Court Opinion

ID: 9940533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 18:01:24.159851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:58.887199
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JANE DOE, on behalf of herself and         No. 22-55315
all others similarly situated,
                                         D.C. No. 2:21-cv-
              Plaintiff-Appellant,        02428-VAP-SK

 v.                                        ORDER AND
                                            AMENDED
WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC,                     OPINION
A.S.; WGCZ HOLDING, A.S.;
WGCZ LIMITED, S.R.O.; NKL
ASSOCIATES, S.R.O.; TRAFFIC F,
S.R.O.; GTFLIX TV, S.R.O.; FTCP,
S.R.O.; VS MEDIA, INC.; HC
MEDIA, S.R.O.; HC MULTIMEDIA
LLC; FBP MEDIA, S.R.O.;
STEPHANE MICHAEL PACAUD;
DEBORAH MALORIE PACAUD;
SERVERSTACK, INC.; DIGITAL
OCEAN HOLDINGS, INC.;
DIGITAL OCEAN, LLC, FKA Digital
Ocean, Inc.,

              Defendants-Appellees.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Central District of California
      Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding
2             DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

          Argued and Submitted December 9, 2022
                   Pasadena, California

                   Filed January 2, 2024
                 Amended February 14, 2024

    Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr., Daniel P. Collins, and
            Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

                            Order;
                   Opinion by Judge Collins;
                   Concurrence by Judge Lee

                          SUMMARY *

                     Personal Jurisdiction

    The panel reversed in part and vacated in part the district
court’s dismissal, for lack of personal jurisdiction, of claims
asserted against 11 foreign-based defendants in a putative
class action alleging that defendants violated federal and
California law by participating in, or benefitting from, the
distribution of videos on the internet that depicted the sexual
abuse of Plaintiff and of other victims of childhood-sex-
trafficking.
    At least four of the videos depicting Plaintiff were
uploaded to two pornography websites, which use English
as their default language but are respectively operated by
two related Czech entities, Defendants WebGroup Czech
*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
             DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.              3

Republic, a.s. and NKL Associates, s.r.o. Both entities have
their principal place of business in the Czech Republic, and
neither has offices, conducts business operations, or is
registered to do business in the United States. Plaintiff filed
this putative class action against WGCZ, NKL, and nine
additional foreign defendants (collectively, the “Foreign
Defendants”), and five U.S.-based defendants.
    Plaintiff contended that personal jurisdiction over the
Foreign Defendants is authorized by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k)(2). Whether personal jurisdiction exists
under Rule 4(k)(2) turns on whether the requirements of the
Due Process Clause are satisfied. Because Plaintiff did not
contend that the Foreign Defendants’ contacts with the
United States were sufficient to give rise to general
jurisdiction, the sole potential basis for personal jurisdiction
was specific jurisdiction over the particular matters at issue
in this lawsuit.
     The panel held that the district court erred in holding that
it lacked specific personal jurisdiction against WGCZ and
NKL under the requisite three-part due process test because
(1) Plaintiff established a prima facie case that WGCZ and
NKL purposefully directed their websites at the United
States, (2) her claims seek redress for harms that arise from
WGCZ’s and NKL’s forum-related activities in targeting
their websites towards the U.S. market, and (3) WGCZ and
NKL failed to make a compelling showing that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
    The panel therefore reversed the district court’s
dismissal of the action against WGCZ and NKL for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Because the district court dismissed
the remaining nine Foreign Defendants solely on the ground
that there was no personal jurisdiction over WGCZ and
4           DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

NKL, the panel vacated the dismissal of those additional
defendants. The panel instructed the district court to address
on remand the remaining unresolved issues concerning
whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted against those
additional defendants.
   Concurring, Judge Lee wrote separately to state that it
would have been prudent for the district court to have
ordered very limited jurisdictional discovery here, which
would have tethered the district court’s analysis more tightly
onto this circuit’s personal jurisdiction framework.

                        COUNSEL

Mark B. Schoeller (argued), Kevin D. Kent, and Vanessa L.
Huber, Clark Hill PLC, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Abbas
Kazerounian and Mona Amini, Kazerouni Law Group APC,
Costa Mesa, California; Benjamin W. Bull, Peter A. Gentala,
and Dani B. Pinter, National Center on Sexual Exploitation,
Washington, D.C.; Kimberly L. Adams, Levin Papantonio
Rafferty Proctor Buchanan O’ Brien Barr & Mougey PA,
Pensacola, Florida; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Derek L. Shaffer (argued), Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan LLP, Washington, D.C.; Michael T. Zeller, Michael
E. Williams, Diane Cafferata, and Dylan C. Bonfigli, Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Los Angeles, California;
Victor H.J. Jih, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Los
Angeles, California; Brian M. Willen, Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati PC, New York, New York; for
Defendants-Appellees.
           DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.          5

                         ORDER

   The slip opinion filed on January 2, 2024 is amended by
adding a footnote at the end of the first full paragraph on
page 18, with the footnote to read as follows:

       We reject Defendants’ contention that we
       may not consider the allegations and
       evidence concerning CDNs in assessing
       whether Plaintiff made a prima facie showing
       of express aiming.         Plaintiff expressly
       pleaded facts concerning Defendants’ use of
       U.S.-based CDNs in the operative complaint,
       and Defendants therefore squarely addressed
       that subject in their motion to dismiss and
       supporting declarations. In her opposition,
       Plaintiff then expressly relied on the CDNs as
       one of Defendants’ relevant contacts with the
       United States. Plaintiff again raised the
       CDNs in her motion to reconsider the district
       court’s dismissal order, and, although
       Defendants argued that reconsideration was
       unwarranted, they also argued on the merits
       that further consideration of the CDNs would
       not change the “express aiming” analysis. In
       declining to specifically address the
       significance of the CDNs in evaluating the
       express-aiming factor, the district court
       emphasized that the relevant substantive
       discussion of how the CDNs gave rise to
       personal jurisdiction was contained in the
       section of Plaintiff’s opposition addressing
       the “arising out of” factor and was not also
       included in the section addressing the
6          DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

