Court Opinion

ID: 9951124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 17:01:17.613696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:17.051805
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOUG SMITH; ROBERT GRIFFIN;               No. 22-35612
ALLEN VEZEY; ALBERT
HAYNES; TREVOR SHAW;                     D.C. No. 3:22-cv-
FAMILIES OF THE LAST                       00077-SLG
FRONTIER; ALASKA FREE
MARKET COALITION,
                                            OPINION
       Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 v.

ANNE HELZER, in her official
capacity as chair of the Alaska Public
Offices Commission; LANETTE
BLODGETT; RICHARD STILLIE,
Jr.; SUZANNE HANCOCK; DAN
LASOTA, official capacities as
members of the Alaska Public Offices
Commissions,

       Defendants-Appellees,

ALASKANS FOR BETTER
ELECTIONS, INC.,

       Intervenor-Defendant-
       Appellee.
2                         SMITH V. HELZER

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the District of Alaska
      Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted February 9, 2023
                      Portland, Oregon

                      Filed March 15, 2024

    Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Danielle J.
          Forrest and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges.

               Opinion by Chief Judge Murguia;
    Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Forrest

                          SUMMARY *

            First Amendment/Campaign Finance

    The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction sought by five individual donors and
two independent-expenditure organizations who sued the
Alaska Public Offices Commission (“Commission”)
alleging that certain campaign finance regulations, enacted
after Alaska voters passed Ballot Measure 2 to illuminate the
use of dark money in their state’s elections, facially violated
the First Amendment.

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                       SMITH V. HELZER                     3

    Plaintiffs challenged two campaign finance regulations:
(1) the individual-donor contribution-reporting requirement,
which generally requires the reporting within twenty-four
hours of contributions that exceed an annual aggregate of
$2,000 to an entity making expenditures for a candidate in
prior or current election cycles, and a sub-part of the
contribution-reporting      requirement     providing    that
contributors must report the true sources of the
contributions; and (2) the on-ad donor-disclaimer
requirement for political advertisements, which requires the
disclosure of certain identifying information about donors in
any communications intended to influence the election of a
candidate.
    The panel first held that, assuming this appeal would
otherwise be moot because the 2022 general election has
already taken place, the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-
review exception applies.
    The panel held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it concluded that the contribution-reporting
and on-ad donor-disclaimer requirements were substantially
related and narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted
interest in providing the electorate with accurate, real-time
information.
    Because both the contribution-reporting and donor-
disclaimer requirements were regulations directed only at
disclosure of political speech, they were subject to exacting
scrutiny. Plaintiffs conceded that the government’s interest
in an informed electorate was “sufficiently important” in the
campaign finance context to warrant disclosure
requirements and satisfied the first prong of the exacting
scrutiny test.
4                      SMITH V. HELZER

    The panel rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the
contribution-reporting requirement was not narrowly
tailored. The requirement was not duplicative of existing
criminal laws because the covered donations were outside
the limited reach of the criminal laws and were not
unconstitutionally redundant. Moreover, nothing in the
record indicated that compliance with the reporting structure
was overly burdensome.
     Applying the holdings and reasonings in No on E v. Chiu,
85 F.4th 493 (9th Cir. 2023), the panel rejected plaintiffs’
arguments that the on-ad donor-disclaimer requirement was
not narrowly tailored because it added marginal additional
value while imposing a substantial cost on the speaker and
took up too much space and time on political
advertisements. The panel further rejected plaintiffs’
argument that the disclaimer requirement for organizations
that receive most of their contributions from sources outside
of Alaska was unconstitutionally discriminatory. Nothing in
the outside-entity disclaimer restricts out-of-state speakers’
speech. Rather, the disclaimer only requires that
organizations communicate whether most of their
contributions came from outside Alaska—information that
is already validly disclosed to the Commission.
    Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Forrest
agreed with the majority that this case is not moot but for a
different reason: The challenged provisions of Ballot
Measure 2 continue to be enforceable in the present, and
plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer the
constitutionally sufficient injury of self-censorship. Judge
Forrest also agreed that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding at this preliminary stage that
plaintiffs failed to show they were likely to succeed in
establishing that Ballot Measure 2’s on-ad disclaimers failed
                      SMITH V. HELZER                     5

under exacting scrutiny. Judge Forrest disagreed, however,
that plaintiffs’ challenge to Ballot Measure 2’s individual-
donor     reporting     requirement    was    unlikely    to
succeed. Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that
the duplicative individual-donor contribution-reporting
requirement failed to satisfy exacting scrutiny because the
burdens it imposes are not in proportion to the interest
served.

                       COUNSEL

Daniel R. Suhr (argued) and Reilly Stephens, Liberty Justice
Center, Chicago, Illinois; Craig W. Richards, Law Offices of
Craig Richards, Anchorage, Alaska; for Plaintiffs-
Appellants.
Scott M. Kendall (argued) and Jahna M. Lindemuth,
Cashion Gilmore & Lindemuth, Anchorage, Alaska, for
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee Alaskans for Better
Elections, Inc.
Laura Fox (argued), Jessica M. Alloway, and Kimberly D.
Rodgers, Assistant Attorneys General, Alaska Office of the
Attorney General, Department of Law, Anchorage, Alaska;
for Defendants-Appellees.
6                      SMITH V. HELZER

                         OPINION

MURGUIA, Chief Circuit Judge:

    “Sunlight,” the Supreme Court has recognized, is “the
best of disinfectants” in elections. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Louis D. Brandeis,
Other People’s Money 62 (1933)). To illuminate the use of
dark money in their state’s elections, Alaska voters enacted
by ballot measure certain campaign-finance regulations.
Five individual donors and two independent-expenditure
organizations then sued the members of the Alaska Public
Offices Commission (“Commission”)—the agency charged
with administering the state’s campaign-finance laws—
alleging that three of these regulations facially violate the
First Amendment. The district court denied plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that they
failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of
their claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) and reviewing the denial of a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion, No on E v. Chiu, 85 F.4th
493, 497 (9th Cir. 2023), we affirm.
                              I
    On November 3, 2020, Alaska voters made three
“sweeping changes to Alaska’s system of elections” by
approving the “Alaska’s Better Elections Initiative” (“Ballot
Measure 2”). Kohlhaas v. State, 518 P.3d 1095, 1100
(Alaska 2022). Ballot Measure 2 (1) “repealed the existing
system of party primaries in favor of an open primary”;
(2) “adopted ranked-choice voting for the general election”;
and (3) implemented a series of amendments to Alaska’s
campaign-finance laws that “addressed the use of ‘dark
money’ in elections.” Id. at 1101. In Kohlhaas, the Alaska
                            SMITH V. HELZER                              7

Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of
the first two changes, id. at 1100–01; we now consider the
constitutionality of a subset of the third.
    At the district court, plaintiffs challenged three of Ballot
Measure 2’s campaign-finance regulations: (1) the
individual-donor      contribution-reporting       requirement,
Alaska Stat. § 15.13.040(r); (2) the true-source requirement,
id. §§ 15.13.040(r) & 15.13.400(19); and (3) the on-ad
donor-disclaimer requirement for political advertisements,
id. § 15.13.090.
    Under the contribution-reporting requirement, any donor
who “contributes more than $2,000 in the aggregate in a
calendar year to an entity” that either (1) “made . . .
independent expenditures” in candidate elections in the
previous or current election cycle or (2) “the contributor
knows or has reason to know is likely to make independent
expenditures . . . in the current election cycle” must report
that contribution to the Commission within twenty-four
hours. 1 Id. § 15.13.040(r). Failing to report such a
contribution subjects the contributor to “a civil penalty of not

1
   In this context, subject to some exclusions, a contribution is any
“purchase, payment, promise or obligation to pay, loan or loan
guarantee, deposit or gift of money, goods, or services for which charge
is ordinarily made, and includes the payment by a person other than a
candidate or political party, or compensation for the personal services of
another person” that is “made for the purpose of,” among other things,
“influencing the nomination or election of a candidate[.]” Alaska Stat.
§ 15.13.400(4). Similarly, an independent expenditure is “a purchase or
a transfer of money or anything of value, or promise or agreement to [do
so], incurred or made for the purpose of” among other things,
“influencing the nomination or election of a candidate” and “that is made
without the direct or indirect consultation or cooperation with, or at the
suggestion or the request of, or with the prior consent of, a candidate” or
their agents. Id. §§ 15.13.400(7), (11).
8                       SMITH V. HELZER

more than $1,000 a day for each day the delinquency
continues.” Id. § 15.13.390(a)(2).
    The true-source requirement—which is a subpart of the
contribution-reporting        requirement—provides          that
contributors must “report and certify the true sources of the
contribution, and intermediaries, if any” and “provide the
identity of the true source to the recipient of the contribution
simultaneously with providing the contribution itself.” Id.
§ 15.13.040(r).      Any “person or legal entity whose
contribution is funded from wages, investment income,
inheritance, or revenue generated from selling goods or
services” is that contribution’s true source.                 Id.
§ 15.13.400(19). So a contributor “who derived funds via
contributions, donations, dues, or gifts is not the true source,
but rather an intermediary for the true source.” Id.
      Finally, the donor-disclaimer requirement mandates that
any communication intended to influence the election of a
candidate contain an easily discernible on-ad disclaimer.
See id. § 15.13.090. Since 2010, that disclaimer has required
(1) the name and title of the speaking entity’s principal
officer; (2) a statement from that principal officer approving
the communication; and (3) “identification of the name and
city and state of residence or principal place of business, as
applicable, of each of the person’s three largest contributors
. . . during the 12-month period before the date of the
communication.” Id. Ballot Measure 2 amended the donor-
disclaimer requirement to include that, if the entity
communicating is an independent-expenditure organization
that “received more than 50 percent of its aggregate
contributions” during the previous 12-month period “from
true sources . . . who, at the time of the contribution, resided
or had their principal place of business outside Alaska,” the
communication must disclaim that a majority of
                        SMITH V. HELZER                       9

