Court Opinion

ID: 6631912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 20:37:56.950685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:58:58.118025
License: Public Domain

Manning J.:
The circuit judge was right in refusing to charge the jury as requested. If the contract had given defendants from the first of August to the last of November to carry the lumber in, it would have been immaterial at what time the several loads were carried, provided they were all carried before the close of November. Defendants were bound to carry one load in August, two in September, two in October, and one in November. There is but one contract, but it consists of separate and distinct parts, each complete in itself, and having a separate time fixed for its performance, and on each of which a right of action would accrue to plaintiffs if not performed within the time limited. In this respiect the contract is analogous to a bond for the payment of money in installments. But here the analogy ceases, for the reason that the price for carrying lumber is fluctuating, which is not the case with money.
A dollar to day will be a dollar a year hence, and on every day through the year; and an installment of two hundred dollars due to day will be no more a year hence, save the interest that would be recovered by way of damages for its detention. But what we have said of money can not be said of prices for transporting lumber. If they were always the same, there would be no ground for controversy between the parties. It is this fluctuation in the prices of freight that furnished the bone of contention in the present suit. The contract required one load to be carried in August — this was done; two loads in September, one of which was carried, the other not; two loads in October, only one of which was carried; and one load in November.. Defendants carried two loads in November. They failed to carry one load in September, and one in October, and carried an extra load in November. On the first of October plaintiffs *67had a right of action against defendants for not carrying one load in September, and the same on the first of November for the load not carried in October. The November part of the* contract was performed, and an extra load was carried in that month which was intended to take the place of one of the loads not carried, and the parties not having agreed which’ it is for the law to make the application. We have no hesitation in saying, in a case like the one before us, it should be applied where it will be most beneficial for defendants, provided no injury is done thereby to plaintiffs.
By the contract, defendants were to have four dollars and a half per thousand. It appears from the testimony on the trial the price of freight was five dollars per thousand in October, and between seven dollars and eight dollars per thousand in November. Plaintiffs’ damages, then, for not carrying the load in September, was fifty cents per thousand, and for not carrying the load in October two dollars and a half per thousand — these sums being the difference between the ruling freights and the contract price when the several causes of action accrued. Now the excess in the price of freight over the contract price, when the extra load was carried in November, was equal to the excess in the price of freight which the plaintiffs were entitled to recover of defendants for not carrying the load in October. The two being equal, one should be set off against the other — the difference, if any, being against defendants, as the price of freight was probably higher when the extra load was carried than it was on the first day of November; the testimony showing it was from seven dollars to eight dollars in that month — seven dollars most probably the first of the month, and eight dollars at its close.
It was admitted on the argument plaintiffs’ damages for a breach of the contract were the difference between the contract price and the price of freight on the day their cause of action accrued. It can not therefore be said, in setting off one against the other, any injustice is done the plaintiffs. But if *68the extra load is substituted for the one not carried in September, defendants would be made to pay two dollars and a .half for every fifty cents damages plaintiffs sustained by reason of defendants’ breach of the contract in September — the difference between the contract price and the ruling price of freight in one case being fifty cents, and in the other two dollars and a half. Suppose defendants had not carried the extra load in November, and plaintiffs had employed some one else to carry it — they would have claimed of defendants, for not carrying the October load, two dollars and a half per thousand, and at the same time have paid to the person who carried it seven dollars per thousand, or two dollars and a half per thousand more than they would have paid defendants had it been carried by them in October. While apparently paying more than the contract price, the carriage of the lumber would, in fact, have cost them but four dollars and a half per thousand — the contract price, after applying the damages they had received of defendants.
Two objections may be made to the result at which we have arrived:
1st. It may be said, under the contract plaintiffs would have had the lumber to be carried in October, in Chicago on the first of November, whereas it was not received until the last of that month, and that, in the mean time, they may have lost the sale of it. It is a sufficient reply to this to say, they have made no claim for any such damage, and they admit the true measure of damages to be the difference between the contract price and the price of freight on the first day of November.
2d. It may also be said, if plaintiffs had known they would have to pay seven dollars per thousand for the extra load carried in November, they would have waited till the following spring before shipping it. To this, the reply is, if they intended to hold defendants for the damages the law gave them, they should have agreed with defendants as to the application on the contract of the extra load before it was *69carried. This they did not do,- and defendants may have intended it should cancel the October default.
We think the court was right in charging as it did, as well» as in refusing to charge as requested. The judgment of the court below must be affirmed, with costs.
The other Justices concurred.