Court Opinion

ID: 9959642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:06:11.782917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:42.650862
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 23–0858

             Submitted February 19, 2024—Filed March 29, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellant,

vs.

FARON ALAN STARR,

      Appellee.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey A.

Neary, Judge.

      The State appeals a district court order granting a motion to suppress due

to failure to honor a defendant’s request to call a family member following arrest

and arrival at the police station. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

      Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden (argued) and
Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.

      Lucas M. Taylor (argued) of Anderson & Taylor, PLLC, Des Moines, for

appellee.
                                        2

MANSFIELD, Justice.
      I. Introduction.

      Iowa law requires that a person who is arrested be permitted to call and

consult a family member or an attorney (or both) “without unnecessary delay

after arrival at the place of detention.” Iowa Code § 804.20 (2022). In this case,

we are called on to decide whether a police officer could refuse an arrested

person’s request to call his father in order to obtain an attorney and instead

question the arrested person. The State argues that the officer did not delay

“unreasonably” because there was a paramount safety issue: the arrested person

had fled a crime scene the day before and was suspected of having burglarized

two long guns in the course of his flight; when arrested, he did not have the guns

on him.

      We do not foreclose the possibility that public safety concerns can justify

a delay in honoring an arrested person’s invocation of Iowa section 804.20, but

we conclude that the circumstances here did not. Therefore, we affirm the district

court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress.

      II. Facts and Procedural History.

      On the morning of November 7, 2022, M.N. ran into a convenience store
in Sioux City, yelling that her boyfriend, Faron Starr, had just assaulted her.

Starr was holding a knife as he ran up to the store behind her. M.N. had a stab

wound in her leg. By the time law enforcement responded to the call from the

store, Starr had fled the scene. M.N. was taken to the hospital.

      Within a few minutes, a report came in of a burglary at a house within a

block or two of the convenience store. The house was located in the same

direction Starr had fled. The homeowner reported that an AR-15, a shotgun, and

ammunition were missing. Police suspected that Starr had committed the
                                         3

burglary. They ordered that two nearby schools and the hospital be placed on

lockdown and continued to try to locate Starr.

      The following day, November 8, the lockdowns were lifted even though

Starr had not yet been found. Starr was eventually arrested at around 3:30 p.m.

outside the hospital where M.N. had gone for treatment. At that time, Starr also

had an outstanding warrant for a parole violation. But he did not have the knife

or guns in his possession.

      The police took Starr to the Sioux City Police Department and called in

Detective Grimsley to question him. Detective Grimsley took about forty-five

minutes to arrive at the station and enter the interview room. He asked Starr a

few questions. After a couple of minutes, he read Starr his Miranda rights and

asked him to sign an acknowledgment.

      Starr equivocated. Initially he said, “I don’t really care to talk to anybody.”

He added, “I’ve been trying to talk to people for a long time.” But then a few

moments later, Starr said, “I really do want to talk to you.” Starr started

answering Detective Grimsley’s questions and interjected that he would sign the

acknowledgment. After another minute of questions and answers, Detective

Grimsley reminded Starr of his need to sign the acknowledgment:

      [L]ike I said, I’ve got to get acknowledgment from you that you’re
      willing to talk to me. If you sign that it doesn’t mean you have to sit
      here and talk to me for three hours. You can stop at any time.

Detective Grimsley filled out the acknowledgment with Starr’s name and handed

it to Starr. The discussion then proceeded as follows:

            Detective Grimsley: Okay. Just right there. We can talk a little
      further.

            Starr: I just really don’t see how that would help anything.

            Detective Grimsley: How about that if you’re willing to sign it
      and listen, I can talk to you a little bit?
                                         4

            Starr: I just wish we can just get to the point.

            Detective Grimsley: That’s what I want to do.

            Starr: Because we’re not legally -- we’re not --

            Detective Grimsley: What’s that?

             Starr: In other words, if I don’t touch this thing, then we’re not
      legally allowed to talk or something?

            Detective Grimsley: Exactly, yeah.

            Starr: Then why don’t I just call my father and have him get a
      lawyer and we can sign this paper and we can talk?

           Detective Grimsley: Well, that’s the thing. That wouldn’t
      happen today.

            Starr: Nothing.

            Detective Grimsley: But I want to talk to you today, right now.

            Starr: I just don’t even, I don’t know if that’s a good decision
      or not.

            Detective Grimsley: Yeah.

             Starr: Like I just said, it’s not you as a person. Nothing like
      that. I don’t --

            Detective Grimsley: I understand.

