Court Opinion

ID: 9839241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 17:05:25.318584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:49.318133
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/12/23 P. v. Parker CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084858
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                                  (Super. Ct. No. 140540)
                    v.

    PHINEHAS LAMONT PARKER,                                                               OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Dawna
Reeves, Judge.
         Dale Dombkowski, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Meehan, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and DeSantos, J.
                                      INTRODUCTION
       Appellant and defendant Phinehas Lamont Parker (defendant) was convicted after
a jury trial of premeditated attempted murder and additional felony offenses, with firearm
and great bodily injury enhancements. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of
parole plus a determinate term of 35 years eight months.
       In 2022, the trial court denied defendant’s Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing. On appeal, appellate counsel filed a brief which summarized the facts and
procedural history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to
independently review the record pursuant to both People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Appellant submitted a supplemental
brief raising several issues. We review the court’s ruling, address defendant’s
contentions, and affirm the trial court’s denial of his petition.
                                            FACTS2
       Manuel Ruelas owns an automobile accessories store in Modesto. He lives with
Chela Miller and their six children. On March 8, 1997, he brought home $9,000 in cash

1       All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. Appellant
filed his petition in 2021 under former section 1170.95, which was substantively amended
effective January 1, 2022, and renumbered as section 1172.6 without further change on June 30,
2022. (People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 715, fn. 3.) The trial court addressed the
allegation in defendant’s petition under the provisions of section 1172.6.
2      The facts are from this court’s nonpublished opinion in appellant’s direct appeal in
People v. Parker (Feb. 6, 2002, F033560 [nonpub. opn.]) (Parker), which the prosecutor
attached as an exhibit in support of its opposition to defendant’s petition.
        In reviewing a section 1172.6 petition, the court may rely on “the procedural history of
the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Clements
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292; People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 400, fn. 9.) The
role of the appellate opinion is limited, however, and the court may not rely on factual
summaries contained in prior appellate decisions or engage in fact finding at the prima facie
stage. (Clements, at p. 292; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis).) We cite to the
factual statement from defendant’s direct appeal to place his arguments in context, and do not
rely on that factual statement to resolve his appeal from the trial court’s order that found his
petition did not state a prima facie case for relief.

                                                2.
because he did not have time to make a bank deposit.[3] Ruelas left the money in a
pocket of his pants.
       Ruelas and Miller went to sleep in the master bedroom; their newborn infant was
sleeping in a bassinet near their bed. Ruelas’s pants were laying on the floor by the bed.
At approximately 3:00 a.m.,[4] they were awakened by two armed men wearing black ski
masks and black clothing. The masks were too large and portions of the men’s faces were
exposed. One of the men was Asian and one was Black. The Black intruder wore
rugged, black work boots.
       The men pointed their guns at Ruelas and Miller, telling them to lie down on the
ground. They demanded that Ruelas tell them where he kept his money and his gun, and
threatened to kill him if he did not tell them. Ruelas insisted there was no money in the
house. They rifled through the room looking for cash.
       The Asian man grabbed Ruelas’s watch and a gold chain with an attached crucifix
from the top of a dresser. The crucifix was set with diamonds and rubies. He also took a
silver belt buckle and a gold watch that belonged to Ruelas.
       Frustrated by their inability to find Ruelas’s money, the Asian man pointed the
gun at Miller’s vagina and at the baby’s head, threatening to kill them if Ruelas did not
tell them where he had hidden the money. The Asian man then left the room and
ransacked other parts of the house.
       Meanwhile, the Black man found a new safe Ruelas had purchased. He instructed
Ruelas to open it. Ruelas told him that he did not know the combination. The Black man

3      There was some question about the source of the money as the defense attempted to
characterize it as drug money.

4       Earlier that evening, at approximately 10:30 or 11:00 p.m., Billy McLain was walking
down a street near their house when he observed three men wearing ski masks and black pants.
One was crouched by a van and the other two were near the house. The men chased McLain and
he ran home.

