Court Opinion

ID: 9384678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:07:35.506053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.582071
License: Public Domain

J-S44010-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                  :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                  :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                                  :
                 v.                               :
                                                  :
                                                  :
    DOUGLAS WILLIAM MILLER                        :
                                                  :
                       Appellant                  :    No. 137 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 21, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0001175-2021,
               CP-21-CR-0001566-2019, CP-21-CR-0002014-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                   FILED: APRIL 4, 2023

        Douglas William Miller appeals the judgement of sentence entered by

the Cumberland County Court of Pleas on December 21, 2021. Specifically,

Miller claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for

unsecured bail pending resolution of his post-sentence motions and appeal.

He maintains the trial court further abused its discretion by imposing excessive

and     unduly    harsh    sentences     rather       than   accepting   the   sentences

recommended by the Commonwealth. Additionally, Miller asserts that the trial

court imposed an unlawful sentence by failing to award him credit for 22 days

of time served. While we find that Miller’s first two claims are without merit,

we agree that he should be credited for his time served.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S44010-22

       For purposes of this appeal, the following factual and procedural history

is undisputed. The sentence at issue arises from three consolidated dockets:

CP-21-CR-1566-2019, CP-21-CR-1175-2021, and CP-21-CR-2014-2021.

       At CP-21-CR-1566-2019, Miller pleaded guilty to a charge of third-

degree retail theft for stealing $74.06 worth of items from a Walmart in

Cumberland County, PA.1 On March 10, 2020, the trial court sentenced Miller

to pay court costs, make restitution to Walmart, and undergo a period of

supervised probation for 24 months on the conditions that he remain on good

behavior and comply with probation standards.

       While on probation, Miller was arrested on July 27, 2021, for crimes

under the other two dockets. At docket number 1175-2021, Miller pleaded

guilty to one count of receiving stolen property for leaving a supermarket with

$99.96 worth of seafood from a Giant supermarket that he had not paid for.

Similarly, at docket number 2014-2021 Miller pled guilty to one count of

receiving stolen property for leaving a Walmart with $265.96 worth of meat

products that he had not paid for.

       At a November 30, 2021 hearing, the trial court accepted Miller’s guilty

pleas at docket numbers 1175-2021 and 2014-2021. At the same hearing,

Miller also admitted to violating the conditions of his parole sentence at docket

____________________________________________

1Miller had three prior convictions for retail theft, elevating the grading of this
offense. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3929(b)(1)(iv).

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number 1566-2019. As such, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered

that Miller appear for an omnibus sentencing hearing on December 21, 2021.

      On December 21, 2021, the trial court resentenced Miller at docket

number 1566-2019 to 15 to 60 months’ imprisonment. The court awarded

Miller credit for the five and half months he had served since his July 27, 2021

arrest. At docket number 1175-2021, the court sentenced Miller to serve not

less than 6 months nor more than 2 years in prison, to be served consecutively

to his sentence at 1566-2019. Additionally, at docket number 2014-2021, the

court sentenced Miller to serve not less than 6 months nor more than 2 years

in prison, to be served concurrently with the sentence at 1175-2021.

      On December 31, 2021, Miller’s counsel filed post-sentence motions

which included a request for unsecured bail pending resolution of his post-

sentence motion and expected appeal. See Post-Sentence Motions, 12/31/21,

at 7. On January 3, 2022, the trial court denied the post-sentence motions

and Miller’s request for unsecured bail, declaring Miller’s “extensive record and

inability to remain arrest free militates against any bail[.]” Order of Court,

1/3/22.

      In his first argument on appeal, Miller claims the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his request for unsecured bail pending resolution of his

post-sentence motions and appeal. We begin our analysis of this claim by

observing that Miller was unable to post bail in the amount of $1,000 after his

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arrest on July 27, 2021. He therefore remained in jail throughout the

remainder of the proceedings in the trial court.

