Court Opinion

ID: 9943234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 21:04:02.608862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:34.299368
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 In re Lei. P. CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     DIVISION THREE

 In re Lei. P. et al., Persons                               B323464
 Coming Under the Juvenile
 Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                          Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF                                               Super. Ct. Nos.
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY                                         22LJJP00197A &
 SERVICES,                                                   22LJJP00207A

        Plaintiff and Respondent,

        v.

 L.P.,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Donald A. Buddle, Jr., Judge. Affirmed and remanded
with directions.
      Gina Zaragosa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         INTRODUCTION

       L.P. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s family law
exit orders terminating dependency jurisdiction over his two
youngest children, Lev. P. (Lev) (born February 2019) and Lei. P.
(Lei) (born July 2020). Father challenges the court’s jurisdiction
findings, arguing there is insufficient evidence that his use of a
belt to discipline his eldest child, Las. P. (Las) (born January
2014),1 placed Lei and Lev at risk of being abused or neglected.
Father also challenges the exit order pertaining to Lev, arguing
the court erred by recommending he participate in various
parenting and counseling services and by failing to establish a
minimum number of visits he is entitled to have each month with
Lev. We agree the matter must be remanded so that the juvenile
court can correct the exit order as to Lev by specifying the
frequency and duration of visits with Lev. In all other respects,
we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Father has three children: Las, Lev, and Lei. Vanessa L. is
Las’s mother, Tamera A. is Lev’s mother, and Laura L. is Lei’s
mother. When the family came to the attention of the
Department of Children and Family Services (Department), Las
lived with father, and Lev and Lei lived with their mothers.
Father was dating Lei’s mother, and she and Lei would
sometimes sleep at father’s house. Under a family law custody
order, Lev’s mother had physical custody of Lev, and father had

1 Father does not challenge any of the court’s orders concerning Las.

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unsupervised weekend visits with the child. Father hadn’t visited
Lev since February 2022.
      In mid-May 2022, the Department and law enforcement
began investigating the family after receiving reports that father
physically abused and refused to feed Las. Las reported that
father has hit her with a belt “a lot of times.” He recently struck
her 10 times with a belt, hit her arm with a hairbrush, and threw
a shoe at her face. Las also claimed Father once punched her
stomach when she misbehaved. A sheriff’s deputy who
interviewed Las observed swelling on the child’s right arm,
multiple belt marks on her thighs and buttocks, and scars caused
by a belt on both of her legs.
      Father admitted he strikes Las with a belt because she
often gets in trouble at school and at home. He recently
“whooped” Las’s buttocks after she was caught touching another
student’s “private parts.” Father doesn’t hit Las “all the time,”
and he never struck her with a hairbrush, a shoe, or his fist.
Father sometimes uses other forms of discipline, such as talking
to the child or putting her on time out. Father claimed he feeds
Las three meals a day, but he doesn’t allow her to have snacks
when she misbehaves.
      Lei’s mother knew father strikes Las with a belt because
the child has “a lot of behavioral issues at home and school.”
Father never struck Lei, however.
      Lev’s mother has been Lev’s sole caretaker for over two
years. Although father has never hit Lev, Lev’s mother was
concerned for the child’s safety around father because of his use
of excessive physical discipline on Las.
      The children’s paternal grandmother told the Department
that she used to hit father with a belt when he misbehaved as a

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child. She told father not to use the same disciplinary method on
Las because it never worked on him. The grandmother saw a
“couple” of marks on Las when she helped the child change
clothes.
       In late May 2022, the Department filed separate
dependency petitions on behalf of Lei and Lev.2 The petitions,
which included identical allegations, asserted father physically
abused Las and caused the child to suffer bruising and swelling
by striking her arms, thighs, and buttocks with a belt, striking
her arm with a hairbrush, and punching her in the stomach, and
that such abuse placed Lei and Lev at risk of serious physical
harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code,3 § 300, subds. (a), (b), & (j); a-1, b-1,
and j-1 allegations.) The court found Lei’s and Lev’s petitions
alleged prima facie cases under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b),
and (j) and detained the children from father’s custody.
       The Department interviewed the family in June 2022.
Father confirmed that he hits Las with a belt when she
misbehaves, and he acknowledged that he could have used “other
forms of discipline” on the child. Father continued to deny hitting
Las with a hairbrush, a shoe, or his fist.
       Lei’s mother knew father “gives [Las] whoopings but he
goes into another room because [Lei] do[es]n’t like loud noise[s].”
According to Lei’s mother, father would strike Las with a belt
when the child misbehaved at home or at school. Lev’s mother
didn’t believe it was inappropriate for father to use a belt to
strike Las because she never saw bruises on the child. Lev’s

2 The Department also filed a petition on Las’s behalf.

3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.

