Court Opinion

ID: 9409050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 19:04:00.730041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.517775
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/14/23 Wilcox v. California State Teachers Retirement System CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 COLLEEN WILCOX,                                                     H049809
                                                                     (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Appellant,                                Super. Ct. No. 20CV364700)

             v.

 CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS’
 RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

             Defendant and Respondent.

                                           I.        INTRODUCTION
         Colleen Wilcox was employed for 14 years as the Superintendent of the Santa
Clara County Office of Education (SCCOE) and was a member of the California State
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). Under the Teachers’ Retirement Law
(Education Code section 22000 et seq.),1 CalSTRS “ ‘is the state agency responsible
for managing contributions made by employees and member school districts to the
State Teachers’ Retirement Fund. [Citation.]’ ” (Blaser v. State Teachers’ Retirement
System (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 349, 356.) After Wilcox left the employ of SCCOE in
2008 and retired in 2010, a dispute arose with CalSTRS concerning the characterization
of her compensation as it affected the calculation of her monthly retirement benefits. In
May 2016, CalSTRS advised Wilcox that $20,000 that she had directed over a three-year

         1
        All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise
specified.
period to be transferred from her deferred compensation fund to additional salary did not
qualify as creditable compensation in determining her retirement benefits. CalSTRS also
told Wilcox that the entire amount of compensation she had received from November 1,
2007 through June 30, 2008 ($188,000) under a settlement agreement was improperly
reported by her employer, SCCOE, as creditable. Wilcox challenged those conclusions.
After an administrative hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld CalSTRS’s
conclusions that the additional salary taken over a three-year period and the
compensation paid under the settlement agreement were improperly reported by SCCOE,
as creditable, thereby overstating Wilcox’s retirement benefits. The decision was
adopted (with minor revisions) by CalSTRS’s Appeals Committee (Appeals Committee)
on February 3, 2019 (the Administrative Decision).
        Wilcox challenged the Administrative Decision by filing a petition for writ of
mandamus with the superior court. In an order filed January 11, 2021, the court upheld
the Administrative Decision, with one exception. The court held, contrary to the ALJ,
that the overpayment claims asserted by CalSTRS against Wilcox were barred, in part, by
the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Judgment was entered on September 1,
2021.
        Wilcox argues on appeal that the trial court erred in upholding the Administrative
Decision. She contends that the plain language of her employment contract permitted
her to designate as additional salary sums that she was otherwise entitled to receive as
deferred compensation and that, after she so designated them as salary, the amounts were
properly creditable for purposes of calculating retirement benefits. Wilcox argues further
that she continued to be employed by the SCCOE (albeit no longer as Superintendent)
from November 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008, and the income she received as specified
in the settlement agreement was salary that was creditable under the Education Code.
Lastly, Wilcox challenges the rejection by the ALJ (and by the trial court) of her
contention that because CalSTRS unreasonably delayed in asserting that this income was

                                             2
improperly reported as creditable, it is barred from doing so under the equitable doctrine
of laches.
       We conclude that there was no error and will therefore affirm the judgment.
                   II.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       A.     Wilcox’s Employment with SCCOE
              1.         Employment Contracts and Deferred Compensation
       On November 10, 2003, Wilcox and the Board of Education of the County of
Santa Clara (SCCOE Board) entered into a contract entitled “MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING” under which she would be employed as Superintendent for the
period of July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2007 (Employment Contract). It provided that she
would receive “Salary” in the annual amount of $192,328. The Employment Contract
included a separate provision (under the subheading “Benefits”) under which the SCCOE
Board would pay Wilcox each year $20,050 “into a deferred compensation fund . . . or as
additional wages as designated and directed by the County Superintendent.” The
amounts designated in the Employment Contract for annual salary and for the deferred
compensation fund were changed in two later written contracts.
       On May 17, 2005, Wilcox elected in writing to accept $5,000 as part of her
“annual salary” from the total amount of $20,050 of her deferred compensation for the
2005-2006 school year, thereby leaving $15,050 as deferred compensation. The SCCOE
acknowledged this designation in a memorandum to Wilcox noting an “[i]ncrease to
base” in salary by $5,000.
       The next year, on May 23, 2006, Wilcox elected in writing to accept $7,500 as
“annual salary” from the then-specified total amount of $20,000 of her deferred
compensation for the 2006-2007 school year, thereby leaving $12,500 as deferred
compensation. The SCCOE acknowledged this designation in a memorandum to Wilcox
noting as an addition under her base salary a “[t]ransfer from [a]nnuity” of $7,500.

                                             3
       On or about May 3, 2007, Wilcox elected in writing to accept $7,500 as “annual
salary” from the then-specified total amount of $12,500 of her deferred compensation
for the 2007-2008 school year, thereby leaving $5,000 as deferred compensation. The
SCCOE acknowledged this designation in a memorandum to Wilcox noting as an
addition under her base salary a “[t]ransfer from [a]nnuity” of $7,500.
       For the school years 2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008, the SCCOE reported
to CalSTRS the amounts of $5,000, $7,500, and $7,500, respectively, as creditable
compensation.
                2.     Employment from November 1, 2007-June 30, 2008
       Wilcox testified that a controversy developed concerning her tenure as
Superintendent. It manifested itself through “a little hostility” at board meetings and one
member “often [being] argumentative.” The controversy led to discussions about her
potential resignation as Superintendent.
       On September 25, 2007, Wilcox, the SCCOE, and the SCCOE Board entered into
an agreement concerning Wilcox’s employment, entitled “Settlement Agreement and
Release of All Claims” (Settlement Agreement). (Boldface & capitalization omitted.)
Wilcox agreed to resign as Superintendent, effective November 1, 2007, but would
continue as an employee (with no stated job title) until July 1, 2008, being paid at an
annual rate of $282,000. The parties agreed further that the SCCOE Board, “or its
delegate, [would] consult with WILCOX so that the job duties and responsibility
assigned to her [would] constitute creditable service for retirement purposes.”2
       On November 9, 2007, the SCCOE Board sent a memorandum advising Wilcox
that she would “be a contracted employee of the Office” with the job title of “Special
Assistant to the Board-Certificated.” The SCCOE Board stated that Wilcox “may be

       2
           The terms of the Settlement Agreement are described in detail, post.

                                              4
assigned to special projects,” and that Acting Superintendent “Joe Fimiani may call upon
[her] as necessary.”
       Wilcox resigned as an employee of SCCOE effective June 30, 2008. The SCCOE
reported to CalSTRS that Wilcox had received creditable compensation from
November 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008, and two-thirds of a year of service credit of
$188,000.
       B.     Administrative Proceedings
       CalSTRS issued a decision letter on May 25, 2016, advising Wilcox that certain
salary that was transferred from her deferred compensation fund, and compensation
received under the Settlement Agreement did not qualify as creditable compensation in
determining her retirement benefits. Specifically, CalSTRS advised Wilcox that the
following items of compensation were improperly included as creditable: (1) “$5000.00
in the 2005-06 fiscal year”; (2) “$7,500.00 in the 2006-07 fiscal year”; (3) “$7,500.00 in
the 2007-08 fiscal year for a tax-deferred compensation plan”; and (4) “[t]he $188,000.00
in compensation [Wilcox was] paid and the .667 years of service credit which was
reported from November 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008 due to a settlement agreement.”
       Wilcox, through her attorney, challenged the decision letter’s conclusions in a
detailed letter of August 8, 2016. She requested that CalSTRS conduct an executive
review of the decision letter. After its review, CalSTRS upheld its findings in a July 26,
2017 determination letter. Wilcox made a timely request for an administrative hearing.
CalSTRS filed a Statement of Issues on or about October 12, 2018. It alleged that the
SCCOE had misreported as creditable compensation received by Wilcox for the school
years 2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008. “As a result, [Wilcox’s] retirement benefit
was calculated inaccurately and she received an inflated monthly benefit that was not in
compliance with the Teachers’ Retirement Law.”
       After an administrative hearing on August 19, 2019, and written closing
arguments, the ALJ issued a proposed decision on November 20, 2019, denying Wilcox’s

