Court Opinion

ID: 9364279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 20:00:58.082102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.934394
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-12287    Document: 63-1      Date Filed: 01/18/2023   Page: 1 of 15

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-12287
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        MICHAEL YLINIEMI,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cr-00083-TKW-MJF-1
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                 20-12287

        Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                A jury convicted Michael Yliniemi of receiving and pos-
        sessing child pornography. On appeal, Yliniemi challenges his con-
        viction, arguing that the district court pressured him to testify and
        so his decision to take the stand was not knowing, intelligent, and
        voluntary. We affirm Yliniemi’s conviction but remand for the dis-
        trict court to correct a clerical error in the judgment.
            FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               A grand jury indicted Yliniemi on two counts: (1) receiving
        child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 2252A(a)(2)
        and (b)(1); and (2) possessing child pornography involving a prepu-
        bescent minor and a minor under the age of twelve, in violation of
        18 U.S.C. sections 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). Yliniemi pleaded not
        guilty and the case was set for trial.
                At trial, the district court spoke with the parties before jury
        selection, and it noted that Yliniemi’s witness list didn’t list anyone
        “other than the defendant.” Yliniemi’s lawyer told the district
        court that “[w]e haven’t made a final decision on whether to put
        [Yliniemi] on the stand yet.” The district court said that it under-
        stood and that Yliniemi wouldn’t need to make a final decision un-
        til after the government’s case—which, if things went “smoothly,”
        would be later that day.
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        20-12287               Opinion of the Court                         3

               After the parties selected a jury and gave their opening state-
        ments, the government presented its four witnesses. First, the gov-
        ernment called Aubrey Chance, an investigator with Bay County
        Sheriff’s Office, who testified to the following. In December 2018,
        the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children referred
        sixteen cases to the sheriff’s office involving a Facebook account
        with the name “Ryan Madnes.” The Madnes account led a cha-
        troom that the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
        flagged for child pornography.
               Investigator Chance executed two search warrants: one on
        Facebook for records related to the Madnes account and one on a
        phone provider for a phone number linked to that Facebook ac-
        count. The Facebook search revealed that the Madnes account
        user had shared about 180 images and 109 videos of child pornog-
        raphy. Some of those images and videos showed minors under the
        age of twelve engaged in sexual acts. The Madnes account was
        linked to the email address “boywanker1095,” and its user claimed
        to be a young boy depicted naked in an image that he would send
        to others.
               The search directed to the Madnes account’s phone number
        uncovered evidence linking Yliniemi to the number. The search
        revealed that the phone number: belonged to the same user since
        2017; placed more than forty percent of its calls to someone
        Yliniemi had lived with at the time; and was used most frequently
        at Yliniemi’s home and work addresses. Investigator Chance also
        looked to see whether the phone number had ever called 9-1-1. As
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        4                           Opinion of the Court                  20-12287

        it turned out, someone had made a 9-1-1 call from the number,
        identified himself as “Michael” (Yliniemi’s first name), and reported
        a trespass at his address (Yliniemi’s address). Investigator Chance
        testified that “everything . . . start[ed] coming together at that
        point.”
              So Investigator Chance questioned Yliniemi where he
        worked—a Waffle House in Panama City Beach. Yliniemi at first
        denied using the phone number but then admitted that he had used
        the number since 2017. Yliniemi also said that he didn’t know an-
        ything about the Madnes account before admitting that the ac-
        count was his.
                  At that point, Investigator Chance read Yliniemi his Mi-
        randa 1 rights and took him to the sheriff’s office, where he recorded
        the rest of Yliniemi’s interview. During this interview, which the
        government played for the jury, Yliniemi said that he created the
        Madnes account on “[his] phone.” He admitted that he got in-
        volved in a chat room where he and others exchanged child por-
        nography.
               The next three witnesses offered similar testimony. The sec-
        ond witness, Lindsey Miller, was a crime analyst at the Bay County
        Sheriff’s Office. Miller testified about the call to 9-1-1 and explained
        that she analyzed Madnes’s phone number and found that the most
        common call was to someone Yliniemi had been living with at the

