Court Opinion

ID: 2964617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:28:22.008174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:58.578878
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1328

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                             RAMBERTO HERNANDEZ, AKA RAM,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Jos  Antonio Fust , U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                           and DiClerico,* District Judge.
                                           ______________

                                _____________________

               H.  Manuel  Hern ndez,  by  Appointment of  the  Court,  for
               _____________________
          appellant.
               Jos   A. Quiles-Espinosa,  Senior  Litigation Counsel,  with
               ________________________
          whom  Guillermo Gil,  United States  Attorney, and  Nelson P rez-
                _____________                                 _____________
          Sosa,  Assistant  United  States  Attorney,  were  on  brief  for
          ____
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                    March 17, 1997
                                 ____________________
                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.   Defendant-appellant  Ramberto
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
                               ___________

          Hern ndez was  convicted of  (1) conspiring  with five  other co-

          defendants  to possess with the intent to distribute in excess of

          five  kilograms of cocaine in  violation of 21  U.S.C.   846; and

          (2)  along with  three other  co-defendants, aiding  and abetting

          each  other in  knowingly and intentionally  distributing twenty-

          nine  kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.    841(a)(1)

          and   841(b)(1)(B)  and  18  U.S.C.     2.    Hern ndez  appeals,

          challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and claiming that his

          Sixth  Amendment rights to confrontation and to a fair trial were

          denied because the government was  permitted to convict him based

          on the  uncorroborated testimony  of a single  unindicted alleged

          coconspirator, William Negr n-Zapata  ("Negr n-Zapata"), who  was

          awaiting sentencing in another case.  We affirm.

                    At  trial  Negr n-Zapata  testified  as  follows.    He

          received   a  call   from  Willie   Maya-Acosta  ("Maya-Acosta"),

          inquiring whether Negr n-Zapata knew  of any kilograms of cocaine

          available for  purchase.  Negr n-Zapata, in  turn, contacted Jos 

          Luis V lez-Carrero ("V lez-Carrero").  On October 27, 1991, Maya-

          Acosta  delivered $290,000  to  Negr n-Zapata.   Later that  day,

          V lez-Carrero and  Negr n-Zapata went to  a fish market  owned by

          appellant  Hern ndez  and   delivered  $261,000  to   Hern ndez.1

          Hern ndez gave them twenty-nine  kilograms of cocaine.  Hern ndez

          was acting as an intermediary in exchange for a commission.

                              
          ____________________

          1   Of the original $290,000, $29,000 was divided between Negr n-
          Zapata and V lez-Carrero as a commission.

                                         -2-

                           I.  Sufficiency of the Evidence
                           I.  Sufficiency of the Evidence

                    Hern ndez'  first claim  challenges the  sufficiency of

          the evidence.  In reviewing such claims, we  view the evidence in

          the light most favorable  to the prosecution and ask  whether any

          rational factfinder  could have  found guilt beyond  a reasonable

          doubt.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United
                  ___ _______    ________                            ______

          States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210, 216 (1st Cir. 1995).
          ______    _____

                    It is well established  that an accomplice is qualified

          to  testify  as long  as  any agreements  he  has  made with  the

          government are presented to the jury and the "judge gave complete

          and  correct instructions  detailing  the special  care the  jury

          should take in assessing the testimony."  United States v. Ortiz-
                                                    _____________    ______

          Arrigoit a,  996 F.2d  436, 438-39  (1st Cir.  1993).   Indeed, a
          __________

          conviction based  solely upon the uncorroborated  testimony of an

          accomplice  can  be  upheld, as  long  as  the  jury is  properly

          instructed and the  testimony is  not incredible as  a matter  of

          law.   See United States  v. And jar,  49 F.3d 16,  21 (1st  Cir.
                 ___ _____________     _______

          1995).  As  always, the credibility of a witness  is a matter for

          the jury.  See Ortiz-Arrigoit a, 996 F.2d at 439.
                     ___ ________________

                    The government's  case relied  on the testimony  of its

          only witness, Negr n-Zapata.  Negr n-Zapata testified that he was

          a long-time  drug dealer,  had already  been convicted twice  for

          drug trafficking, had one sentence  reduced from sixty months  to

          twenty-four months  because of his willingness to testify for the

          government, and was still  awaiting sentencing in a drug  case in

          which he  had been convicted over  two and a half  years prior to

                                         -3-

          his testimony in the instant case.  Negr n-Zapata cooperated with

          the  prosecution  in  exchange  for more  lenient  treatment  and

          certification of his cooperation  to a judge who was  to sentence

          him  after the  Hern ndez trial.   He  was eventually  given time

          served in the case for which his sentence was pending.

                    Although   these   circumstances  raise   questions  of

          credibility  regarding Negr n-Zapata's testimony, this court does

          not engage in a  plenary review of the credibility  of witnesses.