            Starr: -- know what the hell is going on.

            Detective Grimsley: Yeah. And we can’t obviously give you
      advice or anything like that.

      Starr never did sign the acknowledgment of his Miranda rights. However,

the interview between Starr and Detective Grimsley continued. About thirty-five

minutes later, Starr admitted stabbing M.N. with the knife. He implied that he

had dropped the knife while running away. After another fifteen minutes or so,

Detective Grimsley raised the subject of the missing guns:

            Detective Grimsley: One thing I am concerned about is a
      couple guns that got taken yesterday.
                                         5

             Starr: Okay.

           Detective Grimsley: I don’t want those guns on the street
      anymore.

             Starr: Okay.

             Detective Grimsley: Do you know where those guns are?

             Starr: You want me to get rid of them?

             Detective Grimsley: I want them off the street, yeah.

             Starr: You want to get rid of them?

             Detective Grimsley: I want to get them off the street. Yeah.

             Starr: Well, let’s go get them.

      After additional back-and-forth, the police agreed to Starr’s proposal that

he would personally lead them to the house and the individual with whom he

had left the guns. The guns were retrieved, and the parties returned to the police

station. Detective Grimsley’s questioning resumed and became more specific

about the events of the previous day. Starr admitted to more details about the

stabbing and the burglary of the guns.

      Toward the end of this questioning, over two hours after Starr’s initial

request to contact his father, Starr asked again to call his father. Starr also said

he wanted to apologize to M.N. Detective Grimsley said he could not let Starr call

M.N. but offered him the opportunity to call his father. Detective Grimsley

volunteered to bring a phone. He asked Starr if he knew his father’s number;

Starr shook his head. There was a phone book sitting on the desk in front of

Starr. The discussion moved elsewhere and ended soon thereafter.

      On November 16, a trial information was filed in the Woodbury County

District Court charging Starr with willful injury as a habitual offender in violation

of Iowa Code sections 708.4(2) and 902.8, second-degree burglary in violation of
Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.5(1), going armed with intent as a habitual
                                          6

offender in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.8 and 902.8, domestic abuse

assault third offense as a habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code sections

708.2A(4) and 902.8, and two counts being a felon in possession of a firearm as

a habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code sections 724.26(1) and 902.8.

      Starr filed a motion to suppress his statements of November 8 and

evidence developed therefrom. He asserted violations of his constitutional rights

to remain silent under the United States and Iowa Constitutions and his

statutory rights under Iowa Code section 804.20. The State responded that Starr

had not unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights. The State also argued that

a public safety exception to both Miranda and Iowa Code section 804.20 applied

given the urgency of locating the stolen firearms and ammunition.

      The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. Detective

Grimsley was the only live witness, but the police station videos of Starr’s

questioning were also presented. On the matter of public safety, Detective

Grimsley testified,

      The guns were probably -- definitely my top priority in this. They
      were unaccounted for. We didn’t know where they could have gone.
      We didn’t know if they were stashed somewhere. . . . [W]e were
      searching garages and alleys, dumpsters, yards for these
      firearms. . . . [L]ike I mentioned, this is a -- a rather large residential
      area.

Detective Grimsley added that his concern was,

      That anyone and everyone walking around could have -- could have
      picked them up and found them. Kids walking back and forth from
      school could have found them. And they’re very, very dangerous
      weapons. So we didn’t want that to happen.

      The district court issued a ruling partly denying and partly granting the

motion to suppress. The court found that Starr had not made an unambiguous

invocation of his Miranda rights, so there was no constitutional violation:
                                         7

            This evidence does not demonstrate clearly that Starr
      intended to exercise his right to remain silent and refuse to answer
      questions from Detective Grimsley. Starr’s response, when heard on
      the recording, clearly conveys a desire to speak with Grimsley, but
      with some hesitation and equivocation that appropriately prompted
      Grimsley to seek clarification. Grimsley’s effort to clarify whether
      Starr would be willing to speak with him and thus waive his right to
      remain silent was reasonable and necessary in order for him to
      properly navigate the Constitutional safeguards provided to Starr by
      Miranda and to discern the level of Starr’s willingness and desire to
      waive those protections.

      Yet the district court concluded that Starr’s rights under Iowa Code section

804.20 had been violated. The court noted that early in the interview, before any

discussion of the guns or almost all the discussion of the assault on M.N., Starr

asked to call his father. In the court’s view, “Starr’s statement [was] clear enough

to invoke the provisions of Iowa Code Section 804.20.”