      Under our Rules of Criminal Procedure, “when the sentence imposed

includes imprisonment of 2 years or more, the defendant shall not have the

same right to bail as before verdict, but bail may be allowed at the discretion

of the judge.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 521(B)(2). Moreover, “[w]henever bail is refused

or revoked under this rule, the judge shall state on the record the reasons for

this decision.” Id. Bail decisions are left to the discretion of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Myers, 86 A.3d 286, 291-94 (Pa. Super. 2014). In

reviewing a trial court's order denying bail for an abuse of discretion, this court

“will only reverse where the trial court misapplies the law, or its judgment is

manifestly unreasonable, or the evidence of record show that its decision is a

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will." Commonwealth v. Bishop,

829 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations and brackets omitted).

      Here, the maximum aggregated sentence imposed by the trial court was

7 years. Therefore, under Rule 521, the trial court was not required to provide

the same right to bail which Miller had prior to his guilty plea. Rather, the trial

court was permitted to exercise its discretion in determining whether to offer

Miller an opportunity to post bail and under what circumstances.

      Miller contends “[t]he trial court failed to give reasons on the record for

its denial of bail on appeal.” Appellant’s Brief, at 13. Miller also argues that

the trial court abused its discretion under these circumstances since the

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Commonwealth concurred with Miller’s bail request. Contrary to Miller’s first

argument, the trial court stated its reasoning for the decision explicitly: "The

defendant's extensive record and inability to remain arrest free militates

against any bail, especially in light of a sentence of incarceration of 21 months

to seven years." Order of Court, 1/3/22. Further, the ultimate decision on

whether to grant Miller’s request rested in the trial court, not with the

Commonwealth. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 521(D)(2) (“The decision whether to

change the type of release on bail or what conditions of release to impose

shall be based on the judge’s evaluation…”). Notably, the Commonwealth now

defends the court’s refusal of Miller’s bail request. See Commonwealth’s Brief,

at 10. In any event, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion

here. Miller’s extensive criminal history and multiple recent thefts – while on

probation – certainly support the trial court’s evaluation. Miller’s first issue on

appeal merits no relief.

      Next, Miller argues the court abused its discretion in imposing an

excessive sentence. Miller’s claim raises a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of his sentence. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17. We note that since Miller

entered an open plea, he is permitted to challenge the discretionary aspects of

his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 A.3d 970, 972 (Pa. Super.

2020). “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162,

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170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). Prior to reaching the merits of a

discretionary sentencing issue, this Court conducts a four-part analysis:

      (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
      Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
      preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
      sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has
      a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
      substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).

      Here, Miller filed a timely appeal and preserved his claim in his post-

sentence motion. Miller also included a separate Rule 2119(f) Statement in

his brief; accordingly, we will review his Rule 2119(f) statement to determine

whether he has raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.

Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that “we cannot

look beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f)

statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.” (citation

omitted)).

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d

323, 330 (Pa. Super. 2013). “A substantial question [exists] only when the

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code;

or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

process.” Id. (citation omitted).

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      Miller asserts he has presented a substantial question because

      the court imposed sentences without stating adequate reasons for
      why it refused to follow the Commonwealth’s sentencing
      recommendations, because it did not consider mitigating factors,
      because the court imposed a sentence in the aggravated range
      without stating sufficient reasons on the record, and failed to
      consider the factors found in § 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code
      including protection of the public, impact on the victims, and
      impact on the community, which resulted in individual sentences
      and an aggregate sentence that were excessive and harsh.

Appellant’s Brief, at 11-12. While Miller presents this as a singular argument,

we discern three distinct claims. First, Miller argues that the trial court erred

by failing to state the reason why it did not follow the Commonwealth’s

sentencing recommendation. This claim does not raise a substantial question

and we will not review it. See Commonwealth v. Sexton, 222 A.3d 405,

422    (Pa.    Super.    2019)     (“[T]he    Commonwealth’s       [sentencing]

recommendations … are not binding on the trial court’s exercise of discretion

at sentencing. Thus, this claim is frivolous.”) Second, Miller argues the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to consider mitigating factors while

imposing aggravated range sentences. This Court has held that an assertion

that a sentence was excessive and that the trial court failed to properly

consider the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) raises a substantial

question. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super.

2015) (en banc). See also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253

(Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction

with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a

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substantial question”) (internal citation omitted). Similarly, Miller’s third

argument is a claim that the trial court failed to consider the necessary factors

while imposing an excessive sentence. Pursuant to Caldwell, this claim also

raises a substantial question.

