Court Opinion

ID: 9719867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:07:20.033524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:10.704635
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. For the reasons set forth below, I
believe the trial court abused its discretion in denying Gatlin’s motion to sever his trial from his codefendant, Sperling.
Trial courts should grant a motion to sever where there is a possibility that at a separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating testimony. (People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 312 [208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669]; People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917 [59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869].) “When faced with a motion to sever on the ground that there is a possibility that at a separate trial there may be exonerating testimony by a codefendant, there are several areas of inquiry which, to some extent, overlap: (1) Does the movant desire the testimony of the codefendant; (2) will the testimony be exculpatory; (3) how significant is the testimony; (4) is the court satisfied that the testimony itself is bona fide; (5) on the basis of the showing at the time of the motion, how strong is the likelihood that, if the motion were granted, the codefendant will testify; and (6) what is the effect *47of the granting in terms of judicial administration and economy?” (People v. Isenor (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 324, 332 [94 Cal.Rptr. 746].)
Here, the motion to sever was supported by the oifer of proof presented by Gatlin’s attorney that, if Sperling’s trial was severed, Gatlin would offer Sperling as a witness who would exculpate Gatlin. Gatlin’s attorney expressly represented she spoke with Sperling’s attorney who indicated Sperling’s willingness to testify. Sperling’s counsel did not contradict these statements. It is manifest the first two factors enunciated above are satisfied by this offer of proof.
The significance of Sperling’s testimony is also undisputed. Since Gatlin was reluctant to testify on his own behalf because of the probability he would be impeached with his prior felony convictions, Sperling’s exculpatory testimony would be crucial to Gatlin’s defense.
As to the fourth factor, the trial court expressed doubt as to the bona fides of the proposed exculpatory testimony. However, there was no indication Sperling would be willing to perjure herself merely to assist Gatlin. Indeed, since Sperling was willing to testify on Gatlin’s behalf after her trial but prior to the completion of any appeal she may prosecute, there was greater likelihood her testimony was trustworthy since she would be jeopardizing her own rights if she took the stand.
Further, although a trial court is free to reject bald assertions that someone would make an exonerating statement on the defendant’s behalf (People v. Isenor, supra, 17 Cal.App.3d at p. 333), Gatlin was prepared to support his assertion that Sperling would make exculpatory statements with the transcript from the recently discovered tape recordings. However, since the trial court refused Gatlin the crucial time necessary to transcribe the tapes and use them in support of his motion, Gatlin should not now be penalized for his failure to provide such support. Moreover, Sperling’s counsel did not contradict the representations by Gatlin’s counsel that Sperling would in fact testify favorably to Gatlin, providing additional bona fides to these representations.
The majority contends there is no evidence Sperling would be likely to testify. This is incorrect. It was uncontradicted Sperling would in fact testify following the completion of her trial. Given the apparent assent by Sperling’s counsel based upon his failure to indicate otherwise, the trial court’s conclusion that it was speculative Sperling would testify is without basis.
Finally, judicial economy would not mandate the necessity of joint trials. The parties were prepared to proceed when Gatlin first moved for sever*48anee. Had the motion been granted, Sperling’s trial could have commenced and, upon its completion, Gatlin’s trial could have begun. Since Sperling was apparently willing to testify without awaiting any appellate disposition, any severance would not have greatly prolonged disposition of this matter.
In sum, all of the factors militate towards granting the motion to sever. The court’s failure to grant the motion effectively prevented Gatlin from calling a crucial witness. Since there is a reasonable probability Gatlin would have obtained a more favorable result, I believe the judgment should be reversed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 21, 1989, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 28, 1989.