Court Opinion

ID: 9892021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 06:06:41.948551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:16:48.601343
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

SUSAN HERRERA,                                                        UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      October 19, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

V                                                                     No. 361852
                                                                      Oakland Circuit Court
SUN TROY VILLA, LLC,                                                  LC No. 2021-191601-NO

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and BORRELLO and O’BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to
defendant. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        This case arises from injuries plaintiff suffered as a result of tripping on a raised concrete
slab that was part of a sidewalk on premises owned by defendant. At the time of her fall, plaintiff
resided on a leased lot in Sun Troy Villa, a manufactured-home community located in Troy that
defendant owns and operates. On February 19, 2021, around 4:30 p.m., plaintiff was walking on
the sidewalk outside her home on Sun Troy Villa’s premises when she tripped and fell on uneven
pavement, fracturing her knee and arm.

        Photographs plaintiff submitted show a sidewalk in the Sun Troy Villa community located
between a roadway and the manufactured homes running parallel to, and along the distance of, the
roadway. The sidewalk appears in poor condition, with cracks and gaps typical of worn pavement.
The photographs of the sidewalk section where plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell, which was near
her residence, depict a large height differential between two adjacent concrete slabs spanning the
width of the sidewalk, and large cracks on the elevated slab.

        In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant breached its duties to her by failing to
maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition, to inspect the premises, to provide warning, and to
otherwise exercise reasonable care to protect her from the dangerous condition. Additionally,
plaintiff alleged that defendant breached its implied contractual duties under MCL 554.139(1) by

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failing to keep the premises “fit for its intended use and in proper repair” and by “violating safety
codes, including local statutes and ordinances.”

       In her answers to interrogatories, plaintiff stated that, at the time of her accident, she “was
watching where [she] was stepping,” and “tripped and fell because of the defect in the sidewalk.”
She also admitted that she had walked over the same sidewalk approximately a dozen times before,
and “was aware of the condition of the sidewalk at the time of the incident,” but “never realized
how large the gap was between the two flags of pavement.” Plaintiff also stated that her neighbor
had previously complained about the sidewalk’s condition to defendant’s office “at least a couple
of times because of a couple incidents of others tripping on the same sidewalk,” and that she was
aware that her elderly neighbor, and two family members of neighbors, had tripped on the same
sidewalk.

        After only limited discovery, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10), asserting that further discovery stood no chance of creating an issue of fact
regarding its liability for plaintiff’s fall, and that her complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.
Defendant argued that plaintiff’s common-law premises-liability claim must fail because there was
no question of fact that the discontinuity with a large height differential between the concrete slabs
was readily observable upon casual inspection and, thus, the sidewalk’s hazardous condition was
open and obvious. Defendant also argued that plaintiff had no viable claim under MCL
554.139(1)(b) for breach of its duty to “keep the premises in reasonable repair” because that duty
did not apply to common areas, such as the sidewalk where plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell,
warranting summary disposition for failure to state a claim. With regard to its duty under MCL
554.139(1)(a) to see that “all common areas are fit for the use intended by the parties,” defendant
argued that there was no breach because it was undisputed that the sidewalk, despite its
unevenness, was still fit for its intended purpose, as evidenced by the photographs indicating that
the hazard was easily traversable; a pedestrian using the sidewalk could simply step over the height
differential, as plaintiff admitted having done numerous times. Defendant did not address any
claim alleging that it breached its duty by violating local safety ordinances.

        In opposing defendant’s motion, plaintiff focused on her statutory claim. She argued that
defendant had breached its duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because the defective condition at issue
rendered the sidewalk unsafe for walking. To support her claim, plaintiff presented an affidavit
from an engineer, who described the subject sidewalk as “deteriorated, cracked,” with “adjacent
sections” having “a difference in height of over two-inches.” He opined that the sidewalk’s
condition was a “known trip and fall hazard,” “hazardous and unsafe to pedestrians using the
sidewalk,” and in violation of pertinent municipal ordinances. Plaintiff argued that, on the basis
of the available evidence, whether defendant violated its statutory obligations presented an issue
of fact. Plaintiff further complained, however, that defendant’s motion was premature because it
was brought before any witnesses had been deposed.

