Court Opinion

ID: 9959072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:11:37.376733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:25.756174
License: Public Domain

J-A26019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 LOUIS CHARLES AIELLO                  :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1048 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 16, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-09-CR-0001512-2021

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 LOUIS CHARLES AIELLO                  :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1049 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 23, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-09-CR-0005006-2020

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 LOUIS CHARLES AIELLO                  :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1050 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 16, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-09-CR-0005021-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
J-A26019-23

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                         FILED APRIL 10, 2024

       Louis Charles Aiello appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his convictions at three docket numbers for numerous offenses

related to the sexual abuse of children and for possession of child

pornography. Aiello argues the charges should have been severed and the

trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, challenges the

discretionary aspects of his sentence, and claims the Commonwealth

presented insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he was

a sexually violent predator. We affirm.

       Aiello was initially charged in June 2020 with sex crimes against two

minors, D.S. and A.B. Aiello knew D.S. as the son of an acquaintance and he

met A.B. at a wedding. Aiello was accused of numerous crimes: rape of a

person less than 13 years of age; involuntary deviate sexual intercourse

(“IDSI”) with a person less than 13 years of age; indecent assault of a person

less than 13 years of age; and two counts each of IDSI with a person less

than 16 years of age, statutory sexual assault, corruption of minors, and

indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age.1 The charges were at

were at docket number CP-09-CR-5006-2020 (“Docket 5006”).

       He was later charged in September 2020 at a second docket number

with crimes against three additional minors, R.C., C.A., and A.V. Two of the

minors, R.C. and C.A. were Aiello’s nephews. The third, A.V., was his
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3123(a)(6), 3126(a)(7), 3123(a)(7), 3122.1,
6301(a)(1), 3126(a)(8), respectively.

                                           -2-
J-A26019-23

roommate’s son. These charges were at docket number CP-09-CR-5021-2020

(“Docket 5021”). He was charged at this docket with many of the same crimes

as at Docket 5006: rape of a person less than 13 years of age, IDSI with a

person less than 13 years of age, indecent assault of person less than 13 years

of age, statutory rape, statutory sexual assault, incest, IDSI with a person

less than 16 years of age, indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of

age, and two counts each of corruption of minors and indecent exposure.2

       Aiello incurred a third set of charges in January 2021 based on child

pornography that members of the Falls Township Police Department

discovered when they executed a search warrant in June 2020. The

pornography was found on electronic devices in Aiello’s home. He was then

charged at docket number CP-09-CR-1512-2021 (“Docket 1512”) with two

counts of possession of child pornography.3

       Before trial, Aiello moved to sever the charges against each victim into

separate trials and to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search

warrant. The Commonwealth countered with a motion to consolidate the

dockets. At the hearing on the motions, the parties stipulated to the admission

of the testimony from the preliminary hearing. N.T., June 16, 2021, at 32-35.

The trial court summarized the facts as follows:

____________________________________________

218 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 3126(a)(7), 3122 (repealed), 3122.1,
4302, 3123(a)(6), 3126(a)(8), 6301(a), and 3127, respectively.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(d).

                                           -3-
J-A26019-23

       [Aiello] is R.C.’s uncle (specifically, his step-father’s
       brother). In 1993, when R.C. was 10 years old, R.C. and his
       younger brother, aged 6, visited [Aiello] at his trailer home
       in Bensalem. [Aiello] invited the boys to his home for a “fun
       night” of watching movies and playing with various “gizmos
       and gadgets” geared toward children. At the end of the
       night, [Aiello] told the boys it was time to shower before
       bed. Before the boys entered the shower, [Aiello] forced the
       boys to watch him masturbate. When the boys looked away,
       [Aiello] ordered them to “look, watch what I’m doing.” After
       this incident, R.C. never visited the trailer home again, nor
       was he ever alone with [Aiello] again.

       Two years later, in 1995, [Aiello] began to sexually abuse
       his other nephew, 8 year old C.A. The abuse always
       occurred at [Aiello’s] residence at 408 Rumpf Avenue in
       Bucks County. [Aiello] would either go to C.A.’s house to
       pick him up or C.A. would be dropped off by a family
       member. On some occasions, C.A. spent the night. During
       the sexual abuse, [Aiello] would show C.A. pornography and
       then initiate sexual contact, all while talking as if “things
       were normal.” [Aiello] would then proceed to use a bottle of
       oil to masturbate in front of C.A. and would attempt to have
       C.A. masturbate as well. [Aiello] performed oral sex on C.A.
       and coached C.A. to perform oral sex on [Aiello].

       At one point, [Aiello] attempted to perform anal sex on C.A.,
       but it was too painful for C.A. to continue, so C.A. instead
       performed anal sex on [Aiello]. After [Aiello] and C.A.’s
       sexual encounters, [Aiello] routinely took a shower and
       asked C.A. to do the same. [Aiello] also repeatedly
       encouraged C.A. to use enemas, and at one point, [Aiello]
       actually performed an enema on C.A.

       On all of these occasions, C.A. and [Aiello] were alone. In
       2000, C.A, turned 13 years old, and the sexual abuse
       ceased. After the abuse ended, C.A. knew [Aiello] spent
       time with someone known as E.E., the son of [Aiello’s] then-
       girlfriend. . . .

       In 2000, [C.A.] became too old for [Aiello’s] continued
       victimization, [Aiello]    began to sexually abuse an
       acquaintance’s son, D.S. D.S’s father worked as a wedding
       photographer while [Aiello] worked as a wedding disc jockey
       and karaoke host. [Aiello] met D.S. when he was 11 years

                                   -4-
J-A26019-23

       old. D.S. often spent time alone with [Aiello] and E.E. On
       one occasion, after [Aiello] returned from picking up D.S.
       and E.E. from their homes, they socialized for some time
       before [Aiello] brought the boys to his room. [Aiello] made
       the boys disrobe and showed them pornographic videos.
       [Aiello] asked the boys to masturbate one another. At one
       point, E.E. ”backed off.” [Aiello] then kissed D.S. and
       performed oral sex on him. D.S. recalled E.E. masturbating
       [Aiello]. According to D.S., Appellant “really, pushed the
       issue of an enema” and forced D.S. to give him an enema.

