Court Opinion

ID: 9398339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 21:01:36.873374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:32.852594
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    ZAYN AL ABIDIN MUHAMMAD
    HUSAYN (ISN #10016),

                    Petitioner,
    v.                                Civil Action No. 08-1360
                                      (EGS)
    LLOYD AUSTIN, et al.,

                    Respondents.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

         Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Access

to Respondents’ Ex Parte Filings, or in the Alternative for

Respondents’ Ex Parte Filings to be Stricken, see generally Mot.

for Access, ECF No. 348; 1 which Respondents oppose, see Resp’ts’

Opp’n, ECF No. 339. Upon careful consideration of Petitioner’s

motion, Respondents’ opposition, the reply thereto, the

applicable law, and for the reasons explained below, the Court

DENIES Petitioner’s motion.

    I.     Background

         Petitioner seeks access to three ex parte filings by

Respondents. The first filing accompanied Respondents’

Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Relief for Improper

Classification. See Notice, ECF No. 183. Respondents’ notice of

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page
number of the filed document.
filing stated that the opposition was accompanied by a

supporting Declaration of Wendy M. Hilton, and that an

additional compartmented Declaration of Wendy M. Hilton was

filed with the Court for ex parte, in camera review. Id.

Petitioner’s motion was granted in part and denied in part. See

Memorandum Order, ECF No. 273.

     The second filing accompanied Respondents’ Supplement to

Its Opposition to Petitioner’s Emergency Motion to Produce CIA

Medical Records and Allow In-Person Medical Evaluation.

Respondents’ notice of filing stated that redacted versions of

the Supplemental and accompanying declaration had been filed

with the Court Security Officers, and that the unredacted

declaration had been filed with the Court ex parte, for in

camera review. See Notice, ECF No. 186. Petitioner’s motion was

granted. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, ECF No. 549.

     The third filing accompanied Respondents’ Notice in

Connection with Respondents’ Motion for Stay of Respondents’

Filing of Response to Petitioner’s Motion. Respondents’ notice

of filing stated that it was filing a document with the Court

for ex parte, in camera review. Notice, ECF No. 208.

Respondents’ notice of filing further stated that through the

Court Security Officers, it was also filing with the Court and

serving on Petitioner’s counsel a second classified document

that describes Respondents’ ex parte, in camera submission in

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greater detail. Respondent’s motion was found as moot. See

Minute Order (Feb. 4, 2010).

  II.   Analysis

     A. The Protective Order Permits Ex Parte Submission of
        Sensitive Information for In Camera Review By the Court

  Paragraph I.F.49.b of the Protective Order in this case

specifically permits the ex parte submission of classified

information by Respondent:

          Nothing herein requires the government to
          disclose         classified       information.
          Additionally, nothing herein prohibits the
          government     from    submitting   classified
          information to the Court in camera or ex parte
          in these proceedings or entitles petitioners
          or petitioners’ counsel access to such
          submissions or information. Except for good
          cause shown in the filing, the government
          shall    provide    petitioners’  counsel   or
          petitioners with notice served on petitioners’
          counsel on the date of the filing.

Protective Order for Habeas Cases Involving Top Secret/Sensitive

Compartmented Information, ECF No. 78 ¶ I.F.49.b. Furthermore,

          A petitioner’s counsel is presumed to have a
          “need to know” all the information in the
          government’s    possession   concerning    the
          detainee or detainees whom that counsel
          represents. This presumption is overcome to
          the extent the government seeks to withhold
          from a petitioner’s counsel highly sensitive
          information or information concerning a highly
          sensitive source that the government presents
          to the Court ex parte and in camera. Except
          for good cause shown, the government must
          provide notice to petitioner’s counsel the
          same day it files such information with the
          Court ex parte.

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Id. ¶ I.D.28. 2

     Petitioner contends that Protective Order “in no way

provides that Respondents may unilaterally determine when ex

parte submissions are appropriate.” Mot. for Access, ECF No. 348

at 9. Petitioner provides no support for this assertion. And

petitioner is mistaken—the only procedure required by the

Protective Order is that Respondent provide notice of the ex

parte submission to Petitioner’s counsel or demonstrate to the

Court that there is good cause not to provide notice to

Petitioner’s counsel. See id. Here, Respondent complied with the

procedure by providing notice of each ex parte filing. See ECF

Nos. 183, 186, 208.

     B. Respondent Was Not Required to Seek Leave to File the
        Three Ex Parte Submissions 3

     Section I.F of the Case Management Order entered November

6, 2008, ECF No. 48; as amended on December 16, 2008, ECF No.

