Court Opinion

ID: 9492669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:46:48.899696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:25.303929
License: Public Domain

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s decision that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain Farrow’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b). I also agree with the majority that the district court’s decision not to grant a downward departure based on Farrow’s alien status is not reviewable in this case. Furthermore, I agree with Judge Rosen’s conclusion that the district court impermissibly engaged in *203double counting by adding a four-level enhancement to Farrow’s sentence on the ground that he “otherwise used” a dangerous weapon, see U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B), and I fully concur in his analysis of that issue. I disagree, however, with the majority’s decision in Part IV.C. to uphold the district court’s application of the three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2, based on the official status of the victim. Because I believe that U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(b) was not intended to apply to the circumstances of this case, and because, alternatively, I believe that the government did not meet its burden of showing that Farrow knew or should have known that Ward was a law enforcement officer, I respectfully DISSENT from Part IV.C. of the majority’s opinion.
I believe that, as a matter of law, it was improper for the district court to apply § 3A1.2(b) to the appellant. By its terms, Application Note 5 to § 3A1.2 contemplates an enhancement under subdivision (b) only when the assault on a federal officer occurs during the course of or during immediate flight from another offense. Application Note 5 reads:
Subdivision (b) applies in circumstances tantamount to aggravated assault against a law enforcement or corrections officer, committed in the course of, or in immediate flight following, another offense, such as bank robbery. While this subdivision may apply in connection with a variety of offenses that are not by nature targeted against official victims, its applicability is limited to assaultive conduct against law enforcement or corrections officers that is sufficiently serious to create at least a “substantial risk of serious bodily injury” and that is proximate in time to the commission of the offense.
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2 commentary, applic. note 5 (emphasis added). Thus, the clear language of Application Note 5 indicates that § 3A1.2(b) should not apply when the underlying offense is aggravated assault on a federal officer.
The language of § 3A1.2(b) also supports the view that that provision should not apply where the underlying offense is aggravated assault. Subdivision (b) clearly provides for an enhancement when the defendant, “during the course of the offense or immediate flight therefrom,” engages in what amounts to aggravated assault against a law enforcement or corrections officer. It is nonsensical, or at least tautological, to say that, while committing the offense of aggravated assault against Ward, Farrow engaged in aggravated assault against Ward. Reading the Sentencing Guidelines to dictate such a result strongly resembles the kind of double counting disapproved by Part IV.B. of the court’s opinion, which I join. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit agrees that § 3A1.2(b) does not apply when the underlying offense is aggravated assault on a federal officer, relying on the language of Application Note 5. See United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d 725, 734 (11th Cir.1993). But see United States v. Valdez-Torres, 108 F.3d 385, 390 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reading § 3A1.2(b) to apply to aggravated assault on an INS agent).1
*204This reading of § 3A1.2(b) raises the problem that Farrow would receive the same sentence for assaulting a federal officer as he would for aggravated assault on any other citizen. This difficulty results from the fact that § 2A2.2, the guideline that establishes the base offense level for aggravated assault, does not contain any means of specifying a higher offense level if the assault occurred on an officer. It is nonetheless plausible that the official-victim enhancement under § 3A1.2 was intended to apply in cases of aggravated assault only when subsection (a) of § 3A1.2 is invoked — that is, only when the assault on the victim is “motivated by” the victim’s official status. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2(a).2 Although such a policy might seem unwise or unusual, it is, in my opinion, dictated by the plain language of Application Note 5, which is binding on this court unless it is unconstitutional, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent with the Guidelines. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45-47, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). I believe that the majority’s understanding of the “clear overarching purpose” of § 3A1.2, slip op. at 198 n. 18, should not trump the dictates of that plain language.3
Admittedly, the appellant did not raise this argument, either in his appellate brief or at sentencing, when he objected to the official-victim enhancement. Normally, the appellant’s failure to make an argument in the district court or in his brief would preclude this court from reversing on that ground. See, e.g., Fed. R.App. P. 28(a); United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 487 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. — , — U.S. —, 119 S.Ct. 560, 142 L.Ed.2d 466 (1998). That rule is not jurisdictional, however, and we have previously held that it “may be waived in exceptional cases or to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Mayhew v. Allsup, 166 F.3d 821, 823 (6th Cir.1999); see Dorris v. Absher, 179 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Anderson, 584 F.2d 849, 853 (6th Cir.1978) (citing Fed. R.App. P. 2). In my view, lengthening the duration of the appellant’s incarceration based on a sentencing guideline that is, by its terms, inapplicable to him constitutes a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, as in Dorris, the issue in this ease is the district court’s erroneous interpretation of a statute; it concerns a pure question of law, and no material facts are in dispute. See Dorris, 179 F.3d at 425-26. Thus, this court is in a position to exercise its discretion to decide that legal issue. It is true, as the majority points out, that, due to Farrow’s failure to raise this argument at sentencing, the district court did not have the opportunity to consider whether Farrow committed any other offense while assaulting Ward that would satisfy the requirements for applying § 3A1.2. See slip op. at 198 n. 18. However, there is no reason why *205this court could not permit the district court to do so during resentencing. See generally United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595, 597-99 (6th Cir.1997) (noting the appellate courts’ broad power to issue general or limited remands, depending on the circumstances of each particular case). For these reasons, I would hold that the district court erred in using § 3A1.2 to enhance Farrow’s sentence.
In the alternative, I would hold that the government did not, in any case, meet its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Farrow knew or should have known that Ward was a law enforcement officer. The district court’s finding that there was sufficient evidence of Farrow’s knowledge of Ward’s official status appeared to be based primarily on the fact that Farrow was informed that an INS agent was looking for him earlier in the day. As the district court acknowledged, however, Farrow likely had some apprehension about the neighborhood and the late hour, and therefore would not necessarily expect that the four individuals approaching his vehicle were on official business. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Farrow knew what Agent Ward looked like. As Farrow pointed out, if he had hit either the process server or the friend, both of whom were nearby, this would not even be a federal case. It stretches credulity to charge Farrow with reasonable knowledge not only that one of the individuals approaching his vehicle was an INS agent — based on his knowledge that the INS was looking for him — but also that the particular individual whom he ultimately hit was an INS agent. Moreover, as the majority acknowledges, the district court misinterpreted the jury’s verdict when it indicated, with respect to Farrow’s knowledge, that “the jury saw it that way.” The jury found only that Farrow intentionally acted to hit the man in front of him and that that man was a federal officer. Indeed, the government explicitly relied in its closing argument on the fact that it did not have to prove that Farrow knew Ward was an INS agent. Therefore, I would hold that the district court’s finding that Farrow knew or should have known that Ward was an INS agent was clearly erroneous, and I would vacate that portion of Farrow’s sentence as well.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully DISSENT from the Part IV.C. of the majority’s opinion. I concur fully in the remainder of Judge Rosen’s opinion.

