Court Opinion

ID: 9951529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 13:02:52.044882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:26.529682
License: Public Domain

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QUINCY RAPP v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
                 (AC 46079)
                       Alvord, Cradle and Clark, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of murder,
   sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that both his trial counsel and
   prior habeas counsel were ineffective and that his guilty plea was not
   knowing, intelligent and voluntary in violation of his due process rights.
   In 2010, approximately two years after his conviction, the petitioner
   filed a petition for habeas corpus, in which he was represented by D.
   In 2013, the petitioner withdrew his petition just prior to trial. In 2018,
   the petitioner filed the underlying habeas petition, which he amended
   in 2022. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a motion
   pursuant to the statute (§ 52-470) governing summary disposal of habeas
   corpus matters for an order to show cause as to why the petition should
   not be dismissed as untimely because it was filed more than five years
   after the petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final in 2008. In
   response, the petitioner claimed that good cause existed for the delay
   in the filing of his petition because D failed to advise him of the time
   constraints outlined in § 52-470 for a subsequent habeas petition and,
   if he had been so advised, he would not have withdrawn his first habeas
   petition. The habeas court found that the petitioner had failed to show
   good cause for the delay in filing and dismissed the petition. Just prior
   to oral argument in the present appeal, the Supreme Court issued its
   decision in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333), which
   held that ineffective assistance of counsel is an objective factor external
   to a petitioner that may constitute good cause to excuse the late filing
   of a habeas petition under the totality of the circumstances pursuant
   to § 52-470 (c) and (e). Held that the habeas court did not apply the
   correct legal standard under § 52-470 (c) and (e) in deciding that the
   petitioner had not demonstrated good cause for the late filing of his
   habeas petition; although the habeas court did not expressly reject
   the petitioner’s allegation that D’s alleged ineffective assistance in not
   advising him of the deadline for filing a new petition caused the delay,
   the habeas court did not consider the alleged ineffective assistance of
   counsel as an external factor that caused the delay in filing the untimely
   petition, and, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rose, the
   petitioner was entitled to a new hearing at which the court applies the
   correct legal standard set forth by the Supreme Court.
          Argued January 10—officially released March 19, 2024

                            Procedural History

  Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Tolland, where the court, Newson, J., rendered judg-
ment dismissing the petition, from which the petitioner,
on the granting of certification, appealed to this court.
Reversed; further proceedings.
  Vishal K. Garg, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(petitioner).
   Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s
attorney, and Elizabeth Mosely, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                          Opinion

