Court Opinion

ID: 9648618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:30:43.887395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:04.263857
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The chancellor here found that Tom Watson had developed a significant personal relationship with his son, Andrew Reeves. Moreover, the natural mother, Lynn Watson, while acknowledging that Andrew was Tom Watson’s child, swore as part of the adoption petition filed with her new husband that the natural father was unknown. Knowing that the child was Tom Watson’s, she purposely did not notify him of the adoption. Under these circumstances I would hold that Watson’s due process rights were violated. The majority states that the Putative Father Registry Act satisfies notice requirements. It further concludes that if a putative father fails to register, he is not entitled to notice of an adoption, regardless of his personal relationship with his son or the mother’s calculated acts to deny him notice. That cannot be the law. The Putative Father Registry Act certainly provides a procedural mechanism for notifying putative fathers. I cannot agree, however, that it provides an exclusive means for notice or that failure to register deprives a putative father of his right to notice under these circumstances. Notice in addition to that afforded by Arkansas’ Putative Father Registry Act is guaranteed by the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions when the father has developed a significant personal relationship with the son. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in this vein: When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by “com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,” Caban, 441 US, at 392, 60 L.Ed.2d 297, 99 S.Ct. 1760 his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be said that he “act[s] as a father toward his children.” Id., at 389, n 7, 60 L.Ed.2d 297,99 S.Ct. 1760. But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). In Lehr, that relationship between father and son was lacking. Here, the significant personal relationship is given, and the chancery court so found. But since Watson does not attack the Putative Father Registry Act on constitutional grounds, the majority is reluctant to delve into whether Watson had due process rights in addition to the statutory rights. The focus, however, should not be on whether a constitutional question relating to the statute was raised, but on whether Watson was entitled to notice in this case as part of procedural due process. I believe that he was. Any other conclusion violates fundamental fairness. The fact that the natural mother attempted to thwart notice to Watson enhances this position. Under the majority opinion, a putative father could have the best of relationships with his son but fail to register. Then when the natural mother hides the fact of an adoption from him, he has no recourse. I would reverse. Holt, C.J., joins.