Court Opinion

ID: 9897384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:54.162567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:39.300616
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                           May 26 2023, 8:51 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
      Christian P. Skordos                                      Thomas L. Stucky
      Cordell & Cordell, P.C.                                   Stucky, Lauer & Young LLP
      Fort Wayne, Indiana                                       Fort Wayne, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Craig Randolph,                                           May 26, 2023
      Appellant-Petitioner,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                22A-DC-1972
              v.                                                Appeal from the Allen Superior
                                                                Court
      Karen A. Randolph,                                        The Honorable Lori K. Morgan,
      Appellee-Respondent.                                      Judge
                                                                Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                02D08-2102-DC-171

                                        Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                     Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.

      Tavitas, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Craig Randolph (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s dissolution of his marriage

      to Karen Randolph (“Mother”). Father argues that the trial court erred by: (1)

      restricting his parenting time with their child; (2) including his pre-marital
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023                              Page 1 of 22
      retirement account in the marital estate; and (3) awarding Mother sixty percent

      of the marital estate. On cross-appeal, Mother argues that she should be

      awarded appellate attorney fees for defending against Father’s appeal. We find

      Father’s arguments to be without merit and that Mother is not entitled to

      appellate attorney fees. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Issues
[2]   Father raises three issues, and Mother raises one issue, which we restate as:

                I.     Whether the trial court improperly restricted Father’s
                       parenting time.

               II.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion by including
                       Father’s pre-marital retirement account in the marital
                       estate.

              III.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
                       Mother sixty percent of the marital estate.

              IV.      Whether Mother is entitled to appellate attorney fees.

      Facts
[3]   Father and Mother were married in October 2003, and their daughter, E.R.,

      was born in January 2006. Mother also had two older children from a previous

      relationship. The parties separated in February 2021, and Father filed a petition

      for dissolution of marriage.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023              Page 2 of 22
[4]   Prior to the parties’ marriage, Father and Mother each owned a residence. The

      parties sold both residences and purchased a marital residence in Fort Wayne.

[5]   Father is a mechanical engineer. Prior to the parties’ marriage, Father worked

      at Navistar and had a 401(k) retirement account, which Father estimated was

      valued at $85,000 at the time of the marriage. Father stopped making

      contributions to the account shortly before the marriage. At the time of the

      petition for dissolution, the 401(k) was valued at $248,854.72.

[6]   Father’s employment with Navistar ended in 2011, and Father began doing

      contract work. Beginning in approximately 2015, Father’s employment was

      often out of town, and he returned home on the weekends. For two years, he

      was employed in Wisconsin and returned home every other weekend. Since

      the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, Father has worked from home.

[7]   At the beginning of the marriage, Mother had student loans of approximately

      $33,000. Mother is a nurse and worked in a doctor’s office until E.R. was born.

      Mother stayed home to care for the children until E.R. was eight years old.

      Mother then worked weekends as a surgical nurse in a hospital. Approximately

      five or six years ago, Mother began working as a school nurse.

[8]   In April 2021, the trial court entered provisional orders that provided, in part,

      for joint legal custody of E.R. with Mother having primary physical custody

      and Father having parenting time as follows:

              [Father] is granted parenting time with [E.R.] pursuant to the
              provisions of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Until such

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023          Page 3 of 22
               time, if ever, that [Father] is again required to work out of state,
               he is granted additional overnight parenting times on one
               [weekday] overnight each week. The express intent of this order
               is that the child stay with [Father] during the school hours on the
               day of and the day following the weekday overnight parenting
               times so that he may assist her with her virtual school
               attendance.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17. The trial court granted Mother temporary

       possession of the marital residence for four months, at which time Mother

       would vacate the marital residence and give possession of the residence to

       Father.

[9]    During Mother’s possession of the marital residence, Father relocated to a

       camper at a lake in Steuben County, which was forty-five miles away from Fort

       Wayne. E.R.’s relationship with Father is strained, and E.R. did not want to

       visit Father at the camper. E.R. and Father disagreed about E.R.’s

       participation in extracurricular activities because they interfered with parenting

       time, and they disagreed regarding E.R.’s desire to have employment.

