Court Opinion

ID: 9400767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:05:38.805343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.766399
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 22–0239

              Submitted December 15, 2022—Filed June 9, 2023

JIM NAHAS,

      Appellee,

vs.

POLK COUNTY, IOWA, TOM HOCKENSMITH, Individually and in His Official
Capacity, ANGELA CONNOLLY, Individually and in Her Official Capacity,
STEVE VAN OORT, Individually and in His Official Capacity, ROBERT
BROWNELL, Individually and in His Official Capacity, and JOHN NORRIS,
Individually and in His Official Capacity,

      Appellants.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Brad McCall,

Judge.

      County officials appeal a district court’s order denying their motion to

dismiss based on its conclusion that the qualified immunity provisions in the

Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act did not apply retrospectively. AFFIRMED IN

PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

      Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all

participating justices joined. Mansfield, J., took no part in the consideration or

decision of the case.

      Kimberly Graham, County Attorney, and Meghan L. Gavin (argued),

Assistant County Attorney, for appellants.
                                      2

      Nicholas Mauro (argued) of Carney & Appleby Law Firm, Des Moines, and

Michael Carroll of Coppola, McConville, Carroll, Hockenberg & Flynn, P.C., West

Des Moines, for appellee.

      Carlton G. Salmons of Macro & Kozlowski, LLP, West Des Moines, for

amicus curiae Heartland Insurance Risk Pool.
                                        3

CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice.

      An aggrieved former Polk County employee brings an array of tort claims

against the county and the Polk County Board of Supervisors (the Board) under

Iowa Code chapter 670 (2021). Polk County and those employers sought to

dismiss the claims, arguing they were insulated from liability under Iowa’s

recently enacted qualified immunity provision. They also argued the former

employee did not satisfy Iowa Code section 670.4A’s new pleading requirement

for qualified immunity defenses. The district court rejected these arguments and

denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The defendants now appeal that

ruling.

      I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      On January 5, 2021, the Board fired Jim Nahas, the Polk County Human

Resources Director, after he refused to resign. Nahas challenged his termination

by filing a lawsuit against Polk County and four members of the Board, claiming

libel per se, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, extortion, civil

conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of Iowa

Code chapters 21 and 22.

      The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Iowa Code section 670.4A,

a new provision of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), and Iowa Rule

of Civil Procedure 1.421. On January 26, 2022, the district court denied the

motion to dismiss, concluding section 670.4A did not apply retrospectively. The

court also concluded that Nahas’s petition satisfied the notice pleading

standards. The defendants filed a timely appeal, which we retained. See Iowa
                                         4

Code § 670.4A(4) (“Any decision by the district court denying qualified immunity

shall be immediately appealable.”).

      Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

      II. Standard of Review.

      “We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for the correction

of errors at law.” Benskin, Inc. v. W. Bank, 952 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Iowa 2020)

(quoting Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014)). In our

review, “we accept as true the petition’s well-pleaded factual allegations, but not

its legal conclusions.” Id. (quoting Shumate, 846 N.W.2d at 507).

      III. Analysis.

      A. Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act. At common law in Iowa,

governmental subdivisions (e.g., cities and counties) enjoyed some measure of

immunity from a lawsuit. See Jahnke v. Incorporated City of Des Moines, 191

N.W.2d 780, 782 (Iowa 1971) (explaining that the Iowa legislature eliminated

common law tort immunity when it enacted the IMTCA, which was formerly

codified at Iowa Code § 613A (1967)); see also City of West Branch v. Miller, 546

N.W.2d 598, 603 (Iowa 1996) (giving examples of the limits of governmental

immunity at common law). Although the legislature has since broadly waived

governmental immunity for tort cases through the IMTCA, it recently amended

the IMTCA to narrow the scope of municipal liability. In 2021, the legislature

codified qualified immunity in the IMTCA for the first time. 2021 Iowa Acts ch.

