Court Opinion

ID: 9568745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:09.089424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:05:10.457887
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting)—The majority opinion makes a valiant but unconvincing and ineffective effort to distin*766guish the problem involved in the instant appeal from the one involved in our decision in Standard Oil Co. v. State, 57 Wn.2d 56, 355 P.2d 349 (1960). The majority’s rationalization, when critically and realistically analyzed, is not only rather strained but seems to me to make certain unwarranted assumptions by overlooking several significant and somewhat unique facets of the taxing statute as it has been enacted by the legislature.
It may be said that the results in attempting to untangle a ball of yam are dependent upon where one starts, i.e., the point of attack or approach. As to the juristic ball of yarn involved in the instant case, it seems to me the approach or point of attack should be significantly different than that of the majority opinion, whereupon as a consequence a different answer or result emerges.
In my judgment, the most significant aspect of the problem is the simple fact that the legislature imposed a tax upon wholesaling activity or wholesalers in subsection (1) of RCW 82.04.270. Having done so, the legislature then proceeded to expand or enlarge the taxing classification and imposed a tax equal to the wholesaler’s tax not upon persons classifiable as wholesalers, but upon persons performing functions essentially comparable to those of a wholesaler but not actually making sales.
It seems hornbook law in the field of taxation that the legislature occasionally does, and legally can do, some unique—if not somewhat strange—things in prescribing classifications, particularly for the purpose of imposing an excise tax. Such classifications, although perhaps unique and even appearing or sounding somewhat strange, are usually upheld by the courts if they apply equally and reasonably to all persons within the ambit of the classifications prescribed by the legislature. I think the legislature has complied with this basic requirement in connection with the problem involved in the instant appeal. In other words, after imposing a tax upon functions or activities which are clearly “garden-variety” wholesaling in nature, the legislature unequivocally expands the ambit of the tax to remove *767any tax advantage from merger of wholesale and retail functions in a vertically integrated operation, and thus includes and taxes functions not clearly run-of-the-mill wholesaling in nature.
In this connection, the language of the statute and drafting technique employed could not be more meaningful and clear in denoting that the functions or activities subject to excise taxation are not wholesaling but those “essentially comparable to those of a wholesaler.” After the quoted sequence of words, to remove any doubt as to the clarity and application of the taxing statute, the legislature explicitly prescribed that the making of a sale in connection with a comparable wholesale activity would not be a requisite for imposition of the tax.
The majority opinion emphasizes the words “retail stores” and the immediately following words “or outlets.” Implicit in this is an inference that a sale, or some kind of sales transaction, is requisite as an essential part of functions or activities “comparable to those of a wholesaler.” This flies in the face of the language and the logic of the statute as examined in the preceding paragraph.
The majority opinion relies strongly, and I think improperly, upon the classic—but not always appropriate—rule of statutory construction that “If there is any doubt as to the meaning of a tax statute, it must be construed most strongly against the taxing power in favor of the citizen.” Citing In re Estate of Ehlers, 53 Wn.2d 679, 335 P.2d 823 (1959). The necessary assumption for application of this general rule of statutory construction is that the particular statute is ambiguous in meaning. I cannot agree with the majority in making such an assumption in the instant case, and then employing the indicated rule of interpretation as a rationalization to invalidate the tax imposed upon the appellant Foremost Dairies, Inc. For the reasons indicated in the foregoing discussion, I am strongly convinced that the legislature, in drafting subsection (2) of RCW 82.04.270, carefully and deliberately chose language which clearly places the appellant within the taxing classification prescribed. *768In support of this conclusion I would refer to an additional general, or basic, rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be construed as a whole. If the statute is construed as a whole, the intent of the legislature seems unambiguous to me. It quite clearly subjects the functions or activities of Foremost to the wholesaling tax imposed by subsection (1) of RCW 82.04.270. In my judgment, our previous decision in Standard Oil, is not distinguishable and in itself should be controlling and dispositive of the instant appeal. I join Hunter, C. J., in his dissent in this matter.