   CRADLE, J. The petitioner, Quincy Rapp, appeals
from the habeas court’s dismissal of his amended peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely under
General Statutes § 52-470 (c) and (e).1 On appeal, the
petitioner claims that the court erred in concluding
that he failed to establish good cause for his untimely
petition. Specifically, the petitioner argues that his prior
habeas counsel’s failure to advise him of the statutory
deadline for filing a new petition following the with-
drawal of his then pending petition constituted ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, which constituted good
cause for the delay in filing.2 In light of our Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Rose v. Commissioner of
Correction, 348 Conn. 333, 304 A.3d 431 (2023), we
conclude that the judgment of the habeas court must
be reversed, and we remand the case for a new good
cause hearing.3
   The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of the petitioner’s claim on appeal. In 2008,
pursuant to a guilty plea, the petitioner was convicted
of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a,
for which he was sentenced to a term of fifty years of
incarceration. The petitioner did not appeal his convic-
tion. In 2010, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, in which he was represented by Attor-
ney John Duguay.4 On June 6, 2013, just prior to trial,
the petitioner withdrew his petition.5
  On October 31, 2018, the petitioner filed the underly-
ing habeas petition, which he amended on March 21,
2022. In his amended petition, the petitioner raised three
claims. The petitioner alleged that both his trial counsel
and prior habeas counsel had rendered ineffective assis-
tance and that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelli-
gent and voluntary in violation of his due process rights.
On May 25, 2022, the respondent, the Commissioner of
Correction, filed a motion pursuant to § 52-470 (c) and
(e) for an order to show cause as to why the petition
should not be dismissed as untimely because it was filed
more than five years after his judgment of conviction
became final on November 27, 2008, when the period
for filing an appeal of that judgment expired. In
response, the petitioner claimed that ‘‘good cause’’
existed for the delay in the filing of his petition because
his prior habeas counsel, Duguay, failed to advise him
of the time constraints outlined in § 52-470 for a subse-
quent habeas petition and, if he had been so advised,
he would not have withdrawn his first habeas petition.6
  On September 23, 2022, the court held a good cause
hearing, at which the petitioner testified, inter alia, that
he was unaware of the filing deadlines set forth in
§ 52-470 because Duguay never informed him of those
deadlines.7
  On October 13, 2022, the court, by way of a memoran-
dum of decision, rejected the petitioner’s argument that
good cause existed for the delay in the filing of his
petition and dismissed it. The court reasoned: ‘‘[T]he
petitioner has failed to show good cause for the delay
in filing his petition. He admits that he was actively
researching rather complicated legal issues related to
his alleged mental health in order to challenge his con-
viction but claims that he was otherwise unaware of
the fact that there was a time limitation on filing a
challenge to his conviction. [T]he time worn maxim [is]
that everyone is presumed to know the law, and that
ignorance of the law excuses no one . . . . Provident
Bank v. Lewitt, 84 Conn. App. 204, 209, 852 A.2d 852,
cert. denied, 271 Conn. 924, 859 A.2d 580 (2004). Those
tenets are founded upon public policy and in necessity,
and the idea [behind] them is that one’s acts must be
considered as having been done with knowledge of the
law, for otherwise its evasion would be facilitated and
the courts burdened with collateral inquiries into the
content of men’s minds. . . . Id., 209–10. Thus, the
[petitioner] is charged with knowledge of the law. State
v. Surette, 90 Conn. App. 177, 182, 876 A.2d 582 (2005).
Even given the benefit entitled to an incarcerated
inmate due to the lack of complete autonomy and
access to the legal library, there was no evidence here
that anything prohibited or interfered with the petition-
er’s ability to find out about § 52-470, as opposed to the
fact that he chose to focus on researching other legal
issues. And, while the petitioner insinuates that the age
of the legal material he had access to prohibited him
from timely access to changes in the law, he filed the
current petition within eight months of the release of
Cruz [v. United States, Docket No. 11-CV-787 (JCH),
2018 WL 1541898 (D. Conn. March 29, 2018), vacated,
826 Fed. Appx. 49 (2d Cir. 2020)], which was an unre-
ported decision. Surely, therefore, then the petitioner
had ample opportunity to educate himself or to other-
wise become aware of the changes in § 52-470 that
became effective in October, 2012. Public Acts 2012,
No. 12-115, § 1. The delay here was not outside forces
beyond the petitioner’s control; it was simply that the
petitioner had not found what he believed the proper
legal issue to attach his claims to.’’ (Emphasis in origi-
nal; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thereafter, the
habeas court granted the petitioner’s petition for certifi-
cation to appeal, and this appeal followed.
   After the parties filed their briefs in this appeal, but
before oral argument, our Supreme Court issued its
decision in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
348 Conn. 333. At oral argument, the parties were pre-
pared to address, and did address, the impact of Rose
on their respective positions. The issue in this case,
whether the habeas court properly rejected the petition-
er’s claim that ineffective assistance of his prior habeas
counsel constituted good cause for the delay in the
filing of his petition, specifically in light of Rose, is the
same issue that was before this court in Hankerson
v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 562,
567–71,       A.3d      (2024). In Hankerson, this court
explained: ‘‘In Rose, the court addressed whether prior
habeas counsel’s failure to advise a petitioner of the
deadline for filing a new petition following the with-
drawal of a pending petition may constitute good cause
to justify a late-filed petition under § 52-470 (c) . . .
and (e). See [Rose v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra], 346–47. In that case, the respondent, relying on
our Supreme Court’s decision in Kelsey v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, [343 Conn. 424, 441–42, 274 A.3d
85 (2022)], argued that an error by counsel, even if it
rose to the level of constitutionally deficient perfor-
mance, was not an external factor that could constitute
good cause. Rose v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 347. In particular, the respondent in Rose relied
on the Supreme Court’s statement in Kelsey that, to
rebut successfully the presumption of unreasonable
delay in § 52-470, a petitioner generally will be required
to demonstrate that something outside of the control
of the petitioner or habeas counsel caused or contrib-
uted to the delay. . . . Kelsey v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, supra, 441–42.
   ‘‘In Rose, the court rejected the respondent’s reliance
on Kelsey and, instead, relying on federal precedents
in the area of procedural default . . . concluded that
[i]neffective assistance of counsel is an objective factor
external to the defense because the [s]ixth [a]mend-
ment itself requires that responsibility for the default
be imputed to the [s]tate. . . . In other words, it is not
the gravity of the attorney’s error that matters, but that
it constitutes a violation of [the] petitioner’s right to
counsel, so that the error must be seen as an external
