Court Opinion

ID: 9865191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:26:54.926645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:51.522022
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Young
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court as contained in the opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke and from the specially concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Bock.
*579I think there is no donbt as to the power of the people by constitutional amendment to allocate to the old age pension fund the license fees which the cities, prior to the passage of the amendment in question—-article XXIV of the state Constitution—had been authorized by the General Assembly to collect and retain as a part of their general revenues. Chapter 82 and chapter 142, S. L. ’35. Prior to the passage of that amendment we had held that the General Assembly had that power. City of Colorado Springs v. Campbell, 99 Colo. 525, 63 P. (2d) 1244. In fact the specific point determined by that case was, that when the legislature permitted the city to collect a tax under article XXII of the Constitution vesting* in the state the exclusive power to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors and ordered that fees so collected be paid over to the old age pension fund that that mandate of the legislature was enforceable. If the General Assembly had such power a fortiori the people might exercise a like power by constitutional amendment. However, the Colorado Springs- case in no wise negatived the power of the General Assembly to permit the cities to retain license fees under laws then in force, if any, or under laws thereafter to be enacted. When the Old Ag’e Pension Amendment was passed with chapters 82 and 142 of the Session Laws of 1935 in force giving cities the right to retain certain license fees collected in the exercise of a delegated police power such delegation of authority was clearly within the power of the legislature under article XXII of the Colorado Constitution.
The sole question presented by the cause before us is as to the construction to be placed on subsection (b) of section 2 of article XXIV of the Colorado Constitution (c. 200, S. L. ’37, p. 881) which reads as follows: “Section 2. There is hereby set aside, allocated and allotted to the old age pension fund sums and moneys as follows: * * * (b) Beginning January 1, 1937, -eighty-five per cent of all net revenue accrued or accruing, received or receivable from taxes of whatever kind upon all malt, vin*580ous, or spirituous liquor, both intoxicating and nonintoxicating, and license fees connected therewith.”
In his specially concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Bock says: “The amendment specifies ‘all’ net revenue from license fees. There is, therefore, no ambiguity as to what the people had in mind.” Section 3 of article X of the Constitution says: “All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.” (Italics mine.) The same inclusive word “all” is used in section 3 of article X as in subsection (b) section 2 of article XXIY, but we have held repeatedly that the words “all taxes” in section 3 does not refer to excise taxes, but only to ad valorem taxes. Denver City Ry. Co. v. Denver, 21 Colo. 350, 41 Pac. 826, 52 Am. St. Rep. 239, 29 L. R. A. 608, cited in notes; Parsons v. People, 32 Colo. 221, 237, 76 Pac. 666; American Smelting, etc. Co. v. People, 34 Colo. 240, 82 Pac. 531. If subject to limitation in the one case there would seem to be no reason for holding it not subject to limitation in the other when reason and sound principles of constitutional construction require it.
The case cited from the Supreme Court of the United States, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton (U. S.) 1, 188, 6 Law Ed. 23, in the specially concurring opinion, supra, announces the correct and a liberal rule of construction of the Constitution of the United States. The federal government is a government of delegated powers. It was beyond the power of human foresight to forecast all possible federal governmental situations that might arise and to provide by specific delegation the powers to meet them. Whether a power is delegated to the federal government by implication may very well be determined from a consideration of the objectives intended to be acomplished. If within the general objective the power to meet the situation with propriety may be held to have been delegated by implication with the specific delegation of power to accomplish the general purpose. But in construing a state constitution such a rule is not ap*581plicable. ' The state—meaning the people—possesses residual power, that is, all power not delegated. It possesses power to act as it sees fit in any situation except where it has granted the exclusive right of action to the federal government dr consented to be restricted from exercising it by the federal Constitution or has expressly limited itself from exercising by its own constitution. The power so to act being vested in the people to be exercised by them through their legislative representatives or directly by passage of an initiated measure should not be hindered nor obstructed by a judicial construction of the state Constitution that writes into it restrictions on its exercise by implication. In order for a court to hold that a state constitution thwarts an attempted act of the people through their general assembly, it should be able to point out that the state constitution expressly forbids it. Courts, sworn to uphold the Constitution of the state, may not approve the violation of any express constitutional prohibition. Neither may they extend the scope of its prohibitions beyond their clear terms! This principle was well stated and applied in Parsons v. People, supra, wherein Mr. Justice Campbell speaking for the court said: “And since it is always to be borne in mind that a state constitution is an instrument of limitations upon, and not one of grants of, legislative power, courts should be slow to hold, under a constitution like ours, that the state has no other source of revenue for state' purposes except that resulting from a' direct tax upon property. Such a conclusion should be reached only where express and unequivocal language in the constitution, too plain to admit of doubt, or the necessary implication from' something therein expressed, leaves no other alternative:” The federal Constitution is analogous to a gen-’ eral power of attorney granted by a principal to an agent to accomplish certain ’ general objectives and is to be liberally construed to effectuate such purposes. The state Constitution is analogous to a restriction self imposed on the principal (the people of the state) and'is *582to be strictly construed in order that the principal may not be unduly hampered in the conduct of his own, business.
