Court Opinion

ID: 9894728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 18:00:39.175131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:31.693772
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                     FILED
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    NOV 2 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: THOMAS OLIVER,                           No.    22-60019

                   Debtor,                      BAP No. 21-1151

------------------------------
                                                MEMORANDUM*
THOMAS OLIVER,

                   Appellant,

  v.

UST - UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, SAN
DIEGO,

                   Appellee.

In re: THOMAS OLIVER,                           No.    22-60020

                   Debtor,                      BAP No. 21-1182

------------------------------

THOMAS OLIVER,

                   Appellant,

       *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
 v.

UST - UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, SAN
DIEGO,

                Appellee.

                          Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
                           Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
             Spraker, Faris, and Brand, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

                            Submitted November 2, 2023**

Before: BENNETT, SUNG, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Thomas Oliver appeals pro se from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (BAP)

judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order imposing terminating sanctions,

entering a default judgment denying his Chapter 7 discharge, and denying his

motion for recusal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We review

de novo decisions of the BAP and apply the same standard of review that the BAP

applied to the bankruptcy court’s rulings. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re

Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We review the grant of

terminating sanctions, the entry of default judgment, and the denial of the recusal

motion for abuse of discretion. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly

      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007); Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779,

786 (9th Cir. 2011); Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 742 F.3d 1215,

1218–19 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

       1. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed

terminating sanctions against Oliver for his discovery misconduct after repeated

attempts to use lesser sanctions. Before imposing terminating sanctions, the

bankruptcy court considers five factors. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d at

1096. The bankruptcy court properly balanced and provided reasons for all five

factors. As to the fifth factor, the availability of less drastic sanctions, the

bankruptcy court weighed Oliver’s failure to comply with multiple court orders

and monetary sanctions regarding his discovery misconduct and concluded that

any “lesser sanction would be utterly useless.” (citations and quotations marks

omitted). Oliver’s sole argument is that his failure to comply with the court orders

was justified because of the bankruptcy court’s and United States Trustee’s (UST)

alleged errors and malfeasance. However, the record does not support Oliver’s

contention and instead shows that his failure to comply with the court orders was

both willful and in bad faith. See Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 912 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“Where the sanction results in default, the sanctioned party’s violations

must be due to the ‘willfulness, bad faith, or fault’ of the party.” (quoting Hyde &

Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1994))).

                                            3
      2. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it granted default

judgment and denied Oliver a bankruptcy discharge. In reviewing a default

judgment, we must take the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as

true. Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). Here,

the well-pleaded factual allegations of the UST’s complaint show that each of the

elements of § 727(a)(4)(A) was met. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A) (authorizing

denial of discharge if the “debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection

with the case . . . made a false oath or account”); see also In re Retz, 606 F.3d

1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To prevail on [a § 727(a)(4)(A)] claim, a [party] must

show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the debtor made a false oath in

connection with the case; (2) the oath related to a material fact; (3) the oath was

made knowingly; and (4) the oath was made fraudulently.” (citation and quotation

marks omitted)). Oliver failed to disclose the transfer of the Rhode Island property.

Oliver also falsely answered “no” to a question regarding the transferring of

property within a two-year period before filing. Moreover, Oliver made the

omission and false statement knowingly. Oliver does not dispute these facts on

appeal.

      Even though Oliver’s omission and false statement are sufficient for the

denial of discharge, the bankruptcy court also properly denied Oliver’s discharge

under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A). The well-pleaded factual allegations of the UST’s

                                          4
complaint show that each element of § 727(a)(2)(A) was met. See 11 U.S.C. §

727(a)(2)(A) (authorizing denial of discharge if the “debtor, with intent to hinder,

delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of

property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or

concealed, or has permitted [those acts as to,] . . . property of the debtor, within

one year before the date of the filing of the petition”); see also In re Retz, 606 F.3d

at 1200 (“A party seeking denial of discharge under § 727(a)(2) must prove two

things: (1) a disposition of property, such as transfer or concealment, and (2) a

subjective intent on the debtor’s part to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor through

the act [of] disposing of the property.” (alteration in original) (citation and

quotation marks omitted)). Accepting the well-pleaded allegations as true, Oliver

concealed the transfer of the Rhode Island property within the one-year pre-filing

period, and he did so with the intent to hinder and delay a creditor. These

allegations satisfy the § 727(a)(2)(A) standard.

      3. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Oliver’s

recusal motion. A bankruptcy judge must recuse when “a reasonable person with

knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned.” Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 721 F.3d 1032,

1041 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, the record does not contain any evidence that the

bankruptcy judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

                                           5
      AFFIRMED.1

1
  Oliver’s motion for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 10) is DENIED. The motion does
not comply with FRE 201 because Oliver merely repeats arguments from his brief,
rather than ask the court to take notice of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute.

Oliver’s motion for oral argument or hearing en banc (Dkt. No. 11) is DENIED.

Oliver’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED.

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