        After a hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court summarily dismissed plaintiff’s
complaint, holding that (1) the condition of the sidewalk was open and obvious and (2) defendant
“did not violate a duty” under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because defendant was not required to maintain
its sidewalks in “perfect” condition. This appeal followed.

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                                  II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

     “A trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.”
Bowman v Walker, 340 Mich App 420, 425; 986 NW2d 419 (2022).
       A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal
       sufficiency of the complaint; we accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true
       and construe them in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. A motion for
       summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is properly granted when,
       considering only the pleadings, the alleged claims are clearly unenforceable as a
       matter of law and no factual development could justify recovery.

               A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the
       factual sufficiency of a claim. When reviewing an order granting summary
       disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the reviewing court considers all docu-
       mentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the
       nonmoving party. Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is warranted
       when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is
       entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists
       when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.
       [Jeffrey-Moise v Williamsburg Towne Houses Coop, Inc, 336 Mich App 616, 623-
       624; 971 NW2d 716 (2021) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

                               III. PREMISES-LIABILITY CLAIM

        Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her premises-liability claim. We
agree only because there has been an intervening change in this state’s jurisprudence concerning
this issue, and accordingly remand the issue to the trial court.

        In dismissing plaintiff’s premises-liability claim, the trial court concluded that it was
required to do so because the defect alleged in this case was open and obvious. In so doing, the
trial court applied the then-correct analysis applicable to premises-liability claims first announced
in Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), overruled by Kandil-
Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 162907). Lugo held
in relevant part that a possessor of land does not owe a duty to protect invitees from open and
obvious defects. Lugo, 464 Mich at 516. In Kandil-Elsayed, our Supreme Court overruled Lugo
and held that “the open and obvious nature of a danger” is only “relevant to the defendant’s breach
and the plaintiff's comparative fault.” Kandil-Elsayed ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 39-40. Kandil-
Elsayed further clarified that “the three traditional status-based categories” for determining the
duty a possessor of land owes to a person on the land—licensee, invitee, and trespasser—remained
unchanged. Id. at ___; slip op at 39.

        In light of Kandil-Elsayed, there is little for this Court to decide. The trial court here found
that the danger posed by the defect in defendant’s sidewalk was open and obvious and accordingly
dismissed plaintiff’s claim because, under Lugo, defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty to protect
against open and obvious defects. As explained, Kandil-Elsayed overruled the relevant portion of
Lugo and shifted consideration of the open-and-obvious nature of a danger “from duty to

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breach . . . .” Id. at ___; slip op at 40. As the law now stands, defendant unquestionably owed
plaintiff—a person on defendant’s land—a duty, and the contours of that duty depended only on
plaintiff’s status on the land. See Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596;
614 NW2d 88 (2000); Kandil-Elsayed ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 39. Accordingly, the trial court
erred to the extent it concluded that defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty and, on that basis,
dismissed plaintiff’s premises-liability claim. That portion of the court’s ruling is reversed, and
the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

                                       IV. MCL 554.139(1)

        Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her claims of breach
of statutory duties under MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b). We agree in part.

       “In addition to the general common-law duties that a possessor of land owes to invitees,
MCL 554.139 imposes further covenants and duties on landlords who lease or license their
property to residential tenants.” Jeffrey-Mois, 336 Mich App at 636. MCL 554.139 provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
             (1) In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or licensor
       covenants:

               (a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by
       the parties.

               (b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease or
       license, and to comply with the applicable health and safety laws of the state and
       of the local unit of government where the premises are located, except when the
       disrepair or violation of the applicable health or safety laws has been caused by the
       tenants willful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct.

“The statutory protection of MCL 554.139(1) ‘arises from the existence of a residential lease and
consequently becomes a statutorily mandated term of such lease.’ ” Jeffrey-Mois, 336 Mich App
at 636, quoting Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 425; 751 NW2d 8 (2008).

