Court Opinion

ID: 9381273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 16:00:58.243385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.309053
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12950    Document: 10-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2023    Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12950
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        CARLTON SMITH,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA,
        JOHN TURNER,
        Superior Court Judge, Bullock County,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                    22-12950

                        D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-01233-CAP
                             ____________________

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Carlton Smith, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals
        the sua sponte dismissal of his civil suit against the defendants
        because it amounted to an unauthorized successive habeas petition
        under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and, to the extent it was a proper civil rights
        suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it was untimely. 1 Smith argues that
        his claim is distinguishable from a habeas petition because he seeks
        “injunctive relief for a procedural due process violation of a state-
        created right by state actors” in the state postconviction process,
        and he is not challenging the legality of his conviction or sentence.
        Additionally, he asserts that his claims were timely. After review,
        we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
                                    I.      Background
              On March 15, 2022, Smith, proceeding pro se, filed the
        underlying § 1983 complaint in the Northern District of Georgia
        against Georgia’s Attorney General Christopher Carr and Superior
        Court Judge John Turner, alleging that they violated his due
        process rights during a May 2019 hearing in his state postconviction

        1 Smith has filed a “motion to submit appeal” requesting that his appeal be
        submitted to the court for a decision. We DENY this motion as moot.
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        22-12950                 Opinion of the Court                             3

        proceedings.2 Specifically, he alleged that Attorney General Carr
        failed to respond adequately to his petition and “failed to produce
        and submit the trial transcripts” that would have supported Smith’s
        claims. Likewise, Smith alleged that Judge Turner “failed to
        require the production and submission of the trial transcripts as
        required by statute” and violated various other unspecified
        statutory provisions in denying Smith relief. As relief, Smith
        requested that the defendants “be held liable for these procedural
        due process violations” and that “the ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests
        protections given by created state law rules be restored.”
               Prior to any appearance by the defendants, a magistrate
        judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”),
        recommending that the complaint be dismissed sua sponte for two
        reasons. First, the magistrate judge determined that Smith’s § 1983
        complaint was “the functional equivalent of a habeas petition” over
        which it lacked jurisdiction because Smith had already completed
        his federal habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and he had
        not requested leave to file a second or successive petition. Second,
        even if Smith’s claims were proper under § 1983, they were time-
        barred because they were filed outside the applicable two-year
        statute of limitations period.
               Smith objected to the R&R, arguing that he was not
        bringing a habeas claim. Instead, he asserted that his claim was for

        2 Smith is serving a life sentence plus 20 years’ imprisonment following his
        1993 convictions for kidnapping, robbery, and aggravated sodomy.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                      22-12950

        a procedural due process violation, which is proper under § 1983.
        He also maintained that his claims were timely because, although
        the violation occurred in May 2019, the state court’s habeas
        decision was not final until June 2020. He also noted that he filed
        a writ of mandamus in state court seeking a remedy for this
        violation, which was denied on January 27, 2022, and his § 1983
        claim did not arise until the state court declined to provide a
        sufficient remedy.
              The district court conducted a de novo review and adopted
        the R&R over Smith’s objections. 3 Smith timely appealed.
                                       II.     Discussion
               Smith argues that the district court erred in concluding that
        his complaint was an improper second or successive federal habeas
        petition or an otherwise untimely § 1983 action.
               The district court is required to screen any “civil action in
        which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
        officer or employee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “On review, the court
        shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any

        3 In adopting the R&R the district court addressed the magistrate’s judge’s
        determination that the complaint was in essence a second or successive habeas
        petition, but it did not address the determination that the claims were
        otherwise untimely under § 1983. However, we read the district court’s
        statement that it adopted the R&R “as the order and opinion of th[e] court,”
        as implicitly adopting the magistrate judge’s alternative determination that the
        claims were also untimely because they were filed more than two years after
        the hearing during which the alleged due process violation occurred.
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        22-12950                Opinion of the Court                         5

        portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous,
        malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
        granted. . . .” Id. § 1915A(b). In conducting this review, the court
        must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and “construe
        them in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Danglar v.
        Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.4th 54, 55 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022).
               We review de novo whether a petition is an unauthorized
        second or successive habeas petition. Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
        of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Likewise,
        we review de novo a district court’s determination that a complaint
        would be time-barred. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279
        (11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing de novo a sua sponte dismissal of a
        § 1983 action for failure to state a claim based on a determination
        that the claim was time-barred).
               We begin with the district court’s determination that
        Smith’s complaint effectively constituted an unauthorized second
        or successive federal habeas petition under § 2254. Federal courts
        have an obligation to look behind the label of a motion filed by a
        pro se inmate and determine whether a filing is cognizable under a
        different statutory framework. See Spivey v. State Bd. of Pardons
        & Paroles, 279 F.3d 1301, 1302 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v.
        Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624–25 (11th Cir. 1990). If a civil rights action
        requests relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his
        conviction or sentence,” it must be brought in a habeas proceeding.
        Nance v. Ward, 142 S. Ct. 2214, 2222 (2022) (quotations omitted);
        Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533–34 (2011); see also Medberry
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-12950

