Court Opinion

ID: 9857312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:29:21.401526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:26.912534
License: Public Domain

JohN A. FoglemaN, Justice, dissenting. The learned trial judge’s opinion contains a thorough and concise statement of the facts disclosed by this record and excellent statements of legal principles. My disagreement with him and the majority lies in what I take to be misapplication of law to the facts and their overlooking certain applicable legal and equitable principles. I am unable to distinguish this case from other decisions of this court which reached a contrary result. The fundamental basis of appellees’ claim is an alleged parol gift of the land. This is clearly alleged in the complaint and the appellees attempted to make a showing that their mother obtained a redemption deed from a tax forfeiture to the state based upon an agreement with her brothers and sisters that if she would redeem the land it would be hers. Some of appellants concede that there was an agreement but they say that it was that she could live on, use and occupy the property without payment of rent if she would pay the taxes. Here the appellees are confronted with the requirement that they show the parol gift, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence, but by evidence that is clear, convincing and satisfactory, or, as sometimes stated, by evidence that is clear and unequivocal. Gibbs v. Pace, 207 Ark. 199, 179 S. W. 2d 690. Not only is this parol gift the fundamental basis of appellees ’ claim, but it is also the foundation stone of the opinion of both the trial court and the majority that the possession of appellees was adverse and hostile to appellants. My examination of the testimony in support of the parol gift discloses that the evidence supporting it is far from clear, convincing or satisfactory. No one testified about the gift except appellees. Appellee Roe was about 7 or 8 years old when his mother moved on the property, so he does not attempt to tell very much about the parol gift. He first said that none of his aunts and uncle?, ever said anything about the ownership of the property except his Uncle- Will (W. R. Ueltzen). He then related that his Uncle Will had, about six or seven years ago, advised him to go ahead and divide the property with his sister, appellee Sowl; that they (the other Ueltzen heirs) had tried to get it and couldn’t; and that they didn’t want it. When asked, he first said that there was nothing said by any of his other aunts and uncles with reference to the ownership of t he property until his memory was refreshed by his attorney. Then he told of an occasion at a store at Graphic when one Amos Watkins asked his Uncle Bob (R. T. Ueltzen) what they had ever done about the old home place and Uncle Bob replied that he had given it to Roe’s mother years ago. In this, Roe was corroborated by Amos Watkins. Although R. T. Ueltzen denied the conversation, he remembers going with Roe to the store. In spite of appellee Roe’s testimony that there were no statements by his aunts and uncles relating to the ownership of the property, when later asked if there was any discussion as to who owned the property during his mother’s lifetime, he undertook to tell of a conversation among his mother, his Aunt May and his Aunt Chloe in which each of the aunts said that his mother could have her part of the place. He does not fix the time of these conversations in any way. Appellee Sow-1’s testimony is most unsatisfactory. She said that she and her brother were just little kids when her mother redeemed the property, but she could remember her mother discussing the matter with her brothers and sisters before she redeemed it and that they said as far as they were concerned it was hers. She claimed to have heard her aunts and uncles say at different times that the property was her mother’s, but she never identified a time or place or person. In face of the denial of appellants, this is certainly equivocal, unclear, unconvincing and unsatisfactory. No parol gift can be sustained on any such testimony as this. The fact that Maude Roe obtained a redemption deed from the State of Arkansas is much more consistent with the position of appellants that she was to pay the taxes and occupy the property without payment of rent than with the contention of appellees. A redemption deed from the State, of course, is in effect a mere payment of taxes and does not purport to convey any title. Mabrey v. Millman, 208 Ark. 289, 186 S. W. 2d 28 ; Gott v. Moore, 218 Ark. 800, 238 S. W. 2d 754. We should not overlook the fact that this is a case where tenants in common are