Court Opinion

ID: 9653865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:57:21.041643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:02.986893
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
In Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), the question before the Court was whether former article 1257, P.C. (1925), as amended by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., Ch. 426, p. 1122, and Article 37.071, Y.A.C. C.P., are “valid” under the holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). More particularly, the Court, through the late Judge W.A. Morrison, asked itself three leading questions, viz:
Do they provide effective guidance to the jury?
Do they adequately limit the discretion of the jury?
Do they guard against the arbitrary and standardless imposition of the death penalty?
Id., at 938. Upon examining the statutes the Court would quickly answer each question in the affirmative.
After commenting on restricted circumstances under which the State may seek the death penalty, the Court was satisfied that Article 37.071 “further limits the stan-dardless imposition of the death penalty,” viz:
“... It limits the jury’s discretion on the range of punishment to life imprisonment or death. A jury may no longer choose from a range of two years to life to death. Further, in order to impose the death penalty, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt and must respond affirmatively to two or three questions, depending on the circumstances. These questions direct and guide their deliberations. They channel the jury’s discretion on punishment and effectively insure against the arbitrary and wanton imposition of the death penalty.”
Id., at 939. Although those findings might have disposed of the issue, the Court went on to a subsidiary assertion.
Addressing a contention that Article 37.-071 is “too vague to provide adequate guidance to the jury,” the Court took the position that “factors which determine whether the sentence of death is an appropriate penalty in a particular case are too complex to be compressed within the limits of a simple formula.” However, it did identify some “viable factors for the jury’s consideration;” but each pertains just to special issue two: “determining the likelihood that the defendant would be a continuing threat to society.” Id., at 939-940. The Court did not mention special issue one.
Returning to the matter of discretion, the Court waxed philosophically about “the quality of discretion and the manner in which is applied,” to conclude:
“... If discretion in the assessment of punishment can be shown to be reasonable and controlled, rather than capricious and discriminatory, the test of Furman will be met.”
Upon “considerable reflection,” the Court found the statutes “do meet this test.” Id., at 940. Then it moved on to consider unrelated grounds of error.1
*104Jurek v. State was decided April 16, 1975, and rehearing was denied without written opinion May 7, 1975. So far as indicated in Shepard’s Texas Citations, except in a general way such as habeas bail cases, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 527 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), the Court was not called on to construe special issue one before Jurek was submitted on oral argument to the Supreme Court of the United States on March 30, 1976. (Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), had been decided February 18, 1976, but it addressed special issue one summarily to reject a contention that the issue is not applicable to one charged as “principal,” id., at 697, and was pending on rehearing.) Thus, sans edifying judicial interpretation, the advocates mainly had to argue from the face of the statutes. See 19 CrL 4005.
For Jurek, as pertinent here, Anthony Amsterdam charged that “the judge in effect invited the jury to decide that the defendant should be executed and instructed them how to reach that result through the interrogatories;” he asserted that “the first and third were, of necessity, already answered at the guilt phase.” Amsterdam added that “the interrogatories themselves are meaningless. The jury has unfettered power to make the life or death decision, and adequate appellate review is impossible.” Id., at 4006.2
For the State of Texas, then Attorney General John Hill was making an emotional appeal for leaving to the people of Texas “the means of taking care of such a [particularly brutal and callous] crime,” admonishing the Supreme Court that it “is not the keeper of the social values, the conscience, the moral values of the people,” when Justice Stevens asked him “to address the objections Amsterdam made to the three interrogatories considered by the jury in the punishment phase.”
In his response General Hill used as an example a capital murder case arising out of what is surely the 1974 Orange County jail break attempted by Clifford S. Blansett and Billy Wayne Dowden that would later come before the Court in, e.g., Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). After summarizing the factual situation, Hill pointed out and argued:
“... The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and had no trouble finding the requisite intent. But in the punishment phase the jury determined that the defendant did not have the intent required hy the first interrogatory. This example makes clear that the interrogatories do not, as Amsterdam charged, merely repeat issues already decided. The cases show a real basis for distinguishing among defendants; it is not simply jury prejudice.”
