Court Opinion

ID: 9733131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:54:21.141391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.558830
License: Public Domain

*217CIRILLO, President
Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The Register of Wills has the statutorily granted power to determine who may properly receive letters of administration.1 There is no legal justification, statutory or otherwise, for the courts to usurp this power. The majority’s contrary conclusion compels me to dissent.
As the majority recognizes, 20 Pa.C.S. § 901 provides that “The register shall have jurisdiction of ... the grant of letters____” Moreover, 20 Pa.C.S. § 711(12) defines the jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court as including “[t]he appointment, removal, and discharge of ... all fiduciaries of estates ... except that the register shall continue to grant letters testamentary and of administration____” (emphasis added). As the basis for its decision, however, the majority relies on a misinterpretation of two separate statutes, 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 907 and 3183.
Section 907 provides that when a dispute arises before the register concerning the grant of letters, the register, or the court upon petition, may certify the entire record and then the court “shall proceed to a determination of the issue in dispute.” Section 3183 states that upon removal of a personal representative, “the court may direct the grant of new letters ... by the register to the person entitled____” In this case of first impression, the majority interprets these statutes to vest the courts with the authority to force the register to issue letters to the individual that the court deems worthy. This, the majority reasons, effectuates the intent of the legislature.
In my view, the reasonable intent of the legislature was to have the court remand the matter back to the register, if the court determined that the register erred in issuing letters to an administrator. This statutory construction would not, as the majority suggests, lead to an unnecessary *218waste of judicial resources. Conversely, remanding the matter would enable the register to perform his duties without the court encroaching upon the province of the register’s statutorily granted powers. It would require less time and expense for the court to allow the register to do his job, in accord with the court’s proceedings, as opposed to the court doing itself what the register is mandated to do.
The limited standard of review that applies to this case was enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Schulz Estate, 392 Pa. 117, 139 A.2d 560 (1958). After stating the law that the Register of Wills has the initial duty to grant letters of administration, our Supreme Court held that “[o]n appeal from his action judicial review is confined to a determination whether the Register of Wills has abused his discretion in the appointment of an administrator.” Schulz, 392 Pa. at 123, 139 A.2d at 563 (citing Phillip’s Estate, 293 Pa. 351, 143 A. 9 (1928); McMurray’s Estate, 256 Pa. 233, 100 A. 798 (1917)). See also Lizenkon Estate, 455 Pa. 604, 316 A.2d 894 (1974) (affirming trial court’s vacation of decree by register and authorizing register to entertain a petition for the appointment of a neutral administrator).
I recognize, as does the majority in footnote 9, that the issue now before us is not identical to the precise issue presented in Schulz. Nonetheless, a fair and reasonable reading of Schulz indicates that the limitations on judicial review promulgated in that case apply with equal force to support my position in the case now before us.
In sum, I think it was incorrect for the majority to expand the scope of judicial review and usurp the function of the Register of Wills. Accordingly, I cannot join the majority’s opinion.
DEL SOLE, J., joins.

. See generally Walsh v. Tate, 444 Pa. 229, 237-38, 282 A.2d 284, 288 (1971) (discussing 1968 amendment to Pennsylvania Constitution removing constitutional status formerly accorded the Philadelphia Register of Wills).