Court Opinion

ID: 9909746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 22:04:20.521991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:19.486216
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 230264-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                              NOTICE
 Decision filed 12/13/23. The
                                                                                   This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be                   NO. 5-23-0264
                                                                                   Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                      not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                    IN THE                         limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                         under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

MICHAEL WILLIAMS,                               )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )     Champaign County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 20-L-153
                                                )
MACK’S AUTO RECYCLING, INC.,                    )     Honorable
                                                )     Benjamin W. Dyer,
      Defendant-Appellee.                       )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment.

                                                 ORDER

¶1       Held:         Where there was no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court’s order granting
                       summary judgment in favor of Mack’s Auto Recycling, Inc. was correct, and we
                       affirm.

¶2       Michael Williams slipped and fell on an icy accumulation on property owned and managed

by Mack’s Auto Recycling, Inc. (Mack’s). Williams filed suit against Mack’s, and after discovery,

Mack’s filed its motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted Mack’s motion for

summary judgment, and the plaintiff timely appealed. We affirm.

                                                       1
¶3                                            I. Background

¶4      On December 11, 2019, Williams drove his pickup truck from Normal, Illinois, to Mack’s

in Urbana to pick up a transmission that his mother-in-law had purchased. 1 Upon arrival, Williams

entered Mack’s office to speak with the staff, who advised him to move his truck down to a

warehouse bay door so that Mack’s workers could load the transmission into the bed of his truck.

Security camera footage of the area on this date shows that Williams backed his truck up initially,

and then backed it closer to the bay door after the bay door opened. Upon stopping the truck on

the concrete apron, Williams did not move the truck again until the transmission was loaded. After

Williams parked his truck on the concrete apron, he exited his truck, allegedly stepped on a piece

of ice, slipped, and fell.

¶5      During Williams’s discovery deposition, he testified that on December 11, 2019, as he was

driving from Normal to Urbana, he observed snow and ice. Upon arrival at Mack’s, he observed

snow and ice on the property, including on the pathway leading to Mack’s office, and throughout

the “junkyard.” The concrete apron leading into the bay was on a slight incline. There is no

        1
          Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 sets forth the requirements for the appellant’s brief. Ill. S. Ct. R.
341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341(h)(6) mandates that the statement of facts in the appellant’s brief contain
“appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). In
addition, Rule 341(h)(7) mandates that in argument, the appellant must not only make his contentions and
include his reasoning but must also include “citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied
on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
    We are frustrated that the appellant’s brief in this case lacks any citation to the record on appeal in his
statement of facts, and additionally fails to cite any authority for his arguments on appeal. Although we
have the authority to strike the appellant’s statement of facts for this blatant failure to follow Illinois
Supreme Court Rules (see Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12 (citing
People v. Sprind, 403 Ill. App. 3d 772, 778-79 (2010))), we instead rely upon the appellee’s statement of
facts which is in compliance with the rules. Moreover, the appellant’s failure to cite any relevant caselaw
potentially prevents this court from analyzing any arguments he makes on appeal. While “[t]he appellate
court is not a depository into which a party may dump the burden of research” (People v. O’Malley, 356
Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1046 (2005)), the appellee’s brief succinctly sets forth the applicable law providing us
with the ability to review the propriety of the trial court’s summary judgment. In response to the appellee’s
complaints, the appellant added caselaw in his reply brief that we have also reviewed and considered.
                                                      2
evidence as to the degree of the incline, other than from a Mack’s employee, Uginor Gutierrez,

who characterized the incline as “slight.”

¶6       A security camera was mounted near Mack’s sales office and was pointed in the direction

of the loading bay. Williams contends that this camera recorded him opening his truck door,

“disappearing” from view, and then standing next to his truck. He contends that this footage

captured his slip and fall. Mack’s had a second surveillance camera inside the loading bay which

recorded aspects of the placement of the transmission into Williams’s truck bed. From this same

recording, Williams’s truck is depicted leaving the loading bay, and there is a slight downward

incline visible as he departs. Williams is not seen slipping and falling on this second video.2

¶7       Although Williams was aware of the snow and ice throughout Mack’s parking lot and

walkways, he exited his truck after parking it at the bay apparently without looking at the ground.

