Court Opinion

ID: 9842845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:19:42.785323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:58.116681
License: Public Domain

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Though I agree in principle with the several preliminary matters dealt with in the opinion as to the propriety of this proceeding and appeal, as against the suggestion of mootness, etc. made by the Government, I must disagree with the principal thesis proclaimed by my colleagues: that a plea of guilty is subject to impeachment merely because it had been induced by a promise of recommended leniency.
Because of the very considerable implications that this decision will have on the administration of justice I feel I must, though with deference, dissent from the opinion of the Court.
A search of all the cases cited by the majority (and of several additional ones referred to therein or found in the annotations) fails to disclose a single one in which a plea of guilty (or of nolo contendere) was permitted to be withdrawn as involuntarily made in circumstances such as are disclosed by the record here and cited in the opinion, i.e. where made with full knowledge of the consequences, without threats of improper pressures, upon promises which have apparently been kept in good faith (in spite of petitioner’s unsubstantiated allegations to the contrary), and which were not inherently improper. Though in many of the cited cases the language of the holding or the dictum is broad enough to condemn all pleas induced by any “promise,” a careful analysis will show that really they fall into two not mutually exclusive categories, neither of which covers the present situation.
*114The first group includes the cases in which the plea was induced by improper physical and mental pressures or by the threats of the same, and the “promise” merely related to the discontinuance of the illegal conduct. These cases include Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 45 S.Ct. 1, 69 L.Ed. 131, the Supreme Court ease quoted from by the majority (involving a forced confession rather than a plea of guilty), as well as several of the eases cited in footnote 13.1 The vice that makes it necessary to permit the impeachment of a plea so induced is not in the “promise” but is in the illegal conduct to which it relates.
The second group includes all the cases in which for one reason or another the defendant was not fully aware- of all the consequences of his plea;2 pertinent here are those cases in which the defendant was misled on purpose,3 or innocently4 by promises of leniency by the court,5 the prosecutor or the police,6 and/or his own counsel7 (though perhaps not if deception was entirely self-induced8), which promises were either not performable at all9 or were, contrary to the defendant’s understanding, not within the pbwer of the promissor,10 or were simply disregarded once their purpose was accomplished.11 Here again *115the vice that vitiates the plea is not the “promise” but the misapprehension to which it gave rise. No case has been cited in which a plea of guilty was permitted to be withdrawn because induced by a promise by a prosecutor to recomment leniency where such promise was kept, nor where the accused understood that final determination of the sentence would be for the judge and a heavier sentence was actually imposed than that contained in the promised recommendation. A fortiori there is no case in which, as is the situation here, a plea has been voided where the actual sentence did not exceed that which was promised.
A correct statement of the applicable rule might be: a plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes). As has been stated in an oft cited case, United States v. Colonna, 3 Cir., 142 F.2d 210, at page 211:
“The cases uniformly hold that motions to withdraw a plea of guilty should be denied where the plea of guilty was entered either by the defendant or his counsel in his presence, and if the defendant knew and understood what was being done and there was not present any circumstances of force, mistake, misapprehension, fear, inadvertence or ignorance of his rights and understanding of the consequences of the plea.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus the plea must stand if it has not been tainted by any intentional or unintentional overreaching of the defendant.
It need not he feared that this restriction on the impeachability of pleas of guilty to the circumstances permitted by the former cases will permit the perpetuation of injustice, for although no man should be allowed to bargain away his life or liberty it is not apparent why any innocent person would plead guilty if not subjected to or threatened with illegal pressures (including exhaustive inquisitions or threats to “frame” evidence or a more serious charge12), misled by promises not to be fulfilled, or induced by promises inherently improper, merely because he receives assurances that such a plea may lead to punishment less severe than that which he would receive if unjustly (hut fairly) convicted. Our own faith ln the just operation of our judicial system and the necessity that accused persons should have at least minimal trust in it should prevent us from yielding to arguments based on such unfounded anxiety.
it is to be feared that the extension of the holding of the most liberal of the above cases to include situations such as that here presented would considerably impede the administration of justice without any corresponding benefit to accused persons. It is generally known that the great bulk of criminal cases are disposed of by pleas of guilty made after some discussion between the defendant and/or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney in which the latter frequently makes some commitment as to the sentence he will recommend or as to other charges or prosecutions he will drop; if this were not so, or if this Court holds that it may not be so, there would be few inducements for any person to plead guilty.* Furthermore this decision would make it possible to impeach many now invulnerable sentences, and though in such a proceeding the burden of asserting innocence is at least preliminarily on the petitioner13 after many years he *116may be in a much better position to sustain it than the Government to oppose it.14
In the present case it appears from the record and from his own appearance before us that the petitioner was an intelligent man, fully able to comprehend the alternatives open to him and the value of the'prosecutor’s promises. It also appears that the prosecutor in good faith tried to live up to his commitments and to a very large extent was successful in his efforts; in particular, the sentence imposed on the plea in question was that which he had promised to recommend. Nor can it be said that any of the promises were inherently improper for the offer to help obtain the dismissal of federal prosecutions in other districts does not differ fundamentally from the usual practice whereby a prosecutor agrees to nolle prosequi all except the charges on which a plea is to be entered. Also, the trial court apparently believed that the request for special consideration originated with the petitioner and that the action of the prosecutor was of great advantage to him. Finally there is no evidence that any improper threats were made, for the dismal prospect of prosecution in Miami, etc., was conjured up by the petitioner himself and was not in any case a mere weapon.improperly fashioned by the prosecution to induce compliance with its proffered bargain.
The plea of guilty having been entered voluntarily within the meaning of Rule 11, Fed.Rules Cr.Proc., 18 U.S.C.A., and not resulting in a manifest injustice within the meaning of Rule 32(d), Fed.Rules Cr.Proc., 18 U.S.C.A., the dismissal of this proceeding by the lower court should be affirmed.