       [Aiello] sexually abused D.S. whenever they were alone
       together. [Aiello] would display pornography on the
       television, then subsequently perform oral sex on D.S., and
       have D.S. perform oral sex on him. [Aiello] attempted to
       perform anal sex on D.S., but D.S. declined. However,
       [Aiello] forced D.S. to perform protected anal sex on him,
       while using massagers and oils. These acts occurred when
       D.S. was under the age of 13. D.S. was 17 years old when
       he last had sexual contact with [Aiello] in 2007.

       From 2004 to 2006, [Aiello] began to sexually abuse A.V.,
       the 8 year old son of his roommate . . . . One time, when
       A.V. was visiting their residence, [Aiello] approached A.V.
       and offered to show him the television show “Speed Racer.”
       [Aiello] brought A.V. to his bedroom, and, while A.V.
       watched the television, [Aiello] asked if he could change
       clothes. As he did so, [Aiello] proceeded to ask: “So what
       do you think?” A.V. saw [Aiello] completely naked and then
       immediately left the room.

       On another occasion, [Aiello] organized a sleepover with
       A.V. and [his roommate’s] nephew in a tent in the backyard.
       That evening, [A.V.’s father] found the boys in “E.E.’s
       room”—a small crawl space in [Aiello’s] room containing a
       television, posters, and comic books. Mr. Visco inquired as
       to what they were doing and [Aiello] replied that he was
       showing the boys “the crawl space where him and E.E., you
       know, spend time together, sleep together.” At that point,
       suspecting something was amiss, [A.V.’s father] told [Aiello]
       that the sleepover was over and that he was taking the
       boys. [Aiello’s] demeanor immediately changed; he became
       upset and angry that he had already set up a tent in the
       backyard for the sleepover. [A.V.’s father] moved out of
       [Aiello’s] home shortly thereafter.

                                   -5-
J-A26019-23

          In 2007, [Aiello] ceased sexually abusing A.V., and turned
          to 13 year old A.B. [Aiello] met A.B. at A.B.’s sister’s
          wedding. [Aiello] was working as a disc jockey and, A.B.,
          who had a lifelong interest in music, enjoyed his first
          encounter with professional music equipment. As A.B.
          examined [Aiello’s] music equipment, [Aiello] invited him to
          “become an assistant . . . in a business sense.” It was
          through this arrangement that A.B. began to spend time
          alone with [Aiello]. On one occasion in 2007, A.B. was riding
          one of [Aiello’s] dirt bikes on the road in front of [Aiello’s]
          residence when he fell and scraped his hands. [Aiello] took
          A.B. inside his home under the guise of cleaning him up, but
          instead asked A.B. whether he had “ever gotten a hand job
          or a blow job” and removed A.B.’s pants. [Aiello] then
          retrieved a condom, put it on A.B., and began to masturbate
          him.

          Following that assault, [Aiello] sexually abused A.B. “once
          or twice a month,” all while A.B. was under the age of 16.
          [Aiello] would pick A.B. up at his house and bring him to his
          residence to watch movies in the bedroom. They would
          proceed to undress and engage in sexual acts, including A.B.
          performing oral sex on [Aiello], A.B. performing protected
          anal sex on [Aiello], and putting a condom on a “toy banana”
          to use as a dildo. One time, A.B. and [Aiello] traveled to a
          camp in upstate Pennsylvania for a Christian church band
          concert. After the concert, [Aiello] sexually assaulted A.B.
          in one of the cabins.

          A.B. testified that, although he performed anal sex on
          [Aiello], [Aiello] attempted to perform anal sex on him but
          “more often than not [he] refused.” [Aiello] also spoke to
          A.B. about another boy in his life, E.E., with whom [Aiello]
          shar[e]d a similar relationship. In 2011, A.B. reached the
          age of 17 and the sexual abuse stopped.

Trial Court Opinion, filed Nov. 22, 2022, at 3-6 (citations to record omitted).4

       The trial court denied the motion to sever and the motion to suppress
____________________________________________

4 The testimony from the preliminary hearing was admitted at the hearing on

the pre-trial motions. A copy of the preliminary hearing transcript is not in the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -6-
J-A26019-23

and granted the Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate. Following a

stipulated bench trial, the court convicted Aiello of all counts.

       The court sentenced Aiello in December 2021. At Docket 5021, the court

sentenced Aiello to an aggregate sentence of 18 to 36 years’ incarceration. At

Docket 1512, the court sentenced Aiello to an aggregate sentence of six to 12

years’ incarceration. At Docket 5006, the court sentenced him to an aggregate

of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration. The court ordered that the sentences were to

run consecutively to each other, for a total aggregate sentence of 49 to 98

years’ incarceration. The court held an SVP hearing, where the court heard

testimony from a psychologist with the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board

(“SOAB”), Dr. Kristen Dudley. Dr. Dudley testified as an expert in the

assessment of adult sexual offenders and opined that Aiello met the criteria

of a sexually violate predator (“SVP”). N.T., Dec. 23, 2021, at 14. The court

found that Aiello was an SVP.

       Aiello filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. At Docket 5021,

the court vacated its sentence and resentenced Aiello, but imposed the same

aggregate sentence. The court clarified that it imposed some sentences

consecutive to each other because “it was an ongoing situation over a period

of years.” N.T., Mar. 16, 2022, at 11. The court further noted that the sentence

imposed “was consistent with the mandatory minimum sentences.” Id. at 12.
____________________________________________

certified record. However, no one disputes the accuracy of the trial court’s
summary of the evidence. Furthermore, the court’s recitation of the evidence
is consistent with the summary provided by the Commonwealth at the
stipulated bench trial.

