Court Opinion

ID: 9931045
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Date Created: 2024-02-08 15:03:09.914779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:17.554174
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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 22-CM-0611

                        ESTIFANOS T. MEDHIN, APPELLANT,

                                         V.

                            UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

                          Appeal from the Superior Court
                           of the District of Columbia
                              (2020-DVM-001277)

                     (Hon. Jennifer M. Anderson, Trial Judge)

(Argued December 5, 2023                                Decided February 8, 2024)

      Thomas G. Burgess for appellant.

      Chimnomnso N. Kalu, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Matthew
M. Graves, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, John P. Mannarino, and
Patricia-Joy Mpasi, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for
appellee.

      Before EASTERLY, MCLEESE, and SHANKER, ∗ Associate Judges.

      ∗
       Associate Judge AliKhan was originally assigned to this case. Following
her appointment to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, effective
December 12, 2023, Judge Shanker has been assigned to take her place on the panel.
                                          2

      EASTERLY, Associate Judge: Estifanos Medhin, who was convicted after a

bench trial of misdemeanor simple assault and sentenced to one year of probation in

lieu of the authorized maximum of six months’ incarceration, challenges the

Superior Court’s denial of his pre-trial motion for jury trial.        Mr. Medhin’s

conviction triggered a five-year ban on possessing a firearm in the District under

D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6). On appeal, Mr. Medhin argues that this penalty, which

he asserts implicates his fundamental right to bear arms under the Second

Amendment, is sufficiently serious to trigger his Sixth Amendment right to a jury

trial under Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (explaining

that a defendant may rebut the presumption that a petty offense punishable by less

than six months’ imprisonment does not trigger the right to a jury trial if they “can

demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the

maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect

a legislative determination that the offense in question is a ‘serious’ one”). We hold

that the Superior Court did not plainly err in failing to hold a jury trial in

Mr. Medhin’s case because it is not clear under current law that a temporary,

geographically limited firearm ban transforms an otherwise petty offense into an

offense triggering the right to a jury trial. (Mr. Medhin does not challenge the

constitutionality of D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6) on Second Amendment grounds and
                                         3

we express no view on that issue.) We therefore affirm the judgment of the Superior

Court.

                       I.    Facts and Procedural History

         On October 7, 2020, Mr. Medhin was charged by information with

misdemeanor sexual abuse and simple assault, based on allegations by the

complainant that Mr. Medhin had touched her vulva, over her clothes, 1 and stated

that he was going to rape her. Both offenses carry a maximum sentence of 180 days,

or six months, incarceration.    D.C. Code §§ 22-3006, 22-404(a)(1).        Because

Mr. Medhin and the complainant lived in the same residence, both offenses also

constituted an “intrafamily offense,” as that term was previously broadly defined.

See D.C. Code § 16-1001(8) (2009) (defining “intrafamily offense” as

“interpersonal, intimate partner, or intrafamily violence”) & § 16-1001 (6)(A)

(2009) (defining “interpersonal violence” as “a criminal offense that is

committed . . . upon a person . . . [w]ith whom the offender shares or has shared a

        The complainant alleged that Mr. Medhin had touched her “vagina,” but
         1

given that the contact was made over her clothes and the vagina is an internal organ,
we understand her to have meant that Mr. Medhin touched her vulva. Cf. Roberts v.
United States, 216 A.3d 870, 874 (D.C. 2019) (noting that it was unclear in that case
whether the complainant “was using the term ‘vagina’ in its precise anatomical sense
or more colloquially to refer to the vulva”).
                                          4

mutual residence”) 2; see also Shewarega v. Yegzaw, 947 A.2d 47, 52 (D.C. 2008)

(concluding that the term “mutual residence,” as used in D.C. Code § 16-1001,

applied to parties who had no relationship but lived in the same boarding house).

