Court Opinion

ID: 9575448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:13:53.503123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:11.773354
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Beginning. There must always be a beginning to the violation of a constitutional right. We had a beginning here. It was an officer who stopped the car because it fishtailed and threw up dust. A warning ticket was given for this type of driving. No prosecution ensued.
Enter an odor of alcoholic beverage on the driver. Conceptualize that driver can be charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicants. Here, however, no such charge was lodged and the driver apparently passed all sobriety tests. Insufficient evidence; no prosecution.
Enter, now, the possible charge of open container(s) in the stopped vehicle. SDCL 35-1-9.1. No such charge was prosecuted. Testimony indicates that there was a “minuscule” amount of beer in the can. State advocates that the beer can “was not completely empty.” However, Officer Selves has a sworn affidavit in the record reflecting that the beer can was “empty.” There are references, in the transcript of the combined preliminary hearing and suppression hearing, to an “empty beer can” on at least two pages thereof. It is understandable that State did not see fit to charge driver with an open container violation. Conclusion: Insufficient evidence; no prosecution. Per the court below, however, the conclusion was reached that the open, empty beer *225can gave probable cause to arrest and to then search the automobile.
Thus, in reviewing, we see that State’s case on any one of the above charges did not materialize. Instead, we have before us, for review, a motion to suppress on a warrantless search of a vehicle, arising out of the above scenario, pertaining to drugs and drug paraphernalia. Why? Where do the drugs enter the picture? A simple explanation may be found, as reflected by the “troubled” writing (see phrasing of majority opinion, last full paragraph) with respect to the “10-80” radio transmission. Officer Griswold told Trooper Selves to hold the individual because he wanted to come and check him out for a possible “10-80.” Defendant heard this radio transmission and wanted to know what it was all about and Trooper Selves said “Don’t concern yourself.” Trooper Selves testified that even he had to look up what “10-80” meant because it was seldom used but that it pertained to “any narcotic information.”
We are confronted with a situation where officers — inceptually—undertook a narcotics investigation without benefit of a warrant and without benefit of any facts to substantiate that narcotics were either in the vehicle or on the persons in the vehicle. There are legal views, of a conceptually popular belief, that this represents zeal in law enforcement to be blessed in a court of law. However, appellate courts are confronted with protecting the constitutional rights of citizens. Fourth Amendment rights are not for supposed first-class citizens or imagined second-class citizens; they are for all citizens. And they are not second-class rights to be dispensed at the whim of either zealous officers or courts believing that it is their duty to uphold law enforcement intrusions so long as the intrusions are, in the eyes of the law enforcement officers, to protect society. Our nation was founded on individual rights.
Long have I written, in this Court, to try to protect the citizens of this state on South Dakota highways from unreasonable, unlawful, and unconstitutional intrusion.1 It has been a lonely road. When you deprive a person of his constitutional rights, you crush his freedom of spirit and you strike fear in his entire countenance.2 Our courts must protect the citizenry, lest the indispensable freedom guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is stripped away. Apparently, I am not alone in this belief. Reference is made to a five-four decision in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986).
In Class, we had the seizure of a gun, and the issue before the United States Supreme Court was: Should the gun be suppressed? A police officer, in Class, stopped a car for traffic violations and tried to get a peek at the vehicle identification number, a/k/a VIN. The VIN must be placed in the plain view of someone outside of the automobile. An officer reached inside the car to remove some dashboard papers which obstructed his view of the VIN. But as he so moved his body, he noticed a gun protruding underneath the driver’s seat and he seized the gun. The suppression issue eventually was heard by the United States Supreme Court. Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, holding for the government officials, but emphasized that federal law requires the VIN be placed in the plain view of someone outside the automobile. Justice O’Connor called the VIN “a significant thread in the web of regulation of the *226automobile.” Class, 475 U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 964, 89 L.Ed.2d at 88.
But we do not have a VIN in this case or anything near to it by way of comparison. In the ending of her writing, Justice O’Con-nor points out that “our holding today does not authorize police officers to enter a vehicle to obtain a dashboard-mounted VIN when the VIN is visible from outside the automobile.” Id., 475 U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 969, 89 L.Ed.2d at 94. On behalf of the Court, she further wrote: “A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile.” Id., 475 U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 965, 89 L.Ed.2d at 89 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2537-38, 37 L.Ed.2d 596, 600-01 (1973)). In the Almeida-San-chez case, the Court reflected: “Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.” 413 U.S. at 269, 93 S.Ct. at 2537-38, 37 L.Ed.2d at 600-01.3
Let us go back to the facts, to establish a time frame, for the state of mind of the officers. By State’s own brief, it admits that Officer Griswold was searching for evidence. And State justifies all of this by stating that Officer Griswold merely stuck his head inside the car door. Gentlemen and ladies of the law, this is an intrusion. And it was an unlawful intrusion. Below, the court, inter alia, found “Griswold had to enter the confines of the vehicle in order to view the alligator clip.”4 State is clever by a concept of “minimally intrusive.” State says in its brief: “As indicated above, the search involved only the intrusion of the officer’s head into the passenger compartment.” (The plain view doctrine is moored upon peering from outside the vehicle into the inside of the vehicle; the doctrine does not arise from any officer thrusting all or part of his body into the vehicle, and then proceeding to have a “plain view” look.) This conviction should be reversed based upon the initial search.
From the beginning, the officers were seizing individuals and an automobile because of the belief of narcotics being involved. Yet, not one fact had surfaced to establish a basis for the belief. Once Officer Griswold was unlawfully in the automobile, he observed the feathered alligator roach clip. It was not in plain view from outside of the automobile. Only an investigation within the automobile, after an intrusion, revealed this clip. Under New York v. Class, 475 U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 966-68, 89 L.Ed.2d at 91-93, the balancing test is discussed. The nature of the intrusion may be considered as opposed to the importance of the governmental interest promoted by the intrusion. Under all of the circumstances, in my opinion, there was an unlawful seizure. Concededly, there was certainly a reasonable suspicion for a stop. Erratic driving behavior was articu-lable suspicion to stop defendant’s car. Thereafter, however, these two law officers violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. If these two officers had probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of a crime,5 a lesser expectation of privacy would prevail. But they did not have the requisite probable cause.6
*227It is vital that, under our scope of review, the findings of the court below are clearly erroneous. I hazard that they are. It seems that the court below concluded, as a matter of law, that an empty beer can, lying on a floorboard of an automobile, made the entire automobile vulnerable or open to a warrantless search. This is carrying a search of an automobile and a seizure of its contents into the realm of the “unreasonable.” It is “unreasonable” search and seizures that the Fourth Amendment expressly prohibits.

