Court Opinion

ID: 9884196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:46:52.932239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:36.381790
License: Public Domain

GARRITY, J.,
dissents.
GARRITY, Judge, dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that it is a far better practice to adhere closely to the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, in this matter I believe that the instruction explaining reasonable doubt, when considered as a whole, was not erroneous. Additionally, although the majority makes much of the “nagging reticence” phrase, that was not an assigned concern of defense counsel and was therefore not preserved for our review. In any event, the trial judge clearly distinguished “nagging reticence” from that of “being convinced beyond a doubt based upon a reason, a reasonable doubt.”
The Court of Appeals in Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 620 A.2d 295 (1993), explained the scope of review by an appellate court when considering whether the jury has been given a proper explanation of the “reasonable doubt” standard:
On appeal the appellate court considers an explanation of reasonable doubt as a whole; it does not determine the propriety of an explanation from an isolated statement. It views the effect of a suspect statement on the jury in the light of the entire explanation---- [I]f the instruction is actually given but it is some way erroneous, the appellate court must determine whether the error is so prejudicial as to call for reversal or may be excused as harmless.
According to the majority, a principal shortcoming of the trial judge’s effort in the case sub judice was his failure
to communicate clearly that the jury’s decision, if to convict, must be made “without hesitation,” “without reservation,” or the functional equivalent of that concept. There is nothing in the instruction that conveys to the jury the *449proper degree of certainty that the jury must have in order to find guilt. (Emphasis added).
In his instruction given on reasonable doubt, and a juror’s degree of certainty prior to casting a vote, the trial judge explained:
Let us return back to the State’s burden, called the State’s burden of proof. This burden of proof requires that the State of Maryland convince 12 of you, as I said, that crime has been committed, and Mr. Jason Lamont Joyner-Pitts is the actor. When I say convince twelve of you they must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt.
Of all the elements that together make up the crime of his involvement, this beyond a reasonable doubt is sort of a mouthful of lawyer talk. That phrase is the name that we in the law centuries ago attached to the state of mental conviction at which you must arrive before you can put your hand and say I will vote for guilty on that. Anything short of that you must vote—not voting for guilty, you are squarely in the comer of innocence.
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To the extent that you, especially I would have to be convinced to get married, need you be convinced of the elements of the crime and this man’s participation. You must be convinced of those elements and his participation as you would have to be convinced of a weighty matter in your own lives.
For indeed taking an oath to pass upon the guilt or innocence of a fellow human being is a weighty matter in your own life. That is the level at which you personally must arrive before you may raise your hand and say I will vote for guilty.
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... I do not know at what level you individually will be said to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard I just explained to you. Whatever that level is for you that is the level at which you must arrive before you can *450decide, Mrs. Lindsay, mark me down in the guilty column. Anything short of that level is not guilty.
Please note I am not telling you you must be convinced beyond all doubt, that is not the standard of law. It is not the duty of the State to convince you to a mathematical certainty of any of these elements. Let’s be honest about it. If nobody got married until they were convinced beyond all doubt we would all be single. Why? Because we are human beings. We always have that nagging reticence in making important decisions. If something can go wrong it will happen to me. We give it a name, we call it Murphy’s Law.
We are not talking about that nagging reticence. We are talking about a doubt to which you can ascribe a reason. I am not convinced of this because I do not believe this.
The reason itself has to be reasonable. You can’t say don’t believe that because it is raining outside. You can say that, but that is not reasonable. Indeed it is a reason, but it is not a reasonable reason. We are talking but [sic] being convinced beyond a doubt based upon reason, a reasonable doubt.
Also please note it must be the unanimous decision of 12. Twelve of you must be convinced of all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt and convinced of his participation beyond a reasonable doubt before a verdict of guilt can be found. (Emphasis added).
As the majority recognizes, there is absolutely no requirement in assuring a juror’s determination of being certain about his or her decision to vote for conviction to use the specific words “without hesitation” or “without reservation.” Indeed, the Court in Wills made clear that the inclusion of “without hesitation” or “hesitate to act” phrases in the reasonable doubt standard
may tend to confuse the jury and that justice is better served by substituting the phrase “without reservation” for the “hesitant” verbiage. We can visualize, as the Commit*451tee[2] apparently did, that the jury, given the “hesitate” phrase in the instruction, may well think that, if they did not find the evidence sufficient to support a verdict of guilty “immediately,” and if they did not reach a conviction without some debate, a reasonable doubt must exist because they “hesitated to act” or did not act “without hesitation.”
Id. at 384.
When examining the instruction as a whole, with particular reference to the majority’s concern over “certainty,” we should consider that the trial judge made painstakingly certain that the jurors were instructed that their decision to vote for a guilty plea must be made only after analyzing each element in the case and then being satisfied that the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It is worth repeating that the trial judge emphasized that the phrase “reasonable doubt”
is the name that we in the law centuries ago attached to the state of mental conviction at which you must arrive before you can put your hand and say I will vote for guilty on that. Anything short of that you must vote—not voting for guilty, you are squarely in the corner of innocence.
Taking the instruction as a whole, I am firmly convinced that the jury was properly instructed on the concept of reasonable doubt and its need to establish guilt only by unanimously deciding that the State establish every needed element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt before raising their hands to say, “I will vote for guilty.”
Indeed, if one must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of an accused’s guilt before casting a vote of conviction, the mere phrase “without reservation” is but a rote redundance in its truest sense. Nevertheless, the basic admonition to each juror to be confident of their vote before casting it was well covered by the trial court. In any event, in this instance, the mere failure to recite the superfluous phrase “without hesitation” or “without reservation” was not improper because of *452the court’s use of equivalent language to define certainty. I would affirm.

2. The Committee that fashioned the Maryland Pattern Jury Instruction—Criminal 1991 (MPJI-CR).