Court Opinion

ID: 9808339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:34:59.915259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:24.805907
License: Public Domain

LOUGHRY, Justice,
concurring, in part, . and dissenting, in part:
I concur in the majority’s historical analysis of the common law writ of error coram nobis, as well as its ultimate conclusion that the writ remains available only in extraordinary circumstances in criminal proceedings in West Virginia. Further, while I do not disagree with the majority’s new syllabus point four to the extent it reflects the holding of the United State Supreme Court m Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), I disagree with the majority’s implication that Padilla imposes a duty on lawyers to explore the immigration status of all criminal defense clients. Moreover, I do not believe that Padilla has any application under the particular facts and circumstances of the ease at bar.
The sole similarity between Mr. Hutton in the instant matter, and the petitioner in Padilla, Jose Padilla, is that both were longtime, lawful permanent residents of this country, but not American citizens, when they became subject to deportation as a direct consequence of their guilty pleas to criminal charges.. What remains are two factually significant differences that render Padilla inapplicable to Mr. Hutton’s situation.
First, it appears from the facts set forth in Padilla that Mr. Padilla’s counsel was aware that his client was not a citizen of the United States prior to Mr. Padilla entering his guilty plea. Second, armed with the knowledge of his client’s immigration status, Mr. Padilla’s counsel proceeded to advise him that he ‘“did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’ ” Padilla at 359, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (internal citation omitted). Based upon that legal advice, which was later revealed to be incorrect, Mr. Padilla proceeded to. plead guilty to criminal, drag charges, making his “deportation virtually mandatory.” Id.
Conversely,. in the case- sub judice, the appendix record contains a transcript of the coram nobis hearing held before the circuit court during which Mr. Hutton testified that he never told his counsel of his immigration status. Consequently, unlike the attorney in Padilla, and absent a record showing the contrary, it appears that Mr. Hutton’s defense counsel was unaware that his client was not an American citizen. In further and significant contrast to Padilla, Mr. Hutton does not assert that his trial counsel gave him incorrect immigration advice.
In addressing Mr. Padilla’s post-conviction challenge based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Padilla Court observed that the changes to the immigration law in *744this country have “dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction,” and that the “importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.” Id. at 364, 130 S.Ct. 1473. Upon its review of the relevant immigration statute, the Supreme Court found that statute to be “succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction.” Id. at 368, 130 S.Ct. 1473. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Padilla had “sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy the first prong of Strickland[,]”1 leaving the determination of whether Mr. Padilla can satisfy Strickland’s second prong — prejudice—to the Kentucky courts. Id. at 369, 130 S.Ct. 1473.2
Although deportation is a “particularly severe ‘penalty!!,]’ ” id. at 365, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (internal citations omitted), it is clear from Padilla that the Supreme Court did not expressly impose a blanket duty upon lawyers to ask every client charged with a crime whether they are American citizens. The Supreme Court’s silence in this regard has been recognized by other courts. For example, in Clarke v. State, 974 N.E.2d 562 (Ind. Ct.App.2012), the court commented on the issue of whether criminal defense lawyers must “ascertain the citizenship of their clients!!,]” observing that “this issue is percolating in other states[.]” Id. at 568. The Indiana court then cited State v. Stephens, 46 Kan.App.2d 853, 265 P.3d 574, 577 (2011), review denied, wherein the Kansas court stated that “[t]he Padilla Court did not ... impose upon counsel the duty to investigate the citizenship or immigration status of every client in a criminal case.”3
More recently, in State v. Rodriguez, No. 108,505, 320 P.3d 449 (Table) (Kan.App. Mar. 14, 2014), the Kansas court relied upon Stephens, again noting that
[t]he Padilla majority did not impose a duty to investigate the citizenship or immigration status of every client in a criminal case. See State v. Stephens, 46 Kan. App.2d 853, 856, 265 P.3d 574 (2011), rev. denied 294 Kan. 947 (2012). In his concurrence in Padilla, Justice Alito observed that in some cases, it may be hard for defense counsel even to determine whether a client is an ... alien. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 379-80 [130 S.Ct. 1473] (Alito, J., concurring). He suggested that “[w]hen a criminal defense attorney is aware” that a client is an ... alien, he or she should advise the client of the immigration consequences and tell the client to consult an immigration specialist for advice on that subject. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 387 [130 S.Ct. 1473].
Id. at *10. The Kansas court proceeded to find “there was no evidence presented establishing that Rodriguez’s former attorney knew or had a reason to know Rodriguez was an undocumented alien prior to the entry of the no contest plea.” Id. at *10. Similarly, in the case at bar, Mr. Hutton had been a resident of the United States since he was a young child, having lived here for nearly forty years at the time the criminal charges were brought against him. Consequently, there was likely no reason for his counsel to know that he was not an American citizen.
I believe the majority in the case at bar, like the majority in Padilla, leaves unclear whether lawyers must inquire of the immigration status of each and every client charged with a crime. And, the majority’s footnote eighteen only serves to further muddy the waters.
In footnote eighteen, the majority excuses Mr. Hutton’s admitted failure to advise his *745counsel of Ms immigration status by stating that the Padilla Court did not place a burden on criminal defendants to advise their lawyers of their immigration status. While that statement may be correct, I am concerned that the Mverse implication of footnote eighteen is that the burden is on lawyers to explore the immigration status of every erimmal defense client, notwithstanding the fact that Padilla did not expressly impose such a duty.4 Because the focus of Padilla was on the importance of a lawyer giving his or her client accurate advice regardmg the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, the Court simply never addressed precisely how immigration status was to be discerned. See Stephens, 265 P.3d at 577 (“The only issue the UMted States Supreme Court decided was whether defense counsel had a duty to m-form Ms client, known to be a resident alien, of the effect of a guilty plea on the client’s immigration status.”).
Placing an affirmative duty on lawyers to ask every client whether he or she is an American citizen prior to entry of a guilty plea may seem an msignifieant burden, particularly when contrasted with the possibility of adverse immigration consequences arising out of a guilty plea to erimmal charges. However, absent an express holding by the UMted States Supreme Court imposing a blanket duty on lawyers to question every criminal defense client concerning their citizensMp or immigration status, or unless an attorney reasonably should have known of Ms or her client’s immigrant statufe under the particular circumstances, I do not believe that such a global duty of inquiry exists.5
For these reasons, I respectfully concur, in part, and dissent, in part, to the majority’s decision in this case.

