Court Opinion

ID: 9742053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:05:53.543465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:28.221113
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting). The majority views this case as a choice between denying fourth amendment protection to those who live with probationers or parolees and providing a safe haven for probationers and parolees, undercutting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). Were that choice necessary, this would be a more difficult case. But it is not. What the majority has done is to set up a straw man, and then, with reluctance, tear it down. I believe that we can simultaneously follow Griffin, deny probationers and parolees full fourth amendment protection, and yet grant that protection to all other citizens. Therefore, I dissent.
The majority worries that the fourth amendment rights of a person living with a parolee would transfer to the parolee, entitling the parolee to assert those rights. That was the Utah Supreme Court's theory in State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1987). The Utah court concluded that a parolee could avoid all warrantless parole searches by living with a nonparolee. There is no logic to this reasoning. Griffin holds that parolees and probationers have limited *198fourth amendment rights. A search of a parolee's residence pursuant to Department of Corrections rules is valid, whether the parolee lives alone or with someone. Evidence obtained as a result of that search is admissible against the parolee. A parolee cannot avoid warrantless searches by living with a nonparolee. The fears of the majority and of the Utah Supreme Court are groundless.
The search of the apartment did not produce evidence which incriminated Clark. This case is not a review of Clark's parole revocation, nor is it a review of charges brought against Clark. This is a criminal action against West, and the evidence sought to be suppressed incriminated West, not Clark.1 The question is not, as the majority suggests, whether we should apply Griffin's reasoning to West, but whether a person forfeits his or her fourth amendment protections by choosing to live with a probationer or parolee. By attacking a straw man, the majority avoids the real question posed by this case.
Because it is not necessary to abrogate West's fourth amendment rights to ensure that Clark cannot avoid Griffin, Clark and his status need not be considered in analyzing the search of the apartment. The proper analysis is not difficult. Three police officers and a probation and parole agent searched West’s residence without a warrant, without exigent circumstances, and without West's permission. That is exactly the type of search prohibited by the fourth amendment. The result is that the evidence seized in the search must be sup*199pressed insofar as the state seeks to use it against West.
In State v. Griffin, 126 Wis. 2d 183, 206, 376 N.W.2d 62, 73 (Ct. App. 1985) (Dykman, J., dissenting), aff'd, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 388 N.W.2d 535 (1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), I noted in dissent that probationers may achieve their status as a result of convictions for disorderly conduct, drunk driving, and fish and game law violations. Many persons are convicted of issuing worthless checks and placed on probation. A person who makes a bet can be placed on probation, as can a person who drinks intoxicants while a passenger on a common carrier. Persons convicted of possessing small amounts of marijuana are commonly placed on probation. The majority has concluded that the parents, grandparents, siblings, roommates and spouses of persons convicted of any of these crimes have forfeited their fourth amendment rights if they continue living with their children, grandchildren, siblings, roommates or spouses.
The majority may be convinced that society is prepared to accept as reasonable the nighttime breaking down of parents' doors and the subsequent search of the home while the occupants are handcuffed, with the only justification being that a teenage son is on probation for possessing a marijuana cigarette.2 I am not so convinced.
*200If the police have probable cause to believe that a person has contraband or stolen items in his or her home, there is no reason why the police cannot obtain a warrant to search that person's home. That the occupant lives with a probationer or parolee is no reason to invent an exception to the fourth amendment. Here, the police apparently had no belief that West possessed stolen goods when they entered her home without, a warrant and without her permission. She was in no different position from that of most of Wisconsin's residents except that, unknown to the police, she possessed stolen goods. That is not enough for a warrantless search of anyone's residence. Therefore, were I writing for the majority, I would reverse and remand with instructions to suppress the evidence found during the search at West's trial.

 Perhaps the seized evidence also incriminated Clark. But that is not relevant. If the evidence also incriminated Clark, the facts in Clark's case would be identical to those in Griffin, and the same result should occur.

 Griffin also requires that "reasonable grounds" for the search exist, 126 Wis. 2d at 200-01, 376 N.W.2d at 70-71, which in that case was a statement by a police officer that Griffin may have had guns. Id. at 186, 376 N.W.2d at 63-64. Thus, a police officer's statement that an individual might have an illegal trout or marijuana cigarette would be sufficient for a probationer search.