Court Opinion

ID: 9926326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 16:10:16.647306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:35.612166
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court

                                           No. 2022-219-Appeal.
                                           (P 20-2673)

 John J. Cronan             :

       v.                   :

Laurie A. Cronan.           :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
                                                           Supreme Court

                                                           No. 2022-219-Appeal.
                                                           (P 20-2673)

              John J. Cronan                  :

                    v.                        :

            Laurie A. Cronan.                 :

       Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

                                   OPINION

      Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. This appeal concerns the divorce of the

plaintiff, John Cronan, and the defendant, Laurie Cronan. The defendant appeals

from a decision pending entry of final judgment entered by the general magistrate of

the Family Court. On appeal, the defendant argues that the general magistrate was

not authorized to preside over the parties’ contested divorce trial. The defendant

additionally contends that the general magistrate erred with respect to the merits of

his decision. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the decision of the

Family Court.

                                          I

                                 Facts and Travel

      The plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on July 8, 2020, citing

“irreconcilable differences that exist between the parties which have caused the

irremediable breakdown of the marriage.” The parties were married in July 2006

                                        -1-
and have no children together. Although the complaint requested that the case be

placed on the nominal track calendar, matters soon became contested and the case

was scheduled for trial. A justice of the Family Court heard several motions at the

outset of the litigation, but the case was eventually assigned to the general

magistrate, who presided over all subsequent proceedings.1

      The trial commenced in October 2021 and was heard over five days. Five

witnesses testified at trial, including both parties. We set forth only the testimony

relevant to the issues on appeal.

      The plaintiff presented Paul St. Onge, a certified public accountant, to testify

as to the value of plaintiff’s premarital assets. St. Onge testified that he has known

plaintiff since 1983 and defendant since 2007. He testified that he, in the past,

prepared tax returns for both parties and that he continues to prepare plaintiff’s tax

returns. St. Onge affirmed that “there c[a]me a time when John Cronan asked [him]

to put together a list or a summary of investment assets or accounts that [plaintiff]

had in June of 2006, which would be prior to John and Laurie’s marriage on July

4th, 2006[,]” and that he complied with this request.

      According to the document St. Onge prepared, plaintiff’s funds totaled

$1,755,506.34 on June 30, 2006, prior to his marriage to defendant. St. Onge further

1
  At no point during the hearings before the general magistrate did defendant object
to having the general magistrate preside over the proceedings.

                                        -2-
testified as to how he prepared the document, stating that he has “a system that keeps

track of asset values on a daily basis. It keeps track of all transactions.” He testified

that this information was pulled “electronically” rather than from paper files and that

he went into his portfolio accounting system where the information is stored to

prepare the document. He further explained that plaintiff’s largest asset—his 401(k)

from Rhode Island Medical Imaging (RIMI)—was managed by Prudential Financial

in 2006 and that he submitted a request to Prudential for a statement as to that asset,

but was told that it might take a few weeks for Prudential to provide the statement.

      Defense counsel objected to the document prepared by St. Onge being entered

as a full exhibit, arguing that it is not the best evidence; he suggested that statements

from Prudential would be the best evidence. Counsel for plaintiff countered that the

document was “a business record.” When questioned by the general magistrate, St.

Onge affirmed that the document is “a true and accurate record of what [he] pulled

off, the data from the databases, what the value of the accounts were” and that “[i]t’s

not a situation where [he] took the values today and tried to extrapolate back to what

they were[;] those were actual records that [he] pulled information from[.]” St. Onge

then explained that he had records dating back to the 1990s, but that paper statements

ceased to exist after 2003, when he switched to electronic means. The general

magistrate allowed the document to be entered as a full exhibit and indicated that,

                                          -3-
“with respect to the assets, if paper verification from [Prudential] can be generated,

you should submit that.” It does not appear that those statements were produced.

      The plaintiff then called Jane McAuliffe, a certified divorce financial analyst,

to testify on the issue of defendant’s entitlement to alimony.2 In her testimony,

McAuliffe stated that she “work[s] with clients one on one and help[s] them navigate

the division of assets and budgeting and cash flow as they proceed through divorce.”

Her process involves three steps: (1) budgeting and identifying the client’s expenses

and cash flow; (2) identifying and quantifying the makeup of the marital estate; and

(3) financial planning, money management, and tax planning. As noted by the

general magistrate, McAuliffe “formulated a financial plan for [defendant] based on

a life expectancy of age of 90, suggested assets of $3,946,605 from the marriage,

and a listing of expenses identified in [defendant’s] DR-6.”

      McAuliffe also testified that she did not include employment income for

defendant in formulating her plan. Furthermore, she testified that, based on her

projections—with an estimated 5.3 percent rate of return and with a budget of

$163,000 a year, which includes taxes, healthcare, and lifestyle expenses—

defendant would have an estimated $5.5 million left over upon turning ninety.