                                             3.
warned Ruelas that he would kill him if he found the money. He continued to search the
room and eventually found the cash inside Ruelas’s pants. He gave Ruelas a “weird
look,” and then shot him in the face from a distance of approximately five to six feet.
The bullet passed through Ruelas’s cheekbone, broke his collarbone and lodged in his
left armpit. The Black man approached Ruelas and aimed the gun at Ruelas’s forehead.
Ruelas was still conscious. He begged the Black man to “ ‘Just go. Just go.’ ” The
Black man walked away.
       Miller was hiding behind a recliner. She escaped out a window and ran to a
neighbor’s house. Both she and Ruelas called 911. When the police arrived, the
intruders were gone.
       When Ruelas was interviewed by police at the hospital, he described the Black
intruder as 5 feet 10 inches to 5 feet 11 inches tall, 180 pounds and 25 to 30 years old. At
trial, Ruelas estimated that the Black intruder was approximately 6 feet 2 inches tall.
Miller described the Black intruder to the investigating officers as 6 feet 2 or 6 feet
4 inches tall and in his 20’s.
       Defendant is Black and he was 25 years old when the crimes occurred. The
parties stipulated that he is shorter than 6 feet 1 inches tall.
       On March 12, 1997, defendant’s girlfriend and later his wife, Clarissa Hurtado,
sold a gold chain to a local pawnshop. It was recovered by the police. Ruelas and Miller
identified the chain as the one stolen by the intruders.
       On March 14, 1997, Hurtado sold a crucifix to a different pawnshop. The shop
owner originally declined to take the piece because it was set with colored stones.
Hurtado left the store briefly. When she returned, the stones had been removed. The
owner purchased the crucifix and melted it down for scrap.
       On March 21, 1997, Hurtado’s residence was searched. A pair of black work
boots, various articles of men’s clothing, including three black T-shirts, and two letters
addressed to defendant were all found in the master bedroom.

                                                4.
       Ruelas identified the boots found in Hurtado’s residence as the same boots worn
by the man who shot him. The boots were sent to the state crime laboratory for analysis.
Dried blood was found on them. DNA taken from this blood was determined to be
consistent with Ruelas’s genetic profile.
       On or about May 11, 1997, Ruelas and two other men were arrested for attempting
to purchase pseudoephedrine (an ingredient used in the production of methamphetamine).
Although charges were filed against Ruelas, they were eventually dismissed.
       On August 16, 1998, the day before defendant’s first[5] jury trial in this case, a
deputy taped a jailhouse visit between defendant and Hurtado. A portion of the tape was
introduced into evidence. During this visit defendant instructed Hurtado to fabricate a
story about how she had obtained the chain and crucifix. Hurtado told defendant that she
would testify that she had purchased the chain at a flea market a few years ago. She
would describe the stones in the crucifix as being orange in color and not rubies. Hurtado
held up pieces of paper to the glass separator during this conversation.
       On October 20, 1998, two investigators from the district attorney’s office stopped
Hurtado outside the jail immediately after a visit with defendant. She wrestled with the
men and tried to destroy a piece of paper she was holding by tearing it in half and stuffing
it into her mouth.
       Hurtado did not appear at trial. After the court declared her unavailable, the
prosecution introduced her testimony from the second trial. She had testified that a man
named Manuel had asked her to pawn a crucifix that was set with orange stones. She did
so as a favor to him. She purchased the gold chain at few years ago at a flea market and
decided to pawn it because she did not wear jewelry very often. Defendant stayed with
her occasionally in March 1997, and she was pregnant with his child at this time.
However, he was not living with her, and other men also stayed at her residence.

5       Two mistrials occurred in this case. The first mistrial was declared after defendant
threatened his attorney; the second was declared when defense counsel became ill.

                                                5.
          Defendant did not testify. Defense counsel called one witness: defendant’s
mother, Denise Haynes. She testified that defendant was living with her in March 1997.
She loaned defendant $500 to post bail for Hurtado that month.
                                  PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
          On December 23, 1997, an information was filed in the Superior Court of
Stanislaus County charging defendant with committing the following offenses on
March 9, 1997: count 1, premeditated attempted murder of Ruelas (§§ 664/187);
counts 2 and 3, robbery of Ruelas and Miller (§ 212.5); count 4, assault with a firearm on
Miller (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)); and count 5, burglary (§ 459), with firearm, great bodily
injury, and prior conviction allegations.
Jury Instructions6
          The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.66, that the elements of count 1,
attempted murder, were (1) a direct but ineffectual act was done by one person; and
(2) the person committing the act “harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a
specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.”
          CALJIC No. 8.67 defined the special allegation alleged as to count 1, that the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.

