Court Opinion

ID: 9556284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 20:00:17.409614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.786569
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

No. 22-1525

                            JOHN DOE,

                       Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                v.

      TOWN OF LISBON; NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

                           Defendants,

                          EUGENE VOLOKH,

                      Intervenor, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

         [Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                 Kayatta, Gelpí, and Montecalvo,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Eugene Volokh and Ireland Rose Larsen, Law Student Advocate,
with whom First Amendment Clinic, UCLA School of Law were on brief,
for appellant.
     Christopher T. Meier, with whom John M. Crabbs and Cooper
Cargill Chant, P.A. were on brief, for appellee.
     Katie Townsend, Bruce D. Brown, Shannon A. Jankowski, Sasha
Dudding, and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, on brief
for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 15 Media
Organizations, amici curiae.
August 16, 2023
            KAYATTA,        Circuit          Judge.       Intervenor      Eugene        Volokh

challenges the district court's decision to allow a former New

Hampshire police officer to proceed pseudonymously in challenging

the inclusion of his name on New Hampshire's "Exculpatory Evidence

Schedule" (EES).            We assume appellate jurisdiction over this

interlocutory appeal to resolve Volokh's challenge on the merits.

Because Doe's reasons for proceeding pseudonymously place his case

within the category of "exceptional cases in which party anonymity

ordinarily will be warranted," Doe v. MIT, 46 F.4th 61, 71 (1st

Cir.   2022),      we     affirm       the   district      court's      exercise       of   its

discretion in denying Volokh's motion.

                                               I.

                                               A.

            The     EES     is     a    list     maintained       by    New    Hampshire's

Department of Justice identifying law enforcement officers "who

have     engaged     in     misconduct         reflecting        negatively       on    their

credibility     or      trustworthiness."                 N.H.   Ctr.    for    Pub.        Int.

Journalism v. N.H. Dep't of Just., 247 A.3d 383, 387 (N.H. 2020).

Law enforcement officials initially began the list without any

statutory mandate as a means of sharing information about officer

misconduct with prosecutors to better facilitate their compliance

with Brady disclosure requirements in the wake of a decision by

New Hampshire's Supreme Court.                      Id. at 388–89 (describing the

effect     of   State       v.     Laurie,          653   A.2d    549     (N.H.        1995)).

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Subsequently, litigation arose concerning the extent to which, if

any, the EES was a public record subject to disclosure under New

Hampshire's Right-to-Know Law.          Id. at 386–87.         New Hampshire's

Supreme Court classified the EES as a public record that did not

fall into the disclosure exemption carved out for police personnel

files.     Id. at 391–92.     However, that holding did not require the

public disclosure of the names of officers with pending challenges

to their listing.       Id. at 387.

            A year later, New Hampshire enacted a statute that more

or less codified the status quo in the wake of the decisions by

New Hampshire's highest court. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 105:13–d

(2021). In this manner, New Hampshire sought to provide the public

with important information concerning police misconduct while also

affording officers notice and an opportunity to show that they

should not be included on the list before their inclusion is made

public.

            As relevant here, for officers like Doe whose names were

on   the   EES   in   2021,   the   statute   requires   the    New   Hampshire

Department of Justice to notify the officer that the officer's

name is on the list and gives the officer 180 days to "file a

lawsuit in superior court regarding the officer's placement on the

[EES]." Id. § 105:13–d(II)(a). Should the officer timely commence

such a lawsuit, the officer's name will remain nonpublic during

the pendency of the legal challenge and thereafter if the court

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finds in favor of the officer (with exceptions not relevant here).

Id. § 105:13–d(II)(d).

                                 B.

          Formerly employed by the Town of Lisbon ("Town") police

department, Doe complains that the Town caused the New Hampshire

Department of Justice to add his name to the EES. When Doe received

notice of his placement on the list, he timely commenced this

lawsuit in New Hampshire state court challenging his listing and

alleging that the Town's actions in causing him to be placed on

the list violated his rights under state and federal law, including

his rights to due process.   The defendants timely removed the suit

to federal court.   Under both state and federal law, Doe seeks

damages and an injunction removing his name from the list.    Both

parties presume that the adjudication of Doe's claims under New

Hampshire law constitutes the type of proceeding envisioned by the

New Hampshire statute for challenging a listing on the EES.

