Court Opinion

ID: 9364602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 19:00:19.760841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.298211
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50726         Document: 00516616352             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/19/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                        FILED
                                                                                 January 19, 2023
                                         No. 21-50726                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Yaritza Naranjo,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:20-CR-500-1

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Dennis and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Yaritza Naranjo appeals her jury-trial convictions for transportation
   of, and conspiracy to transport, illegal aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
   § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (v)(I). She contends, as she did at trial by motions for
   judgment of acquittal, that the Government did not present sufficient
   evidence to prove she (1) knew of or recklessly disregarded the aliens’ illegal
   statuses or (2) agreed with another person to transport illegal aliens. She also

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Case: 21-50726           Document: 00516616352              Page: 2       Date Filed: 01/19/2023

                                            No. 21-50726

   claims a video recording and transcript of her interview with law
   enforcement, admitted over objection, violated her Sixth Amendment
   confrontation right. Because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find
   her guilty, and because the admission of the tape and transcript, even if
   erroneously admitted, was harmless, we affirm.
                                                   I
           Naranjo’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge is reviewed de novo. 1
   When examining the sufficiency of evidence, our court must affirm a criminal
   conviction “if, after viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the
   light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
   found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 2 In
   short, the question is not whether the jury’s determination was correct, but
   whether it was rational. 3 “We do not delve into the evidentiary weeds: The
   jury ‘retains the sole authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to
   evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’” 4
           The evidence at trial established that Naranjo and her husband drove
   eight hours to pick up four illegal aliens just north of the Mexican border;
   before arriving, one alien texted Naranjo a photograph of the pick-up location
   and a GPS pin of his location; Naranjo and her husband then drove the aliens

           1
            See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 313 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Because
   [defendant] moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case, the
   panel reviews de novo the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to support his
   conviction.”).
           2
            United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citing
   Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
           3
               See United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 677 (5th Cir. 1997).
           4
             United States v. Scott, 892 F.3d 791, 796-97 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States
   v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 2012)).

                                                   2
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                                             No. 21-50726

   further into the United States on a highway known for alien smuggling; they
   dropped the aliens off ahead of a border checkpoint; and Naranjo believed
   the aliens were supposed to pay a smuggler who arranged for their transport.
   The aliens were later apprehended north of the checkpoint, with one in
   possession of Naranjo’s cellphone.                   Although she stated once during
   interrogations with law enforcement that her husband provided the aliens the
   cellphone, Naranjo admitted numerous times during the interrogations that
   she was the one who furnished it to them and that the aliens were going to
   use it “for the part where they were going to run” and to contact a smuggler.
   Considered in the requisite light most favorable to the Government, the
   evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude Naranjo knew or
   recklessly disregarded that the aliens were in the United States unlawfully
   and agreed with at least one other person to transport them. 5
                                                   II
           Naranjo’s Confrontation Clause claim is reviewed de novo but
   “subject to a harmless error analysis.” 6 “We assume without deciding that
   the [transcript] violated the Confrontation Clause.” 7 “We nevertheless
   affirm because we are convinced that the error was ‘harmless beyond a
   reasonable doubt.’” 8 That standard requires the Government to show

           5
            See United States v. Jimenez-Elvirez, 862 F.3d 527, 534 (5th Cir. 2017) (“The
   elements of conspiracy may be established solely by circumstantial evidence, including ‘the
   presence, association, and concerted action of the defendant with others.’” (quoting
   United States v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358, 366 (5th Cir. 2012))).
           6
          See United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 465 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
   McCormick, 54 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1995)).
           7
               See United States v. Sarli, 913 F.3d 491, 496 (5th Cir. 2019).
           8
               Id. (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 464 F.3d 555, 562 (5th Cir. 2006)).

