Court Opinion

ID: 9948841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 00:08:47.788474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:05.454420
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion IS
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                JAMEL JACQKEY GIBBS.                                  No. 83672
                Appellant,
                vs.
                THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                                                                          FILED
                Respondent.
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                                                                      CLE                  JURT
                                                                     SY
                                                                            H1EF DEPUTV CLER1r-

                           Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
                verdict, of second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Eighth
                Judicial District Court, Clark County; Tierra Danielle Jones, Judge.
                            Reversed and remanded.

                Law Office of Jeannie N. Hua, Inc., and Jeannie N. Hua, Las Vegas,
                for Appellant.

                Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
                Attorney, and Taleen R. Pandukht, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
                County,
                for Respondent.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, LEE, and BELL, JJ.

                                                OPINION

                By the Court, BELL, J.:
                           While in pretrial detention, Appellant Jamel Jacqkey Gibbs
                spoke with a defense investigator on a recorded phone line. At trial, the
                State admitted the recording into evidence over Gibbs's objection that the
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                conversation was privileged. The trial court found that the conversation
                was not protected by attorney-client privilege because Gibbs violated jail
                policy by using another detainee's telephone access code and made a three-
                way call to connect to his investigator. In this opinion, we examine whether
                the district court erred in finding Gibbs waived the attorney-client privilege.
                We conclude that a defendant's call to a defense investigator that is routed
                through a three-way call is, alone, insufficient to establish waiver of the
                attorney-client privilege absent a showing that the third party remained
                present during the conversation.          Further, we cannot conclude that
                violation of jail telephone policies operates as a waiver of attorney-client
                privilege. Accordingly, the district court erred in admitting the recorded
                phone call. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse the judgment
                of conviction and remand for further proceedings.'
                                              BACKGROUND
                            The State charged Jamel Gibbs with fatally shooting Jaylon
                Tiffith in the driveway of an apartment complex. Gibbs pleaded not guilty
                to the charges, and the case was set for trial. The record unambiguously
                reflects that defense counsel planned to focus the defense at trial on
                mistaken identity and undermine the single witness who identified Gibbs
                as the shooter.
                            While in pretrial detention, Gibbs placed several phone calls
                using another inrnate's access code. Gibbs called a third party, who then
                employed three-way calling to connect Gibbs to the intended receiver.

                       'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
                is not warranted in this appeal. Further, because we are reversing on the
                ground stated, we need not decide the remaining issues raised in this
                appeal.
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                  During one of these calls, Gibbs spoke with a defense investigator and
                  discussed details of the case that indicated Gibbs was present at the time of
                  the shooting. The State moved to admit this recording at trial. Gibbs
                  objected on the basis that the recorded conversation was protected by
                  attorney-client privilege.      The district court admitted the recording,
                  concluding that Gibbs waived attorney-client privilege because he violated
                  jail phone policies by using another detainee's access code and using three-
                  way calling.
                                 In addition to this evidence, Tiffith's cousin, Brionta Terrell,
                  identified Gibbs as the shooter after viewing a photograph on social media.
                  Another witness saw the shooting while driving by the apartment complex
                  but was unable to positively identify the shooter.
                                 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Gibbs of second-
                  degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. This appeal follows.
                                                  DISCUSSION
                  The district court abused its discretion in admitting the recorded phone call
                  between Gibbs and a defense investigator
                               Gibbs argues that the district court erred in admitting the
                  recording of the phone call between Gibbs and the defense investigator
                  because the conversation was protected by the attorney-client privilege.
                  Decisions regarding the admission of evidence lie within the district court's
                  discretion and will not be disturbed absent a showing that the district court
                  abused that discretion. Mclellan u. State, 124 Nev. 263, 267, 182 P.3d 106,
                  109 (2008). Such an abuse "occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary
                  or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason." Crawford v. State,
                  121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005) (internal quotation marks
                  omitted).   When the district court's exercise of discretion relies upon
                  findings of fact, those findings "are given deference and will not be set aside
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                unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence."
                Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 247, 251, 464 P.3d 114, 119
                (2020).
                             The attorney-client privilege protects against disclosure of
                confidential communications between a defendant and the defendant's
                attorney or a representative of the attorney.             See NRS 49.095(1).
                Confidential communications are "not intended to be disclosed to third
                persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the
                rendition of professional legal services."        NRS 49.055.   Attorney-client
                privilege, like all evidentiary privileges, is "not designed or intended to
                assist the fact-finding process." Diaz v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 88,
                98, 993 P.2d 50, 57 (2000). Rather, the purpose of this privilege is to
                C:encourage clients to make
                                            full disclosures to their attorneys in order to
                promote the broader public interests of recognizing the importance of fully
                informed advocacy in the administration of justice." Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v.
                Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 369, 374, 399 P.3d 334, 341 (2017); see Diaz,
                116 Nev. at 98, 993 P.2d at 57 (recognizing that evidentiary "privileges are
                justified   by   the   public's   interest   in   encouraging   socially   useful
                communications and by certain notions of legitimate privacy expectations").
                             For the attorney-client privilege to apply, "the communications
                must be between an attorney and client, for the purpose of facilitating the
                rendition of professional legal services, and be confidential." Wynn Resorts,
                133 Nev. at 374, 399 P.3d at 341. The attorney-client privilege encompasses
                cornmunications with a representative of the attorney, which, here, would
                include a defense investigator.          See NRS 49.055 (recognizing that
                confidential communications include disclosures to parties necessary to
                render legal services); NR.S 49.085 ("Representative of the lawyer' means a

