Court Opinion

ID: 9473658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:35:37.156437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:39.467468
License: Public Domain

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I generally agree with most of what Judge McKay has written and I therefore join his dissent. I write separately to note two things.
First, I am not convinced that likelihood of flight is the sole consideration that may be given to a bail decision pending appeal. I believe that circumstances could justify a denial of bail where the defendant has been convicted of a violent crime and has otherwise indicated that he is a danger to the community. Nonetheless, I fear that the language of the statute is sufficiently vague to encompass far more situations than I would consider constitutional. That is not the case here, however, and the proper contours of “likely to ... pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community,” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1), must be left to the appropriate cases.
Second, it is unfortunate that Congress has chosen to limit bail pending appeal as a reaction to the sad state of the circuit court dockets. In 1979, there were 1194 appeals filed in the Tenth Circuit; in 1984, there were 1922. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics 11 (1984). The average time it is currently taking this circuit to handle a criminal appeal from the date of the notice to oral argument is 368 days.
In a bail opinion in 1956, Justice Frankfurter addressed the growing length of time of criminal appeals:
“Nothing has disturbed me more during my years on the Court than the time span, in so many cases that come here, between the date of an indictment and the final appellate disposition of a conviction. Such untoward delays seem to me inimical to the fair and effective administration of the criminal law. I see no reason whatever why we in this country cannot be as expeditious in dealing with criminal appeals as is true of England. Applications for appeals are heard in the English Court of Criminal Appeal within eight weeks of conviction; in murder cases appeals ‘are generally before the Court not later than three weeks after the conviction.’ ”
Ward v. United States, — U.S.-, 76 S.Ct. 1063, 1066, 1 L.Ed.2d 25 (1956). When Justice Frankfurter expressed these concerns, the case before him had been pending on appeal for four months and he expected that it would not be heard on the merits for another two months. Given this time frame, which he viewed as far too lengthy, he said:
“The Government should, I believe, be the active mover for an early hearing, thus putting upon the convicted defendant the responsibility for setting forth sound reasons for postponing such a hearing. I am not able to understand why it should not become the settled practice for the Government to move, after an appeal is taken from a conviction, for the hearing of the appeal on the stenographic minutes at the earliest possible moment that a Court of Appeals can accommodate its calendar to the disposition of business that has first call, namely, a criminal appeal. This is especially desirable in a case where bail has been denied.”
Id. 76 S.Ct. at 1067.
I agree with Justice Frankfurter. I believe that Congress should have addressed its concern for the length of the appeal process by enacting some form of speedy appeals act rather than limiting bail. Judge McKay correctly envisions that the circuits soon will be mired in mini-appeals over the bail issues if we exercise our duty as Article III judges to review seriously the trial judge’s determination that no “substantial” issue is presented. For this reason, I urge this court to expedite all criminal appeals where bail has been denied, to deny extensions of time to court reporters and brief writers, and to hear oral argument on the merits within 90 days of conviction. If at the time of oral argument the panel determines that an issue is in fact *962substantial and likely to result in reversal, it can immediately order that bail be set pending the final decision on appeal. In this manner, the court can ameliorate the deprivation of liberty involved where bail has been denied to a defendant whose conviction is- thereafter overturned on appeal.