Court Opinion

ID: 9421891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:00:23.197094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:33.029109
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr.' Justice Whittaker join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
To assert a right of action under the Jones Act, a plaintiff must not only be a seaman,' that is, a “member of a crew of any vessel,” but must have been injured “in the course of his employment.” 46 U. S. C. § 688; 33 U. S. C. § 903 (a)(1). Petitioner was concededly a member of the *134crew of a vessel at the time the events in question took place. The controverted iásue is whether a jury could have found that he was injured “in the course of his employment.” I cannot agree that the nature of a seaman’s duties at the time of injury is irrelevant to this latter issue.
Until today it has not been intimated in any opinion of the Court that I know of that a seaman may recover under the Jones Act for injuries arising out of activities unrelated to the maintenance, or operation of his vessel, and not incidental to its affairs. In other words, the status of being a seaman does not . alone bring the Jones Act into play. The character of the activities giving rise to the injury complained of is also an indispensable element to the existence of a federal right to relief under this statute. In the O’Donnell case, 318 U. S. 36, cited by the Court, it was stated (at 42-43): “The right of recovery in the Jones Act is given to the seaman as such, and . . . depends ... on the nature of the service and its relationship to the operation of the vessel plying in :navigable waters.” There a crew member was ordered to go ashore momentarily to assist in the repair of a fixture being used in unloading the ship. That the work was being done on the dock was held immaterial to Jones Act liability. But _ that work was plainly in aid of the operations of the vessel on which O’Donnell was employed. See Swanson v. Marra Bros., 328 U. S. 1, 4.1 It is a far different matter to say, as the Court seems to say here, that a crew member *135may recover under the Jones Act for injuries arising out of activities not directly relatéd to the affairs of the vessel, as in O’Donnell, and not incidental to' his shipboard work, see Thompson v. Eargle, 182 F. 2d 717; Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F. 2d 416. “In the service of the ship” is something quite different than “in the service of the shipowner.” 2 In this case the seaman’s employer also had a nonseaman-employing business, the .repair yard, for which nonseaman activities were needed.
The Jones Act extended to maritime workers the negligence remedy provided for interstate railroad workers by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. § 51. Under the FELA, and the uniform course of our decisions under it, see, e. g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351 U. S. 493; Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 351 U. S. 502, the remedy given by that Act applies only “to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such [interstate] carrier in- such commerce.” Under the Jones Act the remedy is given to “[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment.” I think this means that a seaman’s injury must have arisen out of his work as a seaman, just as a railroad worker’s injury must have arisen out of his employment in. interstate commerce. Otherwise it is difficult to see what purpose the “in the course of his employment” requirement of the Jones Act serves. Both the FELA and the Jones Act give a federal cause of action in negligence only in respect of particular kinds of injuries — under the FELA, those *136suffered in interstate commerce, under the Jones Act, those suffered.in work as a seaman.
Thus, I think'the issue of liability in this case turns on whether, petitioner, when he fell from the faulty catwalk, was already engaged in' the performance of his raft assignment, or whether he was simply en route to that assignment. If the former^ there would, in my' opinion, be, no liability, for the record contains no basis for an inference that petitioner’s assignment was related to the business of the vessel and, lacking such relationship, petitioner’s injury cannot be deemed to have occurred “in the course of his employment.” In that event any remedy would be that afforded by local law. Cf. Swanson v. Marra Bros., supra, at p. 7; 2 Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 90.22.3 If, however, petitioner was injured en route to his raft assignment, the Jones Act would apply, for “the course of his employment,” I think, continued until he commenced that assignment. . Considering that the evidence presents a jury issue on this score, I eoncur in the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint.
However, I dissent from the reinstatement of the judgment of the District Court. The relevant portion of the charge, to which • respondent excepted, was vague, and lacking in guidance as to the nature .of the factual issue presented in this • respect.4 Moreover, in making liabil*137ity turn on the question whether crew members normally performed work of this nature, the charge was in error.5 Such a factor might well be relevant in a case where there was doubt as to the ultimate issue whether an injury was suffered in the course of work6 in some way related to the vessel in which the plaintiff seaman served. However, here it was not disputed that the petitioner’s assignment to work on the raft was at the time wholly unrelated to any of the affairs of his vessel.

 In referring to the O’Donnell case, it was stated in Swanson (at p. 4): “We there held the ship owner liable, under the Jones Act, for injuries caused to a seaman by a fellow servant while the former was on shore engaged in repairing a conduit which was a part of the vessel and used for discharging its cargo. But in that case we sustained the recovery because the injured person was a seaman and an employee of the vessel, engaged in the course of his employment as such.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 The maintenance and cure decisions relied on by the Court are all, like the Marceau case, instances of injuries incurred during leave-time activities, and . are inapposite here. Whether, on the facts in the case before us, the petitioner would be found to have been working “in the service of his ship” for purposes of the doctrine of maintenance and cure, we need not decide, for the Court advances no reason for assimilating the issue of Jones Act coverage to that of the availability of maintenance and cure.

 1 think the. Court of Appeals was mistaken in considering that the Longshoremen’s and- Harbor. Workers’ Compensation Act would apply, for that Act, 33 U. S. C- §§ 902 (3), 903 (a) (1), excludes from its coverage a “member of a crew of any vessel,” which, this petitioner admittedly was.

 The charge, in pertinent part, read as follows: *-
“While it seemed at the outset to be some question as to whether or not he was a member of the crew, it does not seem to be seriously disputed that at the time of the accident he .was a member of the crew.
“Whether or not at the time of the'.accident he was engaged in *137functions which are normally performed by a member of the crew, and as he stated, some,functions he gaye in detail, that he did perform various functions prior to the date of the accident, are for you to determine.”
Subsequently the court amended the charge in this language:
“I did state that it is not seriously disputed that the plaintiff was not a member of the crew. Apparently according to the defendant’s statement, he says that is a 'serious issue.
“So I will leave that as an issue.”

 The two lower courts seem to have failed to come sharply to grips with the distinction between the two separate requirements of the Jones Act, namely, that the plaintiff have the status of a “seaman,” and that his injury must have been suffered “in the course of his employment” as such. Most of the Jones Act cases decided by this Court have involved only the “seaman” issue. See, e. g., Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 352 U. S. 370; Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U. S. 252; Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U. S. 271. Such decisions are only remotely apposite here where the petitioner’s status as a seaman is not disputed. It only confuses things to equate the issue of being a “seaman” with the issue whether the injuries suffered were “in the' course of his employment.”

 Shore leave cases such as Marcean, supra, present a different problem.