Court Opinion

ID: 9779801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:46:46.901186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:41.388957
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: In its opinion, the majority concludes that our prior decision in People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467 (2000), announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure and, therefore, may not be applied retroactively. Although I have no quarrel with the majority’s holding on this issue, I believe my colleagues have erred by not first addressing a threshold, procedural question: whether Sanders’ postconviction petition was timely filed. The appellate court, using an incorrect standard, determined that Sanders’ petition was untimely. Normally, such a holding ends the case, as the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 2000)) forbids any proceedings filed beyond the time periods it sets forth. However, the appellate court nevertheless reached the merits of the substantive issue. In their opinion, my colleagues do not address this threshold procedural issue, analyzing only Sanders’ substantive claim. By doing so, this court creates confusion for the bench and bar in several respects: not only does the court call into question the proper analytical sequence used to review such claims, the court also leaves standing a published appellate court opinion that applies an incorrect standard to assess the timeliness of Sanders’ petition. Because today’s opinion leaves these matters unaddressed, I am compelled to write separately. Section 122 — 1(c) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(c) (West 2000)) sets forth the specific time period within which a petitioner shall initiate a postconviction proceeding. At the time defendant filed his petition, the Act provided: “No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or her brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline for the filing of the defendant’s brief with the Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” Thus, the General Assembly has not only established a clear framework within the Act for assessing the timeliness of a postconviction petition, but also has specified the test to be used to excuse a petitioner’s noncompliance with these requirements: a petition filed outside the delineated time period is considered untimely unless “the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122— 1(c) (West 2000); see also People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 420 (2003); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002). The appellate court, despite acknowledging that the clear language of section 122 — 1(c) mandates the use of the culpable negligence standard to assess the timeliness of Sanders’ initial postconviction petition, instead applied the cause-and-prejudice standard set forth in Pitsonbarger which is used to determine the timeliness of successive postconvicition petitions.1 In applying this heightened standard, the appellate panel reasoned that where a “defendant seeks in the first instance to file an untimely postconviction petition because of a change in the law that occurred after the filing deadline had passed,” this is “analogous to the situation in which a defendant has already filed an unsuccessful postconviction petition, but seeks to file a successive postconviction petition because of a change in the law that occurred after the rejection of his first petition.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 171-72. This reasoning is without support and in error. As this is the first postconviction petition filed by Sanders, both the Act and our case law make it clear that challenges to timeliness must be evaluated under the culpable negligence standard and not the more stringent cause-and-prejudice test. The appellate court ignored the distinction between initial and successive postconviction petitions, which mandates that each type of petition be evaluated under different analytical frameworks. In addition, the appellate panel’s holding runs counter not only to our long-held view that the Act in general must be “ ‘liberally construed to afford a convicted person an opportunity to present questions of deprivation of constitutional rights’ ” (Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d at 421, quoting People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d 541, 546 (1985)), but also that the specific exception contained in section 122 — 1(c) allowing a petitioner to file an otherwise-untimely petition operates as a “ ‘special “safety valve” ’ in the Act.” Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d at 420, quoting People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 88 (1988). In light of the above, I cannot understand why my colleagues do not address this threshold issue and clarify that the appellate court used the wrong standard. The majority’s silence on this issue is even more disturbing in light of the concession made by the State in its brief to this court that the appellate court’s holding with respect to timeliness does “not find support in the Act,” and that the applicable timeliness standard in this appeal is one of culpable negligence. Further, during oral argument, several members of this court repeatedly questioned the parties concerning the timeliness issue and the manner in which it was handled by the appellate panel. Counsel for both the State and petitioner agreed that the culpable negligence standard applies in this case, and that the appellate court erred in employing the cause-and-prejudice test. It is my view that when the correct standard is applied to Sanders’ postconviction petition, the delay in filing was not due to his culpable negligence. This court has defined culpable negligence as “ ‘something greater than ordinary negligence’ ” and “ ‘akin to recklessness.’ ” Rissley, 206 111. 2d at 420, quoting People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 108 (2002). Sanders had argued on direct appeal that the circuit court’s voir dire was deficient and denied him his constitutional right to a fair and impartial juiy by failing to question the jury regarding potential gang bias. See 393 Ill. App. 3d at 160. Because this argument was rejected on direct appeal, Sanders was barred by res judicata from re-raising it in a postconviction petition. People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371 (1996). As my colleagues hold today, this court’s decision in Strain announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure which impacted defendant’s ability to once again raise this issue in post-conviction proceedings. Thus, it was only after Strain was decided that Sanders was able to resurrect the issue of inadequate voir dire without being barred by res judicata. Here, Sanders’ petition for leave to appeal to this court with respect to his direct appeal was denied on April 2, 1997 (People v. Sanders, 172 Ill. 2d 563 (1997)), and the six-month statutory postconviction period following that date expired on October 2, 1997. Since he was sentenced on May 4, 1994, the three-year period following that date expired on May 4, 1997. Therefore, under the applicable version of section 122 — 1(c), Sanders’ post-conviction petition was due on May 4, 1997, the earlier of the two dates. We decided Strain on November 16, 2000, and Sanders filed the instant postconviction petition exactly one year later, on November 16, 2001. Under these facts, I conclude that Sanders’ delay in filing was not due to his culpable negligence, as he reasonably pursued the voir dire issue again after the new rule in Strain was announced. I note that the Act does not specify an additional time period, after the expiration of the normal filing period, during which a petitioner may be found culpably negligent in filing a postconviction petition based upon a change in the law. In addition, our case law has not squarely addressed this issue. We have, however, traditionally relied upon federal case law in interpreting and applying the Act. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2009). In Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357, 162 L. Ed. 2d 343, 349, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 2481-82 (2005), the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. 2255,116(3) establishes that a federal prisoner may file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence within one year from the date on which the right he asserts was newly recognized by the Court. Relying upon Dodd, there is no question that, at a minimum, Sanders’ petition filed one year after Strain was decided was not untimely. Accordingly, after having survived this threshold procedural inquiry, it only then becomes appropriate to examine the substantive issue of whether Strain applied retroactively to Sanders’ case. As stated, I am in agreement with my colleagues’ holding that Strain represents a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure that is not to be retroactively applied. JUSTICE BURKE joins in this special concurrence.  Section 122 — 1(f) was added to the Act in 2004, and codified the holding of Pitsonbarger. By its plain language, section 122— 1(f) applies only to successive postconviction petitions, and provides that a successive petition may be filed only upon leave of court where “a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim, in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure.” 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(f) (West 2004).