Court Opinion

ID: 9710890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:19:43.108699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:00.819446
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I must register my strenuous dissent to the determination reached by a majority of this court today allowing Appellant’s nine-year old conviction for robbery to be used against him for purposes of impeachment. The application here of the per se rule first announced in Commonwealth v. Randall, 515 Pa. 410, 528 A.2d 1326 (1987), demonstrates in and of itself the absurdity and lack of logic inherent in the operation of such a rule and necessitates the restoration of the Bighum-Roots principle to our jurisprudence.
That the majority gives little attention or analysis to the impeachment issue in this case, one in which the imposition of the death penalty is sought, is indicative of the almost complete lack of comprehension of the prejudicial implications of introducing the mere fact of prior criminal acts, ostensibly to “impeach” the credibility of the defendant-witness. In abandoning the balancing approach of Big-hum-Roots, which, for all its perceived shortcomings, pro*466vided a meaningful inquiry into the need for and relevance of such facially prejudicial evidence, as well as guidelines for its use, the majority has substituted a rule which, under the guise of simplicity, has injected a different and more dangerous measure of uncertainty and prejudice to any criminal defendant who has been previously convicted of a criminal offense.
Randall, while claiming to simplify this issue by providing “concrete guidelines for the admission of prior conviction evidence”, 528 A.2d at 1328, has, in my humble opinion, effectively “severed the head because the nose would not stop bleeding,” in its adoption of a per se rule, akin to F.R.E. 609(a)(1), (2) which favors admissibility.
The majority fails to consider that the approach taken is not legislatively favored in this Commonwealth. Indeed, the policy against using prior convictions against a criminal defendant is codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5918 which provides:
§ 5918. Examination of defendant as to other offenses
No person charged with any crime and called as a witness in his own behalf, shall be asked, or if asked, shall be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed, or been convicted of any offense other than the one wherewith he shall then be charged, or tending to show that he has been of bad character or reputation unless:
(1) he shall have at such trial, personally or by counsel, asked questions of the witness for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good reputation or character, or has given evidence tending to prove his own good character or reputation; or
(2) he shall have testified at such trial against a codefendant, charged with the same offense.
The policy behind the above statute was succinctly expressed by Chief Justice (then Justice) Nix in Commonwealth v. Gullett, 459 Pa. 431, 329 A.2d 513, 517-18 (1974), when he stated:
The reason for the rejection of this evidence is not because it fails to have any probative value on the proba*467bility or the accused’s guilt but rather that the presumed effect is to predispose the minds of the jury to an extent that it would unduly overshadow the presumption of innocence.
The rule announced in Randall is totally contrary to these policy considerations and permits the prosecution virtual carte blanche to do indirectly, under the guise of impeachment, what § 5918 prohibits it from doing directly — introducing evidence of prior crimes to infer the truth of present criminal allegations. It would be unfair to make this statement, however, without setting forth the underlying rationale for making it.
While the majority in Randall vindicate their position as necessary to end the uncertainty of litigation and to reduce the number of appeals based on this issue, the opposite result has obtained. As stated, the per se rule requires two determinations prior to the introduction of this evidence. First, there is a requirement that the conviction sought to be introduced must involve dishonesty or false statement, crimen falsi. Second, the conviction date, or the last date of confinement, must be less than ten years from the date of trial. If these requirements are met, the offense is per se admissible. If not, the trial judge must then apply a balancing test and determine whether the value of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Randall, 528 A.2d at 1329.
As applied, however, the prosecution has only one hurdle to overcome — the ten year hurdle. This hurdle becomes lower when one examines the ten year language. As stated, the ten year period runs from the date of conviction or the last day of confinement. In effect this period can be far greater than the stated ten years since, once convicted, the time of incarceration becomes the starting point for determining the run date.
