Court Opinion

ID: 9565740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:26:39.479459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:52.048506
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
Because it is my opinion that the majority has made its own determination of the weight of the evidence in this case, I respectfully dissent.
In order to view this case from the proper appellate perspective, let us look at excerpts from the findings of the trial court made on the basis of the evidence presented before him: “The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the children are deprived in that they lack the physical presence of the mother and the mother’s physical providing of their needs, that they are further deprived because the mother has not provided any emotional support to the children. The Court further finds that this deprivation is due to a lack of proper parental care and control in that the mother has failed . . . significantly for a period of one year to provide for the care and support of the children as required by the judicial Orders of this Court and has *564failed to comply with the Court ordered plan designed to reunite the children with her. The Court further finds that the failure of the mother to so provide is without justifiable cause on the part of the mother. The Court finds that the actions of the mother in her refusal to cooperate with the Department of Family and Children Services, and in her failure to accomplish the goals as stated by the Court in its reviews of the matter as well as the mother’s continued failure to secure employment and housing and her continual failure to cooperate with the Court and with the Department of Family and Children Services indicates that the deprivation will continue and is likely to continue and will not likely be remedied. The Court further finds that the continued deprivation will and is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, and moral harm to the children involved, that the actions of the older daughter and the testimony concerning the behaviors of the two sons while in the mother’s custody indicates that said mental and emotional harm has already occurred and that the mere non-presence of the parent in the home and the failure of the mother to provide the basic necessities of a home and food for the said children, and that parent’s reliance on others to do the same for her will cause serious emotional harm to the said children. . . . The Court further finds that after considering the physical, mental, emotional, and moral conditions of the child as well as the needs of the children, especially the need for the children to have a secure and stable home, it is in the best interest of these children that the termination of the parental rights of the mother be had.”
Even in the face of these findings by the trial court, which are supported by a transcript of the evidence upon which these findings are based, the majority makes its own determination that “there is no evidence which suggests that the children, who are not living in the appellant’s custody, are currently suffering or are in danger of suffering in the future any serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm due to the mere continuance of their relationship with the appellant.” (Majority opinion, page 562.) Quite to the contrary, I believe that “[t]he strictures of QCGA § 15-11-81 were met in this case and well supported by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of continued deprivation and parental unfitness; the finding of the trial court [should] not be set aside. [Cits.]” In re G. M. N., 183 Ga. App. 458, 461 (359 SE2d 217) (1987).
The majority “opinion [reviews] the evidence presented below and [applies] the clear and convincing evidence test. But, this is not the function of a reviewing court. The factfinding and weighing of evidence is to be done in the trial court under the clear and convincing evidence test. The reviewing court is to defer to the lower court in the area of factfinding and should affirm unless the appellate standard of review, here the rational factfinder test of Blackburn, is not *565met. When we apply the test here we note the conflicting evidence presented to the trial court and conclude that a rational factfinder could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the [parental rights of appellant should be terminated].” (Emphasis supplied.) In re B. D. C., 256 Ga. 511, 513 (350 SE2d 444) (1986). I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and, therefore, I dissent.
Decided December 1, 1987
Rehearing denied December 18, 1987 — Rehearing dismissed January 19, 1988
James R. McKay, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Carol A. Cosgrove, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.