2
  Although it does not appear from the transcript that plaintiff’s counsel moved to
qualify McAuliffe as an expert witness, it is clear from the transcript and from the
decision that the court accepted her as an expert witness and treated her as such.
Furthermore, her experience and qualifications were thoroughly laid out in the
record.

                                        -4-
McAuliffe additionally noted that 5.3 percent was “conservative” and that if

defendant “stays a little bit more growth oriented in the investments and the market

keeps on returning positively, she would do better than this scenario.”

      The defendant called John E. Barrett, Jr., a certified public accountant, who

was qualified as an expert and testified as to the value of plaintiff’s equity interest

in RIMI. Barrett testified that he was hired to give the valuations for the dates of

June 30, 2021, and June 30, 2006. Barrett testified that, in preparing his report, he

spoke with the certified public accountant for RIMI, and he reviewed “financial

statements prepared by the certified public accounting firm for the calendar years

December 31st, 2016 through December 31st, 202[0]”; “[t]he federal corporate

income tax returns for the calendar years December 31st, 2016 through December

31st, 2020”; “internal year-to-date financial information for the company through

June 30th, 2021”; and “a forecast for the company for 2021.”

      Prior to Barrett’s testimony as to the substance of his report, plaintiff’s counsel

indicated that he would not “dispute Mr. Barrett’s amounts that he came up with,

both for June of 2021 and for the non-marital amount he came up with for June of

2006[,]” but rather whether RIMI’s shareholder agreement or Barrett’s report is

controlling. Barrett testified that he used the fair market value as the standard to

determine the value of plaintiff’s equity interest in RIMI because in Rhode Island,

                                         -5-
for divorce purposes, that is the commonly used standard. He defined fair market

value as follows:

             “[I]t’s basically defined by the Internal Revenue Service.
             Revenue Ruling 59-60 would be the price at which the
             property would change hands between a willing buyer and
             a willing seller when the former is not under any
             compulsion to buy and the latter is not under any
             compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable
             knowledge of relevant facts.”

In his opinion, the fair market value for plaintiff’s 2.1 percent equity interest in RIMI

as of June 30, 2021, was approximately $1,229,000.

      When questioned about the shareholder agreement on cross-examination,

Barrett affirmed that the annual valuation indicated that plaintiff’s 2.1 percent equity

interest in RIMI was worth $366,200 as of December 31, 2020, 3 a “different

outcome” than his approximately $1.2 million valuation. He further affirmed that

the valuation he provided was “an estimate.” Barrett then explained that it was his

opinion that “the fair market value of a 2.1 percent equity interest in RIMI as of the

6/30/2021 valuation date is the $1,229,000”; however, he “understand[s] that the

buy/sell agreement allows for a physician, nonowner physician of RIMI right now

to buy in at the 366,200 number.” He further indicated that the shareholder

3
  During plaintiff’s testimony, he reviewed a letter from RIMI’s CPA that was
entered into evidence indicating that the value per share of RIMI as of December 31,
2020, was $3,662. A letter dated September 18, 2020, confirmed that plaintiff’s 2.1
percent equity interest in RIMI is equivalent to one hundred shares.

                                          -6-
agreement did not contain a requirement to sell in a specific manner, and that “there

is language in [the agreement] that provides for the seller to go out and find an

outside party that might be willing to pay more.”

      Following the trial and post-trial motions, the general magistrate issued a

108-page decision on May 3, 2022. The general magistrate laid out the testimony

of each of the witnesses and the evidence before him. Thereafter, he addressed the

contested issues and made twenty-seven findings of fact.

      Ultimately, applying the factors set forth in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1, the general

magistrate determined that the marital estate should be divided on a 60/40 basis in

favor of plaintiff.    It was his determination that “both parties share equal

responsibility for the breakdown of their marriage by their conduct and their spoken

words to the other.” He further found that “[i]t is uncontroverted that [plaintiff] was

the sole source of income throughout the marriage, and the accumulated marital

estate is solely from money earned by [plaintiff].”

      On the issue of plaintiff’s equity interest in RIMI, the general magistrate

reviewed the testimony of Barrett and plaintiff’s two challenges to Barrett’s analysis:

the first being that plaintiff owned greater than 2.1 percent interest in RIMI in 2006

and the second being that the equity interest is defined by the shareholder agreement.

      Prior to trial, defendant had filed a motion in limine to preclude plaintiff from

“contending that the value of his interests in Rhode Island Medical Imaging (RIMI)

                                         -7-
and Melcor Corporation should be determined based on or in light of a shareholder

stock redemption agreements [sic] between the shareholders of stock or other equity

interests in RIMI and Melcor.” She submitted that he had “litigated the exact same

question in a prior divorce proceeding” involving plaintiff and his former wife and

that the trial justice there “rejected plaintiff’s claim and valued Dr. Cronan’s interests

in the business without regard to the shareholder redemption agreements.”