contributions to the entity came from outside the State of
Alaska. See id. § 15.13.400(15).
    Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin all three
requirements, alleging that having to comply with these
regulations in advance of the 2022 general election would
irreparably harm their First Amendment rights. The district
court denied the motion, finding that plaintiffs failed to
establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.
Plaintiffs now timely appeal the district court’s denial of that
motion only as to the contribution-reporting and donor-
disclaimer requirements.
                              II
    In their merits briefing before this court, plaintiffs
reiterated that their claims for relief were rooted in their
desire and right to “participate fully in the November 2022
election . . . without these unconstitutional impositions.”
While this appeal was pending, the 2022 general election
took place. We therefore ordered the parties to file
simultaneous supplemental briefing to address, among other
things, whether this preliminary-injunction appeal must be
dismissed as moot for want of jurisdiction.
    “An interlocutory appeal of the denial of a preliminary
injunction is moot when a court can no longer grant any
effective relief sought in the injunction request.” Akina v.
Hawaii, 835 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2016). That is, such
an “interlocutory appeal may be moot even though the
underlying case still presents a live controversy.” Id. Put
simply, when the event from which plaintiffs’ alleged
irreparable harm “flow[s]” has “concluded” or “taken
place,” the appeal—but not necessarily the underlying
dispute—is moot. See In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 648 F.3d 1012, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
10                         SMITH V. HELZER

And “when an appeal is moot, we lack jurisdiction and must
dismiss” it. Ahlman v. Barnes, 20 F.4th 489, 493 (9th Cir.
2021) (cleaned up).
    We nevertheless retain jurisdiction over otherwise moot
disputes that are capable of repetition yet evade review.
Akina, 835 F.3d at 1011. This exception is used “sparingly,”
Protectmarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827,
836–37 (9th Cir. 2014), and “is reserved for extraordinary
cases in which (1) the duration of the challenged action is
too short to be fully litigated before it ceases, and (2) there
is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will be
subjected to the same action again,” Akina, 835 F.3d at 1011
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Election cases often
fall within this exception, because the inherently brief
duration of an election is almost invariably too short to
enable full litigation on the merits.” Porter v. Jones, 319
F.3d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 2003).
    Assuming that this appeal would otherwise be moot, we
conclude that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review
exception applies. 2 This case, like the many others
involving facial challenges to election laws and campaign-
finance regulations, is exceptional. In Alaska Right to Life
Committee v. Miles, we held that a facial First Amendment
challenge to Alaska campaign-finance-disclosure laws was
“not moot simply because the . . . election ha[d] come and
gone.” 441 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2006). There, “[t]he
provisions of Alaska law challenged by [the plaintiff]

2
  The partial dissent maintains that the appeal is not moot because “the
challenged regulations remain in effect” and therefore “we can still grant
effective relief.” But we cannot grant any relief that would address
plaintiffs’ concerns about irreparable harm around the 2022 election,
which formed the basis of the preliminary injunction motion.
                        SMITH V. HELZER                      11

remain[ed] in place, and there [wa]s sufficient likelihood
that [the plaintiff would] again be required to comply with
them that its appeal [wa]s not moot.” Id. at 779–80. So too
here.
                              III
    This appeal presents questions central to our rights as
American citizens. But because of its interlocutory nature,
we are restricted in our ability to “assist in the final
resolution of the critical issues before the district court.”
Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 1983). Our
review at this stage is “much more limited than review of an
order granting or denying a permanent injunction.” Id. at
724. When all evidence is taken and considered, the district
court’s findings and conclusions may differ from its
preliminary order—as may our view of them. Because our
analysis is confined and the factual record yet to be fully
developed, “our disposition of appeals from most
preliminary injunctions provides little guidance on the
appropriate resolution of the merits.” Id. And once we have
disposed of this appeal, the district court will render a final
judgment on the merits, after which the losing party may
appeal again. Id.
                              IV
      “The grant or denial of a motion for a preliminary
injunction lies within the discretion of the district court. Its
order granting or denying the injunction will be reversed
only if the district court abused its discretion.” Zepeda, 753
F.2d at 724. And an abuse of discretion occurs only when
the district court fails to “employ the appropriate legal
standards[,]” misapprehends the law, or “rests its decision
. . . on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. at 724–25.
“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when ‘the reviewing
12                      SMITH V. HELZER

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. at 725
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). We are “not empowered to substitute
[our] judgment for that” of the district court, so “we will not
reverse the district court’s order simply because we would
have reached a different result.” Id.
    A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy
never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). In Winter, the Supreme Court
held that, to obtain an injunction, plaintiffs “must establish
that [they are] likely to succeed on the merits, that [they are]
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [their]
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at
20. But “[w]here, as here, the government opposes a
preliminary injunction, the third and fourth factors merge
into one inquiry.” Porretti v. Dzurenda, 11 F.4th 1037, 1047
(9th Cir. 2021).
                               A
    To show a likelihood of success on the merits “in the
First Amendment context, the moving party bears the initial
burden of making a colorable claim that its First Amendment
rights have been infringed, or are threatened with
infringement, at which point the burden shifts to the
government to justify the restriction on speech.” Cal.
Chamber of Com. v. Council for Educ. & Rsch. on Toxics,
29 F.4th 468, 478 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up), cert. denied,
143 S. Ct. 1749 (2023). Plaintiffs here facially challenge the
contribution-reporting and donor-disclaimer requirements,
alleging that these regulations impermissibly burden their
First Amendment right to free speech. Facial challenges are
                        SMITH V. HELZER                      13

“disfavored,” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008), and “are the most difficult
to mount successfully,” City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576
U.S. 409, 415 (2015) (cleaned up). In the First Amendment
context, a facial challenge is colorable if plaintiffs show that
“a substantial number of [the regulations’] applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to [their] plainly
legitimate sweep.” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141
S. Ct. 2373, 2387 (2021) (quoting United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010)). The Supreme Court has
cautioned courts “not to go beyond the [regulations’] facial
requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or
‘imaginary’ cases.” Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449–
50 (citation omitted).
    Because both the contribution-reporting and donor-
disclaimer requirements are “regulations directed only at
disclosure of political speech,” they are subject to exacting
scrutiny, which is a “somewhat less rigorous judicial
review” than strict scrutiny. Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rts., Inc. v.
Mangan, 933 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis
omitted); No on E, 85 F.4th at 503 (collecting cases in which
we and the Supreme Court have applied exacting scrutiny to
disclaimer and disclosure requirements). Once the movants
establish a colorable First Amendment challenge to the
regulations, exacting scrutiny demands that the government
show that it has (1) a sufficiently important interest (2) to
which the challenged regulations are substantially related
and narrowly tailored. Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S.
Ct. at 2383. “To withstand [exacting] scrutiny, the strength
of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of
the actual burden on First Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010)). Unlike strict
scrutiny, however, “exacting scrutiny does not require that
14                         SMITH V. HELZER

disclosure regimes be the least restrictive means of achieving
their ends.” Id. Narrow tailoring in this context therefore
“require[s] a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interest served.” Id. at 2384 (quoting McCutcheon v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 218 (2014)).
    In sum, to succeed on appeal, plaintiffs must show that
the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that
the      contribution-reporting       and    donor-disclaimer
requirements were each substantially related and narrowly
tailored to the government’s asserted interest. Because we
conclude that plaintiffs have not met this heavy burden, we
affirm the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction. In so doing, we do not reach the
remaining Winter factors, which were not passed upon by
the district court and are unnecessary to our holding.
                                  B
    Defendants assert, and plaintiffs concede, that the
government’s interest in an informed electorate is
“sufficiently important” in the campaign finance context to
warrant disclosure requirements and satisfy the first prong of
the exacting scrutiny test. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
long made that clear. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67,
84 (upholding disclosure requirements and noting that
providing the electorate information regarding campaign
finance serves various governmental interests). 3 So have

