Court Opinion

ID: 9373574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:56.869778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.337061
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SEAN M. DONAHUE,                                DOCKET NUMBERS
                  Appellant,                         PH-1221-17-0103-W-1
                                                     PH-4324-17-0169-I-1
                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
                 Agency.                             DATE: July 19, 2022

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sean M. Donahue, Hazleton, Pennsylvania, pro se.

           Richard T. Buchanan, Esquire, and Anthony D. DiBacco, Philadelphia,
             Pennsylvania, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed petitions for review of two initial decisions, which
     dismissed one of his appeals as withdrawn and dismissed another for lack of
     jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as these only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case ; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and materi al
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in these appeals, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition s for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petitions for review. We VACATE the initial decision
     dismissing MSPB Docket No. PH-1221-17-0103-W-1 as withdrawn and DISMISS
     that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We AFFIRM the initial decision in MSPB
     Docket No. PH-4324-17-0169-I-1.
¶2         This decision concerns two of the appellant’s appeals.            Donahue v.
     Department of Labor, MSPB Docket No. PH-1221-17-0103-W-1 (0103 appeal),
     Initial Appeal File (0103 IAF), Tab 23, Initial Decision (0103 ID); Donahue v.
     Department of Labor, MSPB Docket No. PH-4324-17-0169-I-1 (0169 appeal),
     Initial Appeal File (0169 IAF), Tab 22, Initial Decision (0169 ID).          Though
     adjudicated separately below, we JOIN them on review because the facts are
     related and joinder will expedite processing without adversely affecting the
     interests of the parties. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(b).
¶3         In October 2016, the appellant contacted the agency, alleging that it had
     refused to provide him with veteran priority services, including referrals and
     placement into a professional job.      0103 IAF, Tab 1 at 9-13.        The agency
     responded, in part explaining that it could not assist him because he had been
     banned from certain facilities due to his conviction for harassment of Government
     officials. Id. at 7-8, 14; see 0103 IAF, Tab 19 at 10-12. In turn, the appellant
     filed the 0103 appeal, asking that the Board force the agency to stop retaliation
                                                                                       3

     against him by denying him services, in particular, services provided at Federally
     funded American Jobs Centers. 0103 IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
¶4        The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order, indicating that the
     0103 appeal appeared to be an individual right of action (IRA) appeal concerning
     whistleblowing or other protected activity. 0103 IAF, Tab 3 at 1 -2. Accordingly,
     he explained the applicable standards and instructed the appellant to meet his
     jurisdictional burden. Id. at 2-8. Over the next few days, the appellant submitted
     a number of pleadings, some of which suggested that he wished to withdraw his
     appeal. 0103 IAF, Tabs 4-16. The agency filed a motion to dismiss the 0103 IRA
     appeal for lack of jurisdiction because (1) the appellant is not an employee,
     former employee, or applicant for employment, (2) he was not subjected to a
     personnel action, and (3) he did not make a protected disclosure.        0103 IAF,
     Tab 19 at 5-9.
¶5        Rather than addressing jurisdiction, the administrative judge dismissed the
     0103 appeal as withdrawn.      0103 ID.    The appellant has filed a petition for
     review. Donahue v. Department of Labor, MSPB Docket No. PH-1221-17-0103-
     W-1, Petition for Review (0103 PFR) File, Tab 1. The entirety of his petition
     consists of the following statement: “In this case both [the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC)] and [the agency] are weaseling out of jurisdiction over a
     complaint that the Administrative Law Judge sees as a ‘textbook whistleblower
     case.’ For that reason, the [Board] should find some means of jurisdiction to
     review the case.” Id. at 3. The agency has filed a response, and the appellant has
     replied. 0103 PFR File, Tabs 3-4.
¶6        Soon after filing his petition for review in the 0103 appeal, the appellant
     filed the 0169 appeal, with allegations similar to those raised in th e 0103 appeal.
     0169 IAF, Tab 1 at 3, 5.      He described the 0169 appeal as a whistleblower
     complaint, alleging that the agency retaliated against him for filing too many
     Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
     (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA) complaints by
                                                                                      4