      The general magistrate ultimately declined to apply the doctrine of collateral

estoppel “because of factual differences that exist today [with regard to plaintiff’s

first marriage] [and] because application of the doctrine would be inherently unjust.”

Specifically, he highlighted that the decision by the trial justice in the first divorce

case was rendered twenty-two years ago, when plaintiff was early in his career and

there was greater potential for RIMI to be sold; he determined that plaintiff is now

approaching retirement and has expressed his intent to retire and that the value of

his equity interest is unlikely to be enhanced by a merger, sale, or acquisition.

      He further stated that “the shareholder agreement is a binding agreement

between RIMI and [plaintiff] upon his retirement dictating the value of [plaintiff’s]

buy out value. To accept [defendant’s] position would be inequitable in this

circumstance, wherein she would receive a far greater value and portion of an asset

that [plaintiff] is not likely to receive.” He therefore determined that the value of

                                          -8-
plaintiff’s equity interest in RIMI would be based on the binding shareholder

agreement and valued at $366,200, per the December 31, 2020 valuation.

      As to the premarital assets, the general magistrate indicated that he found St.

Onge’s testimony to be “without bias to either party and [that] his testimony was

accurate and reliable.” He further stated that the document produced by St. Onge

was created “in the normal course of his business * * *.” Of the $1,755,506

premarital value that St. Onge identified, the general magistrate ultimately found

that plaintiff used $261,676 to fund an account in defendant’s name. Accordingly,

he determined that the total value of plaintiff’s premarital assets was $1,493,830.

      The general magistrate additionally permanently denied defendant’s request

for alimony, based on defendant’s “independent ability to support herself in the

future.” In coming to this conclusion, he relied on defendant’s own testimony as

well as on the testimony of McAuliffe, which he deemed “helpful, reliable, and

credible.”

      A decision pending entry of final judgment entered on May 19, 2022. The

defendant filed a notice of appeal to this Court the same day.

      The defendant additionally filed a notice of conditional appeal from the

general magistrate’s decision to the chief judge of the Family Court pursuant to Rule

73 of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure citing “potentially

                                        -9-
conflicting language” between Rule 734 and G.L. 1956 § 14-1-52.5 The record

indicates that the Family Court has not addressed the merits of this conditional

appeal, which were set forth in a memorandum submitted on August 2, 2022, and

appear to be the same as those issues now before this Court.

      On June 15, 2022, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that “the

[g]eneral [m]agistrate who presided over the trial did not have the requisite

constitutional, statutory, administrative or other legal authority to do so.” She

submitted that the general magistrate’s decision and the resulting decision pending

entry of final judgment were void ab initio. The record indicates that defendant’s

motion for a new trial was not heard in Family Court.

      On August 26, 2022, an amended final judgment was issued granting the

divorce and indicating that “[a]ll other matters set forth in the Decision Pending

Entry of Final Judgment, except the question of the divorce itself, are hereby left

open pending the appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.”

4
  Rule 73(a) of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure provides
that “[a]n appeal from a judgment, order, or decree of a general magistrate or a
magistrate shall be referred to the chief judge or the chief judge’s designee. The
review shall be appellate in nature and on the record.”
5
  General Laws 1956 § 14-1-52(a) provides for an appeal to this Court “[f]rom any
final decree, judgment, order, decision, or verdict of the family court * * *.”

                                       - 10 -
                                           II

                                      Discussion

      On appeal, defendant submits that the general magistrate made a number of

errors. First, she takes issue with the authority of the general magistrate in presiding

over the contested divorce. Second, she contends that the general magistrate erred

in his distribution of the marital assets. Third, she asserts that plaintiff “did not meet

his burden in establishing the value of his ‘alleged’ premarital accounts.” Fourth,

she submits that the general magistrate erred in denying her request for alimony.

Fifth, defendant argues that she “has essentially been frozen out of any portion of

the marital estate * * *.”

                                            A

                          Power of the General Magistrate

      The defendant submits multiple claims of error as to the general magistrate’s

authority to preside over a contested divorce trial. The defendant argues that the

applicable statutes limit the function of presiding over a contested divorce to judges

alone. Additionally, defendant alleges that a magistrate presiding over a trial in any

court violates three state and federal constitutional principles: separation of powers,

due process, and equal protection.

      We need not, however, address the statutory and constitutional challenges to

the general magistrate’s authority because it is clear to us that defendant has failed

                                          - 11 -
to preserve this issue for appellate review. Significantly, in her brief, defendant

admits that “[t]here is no argument that the defendant did not raise at trial the issue

of the magistrate’s ability to conduct the proceeding.” The defendant, however,

argues that the raise-or-waive rule is inapplicable because the issue is one of

subject-matter jurisdiction and, even if the raise-or-waive rule is applicable, this case

meets the Court’s narrowly applied exception to the rule. We review each contention

seriatim.

