Court Opinion

ID: 9572241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:39:58.096676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:07.582534
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
concurring specially.
The issue in these cases is whether it is permissible for a trial *777court to use the actual language of OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) and (h) when instructing the jury on venue in a criminal homicide trial. I agree that such a charge does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of persuasion to the defense. However, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the statute as poorly drafted and I cannot concur in what is, in effect, a judicial rewriting of the law. In my opinion, the language of OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) and (h) is unambiguous, and should be followed and applied literally by the courts of this state.
“[A]ll criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed. . . .” Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI of the Ga. Const. of 1983. OCGA § 17-2-2 “does not violate the mandate of [this constitutional provision]. It merely provides a mechanism by which that mandate can be carried out when the place in which the crime is committed cannot be determined with certainty.” Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 181 (1) (274 SE2d 455) (1981). The statute is not unconstitutionally vague or indefinite. Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 367 (2) (b) (314 SE2d 621) (1984). The statute does not create any presumptions whatsoever. The General Assembly’s use of the mandatory phrase “shall be considered” simply establishes, as a matter of law, the county wherein the crime was committed under certain circumstances. Thus, if it cannot be determined in which of several counties the crime was committed, venue is proper in any one of them in which the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that it might have been committed. OCGA § 17-2-2 (h). With specific regard to homicide, venue is in the county where the cause of death was inflicted. OCGA § 17-2-2 (c). If that county cannot be determined, venue is proper in the county where the death occurred or where the dead body was discovered. OCGA § 17-2-2 (c).
According to the majority’s rephrasing of the statutory language, a jury “may consider whether” the crime was committed in one of the specified counties. However, the fact-finder has no discretion with regard to the matter of venue. Venue in a criminal case is controlled by our constitution and by the implementing provisions of OCGA § 17-2-2. As with the other elements of the State’s case, the jurors must determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of venue based upon the evidence admitted at trial. If the evidence does not establish in which of several counties the crime was committed, then venue is proper in any county wherein the evidence does show beyond a reasonable doubt that it might have been perpetrated. If the evidence in a homicide case does not establish the county in which the cause of death was inflicted, then venue is properly laid in the county where the death occurred or where the dead body was discovered. If the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that venue, as thus defined, is proper in the county where the trial is held, then the jury must return a verdict of not guilty. See Schiefelbein v. *778State, 258 Ga. 623 (373 SE2d 354) (1988); Felker v. State, supra at 368 (2) (c).
Decided June 2, 2003
Reconsideration denied July 11, 2003.
Jackson & Schiavone, George T. Jackson, Steven L. Sparger, for appellants.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Benjamin B. Reed, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jill M. Zubler, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Here, the State alleged that the murder occurred in Chatham County. Venue would be in that county under either OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) or (h). Felker v. State, supra at 367 (2) (b). The trial court correctly charged on those statutory provisions, and instructed the jury on the State’s burden to show venue beyond a reasonable doubt. Felker v. State, supra at 367 (2) (c). Under the majority’s suggested instruction, the jury would have been authorized to “consider” in which county venue was proper, rather than required to determine whether Chatham County was the proper venue under OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) or (h). The courts cannot rewrite legislation, and certainly should not do so in such a way as to create an impermissible and misleading impression that venue is a matter which is addressed to the jury’s wide-ranging discretion. The charge given by the trial court in this case tracked the language of the venue statute approved by the General Assembly, and the instruction was correct in all respects. For that reason, I concur in the affirmance of the judgments.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this special concurrence.