Court Opinion

ID: 9629209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:39:06.922146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:16.920344
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the lead opinion’s discussion of the scope of the due process clauses of the California Constitution and in the conclusion that those constitutional provisions *279mandate that an individual committed to the California Réhabilitation Center (CRC) be afforded adequate notice and hearing before being excluded from CRC.1 However, I cannot agree with that part of the lead opinion which leaves an individual largely defenseless at that hearing. In stripping an individual of his right to present evidence, to call witnesses, and to confront and cross-examine the state’s witnesses, this court ignores the requirements of procedural due process.
The lead opinion properly recognizes that a patient-inmate has an “important interest” in the medical and psychological treatment provided by the state at CRC. (Opn. of Mosk, J., ante, at p. 272.) According to Department of Corrections documents submitted to this court, treatment is provided in “a minimum security, open-dormitory institution,” which maintains “a therapeutic and educational climate.” The individual’s confinement in CRC is likely to be measured in months, not the years common in state prison sentences.2 Hence, a decision to exclude an individual from CRC not only eliminates the availability of treatment and counseling but can result in confinement under more severe conditions in a state prison.
Our society has a significant interest in “promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability in governmental decision making . . . .” (Opn. of Mosk, J., ante, at p. 267.) Also, due process encompasses a concern for the dignity of the individual subjected to the state’s power; part of that concept is the right to participate in a governmental adjudicatory process which significantly affects one’s life. (See opn. of Mosk, J., ante, at pp. 267, 268.)
In the context of this case, these interests require that adequate notice and hearing be afforded to an individual who may be excluded from CRC. The lead opinion appears to echo that requirement. However, in failing to provide the panoply of rights normally incident to such hearings, the lead opinion ensures that the required notice and hearing formalities will be of little actual utility. Silent as to whether a patient-inmate has the right to present witnesses and documentary *280evidence, the opinion specifically denies him any right to cross-examination. The opportunity to ask questions of the state’s witnesses is left in the unsupervised discretion of CRC officials. (Opn. of Mosk, J., ante, at p. 276, fn. 6.) While proclaiming a concern that procedural protections “be tailored to promote more accurate and reliable administrative decisions” (opn. of Mosk, J., ante, at p. 267), the lead opinion denies the patient-inmate the very tools which have been historically sanctioned to achieve that end.
Few rights are more fundamental than the right to present witnesses and documentary evidence in one’s own behalf. (See Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 566 and 583 [41 L.Ed.2d 935, 956-957, 966-967, 94 S.Ct. 2963] (conc, and dis. opn. of Marshall, J.); Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 294, 302 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 308, 312-313, 93 S.Ct. 1038]; Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 267-268 [25 L.Ed.2d 287, 298-299, 90 S.Ct. 1011].) In granting these rights, the state ensures that the decision-maker is forced to consider all relevant evidence, even that which by design or oversight might have otherwise been ignored. And if an individual’s protestations are seen as self-serving or lacking in credibility, he can present a choir of disinterested, supportive witnesses who can help establish the facts.
Consider the prospects of a CRC patient-inmate subject to exclusion. It would appear that he has little chance of persuading CRC officials to reconsider their decision to exclude him if he cannot present witnesses and documentary evidence to support his contentions. Not only may witnesses be crucial to rebutting the factual foundation for exclusion, but they may bear witness to mitigating factors which justify reconsideration. Clearly, the patient-inmate’s entitlement to such rights is both reasonable and unassailable. Yet, the lead opinion is silent as to any countervailing and paramount considerations justifying denial.
The right of cross-examination has been termed “ ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’ ” (People v. Fries (1979) 24 Cal.3d 222, 231 [155 Cal.Rptr. 194, 594 P.2d 19].) The United States Supreme Court has recently declared that “[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believeability of a witness and truth of his testimony are tested.” (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 316 [39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353, 94 S.Ct. 1105].) As a consequence, “[i]n almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” (Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 269 [25 L.Ed.2d at *281p. 300], italics added. Accord Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 294 [35 L.Ed.2d at p. 308]. Cf. Pointer v. Texas (1964) 380 U.S. 400 [13 L.Ed.2d 923, 85 S.Ct. 1065].)
Notwithstanding such compelling authority, the lead opinion denies the patient-inmate any right of cross-examination because the decision to exclude is “evaluative in náture.” (Opn. by Mosk, J., ante, p. 275.)3 This explanation is unpersuasive. In excluding an individual from CRC, the state must determine whether the individual committed the alleged acts and, in light of his record, whether the conduct warrants his exclusion. The first finding is factual in nature. The fact that discretion is involved in the second finding has never before been the basis for removing procedural rights. Indeed, it is a concern with “minimizing . . . abuses of government discretion .. .” which prompted the lead opinion to adopt an expanded due process analysis. (Ante, p. 267.)
In Morrisey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 480 [33 L.Ed.2d 484, 493-494, 92 S.Ct. 2593], the United States Supreme Court recognized that the “second step” in the parole revocation process involved decisions about the individual which were “predictive and discretionary,” i.e., should parole be revoked in light of the parolee’s conduct. In its next term, that court recognized that a probation revocation decision also depended heavily upon a “professional evaluation” of the probationer. (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 784, fn. 8 [36 L.Ed.2d 656, 663, 93 S.Ct. 1756].) A similar professional judgment is required in the decision to revoke the outpatient status of an individual committed to CRC, the process considered by this court in In re Bye, supra, 12 Cal.3d 96. Yet, the evaluative nature of the decision in each case was not considered a bar to the right to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses.
It cannot be denied that significant questions of a purely factual nature are involved in the decision to exclude. In the present case, CRC *282requested that appellant’s commitment to CRC be vacated because of his “excessive criminality with emphasis on violence.” They claimed this assertion was supported by a recent conviction for disturbing the peace (Pen. Code, § 415) and a list of arrests. However, it was demonstrated at the hearing in superior court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3053 that appellant’s recent conviction arose out of a domestic dispute, and that he had not been convicted of any violent crime since a conviction for assault 13 years previously. Appellant’s aggressive behavior arose largely out of marital problems. The court observed that “. . . at least most of Mr. Ramirez’ difficulties stemmed from this long, unhappy marital association.” If such allegations can be tested by cross-examination at the exclusion hearing, their significance can be more accurately weighed by CRC personnel.
The lead opinion fails to provide persuasive reasons for denying a patient-inmate the right to present witnesses and documentary evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Further, in failing to provide these fundamental rights, the lead opinion ignores important case law which has mandated one or both of these rights in analogous contexts as necessary components of due process. (See Morrisey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 487 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 497-498] [parole revocation]; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 782 [36 L.Ed.2d at pp. 661-662] [probation revocation]; Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 566 [41 L.Ed.2d at pp. 956-957] [prisoner subject to loss of good time credits or solitary confinement]; Wright v. Enomoto (N.D.Cal. 1976) 462 F.Supp. 397, 403-405, affd. 434 U.S. 1052 [55 L.Ed.2d 756, 98 S.Ct. 1223] [prisoner subject to administrative segregation in maximum security housing]; In re Bye, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 110 [revocation of CRC outpatient status].) Thus, absent any countervailing considerations, it is clear that a CRC patient-inmate is entitled to call and to cross-examine witnesses at any hearing to exclude that individual from CRC.

