Court Opinion

ID: 9494067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:28:35.067413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:12.388367
License: Public Domain

*505RYMER, Circuit Judge, dissenting but concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the judgment reversing for Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), error, although I disagree with the majority’s reasoning and instructions on remand. However, because we reverse on this ground, discussion of what “pertinent claim or judgment” in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) means or how it plays out in this case is unnecessary to the decision. I therefore dissent from any discussion of this issue.
I concur in the judgment because I believe that Tillema did not have an informed opportunity to amend his first federal petition and let the unexhausted Eighth Amendment claim go. James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.2000). The district court dismissed Tillema’s original mixed petition without prejudice, but did not give him the choice of exhausting the claim by returning to state court, or deleting it from the petition to stay in federal court. Perhaps if this oversight had not occurred, the statute of limitations would not have become a problem. Now the statute of limitations is a problem, but Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568 (9th Cir.2000), sheds light on how it could be approached (and may be cured). In Anthony, the district court itself recognized that it had mistakenly dismissed the petitioner’s mixed petition without affording him an opportunity to amend or resubmit the petition with only exhausted claims, and the court treated his next (otherwise untimely) petition as an amendment that related back to and preserved his original filing date. We held that the court had authority to do this. By the same token in this case, we must reverse because the district court mistakenly dismissed Tillema’s mixed petition without offering options, but we should leave it to the district court on remand to craft an appropriate remedy. I would not direct the district court to apply equitable tolling, because to do so goes well beyond James or Anthony. It is one thing to uphold a district court’s exercise of discretion to reinstate the first petition or to relate a new filing back; it is quite another to hold that a district court must apply equitable tolling just because it “misapplied” the law.
I dissent from discussing (let alone deciding) the “pertinent judgment or claim” issue because:
(1) The issue is not certified;1
(2) We agree there is a straightforward basis for reversing on another ground (failure to give Tillema the choice of returning to state court or resubmitting the federal habeas petition without the unexhausted claim), which makes the majority’s alternative holding (on what constitutes a “pertinent judgment or claim”) unnecessary;
(3) To reach the issue and to resolve it as the majority does creates a circuit split. See Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that a state petition does not toll the statute with respect to a claim that is raised in the *506federal petition but not in the state petition), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1210, 120 S.Ct. 2211, 147 L.Ed.2d 244 (2000);
(4) This is an important issue, raising serious questions of statutory interpretation and Congressional intent, which the majority’s opinion resolves by reading both the adjective “pertinent” and the word “claim” out of § 2244(d)(2) even though this construct is not plain2 and the opinion offers no contextual or other reason founded in legislative history to do so; and
(5) All this is done based on a few sentences in the briefs that provide no real discussion, and certainly no in-depth analysis, of the issue.3

. The only issue on which the Certificate of Appealability was issued is: "whether the Petitioner's first habeas petition tolled the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ('AEDPA') limitations period.”

. It is by no means clear that “pertinent” judgment refers only to the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence (as the majority interprets it), such that any post-conviction attack that could undo that judgment tolls the running of the statute regardless of which claims are pursued in the state system and which are brought on federal habeas. After all, all post-conviction efforts aim to undo that judgment. Further, the "pertinent” judgment for purposes of federal habeas proceedings can be the judgment of the state appellate court. Thus, contrary to the majority's view, to construe the text differently from the way it construes it does not inevitably read "judgment" out of the statute.
Nor is the majority's reading required to preserve grounds raised on direct review for timely federal habeas review; the petitioner may preserve all his grounds (including those raised on direct review) for timely federal habeas by raising them in properly filed state post-conviction proceedings (whether or not they will be held to be procedurally defaulted). This would stop the clock from running as to them.
It also is by no means clear that "judgment” necessarily trumps "claim,” or that reading "judgment” as broader than "claim” helps discern how § 2244(d)(2) should be construed, as the majority suggests. Sometimes there can be a cognizable habeas "claim” without any "judgment” at all, for example, pre-trial no-bail detention.
The one thing that does seem clear is that whatever the "judgment,” or whatever the "claim,” it must be "pertinent” to be not counted toward the one-year period of limitation. In order for a judgment or claim to be "pertinent” there must be judgments or claims that are not "pertinent” — unless, of course, Congress meant to distinguish only impertinent judgments.

. This is not surprising, as the parties were focused on other issues. In any event, here is the sum total of the argument: From the state:
To give meaning to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the Second Motion to Vacate cannot serve to toll the limitations period because it does not contain a pertinent claim that is being challenged in the federal petition. An interpretation of this statute that any challenge to the judgment will toll the limitations period, would ignore that "pertinent” qualifies both "judgment” and "claim." In that regard, the word "claim” would be rendered surplus-age. A statute must be construed such that every word has operative effect. United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 229 (9th Cir.1995). The claim raised in TILLEMA’s Second State Petition have [sic] no relationship to the claims raised in the instant Amended Petition. Accordingly, that Motion cannot serve to toll the AEDPA limitations period because it does not challenge a "pertinent judgment or claim.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(3).
From Tillema:
The analysis does begin with basic principles of statutory construction. The one year statute is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) when the "State ... challenge” [sic] attacks the state judgment. The judgment is, of course, the conviction and sentence that was imposed; in this case, three consecutive life sentences. Congress separated the words "judgment” and "claim” with the word "or” because they intended to provide "separate and distinct alternatives.” In re Pacific Atlantic Trading Co., 64 F.3d 1292, 1301 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896, 897 (9th Cir.1990).
This intent is further illuminated upon review of the entire text of § 2244(d). For *507example, subsection (1)(A) contemplates a "judgment” as its triggering date, whereas subsection (1)(D) references a claim or claims as the key to triggering the one year period. Clearly, each word has separate meaning because Congress wrote the statute with that intent. The Appellee's interpretation of the phrase "pertinent judgment or claim” should be rejected by this court.