Court Opinion

ID: 9780679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:25:38.293967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:10.513428
License: Public Domain

GURICH, J.,
specially concurring in
result:
1 1 The trial judge, in this case, after hearing arguments from both parties, granted the plaintiffs' motion for new trial, finding juror misconduct during deliberations. Because the trial judge was in the best position to evaluate the post-trial motions of the parties, I concur with the majority that the Defendants did not overcome the heavy burden of proving that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting a new trial. Taliaferro v. Shahsavari, 2006 OK 96, ¶ 14-15, 154 P.2d 1240, 1244-45. However, the majority does not address whether and to what extent jurors may rely upon professional or occupational expertise during deliberations and whether a juror's statements based on such expertise constitute extraneous prejudicial information. I write separately to comment on these issues.
2 Over the past thirty years, occupational exemptions from jury service have been eliminated across the country.1 Oklahoma is no exception.2 The only professionals exempt from jury service in Oklahoma state courts are Justices of the Supreme Court, judges of *1039the Court of Civil Appeals, judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, judges of the district courts, sheriffs, and "licensed attorneys engaged in the practice of law." 38 0.S.2009 § 28. Jurors with professional or occupational expertise routinely sit on juries, and often, as in this case, they sit on cases involving an issue related to their area of expertise.
T3 Parties to the litigation are responsible for questioning prospective jurors during voir dire regarding any knowledge or expertise they may have in an area relevant to the litigation. Any concerns about a juror's ability to remain fair and impartial because of his or her expertise should be resolved before the jury is seated. See Rule 6, Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, 12 0.8. Ch. 2, App. If a juror with expertise remains on the jury, the trial court, in addition to giving Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 1.4,3 should consider giving the following instruction:
Should you have professional or occupational expertise in an area that is relevant to this litigation, you may rely on that expertise and experience in informing your deliberations. You may share that expertise and experience with other members of the jury as it applies to the specific evidence introduced in this case. However, you may not consider extra facts or law, not introduced at trial, that are specific to parties or an issue in this case that may be based on your professional or occupational expertise.4
T4 No error is committed when jurors with professional or occupational expertise rely on their expertise to evaluate the evi-denee. But when a jury verdict is challenged on such grounds, the trial court should set aside the verdiet only when it is clear a juror has introduced specific facts or legal content relevant to the case from outside the record.5
T5 Generally, affidavits, depositions, and oral testimony of jurors may not be used to impeach a jury verdict. Oxley v. City of Tulsa, 1989 OK 166, ¶ 25, 794 P.2d 742, 747. Section 2606(B) is an exception to this general rule. Id. It authorizes jurors to testify regarding allegations of misconduct:
A juror may testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. An affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying shall not be received for these purposes. 12 0.8.2001 § 2606(B) (emphasis added).
1 6 To set aside a verdict for juror misconduct based on the introduction of extraneous prejudicial information to the jury, the trial court must find both that extraneous information was improperly before the jury and that the extraneous information prejudiced the verdict.6 See id. When determining whether a juror with expertise improperly introduced extraneous information to the jury, the trial court must first decide whether the "experience used by the juror in deliberations [was] part of the juror's background, gained before the juror was selected to participate in the case," or was the result of *1040independent investigation into a matter relevant to the case. Id.
T7 If the trial court finds that extraneous information was introduced to the jury, it must also determine that the extraneous information prejudiced the jury's verdict. Because section 2606(B) prohibits a juror from testifying "to the effect of anything upon the juror's mind or another juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes during deliberations," the trial court's inquiry into the element of prejudice must be an objective one. The trial court must determine whether the average hypothetical juror would be influenced by the juror misconduct. Meyer, 80 P.3d at 456-57. Affidavits or statements by jurors about the actual effect of the misconduct on the deliberations or their individual decisions are not admissible to determine the impact of the misconduct upon a verdict. Id. Rather, the trial court should consider, for example, how the material was introduced to the jury, the length of time it was discussed by the jury, the timing of its introduction, whether the information was ambiguous, vague, or specific in content, whether it was cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial, whether it involved a material or collateral issue, or whether it involved inadmissible evidence. Id.
T8 Such an approach by trial courts protects the policy behind section 2606(B):
[There are compelling interests for prohibiting testimony about what goes on in the jury room after a verdict has been rendered. The rule protects the finality of verdicts. It protects jwrors from harassment by counsel seeking to nullify a verdict. It reduces the incentive for jury tampering. It promotes free and frank jury discussions that would be chilled if threatened by the prospect of later being called to the stand. Finally, it preserves the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople [that] would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny.
United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233-34 (10th Cir.2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted).7 Additionally, this approach recognizes the traditional role of the jury. Jurors are expected to call on their personal experiences and common sense in reaching a verdict. Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 1.4 provides: "You may make deductions and reach conclusions which reason and common sense lead you to draw from the facts which you find to have been established by the testimony and evidence in the case." Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 1.4 (emphasis added). Instruction 1.8A also instructs the jury to make its decision based on "the reasoning" each juror has. Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 1.8A.
T9 The line between a juror's application of his or her professional or occupational expertise to evidence in the record and a juror's introduction of legal content or specific factual information learned from outside the record is often a fine one. As such, the procedure set forth in section 2606(B) must be precisely followed, and a jury verdict set aside only when it is clear a juror with professional or occupational expertise has introduced specific facts or legal content relevant to the case from outside the record. Otherwise, all jury verdicts are subject to challenge.

. For a discussion of occupational exemptions from jury service and the recent statutory reforms abolishing most occupational exemptions, see Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and Gagged: The Peculiar Predicament of Professional Jurors, 25 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 239 (2007); See also Jury Service Reform, American Tort Reform Association (2011), http//www.atra.org/issues/jury-service-reform.

. In 2004, the Legislature amended 38 0.8. § 28 to encourage jury service by business and other professionals by reducing the time commitment and allowing professionals flexibility in rescheduling to meet the needs of their offices.

. "Do not read newspaper reports or obtain information from the internet about this trial or the issues, parties or witnesses involved in this case, and do not watch or listen to television or radio reports about it. Do not attempt to visit the scene or investigate this case on your own." Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 1.4.

. See Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052, 1063 (Colo.2011).

. A majority of courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have held that jurors' intradeliberational statements, when based on personal knowledge and occupational or professional experience, do not constitute extraneous prejudicial information. This approach allows jurors with professional or occupational expertise to rely on that knowledge to inform their deliberations and to communicate their opinions to fellow jurors so long as they do not bring in legal content or specific factual information learned from outside the record. Under this approach, jurors with expertise can apply their expertise to evidence already introduced at trial. See eg., Kendrick, 252 P.3d 1052; Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir.2005); Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. 554, 80 P.3d 447 (2003); State v. Mann, 131 N.M. 459, 39 P.3d 124 (2002); Brooks v. Zahn, 170 Ariz. 545, 826 P.2d 1171 (Ariz.App.1991); Baker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.App.1987).

. This Court has applied the extraneous-prejudicial-information exception contained in § 2606(B) on two previous occasions. See Oxley, 1989 OK 166, 794 P.2d 742; Willoughby v. City of Okla. City, 1985 OK 64, 706 P.2d 883.

. This Court has recognized that 12 0.8.2001 § 2606 (B) is "substantially similar to the federal rule"; therefore, Benally 's discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(B) is instructive. Willoughby, 1985 OK 64, ¶ 12, 706 P.2d 883, 887.