183, § 14 (codified at Iowa Code § 670.4A (2022)). Specifically, the legislature

codified a substantive qualified immunity protection and introduced a
                                          5

heightened pleading requirement for plaintiffs bringing IMTCA claims. Id. § 14(1),

(3) (codified at Iowa Code § 670.4A(1), (3) (2022)).

      1. Section 670.4A(1)’s new qualified immunity protection. Iowa Code section

670.4A(1) provides:

             1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an employee or
      officer subject to a claim brought under this chapter shall not be
      liable for monetary damages if any of the following apply:

             a. The right, privilege, or immunity secured by law was not
      clearly established at the time of the alleged deprivation, or at the
      time of the alleged deprivation the state of the law was not
      sufficiently clear that every reasonable employee would have
      understood that the conduct alleged constituted a violation of law.

            b. A court of competent jurisdiction has issued a final decision
      on the merits holding, without reversal, vacatur, or preemption, that
      the specific conduct alleged to be unlawful was consistent with the
      law.

      Section 670.4A(1) establishes that qualified immunity protects employees

or officers so they are not “liable for monetary damages” under the IMTCA if one

of three conditions applies. Id. The first condition is that a legal right, privilege,

or immunity that the plaintiff claims was violated was not clearly established at

the time of the alleged violation. Id. § 670.4A(1)(a). The second condition is that

the law was not so clear that reasonable employees would have known the

conduct the plaintiff alleges violated the law. Id. The third condition is not at

issue in this case. See id. § 670.4A(1)(b).

      2. Section 670.4A(3)’s new procedural requirements. Historically, Iowa is a

notice pleading state. See Young v. HealthPort Techs., Inc., 877 N.W.2d 124, 127

(Iowa 2016) (“Under our notice-pleading standards, nearly every case will survive
                                         6

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which any relief may be

granted.” (citing Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1994))). As such, a

      petition need not allege ultimate facts that support each element of
      the cause of action. The petition, however, must contain factual
      allegations that give the defendant “fair notice” of the claim asserted
      so the defendant can adequately respond to the petition. A petition
      complies with the “fair notice” requirement if it informs the
      defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the claim’s
      general nature.

Rees v. City of Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted)

(quoting Schmidt v. Wilkinson, 340 N.W.2d 282, 283 (Iowa 1983)).

      Defendants may file preanswer motions to dismiss for plaintiffs’ “[f]ailure

to state a claim upon which any relief may be granted.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f).

“A court should grant a motion to dismiss ‘only if the petition on its face shows

no right of recovery under any state of facts.’ ” Young, 877 N.W.2d at 127 (quoting

Tate v. Derifield, 510 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Iowa 1994)). In the past, we have explicitly

declined to replace our notice pleading system with the heightened pleading

standards that federal courts use. Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa

Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 607 (Iowa 2012). But the legislature may

impose heightened pleading requirements for specific types of claims. See, e.g.,

Meade v. Christie, 974 N.W.2d 770, 779 (Iowa 2022) (recognizing heightened

pleading requirements imposed under director shield statute for claims against

corporate directors).

      The IMTCA now places a heightened pleading requirement on plaintiffs

who bring claims against municipal corporations or those corporations’

employees or officers. Iowa Code § 670.4A(3). This heightened pleading
                                          7

requirement has three features. First, plaintiffs “must state with particularity

the circumstances constituting the violation.” Id. Second, plaintiffs must plead

“a plausible violation” of the law. Id. Third, they also “must state . . . that the law

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. Ultimately, section

670.4A provides that the failure to plead a plausible violation or that the law was

clearly established will “result in dismissal with prejudice.” Id.

      B. Retrospective Application of Section 670.4A. The parties contest

whether and to what extent the qualified immunity provisions and heightened

pleading requirement are applicable in this case. Nahas contends that applying

the qualified immunity provisions and heightened pleading requirement would

be an impermissible retrospective application of new law. The defendants

disagree. We begin our analysis of the dispute with an overview of the relevant

law. We then analyze the qualified immunity provisions and heightened pleading

requirement separately.

