Court Opinion

ID: 9714095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:30:30.721182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.361766
License: Public Domain

Supplemental Opinion by Black, J.
(dissenting). The foregoing opinion for affirmance was submitted to other members of the Court on September 13th. Since then Justices O’Hara and Smith, unwilling as I gather to join Justice Kelly in contribution of ¡that last full measure of devotion to the Murphy *638Case (Murphy v. Flint Board of Education, 314 Mich 226), have submitted their separate reasons for holding that the plaintiff school teacher is not entitled • to compensation per the award below.
This most recent opinion for reversal invites what is due even though there be no invitation, that is, a rejoinder by one who actually has stopped to familiarize himself with the facts, the facts which supposedly make the law. The ensuing supplemental opinion is accordingly turned in for recording in our books; also for better days of better precedent in this State of the fair peninsulas and of unbelievably erratic compensation case law.' Purposely tautological, it will return regularly to controlling-evidence the award-reversing Brethren have not— judging by chirography to date — sifted and considered as yet.
First: Justices O’Hara and Smith, having plucked a short sentence from the center of that discourse' which was approved and adopted in the Punches Case4 say “There is the ‘key finding.’ ” I suggest instead that the continuant contexture of Punches leads best to such “key finding” (a finding which proceeds directly opposite to the heading my Brothers steer by their special juristic compass). Recounted, then, for the convenience of those who must read and then estimate anew the legal future of section 1, is Pimches' unbroken and pertinent text (p 349):
“This is not a case where an employee went out of the scope of his employment to do the work of' another, without the knowledge and consent of his employer. The foreman, according to his own testimony, had assumed the responsibility of seeing that this team received the necessary care. He permitted the decedent to drive the team because he was familiar with horses, and permitted him to attend to.' *639the team for the same reason. Driving and tending this team was the work decedent was paid for. He had taken the team to his home for the purpose of feeding and caring for it. "While bringing the team to work in the morning, after feeding and caring for it, he was accidently injured.
“It is our opinion that this accident arose out of :and in the course of his employment. Authority to ■do a certain piece of work does not necessarily rest upon express command of the employer. "Where an employer, with full knowledge of the circumstances, permits an employee to do part of his work outside of his regular hours, or off the employer’s premises, he should not be heard to say that he is not responsible for the work or for accidents that may arise out ■of the work. The employer, through his foreman, •consented to the decedent’s practice of taking the team to his home, and caring for it, caused feed to be sent to his home that the team might be cared for there, and in our opinion, the decedent was in the employ of the employer when necessarily caring for the team, and taking it to and from his barn (citing cases).”
Now I make bold to paraphrase and metaphrase the Punches Case.
This is not a case where Mrs. Baas went out of the scope of her employment to do the work of .another, without the knowledge and consent of her employer. The principal of the school, according to her own testimony, had assumed the responsibility for seeing that the task of teaching the second grade, hy Mrs. Baas, was done properly and according’ to her direction. She and the superintendent permitted, nay approved, the taking home by Mrs. Baas of the papers and books which had to be worked upon in preparation for the next school day, also for the week ahead, just as the employer’s team had to be ■cared for by Jideon Punches lest that team be not ready for the next day’s “on the job” work. Teach*640ing the second grade, and preparing to teach the second grade that next school day and that next week, was the work Mrs. Baas was paid to do. She could not do the one, at school, without first having done her required preparatory work at home. That actually completed preparatory work, unlike the undone work teacher Edna Murphy started to take home (but did not get there) on the day of her misfortune, had to be done at home and had to be ready when the second-graders were called to attention the next school morning. Why? Because the grade was taught by “ditto” sheets the teacher had to master-prepare, ahead of time for such next day. And why did that master-preparation have to be done at the teacher’s home? Because no other place was provided for the doing thereof, and because the employer approved its being done at the teacher’s home.
Not that it was necessary, to establish the “in” and “out of” character of Mrs. Baas’ trip, that she transport or attempt to transport those “ditto” sheets only to school. The separate “lesson plans,” also prepared by her at home for the next 2 weeks, also had to be gotten to school by her; or by “someone sometime.” Such fact alone was sufficient to provide the essential “concurrent cause of the trip” Mrs. Baas started that morning. More of this later, as Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 NY 90 (167 NE 181) comes to scrutiny and application.
