Court Opinion

ID: 9847716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:05:58.099444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:28.859080
License: Public Domain

*267Duff, J.,
with whom Koontz, C.J., Baker, J., and Bray, J., join, dissenting.
The record contains no evidence from which the commission could have found that the claimant was an employee for services performed in her housecleaning duties. Furthermore, the issue presented is neither complex nor technical; thus, the normal deference accorded to the commission’s finding should not be applied to justify a ruling in this Court when there is no evidence in the record in support of the commission’s finding. Therefore, I am unable to join in the majority opinion.
In reaching its decision that claimant was an employee rather than an independent contractor, the commission considered the homeowners’ right to control “the method and the means” by which the work was performed. See Phillips v. Brinkley, 194 Va. 62, 66-67, 72 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1952). The commission found from the evidence that claimant was employed as “a day worker or a ‘servant’, rather than as an independent contractor.” Further, citing Phillips, the commission held that she was an employee based upon the fact that “the nature of the employment in which claimant engaged ... is the kind of work over which each employer had direct control.” The record supports neither of those findings.
The evidence in the record shows that claimant did not work for “wages” from the various homeowners. She contracted for a price per house of between forty-five to fifty dollars. Claimant’s 1988 tax returns were introduced as exhibits and showed that she reported a profit of $11,440 as outside income from her “housekeeping” business. She paid self-employment tax on this amount, and she paid her own withholding and social security taxes. There was no evidence in the record that claimant was transported to the houses by the homeowners. As well, there was no evidence in the record that any of the homeowners retained or exercised the right to “control the methods or means of doing the work.” Furthermore, claimant stipulated at the hearing that her housecleaning work was done as a sole proprietor. This, of course, is a form of business operation in which one person owns all of the assets of the business. Black’s Law Dictionary 1392 (6th ed. 1991). The commission’s opinion fails to consider the stipulation.
*268I would hold that the stipulation was a relevant, indeed necessary, consideration in determining whether claimant was an employee or an independent contractor. The stipulation may not have been binding, as a matter of law, on the issue presented. However, it was a highly probative admission that should have merited careful weighing along with the other evidence presented. This was not done.
Turning to the issue of control exercised by the homeowners over claimant’s work, I fully recognize that factual findings of the commission are binding on appeal. However, if no credible evidence exists in support of a factual finding, the issue of sufficiency of the evidence is one of law for this court to decide. Spruill v. C.W. Wright Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 330, 333, 381 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1989). No evidence in the record supports the commission’s finding that “the nature of the employment in which Crawley engaged. . . is the kind of work over which each employer had direct control.” Claimant had the burden of proving that she is an employee within the definition of Code § 65.1-4. See Behrensen v. Whitaker, 10 Va. App. 364, 366, 392 S.E.2d 508, 509 (1990). Neither claimant nor any other witness testified that any of the homeowners exercised or had the right to exercise control over how she did her work. The reasonable inference to be drawn from the record was that claimant contracted for a given result for a fixed price, a clean house for forty-five or fifty dollars, classic indicia of an independent contractor.
The majority opinion emphasizes the deference that the courts must give to the “technical expertise and more extensive experience” of the administrative agency. It is basic that the more technical and complex the issue, the more deference should be accorded to the finding of the agency. There is nothing esoteric, technical or complex about whether control of the methods and means of doing claimant’s work was exercised by the homeowners. Either it was or it was not, and this finding depends on the evidence introduced. I would not give great deference to the finding of an administrative agency on a non-technical issue such as this, nor would I hold that such deference constitutes a proper substitute for evidence.
The question whether a finding is supported by evidence is one of law subject to judicial review and independent determination by the court. The action of the administrative agency will be over*269turned where it lacks the requisite support in the evidence. 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 678 (1962). I do not find such support in the record before us and would reverse the findings and remand for the entry of an order disallowing the combining of the business profits with the wages earned with Metropolitan Cleaning Corporation.