Court Opinion

ID: 9751833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:08:43.547105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:00.451884
License: Public Domain

WORK, Acting P. J., Dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion this nonconsensual police detention was based on an anonymous tip sufficiently corroborated to pass constitutional muster. Even the most liberal reading of the record cannot justify this detention. Fourth Amendment privacy protections are not preserved merely by citing the legal standards by which to evaluate police conduct while ignoring the quality of the observed facts purporting to justify a detention. I point to the following shortcomings of the majority opinion.
The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including brief detentions short of arrest. (Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 50 [61 L.Ed.2d 357, 361, 99 S.Ct. 2637].) Thus, the majority’s reliance on this intrusion being brief and minimal is irrelevant, as is the fact Ramirez consented to the search after the illegal detention occurred.
The so-called corroborative facts on which the majority relies are mischaracterized and, in any event, the officers did not purport to have relied on any *1621of them. The first of the four it lists, “every physical detail given by the informant” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1619) was corroborated by the officer’s observations (three Hispanic males were sitting in a specifically described car with its windows down in a small public area lawfully parked at approximately 11:45 a.m.) does not corroborate the informant’s reliability on the question whether these persons were engaged in criminal activity or suggest the informant had any “insider” knowledge of these persons or their activities.
The second factor, that the open public park was in a known high-volume narcotics dealing area of the city, does not, of itself, supply relevant corroboration. (See Brown v. Texas, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 52 [61 L.Ed.2d at pp. 362-363]; People v. Verin (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 551, 558 [269 Cal.Rptr. 573].) Further, the officer never suggested he relied on his knowledge of the character of the neighborhood. His testimony straightforwardly confirms he received the anonymous tip and, upon observing the car parked with its windows open at high noon in this open public park, he and his partner immediately strode to the door and ordered the occupants out. Further, the officer only testified on this point on redirect examination, as follows:
“Q. Officer, are you familiar with the area around Golden Hill Park?
“A. Yes, Ma’am. I am.
“Q. Have you had any experience with any other narcotics transactions in that area?
“A. Yes, Ma’am. I have.
“Q. On approximately how many different occasions have you dealt with narcotics transactions in that area?
“A. I would not even want to make a guess. It’s a very proliferate area for narcotics, and we have made hundreds of contacts with narcotics, under the influence of narcotics, that type of thing.”
In spite of the majority’s representation, Officer Righthouse never said he had made hundreds of drug-related contacts in that specific park area. He stated we (presumably referring to members of the San Diego Police Department) had made hundreds of contacts. In any event, he did not refer to “within” the park, but rather responded to the prosecutor’s inquiry concerning “the area around Golden Hill Park.” The majority cites People v. Limon (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 397], for the proposition that *1622knowledge of the character of an area for criminal activity “could properly lend significance to otherwise innocuous facts or behavior.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11619.) I have no quarrel with that proposition, but it is inapposite here. In Linton, the court quite accurately noted that an officer may consider whether observed activities are consistent with hand-to-hand exchanges of money or drugs in the context of whether that activity takes place in a high crime area known for drug activity, rather than elsewhere. (Id. at p. 532.) Here, of course, the officers observed nothing to indicate the persons had, were, or were going to be, engaged in criminal activity. A fair reading of Linton exposes the shortcomings of the majority’s position.
Further, the “high crime area” argument is akin to the similar argument raised during the appeal in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975) 422 U.S. 873, 886, footnote 11 [45 L.Ed.2d 607, 619-620, 95 S.Ct. 2574], in which the court commented on the government’s appellate argument that the location of its immigration traffic stop (i.e., close to the Mexican border) justified the detention of a vehicle containing three persons appearing to be of Mexican descent. The Supreme Court dismissed this as an “after-the-fact” attempt at justification. So it is on this record where Officer Righthouse quite forthrightly stated he and his partner received a radio call concerning a tip from an anonymous person, drove to the location of the vehicle, walked up to the rear of the vehicle while the occupants were engaged in a conversation with the windows down, and ordered them out of the vehicle. As he stated, none of the occupants were free to leave because “[t]hey were under detention for a narcotics investigation . . . .” (Italics added.)