      The district court then addressed the State’s argument that a public safety

exception applied under section 804.20. The court rejected this argument,

concluding as follows:

      As of this point, no such exception has been recognized. It is likely
      that the Iowa Supreme Court would look favorably on such a
      suggestion under the proper circumstances, but it is the prerogative
      of the Iowa Supreme Court to carve out exceptions to statutes and
      constitutional provisions and not the District Court.

      The court thus suppressed all evidence obtained after Detective Grimsley’s

denial early in the interview of Starr’s request to call his father, when Detective

Grimsley answered, “Well, that’s the thing. That wouldn’t happen today.”

      The State applied for interlocutory review of the district court’s order

suppressing evidence based on the violation of Iowa Code section 804.20. We

granted the application and retained the appeal.

      III. Standard of Review.

      “Our review of the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress is for
the correction of legal error because the basis for the motion is statutory.” State
                                          8

v. Casper, 951 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Iowa 2020). “If the district court applied the law

correctly and substantial evidence supports the court’s findings of fact, we will

affirm the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress.” State v. Davis, 922

N.W.2d 326, 330 (Iowa 2019).

      IV. Analysis.

      A. Overview of Iowa Code Section 804.20. We must decide whether the

district court correctly applied Iowa Code section 804.20 in this case. That

section, entitled “Communications by arrested persons,” provides,

              Any peace officer or other person having custody of any person
      arrested or restrained of the person’s liberty for any reason
      whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after
      arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member
      of the person’s family or an attorney of the person’s choice, or both.
      Such person shall be permitted to make a reasonable number of
      telephone calls as may be required to secure an attorney. If a call is
      made, it shall be made in the presence of the person having custody
      of the one arrested or restrained. If such person is intoxicated, or a
      person under eighteen years of age, the call may be made by the
      person having custody. An attorney shall be permitted to see and
      consult confidentially with such person alone and in private at the
      jail or other place of custody without unreasonable delay. A violation
      of this section shall constitute a simple misdemeanor.

Iowa Code § 804.20 (emphasis added). The State argues that the statute—by its

terms—prohibits only “unnecessary delay” in honoring an arrestee’s request to
make a phone call to a family member. It contends that delay here was necessary

because of the threat to public safety posed by the missing firearms. Starr

maintains that there is no public safety exception to the rights afforded by

section 804.20. And he adds that even if there were such an exception, it would

not apply under the facts of this case.

      Notably, the original version of what is now Iowa Code section 804.20

differed in some respects from the current version, which dates to the 1976
criminal Code revision. See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245 (ch. 2), § 421 (codified at
                                          9

Iowa Code § 804.20 (Supp. 1977)). As originally enacted in 1959, the statute

read,

              Any peace officer or other person having custody of any person
        arrested or restrained of his liberty for any reason whatever, shall,
        before preliminary hearing and arraignment, except in cases of
        imminent danger of escape, permit that person, without
        unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to call,
        consult, and see a member of his or her family or an attorney of his
        or her choice. If a call is made, it shall be made in the presence of
        the person having custody of the one arrested or restrained. If the
        person arrested or restrained is intoxicated, or a person under
        eighteen years of age, the call shall be made by the person having
        custody. An attorney shall be permitted to see and consult the
        person arrested or restrained alone and in private at the jail or other
        place of custody. . . . A violation of this section shall constitute a
        misdemeanor.

1959 Iowa Acts ch. 373, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 755.17 (1962)). Thus, the

present-day version omits the exception for “cases of imminent danger of

escape”; makes clear that the detainee can call, consult, or see both a family

member and an attorney; indicates that a reasonable number of calls to secure

an attorney shall be permitted; and makes clear that an attorney shall be

permitted to see and consult confidentially with the detainee “without

unreasonable delay.” Iowa Code § 804.20.

