Court Opinion

ID: 9964591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 15:00:45.080127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:36.858411
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KIMBERLY PATRICK,                               DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         NY-0752-12-0130-I-6

             v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE                       DATE: April 29, 2024
  CORPORATION,
             Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Kimberly Patrick , Parlin, New Jersey, pro se.

      Beth A. Wilt , Esquire, Arlington, Virginia, for the agency.

      Scott David Cooper , Esquire, Fairfax, Virginia, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision that
reversed the appellant’s removal, and the appellant has filed a cross petition for
review of the initial decision and a motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for
review for failure to comply with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the appellant’s motion to dismiss,
GRANT the agency’s petition for review, DENY the appellant’s cross petition for
review, and REVERSE the initial decision.            The appellant’s removal is
SUSTAINED.

                                  BACKGROUND
      The appellant was a Grade-12 Examiner for the agency. Patrick v. Federal
Deposit   Insurance   Corporation,    MSPB     Docket    No. NY-0752-12-0130-I-4,
Appeal File (I-4 AF), Tab 43 at 41.     In her position, she participated in, and
sometimes directed, the examination of banks in order to determine their financial
condition, evaluate their management, and ascertain their compliance with
applicable laws and regulations. I-4 AF, Tab 44 at 103.
      On October 15, 2008, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal based
on 16 specifications of “excessive absences resulting in [the appellant’s] inability
to perform [her] duties on a regular basis.”        I-4 AF, Tab 43 at 63.       The
specifications charged that the appellant was absent from duty and had been
granted leave without pay (LWOP) for the partial pay period from March 5, 2008,
through March 14, 2008, and for each full pay period from March 17, 2008,
through October 3, 2008.      Id. at 64-66.    Following the appellant’s written
response, in which she challenged the action and alleged retaliation for
whistleblowing activity, id. at 52-61, the deciding official issued a January 9,
2009 decision sustaining the charge and removing the appellant, effective
January 16, 2009, id. at 43-49.
      After some proceedings in Federal district court, on March 28, 2012, the
appellant filed this Board appeal, challenging her removal and raising an
affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation.       Patrick v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-12-0130-I-1, Initial Appeal
File (IAF), Tab 1 at 5, 10-11. There ensued several years of delay related to the
district court proceedings. Ultimately, however, the Board appeal proceeded to
                                                                                   3

adjudication, and the administrative judge issued an initial decision reversing the
removal on due process grounds.          Patrick v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-12-0130-I-6, Appeal File (I-6 AF),
Tab 87, Initial Decision (ID). Specifically, she found that the deciding official
violated the appellant’s right to due process by basing his decision on absences
that occurred both before and after those set forth in the charge. 2 ID at 14-16.
She ordered the agency to provide the appellant interim relief in the event that
either party petitioned for review. ID at 17.
      The agency has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR) File,
Tab 1, and the appellant has filed a motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for
failure to provide interim relief, PFR File, Tab 3, a response to the agency’s
petition, PFR File, Tab 9, and a cross petition for review. PFR File, Tab 10. The
agency has filed a reply to the appellant’s response to its petition for review, PFR
File, Tab 13, and a response to her cross petition for review. PFR File, Tab 15.

                                    ANALYSIS
The appellant’s motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for review for failure to
provide interim relief is denied.
      When, as here, the appellant was the prevailing party in the initial decision
and interim relief was ordered, a petition for review filed by the agency must be
accompanied by a certification that the agency has complied with the interim
relief order, either by providing the interim relief ordered, or by making a
determination that returning the appellant to the place of employment would
cause undue disruption to the work environment. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii),
(B); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a); see Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R.
11, ¶ 6 (2015).
      In its petition for review, the agency questions the propriety of the interim
relief order because the appellant admitted that her impairment prevents her from