The specially concurring opinion points out that, “This section [subsection (b) section 2, article. XXIV] determines in part the revenues necessary to pay the pension. The amendment establishes a minimum pension of $45 per month.” (Italics mine.) It is pertinent to observe that the amendment contemplates that the General Assembly in the exercise of its discretion may or may not add other monies to the fund, for subsection (f) of section 2, supra, allotted to it “such other money as may be allocated to said fund by the General Assembly.” Assuming that “we may take judicial notice of the fact that sufficient funds have very seldom been raised to meet this minimum” of $45, it does not follow that we, rather than the General Assembly, must furnish them by construing into the amendment a restriction on the power of the General Assembly such that it may not permit to stand an already existing lawful allocation of a part of the liquor license fees to the cities. The opinion of the court construes the amendment as not only so restricting the power of the General Assembly to allow existing valid legislation to stand (chapter 82 and chapter 142, supra), but also as amending that legislation so that funds validly allocated to the city at the time the laws were passed are now, contrary to such laws, allocated to a special fund of the state. The power so to do, as already stated, may be assumed. Does it clearly appear that such was intended, considering the expressed purpose of the amendment set forth in section 1 thereof: “A fund to be known as the Old Age Pension Fund is hereby created and established in the Treasury of the State of Colorado ?” In answer to the interrogatory of the Governor, “Are the provisions of said amendment or any thereof, self executing?”, this court said: “The answer is: It is self-executing as to the establishment of the specified fund; otherwise not-, save that the fund so ere*583ated becomes • the fund out of which payments will' be made under the laws heretofore in force until said amendment No. 4 is otherwise -effectuated by legislation.” In Re Interrogatories, 99 Colo. 591, 65 P. (2d) 7. If the court adheres to the view expressed by the majority in answer to the foregoing interrogatory, how can it now say that the amendment'is self executing— self executing even to the extent, if the opinion and specially concurring opinion are correct,' of amending chapters 82 and 142, supra, by implication, and making a new allotment of the monies received by the cities for license fees under those acts to a special fund of the state? If self executing as to the establishment of the fund and “otherwise not,” it was authority for the state treasurer to set up the fund and to place therein all monies in his hands or that might come into his hands as the custodian of the state funds. It could not be authority without enabling legislation, to take funds then otherwise lawfully allocated to the cities and transfer them to the state without at the same time being otherwise self executing.
The answer as to what license fees were allocated by article XXIV must be found from an examination of the article itself. That article creates and establishes the Old Age Pension fund “in the Treasury of the State of Colorado.” Having established the fund it sets aside and allocates to that fund sums and money as follows: “Beginning January 1, 1937, eighty-five per cent of all net revenue accrued or accruing, received or receivable from taxes of whatever kind upon all malt, vinous, or spirituous liquor, both intoxicating and nonintoxicating and license fees connected therewith.” Under chapters 82 and 142, supra, there were at the time this article XXIV was enacted license fees “accrued and accruing” to the state and the cities and “received and receivable” by the state and the cities. The fees referred to as- accrued and accruing, received and receivable, must have been those that have accrued to, have been received by, *584and that are accruing to, and are receivable by, one or the other or both of these governmental entities. It would seem reasonable, since the fund is established in the state treasury, that the reference is to those that have accrued and have been received by, and are accruing to and are receivable by, the state. This would follow from the fact of the amendment being self executing as to the establishment of the fund and not otherwise. The following subsection (c) lends weight to this construction because it allocated to the fund unexpended money “as of January 1, 1937,” “in any fund of the State of Colorado, or political subdivision thereof,” “which prior to said date has teen allocated to the payment of an old age pension.” It is to be noted that it does not say unexpended money which is herem allocated to the payment of an old age pension. The license fees received by the cities had not been so allocated. Furthermore, the prohibition in section 5 of article XXIY extends only to the extent of denying the right to the General Assembly to repeal laws “providing revenue for the old age pension fund.” Under chapters 82 and 142, supra, in so far as city licenses are concerned, no revenue is or ever was provided for the old age pension fund and there is therefore no prohibition against the repeal of those provisions'of these laws.-
It is to be noted further that if section 2, subsection (b), is given the construction contended for by the state, and license fees collected by the cities constitute a part of the old age pension,fund, that there can be logically no reason for not holding that the same section allocates to the same fund eighty-five per cent of all ad valorem taxes upon stocks- of liquor whether said taxes have accrued or are accruing, have been received or are receivable by the state, the counties, school districts, educational institutions, or any other subordinate branches of government. • If it be held that article XXIY seizes.the license fees which the city collects and under the laws as enacted was permitted to retain, I am unable to escape *585the conclusion that subsection (b) will likewise seize the ad valorem taxes on liquor payable to the subordinate branches of our government as well as such taxes as are payable to the state. If subsection (b) is so- construed as to taxes on liquor it will repeal by implication section 11 of article X limiting the rate of taxation on property for state purposes to four mills on each dollar of valuation, for the old age pension fund is for the payment of pensions, now clearly a state purpose. It will repeal in part also by implication section 10 of article X which provides that all corporations shall be subject to taxation for state, county, school, municipal and other purposes on the real and personal property owned by them within the limits of the authority levying the tax in so far as any stock of liquor within any of such governmental subdivisions is owned by a corporation.
The power to do the things by constitutional amendment that the state contends was done may be conceded. That it was intended by the people that the amendment held to be self executing only as to the establishment of the fund should be given a construction, the ramifications of which require such an extensive and radical invasion of our system of raising and allocating revenues may well be questioned and particularly in view of the fact that a reasonable and logical construction may be placed upon the amendment which does not require such an invasion. A restriction in the state Constitution is a limitation upon the otherwise plenary power of the people to act in the matter through their reserved power of initiating laws or through their representatives in the legislature, and a decent respect for such prerogative requires that we do not extend a restriction beyond its clear terms and that all doubts as to the extent of a restriction be resolved in favor of the people having retained rather than having surrendered power.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Burke concur with me in the views herein expressed.