Court Opinion

ID: 9889996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 20:09:18.945078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:55.263972
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Lorenz v. McDonald, 2023-Ohio-3703.]

                                      COURT OF APPEALS
                                    LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
                                  FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

KAITLYN M. LORENZ,                              :   JUDGES:
                                                :   Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
        Petitioner - Appellee                   :   Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                                :   Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-                                            :
                                                :
JEREMY R. MCDONALD,                             :   Case No. 2023 CA 00052
                                                :
        Respondent- Appellant                   :   OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                            Appeal from the Licking County
                                                    Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
                                                    Relations Division, Case No. 2023
                                                    DR 00162

JUDGMENT:                                           Vacated

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                   October 11, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Petitioner-Appellee                             For Respondent-Appellant

KAITLYN M. LORENZ, Pro Se                           JENNIFER L. SPRINGER
5573 Lancaster Road                                 Joslyn Law Firm
Hebron, Ohio 43025                                  501 South High Street
                                                    Columbus, Ohio 43215
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00052                                               2

Baldwin, J.

       {¶1}   Jeremy R. McDonald appeals the decision of the Licking County Court of

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division granting appellee, Kaitlyn M. Lorenz’s

application for a protection order.

                    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

       {¶2}   McDonald and Lorenz’s relationship came to an end in July of 2022, but

they did not end communication. The parties exchanged texts and had face to face

contact and not always in a calm and friendly manner. The last contact between the

parties occurred in February 2023. Lorenz, after deciding that she did not want to worry

about McDonald appearing at her home, filed a petition for a protection order that was

ultimately granted. McDonald opposed the request and now contends that the record

contains insufficient evidence to support the award of the order. After a review of the

record, we find that the evidence submitted may reflect a rocky relationship and many

disputes, but it does not support the issuance of a five year order of protection.

       {¶3}   The history of the interaction between McDonald and Lorenz prior to June

2022 is not clear in the record with the exception of both party’s acknowledgment that it

was a “rocky” or “toxic” relationship without offering more detail regarding that

characterization. Lorenz claimed that they had a six year relationship up until July 2022

and McDonald did not refute her claim. Both also agree that Lorenz moved in with

McDonald in June 2022 and moved out the following month after McDonald sent her a

text message telling her she was not permitted to return to the home. McDonald’s rational

for excluding her from his home is not made clear by the party’s testimony or the exhibits,

but it was clear that he was serious that she not return. He told her in a text message that
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00052                                             3

she would be trespassing if she came in the home and he included a link to an article that

contained a statement that trespassers could be shot. Lorenz did appear at the home, but

McDonald’s sister was present and would not allow her in and, instead, offered to have

her personal items brought to her.

      {¶4}   McDonald received mail addressed to Lorenz after July 2022 at his home

and, rather than notify the post office that she had moved, he contacted her to hand

deliver it to her place of work. She told him not to contact her, but he ignored her plea

and delivered the mail to her place of work. The record suggests that he visited her place

of work more than once after the breakup and that they had a thirty-minute conversation

during one of the visits. McDonald did not demand that he leave her place of employment

when he appeared nor did she contact any law enforcement agency to have him removed.

      {¶5}   The last contact between the McDonald and Lorenz occurred approximately

four weeks prior to the hearing where the two had a discussion regarding their lives while

Lorenz was seated in the car.

      {¶6}   Lorenz admits she was never physically assaulted and that McDonald did

not threaten her with physical harm, but she contended that he was mean after he had

been drinking. She did not complain about mental distress as a result of McDonald’s

actions and did not complain that she feared for her safety. Instead, she stated that “I

just want to be left alone” and “I want to live my life and not have to worry about him

showing up.” (Transcript, March 3, 2023, p. 27, lines 2-3).

      {¶7}   The petition was presented to the Magistrate with both parties acting pro

se. With some guidance from the trial court, the parties testified and presented witnesses

and exhibits. The Magistrate granted the protective order, concluding that McDonald “had
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00052                                                 4

continued unwanted contact with [Lorenz] that has caused [Lorenz] great mental distress.

Such conduct has included appearing unexpectedly at Petitioner's work and threatening

to do so at other locations, in addition to several aggressive telephone conversations.”

