Court Opinion

ID: 9947757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 17:00:58.40523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:32.109995
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1325            Document: 010111009931   Date Filed: 03/05/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                             PUBLISH                            Tenth Circuit

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      March 5, 2024

                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                                 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                             _________________________________

  MICHAEL BACOTE, JR.,

         Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                             No. 22-1325

  FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,

         Defendant - Appellee.

  ------------------------------

  DISABILITY LAW COLORADO;
  AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION;
  AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
  OF COLORADO; THE ARC OF THE
  UNITED STATES; BAZELON CENTER
  FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW; CIVIL
  RIGHTS EDUCATION AND
  ENFORCEMENT CENTER;
  COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY
  COALITION; DISABILITY RIGHTS
  ADVOCATES; DISABILITY RIGHTS
  EDUCATION AND DEFENSE FUND;
  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE
  DEAF; NATIONAL DISABILITY
  RIGHTS NETWORK; NATIONAL
  FEDERATION OF THE BLIND,

         Amici Curiae.
                             _________________________________

                         Appeal from the United States District Court
                                 for the District of Colorado
                            (D.C. No. 1:17-CV-03111-RM-NRN)
                           _________________________________
Appellate Case: 22-1325    Document: 010111009931         Date Filed: 03/05/2024     Page: 2

 Kaitlynn Tuohy (Student Attorney), University of Denver Sturm College of Law Civil
 Rights Clinic, Denver, Colorado (Danielle DeSantis (Student Attorney), Aurora L.
 Randolph, Kayley Rettberg (Student Attorney), Laura Rovner, Robert Vanneste (Student
 Attorney), University of Denver Sturm College of Law Civil Rights Clinic, Denver,
 Colorado; Darold Killmer, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP, Denver, Colorado; Annika
 K. Adams, Zachary D. Warren, Highlands Law Firm, LLC, Denver, Colorado; with her
 on the briefs) for Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Bacote, Jr.

 Kyle Brenton, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado (Cole Finegan, United
 States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee
 Federal Bureau of Prisons.

 Amy Farr Roberson, Fox & Robertson, PC, Denver, Colorado, filed an Amici Curiae
 brief in support of Plaintiff-Appellant.
                           _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 CARSON, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________

       If a plaintiff requests injunctive or declaratory relief too attenuated from the

 controversy, prudence counsels us to dismiss the appeal. Accordingly, inmates may

 seek injunctive or declaratory relief from the conditions of their confinement. But if

 the inmate receives a transfer to a different prison during the litigation, we may hold

 his appeal prudentially moot.

       Defendant Federal Bureau of Prisons incarcerated Plaintiff Michael Bacote, Jr.

 in an administrative maximum facility. Plaintiff filed a claim for injunctive and

 declaratory relief, but after the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims and entered

 judgment for Defendant, Defendant voluntarily transferred Plaintiff to a mental

 health ward in a different penitentiary. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

 § 1291, we dismiss this appeal as prudentially moot.

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Appellate Case: 22-1325    Document: 010111009931        Date Filed: 03/05/2024      Page: 3

                                           I.

       While incarcerated, Plaintiff served as a lookout during the murder of another

 inmate. For this act, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, accepting a

 twenty-eight-year prison sentence. Following his conviction, Defendant transferred

 Plaintiff to the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum Facility in

 Florence, Colorado (“ADX-Florence”).

       Based on his appreciable history of mental illness, Plaintiff filed this action,

 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the conditions of his confinement at

 ADX-Florence. The district court held that Plaintiff had released most of his claims

 as part of a class action settlement by mentally disabled plaintiffs at ADX-Florence—

 a suit in which Plaintiff had once been the named plaintiff. Accordingly, the district

 court dismissed all except one of Plaintiff’s claims and denied Plaintiff’s request to

 file a fifth amended complaint.