     denying him services at American Job Centers, including priority job referrals.
     Id. at 5.
¶7         The administrative judge construed the 0169 appeal as both an IRA appeal
     and a USERRA claim, and issued an order explaining the jurisdictional burdens
     for each. 0169 IAF, Tab 2 at 2, Tab 3 at 1, Tab 10 at 2 -3. The agency filed a
     motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 0169 IAF, Tab 6. After both parties
     responded, the administrative judge dismissed the 0169 appeal because the
     appellant failed to meet his jurisdictional burden. 0169 ID. The appellant has
     filed a petition for review.   Donahue v. Department of Labor, MSPB Docket
     No. PH-4324-17-0169-I-1, Petition for Review (0169 PFR) File, Tab 1. In that
     petition, the appellant does not present any arguments pertaining to jurisdiction.
     Instead, he simply reasserts that the agency is improperly denying him services
     and alleges that the Board “is being lazy.” Id. at 3. The agency has filed a
     response. 0169 PFR File, Tab 3.

     The administrative judge improperly dismissed the 0103 appeal as withdrawn.
¶8         An appellant’s withdrawal of an appeal is an act of finality.       Page v.
     Department of Transportation, 110 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 5 (2009).        Generally, the
     Board will not reinstate a withdrawn appeal absent unusual circumstances , such
     as misinformation or new and material evidence.       Id.   However, a voluntary
     withdrawal must be clear, decisive, and unequivocal. Id.
¶9         Here, the appellant titled the pleading discussing withdrawal a “Temp
     Withdrawal of Appeal: Going to OSC First.” 0103 IAF, Tab 13 at 1. In it, he
     explained that he “expect[ed] to pick up the matter after hearing back from OSC.”
     Id. at 3. Later that same day, the appellant submitted pleadings suggesting he had
     just found prior OSC complaints he filed in May and December 2016. 0103 IAF,
     Tab 14 at 3-9, Tab 16 at 6-18. He also submitted letters from OSC’s Disclosure
     Unit corresponding to those complaints, OSC Case Numbers DI-16-3690 and
     DI-17-1100, each of which explained that OSC lacked jurisdiction over the
     matters because the appellant was not an employee, former employee, or
                                                                                          5

      applicant for employment in the Federal Government. 0103 IAF, Tab 16 at 4-5.
      Days later, after the agency filed its motion to dismiss the 0103 appeal for lack of
      jurisdiction, the appellant filed additional pleadings as if he was still pursuing the
      appeal. 0103 IAF, Tabs 19-22. All of this occurred before the administrative
      judge dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
¶10         Under these specific circumstances, we find that the appellant’s withdrawal
      did not meet the standard of being clear, decisive, and unequivocal. Therefore,
      we vacate the initial decision which dismissed the 0103 appeal as withdrawn.
      Nevertheless, as detailed below, we find that the appeal must be dismissed for
      lack of jurisdiction.

      The appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over the 0103 appeal.
¶11         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
      given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.         Maddox v. Merit Systems
      Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).         Thus, it follows that the
      Board does not have jurisdiction over all matters alleged to be unfair or incorrect.
      Johnson v. U.S. Postal Service, 67 M.S.P.R. 573, 577 (1995).
¶12         The statutory provisions that authorize the filing of IRA appeals such as
      this, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a), define those individuals entitled to file such
      an appeal. Pasley v. Department of the Treasury, 109 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶ 10 (2008);
      Glover v. Department of the Army, 94 M.S.P.R. 534, ¶ 9 (2003). Both provisions
      limit IRA appeal rights to an employee, former employee, or applicant for
      employment. Pasley, 109 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶ 10 (discussing the limitation described
      in 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)); Glover, 94 M.S.P.R. 534, ¶ 9 (discussing the limitation
      described in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a)). Accordingly, the Board has held that Congress
      clearly intended to provide IRA appeal rights only to employees, former
      employees, and applicants for employment and that it authorized those
      individuals to file such appeals only when they themselves were the subject of the
      disputed action. Pasley, 109 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶ 10 (finding that the Board lacked
      jurisdiction over an individual’s IRA appeal concerning his termin ation from a
                                                                                           6