                                           -7-
J-A26019-23

The court pointed out that the crimes at Docket 5006 involved different people

and times, and found they required separate sentences. The court reasoned,

“You don’t get to sexually assault one victim and then receive the same

sentence to run concurrent with each victim.” Id. At Docket 1512, the court

vacated the sentence and ordered that the sentences at counts 1 and 2 run

concurrently, rather than consecutively. That reduced the sentence to three

to six years’ incarceration, for a new aggregate total at all three dockets of 46

to 92 years’ incarceration. Aiello filed a timely notice of appeal.5

       Aiello raises the following issues:

          1. Did the trial court err in consolidating criminal
          informations 5006-2020; 5021-2020; and 1512-2021 as
          there was no nex[u]s between the pornographic images
          found and the alleged acts that occurred during the periods
          of 1993 through 2011.

          2. Did the trial court err in consolidating criminal
          informations 5006-2020; 5021-2020; and 1512-2021 as
          there was no continuous course of conduct as these
          allegations were distinct crimes and the consolidation
          prejudiced [Aiello] by bolstering the credibility of the
          Commonwealth’s witness and bootstrapping [Aiello’s]
          defenses as the defense to each victim may be inconsistent
          with each other.

          3. Did the trial court err in failing to suppress the evidence
          gathered from a defective search warrant.

          4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing
          [Aiello] by imposing manifestly excessive sentences, failing
          to consider all relevant factors, failing to adequately state

____________________________________________

5 The Honorable Diane E. Gibbons presided over Aiello’s trial and sentencing.

She retired shortly after Aiello filed his concise statement of matters raised on
appeal. The Honorable Wallace H. Bateman wrote the Rule 1925(a) opinion.

                                           -8-
J-A26019-23

           the reasons relied upon and relying on improper factors in
           imposing said sentence.

           5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing
           [Aiello] to lifetime registration.

Aiello’s Br. at 7-8.

   I.      Consolidation

        In his first two issues, Aiello argues the trial court erred in granting the

Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate. He maintains the pornography

charges were improperly consolidated with the sexual abuse charges because

there was no connection between the pornographic images and the sexual

abuse. In his view, “the evidence of possession of child pornography did not

tend to prove a common plan, scheme or design embracing the commission

of the child sex abuse crimes.” Aiello’s Br. at 21. He adds that the charge of

possession of pornographic images is not rationally based on the same act or

transaction as the child sex abuse claims. In his telling, the evidence of child

pornography was in effect prohibited evidence of criminal propensity in the

sex crime cases. He contends that A.B.’s report of seeing an image of a naked

minor as Aiello’s computer screen saver during Aiello’s conduct against A.B.

was not a proper basis to consolidate the pornography charges with the other

cases. He argues that there was no evidence that any of the images found

during the search were the image A.B. saw. Aiello further maintains that

consolidating the cases “of recently discovered child pornography with child

sexual assault that occurred over ten years ago, would be highly probative of

the propensity to commit child sexual assault.” Id. at 24.

                                        -9-
J-A26019-23

      Aiello further argues the court erred in consolidating the three dockets

and in denying his motion to sever because the events underlying the cases

did not form a continuous course of conduct.

      As for consolidating the sex crimes cases, he argues the allegations

constituted distinct crimes and he was prejudiced because consolidation

effectively bolstered the credibility of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. He also

contends that consolidation impeded his presenting defenses to charges as to

some victims that might have been inconsistent with defenses to charges

relating to other victims. Aiello argues the allegations relating to A.V. and R.C.

were distinct from those regarding D.S., A.B., and C.A. He states that A.V.

reported a single incident in which Aiello exposed himself, and R.C. reported

one instance where Aiello masturbated in front of him and his brother. In

contrast, he states that D.S., A.B., and C.A. reported that Aiello masturbated

himself and them, and had them masturbate him. He states they alleged he

also attempted and had actual anal sex with D.S., A.B., and C.A.; performed

oral sex on and received oral sex from them; and watched pornography with

them. He maintains that the crimes against each victim were distinct from

those against other victims, and consolidation resulted in evidence of crimes

of acts against other victims serving as impermissible evidence of “his

propensity to commit crimes of sexual contact with children, particularly

sexual contact with a particular age group of a particular sex, boys in

particular[.]” Id. at 28-29.

                                     - 10 -
J-A26019-23

      We review a trial court’s decision to sever or consolidate charges for an

abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa.

1997).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582 governs the joinder of

separate informations for trial and provides:

         (1) Offenses charged in separate             indictments   or
         informations may be tried together if:

            (a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be
            admissible in a separate trial for the other and is
            capable of separation by the jury so that there is no
            danger of confusion; or

            (b) the offenses charged are based on the same act
            or transaction.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1).

      Rule 583 governs severance of offenses and provides:

         The court may order separate trials of offenses or
         defendants, or provide other appropriate relief, if it appears
         that any party may be prejudiced by offenses or defendants
         being tried together.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 583.

      “Under Rule 583, the prejudice the defendant suffers due to the joinder

must be greater than the general prejudice any defendant suffers when the

Commonwealth’s evidence links him to a crime.” Commonwealth v. Dozzo,

991 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819

A.2d 100, 107 (Pa.Super. 2003)). Rather, the prejudice required under Rule

583 is “that which would occur if the evidence tended to convict [the] appellant

only by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury was

                                     - 11 -
J-A26019-23

incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid cumulating the

evidence.” Id. (quoting Lauro, 819 A.2d at 107).

     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Collins, 703

A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 1997), read Rules 582 and 583 together and determined

that to decide whether to grant severance, courts must ask whether the

evidence would be admissible in separate trials, the evidence is capable of

separation by the jury, and the defendant will be unduly prejudiced if the

offenses are tried together. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206,

210-11 (Pa.Super. 2015).

     Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is not admissible to prove that the

defendant acted “in conformity with those acts or to demonstrate a criminal

propensity.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 320, 325 (Pa.Super. 2012);

Pa.R.E. 404(b). The evidence, however, may be admissible for another, proper

purpose. Brown, 52 A.3d at 325. One such proper purpose is to demonstrate

a common plan, motive, scheme, or intent. Dozzo, 991 A.2d at 902 (citation

omitted).

