Court Opinion

ID: 9742479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:14:34.846306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:45.426160
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, specially concurring: I concur with the majority that the discretion vested in the three-judge panel in determining if the death penalty is not to be imposed is too unbridled to satisfy the constitutional requirements expounded in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 92 S. Ct. 2726. The “compelling reasons for mercy” test is too vague and indefinite and permits a degree of arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty not permissible under Furman. To this extent I concur in the majority opinion. I do not agree however with the majority’s holding that the legislature cannot create a three-judge panel. Unfortunately, the statute refers to this panel as a “three-judge court.” This language at once invites the objection that under our present constitution the legislature has no authority to create courts. The “three-judge court” illusion is furthered by the implication in the statute that the three-judge court sentences the defendant to death. However, section 5 — 4—1(b) of the Unified Code of- Corrections (111. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 4—1(b)) provides that all sentences shall be imposed by the judge who presided at the trial unless he is no longer sitting as a judge in that court. Also, section 9 — 1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (111. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)) provides for the determination by the three-judge court of whether or not the death penalty shall be imposed. “After such determination by a majority of the 3 judge court and notice to the trial judge of their decision in writing the trial judge shall enter sentence accordingly.” Thus, the three-judge court does not impose the sentence of death under the statute and does not deprive the judge who presided at the trial of his judicial function. The three judges act only as a panel for determining whether or not the death penalty shall be imposed and do not act as a court. This is not usurping the function of the judge. In fact, prior to the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, in certain felonies, including murder, the jury that determined the defendant’s guilt also by its verdict fixed the punishment and the judge sentenced the defendant to the punishment fixed by the verdict. 111. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 38, par. 801. The three-judge panel idea is not unique to the statute under consideration. Without conducting an exhaustive search of the statutes, I can offhand think of at least two other instances in which the legislature has conferred nonjudicial functions on three-judge panels. In the North Shore Sanitary District Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 42, par. 276.99 et seq.) and in the Sanitary District Act of 1917 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 42, par. 298.99 et seq.) the legislature has provided for three judges to sit as Boards of Commissioners in the organization of districts under these acts. Also, it cannot be seriously contended that the legislature lacks authority to confer upon judges authority to perform judicial related functions or even nonjudicial functions. If the legislature lacks such authority no judge may perform a marriage ceremony or administer an oath because the authority to perform both functions stems from legislative grants. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 89, par. 4 (Marriages); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 101, par. 2 (Oaths). I agree with the majority that the provision of the statute for an appeal to the appellate court is in violation of section 4(b) of article VI of our constitution. However, if the statute were not otherwise invalid, I would hold that the provision for appellate review is severable and that the constitutional provision and our Rule 603 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 603) providing for appeals directly to this court in cases where the penalty of death is imposed would govern.