Court Opinion

ID: 9952058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 17:01:18.788826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:46.888298
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL T. MCLAUGHLIN,                            No. 21-15806

             Petitioner-Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:11-cv-
    v.                                         00884-JCM-VCF

RONALD OLIVER; ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF                            OPINION
NEVADA,

             Respondents-Appellees.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the District of Nevada
          James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

             Argued and Submitted May 17, 2023
                      Phoenix, Arizona

                      Filed March 19, 2024

     Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Daniel P. Collins,
    Circuit Judges, and Edward R. Korman, * District Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Collins

*
 The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
2                     MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

                          SUMMARY **

                         Habeas Corpus

   The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Michael
McLaughlin’s habeas corpus petition challenging his state
court convictions for attempted murder, battery, and
burglary arising from his stabbing attack on multiple
employees at the Clark County Social Services office in
Henderson, Nevada.
    McLaughlin contended that his trial counsel was
ineffective in failing to pursue a defense of voluntary
intoxication with respect to the charges that required the
State to prove specific intent.
    The district court denied the petition, but this court
vacated and remanded in an unpublished decision. In that
decision, this court held that McLaughlin’s first state post-
conviction counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in
“fail[ing] to conduct any independent investigation of the
claim” and that this consideration sufficed to establish cause
and prejudice under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), to
excuse the procedural default of failing to properly present
the new evidence to the state courts. This court therefore
concluded that the claim was subject to de novo review in
federal court, and remanded for the district court to consider
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. Although 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2) generally bars consideration of new evidence
that was not considered by the state courts, this court held
that the bar of § 2254(e)(2) did not apply. This court held

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                     3

that McLaughlin had attempted to present the evidence to the
state courts in his second post-conviction proceeding, and
also that, under Ninth Circuit precedent, he should not be
charged with the deficiencies of his first post-conviction
counsel. In accordance with this court’s instructions, the
district court on remand held an evidentiary hearing and
received substantial evidence that had not been considered
by the Nevada state courts when those courts rejected
McLaughlin’s ineffective assistance claim on the
merits. The district court again denied relief, and
McLaughlin appealed.
    In this appeal, the panel held that the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366
(2022), has overruled the then-existing Ninth Circuit
authority under which this court previously authorized the
district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to
consider McLaughlin’s new evidence.
    McLaughlin argued that he did not “fail[] to develop the
factual basis” of his ineffective assistance claim “in State
court proceedings” within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2),
because he “attempt[ed]” to develop that claim by filing a
successive state post-conviction petition that was rejected as
procedurally barred.
    The panel held that McLaughlin’s failure to present that
evidence to the state courts “in compliance with state
procedural rules” counts as a “fail[ure] to develop the factual
basis of a claim in State court proceedings” under
§ 2254(e)(2), as construed in Shinn.
    The panel held that, under Shinn, the fact that
McLaughlin’s first post-conviction counsel’s negligence led
to that failure makes no difference. The panel explained that
Shinn’s holding that post-conviction counsel’s errors are
4                   MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

imputed to the petitioner for purposes of § 2254(e)(2) is
directly contrary to this court’s prior conclusion, in
McLaughlin’s first appeal, that such imputation “makes no
sense in the context of a claim rescued from procedural
default by Martinez.” When (as here) § 2254(e)(2) applies
and the petitioner cannot meet its requirements, a federal
court may not consider new evidence to assess cause and
prejudice under Martinez to excuse the procedural default in
state court.
     Because the negligence of McLaughlin’s first post-
conviction counsel in failing to develop the state court is
attributable to McLaughlin, there was a “fail[ure]” within the
meaning of § 2254(e)(2) and the restrictions of that section
therefore apply. Because McLaughlin conceded that he
cannot meet the strict requirements of § 2254(e)(2), that
section bars consideration of McLaughlin’s new evidence.
    Accordingly, the panel could not consider McLaughlin’s
new evidence or the augmented version of his trial-
ineffective-assistance claim based on that evidence. It could
only consider, through the deferential lens of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
whether the state court properly rejected McLaughlin’s
original trial-ineffective-assistance claim. Here, however,
McLaughlin conceded at oral argument that his habeas claim
fails on the merits under AEDPA if § 2254(e)(2) bars
consideration of his new evidence. Accordingly,
McLaughlin’s habeas petition necessarily fails.
                   MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                    5

                        COUNSEL

Megan Hopper-Rebegea (argued) and Jonathan M.
Kirschbaum, Assistant Federal Public Defenders; Rene L.
Valladares, Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal
Public Defender, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Petitioner-
Appellant.
Adam L. Woodrum (argued), Deputy State Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General, Carson City,
Nevada; Allison Herr, Senior Deputy Attorney General;
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney
General, Las Vegas, Nevada; for Respondents-Appellees.

                        OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

    In this federal habeas corpus proceeding, Petitioner
Michael McLaughlin challenges his state court convictions
for attempted murder, battery, and burglary arising from his
stabbing attack on multiple employees at the Clark County
Social Services (“CCSS”) office in Henderson, Nevada in
December 2002. McLaughlin contends that his trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to pursue a defense of voluntary
intoxication with respect to those charges (such as attempted
murder) that required the State to prove specific intent. The
district court denied the petition, but we vacated and
remanded in an unpublished decision. In accordance with
our instructions, the district court on remand held an
evidentiary hearing and received substantial evidence that
had not been considered by the Nevada state courts when
those courts rejected McLaughlin’s ineffective assistance
6                  MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

claim on the merits. The district court nonetheless again
denied relief, and McLaughlin has again appealed. We
conclude that, under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), the federal
courts are barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) from
considering any of the new evidence offered by McLaughlin
in support of his federal petition. Because McLaughlin
concedes that he cannot succeed on his ineffective assistance
claim unless we consider his new evidence, we affirm the
district court’s denial of McLaughlin’s habeas petition.
                             I
                             A
    On December 4, 2002, McLaughlin went to the CCSS
office in Henderson, Nevada to apply for medical and rental
assistance. The social worker who assisted him, Shelleen
Abrams, concluded that he was eligible for medical
assistance, and she “issued him a two-month medical card
for his medical problem.” But Abrams concluded that,
because McLaughlin was then living with his brother, he did
not qualify for rental assistance. After McLaughlin
departed, Abrams noticed a set of keys on the floor and left
them with the front desk in case McLaughlin or someone
else called for them. McLaughlin later left Abrams a phone
message inquiring about the keys, and Abrams called back
and relayed the message that the keys were available to be
picked up at the front desk.
    McLaughlin returned to the office to retrieve his keys at
around 11:15 AM on December 10. When he arrived,
however, McLaughlin told the office manager at the front
desk, Kathryn Atkinson, that he wanted to inquire again
about rental assistance because he said he was now “on the
street.” Atkinson walked over to where Abrams was in an
                    MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                    7

adjacent room and told her about McLaughlin’s renewed
request for rental assistance. Abrams said to McLaughlin,
who was then standing by the doorway, “Mike, you’re not
eligible for rent.” Abrams then told Atkinson to ask
McLaughlin to sit down and wait while Abrams finished up
with another client and that Abrams would try to see him
before lunch.
    When an employee announced that the office would
close for lunch at noon, McLaughlin got up to leave, but
Atkinson told him that he could stay because Abrams wanted
to try to see him before lunch. Atkinson later became
concerned that McLaughlin seemed agitated and was
muttering to himself, and so she locked the door to the
separate area where the social workers were. McLaughlin
later went to use the restroom, and Atkinson went out the
front entrance towards the street to check on another client.
When she went to go back inside, McLaughlin confronted
her at the doorway, holding a knife with a blade at least four
inches in length. McLaughlin then attacked Atkinson,
knocking her to the ground. He then proceeded to hit and
kick her, and he stabbed her in the side and abdomen.
Believing that McLaughlin was trying to stab her in the
throat, Atkinson defensively tried to keep the knife away
from her neck and ended up receiving more than a dozen cuts
to her hands.
    Meanwhile, the office’s security guard, Steven Glenn,
heard Atkinson’s screams and came to her assistance. After
Glenn punched McLaughlin in the chin, McLaughlin
stabbed Glenn near the heart, and Glenn fell backwards.
Both men went back inside, and at one point in the ensuing
struggle, McLaughlin fell to the floor and the knife came out
of his hand. McLaughlin, however, managed to retrieve the
knife. McLaughlin also chased the supervising social
8                  MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

worker, Susan Rhodes, stabbed her twice, and hit her in the
head with a chair. Glenn and others were trying to subdue
McLaughlin, hitting him with chairs, but McLaughlin
laughed and said, “You’ll never stop me.” At another point
during the attacks, McLaughlin said words to the effect of,
“[Y]ou people think you can get by with anything. I’m going
to show you that you can’t.” Among the others assaulted by
McLaughlin were Edward Johanns, a volunteer at a Catholic
social service agency down the corridor who had come to try
to help stop the attack, as well as a priest from that same
agency.
    When the police arrived soon thereafter in response to a
911 call, McLaughlin immediately obeyed their order to get
on the ground, and he did not resist being arrested.
                             B
    McLaughlin was charged in Nevada state court with
three counts of attempted murder in connection with the
attacks on Atkinson, Glenn, and Rhodes; one count of
battery with a deadly weapon for the attack on Johanns; and
one count of burglary while armed with a deadly weapon.
At trial, McLaughlin’s defense attorney, Lynn Avants,
argued that McLaughlin had not planned the crimes; that he
lacked the specific intent required for attempted murder; and
that, at most, he was guilty of multiple batteries, which are
general intent crimes. The jury, however, convicted
McLaughlin on all counts. Taking account of certain
enhancements resulting from his six prior felony
convictions, the trial court sentenced McLaughlin to prison
                      MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                         9

for a maximum of 130 years. 1 McLaughlin’s conviction was
affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court in February 2006.
    McLaughlin also sought state post-conviction relief. In
his operative pro se petition, McLaughlin generally alleged
that his trial counsel had “fail[ed] to conduct an adequate
pre-trial investigation,” but he did not specifically mention
voluntary intoxication or any related issue. The State
opposed the petition, noting, as to the allegation of
inadequate pretrial investigation, that it was bereft of
supporting allegations. In November 2007, the trial court
held a hearing on the petition at which Avants,
McLaughlin’s former counsel, testified. The trial court
subsequently denied the petition, holding that McLaughlin
had failed to allege any specific respect in which Avants’
investigation was inadequate and had failed to show that the
outcome would have been any different had he investigated
more thoroughly. In April 2009, however, the Nevada
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the trial court
should have appointed counsel for McLaughlin before
rendering a decision on the petition.
    Appointed counsel filed a supplemental brief in support
of McLaughlin’s state petition in June 2010.              The
supplemental brief argued, inter alia, that trial counsel had
been ineffective in failing to present a defense of voluntary
intoxication to the charges that required proof of specific
intent. The brief noted that, in the presentence report,
McLaughlin had stated that “he was high on
methamphetamine” at the time of the offense, and the

1
  The trial court initially fixed McLaughlin’s minimum sentence at 52
years, but as a result of a 2018 ruling in a subsequent state post-
conviction proceeding that is not at issue here, McLaughlin is now
eligible for parole in 2035.
10                  MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

medical records from McLaughlin’s treatment after the
attack stated that McLaughlin had said that he had “used
marijuana” earlier that day. Such intoxication, the brief
argued, could have provided a permissible basis under
Nevada law for the jury to find a lack of specific intent. See
NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.220 (2002) (“No act committed by a
person while in a state of . . . voluntary intoxication shall be
deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but
whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose,
motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a
particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his . . .
intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining
the purpose, motive or intent.”).
    The trial court held a second hearing on McLaughlin’s
petition, at which Avants again testified.            Avants
acknowledged that, at the time of his representation of
McLaughlin in the CCSS matter, he probably had received
certain medical records that were shown to him during the
hearing. Those records indicated that McLaughlin had
received treatment for “methamphetamine overdose and
psychosis” in 1996 and that, while in the hospital, he “had
torn a catheter out of himself,” causing significant injury.
The records also stated that McLaughlin had been
hospitalized in 1995 because he had been “acting crazy”
towards his mother, who said that he was being “paranoid”
and claimed he was “being attacked by Martians.” The
medical records also showed that, on the day of the attacks
in 2002, McLaughlin had reported using marijuana earlier
that day. Avants also stated that, because he had represented
McLaughlin even before the CCSS matter, he knew at that
time that McLaughlin had convictions for drug possession
and Avants “was aware of his abuse of methamphetamines.”
                    MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                   11

    Avants nonetheless gave three reasons why he did not
pursue the theory that McLaughlin lacked specific intent
because he was high on drugs. First, he said that “there was
never any indication from the conversations [he] had with
Mr. McLaughlin that he was suffering from some sort of
narcotic, amphetamine-induced psychosis” at the time of the
attacks. Avants testified that, if McLaughlin had told him
that he “didn’t know what [he] was doing at the social
welfare center that day because [he] was so high or so
medicated,” Avants would have pursued that further.
Second, Avants also acknowledged, during questioning by
the State, that no blood work had been done for McLaughlin
on the day of the incident, and so there was no medical staff
or expert that Avants could have called to establish that
McLaughlin had methamphetamine in his system on the day
of the attack. Third, Avants said that, even if such a defense
had been available on the facts, he believed that many jurors
are “extremely resistant to any argument that because
somebody is high on narcotics, that their ability to form
intent is somewhat impaired.” That “risk” was “something
that you have to factor in whenever you’re going to present
that specific defense.”
    McLaughlin also testified at the hearing, and he stated
that in discussing the charged incident, he had told Avants
that he “did meth the night before into the early morning.”
McLaughlin said that he had last used methamphetamines at
around 3:00 or 3:30 AM, which (according to the trial
testimony) would have been about eight hours before he
arrived at the CCSS. McLaughlin also confirmed that the
medical records shown to Avants at the hearing were part of
the case file that McLaughlin had received from counsel
after the case was concluded. McLaughlin stated that,
although the records did not include a toxicology report, he
12                  MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

was certain that a blood draw had been done at the hospital
on the day of the CCSS incident. He claimed that he
voluntarily mentioned his marijuana use to hospital staff
because he assumed it would be discovered when they tested
his blood, but that he nonetheless did not tell them about
having used methamphetamines because that was not “really
socially acceptable like marijuana is.”
    The trial court denied McLaughlin’s petition in a written
order on January 11, 2011. The court noted that there was
no “physical evidence” that supported McLaughlin’s claim
he was intoxicated at the time of the incident and that counsel
had testified as to the “risks inherent in portraying a criminal
defendant to a jury as a drug addict.” Accordingly, the court
found “trial counsel’s failure to raise the defense of
voluntary intoxication to be a strategic decision, made
intentionally and effectively.” In the alternative, the trial
court held that “there is no reasonable likelihood the defense
would have changed the outcome at trial.”
    Just over a year later, the Nevada Supreme Court
affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. The court held
that the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly
erroneous and were supported by substantial evidence, and
that McLaughlin had not shown any legal error.
                               C
    While his post-conviction appeal was pending in the
Nevada Supreme Court, McLaughlin filed a pro se federal
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, and
he filed an amended petition after his state appeal was
rejected. The district court thereafter appointed counsel,
who subsequently filed a further amended petition on
January 31, 2013. In addition to recounting the facts
developed at the state court post-conviction hearings, the
                   MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                   13

federal petition relied on several declarations containing
additional information assembled by counsel’s investigator.
    First, habeas counsel submitted a December 24, 2012
declaration from McLaughlin’s mother, Marva Bennett, who
stated that McLaughlin had stopped by her house on the
morning of the CCSS incident. Bennett pretended that she
was not home and, observing McLaughlin “through the
peephole” in the door, she could see that he appeared
“extremely agitated and high.” She said that, “[a]s he was
leaving,” McLaughlin “pushed over some of [her] lawn
chairs and threw rocks.”
    Second, the counseled amended federal petition attached
a January 24, 2013 declaration from McLaughlin’s half-
brother, Alan White. White stated that McLaughlin had a
“serious methamphetamine addiction at the time of his
arrest” and that McLaughlin had smoked methamphetamine
at White’s house around 7:00 or 8:00 PM the night before
the CCSS incident. According to White, at “[a]round 1:30
or 2:00 a.m.,” he confronted McLaughlin, who was “high,”
and told him that he would need to leave. White said that,
when he woke up at around 6:00 AM, McLaughlin was gone.
    Third, habeas counsel subsequently submitted a
declaration from the investigator recounting her recollection
of a February 6, 2013 interview with Jason Johnson. The
investigator said that Johnson claimed that McLaughlin
arrived at his house sometime between 11:00 PM the day
before, and 2:00 AM the day of, the CCSS attack. Johnson
also reportedly stated that he and McLaughlin “stayed up all
night, without sleep, working on a piece of electronic
equipment” and that, at some point, “McLaughlin smoke[d]
half a gram of methamphetamine.” Johnson assertedly said
that McLaughlin left around 10:30 AM, “stating that he ‘had
14                  MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

to go do something,’” and that Johnson “was shocked by
McLaughlin’s arrest” later that day.
    Fourth, habeas counsel submitted with the amended
petition an additional declaration in which the investigator
summarized certain points from her January 18, 2013
interview with Steven Glenn, the CCSS security guard
whom McLaughlin had attacked during the charged incident.
According to the investigator, Glenn thought that it was
“obvious” that McLaughlin was “high” during the attack;
that this explained the “superhuman strength” that
McLaughlin showed during the incident; and that at times
during the incident McLaughlin had a “vacant, nobody’s
home look.”
    Shortly after submitting McLaughlin’s federal petition,
federal habeas counsel returned to state court and filed a
successive post-conviction petition. Based on the same new
evidence submitted in support of the federal petition, the
state petition re-asserted McLaughlin’s claim that trial
counsel had been ineffective in failing to investigate and
pursue a voluntary intoxication defense. The state trial court
denied the petition as procedurally barred, and the Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed. The state high court held that,
because McLaughlin’s petition was both untimely and
successive, it “was procedurally barred absent a
demonstration of good cause.” See NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 34.726, 34.810.       The trial court concluded that
McLaughlin was “aware of his state of mind” at the time and
had previously known about each of the four proffered
witnesses, who “could have been interviewed during the
course of previous proceedings.” Consequently, the trial
court held, McLaughlin had failed to show good cause for
not presenting this additional evidence in connection with
his prior post-conviction petition. On appeal, McLaughlin
                    MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                    15

argued that his post-conviction counsel for his prior state
petition had been ineffective in failing to develop this
evidence, but the Nevada Supreme Court rejected this
contention. The court held that, under its decision in Brown
v. McDaniel, 331 P.3d 867 (Nev. 2014), “[i]neffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel” cannot establish good
cause where, as in this case, “the appointment of counsel in
the prior post-conviction proceedings was not statutorily or
constitutionally required.”      Accordingly, the Nevada
Supreme Court held that the trial court “did not err in
dismissing McLaughlin’s petition as procedurally barred.”
    The federal district court denied McLaughlin’s habeas
petition in March 2015. Noting that the Nevada Supreme
Court had held that McLaughlin’s augmented ineffective
assistance claim had been rejected as procedurally defaulted,
the court turned to whether federal law would excuse that
default. The court noted that, under Martinez v. Ryan, 566
U.S. 1 (2012), ineffective assistance of state post-conviction
counsel—even though such counsel is not constitutionally
guaranteed—may in some circumstances provide cause for
excusing, in federal court, a state-law procedural default of
an underlying claim that trial counsel was ineffective.
Nonetheless, the district court held that, even considering the
new evidence, the underlying claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel was “without merit.” The district court
granted a certificate of appealability as to this claim.
    McLaughlin appealed, and we vacated and remanded.
McLaughlin v. Laxalt, 665 F. App’x 590 (9th Cir. 2016). We
held that McLaughlin’s first state post-conviction counsel
had rendered ineffective assistance in “fail[ing] to conduct
any independent investigation of the claim” and that this
consideration sufficed to establish cause and prejudice under
Martinez to excuse the procedural default of failing to
16                 MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

properly present the new evidence to the state courts. Id. at
592–93. We therefore concluded that the claim was subject
to de novo review in federal court, and we remanded for the
district court to consider whether to hold an evidentiary
hearing. Id. at 593. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)
generally bars consideration of new evidence that was not
considered by the state courts, we held that the bar of
§ 2254(e)(2) did not apply. Id. We held that McLaughlin
had attempted to present the evidence to the state courts in
his second post-conviction proceeding, and also that, under
Ninth Circuit precedent, he should not be charged with the
deficiencies of his first post-conviction counsel:

       [A]lthough a state habeas lawyer’s errors
       normally are imputed to a habeas petitioner
       for purposes of determining whether the
       petitioner has been diligent under
       § 2254(e)(2), Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
       420, 432 (2000), such imputation makes no
       sense in the context of a claim rescued from
       procedural default by Martinez. See Detrich
       v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013)
       (en banc) (opinion of Fletcher, J.) (“Indeed,
       even with respect to the underlying trial-
       counsel IAC [ineffective assistance of
       counsel] ‘claim,’ given that the reason for the
       hearing is the alleged ineffectiveness of both
       trial and PCR [post-conviction review]
       counsel, it makes little sense to apply
       § 2254(e)(2).”).

665 F. App’x at 593.
                    MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                   17

    On remand, the district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing at which Avants again testified. The court also
received live or deposition testimony from Bennett, White,
and Johnson, as well as from a pharmacological expert and
from three of the officers who had been involved with the
arrest of McLaughlin in December 2002. The district court
held that, even considering all of the new evidence, Avants
had not rendered ineffective assistance and that McLaughlin
had not shown prejudice. The district court therefore denied
the petition and declined to issue a certificate of
appealability. We subsequently granted a certificate of
appealability as to the issue of “whether [McLaughlin’s] trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
investigate and present a defense of voluntary intoxication.”
McLaughlin has timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253(a).
                             II
    The State contends, as a threshold matter, that the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shinn v. Martinez
Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), has overruled the then-
existing Ninth Circuit authority under which we previously
authorized the district court to conduct an evidentiary
hearing in this case and to consider McLaughlin’s new
evidence. We agree.
                              A
    “To ensure that federal habeas corpus retains its narrow
role,” which is to “guard[] only against ‘extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’” the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)
“imposes several limits on habeas relief, and [the Supreme
Court] ha[s] prescribed several more.” Shinn, 596 U.S. at
377 (simplified). Chief among these are the “strict rules
18                   MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

requiring prisoners to raise all of their federal claims in state
court before seeking federal relief.” Id. “Ordinarily, a state
prisoner satisfies this exhaustion requirement by raising his
federal claim before the state courts in accordance with state
procedures.” Id. at 378. However, if the prisoner fails to
comply with state procedures, and the state courts “dismiss
these claims for their procedural failures, such claims are
technically exhausted” in the sense that no remedies remain
available in state court. Id. But that does not mean that
prisoners can simply “ignore state procedure on the way to
federal court,” because that “would defeat the evident goal
of the exhaustion rule.” Id. To address that concern, the
Supreme Court has developed, as “an important corollary to
the exhaustion requirement,” the “doctrine of procedural
default.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Under that doctrine, federal courts generally decline to hear
any federal claim that was not presented to the state courts
consistent with the State’s own procedural rules.” Id.
(simplified).
    However, there are certain limited exceptions to these
rules, and a federal court is therefore “not required to
automatically deny unexhausted or procedurally defaulted
claims.” Id. at 379. In particular, a federal court “may
excuse [a] procedural default,” but “only if a prisoner ‘can
demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law.’” Id. (quoting
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (emphasis
added)).
    In Shinn, the Supreme Court addressed the
circumstances in which a “federal habeas court” presented
with a procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claim may proceed to “hear [such] a claim or
consider evidence that a prisoner did not previously present
                       MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                         19

to the state courts in compliance with state procedural rules.”
596 U.S. at 375–76. Such claims present unique concerns,
because some States expressly “require[] prisoners to raise
such claims for the first time during state collateral
proceedings,” where “there is no constitutional right to
counsel.” 2 Id. at 380, 386. Similarly, other States implicitly
require the use of collateral proceedings by “effectively
foreclos[ing] direct review of trial-ineffective-assistance
claims.” Id. at 380. Given these unique features, the
Supreme Court held in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012),
that “ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel
may constitute ‘cause’ to forgive procedural default of a
trial-ineffective-assistance claim” in States that explicitly or
effectively require the use of collateral proceedings to raise
such claims. Shinn, 596 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added). In
reaching this conclusion, Martinez created a limited
exception to the general “rule that attorney error cannot
establish cause to excuse a procedural default unless it
violates the Constitution.” Id.
    In Shinn, the Supreme Court addressed whether
Martinez’s special rule for applying Coleman’s cause-and-
prejudice test in the context of trial-ineffective-assistance
claims would also apply to “excus[e] a prisoner’s failure to
develop the state-court record” concerning such claims. Id.
at 381. Prior to AEDPA, the Court had applied, in deciding
whether to excuse such record-development failures, the
same Coleman cause-and-prejudice standard that is used to
excuse procedural defaults generally. See Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1992). But Congress in
AEDPA “replaced Keeney’s cause-and-prejudice standard

2
 The State expressly conceded in its answering brief in this court that
Nevada is such a State.
20                 MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

for evidentiary development with the even more stringent
requirements now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).”
Shinn, 596 U.S. at 381 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). The Court described those requirements as
follows:

       Section 2254(e)(2) provides that, if a prisoner
       “has failed to develop the factual basis of a
       claim in State court proceedings,” a federal
       court may hold “an evidentiary hearing on the
       claim” in only two limited scenarios. Either
       the claim must rely on (1) a “new” and
       “previously     unavailable”      “rule      of
       constitutional law” made retroactively
       applicable by th[e] [Supreme] Court, or
       (2) “a factual predicate that could not have
       been previously discovered through the
       exercise       of       due        diligence.”
       §§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(i), (ii). If a prisoner can
       satisfy either of these exceptions, he also
       must show that further factfinding would
       demonstrate, “by clear and convincing
       evidence,” that “no reasonable factfinder”
       would have convicted him of the crime
       charged. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Finally, even if all
       of these requirements are satisfied, a federal
       habeas court still is not required to hold a
       hearing or take any evidence. Like the
       decision to grant habeas relief itself, the
       decision to permit new evidence must be
                           MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                    21

           informed by principles of comity and finality
           that govern every federal habeas case.

596 U.S. at 381–82. 3
     Shinn held that, because Congress had displaced
Keeney’s judge-made cause-and-prejudice standard with a
stricter statutory standard, the Court could not, as it had in
Martinez, invoke its “equitable judgment and discretion” to
create exceptions excusing a prisoner’s “fail[ure] to develop
the factual basis of a claim in State court.” Id. at 384–85
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because
“§ 2254(e)(2) is a statute that [the courts] have no authority
to amend,” its strictures must be enforced according to their
terms, with no Martinez-style judge-made equitable
exceptions for “only a subset of claims.” Id. at 385–87.

3
    The full text of § 2254(e)(2) is as follows:
            If the applicant has failed to develop the factual
       basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court
       shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim
       unless the applicant shows that—
               (A) the claim relies on—
                    (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made
               retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
               Supreme Court, that was previously
               unavailable; or
                    (ii) a factual predicate that could not have
               been previously discovered through the
               exercise of due diligence; and
               (B) the facts underlying the claim would be
            sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
            evidence that but for constitutional error, no
            reasonable factfinder would have found the
            applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
22                  MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

    The Shinn Court also considered two specific issues
concerning the proper construction of § 2254(e)(2). First,
the Court addressed what counts as a “fail[ure] to develop
the factual basis of a claim in State court,” so as to trigger
the application of § 2254(e)(2)’s restrictions. The Court held
that a petitioner “fails” to develop the state court record
within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2) when he or his state
post-conviction counsel is “at fault for the undeveloped
record in state court.” 596 U.S. at 382 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). As the Court explained,

       [A] prisoner bears the risk in federal habeas
       for all attorney errors made in the course of
       the representation, unless counsel provides
       constitutionally ineffective assistance. And,
       because there is no constitutional right to
       counsel in state postconviction proceedings,
       a prisoner ordinarily must bear responsibility
       for all attorney errors during those
       proceedings. Among those errors, a state
       prisoner is responsible for counsel’s
       negligent failure to develop the state
       postconviction record.

596 U.S. at 382–83 (emphasis added) (simplified).
    Second, the Court clarified the sweep of § 2254(e)(2)’s
restrictions once they are triggered. Although § 2254(e)(2)’s
language refers only to prohibiting “an evidentiary hearing
on [a] claim,” the Court in Shinn reaffirmed that the statute’s
restrictions also apply “when a prisoner seeks relief based on
new evidence without an evidentiary hearing.” Shinn, 596
U.S. at 389 (quoting Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653
(2004) (restoring emphasis deleted by Shinn)). A narrower
                    MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                    23

reading of § 2254(e)(2), the Court stated, “would have
countenanced an end-run around the statute.” Id. Thus, even
where a federal habeas court “admits or reviews new
evidence” for some other purpose—such as determining
whether the Martinez exception applies to a trial-ineffective-
assistance claim that was procedurally defaulted in state
post-conviction proceedings—the court “may not consider
that evidence on the merits of a negligent prisoner’s
defaulted claim unless the exceptions in § 2254(e)(2) are
satisfied.” Id. (emphasis added).
                              B
    Against this backdrop, we conclude that § 2254(e)(2), as
construed in Shinn, prohibited the district court from
considering any of McLaughlin’s new evidence in
connection with the merits of his trial-ineffective-assistance
claim.
    Relying on our prior decision in this case, McLaughlin
argues that he did not “fail[] to develop the factual basis” of
his ineffective assistance claim “in State court proceedings”
within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2), because he
“attempt[ed]” to develop that claim by filing a successive
state post-conviction petition that was rejected as
procedurally barred. McLaughlin v. Laxalt, 665 F. App’x at
593 (emphasis added). But as Shinn made clear, the
restrictions discussed by the Court in that case—including
§ 2254(e)(2)—limit when “a federal habeas court” may
“hear a claim or consider evidence that a prisoner did not
previously present to the state courts in compliance with
state procedural rules.” Shinn, 596 U.S. at 375–76
(emphasis added). Under Shinn, therefore, a failure to
present evidence to the state courts “in compliance with state
procedural rules,” id., counts as a “fail[ure] to develop the
24                      MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

factual basis of a claim in State court,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2). See also Shinn, 596 U.S. at 378 (noting that it
is improper “to allow a state prisoner simply to ignore state
procedure on the way to federal court”). 4 Here, the Nevada
Supreme Court squarely held that McLaughlin’s successive
petition, with its new evidence, “was procedurally barred,”
and the court therefore declined to consider any of that
evidence. McLaughlin’s failure to present that evidence to
the state courts “in compliance with state procedural rules”
counts as a “fail[ure] to develop the factual basis of a claim
in State court proceedings” under § 2254(e)(2), as construed
in Shinn. 596 U.S. at 375–76 (citation omitted).
    Moreover, under Shinn—and contrary to our prior
decision in this case—the fact that McLaughlin’s first post-
conviction counsel’s negligence led to that failure makes no
difference. As the Supreme Court held, there has been a
“fail[ure]” within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2) if “the
prisoner [is] ‘at fault’ for the undeveloped record in state
court,” and, “under § 2254(e)(2), a prisoner is ‘at fault’ even
when state postconviction counsel is negligent.” Shinn, 596

4
  Given the intervening and binding decision in Shinn, we reject
McLaughlin’s contention that we are bound to adhere to our prior
unpublished decision under the law-of-the-case doctrine. That doctrine,
which “provides that ‘one panel of an appellate court will not as a general
rule reconsider questions which another panel has decided on a prior
appeal in the same case,’” is “not an inexorable command.” United
States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted). In particular, a panel “may depart from the law of the case”
when, as here, “an intervening change in the law has occurred.” Id.
(citation omitted); see also Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 924 F.2d
805, 810 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the “doctrine of law of the case
does not bar reconsideration” of the panel decision on a prior appeal
where the “Supreme Court’s decision” in a recent case “is intervening
authority which we are obligated to follow”).
                    MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                   25

U.S. at 382, 384; see also id. at 382 (“[U]nder AEDPA and
[the Supreme Court’s] precedents, state postconviction
counsel’s ineffective assistance in developing the state-court
record is attributed to the prisoner” for purposes of
§ 2254(e)(2).). Shinn acknowledged that Martinez had
recognized an equitable exception that would allow, in
certain circumstances, a habeas petitioner to establish cause
for a procedural default when post-conviction counsel was
ineffective in asserting a trial-ineffective-assistance claim.
Id. at 380. But the Court held that no such comparable
equitable exception could be engrafted onto § 2254(e)(2)’s
strict limitations on the consideration of new evidence. Id.
at 384–85 (holding that any such “expansion of Martinez”
was inconsistent with § 2254(e)(2), which the courts “have
no authority to amend”).
    Shinn’s holding on this score—i.e., that post-conviction
counsel’s errors are imputed to the petitioner for purposes of
§ 2254(e)(2)—is thus directly contrary to our prior
conclusion, in McLaughlin’s first appeal, that such
imputation “makes no sense in the context of a claim rescued
from procedural default by Martinez.” 665 F. App’x at 593.
Indeed, Shinn expressly rejected a comparable argument that
“there is no point in developing a record” at a hearing to
address possible “cause and prejudice” under Martinez “if a
federal court cannot later consider that evidence on the
merits” of the claim due to § 2254(e)(2). Id. at 389. Shinn
acknowledged the tension between Martinez and
§ 2254(e)(2), but the Court held that § 2254(e)(2), as
construed by the Court, prevails over Martinez:

       While we agree that any such Martinez
       hearing would serve no purpose, that is a
       reason to dispense with Martinez hearings
26                  MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER

       altogether, not to set § 2254(e)(2) aside.
       Thus, if that provision applies and the
       prisoner cannot satisfy its “stringent
       requirements,” a federal court may not hold
       an evidentiary hearing—or otherwise
       consider new evidence—to assess cause and
       prejudice under Martinez.

596 U.S. at 389 (citation omitted).
    Because the negligence of McLaughlin’s first post-
conviction counsel in failing to develop the record in state
court is attributable to McLaughlin, there was a “fail[ure]”
within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2) and the restrictions of
that section therefore apply. Because, as in Shinn, 596 U.S.
at 382, McLaughlin concedes that he cannot meet the strict
requirements of § 2254(e)(2), that section bars consideration
of McLaughlin’s new evidence.
     Furthermore, as noted earlier, Shinn also held that, when
(as here) § 2254(e)(2) applies and the petitioner cannot meet
its requirements, a “federal court may not . . . consider new
evidence[] to assess cause and prejudice under Martinez.”
Shinn, 596 U.S. at 389 (emphasis added). Because
§ 2254(e)(2)’s limitations thus prevail over Martinez, Shinn
abrogates our prior decision holding that McLaughlin’s
“new evidence” could be considered as so “‘fundamentally
alter[ing]’” his ineffective assistance claim that the
augmented version of the claim should be considered a “new
claim” that “fits within the Martinez exception to procedural
default.” McLaughlin v. Laxalt, 665 F. App’x at 592
(quoting Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1318 (9th Cir.
2014) (en banc)). Because, under Shinn, McLaughlin’s new
evidence cannot be considered either on the merits or “to
assess cause and prejudice under Martinez,” 596 U.S. at 389,
                    MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER                   27

our prior decision concluding otherwise no longer remains
good law.
    Accordingly, we may not consider McLaughlin’s new
evidence or the augmented version of his trial-ineffective-
assistance claim based on that evidence. We may only
consider, through the deferential lens of AEDPA, whether
the state court properly rejected McLaughlin’s original trial-
ineffective-assistance claim. See Guillory v. Allen, 38 F.4th
849, 856, 859 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, however, McLaughlin
conceded at oral argument that his habeas claim fails on the
merits under AEDPA if § 2254(e)(2) bars consideration of
his new evidence. Hilao v. Est. of Marcos, 393 F.3d 987,
993 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A party . . . is bound by concessions
made . . . at oral argument.”). Accordingly, McLaughlin’s
habeas petition necessarily fails.
                             III
   For these reasons, the judgment of the district court
denying McLaughlin’s habeas petition is affirmed.
   AFFIRMED.