Court Opinion

ID: 9461784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:24:48.801107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:16.174094
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OPINION OF THE COURT
VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee. The district court ruled that plaintiff’s diversity suit for non-support, based in contract upon a separation agreement executed in Pennsylvania, could not be maintained in the federal courts under the circumstances of this record. It premised this holding upon the federal courts’ traditional policy against intervention in “domestic relations” cases. We conclude that the district court acted within its authority in holding that this case could not be maintained in federal court. We will, however, reverse the district court’s entry of an order granting summary judgment and remand with directions to enter judgment dismissing this suit for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
I.
Lynne E. Solomon (“plaintiff”) and John F. Solomon, Jr. (“defendant”) were married on August 16, 1958. Three children were born of this union. Marital difficulties arose and consequently, on November 22, 1968, husband and wife signed a separation agreement providing, inter alia, that the wife have custody of the children, that' the husband pay a stipulated weekly amount for child support, and that — subject to certain restrictions — the husband be granted visitation rights. Paragraph 2(g) of the agreement provided in part:
“ • ■ • in the event that the parties cannot resolve the issue of Husband’s future visitation rights between themselves, they hereby agree to submit any dispute for resolution in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Both parties herewith agree to submit voluntarily to the jurisdiction of said Court in any such proceedings.” 1 (Emphasis added.)
*1020Moreover, the parties agreed in Paragraph 17 to a mechanism for the resolution of other disputes:
“Except with respect to paragraph 2(g) of the Agreement, all disputes, differences, questions of interpretation, questions of construction, disagreements and other problems which may arise in any manner out of this Agreement of the separation of the parties shall be referred to Victor J. Roberts, Esquire, and William L. O’Hey, Jr., Esquire, for decision. If they cannot agree they shall refer the matter to a third person agreeable to them for decision, which shall include the allocation of any costs incurred.
“The parties agree to abide by the decision thus reached . . . .”2
The tranquility of' separation was short-lived. On March 14, 1969, defendant brought a habeas corpus action in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, contending that his visitation rights had been infringed. A hearing was held on April 3, 1969, and plaintiff submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Montgomery County Court. By court order of May 19, 1969, defendant was granted specified visitation rights and plaintiff was required to post a $5,000.00 bond upon condition that she not remove the children from the court’s jurisdiction without express written approval of the court. The bond was finally posted on June 13, 1969, after defendant had petitioned for a contempt citation against plaintiff. While the case was pending, plaintiff and the children moved to Florida in violation of the court’s order.3 Subsequently, on November 10, 1969, plaintiff was declared in contempt, judgment on the bond was granted, and a bench warrant for plaintiff’s arrest, which remains outstanding, was issued.4 The above-mentioned (1) May 19, 1969, state court order recited that “ . . . the mother, Lynne E. Solomon, stated in Court on April 13, 1969, that she submitted to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania . . . ” (37a), and (2) November 10, 1969, state court order recited that “ . . . Lynne E. Solomon having stated at the initial hearing on June 13, 1969, and again on August 8, 1969, and again on August 11, 1969, that she would abide by the jurisdiction of the Montgomery County, Pennsylvania Court . . . ” (40a).5 Defendant con*1021cedes non-payment of support after November 1969, but contends that he did so only after plaintiff had materially breached the separation agreement by denying his visitation rights.
After plaintiff secured residence in Florida, defendant obtained a divorce decree and remarried.6 In August 1972, plaintiff and the children moved from Florida to Newark, Delaware. On December 13, 1973, plaintiff filed suit, based upon diversity of citizenship, in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking money damages for non-support, specific enforcement of the separation agreement, and appropriate equitable relief.7 This suit was instituted by plaintiff in her representative capacity as parent and natural guardian of the children and in her own right. Defendant submitted alternative motions for summary judgment, dismissal, or a stay of proceedings pending resolution of the litigation in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a cause of action involving “domestic relations.”8 This appeal followed.
II.
Traditionally, the federal courts have evinced great reluctance to entertain cases involving domestic relations. This doctrine is not premised upon explicit statutory language limiting the jurisdictional authority of federal courts. Indeed, the jurisdictional statute utilized by plaintiff to bring suit grants original jurisdiction to federal district courts “in all civil actions”9 where there is jurisdictional amount and diversity of citizenship.10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Rather, the jurisdictional exception for domestic relations has been judicially carved, beginning with and extending through a se*1022ríes of dicta in decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
In Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 16 L.Ed. 226 (1859), the Court entertained a suit filed in federal court in Wisconsin by a wife residing in New York against her husband, who lived in Wisconsin. Her suit sought to enforce a decree of the New York state courts which granted her separation and alimony. Although ruling that the district court had properly exercised jurisdiction, the Court commented:
“Our first remark is — and we wish it to be remembered — that this is not a suit asking the court for the allowance of alimony. That has been done by a court of competent jurisdiction. The court in Wisconsin was asked to interfere to prevent that decree from being defeated by fraud.
“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board.”
62 U.S. at 584.
Chief Justice Taney and Justices Daniel and Campbell remained unplacated by this caveat and dissented, arguing that the federal courts had absolutely no jurisdiction over the subjects of divorce and alimony.
In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890), involved a dispute over child custody in which the child’s father had applied in the federal district court of Nebraska for a writ of habeas corpus to recover the child from the care of her grandparents. The district court granted the writ and, when the grandfather refused to relinquish the child, cited him for contempt and committed him to jail. The grandfather petitioned directly to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that he was illegally imprisoned because the district court had erred in assuming jurisdiction of the father’s custody case. The Supreme Court agreed, explaining that federal courts have no jurisdiction over child custody suits. It emphasized:
“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.” (Emphasis added.)
136 U.S. at 593-94, 10 S.Ct. at 853.
In Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 20 S.Ct. 58, 44 L.Ed. 115 (1899), the Court heard an appeal from a divorce decree and alimony award which had been affirmed by the territorial Supreme Court of Arizona. It concluded that the jurisdietionally restrictive dictum of Barber was not applicable to the jurisdiction of territorial courts or to the United States Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over those courts. The only statutory restriction upon appeals from the territorial Supreme Courts to the United States Supreme Court was that the matter in dispute exceed $5,000.00. In holding that the alimony award, but not the divorce decree, met that requirement, the Court remarked:
“It may therefore be assumed as indubitable that the Circuit Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction, either of suits for divorce, or of claims for alimony, whether made in a suit for divorce, or by an original proceeding in equity, before a decree for such alimony in a state court. Within the States of the Union, the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the State, and not to the laws of the United States. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593, 594 [10 S.Ct. 850, 34 L.Ed. 500, 503].”
175 U.S. at 167, 20 S.Ct. at 60.
The territorial jurisdiction exception to the broad prohibition against domestic relations suits in federal courts arose again in De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 26 S.Ct. 485, 50 L.Ed. 765 (1906). In that case, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands reversed a divorce decree and alimony and allowance awards granted by the trial court. Cit*1023ing Simms, the Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal:11
“It has been a long-established rule that the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery, or an incident of a divorce or separation, both by reason of the fact that the husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of different states so long as the marriage relation continues (a rule which has been somewhat relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that a suit for divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value.
“But the general rule above stated has no application to the jurisdiction of the territorial courts, or of the appellate jurisdiction of this court over those courts.”
201 U.S. at 307-08, 26 S.Ct. at 486. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was reversed with Justices Holmes, Peckham, White and Day dissenting on the jurisdictional question.
