Court Opinion

ID: 9752029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:30:10.86684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:43.085702
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the appeal of Ranney Moran is not frivolous and that DOT is not entitled to counsel fees under Pa.R.A.P. 2744. I also agree that the order of the trial court must be affirmed; as my reasons for affirming differ from the those of the majority, I respectfully offer this concurring opinion.
At issue herein is the interrelationship between sections 1537 and 1539 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1537 and 1539. The applicable sections provide:
(b) Subsequent accumulation of points. — When a driver’s record is reduced to zero points and is maintained at zero points for 12 consecutive months, any accumulation of points thereafter shall be regarded as the initial accumulation of points.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1537(b) (emphasis added). Further, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1539 provides:
(a) General rule. — When any person’s driving record shows an accumulation of 11 points or more, the department shall suspend the operating privilege of the person as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Duration of suspension. — The first suspension shall be for a period of 5 days for each point, the second suspension shall be for a period of 10 days for each point, the third suspension shall be for a period of 15 days for each point and any subsequent suspension shall be for a period of one year.
(c) Determination of subsequent suspensions. — Every suspension and revocation under any provision of this sub-chapter shall be counted in determining whether a suspension is a second, third or subsequent suspension. Acceptance into Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for an *662offense enumerated in section 1532 ... shall be considered a suspension in making such determination.
It is undisputed that Moran was placed in Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) in 1982 because he had operated his automobile under the influence of alcohol in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731.1 Moran’s license was suspended in 1983 because his point total reached eleven because of violations unrelated to the drunken driving charge. DOT treated this suspension as Moran’s second and the suspension was for 110 days.2 In 1984, his license was suspended for a third time for three months because he was placed in ARD for again violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731. Thereafter, Moran’s point total was reduced to zero and remained at that level for more than one year. In 1989, Moran began accumulating points for a series of violations until his point total exceeded the maximum of eleven. DOT suspended his license for one year, claiming that the suspension was Moran’s fourth.
Moran has made only one argument throughout these proceedings; he asserts that because his point total was reduced to zero and remained at that level for more than one year, DOT must consider this current suspension for accumulation of points to be his first. Moran argues that DOT should ignore the two admissions into ARD. The majority rejects that argument. I also believe that argument is wrong, for it renders meaningless the legislative mandate of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1539(c) which specifically requires that suspensions based upon an admission to ARD must be counted. That being said, I nonetheless believe that the majority’s interpretation of the sections involved renders meaningless the legislative mandate of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1537(b).
It is well settled that a statute should be interpreted in a manner as to give meaning to all sections if possible. 1 *663Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2); Jones v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Midland-Ross Corp.), 148 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 593, 612 A.2d 570 (1992). I believe that Moran’s present suspension for accumulation of points should be considered his third; by reducing his point total to zero and having it remain there for more than one year, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1537(b) requires that the suspension for accumulation of points in 1983 be erased as if it had never occurred. Nonetheless, those suspensions that were for other than accumulation of points must still be considered. Thus, I believe that this suspension should be considered Moran’s third for purposes of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1539(c). This interpretation accords meaning to all of the sections.
As Moran has set forth only one argument and as that argument is incorrect, this court has no choice but to affirm. Hence, this concurring opinion.

. The record does not show that Moran's license was ever suspended for his first admission into ARD. Moran does not argue that the DOT’s failure to prove an actual suspension negates that "suspension”. Because Moran fails to claim that a non-suspension cannot be counted, I express no view on that question.

. Violations of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 are specifically enumerated as offenses under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532.