Court Opinion

ID: 9928416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 19:00:38.013008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:18.231570
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10787         Document: 00517051372             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/31/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                        No. 22-10787
                                      ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                January 31, 2024
   Keishonna Harper,                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Lockheed Martin Corporation,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 4:21-CV-571
                      ______________________________

   Before Jolly, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge: *
          In July 2020, Plaintiff Keishonna Harper resigned from her job at De-
   fendant Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Lockheed”). She soon filed this
   lawsuit alleging race and sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII and
   § 1981. She also claimed unlawful retaliation, in violation of Title VII and the
   Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The district court granted summary

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10787         Document: 00517051372              Page: 2       Date Filed: 01/31/2024

                                          No. 22-10787

   judgment for Lockheed on all claims and denied Harper’s motion for recon-
   sideration. Harper appeals, we AFFIRM.
                                                I.
           Harper is an African American woman who worked as a Contracts
   Negotiation Manager at Lockheed’s Fort Worth, Texas facility. Almost
   immediately after assuming the position, issues developed between her and
   her subordinates and supervisors. Four such conflicts underlie her claims
   before us.
           First, Harper contends that in 2018, her white and male subordinates
   were disrespectful and insubordinate. She later argued that they behaved in
   this way because she was a woman of color.
           Second, Harper alleges that Terry Ford, the Director of Contracts
   Negotiation at Lockheed, made unjustified comments to her in an informal
   2018 feedback session. Ford was not Harper’s direct supervisor at the time.
   Nevertheless, he met with Harper concerning complaints he had heard from
   Harper’s subordinates. Ford chided her for cursing at work. He later told
   her that he would not be giving such feedback if Harper were a man. 1 Ford
   further said that Harper had had “a conversation with a female . . . employee
   about being a woman of color in corporate America.” He added, “[w]e all
   see what you look like. You don’t have to tell people.” He admonished her,
   as a supervisor, she should have these conversations with professionals and
   not out in the open. Harper reported this conversation to HR in 2019 and
   again in early 2020.

           _____________________
           1
             Although the parties dispute the precise phrasing of this quote, we view the record
   in the light most favorable to Harper. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

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                                         No. 22-10787

           Third, in early 2020, during a performance review, Harper was told by
   a supervisor that she needed to be in the office more. Harper, believing that
   the comments were about her FMLA leave, reported the comments to HR.
           Fourth, again in early 2020, Harper learned that a non-supervisory
   subordinate noticed that Harper was absent on Martin Luther King Jr. day
   and told another non-supervisory coworker, “I know why she’s really out.
   It’s MLK day.” Harper, after having been told of the comment, reported the
   comment to HR. HR suggested that Harper have a conversation with the
   entire team about Title VII and appropriate workplace comments.
           In the midst of Harper’s complaints about workplace conduct of
   others, management was having its trouble with Harper herself. In March of
   2020, Lockheed opened an EEO investigation into Harper’s inappropriate
   sexual comments in the workplace. The investigation then led to a separate
   inquiry into Harper’s leadership abilities. When the two investigations
   concluded, Lockheed’s disciplinary review board suspended Harper without
   pay for two weeks and transferred her to a new position without leadership
   responsibilities. After her suspension, Harper resigned, filed an EEOC
   charge, and then filed this suit.
                                              II.
           Harper has brought three claims that we consider today: (1) race and
   sex discrimination under Title VII and § 1981; 2 (2) retaliation under Title
   VII; and (3) retaliation under the FMLA. This case did not go to trial.
   Instead, the district court granted Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment
   and dismissed Harper’s complaint.

           _____________________
           2
             Since both Title VII and Section § 1981 follow the same framework here, Jones v.
   Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005), we refer to both claims
   collectively as “discrimination claims.”

