Court Opinion

ID: 9962062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 16:06:24.48911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:46.214457
License: Public Domain

IN THE

      Court of Appeals of Indiana
  Pious Trans, Inc., Gagandeep Singh, and Yadwinder Singh,                      FILED
                                    Appellants-Plaintiffs                 Apr 22 2024, 10:02 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                               v.                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

                  Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London,
                                    Appellees-Defendants

                                        April 22, 2024
                                Court of Appeals Case No.
                                      23A-PL-3044
                        Appeal from the Hancock Circuit Court
                    The Honorable Cody B. Coombs, Magistrate
                                  Trial Court Cause No.
                                   30C01-2206-PL-859

                          Opinion by Judge Bradford
                   Chief Judge Altice and Judge Felix concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-3044 | April 22, 2024   Page 1 of 9
      Case Summary
[1]   In July of 2020, Pious Trans, Inc., which is owned and operated by Gagandeep

      Singh, hired Yadwinder Singh (“Singh”), who had been issued a New York

      Class A commercial driver’s license (“CDL”) approximately sixteen months

      previously. In December of 2020, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London

      (“Underwriters”), issued a physical-damage insurance policy to Pious (“the

      Policy”). In April of 2021, Pious added Singh and a tractor-trailer with a gross

      weight of over 26,001 pounds (“the Freightliner”) to their Policy coverage. In

      August of 2023, Singh was operating the Freightliner and was involved in a

      collision with another tractor-trailer. After Underwriters denied Pious’s claim

      arising from the collision, Pious, Gagandeep, and Singh (“Appellants”) sued

      the other driver for negligence and Underwriters and Pious’s insurance agent

      for breach of contract and bad-faith denial of their claim. Underwriters moved

      for summary judgment on the questions of coverage and bad faith, which

      motion the trial court granted. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On July 6, 2020, Pious hired Singh, who held a Class A CDL (issued to him by

      New York on February 22, 2019) as a driver. Singh’s Class A CDL permitted

      him to operate any motor vehicle or combination of vehicles, including tractor-

      trailers. On December 10, 2020, Underwriters issued the Policy to Pious,

      which included a “Driver Criteria Conditions Endorsement” that provides, in

      part, as follows:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-3044 | April 22, 2024       Page 2 of 9
                This Insurance shall not indemnify the Insured for loss or damage
                to any Automobile as insured by and otherwise recoverable under
                this Policy unless the Automobile is driven or operated by or
                under the care, custody or control by a driver who at inception of
                this Policy or at the date of hire, whichever is the later, provides
                documented evidence of an MVR[1] not more than 60 days old or
                not older than the date of loss if the driver is involved in a claim
                showing that they:
                [….]
                2.     Have a minimum two (2) years (twenty-four (24)
                       consecutive months) of Commercial Driver’s License
                       experience, at the time of policy inception or date of hire,
                       whichever is the later, driving similar equipment to that
                       insured under this Policy.
      Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 53 (emphasis in original). On April 23, 2021, Pious

      added the Freightliner as a scheduled vehicle and Singh as a scheduled driver

      but incorrectly listed his hire date as April 1, 2021, instead of July 6, 2020.

[3]   On August 3, 2021, Singh was stopped in traffic on Interstate 70 in Greenfield

      when he was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by Nigusie Melaku. After filing

      and withdrawing an initial claim with Underwriters, Pious reopened the matter

      and, on February 7, 2022, the Littleton Group (on behalf of Underwriters)

      issued a denial letter to Pious, which indicated that there was no coverage

      because Singh had not had the required two years of CDL experience at the

      time the Policy had been issued.2

      1
          An MVR is a “motor vehicle record.”
      2
        While the claim was also denied on the basis that Pious had misrepresented Singh’s hire date in violation of
      the Policy, Underwriters did not raise this in the trial court as a ground for the entry of summary judgment.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-3044 | April 22, 2024                                Page 3 of 9
[4]   On June 28, 2022, Appellants sued Melaku for negligence and Pious’s

      insurance agent and Underwriters for breach of contract and bad-faith denial of

      their claim. Underwriters moved for summary judgment on the coverage

      claim, arguing that the undisputed facts established that the loss was not

      covered because Singh had not met the Policy’s driver-qualification

      requirements. Appellants responded that Singh had satisfied the Policy’s

      experience requirement on the bases that (1) a New-York-issued Class E

      operator’s license, which he had held since 2002, was equivalent to a CDL and

      (2) Singh had operated vehicles similar to those insured by the Policy.

