Court Opinion

ID: 9555796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 13:08:32.647491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:02.588453
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                            No. 04-22-00329-CR

                                         John Anthony GARCIA,
                                                Appellant

                                                       v.

                                           The STATE of Texas,
                                                 Appellee

                     From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2021CR2058
                              Honorable Jennifer Peña, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:      Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting:         Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                 Beth Watkins, Justice
                 Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) 1

Delivered and Filed: August 9, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Appellant John Anthony Garcia challenges his judgment of conviction for aggravated

robbery. He argues his retained counsel acted in such a way that violated his Sixth Amendment

right to effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

1
 The Honorable Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Retired) of the Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment
of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
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                                          BACKGROUND

       Garcia was charged with aggravated robbery, enhanced for repeat offender status, after he

allegedly robbed a convenience store at gun point in November 2020. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 29.03(a)(2). A jury found Garcia guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years with the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division. Garcia now appeals.

                             INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       Garcia argues his trial counsel’s many acts or omissions, jointly or severally, fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. He further argues had these deficiencies not occurred, more

than a reasonable probability exists he would have either been acquitted or received a lesser

punishment than the thirty years assessed by the trial court.

   A. Standard of Review

       We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the well-established standard in

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “Evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment involves a two-pronged test: (1) whether counsel was

deficient, and (2) whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error.” Hart v.

State, 667 S.W.3d 774, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “To

establish that counsel’s actions were deficient, the appellant must show, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. “There is

a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,

the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Courts should consider the reasonableness of

counsel’s actions at the time, rather than viewing such actions through the benefit of hindsight.”

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Id. at 782. “The Court should make this determination in light of all the circumstances in order to

determine if the actions fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id.

        “Claims of ineffective assistance must be firmly rooted in the record.” Id. “Under most

circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to show that counsel’s

representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic decision-making as to

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable and professional.” Id.

(quoting Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). “Given this fact, trial

counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his conduct before being

denounced as ineffective.” Id. “In the absence of such an opportunity, when faced with an

undeveloped record on direct appeal, [c]ourts commonly assume a strategic motive if any can be

imagined and find counsel’s performance deficient only if the conduct was so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Okonkwo v.

State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Counsel’s actions are considered deficient only if the court finds, as a matter of law, that ‘no

reasonable trial strategy could justify trial counsel’s acts or omissions, regardless of his or her

subjective reasoning.’” Id. (quoting Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).

        To show prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id.; Compton v. State, 666 S.W.3d 685, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023)

(“This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair

trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)). Failure to show either

deficient performance or prejudice defeats an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Thompson

v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

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   B. Failure to Move for Continuance

          Garcia first argues his attorney’s performance was deficient because he failed to preserve

error by not filing a written motion for continuance. Garcia further contends trial counsel’s

continuance error was prejudicial.

          Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 29.03 provides “[a] criminal action may be

continued on the written motion of the State or of the defendant, upon sufficient cause shown” in

the motion. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 29.03. “All motions for continuance must be sworn to by

a person having personal knowledge of the facts relied on for the continuance.” Id. art. 29.08. The

Court of Criminal Appeals “construed these statutes to require a sworn written motion to preserve

appellate review from a trial judge’s denial of a motion for a continuance.” Anderson v. State, 301

S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “A motion for continuance not in writing and not sworn

preserves nothing for review.” Richardson v. State, 606 S.W.3d 375, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (quoting Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 755 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999)).

          “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must demonstrate that the trial

court would have erred in denying a properly filed written motion.” Id. “Appellate courts review

the trial court’s decision to deny a motion for continuance for abuse of discretion.” Id. “An

appellate court will conclude the trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance was an abuse of

discretion only if the record shows with considerable specificity how the defendant was harmed

by the absence of more preparation time than he actually had.” Nwosoucha v. State, 325 S.W.3d

816, 825 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (quoting Gonzales v. State, 304

S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish an

abuse of discretion, a defendant must show that she was actually prejudiced by the denial of her

motion.” Id. Ordinarily, a defendant can “make such a showing only at a hearing on a motion for

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new trial because only then will she be able to produce evidence regarding what additional

information, evidence, or witnesses the defense would have had available if the trial court had

granted the motion for delay.” Id. at 825–26.