                                      A. MCL 554.139(1)(a)

       Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of her statutory
claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a) because reasonable minds could differ regarding whether the
sidewalk was fit for pedestrian travel. We disagree.

       Under MCL 554.139(1)(a), a lessor covenants that “all common areas are fit for the use
intended by the parties.” As explained by this Court in Estate of Trueblood v P&G Apartments,
LLC, 327 Mich App 275, 289; 933 NW2d 732 (2019):
               In Allison, 481 Mich at 427-431, our Supreme Court addressed the
       analytical framework to be used when determining liability under MCL
       554.139(1)(a). First, the court is to determine whether the area in question is a
       “common area.” Then, the court is to identify the intended use of the common area.

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        Lastly, the court must determine if there could be “reasonable differences of
        opinion regarding” whether the conditions made the common area unfit for its
        intended use.

Unless the evidence shows that “there could be no reasonable differences of opinion” regarding
the fitness of a common area for the use intended by the parties, the question is for the trier of fact.
Allison, 481 Mich at 430.

        Here, the parties do not dispute that the subject sidewalk, which traversed along a roadway
in defendant’s manufactured-home community where plaintiff resided, was a common area within
the meaning of MCL 554.139(1)(a). And it cannot seriously be disputed that the intended use of
the sidewalk was walking on it. See Trueblood Estate, 327 Mich App at 290; Benton v Dart
Properties, Inc, 270 Mich App 437, 444; 715 NW2d 335 (2006).

         The remaining, and dispositive, question in determining whether defendant could be liable
under MCL 554.139(1)(a) is whether the defect at issue made the sidewalk unfit for walking on it.
As explained by our Supreme Court, “The statute does not require a lessor to maintain a [common
area] in an ideal condition or in the most accessible condition possible, but merely requires the
lessor to maintain it in a condition that renders it fit for” its intended use. Allison, 481 Mich at
430. While “[k]eeping common areas fit for their intended use may well require a lessor to perform
maintenance and repairs to those areas,” id. at 433, “[t]he statute does not require any level of
fitness beyond what is necessary to allow tenants to use the [common area] as the parties intended,”
id. at 431. With this understanding of MCL 554.139(1)(a), we conclude that there is no question
of fact that the sidewalk at issue in this case was fit for its intended use.

        Plaintiff established, and it is not disputed, that the subject sidewalk was not in ideal
condition. Aside from the photographs depicting a more than two-inch height differential between
adjacent concrete slabs, plaintiff stated that, in addition to her own accident, other individuals had
tripped on the same sidewalk within the last two years. Plaintiff’s expert opined that the height
differential was a known trip-and-fall hazard, and that the subject sidewalk’s condition was
“hazardous and unsafe to pedestrians using the sidewalk.”

        However, establishing a breach of duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) requires evidence of
more than the presence of a hazardous condition and someone falling. See Trueblood, 327 Mich
App at 291-292 (explaining that “a plaintiff must present more evidence than simply the presence
of ice or snow and someone falling” to establish that a common area was not fit for its intended
use). Plaintiff must show that the sidewalk was unsuitable for its intended purpose. The
appropriate focus, therefore, is on the accessibility of the sidewalk for pedestrian travel.

       The height differential between the adjacent concrete slabs at issue exceeds two inches and
extends the sidewalk’s entire width, thereby forcing tenants using the sidewalk to confront the
hazardous condition. However, users need not walk on the discontinuity itself because the hazard
was plainly visible and easily avoidable, and thus a pedestrian could simply step over the uneven
slabs and continue walking. Indeed, plaintiff repeatedly negotiated the hazard in the past, as
evidenced by her admission that she had “walked over the same sidewalk on approximately a
dozen occasions” before her accident, which shows that the discontinuity did not preclude her from

