Court Opinion

ID: 9797276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:17:17.314532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:53:41.894408
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s determination that Hollingsworth did not preserve for appeal the issue of whether the statements he provided to the police during their investigation were voluntarily given. That determination is based upon the majority’s view that Hollingsworth failed to comply with the provisions of K.S.A. 60-404 and, thus, undermined the purpose behind the contemporaneous objection rule. Citing to State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 429, 212 P.3d 165 (2009), which quoted State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 342, 204 P.3d 585 (2009), the majority identifies the rule’s rationale as being “to give ‘the trial court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using the tainted evidence, and thus avoid possible reversal and a new trial.’ ” Here, Hollingsworth complied with the letter of the statute and gave the district court ample opportunity to avoid the use of tainted evidence.
On October 27, 2006, prior to trial, Hollingsworth filed a pro se motion to suppress his statements and reenactments, arguing that he was under stress due to the events in question and due to his living conditions at the time of his arrest. The State responded by requesting a Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine the voluntariness of Hollingsworth’s statements. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). On December 8, 2006, the district court conducted an evidentiaiy hearing on that issue and subsequently ruled that the evidence was admissible at trial.
The majority apparently construes K.S.A. 60-404 as requiring Hollingsworth to reassert and reargue his objection at the trial. However, the statute does not say that. It provides:
“A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence *1261unless there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection.” K.S.A. 60-404.
Here, there appears of record an objection to the evidence which was timely interposed well in advance of trial that clearly specifies the ground for the objection. The district court had ample opportunity to avoid conducting a trial with tainted evidence and, accordingly, to avoid the possibility of reversal or a new trial. Indeed, the district court was not only alerted to the admissibility challenge, but it had the additional benefit of an evidentiary hearing, after which it could carefully consider and rule on the objection. Then, having ruled that Hollingsworth's confession was admissible, the court’s order would remain the law of this case, until such time as the court might modify or amend its prior ruling.
In effect, the majority reads K.S.A. 60-404 as requiring a defendant, at trial, to timely interpose a motion for modification of the court’s previous adverse admissibility ruling. That interpretation does not comport with either the statutory language or the rationale for the rule. I would find that the issue was preserved for appeal.