Court Opinion

ID: 9947780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 17:13:45.024252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:34.066140
License: Public Domain

J-A26018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 JONATHAN RICHARD SMITH                   :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 148 EDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 29, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-45-CR-0000896-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                         FILED MARCH 5, 2024

      Jonathan Richard Smith appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his guilty plea to two counts of possession of a controlled substance.

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). Smith challenges the denial of his petition to

withdraw his guilty plea and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We

affirm.

      In February 2022, Smith entered a written guilty plea to two counts of

possession of a controlled substance. The written guilty plea stated he was

pleading guilty to possessing a controlled substance on two separate

occasions. In return, the Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros the remaining

charges and that the “sentence [would] run concurrent with that imposed at”

two other dockets. Written Guilty Plea, filed Feb. 18, 2022, at ¶ 5. The

agreement stated that the maximum penalty the court could impose was six

years in prison and a $50,000 fine. The agreement further stated that the trial
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court was not bound by any sentencing agreement: “I understand that any

agreement for sentencing is not binding on the Court and I have not been

guaranteed a specific sentence in exchange for this plea. The Court retains

the power to decide my sentence.” Id. at ¶ 9.

      At the sentencing, Smith’s counsel agreed that it was an open, not a

negotiated,   plea   agreement.   N.T.,   3/29/22,   at   3. The   pre-sentence

investigation report (“PSI”) mentioned that Smith was considering getting a

medical marijuana card. The court asked whether Smith had any medical

conditions, and Smith responded he did not. The court asked why he wanted

a medical marijuana card, stating that the court thought Smith was “looking

to do an end-run,” and that he was “trying to game the system to continue in

the lifestyle that [he has] lived that has gotten [him] 5[2 adult] arrests and

22 convictions.” Id. at 5. Smith stated, “You’re right, Your Honor. You’re

right.” Id. At one point, counsel attempted to speak, but the court stated that

it was asking the defendant and did not ask to speak with counsel.

      Prior to imposing the sentence, the court stated it “note[d] the

aggravating factor, which [it thought was] appropriate.” Id. at 10. It also

pointed out that “given [Smith’s] history, the[] offenses [were] a pattern of

behavior consistent with an inability or unwillingness to detach himself from

criminal activity and to conform to the laws governing society, making him a

threat to any community [in which] he resides.” Id. At count 1, the court

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sentenced Smith to 17 to 36 months’ incarceration and at count 2, it sentenced

him to a consecutive term of 17 to 36 months’ incarceration.1

       Smith filed post-sentence motions requesting the court reconsider his

sentence and allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the

motion to reconsider the sentence and scheduled a hearing on the motion to

withdraw the guilty plea. After a hearing, it denied the motion to withdraw the

guilty plea. Smith filed a timely notice of appeal.

       Smith raises the following issues:

          A. Whether the sentencing court erred and abused its
          discretion by sentencing Smith in the aggravated range
          where the only aggravating factor cited was that Smith
          would consider getting a medical marijuana card upon
          release from incarceration?

          B. Whether the sentencing court erred and abused its
          discretion by not offering Smith a chance to withdraw his
          negotiated plea prior to sentencing where the court not only
          did not accept the joint sentencing recommendation of a
          time-served sentence, but instead imposed an aggravated
          range sentence, running two of the sentences consecutively,
          thereby constituting a lengthy state sentence?

          C. Whether the sentencing court erred and abused its
          discretion by not allowing Smith to withdraw his plea of
          guilty after sentencing where the court not only did not
          accept the joint sentencing recommendation of a time-
          served sentence, but instead imposed an aggravated range
          sentence, running two of the sentences consecutively,
          thereby constituting a lengthy state sentence and Smith did
          not have the opportunity to confer about such sentence with
          counsel before it was given because his sentencing was via
          alternative technology rather than in person?

____________________________________________

1 That same day, the court sentenced him to a concurrent sentence at another

docket, pursuant to the plea agreement.

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Smith’s Br. at 4-5.2

       The trial court sentenced Smith at each count to 17 to 36 months, for

an aggregate term of 34 to 72 months’ incarceration. Smith claims that the

sentencing guideline range for each count was 3 to 14 months. He argues the

trial court did not comment regarding the range or indicate that it was aware

of the range at the time of sentencing. He maintains that “[i]nstead, the

[c]ourt continued to comment about Smith indicating that he might get a

medical marijuana card upon his release from incarceration.” Id. at 13. Smith

maintains the court did not ask the reason for this statement or allow him

“much room to comment outside of persistent and specific questions such that

he could not explain himself.” Id. Smith also claims that the court did not

allow Smith’s counsel to clarify Smith’s comments.

