Court Opinion

ID: 9645980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:41:24.989527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:33.609743
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy:
As the opinion of the Court shows, our rules and recent decisions indicate the following standards with regard to the withdrawal of guilty pleas before sentence has been entered:
1. Whether or not to grant such a request to withdraw is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Pa. R. Grim. P. 320.
2. This discretion should be liberally exercised in favor of allowing withdrawal; i.e., the request should *552be allowed “for any fair and just reason”, but not if the prosecution has been “substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the plea.” Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 299 A. 2d 268 (1973).
In the case at bar, the guilty plea originally tendered by the defendant was accepted only after an exhaustive colloquy conducted by the Hon. John J. Mc-Devitt, the trial judge. An examination of the notes of that hearing demonstrates that the judge was most careful in satisfying himself that the plea was made voluntarily and with full knowledge of what was entailed, and that there was a factual basis for it.
After the petition for leave to withdraw was filed, some 18 months later, the same judge held a two-day hearing before concluding to deny the request. In his memorandum opinion and supplemental memorandum in support of his order denying the request, Judge Mc-Devitt reviewed the testimony at both hearings and explained the reasons for his decision:
“Defendant signed a detailed' nine page statement on December 14, 1969 witnessed by his attorney, Herbert G-. Hardin, Esquire, and Detective Preston Scott. Later, defendant decided to withdraw his guilty plea, repudiated his confession, discharged his attorney and hired another attorney. He thereafter maintained that he was not part of the conspiracy and that he did not participate in the killing of Sonia Rosenbaum. In effect, defendant’s position is that Detective Scott and Herbert G. Hardin, Esquire, fabricated the story he told in his confession and that he had been “programmed” by his attorney to make certain responses at the initial hearing to determine the voluntariness of his confession.
“This position seems to be entirely preposterous in the light of Herbert G. Hardin’s long experience with criminal cases, the solid circumstantial evidence avail*553able to tlie police, and the consistency of this evidence with the detailed confession.
“In addition, Woods’ later testimony is replete with inconsistencies and unexplained damaging admissions which make his testimony completely unworthy of belief. No credible evidence was presented at any of the subsequent hearings to indicate that defendant was denied any constitutional rights, did not know what he had done or had not participated in the crime.
“Therefore, the Court’s initial determination that the confession was voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly made is unchanged.”
It is obvious that the trial court felt that the defendant’s about-face was unjustified and incredible. As he stated in his first opinion, “[Wjhere a defendant alleges that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly the matter is one of credibility and the Hearing Judge may refuse to believe the defendant’s version of what happened. Commonwealth v. Cushnie, 433 Pa. 131 (1969).”
I have favored the recognition that we have now made of the distinction between pre-sentence and post-sentence plea withdrawals, and of the rule that at the pre-sentence stage, the discretion of the trial court should be liberally exercised in favor of permitting the change in plea to be made. See Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, 264 A. 2d 643 (1970) (dissenting opinion of Justice Roberts, joined by this writer). It seems to me, however, that if we really mean that the tidal court has discretion in deciding whether or not to permit withdrawal of a plea, we must uphold the exercise of it in this case. If we mean that “any fair and just reason” will support a withdrawal (provided no substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth), that must mean something other than a complete retraction of everything the defendant had previously stated under *554oath in response to meticulous questioning. I find it difficult to accept as a fair and just reason what to the hearing court was obviously a cock-and-bull story. If the mere desire to change a plea is a fair and just reason, then a plea change becomes an absolute right (again, absent substantial prejudice to the prosecution) and we should declare it as such rather than talk in terms of discretion.
Finally, I point out that the ruling of the lower court here complained of was entered prior to our decision in Commonwealth v. Forbes, supra, decided January 19, 1973. If Forbes in effect changed the law to say that a belated protestation of innocence is, by itself, reason to allow a change of plea, then it should not be applied retroactively, as the Court appears here to do.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.