3
  See also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 369
(2010) (finding the public’s “informational interest” in “knowing who is
speaking about a candidate shortly before an election” sufficient to
                            SMITH V. HELZER                             15

we. See, e.g., No on E, 85 F.4th at 505 (“We have repeatedly
recognized an important (and even compelling)
informational interest in requiring ballot measure
committees to disclose information about contributions.”
(cleaned up)). 4
    With this important informational interest firmly in
mind, we turn to its relationship with Alaska’s contribution-
reporting and donor-disclaimer requirements. For these
regulations to survive exacting scrutiny, they must be
substantially related to the interest and reasonably narrowly
tailored to serving it. No on E, 85 F.4th at 504. We address
these interrelated considerations, taking each of the two
challenged requirements in turn.
                                    1
   Plaintiffs do not contest that the individual-donor
contribution-reporting requirement is substantially related to

support law requiring disclosure of funding sources); McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (recognizing “providing the
electorate with information” as an “important state interest[]”), overruled
on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
4
  See also Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs & Fair Competition v. Norris,
782 F.3d 520, 540 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[T]he government’s
interests in electoral integrity and in providing voters with
information . . . constitute a sufficiently important governmental interest
to which the . . . disclosure requirement bears a substantial relation.”
(cleaned up)); Human Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d
990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding disclosure laws because
“[p]roviding information to the electorate is vital” and “by revealing
information about the contributors to and participants in public discourse
and debate, disclosure laws help ensure that voters have the facts they
need to evaluate the various messages competing for their attention”);
Alaska Right to Life, 441 F.3d at 793 (“[W]e believe that there is a
compelling state interest in informing voters who or what entity is trying
to persuade them to vote in a certain way.”).
16                         SMITH V. HELZER

the state’s asserted informational interest. Rather, they argue
only that the requirement is not narrowly tailored. Plaintiffs
reason that the requirement is (1) duplicative of existing
criminal laws and reporting required by recipient
organizations, and (2) too burdensome. The district court
rejected both arguments as unpersuasive. We agree with the
district court and conclude that the contribution-reporting
requirement is both substantially related and narrowly
tailored to the government’s interest in providing the
electorate with accurate, real-time information.
    First, plaintiffs argue that because existing criminal laws
prohibit making and receiving straw-donor contributions,5
donations not made by true sources are illegal and reporting
them would make little sense. Putting aside that this
argument goes more to the true-source requirement—from
which plaintiffs “do not seek relief . . . in this preliminary
appeal”—violation of the criminal regulation that plaintiffs
cite requires the offender to intend to make a straw-donor
contribution, for example, by directing another to make the
contribution or reimbursing them for doing so. See Alaska
Admin. Code tit. 2, § 50.258(a).              The challenged
contribution-reporting requirement, on the other hand,
requires disclosure of contributions regardless of whether
they were made at the true source’s behest.                 The
contribution-reporting requirement therefore covers
donations outside the limited reach of the criminal law.

5
  “A straw donor contribution is an indirect contribution from A, through
B, to the campaign. It occurs when A solicits B to transmit funds to a
campaign in B’s name, subject to A’s promise to advance or reimburse
the funds to B.” United States v. O’Donnell, 608 F.3d 546, 549 (9th Cir.
2010). “[S]traw donor schemes . . . facilitate attempts by an individual
(or campaign) to thwart disclosure requirements and contribution limits.”
Id.
                             SMITH V. HELZER                               17

    Nor is the contribution-reporting requirement
unconstitutionally redundant.        As the district court
recognized, the reporting requirements for contributors and
recipient organizations “overlap[] . . . but [are] not
completely duplicative of” one another, especially because
the “contributor will always be in a better position . . . to both
identify the true source of its own contribution and quickly
report it.” The individual-donor contribution-reporting
requirement works in concert with the recipient
independent-expenditure organizations’ disclosures to the
Commission, helping to ensure that the information received
by voters is reliable and accurate. As we emphasized in
Brumsickle, “[a]ccess to reliable information becomes even
more important as more speakers, more speech—and thus
more spending—enter the marketplace, which is precisely
what has occurred in recent years.” 624 F.3d at 1007
(emphasis added). Prompt disclosure by both sides of a
transaction ensures that the electorate receives the most
helpful information in the lead up to an election. 6
   Plaintiffs attempt to analogize this case to McCutcheon
and Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate,

6
  Indeed, the district court found that “requiring prompt disclosure by
both parties maximizes the likelihood of prompt and accurate reporting
of the information when it is most useful to the electorate,” and that “the
donor disclosure requirement is closely tailored to providing valuable
funding information to the State and its citizens.” Although the partial
dissent questions “whether any marginal increase in the reliability and
accuracy of information justifies the reporting burden placed on
individual donors,” we are “not empowered to substitute [our] judgment
for that” of the district court.” Zepeda, 754 F.2d at 725. Because the
district court did not “apply incorrect substantive law” or make “a clearly
erroneous finding of fact that is material to the decision,” id., the district
court’s analysis of the contribution-reporting requirement does not
amount to an abuse of discretion.
18                         SMITH V. HELZER

142 S. Ct. 1638 (2022), but neither applies here because
those cases considered redundant contribution limits, not
disclosure requirements. In McCutcheon, the Supreme
Court invalidated a “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis
approach” to contribution limits in which a federal law
targeting quid pro quo corruption in electioneering had
restricted both the amount that a single donor could
contribute to a candidate or committee and the amount that
the donor could contribute in total to all candidates and
committees. 572 U.S. at 221 (quoting Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 479
(2007)). And in Cruz, the Court similarly rejected a
prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach that limited the use
of post-election contributions to repay loans the candidate
made to his campaign committee. 142 S. Ct. at 1652–53.
But the Supreme Court in Citizens United recognized a stark
contrast between contribution limits and disclosure
requirements. 558 U.S. at 366–67. Disclosure requirements,
unlike contribution limits, “may burden the ability to speak,
but they impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities”
and do not “prevent anyone from speaking,” so they may “be
justified based on a governmental interest in providing the
electorate with information about the sources of election-
related spending.” Id. (cleaned up). That is precisely the
case here. 7

7
  Plaintiffs’ reliance on Americans for Prosperity Foundation also fails.
That case involved neither public disclosure of information nor
electioneering; rather, it arose in the context of a California law that
required all 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations to report confidentially
their top donors to the state Attorney General each year. 141 S. Ct. at
2379–80. The government justified this broad disclosure by asserting
that disclosure prevented charity fraud and self-dealing, but the record
                            SMITH V. HELZER                              19

    Second, plaintiffs insist that the contribution-reporting
requirement places an onerous burden on “everyday
Americans” because it demands that the contributor know
that they are required to report at all times and because the
time in which to file a report—twenty-four hours—is too
short. These burdens on the contributor do not cross the line
into unconstitutionality.
    Partly because of the posture of this appeal, and partly
because plaintiffs failed to introduce any such evidence,
there is nothing in the record to indicate that compliance with
the reporting structure has been overly burdensome.
Plaintiffs do not raise concerns about “technological literacy
and internet access” discussed in the partial dissent. Nor
have plaintiffs provided any evidence that the “everyday”
American they repeatedly describe contributes $2,000 or
more per calendar year to a single independent-expenditure
organization such that the threshold is unconstitutionally
overinclusive. Defendants may be correct that these are
“major” contributors, not unsophisticated parties, but at the
very least, the threshold is reasonably tailored to weed out
contributors with de minimis involvement with the recipient
organization. Regardless, because we cannot consider
“‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’” cases to sustain a facial

showed that the information gathered was almost never used for any sort
of investigative purpose. Id. at 2385–87. The Supreme Court held that
“[i]n reality . . . California’s interest is less in investigating fraud and
more in ease of administration.” Id. at 2387. This interest could not
satisfy exacting scrutiny. Id. But, of course, neither fraud deterrence nor
administrative ease is the interest the government asserts here. The
informational interest—specific and central to the public’s well-
recognized stake in the factual circumstances of political advertising—
justifies the limited disclosures mandated by the contribution-reporting
requirement.
20                         SMITH V. HELZER

challenge, 8 we conclude that plaintiffs have failed to show
that a substantial number of the applications of the
contribution-reporting requirement are unconstitutional in
relation to the law’s “plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State
Grange, 552 U.S. at 449–50; see also Ams. for Prosperity
Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2387.
    As the district court found, Ballot Measure 2’s reporting
mechanism is relatively simple and “straightforward.”
Contributors who hit the $2,000 threshold must fill out a
short online form that asks for the amount of the triggering
contribution, the aggregate total amount of their
contributions, the name of the recipient independent-
expenditure organization, and, if the donor is not the true
source of the funds, the true source’s identity and the
identities of any intermediaries. The process is even easier
when the donor is the true source of the funds—as plaintiffs
claim they “always” are for their donations. As at least one
of our sister circuits has held, the simplicity of an online
form and the required promptness of the disclosure both
advance the state’s interest in providing real-time and
accurate information about electioneering communications.
See Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576,
595 (8th Cir. 2013) (“With modern technology, the burden
of completing the short, electronic form within two days of
making a $750 expenditure is not onerous.”). Without any
evidence tending to show that the deadline or this brief
online form—which could easily be filled out concurrently
with an online donation or momentarily after signing a
check—is unduly burdensome, we are not persuaded that the

8
 Plaintiffs raise several such hypotheticals in their briefing, including
ones they concede are “far-fetched.”
                           SMITH V. HELZER                            21

district court’s findings and conclusions about its likely
constitutionality were erroneous. 9
    Similarly, exacting scrutiny simply requires that the
threshold at which contributions are disclosed be reasonably
narrowly tailored to fit the state’s interest. As the Supreme
Court noted in Buckley, this line is “necessarily a judgmental
decision, best left” to the discretion of the legislature, here
the people of Alaska. 424 U.S. at 83. Because “[t]he
acceptable threshold for triggering reporting requirements
need not be high,” we have routinely upheld reporting
thresholds much lower than the $2,000-per-calendar-year
one here. Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rts., 933 F.3d at 1118 (citing
cases upholding reporting thresholds as low as $100). On
this record, we uphold this one as well.
    That Ballot Measure 2’s contribution-reporting
requirement applies at all times, rather than only close to an
election, does give us some pause. We have held that, “in
valid electioneering disclosure laws, the frequency of
required reporting does not extend indefinitely to all
advocacy conducted at any time but is tied to election
periods or to continued political spending.” Id. at 1117.
Although the contribution-reporting requirement here
applies whenever the contributor donates to an organization

