Court Opinion

ID: 9945915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 19:13:06.967429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:50.314406
License: Public Domain

02/28/2024

        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                  Assigned on Briefs January 24, 2024 at Knoxville

                 STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LEROY MORENO

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Fayette County
                    No. 21-CR-124 J. Weber McCraw, Judge

                             No. W2023-00316-CCA-R3-CD

The Fayette County Circuit Court sentenced the Defendant, Leroy Moreno, as a Range I
offender to nine years at thirty percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction
following his guilty-pleaded conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver
between one-half gram and twenty-six grams. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by sentencing the Defendant above the minimum sentence
in his range and by denying him probation. Regarding the length of his sentence, the
Defendant specifically contends that the trial court had no basis to deviate from the
minimum sentence due to the Defendant’s minimal criminal history and the enhancement
and mitigating factors’ offsetting each other. He further argues that the trial court erred by
failing to consider the statistical information provided by the Administrative Office of the
Courts (“AOC”) regarding sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee. Relative
to the trial court’s denial of probation, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by
denying probation when he accepted responsibility for his conduct and had no previous
probation violations. Additionally, he contends that the trial court erred by denying
probation because basing its denial on the need for deterrence and the seriousness of the
offense was not supported by the record. Following our review, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, JR., and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Kari I. Weber, Assistant District Public Defender (on appeal), Somerville, Tennessee, and
Patrick E. Stegall (at guilty plea and sentencing hearings), Memphis, Tennessee, for the
appellant, Leroy Moreno.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Johnny Cerisano, Assistant Attorney
General; Mark Edward Davidson, District Attorney General; and Falen Marie Chandler,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                     I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A Fayette County grand jury indicted the Defendant for possession with intent to
deliver cocaine in an amount more than one-half gram, specifically 57.19 grams, and for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On March 21, 2022,
the Defendant pleaded guilty to the amended count of possession of cocaine with intent to
deliver between one-half gram and twenty-six grams, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1). As part of his agreement with the State, the Defendant’s
firearm charge was dismissed.

       At the guilty plea hearing, the State indicated that had the case proceeded to trial,
the proof would have shown the following: On March 16, 2021, Special Agent Andre Nash
of the West Tennessee Drug Task Force was working traffic enforcement on Interstate 40
(“I-40”) eastbound in Fayette County, Tennessee. While on patrol, Special Agent Nash
conducted a traffic stop of a black 2019 Chevy Impala with extremely dark tinted windows.
The driver, the Defendant’s mother, was unable to locate her driver’s license. The driver
informed Special Agent Nash that she had driven her mother to Texas for a funeral. Special
Agent Nash then spoke with the Defendant who was the passenger. The Defendant stated
that he and the driver were returning to Ohio from Texas. He stated they had taken his
grandmother to Texas because she was on crutches and he wanted her to be comfortable.
Special Agent Nash observed the Defendant sweating profusely from his head.

       While running various background checks, Special Agent Nash obtained verbal and
written consent from the driver to search the vehicle. During the search, Special Agent
Nash located under the Defendant’s seat a Springfield Armory pistol with nine live rounds
and a duffle bag with men’s clothing that contained a clear plastic bag with a white powdery
substance. The Defendant told Special Agent Nash that the white substance was creatine.
Special Agent Nash also located a Pringles chip can with “a false bottom” that contained
two plastic storage bags filled with an off-white “powdery rock-shaped” substance. Special
Agent Nash then located a Dr. Pepper can with “a false top” containing fourteen pill
capsules filled with a white powder. Special Agent Nash field-tested the white powdery
substance from the Pringles can, and it tested positive as cocaine. The white powder inside

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the capsules also tested positive as cocaine. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation later
confirmed the identity of the substances as cocaine. The combined substances weighed
approximately fifty-seven grams.