. Bryarly v. Howard, 7 Cir., 165 F.2d 576 (dicta); Behrens v. Hironimus, 4 Cir., 166 F.2d 245 (incessant questioning, intravenous feeding); United States v. Paglia, 2 Cir., 190 F.2d 445, 448 (promise to withdraw a charge as to which the Government did not have sufficient evidence).

. United States v. Sehon Chinn, D.C.S.D.W.Va., 74 F.Supp. 189, affirmed 163 F.2d 876 (misrepresentation by counsel insufficient to vitiate plea; dictum: misrepresentation by prosecution would be) ; Bryarly v. Howard, supra (plea induced by promise to withhold prosecution on it entirely on pretense that it would merely help police clear its records); Behrens v. Hironimus, supra (in addition to “third-degree” methods, supra, apparently unkept or misrepresented promises of a lenient sentence); United States v. Lias, 4 Cir., 173 F.2d 685 (inadvertent misleading effect of judge’s remarks to counsel relating to proposed sentence); United States v. Shneer, 3 Cir., 194 F.2d 598 (dictum: plea might be withdrawn if expectation of leniency induced by misrepresentation of prosecutor to counsel or of counsel to defendant); Futterman v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 202 F.2d 185 (dictum: while misrepresentation leading to mistaken hope of leniency not enough, perhaps promise by counsel of probation would be); United States v. Parrino, 2 Cir., 212 F.2d 919 (dictum: though counsel’s innocent misrepresentation as to a collateral effect of a plea would not vitiate it, perhaps if such were made innocently by the court or the prosecutor, or improperly by counsel, or related to the direct consequences of the plea it would not be permitted to stand); Motley v. United States, 5 Cir., 230 F.2d 110 (allegation that counsel after conference with prosecutor informed defendant that if he pleaded guilty he would receive a lesser term than by insisting on grand jury, and maximum term was actually imposed, is sufficient to require a hearing on whether plea was improperly induced).

. Bryarly v. Howard, supra.

. United States v. Lias, supra; United States v. Shneer, supra; United States v. Parrino, supra.

. United States v. Lias, supra; United States v. Parrino, supra (dicta).

. United States v. Sehon Chinn, supra (dicta); Bryarly v. Howard, supra; United States v. Parrino, supra (dicta).

. United States v. Shneer, supra (dicta); Futterman v. United States, supra; Motley v. United States, supra; but cf. United States v. Sehon Chinn, supra; United States v. Parrino, supra.

. United States v. Shneer, supra.

. Cf. United States v. Parrino, supra.

. United States v. Sehon Chinn, supra; cf. United States v. Fox, 3 Cir., 130 F.2d 56, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 666, 68 S.Ct. 74, 87 L.Ed. 535.

. Bryarly v. Howard, supra; United States v. Paglia, supra (dicta). In many instances it is impossible to tell from the opinion whether a sentence heavier than that expected was imposed because the court disregarded the prosecutor’s advice or because the prosecutor did not abide by his commitment.

. Cf. United States v. Paglia, supra, discussion 190 F.2d at page 448.

. Rule 32(d), Fed.Rules Cr.Proc., 18 U.S. C.A., permits the withdrawal of a plea *116of guilty after sentence only “to correct manifest injustice,” and it is,hard to see how a conviction could he thus described unless the accused were really innocent or perhaps if the plea or conviction were tainted by a denial of due process. That the standards of Rule 32(d) are also applicable in § 2255 proceedings, see United States v. McNair, D.C.D.C., 18 F.R.D. 417, 419, affirmed, D.C.Cir., 235 F.2d 856.

. United States v. Shillitani, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 16 F.R.D. 336, 339 fn. 6; United States v. Espinosa, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 16 F.R.D. 420; United States v. McNair, supra.