      1. Retrospective application of statutes generally. “Whether a statute

applies retrospectively, prospectively, or both is simply a question regarding the

correct temporal application of a statute.” Hrbek v. State, 958 N.W.2d 779, 782

(Iowa 2021) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1522, 1524 (1994)

(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgments)). In determining the correct temporal

application of a statute, we generally apply a “three-part inquiry.” Id.

      “First, [we] must determine whether application of a statute is in fact

retrospective.” Id. “With respect to the first part of the inquiry, application of a

statute is in fact retrospective when a statute applies a new rule, standard, or
                                        8

consequence to a prior act or omission.” Id. In determining the relevant act or

omission, we look for the specific conduct regulated or addressed in the statute.

See id.; see also Miss. Dep’t of Corr. v. Roderick & Solange MacArthur Just. Ctr.,

220 So. 3d 929, 940 (Miss. 2017) (en banc) (Dickinson, J., concurring in result

only) (“In other words, to determine whether the statutory amendment should

apply, a court must understand what event or conduct the statute will control.”).

Stated differently, we make a “commonsense, functional judgment about

‘whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed

before its enactment.’ ” Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 357–58 (1999) (quoting

Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1499 (majority opinion)). We perform this threshold

inquiry to determine whether there is a “truly ‘retrospective’ application of a

statute.” Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1504. “Application of a statute to conduct

occurring after the effective date is in fact a prospective and not retrospective

application.” Hrbek, 958 N.W.2d at 783. If application of a statute is, in fact,

prospective and not retrospective, then no further inquiry is needed. See id.

      Second, if the court determines application of the new statute would be

retrospective, “then the court must determine whether the statute should be

applied retrospectively.” Id. at 782. Whether a statute should be applied

retrospectively is a question of statutory interpretation. Iowa Beta Ch. of Phi

Delta Theta Fraternity v. State, 763 N.W.2d 250, 266 (Iowa 2009) (“The first step

in determining if a statute applies retrospectively, prospectively, or both is to

determine whether the legislature expressly stated its intention.”). On this point,

the legislature has provided instruction regarding the correct temporal
                                         9

application of new statutes: “[a] statute is presumed to be prospective in its

operation unless expressly made retrospective.” Iowa Code § 4.5 (emphasis

added).

      Third, if the legislature expressly provides that a new law should have

retrospective operation, then the court must determine whether any substantive

law prohibits retrospective application of the new statute. Hrbek, 958 N.W.2d at

782; see Thorp v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1989).

For example, the ex post facto clause of the Iowa Constitution prohibits the

legislature from retroactively increasing the penalty for a crime. State v. Lathrop,

781 N.W.2d 288, 298 (Iowa 2010). By way of another example, we have held that

statutory changes that altogether eliminate a right of recovery or cause of action

deprive a plaintiff of a vested right and violate due process. Thorp, 446 N.W.2d

at 461–62.

      2. Qualified immunity. We first address the applicability of the immunity

provisions set forth in section 670.4A(1)(a). As discussed above, the new

statutory provisions provide that employees and officers “shall not be liable for

monetary damages” if

      [t]he right, privilege, or immunity secured by law was not clearly
      established at the time of the alleged deprivation, or at the time of
      the alleged deprivation the state of the law was not sufficiently clear
      that every reasonable employee would have understood that the
      conduct alleged constituted a violation of law.

Iowa Code § 670.4A(1)(a). The effective date of the statute was the day of its

passage, June 17, 2021. 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 183, § 16.
                                       10

      In the first step of the inquiry, we must determine whether application of

the statutory immunity provisions in this case would be truly retrospective. See

Hrbek, 958 N.W.2d at 782. To make that determination we must identify the

event of legal consequence that the statute governs. See id. Ultimately, this is a

commonsense, functional judgment that identifies the new standards or legal

consequences contained in the statute and what event or events trigger those

new standards or legal consequences. Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir.

2002) (per curiam).

