Court Opinion

ID: 9841232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 18:01:04.088779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:39.848147
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50904         Document: 00516903587             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/21/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                                                                         FILED
                                      No. 21-50904                              September 21, 2023
                                  consolidated with
                                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                      No. 21-50908
                                                                                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Martin Blas Cortez,

                                                                   Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeals from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                         USDC Nos. 7:16-CR-1, 7:20-CR-227-1

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge: *
          In July 2020, Odessa Police received a welfare call about an individual,
   Defendant Martin Cortez, seemingly asleep in a vehicle in a Denny’s
   restaurant parking lot. This call triggered an extended traffic stop of Cortez,
   culminating a search of the vehicle which revealed two bullets. Cortez, who
   was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition in

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), filed a motion to suppress challenging this
   search on the basis that the officers had unlawfully prolonged his detention
   without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied this motion and,
   following a bench trial, convicted Cortez. Cortez appeals the denial of his
   motion to suppress. For the reasons given below, we AFFIRM.
                                            I.
          The morning of July 18, 2020, a Saturday, Odessa Police Corporal
   Taylor Box was dispatched to a Denny’s restaurant parking lot to conduct a
   welfare check on a person passed out in a vehicle. Box arrived at 9:04 a.m.
   and encountered Defendant Martin Cortez asleep in the driver’s seat of a
   black Chevy pickup truck. The windows were darkly tinted—to the point
   where it affected Box’s ability to see into the car—and, as Box testified, not
   in compliance with Texas law. According to Box, when he first arrived at the
   Denny’s, he suspected that he could be dealing with an intoxicated subject
   who was trying to sleep it off.
          Box approached the vehicle and knocked on the driver’s side window,
   waking Cortez up. Box then asked Cortez to roll down his window, but Cortez
   refused; instead, he rolled the window down slightly, just enough to pass
   through a Texas identification card.
          After taking the identification card, Box requested that Cortez step
   out of the vehicle. Again, Cortez refused. At this point, Box requested
   assistance. A few minutes later, Corporal Reed Jones responded as backup,
   along with other officers.
          For almost ten more minutes, Cortez remained in the vehicle despite
   the officers’ repeated orders to exit. In the interim, the officers ran a warrant
   check on Cortez, and by 9:13 a.m., Box had confirmed that Cortez had no
   outstanding warrants. Although it is unclear exactly when, the officers would
   later learn, and Cortez confirm, that he had a history of drug possession

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   charges, had state and federal firearms offenses in his record, and was on
   active supervised release at the time of this stop.
            When an officer asked Cortez about his identification, Cortez did not
   have a driver’s license, only an identification card. According to Cortez, he
   was in the process of obtaining a driver’s license, but his application was
   complicated by the fact that he had several unpaid tickets. He admitted to
   driving without a license, saying that this was his only way to get to work.
            Because Cortez continued to refuse to leave the truck, the officers
   sought permission from a supervisor to break the truck’s driver’s side
   window and physically remove Cortez. That request was denied. Finally, at
   9:18 a.m., almost fifteen minutes after Box first approached, Cortez complied
   and exited the vehicle. The officers conducted a protective pat down and
   moved Cortez to the side of the truck.
            Cortez told the officers he had stayed late at a friend’s house the night
   before and had decided to rest at the Denny’s parking lot rather than drive
   home tired. Box stated that he intended to check if Cortez was intoxicated,
   as individuals in this situation (sleeping in a parking lot early on a Saturday
   morning) are often trying to sober up from the night before. Although Cortez
   protested that he neither drank nor did drugs, Box pointed out that Cortez
   had a history of drug possession charges. Cortez admitted that was true, but
   nevertheless maintained that he was currently sober. When asked by another
   officer if he was “out of the game now,” Cortez said that while he had, at
   some unspecified time in the past, failed a few drug tests and relapsed, he
   tried to get back on track. In response to further questions from the officers,
   Cortez admitted that he had been addicted to crack cocaine and previously
   used methamphetamine. Cortez, after being asked how long it had been since
   he had gotten clean, indicated that it had been “months” since he last used
   drugs.

