Court Opinion

ID: 9402946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-19 15:08:28.726522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.579849
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued June 13, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00651-CV
                           ———————————
   DAWN URSIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF JA’CARDO
                     HAWKINS, Appellant
                                        V.
               BRAND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 295th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2020-21353

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this wrongful-death suit, appellant Dawn Ursin, individually and “on behalf

of” her deceased son Ja’Cardo Hawkins (Ursin), challenges the summary judgment

rendered in favor of appellee Brand Solutions, Inc. (Brand). In her sole appellate

issue, Ursin contends that the trial court erred in granting Brand’s no-evidence
motion for summary judgment. Because Ursin has not challenged all grounds on

which the judgment was based, we affirm.

                                     Background

      Brand hired Hawkins as an employee to help build scaffolding. On his first

day of work, Hawkins collapsed at a jobsite. He was transported to a hospital where

he was pronounced dead. The report for Hawkins’s autopsy stated that the manner

of Hawkins’s death was “natural” and that the cause of his death was “hypertrophic

cardiomyopathy with congestive heart failure.” The report explained that

hypertrophic cardiomyopathy “may be asymptomatic or may be complicated by

cardiac arrhythmias and sudden death.”

      Brand was a subscriber to workers’ compensation insurance, and Ursin—

Hawkins’s mother—applied for workers’ compensation death benefits. The

insurance carrier denied the claim. In its denial notice, the carrier explained that its

“investigation show[ed] this was a cardiac incident and heart attacks and/or cardiac

incidents are not compensable under Texas Labor Code” and that Hawkins’s

employment was “not a substantial contributing factor” in causing his heart attack.

      Ursin then filed suit against Brand, citing the Texas Wrongful Death and

Survival Statutes. In her original petition, Ursin asserted causes of action for

negligence, gross negligence, and products liability. She claimed that Brand had

“placed [Hawkins] on a scaffold without proper safety training or instruction” and

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that Hawkins “was not properly secured in his safety harness while on the scaffold,”

allowing him to fall from the scaffolding. She sought actual and exemplary damages.

      Brand filed a hybrid traditional and no-evidence motion for summary

judgment. As evidence supporting its traditional motion, Brand offered Hawkins’s

autopsy report and Ursin’s discovery responses. Brand argued that if Hawkins’s

death “was a result of his employment with Brand, then the workers’ compensation

benefits are his, and his mother’s, exclusive remedy.” Alternatively, Brand asserted

that its summary-judgment evidence conclusively showed that Hawkins’s death

“was unrelated to his employment[] and was not a result of anything he did in the

course and scope of his employment.” To support its no-evidence motion for

summary judgment, Brand asserted that Ursin could produce no evidence to prove

each element of her causes of action.

      Ursin responded but addressed only Brand’s no-evidence motion for summary

judgment. As summary-judgment evidence, Ursin attached the autopsy report and

her own discovery responses.1 Without adding argument to her response, Ursin later

supplemented her evidence with her own deposition.

      On March 22, 2022, the trial court signed an order granting Brand’s summary

judgment on Ursin’s causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, and products

1
      Brand objected to Ursin’s reliance on her own discovery responses, but the record
      does not reflect that trial court ruled on the objection.
                                          3
liability. The order did not indicate whether summary judgment was granted on

traditional grounds, no-evidence grounds, or both. The court also permitted Ursin to

amend her petition to include a “cause of action under the Wrongful Death statute to

incorporate a cause of action for an intentional tort.” See Mo-Vac Serv. Co. v.

Escobedo, 603 S.W.3d 119, 124–25, 130 (Tex. 2020) (discussing intentional-tort

exception to exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation).

      Ursin filed an amended petition. She alleged that, “as a direct and proximate

result of the intentional act of [Brand] at the time and place of the subject

incident . . . ., Mr. Hawkins sustained injuries and damages which ultimately

resulted in his painful and agonizing death.” She alleged that Hawkins’s death “was

substantially certain to occur due to [Brand’s] conduct.” She also continued to allege

gross negligence to support her claim for exemplary damages.

      Brand filed an amended hybrid traditional and no-evidence motion for

summary judgment to address the newly added intentional-tort claim. Brand asserted

that Ursin could produce no-evidence for each element necessary to prove the

intentional-tort exception. Brand’s summary-judgment evidence included the

autopsy report along with witness statements and Brand’s report from its own

investigation showing that Hawkins was on the ground, not on scaffolding, when he

collapsed. Brand asserted that its evidence conclusively showed that it had not acted

                                          4
intentionally to harm Hawkins and that Hawkins died from natural causes, not from

a work-related injury.

      Ursin’s two-page response indicated that Ursin was responding to Brand’s no-

evidence motion for summary judgment but made no reference to Brand’s traditional

motion. Ursin attached only one exhibit, her safety expert’s report. Without

discussion of the report’s content, Ursin claimed that the expert report showed “the

existence of a material fact.” At a hearing on the motions, Ursin, for the first time,

cited her own previously-filed deposition and the deposition of a Brand employee.

While Ursin’s deposition appears in the record, the employee’s deposition does not.2

      On August 9, 2022, the trial court signed an order expressly granting both the

amended traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment without

identifying the specific bases for the granting motions.3 This appeal followed.

       Affirming Summary Judgment Based on Unchallenged Grounds

      To obtain reversal on appeal, an appellant must challenge all possible grounds

on which a summary judgment could have been granted, whether properly or

2
      We note that Ursin has attached the employee’s deposition transcript to her brief
      and refers to it throughout her briefing. However, the transcript does not appear in
      the appellate record. Because we may not consider attachments not in the record,
      we do not consider the attached transcript. See Holland v. Mem’l Hermann Health
      Sys., No. 01-14-00283-CV, 2015 WL 7455328, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
      Dist.] Nov. 24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
3
      The August 9 order stated that “all claims and causes of action” brought by Ursin
      against Brand were dismissed with prejudice. Because the order disposed of all
      claims and parties, the order is the final judgment in this case.
                                           5
improperly. See McCoy v. Rogers, 240 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); see also Vawter v. Garvey, 786 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex.

