Court Opinion

ID: 9638047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:31:26.381324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:03.089823
License: Public Domain

DENMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent from the opinion of the court, on two grounds. One is that two of the-three major contentions of the appellant in his argument .and briefs are not mentioned, much less discussed in the opinion. Cf. Ballard v. United States, 9 Cir., 152 F.2d 941, 947. The other is that these two,contentions should prevail and the judgment of conviction be reversed.
The brief of the government describes-Alcatraz Island as consisting of a penitentiary and a wide area of land surrounding it. Appellant was committed to the penitentiary not to Alcatraz Island. The island, is visible from the shores of San Francisco and this area outside the penitentiary well, could contain ten or twelve acres. The charge is attempting to escape from cus- • tody — not attempting to escape from the penitentiary, a different offense as shown, by the statute set forth in the court’s opinion.
It is admitted by the government that the appellant did not attempt to escape from the penitentiary. It was upon the government to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant in the non-penitentiary portion of Alcatraz Island was (a) in the custody of some official representative of the Attorney General and (b) that, he attempted to escape therefrom.
Regarding the proof of custody, the “lieutenant” claimed by the government to, have the custody of appellant was not produced as a witness. Another witness was produced .who stated that appellant had *591been in the custody of this lieutenant, who sent appellant to perform certain chores. There is no evidence that anyone remained as a physical custodian of appellant after he was sent on this mission.
In this situation, with the failure to produce the claimed custodian and the reliance upon secondary evidence, the jury well could have believed that it was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the claimed attempt to escape from custody the appellant was in anyone’s physical custody. Assuming, arguendo, that there was evidence to warrant the inference that custody existed, the prosecuting attorney removed from the jury the necessity of drawing any inference by stating that the jury could find appellant guilty •of an entirely different offense, namely, of attempting to escape from the penitentiary. In his closing address to the jury the prosecuting attorney stated the law to be “To escape from the penitentiary itself or its ground or from any place which the Warden has set up as being the limits of the penitentiary is to escape from his ‘custody, although you may not actually escape from his physical custody or the physical custody of any one of his representatives.”
That is saying to the jury that “Even though you do not believe the government’s single witness as to custody, or if the failure to produce the physical custodian makes a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a physical custody, nevertheless you can convict the accused of attempting to escape from the penitentiary
Appellant at once objected to this misstatement of the law by the prosecutor, but the court, instead of instructing the jury to disregard it, stated “You may discuss the evidence that is now before the Jury and draw any inferences which the law will permit. You may proceed.”
Appellant thereupon sought to have this error clarified to the jury by the following requested instruction as to the “physical” nature o'f custody:
“I charge you that the commitment is only the authority for a prisoner’s custody; it is not the custody itself. A commitment may exist authorizing a prisoner’s custody, but it does not necessarily follow that he is in custody at all times during the existence of that commitment. The authority of the commitment is - continuous from the time it is issued until the. date of the expiration of the sentence; but the custody which it authorizes does not begin until the prisoner is placed in physical safekeeping, and this custody may be interrupted at any time thereafter. The law does not prohibit, nor is the defendant charged with, attempting to escape from the authority for his .custody; he is charged with attempting to escape from custody.” (Emphasis supplied.) The court refused to give this instruction and gave no equivalent instruction, nor did the court at any time advise the jury that they should disregard the wrongful statement of the prosecutor or even that they should confine their knowledge of the law to the law as stated by the court.
There was further ground for requiring the requested instruction. Appellee had made formal proof of the documents showing that appellee had the right to the custody. Without an instruction distinguishing between the Warden’s right to custody and the physical custody itself, the jury well might infer that the mere right to custody actually amounted to the physical custody wherever the appellant actually may be in the area of the island or elsewhere.
The appellee makes this contention here, claiming that the right of the Attorney General to have custody of a prisoner means that the prisoner is in his custody anywhere in the area over which the Attorney General’s authority extends — that is the entire United States. The appellee’s brief states that it is an erroneous assumption that, to violate the statute, it is “necessary for him [the convict] to escape or attempt to escape from the actual physical custody of the Attorney General or one of his authorized representatives.” That is to say, the prisoner is actually in the custody of the Attorney General though there be no physical custody at all.
There are two obvious comments on this contention so urged on this court. The first is that the crime of escape from custody never could be committed in the *592United States. The felon, no matter what he does, is still in custody.
The second comment is relevant to the trial below. If such a contention of custody without “physical” custody may seriously be urged on this court, then it would be a most likely belief of the jury. Hence the necessity for the refused instruction on the need for a “physical” custody as distinguished from the mere right to custody.
The judgment of conviction should be reversed.