Court Opinion

ID: 9776333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:30:50.269257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.355505
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring and dissenting on appellant’s petition for discretionary review.
While I join the majority’s resolution of appellant’s first ground for review, I respectfully dissent to Part II of the majority opinion which holds written jury waivers are not required in municipal court cases.1
The Code of Criminal Procedure governs all criminal proceedings. Tex.Code Crim. ProcAnn. art. 1.02. Further, art. 1.05 provides every defendant with the right to “a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.” But this right may be waived: *484Tex.Code Crim.Proe.Ann. art. 1.13(a).2
*483The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a capital felony case in which the State notifies the court and the defendant that it will seek the death penalty shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury, conditioned, however, that such waiver must be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court with the consent and approval of the court, and the attorney representing the State. The consent and approval of the court shall be entered of record on the minutes of the court, and the consent and approval of the attorney representing the State shall be in writing, signed by him, and filed in the papers of the cause before the defendant enters his plea.
*484The majority believes art. 1.13(a) is inapplicable to cases in municipal court because such prosecutions are governed by Chapter 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ante, 901 S.W.2d at 482-83. I disagree. The majority states: “[gjiven Chapter 45’s comprehensive and specific applicability to the unique municipal court context, we hold that article 45.24 which specifically addresses jury waiver in the municipal court context is controlling, to the preclusion of article 1.13.”. However, art. 45.24 provides only that “[t]he accused may waive a trial by jury; and in such case, the justice shall hear and determine the cause without a jury.”
Chapter 45 provides specific articles relevant only to proceedings in a justice or corporation court and such courts are bound by these articles. See and Compare, Cheney v. State, 755 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). But a justice or corporation court is not insulated from the remainder of the Code. See, Art. 1.02. If another portion of the Code of Criminal Procedure addresses an issue not specifically addressed by Chapter 45, a justice or corporation court is duty bound to apply that article. And when we review art. 45.24 we see that it does not address whether a jury waiver must be written, while art. 1.13(a) specifically requires a written waiver.3
In Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), we held the courts will be bound by the plain meaning of a statute unless such an interpretation is ambiguous or leads to an absurd result. Id., 818 S.W.2d at 785. The plain meaning of art. 1.13(a) neither leads to an absurd result nor suffers from ambiguity. The Legislature plainly required a waiver of a defendant’s right to a jury trial be in writing and in open court. Id. Accordingly, the majority errs in holding a waiver of a jury trial in municipal court need not be written.
I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the defendant’s waiver in the instant case was made in person, in writing, in open court, and reflected on the minutes of the court. See, art. 1.13(a). Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.

. Appellant’s second ground for review states:
Whether Art. 1.13(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Texas, effective Sept. 1, 1991, requires a written waiver of trial by jury before the commencement of a trial before the Court without a jury where the offense is a misdemeanor punishable by fine only.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. The majority provides an extensive discussion of the rule of in pari materia and holds art. 45.24 applies to the instant case because it is “specifically applicable to jury waiver in municipal court.” However, the majority wrongfully applies the rule. Art. 45.24 authorizes the waiver of a jury in municipal court but does not address whether such a waiver may be oral or must be written. Art. 1.13 specifically requires a written jury waiver. Therefore, art. 45.24 is a general statute while art. 1.13 is more detailed, and specifically addresses the instant issue. A correct application of the rule of in pari materia requires the Court to apply art. 1.13 in this case. Cheney, 755 S.W.2d at 126.