Court Opinion

ID: 9560370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:48:22.239041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:52.763408
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
dissenting.
The record does not support the court’s decision to vacate the sentence of death. I *611do not agree with the court’s characterization of the findings of the trial judge or with the court’s understanding of the opinions of the three expert witnesses. More importantly, I do not agree that the slim evidence of defendant’s impairment outweighed the significant aggravating factors in this case.
The court first describes scant evidence as crucial information and then reasons that this slight evidence outweighs the two significant aggravating factors. But neither the defendant nor his experts considered this slight evidence to be crucial information. The defendant never raised the question of impairment in his brief or at oral argument. Our power of independent review does not extend to the sua sponte creation of psychological theories not supported by the evidence.
1. The Special Verdict
The trial judge found “that while the defendant suffers from some mental deficiency and generalized brain dysfunction which compromises his ability to respond effectively to the events in his environment, it does not significantly impair his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.” Special verdict at 8. He also found that “[t]he defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was not affected, although his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to the prosecution.” Id. at 9. In other words, the judge found that the statutory G(l) mitigating factor existed, but that it was not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Id. at 10.
2. The Experts
A review of the evaluations by the three experts shows that the defendant has some impairment of memory. Drs. Scialli and Tatro recommended neurological testing and a CT scan or MRI to determine whether the defendant had brain damage. These tests were never performed. Thus, it remains unconfirmed whether defendant has organic brain damage. None of the doctors found psychosis. Their tests collectively revealed that the defendant had a low IQ and memory impairment. Moreover, there was no consensus that the deficiency existed at the time of the crimes, and even less certainty as to the role, if any, the deficiency played in the crimes. However, the doctors did discuss the nature of the defendant’s impairment and concluded that he did not lose contact with reality and was able to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Dr. Tatro concluded that the defendant had “mixed personality disorder: narcissistic, histrionic, and paranoid features.” Ta-tro report at 28. He also suggested that there might be an organic personality syndrome. He said:
This is not to suggest that Mr. Stuard gets so cut off from reality that he does not know what he is doing or that what he is doing is wrong in the eyes of society, in general, or the law, in particular. Again, there is no indication that Mr. Stuard is psychotic now or that he has been in the past.
Id. at 20.
In addition, Dr. Tatro did not think his tests were sufficient to diagnose organic brain damage. He merely inferred this, id. at 11, and thus recommended “further examination be done to either confirm or rule out the existence of this form of mental defect.” Id. at 22.
In discussing whether the unverified impairment played a role in the defendant’s commission of the crimes, Dr. Tatro said “[i]t is difficult to assess what role the organicity that is evident in Mr. Stuard’s test responses may have played in the commission of the crimes he committed.” Id. at 21.
The report of Dr. Scialli concluded that:
It is my opinion that at the time of the crimes Mr. Stuard was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. However ... his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired but not so im*612paired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
Scialli report at 1.
Dr. Scialli did believe that defendant had dementia, presumably organic brain dysfunction. He described the condition as memory impairment. Importantly, he stated that he had no way of knowing whether the dementia existed at the time of the commission of the three murders. Id. at 3. In order to reach this conclusion, he would need a brain imaging scan and a neurological consultation. Id. at 4.
Dr. Scialli disagreed with Dr. Tatro’s diagnosis of organic personality syndrome. He also disagreed with Dr. Tatro’s conclusion that the defendant had some loss of reality contact. He said “[njeither Dr. Ta-tro’s description of his conversation with Mr. Stuard nor my own experience support this.” Id. at 9. Indeed, Dr. Scialli said:
In summary, regarding Dr. Tatro’s report, he seems to imply that Mr. Stuard could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, and felt justified in committing the crimes due to a “paranoid stance.” I disagree with this.
Id. at 10.
Instead, Dr. Scialli said “Mr. Stuard did appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. To a certain extent, he also exercised his choice not to comply with the law.” Id.
Dr. Blackwood concluded that the defendants mental deficiency and generalized brain dysfunction would not significantly impair his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, but could affect his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Blackwood report at 5.
3. Impairment
The court questions the weight the trial judge accorded the psychiatric testimony. Ante, at 38. But the trial judge’s evaluation of the evidence and the doctors’ reports was accurate.
Dr. Tatro, a clinical psychologist, and not a medical doctor, did not pretend to be in the business of diagnosing organic brain injuries. Other than his interview of the defendant, all he did was administer psychological tests. He did not diagnose the defendant as having brain damage. He simply stated that intelligence tests indicated that the defendant “may have suffered some impairment of earlier higher levels of cognitive functioning that raise [sic] the question of possible brain damage.” Tatro report at 10. Dr. Tatro’s final diagnosis was “mixed personality disorder.” Id. at 23. But we have already held that a “personality disorder alone is insufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance." State v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 505, 826 P.2d 783, 802 (1992).
