Court Opinion

ID: 9578367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:44:31.461337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:47.700974
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting from Division 1. The result of the majority holding is that the only burden required of the insurer is to show that it acted with diligence and in good faith in seeking to obtain the insured’s cooperation. That not only is in direct contravention of the "law of this case” as established in Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot, 123 Ga. App. 397 (181 SE2d 305), but is in contravention of the law of this State as established by prior decisions of the Court of Appeals, to wit: Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Carmical, 99 Ga. App. 98, 103 (107 SE2d 700); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wendler, 117 Ga. App. 227, 231 (160 SE2d 256); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot, 123 Ga. App. 397, supra; and in particular, it is in direct contravention of an opinion written by Judge Eberhardt, concurred in by Judge Hall, in St. Paul Fire &c. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 116 Ga. App. 658, 660 (158 SE2d 278), which holds: "The question as to whether the company was reasonably diligent in seeking to obtain information from the insured and if so, whether the insured’s conduct was such as to indicate a purposeful intention to refuse the cooperation to which his insurer was entitled is for resolution by the jury.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Surely, it cannot be successfuly maintained that the insurance company in this case showed a "purposeful intention” on the part of the insured to fail to cooperate.
Further, where an insurer conducts a defense, as was done in this case, without giving notice of reservation of rights, it is obligated thereafter to afford coverage. See Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot, 123 Ga. App. 397, supra; Jones v. Ga. Cas. &c. Co., 89 Ga. App. 181, 185 (78 *808SE2d 861); State Farm Mut. &c. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 104 Ga. App. 815 (123 SE2d 191).
The insurer never gave a notice of reservation of rights to the defendant, but in lieu it mailed a letter to the insured from Brunswick to California, setting up certain self-serving statements, saying that it had previously done so. Of course, self-serving declarations are as hearsay and prove nothing. See Gay v. Osteen, 56 Ga. App. 224, 231 (192 SE 539); Mineola Mill Co. v. Griffin, 18 Ga. App. 668 (2) (90 SE 360).
Further, although the insurer’s attorney mailed this second letter to the insured, and had a return receipt signed by the insured it elected not to introduce said signed receipt in evidence and since there was absolutely no proof that the insured received said letter, with self-serving declaration therein prior to the trial, the "law of the case” as established when this case was before this court earlier (Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot, 123 Ga. App. 397, supra) is controlling on the principle of law to be applied thereafter. See Moorman v. Williams, 107 Ga. App. 640 (2) (131 SE2d 238); Blackwell v. Southland Butane Gas Co., 95 Ga. App. 113 (97 SE2d 191).
The insurance company relies upon the cases of H. Y. Akers & Sons v. St. Louis Fire &c. Ins. Co., 120 Ga. App. 800 (172 SE2d 355) and Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Sorrough, 122 Ga. App. 556 (177 SE2d 819). Both of these opinions were written by Judge Eberhardt. They must give way to the older cases on this same point and they must likewise give way to opinions concurred in by five judges. See Code Ann. §24-3501 (Ga. L. 1945, p. 232; 1960, pp. 158, 159; 1961, p. 140; 1967, p. 538).
And particularly, should they give way to Judge Eberhardt’s earlier opinion in the case of St. Paul Fire &c. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 116 Ga. App. 658, 660, supra.
I am stating my views here for fear that hereafter some of the attorneys in Georgia may feel that an insurance company can evade its obligation simply by showing that it used reasonable diligence to secure the insured’s coopera*809tion to thereby establish he did not cooperate. But, the true law is as Judges Eberhardt, Hall and Felton decided in St. Paul Fire &c. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 116 Ga. App. 658, 660, supra, to the effect that the insurance company has a burden of showing two things, to wit: that the insurance company was reasonably diligent in seeking to obtain cooperation; and that the insured’s conduct was a purposeful intention to refuse to cooperate.
In Georgia we have the rule of stare decisis, which means the older case must control until overruled. See Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 123 Ga. App. 108, 111 (179 SE2d 525); Croker v. Smith, 225 Ga. 529, 531 (169 SE2d 787); McCurry v. McCurry, 223 Ga. 334, 335 (155 SE2d 378). Therefore, the following cases will still prevail, in Georgia, to wit: Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Carmical, 99 Ga. App. 98, 103, supra; St. Paul Fire &c. Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 116 Ga. App. 658, 660, supra; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Wendler, 117 Ga. App. 227, 231, supra; Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot, 123 Ga. App. 397, supra.
For the reasons stated above I dissent from the judgment of reversal. I likewise concur in all that is stated by Judge Pannell in his dissent.