Court Opinion

ID: 9895657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 14:07:33.212012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:22.541880
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. Scribner, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4017.]

                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.

                         SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-4017
                       DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SCRIBNER.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
       may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Scribner, Slip Opinion No.
                                   2023-Ohio-4017.]
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Two-
        year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed.
    (No. 2023-0473—Submitted May 16, 2023—Decided November 8, 2023.)
           ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct
                        of the Supreme Court, No. 2022-033.
                                   ______________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Respondent, Theodore Ferris Scribner, of Akron, Ohio, Attorney
Registration No. 0076063, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2003.
        {¶ 2} In an August 2022 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged
that Scribner mismanaged and/or misappropriated funds belonging to nine separate
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

clients, failed to maintain required records regarding his client trust account and his
relationship with his clients, and made an improper loan to a tenth client.
       {¶ 3} The parties submitted stipulations of fact, misconduct, and
aggravating and mitigating factors. They also submitted 36 stipulated exhibits. A
three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct conducted a hearing at
which it heard testimony from Scribner and three character witnesses. The panel
issued a report finding that Scribner committed the charged misconduct and
recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law for two years with 18
months stayed. The panel further recommended that we place conditions on his
reinstatement and require him to serve a one-year period of monitored probation.
The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct and recommended
sanction. No objections have been filed.
       {¶ 4} After a thorough review of the record, we adopt the board’s findings
of misconduct and recommended sanction.
                  FINDINGS OF FACT AND MISCONDUCT
Count I—Misappropriation of Client Funds, Mismanagement of Client Trust
              Account, and Failure to Maintain Required Records
       {¶ 5} Scribner is a sole practitioner. The first count of relator’s complaint
identifies nine personal-injury clients whom Scribner represented during the 2016-
2020 time frame. Scribner admitted that he entered into an unwritten contingent-
fee agreement with one of those clients and that he failed to maintain copies of the
written and signed contingent-fee agreements for five others.
       {¶ 6} At all times relevant to this proceeding, Scribner maintained a client
trust account and a separate business/operating account. Scribner admits that he
failed to maintain monthly reconciliations of his client trust account. And he has
stipulated that between January 1, 2015, and December 14, 2020, he withdrew over
$73,000 in cash from his client trust account and that due to his failure to maintain

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rule-compliant general and client ledgers, it is not possible to connect those cash
withdrawals to particular clients.
       {¶ 7} Scribner admits that he received personal-injury settlements on behalf
of the clients at issue in this count and that during a period of financial strain, he
misappropriated portions of those funds belonging to seven of those clients for his
own personal or business purposes or to reimburse funds that he had previously
misappropriated from other clients.
       {¶ 8} Scribner prepared closing statements for the nine personal-injury
clients, but he failed to maintain copies of those statements that were signed by
himself and the client. And he stipulated that he did not always disburse the clients’
settlement proceeds in accordance with the accounting set forth in their closing
statements. For example:
   •   Scribner agreed to hold $454 of Corry Sage’s settlement proceeds to pay an
       ambulance bill; rather than pay that bill, he misappropriated those funds by
       unilaterally deciding to take them as payment for work he had performed in
       Sage’s separate domestic-relations matter.
   •   Scribner agreed to hold $2,900 of Candace Teets’s $22,000 settlement to
       pay outstanding liens related to her case. After nine months, he paid a $250
       ambulance bill for Teets, but he misappropriated the remaining $2,650
       settlement for his own purposes.
   •   Scribner misappropriated $785 from Kimberly St. Clair and $256.38 from
       Stacy Rich despite the fact that his closing statements showed that those
       funds were intended to pay various case-related expenses on behalf of those
       clients.
   •   In April 2019, Scribner received a $25,000 settlement check on behalf of
       Katrina Karnes.      Although her expenses—including Scribner’s fee—
       exceeded the settlement amount, Scribner distributed $6,250 to himself and