        Trial counsel stipulated to the factual basis, and the trial court accepted the
Defendant’s guilty plea. The Defendant affirmed his understanding that he would be
sentenced as a Range I offender and that his manner and method of service would be left
to the discretion of the trial court.

        The sentencing hearing was held on April 12, 2022. The State entered the
presentence report as an exhibit. Special Agent Nash testified that he had been employed
with the West Tennessee Drug Task Force for six years. During this time, he had received
specialized training for drug interdiction, including a forty-hour interdiction class, three to
six weeks of “ride-alongs” with another agent, and continued yearly trainings. He
explained that interdiction agents are trained in finding compartments and detecting “body
language, deception.” He stated that drug trafficking on I-40 was “very common” and that
out of the approximate four to five hundred cars he stops per month, a “large number”
resulted in finding illegal narcotics. He affirmed that there has been an increase in drug
trafficking along I-40 and that he had prior experience with the method of concealment the
Defendant used in this case.

       He further explained that when a smaller amount of drugs is found, such as in the
instant case, the drugs are often a sample going to the distributor. He stated that the
presence of a criminal history was just one indicator of drug smuggling and that it was a
trend that drug smugglers had no criminal history. A photograph of the evidence seized
was entered as an exhibit.

       The Defendant testified that the drugs found in the vehicle were his but that he had
believed the white-powdery substance in his duffle bag was creatine. He denied trafficking
the drugs but agreed that he possessed “quite a bit” of cocaine. He said that he had
concealed the drugs because they were illegal. He acknowledged obtaining the drugs in
Texas and that he was taking them to Ohio. When asked what his plans were for the drugs
once in Ohio, he stated he had no plans for them other than “personal use[,] probably.”

       The Defendant stated that he owned a landscape business and had two daughters of
whom he did not have custody. Relative to his criminal history, the Defendant stated that
he had an assault conviction from 2009 and a possession of marijuana conviction from
eight or nine years ago, but he denied that the marijuana had been his. He affirmed that he
had been on probation previously and stated that he could comply with its terms and

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conditions if granted again. He stated that his previous probations had always been
unsupervised and that he had never incurred a violation.

       When questioned about an outstanding warrant reflected in the presentence report,
he explained that he had recently missed a child support review date in Mansfield, Ohio,
and the court there had issued a bench warrant. The Defendant stated he had already
submitted to the warrant and paid the fine. The Defendant explained that he had missed
that court date in Ohio because he feared missing a court date in Tennessee for the instant
case. He acknowledged that he was behind on child support payments but stated that the
court date was only a progress review and not for non-payment.

        At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that in determining the
appropriate sentence for this offense, it had considered the evidence presented, the
presentence report, including the “statistical information . . . provided in the pre[]sentence
report[,]” the principles of sentencings, the nature and characteristics of the criminal
conduct, the arguments made for sentencing alternatives, the statement the Defendant made
on his own behalf, evidence offered by the parties on enhancing and mitigating factors, and
the Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. The trial court determined that the Defendant
was a Range I offender. The trial court found that enhancement factor (1) applied because
the Defendant had a previous history of criminal convictions or behavior in addition to
those necessary to establish the appropriate range. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1).
It further found that mitigating factor (1) applied due to the Defendant’s criminal conduct
neither causing nor threatening serious bodily injury. See id. at § 40-35-113(1).

        In deciding whether to grant an alternative sentence, the trial court stated it had
considered the presentence report, the Defendant’s physical and mental condition, the
Defendant’s social history, and the Defendant’s testimony. It determined that the
Defendant appeared fit and capable. The trial court considered the facts and circumstances
of the offense and noted the large amount of narcotics the Defendant was transporting. It
stated that the narcotics were concealed, showing this was planned conduct. It found that
the Defendant had a previous criminal history and that his previous actions and character
were not to his advantage. The trial court noted that while the Defendant’s child support
issues were not criminal, they demonstrated the Defendant’s character; the court noted that
the Defendant had acknowledged he was behind on “taking care of his family.”