                                             5
appeal. On February 3, 2019, the CalSTRS Appeals Committee adopted the ALJ’s
proposed decision, with minor revisions. It was concluded in the Administrative
Decision that the four items of Wilcox’s compensation identified in CalSTRS’s decision
letter (as described above) were erroneously classified by the SCCOE as creditable for
retirement purposes.
       Regarding the additional reportable wages that Wilcox elected to receive beyond
her fixed salary for the school years of 2005-2006 ($5,000), 2006-2007 ($7,500), and
2007-2008 ($7,500), the Appeals Committee concluded that “[t]he evidence established
that [Wilcox] elected to take funds specifically designated for a tax-deferred retirement
plan and elected to have those funds paid to her as salary. This was not a permanent
restructure of her pay rate.” The Appeals Committee found further that “the principal
purpose of [Wilcox’s] transfers for the 2005-06, 2006-07, and 2007-08 school years from
her tax-deferred compensation to salary was to enhance her retirement benefits.” It was
therefore held that the compensation Wilcox elected to transfer from deferred
compensation to salary were misreported as creditable by the SCCOE.
       The Appeals Committee held further that after Wilcox resigned as Superintendent
by executing the Settlement Agreement, she did “not perform[] activities that qualified as
creditable service.” The Appeals Committee, instead, found that Wilcox had not
performed “substantive work directly related to performing the duties of a
superintendent[ and t]here was no corroborating evidence that [she] worked on any
special projects. . . [or that there were] any new tasks that she performed for SCCOE
between November 1 2008 and June 30, 2008.” The Appeals Committee therefore held
that the SCCOE had “misreported $188,000 as creditable compensation and misreported
.667 years of service credit,” reasoning that the compensation was excluded under

                                             6
section 22119.2, subdivision (d),3 and Wilcox “did not engage in the type of activities
that qualify as creditable service under . . . section 22119.5.”
       Lastly, the Appeals Committee addressed and rejected three defenses that were
asserted by Wilcox. First, it concluded that CalSTRS was not barred by the applicable
statute of limitations (§ 22008) from “seeking to reverse the incorrectly reported
payments.” Second, the Appeals Committee held that CalSTRS was not equitably
estopped from recovering overpayments of pension benefits received by Wilcox. Third,
the Appeals Committee concluded that CalSTRS was not barred by laches from
recalculating Wilcox’s pension benefits to address the SCCOE’s misreporting of
compensation as creditable.
       C.     Court Proceedings
       Wilcox filed a petition for writ of mandate in the court below on March 20, 2020.
After briefing, argument on October 22, 2020, and post-hearing briefing, the court issued
its order on January 11, 2021 (the Order). Judgment was entered on September 1, 2021.
       The court—except as it concerned the issue of the applicability of the statute of
limitations (discussed below)—upheld the Administrative Decision of the Appeals
Committee. It concluded that the allocation by Wilcox of a total of $20,000 for the
school years of 2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008 as additional wages from the
deferred compensation fund was incorrectly reported by the SCCOE as creditable. The
court held that the facts that the funds Wilcox directed as additional wages had “never
actually [been placed] into a tax deferred fund and [were] taxable as additional wages . . .
[were] not dispositive. Clearly and undeniably, the money came out of a fund that was
separate from her fixed salary and designated as a benefit regardless of her decision to

       3
          The Administrative Decision refers to the statute identifying express exclusions
to “ ‘[c]reditable compensation’ ” as section 22119.2, subdivision (c). By amendment
of section 22119.2, effective after the ALJ’s filing of her proposed decision, the text
concerning such exclusions was redesignated under subdivision (d). (See Stats. 2019,
ch. 96, § 3.)

                                              7
allocate it as additional wages. [Wilcox’s] contract with the [SCCOE Board] provided
for a fixed salary and also provided her with an additional amount of money to be
allocated to a tax-deferred plan or allocated as wages as a separate benefit from her fixed
salary. The conversion of the tax-deferred compensation payments did not constitute a
permanent restructure of her salary because there was no permanent change to her salary
and her decision to convert tax-deferred compensation into additional wages was within
her discretion on a year-to-year basis.”
       In the Order, the court next considered Wilcox’s arguments challenging (and
CalSTRS’s arguments supporting) the Administrative Decision finding that the SCCOE
had improperly reported her November 2007 through June 2008 compensation as
creditable. In its recital of the parties’ arguments, the court noted that Wilcox had
asserted that CalSTRS was barred by laches from claiming that this eight months of
compensation was not creditable. The trial court acknowledged that Wilcox had been
disadvantaged due to the length of time that transpired from when she performed the
work in 2007-2008 to the administrative hearing in 2019. The court, however, concluded
that (1) the evidence in the administrative record did not establish that her compensation
received after she resigned as Superintendent was creditable, and (2) laches was
unavailable to her as a defense because, although “[Wilcox] may have prejudiced by the
delay, there is a strong public policy of protecting the integrity of a public retirement fund
and . . . she had no right to excess retirement benefits.”
       Lastly, the trial court considered Wilcox’s contention that CalSTRS’s claims
were barred at least in part by the three-year statute of limitations as provided under
section 22008. Under subdivision (a) of that statute, an action seeking adjustments for
erroneous payments under the Defined Benefit Program or the Defined Benefit
Supplement Program must be brought within “three years after all obligations . . . have
been discharged.” Subdivision (c) of section 22008 provides: “If an incorrect payment
is due to lack of information or inaccurate information regarding the eligibility of a

                                              8
member, former member, beneficiary, or annuity beneficiary to receive benefits under
the Defined Benefit Program or Defined Benefit Supplement Program, the period of
limitations shall commence with the discovery of the incorrect payment.” The statute
of limitations for bringing an action to recoup overpayments “commence[s] with . . .
‘discovery of the incorrect payment.’ . . . ‘[D]iscovery’ means the date CalSTRS actually
discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
incorrect payment.” (Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th
340, 348 (Baxter); see also id. at pp. 356-363.) The trial court here concluded that
CalSTRS was placed on inquiry notice in May 2013, when it received an e-mail from
Lesley King of the SCCOE indicating that Wilcox had not performed creditable service.
Since the statement of issues for the administrative proceeding was not filed by CalSTRS
until October 2018, the trial court, relying on Baxter, held that the statute of limitations
barred CalSTRS’s overpayment claims prior to October 10, 2015, but that such claims
after that date were not time-barred.4
       The trial court therefore granted Wilcox’s petition for writ of mandate in part (as
to CalSTRS’s claims that were held by the court to be time-barred) and otherwise denied
the petition. Judgment was entered on September 1, 2021.
       Wilcox filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.

       4
         CalSTRS did not file a cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s decision that
the three-year statute of limitations barred CalSTRS’s overpayment claims prior to
October 10, 2015. CalSTRS confirmed in its respondent’s brief that it “does not dispute
this outcome” concerning the statute of limitations acting as a partial bar to CalSTRS’s
overpayment claim. Similarly, Wilcox on appeal does not challenge the court’s Order
insofar as it concludes that CalSTRS is not barred by the statute of limitations from
pursuing overpayment claims on or after October 10, 2015.

                                              9
                                   III.   DISCUSSION
       A.     Administrative Mandamus
       A party may file a petition for writ of administrative mandamus “for the purpose
of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the
result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is
required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior
tribunal, corporation, board, or officer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).)
Administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 is the exclusive
remedy for judicial review of the quasi-adjudicatory administrative action of state-level
agencies following a hearing. (People v. County of Tulare (1955) 45 Cal.2d 317, 319.)
       The matters that may be addressed by the court in a mandamus proceeding are
whether the agency “has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there
was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) Under the statute, the petitioner establishes that the agency
abused its discretion by showing that it “has not proceeded in the manner required by
law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not
supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.) The superior court, in reviewing whether the
agency’s findings are supported by the evidence, applies either the substantial evidence
standard or the independent judgment standard. (Id., subd. (c).)5
       In cases where the “administrative decision[] . . . substantially affect[s] vested,
fundamental rights,” the trial court “exercises its independent judgment upon the
evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143,

       5
         “Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases
in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the
evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are
not supported by the weight of the evidence. In all other cases, abuse of discretion is
established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence in the light of the whole record.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).)