The elasticity of the majority’s interpretation of the evidence is evident from the third factor it cites, “the activity that the men were engaged in, conversing in the car, was consistent with the information in the tip (dealing drugs from that car) . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1619, italics added.) How conversing in a car lawfully parked at noon in a public park suggests drug dealing escapes me, especially since the car windows were rolled down and there were no indicia of attempts to conceal the occupants’ activities.
The majority’s stated “fourth” factor, “some exigency existed because of the report of a crime in progress” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1619) is unavailing in this case. Indeed, the majority do not cite any fact to support a belief some exigency required detention and, of course, neither the officers nor the People advanced this theory to the trial court. To the extent the majority may be referring to cases such as People v. Orozco (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 435 [170 Cal.Rptr. 604], involving a report of shots being fired corroborated by officers observing cartridges near the identified vehicle, for this proposition, the decision emphasizes it was the reported acts of violence plus the *1623observed facts which gave the officers reasonable cause to fear for their safety and to detain. (Id. at p. 445.)
Under the circumstances of Orozco and similarly fact-based cases, there exists a substantial risk that an attempt to “wait out” the suspect may have fatal consequences. No such parallel risk is evident here with this anonymous drug tip where surveillance or engagement in “controlled buys” constitutes more reasonable courses of action. (Unlike the factors relied on in Orozco and similar cases such as U.S. v. Bold (2d Cir. 1994) 19 F.3d 99, 102-104; U.S. v. Walker (2d Cir. 1993) 7 F.3d 26, 31; U.S. v. Clipper (D.C. Cir. 1992) 973 F.2d 944, 949-951 [297 App.D.C. 372]; see U.S. v. Cox (8th Cir. 1991) 942 F.2d 1282, 1284-1285.) To conclude any report of criminal activity, no matter how nonviolent, alone establishes exigent circumstances sufficient to satisfy a police detention would render Fourth Amendment protections meaningless. Indeed, as Justice Scalia recognized in Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321, 329 [94 L.Ed.2d 347, 357, 107 S.Ct. 1149], under some circumstances there may well be no effective means to investigate short of such an intrusion, “[b]ut there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”
In Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 329 [110 L.Ed.2d 301, 308, 110 S.Ct. 2412], the court emphasized the anonymous tip, standing alone, would not warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe a detention was appropriate. However, the court looked at the totality of the circumstances and concluded the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated by additional facts obtained through the officer’s personal observation furnishing a reasonable suspicion White was engaged in criminal activity. (Ibid.) The court noted the officers, as predicted, saw a woman get into the described vehicle and then drive along a direct route toward the predicted destination, a route which involved several turns. The court then stated “. . . the independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer’s predictions imparted some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.” (Id. at p. 332 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 310], italics added.) Further, the court stressed its belief in the importance the anonymous tip included a prediction of future actions which were observed occurring. The court stated: “What was important was the caller’s ability to predict respondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated [knowledge of] inside information—a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs.” (Ibid., italics in original.) Even with these significant aspects of the anonymous caller’s predictions being verified, the majority referred to it as a “close case” as to whether there was sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop. (Ibid.)
Here, of course, we have no observed facts suggesting criminal conduct or related to predicted behavior. The majority, however, ignores Alabama v. *1624White's implicit holding that, but for the informant’s predictive information which were borne out by the officer’s observations, “[s]imply put, a tip such as this one, standing alone, would not ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that [a stop] was appropriate.” (Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 329 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 308], citing Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 22 [20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906-907, 88 S.Ct. 1868], quoting Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 162 [69 L.Ed. 543, 555, 45 S.Ct. 280, 39 A.L.R. 790].) Instead, it purports to find applicable California precedent where there is in fact none in point. The majority suggests Ramirez’s (and presumably my) argument overlooks that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause to arrest. It is incorrect. The case against the majority opinion rests squarely on the holding of Alabama v. White and its cited authority, and is specifically related to the reasonable suspicion standard relating to detentions.