        When considering the Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the trial court stated
that the Defendant’s bench warrant was “not a great factor” in its consideration. It further
stated that although the Defendant had complied with past probationary sentences, he was
only on probation because he had engaged in criminal conduct. The trial court thus found

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that measures less restrictive than confinement had been unsuccessful. See id. at § 40-35-
103(1)(C).

        The trial court considered the interest of society in being protected from possible
future criminal conduct by the Defendant. It expressed concern over the Defendant’s
“flippant” nature regarding his conduct, noting that this was a “very deliberate” attempt to
transport narcotics through the state. The trial court found the Defendant’s statement that
he had no plans for the narcotics not to be credible. The trial court placed “great interest
and inference” on whether full probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
offense and if confinement was suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to
commit similar offenses. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(B). Relying on Special
Agent Nash’s testimony, who had particular knowledge of drug trafficking in this
jurisdiction along I-40, the trial court placed “great emphasis” on the concern of public
safety. It then found that the Defendant had employment and the ability to earn income.
The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years at thirty percent, denied his request
for an alternative sentence, and ordered a $10,000 fine plus court costs.

       The Defendant appeals, challenging the trial court’s sentencing decision.

                                     II.    ANALYSIS

                                A.     Standard of Review

       When an accused challenges the length of a sentence or manner of service, this court
reviews the trial court’s sentencing determination under an abuse of discretion standard
accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707
(Tenn. 2012); see also State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012) (applying
the Bise standard to “questions related to probation or any other alternative sentence”). The
party challenging the sentence imposed by the trial court has the burden of establishing that
the sentence is erroneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.; see
also State v. Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001).

        This court will uphold the trial court’s sentencing decision “so long as it is within
the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in
compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-
10. Moreover, under such circumstances, appellate courts may not disturb the sentence
even if we had preferred a different result. See State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 346 (Tenn.
2008). Those purposes and principles include “the imposition of a sentence justly deserved
in relation to the seriousness of the offense,” Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-

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102(1), a punishment sufficient “to prevent crime and promote respect for the law,”
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-102(3), and consideration of a defendant’s
“potential or lack of potential for . . . rehabilitation,” Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-103(5). See id. at 344. Ultimately, in sentencing a defendant, a trial court should
impose a sentence that is “no greater than that deserved for the offense committed” and is
“the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is
imposed.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(2), (4).

        The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted in order “to promote justice” and “assure
fair and consistent treatment of all defendants by eliminating unjustified disparity in
sentencing and providing a fair sense of predictability of the criminal law and its
sanctions.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102. In determining the proper sentence, the trial
court must consider: (1) the evidence adduced at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2)
the presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing
alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5)
evidence and information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating factors
set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; (6) any
statistical information provided by the AOC as to Tennessee sentencing practices for
similar offenses; (7) any statement the defendant wishes to make in the defendant’s own
behalf about sentencing; and (8) the result of the validated risk and needs assessment
conducted by the department and contained in the presentence report. Id. at § 40-35-
210(b).

        To facilitate meaningful appellate review, the trial court must state on the record the
sentencing principles it considered and the reasons for the sentence imposed. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-210(e)(1)(B); Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705. Mere inadequacy in the articulation
of the reasons, however, should not negate the presumption [of reasonableness].” Bise,
380 S.W.3d at 705-06. A sentence should be upheld if the trial court provided “enough to
satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and [that it] has a
reasoned basis for exercising [its] . . . legal decision making.” Id. (quoting Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007)).

                                 B.      Length of Sentence

       The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a nine-
year sentence as opposed to the minimum eight-year sentence. He argues that the trial
court’s decision lacked basis, as he had a minimal criminal history, and because the trial
court’s finding of one enhancement factor and one mitigating factor, essentially, offset each
other. He further argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider the AOC’s statistical

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information regarding sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee. The State
contends that the trial court did not err by imposing a sentence within the applicable range
and that the trial court’s failure to consider the statistical information does not overcome
the presumption of reasonableness afforded to its sentencing determination. We agree with
the State.

