Court Opinion

ID: 9561319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:06:58.674794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:43.212495
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
The preliminary question in this case is whether the trial court properly decided the cross motions for summary judgment. The general rule governing the granting of summary judgment motions is that the “non-movant for summary judgment is entitled to have the facts and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom construed most favorably to the non-movant.” Deal v. Cockrell, 111 Idaho 127, 721 P.2d 726 (1986). But, “where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences.” Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). See Old West Realty v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 110 Idaho 546, 716 P.2d 1318 (1986); Kromrei v. AID Insurance Co., 110 Idaho 549, 716 P.2d 1321 (1986).
Under the facts of this case, the latter rule controls. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by both parties. The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, *723found no dispute as to evidentiary facts, and therefore no dispute of material fact. The trial court, based upon the affidavits submitted, is entitled to draw whatever inferences it may, even if there are conflicting inferences, for it can and will resolve the conflicts. There are sufficient facts from which inferences could be made which support the trial court’s decision, and accordingly this summary judgment should not be disturbed on appeal. Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 691 P.2d 1283 (Ct. App.1984).
The majority opinion found, as did the trial court, that the K-Mart inserts fell within the use tax provision of I.C. § 63-3621, and within the use definition in I.C. § 63-3615. The statute requires that a party fall within the use tax before a court can consider the exemptions contained in I.C. § 63-3622.
Based upon these principles, the trial court’s decision finding the K-Mart advertising inserts a component part of the newspaper should be affirmed. The majority accurately states the issue and, for purposes of this dissent, it will be restated. In this case we determine whether an advertiser, which has its advertising supplements printed out of state and which then pays the newspaper to insert and deliver the supplements with the newspaper, is subject to payment of a use tax on the cost of the purchase of the supplements from the out-of-state printer. The controlling statutory provision is contained in I.C. § 63-3622(d), which reads:
“63-3622. Exemptions. — There are exempted from the taxes imposed by this act the following:
“(d) Receipts from the sale, storage, use or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property which will enter into and become an ingredient or component part of tangible personal property manufactured, processed, mined, produced or fabricated for ultimate sale at retail within or without this state, and tangible personal property primarily and directly used or consumed in or during such manufacturing, processing, mining, farming, or fabricating operations by a business or segment of a business which is primarily devoted to such operation or operations, provided that the use or consumption of such tangible personal property is necessary or essential to the performance of such operation.”
This section is divisible into three parts which define the parameters of the use tax exemption. The first portion of the exemption relates to
“receipts [received] from the sale, storage, use or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property which will'enter into and become an ingredient or component part of tangible personal property manufactured, processed, mined, produced or fabricated for ultimate sale at retail within or without this state.”
The second portion of the exemption relates to
“tangible personal property primarily and directly used or consumed in or during such manufacturing, processing, mining, farming or fabricating operation by a business or a segment of a business which is primarily devoted to such operation or operations.”
The third portion of the exemption limits the scope of the second exemption to “the use or consumption of such tangible personal property [which] is necessary or central to the performance of such operation.” The first portion, set out above, exempts those parts of tangible personal property which enter into and become an ingredient or component part of other tangible personal property which is manufactured, processed, produced or fabricated for ultimate sale at retail. The trial court concluded that the K-Mart advertising inserts fell within this first portion of the statutory exemption as a component part of the newspaper. The trial court found the following facts: K-Mart purchased the inserts from an out-of-state supplier and exercises exclusive control over the inserts until delivery to the newspaper company; K-Mart *724controls the date and size of the advertising distribution; once delivery is made to the newspaper companies, K-Mart relinquishes control of the inserts. The “advertising supplements are distributed with the newspapers.” The trial court further found that “the advertising supplements are collated by the newspapers in the same fashion as are comic, TV magazine, and Sunday supplements”; that the various newspaper companies “consider [the advertising supplements as] component parts of their paper.” “The supplements are retained in the [newspaper company’s] permanent records.” The trial court found that “subscribers are entitled to receive the advertising supplement and the newspaper [company] will ensure delivery if it is not supplied to a particular subscriber.” The trial court found that, “Advertising is one part of a newspaper. It is no less a part of a newspaper if it is folded into the paper as a separate section than if it is found in the sports pages ... or if it appears underneath news articles in the body of the newspaper.” As the trial court emphasized, “The advertising supplement to a newspaper has no character of its own apart from the newspaper, [and it] is not intended for sale separate from the newspaper, and is incorporated into the newspaper as a component part of it from the time it is printed.” Thus, the trial court, acting as the trier of fact, is justified and is supported by sufficient evidence in the record from which inferences could be drawn indicating that the advertising supplements supplied by K-Mart, and as viewed by others in the newspaper industry, are a component part of the newspaper. That finding clearly falls within the statutory exemption as a component part.
K-Mart supplies advertising inserts, tangible personal property, to various newspaper publishers within the State of Idaho. The inserts enter into and become a component part of a newspaper edition. The newspaper, which is tangible personal property, is then sold to the ultimate retail consumer, the subscriber, who pays a sales tax on the sales price. The trial court’s finding that K-Mart fell within the exemption contained in the first portion of the statute is not "clearly erroneous” and should be affirmed. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Argyle v. Slemaker, supra; Rasmussen v. Martin, 104 Idaho 401, 659 P.2d 155 (Ct.App. 1983); Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982); Jensen v. Bledsoe, 100 Idaho 84, 593 P.2d 988 (1979). The creation of a newspaper is a process, i.e., the taking of many parts and joining them together into a whole. Thus, the opinion of the trial court based upon the component exemption portion of the statute should be affirmed.
The majority is correct in stating that the statute exempts two types of tangible personal property, the property that becomes a component part of property sold at retail and property used or consumed in the production of property sold at retail. See ante at 721,727 P.2d at 1149. The second portion of the exemption refers to that type of tangible personal property which is used or consumed in or during such manufacturing, processing, mining, farming or fabricating operations. This exemption would only be applicable if the tax sought to be imposed concerned the ink or the paper purchased by the newspaper company and used in the production of the newspaper; since it is not, the second portion is not applicable in this case. The majority states that the third part, the restriction, is applicable to both exemptions. A basic reading of the statute shows that to be incorrect. The restriction is only applicable to the second portion of the exemption. By reading the exemption section as a whole, it is apparent that the restriction applies only to tangible personal property primarily and directly used or consumed in or during such manufacturing. It is not applicable to the first portion of the exemption.
I would affirm the trial court’s decision that K-Mart falls within the exemption from the payment of the use tax.
SHEPARD, J., concurs.