Court Opinion

ID: 9554721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 19:01:03.865275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:20.596372
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30615        Document: 00516851477             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/09/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                     August 9, 2023
                                       No. 22-30615                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Doctor Keri Turner,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana
   System; Steven H. Kenny, Jr.,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:21-CV-664
                     ______________________________

   Before Davis, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Dr. Keri Turner, a former professor at Nicholls State University, sued
   the University’s board of supervisors and its human resources director under
   the Family and Medical Leave Act and related state law. The district court
   granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30615       Document: 00516851477          Page: 2      Date Filed: 08/09/2023

                                     No. 22-30615

                                          I.
          In 2010, Turner was diagnosed with irritable bowel syndrome
   (“IBS”). At the time, she was a tenured English professor at the University.
   Her condition worsened in the years that followed. By the spring 2018
   semester, Turner’s symptoms had progressed to the point that she found it
   difficult to teach classes in person and hold office hours.
          In March 2018, the University granted Turner intermittent leave
   under the FMLA. During this initial FMLA leave period, Turner continued
   to be paid without interruption and without having to submit a doctor’s note
   each time she took leave.
          In March 2019, Turner made a disability accommodation request to
   teach all her classes online. The University denied her request because,
   according to the University, granting her request would have required firing
   four adjunct professors and reassigning another professor to cover her in-
   person classes.
          During the first few months of the fall 2019 semester, Turner
   accumulated over forty absences, which included canceled classes and office
   hours. These absences were not protected by the FMLA because Turner’s
   previous intermittent FMLA leave period had expired in March 2019.
          On October 17, 2019, Turner met with Defendant Steven Kenny, Vice
   President and Director of Human Resources at the University. Kenny
   informed her that—due to her excessive absenteeism—she would be
   required to produce doctor’s notes for each sick day under the University
   sick leave policy which allows that supervisors may choose to require medical
   documentation for each absence to grant paid sick leave.
          On October 31, 2019, Turner met with University President Jay
   Clune. Clune informed her that the University was removing her from her

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   teaching position and reassigning her to the writing lab due to the volume of
   absences she had accumulated since the beginning of the semester. At the
   meeting, Clune gave Turner the option of retiring or continuing to work in
   the writing lab for the remainder of her career. Turner submitted her letter
   of resignation soon after noting her intent to resign at the end of the academic
   year.
           In early November, Turner was again granted intermittent FMLA
   leave. But the University continued requiring her to submit a doctor’s note
   every time she took leave. Finally, on May 15, 2020, Turner resigned.
           Turner sued the University and Kenny in Louisiana state court under
   the FMLA and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law. The
   University defendants removed and moved for summary judgment. The
   district court granted summary judgment to the University defendants.
   Turner timely appealed.
           We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment using
   the same standards as the district court. See Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. SCD
   Mem’l Place II, LLC, 25 F.4th 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment
   is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
   material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
                                         II.
           We first address Turner’s FMLA claim. Then we address her state
   law claims under the LEDL.
                                         A.
           The FMLA provides eligible employees the right to take up to twelve
   weeks of unpaid leave when the employee has “a serious health condition
   that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of

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   such employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Employers that “interfere with,
   restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” any right under
   the FMLA may be liable for FMLA interference. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
          Claims of FMLA interference are analyzed under the McDonnell-
   Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Amedee v. Shell Chem., LP, 953 F.3d
   831, 835 (5th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff bears the initial burden to make out a
   prima facie case of FMLA interference. To do so, a plaintiff must
   demonstrate that (1) she was an eligible employee; (2) her employer was
   subject to FMLA requirements; (3) she was entitled to leave; (4) she gave
   proper notice of her intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) her employer
   denied her the benefits to which she was entitled under the FMLA. See
   Caldwell v. KHOU-TV, 850 F.3d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 2017). The only element
   at issue here is the fifth: whether the University denied Turner the FMLA
   benefits she was entitled to receive.
          As a preliminary matter, all agree that Turner received all the FMLA
   leave she requested. See De La Garza-Crooks v. AT&T, 252 F.3d 436, 436 (5th
   Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (observing that a “plaintiff suffers no FMLA injury
   when she receives all the leave she requests” (quotation omitted)). The
   University granted both Turner’s requests for FMLA leave—first in March
   2018 and then in November 2019.
          Rather than claim she was denied FMLA leave, Turner claims Kenny
   interfered with her FMLA rights when he required her to obtain doctor’s
   notes providing a medical justification for each absence. True, once an
   employee is initially certified for intermittent FMLA leave, employers cannot
   ask employees to recertify their medical condition more often than once
   every 30 days. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.308(a). But, as the district court correctly
   found, the University did not require doctor’s notes for Turner’s FMLA

