Court Opinion

ID: 9760369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:50:18.601357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:11.202045
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority avoids deciding the Batson issue in this case by needlessly focusing on proper labeling of procedural issues.
The trial court issued conclusions of law that stated in part:
“Reviewing the challenges as a unit and all other relevant facts and circumstances, the court concludes that the record does not demonstrate purposeful discrimination in the jury selection.”
Coupled with this conclusion of law the record also reflects that a full cross examination of the State’s prosecutor occurred in a defense motion to quash the jury based on the systematic exclusion of minorities from jury service in Tarrant County. The majority chooses to ignore the cross examination of the State’s prosecutor which answers the Batson issue that is before us.1 The State’s prosecutor was specifically asked why he struck the only Hispanic on the panel. Defense counsel questioned the prosecutor as follows:
“Q. Refer to juror number 16, Catalina Rodriguez Gonzalez, the fact that she has got a Bachelors of Music, Seventh Day Adventist, medical secretary at the present time, would that not qualify her to be a good State’s juror?
“A. No, I wouldn’t think so, not with a Masters of Divinity. That — might indicate somebody who would possibly be weak on punishment.”
In addition to this testimony counsel for the defense argued that the State had questioned venireperson Gonzalez in a superficial manner.
The majority now chooses to ignore this testimony because it occurred at the hearing on the motion to quash the jury panel. In other words, the cross examination was improperly labeled. The majority offers no explanation why this testimony does not satisfy the substantive requirements of Batson. In United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir.1987), the proper role of a reviewing court was explained.
“Taking our cue from Batson’s repeated analogies to Title VII jurisprudence, 106 S.Ct. 1721 n. 18, 1722 n. 19, 1724 n. 21, we hold that when the prosecution’s explanation is of record, we will review only the district court’s finding of discrimination vel non. Cf., e.g., U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Gov. v. Aikens, 460 *195U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481-82, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Merrill v. Southern Methodist University, 806 F.2d 600, 605 n. 6 (5th Cir.1986) (noting in Title VII context that “ ‘by the time a full-tried case reaches us on appeal, the parties’ showing at the preliminary levels of the framework is irrelevant.... We need address only the propriety of the ultimate finding of discrimination vel non.’ ” (quoting EEOC v. Exxon Shipping Co., 745 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir.1984).” Forbes, 816 F.2d at 1010.
This Court has before it all the facts necessary to decide whether intentional discrimination has occurred. Because the cross-examination of the State’s prosecutor occurred at the time of the alleged violation, the best testimony as to whether discrimination occurred during voir dire is before us. The majority’s opinion does absolutely nothing to further the aims of Bat-son and ignores the proper role of an appellate court in reviewing questions of intentional discrimination in jury selection.
I also add that members of the majority have shown a propensity to castigate the State for preparing for a Batson hearing. See Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 716 (Tex.Cr.App.1989, original submission). I can find no support in caselaw that a party’s preparation for a hearing diminishes their credibility. Since the majority is insisting on a remand then I flatly reject any contention that the parties to a Batson hearing should have their credibility impugned based on a professional responsibility to represent their clients to the best of their ability.
WHITE, J., joins this dissent.

. The cross examination in question is relegated to a footnote in the majority opinion. Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).