Court Opinion

ID: 9371600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 17:08:20.485487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:28.760329
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hawkins, 2023-Ohio-452.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                             No. 111579
                 v.                                :

THOMAS D. HAWKINS, IV,                             :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 16, 2023

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-21-658565-A

                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Glen Ramdhan, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Scott J. Friedman, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Thomas Hawkins, IV, appeals his conviction for gross sexual

imposition for the touching of a nine-year-0ld child’s genital area, resulting in a five-

year term of imprisonment on the third-degree felony following the jury trial. For

the following reasons, the conviction is affirmed.
               Hawkins was initially indicted on four sex offenses committed against

a child under the age of 13 between December 2019 and June 2020: two counts of

rape for digital and anal penetration and two counts of gross sexual imposition for

the touching of the victim’s breasts and vagina.         Hawkins was in a six-year

relationship with the victim’s mother and moved in with her approximately a year

before sexually assaulting the child. The victim often referred to Hawkins as her

“stepfather.” At trial, both the sexual-assault nurse examiner and the intake social

worker for the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services testified

with respect to the conversation they had with the victim, in which the victim

revealed that Hawkins touched her on her breasts, butt, and vagina on multiple

occasions with his hands and penis. There is a dispute as to how many times the

sexual assaults occurred as between the two witnesses’ recollections of the victim’s

statements, but both recalled the victim disclosing instances of oral, anal, and digital

penetration.

               The victim, ten years old at the time of trial, testified that Hawkins

“touched [her] vagina” and legs in her bedroom after removing her clothes. The

incident began with Hawkins bringing the victim candy from the kitchen and then

getting into bed with the victim. That assault occurred around New Year’s in 2020.

The victim also related that on other occasions Hawkins placed his penis in her

mouth and vagina. After that testimony, the victim drew back from the state’s

questioning and told the prosecutor that she did not remember what happened. In
response to the state’s attempt for clarification, the victim stated that her lack of

recall was because she no longer wished to talk about the abuse.

                The state then asked the victim whether a video of her earlier

statements would refresh her recollection.      Initially, Hawkins objected to any

introduction of the victim’s recorded statements, even if to refresh her recollection.

After objections were raised, the trial court engaged in a memorialized sidebar

regarding the ongoing examination.

      THE COURT: Here’s my thought: First of all, we have a witness with
      a very tender age so the Court is trying to give the witness some
      leeway. However, we also have a defendant who is on trial for his life
      so we’ve got to abide by the rules. I will not permit the use of a
      videotape even if she’s using a — if she’s looking at the laptop with
      earphones on. * * *
      However, in an effort to be fair and as balanced as I possibly can, I will
      permit the prosecution to call to her attention that on a prior occasion
      she said different things. So in other words, this is very similar to
      when the State has a hostile witness. This is a complete surprise to
      the State, I would imagine. In any case, I’ll permit that, not the
      introduction of the video, either audio or video, noting the defense’s
      objection, and I will permit vigorous cross-examination and the use of
      the videotape at that point in your case if you wish.
Tr. 346-347.

                After being provided some latitude with the young witness, but

precluded from using the video recording in any manner, the state proceeded to ask

a series of yes-or-no questions regarding statements the victim made to the social

worker:

      Q. And where did you tell this lady [social worker] that Mr. Hawkins
      touched you? Did you tell her that he touched you on your vagina?

      A. Yes.
***

Q. Did you tell this lady that Mr. Hawkins touched you on your boobs?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you tell this lady how he touched you, like what body part?
[Victim], did you tell this lady that he touched you with his body parts?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you say it was his private part or a different part of his body?

A. His private part.

Q. Did you tell this lady that he would touch you in your room?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you tell this lady he would touch you in your mom’s room?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you tell this lady if your clothes would be on or not?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What did you tell this lady about your clothes?

A. I told her that they was off.

Q. Who would take off your clothes?

A. Thomas [Hawkins].

***

Q. Did you tell this lady about him touching your butt?

A. Yes.
      Q. And what did you tell this lady about him touching your butt? Did
      he put any body parts in your butt?

