Court Opinion

ID: 9956963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:02:22.969529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:03.557611
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11284    Document: 35-1       Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 1 of 9

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11284
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       BERNARD HERIVEAUX,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       EX-DIRECTOR DANIEL JUNIOR,
       Ex-Director, Individual Capacity,
       COMMANDER NAEEM PERVAIZ,
       Commander, Individual Capacity,
       CHIEF ANGELA LAWRENCE,
       Chief, Individual Capacity,
       MIAMI-DADE         COUNTY         OF     CORRECTIONS            AND
       REHABILITATION,
       MIAMI DADE COUNTY,
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                23-11284

                                                    Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-21591-FAM
                          ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Bernard Heriveaux appeals the district court’s order
       dismissing with prejudice his third amended complaint. After
       careful review, we affirm.
                                        I.
              Heriveaux, a Haitian-American man, worked for the Miami-
       Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for
       approximately 20 years. While represented by counsel, he sued
       Miami-Dade County as well as Daniel Junior, the former director
       of the department; Angela Lawrence, the second in command at
       the department; and Naeem Pervaiz, the third in command at the
       department. He alleged that he was discriminated against because
       of his race, nationality, and age and that the defendants retaliated
       against him.
             After Junior, Lawrence, and Pervaiz filed motions to dismiss
       Heriveaux’s second amended complaint, the district court
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       23-11284                   Opinion of the Court                           3

       concluded that the second amended complaint was a shotgun
       pleading that failed to comply with Federal Rules of Civil
       Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b). The court explained that “many of the
       [second amended complaint’s] allegations do not specify which
       Defendant is responsible for which act,” and as a result “the
       pleading fails to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims
       against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Doc.
       34 at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 1 After identifying the
       deficiencies in the second amended complaint and discussing how
       they could be corrected, the court gave Heriveaux an opportunity
       to file a third amended complaint.
               Heriveaux’s third amended complaint consisted of nearly
       400 paragraphs and purported to raise 23 counts against the county,
       Junior, Lawrence, and Pervaiz. In Counts One through Five,
       Heriveaux purported to bring claims against the county for race
       discrimination, national origin discrimination, age discrimination,
       retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII. 2 In
       Counts Six through Fourteen, he purported to bring claims under

       1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

       2 The third amended complaint stated that Heriveaux’s age discrimination

       claim was brought under Title VII. But Title VII does not prohibit
       discrimination based on age. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting employment
       discrimination based on “race, color, religions, sex, or national origin”).
       Instead, a different statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
       prohibits employers from discriminating against any employee who is at least
       40 years of age because of that employee’s age. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1),
       631(a); see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009).
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                       23-11284

       42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants. In each of these
       counts, he alleged that Junior, Lawrence, or Pervaiz had deprived
       him “of his constitutional right to employment which is protected
       by the United States Constitution and Federal Statutes.” See, e.g.,
       Doc. 35 at ¶ 197. And in Counts Fifteen through Twenty-Three,
       Heriveaux purported to bring claims against Junior, Lawrence, and
       Pervaiz under the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Fla. Stat.
       § 760.10(1)(a), (7).
               The defendants moved to dismiss the third amended
       complaint. The district court granted their motion, concluding that
       the third amended complaint was a shotgun pleading that violated
       Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b). The court explained that the third amended
       complaint still contained paragraphs “refer[ring] to the Defendants
       collectively,” making it difficult “to ascertain which Defendant
       engaged in what allegedly wrongful conduct.” Doc. 39 at 4
       (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
       district court also set forth an alternative reason for dismissing the
       § 1983 claims in Counts Six through Fourteen, concluding that
       Heriveaux failed to state a claim because he did not “identify a
       constitutional basis for those claims.” Id. at 6. 3

       3 The district court also gave an alternative reason for dismissing Heriveaux’s

       FCRA claims against the individual defendants, explaining that “individual
       liability does not exist under the FCRA.” Doc. 39 at 6 (internal quotation marks
       omitted). Because Heriveaux does not challenge on appeal the dismissal of the
       FCRA claims, we discuss them no further.
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       23-11284                   Opinion of the Court                                  5

               Heriveaux then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to alter and amend
       the judgment. In the motion, he argued that his third amended
       complaint “did not have any characteristics” of a shotgun pleading
       “and complied with” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 40-
       1 at 5. The district court denied the motion, stating that it “merely
       repeat[ed] arguments” that the court had “already examined and
       rejected.” Doc. 41 at 3. 4
               This is Heriveaux’s appeal.
                                              II.
              We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint as a
       shotgun pleading for an abuse of discretion. Weiland v. Palm Beach
       Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
                                              III.
              To state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain “a short
       and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
       to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement
       must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
       grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