        Iowa Code section 804.20 applies to all persons who have been arrested,
not just persons arrested on suspicion of drunk driving. State v. Sewell, 960

N.W.2d 640, 645 (Iowa 2021). “On its face Iowa Code section 804.20 is a statute

of general application. There is no indication in the statute that it is only

concerned with the implied consent doctrine or the administration of breath

tests.” State v. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667, 674 (Iowa 2005). The first case in

our court applying the original 1959 version of section 804.20 was a murder

case. See State v. Shephard, 124 N.W.2d 712, 714, 718 (Iowa 1963).
                                        10

      We have said that a suspect’s invocation of their right to communicate

with a family member or attorney should be construed “liberally.” Davis, 922

N.W.2d at 330–31 (quoting State v. Lamoreux, 875 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Iowa 2016));

see also State v. Hellstern, 856 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa 2014). In State v. Garrity,

we held that once a detainee asks to make a phone call to any person, the officer

has an obligation to advise the detainee of the persons to whom calls can be

made under the statute. 765 N.W.2d 592, 596–97 (Iowa 2009). In State v. Hicks,

we held that once the statute is invoked by requesting a call to an appropriate

person, “the detaining officer must direct the detainee to the phone and invite

the detainee to place his call or obtain the phone number from the detainee and

place the phone call himself.” 791 N.W.2d 89, 97 (Iowa 2010). In State v. Lyon,

we observed that “we have insisted that law enforcement officers not play games

when faced with a request from a person in custody to communicate with the

outside world after being arrested.” 862 N.W.2d 391, 401 (Iowa 2015).

      At the same time, we have recognized practical limits on this right of

communication and consultation. Davis, 922 N.W.2d at 331 (stating that we also

apply the statute “pragmatically”). One such limit is the two-hour time window

for chemical testing when the individual has been arrested for operating while
intoxicated. See State v. Walker, 804 N.W.2d 284, 290 (Iowa 2011) (“The time for

consultation is, however, effectively limited by law enforcement’s interest in

obtaining the test within two hours . . . .”); Garrity, 765 N.W.2d at 595–96, 596

n.1 (“[T]he arrestee’s right to prior consultation is limited to circumstances where

it does not ‘materially interfere’ with the chemical test procedure.”). But we have

recognized other limits as well.

      For example, in State v. Bowers, the defendant and his wife were suspects

together in a case of sexual abuse. 661 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Iowa 2003). Both were
taken to the fire department for questioning, but the defendant was only allowed
                                         11

to speak briefly with his wife before he was questioned. Id. He argued that “the

DCI agents unduly limited his right to consult with his wife at the fire station

and thus denied him a right provided by Iowa Code section 804.20.” Id. at 541.

We held that “given the circumstances of the present case, section 804.20 was

not violated.” Id. at 542. We offered the following reasoning:

      We believe that the right of a person in custody to consult with a
      family member is considerably diluted when the family member is
      also in custody for criminal conduct carried on jointly with the
      interrogated subject. Under the circumstances that existed, we are
      satisfied that the brief exchange of words that was permitted was
      sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 804.20.

Id.; see also State v. Tubbs, 690 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Iowa 2005) (finding no violation

of section 804.20 when the defendant was denied the right to speak with his wife

because of a no-contact order and didn’t ask to talk to anyone else).

      Likewise, in State v. Lamoreux, we determined that a defendant was not

entitled to relief when he and his attorney were given a nonprivate, monitored

consultation room at the jail but his attorney was aware of this fact and didn’t

ask for something different. 875 N.W.2d at 175–76, 180–81. We explained,

             Importantly, this case does not involve surreptitious recording
      of attorney-client conversations. Here, Lamoreux’s attorney was
      aware that the video and audio recording systems were functional
      and that the audio could be switched off. Yet he did not turn the
      audio off, cover the camera, or request another room, although he
      had been known to turn off the microphone in the past. Additionally,
      the presence of the audio and camera monitoring would have been
      obvious to Lamoreux himself. Nothing in the record indicates that
      Lamoreux’s attorney was not “permitted” to consult confidentially
      and in private with his client; rather, the attorney made a decision
      to go ahead and consult with his client without privacy. No violation
      of Iowa Code section 804.20 occurred in this situation.

             . . . Space is often limited in law enforcement facilities and, as
      here, rooms may be equipped with surveillance for general security
      reasons. It may be more practical, and safer, to have the monitoring
      in effect unless specifically deactivated rather than the other way
      around. Also, an attorney called to a police station or jail late at
      night to meet an unruly client whom he or she does not know may
                                        12

      prefer not to be alone in a closed-off, unmonitored room. In addition,
      we are reluctant to interpret section 804.20 as granting relief from
      a set of circumstances that were clearly accepted at the time.
      Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect an attorney who sees a
      surveillance system in operation to ask that the surveillance be
      turned off or that a different room be provided. Normally, in our legal
      system, attorneys have to ask for things and are good at doing so;
      that is why clients are willing to pay them.

Id. at 180–81.

