Court Opinion

ID: 9738077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:42:04.404619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.616145
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, P. J.
I concur.
I agree with Justice Friedman (see dissenting opinion) that the problem is one of statutory interpretation, but I believe that the judicial declaration of legislative intent made 73 years ago in Smith v. Smith (1891) 88 Cal. 572 [26 P. 356], is reasonable and should be followed by us—as it has been, presumably, by three generations of litigants.
In relating Code of Civil Procedure section 395 to section 392, providing that actions involving real property shall be tried in the county of the land’s situs, the court in Smith stated (at p. 576): “... If, in his complaint, the plaintiff join with such a cause of action another which is not embraced in its provision ... his action becomes one of those ‘ other cases’ provided for in section 395. ...” This effectually states that unless an action is wholly local in character, section 395, the “all other cases” section, fixes the proper place of trial.
By parity of reasoning I think it must be held that section 395 applies even where a county is a party defendant. Unless the action is one wholly against a county section 394 is inapplicable.
I do not agree with Justice Friedman that the fact that the defendant in Smith had asserted the right “was the pivotal feature” of that decision. Place of trial should be determinable when the complaint is filed. It should not rest upon the whim of a defendant. (Monogram Co. v. Kingsley, 38 Cal.2d 28 [237 P.2d 265].)
Nor should we recede from reasonable precedent because of the plight (depicted in the dissent) of a county geographical*254ly antipodal to the residence of vacationing motorists in having to defend itself in a far-distant forum. In situations like that I have confidence in the court’s proper exercise of the power to make any change of venue which will serve the ends of justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 397.)