Court Opinion

ID: 9852708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:35:11.461353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:32.708546
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
concurring.
I think it essential to a proper resolution of the Civil Rule 12(b)(6) issue in this appeal to keep in mind that Ahwinona filed pro se complaints against Maniilaq, Jackson, and the State. Given that Ahwinona was unrepresented at all times in connection with the proceedings in the superior court, I am of the view that considerations of basic fairness require that the superior court’s grant of the State’s Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion dismissing Ahwinona’s complaint be reversed.
In regard to its treatment of the State’s motion as a Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court first notes that if the superior court in deciding such a motion relies on matters outside the pleadings, the motion is normally to be treated as one for summary judgment and is to be resolved in accordance with Civil Rule 56. Secondly, the court observes in part:
[T]he documents evidencing the prior settlement and terms of the release were attached to Ahwinona’s 1994 complaint. Under these circumstances, the trial court could properly rely upon these materials in deciding the State’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) without converting it into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 ... Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2704 [129 L.Ed.2d 832] (1994).
Relying on Branch and similar federal authorities to analyze and dispose of Ahwino-na’s Civil Rule 12(b) motion, the court concludes that the documents attached to Ahwinona’s complaint compel the conclusion as a matter of law that Ahwinona agreed to settle his claim against Maniilaq, Jackson, and the State for a total of $6,000.
In Branch, 14 F.3d at 453-54, the Ninth Circuit wrote:
We have said that a document is not “outside” the complaint if the complaint specifically refers to the document and if its authenticity is not questioned. Townsend v. Columbia Operations, 667 F.2d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir.1982). The leading commentators state that “when [the] plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent document as part of his pleading, [the] defendant may introduce the exhibit as part of his motion attacking the pleading.” 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1327, at 762-63 (2d ed.1990); accord Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 n. 3 (1st Cir.1991).... As it makes sense and comports with existing practice, we hold that documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Such consideration does “not convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Romani, 929 F.2d at 879 n. 3.
It strikes me that the instant appeal is an inappropriate vehicle to announce a completely new interpretation of Civil Rule 12(b)(6). I say this because Ahwinona was acting pro se in regard to all proceedings before the superior court. The Branch rule is a fairly esoteric rule to announce in the context of pro se litigation against the State, particularly where the pro se litigant was not *889apprised of the potential Civil Rule 12(b)(6) consequences of attaching documents to his complaint.1
However, I concur in the court’s alternative holding to the effect that reviewing the superior court’s decision as if that court had converted the State’s motion to a summary judgment motion, Ahwinona has failed to raise material fact issues sufficient to avoid the terms of the release and the effect of the prior settlement.

. In Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1023, 108 S.Ct. 1579, 99 L.Ed.2d 894 (1988), we said:
We agree with Breck that the pleadings of pro se litigants should be held to less stringent standards than those of lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652, 654 (1972) (per curiam). In this regard we note that several courts have explicitly imposed a duty on the trial judge to advise a pro se litigant of his or her right under the summary judgment rule to hie opposing affidavits to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C.Cir.1968) (per curiam); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.1975) (per curiam). Likewise, we believe the trial judge should inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for the action he or she is obviously attempting to accomplish; here Breck should have been advised of the necessity of submitting affidavits to preclude summaiy judgment, and of the possibility of amending her complaint.
See also Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229, 233 n. 8 (Alaska 1988); Smith v. Sampson, 816 P.2d 902, 906 (Alaska 1991); Keating v. Traynor, 833 P.2d 695, 696 (Alaska 1992); and Zok v. State, 903 P.2d 574, 576 n. 2 (Alaska 1995).