Court Opinion

ID: 9774592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:25:55.092453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:11.194377
License: Public Domain

JABAR, J.,
with whom ALEXANDER and SILVER, JJ., join, dissenting.
[¶ 28] I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision. There were two sets of outdoor “permanent bleachers,” one on the home side of the football field and one on the visitors’ side. They provided the same function, they exposed the public to the same physical risks, and they imposed upon the high school the same obligation to make them safe for spectators. Yet the practical effect of the decision is that the Town of Bucksport and the Bucksport School Department are immune from liability for the bleachers on one side of the field but not necessarily the bleachers on the other side. The Legislature could not have intended such an illogical result. Because the bleachers belonged to Bucksport High School, I would hold that they were an appurtenance to the high school building and as such they fall within the exception to immunity pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2) (2009) of the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA).
[¶ 29] Furthermore, the visitors’ bleachers were not used in connection with outdoor recreation as that term is used by the Legislature. Therefore, the bleachers do not fall under the exclusion contained in 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2)(A)(3), and the Town and School Department are not exempt from liability.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Interpretation of Appurtenance
[¶ 80] The term “appurtenance” is not defined in the MTCA. The statute simply creates an exception to immunity when a governmental entity is negligent in the “construction, operation or maintenance of any public building or the appurtenances to any public building.” 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2). Because the term is not defined, we must employ principles of statutory construction in determining what constitutes an appurtenance for purposes of the MTCA.
[¶ 81] “The first step in statutory interpretation requires an examination of the plain meaning of the statutory language ... in the context of the whole statutory scheme.” State v. Stevens, 2007 ME 5, ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1229, 1233 (quotation marks omitted). Title 1 M.R.S. § 72(3) (2009) states: “Words and phrases shall be construed according to the common meaning of the language. Technical words and phrases and such as have a peculiar meaning convey such technical or peculiar meaning.” It is therefore appropriate to use dictionary definitions to assist in statutory construction. See State v. Spaulding, 1998 ME 29, ¶ 7 n. 2, 707 A.2d 378, 379.
[¶ 32] In Sanford v. Toum of Shapleigh, we noted the straightforward dictionary-derived meaning of appurtenance as “ ‘[something that belongs or is attached to something else,’ and appurtenant means being ‘[a]nnexed to a more important thing.’ ” 2004 ME 73, ¶ 9, 850 A.2d 325, 328 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 98 (7th ed.1999)).2 The Black’s Law Dictionary definition is consistent with the definition from Webster’s Dictionary: “appurtenances” are “accessory objects used in any function.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 107(2002).
[¶ 33] As the definition from Black’s Law Dictionary establishes, an object may be appurtenant to a building either be*400cause it “belongs to” it or because it is “attached to” it. The use of the disjunctive is important because this definition contemplates that something might “belong to” a building even if it is not “attached to” it. Thus, “belonging to” and “being attached to” are two distinct and different ways in which something can be considered an appurtenance.
[¶ 34] The Court does not address whether the visitors’ bleachers belonged to the high school. Instead, it focuses exclusively on a restriction that we created in Sanford — a restriction not found in the definition of appurtenance and directed at a concern not present here.
[¶ 35] Sanford involved whether a freestanding, wheeled trash bin located in a parking lot at the Town’s waste transfer station was an appurtenance under the MTCA. 2004 ME 73, ¶ 7, 850 A.2d at 328. In that case, we considered whether the trash bin’s function should control its classification as an appurtenance. We noted that although a function-based definition would be “sensible” and “practical,” we were concerned that, on the facts of that case, a function-based definition related to movable property might unduly expand governmental liability. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11, 850 A.2d at 328, 329. We held that such a movable item was not an appurtenance to a public building based on its status as “personal properly that does not belong and is not attached to the building.” Id. ¶ 12, 850 A.2d at 329.
[¶ 36] Sanford, therefore, does not govern the instant case. The visitors’ bleachers are significantly different from the trash bin in Sanford. The ten-level bleachers were assembled on a metal frame that rested on the ground adjacent to the field. They could not be moved without being disassembled. They had remained in place for about six years before the accident in 2006.
[¶ 37] Following the accident, the school replaced the wooden bleachers on the visitors’ side with aluminum bleachers. They were similar to the wooden bleachers in that they were freestanding and not permanently attached to the ground or to cement pillars like the home bleachers. Also like the previous wooden bleachers, the aluminum bleachers could not be removed without being disassembled. The school superintendent characterized the freestanding aluminum bleachers as permanent and not meant to be moved. He also differentiated these types of bleachers from portable bleachers that the school used on their athletic fields. The portable bleachers had wheels attached and could be moved without being disassembled and reassembled.
[¶ 38] Unlike these portable bleachers and unlike the trash bin in Sanford, the bleachers where the injury occurred were not portable. They were a structure that belonged to the high school building and supported the core functions of the high school. As such they were an appurtenance to the high school.
[¶ 39] The case law preceding Sanford also fails to lend support to the Court’s decision. In Kitchen v. City of Calais, we concluded that raised curbing in the parking area was not an appurtenance to the police station. 666 A.2d 77, 78 (Me.1995). In reaching this result, we reasoned that to conclude otherwise would render the provisions of 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2), (4) (2009) redundant; we did not rely upon any definition or understanding of the term appurtenance. Kitchen, 666 A.2d at 78-79. In Stretton v. City of Lewiston, we determined that an unimproved athletic field was not an appurtenance to a public building. 588 A.2d 739, 741 (Me.1991). Because, as a general rule, an appurtenance refers to an object or thing and not to land, see 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds §§ 53, 55 *401(2002), this case also fails to assist in interpreting the term.