      We conclude the relevant events here are the allegedly unlawful acts giving

rise to Nahas’s claims. The statute changes the legal consequences for “the

conduct” giving rise to “alleged deprivation” of a “right, privilege, or immunity

secured by law.” Iowa Code § 670.4A(1)(a). Prior to the effective date of the

statute, municipal officers and employees were liable for monetary damages for

conduct that resulted in a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured

by law. After the effective date of the statute, municipal officers and employees

are not liable for monetary damages for the same conduct unless the right,

privilege, or immunity secured by law was clearly established and every

reasonable employee would have understood the conduct to be in violation of the

law. Id.

      Application of the statutory immunity provisions to this case would be a

retrospective application of new law. Every one of the alleged acts giving rise to

Nahas’s claims occurred before section 670.4A took effect on June 17, 2021.

Application of the immunity provisions in this case would attach new legal
                                         11

consequences to the defendants’ acts completed prior to the effective date,

potentially immunizing them from liability for tortious conduct that they may

otherwise be liable for at that time and impairing Nahas’s ability to recover under

the law for that conduct. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505 (explaining a

retroactive statute is one that either “impair[s] rights a party possessed when he

acted, increase[s] a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose[s] new duties with

respect to transactions already completed”).

      Because application of the statutory immunity provisions to this case

would be retrospective, we must determine whether the legislature intended

these provisions to operate retroactively. See Iowa Code § 4.5 (explaining that

the legislature presumes statutes operate prospectively “unless expressly made

retrospective”); c.f. Hrbek, 958 N.W.2d at 782 (“Second, if the court determines

application of a statute is in fact retrospective, then the court must determine

whether the statute should be applied retrospectively.”). This is a question of

statutory interpretation. The bill containing the statutory immunity provisions

provided that the act, “being deemed of immediate importance, takes effect upon

enactment.” 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 183, § 16. The day of enactment was June 17,

2021. The legislation does not contain express language regarding retrospective

application. See id. The omission of any such language is especially salient here

because the bill that created section 670.4A contained another statutory

provision that was expressly given retrospective operations. Id. § 26 (providing

that newly enacted Iowa Code section 80.6A(1)(b) applies retroactively to

January 1, 2021); see Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186,
                                        12

193–94 (Iowa 2011) (concluding the legislature’s omission of language carried

significance where the same language was used in related statutes). Because

there is no express statement making the statutory immunity provisions

retrospective, we conclude the law can only be applied prospectively to conduct

occurring after the effective date of the statute. The qualified immunity defenses

are thus not applicable in this case.

      3. Retrospective application of the heightened pleading requirement. In

addition to the statutory immunities, section 670.4A sets forth a new heightened

pleading standard for claims arising under the IMTCA. “The heightened pleading

requirement in section 670.4A(3) has three components.” Victoriano v. City of

Waterloo, 984 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 2023). First, a plaintiff “alleging a violation

of the law must state with particularity the circumstances constituting the

violation.” Iowa Code § 670.4A(3). Second, the statute requires the plaintiff to

“plead a plausible violation” of law. Id. Third, the statute requires the petition

plead “that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”

Id.

      Nahas has filed three petitions in this case—his initial petition and then

two amended petitions. He filed his initial petition on September 27, 2021.

Subsequently, he filed the two amended petitions on October 14 and

November 11. The defendants contend the heightened pleading standard applies

here, and Nahas contends application of the heightened pleading standard to his

petitions in this case would be an impermissible retrospective application of the

statute.
                                         13

      In the first step of our inquiry, we must determine whether the application

of the heightened pleading requirement is truly retrospective. See Hrbek, 958

N.W.2d at 782. The pleading statute changes the legal requirements for the

petition. Prior to the effective date of the statute, a petition was sufficient if it

satisfied our notice pleading standards. “Under notice pleading, a petition [was]

sufficient ‘if it inform[ed] the defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim

and of the claim’s general nature.’ ” Victoriano, 984 N.W.2d at 181 (quoting Rees,

682 N.W.2d at 79). After the effective date of the statute, however, the petition

must satisfy the heightened pleading requirement or be subject to dismissal. See

Iowa Code § 670.4A(3). At first glance, then, it appears the relevant event is the

filing of the petition because the filing of the petition is the act that triggers the

new statutory consequence. But more nuanced analysis is required. As Justice

Scalia explained, it will not “always be easy to determine, from the statute’s

purpose, the relevant event for assessing its retroactivity.” Landgraf, 114 S. Ct.

at 1526 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgments).