[10]   The parties participated in therapy with Timothy Theye. Theye opined that the

       “biggest issue” in the relationship between Father and E.R. is that Father has

       “very rigid ideas in terms of parenting [ ] that tend[ ] to irritate” E.R. Tr. Vol. II

       p. 10. Theye was concerned that E.R.’s psychological and emotional

       development “could [be] adversely impact[ed]” if she was forced to meet

       Father’s parenting time demands. Id. at 16. Theye was also concerned that

       E.R. will “reject [Father] all together [sic]” when she turns eighteen years old if

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023            Page 4 of 22
       he “continued to push [E.R.] for parenting time that she’s not comfortable

       with.” Id. at 17. Theye supported E.R.’s request for parenting time consisting

       of a Saturday overnight every other weekend and a mid-week evening visit

       without an overnight.

[11]   The trial court appointed a Guardian ad litem (“GAL”), who believed that

       Father and E.R. have “very different” personalities, which “clash.” Tr. Vol. III

       p. 74. The GAL noted that “there doesn’t seem to be a whole lot of empathy

       on either one of their parts about how the other one feels . . . .” Id. She

       believed that Father, Mother, and E.R. were “a lot alike . . . in that, they want

       what they want when they want it and why they want it.” Id. at 75. The GAL

       had hoped that therapy would improve the relationship between Father and

       E.R., but it did not. The GAL shared Theye’s concerns and also supported

       E.R.’s proposed parenting time schedule.

[12]   The trial court held a final hearing in April 2022. At the hearing, Father

       requested seventy-one percent of the marital estate, and Mother requested sixty

       percent of the marital estate. The trial court conducted an in camera interview

       with E.R. The trial court then entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon.

       The trial court awarded the parties joint legal custody of E.R. with Mother

       having primary physical custody. Regarding Father’s parenting time, the trial

       court found:

               71. [Father] argues that [Mother] and [GAL]’s position with
               regard to the modification of his parenting time amounts to a
               restriction on his parenting time and in order to grant the request

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023          Page 5 of 22
        of [Mother] and modify and “restrict” his parenting time as
        requested by [Mother] and [GAL], the Court must find that
        continuing the current parenting time schedule in full force and
        effect might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly
        impair the child’s emotional development.

                                              *****

        74. The child is experiencing anxiety, nausea and vomiting
        associated with parenting time with [Father]. The Court finds
        that modifying the parenting time schedule to alternate weekends
        from Saturday overnight to the next day (Sunday) and mid-week
        for up to four hours as well as alternate holidays and extended
        parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time
        Guidelines is in the minor child’s best interests and that said
        schedule does not amount to a “restriction” of [Father’s]
        parenting time requiring the Court to find that the continued
        exercise of the current schedule might endanger the child’s
        physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional
        development. In the event that it is determined that such a
        finding is required, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial
        demonstrating that the child might suffer emotional harm if the
        current parenting time schedule was maintained in full force and
        effect and therefore, the Court[] further finds[] that the current
        schedule is not in the child’s best interests as it might endanger
        the child’s physical health or significantly impair her emotional
        development due to the decline in the parent-child relationship
        between [Father] and child.

        75. The Court finds that the parenting time schedule that is in the
        child’s best interests is the schedule that provides [Father] with
        parenting time with [E.R.] on alternate weekends commencing
        on Saturday overnight with mid-week parenting time for up to
        four (4) hours and holiday and extended parenting time pursuant
        to the dictates of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023             Page 6 of 22
       Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 66-68. Thus, the trial court granted Father

       parenting time with H.R. on “alternate weekends commencing on Saturday at

       12:00 p.m. and concluding the next day (Sunday) at 6:00 p.m., as well as mid-

       week (each week) for 4 hours and alternate holidays and extended parenting

       time pursuant to the provisions of the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.” Id.

       at 83.