      After the Superior Court scheduled a non-jury trial for June 15, 2022,

Mr. Medhin requested a jury trial, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. Because he is

a lawful permanent resident with a prior conviction for a crime of moral turpitude,

Mr. Medhin stated that, if he were to be convicted either of sexual abuse or simple

assault, he could be deported. Relying on this court’s decision in Bado v. United

States, 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018) (en banc), Mr. Medhin argued that the penalty of

deportation is sufficiently serious to overcome the presumption that his offenses

were petty and to trigger his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

      The government subsequently filed an amended information wherein it

charged Mr. Medhin only with simple assault. The government separately filed an

opposition to Mr. Medhin’s request for a jury trial, arguing that the amended

information rendered his arguments related to the sexual abuse charge moot and that

      2
        D.C. Code § 16-1001 was amended in 2021 by the Intrafamily Offenses and
Anti-Stalking Orders Amendment Act, D.C. Law 23-275. The statute now defines
“intrafamily offense” as “[a]n offense punishable as a criminal offense against an
intimate partner, a family member, or a household member,” D.C. Code
§ 16-1001(8)(A), and defines “household member” in pertinent part as “a person
with whom, in the past year, the offender . . . [s]hares or has shared a mutual
residence[,] and . . . maintained a close relationship, beyond mere acquaintances,
rendering application of the statute appropriate,” D.C. Code § 16-1001(5B)(A).
                                            5

simple assault is not a deportable offense because it is not a “crime involving moral

turpitude” and does not constitute a “crime of domestic violence” within the meaning

of that term under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mr. Medhin did not file a

response. Two weeks later, the Superior Court rejected Mr. Medhin’s jury demand.

Acknowledging Mr. Medhin’s argument that the deportation consequence of an

offense could rebut the presumption that an offense is petty and ineligible for a jury

trial, the court ruled that simple assault, the only charge Mr. Medhin faced, is not a

deportable offense.

      The Superior Court held a bench trial on August 8, 2022. After crediting the

complainant’s testimony over Mr. Medhin’s, the court found Mr. Medhin guilty of

simple assault and sentenced him to ninety days’ incarceration in favor of one year’s

supervised probation. The court also informed him, “[b]ecause this is a crime of

domestic violence, you may not own or possess a firearm.” Mr. Medhin timely

appealed.

                                    II.    Analysis

      Upon Mr. Medhin’s conviction, he automatically became subject to D.C.

Code § 22-4503(a)(6), which provides that “[n]o person shall own or keep a firearm,

or have a firearm in his or her possession . . . , within the District of Columbia, if the

person . . . [h]as been convicted within the past 5 years of an intrafamily offense, as
                                           6

defined in D.C. Official Code § 16-1001(8), punishable as a misdemeanor.” 3 appeal,

Mr. Medhin has abandoned his pre-trial claim that he was entitled to a jury trial

under Bado because of the potential deportation consequences of his charged

offenses; instead he argues that D.C. Code § 22-4503(6)’s “onerous and potentially

deadly” deprivation of an individual’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear

arms, U.S. Const. amend. II, is sufficiently serious to transform his presumptively

petty simple assault charge into a serious offense, thereby entitling him to a jury trial

under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

                                 A.     Preservation

      Mr. Medhin’s motion for a jury trial was based entirely on the potential

deportation consequences of his charged offenses. Nevertheless, he argues that his

jury trial argument grounded in the Second Amendment is preserved on appeal

because, pursuant to Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992), “[h]e is

entitled to make any arguments in support of” his general claim below that he was

entitled to a jury trial. The government argues that Mr. Medhin’s jury trial claim is

      3
        When the Superior Court informed Mr. Medhin at sentencing that he was
banned from possessing a firearm, it did not mention D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6) or
its five-year ban on possessing firearms for an individual convicted of an
“intrafamily offense.” Because a seemingly temporally unlimited ban has no
obvious legal or factual foundation, in assessing the seriousness of Mr. Medhin’s
offense and his right to a jury trial, we limit our focus to the self-executing five-year
ban under D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6).
                                          7

reviewable only for plain error. See Grogan v. United States, 271 A.3d 196, 212

(D.C. 2022) (reaffirming that where a criminal defendant fails to preserve a claim in

the trial court, this court reviews only for “plain error”). On this record, we agree

with the government.

