Court Opinion

ID: 9775463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:59:38.568488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:26.424800
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON COURT’S OWN MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
Appellant appealed his felony conviction for the offense of burglary under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 30.02. Pursuant to V.T. C.A., Penal Code, § 12.42, the trial court had assessed punishment at life imprisonment.
The Eastland Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the indictment set aside. Carr v. State (No. 11-82-*154307-CR, Feb. 24, 1983). The Court of Appeals held that appellant was entitled to relief under Article 32A.02, Y.A.C.C.P., the Texas Speedy Trial Act. We granted State’s Petition for Discretionary Review to determine whether the State’s timely announcement of ready on one indicted offense carried over to a subsequently indicted different offense arising out of the same transaction.
On original submission we held that the State’s timely announcement of ready on one offense does not constitute an announcement of ready on the second offense arising out of the same transaction, when the subsequent indictment alleges a primary offense that is different from the one alleged in the earlier charging instrument. This was held to be true even though the facts showed that both offenses were in fact committed in one transaction. On February 20, 1984, this Court granted its own motion for rehearing to review this holding in view of the conflict with Denson v. State (No. 63,428 — July 7,1982 — pending on rehearing).
The record shows that appellant was arrested on May 4, 1981, in connection with the January 24, 1981, burglary of the Higginbotham Brothers Hardware Company in Stephenville.
Appellant was indicted on May 21, 1981, for the offense of theft under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 31.03(a) and (b)(1). The State announced ready on the theft indictment on June 29,1981, 56 days after appellant’s arrest. The State also announced ready on the same theft indictment on November 2, 1981, and January 11, 1982.
As noted by the trial judge, the State dismissed the theft indictment “subsequent” to the return of a new indictment for burglary on June 2, 1982. This second indictment also alleged the offense to have been committed on January 24, 1981. The indictment for burglary was presented 394 days after appellant’s arrest on May 4, 1981. The State first announced ready on the burglary indictment on June 28, 1982, 420 days after appellant’s arrest.
The Speedy Trial Act requires a trial court to grant a motion to set aside an indictment if the State is not ready for trial within 120 days of the commencement of a criminal action if the defendant is accused of a felony. Article 32A.02, § 1(1), supra. A “criminal action” commences when an indictment is filed against the defendant in court, “unless prior to the filing the defendant is either detained in custody or released on bail or personal bond to answer for the same offense or any other offense arising out of the same transaction....” Article 32A.02, § 2(a), supra; see also Kalish v. State, 662 S.W.2d 595, 600 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (“[W]hen a person is detained, placed under restraint or taken into custody by a peace officer, all such chargeable voluntary conduct in which the person was then and there engaged, constituting an offense continuing in nature, arises out of the same transaction.”) In the instant case there is no question that the second indictment for burglary arose out of the “same transaction” as the initial indictment for the theft committed on January 24, 1981. Unless the State’s announcement of ready on the first indictment “carried over” to the second indictment, the State did not show itself to be ready within the 120 day time period required by the Act.
This Court has previously wrestled with the issue of whether a State’s announcement of ready as to one indictment carries over to a subsequent indictment for an offense arising out of the same transaction. In Perez v. State, 678 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Tex. Cr.App.1984), the defendant was indicted for burglary of a vehicle and later reindict-ed on allegations of the same crime, along with a prior conviction alleged for enhancement. Since the reindictment was for the same case, the State’s timely announcement of ready carried over to the second indictment. See and cf. Santibanez v. State, 717 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986) (“Since both indictments involve the same offense, the motion for continuance, if good, carries forward from the first indictment to the second indictment.”); Whaley v. State, 717 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986) (“We find the unlawful delivery charges in the first indictment to be the same cases as in the second and third in*155dictments.”); Durham v. State, 701 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986).
Several Courts of Appeals have adopted the “different proof’ standard to determine whether an act by a party on the first indictment should carry over to any succeeding indictments. See McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 859 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986); Presley v. State, 686 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, PDR refd); Richardson v. State, 629 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, PDR refd).
“The critical feature for determining whether an act by a party on the first indictment should carry over to any succeeding indictments is whether the indictments are subject to the same proof. Presley v. State, 686 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, pet. pending). Announcements of ready on one indictment will not carry over to a subsequent indictment if the indictments charge different offenses subject to different proof, even though they involve the same complaining witness and arise from the same transaction. See Richardson v. State, 629 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, pet. refd). See also Perez v. State, 678 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (approving Richardson).” McGlothlin, supra, at 859.
Richardson, supra, presents an analogous situation to the present case. The defendant was initially indicted for the offense of theft and later “reindicted” (according to the State) for burglary of a vehicle. The Court of Appeals noted:
“Although both F-78-6913-1H and the instant case have the same complaining witness, they are different offenses subject to different proof, and therefore are not the ‘same case’ even though they are from the same transaction. Consequently, the announcements of ready in one case will not apply to the other case.” Richardson, supra, at 165.
Although the petition for discretionary review was denied in Richardson, this Court has adopted the standard enunciated in that case, namely that readiness carries forward from one indictment to a subsequent indictment as long as the offense is the same offense subject to the same proof.
“In Richardson, supra, there were two separate offenses, burglary of a vehicle and third degree theft. Although both offenses arose from the same transaction, they were subject to different proof. For this reason the Dallas Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the second indictment, which had been returned after the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act had passed.” Whaley, supra, at 29; see also Behrend v. State, 729 S.W.2d 717, 722.
