Court Opinion

ID: 9750766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:31:01.350748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:21.559539
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973) (Press I), the United States Supreme Court held an order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing sex-designated advertisements by employers offering employment not to be violative of the first amendment of the federal constitution. Today, a majority of this Court has found the prohibition of situations wanted advertisements identifying the race, color, religious creed, age and sex of the applicant under circumstances prohibited by the Human Relations Act, Act of Oct. 27,1955, 43 P.S. § 951, et seq. (Supp.1978-79), P.L. 744, as amended, to be impermissible under the first amendment. To reach this startling result, the majority has given Press I an unwarrantedly narrow interpretation and has read into the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the commercial speech area unjustified implications. The majority in its zeal to extend the protection to be given commercial speech, totally ignores this Commonwealth’s strong commitment to an egalitarian society. See e. g. Pa.Const. Art. I § 28. I therefore must express my most vehement disagreement.
In Press I, the United States Supreme Court avoided the level of protection commercial speech should be accorded by noting:
*324Whatever the merits of this contention may be in other contexts, it is unpersuasive in this case. Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity under the Ordinance. We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes. Nor would the result be different if the nature of the transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned “Narcotics for Sale” and “Prostitutes Wanted” rather than stated within the four corners of the advertisement.
The illegality in this case may be less overt, but we see no difference in principle here. Sex discrimination in nonexempt employment has been declared illegal . . .
413 U.S. at 388, 93 S.Ct. at 2560 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, supra, announced unequivocally that the practice or policy of discrimination in employment by reason of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex or national origin is violative of the public policy of this Commonwealth. Section 5 of the Act specifies those practices which have been declared illegal in an effort to eradicate the evils of discrimination. Section 5(g) prohibits an individual seeking employment from attempting to influence the employment decision by supplying information relating to those factors or qualities which have been proscribed in making such a judgment. Section 5(e) prohibits a third party from aiding and abetting the transmittal of the prohibited information for the purpose of influencing the employment decision. It is conceded that the ads which form the basis of this lawsuit were in violation of Sections 5(g) and (e) and therefore illegal under the law of this Commonwealth. Notwithstanding the fact that it has been conceded that the publishing of these ads was illegal commercial activity under the terms of the Act, the majority seeks to support its result by finding that the advertiser’s *325rights, as guaranteed by the freedom of expression amendment of the federal constitution, have been improperly curtailed by the mandate of Section 5(g).
While recognizing that a state may prohibit discriminatory employment practices, the majority argues that the restriction of freedom of expression accomplished by Section 5(g) “is not necessary to promote that legitimate state objective.” (Maj. op. p. 1189) This position ignores the holding and supporting rationale of Press I. In that case, the United States Supreme Court clearly sanctioned the restriction of the advertiser’s right to freedom of expression to effectuate a legitimate regulation of an unlawful activity. Moreover, in its latest decisions the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed the right to restrain commercial advertising that is inimical to the public welfare. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976).
The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely, (citation omitted)
Also, there is no claim that the transactions proposed in the forbidden advertisements are themselves illegal in any way.
Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 771-72, 96 S.Ct. at 1830. (citations omitted).
Here the transactions proposed in the forbidden advertisements are in themselves illegal. The ads encourage the employer to make the employment decision based upon the prohibited considerations. The commercial speech being restrained is simply a solicitation for discriminatory hiring. The majority seeks to disguise the illegality by characterizing the content of these ads as a mere expression of the applicants “job qualifications, abilities, personal experience, or educational history.” This gloss does not dismiss the *326controlling fact that the qualifications sought to be communicated are not legitimate concerns in the employment decision and are solely for the purpose of encouraging discriminatory hiring decisions. It is not simply a request to be hired as the majority contends, rather it seeks to pollute the hiring decision by introducing the prohibited considerations.
Commercial speech is only distinguishable by its content and the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the first amendment protections should not be withdrawn from it simply because it proposes a mundane commercial transaction. Here, however, the restraint is not being imposed because of the commercial character of the message, but rather the illegal transaction it proposes.
The majority perceives a distinction in the nature of the transactions here and that encountered in Press I. I confess that I am unable to comprehend that distinction. In both instances the illegal activity condemned was discriminatory employment. In Press I, the regulation was directed to the conduct of the prospective employer. In this appeal, the conduct of the prospective employe is being regulated. Both regulations were directed to the same end, i. e. discriminatory hiring. Further, both regulations did not impinge upon the free flow of commercial information necessary to make the employment decision. The only information restrained was information not lawfully relevant to the proposed commercial transaction.
Finally, in both Press Í and the instant appeal, we are concerned with the right of the newspaper to publish the information. There, is obviously no greater right derived by the newspaper to communicate the expressions of a potential employe than its right to disseminate the needs of a potential employer. I am therefore of the view that the employe’s rights of freedom of expression under the first amendment have not been abridged by the state’s legitimate exercise of its police power in an attempt to eradicate one of the most pervasive and elusive evils in our society today.