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       to Karnes. He retained $12,500 of the settlement proceeds on the agreement
       with Karnes that he would attempt to negotiate Karnes’s outstanding
       medical bills. Karnes’s chiropractor agreed to accept $6,000 for his nearly
       $20,000 bill and loaned the entire $6,000 to Scribner, which Scribner left in
       his client trust account. Scribner stipulated that instead of paying Karnes’s
       medical bills and refunding the remaining money to Karnes, he
       misappropriated the full $12,500 by making cash withdrawals and
       reimbursing other clients. He later repaid the loan he had received from the
       chiropractor with a check from his client trust account, with the notation
       “Karnes Final Payment.” And he deposited $6,000 in cash to cover the
       amount of the check.
       {¶ 9} There were also irregularities in Scribner’s payment of his fees to
himself. More specifically:
   •   Scribner withdrew $4,000 from his client trust account as an advance on his
       fee for representing Garry Yalung before he even settled the case. When
       the case settled, Scribner prepared a closing statement that identified his full
       $10,000 fee—though he disbursed just $6,000 to himself at that time.
       Instead of timely paying a $1,500 medical bill and disbursing the remaining
       $2,925 of the settlement proceeds to Yalung, Scribner held them in his client
       trust account and eventually misappropriated them.
   •   In Nichole Baldinger’s case, Scribner’s closing statement showed that he
       was entitled to a fee of $25,609.75—but he disbursed just $20,000 to
       himself. There is no record to establish that he ever disbursed the remaining
       $5,609.75 of his fee.
   •   The closing statement in Rachel Kornish’s case showed that Scribner was
       entitled to a contingent fee of $5,328—though he never issued a check to
       himself for that fee. Scribner stipulated that his failure to withdraw those
       fees from his client trust account resulted in the commingling of personal

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                                  January Term, 2023

       and client funds and that some of those funds were used to rectify previous
       misappropriations and make reimbursements for other improper payments
       made from his client trust account.
   •   After settling Sonceriae Bradley’s case for $5,000, Scribner collected his
       $1,250 contingent fee.       Bradley then agreed to pay her share of the
       settlement to Scribner for representing her in a separate misdemeanor case.
       Scribner left that fee in his client trust account, slowly depleting it through
       various cash withdrawals over the next several months.
       {¶ 10} And on January 17, 2020, Scribner overdrew his client trust account
after his bank returned a check that had been deposited into that account without
the client’s endorsement.
       {¶ 11} After relator initiated his investigation, Scribner issued checks to
satisfy the outstanding medical bills or subrogation claims of Sage, Teets, St. Clair,
Yalung, Rich, and Karnes. In December 2022, he made restitution of $135 to St.
Clair and $2,925 to Yalung. The parties and the board have acknowledged that no
additional restitution is owed.
       {¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board found that Scribner’s conduct
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(1) (requiring a lawyer to set forth a contingent-fee
agreement in a writing signed by both the client and the lawyer), 1.15(a)(1)
(requiring a lawyer to maintain a copy of any fee agreement with a client),
1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each client that sets forth the
name of the client; the date, amount, and source of all funds received on behalf of
the client; and the current balance for each client), 1.15(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to
maintain a record for the lawyer’s client trust account, setting forth the name of the
account; the date, amount, and client affected by each credit and debit; and the
balance in the account), 1.15(a)(5) (requiring a lawyer to perform and retain a
monthly reconciliation of the funds held in the lawyer’s client trust account),
1.15(b) (permitting a lawyer to deposit his or her own funds into a client trust