                                             10
fn. omitted.) But even in cases where the independent judgment standard applies, the
trial court gives considerable weight to the agency’s decision: “[A] trial court must
afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and
the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court
that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v.
City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817 (Fukuda).) Agency decisions involving
retirement benefits have long been considered matters affecting vested fundamental rights
and, as such, are subject to independent review by the superior court. (See Strumsky v.
San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 45-46 (Strumsky);
see also O’Connor v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1610,
1620 (O’Connor).)
       B.        Appellate Standard of Review
       As an appellate court—regardless of whether the trial court independently reviews
administrative findings or reviews them for substantial evidence—we review the trial
court’s findings in an administrative mandamus proceeding for substantial evidence.
(Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 824.) “If a fundamental vested right was involved and
the trial court therefore exercised independent judgment, it is the trial court’s judgment
that is the subject of appellate court review. [Citations.]” (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1058 (JKH
Enterprises).)
       In this case, therefore, “we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence. In doing so, we must resolve all conflicts in favor of CalSTRS, the party
prevailing below. Further, we cannot reweigh the evidence. Thus, we do not determine
whether substantial evidence would have supported a contrary judgment, but only
whether substantial evidence supports the judgment actually made by the trial court.
[Citations.] In sum, ‘[t]he question on appeal is whether the evidence reveals substantial
support—contradicted or uncontradicted—for the trial court’s conclusion that the weight

                                             11
of the evidence supports the [agency’s] findings of fact. [Citation.] We uphold the trial
court’s findings unless they so lack evidentiary support that they are unreasonable.’
[Citation.]” (Duarte v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 370,
384 (Duarte).)6
       “Pure questions of law decided by the trial court are reviewed de novo by the
Court of Appeal. [Citation.] In such instances, the appellate court is not ‘bound by the
findings of the trial court. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Pure legal questions include the
interpretation of statutes [citations], and municipal laws [citation].” (Baxter, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 353.)
       An agency’s interpretation of a statute or ordinance is given deference by the
court. (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
204, 219.) Thus, “ ‘. . . “[i]n determining the proper interpretation of a statute and the
validity of an administrative regulation, the administrative agency’s construction is
entitled to great weight, and if there appears to be a reasonable basis for it, a court will
not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body.” [Citations.]’ ”
       6
         In her opening brief, Wilcox contends, erroneously, that our review of this matter
is the same as the trial court’s review, namely, that we must review the agency’s decision
to determine whether the administrative record is supported by substantial evidence. This
assertion is renewed in Wilcox’s reply brief. Wilcox thus focuses upon the
Administrative Decision adopted by the CalSTRS Appeals Committee. In support of this
position, counsel for Wilcox cites, and appears to quote Vineyard Area Citizens for
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412 (Vineyard
Area). There, the California Supreme Court held: “An appellate court’s review of the
administrative record for legal error and substantial evidence in a CEQA case, as in other
mandamus cases, is the same as the trial court’s: The appellate court reviews the
agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision; in that sense appellate judicial review
under CEQA is de novo. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 427.) The instant mandamus case is not
a CEQA case. And here, unlike the circumstances in Vineyard Area, the Administrative
Decision being reviewed substantially affected fundamental vested rights and was thus
subject to independent review by the trial court. (See Strumsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp.
45-46.) Therefore, “on appeal we are only concerned with the superior court’s findings.
(JKH Enterprises, [supra], 142 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1058 . . . ; [citations].)” (Espinoza v.
Shiomoto (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 85, 117, original italics.)

                                              12
(O’Connor, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1620; see also California State Teachers’
Retirement System v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 41, 54 [“ ‘agency
interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and
respect by the courts’ ”].) But it is ultimately “ ‘ “for the courts, not for administrative
agencies, to lay down the governing principles of law.” ’ ” (Garamendi v. Mission Ins.
Co. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 30, 41.) “Courts must . . . independently judge the text of
the statute, taking into account and respecting the agency’s interpretation of its meaning,
of course, whether embodied in a formal rule or less formal representation. Where the
meaning and legal effect of a statute is the issue, an agency’s interpretation is one among
several tools available to the court.” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of
Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 (Yamaha Corp.).)
       C.     Review of Trial Court Judgment
       In our review of the judgment, we will consider three main questions. First, we
will address whether the trial court erred in upholding the Appeals Committee’s
determination that the amounts from her deferred compensation fund that Wilcox elected
to receive as additional salary for three school years (spanning from 2005 to 2008 and
totaling $20,000) were incorrectly reported by SCCOE as creditable. Second, we will
consider whether the trial court erred in sustaining the Appeals Committee’s
determination that the compensation Wilcox received from November 1, 2007, through
June 30, 2008 ($188,000) was also incorrectly reported by SCCOE as creditable, thereby
inflating her retirement benefits. Third, we address whether the trial court erred in
concluding that the Appeals Committee properly rejected Wilcox’s assertion that
CalSTRS was barred by laches from challenging the SCCOE’s reporting of her
compensation as creditable.7

       7
        In the administrative proceeding, Wilcox specifically alleged as an affirmative
defense and argued in its post-hearing brief that CalSTRS was barred under principles of
(continued)

                                              13
       Preceding the discussion of the issues in this appeal is a discussion of the
Teachers’ Retirement Law, the role of CalSTRS, and general principles concerning the
administration of the Teachers’ Retirement Fund.
                1.    Background: Teachers’ Retirement Law
       “CalSTRS was created by the Legislature in 1913 as a retirement system for
credentialed California teachers and administrators in kindergarten through community
college. [Citation.] The CalSTRS Board is responsible for the administration of
CalSTRS, including implementation of the State Teachers’ Retirement Plan (plan), and
‘shall set policy and shall have the sole power and authority to hear and determine all
facts pertaining to application for benefits under the plan or any matters pertaining to
administration of the plan and [CalSTRS].’ [Citations.] The CalSTRS Board has
fiduciary obligations—both statutory and constitutional—to soundly administer the plan
and maintain its fiscal integrity. [Citations.]” (Duarte, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 384-385.)
       As was explained further in Duarte: “The constitutional obligations of a public
retirement board such as the CalSTRS Board have been interpreted to include a duty ‘to
“ensure the rights of members and retirees to their full, earned benefits.” ’ [Citation.]
Such obligations therefore do not permit the payment of benefits not otherwise

equitable estoppel from taking corrective action with respect to the SCCOE’s incorrect
reporting of her compensation ($20,000 taken as additional wages from 2005-2008 and
$188,000 received after her resignation as Superintendent) as creditable. The Appeals
Committee rejected this defense, concluding in the Administrative Decision that Wilcox
had failed to establish all requisite elements of equitable estoppel. Wilcox did not raise
equitable estoppel as a defense in her mandamus proceeding before the trial court, and
the court did not address such defense in its Order. She also does not raise equitable
estoppel in her appellate briefs. Wilcox has thus waived (or forfeited) any right to assert
that CalSTRS was barred under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (See Children’s
Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 776 [appellant’s failure
to assert theory either at the trial level or in its opening brief renders the issue “ ‘doubly
waived’ ”],)