      The difficulty in this case arises because the three parts of the heightened

pleading requirement relate to two different events. The first two—that a plaintiff

plead with particularity a plausible violation of the law—relate to the drafting

and framing of the petition. Nahas’s lawyer could control the drafting and

framing of the petitions filed after the enactment of the new law. The new law

thus attached new legal consequences (dismissal) to conduct (the drafting and

framing of the petition) that occurred after the effective date of the statute. This

leads us to conclude that applying the first two parts of the requirement would
                                         14

be prospective and not retrospective. No further inquiry is needed. See Hrbek,

958 N.W.2d at 783. The particularity and plausibility standards are thus

applicable here.

      We reach a different conclusion with respect to the third part of the

requirement—that the petition must state “the law was clearly established at the

time of the alleged violation.” Iowa Code § 670.4A(3). With respect to this

provision, the relevant event to which a new legal consequence would attach is

not the drafting and framing of the petition. Instead, it is the existence or

nonexistence of a historical social fact—whether the law was “clearly established

at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. The “clearly established” standard is thus

inherently backward-looking. In this case, that historical social fact was

determined at the time of the alleged violations, which were all prior to the

enactment of this statutory provision. Further, whether the law was clearly

established is inextricably intertwined with the new qualified immunity defense

and only relevant to this case to the extent the new qualified immunity defense

is operative in this case, and we already have concluded that qualified immunity

is not operative in this case because it would be an impermissible retrospective

application of the statute. We thus conclude that application of this pleading

standard to this case would in fact be a retrospective application of this

particular statutory provision. Because the legislature did not expressly make

this statutory provision retrospective, it cannot be applied in this case. See Iowa

Code § 4.5.
                                        15

      C. Motion to Dismiss. Having determined the particularity and

plausibility standards apply to Nahas’s petition, we now review the district court

ruling on the motion to dismiss. The significance of our ultimate determination

is apparent in section 670.4A(3)’s command that the “[f]ailure to plead a

plausible violation or failure to plead that the law was clearly established . . .

shall result in dismissal with prejudice.” Id. § 670.4A(3).

      1. Section 670.4A(3)’s particularity and plausibility pleading standard. The

meaning of “particularity” and “plausibility” in the section 670.4A context is a

question of statutory interpretation. “As with all cases involving statutory

interpretation, we start with the language of the statute to determine what the

statute means.” Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc., 975 N.W.2d 670, 680 (Iowa 2022). When

we interpret statutes, “[w]ords bear their ordinary meanings unless the context

indicates that a technical meaning applies.” Bribriesco-Ledger v. Klipsch, 957

N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa 2021) (citing Seavert v. Cooper, 175 N.W. 19, 21 (Iowa

1919)); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 73 (2012) [hereinafter Scalia & Garner, Reading

Law]. For example, when statutes use legal terms of art, context suggests that

the legislature “adopt[ed] the cluster of ideas that were attached to each

borrowed word in the body of learning from which it is taken.” Air Wis. Airlines

Corp. v. Hoeper, 571 U.S. 237, 248 (2014) (quoting Fed. Aviation Admin. v.

Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012)).

      Here, we conclude that the particularity and plausibility aspects of section

670.4A(3)’s heightened pleading requirement require the same pleading as the
                                         16

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from

another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the

old soil with it.” Beverage, 975 N.W.2d at 682 (alteration in original) (quoting

Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 73). “Particularity” and “plausible” are

established terms of art in federal civil procedure. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677–79 (2009) (concluding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires

plaintiffs to allege enough facts to state a facially plausible case); see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity

the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007) (requiring plaintiffs to plead facts that raise a

plausible right to relief). Because the words “plausibility” and “particularity” have

an established meaning in federal law, we expect that the legislature intended to

incorporate that meaning when it used those words. In other words, if the

legislature wanted a different pleading standard, it probably would not have used

words that have such an established meaning in federal civil procedure.