                             Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

       First, defendant argues that “the application of the raise or waive rule in this

case is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” Quoting this Court’s opinion in Pine

v. Clark, 636 A.2d 1319 (R.I. 1994), she submits that “[a] challenge to subject-matter

jurisdiction questions the very power of the court to hear the case. It is an axiomatic

rule of civil procedure that such a claim may not be waived by any party and may

be raised at any time.” Pine, 636 A.2d at 1321 (emphasis added).

       Notably, defendant is not challenging the jurisdiction of the Family Court over

the divorce proceeding—and there is no claim that the Family Court lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction over a contested divorce proceeding—but rather she is

challenging the authority of the general magistrate to preside over the contested

divorce proceeding. The issue thus becomes whether subject-matter jurisdiction

attaches to the court itself or the officer of the court.

                                          - 12 -
        As this Court has noted, “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction is the very essence of

the court’s power to hear and decide a case.” Long v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1074, 1079

(R.I. 2009) (emphasis added). This Court has noted, on occasion, that the term

“subject-matter jurisdiction” is often misused; “[w]hen properly used, it refers only

to a court’s power to hear and to decide a particular case * * *, and not to whether a

court, having the power to adjudicate, should exercise that power.” Cranston

Teachers Association v. Cranston School Committee, 120 R.I. 105, 108-09, 386 A.2d

176, 178 (1978). “The term ‘lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter’ means quite

simply that a given court lacks judicial power to decide a particular controversy.”

Pollard v. Acer Group, 870 A.2d 429, 433 (R.I. 2005).6 Additionally, Black’s Law

Dictionary defines subject-matter jurisdiction as “[j]urisdiction over the nature of

the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the

6
    This Court has recently addressed the meaning of “judicial power”:

               “Furthermore, under our state constitution, ‘the judicial
               power of this state shall be vested in one supreme court,
               and in such inferior courts as the general assembly may,
               from time to time, ordain and establish.’ R.I. Const., art.
               10, § 1. Thus, all judicial power is reserved to the courts
               and has been since the adoption of the state constitution in
               1842. Lemoine v. Martineau, 115 R.I. 233, 238, 342 A.2d
               616, 620 (1975). We have ‘defined the exercise of judicial
               power as the control of a decision in a case or the
               interference with its progress, or the alteration of the
               decision once made.’ Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Taylor
               v. Place, 4 R.I. 324 (1856)).” Quattrucci v. Lombardi, 232
               A.3d 1062, 1066 (R.I. 2020) (brackets omitted).

                                          - 13 -
conduct of persons or the status of things.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1020 (11th ed.

2019) (emphasis added).

       In the case at bar, defendant takes issue with the authority of the general

magistrate to preside over a contested divorce; such an issue does not implicate the

subject-matter jurisdiction of the Family Court. Cf. Clark v. Poulton, 963 F.2d 1361,

1367 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that, even assuming that the magistrate exceeded

his authority, such an error would be “a procedural lapse, not a jurisdictional

failing”); Griego v. Padilla, 64 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1995) (“A magistrate

judge’s lack of statutory authority is not a jurisdictional defect; thus, objection to

such authority is waived if not timely raised.”); United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429,

431 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029 (1990) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction is

absent when a federal court may not issue a binding decree on a subject—perhaps

because Congress has not authorized it, perhaps because the Constitution does not

allow it. Which judicial officer presides during jury selection does not affect the

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, for it has nothing to do with whether the tribunal

may enter a judgment conclusively resolving this dispute. The judgment (that is, the

sentence) of the district court concerns a federal crime and is binding. Everyone was

in the right court. Courts may err, even offend against the Constitution, without

losing subject-matter jurisdiction.”); United States v. Maragh, 189 F.3d 1315, 1317

(11th Cir. 1999) (“We used [the term subject-matter jurisdiction] in Gomez as a

                                        - 14 -
synonym for ‘authority,’ not in the technical sense involving subject-matter

jurisdiction. The judgment here is the judgment of the District Court; the relevant

question is whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction; and there is no doubt that it

had. The fact that the court may have improperly delegated to the Magistrate a

function it should have performed personally goes to the lawfulness of the manner

in which it acted, but not to its jurisdiction to act.”). It stands to reason that a

challenge to a magistrate’s authority is not an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.

        Accordingly, defendant’s arguments as to the general magistrate’s authority

to preside over a contested divorce trial are subject to our well-settled raise-or-waive

rule.

                       Exception to the Raise-or-Waive Rule

        The defendant further argues that the issue of whether the general magistrate

has authority to preside over a contested divorce falls into this Court’s narrow

exception to the raise-or-waive rule.7

7
  We pause to address defendant’s characterization of this Court’s long-standing
raise-or-waive rule. The defendant states the following in her brief:

              “The ‘waive’ element of the raise or waive rule requires
              the same elements as any other waiver. In order to apply,
              the waiver has to be knowing and intelligent. See, e.g.,
              State v. Sampson, 24 A.3d 1131, 1141 (R.I. 2011).
              Moreover, ‘[w]aiver is an intentional and voluntary
              relinquishment of a known right.’ Commonwealth v.
              Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 2009) (quoting

                                         - 15 -
      “According to this Court’s well settled raise-or-waive rule, issues not properly

presented before the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”

Donnelly Real Estate, LLC v. John Crane Inc., 291 A.3d 987, 994 (R.I. 2023)

(quoting Borgo v. Narragansett Electric Company, 275 A.3d 567, 576-77 (R.I.