A unanimous court reaffirmed the primacy of state courts in domestic relations suits in a non-diversity setting in Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 50 S.Ct. 154, 74 L.Ed. 489 (1930). Relator, Vice-Consul of Roumania, had married a resident of Ohio who later sued him for divorce and alimony in the state courts of Ohio. The Ohio state trial court granted temporary alimony over relator’s objection that it lacked jurisdiction. His petition for writ of prohibition was denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider relator’s argument that, under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution,12 the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction. Explaining the earlier domestic relations cases and noting that the parties’ suit for divorce in a federal district court had been dismissed earlier, Justice Holmes’ opinion, affirming the Ohio courts, reasoned:
“The words quoted from the Constitution do not of themselves and without more exclude the jurisdiction of the State. . . . The statutes do not purport to exclude the State Courts from jurisdiction except where they grant it to the Courts of the United States. Therefore they do not affect the present case if it be true as has been unquestioned for three-quarters of a century that the Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over divorce. If when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty in construing the instrument accordingly and not much in dealing with the statutes.”
*1024280 U.S. at 383-84, 50 S.Ct. at 155.
Our understanding of these cases requires us to conclude that the district court properly refused to exercise jurisdiction over the instant case. The import of the Supreme Court’s language in these cases is that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction in domestic relations suits except where necessary to the effectuation of prior state court judgments involving the same matters 13 or where jurisdiction lies by dint of the participation and review of territorial courts.14 The case at bar cannot be categorized into either narrow exception. In fact, assumption of jurisdiction in this case would, as the district court recognized, have precisely the opposite effect since it would undermine and derogate both the state court’s contempt citation against plaintiff and its decision to continue generally her support action until such time as plaintiff purged herself of contempt.15
Nor do we accept plaintiff’s contention that a divorce decree without more removes this case from the arena of domestic relations and permits the intervention of federal courts to adjudicate issues unaffected by that decree.16 At the core of both parties’ contentions is the parent-child relationship. The divorce decree in this case did not sever that relationship. There is no evidence that it either incorporated the terms of the separation agreement or merged with it. The state courts have not rendered any judgment on support payments which requires our invocation of jurisdiction to assure its efficacy. In Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688, 689 (3d Cir. 1947), we disclaimed jurisdiction over the suit of an illegitimate child against his putative father for support and education.17 That case made clear *1025the fact that the classification of a suit as one in domestic relations does not depend upon the existence, and impliedly the continuation, of a marriage relationship.18
In holding that the domestic relations doctrine applies to the case before us, we do not mean to suggest that a separation agreement may never be litigated in the federal courts by parties between whom there is diversity of citizenship. In a different case, in which the custody of no child was involved, in which there was neither pending state court action nor an agreement to litigate in the state courts, and in which there was no threat that a feuding couple would play one court system off against the other, we might well assume jurisdiction. But all the above dangers are involved in the present case and lead us to the conclusion that the domestic relations doctrine should apply. See In re Burrus, supra.
The domestic relations exception to the jurisdictional powers of federal courts represents an historically engrained limitation upon us. It is true that the rationale upon which it is premised has shifted from conceptions regarding the powers of ancient ecclesiastical courts, see note 8, supra, the non-diversity of married couples, and the lack of monetary value of a divorce, see De La Rama, supra, to the modern view that state courts have historically decided these matters and have developed both a well-known expertise in these cases and a strong interest in disposing of them. See C. Wright, Handbook of. the Law of Federal Courts 84 (2d ed. 1970). In Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973), Judge Friendly used this language at pages 514 and 515, after quoting from Barber v. Barber, supra, the wording set forth above at page 1022 of this opinion:
“Mr. Justice Holmes . . . continued [280 U.S.] at 383-384, 50 S.Ct. at 155:
Therefore, they do not affect the present case if it be true as has been unquestioned for three-quarters of a century that the Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over divorce. If when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty in construing the instrument accordingly, and not much in dealing with the statutes.
“We have no disposition to question that conclusion, whether the history was right or not, cf. Spindel v. Spindel, supra, 283 F.Supp. at 802—803. More than a century has elapsed since the Barber dictum without any intimation of Congressional dissatisfaction. It is beyond the realm of reasonable belief that, in these days of congested dockets, Congress would wish the federal courts to seek to regain territory, even if the cession of 1859 was unjustified. Whatever Article III may or may not permit, we thus accept the Barber dictum as a correct interpretation of the Congressional grant.
“The holding that, with one possible exception, federal jurisdiction was not barred by the dictum in Barber v. Barber, supra, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 584, 16 L.Ed. 226, does not necessarily entail a conclusion that the district court should have adjudicated this action. It would be difficult to think of a case where invocation of federal jurisdiction by a plaintiff was less justified than here; indeed, anyone challenged to produce an example why diversity jurisdiction should be abolished or se*1026verely curtailed would hardly have conceived so dramatic an illustration. Most important of all, decision requires exploration of a difficult field of New York law with which, because of its proximity to the exception for matrimonial actions, federal judges are more than ordinarily unfamiliar.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
In concluding his opinion, Judge Friendly made this comment at page 521:
“If our decision here has inadvertently rent a seam in New York matrimonial law, we trust the New York courts will speedily repair it in some other case. The injury was not of our making.”
Concededly, this judge-made doctrine is not without its critics.19 But until such time as either Congress or the Supreme Court sees fit to amend or emasculate this exception, we are bound by the precedent of the Supreme Court’s language and the weight of federal authority 20 to apply it to the broad area of domestic relations. Its application in this case preserves the sanctity of state court judgments and protects against confusing and complicated piecemeal litigation. Although plaintiff repeatedly stated in open court that she “submitted to the jurisdiction of the” state court, as noted at page 1020 above, she seeks to have the federal court nullify its rulings in this action.
The district court was justified in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction of this case.
III.
Our ruling that plaintiff cannot resort to the federal judiciary is bottomed upon the domestic relations doctrine. Its application in this case, we believe, produces a result consistent with the federal appellate court cases. In addition, review of the terms of this particular separation agreement, without the necessity of interpreting their legal ramifications, and the declarations of plaintiff to the state courts, buttresses the district court conclusion that the federal courts have no jurisdictional authority to decide the merits of this case.
The basis of plaintiff’s suit in contract is the contention that defendant violated their separation agreement by his failure to pay support. Defendant, in turn, concedes that he terminated payments but argues that he was legally justified in doing so because plaintiff’s denial of his visitation rights represented an earlier material breach of contract which voided the entire agreement, including the terms relating to support. Simply stated, defendant’s contractual liability is contingent upon a determination of whether he was denied a contractual right and, if so, whether that denial was a material breach of the separation agreement.21 That determination requires a consideration of a dispute as to visitation rights — an area where the parties agreed, under paragraph 2(g) of the separation agreement, to submit to the jurisdiction and decision of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.22
*1027IV.
Under Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.), lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be raised and adjudicated by a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. See, e. g., Jones v. Brush, 143 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1944); Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 372 F.Supp. 939, 946 (E.D.Pa.1974). Accordingly, the district court’s order of summary judgment in favor of defendant will be reversed and the case will be remanded with instructions to enter judgment dismissing the action for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Costs will be taxed against appellants.

. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently recognized the validity of forum-selection clauses in fairly negotiated contracts. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1914, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), where the Court said:
“The choice of that forum was made in an arm’s-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts.”
In Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir. 1966), the court said:
“The court there reviewed the earlier Pennsylvania decisions and announced the modern rule which is to prevail in Pennsylvania. ‘The modern and correct rule is that, while private parties may not by contract prevent a court from asserting its jurisdiction or change the rules of venue, nevertheless, a court in which venue is proper and which has jurisdiction should decline to proceed with the cause when the parties have freely agreed that litigation shall be conducted in another forum and where such agreement is not unreasonable at the time of litigation.’ Central Contracting Co. v. C. E. Youngdahl & Co., Inc., 418 Pa. 122, 133, 209 A.2d 810, 816 (1965). . . .
“We need not consider whether in this diversity case we are bound to apply the Pennsylvania rule, for both federal and state courts have increasingly in recent years recognized the same principle which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has now adopted. It is becoming more widely recognized that for reasons of business or convenience the parties may have bargained that all litigation arising out of their complex activity under a contract shall be drawn into one jurisdiction. So long as there is nothing unreasonable in such a provision there is no basis for viewing it as an affront to the judicial power, which must be stricken down. On the contrary, it should be respected as the responsible expression of the intention of the parties so long as there is no proof that its provisions will put one of the parties to an unreasonable disadvantage and thereby subvert the interests of justice.
“The Pennsylvania rule, therefore, represents the correct principle, and we accept it *1020and apply it here. This brings us to the question whether the provision that the action must be brought only in the courts of New York County is unreasonable.
“On the face of it there is no unreasonableness in the provision.”
Federal district courts sitting in Pennsylvania have held that Pennsylvania would find consent to be a basis for jurisdiction. See AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Hagenbarth, 296 F.Supp. 1142, 1143 (E.D.Pa.1968); Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F.Supp. 967, 978-81 (W.D.Pa.1973).

