Court Opinion

ID: 2964159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:21:33.876629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:51.541040
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2272

                                   WAYNE F. CROSS,

                                Petitioner, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                 MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM,
                        WARDEN OF NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE PRISON,

                                Respondent, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                 [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
                                                 ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________

                          Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            John R.  Baraniak, Jr. with  whom Mark P.  Szpak, Jill J.  Chasson
            ______________________            ______________  ________________
        and Ropes & Gray were on briefs for petitioner.
            ____________
            Patrick E. Donovan,  Assistant Attorney General, Criminal  Justice
            __________________
        Bureau, with  whom Jeffrey R.  Howard, Attorney General, was  on brief
                           __________________
        for respondent.

                                 ____________________

                                    June 27, 1996
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN,  Circuit  Judge.    Wayne  F.  Cross,  currently
                          ______________

            serving a New Hampshire state sentence for two bank robberies

            in that state, appeals from  an order of the federal district

            court in New Hampshire dismissing  his petition for a writ of

            habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.   2254.  In the petition, Cross

            sought to attack the New Hampshire state court convictions on

            the  ground   that  New  Hampshire  officials   violated  the

            Interstate Agreement  on Detainers,  N.H. Rev.  Stat. Ann.   

            606-A et seq.  ("IAD"), and  the Fourteenth  Amendment.   The
                  _______

            facts are as follows.  

                 While Cross was  in prison in Massachusetts  in November

            1983, New  Hampshire authorities  obtained jurisdiction  over

            Cross  pursuant  to the  IAD to  try  him for  two  1982 bank

            robberies.  Cross  had himself requested a  rapid disposition

            of  the charges  and waived  objections  to the  extradition.

            Thereafter, Cross was  convicted on the bank  robbery charges

            in  New Hampshire  state  court, and  in  February 1985,  was

            sentenced to  two consecutive terms of 7-1/2 to 15 years.  He

            then appealed from the convictions.  

                 At the same time, Cross asked New Hampshire officials to

            return him to Massachusetts pending resolution of his appeal,

            citing  an IAD  provision that  says the  prisoner should  be

            returned  to the sending state "[a]t the earliest practicable

            time consonant with  the purposes of  this agreement."   N.H.

            Rev.  Stat. Ann.    606-A:1, art. V(e).   Cross  said that he

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            wanted to go back to  the Massachusetts prison to complete an

            electrician training program  that he had been  participating

            in before his rendition to New Hampshire.    

                 But New Hampshire officials were concerned that if Cross

            was  returned to Massachusetts  and his New  Hampshire appeal

            resulted in a  new trial, the anti-shuttling provision of the

            IAD might prevent his reprosecution.   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.  

            606-A:1, art. III(d).   Also, the officials were not  certain

            that Cross'  earlier waiver  of extradition  would cover  his

            return to New  Hampshire if a new trial became necessary.  As

            a  precaution,  they kept  him  in  New Hampshire  until  his

            convictions were affirmed on appeal in December 1986, some 22

            months after he was  sentenced.  State v. Cross, 519 A.2d 272
                                             _____    _____

            (N.H.   1986).     He   was   then   promptly   returned   to

            Massachusetts.1     After   completing   his    Massachusetts

            sentence in 1992, Cross was returned to  New Hampshire, where

            he is currently  serving out the bank robbery  sentences.  It

            was at this  point that Cross filed the  instant petition for

            habeas corpus in the federal district court in New Hampshire.

                                
            ____________________

                 1Following  his  conviction,  Cross filed  a  "motion to
            return" in  New Hampshire state court which  was dismissed as
            moot after  he was returned  to Massachusetts.  Prior  to the
            present action,  Cross also  brought proceedings  in the  New
            Hampshire state court collaterally attacking his bank robbery
            convictions  and also filed a habeas  petition in the federal
            district   court   in   Massachusetts;  both   efforts   were
            unsuccessful.  Only  the state appeal is reported.   Cross v.
                                                                 _____
            Warden, 644 A.2d 542 (N.H. 1994).
            ______
              

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            Cross'  petition  alleged  that his  convictions  on  the New

            Hampshire bank  robbery charges must  be invalidated--without

            possibility of retrial--because the state violated the IAD by

            holding him in New Hampshire pending resolution of his appeal

            there.

