Court Opinion

ID: 9644469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:57:05.640036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:13.923075
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice, dissenting. In McDaniel v. State, 288 Ark. 629, 708 S.W.2d 613 (1986), we interpreted A.R.Cr.P. Rules 24.4 and 24.6 to require that: “The court must ascertain from the accused whether he is pleading guilty because he is in fact guilty.” (Emphasis added.) Both before and after McDaniel v. State, supra, we have set out the same clear standard for accepting guilty pleas. We repeated the statement in Snelgrove v. State, 292 Ark. 116, 728 S.W.2d 214 (1987). In Muck v. State, 292 Ark. 310, 730 S.W.2d 214 (1987), we wrote: “The court must ask the defendant if he did the things of which he stands accused and is pleading guilty because he is guilty.” (Emphasis added.) Earlier, in Atkins v. State, 287 Ark. 445, 701 S.W.2d 109 (1985), we wrote: “No court should accept a plea of guilty without determining whether the accused believes he is guilty and that belief has a factual basis.” (Emphasis added.) The majority opinion says it is now “clarifying” this bright line interpretation of Rule 24.6 so that now “there is no single method by which the requirement of Rule 24.6 can be achieved.” The trial courts have lost a clear standard, and we will be faced with endless post-conviction appeals from guilty pleas. If anything in the law ought to be clear cut and have finality it is a guilty plea in a criminal case. Establishing the factual basis from the defendant would also eliminate problems associated with false promises or statements by a prosecutor. See Vagi v. State, 296 Ark. 377, 757 S.W.2d 533 (1988). This is one of the reasons the federal trial courts are required to ascertain from the defendant whether there is a factual basis. As stated by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Santobella v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971): The decisions of this Court have not spelled out what sorts of promises by prosecutors tend to be coercive, but in order to assist appellate review in weighing promises in light of all the circumstances, all trial courts are now required to interrogate the defendants who enter guilty pleas so that the waiver of these fundamental rights will affirmatively appear in the record. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238. In summary, I would not erase the bright line about who must state the factual basis for a plea of guilty. Therefore, I dissent. Purtle and Newbern, JJ., join in this dissent.