Court Opinion

ID: 9897698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:23:53.21829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:41.482337
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Malveaux and Causey
              Argued at Richmond, Virginia

              BRUCE ERIC ANDERSON
                                                                          MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0220-22-2                               JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY
                                                                               OCTOBER 31, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY
                                               J. Overton Harris, Judge

                              Kevin E. Calhoun (Charles C. Cosby, Jr., on brief), for appellant.

                              Mason D. Williams, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Bruce Eric Anderson appeals his convictions, following a bench trial, for arson of an

              unoccupied building and maliciously burning a structure with the property inside it valued at $500

              or more, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-77, 18.2-80.1 Anderson argues that the trial court erred in

              finding the evidence sufficient to prove malice and in finding that the garage was valued at more

              than $500.2 For the reasons below, we affirm Anderson’s conviction for arson of an unoccupied

              building, in violation of Code § 18.2-77, but reverse and remand his conviction for maliciously

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                       At the time of the offense, Code § 18.2-80 made it a “Class 4 felony” “[i]f [the
              defendant] commits such offense at a time when no person is in such building, or other structure,
              and such building, or other structure, with the property therein, be of the value of $500 or more.”
              Code § 18.2-80 (2018). All the language of the statute that was in effect at the time of the
              offense is the same as the language of the current statute, except the current statute changed
              “$500” to “$1,000.” The same conduct is a “Class 1 misdemeanor” if “[the building, or other
              structure] and the property therein be of less value.” Code § 18.2-80 (2018).
                     2
                       Anderson initially noted three assignments of error. The third one alleged that the trial
              court had erred in finding that Anderson’s daughter was a victim who suffered emotional injury
burning a structure (garage) with property valued at $500 or more, in violation of Code § 18.2-80,

because the evidence sufficiently establishes every element of the lesser-included offense of

misdemeanor maliciously burning a structure under the same code section.

                                            BACKGROUND3

        Anderson does not contest the circuit court’s finding that he intentionally set fire to his

house and garage on Pouncey Tract Road in Hanover County in April 2021. The evidence shows

that no one was present in the house when Anderson set fire to it and that Anderson left the house

after setting the fire. The Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence about the value of the

garage and the property inside it. Instead, the circuit court determined that if the court assigned “a

minimal value of a dollar to each and every component [of the garage], each and every piece of

concrete block, every square foot[,] let’s say of concrete pad, shingles, windows, doors, the value is

clearly in excess of five hundred dollars. Clearly in excess.”

        Therefore, the trial court convicted Anderson for arson of an unoccupied building, in

violation of Code § 18.2-77, and maliciously burning a structure (garage) with the property inside it

valued at $500 or more, in violation of Code § 18.2-80. This appeal follows.

for the purpose of scoring in his sentencing guidelines. Anderson withdrew that assignment of
error in his opening brief to this Court.
        3
         On appeal, “we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the
Commonwealth.” Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). That principle requires us to “discard the
evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the
credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn
therefrom.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)).
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                                              ANALYSIS

                                         Standard of Review

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask

itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether

‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction,

‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might

differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth,

69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288 (2017)).

                                                Malice

       Anderson argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted with malice because

malice requires ill will toward another person or entity, and he did not burn the property of

another, nor was the property occupied. For the reasons below, we disagree.

       Both Code §§ 18.2-77 and 18.2-80 require that the burning be done “maliciously,” but

neither statute specifically defines “maliciously.” Further, “[n]o Virginia case distinguishes the

malice which is a necessary element of arson from the malice which has been required in other

common law crimes.” Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 530, 532 (1991). “[M]alice inheres

in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill

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will.” Hamm v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 150, 153 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting

Bell, 11 Va. App. at 533). “[I]n the case of arson, [malice] is not necessarily a feeling of ill will

toward another person[] but may be a purposeful intent to do a wrongful act.” Id. at 154

(emphasis added). “[I]f one is fully aware that his conduct creates a grave risk that a dwelling

place will be burned, and proceeds with the conduct, and causes the result, he is punishable

under” Code § 18.2-77. Ronald J. Bacigal, Virginia Practice—Criminal Offenses & Defenses,

Arson and Bombing A44 (III)(B) (2021). Malice “may be directly evidenced by words[] or

inferred from acts and conduct which neces[s]arily result in injury. Its existence is a question of

fact to be determined by [the trier of fact].” Bell, 11 Va. App. at 533 (quoting Long v.

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 198 (1989)).

        Additionally, “[w]hen statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning

will apply.” Torloni v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 261, 267 (2007). “When construing penal

statutes, a court must not add to the words of the statute, nor ignore its actual words, and must

strictly construe the statute and limit its application to cases falling clearly within its scope.”

Robinson v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 45, 51 (2007).

        The plain language of both Code § 18.2-77 and Code § 18.2-80 does not limit the

offenses to the property of another. Code § 18.2-77 states that an offense occurs if “any person

maliciously” burns or destroys a dwelling house “whether belonging to himself or another.”

(Emphasis added). Code § 18.2-80 prohibits “any person maliciously” burning or destroying any

building “whether the property of himself or of another.” (Emphasis added). The plain language

of both statutes also does not limit the offenses to burning a structure that is occupied. Code

§ 18.2-77(B) states that “[a]ny such burning or destruction when the building or other place . . .

is unoccupied, shall be punishable as a Class 4 felony.” (Emphasis added). Code § 18.2-80

states that if the offense is committed “at a time when no person is in such building, or other

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structure” it is punishable as a crime, with the grade of the offense depending on the value of the

structures and property inside it. (Emphasis added). Thus, we will not read into the statute the

requirement that the burning of the structure be directed toward another person or property

owned by another person when both statutes clearly provide otherwise.

