Court Opinion

ID: 9775737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:08:15.72583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.763933
License: Public Domain

BROOKSHIRE, Justice,
concurring.
Both parties clearly and unequivocally testified that Mr. Dawson had begun the purchase of property under a contract for deed. The contract for deed to several lots in a subdivision was executed at a time considerably prior to the marriage of the parties. Hence, the character of the property was established as being the separate real property of Mr. Dawson. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.1984). See also, Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.1977).
The separate real estate of Mr. Dawson was awarded to Mrs. Dawson, thus totally divesting Mr. Dawson of his title to his separate land. This award by the court was not correct. Eggemeyer, supra.
During the marriage, the community estate made substantial payments toward the purchase price of the lots.
The crucial question, here, is the proper measure of and the application for substantial reimbursements from community property funds to pay off a sizeable part of the purchase money on Mr. Dawson’s separate lots. The principles, generally, that govern reimbursement claims for prenuptial debts are not entirely settled. See Penick v. Penick, 32 Tex.Sup.Ct.Jour. 143, Dec. 14, 1988. The Supreme Court, in Penick, supra, wrote, in substance, that the confusion or uncertainty is, in part, attributable to the opinion in Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935) and Golden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943). The Dakan, supra, case provided that reimbursement for a purchase money advance should be at the cost to the contributing estate. The court, in Penick, supra, wrote, at page 144:
“[W]e have gleaned the following rules applicable to purchase money reimbursement claims. As a threshold requirement, it is typically held that the contributing estate need not show enhancement or the benefit of its contribution as a condition of reimbursement. See e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 713 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1986, no writ); Fyffe v. Fyffe, 670 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1984, writ dis’d w.o.j.). Instead, the payment by one marital estate of the debt of another creates a prima facie right of reimbursement.”
The court then reasoned and emphasized that reimbursement is an equitable claim. Therefore, a court, sitting in equity, is bound to look at all of the surrounding facts and circumstances and then determine what is fair, just and equitable.
In the last analysis, the Supreme Court announced that great latitude must be given to the trial court in applying equitable *952principles to evaluate a claim for reimbursement. Id. Lastly, in Penick, supra, the court wrote, at page 146:
“The discretion to be exercised in evaluating a claim for reimbursement is equally as broad as that discretion subsequently exercised by the trial court in making a ‘just and right’ division of the community property. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. sec. 3.63 (Vernon Supp.1988).”
Following Penick, supra, I join in the reversal and remand.