       Smith argues the situation would be difficult in any courtroom but “was

absolutely untenable where, as here, the sentencing was being conducted via

alternative technology.” Id. He claims the use of alternative technology is not

appropriate where the court veers from the parties’ agreement “to the point

where the sentence is unrecognizable from the perspective of the negotiated

plea.” Id. He claims “[t]hat a sentencing [court] might ignore a sentencing

recommendation so completely that what was pled to be effectively a time

served sentence[] turns into nearly the statutory maximum is so totally

unexpected that a counsel cannot prepare for that possibility.” Id. at 14.

____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth did not file an appellee brief.

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      Smith further argues that the court “note[d] the aggravating factor,”

but did not say what that factor was. Id. (citation omitted). He claims that his

mention of his plan to get a medical marijuana card was not an appropriate

aggravating factor. He argues that the court “barely g[ave Smith] a chance to

respond” to the court’s questions about the medical marijuana card and noted

that, even if he applied for one, Smith would not receive a card without

following the proper procedures. Id. at 15. He claims that his comment

“related to seeking to legally possess[] marijuana.” Id.

      In this issue, Smith challenges the discretionary aspect of his sentence.

There is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en

banc). Rather, we follow a four-part analysis before addressing a challenge to

discretionary aspects of sentence. We must determine whether the appellant:

(1) filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserved the sentencing issue

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider or modify sentence; (3) included in

the appellate brief a concise statement of the reasons relied on for appeal;

and (4) has asserted a substantial question that the sentence is not

appropriate under the Sentencing Code. See Commonwealth v. Austin, 66

A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

      Here, Smith filed a timely appeal, preserved his claim in a timely post-

sentence motion, and included a concise statement of reasons relied on for

appeal in his appellate brief. Smith argues that the court failed to place on the

record the factors to support the aggravated sentence and failed to

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demonstrate it understood the applicable guideline range. Smith’s Br. at 10.

The claim the court failed to state its reasons for the aggravated range

sentence states a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d

1263, 1278 (Pa.Super. 2008) (stating that “an allegation that the court failed

to state adequate reasons on the record for imposing an aggravated-range

sentence . . . raises a substantial question for our review.”).

      The Sentencing Code requires a court to impose a sentence consistent

with “the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “A sentencing court need

not undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or

specifically reference the statute in question, but the record as a whole must

reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and

character of the offender.” Commonwealth v. Rush, 162 A.3d 530, 544

(Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “An aggravated range sentence for [a

defendant] will . . . be justified to the extent that the individual circumstances

of [the defendant’s] case are atypical of the crime for which [the defendant]

was convicted, such that a more severe punishment is appropriate.”

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 848 (Pa.Super. 2006). “Where the

court has the benefit of a PSI report, we presume the court was aware of all

appropriate sentencing factors and considerations[.]” Commonwealth v.

Snyder, 289 A.3d 1121, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2023).

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       The court did not abuse its discretion. The court stated its reasons for

deviating from the sentencing guidelines, that is, it relied on Smith’s stated

intent to seek a medical marijuana card, even though he suffered no health

conditions, and that “given [Smith’s] history, the[] offenses [were] a pattern

of behavior consistent with an inability or unwillingness to detach himself from

criminal activity and to conform to the laws governing society, making him a

threat to any community [in which] he resides.” N.T. at 10. Further, that the

court did not state the applicable guideline range does not mean it did not

consider it, particularly where, as here, there is a PSI. See Snyder, 289 A.3d

at 1126. This claim lacks merit.3

       Smith next contends the court erred and abused its discretion by not

offering Smith a chance to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing where

the court did not accept the sentencing recommendation and imposed two

consecutive aggravated range sentences. Smith argues that an obligation to

notify a defendant of the right to withdraw the plea “falls in line with the ever-

increasing series of cases, similar to Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356
____________________________________________

3 Smith does not include his challenge to the use of technology in his Rule
2119(f) statement. However, we do not find waiver on that basis, as the
Commonwealth did not file a brief and therefore did not object to the failure
to include this claim in the statement. Cf. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 149
A.3d 349, 353 (Pa.Super. 2016) (“[i[f the Commonwealth objects to the
appellant’s failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), the sentencing claim is
waived for purposes of review”). Even so, Smith does not explain how his
challenge to the use of technology during the sentencing hearing raises a
substantial question. This is particularly problematic as he does not claim to
have objected to the use. We therefore do not find a substantial question. In
any event, there is no indication the use of technology interfered with the
sentencing proceedings or counsel’s ability to confer with Smith.