                                              14
authorized. [Citation.]” (Duarte, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 385, second italics
added.) In the same vein, “public agencies are not free to define their employee
contributions as compensation or not compensation . . . the Legislature makes those
determinations.” (Oden v. Board of Administration (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 194, 201.)
       The central issue in this case is whether certain compensation received by Wilcox
was properly classified by her employer, SCCOE, as “creditable.” “Under the statutory
framework, retirement allowances are calculated by the administrator, CalSTRS, based
upon a member’s compensation earnable in his or her final compensation period.
[Citations.]” (Blaser v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 507,
533 (Blaser II), boldface & italics omitted, fn. omitted.) The Education Code defines
“ ‘[c]reditable compensation’ ” as “remuneration that is paid in cash by an employer to
all persons in the same class of employees for performing creditable service in that
position.” (§ 22119.2, subd. (a).) Such “ ‘[c]reditable compensation’ ” includes “[s]alary
or wages paid in accordance with a publicly available written contractual agreement,
including, but not limited to, a salary schedule or employment agreement,” and
“[r]emuneration that is paid in addition to salary or wages, provided it is paid to all
persons who are in the same class of employees in the same dollar amount, the same
percentage of salary or wages, or the same percentage of the amount being distributed.”
(Id., subd. (a)(1), (2).)
       Under section 22119.2, “ ‘[c]reditable compensation’ ” excludes “[p]ayments . . .
for participation in a deferred compensation plan. . . when the cost is covered by an
employer and is not deducted from the member’s salary.” (Id., subd. (d)(5).) Also
excluded as “ ‘[c]reditable compensation’ ” is “[s]everance pay, including lump-sum
and installment payments, or money paid in excess of salary or wages to a member as
compensatory damages or as a compromise settlement.” (Id., subd. (d)(8).) And the
Education Code excludes as “ ‘[c]reditable compensation’ ” “[a]ny other payments the
board determines not to be ‘creditable compensation.’ ” (Id., subd. (d)(9).)

                                             15
       “Additionally, the policy considerations of ‘creditable compensation’ are
delineated in the statute: ‘This definition of “creditable compensation” reflects sound
principles that support the integrity of the retirement fund. Those principles include, but
are not limited to, consistent treatment of compensation throughout a member’s career,
consistent treatment of compensation among an entire class of employees, consistent
treatment of compensation for the position, preventing adverse selection, and excluding
from compensation earnable remuneration that is paid to enhance a member’s
benefits. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Blaser II, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 534, quoting § 22119.2,
subd. (g), boldface & italics omitted.)
              2.     Additional Salary Paid 2005-2008
                     a.     Evidence (Documentary)
       Under the four-year Employment Contract dated November 10, 2003
(paragraph 3, “Compensation,” subparagraph a, “Salary”), Wilcox was to receive an
annual salary of $192,328.8 In a separate section of that contract (paragraph 3,
“Compensation,” subparagraph b, “Benefits,” sub-subparagraph (9)), Wilcox was to
receive on July 1 of each year of the contract $20,050 to be paid “into a deferred
compensation fund (e.g. an Internal Revenue Code section 457 plan) or as additional
wages as designated and directed by the County Superintendent.” Wilcox was required
to give written notice to the SCCOE Board 30 days before July 1 if she wished to receive
“the . . . sum in deferred compensation arrangement.”
       There were two subsequent employment contracts executed by Wilcox and the
SCCOE Board. Although the amount designated for annual salary increased in those
subsequent contracts, and the amount of annual deferred compensation changed (from
$20,050 to $20,000, and then to $12,500), the text of the paragraphs in the Employment

       8
       That annual salary figure increased over time to $220,533, to $243,580, and to
$262,454.

                                             16
Agreement and the two later contracts with respect to base salary and deferred
compensation was otherwise identical.
       On May 17, 2005, Wilcox elected in writing to accept as “additional salary”
$5,000 from the total amount of $20,050 of her deferred compensation for the 2005-2006
school year, thereby leaving $15,050 as deferred compensation. In her letter, she stated:
“Section 3.b.9 of my MOU allots $20,050 each year into a deferred compensation
fund. . . . To that end, I am electing to transfer $5,000 of that fund toward my annual
salary.” Wilcox also stated: “I have been advised by a STRS representative that it is
wise to do so gradually before retirement so [as] not to create an apparent ‘spike’ in
salary upon retirement.”
       Similarly, on May 23, 2006, Wilcox elected in writing to accept $7,500 as
“additional salary” from the total amount of $20,000 of her deferred compensation for the
2006-2007 school year. Wilcox stated that she was “electing to transfer $7,500 of [the
deferred compensation] fund toward [her] annual salary. . . [thereby] reduc[ing her]
deferred compensation plan to $12,500 per year and increase [her] salary by $7,500.”
       And on May 3, 2007, Wilcox elected in writing to accept as “additional salary”
$7,500 from the total amount of $12,500 of her deferred compensation for the 2007-2008
school year. Wilcox stated that she was “electing to transfer $7,500 of [the deferred
compensation] fund toward [her] annual salary. . . [thereby] reduc[ing her] deferred
compensation plan to $5,000 per year and increase [her] salary by $7,500.”
                     b.     Evidence: Testimony
       Jody Cozad, manager of two units of CalSTRS, testified at the administrative
hearing that he was involved in Wilcox’s compensation review that led to the issuance of
the CalSTRS decision letter in 2016. CalSTRS’s determination that the three payments
directed by Wilcox from the deferred compensation fund to additional salary were not
creditable was based in part upon the fact that the provision of the Employment Contract
specifying that Wilcox would receive $20,050 as deferred compensation (paragraph 9 of

                                            17
the benefits section) was separate and apart from the salary provision on page one of the
contract. Cozad testified that two subsequent employment contracts involving Wilcox
and the SCCOE Board were similarly structured to provide Wilcox with her specified
salary on page one of the contracts, and, in a separate section involving benefits, with
deferred compensation. Cozad indicated that the funds committed under paragraph 9
were treated in SCCOE Board minutes and memoranda as deferred compensation.
Specifically, Wilcox, in three memoranda, elected to receive from the deferred
compensation fund the sums of $5,000, $7,500, and $7,500 as additional salary, thereby
decreasing the plan amounts. The fact that Wilcox was permitted under the contract to
designate the compensation as additional salary did not change Cozad’s view that the
funds were deferred compensation that were not creditable.
       Leon Beauchman, former SCCOE Board Member, testified that the Board
ultimately hired Charles Weis as Superintendent to succeed Wilcox, effective July 1,
2018. Weis’s employment contract included a provision granting him deferred
compensation. Unlike Wilcox’s Employment Contract (and two subsequent employment
contracts), Weis’s employment contract did not provide that he could elect to receive the
deferred compensation as additional salary.9
       Wilcox testified at the hearing that when she entered into her employment
contract, it was her understanding that the $20,050 specified in paragraph 9 of the
benefits provision that this amount was a “salary increase [that she] could take . . . in
tax sheltered annuity or in salary.” Wilcox consulted with a CalSTRS representative

       9
         The provision of the Weis employment agreement, under the heading
“DEFERRED COMPENSATION,” read as follows: “For the term of this Agreement the
Board shall pay annually at County Superintendent’s election, the sum of $20,000.00 or
the limit allowed by law, whichever is less, into an IRC 457 deferred compensation fund
established for County Superintendent. County Superintendent shall provide the Board
and the SCCOB payroll department at least thirty (30) days prior written notice of such
election.”

                                             18
before electing in 2005-2006 to have $5,000 transferred from deferred compensation to
additional salary. She was not told then (or at a later time) that by doing so, she ran the
risk that the transferred amount would be not creditable.
                     c.     Administrative Decision
       In the Administrative Decision, confirmed by the Committee, the ALJ found that
the funds that Wilcox elected to have paid as additional salary—totaling $20,000 over
three years—were not creditable because they did not involve “a permanent restructure
of her pay rate.” The ALJ concluded further “that the principal purpose of [Wilcox’s]
transfers for the 2005-06, 2006-2007, and 2007-08 school years from her tax-deferred
compensation to salary was to enhance her retirement benefits.” It was therefore
concluded by the ALJ that the SCCOE had misreported the compensation because
“these funds were for a tax-deferred compensation plan . . . . As such, the additional
compensation is excluded pursuant to Education Code section 22119.2,
subdivision [(d)(5)], because the payments were for participation in a tax-deferred
compensation plan which is not creditable.”
                     d.     Trial Court Decision
       The trial court found “that the ALJ properly concluded that the District
erroneously reported compensation from [Wilcox’s] deferred compensation plan as
creditable compensation.” The court concluded that the circumstances that the funds that
were diverted had not actually been placed into a deferred fund were “not dispositive.
Clearly and undeniably, the money came out of a fund that was separate from [Wilcox’s]
fixed salary and designated as a benefit regardless of her decision to allocate it as
additional wages. [Her] contract with [SCCOE] provided for a fixed salary and also
provided her with an additional amount of money to be allocated to a tax-deferred plan
or allocated as wages as a separate benefit from her fixed salary.”

