Court Opinion

ID: 9819695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:31:46.390969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:21.040747
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting: I dissent. As the majority point out, in dismissing the defendant’s postconviction petition at the first stage, the trial court found that the petition did not have supporting affidavits and its assertions were conclusory. The majority agree with this conclusion and cite People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 66 (2002), for its holding that the failure to attach the necessary “affidavits, records or other evidence,” as is required by section 122 — 2 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 — 2 (West 2000)), justifies the summary dismissal of the petition. The majority state: “[W]e must agree with the trial court that the petition was defective on its face.” 343 Ill. App. 3d at 919. This holding should end our analysis and should result in affirming the trial court. By their decision in this case, the majority refuse to follow the dictates of a very recent decision of our supreme court. “[I]t is fundamental to our judicial system that ‘once our supreme court declares the law on any point, its decision is binding on all Illinois courts,’ and we cannot refuse to follow it because we have no authority to overrule or modify supreme court decisions.” People v. Crespo, 118 Ill. App. 3d 815, 822 (1983), quoting People v. Jones, 114 Ill. App. 3d 576, 585 (1983). The majority note that the violation of the 10-day notice rule which occurred in this case was the result of the clerk of the circuit court mailing the notice of dismissal two days late. This late mailing resulted in no prejudice to the defendant whatsoever. The defendant timely filed his notice of appeal. In reversing the order of the trial court, an order the majority admit was legally correct, the majority rely on the holding in People v. Redmond, 328 Ill. App. 3d 373 (2002). In Redmond, the trial court sent out the notice of dismissal more than 90 days after the petition was filed and the defendant learned of the order indirectly more than two months after its entry. Redmond, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 375. Upon receiving the defendant’s motion to vacate the dismissal, the trial court “relate[d] forward” the date of the dismissal to preserve the defendant’s right to appeal. This revised date of the summary dismissal was beyond the 90-day period required by section 122 — 2.1(a) of the Act. On appeal, the Second District reversed, holding that the 10-day service provision of section 122 — 2.1(a)(2) is mandatory. Redmond, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 377. In People v. Crane, 333 Ill. App. 3d 768, 773 (2002), the Second District distinguished its earlier holding in Redmond and held that a violation of section 122 — 2.1(a)(2)’s requirement of notice within 10 days of a dismissal was harmless where the defendant received the mailing in time to file a timely motion to reconsider. Similarly, as the defendant in this case received the notice of dismissal in time to file a timely motion to reconsider, any error was harmless. More importantly, a panel of the First District has directly rejected the Second District’s holding in Redmond. In People v. Ross, 339 Ill. App. 3d 580 (2003), this court reviewed a case in which a trial court summarily dismissed a defendant’s pro se postconvietion petition on January 15, 2001, within the 90-day statutory period. On February 1, 2001 the trial court discovered that the clerk of the court had not sent notice of the dismissal order to the defendant. The court then entered an order directing the clerk to send out notice of the dismissal to the defendant. The court characterized its order as nunc pro tunc from January 19, 2001. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court’s failure to meet the notice provision of subsection 122 — 2.1(a)(2) rendered the dismissal void based on the holding in Redmond. This court rejected this argument, pointing out that the court in Redmond did not discuss the supreme court’s explicit holding in People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64 (1988), that the written order requirement of section 122 — 2.1(a) had to be interpreted as “directory” rather than mandatory due to the separation of powers doctrine. Ross, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 584, citing Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 82. The Ross court pointed out that the Redmond court “held that every provision in section 122 — 2.1 is mandatory, and the failure to serve defendant with a written order within the time period rendered the dismissal void. Redmond, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 378.” (Emphasis added.) Ross, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 584. This holding is clearly contrary to the holding in Porter. I agree with the holding in Ross and disagree with the holding in Redmond; consequently, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s postconviction petition. The majority explain that they read the 10-day requirement of the statute as being mandatory because “[t]o do otherwise would be to render the 10-day requirement meaningless and would leave Robinson with a right but no remedy for the violation of the statute.” 343 Ill. App. 3d at 921-22. In People v. Cortez, 338 Ill. App. 3d 122 (2003), this court considered what remedy was available to a defendant when the trial court ordered a postconviction petition to be docketed for further consideration, but the State filed its motion to dismiss more than 30 days after the docketing, in contravention of section 122 — 5 of the Act. The Cortez court considered the holding of our supreme court in People v. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d 117, 119 (1975), and People v. Hendrix, 54 Ill. 2d 165, 169 (1973). In both of those cases, the supreme court considered what remedy was available to defendants whose state constitutional right to a “prompt preliminary hearing” had been violated. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 7. In both cases, the supreme court noted that the legislature had not provided for a remedy for violation of this “right.” In both cases, the supreme court rejected the defendants’ arguments that their cases should be dismissed, holding that a dismissal of the charge was not a remedy available to the courts. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d at 120; Hendrix, 54 Ill. 2d at 169. Also see People v. Owen, 323 Ill. App. 3d 653, 660 (2001) (defendant not entitled to rescission of statutory summary suspension of driver’s license although the arresting officer did not report the driving-under-the-influence arrest to the sheriffs office as required by section 107 — 4(a—7) of the Criminal Code of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/107 — 4(a—7) (West 2000))). In Cortez, this court held that when the State fails to file its motion to dismiss within the 30-day time limit in section 122 — 5, the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only where he shows (1) that he objected, at the trial court level, to the State’s delay in filing its motion to dismiss and (2) that he suffered prejudice as a result of the State’s failure to file a timely motion to dismiss. Cortez, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 128. Applying this rationale to the instant case, it makes sense that if a defendant can show that he suffered prejudice due to the failure to receive a notice of the dismissal within 10 days of its entry, his petition should be remanded for further consideration pursuant to sections 122 — 4 through 122 — 6 of the Act. As the defendant in this case has suffered no prejudice, he should not be entitled to any relief. I also disagree with the majority’s holding that this case should be remanded to the trial court. Our review of a trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing is plenary. People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 412 (2003). While Rissley was a capital case and consequently involved a dismissal of a postconviction petition at the second stage, the supreme court has specifically held that our review of a summary dismissal of a postconviction petition is also plenary. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-88 (1998). This court is in as good a position as the trial court to find, as the majority have, that the petition in this case is “defective on its face.” 343 Ill. App. 3d at 919. Finally, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of our supreme court’s holding in People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (1995), and the holding in People v. Simmons, 256 Ill. App. 3d 651 (1993), as being based on “assumptions.” When we make such a characterization of another court’s holding (especially that of a higher court), we should explain our basis for doing so.