       Plaintiff therefore proceeded on a solitary claim, arguing that Defendant had

 violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his

 mental disability. To further this claim, Plaintiff retained a forensic psychiatrist who

 concluded that Plaintiff suffered from an intellectual disability and Major Depressive

 Disorder. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s psychiatrist’s report, Defendant’s psychology

 staff examined Plaintiff themselves and concluded that Plaintiff suffered from an

 intellectual disability and Persistent Depressive Disorder. Plaintiff’s diagnoses

 triggered the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Program Statement 5310.16, which forbids

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Appellate Case: 22-1325     Document: 010111009931        Date Filed: 03/05/2024       Page: 4

 Defendant to incarcerate inmates with Persistent Depressive Disorders in ADX-

 Florence.1 Accordingly, Defendant transferred Plaintiff from ADX-Florence to the

 mental health unit at the United States Penitentiary in Allenwood, Pennsylvania

 (“USP-Allenwood”).

       Based on Plaintiff’s diagnoses, the district court determined that Plaintiff had

 an intellectual disability, depressive disorder, and suffered from serious mental

 illness. But before Defendant transferred Plaintiff to USP-Allenwood, the district

 court dismissed Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, holding that Plaintiff had failed

 to establish that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s disability.

 Because this was Plaintiff’s only remaining claim, the district court also entered

 judgment in Defendant’s favor.

       Plaintiff presents three issues for appeal. Plaintiff claims the district court

 erred by: (1) determining the class action settlement released his claims; (2) denying

 him leave to amend his complaint; and (3) entering judgment for Defendant.

                                            II.

       1
          A Federal Bureau of Prisons “program statement is ‘an interpretative
 statement of position circulated within [the] agency that serves to provide
 administrative guidance in applying a then existing published rule.’” Hunnicutt v.
 Hawk, 229 F.3d 997, 999 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (citing Pelissero
 v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999)). Program statements are “merely
 internal guidelines [that] may be altered by the Bureau at will.” Jacks v. Crabtree,
 114 F.3d 983, 985 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Koray v. Sizer,
 21 F.3d 558, 562 (3rd Cir. 1994), rev’d on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S.
 50 (1995)).
                                             4
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       We hold this appeal moot because Defendant no longer incarcerates Plaintiff at

 ADX-Florence. So we do not reach any of the issues Plaintiff raises on appeal.

       The doctrine of mootness rests on a simple principle: the controversy that

 existed at litigation’s commencement may dissipate before its conclusion. United

 States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011). We recognize two types of

 mootness: constitutional and prudential. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of

 Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1121 (10th Cir. 2010). Constitutional mootness stems

 from Article III’s requirement that federal courts only adjudicate “Cases” or

 “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Fletcher v. United States,

 116 F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Texas Int’l Corp., 974 F.2d 1246,

 1247 (10th Cir. 1992)). A case becomes constitutionally moot if it ceases to “present

 a real and substantial controversy with respect to which specific relief may be

 fashioned.” Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (citing Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S.

 472, 477 (1990)). In a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief, we may hold the case

 moot despite “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct” if the plaintiff does not show

 “continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96

 (1974).

       Following our precedent, we hold that this appeal is not constitutionally moot.

 As we explained in Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1029–30 (10th Cir. 2011), if a

 plaintiff sues the Federal Bureau of Prisons—rather than an individual facility or

 officer—the case does not become constitutionally moot if the Bureau transfers the

 plaintiff-inmate to a new facility. In such cases, the potential for prospective relief

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 exceeds the threshold of constitutional mootness. Id. So Plaintiff escapes

 constitutional mootness because he sues the Bureau generally.

       Still, even if a case survives our constitutional inquiry, we may dismiss it

 under the doctrine of prudential mootness.2 Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at

 1121 (quoting Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321). Prudential mootness concerns “not the

 power to grant relief but the court’s discretion in the exercise of that power.”

 Chamber of Com. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

 Under the Supreme Court’s original formulation of this doctrine, the movant must

 persuade the court that a “cognizable danger of recurrent violation” exists, beyond a

 “mere possibility.” Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t, 7 F.3d at 1492 (quoting United States v.

