Court Opinion

ID: 9412809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 17:09:21.680791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:26.692948
License: Public Domain

J-S24039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DARRIUS DOWLING                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 6 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-22-CR-0000449-2022

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DARRIUS D. DOWLING                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 11 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-22-CR-0001850-2022

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                         FILED: AUGUST 1, 2023

       In these consolidated appeals,1 Darrius Dowling appeals from the

December 20, 2022 judgment of sentence ordering him to serve one year of

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The appeals in this matter were sua sponte consolidated by this Court on

February 2, 2023. See Per Curiam order, 2/2/23.
J-S24039-23

probation and to pay $3,185.41 in restitution and $75 in fines. This sentence

was imposed after Appellant was found guilty in a bench trial of accidents

involving damage to attended vehicle or property, duty to give information

and render aid, possession of a small amount of marijuana, and possession of

drug paraphernalia.2        Contemporaneously with this appeal, Spencer H.C.

Bradley, Esq. (hereinafter, “Counsel”), has filed a brief and petition to

withdraw in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), and its progeny.

After careful review, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the

judgement of sentence.3

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case, as gleaned from

the certified record, are as follows:          On December 2, 2021, Appellant was

charged at docket no. CP-22-CR-0000449-2022 with accidents involving

damage to attended vehicle or property and duty to give information and

render aid. At docket no. CP-22-CR-0001850-2022, Appellant was charged

with possession of a small amount of marijuana and possession of drug

paraphernalia.     These charges stemmed from Appellant’s involvement in a

December 1, 2021 hit and run accident with another vehicle in the parking lot

____________________________________________

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3743(a), § 3744(a), 35 P.S. § 780-113(31) and § 780-
113(32), respectively.

3 The Commonwealth has indicated that it will not be filing an appellate brief

in this matter and agrees with Counsel that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous.

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of Weis Market in Susquehanna Township, Pennsylvania. Notes of testimony,

12/20/22 at 5-7.        Upon locating Appellant’s vehicle, responding officers

discovered remnants of marijuana blunts on the vehicle’s dashboard totaling

less than 30 grams. Id. at 16-19. As a result of the collision, the victim’s

vehicle sustained extensive damage to the driver side door, tires, and rod

which resulted in $3,185.41 in repairs. Id. at 6, 9, 35.

       The Commonwealth sought joinder of these two cases for trial.        On

December 20, 2022, Appellant waived his right to a jury and appeared for a

bench trial before the Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo. Following a one-day

trial, Appellant was found guilty of accidents involving damage to attended

vehicle or property, duty to give information and render aid, possession of a

small amount of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. That same

day, Appellant was sentenced to serve one year of probation and to pay

$3,185.41 in restitution and $75 in fines.

       On December 28, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.4 On

December 30, 2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b). On January 12, 2023, Counsel entered his appearance on behalf on

Appellant. Following an extension, Counsel filed statement of intent to file an

____________________________________________

4 Appellant was represented by Jason M. Jeffries, Esq. at the time he filed his

appeal.

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Anders brief on February 13, 2023.5 On March 8, 2023, the trial court filed

a statement in lieu of Rule 1925(a) opinion. Thereafter, on April 24, 2023,

Counsel filed an Anders brief and a petition to withdraw. Appellant has not

responded to Counsel’s petition to withdraw.

       As a preliminary matter, to withdraw under Anders, counsel must

satisfy certain technical requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court

for leave to withdraw and state that after making a conscientious examination

of   the   record,    he    has   determined     that   the   appeal   is   frivolous.”

Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 947 (Pa.Super. 2012), quoting

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in

which counsel:

              (1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history
              and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to
              anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
              supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth counsel’s
              conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and(4) state[s]
              counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
              frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts
              of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on
              point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal
              is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

       With respect to the briefing requirements, “[n]either Anders nor

McClendon requires that counsel’s brief provide an argument of any sort, let

____________________________________________

5 Counsel incorrectly styled his statement of intent to file an Anders brief as

a “concise statement of matters complained of on appeal.”              See Pa.R.A.P
1925(c)(4).