                                   4
mother claimed she “would’ve stopped it” if father became too
abusive toward Las. Lev’s mother also claimed Las may have lied
when she claimed father hit her with a hairbrush and shoe.
       As of late July 2022, father was enrolled in an effective
parenting program, an anger management program, and
individual counseling. Father was at risk of being dropped from
the effective parenting program because he missed a “significant
amount of classes.”
       The court held the jurisdiction hearing in mid-August 2022.
As to Lei and Lev, the court dismissed the a-1 and b-1 allegations
and sustained an amended version of the j-1 allegation.4
Specifically, the court struck language that father “physically
abused” Las and replaced it with language that he used
“excessive [physical] discipline” on the child. The court also
struck language that father hit Las with a hairbrush, threw a
shoe at the child’s face, and punched the child in the stomach.
The court granted Lei’s mother sole physical custody of Lei, Lev’s
mother sole physical custody of Lev, and father monitored visits
with each child. As to Lei and Lev, the court terminated
dependency jurisdiction, pending approval of a family law exit
order.
       In late August 2022, the court signed Lei’s and Lev’s exit
orders and terminated dependency jurisdiction. As to Lei, the
court awarded father monitored visits “3x a week for 3 hours,
minimum,” and it authorized Lei’s mother, a mutually agreed

4 The court sustained Las’s petition under section 300, subdivision (b),

finding father’s use of excessive physical discipline put the child at
serious risk of physical harm.

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upon monitor, or a professional monitor paid for by father, to
supervise the visits. As to Lev, the court awarded father
monitored visitation, and it authorized Lev’s mother, a mutually
agreed upon monitor, or a professional monitor paid for by father
to supervise the visits. The court also recommended father
complete various parenting and counseling services “prior to
modification” of Lev’s exit order.
      Father appeals.

                          DISCUSSION

1.    Jurisdiction Findings
      Father contends the court erred in sustaining Lei’s and
Lev’s petitions because the Department failed to prove his use of
excessive physical discipline on Las endangered their safety. As
we explain, substantial evidence supports the jurisdiction
findings under section 300, subdivision (j).
      A court may exercise jurisdiction over a child under section
300, subdivision (j), where the child’s sibling has been “abused or
neglected” as defined under subdivisions (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i) of
the same statute, if there is “a substantial risk that the child will
be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” (§ 300,
subd. (j).) The court “shall consider the circumstances
surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and
gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the
sibling, the mental condition of the guardian, and any other
factors the court considers probative in determining whether
there is a substantial risk to the child.” (Ibid.) In other words, the
court should “ ‘consider the totality of the circumstances of the
child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child is at
substantial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the

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subdivisions enumerated in subdivision (j).’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56
Cal.4th 766, 774.)
       The juvenile court doesn’t need to wait until a child is
seriously injured before asserting jurisdiction if there is evidence
that the child is at risk of future harm because of the parent’s
conduct. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 993.) The
court may consider past events as an indicator of whether the
child faces a current risk of harm because “[a] parent’s past
conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 (T.V.).) A parent’s denial of wrongdoing
or failure to recognize the negative impact of the parent’s conduct
is also relevant to determining risk under section 300. (In re A.F.
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 (A.F.).)
       We review a juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding for
substantial evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
We will affirm the finding if it is supported by evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (In re R.V. (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) We review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s findings and draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of those findings. (In re
R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) As we explain, substantial
evidence supports the court’s findings that father’s use of
excessive physical discipline on Las placed Lei and Lev at serious
risk of being abused or neglected under section 300, subdivision
(j).
       As a threshold matter, father doesn’t dispute that
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding sustaining
jurisdiction over Las under section 300, subdivision (b). Indeed,
the record is replete with evidence that father subjected Las to
excessive physical discipline. In May 2022, Las told law

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enforcement that father recently struck her 10 times with a belt,
and she told the Department that she remembers father hitting
her “a lot of times.” Father confirmed that he frequently strikes
Las with a belt when she misbehaves, although he denied using
other forms of physical discipline on the child. The sheriff’s
deputy who interviewed Las observed scarring and belt marks on
the child’s legs and thighs, as well as swelling on the child’s arm.
One of the Department’s social workers also observed swelling
and redness on Las’s arm, and the child told the social worker
she had “bruising on her legs and buttock area due to her father
hitting her with a belt.” (See In re Mariah T. (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 428, 438 [mother’s use of a belt to inflict “deep,
purple bruises” on child supports jurisdiction]; In re David H.
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1645 [mother’s repeated use of belt
to inflict “bruises, linear red marks, welts and broken skin”
supports jurisdiction].)
       Nevertheless, father argues, Lei and Lev did not face a risk
of being abused or neglected because they were differently
situated than Las. Specifically, father argues, Lei and Lev were
not at risk of being harmed by him because they were younger
than Las, lived with their mothers, and did not have the same
behavioral problems as Las. We disagree.
       Before the Department began investigating him, father had
access to Lei and Lev. Lei’s mother reported that she and Lei
often visited father and sometimes slept at his home. Lei’s
mother also reported that father would strike Las with a belt
while Lei was at his home. And although father hadn’t seen Lev
for several months by the time the Department received the
initial referral, he was entitled to unsupervised visits with her
every weekend.