Williams placed his left foot down onto an alleged patch of ice the size of a manhole cover and

slipped and fell. Williams testified that the color of the ice was clear and that it did not appear to

be aggravated by any “man-made activity.” Williams confirmed that the ice he slipped upon was

“naturally accumulated.” He also confirmed that the ice did not appear to have been caused by any

defect or condition of the concrete apron or connected in any way to the incline. Williams testified

that he saw nothing on the ground as he was backing up toward the bay. Specifically, he stated that

he saw no salt or anything like shovel marks or other “manipulation” of the ice on the concrete

apron.

         2
          From our review of the videos submitted as exhibits in the record on appeal, there is no direct or
clear footage showing Williams exiting his vehicle, slipping, and falling. This is not to infer that Williams
did not fall, but simply that the footage recovered and submitted into evidence is from obscured angles and
at distances that simply do not allow a direct view of Williams exiting his vehicle when parked at Mack’s
bay on the concrete apron. We further note that Williams’s briefs on appeal do not provide references to
timestamps on the videos which would assist the court in reviewing this footage. However, deposition
transcripts in the record did contain helpful timestamp references.
                                                     3
¶8     Mack’s manager, Donald Brown, was also deposed and testified that before Williams’s

fall, Mack’s was unaware of the alleged spot of ice. His first indication that ice was present in that

area came from Williams himself, who stopped in the office to turn in his paperwork after the

transmission was loaded into his truck. Similarly, Mack’s two employees who were present at the

time of the fall, Robert McCartney and Uginor Gutierrez, both testified that they were both

unaware of any ice on the concrete apron prior to Williams’s fall.

¶9     On October 13, 2020, Williams filed his negligence complaint against Mack’s alleging that

Mack’s “had a duty to maintain their property in a reasonably safe manner and to warn customers

of any dangers or risks on their property pursuant to the Illinois Premises Liability Act.” He alleged

the loading ramp area was inclined and, on the date and time at issue, was covered with ice. He

alleged that there were no posted signs or warnings of this dangerous condition, and that Mack’s

should have known about the dangerous icy condition of the inclined loading area. Specifically,

Williams alleged Mack’s breached its duty to him in one or more of the following eight ways:

       1. Failed to maintain the property in a reasonably safe manner in violation of the Illinois

           Premises Liability Act (Act);

       2. Failed to warn of the slippery and dangerous condition of the premises in violation of

           the Act;

       3. Failed to clean the area where Williams fell despite Mack’s knowledge of the

           dangerous condition in violation of the Act;

       4. Negligently failed to maintain its property in a reasonably safe manner;

       5. Negligently failed to warn of the slippery and dangerous condition;

                                                  4
       6. Negligently created an unsafe and dangerous condition by constructing a loading area

           on an incline that created an unnatural accumulation of ice in an area where Mack’s

           knew that employees and customers would be loading items;

       7. Negligently requested Williams’s assistance in loading the purchased items on this ice-

           covered incline; and/or

       8. Negligently failed to assist Williams in loading the items.

Williams alleged that because of his slip and fall, he sustained bodily injuries and incurred medical

expenses and monetary damages associated with his pain and suffering, disability, and loss of

normal life.

¶ 10   Mack’s filed its motion for summary judgment on October 7, 2022. Williams filed a

responsive pleading, and Mack’s filed a reply. On March 24, 2023, the trial court entered its order

granting Mack’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that no facts cited by Williams

met any of the exceptions to the natural-accumulation doctrine, “including his insistence that the

man-made incline itself was an unnatural use of the property, or that it was an area to which

Williams was directed by employees of Mack’s.” The court stated that there was absolutely no

evidence to establish that the accumulation of ice on the incline was unnatural in nature. Moreover,

the court found that Williams cited no persuasive legal authority to establish that a natural

accumulation of ice on a man-made ramp or incline created a separate exception under Illinois

law. Williams timely appealed from this order.