      “This court does not ‘apply plain error review in a rigid fashion which elevates

form over the practical dynamics of trial litigation.’” Tinsley v. United States, 868

A.2d 867, 883 (D.C. 2005) (Glickman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(quoting Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 154 (D.C. 1999)). “We appreciate

that difficult questions may . . . arise at trial with little warning, and . . . trial

counsel . . . may be understandably taken off guard by a completely unexpected

denouement.” Id. (quoting Salmon v. United States, 719 A.2d 949, 953 (D.C. 1997))

(internal quotation marks omitted). “When that happens, our cases do not hold

counsel to unrealistic standards of precision. Rather, we treat a claim as preserved

for appeal so long as the judge is fairly apprised as to the question on which she is

being asked to rule.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). But the

trial judge in Mr. Medhin’s case was only “fairly apprised” of his argument that he

was entitled to a jury trial because of the deportation consequences of the charges he

faced, and not because of the Second Amendment implications. And this is not a

case where leeway is warranted given the fast-paced nature of trial court

proceedings.
                                         8

      The trial court was not “fairly apprised” of Mr. Medhin’s argument that he

was entitled to a jury trial because of the Second Amendment implications of a

conviction for simple assault; that argument was not “fairly included” in an analysis

of his argument that he was entitled to a jury trial because of the deportation

consequences of a conviction for misdemeanor sexual abuse. 4 See Gilchrist v.

United States, 954 A.2d 1006, 1012-13 (D.C. 2008) (holding that challenge to

statement’s admissibility as a declaration against penal interest under Laumer did

not preserve constitutional claims); see also, e.g., Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d

970, 980-82 (D.C. 2010) (holding that challenge to expert’s qualifications did not

preserve challenge to expert’s methodology); Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d

1181, 1186-88 (D.C. 2008) (concluding that defendant’s Rule 403 objection did not

preserve hearsay argument). Mr. Medhin’s Second Amendment argument requires

both confirmation that his simple assault conviction is a qualifying “intrafamily

offense” under D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6) (prohibiting anyone convicted of an

intrafamily offense from possessing a firearm), and analysis of a whole body of post-

Heller Second Amendment precedent.           See infra Part II.B.   But neither the

      4
       In his motion for a jury trial, Mr. Medhin asserted that if he were “convicted
of even one count of sex abuse . . . or alternatively of simple assault, he could be
rendered deportable.” But the entirety of his analysis related to the deportation
consequences of a misdemeanor sex abuse conviction.
                                           9

“intrafamily offense” provision of the statute nor this case law was brought to the

court’s attention even in passing. 5

      Moreover, after the government filed an amended information that no longer

contained a charge carrying deportation consequences and filed an opposition to

Mr. Medhin’s motion for a jury trial on that basis, Mr. Medhin had ample time

before the court ruled—two weeks—to file a response (or seek an extension of time)

to explain that he was entitled to a jury trial because of the Second Amendment

implications of D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6). But he did not file a response or seek

an extension. By seemingly indicating that he had no further objection to a bench

trial, Mr. Medhin failed to preserve this argument. See Coleman v. United States,

202 A.3d 1127, 1133-34 (D.C. 2019) (reviewing defendant’s claim for plain error

where defendant “initially requested a jury trial [on the stalking charge], [but] he did

not object to the amended information and made no jury demand on the attempted

stalking charge”); cf. Parker v. United States, 757 A.2d 1280, 1289 (D.C. 2000)

      5
         Counsel suggested at oral argument that the Superior Court must have been
“apprised” of the issue because it instructed Mr. Medhin at sentencing that he was
prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm as a result of his domestic violence
offense. But as explained above, the court did not cite the statute and referenced a
seemingly temporally unlimited ban. See supra n.2. Moreover, there is no
indication that the court was on notice either of the Second Amendment implications
of its ban or that these implications might trigger Mr. Medhin’s Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial under a Blanton analysis.
                                           10

(“[W]hen an objection has been overruled at an earlier stage of the trial and the

circumstances change as the trial progresses, the defendant must renew the objection

on the basis of the changed circumstances in order to preserve the claim . . . for

appeal.”) (emphasis added).

      For these reasons, we conclude that applying plain error review is appropriate

under the circumstances.

                  B.     The Seriousness of the Firearm Penalty

      Under plain error review, an appellant must show that the objectionable action

was (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects the appellant’s substantial rights, and

(4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings. Grogan, 271 A.3d at 212-13. Assuming without deciding that the

Superior Court’s denial of Mr. Medhin’s motion for jury trial was error, we conclude

that this error was not plain.