        1
            Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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        20-12287               Opinion of the Court                         5

        time. The third witness, David Ammons, was Yliniemi’s boss at
        Waffle House. Ammons testified that he had used the phone num-
        ber associated with Madnes to call Yliniemi. The fourth (and final)
        government witness was Yliniemi’s ex-girlfriend, Amanda Thor-
        burn. Thorburn testified that Yliniemi called her from jail and
        “confessed to [her] on the phone,” telling her that he “looked up
        things he shouldn’t have.” The government rested.
               After the government rested, the district court asked
        Yliniemi (out of the jury’s presence) if he “plan[ned] to put on a
        case.” Yliniemi’s lawyer responded: “He has spoken to me, and
        I’ve spoken to him at length about this particular issue. He’s choos-
        ing not to testify.”
                At that point, the district court addressed Yliniemi person-
        ally and let him know that he had both “an absolute right not to
        testify” and “an absolute right to testify.” The district court swore
        Yliniemi in and asked him if he understood his “right to either tes-
        tify or not testify.” Yliniemi responded, “Yes, sir.” “And you un-
        derstand,” the district court asked, “that that’s a decision that only
        you can make?” While Yliniemi confirmed that he understood,
        Yliniemi’s lawyer interjected and told the district court that
        Yliniemi was “torn between testifying and not testifying.”
                Yliniemi then asked for more time to think about testifying,
        and he stated that he wanted “to spend one more night with [his]
        family” because his father was older and had heart problems. The
        district court asked how much time had passed since his arrest, and
        Yliniemi said that he had been busy with work. Yliniemi also stated
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 20-12287

        that he hadn’t “had very much time” with his attorney to discuss
        whether to testify.
                The district court then asked Yliniemi if he would be able to
        decide if it gave him more time to speak with his lawyer. Yliniemi
        responded: “I’d like to spen[d] my last night with my parents, if
        this is my last night.” The district court then asked, “[y]ou under-
        stand you’re not going to be shot at the end of this, don’t you,” and
        explained that Yliniemi hadn’t suggested that spending more time
        with his family would impact his decision to testify.
                The district court explained to Yliniemi that, if he decided
        not to testify, the jury wouldn’t be allowed to hold that decision
        against him. The district court also explained that the jury would
        “weigh [his] testimony like any other witness.” The district court
        then asked Yliniemi about his prior criminal history and whether
        he’d taken his lack of a criminal history into account in deciding
        whether to testify. Yliniemi responded, “I need time with [counsel]
        and I’ll testify.”
                The district court decided to take a fifteen-minute break so
        that Yliniemi could discuss his decision with his lawyer. The dis-
        trict court also repeatedly explained that it was “not trying to influ-
        ence [Yliniemi] one way or the other,” that the decision was one
        that “only” Yliniemi could make, that it was “completely
        [Yliniemi’s] decision,” and that Yliniemi’s decision wouldn’t “mat-
        ter one way or the other” to the district court. Yliniemi told the
        district court that he understood, and then they broke.
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        20-12287              Opinion of the Court                       7

                The parties returned almost twenty minutes later. The dis-
        trict court then had an exchange with Yliniemi, in which Yliniemi
        confirmed that he had enough time to talk to his lawyer, that he
        understood his rights, and that he had chosen to take the stand:
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Yliniemi, when we left
              you asked for some additional time to discuss with
              [your lawyer]. Have you had the time you need to
              discuss with him?

              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

              THE COURT: And have the time to discuss what op-
              tions you have in this case about testifying?

              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

              THE COURT: And have you made a decision at this
              point what you intend to do?

              THE DEFENDANT: We’re going to testify.

              THE COURT: You’re going to testify. All right. You
              understand that decision is a decision that only you
              can make?

              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

              THE COURT: And whatever advice [your lawyer]
              gave you is something you can take into account or
              not take into account . . . but you ultimately have to
              make that final decision?
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        8                    Opinion of the Court                20-12287

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

             THE COURT: And you said you do not have a crim-
             inal history?

             THE DEFENDANT: No, I don’t have a criminal his-
             tory, sir.

             THE COURT: Okay. And you do understand . . . if
             you had chosen not to testify, I would tell the jury
             they can’t hold that against you in any way, shape, or
             form?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

             THE COURT: Okay. And even knowing that, you
             want to get on the stand and testify?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

             THE COURT: And you understand, when [you do]
             that, you’re going to be subject to cross-examination
             by [the government]?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

             THE COURT: And you understand that when you
             get on the stand and testify, the jury’s going to weigh
             your testimony just like any other witness?

             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

             THE COURT: And you understand that, . . . if you
             say anything untrue on the stand, you could be
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        20-12287                Opinion of the Court                          9

               subject to a perjury prosecution, separate and apart
               from this case?