I said — above—that the work taken home by Mrs. Baas was imminently required for the next school day; whereas such was not the fact of Murphy. Now hear Justice Carr, writing in Murphy at 234:
“She [Edna Murphy] was not charged with the duty of transporting or safeguarding property of the employer. It should be noted, also, that the accident happened on Monday; that the examinations, *641for which plaintiff wished to prepare questions, did not begin until the following week, and there is no showing in the record that the preparation of such questions on the day of injury ivas necessary.”5
This is not all for the dubious case of Mtirphy, as we shall see anon.
To the contrary of Murphy, there is in this case of Baas an undisputed “showing in the record” that the precedent preparation of the master-dittos was necessary to the teaching of the second grade, the very next school day. Thus Justice Carr, for all who will not avert judicial gaze as they read what was written by him in Murphy, has with then signatory Justices distinguished the Murphy Case from the one now before us.
Now, lest there be attempted squirming from this “key” fact, let us read quite undisputed testimony dealing with Mrs. Baas’ duties and her faithful execution thereof up to the point of collision that icy and wintry morning. Miss De Boo, principal of the Zeeland school where Mrs. Baas taught, is testifying :
“Q. Were any books returned to you?
“A. A man brought her briefcase and planning book, and her plan book was for the next 2 weeks. That was so nice for the assistant teacher that had to step in.
“Q. Mr. Mulder testified it was up to her to draw those plans, is that right?
“A. She would come to me sometimes because I taught second grade too, so sometimes we planned it together.
“Q. This work was done at home?
“A. This work was done at home because she had her reading book and spelling book, and we would get a whole empty book and have to fill in what we have to do every day and every subject. That has *642to be at least a week in advance so if anything should happen if we be sick or something, the substitute teacher can step in and go on with what Bible story, or what arithmetic we are working on, or spelling.”
Now we listen to Mr. Mulder, superintendent of the school system:
“Q. It is part and parcel of the professional practice of teachers to do part of their work at home, particularly the teachers assigned to your school; is that correct?
“A. Yes, and the reason — getting back to this other idea of doing if in school — -teachers would have no social life at all if they didn’t do it that way. They might go out to a basketball game and have to do it after the basketball game. Otherwise, she would be tied to a desk all of her time. Maybe that is why people think teachers are queer.
“Q. They would be required to transport in these briefcases, papers and books; is that right?
“A. I would say that would be commonplace.
“Q. You couldn’t prepare assignments if you did not have the books ?
“A. Lesson plans.
“Q. Anything else that had to be transported back and forth?
“A. Particularly in the case of Mrs. Baas, she would have no plans, so she would have to prepare all her plans, and she would have to do all of her planning when she was not in school. If you can picture a teacher sitting at a desk where the pupils were and doing her planning—
“Q. This would require some physical properties —books and papers?
“A. Very definitely.”
Finally, Mrs. Baas’ husband testified as follows:
“Q. "We are interested in knowing from you what work Irene regularly brought home, how many hours she worked regularly on her work assignment and *643what she particularly did the weekend prior to this injury.
“A. Well, the routine at our house was we would eat supper around 6 o’clock or 6:30, and immediately after supper cleared the table. I would do the dishes and she would do her homework — approximately 7 or 7:30. She would usually work until 11 o’clock, or possible longer.
“Q. Describe her homework. Were there merely papers, or papers and books'?
“A. There were papers and books. Mostly papers. She would first usually correct papers. This was the project she had done during the day. Also she had to prepare the lesson for the class the next day. She made dittos — she had a type of paper she would draw the lesson plans on and the next morning the first thing she would run off the ditto machine and have a copy for each pupil. Her master 2-week plan was usually done every weekend. She would plan at least a week ahead each weekend.”
So far, my Brethren in majority do not advise why they have ignored — or must ignore — all this evidence. True, they may not believe any of it. But if that is the reason, such reason should he stated of record, rather than given the silent treatment. All members of this Court are entitled to know why evidence and inference of apparently decisive value are majority-disdained here. So is this permanently disabled schoolteacher and her family.
