Court Opinion

ID: 9410324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 20:06:38.4283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:56.694324
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/20/23 P. v. Icona CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080230

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD286841)

 FRANK ANTHONY ICONA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Laura W. Halgren, Judge. Affirmed.
         Deanna L. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                              INTRODUCTION

      As recently amended, Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
provides that a sentencing court “shall order imposition of the lower term” if
a defendant’s childhood trauma, among other circumstances, contributed to
the commission of his offense, “unless the court finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.”
      After Frank Anthony Icona pled guilty to four counts of committing a
lewd act on his stepson, the trial court selected the middle term and
sentenced him to nine years and four months, finding the aggravating factors
outweighed his own childhood sexual abuse and other mitigating factors to
make the lower term contrary to the interests of justice. Icona contends his
sentence must be vacated because amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
created an alternative statutory maximum of the lower term for defendants
like him such that aggravating factors for imposing the middle term must be

proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under the Apprendi2 rule. He
also contends the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the middle
term. We reject both contentions and affirm the court’s judgement.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Icona pled guilty in December 2021 to two counts of committing a lewd
act on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 3 and 5) and two
counts of committing a lewd act on a child who was at least 10 years younger

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

2     Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi).

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than him and aged 14 or 15 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 7 and 13).3 Icona
agreed to leave the sentence to the trial court, with the understanding he
faced a maximum possible sentence of 11 years and four months.
      At sentencing in March 2022, the trial court sentenced Icona to a total
prison term of nine years and four months, consisting of: the middle term of
six years on count 3; plus consecutive terms of two years on count 5 (one-third
of the six-year middle term) and eight months each on counts 7 and 13 (one-
third of the two-year middle term). In selecting the middle term, the court
found Icona fell within section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), because there was
“childhood trauma with psychological impact that . . . perhaps explains his
reaction when accused of the crimes in this case” and “that is something that
would qualify him to have a low term as the presumption.” The court also
found Icona’s lack of criminal history and prior military service to be
mitigating factors. The court, however, found aggravating factors⎯including
the vulnerability of the victim, the planning and sophistication of his
offenses, taking “extreme advantage” of a position of trust, and harm to the
victim⎯outweighed the mitigating factors and “make the low term contrary
to the interest of justice.”

3    Icona was charged with 14 counts. The remaining counts were
dismissed as part of the plea agreement.

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                                  DISCUSSION
                                         I.
    There Is No Statutory or Sixth Amendment Right to Have Aggravating
         Factors Used to Impose the Middle Term Under Section 1170,
       Subdivision (b)(6) Proven to a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
                        or Stipulated to by the Defendant
      Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170,
California’s determinate sentencing law (DSL). Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567) “amended section 1170, subdivision (b), to
specify that, when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad,
the chosen term shall not exceed the middle term, unless the facts supporting
the aggravating circumstances are (1) established by the defendant’s
stipulation to them, (2) proven to a jury (or to a court, if jury is waived)
beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a
certified record of conviction. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c), adding § 1170,
subd. (b)(1)–(3), by amendment.)” (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37,
44 (Jones).)
      “Senate Bill 567 also added a provision that requires the court to
impose the low term if the defendant’s psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense, ‘unless the
court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the

interests of justice.’[4] (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c), adding § 1170,

4     Although we agree with the court in Jones that “it is Senate Bill 567
that added subdivision (b)(6) to the statute,” Jones, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
page 44, footnote 11 [citing Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c)], the text of
subdivision (b)(6) originated in Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).

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subd. (b)(6), by amendment.)” (Jones, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 44, fn.
omitted.) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), provides:
      “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and unless the court finds that
      the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
      circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
      contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
      imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
      contributing factor in the commission of the offense:
      “(A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or
      childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect,
      exploitation, or sexual violence.
      “(B) The person [was under age 26] at the time of the commission
      of the offense.
      “(C) Prior to the instant offense, or at the time of the commission
      of the offense, the person is or was a victim of intimate partner
      violence or human trafficking.”
      Icona essentially contends this sentencing scheme establishes two
“statutory maximum[s]” under Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466. He concedes
the middle term is the default statutory maximum. But in his view, the
lower term becomes the statutory maximum when any of the three
enumerated circumstances in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), applies. In this
situation, Icona argues any aggravating factors used to impose the middle
term must be stipulated to by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt to comply with Apprendi. He would have us read this

(Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5, pp. 8737–8738.) Both Senate Bill 567 and
Assembly Bill No. 124 were passed by the Legislature in September 2021 and
approved by the Governor on October 8, 2021. (Jones, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th
at p. 44, fn. 11.) Both bills proposed amendments to section 1170, subdivision
(b). (Jones, at p. 44, fn. 11.) However, “because Senate Bill 567 was the last
bill signed by the Governor and bears the highest chapter number,” its
reconciled version of the two bills’ amendments to section 1170 prevails.
(Jones, at p. 44, fn. 11.)
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requirement into subdivision (b)(6) to avoid any constitutional concerns. We
decline to do so.
      As this court recently concluded in People v. Hilburn, “the Legislature
intended to maintain the sentencing court’s discretion to impose the middle
term even if it finds the defendant falls within one of the three categories of
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).” (People v. Hilburn (July 5, 2023, D080175)
___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2023 WL 4342646, at p. *8] (Hilburn).) The Legislature
knew how to establish a heightened proof requirement for aggravating
factors, as it did for aggravating factors used to impose the upper term under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). (Hilburn, at ___ [2023 WL 4342646 at p. *8].)
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), “states no such requirement for the equitable
balancing determination it entrusts to the trial court.” (People v. Bautista-
Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922, 929 (Bautista-Castanon).) Therefore,
consistent with the First District’s conclusion in Bautista-Castanon, we
decline to import the proof requirement from subdivision (b)(2) into
subdivision (b)(6) “as a prerequisite to imposing the middle term.” (Ibid.)
      This construction of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), does not violate
Icona’s jury trial rights under Apprendi. During oral argument, Icona’s
counsel acknowledged the middle term is the maximum sentence that may be
imposed “solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea” or
“reflected in the jury verdict.” (Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296,
303–304, italics omitted.) This makes the middle term the DSL’s “ ‘statutory
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes.” (Id. at p. 303.) However, Icona’s counsel
contended subdivision (b)(6) provides a separate “statutory maximum” under
Apprendi. This is wrong because, as we explained in Hilburn, imposition of
the lower term under subdivision (b)(6) depends on additional judicial
factfinding post-verdict or post-plea. (Hilburn, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th ___

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[2023 WL 4342646, at p. *9].) The trial court must find at least one of the
enumerated circumstances in subdivision (b)(6) applies to the defendant, the
circumstance contributed to the commission of the offense, and the
imposition of the lower term is not contrary to the interests of justice.
(Hilburn, at ___ [2023 WL 4342646, at p. *9].) “Because those findings occur
after the defendant is convicted, and are not necessary for imposition of the
presumptive middle term, they do not create a new statutory maximum
sentence.” (Ibid.) In addition, Apprendi “precludes only increased
punishment based on facts not found by the jury,” which does not apply to
subdivision (b)(6)’s selective imposition of the lower term. (Hilburn, at ___
[2023 WL 4342646, at p. *9].)
      We conclude the trial court’s imposition of the middle term violated
neither Icona’s statutory rights under the DSL, nor his Sixth Amendment
jury trial rights under Apprendi.
                                       II.
 Icona Waived His Claim the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Sentencing
      Icona further contends the trial court abused its discretion in finding
the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). In response, the People argue Icona waived this argument
by failing to object after the court announced its intended sentence. We agree
Icona waived his claim for abuse of discretion.
      In People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 (Scott), the California
Supreme Court held “complaints about the manner in which the trial court
exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” This applies to “cases in which
the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in
which the court purportedly erred because it . . . misweighed the various

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factors[ ] or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid
reasons.” (Id. at p. 353, italics added.)
      The DSL requires the trial court to “set forth on the record the facts
and reasons for choosing the sentence imposed.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5).) The
purpose of this requirement is to decrease the risk of error. (Scott, supra, 9
Cal.4th at p. 351.) “In the event ambiguities, errors, or omissions appear in
the court’s reasoning, the parties can seek an immediate clarification or
change.” (Ibid.) To this end, the waiver doctrine from Scott requires counsel
to call to the court’s attention “defects in the court’s statement of reasons.”
(Id. at p. 353.) Waiver thus applies to arguments about “sentences which,
though otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or
factually flawed manner.” (Id. at p. 354.) The court in Scott specifically
applied waiver to arguments the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
a higher sentence based on articulated sentencing factors that “were
inapplicable, duplicative, and improperly weighed.” (See id. at p. 355.)
      As an additional requirement for waiver to apply, defendant’s counsel
must have had “a meaningful opportunity to object” at the sentencing hearing
after being “clearly apprised of the sentence the court intends to impose and
the reasons that support any discretionary choices.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 356.)
      Icona contends the trial court abused its discretion when it found the
aggravating factors outweighed Icona’s childhood trauma and other
mitigating factors under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). Icona attempts to
minimize each of the aggravating factors found by the court. He argues
(1) “ ‘vulnerability of the victim’ ” is not a proper aggravating factor when the
victim’s age is an element of the offense, (2) “ ‘harm to the victim’ ” is
inherent in the elements of the crime, (3) “ ‘planning and sophistication’ ”

