Court Opinion

ID: 9744818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:17:24.963334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:52.093079
License: Public Domain

CRAVEN; J., dissenting: The majority opinion in this case permits statutory conditions precedent to commitment as a sexually dangerous person to be supplied by stipulation. It is my view that this is not permissible under the required strict construction of the act relating to sexually dangerous persons. It has been held that proof of a mental disease that has existed for at least one year prior to the filing of a petition was essential to support a jury verdict finding the defendant to be a sexually dangerous person. People v. Sims, 382 Ill 472, 47 NE2d 703. In this case the finding was by the court based upon a stipulation that expanded psychiatric findings. The effect of the majority opinion is to permit of voluntary commitment as a sexually dangerous person. In the case of People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill2d 261, 139 NE2d 776, and in other cases, the most recent being People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill2d 306, 205 NE2d 625, the court has stated that in proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act the defendant must be accorded the essential protections available in a criminal trial and that the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act must be given a strict construction. The commencement of proceedings under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act is conditioned upon the existence of a criminal charge. After the filing of a petition provision is made for the court to appoint two “qualified psychiatrists” to make an examination of the defendant and to report the same to the court and to the defendant. Here, the psychiatrists were appointed prior to the filing of the petition. In order that a person be found to be a sexually dangerous person, it must be established that he is suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed for a period of at least one year immediately prior to the filing of the petition, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and these propensities must have been demonstrated toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children. This proceeding, then, is a judicial inquiry into the question of mental disorder and it has nothing to do with guilt or innocence, but only with the ascertainment of mental condition. It seems to me highly contrary to strict construction to permit one who is the subject of inquiry as to mental condition to supply, by way of stipulation, omitted but essential proof of the mental condition. The record in this case indicates that counsel for the defendant was under the erroneous impression that commitment as a sexually dangerous person would leave pending the criminal charge. It seems one of the motives for the stipulation and the resulting commitment as a sexually dangerous person was an understanding that the criminal charges then pending would be dismissed. Such dismissal is not discretionary, but rather dismissal of the underlying criminal charge is required upon cornmitment as a sexually dangerous person. (Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 38, par 105-9.) Commitment as a sexually dangerous person means not only a deprivation of liberty and incarceration not unlike incarceration upon conviction of a felony but carries with it the imposition of a label as a sexually dangerous person. The legislature has conditioned the imposing of such a label by requiring psychiatric testimony as to the existence of a mental condition as well as the other stated conditions precedent. See People v. Hampsten, 32 Ill2d 596, 208 NE2d 577 (1965). Since the finding of the court in this case could not be based upon such psychiatric testimony which, however fallible, is more certain as to mental condition than the stipulation of the one sought to be committed, the order of commitment should be reversed.