Court Opinion

ID: 9883379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:41:19.480144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:17.800556
License: Public Domain

PARKER, Judge
(dissenting).
The State argues that the officers’ approach of Reese’s car was not a “seizure” requiring certain fourth amendment protections and that even if it was, the officers had a reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop.
When the police saw the cars stopped side by side in the street and observed that neither moved through the intersection although they had the right of way, they moved their squad car in front of Reese’s and shone the lights into her car. In the words of Officer Fleury, they “initiated a stop.” Officer Griffin approached and asked Reese for identification, although he testified he had not intended to give her a citation.
This court recently decided two instructive cases. In Kozak v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 359 N.W.2d 625 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), an officer stopped to investigate a car parked on the highway shoulder. We said that in the proper performance of duties, an officer has “not only the right but a duty to make a reasonable investigation of vehicles parked along roadways to offer such assistance as might be needed * * Id. at 628.
In addition, this court found no seizure implicating the fourth amendment when an officer who observed a car parked on the roadway with the motor running and the lights on pulled up behind the car and asked to see the driver’s license. Blank v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 358 N.W.2d 441 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). This court said:
[I]t is a common practice for police officers to walk up to cars stopped in the road, in winter, especially when their engines are running and the lights are on. There could be mechanical problems with the car or medical problems with the driver or passengers, or a variety of reasons justifying investigation.
Id. at 442-43.
The case before us presents a different problem than the “stopped car” cases. *424Reese’s car was waiting at the intersection, not stopped beside a roadway. The positioning of the police car to block any forward movement by Reese’s car classifies this as a stop, and the officers themselves considered it as such.
The question then becomes whether there was a reasonable and constitutional basis for this stop. The United States Supreme Court enunciated the standard for investigations or stops in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979):
Accordingly, we hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also discussed justifiable “stops,” adopting fourth amendment analysis from the federal courts. An automobile stop is valid if the police officer is able to state a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. State v. L’Italien, 355 N.W.2d 709, 710 (Minn.1984) (citations omitted).
In applying this standard, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances and should remember that trained law-enforcement officers are permitted to make “inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695.
State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn.1983) (the court reversed and remanded for trial).
The supreme court has also stated:
To lawfully stop a person for questioning, as distinct from making an arrest, a police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, together with reasonable inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the invasion of a citizen’s personal security. The intrusion cannot be based on an inarticulate hunch, and must be reasonable in light of the particular circumstances. A police officer may approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.
State v. Engholm, 290 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Minn.1980) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
The United States Supreme Court stated that the demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of fourth amendment jurisprudence. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (citation omitted). The facts of this case present a close question. I would hold that the officers' statements that they thought Reese might have been involved in an accident, or that she might be being accosted, were too speculative to justify a stop and a request for identification.
I am not unmindful of the police officers’ duty to investigate questionable situations such as this and agree that they were quite right to look into it. See Kozak v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 359 N.W.2d 625 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). However, an offer of aid would have been the appropriate response to this situation. The request for Reese’s identification was an unwarranted intrusion. See Crowder v. United States, 379 A.2d 1183 (D.C.1977) (officer’s demand for identification was a sufficient “show of authority” to constitute a seizure). There is no general police right to stop a driver and ask for identification in the absence of specific articulable reasons indicating suspicion that an offense may have been, or is being, committed. There was no such ar-ticulable reason to be directed at the driver here. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.