¶ 11                                       II. Analysis

¶ 12   Under section 2-1005(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” 735 ILCS

                                                 5
5/2-1005(c) (West 2018). “The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but

rather to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Adams v. Northern Illinois

Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 42-43 (2004).

¶ 13    “Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be granted only where the movant’s

right to it is clear and free of doubt.” Hutchcraft v. Independent Mechanical Industries, Inc., 312

Ill. App. 3d 351, 357 (2000). In determining whether to grant a request for summary judgment, the

trial court strictly construes all evidence in the record against the moving party and liberally in

favor of the opponent. Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL 122486, ¶ 12 (citing Adams, 211 Ill.

2d at 42-43); Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986); Koziol v. Hayden, 309 Ill. App. 3d 472,

476 (1999). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file

to decide if there is any issue of material fact. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 29; Myers v.

Health Specialists, S.C., 225 Ill. App. 3d 68, 72 (1992). If a reasonable person could draw divergent

inferences from the undisputed material facts or if a material fact remains in dispute, then the trial

court should deny the motion. Adams, 211 Ill. 2d at 43; Koziol, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 476. On appeal,

courts review summary judgment orders de novo. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 29; Myers, 225 Ill.

App. 3d at 72.

¶ 14   We first examine Illinois tort law on the issue of premises liability. In 1997, portions of the

Illinois Premises Liability Act (740 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2018)) were declared

unconstitutional due to unseverability. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997).

Subsequent to the supreme court’s Best opinion, only the following portions of section 2 of the

Premises Liability Act remain intact (740 ILCS 130/2 (West 2018)). Section 2 abolished the

common law distinction between invitees and licensees with respect to the duty owed by an owner

or occupier of land. Id. In addition, section 2 outlined the duty owed by the owner or occupant of

                                                  6
property to persons entering that property. Id. The duty owed is that of reasonable care under the

circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on the premises. Id.

¶ 15      In negligence-based tort claims, the plaintiff must establish the essential elements which

include “the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and

an injury caused by that breach.” Pearson v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, 2020 IL App (5th) 180505,

¶ 28 (citing Ward v. K Mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140, 143 (1990)). “Whether a duty exists is a

question of law for the court to decide, which is subject to de novo review.” Id. (citing Krywin v.

Chicago Transit Authority, 238 Ill. 2d 215, 226 (2010)).

¶ 16      We first examine the issue of whether Mack’s owed Williams a duty. To make this

determination we must first analyze the relationship between the parties “to determine if the

‘plaintiff and [the] defendant stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposed upon

the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff.’ ” Id. ¶ 31

(quoting Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 436 (2006)).

¶ 17      Generally, a landowner bears no duty to affirmatively protect an individual from harm

while on the landowner’s property unless a “special relationship” exists between the parties.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965). Illinois courts have recognized the following four

special relationships that require the landowner to warn or protect a person from harm: “ ‘(1)

carrier-passenger; (2) innkeeper-guest; (3) business inviter and invitee[;] and (4) one who

voluntarily takes custody of another in such a manner that it deprives the person of his normal

opportunities for protection.’ ” Pearson, 2020 IL App (5th) 180505, ¶ 34 (quoting Lutz v. Goodlife

Entertainment, Inc., 208 Ill. App. 3d 565, 569 (1990)); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A

(1965).

                                                  7
¶ 18   In this case, the only possible special relationship between Mack’s and Williams is as a

business inviter and its invitee. A person is designated as an invitee on the land of another if

“ ‘(1) he enters by invitation, express or implied, (2) his entry is connected with the owner’s

business or with an activity the owner conducts or permits to be conducted on his land[,] and

(3) there is a mutuality of benefit or a benefit to the owner.’ ” Lutz, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 569 (quoting

Barmore v. Elmore, 83 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1058-59 (1980)). Mack’s does not dispute that Williams

satisfies the requirements for a business invitee.