      An error is plain if it is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable

dispute.” Williams v. United States, 210 A.3d 734, 743 (D.C. 2019) (quoting In re

Taylor, 73 A.3d 85, 96 (2013)). The error must be “clear under current law,” as in

“at the time of our appellate review.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because the maximum sentence for Mr. Medhin’s simple assault offense is six

months, it is within the “category of petty crimes or offenses which is

[presumptively] not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision.” Blanton,
                                          11

489 U.S. at 541 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968)). That is,

unless Mr. Medhin “can demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed

in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe

that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a

‘serious’ one,” he is not entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at

543.

       It is not “clear or obvious” under current law that a temporary, geographically

limited prohibition on firearm ownership and possession, in conjunction with a six-

month maximum sentence, is “so severe” as to reflect a determination by the D.C.

Council that intrafamily offenses subject to that penalty are sufficiently serious to

warrant a jury trial. Mr. Medhin contends that his “argument cannot be met without

reckoning with Heller.” Certainly the Supreme Court’s discussion of an individual’s

right to bear arms under the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008), McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), and N.Y.

State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), are relevant to our review

for plain error to the extent that they speak to the severity of the penalty at issue.

Indeed, we agree with Mr. Medhin that Heller and its progeny suggest that the

intrafamily offense firearm ban is not de minimis: the Second Amendment

“guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of

confrontation[s],” and so long as Mr. Medhin resides in the District, the firearm ban
                                          12

under D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(6) makes no exception for Mr. Medhin’s home,

“where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.” Heller, 554

U.S. at 592, 628. Yet we are aware of no case—and Mr. Medhin has not pointed to

any—holding that a temporary firearm restriction is sufficiently serious to overcome

the presumption that a petty offense does not warrant a jury trial under the Sixth

Amendment.

      More generally, this court’s recent decisions discussing the right to a jury trial

under Blanton—Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243 (D.C. 2018) (en banc), and

Fallen v. United States, 290 A.3d 486 (D.C. 2023)—do not provide Mr. Medhin with

the foundation he needs to show plain error. It is true, as this court stated in Fallen,

that “neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that actual physical

containment is necessary to deem a penalty sufficiently severe,” 290 A.3d at 496.

And we decline to endorse the government’s contention that a penalty cannot be

sufficiently severe under Blanton absent a showing of “life-altering” consequences

such as the physical separation from one’s home and family attendant to deportation,

see Bado, 186 A.3d at 1250-52, or the severe invasions of privacy and public

humiliation attendant to sex offender registration, see Fallen, 290 A.3d at 496-99.

Nonetheless, lacking any other examples, we cannot say that current law would

clearly direct a trial court to find a temporary, geographically limited firearm ban

sufficiently severe to entitle a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor to a jury trial.
                                            13

      Mr. Medhin urges us to rely on a case in which the Nevada Supreme Court

concluded that, in amending the penalties attached to misdemeanor domestic battery

to include a permanent prohibition on the possession or control of firearms, the

Nevada Legislature “indicated that the offense . . . is serious” and, therefore, “one

facing the charge is entitled to the right to a jury trial.” Andersen v. Eighth Jud. Dist.

Ct., 448 P.3d 1120, 1124 (Nev. 2019). But he does not explain why a permanent

ban is comparable to a five-year ban. The space between five years and an indefinite

number of years is far too wide to characterize the seriousness of the former as

“obvious” or “clear under current law.”

      Mr. Medhin also cites Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1990).

The fifteen-year ban on holding a driver’s license at issue in Richter is closer to the

five-year ban in Mr. Medhin’s case but is still three times as long and addresses a

different activity—the ability to drive, “which individuals in a modern society

depend upon . . . for the pursuit of their livelihood.” Id. at 1205. Accordingly,

Richter, which is not binding precedent on this court, still does not provide the

requisite support for “plain” error here.

      If any error can be said to have occurred below, we hold that it was not plain.

Because Mr. Medhin has failed to meet the second prong of the plain error test, we

affirm the Superior Court’s denial of Mr. Medhin’s motion for jury trial.

                                                              So ordered.