                “If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder, you must
          determine whether this allegation is true or not true.

                 “ ‘Willful’ means intentional. ‘Deliberate’ means formed or arrived
          at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of
          considerations for and against the proposed course of action.
          ‘Premeditated’ means considered beforehand.

                 “If you find that the attempted murder was preceded and
          accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the result of
          deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon
          pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other

6         The jury instructions from defendant’s trial were augmented to the instant appellate
record.

                                                  6.
       condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is attempt to commit
       willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.”
       The jury was separately instructed on the elements of counts 2 through 5, robbery,
assault with a deadly weapon, and burglary. The jury was not instructed on the
felony-murder rule. As we discuss below, the jury was also instructed on principals,
aiders and abettors, and the natural and probable consequences doctrine but only as to
counts 2 through 5.
Defense Counsel’s Closing Argument
       “Defense counsel argued in closing that this was a case of mistaken identity. He
theorized that Ruelas was a drug dealer who had contact with unsavory characters who
robbed and shot him. The intruders wore masks because Ruelas knew them from the
drug trade. He pointed out that a shoeprint impression had been taken from the victim’s
bedroom. This print did not match the work boots. The person who shot Ruelas could
have made this impression. The boots taken from Hurtado’s residence were not
specifically identified as belonging to defendant and Hurtado had testified that other men
stayed with her. The boots could have belonged to one of them. Furthermore, defendant
did not match the description of the Black intruder because he was less than 6 feet 1 inch
tall. Also, defendant had to borrow money for Hurtado’s bail, which is inconsistent with
having just stolen $9,000 from Ruelas. In addition to all of the above, the DNA analysis
was unreliable.” (Parker, supra, F033560.)
Convictions and Sentence
       On April 26, 1999, defendant was convicted as charged of count 1, premeditated
attempted murder, with the enhancements that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5)
and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the commission or attempted
commission of the offense (§ 12022.7); count 2, first degree robbery of Ruelas, with
personal use and great bodily injury enhancements; count 3, first degree robbery of
Miller, with the personal use enhancement; count 4, assault with a deadly weapon, and

                                             7.
that he was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)); and count 5, first degree burglary,
with the personal use enhancement; and a prior prison term enhancement.
       On June 18, 1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of
life in prison with the possibility of parole for count 1, plus a consecutive determinate
term of 35 years eight months for the other convictions and enhancements.
Direct Appeal
              On February 6, 2002, this court filed the nonpublished opinion in
defendant’s direct appeal. We rejected his claims of juror misconduct, prosecutorial
misconduct, failure to dismiss the case, and alleged sentencing errors, and held the trial
court was not required to give cautionary instructions about accomplice testimony
because Hurtado was not an accomplice. (Parker, supra, F033560.)
       We reversed defendant’s conviction in count 3 for robbery of Miller because of
insufficient evidence and ordered the sentence stricken. We also ordered the abstract of
judgment corrected to state that defendant had to serve the determinate term and then the
indeterminate term. As modified, we affirmed the judgment. (Parker, supra, F033560.)
       An amended abstract of judgment was subsequently filed, which struck the
conviction and term imposed for count 3, corrected defendant’s aggregate determinate
term to 31 years, and clarified that he would first serve the determinate term and then
serve the indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole.
                          PETITION FOR RESENTENCING
       The instant appeal is from the denial of defendant’s petition for resentencing, filed
in propria persona on December 6, 2021, pursuant to former section 1170.95. Defendant
requested appointment of counsel.
       Defendant’s supporting declaration consisted of a preprinted form where he
checked boxes that stated (1) a complaint, information, or indictment was filed against
him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) he was convicted of first or