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account for the sole purpose of paying or obtaining a waiver of bank service
charges), 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit advance legal fees and expenses
into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or
expenses incurred), 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver funds or other
property that the client is entitled to receive), and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). We
adopt these findings of misconduct.
             Count II—Providing Financial Assistance to a Client
       {¶ 13} Van Jones hired Scribner to represent him in a personal-injury
matter. On March 6, 2020, Jones and the alleged tortfeasor agreed to settle the case
for $7,500. As of 12 days after reaching the settlement, the alleged tortfeasor had
not presented payment to Scribner or Jones. At that time, Scribner entered into a
written agreement with Jones in which Scribner agreed to advance $500 of his
personal funds to Jones and Jones agreed to repay Scribner from his share of the
settlement proceeds. Scribner issued a $500 check to Jones from his operating
account, with the notation “PI Settlement.” On March 30, Scribner deposited the
$7,500 settlement check into his client trust account. Three days later, he paid
Jones’s outstanding medical bill and distributed the remaining proceeds to himself
and Jones in accordance with their written agreements.
       {¶ 14} Scribner admitted and the board found that this conduct violated
Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(e) (prohibiting a lawyer from providing financial assistance to a
client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation). We adopt this finding
of misconduct.
                                    SANCTION
       {¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the attorney violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.

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                               January Term, 2023

       {¶ 16} The parties stipulated and the board found that Scribner had acted
with a dishonest or selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and
committed multiple offenses and that his clients were vulnerable; in addition, we
note that some clients experienced delays in the distribution of portions of their
settlement proceeds. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (3), (4), and (8). As for
mitigation, the parties stipulated and the board found that Scribner had a clean
disciplinary record; had made a timely, good faith effort to make restitution; had
made full and free disclosure to the board and exhibited a cooperative attitude
toward the disciplinary proceedings; and had presented evidence of his good
character. See Gov.Bar. R. V(13)(C)(1), (3), (4), and (5). The board also found
that Scribner was genuinely remorseful for his misconduct, had accepted full
responsibility for his actions, and had completed a continuing-legal-education
(“CLE”) course focused on client-trust-account management before his disciplinary
hearing.
       {¶ 17} Scribner testified that he was experiencing mental-health issues due
to challenging situations in his life, including financial difficulties related to a
failing business venture, during the period when he committed the misconduct. On
relator’s recommendation, he had contacted the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program
(“OLAP”). Although he signed a two-year OLAP contract on August 9, 2022, that
required him to refrain from the use of all mood-altering substances including
alcohol, he did not seek to establish any mental or substance-use disorder as a
mitigating factor. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).
       {¶ 18} “The presumptive sanction for misappropriation of client funds is
disbarment.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Burchinal, 133 Ohio St.3d 38, 2012-Ohio-
3882, 975 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 17. However, this presumption “may be tempered with
sufficient evidence of mitigating or extenuating circumstances.” Disciplinary
Counsel v. Edwards, 134 Ohio St.3d 271, 2012-Ohio-5643, 981 N.E.2d 857, ¶ 18.

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        {¶ 19} Here, the board considered seven misappropriation cases in which
we imposed sanctions ranging from a fully stayed one-year suspension to a two-
year suspension with one year conditionally stayed. For example, in Disciplinary
Counsel v. Gorby, 142 Ohio St.3d 35, 2015-Ohio-476, 27 N.E.3d 510, the attorney
engaged in dishonest conduct, commingled personal and client funds, and
misappropriated approximately $6,400 from her sister- and brother-in-law, whom
she was representing in a foreclosure proceeding. Recognizing that Gorby’s clients
had suffered no harm and that Gorby posed little, if any, threat to the public because
her misconduct was the product of a very contentious family relationship, id. at
¶ 15, we suspended her for one year but stayed the entire suspension on the
conditions that she engage in no further misconduct and submit to a one-year period
of monitored probation focused on law-office and trust-account management, id. at
¶ 28.
        {¶ 20} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner, 145 Ohio St.3d 192, 2016-Ohio-
359, 47 N.E.3d 847, an attorney overdrew her client trust account on several
occasions, misused that account for personal expenses, commingled personal and
client funds, misappropriated client funds, failed to maintain required client-trust-
account records, and made a false statement to a client about the reason she could
not promptly distribute the client’s settlement proceeds. Making matters worse,
those violations occurred after the relator terminated an earlier investigation based
on Corner’s assurances that she understood her obligations with respect to the
management of her client trust account. See id. at ¶ 13. Although Corner engaged
in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses, she had no prior disciplinary
record, cooperated in the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, and established the
existence of a qualifying mental disorder. Id. at ¶ 34-35. We imposed a two-year
suspension for Corner’s misconduct but stayed the second year on the conditions
that she commit no further misconduct, continue to participate in appropriate