      A. Yes.

      Q. [Victim], what body parts did he put in your butt?

      A. His private — his area.

      Q. When you say “his area,” are you referring to his cock like you said
      before?

      A. Yes.

      Q. And he put that in your butt?

      A. Yes.

Tr. 349-352. Hawkins maintained a continuing objection to that entire line of

questioning. Following the remainder of the trial, the jury acquitted Hawkins of

both rape counts and the gross sexual imposition relating to the touching of the

victim’s breasts. The jury, however, found Hawkins guilty of gross sexual imposition

for the touching of the victim’s vagina.

                There are two assignments of error, both of which focus on

evidentiary issues arising at trial. “‘Balancing the risks and benefits of the evidence

necessarily involves an exercise of judgment * * *.’” State v. Brinkman, Slip Opinion

No. 2022-Ohio-2550, ¶ 40, quoting State v. Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-

Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, ¶ 30. Thus, the admissibility of relevant evidence

generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Garrett, 2022-

Ohio-4218, ¶ 155, quoting State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987),

paragraph two of the syllabus; Columbus v. Taylor, 39 Ohio St.3d 162, 164, 529
N.E.2d 1382 (1988). Appellate courts “‘will not reject an exercise of this discretion

unless it clearly has been abused and the criminal defendant thereby has suffered

material prejudice.’” State v. Whitaker, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2840, ¶ 87,

quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 98, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978).

              In the first assignment of error, Hawkins claims that “the trial court

erred when it permitted the state to ask a series of leading questions and elicit

inadmissible hearsay from” the victim. After citing the text of Evid.R. 611 (dealing

with leading questions), Evid.R. 802 (general hearsay preclusion), and Evid.R.

803(5) (recorded recollection exception to Evid.R. 802), Hawkins claims that

      [i]n this case, the trial court essentially allowed the prosecutor to testify
      in place of the witness after the alleged victim indicated that she did not
      recall additional details and she no longer wanted to discuss the
      allegations. Under the guise of refreshing the witness’s recollection, the
      prosecutor recited [the victim’s] prior account of the assault and asked
      her if she recalled making those statements[.] [(Internal quotations of
      the transcript omitted.)]

      The Supreme Court of Ohio has cautioned that while a party may
      refresh a witness’s recollection by showing the witness a prior
      statement, the party may not read the statement aloud, have the
      witness read it aloud, or otherwise place it before the jury. * * *
      [(Internal citation dealing with Evid.R. 803(5) omitted.)] Here, the
      prosecutor repeated [the victim’s] prior allegations, but phrased them
      in the form of questions. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to ask
      these questions, over the defense objection, and thereby permitted
      inadmissible evidence to be presented to the jury.

The appellate argument does not present analysis of the relevant case authority to

permit a more detailed appellate discussion. App.R. 16(A)(7). It merely presents a

conclusion, that the evidence was inadmissible. Any discussion at this point in favor

of sustaining the assigned error would solely depend on the creation of legal analysis
supporting Hawkins’s claims, a responsibility that should not be borne by appellate

courts. See State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d

900, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933

N.E.2d 753, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and

Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983).

               Further, Hawkins largely focuses on the recorded recollection

exception to hearsay, providing case citations to the pertinent analysis; however, the

transcript fails to demonstrate the applicability of that analysis. The disputed

statements were not read into evidence from the video recording, and the video was

not shown to the victim under Evid.R. 803(5) as recorded recollections. The trial

court expressly precluded the state from introducing or otherwise using any

recorded statement during the victim’s testimony. There can be no error in the

court’s application of Evid.R. 803(5).

               There is a matter of appellate procedure to address with respect to

Hawkins’s Evid.R. 803(5) discussion. Following the close of the briefing schedule,

Hawkins filed a notice of additional authority under App.R. 21(I), citing State v.

Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110982, 2022-Ohio-4630, ¶ 32, which appears

relevant to the discussion of Evid.R. 803(5) and was released after the briefing was

completed. App.R. 21(I) provides that “[i]f counsel on oral argument intends to

present authorities not cited in the brief, counsel shall, at least five days prior to oral

argument, present in writing such authorities to the court and to opposing counsel.”

Subdivision (I) is meant to provide opposing counsel timely notice of supplemented
arguments in preparation for the upcoming oral argument, but the rule only pertains

to appeals in which an oral argument is conducted. Id. This appeal was submitted

on briefs, with no oral argument being requested by either party and the parties

agreeing that the matter could be resolved upon consideration of the briefing alone.

App.R. 21(G).

