Court Opinion

ID: 9540183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:13:28.353034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:41.488117
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Staton, P.J.
I dissent from the majority opinion since it has misinterpreted IC 1971, 18-7-5-19 which clearly provides for-a quorum to transact the business of the Commission “at a regular *421or properly called special meeting. . . .” Therefore, Braughton v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals (1970), 146 Ind. App. 652, 257 N.E.2d 8391 would apply, since a “prior and legally effective determination . . .” has been made by the Commission. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment.
The statute, IC 1971, 18-7-5-19, provides:
“QUORUM — Number required for official action. — A majority of members qualified by this chapter (18-7-5-1 — 18-7-5-99) to vote, shall constitute a quorum. No action of the commission is official, however, unless authorized by a majority of the commission at a regular or properly called special meeting.”
The majority opinion has interpreted the statute to mean that no official, binding action can be taken by the commission unless there is at least a majority of the commission voting or six of the eleven members voting in favor of a proposal. This interpretation ignores the use of the word “quorum” and its meaning. The statute should be interpreted in the proper context of the language used and in accordance with the obvious intent of the legislature. The statute should be interpreted to mean that a majority of the commission shall constitute a quorum; however, no action of the quorum is official unless it takes place at a regular or properly called special meeting. Otherwise, there would be no purpose of defining what constituted a quorum or for the statute.
A “quorum” means the number of members who are legally competent to transact business in the absence of other members. Slush v. Patterson (1947), 201 Miss. 113, 29 So.2d 311. It implies a regular or properly called special meeting of the members. Application of McGovern (1943), 291 N.Y. 104, 51 N.E.2d 666. In State ex rel. Green v. Edmondson (1912), 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 577, 23 Ohio Dec. 85, the court explained the function of a quorum:
“[A] quorum consists of a majority of its members, and that such quorum, due notice having been given of the time and *422place of meeting to all members, can exercise the powers of the commission; and further, that a majority of such quorum is the action of the body or commission.”
This same general rule was applied in Davidson v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 46, 221 N.E.2d 814 when only three of the five members of the Indiana Supreme Court participated in an opinion. One of the three members, Judge Jackson, dissented; the other two members, Judges Arterburn and Myers, concurred. Chief Justice Arterburn wrote:
“It is to be noted that a majority of the Judges of the Court, which would be three in the present instance, may constitute a quorum. A quorum is defined as the number of persons that are members of a body when assembled who are legally competent to transact the business of such a body. Normally, without the constitutional provision, a majority is considered a quorum at common law. The Constitution could have fixed a different number, but did not. Three members of this Court, under the Constitution as well as at common law, constitute a quorum to do business. This Court, when so constituted, may render a 2-1 decision.”
The ambiguity here arises from the use of the word “commission” instead of the word “quorum” in the second sentence of the statute. If “quorum” is substituted for “commission,” the statute immediately becomes clear and meaningful. This meaning was the intent of the legislature. If this substitution, “quorum” for “commission,” is not made, the statute is ambiguous and meaningless. Without the substitution, the Indiana Legislature appears to have done a useless, meaningless act. State ex rel. Bynum v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 1 (1973), 259 Ind. 647, 291 N.E.2d 355. Cordial v. Grimm (1976), 169 Ind. App. 58, 346 N.E.2d 266.
A quorum of six Commission members voted on March 21, 1973. Four members voted against the proposed subdivision and two members voted in favor of the proposed subdivision. This was a “legally effective determination” by the Commission. Braughton, supra, does apply. I would reverse the trial court’s *423judgment with instructions to enter judgment for Richard E. Carpenter.
NOTE-Reported at 367 N.E.2d 1156.

. Braughton was overruled in part by Easley v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zon. App. of Marion Cty. (1974), 161 Ind. App. 501, 317 N.E.2d 185. Specifically, Easley overturned Braughton's holding that remonstrators raising the defense of res judicata in variance hearings bear the burden of proof to establish that conditions are unchanged since the time of a prior variance denial.