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(2010), where a defendant has to be aware of an increasing amount of

information in order to make a knowing[,] voluntary[,] and intelligent guilty

plea.” Smith’s Br. at 17. He claims that here, the trial court “accepted a plea

agreed to be a time-served sentence and ran the sentence two months short

of the statutory maximum, and then ran the two pleas consecutively such that

instead of time served Smith received a sentence of 34 months.” Id. at 18.

He argues the court’s statement that it did not have to follow the plea

agreement “is clearly insufficient in light of the outcome of the sentence,”

considering what a defendant “would reasonabl[y] expect, and be prepared

for by counsel, at the time of sentencing.” Id.

       “[W]hen a trial court has accepted a plea agreement entered into by the

Commonwealth and a defendant, the prosecutor is duty bound to fulfill the

promises made in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea.” Commonwealth

v. Martinez, 147 A.3d 517, 532 (Pa. 2016). When determining whether a

defendant is entitled to specific performance of a plea agreement term, a

“court must determine whether an alleged term is part of the parties’ plea

agreement.” Id. at 533. If the court finds the term is part of the agreement,

“then the [defendant] is entitled to specific performance of the term.” Id.

       Here, a time-served sentence was not part of the plea agreement.4 The

written agreement included only that the sentence would run concurrent to a

____________________________________________

4 Smith did not request the transcript of the plea hearing. Therefore, he has

waived any claim that relies on the transcript. Commonwealth v. Preston,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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sentence at another docket, and the agreement was clear that the trial court

was not bound by the recommendation and that the maximum possible

sentence was six years. At the sentencing, the Commonwealth requested that

the sentences run concurrent to a sentence already imposed, which was the

agreement set forth in the guilty plea. It therefore upheld its bargain.

Deviation from an alleged recommended sentence is not equivalent to

mandatory deportation upon conviction, which was the basis of the counsel

ineffectiveness claim at issue in Padilla, particularly where the defendant had

been informed that the court retained the discretion to impose any sentence

up to the statutory maximum.5

       In his final claim, Smith maintains the trial court erred and abused its

discretion by not allowing him to withdraw his plea after sentencing. He

stresses that the court did not accept the joint sentencing recommendation

and instead imposed consecutive, aggravated-range sentences. He adds that

he did not have an opportunity to confer with counsel before sentence was

____________________________________________

904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa.Super. 2006) (where appellant failed to request transcript,
any claim that cannot be resolved without the transcript will be deemed
waived for appellate purposes).

5  The United States Supreme Court in Padilla held defense counsel’s
performance was deficient where counsel failed to inform the defendant that
if he pleaded guilty, he would face possible deportation. The Court stated:
“[W]e have long recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical
phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel. The severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of
banishment or exile,’—only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform
her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.” 559 U.S. at 373-74
(citations omitted).

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imposed because the sentencing hearing was via alternative technology. He

claims this is not a case of sentencing testing, as without a time-served offer,

Smith would have waited for trial.

      “[W]hether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within the

sound discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660,

664 (Pa.Super. 2017). “When a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea after

sentencing, he ‘must demonstrate prejudice on the order of manifest

injustice.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1046

(Pa.Super. 2011)). “Manifest injustice occurs when the plea is not tendered

knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly.” Id. (quoting

Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa.Super. 2016)).

      Here, the trial court concluded:

         Here, [Smith] argues that we did not “offer” him the
         opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea before imposing
         sentence. We know of no law that requires us to do so.
         Further, the length of a sentence is not a factor for
         consideration in determining a post-sentence motion to
         withdraw guilty plea. Moreover, [Smith’s] written guilty plea
         specifies that there is no agreement as to sentence that is
         binding upon the court. [Smith’s] claims that we should
         have “offered” him the opportunity to withdraw his guilty
         plea because the sentence we imposed is longer than he had
         desired is nothing more than an attempt to test the weight
         of potential punishment, and withdraw the plea as
         unexpectedly severe – the exact situation the Supreme
         Court ruled against in [Commonwealth v. Starr, 301 A.2d
         592 (Pa. 1973)].

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed Feb. 15, 2023, at 8.

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      The court did not abuse its discretion. Smith has not established

manifest injustice. The written plea agreement explained that the court was

not bound by the sentencing recommendation and that the sentence imposed

could be as high as six years. Smith agreed to the plea knowing those terms.

Smith cites no case law, and we know of none, that requires a court to inform

a defendant it will impose a sentence higher than requested and allow a

defendant to confer with counsel. Further, although he challenges the use of

alternative technology, he did not raise this challenge below, and there is

nothing in the record to suggest the use of the technology impacted counsel’s

ability to confer with Smith.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 3/5/2024

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