       “express aiming” factor. Even assuming that
       technical observation to be correct, we
       nonetheless      conclude     that   Plaintiff
       sufficiently raised the issue below to permit
       this court, on de novo review, to address the
       merits of the parties’ arguments concerning
       the significance of the CDNs with respect to
       the express-aiming factor. See Menken v.
       Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 n.4 (9th Cir.
       2007).

    An amended version of the opinion, reflecting this
change, accompanies this order. The concurrence of Judge
Lee is unchanged. With the opinion as amended, the panel
has unanimously voted to deny the petition for panel
rehearing and rehearing en banc filed on January 16, 2024
(Dkt. No. 56).
    The full court has been advised of the petition for
rehearing en banc and no judge of the court has requested a
vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App.
P. 35. Accordingly, the petition for panel rehearing and
rehearing en banc is DENIED. No further petitions for
rehearing or rehearing en banc will be entertained.
            DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.             7

                         OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

    Plaintiff-Appellant, proceeding pseudonymously as
“Jane Doe” (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”), brought this putative
class action against numerous parties who allegedly violated
federal and California law by participating in, or benefiting
from, the distribution of videos on the internet that depicted
the sexual abuse of Plaintiff and of other victims of
childhood sex-trafficking. The district court dismissed all of
the claims on various grounds, and on appeal Plaintiff
challenges only the district court’s dismissal, for lack of
personal jurisdiction, of the claims asserted against 11
foreign-based defendants. We reverse in part, vacate in part,
and remand.
                              I
                              A
    Because the district court did not hold an evidentiary
hearing on the question of personal jurisdiction and instead
held that Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case
for personal jurisdiction against the relevant defendants, the
applicable standard of review requires us to take the
“uncontroverted allegations” in Plaintiff’s complaint as true
and to resolve any “conflicts between the facts contained in
the parties’ affidavits” in Plaintiff’s favor. Rio Props., Inc.
v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
Applying those standards, we take the following facts as
true.
    Doe is a California resident and U.S. citizen who, at the
age of 14, was a victim of sex trafficking in the United
States. Specifically, while Plaintiff “was still a minor, a sex
8             DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

trafficker forced [Plaintiff] to participate in the creation of
videos of adults raping her.” At least four such videos were
uploaded to the pornography websites XVideos.com and
Xnxx.com, which are “video hosting website[s], where
registered users can upload adult videos” and visitors “can
view those videos for free without creating an account.”
While they were hosted on these websites, the videos of
Plaintiff’s abuse were viewed, shared, and downloaded
multiple times, with one video being viewed more than
160,000 times. Plaintiff claims that, beginning in 2017, she
contacted these two websites several times to ask them to
take down these videos, but she received no response until
her attorney sent a cease-and-desist letter in the fall of 2020. 1
After the cease-and-desist letter was received, the videos
were taken down.
    Although both XVideos.com and Xnxx.com use English
as their default language, the two websites are respectively
operated by two related Czech entities, Defendants-
Appellees WebGroup Czech Republic, a.s. (“WGCZ”) and
NKL Associates, s.r.o. (“NKL”). Both entities have their
principal place of business in Prague, Czech Republic, and
neither entity has offices, conducts business operations, or is
registered to do business in the United States. As explained
in a declaration provided by the person who serves as
“administrative director” for both WGCZ and NKL,
Xnxx.com “is similar to xvideos.com, and it displays
basically the same video content as xvideos.com but through
a different interface.” XVideos.com and Xnxx.com are both
hosted on servers located in the Netherlands that are
operated by ServerStack, Inc. (“ServerStack”), a U.S.-based
company that is wholly owned and operated by its ultimate
1
  The website operators assert that they have been unable to locate any
records of any such requests prior to the cease-and-desist letter.
              DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.                    9

parent company, U.S.-based DigitalOcean Holdings, Inc.
(“DigitalOcean”). WGCZ and NKL also contract with
ServerStack to analyze “new [video] uploads,” including for
purposes of “flagging[] and deleting” child sexual abuse
material.
    In addition, WGCZ and NKL contract with various
content delivery networks (“CDNs”), including U.S.-based
CDN companies, that temporarily copy content from the
Netherlands-based servers that host XVideos.com and
Xnxx.com to additional servers, including servers in the
United States. This temporary copying by CDNs helps to
ensure that the websites’ “high-definition video content”
will be “efficiently and reliably stream[ed]” to users who are
located closer to those CDN servers, thereby providing an
“uninterrupted experience.” In operating their websites,
WGCZ and NKL use the services of several California-
based companies, including Google, EPOCH, PayPal, and
Twillio. Specifically, WGCZ and NKL contract with
Google and Twillio to manage emails, and they contract with
PayPal and EPOCH to manage payments in U.S. dollars to
and from their users and advertisers. 2 WGCZ and NKL are
also the owners of several registered U.S. trademarks for
XVideos.com and Xnxx.com.
    Registered users who upload videos to either
XVideos.com or Xnxx.com agree to similar standard “Terms
of Service,” which include a provision that users will not
“submit material that depicts any person under 18 years of
age (or the age of majority under the laws of [their] state or
jurisdiction), whether real or simulated.” After submitting
2
  The operative complaint suggests that the companies ended their
relationship with PayPal in April 2021, but the October 2021 declaration
of the companies’ administrative director refers to the companies’
relationship with PayPal in the present tense.
10             DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

