Court Opinion

ID: 9717270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:00:59.463887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:52.227879
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
concurring.
While I concur in the judgment of the Court and generally agree with the reasoning set forth in the majority opinion, I write separately for two reasons. First, I wish to disassociate myself from the pronouncement made in that opinion to the effect that Taglianetti v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 503 Pa. 270, 469 A.2d 548 (1983), was wrongly decided. Our decision today requires no such declaration.
Second, I must expressly take issue with Mr. Justice Flaherty’s dissent.
I.
In the instant case, insurers breached a voluntarily assumed fiduciary duty to provide Appellant with all available benefits, which duty necessarily involves taking action in accordance with changes in the law. In Taglianetti, supra, we agreed with the contention that an employer was under no legally imposed affirmative duty to provide information of possible worker’s compensation benefits to a deceased employee’s spouse where there was no evidence of fraud, intentional deception, or the making of misleading statements. This case involves a duty voluntarily assumed by an insurer; Taglianetti presented a stituation where we held that by law no duty to inform exists or may be imposed on an employer. Both legally and factually, the two cases are distinct. If Taglianetti, so recently decided, is unsound, this is neither the time nor the place to say so. Subject to the above qualification, I agree with the majority opinion.
*482II.
As to Mr. Justice Flaherty’s dissent, I find it unfortunate that he complicates a simple proposition of law into an earthshaking dilemma that would serve as an excuse to deny justice and fair play to a bereaved, defenseless, unsuspecting and trusting widow. Mr. Justice Flaherty’s dissent, if it became law, would snatch from a poor widow the benefits she was entitled to receive but for the knowing and intentional misguidance of the insurers that induced her to place her entire trust and confidence in the insurers to see to it that she received all of the benefits to which she was entitled. Once the insurers knowingly and purposefully talked the widow out of seeking independent legal counsel, the insurers voluntarily placed themselves in the position of protecting the widow and obtaining for her all benefits that were reasonably due under the facts and state of law known to the insurers.
Our majority opinion does not transform insurance companies into legal service advisors for claimants, as feared by the dissent. On the contrary, in this case, the insurers themselves voluntarily transformed themselves into legal advisors to the widow. This accommodation offered by the insurer would certainly inure to the monetary benefit of both parties. Unless the dissenting opinion is suggesting that legal representation per se harms the interests of widows, orphans and others similarly situated, I believe that the approach cutlined in the majority opinion will benefit everyone. After all, the law does not favor a volunteer. It is simple black letter law that where one gratuitously undertakes to render legal or other services and then does so in a careless or negligent way, causing harm, liability attaches. Pascarella v. Kelley, 378 Pa. 18, 105 A.2d 70 (1954).
Had privately retained counsel committed the same omission committed by the insurers here (not recognizing and acting upon the decision in Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859 (1981)), thus causing the client a loss of liability benefits, such counsel would have been subject to a mal*483practice suit. See, Pa.R.P.C. 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), and 1.4 (Communication). See also, Lichow v. Sowers, 334 Pa. 353, 6 A.2d 285 (1939). Why should we hold the insurers, under these circumstances, to any lesser degree of responsibility?
McDERMOTT, J., joins this Concurring Opinion.