                                             19
                     e.     Analysis
       We conclude that there was substantial evidence—indeed, the relevant facts were
undisputed—supporting the trial court’s conclusion. On its face, the Employment
Contract specified that the origin of the funds, although diverted at Wilcox’s election to
additional wages, was a deferred compensation fund established for the employee’s
benefit without deduction from her salary. As such, they were not creditable under the
Teachers’ Retirement Law. (See § 22119.2, subd. (d)(5) [“ ‘[c]reditable compensation’ ”
excludes “[p]ayments . . . for participation in a deferred compensation plan. . . when the
cost is covered by an employer and is not deducted from the member’s salary”].)
Further, it is significant that the Employment Agreement made provision for the deferred
compensation fund in a section captioned “Benefits” that was separate and apart from a
section earlier in the document captioned “Salary.” And we agree with the trial court that
the fact that the funds had not been specifically placed into a deferred fund and the fact
that Wilcox’s receipt of the funds was subject to taxation do not render the additional
income creditable for retirement purposes.
       The trial court’s conclusion that the $20,000 that Wilcox elected to receive as
additional salary during the three school years (2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008)
was not creditable was supported further by the CalSTRS-promulgated Employer
Directive 2003-2004 (the Directive). The Directive was intended, inter alia, to clarify
the standards under which compensation was creditable, and it applied “to all county
superintendent of schools, school districts; community college districts and other
employing agencies that employ persons to perform creditable service subject to
coverage under the State Teachers’ Retirement Plan.” Under the Directive, CalSTRS
advised that “[a] restructure of compensation into salary that was formerly used to
provide fringe benefits” would “not have an adverse impact on the integrity of the
[Teachers’] Retirement Fund” and was thus creditable if it met various conditions; one
such condition was that the restructure “be intended as a permanent change in the

                                             20
employer’s business practice.” (See Yamaha Corp., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 7 [“[a]n
agency interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to
consideration and respect by the courts”].)
       The trial court concluded that the restructure of Wilcox’s compensation for the
three school years, done at her election, “did not constitute a permanent restructure of her
salary because there was no permanent change to her salary and her decision to convert
tax-deferred compensation into additional wages was within her discretion on a year-to-
year basis.” This conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. In each of the three
school years, Wilcox had the discretion to designate all, some, or none of the funds
identified under her employment agreement as deferred compensation as additional
wages. There was no evidence that, either as agreed or as implemented by Wilcox, any
restructure of compensation as additional salary was intended as a “permanent change.”
       Lastly, the trial court’s determination that the $20,000 that Wilcox elected to
receive as additional salary, rather than as deferred compensation, was not creditable was
supported by the policy objectives expressly stated in the Teachers’ Retirement Law:
“This definition of ‘creditable compensation’ [stated in § 22119.2, subd. (a)] reflects
sound principles that support the integrity of the retirement fund. Those principles
include . . . consistent treatment of compensation throughout a member’s career,
consistent treatment of compensation among an entire class of employees, consistent
treatment of compensation for the position, preventing adverse selection, and excluding
from compensation earnable remuneration that is paid to enhance a member’s benefits.”
(§ 22119.2, subd. (g).) There was evidence presented at the hearing that, were Wilcox’s
salary held creditable, it would mean that the SCCOE had not adhered to the policy of
providing for the “consistent treatment of compensation among an entire class of
employees, [or the] consistent treatment of compensation for the position.” (Ibid.) Weis,
the Superintendent who succeeded Wilcox, was not afforded the opportunity in his

                                              21
employment contract to elect to transfer funds committed as deferred compensation to
additional salary.10
       There was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the
SCCOE improperly reported as creditable the additional salary Wilcox elected to receive
from the deferred compensation fund contractually established for her benefit for the
2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008 school years. (See Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 824; Duarte, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.)
              3.       Salary Paid November 2007 through June 2008
                       a.    Evidence: The Settlement Agreement
       The second material issue decided by the Appeals Committee, which decision
was reviewed by the trial court, was whether the payments received by Wilcox from
November 1, 2007 to July 1, 2008, were properly reported by the SCCOE to CalSTRS as
creditable. Resolution of this question involves a review of the testimony presented, and
close consideration of the terms of the September 25, 2007 Settlement Agreement
executed by Wilcox, SCCOE, and the SCCOE Board.11 The relevant terms of that
Settlement Agreement include the following:
              (1) Wilcox agreed to resign as Superintendent, effective November 1, 2007.
              (2) As of November 1, 2007, Wilcox would continue to be an SCCOE
       employee with a job “title, job duties and responsibilities and reporting
       relationship as may be directed by the BOARD.”
              (3) Wilcox would “perform assignments off site.”

       10
          Although this evidence and this policy objective were not specifically
referenced by the trial court, the Appeals Committee concluded that the “SCCOE was
inconsistent in its treatment of [Wilcox’s] ability to convert funds from the tax-deferred
retirement plan when her successor was not provided the same opportunity.”
       11
          Wilcox and SCCOE/SCCOE Board were represented by their respective counsel
“in connection with [the] matter.”

                                            22
             (4) Wilcox—under the heading “Settlement Payments”—would be paid
      from November 1, 2007, to July 1, 2008, at the annual rate of $282,000.
             (5) As of November 1, 2007, Wilcox would “cease to accrue any further
      vacation or sick leave.”12
             (6) Wilcox agreed to resign her (at the time, untitled) position with SCCOE
      “[n]o later than July 1, 2008.”
             (7) In the event Wilcox submitted her resignation after January 1, 2008, and
      before July 1, 2008, she would be paid “in a lump sum an amount equal to the
      value of her unpaid salary and benefits that would have been payable from the date
      of such resignation through July 1, 2008.”
             (8) Upon her resignation, Wilcox would receive in severance—either in two
      equal sums (on July 1, 2008, and January 2, 2009, or in 12 monthly installments—
      “her current salary at the annual salary rate of $274,000 . . . , plus the value of
      18 months of COBRA benefits.”13
             (9) The SCCOE Board, “or its delegate, [would] consult with WILCOX so
      that the job duties and responsibility assigned to her [would] constitute creditable
      service for retirement purposes.”
             (10) If any conflict existed between the provisions of the Settlement
      Agreement and Wilcox’s then-current employment agreement of September 20,
      2006, the terms of the Settlement Agreement would control.

      12
           Under her employment contract in effect at the time she executed the Settlement
Agreement, Wilcox received 26 working days’ vacation per year and 12 days’ annual
sick leave.
        13
           As a result of her execution of the Settlement Agreement, Wilcox elected in
effect to forgo six months of severance benefits. Under her employment contract in
effect immediately before she executed the Settlement Agreement, Wilcox would have
received, had she resigned at the SCCOE Board’s request on or before July 1, 2008,
18 months’ severance pay at her existing annual salary.