Id., at 4007.
In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), delivered July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court did not settle the argument. Instead, in the vernacular, it punted, viz:
“The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has not yet construed the first and third questions ...; thus it is as yet undetermined whether those questions would properly include consideration of mitigating circumstances. In at least some situations the questions could, however, comprehend such an inquiry. * * * * We cannot, however, construe the statute; that power is reserved to the Texas courts.”
Id., n. 7, at 272, 96 S.Ct., at 2956.3
The judicial quest for meaning of “deliberately” as used in Article 37.071(b)(1) *105probably began in Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and would blaze a trail of twists and turns such as to create a veritable maze. Although years ago the Court had accepted its “well-defined meaning” in context of a perjury indictment, Ferguson v. State, 36 Tex.Cr.R. 60, 35 S.W. 369 (1896), the Court never alluded to that definition of “deliberately.” 4
The claim in Granviel was that the evidence is insufficient to support an affirmative answer to special issue one because it did not show the killing in question was “the result of any ‘premeditation’ or deliberation,” in that the killing “had none of the characteristics of a ‘weighed’, ‘pondered upon’ act because it ‘occurred in a frenzy’.” Id., at 122-123. The Court, speaking through Judge Thurman M. Gup-ton, found otherwise, viz:
“... We do not agree with appellant’s interpretation of Art. 37.071(b)(1), supra. The statutory requirements that appellant’s conduct be committed deliberately does not mean that it must be a premeditated act. There is sufficient evidence in the record from which jury could conclude that when appellant deliberately stabbed and bound two year old Natsha nine times as she lay on the floor and the bed, he could reasonably expect that her death would result.”
Id., at 123 (emphasis by Judge Gupton).5
In Brown v. State, 554 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), reminiscent of Anthony Amsterdam’s charges before the Supreme Court, see ante, at 104, the constitutional contention is that the statute denies “the right to an impartial jury in assessing punishment because Article 37.071(b)(1) and (3) require the same finding as a finding of guilt under Article 19.03, Texas Penal Code.” Id., at 678. Reprising what the Supreme Court had to say about the Court not yet construing those questions, ante, at 104, the Court pointed to its general findings in Jurek, ante, at 103, and rejected the contention, viz:
“We hold that the punishment issues enumerated in Article 37.071(b)(1) and (3) serve the purpose of guiding the jury’s punishment deliberations and do not deny a defendant the right to an impartial jury in assessing punishment.”
Id., at 679. Professor Amsterdam meet Judge Truman Roberts.
Having thus refuted Amsterdam in Brown, in a supremely ironic turn of events the Court, perhaps unwittingly, disabused Attorney General Hill in, of all cases, Blansett v. State, supra, viz:
“... [T]he provisions of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.03(a) and Art. 37.071(b)(1), Y.A.C.C.P., are inconsistent; a jury having found that a defendant intentionally committed a capital murder to be consistent would have to find that the act was deliberately done. However, the inconsistent answer to the question Art. 37.-071(b)(1) reflects only that the jury did not want the death penalty assessed.”
556 S.W.2d, n. 6, at 327.
So far, then, the Court has said that “deliberately” does not mean “premeditat-edly,” that it is used in its “ordinary meaning,” that it is not the same as a jury finding of “intentionally” on guilt but that to be consistent a jury would have to find that an “intentional” act is “deliberately *106done.” Over the next few years the Court goes deeper into the maze.6
Not until confronted directly with the fact that a jury gave a negative answer to special issue one and a claim that “ ‘deliberately’ as used in the first punishment issue ... is the linguistic equivalent of ‘intentionally’ and ‘knowingly’,” Heckert v. State, 612 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), did the Court try to find its way out, viz:
“The presumption is that in enacting a statute, the Legislature intends the entire statute to be effective, [citations omitted]. Moreover, it must be presumed that the Legislature did not intend to do useless thing in the enactment of a statute, [citation omitted].
If this Court were to adopt appellant’s argument that deliberately and intentionally or knowingly were linguistic equivalents, it would render Art. 37.071(b)(1), supra, a nullity. Under such a holding Art. 37.071(b)(1), supra, would be a useless thing in that a finding of an intentional or knowing murder would be irreconcilable with a finding that the defendant’s conduct was not committed deliberately. We will presume that the Legislature would not have enacted Art. 37.-071(b)(1), had it intended for a finding of deliberateness to be based on the same standard as that of intentional or knowing.”