To rule peremptorily that sworn and administratively found facts disclose — as a matter of law — no> right to that which the statutory administrator has awarded or denied, and to make such ruling without deign of reason for disregard of such facts, is no less than that kind of judicial otiosity which, sooner or later if not uncovered, is due to make sluggards of us all. I prefer a clangorous arousal, hopeful that it will provoke some explanatory precedent of' factual as well as leg*al value upon which the appeal *644board, to say nothing of an already vexed profession, may rely with some degree of assurance.
One would naturally conclude, upon uncritical perusal of the 2 current opinions for reversal, that the presently assigned task of this Court is that of finding any evidence — any permissible inference — ■ upon which to base a denial of compensation. The task happens to be the other way around where, as here, the board has awarded compensation and the employer has sued out certiorari under longstanding section 12 of part 3 of the act (CL 1915, § 5465, CL 1929, § 8451, CL 1948, § 413.12 [Stat Ann, Stat Ann 1950 Rev, Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.186]). To the fully sharpened point, see Fellows, J., writing for the unanimous Court in Meyers v. Michigan Central R. Co., 199 Mich 134; and quotation of Meyers with unreserving approval in Thornton v. Luria-Dumes Co-Venture, 347 Mich 160, 162. If this were not so, some great Nestor of our bench would — long since — -have told us.
Second: Justices O’Hara and Smith quote Murphy (at 229) as relevantly informing us that “No claim is made that the fact that she was carrying the books and papers referred to contributed in any way to the injury she suffered.” This brings us to the reliance of Justices O’Hara and Smith upon another selected sentence taken from the landmarked and much misunderstood6 case of Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, 251 NY 90, 93 (167 NE 181).
The court in Marks laid down a hitherto universally accepted test. Justice Cardozo, having considered the testimonial record at hand, concluded by such test that the death of Mr. Marks was noncompensable because he was killed on the highway while on a purely personal trip, that is, “He was *645making it in fulfillment of a promise to call for Ms-wife at the end of the day, and bring her home in the family car.” Now, with the Cardozo test¡ in constant mind, I consider Michigan’s “twofold purpose” rule; a rule which, as we shall perceive by quotation, fits such test perfectly.
Two factors, one definitely personal and the other just as precisely the doing of “something useful and helpful to her employer” (the quote again is from Punches), establish that Mrs. Baas was “engaged in a twofold purpose.”7 That “twofold purpose” was the personal-benefit trip to work from home, and-the bringing to work with her of that work-produet which had been, yes, manufactured at home for the job to be done, that day and ensuing days, at the regular place of work. Indeed, the ditto sheets and lesson plans done at home, which Mrs. Baas was endeavoring to transport to school, made it possible for the hurriedly summoned substitute teacher *646"to carry directly on, as Mrs. Baas would have done but for her accident while on the way.
My Brothers declare, from Marks’ Dependents v. Gray, that “What concerns us here is whether the risks of travel are also risks of employment.” I fully agree and note immediately that the appeal board, similarly concerned, answered affirmatively by pointing to the messenger test. “Someone” (see ensuing quotation of Larson) had to bring the sheets and lesson plans to school from the Baas home, and the transportation thereof was due that morning. The sheets and plans did get to school, partly through Mrs. Baas’ effort and partly through the effort of a volunteer, the latter probably having been 1 of the police officers who picked up, from the pavement, Mrs. Baas’ strewed about books and papers. As the appeal board pointed out, if the second transporter had been an employee of the school, and had been sent to the scene of accident to get the books and papers, he would — traveling each way on the trip — have been engaged in the course of his employment and, if disabled on the way, would have qualified for compensation. Nevertheless, say my Brothers, Mrs. Baas is to be judged —yes, as a matter of law — as having been outside the legal ambit that morning.
Grotesque law? Yes, bred and inbred only in Michigan; the State which, according to Roscoe Pound, “has attained a bad eminence in narrow interpretation and application of the workmen’s compensation act.” (Por full quotation and source, see Mack v. Reo Motors, Inc., 345 Mich 268, at 281.)
