Court Opinion

ID: 9633174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:36:33.119764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:30.298511
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting. No quarrel do I have with much of the court’s opinion in this case. However, the right of cross-examination during student suspension hearings was not provided for in the suspension hearing act. That is a matter for legislative judgment, for with the right to cross-examine there should be given the power to subpoena witnesses. The right to cross-examine should not be declared by this court in the absence of the power to subpoena witnesses.
We are concerned in the present appeal with proceedings held by school officials who are considering student discipline in a high school. This is not a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding.
One afternoon four separate assaults occurred in the school building. Three of the victims could not or would not identify their assailants. The fourth victim identified his assailant and signed an affidavit in writing reciting the facts surrounding the assault and naming the student responsible. The victim declined to appear at the hearing. He had been assaulted by this same assailant on a previous occasion. The hearing was held by the school officials to consider the matter. The alleged assailant, his mother and his attorney were present at the final hearing which resulted in suspension for the maximum period ending with the current school year. The student in prior semesters had previously suffered two suspensions for assaulting other students in the school building. The hearing with which we are presently concerned is not a criminal or civil trial held under courtroom conditions. It is not a hearing before a governmental administrative tribunal held in quasi judicial surroundings. It is simply a disciplinary proceeding held by school officials to whom is delegated the authority granted by the statute covering the suspension of elementary and high school students. *16This should be kept in mind, for procedural due process must be tailored to fit the particular occasion. This court should not require the same procedural due process in our schools that it would require in a courtroom. Neither should this court impose unnecessary procedural requirements upon school officials which are not contemplated in the legislative act which governs the hearings they must conduct. (K. S. A. 72-8901, et seq.)
The administration of our public school system has become difficult enough in our permissive society without imposing additional burdens and duties upon the school officials unsupported by a grant of the corresponding power and authority to subpoena witnesses. The statute governing suspension proceedings by school officials enumerates the procedural requirements at such hearings. The right of confrontation and cross-examination is not one of the enumerated requirements.
This act was passed in 1970 and it ushered in a whole new concept of student discipline for the school officials to initiate and follow before suspending any student. The school officials have in most cases accepted the legislative fiat and have substantially complied with the act. They are not lawyers or judges. Now, this court adds a new and heretofore non-existent procedural due process requirement to the already heavy procedural burden imposed by the statute, the right to cross-examine witnesses. The majority hold the right to cross-examine must be afforded “absent compelling reasons for dispensing with it”.
There are few if any lawyers so bold as to attempt a definition of that term. I feel certain the term cannot be meaningfully applied by school officials in student suspension hearings. The obvious solution for school officials will be to allow unlimited cross-examination of witnesses in all future student suspension hearings. If this is done the value of affidavits, although permitted by the statute, will be indirectly curtailed or eliminated by this court’s decision.
The statute declares the right of the student to have legal counsel of his own choice present “and to receive the advice of such counsel or other person whom he may select.” This court now says legal counsel may not only be present and advise but he may cross-examine all witnesses. An experienced trial lawyer, skillful in the art of cross-examination, may well take control of such hearings. The hearing officials of the school, unlearned in the law, cannot be *17expected to control the nature or the extent of cross-examination. They hold no contempt powers.
The act which dictates the procedure for these hearings does not grant the right to cross-examine the witnesses. The grant of that right should be left to the sole discretion of the hearing officials. In judicial and quasi judicial hearings there are certain corresponding powers which complement the right to cross-examine witnesses, such as the power to subpoena witnesses, to enforce their attendance and in some cases the power to hold lawyers in contempt for improprieties.
The legislature did not see fit to confer on the school officials the power to compel the attendance of witnesses by subpoena. How then can this corut reasonably impose upon the officials a duty which the officials have no way to enforce? If no power to subpoena witnesses exists, the witnesses in the face of a possible grueling cross-examination may well decline to appear. The school officials may well be faced with a dilemma of this court’s making.
The majority agree that the case law defining procedural due process does not require that the student be afforded the right of cross-examination in every school discipline case. This is true because they would require it “absent compelling reasons for dispensing with it”. Heretofore no such right could be demanded at school hearings. The legislature in the hearing statute (K. S. A. 72-8903) specifically set forth the procedural requirements to be followed and omitted any reference to cross-examination. The statute granted the right to have counsel present and “to receive the advice of such counsel” but it clearly authorized affidavits in writing to be presented and considered. K. S. A. 72-8903 (d) provides:
“. . . Such regulations shall afford procedural due process, including the following:
“(d) the right of the student or pupil to present his own witnesses in person or their testimony hy affidavit, and”. (Emphasis added)
Absent any express provision therefor cross-examination might well be permitted in the discretion of the school officials when a witness appears voluntarily, but that is not the issue here. The right which the student asserts here is the right to require another student, who signed an affidavit under oath, to appear at the hearing and be cross-examined when he has refused or has expressed a desire not to attend. Obviously, without the subpoena power the school officials can do nothing to require attendance. The only *18sanctions available to them would be school discipline or striking the affidavit from the files and dismissing the proceedings. The first sanction would be unfair to a student threatened by his peers. The second sanction would obviously defeat the object of disciplinary proceedings and contribute to further disruptions of the educational mission of the school. Neither sanction is a satisfactory solution.