¶ 19   Although Williams was a business invitee, Illinois cases involving ice, snow, or water on

the business owner’s property are governed by the natural-accumulation rule, and thus liability for

an icy condition is not automatic as liability requires more than the business inviter and invitee

relationship. Kellermann v. Car City Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d 285, 288 (1999). This

rule provides that property owners/inviters have no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice,

snow, or melted water from their premises. Riccitelli v. Sternfeld, 1 Ill. 2d 133, 137 (1953);

Mickens v. CPS Chicago Parking, LLC, 2019 IL App (1st) 180156, ¶ 26; Kellermann, 306 Ill. App.

3d at 288.

¶ 20   The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the natural-accumulation rule in Graham v. City of

Chicago, 346 Ill. 638, 643 (1931), holding that it would be “unreasonable to compel a city to

expend the money and perform the labor necessary to keep its walks reasonably free from ice and

snow during winter months.” Initially, the rule applied only to cities and municipalities, but Illinois

courts expanded the rule to include landlords, allowing landlords to avoid liability to its tenants,

stating that it is “ ‘unreasonable and somewhat impractical to require a landlord to remove ice and

snow from sidewalks used jointly by his tenants where the ice and snow arise from natural

                                                     8
causes.’ ” Kellermann, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 289 (quoting Cronin v. Brownlie, 348 Ill. App. 448, 456

(1952)).

¶ 21   The natural-accumulation rule extends past the time frame when the precipitation is falling

or when the ice, snow, or water has been tracked inside a business owner’s premises.

       “[I]f a landowner fails to remove snow or ice that naturally accumulated—either

       because it made no attempt at removal, or because it made some attempt but did not

       remove all the snow or ice—that landowner is not liable for injuries caused by those

       natural accumulations, no matter how dangerous they may be.” (Emphases in

       original.) Mickens, 2019 IL App (1st) 180156, ¶ 28 (citing Murphy-Hylton v.

       Lieberman Management Services, Inc., 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 19).

¶ 22   The natural-accumulation rule has consistently been applied in Illinois to businesses of all

types. Id. Moreover, the natural-accumulation rule has been applied to all areas on a business

owner’s property, including sidewalks, parking lots, the interior of the owner’s building after being

tracked inside, and on the steps of an entrance way. Id. Additionally, the rule that a business owner

has no duty to remove a natural accumulation of ice, snow, or water is applicable regardless of

ongoing precipitation or the length of time that the natural accumulation has been present. Krywin,

238 Ill. 2d at 230 (citing Sheffer v. Springfield Airport Authority, 261 Ill. App. 3d 151, 154 (1994)

(weather was “bright and sunny” when the plaintiff fell on the ice) and Frederick v. Professional

Truck Driver Training School, Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d 472, 478 (2002) (finding that there was no

exception to the natural-accumulation rule on the basis of the passage of time)).

¶ 23   In contrast, a business owner may still be held liable for injuries resulting from a slip and

fall on accumulated ice, snow, or water on the business owner’s property if the ice, snow, or water

is construed as “unnatural” or “aggravated.” Bloom v. Bistro Restaurant Ltd. Partnership, 304 Ill.

                                                 9
App. 3d 707, 711 (1999); Roberson v. J.C. Penney Co., 251 Ill. App. 3d 523, 528 (1993);

Shoemaker v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 187 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1043 (1989).

Illinois courts have found liability involving artificial or unnatural accumulations of ice, snow, or

water or a natural condition aggravated by the property owner. See Ziencina v. County of Cook,

188 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1999) (mound or pile of snow created by shoveling or plowing to remove the

snow is “unnatural”); Russell v. Village of Lake Villa, 335 Ill. App. 3d 990, 995 (2002) (mound of

plowed snow that melted and refroze into a sheet of ice—the sheet of ice is “unnatural”); Kittle v.