It is clear that the procedural rights provided by the lead opinion for an individual subject to exclusion from CRC are in addition to the rights mandated in this court’s unanimous opinion in In re Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96 [115 Cal.Rptr. 382, 524 P.2d 854] for an individual whose outpatient status is being revoked. (See opn. of Mosk, J., ante, at p. 270, fn. 2.)

The Superintendent of CRC, in a letter dated January 27, 1978, stated “that the average time that a new resident spends in the institution is eight months.” A subsequent letter from the Director of Corrections, dated April 12, 1978, indicated that the “median stay in the institution is now seven months. . . .”

The lead opinion suggests that permitting cross-examination would also “impair administrative efficiency.” (Opn. of Mosk, J., ante, p. 276.) Cross-examination is unlikely to be any more disruptive in this context than in any other. Indeed, this court unanimously held that an individual committed to CRC is entitled to cross-examine witnesses at a hearing to review the revocation of CRC outpatient status, in which identical issues and staff would be involved. (In re Bye, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 110.) In any case, the speculative loss of some efficiency to ensure that the process is administered in a more fair and less arbitrary manner is a comparatively minor cost. As Justice Marshall remarked, “how often do we have to reiterate that the Due Process Clause ‘recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency’?” (Wolffv. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 583 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 967] (conc, and dis. opn.).)