2
  The administrative judge found that the appellant did not prove her whistleblower
defense. ID at 12-14.
                                                                                   4

returning to duty, and because the appellant is currently receiving disability
payments from both the Social Security Administration and the Office of
Personnel Management.      PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17.     Nevertheless, the agency
representative also certified under oath that the agency has fully complied with
the administrative judge’s interim relief order.     Id. at 16.   In her motion to
dismiss, the appellant argues that the agency has not provided her interim relief,
chiefly because it has not sent her a standard form (SF) 50 documenting the
cancellation of its removal action. PFR File, Tab 3. The appellant has included
copies of correspondence with the agency regarding her return to duty. PFR File,
Tab 3 at 13-18, Tab 4 at 5-8.
      Ordinarily, when an appellant challenges the agency’s certification of
compliance with an interim relief order, the Board will issue an order affording
the agency the opportunity to submit evidence of compliance.               5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.116(b). If the agency fails to provide evidence of compliance in response
to such an order, the Board may, at its discretion, dismiss the agency’s petition
for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e). In this case, however, we find it unnecessary
to issue such an order because the appellant has herself submitted evidence
demonstrating that the agency is in compliance with the administrative judge’s
interim relief order.   That evidence shows that the agency has restored the
appellant to her former position by ordering her to return to duty and describing
how that process would be accomplished, and it has explained that an SF-50
documenting her restoration is available to her through the agency’s secure email
system once she returns to duty. PFR File, Tab 3 at 13-18, Tab 4 at 5-8. That the
SF-50 documenting the appellant’s restoration to duty was not mailed to her is
immaterial. An SF-50 is only documentation of a personnel action; it does not
constitute the personnel action itself, and it does not control an employee’s status
and rights.   Fox v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 22 (2014);
Hunt-O’Neal v. Office of Personnel Management, 116 M.S.P.R. 286, ¶ 10 (2011);
see Grigsby v. Department of Commerce, 729 F.2d 772, 774–76 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
                                                                                  5

That the appellant disagrees with the agency’s position on this matter and has
chosen not to return to the workplace fails to support a finding that the agency is
not in compliance with the administrative judge’s interim relief order, and we
therefore decline to dismiss the agency’s petition for review on that basis.

The agency did not violate the appellant’s right to due process.
      The administrative judge reversed the appellant’s removal, finding that the
agency violated the appellant’s right to due process because the deciding official
based his decision on the appellant’s absences from October 23, 2007, through
January 9, 2009, the date the decision letter was issued, despite the fact the
charge only referenced the appellant’s absences from March 5, 2008, through
October 3, 2008. ID at 14-15. Specifically, the administrative judge found that
the deciding official referred several times in the decision letter to having
considered the appellant’s absences from October 22, 2007, and continuing, and
that his hearing testimony was essentially in accord, until he began to “catch on”
to the “problem,” whereupon he then stated that he only considered the
appellant’s excessive absences as set forth in the specifications under the charge.
ID at 15; I-4 AF, Tab 43 at 43-49; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 51, 68-69
(testimony of the deciding official).    In suggesting that the deciding official
thereby considered new and material evidence, and that such consideration
constituted a violation of the appellant’s due process rights, the administrative
judge relied upon Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1999). ID at 14. The agency argues on review that Stone does not
support reversing the appellant’s removal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10. We agree.
      In Stone, the court held that the introduction of new and material
information by means of ex parte communications to the deciding official
undermines the public employee’s constitutional due process guarantee of notice
and the opportunity to respond, and that procedural due process guarantees are
not met if the employee has notice only of certain charges or portions of the
                                                                                     6

evidence and the deciding official considers new and material information. 3
Stone, 179 F.3d at 1376. Here, although the administrative judge found that the
deciding official based his decision on absences that occurred both before and
after those identified in the specifications, ID at 14, we find that the deciding
official found “all specifications contained in the October 15, 2008 Letter of
Proposed Removal [] sustained.” 4 I-4 AF, Tab 43 at 48 (emphasis removed). To
the extent that the deciding official described all of the appellant’s absences,
those the administrative judge referred to as an ex parte communication were also
clearly referenced in the proposal notice in describing the appellant’s continuous
absence. Id. at 63-64.
      Moreover, even if the absences that occurred both before and after those
described in the proposal notice were considered an ex parte communication, not
every ex parte communication is a procedural defect so substantial and so likely
to cause prejudice that it undermines the due process guarantee and entitles the
claimant to an entirely new administrative proceeding, and only ex parte
communications that introduce new and material information to the deciding
official will violate the due process guarantee of notice.           Stone, 179 F.3d
at 1376-77.    Among the factors deemed useful for the Board to weigh in
considering whether new and material information has been introduced by means