9
   Plaintiffs briefly argue that because contributors to independent-
expenditure organizations may require the assistance of a campaign-
finance attorney to know when and how to report their contributions, the
reporting requirement is not narrowly tailored. The partial dissent makes
a similar argument. We are unconvinced. The form itself asks nothing
more than basic knowledge about the contribution the donor is making
or has made, and figuring out whether one must report their contribution
is as simple as asking the organization whether it has made or will make
an independent expenditure or conducting a quick search on the
Commission’s database of independent-expenditure organizations.
22                         SMITH V. HELZER

that has made, will make, or is likely to make independent
expenditures, the “frequency of required reporting” is
limited to only “continued political spending.” Id. Once the
donor has hit the threshold and filled the form out once, they
need only fill it out again if they continue making
contributions to that independent-expenditure organization.
Accordingly, the temporal application of the requirement is
not an onerous burden on the contributor, and it is reasonably
tailored to the state’s important interests in keeping the
public informed. The contribution-reporting requirement
withstands exacting scrutiny.
                                    2
    We now turn to whether Ballot Measure 2’s donor-
disclaimer requirement is substantially related and narrowly
tailored to the government’s asserted informational interest.
Plaintiffs argue that (1) the disclaimer requirement “adds
marginal additional value while imposing substantial cost on
the speaker” because the information in the disclaimer is
“already available on [the Commission’s] website”; (2) the
disclaimer takes up too much space and time on political
advertisements; and (3) the additional out-of-state donor
notice is unconstitutionally discriminatory. We disagree and
hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the
merits of their claims as to the donor-disclaimer
requirement. 10

10
   Plaintiffs make two additional arguments, which we also reject.
Plaintiffs broadly rely on the following language from the Supreme
Court’s decision in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: “The simple
interest in providing voters with additional relevant information does not
justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures
                             SMITH V. HELZER                              23

    Our court recently addressed a relatively similar donor-
disclaimer requirement. In No on E, the City of San
Francisco had adopted an ordinance that required certain
political advertisements to identify the speaker’s top
contributors, along with the top three donors to those
contributors. 85 F.4th at 498–99. Recognizing the “strong
governmental interest in informing voters about who funds
political advertisements” and applying exacting scrutiny, we
upheld the disclaimer requirement because, among other
reasons, San Francisco “show[ed] that donors to local
committees are often committees themselves and that
committees often obscure their actual donors through

she would otherwise omit.” 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995). But as the district
court correctly noted, McIntyre arose in a materially different factual
context, one involving private individuals’ independent and self-funded
pamphleteering for ballot measures. We have previously distinguished
disclaimer requirements in political advertisements from “McIntyre-type
communications.” Yamada v. Snipes, 786 F.3d 1182, 1203 n.14 (9th Cir.
2015) (quoting Alaska Right to Life, 441 F.3d at 793). And to whatever
extent McIntyre’s reasoning applies here, it is undermined by the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196–
97, and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369, in which the Court found the
informational interest sufficient to uphold disclosure and disclaimer
requirements. Indeed, in both cases, the Court did so over partial dissents
that raised this very issue. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 480 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); McConnell, 540 U.S. at
275–77 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
   Plaintiffs also argue that the disclaimer requirement lacks a “limiting
principle” because, if upheld, the state would have a “blank check” to
require disclosure of “any and all information it wants,” including the
donors’ contact information, “race, religion, political affiliation, sexual
orientation, ethnic background, and interest-group memberships.” As
we have reiterated, these hypothetical and imaginary concerns are
irrelevant to our analysis in the context of a facial challenge to a law that
requires none of these disclaimers. See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at
449–50.
24                        SMITH V. HELZER

misleading and even deceptive committee names.” Id. at
505–06. Although the No on E appeal involved only an as-
applied challenge to the San Francisco ordinance, see id. at
502 n.5, we conclude that its holdings and reasoning readily
apply and control in the context of this facial challenge.
    In upholding the donor-disclaimer requirement in No on
E, we rejected three arguments that mirror those made by
plaintiffs here. First, we found unpersuasive the plaintiffs’
argument that on-ad disclaimers took up too much space on
advertisements. Id. at 507–08. 11 Second, citing to a First
Circuit case that also upheld a donor-disclaimer requirement,
we rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the donor-
disclaimer requirement was not narrowly tailored because
the information to be disclaimed was already “available in
an online database.” Id. at 509 (citing Gaspee Project v.
Mederos, 13 F.4th 79, 91 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting that “the
on-ad donor disclaimer ‘provides an instantaneous heuristic
by which to evaluate generic or uninformative speaker
names’” and therefore more effectively serves the
government’s informational interest than an online
database), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2647 (2022))). And third,
we rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the disclaimer
requirement was insufficiently tailored because the plaintiffs

11
   The plaintiffs in No on E relied heavily on this court’s decision in
American Beverage Association v. City & County of San Francisco,
which invalidated a city ordinance requiring health warnings for
beverage advertisements. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 753–54 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). However,
that decision is readily distinguishable from cases arising in the
electioneering context. No on E, 85 F.4th at 507–08 (“[T]he
governmental interest in informing voters about the source of funding
for election-related communications is much stronger and more
important than the governmental interest in warning consumers about the
dangers of sugar-sweetened beverages.”).
                        SMITH V. HELZER                      25

did not challenge the disclosure of the information—only its
presence on the disclaimer—and failed to show that one
could be permissible but the other not. Id. at 510. Agreeing
with the reasons we stated in No on E, we reject plaintiffs’
equivalent arguments here.
    Having jettisoned most of plaintiffs’ challenges to the
donor-disclaimer requirement, we consider the one major
aspect in which the disclaimer required by Ballot Measure 2
differs from the San Francisco one upheld in No on E: the
additional disclaimer requirement for organizations that
receive a majority of their contributions from true sources
outside of Alaska. See Alaska Stat. § 15.13.090. Plaintiffs
argue that this disclaimer is not narrowly tailored and
unconstitutionally discriminates against out-of-state
speakers, relying on cases in which we and the Second
Circuit invalidated contribution limits to which only out-of-
state entities were subject. But those cases are inapposite.
    As discussed supra, a contribution limit impacts speech
in a manner much more severe than a disclosure or
disclaimer requirement, so the former is subjected to strict
scrutiny and can only be justified by the state’s concern
about risks of quid pro quo corruption, while the latter is
subject to exacting scrutiny and can be justified by the state’s
informational interest. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–
67. Nothing in the outside-entity disclaimer restricts out-of-
state speakers’ speech. Rather, the disclaimer only requires
that organizations communicate whether most of their
contributions came from outside Alaska—information
plaintiffs concede is already validly disclosed to the
Commission. And when “disclosures are permissible . . . we
are not persuaded that a law requiring those same donors to
be named in an on-advertisement disclaimer is insufficiently
tailored.” No on E, 85 F.4th at 511. Accordingly, at this
26                      SMITH V. HELZER

stage, we conclude that the disclaimer requirement is both
substantially related and narrowly tailored to the state’s
informational interest.
                               V
    We hold that the district court acted within its discretion
to conclude that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the
merits of their First Amendment claims. Accordingly, the
district court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction is
     AFFIRMED.

FORREST, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:

    I agree that this case is not moot, but for different reasons
than the majority. I also agree that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding at this preliminary stage
that Plaintiffs failed to show they were likely to succeed in
establishing that Ballot Measure 2’s on-ad disclaimers fail
under exacting scrutiny. I disagree, however, that Plaintiffs’
challenge to Ballot Measure 2’s duplicative individual-
donor reporting requirement is unlikely to succeed.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part.
                    I. BACKGROUND
                    A. Ballot Measure 2
    Ballot Measure 2 was passed in November 2020,
bringing significant changes to the rules governing Alaskan
elections. See 2020 Alaska Laws Initiative Measure 2;
Kohlhaas v. State, 518 P.3d 1095, 1100–01 (Alaska 2022).
                           SMITH V. HELZER                             27

The only provision that I discuss is Plaintiffs’ challenge to
the requirement that individual donors report certain
contributions to the state within 24 hours.
    Plaintiffs are politically active individuals who have
donated money to entities that make “independent
expenditures,” 1 and two independent-expenditure entities
that receive financial donations. Plaintiffs sued members of
the Alaska Public Offices Commission (APOC)—the
agency that administers Alaska’s election laws, 2 see Alaska
Stat. § 15.13.030—asserting, among other things, a facial
challenge to Alaska Statute § 15.13.040(r). 3 This provision
requires individual donors to disclose their financial
contributions that exceed an annual aggregate of $2,000 and
that are made to an entity that has spent money for a
candidate in the prior election cycle or has or may spend
money on a candidate in the current election cycle. Id. The
disclosure must be made within 24 hours of the triggering
donation. Id. Section 15.13.040(r) reads in full:

