Court Opinion

ID: 9387166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-15 06:09:10.74328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.883056
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed April 13, 2023

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                               No. 11-22-00296-CV
                                   __________

   IN THE INTEREST OF N.B., A.B., V.Z., A.Z., A.Z., AND A.Z.,
                      CHILDREN

                     On Appeal from the 326th District Court
                              Taylor County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 10437-CX

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
       This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated the parental
rights of the mother and the respective fathers of N.B., A.B., V.Z., A.Z., A.Z., and
A.Z. The mother filed this appeal. On appeal, she presents two issues in which she
challenges the trial court’s findings that the termination of her parental rights would
be (1) in N.B.’s best interest and (2) in A.B.’s best interest. We affirm the order of
the trial court.
                          I. Termination Findings and Standards
      The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West 2022). To terminate parental
rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has
committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. In this case, the trial court found
that Appellant had committed three of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—
those found in subsections (D), (E), and (O). Appellant does not challenge these
findings on appeal.
      The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination
of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of her children. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2).      On appeal, Appellant challenges both the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s best interest finding as to N.B.
and A.B. Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s best interest finding as to her
four youngest children.
      To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case,
we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the
evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine
whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or
conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We note that the trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility
and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (citing In
re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)).
      With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied).
                                            2
But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not
limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the
child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now
and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the
programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the
child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or
omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship
is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best
interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
                                II. Evidence and Analysis
      The record shows that the Department of Family and Protective Services
became involved with Appellant, Appellant’s six children, and C.Z. (the father of the
four youngest children) in February 2021 based upon concerns regarding Appellant’s
and C.Z.’s use of methamphetamine and marihuana, Appellant’s and C.Z.’s
exchange of food stamps for alcohol, N.B.’s truancy from school, the dirty condition
of the children, and C.Z.’s criminal history. Approximately two weeks after the
initial intake, the Department received another intake that related to N.B. and his
girlfriend. Then, in May 2021, the Department received another intake based upon
a physical altercation between Appellant and C.Z. at a convenience store. The police
were called, and C.Z. was arrested. He was subsequently convicted of assault family
violence and resisting arrest as a result of the incident. The altercation occurred in
the presence of the four youngest children, who were crying and scared at the time.