      Lastly, we apply an exclusionary rule to remedy violations of section

804.20. Davis, 922 N.W.2d at 331 (“When section 804.20 is violated, exclusion

of evidence is the appropriate remedy.”); Hicks, 791 N.W.2d at 97 (“The remedy

associated with a section 804.20 violation is the exclusion of evidence . . . .”);

Garrity, 765 N.W.2d at 597 (“We apply the exclusionary rule to violations of Iowa

Code section 804.20, whether it is a violation of the right to communicate with

family or with an attorney. The exclusionary rule extends to the exclusion of

breath tests, breath test refusals, and non-spontaneous statements obtained

after unnecessary delay in allowing the person the statutory right to consult with

an attorney or family member.” (citation omitted)); State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1,

10–11 (Iowa 2007) (“Harris’s Fifth Amendment right to an attorney and his

statutory right to contact a family member were violated. Both violations required
suppression of the statements made by Harris after he requested an attorney

and requested permission to call his brother.”).

      In State v. Walker, we described the exclusionary remedy as “mandated by

more than a generation of our precedent,” invoked the doctrine of stare decisis,

and concluded that we saw “no reason to retreat from our precedent in this case

today.” 804 N.W.2d at 296. Therefore, we rejected an approach taken by the

court of appeals that would have required the defendant to show prejudice from

the denial of section 804.20 rights. Id. As we put it, “Prejudice is presumed upon
a violation of section 804.20.” Id.
                                         13

      B. The Public Safety Exception to Miranda. Notably, there is a narrow

public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before

the answers of a person in custody may be admitted into evidence. See New York

v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653–56 (1984). In New York v. Quarles, a woman told

officers she had just been raped by a man carrying a gun. Id. at 651–52. One of

the officers pursued the man in a supermarket, caught up with him, and

handcuffed and arrested him. Id. at 652. After discovering that the man was

wearing a shoulder harness that was empty, the officer asked him where the gun

was. Id. The man replied, “the gun is over there.” Id. In holding that this answer

was admissible despite the absence of a prior Miranda warning, the United States

Supreme Court reasoned,

             The police in this case, in the very act of apprehending a
      suspect, were confronted with the immediate necessity of
      ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason
      to believe the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and
      discarded in the supermarket. So long as the gun was concealed
      somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts
      unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public
      safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee
      might later come upon it.

Id. at 657. The Court expressed the view that this exception was both “narrow”
and “w[ould] not be difficult for police officers to apply.” Id. at 658. As the Court

explained with respect to the case before it,

      Officer Kraft asked only the question necessary to locate the missing
      gun before advising respondent of his rights. It was only after
      securing the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he
      continued with investigatory questions about the ownership and
      place of purchase of the gun. The exception which we recognize
      today, far from complicating the thought processes and the on-the-
      scene judgments of police officers, will simply free them to follow
      their legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a
      danger to the public safety.
                                            14

Id. at 659. The Court also made clear that the public safety exception was based

on an objective standard, not dependent on “the motivation of the individual

officers involved.” Id. at 655–56.

      In In re J.D.F., we applied Quarles to a case involving a juvenile. 553

N.W.2d 585, 588–89 (Iowa 1996). A report came over the police radio of a juvenile

carrying a weapon and attempting to load ammunition into it. Id. at 587. A

responding police officer saw a juvenile who matched the description and

appeared to have a “gun sticking out the front of [his] pants.” Id. The juvenile

fled when the officer asked if he was carrying a gun. Id. After giving chase, the

officer caught the juvenile, who did not possess a weapon at that point. Id.

Another officer on the scene questioned the juvenile repeatedly about the gun

without Mirandizing him, and the juvenile “led the officers to a . . . pistol, which

was hidden under a tree in a residential back yard.” Id. We held that the public

safety exception to Miranda applied:

            The facts in this situation fall within the narrow scope of the
      exception as defined in Quarles. The officers on the scene had good
      reason to believe that a loaded weapon had been dropped
      somewhere in a residential neighborhood. The chances of someone
      coming upon the weapon were good and the officers took appropriate
      action to secure the area.

Id. at 588.

      Our court has addressed the public safety exception in a number of cases.