Since Marks’ Dependents v. Gray is advanced as authority for overruling the appeal board, I would examine its rightful scope with Larson, concededly a national authority on workmen’s compensation (1 Larson at 244):
*647“It is inaccurate and misleading to call this test,! as sometimes has been done, the ‘dominant purpose’; test, or to paraphrase it by saying that the trip is a business trip if the ‘primary’ purpose is business.' Judge Cardozo used no such language. He said it was sufficient if the business motive was a concurrent cause of the trip. He then defined ‘concurrent cause’ by saying that it meant a cause which would have occasioned the making of the trip even if the private mission had been canceled. One detail must be stressed to make this rule complete: it is not necessary, under this formula, that, on failure of the personal motive, the business trip would have been taken by this particular employee at this particular time. It is enough that someone sometime would have had to take the trip to carry out the business mission. Perhaps another employee would have done it; perhaps another time would have been chosen; but if the trip would ultimately have had to be made, and if the employer got this necessary item of travel accomplished by combining it with this employee’s personal trip, it is accurate to say that it was a concurrent cause of the trip, rather than an incidental appendage or afterthought.”8 (Italics by Larson.)
Yes, “It is enough that someone sometime would have had to take the trip [the trip Mrs. Baas started that morning] to carry out the business mission.” I repeat then, for due stress, that the lesson of the day, ready for “dittoing,” had to be transported from Mrs. Baas’ home to the school, and that “someone” had to get it the rest of the way when Mrs. Baas’ “twofold” trip was interrupted by her accident; an *648accident which, regrettably, seems to have pnt her but of all kinds of gainful employment for the rest of her life; not just 500 weeks.
The appeal board, boresighting the target made by Cardozo and Larson, saw this transportational fact clearly and applied it rightfully to the concurrent causes of Mrs. Baas’ trip. The trip was dually purposed and, just on account of its duality, may well have brought her to the immediate seconds of collisive danger on time for accident and injury that icy morning, rather than earlier or later for safety. By Cardozo’s test, her work created an additional “necessity for travel” from home to school.
“The test in brief is this: If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own. Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., 231 NY 273 (131 NE 914).” Marks’ Dependents v. Gray at 93, 94.
Cardozo’s test has become the standard text of 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation, § 241, pp 744, 745, “Effect of Mingling of Purposes of Employer and Employee.” The text:
“The test ordinarily employed for determining liability in such a case is that, if the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment though he is serving at the same time some purpose of his own.”
Third: Justices O’Hara and Smith conclude that “Her accidental injury arose out of automobile travel, not out of the work she was required to do at home.” That flat declaration is put forth as a matter of law. There is no qualification. Thus it must be, likewise as a matter of law, that when any employee gets into a motor propelled vehicle, and then drives it out on a public way, an injury sustained by him during the course of such highway *649travel arises exclusively out of such motor travel, no matter the nature of the employee’s mission.
Such reasoning spurns the automobile-traveling-salesman’s case of Derleth, quoted in my first opinion. It snubs too the motorcycling employee’s case of Kingsley v. Donovan, 169 App Div 828 (155 NYS 801), upon which the Court in Derleth relied along with Punches and other like section 1 cases. It ignores (here is the real sin) the “twofold purpose” rule, a rule which is neither new nor novel. See 1 Larson,, beginning under heading “Dual Purpose Trips” at page 240 (§ 18.10 et seq_.). The rule seems to have come first — in Michigan — to unanimous and unequivocal approval in the Clifton Case (Clifton v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 217 Mich 462) at 465. Later in Anderson v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. 326 Mich 429, the Court said (p 433):
“The commission found that decedent had a twofold purpose in going to the restaurant, one to have breakfast and the other to do business for his employer, in accordance with the well-established custom acquiesced in by the employer; that the causes were concurrent and so closely related that it would be impossible to conclude that either one was the primary reason for his absence from the store. As the business aspect was found not to be merely incidental, it follows that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, and is compensable. The requisite causal connection was present.”
Note, in the Anderson Case, the Court’s refusal upon stated reason to apply the Murphy Case. Is not Murphy presently inapplicable for the same reason as was given for inapplicability thereof to Anderson¶ Here is Anderson’s eohibitor of Murphy (p 434):
“Defendants cite Murphy v. Flint Board of Education, supra, Jeffries v. Jodawelky, 304 Mich 421, Conklin v. Industrial Transport, Inc., 312 Mich 250, *650and Eaggar v. Tanis, 320 Mich 295, in support of their claim that the injury was outside the ambit of .employment. The facts of those cases distinguish them from the instant one. In the Murphy Case the injury occurred after the working day, while claimant was on the way home. She was not at the time engaged in any specific mission for her employer.”
