Court Opinion

ID: 9560357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:48:13.986175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:52.701889
License: Public Domain

De MUNIZ, J.,
dissenting.
In State v. Lewis, 123 Or App 476, 479-80, 860 P2d 306 (1993), we stated:
“The considerations set out in subsection (2) of the statute, including the requirement that the court ‘take into account’ the defendant’s ability to pay, merely guide the sentencing court’s discretion in determining what portion of the maximum amount of restitution should be ordered. Subsection (2) does not define a maximum restitution apart from the requirements of subsection (1). We conclude that, when a defendant has pleaded guilty, so long as the court ‘takes into account’ each of the criteria set out in subsection (2) and bases its decision on those considerations, there is no reversible error.”
*494For some reason, the majority now concludes that the court’s comments that defendant should not escape restitution simply because he “decided to commit tons of crimes” reflects the court’s “philosophical disagreement with the legislature’s decision that defendant’s ability to pay is to be ‘taken into account’ ” and reveals that the court did not “consider defendant’s ability to pay in determining the amount of restitution.” 124 Or App at 493. I read the record differently.
In my view, the court simply revealed that it did not feel that defendant’s incarceration and limited work experience should shield defendant from paying for his crimes to the full extent of the law. The court considered defendant’s limited ability to pay and, nevertheless, imposed the full measure of restitution. Nothing more was required. We should follow Lewis and affirm.
I dissent.