Court Opinion

ID: 9446957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:22:25.098238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:51.173471
License: Public Domain

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The learned trial judge cited in his opinion several cases 3 which support the following statement he quoted from Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 1933, 288 U.S. 333, 339, 53 S.Ct. 391, 393, 77 L.Ed. 819:
“We, therefore, have a case belonging to that class of cases where proven facts give equal support to each of two inconsistent inferences; in which event, neither of them being established, judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the party upon whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these inferences as against the other, before he is entitled to recover. * * *
The District Court’s opinion then adds:
“Were this the state of the law at present, this Court would have been inclined to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. This principle, however, no longer prevails in the Federal courts. * * *
“The conclusion seems inescapable that the decision in Lavender v. Kurn, 1946 [327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916], must be deemed to constitute an abandonment of the earlier doctrine that if the evidence is capable of either of two inferences, it cannot he deemed to support either. This case substitutes the principle that in such an event, it is for the jury to determine which inference to deduce and that the jury has a right to draw either one. The prior cases, to which reference has been made, must be deemed to have been overruled sub sileniio. * * * ” [163 F.Supp. 752.]
Thus the district judge thought Lavender v. Kurn required him to depart from the general rule in negligence cases set forth in the Chamberlain opinion. But the Lavender case arose under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act * and was intended to apply in actions thereunder.4 *784It should not be extended to a field beyond that with which it dealt. Applying the liberal Lavender rule generally in negligence cases would upset the widely recognized principle that a finding of negligence cannot be based on conjecture.
The majority’s attempt to justify, without relying on the Lavender ruling, the jury’s inference of negligence from the facts before it is not convincing to me. The proof equally well justified the inference that Safeway was not negligent. The verdict was therefore the result of the jury’s speculative choice between the conflicting inferences. I think the trial judge should have directed a verdict for Safeway Stores.
Before: WILBUR K. MILLER, DANAHER and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges, in Chambers.
PER CURIAM.
Upon consideration of appellant’s petition for rehearing, it is
Ordered by the court that the petition for rehearing is denied.
Circuit Judge WILBUR K. MILLER would grant the petition for rehearing.
Circuit Judge BASTIAN has filed a statement of his views on the petition for rehearing.
Statement of Circuit Judge BASTIAN on the Petition for Rehearing Filed March 19, 1959.
Judge MILLER has voted to grant the petition for rehearing and Judge DANAHER to deny. I join Judge DANAHER and vote for denial. However, as it appears that some misapprehension exists as to the basis of our ruling, although I think the opinion of Judge Danaher is crystal clear, I should like to add a few words.
The case was decided by the District Judge on the theory that Lavender v. Kurn, 1946, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916, was applicable. Judge Miller, as appears from his dissenting opinion, felt that that case should be limited to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.; and with that I thoroughly agree. Judge Danaher was inclined to the same position, although he felt, and I think properly, that it was not necessary in this case to pass upon that point in view of the fact that the judgment could be affirmed on the ground that it was controlled by the cases on common law negligence as they exist in the District of Columbia. (See Judge Danaher’s opinion filed March 5, 1959.) He pointed out the fact that there was contrariety of opinion in the several circuits as to whether cases arising under Lavender-were limited to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and further pointed out that this court (Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Pomeroy, 1956, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 272, 239 F.2d 435, cert. denied, 1957, 353 U.S. 950, 77 S.Ct. 861, 1 L.Ed.2d 859), appeared to hold to the contrary.
It would also seem to me that the opinion of the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 1957, 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, indicates that the effect of that case is limited to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
The result, therefore, is that we affirmed in Safeway, not on the authority of Lavender v. Kurn, supra, but on consideration of the cases on common law negligence as found by this court. There was and still is, in the opinion of Judge Danaher and myself, evidence to go to the jury on the question of common law negligence.

. Gunning v. Cooley, 1930, 281 U.S. 90, 50 S.Ct. 231, 74 L.Ed. 720; Kelly Furniture Co. v. Washington Ry. & Elec. Co., 1935, 64 App.D.C. 215, 76 F.2d 985; Capital Transit Co. v. Gamble, 1947, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 160 F.2d 283; and Ewing v. Goode, C.C.S.D.Ohio, 1897, 78 F. 442, 444.
In the Ewing case Circuit Judge William Howard Taft wrote: “When a plaintiff produces evidence that is eon-sistent with an hypothesis that the defendant is not negligent, and also with one that he is, his proof tends to establish neither.”

 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.

. For example, the Supremo Court said in the Lavender opinion, 327 U.S. at page 654, 66 S.Ct. at page 744, “Rulings on the admissibility of evidence must normally be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge in actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.” It thus indicated an intention to restrict its opinion to that kind of case.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 1957, 352 U.S. 500, 507-508, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, seems to have restricted the Lavender rule to cases under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. See *784also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Pomeroy, 1956, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 272, 239 F.2d 435, certiorari denied, 1957, 353 U.S. 950, 77 S.Ct. 861, 1 L.Ed.2d 859.