E.g., State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 578, 580–81 (Iowa 2012) (holding that the

public safety exception did not apply when the defendant was Mirandized, he

asked for an attorney, he was put in a squad car, and then several hours later,

the   officers   sought   to   reinitiate   questioning   after   discovering   inactive

components of a meth lab but no smell); State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 269,

275 (Iowa 2006) (deciding that the public safety exception applied when an officer
entered a home that was a suspected meth lab, detected a strong odor of
                                          15

anhydrous ammonia, pointed his gun at the defendant, and asked him if there

was an active meth lab); State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 786, 788–89, 791

(Iowa 1994) (rejecting the public safety exception where an inmate who had

stabbed another inmate with a shank had already been handcuffed and

Mirandized; prison officials had the shank, the inmate had repeatedly said he

didn’t want to talk, and questioning went beyond the “limited purpose” of finding

out if there were other shanks).

      Usually, the public safety exception applies to statements made at the

place of arrest, rather than at the police station or the jail. See, e.g., United States

v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding the exception

applicable when the agent “asked questions he reasonably believed were

necessary to secure the scene following Ochoa’s arrest”); People v. Allen, 199 P.3d

33, 36 (Colo. App. 2007) (“[O]ur caselaw indicates that the public safety exception

applies most readily in the context of immediate, on-scene investigations of crime

. . . .” (citation omitted)); State v. Campbell, 347 So. 3d 653, 653–55 (La. 2020)

(per curiam) (holding that the public safety exception applied when officers

responded to a child’s report of her father shooting her mother during a domestic

disturbance and the officers handcuffed and immediately questioned the
defendant outside as to what had happened); Schwartz v. Wyoming, 483 P.3d

861, 867 (Wyo. 2021) (“The public safety exception applies to Max’s statements

at the scene of the crime.”).

      But in a few cases, the doctrine has been applied even when the defendant

has been taken into custody and moved elsewhere before the relevant

questioning occurs. See, e.g., Trice v. United States, 662 A.2d 891, 893, 896 (D.C.

1995). In Trice v. United States, the victim reported that he had been shot by the

defendant in an armed robbery. Id. at 892. Four days later, an officer arrested
the defendant at his home pursuant to an arrest warrant. Id. Young children
                                        16

were present. Id. After the defendant had been taken to the police station, he

invoked his Miranda rights and said he would not answer questions without an

attorney present. Id. at 893. The officer spent twenty minutes asking personal

background questions anyway. Id. Then the detective said, “I’d like to know

where the shotgun is. There are little kids in the house. I don’t want anyone to

get hurt.” Id. At this point, the defendant responded, “It’s okay. I gave it back to

the person I borrowed it from.” Id.

      The District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that the public safety

exception applied to the defendant’s statement:

             The fact that four days had passed before Detective Trugman
      asked appellant about the gun does not, in itself, make the public
      safety exception inapplicable. The passage of considerable time
      between the crime and police questioning about the location of a
      missing weapon might render the exception inapplicable if, for
      example, it would be unreasonable under the circumstances to
      believe, objectively, that the police questions were prompted by a
      concern for public safety, rather than by the need for factual
      investigation. In this case, however, the detective did not learn of the
      specific threat his question was designed to eliminate—danger to
      children—until he saw children in appellant’s home at the time of
      arrest, four days after the shooting. On the facts here, therefore, the
      passage of four days between crime and questioning had no bearing
      on the later perception of danger and thus did not render the public
      safety exception inapplicable.

            Similarly, the fact that Detective Trugman waited more than
      an hour after observing the children at appellant’s home before
      asking appellant about the gun does not require us to conclude that
      his question was designed to elicit incriminating evidence rather
      than to protect the children. . . .

            ...

            As indicated earlier, however, we do not suggest that the
      exception remains available indefinitely simply because a missing
      weapon has not been located; if the police, after becoming aware of
      a threat to public safety, delay questioning the suspect about that
      threat for an unreasonable period of time, a court no longer may be
      able to conclude that the question was prompted by a concern for
      public safety rather than for factual investigation. This case,
      however, has not reached that outer limit.
                                        17

Id. at 896–97.

      In United States v. Ferguson, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit upheld an application of the public safety exception to

questioning that occurred after the defendant’s arrival at the police station. 702

F.3d 89, 94–96 (2d Cir. 2012). There the defendant was arrested outside an

apartment building based on a report of having brandished and fired a pistol. Id.

at 90. At the precinct, the defendant was questioned about the location of the

firearm without having been Mirandized and he led police to his sister’s

apartment where they found the weapon. Id. The police sergeant testified that he

had “a sense of urgency” because the defendant had been arrested close to a

playground, ballfield, and church, and he felt that possibly the weapon could be

“out there for anyone to get.” Id. at 91. The court explained that several factors

      created an objectively reasonable need for officers to protect the
      public from the realistic possibility that Ferguson, having possessed
      a dangerous weapon as little as an hour before his arrest, had
      hidden that weapon in a public place. Thus, these factors
      differentiate this case from numerous others in which pre-Miranda
      questioning would not be permitted.