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          Following these disclosures, an officer asked Cortez if there was
   anything illegal in the vehicle and requested his consent to search the truck.
   Cortez replied that there was nothing illegal in the truck and refused consent
   to the search. Cortez had prior federal and state gun felony convictions.
   Specifically, in 2016, Cortez had been convicted of being a felon in possession
   of a firearm and sentenced to 21-months’ imprisonment and three years of
   supervised release. Although Cortez’s supervised release commenced on
   May 8, 2017, Cortez was in state custody from May 8, 2017 until October 29,
   2018 in connection with a state conviction for possession of a controlled
   substance with intent to deliver and unlawful possession of a firearm by a
   felon. Cortez’s federal supervised release was not running for the over 17
   months he was in state custody. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e); United States v. Molina-
   Gazca, 571 F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Cortez’s supervised
   release end date was October 28, 2021, meaning that he was on supervised
   release when the instant offense occurred on July 18, 2020. The officers
   continued to press for consent and suggested that Cortez’s refusal could be
   a violation of his terms of supervised release.
          At 9:28 a.m. Box informed Cortez that he was not going to be arrested
   for the offense of driving without a license unless they witnessed him driving
   off from the parking lot. Similarly, an officer indicated that while the dark tint
   on the truck’s windows violated Texas law, Cortez would not be arrested at
   this time
          At 9:29 a.m., however, the officers realized that the registration sticker
   on the truck did not match the license plate. An officer ran the plates and
   discovered that the vehicle was reported as stolen. Believing that Cortez was
   driving a stolen vehicle, the officers handcuffed him. Cortez told the officers
   that the truck had been stolen from his family and that they had filed a police
   report for the theft, but that the truck had since been recovered. Cortez told
   the officers that he had been instructed to leave the registration sticker and

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   plates on the truck until he received replacements. By 9:41 a.m., the officers
   confirmed that Cortez’s mother was the owner of the vehicle, created an
   information report, and alerted Ward County to follow-up on the registration
   sticker.
          Next, Box returned turned to the still-active investigation into
   whether Cortez was intoxicated. Within a few minutes, no later than 9:47
   a.m., Box finished conducting field sobriety tests. Box observed no signs of
   intoxication.
          Following Box’s conclusion that Cortez was not intoxicated, Cortez
   remained handcuffed on the curb for just over ten minutes. At 9:59 a.m., Box
   moved Cortez from the curb into the back of a police car, explaining that he
   wanted to get Cortez out of the sun and into the air conditioning. When
   Cortez asked why he was still being detained, Box informed him that the
   officers were still looking into the registration sticker on the truck and that he
   had not complied with his parole.
          The other reason for the detention, Box told Cortez at 10:04 a.m., was
   that the officers were “calling canine” to conduct an open-air sniff of the
   truck. Brandon Upchurch, a K-9 handler with Ector County ISD Police who
   conducted the sniff test, testified that he was called sometime around 10:00
   a.m. According to Box, the officers suspected that there were drugs in the
   vehicle because Cortez kept refusing to consent to a search and had a history
   of being involved with narcotics. The canine sniff occurred at 10:12 a.m., and
   the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics on the driver’s side door.
          The officers then searched the vehicle. Although the search revealed
   no drugs, the officers discovered one .38 special caliber bullet and one .22
   caliber bullet located on the floorboard of the driver’s seat under a towel.
          Cortez was arrested and ultimately indicted on one count of being a
   felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

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   Additionally, Cortez’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke Cortez’s
   supervised release, alleging that Cortez violated the condition prohibiting
   him from committing a new offense.
          Cortez filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officers lacked
   consent to search the vehicle and that they did not have reasonable suspicion
   to prolong his detention to allow time for the K-9 unit to arrive. An
   evidentiary hearing was held in connection with this motion, at which Box,
   Jones, and Upchurch testified and video evidence from the officers’
   bodycams was introduced. The district court denied the motion, finding that
   the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend Cortez’s detention to wait for
   the dog.
          Thereafter, the district court conducted a bench trial at which the
   parties agreed that the ruling on the motion to suppress was viable for appeal.
   In a signed and admitted stipulation, the parties agreed to the existence of
   facts sufficient to establish a violation of § 922(g)(1) if the prolonged
   detention was legal. Cortez was convicted and sentenced to 30 months of
   imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Furthermore,
   the district court revoked Cortez’s supervised release and sentenced him to
   18 months of imprisonment with no additional term of supervision. Cortez
   timely filed notices of appeal in each case, and the cases have now been
   consolidated on appeal.
                                         II.
          Cortez challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that
   the officers detained him without reasonable suspicion beginning at 9:47