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alone the type of argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. [W]hat

the brief must provide under Anders are references to anything in the record

that might arguably support the appeal.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 359-360.

      Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to his client and

“advise[] him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any

additional points that he deems worthy of the court’s attention, and attach[]

to   the   Anders   petition   a   copy    of   the   letter   sent   to   the   client.”

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation

omitted). “[If] counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this

Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.”   Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa.Super.

2007) (en banc) (quotation marks and quotation omitted).

      Our review of Counsel’s petition to withdraw, supporting documentation,

and his Anders brief reveals that he has substantially complied with all of the

foregoing requirements. We note that Counsel also furnished a copy of the

brief to Appellant, advised him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro

se, and/or raise any additional points that he deems worthy of this Court’s

attention.    The letter properly advised Appellant of his rights under

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751-752 (Pa.Super. 2005). As

Counsel has complied with all of the requirements set forth above, we

conclude that counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements of Anders

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and Santiago. We, therefore, proceed to conduct an independent review to

ascertain whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Commonwealth v.

Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc).

      Counsel’s Anders brief sets forth the following four issues that Appellant

wishes to raise on appeal:

A. Joinder

      Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in joining

his two cases for trial. Anders brief at 14-15.

      It is well settled that the decision “[w]hether to join or sever offenses

for trial is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be reversed on appeal

absent a manifest abuse thereof, or prejudice and clear injustice to the

defendant.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1150 (Pa.Super.

2020) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 242 A.3d 304 (Pa. 2020).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582 governs of the joinder of

separate indictments or criminal informations for trial and provides, in relevant

part, as follows:

             (A)    Standards

             (1)    Offenses charged in separate indictments or
                    informations may be tried together if:

                    (a)   the evidence of each of the offenses would
                          be admissible in a separate trial for the
                          other and is capable of separation by the
                          jury so that there is no danger of
                          confusion; or

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                   (b)   the offenses charged are based on the
                         same act or transaction.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1)(a)-(b).

      Instantly, the trial court elected to consolidate the charges set forth in

CP-22-CR-0000449-2022 and CP-22-CR-0001850-2022 for Appellant’s bench

trial, as they were based on the same act or transaction. We conclude that

this decision was fully within the discretion of the trial court and Appellant was

not prejudiced and did not suffer clear injustice as a result of the consolidation.

Appellant’s claim to the contrary is wholly frivolous.

B. Sufficiency & Weight of the Evidence

      Appellant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his

convictions for the aforementioned offenses because the testimony presented

at trial failed to establish that he was the driver of the vehicle in question.

Anders brief at 16-22.      Though couched in terms of both sufficiency and

weight, Appellant’s claim challenging his identification as the driver of the

vehicle is more properly construed as a challenge to the weight of the

evidence. See Commonwealth v. Cain, 906 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa.Super.

2006) (stating, “any uncertainty in an eyewitness’s identification of a

defendant is a question of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency”),

appeal denied, 916 A.2d 1101 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825

A.2d 710, 713-714 (Pa.Super. 2003) (explaining sufficiency of evidence

                                       -7-
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review does not include assessment of credibility, which is more properly

characterized as challenge to weight of evidence).

      Here, the record reflects that the victim, Janetta King, identified

Appellant in court as the driver of the BMW that struck her automobile on the

day in question.   Notes of testimony, 12/20/22 at 7.     King also identified

Appellant as the individual in a photograph of the BMW’s operator that

responding Police Officer Benjamin Gainer obtained from Weis Market

following the accident.    Id. at 11, 15.     Officer Benjamin’s subsequent

investigation determined that Appellant was the registered owner of this BMW,

which was found abandoned across the street from the accident scene. Id.

at 17-18.   Appellant, on the contrary, presented testimony that he was in

Pottstown, Pennsylvania, on the day of the accident, quarantined with Covid-

19 with his girlfriend, Brittany Johnston. Id. at 22, 29-30.

      This Court has recognized that “a true weight of the evidence challenge

concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions

which evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632,

643 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 970 (Pa.

2018). “An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is

addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Galvin,

985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1051

(2010).

            Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to
            hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate

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           court will give the gravest consideration to the
           findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
           reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
           is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
           assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial
           is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or
           was not against the weight of the evidence and that a
           new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

           This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by
           the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
           new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
           evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
           trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
           term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
           wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
           conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not
           exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
           the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the
           foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
           personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
           Discretion is abused where the course pursued
           represents not merely an error of judgment, but
           where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
           where the law is not applied or where the record
           shows that the action is a result of partiality,
           prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and

emphasis omitted).

     Upon review, we find that Appellant’s claim that the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence must fail. “[T]he trier of fact while passing upon

the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free

to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”            Commonwealth v.

Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted), appeal

denied, 926 A.2d 972 (Pa. 2007).

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      Here, the trial judge, sitting as factfinder, clearly found the identification

testimony of King and Officer Gainer credible, and elected not to believe

Appellant’s version of the events.     We are precluded from reweighing the

evidence and substituting our judgment for that of the factfinder. Clay, 64

A.3d at 1055. Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s weight claim is wholly

frivolous.

C. Discretionary Aspects of Sentencing

      Appellant next argues that his sentence one year of probation was

excessive and unreasonable. Anders brief at 23-24.

      “Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion.”   Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa.Super.

2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015). Appellant

must “establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored

or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.”

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1123 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation

omitted), appeal denied, 184 A.3d 944 (Pa. 2018).

      Where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence,

as is the case here, the right to appellate review is not absolute.

Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal

denied, 206 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2019). On the contrary, an appellant challenging

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the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this court’s jurisdiction

by satisfying the following four-part test:

            (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether
            appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether appellant’s
            brief includes a concise statement of the reasons
            relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
            discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether
            the concise statement raises a substantial question
            that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing
            code.

Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa.Super. 2013)

(citations omitted).

      Instantly, the record reveals that although Appellant filed a timely notice

of appeal, he failed to include a statement in his brief that comports with the

requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), nor filed a post-sentence motion

preserving his sentencing claims. Nevertheless, Anders requires this court

to review issues otherwise waived on appeal. Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978

A.2d 995, 998 (Pa.Super. 2009).        Accordingly, we must now determine

whether Appellant has raised a substantial question.

      Instantly, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of

one year of probation, which was well within the standard range of the

Sentencing Guidelines.    204 Pa.Code. § 303.16(a).        This Court has long

recognized that “[a] bald or generic assertion that a sentence is excessive

does not, by itself, raise a substantial question justifying this Court’s review

of the merits of the underlying claim.”       Commonwealth v. Christine, 78

A.3d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted), affirmed, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa.

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2015).       Additionally, “a claim of excessiveness that is raised against a

sentence within the statutory limits fails to raise a substantial question as a

matter of law.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 623 (Pa. 2002).

      Accordingly, we find that Appellant has failed to raise a substantial

question for our review and his first discretionary sentencing claim is wholly

frivolous.

D. Restitution

      Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering him to pay $3,185.41 in restitution to the victim. Anders brief at

24-25.

      “[I]ssues concerning amount of restitution implicate the discretionary

aspects of a defendant’s sentence.” Commonwealth v. Solomon, 247 A.3d

1163, 1167 (2021) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 274 A.3d 1221 (Pa.

2022). It is well settled in this Commonwealth that a trial court will have been

found to have abused its discretion if it “order[ed] speculative or excessive

restitution or enter[ed] a restitution award not supported by the record.” Id.

at 1168 (citations omitted).

      Here, the record reflects that the victim testified that she had to have

her vehicle repaired as a result of the accident which cost $3,185.41, and

Appellant’s counsel had full opportunity to cross-examine her.        Notes of

testimony, 12/20/22 at 9, 35. Based on the foregoing, we find that Appellant’s

challenge to the restitution amount is wholly frivolous.

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     Finally, our independent review of the entire record, as required

pursuant to Anders, reveals no additional non-frivolous claims. Yorgey, 188

A.3d at 1195. Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm

Appellant’s December 20, 2022 judgment of sentence.

     Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/03/2023

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