Court Opinion

ID: 9759274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:10:37.332219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.650225
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
I must strenuously dissent from the majority’s disregard of the importance of the issues presented by prison overcrowding and their understatement of the importance of permitting the District Attorney of Philadelphia, the petitioner, to intervene. Under the guise of finding that petitioner “unduly delayed” in seeking intervention and that “... the dispositive issue is ... whether petitioner knew or should have known before entry of the decree of the possible remedies that the present litigation was likely to produce” (slip op. at 229) the majority incorrectly perceives a dereliction on the part of a public official, when in fact none here exists. As a result of this misguided and tortured reasoning, the safety of the community is unnecessarily imperiled.
*283Petitioner may have been aware of the instant litigation before he sought intervention, but that fact alone is not dispositive of the inquiry as to whether this Court should allow intervention. Accepting arguendo the dereliction of the District Attorney in not previously acting, as the majority charges, I nevertheless reject the fuzzy reasoning, reminiscent of the turbulent Ws, that the public at large should be required to pay the cost. More importantly, it is my view that the District Attorney was correct in his assessment that intervention was not previously required.
The instant litigation was purportedly initiated to alleviate the alleged unconstitutional prison conditions existing in the Philadelphia Prison System. In response, a number of innovative and untried remedies were and are being suggested to resolve perceived injustices. Originally, the remedies designed were directed to the internal institutional capacity of the prisons. This obviously was not an area that the District Attorney, the prosecuting arm of county government, was charged to oversee.
For the first time, in its order of March 17, 1981, amended by the order of June 22, 1981 the court below developed a mechanism for the release of pre-trial detainees which undercut the traditional bail setting process.1 Without question, the District Attorney has a major role under our law in determining the bail in each instance of one held for court in a criminal case. A primary consideration in the setting of bail is to assure the safety of the general public. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C., §§ 3146, 3148; Harris v. U. S., 404 U.S. 1232, 92 S.Ct. 10, 30 L.Ed.2d 25 (1971); U. S. v. James R. Anderson, 670 F.2d 328 (D.C.Cir.1982); U. S. v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1979); U. S. v. Long, 422 *284F.2d 712 (D.C.Cir.1970); U. S. v. Seide, 492 F.Supp. 164 (D.C.Cal.1980). The District Attorney is charged with the obligation of seeing that this end of the process is accomplished in every case. It should be obvious where that process has taken place and an amount has been established for security upon the release of a pre-trial detainee, any reduction of the amount dehors the bail process undermines the entire structure of the bail process.
It was because of the concern for the safety of the citizenry occasioned by this questionable disregard for the need of adequate security that this writer, joined by the then Mr. Justice Kauffman, modified the order of the court below to exclude from the application of its order those detainees charged with crimes that clearly posed a threat to society. While that modification was intended to provide a temporary amelioration of the effects of the order below, it was not envisioned as a complete rectification for the substitution of the traditional bail process.2
The ultimate responsibility for the establishment and sustaining of order and safety of our citizens in this Commonwealth, including this county, rests with the sovereign, the state. Both the prosecution of those violating the criminal laws and the maintainance of those in custody for having violated those laws are carried out by the state directly through county district attorneys or indirectly by political subdivisions that have been delegated the authority to carry out the state’s responsibility for its prisons. In the City of Philadelphia, the City Solicitor has been designated the *285public official to execute the city’s delegated responsibility to maintain the housing of those charged with crimes. The District Attorney of Philadelphia is the state’s designee to carry the onus of law enforcement. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Bauer, 437 Pa. 37, 261 A.2d 573 (1970).
This case, evolving from its initial issue of adequate and humane confinement of incarcerated persons, came to involve the very essence of law enforcement (public safety). Today’s decision handicaps the representation of the public by eliminating the safety arm of the public’s right to an orderly and safe community and leaves the public to be represented only by the City’s public official charged with the orderly and humane maintainance of its local prisons.3 I would not have dismembered the public’s interests by denying full participation of the state’s law enforcement official.4
Accordingly, I would grant the request for extraordinary relief and hold that the District Attorney should be permitted to intervene in the matter before the Commonwealth Court.
Mr. Justice McDERMOTT and Mr. Justice HUTCHINSON join in this opinion.

. The earlier creation of a release mechanism, in and of itself, is not dispositive of the present inquiry. The scope and effect of that mechanism is the critical element if a proper analysis is to be made. The previous release of a small number of pre-trial detainees did not endanger the District Attorney’s overall responsibility to effectively prosecute criminal defendants. However, when the specter of a wholesale release of pre-trial detainees charged with serious crimes became imminent, the cumulative effect of this procedure was to redirect the impact of the instant litigation to the heart of the District Attorney’s primary prosecutorial function.

. The majority vacates the stay and erroneously concludes the decree of the lower court is sufficient to protect the public and does not constitute an undue burden on the District Attorney. The July 7, 1981 partial stay and modification was specifically designed to prohibit the release of pre-trial detainees charged with the most serious crimes of violence. The necessity for this stay and modification was occasioned by the very fact that pretrial detainees charged with such crimes would be released pursuant to the lower court’s decree. That protection has today been removed. Moreover, the majority’s conclusion that participation by the District Attorney is sufficient to protect the public’s interest ignores reality. The bail review procedure forces the District Attorney’s office to expend the valuable resources of an already overburdened staff for a second time after having participated in the original bail-setting process.

. The majority ignores that by its refusal to permit the District Attorney to participate it may in effect have left the people of this county without any effective representation in this extremely important matter. In its adjudication of the original City defendant’s exceptions to the Order of March 17, 1981, the lower court dismissed the exceptions, inter alia, on the grounds the City defendant failed to file a brief supporting its contentions within the time provided by Philadelphia Civil Rule 240. Should that ruling be upheld by the Commonwealth Court, the merits of this case will escape appellate review.

. Although the majority expressly purports merely to deny the District Attorney’s request for extraordinary relief, it nevertheless appears evident from the opinion that they have also concluded the merits of the appeal of the District Attorney presently before the Commonwealth Court seeking review of the order denying intervention by the court below. From footnote 12 of the opinion, the majority appears to conclude that the only resource now available to the District Attorney is to seek participation as amicus. Thus, sub silentio, they have exercised their extraordinary power and mooted the appeal of the District Attorney presently pending in the Commonwealth Court.