     Here, the trial court concluded consolidation was proper because the

evidence would be admissible in separate trials to show a common plan,

scheme or design:

        In the case at bar, the Court properly consolidated the cases
        because the evidence of each of the offenses was
        admissible, in that it tended to prove a common plan,
        scheme or design embracing the commission of the crimes.
        Moreover, had the matters been tried separately, the
        evidence of his crimes would have been admissible in each
        individual trial.

                                   - 12 -
J-A26019-23

           In making the determination for consolidation, the Court
       first considered the victims’ ages. [Aiello] generally began
       abusing the victims when they were under 13 years old and
       ceased when they reached their mid to late teenage years.
       In 1993, [Aiello] sexually abused 10-year-old R.C. From
       1995 to 2000, [Aiello] sexually abused C.A. between ages 8
       and 13. From 2000 to 2007, [Aiello] sexually abused D.S.
       between ages 11 and 17. In 2006, [Aiello] sexually abused
       10-year-old A.V. Further, the boys’ age ranges throughout
       the years indicate that [Aiello’s] abuse was continuous and
       ongoing, as he moved from one victim to the next, with
       some overlap.

          Second, the Court considered how [Aiello] chose his
       victims. [Aiello] utilized his relation to the victims and their
       families to facilitate his abuse, having met his targets
       through his own family or by befriending the victims’
       families. [Aiello] is R.C.’s uncle. C.A. is [Aiello’s] nephew.
       D.S. met [Aiello] through his father, who was a wedding
       photographer while [Aiello] was working as a wedding disc
       jockey and karaoke host. [Aiello] was a friend of A.V.’s
       grandmother and had lived with A.V.’s father from 2004 to
       2006. A.B. met [Aiello] when [Aiello] was the-disc jockey at
       A.B.’s sister’s wedding in 2007.

          Third, the Court considered the location of the sexual
       abuse. Most of the abuse perpetrated by [Aiello] occurred
       at his home. R.C. was abused at [Aiello’s] trailer home in
       Bensalem. C.A., D.S., A.V., and A.B. were abused at
       [Aiello’s] residence. R.C., C.A., and A.B. all indicated that
       [Aiello] would pick them up from their homes and drive
       them to his residence.

           Fourth, the Court considered the grooming techniques
       [Aiello] used on each victim. Multiple victims described the
       same pattern of grooming: [Aiello] would invite them, often
       to his home, to partake in various activities that would
       appeal to boys of their age, such as: watching television and
       movies, playing with various toys, backyard campouts,
       riding dirt bikes, and music disc jockeying. R.C. described
       how [Aiello] had invited him and his younger brother to his
       home for a “fun night” of watching movies and playing with
       various “gizmos and gadgets” that appealed to them at that
       age. C.A. shared that he helped [Aiello] purchase two dirt
       bikes in 2000. A.V. described the invitation to watch Speed

                                   - 13 -
J-A26019-23

       Racer in [Aiello’s] bedroom when he was at the residence.
       He also described how [Aiello] showed him the crawlspace
       where E.E. slept. This crawlspace was filled with items that
       would appeal to a boy of his age: a television, posters, and
       comic books. A.V.’s father described an incident which
       occurred sometime in 2006 or 2007 when his son and
       nephew were 10 and 8 years old, respectively. [Aiello] asked
       A.V.’s father to invite the boys to sleep with him in a tent in
       the backyard. It was later that night when A.V.’s father
       discovered the boys in the aforementioned crawlspace with
       [Aiello] standing just outside. A.B. described his interest in
       music and disc jockey equipment and [Aiello’s] subsequent
       invitation for him to become his “assistant” and spend time
       alone together. He described riding dirt bikes at [Aiello’s]
       residence in 2007. He described how [Aiello] invited him
       over to his residence to watch movies before he abused him.
       He also described how [Aiello] invited him to attend a
       Christian church band concert in upstate Pennsylvania, after
       which, [Aiello] again abused him while watching a movie.

          Fifth, the Court looked at the similarities in the victims’
       stories. The victims who testified in this matter, who had
       never met each other or knew of each other’s existence,
       provided nearly [] identical accounts of [Aiello’s] efforts to
       “test the waters” prior to engaging in sexual acts. [Aiello]
       exposed himself in his shower and masturbated in front of
       R.C. and R.C.’s younger brother under the guise of the boys
       needing to shower before bed. [Aiello] exposed himself to
       A.V. under the guise of changing his clothing while A.V. was
       watching television in his bedroom. [Aiello] showed C.A.
       pornography before initiating sexual contact and talked as if
       “things were normal.” [Aiello] would then expose himself
       and begin masturbating with a bottle of oil. [Aiello] also
       showed D.S. and E.E. pornographic videos before asking the
       boys to masturbate one another. After A.B. scraped his
       hands when he fell off a dirt bike, [Aiello] assisted him with
       cleaning up, asked whether had “ever gotten a hand job or
       a blow job” and began removing A.B.’s pants.

          Sixth, the Court examined the specific methods of sexual
       abuse. C.A. and D.S. both described [Aiello’s] use of oils
       during the sexual abuse. [Aiello] masturbated in front of
       C.A., D.S., R.C., and R.C.’s younger brother. He then
       directed the victims to masturbate themselves. Following
       masturbation, [Aiello] performed oral sex on A.B., C.A., and

                                   - 14 -
J-A26019-23

         D.S., and had the boys perform oral sex on him. In the cases
         of A.B., C.A., and D.S., [Aiello] attempted to perform anal
         sex on them. Each of the boys objected when the experience
         became painful. [Aiello] then had the victims perform anal
         sex on him.

             Further, multiple victims recounted [Aiello’s] use of an
         enema. C.A. and D.S. both described how [Aiello]
         ritualistically encouraged them to give themselves enemas
         following the sexual assaults, with [Aiello] performing an
         enema on C.A. and D.S. performing an enema on [Aiello].
         In the case of C.A., after [Aiello] and C.A. had sexual
         contact, [Aiello] routinely took a shower and encouraged
         C.A. to do the same.