Id., at 552-553. Still it was not error to fail to so inform a jury. Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, at 81 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
Heckert v. State, supra, begat Fearance v. State, 620 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (Opinion on Rehearing), in treating sufficiency of evidence to show “deliberately,” viz:
“... [W]e now know that ‘deliberately,’ as used in that question on punishment, is not the linguistic equivalent of ‘intentionally,’ as used in the charge on guilt-innocence. Heckert v. State, [supra]; rather it is the thought process which embraces more than a will to engage in conduct and activates the intentional conduct.6 * * * *
[[Image here]]
6. The person who engages in certain conduct deliberately has upon consideration said to himself, 'Let’s do it.’ Still conduct committed 'deliberately' need not be ‘premeditated.’ As explained in Black’s Law Dictionary (Fourth Rev.Ed.1968) at 1343:
‘Premeditation differs essentially from will which constitutes the crime; because it supposes, besides an actual will, a deliberation and a continued persistence.' [Emphasis in original].”
Id., at 584. See Rumbaugh v. State 629 S.W.2d 747, at 754 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (evidence sufficient, see Milton).
In Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), accused requested a special requested charge on the first issue. However, it defined both “deliberate” and “premeditated,” and would have instructed the jury that a killing resulting from “deliberation and premeditation” is “deliberate,” elaborating on that concept. Id., at 779-780. The Court found the trial court did not err in refusing the requested charge essentially for two reasons: first, on account of the holding in King v. State, supra, see note 5, ante; second, in that both Granviel and Fearance differentiated “deliberately” and “premeditatedly,” the re*107quested charge “would not have been proper.” Id., at 780.7
Despite an emerging awareness that “deliberately,” as used in special issue one, is not the “same standard” as that of “intentionally” in the authorization charge on guilt, Heckert and Russell, supra, the Court continued to reject efforts to enlighten juries to that fact. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 674 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), wherein four members of the Court recorded their agreement that upon request the jury should be properly instructed as to meaning of “deliberately.” Id., n. 6, at 322.8
In Morin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 265, at 270 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), it found no error in refusing a requested definition of “deliberately,” by misreading the issue in Heckert, supra, and merely reciting the first holding in King v. State, and alluding to Russell v. State, supra; but see opinion dissenting to denial of motion for rehearing, at 270-271.9 *108In like vein a majority rejected a contention in Stewart v. State, 686 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), that, having found he acted “intentionally” in relation to the homicide, the jury was precluded from considering mitigating circumstances, including evidence that he was not the triggerman, in answering special issue one. Noting there was conflicting evidence on the point, that “deliberately” is not linguistically equivalent to “intentionally” but need not be defined (reciting the usual litany of cases), that “we cannot tell from the record that the jury did not consider the mitigating factors,” that “the jury was given the freedom to construe ‘deliberately’ as they understood it to be commonly used,” and that defendant has not shown .“the jury did construe ‘deliberately’ as the equivalent of ‘intentionally or knowingly,’ ” the majority “decline[d] to assume they did.” Id., at 121-122 (emphasis in original).10 To same effect is Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, at 653-654 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), as well as the concurring opinion.11
A charge issue was not raised in Cannon v. State, 691 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), but in testing sufficiency of eviden-tiary support for an affirmative answer to special issue one, the Court noticed that acts of repeatedly stabbing a victim were held sufficient in Granviel v. State and Duffy v. State, both supra. However, it also pointed out that in Fearance v. State, supra, the Court said that deliberately is “the thought process which embraces more than a will to engage in conduct and activates the intentional conduct.” Accordingly, the Court explained:
“Thus, while from the act of suddenly and impulsively firing a gun can be found the intent to cause the death, such action may not necessarily show the act was deliberate. To find the act of deliberateness there must be the moment of deliberation and the determination on the part of the actor to kill. Such determination must necessarily be found from the totality of the circumstances of the individual case.”
Id., at 677. Thus once again the Court confirms a special distinction between “intentionally” and “deliberately,” and analyzes the evidence in that light.12
In Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), a trial court did give the jury a definition along the lines indicated in Fearance v. State, supra, at 584, and as suggested in Williams v. State, supra, n. 6, *109at 322.13 And the Court seems to chide the judge for doing so, viz:
“Thus, notwithstanding this Court’s stance on the issue of whether or not the jury should be instructed on the difference between ‘deliberate’ and ‘intentional’ [citations omitted], appellant has no room to complain. Regardless of his belief that generally the terms are understood by juries to have similar meanings, this jury was specifically instructed that they do not.’’
Id., at 244. There is a valuable lesson to be learned here.
Rector v. State, 738 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), discusses several aspects of special issue one. First it reaffirms that the law of parties may not be applied; that is, “the State may not rely on evidence that another with whom the defendant was acting acted deliberately and with a reasonable expectation that death would result;” instead, “the jury must determine whether [defendant’s] own culpable conduct which contributed to the deceased’s death was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death would result.” Green v. State, 682 S.W.2d 271, at 287 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). Next, the Court restates a measure of proof, viz:
“Proof of deliberateness does not mean that the murder must be premeditated. Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107, 123 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 2642, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977). ‘To find the act of deliberateness, there must be the moment of deliberation and the determination on the part of the actor to kill.’ Cannon v. State, 691 S.W.2d 664, 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).”
Id., at 242. Finally, upon analyzing the evidence the Court finds it sufficient to support an affirmative finding. Id., at 243.
In Livingston v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), responding to evidentia-ry contentions that “repetitiveness” on part of defendant was not shown and that a struggle with his robbery victim “caused Appellant to do something that he had no intention of doing when he first approached [her],” id., at 338, the Court touched all bases of “deliberately,” viz:
“The term ‘deliberately’ is not defined by statute and is therefore to be taken and understood in common everyday language. Rector v. State, supra; Stewart v. State, 686 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). Thus, we do not require the State to prove that the killing was premeditated or that the defendant carefully weighed or analyzed the situation before killing the deceased in order to support a finding that he acted deliberately. Rector v. State, supra; Kunkel v. State, supra [771 S.W.2d 435 (1986)] [pending certiorari]; Smith v. State, supra; Granviel v. State, supra. On the other hand, ‘deliberately’, as used in the first special issue, is not the linguistic equivalent of ‘intentionally’, as used in the charge on guilt-innocence. Fearance v. State, 620 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Heckert v. State, 612 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Rather, ‘it is the thought process which embraces more than a will to engage in conduct and activates the intentional conduct.’ Fearance v. State, 620 S.W.2d at 584. To this end, ‘there must be the moment of deliberation and the determination on the part of the actor to kill,’ as found ‘from the totality of circumstances of the individual case.’ Cannon, supra.”
Id., at 338-339. After recounting details of relevant evidence the Court noted that the facts that a person is armed when entering an area of a crime or while committing one has “probative value in proving deliberately,” and the fact that there was a struggle “does not negate an inference of deliberate conduct,” especially where it seems “the killing took place when the victim refused to part with particular property;” thus the Court concluded:
*110“Here, appellant carried a loaded pistol to the scene of the robbery. He lay in wait for his victim. After struggling with her, he apparently bested her efforts, but did not seek to escape without further harming her. Instead, the record clearly reflects he reached back, leveled and aimed the pistol at her, and squeezed the trigger with little or no chance of missing his target. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that appellant acted deliberately.”
Id., at 339.14 Compare, however, Andrews v. State, 744 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).15
Whether in context of voir dire, an instruction on “deliberately” or sufficiency of evidence, the Court remains lost in the maze it entered some twelve years ago. Without guidance, much of the bench and bar are also wandering around trying to find a way out.
On voir dire they conjure up hypothetical scenarios to put to venirepersons, and as often as not produce such bewilderment in the end that error is committed, e.g., Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, at 684-690 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 248, 98 L.Ed.2d 206 (1987), sometimes compelling reversal of the judgment, e.g., Lane v. State, 743 S.W.2d 617, at 621-629 (Tex.Cr.App.1987):