factor, i.e., imputed to the [s]tate. . . . Although a peti-
tioner is bound by his counsel’s inadvertence, igno-
rance, or tactical missteps, regardless of whether coun-
sel is flouting procedural rules or hedging against
strategic risks, a petitioner is not bound by the ineffec-
tive assistance of his counsel. . . . Consistent with this
authority, we conclude that ineffective assistance of
counsel is an objective factor external to the petitioner
that may constitute good cause to excuse the late filing
of a habeas petition under the totality of the circum-
stances pursuant to § 52-470 (c) and (e). . . . Rose v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 348 Conn. 347–48.’’
(Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Hankerson v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 223 Conn. App. 567–69.
   In Hankerson, the habeas court ‘‘expressly relied on
Kelsey in concluding that, even if the petitioner’s testi-
mony, which indicated that he was not properly advised
by [prior habeas counsel] of the deadline for filing a new
habeas petition, were accurate, [prior habeas counsel’s]
failure to advise the petitioner would not be an external
factor that constitutes good cause.’’ Id., 569. Although
this case is distinguishable from Hankerson in that the
habeas court in this case did not expressly reject the
petitioner’s allegation that Duguay’s alleged ineffective
assistance in not advising him of the deadline for filing
a new petition caused the delay, it is similar in that the
habeas court did not consider the alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel as an external factor that caused
the delay in filing the untimely petition. Thus, in the
present case, like in Hankerson, ‘‘the habeas court did
not have the benefit of our Supreme Court’s clarification
of Kelsey in Rose regarding ‘the fundamental distinction
between internal and external factors that cause or
contribute to a petitioner’s failure to comply with a
procedural rule.’ [Rose v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 348 Conn.] 347. The habeas court therefore did
not apply the correct legal standard when deciding
whether the petitioner had demonstrated good cause
for the late filing of his petition.’’ Hankerson v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, supra, 223 Conn. App. 569.
Accordingly, also as in Hankerson, the petitioner in this
case is entitled to a new hearing at which the court
applies the correct legal standard set forth by our
Supreme Court.
   The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new hearing and good cause determination under
§ 52-470 (c) and (e).
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     General Statutes § 52-470 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(c) Except as pro-
vided in subsection (d) of this section, there shall be a rebuttable presump-
tion that the filing of a petition challenging a judgment of conviction has
been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of the
following: (1) Five years after the date on which the judgment of conviction
is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) October 1, 2017;
or (3) two years after the date on which the constitutional or statutory
right asserted in the petition was initially recognized and made retroactive
pursuant to a decision of the Supreme Court or Appellate Court of this state
or the Supreme Court of the United States or by the enactment of any public
or special act. The time periods set forth in this subsection shall not be
tolled during the pendency of any other petition challenging the same convic-
tion. . . .
   ‘‘(e) . . . If . . . the court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated
good cause for the delay, the court shall dismiss the petition. . . .’’
   2
     The petitioner also argues that good cause existed for his delay in filing
because he did not believe that he had a valid basis for his petition until
the 2018 release of Cruz v. United States, Docket No. 11-CV-787 (JCH),
2018 WL 1541898 (D. Conn. March 29, 2018) (holding that decision in Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), applies
to persons who were eighteen years old at time of their crimes, making
sentencing schemes requiring mandatory life sentences without possibility of
parole violation of eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment by failing to consider youth and accompanying considerations
in sentencing), vacated, 826 Fed. Appx. 49 (2d Cir. 2020). Although the
habeas court referred to this argument as support for its conclusion that
the petitioner had ample opportunity to learn of the filing deadlines set
forth in § 52-470, it did not address the petitioner’s argument that good
cause existed for his delay because he did not believe that he had a basis
for his petition until the release of Cruz in 2018. Because the court did not
address this argument, it is not properly before us now.
   3
     In light of this resolution, we need not address the petitioner’s additional
claim that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continu-
ance of the good cause hearing to afford him the opportunity to subpoena
his prior habeas counsel, who then resided in Colorado, or to obtain an
affidavit from him regarding what advice he rendered to the petitioner, if
any, regarding the § 52-470 deadlines. We note, however, that the habeas
court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for continuance, like its ultimate
decision on good cause, was not fully informed in that Rose had not yet
been decided when the court ruled on that motion and, in the absence of
that ruling, the alleged ineffective assistance of the petitioner’s prior habeas
counsel was not an external factor for the court’s consideration when
determining good cause. In other words, prior to Rose, a continuance to
secure the testimony of prior habeas counsel would have been unnecessary.
On remand, the petitioner should be afforded a reasonable opportunity,
within the court’s discretion, to subpoena or otherwise attempt to secure
admissible evidence pertaining to the assistance rendered by the petitioner’s
prior habeas counsel.
   4
     At that time, Duguay was an associate attorney at the Law Office of
Michael D. Day, LLC. After Michael Day met with the petitioner once upon
the appointment of his office to represent the petitioner, Duguay undertook
the representation of the petitioner.
   5
     At the good cause hearing in this action, the petitioner testified that, in
connection with his first habeas petition, he underwent a psychological
evaluation but that that evaluation ‘‘didn’t show whatever it was supposed
to show . . . .’’ The petitioner testified that, on that basis, Duguay ‘‘sug-
gested that [the petitioner] withdraw [his] habeas because the case was
weak, and if [he] didn’t withdraw the habeas, that [Duguay] would file an
Anders brief . . . .’’
   6
     The petitioner also claimed that the delay in his filing was caused by
‘‘the Department of Correction’s denial of [his] constitutional right of access
to the courts by failing to provide adequate legal resources that would allow
him to educate himself about the time limitations for filing a habeas corpus
petition.’’ To the extent the habeas court implicitly rejected that claim, the
petitioner has not challenged that ruling on appeal.
   7
     At the good cause hearing, the petitioner, through his counsel, attempted
to introduce into evidence emails between Duguay and the petitioner’s
counsel pertaining to what Duguay told the petitioner as to the § 52-470
filing deadlines. The court declined to admit them into evidence because
there was no foundation for them, they constituted hearsay and they were
being offered to ‘‘prove a fact that right now before [the court] [based on
the petitioner’s testimony] is uncontroverted.’’