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                                January Term, 2023

mental-health treatment, and remain in full compliance with her OLAP contract.
Id. at ¶ 44.
        {¶ 21} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Joltin, 147 Ohio St.3d 490, 2016-Ohio-
8168, 67 N.E. 3d 780, we imposed a two-year suspension, with one year
conditionally stayed, on an attorney who—in addition to committing many of the
same client-trust-account violations that Scribner committed here—neglected a
client’s legal matter and initially failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary
investigation. See id. at ¶ 34. Conditions of the stay included a period of monitored
probation, completion of CLE focused on client-trust-account management, and
OLAP compliance. Id.
        {¶ 22} And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Coleman, 144 Ohio St.3d 35, 2015-
Ohio-2489, 40 N.E.3d 1092, the attorney engaged in dishonest conduct,
commingled personal and client funds, misappropriated approximately $18,000 in
client funds, and failed to maintain required client-trust-account records, including
ledgers and monthly reconciliations.         Aggravating factors—consisting of
Coleman’s dishonest motive, financial harm to a vulnerable client, and a prior one-
day    attorney-registration   suspension—were     balanced    against   Coleman’s
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, his good character and
reputation, and his efforts to rectify some factors that had contributed to his
misconduct. Id. at ¶ 10. We suspended Coleman for two years with 18 months
stayed on the conditions that he commit no further misconduct and work with a
law-practice monitor for the duration of his stayed suspension. Id. at ¶ 17.
        {¶ 23} After considering the range of sanctions we have imposed for similar
misconduct, the board recommends that we suspend Scribner for two years with 18
months stayed. In addition, the board recommends that we condition Scribner’s
reinstatement to the practice of law on the submission of proof that he has complied
with his August 9, 2022 OLAP contract and any extension thereof and has
completed three hours of CLE focused on client-trust-account management, in

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addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X. Furthermore, the board recommends
that upon reinstatement, Scribner be required to serve a one-year period of
monitored probation focused on his law-office and client-trust-account
management. Having considered Scribner’s misconduct, the aggravating and
mitigating factors, and our applicable precedent, we agree that a two-year
suspension with 18 months stayed, with conditions on reinstatement and a period
of monitored probation, is the appropriate sanction in this case.
                                 CONCLUSION
       {¶ 24} Accordingly, Theodore Ferris Scribner is suspended from the
practice of law in Ohio for two years with 18 months stayed on the condition that
he commit no further misconduct. If Scribner fails to comply with the condition of
the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full two-year suspension. In
addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(24), Scribner’s reinstatement to the
practice of law shall be conditioned on proof of compliance with his August 9, 2022
OLAP contract and any extension thereof and completion of three hours of CLE
focused on client-trust-account management, in addition to the hours required by
Gov.Bar R. X. Upon reinstatement, Scribner shall serve a one-year period of
monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21) focused on his law-
office and client-trust-account management. Costs are taxed to Scribner.
                                                             Judgment accordingly.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and
DETERS, JJ., concur.
       FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion.
                               _________________
       FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
       {¶ 25} Over a five-year period, respondent, Theodore Ferris Scribner,
mismanaged and/or misappropriated funds belonging to nine clients, failed to
maintain required records regarding his client trust account and his relationships