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                person employed by the lawyer to assist in the rendition of professional legal
                services."); United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 802 (9th Cir. 2015)
                (protecting communications with third party acting as counsel's agent when
                communications were necessary for advising and defending client),
                abrogated on other grounds by Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443
                (2017). A defendant who asserts a privilege bears the burden of showing
                that the evidence is privileged and that the defendant has not waived that
                privilege. Canarelli, 136 Nev. at 252, 464 P.3d at 120; see also United States
                v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a party
                asserting privilege must "establish all the elements of the privilege,"
                including that it has not been waived); Louen v. Twedt, 236 F.R..D. 502, 506
                (E.D. Cal. 2006) ("A person asserting attorney-client privilege has the
                burden of persuasion as to all elements of the privilege, including an
                affirmative showing of non-waiver . . . .").     The privilege "should be
                interpreted and applied narrowly." Canarelli, 136 Nev. at 252, 464 P.3d at
                120 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                             The district court was persuaded that Gibbs's communications
                were not privileged, or that he had waived any privilege, because he
                connected his call to the investigator using three-way calling and violated
                the detention center's rules by using another inmate's access code. We do
                not agree.
                             First, we cannot say that Gibbs's violation of the detention
                center's rules prohibiting using another inmate's telephone access code
                resulted in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.        Attorney-client
                privilege belongs to the client and may only be waived by the client. NRS
                49.105(1). The analysis focuses entirely on whether the client intended—
                either explicitly or implicitly—to waive the attorney-client privilege.

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                Violation of a jail policy alone does not inform the analysis of whether a
                defendant intended for an attorney-client conversation to be confidential or
                whether the privilege is waived.
                            Second, we cannot conclude, based on the record before us, that
                use of three-way calling alone resulted in waiver of the attorney-client
                privilege. Absent a waiver, the communication between Gibbs and the
                defense investigator was a confidential communication protected by
                attorney-client privilege. The investigator's role was to assist counsel in
                preparing a legal defense for Gibbs, and Gibbs's communications with hirn
                concerned Gibbs's whereabouts at the time of the shooting, a matter that
                was material to his defense.
                            The record does not indicate that the three-way calling method
                used by Gibbs to communicate with the investigator rendered the
                conversation nonconfidential. Generally, communications between a client
                and counsel in the presence of a third party lack confidentiality. Neu. Tax
                Comm'n v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115, 134, 310 P.2d 852, 862 (1957), superseded on
                other grounds by statute as stated in M & R Inv. Co. v. Nev. Gaming
                Comm'n, 93 Nev. 35, 35, 559 P.2d 829, 830 (1977). The presence of a third
                party implies that the client did not intend the communication to be
                confidential. See NRS 49.055 ("A communication is 'confidential' if it is not
                intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom
                disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to
                the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
                communication."); Wardleigh v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 111 Nev. 345, 353,
                891 P.2d 1180, 1185 (1995) (recognizing that the presence of people who
                were not represented clients indicates an intent that a meeting with counsel
                is not confidential). Here, though, nothing in the record shows a third party