       Here, Garcia’s counsel did not file a sworn written motion for continuance, failing to

preserve any complaint regarding a continuance motion for appeal. See Anderson, 301 S.W.3d at

279; Richardson, 606 S.W.3d at 384. But even if Garcia had filed a written motion, we cannot

conclude the trial court would have abused its discretion by denying it. Trial proceedings

commenced on Wednesday, March 30, 2022. After the State announced it was ready, counsel for

Garcia stated:

       We are not ready, Your Honor. At this point, the defense is going to request a
       continuance based on the following: Last week I asked the State which of the five
       cases they were wanting to go to trial on. They gave me Cause No. 2021-CR-2233.
       Yesterday the State informed me that they had chosen a different case to go to trial
       on. That’s 2021-CR-2058. I think the State will agree with me that I was given one
       information last week and a – different information yesterday. The case that I was
       told originally was going to be tried is the one that I have prepared and am ready
       for trial on. I will say this: I have been retained on all five cases. So, I’m aware of
       the other cases being here. However, I was ready on the one case they told me and
       not quite as ready on the new case.

Counsel for the State explained she informed Garcia’s counsel five days earlier—on Friday, March

25, 2022—it was going to trial on the case involving the November 11, 2020 aggravated robbery.

However, she decided to go to trial on the November 4, 2020 aggravated robbery case instead

“[a]fter meeting with witnesses, serving witnesses, reviewing the evidence, [and] meeting with

officers.” Counsel for the State further indicated she informed Garcia’s counsel in writing on

Tuesday, March 29, 2022—four days later and on the day before trial. Counsel for the State added

the November 4, 2020 incident was just “one week before the [November 11, 2020 aggravated

robbery].” The trial court then denied the motion, explaining “all cases were set for trial,” and

Garcia had been in jail for more than 500 days on each case.

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         Nothing in the record shows how Garcia was harmed by the lack of a few more days to

prepare for trial. Garcia’s counsel did not identify any witnesses as unavailable based on the

change, acknowledged he had been retained on the aggravated robberies, and simply claimed he

was “not quite as ready.” See Nwosoucha, 325 S.W.3d at 825. Furthermore, the trial court

explained the cases had been set for trial for some time.

         Accordingly, we cannot conclude trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

file a written motion for continuance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Richardson, 606 S.W.3d at

384; Nwosoucha, 325 S.W.3d at 825. 2

    C. Opening the Door to Extraneous Offenses

         Garcia also contends his trial counsel’s performance was deficient when he “opened the

door” to extraneous offense evidence to prove his identity, and but for that evidence, a reasonable

probability exists he would have been acquitted or sentenced to a lesser punishment. Specifically,

Garcia argues his trial counsel opened the door when he stated during jury selection:

                 What we’re here to tell you is that it wasn’t this defendant who did it. Okay?
         So, you can put aside all the other stuff. Was it in Bexar County? What was the
         date? What was the time of day? Yada. Yada. Yada. The bottom line is: The State
         has to prove he did it. He’s saying he didn’t. That’s what we’re here about. Okay?
         That’s what justice is about. It’s—you have to make a decision. Did he do it, or did
         he not do it?

         “We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude extraneous offense evidence under

Rules 404(b) and 403 for an abuse of discretion.” Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex.

2
  Garcia also argues his trial counsel’s decision not to file a motion for new trial was deficient because it insulated his
failure to file a written continuance motion from a finding of prejudice in this court. However, Garcia’s contention
relies on a misunderstanding of the record. The day after sentencing, Garcia’s trial counsel was replaced by the Bexar
County Public Defender’s Office—which represents him before this court. Because Garcia’s trial counsel was
replaced well before the deadline to file a motion for new trial, see TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4, we cannot conclude trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion for new trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Cooks
v. State, 240 S.W.3d 906, 911-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (providing where appellant is represented by counsel, there
is rebuttable presumption counsel continued to effectively represent defendant between end of trial and new trial
motion deadline and, even if presumption rebutted, error subject to harm analysis and harm only found where appellant
presents facially plausible claim).

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Crim. App. 2022). An extraneous offense “may be admissible” under Texas Rules of Evidence

Rule 404(b) to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence

of mistake, or lack of accident.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2). However, even if a trial court determines

evidence is admissible pursuant to rule 404(b), “Rule 403 may still preclude its admission if the

trial court determines that the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the

risk of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay or needlessly

presenting cumulative evidence.” Perkins, 664 S.W.3d at 216.