                 In  addition to  the IAD  claim, the  petition  made two

            constitutional claims.  First, Cross argued that the delay in

            his return  to Massachusetts unconstitutionally  burdened his

            right to appeal,  in violation of the Due  Process Clause, by

            forcing him temporarily to forego rehabilitation if he wished

            to challenge  his convictions.   Second,  Cross claimed  that

            exacting this "extra  price" for pursuing an  appeal violated

            the  Equal Protection  Clause by  irrationally  treating some

            convicted defendants differently than others.

                 The district court dismissed  the petition, relying upon

            a  report and recommendation  by the  magistrate judge.   The

            magistrate   judge  had  ruled   that,  under  First  Circuit

            precedent, an IAD-violation claim was not ordinarily a ground

            for habeas  relief.  Fasano v.  Hall, 615 F.2d 555,  557 (1st
                                 ______     ____

            Cir. 1980).   As  for the  constitutional claims,  the report

            said that  these claims  were foreclosed as  an abuse  of the

            writ, under Sawyer  v. Whitley, 505 U.S.  333 (1992), because
                        ______     _______

            they had not been raised  by Cross in his prior Massachusetts

            federal habeas petition.

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                 1.  Even  assuming arguendo that New  Hampshire violated
                                    ________

            the  IAD--a  point  we need  not  decide--the  district court

            correctly ruled that  this statutory claim is  not cognizable

            under section 2254.   Although the IAD  is considered federal

            law for purposes of habeas corpus, Reed v. Farley, 114 S. Ct.
                                               ____    ______

            2291,  2296 (1994), nonconstitutional claims can be raised on

            habeas only  if  the alleged  error  results in  "a  complete

            miscarriage  of justice."   Id. at 2300  (citations omitted).
                                        ___

            Cross cannot meet this substantial burden.  The IAD provision

            at issue here has nothing to  do with securing a fair  trial,

            and  Cross makes  no  claim that  the  alleged IAD  violation

            actually impaired  his ability  to  prepare a  defense or  to

            prosecute his appeal.  See Fasano, 615 F.2d at 557-58.
                                   ___ ______

                 Moreover,  we do not  agree with Cross'  suggestion that

            Reed  v. Farley undermines Fasano  v. Hall.   It is true that
            ____     ______            ______     ____

            Reed v. Farley leaves open  the possibility that, in  unusual
            ____    ______

            circumstances,   an    IAD    violation    or    any    other

            nonconstitutional violation of federal law might give rise to

            a claim  considered in a  habeas proceeding.   114 S.  Ct. at

            2296-99.  But Reed v.  Farley declined to consider such claim
                          ____     ______

            in  circumstances that  were  arguably  more compelling  than

            those presented here, and whatever  gap the Supreme Court has

            left open is too narrow for Cross.

                 Contrary  to  Cross'  suggestion,  denying review  under

            section 2254 does not insulate the prompt return provision of

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            the IAD  from federal  enforcement or extend  to prisoners  a

            federal  right  without  a  remedy.   The  IAD,  approved  by

            Congress  as an interstate compact, comprises federal law for

            purposes of  42 U.S.C.    1983.  E.g.,  Cuyler v. Adams,  449
                                             ____   ______    _____

            U.S. 433  (1981).  Cross  was free to seek  injunctive relief

            under  section  1983,  requiring New  Hampshire  officials to

            comply  with their  IAD obligations.   Id.  See  also Stow v.
                                                   ___  _________ ____

