Court Opinion

ID: 9682708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:15:10.518954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:40.834520
License: Public Domain

OPINION
CLINTON, Judge.
In a municipal court in Austin petitioner was convicted of a traffic violation. On appeal to the county court at law he invoked the following provisions of Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701d, § 143A:
*586“Dismissal of certain misdemeanor charges upon completing driving safety course
Sec. 143A. (a) When a person is charged with a misdemeanor offense under this Act, other than a violation of Section 50 or 51, committed while operating a motor vehicle, the court:
* * * * * *
(2) shall defer proceedings and allow the person 90 days to present written evidence that, subsequent to the alleged act, the person has successfully completed a driving safety course approved by the court, if:
(A) the person presents to the court an oral request or written motion to take a course;
(B) the person has a valid Texas driver’s license or permit; and
(C) the person’s driving record as maintained by the Texas Department of Public Safety does not indicate successful completion of a driving safety course under this subdivision within the two years immediately preceding the date of the alleged offense.
(b) When the person complies with the provisions of Subsection (a) of this section and the evidence presented is accepted by the court, the court shall dismiss the charge.”1
The court filed a written order denying petitioner’s motion and included its findings and reasoning as follows:
“The Defendant, giving competent and acceptable proof, has proven to this Court, in a written statement under oath, that:
1) He has a valid Texas driver’s license; and
2) His driving record as maintained by the Texas Department of Public Safety does not indicate successful completion of a defensive driving course under Art. 6701d, Section 148A(a)(2) TCS as amended, within the two years immediately preceding September 6, 1982, which is the date he is allged [sic] to have committed the offense involved in this suit.
It is, however, the opinion of this Court that since this Court is not ‘the Court’ that the defendant was charged in, then this Court has no statutory power to grant defensive driving under Art. 6701d, Section 143A(a)(2) TCS as amended.
It is further the opinion of this Court that it may not ‘defer proceedings’ when proceedings have already begun, and that proceedings begin in a Class C misdemeanor when the defendant pleads to the complaint in the court of original jurisdiction. To hold otherwise is to hold that a defendant may try his case, lose, and still have it dismissed if a motion for new trial is granted or an appeal is taken from a justice court or a municipal court not of record. If the Legislature had intended such a manifestly wasteful result, it surely would have said so.”
The caption describes the statute as “[a]n Act relating to a driving safety course as an alternative to prosecution for certain traffic offenses.. .. ” Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 610 at 1359. When a person stands “charged” with an offense he may, under circumstances prescribed by the Act, choose between going to trial or taking a driving course. After foregoing the “alternative to prosecution,” choosing to go to trial, and after having been convicted, he may not invoke the statute on appeal to the county court at law. Accord, Op.Tex.Att’y.Gen. No. MW-428 (1982).
Petitioner vehemently argues that the Act permits him to invoke its provisions and obtain a dismissal at any stage of proceedings, even in this Court. However, we agree with the county court at law in so far as it said, “If the Legislature had intended such a manifestly wasteful result, it surely would have said so.”
The application for writ of mandamus is denied.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.