                App.R. 21(G), with respect to submission of the appeal upon briefs,

does not contain any provision authorizing the submission of additional authority

following the close of the briefing schedule. In the rare situation when additional

authority is required after appeals are submitted on briefs through App.R. 21(G),

i.e., when intervening, binding authority is released during the pendency of an

appeal, that additional authority must be submitted through a motion requesting

additional briefing discussing the new authority. It cannot be considered through

the filing of a notice of additional authority under App.R. 21(I). This motion practice

provides the opposing party a structured opportunity to address the presentation

and applicability of additional authority, which is outside the briefing structure to

which the parties had originally agreed and, in addition, complies with the dictates

of State v. Tate, 140 Ohio St.3d 442, 2014-Ohio-3667, 19 N.E.3d 888, ¶ 21, should

that additional authority be deemed dispositive. Id., quoting State v. 1981 Dodge

Ram Van, 36 Ohio St.3d 168, 170, 522 N.E.2d 524 (1988) (“[A]ppellate courts

should not decide cases on the basis of a new, unbriefed issue without ‘giv[ing] the

parties notice of its intention and an opportunity to brief the issue.’”).
              Nevertheless, the sole issue in the first assignment of error, given the

inapplicability of Evid.R. 803(5), is whether the prosecutor’s use of yes-or-no

questions regarding what the victim remembered telling the social worker

constitutes, per se, reversible error as leading questions or in violation of the rule

against hearsay.

              Inasmuch as Hawkins alluded to the questions being leading in

nature as contemplated under Evid.R. 611, we cannot conclude, without more, that

asking a question that could elicit a yes-or-no response is a leading questi0n as a

matter of law. “‘A leading question has been defined as a question that suggests a

particular answer by the form or substance of the inquiry.’” State v. Messenger, 3d

Dist. Marion No. 9-09-19, 2010-Ohio-479, ¶ 54, quoting Haley v. Mason & Dixon

Lines, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-910221, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4303, 14

(Aug. 26, 1992), and State v. Bradley, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 1583, 1987 Ohio App.

LEXIS 8824 (Sept. 22, 1987). In order “‘[t]o determine what constitutes a leading

question, “[t]he whole issue is whether an ordinary man would get the impression

that the questioner desired one answer rather than another.”’” Id., quoting Haley

at 15, and McCormick, Evidence, Section 6, 17-18 (4th Ed.1992).

              The questions posed to the young victim in this case could have been

answered equivocally, or in the affirmative or negative, in part demonstrating that

the prosecutor was not suggesting a particular response. Asking a witness whether

the witness told another person something specific does not, in and of itself,
constitute a leading question. The witness is free to answer yes, no, or something

along the lines of “I don’t recall.”

               Notwithstanding that observation, and even if we presumed for the

sake of discussion that the questions were more leading than not, the trial court has

discretion to allow leading questions on direct examination. State v. Diar, 120 Ohio

St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-6266, 900 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 149, citing State v. Drummond, 111

Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 138, and State v. D’Ambrosio,

67 Ohio St.3d 185, 190, 616 N.E.2d 909 (1993). This extends to the trial court’s

discretion to permit a prosecutor leeway with the use of leading questions on direct

examination of a young witness victim. State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

85207, 2005-Ohio-5132, ¶ 45, citing Staff Notes Evid.R. 611(C) (the rule refers to the

use of leading questions when the witness being examined is hostile, and the

reference to hostility does not foreclose the use of leading questions based on other

considerations, including the handicaps of age, illness, or limited intellect of a

witness), State v. Madden, 15 Ohio App.3d 130, 472 N.E.2d 1126 (12th Dist.1984),

and State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St.2d 81, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969). Hawkins has not

presented any arguments differentiating that precedent. App.R. 16(A)(7).

               And finally with respect to the first assignment of error as presented,

there is no material prejudice from the introduction of the victim’s out-of-court

statements through the victim’s testimony. Hawkins was acquitted of all but one

charge, gross sexual imposition, for the unlawful touching of the victim’s vagina. Of

the several disputed statements, only one pertained to the conviction. Even though
the challenged questions of the victim elicited hearsay responses, the victim was

available for cross-examination regarding her own, direct trial testimony

establishing that Hawkins inappropriately touched the victim’s genital area, the

same fact established by the only pertinent out-of-court statement challenged in this

appeal. See State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-Ohio-9423, 108 N.E.3d 1,

¶ 128-129 (although availability for cross-examination of the speaker does not cure

the hearsay problem, the error in admitting the statement is harmless when there is

other evidence of the defendant’s guilt).       Hawkins claims the error in the

introduction of the isolated statement is not harmless because “the series of leading

questions” impacted the jury’s decision. In other words, according to Hawkins, the

whole line of questioning was the cause of the material prejudice.

