Court Opinion

ID: 9365079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-21 01:00:26.63401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:43.131582
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30129        Document: 00516618250             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/20/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                                         FILED
                                                                                     January 20, 2023
                                        No. 22-30129                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk

   Barry J. Badeaux,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Louisiana-I Gaming, a Louisiana partnership in
   Commendam, doing business as Boomtown Belle Casino
   Westbank,

                                                                   Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 2:20-CV-2348

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Elrod and Oldham, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         After tripping over a sprinkler head in a grassy area of a casino parking
   lot, Barry Badeaux sued the casino, Louisiana-I Gaming, for negligence under
   Louisiana state law. The district court first granted summary judgment in
   favor of Louisana-I Gaming and soon after denied Badeaux’s motion for

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30129      Document: 00516618250           Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/20/2023

                                     No. 22-30129

   reconsideration. Badeaux appeals both of these district court decisions.
   Given that there was no genuine dispute of material fact, and Badeaux did
   not produce new evidence or establish a manifest error of law in his motion
   for reconsideration, we AFFIRM.
                                           I
          Plaintiff-Appellant Barry Badeaux was a patron of Defendant-
   Appellee’s Boomtown Belle Casino in New Orleans during the early morning
   hours of November 30th, 2019. Around 3:00 a.m., Badeaux alleges that he
   went to his vehicle in the casino’s parking lot to retrieve some sodas. His
   vehicle was parked in a spot directly adjacent to a curbed and landscaped area
   of the lot. On his way back from his vehicle, Badeaux alleges he sustained
   injuries after tripping and falling on a sprinkler head located in the curbed and
   landscaped area.
          Badeaux sued Louisiana-I Gaming in state court for negligence,
   seeking damages under both Louisiana’s premises liability statute, La. Civ.
   Code Ann. art. 2317.1 (1996), and the Louisiana Merchant Liability Act, La.
   Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.6 (1996). Louisiana-I Gaming removed the action
   to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction.
          The district court granted Louisiana-I Gaming’s motion for summary
   judgment, holding that Louisiana-I Gaming did not owe Badeaux any legal
   duty to protect him from the sprinkler because it was an “open and obvious”
   hazard that was not “unreasonably dangerous.” The district court denied
   Badeaux’s motion for reconsideration because Badeaux had not
   demonstrated a manifest error of law in the court’s summary judgment and
   did not present new evidence that undermined the court’s order. Badeaux
   timely appealed.

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                                    No. 22-30129

                                         II
                                         A.
          We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
   applying the same standard as the district court. Petro Harvester Operating
   Co. v. Keith, 954 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is proper
   when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
   entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “No genuine
   dispute of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
   trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767
   F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014). In reviewing the record, the court views “all
   the facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Ortega
   Garcia v. United States, 986 F.3d 513, 524 (5th Cir. 2021). However,
   “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory
   facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a
   motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d
   1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Here, the substantive law of
   Louisiana, the forum state, applies. Petrohawk Props., L.P. v. Chesapeake La.,
   L.P., 689 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2012).
          The threshold question “in any negligence action is whether the
   defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, and whether a duty is owed is a question
   of law.” Thibodeaux v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 816 F. App’x 988, 990 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (quoting Bufkin v. Felipe’s La., LLC, 171 So. 3d 851, 855 (La.
   2014). Under Louisiana law, a defendant does not have a duty to protect
   against that which is “obvious and apparent,” because an “open and
   obvious” hazard does not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. Broussard v.
   State ex rel. Off. of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175, 184 (La. 2013); see also
   Thibodeaux, 816 F. App’x at 990 (“[A hazard] does not present an
   unreasonable risk of harm when it is an open and obvious risk.”).

