Court Opinion

ID: 9567066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:48:02.902137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:57.495350
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree that the conviction for possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime must be reversed. No matter how one-sided the evidence is against a criminal defendant, the court cannot direct a verdict of guilty, which is essentially what it did here.
I cannot agree with the majority’s decision in Division 3, however, as I do not think this due process issue can or should be decided in the context of this appeal. Because defendant may be retried on the weapons offense, there is at least a possibility — a possibility not present in Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 249 (7) (319 SE2d 484) (1984) — that defendant may have been prejudiced by the two-year delay in his appeal. And it is unrealistic and impractical to expect a defendant to show prejudice from a delay in the appeal in the course of that appeal itself, since no one will be able to evaluate the prejudice until they know the outcome of the appeal. For this reason, I believe the question of whether a delay in the appellate process violated the defendant’s due process rights should not be raised or addressed as an issue in the course of the allegedly delayed appeal, but should instead be raised in the lower court before any retrial.
In Graham, we agreed with other jurisdictions that “a defendant may be denied due process of law where there is an inordinate delay in the appellate process, including an excessive delay in the furnishing of a trial transcript necessary for completion of an appellate record.” 171 Ga. App. at 250. We adopted an analytical approach similar to that utilized in cases involving speedy trial violations: whether a delay in the appellate process violates due process depends on (1) the length of the delay, (2) the cause of the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. In Graham, the delay was a year, the trial was very lengthy, the court reporter had relocated to another state, and the defendant acknowledged he had not called the delay to the attention of the trial court. Moreover, as none of the defendant’s other enumerations of error were meritorious, there was no question of retrial. Under these circumstances, we could conclude there was no prejudice and no violation of due process as a matter of law. Id. at 251.
Here, we know that the delay was an unacceptably excessive two *297years.1 The cause of the delay is not reflected in the record, though it is obvious that the trial was neither lengthy nor complex. And it appears from the briefs (though it cannot be ascertained from the record) that defendant repeatedly brought the delay to the trial court’s attention and asked it to expedite the process. Like prejudice, these factors can best be explored in the context of an evidentiary hearing below.
Decided October 23, 1996
Lawrence D. Gatehouse, for appellant.
Daniel J. Craig, District Attorney, Charles R. Sheppard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
In Graham and Proffitt v. State, 181 Ga. App. 564, 566 (3) (353 SE2d 61) (1987), the defendants’ convictions were fully affirmed, so we could conclude that there was no prejudice and no violation of due process as a matter of law. But where, as here, the defendant’s conviction is partially or fully reversed and the defendant may be retried, we should refrain from deciding the due process issue and allow the trial court to address it first. If the trial court finds a due process violation, retrial of defendant on the weapons charge should be precluded; if it does not, retrial can proceed. And if the State chooses not to retry defendant, there will have been no prejudice and thus no violation of due process. See Proffitt, 181 Ga. App. at 566-567; Graham, 171 Ga. App. at 250.

 Under OCGA § 5-6-43 (c), this Court has the duty to expedite disposition of criminal cases where the defendant is confined in jail. And to the extent they do not already do so, trial courts giving their court reporters directions should prioritize transcripts in such cases accordingly.
The defendant/appellant has the responsibility to call the delay to the attention of the trial court, as is reflected in the third factor in the analysis set forth in Graham,-, but only the trial court has the power to ensure the court reporter completes the transcript.