Court Opinion

ID: 9925684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 19:02:15.337805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.607181
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/22/24 P. v. Bocksberger CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D083000

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.
                                                                     (Super. Ct. No. FWV22002261)
KIRK ALLEN BOCKSBERGER,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Corey G. Lee, Judge. Dismissed.
         David Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
         Defendant Kirk Allen Bocksberger appeals from a judgment after he
entered into an agreement to plead no contest to one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). As part of his plea
agreement, Bocksberger waived, among other things, his right to appeal from
any motion he had filed and from his judgment. He filed a notice of appeal
based on the trial court’s denial of his section 1538.5 motion to suppress
evidence and requested a certificate of probable cause from the trial court.
That court noted that a certificate of probable cause was not needed.
      On appeal, Bocksberger contends: (1) he did not knowingly waive his
right to appeal from the denial of his section 1538.5 motion; (2) that waiver
was not made part of his plea agreement; (3) he should be allowed to
withdraw his plea because he was denied effective assistance of counsel in
waiving his right to appeal; (4) his waiver of his right to appeal the denial of
his section 1538.5 motion is contrary to public policy; (5) the trial court erred
by denying his section 1538.5 motion; and (6) his incriminatory statements
must be suppressed because they resulted from a custodial interrogation
without warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
      In their respondent’s brief, the People argue that because Bocksberger
waived his right to appeal from any motions he filed and from his judgment,
he cannot appeal the denial of his section 1538.5 motion or otherwise appeal
the judgment. In particular, the People argue that because he did not
request or obtain a certificate of probable cause as to the validity of his
waiver of the right to appeal, he cannot challenge on appeal the validity of
that waiver and his appeal must be dismissed.
      As explained below, we agree with the People and therefore dismiss the
appeal.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On July 4, 2022, City of Ontario policer officer Martin Rodriguez made
a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Bocksberger. During the stop, Rodriguez
found a loaded shotgun in the vehicle’s trunk and ammunition in its backseat

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and trunk. An information charged Bocksberger with one count of being a
felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of being
a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)).
      He filed a section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence obtained during
the traffic stop of his vehicle. The trial court denied his motion.
      Subsequently, Bocksberger entered into a plea agreement and pled no
contest to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)). In his plea agreement, Bocksberger, among other things,
waived his right to appeal from any motion he had brought and from the
judgment.
      The trial court imposed the lower term of 16 months in prison and,
based on his presentence custody credits, he was immediately released.
      Bocksberger filed a notice of appeal and requested that the trial court
issue a certificate of probable cause as to the denial of his section 1538.5
motion to suppress. The court neither granted nor denied his request, noting
that a certificate of probable cause was not needed.
                                 DISCUSSION
 Bocksberger Was Required to Request, and Obtain, a Certificate of Probable
  Cause as to the Validity or Enforceability of His Plea Agreement and/or
 Waiver of His Right to Appeal as a Prerequisite to Challenging the Denial of
                         His Section 1538.5 Motion
      At the outset, we address the People’s assertion that for Bocksberger to
challenge on appeal the denial of his section 1538.5 motion to suppress, he
was first required to request, and obtain, a certificate of probable cause from
the trial court as to the validity or enforceability of his plea agreement and/or
his waiver of the right to appeal the denial of that motion. The People argue
that, absent such a certificate of probable cause, he cannot challenge the
validity or enforceability of his plea agreement and/or his waiver of his right

                                        3
to appeal, which waiver precludes us from addressing the merits of his
section 1538.5 contention and requires that we dismiss his appeal. We agree
with the People’s position.
                                           A
      On October 14, 2022, Bocksberger entered into a written plea
agreement with the prosecution pursuant to which he agreed to plead no
contest to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in exchange for
a recommendation of the lower term sentence of 16 months and dismissal of
the other count. In his written plea agreement, Bocksberger declared under
penalty of perjury, among other things, that: “My lawyer has explained
everything on this Declaration to me, and I have had sufficient time to
consider the meaning of each statement. I have personally placed my initials
in certain boxes on this Declaration to signify that I fully understand and
adopt as my own each of the statements which correspond to those boxes.”
One of the boxes that he initialed was adjacent to his declaration that stated:
“I waive and give up any right to appeal from any motion I may have brought
or could bring and from the conviction and judgment in my case since I am
getting the benefit of my plea bargain.” (Italics added.) His defense counsel
also declared that he had “personally read and explained the contents of
the . . . Declaration to [Bocksberger].”
      At the hearing on his plea agreement, Bocksberger orally confirmed
that he had “personally place[d] his initials after reading, understanding, and
discussing each paragraph with [his] attorney,” and that he understood he
was giving up his rights to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, and to remain
silent. He also confirmed that he “had enough time to discuss [his] case with
[his] attorney, including all [his] rights, potential defenses, penalties,
punishments, and future consequences as a result of entering this plea.” At