Considering the disappearance of the first hurdle, that the conviction be one of crimen falsi, it is clear from the majority’s analysis of the facts of the instant case that this requirement has been totally dispensed with. Since the *468Randall majority did not facially overrule the Big-hum-Roots requirement that the conviction be one involving crimen falsi, I would assume it axiomatic that the Commonwealth is still put to the burden of demonstrating the crimen falsi nature of the conviction. Unless all crimes are now deemed crimen falsi, or the term is limited to the traditional notions of crimen falsi, i.e. perjury, false swearing and embezzlement, the record of a conviction does not itself provide the underlying factual premise to establish the crimen falsi nature of an offense. In the case before us, however, the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence of the dishonest nature of the offense, and thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the Randall rationale were valid, its requirements were not met. The effect of this is to allow the jury to hear the Clerk of Courts state that the defendant was previously convicted of an offense, and nothing as it relates to how this testimony affects the defendant’s credibility.
A review of the handling of the impeachment issue before the trial court clearly reveals that the requirements of Bighum-Roots, unquestionably operant at the time of trial, were ignored by both the Commonwealth and the trial judge. It is this total failure to meaningfully evaluate the prior conviction at the suppression hearing that evinces a complete denial of Appellant’s due process rights under then existing precedent. To now attempt to validate that denial by applying a new and different standard is unacceptable. While this jurisdiction has not clearly delimited the principals of application as to the prospectivity or retroactivity of a new change in existing evidentiary or procedural rules in situations such as the present, it is clear that court which have done so, most notably the U.S. Supreme Court, have required, in most instances, prospective application of new changes, with retroactive application being the exception. See, generally, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 16 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 93 S.Ct. 1966, 36 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973); See especially, Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 93 S.Ct. 2926, 37 L.Ed.2d 873 (1973), Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 *469S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). Where retroactive application has been applied, it has been to benefit a defendant by allowing him the protection of an enlargement in a constitutional principal. Application of the Randall rule, in contrast, has the repugnant effect of not only forcing Appellant to conform to a standard that was not applicable at the time he was tried, but also to see the correctness of his appellate assertion fail, not because he is wrong in his theory of the law, but rather because the rule of evidence upon which he justifiably relied at trial has been altered, and evidence not admissible at that time has now become post facto valid. This is an affront to due process.
In Commonwealth v. Roots, 482 Pa. 33, 393 A.2d 364 (1978), we placed upon the Commonwealth the initial burden of showing that the need for using prior conviction evidence to impeach a defendant outweighed the inherent prejudice to the defendant. We stated, “[w]e do not assume the admissibility of this impeachment evidence absent a substantial showing of prejudice by the defendant. Rather, the burden is upon the prosecution to show that the need for this evidence overcomes its inherent potential for prejudice.” Id. 482 Pa. at 40-41, 393 A.2d at 368. (Citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
At the suppression hearing, Appellant requested that the court prohibit the Commonwealth from using a prior robbery conviction approximately nine years old, involving the theft of an automobile and the robbery of an individual therein. He argued that the evidence would be highly prejudicial in that the similarity of the prior conviction to the allegations in the instant case would allow the jury to draw an unwarranted inference of guilt. When asked to respond to this allegation the Commonwealth declined and stated to the court that it would rely upon its brief. That brief is not contained in the record, nor is any other record showing by the Commonwealth present. I can therefore only conclude that the Commonwealth has indeed failed to meet its burden.
*470Even assuming that the Commonwealth had met its initial burden, it was then the duty of the trial court to apply the remainder of the Roots analysis, 482 Pa. at 39-40, 393 A.2d at 367. This was not done. In reviewing these factors, the trial court must carefully evaluate the competing interests rather than merely recite the five factors verbatim. We held that "... [t]here must be a meaningful exercise of discretion in these cases and that the former per se rule of admissibility has been expressly repudiated.” Id., 482 Pa. at 39, 393 A.2d- at 367 (emphasis added). In the instant case, it is clear that no meaningful review of the factors was undertaken. To illustrate this, I set forth the review of the relevant factors, and the disposition of each by the trial court. As to factor No. 1, the Court stated:
THE COURT: The law, I think, is relatively clear, I’m supposed to consider certain factors in determining how justice balances out and what is fair.