suitable video verification “to prove that the content under
[their] account is clearly [theirs],” registered users on
XVideos.com have the option to create a “channel,” which
allows them to “promote [their] brand through various ads
and links” and monetize their uploaded videos. 3 WGCZ
“promotes and profits from these partner channels,”
including channels that distributed videos of Plaintiff’s
abuse.
    As of July 2021, XVideos.com “was ranked the 7th most
trafficked website globally” and “the 9th most trafficked
website in the United States,” and Xnxx.com “was ranked
the 10th most trafficked website both in the world and in the
United States.” The United States is the largest market for
both XVideos.com and Xnxx.com, with each website
generally drawing “between 12 and 19 percent” of its traffic
from users with U.S.-based IP addresses. Although neither
WGCZ nor NKL solicits video content for these two
websites from particular countries or individuals, the
websites’ advertising includes geographically targeted and
location-based ads that are arranged by a Czech website-
advertising company (Traffic F, s.r.o.) that sells ad space to
third parties.
                                     B
    On March 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed this putative class
action against WGCZ, NKL, and nine additional foreign
defendants (collectively, the “Foreign Defendants”), 4 and

3
  Although the operative complaint does not explicitly address the point,
the apparent inference is that Xnxx.com offers the same ability to
monetize uploaded videos as does XVideos.com.
4
  The nine additional Foreign Defendants consist of seven additional
Czech entities—namely, (1) WGCZ Holding, a.s.; (2) WGCZ Limited,
s.r.o.; (3) Traffic F, s.r.o.; (4) GTFlix TV, s.r.o.; (5) FTCP, s.r.o.; (6) HC
              DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.                11

five U.S.-based defendants (including ServerStack and
DigitalOcean). In her operative First Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff sought to represent one or more classes of persons
who were depicted in child pornography videos and images
that were hosted on defendants’ websites. She asserted, on
her own and the putative classes’ behalf, four causes of
action.
    First, Plaintiff asserted a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1595,
which creates a private civil cause of action for victims of
violations of any provision of Chapter 77 of title 18 of the
United States Code, including the prohibition in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a)(2) on benefitting from participation in a venture
that has engaged in sex trafficking. Plaintiff alleged that all
of the defendants were liable under § 1595’s civil remedy,
which imposes liability not only on the “perpetrator” of the
offense, but also on any person who “knowingly benefits, or
attempts or conspires to benefit, financially or by receiving
anything of value from participation in a venture which that
person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in
violation of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
    Second, Plaintiff alleged that the distribution of child
pornography depicting her and the class members violated
the federal child pornography prohibitions in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A. Plaintiff asserted that, as a result, those involved
in that distribution were liable for damages and other relief
under the civil action subsection of that statute. See 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(f).
   Third, Plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated 18
U.S.C. § 2260(b), which generally prohibits persons outside

Media, s.r.o.; and (7) FBP Media, s.r.o.—and two natural persons
(Stephane Michael Pacaud, a “tax resident” of the Czech Republic, and
his sister Deborah Malorie Pacaud, a citizen of France).
12           DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

the United States from trafficking in child pornography,
“intending that the visual depiction will be imported into the
United States.” According to Plaintiff, the defendants were
therefore liable under the civil cause of action in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a) for “personal injury as a result of such violation.”
    Fourth, Plaintiff alleged that defendants were liable
under California’s statute creating a civil cause of action in
favor of a person who suffers damages from the
unauthorized distribution of private sexually explicit images
of that person. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.85.
    The defendants filed various motions to dismiss, only
one of which is at issue here. Specifically, the Foreign
Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. In an
amended order issued on January 13, 2022, the district court
granted that motion. In its order, the court held that Plaintiff
had failed to establish personal jurisdiction over WGCZ and
NKL. Because the remaining nine Foreign Defendants were
only included in the lawsuit on the theory that they had an
“alter ego relationship” with WGCZ and NKL, the court
concluded that its lack of jurisdiction over WGCZ and NKL
meant that the court “also lack[ed] personal jurisdiction over
their potential alter-egos.” Accordingly, the court held that
Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery “to prove the
existence of an alter ego relationship” was moot and that the
court did not need to decide whether any of these additional
nine Foreign Defendants were in fact alter egos. On
February 25, 2022, the court denied Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration concerning the dismissal of the Foreign
Defendants, except that the court explicitly clarified that its
dismissal of these defendants was without prejudice.
             DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.            13

    The district court’s January 13, 2022 order also
dismissed the claims against the five remaining U.S.-based
defendants for failure to state a claim, but the order granted
leave to file a further amended complaint on or before
February 15, 2022. Plaintiff, however, did not file an
amended complaint and instead filed a notice of appeal on
March 28, 2022. Shortly thereafter, the district court issued
an order dismissing the case with prejudice. Construing its
February 25, 2022 order on reconsideration as having
granted leave to file an amended complaint against the
Foreign Defendants as well, the court noted that Plaintiff had
failed to file any amended complaint, and it therefore
dismissed the action with prejudice and entered judgment
accordingly. Under our decision in Weston Fam. P’ship
LLLP v. Twitter, Inc., 29 F.4th 611, 618–19 (9th Cir. 2022),
the district court’s subsequent formal dismissal order and
final judgment, even though filed after the notice of appeal,
cures any prematurity arising from the fact that Plaintiff filed
a notice of appeal at a time when she still had leave to amend
the complaint. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 over Plaintiff’s appeal.
                              II
    A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant if such jurisdiction is authorized by applicable law
and “the exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate federal
due process.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151,
1154 (9th Cir. 2006). The only applicable law that Plaintiff
contends authorizes personal jurisdiction over the Foreign
Defendants here is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).
That rule provides that, “[f]or a claim that arises under
federal law,” a court may assert “personal jurisdiction over
a defendant” if (1) “the defendant is not subject to
jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction” and
14             DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

