Court Opinion

ID: 9797498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:22:17.056496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:56:25.498717
License: Public Domain

MORENO, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting. — I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that holds that the statute of limitations is satisfied by the filing of a “John Doe” arrest warrant that identifies the suspect by only a DNA profile. As explained below, the original arrest warrant filed in this case was not a true warrant because it did not actually authorize the arrest of anyone; it was a clever artifice intended solely to satisfy the statute of limitations until the identity of the perpetrator could be discovered. When this occurred, through a “cold hit” match of defendant’s DNA, the arrest warrant was amended to reflect defendant’s name and only then, after the statute of limitations had expired, did the warrant become effective and permit defendant to be arrested.
On August 25, 1994, Deborah L. was raped in her home by an unknown assailant. It was dark and the victim could provide only a general description of her attacker as a male of Hispanic or African-American descent with a “medium black complexion,” appearing to be in his twenties, approximately 5’7” tall, weighing about 180 pounds, with brown eyes. A semen sample was recovered from her vagina when she was treated for her injuries shortly after the crime. Sacramento Police Detective Peter Willover was assigned as the lead investigator, but the file lay on his desk, unsolved, for nearly six years.
In 2000, Detective Willover was aware that the statute of limitations would soon expire1 and spoke to the prosecutor about “the possibility of doing some DNA work on cases that were about to expire in statute of limitations.” Detective Willover had requested that the semen sample be analyzed for DNA in 1994, but he did not know if such an analysis had been conducted. Because advances had been made in DNA technology, he again requested that the sample be tested.
*1144On August 21, 2000, four days before the statute of limitations was to expire, a felony complaint was filed charging “JOHN DOE unknown male with Short Tandem Repeat (STR) Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Profile at the following Genetic Locations, using the COfiler and Profiler Plus Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) amplification kits: D3S1358 (15, 15), D16S539 (9, 10), THO1 (7, 7), TPOX (6, 9), CSF1PO (10, 11), D7S820 (8, 11), vWa (18, 19), FGA (22, 24), D8S1179 (12, 15), D21S11 (28, 28), D18S51 (20, 20), D5S818 (8, 13), D13S317 (10, 11)” with rape and four related sexual offenses against the victim on August 25, 1994.
On August 22, 2000, Detective Willover executed a declaration in support of an arrest warrant for John Doe stating that “DNA was extracted from the sperm fraction obtained and this DNA was typed at 13 genetic locations.” The declaration recited the above quoted DNA profile that was included in the complaint. An arrest warrant was issued that day for “JOHN DOE,” describing him only as a Black male. A related document stated, under the designation “REMARKS”: “SUSPECT IDENTIFIABLE BY GENETIC PROFILE IN SACRAMENTO POLICE DEPARTMENT REPORT [94-J70626. CONTACT SPD DET. PETE WILLOVER [telephone number] OR SACRAMENTO DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S ADULT SEXUAL ASSAULT UNIT [telephone number].”
On September 15, 2000, an analysis of defendant’s DNA resulted in a “cold hit” match with the DNA profile obtained from the semen recovered from the victim in this case. On September 18, 2000, more than six years after the victim was sexually assaulted, the complaint and the arrest warrant were amended to replace the “John Doe” designation and DNA profile with the name of defendant, Paul Robinson, and defendant was arrested.
On November 20, 2000, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired before the amended complaint was filed. At a subsequent hearing, the district attorney who prepared the original complaint and arrest warrant testified that the suspect’s DNA profile had not been entered on the face of the arrest warrant because “the way the computer system is set up, it will not take that many characters in identifying information.” She agreed that a peace officer would not have had enough information to make an arrest based upon the arrest warrant alone without contacting her or Detective Willover.
A clerk in the warrants section of the Sacramento Police Department testified that standard procedure includes entering a felony arrest warrant in either the “California wanted persons or NCIC, which is nationwide want[ed] persons system,” but it is not possible to do so without certain “mandatory information,” which includes “the name, sex, date of birth, [and] height.” *1145Neither warrant system permits entry of a DNA profile. Accordingly, the arrest warrant in the present case had not been entered into either the statewide or national system because there were “not enough criteria for entry.” The clerk explained: “There would be really nothing for us to do. There is not enough information here to go forward with any of the record checks.”