(Order of Protection, March 24, 2023, p. 2). The Magistrate also found that:

       “The evidence suggests that Respondent's behavior is exacerbated by his

       consumption of alcoholic beveregesdoes(sic). The evidence does not

       suggest the use of illegal drugs.”

       “One of Respondent's threats included informing Petitioner that it was legal

       to shoot intruders into his home, which the Court reads as an explicit threat

       of physical violence. This implies the presence of weapons and a

       willingness to use them.”

Id.

       {¶8}   McDonald filed objections and supplemental objections to the Magistrate’s

decision, arguing that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support the

issuance of the protective order. The trial court reviewed the record and found that “* * *

there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the Respondent

caused the Petitioner great mental distress.” (Opinion/Judgment Entry, May 17, 2023, p.

4). The trial court found that McDonald’s reference to the legality of shooting intruders

into his home was correctly described by the Magistrate as a legitimate threat of violence.

The trial court concluded that the threat constituted domestic violence if the fear resulting

from those threats was reasonable and that the reasonableness of the fear should be

determined with reference to the history between the petitioner and the respondent. The

trial court offered no further comment on the alleged fear of Lorenz, but concluded that:
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00052                                                5

“It was not error for the Magistrate to issue an Order of Protection based on the evidence

adduced at the hearing.” Id. at p. 8.

       {¶9}    McDonald filed a timely appeal and submitted one assignment of error:

       {¶10} “I. THE TRIAL COURT’S ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF PROTECTION

FOR VIOLATING R.C. 3113.31 WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

AND THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF

THE EVIDENCE.”

       {¶11} Appellee did not file a brief or otherwise appear in the appeal.

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       {¶12} The decision whether to grant a civil protection order lies within the sound

discretion    of   the   trial   court.   Singhaus   v.   Zumbar,   5th   Dist.   Tuscarawas

No. 2015AP020007, 2015-Ohio-4755. Therefore, an appellate court should not reverse

the decision of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion. To find an abuse of discretion,

we must determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5

Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

       {¶13} A reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court

where there exists some competent and credible evidence supporting the judgment

rendered by the trial court. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972

N.E.2d 517. The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses

are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 552 N.E.2d 180

(1990). The trier of fact “has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00052                                              6

credibility of each witness, something that does not translate well on the written page.”

Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997).

                                        ANALYSIS

       {¶14} McDonald contends that the holding of the trial court is not supported by the

evidence in the record. We have reviewed the record and find that the trial court’s

conclusion that a protection order was warranted as a result of McDonald’s reference to

a web site article that stated that trespassers may be shot is not supported by the relevant

law as it does not include a finding that the threat put Lorenz “in fear of imminent serious

physical harm” and we also find that the record lacks any evidence that Lorenz

experienced that fear.

       {¶15} Lorenz’s request for an order of protection contains a four page narrative

that provides a more coherent chronology of events between the parties. (Petition,

February 21, 2023, p. 2-5). The petition makes clear that the threat that the trial court

relied upon occurred early during the break between the parties, and was followed by an

effort by the parties to remain friends. Lorenz decided that effort failed and she blocked

all communication with McDonald until he mentioned that he had received some of her

mail. In the petition Lorenz mentions that “at this point I have been stopping by after work

to pick up my mail.” Id. at p. 5. She became angry and blocked all contact with McDonald

and he appeared at her place of work the next day, but was told by others that Lorenz

was not there. He visited her work again the following week and met her at her car where

they had a lengthy conversation and Lorenz was persuaded to unblock him on Snapchat.

A week later she received “a message that made no sense” and “reblocked him.” Id.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00052                                              7

       {¶16} Lorenz’s testimony repeated the allegations from her petition, but added

that she told either McDonald or McDonald’s mother that she would call the police if

McDonald appeared at her place of work or came to her home. McDonald did visit

Lorenz’s place of work on two occasions, but did not contact the authorities to have

McDonald removed.