(2) “exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United
States Constitution and laws.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
Because the first three causes of action in Plaintiff’s
complaint expressly “arise[] under federal law,” id., the
threshold requirement for invoking Rule 4(k)(2) is satisfied,
at least with respect to those three claims. 5 Moreover, the
parties agree that none of the Foreign Defendants are
“subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general
jurisdiction.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)(A). With those
requirements satisfied, the applicability of Rule 4(k)(2) here
turns on the final requirement that “exercising” jurisdiction
over the defendants would be “consistent with the United
States constitution and laws.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)(B).
And because no party contends that some other federal law
limits the applicability of Rule 4(k)(2) here, the reach of that
5
  Although Rule 4(k)(2) does not itself provide for personal jurisdiction
against foreign defendants with respect to state law claims, we assumed
in Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972 (9th Cir. 2021), that the
jurisdiction provided by that rule would also allow for jurisdiction over
any pendent state law claims against the same defendants. See id. at 984
(noting that our upholding of jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) in that case
would allow for resolution of both the plaintiff’s state law claims and its
federal claims in a U.S. forum). That assumption was consistent with
the holdings of other circuits that have concluded that, when federal law
allows for personal jurisdiction against a particular defendant with
respect to federal claims, pendent or supplemental jurisdiction may be
asserted over related state law claims against the same defendant. See
Laurel Gardens, LLC v. McKenna, 948 F.3d 105, 123–24 (3d Cir. 2020);
ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 628–29 (4th Cir. 1997);
IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1056–57 (2d
Cir. 1993); see also Canaday v. Anthem Cos., 9 F.4th 392, 401 (6th Cir.
2021) (distinguishing, on this point, between “pendent claim and pendent
party personal jurisdiction”). Accordingly, if Rule 4(k)(2) authorizes
personal jurisdiction against any of the defendants here with respect to
the federal claims, then the district court may also assert personal
jurisdiction against those same defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s
related state law claims.
            DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.            15

rule in this case is co-extensive with the limits of the Due
Process Clause of the federal Constitution.
    Accordingly, whether personal jurisdiction exists under
Rule 4(k)(2) turns on whether the requirements of the Due
Process Clause are satisfied here. A court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a non-U.S. defendant comports
with due process if that defendant has “certain minimum
contacts” with the relevant forum “such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283
(2014) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)). In the context of Rule 4(k)(2), in which no
individual state has personal jurisdiction over the defendants
and the claim is based on federal law, the relevant forum for
assessing whether minimum contacts exist is the United
States “as a whole.” AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970
F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
    Plaintiff does not contend that the Foreign Defendants’
contacts with the United States were sufficient to give rise to
“general jurisdiction,” which would allow the forum to “hear
any and all claims against them.” Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (citation omitted). To support a
claim of such general jurisdiction, Plaintiff would have to
show that the defendant’s contacts with the forum “are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at
home in the forum State.” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff
does not assert that that high standard could be met here.
“Accordingly, the sole potential basis for personal
jurisdiction is specific jurisdiction” over the particular
matters at issue in this lawsuit. Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty.
Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added).
16           DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

     Specific jurisdiction may be constitutionally exercised
over a non-U.S. defendant under Rule 4(k)(2) if three
requirements are satisfied. First, the defendant must have
“performed some act or consummated some transaction by
which it purposefully directed its activities toward the
United States or purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting business in the United States.” Ayla, 11 F.4th
at 979 (simplified). Second, “the claim must be one which
arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related
activities.” AMA Multimedia, 970 F.3d at 1208 (citation
omitted). Third, “the exercise of jurisdiction must comport
with fair play and substantial justice, i.e.[,] it must be
reasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). “If any of the three
requirements is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum would
deprive the defendant of due process of law.” Id. (citation
omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the
first two prongs of th[is] test.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v.
Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted). If the plaintiff establishes that those two
prongs are satisfied, “the burden then shifts to the defendant
to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction
would not be reasonable.” Id. at 1068–69 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
    As we noted earlier, Plaintiff’s argument below was that
(1) personal jurisdiction existed under this test against
WGCZ and NKL; and (2) the remaining nine Foreign
Defendants were alter egos of WGCZ and NKL, such that
the court’s personal jurisdiction over WGCZ and NKL
extended to these additional defendants. See supra at 12.
The district court concluded that Plaintiff’s first premise
failed and it therefore declined to address either the merits of
Plaintiff’s alter ego theory or Plaintiff’s request for
jurisdictional discovery concerning these additional
            DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.            17

defendants. Consequently, the only issue before us is
whether the district court correctly held that, under the
above-described three-prong test, a prima facie showing of
specific personal jurisdiction against WGCZ and NKL had
not been shown. We review a dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction de novo. Burri Law PA v. Skurla, 35 F.4th 1207,
1213 (9th Cir. 2022).
                             III
     We conclude that the district court erred in holding that
it lacked specific personal jurisdiction against WGCZ and
NKL under the three-part due process test set forth above.
                              A
    The first prong of the due process analysis examines
whether the defendant either “[1] purposefully directed its
activities toward the United States or [2] purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the
United States.” Ayla, 11 F.4th at 979 (simplified). Although
these two standards overlap to some extent, “[w]e generally
focus our inquiry on purposeful availment when the
underlying claims sound in contract and on purposeful
direction when they arise from alleged tortious conduct
committed outside the forum.” Id.; see also Schwarzenegger
v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004).
We have held that the civil cause of action for victims of sex-
trafficking in 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) “sounds in tort,” Ditullio
v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011), and the same
reasoning extends equally to the causes of action established
for victims of child pornography in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(f)
and 2255(a). We therefore “focus on purposeful direction
here.” Ayla, 11 F.4th at 979.
18          DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