[13]   Regarding the parties’ marital estate, the trial court included Father’s entire

       Navistar 401(k) in the marital estate and divided the marital estate as follows:

                93. In considering the requirements of Ind. Code §31-15-7-5, the
                Court finds that both spouses contributed to the acquisition of
                property whether it was income producing or non-income
                producing. [Father] was employed during the majority of the
                parties’ marriage, however, there were a few short periods of
                time when he was without employment while he was looking for
                a new job. [Mother] was employed during portions of the
                parties’ marriage. There was a period of time when she did not
                work because she was at home with the parties’ child and
                providing care for her as well as managing the household
                responsibilities. As it relates to the second statutory factor,
                [Father] had a 401([k]) through Navistar at the time of the
                parties’ marriage. The value of the plan at the time of the
                marriage was $84,000.00. He has not personally made a
                contribution to the plan since the date of the parties’ marriage,
                however the value of the plan has increased significantly over the
                course of the parties’ marriage. [Father] had approximately
                Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000.00) of credit card debt just
                prior to the parties’ marriage that the parties paid off while
                [Father] was residing with [Mother] in her home. [Mother]
                brought approximately Thirty-Three Thousand Dollars
                ($33,000.00) of student loan debt into the marriage. With regard
                to the third statutory factor, the Court finds that [Father] earns

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023          Page 7 of 22
               more than twice the income that [Mother] earns from his [sic]
               employment and is likely to continue doing so into the future.
               As it relates to the fourth statutory factor, there is no credible
               evidence at trial that either party has dissipated marital assets.
               As it relates to the fifth statutory factor, the Court finds that
               [Father] earns more than twice the income that [Mother] earns
               from employment. He has historically earned a higher income
               than [Mother] and will likely continue to do so into the future.
               He has been awarded more of the marital assets that will afford
               him the opportunity to continue to build upon his wealth and
               earning potential. In light of these considerations, the Court
               finds that [Mother] has rebutted the presumption that a 50-50
               division of the marital estate is just and reasonable and the Court,
               therefore, finds that the entry of an order awarding [Father] 40%
               and [Mother] 60% of the marital estate is appropriate.

       Id. at 74-75. Father now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
[14]   In addressing the parties’ dissolution of marriage, the trial court entered

       findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A),

       which “prohibits a reviewing court on appeal from setting aside the trial court’s

       judgment ‘unless clearly erroneous.’” Smith v. Smith, 194 N.E.3d 63, 72 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)).

       “When a trial court has made special findings of fact, as it did in this case, its

       judgment is clearly erroneous only if (i) its findings of fact do not support its

       conclusions of law or (ii) its conclusions of law do not support its judgment.”

       Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to

       support them either directly or by inference.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023           Page 8 of 22
       I. Parenting Time

[15]   Father first challenges the trial court’s parenting time order. Parenting time

       decisions require us to “give foremost consideration to the best interests of the

       child.” Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013). We review

       parenting time decisions for an abuse of discretion. Id. “Judgments in custody

       matters typically turn on the facts and will be set aside only when they are

       clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1257 (Ind.

       2008)). “We will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate

       inferences support the trial court’s judgment.” Id.

[16]   Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by “restricting” his

       parenting time with E.R. Appellant’s Br. p. 14. Father contends that the trial

       court “reduced a parenting time order that exceeded the schedule laid out in the

       Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines to one that was significantly less.” Id. at

       15. Under the provisional order, Father was entitled to two overnights on

       alternating weekends and one mid-week overnight each week. Under the

       dissolution decree, however, Father was granted one overnight on alternating

       weekends and one mid-week visit of four hours. According to Father, in order

       to “restrict” his parenting time, the trial court was required to find that

       parenting time would endanger the child’s physical health or significantly

       impair the child’s emotional development, and the trial court did not make such

       a finding.

