Court Opinion

ID: 9811482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:22:03.757046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:05.643097
License: Public Domain

DONALD R. ROSS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s disposition of this case. I write separately because I feel the majority opinion encourages trial courts to do what Article 37.07, Section 4, prohibits juries from doing: speculating about how the parole law will be applied to a particular defendant.
Immediately after the trial court inquired of State’s counsel about what percentage of the recommended forty years’ imprisonment Meredith would have to serve before becoming eligible for parole, there was a confusing colloquy between the trial court and State’s counsel about the answer, based on how long another defendant in another case had served before making parole. This kind of rank speculation was inappropriate.
I agree that trial courts have broad discretion in assessing punishment and, like jurors, “may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time.” However, I believe the other admonitions in Article 37.07, Section 4, of the Code of Criminal Procedure that:
It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct time might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison and parole authorities.
and
[Y]ou are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.
are equally applicable to trial courts as they are to jurors. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 2005). A legislative act or decision by the *400Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is not needed to tell us this is true. Even though these admonitions are set in the context of a jury verdict, I think the Legislature’s intent is apparent in these admonitions that speculation concerning the application of the parole law to a particular defendant is prohibited, whether it be by the judge or the jury.
Although the trial court in this case invited such speculation, the record shows that the trial court assessed Meredith’s punishment based more on his criminal history than on any consideration of the parole law. For this reason, I concur in the result.