        Turning to Garcia’s argument trial counsel opened the door, the State contended during

jury selection Garcia’s trial counsel made identity an issue and moved to admit the extraneous

offenses under rule 404(b) to prove Garcia was the November 4, 2020 perpetrator. The State

proceeded to identify the similarities between the November 4, 2020 offense and the other

aggravated robberies occurring in October and November 2020. The trial court denied the State’s

motion, explaining it was premature. Because the trial court denied the motion, rejecting the State’s

contention Garcia opened the door to the extraneous offenses during jury selection, Garcia has not

demonstrated how counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or a

reasonable probability exists, but for trial counsel’s alleged error, the proceeding’s result would

have been different. 3 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

    D. Failure to Object

        Garcia further argues his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to

object to testimony about Garcia’s illegal November 14, 2020 stop on no reasonable suspicion

grounds, and to certain facts not in evidence used by the State during its closing argument to

3
 After the trial commenced and after testimony from the witness in the November 4, 2020 aggravated robbery, the
State moved a second time to admit the extraneous offenses for identity purposes. It argued Garcia’s trial counsel
made identity an issue on the witness’s cross-examination. Garcia does not contend trial counsel opened the door
during the November 4, 2020 witness’s questioning, and we do not consider it here. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

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explain why law enforcement never investigated appellant’s son as a viable alternate suspect.

Garcia further contends no reasonable trial strategy could explain this professional neglect.

        Turning to the failure to object, the record is practically silent regarding counsel’s reasons

for not objecting, and this case therefore “falls into the category of ineffective-assistance claims

raised on direct appeal for which the record is undeveloped because it does not adequately reflect

counsel’s reasoning.” Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 783. Where counsel has not had an “opportunity to

explain his actions,” we may assume a strategic motive “if any can be imagined,” and will “find

counsel deficient only if his conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have

engaged in it or . . . if no reasonable trial strategy could justify counsel’s actions.” Id.

        Here, we can imagine trial counsel’s decision not to object to the admission of the

November 14, 2020 traffic stop evidence was a reasonable trial strategy because it permitted

counsel to show the State’s evidence identifying Garcia as the November 4, 2020 perpetrator was

incomplete and unreliable. See id. at 782. The bulk of the State’s evidence at trial focused on the

identity of the perpetrator and specifically the video footage from the different convenience stores.

It demonstrated the perpetrator carried a long-barreled black pistol and wore a medical face mask,

hoodie, and jeans. Virtually none of the evidence at the traffic stop was consistent with the video

footage or eyewitness statements of the robberies. For example, Garcia’s trial counsel elicited

testimony regarding the traffic stop from Officer Medina—an officer involved in the stop—

establishing Garcia did not have a firearm, was not wearing a face mask, and Medina “didn’t know

who [Garcia] was” until after he reviewed the information on his driver’s license. Detective

Ludwig further testified Garcia was wearing clothing with the Popeye’s logo, and he informed the

officers he was on his way to work. Although the detective testified Garcia “seemed to fit the

physical description of the suspect” during the stop, he conceded “there’s a lot of people at that

approximate height and weight in San Antonio. So I couldn’t say for certain if that’s him.” The

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detective also used the stop to conduct a field identification of Garcia with the November 14, 2020

robbery witness. He testified that after he commenced the field identification, the witness was

unable to see Garcia from fifty to sixty yards away because her vison was “not real good.” He

further testified he ultimately drove the witness to a location within thirty-five to fifty yards and

provided her binoculars to facilitate the field identification. The witness only then positively

identified Garcia—who wore a medical mask put on him by SAPD—by “his eyes.”

       Because undermining the State’s identification evidence would constitute a reasonable trial

strategy that is not so outrageous and unjustified, we cannot conclude Garcia has overcome the

strong presumption counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision to undermine the State’s

identification evidence, and we cannot conclude trial counsel’s actions were deficient. See id. at

784 (concluding, based on undeveloped direct-appeal record, counsel not deficient when counsel

elected to argue at punishment phase “[a]ppellant had acted rationally and reasonably in seeking

to protect his daughter, rather than pursuing a sudden-passion argument” because “such a strategy

is not so outrageous that no reasonable attorney would have engaged in it”); see, e.g., Ex parte

Scott, 541 S.W.3d 104, 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (holding court could not find trial counsel

employed unreasonable strategy and was ineffective for not calling witness because testimony

would have also severely undercut defensive strategy); see also Prine v. State, 537 S.W.3d 113,

118 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (reasoning even if probation officer opinion inadmissible, decision to

call him as witness was strategic choice and evaluating those risks and benefits is type of strategy

ordinarily requires evaluating attorney’s explanation before concluding counsel is ineffective).