             Accordingly, the Court found the probative value in the
         consolidation of these offenses to be quite strong insofar as
         the victims’ accounts were independently corroborative of
         each other. Having determined that the evidence of each of
         these offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for
         the others in that they support a common scheme, plan or
         design, the Court also considered, the possibility that a jury
         would be confused or unable to separate the evidence at
         trial. The Court found that the evidence was not particularly
         technical or complex and that the offenses were in fact
         distinct and occurred at different points in time, minimizing
         danger of confusion. The Court also took into account the
         fact that a curative and cautionary instruction would have
         been given to the jury. Therefore, [Aiello’s] assertion that
         the Court erred in consolidating the informations is wholly
         without merit.

Rule 1925(a) Op. at 10-13 (citations to record omitted).

      To the trial court’s thorough analysis we add only that the images on

which the child pornography charges were based depicted young boys, who

looked like the victims, engaging in acts that mirrored the acts Aiello had the

victims perform.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the

informations for trial. The evidence related to each victim would have been

                                     - 15 -
J-A26019-23

admissible in the trials for the other victims, as evidence of a common plan,

scheme, or intent. The victims were similar in age, the location of the crimes

was the same, and the grooming techniques and details of the crimes were

similar. Further, the evidence of child pornography would have been

admissible in the sex abuse trials. The images depicted young boys, as were

the victims, and depicted sexual acts like those Aiello had the victims perform.

For example, there was evidence that Aiello had victims perform enemas, and

police found images of enemas on his laptop. Moreover, the evidence did not

tend to suggest a conviction based only on his propensity to commit crimes.

Rather, it was relevant to show a common design, plan, or scheme. In

addition, the testimony of each victim was sufficiently distinct such that a fact

finder would be capable of separating the evidence.

   II.      Search Warrant

         In his third issue Aiello argues the trial court erred in denying his motion

to suppress. He argues the warrant was based on stale information and was

overbroad.

         “[S]earch warrants may only issue upon probable cause and ‘[t]he

issuing     authority,   in   determining   whether   probable   cause   has   been

established, may not consider any evidence outside the affidavits.’”

Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 482 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Leed, 186 A.3d 405, 413 (Pa. 2018)) (alteration in

original). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the

affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information

                                        - 16 -
J-A26019-23

are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the

belief that a search should be conducted.” Id. (citation omitted).

      “Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a

suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions

drawn from those facts are correct.” Id. at 480. (quoting Commonwealth v.

Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)). Where “the appeal of the

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court,

whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law

to the facts.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further explained that:

         It is the duty of a court reviewing an issuing authority’s
         probable cause determination to ensure that the magistrate
         had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
         existed. In so doing, the reviewing court must accord
         deference to the issuing authority’s probable cause
         determination, and must view the information offered to
         establish probable cause in a common-sense, non-technical
         manner.

                                     ...

         [Further,] a reviewing court [is] not to conduct a de novo
         review of the issuing authority’s probable cause
         determination, but [is] simply to determine whether or not
         there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the
         decision to issue the warrant.

Jones, 988 A.2d at 655 (quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 86,

764 A.2d 532, 537–38, 540 (2001)) (alterations in original).

                                    - 17 -
J-A26019-23

        In June 2020, the police applied for a search warrant of Aiello’s home.

The warrant sought, among other things, “[p]hysical evidence of Aiello’s

sexual assault and exploitation of DS, AB, ‘Bobby,’ ‘the neighborhood

children,’ or any other child including, but not limited to, enema equipment,

camping equipment, pornography (adult or child), notes, diaries, memos,

letters, records, receipts, papers, or other writings, photographs, videos,

communication devices, including cellular phones and computers.” Application

for Search Warrant at ¶ 1. It further sought “[a]ny and all digital storage

devices, including, but not limited to thumb drives, flash drives, and external

drives” and “[a]ny and all documents and/or photographs consisting of

written, printed, or electronically stored material related to the identities of

additional victims, including but not limited to ‘Bobby’ and the ‘neighborhood

kids’    and/or   co-conspirators.”   Id.   at   ¶¶   8-9.   It   further   sought

“[c]orrespondence, ‘trophies,’ grooming aids, or other items demonstrating

an interest in the exploitation of children,” and “[a]ny and all devices capable

of connecting to the internet.” Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.

        The affidavit of probable cause detailed the background of the affiant—

Detective Stephen Reeves of the Falls Township Police Department—and two

co-affiants—Chief Sean Perry of the Penndel Borough Police Department and

Lieutenant Robert M. Gorman of the Bucks County District Attorney’s

Office/Bucks County Detectives. It stated that Detective Reeves had received

numerous in-service police trainings and had conducted “hundreds of criminal

investigations including assault, armed robbery, homicide, rape, child abuse,

                                      - 18 -
J-A26019-23

fraud, burglary, theft, missing persons and narcotics violations.” Affidavit of

Probable Cause at 1. Detective Reeves was a member of the Pennsylvania

Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force and completed multiple on-line

courses pertaining to sexual assault investigations.

      The affidavit detailed the information received from D.S., including that

Aiello spoke of an ex-girlfriend’s son named “Bobby” and that Aiello sometimes

abused D.S. and Bobby together. The affidavit further discussed information

received from A.B. regarding the abuse and asserted that A.B. had stated that

Aiello spoke about “Bobby,” but A.B. had not met him. A.B. further said that

Aiello spoke of relationships with “other neighborhood kids,” and that Aiello

told A.B. that he had taken nude photographs of Bobby and the “neighborhood

kids” and that he saw a photograph of Bobby and Bobby’s mother in Aiello’s

residence. A.B. also stated that, as recently as 2011, he saw a screen saver

on Aiello’s desktop computer that “depicted a naked 14 or 15-year old boy

with minimal muscle tone and child-like features,” and that “[t]he boy’s penis

was visible in the photo.” Id. at 5.

