Court Opinion

ID: 9396657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 15:04:45.952634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.660260
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                       Docket No. 49778

 STATE OF IDAHO,                                )
                                                )    Filed: May 23, 2023
        Plaintiff-Respondent,                   )
                                                )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 v.                                             )
                                                )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
 JOHN ETHAN DARCY, aka JOHN                     )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
 ETHAN D’ARCY,                                  )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
                                                )
        Defendant-Appellant.                    )
                                                )

       Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
       County. Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder, District Judge. Hon. David D. Manweiler,
       Magistrate.

       Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court,
       affirming judgment of conviction for battery, affirmed.

       Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
       Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

       Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
       General, Boise, for respondent.
                 ________________________________________________

LORELLO, Chief Judge
       John Ethan Darcy, aka John Ethan D’Arcy, appeals from a decision of the district court, on
intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming his judgment of conviction for battery.
We affirm.
                                                I.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       An officer working as a detention deputy at the county jail was conducting a morning
headcount of the inmates. During the count, inmates are required to stand up, look at the officer,
and say their name. Upon reaching the victim’s dorm, the officer noticed that the victim had black

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eyes, bruising under his eyes, and discoloration on his forehead and the bridge of his nose. The
officer asked the victim how he obtained the injuries, and he told the officer what happened. The
officer asked another officer to access the video surveillance footage of the victim’s dorm. After
reviewing the video, the officer identified Darcy as the aggressor. The officer, along with two
other officers, approached Darcy, who was laying in his bunk. Darcy immediately stood up and
put his hands behind his back before the officers said anything. The officer observed that the
knuckles of Darcy’s left hand were red and swollen.
       The State charged Darcy with misdemeanor battery. I.C. § 18-903. During the subsequent
jury trial, the officer testified as to the injuries he observed on the victim during the headcount and
testified that the footage from the surveillance video showed Darcy was the aggressor. The
surveillance video showed that Darcy got out of his bunk, went to the victim’s bunk, pushed, or
punched the victim before walking away, and then returned and punched the victim several more
times. The victim was seated in his bunk during the entirety of the altercation and does not appear
to move or fight back. The victim did not testify at Darcy’s trial. After the State rested, Darcy
moved for a judgment of acquittal under I.C.R. 29, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence that Darcy’s conduct was unlawful or against the will of the victim. The magistrate court
denied the motion. Darcy then testified and admitted that he initiated the contact and returned to
the victim’s bunk to punch him after the victim called Darcy a “bitch.” Darcy also testified that
the victim did not hit back. The jury found Darcy guilty of misdemeanor battery. Darcy appealed,
and the district court affirmed on intermediate appeal. Darcy again appeals.
                                                  II.
                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
       For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the
magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate court’s
conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480,
482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm
or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955,
958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court’s findings and conclusions, whether

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the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefor, and either affirm
or reverse the district court.
        In reviewing the denial of an I.C.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, the appellate court
must independently consider the evidence in the record and determine whether a reasonable mind
could conclude that the defendant’s guilt as to such material evidence of the offense was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Clark, 161 Idaho 372, 374, 386 P.3d 895, 897 (2016). On
review, the court does not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, the evidence is
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383,
385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001.
                                                 III.
                                            ANALYSIS
        “Mindful of the trial evidence and the fact that trial counsel never requested, and the jury
was not given, an instruction on the common law defense of consent,” Darcy challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s guilty verdict on this basis, arguing that the
district court erred in affirming the magistrate court’s denial of his motion for judgment of
acquittal. Darcy contends that the State failed to carry its burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt the elements of a battery charge, specifically asserting that there was no evidence to
demonstrate the striking was either unlawful or against the will of the victim. The State responds
that the magistrate court and the district court properly concluded there was sufficient evidence to
sustain the jury’s guilty verdict. We hold that Darcy has failed to show error.
        After the State rested its case-in-chief, Darcy moved for a judgment of acquittal under
I.C.R. 29 as to the battery charge. The magistrate court denied Darcy’s I.C.R. 29 motion,
reasoning:
        [W]hether an act is unlawful is based upon the law and the facts and it’s clear from this
        Court’s review of the evidence that there was a physical altercation that took place. It did
        not seem to be physically provoked by [the victim], but whether it was verbally provoked
        or consented to or whether there was threats against [Darcy] is unclear because there’s no
        audio and [the victim’s] not here to testify.