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                                January Term, 2023

with his clients, and made an improper loan to a tenth client. Scribner admitted that
during a period of financial strain, he used personal-injury settlements belonging to
his clients for his own personal or business purposes or to reimburse funds that he
had previously misappropriated from clients. Specifically, Scribner withdrew
$73,345.10 in cash from his Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Account (“IOLTA”), and
due to his failure to maintain rule-compliant general and client ledgers, he made it
impossible to connect those withdrawals to particular clients.
       {¶ 26} All in all, Scribner committed ten violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct: (1) Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(1) (requiring a lawyer to set forth a
contingent-fee agreement in a writing signed by both the client and the lawyer); (2)
Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(e) (prohibiting a lawyer from providing financial assistance to a
client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation); (3) Prof.Cond.R.
1.15(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a copy of any fee agreement with a
client); (4) Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for
each client that sets forth the name of the client; the date, amount, and source of all
funds received on behalf of the client; and the current balance for each client); (5)
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for the lawyer’s
client trust account, setting forth the name of the account; the date, amount, and
client affected by each credit and debit; and the balance in the account); (6)
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(5) (requiring a lawyer to perform and retain a monthly
reconciliation of the funds held in the lawyer’s client trust account); (7)
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(b) (permitting a lawyer to deposit his or her own funds into a
client trust account for the sole purpose of paying or obtaining a waiver of bank
service charges); (8) Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit advance
legal fees and expenses into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer
only as fees are earned or expenses incurred); (9) Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) (requiring
a lawyer to promptly deliver funds or other property that the client is entitled to

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receive); and (10) Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
       {¶ 27} Today, a majority of this court adopts the Board of Professional
Conduct’s recommendations that Scribner be suspended from the practice of law
for two years, with 18 months stayed, and that he serve a one-year period of
monitored probation. I believe that the sanction adopted by the majority does not
adequately protect the public. In accord with the sanctions imposed in serious
attorney-misconduct cases in which misappropriation was one of several violations,
Scribner should have more “time out” and additional monitoring to better protect
the public. In my view, the appropriate sanction is a two-year suspension, with one
year stayed, and two years of monitored probation with the other conditions
recommended by the board. Thus, I respectfully dissent in part.
         Appropriate Sanction for Misappropriation of Client Funds
       {¶ 28} “[M]isappropriation of client funds is an egregious violation of a
lawyer’s ethical responsibilities,” Disciplinary Counsel v. Connaughton, 75 Ohio
St.3d 644, 645, 665 N.E.2d 675 (1996), and “[t]he presumptive sanction for
misappropriation of client funds is disbarment,” Disciplinary Counsel v. Burchinal,
133 Ohio St.3d 38, 2012-Ohio-3882, 975 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 17. However, when there
were mitigating circumstances, this court has adopted a lesser sanction.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise, 85 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 707 N.E.2d 852 (1999). That
lesser sanction includes an actual suspension from the practice of law, but some of
the suspension may be stayed if the misconduct is an isolated incident and not a
course of conduct throughout the attorney’s career. See Disciplinary Counsel v.
Claflin, 107 Ohio St.3d 31, 2005-Ohio-5827, 836 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 14-15.
       {¶ 29} A majority of the court adopts the board’s recommended sanction of
a two-year suspension, with 18 months stayed, and one year of monitored
probation. In adopting the board’s recommended sanction, the majority opinion
focuses on four of the seven cases that the board relied on: Disciplinary Counsel v.

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                                January Term, 2023