                                             8.
second murder pursuant to the felony-murder rule or natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or pleaded guilty or no contest in lieu of a trial because he believed he could
have been convicted under the felony-murder rule or natural and probable consequences
doctrine; and (3) he could not presently be convicted of murder because of changes made
to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.
       Defendant further checked boxes that declared he was not the actual killer; he did
not, with the intent to kill, aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, solicit, request, or assist
the actual killer in the commission of the murder; he was not a major participant or did
not act with reckless indifference to life; and the victim was not a peace officer.
       In addition to the petition, defendant filed a separate brief, in propria persona, that
requested the trial court take judicial notice of the record from his jury trial, and raised
numerous procedural and evidentiary claims of error that allegedly resulted in his
conviction. He argued his conviction for attempted murder must be reversed for
insufficient evidence because he was never identified as the perpetrator.
       On January 11, 2022, the court appointed the public defender’s office to represent
defendant.
The People’s Opposition
       On January 20, 2022, the prosecution filed opposition and recited the facts from
this court’s opinion in the direct appeal. The prosecution acknowledged that defendant’s
petition for resentencing of his attempted murder conviction was cognizable under the
amendments enacted by Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) that became
effective on January 1, 2022. The prosecution further argued defendant was ineligible for
relief because he was convicted as the actual shooter who committed the attempted
murder, and the jury was not instructed on any theories of imputed malice.7

7      Defendant filed his petition under the initial version of former section 1170.95, that
permitted “a person with an existing conviction for felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to have the murder

                                               9.
Defendant’s Reply Briefs
       On February 15, 2022, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a reply brief and
argued the petition stated a prima facie case for relief and an evidentiary hearing should
be held.
       On May 20, 2022, defendant separately filed, in propria persona, his own reply
brief and argued the prosecutor’s opposition created “a false narrative” because he was
misidentified as the gunman at the jury trial. Defendant attached lengthy portions of the
reporter’s transcript from his jury trial in support of his argument that he was
misidentified and his conviction should be reversed.
       On July 7, 2022, the trial court heard and denied defendant’s motion to discharge
his appointed counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
                      HEARING ON DEFENDANT’S PETITION
       On July 28, 2022, the trial court held a hearing as to whether defendant’s petition
stated a prima facie case for relief. Defendant appeared via teleconference and his
attorney was in the courtroom.
       The trial court stated it had reviewed the pleadings and supporting exhibits, and
invited argument. The prosecutor stated defendant was ineligible for resentencing
because he was the person who fired the gun and committed the attempted murder.

conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not have
been convicted of murder as a result of the other legislative changes implemented by Senate Bill
No. 1437.” (People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992.)
        As noted above, effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
made substantive amendments to former section 1170.95, later renumbered as section 1172.6,
and “ ‘[c]larifie[d] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under
a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine are permitted the
same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same theories.’ ” (People v.
Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn. 18, italics added; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 377, 388; People v. Saibu, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 716, fn. 3.) The prosecution
thus recognized that defendant’s petition for resentencing of his attempted murder conviction
was cognizable since the amended statute had become effective.

                                              10.
Defendant’s counsel submitted on the pleadings. The court stated it would file a written
order with its decision.
The Trial Court’s Denial of the Petition
       On July 29, 2022, the trial court filed an order that found defendant failed to state
a prima facie case for relief and he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
The court quoted part of this court’s opinion from defendant’s direct appeal, that
defendant personally shot one victim in the face.
       The court further found the charging information did not allege attempted felony
murder or any theory of imputed malice, and the record of conviction showed defendant
was charged and convicted as the direct perpetrator of the premeditated attempted murder
who acted with specific intent.

               “The jury was instructed with [CALJIC Nos.] 8.66 and 8.67 which
       outlined the only theory of attempted murder advanced at trial; that the
       attempted killing was intentional, deliberate and premeditated, first degree
       attempted-murder. Further, in finding defendant guilty of attempted
       murder, the jurors specifically found true the allegations that the attempted
       killing was deliberate, intentional and premeditated. The jury verdicts also
       demonstrate their finding that Defendant personally used a firearm in the
       commission of the attempted murder and personally and intentionally
       inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. [Defendant] was convicted of
       attempted murder under a theory that remains in effect despite the changes
       to … Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
       On August 22, 2022, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                      DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court’s Findings
       We first note that when defendant filed his petition, the trial court complied with
section 1172.6 and appointed counsel, provided for further briefing, conducted a hearing
on the petition, and stated reasons for denying the petition without issuing an order to
show cause. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b), (c).)

