Court Opinion

ID: 9855640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:28:39.912339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:16.894164
License: Public Domain

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion written by Judge Hodny; however, I believe the summary judgment dismissal should be affirmed on the ground that the only third party to whom Aas’ letter was communicated by the Clinic did not understand it in a defamatory sense. With that fact, established by Linda Creighton’s affidavit and unrefuted by Judy, it is unnecessary for this Court to decide the issue of whether or not the letter is susceptible of a defamatory meaning.
In order for a libel to be actionable there must be a publication of it to a third party. Dvorak v. Kuhn, 175 N.W.2d 697 (N.D.1970). The Clinic concedes that the letter was published to a third party — Linda Creighton, administrative secretary to Mr. Aas — who typed and mailed the letter to Judy, and it is undisputed that Linda Creighton was the only third party to whom the letter was communicated by the Clinic. With regard to the communication of an allegedly libelous item the Restatement, Second, Torts § 563 (1977) provides the following:
“The meaning of a communication is that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to express.”
The official comment to the foregoing section highlights its importance to this case:
“. . . although the person making the communication intends it to convey a defamatory meaning, there is no defamation if the recipient does not so understand it. This is true although the defamatory meaning is so clear that an ordinary person would immediately recognize it.
“. . . The question to be determined is whether the communication is reasonably understood in a defamatory sense by the recipient.
* * * * * *
“It is not enough that the language used is reasonably capable of a defamatory interpretation if the recipient did not in fact so understand it.”
In support of its motion for summary judgment the Clinic submitted an affidavit of Linda Creighton indicating that she did not construe the letter in a defamatory sense:
“During late 1979, I handled one or more legal documents concerning a lawsuit by Judy Moritz against Dr. Giltner, a doctor at the Medical Arts Clinic.

“When I typed the letter (listening to the tape on the transcribing machine) and when I proof-read the letter, I remembered the legal documents that I had previously handled. It was my opinion that Mr. Aas sent the letter because of the lawsuit against Dr. Giltner. I did not, and cannot now, think of any other reason why the letter was sent.”
According to Linda’s affidavit she was aware of Judy’s lawsuit against Dr. Giltner and, with that knowledge, she understood the letter to mean that because of the law*464suit the Clinic’s physicians desired to withdraw from further treatment of Judy and her family.
Actions involving state of mind are not usually suited for disposition by summary judgment. Zuraff v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 252 N.W.2d 302 (N.D.1977). Nevertheless, when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided by Rule 56 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, an adverse party cannot rest upon the mere allegations or denials of her pleadings; but her response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in the rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Rule 56(e), N.D.R.Civ.P.; Boone v. Estate of Nelson, 264 N.W.2d 881 (N.D.1978). Through Linda Creighton’s affidavit the Clinic demonstrated that the letter was not understood in a defamatory sense. Judy did not respond by affidavit or otherwise to refute Linda’s affidavit and, accordingly, has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. For that reason I concur with the result of the majority opinion affirming the summary judgment dismissal.
I also concur with the majority opinion in its reversal of the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Clinic.