“This Court has emphasized the importance of jurors being able to accurately discern the separate meanings of intentional and deliberate conduct. * * * * Even though this Court has properly declined to assume a legislative function and define ‘deliberately’, and instead relied on the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term as a juror individually knows it, this Court cannot condone an attempt by a State’s attorney to mislead a juror into believing that the definition of deliberate conduct is nothing more than a second finding of intentional conduct.”
[[Image here]]
“In the instant case, juror Sutton was incapable of carrying out this crucial function [of comprehending meaning of the ‘deliberateness question’ as distinct from other inquiries in the case] because the hypothetical deceived him in believing his impression of deliberate was distinct from a legitimate inquiry into the intentional nature of the appellant’s conduct. As mentioned in Gardner, the defense may successfully challenge for cause a ‘venireman who is unable to reconsider guilt evidence in the particular context of special issues.’ Certainly the venireman who cannot distinguish between an ‘intentional’ and a ‘deliberate’ killing will have substantial difficulty in this regard. Gardner, supra, at 689. * * * * i)
Id., at 628-629. Concerning venireperson Sutton, another complaint was the trial court erred in restricting questioning as to “his understanding of special issue number one,” and the Court similarly found, viz:
“... As we quoted from Gardner, supra, this was a proper inquiry for the defense in light of the hypothetical used by the State. This was a denial of the appellant’s opportunity to intelligently exercise his voir dire of juror Sutton.”
Harm having been shown and not cured, the judgment was reversed on this point of error as well. Id., at 629. Accord: Morrow v. State, 753 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Felder v. State, 758 S.W.2d 760, at 767-770 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
*111On the matter of jury instruction, even when one is requested the Court continues to write about simplicity of the term in its ordinary meaning as “approximated,” yet to say it is “not necessary” to give an requested instruction, thereby implying that a judge may inform a jury as to that meaning of “deliberately” as determined by this Court, Fearance v. State, 771 S.W.2d 486, 512-513 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); and when an appellant renews the argument that the term is synonymous with “intentionally,” we reprise Heckert to presume that the Legislature enacted special issue one with a different standard in mind, Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523, 536-537 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
Concurring in Lane, supra, Judge Duncan agreed with those verities therein stated by the Court, observed that “this Court has been inundated with appeals in which there was obvious confusion among the judges, lawyers and jurors as to how 'intentionally’ could be different from ‘deliberately,’ ” recalled that in Williams v. State, supra, four Judges would have a trial judge honor a timely request for an instructive definition of “deliberately” suggested by the dissenting opinion in Russell v. State, supra, 665 S.W.2d, at 787, and associated himself with them, viz:
“Based on the foregoing observations, it is my opinion that the absence of a definition of ‘deliberately’ during the punishment phase of a capital murder trial does nothing to further the administration of justice in that it invariably causes confusion among the judges, lawyers and jurors. Therefore, in the future (trials that commence after the date of this opinion) I would suggest that upon request by either the State or the defendant that trial judges give the jury an appropriate definition of ‘deliberately’ that they are to use in answering the first special issue under Article 37.-071(b)(1).”
Id., at 630-631.16
This Court created such a maze that a meaningful definition of “deliberately” is lost and cannot be found from our opinions. There is a decision to support almost any meaning one might desire to use in a certain situation. Presently this Court is *112bound by its duty to interpret and construe special issue one in order that the bench and bar may give it the force and effect contemplated by the Legislature.
Judge Learned Hand put it correctly, viz: “... It is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of a dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.”
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, at 739 (CA2 1945).
Accordingly, we need be mindful of a synopsis of constitutional rationale relating to discretion of the “sentencer,” set forth in the plurality opinion of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), viz:
”... [The State] must channel the sen-tencer’s discretion by ‘clear and objective standards’ that provide ‘specific and detailed guidance,’ and that ‘make rationally reviewable the process of imposing a sentence of death.’ As was made clear in Gregg, a death penalty ‘system could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.’ 428 U.S., at 195, n. 26 [96 S.Ct. at 2935, n. 46].”
Because the majority piously defers to the Legislature to lead participants in the criminal justice system out of the maze this Court itself created, I dissent.
TEAGUE, J., joins in this opinion.
Before the court en banc.