        v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] state prisoner
        seeking post-conviction relief from a federal court has but one
        remedy: an application for a writ of habeas corpus.”).
               The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
        (“AEDPA”) provides that, before a petitioner may file a second or
        successive habeas petition, the petitioner first must obtain an order
        from this Court authorizing the district court to consider the
        petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Absent authorization from
        this Court, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second
        or successive habeas petition. See Farris v. United States,
        333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).
                Here, it is clear that Smith’s complaint concerned alleged
        defects in his state postconviction proceedings that purportedly
        violated his procedural due process rights. We have repeatedly
        held that “an alleged defect in a collateral proceeding does not state
        a basis for habeas relief.” Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1261
        (11th Cir. 2004); see also Alston v. Dep’t of Corr., Fla., 610 F.3d
        1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2010); Carrol v. Sec’y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354,
        1365 (11th Cir. 2009). Rather, “[f]ederal habeas relief is available to
        remedy defects in a defendant’s conviction and sentence,” and “[a]
        challenge to a state collateral proceeding does not undermine the
        legality of the detention or imprisonment—i.e., the conviction
        itself.” Alston, 610 F.3d at 1325–26 (quotations omitted).
              Smith did not challenge the validity of his conviction or
        sentence in the underlying complaint. Nor did he seek immediate
        or speedier release or seek relief that would “necessarily imply the
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        22-12950                  Opinion of the Court                               7

        invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Nance, 142 S. Ct. at 2222.
        Rather, he essentially sought a properly conducted state
        postconviction proceeding. Accordingly, because the gravamen of
        Smith’s claims did not fall within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the
        district court erred in holding that Smith’s § 1983 complaint was an
        unauthorized second or successive § 2254 petition.
               We now turn to the district court’s determination that the
        complaint was untimely under § 1983. “Section 1983 broadly
        authorizes suit against state officials for the deprivation of any
        rights secured by the Constitution.” Nance, 142 S.Ct. at 2221.
        There is no federal constitutional right to a direct appeal or to
        postconviction review by the states, but once such a remedy is
        granted, its operation must conform to the due process
        requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 See Evitts v. Lucy,
        469 U.S. 387, 400–02 (1985).
                A procedural due process violation by a state “may form the
        basis for a suit under [§] 1983.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550,
        1555 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, § 1983 is generally the proper vehicle
        for state prisoners to challenge alleged constitutional errors in state
        proceedings where the relief sought does not “necessarily imply
        the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” See, e.g., Skinner v.
        Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529 (2011) (holding § 1983 was proper vehicle

        4 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides “nor shall
        any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
        of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-12950

        for postconviction claim for access to DNA evidence); Wilkinson
        v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005) (holding that § 1983 was
        proper vehicle to bring constitutional challenge to state’s parole
        hearings and procedures); see also Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d
        1538, 1566 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that “a petitioner for whom
        habeas relief is not available may seek redress from the responsible
        parties for any due process violation caused by state appellate delay
        through a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Franzen v.
        Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing habeas
        petition alleging that errors in state postconviction proceeding
        violated due process rights, but noting that “dismissal would not
        prejudice [defendant’s] ability to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C.
        § 1983”).
               All constitutional claims brought under § 1983, however, are
        subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury
        actions in the state where the § 1983 action was brought. McNair
        v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). In Georgia, the
        applicable statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two
        years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33; see also Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181,
        1182 (11th Cir. 2003). However, “a procedural due process
        violation is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide
        due process.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557 (quotations omitted). “In
        other words, the [S]tate may cure a procedural deprivation by
        providing a later procedural remedy; only when the [S]tate refuses
        to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural
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        22-12950                    Opinion of the Court                                 9

        deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable under
        [§] 1983 arise.” Id.
                Here, the magistrate judge concluded that Smith’s
        complaint was untimely because Smith alleged that his due process
        rights were violated during an evidentiary hearing in May 2019,
        and Smith did not file the underlying complaint until March 2022,
        more than two years later. But in his objections to the R&R, Smith
        alleged that the two-year statute of limitations period did not begin
        to run until, at the earliest, the date on which the Georgia Supreme
        Court denied Smith a certificate of probable cause in June 2020 5
        because, under McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557, an actionable
        procedural due process claim does not arise under § 1983 until “the
        [S]tate refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the
        procedural deprivation.” In its order addressing Smith’s objections
        to the R&R, the district court did not address Smith’s contention.
        Instead, the district court focused exclusively on the determination
        that the complaint constituted an unauthorized second or
        successive habeas petition. In light of Smith’s allegations—which
        we must take as true at this stage—we vacate the district court’s

        5 Smith also asserts that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the
        state court denied his petition for a writ of mandamus in which he sought to
        remedy the alleged due process violations.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-12950

        dismissal and remand for reconsideration of whether the § 1983
        claims are timely in light of McKinney. 6
               VACATED AND REMANDED.

        6 We express no opinion on the merits of Smith’s claims. Furthermore, the
        district court is free on remand to consider other issues aside from timeliness
        of the claims, including whether other grounds exist that warrant dismissal of
        the complaint.