Court Opinion

ID: 9832150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:40:21.384781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:42.956169
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In his motion for rehearing, appellant has cited and quoted from a number of cases, insisting that they support his contention to the effect that the deed from Donohoe to Lewis was insufficient to support the plea of the statute of liipitation of five years; and we will review them for the purpose of showing that they do not militate against the doctrine announced in our opinion, to the effect that, even where there are slight inaccuracies regarding the number of the certificate, name of the surveys of patentee, etc., yet if the description otherwise given so identifies the land as to give notice to the owner that the defendant in possession is claiming the same, it is sufficient.
In the case of Clark v. Kirby, 25 S. W. 1096, it appears that the deed relied on by defendants to support the plea of limitation *650Rad no other description than the name of the patentee and certificate number, and these were in fact misdescribed.
In Williams v. Thomas, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 472, 44 S. W. 1073, the description in the deed was, “The west one-half of the W. N. Morris survey,” whereas the land in controversy was the W- U. Morris survey; no field notes were given. It was held that the description was insufficient, and that it did not identify the land.
In Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex. 36, 76 Am. Dec. 53, the deed was held void for want of description, it being ambiguous, and was not sufficient to support the plea of limitation.
In Brokel v. McKechnie, 69 Tex. 32, 6 S. W. 623, the deed contained no other description than the number of the survey, which was misdescribed, and the name of the patentee. This, of course, was held insufficient, and that parol evidence • was not admissible to explain such misdescription.
In Murphy v. Welder, 58 Tex. 235, the court said that the deed did not describe the land with sufficient certainty to meet the requirements of the statute. Besides this, it also held that the proof failed to show payment of taxes and adverse possession, as required.
In Cook v. Oliver, 83 Tex. 559, 19 S. W. 161, this description was held insufficient: “450 acres of land situated in Houston county, on the east bank of -the Trinity river, and the same known as the Brookfield Bluff Place, and the same now occupied by said Murphy * * * and the field notes as rnade by W. M. James are hereby made a part of this transfer.” The field notes were not given.
In Flanagan v. Boggess, 46 Tex. 330, the following description was held sufficient: “620 acres of the headright of David Brown, situated about 12 miles north of Henderson in the neighborhood of Bellview” ; the .court remarking: “The deed in the case before us does not purport to convey an undefined part of a larger tract of land, as in the case of Wofford v. McKinna [23 Tex. 36, 76 Am. Dec. 53], supra. The ‘620 acres of the headright of David Brown’ may be all of the D. Brown headright located in that survey; the balance being elsewhere. Or, if we look to evidence where we find a patent calling for 640 acres, we also find that the land was given in as 620 acres, and it may be that the latter is the real number of acres. In either case the description is not of an uncertain part of a tract of land, but of an entire tract. The name of the headright and the locality, with the number of acres of the survey, fixed the land as definitely as seems to be necessary to satisfy the statute until there is evidence showing the contrary.”
In Kilpatrick v. Sisneros, 23 Tex. 113, the deed was held bad for uncertainty of description and the false reference, the court saying: “The object of the statute in prescribing registry of the deed, as necessary to enable the possessor to avail himself of the five-year limitation, is to give notice to the owner that the defendant in possession is claiming under the deed. And if there is such falsity or uncertainty of description as that it will not answer the purpose intended, it cannot be considered a deed duly registered, within the meaning of the statute.” There was a failure also to prove adverse possession during the period of limitation.
In Young v. Trahan, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 611, 97 S. W. 147, the description of the land is not contained in the report.
In Ozee v. City of Henrietta, 90 Tex. 337, 38 S. W. 768, the description was likewise held insufficient, the court stating that it was lacking in those elements of accuracy and certainty which are required in a conveyance made by an officer under a naked statutory power to sell and convey property for the enforcement of the collection of taxes, citing Wofford v. McKinna and Kilpatrick v. Sisneros, supra, saying that they seriously doubted whether it was sufficient as a conveyance between parties acting in their own right. “A portion of a tract of land of which the original grantee is ‘R. R. Add.’ or railroad addition, if the abbreviations mean that, does not describe a part of an addition to a city, which is known as railroad addition, and of which W. G. Eustis is original grantee. It may be that where, even in a tax deed, a tract or lot of land is clearly and accurately described otherwise, descriptive words false in one particular may be disregarded. But if we strike out the false description in the deed in question, we have substantially nothing left but the words ‘block 23,’ which manifestly is uncertain. The only words to show what ‘block 23’ is meant point to some other ‘block 23,’ and not to that found in Eustis railroad addition to the city of Henrietta. If intended to .designate the latter block, the description is false as a whole, and the deed not sufficient to operate as a conveyance of the property intended.”
In Mars v. Morris, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 217, 106 S. W. 430, the clause in the deed did not embrace the land in controversy; hence the court properly held that the deed was insufficient as a basis for the plea of limitation.
In Berrendo Stock Co. v. Kaiser, 66 Tex. 352, 1 S. W. 257, no other description was given, except the number of the survey and the quantity; the deed was held insufficient.
The rule as gathered from our decisions seems to be that, if the land in possession of defendant is sufficiently described in the deed relied on to support the plea, as to give notice to the owner of such claim, then it is sufficient; and this is true notwithstanding the fact that there may be some other references in the deed that are untrue and misleading, which may be rejected as surplusage, such as the number of the1 survey, name of the patentee, and the like. See McCurdy v. Locker, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 222, 20 S. W. 1109. *651See, also, Eastman v. Gibbs, 125 S. W. 372.
After a most careful consideration of the motion, we are of the opinion that the deed assailed is sufficient under the statute; and therefore it becomes our duty to overrule the motion for rehearing.
Motion overruled.