[17]   Father relies upon Indiana Code Section 31-17-4-2, which provides:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023              Page 9 of 22
                The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting
                time rights whenever modification would serve the best interests
                of the child. However, the court shall not restrict a parent’s
                parenting time rights unless the court finds that the parenting
                time might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly
                impair the child’s emotional development.

       (emphasis added). 1

[18]   First, we note that this statute applies to the modification of parenting time

       rights. Here, however, the trial court made an initial determination regarding

       Father’s parenting time rights, not a modification of parenting time rights. The

       provisional order was not a final determination of parenting time rights; rather,

       the provisional order was “temporary in nature and terminate[d] when the final

       dissolution decree [was] entered or the petition for dissolution [was] dismissed.”

       Linenburg v. Linenburg, 948 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

       Accordingly, Indiana Code Section 31-17-4-2 does not apply here.

[19]   Applicable here, Indiana Code Section 31-17-4-1 provides: “[A] parent not

       granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable parenting time rights

       unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time by the noncustodial

       parent might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the

       1
        Although the statute uses the word “might,” our Supreme Court has held: “Extraordinary circumstances
       must exist to deny parenting time to a parent . . . . If the trial court finds such extraordinary circumstances do
       exist, then the trial court shall make specific findings regarding its conclusion that parenting time would
       endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development.” Perkinson,
       989 N.E.2d at 765 (emphasis added).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023                                    Page 10 of 22
       child’s emotional development.” (emphasis added). Thus, we will address

       whether a finding that parenting time would endanger the child’s physical

       health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development was required

       here.

[20]   Father seems to argue that any deviation of parenting time below that

       recommended by the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines amounts to a

       “restriction” requiring a finding that parenting time would endanger the child’s

       physical health or significantly impair the child’s emotional development. The

       Guidelines, however, specifically allow “[d]eviations from these Guidelines by

       either the parties or the court that result in parenting time less than the

       minimum time set forth below” provided that the deviations are “accompanied

       by a written explanation indicating why the deviation is necessary or

       appropriate in the case.” Ind. Parenting Time G. Preamble. Accordingly, there

       is a difference between a “restriction” of parenting time, which requires a

       finding of endangerment or impairment, and a “deviation” from the parenting

       time contemplated by the Guidelines, which requires only a written explanation

       from the trial court.

[21]   We addressed a similar issue in In Re of Paternity of J.K., 184 N.E.3d 658, 666

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). There, a father challenged the modification of his

       parenting time to his teenage son in the context of the paternity statutes,

       Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1 and Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-2, which

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023          Page 11 of 22
       are similar to the statutes at issue here. 2 Distance was a major factor in the trial

       court’s decision to modify parenting time, as the father lived in Texas, and the

       teenage son lived in Indiana; the father argued that the trial court “restricted”

       his parenting time by awarding less parenting time than that contemplated by

       the Guidelines. In re Paternity of J.K., 184 N.E.3d at 665. We concluded that

       the trial court’s parenting time award was reasonable.

[22]   We first held that the trial court’s parenting time award was consistent with the

       Guidelines. Moreover, we held:

                [E]ven if the parenting time order was inconsistent with the
                minimums established by the Guidelines, we do not find that the
                parenting time ordered was unreasonable such that a finding of
                endangerment or impairment under Indiana Code Section 31-14-
                14-1 would be required. We are not aware of any authority
                establishing that a parenting time award that falls below the
                presumptive minimums set forth in the Parenting Time
                Guidelines is per se unreasonable for purposes of Indiana Code
                Section 31-14-14-1 Thus, even if we were to accept Father’s
                claim that the parenting time award fell below the minimums
                contemplated by the Guidelines, which we do not, that does not
                necessarily render the parenting time award here unreasonable.

       J.K., 184 N.E.3d at 666 (emphasis added).