      Alternatively, Appellants argued the Policy’s terms (specifically, “Commercial

      Driver’s License” and “similar equipment”) were ambiguous and should be

      construed in favor of coverage. Appellants also alleged that the evidence

      established that Underwriters had acted in bad faith as a matter of law. On

      November 13, 2023, the trial court entered summary judgment in Underwriters’

      favor.

      Discussion
[5]   When reviewing the grant or denial of a summary judgment motion, we apply

      the same standard as the trial court. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Simrell’s Sports Bar &

      Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Summary judgment is

      appropriate only where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of

      material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

      Id.; Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a

      party must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-3044 | April 22, 2024         Page 4 of 9
      element of the other party’s claim. Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 741 N.E.2d at 386. Once

      the moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden

      shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist.

      Id. The party appealing the summary judgment bears the burden of persuading

      us that the trial court erred. Id. “In determining whether there is a genuine

      issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, all doubts must be

      resolved against the moving party and the facts set forth by the party opposing

      the motion must be accepted as true.” Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d

      435, 438–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied.

      I.      Coverage
[6]   Resolution of Appellants’ coverage claim requires us to examine the provisions

      of the Policy. Generally, insurance contract provisions are subject to the same

      rules of interpretation and construction as are other contract terms. Sharp v. Ind.

      Union Mut. Ins. Co., 526 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (internal citation

      omitted), trans. denied. If a contract is clear and unambiguous, the language of

      the contract must be given its plain meaning. Id. (internal citation omitted).

      Ambiguous terms in an insurance policy, however, will be construed against the

      insurer, particularly where a policy excludes coverage. Hoosier Ins. Co. v.

      Audiology Found. of Am., 745 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

      A contractual term is not rendered ambiguous by the mere fact that the parties

      differ as to its meaning, Haag v. Castro, 959 N.E.2d 819, 821–22 (Ind. 2012), and

      the fact “that a policy does not define a term does not necessarily make the term

      ambiguous.” Id. at 821. Rather, insurance policy provisions are ambiguous

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-3044 | April 22, 2024         Page 5 of 9
      only if they are “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id.

      (quoting Holiday Hosp. Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574, 578

      (Ind. 2013)) (emphasis added by Haag).

[7]   As mentioned, in order for Singh’s accident to be covered by the Policy, it

      would have to be established that he had had “a minimum two (2) years […] of

      Commercial Driver’s License experience, at the time of policy inception or date

      of hire, whichever is the later, driving similar equipment to that insured under

      this Policy.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 63. Appellants’ first argument is that

      the actual inception date of the Policy was April 23, 2021, or the date on which

      Singh was added by Endorsement 31. Consequently, the argument goes, Singh

      had more than two years of CDL experience at the inception of the Policy, as

      he had received his CDL in February of 2019. As Underwriters point out,

      however, Appellants are making this argument for the first time on appeal and

      have therefore waived it for appellate consideration. Issues not raised before

      the trial court on summary judgment cannot be argued for the first time on

      appeal and are waived. Huntington v. Riggs, 862 N.E.2d 1263, 1269 (Ind. Ct.

      App. 2007), trans. denied.

