Court Opinion

ID: 9717483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:04:17.725949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:53.411830
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s comment constituted plain error. Rather than grant the defendant a new trial, I would instead remand the cause to the appellate court for the resolution of additional issues raised there by the defendant but not decided by that court in the course of the original appeal. As the majority opinion acknowledges, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s remark, nor did counsel raise the matter in the defendant’s post-trial motion. Ordinarily, then, the issue would be deemed waived by reason of counsel’s procedural defaults. (People v. Whitehead (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 425, 446-47.) But like the appellate court before it, the majority in the present case believes that the prosecutor’s comment constituted plain error. (See 107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a) (on review of a criminal case, “[pjlain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court”).) Because courts apply the plain error doctrine to redress “serious injustices which have been done to the defendant” (People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576), one may question the majority’s suggestion (141 Ill. 2d at 407) that plain error may also be harmless error. See United States v. Young (1985), 470 U.S. 1, 16 n.14, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 13 n.14, 105 S. Ct. 1038,1047 n.14. This court has previously invoked the plain error rule when an error affecting a substantial right might have altered the outcome of a factually close case or, alternatively, operated to deny the defendant a fair trial. (People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 463, 488; People v. Sanders (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 262, 273.) In the present appeal, the court holds that both grounds for application of the plain error rule exist. Assuming that the prosecutor’s comment was erroneous, I do not agree with the majority that the plain error rule is applicable here. Contrary to the majority’s view, the proof in this case was not closely balanced. At trial, the prosecution introduced into evidence the defendant’s confession, which detailed his participation in the victim’s murder. The confession was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for that offense on an accountability theory. As the State observes, “a voluntary confession by a competent person is the highest type of evidence known to the law” (People v. Smith (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 344, 349). I do not consider that the force of the defendant’s admissions was seriously undermined by certain discrepancies appearing in other evidence introduced by the prosecution. Nor do I believe that the nature of the alleged error was so egregious that it operated to deny the defendant a fair trial. “Any error related to *** comments to which no objections were made would normally be considered waived unless the comments were so inflammatory that defendant could not have received a fair trial or so flagrant as to threaten deterioration of the judicial process.” (People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 518;) The comment challenged here was a fleeting reference, and it came at the end of a three-day trial. Moreover, the prosecutor’s argument told the jurors little that they would not already have surmised from the witness’ behavior in the courtroom. Defense counsel may well have believed that a contemporaneous objection would have only highlighted the arguably improper comment. The defendant’s failure to object to the comment now complained of denied the trial judge the opportunity to assess the impact of the alleged error and devise an appropriate remedy for it. Had defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, the trial judge could have considered whether the remark in question violated his earlier directive to the parties not to comment on the witness’ reluctance to testify, or whether instead the remark was based on competent evidence or was invited by defense counsel’s own closing argument, as the State contends. If the trial judge concluded that the comment was improper, he would then have decided whether simply to sustain the defense objection, to strike the comment and instruct the jury to disregard it, or to declare a mistrial. In determining the probable effect of the comment on the jury, and in devising an appropriate remedy for the asserted error, the judge would have considered a number of circumstances, including the strength of the parties’ evidence and the context in which the remark was made. Those questions raise factual issues and in many cases are more easily, and more accurately, resolved in the trial court than on review. In attempting to correct what the majority perceives to be a substantial injustice, today’s decision only erodes the traditional division of duties between the trial courts and courts of review. Finally, we should not find in our resolution of the present appeal a vehicle by which to discipline the prosecutor for his alleged violation of the trial judge’s directive. That the prosecutor’s conduct was “egregious” and in “blatant disregard” of the court’s order, as the majority says (141 Ill. 2d at 407), is simply irrelevant to the question whether the alleged error was also harmless. (See United States v. Hasting (1983), 461 U.S. 499, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96, 103 S. Ct. 1974.) The trial judge had the authority to impose an appropriate sanction on the prosecutor, if the judge believed one was necessary; we should not exact from society the time and expense of a new trial, if the error was indeed harmless. In sum, I do not believe that the evidence was so closely balanced that the unobjected-to comment could have affected the outcome of the proceeding, nor do I consider that the comment denied the defendant a fair trial. Accordingly, I do not regard this case as an appropriate one in which to apply the plain error rule. In light of its result in the present matter, the appellate court did not consider certain other issues raised by the defendant on appeal to that court. The parties have not briefed those questions before this court, and therefore I would remand the cause to the appellate court for consideration of those remaining issues.