    The governing test for determining whether a defendant
has purposefully directed its actions toward the forum is the
so-called “‘effects’ test, derive[d] from Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783 (1984).” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069. Under
that test, “[t]he defendant must have (1) committed an
intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state,
(3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be
suffered in the forum state.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). WGCZ and NKL concede that
they committed intentional acts by operating Xvideos.com
and Xnxx.com, and so the first element of the Calder test is
met. WGCZ and NKL contend, however, that the other two
elements have not been satisfied, and we therefore address
those elements in turn.
                              1
    We conclude that Plaintiff made a sufficient prima facie
showing that WGCZ’s and NKL’s operation of their
pornography websites was “expressly aimed” at the United
States. Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069 (citation omitted).
    We have held that “maintenance of a passive website
alone cannot satisfy the express aiming prong” of the Calder
effects test. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647
F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
However, “operating even a passive website in conjunction
with ‘something more’—conduct directly targeting the
forum—is sufficient.” Id. (citation omitted). In determining
whether a defendant’s operation of a particular website has
crossed the line between passively benefiting from U.S.
users of its website and expressly aiming its website at such
users, “we have considered several factors, including the
interactivity of the defendant’s website; the geographic
scope of the defendant’s commercial ambitions; and whether
             DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.            19

the defendant ‘individually targeted’ a plaintiff known to be
a forum resident.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not
contend that she was “individually targeted” in the sense that
Mavrix describes. Id. (citation omitted). Rather, the
question here is whether express aiming at the U.S. market
has been shown by virtue of what the evidence reveals about
(1) how WGCZ and NKL operate these particular websites
and (2) the “geographic scope” of the companies’
“commercial ambitions” in doing so. Id. To establish the
requisite “something more” based on these sorts of
considerations, we have held that the plaintiff must show that
the website operator “both actively appealed to and profited
from an audience” in the U.S. forum. Will Co., Ltd. v. Lee,
47 F.4th 917, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2022) (simplified). Here, as
in Will, that showing has been sufficiently made.
    Will concerned a Japanese pornographer’s U.S.
copyright infringement claims against the defendant
operators of an adult “video-hosting site based in Hong
Kong.” See 47 F.4th at 919. In concluding that the
defendants operated their website in a way that was
expressly aimed at the United States, we emphasized that the
defendants had taken two specific steps that “reduced the
time it takes for the site to load in the United States.” Id. at
924. Specifically, the defendants “acquired hosting services
from an American company, Gorilla Servers, with servers in
Utah,” and they “purchase[d] content delivery network
services for North America.” Id. at 920, 924. The use of
these measures, we held, showed that the defendants “chose
to have the site load faster for viewers in the United States
and slower for viewers in other places around the world.” Id.
at 925. Given that “[t]he time it takes for a site to load,
sometimes referred to as a site’s ‘latency,’ is critical to a
website’s success,” we held that the defendants’ adoption of
20            DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

measures that differentially favored the United States market
was “good evidence” of the defendants’ efforts to actively
appeal specifically to the United States market, as opposed
to passively offering a website to the world at large. Id. at
924–25.
    Here, in contrast to Will, WGCZ and NKL did not
contract to host their websites on physical servers in the
United States. However, they did contract with U.S.-based
content delivery network services (“CDNs”) for their
websites, and they did so for the conceded purpose of
ensuring that “users viewing videos have [an] uninterrupted
experience.” As WGCZ and NKL acknowledge, “it is not
ideal to efficiently and reliably stream high-definition video
content to all users over the globe without using CDNs.”
According to WGCZ and NKL, its CDN providers “‘pull’
certain content from [the companies’] servers in Amsterdam
onto the CDN providers’ regional facilities based upon local
user clicks and videos.” That content “is temporarily cached
on, and served from, the CDN facilities and subsequently
deleted.” By using U.S.-based CDNs to improve the
viewing experience of persons near those CDNs, and by
allowing CDN providers to pull content onto the U.S.-based
CDNs’ servers to do so, WGCZ and NKL have differentially
targeted U.S. visitors in a way that, under Will, constitutes
express aiming at the U.S. market. See Briskin v. Shopify,
Inc., 87 F.4th 404, 420 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting that, under
Will, express aiming is shown when there is “some
differentiation of the forum state from other locations”). 6

6
   We reject Defendants’ contention that we may not consider the
allegations and evidence concerning CDNs in assessing whether Plaintiff
made a prima facie showing of express aiming. Plaintiff expressly
pleaded facts concerning Defendants’ use of U.S.-based CDNs in the
operative complaint, and Defendants therefore squarely addressed that
               DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.                    21