. Presiding Judge Onion concurred in the results. Judges Odom and Roberts dissented separately: the former on effect and meaning of the statute, especially vagueness of special issue two; the latter went further to find that issue unconstitutional. Neither specifically addressed the first special issue. Jurek, at 943 and 946, respectively.

. All emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise noted.

. In the wake of Jurek v. Texas the Court decided several other capital cases in 1976, and in several it seems to regard an affirmance by the Supreme Court as carte blanche to reject out of hand constitutional challenges, e.g., Gholson v. State, 542 S.W.2d 395, at 397 (Tex.Cr.Ap.1976), and White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104, at 105 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); but except for Granviel v. State, 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), none directly implicated the first special issue. It had no impact on the majority opinion in Smith v. State, supra, at 697 (issue applicable to a "principal” and evidence sufficient to support affirmative finding to special issue one); however, in light of Jurek, et al., Judges Odom and Roberts withdrew their respective opinions questioning constitutionality of the statutory scheme. See Smith, at 700.

. By common law and statute then in effect perjury was "a false statement, deliberately and willfully made [et cetera].” Id., at 369. In the course of its discussion the Court contrasted the meaning of "deliberately and "willfully," approving a "well-defined” meaning of the former, viz:
“ 'Deliberately' means 'with careful consideration or deliberation; with full intent; not hastily or carelessly, — as a deliberately formed purpose.’”
Id., at 370.

. Shortly thereafter, as to defining the term "deliberately” and others in court’s charge on punishment, the Court saw no need because they are “words simple in themselves, and are used in their ordinary meaning, [so] jurors are supposed to know such common meaning and terms,” and thus "are not necessarily to be defined in the charge ...,” quoting Joubert v. State, 136 Tex.Cr.R. 219, 124 S.W.2d 368, at 369 (1939). King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105, at 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).

. As its decisions demonstrate, the Court would resort to one or another such notion — or none— depending on the issue presented.
On voir dire examination, a trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to permit defense counsel to explore the matter by ruling that “deliberately” is "what it means to [a veni-reperson],” Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, at 323 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), or that it does not have a “statutory definition or meaning," and thus is to be taken and understood in common language, Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516, at 525-26 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); see also Milton v. State, 599 S.W.2d 824, at 826 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (refusal not abuse of discretion).
As to sufficiency of evidence, without any effort for definitiveness the Court routinely upheld an affirmative answer: Duffy v. State, 567 S.W.2d 197, at 209 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (See Granviel, supra); Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344, at 351 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Villarreal v. State, 576 S.W.2d 51, at 65 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Wilder and Armour v. State, 583 S.W.2d 349, at 356-357 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Armour culpable as party with Wilder)-, Ex parte Alexander, 608 S.W.2d 928, at 930-931 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) ("proof evident” by obtaining and loading weapon in anticipation of return of victim).
The problem of instructing the jury on meaning of the term was not raised during this early period.

. The dissenting opinion first considered "whether the word ‘deliberately’ had taken on in any material fashion a ‘special definition,'” id., at 782, and after tracing some of the above developments, concluded that it has "in the sense enunciated in Heckert," that is, "deliberately is neither the linguistic nor connotative equivalent of “intentionally." Id., at 784. Then, considering "whether in this point in the evolution of our capital murder law, [there is] any compelling reason to require that ‘deliberately1 be defined [for] the jury at punishment," for reasons given at 785-787, the writer urged the Court to act accordingly, viz:
"... [W]e should now employ that power reserved to us by the Supreme Court in Jurek [notes omitted throughout], supra, and hold that upon timely request by a capital murder defendant or the State, that party is entitled to have the jury instructed at the punishment phase to the effect of the following:
(1) as employed in the first special issue, the word "deliberately has a meaning different and distinct from the word "intentionally," as that word was previously defined in the charge on guilt, and
(2) instead, as employed in the first special issue, the word "deliberately means a manner of doing an act characterized by or resulting from careful and thorough consideration; characterized by awareness of the consequences; willful, slow, unhurried, and steady as though allowing time for a decision."
Id., at 787. See Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co. (1979). But see Smith v. State, 676 S.W.2d 379, at 393 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (proof need not show accused "carefully weighed or considered” or "studied” situation), and Selvage v. State, 680 S.W.2d 17, at 21-22 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (pro forma).