                                             11.
       The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is “limited.” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court “ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true
and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual
allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’
[Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s]
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a
credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       In denying defendant’s petition, the trial court’s order stated he failed to state a
prima facie case for relief and was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. In doing
so, however, the court quoted part of this court’s opinion from defendant’s direct appeal,
that stated defendant personally shot one victim in the face. As explained above, the role
of an appellate opinion is limited and the court cannot make factual findings when
making the prima facie determination. To the extent the court relied on the factual
summary contained in this court’s prior opinion to find he failed to state a prima facie
case, that reliance was erroneous. (People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 292;
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
       To demonstrate prejudice from the trial court’s error, defendant must show it is
reasonably probable that, absent the error, his petition would not have been denied
without an evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972–974; People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) In determining prejudice, we may review the record
of conviction which includes the jury instructions (People v. Williams (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251–1252; People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599; People
v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50, 54–55), the closing arguments, and the verdict.
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90,
106; People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.)

                                              12.
       We find the trial court’s brief reference to the direct appeal was not prejudicial
because the record of conviction shows defendant was ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law. The rest of the trial court’s ruling to deny the petition was based on the
instructions given at defendant’s jury trial that defined the elements of premeditated
attempted murder. “Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the
commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.”
(People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623; People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222, 224.)
Defendant was correctly instructed with CALJIC Nos. 8.66 and 8.67 on the elements of
attempted murder, that he had to act with the specific intent to kill, and the attempted
murder “was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was
the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon
pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition
precluding the idea of deliberation, it is an attempt to commit willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder.” As we further explain below, the instructions also show that
defendant was not convicted of premeditated attempted murder based on any theories of
imputed malice.
II. The Jury Instructions
       We now turn to defendant’s contentions raised in his letter brief.
A. CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01
       First, defendant contends his section 1172.6 petition stated a prima facie case for
relief because the prosecutor relied on instructions defining aiding and abetting to convict
him of attempted murder.
       Defendant was charged and tried by himself. The trial court instructed the jury
with CALJIC No. 2.11.5, that there was evidence a person other than the defendant “was
or may have been involved” in the crimes, there may be reasons why that person was not
on trial, and not to discuss or give any consideration as to why the other person was not
being prosecuted in the trial.

                                             13.
       The trial court gave CALJIC No. 3.00, that persons who are involved in
committing a crime are referred to as principals, and “[e]ach principal, regardless of the
extent or manner of participation is equally guilty.” (Italics added.) Principals were
defined as “[t]hose who directly and actively commit the act constituting the crime,” or
“[t]hose who aid and abet the commission of the crime.”
       CALJIC No. 3.00 “generally stated a correct rule of law. All principals, including
aiders and abettors, are ‘equally guilty’ in the sense that they are all criminally liable.”
(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 433.) However, the
“equally guilty” language has been held misleading “if the principals in a particular case
might be guilty of different crimes and the jury interprets the instruction to preclude such
a finding,” and the pattern instruction has since been amended. (Ibid.; see, e.g., People v.
Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504, 517–520; People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972,
982–983.)
       As discussed above, the jury was instructed that attempted murder requires the
specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing. The entirety of the instructions and the jury’s guilty
verdict establishes that it convicted appellant based on his own intent to kill, and not on
any theories of imputed malice.
B. CALJIC No. 3.02
       Defendant next argues the jury was instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine because the court gave CALJIC No. 3.02. This instruction stated:

              “One who aids and abets another in the commission of crimes is not
       only guilty of those crimes, but is also guilty of any other crime committed
       by a principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the crimes
       originally aided and abetted.