2022)). “We also recognize that there is a narrow exception to the raise-or-waive

rule where the alleged error is more than harmless, and the exception implicates an

issue of constitutional dimension derived from a novel rule of law that could not

reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial.” Decathlon Investments

v. Medeiros, 252 A.3d 268, 270 (R.I. 2021) (quoting State v. Brown, 9 A.3d 1240,

1246 (R.I. 2010)).

      The defendant couches her argument in the three-part test set forth in State v.

Florez, 138 A.3d 789 (R.I. 2016), which states:

             “To fall within this exception, the defendant must show:
             (1) that the error complained of amounts to more than
             harmless error; (2) that a sufficient record exists to permit

             United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099-1101 (3d
             Cir. 1995)[emphasis supplied].”

This is a misstatement of our raise-or-waive rule. The defendant conflates the
criminal waiver standard, citing a case involving a criminal defendant’s waiver of
his constitutionally protected right to counsel, with this Court’s well-settled rule
regarding preservation of arguments on appeal. Put simply, under the raise-or-waive
rule, “a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was
not raised before the trial court.” E.T. Investments, LLC v. Riley, 262 A.3d 673, 676
(R.I. 2021) (quoting Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019)). Therefore,
if a party does not raise the argument before the trial court, then the argument is
waived on appeal. See id.

                                        - 16 -
             a determination of the issue; and (3) that counsel’s failure
             to raise the issue before trial must be premised upon a
             novel rule of law that counsel could not reasonably have
             known during the trial.” Florez, 138 A.3d at 796 (brackets
             omitted) (quoting Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774
             A.2d 866, 878 (R.I. 2001)).

According to defendant, each element is met in this case. The defendant first submits

that “the error here is not harmless since it determines whether there should have

been a trial at all.” Second, defendant argues that, because this issue is a question of

law, “the existing record is sufficient to make a determination.” Third, defendant

contends that, because “the judicial officers themselves evidently did not know” that

the general magistrate was not empowered to try a contested divorce case, “this

Court should not find that the defendant’s counsel knew or should have known[.]”

She additionally suggests that the issue is novel because it “has not previously been

litigated on the merits.”

      In making this argument, defendant fails to successfully distinguish this case

from our previous cases dealing with the constitutional authority of magistrates. See

McKenna v. Guglietta, 185 A.3d 1248, 1251 (R.I. 2018) (“[T]his Court has

previously stated that a challenge to the constitutional authority of a magistrate is

subject to our stringent raise-or-waive rule such that claimants must raise their

arguments challenging the authority of the magistrate to act in the original

proceeding before that magistrate.”); Gordon v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 474 (R.I. 2011)

(“We need not * * * address this constitutional challenge to the magistrate’s

                                         - 17 -
authority because it is clear to us that applicant has failed to preserve the issue for

appellate review.”); Yates v. Wall, 973 A.2d 621, 623 (R.I. 2009) (mem.)

(concluding that an applicant for postconviction relief had lost the opportunity to

challenge “the constitutionality of a magistrate’s statutory authorization” by “failing

to raise [that issue] at the trial level”).

       The defendant indicates that this case differs from that of McKenna because

McKenna “did not involve the clear dichotomy extant here, i.e., the difference—if

there is one—between magistrates and judges.” She contends that “McKenna was

concerned with the process by which magistrates are appointed[,]” whereas the issue

in this case is “whether magistrates are in fact judges in disguise * * * [a]nd if they

are, then the disguise is so effective that ordinary lawyers appearing before them

would have no way of knowing that there is an issue to raise.” This distinction,

however, does not reveal “a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have been

known to counsel at the time of trial.” Decathlon Investments, 252 A.3d at 270

(quoting Brown, 9 A.3d at 1246). The defendant’s three constitutional challenges—

separation of powers, due process of law, and equal protection—are not “novel,” and

the question of the general magistrate’s authority could reasonably have been known

to counsel at the time of trial.

       Furthermore, this issue could have been “litigated on the merits,” as defendant

suggests, had she raised the issue in the Family Court. Notably, defendant filed a

                                              - 18 -
motion for a new trial on June 15, 2022, the crux of her argument being that “the

[g]eneral [m]agistrate who presided over the trial did not have the requisite

constitutional, statutory, administrative or other legal authority to do so.” This

motion for a new trial came after she had already filed a notice of appeal to this

Court on May 19, 2022; the Family Court did not address the motion for a new trial

presumably because defendant had filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

      Accordingly, because defendant did not challenge the authority of the general

magistrate in the Family Court, we deem the issue waived on appeal.