. In overruling a point of error complaining that the trial judge precluded defendant from presenting evidence to the jury as to his deliberateness, the Court opined that "a distinction between intentional and deliberate would indeed have been helpful to the jury, especially ... in light of the prosecutor’s voir dire (to which no objections were lodged) that equated deliberately and intentional as synonymous terms.” Id., at 320 (emphasis in original).
Also rejected was a claim that special issue one has been rendered unconstitutional by judicial interpretation so limiting the deliberateness issue as to preclude "proper consideration of mitigating circumstances.” In that connection the Court found the issue has caused “some confusion,” whereas the plurality went further in note 6, viz:
“Trial courts, attorneys and jurors have evidenced much confusion and conflict over different interpretations of the common meaning of deliberate within the context of a capital murder punishment hearing. While a majority of the Court does not agree, four judges ... do agree that upon timely request by a capital murder defendant or the State, that party is entitled to have the jury instructed at the punishment phase that:
(1) as used in the first special issue, the word ‘deliberately has a meaning different and distinct from the word ‘intentionally’ as that word was previously defined in the charge on guilt and
(2) the word ‘deliberately1 as used in the first special issue means a manner of doing an act characterized by or resulting from careful consideration: ‘a conscious decision involving a thought process which embraces more than mere will to engage in the conduct.’
See Fearance v. State, 620 S.W.2d 577, 584 (opinion on appellant’s motion for rehearing 1981).”
Id., at 322, n. 6 (emphasis in original).

.Quaere:
"If in 1977 the members of this Court believed ‘deliberateness’ was the same thing as ‘intentional,’ all the collective legal training notwithstanding, how can we any longer seriously suggest that jurors, without the least bit of assistance, will, in every case not apply it the same way as Blansett — a way Heckert now acknowledges would be unconstitutional?”
Id., at 271 (emphasis in original).
To be noted in this regard is that the Court went through much the same enlightenment in the matter of the law of parties vis a vis special issue one. Compare Wilder v. State, supra, 583 S.W.2d, at 356-357, with Meanes v. State, 668 S.W.2d 366, 375-376 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), and *108concurring opinion, at 376-378, adopted by the Court in Green v. State, 682 S.W.2d 271, at 287 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).

. Arguing that "no party has a burden of proof in this matter [of mitigation]," and that the State of Texas does have a duty to ensure due process generally, including inter alia, “that the jury is given adequate guidance in its deliberations specifically,’’ the dissenting opinion points out past failures in that respect, viz:
"... [A] majority of this Court has blithely said, time and again, that in considering whether to impose a death sentence the jury must be allowed to consider whatever mitigating circumstances the defense can bring before it. But they also have repeatedly denied the utility, much less necessity, of informing the jury that they may so consider the evidence.”
Id., at 126.

. The gist of which is in the following comments:
“As used in the first special issue, the word 'deliberately' is not ‘simple in meaning,’ as the continuing debate between lawyers, scholars and judges over its meaning and import well attests.
It is inconceivable to me that the Court has acknowledged the jury’s failure to differentiate ‘deliberately’ from ‘intentionally’ would constitute denial of due process, see Heckert v. State, [supra], yet continues to refuse to require as matter of course that the jury be informed ‘distinctly [of] the law applicable to the case.’ Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., in this regard.”
Id., at 657.