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   Accordingly, we have previously held that summary judgment is warranted
   “when no legal duty is owed because the condition encountered is obvious
   and apparent to all and not unreasonably dangerous.” Thibodeaux, 816 F.
   App’x at 990 (citation omitted).
          Here, there is ample evidence that the sprinkler head was an “open
   and obvious” hazard. There are multiple photographs of the scene showing
   that: (1) there were working lights in the parking lot on the night of Badeaux’s
   fall; (2) the sprinkler head was located in a grassy, landscaped area that was
   separated from the parking lot by a raised curb; and (3) the raised curb
   surrounding the sprinkler head was painted bright yellow. In addition, there
   is video footage displaying Badeaux walking onto the curbed area prior to his
   fall. Finally, a facilities manager at the casino swore in an affidavit that the
   design and construction of the parking lot complied with every ordinance,
   law, and industry standard at the time of construction. This evidence
   supports the district court’s conclusion that a sprinkler head raised seven
   inches above the ground, located in a landscaped area surrounded by a bright
   yellow curb within a well-lit parking lot is an “open and obvious” hazard.
          While Badeaux suggests that a jury must always make the crucial
   determinations on whether a hazard is “open and obvious,” and whether said
   hazard is otherwise “unreasonably dangerous,” the district court correctly
   dismissed this argument given the prevailing case law. See, e.g., Allen v.
   Lockwood, 156 So. 3d 650, 653 (La. 2015) (holding summary judgment may be
   appropriate “in cases where the plaintiff is unable to produce factual support
   for his or her claim that a complained-of condition or thing[] is unreasonably
   dangerous”); Martin v. Boyd Racing, L.L.C., 681 F. App’x 409, 412 (5th Cir.
   2017) (affirming grant of summary judgment and holding that a “court can
   decide that a condition does not present an unreasonable risk of harm, as a
   matter of law”). Therefore, Louisiana-I Gaming did not owe a duty to
   protect Badeaux from the open and obvious sprinkler head, and Badeaux’s

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   evidence failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
   the sprinkler was unreasonably dangerous.
                                              B.
           We review a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration
   under an abuse of discretion standard, unless the district court considered
   new evidence and still upheld summary judgment, in which case we review
   the district court’s decision de novo. Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473,
   477 (5th Cir. 2004). Here, the record shows the district court considered the
   new evidence Badeaux put forth, so we review the decision de novo.
           A motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
   59(e) must either clearly establish a manifest error of law or fact, or must
   present newly discovered evidence. In re Life Partner Holdings, Inc., 926 F.3d
   103, 128 (5th Cir. 2019). Badeaux puts forth arguments concerning both a
   manifest error of law and new evidence.
           Badeaux suggests that the district court committed a manifest error of
   law because it failed to consider and apply the legal standard articulated in
   Walker v. Union Oil Mill, Inc., 369 So. 2d 1043 (La. 1979), when determining
   whether Louisiana-I Gaming owed Badeaux a duty to protect him from the
   dangers of the sprinkler. However, we hold the district court correctly
   considered four of the six Walker factors. 1 The two factors that the court did
   not consider were not relevant to the court’s analysis. 2 Moreover, Badeaux
   never presented these factors to the court prior to his motion for

           1
             The court: (1) noted that Badeaux was walking to and from his car at 3 a.m.; (2)
   examined the photographs of the scene and lighting; (3) considered the location of the
   sprinkler head; and (4) noticed the mulch surrounding the sprinkler.
           2
             The court did not consider that the drink machine on the premises was broken
   and that Badeaux was carrying drinks when he walked away from his car.

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                                             No. 22-30129

   reconsideration. It was improper for Badeaux to raise them for the first time
   in a Rule 59(e) motion. See Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1703 (2020)
   (“[C]ourts will not address new arguments or evidence that the moving party
   could have raised before the decision issued.”).
           Badeaux proposes that the deposition testimony of Kevin Murray,
   Louisiana-I Gaming’s facility manager, was “new evidence.” Murray’s
   testimony concerned whether the material surrounding the sprinkler was red
   or black mulch. Ultimately, Badeaux is concerned with the visibility of the
   black sprinkler. This testimony is not new evidence, as it was obtained at
   least one week before the district court entered its order. Regardless, we hold
   that this evidence does not undermine the reasons the district court relied on
   to dismiss Badeaux’s claim. Therefore, the court did not err in denying the
   motion for reconsideration on these grounds. 3
                                         *        *         *
           For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

           3
              Badeaux also argues that the district court failed to consider the risk-utility test
   set forth in Bufkin v. Felipe’s La., LLC, 171 So. 3d 851 (2014). This argument is meritless
   because Louisiana law does not require a risk-utility analysis when the hazard is “open and
   obvious.” Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 184–85. A defendant “generally does not have a duty to
   protect against [such hazards].” Id. at 184.

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