Gorby, 142 Ohio St.3d 35, 2015-Ohio-476, 27 N.E.3d 510; Disciplinary Counsel
v. Corner, 145 Ohio St.3d 192, 2016-Ohio-359, 47 N.E.3d 847; Disciplinary
Counsel v. Coleman, 144 Ohio St.3d 35, 2015-Ohio-2489, 40 N.E.3d 1092; and
Disciplinary Counsel v. Joltin, 147 Ohio St.3d 490, 2016-Ohio-8168, 67 N.E.3d
780. The suspensions imposed in those disciplinary cases for misappropriating
client funds range from one year fully stayed, Gorby at ¶ 28, to two years with 18
months stayed, Coleman at ¶ 17, to two years with one year stayed, Corner at ¶ 44;
Joltin at ¶ 34.
        {¶ 30} While I agree with the majority opinion that Corner and Joltin are
on point, I would also consider Claflin and Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Dull, 151
Ohio St.3d 601, 2017-Ohio-8774, 91 N.E.3d 739. In Claflin, the respondent failed
to deliver a $10,000 settlement to his client for nearly three years. Claflin at ¶ 4-6.
This court determined that Claflin had harmed a vulnerable client, id. at ¶ 11, and
that his “months-long use of his client’s funds” and misrepresentations to the
Cuyahoga County Bar Association could not be tolerated, id. at ¶ 14. The court
also recognized that Claflin had paid the client prior to the disciplinary proceedings
and had committed no other misconduct. Id. at ¶ 15. Considering those factors,
this court found that a two-year suspension, with one year conditionally stayed,
struck the right balance to protect the public. See id.
        {¶ 31} And in Dull, the respondent misappropriated $37,000 of his client’s
money for his own personal use. Dull at ¶ 4-5. Dull paid back the misappropriated
money with interest after his client filed a grievance with the Trumbull County Bar
Association. Id. at ¶ 6. This court determined that a two-year suspension, with one
year conditionally stayed, was appropriate because Dull had misappropriated a
significant amount of money, failed to retain the appropriate client-trust records
required by our rules, and had a dishonest and selfish motive. Id. at ¶ 14-16. The
court found that this sanction was consistent with the sanctions imposed in other
cases involving attorneys who engaged in isolated incidents of misappropriation in

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otherwise unblemished legal careers. Id. at ¶ 16, citing Claflin and Disciplinary
Counsel v. Gildee, 134 Ohio St.3d 374, 2012-Ohio-5641, 982 N.E.2d 704
(imposing a two-year suspension, with one year conditionally stayed, on an attorney
who misappropriated funds and engaged in other misconduct in a single client’s
case but had an otherwise untarnished legal career).
       {¶ 32} Here, Scribner misappropriated over $73,000 of client funds in what
appears to be some sort of Ponzi scheme. After money from one client would be
placed in Scribner’s IOLTA, Scribner would pay off some of the client’s expenses
and use the remainder for personal expenses or to reimburse other clients—and then
repeat the process. There was also an occasion on which Scribner failed to take his
attorney fee from the IOLTA and thus commingled his earned fee with his IOLTA.
Scribner committed additional violations by providing financial assistance to a
client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation and by failing to
maintain copies of written and signed contingent-fee agreements in at least six
instances.
       {¶ 33} Scribner’s misconduct was not a single incident of misconduct or
misconduct involving a single client—he committed numerous and repeated
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct over a number of years. While he
has no prior discipline and generally has an unblemished legal career, we cannot
discount this pattern of mismanagement and misappropriation of client funds.
Scribner’s misconduct is most similar to the misconduct in Corner and Joltin, as
described in the majority opinion, and is arguably more egregious than the
misappropriation in Claflin and Dull. Therefore, I would impose a two-year
suspension, with one year conditionally stayed, for a total “time out” of 12 months
and would impose a two-year term of monitored probation given Scribner’s lengthy
history of misappropriation and significant problems in managing his IOLTA. I
concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it adopts the reinstatement
conditions recommended by the board.

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                                  January Term, 2023

                                      Conclusion
        {¶ 34} We cannot tolerate members of the bar misappropriating the funds
of one client, let alone the funds of nine clients. See Claflin, 107 Ohio St.3d 31,
2005-Ohio-5827, 836 N.E.2d 564, at ¶ 14. Attorneys must resist the lure of
accessible client funds, even when times are hard, to ensure that the public will
have the confidence that attorneys will act in accordance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Stealing from clients, no matter the reason for doing so, is
a significant breach of that attorney-client trust. In this case, to adequately protect
the public from future harm, we should suspend Scribner from the practice of law
for two years, with one year stayed on the conditions recommended by the board,
and impose a two-year term of monitored probation. Because the majority adopts
a lesser sanction, I respectfully dissent in part.
                                 _________________
        Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Kelli C. Schmidt and Karen
H. Osmond, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
        Plakas Mannos and Peter T. Cahoon, for respondent.
                                 _________________

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