Court Opinion

ID: 9543954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:50:50.006711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:33.429848
License: Public Domain

*550MARTONE, Justice,
concurring.
I join the court in affirming this conviction and sentence. I write separately to express my disagreement with the court’s resolution of two important legal issues, one not raised on appeal by the defendant, and both unnecessary to the resolution of this case. I refer to the question of territorial jurisdiction: Who gets to decide it and by what standard?
The court concludes that “[i]n the very rare case in which jurisdiction is legitimately in issue because of contradicting jurisdictional facts, Arizona’s territorial jurisdiction must be established beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury.” Ante, at 538, 892 P.2d at 1327. But the court also concedes that “[o]n appeal, Defendant does not renew his argument that the jurisdictional question was for the jury.” Ante, at 535, 892 P.2d at 1324. The court also concedes that “[tjhere was no controverting evidence on the jurisdictional issue.” Ante, at 539, 892 P.2d at 1328.
Thus, the court decides two important substantive issues, one of which is not raised by the defendant on appeal, and neither of which is presented by the facts of this case. I do not believe we should decide complex issues unless we must. We never know what the next case will present. The court says that “fundamental error doctrine requires us to reach this issue,” ante, at 535 n. 2, 892 P.2d at 1324 n. 2. On the contrary, the court must decide whether there is error, and then whether it is fundamental. State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424, 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988). “Since there is no error, there is no occasion to reach the doctrine of fundamental error.” State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 505 n. 2, 844 P.2d 1152, 1155 n. 2 (1993).
Nor does the nonwaivability of subject matter jurisdiction require us to reach these issues. First, subject matter jurisdiction is not in dispute. The Superior Court of Arizona is a trial court of general jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction over the offense as charged. But even if one categorized territorial jurisdiction under the heading of subject matter jurisdiction, the question of territorial jurisdiction has been raised by the defendant and we are deciding it. What has not been raised is the discrete legal issue of whether the judge or jury decides it.
Even if this ease were an appropriate occasion to decide these complex issues, I would decide each of them differently. I subscribe to the view that the court, and not the jury, decides the question of territorial jurisdiction. State v. Beverly, 224 Conn. 372, 618 A.2d 1335 (1993); Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177 (D.C.App.1990). Jurisdiction is a question of law and thus the judge ought to make the findings necessary to support a conclusion that there is jurisdiction. Cf Rule 43(i), Ariz.R.Civ.P. Many motions in both civil and criminal cases require the taking of evidence. These include motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, motions to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction, motions for transfer of venue, and many others. These sorts of motions raise legal issues and it is up to the judge to find whatever facts are necessary to support the appropriate legal conclusion. It seems anomalous to me to allow a jury to tell the court whether it has jurisdiction or not.
Nor do I agree that the better rule is that jurisdictional facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary to establish the elements of a crime but, as the court acknowledges, “[w]e do not, however, equate jurisdiction with elements of the offense.” Ante, at 538, 892 P.2d at 1327. The jurisdiction of the court has nothing to do with the elements of a crime.1
Does the standard of proof really matter? I believe it can. It may well be that there is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that any state has jurisdiction. But there may be proof by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more states have jurisdiction. Having imposed the reasonable doubt standard on jurisdiction, there may now be instances in which a criminal charge could be heard nowhere, even though the offense itself can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I *551thus favor a rule that, because territorial jurisdiction is not an element of the offense, the jurisdictional standard of proof is by the preponderance of the evidence. People v. Cavanaugh, 44 Cal.2d 252, 282 P.2d 53 (1955).
CORCORAN, Justice.
I concur with the majority and affirm both defendant’s convictions and sentences, including the death sentence. However, because the defendant has not raised in this court, and the parties have not briefed, the question whether the judge or the jury is to determine the jurisdictional question, I would not decide it. I would await an appropriate case where the issue is both raised and briefed.
As to the issue of whether jurisdictional facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, I agree with Justice Martone that the standard should be a preponderance standard.

. The court says that it "makes no sense in a single trial to require the factfinder to determine the existence of facts on the reasonable doubt standard for guilt purposes and the same facts on the preponderance standard for jurisdiction purposes.” Ante, at 538, 892 P.2d at 1327. But under my view, it is not the same fact finder. The jury decides guilt. The judge decides jurisdiction.