      The affidavit also stated that based on his training and experience,

Detective Reeves was aware of traits and characteristics commonly found in

those who collect child pornography. The affidavit identified such traits and

characteristics as including that such individuals “maintain books, magazines,

newspapers and other writings, in hard copy or digital medium, on the subject

of sexual activities with children as a way of understanding their own feelings

toward children, justifying those feelings and finding comfort for their illicit

                                       - 19 -
J-A26019-23

behavior and desires,” and that “[s]uch individuals rarely destroy these

materials because of the psychological support they provide.” Id. at 6. The

affidavit elaborated that collectors of child pornography “rarely, if ever,

dispose of their sexually explicit materials and may go to great lengths to

conceal and protect from discovery, theft and damage, their collections of illicit

materials.” Id. The affidavit explained that “[i]n addition to the emotional

value the images have to the collector the visual images are intrinsically

valuable for trading and/or selling and therefore are rarely destroyed or

deleted by the collector.” Id. The affidavit further provided that child

pornography collectors “often collect, copy, or maintain sexually explicit

materials on digital storage devices which may consist of USB flash drives,

thumb drives, and memory cards.” Id. It stated that they also “often collect

grooming aids and ‘trophies’ in the exploitation of children.” Id.

      The affidavit stated that, based on his training and experience, Detective

Reeves was also aware of traits and characteristics found generally in those

who sexually abuse children. Detective Reeves specified in the affidavit that

“[t]hese individuals rarely, if ever, dispose of any materials that may aid them

in perpetrating abuse, including documentation and contact information for

victims,” or “materials . . . known as ‘trophies,’” which, in this case, would

include photographs of “Bobby” or other neighborhood children. The affidavit

stated that “[l]ocating photographs or any other identifying information of

victims . . . would assist in this investigation.” Id. at 7.

                                      - 20 -
J-A26019-23

      A. Staleness

      Aiello argues that the last alleged abuse occurred in 2010, with the last

report of a pornographic image being seen at his residence happening in 2011.

He therefore maintains that the search warrant, executed in June 2020, was

based on stale information. He disputes the Commonwealth’s argument that

perpetrators of sexual abuse of children rarely, if ever, dispose of photographs

of the children they victimize. He maintains there was no information that

Aiello had been committing crimes for the nine and a half years before the

search. He maintains there was no evidence of file sharing, that Aiello had

physical pictures of child pornography, or that A.B. viewed pornographic

images of the victims in this matter. Aiello further argues the lapse of nine

and a half years would render whatever device had been used obsolete, and

the search warrant “does [not] allege that that specific device is still in the

home.” Aiello’s Br. at 33. He concludes “[a]s there was no continuous course

of conduct for over nine and a half years, the affidavit of probable cause is

based solely on stale information and must be suppressed.” Id. at 33.

      When determining whether a warrant is supported by probable cause,

the “[a]ge of the information supporting a warrant application is a factor.”

Green, 204 A.3d at 484 (quoting Leed, 186 A.3d at 413) (alteration in

original). “If the information is too old, it is stale, and probable cause may no

longer exist.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, staleness

“is not determined by age alone, as this would be inconsistent with a totality

of the circumstances analysis.” Id. (citation omitted).

                                     - 21 -
J-A26019-23

      In Commonwealth v. Gomolekoff, 910 A.2d 710, 713-15 (Pa.Super.

2006), this Court rejected a staleness claim where police obtained a warrant

nine and a half months after the defendant sent emails containing alleged

child pornography. We noted that other courts had observed in other cases

that “pedophiles rarely, if ever, dispose of child pornography” and that

“[p]resumably individuals will protect and retain child pornography for long

periods for time because it is illegal and difficult to obtain.” Id. at 714 (quoting

United States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 434 (3d Cir. 2002)). We

further pointed out that the affidavit in support of the warrant application in

Gomolekoff stated that the affiant was aware due to training and experience

that persons who use home computers tend to retain their files and data for

extended periods. Id.

      In this case, there was a lengthy period between the last alleged abuse

and when A.B. saw child pornography on Aiello’s computer and the execution

of the search. However, the affidavit of probable cause contained information

that Aiello had sexually abused children and had possessed child pornography.

It further stated that the affiant, based on his training and experience, knew

that those who collect child pornography rarely, if ever, delete or destroy it,

and those who commit sexual abuse of children rarely, if ever, dispose of

material that would aid them in the commission of the assault, including

trophies and identifying information. Here, the affidavit contained substantial

evidence in the record supporting the decision to issue the warrant, as the

                                      - 22 -
J-A26019-23

facts and circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the

belief that a search should be conducted.

      B. Overbreadth

      Aiello also maintains the search warrant was overbroad. He concedes

that A.B. stated he observed what he believed to be a naked 14- or 15-year-

old boy with “minimal muscle tone and child-like features” on Aiello’s desktop

computer. Aiello’s Br. at 33. He also notes that the affidavit of probable cause

states that the affiant “is aware of the following traits and characteristics

commonly found to exist and be true in cases involving individuals who collect

child pornography,” but claims that none of the listed traits involve desktop

computers. Id. at 33-34 (citation omitted). He argues that the search was

based on information from a 10-year-old who “had an untrained eye, saw

something that may have been child pornography on a desktop computer,”

and such information does not provide probable cause “to search every

electronic device that might be found within the home.” Id. at 35-36.

      Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in

pertinent part: “[N]o warrant to search any place or to seize any person or

things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be. . . .” Pa. Const.

Art. I § 8. Thus, “a warrant must name or describe with particularity the

property   to   be   seized   and   the   person   or   place   to   be   searched.”

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1002 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 816 A.2d 282, 290 (Pa.Super. 2003)). “The

particularity requirement prohibits a warrant that is not particular enough and

                                      - 23 -
J-A26019-23

a warrant that is overbroad,” which are separate, but related, issues. Id.

(citation omitted). A warrant lacks sufficient particularity if it “authorizes a

search in terms so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to pick and

choose among an individual’s possessions to find which items to seize.” Id.

(citation omitted). A warrant is unconstitutionally overbroad if it “authorizes

in clear or specific terms the seizure of an entire set of items, or documents,

many of which will prove unrelated to the crime under investigation.” Id. at

1002-03 (citation omitted).6

       Here, the warrant was not overbroad. It sought evidence, including child

pornography, trophies, and identifying information for victims, and, although

it permitted the seizure of devices, the search was limited to the items sought.

