Court Opinion

ID: 9651793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:49:23.633171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:08.239364
License: Public Domain

KRESSEL, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Because I think the bankruptcy court and the majority have expanded 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10) beyond its intended meaning, I dissent. The opportunity of a debtor to waive his or her discharge has been part of the bankruptcy law for many years. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, which was the law prior to 1979, provided: “The bankrupt may, before the hearing on such application (for discharge), waive by writing, filed with the court, his right to a discharge.” 11 U.S.C. § 32 (repealed). Two bankruptcy rules implemented and perhaps modified the statute. Bankruptcy Rule 405 provided “Any bankrupt may waive his right to discharge by a writing filed with the court” and Rule 404(d)(2) provided “the court shall forthwith grant the discharge unless the bankrupt has filed a waiver under Rule 405.”2
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 carried the waiver concept forward in 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10), but added the require*530ment that the court approve the written waiver and that the waiver be executed after the order for relief under chapter 7.
The few courts that have addressed § 727(a)(10), have struggled with the proper role of the court, as have we. As seems to be true with so much bankruptcy legislation, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act is devoid of any indication of what Congress thought the role of the court should be in approving a waiver under § 727(a)(10). One thing is clear, however: the statute does not include the language “after notice and a hearing.” I would take that to be intentional and infer from that omission that Congress did not intend that creditors or parties in interest, other than the debtor, have a role in the court’s determination of whether or not to approve the waiver. I think the court’s proper role is limited to assuring that the statutory requirement that the waiver be executed after the order for relief is met and the waiver is a true one, i.e., that the debtor has knowingly executed the waiver. The Supreme Court has told us that “a waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458, note 13, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). Therefore, it would be appropriate for the court to assure itself that the written document did indeed represent the debtor’s intentional relinquishment of a known right.
The bankruptcy court clearly considered the concerns and interests of creditors in its decision and, in fact, the effect of the waiver on creditors weighed very heavily in the court’s decision. The court also indicated that it felt the debtor was not fully cognizant of all of the ramifications and effects of his waiver. I think such inquiries are beyond the scope of the court’s proper role. It is clear from the record that this debtor was competently advised by his attorney of the legal effect of his waiver. The fact that the court and the debtor’s attorney disagreed over some of the consequences of that waiver is to me an irrelevant inquiry.
Because I feel that the bankruptcy court applied the wrong legal standard in denying its approval of the debtor’s discharge, I would hold that the bankruptcy court should have approved the debtor’s waiver of his discharge.

. Before 1978, the Supreme Court was authorized to promulgate bankruptcy rules that superseded the Bankruptcy Act to the extent that they were inconsistent.