.Contemporaneously, however, the Court clung to the notion that a requested definition to that effect is not required to enable a jury to make a proper analysis of the evidence concerning deliberateness. Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, at 113 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); East v. State, 702 S.W.2d 606, at 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). It also found sufficient evidence in Cordova v. State, supra (under Enmund v. Florida [458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982)]); Santana v. State, 714 S.W.2d 1, at 5-6 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (following Selvage v. State, supra); Carter v. State, 717 S.W.2d 60, at 66-67 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (using common meaning of "deliberately,” not whether defendant "carefully weighed or considered or carefully studied situation”).

. Pointing out that "deliberately” has a meaning different and distinct from "intentionally," the definition given by the trial court continues:
"[T]he word ‘deliberately* as used in this first special issue means a manner of doing an act characterized by or resulting from careful consideration: ‘a conscious decision involving a thought process; conduct which embraces more than mere will to engage in the conduct.’”
Cf. Russell v. State, supra, at 787 (Dissenting opinion)

. In note 18 is an observation that the evidence does not support his theory that he was “surprised when Complainant began struggling [and] during the course of the struggle, the gun discharged killing Complainant.” Ibid.

. Although sketching various approaches to the problem, the plurality opinion actually avoids it, viz:
"In this instance, we do not find that it is necessary to involve ourselves in or engage in the ongoing controversy whether the word ‘deliberately* has now obtained a technical or special meaning, and thus should be expressly defined in the punishment charge of a capital murder case [because there is overwhelming evidence that conduct of defendant was deliberate]."
Id., at 51-52. In that the issue then being considered was whether § 19.03(a)(2) coupled with § 7.02(a)(2) or (b) is unconstitutional as applied, that six Judges merely concurred in the result suggests they regarded the predicate discussion to be somewhat irrelevant and basically fruitless.

. Of course, in implementing that suggestion we merely demonstrate that this Court is capable of discharging its judicial function, rather than making entreaties for legislative action as was done by the majority, id., n. 7, at 628, and again in Nichols v. State, 754 S.W.2d 185, at 201, n. 17, viz:
"We note that the Legislature has not, as yet, accepted our oft repeated invitation to statutorily define ‘deliberately1 in the context of 37.071(b)(1). See Lane, supra at 628, n. 7, 630, n. 11 and 630-631 (Duncan, J., concurring); Williams, supra at 322, n. 6. Thus no explicit definition can be applied herein. Once again we note the need for a statutory definition and exemplify the clarification to be afforded by legislative action in this area.”
Id., n. 17, at 201. But the Legislature does not expect the Judicial Department to be suppliant in such matters. Inherent in all appellate courts is power — indeed a duty — to interpret and construe legislative enactments. See generally Aldisert, The Judicial Process (American Casebook Series, West Publishing Co. 1976) Chapter 1, Section 4, 170ff.
Courts exercising criminal jurisdiction have power and authority to interpret criminal statutes passed by the Legislature, Crouch v. Craik, 369 S.W.2d 311, 315 (Tex.1963), to the exclusion of all others save courts of equity with jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of penal law in exceptional situations, State v. Shoppers World Inc., 380 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex.1964), and Passel v. Fort Worth Independent School District, 440 S.W.2d 61, at 63 (Tex.1969). Otherwise, for instance, “probable cause” would defy understanding.
The Court has recognized and followed a cardinal rule of statutory construction, viz;
"In determining the meaning of a word employed in statute the inquiry is not as to its abstract meaning, but as to the sense in which it is used. When the legislative purpose so requires, a word may be given a broader or narrower meaning than that which it has in ordinary usage. Bailey v. State, 104 Tex.Cr.R. 432, 284 S.W. 574."
Baldridge v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 519, 321 S.W.2d 309, at 310 (1959). In Bailey v. State, supra, at 576, the Court relied in part on "a learned text-writer,” namely, Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, vol. 2, § 376, p. 222, viz: "The particular inquiry is, not what is the abstract force of the words or what they may comprehend, but in what sense they are intended to be used as they are found in the act." See also 53 Tex.Jur.2d Statutes § 147. Determination of meaning. (1964).

. This was originally appellant's second point of error. Point of error three was identified in the original opinion as point of error two.