             “In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of Assault with a
       Deadly Weapon, as charged in Count IV, you must be satisfied beyond a
       reasonable doubt that:

                                              14.
                      “(1) The crimes of robbery and burglary were committed;

                      “(2) That the defendant aided and abetted those crimes;

                       “(3) That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime of
                assault with a deadly weapon; and

                      “(4) The crime of assault with a deadly weapon was a natural
                and probable consequence of the commission of the crimes of
                robbery and burglary.”
       Defendant argues CALJIC No. 3.02 was sufficiently “general” so that the jury
could have relied on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to convict him of all
the charged offenses, including attempted murder, and he was thus eligible for
resentencing.
       Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it previously applied to
aiding and abetting, “a defendant can be found guilty of murder if he or she aids and
abets a crime (i.e., the target crime) and murder (i.e., the nontarget crime) is a natural and
probable consequence of that target crime.” (People v. Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
663, 683.)
       In this case, however, CALJIC No. 3.02 expressly limited the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to the target offenses of counts 2 and 3, robbery, and count 5,
burglary, and identified count 4, assault with a deadly weapon, as the nontarget offense.
The jury was not instructed that count 1, attempted murder, was one of the target or
nontarget offenses, and it was not listed in CALJIC No. 3.02 to permit the jury to find
him guilty of that offense based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
       Defendant’s contrary arguments ignore the plain language of the instruction, and
we presume the jurors followed the trial court’s instruction. (People v. Houston (2012)
54 Cal.4th 1186, 1211; People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 399.) We conclude the
entirety of the instructions establish defendant was charged and convicted of
premeditated attempted murder based on his own express malice and intent to kill, and
not any theories of imputed malice.

                                             15.
III. Ineffective Assistance
       Defendant argues the deputy public defender appointed to represent him in the
section 1172.6 proceedings was biased against him and prejudicially ineffective.
Defendant’s arguments are based on the Marsden hearing that was held prior to the
section 1172.6 hearing.
A. Marsden hearing8
       On January 11, 2022, the court appointed the public defender’s office to represent
defendant on his section 1172.6 petition.
       On February 15, 2022, Deputy Public Defender Karen Kelly, defendant’s attorney,
filed a reply to the prosecution’s opposition to defendant’s petition, and argued the
petition made a prima facie case for relief and an evidentiary hearing should be held.
       On May 20, 2022, defendant, acting in propria persona, filed his own reply brief
and argued his petition should be granted because he was misidentified as the gunman at
his jury trial. Defendant attached lengthy portions of the reporter’s transcript from the
jury trial, and asked the trial court to review the transcript.
       On July 7, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s Marsden
motion to discharge his appointed counsel. At the hearing, defendant complained Kelly
was not on “the same page” with him and she did not want to “bring to the court the
issues that I wish to have brought to the court .…”
       Defendant stated that he also had a conflict with the public defender’s office that
began before his jury trial. Defendant stated his first attorney was a deputy public
defender who was later “removed” before his jury trial because the trial court claimed
defendant threatened her. Defendant claimed Kelly was a close friend of his

8       If defendant raises a Marsden issue on appeal, or an issue related to Marsden, the
previously sealed transcript of the in camera hearing is subject to disclosure. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.47; People v. Knight (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1, 7–8.)

                                                16.
first attorney, and he believed Kelly would not fairly represent him in the current
proceedings because of her alleged friendship with his prior attorney.
       Kelly stated she only knew defendant’s first attorney because they worked in the
public defender’s office at the time of defendant’s jury trial. They may have met
one time socially in 2010, but Kelly had never been to the first attorney’s home, she did
not have a friendship with the first attorney, that person had left the office, she was no
longer in contact with that person, and they had never discussed defendant’s case.
       As for defendant’s petition, Kelly said defendant believed he could raise identity
issues from his trial in his section 1172.6 petition, and they disagreed on what arguments
could be raised.
       The court found no conflict and denied defendant’s Marsden motion.
B. Analysis
       Defendant’s ineffective assistance arguments about his attorney’s conduct in the
section 1172.6 proceedings are based on his complaints about her at the Marsden hearing.
The law governing a Marsden motion “is well settled. ‘When a defendant seeks to
discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate
representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his
contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance.
[Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the
first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that
defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that
ineffective representation is likely to result [citations].’ ” (People v. Fierro (1991)
1 Cal.4th 173, 204; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 857.)
       While the trial court must afford the defendant the opportunity to express specific
reasons why he believes he is not being adequately represented, the court is not required
to accept defendant’s assertions of inadequate representation and may instead credit
counsel’s explanation. (People v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 970, 978–980; People v.

