Court Opinion

ID: 9723160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:04:19.870545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.203988
License: Public Domain

Justice Levin,
dissenting in Livingston County v Livingston Circuit Judge, 393 Mich 265; 225 NW2d 352 (1975), simply noted that "neither a definition of nor procedure for determining the 'public employer’ is provided”.1
The Board asserts that the true relationship between it and WCR is simply one of independent contractor status. This may or may not be true. However, that argument in no way precludes a finding of joint employer status as to the employees.
In Boire v Greyhound Corp, 376 US 473, 481; 84 S Ct 894; 11 L Ed 2d 849 (1964), the United States Supreme Court dismissed the significance of the independent contractor relationship in a situation similar to this case. In Boire, the NLRB had found Greyhound Co. to be a joint employer of the employees of Floors Co. with whom Greyhound had contracted. The United States Supreme Court held:
"Whether Greyhound, as the Board held, possessed sufficient control over the work of the employees to *426qualify as a joint employer with Floors is a question which is unaffected by any possible determination as to Floors’ status as an independent contractor, since Greyhound has never suggested that the employees themselves occupy an independent contractor status.” 376 US at 481. (Emphasis added.)
The Board does not contend that the employees involved in the instant case are independent contractors. Therefore, the exact relationship between appellant and WCR is irrelevant, as was the relationship in Boire, supra.
This Court in Wayne County, supra at 294, attempted to isolate the criteria identifying an employer:
" * * * we find the general characteristics of identification of an employer are: (1) that they select and engage the employee; (2) that they pay the wages; (3) that they have the power of dismissal; (4) that they have the power and control over the employee’s conduct.”
As in Boire, supra at 475, the question of whether the Board possessed sufficient indicia of control to be considered an employer is one of fact.
As a factual issue, MERC’s determination is subject to only limited judicial review. The standard of appellate review of MERC Board findings of fact is set forth in the LMA:
"The findings of the board with respect to questions of fact if supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive.” MCLA 423.23(eMf); MSA 17.454(25)(e)-(0.
This standard comports with Const 1963, art 6, § 28 and § 106 of the Administrative Procedures *427Act (MCLA 24.101 et seq.; MSA 3.560(101) et seq.) regarding the minimum constitutional scope of judicial review of administrative decisions. MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, 393 Mich 116, 121; 223 NW2d 283 (1974), Municipal Employees v Chesaning, 62 Mich App 157; 233 NW2d 511 (1975), Van Buren Public School District v Wayne Circuit Judge, 61 Mich App 6; 232 NW2d 278 (1975), MERC v Kleen-O-Rama, 60 Mich App 61; 230 NW2d 308 (1975). However, our understanding of that standard of appellate review, limited in scope though it may be, does not permit us to unthinkingly ratify MERC actions. Despite some testimonial support for MERC conclusions, there is a point at which findings of fact can grow into an error of law. International Union of Operating Engineers v Sinai Hospital, 64 Mich App 18, 21; 234 NW2d 772 (1975).
The facts in this case reveal that the employees perform services for the Board and county which the Board and county are required by law to undertake. Although their wages are paid by WCR, WCR receives its funding from the Board and the county. The Board determines the qualifications necessary for employment in a particular position, sets the amount to be paid as wages, and earmarks a certain amount of money for that purpose. Any additional funds the WCR receives from contributions cannot be used to increase wages but must be turned over to the Board.
In this factual setting, a meticulous adherence to common-law definitions would not further the purpose of Michigan’s labor law framework. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has realized that, on occasion, a more flexible conception of the term "employer” is required. In NLRB v EC Atkins & Co, 331 US 398; 67 S Ct 1265; 91 L Ed *4281563 (1947), the United States Supreme Court, in formulating the definition of an employer-employee relationship under the National Labor Relations Act, rejected the strict application of technical and traditional common law definitions. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court found that guards at a military defense plant were employees of the defense contractor despite the fact that the War Department directed the work at the plant:
"In this setting, it matters not that respondent was deprived of some of the usual powers of an employer, such as the absolute power to hire and fire the guards and the absolute power to control their physical activities in the performance of their service. Those are relevant but not exclusive indicia of an employer-employee relationship under this statute. As we have seen, judgment as to the existence of such a relationship for purposes of this Act must be made with more than the common law concepts in mind. That relationship may spring as readily from the power to determine the wages and hours of another coupled with the obligation to bear the ñnancial burden of those wages and the receipt of the benefíts of the hours worked, as from the absolute power to hire and lire or the power to control all the activities of the worker. In other words, where the conditions of the relation are such that the process of collective bargaining may appropriately be utilized as contemplated by the Act, the necessary relationship may be found to be present.” 331 US at 413-414 (Emphasis added.)
Based on the reasoning cited above and the facts cited earlier, there was sufficient evidence to support the administrative law judge’s finding:
"The Board has every appearance of an 'employer’ *429relationship with the WCR employees. The Board controls, to a large degree, the wages and classifications of the people working at the WCR. It is the duty of the Board to specifically review performance and individual wages before submitting monetary requests to the State of Michigan. There does not appear to be any prohibition against the Board consulting with or bargaining with the Charging Party as to what wages or fringe benefits will be in the requested budget.”
The defendant Board must therefore bargain with the WCR employees subject to the provisions of PERA.
Finding that the Board is also an employer of the WCR employees does not resolve all of the Board’s contentions on appeal. As noted above, the Board contends that it cannot be found guilty of unfair labor practices because it was not originally named as an employer. The Board’s position is not well-taken. MERC regulation 423.444(2) (1968 AACS, p 4770), states that "[i]n appropriate cases, the board or its agent may consolidate representation and unfair labor practice proceedings for hearing and decision”.
This is an appropriate case. To hold otherwise would put AFSCME in an untenable position. It could bargain with WCR as to working conditions but not as to wages and fringe benefits; as to wage and fringe benefits, it could not bargain with anyone.
It is unfortunate that the term "unfair labor practice” has gained such a pejorative gloss. It merely refers to any act which frustrates the objectives of LMA and PERA. The Board’s action in refusing to bargain with AFSCME did frustrate the goals of those acts. Therefore, MERC’s order (adopting the recommended order of the adminis*430trative law judge) that the Board bargain in good faith with AFSCME is affirmed.2 Affirmed.

 In all likelihood the 1965 Legislature did not even consider the question.

 We cannot concern ourselves with the implications of this decision on the other 39 contracting agencies as each has its own contract. Unless and until one of those other contracts is brought here for review, this Court must confine itself to the dispute between AFSCME and the Board.