Court Opinion

ID: 9720149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:18:09.910096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:13.657273
License: Public Domain

SPARKS, Acting P. J.
Although I concur in the result arrived at by the majority, I reach the same destination as my colleagues by taking a different judicial route.
Without deciding the issue, the majority assumes that the denial of the incentive bonus award constitutes an unlawful discrimination under Labor Code section 132a. It then resolves the conflict between that statute and the statute authorizing the bonus, Government Code section 19994.20, by applying the rule that a special statute takes precedence over a conflicting general statute. As the majority sees it, Government Code section 19994.20 is the more specific statute because it deals only with state employees and their collective bargaining agreements. In my view, the majority’s unspoken premise is flawed. These two disparate statutes do not deal with the same subject matter and consequently the special/general rule has no application here.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1859 directs that “[i]n the construction of a statute the intention of the legislature . . . is to be pursued, if possible; and when a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former.” Consequently, “where the same subject matter is covered by inconsistent provisions, one of which is special and the other general, the special one, whether or not enacted first, is an exception to the general statute and controls unless an intent to the contrary clearly appears.” (Warne v. Harkness (1963) 60 Cal.2d 579, 588 [35 Cal.Rptr. 601, 387 P.2d 377].) But here the statutes do not deal with the same subject matter. One deals with discrimination by employers against industrially injured employees while the other authorizes accident reduction incentive programs to be included in memorandums of understanding negotiated between the Department of Personnel Administration and state employee organizations. The statute authorizing incentive programs says nothing about discrimination and can hardly be characterized as a more specific discrimination statute. The majority goes awry by assuming that when two disparate statutes conflict in their application the judicial task is to determine which of the two is the narrowest. But when the statutes are dissimilar and have unrelated purposes, it is meaningless to inquire which of the two is the more specific. The potential conflict between these disparate statutes must be resolved by other rules of statutory construction.
*584Code of Civil Procedure section 1858 mandates that “[i]n the construction of a statute . . . where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.” We are thus enjoined, wherever possible, to reconcile seemingly conflicting or inconsistent provisions by reading all parts of a statute together and construing them to achieve harmony rather than holding that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency. (Wemyss v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 616, 621 [241 P.2d 525].) Our duty to harmonize statutes if reasonably possible applies even though the apparent inconsistencies appear in different codes. “In examining statutes that appear to conflict, we are guided by settled rules of statutory construction. The most fundamental of these rules is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. Statutes that are apparently in conflict should, if reasonably possible, be reconciled, even when the court interprets provisions in different codes . . . (Walters v. Weed (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1, 9 [246 Cal.Rptr. 5, 752 P.2d 443]; citations omitted.)
Labor Code section 132a was originálly enacted as a criminal statute in 1941. (Stats. 1941, ch. 401, § 1, p. 1686.) In 1972, the Legislature amended the section to provide not only for criminal sanctions for unlawful discrimination but also for the payment of a penalty and at the same time to declare the broad policy of the state against discrimination toward industrially injured employees. (Stats. 1972, ch. 874, § 1, p. 1545.) In 1984, some six years after the decision in Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658 [150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564], the Legislature enacted a new accident reduction incentive plan for state employees. (Stats. 1984, ch. 674, § 1, pp. 2472-2473.) Under the terms of the enabling statute, the Department of Personnel Administration may meet and confer with representatives of recognized employee organizations “on the implementation of an accident prevention incentive award program covering employees in that unit.” (Gov. Code, § 19994.20, subd. (a).) The declared purpose of the program is “to reduce, through the cooperative effort of labor and management, the number of on-the-job injuries to, and the use of sick leave by, state employees.” (Ibid.) This laudable purpose does not facially conflict with the “declared policy of this state that there should not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment.” (Lab. Code, § 132a.) The Government Code provision seeks to minimize injuries to state employees as well as reduce sick leave absences by authorizing an “incentive award program” in the memorandum of understanding between the department and state employee organizations. The objective is not to penalize or discriminate against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment but is rather to provide incentives for averting accidents and the use of sick leave. Labor Code section 132a, on the other hand, seeks to prohibit, by the use of monetary and penal *585sanctions, an employer from discharging or threatening to discharge, or in any other manner discriminating against an employee who seeks workers’ compensation benefits. Thus Labor Code section 132a covers all the “ways in which an employer may unlawfully penalize an employee.” (Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 667.) A statutorily authorized incentive program, however, is not such a prohibited way of illegally penalizing a nonqualifying employee. An incentive award program, by its very nature, necessarily contemplates the conferring of some benefit upon employees who fulfill the terms of the program. But the program, far from being unlawful, has been expressly authorized by the Legislature. Consequently, the failure to earn such a benefit cannot be said to constitute the type of unlawful discrimination envisaged by the Labor Code.
The Legislature could not have intended that the statutorily authorized implementation of the accident reduction incentive program for “on-the-job injuries” would automatically subject the State of California to a penalty of upwards to $10,000 under Labor Code section 132a for every industrially injured state employee who did not qualify for the award. Nor could it have intended that state officers would commit crimes under Labor Code section 132a by implementing the incentive bonus program expressly authorized by statute. Given the express intent of the Legislature “to reduce, through the cooperative effort of labor and management, the number of on-the-job injuries to . . . state employees” by the “implementation of an accident prevention incentive award program” (Gov. Code, 19994.20, subd. (a)), I would harmonize the two statutes by holding that the granting or denial of an incentive award under Government Code section 19994.20 does not constitute an act of unlawful discrimination within the meaning of Labor Code section 132a.
A petition for a rehearing was denied October 11, 1988, and petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 19, 1989.