       2
         Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1(a) provides: “A noncustodial parent is entitled to reasonable parenting
       time rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time might: (1) endanger the child's physical
       health and well-being; or (2) significantly impair the child's emotional development.” Indiana Code Section
       31-14-14-2 provides: “The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever
       modification would serve the best interests of the child.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023                                    Page 12 of 22
[23]   We further noted:

               It surely cannot be the case [ ] that any alteration in parenting
               time amount or condition imposed upon how parenting time is to
               be spent constitutes an unreasonable restriction of parenting time
               rights under Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1. The practical
               result would be that any parenting time order that does not
               match the Guidelines verbatim is only justifiable if the child is in
               danger. Reading Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1 in its entirety,
               however, gives the proper context to the meaning of the statute as
               a whole. Specifically, the statute references situations in which
               supervised parenting time should or must be ordered.
               Accordingly, supervised parenting time requires a finding that the
               supervision restriction be justified by a risk of harm to the child.
               See I.C. § 31-14-14-1(d)-(e). The contemplated factual finding is
               only required where parenting time rights are curtailed in an
               unreasonable manner. To require a factual finding of threat of
               harm to the child in order to justify any departure from our
               Parenting Time Guidelines would be to defy the fact-sensitive,
               nuanced nature of the trial court’s endeavor. We cannot
               conclude that the legislature intended to impose such a
               significant handicap on such a sensitive function of our State’s
               courts, or to rob those courts of the flexibility given to them by
               the Guidelines. They are, after all, guidelines. As always, the
               focus of a trial court’s considerations when modifying parenting
               time must be reasonableness and the best interests of the child.

               Indeed, the Guidelines contemplate deviations below the so-
               called minimum and require simply that such deviations be
               “accompanied by a written explanation indicating why the
               deviation was necessary or appropriate in the case.” Ind.
               Parenting Time Guidelines Preamble (C)(3).

       Id. at 666-67 (footnote and record citation omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023         Page 13 of 22
[24]   In applying these principles to this case, we cannot say that Father’s parenting

       time was “restricted” or that the parenting time awarded by the trial court was

       unreasonable. First, Father does not explain how the parenting time schedule

       ordered by the trial court differs from the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

       Parenting Time Guideline II(E) applies to adolescents and teenagers and

       provides:

               1. Regular Parenting Time. Regular parenting time by the
               noncustodial parent on alternating weekends, during holidays,
               and for an extended time during the summer months as set forth
               in the Parenting Time Guidelines (Section II. D.) shall apply to
               the adolescent and teenager.

               2. Special Considerations. In exercising parenting time with a
               teenager, the noncustodial parent shall make reasonable efforts to
               accommodate a teenager’s participation in his or her regular
               academic, extracurricular and social activities.

       Accordingly, under the Guidelines for teenagers, Father would have been

       entitled to parenting time on alternating weekends, certain holidays, and

       extended time during the summer. The trial court here reduced the weekend

       parenting time to eliminate Friday overnights but added a four hour visit during

       the week, which is not part of the Guidelines for teenagers. 3

       3
        There is a conflict between the Guidelines for parenting time with teenagers and the commentary. The
       commentary to the Guidelines for parenting time with teenagers gives an example for a student athlete and
       implies that a mid-week visit is required. The Guidelines for teenagers, however, do not require such a mid-
       week visit.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023                                Page 14 of 22
[25]   This is not a case where Father’s parenting time was eliminated, required to be

       supervised, or significantly deviated from the Guidelines. See, e.g., J.M. v. N.M.,

       844 N.E.2d 590, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (addressing whether parenting time

       would significantly impair the child’s emotional development where the trial

       court ordered supervised parenting time), trans. denied; Barger v. Pate, 831

       N.E.2d 758 , 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (addressing the same where, at mother’s

       discretion, father was not allowed parenting time with one child when another

       child was present); Duncan v. Duncan, 843 N.E.2d 966, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)

       (addressing the same where father molested one of the three children), trans.

       denied. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Father’s parenting time was

       restricted in a manner that required a written finding that parenting time would

       endanger E.R.’s physical health or significantly impair her emotional

       development.