1990) (proscribing reversal of summary judgment without properly assigned error).

If an appellant fails to challenge all grounds on which the judgment may have been

granted, the appellate court must uphold the summary judgment. See Star-Telegram,

Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995); Jarvis v. Rocanville Corp., 298

S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied); see also Britton v. Tex.

Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,

no pet.). (“[I]f an independent ground fully supports the complained-of ruling or

judgment, but the appellant assigns no error to that independent ground, then (1) we

must accept the validity of that unchallenged independent ground . . . and thus (2)

any error in the grounds challenged on appeal is harmless because the unchallenged

independent ground fully supports the complained-of ruling or judgment.”).

      Consistent with this principle, when a defendant moves for both traditional

and no-evidence summary judgment, and the plaintiff fails to challenge both the

traditional and no-evidence grounds on appeal, an appellate court must affirm. See

Means v. Prop. Mgmt. Contractors, LLC, No. 01-21-00415-CV, 2023 WL 138620,

at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming

summary judgment because appellants challenged only no-evidence grounds and

failed to challenge traditional grounds for summary judgment when judgment may

                                         6
have been based on grant of either motion); see also Pounders v. Timely Prop. Sols.,

L.L.C., No. 02-22-00395-CV, 2023 WL 3114314, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Apr. 27, 2023, no pet. h.) (upholding summary judgment because appellant raised

issues challenging grant of traditional motion for summary judgment but failed to

challenge grant of no-evidence motion) (mem. op.); Hearn v. Snapka, No. 13-11-

00332-CV, 2012 WL 7283791, at *10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 28, 2012,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (affirming summary judgment because appellant challenged

no-evidence grounds on appeal but failed to challenge traditional grounds supporting

trial court’s summary judgment).

      A case similar to the instant case is Munguia v. Justrod, No. 14-18-01059-

CV, 2021 WL 282569 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 28, 2021, pet. denied).

There, like here, the trial court expressly granted both the appellee’s no-evidence

and traditional motions for summary judgment. Id. at *1. On appeal, the appellant

raised four issues, “each of which expressly challenge[d] only the trial court’s grant

of no evidence summary judgment,” and “[n]one of [the appellant’s] issues

challenge[d] the trial court’s grant of traditional summary judgment.” Id. Because

the appellant failed to address the grounds raised in the appellee’s traditional motion

for summary judgment, the court of appeals held that it “must affirm the trial court’s

judgment.” Id. at *2.

                                          7
      Here, Ursin raises only one issue on appeal. Like the appellant in Munguia,

Ursin’s issue and supporting argument expressly challenges only the trial court’s

grant of Brand’s amended no-evidence motion for summary judgment. See id.

Ursin’s issue does not challenge the trial court’s grant of Brand’s amended

traditional motion for summary judgment, which provided separate grounds to

support the judgment. See id. We note that Brand specifically highlighted the

omission in its brief and pointed out that the judgment could be affirmed on this

basis alone, but Ursin did not file a reply brief to address the omission. See id. at *1.

      Even construing her briefing liberally, Ursin’s arguments challenging the

grant of the amended no-evidence summary judgment do not challenge the grounds,

arguments, and evidence Brand raised to support its amended traditional motion for

summary judgment.4 See id. at *2. Accordingly, like the Munguia court, we must

4
      We also note that, instead of citations to the clerk’s record, Ursin refers not only to
      the employee’s deposition transcript that is not in the record, but also to other
      documents attached to her brief that are purportedly in the record. Although the
      Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appendix in civil cases, the rules also
      require citations to the record. Compare TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(d), (g), (i) with TEX.
      R. APP. P. 38.1(k). “An appendix is not a substitute for a clerk’s record nor are
      citations to the appendix a substitute for citations to the record.” Yoonessi v. D’Arcy,
      No. 05-07-00689-CV, 2008 WL 4981631, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 25, 2008,
      pet. denied) (mem. op.) This Court has no duty to cross-reference the documents
      attached to Ursin’s brief with the 400-page clerk’s record. See Nevarez as Tr. of
      1010 S. Oregon Family Tr. v. City of El Paso, No. 08-22-00061-CV, 2023 WL
      3325197, at *8 n.12 (Tex. App.—El Paso May 9, 2023, no pet. h.). Nor does the
      Court have the duty to verify that the attached documents are the same documents
      contained in the official record.
                                             8
affirm the trial court’s judgment.5 Id.; see Pounders, 2023 WL 3114314, at *3;

Means, 2023 WL 138620, at *9; Hearn, 2012 WL 7283791, at *10.

      We overrule Ursin’s sole issue.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               Richard Hightower
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.

5
      To the extent that Ursin’s sole issue can be read to also challenge the March 22,
      2022 order granting summary judgment on Ursin’s gross-negligence claim, that
      challenge would also fail because Ursin has not challenged the traditional motion
      for summary judgment ground on which that order may have been based. See Means
      v. Prop. Mgmt. Contractors, LLC, No. 01-21-00415-CV, 2023 WL 138620, at *9
      (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 10, 2023, no pet.); see also Pounders v. Timely
      Prop. Sols., L.L.C., No. 02-22-00395-CV, 2023 WL 3114314, at *2 (Tex. App.—
      Fort Worth Apr. 27, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Hearn v. Snapka, No. 13-11-
      00332-CV, 2012 WL 7283791, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 28, 2012,
      pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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