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shown by committing the offenses when others were not around does not
make the offense worse than it would ordinarily have been, and (4) “ ‘taking
advantage of a position of trust’ would seemingly be prominent in every
‘resident child molester case.’ ” Finally, Icona argues the “strong mitigating
factors” found by the court, in combination with the childhood trauma
mitigant that made subdivision (b)(6) applicable, “prevented the court from a
reasoned finding that the limited aggravators outweighed the mitigating
circumstances such that the interests of justice required an elevated term.”
      Each of Icona’s arguments falls within the scope of the waiver doctrine
from Scott. If Apprendi does not apply, Icona does not contest the middle
term is “permitted by law,” so long as the court did not impose it in a
procedurally or factually flawed manner. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.)
Icona’s arguments go directly to the factual and procedural flaws that can be
waived under Scott. His arguments about the aggravating factors either
relate to their applicability in this case, or to them being given too much
weight. Similarly, regarding the balancing of the aggravating factors against
the mitigating factors, Icona contends the court “misweighed the various
factors” in exercising its discretion. (Scott, at p. 353.) All these arguments
can be waived under Scott.
      Icona’s counsel failed to object at all, let alone based on any of the above
reasons, after the court stated its intention to impose the middle term
sentence. The court began the sentencing hearing by articulating its
understanding of the revised DSL. The court stated, “I think I am still free if
I find aggravating factors in the case and have those conclude they outweigh
the mitigants, I could still impose the middle term under [section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)].” (Italics added.) The court then invited argument by each
of the parties. Following the parties’ argument, the court made findings

                                        9
regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors. The court found Icona had
suffered childhood trauma that had contributed to the commission of his
offenses under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). However, the court
announced its intention to impose the middle term because it found the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.
      Following the court’s announcement of its findings and intention to
impose the middle term, Icona’s counsel made no objection. Nor did Icona’s
counsel object after the court asked, “Is there anything additional that I have
overlooked that I need to address?” Thus, Icona’s counsel failed to object at
the sentencing hearing, despite having a meaningful opportunity to do so.
Icona was “clearly apprised of the sentence the court intend[ed] to impose and
the reasons that support[ed] any discretionary choices.” (Scott, supra, 9
Cal.4th at p. 356.) Icona now identifies perceived errors in how the court
exercised its sentencing discretion. He has waived his opportunity to make
such arguments.
      Icona contends he properly objected to the middle term through his
“Statement in Mitigation and Sentencing Brief” and at the sentencing
hearing. We reject both. First, Icona filed his statement in mitigation before
the sentencing hearing. As this came before the court’s statement of its
intention to impose the middle term and its weighing of the sentencing
factors, it does not count as a proper objection to avoid waiver. Scott
recognized the defendant may file a statement in mitigation in advance of the
sentencing hearing but held an objection must separately be raised when the
court states its intended sentence and the reasons therefor. (See Scott, supra,
9 Cal.4th at pp. 351, 353, 356.)
      Second, Icona contends the court “made sentencing findings and
relayed those findings to [Icona]” prior to his counsel’s argument during the

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sentencing hearing. The record does not support Icona’s contention. Icona
relies on the court’s statement “if I find aggravating factors in the case and
have those conclude they outweigh the mitigants, I could still impose the
middle term.” (Italics added.) But this was not a statement of the court’s
intended sentence. The court merely used conditional language to describe
its understanding of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). The court announced its
intended sentence and supporting reasons much later in the sentencing
hearing, following the parties’ argument.
      Even if the court had announced its intended sentence at the start of
the sentencing hearing, the arguments of Icona’s counsel during the hearing
do not match those raised on appeal. His counsel focused on the erroneous
contention aggravating factors under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), must be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. At no point during the
sentencing hearing did Icona’s counsel present any of the specific arguments
against the aggravating factors Icona now raises on appeal.
      Because we conclude Icona waived his arguments against the trial
court’s sentence by failing to object when the sentence was announced, we
decline to reach the substance of Icona’s abuse of discretion claim.

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                             DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                           DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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