                                             23
              (11) The parties agreed to a mutual nondisparagement clause and agreed to
       keep the terms of the Settlement Agreement confidential to the extent permitted by
       law.
              (12) The parties agreed to a mutual release of all claims arising out of
       Wilcox’s employment.
              (13) Wilcox agreed to indemnify and hold harmless the SCCOE of and
       from any liability arising from any future claim by any person or entity “as a result
       of any injury to WILCOX as described in this release.”
              (14) The parties agreed that the agreement was “a compromise settlement
       and that the consideration for this release shall not be deemed to be or construed as
       an admission of liability to WILCOX . . . by the [SC]COE.”
       On November 9, 2007—after the effective date of Wilcox’s resignation as
Superintendent—the SCCOE Board issued a memorandum that recited that it was an
“explanation of the Office’s plan for implementing the Settlement Agreement.” It was
stated in the memorandum that Wilcox would “be a contracted employee of the Office
although not a member of the Management Team.” Wilcox was given a new job title as
“Special Assistant to the Board-Certificated.” The extent of her job duties, as delineated
in the memorandum, were stated as follows: Wilcox “may be assigned to special projects
by the Board per Ed. Code [§] 1042(d).” Wilcox was to “report directly to the [SCCOE]
Board President,” and it was stated that “Joe Fimiani [Acting Superintendent] may call
upon [her] as necessary.” It was stated further that “[n]o clerical support, supplies or
equipment [would] be provided” to Wilcox.
                     b.     Evidence: Testimony
       Manager Jody Cozad testified at the administrative hearing that during its review,
CalSTRS inquired about Wilcox’s specific job assignments and duties from November 1,
2007, and December 31, 2009; SCCOE responded that “ ‘[n]o job assignments were
given to Ms. Wilcox during that period.’ ” Cozad testified that during the review,

                                             24
CalSTRS inquired of Wilcox as to the work that she performed after November 1, 2007,
but she did not provide CalSTRS with information about special projects on which she
had worked or assignments she had completed. Cozad concluded from his review that
there was no evidence that Wilcox had performed creditable work from November 1,
2007 to June 30, 2008.
       Former SCCOE Board member Beauchman testified that at the time Wilcox
resigned as Superintendent, the SCCOE Board wanted her to remain to assist during the
transition by providing advice to the interim Superintendent and then to the permanent
Superintendent. Beauchman testified that “it was pretty general as far as what [Wilcox]
was going to be supporting.”
       Beauchman testified that the SCCOE Board, in its negotiations concerning
Wilcox’s resignation as Superintendent, did not “try[] to structure something or create a
term, so to speak, that would have an implication on her retirement.” Beauchman could
not recall any special projects that were assigned to Wilcox after she resigned as
Superintendent. Although he could not recall any specific issues, Beauchman believed
that he had spoken with Wilcox on more than one occasion after she resigned as
Superintendent “about what was going on, just generally how things were going.”
       Wilcox testified that she signed the Settlement Agreement setting forth the terms
of her resignation as Superintendent. The annualized amount of her compensation under
the agreement ($282,000) was approximately the amount of her annual salary as
Superintendent when she resigned. Wilcox testified that her last employment agreement
entitled her to 18 months’ severance, only; 12 months’ severance was authorized in the
Settlement Agreement. She stated further that there were “a lot” of benefits provided
under her employment agreement that she did not receive because they were “negotiated”
out in the Settlement Agreement, such as health and dental benefits until she was 70 years
old.

                                            25
       Wilcox did not have conversations with the SCCOE Board concerning the
language in the Settlement Agreement that “ ‘[t]he board or its delegate will consult with
Dr. Wilcox so that the job duties and responsibility assigned to her will constitute
creditable service for retirement purposes.’ ” She testified that at the time the Settlement
Agreement was negotiated, no one identified any “special projects” that would be
assigned to her in her new position. Wilcox stated that she had worked on one or two
“small projects,” but that she could not recall the specifics, given the passage of time.
       Wilcox testified that she had worked at least 70 hours per week as Superintendent,
but the number of hours she worked after November 1, 2007, were “[m]uch less” and
“varied greatly.” She received calls from all applicants for her former position, but she
did not know whether they were specifically referred to her by the SCCOE. One of the
applicants was Charles Weis, who was ultimately hired as Wilcox’s successor.14 Wilcox
testified that she had (a) one meeting with Fimiani; (b) telephone conversations with the
administrative assistants (Katherine O’Casey and Lisa Smith) to the interim
Superintendent; (c) met with Beauchman about a budget matter; and (d) met over lunch
with the director of the SCCOE’s environmental science camp.
       Lisa Smith, who was executive assistant to interim Superintendent Fimiani after
Wilcox resigned as Superintendent, submitted a declaration in which she stated that from
November 2007 through June 2008, she had spoken with Wilcox about SCCOE matters,
Wilcox had made herself available to the SCCOE Board; and Wilcox had personally
called Board members. Because of the passage of time, Smith was unable to provide
specifics about those contacts.15

       14
          Weis declared that between “November 1, 2007, through June 2008, . . . [he]
spoke with Dr. Wilcox and met with her to discuss SCCOE operations and Board
procedures and activities.”
       15
          Similarly, a declaration was submitted by Katherine O’Casey, who was an
executive administrative assistant between November 2007 and March 2008 reporting
(continued)

                                             26
                     c.     Administrative Decision
       Based upon the evidence, it was concluded in the Administrative Decision “that
after [Wilcox] resigned from her position as Superintendent . . . , she was not performing
activities that qualified as creditable service.” The Appeals Committee found that
“[t]here was insufficient evidence of substantive work directly related to performing the
duties of a superintendent. There was no corroborating evidence that [Wilcox] worked
on any special projects. She only had some telephone conversations and meetings with
SCCOE employees, applicants and a[n SCCOE] Board member which related to her
previous experience as superintendent. There was no evidence of any new tasks that she
performed for SCCOE between November 1 2008 and June 30, 2008. There was no
evidence that she was teaching, manning courses or preparing instructional materials,
selecting or examining teachers, or enforcing laws related to public education; all of
which would qualify as creditable service under the Education Code. . . . It appears that
the position of Special Assistant position was created as a compromise settlement to
enable [Wilcox] to qualify for creditable service.” Thus, the Appeals Committee held
that (1) the “SCCOE misreported $188,000 as creditable compensation and misreported
.667 years of service credit”; (2) “the credited additional compensation of $188,000 is
excluded pursuant to Education Code section 22119.2, subdivision (c), because it was
derived from severance pay pursuant to a compromise settlement which is specifically
excluded as creditable compensation”; (3) “[Wilcox] did not earn service credit of
.667 years pursuant to Education Code section 22119.2, subdivision (c), because it was
derived from a compromise settlement which is specifically excluded as creditable
compensation”; and (4) “[Wilcox] did not engage in the type of activities that qualify as
creditable service under Education Code section 22119.5.”

to interim Superintendent Fimliani. O’Casey declared that during that time frame, she
had spoken with Wilcox several times concerning matters about which she could not
recall, and that Wilcox spoke with Fimliani.

                                            27
                    d.     Trial Court Decision
       The trial court—after detailing the evidence presented at the administrative
hearing and discussing the terms of the Settlement Agreement—concluded that “[t]he
evidence in the administrative record did not support her claim that her services were
creditable.”
                    e.     Analysis
       We begin with a discussion of the terms and conditions of the Settlement
Agreement itself (and the November 9, 2007 memorandum that followed), which, we
conclude, presented substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion. Wilcox
was required to resign her longstanding position as Superintendent, effective
November 1, 2007. Her new position was nonspecific: she would continue to be an
SCCOE employee with a job “title, job duties and responsibilities and reporting
relationship as may be directed by the BOARD.” The SCCOE, in its November 9, 2007
memorandum, gave Wilcox a new job title as “Special Assistant to the Board-
Certificated.” The SCCOE told her that she would “not [be] a member of the
Management Team”; she “may be assigned to special projects by the Board”; she was
to “report directly to the [SCCOE] Board President”; and that “[Acting Superintendent]
Joe Fimiani may call upon [her] as necessary.” Under the Settlement Agreement, Wilcox
was required to “perform assignments off site.” And she was further denied support,
confirmed in a November 9, 2007 memorandum that stated she would receive “[n]o
clerical support, supplies or equipment.”
       The SCCOE agreed under the Settlement Agreement to pay Wilcox from
November 1, 2007, to July 1, 2008, at the annual rate of $282,000 (an approximation of
her prior annual salary as Superintendent). This term was contained under the heading
“Settlement Payments.” (Original underscoring.) The payment obligation was not
termed “wages” or “salary.” Thus, Wilcox would receive two-thirds of the annualized
amount, i.e., $188,000. She was required to resign her position (unspecified in the