      private sector employer); Glover, 94 M.S.P.R. 534, ¶ 9 (finding that the Board
      lacked jurisdiction over an individual’s IRA appeal brought on behalf of her late
      husband).
¶13         Another limitation on the Board’s jurisdiction in the context of an IRA
      appeal is the action itself. For purposes of an IRA appeal, “personnel actions” are
      defined at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Pasley, 109 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶ 10. The listed
      “personnel actions” include the following: (1) an appointment; (2) a promotion;
      (3) an action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 or other disciplinary or corrective action;
      (4) a detail, transfer, or reassignment; (5) a reinstatement; (6) a restoration; (7) a
      reemployment; (8) a performance evaluation under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43 or under
      tile 38; (9) a decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards, or concerning
      education or training if the education or training may reasonably be expected to
      lead to an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other action
      described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A); (10) a decision to order psychiatric testing
      or examination; (11) the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure
      policy, form, or agreement; and (12) any other significant change in duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions.      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A); see, e.g.,
      Weber v. General Services Administration, 54 M.S.P.R. 444, 446 (1992)
      (dismissing an IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant’s arrest
      by agency police was not a “personnel action”), aff’d, 989 F.2d 1203 (Fed. Cir.
      1993) (Table).
¶14         Either of the aforementioned limitations preclude Board jurisdiction in the
      0103 appeal. The appellant is a veteran alleging that he was denied employment
      services, such as job referrals. 0103 IAF, Tab 1. He has not alleged that he is an
      employee, former employee, or applicant for employment, 2 and the action he

      2
        In several of his other Board appeals, the appellant presented allegations concerning
      his nonselections for specific positions with Federal agencies. See, e.g., Donahue v.
      Department of Labor, MSPB Docket No. PH-3330-16-0357-I-1, Initial Appeal File,
      Tab 1; Donahue v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. PH-3330-16-
      0342-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 1. Accordingly, we recognize that the appellant has,
                                                                                          7

      disputes is not a “personnel action.”       Therefore, the 0103 appeal must be
      dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 3
¶15         Because the Board lacks jurisdiction over the 0103 appeal for the
      aforementioned reason, we need not address the agency’s arguments that
      jurisdiction is also lacking due to the absence of a protected disclosure. 0103
      IAF, Tab 19 at 5. However, given our disposition in the 0169 appeal, we note
      that the appellant also failed to prove exhaustion in the 0103 appeal, another
      requirement for establishing jurisdiction in an IRA appeal. Compare 0103 IAF,
      Tab 16 at 4-5 (showing that it was OSC’s Disclosure Unit that addressed the
      appellant’s May and December 2016 complaints, OSC Case Numbers DI-16-3690
      and DI-17-1100), with Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592,
      ¶ 9 (2016); Mason v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶¶ 8,
      16 (2011) (recognizing that disclosures to OSC’s Disclosure Unit do not satisfy
      the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)).

      The appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over the 0169 appeal.
            IRA Appeal
¶16         As we just alluded to, one jurisdictional limitation for an IRA appeal is the
      requirement that an appellant prove that he exhausted his claim with OSC. Supra,

      at times, been an applicant for employment. However, the allegations underlying this
      appeal do not involve him being an applicant for employment; they involve him being
      denied employment services, such as job referrals. See, e.g., 0103 IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
      3
        We recognize that the appellant’s 0103 appeal repeatedly referenced USERRA and the
      Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). E.g., 0103 IAF, Tab 1 at 13.
      However, the administrative judge construed this case as an IRA appeal, and the
      appellant did not object at any point. 0103 IAF, Tab 3 at 2. In fact, his petition for
      review only refers to this as a whistleblower case. 0103 PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. Had the
      appellant intended this to be a USERRA or VEOA appeal, it appears that he could have
      clearly explained as much, given the numerous USERRA and VEOA appeals he has
      previously filed with the Board. See, e.g., Donahue v. Central Intelligence Agency,
      MSPB Docket No. DC-3330-12-0411-I-2 (USERRA and VEOA appeal); Donahue v.
      Federal Reserve System, MSPB Docket No. DC-3330-12-0691-I-1 (VEOA appeal);
      Donahue v. Federal Reserve System, MSPB Docket No. DC-3330-12-0692-I-1
      (USERRA appeal).
                                                                                     8

