Court Opinion

ID: 9581957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:20:45.810685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:21.308313
License: Public Domain

Judge Johnson
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I, like the trial judge, recognize that defendant/respondent’s alcoholism has “significantly disrupted his life and impaired his ability to have a relationship with his children and to provide support” pursuant to court order. However, I, like the trial judge, believe that in the years immediately preceding plaintiff/ petitioner’s petition for termination of defendant/respondent’s parental rights, defendant/respondent’s accrued arrearages and lack of a relationship with his children were “the result of choices that he willfully, deliberately, intentionally and voluntarily made rather than the result of problems with alcoholism or the lack of a drivers [sic] license.”
Because the court may terminate parental rights upon a finding of any one of the grounds listed in North Carolina General Statutes § 7A-289.32 (Cum. Supp. 1993), I only address North Carolina General Statutes § 7A-289.32(5). As the majority notes, North Carolina General Statutes § 7A-289.32(5) states:
[The court may terminate the parental rights upon a finding of. . . the following:]
(5) One parent has been awarded custody of the child by judicial decree, or has custody by agreement of the parents, and the other parent whose parental rights are sought to be terminated has for a period of one year or more next preceding the filing of the petition willfully failed without justification to pay for the care, support, and education of the child, as required by said decree or custody agreement.
All findings of fact made as a result of an adjudicatory hearing terminating parental rights must be based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. North Carolina General Statutes § 7A-289.30(e) *25(1989). If the court determines the existence of any of the conditions authorizing a termination of parental rights then the court shall issue an order terminating parental rights, unless the court determines that the best interests of the child require otherwise. North Carolina General Statutes § 7A-289.31(a) (1989).
In the order terminating the parental rights of defendant/ respondent in the case sub judice, the trial court found the following:
18. On December 6,1985 this court entered its child support order requiring Respondent to pay child support in the amount of $250.00 per month and this Order has remained in effect continually since that time.
19. Petitioner alleged in her petition that [defendant/respondent] was $15,200.00 in arrears in his child support obligation at the time the Petition was filed. On or about June 18, 1992, [defendant/respondent] filed a response to the Petition and admitted that he failed to pay child support as required by the court’s support Order entered December 6, 1985 for a period of time. Respondent further stated in his verified Motion in the Cause for Determination of Prospective Child Support that because of unemployment, dependency upon alcohol and lack of financial means that he has failed to pay support in . . . accord with the prior Orders of this court.
20. As of May 22, 1992, the date the Petition was filed, Respondent was in arrears in his child support obligation in the amount of $15,200.00. Respondent made no child support payments during 1992 prior to May 22, 1992, and made no child support payments during 1991, 1990 and 1989.
21. Between January 1, 1989, and June 18, 1992, Respondent, in addition to failing to pay the Court ordered child support, also failed to provide any other form of financial assistance for the children.
22. Prior to the time that Respondent ceased paying child support all together, he had a history of being sporatic [sic] in his support payments. This Court has issued Orders to'show cause relating to Respondent’s failure to pay child support during December 1983, July 12, 1984 ($450.00 arrearage), November 7, 1985 ($650.00 arrearage), February 20, 1986 ($1075.00 arrearage), March 4, 1986 ($1125.00 arrearage), and October 10, 1986 ($500.00 arrearage). Respondent was gainfully employed during these periods of time *26and could have made child support payments on a regular basis but elected not to do so.
33. The Petition to Terminate Parental Rights was filed by [petitioner] on May 22, 1992. On June 2, 1992, [defendant/respondent] paid $750.00 in child support to the Lee County Clerk of Superior Court. This was the first payment that [defendant/respondent] made towards child support in at least three years and also the first financial contribution for the children of any kind in the preceding three years. Thereafter on July 22, 1992, [defendant/ respondent] paid $7,750.00 towards his child support obligation with this payment being made to the Lee County Clerk of Superi- or Court. These funds were obtained through a loan [defendant/respondent] obtained using his mother to co-sign for the loan. Respondent made a number of promises between August 1990 and May 22, 1992, to begin to pay child support but never followed through despite the fact that he was working during this period and could have paid support.
78. The court is satisfied that [defendant/respondent] has a serious drinking problem and that in 1985 his driver’s license was permanently revoked, which things significantly disrupted his life and impaired his ability to have a relationship with his children and to provide support pursuant to this court’s Order. However, the court is also persuaded and finds as a fact that during August 1990 [defendant/respondent] attempted to begin his sobriety and became very actively involved in [an] entrepreneurial project to mass produce preformed grits. This project required a great deal of intellectual stamina, physical endurance and tenacity. Apparently [defendant/respondent] applied all these skills and traits rather successfully and has brought his project to the point where some think it will soon reach fruition. [Defendant/respondent,] however, did not apply himself with the same diligence, tenacity and ingenuity to maintaining a relationship with his children after August 1990 or to paying his child support obligation as required by this court. . . . Therefore the [accrued arrearages and defendant/respondent’s lack of a relationship with his children] are the result of choices that he willfully, deliberately, intentionally and voluntarily made rather than the result of problems with alcoholism or the lack of a drivers [sic] license.
*27The trial court concluded as law “that the grounds to terminate [defendant/respondent’s] parental rights exists as provided for in G.S. 7A-289.32(5). On the date the Petition was filed, Respondent owed $15,200 in child support, made no payments since 1989, despite his promises to do so, and elected to spend his time on his entrepreneurial project rather [than] earning wages to care for his children.” I agree with the trial court and find that plaintiff/petitioner has shown by clear, convincing and cogent evidence that defendant/respondent “willfully failed without justification” to pay child support per the terms of the child support agreement.
Having found as such, the inquiry is now to determine if “the best interests of the child require that the parental rights of such parent not be terminated.” North Carolina General Statutes § 7A-289.31(a). I recognize that both defendant/appellant and the guardian ad litem find the testimony of Dr. Linda Silber, the child psychologist appointed by the court, persuasive in that Dr. Silber did not recommend termination of defendant/respondent’s parental rights. I further recognize that it was also the minor children’s guardian ad litem’s opinion that the best interests of the minor children would not be served by terminating defendant/respondent’s parental rights. Nonetheless, having reviewed the record in its entirety, I believe the trial court had ample evidence to support its decision to terminate defendant/respondent’s parental rights. Irrespective of defendant’s child support arrearages, this evidence includes the findings that defendant/respondent infrequently visited the minor children during the years 1987 to 1992; that from 1987 through the date of the last hearing in this matter, defendant/respondent did not write any letters to his minor children or have phone conversations of any length with his minor children on a regular basis; that from 1987 to July 1992, defendant/respondent never sought the assistance of any court to help him maintain a relationship with his children; that defendant/respondent applied himself with tenacity and clarity to his entrepreneurial project, but that he did not apply this same tenacity and sense of purpose to maintaining a relationship with his children; and that defendant/respondent could have maintained relationships with his minor children through letter writing, telephone calls and visitations, but chose not to do so. And, although clearly not determinative of this issue, I finally note that the court found that the minor children testified to the court that they have no desire to see or get to know defendant/respondent; that both of the minor children have developed happy and secure relationships living with their mother *28and her husband, Jim Bost; and that the minor children want to be adopted by Mr. Bost and Mr. Bost will in fact adopt the minor children at a time when it is legally proper to do so.
In child custody matters, “wide discretion is vested in the trial judge. lie has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and his decision ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” In re Custody of Pitts, 2 N.C. App. 211, 212, 162 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1968) (emphasis added). I find no abuse of discretion performed by the trial judge herein.
I would affirm the decision of the trial court.