                                           4
the hearing, his counsel represented she had adequate time to discuss “all
these issues” with him, she had discussed the declaration and plea form with
him, and she was satisfied he “understands everything on the form.”
      The trial court then found that Bocksberger had read and understood
his declaration and plea agreement and accepted his plea of no contest to the
section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) charge. The court then sentenced him to
16 months in prison and, based on his presentence custody credits, he was
immediately released on parole.
      Five days later, Bocksberger’s counsel filed a notice of appeal on his
behalf, stating: “This appeal is based on the denial of a motion to suppress
evidence under . . . section 1538.5.” The notice of appeal included a request
that the trial court issue a certificate of probable cause as to his challenge to

its denial of his section 1538.5 motion to suppress.1 The trial court did not
check the box to either grant or deny his request for a certificate of probable
cause and noted that a certificate was “[n]ot needed.”

1      The request stated in full: “I request a certificate of probable cause.
The reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the
legality of the guilty plea, no-contest plea, or probation violation admission
proceeding are (specify): [¶] The Superior Court denied Mr. Bocksberger’s
Motion to Suppress Evidence pursuant to . . . section 1538.5. Based on the
denial of said motion, Mr. Bocksberger subsequently entered a plea of no
contest. As Mr. Bocksberger’s attorney, I wrote, filed, and litigated the
Motion to Suppress Evidence. It is my information and belief based on the
evidence and testimony deduced at the evidentiary hearing that
Mr. Bocksberger’s right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures were
violated. It is my further belief that Mr. Bocksberger was subjected to an
unlawful and prolonged detention. It is defense’s position the Court abused
[its] discretion in the denial of Mr. Bocksberger’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence. As such, I request a certificate of probable cause based on the
Constitutional violations.”

                                        5
                                         B
      Section 1237.5 provides: “No appeal shall be taken by the defendant
from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . ,
except where both of the following are met: [¶] (a) The defendant has filed
with the trial court a written statement executed under oath or penalty of
perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds
going to the legality of the proceedings. [¶] (b) The trial court has executed
and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the
court.”
      In general, a certificate of probable cause is not required to challenge
on appeal an order denying a section 1538.5 motion to suppress. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(A).) However, if a defendant has agreed to enter a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere and that agreement includes a waiver of the
right to appeal or, in particular, a waiver of the right to appeal the denial of a
section 1538.5 motion, a certificate of probable cause as to the validity or
enforceability of that waiver is required to pursue an appeal.
      Rule 8.304(b)(1)(A) states: “To appeal from a superior court judgment
after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . on grounds that affect the validity
of the plea . . . , the defendant must file in that superior court—with the
notice of appeal . . .—the written statement required by . . . section 1237.5 for
issuance of a certificate of probable cause.” In People v. Jones (1995)
10 Cal.4th 1102 (Jones), our Supreme Court stated: “[S]ection 1237.5 does
not allow the reviewing court to hear the merits of issues going to the validity
of the plea unless the defendant has obtained a certificate of probable
cause . . . .” (Id. at p. 1112, fn. 5; see also, People v. Panizzon (1996)
13 Cal.4th 68, 73 [“Since the challenge attacks an integral part of the plea, it
is, in substance, a challenge to the validity of the plea, which requires

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compliance with the probable cause certificate requirements of section 1237.5
and [the applicable rule of the California Rules of Court].”].)
      “[W]hen a defendant waives the right to appeal as part of a plea
agreement, and the waiver’s terms encompass the issue the defendant wishes
to raise, the defendant must obtain a certificate of probable cause to avoid
dismissal of the appeal. With a certificate of probable cause in hand, the
defendant may argue that the waiver is not enforceable as to the issue raised,
whether because the waiver was not knowing and intelligent or for some
other reason.” (People v. Espinoza (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 794, 803
(Espinoza).) In particular, one court stated that when a defendant has
waived his or her right to appeal, “the ruling on the [section 1538.5]
suppression motion may not be appealed without first obtaining the requisite
certificate [of probable cause].” (People v. Mashburn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th
937, 940 (Mashburn).) In that context, Mashburn concluded: “[The
defendant’s] challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress may only be
heard if the waiver of the right to appeal is unenforceable, which is an issue
regarding which [the defendant] was obligated to obtain a certificate of
probable cause.” (Id. at p. 943.)
      In People v. Codinha (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1047 (Codinha), we
addressed an appeal involving circumstances analogous to those in this case.
(Id. at pp. 1073–1074.) In the plea agreement in that case, the defendant,
among other things, waived his right to appeal the denial of his
section 1538.5 motion to suppress. (Codinha, at p. 1073.) His notice of
appeal stated that he would challenge the validity of his plea and the denial
of his section 1538.5 motion, but his request for a certificate of probable cause
did not mention (either directly or indirectly) his waiver of the right to appeal
the denial of his section 1538.5 motion or his intent to challenge the validity