. The agreement was executed in Pennsylvania, where both parties were then domiciled, and, pursuant to Paragraph 27, was to be construed in accordance with the laws of Pennsylvania.

. Plaintiff hau earlier sought revision of the visitation rights. This petition was dismissed on October 6, 1969, following the plaintiffs move to Florida.

. No appeal was taken from these orders.

. This November 10, 1969, state court order contains this language, inter alia (39a — 40a):
“AND NOW, this 10th day of November, 1969, Lynne E. Solomon having been ordered by the Court under date of May 19, 1969 to grant visitation rights to the father, John F. Solomon, Jr., and, having failed to do so, and having been ordered by the Court on August 11, 1969 not to remove the children from the jurisdiction of the Court without the written consent of the Court, and she having deliberately violated that Order, and Lynne E. Solomon having been notified that these proceedings would be held by Rule and Order dated October 29, 1969, which was served upon her specifically in accordance with the Order of the Court and under the terms of that Order,
Lynne E. Solomon is declared in contempt and a bench warrant is directed to be issued and executed. Judgment is granted on the bond dated June 13, 1969.”
The above language makes clear that the Pennsylvania courts held on the facts of this case that the obligation to grant visitation rights to the husband was not independent of, but was directly connected with, the financial provision in the bond on which judgment was entered.