                                            28
Settlement Agreement) “[n]o later than July 1, 2008.” Moreover, Wilcox had the option
of resigning early—on or after January 1, 2008 and prior to July 1, 2008—without
penalty to receiving the full settlement amount of $188,000. Thus, at her election, Wilcox
could have remained employed for only two months (which, as wages, would translate
into $47,000), and would still receive additional “wages” of $141,000. Furthermore,
Wilcox’s entitlement to the “Settlement Payments” was conditioned on her execution of a
release of all claims. (See Skrbina v. Fleming Companies (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353,
1367 [employee’s entitlement to severance benefits provided in memorandum of
agreement was conditioned on his release of the employer as provided in that
agreement].)
       The Settlement Agreement also provided that Wilcox, as an SCCOE employee,
would no longer receive vacation or sick leave as of November 1, 2007, in contrast to her
previously receiving 26 days’ and 12 days’ annual vacation and sick leave, respectively.
She was provided with 12 months’ severance after her termination on July 1, 2018, which
was six months less than the severance benefits under her employment agreement. And
under the Settlement Agreement, the SCCOE agreed to provide Wilcox upon her
termination “the value of 18 months of COBRA benefits,” a term significantly less
favorable than under her employment agreement.16
       We conclude that these provisions of the Settlement Agreement (identified in the
previous three paragraphs) strongly support the existence of a severance arrangement
under which the amounts payable to Wilcox were noncreditable severance payments.
(See § 22119.2, subd. (d)(8).)
       The testimony from the administrative hearing also supported the conclusion that
the payments received by Wilcox under the Settlement Agreement were not creditable.

       16
         Under her employment agreement, it was agreed that Wilcox, upon her
retirement, would receive full health, dental, and vision benefits until she reached the age
of 70. (As of July 1, 2008, Wilcox was 59.)

                                             29
Wilcox acknowledged that under that agreement, “[she] didn't receive a lot that [she]
was supposed to have received [under her employment agreement]” because “it-was []
negotiated” out. In her testimony, she admitted that, although her compensation
remained roughly the same after November 1, 2007, she worked “[m]uch less” than the
70-plus hours a week she worked as Superintendent. According to Wilcox, at the time
the Settlement Agreement was negotiated, no one described the nature of any “special
projects” to which she might be assigned in her capacity as “Special Assistant to the
Board-Certificated.” And when asked to describe any “special projects” assigned to her
between November 1, 2007, and June30, 2008, Wilcox stated that she had worked on one
or two “small projects,” but that she could not recall the specifics, given the passage of
time. Former SCCOE Board member Beauchman could not recall any “special projects”
assigned to Wilcox. And as to the work Wilcox specifically recalled performing—
fielding calls from applicants for the Superintendent position—she was unable to confirm
that it resulted from referrals by the SCCOE.
       The trial court’s conclusion that the post-November 1, 2017 compensation Wilcox
received was not creditable, consistent with the findings in the Administrative Decision,
was supported for two essential reasons.
       First, it was proper to conclude that the weight of the evidence demonstrated that
the compensation was not creditable because it constituted severance payments. The
Education Code expressly excludes such payments from being creditable compensation.
“ ‘Creditable compensation’ does not mean and shall not include: [¶] . . . [¶] . . .
Severance pay, including lump-sum and installment payments, or money paid in excess
of salary or wages to a member as compensatory damages or as a compromise
settlement.” (§ 22119.2, subd. (d)(8).) Here, a strong inference can be drawn from the
structure and terms of the Settlement Agreement, and from how it was carried out, that
the compensation Wilcox received was “[s]everance pay, including lump-sum and
installment payments, or money paid in excess of salary or wages . . . as a compromise

                                             30
settlement.” (Ibid.) Factors supporting this conclusion, as discussed above, include the
Settlement Agreement (1) being a compromise in which Wilcox would receive
“Settlement Payments” in exchange for her release of all claims; (2) containing a
provision that “the consideration for this release shall not be deemed to be or construed as
an admission of liability to WILCOX . . . by the [SC]COE”; (3) requiring Wilcox to hold
harmless and indemnify the SCCOE from any future claims brought against it arising out
of alleged injuries to Wilcox; (4) lacking specifics as to her ongoing duties as an
employee; (5) providing that Wilcox would be entitled to the full amount of the
settlement payments even if she resigned as much as four months early; (6) failing to
provide for typical employee benefits such as vacation and sick pay; and (7) requiring
that Wilcox work “off site.”17
       Second, it was proper to conclude that the weight of the evidence showed that
Wilcox, in fact, did not perform work after November 1, 2007, that was creditable.
Although her prior work as Superintendent was creditable by an express provision of the
California Teachers’ Law (see § 22119.5, subd. (c)(1)), it was very doubtful that her work
as “Special Assistant to the Board-Certificated” met the statutory requirements.
Activities that are identified as creditable are “(1) The work of teachers, instructors,
district interns, and academic employees employed in the instructional program for
pupils. . . . [¶] (2) Education or vocational counseling, guidance, and placement services.
[¶] (3) The work of employees who plan courses of study to be used in California public
       17
          Wilcox argues that its title notwithstanding, the Settlement Agreement was not
a “settlement agreement” as contemplated under the Teachers’ Retirement Law. We
disagree for the reasons we have discussed. We observe further that the Settlement
Agreement here contains provisions that are typical of a standard settlement agreement,
such as a release of all claims, a clause indicating that the payor of settlement monies
does so without admission of liability, an indemnification provision under which the
releasor indemnifies the releasee, a confidentiality provision, and the express use of the
terms “settlement” and “compromise” in describing the contractual arrangement. (See
J.B.B. Investment Partners Ltd. v. Fair (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 [“standard settlement
terms” included, inter alia, waiver of unknown claims and an indemnification provision].)

                                             31
schools, or research connected with the evaluation or efficiency of the instructional
program. [¶] (4) The selection, collection, preparation, classification, demonstration, or
evaluation of instructional materials of any course of study . . . or other services related
to California public school curriculum. [¶] (5) The examination, selection, in-service
training, mentoring, or assignment of teachers, principals, or other similar personnel
involved in the instructional program. [¶] (6) The work of nurses, physicians, speech
therapists, psychologists, audiologists, and other California public school health
professionals. [¶] (7) Services as a California public school librarian. [¶] (8) Activities
connected with the enforcement of the laws relating to compulsory education,
coordination of child welfare activities involving the school and the home, and the school
adjustment of pupils. [¶] (9) The work of employees who are responsible for the
supervision of persons or administration of the duties described in this subdivision.”
(§ 22119.5, subd. (b).) The evidence here was that the types of work performed by
Wilcox after November 1, 2007 consisted of (a) talking to potential applicants for the
Superintendent position; (b) meeting with Beauchman about an unspecified budget
matter; (c) working on one or two “small projects”; (d) attending one meeting with
Fimiani; (e) having telephone conversations with administrative assistants (Katherine
O’Casey and Lisa Smith); and (f) meeting over lunch with the director of the SCCOE’s
environmental science camp. These activities do not fall within the categories of
creditable work enumerated in section 22119.5, subdivision (b).
       There was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the
compensation Wilcox received after her resignation as Superintendent was not creditable
and had therefore been misreported by the SCCOE. (See Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 824; Duarte, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.)
              4.     Equitable Defense of Laches
       The trial court addressed in its Order the defense of laches asserted by Wilcox.
The court succinctly described her position as follows: “[Wilcox] has consistently relied