Standard procedure also includes assigning a peace officer to execute the warrant. The warrant in the present case had not been assigned to an officer because “[t]here was not enough information to assign it to anybody . . . .” When asked whether she would have assigned the arrest warrant to an officer to execute if a DNA profile had appeared on the face of the warrant, the clerk replied she would not, because “I know nothing about DNA.”
Detective Willover acknowledged that the original arrest warrant did not authorize the arrest of any individual, stating: “I would not, as a peace officer, arrest somebody just on the face of this” because the arrest warrant “doesn’t identify the individual named in the warrant.” If an officer had telephoned him, as called for in the “Remarks” section of the document accompanying the warrant, Detective Willover testified he “would explain to the officer it is a warrant in the name of John Doe due to the fact we don’t know who the individual is, and I would explain to the officer that most likely we have not had a DNA hit yet and there is nobody to arrest.” It was not until September 15, 2000, when he received word from the crime lab that defendant’s DNA had been matched to the semen sample, that there was sufficient information to arrest anyone based upon the arrest warrant.
The detective admitted that the only reason to issue the arrest warrant was to prevent the statute of limitations from expiring:
“Q. Detective, you testified you knew you could not execute the warrant until after a match; is that correct?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Why is that?
“A. I didn’t know who the person was.
“Q. So why did you get the warrant? [f] . . . [f]
“[A.] I was aware that once a warrant is issued on the case, a statute of limitations would not expire as long as you showed due diligence. In my mind, I was hoping to be able to identify and prosecute the person who committed these crimes.”
*1146In my view, the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss because the prosecution of defendant was not commenced until after the statute of limitations had expired. The arrest warrant that was issued a few days before the statute of limitations expired was not a true arrest warrant; it was a mere placeholder, because it did not authorize the arrest of any individual. It was not until the warrant was amended to replace the name John Doe and the reference to the DNA profile with defendant’s name that the warrant became effective and the prosecution commenced; but this was too late, because the statute of limitations had already expired.
I do not impugn the motives of Detective Willover or the prosecutor. They made an inventive attempt to continue investigating a serious crime. But permitting this attempt to succeed creates a large loophole in the statute of limitations that the Legislature did not intend.
Statutes of limitation are not required by either the state or federal Constitutions, and “[tjhere is no statute of limitations for murder, embezzlement of public funds, and certain other offenses punishable by life imprisonment. [Citation.]” (People v. Frazer (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737, 743 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312, 982 P.2d 180]; see id. at pp. 769-770.) The interests of the state protected by statutes of limitation “include both societal repose and the protection of individuals whose means of defense might be impaired by the passage of time. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 770.) Statutes of limitation “encourage the swift and effective enforcement of the law, hopefully producing a stronger deterrent effect.” (People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 547 [134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75].) “[A]doption of a period of limitation represents a legislative recognition that for all but the most serious of offenses (such as murder or kidnapping) a never-ending threat of prosecution is more detrimental to the functioning of a civilized society than it is beneficial. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“California’s criminal statutes of limitation were first enacted in 1851 and codified in 1872.” (People v. Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 743.) In 1981, the Legislature directed the California Law Revision Commission (sometimes hereafter Commission) to study the statutes of limitations and make recommendations. (Stats. 1981, ch. 909, § 3, p. 3443.) As a result, “[t]he entire scheme . . . was overhauled in 1984. [Citation.]” (21 Cal.4th at p. 743; see Stats. 1984, ch. 1270, § 2, p. 4335.)
The Law Revision Commission began its recommendations by examining the functions of statutes of limitations in felony prosecutions: “The preeminent function of a felony limitations statute is to protect a person accused of crime both from having to face charges based on evidence that may be unreliable and from losing access to the evidentiary means to defend against *1147the accusation. . . . [W]ith the passage of time, memory becomes less reliable, witnesses die or become otherwise unavailable, and physical evidence becomes more difficult to obtain . . . .” (Recommendation Relating to Statutes of Limitation for Felonies (Jan. 1984) 17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1984) p. 308 (hereafter Recommendation).)
The Law Revision Commission carefully explained why it recommended that certain acts should be deemed to commence prosecution sufficient to satisfy the statute of limitations: “The statute should be satisfied when the accused is informed of the decision to prosecute and the general nature of the charge with sufficient promptness to allow the accused to prepare a defense before evidence of his or her innocence becomes weakened with age. Actions that satisfy this general standard should amount to commencement of prosecution for the purpose of the statute of limitations.” (Recommendation, supra, at p. 316.) The Commission concluded that the “finding of an indictment, the filing of an information, and the certification of a case to the superior court are all acts that commence prosecution,” stating: “Each of these events marks a formal decision by the prosecution as to the general nature of the charge and the identity of the accused, and will ordinarily come to the attention of the accused.” (Ibid., italics added.)
