Court Opinion

ID: 9744595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:08:37.332304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.255604
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: In United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that a court may not use the reversal of a criminal conviction as a means to punish or deter perceived prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument where the improper argument amounts to harmless error. In the instant case, the majority has disregarded the Supreme Court’s admonition. The prosecutor’s closing argument in the case at bar, even if improper, amounts to no more than harmless error and does not warrant the reversal of defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, I dissent. In Hasting, the prosecutor argued in closing as follows: “ ‘Let’s look at the evidence the defendants] put on here for you so that we can put that in perspective. I’m going to tell you what the defendants] did not do.’ ” 461 U.S. at 502, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 101-02, 103 S. Ct. at 1977. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, which was denied. The defendants were convicted on the basis of overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, declining to rely on the harmless-error doctrine, stating that the application of that doctrine would impermissibly compromise the clear violation of a defendant’s constitutional right not to incriminate himself. See Hasting, 461 U.S. at 503, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 102-03, 103 S. Ct. at 1977. In its opinion, the Supreme Court found that, notwithstanding the harmless nature of the error, the court of appeals acted to discipline the prosecutor and warn other prosecutors for what it perceived to be repeated errors in closing argument. See Hasting, 461 U.S. at 504, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 103, 103 S. Ct. at 1978. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals could not ignore the harmless-error doctrine simply to justify the reversal of a criminal conviction. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 104, 103 S. Ct. at 1978. The Supreme Court then went on to discuss the harmless-error doctrine, holding that it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 509, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 106, 103 S. Ct. at 1980. The Supreme Court held that even absent the prosecutor’s allusion to the failure of the defendants to proffer evidence to rebut the State’s evidence, it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 510-11, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 107, 103 S. Ct. at 1981. Accordingly, any error in the prosecutor’s closing argument was harmless, and the conviction could not be overturned on that basis. In the case at bar, I fear that the majority is reversing defendant’s conviction in order to punish the prosecutor for what it perceives to be his improper closing argument and not because the majority believes that the prosecutor’s closing argument seriously prejudiced defendant and deprived him of a fair trial. As the Supreme Court held in Hasting, a court of review may not reverse a conviction to punish a prosecutor, but it must engage in a harmless-error analysis to determine whether the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the prosecutor’s improper closing argument. In Illinois, improper closing arguments warrant a reversal only where they result in substantial prejudice to the defendant, considering the content and context of the language, its relationship to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 151-52 (1998). In Kliner, our supreme court held that even error resulting from the prosecutor’s comment in closing argument on the defendant’s failure to testify does not require a reversal where the reviewing court is able to conclude upon an examination of the entire record that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 185 Ill. 2d at 157. Unlike the majority, then, I would engage in a harmless-error analysis to determine whether defendant was substantially prejudiced by the prosecutor’s closing argument. I begin with the content and context of the language used by the prosecutor. In my opinion, the majority unfairly characterizes the nature of the prosecutor’s comments and the exchanges between the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the trial judge. The majority takes the prosecutor’s comments out of context and attempts to portray them as having been made defiantly. I simply do not read the record that way. “Closing arguments must be viewed in their entirety, and remarks must be viewed in context.” People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 146 (1998). Reading the record of closing arguments and the discussion at the trial regarding those arguments, I do not believe that the prosecutor intended to direct the attention of the jury to defendant’s failure to testify, nor do I believe that his comments had that effect. Finally, I do not believe that any of the comments were made defiantly. For example, the prosecutor’s first reference to the evidence being unrebutted occurred as follows: “We’ve also showed [sic] you that this clearly without any question at all was a robbery. How did this [defendant] get possession of this 300 bowling ring from Dennis Oberbeck who wanted to leave the ring to his son who would never give it up, he would never pawn it, he would never trade it in[?] The only time he took it off was when he went to bed. Did he give it up willingly? The evidence is completely unrebutted that that’s not what happened.” Upon defendant’s objection, a discussion was held outside the presence of the jury. The prosecutor insisted that under the law in Illinois he could properly comment on the unrebutted nature of the State’s evidence. Defense counsel insisted that he could not. The trial court did not sustain defendant’s objection. The prosecutor stated that he was going to further comment on the unrebutted nature of the State’s evidence. When defense counsel asked, “So you’re going to go back out and aggravate it?” the prosecutor responded, “There’s no doubt about that.” The prosecutor did repeat his argument that the State’s evidence was uncontradicted and unrebutted in various respects. The prosecutor’s comment that defendant had failed to prove his innocence and had not proven anything was made in direct