Now will someone rise here and say what all ■reversers are so far chary of saying; that is, that Mrs. Baas was not at the time “engaged in any specific mission for her employer” ? Failing that, are we not plunged ever deeper into that “wilderness of doubt and confusion” former Justice Talbot Smith wrote of in the section 1 case of Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich 577, at 601?
The- Sheppard Case, all 58 pages of it, was written in 1957. Now-, with the handing down in 1963-of this similarly divided case, have we not cast section 1 again into that nebulous world of demi-law we know 'too well? All one can answer now is that better precedent surely must be ahead, as our personnel .continues, inevitably to change and change again.
Fourth: Justices O’Hara and Smith look upon my first opinion as “erroneously” making, of Jideon Punches’ driving of the team as he rode to work, as “synonymous with driving the automobile here.” Well, my error — if it be an error — stands confessed, patent and proclaimed. The 2 acts of driving are indeed legally synonymous, as much as if Mrs. Baas had taken a horse (belonging to the school district) home for feeding and care and then had hitched the horse to a borrowed or rented gig or cutter for return of herself with books and papers to school. Both drivers were taking to work something they had readied for the day’s work, by work done at home; something the employer needed to have brought in for the regular day’s work. Whether drawn by horse or motor both were engaged in a “twofold *651purpose,” and both upon vehicular injury — while ori the way — became entitled to compensation for injury suffered in the course and out of such dual purpose.
Fifth: The clincher launched by Justices O’Hara and Smith is this: “Plaintiff was not required by her employer to drive or travel by car.” It is not unfair to retort that neither was Jideon Punches required by his employer to ride — I said “ride”— in Mr. Barry’s wagon.9 He should, by the quartering hairsplit my Brothers make, have driven the team each way from the safety of shanks’ mare.
Looking with care at such hairsplit, it should.be stressed that it was no part of Jideon’s duty to take the wagon (distinguished from the team) home; also that he would not have been hurt had he not been riding in the wagon when the team ran away. It was Jideon’s employer-understood duty to take the team home, for care and shelter there, and. to return it the next day. The wagon, on the other hand, was taken home by Jideon for his own convenience, that of riding instead of driving the team afoot. So, if we are to say that Mrs. Baas’ injury arose exclusively from automobile travel, as Justices O’Hara and Smith do by their naked dixi, then we should say forthrightly that the Fellows Court missed wholly this legal jewel my Brothers have unearthed.
If Justices O’Hara and Smith are right, should not the Court — in Punches — have said just as flatly that Jideon’s fatal injuries arose out of wagon travel, and not out of any work he was required to do at home? And since there will be no answer to this, *652is not the professional reader of our trisected opinions entitled to conclude that some seated here do heave and strain mightily at more and more midges, gnats, punkies, and no-see-ums10 in effort to find more and more reasons for defeating what seems to be just compensation?
This should be enough, but that observation of my Brothers that Mrs. Baas was not required to travel by car calls for further treatment, humorous as well as serious. Now I find in the record and briefs no proof and no claim that she could have traveled from home to school in any way — any at all — excepting by automobile. There is no suggestion by anyone that public buses or jitneys, or street cars, or even an early morning passenger train, were either convenient or running conveniently between the vicinities of home and school (a little over 6 miles apart). The thought of airplane travel is a bit to the absurd, and she could not ride a bicycle on account of the extremely icy condition of the highways that day. But then, the inference of my Brothers considered, there may have been a livery stable handy with cutters (it being wintry, snowy and dangerously slippery) and horses for rent. And, yes, she could have walked, just as Jideon Punches could have walked; the only difference being that she had just 6 times the distance to cover, over ice and through snow, with books and papers carried by 1 arm and her lunch with thermos bottle carried by the other, while Jideon had only a mile to go, walking with the reins in his hands through the dew and the sunshine of a salubrious September morn. Too, considering her rugged ancestry and the fame of Hans Brinker, Mrs. Baas could have skated to school, towing her done work and prepared lunch on a sled, and thus the good lady could have avoided the *653risks (meanwhile accepting other and possibly more dangerous risks) of “automobile travel” and that callous legal brand my Brothers do now stamp upon her status. Yes, she probably “assumed the risk” of automobile travel that winter morning of 1958, not realizing that this Court was due in 1963 to read another tort concept of master and servant liability into the compensation act; a concept which supposedly was 1 of the salient reasons for adoption of this remedial act a half century ago.