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               I think there’s enough in the record to get to the jury at this time. Obviously the
       Court would have preferred to have [the victim] here and heard his testimony. That’s up
       to the State whether they want to present that proof or not. But based on the photographs,
       the head count, which is daily twice a day. and the testimony of the witnesses, I think
       there’s a sufficient nexus that’s been established by the State in this case. The injuries that
       are visible in State’s 2 and 3 were attributed to the altercation that occurred on September
       23rd, and that [Darcy] was responsible for those injuries.
The jury found Darcy guilty. On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed the magistrate
court’s decision denying Darcy’s I.C.R. 29 motion. We agree with the district court that the State
presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Darcy was guilty of battery.
       Idaho Code Section 18-903 provides that a person commits battery when there is:
(a) willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another; or (b) actual,
intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person against the will of the other; or
(c) unlawful and intentional bodily harm to an individual. The State argued to the jury that Darcy
violated I.C. § 18-903 when he pushed or punched the victim, walked away, and then returned and
punched the victim several times. To establish this, the State presented the testimony of an officer
who stated that during the morning headcount he noticed that the victim had black eyes and
bruising on his forehead and nose. The officer testified that he reviewed the surveillance footage
from the day before and identified Darcy as the aggressor. The State introduced the surveillance
footage which showed that Darcy got out of his bunk and went to the victim’s bunk where he was
sitting down, and pushed or punched the victim, walked away, and then returned to punch the
victim several more times. The officer further testified that he and other officers approached Darcy
after they reviewed the footage and that Darcy stood up, put his hands behind his back, and had a
red and slightly swollen left hand. The State also admitted into evidence a photo of the victim’s
face and nose and a photo of Darcy’s hands.
       Darcy testified at trial in his own defense. He stated that about ten to fifteen minutes before
the altercation depicted in the surveillance footage occurred, the victim came to Darcy’s bunk and
verbally threatened him. Darcy also stated that the victim taunted Darcy and that he felt threatened.
He said he initially pushed the victim and walked away until the victim called him a “bitch.” In
response, Darcy stated that he returned to the victim’s bunk and punched him about ten times in

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order to “accomplish what needed to be accomplished.” Darcy testified that the victim was sitting
in his bunk when this occurred, and that the victim did not move or strike Darcy back.
       On appeal, Darcy argues there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that his touching of
the victim was either unlawful or against the will of the victim because there is no evidence that
the victim did not consent to the contact. However, as Darcy concedes, he “never requested, and
the jury was never given, an instruction on the common law defense of consent.” Moreover, Darcy
had the burden of production in raising a prima facie defense of consent. See State v. Kelly, 158
Idaho 862, 867, 353 P.3d 1096, 1101 (Ct. App. 2015); State v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 666 n.2, 8
P.3d 657, 661 n.2 (Ct. App. 2000). Darcy presented no such evidence. Darcy’s now-claimed
defense of consent does not demonstrate the evidence of battery was insufficient.
         The video surveillance footage, the testimony of the officer, the photos of the victim’s
injuries, and Darcy’s own testimony are sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find that
Darcy committed the act of battery. By Darcy’s own admission, he pushed the victim, walked
away, and then returned to repeatedly punch the victim in the face after he called Darcy a “bitch.”
Darcy also admitted that the victim did not hit back, nor were there injuries on the victim indicating
that he hit Darcy at any point. In other words, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that
Darcy was defending himself. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of battery were met beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, Darcy’s challenge to the district court’s decision affirming the magistrate court’s
denial of Darcy’s I.C.R. 29 motion fails.
                                                  IV.
                                          CONCLUSION
       There was sufficient evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of battery. Thus, Darcy has
failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court’s denial of his I.C.R. 29
motion. Accordingly, the decision of the district court, affirming Darcy’s judgment of conviction
for misdemeanor battery is affirmed.
       Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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