Court Opinion

ID: 9792734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:35:30.928474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:44.614112
License: Public Domain

COATS, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s decision upholding Ross’ sentence. Ross is a serious offender and the trial court certainly did not err in imposing a substantial sentence. However, the court was required to impose a sentence that was reasonable in light of sentences other courts have imposed for similar offenders who have committed similar crimes. In our previous decision in Ross v. State, 836 P.2d 378 (Alaska App.1992), we pointed out that Ross’ sentence was unprecedented:
In the present case, Ross’ composite sentence of eighty-four years without eligibility for parole vastly exceeds the second felony offender benchmark and, indeed, substantially exceeds even the sentences imposed in some of the cases falling within Williams ’ third benchmark category. Unlike other offenders in Williams’ third benchmark category, Ross’ criminal history — consisting of a misdemeanor conviction for driving while intoxicated and a single prior felony, albeit for a similar crime — is not so extensive as to qualify him as an habitual offender, see, e.g., Contreras v. State, 767 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Alaska App.1989), and does not appear to “establish an ingrained, compulsive criminal pattern” of violent misconduct. Schuenemann v. State, 781 P.2d 1005,1009 (Alaska App.1989). And unlike other cases in the third benchmark category, Ross’ kidnapping did not entail an extraordinarily lengthy abduction. See, e.g., Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200,1202-03 (Alaska 1978) (virtual enslavement of victim with repeated sexual assaults over eight days).
Despite the seemingly unprecedented length of the composite term he imposed in *784this case, Judge Michalski failed to discuss the seriousness of Ross’ conduct in relation to other similarly situated offenders. Although the judge gave general consideration to the sentencing criteria specified in State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970), he made no findings to explain the apparent disparity between Ross’ composite sentence and sentences previously given to similarly situated offenders.
It seems to us that the aggravated nature of Ross’ conduct and the disturbing similarity of his prior sexual assault make his case at least comparable to, and perhaps more serious than, Yearty v. State[, 805 P.2d 987, 996-97 (Alaska App.1991) ]. We are thus inclined to think that a sentence exceeding Williams ’ second category benchmark of thirty years would be justified here, as was the case in Yearty. On the other hand, given Ross’ limited criminal history, we are skeptical that a sentence placing Ross in the third benchmark category could be justified, particularly in light of the sketchy psychiatric information contained in the sentencing record.
Ross, 836 P.2d at 384 (footnotes omitted).
Given Ross’ criminal history it is difficult to criticize the sentence the trial court gave him. This is frequently the case with people who commit serious felony crimes. It is for this reason that we have guidelines: to try to ensure that a defendant receives a sentence that is to some degree comparable to the sentences similar offenders have received. I do not think that Ross’ sentence meets this standard of fairness.
I recognize that this is a difficult case. Given Ross’ history and current offenses, the trial court could certainly find that Ross was a dangerous offender who was likely to repeat his behavior. In light of this, I believe the court could have imposed a sentence in the range of fifty to sixty years of imprisonment, a sentence well beyond the normal guidelines. However, a sentence in the range of eighty-four years still appears to me, as it did to the court in our prior Ross decision, to be “seemingly unprecedented.”
I therefore dissent.