Court Opinion

ID: 9483879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:33:51.972073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:53.150506
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. We have been directed to reconsider our earlier decision in light of the memorandum of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency of September 18, 1992. In my view, despite the varying interpretations given the statute by the agency in the past, we are not, under the circumstances here, entirely relieved of our obligation under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), to defer to the reasonable interpretation of the agency charged with the administration of the statute. It is true that the Supreme Court has said that “[a]s a general matter ... the case for judicial deference is less compelling with respect to agency positions that are inconsistent with previously held views.” Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 2535, 115 L.Ed.2d 604 (1991). The Court has also stressed, however, that “[a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863, 104 S.Ct. at 863. Indeed, the agency has the continuing obligation to ensure that its interpretation is reasonable by considering “varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.” Id. at 863-64, 104 S.Ct. at 2792.
*305The reasonableness of the Administrator’s interpretation must be assessed “not in a sterile textual vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a technical and complex arena.” Id. at 863, 104 S.Ct. at 2792. As the Solicitor General graphically set out in his brief before the Supreme Court, the basic problem is that Congress has simply failed to address a major environmental policy question. See Br. of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11 n. 6, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1932, 118 L.Ed.2d 539 (1992). Consequently, the Administrator has attempted to resolve the matter on the basis of the available evidence. Here, confronted with the split of authority between two courts of appeals, the Administrator took another look at an admittedly ambiguous issue and reassessed his earlier pronouncements. In my view, this was responsible agency action and is deserving of our deferential review.
While the Administrator’s approach differs somewhat from the analysis of my colleagues in the Second Circuit (and while I find Judge Haight’s presentation somewhat more convincing than the Administrator’s), I do not perceive that tension to be a fundamental one. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court. Hopefully, Congress will make the policy decision that needs to be made and the highest court in the land will be spared the necessity of having to deal with what is, at bottom, a problem for the legislative branch.