The Commission’s reason for adding the filing of an arrest warrant to the list of actions that commence a prosecution and satisfy the statute of limitations stemmed, in part, from its recommendation that the statute of limitations no longer be tolled while the suspect is absent from the jurisdiction. The Commission recommended that instead of tolling the statute of limitations while the suspect is absent from the jurisdiction, “the statute of limitations can be satisfied by issuing a warrant for arrest of the person.” (Recommendation, supra, at p. 315.) But issuing an arrest warrant would satisfy the statute of limitations only if “the warrant specifies the name of the defendant or identifies and describes the defendant with sufficient particularity. Otherwise there is the possibility that a ‘Doe’ warrant would satisfy the statute without ever reasonably informing a person that he or she is being prosecuted.” (Id. at p. 316, italics added.)
The Law Revision Commission recommended that Penal Code section 804, subdivision (d)2 be added to provide that “prosecution for an offense is commenced when ...[][]... [][] (d) An arrest warrant is issued, provided the warrant names or describes the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint.” (Recommendation, supra, at p. 322.) The Commission added a comment explaining that the warrant must “specify the name of the defendant or describe the defendant *1148with particularity” because “[issuance of a ‘Doe’ warrant does not reasonably inform a person that he or she is being prosecuted and therefore does not satisfy the statute of limitations.” (Ibid.) The Legislature enacted section 804 exactly as the Commission proposed, except for adding the words “or bench warrant” to subdivision (d). (Stats. 1984, ch. 1270, § 2, pp. 4335, 4336.)
“Because the official comments of the California Law Revision Commission ‘are declarative of the intent not only of the draftsman of the code but also of the legislators who subsequently enacted it’ [citation], the comments are persuasive, albeit not conclusive, evidence of that intent [citation].” (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 148 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 341, 65 P.3d 807].) Nothing in the legislative history of section 804, subdivision (d), runs counter to the above quoted comment. Nothing in that history suggests that the Legislature intended that the filing of a “John Doe” arrest warrant that refers to a DNA profile would satisfy the statute of limitations. Rather, it is abundantly clear that such a warrant is deficient for statute of limitations purposes, because it “does not reasonably inform a person that he or she is being prosecuted and therefore does not satisfy the statute of limitations.” (Recommendation, supra, at p. 322.)
The majority reasons that the arrest warrant was sufficient because the reference to a DNA profile prevented the warrant from being a “general warrant, upon which any other person might as well have been arrested.” (West v. Cabell (1894) 153 U.S. 78, 86 [38 L.Ed. 643, 14 S.Ct. 752].) I agree that this was not a general warrant. The flaw here is not that the warrant authorized the arrest of too many people, but that it authorized the arrest of no one at all.
The majority acknowledges that the statute of limitations would not be satisfied by “initiating a shell action against nobody in particular.” (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 1137, fn. 30.) It is true that the DNA warrant in this case was aimed at one particular suspect, but it still was a shell action, because the prosecution did not yet know the identity of that suspect. In fact, the prosecution likely would never had been able to identify the suspect had he not been arrested for a new crime and been forced to provide a blood sample. The investigating officer candidly admitted that the warrant was not intended to authorize the arrest of anyone until a match had been found for the DNA sample. The Attorney General states that “until a match was made, the warrant could not be executed.” When that happened, the warrant was amended to reflect defendant’s name and then, and only then, was it transformed from a shell action into a true warrant that could authorize the arrest of a person.
The majority concludes that the DNA arrest warrant satisfied section 804, which requires that the warrant “describe” the defendant with particularity. I *1149disagree. The original arrest warrant in the present case did not describe the defendant at all, because it gave no means for a peace officer attempting to execute the warrant to recognize the defendant and make an arrest. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “describe” as follows: “To set forth in words, written or spoken, by reference to qualities, recognizable features, or characteristic marks; to give a detailed or graphic account of. (The ordinary current sense.)” (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 511, col. 3.) A DNA profile does not consist of words and does not refer “to qualities, recognizable features, or characteristic marks.” A DNA profile can be used to identify a person, in the same sense that a valid Social Security number can identify an individual, but neither a Social Security number nor a DNA profile “describes” that person.