3
  Ex parte communications have been broadly construed to include information known
by the deciding official. Stone, 179 F.3d at 1376. The real focus of Stone and its
progeny is the consideration of information of which the appellant was not afforded
notice and an opportunity to respond and is grounded in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), which extended
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to an individual’s loss of Government
employment.
4
   We have reviewed the deciding official’s hearing testimony, particularly that
described by the administrative judge as his “catching on” to “the problem.” ID at 15.
Contrary to the administrative judge’s findings, we find that, after his memory was
refreshed by his examination of the decision letter, which was drafted approximately
9 years before the Board hearing, the deciding official testified that he considered as
excessive absences those set forth under the specifications in the notice of proposed
removal. HT at 67-69 (testimony of the deciding official).
                                                                                     7

of ex parte contacts are whether the ex parte communication introduces
cumulative information or new information; whether the employee knew of the
error and had a chance to respond to it; and whether the ex parte communication
was of the type likely to result in undue pressure upon the deciding official to
rule in a particular manner. Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377.
       Although the administrative judge cited Stone, ID at 14, she did not address
the Stone factors.   We do so now.       First, in the decision letter, the deciding
official described the appellant’s absences from the time they began in 2007,
prior to considering the absences charged in the proposal notice, I-4 AF, Tab 43
at 43, as did the proposal notice itself, id. at 63, and therefore that information
cannot be considered “new.”       Moreover, the appellant addressed her absences
beginning in 2007 in her reply to the proposal notice. Id. at 52-53. While the
deciding official briefly noted in the decision letter that the appellant had not
returned to work “to date,” that is, to the date the decision letter was issued, id.
at 63, such that the appellant did not have an opportunity to address those
absences, there is no suggestion that the deciding official’s description of any of
the appellant’s absences either before or after the significant 7-month period of
absences set forth in the proposal notice’s specifications was likely to result in
undue pressure upon him to rule in a particular manner.          Weighing the Stone
factors, we find that the information alleged to be an ex parte communication was
not “so likely to cause prejudice that no employee can fairly be required to be
subjected to a deprivation of property under such circumstances.”               Stone,
179 F.3d at 1377.     We therefore find that the agency did not violate the
appellant’s due process rights and that the removal cannot be reversed on that
basis. 5
5
  Although we have found that there was no due process violation, we must determine
whether the deciding official’s consideration of the information at issue may have
constituted harmful procedural error. We find that the appellant has not shown that any
such error was likely to have caused the agency to have reached a different conclusion
about the removal action, given the extent of her absences. See Mathis v. Department
of State, 122 M.S.P.R. 507, ¶ 16 n.4 (2015); Tom v. Department of the Interior,
                                                                                   8

The agency has proven its charge of excessive absences.
      As a general rule, an agency may not take an adverse action based on an
employee’s use of approved leave.       Coombs v. Social Security Administration,
91 M.S.P.R. 148, ¶ 12 (2002). However, an exception exists when the following
criteria are met: (1) the employee was absent for compelling reasons beyond his
control so that agency approval or disapproval of leave was immaterial because
he could not be on the job; (2) the absences continued beyond a reasonable time,
and the agency warned the employee that an adverse action could be taken unless
he became available for duty on a regular, full-time or part -time basis; and (3) the
agency showed that the position needed to be filled by an employee available for
duty on a regular, full-time or part-time basis. Cook v. Department of the Army,
18 M.S.P.R. 610, 611-12 (1984). This exception is applicable only under unusual
circumstances, such as when the employee is unable to return to duty because of
the continuing effects of illness or injury. Id.
      For the reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree with the
administrative judge that the first criterion is met. ID at 10; I-6 AF, Tab 53. As
to the second criterion, we observe that the agency did not warn the appellant
until on or about August 6, 2008, that she could be removed for excessive
approved absences unless she returned to duty by August 18, 2008.           I-4 AF,
Tab 43 at 113-14. The Board has held that absences that predate the warning
required under Cook cannot be used to support an excessive absence charge.
Williams v. Department of Commerce, 2024 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 6-8. In light of this
holding, and given the nature of the agency’s return-to-work letter, we find that
specifications 1 through 12 of the charge cannot be sustained. I-4 AF, Tab 43
at 64-65.   Nevertheless, specifications 13 through 16 cover the period from
August 18, 2008, onward and encompass 280 hours of approved LWOP.                 Id.
at 65-66. We agree with the administrative judge that these specifications are
sustained, ID at 10, and we find that the appellant’s complete absence from work