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      The court also could infer that father would strike Lei and
Lev with a belt if they misbehaved while under his supervision
based on his extensive history of doing the same to Las. (See T.V.,
supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 [a parent’s past conduct is a
good predictor of future behavior].) According to Las, father hit
her “a lot of times” with a belt when she got into trouble at home
and at school. Although father claimed he sometimes used other,
non-violent methods of discipline, he admitted he frequently hit
Las with a belt when she misbehaved. The children’s paternal
grandmother and Lei’s mother were also aware that one of
father’s primary methods of disciplining Las was to strike the
child with a belt. While Lei and Lev are younger than Las, they
are still old enough to misbehave. And their younger ages make
them more vulnerable to suffering serious injury if father were to
hit them with a belt.
      Importantly, father showed a lack of insight into the
severity of his disciplinary methods. While father acknowledged
he could have used less violent means to correct Las’s behavior,
he also minimized his conduct. He blamed Las for his decision to
strike her with a belt, and he didn’t believe his use of a belt was
excessive, despite inflicting several visible injuries on the child.
(See A.F., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [mother’s failure to
appreciate seriousness of her conduct supports finding that she
continued to pose a risk of harm to her child].) And although
father enrolled in an effective parenting program before the
jurisdiction hearing, he had missed a “significant” amount of
classes and was at risk of being dropped from the program. In
addition, Lei’s mother, the other adult who was sometimes
present when father struck Las, didn’t disapprove of father using

                                 9
a belt to discipline Las, and she minimized his conduct, blaming
it on Las’s behavioral issues.
       In sum, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
that father’s use of excessive physical discipline on Las placed Lei
and Lev at risk of being abused or neglected as required by
section 300, subdivision (j).
2.    Recommended Services
       Father next argues the court abused its discretion when, as
part of Lev’s exit order, it recommended he complete various
parenting and counseling services. As we explain, father forfeited
this argument.
       An appellate court “ ‘ordinarily will not consider a
challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not
made in the trial court.’ ” (In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th
663, 672.) A parent must raise a specific objection stating the
ground or grounds on which the objection is based. (Ibid.)
Likewise, “ ‘[u]nder the doctrine of invited error, when a party by
its own conduct induces the commission of the error, it may not
claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of
that error.’ ” (In re G.P. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1193
(G.P.).)
       Here, the record shows father asked the court to issue an
order recommending he complete various parenting and
counseling services. At the disposition hearing, father objected to
any order requiring him to participate in court-ordered services,
“like parenting, anger management, and/or individual
counseling.” Father proposed, however, that the “court might
recommend … [he] complete those programs but not require it as
an order.” The court agreed with father and, as part of Lev’s exit
order, recommended that he participate in the following

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parenting and counseling services: “(1) Parenting children with
Special Needs; (2) Parents Beyond Conflict[;] (3) Individual
Counseling to address case issues to include appropriate forms of
age-appropriate discipline, childhood trauma, grief and loss,
mental health, domestic violence, healthy relationships,
appropriate coping skills, child safety, protective parenting and
effective coparenting[;] and (4) Conjoint Counseling with the
minor when deemed appropriate by child’s respective therapist.”
       Because father requested the court issue an order
recommending he complete various parenting and counseling
services, he cannot challenge the recommendations in that order
on appeal. (G.P., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193.) In addition,
father does not argue he was prejudiced by the court’s
recommendations or cite any legal authority explaining why
recommendations, as opposed to requirements, should be
construed as orders that cannot be changed absent a significant
change of circumstances.
3.    Lev’s Visitation Order
       Finally, father argues the court abused its discretion when
it awarded him monitored visitation with Lev because the child’s
exit order does not establish a minimum number or frequency of
visits. We agree.
       The authority to determine the extent of a parent’s
visitation resides solely with the court. (In re T.H. (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123.) While a court may delegate to third
parties the responsibility for managing the details of visits, such
as their time, place, or manner, the court must determine
whether visits will occur as well as the frequency and length of
visits. (In re Rebecca S. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314
(Rebecca S.).) A court, therefore, abuses its discretion when it

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awards visitation without ensuring that visitation will in fact
occur. (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.) This rule
applies to exit orders issued when the court terminates
dependency jurisdiction. (T.H., at p. 1123.)
       Here, Lev’s exit order does not establish the extent of
father’s visitation with the child. Although the order provides
that Lev’s mother, a mutually agreed upon monitor, or a
professional monitor paid for by father may supervise father’s
visits, it does not specify a minimum number of visits with Lev
that father is entitled to each month. Nor does the exit order
specify a minimum number of hours father may visit the child
each month.5 (See T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124 [by
failing to specify a minimum number of visits per month, parent’s
right to visitation was “ ‘illusory’ ”].) The matter, therefore, must
be remanded to allow the court “ ‘to make a new visitation order
that specifies both the frequency and duration’ ” of father’s visits
with Lev. (Rebecca S., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)

5 Unlike Lev’s exit order, Lei’s exit order specifies that father is

entitled to visit Lei at least three times a week for three hours.

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                         DISPOSITION

      The exit order as to Lev is remanded to allow the juvenile
court to specify the frequency and duration of father’s visits with
Lev. The orders terminating dependency jurisdiction are
otherwise affirmed.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                            LAVIN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

      EGERTON, J.

      ADAMS, J.

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