[26]   Nevertheless, the trial court’s parenting time schedule did deviate from the

       Guidelines, and the trial court was required to issue a written explanation for

       the deviation. The trial court properly explained the deviation by noting that

       E.R. was “experiencing anxiety, nausea and vomiting associated with parenting

       time” with Father. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 67. E.R.’s relationship with

       Father was significantly strained at that time. E.R. proposed the parenting time

       schedule awarded by the trial court, and the GAL and therapist agreed that the

       proposed schedule was in E.R.’s best interest. Under these circumstances, we

       cannot say that the parenting time award was unreasonable.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023         Page 15 of 22
       II. Marital Estate

[27]   Next, Father challenges the trial court’s inclusion of his entire Navistar 401(k)

       in the marital estate. “It is well settled that in a dissolution action, all marital

       property goes into the marital pot for division, whether it was owned by either

       spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and

       before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts.”

       Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Specifically,

       Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-4(a) provides:

               In an action for dissolution of marriage under IC 31-15-2-2, the
               court shall divide the property of the parties, whether:

               (1) owned by either spouse before the marriage;

               (2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:

                        (A) after the marriage; and

                        (B) before final separation of the parties; or

               (3) acquired by their joint efforts.

       For purposes of dissolution, property means “all the assets of either party or

       both parties.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-98. “Marital property includes both assets

       and liabilities.” McCord v. McCord, 852 N.E.2d 35, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),

       trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023            Page 16 of 22
[28]   “‘The requirement that all marital assets be placed in the marital pot is meant to

       insure [sic] that the trial court first determines that value before endeavoring to

       divide property.’” Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d at 110 (quoting Montgomery v. Faust,

       910 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). “‘Indiana’s ‘one pot’ theory

       prohibits the exclusion of any asset in which a party has a vested interest from

       the scope of the trial court’s power to divide and award.’” Id. (quoting Wanner

       v. Hutchcroft, 888 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). In general, “[w]hile

       the trial court may decide to award a particular asset solely to one spouse as

       part of its just and reasonable property division, it must first include the asset in

       its consideration of the marital estate to be divided.” Id. “The systematic

       exclusion of any marital asset from the marital pot is erroneous.” Id.

[29]   All assets and liabilities of both parties must be included in the marital pot.

       Accordingly, the trial court properly included the Navistar 401(k) in the marital

       pot. The trial court may then award a particular asset to one party as part of its

       division of the marital estate. See Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. Moreover, “[e]ven

       where the trial court properly sets aside the value of premarital assets to one

       spouse, the appreciation over the course of the marriage is a divisible marital

       asset.” Wanner, 888 N.E.2d at 263. The trial court did not abuse its discretion

       by including Father’s Navistar 401(k) as a marital asset; rather, the trial court

       was required to consider all property obtained prior to the filing of the petition.

       See, e.g., Meyer v. East, 205 N.E.3d 1066, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding that

       the trial court properly included assets in the marital estate but abused its

       discretion by excluding a liability from the marital estate).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023           Page 17 of 22
       III. Division of the Marital Estate

[30]   Next, Father argues that the trial court’s division of the marital estate was an

       abuse of discretion. “‘The party challenging the trial court’s property division

       bears the burden of proof.’” Smith, 194 N.E.3d at 72 (quoting Smith v. Smith,

       854 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). “That party must overcome a strong

       presumption that the court complied with the statute and considered the

       evidence on each of the statutory factors.” Id.; see Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. “The

       presumption that a dissolution court correctly followed the law and made all

       the proper considerations when dividing the property is one of the strongest

       presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.” Smith, 194 N.E.3d at

       72. “Thus, we will reverse a property distribution only if there is no rational

       basis for the award.” Id.

[31]   Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-4(b), the trial court “shall divide the

       property in a just and reasonable manner. . . .” We “presume that an equal

       division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable.” I.C.

       § 31-15-7-5.

