Court Opinion

ID: 9631311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:34:01.235552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:51.940491
License: Public Domain

*80Vanderbilt, C. J.
(dissenting). Honig struck his unconscionable bargain with his seriously ill and financially distressed client on November 25, 1950, persisted for months thereafter in his efforts to enforce it and to the date of the hearing before this court he evidenced no sign of repentance. Before the Ethics and Grievance Committee and before this court he has sought to justify his wrongful conduct by a variety of explanations, none convincing.
First, his brief states that he “labored under the mistaken belief that he was justified in dealing with Mr. Kornhoff other than as a client.” But how could this be when he had dealt with Kornhoff as a client in the past and when Kornhoff came to his office on this occasion before leaving for the hospital for a very serious operation expressly for the purpose of having him draw a deed to a third party? Moreover, at the hearing before the Ethics and Grievance Committee . Honig testified:
“Q. Mr. Honig, you recognized that you were performing a legal service for Mr. Kornhoff that morning as soon as he asked you to prepare a deed, didn’t you? A. Yes.
Q. And you realized that you were dealing with him then as a client, didn’t you? A. That is right, Sir.
Q. Then didn’t it occur to you that you shouldn’t deal with a client in the way that you were, namely, getting -from him this property under those circumstances? A. Well, it is hard to explain that.” (page 78)
Second, he attempts to justify his conduct by saying in his brief that he “thought he was giving Mr. Kornhoff a better proposition than was offered him by Mr. Berkowitz and that since it was an improvement Mr. Kornhoff should have been satisfied.” This is not 'the language of repentance by one who recognizes his responsibilities as an attorney but rather a brazen attempt to justify his position by suggesting a standard of professional conduct which fails completely to comprehend the true nature of the attorney’s obligation to his client.
Third, in his brief it is stated that.“no complaint can be found of Mr. Honig’s treatment of the mortgage situation,” *81but the uneontradicted facts indicate otherwise. Kornhoff desired to assure his mother a home in the event he should not survive his operation and Honig was well aware of this, for he testified at the hearing:
“The only thing that I corüd do or I might consider is, if you convey the title to me, I will guarantee to you that your mother and you will have a place to live for a year, after you sign the agreement.”
Nowhere, however, did Honig even mention the mother in the odd agreement which accompanied the execution of the deed absolute by Kornhoff to him, and significantly Honig did not provide Kornhoff with a copy of the agreement so that in the event of Kornhoff’s not unexpected death his mother would have had no evidence of the arrangement her son had made. The agreement, moreover, was false in reciting that it was “For and in consideration of legal services rendered,” since at the hearing Honig admitted that Kornhoff did not owe him anything for legal services.
Fourth, Honig attempts to justify his conduct by pointing out that Kornhoff was an experienced real estate broker who knew the difference between a deed and a mortgage, apparently inferring 'that the standard of the market place, caveat emptor, is applicable to the dealings of attorney and client. Not only is the inference unacceptable as contrary to Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics:
“The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. * *
but the argument completely overlooks the fact that at the time Kornhoff, experienced though he may have been, was distraught by the specter of death' — he was to be hospitalized that afternoon for an operation which he knew might be fatal — and distressed at the financial straits in which he found himself.
*82Fifth, Honig did not even live up to his agreement with Kornhoff, but in February or March endeavored to get Kornhoff to turn over possession of his home long before the expiration of the one-year period by offering to compensate him for its use for the balance of the year. Kornhoff refused, but offered to pay Honig whatever sums were due him in connection with the property and demanded a reconveyance, to which Honig replied by insisting that Kornhoff live up to the terms of the contract, despite the fact that Honig was now fully aware, if he had ever been unaware, of all the facts as to how much he stood to gain at his client’s expense. Indeed, Honig admits that he may have asked $5,000 for the settlement of his claim to the property, as testified to by Kornhoff. Negotiations being unsuccessful, an action was instituted on behalf of Kornhoff against Honig to recover the property. This action was eventually settled by Kornhoff reimbursing Honig for all money expended by him in connection with the property and in addition paying Honig $600 and by Honig reconveying the property. Following this settlement Kornhoff brought the matter to the attention of the Bergen County Ethics and Grievance Committee which, after hearing, submitted a unanimous presentment to this court. The $600 exacted by the respondent from his client for the settlement of his outrageous claim was not refunded until after the argument of this matter before us, and then only as the result of our direct suggestion that it be done forthwith, and his resignation likewise was not forthcoming until after the argument here. The refunding of this $600, moreover, did not make Kornhoff whole, for the record shows that he expended at least $1,000 for attorney’s fees in his efforts to recover the property that was his.
The respondent here not only took undue advantage of a client who was peculiarly in need of trustworthy professional assistance, but he persisted for months in the prosecution of his reprehensible course of conduct to keep his client’s property. His was no error in judgment occasioned by the temptation of the moment, but a crafty scheme for his own *83enrichment at his client’s expense; a scheme quickly devised, to be sure, yet pursued at leisure. A lawyer’s character is not to be determined by his transactions with the strong but by his dealings with the weak. It is not the integrity occasioned by compunction, but the moral fibre revealed in the midst of temptation that is the true measure of a man. As the majority recognizes, every attorney owes an unyielding obligation to his client to serve him faithfully, fairly and honestly and that in the performance of this obligation he is held to a higher standard than that required or expected of other fiduciaries, 536 Broad St. Corp. v. Valco Mortgage Co., Inc., 135 N. J. Eq. 361, 377 (Ch. 1944), affirmed o. b. 138 N. J. Eq. 431 (E. & A. 1946). But it is of no protection to the client to establish a sound standard by words if rigid adherence thereto is not required in fact. The respondent by his conduct in this matter has shown such a lack of those qualities essential in every lawyer that he should not be permitted again to prey upon those who might similarly come to him in their hour of need. The duty of imposing discipline on an attorney is not a pleasant one, but in the interest of the public and to protect the reputation of the thousands of lawyers in the State who faithfully abide by the Canons of Professional Ethics the duty must be performed unflinchingly and that discipline imposed which the facts clearly warrant.
I would strike the respondent’s name from the rolls as an attorney and counsellor at law. I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Oliphant and Mr. Justice Brennan join in this dissent.
For two-year suspension — Justices Hbheb, Wacheneeld, Burling and Jacobs — 4.
For disbarment — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Olipiiant and Brennan — 3.