       The weight to be afforded an enhancement or mitigating factor is left to the trial
court’s discretion so long as its use complies with the purposes and principles of the 1989
Sentencing Act and the court’s findings are adequately supported by the record. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d)-(f); Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 342-43. Moreover, misapplication
of an enhancement or mitigating factor no longer “invalidate[s] the sentence imposed
unless the trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” Bise, 380
S.W.3d at 706. Accordingly, this court will uphold the trial court’s sentencing decision
“so long as it is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence
is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id. at 709-
10.

        Here, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing a nine-year
sentence, one year above the minimum in the range. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4),
(c)(1); 40-35-112(a)(2). He contends that the trial court had no basis to deviate from the
minimum sentence because of his minimal criminal history and because the applicable
enhancement and mitigating factors should have offset each other. However, defendants
are not entitled to the minimum sentence in a range as trial courts have the discretion “to
select any sentence within the applicable range so long as the length of the sentence is
‘consistent with the purposes and principles of [the Sentencing Act].’” Carter, 254 S.W.3d
at 343 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d)). While the Defendant contends that his
“minimal” criminal history consisting of an assault, possession of marijuana, and failure to
appear supported imposing the eight-year minimum sentence in his range, even a limited
criminal history may be used to enhance a sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1);
State v. Warren, No. M2001-02139-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 354505, at *4 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Feb. 14, 2003) (holding that the defendant’s three prior misdemeanor convictions
were sufficient to enhance his sentence). As to the Defendant’s contention that the trial
court found only one enhancement factor and one mitigating factor, the presence of one
does not necessarily offset the other. The trial court has the discretion to determine the
weight given to each, and “mere disagreement” with its weighing of principles and factors
is not a basis for an appeal. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d)-(f); Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706,
709; Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 342-43.

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        The Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider the
AOC’s statistical information in its sentencing decision. The State concedes that the trial
court failed to consider the AOC’s statistical information, but we are not bound by this
concession. See, e.g., State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 716 n.3 (Tenn. 2001). The record
reflects that the trial court said it had considered the “statistical information . . . provided
in the pre[]sentence report[.]” While the presentence report does not contain any
information pertaining to the AOC’s report on sentencing practices in Tennessee, we are
unclear as to what other statistical information the trial court could have been referring to
in making this reference. It is quite possible that the trial court simply misspoke by stating
that the statistical information was located in the presentence report. A defense objection,
or at least a request for clarification, would have been helpful at this point to give the trial
court an opportunity to explain precisely what it was relying on when imposing the
Defendant’s sentence. As the record stands, however, and given the trial court’s statement
that it had considered “statistical information,” we cannot say that this record clearly
demonstrates that the trial court failed to consider the AOC’s statistical information. The
Defendant is not entitled to relief.

                                 C.     Alternative Sentence

        The Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him
probation. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred because he accepted
responsibility for his conduct and had no previous probation violations. He further argues
that the trial court erred by basing its denial of probation on deterrence and the seriousness
of the offense when the record was devoid of the requisite proof to support this reasoning.
The State argues that the trial court did not err as the record supported its decision and
because the heightened standard for denial of probation based solely on deterrence or solely
on the seriousness of the offense did not apply. We agree with the State.

        Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-102(5) states that “convicted felons
committing the most severe offenses, possessing criminal histories evincing a clear
disregard for the laws and morals of society and evincing failure of past efforts at
rehabilitation shall be given first priority regarding sentencing involving incarceration.” A
trial court should consider the following when determining a defendant’s suitability for
alternative sentencing:

             (A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a
       defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct;

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              (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of
       the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective
       deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

              (C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or
       recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1). A defendant is not entitled to any presumption of being
a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347.

