Court Opinion

ID: 9610652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:44:51.723822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:47.537921
License: Public Domain

Ingram, Justice,
dissenting.
In my opinion, the present statute violates Art. IV, Sec. I, Par. I of the Constitution of Georgia despite the disclaimer provisions contained in § 15 A of the Act which disavow any intention to violate the Constitution. The records of the Constitutional Commission of 1943-1944 show the following with respect to this section of our Constitution: "Chairman Arnall:'. . . We get back to the fundamental involved in this paragraph, it merely confers on the General Assembly the right to regulate utilities unless the Assembly by statute or enactment provides that municipally owned and county owned utilities shall be regulated by the Georgia Public Service Commission. It is the opinion of the Chair this regulation remains in the hands of the municipality or county involved. However, the Chair is perfectly willing and will be quite delighted, if it meets the approval of this Commission, to refer this paragraph to a committee comprised of Judge Grice, Judge MacIntyre and Attorney General Head to report to us whether or not the paragraph, if adopted as read, will in any way subject the locally owned, municipally owned water works and power plants to regulations of the Public Service Commission in the absence of the Act of the General Assembly, and thereby we could all be satisfied of the effect of what we are doing. . .’ Mr. Durden: T also suggest this committee have the authority to include in there the specific prohibition to exempt plants owned by cities and counties’ Mr. Gowen: 'I object. I don’t think we ought to tie the hands of the legislature and say the legislature in its wisdom could not undertake to subject these if they decide *773to. I don’t see — if you’re going to start in tying the hands of the General Assembly in order to protect every municipality in the State of Georgia, I’m afraid you won’t have much Constitution. Chairman Arnall: 'Without objection, this paragraph will be referred to the committee just suggested for study and report back to the full Commission. Is there objection to that? If there is none, it is so ordered. . .’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Records of Constitutional Commission, 1943-1944, Vol. I, pp. 175, 176.
Volume II of the Records of the Constitutional Commission contains the following action by the Commission after receipt of the Committee’s report: "Judge Grice:'... I rise now on another matter. We passed over a section of the report of Mr. Lovejoy and it was referred to Judge MacIntyre and Mr. Head and myself to offer an amendment. It relates to the Railroad Tariffs, and we have our reports, and since we passed that, we should complete it.’ Acting Chairman Harris: 'The clerk will read the report.’ Mr. McCutcheon: 'Paragraph I of § II of Art. IV dealing with Railroad Tariffs. Paragraph I. Public Utility Tariffs and Charges. The power and authority of regulating railroad freight and passenger tariffs and of charges of public utilities for their services, of preventing unjust discriminations, and requiring reasonable and just rates of freight and passenger tariffs and of charges of public utilities, are hereby conferred upon the General Assembly, whose duty it shall be to pass laws from time to time to regulate such tariffs and charges, to prohibit unjust discrimination by the various railroads and public utilities of this State, and to prohibit said railroads and public utilities from charging other than just and reasonable rates, and to enforce the same by adequate penalties.’ Acting Chairman Harris: 'That is on page VIII of the Subcommittee No. III. The effect of this, as I understand it, is to exempt utilities from the rate making of the Public Service Commission, where they are owned by municipalities or counties. Is there any objection to the adoption of the amendment? The Chair hears none, and the amendment is adopted.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Records of Constitutional Commission, 1943-1944, Vol. II, pp. 122-123.
*774The amendment which was adopted added the following provision to this paragraph of the Constitution: "Provided, nevertheless, that such power and authority shall never be exercised in any way to regulate or fix charges of such public utilities as are or may be owned or operated by any county or municipality of this State.” The General Assembly changed the period at the end of the proposed paragraph to a semicolon and added, "except as provided in this Constitution.”
When the General Assembly added the words, "except as provided in this Constitution,” it was done to accommodate that paragraph of the Constitution to the provision contained in Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. V of the Constitution, which provides for regulation and taxation of municipal utilities operating beyond the limits of the county in which the municipality is located. Consequently, it seems to me that the framers of the 1945 Constitution clearly intended to limit the power of the General Assembly by the constitutional prohibition that was added to the original section. This provision plainly says that the power and authority of the General Assembly "shall never be exercised in any way to regulate or fix charges” of municipally owned public utilities. I realize that § 15 A of the present Act contains a disclaimer that the Act was not intended to violate this section of the Constitution. Nevertheless, when the entire statute is read it is apparent that the Public Service Commission cannot carry out all of the duties conferred upon it by this statute without violating this section of the Constitution. See §§ 9, 10 and 11 of the Act.
I take no delight in expressing the opinion that the General Assembly did not have the constitutional power to enact the regulatory sections of this legislation. I have joined in other decisions of this court which hold that the General Assembly has the power to do almost anything it wants to unless that power is restrained by the Constitution. In my view, this is one of the places where the Constitution places a restraint upon the power of the General Assembly of Georgia, and it is the duty of this court to uphold that restraint. Consequently, it is on this basis that I must dissent to the majority opinion. The words of the prohibition contained in this portion of the *775Constitution are too plain and clear to admit of any other construction except that it was intended to prevent the General Assembly from exercising power and authority in any way to regulate or fix charges of municipally owned utilities when operating inside the counties in which they are located.
Several sections of the present Act constitute an attempt by the General Assembly to delegate this authority to the Public Service Commission and if the General Assembly is forbidden by the Constitution to do it, a fortiori, it cannot delegate this power and authority to the Public Service Commission to do it. Therefore, I must dissent.