2 Petitioner points out that Petitioner’s counsel has top secret
security clearance and so the use of ex parte submissions is
unnecessary. Mot. for Access, ECF No. 348 at 13-14. This
argument ignores that the Protective Order specifically
contemplates the possibility of the need for Respondent to
submit filings ex parte.
3 Petitioner’s reliance on a footnote in Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d

1287, 1298 n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1980) to assert that Respondent is
required to demonstrate that the ex parte submissions were
“absolutely necessary” is entirely misplaced. In Allen, the
Court stated, in the Freedom of Information Act context, that
while in camera affidavits may be appropriate, they should be
employed only where “absolutely necessary” due to the inability
of the plaintiff to respond.

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62; does require Respondents to move for an ex parte exception

to disclosure when the information to be disclosed to the

Petitioner is exculpatory evidence pursuant to Section I.D. or

discovery evidence pursuant to Section I.E of the Case

Management Order. See Case Management Order, ECF Nos. 48 and 62.

Here, none of Respondents’ ex parte submissions fall within

these categories.

     Petitioner acknowledges that ex parte motions may need to

be filed in this case, see Reply, ECF No. 349 at 1; 4 acknowledges

that ex parte submissions may appropriately be used to protect

sensitive national security information, see id. at 2; but

contends that Respondent is required to seek leave of Court to

make the ex parte submissions. Mot. for Access, ECF No. 348 at

9.

     Petitioner points to Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043,

1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986) to support his position that “ex parte

proceedings are not permissible unless the government has first

shown: (1) ‘a large risk that an unjust result would eventuate

if the case proceeded without the privileged material,’ (2) a

‘proper invocation of the privilege,’ (3) a ‘demonstration of

4 Accordingly, the Court need not reach Petitioner’s passing
reference to the Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)(codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. app.). See Mot. for Access, ECF No. 348 at 11, 12.

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compelling national security concerns,’ and (4) ‘public

disclosure by the government, prior to any in camera

proceedings, of as much of the material as it could divulge.’”

Id. (quoting Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1061).

     However, Abourezk provides no support for Petitioner’s

position. First, the context in that case was that ex parte, in

camera evidence had been used by the district court to decide

the merits of a dispute:   “It is . . . the firmly held main rule

that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the

basis of ex parte, in camera submissions.” Abourezk, 785 F.2d at

1061. Petitioner does not—and cannot—claim that the ex parte

submissions at issue here relate to the ultimate merits of the

case, 5 but contends that “[a]s long as the information is

material and relevant to the Court’s decision in ruling on the

motions at issue, the adversarial process envisions Petitioner’s

involvement.” Reply, ECF No. 349 at 3. Petitioner provides no

support for this contention. And Petitioner does not explain how

this assertion is consistent with his acknowledgment that ex

parte submissions may need to be filed in this case and may

appropriately be used to protect sensitive national security

information. See Reply, ECF No. 349 at 2. Nor does he

5 Accordingly, Petitioner’s reliance on cases where the ex parte
filings were relevant to the ultimate merits of the case is
misplaced.

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acknowledge that in Abourezk, the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) noted that courts

routinely consider ex parte submissions in camera when, for

example, deciding the applicability of evidentiary privileges.

Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1061.

     Second, in Abourezk, the D.C. Circuit did not direct the

district court to disallow the use of ex parte evidence. Rather,

the D.C. Circuit directed the district court “to make certain

that plaintiffs are accorded access to the decisive evidence to

the fullest extent possible, without jeopardizing legitimately

raised national security interests.” Id. at 1060.

     Here, with regard to the first two ex parte submissions,

Petitioner was provided redacted versions of the submissions.

With regard to the third, Petitioner was provided a second

classified document that describes Respondents’ ex parte, in

camera submission in greater detail. Accordingly, any

disadvantage to Petitioner was minimized to the extent possible.

     Petitioner also points to Al Odah v. United States, 559

F.3d 539, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2009) to support his argument that “it

is incumbent on the court to make the determination of whether

ex parte submissions are appropriate”—specifically invoking the

D.C. Circuit’s statement in Al Odah that “[t]his court’s opinion

in Bismullah did not hold that the government’s submission of

classified materials to the court for in camera, ex parte review

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ends that inquiry.” Reply, ECF No. 349 at 2. The inquiry that

the D.C. Circuit refers to, however, is the district court’s

“determin[ation of] whether the classified information is

material and counsel’s access to it . . . necessary to

facilitate meaningful review, and whether no alternatives to

access would suffice to provide the detainee with the meaningful

opportunity required by Boumediene.” Al Odah, 559 F.3d at 548.

Al Odah neither requires Respondent to seek leave to file ex

parte submissions nor for the Court “to make the determination

of whether the ex parte submission is appropriate” in the

context here.

  III. Conclusion and Order

     For the reasons stated above, it is hereby

     ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Access to Respondents’

Ex Parte Filings, or in the Alternative for Respondents’ Ex

Parte Filings to be Stricken, ECF No. 348, is DENIED.

     SO ORDERED.

Signed:   Emmet G. Sullivan
          United States District Judge
          May 30, 2023

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