        We therefore turn to a substantive review of Miller’s second and third

sentencing claims. The trial court’s sentence will not be disturbed on appeal

unless the court abused its discretion:

        Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
        sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
        absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
        of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
        the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
        sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
        judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
        arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa.Super. 2006)(citation

omitted).

        Moreover, “Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being

imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed.” Commonwealth

v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 470 (Pa.Super. 2018)(citations omitted). The

decision to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences only raises

a substantial question in “the most extreme circumstances, such as where the

aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and

the length of imprisonment.” Id. Plea agreements are not binding upon the

court    and    a   court   may    reject    the   Commonwealth’s     sentencing

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recommendation if the court believes the terms do not serve justice. See

Commonwealth v. White, 787 A.2d 1088, 1091 (Pa. Super. 2001).

     Here, Miller claims the trial court imposed an aggravated range sentence

at docket number 1566-2019 without stating reasons for the departure from

the standard range on the record. Both parties, as well as the trial court,

classify the sentence at docket number 1566-2019 as an aggravated range

sentence, and our review of the relevant sentencing guidelines confirms their

calculations. As the court imposed an aggravated range sentence, it was

required to “state the reasons on the record[.]” 204 Pa. Code § 303.13(c).

     While the court was not loquacious, it did recognize the deviation and

stated its reasons on the record:

           Well, Mr. Miller, I agree that insanity is doing the same thing
     over and over and expecting a different result. Your record goes
     back many, many, many years, and you have always gotten
     county sentences. You have always gotten county probation. Try
     as we might, we have not been able to give you the services
     necessary to turn your life around.

     …

           These sentences are standard-range sentences, except for
     the one that was imposed as a result of your probation revocation
     [at 1566-2019.] Any lesser sentence would depreciate the
     seriousness of the crimes. We have done all we can do for you at
     the county level. Hopefully, there will be services you avail
     yourself of at the state level.

N.T., 12/21/21, at 6-7. As such, the court set forth reasons, on the record,

for its decision to impose an aggravated range sentence. Miller’s claim that

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the court failed to state reasons on the record for an aggravated range

sentence merits no relief.

        Next, Miller argues the court abused its discretion by failing to consider

mitigating factors when it imposed an “excessive” sentence. We disagree. As

set forth above, the transcript reveals that the court was well aware of Miller’s

criminal history. It was also aware that multiple attempts to provide services

offered by county probation had failed to rehabilitate Miller. Finally, the court

acknowledged that Miller had cooperated with the Commonwealth in another

case:

        [Miller:]         I thought I provided a service to the DA’s office.

        THE COURT:        You did. That’s why I didn’t make the sentences
                          much greater than I made them.

Id., at 8. The court considered the mitigating circumstances as well as Miller’s

rehabilitative needs. Miller’s claim to the contrary merits no relief.

        Lastly, Miller claims that the trial court imposed an unlawful sentence at

docket CP-21-CR-1175-2021 by failing to award him credit for 22 days of time

served. A defendant must be credited “for all time spent in custody as a result

of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed.” 42 Pa. C.S.A.

§ 9760. “Credit shall include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial,

during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.” Id.

The Commonwealth does not dispute Miller’s claim:

        [Miller] was incarcerated as a result of being unable to post bail for a
        total of twenty-two (22) days from April 21, 2021, to May 12, 2021.

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      [Miller] was not … serving time towards any other docket. As such,
      pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9760, [Miller] is entitled to an award of
      twenty-two (22) days of time served.
Commonwealth’s Brief, at 11. Moreover, in its opinion on appeal, the trial

court admits it erred and requests remand to amend the sentence to include

the credited time. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/29/22 at 6. We agree and

therefore vacate the sentence at docket number 1175-2021 and remand for

resentencing on that docket only.

      Order denying post conviction bail affirmed. Judgment of sentence CP-

21-CR-0001566-2019, and CP-21-CR-0002014-2021 affirmed. Judgment of

sentence   for   docket number      CP-21-CR-1175-2021   vacated and   case

remanded for resentencing consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

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