         Every individual, person, nongroup entity, or
         group that contributes more than $2,000 in
         the aggregate in a calendar year to an entity

1
  “‘[I]ndependent expenditure’ means an expenditure that is made
without the direct or indirect consultation or cooperation with, or at the
suggestion or the request of, or with the prior consent of, a candidate, a
candidate’s campaign treasurer or deputy campaign treasurer, or another
person acting as a principal or agent of the candidate.” Alaska Stat.
§ 15.13.400(11).
2
 The state attorney general enforces Alaska’s election laws based on
APOC’s investigations, examinations, reports, and recommendations.
See id. § 15.13.030(8)–(9).
3
 Alaskans for Better Elections, Inc. intervened to defend Ballot Measure
2, which it sponsored.
28                     SMITH V. HELZER

       that made one or more independent
       expenditures in one or more candidate
       elections in the previous election cycle, that
       is making one or more independent
       expenditures in one or more candidate
       elections in the current election cycle, or that
       the contributor knows or has reason to know
       is likely to make independent expenditures in
       one or more candidate elections in the current
       election cycle shall report making the
       contribution or contributions on a form
       prescribed by the commission not later than
       24 hours after the contribution that requires
       the contributor to report under this subsection
       is made. The report must include the name,
       address, principal occupation, and employer
       of the individual filing the report and the
       amount of the contribution, as well as the
       total amount of contributions made to that
       entity by that individual, person, nongroup
       entity, or group during the calendar year. For
       purposes of this subsection, the reporting
       contributor is required to report and certify
       the true sources of the contribution, and
       intermediaries, if any, as defined by AS
       15.13.400(19). This contributor is also
       required to provide the identity of the true
       source to the recipient of the contribution
       simultaneously       with     providing      the
       contribution itself.

I refer to this as the “individual-donor reporting
requirement” and to the described entities that receive the
donations that trigger this reporting requirement as
                        SMITH V. HELZER                      29

“independent-expenditure       entities.”    Violating  this
individual-donor reporting requirement triggers a fine of up
to $1,000 for each day that the report is delayed—regardless
of whether the donor was aware of the requirement or that
the amount they donated exceeded the aggregate $2,000
threshold. Id. § 15.13.390(a)(2).
    Notably, the individual-donor disclosures are not the
only donation disclosures required under Alaska law. The
independent-expenditure entities also must report the
donations that they receive. As an initial matter, within 10
days of making an independent expenditure, these entities
must report their officers and directors, the date and amount
of all their contributions and expenditures, and “the
aggregate amount of all contributions” received. Id.
§§ 15.13.040(e), 15.13.110(h). For donors who contribute
more than $50 in a year, the independent-expenditure entity
also must disclose the donor. Id. § 15.13.040(e)(5)(A). If an
independent-expenditure entity receives a contribution that
exceeds an aggregate of $2,000 from a single donor or makes
an expenditure exceeding $250 within 9 days of an election,
the entity must file a disclosure report within 24 hours of
receiving the triggering donation or making the triggering
expenditure. Id. §15.13.110 (h), (k).
    The information that independent-expenditure entities
must report mirrors what the individual donors must report.
Individual donors are required report their “name, address,
principal occupation, and employer . . . the amount of the
contribution . . . the total amount of contributions made to
[the] entity [recipient] . . . during the calendar year” and the
30                            SMITH V. HELZER

“true source” of their donation. 4 Id. § 15.13.040(r). The
receiving independent-expenditure entities are required to
report for any individual donor who contributes more than
$50 “the name, address, principal occupation, and employer”
of the donor. Id. § 15.13.040(e)(5)(A). And for donors who
give more than $2,000 in a year, the independent-
expenditure entity must also report the true source of the
donor’s funds. Id. § 15.13.110(k). The overlap in these
disclosure requirements is clear. For contributors who give
more than $2,000 in a single year to one entity, the state
receives all the same information from both the individual
donor and the entity receiving the donation.
                   B. District Court Proceedings
    The district court denied Plaintiffs a preliminary
injunction, concluding that they failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits on any of their
challenges. See Smith v. Helzer, 614 F. Supp. 3d 668, 691
(D. Alaska 2022). Applying exacting scrutiny to Plaintiffs’
challenge to the individual-donor reporting requirement, the

4
    “[T]rue source” is defined as:
           the person or legal entity whose contribution is funded
           from wages, investment income, inheritance, or
           revenue generated from selling goods or services; a
           person or legal entity who derived funds via
           contributions, donations, dues, or gifts is not the true
           source, but rather an intermediary for the true source;
           notwithstanding the foregoing, to the extent a
           membership organization receives dues or
           contributions of less than $2,000 per person per year,
           the organization itself shall be considered the true
           source.
Alaska Stat. § 15.13.400(19).
                        SMITH V. HELZER                      31

district court concluded that Alaska “has a sufficiently
important governmental interest in providing voters with
information related to the source of funds received by
independent expenditure entities,” id. at 677, and that this
reporting requirement is substantially related to that
informational interest and narrowly tailored to achieve its
ends, id. at 678–81.
    The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ contentions that the
individual-donor reporting requirement is unduly
burdensome given its strict deadline and compliance
burdens. Id. at 678–79. The district court found that the
individual-donor reporting requirement is “not completely
duplicative” of the independent-expenditure entities’
disclosure requirement and reasoned that “requiring prompt
disclosure by both parties [to a donation] maximizes the
likelihood of prompt and accurate reporting of the
information when it is most useful to the electorate.” Id. at
680.
    Finally, the district court determined that the temporal
parameters of the individual-donor reporting requirement—
covering donations made to independent-expenditure
entities that have not, and may not, make expenditures in the
current election cycle—do not render the law
unconstitutional because the required disclosures help
ensure voters have access to complete information in
advance of an election and “prevents donors from
sidestepping disclosure requirements by strategically
donating in the final stretch of an election cycle.” Id. at 681.
   Plaintiffs timely appealed, and the district court stayed
proceedings pending our decision.
32                     SMITH V. HELZER

                      II. MOOTNESS
     To begin with, I agree with the majority that this
interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of a
preliminary injunction is not moot even though the 2022
election cycle is over. But I reach this conclusion for
different reasons. In my view, this case is not moot in the
first instance, and, therefore, there is no need to reach the
capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to
mootness.
    “Mootness doctrine addresses whether an intervening
circumstance has deprived the plaintiff of a personal stake in
the outcome of the lawsuit.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1,
14 (2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Thus, a claim is moot “when the issues presented are no
longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest
in the outcome.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)
(quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013));
see also Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 823 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“A case that has lost its character as a present, live
controversy is moot and no longer presents a case or
controversy amenable to federal court adjudication.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). And
“[w]here one of the several issues presented becomes moot,
the remaining live issues supply the constitutional
requirement of a case or controversy.” Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 497 (1969).
    Accordingly, we assess mootness by considering
whether we can give the appellants any effective relief if we
decide the controversy in their favor. See NASD Disp. Resol.,
Inc. v. Jud. Council, 488 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“The test for whether such a controversy exists is ‘whether
the appellate court can give the appellant any effective relief
                       SMITH V. HELZER                      33

in the event that it decides the matter on the merits in his
favor.’” (quoting In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir.
2005))). This same test extends to considering whether an
interlocutory appeal is moot, even if the underlying case still
presents a live controversy. See Akina v. Hawaii, 835 F.3d
1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2016). An appeal of the denial of a
preliminary injunction is moot and, absent exception, must
be dismissed if we cannot grant any effective relief. See
Ahlman v. Barnes, 20 F.4th 489, 493 (9th Cir. 2021); see also
Pub. Util. Comm’n v. FERC, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir.
1996) (“The court must be able to grant effective relief, or it
lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.”).
    A mootness question arises when a preliminary
injunction is denied and the harm the requested injunction
sought to prevent occurs while the appeal is pending. For
example, the plaintiffs in Akina sought to enjoin defendants
from engaging in certain voter-registration activities or
holding certain elections for Native Hawaiians. 835 F.3d at
1010. While this court was considering the appeal, the
challenged election was cancelled, and a ratification vote
that plaintiffs sought to challenge was never scheduled. Id.
Accordingly, we determined the appeal was moot because
we could not provide any effective relief. Id. Similarly, we
have found appeals moot after an underlying dispute was
resolved in separate litigation, NASD Disp. Resol., Inc., 488
F.3d at 1067; after an inmate challenging denial of medical
treatment was released before we decided the propriety of
the district court’s injunction ruling, Norsworthy v. Beard,
802 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015); and after a challenged
injunction expired before we could rule, Ahlman, 20 F.4th at
494.
    The circumstances in each of these cases are
distinguishable from the present case. Plaintiffs here seek to
34                      SMITH V. HELZER