          Because disclosure of his name will allegedly cause much

of the very harm he seeks to avoid, Doe has sued under the "John

Doe" pseudonym rather than his own name.   Apparently by oversight,

a single page of the original complaint contains a word processing

pathway that includes Doe's actual name.     Prior to removal, Doe

secured an order from the New Hampshire Superior Court sealing the

state court docket and all pleadings.   After removal, the parties

filed a joint "motion for redaction" asking that the district court

                               - 5 -
redact the reference path and file name contained on the complaint

that revealed Doe's full name to protect Doe's pseudonymity.                 The

district court granted the motion subject to the condition that a

redacted copy of the complaint be placed in the public docket.               As

a result, the unredacted state court complaint is sealed, and there

appears   on   the   federal   docket    a    redacted   complaint    that   is

identical to the original complaint in all respects except for

redaction of the word processing pathway containing Doe's name.

Nothing else in the federal docket is redacted or sealed.

           Following    removal,   the       parties   agreed   to   split   the

action, retaining in federal court all of Doe's claims for damages

under federal and state law, while remanding to state court his

requests that the court: (1) declare that he should not be listed

on the EES; and (2) issue an injunction (or writ of mandamus)

ordering the removal of his name.1

           During the pendency of these (now several) lawsuits, the

New Hampshire Department of Justice has not released to the public

the listing of Doe's name on the EES.           All parties to this appeal

presume -- and therefore so shall we -- that if Doe prevails in

     1  Counts I and II allege that Doe's inclusion on the EES
violated his procedural and substantive due process rights under
the United States Constitution and the New Hampshire Constitution.
Counts V and VI, both asserted only against the Town, allege libel,
slander, and damage to Doe's reputation and seek attorney's fees.
Counts III and IV, remanded in full, seek declaratory relief and
mandamus removing Doe's name from the list. No party challenges
the appropriateness of this severance and remand.

                                   - 6 -
the remanded state proceeding his name will be deleted from the

EES absent further proceedings not relevant here.          Conversely, it

also appears that all parties agree that, should Doe lose the state

action, his listing will become public.

          Both parties to this lawsuit are content to have Doe

proceed as Doe, but Volokh, a UCLA law professor, is not.           He has

intervened in the federal action to challenge Doe's pseudonymity

and to request that the single sealed document in the record, the

state court complaint that includes Doe's name in the reference

path and filename at the bottom of one page, be unsealed.           Volokh

contends that he cannot effectively write about the case in his

academic work and on his blog because of Doe's anonymity.

          In   an   order   "limited   to   pretrial   proceedings,"    the

district court granted Volokh's motion to intervene but denied his

motion to unseal and challenge pseudonymity.           Volokh now asks us

to reverse that denial.

                                  II.

          At the outset, Doe challenges this court's appellate

jurisdiction   over    Volokh's   interlocutory        appeal   under   the

collateral order doctrine.     This doctrine permits appellate courts

"to hear appeals from judgments that are not complete and final if

they 'fall in that small class which finally determine claims of

right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the

action, too important to be denied review and too independent of

                                  - 7 -
the   cause    itself    to    require    that   appellate     consideration     be

deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.'" Godin v. Schencks,

629 F.3d 79, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Nieves-Márquez v.

Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 123 n.13 (1st Cir. 2003)).                  We have not

yet   addressed      whether    orders    granting   motions     to    proceed   by

pseudonym fall within the collateral order doctrine, although we

have held that "orders denying motions to proceed by pseudonym are

immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine."                 MIT,

46 F.4th at 66 (emphasis added).                 We decline to resolve this

question      now.      Instead,    we    assume   that   we    have    appellate

jurisdiction over Volokh's appeal "[r]ather than resolving the

issues relating to [the] application of the collateral order

doctrine."      Sherrod v. Breitbart, 720 F.3d 932, 936 (D.C. Cir.