[8]   Appellants also argue that (1) the Policy term “commercial” is ambiguous and

      should be construed in favor of coverage and (2) Singh’s experience with his

      New-York-issued Class E operator’s license qualifies as CDL experience

      pursuant to the Policy because it allowed him to operate a vehicle for

      commercial purposes. As an initial matter, we note that Appellants argued

      below that the phrase “commercial driver’s license” was ambiguous but argue

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-3044 | April 22, 2024        Page 6 of 9
       on appeal only that the word “commercial” is. Appellants would have us take

       the word “commercial” out of its relevant context, but because the term

       “commercial driver’s license” is a term of art with a specific statutory definition,

       we decline the invitation.

[9]    We conclude that the Policy term “commercial,” specifically as used in the

       term “commercial driver’s license,” is not ambiguous and that a New-York-

       issued Class E operator’s license is in no way equivalent to a CDL. While the

       Policy does not define the word “commercial” or the term “CDL,” “CDL” has

       a very specific meaning pursuant to New York and federal law. CDLs, far from

       authorizing an individual to operate any vehicle for any commercial purpose,

       do nothing more or less than authorize individuals to operate motor vehicles

       that belong to one of three classes: (1) combination vehicles weighing at least

       26,001 pounds (e.g., tractor-trailers), (2) straight vehicles weighing at least

       26,001 pounds, and (3) vehicles designed to transport sixteen or more

       passengers or hazardous materials. 49 C.F.R. § 383.5, see also N.Y. Veh. &

       Traf. Law § 501-a(1) (providing that a CDL is “valid to operate any motor

       vehicle or combination of vehicles” with the exception of certain motorcycles).3

[10]   It stands to reason that a Class E operator’s license would also have to allow an

       individual to operate vehicles belonging to at least one of these classes—at the

       very least—if it is to be considered equivalent to a CDL. As it happens,

       3
         Indeed, the statutory definitions of CDLs make no mention of commercial use at all, only the
       characteristics of the vehicles covered.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-3044 | April 22, 2024                               Page 7 of 9
       however, New York’s Class E operator’s license specifically excludes all of these

       types of vehicles. See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 501(2)(a)(iv) & (v) (providing

       that a Class E operator’s license does not permit its holder to operate any

       vehicle (1) that weighs over 26,001 pounds, (2) is used to transport more than

       fourteen persons for hire, or (3) for which a hazardous materials endorsement is

       required). As used in the Policy term “CDL,” the word “commercial” is not

       ambiguous, and Appellants’ suggested interpretation that holding a Class E

       operator’s license qualifies as CDL experience pursuant to the Policy is not

       reasonable. The trial court correctly concluded that Singh had not satisfied the

       Policy’s experience requirements.4

       II.     Bad Faith
[11]   Appellants also contend that Underwriters denied their claim in bad faith.

       Indiana law has long recognized a legal duty implied in all insurance contracts

       that the insurer deal in good faith with its insured. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Craighead,

       192 N.E.3d 195, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Hoosier Ins., 745 N.E.2d at

       310), trans. denied. The first essential element of any bad-faith claim against an

       insurer, however, is breach of the insurance contract. See Knight v. Ind. Ins. Co.,

       871 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“The trial court properly concluded

       that the Insurer’s denial of coverage did not constitute a breach of the contract

       and thus there was no viable bad faith or punitive damages claim.”). Because

       4
         Because we have concluded that Singh had not had the required two years of CDL experience when Pious
       hired him, we need not address Appellants’ argument that alleged ambiguity in the phrase “driving similar
       equipment to that insured under this Policy” requires us to find coverage. Appellants’ App. Vol. III p. 63.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-3044 | April 22, 2024                               Page 8 of 9
       we have concluded that Underwriters did not breach the Policy in denying

       coverage, Appellants’ bad-faith claim must also fail.

[12]   We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

       Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
       Craig C. Siebe
       Jonathan L. Albright, Jr.
       Nickloy, Albright & Gordon LLP
       Noblesville, Indiana
       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S, LONDON
       Edward M. O’Brien
       Katherine E. Trapp
       Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP
       Louisville, Kentucky
       Edward A. DeVries
       Philip G. Rizzo
       Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP
       Merrillville, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-3044 | April 22, 2024   Page 9 of 9