Court Opinion

ID: 9409178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-16 07:11:10.434179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.210134
License: Public Domain

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and Memorandum
Opinion filed July 11, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-23-00192-CV

                             IN RE K.J.A., Relator

                         ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
                           WRIT OF MANDAMUS
                              246th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. 2015-02907

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

      On March 22, 2023, relator K.J.A. filed a petition for writ of mandamus in
this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the
petition, relator asks this court to compel the Honorable Angela Graves-Harrington,
presiding judge of the 246th District Court of Harris County, to render judgment in
the underlying divorce case. We conditionally grant the petition. 1

                                       BACKGROUND

       The bench trial in the underlying divorce commenced on May 6, 2019, and
concluded on December 11, 2019. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court orally
pronounced that the parties were divorced. On November 15, 2021, relator filed a
Motion to Sign Decree of Divorce and Proposed Final Decree of Divorce. On that
same day, relator also filed a community inventory and appraisement “based on
evidence produced at trial, testimony of parties, testimony of fact witnesses.” The
next day, relator filed a notice of submission for December 6, 2021, of her motion
to sign the divorce decree. Real party in interest filed a response opposing relator’s
motion, arguing that it would be improper for the court to sign the final divorce
decree because the trial court had not made a final decision as to the characterization
of the various community asserts. The submission date passed without a ruling.

       On January 3, 2022, relator filed a motion for a status conference regarding
the trial court’ rendition in the matter. Shortly thereafter, relator filed a notice of
remote hearing set for February 2, 2022. The parties appeared for the hearing on
February 2, 2022, but were informed after docket call that the trial court could not
hear relator’s motion and the remote hearing on relator’s motion was rescheduled
for February 11, 2022. At that the February 11, 2022 hearing, the trial court advised

       1
          The court requested a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from real party in
interest. However, he did not file one.
                                               2
the parties that it would have a rendition the following Monday. The trial court did
not render judgment.

      On March 8, 2022, relator filed another motion for status conference regarding
rendition. Two days later, relator filed a notice of remote hearing on relator’s motion
for status conference set for April 6, 2022. At the hearing, the trial court told the
parties that it would issue a rendition soon.

      Relator filed yet another motion for a status conference on June 21, 2022, but
no hearing was held. On December 5, 2022, relator filed her final motion for a status
conference. The trial court granted an in-person hearing for January 18, 2023. At
that hearing, the trial court indicated that a rendition would be coming within a week.
As of the time relator filed her petition for writ of mandamus, the trial court had not
rendered judgment.

                                      ANALYSIS

      Generally, to be entitled to mandamus relief, relator must establish that (1) the
trial court abused its discretion; and (2) relator has no adequate remedy by appeal.
In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC, 639 S.W.3d 671, 681 (Tex.
2022) (orig. proceeding).

      A writ of mandamus will lie to compel a trial court to proceed to judgment
within a reasonable time. In re Black, 640 S.W.3d 894, 897 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2022, orig. proceeding) (citing Tex. State Bd. of Examrsiners in Optometry v. Carp,
388 S.W.2d 409, 417 (Tex. 1965)). While it is a basic premise that an appellate
court lacks the power to compel a trial judge to do a particular act involving or
requiring discretion on his part, this court is empowered to order a trial judge to

                                           3
exercise her discretion in some manner. O’Donniley v. Golden, 860 S.W.2d 267,
270 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, orig. proceeding).                However, while we have
jurisdiction to direct the trial court to exercise its discretion, we may not tell the trial
court how to rule on a particular matter. In re ReadyOne Indus., Inc., 463 S.W.3d
623, 624 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, orig. proceeding).

       The trial court has a reasonable time in which to render judgment. In re Mesa
Petroleum Partners, LP, 538 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, orig.
proceeding). “The test for determining what time period is reasonable is not subject
to exact formulation, and no ‘bright line’ separates a reasonable time period from an
unreasonable one.” In re Greater McAllen Star Props., Inc., 444 S.W.3d 743, 748
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2014, orig. proceeding).                What is considered a
reasonable amount of time is dependent upon the circumstances of each case. In re
Shredder Co., L.L.C., 225 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tex.—El Paso 2006, orig. proceeding).

       The bench trial concluded on December 11, 2019. Relator waited nearly two
years, until November 15, 2021, before filing her motion to sign the divorce decree.
Relator subsequently filed four motions for status conference regarding the rendition
of judgment. The trial court held two remote hearings and on in-person hearing.
After each hearing, the trial court told the parties that it would render judgment soon
after the hearing, the Monday following the hearing, or within a week of the hearing.
The trial court has been aware that relator has been requesting that it sign a final
decree of divorce for over one year and seven months. The trial court has had more
than a reasonable time to sign the final divorce decree. Therefore, the trial court has
abused its discretion by not signing a final divorce decree.

                                             4
      A trial court’s discretion extends to its decision on how to rule on a matter
properly before it, and an appellate court then reviews the rulings produced by that
judicial power in the normal appellate process. In re Maasoumi, No. 05–08–01074–
CV, 2008 WL 4881328, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 13, 2008, orig. proceeding)
(mem. op.). The refusal to rule within a reasonable time frustrates that purpose and
constitutes a denial of due course of law. Id. Thus, the failure to enter a judgment
deprives a party of an adequate remedy at law, including the right to accept or appeal
a judgment entered. Black, 640 S.W.3d at 897. Relator does not have an adequate
remedy by appeal. See id.

                                     CONCLUSION

      Having determined that the trial court abused its discretion and relator does
not have an adequate remedy by appeal, we conditionally grant relator’s petition for
writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to enter a final divorce decree. However,
we do not instruct the trial court on how to rule on the divorce decree. We are
confident the trial court will act in accordance with this opinion and a writ will issue
only if the trial court fails to comply.

                                     PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Poissant.

                                           5