claiming adversely to other tenants in common. The trial court and the majority of this court recognized that the possession of one such tenant is the possession of all; that much stronger evidence of adverse possession is required where the tenants are related than would otherwise be the case; and that it is incumbent upon one claiming adversely to a tenant in common to unequivocally bring home to the latter knowledge of his adverse claim. Failure of proof on the parol gift leads only to the conclusion that the original possession of Mrs. Roe was permissive. Having been permissive, it is presumed to have continued to be so and could never be anything else regardless of duration in the absence of an explicit disclaimer. Terral v. Brooks, 194 Ark. 311, 108 S. W. 2d 489 ; Dial v. Armstrong, 195 Ark. 621, 113 S. W. 2d 503 ; Gibbs v. Pace, 207 Ark. 199, 179 S. W. 2d 690. Where one of the parties in a claim of adverse holdings entered permissively, the statutory period Will not begin to run until an adverse holding is declared and notice of such change is brought to the knowledge, of an owner. Bailey v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513, 237 S. W. 2d 16 ; Still v. Still, 239 Ark. 865, 394 S. W. 2d 733. When a tenant in common seeks to oust or dispossess the other tenants and turn his occupancy into an adverse possession and acquire the entire estate by lapse of time under the statute of limitations, he must show when knowledge of such adverse claim, or of his intention to so hold was brought home to them, for it is only from that time that his holding will be adverse. Singer v. Naron, 99 Ark. 446, 138 S. W. 958 ; Gibbs v. Pace, 207 Ark. 199, 179 S. W. 2d 690. Just last May this court held that a cotenant must prove that he asserted a hostile claim and that notice thereof was brought home to his co-owners. Palmer v. Sanders, 240 Ark. 859, 342 S. W. 2d 300. Roe admits that he never told his aunts and uncles that he was claiming the property adversely. Mrs.. Sowl seems to claim to have told them, but her testimony is so unsatisfactory that it is inconclusive and of no value whatever. This is her testimony on that subject: “Q. And since you and Billy have gotten the deed did you ever notify these folks that you were claiming to own the property! A. I think they knew. Q. I don’t know whether they knew or not. I am asking if you personally over did! A. Yes. Q. When and where did that happen! A. I couldn’t pin it down to the exact date. Q. Where did this conversation take place! A. I think it was around the time of Mother’s funeral. Q. They were back at that time? A. Yes, they were all back except Ontie. Q. Did you notify them at that time you had a deed to the property? A. There was, so much going on we didn’t sit down and say we owned this, there is the deed. Q. Are you saying that you told them at that time that your mother had made a deed to the property to you? A., We have the deed, yes. Q. I know you have it. I am asking if you told them that you had it? A. Yes. Q. Who did you tell? A. Different ones of them at different times. Q. Did you just volunteer the information that you had a deed? A. It is just a course of conversation when you talk to relatives. Q. Now, of these people here, which one' did you? A. Different ones. Q. That hasn’t been so long ago. Just which one? A. Uncle Bob, and I know Uncle Will knew about it. Q. Did you tell him about it? A. We talked about it. Q. You and Uncle Will talked about it? A. With Billy. Q. What did they say when you told them you had a deed? A. They didn’t say anything. They didn’t say they opposed it, or anything.” Appellees rely on the building of improvements, the payment of taxes, the retention of rents and profits, the selling of timber, and the failure of appellants to claim benefits or make contributions, along with a deed from their mother, to. overcome the presumptions and establish their disclaimer. The conveyance cannot be relied on to establish a disclaimer. As was said of a mortgage in Tennison v. Carroll, 219 Ark. 658, 243 S. W. 2d 944, a cotenant should not be expected to check a record constantly to determine whether such instruments have been executed. A brother’s joint occupancy of a farm with his mother, who was entitled to homestead and unassigned dower, was held insufficient to support a claim of adverse possession against his brothers, even though the mother had conveyed her interest to the former by deed of which the latter had no knowledge. McGuire v. Wallis, 231 Ark. 506, 330 S. W. 2d 714. Nor were they, in that case, charged with notice of a deed of their brother to his son when they had no knowledge of the deed and it was not followed by