Id. at 95. The court added, “We recognize that, in certain circumstances, the

passage of time between an arrest and an interrogation, among other
considerations, may diminish the immediacy of the threat posed by an

unaccounted-for firearm.” Id.

      In United States v. Bowers, which involved the notorious massacre at the

Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the district court held that

the public safety exception applied to certain questioning of the defendant even

after he had invoked his Miranda rights and been taken to the hospital. 676

F. Supp. 3d 403, ___, 2022 WL 195819, at *1, *7–8, *12 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2022).

The court explained, “The questions posed by the SWAT officers were designed
                                       18

to ensure the safety of the officers and the public rather than to elicit

incriminating answers.” Id. at ___, 2022 WL 195819, at *12.

      But such cases are relatively rare. More typical is People v. Ingram, where

the Colorado Supreme Court found the public safety exception inapplicable to

off-site questioning about a missing firearm. 984 P.2d 597, 604–05 (Colo. 1999)

(en banc). In that case, the defendant had been arrested in connection with a

shooting after driving away from the scene. Id. at 600–01. The defendant did not

have a gun on his person. Id. at 601. Several hours after his arrest, despite the

defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights, he was questioned at the sheriff’s

department as to “what type of gun he owned and where the gun was located.”

Id. The court noted, “Ingram had been safely in custody for several hours and

had already invoked his Miranda rights, demonstrating that there was no

‘immediate necessity’ which would justify Detective Birch’s decision not to

scrupulously honor Ingram’s invocation of his right to silence.” Id. at 605; see

also People v. Dennis, 866 N.E.2d 1264, 1276–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding

that the public safety exception did not apply to postarrest questioning of the

defendant after he had been taken to the hospital and noting that “the police in

the instant case were not confronted with a situation where the defendant had
‘just’ discarded a weapon in a crowded or populated area”).

      C. Applying Iowa Code Section 804.20 to This Case. So now we must

decide how section 804.20 applies to the circumstances of the case. “We begin

our inquiry in this case with the language of the statute as a whole.” Sewell, 960

N.W.2d at 643 (quoting Doe v. State, 943 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 2020)).

      We agree with the State that the language “without unnecessary delay”

means there must exist some circumstances when delay would be necessary.

See Iowa Code § 804.20. Also, we note that the statute does not limit the kinds
of situations that might necessitate delay. Cf., e.g., In re C.Z., 956 N.W.2d 113,
                                          19

121 (Iowa 2021) (discussing the principle that the legislature knows how to limit

terms it is using); State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 665, 667 (Iowa 2018)

(noting that the broad term “against the will of the other” was not limited by the

legislature and could include the situation where the victim had been defrauded

by the defendant into believing the defendant was someone else); Vance v. Iowa

Dist. Ct., 907 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 2018) (“[W]e may not expand or alter the

language of [the statute at issue] to create this distinction since it is not evident

from the language used by the legislature that it intended to create this

limitation.”); Nelson v. Lindaman, 867 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2015) (“This court has

no power to read a limitation into the statute that is not supported by the words

chosen by the general assembly.” (quoting Cubit v. Mahaska County, 677 N.W.2d

777, 782 (Iowa 2004))). Thus, it is conceivable that public safety could be one

such situation. Consider, for example, the possibility that the police learn that

the detainee had left weapons in an area frequented by children after the

detainee arrived at the police station.

      We note that in 1976, the legislature removed the specific exception for

“cases of imminent danger of escape” from the statute. Compare 1959 Iowa Acts

ch. 373, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 755.17 (1962)), with 1976 Iowa Acts
ch. 1245 (ch. 2), § 421 (codified at Iowa Code § 804.20 (Supp. 1977)). At the same

time, the legislature left in place the “without unnecessary delay” language that

accompanied the right to call and consult with a family member or attorney.

1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245 (ch. 2), § 421 (codified at Iowa Code § 804.20 (Supp.

1977)). And, it added similar “without unreasonable delay” language to the

detainee’s right of confidential consultation with their attorney after the attorney

arrived at the place of detention. Id. It would make no sense to conclude that the

legislature took out the “escape” language to assure that detainees who were
about to escape could contact a family member or attorney immediately. We
                                        20

think it is more logical to conclude that the legislature believed that the “without

unnecessary delay” language was broad enough to cover any potential reason

for deferring the right to call, consult, or see a family member or attorney—

including the public safety threat posed by the imminent danger of escape.

