Court Opinion

ID: 9859170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:01:55.462347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:08.369537
License: Public Domain

Thomas Gallagher, Justice
(dissenting).
The trial resulted in a directed verdict for defendants based upon the ground that the failure of decedent to observe statutory regulations prescribed for the operation of vehicles on the highway conclusively established his contributory negligence barring recovery.
In directing a verdict for defendants, the trial court stated:
“* * * the evidence is conclusive in this case in the first place that this hoy failed to stop when approaching this trunk highway, and our Supreme Court has held that the word ‘approaching’ in that statute means ‘in proximity to or within the limit of danger.’ * * * this accident, from all the evidence, took place on the west side — west half of this trunk highway, a place where the hoy had no right to he. * * * Now in view of those things it appears conclusively to the court that it would be error if we submitted this case to the jury, that it is a clear case of contributory negligence on the part of the boy * * *. The presumption that the boy exercised due care * * * has been clearly overcome. There is an*300other provision which requires stopping but this particular statute requires yielding the right of way.” (Italics supplied.)
Shortly after the accident, at the coroner’s inquest, defendant driver testified that when he first saw that decedent couldn’t make the right turn, he (defendant driver) first tried to “straddle” between the two boys by turning to the left to let decedent get across; that when he saw he could not do this, he then “swung to the right.” At the trial, he testified that his only turn was to the right.
Because of his inability to make a right turn or to bring his bicycle to a stop, and perhaps because of his confusion resulting from defendant driver’s turns, as above described, decedent traveled over to the west side of the highway in an attempt to pass in front of the truck. Fafrowicz testified that the truck was some 30 to 40 feet from the Hoffert driveway when he first observed the boys; that at the time they were just entering highway No. 65, with the decedent about 10 feet behind the Anderson boy; and that decedent was dragging his feet in an effort to stop his bicycle. .There was nothing to obstruct defendant driver’s view as he came down highway No. 65, and both boys must have been clearly within his sight. The point of contact was approximately 15 feet north of the north line of the Hoffert driveway. The truck came to a stop about 145 feet south of this point.
There was no stop sign at the point where the private driveway from the Hoffert residence enters highway No. 65. Consequently, there was no statutory duty on decedent to stop before entering it by virtue of § 169.20, subd. 3, which relates to entry onto through highways. See, § 169.01, subd. 35.
It may be conceded that decedent violated statutory traffic regulations, § 169.20, subd. 4, which requires the driver of a vehicle entering a highway from a private road to yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on such highway; and § 169.18, subd. 1, which requires drivers to keep to the right of the center line of highways. The question then arises, did such violations constitute contributory negligence proximately contributing to the ac*301cident sufficient to bar plaintiffs’ recovery as a matter of law ? If not, tbe court’s direction of a verdict on this issue constituted error requiring reversal, unless the record discloses evidence of contributory negligence as a matter of law under common-law principles.
By virtue of § 169.96, violation of the foregoing statute does not constitute negligence per se, but is only prima facie evidence of negligence. As stated in Demmer v. Grunke, 230 Minn. 188, 42 N. W. (2d) 1, 3:
“A statutory violation constituting prima facie evidence of negligence prevails as a controlling evidentiary factor against the violator only so long as there is an absence of evidence tending to show a reasonable ground for such violation or only so long as there is no actual evidence to justify a reasonable assumption that such violation was not negligent under the circumstances and would therefore not reasonably endanger himself or any other person entitled to the protection of the act.
“The burden of producing such evidence of justification is upon the violator, but the moment such evidence appears from any quarter whatever the prima facie case against the violator not only ceases thenceforth to have any validity, but wholly vanishes from the litigation as an evidentiary factor, and thereupon the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the opposing litigant.”
There is evidence here that decedent may have been confronted with a sudden emergency caused by the actions of defendant driver, as admitted by his own testimony in turning first to the left to attempt to “straddle” between the two boys, and, finding this impossible, immediately thereafter turning to the right. A jury might reasonably conclude from such testimony, which is set forth in detail in the majority opinion, that decedent’s attempt to go to the west side of the highway in front of the truck was based upon his belief that this was the only way he could save himself from disaster, and that such factors constituted justification for his statutory violations. As stated in the Demmer case, “the moment such evidence appears from any quarter whatever the prima facie case *302against the violator * * * wholly vanishes from the litigation as an evidentiary factor, and thereupon the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the opposing litigant.” I do not see how we can ignore this principle so recently enunciated, in the light of the above facts. I feel that the court should have submitted to the jury the question of decedent’s contributory negligence under instructions that he was required to exercise only the degree of care which might reasonably be expected of a person of his age, intelligence, and experience, and if it found justification for his statutory violations under the doctrine expressed in the Demmer case that this issue be resolved in plaintiffs’ favor.
The reasoning applied to the acts of decedent with reference to his statutory violations may be applied with equal force to any claim of contributory negligence under common-law principles. We have repeatedly held, in similar cases involving minors of decedent’s age, that this issue should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions as to the consideration to be given to the age, intelligence, and experience of the child involved. Eckhardt v. Hanson, 196 Minn. 270, 264 N. W. 776, 107 A. L. R. 1; Carlson v. Sanitary Farm Dairies, Inc. 200 Minn. 177, 273 N. W. 665; McCarthy v. City of St. Paul, 201 Minn. 276, 276 N. W. 1; Middaugh v. Waseca Canning Co. 203 Minn. 456, 281 N. W. 818; Turenne v. Smith, 215 Minn. 64, 9 N. W. (2d) 409.
For the reasons outlined, I am unable to concur in the majority opinion.
Frank T. Gallagher, Justice (dissenting).
I concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice Thomas Gallagher.
Mr; Justice Theodore Christianson, not having been a member of the court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.