Court Opinion

ID: 9779407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:49:50.95666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:26.165228
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree the jury in this case could have found slander per se as prescribed in § 570 of RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND):
One who publishes matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a slander is subject to liability to the other although no special harm results if the publication imputes to the other
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(c) matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession, or office, as stated in § 573 ...
Section 573 discusses slander that would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of his lawful business, trade or profession, and notes no special harm need be proved. Only in cases of slander per se may general damages be found without proof of special damages or harm. The error here is the jury based all its answers on a definition of simple slander, not slander per se. And no special damages were found. The damages here are general.
In this case the proof aimed at showing the plaintiff had been harmed in her business or trade, however, the special issues submitted to the jury did not require those necessary findings.
The pertinent issues are numbers one and two, the first inquiring whether the defendant made statements to city council members and staff. The second one was:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the statements in Special Issue No. 1 were defamatory to the plaintiff.
(The jury answered “yes.”)
Then followed the erroneous instruction. This is the crucial definition:
You are instructed that a defamatory statement is a statement tending to in*264jure the reputation of a person, and expose her to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury, or to impeach her honesty, integrity or virtue.
It is clear this is not the required definition of slander per se under § 573. The jury should have been instructed that to be defamatory the statement must tend to impute unfitness to perform the duties of her employment or prejudice her in her business or trade. To be actionable per se the statement must have adversely affected her fitness for the proper conduct of her business, trade or profession, as required by § 573, supra. The proper instruction was not submitted to permit the jury to find slander per se. Therefore, since special damages were not submitted to the jury, the damages as awarded are general damages and cannot stand when not based on a slander per se finding.
Further, Special Issue No. 7 is a simple slander question (not per se). In order to sustain recovery under that finding (loss of esteem in the community), special damages or harm must also be found by the jury.
Since no issue answered by the jury was based on slander per se, I would sustain points three and five, which preserved this error — that the evidence establishes as a matter of law no special injury (harm) was sustained.