Court Opinion

ID: 9722869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:53:44.4306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:41.181234
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The defendants requested the judge to charge the jury on their theory of the case.1 Defendants’ theory was supported by evidence and, therefore, they had a right to an instruction thereon.2 The majority acknowledges that rule of law but rejects defendants’ claim of error, finding the trial judge complied when he gave the charge set out in the majority opinion. And this is where we disagree.
The judge’s charge that each party claimed the other was negligent did not satisfy the court’s obligation to charge a requesting party’s theory, if supported by evidence, even though the “theory may be controverted by evidence of the opposing party.”3
*11The judge’s charge told the jury little, if anything, more than they knew from their own experience. As soon as they learned this was an automobile collision case, the jury knew that, in all probability, each party charged the other with fault and denied his own culpability.
The simple statement that plaintiff asserts defendant was at fault, while defendant denies fault and, additionally, asserts plaintiff’s faulty conduct caused his injury, is not what we mean by a “theory of the case.” That statement is the “theory” of almost every negligence case. It is not, however, a statement of either the plaintiff’s or defendant’s theory in particular.
True, there is no set formula for jury instructions. The trial judge need not charge the precise words requested.4 However, he cannot discharge this obligation by a statement adding nothing to the jury’s understanding of the case. If the right to the charge is to be meaningful, and if the charge is to serve its intended purpose of enlightening the jury and assisting it in its deliberations, the trial judge must relate the opposing concepts of the evidence to the disputed issues the jury is about to resolve. We know the evidence must he related to the issues in a statement of the “theory”, from the case of Schattilly. The Court first stated the nature of plaintiff’s theory (p 666) :
“From the pleadings and the record and plaintiff’s requests to charge, it is apparent that plaintiff’s theory of the happening of this accident was that the defendant Ella Yonker stepped on the accelerator pedal as she was undertaking to get out of this *12automobile via the driver’s door, and that this action, coupled with the fact that the car was in gear and the brake not set, constituted negligence which was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.”
The court then ruled that, since there was ample evidence to sustain plaintiff’s theory, it was (p 666) “reversible error for the trial court to ignore plaintiff’s requests to charge upon the question of whether or not one of the defendants stepped on the accelerator while the automobile in question was running and in gear.” See, also, Snyder v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company (1983), 371 Mich 36, 45, where an opinion signed by 4 Justices5 observed that the trial judge’s manner of instruction “amounted to an exclusion of the consideration of the defendant’s theory and provided no guidance in the application of the factual evidence adduced by it to that theory.” (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, the Supreme Court requires a recitation of the competing views of the evidence, not an empty ritual.
Finally, my Brothers state: “it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to say no more than he did on defendants’ theory, especially when plaintiff’s theory was treated in a similar manner.” The implication is that the judge need not grant requests for instructions on the parties’ theories of the case so long as he does not discriminate between plaintiff and defendant by denying one and granting the other.6 In my opinion, their statement misinterprets the purpose of placing this obligation upon the trial court. That purpose is clarification and delineation *13of tlie contested issues so that the deciding jury may be a well-instructed, knowledgeable jury.7
The manner in which the trial judge sets forth each party’s theory is within his discretion; it is not within his discretion to refuse, upon request, to instruct concerning the parties’ relevant theories.8
I would reverse and grant a new trial.

 See footnote 1 of the majority opinion for text of the requested charge.

 Camden Fire Insurance Company v. Kaminski (1958), 352 Mich 507, 511; Schattilly v. Yonker (1957), 347 Mich 660; Snyder v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company (1963), 371 Mich 36; Gapske v. Hatch (1957), 347 Mich 648, 658. This rule is applicable in criminal as well as civil eases. People v. Welke (1955), 342 Mich 164.

 Schattilly v. Yonker, supra, p 666.

 “There eoulcl be no error in the trial judge declining to accept plaintiff’s requested instructions, in their exact wording, so long as in his own words he set forth plaintiff’s theory of the case (in the event there was testimony to support it) and instructed the jury on the law applicable thereto.” Schattilly v. Yonker, supra, p. 665.

 The other 4 Justices joined in a separate opinion which did not address itself to this issue.

 In Snyder v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company, supra, the Court was faced with a trial judge’s unequal treatment of plaintiff’s and defendant’s theories of the ease, but nowhere in that opinion did the Coux-t iixtimate the trial judge’s duty in insti'ueting the jui’y on the respective theories was merely to insure that the parties received equal treatment.

 “The jury was entitled to have before it during its consideration of the ease both plaintiff’s and defendant’s theories (where, as here, there was evidence to support them) and the law applicable thereto. Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich 247; Toole v. Consolidated Street Railway Co., 100 Mich 379 (25 LRA 744, 4 Am Neg Cas 169); Webber v. Park Auto Transportation Co., 138 Wash 325 (244 P 718, 47 ALR 590); 53 Am Jur, Trial, § 626, p 487.” Gapske v. Hatch (1957), 347 Mich 648, 658.

 “Each party is entitled to have his theory of the ease, if supported by evidence, explained to the jury. The theories of each party and issues raised thereby must be stated fairly, giving equal stress to the positions of each party. In stating the issues to the jury, the allegations, denials, and admissions by both parties should be clearly and succinctly stated in the instructions, outlining the issues as presented by the pleadings of all parties and by the evidence. Instructions should be concrete and specific with respect to the faets and issues and not abstract in character.” 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed) 562, authors’ comments to GCR 1963, 516.