    On this point, our decision in Ayla is also instructive. In
Ayla, a U.S.-based beauty company sued an Australian
skincare company for trademark infringement and related
torts. 11 F.4th at 976–77. In holding that the Australian
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the United
States under Rule 4(k)(2) for these claims, we held that the
defendant had “done more than merely place its products
into the stream of commerce, running the risk that its
products might randomly or serendipitously arrive in the
United States.” Id. at 981. In particular, we noted that the
Australian defendant had contracted with “Dollar
Fulfillment,” a third-party Idaho fulfilment center, in order
to ensure that it could “ship its products quickly within the
United States.” Id. at 984. We noted that “[b]y contracting
with a distribution center in the United States, [defendant]
could offer two- to four-day shipping within the United
States, whereas delivery to most other parts of the world
would take five to ten days.” Id. at 982. WGCZ’s and

subject in their motion to dismiss and supporting declarations. In her
opposition, Plaintiff then expressly relied on the CDNs as one of
Defendants’ relevant contacts with the United States. Plaintiff again
raised the CDNs in her motion to reconsider the district court’s dismissal
order, and, although Defendants argued that reconsideration was
unwarranted, they also argued on the merits that further consideration of
the CDNs would not change the “express aiming” analysis. In declining
to specifically address the significance of the CDNs in evaluating the
express-aiming factor, the district court emphasized that the relevant
substantive discussion of how the CDNs gave rise to personal
jurisdiction was contained in the section of Plaintiff’s opposition
addressing the “arising out of” factor and was not also included in the
section addressing the “express aiming” factor. Even assuming that
technical observation to be correct, we nonetheless conclude that
Plaintiff sufficiently raised the issue below to permit this court, on de
novo review, to address the merits of the parties’ arguments concerning
the significance of the CDNs with respect to the express-aiming factor.
See Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007).
22          DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

NKL’s purchase of U.S.-based CDN services to ensure faster
website loading times and a more seamless viewing
experience for U.S. users is the digital analogue of
contracting with a U.S. fulfilment center to enable faster
product delivery for U.S. customers. Here, as in Ayla, the
use of such a U.S.-based operation to facilitate quick
delivery of product to nearby consumers demonstrates the
sort of differential targeting that constitutes express aiming
at the U.S. market.
     In arguing for a contrary conclusion, WGCZ and NKL
rely on AMA Multimedia, in which we declined to find that
a Polish pornography website had expressly aimed at the
U.S. market merely by using a U.S.-based “domain name
server (‘DNS’)” company. 970 F.3d at 1205. As we
explained, a DNS company “allows users to access [a
website] more efficiently by translating its domain names
[i.e., webpage addresses] into Internet Protocol addresses.”
Id. We held that, even if the use of a U.S.-based company to
perform this basic threshold step for locating a webpage
resulted in faster speeds for U.S. users, such a contract for
DNS services was nonetheless insufficient to show a
differential “desire to appeal to the U.S. market or generate
more U.S. users, as opposed to more users globally.” Id. at
1212. But unlike the mere use of a U.S.-based company in
AMA Multimedia for the basic threshold step of translating
webpages into IP addresses, the use of CDNs in particular
locations to pull content onto local servers in those locations
(including specifically the United States), and for the express
purpose of improving nearby users’ viewing experience,
demonstrates differential targeting of the U.S. market. See
id. at 1212 n.8 (distinguishing UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Kurbanov, 963 F.3d 344, 354 (4th Cir. 2020), on the ground
that, inter alia, the defendant in UMG, who was alleged to
            DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.            23

have infringed the plaintiff’s copyrights, had “relied on U.S.-
based servers” (citation omitted)).
    The fact that WGCZ and NKL may have also
differentially targeted other particular locations does not
detract from the fact that their use of U.S.-based CDNs
shows that they expressly aimed their websites at the U.S.
market. Indeed, in Will, we found express aiming due to the
use of U.S.-based CDNs, even though the defendant also
used other CDNs in Asia. See 47 F.4th at 920, 925.
Likewise, in Ayla, we held that the Australian defendant’s
use of advertising that was targeted “specifically at
Americans” showed express aiming at the U.S. market, even
though the defendant “addressed much of its advertising to
an international or Australian audience.” Id. at 980–81. As
we explained, the existence of other advertising specifically
directed at other markets did “not alter the jurisdictional
effect of marketing targeted specifically at the United States,
the relevant forum.” Id. at 981.
    Moreover, as in Will, WGCZ and NKL not only actively
appealed to a U.S.-based audience, but they also “profited
from an audience in that forum.” 47 F.4th at 922–23
(simplified). Users in the United States account for between
12% and 19% of the traffic on both XVideos.com and
Xnxx.com, and so those websites “earned considerable
revenue from that market.” Id. at 924 (explaining that the
defendant made money by selling website advertising space
and that the defendant made more money from advertisers
when more visitors accessed its website).
    We recognize that, as WGCZ and NKL correctly
contend, Plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing that
the specific advertising structure used by XVideos.com and
Xnxx.com would itself be sufficient to show express aiming
24          DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

at the United States. In AMA Multimedia, we held that the
use of a “third-party advertising company” to provide “geo-
located advertisements” that are “always directed” at
whatever forum happens to be the source of that particular
visit by a website user does not constitute express aiming.
970 F.3d at 1211 (emphasis in original). Put another way,
AMA Multimedia held that tailoring ads to the particular
geographic source of every particular user who visits a page
is effectively the same as passively offering the webpage to
any visitor from anywhere in the globe, and it is therefore
the antithesis of differential aiming at a subset of particular
locations. By contrast, we clarified in Will that, under our
decision in Mavrix, an advertising structure that entails more
advertising revenue based on a greater number of clicks in a
particular jurisdiction shows “something more” than the
mere use of generic geo-located advertising. See Will, 47
F.4th at 924 (citation omitted). Here, the record does not
contain sufficient evidence to say whether WGCZ’s and
NKL’s advertising falls on the AMA Multimedia side of the
line or the Mavrix/Will side, and we therefore cannot say that
the companies’ advertising, standing alone, demonstrates
express aiming at the United States. However, we have
already concluded that WGCZ’s and NKL’s use of U.S.-
based CDNs to improve the viewing experience of U.S.
visitors shows that WGCZ and NKL actively targeted the
U.S. market. Therefore, the substantial financial success that
the companies achieved from those efforts is a relevant
additional factor in confirming that the companies expressly
aimed their websites at the United States. As in Will, the
record here shows that WGCZ and NKL “both actively
               DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.                      25