            Horan, 36 F.3d 1089 (1st Cir. 1994). 
            _____

                 2.  The  district court dismissed Cross'  constitutional

            claims as an abuse of the writ, believing that neither of the

            constitutional  claims had  been  presented in  Cross'  prior

            federal  habeas proceeding  in Massachusetts.   See generally
                                                            _____________

            Sawyer,  505 U.S.  at 338;  Rule 9(b)  following 28  U.S.C.  
            ______

            2254.   On  this  appeal,  both sides  concede  that the  due

            process   claim  was  raised  in  the  prior  federal  habeas

            proceeding and  so is not  foreclosed as  a "new" claim.   It

            appears that the equal protection claim was not raised in the

            Massachusetts habeas proceeding.

                 Cross  now offers several  arguments (e.g., that  he was
                                                       ____

            previously proceeding pro se,  that the Massachusetts  habeas
                                  ___ __

            court held  no evidentiary  hearing) as to  why he  should be

            allowed to renew the due  process claim in this second habeas

            proceeding  and to make the equal  protection claim here even

            though not previously made in  the earlier petition.  We need

            not  decide these issues  because we  are satisfied  that the

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            delayed return, whatever its propriety under the IAD, did not

            violate the Constitution.2

                 There is no indication that the delayed return comprised

            an attempt to punish Cross for appealing or to interfere with

            Cross'  appeal from  his  New  Hampshire  convictions.    Cf.
                                                                      ___

            Blackledge v.  Perry, 417 U.S.  21 (1974).  On  the contrary,
            __________     _____

            the aim was  to secure Cross' availability for  a retrial, if

            his appeal  caused one to be  necessary.  Whether or  not the

            New Hampshire authorities were overly cautious, their purpose

            was certainly a legitimate one.

                 The  delay may well have interfered with Cross' training

            program and  that is regrettable.  But  the Constitution does

            not  protect  against  every incidental  burden  that  may by

            happenstance result from  the decision to appeal.   Beauchamp
                                                                _________

            v.  Murphy, 37 F.3d 700 (1st Cir. 1994).  The likelihood that
                ______

            a delayed return from one prison to  another would discourage

            meritorious  appeals  is  very slight  in  the  generality of

            cases;  more serious burdens were sustained in North Carolina
                                                           ______________

            v. Pearce,  395 U.S. 711 (1969),  and in Beauchamp.   And, in
               ______                                _________

            this case, Cross did pursue his appeal.
                             ___

                                
            ____________________

                 2It is far from clear that  an unconstitutional delay in
            returning  Cross to Massachusetts would permit a habeas court
            to  invalidate  an otherwise  valid conviction  that occurred
            prior to the delay.  Ordinarily, in habeas there must be some
            causal  connection between the legal error and the challenged
                    __________
            detention.

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                   The equal protection claim made in Cross' brief is the

            same undue burden  claim just discussed--recast by   pointing

            to other  defendants who do  not suffer the same  burden when

            they  choose   to  appeal  (e.g.,   convicted  New  Hampshire
                                        ____

            defendants who  were not  extradited) and  claiming that  the

            discrepant  burden on Cross was irrational.  Certainly, Cross

            was   treated   differently,   but  that   is   because   his

            circumstances were different:   the rationale for a delay  in

            returning him to  Massachusetts does not  apply to those  who

            had not been extradited or had been but did not appeal. 

                 Cross' real argument, mislabeled as an equal  protection

            claim, is simply  that Cross himself did not  need to be kept

            in  New  Hampshire  because  that  state  could  easily  have

            reclaimed  him for a  new trial had that  been required.  New

            Hampshire authorities may  have been mistaken in  reading the

            anti-shuttling clause too broadly or  too narrowly construing

            Cross'  earlier waiver.    But such  a fumble  is at  worst a

            garden variety  administrative error in  application and  not

            invidious classification  under the Equal  Protection Clause.

            See J. Nowak & R. Rotunda, Constitutional Law   14.2,  at 570
            ___                        __________________

            (4th ed. 1991).

                 Affirmed. 
                 ________

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