.See Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995) ("In the West Virginia courts, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be governed by the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): (1) Counsel’s performance was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.”).

. Under the majority’s remand, I would remind the circuit court that Mr. Hutton will need to prove that his counsel’s performance was deficient under the first prong of Strickland and, if he is successful in that regard, he will still have to satisfy the second prong and prove prejudice before he will be entitled to. relief.

. See Clarke, 974 N.E.2d at 569.

. I share Justice Alito’s concerns about the burden- that Padilla does place on a lawyer who is aware that his or her client is an alien. As Justice Alito summarized, "a criminal defense attorney should not be required to provide advice on immigration law, a complex specialty that generally lies outside the scope of a criminal defense attorney’s expertise.” Id. at 387-88, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (Alito, J., concurring). Explaining further, Justice Alito stated that
an alien defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is satisfied if defense counsel advises the client that a conviction may have immigration consequences, that immigration law is a specialized field, that the attorney is not an immigration lawyer, and that the client should consult an immigration specialist if the client wants advice on that subject.
Id. at 388, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (Alito, J., concurring).

. Given the uncertainly created by Padilla in this regard, perhaps the issue should be addressed either through our procedural rules, or through a statutory enactment. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374 n. 15, 130 S.Ct. 1473 ("[Mjany States require trial courts to advise defendants of possible immigration consequences. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(C) (2009-2010);' Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 1016.5 (West 2008); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 54-lj (2009); D.C.Code § 16-713 (2001); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.172(c)(8) (Supp.2010); Ga.Code Ann. § 17-7-93(c) (1997); Haw.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 802E-2 (2007); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 2.8(2)(b)(3) (Supp.2009); Md. Rule 4-242 (Lexis 2009); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, § 29D (2009); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.01 (2009); MontCode Ann. § 46-12-210 (2009); N.M. Rule Crim. Form 9-406 (2009); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law Ann. -§ 220.50(7) (West Supp.2009); N.C. Gen.Stat. Ann. §.-15A-1022 (Lexis 2007); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2943.031 (West 2006); Ore.Rev.Stat. § 135.385 (2007); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-12-22 (Lexis Supp.2008); Tex. .Code. Ann. Crim. Proc., Art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6565(c)(1) (Supp. 2009); Wash. Rev.Code § 10.40.200(2008); Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (2005-2006).”).
Decisions from other courts also reflect the use of plea forms that address the issue of citizenship. See State v. Navarette-Pacheco, No. 106,-874, 286 P.3d 239, 2012 WL 4795579, at *1 (Table) (Kan.Ct.App. Oct. 5, 2012) (observing that defendant’s " 'Acknowledgement of Rights and Entry of Plea’ form read: 'If I am not a United States citizen, I understand that a conviction of a felony offense most likely will result in my deportation from the United States.’ "); Ramirez-Gil v. State, 327 P.3d 1228, 1231 (Utah Ct.App.2014) (noting defendant’s acknowledgment that "written plea form contains the following statement, 'I understand that if-1 am not a United States citizen, my plea(s) today may, or even will, subject me to deportation under United States immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise adversely affect my immigration status, which may include permanently barring my re-entiy into the United States. I understand that if I have questions about the effect of my plea on my immigration status, I should consult with an immigration attorney.’ ”).