. Officers, public officials “holding” people is reminiscent of the Nazi Party, a fanatical political party which took over Germany and then, one by one, invaded and occupied several European countries. This eventually triggered the entry of America into World War II. The Nazis “held” people — without process.

. See State v. Anderson, 359 N.W.2d 887,893 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., concurring in result); State v. Auen, 342 N.W.2d 236,241 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., dissenting); State v. Anderson, 331 N.W.2d 568,573 (S.D.1983) (Henderson, J., concurring in result). In Anderson, 331 N.W.2d at 573,1 voiced my concern regarding the rights of the driving public:
Erosions of liberty do not come in giant leaps, they come in miniscule encroachments often hidden to the trained and educated mind. Like a thief in the night, language can steal a liberty deeply ingrained in the fabric of the American way of life. I am afraid of each little encroachment on the liberty of my fellow Americans on the highway.

.In discussing probable cause, the United States Supreme Court wrote:
Since Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949) (brackets in original; footnote omitted) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543, 555 (1925)). See generally 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1 (2d ed. 1987) (where a historical discourse on probable cause appears).

. No residual marijuana or narcotics was found on the alligator clip.

. Recall: Officer Griswold (not at the scene) wanted a "hold” on the individual to have a 10-80 (narcotic) check.

. We should not forget that this search was prefaced upon Officer Griswold’s purely intui-tional compulsion to conduct a "narcotics information" search. He could not have had probable cause to commence such an inquisition as it *227is undisputed that he did not know whose vehicle Officer Selves had stopped. The Fourth Amendment probable cause mandate is designed “to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890-91 (1949). See 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.2(a) (2d ed. 1987). In this situation, only the existence of probable cause could legitimize the search. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 594 (1982); 1 W. LaFave, supra § 3.1(a), at 542-43. As neither Officers Selves nor Griswold had probable cause, the search was improper.