97 M.S.P.R. 395, ¶ 43 (2004).
                                                                                      9

during these 7 consecutive weeks continued beyond a reasonable time, see Curtis
v. U.S. Postal Service, 111 M.S.P.R. 626, ¶¶ 2, 10 (2009) (sustaining a charge of
excessive absence based on 77 days of LWOP over a 4-month period), overruled
on other grounds by McCauley v. Department of the Interior, 116 M.S.P.R. 484
(2011); Gartner v. Department of the Army, 104 M.S.P.R. 463, ¶¶ 10-11 (2007)
(sustaining a charge of excessive absence based on 333.5 hours of absence over a
6-month period). We also agree with the administrative judge that the third Cook
criterion is satisfied because there were insufficient staff in the appellant’s unit to
cover the workload in her absence.       ID at 10; HT at 15-16 (testimony of the
deciding official), 73, 115 (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor). Therefore,
even excluding the 944 hours of absence covered in specifications 1 through 12,
we find that the Cook exception applies.
      In her cross petition for review, the appellant argues that some of the hours
of approved leave cited in the proposal notice were covered under the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) and therefore the charge cannot be sustained.
PFR File, Tab 10 at 8. However, we find that the administrative judge handled
this issue correctly by excluding the FMLA-protected leave from her analysis. ID
at 10; I-4 AF, Tab 44 at 7. Although FMLA-protected leave cannot be used to
support a charge of excessive absence, McCauley, 116 M.S.P.R. 484, ¶ 11, an
agency’s inclusion of such leave in its charge does not require automatic reversal.
The remedy in this situation is for the Board to exclude the FMLA-covered leave
from its tabulation of the total absences at issue. See Hamilton v. U.S. Postal
Service, 84 M.S.P.R. 635, ¶¶ 16-17 (1999). Because all of the claimed FMLA-
protected leave falls within the 944 hours already excluded above, the appellant’s
argument provides insufficient basis to disturb the initial decision.
      The appellant also argues that, by removing her “during the statutory
one-year period,” the agency effectively deprived her of her right to restoration.
PFR File, Tab 10 at 9.      The appellant’s argument pertains to the removal of
                                                                              10

compensably injured employees and does not apply to the instant appeal, in which
no compensable injury is involved.
      The appellant also argues that, in removing her based on the charge of
excessive absences, the agency should not have considered the medical
documents she submitted to the administrative judge, who placed them under seal.
I-6 AF, Tab 53.   She argues that the agency’s doing so was in violation of a
protective order issued by the district court.    PFR File, Tab 10 at 13-15.
Although the appellant did not serve these documents on the agency at the time
she submitted them to the administrative judge, she provided some of the
documents to the agency during the period from 2007-2008 and acknowledges
that they were subsequently returned to her in connection with her district court
litigation. I-6 AF, Tab 53 at 1. To the extent the appellant is alleging that the
agency violated the Privacy Act in considering these documents, the Board does
not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Privacy Act claims, Calhoon v. Department of
the Treasury, 90 M.S.P.R. 375, ¶ 15 (2001), and in any event, the appellant has
fully litigated her Privacy Act claims through the courts, Patrick v. Federal
Deposit   Insurance   Corporation,   MSPB    Docket   No. NY-0752-12-0130-I-5,
Appeal File, Tab 32 at 4-11; I-4 AF, Tab 4, Tab 11 at 9.      In addition, citing
5 C.F.R. part 339, regarding Medical Qualification Requirements, the appellant
argues that the agency’s Occupational Medicine Consultant was not authorized to
consider her medical documents because her position does not have medical
standards. PFR File, Tab 10 at 19. However, part 339 does not preclude an
agency from asking for and considering medical documentation in support of an
employee’s request for LWOP based on the assertion that she is unable to perform
her duties.    5 C.F.R. § 339.303.     The appellant further argues that the
administrative judge omitted consideration of what she describes as certain
“material facts” regarding these matters. PFR File, Tab 10 at 16. However, an
administrative judge’s failure to mention all of the evidence of record does not
mean that she did not consider it in reaching her decision.          Marques v.
                                                                                11

