Court Opinion

ID: 9525860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:08:57.422706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:19.513303
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RATHJE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, this court’s decision in People v. Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d 202 (1992), controls the result of the instant appeal. In Harper, the issue was whether the arresting officer lacked the sufficient articulable facts to justify an investigatory stop of defendant pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). In Harper, the subject building was a "known dope house.” One of the arresting officers, Detective Mark Brictson, testified that he was aware of prior searches of the building that had turned up narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Further, seven people had previously been arrested near the building for narcotics possession. The Harper opinion stated in relevant part: "Defendant’s behavior — parking at a location near the building and walking across lawns, entering the door leading to the upper floor and remaining less than a minute — was consistent with that of others Brictson had observed at that location who were later discovered to possess narcotics. Brictson admitted, howe.ver, that he did not know defendant and he did not see what defendant did once he entered the outer door of the building. Moreover, the record contains no evidence that Brictson observed any crime being committed or that he had received a report of any crime in the area. *** On the facts of this case, we conclude that the court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress was manifestly erroneous. The facts known to the officers simply did not establish an articulable basis to believe that a crime had been, or was about to be, committed. The officers merely observed defendant leave a car parked near the subject premises, enter the building, remain for a short time, and leave. The officers did not observe any transactions within the building or hear any conversations. They did not know what defendant did while inside the building. They had not received a report of any crime or suspicious activity in the vicinity. Their decision to stop defendant was based on no more than a hunch that he might be involved in drug activity.” (Emphasis added.) Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 205-06. The Harper court found support for its decision in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. a. 1889 (1968), a companion case to Terry. The Harper court described Sibron thusly: "There the officer had observed defendant talking to several 'known narcotics addicts’ over a period of approximately eight hours, but did not hear any conversations or see anything change hands. [Citation.] Finally, the officer approached the defendant and said, 'You know what I am after.’ [Citation.] The defendant then reluctantly began reaching into his pocket, but the officer reached in first and recovered an envelope containing heroin. The court reversed the conviction, stating: 'The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s personal security.’ ” Harper, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 206, quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 62, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 934, 88 S. Ct. at 1902. The Harper court concluded: "In the instant case, the officers did not hear any conversations or observe anything which appeared to be a drug transaction. Indeed, they were completely unaware of what defendant did after he entered the building. He might well have knocked on an inner door, found no one at home, and left. The facts simply do not lead to an articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed.” 237 Ill. App. 3d at 206. In other words, in determining the legitimacy of the Terry stop, the Harper court placed little or no importance on Brictson’s knowledge of the behavior of narcotic users making buys at known drug houses. Rather, in finding that the officers did not have an articulable basis to believe a crime had been committed, the Harper court placed primary emphasis on the fact that Brictson had not observed a crime occurring within the building and secondary emphasis on the fact that police had not received reports of suspicious activity in the vicinity. Harper’s actions were virtually the same as the instant defendant’s. Both were in vehicles that parked near, not in front of, the building under surveillance. Both entered the building and remained a short time before reemerging. In both cases, the police did not observe any transactions within the subject buildings, nor did they know what the defendants did inside the buildings. In both cases, the arresting officers did not recognize the defendants prior to the Terry stop. One difference between the cases is that the police in Harper were far more certain that drug activities were occurring in the subject building. As noted above, an earlier search of the building had resulted in the discovery of narcotics. Numerous drug arrests had occurred in the building’s vicinity. One of the arresting officers had participated in another search of the building in which drug paraphernalia had been found. In the appeal at bar, the arresting officers could not have described the building at 132 Hinsdale Place as a "known dope house” prior to the night in question. Officer Jerome stated that the police department had received anonymous tips that drugs were being sold from that address. Officer Jerome also testified that controlled buys had been conducted there, but he did not remember exactly when. He did not know who was delivering cocaine from 132 Hinsdale Place. To the best of Jerome’s knowledge, 132 Hinsdale Place was a single-family residence, but he was not sure of this. He did not know the names of the people living in the two-story building or how many people lived there. Officer Jerome had never been in the building and, to the best of his knowledge, no other officer had ever entered it before December 12, 1991. According to Officer Jerome, on December 12, 1991, the officers did not have enough information to arrest anyone inside the house or to get a search warrant. Admittedly, there was suspicious activity in the vicinity of the instant building prior to the instant arrest, a factor which the Harper court appeared to place some emphasis upon. However, the building in Harper was the scene of ongoing suspicious activity, as evidenced by the searches of same and the numerous drug arrests made near it prior to Harper’s arrest. As defendant points out, the four arrests made before the instant defendant’s arrest may have converted a "suspected dope house” into the "known dope house” of Harper. Nevertheless, these arrests provided no more of an articulable basis for the Terry stop of this defendant than the prior arrests and searches in Harper provided an articulable basis for the Terry stop in that case. Moreover, I observe in passing that the trial court relied heavily on the prior arrests and the arrestees’ statements to justify this Terry stop. There is little evidence in this record as to how these arrests occurred. If, indeed, said arrests were based on the same or similar circumstances as occurred here, then, under Harper, they were based on illegal Terry stops. It would follow that the Terry stop of this defendant was the fruit of prior illegal activity. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. a. 407 (1963). In conclusion, Harper controls this case. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was manifestly erroneous.