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                         listened to or participated in the call. Gibbs called a third party who then
                         made a three-way call to connect Gibbs to the investigator. Although a third
                         party was used to connect the call, the transcript of the call does not indicate
                         that the third party listened to or participated in the conversation with the
                         investigator.
                                     No other evidence in the record indicates that the third party
                         remained on the call, either actively listening to the conversation or
                         passively remaining in earshot of the conversation, see Rogers v. State, 717
                         S.E.2d 629, 632 (Ga. 2011) (considering whether evidence showed that third
                         party to attorney-client conference call ceased to listen to call to determine
                         that party's presence); see also Manley v. State, 115 Nev. 114, 120, 979 P.2d
                         703, 707 (1999) (holding that disclosure of some contents of communication
                         between client and counsel operates as waiver of privilege regarding entire
                         communication), as opposed to merely connecting the call and either placing
                         down the handset or disconnecting from the other parties, see Lisle v. State,
                         113 Nev. 679, 701, 941 P.2d 459, 474 (1997) (holding that merely informing
                         third party that communication between client and counsel occurred does
                         not waive privilege regarding conversation), overruled on other grounds by
                         Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1117 n.9, 968 P.2d 296, 315 n.9 (1998).
                         Because some telecommunication carriers permit the host of a three-way
                         call to disconnect and leave the remaining parties connected, see, e.g.,
                         AT&T, Use Three-Way Calling, http ://att.com/support/article/u-verse-voice/
                         KM1064301/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2024); Xfinity, Use the Three-Way Calling
                         Feature with Xfinity Voice, http://xfinity.com/support/articles/3-w ay-calling
                         (last visited Feb. 21, 2024), the host may have even completely disconnected
                         after the investigator joined the call.

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                            The district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to gather
                any additional evidence regarding the waiver issue. Given the absence of
                information in the record, we cannot conclude that substantial evidence
                supports the district court's finding that Gibbs waived the attorney-client
                privilege. See Canarelli, 136 Nev. at 251, 464 P.3d at 119. Thus, we
                conclude that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
                Gibbs's conversation with the investigator was not protected by the
                attorney-client privilege.
                The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
                           The State contends that even if the district court abused its
                discretion in admitting the recorded phone call, that error is harmless. "Any
                error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
                rights shall be disregarded." NRS 178.598. The error here involves the
                admission of evidence protected by attorney-client privilege. Because the
                error intrudes upon the right to counsel, we can conclude that the error was
                harmless only if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
                Manley, 115 Nev. at 121-23, 979 P.2d at 707-09 (evaluating the iniproper
                admission of evidence in violation of attorney-client privilege for harmless
                error under Chapman u. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). We cannot
                conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
                            Here, defense counsel planned a mistaken identity defense and
                planned to undermine the single witness who identified Gibbs as the
                shooter. No evidence suggested that the witness had met Gibbs before.
                After the shooting, the witness used social media to help identify Gibbs at
                the scene, demonstrating a lack of familiarity with Gibbs.         While the
                remaining evidence tying Gibbs to the offense may have been sufficient to

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                support a conviction, the evidence was not overwhelming. The evidence at
                trial showed no weapon was recovered that could be matched to the casing
                left at the scene, the projectile recovered during the autopsy, or the

                ammunition recovered from Gibbs's girlfriend's apartment. Although the
                ammunition recovered from the girlfriend's apartment was the same brand
                and caliber as the casing found at the scene, no forensic evidence was
                introduced to suggest a more compelling connection. Gibbs's statements to
                the investigator conceded that Gibbs was present during the shooting. This
                evidence directly undermined the theory of defense and necessitated a
                change in strategy at the start of trial; therefore, we cannot conclude beyond
                a reasonable doubt that its admission was harmless. See Carr v. State, 96
                Nev. 238, 239-40, 607 P.2d 114, 116 (1980) (concluding that erroneous

                admission of hearsay that "directly undermined the defense's theory of the
                case" was not harmless).
                                               CONCLUSION
                            The district court abused its discretion in admitting a recording
                of a phone call between Gibbs and his defense investigator. In reaching this
                determination, we conclude that a jail rule violation in and of itself does not
                support a finding that the attorney-client privilege was waived. Further,
                while we agree that the presence of a third party during a conversation may
                waive the privilege, the limited record here does not support such a finding.
                Because the conversation was privileged and the admission of the phone

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                call was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse the judgment
                of conviction and rernand for a new trial.

                                                                               J.
                                                    Bell     Ce.Y   3P------

                We concur:

                                                J
                Stiglich

                                                J
                Lee

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