                                           B

                                  Claims of Error

      The defendant additionally submits multiple claims of error as to the merits

of the general magistrate’s decision pending entry of final judgment. General Laws

1956 § 8-10-3.1 provides, in relevant part:

             “(d) A party aggrieved by an order entered by a magistrate
             shall be entitled to a review of the order by a justice of the
             family court. Unless otherwise provided in the rules of
             procedure of the family court, such review shall be on the
             record and appellate in nature. The family court shall by
             rules of procedure establish procedures for review of orders
             entered by a magistrate, and for enforcement of contempt
             adjudications of a magistrate.

             “(e) Final orders of the family court entered in a
             proceeding to review an order of a magistrate may be
             appealed to the supreme court.”

                                         - 19 -
It appears that the Family Court did establish a relevant rule of procedure;8 Rule

73(a) of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure states that “[a]n

appeal from a judgment, order, or decree of a general magistrate or a magistrate shall

be referred to the chief judge or chief judge’s designee. The review shall be appellate

in nature and on the record.”

      In accordance with Rule 73(a) and the procedure set forth therein, we are of

the opinion that the merits of this case should have been addressed by the “chief

judge or chief judge’s designee” before defendant filed a notice of appeal to this

Court. See Bowman v. Forgue, 184 A.3d 1130, 1130 (R.I. 2018) (mem.) (“Although

the general magistrate of the Family Court heard the plaintiff’s motions and granted

the plaintiff partial relief, which was then upheld by a trial justice of the Family

Court, the plaintiff nonetheless appealed to this Court.”). However, in the interest

of judicial economy and efficiency, we address the arguments here, stressing that

future litigants should follow the procedure set forth in Rule 73.

                                Standard of Review

      “This Court will not disturb findings of fact made by a trial justice or

magistrate in a divorce action unless he or she has misconceived the relevant

8
  Rule 73 of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure was adopted
in 2014. See In re Amendments to the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations
Procedure and the Family Court Rules of Practice (Misc. Order entered Oct. 31,
2014).

                                        - 20 -
evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.” Sullivan v. Sullivan, 249 A.3d 637, 641

(R.I. 2021) (quoting Boschetto v. Boschetto, 224 A.3d 824, 828 (R.I. 2020)).

“Consequently, unless it is shown that the trial justice either improperly exercised

his or her discretion or that there was an abuse thereof, this Court will not disturb

the trial justice’s findings.” Id. (quoting Boschetto, 224 A.3d at 828).

                          Distribution of Marital Estate

      The defendant argues that the general magistrate abused his discretion and/or

committed clear error in equitably distributing the marital estate in two ways. First,

she alleges that the general magistrate erred in determining the value of plaintiff’s

equity interest in RIMI. She maintains that collateral estoppel should apply because

the issue was previously litigated in plaintiff’s prior divorce case. Second, she

contends that the general magistrate erred in awarding plaintiff 60 percent of the

marital estate, arguing that he “ignored uncontradicted sworn statements of fact in

his decision * * *.”

                                          1

      We first address defendant’s argument as to whether collateral estoppel

should have applied to the determination of the value of plaintiff’s equity interest in

RIMI. The defendant contends that the magistrate erred by refusing to impose the

doctrine of “offensive collateral estoppel” against plaintiff when considering the

value of his equity interest in the medical practice. The defendant indicates that, in

                                        - 21 -
plaintiff’s first divorce, decided in 1999, the trial justice used the fair market value

of RIMI rather than the shareholder agreement to assess the value of plaintiff’s

equity interest in the practice. The defendant suggests that collateral estoppel should

apply to preclude plaintiff from relying on the shareholder agreement in this case

because it was rejected in the prior case. The defendant also argues that evidence

plaintiff presented to establish the value of RIMI was unreliable because it did not

establish the fair market value of the practice.

      “Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, an issue of ultimate fact that has

been actually litigated and determined cannot be re-litigated between the same

parties or their privies in future proceedings.” Doe v. Brown University, 253 A.3d

389, 396 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee v. Board

of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 1014 (R.I. 2004)).

             “‘Subject to situations in which application of the doctrine
             would lead to inequitable results,’ collateral estoppel is
             applied when: ‘(1) the parties are the same or in privity
             with the parties of the previous proceeding; (2) a final
             judgment on the merits has been entered in the previous
             proceeding; and (3) the issue or issues in question are
             identical in both proceedings.’” Id. (brackets omitted)
             (quoting Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee,
             854 A.2d at 1014).

This Court has opined that collateral estoppel should not “be mechanically applied,

for [it is] capable of producing extraordinarily harsh and unfair results.” Apex Oil

Company, Inc. v. State by and through Division of Taxation, 297 A.3d 96, 111 (R.I.