any visible change in the possession of the property. In the case last above cited, this court reversed a decree of the Hot Spring Chancery Court sustaining a claim of adverse possession even though the occupying brother lived in a house that was on the land, built and occupied a house thereon, was in charge of the farm, managing it for his own benefit, paying taxes and paying installments upon a mortgage debt. In addition, the construction of two barns, drilling of a well and putting in a stock pond by this brother’s son were not sufficient to persuade this court that this would satisfy the requirement of notorious, unequivocal action necessary. Living on the property, improving it, paying taxes and collecting rents were held insufficient to overcome the presumption accompanying a permissive entry in Flunder v. Childs, 238 Ark. 523, 382 S. W. 2d 881, reversing the lower court. The fact that cotenant’s brother paid no taxes, collected no rents or profits, exerted no control and contributed to no improvements while off the land for 18 years was held insufficient to constitute notice that his sister was claiming adversely to him in an action against his sister’s grantee. Baxter v. Young, 229 Ark. 1035, 320 S. W. 2d 640. Continued review of cases would only extend this opinion. I find it impossible to distinguish this case from Gibbs v. Pace, 207 Ark. 199, 179 S. W. 2d 690, applying almost every principle involved here. There a parol gift from the cotenant was claimed. The claimant also asserted adverse possession evidenced by physical possession, enjoying profits, cutting timber, paying taxes, and making improvements. There the cotenant, claiming adverse possession, wrote one of the heirs of his cotenant seeking to purchase whatever interest the heirs might have. The similarity even goes to the extent that interest was activated in that ease by an attempted sale of fee simple title to a stranger to the tenancy and here hv an oil lease. It cannot be said that the difference lies in the decree of the chancellor having been favorable to the absent cotenants in the Gibbs case and unfavorable in the present case. It is clearly stated in the opinion in the former case that the cause was tried do novo and nowhere is there any mention of any weight being given the lower court’s decree. I am willing to concede that there is a basis for sustaining the trial court’s findings as to W. R. (Will) Ueltzen and R. T. (Bob) Ueltzen by estoppel. Proof of a transaction constituting an estoppel must also be clear and convincing. There must be cea*-tainty to every intent and the party setting it np must prove it strictly. Arkansas National Bank v. Boles, 97 Ark. 43, 133 S. W. 195 ; James Talcott, Inc., v. Associates Discount Corp., 302 F. 2d 443 (1962). I think that proof is satisfactorily clear to sustain the lower court’s holding that they are estopped from any claim in this land by failure to speak when they should have spoken. Billy Roe’s testimony about his Uncle Will’s advice concerning division of the property was positive and unequivocal. Roe said he once suggested a place for a division line. He further stated that Will Ueltzen did not claim any interest when Roe advised him of the oil lease. Will Ueltzen’s denials are at least tempered by tacit admissions on cross-examination. He could have at least advised the attorney for Roe about his claim when the lease came up, but excused himself by saying, “I didn’t know you wanted to know.” Roe also testified that W. R. Ueltzen said that he would sign a quitclaim deed when the matter of the oil lease first came up. The evidence as to estoppel of R. T. Ueltzen is even more convincing, in view of Amos Watkins’ testimony about the conversation at the store at Graphic. It must be remembered that the other heirs of R. R. and Laura Ueltzen were living out of the state and quite a distance from the property. They are not bound by any statements of their tenants in common. 31A C. J. S., 814, Evidence, § 318. Nor do I see any inconsistency in their being agreeable to having the property occupied and used by the children of their sister, Maude, but not being willing for them to sell, lease, or convey the property or interests therein to outsiders. Undivided absentee ownership of property presents many practical difficulties in management which does make the position of these heirs reasonable and tenable. I would affirm the chancery court’s decree as to W. R. and R. T. Ueltzen but reverse it as to the other heirs of R. R. and Laura Ueltzem. I fear the result reached by the majority is an erosion of rules of property by improper application. I am authorized to state that Byrd, J., joins in. this dissent.