A review of case precedent from other jurisdictions supports my reading and application of Alabama v. White. For instance in Georgia, the court of appeal held an anonymous tipster’s report “some guys” were selling drugs in the “Mud Puddle,” a known drug area, providing only a general description of suspected drug sellers as “young Black males” without giving any individual description of defendant or making prediction of future behavior of either defendant or the group upon which reliability could be tested, did not provide legitimate articulable reasonable suspicion warranting police officers’ investigatory stop. (State v. Sapp (1994) 214 Ga.App. 428 [448 S.E.2d 3, 5].) On the other hand, in Arkansas, the Supreme Court held an anonymous tip defendant, known to the police to have had previous drug arrests and convictions, and another with a prior drug record were in a specific unit of a particular hotel selling drugs and using a blue van to make deliveries was sufficiently corroborated by the police to afford reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop when defendant was seen leaving the particular hotel in the blue van. (Johnson v. State (1994) 319 Ark. 78 [889 S.W.2d 764, 765-766].)1 Moreover, in Florida, the court of appeal held an anonymous tip a Black male with a gray beard, wearing a black cap, gray pants and a blue jacket was riding a bicycle, had a gun in one of his jacket pockets and was *1625possibly selling drugs did not support an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion, because the tip only offered easily observable facts without any prediction of future actions and the suspect at the time of the stop was not doing anything suspicious. (Butts v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1994) 644 So.2d 605, 606.) Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court held an anonymous tip two Black males dressed in particular clothing were selling drugs at a specific location was not sufficient to justify investigatory stop of defendant, because the tip merely contained a range of details relating to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip and offered no facts not easily predictable demonstrating a familiarity with defendant’s affairs, and the officers had failed to corroborate the tip with independent investigation sufficient to furnish reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. (Ex Parte Barnette (Ala. 1993) 624 So.2d 507, 509; accord, Brown v. U.S. (D.C.App. 1991) 590 A.2d 1008, 1023; State v. Kennison (1991) 134 N.H. 243 [590 A.2d 1099, 1102].)
Finally, any inference that my disagreement with the majority’s analysis of Alabama v. White’s application to this case suggests I view the holding of Alabama v. White as restricting police power, is simply wrong. It simply defines existing law. I confess, however, I do not not read Alabama v. White as justifying police detentions solely upon only confirming anonymous tip details relating to easily obtained, non-suspicious-appearing facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, such as an occupied car precisely matching the caller’s description lawfully situated in a public park at high noon, facts obtainable by any passerby and having no unlawful connotation. (See Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 332 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 310].)2
Absent even a scintilla of a relevant corroborating fact to justify this detention, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 18, 1996. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Similarly, in U.S. v. Perrin (4th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 869, 871-873, the reviewing court held that two anonymous telephone calls, one identifying defendant by his street name (later arrested for possessing a firearm by a felon) as selling crack cocaine from a particular apartment complex, corroborated by police observation of defendant leaving the building within an hour of the second tip, the location of the apartment complex within a high-crime area, the officers’ knowledge drugs were regularly sold at that particular apartment complex, one officer’s personal familiarity with the defendant and the reasonableness of the officers’ belief a person suspected of dealing drugs might be carrying a weapon, provided the officers with reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory detention. However, the court stated the fact the tip involved incidents purportedly occurring in a “high crime” area would not have been sufficient corroboration of itself. (Id. at p. 873.)

The majority’s reference that it is “unable to attach too much significance to the beer cans seen by the officer as he approached the car” is inexplicable. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1619, fn. 4, italics added.) The officer never said he saw any cans, only that he “believed there was a beer can on the ground . . . possibly,” and “possibly” one on the floorboard of the car. Not only did the officer not state he, in fact, saw any can, he did not purport to rely on that factor. Thus, the majority is correct not to place “too much significance,” on its misconstrued reading of the record.