Court Opinion

ID: 9464396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:31:55.175731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:35.990354
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.
The single issue in this appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the permanent injunction entered against it. For the reasons set forth below, we find the district judge properly exercised his discretion, and therefore affirm the judgment.
This proceeding began on January 9,1974 when plaintiffs, members of the Marine Air Reserve, filed a complaint against the United States Marine Corps. Plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights were violated by defendant’s policy prohibiting reservists from wearing short hair wigs to cover long hair while attending annual active training duty (summer camp).1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. De Filippis v. United States, 370 F.Supp. 82 (N.D.Ill.1974). On October 30, 1974, after another hearing, the court permanently enjoined the Marine Corps from enforcing its no-wig regulation against plaintiffs. This injunction was issued after the district court had determined that any legitimate governmental interest in the regulation was outweighed by its infringement of the reservists’ personal liberties. No appeal was ever taken from this order.2
On April 5, 1976, the United States Supreme Court decided Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 47 L.Ed.2d 408 (1976), which upheld the validity of police department hair grooming standards similar to those of the Marine Corps. As part of its decision, the Court held that the burden was not on the Government to justify the regulation, but rather that the burden was on the plaintiffs to demonstrate the absence of rational connection between the regulation and its purported purpose. Id. at 247, 96 S.Ct. 1440.
Six months after Kelley was decided, the Marine Corps moved pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate the district court’s earlier order, stating that “because of the recent Supreme Court ruling in the case of Kelley v. Johnson, ... it would be inequitable to continue to enforce the permanent injunction . . . .” The Government specifically argued that Kelley had changed the law concerning the burden of proof, i. e., the burden should have initially been placed on plaintiffs to show no rational basis. The Government, however, neither filed affidavits nor offered testimony showing how continued enforcement of the injunction was inequitable. The district court denied the motion to vacate on January 24, 1977.
I
We begin our analysis by recognizing that a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate is not a substitute for an appeal. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950); Flett v. W. A. Alexander & Co., 302 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 841, 83 S.Ct. 71, 9 L.Ed.2d 77 (1962). Rule 60(b) provides for extraordinary relief. Because of the interest in finality of judgments, Rule 60(b) requires a showing of exceptional circumstances or a grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions. Ben Sager Chemicals International, Inc., v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977); *343Securities and Exchange Commission v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 539 F.2d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 1976). Appellate review of a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is limited to determining whether the district court abused its discretion. Ben Sager Chemicals, supra at 809; Beshear v. Weinzapfel, 474 F.2d 127, 130-31 (7th Cir. 1973).
Relief under Rule 60(b) is limited to one of the six grounds specified in the rule.3 Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972). In this case defendant moved to vacate the injunction both under Rule 60(b)(5), allowing relief from the inequitable prospective application of a judgment,4 and Rule 60(b)(6), the residual clause allowing relief for “any other reason justifying relief.” A review of these subsections reveals that neither supports the Government’s contentions.
II
The Government’s claim under Rule 60(b)(6) can be disposed of easily. It must first be noted that (b)(6) is separate from and exclusive of the other five grounds specified in Rule 60(b). Ben Sager Chemicals, 560 F.2d at 810 n. 3; Bershad v. McDonough, 469 F.2d 1333, 1336 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1972). See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949). As the Government here invokes subsection (b)(5), it cannot also claim relief under (b)(6).5
III
The question then is whether the Government has met its burden of demonstrating under Rule 60(b)(5) that inequity results from continued enforcement of the injunction.6 This provision does not allow *344relitigation of issues that have been resolved by the judgment. Rather, it requires a change in the conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable. 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice § 2863 (1973). As Mr. Justice Cardozo stated in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 464, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932):
There is need to keep in mind steadily the limits of inquiry proper to the case before us. We are not framing a decree. We are asking ourselves whether anything has happened that will justify us now in changing a decree. The injunction, whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to the conditions that existed at its making. We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of readjusting, (emphasis added.)
A strong showing must be made before an injunction will be modified or vacated.
No doubt the defendants will be better off if the injunction is relaxed, but they are not suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression. Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation . . .. Id. (emphasis added.)
The Government here has not met its burden of proof. Indeed, it has made no showing of how continued enforcement of the injunction works an injustice or constitutes a “grievous wrong.” It offered no testimony, filed no affidavits; it only cited Kelley v. Johnson. The Kelley decision, even if applicable,7 was not by itself such a subsequent event as to render inequitable continued application of the injunction.
We will not blindly apply the principle of finality when to do so will cause injustice. On the other hand, there must be an end to litigation someday. Absent a clear showing of grievous wrong, judgments will not, and cannot, be opened.
The order of the district court is affirmed.

. The complaint also challenged defendant’s policy of prohibiting reservists from wearing short hair wigs while attending monthly drills. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the Commandant of the Marine Corps announced a change in policy allowing short hair wigs at monthly drills. This change did not affect the prohibition of such wigs at summer camp.

. The Government did file a notice of appeal in the district court, but withdrew the appeal voluntarily before it was docketed in this court.

. Rule 60(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

. The second clause of subsection (b)(5) of Rule 60 contains language which initially seems to support the Government’s claim for relief because of a change in the law. That clause provides for relief from a final judgment when “a prior judgment upon which it was based has been reversed or otherwise vacated . . . .” This clause does not help the Government here because Kelley v. Johnson cannot be considered a “prior judgment” and therefore it cannot be said that the order granting the injunction in the instant case “was based” on Kelley. As the First Circuit observed concerning this clause:
For a decision to be “based on” a prior judgment within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5), the prior judgment must be a necessary element of the decision, giving rise, for example, to the cause of action or a successful defense. . . . It is not sufficient that the prior judgment provides only precedent for the decision.
[A] change in applicable law does not provide sufficient basis for relief under [Rule] 60(b)(5). Lubben v. Selective Service Sytem, 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972).

. The Government’s claim under (b)(6) would nevertheless fail for two additional reasons. First, courts are generally agreed that a change in the law after entry of judgment does not alone justify relief under (b)(6). See, e. g., Title v. United States, 263 F.2d 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1959); Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958); Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1952). Second, the failure of the Government here to prosecute an appeal has generally been held to bar relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950); Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 651 (1st Cir. 1972). But see Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 433, 81 S.Ct. 202, 5 L.Ed.2d 173 (1960).

. In its brief and at argument, the Government seemingly misconstrued who had the burden of proof in this case. It continually argued that under Kelley, plaintiffs had the burden. That might be so if this were an appeal from the entry of the original injunction. See n. 7 infra. But the Government, as the moving party, had the initial burden to show the inequity of continued application of the injunction.

. It is not clear whether Kelley would have even applied to this case as there are significant factual differences. For example, petitioners in Kelley challenged the authority to issue hair regulations whereas the reservists here only challenge the prohibition against use of short hair wigs to comply with admittedly valid hair regulations. Further, petitioners in Kelley were full-time policemen, whereas the reservists are primarily private citizens, spending only one month per year in active duty.