Department of Health and Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d,
776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).
      For the reasons discussed above, the charge of excessive absence is
sustained.

The appellant has not proven her whistleblower defense or her defense of
retaliation for grievance activity.
      In an adverse action appeal such as this, an appellant’s claim of
whistleblower retaliation is treated as an affirmative defense. As applicable here,
to prove such a claim, an appellant must show by preponderant evidence that she
engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a protected disclosure under
5 U.S.C. § 2320(b)(8) that was a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel
action.   Shannon v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 21
(2014).
      In this case, the administrative judge found that the appellant made
disclosures protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). ID at 12. Specifically, the
administrative judge found that, in 2004 and 2005, the appellant complained to
her supervisor and a manager about changes that were made to the reports of bank
examinations that she prepared. She further found that, because the appellant was
not consulted about the changes and the information she deemed critical was
deleted from some reports, the appellant reasonably believed that her supervisor
and the manager had abused their authority. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A);
Chavez v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 18 (2013). We
agree that these disclosures were protected.
      Nevertheless, the administrative judge found that these disclosures were
not a contributing factor in the appellant’s removal.    ID at 12-14.    The most
common way of proving contributing factor is the knowledge/timing test of
5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), under which contributing factor may be inferred based on the
responsible agency officials’ knowledge of the disclosures and the temporal
proximity between the disclosures and the action under appeal.       In her initial
                                                                                 12

decision, the administrative judge found, and the appellant did not dispute, that
the deciding official lacked actual knowledge of the disclosures. ID at 12-13; HT
at 14, 27-29 (testimony of the deciding official). On review, the appellant argues
that the deciding official “should have exercised proper due diligence and
reasonable care to gain knowledge.” PFR File, Tab 10 at 24. However, even if
the appellant is correct, we find that this is insufficient to impute knowledge of
the disclosures to the deciding official. Nor does there appear to be any evidence
that any other official who influenced the removal had knowledge of the
appellant’s disclosures.   We therefore find that the knowledge portion of the
knowledge/timing test is not satisfied. See Pridgen v. Office of Management and
Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 64.
        Furthermore, even if the knowledge portion of the knowledge/timing test
had been satisfied, the timing portion was not.       As the administrative judge
correctly noted, the appellant’s disclosures predated the proposed removal by 3 or
more years.    ID at 12-13.   This gap in time is too great to satisfy the timing
portion of the knowledge/timing test.    See Salinas v. Department of the Army,
94 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 10 (2003) (holding that a gap of more than 2 years between the
appellant’s disclosure and the challenged personnel action was too great to satisfy
the timing portion of the knowledge/timing test). On review, the appellant argues
that, under the statute, a disclosure will be considered protected regardless of the
amount of time that has elapsed since the disclosure. PFR File, Tab 10 at 25.
Although this is true, see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(G), the question is not whether
the appellant’s disclosures were protected, but whether they were a contributing
factor in the appellant’s removal. For the reasons explained above, we find that
the appellant has not established contributing factor under the knowledge/timing
test.
        If an appellant has failed to satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the Board
will consider other evidence of contributing factor, such as evidence pertaining to
the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action,
                                                                                      13