The factors are, first, the degree to which the commission of the prior offense reflects upon the veracity of the defendant-witness. It is my understanding that the Commonwealth, if permitted, would use the conviction in 1975 for the offense of burglary, larceny of a vehicle?
MR. PILLETS: That is correct, your Honor.
THE COURT: And obviously those crimes have been construed in this Commonwealth to constitute appropriate offenses for impeachment purposes ...
N.T. Vol. 1, pp. 307-08.
As can be seen, there was absolutely no discussion or analysis relative to the weighing of this factor. Instead it is clear that the trial court merely relied upon the offense’s per se admissibility based upon prior court decisions, not quoted or cited, which may or may not have involved other factors more directly affecting credibility.
As to the second factor, the court stated:
THE COURT: Second, a likelihood in view of the nature and extent of the prior record, that it would have a greater tendency to smear the character of the defendant and suggest a propensity to commit the crime for which *471he stands charged rather than providing a legitimate reason for discrediting him as an untruthful person.
Again, it is my understanding that the defendant has a record of, in addition to these offenses, of three armed robbery, or three robbery convictions, at least one of which was armed, is that correct?
MR. PILLETS: Yes, at least one of which was armed, and also for kidnapping.
THE COURT: And the Commonwealth, however, only proposes, if permitted, to use the last which is a crime of burglary and the auto larceny.
MR. PILLETS: Correct.
N.T. Vol. 1, p. 308.
Again the trial court provided no meaningful discussion of this factor. Little more was done than to enumerate prior convictions of the defendant and strike the “balance” by acknowledging that less than all prior convictions would be introduced. That they were clearly similar to the crimes for which he is now being charged and would tend to create in the minds of the jury the impression that because Appellant had committed this type of crime in the past, he has committed the present crime, was completely ignored by the trial court.
As to the third factor:
THE COURT: The Third requirement is the age and circumstances of the defendant — -the defendant is how old?
MR. LUMBIS: Thirty-two.
THE COURT: Thirty-two years of age. The circumstances of the defendant, as far as I know, is that he is obviously incarcerated without bail, has been and apparently during the pendency of this trial and depending upon the outcome, will continue to be.
N.T. Vol. 1, pp. 308-09.
This was the extent of discussion on factor Three. Merely stating the age of the appellant and where he is presently residing falls far short of a meaningful exercise of discre*472tion relative to this factor. The proper inquiry should have been whether the prior crimes were committed as a minor.
As to the fourth factor:
THE COURT: Fourth is the strength of the prosecution’s case and the prosecution’s need to resort to this evidence as compared with the availability to the defense of other witness through which his version of the events surrounding the incident can be presented.
It would appear to the Court that the essential incidents involved in this case are known, if at all, to two people, and one of which is allegedly the defendant and the other is allegedly Mr. Alexander, as to the essential elements of the actual killing.
To the extent that the Commonwealth’s case rests in large measure upon Mr. Alexander and in view of the fact that the law provides that information coming from him comes in a sense from a corrupt source.
The Commonwealth may not have available to it a lot of evidence concerning this case. On the other hand I also recognize that the defendant is in a similar predicament in that he has indicated an alibi defense and has further indicated that he has been unable to identify those who could support his alibi.
MR. KOSTELANSKY: Judge, I have one other thing, in addition to the homicide there are other charges, the theft, kidnapping are the things dealing with articles and the Commonwealth has offered, even in the suppression hearing, testimony with regard to that, other than James Alexander, so we are not balancing only one charge, there are several other charges that the defendant is charged with.
