathan A. Cook

50
     Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii).
51
  Ryan v. Gifford, 2008 WL 43699, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

                                           16