Court Opinion

ID: 9624018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:48:44.53297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:37.794723
License: Public Domain

GIBSON, J.
(dissenting). Apart from what has been stated in Justice Halley’s dissenting opinion and from other considerations upon which error in the holding of the majority opinion might be grounded, I am of the opinion the following considerations clearly demonstrate that the statement in the opinion that the Corporation Commission has authority to ,fix the price at which natural gas may be produced and taken from the field is not only without authority in law but is judicial legislation and that too in the face of a legislative enactment to the contrary.
The private ownership of the gas is recognized and the right of sale as an incident of ownership obtains under and is protected by the Constitution until qualified under proper authority. The Corporation Commission is without power to invade the right of the owner to sell and of the purchaser to buy except to the extent the right so to do is granted by the Legislature under authority of the Constitution. ,
In 1913 (S. L. 1913, ch. 198, sec. 3) such right, subject to limitations, was granted as follows:
“Any person, firm or corporation, taking gas from a gas field, except for purposes of developing a gas or oil field, and operating oil wells, and for the purpose of his own domestic use, shall take ratably from each owner of the gas in proportion to his interest in said gas, upon such terms as may be agreed upon between said owners, and the party taking such, or in case they cannot agree at such a price and upon such terms as may be fixed by the Corporation Commission after notice and hearing; provided, that each owner shall be required to deliver his gas to a common point of delivery on or adjacent to the surface overlying such gas.”
This section has been carried forward in the 1921, 1931 and 1941 statutes, and now appears as Tit. 52 O. S. 1941 §233.
The conclusion of the court that the Commission has plenary authority to fix the price of gas in the field is implied from the provisions of S. L. 1915, ch. 197, §4, which is as follows:
“Whenever the full production from any common source of supply of natural gas in this state is in excess of the market demands, then any person, firm or corporation, having the right to drill into and produce gas from any such common source of supply, may take therefrom only such proportions of the natural gas that may be marketed without waste, as the natural flow of the well or wells owned or controlled by any such person, firm or corporation bears to the total natural flow of such common source of supply having due regard to the acreage drained by each well, so as to prevent any such person, firm or corporation securing any unfair proportion of the gas therefrom; provided, that the Corporation Commission may by proper order, permit the taking of a greater amount whenever it shall deem such taking reasonable or equitable. The said commission is authorized and directed to prescribe rules and regulations for the determination of the natural flow of any such well or wells, and to regulate the taking of natural gas from any or all such common sources of supply within the state, so as to prevent waste, *53protect the interests of the public, and of all those having a right to produce therefrom, and to prevent unreasonable discrimination in favor of any one such common source of supply as against another.”
This section, together with other provisions of the 1915 Act, was also carried forward in the 1921, 1931 and 1941 statutes, and the same now appears as Tit. 52 O. S. 1941 §239.
That under such circumstances the quoted statutes are in pari materia there can be no question. And such fact has been expressly declared by this court in Republic Natural Gas Co. v. State, 198 Okla. 350, 180 P. 2d 1009 (app. dismissed 68 S. Ct. 972, 334 U. S. 62, 92 L. Ed. 1212) wherein there is said:
“It is also significant that both the 1913 Act and the 1915 Act were brought forward in the 1921 Statutes, the 1931 Statutes, and the 1941 Statutes, so that it is apparent that the Legislature in adopting the 1941 Statutes did not consider the 1913 Law superseded by the 1915 law.”
The established rule of construction in such situation is to treat the sections as parts of one law. The rule is thus stated in 59 C. J. 1043, §620:
“ ... It is a well established rule that in the construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law, although they were enacted at different times, and contain no reference to one another.”
This rule has been repeatedly recognized and applied by this court. Ratliff v. Fleener, 43 Okla. 652, 143 P. 1051 1052; Jefferson v. Cook, 53 Okla. 272, 155 P. 852, 855. We there expressly held the acts relating to the subject should be read together as constituting “one law.”
The fundamental rule of construction is the determination of the intent of the Legislature that is embodied in the law. And the same is to be ascertained primarily from the language used in the statute and where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous there is no occasion for construction. McCain v. State Election Board, 144 Okla. 85, 289 P. 759, 761. (See, also, text and cases cited thereon in 59 C. J. 952, §569). In such situation, where the meaning of the language is plain, it must be given effect by the courts. Osage County Motor Co. v. Pappin, 139 Okla. 23, 281 P. 217; Pasley v. Union Nat. Bank of Bartlesville, 137 Okla. 171, 278 P. 621. (See further text and cases cited 59 C. J. p. 955). Another pertinent rule is where statutes are in pari materia they should so far as possible be construed as in harmony with each other. State et al. v. State ex rel. Shull, State Bank Com’r, 142 Okla. 293, 286 P. 891.
Now, consider the two sections of the one law in the light of these rules.
Section 233 deals specifically with the extent of the power to fix prices that may be exercised by the Commission. This power is not plenary and the very idea that it may be so considered is expressly negatived by the requirement of conditions to the exercise thereof. Section 239 does not even purport to deal with the definition of Commission’s power. But even if it can be construed as involving the exercise of price-fixing power, it can be none other than that which is provided for in section 233, to be exercised under the conditions therein prescribed. To hold otherwise is not only to fail to harmonize the two provisions, but is to ignore a legislative intent which is expressly declared. Upon what theory can you imply a legislative intent that is different from and contrary to that which is expressly and plainly declared in the law being construed?
I consider the effect of the holding of the majority to be even more serious than a distortion of the legislative intent, because to the extent it recog*54nizes in the Commission a power in excess of the limitation imposed by the Legislature, it involves an impairment of property rights.
If the better enforcement of the law requires that the Corporation Commission be clothed with more power than that expressly granted in the law, such fact is- a challenge to further legislative action to be taken with due regard to constitutional limitations. Such need can afford no justification for this court to invest the Commission with the power by judicial fiat.