                                         - 22 -
2023) (quoting Casco Indemnity Company v. O’Connor, 755 A.2d 779, 782 (R.I.

2000)). “To avoid unfairness, courts have declined to apply collateral estoppel in

situations in which the doctrine would lead to an inequitable result.” Casco, 755

A.2d at 782.

      In addressing the RIMI issue in his decision, the general magistrate laid out

the relevant testimony and addressed the arguments made in defendant’s motion in

limine. The general magistrate ultimately found that the doctrine of collateral

estoppel does not apply “because of factual differences that exist today” and further

that it should not apply “because application of the doctrine would be inherently

unjust.” He then supported that determination with the following facts:

               “The decision by [the former chief judge] was rendered
               twenty-two (22) years ago. [The plaintiff] was early in his
               working years and there was a much greater potential for
               RIMI to be sold or acquired by merger prior to [plaintiff’s]
               retirement than there is today. [The plaintiff] is now 71
               years old and retirement is imminent and/or soon
               approaching. His contract is expiring at Brown University
               and he would by necessity revert to a staff radiologist after
               June, which he is not planning to do. He has been a
               member of the Board at RIMI and testified it is rare for
               anyone to work at RIMI past the age of 65. He testified it
               is his intent to retire this year. There is a far less likelihood
               at this stage of [plaintiff’s] career that the value of his
               RIMI stock would be enhanced by merger, sale or
               acquisition, as opposed to twenty-two (22) years ago when
               [the chief judge] heard and decided [plaintiff’s] first
               divorce matter.”

                                            - 23 -
Based on the findings of fact made by the general magistrate, we are satisfied that

the general magistrate did not err in declining to apply the doctrine of collateral

estoppel. It is clear that he considered the facts and circumstances in concluding that

“application of the doctrine would be inherently unjust.” See Casco, 755 A.2d at

782.

                                          2

       We turn now to the crux of defendant’s argument regarding the valuation of

plaintiff’s shares in RIMI.

       “The justices of the Family Court are vested with broad discretion as they seek

to fairly divide marital property between the parties in divorce proceedings.”

Sullivan, 249 A.3d at 641 (quoting Boschetto, 224 A.3d at 828). “It is well

established that the equitable distribution of property is a three-step process.” Id.

(quoting Boschetto, 224 A.3d at 828). “The trial justice first must determine which

assets are marital property, then must consider the factors set forth in G.L. 1956

§ 15-5-16.1(a), and, finally, he or she must distribute the property.” Id. (brackets

omitted) (quoting Boschetto, 224 A.3d at 828).

       At issue with regard to the first step is the determination of the value of

plaintiff’s equity interest in RIMI. The defendant submits that the general magistrate

abused his discretion in determining the value of that equity interest in accordance

with the shareholder agreement. Specifically, defendant submits that the proper

                                        - 24 -
valuation of that equity interest is $1,229,000, which, according to her expert, is its

fair market value.

      The plaintiff presented evidence that his one hundred shares of the practice

were worth $100,302.58, or $1,003.03 per share, in 2006, when the parties were

married. According to plaintiff, those shares were worth $3,662 each, or $366,200

in total, as of December 2020. These amounts were based on RIMI’s shareholder

agreement, not on the practice’s fair market value.        That value, according to

defendant’s expert witness, Barrett, was $1,229,000 in 2021.

      As Barrett readily acknowledged, utilization of the fair market value versus

the annual valuation set forth by RIMI yielded “two different outcomes.”

Furthermore, Barrett testified that he “underst[oo]d that the buy/sell agreement

allows for a physician, nonowner physician of RIMI right now to buy in at the

366,200 number.”        The general magistrate determined that the shareholder

agreements “are clear in that, to perpetuate the corporation, provisions were made

for the disposition of shares of stock among shareholders upon death, retirement or

withdrawal from employment” and that those agreements “set the buy in/buy out

price.” He found that

             “the shareholder agreement is a binding agreement
             between RIMI and [plaintiff] upon his retirement,
             dictating the value of [plaintiff’s] buy out value. To
             accept [defendant’s] position would be inequitable in this
             circumstance, wherein she would receive a far greater

                                        - 25 -
             value and portion of an asset that [plaintiff] is not likely to
             receive.”

We discern no error in the general magistrate’s analysis. He highlighted the history

of employees who have come and gone for a price consistent with the provisions of

the shareholder agreements—both in 2019 and 2020—as testified to by Barrett.

Such testimony and evidence further support the general magistrate’s determination

that the value of plaintiff’s equity interest in RIMI is “to be set based on the terms

of the binding shareholder agreement * * *.”

      Accordingly, we are satisfied that the general magistrate did not misconceive

the relevant evidence, nor was he otherwise clearly wrong, as to the valuation of

plaintiff’s equity interest in RIMI as $366,200.