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                                          No. 21-50726

   “there was ‘no reasonable possibility that the tainted evidence might have
   contributed to the jury’s verdict of guilty.’” 9
           Naranjo argues that the transcript violated her confrontation right
   because Agent Donaldson, in his questions to her, repeated statements that
   were allegedly made by co-conspirators who were not available to testify at
   trial. The statements were presented to her as the story her alleged co-
   conspirators had told, and Donaldson asked Naranjo if everything was true.
           The district court, in admitting the transcript over objection, twice
   issued a limiting instruction to the jury that “the statements of the agent in
   the video regarding what some other person or persons told him [are] not
   introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” In the Confrontation
   Clause context evaluating a limiting instruction, we have explained “[t]he
   almost invariable assumption is that jurors follow such instructions. To
   overcome this presumption, there must be an overwhelming probability that
   the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instruction . . . and a strong
   likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the
   defendant.” 10 No such probability has been shown here.

           9
            United States v. Buluc, 930 F.3d 383, 392 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.
   Jones, 930 F.3d 366, 379 (5th Cir. 2019)).
           10
              United States v. Moparty, 11 F.4th 280, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (first quoting United
   States v. Ramos-Cardenas, 524 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2008); and then quoting Greer v.
   Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see
   also United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 683 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Juries are presumed to
   follow limiting instructions. Because the statement was not admitted to establish the truth
   of the matter asserted, it does not contravene Crawford.” (citing United States v.
   Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 288 (5th Cir. 2002)); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 n.6
   (1985)) (“The assumption that jurors are able to follow the court’s instructions fully
   applies when rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause are at issue.” (citing Frazier v.
   Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 735 (1969))).

                                                4
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                                          No. 21-50726

           Further, “[t]he potentially problematic sections of the [transcript]
   were all proven by other testimony, and therefore there is no reasonable
   probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had those
   sections been redacted.” 11 All of the information in the agent’s questions
   was admitted by Naranjo herself or substantiated by other evidence at trial.
   The only part of the agent’s statement Naranjo disagreed with in the
   interrogation was that “the people they picked up were gonna pay them
   later . . . for the ride.” The jury, however, found for Naranjo on that point.
   This indicates both that she could not have been harmed on this point and
   that the jury credited Naranjo’s admissions rather than the agent’s questions.
           Finally, “[t]o decide how harmful the challenged evidence was, we
   consider how it was used. If the government relied on the violative testimony
   in its closing argument, we are more likely to conclude that the error was
   harmful.      If the government makes only ‘fleeting references’ to the
   unconstitutional evidence, we are less likely to find harm.” 12 Here, “[t]he
   prosecution essentially pointed to [Naranjo’s] own account of what
   happened and asked the jury to draw the only reasonable inference

           11
              See United States v. McClaren, 13 F.4th 386, 416 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub
   nom. Fortia v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1244 (2022) (“The factual basis contained
   information from three people who purchased crack from Gracin and did not testify, which
   was cumulative evidence of Gracin’s own involvement in the drug conspiracy, which he
   admitted at trial.”); United States v. Bedoy, 827 F.3d 495, 512 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Even
   assuming—without deciding—that Crawford proscribes Agent Minor’s testimony, we find
   that any error in admitting the tapes was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The content
   of the Mazzei phone calls was cumulative: there was substantial evidence that Bedoy knew
   of or foresaw a federal grand jury investigation—namely, Bedoy’s and Sysy’s own
   statements, which Bedoy concedes were properly admitted.”).
           12
               United States v. Hamann, 33 F.4th 759, 771 (5th Cir. 2022) (first citing United
   States v. Alvarado-Valdez, 521 F.3d 337, 342 (5th Cir. 2008); and then citing United States
   v. Sarli, 913 F.3d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 2019)).

                                                5
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                                              No. 21-50726

   available.” 13 The prosecution did not focus on the agent’s statements in its
   opening or closing; it emphasized over and over again that the jury should
   focus on Naranjo’s words. “By contrast, in cases where we’ve granted relief,
   the defendant’s involvement was hotly contested, and the prosecution
   depended on out-of-court testimony to identify the defendant as a participant
   in the crime.” 14 Accordingly, even if there was a Confrontation Clause error
   in admitting the transcript and recording, it was harmless.
                                          *        *         *
           For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

           13
                Sarli, 913 F.3d at 497.
           14
             Id. at 496-98 (“To overturn a conviction based on mere fleeting references to
   out-of-court statements would be tantamount to establishing a rule of per se harm. Our
   precedents, by contrast, require not just speculation, but a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the
   error contributed to the conviction. Meeting that standard requires far more than this case
   involves.”).

                                                   6