appealed to and profited from an audience in that forum.” 47
F.4th at 922–23 (simplified). 7
    Accordingly, we conclude that WGCZ’s and NKL’s
operation of their websites was “expressly aimed” at the
United States and that this element of the Calder test for
determining purposeful direction has been satisfied.
                                     2
    We turn, then, to the remaining prong of the Calder test,
which asks whether WGCZ’s and NKL’s operation of their
websites “caus[ed] harm that the defendant[s] know[] is
likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Axiom Foods, 874
F.3d at 1069 (citation omitted); AMA Multimedia, 970 F.3d
at 1209 (citation omitted). The answer to that question is
yes.
    “A defendant causes harm in a particular forum when the
‘bad acts’ that form the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint
occur in that forum.” Will, 47 F.4th at 926 (citing Mavrix,
647 F.3d at 1231). Here, the harm on which Plaintiff’s
complaint is based is the publication of videos of her
childhood sexual abuse on WGCZ’s and NKL’s websites.

7
   Similarly, while WGCZ’s and NKL’s mere act of registering
trademarks in the United States might not by itself be sufficient to show
express aiming at the United States, it is a consideration that further
confirms the companies’ efforts to differentially protect their ability to
reach, and profit from, U.S.-based users of their websites. See Ayla, 11
F.4th at 982 n.4 (noting that a foreign defendant’s action in registering a
trademark in the United States “might be considered compelling
evidence that [it] has satisfied the purposeful availment or direction
test”). By contrast, we attach little weight to the fact that WGCZ and
NKL used U.S.-based companies for generic email and payment services
involving its user base generally. At least on the current record, Plaintiff
has not shown that WGCZ’s and NKL’s use of these services shows a
differential aiming at the U.S. market.
26          DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

At least one of those videos attracted more than 160,000
views worldwide before it was taken down in response to a
cease-and-desist letter from Plaintiff’s attorney. And given
that between 12% and 19% of the relevant websites’ users
are in the United States, it is clear that a substantial volume
of the widespread publication of the videos of Plaintiff’s
abuse occurred in the United States. These facts more than
suffice to bring this case squarely within the rule that, where
“a Defendant’s actions cause harm in multiple fora,
jurisdiction is proper in any forum where a ‘sufficient’
amount of harm occurs, even if that amounts to only a small
percentage of the overall harm caused.” Id. (citing Yahoo!
Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433
F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Indeed, in Will,
we held that sufficient publication-related harms (i.e.,
copyright infringement) had been suffered in the United
States when U.S. viewers made up only 4.6% of the
viewership of a foreign website. Id. at 926–27; see also
Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780–81 (1984)
(holding that jurisdiction was proper in New Hampshire for
publication-based defamation torts, even though the
defendant magazine publisher sold most of its magazines
elsewhere and that, as a result, “the bulk of the harm done to
[the plaintiff] occurred outside New Hampshire”); see also
Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir. 1982)
(noting, in the decision subsequently reviewed by the
Supreme Court, that the percentage of the defendant’s
magazines that were sold in New Hampshire was “less than
one percent”).
    Moreover, this U.S.-based publication harm was clearly
foreseeable, given the facts described earlier concerning
WGCZ’s and NKL’s targeting of the U.S. market and the
inferences that may reasonably be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor.
            DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.          27

Here, as in Will, the relevant defendants “actively appealed
to a U.S. audience, knew that a significant number of people
in the United States were actually viewing the website[s],
and were put on notice that they were hosting [the offending
material] when [Plaintiff] sent them a takedown notice.” 47
F.4th at 927. Given these facts, it is “hard to see how
[WGCZ and NKL] could have failed to anticipate the harm
that occurred in the forum.” Id.
    Because Plaintiff has met all the requirements of the
Calder effects test, she has established a prima facie case
that WGCZ and NKL purposefully directed their websites at
the United States, and she has therefore satisfied the first
prong of the due process analysis.
                             B
    The second prong of the due process analysis requires
Plaintiff to show that her claims “arise out of or relate to”
WGCZ’s and NKL’s “contacts with the forum.” Ford Motor
Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 141 S. Ct.
1017, 1026 (2021) (citation and emphasis omitted). Where,
as here, the relevant contacts with the forum consist of
directing a content-sharing website at the U.S. market, we
have little difficulty concluding that the Plaintiff’s
publication-based harms arise out of those forum-related
activities.
    As we held in Mavrix, where a defendant published
copyrighted photographs “on a website accessible to users in
the forum state,” the copyright owner’s “claim of copyright
infringement arises out of [that] publication,” thereby
satisfying the second prong of the due process analysis. 647
F.3d at 1228. And in Keeton, in which the forum-related
activities consisted of distributing magazines in New
Hampshire, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s claim
28           DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