[¶ 40] The majority opinion also limits the definition of appurtenance by equating fixtures with appurtenances. While it is true that all fixtures are appurtenances, not all appurtenances are fixtures. A fixture is one kind of appurtenance. If the Legislature wanted to limit liability to public buildings or fixtures, it could have used the term fixture. Although the Court cites authorities that accurately define the term fixture, the MTCA uses the term appurtenance. We must not be limited by the law surrounding fixtures because to do so improperly limits the definition of an appurtenance.
[¶ 41] Applying the definition of appurtenance to this case could only result in a determination that the bleachers are appurtenances to the high school.
B. The Purpose of the MTCA
[¶ 42] The Legislature enacted the MTCA to afford citizens a remedy to which they otherwise would not be entitled due to sovereign immunity. In a recent case, we recognized that the Legislature intended to create exceptions to immunity where insurance coverage is available. See Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River, 2007 ME 68, ¶34 n. 4, 922 A.2d 484, 493. We noted:
The Legislature created the narrow exceptions to governmental immunity under the assumption that governmental entities would acquire insurance to cover liability for claims outside immunity protection:
“The Legislature last January enacted the Maine Tort Claims Act, which reestablished the rule of sovereign immunity for governmental entities, but provided that commencing July 1st of this year there would be open to liability certain specific areas, particularly the areas of motor vehicle, equipment, construction and then the use and maintenance of public buildings.... The areas that we intend to open were areas where it appeared likely that an insurance program could be arranged within the reach of the pocketbooks of Maine communities and the State.... [F]or the small towns, it is vitally important that there be insurance in the areas where the town is exposed to liability.”
Id. (quoting 2 Legis. Rec. 1644 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Collins)).
[¶ 43] The bleachers at issue here are exactly the kind of appurtenance contemplated by the Legislature; counsel for the Town assured the Court at oral argument that in the event the Court determined that the bleachers are an appurtenance and therefore the Town is not immune, the Town would be covered by insurance. Common sense tells us that fans sitting on bleachers on the visitors’ side of the field should be afforded the same protection as fans sitting on bleachers on the home side of the field.
[¶ 44] Accordingly, we should interpret 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2) in the manner intended by the Legislature and hold that the bleachers are an appurtenance and therefore within the intended exceptions to governmental immunity.
C. Public Outdoor Recreation
[¶ 45] The MTCA creates several exclusions to the public building exception, including one which provides that a governmental entity is not liable for any claim resulting from “[t]he construction, ownership, maintenance or use of ... [l]and, buildings, structures, facilities or equipment designed for use primarily by the public in connection with public outdoor recreation.” 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2)(A)(3).
*402[¶ 46] Attending a high school football game, as enjoyable as it may be, does not constitute outdoor recreation. The term recreation is defined as “the act of recreating or the state of being recreated: refreshment of the strength and spirits after toil: DIVERSION, PLAY.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 1899. Applying this definition, recreation contemplates participatory activities and excludes passive ones.
[¶ 47] Further support that public outdoor reaction excludes nonparticipatory activities is found in the recreational land use statute, 14 M.R.S. § 159-A (2009). That statute defines recreational activities, in relevant part, as:
[R]ecreational activities conducted out-of-doors, including, but not limited to, hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, environmental education and research, hiking, recreational caving, sight-seeing, operating snow-traveling and all-terrain vehicles, skiing, hang-gliding, noncommercial aviation activities, dog sledding, equine activities, boating, sailing, canoeing, rafting, biking, picnicking, [or] swimming....
14 M.R.S. § 159-A(1)(B). When interpreting a statute, “a general term followed by a list of illustrations is ordinarily assumed to embrace only concepts similar to those illustrations.” Francis v. Dana-Cummings, 2008 ME 184, ¶ 15, 962 A.2d 944, 947-48 (quotation marks omitted). Section 159-A includes only active or participatory pursuits among its definition of outdoor recreation.
[¶ 48] Reading section 159-A in conjunction with section 8104-A(2)(A)(3), as we must, aids in the construction of the term recreation as used in the MTCA. See Noel v. Town of Ogunquit, 555 A.2d 1054, 1056-57 (Me.1989); see also Davey v. Lincoln County, 505 A.2d 818, 821 (Me.1986) (explaining that “legislation on the same subject matter must be viewed in its overall entirety in order to reach an harmonious result which we presume the Legislature intended”). The recreational land use statute and the MTCA create immunity for the same type of recreational activity. See Noel, 555 A.2d at 1057. In Noel, we stated:
[I]f the legislature had intended the recreational land use statute to apply to governmentally-owned lands, there would have been no reason for the legislature to enact section [8104-A(2)(A)(3) ] as part of the Maine Tort Claims Act to provide specific immunity to towns for their use of land for recreational purposes.
Id. at 1057. We further noted that the Legislature is “presumed to be cognizant of prior statutes dealing with the use of recreational lands and to have a consistent policy and design concerning those lands.” Id. Accordingly, the recreational land use statute and the MTCA afford coextensive protection for the recreational use of lands, the former applying to private lands and the latter applying to public lands. Paying to watch a high school football game from the bleachers does not fit the definition of outdoor recreation in the MTCA.
[¶ 49] For the reasons stated above, the term public outdoor recreation as used in 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2)(A)(3) does not include the observation of a high school football game from school-provided bleachers. The Bucksport High School visitors’ bleachers are an appurtenance to the school and are not used in connection with outdoor recreational activity. Therefore, the MTCA does not provide the Bucksport School Department and the Town of Bucksport with immunity from Searle’s claim. The judgment should be vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

. The seventh edition of Black's Law Dictionary is cited, instead of the more recent ninth edition, because the seventh edition was used in Sanford, v. Town of Shapleigh, 2004 ME 73, ¶ 9, 850 A.2d 325, 328-29.