. The record does not indicate when the divorce was granted. More importantly, there is ■ no evidence whatsoever that the divorce decree incorporated any portion of the separation agreement. Plaintiff’s suit is grounded upon the contractual arrangement.

. It should be noted that plaintiff had previously instituted two nonsupport proceedings in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The first, filed March 5, 1970, while plaintiff was residing in Florida, was dismissed because plaintiff was in contempt of court. The second, filed December 3, 1972, after plaintiff moved to Delaware, was continued generally until such time as plaintiff purged herself of contempt. These decisions demonstrate — contrary to the suggestion of the dissenting opinion — -that the state court was not prepared to treat the support and visitation actions as wholly distinguishable. Both actions were based upon the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 62 P.S. § 2043.1 et seq. We are not called upon to decide whether in these suits, under 62 P.S. § 2043.4, the “duty of support imposed or imposable by law” consisted of the separation agreement, a support obligation under Pennsylvania law and independent of the agreement, or both. Plaintiff was free to appeal the March 5, 1970, dismissal, as well as the finding of contempt, to the Pennsylvania appellate courts.

. Specifically, the district court concluded (48a): “ . . . the present case ‘involves domestic relations’ and thus is a matter which has been traditionally left by the federal courts to the purview of the state courts.”

. The original diversity statute of 1789 specified “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity . . . .” Act of September 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. Various commentators have explained that, initially, the refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction was grounded at least in part upon the rationale that, since domestic relations cases were historically heard in ecclesiastical courts, they did not come within the compass of this provision. See, e. g., Wright, Federal Courts, 2d ed. § 25 at p. 84. This phraseology was maintained (28 U.S.C. § 41(1), 1940 ed.) until 1948, when Congress revised Title 28 of the United States Code, and the phrase “all civil actions” was substituted. Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 930. The Revisor’s Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 suggest that the sole purpose of the amendment was to produce conformity with the language of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The legislative history of the 1948 amendment in no way suggests that this particular change was motivated by a desire to expand or contract the jurisdictional scope of the federal courts. Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F.Supp. 797, at 801 (E.D.N.Y.1968).

. There is no dispute as to either jurisdictional amount or diversity of citizenship in this case.

. Unlike Simms, the Court proceeded to consider the divorce decree as well as the alimony award. It explained:
“While, as indicated in Simms v. Simms, the decree for alimony, although in one sense an incident to the suit for divorce, is a distinct ■and final judgment for a sum of money, and is therefore a good ground for an appeal from that part of the decree, yet, where the appeal is from the whole decree (as in this case), or even from a part of the decree, and the denial of alimony or separation of the conjugal property depends upon the evidence which bears upon the right to a divorce, we cannot determine that question without passing upon the sufficiency of the testimony authorizing or refusing the divorce. An appeal from the decree for alimony or other' property right would be of no value whatever unless the facts connected with the allowance or refusal of such right were open to review in the appellate court. Although an appeal from a part of a decree does not bring up the part not appealed from, yet, if the whole decree, must be reviewed in order to decide the appeal, such an appeal brings up the entire record. . . The case is even stronger where the appeal is taken from the whole decree.” (Citations omitted.)
201 U.S. at 310, 26 S.Ct. at 487.

. Article III, Section 2, reads in pertinent part:
“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”

. Barber v. Barber, supra. See, e. g., Cain v. King, 313 F.Supp. 10, 16 (E.D.La.1970) (merger of separation agreement into divorce decree). The Full Faith and Credit Clause (Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution) requires that the domestic relations decrees of the courts of one state be given proper recognition in other states. See Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 72 S.Ct. 398, 96 L.Ed. 448 (1952); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942). In the second Williams case, the Court said at 237 of 325 U.S., at 1098 of 65 S.Ct.: “ . . . in [the] federal system . . [the] regulation of domestic relations has been left with the States and not given to the national authority. . . ■ ”

. De La Rama v. De La Rama, supra; Simms v. Simms, supra.

. We reiterate that plaintiff did not appeal either of these decisions in the state courts of Pennsylvania.