      ¶ 15; Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8.         However, unlike OSC’s Complaints
      Examining Unit, OSC’s Disclosure Unit does not review allegations of prohibite d
      personnel practices. Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 16. As a result, the Board has
      held that disclosures to OSC’s Disclosure Unit do not satisfy the exhaustion
      requirement in an IRA appeal. Id. Even though the administrative judge in the
      0169 appeal warned of this and provided an opportunity to respond, the appellant
      failed to show that OSC’s Complaints Examining Unit considered his a llegations;
      instead, he provided a January 2017 letter pertaining to OSC Case Number
      DI-17-1230, showing only that OSC’s Disclosure Unit considered his allegations.
      Compare 0169 IAF, Tab 1 at 16-18, with 0169 IAF, Tab 10 at 2-3. Therefore, to
      the extent that the appellant intended to bring an IRA appeal in the 0169 appeal,
      the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to meet his
      jurisdictional burden of proving exhaustion. 0169 ID at 3 -5.
¶17        Absent any argument or evidence to the contrary on review, we agree with
      the administrative judge’s conclusion—the appellant failed to prove exhaustion
      for purposes of an IRA appeal in the 0169 appeal. Given our disposition in the
      0103 appeal, we also note that the appellant does not meet the req uirements of
      5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(a) in the 0169 appeal. See supra, ¶¶ 12-13. In the
      context of the 0169 appeal, like the 0103 appeal, the appellant is a veteran
      alleging that he was denied employment services, such as job referrals.
      0169 IAF, Tab 1 at 5. He is not an employee, former employee, or applicant for
      employment against whom a personnel action was taken or proposed to be taken.
      See supra, ¶¶ 12-13.

            USERRA
¶18        To the extent that the appellant sought to bring a USERRA claim in the
      0169 appeal, the administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to
      establish jurisdiction.   Concerning USERRA’s anti-discrimination provision,
      38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
      allegations failed because he was not an agency employee or applicant for
                                                                                            9

      employment, nor was he denied any benefit of employment. 0169 ID at 5-7; see
      Gossage v. Department of Labor, 118 M.S.P.R. 455, ¶ 10 (2012) (recognizing that
      an appellant establishes the Board’s jurisdiction over a USERRA discrimination
      claim by nonfrivolously alleging that, inter alia, the agency denied him initial
      employment, reemployment, retention, promotion, or any benefit of employment).
      Concerning USERRA’s anti-retaliation provision, 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b), he found
      that the appellant’s allegations failed because they did not involve an adverse
      employment action.      0169 ID at 7; see Kitlinski v. Merit Systems Protection
      Board, 857 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (recognizing that USERRA’s
      anti-retaliation provision applies only to “acts of discrimination in emplo yment
      and adverse employment actions . . . which [are] generally defined to include
      actions adversely affecting [an] employee’s employment status, such as firing,
      demotion, suspension, a loss of benefits, or a reduction in pay”).
¶19         The appellant has failed to present any basis for us to reach a conclusion
      different from the administrative judge, even when construing his allegations
      liberally.   See Gossage, 118 M.S.P.R. 455, ¶ 10 (recognizing that USERRA
      claims should be broadly and liberally construed for purposes of determining
      Board jurisdiction).   As discussed throughout this decision, the appellant is a
      veteran alleging that he was denied employment services, such as job referrals.
      0169 IAF, Tab 1 at 5. He has not presented allegations that involve employment
      with the agency, application for employment with the agency, or any other agency
      connection that falls within the Board’s jurisdiction.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
             You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      10

review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
                                                                                    11

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, o r other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
                                                                                12

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for

5
  The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
                                                                                     13

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit , you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor war rants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       14

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.