whether the whistleblowing was personally directed at the proposing or deciding
officials, and whether these individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against
the appellant. Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15 (2012).
Here, the evidence shows that, in light of the appellant’s lengthy absence with no
foreseeable end, the agency had strong reasons in support of its removal action.
In addition, the disclosures in 2004 and 2005 were not directed at either the
proposing or deciding officials. The evidence further shows that the deciding
official did not know the appellant, HT at 14 (testimony of the deciding official),
and the proposing official was far removed from her organizationally.               The
appellant has not alleged that either had a motive or desire to retaliate against her.
We therefore agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to prove
that her disclosures were a contributing factor in her removal. 6
      The appellant also argues on review that the eight grievances she filed or
attempted to file were also protected disclosures under the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancements Act of 2012 (WPEA). 7              PFR File, Tab 10 at 26.
According to her, these disclosures generally described wrongdoing by the
agency, including interfering in the way she performed her job duties, unfairly
criticizing her work in performance evaluations, and denying her telework.
I-6 AF, Tab 27 at 16-19.       Although the administrative judge noted that the
appellant filed grievances in 2005 and 2006, and also filed suit against the
agency, ID at 5, the administrative judge did not specifically consider these

6
  Because we have found that the appellant failed to prove that her disclosures were a
contributing factor in her removal, we do not reach the issue of whether the agency
proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have removed her absent her
disclosures. See Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10
(2014), aff’d per curiam, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
7
  According to the appellant, she “attempted to file” certain of these grievances, but
either the union steward would not sign the paperwork or the agency refused to hear the
matter. The appellant did not enter any of the grievances into the record, insisting that
doing so would violate the court’s protective order, IAF, Tab 8 at 7, and the
administrative judge did not disagree. The appellant did, however, describe each of the
grievances. I-6 AF, Tab 27 at 16-19.
                                                                                     14

filings in the discussion of the appellant’s whistleblower retaliation claim. The
agency argues that any such consideration is precluded under the WPEA because
the appellant filed her grievances in 2005 and 2006 and was removed in January
2009, nearly 4 years before the December 12, 2012 effective date of the
legislation enacting the WPEA. 8 PFR File, Tab 15 at 10. Even if the WPEA does
not apply, however, the appellant’s claim of retaliation for her having filed
grievances remains viable because, prior to the enactment of the WPEA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9) made it a prohibited personnel practice to retaliate against an
employee or applicant for employment “because of the exercise of any appeal,
complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation.” Wheeler v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 88 M.S.P.R. 236, ¶ 9 (2001).
        For an appellant to establish such a claim of retaliation, she must show
that:   (1) she engaged in the activity; (2) the accused official knew of such
activity; (3) the adverse action under review could, under the circumstances, have
been retaliation; and (4) there was a genuine nexus between the alleged retaliation
and the adverse employment action. Warren v. Department of the Army, 804 F.2d
654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986). When, as here, the record is complete, the Board
will not inquire as to whether the action under review “could have been”
retaliatory, but will proceed to the ultimate question, which is whether, upon
weighing the evidence presented by both parties, the appellant has met her overall
burden of proving by preponderant evidence that the action under appeal was
retaliatory. See Simien v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 M.S.P.R. 237, ¶ 28 (2005).
8
  Citing the Board’s decision in Day v. Department of Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R.
589 (2013), the appellant argues that the WPEA was retroactive. PFR File, Tab 10
at 29. In Day, the Board found an exception to the broadly applicable presumption that
statutes are not retroactive, explaining that certain provisions of the WPEA were
retroactive because they specifically sought to clarify then-existing interpretations of
the statutory scheme and not create new rights and liabilities. Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994); Day, 119 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶¶ 10-26. The
statutory provisions identified in Day are not at issue in this appeal. Furthermore, the
appellant has not identified another basis for finding the WPEA applicable to an appeal
in which the protected disclosures, the personnel action, and even the filing of the
appeal all pre-dated the passage of the statute.
                                                                                 15

