Court Opinion

ID: 9597106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:55:29.815274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:03.305714
License: Public Domain

Ness, Justice
(concurring in result) :
Appellant desired to prove through the testimony of narcotics officers, presumably experts on drug use habits, that the statute created an unconstitutional presumption. Apparently his effort to introduce testimony was predicated on State v. Tabory, 260 S. C. 355, 363, 196 S. E. (2d) 111, 113 (1973) in which this Court refused to consider the identical question because “there is nothing in the record before us to substantiate such contention.”
I would affirm the conviction on a more restrictive basis than the majority. The appellant was in possession of four and three-eighths pounds of marijuana. It is now common knowledge that four and three-eighths pounds is a substantial amount of marijuana. I would take judicial notice that the legislature would not be amiss in concluding that it is more likely than not that one who possessed that quantity of marijuana did so with the intent to distribute.
The reason for a stricter judicial analysis of a criminal presumption statute is to insure that any conviction comports with the due process clause which requires “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . .” In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. (2d) 368 (1970). Thus, we learn from Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed. (2d) 380 (1973) that a presumption statute is valid “if a statutory inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to in*95voke the inference is sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well as the more-likely-than-not standard . . .” at page 2361-62. Accordingly, I would hold that the appellant was not denied a fair trial by virtue of the statute, even if it were unconstitutional, as to a defendant who possessed a lesser quantity of marijuana.
Appellant occupies a position similar to that of Captain Howard Levy who was court-martialed for violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Captain Levy alleged that the articles relied upon by the government for his conviction were unconstitutionally vague. In affirming the convictions, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who has been forewarned of the criminality of his own conduct is not entitled to attack a vague statute. Levy was not allowed to mount a constitutional attack on behalf of others whose conduct may have been constitutionally protected. Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 2562, 41 L. Ed. (2d) 439 (1974).
Similarly, appellant cannot seize upon the unconstitutionality of the statutory presumption. The presumption could clearly be applied to him without violating the Constitution. He has not been the victim of a statute which might result in convictions secured by proof of each element by a standard less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I agree that the conviction should be affirmed.
The majority opinion seems to follow three distinct lines of reasoning. First, the Court is imbued with a “specialized competency” in the area of criminal presumption statutes dealing with narcotics offenses. Second, the Court should apply a generalized judicial notice of the ability of the legislature to consider data relevant to the presumption and cull conclusions from it. Third, the quality of testimony sought to be introduced by the appellant would not be adequate to overcome the presumption of constitutionality.
*96I have not been annointed with “specialized competency” concerning the habits of marijuana users. Further, I do not think it is a matter of common knowledge that one who possesses more than one ounce of marijuana does so necessarily with the intent to distribute; therefore, a generalized judicial notice is not proper. Finally, while I agree with the majority that it is unlikely that the testimony of a few narcotics officers would overcome the strong presumption of validity of the statute and persuade a court that the statute was unconstitutional, the appellant’s counsel attempted to make an offer of proof, but was summarily dismissed by the trial judge. Any doubt as to the persuasiveness of the proposed testimony should be resolved in favor of the appellant.
I do not consider either Leary v. United States, supra, or United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 85 S. Ct. 754, 757, 13 L. Ed. (2d) 658 (1965) supportive of the majority’s reliance upon “specialized judicial competence.” In both, the Supreme Court recognized that data relative to similar criminal presumptions “plainly is ‘not within specialized judicial competence’.” Leary, supra, 89 S. Ct., p. 1549. A major portion of the Leary opinion discusses empirical data concerning the validity of the presumption. Appellant was merely attempting to develop a record to document his argument, as was done in Leary, and suggested by this Court as the appropriate procedure in State v. Tabory, supra 2
If I were convinced the presumption statute, as applied to one who possessed four and three-eighths pounds of marijuana, could be assailed within the test established by United States v. Leary, supra, and United States v. Barnes, supra, I would remand so the appellant could be fully heard in accordance with State v. Tabory, supra. However, being convinced the appellant was not prejudiced and that the pre*97sumption, as applied to him, satisfied due process requirements, I would affirm on this limited basis.
Rhodes, J., concurs.

 assume the majority has concluded that the legislative information maintains currency. “A statute based upon a legislative declaration of facts is subject to constitutional attack on the ground that the facts no longer exist; in ruling upon such a challenge a court must, of course, be free to re-examine the factual declaration.” Leary v. United States, supra, 89 S. Ct., p. 1549, footnote 68.