Unlike a detailed physical description, a DNA profile neither describes the suspect in the conventional sense that would permit an arresting officer to recognize and arrest the suspect, nor identifies a particular person. At most, a DNA profile is information that can be used to identify a suspect once a DNA match is made, but it is not a substitute for the detailed physical description required in a “John Doe” warrant.
The rule the majority creates does not result in an injustice in this particular case. To the contrary, defendant is guilty of heinous crimes and deserves the punishment he will receive. But the effect of the majority’s rule is not limited to this case. It will permit this type of sham arrest warrant to be used to circumvent the statute of limitations in any criminal prosecution in California in which biological evidence is left at the crime scene from which DNA can be extracted. Our ruling is not limited to situations like the present case in which DNA is extracted from semen recovered from a rape victim. It would apply equally if a human hair is found at the crime scene from which DNA can be extracted, or if the suspect left blood at the scene. And it is not limited to cases involving a sexual assault. Thus, the prosecution can effectively circumvent the statute of limitations in any case in which the police happen to find DNA evidence linking a suspect to the crime. In those cases, an arrest warrant identifying the suspect only by his or her DNA profile can be filed and the statute of limitations will not bar the case from being prosecuted whenever a match is made — whether that be a matter of months, years, or decades.
The majority opinion will have the unfortunate effect of usurping the Legislature’s reasoned and measured treatment of the statute of limitations in cases involving DNA evidence. After the statute of limitations had expired in this case, the Legislature enacted subdivision (g)(1) of section 803, which establishes a special one-year statute of limitations for certain sexual offenses, including rape, that runs from “the date on which the identity of the suspect *1150is conclusively established by DNA testing.”3 The Legislature carefully limited the scope of section 803, subdivision (g)(1). It is limited to those sexual offenses for which a conviction would result in lifetime sexual offender registration under section 290. The DNA evidence must be analyzed “no later than two years from the date of the offense.” (§ 803, subd. (g)(1)(B).) And the criminal complaint must be filed within one year from when the identity of the suspect is established. None of these limitations apply to the majority’s holding. A DNA arrest warrant may be filed for any criminal offense. The DNA evidence may be analyzed at any time before the ordinary statute of limitations for the offense has run. And because the filing of the DNA arrest warrant satisfies the statute of limitations, if the DNA profile later is matched to a suspect’s DNA, there is no further statute of limitations governing when the prosecution must amend the arrest warrant and arrest the suspect and file a criminal complaint.
The majority’s holding will thus abrogate the careful limitations crafted by the Legislature. The prosecution can use DNA arrest warrants to satisfy the statute of limitations for crimes expressly excluded from the scope of section 803, subdivision (g)(1). For sexual crimes covered by section 803, subdivision (g)(1), if the prosecution fails to analyze the DNA evidence within two years from the date of the offense, the majority’s holding would still permit the prosecution to analyze the evidence and file a DNA arrest warrant at any time before the ordinary statute of limitations for the offense expires. And if the prosecution has satisfied the statute of limitations by filing a DNA arrest warrant, the limitation imposed by section 803, subdivision (g)(1) that a criminal complaint must be “filed within one year of the date on which the identity of the suspect is conclusively established by DNA testing” does not apply.
Our resolve as a court is tested when we are called upon to release a guilty person in order to defend a principle. This defendant certainly committed heinous crimes against an innocent victim, but it is our duty to apply the laws enacted by the Legislature evenly and rationally, even if that means letting a guilty person go free. “[T]he potential that a guilty person will avoid just punishment is inherent in all statutes of limitations. Society has assumed this loss in exchange for other considerations.” (People v. Frazer, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 784 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.).)
*1151The DNA arrest warrant in this case was not a true warrant, because it did not authorize the arrest of anyone. It was a shell, a clever artifice designed to satisfy the statute of limitations so the criminal investigation could continue indefinitely until the perpetrator was identified. The filing of the DNA arrest warrant in this case did not commence a criminal prosecution against defendant and, thus, did not satisfy the statute of limitations.
Werdegar, J., concurred.

Penal Code section 800 provides that the statute of limitations for this crime expires “six years after commission of the offense.”

Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

It is interesting to note that the Legislature used the phrase “the date on which the identity of the suspect is conclusively established by DNA testing” to mean when a DNA profile obtained from evidence collected from the crime scene is matched to a particular suspect. This is at odds with the majority’s holding that obtaining a DNA profile from evidence collected from a crime scene identifies the suspect.