Liss, 108 Ill. App. 3d 922, 925-26 (1982) (issue of fact remained whether the owner provided

adequate lighting in area where business invitee slipped and fell on a natural accumulation);

Roberson, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 528 (business owner liable if injuries resulted from an artificial or

unnatural accumulation or from a natural accumulation that was aggravated in some manner by

the owner); Bloom, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 711 (business owner liable if the accumulation of ice, snow,

or water is unnatural because of the design, construction, or maintenance of the building or

premises).

¶ 24   As our review of the trial court’s order granting Mack’s motion for summary judgment is

de novo, we turn to the allegations of the complaint filed in this case. Because of the Illinois

natural-accumulation rule, most of Williams’s allegations are only viable if the incline in Mack’s

loading bay area resulted in an unnatural accumulation of ice. The other claims raised by Williams

involve failure to maintain the area, failure to warn about the ice, and failure to remove the ice—

all of which involve the Premises Liability Act and general tort liability. In keeping with the Illinois

natural-accumulation rule, Mack’s had no duty to “remove, monitor, or exercise reasonable care

in making reasonably safe an area which contains naturally accumulated snow and ice.”

Kellerman, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 290.

                                                  10
¶ 25   At issue then is whether the ice just outside of the bay door opening was “unnatural”

because of the slight incline. First, we note that based upon the testimony of Mack’s employees,

no one was aware of the small round patch of ice on the incline. No one had attempted to remove

the ice or put salt or other material down. Williams testified that the ice was clear and had not been

altered in any way. There was no evidence that Mack’s had previously removed ice or snow from

that area, and that the ice or snow had melted and refroze. Thus, there was no factual support that

the patch of ice was “unnatural.” Second, there was no structural or other type of expert evidence

supporting the allegation that the slight incline into the loading bay was the cause of the alleged

unnatural ice patch. Williams presented no evidence to establish the degree of incline at issue, and

presented no evidence that the incline was dangerous. From our review of the security camera

footage of the loading bay area, we can confirm that there is a very slight incline from the parking

lot up into the bay. However, while there is an incline into the loading bay, the plaintiff was

required to establish in some way that this incline is structurally unsound or somehow could have

resulted in an unnatural accumulation of ice. Williams failed to do so. Third, Williams cited no

legal authority to support his claim that the slight incline resulted in the patch of ice being an

unnatural accumulation. From our own research, we find no case authority supporting Williams’s

claim that this slight incline created an unnatural accumulation of ice. Overall, we conclude that

there is no basis in fact or law to find that the patch of ice at issue constituted an unnatural

accumulation.

¶ 26   During oral argument on appeal, Williams’s attorney admitted that the ice in question was

a natural accumulation. However, he disputed Illinois law that business owners had no duty to

remove, barricade, or warn against a natural accumulation, arguing that the overall business

owner’s general duty of due care to its invitees established a genuine issue of material fact barring

                                                 11
the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in Mack’s favor. This argument remains flawed

because of the Illinois natural-accumulation law barring liability in certain situations. As the patch

of ice at issue was acknowledged to be a natural accumulation by both Williams and his attorney,

Mack’s has no liability to Williams for this patch of ice.

¶ 27   Also, during oral argument on appeal, Williams’s attorney contended that the loading bay

was not an “entrance” to Mack’s business, and thus caselaw holding that the natural-accumulation

law in Illinois extends to areas of ingress to and egress from the business is not applicable in this

case. We disagree. Every business is different, and its ingress and egress points will depend upon

the type of business involved and may include more than one location. In this case, the defendant

was taking delivery of a salvaged transmission. If we were to accept Williams’s theory, the only

official ingress and egress would be located at Mack’s business office. As acceptance of the

transmission required the use of a forklift to transfer the item into the bed of the defendant’s own

pickup truck, the business office at Mack’s was not the sole entrance or exit and included the

loading bay precisely for completion of purchase transactions such as this one. “When the

landowner prescribes a means of ingress and egress, it has a duty to illuminate properly and give

adequate warning of a known, dangerous condition, or it must repair the condition.” (Emphasis

added.) Richter v. Burton Investment Properties, Inc., 240 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1002 (1993) (citing

Branson v. R&L Investment, Inc., 196 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1092 (1990)). As previously discussed in

this order, there was no evidence that any person affiliated with Mack’s was aware of this small

patch of ice. Nor was there any evidence that the patch of ice was in any way “unnatural.”