2013).        "Although        hypothetical      jurisdiction     is    generally

disfavored, such a barrier is insurmountable only when Article III

jurisdiction is in issue."          Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar, 976

F.3d 86, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).                     This case

poses a question of statutory, not Article III, jurisdiction.2

      2 The collateral order doctrine provides an exception to 28
U.S.C. § 1291's statutory grant of jurisdiction over final
decisions of United States district courts to the courts of appeal.
Because the potential jurisdictional constraint here is imposed by
statute and not by the Constitution, we may assume hypothetical
jurisdiction here. See Tacuri-Tacuri v. Garland, 998 F.3d 466,
472 (1st Cir. 2021) ("[A]s this Court has done before when
statutory   jurisdiction   is  ambiguous   but   the   merits   are
straightforward, we bypass the jurisdictional issue and explain
why the merits hold no water."); Donahue v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg.

                                         - 8 -
Thus, the question of jurisdiction "need not be resolved if a

decision on the merits will favor the party challenging the court's

jurisdiction."   Id. at 92.   For reasons we will explain, a decision

on the merits favors Doe.     We therefore exercise our discretion to

assume appellate jurisdiction to resolve Volokh's appeal on the

merits.

                                  III.

                                   A.

          Federal courts maintain a "strong presumption against

the use of pseudonyms in civil litigation."       Does 1-3 v. Mills, 39

F.4th 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2022).           Nevertheless, a district court

"enjoys broad discretion to quantify the need for anonymity in the

case before it."    MIT, 46 F.4th at 72.        "This broad discretion

extends to the court's ultimate determination as to whether that

need outweighs the public's transparency interest." Id. Our court

then reviews "a district court's denial of a motion to proceed by

pseudonym for abuse of discretion," id. at 66, and the parties

agree that it follows that the same standard of review also applies

to a district court's denial of a motion challenging pseudonymous

proceedings.     Under this deferential standard, we reverse the

district court "only if it plainly appears that the court below

Ass'n, 980 F.3d 204, 207 (1st Cir. 2020) ("[W]e conclude that the
prudent course here is, as we sometimes do, to assume appellate
jurisdiction and proceed to the merits, given how clear they
are.").

                                 - 9 -
committed a meaningful error of judgment."        Fontanillas-Lopez v.

Morell Bauzá Cartagena & Dapena, LLC, 832 F.3d 50, 63 (1st Cir.

2016) (quoting West v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 803 F.3d 56,

66 (1st Cir. 2015)).

          Volokh,    though,   argues    that   because   he    seeks   the

unsealing of the original complaint, we should view this appeal as

asserting a violation of the First Amendment presumptive right of

the public to access official court records.          See Doe v. Pub.

Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 269 (4th Cir. 2014).        According to Volokh,

his appeal of the district court's pseudonymity decision should be

treated in the same manner as a sealing decision because, here,

pseudonymity has been protected in part by the sealing of a

document -- the original complaint that erroneously contained

Doe's real name at the bottom of a single page.                He contends

further that, so viewed, the appeal calls for de novo review, and

"strict scrutiny."     See id. at 267, 270 (holding that plaintiffs

plausibly alleged that the district court's extensive redaction of

its memorandum opinion and "wholesale sealing of the parties'

summary judgment motions and accompanying materials" violated the

public's First Amendment right of access, requiring that the party

seeking to seal the documents present a "compelling interest

sufficient to overcome the strong First Amendment presumptive

right of public access").

                                - 10 -
             We reject Volokh's attempt to frame this case as a

sealing/unsealing case.         The only item sealed is a complaint

identical    to    the   complaint   on   the   public    docket   save   for   a

formatting snafu that reveals Doe's name.                Thus, the public has

not been deprived of its ability to access information any more

than in any case in which a party proceeds pseudonymously.                 This

distinguishes Volokh's request from Courthouse News Service v.

Quinlan, 32 F.4th 15 (1st Cir. 2022), in which we held that the

sealing of newly filed complaints, in their entirety, for up to

six calendar days could at least plausibly impede the public's

presumptive First Amendment "right to access judicial records."

Id. at 21.    Indeed, had Doe's name not erroneously appeared on the

reference path and file name at the bottom of a single page of the

complaint, the document would not have been sealed -- yet Volokh's

pseudonymity challenge would have, presumably, proceeded.                       In

short, the public has full access to all information contained in

the docket other than one party's name.          We therefore see no reason

to analyze this appeal as raising a challenge distinct from the

pseudonymity challenge addressed in Doe v. MIT.

