Court Opinion

ID: 9646730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:09:21.075336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:41.215729
License: Public Domain

CORNELIUS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the disposition of this case, but as to Aetna Insurance Company I concur only because it has not properly complained of what I believe was an erroneous definition of agency given in the court’s charge.
The definition of agency given in the charge was obviously based upon Tex.Ins. Code Ann. art. 21.02 (Vernon Supp.1988).1 *256In my judgment, that statute does not cover the situation we have here — where a person simply mails or delivers another person’s insurance premium to the insurance company either for his own benefit (as in the case of a mortgagee who wants to protect his collateral) or as an accommodation to the insured.
The statute was enacted in order to make certain persons and companies agents for purposes of certification and licensing and in order to subject them to penalties provided by the Insurance Code for various prohibited acts. It was not intended to generally make persons agents of insurance companies for notice or other purposes. Indeed, the statute expressly provides that it makes the designated persons or companies agents “as far as relates to all the liabilities, duties, requirements and penalties set forth in this chapter” (emphasis added). The chapter referred to is Chapter 21 of the Insurance Code which deals with certification and qualification of insurance companies, licensing of agents, and prohibited acts such as misrepresentation of policy provisions. Nowhere does the chapter purport to deal with the question of general agency for the purposes of notice. See Home v. Charter National Ins. Co., 614 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); cf. Guthrie v. Republic National Ins. Co., 682 S.W.2d 634 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Don Chapman Motors Sales v. National Savings Ins. Co., 626 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.App.-Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Interpreting Article 21.02 as making a person who "transmits” a premium to an insurance company the general agent of that company would produce unreasonable and unfair results. Under such an interpretation a policyholder could simply have an acquaintance or confederate mail his premiums to the insurance company, and thereby make such person the company’s agent. Without having any relationship with the company, such an “agent” could bind the company as to notices or actions for purposes of estoppel or other equitable and legal remedies. Agency is ordinarily a question of fact, depending on whether a person has, by express or implied agreement, been appointed or designated to act on behalf of another person. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. v. Wesson, 447 S.W.2d 436 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref’d); 3 Tex.Jur.3d Agency § 13 (1980). While the Legislature, within the constraints of due process, may create an agency relationship by law without requiring the parties’ consent, I do not believe the statute in question can be reasonably interpreted as expressing a legislative intent to create a broad agency relationship as defined in the court’s charge. I believe Article 21.02 is limited to the specific provisions and penalties of Chapter 21 of the Insurance Code. Indeed, the addition of the language, “This article does not authorize an agent to orally, in writing, or otherwise alter, amend, modify, waive, or change a term or condition of an insurance policy or application for an insurance policy” to the statute by the 1985 amendment seems to confirm that view of the legislative intent. If the cases of Aetna Insurance Company v. Tipps, 132 Tex. 213, 121 S.W.2d 324 (1938), and General American Life Ins. Co. v. Gant, 119 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1938, writ dism’d), can be construed to hold otherwise, I believe they were wrongly decided.
In spite of what I believe to be an erroneous and over-broad definition of agency in the court’s charge, I concur in the judgment because Aetna did not object to the definition in the trial court for the correct reason, nor has it complained at all of the definition in this appeal. It is thus in the position of having waived the error.

. At the time the cause of action arose, Article 21.02 provided:
Any person who solicits insurance on behalf of any insurance company, whether incorporated under the laws of this or any other state or foreign government, or who takes or transmits other than for himself any application for insurance or any policy of insurance to or from such company, or who advertises or otherwise gives notice that he will receive or transmit the same, or who shall receive or deliver a policy of insurance of any such company, or who shall examine or inspect any risk, or receive, or collect, or transmit any premium of insurance, or make or forward any diagram of any building or buildings, or do or perform any other act or thing in the making or consummating of any contract of insurance for or with any such insurance company other than for himself, or who shall examine into, or adjust, or aid in adjusting, any loss for or on behalf of any such insurance company, whether any of such acts shall be done at the instance or request, or by the employment of such insurance company, or of, or by, any broker or other person, shall be held to be the agent of the company for which the act is done, or the risk is taken, as far as relates to all the liabilities, duties, requirements and penalties set forth in this chapter. The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to the citizens of this State who arbitrate in the adjustment of losses between the insurers and insured, nor to the adjustment of particular or general average losses of vessels or cargoes by marine adjusters who had paid an occupation tax of Two Hundred ($200.00) Dollars for the year in which the adjustment is made, nor to practicing attorneys at law in the State of Texas, acting in the regular transaction of their business as such attorneys at law, and who are not local agents, nor acting as adjusters for any insurance company. Any person who shall *256do any of the acts mentioned in this article for or on behalf of any insurance company without such company having first complied with the requirements of the laws of this State, shall be personally liable to the holder of any policy of insurance in respect of which such act was done for any loss covered by the same.