. We cannot agree with any language in Richie v. Richie, 186 F.Supp. 592, 594 (E.D.N.Y.1960), and Manary v. Manary, 151 F.Supp. 446, 447, 449 (N.D.Cal.1957), which implies that a divorce decree ipso facto terminates domestic relations and grants jurisdiction to federal courts on any issue arising from the marital relationship. In our view, the district court’s assertion of jurisdiction in Richie was amply warranted by the fact that plaintiff’s action sought to recover upon a valid state judgment in Washington based upon an earlier divorce decree, granted in Texas, which incorporated a separation agreement. Conversely, the dismissal of the action in Manary was proper since the plaintiff, after the decree of divorce, sought to overturn portions of the property settlement incorporated into that decree. '

. We cannot agree with the dissenting opinion that the Albanese case has been “overruled" by Carr v. Wisecup, 263 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1959), which did not cite or discuss a single case involving the principle stated repeatedly by the Supreme Court of the United States since Barber v. Barber, supra (1859), that the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over domestic relations matters. The issue concerning the limitation of federal jurisdiction in domestic relations matters was not raised in any of the briefs filed in this court in the Carr case. Also the Carr decision was not an en banc decision. Furthermore, in 1972, thirteen years after, on the dissent’s interpretation, Carr had overruled Albanese, Albanese was cited with approval by this court. In Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 1972), the court used this language:
“Traditionally, it has been the policy of federal courts to avoid assumption of jurisdiction in this species of litigation. ‘The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of United States.’ In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594, 10 S.Ct. 850, 853, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890). Indeed, this court has explicitly held there is no federal diversity jurisdiction in a domestic relations case involving a child. Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1947).”

. While separation or property agreements between spouses will normally be treated as enforceable contracts, it is generally recognized that these agreements will not be enforced if they encourage divorce. See, e. g., Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414, 131 A. 236 (1925). see generally Clark, Domestic Relations, § 16.1 at p. 521. We refuse to provide that incentive, however slight, by a ruling the effect of which is incongruous with the purposes of and limitations on a separation agreement.

. See, e. g., Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F.Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.1968). See generally Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 1, at 25 (1956). It is noteworthy, however, that when the Supreme Court created or enforced even the two narrow exceptions to the rule against federal jurisdiction in domestic relations cases, the majority of the Court, encountered stiff opposition from justices who believed that there was no jurisdiction in the federal courts over these cases. De La Rama v. De La Rama, supra; Barber v. Barber, supra. Unanimity occurred when the Court refused jurisdiction. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, supra.

. See, e. g., Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1967) (custody and visitation rights); Blank v. Blank, 320 F.Supp. 1389, 1391 (W.D.Pa.1971) (divorce action remanded to state court); Linscott v. Linscott, 98 F.Supp. 802, 804-05 (S.D. Iowa 1951) (property settlement agreement).

. The question of defendant’s liability for support payments under the contract is, of course, an entirely separate one from that of his liability for support payments under Pennsylvania law.

. The authorities explain that, generally, contractual agreements to limit the jurisdiction of *1027courts are not effective to deprive any court of jurisdiction which it would otherwise have unless the provision is justice-promoting, represents a fair compromise after the dispute has arisen, or is tailored to the convenience of the parties. In this case, as we have held, federal courts would not have had jurisdiction. Whether or not paragraph 2(g) is effective to deprive other courts of jurisdiction is a question which we need not reach.
Paragraph 17 of the separation agreement mandated that all disputes, other than those relating to visitation rights, were to be resolved by an arbitration-like procedure. Whether this arbitration clause would serve to deprive us of jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case is a question which we need not decide. It is clear that Pennsylvania courts do not allow arbitration clauses to deprive them of jurisdiction. Central Contracting Co. v. C. E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 209 A.2d 810 (1965); Mixer, Inc. v. Smith, 229 Pa.Super. 273, 323 A.2d 794 (1974). Though we need not consider the enforceability of this clause, we feel compelled to state that there is no evidence in the record before us that the parties utilized this mechanism in an attempt to resolve their dispute on support payments. See generally 6A Corbin on Contracts, §§ 1432, 1433 and 1445 (1951, Supp.1962); Restatement of Contracts (ALI), §§ 550 and 558 (1932, Supps.1948, 1954, 1965, 1972-73); 6 Williston on Contracts, § 1725 (1938 Revised Ed., Supp.1972). See also Furbee v. Vantage Press, Inc., 150 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 464 F.2d 835, 837 (1972).