In Presley, supra, the defendant was indicted for rape of a child. Another indictment was returned charging aggravated rape of a child and containing an enhancement paragraph. The second indictment was followed by a third indictment again charging aggravated rape of a child and containing an enhancement paragraph. “All three indictments related to the same transaction and at the conclusion of the hearing on August 26, 1983, the trial judge announced that the motion to quash the cases other than F-83-96123 (represented by the third indictment) was granted.” Presley, supra, at 766. Presley complained on appeal that the State’s “reindictment” for aggravated rape was for a different offense and that the State was not ready for trial within the statutory time period because 134 days had elapsed since his arrest.
The Court of Appeals held:
“Although in the instant case the appellant was alleged to have violated two separate Penal Code sections, the facts underlying the two violations are identical: both violations involved the commission of the same prohibited acts against the same complaining witness during the course of one transaction. The only difference between the requisites of the Penal Code sections is that in order for the State to convict a defendant for the offense of rape of a child, the victim must have been under the age of seventeen years, whereas the aggravated rape statute required the child to have been under the age of fourteen years. Obviously, at *156the time of the offense the victim was a certain fixed age (under the age of fourteen); therefore, the subsequent indictments did not enlarge upon the State’s burden of proof or curtail any of appellant’s available defenses. The State’s preparation for trial was in no way affected by the substitution of the greater offense in the subsequent indictment. We hold that under the particular facts of this case, there was only one case based upon a single offense arising out of one transaction. Accordingly, the State’s announcement of ready from the earlier indictment constituted an announcement of ready on the second and third indictments arising out of the same transaction.” Presley, supra, at 768.
Presley draws attention to “seemingly inconsistent opinions [by this Court] regarding the question of when the State’s announcement of ready carries forward to subsequent indictments.” Presley, supra, at 767. The cases referred to by the Court of Appeals are Denson (No. 63,428, July 7, 1982) (“[Announcements of ready or continuances granted concerning one offense will apply to another offense when both offenses arose out of the same transaction.”), and Carr, the instant case. Both cases are currently before this Court on motions for rehearing.
On original submission in the instant case we reached the opposite conclusion from Denson. We noted that there is a distinction between successive indictments for the same offense and a subsequent indictment for a different offense.
“[W]hen the latter indictment alleges the same offense, or where the facts show that only a single offense has been committed, the State’s announcement of ready on the earlier indictment, or the defendant’s waiver of speedy trial on the earlier indictment, will be effective. Conversely, when the subsequent indictment alleges a primary offense that is different from the one alleged in the earlier charging instrument, and the facts show that both offenses were in fact committed in one transaction, we hold that the State’s timely announcement of ready on one offense does not constitute an announcement of ready on the second, different offense arising out of the same transaction.” (Emphasis in original.)
Under the circumstances presented we held Carr was entitled to relief since the subsequent indictment alleged an offense different from the one alleged in the earlier indictment.
This Court’s most recent encounter with the issue about whether an announcement of ready carries over to a subsequent indictment occurred in Behrend, supra. Beh-rend was originally indicted for capital murder by suffocating the victim with chloroform. The second indictment alleged murder by “manner and means unknown,” eliminating the aggravating feature and changing only the manner by which the victim was alleged to have been killed. Citing Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.Cr. App.1986), Whaley, supra, and Richardson, supra, we noted: “These cases indicate that as long as the subsequent indictment is for the same offense arising out of the transaction for which the defendant was originally arrested, announcements of ready by the state carry forward.” Beh-rend, supra, at 722. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, we held:
“Although these two offenses [capital murder and murder] differ in that the first required greater proof than the second, these offenses clearly arose out of the same transaction, viz: the killing of the victim. They were, just as in Whaley and Sharp, supra, the same offense for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. Thus, we find that the State’s announcement of ready on the second indictment carried forward to the second and final indictment.” Behrend, supra, at 723.
In the instant case both offenses alleged in the indictments arose out of the same transaction. Nevertheless, we cannot stretch our recent decision in Behrend to conclude that theft and burglary are “the same offense for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.” Burglary, as defined in V.T. C.A., Penal Code, § 30.02, requires greater proof than theft under V.T.C.A., Penal *157Code, § 31.03.1 In Behrend, supra, the State was conceivably “ready” to prove the elements of the lesser included offense of murder alleged in the second indictment, rather than capital murder. In the instant case an announcement of ready by the State in the theft case does not automatically mean the State was “ready” to try the burglary case. These offenses involve different elements of proof, and the State’s announcement of ready under one indictment will not carry forward to an indictment alleging a completely different offense. See Richardson, supra. This holds true despite the fact that both offenses arose out of the same transaction.
On original submission we noted that the time periods prescribed in Article 32A.02, § 1, may not be elongated by stringing out successive “reindictments” for the various offenses committed in that transaction far beyond the limitations imposed. “To hold otherwise would be to defeat the purpose of the Act, and to radically misapply its stringent requirements.”
We hold that the State’s announcement of ready on the theft indictment did not carry over to the burglary indictment, despite the fact that both offenses arose out of the same transaction. We disavow any language in the opinion on original submission in Denson, supra, to the contrary. The motion for rehearing is denied.
WHITE, J., concurs in the result.
McCORMICK, J., dissents.

. Under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 30.02(a), a person commits burglary if, without the effective consent of the owner, he:
"(1) enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the public, with intent to commit a felony or theft; or
"(2) remains concealed, with intent to commit a felony or theft, in a building or habitation; or
“(3) enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft.”
Theft, under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 31.03(a) and (b)(1), provides that a person commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property and the appropriation is without the owner’s effective consent.