enjoin challenged provisions of Ballot Measure 2 while this
litigation remains pending. And where the challenged
regulations remain in effect, we can still grant effective relief
for Plaintiffs. Cf. McDonald v. Lawson, --- F.4th ----, No. 22-
56220, 2024 WL 854881 (9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2024). While it
is true that some of the Plaintiffs here referenced the then-
imminent 2022 election in their complaint, alleging that
Ballot Measure 2 will impact their speech rights ahead of
that election, nothing in the complaint itself suggests that
Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries are connected to that election
alone. To the contrary, Plaintiffs clearly alleged that they
contributed and received donations exceeding $2,000 in
elections cycles before 2022 and intend to continue to do so
in future election cycles. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction is also not limited to relief related specifically to
the 2022 election cycle, as the majority suggests, but makes
clear that they intend to participate in electioneering activity
that falls within the ambit of the challenged regulations after
the 2022 election. As a result, Plaintiffs continue to have a
“personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,” Moore, 600
U.S. at 14 (quotation omitted), and, crucially, the court
continues to have the ability to grant Plaintiffs precisely the
relief that they seek: an injunction preventing enforcement
of Alaska’s challenged election regulations, see Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 162 (2014) (stating
that an injury-in-fact exists where plaintiffs’ “intended
future conduct is ‘arguably proscribed by the statute they
wish to challenge’” (alterations adopted, internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
   Clark v. City of Lakewood helps illustrate the point. 259
F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Aug. 15, 2001).
There, we concluded that a plaintiff whose business license
expired “still ha[d] a legally cognizable interest in the
                        SMITH V. HELZER                        35

outcome” of his First Amendment challenge to an adult
cabaret licensing ordinance “sufficient to allow him to seek
injunctive relief.” Id. at 1012. The challenged licensing
scheme remained in effect, impacting the plaintiff’s ability
to conduct his business. Id. Acknowledging that “the
expiration of [plaintiff’s] license may make it more difficult
for [him] to return to business,” we concluded that this did
not moot his case because applying for a new license “is not
an insurmountable barrier.” Id. Here, the individual
Plaintiffs similarly remain subject to the regulatory scheme
that they assert is infringing their constitutional rights. For
them to face a heavy fine, they only need to make a donation
exceeding the $2,000 threshold—an act they have carried
out multiple times in the past and intend to carry out in the
future—and not comply with the individual-donor reporting
requirement.
    And Plaintiffs need not be prosecuted under the
challenged regulation to experience legally cognizable
harm; the ever-present, looming threat of prosecution is
enough is to have a chilling effect on their protected political
speech. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383,
393 (1988) (observing that self-censorship is “a harm that
can be realized even without an actual prosecution”); but cf.
Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 787 (9th Cir. 2010), as
amended Dec. 16, 2010 (“Mere allegations of a subjective
chill are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific
present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”
(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).
Because the challenged provisions of Ballot Measure 2 were
enforceable before the 2022 election and continue to be
enforceable in the present, Plaintiffs have and continue to
“suffer[] the constitutionally sufficient injury of self-
censorship, rendering [their] . . . challenge to the statute . . .
36                           SMITH V. HELZER

justiciable.” Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d
1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, as the state
seemingly conceded in its supplemental briefing, this appeal
simply is not moot as a threshold matter. 5
    The majority skips this first-level inquiry and resolves
this question by applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-
evading-review exception to mootness, which is commonly
employed in election cases. Although I agree that there is a
sufficient likelihood that Plaintiffs will be subject to
enforcement in the future, I simply do not think we need to
get to this (or any other) exception to mootness. Our
jurisprudence applies the capable-of-repetition exception in
two general categories of election cases. The first category
involves plaintiffs, usually asserting as-applied First
Amendment challenges, who are seeking relief for injuries
premised on issues, candidates, or electioneering activities
tethered to a particular election. See, e.g., No on E v. Chiu,
85 F.4th 493, 500–02 (9th Cir. 2023), as amended Oct. 26,
2023 (opponents of a specific ballot measure in the 2020
election—California Proposition E—challenged on-ad
disclosures); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 487–90 (9th Cir.
2003) (plaintiffs challenged cease-and-desist letter sent by
California Secretary of State related to their website
discussing strategy for 2000 presidential election); Baldwin

5
  Similarly, this case is constitutionally ripe for review because Plaintiffs
have suffered self-censorship injury. See Getman, 328 F.3d at 1095 (“[A]
finding that the plaintiff has suffered a harm ‘dispenses with any ripeness
concerns’” (quoting Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v.
Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1007 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2003))); see also Twitter, Inc.
v. Paxton, 56 F.4th 1170, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2022) (“We ‘appl[y] the
requirement[] of ripeness . . . less stringently in the context of First
Amendment claims.’” (quoting Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045,
1058 (9th Cir. 2010))).
                        SMITH V. HELZER                      37

v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1362, 1364–65 (9th Cir.
1976) (plaintiffs prevented from erecting signs on behalf of
a specific candidate for city council). The second category
of cases involves plaintiffs seeking relief for allegedly
unconstitutional impediments to political participation at
specific and singular points in time in an election cycle—
primarily the ballot stage. See, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502
U.S. 279, 287–88 (1992) (plaintiff-candidates prevented
from registering party name on 1990 city election ballot);
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726–28, 737 n.8 (1974)
(independent candidates and supporters challenged
California statutory requirements for achieving ballot
position in 1972 federal election); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 814, 815–16 (1969) (independent candidates blocked
from certification and placement on 1968 Illinois state
election ballot).
    In both categories, the claimed harm is temporally
limited. That is not true here. First, Plaintiffs are individual
donors and organizations that have participated in multiple
past elections, and their claimed injuries are not tied to any
election-specific candidate, issue, or even the 2022 election
generally. Second, Plaintiffs’ injuries are not all based on
prohibitions triggered at a singular stage in the election
cycle. The challenged individual-donor reporting
requirement applies all the time, and therefore Plaintiffs’
self-censorship injuries are ongoing.
    Although I reach the same result as the majority, the
distinction in our reasoning is not one without a difference.
On the initial question of whether a case is moot, the party
asserting mootness has the burden. See Native Vill. of
Nuiqsut v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 9 F.4th 1201, 1209 (9th
Cir. 2021). But where a court considers whether an
exception to mootness applies (necessarily suggesting that
38                         SMITH V. HELZER

the case is moot), the burden shifts to the party opposing
mootness. See id. (explaining that while defendants bear the
burden on the initial mootness question, under the capable-
of-repetition exception, the plaintiffs bear the burden of
showing that there is a reasonable expectation that they will
once again be subjected to the challenged activity). Indeed,
the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception
“provides only minimal protection to individual plaintiffs.”
FERC, 100 F.3d at 1459 (quoting Doe v. Att’y General, 941
F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1991)).
    Moreover, we have a “virtually unflagging
obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given” to us. Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976). Unlike “[s]tanding doctrine [that] functions
to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of
the federal courts are devoted to those disputes in which the
parties have a concrete stake . . . by the time mootness is an
issue, the case has been brought and litigated, often . . . for
years.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.,
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000). “To abandon the case at an
advanced stage may prove more wasteful than frugal.” Id. at
191–92. Appeals that are erroneously dismissed as moot
transgress the obligation to exercise our jurisdiction and lead
to waste, inefficiency, and “sunk costs to the judicial
system.” Id. at 192 n.5; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1
(emphasizing the need “to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”).
And the risk of such error increases where the initial question
of whether mootness even applies is skimmed over. 6

6
 This practice seems particularly prevalent in election cases. See, e.g.,
Alaska Right to Life Comm. v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 779–80 (9th Cir.
                          SMITH V. HELZER                           39

      Defendants’ arguments that it would be more efficient
and effective to resolve the complex issues raised by this
case on an appeal from a merits decision, rather than in this
interlocutory posture, are well-taken. We have said as much
repeatedly. See, e.g., Dish Network Corp. v. FCC, 653 F.3d
771, 776 (9th Cir. 2011), as amended Aug. 9, 2011 (“[S]uch
appeals often result in unnecessary delay to the parties and
inefficient use of judicial resources.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719,
724 (9th Cir. 1983) (“We think it likely that this case, for
instance, could have proceeded to a disposition on the merits
in far less time than it took to process this preliminary appeal
. . . In addition, our disposition of this appeal will affect the
rights of the parties only until the district court renders
judgment on the merits of the case, at which time the losing
party may appeal again.” (internal citation omitted)). We
also have cautioned district courts not to unnecessarily delay
resolution by awaiting interim rulings on preliminary
injunctions. See California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 583–84
(9th Cir. 2018). Surely that concern is present here where the
district court stayed proceedings pending this appeal without
explanation and with dispositive motions pending. But,
regardless of concerns about efficiency, we have jurisdiction
over this appeal and, therefore, a duty to proceed. Cf. Dish
Network Corp., 653 F.3d at 776; Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 724;
Azar, 911 F.3d at 584.