To conduele: Her accident having occurred more than 5 years ago, and the issue not having been submitted here until 1963, Mrs. Baas lacks this year 1 vote only for deserving affirmance. The only victor is an insurer which is due to save medical, hospital, and nursing bills which, just for a part only of the initial 6-month statutory period, totaled $5,614.66, plus the sum of compensation payable for the statutory duration at the presently ordered rate of $40 per week. The only victim is the totally disabled Mrs. Baas, together with her 2 school-age dependent daughters. Today’s result is, without doubt, another tragedy of that chronic disease of courts and tribunals. But for the ever brutal injustice of delayed justice, “it might have been” otherwise. It is. not likely that the Court seated here in 1958 through 1960 would have ignored the “twofold purpose” rule.
Others will be duly warned by what they read here, but Mrs. Baas and her family will never forget what we do here. Schoolteachers will perceive at once that today’s trisection will not — because it. cannot — live long in the precedential annals of a Court that should know better; also, as to the meantime, that each of their class had best obtain, beforehand from the principal, a written order to take that work home for preparation and return to school, by some in-the-order specified means of travel. Such an order probably — I say “probably” — would over*654come the objections of habitual deniers of compensation.
Having reviewed the case again in the light of that which has been contributed by Justices O’Hara and Smith, I am the more convinced that the appeal board was legally as well as sensibly right. As in Wheeler, supra at 594, I join the appeal board in quoting former Justice Talbot Smith as follows:
“An injury arises out of the employment if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment; in other words, out of the employment looked at in any of its aspects.”
My vote to affirm is cast again.

 Punches v. American Box Board Co., 216 Mich 342.

 Emphasis supplied by the present writer.

 See the “when rightly understood and applied” quotation from Larson, in the Brown v. Arapahoe Case, post p 647.

 This quotation is from the pen of Justice Carr, -writing for himself and 3 others in Wheeler v. Conservation Dept., 350 Mich 590, at. 595. There Justice Carr and the other 3 agreed with 4 more Justices: that, because Wheeler “was promoting also a private purpose” did not alter the right of Wheeler’s dependents to compensation in that section 1 ease. Justice Carr,(supported by present Justices Dethmers and Kelly) wrote as follows :
“The situation presented fairly comes within the rule recognized in Anderson v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, 326 Mich 429. There defendant’s employee, as found by the workmen’s compensation, commission, was, at the time of the accident in which he was injured," engaged in a twofold purpose. The testimony indicated that his mission involved not only a private purpose but also the performance of an act within the scope of his employment. The conclusion is warranted that a like situation existed in the case now before us, thus justifying the conclusion of the appeal board that the electrocution of Mr. Wheeler arose out of and in the course of Ms employment.. Under the rule in the Anderson Case the faet that he was promoting! also a private purpose did not alter the situation.
“The statute (CL 1948, §413.12 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev §17.186])! provides that the findings of fact made by the compensation commission (now the appeal board), acting within the scope of its powers,, 'shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive.’ There being testimony, to support the finding made, this Court may not on appeal change thej result. Shaw v. General Motors Corporation, 320 Mich 338; Hooks v. Wayne County Road Commissioners, 345 Mich 384.”

 Recently, in tlie strikingly like case of Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 NM 99, 102 (370 P2d 816, 818, 819), the supreme court of New Mexico observed, immediately after quotation of the Marks-Gray test:
“The above test, as said in 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, at p 241, is ‘a formula which, when rightly understood and' applied, has never yet been improved upon.’ ” (Italics by New Mexico •court.)

 Neither is it unfair to retort that Mr. Wheeler (Wheeler, supra at 592, 593) “was not required by his employer” to crawl under the cottage for extension there of the wire connecting his television set with the television mast on the chimney. If, as Justices Care, Kelly, and. Dethmers agreed in Wheeler, Mr. Wheeler was “engaged in a twofold purpose” with resultant right to compensation of his dependents, then the Brethren should advise why Mrs. Baas was not with like result carrying out “a twofold purpose” that morning. Her compensable right is a bit stronger, one would think, than was that of the Wheeler dependents.

 “Ye blind guides, which strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel.” (Matthew 23:24.)