      Federal caselaw is replete with discussions of what the particularity and

plausibility standards entail. On the one hand, particularity “requires plaintiffs

to plead ‘the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any

newspaper story.’ ” Summerhill v. Terminix, Inc., 637 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir.

2011) (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 492 F.3d 986, 995 (8th Cir.

2007)). The purpose of particularity as a pleading standard is “to enable the

defendant to respond specifically and quickly to the potentially damaging

allegations.” Drobnak v. Anderson Corp., 561 F.3d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 2009)
                                           17

(quoting United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556

(8th Cir. 2006)). Allegations that are vague or conclusory are insufficient.

Ambassador Press, Inc. v. Durst Image Tech. U.S., LLC, 949 F.3d 417, 421–22

(8th Cir. 2020). Likewise, an allegation pleaded on information and belief does

not satisfy the particularity standard unless the allegation “set[s] forth the source

of the information and the reasons for the belief.” Id. at 421 (quoting Munro v.

Lucy Activewear, Inc., 899 F.3d 585, 590 (8th Cir. 2018)).

      By comparison, an allegation is plausible insofar as it “allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Aschroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).

Plausibility determinations are highly context-specific, and they demand “the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

Plausibility is not a “probability requirement” because plausibility demands

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678.

For example, “a complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

defendant’s liability” does not satisfy the plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557). Likewise, a plaintiff is not entitled to relief if the

court cannot “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In short, plaintiffs need to allege sufficient facts to

show the defendants are liable for specific causes of action.

      2. Applying the pleading standards. Now, we apply the relevant pleading

standards to Nahas’s second amended petition. Of the petition’s seven counts,
                                         18

only counts I and IV have met the applicable pleading standards and will survive

the defendants’ motion to dismiss as a matter of law.

      a. Count I: libel per se. Nahas’s allegation of libel per se is satisfactory

under the heightened pleading standards. The allegation not only informs the

defendants that his termination letter’s publication is the basis for the libel claim

but it is particular and plausible as well. Nahas specifies with particularity that

the defendants publicly released to news outlets a termination letter that

accused Nahas of dishonesty. Assuming these allegations are true, we can

plausibly infer the defendants committed libel per se based on this conduct. The

district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss on this count.

      b. Count II: wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Count II of the

second amended petition fails as a matter of law. The petition refers broadly to

“the public policy of the State of Iowa” and relies on Polk County policies as

sources of public policy. Nahas cites no caselaw, statute, administrative

regulation, or constitutional provision as a source of a public policy that the

defendants might have violated. “[W]e have consistently refused to recognize the

existence of alleged public policies based in general and vague concepts of

socially desirable conduct, internal employment policies, or private interests.”

Berry v. Liberty Holdings, Inc., 803 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Iowa 2011). Nahas has

therefore failed as a matter of law to allege a claim for wrongful discharge because

he has not cited acceptable sources of public policy. The district court erred by

denying the motion to dismiss with respect to count II.
                                          19

      c. Count III: extortion. The extortion claim fails the heightened pleading

standard. Nahas principally alleges that Polk County put him on administrative

leave and threatened to terminate his employment to induce him to make

statements that would harm Matt McCoy politically. By statute, extortion

requires that a person take one of seven proscribed actions to obtain a tangible

or intangible benefit. Iowa Code § 711.4. We do not believe that the conduct

Nahas alleged plausibly amounts to extortion. Nahas’s allegations do not show

“more than a sheer possibility,” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, that the alleged actions

constitute threats or coercion because the allegations are much more consistent

with a good-faith investigation into potential workplace misconduct. The district

court erred by denying the motion to dismiss count III.