2006); Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 13 F.4th 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2021); Mazo
v. N.J. Sec’y of State, 54 F.4th 124, 135–36 (3d Cir. 2022); Ctr. for
Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 661–62 (5th Cir.
2006); Fla. Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar, 273 F.3d 1318, 1324 n.6 (11th
Cir. 2001).
40                     SMITH V. HELZER

       III. INDIVIDUAL-DONOR REPORTING
            REQUIREMENT
    As the majority explains, the Winter factors govern
whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction
enjoining the challenged provisions in Ballot Measure 2. See
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
The district court addressed only whether Plaintiffs had
shown a likelihood of success on the merits. See Smith, 614
F. Supp. 3d at 691. We review a district court’s decision to
deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Cal.
Chamber of Com. v. Council for Educ. & Rsch. on Toxics,
29 F.4th 468, 475 (9th Cir. 2022). “A district court abuses its
discretion if it rests its decision on an erroneous legal
standard or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Am.
Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 916 F.3d
749, 754 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In assessing the likelihood-of-success
factor “in the First Amendment context, [plaintiffs] . . .
bear[] the initial burden of making a colorable claim that
[their] First Amendment rights have been infringed, or are
threatened with infringement, at which point the burden
shifts to the government to justify the restriction on speech.”
Cal. Chamber of Com., 29 F.4th at 478 (citation omitted).
                              A.
    Plaintiffs challenge Ballot Measure 2’s individual-donor
reporting requirement as violative of the First Amendment.
The First Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment,
forbids states from enacting laws that “abridg[e] the freedom
of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Political speech “is central
to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010). This is so
because “[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy,”
                       SMITH V. HELZER                      41

“it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people,”
and it is a “precondition to enlightened self-government and
a necessary means to protect it.” Id. at 339; see also Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government.”). Accordingly, “[t]he First
Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office,”
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted), and the Supreme Court has
“frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies
the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values,’ and is entitled to special protection.” Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)).
    Notwithstanding the favored status of political speech,
regulation of the disclosure of such speech is subject to
“exacting” rather than “strict” scrutiny. See Nat’l Ass’n for
Gun Rights, Inc. v. Mangan, 933 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir.
2019). Exacting scrutiny provides a slightly lower standard
of judicial skepticism than strict scrutiny, but it is not a
rubber stamp. The state must demonstrate “a substantial
relation between the disclosure requirement and a
sufficiently important governmental interest . . . and that the
disclosure requirement [is] narrowly tailored to the interest
it promotes.” Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S.
Ct. 2373, 2385 (2021) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
    Although the precise bounds of exacting scrutiny are not
well defined and the cases applying it are inherently context
dependent, some general principles guide this analysis. One
principle running through the jurisprudence is a concern that
overly burdensome or complex regulations may stifle
42                     SMITH V. HELZER

important political expression. “The First Amendment does
not permit laws that force speakers to retain a campaign
finance attorney . . . .” Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 324. We
addressed this point in Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church
of East Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir.
2009). In that case, Montana law required “incidental
committees” to disclose their political expenditures. Id. at
1026–27. These committees also had to register and identify
their treasurers and other officers; their expenditures; and
their donors’ names, addresses, and occupations. Id. at 1027,
1034. “Incidental committee” was broadly defined to cover
any time two or more persons made an expenditure for or
against a candidate or ballot proposition. Id. at 1026. While
we recognized that Montana, as a general matter, had an
important interest in providing information about the
constituencies advocating for and against ballot issues, we
held that this interest was not served in proportion to the
burdens imposed on donors making small, in-kind
expenditures by, for example, printing copies of a ballot
petition. Id. at 1031, 1033–34. Judge Noonan, concurring,
identified two primary burdens imposed on donors under
Montana’s regulations: (1) having to “[r]ead[] and
understand[] the statute with the help of counsel” and
(2) having to form “an independent political committee,
registered with the state, equipped with a campaign
treasurer, a depository, and a new name” and file the
required forms. Id. at 1035–36 (Noonan, J., concurring).
    Another principle at play is the Supreme Court’s
repeated concern about “‘prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis
approaches’ to regulating campaign finance.” FEC v. Cruz,
596 U.S. 289, 306 (2022) (alteration adopted) (quoting
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 221 (2014)). The Court
has explained that stacking regulations on top of more
                       SMITH V. HELZER                      43

regulations “is a significant indicator that the [challenged]
regulation may not be necessary for the interest it seeks to
protect.” Id. In Cruz, for example, the Court held that
regulations limiting candidates from being repaid more than
$250,000 on loans made to their own campaigns in order to
advance anti-corruption interests failed under “closely
drawn” scrutiny where individual contributions to
candidates were already regulated for the same anti-
corruption purposes. Id. at 293–95, 305–06. And in Arizona
Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the
Court struck down an Arizona matching-funds regulation,
noting that the provision did little to serve the state’s anti-
corruption interests where the state also maintained “ascetic
contribution limits, strict disclosure requirements, and the
general availability of public funding.” 564 U.S. 721, 752
(2011). While aspects of these cases are distinguishable, the
central theme—that as regulations become increasingly
duplicative, their service to the asserted governmental
interest becomes more trivial—is an apt one.
    Americans for Prosperity Foundation is further
illustrative. There, the Supreme Court considered a First
Amendment associational challenge to a California law
requiring charitable organizations to disclose their major
donors. Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2379,
2382. Reviewing the law under exacting scrutiny, the Court
found that there was a “dramatic mismatch” between the
interest promoted—policing fraud—and the disclosure
regime enacted. Id. at 2386. The Court explained that the
collected information played no role in advancing
California’s investigative, regulatory, or enforcement efforts
and “[m]ere administrative convenience” for the state was
not a sufficient justification for the burdens imposed on
donors. Id. at 2386–87. Accordingly, the Court held that
44                          SMITH V. HELZER

California’s compelled-disclosure regulation was facially
unconstitutional. Id. at 2385.
                                    B.
    Plaintiffs assert a facial challenge 7 to Ballot Measure 2’s
individual-donor reporting requirement, arguing that the law
is duplicative and not narrowly tailored and that it imposes
significant burdens on their political speech without
adequately advancing Alaska’s informational interests.
                       i. Alaska’s Interest
    Alaska indisputably has an important interest in
informing voters about who funds political activity. See
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371 (stating that disclosures
“enable[] the electorate to make informed decisions and give
proper weight to different speakers and messages”); No on
E, 85 F.4th at 504 (observing that “[c]ourts have long
recognized the governmental interest in the disclosure of the
sources of campaign funding”). But under exacting scrutiny,
that interest—important as it is—does not govern in a
vacuum. We must assess to what degree the challenged
regulation promotes this interest in the context of the full
complement of reporting requirements. See Ams. for
Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2385–87. Through that lens,
the challenged individual-donor reporting requirement does

7
  While the majority correctly notes that facial challenges are generally
“disfavored,” Maj. Op. at 12–13, it fails to mention that facial challenges
to legislation in the First Amendment context are treated with more
solicitude. See S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, Or., 372 F.3d 1128,
1134 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Courts generally disfavor facial challenges to
legislation, although this reluctance is somewhat relaxed in the First
Amendment context.”).
                         SMITH V. HELZER                        45

very little—if anything at all—to further Alaska’s
informational interest.
     As described above, the individual-donor reporting
requirement mirrors the reporting requirement imposed on
the independent-expenditure entities that receive the
donations, which has not been challenged. At the $2,000
threshold, both the donors and the recipient entities must
report the same information by the same deadline—within
24 hours of the triggering donation. Alaska Stat.
§§ 15.13.040(e), (r), 15.13.110(k). Additionally, both parties
must report the true source of the funds donated. Given this
overlap, the individual-donor reporting requirement furthers
Alaska’s informational interest only minimally. See Ams. for
Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct at 2386 (discussing the
“means-ends fit that exacting scrutiny requires” and
concluding a state “is not free to enforce any disclosure
regime that furthers its interests”); see also McCutcheon,
572 U.S., at 218 (“In the First Amendment context, fit
matters. Even when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny,
[it] still require[s] ‘a fit . . . whose scope is ‘in proportion to
the interest served . . . .’” (quoting Bd. Trs. of State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))).
    The majority (as well as the district court and
Defendants) agrees, as a general matter, that Alaska’s
interest is “informational” or in obtaining “reliable and
accurate” information. See Maj. Op. at 17. But in explaining
how the individual-donor reporting requirement promotes
this interest, the majority first echoes the district court’s
claims that “the contributor will always be in a better
position than the [independent-expenditure entity] to both
identify the true source of its own contribution and quickly
report it.” Smith, 614 F. Supp. 3d at 680 (emphasis added).
While there is no doubt that the donors are in the best
46                      SMITH V. HELZER

position to know the true source of their donated funds,
Ballot Measure 2 addressed this concern by requiring
individual donors that give more than $2,000 to a single
independent-expenditure entity in a year to provide to the
entity “the identity of the true source . . . of the contribution
simultaneously with providing the contribution.” Alaska
Stat. § 15.13.040(r). This undermines any suggestion that
the independent-expenditure entities do not have access to
this information. Likewise, there is every expectation that in
submitting their reports, the independent-expenditure
entities are simply going to parrot what their donors told
them about the true source of the contributions. In fact,
Defendants admitted as much. Thus, it remains true that the
two layers of reporting are duplicative.
     The district court and the majority further assert that
“maximiz[ing] the likelihood” of accurate information is
itself a justifiable basis for imposing a reporting
requirement, even if the added requirement is a duplicative,
belt-and-suspenders safeguard. Smith, 614 F. Supp. 3d at
680. This reasoning inevitably implicates a false binary (the
information received by the state is either “reliable and
accurate” because of the duplicative reporting requirements,
or it is not reliable and accurate) and ignores that gradations
of reliability and accuracy occur on a spectrum. Of course,
any single disclosure report may be accurate or inaccurate.
But when assessing whether the state’s informational
interest is advanced by the individual-donor reporting
requirement, we must consider whether the donor reports
increase the reliability and accuracy of the aggregate
information provided to the public. Thus, the proper question
is whether any marginal increase in the reliability and
accuracy of information justifies the reporting burden placed
                           SMITH V. HELZER                             47

on individual donors. 8 I am not convinced that it is here
because exacting scrutiny requires “a substantial relation
between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently
important governmental interest.” Ams. for Prosperity
Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2385 (quoting Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S.
186, 196 (2010)); see also Acorn Invs., Inc. v. City of Seattle,
887 F.2d 219, 225–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that a
substantial relation exists when the challenged law
“further[s]” or advances an important government interest).
                       ii. Burdens Imposed
    The individual-donor reporting requirement imposes
several burdens on donors. First, as in Canyon Ferry Road,
individual donors face the burden of “[r]eading and
understanding the statute with the help of counsel.” 556 F.3d
at 1035–36 (Noonan, J., concurring). Alaska’s statutory
scheme, which utilizes numerous specialized and unfamiliar
terms and multiple cross references, is not simple to
understand. While becoming informed about the law is not a
unique or insurmountable obligation, it is still a burden that
must be considered, particularly where the relatively low
financial threshold triggering the reporting requirement is
unlikely to ensure that only those with significant resources