The court characterizes the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant did not suffer from a mental illness or disease as “incorrect.” Ante, at 609, 863 P.2d at 901. But leading authorities state that dementia is not a mental illness or disease:
Both dementia and delirium are included under the general diagnostic category of organic brain syndromes. But the term is not particularly useful, for it is nonspecific and conveys little information about the conditions it is meant to describe.
Dementia and delirium are not diseases.
Robert J. Waldinger, Psychiatry for Medical Students 200 (1984) (emphasis in original).
Nor does the DSM-III-R characterize dementia as an illness. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 103-107 (3d ed. rev. 1987).
Even if Stuard had dementia, as the court notes, ante, at 607 n. 11, 863 P.2d at 899 n. 11, it was mild to moderate. Moreover, Dr. Scialli said:
I have no way at present of knowing if this Dementia existed at the time of the commission of the three murders.
Scialli report at 3. The court suggests Dr. Scialli found that “the murders ... were the unfortunate result of his mental impairment.” Ante, at 608, 863 P.2d at 900. But this is the court’s conclusion, not Dr. Scial-li’s. He equivocated on the question of *613causation. At one point, he acknowledged that he did not know exactly what caused the defendant to act during the course of the homicides. R.T. Nov. 26, 1990 at 25. But at another point he said “[r]ather due to his dementia, [the defendant] reacted suddenly and overwhelmingly when he confronted and was confronted by his victims.” Scialli Report at 10. In light of equivocal testimony, the trial judge was in the best position to choose one version over another. This court, instead, relies only on that part of the Scialli testimony that supports its conclusion.
We have said that evidence of the existence of a disorder is insufficient. “It does not prove that, at the time of the crimes, the disorder controlled defendant’s conduct or impaired his mental capacity to such a degree that leniency is required.” Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 505, 826 P.2d at 802. We also recognized that the mitigating strength of the impairment depends upon the degree or nature of the impairment. “Such conditions differ in degree from a slow, dull brain damaged defendant whose judgement and rationality are marginal____ Mental impairments have a far greater mitigating effect because they may evidence an inability of the defendant to control his conduct.” Id. at 505, 826 P.2d at 802. Thus, assuming that defendant indeed suffers from dementia, a disorder primarily inhibiting memory, what is its effect?
In Brewer we evaluated whether, despite the defendant’s impairment — borderline personality disorder — he could control his actions. We noted that under the precipitating stress of the homicide, Brewer’s impairment compromised his ability to reason and he lashed out with anger. Id. at 506, 826 P.2d at 803. However, we found that he possessed the ability to restrain himself, understood the wrongfulness of his conduct, and did not lose touch with reality. We concluded that his disorder did not warrant leniency. Id.
The effect of dementia on Stuard resembles the effect of borderline personality disorder on Brewer. Even if Stuard, like Brewer, became enraged when confronted by his victims, he still displayed some ability to control his actions. For example, after the police secured the neighborhood where the three murders occurred, the rampage stopped. Stuard waited three months to strike again and did so in an entirely different neighborhood. The doctors agree he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct and that he did not lose touch with reality.
4. Weighing
But even if defendant were impaired, and even if there were evidence that he was impaired at the time of the crimes, and even if there were evidence of causation, we still must balance that against aggravating factors. The trial judge heard the witnesses — we did not. The trial judge presided over the aggravation/mitigation hearing — we did not. He thoughtfully concluded that whatever the nature of the defendant’s condition, it did not require leniency in this case. That is, it was insufficient to outweigh the significant aggravating factors.
I agree with the trial judge. He found two aggravating factors. The defendant did not contest the validity of the § 13-703(F)(1) factor. And, the court is so persuaded by the second factor — that his murders were especially heinous, cruel or depraved — that it says “it is unnecessary to prolong this review____ Suffice it to say that each victim must have suffered terrible pain during the beatings and stabbings they endured.” Ante, at 605, 863 P.2d at 897. But this understates the horror and ghastliness of the multiple murders Stuard committed. The frail, elderly victims endured torturous deaths. They were choked, stabbed, and beaten to death by a former boxer. He then arranged each corpse into a perverse and morbid display.
The trial judge carefully weighed the enormity of the defendant’s atrocities against his mental condition and concluded that the scale tipped overwhelmingly on the side of aggravating circumstances. Even the defendant does not suggest otherwise on appeal. The defendant brutally murdered three elderly, defenseless women. *614The manner in which he did it shows cruelty and depravity in the extreme.
We have an obligation to ensure that the death sentence is not imposed in an arbitrary and freakish way. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2764, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252-53, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2967, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). We are aware of no case in which dementia, a condition primarily affecting memory, has been held to be sufficient to outweigh substantial aggravating factors.11 It is arbitrary to impose death on others and then relieve the defendant of the death sentence on inconclusive and insubstantial psychological evidence.
The trial judge’s comprehensive 14 page special verdict reflects a very careful and impartial evaluation of the evidence. While justice sometimes requires us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge in death cases, this case is not one of them.

. Because the court reverses on an issue not raised by the defendant, the state has had no opportunity to brief the issue. If our independent review suggests an issue not raised by the parties we should solicit supplemental briefs before deciding it.