Court Opinion

ID: 9929262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 05:06:28.051783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:22.730410
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT GELIA,                                                         UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      February 1, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                     No. 364026
                                                                      Hillsdale Circuit Court
HILLSDALE SMILES, PLLC,                                               LC No. 2022-000031-NO

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and RIORDAN and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff appeals from an order of the circuit court granting summary disposition in favor
of defendant on plaintiff’s premises liability claim.1 We vacate the order granting summary
disposition and remand the matter to the trial court.

         Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he suffered serious injuries on or about January 19, 2021,
when he fell on defendant’s premises “on a sheet of invisible ice.” In his deposition, plaintiff
testified that on the day in question he parked in defendant’s parking lot. He did not see any snow
on the ground in the parking area. He slipped and fell as he stepped out of his truck, hitting his
hip and right leg on the truck. He also gouged his shin in the fall. When he put his hand to the
ground to push himself back up, he discovered that “there was nothing but ice on” the parking lot
and that was “when I realized there was black ice.”

       Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a
claim) and MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). Specifically, with respect to

1
  Plaintiff’s complaint also included a claim for general negligence. But the parties agreed that
that claim would be dismissed.

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the premises liability claim, defendant plead that there was no genuine issue of material fact that
plaintiff’s claim was precluded because the icy condition was open and obvious.2

       The trial court granted defendant’s motion, opining as follows:

               In reviewing the—the pleadings, I—I've done some of my own research.
       And—and I know it was referenced, but I have actually taken the trouble of printing
       the case of Janson versus Sajewski Funeral Home [Inc], 486 Mich 934 [; 782 NW2d
       201 (2010)], because I found it to be very instructive. It states, it actually references
       the Slaughter versus Blarney Castle Oil [Co, 281 Mich App 474; 760 NW2d 287
       (2008)] case, and it says: it renders that:

                      That case renders alleged black ice conditions to be open and
               obvious when there are indicia of potentially hazardous conditions
               including the specific weather conditions present at the time of Plaintiff 's
               fall. And that's the case here.

                       Here the slip and fall occurred in winter with temperature at aIl times
               below freezing, snow present around the Defendant's premises; mist and
               light freezing rain falling earlier in the day; and light snow falling during
               the period prior to Plaintiff's fall in the evening. These wintery conditions,
               by their nature, would have alerted an average user of ordinary intelligence
               to discover the danger upon casual inspection.

              And it goes on to say there was no special aspect. That is the finding in the
       Janson case with reference back to, as I said, the—the Slauqhter matter.

              It is clear that an open and obvious condition will bar recovery. There is an
       exception for black ice because, by its very nature, black ice is not open and
       obvious. That—that's what the caselaw says.

               I find that there's also an exception to the exception. That exception is
       negated when there is other indicia of a potentially hazardous condition as I just
       read from the Janson case.

               In this case, it was January, the coldest month in the state of Michigan. The
       temperatures had consistently been below freezing. There were snow flurries the
       day before. There was snow on the ground. The Plaintiff in this case is a lifelong
       Michigan resident. And while that alone is clearly not enough to satisfy the indicia
       of the potentially hazardous condition, I find that the rest of these things very clearly
       mirror the Janson case.

2
 The (C)(8) motion was directed at the negligence claim, arguing that plaintiff cannot pursue a
negligence claim where the claim sounds in premises liability.

                                                 -2-
                I also find that there was no special aspect to the black ice, and for that
        reason, I will grant this motion for summary disposition.

Plaintiff now appeals and we vacate the grant of summary disposition.

        The only issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in granting summary
disposition based upon the open-and-obvious-danger doctrine. Although the trial court’s
conclusion may well have been correct given the state of the law when it rendered its decision, our
Supreme Court made a significant change to the law in this area while this case was pending on
appeal. See Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, __ Mich __; __ NW2d ___ (2023). Given some of
the principles cited by the trial court are now of questionable validity in light of the Kandil-Elsayed
decision, we conclude that it is necessary to reverse the grant of summary disposition and remand
the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.3

        The Court in Kandil-Elsayed, slip op at 2, summarized its holding as follows:

                In Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516-517; 629 NW2d 384
        (2001), we held that courts must analyze both the open and obvious danger doctrine
        and any exceptions to it under the element of duty. The Lugo Court also held that
        if a danger is open and obvious, only where an invitee “provide[s] evidence of
        special aspects of the condition” will the invitor still owe a duty of care. Id. at 514.
        We conclude that Lugo was wrongly decided and must be overruled in two respects.
        First, we overrule Lugo’s decision to make the open and obvious danger doctrine a
        part of a land possessor’s duty. Rather, we hold that the open and obvious nature
        of a condition is relevant to breach and the parties’ comparative fault. Second, we
        overrule the special-aspects doctrine and hold that when a land possessor should
        anticipate the harm that results from an open and obvious condition, despite its
        obviousness, the possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care.

          Clearly, given that it was the controlling law at the time, the trial court analyzed the motion
for summary disposition under Lugo and its progeny both with respect to the issue whether the
open-and-obvious issue goes to duty or to reach of duty and comparative negligence, as well as
the application of the now-repudiated special-aspects doctrine. Furthermore, there is relatively
little light between the facts of this case and those of Kandil-Elsayed. The case before us involves
a slip-and-fall on black ice, while Kandil-Elsayed involved a slip-and-fall on snow-covered ice.
Kandil-Elsayed, slip op at 3. The Court concluded that, under its new framework, there now
existed questions of material fact when the defendant breached its duty and, therefore, a remand

3
  It should be noted that both parties’ primary briefs on appeal were filed before the Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Kandil-Elsayed. Plaintiff did file a reply brief which addressed the effect
of Kandil-Elsayed. Also, defense counsel at oral argument suggested that Kandil-Elsayed should
not be given retroactive effect. Unbeknownst to either counsel or this panel, our court earlier that
morning released a published opinion holding that Kandil-Elsayed is to be applied retroactively
and applies to “all cases currently pending on direct appeal.” Gabrielson v. Woods Condominium
Association, Inc., __ Mich App __; __ NW2d ___ (2024), slip op at 2.

                                                  -3-
was necessary. Id. at 44. If that is necessary in a case where the condition is more obvious than
that of black ice, a similar result is necessary here.

       For these reasons, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary disposition on plaintiff’s
premises-liability claim. Defendant is free to renew its motion for summary disposition on
remand. If so, the trial court shall decide the motion in light of the framework set forth in Kandil-
Elsayed.

        Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff may tax costs.

                                                              /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                              /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                              /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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