 W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). Under this doctrine, if the circumstances

 of a controversy become too attenuated, prudence counsels us not to reach the merits

 of the appeal. Id. at 1491–92 (quoting Chamber of Com., 627 F.2d at 291). We will

 hold a suit prudentially moot if the “circumstances [have] changed since the

 beginning of litigation that forestall any occasion for meaningful relief.” S. Utah

 Wilderness All. v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727–28 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing 13A Charles

 A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.3 (2d ed. 1984)). Although

 Plaintiff’s claims survive our constitutional-mootness examination, we hold

 Plaintiff’s claims prudentially moot. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a cognizable

       2
         We exercise prudential mootness only if a plaintiff seeks injunctive or
 declaratory relief. Bldg. & Constr. Dep’t v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1492
 (10th Cir. 1993).
                                             6
Appellate Case: 22-1325    Document: 010111009931         Date Filed: 03/05/2024     Page: 7

 danger of recurrent violation beyond a mere possibility, see W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.

 at 633, and prudential considerations encourage us to stay our hand, see Bldg. &

 Constr. Dep’t, 7 F.3d at 1491–92 (quoting Chamber of Com., 627 F.2d at 291).

       Four considerations inform our decision.3 First, Defendant no longer subjects

 Plaintiff to the specific conditions from which Plaintiff seeks relief. In each of his

 complaints, Plaintiff asked the district court for relief from various aspects of his

 incarceration at ADX-Florence. But because the location—and therefore

 conditions—of Plaintiff’s confinement have changed, Plaintiff has not yet asked any

 district court to relieve him from his current conditions. As we held in Jordan, if a

 plaintiff requests relief which “applies to [a plaintiff’s] current penal placement,” a

 subsequent facility transfer encourages us to hold the request prudentially moot.

 654 F.3d at 1034. Because the district court lacked the opportunity to either grant or

 deny this relief, we cannot prudently do so.

       Second, Plaintiff asks us to issue judgment without any information about his

 current conditions of confinement.4 From what conditions would our judgment

 provide Plaintiff relief? Which qualities of Plaintiff’s current incapacitation should

       3
           Although sufficient here, these considerations are not necessary: different—
 or fewer—prudential considerations may guide our judgment in future cases.
         4
           We deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal. Although
 we have “inherent equitable power to supplement the record on appeal,” United
 States v. Kennedy, 225 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Ross v. Kemp, 785
 F.2d 1467, 1474–75 (11th Cir. 1986)), we can exercise this power “only to the extent
 it is necessary to ‘truly disclose[] what occurred in the district court,’” Id. at 1191
 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(1)). Because Plaintiff’s Motion
 does not concern the district court proceedings, it is more akin to “a license to build a
 new record.” Id. So we deny the motion in accordance with our precedent. Id.
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 we hold improper? We do not know the answers to these questions because Plaintiff

 has not provided them in a complaint. Instead, Plaintiff invites us to make judgments

 based on conjecture and speculation. As in Jordan, we will likely hold an appeal

 prudentially moot if the plaintiff presents little “information regarding [the

 plaintiff’s] current conditions of confinement.” Id. at 1033. Neither Plaintiff’s

 complaints nor the district court’s findings supply a factual basis by which we can

 evaluate Plaintiff’s current conditions of confinement, rendering us underinformed

 about the matter Plaintiff asks us to resolve.

       Third, the record encourages us to hold Plaintiff’s case moot. As part of

 Defendant’s settlement with the class action of mentally disabled ADX-Florence

 inmates, Defendant assured the class that it would move the class members from

 ADX-Florence to USP-Allenwood’s mental health unit—where Defendant now

 incarcerates Plaintiff—or a comparable facility.5 Additionally, when Plaintiff

 received his diagnoses, Defendant promptly moved him to USP-Allenwood

 because—per Defendant’s internal policies—the Federal Bureau of Prisons does not

 designate ADX-Florence to house “seriously mentally ill inmates.” Program

 Statement 5310.16 at 19. Thus, to the limited extent that the record reveals the

 conditions of Plaintiff’s current confinement, it suggests that Defendant gave

       5
         We do not decide whether the class action settlement in Cunningham v.
 Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 12-cv-01570-RPM-MEH, 2016 WL 8786871 (D.
 Colo. Dec. 29, 2016), aff’d, 709 F. App’x 886 (10th Cir. 2017), binds Plaintiff. We
 reference this settlement only as a record-based insight into the relative conditions of
 Defendant’s facilities.

