Court Opinion

ID: 9607577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:00:04.485028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:39.338523
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I join in Judge Beasley’s dissent, and also write separately to point out that footnote 1 of the majority is an incomplete account of the colloquy between the trial court and defense counsel. Based upon *98that discussion, I cannot agree with the majority’s assertion that “[t]he single objection, therefore, adequately preserved for review the entire line of questioning.” The only evidence under discussion was Larocque’s repeated visits to a convenience store near the victim’s home. Defense counsel asserted that Larocque’s conduct was a “similar transaction” and that he should have been given notice of the State’s intent to present such evidence. The trial court’s verbatim response was: “I think intimidation, evidence of intimidation of a witness is relevant. I don’t think it would require notice but I will note your objection and overrule it.” The trial court was merely stating the basis for its ruling, which was confined to the defense objection to the testimony regarding the visits to the convenience store. It is also apparent that defense counsel made no continuing objection to this evidence, or to any additional evidence offered to show intimidation. Counsel’s only response to the judge’s ruling was, “Okay.”
Decided December 5, 1996
Reconsideration denied December 19, 1996
Chandler & Britt, Walter M. Britt, Gregory D. Jay, for appellant.
Lydia J. Sartain, District Attorney, Lee Darragh, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The other, unobjected-to, evidence of intimidation was far more damaging to Larocque than the convenience store visits: Larocque admitted that he rented a car at an agency across the street from the victim’s workplace in Stone Mountain, although he lived in Lawrenceville; he was also seen and recognized by a former co-worker driving along a private service road in the rear of the victim’s workplace. All of this occurred in the context of a condition placed on Larocque’s bond that he keep away from the victim; moreover, evidence was presented that Larocque’s visits coincided with the appearances of his case on the trial calendar. As the other dissent observes, such conduct is clearly relevant to the issue of guilt or innocence. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.