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                                    No. 22-10787

          The district court held that Harper failed to show that she had
   suffered an adverse employment action. Although Harper had argued in her
   briefing that she unlawfully was demoted and constructively discharged, the
   district court concluded that Harper had waived these discrimination claims.
   Specifically, it noted that, at Harper’s deposition, Lockheed asked Harper to
   identify the company actions that were because of race and sex. Harper
   responded that Lockheed acted discriminatorily when it failed to respond to
   her complaints, when it treated her white colleagues’ leave of absences
   differently from her leave of absences, and when Ford gave her feedback
   about cursing. Lockheed then asked if there were any other company actions
   that would not have happened if Harper were a different race or sex. Harper
   said, “Not that I can think of at the moment.” Since Harper said nothing
   about demotion or constructive discharge in these responses, the district
   court concluded that her omissions “narrowed” her discrimination claims.
   It thus assumed she had waived any discrimination claims based on demotion
   or constructive discharge. The district court further concluded that the
   complaints that Harper did assert were not cognizable adverse employment
   actions under our precedent. The bottom line: the court held that Harper
   had failed to present a prima facie case of race and sex discrimination.
          In dismissing the Title VII retaliation claims and the FMLA retaliation
   claims, however, the district court’s reasoning was aimed at the merits: it
   held that Harper did not present any evidence regarding causation or pretext.
   The court thus granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint and
   entered judgment accordingly.
          Harper moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Harper has
   appealed.

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                                     No. 22-10787

                                          III.
          We review summary judgments de novo. Hudson v. Lincare, Inc., 58
   F.4th 222, 228 (5th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is proper if “there is no
   genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
   as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “‘All reasonable inferences’ must
   be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
   judgment, and any doubt must be resolved in that party's favor.” Jones v.
   Gulf Coast Rest. Grp., Inc., 8 F.4th 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2021).
          This appeal can be organized into three buckets: (1) Harper’s race-
   based and sex-based discrimination claims, (2) her Title VII retaliation
   claims, and (3) her FMLA retaliation claims. We will first address the race
   and sex discrimination claims and next, the FMLA retaliation claims.
   Finally, we will turn to the Title VII retaliation claims.
                                          IV.
          We begin with Harper’s discrimination claims, in which she alleges
   that Lockheed demoted, then constructively discharged her, based upon her
   race and sex. The district court dismissed these claims, reasoning, as we have
   said, that (1) Harper “narrowed” her discrimination claims by her deposition
   testimony and (2) Harper’s remaining claims were not cognizable adverse
   employment actions because they were not “ultimate employment
   decision[s]" under our precedent.
          With respect to “narrowing her claims,” she asserts that Lockheed
   constructed a “gotcha” moment at her deposition by asking her to specify
   what actions constituted her discrimination claims. Her response allowed
   Lockheed to seize upon her failure to include other specific complaints.
   Lockheed responds that Harper should be taken at her word, especially
   because there was no objection or correction to this testimony made by her
   or her lawyers, either at the deposition or thereafter.

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                                          No. 22-10787

           Irrespective of whether the district court may have been incorrect in
   finding that Harper had narrowed her discrimination claims, we need not
   further address this issue because Harper failed to contest the “narrowing”
   issue before the district court. 3            Thus, her failure to challenge the
   “narrowing” in the district court results in forfeiture. Rollins v. Home Depot
   USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021).
           All that remains, then, are the two discrimination claims Harper
   asserted in her deposition: (1) the claim that Lockheed failed to thoroughly
   investigate and take appropriate actions related to the complaints she made
   internally regarding racist and sexist comments and (2) the claim that
   Lockheed improperly reprimanded her for failing to be in the office. The
   district court granted summary judgment on these claims because the claims
   were not “ultimate employment decisions” as required under our precedent
   at the time. See McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 429 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2007).
   This analysis, however, was overruled in Hamilton v. Dallas County, 79 F.4th
   494, 497 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc). 4

           _____________________
           3
              Harper had numerous opportunities to object to the “narrowing” argument in
   the district court. There was no effort of Harper’s attorneys to clarify her response through
   further examination at her deposition. They simply let her answer stand as given with no
   indication that it was incorrect. At summary judgment, Lockheed argued that Harper had
   narrowed her claims. Harper, again, did not object to Lockheed’s argument. The district
   court then dismissed Harper’s discrimination claims, noting that Harper had narrowed her
   claims at her deposition. Even after the district court entered final judgment, Harper still
   raised no objection to the district court’s narrowing holding. This is all to say: Harper had
   ample opportunity to object to the “narrowing” argument before the district court in order
   to allow it to correct its alleged error but failed to do so at any point of the proceedings.
           4
             Specifically, Hamilton eliminated the requirement that a discrimination claim
   must be premised upon an “ultimate employment decision.” 79 F.4th at 499–502. Rather,
   an adverse employment action need only be “discrimination in the terms, conditions, or
   privileges of employment.” Id. at 501 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