       {¶17} The trial court found that record did not support a finding that Lorenz

suffered mental distress sufficient to establish a violation of 2903.211, Menacing by

Stalking, but concluded that she had demonstrated that McDonald’s reference to the web

page that discussed the legality of shooting an intruder was a legitimate threat of violence

that “constitute[s] domestic violence for the purposes of R.C. 3113.31 if they(sic) fear

resulting from those threats is reasonable.” (Opinion/Judgment Entry, May 17, 2023, p.

8). The trial court also cited authority that requires review of the history between the

petitioner and the respondent to evaluate the petitioner’s allegation of fear. While the

statement of law is correct, we find the trial court’s analysis incomplete and we further

find the record does not contain competent credible evidence to satisfy the requirements

of R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a)(ii).

       {¶18} Revised Code 3113.31(A)(1)(a)(ii) defines domestic violence as “Placing

another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm * * * .” The

record contains references to Lorenz’s desire to “* * * to be left alone” and “* * * live my

life and not have to worry about him showing up” but no clear statement that she pursued

the order as a result of any fear of McDonald. And, if we construe her comments and

complaints about McDonald as exhibiting fear, the record lacks any competent credible
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00052                                              8

evidence that supports a conclusion that Lorenz was in fear of “imminent serious physical

harm.” These gaps in the evidence warrant a reversal of the grant of the protective order.

       “In order to grant a protective order, the evidence must be clear and

       unequivocal that the petitioner was placed in fear of imminent physical

       harm. The evidence must reveal a nexus between the communication

       directed to a petitioner with subsequent actual fear of imminent, serious

       physical harm. While an objective standard is to be applied to the impact

       upon a victim's state of mind as it relates to threatening communications,

       the evidence must be unequivocal.”

Coughlin v. Lancione (Feb. 25, 1992), Franklin App. No. 91AP–950, 1992 WL 40557 as

quoted in Fleckner v. Fleckner, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-988, 177 Ohio App.3d 706, 2008-

Ohio-4000, 895 N.E.2d 896, ¶ 24.

       {¶19} “Imminent” means “ready to take place,” “near at hand,” “impending,”

“hanging threateningly over one's head,” or “menacingly near.” Webster's Third New

International Dictionary (1969), 1130.” Id., at ¶ 20. Lorenz did not testify that “* * * she

was in imminent fear of harm [from McDonald] * * *” or that “* * * she was deathly afraid

of [McDonald]. Elkins v. Denczak, 5th Dist. No. 2022-AP-10-0040, 2023-Ohio-1545, 213

N.E.3d 1269, ¶ 21. Lorenz references fear only in the context of McDonald showing up

at her place of work, taking one of her dogs from daycare or coming to her house in the

middle of the night. Her fear was that he would not leave her alone without some

consequences. (Trial Transcript, p. 16, lines 6-14). We have reviewed the record and find

nothing to support a conclusion that Lorenz was placed in fear of imminent serious

physical harm at the hand of McDonald at any time.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00052                                              9

       {¶20} Lorenz’s last meeting with McDonald occurred in early February, three and

one-half to four weeks before the hearing, while Lorenz was in her car. The conversation

was not “mean” or “aggressive” and he asked her to unblock him so he could send a

message if he received more of her mail. (Trial Transcript, p. 14, lines 18-25). Lorenz did

not call the authorities and did not express any fear of harm from McDonald. Instead she

was frustrated that he continued to contact her and re-blocked his social media access to

her. The fact that this was the last contact between the parties, that it occurred weeks

before the filing of the petition and that it occurred after the text exchange referencing

shooting intruders further undermines any support for the conclusion that Lorenz was in

fear of imminent serious physical harm as a result of that comment. Lorenz requested a

protective order, not out of fear of physical harm, but so McDonald would leave her alone.

(Trial Transcript, p. 15, line 1 to p. 16, line 14).

       {¶21} While the reference to shooting an intruder can be construed as a threat,

the trial court’s failure to find that McDonald feared imminent serious physical harm is a

legal defect that requires we vacate the entry issuing the protective order. We further find

that the record does not support a finding that Lorenz feared any physical harm and only

sought to terminate all contact with McDonald.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00052                                           10

      {¶22} McDonald’s assignment of error is well taken and the decision of the Licking

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division is vacated.

By: Baldwin, J.

Gwin, P.J. and

King, J. concur.