      Not only is the language “without unnecessary delay” seemingly broad

enough to allow for a delay based on an overarching safety concern, but such an

interpretation also seems consistent with our existing practical approach to

section 804.20. Our cases already allow the statutory right of communication

and consultation to be limited or denied where (1) the arrestee wants to contact

a family member who is also alleged to be part of the criminal conspiracy,

Bowers, 661 N.W.2d at 542, (2) there is a no-contact order between the parties,

Tubbs, 690 N.W.2d at 914, (3) the two-hour time window for chemical testing is

running out, Walker, 804 N.W.2d at 290, or (4) the attorney is aware of

monitoring at the place of detention and fails to ask for a room that is not

monitored, Lamoreux, 875 N.W.2d at 180–81.

      All things considered, we believe the cases interpreting the public safety

exception to Miranda provide a useful guidepost to consider when we examine

whether a delay under Iowa Code section 804.20 was “necessary.” The Supreme
Court spoke of “immediate necessity” in Quarles. 467 U.S. at 657. That phrasing

sounds like the flip side of “unnecessary delay” in section 804.20. Moreover, to

some degree, both Miranda and section 804.20 protect similar interests through

the mechanism of access to counsel.

      Reviewing the facts here, law enforcement did not proceed “without

unnecessary delay.” When Starr was arrested, he was not questioned at the

scene about the guns or taken to the location of the burglary to help find them.

Significantly, section 804.20’s right to call and consult a family member or
                                        21

attorney is not triggered until the detainee arrives at the place of detention.

Davis, 922 N.W.2d at 332.

      Instead, Starr was brought directly to the police station. Then, forty-seven

minutes elapsed from when police put Starr in the interrogation room until

Detective Grimsley arrived to question him. A couple of minutes later, Detective

Grimsley read the Miranda warnings to Starr. Notably, Detective Grimsley did

not believe the circumstances were urgent enough to ask Starr about the guns

or to forgo Miranda warnings at that point. We do not doubt the police were

genuinely concerned about what had happened to the guns, but they were willing

to tell Starr at the outset that he could remain silent if he wanted to.

      Seven minutes after that, Starr asked to make a call to his father to get an

attorney, and Detective Grimsley responded that that “wouldn’t happen today.”

Detective Grimsley didn’t say, “I need to know first where the guns are.” Another

fifty-one minutes of discussion between Starr and Detective Grimsley passed

before Detective Grimsley brought up the subject of the missing firearms.

      In other words, the stolen guns didn’t come up until nearly two hours after

Starr had been taken into custody for questioning at the police station. Before

getting to the subject of the guns, Detective Grimsley questioned Starr for
investigative purposes about his stabbing of M.N. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659

(noting that the officer “asked only the question necessary to locate the missing

gun”); Deases, 518 N.W.2d at 791 (declining to apply the public safety exception

while noting that the officer’s questions did not reflect only the limited purpose

of asking about the potential threat to public safety).

      Additionally, by the time any of Detective Grimsley’s questioning occurred,

over a full day had gone by since the firearms had been stolen. The lockdowns

of the schools and the hospital had been lifted. There had been no reports of the
guns being used. And there was nothing specific to indicate they had been
                                        22

abandoned—unlike the guns in Quarles and J.D.F. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652;

J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d at 587.

      We conclude that Starr was not afforded his right to call a family member

“without unnecessary delay.” While it was certainly plausible that the missing

firearms could have posed a threat to public safety and that Starr knew their

whereabouts, the situation lacked the immediacy of Quarles, J.D.F., State v.

Simmons, or other cases where the Miranda public safety exception has been

invoked. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657; Simmons, 714 N.W.2d at 275; J.D.F., 553

N.W.2d at 588. Moreover, the Sioux City police acted as if it lacked that

immediacy, waiting nearly two hours from the time Starr was deposited at the

police station before bringing up the subject of the missing guns.

      All criminal investigations are intended to lead to greater public safety. But

delay in honoring a detainee’s invocation of section 804.20 must be necessary;

that is, it must be targeted narrowly to the prompt resolution of an immediate

public safety threat. That was not the case here. The delay—objectively viewed

under all the circumstances—occurred in the context of an overall investigation

of Starr’s criminal spree rather than as a quick postponement to permit

resolution of a paramount public safety matter.
      V. Conclusion.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the suppression order of the district

court and remand for further proceedings.

      AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.