Court Opinion

ID: 9790790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:59:34.290307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.652323
License: Public Domain

Judge DUBOFSKY
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that intoxication was an affirmative defense to the charge of universal malice/extreme indifference murder.
Universal malice/extreme indifference murder is one of several forms of murder included in our first degree murder statute. See § 18-3-102(1), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B). Since the consequences for committing first degree murder are greater than those for second degree murder, the mens rea and/or actions which justify a conviction in the former category must be different and greater than that mens rea and actions which fall into the latter category. See People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo.1988). Furthermore, a defendant’s mens rea and the criminality of his actions in committing universal malice/extreme indifference should be roughly equivalent to other first degree murder offenses. See People v. Jefferson, supra.
Historically, homicides resulting from universal malice/extreme indifference were considered part of the “malice aforethought” first degree murder crimes. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 36 (2d ed. 1969); Gautney v. State, 284 Ala. 82, 222 So.2d 175 (1969).
Universal malice/extreme indifference homicide may involve such a wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable risk to human life as to constitute malice aforethought. R. Perkins, Criminal Law, supra; Brewer v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. 9, 143 S.W.2d 599 (1940).
*779A mental state constituting malice aforethought does not presuppose or require any ill will or hatred of the particular victim. People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911 (1966). Thus, a person who acts with wanton disregard for human life and in such a way as to create a situation in which there is a high degree of probability that a death will result, acts with malice aforethought. People v. Love, 168 Cal.Rptr. 407, 111 Cal.App.3d 98 (1980).
In Colorado, the previous homicide statutes were phrased in terms of malice aforethought. Murder in the first degree resulted from deliberate and premeditated killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Murder in the second degree consisted of an unlawful killing with implied malice aforethought but without premeditation and deliberation. Walker v. People, 175 Colo. 173, 489 P.2d 584 (1971).
These concepts in the earlier homicide statutes were carried forward in our present statutes but without the malice aforethought terminology. For example, our present first degree murder with deliberation statute equates to Colorado’s prior murder with both malice aforethought and deliberation, and our second degree murder statute roughly equates to the prior malice aforethought without deliberation statute. See §§ 18-3-102(1) and 18-3-103(l)(a), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B); Colo.Sess.Laws 1971, ch. 121, § 40-3-102 at 418; Colo.Sess. Laws 1971, ch. 121, § 4-3-103 at 418.
The decision to place universal malice/extreme indifference homicide in the first degree murder statute along with homicide after deliberation and specific intent demonstrates the General Assembly’s intention to equate the elements involved in these two offenses. See People v. Conley, supra.
The premeditation or deliberation requirement of first degree murder does not require a “plan” or protracted consideration of the killing by the defendant. Instead, it requires only the time necessary for one thought to follow another. Hinton v. People, 169 Colo. 545, 458 P.2d 611 (1969); Hammil v. People, 145 Colo. 577, 361 P.2d 117 (1961).
In my view, the extreme indifference first degree murder statute requires more premeditation and wrongful intent than the “knowingly” mens rea found in our second degree murder statute. See People v. Jefferson, supra. Universal malice requires a malevolent or vicious outlook which by implication requires forethought or deliberation that is very similar to the mens rea deliberation and specific intent requirement of § 18-3-102(l)(a), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B).
Several jurisdictions have held that malice aforethought is an inherent part of their extreme indifference murder statutes. People v. Love, supra; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 461 Pa. 557, 337 A.2d 545 (1975); Gautney v. State, supra.
In People v. Jefferson, supra, the majority recognized the premeditation aspect of universal malice when it referred to such murder as cold-blooded. Here, the jury was instructed that cold-bloodedness was an aspect of universal malice/extreme indifference homicide.
The term “cold-blooded” is used to designate a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. Skeggs v. State, 24 Ala.App. 307, 135 So. 431 (1931); State v. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13 (1877). The expression “in cold blood” designates a homicide in which there are no circumstances in mitigation or in justification which excuse the killing. See State v. Robison, 54 Nev. 56, 6 P.2d 433 (1931). The cold-blooded aspect of universal malice/extreme indifference murder brings it in line with the deliberation/specific intent requirements of § 18 — 3— 102(l)(a). The cold-bloodedness element makes this offense akin to a specific intent crime to which intoxication is available as a defense.
Furthermore, the General Assembly in § 18-3-103, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B) specifically stated that self-induced intoxication is not a defense to murder in the second degree. It has not negated the availability of that defense to first degree murder and probably intended that it be available as a defense to universal malice/extreme indifference murder.
*780Accordingly, I believe self-induced intoxication can negate the mens rea required for universal malice/extreme indifference murder, and thus, the absence of a jury instruction to that effect here requires reversal.