                                              32
upon the equitable doctrine of laches as a defense to [CalSTRS’s] claim that her
compensation between November 2007, through June, 2008 was not creditable towards
her retirement income under the Education Code due to the limited work she performed
and the nature of that work. [Wilcox] claims that since she was not notified of
[CalSTRS’s] concern until 2016 and the actual administrative hearing was not until 2019,
she was unable to produce adequate evidence as to the nature and volume of the work she
performed about 10 years earlier.”
       The trial court acknowledged that Wilcox was “placed at great disadvantage” at
the administrative hearing due to the many years that had elapsed since the time she had
performed work after her resignation as Superintendent.18 But the court held that “while
[Wilcox] may have prejudiced by the delay, there is a strong public policy of protecting
the integrity of a public retirement fund[,] and like the Petitioners in [McGlynn v. State of
California (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 548], she had no right to excess retirement benefits.
While her employer may have promised otherwise and while she may have relied upon
that promise, she cannot rely upon equitable doctrines such as laches to recover excess
payments that contravene the requirements of the Education Code.” The trial court
therefore concluded that Wilcox could not assert the equitable doctrine of laches as a
basis for challenging the conclusion that the SCCOE had misreported as creditable her
compensation from November 2007 through June 2008. On appeal, Wilcox appears to
challenge this conclusion.19

       18
           The court stated: “[Wilcox] was placed at a great disadvantage attempting to
recall and recreate the specifics of the work she performed in 2007-2008 when she
appeared at the administrative hearing in 2019. Understandably, she could not recall
with any detail what she did ten years earlier.”
        19
           The opening brief submitted by Wilcox contains (except for changing
“petitioner” to “appellant”) a verbatim discussion on the subject of laches that was
presented in the trial court. Wilcox does not present any specific argument concerning
the trial court’s having committed error in rejecting her laches defense, nor does she
(continued)

                                             33
       The United States Supreme Court has explained that “laches is a defense
developed by courts of equity; its principal application was, and remains, to claims of an
equitable cast for which the Legislature has provided no fixed time limitation. [Citation.]
Both before and after the merger of law and equity in 1938, this Court has cautioned
against invoking laches to bar legal relief. [Citations.]” (Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. (2014) 572 U.S. 663, 678, fn. omitted.) Therefore, “[t]he doctrine of laches
applies in equitable actions alone. [Citations.]” (Blue Cross of Northern California v.
Cory (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 723, 743-744.)
       The elements of the equitable defense of laches consist of “unreasonable delay
in bringing suit ‘plus either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.’ [Citation.] Prejudice is never
presumed; rather it must be affirmatively demonstrated by the [proponent of the defense]
in order to sustain his [or her] burdens of proof and the production of evidence on the
issue. [Citation.]” (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614, 624.)
       The trial court concluded that Wilcox could not assert laches as a defense to
CalSTRS’s claim that the SCCOE had misreported as creditable her compensation from
November 2007 through June 30, 2008 because to do so would “contravene the
requirements of the Education Code.” This reasoning is grounded under case law
considering the potential application of the defense of equitable estoppel against a
governmental agency.
       Although equitable estoppel may be asserted as a defense, in appropriate
circumstances, to defeat action by a governmental entity “ ‘where justice and right
require it’ ” (City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 493), “no court has
expressly invoked principles of estoppel to contravene directly any statutory or

address the cases (discussed post) relied upon by the court in reaching its decision.
(See In re Marriage of Shaban (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 398, 408.) [“[a]ppellate work is
most assuredly not the recycling of trial level points and authorities”].)

                                            34
constitutional limitations.” (Longshore v. County of Ventura (1979) 25 Cal.3d 14, 28.)
Therefore, it was held in Medina v. Board of Retirement (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 864 that
where the public agency misclassified employees as safety members (rather than general
members) resulting in their retirement benefits being overstated, the employees were
precluded from asserting that the agency was estopped from properly reclassifying them.
The appellate court held: “[E]stoppel is barred where the government agency to be
estopped does not possess the authority to do what it appeared to be doing. Here, [the
agency] cannot be estopped from reclassifying [employees] as general members, because
[it] did not possess the authority to continue to classify [employees] as safety members
after they became district attorneys even though they appeared to be doing so.
[Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 870-871.) In the same context of the miscalculation of pension
benefits, several appellate courts have likewise held that the employee was precluded
from asserting equitable estoppel where to do so would effectively compel the agency
to violate the applicable pension laws. (See, e.g., Blaser II, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 532-537; McGlynn v. State of California (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 548, 561; City of
Pleasanton v. Board of Administration (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 522, 542-543; Fleice v.
Chualar Union Elementary School Dist. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 886, 893-895.)
       By parity of reasoning, application of the equitable defense of laches here to ratify
the improper reporting by the SCCOE of compensation as creditable and thereby require
CalSTRS to pay miscalculated pension benefits to Wilcox would compel that agency to
violate the Education Code. Under these circumstances, equity cannot be invoked to
require the public agency, CalSTRS, to consider compensation received by Wilcox as
creditable when to do so would contravene the Teachers’ Retirement Law. (Cf. Blaser II,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 536-537 [“applying estoppel here would require
CalSTRS . . . to miscalculate Teachers’ monthly retirement benefits to include credit for
compensation that is not DB-creditable, in violation of the Education Code”].) This court
recently had the occasion to determine the potential applicability of laches raised as a

                                             35
defense by schoolteachers, members of CalSTRS, to claims by CalSTRS that the
members had been overpaid due to their employer’s misreporting of certain
compensation as creditable. (See Id. at pp. 539-547.) We concluded that the members
were precluded from asserting laches, inter alia, “because doing so would require
CalSTRS to continue to calculate and pay benefits in a manner that ‘directly
contravene[s] statutory limitations.’ [Citation.] A conclusion that laches barred
CalSTRS from making benefit adjustments that are not time-barred would circumvent
that principle that estoppel cannot apply to compel a governmental entity to act in a way
that is contrary to its statutory authority. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 547.)
       Further, permitting the equitable defense of laches in this case would be
antithetical to the policy that a public retirement board must administer its pension plan in
a manner consistent with the law so that members receive only the benefits to which they
are legally entitled. As the court in Duarte explained: “The constitutional obligations of
a public retirement board such as the CalSTRS Board have been interpreted to include a
duty ‘to “ensure the rights of members and retirees to their full, earned benefits.” ’
[Citation.] Such obligations therefore do not permit the payment of benefits not
otherwise authorized. [Citation.] Rather, ‘the statutory scheme governs the scope of the
benefits earned.’ [Citation.] Thus, while ‘ “[p]ension provisions should be broadly
construed in favor of those who were intended to be benefited thereby . . . [,] they cannot
be construed so as to confer benefits on persons not entitled thereto.” ’ [Citation.]”
(Duarte, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 385.)
       The trial court did not err in its conclusion that Wilcox could not assert laches as a
basis to prohibit CalSTRS from challenging the SCCOE’s misreporting her compensation

                                               36
received from November 2007 through June 30, 2008 as creditable.20
                                 IV.    DISPOSITION
       The judgment on the petition for writ of mandate, entered on September 1, 2021,
is affirmed. Each party shall bear her/its own respective costs on appeal.

       20
          There is an additional reason, not stated by the trial court, that Wilcox was
precluded from asserting the equitable defense of laches. The trial court, following this
court’s decision in Baxter, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 340, held that (a) the statute of
limitations barred CalSTRS’s recovery of overpayments for benefits paid to Wilcox prior
to October 10, 2015; and (b) under the continuous accrual theory, CalSTRS was not time-
barred from asserting overpayment claims for benefits paid after October 10, 2015. As
we concluded in Blaser II, allowing the member to assert laches as a defense to preclude
overpayment claims that were not barred by the statute of limitations would nullify the
proper application of the continuous accrual theory. Moreover, it would undermine that
theory’s policy goal of preventing the inequities that would arise “if the aggrieved
party—the underpaid retiree or the plan administrator that overpaid benefits—were
prohibited from seeking redress for claims arising out of periodic payments accruing
within the limitations period.” (Blaser II, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 546.) This
principle would apply here to preclude Wilcox from asserting the equitable defense of
laches.

                                            37
                                BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

DANNER, J.

WILSON, J.

Wilcox v. California State Teachers’ Retirement System
H049809