              Hawkins has not discussed the implications of this procedural history

that demonstrates the jury’s decision to disregard a majority of the disputed

statements he now claims were prejudicial. He instead treated all statements,

whether he was acquitted of the charge pertaining to the subject matter of the

statement, as demonstrating the material prejudice caused by the introduction of

the out-of-court statements. Because the jury acquitted Hawkins of most of the

charges dealing with all but one of the disputed statements, we cannot conclude that

the introduction of all the disputed testimony caused material prejudice. On the

contrary, the jury demonstrated its capacity to disregard a vast majority of the

victim’s testimony merely relating her own out-of-court statements. The first

assignment of error is overruled.
              In the second assignment of error, Hawkins claims the trial court

erred in permitting a social worker to testify about out-of-court statements made by

the alleged victim. According to Hawkins, the entirety of the social worker’s

testimony is inadmissible under Evid.R. 803(4) (admissibility of statements made

for medical diagnosis or treatment) because the social worker was not a licensed

medical professional and, therefore, the victim’s statements were not primarily for

the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. Hawkins did not object to the social

worker’s testimony at trial and has waived all but plain error. Crim.R. 52(B).

              As has been recognized, “courts have acknowledged the ‘dual role’ —

medical diagnosis/treatment and investigation/gathering of evidence — of social

workers who interview a child who may be the victim of sexual abuse.” State v.

Fears, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104868, 2017-Ohio-6978, ¶ 37, citing State v. Arnold,

126 Ohio St.3d 290, 2010-Ohio-2742, 933 N.E.2d 775, ¶ 33. Statements made for

the purpose of diagnosis and treatment are admissible under Evid.R. 803(4), even

those made to social workers who are not licensed as treating medical professionals.

Id., citing State v. Muttart, 116 Ohio St.3d 5, 2007-Ohio-5267, ¶ 46, 875 N.E.2d 944,

and State v. Goza, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89032, 2007-Ohio-6837, ¶ 39. “Social

workers are oftentimes in the best position to help determine the proper treatment

for the minor, which treatment includes determining which home was free of sexual

abuse.” Id., citing State v. Durham, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84132, 2005-Ohio-202,

¶ 33, and Presley v. Presley, 71 Ohio App.3d 34, 39, 593 N.E.2d 17 (8th Dist.1990).
              The record does not support Hawkins’s broad claim. The social

worker testified that her job as an intake sex-abuse social worker involves doing

interviews, assessing for safety, and making referrals for services for the children.

Tr. 389:15-23. In doing the forensic interview, from which the social worker related

the victim’s out-of-court statements at trial, she is making assessments of what the

child could benefit from such as counseling services, mental-health assessments,

medical assessments, and other types of treatment. Tr. 391:18-23; 402:20-24. The

information obtained from a child, which includes details of sexual or physical

abuse, is used to help determine if the child needs counseling assessments, mental

health assessments, and physical assessments. Id.

              The state adequately provided a foundation for at least some of the

hearsay related at trial through the social worker’s testimony, and Hawkins has not

identified any specific statements that violated the permissible scope of Evid.R.

803(4). Since Hawkins has not provided any specificity as to which statements

should have been excluded as being beyond the permissible bounds of Evid.R.

803(4), and not all the social worker’s testimony would have been inadmissible

under prevailing authority, the second assignment of error is overruled. Any

analysis pertaining to specific statements from the social worker would solely fall

upon this court to discover and then to provide the appropriate legal rationale

supporting their exclusion. This is beyond the scope of permissible review and

would provide the state with no meaningful opportunity to discuss the issue. Tate,

140 Ohio St.3d 442, 2014-Ohio-3667, 19 N.E.3d 888, at ¶ 21, quoting 1981 Dodge
Ram Van, 36 Ohio St.3d at 170, 522 N.E.2d 524 (1988). The second assignment of

error is overruled.

               Hawkins’s conviction is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR