Court Opinion

ID: 9576068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:20:33.534005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:24.067475
License: Public Domain

Sawyer, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly looks to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003; 112 S Ct 2886; 120 L Ed 2d 798 (1992), for guidance. However, the majority fails to appreciate the ramifications of the Lucas decision.
In Lucas, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land, a taking occurs *77and the owner is entitled to compensation. Id. at 1016. The Lucas Court found a taking where a state statute prohibited building on the plaintiffs beach-front property. The instant dispute involves the question raised, but not directly answered, in Lucas, namely, whether all the economic use of all of plaintiffs’ property must be deprived by the regulation before there is a taking or whether it is sufficient that a portion of plaintiffs’ parcel is denied all of its beneficial use because of the taking.1 The Court commented on this question in Lucas, id. at 1016, 1017, n 7:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasible use” rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the "property interest” against which the loss of value is to be measured. When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole. (For an extreme — and, we think, unsupportable — view of the relevant calculus, see Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 42 NY2d 324, 333-334; 366 NE2d 1271, 1276-1277 (1977), aff'd 438 US 104 [98 S Ct 2646; 57 L Ed 2d 631] (1978), where the state court examined the diminution in a particular parcel’s value produced by a municipal ordinance in light of total value of the taking claimant’s other holdings in the vicinity.) Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our "depri*78vation” fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.
While the Supreme Court was able to avoid the question in Lucas because it was undisputed that Lucas was denied the beneficial use of all of his property by the regulatory taking, that question cannot be avoided in the case at bar. If either the remaining 24.6-acre parcel or the original fifty-acre parcel is viewed as a whole, then it is clear that plaintiffs have not been denied all economic use of their property because the property is usable with the exception of approximately 4.3 to 6 acres of wetlands and surrounding area. On the other hand, if we focus on the wetland parcel itself, plaintiffs are denied the economic use of that property inasmuch as the denial of the fill permit precludes them from developing and making use of that parcel.
In reaching its decision, the majority finds support in Bevan v Brandon Twp, 438 Mich 385; 475 NW2d 37 (1991). In Bevan, our Supreme Court concluded that there was no taking where a zoning ordinance had the effect of allowing the property owner to build only one house on two contiguous lots.2 Our Supreme Court concluded that in determining whether a taking existed, the property must be viewed as a whole. Id. at 397. However, I do not believe that Bevan is controlling for two reasons.
First, the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Bevan was rendered before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas. Accordingly, there is a question whether Bevan remains good law. The viability of the decision in Bevan, more*79over, is additionally questionable because of Re-van’s strong reliance on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central, supra. Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court directly cites Penn Central in support of the proposition that the property must be viewed as a whole. However, when the United States Supreme Court decided Lucas the following year, it disavowed that view expressed in Penn Central, declaring that view to be "extreme” and "unsupportable.” 505 US 1017, n 7.
Moreover, even if we were to defer to the Supreme Court to address the question of the continuing viability of Bevan in light of Lucas, I do not believe that Bevan is relevant to the disposition of the case at bar. In Bevan, the property owner was not denied the beneficial use of all of his property, or even a portion of his property. Rather, he merely was restricted with respect to the extent to which he could use and develop the property. That is, unlike the case at bar, the property owner in Bevan could build a single-family detached house, the intended use of the lots, anywhere he wanted on either of the lots involved. He merely was precluded from building two houses, one on each lot, as he had intended. Therefore, the property owner was able to use all of his property, though not in the manner he desired. In the case at bar, however, the property owner enjoys no such freedom. The effect of the Wetland Protection Act, MCL 281.701 et seq.; MSA 18.595(51) et seq., and of defendant’s denial of a fill permit is to preclude utterly the use of a portion of plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs are not free to choose what portion of their property to develop. Rather, the regulation allows development of a specific portion of the property and absolutely precludes the development of another portion of the property.
*80The majority’s strong reliance on Loveladies Harbor, Inc v United States, 28 F3d 1171 (CA Fed, 1994), is somewhat mystifying inasmuch as that court ruled in favor of the property owner. Ultimately, like Lucas, it avoided a clear determination on partial takings, concluding that a full taking had occurred. Loveladies, supra at 1182.
In sum, where there is a mere restriction on the extent of use of property, as was the case in Sevan, there is no taking. However, where a property owner is prohibited from making use of his property, or even a portion of the property, then there is a taking with respect to the identifiable portion which cannot be used. In short, in light of the strong historical protection of private property in this country and the constitutional mandate that the government may put private property to public use only after compensating the owner of that property, I believe that the question posed in Lucas is best answered by concluding that a taking occurs where a regulation precludes the use of an identifiable, discreet piece of property, even if that property forms only a portion of a larger parcel. I do not find it relevant how large a portion of property the owner possesses. What is relevant is that the government has determined that a public purpose would be served by denying the rightful owner of the property the use of that property and requiring it to be used, or in this case not used, in accordance with that public purpose. While the government is permitted to do this, it must compensate the property owner for putting the property to public use. Our historical protection of private property in the constitution allows no less.3
*81For the above reasons, I would conclude that the trial court erred in determining that there was no taking. Rather, the trial court should have determined that a taking occurred by the denial of the fill permit under the Wetland Protection Act and should have proceeded to determine the amount, if any, of compensation due plaintiffs.

This appears to be the basis of the dispute between the parties concerning whether the remaining 24.6-acre parcel should be considered or whether the original fifty-acre parcel should be considered in analyzing whether there was a taking. However, it is not relevant which of those two parcels is viewed. Father, the focus is on the 4.6-acre parcel that forms the subject of the regulation.

 The reason for the restriction was that the property was accessible only by an easement that was twenty feet wide while a zoning ordinance required a road with a right of way of sixty-six feet in width if it was servicing two or more houses.

 It should be noted that the conclusion that there is a taking does not necessarily compel the conclusion that there must always be compensation. Compensation is, of course, required for the value taken. If the property is utterly worthless, then there is no value *81taken and no need for compensation. Similarly, if the cost of filling the property and rehabilitating it to the point that it can be developed would exceed the value of the property once it is rehabilitated, then nothing of value is taken. However, we are not called upon in this appeal to address the issue of the amount of compensation, rather only whether there was a taking. I would conclude that there was a taking, but leave it for the trial court to determine the amount, if any, of compensation that is due.