                                           3
      The Department instituted a safety plan for the family. However, Appellant
and C.Z. failed to abide by the conditions of the safety plan, and the children were
subsequently removed from their parents’ care. During the investigatory stage of the
case, the Department’s investigator had asked Appellant to submit to a drug test, but
Appellant refused—as did C.Z. They denied any drug use. All six children were
taken for a drug test at the time of removal. A.B., who was eleven years old and had
been staying with her aunt, tested negative. Fourteen-year-old N.B. tested positive
for marihuana. The other four children (a three-year-old, two-year-old twins, and a
one-year-old) all tested positive for methamphetamine.          Appellant and C.Z.
submitted to drug testing twelve days later; they both tested positive for marihuana
and methamphetamine. The father of N.B. and A.B. lived in Michigan, had been
absent from their lives for years, and did not participate in the safety plan or the
proceedings below.
      After the children were removed, Appellant was ordered by the trial court to
comply with the requirements set forth in her family service plan. Appellant was
only partially compliant with the requirements of her family service plan. She failed
to attend counseling, did not allow the Department to make unannounced visits at
her home, and failed to obtain and maintain a lawful source of income. After
completing an inpatient drug treatment program, she failed to follow through with
outpatient aftercare as required. She tested positive for methamphetamine in June
2021, July 2021, November 2021, December 2021, January 2022, and May 2022,
and she failed to submit to drug testing as requested during the intervening months.
In June 2022, Appellant tested negative. However, in July 2022, she again failed to
submit to testing. In September 2022, she tested positive for methamphetamine.
The results of this final drug test, which was a hair follicle test that occurred less
than two weeks prior to the commencement of trial, showed that Appellant was
positive for methamphetamine at the level of 15,323 pg/mg.             The level of
                                          4
methamphetamine, and the fact that Appellant relapsed shortly after inpatient
treatment and shortly before the commencement of trial, is particularly concerning.
       Also concerning is Appellant’s conduct with respect to N.B. After the children
were removed from Appellant’s care, N.B. was placed with fictive kin. This
placement was going well for almost a year—at which time N.B. began having more
contact with Appellant. The fictive kin grounded N.B., and he began speaking to
Appellant more often. Appellant started picking N.B. up from school at lunch and
smoking marihuana with him, causing him to miss classes after lunch. Appellant
would also leave marihuana for N.B. to pick up in an alley near the home of the
fictive kin.
       The evidence shows that Appellant loves both N.B. and A.B. and that they
loved and were bonded with her. However, other evidence shows that Appellant’s
conduct and relationship with her children was not appropriate and was not safe for
the children. For example, N.B.’s fictive kin, with whom N.B. was placed for
thirteen months—until Appellant interfered—and who had known N.B. his whole
life, blamed Appellant for N.B.’s attitude changing for the worse. According to the
fictive kin, if N.B. were to be placed with any of Appellant’s relatives, Appellant
would have access to N.B.
       The fictive kin believed that N.B. would benefit from the termination of
Appellant’s parental rights.       The Department’s caseworker and the CASA
representative each testified that it would be in the best interest of all of Appellant’s
children, including N.B. and A.B., for her parental rights to be terminated.
       The Department’s plan for A.B. was for her to remain in the care of her
maternal aunt—with whom A.B. had been living even before she was officially
removed from Appellant’s care.        The Department requested that the aunt be
appointed as permanent managing conservator of A.B., and the trial court granted
that request. The aunt testified that, at the time of trial, she did not seek to adopt
                                           5
A.B. but only sought permanent managing conservatorship. The aunt provided A.B.
with a safe and stable home, and A.B. was doing well there. The aunt did not believe
that Appellant’s parental rights should be terminated as to A.B. because A.B. wanted
to maintain a relationship with Appellant.
      The Department’s plan for N.B. was less certain. After placement with his
fictive kin ended, N.B. was moved to an emergency shelter in Houston, where he
remained at the time of trial. N.B. was doing well at the shelter and had even been
participating in therapy for the first time. N.B. wished to either remain at the shelter
or be returned to Abilene. N.B. was resistant to the idea of adoption, but the
Department’s permanency supervisor indicated that N.B. was adoptable and that
termination and closure would allow N.B. to be more receptive to the Department’s
endeavor of finding a permanent home for N.B. The record shows that N.B. was
angry with Appellant because she continued to use methamphetamine and that he
was indifferent to Appellant’s rights being terminated.
      The trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility.
A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503. We are not at liberty to disturb the determinations of the
trier of fact as long as those determinations are not unreasonable. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d
at 573. Giving due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the evidence
presented at trial and the Holley factors, the trial court could reasonably have formed
a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be
in the best interest of N.B. and A.B. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Upon
considering the record as it relates to the desires of N.B. (who loved Appellant but
was indifferent to her rights being terminated), the desires of A.B. (who loved
Appellant and wanted to maintain a relationship with her), the emotional and
physical needs of N.B. and A.B. now and in the future, the emotional and physical
danger to each child now and in the future, the parental abilities of those involved,
the Department’s plans for each child, the occurrence of domestic violence in the
                                             6
presence of the children, Appellant’s use of drugs in the presence of her children,
Appellant’s supplying N.B. with illegal drugs while this case was pending, and
Appellant’s continued use of methamphetamine, we hold that the evidence is legally
and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of
Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of both N.B. and A.B. See id. We
defer to the trial court’s finding as to the best interest of each child, see C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 27, and we cannot hold in this case that the trial court’s finding as to either
child’s best interest is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly,
we overrule both of Appellant’s issues on appeal.
                                   III. This Court’s Ruling
       We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                 W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                 JUSTICE

April 13, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

                                            7