          A rational  juror could have believed  Negr n-Zapata's version of

          events.  Negr n-Zapata testified in considerable detail regarding

          the crime and  Hern ndez' role in it.   Viewing the testimony  in

          the  light most  favorable to  the verdict,  the jury  could have

          concluded that the testimony established that Hern ndez joined in

          the conspiracy,  and possessed and distributed  cocaine.  Negr n-

          Zapata was cross-examined in  detail regarding both his testimony

          and  his credibility.   Finally,  appellant fails  to demonstrate

          that there existed  overwhelming evidence to contradict  Negr n's

          testimony.   For all of these reasons, we deny the sufficiency of

          the evidence claim.

                            II.  The Confrontation Clause
                            II.  The Confrontation Clause

                    Hern ndez  claims  that  his Sixth  Amendment  right to

          cross-examine Negr n-Zapata was denied.  The    Sixth   Amendment

          states  that "[i]n  all criminal  proceedings, the  accused shall

          enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

          him."  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees the

          accused the right to cross-examine government witnesses fully and

                                         -4-

          fairly.   See  Delaware  v. Van  Arsdale,  475 U.S.  673,  678-79
                    ___  ________     ____________

          (1985);  United States  v. Rivera-Santiago,  872 F.2d  1073, 1084
                   _____________     _______________

          (1st Cir. 1989).  

                    It  is well established  that "the Confrontation Clause

          guarantees  an opportunity  for effective  cross-examination, not
                         ___________

          cross-examination  that  is effective  in  whatever  way, and  to

          whatever extent, the defense might wish."  Delaware v. Fensterer,
                                                     ________    _________

          474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985).  "[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally

          satisfied  when the defense is given full and fair opportunity to

          probe  and  expose these  infirmities  through cross-examination,

          thereby calling  to the attention  of the factfinder  the reasons

          for giving scant  weight to the witness' testimony."   Id. at 22.
                                                                 ___

          Furthermore,  once  the defendant  is  given  the opportunity  to

          cross-examine   government  witnesses,   the  extent   of  cross-

          examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court and

          we review only for abuse of discretion.  See Rivera-Santiago, 872
                                                   ___ _______________

          F.2d at 1085.

                    In  the instant  case, there  can be  no question  that

          Hern ndez  was permitted  a full and  fair opportunity  to cross-

          examine the witness.  Indeed, the defendant fails to identify any
                                                                        ___

          circumscription  imposed  on  his  cross-examination  of  Negr n-

          Zapata, much less a  restriction that would rise to the  level of

          an abuse of discretion.2  The defense argues that "[t]he jury was
                              
          ____________________

          2   We add that defense  counsel did not raise  the confrontation
          issue  at trial.   Arguments raised for the  first time on appeal
          are forfeited and reversible only upon a demonstration  of "plain
          error."   United States v.  Sullivan, 98 F.3d  686, 687 (1st Cir.
                    _____________     ________
          1996).  "The  plain error  doctrine of Federal  Rule of  Criminal

                                         -5-

          allowed to  hear Negr n-Zapata's testimony unaware  that he would

          be  rewarded with  a sentence  of time  served because  of, among

          other things, his testimony in  this case.  As a result,  defense

          counsel  were denied  a 'full  and fair'  opportunity  to impeach

          Negr n-Zapata   by  showing   his   motivation  to   please   the

          government."  Appellant's Brief at 11.

                    In fact,  the defense  was afforded the  opportunity to

          cross-examine Negr n-Zapata  on every  aspect of  his cooperation

          agreement  with the  government.   On cross-examination,  Negr n-

          Zapata admitted that  he had been  awaiting sentence for  twenty-

          nine  months and  that he  had a  cooperation agreement  with the

          government.  He testified that, in exchange for  his cooperation,

          the  government would recommend a reduced sentence in the case in

          which he  was  awaiting sentencing.   In  addition, the  district

          court  judge read  portions of  the Sentencing Guidelines  to the

          jury  to  make it  clear that  Negr n-Zapata's sentence  could be

          reduced  below the minimum mandatory sentence in exchange for his

          cooperation.

                    Hern ndez argues that the defense could have  impeached

          Negr n-Zapata's testimony more successfully  if it had known that

          he would be  credited for time served and released.  Whether true
                              
          ____________________

          Procedure  52(b) tempers the blow  of a rigid  application of the
          contemporaneous-objection  requirement.  The  Rule authorizes the
          Courts   of  Appeals  to  correct  only  'particularly  egregious
          errors,'  those  errors  that  'seriously  affect  the  fairness,
          integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'"  United
                                                                     ______
          States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (citations omitted).  Even
          ______    _____
          if  we  were to  conclude  that there  had  been  a violation  of
          Hern ndez' right  to cross-examination, appellant  would have  to
          demonstrate plain error in order to win a reversal.

                                         -6-

          or not, this contention does not lead to the conclusion that  the

          right  to  cross-examine was  compromised.   At  the time  of the

          testimony,  Negr n-Zapata  had  no  assurance that  he  would  be

          credited for  time served  and released.    He only  knew, as  he

          testified,  that  his  cooperation  would  be  certified  to  the

          sentencing judge.  In  other words, the defense was  permitted to

          present to the jury the conditions  under which Negr n-Zapata was

          testifying.    The jury  was fully  informed  and able  to assess

          Negr n-Zapata's credibility.   We  conclude, therefore,  that the

          defense was granted a full and fair opportunity to  cross-examine

          Negr n-Zapata.