       4 In the portion of his initial appellate brief setting forth the issues on appeal,

       Heriveaux identified one of the issues on appeal as whether the district court
       abused its discretion in denying his Rule 59(e) motion. But he failed to
       adequately raise this issue on appeal because this single sentence is the only
       time he mentions it. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681
       (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that an appellant fails to adequately raise an issue
       on appeal when he makes only “passing references” to it “without advancing
       any arguments or citing any authorities”).
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11284

       544, 555 (2007) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks
       omitted). An adequate complaint “requires more than labels and
       conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
       of action will not do.” Id. In addition, the complaint must “state its
       claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
       practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
       The purpose of these rules is “to require the pleader to present his
       claims discretely and succinctly, so that, his adversary can discern
       what he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading” and so that
       “the court can determine which facts support which claims and
       whether the plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be
       granted.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320 (internal quotation marks
       omitted).
              Complaints that violate these rules are often referred to as
       “shotgun pleadings.” Id. A shotgun pleading fails “to give the
       defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
       grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. Shotgun
       pleadings “waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the
       scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and
       undermine the public’s respect for the courts.” Vibe Micro Inc. v.
       Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (alterations adopted)
       (internal quotation marks omitted). Shotgun pleadings include
       complaints that: (1) contain “multiple counts where each count
       adopts the allegations of all preceding counts”; (2) are “replete with
       conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected
       to any particular cause of action”; (3) fail to separate into a different
       count each cause of action or claim for relief; or (4) assert “multiple
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       23-11284               Opinion of the Court                         7

       claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the
       defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of
       the defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at
       1321–23.
              A district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a
       complaint on shotgun-pleading grounds. Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at
       1295. When a plaintiff files a shotgun pleading, we require a district
       court to “give him one chance to replead before dismissing his case
       with prejudice” on shotgun-pleading grounds. Id. at 1296. In its
       order requiring repleading, the court “should explain how the
       offending pleading violates the shotgun pleading rule.” Id.
               The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
       dismissed Heriveaux’s third amended complaint as a shotgun
       pleading. A review of the third amended complaint shows that it
       failed to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against
       them and the grounds upon which each claim rested. See Weiland,
       792 F.3d at 1323. Among other deficiencies, the third amended
       complaint was replete with vague and conclusory allegations. It
       also contained allegations that the “Defendants” performed certain
       acts or omissions without identifying the particular defendant who
       acted or failed to act, making it impossible to identify which
       defendant was responsible for which act or omission.
             It is true that in the third amended complaint Heriveaux
       attempted to separate each cause of action into a separate count.
       But a closer look at the pleading shows that he continued to
       combine his claims. For example, in Count One, Heriveaux
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11284

       purported to bring a Title VII race discrimination claim against the
       county. And in Count Five he purported to bring an age
       discrimination claim against the county. But in each of these
       counts, he alleged that he was ultimately fired not because of his
       race or age but for reporting sexual harassment, indicating that in
       each of these counts he tried to raise multiple claims. We thus
       cannot say that the third amended complaint properly separated
       each cause of action into different counts.
              Because the third amended complaint still required the
       defendants to guess what conduct each count was referring to and
       because the district court had already given Heriveaux an
       opportunity to fix the deficiencies in his pleadings, we conclude
       that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed
       the third amended complaint as a shotgun pleading.
               In addition, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
       § 1983 claims against the individual defendants, which were set
       forth in Counts Six through Fourteen of the third amended
       complaint, for another reason. The district court dismissed these
       claims not only because the third amended complaint was a
       shotgun pleading but also because Heriveaux failed to state a claim
       for relief under § 1983.
              When a district court’s ruling rests on two or more
       independent, alternative grounds, the “appellant must convince us
       that every stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect.”
       Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir.
       2014). “When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one
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       23-11284                    Opinion of the Court                                    9

       of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is
       deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it
       follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Id. On appeal,
       Heriveaux has challenged only the district court’s determination
       that the third amended complaint was a shotgun pleading. He has
       not adequately raised any challenge to the district court’s
       conclusion that Counts Six through Fourteen failed to state a claim
       under § 1983. 5 We thus affirm the dismissal of Counts Six through
       Fourteen on this alternative ground as well.
                                               IV.
               For the above reasons, we affirm.
               AFFIRMED.

       5 Heriveaux devoted one sentence in his opening brief to challenging the

       district court’s ruling that he failed to state a claim under § 1983. But this single,
       perfunctory reference to the issue, which was not supported by argument or
       citations to authority, is inadequate to raise it on appeal. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d
       at 681.