Court Opinion

ID: 9528097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:36:59.715628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:29.404350
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
specially concurring.
Although I agree with the decision of the majority to affirm the trial court’s summary judgment order, I reach that result by a route differently traveled from the route traveled by the majority.
In June, 1989, the plaintiff hired the defendant to represent her in divorce proceedings filed against her by her husband. Of paramount concern in that action were custody of the parties’ minor daughter and a fair distribution of the marital property. The defendant's legal representation of the plaintiff ended in late September, 1989, about a week after a one and one-half day trial. Conducting the trial was district court judge Timothy Judson. As a result of the trial, the judge granted primary custody of the parties’ minor daughter to the plaintiff’s husband; he also, divided the property.
Dissatisfied with the results of the divorce trial, the plaintiff pursued an appeal1 and filed an action against the defendant in February, 1991, in which she alleged legal malpractice2 and unlawful execution and seizure of a motor vehicle to satisfy delinquent legal fees.3 With regard to the plaintiff’s legal malpractice charge, she alleged in her complaint that her divorce lawyer had departed from accepted professional standards in the following particulars:
• failure to call at the trial expert and lay witnesses known to the defendant whose testimony would have been relevant to the determination of the custody of the plaintiff’s minor daughter;
• failure at the trial to introduce testimony and exhibits as to the sexual practices of her husband which were relevant in determining the child’s custody;
• failure at the trial to impeach or rebut the testimony of her husband and his witnesses by use of available depositions and witnesses whose testimony was known to the defendant;
• failure at the trial to present evidence available to the defendant which would have resulted in the trial court awarding her a greater share of the marital property than was awarded to her; and
• failure to ensure that the divorce decree embodied the trial court’s decision as it appears in the trial transcript.
Following the defendant’s answer, which denied the allegations of negligence and unlawful execution and seizure, the parties *1253engaged in discovery. On May 23, 1991, the plaintiff answered the defendant’s written interrogatories. In her answers she listed and described all of the acts, errors and omissions of the defendant which she contended fell below the standard of care for a practicing Wyoming divorce attorney. Her list and description was about seven pages in length and can be divided into two discrete categories: trial and nontrial allegations. In the “nontrial” category fall the charges that the defendant failed to consult the plaintiff about the selection of an appraiser to appraise the value of the marital property; the inspection outside her presence of her papers and records by her husband’s attorney; and the hearing to determine whether a certain attorney, against whom the plaintiff had negative feelings, would be appointed guardian ad litem for her daughter.
In the “trial” category fall the charges that the defendant failed to discredit the plaintiff’s husband on cross-examination concerning prior inconsistent testimony and statements, his drinking problem, his abuse of animals, his unusual sex habits, and his violent temper; failed to call witnesses on the plaintiff’s behalf who would have testified about her care of and bonding with her daughter; failed to present evidence to support her position as to a fair distribution of the marital property; failed to call as a favorable witness a certain child psychologist who had evaluated the parties and their daughter; and failed to object to, and move for a mistrial because of, an ex parte communication between the trial court judge and the child’s guardian ad litem.
In July, 1991, at the plaintiff’s request, the trial court set a date for a scheduling conference. As a result of that conference, the trial court entered a scheduling order. In pertinent part, the order required the plaintiff to designate expert witnesses by October 15, 1991, and the defendant to complete the depositions of those expert witnesses by October 31, 1991. The order further required the defendant to designate his expert witnesses by November 15,1991, and required all discovery to be completed by December 16, 1991. Finally, the order established a trial date of March 30, 1992.
In late September, 1991, again at the plaintiff’s request, the court entered an amended scheduling order which extended by fifteen days the dates on which the parties were to designate expert witnesses and the defendant was to have completed the depositions of the plaintiff’s experts. The other dates in the scheduling order remained unchanged.