               However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who
               presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the
               following factors, that an equal division would not be just and
               reasonable:

               (1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
               property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
               producing.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023          Page 18 of 22
               (2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
               spouse:

                        (A) before the marriage; or

                        (B) through inheritance or gift.

               (3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
               disposition of the property is to become effective, including the
               desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell
               in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just
               to the spouse having custody of any children.

               (4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to
               the disposition or dissipation of their property.

               (5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

                        (A) a final division of property; and

                        (B) a final determination of the property rights of the
                        parties.

       Id.

[32]   “After determining what constitutes marital property, the trial court must then

       divide the marital property under the presumption that an equal division is just

       and reasonable.” Eads v. Eads, 114 N.E.3d 868, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The

       presumption of an equal division may be rebutted by the presentation of certain

       factors detailed in Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5. The trial court, however,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023            Page 19 of 22
       must state its reasons for deviating from the presumption of an equal division in

       its findings and judgment. Eads, 114 N.E.3d at 874.

[33]   Here, both parties requested an unequal division of the marital estate. Father

       requested seventy percent of the marital estate, while Mother requested sixty

       percent. The trial court found that a deviation from the presumption of an

       equal division was just and reasonable and awarded Mother sixty percent of the

       marital estate. The trial court noted that: (1) both parties contributed to the

       acquisition of property, whether by income-producing employment or by

       providing care to E.R.; (2) Father’s Navistar 401(k) significantly increased

       during the marriage, the parties paid off $13,000 of Father’s credit card debit

       shortly before the marriage, and Mother had $33,000 in student loan debt at the

       time of the marriage; (3) Father earns more than twice Mother’s income; (4) no

       evidence of dissipation of assets was presented; and (5) Father will likely

       continue to earn significantly more income than Mother.

[34]   Father, however, argues that Mother voluntarily remained unemployed for

       several years despite economic difficulties in the family; Father worked “long

       and difficult hours” during the marriage and desired to work less for the sake of

       his health; and the order “forces Father to liquidate his primary retirement

       account and continue working hours that are detrimental to his health in order

       to replace his lost retirement funds.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 18-19.

[35]   At the time of the dissolution hearing, Mother was sixty years old, and Father

       was fifty-four years old. Father earned more than twice Mother’s income.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023         Page 20 of 22
       Although Father entered the marriage with his Navistar 401(k), the account’s

       value significantly increased during the marriage. Moreover, Father’s future

       earning potential is significantly greater than Mother’s future earning potential

       given their age differences and income levels. Father presented evidence of his

       dissatisfaction with his employment, but the trial court was required to weigh

       this evidence against other factors here. We will not substitute our judgment

       for that of the trial court; the trial court’s division of marital property was just

       and reasonable and supported by a rational basis. See, e.g., Hartley v. Hartley,

       862 N.E.2d 274, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming the trial court’s sixty

       percent/forty percent division of the marital estate).

       IV. Appellate Attorney Fees

[36]   As a final matter, we address Mother’s request for attorney fees pursuant to

       Indiana Appellate Rule 66. “Our discretion to award attorney fees under

       Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E) is limited to instances when an appeal is

       permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or

       purpose of delay.” Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2003). Mother makes no argument explaining how Father’s appeal was

       frivolous or in bad faith. While we find Father’s argument unpersuasive, we

       cannot say that his appeal was permeated with frivolous claims or brought in

       bad faith. Accordingly, we decline Mother’s request for appellate attorney fees.

       See, e.g., Falatovics v. Falatovics, 72 N.E.3d 472, 481-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)

       (declining to award appellate attorney fees).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023            Page 21 of 22
       Conclusion
[37]   Father’s parenting time was reasonable; the trial court properly included

       Father’s Navistar 401(k) in the marital estate; and the trial court did not abuse

       its discretion in dividing the marital estate. Moreover, Mother fails to

       demonstrate that she is entitled to appellate attorney fees. Accordingly, we

       affirm.

[38]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DC-1972 | May 26, 2023           Page 22 of 22