Court Opinion

ID: 9477835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:32:43.122866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:04.790797
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In my view, the AU’s opinion denying benefits embodies a correct application of the legal principles that control this case and is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. I would affirm, and thus, I dissent.
The court determines a remand is required here solely because “the AU failed to recognize and to apply the proper allocation of the burden of proof.” Ante at 426. I continue to believe we should not automatically return cases to the district court due to a failure of the AU expressly to state the burden of proof has been shifted to the Secretary. See Ulrick v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 1381, 1383 (8th Cir.1985) (Fagg, J., dissenting). When reviewing the decision of a district court, detailed discussion of the applicable burdens of proof is not required when the appellate court is able to ascertain whether the appropriate rule was in fact recognized and applied. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 603 & n. 1 (7th Cir.1985). Requiring more from AUs makes unwarranted work for the judicial system and the agency, places a premium on mechanical compliance, and creates the risk of an appellate decision that “exalt[s] form over substance.” Ulrick, 780 F.2d at 1383 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
In this case the Secretary concedes Butler cannot do his past relevant work. Under the established pattern of proof, the burden then shifts to the Secretary to show Butler has the capacity to perform other jobs in the national economy that are available to him. Although the AU did not expressly state the shift took place, he evaluated the evidence on this point, including the credibility of Butler’s complaints of *430pain. He then concluded Butler remains able to do light work and thus, is not disabled under the regulations. The record contains substantial evidence supporting this conclusion, and when considered from this perspective, I believe the AU’s decision contains no reversible error in the application of the burden of proof.
The court makes a similar misstep when it concludes “the AU’s decision [is also] inconsistent with the [e]ourt’s mandate in Polaski.” Ante at 429. I recognize Pola-ski is the controlling authority on the required procedure for evaluating Butler’s complaints of pain. I believe, however, it is clear the ALJ was equally aware of Polo-ski’s holding and significance.
As with the district courts, we should not reverse a thorough administrative decision merely because the AU did not, in litany fashion, make “a particularized finding on each piece of evidence presented by the parties,” White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 845 F.2d 1497, 1499 (8th Cir.1988), if that decision is stated “so that the parties and reviewing court understand what [has been] decided and why,” id. Here, the AU’s opinion lists verbatim each of the factors required by Polaski to be considered. The opinion then states Butler’s “subjective complaints of pain * * * have been fully evaluated in accordance with the standard in Polaski v. Heckler and the Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984.” These specific statements, combined with the court’s own acknowledgment that “there is evidence on the record of each [Polaski ] factor,” ante at 429, clearly shows the AU not only evaluated the record with the Polaski factors in mind, but also had before him ample evidence from which to draw the conclusion he did concerning Butler’s claims of pain.
The AU fully analyzed the objective medical evidence and the subjective aspects of Butler’s complaints, but also determined “[Butler’s] testimony regarding [his limitations] * * * lack[ed] credibility.” Merely because the AU exercised his judgment in the face of “conflicting evidence in the record,” ante at 427, and concluded not all of Butler’s allegations of pain were credible does not mean the AU “strict0y] reli[ed] on objective medical evidence,” Beeler v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 124, 127 (8th Cir.1987), or improperly “reject[ed] subjective complaints [of pain] solely because of lack of objective medical evidence,” id.; see ante at 429. In my opinion, it is self-evident the AU’s analysis of the pain component of Butler’s condition included a weighing of the Polaski criteria and resulted in a decision that is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
In sum, by failing to look up from its appellate microscope, the court has ordered a reversal that requires nothing more than an articulation of standards already implicit in the decision we are asked to consider. In my view, compliance by the AU with the court’s directives will add nothing to this case, and the items deemed necessary for correction on remand do not prevent us from now making a meaningful review of Butler’s claims.
Because I believe the AU’s opinion not only provides an adequate basis for review but is entirely supported by substantial evidence, I would affirm.