      d. Count IV: civil conspiracy. Nahas alleges a civil conspiracy with sufficient

particularity and plausibility. “Civil conspiracy is not in itself actionable; rather[,]

it is the acts causing injury undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy which

give rise to the action.” Basic Chems., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 233 (Iowa

1977) (citing Shannon v. Gaar, 6 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Iowa 1942)). The second

amended petition plausibly alleges that two or more of the defendants combined

to defame Nahas and deprive him of the benefits of his employment throughout

the period leading up to his termination. From that, we can infer liability for civil

conspiracy to commit libel against Nahas, assuming the allegations in the second

amended petition to be true.

      Under the notice pleading standard, Nahas’s conspiracy claim also

survives the motion to dismiss. See Robbins v. Heritage Acres, 578 N.W.2d 262,
                                         20

265 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (concluding a plaintiff’s petition set out a set of facts

that could support a civil conspiracy claim). The district court correctly denied

the motion to dismiss Nahas’s civil conspiracy allegation.

      e. Count V: intentional infliction of emotional distress. The intentional

infliction of emotional distress allegation fails the plausibility pleading standard.

It is not plausible that publishing a termination letter amounts to the type of

outrageous conduct the defendants would have to have committed to be held

liable. The facts that Nahas alleges are not consistent with the type of outrageous

conduct that would constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. See

Lennette v. State, 975 N.W.2d 380, 391–92 (Iowa 2022) (listing the elements of

an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). It is not uncommon for

supervisors to terminate employees, and other people such as coworkers and

clients learn about the termination—and the reasons for it—with regularity. The

district court erred when it denied the motion to dismiss this claim.

      f. Counts VI and VII: violations of Iowa Code chapters 21 and 22. Count VI

does not satisfy the heightened pleading standard. The second amended petition

fails to allege plausible and particular violations of chapter 21. Nahas claims that

the Board met in a secret, unauthorized closed session and thereby violated Iowa

Code section 21.3. But the basis for this allegation is a statement by the Polk

County Administrator that the Board made the decision to terminate Nahas.

Common sense and experience tell us that such a statement does not mean that

the Board held a closed session in violation of section 21.3. Importantly,

chapter 22 does not even require the Board to hold a public meeting to confer
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with the Polk County Administrator about personnel decisions like terminating

Nahas. Although Nahas states otherwise in his petition, that statement is a legal

conclusion that we are not required to accept as true. See Benskin, 952 N.W.2d

at 298.

      Moreover, Nahas does not allege with particularity that a secret meeting

ever occurred. He fails to state who attended the alleged meeting, when it

occurred, or where it was held. He simply claims that the Board met jointly or

by proxy in the days leading up to Nahas’s termination. Without more specific

particulars, Nahas has failed to satisfy the particularity standard of section

670.4A(3).

      Further, count VII fails as a matter of law. Nahas is legally incorrect in

arguing section 22.7 forbids Polk County from releasing information about his

termination. See Iowa Code § 22.7(11)(a)(5). The exceptions listed in section 22.7

are not a basis for requiring the disclosure of documents. See id. § 22.7. Rather,

they allow a lawful custodian of government documents to refuse to release

documents that contain confidential information. Id. Whether the termination

letter is confidential or not, Polk County still was not prohibited from releasing

it under section 22.7. The district court erred by denying the motion to dismiss

counts VI and VII.

      D. Section 670.4A’s Constitutionality. Finally, Nahas disputes section

670.4A’s constitutionality. We decline to consider this argument because error

was not preserved for our review. The district court never ruled on the statute’s

constitutionality. “It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues
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must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will

decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002)

(citing Metz v. Amoco Oil Co., 581 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Iowa 1998) (en banc)); see

also Peters v. Burlington N. R.R., 492 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1992).

      IV. Conclusion.

      For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s decision allowing counts I

and IV to proceed and reverse the district court with respect to counts II, III, V,

VI, and VII. We remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

      AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

      All justices concur except Mansfield, J., who takes no part.