Court Opinion

ID: 9478797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:58:24.930733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:37.434107
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Since all roads lead to Rome, I concur. However, that is so because the Brady claim, when addressed on the merits, fails to establish “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). It would be on those grounds that I would affirm dismissal of the Brady claim on the merits.
As for the procedural approach to the Brady claim, disposition of it on procedural grounds which the majority has adopted as a rationale is merely a device for punishing the procedurally defective party, for reasons of comity among others. Had Tit-comb’s Brady point had merit, and only Titcomb had defaulted procedurally, a desire for efficient and effective functioning of the courts would have outweighed consideration of a meritorious point in the single case. Here, however, both parties have been procedurally defective in not raising issues they could have raised.1 If *785the Brady claim on the merits had been one which, if reached, should have been decided in Titcomb’s favor, it would to me appear a shocking denial of justice when he was being punished for failure properly to raise the issue when the state had been as much at fault in a completely analogous way. The punishment, when only one party has been at fault, may be justified on grounds of judicial economy and disregard of plainly stated rules. However, when the state has disregarded the rules also, the other party should be allowed to proceed with a contest on the merits.2
Two wrongs may not make a right, but on occasion they will minimize what otherwise would appear to be a gross injustice. It may be slight solace, but being incarcerated for the right reason may be more tolerable than being incarcerated for the wrong reason.

. In its own brief, the Commonwealth conceded that "the [district] court proceeded [to] the merits of that issue [the Brady claim] because the Commonwealth had not raised that bar in its [second] motion to dismiss." Indeed, the Commonwealth did raise the Wainwright defense in its second motion to dismiss, but only with respect to the petitioner’s claims of jury coercion, perjured testimony and after discovered evidence.
Reluctantly acknowledging that the Commonwealth may have failed to assert the Wainwright defense before the District Court as to the Brady claim, the majority attempts to amend the pleadings of the Commonwealth to correct the oversight. The majority relies heavily on the fact that the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court declaring the procedural default bar as to the petitioner’s Brady claim was before the District Court as part of the record. Thus, the "pleadings” in District Court should be amended to conform to the evidence under Fed.R.Civ.P. *78515(b). I disagree because a Rule 15(b) amendment is inapplicable in the present instance.
Rule 15(b) provides that "[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they should be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." (Emphasis added). There was no trial (or hearing) held by the district court, although the petitioner had requested one. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record before us that suggests that the petitioner consented to such “evidence,” either expressly or implicitly. There is, on the other hand, every indication that the petitioner would be prejudiced by an unrequested amendment. Finally, the petitioner, in his reply brief, did specifically object to the Commonwealth’s delayed assertion of the Wainwright defense, which it raised for the first time on appeal after realizing its mistake in the District Court.

. It appears that the Fourth Circuit has had no occasion to address this issue. However, recent decisions in other circuits have held that the State, having failed to raise the procedural default defense in district court, is now itself precluded from relying on it at the appellate level. See United States ex rel. Bonner v. DeRobertis, 798 F.2d 1062, 1066 (7th Cir.1986) (state waived protection of Wainwright doctrine by its inattention to it); Barrera v. Young, 794 F.2d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir.1986) (same); Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059, 105 S.Ct. 1775, 84 L.Ed.2d 834 (1985) (state’s failure to raise procedural default in district court precludes state from raising waiver issue in court of appeals); Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212, 103 S.Ct. 3547, 77 L.Ed.2d 1395 (1983) (same); Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1368 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949, 102 S.Ct. 2021, 72 L.Ed.2d 474 (1982) (same).