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   leave. It required such notes for the University’s separate, paid sick leave
   policy.
             The University afforded its employees paid sick leave, which it
   allowed to run concurrently with unpaid FMLA leave. The University
   followed this policy during Turner’s first FMLA leave period, which is why
   Turner continued to be paid during that period without interruption. But
   University policy also allowed supervisors to require doctor’s notes for each
   absence to receive paid sick leave when there was excessive absenteeism.
   During Turner’s second FMLA leave period, the University freely admits
   that it continued requiring Turner to submit documentation for each absence
   to allow her to continue receiving paid sick leave pursuant to the University’s
   sick leave policy.
             Turner points to no evidence to support her contention that the
   University’s requirement that she submit medical documentation to support
   each absence during her second FMLA leave period pertained to her unpaid
   FMLA leave rather than her paid sick leave. Cf. Acker v. Gen. Motors, LLC,
   853 F.3d 784, 791 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[A]n employer generally does not violate
   the FMLA if it terminates an employee for failing to comply with a policy
   requiring notice of absences, even if the absences that the employee failed to
   report were protected by the FMLA.”). The FMLA allows employers to
   require their employees “to comply with the employer’s usual and
   customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave, absent
   unusual circumstances.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d). No reasonable jury could
   conclude that the University’s requirement that Turner submit medical
   documentation to support each absence under its paid sick leave policy—
   which began before Turner’s second FMLA leave period started—was
   actually a veiled attempt to unlawfully require her to recertify her medical
   condition before taking each absence for purposes of the FMLA. See 29

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   C.F.R. § 825.308(a). That is because there is no evidence to support this
   contention, and it conflicts with the chronology of events.
                                                 B.
           Next, Turner’s LEDL claims. Turner first claims that she sued the
   University defendants for retaliation in violation of the LEDL and that the
   district court erred by construing that state-law claim as arising under the
   FMLA.
           Assuming for the sake of argument that the district court erred by
   construing Turner’s state law retaliation claim as an FMLA retaliation claim,
   any error was harmless because Louisiana courts look to federal employment
   law to interpret the LEDL. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Foti, 2011-0426 (La. App. 1
   11/9/11), 81 So. 3d 41, 44. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a
   plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged in protected activity, (2) the
   employer took a materially adverse action against her, and (3) a causal link
   exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Mauder v.
   Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cty., 446 F.3d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 2006).
   Turner’s retaliation claim fails because she does not point to any protected
   activity in her opening brief sufficient to support a retaliation claim. 1
           Turner also sued the University defendants for failing to
   accommodate her disability under the LEDL. To prevail on a failure-to-
   accommodate claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) she has a qualifying disability,
           _____________________
           1
             In her reply brief, Turner identifies two possible protected activities: (1) that “she
   requested sick leave and permission to teach remotely and by alternative means to
   accommodate her” IBS and (2) that she “plac[ed] an EEOC charge claiming in part that
   Nicholls State University retaliated against her for refusing to properly accommodate her
   disability.” Even assuming these activities are protected (Turner cites no authority to
   establish this), Turner has forfeited any argument as to these activities by failing to raise
   them in her opening brief. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d 496, 499 n.1
   (5th Cir. 2004).

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   (2) the employer knew about her disability, and (3) the employer refused to
   make reasonable accommodations for the known limitations. See Feist v. La.,
   Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013). Turner
   claims she was denied a reasonable accommodation when the University
   refused her request to teach only online courses. Assuming without deciding
   that Turner is a qualified individual under the LEDL, the district court
   granted summary judgment to the defendants because Turner admitted that
   “in order to accommodate her request to teach online, three of her in-person
   sections would have to be swapped with three online sections which were
   already assigned to adjunct professors.” That admission is fatal to her claim
   given that an employer is not required to “relieve an employee of any
   essential functions of his or her job, modify those duties, reassign existing
   employees to perform those jobs, or hire new employees to do so.” Thompson v.
   Microsoft Corp., 2 F.4th 460, 467 (5th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added); see also
   Claiborne v. Recovery Sch. Dist., 690 F. App’x 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2017).
          AFFIRMED.

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