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Appellate Case: 22-1325      Document: 010111009931          Date Filed: 03/05/2024     Page: 9

 Plaintiff conditions preferable to those about which Plaintiff complained. This

 confirms that we should apply prudential mootness and dismiss this case.

        Finally, even if Plaintiff has requested relief that could have a continuing

 effect, this relief requires us to restrict the conduct of officials outside of this circuit.

 As a general principle, opinions handed down in one circuit do not bind other circuit

 courts. Hill v. Kan. Gas Serv. Co., 323 F.3d 858, 869 (10th Cir. 2003). Accordingly,

 prudence counsels us to be reluctant to issue judgments that bind extra-circuit

 officials. See Jordan, 654 F.3d at 1034. Such a judgment may not align with past or

 future Third Circuit precedent and may lead to disparate treatment of inmates at USP-

 Allenwood. Our precedent instructs us to find this type of plea prudentially moot.6

 Id. (citing Va. Soc’y for Hum. Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 263 F.3d 379, 394

 (4th Cir. 2001)).

        Under these considerations, Plaintiff has not persuaded us that he faces a

 cognizable danger of recurrent violation beyond a mere possibility.7 See Bldg. &

 Constr. Dep’t, 7 F.3d at 1491–92; W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633. In accordance

        6
          We recognize Plaintiff’s concern that some could misinterpret this holding as
 a license for the Federal Bureau of Prisons to concoct mootness by transferring
 litigant inmates. Because Plaintiff has not alleged—or presented evidence—that
 Defendant acted to create mootness, we need not answer whether or how we would
 apply this discretionary doctrine in such a case.
        7
         The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to file a fifth amended complaint.
 Although Plaintiff appeals this decision, we need not reach this issue. Because his
 proposed fifth amended complaint expressly addressed his conditions of confinement
 only at ADX-Florence, we would hold his appeal prudentially moot under either the
 fourth or fifth amended complaint.

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Appellate Case: 22-1325    Document: 010111009931        Date Filed: 03/05/2024    Page: 10

  with these considerations and our precedent, we dismiss this appeal as prudentially

  moot.8

           DISMISSED.

           8
            During oral argument, we asked Defendant whether it forfeited its prudential
  mootness argument under United States v. Winter Rose Old Rock, 76 F.4th 1314,
  1317–18 (10th Cir. 2023). Our questioning prompted Defendant to file its Motion to
  Dismiss Appeal as Prudentially Moot and for Leave to File Out of Time for Good
  Cause—prompting Plaintiff to file its Motion to Strike and File Response to Motion
  to Dismiss.
          In Winter Rose Old Rock, 76 F.4th at 1317 n.3, we held that under 10th
  Circuit Rule 27.3, parties forfeit all grounds for dismissal—except for lack of
  jurisdiction or waiver of appeal—not raised in a motion to dismiss within fourteen
  days of the filing of the notice of appeal, absent good cause. We conclude Winter
  Rose Old Rock does not preclude us from considering Defendant’s prudential
  mootness argument. First, we can find a case prudentially moot without the request
  of a party. Prudential mootness concerns whether the “party invoking the equitable
  remedial powers of the federal courts . . . ‘satisf[ied] the court that [the requested]
  relief is needed.’” Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1210–
  11 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632). Because we can hold
  sua sponte that a plaintiff has not satisfied this burden, we can dismiss this appeal as
  prudentially moot without considering Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
          Second, assuming Winter Rose Old Rock interpretation of Rule 27.3 applies to
  Defendant’s motion, we may suspend any part of our rules with or without party
  motion. 10th Cir. R. 2.1; Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 887
  F.3d 986, 988 (10th Cir. 2017). We do so here and evaluate the prudential mootness
  argument Defendant raised in its first brief and at oral argument. So we deny as
  moot Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Prudentially Moot and for Leave to
  File Out of Time for Good Cause, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and File Response
  to Motion to Dismiss.
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