The cases cited and relied upon in the majority opinion clearly recognize that a student suspension hearing does not require the same protections that are afforded in judicial or quasi judicial hearings. In the Dixon case, cited by the majority, it is pointed out that the nature of such a hearing should vary depending upon the circumstances. The court in Dixon said:
“. . . This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. . . .” (294 F. 2d p. 159)
So the federal courts have specifically held that no right of cross-examination need be afforded in school hearings.
The purpose of our school system is to educate young people of school age. That is and must remain the paramount interest of teachers and school officials. Suspension hearings of necessity require the attendance of both students and teachers. Such attendance is bound to disrupt classes and schedules. There must be special considerations given to the circumstances attending school disciplinary hearings. Public school children suspended for misconduct are not criminals. The legal processes due them are less exacting than those due one who is accused under a criminal statute. Suspension proceedings must be viewed in a school setting. The proceedings required should be educationally sound and not place undue burden upon those whose primary duty is to carry on their educational mission.
In Banks v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 314 F. Supp. 285 (1970) it was said:
“There are significant factual distinctions between Dixon and this case— between a college suspension and a public school suspension. For example, in a college or university, teachers and students are rarely in class for more than a few hours a day, whereas in the public school system teachers and students are in class throughout the day. . . .
“Additionally, the consequences of a public school suspension are considerably less serious than those which follow from a university suspension. . . .” (p. 292)
The hearing in the present case concerns a public school sus*19pension, not a college or university suspension. There is no compelling reason to further burden the beleaguered school officials with additional due process requirements imposed by this court on top of the statutory provisions of K. S. A. 72-8903.
We are concerned here with procedural due process only and not with constitutionally protected liberty or property which are generally affected in judicial or quasi judicial proceedings. The federal courts have recognized a clear distinction. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701, it was said:
“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. But the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite.” (p. 569)
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits. . . .” (p. 576)
“. . . To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.” (P'««577)
“We must conclude that the summary judgment for the respondent should not have been granted, since the respondent has not shown that he was deprived of liberty or property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .” (p. 579)
The foregoing case involved a teaching job at a state university for a fixed term of one year. Refusal to continue the teacher’s employment without giving a reason violated no due process rights protected within the Fourteenth Amendment. The same is true in our present case where statutory procedures were followed and the only question is whether those procedures provide for reasonable notice and a fair and impartial hearing.
The court refers to many decisions, including Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011, which involve the rights of adults in their liberty or property. These cases should not be used as a measure of procedural process in a school suspension case.
Judge Conford of the New Jersey Superior Court in his strong concurring opinion in Tibbs v. Bd. of Ed. of Tp. of Franklin, 114 *20N. J. Super. 287, 276 A. 2d 165, pointed to the difference as follows:
“. . . Decisions like Goldberg v. Kelly, [supra] involve adverse governmental action against persons who are sui juris and not immature members of a controlled high school community in the course of a process of disciplined education. Such decisions are therefore not apposite in the immediate context. . . .” (p.299)
Governmental boards and commissions authorized to hold administrative hearings of a quasi Judicial character are generally, if not always, granted the power and authority to call witnesses and to enforce their attendance at hearings. With this power and authority assured no reason appears why the right of confrontation and cross-examination should not be declared a requirement of procedural due process. A most recent example of this may be found in Adams v. Marshall, 212 Kan. 595, 512 P. 2d 365. In Adams the Civil Service Commission, before whom the matter of discharge of a police officer was pending, had the power of subpoena together with the authority to enforce attendance at its hearings. This court unanimously held the commission must permit cross-examination of witnesses as a requirement of procedural due process.
However, it is both illogical and undesirable where an administrative body has no authority to compel the attendance of witnesses by subpoena, to hold that the right of confrontation and cross-examination exists. No subpoena power is granted to the Board of Education under the hearing statute. This court has no power to legislate such authority. The lack of this authority indicates no right of confrontation and cross-examination should attend. The subpoena power is quid pro quo for the right to confront and cross-examine. (State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp et al., 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433; People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees, Etc., 10 Ill. App. 2d 207, 134 N. E. 2d 635; Tibbs v. Bd. of Ed. of Tp. of Franklin, supra.)
Therefore I must respectfully dissent from Paragraph (5) (a) of the syllabus and the corresponding portions of the opinion.
Fatzer, C. J., and Schroeder, J., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.