               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

               THE COURT: All right. Knowing all that, your de-
               cision is still to testify?

               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

                With that, Yliniemi took the stand. Yliniemi denied receiv-
        ing or possessing child pornography. He testified that he gave the
        taped confession because Investigator Chance told him he would
        not go to jail if he confessed. Yliniemi also testified that he told his
        ex-girlfriend that he was accused of accessing child pornography,
        not that he in fact did so.
               The jury found Yliniemi guilty of both counts. The district
        court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment to be followed
        by five years of supervised release. Yliniemi timely appealed.
                                    DISCUSSION
                       The right to testify or to remain silent
              Yliniemi argues that his conviction must be reversed be-
        cause his decision to testify was not “knowing, intelligent, and vol-
        untary.” He contends that the district court created a “coercive
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                      20-12287

        atmosphere” by questioning him and then requiring him to make
        a quick decision. We disagree. 2
                “A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to choose
        whether or not to testify[.]” United States v. Anderson, 1 F.4th
        1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2021); see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,
        52–53 (1987) (“Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in
        his own defense, or to refuse to do so.” (cleaned up)). “This right
        [to testify or to remain silent] is personal to the defendant and can-
        not be waived either by the trial court or by defense counsel.”
        United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992) (en
        banc). It’s the defendant’s choice alone. Id.
               We’ve explored how a district court might probe a defend-
        ant’s decision. On the one hand, the district court is generally not
        required to “conduct an on-the-record inquiry” into whether the
        defendant has “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived”
        his right to testify or to remain silent. United States v. Van De
        Walker, 141 F.3d 1451, 1452 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Anderson, 1
        F.4th at 1259 (same). In fact, a “district court runs the risk of

        2
         The parties disagree about whether we should review for plain error or struc-
        tural error. Because we find no error at all, we don’t need to reach that issue.
        See United States v. Nelson, 884 F.3d 1103, 1104 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e are
        presented with several questions about the nature of and relationship among
        the various ‘error’ doctrines that pervade federal criminal law—trial error,
        harmless error, structural error, plain error, and invited error. In the end, we
        needn’t definitively resolve those questions, because . . . the district court
        committed no constitutional error.”).
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        20-12287                Opinion of the Court                        11

        denying a defendant’s right to testify [or to remain silent] by engag-
        ing in too searching of an inquiry; its questions might dampen the
        defendant’s protected choice.” United States v. Hung Thien Ly,
        646 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2011).
                On the other hand, there is certainly no per se rule prohibit-
        ing a trial court from ensuring that a defendant’s choice is knowing,
        intelligent, and voluntary. “[A] trial court’s inquiry as to whether
        a defendant wishes to testify or to remain silent is hardly an act that
        deprives the defendant of his right to choose.” Anderson, 1 F.4th
        at 1253. Indeed, on-the-record questioning is often a “pruden[t]”
        means of protecting a defendant’s right to testify. Id. at 1257–59.
        A simple colloquy can “nip . . . post-conviction issues in the bud,
        eliminating the basis for a claim that the defendant was denied the
        right to testify [or to remain silent].” Id. at 1258. Asking whether
        the defendant freely decided also “ensures that the defendant’s
        rights are protected.” Id. at 1259.
               In the end, a “district court’s straightforward and neutral in-
        quiry” won’t violate a defendant’s right to make a personal choice
        as to whether to testify. Id. at 1253. In conducting this inquiry,
        however, the district court must “avoid questions that probe trial-
        strategy issues or suggest the court’s own opinion as to what choice
        the defendant should make—questions that might disturb the at-
        torney-client relationship, undermine the defendant’s ability to
        make a knowing and intelligent decision, or overpower the defend-
        ant’s will.” Id. at 1259. The district court, for example, should not
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   20-12287

