Court Opinion

ID: 993603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:10:10.433302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:45.234692
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: LEONARD DARNELL COX,
Debtor.

LEONARD DARNELL COX,
                                                                No. 96-2695
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARION ARNELL MITCHELL,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-96-2512-AW, BK-95-17515-PM, AP-96-1095)

Submitted: October 28, 1997

Decided: November 26, 1997

Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS,
Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Beverly A. Moses, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Carl V.
Angelis, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Leonard Cox appeals the district court's order granting his former
wife Marian Mitchell's motion to dismiss an appeal from the bank-
ruptcy court as interlocutory. This court may exercise jurisdiction
only over final orders,1 and certain interlocutory and collateral orders,2
and the order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable
interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss Cox's
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Mitchell filed an action in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia seeking to amend the parties' judgment of divorce to reflect
her entitlement to a portion of Cox's military retirement pension.
After the motion was denied, Mitchell appealed to the D.C. Court of
Appeals. Meanwhile, Cox filed for bankruptcy, thus automatically
staying Mitchell's appeal. Mitchell filed a complaint in bankruptcy
court seeking to have her interest in Cox's pension declared nondis-
chargeable and to lift the stay in the D.C. Court of Appeals. The bank-
ruptcy court agreed to lift the stay so that the D.C. Court of Appeals
could determine whether Mitchell had an interest in the pension. Cox
appealed the bankruptcy court's order to the district court which dis-
missed it as interlocutory. Cox now appeals the district court's dis-
missal to this Court.

As a general rule, a final judgment under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 (1994)
is "one which ends the litigation . . . and leaves nothing for the court
to do but execute the judgment."3 In contrast, an interlocutory order
is one which does not finally determine a cause of action but only
_________________________________________________________________
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
3 Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).

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decides some intervening matter pertaining to the cause, and which
requires further steps to be taken to enable the court to adjudicate the
cause on the merits.4 The bankruptcy court's order lifting the auto-
matic stay of Mitchell's legal proceedings in the D.C. Court of
Appeals is not a final order because it does not resolve the litigation,
decide the merits, settle liability, establish damages, or even deter-
mine the rights of any party to Cox's bankruptcy case.5 Notwithstand-
ing the liberal interpretation of finality often applied to bankruptcy
appeals,6 the order appealed by Cox is clearly interlocutory in nature
as the bankruptcy judge made clear in his order that the bankruptcy
court retained jurisdiction to determine the issue of dischargability.

Because Cox's appeal to the district court was interlocutory, the
district court's decision is not a reviewable final order; therefore,
Cox's appeal of the district court's order to this court is dismissed as
interlocutory.7 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
_________________________________________________________________
4 See In re Abingdon Realty Corp. , 634 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1980).
5 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay , 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
6 See A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin , 788 F.2d 994, 1009 (4th Cir. 1986).
7 See In re Looney, 823 F.2d 788, 791 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987).

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