response to defense counsel’s closing argument that defendant did not have to prove his innocence. The prosecutor responded in rebuttal argument: “[Defense counsel] has told you that the defendant is not required to prove his innocence and that’s true, and for the defendant that’s probably really good because he sure didn’t prove his innocence. He didn’t prove anything.” Defense counsel’s objection was sustained, the comment was stricken, and the jury was immediately instructed to disregard it. The prosecutor’s comments about knowing where the line was occurred in the following exchange: “THE COURT: Well, I just want to make the record clear. I think you were walking the line. You walked the line. MR. WEBER: And I know where the line is. * ifc * MR. MARGUEIS: No, I think it would have been plain error. MR. WEBER: It’s not. But I can tell you right now I know what the line is.” Reading these comments in context, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that they were made defiantly or with the intent and motive to direct the jury’s attention to defendant’s failure to testify. Looking at the prosecutor’s comments in relationship to the evidence and their effect on defendant’s right to a fair trial, I do not believe that the comments, made during the course of lengthy closing arguments, were so egregious as to cause substantial prejudice to defendant. The most egregious of the comments, that defendant had failed to prove his innocence, was immediately cured by defendant’s timely objection and the trial court’s striking of the statement and instruction to the jury to disregard it. “A trial judge’s prompt action in sustaining an objection to improper argument is generally sufficient to cure the error.” People v. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d 115, 127 (1989). Furthermore, the jury was properly instructed that the State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, that this burden remains on the State throughout the case, and that the defendant is not required to prove his innocence. The jury was also instructed that the fact that the defendant did not testify could not be considered in any way in arriving at a verdict. These instructions go a long way toward ameliorating, if not curing, any error resulting from the prosecutor’s closing argument. See People v. Tate, 45 Ill. 2d 540, 546 (1970). While the evidence of guilt in this case is not overwhelming and is primarily circumstantial, it is not, as the majority characterizes it, weak. In light of all the evidence of guilt, the prosecutor’s comments could not have so prejudiced defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial. Even if the prosecutor’s comments had not been made, it remains clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty. See Hasting, 461 U.S. at 510-11, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 107, 103 S. Ct. at 1981. I note that our supreme court has repeatedly held comments similar to those made by the prosecutor in the case at bar to be harmless error. In People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 157 (1998), the prosecutor had commented on the “unrebutted” nature of some of the State’s evidence. The supreme court held that even if the prosecutor’s argument had been improper, it did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial where the defendant’s rights were sufficiently safeguarded when the trial judge, at the close of the evidence, instructed the jurors that the defendant’s decision not to testify should not be considered by them in rendering a verdict. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 159-60. In People v. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d 115, 125 (1989), the prosecutor commented that the jury had heard “no other explanation” for the defendant’s presence at the scene of a crime. The supreme court held on review that this comment constituted an impermissible comment on the defendant’s failure to testify, but the court found it to be harmless error. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d at 126. The court held that, despite the occurrence of constitutional error at the trial, a defendant’s conviction may be affirmed if the reviewing court concludes, upon the entire record, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d at 127. In People v. Tate, 45 Ill. 2d 540, 544-45 (1970), the prosecutor argued that the State’s evidence was uncontradicted and that the defendant had offered no explanation for his possession of a stolen car. The supreme court held that, when read in the context of the entire trial record, any error occasioned by the prosecutor’s fleeting statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tate, 45 Ill. 2d at 545-46. The jury had been correctly instructed that the State had the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that this burden remained on the State throughout the case, and that the defendant was not required to prove his innocence. Tate, 45 Ill. 2d at 546. The supreme court concluded that the prosecutor’s comment could have had no effect on the jury’s verdict. Tate, 45 Ill. 2d at 546. Finally, I note that even the trial court, which presided over the entire trial, did not believe that defendant had been substantially prejudiced and deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial and defendant’s posttrial motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. “The trial court has discretion to determine the proper character, scope[,] and prejudicial effect of closing arguments.” Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 151. Indeed, the trial court is in the best position to determine the prejudicial effect of a remark made during closing argument, and, therefore, absent a clear abuse of discretion, its ruling should be upheld. People v. Maori, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 51 (1998). In the instant case, the trial court determined that defendant was not sufficiently prejudiced by the prosecutor’s improper argument to warrant granting defendant’s motion for a mistrial. While recognizing the prosecutor’s argument as being close to, if not over, the line of propriety, the trial court found that defendant’s objections and the court’s instruction to the jury to disregard the improper argument cured any error and rendered a mistrial unnecessary. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I must dissent from the opinion and the decision of the majority.