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   a.m., when the officers concluded their investigation into whether he was
   intoxicated.1
            When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we
   review its conclusions of law, including the determination as to the existence
   of reasonable suspicion, de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United
   States v. Freeman, 914 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2019). A factual finding is
   “clearly erroneous only if a review of the record leaves this Court with a
   definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United
   States v. Hearn, 563 F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted). And “[t]he clearly erroneous standard is particularly
   deferential where denial of the suppression motion is based on live oral
   testimony because the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
   the witness.” United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2010)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (cleaned up). Additionally,
   we “review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,”
   here, the Government. United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir.
   2005).
            The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against “unreasonable
   searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The stopping of a vehicle
   and detention of its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth
   Amendment.” United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004)
   (en banc). The legality of a traffic stop is analyzed under the standard first
   articulated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1 (1968). United
   States v. Smith, 952 F.3d 642, 647 (5th Cir. 2020). Under Terry, we “first
   examine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and then

            1
            Cortez concedes that reasonable suspicion supporting the stop existed before this
   time, and the Government does not contest that this is the relevant time period for
   purposes of this appeal.

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   inquire whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in
   scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.” United States v. Cavitt,
   550 F.3d 430, 435–36 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
          In the case of traffic stops, “[a]uthority for the seizure ends when
   tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
   completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). However,
   “additional investigation unrelated to the safe and responsible operation of
   the vehicle” is permissible only “if that investigation does not lengthen the
   driver’s detention or is supported by reasonable suspicion of additional
   criminal activity.” United States v. Reyes, 963 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2020),
   cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 861 (2020)). Thus, “if the officer develops reasonable
   suspicion of such activity in the course of the stop and before the initial
   purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, then the detention may continue until
   the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed.” Id. at 487–
   88 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).2
          To assess reasonable suspicion, courts “conduct[] a fact-intensive,
   totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.” United States v. Rodriguez, 564 F.3d
   735, 741 (5th Cir. 2009). Requiring “more than merely an unparticularized
   hunch,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), “[r]easonable
   suspicion exists when the detaining officer can point to specific and
   articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from those
   facts, reasonably warrant the . . . seizure.” United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341,
   352 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In

          2
              Here, although Cortez was in his parked car at the time of the initial police
   encounter, both parties and the district court treat his detention as a traffic stop,
   presumably because Cortez was initially suspected of driving while intoxicated and the
   officers later developed probable cause that he had driven without a license.

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   considering the totality of the circumstances, “[f]actors that ordinarily
   constitute innocent behavior may provide a composite picture sufficient to
   raise reasonable suspicion in the minds of experienced officers.” United
   States v. Cervantes, 797 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2015). In sum, “[r]easonable
   suspicion is a low threshold, requiring only a minimal level of objective
   justification.” United States v. Alvarez, 40 F.4th 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
          Cortez does not dispute that the officers reasonably pursued many
   points of suspicion throughout the first forty-three minutes of the stop,
   including Cortez’s illegally tinted windows, the possibility of trespass, his
   suspected intoxication, the false registration stickers on his truck, the report
   listing the vehicle as stolen, his lack of a valid driver’s license, a potential
   supervised release violation, his admitted recent drug use, and his felony
   convictions. Still, Cortez contests that under the Fourth Amendment, it was
   unreasonable to prolong his detention while waiting for a K-9 unit to conduct
   a drug sniff.
          Upon review of the record, we find no error. To begin, it is undisputed
   that throughout these twenty-five minutes, the officers had probable cause to
   arrest Cortez for two separate state offenses—the unlawful tint on the
   truck’s windows and his admission that he had driven without a license.
   Although we do not embrace the Government’s argument that Rodriguez is
   inapposite when probable cause to arrest exists, we recognize that these
   factors are nonetheless relevant to Rodriguez’s reasonable suspicion analysis.
   Thus, we consider the truck’s darkly tinted windows and Cortez’s illegal
   driving only insofar as they help raise the officers’ suspicion to “more than a
   hunch.” Allen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2016).
          Additionally, Cortez initially refused to exit his vehicle or to even roll
   down his tinted windows so that the officers could see into the truck. Indeed,

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   it took almost fifteen minutes—to the point where the officers were
   considering breaking the window—for Cortez to comply with the officers’
   instructions. Even considering that Cortez subsequently exited the vehicle,
   this refusal supports the officers’ suspicion that Cortez was hiding something
   illegal in his truck. See Reyes, 963 F.3d at 488–89 (listing a defendant’s initial
   refusal to exit her truck as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion).
          Finally, and importantly, during the stop Cortez confirmed his
   criminal history, which included multiple arrests for drug possession as well
   as state and federal felony convictions, and his current supervised release
   status, and admitted that he had abused drugs as recently as several months
   ago. This history and the considerations described above are enough to
   demonstrate that the officers had “more than a hunch” that Cortez
   possessed drugs. The district court did not err in denying the motion to
   suppress.
                                          III.
          We AFFIRM the district court.

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