       At the time of the offense in question, a defendant who received a sentence of ten
years or less, except for certain specified offenses, was eligible to serve his sentence on
probation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a), (c)(1) (Supp. 2020). While the trial court is
required to automatically consider probation as a sentencing option, see Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-35-303(b), no criminal defendant is automatically entitled to
probation as a matter of law, see State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1997). “[T]he
burden of establishing suitability for probation rests with the defendant[,]” including the
defendant’s showing that probation will serve the ends of justice and the best interests of
the public and the defendant. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
35-303(b) and State v. Housewright, 982 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)).
Additionally, among the factors applicable to the probation consideration are: “(1) the
defendant’s amenability to correction; (2) the circumstances of the offense; (3) the
defendant’s criminal record; (4) the defendant’s social history; (5) the defendant’s physical
and mental health; and (6) special and general deterrence value.” State v. Trent, 533
S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn. 2017). In assessing a defendant’s potential for rehabilitation,
candor is a relevant factor, and “the lack of candor militates against the grant of probation.”
State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002); see State v. Bunch, 646
S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983).

        A trial court may sentence a defendant to a term of incarceration based solely on a
need for deterrence “when the record contains evidence which would enable a reasonable
person to conclude that (1) deterrence is needed in the community, jurisdiction, or state;
and (2) the defendant’s incarceration may rationally serve as a deterrent to others similarly
situated and likely to commit similar crimes.” State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn.
2000). When denying an alternative sentence based on the seriousness of the offense “the
circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying, shocking,
reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree, and the nature
of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than confinement.” State
v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006) (citations omitted). Further, when the

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seriousness of the offense itself is the sole reason for denying probation, “the circumstances
of the offense as particularly committed in the case under consideration must demonstrate
that the defendant committed the offense in some manner more egregious than is
contemplated simply by the elements of the offense.” Trent, 533 S.W.3d at 292-93.
However, these “heightened” standards of review in Hooper and Trotter are inapplicable
when the trial court does not base confinement solely on deterrence or solely on the
seriousness of the offense. State v. Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tenn. 2014)
(citations omitted).

        In the instant case, the Defendant was eligible to serve his nine-year sentence on
probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a), (c)(1) (Supp. 2020). However,
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver between one-half gram and twenty-six grams
is a Class B felony, meaning the Defendant did not qualify to be considered a favorable
candidate for probation. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
102(6)). The trial court found that previous rehabilitative efforts, though successfully
completed at the time, had failed to prevent or deter new criminal conduct. See State v.
Vanwinkle, No. M2017-00812-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 2383613, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App.
May 25, 2018). While considering deterrence and the seriousness of the offense, the trial
relied on Special Agent Nash’s specialized knowledge and testimony regarding drug
trafficking along I-40 and placed “great emphasis” on the concern for public safety. The
trial court properly found that probation should be denied based upon several different
considerations. As such, the trial court was not required to make further specific findings
under Trotter or Hooper. See Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d at 476.

        Although the Defendant argues that he accepted responsibility for his conduct and
that he had no previous probation violations, the record does not support his amenability
to correction. While the Defendant acknowledged that he was concealing and transporting
“quite a bit” of cocaine from Texas to Ohio, he denied that he was trafficking the drugs.
Moreover, the Defendant continued to deny that he knew the substance in the duffle bag
was also cocaine and not creatine. Further, the trial court noted credibility concerns with
the Defendant’s saying he had no plans for the large amount of narcotics he was
transporting to Ohio, a relevant factor in determining a defendant’s potential for
rehabilitation. See Souder, 105 S.W.3d at 608; Bunch, 646 S.W.2d at 160. As such, the
trial court did not err by concluding that the Defendant had not met his burden in
establishing his suitability for probation. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347. The Defendant is not
entitled to relief.

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                                  III.   CONCLUSION

        In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.

                                                   ______________________________
                                                   KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

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