Court Opinion

ID: 9720262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:22:57.120126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:14.823543
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). The majority’s holding effectively permits defendant to circumvent the Legislature’s intent in enacting MCL 500.3148(1); MSA 24.13148(1). That intent was to discourage insurance companies, so disposed, from unreasonably withholding personal protection insurance (pip) benefits from their insureds until ordered to pay them by a court. The discouragement was in the form of an award of attorney fees to insureds obliged to sue to recover pip benefits to which they were entitled. The penalty provision sought to force insurers to promptly pay their insureds. Beach v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 216 Mich App 612, 629; 550 NW2d 580 (1996).
The statutory penalty does not limit the award of attorney fees to those incurred in trial proceedings *50only. Defendant squarely raised the question in Bloemsma v Auto Club Ins Ass’n (After Remand), 190 Mich App 686; 476 NW2d 487 (1991). The Court of Appeals ruled that appellate attorney fees are recoverable when the trial court has determined that an insurance company unreasonably withheld pip benefits. It stated:
This Court has held that a statutory provision for attorney fees applies to appellate proceedings when the statute does not place any restrictions on the recovery of attorney fees and does not limit attorney fees to services rendered at the trial court level. Smolen [v Dahlmann Apartments, Ltd, 186 Mich App 292, 296; 463 NW2d 261 (1990)] (provision for attorney fees under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MCL 445.901 et seq.-, MSA 19.418(1) et seq., applies to appellate proceedings). Although the provision for attorney fees at issue here, MCL 500.3148(1); MSA 24.13148(1), restricts an award of attorney fees to cases in which the court finds that the insurer unreasonably refused to pay the claim or unreasonably delayed in making proper payment, no other restrictions are imposed, and the award of attorney fees is not limited to services rendered at the trial court level. [Id. at 690-691.]
In this case, the majority adopts the Court of Appeals dissent. 223 Mich App 446, 451-453; 566 NW2d 658 (1997). It concludes that plaintiff cannot recover appellate attorney fees because the insurer paid the disputed pip benefits before .it appealed. Its appeal was solely from the award of trial attorney fees. Consequently, the Court reasons, MCL 500.3148(1); MSA 24.13148(1) does not apply.
The majority appears not to consider that plaintiff would never have been in the appellate court had not the insurance company unreasonably withheld benefits in the first place.
*51I believe the Court of Appeals dissent is misleading when it asserts that “any money expended by plaintiff in the original appeal was not for the purpose of securing payment of those benefits or avoiding recoupment by defendant of benefits already paid.” Id. at 453. Indeed, plaintiff had tp either fight the appeal or risk recoupment by defendant of his trial attorney fees that defendant had already paid.
Initially, he won on appeal but, because of today’s opinion, he must pay his appellate attorney fees from his award of trial attorney fees or from his PIP benefits. By this circumvention, defendant has succeeded in thwarting the intent of the Legislature.
It was approximately a decade ago that a trial court found that this defendant wrongfully refused to pay pip benefits to its insured Thomas Bloemsma. It was required to pay the benefits plus Mr. Bloemsma’s trial attorney fees. It appealed and, pursuant to MCL 500.3148(1); MSA 24.13148(1), was ordered to pay Mr. Bloemsma’s appellate attorney fees, as well. Bloems-ma, supra.
In the instant case, involving Mr. McKelvie, defendant again wrongfully refused to pay pip benefits. Here, it appealed only from the award of trial attorney fees. Again it lost on appeal. But this time, under the same statute and although the award of trial attorney fees was sustained on appeal, defendant has succeeded in not paying plaintiff’s appellate attorney fees.
The result is that Mr. McKelvie received his pep benefits only after long delay and litigation, and he incurred appellate attorney fees in the process. The statute’s penalty has been blunted, if not defeated altogether, from the point of view of the party it sought to protect.
*52The Legislature can prevent recurrences by revisiting MCL 500.3148(1); MSA 24.13148(1) and adding language to ensure, as the Court refuses to do, that its intent is followed in the future.
I would affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.