Court Opinion

ID: 9699172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:12:17.826181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.502206
License: Public Domain

SIMPSON, Justice
In May, 1960, J. E. Milam Construction Company, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Milam, was engaged in the general contracting business. Seaboard Surety Company had bonded Milam on some of his contracts and Western Casualty and Surety Compariy' had bonded others. The plaintiff below, William R. Phillips & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Phillips) was agent for Western Casualty and there was a premium due Phillips in the amount of $8,021.07. Milam executed two notes payable to Phillips totalling this amount, on May 28, 1960. These notes were payable at the Bessemer Branch of The First National Bank of Birmingham.
By August of 1960, Milam was experiencing serious financial troubles. On August 25, 1960, Milam and Seaboard executed an agreement under which Seaboard guaran- • teed the payment of a loan of $150,000' which was to enable Milam to complete several jobs it had under construction. An account was opened at The First National Bank of Birmingham. Withdrawals could be made only by checks countersigned by Seaboard. The agreement provided that the money was to be used in part as fol- ' lows:
“(E) To pay such other expenses and indebtednesses as are mutually. agreed upon between Contractor. [Milam] and Seaboard in order to insure the continued operation of-the contracts.”
This agreement was signed by Milam and Seaboard.
Following the execution of this agreement a meeting was held in the offices of Milam in Birmingham. Present were Thomas F. Starr, representing Seaboard; a representative of Western Casualty; Jay Milam, president of J. E. Milam Construction Company; Gerald Stone, an attorney representing Western, and the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s version of the conversations at this meeting varies from that of the defendant. It is the plaintiff’s position that Mr. Starr, the Seaboard representative, assured him and others present that under the arrangement worked out between Seaboard and Milam, the debt which was due Phillips would be paid. Seaboard denies that Phillips’ debt was included.
*512• In May of 1962, the debt díte Phillips had not been paid. Phillips sued Seaboard, in the Bessemer Division of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, for breach of contract claiming $8,021.07. Trial was had and the jury returned a verdict for Phillips. This appeal followed.
Appellant assigns as error the refusal of the court below to grant its motion to transfer the cause to the Birmingham Division of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, arguing that the transaction out of which this suit arose (the conversation referred to above) occurred in Birmingham and hence suit must be brought in the Birmingham Division. The appellant says that unless the statements allegedly made by Mr. Starr in that conversation are the basis of this suit, then the same is barred by the Statute of Frauds as there was no document signed by the defendant to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of the debt due by Milam to the plaintiff, Phillips.
Appellant’s contentions are not well taken. In the first instance, it is clear that the Bessemer Division has jurisdiction over causes of action arising within its territory. The notes were payable in Bessemer and default on them occurred there. I-Ience, the cause of action occurred there. Ex Parte Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 243 Ala. 508, 10 So.2d 746.
In the second instance, it would appear to be undisputed that Seaboard was interested in seeing that Milam completed the contracts which it was liable on as surety. To enable him to do that Seaboard entered into an agreement “to pay such other expenses and indebtednesses as are mutually agreed upon between Contractor [Milam] and Seaboard in order to insure the continued operation of the contracts”. The jury found as a matter of fact that Milam’s debt to Phillips was included in this agreement. This memorandum was signed by Seaboard. We think it clearly sufficient to take the ' matter out of the Statute of Frauds, Title 20, § 3, Code.'
In addition, it was clearly to Sea-, boár'd’s advantage to help Milam complete,1 the contracts which it was surety on. There' was obviously sufficient .consideration flow-'1 ing to Seaboard to support its promise to pay even had there been no memorandum signed by it. The promise to pay the debt of another, based upon a new and valuable consideration, beneficial to the promisor", is not within the Statute of Frauds. Locke v. Kay, 257 Ala. 376, 59 So.2d 70.
Appellant next objects to the court’s allowing the reporter to read to the jury a portion of the testimony of witness Gerald Stone, after the jury had deliberated for some time. We are committed to the proposition that such action is discretionary with the trial court. It is to the advantage of all parties and in the public interest that juries reach a verdict and unless it is ap- • parent that such action is prejudicial to one side or the other, we will not overrule the judgment of the trial court. Iverson v. Phillips, 268 Ala. 430, 108 So.2d 168.
In other assignments made we likewise find no error to reverse.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL' and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.