THE COURT: Well, on the major charge against you, that essentially is going to be decided by two people. There may be other collateral evidence or circumstantial evidence which comes from the traveling together, whatever might have been seized, but essentially it appears the Commonwealth’s case — correct me if I’m wrong — is based upon Mr. Alexander.
*473MR. EICHORN: In a large measure, your Honor, yes, sir, that is a fair statement.
THE COURT: Can the defense offer to me any other alternative that the Commonwealth would have to directly impeach the credibility of the defendant as regards the alleged homicide other than, let’s say, Mr. Alexander’s testimony, if they are not permitted to use this conviction. MR. KOSTELANSKI: They have essentially what is circumstantial evidence which will be presented. I am not aware of any other direct evidence the defense is going to offer in this case, testimony that was not presented her [sic] today. The Commonwealth has witnesses who will indicate that they started out together, at least based on the police report that I have been provided, by Mr. Alexander as well as Mr. Strong together and tie it to the yellow T-shirt which has been identified along the way by various people, some of which the Court has had the opportunity to hear by virtue of the suppression hearings that were held here, in addition to the circumstances as part of the criminal history and the arrest and the testimony of Officer Hill and the references that are going to be made in the presentation that Mr. Strong presented the Texas and Pennsylvania identification when questioned as to his identity. There was the victim’s identification that he had upon him, either in the bag — I can’t recall if he took it out of or off the person or in the bag that he discovered the wallet which was the victim’s and those circumstances there, the gun, those kind of items.
So I think when you weigh all those factors first the case is much more than James Alexander alone. It is true on the one issue but there’s circumstantial evidence which I’m going to be arguing that will corroborate his testimony.
Of course, it’s the only position of the defendant is only his own testimony of the defense of the charges as it stands right now. As I indicated to the Court I think it’s a fair statement to make at this time, a fair assumption *474on anybody’s part that that is not going to change unless there’s a major miracle and I don’t expect that.
THE COURT: All right. I am satisfied on the basis of the record presented to me that the 1975 conviction of this defendant for burglary and larceny of an automobile presents Bighum offenses; and, I am also satisfied that the Commonwealth — or satisfied that the burden, that the probative value of the evidence of those convictions as it bears on the credibility of the defendant as a witness outweighs the prejudicial effect it could have upon the jury and I think that the need for the evidence in this case overcomes any inherent potential it might have to prejudice and, accordingly, the motion to preclude the Commonwealth from using those offenses for impeachment purposes should the defendant testify is denied.
N.T. Vol. 1, pp. 309-12. (Emphasis added)
No discussion was had to the fifth, extremely important factor, the existence of alternative means of attacking the defendant’s credibility is present. As to the discussion of the fourth factor, the trial court determined that there was a possibility that the case would consist of the conflicting testimony of Appellant and Alexander. As such, the Court weighed what it perceived to be a standoff in favor of the Commonwealth.
From this review, I find that the trial court’s exercise of discretion in determining the propriety of admitting Appellant’s prior conviction was woefully inadequate. The court failed to even recognize the fact that the conviction sought to be introduced was almost nine years old, a factor, I concede, the Randall majority would now also discredit. Nor did it take into account whether other means were available for attacking Appellant’s credibility, an important factor since he was the only one to testify on his own behalf during the trial. Where a defendant’s own testimony is the only means by which he can present his version of the truth before the jury, we have stressed that "... it is more important to the search for truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant’s story than to know of a prior *475conviction.” Roots, 482 Pa. at 41, 393 A.2d at 368, quoting Com. v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 567, 307 A.2d 255, 263 (1973).
Using the above analysis, I would hold that it was error to allow Appellant’s prior 1975 conviction for robbery to be introduced for the purpose of impeachment in his trial. Under the law applicable at the time of trial, the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of showing that the need for that evidence outweighed its inherently prejudicial nature and further because the trial court failed to adequately evaluate and balance the factors set forth in Roots in allowing the evidence to be admitted.
For the foregoing reasons, I have no other alternative but to dissent.
NIX, C.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.