that she was defamed in those magazines “arises out of the
very activity being conducted, in part, in New Hampshire.”
465 U.S. at 780. We reached the same conclusion with
respect to a defamation claim based on “libelous articles”
contained in “international medical journals” that were
distributed in California: such “libel claims clearly ‘arose
out’ of the publication of the articles.” Core-Vent Corp. v.
Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993). Based
on these precedents, it is clear that Plaintiff’s claims seeking
redress for harms caused by WGCZ’s and NKL’s
publication of the videos of her abuse arise from those
companies’ forum-related activities in targeting those
websites towards the U.S. market.
                               C
    The only remaining question concerns the third prong of
the due process analysis, under which “the exercise of
jurisdiction . . . must be reasonable.” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d
at 1068 (citation omitted). Where, as here, the plaintiff has
satisfied the first two prongs, “the burden then shifts to the
defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of
jurisdiction would not be reasonable.’” Id. at 1068–69
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). WGCZ and NKL have
not carried that burden.
    In evaluating the reasonableness of an exercise of
personal jurisdiction, we “use a seven-factor balancing test
that weighs”:

       (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful
       interjection into the forum state’s affairs;
       (2) the burden on the defendant of defending
       in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with
       the sovereignty of the defendant’s state;
            DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.           29

       (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating
       the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial
       resolution of the controversy; (6) the
       importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s
       interest in convenient and effective relief;
       and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.

Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law. Grp., 905
F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2018). Consideration of these factors
here confirms the reasonableness of exercising personal
jurisdiction over WGCZ and NKL.
    As we reaffirmed in Ayla, the “purposeful interjection
factor in the reasonableness analysis is ‘analogous to the
purposeful direction’” prong. 11 F.4th at 984 (quoting
Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir.
1988)). Here, WGCZ and NKL have purposely directed
their websites at the U.S. market, using U.S.-based CDN
service providers, and they thereby garnered substantial and
financially valuable web traffic in the United States. Given
these “ongoing ties to the forum,” this “factor weighs in
favor of jurisdiction.” Id.
     Given WGCZ’s and NKL’s “extensive contacts with the
United States,” their argument that it would be unduly
burdensome to “have to travel to the United States for court
appearances is entitled to little weight.” Ayla, 11 F.4th at
984. That remains true even though, as a general matter,
“litigation in a distant forum is inconvenient” and there are
“‘unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself
in a foreign legal system.’” Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102,
114 (1987)). As the Supreme Court recognized in Asahi,
“[w]hen minimum contacts have been established, often the
interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of
30          DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on
the alien defendant.” 480 U.S. at 114. Here, a U.S. forum
is important to Plaintiff’s “interest in convenient and
effective relief.” Freestream, 905 F.3d at 607. Further, a
U.S. forum has a very powerful interest in adjudicating a
dispute involving alleged dissemination of child
pornography depicting the rape of a 14-year-old U.S. citizen
who was subjected to sex trafficking. See Ayla, 11 F.4th at
984 (holding that the United States has an interest in
protecting, and providing redress to, its citizens). By
contrast, there is no unreasonable interference with the
sovereignty of the Czech Republic, given that there is and
can be no contention that hosting videos of 14-year-olds
being raped is lawful under Czech law. And the “most
efficient judicial resolution” of this controversy concerning
claims made by a U.S. citizen under U.S. law about the
website publication of materials made available in the
United States would be in a U.S. forum. Freestream, 905
F.3d at 607; see also Ayla, 11 F.4th at 984.
    Finally, we have held that the remaining factor—namely,
“the existence of an alternative forum”—is relevant only
when, under the other factors, a U.S. forum “is shown to be
unreasonable.” Ayla, 11 F.4th at 984 (citations omitted). As
we have explained, WGCZ and NKL have “not made that
showing.” Id. at 985 (citation omitted).
    Taking all these considerations together, we conclude
that WGCZ and NKL have failed to make a compelling
showing that the exercise of personal jurisdiction here would
be unreasonable.
                             IV
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Plaintiff
sufficiently established a prima facie case for exercising
            DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.           31

personal jurisdiction over WGCZ and NKL, and those
defendants failed to show that the exercise of such
jurisdiction would be unreasonable. We therefore reverse
the district court’s dismissal of this action against WGCZ
and NKL for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because, as we
explained earlier, the district court dismissed the remaining
nine Foreign Defendants solely on the ground that there was
no personal jurisdiction over WGCZ and NKL, we vacate
the dismissal of those additional defendants. On remand, the
district court should address the remaining unresolved issues
concerning whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted
against those additional defendants.
  REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and
REMANDED.

LEE, Circuit Judge, concurring.

    I largely agree with Judge Collins’ excellent opinion.
But I write separately because it would have been prudent
for the district court to have ordered very limited
jurisdictional discovery here. Such discovery would have
tethered the district court’s analysis more tightly onto our
circuit’s personal jurisdiction framework.
    For example, it would have helped to know the extent of
WGCZ’s and NKL’s use of content delivery network
services (CDNs) in the United States—and elsewhere
around the globe—to improve the viewing experience of
their users. That, in turn, would have aided us in determining
whether WGCZ and NKL differentially targeted the United
States and thus expressly aimed at our market. Will Co., Ltd.
v. Lee, 47 F.4th 917, 922–26 (9th Cir. 2022).
32          DOE V. WEBGROUP CZECH REPUBLIC, A.S.

    But even without such jurisdictional discovery, other
evidence and common sense strongly suggest that WGCZ
and NKL expressly aimed at the United States market. And
it makes little sense to insist on a remand on that issue and
further delay this case involving allegations of underaged
sex trafficking. Cf. Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. __
(2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that it
would be “freakish to single out” the provision at issue,
given the circumstances). But in other less obvious cases, it
may behoove a district court to allow jurisdictional
discovery, especially if the pleadings are imprecise.