                                             17.
Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 436.) We review the denial of a Marsden motion under
an abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085.)
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s Marsden
motion. Defendant’s claim of an alleged prejudicial friendship between his current
attorney, and the attorney who was initially appointed to represent him prior to his jury
trial, was completely refuted by Kelly’s uncontested statements to the court.
       In addition, defendant’s complaints about Kelly’s failure to raise certain issues in
his section 1172.6 petition were based on either a misunderstanding or misapprehension
of the applicable law. Kelly cited defendant’s supplemental reply brief—where
defendant raised evidentiary issues from his jury trial—as indicative of their
disagreement. “The mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not afford the
petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jury’s findings. To the contrary, ‘[n]othing in the language of
section [1172.6] suggests it was intended to provide redress for allegedly erroneous prior
factfinding.… The purpose of section [1172.6] is to give defendants the benefit of
amended sections 188 and 189 with respect to issues not previously determined, not to
provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been resolved.’ ” (People v.
Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
       As explained above, the entirety of the record reflects defendant was ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. Defense counsel correctly acknowledged
that defendant could not raise claims of alleged trial error in his petition. Defendant’s
attorney was not ineffective for failing to raise meritless objections or motions. (People
v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732.)
IV. Defendant’s Contentions About His Jury Trial
       Finally, defendant raises several procedural and evidentiary contentions about his
jury trial, and claims the trial court failed to address these issues in ruling on his
section 1172.6 petition.

                                              18.
A. Procedural and Evidentiary Claims
       Defendant raises additional ineffective assistance claims, but these arguments are
based on the conduct of the defense attorney who represented him at his jury trial.
Defendant also challenges the evidence at his jury trial, and that he was never identified
as the perpetrator of the charged offenses, his conduct did not violate any criminal
offenses, and the prosecution failed to show his intent. Defendant further complains that
at the hearing on his section 1172.6 petition, the trial court failed to consider the
reporter’s transcript from his jury trial that he filed with his petition, because these
transcripts allegedly showed he was never identified as the perpetrator and his conviction
must be reversed.
       As we have explained, the purpose of section 1172.6 is to give defendants the
benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with respect to issues not previously
determined, “ ‘not to provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been
resolved.’ ” (People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 947.) Section 1172.6 “does
not permit a petitioner to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged trial error.” (People
v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.) Defendant cannot relitigate trial issues in his
section 1172.6 petition.
B. Section 745
       Finally, defendant contends his convictions must be reversed under section 745
because the prosecution against him was allegedly racially motivated.
       Section 745 was added to the Penal Code by the California Racial Justice Act of
2020 (CRJA), and was originally effective on January 1, 2021, and amended effective
January 1, 2023. (People v. Thompson (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 69, 95, fn. 6.) Under the
CRJA, “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or
impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a).)
Section 745 sets forth various categories of conduct “which, if proved, is enough to

                                              19.
‘establish’ a violation of section 745, subdivision (a).” (Young v. Superior Court (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 138, 147.)
       The CRJA applies to all cases where the judgments are not final. As of January 1,
2023, it also applies to cases where the defendant was sentenced to death, and to matters
involving “immigration consequences related to the conviction or sentence.” (§ 745,
subd. (j)(1), (2).) Section 745 states that a claim under the CRJA shall be brought in the
trial court in a pending case, a petition for writ of habeas corpus if judgment has been
imposed, or a motion under section 1473.7 for those no longer in custody. (§ 745,
subd. (b).)
       Defendant’s convictions became final in or about 2002, he was not sentenced to
death, and there is no indication his case involved any immigration issues. Defendant did
not file a separate motion or habeas petition raising a claim under the CRJA, as required
by section 745. Instead, he has tried to bootstrap his alleged section 745 claim into the
instant appeal from the denial of his section 1172.6 petition, by raising it for the first time
in his supplemental letter brief. In his letter brief, he declares his convictions must be
reversed under section 745 because he is African-American, he was allegedly profiled by
law enforcement when he was arrested and charged, and the prosecution failed to prove
he was the perpetrator at the jury trial. Defendant provides no authority to suggest he is
authorized to seek relief under the CRJA in a section 1172.6 proceeding and we decline
to address the issue.
                                       DISPOSITION
       The court’s order of July 29, 2022, denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing, is affirmed.

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