       Turning to Garcia’s argument counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to object

during the State’s closing argument, Garcia argues the State referenced his son’s age during closing

argument to explain why law enforcement decided not to investigate his son even though evidence

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showed his son owned the Peanuts hoodie seen in the robberies. Garcia contends this was improper

argument by the State because his son’s age was not in evidence.

       Garcia misstates the record. During its closing argument, the State contended:

              November 14th, 2020, the same exact Circle K. You heard from Sabrina
       Delgado the same hoodie, white, off white with Peanuts, jeans, mask on, Hispanic
       male, 30 to 40, wide, big eyes and a blue mask on, cigarettes again. This time the
       gun’s in the waistband. Circle K, again Bexar County.
               The difference in these last ones, right, is that Perla Rodriguez, although she
       didn’t want to do it, you-all heard her say, Oh, my God; Oh, my God, when she was
       asked to look at the Defendant and say is that the person. She didn't want to do it,
       but she was here. And she said, Yes. That is the person, and I recognize him.
               Sabrina Delgado, within two hours of having been robbed, goes and
       identifies him that same day with binoculars on, right? When you put all of these
       together, what it means is that you know it’s John Garcia on November 4th because
       of his signature robbery style and the distinctive car, the distinctive gun, which he
       is in possession of, right, and he’s found inside of that distinctive car. His physical
       attributes actually match, right?
               They didn’t go and talk to a 15 or 16-year-old boy because every single one
       of these witnesses told them he was a Hispanic male in his thirties. Doesn’t make
       sense to go and interview somebody.

The reference is clearly made to draw a contrast with the evidence in the record supporting the

perpetrator was in his thirties. And although the closing statement referred to “a 15 or 16-year-old

boy,” there is no reference to Garcia’s son. Even if there were a reference to the age of Garcia’s

son, the record shows DeLaFuente—who Garcia lived with at the time of his arrest—testified he

believed Garcia’s son was approximately seventeen or eighteen years old at the time of trial.

Moreover, trial counsel’s decision not to object to the closing argument was a reasonable trial

strategy because it permitted counsel to further contend during his closing argument the State’s

investigation was insufficient: “I kind of wish they had gone to see Mr. Garcia’s son to find out –

he’s a teenage boy that might not even fit into the hoodie.” See Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 783.

       Because the age of Garcia’s son was in evidence and because arguing the investigation

conducted surrounding the robberies was insufficient, we cannot conclude Garcia has overcome

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the strong presumption counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision or counsel’s actions were

deficient. See Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 784; Scott, 541 S.W.3d at 116; Prine, 537 S.W.3d at 118.

Accordingly, we cannot conclude counsel rendered ineffective assistance. See Thompson, 9

S.W.3d at 813. 4

    E. Eliciting Testimony About Warrants

         Garcia argues his trial counsel’s performance was deficient when he elicited testimony

from Officer Medina about Garcia’s active warrants at the time of his November 14, 2020 arrest.

Specifically, he argues the testimony about the warrants rendered the testimony regarding the

traffic stop harmless and was otherwise improper because it referred to prior bad acts and was

inadmissible under Texas Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). Because we have already concluded

counsel’s failure to object to the traffic stop was not deficient, we only consider whether counsel’s

performance was deficient for eliciting testimony on the warrants. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. Here,

Garcia fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence how counsel’s actions fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness. See Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 781. Nor does he demonstrate

prejudice by showing how the proceeding’s result would have been different. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. We therefore cannot conclude counsel rendered ineffective assistance by eliciting

testimony on the warrants. 5

4
  Garcia further contends trial counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to object to the State’s use of un-
Mirandized statements made by Garcia to a detective in the field. However, Garcia does not identify any of his
statements used against him, TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1, or how counsel’s failure to object to the use of the statements was
prejudicial to his defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. We therefore cannot conclude counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the State’s use of un-Mirandized statements made by Garcia to a detective in the
field.
5
  Finally, Garcia argues the totality of representation deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. Because we find
the ineffective assistance claims raised here were not errors or Garcia failed to otherwise carry his burden of showing
how they were, we cannot conclude any cumulative effect resulted in the deprivation of effective assistance of counsel.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Reyes v. State, 557 S.W.3d 624, 642 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. ref’d).

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                                  CONCLUSION

      The judgment is affirmed.

                                        Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Do Not Publish

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