      The administrative judge found that the manager who was the subject of the
appellant’s disclosures retired more than 1 year before the appellant’s removal
was recommended and that, while her supervisor who was also named knew that
the appellant had filed grievances, he testified that he did not know what was
stated in them and did not know, when he recommended her removal, that she had
filed suit against the agency.     ID at 12-13; HT at 7, 92 (testimony of the
appellant’s supervisor). In addition, as noted, the deciding official testified that
he had no knowledge of the appellant’s disclosures, including her grievances,
apart from what she said in her response to the notice of proposed removal. HT
at 27-29 (testimony of the deciding official).
      To establish a genuine nexus between the protected activity and the adverse
action, the appellant must prove that the action was taken because of the
protected activity. Williams v. Social Security Administration , 101 M.S.P.R. 587,
¶ 12 (2006). This requires the Board to weigh the intensity of the motivation to
retaliate against the gravity of the misconduct, id., considering the gravity of the
misconduct as it appeared to the deciding official at the time he took the adverse
action, Otterstedt v. U.S. Postal Service, 96 M.S.P.R. 688, ¶ 23 (2004).        The
deciding official testified that he considered the appropriate factors in
determining to uphold the appellant’s proposed removal, notably, that she had
taken excessive leave with no prospect of returning, no lesser penalty seemed
feasible, the position needed to be filled, and the appellant’s allegation of
retaliation had no impact on his decision. HT at 31-32 (testimony of the deciding
official). Although we find that the appellant engaged in protected activity by
filing grievances, there was little or no motivation to retaliate against her on the
part of the deciding official, given his lack of knowledge, and that the agency had
legitimate reasons for effecting the non-disciplinary removal. We therefore find
that the appellant failed to show that the agency retaliated against her for filing
grievances.
                                                                                    16

The agency has established that there is a nexus between the sustained charge and
the efficiency of the service and that removal is a reasonable penalty. 9
      Disciplinary action is warranted based on a sustained charge of excessive
absence. The Board has held that a prolonged absence with no foreseeable end
can provide just cause for removal because it constitutes a burden that no
employer can efficiently endure and it therefore establishes a nexus to the
efficiency of the service. Campbell v. U.S. Postal Service, 94 M.S.P.R. 646, ¶ 17
(2003).
      Regarding the penalty, when, as here, the agency’s charge is sustained, the
Board will review the agency-imposed penalty to determine if the agency
considered all of the relevant factors and exercised management discretion within
the tolerable limits of reasonableness. Singletary v. Department of the Air Force,
94 M.S.P.R. 553, ¶ 9 (2003), aff’d, 104 F. App’x 155 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In making
this determination, the Board must give due weight to the agency’s primary
discretion in maintaining employee discipline and efficiency.             Douglas v.
Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981).
      In his decision letter, the deciding official stated that he considered that the
appellant’s prolonged absence for which there was no foreseeable end detracted
from the efficiency of the agency’s examination program, and that her position
needed to be filled; that her supervisors had lost confidence in her dependability
and reliability in the performance of her duties; that the removal decision was
consistent with actions taken by the agency against other similarly situated
employees; that the appellant was on clear notice that her excessive absences had
caused an undue hardship on the operation of the field office; and that there was
little potential for her rehabilitation. I-4 AF, Tab 43 at 45-48. The deciding
official also considered that the appellant had no prior disciplinary record; that
she had more than 10 years of Federal service and more than 7 years of service
with the agency, during which time she progressed from Grade 7 to Grade 12; and
9
  These are issues that the administrative judge did not address. However, we find that
the record is sufficiently developed for the Board to address them on review.
                                                                                     17

that her annual performance ratings for the last 3 years were “Meets
Expectations.” Id. at 46. Notwithstanding, the deciding official stated that there
was no other appropriate action than removal. Id. at 48. His hearing testimony
was in accord. HT at 24, 31 (testimony of the deciding official).
      Based on the deciding official’s consideration of the appropriate Douglas
factors, both aggravating and mitigating, we find that the agency’s determination
does not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and that its removal penalty must
be accorded deference. See Beard v. General Services Administration, 801 F.2d
1318, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 10
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

10
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       18

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                19

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S.420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                       20

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b)    other   than    practices   described    in   section 2302(b)(8),   or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 11 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439
11
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              21

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.