       Here, the record shows that Anderson committed a wrongful act intentionally when he set

fire to his house and garage. Under the definition of malice, the commission of a wrongful act

intentionally establishes malice. Anderson does not contest the trial court’s finding that he

intentionally set fire to his house and garage, and the law does not require that this act have been

directed toward a person or entity. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that Anderson acted

with malice and convicting him for violating Code §§ 18.2-77, 18.2-80.

                                    Proof of Value of Property

       Anderson also argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that

the garage and its contents were valued at $500 or more. For the reasons below, we agree and

reverse and vacate his conviction for maliciously burning a structure with the property inside it

valued at $500 or more, in violation of Code § 18.2-80, and remand the conviction for retrial on

the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor maliciously burning a structure under the same code

section.

       “[T]he burden is on the Commonwealth to prove every essential element of the offense

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bishop v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 9, 12 (2008) (quoting Powers v.

Commonwealth, 211 Va. 386, 388 (1970)). As stated above, on appeal, a reviewing court asks

“whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 658, 663 (2003) (quoting Kelly v.

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257 (2003) (en banc)).

                                                -5-
       In Crowder v. Commonwealth, we held that “no rational factfinder could have found

beyond a reasonable doubt that the Commonwealth proved the $1,000 threshold value element of

the felony destruction of property charge” because it did not introduce any evidence on the value

of the property. Id. at 663. No witness, even a lay witness, gave any testimony on the value of

the property. Id. at 664-65. Thus, we reversed and vacated Crowder’s conviction, but because

the “proven elements of the original charge qualif[ied] as a lesser-included offense,” remanded

the matter for a retrial on this lesser-included offense. Id. at 666-67.

       Here, as in Crowder, the Commonwealth also did not introduce any evidence to establish

the value of the garage and the property inside it. No witness testified about the value of this

property. The Commonwealth also did not introduce any exhibits that established the value of

the property. There were no pictures of the garage before it was damaged by the fire. The

Commonwealth introduced no evidence whatsoever about the value of the garage or the property

contained inside the garage. An assistant fire marshal for Hanover County testified about

observations he made while investigating Anderson’s property for the cause and origin of the

fire. The circuit court gleaned from this testimony that the garage had several features, such as

“concrete block[s],” a “concrete pad,” “shingles, windows, [and] doors.” The circuit court

determined that if it assigned “a minimal value of a dollar to each and every component [of the

garage],” “the value is clearly in excess of five hundred dollars. Clearly in excess.”

       Under these circumstances, we hold that the Commonwealth did not carry its burden to

establish the value of the property, which is an essential element of burning or destroying a

building or structure valued at $500 or more, in violation of Code § 18.2-80. It is true that

“factfinders may draw inferences from the evidence so long as those inferences do not ‘defy

logic and common sense.’” Wynnycky v. Kozel, 71 Va. App. 177, 203 (2019) (quoting Fox Rest

Assocs., L.P. v. Little, 282 Va. 277, 283 (2011)). However, “a factfinder must base its decision

                                                 -6-
on evidence presented rather than mere surmise or conjecture.” Id. (emphasis added). The fact

that particular factfinders may have knowledge that allows them to combine past experience with

inference to arrive at a conclusion does not relieve the Commonwealth of its burden to present

evidence to establish the element of an offense. If such was the case, we would have to account

for the personal experience of, in bench trials, every trial judge, and in jury trials, every juror.

Rather, our precedent does not require us to account for the particularities of different factfinders

but to determine whether the matter sought to be proved is “within the range of the common

experience of the jury.” Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 182, 186-87 (2002) (emphasis

added) (noting that “[e]xpert testimony is admissible if the area of expertise to which the expert

will testify is not within the range of the common experience of the jury”). The value of

property is not within the range of common experience of the jury; thus, the Commonwealth was

required to present evidence of value. Lee v. Mulford, 269 Va. 562, 565 (2005) (“Ordinarily,

expert testimony will be required to assist the [factfinder in determining reasonable attorney

fees].” (emphasis added)).

        The Commonwealth has presented no evidence whatsoever about the value of the garage

or the property therein, and thus, has not established this essential element of the offense.

However, as in Crowder, the proven elements of the offense here qualify as a lesser-included

offense. Code § 18.2-80 provides that if all the elements of burning or destroying a building or

structure valued at $500 or more are met, but the structure “and the property therein be of less

value,” the crime is punishable as “a Class 1 misdemeanor.” Because Anderson only contests

the valuation element of Code § 18.2-80, the other proven elements of the offense qualify as a

lesser-included offense. Thus, we reverse Anderson’s conviction for burning or destroying a

building or structure valued at $500 or more, but “remand . . . the lesser charge for retrial—

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assuming the Commonwealth, in its prosecutorial discretion, chooses to go forward on the lesser

charge.” Crowder, 41 Va. App. at 666.

                                            CONCLUSION

       For the reasons stated, we affirm Anderson’s conviction for arson of an unoccupied

building, in violation of Code § 18.2-77, but we reverse his conviction for maliciously burning a

structure with the property inside it valued at $500 or more, in violation of Code § 18.2-80.

Because the evidence sufficiently establishes every element of the lesser-included offense of

misdemeanor malicious burning of a structure under Code § 18.2-80, we remand this matter for

retrial, if the Commonwealth be so advised.

                                                   Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

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