                                       B.

             Issued after the district court's decision here, Doe v.

MIT eschewed the multi-factor tests employed in other circuits to

determine whether pseudonymous litigation is warranted.               46 F.4th

at 69–70.         Instead, we sketched        "four general categories of

                                     - 11 -
exceptional cases in which party anonymity ordinarily will be

warranted."       Id. at 71.       These categories are: (1) cases in which

disclosure       of   the   would-be      Doe's   identity    would    "cause   him

unusually severe harm"; (2) "cases in which identifying the would-

be Doe would harm 'innocent non-parties'"; (3) "cases in which

anonymity is necessary to forestall a chilling effect on future

litigants who may be similarly situated"; and (4) "suits that are

bound up with a prior proceeding made confidential by law."                     Id.

at 71 (quoting Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185,

190 (2d Cir. 2008)).        Ultimately, these categories are designed to

provide guidance to district courts in "balanc[ing] the interests

asserted by the movant in favor of privacy against the public

interest in transparency, taking all relevant circumstances into

account."    Id. at 72.      To follow that guidance, the district court

determines whether the case before it fits into one of the four

categories. If so, "party anonymity ordinarily will be warranted."

Id. at 71.       Moreover, "it [also] is possible that a party whose

case for pseudonymity appears weak when each [category] is analyzed

separately may nonetheless make a persuasive showing when multiple

[categories] are implicated," and anonymity will be warranted.

Id.   at   72.        Otherwise,    the     presumption   against     pseudonymous

litigation       will    prevail,      at    least   absent    the    "rare"    and

"exceptional" case not foreseen in Doe v. MIT.

                                       - 12 -
            This litigation fits into the fourth category.3                       The

actions of the New Hampshire Department of Justice in preliminarily

listing    Doe   are    fairly   viewed      as    a   "prior    proceeding,"     and

litigation of the now-remanded state claims may be considered such

a   proceeding    but   for   the     immaterial       distinction    that   it   is

contemporaneous rather than "prior."               As explained in Doe v. MIT,

this category is implicated "when denying anonymity in the new

suit would significantly undermine the interests served by that

confidentiality [provided by law in the prior proceeding]."                       Id.

at 72.

            Volokh, though, contends that we should grant no weight

to New Hampshire's treatment of Doe's EES listing as confidential,

or to the fact that its courts allow him to proceed anonymously.

After all, we are in federal court, where the Federal Rules of

Procedure control.        But Doe v. MIT makes clear that the federal

rules     and    practice     allow    for        pseudonymous     litigation     in

appropriate cases.        So we are simply asking whether, under that

federal precedent, the circumstances of this case allow a district

court the discretion to grant pseudonymity.

      3 Volokh would have us narrowly reframe Doe v. MIT's fourth
category as a holding that "the confidentiality of a Title IX
disciplinary proceeding may sometimes -- but not always -- furnish
grounds for finding an exceptional case warranting pseudonymity."
This framing overlooks the fact that a Title IX disciplinary
proceeding is but one specific example of a proceeding that fits
within the more broadly defined category of "prior proceeding[s]
made confidential by law." MIT, 46 F.4th at 71.

                                      - 13 -
              Nor does the fact that the "prior" proceedings at issue

are state court proceedings preclude treating this case as within

the fourth category identified in Doe v. MIT.            In that case itself,

the court cited to state court juvenile proceedings as an apt

example of "a prior proceeding made confidential by law."              Id. at

72.   We keep in mind, too, that fitting into the fourth category

provides no automatic occasion for pseudonymous litigation.                Id.

at 71 ("party anonymity ordinarily will be warranted") (emphasis

supplied).

              We     certainly   consider,        too,     "the    background

confidentiality regime in assessing the circumstances relevant to

a   request    for   pseudonymity."     Id.   at    76.     This   background

information, here gleaned from New Hampshire's statute, tells us

that New Hampshire has a strong public interest in pseudonymity

through the EES challenge process that "should weigh heavily in"

the federal district court's decision as to whether a litigant may

proceed    pseudonymously.       Id.   (quoting    MetLife,    Inc.   v.   Fin.

Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).

The interests served by New Hampshire's decision to provide Doe

with a court hearing before publicizing his listing on the EES are

obvious.      The opportunity for prepublication challenges mitigates

due process concerns and increases the likelihood that the list is

reliable.      The list is valuable to the state and to the public

only if it is accurate, and ensuring that listings are thoroughly

                                   - 14 -
vetted   before    being   publicized    directly      furthers   that    end.

Officers, too, have a strong interest in being able to challenge

listings before they are made public.           The listing is a form of

official public branding by the state.           The effects of such an

official public branding on one wishing to work as a police officer

are likely to be immediate and concrete.          See, e.g., Duchesne v.

Hillsborough      Cnty   Att'y,    119   A.3d   188,     196   (N.H.     2015)

("[I]nclusion on the [EES] carries a stigma [and] police officers

have a weighty countervailing interest in [e]nsuring that their

names are not placed on the list when there are no proper grounds

for doing so."); Gantert v. City of Rochester, 135 A.3d 112, 118

(N.H. 2016) (explaining that officers have a liberty interest under

the New Hampshire constitution in their professional reputations

implicated by inclusion on the EES).            The district court thus

concluded, and we agree, that Doe's fears of disclosure went beyond

a concern that he would suffer embarrassment if his identity was

released and that his concerns that he would "experience severe

reputational damage and impairment of future career prospects"

were "well founded."

           Volokh's      best     argument   against      Doe's    continued

pseudonymity points to the fact that Doe has done more than seek

to avoid being listed on New Hampshire's EES.            Doe also seeks an

award of damages under both state and federal law, alleging that

public officials have acted unconstitutionally in listing him.

                                   - 15 -
So, for that reason, Volokh says we should preclude Doe from

proceeding pseudonymously in pursuit of his damages claims even if

we would not have so ruled in a narrower case.

          While we acknowledge the distinction, we think it falls

short of requiring that we find an abuse of discretion by the

district court on the facts of this case.   The damages claims, as

reflected so far in the record, arise out of the same occurrence

that gave rise to the requests for declaratory and injunctive

relief.   They would therefore have likely been subject to claim

preclusion had they not been pled initially in the same complaint.4

So were we to accept Volokh's distinction as controlling, we would

be saying to any officer improperly listed on the EES that the

price of retaining the anonymity promised by the statute is the

     4  See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.
75, 81 (1984) ("[A] federal court must give to a state-court
judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment
under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.");
Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry, 125 A.3d 362, 364 (N.H. 2015)
("[Claim   preclusion]    prevents   parties   from    relitigating
matters . . . that could have been litigated in the first action,
and it applies if three elements are met: '(1) the parties are the
same or in privity with one another; (2) the same cause of action
was before the court in both instances; and (3) the first action
ended with a final judgment on the merits.'" (quoting In re Est.
of Bergquist, 100 A.3d 510, 512 (N.H. 2014))); see also id.
(explaining that "[t]he term 'cause of action' is defined as the
right to recover, regardless of the theory of recovery" and that
to determine "whether two actions are the same cause of action for
the purpose of applying res judicata, [a court considers] whether
the alleged causes of action arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence." (first quoting Meier v. Town of Littleton, 910 A.2d
1243, 1246 (N.H. 2006); then quoting Sleeper v. Hoban Fam. P'ship,
955 A.2d 879, 883 (N.H. 2008))).

                              - 16 -
release of any claim for compensation of any damages arising out

of that improper listing.

          Volokh also asserts that First Amendment and common law

principles create a presumptive right of the public to know Doe's

name now that he has filed suit.   We agree.   See MIT, 46 F.4th at

67–68.   The district court, however, recognized and applied that

presumption.   And although the district court did not have the

benefit of our later-issued opinion in Doe v. MIT, its analysis -

- training its attention on the state disclosure procedure, and

recognizing that this case is unique because of its relationship

to that procedure -- aligns well with the guidelines provided in

Doe v. MIT.

                               IV.

          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of

Volokh's motion to unseal and oppose pseudonymity.

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