Court Opinion

ID: 9559958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:39:35.339069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:55.191698
License: Public Domain

WEBB, Justice.
We address first the defendant’s assignment of error as to whether the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask certain questions regarding defendant’s post-arrest silence.
At trial, the prosecutor repeatedly questioned Detectives Jenkins and Dayton and the defendant about whether the defendant had ever informed anyone that Terry Kicinski had attacked him on the night of the incident. The following are excerpted portions of the interchange that took place between the prosecutor and Detective Jenkins.
Q: Did he mention anything about any attack by anyone whatsoever at all?
A: No.
MRS. Brown: Objection.
COURT: Overruled.
Q: Did he ever tell you on that occasion or the next day that Terry Kicinski had done anything at all to him?
MRS. Brown: Objection.
COURT: Sustained.
Q: Did he tell you that Terry Kicinski attacked him?
MRS. Brown: Objection.
COURT: Sustained.
Similar questions were asked of the defendant:
Q: Mr. Hoyle, you never recontacted the police officers and gave them this story that you have just given these jurors here today have you?
A: I beg your pardon?
*236Q: You never got back in touch with any of these police officers and told them what you have told these jurors today about what Terry Kicinski did?
Mr. Elmore: Objection.
COURT: Objection sustained.
Q: You never mentioned the night or early morning hours of the 21st when you agreed to answer questions that you had been attacked in any way, did you?
Mr. ELMORE: Objection.
COURT: Overruled.
A: No, I did not.
Q: And you complained of no injuries?
A: No, I did not.
Finally, the prosecutor made reference to defendant’s silence when he made his closing argument before the jury:
Who said anything, until yesterday, about Terry Kicinski having grabbed his gun? Who? When was there an opportunity to say that? For months and that night. You think what you would do. If somebody had severely beaten you, if somebody had caused you to think that you had to defend yourself, if somebody had struggled with you over a gun and had accidently shot themselves, don’t you think, when the police were there and polite and nice and trying to get to the truth . . . don’t you think you would tell him then?
The United States Supreme Court held in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), that when a person under arrest has been advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), which includes the right to remain silent, there is an implicit promise that the silence will not be used against that person. The Court in Doyle held it is a violation of a defendant’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to then impeach the defendant on cross-examination by questioning him about the silence.
We hold that the rule of Doyle was violated in this case. The defendant told the officers he would not answer questions *237as to what happened when Terry Kicinski followed him to the truck. He had a constitutional right not to answer such questions and Doyle holds it was a violation of this right for his silence to be used against him. The questions of the district attorney and the argument to the jury as to the defendant’s failure to tell the police of his defense were in violation of Doyle.
In State v. Lane, 301 N.C. 382, 271 S.E.2d 273 (1980) this Court held it was prejudicial error to allow a defendant to be cross-examined as to why he did not tell the officers of the alibi he used at trial.- We said that the defendant had the right under article I, section 23 of the Constitution of North Carolina as well as the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to remain silent and “any comment upon the exercise of this right, nothing else appearing, was impermissible.” Under Lane it was error to comment on the defendant’s silence in this case. See also State v. Freeland, 316 N.C. 13, 340 S.E.2d 35 (1986); State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); State v. Castor, 285 N.C. 286, 204 S.E.2d 848 (1974).
The State contends that if it was error to allow the questions and the jury argument it was not prejudicial. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(b) provides:
A violation of the defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless.
In this case there was not an eyewitness to the shooting other than the defendant. His defense depended on the jury’s acceptance of his version of the event. The State has not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that it was harmless to attack the credibility of this version by improper evidence, which improper evidence was reinforced by jury argument. We hold this was prejudicial error requiring a new trial. See State v. Silva, 304 N.C. 122, 282 S.E.2d 449 (1981).
In another assignment of error the defendant contends it was error to admit into evidence a statement he made at his home shortly before he was taken to police headquarters. When the officers were at the home of the defendant he agreed with them *238to go to police headquarters. At that time the defendant started towards his closet to get his coat. The officers stopped him and got his coat for him. One of the officers took into his possession a pistol that was on a nearby shelf. The defendant asked the officers if they had a warrant and was informed that they did not. One of the officers then told the defendant he would obtain a warrant and would leave an officer at the defendant’s home until a warrant could be procured. The defendant then went with the officers. As they were leaving the defendant’s home one of the officers asked the defendant how long he had been at home to which the defendant replied, “all night.” It is to the admission of this statement that the defendant assigns error.
When a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way he must be advised of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel before any responses he may make to interrogation may be introduced in evidence. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; State v. Biggs, 292 N.C. 328, 233 S.E.2d 512 (1977); State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623, 242 S.E.2d 814 (1978). We hold that when an officer told the defendant that he would get a warrant for him and would leave an officer at the defendant’s home until the warrant could be procured, the defendant was deprived of his freedom in a significant way. It was necessary to advise him of his rights before his answer to the question as to how long he had been at his home could be introduced into evidence. In light of our holding that the defendant must have a new trial on other grounds, we need not determine whether this error was so prejudicial as to require a new trial.
The defendant has also assigned error to the denial of his motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence. We hold that the evidence as recited in this opinion was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of first degree murder. State v. Robbins, 275 N.C. 537, 169 S.E.2d 858 (1969).
The defendant has made numerous other assignments of error. We have examined them and they are either without merit or the questions they raise may not recur at a new trial.
New trial.