That the device that initially held an image may no longer be available is

irrelevant here, as digital material can be transferred between devices. The

warrant described the physical devices and digital data for which there was

probable cause as nearly as may be under the circumstances. Green, 204

A.3d at 482.

   III. Discretionary Aspects of the Sentence

       Aiello next challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. There

is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence.

____________________________________________

6 Pennsylvania’s requirement that the warrant describe the items to be seized

“as nearly as may be” is “more stringent” than the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of particularity in the description. Orie, 88 A.3d at 1003. It
requires that the warrant “describe the items as specifically as is reasonably
possible.” Id. (quoting Rivera, 816 A.2d at 290).

                                          - 24 -
J-A26019-23

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en

banc). Rather, we follow a four-part analysis before addressing a challenge to

discretionary aspects of sentence. We must determine whether the appellant:

(1) filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserved the sentencing issue

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider or modify sentence; (3) included in

the appellate brief a concise statement of reasons for seeking allowance of

appeal; and (4) asserted a substantial question that the sentence is not

appropriate under the Sentencing Code. See Commonwealth v. Austin, 66

A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). “[I]f the appeal

satisfies each of these four requirements, we will then proceed to decide the

substantive merits of the case.” Id. (citation omitted).

      All four requirements are met here. Aiello alleges he raises a substantial

question that the trial court imposed a manifestly excessive sentence

considering Aiello’s lack of prior record or history of addiction and his

rehabilitative needs. He further alleges he raises a substantial question

because the trial court primarily relied on the nature of the crimes, and that

the factors the court relied on were contrary to the fundamental norms

underlying the sentencing process, that is, the defendant’s rehabilitative

needs and the protection of the public. The claims that the court relied on

improper factors and imposed an excessive sentence without considering

rehabilitative needs raise substantial questions. Commonwealth v. Snyder,

289 A.3d 1121, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2023) (finding an excessive sentence claim

coupled with a claim of disregard for appellant's “rehabilitative potential”

                                     - 25 -
J-A26019-23

raises a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 254 A.3d 769,

782 (Pa.Super. 2021) (stating that a claim that the sentencing court relied on

improper factors raises a substantial question). We will therefore now address

Aiello’s sentencing claim on the merits.

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the trial court,

and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of

discretion. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa.Super.

2015). “[A]n abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.”

Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he appellant must establish, by reference to the

record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a

manifestly unreasonable decision.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Aiello maintains the trial court abused its discretion because it “in fact

gave [Aiello] a life sentence by running almost all counts consecutive to each

other for an aggregate confinement of not less than [46] to [92] years in state

prison.” Aiello’s Br. at 39. He points out that the trial court stated that the

protection of the public required incarceration for the remainder of Aiello’s

natural life, as there was no chance of rehabilitation, but argues that the

expert testimony at sentencing was that there was a possibility of

rehabilitation through treatment, which Aiello had never received. He argues

the trial court failed to “seriously consider” his rehabilitative needs and lack of

prior record. He claims the court’s “primary focus was the seriousness of the

crime,” which, he alleges, was in contravention of the sentencing code. Id. at

                                      - 26 -
J-A26019-23

40. He argues the trial court imposed a manifestly excessive sentence, failed

to consider all relevant factors, and failed to adequately state the reasons

relied upon, and relied on improper factors.

      Here, the trial court discussed the crimes and their continued impact on

the victims. N.T., Dec. 23, 2021, at 69-71. It noted that Aiello had never taken

responsibility for the crimes and showed no remorse. Id. at 71. The court

stated it had read the character letters submitted on Aiello’s behalf, but

pointed out those people had never seen Aiello with the children. Id. at 72. It

further stated that the court considered that Aiello “will continue to deny what

is clear guilt, which means [he was] not a good candidate for treatment.” Id.

at 72-73. It therefore concluded that its “only other choice [was] to remove

[him] from society.” Id. at 73. The court concluded “I think that the protection

of the community – there is no chance of rehabilitation of [Aiello] and so,

therefore, the protection of the community requires that he be incarcerated

for the remainder of his natural life.” Id. at 74. Further, at the re-sentencing,

the court clarified that there were multiple victims over a lengthy period, and

the sentences reflected that.

      The court considered not only the seriousness of the crimes and the

impact on the victims and the need to protect the public, but also Aiello's

character evidence and his rehabilitative needs. The court was not required to

view the letters and his rehabilitative needs as Aiello would have liked. The

court did not abuse its discretion when imposing sentence.

                                     - 27 -
J-A26019-23

   IV.   SVP Designation

      In his final issue, Aiello maintains the court erred when it found he was

an SVP and therefore required to register as a sex offender for life. He argues

the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence

that Aiello had an increased likelihood of reoffense. He argues Dr. Dudley

acknowledge some of the statutory factors did not apply (Aiello did not exceed

the means necessary to achieve the offense, the offense did not include a

display of unusual cruelty, and there was no evidence the victims were

mentally challenged). He points out that Dr. Dudley further acknowledged

Aiello did not have a prior record, and therefore had not previously had a

sentence that required participation in any available programs. He also

maintains Dr. Dudley said pedophilia can be controlled and that Aiello was at

risk for reoffending but the risk could be managed.

      In addition, although admitting that Dr. Dudley opined that Aiello met

the criteria to be classified as an SVP, Aiello claims Dr. Dudley’s testimony

lacked an in-depth discussion of the basis for her opinion. Aiello argues that

“while acknowledging that a number of statutory factors do not apply, Dr.

Dudley merely indicated that [Aiello] would be at risk to reoffend.” Aiello’s Br.

at 49. He argues the Commonwealth “failed to demonstrate any likelihood of

reoffending, let alone an increased likelihood.” Id. He further claims the court

failed to consider the likelihood of reoffense, as it stated that there was no

known cure for pedophilic disorder and Aiello therefore was a lifetime risk of

reoffending.