On November 4, 1991, a few days beyond the date on which the designation of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses was due according to the amended scheduling order, the plaintiff filed a motion dated November 1, unaccompanied by supporting affidavit, seeking the trial court’s order extending to November 15, 1991, the date on which the plaintiff must designate her expert witnesses. The plaintiff did not seek a hearing on this motion, none was held, and the trial court never entered on order extending the November 1 deadline.
Not until December 13, 1991, more than forty days after the plaintiff’s expert witness designation was due, did the plaintiff file her expert witness designation. In the intervening time period, the defendant had timely designated his three expert witnesses who included the defendant himself and Timothy J. Judson, the trial court judge who had presided at the subject divorce trial and later returned to private law practice.
On December 20, 1991, the defendant filed his summary judgment motion with supporting materials which included testimony of his three expert witnesses in the form of either affidavits or deposition transcripts. Although the plaintiff opposed the defendant’s motion, her supporting material included only lay testimony from herself and other lay witnesses, but not expert testimony. Noticeably absent from her supporting materials was any testimony from the expert witnesses she had designated tardily.
Following a hearing in late January, 1992, the trial court, in early February, 1992, issued its decision letter in which it announced it was granting the defendant’s *1254motion. In its decision the trial court correctly observed, among other things, that in this legal malpractice case, as with medical malpractice cases, expert testimony is necessary to establish, as fact, that the defendant lawyer’s conduct fell below the standard of care which would have been exercised by a reasonable prudent attorney in the same or similar circumstances. The trial court remarked that the plaintiff had failed both to offer expert testimony on that crucial issue of fact and to seek relief under the relevant rules of civil procedure to obtain additional time in which to obtain such testimony. Finding that no expert testimony had been presented to suggest that the defendant had departed from recognized standards of legal practice, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion. The order was entered shortly thereafter.
We review a summary judgment de novo and may affirm the judgment on any proper legal ground, even one not used by the trial court. Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 706 (Wyo.1987). The majority affirms the judgment based on the sufficiency of the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness, Timothy Judson. I would hold that Mr. Judson’s testimony was deficient4 because it does not contain statements of the recognized standards of care applicable to the several allegations of negligence made by the plaintiff in her complaint, in her answers to interrogatories, and in her deposition testimony.
In past decisions we have taken a firm stand on what we require of an expert witness in a professional negligence case. We have made it clear that an expert witness must establish what the standard of care is and in what way the professional deviated from or complied with that standard. See, e.g., Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo.1989) (dental malpractice); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo.1987) (hospital negligence malpractice); Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo.1985) (hospital and medical malpractice); Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768 (Wyo.1981) (medical malpractice). If the supporting materials were deficient, we did not hesitate to refuse to grant summary judgment.
The majority acknowledges that the Judson expert testimony “is arguably flawed because it does not specifically state the applicable standard of care.” Op. at pg. 1250. But then the majority justifies its departure from this court’s usual swift reaction to such deficient expert testimony by declaring, without either evidentiary or legal support, that the plaintiff’s allegations “primarily concerned Mr. Lubnau’s tactical errors.” Op. at p. 1250. Such tactical errors, the majority explains, are a matter of judgment as to which the expert witness may simply state his or her opinion whether the defendant attorney acted reasonably under the circumstances. I have grave concerns with the majority’s departure from our long-standing case law and placing the court on such a slippery slope without the benefit of either evidentiary support or legal support. When the majority in a legal malpractice case is willing to so easily, and upon such minimal consideration of the plaintiff’s numerous allegations, identify the defendant’s various acts and omissions as matters of judgment, it runs the risk of being perceived as having established a double standard, i.e., it applies a “matter of judgment” standard for the legal profession