                    Finally, we note that  appellant's appeal to Rule 32(a)

          of  the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 the Local Rules for

          the  District  of Puerto  Rico,  and  Sixth Amendment  guarantees

          regarding  speedy sentencing  belong  to  the defendant  awaiting

          sentencing, in this case Negr n-Zapata.  Violation of these rules

          does not give Hern ndez grounds for a reversal of his conviction.

                               III.  Jury Instructions
                               III.  Jury Instructions

                    Finally,  Hern ndez objects  to the  jury instructions.

          The relevant portion of the instructions is as follows:

                         You   have    also   heard   testimony
                      regarding   the   Government's   witness'
                      reputation    in   the    community   for
                      truthfulness   or  untruthfulness.     In
                      deciding this case,  you should  consider
                      that  evidence together  with and  in the
                      same manner as all the  other evidence in
                      the case.
                              
          ____________________

          3   Federal  Rule  of  Criminal  Procedure  32(a)  requires  that
          sentencing should take place without "undue delay."

                                         -7-

                         You  have also heard testimony from an
                      unindicted   co-conspirator  who   has  a
                      cooperation     agreement    with     the
                      Government.   That testimony was given in
                      exchange for a  promise by the Government
                      that  the witness will  not be prosecuted
                      for   some   crimes  he   has  admittedly
                      committed,  including  the  ones in  this
                      case.   The Government  will also certify
                      his cooperation to another judge who will
                      sentence  him  in  another  case  in  the
                      future.

                         In  evaluating   this  testimony,  you
                      should  consider  whether that  testimony
                      may   have   been   influenced   by   the
                      Government's   promise  and   you  should
                      consider  that   testimony  with  greater
                      caution than that of an ordinary witness.
                      Such agreements are legal.   The only  --
                      the  law only requires  that you consider
                      testimony given under those circumstances
                      with  greater  caution  than that  of  an
                      ordinary witness.

          Trial Transcript, vol. VI, at 896.

                    The  entirety of appellant's  argument with  respect to

          the jury instructions  is to quote the last two paragraphs of the

          above excerpt and to  state that "the trial judge, in  giving the

          legally required instruction to  the jury on the care  with which

          it  must consider the  testimony of an  accomplice, minimized the

          importance of the charge by adding the word 'only.'"  Appellant's

          Brief at 11.

                    Because   appellant  failed  to   object  to  the  jury

          instructions  at  trial, we  review only  for  plain error.   See
                                                                        ___

          Sullivan, 98 F.3d at 687.  "Our principal focus in reviewing jury
          ________

          instructions is  to determine whether  they tended to  confuse or

          mislead  the  jury  on  the  controlling  issues."   See  Service
                                                               ___  _______

          Merchandise Co. v. Boyd Corp., 722 F.2d 945, 950 (1st Cir. 1983).
          _______________    __________

                                         -8-

          We do not  believe that  the instructions provided  by the  trial

          judge confused or misled  the jury.  The judge  accurately summed

          up the  conditions under which Negr n-Zapata  testified and added

          that jurors should  "consider whether the testimony may have been

          influenced by  the government's  promise and you  should consider

          the  testimony with  greater  caution than  that  of an  ordinary

          witness."   Tr. IV, at 896.   Because the jury  was informed that

          Negr n-Zapata's testimony  should be  viewed with caution,  we do

          not believe there was error in the instructions and certainly not

          "plain error."4

                    Although  appellant's claims cannot  justify a reversal

          in this case,  we add  that we find  troubling certain  practices

          brought  to light in this case.   In particular, we are concerned

          with the practice of incarcerating an individual  for an extended

          period of  time without sentencing,  while holding out  a promise

          that his or her cooperation will lead to a more lenient sentence.

          At  least two aspects of  this practice are  problematic.  First,

          although  the   government's  offer  may  be   attractive  to  an

          individual  defendant, we do not believe that the right to prompt

          sentencing exists merely as a bargaining chip for defendants.  It

          is inappropriate to hold  a defendant in prison for  long periods

          of time pending  sentencing, in this case  two and a half  years,

          while the government tries to extract information from him.

                              
          ____________________

          4  We add that Hern ndez not only fails to point to error  in the
          instructions, but  concedes that they  were "perhaps  technically
          correct."  Appellant's Brief at 12.

                                         -9-

                    The second problem is  that this practice increases the

          likelihood  that  innocent  individuals  will  be  implicated  by

          defendants trying to placate the government.  This is obviously a

          concern whenever  a defendant  cooperates with the  government in

          exchange  for lenience,  but  we  feel  that  as  the  period  of

          incarceration  increases  unduly, the  risk  of false  statements

          intended to appease the defendant's captors becomes too great.

                    Although  this is not the case for corrective action by

          this  court, suffice  it to  say that  we caution  the government

          against  abuse  of  this practice  and  that  we  will view  with

          suspicion its continued use.   Nothing in this opinion  should be

          taken to support such conduct.

                                   IV.  Conclusion
                                   IV.  Conclusion

                    For  the reasons stated  herein, appellant's conviction

          is affirmed.
             affirmed
             ________

                                         -10-