                                     - 28 -
J-A26019-23

      We review an SVP designation to determine whether the Commonwealth

presented clear and convincing evidence that the defendant meets the

statutory definition of an SVP. Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d

186, 189 (Pa.Super. 2015). “As with any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we

view all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Baker, 24

A.3d 1006, 1033 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

      To be classified as an SVP, the Commonwealth must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant has “a mental abnormality or

personality disorder that makes [him] likely to engage in predatory sexually

violent offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12 (“Sexually violent predator”). The

statute defines “mental abnormality” as “[a] congenital or acquired condition

of a person that affects the emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a

manner that predisposes that person to the commission of criminal sexual acts

to a degree that makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other

persons.” Id. (“Mental abnormality”). The defendant’s conduct must also have

been “predatory,” which the statute defines as “[a]n act directed at a stranger

or at a person with whom a relationship has been instituted, established,

maintained, or promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support

victimization.” Id. (“Predatory”).

      To determine whether the defendant meets the above definition, the

SOAB evaluates the following factors, “which are mandatory and are designed

as criteria by which the likelihood of reoffense may be gauged”:

                                     - 29 -
J-A26019-23

        (1) Facts of the current offense, including:

           (i) Whether the offense involved multiple victims.

           (ii) Whether the individual exceeded              the    means
           necessary to achieve the offense.

           (iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the victim.

           (iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim.

           (v) Age of the victim.

           (vi) Whether the offense included a display of unusual
           cruelty by the individual during the commission of the
           crime.

           (vii) The mental capacity of the victim.

        (2) Prior offense history, including:

           (i) The individual's prior criminal record.

           (ii) Whether     the     individual   completed    any    prior
           sentences.

           (iii) Whether the individual participated in available
           programs for sexual offenders.

        (3) Characteristics of the individual, including:

           (i) Age.

           (ii) Use of illegal drugs.

           (iii) Any mental illness, mental disability or mental
           abnormality.

           (iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to the
           individual's conduct.

        (4) Factors that are supported in a sexual offender
        assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of
        reoffense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165,

1168-69 (Pa.Super. 2011).

                                        - 30 -
J-A26019-23

      At sentencing, Dr. Dudley testified as an expert in the assessment of

adult sexual offenders. N.T., Dec. 23, 2021, at 14. Dr. Dudley testified that

there were multiple victims, with both “hands-on” offenses and possession of

child pornography, and that the multiple victims established a pattern of

behavior. Id. at 21. Further, she testified that the period during which the

offenses occurred – over 16 years – was relevant because it demonstrated

that the pattern was longstanding. Id. at 21-22. She testified that these two

factors went “directly to the heart of the diagnostics.” Id. at 22. She stated

that to reach a conclusion that Aiello had pedophilia disorder, the evidence

had to establish a “sexual attraction to children and acting on that attraction,”

and having multiple victims over a period of many years was an indication of

attraction and acting on the impulse. Id.

      Dr. Dudley testified that the factor regarding whether the individual

exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense was not relevant, as

Aiello did not do anything more than necessary to gain compliance from his

victims. Id. at 22-23. She said, however, that Aiello’s relationship with the

victims had significance because he had befriended some of the victims’

families and gained access to the children, one of whom was a biological

relative. Id. at 23-24. She explained that there was “a level of trust between

the adults who were caring for these children and [] Aiello, and that increased

his ability to be able to sexually abuse them.” Id. at 24. She testified that the

ages of the victims were between seven and 17. Id. Dr. Dudley testified that

Aiello did not display unusual cruelty and there was no evidence that any

                                     - 31 -
J-A26019-23

children had any mental deficits or limitations that would have increased their

vulnerability. Id. at 24-25. She further testified that this was Aiello’s first

known offense, and therefore he had not completed prior sentences or

available sexual offender programs. Id. at 25.

      Dr. Dudley testified that Aiello was 32 years old when the abuse of

children began. Id. at 25-26. He was therefore significantly older than his

victims. Id. at 26. She testified that there was no evidence he was using illegal

drugs or providing drugs to the victims. Id.

      Dr. Dudley opined, to a reasonable degree of professional and

psychological certainty, that Aiello had pedophilic disorder, which is a sexual

attraction to juveniles and acting on that attraction. Id. at 27. She testified

that with someone with pedophilic disorder, “the attraction to pubescent

children . . . is immutable.” Id. at 28. However, she testified that “acting on

the urges[] can wax and wan[e] over time,” and “is a lifelong condition that

can be managed.” Id. Dr. Dudley further testified that Aiello had a “lifelong

risk of re-offense unless or until he receive[d] intensive sex-offender specific

treatment because, while it is possible to control deviate sexual impulses with

such treatment and motivation, . . . at present, there is no known cure.” Id.

at 29. She further testified there was research to support that offenders who

sexually assault children and are in possession of child sexual exploitation

material (“CSEM”) “are more likely to re-offend compared to offenders who

only possess CSEM or only sexually assault one child.” Id. at 30.

                                     - 32 -
J-A26019-23

      Dr. Dudley thus testified that it was her opinion, to a reasonable degree

of professional and psychological certainty, that         Aiello demonstrated

predatory behavior. Id. at 30. She based this opinion on the fact that Aiello

was the uncle of one victim and friends with the families of several other

victims and he “used those relationships to develop relationships with these

children for . . . his own sexual gratification and sexually abused them.” Id.

at 31. Dr. Dudley concluded that it was her opinion, to a reasonable degree of

profession and psychological certainty, that Aiello met the criteria to be

designated as an SVP. Id. at 32.

      Here, Dr. Dudley’s testimony supported, by clear and convincing

evidence, the court’s finding that Aiello was an SVP. Neither the fact that some

statutory factors were not relevant in this case, nor that Dr. Dudley stated

that hypothetical treatment can in some cases help manage pedophiliac

disorder, renders the evidence here insufficient. Rather, the evidence that the

Commonwealth produced specific to Aiello regarding the applicable factors

supported the court’s finding.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 4/10/2024

                                     - 33 -
J-A26019-23

              - 34 -