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of that waiver. (Codinha, at pp. 1073–1074.) Rather, his request for a
certificate of probable cause mentioned only the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel and the denial of his section 1538.5 motion. (Codinha,
at p. 1074.) The trial court granted the defendant’s request for a certificate of
probable cause without specifically mentioning the defendant’s waiver of his
right to appeal. (Ibid.)
      In Codinha, we declined to address the merits of the defendant’s
contention on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his section 1538.5
motion to suppress. (Codinha, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1074,
1078–1079.) We stated: “As a general rule, obtaining a certificate of
probable cause does not make cognizable issues that the defendant waived as
part of a guilty plea. More specifically, in this case, by failing to disclose the
express Waiver to the trial court in his request for a certificate of probable
cause, [the defendant] may not argue on appeal that the Waiver was
ineffective or unenforceable or that the generic certificate of probable cause
issued by the trial court otherwise affected the Waiver.” (Id. at p. 1074.) We
further stated: “[the defendant’s] challenge to the denial of his motion to
suppress may only be heard if the Waiver is unenforceable—which, according
to Mashburn, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at page 943 . . . , ‘is an issue regarding
which [the defendant] was obligated to obtain a certificate of probable cause.’
[Citations.]” (Codinha, at p. 1078.) Accordingly, in Codinha, we concluded:
“[T]he lack of a certificate of probable cause as to the enforceability of the
Waiver precludes appellate review of the issue of the denial of the
section 1538.5 suppression motion.” (Ibid.) We further concluded:
“[W]ithout a certificate of probable cause as to the Waiver, we will not reach
the merits of [the defendant’s] arguments related to the denial of his
section 1538.5 suppression motion.” (Id. at p. 1079.)

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                                        C
      In this case, the record shows that in his plea agreement, Bocksberger
waived his right to appeal from any motion that he brought, which
necessarily included a waiver of his right to appeal from the denial of his
section 1538.5 motion to suppress. After the trial court entered its judgment,
Bocksberger filed a notice of appeal and attached a request for a certificate of
probable cause, citing only his challenge to the denial of his section 1538.5
motion to suppress. Neither his notice of appeal nor request for a certificate
of probable cause cited any challenge to the validity or enforceability of his
waiver of the right to appeal any motions he had brought (e.g., his
section 1538.5 motion to suppress). As discussed above, the trial court did
not grant or deny his request for a certificate of probable cause and simply
noted that a certificate was not needed. In so noting, the trial court correctly
interpreted rule 8.304(b)(2)(A), which sets forth the general rule that a
certificate of probable cause is not required to appeal from the denial of a
section 1538.5 motion to suppress. However, that general rule does not apply
here to allow Bocksberger to appeal the denial of his section 1538.5 motion to
suppress because he waived his right to appeal from the denial of that motion
and failed to request or obtain a certificate of probable cause as to the validity
or enforceability of that waiver.
      By failing to request, and obtain, a certificate of probable cause as to
the validity or enforceability of his plea agreement and/or his waiver of the
right to appeal from the denial of his section 1538 motion to suppress, we
conclude that Bocksberger cannot now challenge on appeal either: (1) the
validity or enforceability of that waiver; or (2) the denial of his section 1538.5
motion to suppress. (Rule 8.304(b)(1)(A); Jones, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1112,
fn. 5; Codinha, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1074, 1078–1079; Mashburn,

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supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 940, 943; Espinoza, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at
p. 803.) Therefore, we cannot consider the merits of his challenge to either
the validity or enforceability of his waiver of the right to appeal the denial of
his section 1538.5 motion to suppress or the trial court’s denial of that

motion. Accordingly, we must dismiss his appeal.2
                                 DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.

                                                                   CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

2    Because we dismiss the appeal, we do not address the merits of any of
Bocksberger’s specific contentions raised in his opening brief.
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