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                                     No. 22-10787

          Notwithstanding this intervening authority, summary judgment on
   Harper’s discrimination claims was still proper. To properly establish a
   prima facie case of discrimination, Harper must show that she: (1) is a
   member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position that she held,
   (3) was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) was treated less
   favorably than others similarly situated outside of her protected class. Bryan
   v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2004). Based on the
   record before us, Harper failed to prove that she was treated less favorably
   than others similarly situated outside of her protected class or provide
   evidence that her employer took the adverse actions because of her
   protected-class status. Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th
   Cir. 2017); Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 346–47 (5th Cir.
   2013). Harper therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination,
   and summary judgment was appropriate. See Holtzclaw v. DSC Commc’ns
   Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We may affirm a summary
   judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is different from
   that relied on by the district court.” (internal citation omitted)).
          Accordingly, we AFFIRM the summary judgment for Lockheed on
   her discrimination claims.
                                          V.
          We now move to the FMLA retaliation claims. Although Harper has
   dedicated a section of her opening brief to “retaliation”, her retaliation
   arguments are centered on her Title VII retaliation claims. Her brief refers
   to the FMLA only in two passing references. Harper thus has forfeited her
   FMLA claims by failing to present any supporting arguments. See United
   States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 447 (5th Cir. 2010); Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d
   436, 451 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a “passing reference” to a claim in a

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                                     No. 22-10787

   brief is insufficient).   We therefore AFFIRM the grant of summary
   judgment on the FMLA retaliation claims.
                                         VI.
          All that remains for us to decide is Harper’s Title VII retaliation claim.
   To establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, Harper must show that
   (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment
   action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the
   adverse employment action. Wright v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433
   (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
   1996)).   Protected activity, as relevant here, includes “oppos[ing] any
   practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”, 42
   U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), i.e., “the opposition clause” which creates a safe
   harbor of protection for those who would speak or act against unlawful
   discrimination.
          Harper contends that she engaged in protected conduct under the
   opposition clause by complaining to HR about: (1) Ford’s improper
   comments during the 2018 feedback session; (2) the MLK day comment
   made by a subordinate; (3) her subordinates’ 2018 insubordination and
   disrespect, which allegedly was race- and sex-based; (4) unspecified “racism,
   sexism, disrespect and insubordination”; and (5) her supervisor’s comments
   about her being out of the office too much. Harper argues that these events
   are protected activity because it is sufficient for her to “communicat[e] with
   [HR] about discrimination.” Lockheed argues that Harper has not shown

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                                         No. 22-10787

   that any of her claims rise to the level of activity or conduct protected by Title
   VII. 5
            Harper views the standard in terms too general. The opposition
   clause requires Harper to show that she opposed unlawful employment
   practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In other words, she must have opposed
   conduct that is discriminatory or offensive in a way that violates federal
   antidiscrimination law. Harper has not satisfied that threshold here because
   she has not shown that these complaints are connected to race or sex animus.
   At best, the comments Harper alleges fall into the category of isolated
   incidents that do not rise to the level of Title VII discrimination. See Clark
   Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam) (noting that
   “offhand comments” and “isolated incidents,” unless extremely serious,
   are not unlawful under Title VII). Other incidents that she reported also have
   no context that show these incidents to be unlawful discrimination. Lawrence
   v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 808 F.3d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating
   that “unsubstantiated assertions” are insufficient to avoid summary
   judgment). In sum, Harper has failed to show that she opposed an unlawful
   employment practice under Title VII.
                Since Harper has not shown that she engaged in protected conduct,
   she has failed to make a prima facie case. In short, we AFFIRM the
   dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claims.

            _____________________
            5
            Although the district court did not reach this issue, “we may affirm on any ground
   supported by the record.” Gilbert v. Donahoe, 751 F.3d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal
   quotations and citation omitted).

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                                   No. 22-10787

                                      VII.
         Based on the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court did not
   err in granting summary judgment in favor of Lockheed. Accordingly, the
   judgment dismissing Harper’s compliant is
                                                                AFFIRMED.

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