8
  I am not disputing the district court’s factual finding that duplicative
reporting requirements may as a general matter increase the accuracy of
information. I dispute that the district court properly applied exacting
scrutiny in analyzing Alaska’s asserted information interest relative to
the burdens being imposed by the duplicative individual-donor reporting
requirement. See Cruz, 596 U.S. at 306; see also Bennett, 564 U.S. at
752.
48                          SMITH V. HELZER

will be required to file donation reports. 9 It must also be
remembered that the reporting requirement imposes strict
liability for failure to comply. See Alaska Stat.
§ 15.13.390(a); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (noting that “a rule of strict liability
that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the
accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable
self-censorship”).
     Additionally, the individual-donor reporting requirement
forces donors to predict whether the entities that they are
donating to are “likely to make independent expenditures in
one or more candidate elections in the current election
cycle.” Alaska Stat. § 15.13.040(r). The majority assumes
that individual donors can accomplish this by simply
conducting a “quick search on the [APOC]’s database of
independent-expenditure organizations” or “simpl[y] . . .
asking the organization” directly “whether it has made or
will make an independent expenditure.” Maj. Op. at 21 n.9.
I also reject these assumptions. The donor’s deadline for
filing a required report is 24 hours from the time of donation.
It is unreasonable to assume that a donor will have all the
information about the recipient entity necessary to determine
whether a report is required before making a donation. And

9
  The majority suggests that “everyday” Americans do not donate over
$2,000 in a year to a single political organization and that this financial
threshold may well ensure that the reporting requirement will apply only
to “‘major contributors,’ not unsophisticated parties.” Maj. Op. at 19.
Without supporting evidence, this seems an improbable assumption. It
does not naturally follow that because a donor can afford to contribute
$2,001 towards political activity, she either has the sophistication to
understand election law or can afford to pay an attorney hundreds of
dollars an hour for advice about complying with her reporting
requirement.
                          SMITH V. HELZER                           49

if a donor were to reach out to the recipient entity to confirm
the necessary information, the donor is not guaranteed to
receive a timely response—presumably most or all
independent-expenditure entities operate during normal
business hours. Moreover, unlike knowledge of the law,
internet access is not a requirement of citizenship. Nor is it a
given that all donors will have internet access. Many
Americans take online connectivity for granted, but there are
obstacles to accessing the internet that may have particular
relevance in Alaska, the vast majority of which is remote. 10
An Alaskan who does not have personal internet access may
not be able to simply jaunt down to a nearby coffee shop or
library.
    The significance of the burdens placed on individual
donors is highlighted by comparison to the burdens imposed
by the independent-expenditure entities’ overlapping
reporting requirement. Independent-expenditure entities
must register with APOC, and they are necessarily familiar
with their reporting obligations and the filing process given
that their normal operations, including receiving donations,
fall under regulated activity. See Alaska Stat. § 15.13.050.
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that these entities have more
experience and resources than individual donors for

10
   As of 2020, Alaska had the worst internet speeds and coverage in the
country. See Kristen M. Renberg, PhD & Angela Sbano, The Air We All
Breathe: Internet Bans in Probation Conditions—Dalton v. State, 38
Alaska L. Rev. 171, 180 (2021) (“Alaska ranks lowest in terms of
Internet coverage, prices, and speeds, ‘with 61% wired and fixed
wireless broadband coverage and no low-priced (wired) plan
availability’” (citing Tyler Cooper & Julia Tanberk, Best and Worst
States for Internet Coverage, Prices and Speeds, 2020, BroadbandNow
Res. (Mar. 3, 2020))). “Alaska faces a particularly steep challenge to
widespread, equitable Internet access . . . . [L]ess than 60% of people
living on tribal lands have access to broadband . . . .” Id.
50                          SMITH V. HELZER

understanding their obligations and compiling and filing the
required reports within the statutory deadline.
    Beyond understanding the reporting obligation,
preparing and filing the required reports imposes burdens on
individual donors. While the form itself may be
straightforward, the 24-hour filing deadline is very short. Id.
§ 14.13.040(r). The report form also must be filled out and
filed online. Discounting the tangible obstacles imposed by
these circumstances, the majority all but accepts the state’s
description of the online filing process as streamlined,
which, in turn, leads to glaring blind spots about
technological literacy and internet access, previously
referenced. The filing process is also not as simple as filling
in a few data fields and hitting “submit.” Individual donors
must create an account in APOC’s online filing system. The
state provided screenshots of the report form, but it did not
present evidence of how accounts are created or how donors
must navigate the APOC website to file their reports. 11
These details matter in a system where if a donor fails at any
step of the process, or takes more than 24 hours to complete
the process, she faces a fine of up to $1,000 a day, with no
outer limit. To summarize: The civically minded retiree who
donates over $2,000 to any organization that supports or may
support a candidate seeking election must know about the
individual-donor reporting requirement and what it
demands, determine whether her donation triggers a report,
access the internet, register for an APOC account, locate the
required reporting form on the APOC website, and fill it out
within 24 hours of making a triggering donation. If she fails

11
  The screenshots of the “test” site the state submitted appear to indicate
a donor would need to navigate through five different pages to reach the
proper disclosure form.
                           SMITH V. HELZER                            51

to check every one of these boxes in time, she is on the hook
for what could be significant fines. All of this so that the state
can collect the same information from her that it receives
from the organization to which she donated. In my view, this
is another example of a “mismatch” between the state’s
asserted informational interest and the requirement it is
imposing. See Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at
2379.
    Moreover, I share the majority’s apprehension about the
limitless temporal bounds of the 24-hour reporting
requirement. I frankly fail to see any justification for a strict
enforcement regime that surveils year-round and imposes
harsh penalties on contributors for potentially minor
violations before, during, and after an election cycle. Even
assuming that prompt disclosure is helpful to voters during
an election cycle, why a 24-hour filing deadline is needed in
the lulls between active elections is a mystery.
                               *****
    “[Alaska] is not free to enforce any disclosure regime
that furthers its interests. It must instead demonstrate its need
for universal production in light of any less intrusive
alternatives.” Id. at 2386. It has not done so here. Rather,
Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed in
showing that Ballot Measure 2’s individual-donor reporting
requirement fails to satisfy exacting scrutiny because the
burdens it imposes are not “in proportion to the interest
served.” 12 Id. (quoting McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 218). In

12
  Because of the procedural posture of the case, I do not reach the issue
of severability. However, if the district court determines that Ballot
Measure 2 is severable under Alaska state law, then it can sever
52                          SMITH V. HELZER

denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the
district court failed to properly weigh the burdens of the
individual-donor reporting requirement against the degree to
which Alaska’s informational interest is actually served by
requiring individual donors to report the same information
that is collected from the entities that receive the donations.
See id.; Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 564
U.S. at 752. The majority’s characterization of the
obligations imposed on individual donors glosses over the
practical realities for individuals who may choose to engage
in political expression by donating money and the significant
financial penalties that will result if they do not perfectly
comply with the near-immediate reporting requirement.
Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that the individual-
donor reporting requirement risks chilling individual donors
from fully participating in political expression. See, e.g.,
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 75 (2023)
(“Prohibitions on speech have the potential to chill, or deter,
speech outside their boundaries. A speaker may be unsure
about the side of a line on which his speech falls. . . . Or he
may simply be concerned about the expense of becoming

potentially unconstitutional provisions of the statute when it decides the
merits of this case. See Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d
1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“Severability is a matter of state
law.” (alteration and citation omitted)); see also Forrer v. State, 471 P.3d
569, 598 (Alaska 2020) (“A provision is severable if the portion
remaining is independent and complete in itself so that it may be
presumed that the legislature would have enacted the valid parts without
the invalid part. However, when the invalidation of a central pillar so
undermines the structure of the Act as a whole, then the entire Act must
fall.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted));
Planned Parenthood of the Great N.W. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1153
(Alaska 2016) (Fabe, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he presence of a severability
clause does not necessarily mean that a statute’s constitutionally invalid
provisions are severable from the remainder of the statutory scheme.”).
                       SMITH V. HELZER                     53

entangled in the legal system. The result is ‘self-censorship’
of speech that could not be proscribed—a cautious and
restrictive exercise of First Amendment freedoms.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). For all these reasons,
I would reverse as to Plaintiffs’ challenge to the individual-
donor reporting requirement and remand for the district court
to consider the remaining Winter factors.
   I respectfully dissent in part.