but a “reasonable care” standard for the other learned professions. This court has rejected the notion of permissible errors of honest judgment in the context of allegations of medical malpractice. Kobos v. Everts, 768 P.2d 534, 536-39, 549-50 (Wyo.1989) (Cardine, C.J., specially concurring). I would feel much more comfortable with the majority’s treatment of the defendant’s alleged “tactical errors” if the defendant’s expert witnesses had provided appropriate opinion testimony identifying the plaintiff’s numerous allegations as falling within the category of trial tactics as to which the ordinary practicing attorney must exercise good *1255faith judgment. Indeed, authority exists that a trial lawyer is immune from liability for alleged tactical errors made in good faith during the course of a trial. See, e.g., Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice, §§ 24.7, 24.34 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp.1992) and eases cited therein; Ambrosio and McLaughlin supra, n. 2, at 1367-68 and cases cited therein; John J. Thomason, A Plea for Absolute Immunity For Errors in Trial Judgment, 14 Wil-liamette L.J. 369 (1978); and Jody Keys, The Use of Expert Testimony in Actions Against Litigation Attorneys, 14 William-ette L.J. 425 (1978). Although a good number of the plaintiff’s allegations fall under the “trial tactics” umbrella, some do not; the majority opinion fails to discuss those. Thus, the majority opinion does not seem to cover the defendant’s alleged failures to consult the plaintiff about the selection of an appraiser to appraise the value of the marital property; the inspection of her papers and records by opposing counsel; and the hearing to determine the guardian ad litem for her daughter.
Because of my foregoing concerns, I prefer to uphold the judgment below on a different ground. The trial court ordered and held a scheduling conference which resulted in a scheduling order. As Wyo. R.Civ.P. 26(f) provides, “[fjollowing the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order * * * establishing a plan and schedule for discovery * * The plaintiff failed to comply with the amended scheduling order when she did not timely designate her expert witnesses. The trial court appropriately recognized that this legal malpractice case was one in which the testimony of expert witnesses was necessary to establish, as factual matters, the standards of care with respect to each allegation of wrongdoing, whether the defendant’s conduct complied with or deviated from those standards of care, and causation. We have not heard the plaintiff claim that some or all of her allegations were of such nature that the standard of care and defendant’s compliance or deviation were within the lay person’s common knowledge, rendering unnecessary expert testimony. Since expert testimony was necessary for the plaintiff to present her case and since she had violated the trial court’s amended scheduling order with regard to designating expert witnesses, when the trial court held the summary judgment hearing the plaintiff was unable to present her case. Under the provisions of Wyo.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C), if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the trial court may, among other things, make an order rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party. The trial court exercises broad discretion with regard to such sanctions. Matter of Estate of Mora, 611 P.2d 842, 846 (Wyo.1982); see also, Gooder v. Roth, 788 P.2d 611, 614 (Wyo.1990).
I would consider the trial court’s judgment as a default judgment. I would affirm that judgment as I find the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances. Other jurisdictions have upheld summary judgments in legal malpractice actions under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Hinshaw, 75 Ill.App.3d 516, 31 Ill.Dec. 357, 363, 394 N.E.2d 559, 565 (1979). See also, Lipscomb v. Krause, 87 Cal.App.3d 970, 151 Cal.Rptr. 465, 468 (1978) (affirmed trial court’s order granting attorney’s motion for nonsuit when plaintiff failed to present expert testimony); Shanley v. Barnett, 168 Ill.App.3d 799, 119 Ill.Dec. 592, 595-96, 523 N.E.2d 60, 63-64 (1988) (plaintiff’s failure to obtain expert testimony to establish attorney’s negligence rendered summary judgment for attorney appropriate); and Fishow v. Simpson, 55 Md.App. 312, 462 A.2d 540, 544 (1983).

. Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261 (Wyo.1991).

. For an overview of such an action, see Michael P. Ambrosis & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Establishing Liability in Legal Malpractice Cases, 61 Temple L.Rev. 1351 (1988); and William D. Farber, Legal Malpractice in Domestic Relations, Proof of Facts, 44 Am. Jur.2d 377 (1986 & Supp.1992).

.The issue concerning the alleged unlawful execution and seizure of a motor vehicle is not raised on appeal. We deem it waived.

. Similarly, I would hold that the other expert testimony offered by the defendant was, for the same reason, also deficient.