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using the sidewalk but rather presented a mere inconvenience of access. Accord Allison, 481 Mich
at 430 (in the context of a snow-covered parking lot, explaining that “[m]ere inconvenience of
access . . . will not defeat the characterization of a lot as being fit for its intended purposes”).
Because the uneven sidewalk was still traversable despite the complained-of condition, it was akin
to the patches of ice on the sidewalk in Jeffrey-Moise, 336 Mich App at 637-638, which presented,
at most, a mere inconvenience that did not render the sidewalk unfit for walking. Compare
Trueblood, 327 Mich App at 292 (explaining that a sidewalk “completely covered in ice” is not fit
for its intended use because if anyone “walked on the sidewalk, he [or she] was inevitably going
to confront the ice”); Hadden v McDermitt Apartments, LLC, 287 Mich App 124, 132; 782 NW2d
800 (2010) (holding that there was a question of fact whether “a hidden danger”—“black ice on a
darkly lit, unsalted stairway”—“rendered the stairway unfit for its intended use”). Thus, the
evidence presented failed to establish that the sidewalk’s defective condition rendered it unfit for
its intended purpose within the meaning of MCL 554.139(1)(a).1 Accordingly, we hold that the
trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to defendant on plaintiff’s claim that
defendant breached its statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep the common areas fit for
the use intended by the parties.

                                     B. MCL 554.139(1)(b)

       Plaintiff next argues that the trial court prematurely dismissed her claim that defendant
breached its implied covenant to comply with local safety laws pursuant to MCL 554.139(1)(b).
We agree.

        MCL 554.139(1)(b) provides that every lessor covenants “[t]o keep the premises in
reasonable repair during the term of the lease or license, and to comply with the applicable health
and safety laws of the state and of the local unit of government where the premises are
located . . . .” There is no question that defendant did not have a statutory duty under § (1)(b) to
keep its sidewalk in reasonable repair because that duty does not apply to common areas, including
sidewalks. Allison, 481 Mich at 432-435. Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. Instead, plaintiff
argues that defendant breached the second covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(b) by failing to

1
   Plaintiff points out that, under MCL 691.1402a(3)(a), which governs actions against
municipalities involving defective public sidewalks, a vertical discontinuity of two or more inches
rebuts the presumption that the municipality has “maintained the sidewalk in reasonable repair.”
Plaintiff argues that this requirement “reflects the common understanding that small differentials
are acceptable, while a differential exceeding two inches is not,” to show that reasonable jurors
could conclude that the discontinuity of more than two inches in this case rendered it unfit for
walking. We find plaintiff’s reliance on MCL 691.1402a(3)(a) inapt. Besides containing no
similar presumption, MCL 554.139(1)(a) focuses on whether the sidewalk’s defective condition
rendered it unfit for its intended use. MCL 554.139(1)(b), on the other hand, concerns a landlord’s
duty “[t]o keep the premises in reasonable repair,” which is more akin MCL 691.1402a. But our
Supreme Court held in Allison that the reasonable-repair covenant in MCL 554.139(1)(b) does not
apply to common areas like sidewalks. Allison, 481 Mich at 432-435.

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comply with pertinent provisions of the city of Troy’s ordinances governing sidewalk
maintenance.

       Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to raise this issue before the trial court and so it is not
preserved for appellate review. As this Court has explained:
                Michigan generally follows the “raise or waive rule” of appellate review.
        Although this Court has inherent power to review an issue not raised in the trial
        court to prevent a miscarriage of justice, generally a failure to timely raise an issue
        waives review of that issue on appeal. By limiting appellate review to those issues
        raised and argued in the trial court, and holding all other issues waived, appellate
        courts require litigants to raise and frame their arguments at a time when their
        opponents may respond to them factually. Generally, a party may not remain silent
        in the trial court, only to prevail on an issue that was not called to the trial court’s
        attention. [Soaring Pine Capital Real Estate and Debt Fund II, LLC v Park Street
        Group Realty Servs, LLC, 337 Mich App 529, 539-540; 976 NW2d 674 (2021),
        rev’d in part on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds, ___ Mich ___
        (2023) (Docket No. 163320) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

“ ‘This Court will not review a case on a theory different from that on which it was tried.’ ”
Higgins Lake Prop Owners Ass’n v Gerrish Twp, 255 Mich App 83, 117; 662 NW2d 387 (2003),
quoting Head v Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc, 234 Mich App 94, 110; 593 NW2d 595
(1999). Thus, if an issue was not raised in the pleadings, or argued below, appellate review is
forfeited. See Soaring Pine, 337 Mich App at 539-540.

        Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendant “failed to keep the premises and all common
areas therein fit for its intended use and in proper repair pursuant to MCLA 554.139(a)(b) [sic],”
thereby directly implicating the first covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(b) (to keep the premises in
reasonable repair). With respect to the second covenant under MCL 554.139(1)(b)—obligating a
lessor to comply with applicable local safety and health laws—plaintiff did not set forth a specific
count asserting that claim. However, she did generally allege that defendant breached its duties to
plaintiff by “violating safety codes, including local statutes and ordinances.” Although plaintiff
did not specifically reference defendant’s statutory duty under MCL 554.239(1)(b), the allegation
would nonetheless have reasonably informed defendant of the need to defend the claim that it
breached its duty under MCL 554.139(1)(b) to comply with local safety ordinances in regard to its
sidewalk. See MCR 2.111(B)(1) (a complaint need only contain “specific allegations necessary
reasonably to inform the adverse party of the nature of the claims the adverse party is called on to
defend”); Smith v Stolberg, 231 Mich App 256, 259-260; 586 NW2d 103 (1998). It is “well
established that the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the claim as a whole and
looking beyond the procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim.” Tipton v William
Beaumont Hosp, 266 Mich App 27, 33; 697 NW2d 552 (2005) (quotation marks, citation, and

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alteration omitted). Accordingly, plaintiff adequately raised a claim pertaining to local ordinances
under MCL 554.139(b) in her pleadings.2

        Plaintiff further raised the issue of defendant’s violation of local ordinances and MCL
554.139 during discovery. She stated in her responses to interrogatories that “Defendant violated
MCL 554.139 (a)(b) [sic],” but that she “had not yet retained an expert to investigate what other
code or ordinances Defendant may have violated.” Further, in response to defendant’s motion for
summary disposition, plaintiff again raised the issue of defendant’s noncompliance with local
safety laws, particularly the Troy City Code, and, notably, presented an affidavit from an expert
who opined that the sidewalk’s condition violated two specific code provisions. However, plaintiff
did not argue that defendant’s noncompliance with the code constituted a breach of defendant’s
statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(b) while defending defendant’s motion, but rather cited such
noncompliance as support for her position that the sidewalk was not fit for its intended use under
MCL 554.139(1)(a). But that failure is somewhat understandable because defendant did not move
for summary disposition of any claim that it failed to comply with local safety ordinances in
violation of MCL 554.139(1)(b); rather, it moved for summary disposition on (1) plaintiff’s
common-law premises-liability claim, (2) her claim that defendant breached the covenant in MCL
554.139(1)(a), and (3) her claim that defendant breached the reasonable-repair covenant in MCL
554.139(1)(b).

        Regardless, we conclude that plaintiff adequately raised the issue whether defendant
violated applicable local safety laws before the trial court. Although plaintiff did not further
develop her argument that defendant’s failure to comply with local safety laws breached its
statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(b) in response to defendant’s motion, she at least implied
such a claim throughout her pleadings by asserting that defendant violated such laws. And, again,
defendant did not move to dismiss any claim on that ground.

        Despite concluding that defendant sufficiently pleaded a claim under MCL 554.139(1)(b)
that defendant breached its implied covenant to comply with local safety ordinances, we decline
to address whether that claim survives summary disposition because the trial court failed to do so
in the first instance. We therefore remand the issue to the trial court in order to allow it the
opportunity to address the issue through the proper course, including developing any relevant
additional facts or arguments.

2
  To the extent the parties may dispute whether plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that defendant
breached its duty under MCL 554.139(1)(b) to comply with applicable local safety ordinances,
plaintiff presented factual support for that claim. As this Court has explained, “If a trial court
grants summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), (C)(9), or (C)(10), the court must give
the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings pursuant to MCR 2.118, unless the amendment
would be futile.” Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 209;
920 NW2d 148 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also MCR 2.116(I)(5).

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        Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                           /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                           /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                           /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

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