Court Opinion

ID: 9701960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:47:16.825689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:31.430355
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). I would hold that MCL 500.3145(2); MSA 24.13145(2) was tolled by plaintiff asserting its claim and by the parties’ negotiations, and I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
i
As this Court has stated in the past, limitation periods are not inflexible. See Lewis v DAIIE, 426 Mich 93, 102; 393 NW2d 167 (1986). Rather, judicial tolling, a well-established legal doctrine available in certain circumstances, makes them flexible. As the United States Supreme Court stated:
[T]he mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also sets a time limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict the power of the federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose. [American Pipe & Construction Co v Utah, 414 US 538, 559; 94 S Ct 756; 38 L Ed 2d 713 (1974).]
Similarly, Michigan courts have used their power to toll limitation periods in insurance cases when the circumstances have not been inconsistent with legislative purposes. For example, in Tom Thomas Organization, Inc v Reliance Ins Co, 396 Mich 588; 242 NW2d 396 (1976), this Court tolled a provision in an insurance contract that limited the time for bringing *389suit under the contract to twelve months. Admittedly, Tom Thomas involved a contractual provision, but the Court in In re Certified Question (Ford Motor Co v Lumbermens Mut Casualty Co), 413 Mich 22; 319 NW2d 320 (1982), applied a similar analysis to a limit in a statutory fire insurance policy. Further, in Lewis, supra, this Court tolled a limitation provision in the same statute at issue in the instant case.1 Thus, judicial tolling is available when circumstances make it appropriate, and judicial tolling has been held appropriate for § 3145.
n
The majority argues that the restrictive language of subsection 3145(2) speaks for itself, but that position turns a deaf ear to the analytical voice of this Court. In Ford Motor Co, supra, this Court held the following statutory language to allow tolling:
No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equily unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve months next after inception of the loss. [MCL 500.2832; MSA 24.12832; see also Ford Motor Co, supra at 34-40.]
*390In this case, we are asked to toll MCL 500.3145(2); MSA 24.13145(2), which provides:
An action for recovery of property protection insurance benefits shall not be commenced later than 1 year after the accident.
Comparing the language of these provisions, neither appears to allow tolling more or less than the other. Thus, I would employ the same analysis used in Ford Motor Co and subsequent cases of this Court.
When interpreting the limitation provision at issue in that case, the Ford Motor Co Court relied on our earlier decision in Tom Thomas, supra, and considered the legislative intent behind the limitation period. Ford Motor Co, supra at 32. Later decisions of this Court have also considered legislative intent when deciding whether to toll limitation provisions, specifically the limitation provisions in the no-fault act. See Welton v Carriers Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 578-579; 365 NW2d 170 (1984); Lewis, supra at 101-103. As we stated in Lewis, tolling the limitation period is entirely consistent with the legislative intent behind the no-fault act:
“Tolling the statute when the insured submits a claim for specific benefits would not appear to detract from the policies underlying the one-year limitation on recovery. By submitting a timely and specific claim, the insured serves the interest in preventing stale claims by allowing the insurer to assess its liability while the information supporting the claim is relatively fresh. A prompt denial of the claim would barely affect the running of the limitation period, while a lengthy investigation would simply ‘freeze’ the situation until the claim is eventually denied. In effect, the insured would be charged with the time spent reducing his losses to a claim for specific benefits plus the time spent deciding *391whether to sue after the claim is denied.” [Lewis, supra at 101, quoting Welton, supra at 578-579.]
The legislative purposes behind limitation provisions, preventing stale claims and easing crowded dockets, are either inapplicable or contrary to the majority’s decision. First, preventing stale claims from reaching our courts is not a consideration in this case, because the defendant insurer can protect itself from, stale claims by promptly responding to a policyholder’s claim. Thus, whether insurers must deal with stale claims is uniquely within their own control. Next, the majority’s interpretation actually encourages needless litigation. Under the majority’s decision, a prudent policyholder must file suit within one year of the injury, regardless of whether the insurer is still processing the claim, or lose the claim altogether. This contravenes an important motivation for the no-fault system, reducing litigation, see Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483, 501; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), and the similar judicial policy of discouraging litigation. See Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co, 415 US 36; 94 S Ct 1011; 39 L Ed 2d 147 (1974). Additionally, requiring a precautionary suit by the policyholder could adversely affect the negotiations between the claimant and the insurer. Negotiating parties usually attempt to maintain a cooperative atmosphere, and litigation pending between the parties would hinder that atmosphere. See Johnson v Railway Express Agency, 421 US 454, 468; 95 S Ct 1716; 44 L Ed 2d 295 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the consistency of tolling with these legislative purposes has led earlier courts that have considered this precise question to toll subsection 3145(2). In Preferred Risk Mut Ins Co v State Farm Mut Auto*392mobile Ins Co, 123 Mich App 416; 333 NW2d 303 (1983), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that tolling subsection 3145(2) is appropriate on the basis of the authority of Ford Motor Co, supra, the judicial principle of discouraging litigation, and that tolling is consistent with the statute’s purpose.2 Preferred Risk, supra at 419-421. Likewise, in Norfolk & W R Co v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 894 F2d 838 (CA 6, 1990), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in part on the basis of Preferred Risk, but also on the similarities between subsection 3145(2) and the fire insurance statute that was tolled in Ford Motor Co, concluded that tolling is appropriate under this subsection. Those courts followed this Court’s precedential models for analyzing tolling provisions, and using that analysis, concluded that subsection 3145(2) should be tolled while the insurer is assessing its liability.
in
Thus, I would trace the analysis used by this Court in the past when it has interpreted limitation provi*393sions, an analysis that has considered legislative purposes. In this case, tolling the limitation period while the claim is pending with the insurer is entirely consistent with those purposes. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and toll the limitation period of MCL 500.3145(2); MSA 24.13145(2).
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 The majority distinguishes this Court’s decision in Lewis on the basis of language it highlights in subsection 3145(1) “indicating that the Legislature intended that the one-year limitation period would be suspended by the giving of notice.” Ante at 386. A careful reading of Lewis, however, reveals that the basis of our decision there was preserving legislative purposes, and not the sentence the majority highlights. In fact, the Lewis dissent argued that the language of subsection 3145(1) clearly was opposed to our decision in that case. Lewis, supra at 104-105 (Brickley, J., highlighting this language from subsection 3145(1): “ ‘However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced’ ”). Id. at 105. Thus, the majority relies on a phantom distinction to differentiate the instant case from Lewis, because applying the same analysis used in Lewis supports tolling the statute.

 A subsequent panel of the Court of Appeals rejected the approach taken in Preferred Risk. USF&G Co v Amerisure Ins Co, 195 Mich App 1; 489 NW2d 115 (1992). The courts below believed USF&G was binding on the basis of Administrative Order No. 1994-4, 445 Mich xci, now MCR 7.215(H).
Though it discussed the statutory language, the basis of the USF&G panel’s decision was factual. It stated that because the insured was so late in presenting its claim:
[E]ven if there were tolling of the statute of limitations between the date of the making of a specific claim [as required under Welton, supra] and the date of defendant’s denial of liability, that tolling would not save this action from operation of the statute of limitations. [BSF&G, supra at 7.]
Thus, that Court’s discussion of the statutory language was mere dicta, it did not bind the lower courts in the instant case, and has limited persuasive value.