Williams’s argument that the natural accumulation of ice at this loading bay required a separate

standard of care is not in keeping with Illinois law.

                                                 12
¶ 28   Williams alternatively argues that Mack’s should be held liable for this incident because

its employees requested his assistance in loading the transmission into his truck bed and/or failed

to assist him in loading the transmission. Again, Williams cites no legal authority supporting these

allegations. The videos included in the record on appeal do not have sound, and so we are unable

to confirm that the employees “asked” for Williams’s assistance. From the video, Williams backed

his truck toward the loading bay entrance, stopped, and then backed the truck further into the bay.

When Williams appears on the video inside the bay, he “assists” by lowering the tailgate of his

pickup truck and moving items around in the truck bed to apparently allow for room for the

transmission. He also removed a transmission core from the bed of his truck which was eventually

placed on Mack’s forklift. Mack’s employee guided the new transmission into the truck bed—not

Williams. After the transmission was in the bed of the pickup truck, Williams merely adjusted its

placement, closed the tailgate, and returned to the cab of his truck.

¶ 29   Uginor Gutierrez was Mack’s employee who loaded the transmission into Williams’s truck

bed. During his deposition, Gutierrez testified that he did not see the alleged slip and fall and does

not remember any conversations that he may have had with Williams in the loading bay. Portions

of the security video were shown to Gutierrez during the deposition. Based upon the security

footage, Gutierrez explained that he used the forklift to place the transmission into the bed of

Williams’s truck. Additionally, Williams removed an old transmission core from his truck bed and

assisted Gutierrez in loading that core onto Mack’s forklift. Then, Williams entered Mack’s sales

office where he picked up the receipt for the transaction. Gutierrez was present in the office when

Williams entered the office to pick up the paperwork and testified that Williams informed those in

Mack’s office that he had fallen on ice outside of the bay.

                                                 13
¶ 30    Although Williams testified that a Mack’s employee directed him to assist in the loading

of the new transmission into his truck bed, from our review of the security video, coupled with the

testimony of Gutierrez, Williams did not load the transmission or assist Gutierrez in loading the

transmission. Instead, Mack’s employee loaded the transmission into Williams’s truck bed. While

we confirm that Williams lowered the tailgate of his pickup truck, and after the transmission was

loaded into the bed of his truck, Williams adjusted the placement of the transmission in the bed

and then closed his truck bed, these actions do not necessarily align with the allegations in his

complaint that he “assisted” with loading the transmission. 3 At most, Williams’s assistance was in

opening, and then closing, the tailgate of his pickup truck. In that limited way, he may have assisted

Mack’s staff. However, simply assisting in this manner, without citing legal authority establishing

that a business owner has liability in this situation, is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material

fact. Thus, exiting his truck to lower and then raise the tailgate of his truck at Mack’s loading bay

is no different than exiting his truck on Mack’s property to enter the sales office. Both scenarios

fall into the same category of icy falls on a business owner’s property given the natural-

accumulation rule in Illinois: “[the] landowner is not liable for injuries caused by those natural

accumulations, no matter how dangerous they may be.” Mickens, 2019 IL App (1st) 180156, ¶ 28

(citing Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 19).

¶ 31                                        III. Conclusion

¶ 32    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Champaign County circuit court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of Mack’s Auto Recycling, Inc.

¶ 33    Affirmed.

        3
         The allegations of Williams’s complaint only reference the loading of the transmission purchased
from Mack’s, and do not mention the transmission core that was apparently from the transmission being
replaced Williams left with Mack’s.
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