. At oral argument, the government suggested that the district court relied on § 3A 1.2(a), which provides for an enhancement when the underlying offense is “motivated by” the official status of the victim, rather than on § 3A1.2(b). This assertion is incorrect. A review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that both the court and counsel focused in that hearing on Farrow's knowledge, not his motivation. Furthermore, the Presentence Investigation Report named § 3A1.2(b) as the basis for the enhancement, J.A. at 251, and the minutes of the criminal proceedings clearly indicate that the district court "adopt[ed] the findings and guidelines application in the Presentence Report” with respect to that issue, J.A. at 82. Counsel for the government also suggested that remaining illegally in the country, rather than aggravated assault, was the “other offense” during the course of which Farrow assaulted Ward, thus invoking the enhancement under § 3A1.2(b). A review of the sentencing transcript, however, indicates that the district court made no *204findings with respect to the legality of Farrow’s presence in this country for the purposes of the sentencing enhancement.

. As the D.C. Circuit has pointed out, Application Note 1 to § 2A2.4 (Obstructing or Impeding Officers) instructs the sentencer to apply the official-victim enhancement of § 3A1.2 if the conduct amounts to aggravated assault. See Valdez-Torres, 108 F.3d at 390. However, this requirement is not inconsistent with the reading of § 3A1.2 that I have suggested: nothing in the language of Application Note 1 to § 2A2.4 requires a three-level enhancement in every case of aggravated assault on an officer or prohibits following the additional requirements imposed by the language of § 3A1.2(a) and § 3A1.2(b) before giving that enhancement. Indeed, the reference to § 3A1.2 in Application Note 1 to § 2A2.4 suggests that all the requirements and limitations of § 3A 1.2 should be observed.

. The majority suggests that another difficulty with my reading of § 3A1.2 is that defendants who engage in "identical assaults on federal officers” would receive different sentences, depending on whether those assaults were committed in the course of another offense. Slip op. at 198 n. 18. I see nothing anomalous, however, in concluding that a defendant who assaults an officer in the course of committing a separate crime is more culpable or more in need of deterrence than a defendant who assaults an officer while committing no other crime and who is not motivated by the officer’s official status in committing the assault.