        “discuss sensitive issues of trial strategy or tip the scales in favor of
        testifying or not testifying.” Id. at 1257 (cleaned up).
                What the district court did here fell well within those guard-
        rails. At the start of the trial, Yliniemi’s lawyer informed the district
        court that Yliniemi hadn’t “made a final decision” on whether he’d
        take the stand. When the government finished its case in chief, the
        district court asked if Yliniemi would put on a case, and Yliniemi’s
        lawyer said that Yliniemi was “choosing not to testify.” So the dis-
        trict court addressed Yliniemi personally and asked him if he un-
        derstood that he had the “right to either testify or not testify.”
        While Yliniemi responded that he did, Yliniemi’s counsel then in-
        formed the district court that Yliniemi was actually “torn between
        testifying and not testifying.”
                At that point, the district court asked Yliniemi some straight-
        forward, neutral questions. The district court, outlining Yliniemi’s
        rights, asked Yliniemi if he understood: (1) that he had no criminal
        history that could come in; (2) that the jury wouldn’t be allowed to
        hold his decision against him if he chose not to testify; (3) that the
        jury would “weigh [his] testimony like any other witness”; (4) that
        he would be “subject to cross-examination” if he testified; and (5)
        that he could face a “perjury prosecution” if he said “anything un-
        true on the stand”. Yliniemi doesn’t claim that the district court’s
        explanation was incorrect. And it’s implausible that this neutral
        summary of Yliniemi’s rights “overpower[ed] [his] will.” Id. at
        1259.
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        20-12287                  Opinion of the Court                             13

                Even more, the district court repeatedly stressed that the de-
        cision to testify—or not to testify—was Yliniemi’s alone. It ex-
        plained that it was “not trying to influence [Yliniemi’s decision] one
        way or the other,” that the decision was one that “only” Yliniemi
        could make, that it was “completely [Yliniemi’s] decision,” and that
        Yliniemi’s decision wouldn’t “matter one way or the other” to the
        district court. Yliniemi confirmed that he understood that the de-
        cision was one that he had to make and that the district court was
        not looking to influence his decision. In short, the record shows
        that the district court did not “discuss sensitive issues of trial strat-
        egy or tip the scales in favor of testifying or not testifying.” Id. at
        1257 (cleaned up).
               The record also shows that Yliniemi had enough time to de-
        cide to testify. As the district court pointed out, Yliniemi had been
        arrested more than three months before trial. On the morning trial
        began, the district court also alerted Yliniemi to the fact that he
        would need to decide whether to testify after the government fin-
        ished its case—which, if things went “smoothly,” would be later
        that day. When that happened, Yliniemi asked for more time to
        speak with his lawyer, and the district court granted that request,
        taking a fifteen-minute recess. 3 After they returned from the break,

        3
          Yliniemi also requested more time because he wanted to spend his “last night
        with [his] parents.” The district court asked Yliniemi if he understood he
        wasn’t “going to be shot” at the end of the trial. There’s no evidence—nor
        does Yliniemi claim—that the district court’s statement overpowered his deci-
        sion on whether to testify.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 20-12287

        Yliniemi never asked for more time. Instead, he told the district
        court that he “had the time [he] need[ed] to discuss” things with his
        lawyer. On these facts, Yliniemi’s decision to testify was knowing,
        intelligent, and voluntary.
               Our sister circuits have affirmed convictions under similar
        circumstances. In United States v. Tull-Abreu, 921 F.3d 294 (1st
        Cir. 2019), for example, the First Circuit found no error where the
        trial court “accurate[ly]” explained “the right not to testify and
        some potential consequences of choosing to testify (for example,
        possibly facing cross-examination).” Id. at 303. The defendant was
        also “granted a [thirty-minute] recess to contemplate the matter
        further and did not ask for more time after the recess.” Id. The
        same thing happened here. There was no error. See also, e.g., Hol-
        lenbeck v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 451, 452–53 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
        a district court’s colloquy providing a neutral explanation of the
        right to testify was “a model of appropriate judicial concern for the
        constitutional rights of a criminal defendant”); United States v.
        Goodwin, 770 F.2d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a defend-
        ant’s decision to testify was voluntary where the district court ex-
        plained it “was not trying to steer her one way or the other” and
        gave her “time to talk things over”).
                                   A clerical error
               Although we affirm Yliniemi’s conviction, there is a clerical
        error in his judgment. We can raise clerical errors in a judgment
        and remand with instructions to correct those errors. See United
        States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 822 (11th Cir. 2006). The final
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        20-12287              Opinion of the Court                      15

        judgment states that Yliniemi pleaded guilty to counts one and two
        of the indictment. But Yliniemi was convicted of those counts after
        a jury trial. We remand to the district court with instructions to
        amend the judgment to correct this clerical error.
            AFFIRMED; REMANDED TO CORRECT A CLERICAL
        ERROR IN THE JUDGMENT.