                                           3

      The defendant additionally takes issue with the general magistrate’s execution

of the second and third steps of the equitable distribution of property: the

consideration of the factors set forth in § 15-5-16.1(a) and the distribution of the

property. See Sullivan, 249 A.3d at 641. She submits that the general magistrate

erred in awarding plaintiff 60 percent of the marital estate. Specifically, defendant

relies upon her assertion that the general magistrate did not afford plaintiff’s

response to requests for admissions any evidentiary weight and that they were

“sparsely referenced in passing (not considered, weighed, evaluated or factored) in

the court’s decision[.]”

                                         - 26 -
      The second step of the analysis requires the general magistrate to consider the

factors set forth in § 15-5-16.1(a), which include:

             “(1) The length of the marriage;

             “(2) The conduct of the parties during the marriage;

             “(3) The contribution of each of the parties during the
             marriage in the acquisition, preservation, or appreciation
             in value of their respective estates;

             “(4) The contribution and services of either party as a
             homemaker;

             “(5) The health and age of the parties;

             “(6) The amount and sources of income of each of the
             parties;

             “(7) The occupation and employability of each of the
             parties;

             “(8) The opportunity of each party for future acquisition
             of capital assets and income;

             “(9) The contribution by one party to the education,
             training, licensure, business, or increased earning power
             of the other;

             “(10) The need of the custodial parent to occupy or own
             the marital residence and to use or own its household
             effects taking into account the best interests of the children
             of the marriage;

             “(11) Either party’s wasteful dissipation of assets or any
             transfer or encumbrance of assets made in contemplation
             of divorce without fair consideration; and

                                         - 27 -
             “(12) Any factor which the court shall expressly find to be
             just and proper.”

      The general magistrate noted the requests for admissions in his recitation of

the facts, and he made at least one specific reference to the substance of the

admissions. Indeed, in his discussion of the distribution of assets, the general

magistrate noted that “[plaintiff] has acknowledged that he was looking at

pornography, that he called [defendant] names that were demeaning and insulting

and that there were incidents as [defendant] explained for which he later

apologized.” As this Court has continually stated, a judicial officer “need not

‘explicitly list his or her findings on each factor’ so long as this Court can determine

that the [judicial officer] considered ‘all the necessary facts and statutory factors.’”

DiDonato v. DiDonato, 295 A.3d 828, 834 (R.I. 2023) (quoting Sullivan, 249 A.3d

at 644).

      In his decision, the general magistrate thoroughly reviewed the testimony of

the parties and the witnesses in the case. We defer to the general magistrate’s

findings of fact in divorce proceedings. DiDonato, 295 A.3d at 834.

      In the case at bar, the general magistrate engaged in a comprehensive

discussion of the statutory factors enumerated in § 15-5-16.1(a).           It was his

determination that “both parties share equal responsibility for the breakdown of their

marriage by their conduct and their spoken words to the other.” After reviewing the

testimony and assessing the credibility of the parties, it was his finding that “[i]t is

                                         - 28 -
uncontroverted that [plaintiff] was the sole source of income throughout the

marriage, and that the accumulated marital estate is solely from money earned by

[plaintiff]. [The defendant] was laid off in or around the first year of the parties’

marriage and has not earned any money since that time.”

      The general magistrate ultimately determined that

             “In consideration of the length of the parties’ marriage, the
             respective contributions made to the marriage by the
             parties, their respective contributions to asset
             accumulation and preservation during this fifteen (15) year
             marriage, their age and health, as well as all other factors
             explained herein, the Court is of the opinion that the
             marital estate should be divided 60/40 in favor of
             [plaintiff].”

We are of the opinion that the general magistrate did not abuse his discretion, nor

was he otherwise clearly wrong, in awarding plaintiff 60 percent of the marital estate.

                                 Premarital Assets

      The defendant next contends that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of

establishing the value of his premarital assets. Specifically, defendant argues that

the magistrate erred in relying on the “inherently unreliable” testimony of plaintiff’s

accountant regarding the premarital value of his retirement accounts. Rather than

present statements from this time, the accountant prepared a summary of plaintiff’s

investment accounts and their value as of June 30, 2006. The defendant claims that

the general magistrate should not have relied on this summary because no source

documents were presented to substantiate the summary.

                                        - 29 -
      To the contrary, the general magistrate found that plaintiff’s witness, St. Onge,

“testified without bias to either party and his testimony was accurate and reliable.”

He determined that the summary of plaintiff’s assets offered by St. Onge was created

in the normal course of business, by maintaining “a system that tracks transactions

and the value of assets from the mutual fund companies daily.”

      It is clear from both the decision of the general magistrate during trial to admit

the document prepared by St. Onge into evidence and his written decision that he

classified the document as a business record of the kind referred to in Rule 803(6)

of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.           The general magistrate specifically

questioned St. Onge as to the production and creation of the document he offered,

and he ultimately allowed it into evidence over the best-evidence objection of

defense counsel. He again indicated in his decision that “[t]he document was

retrieved from [plaintiff’s] file and is one customarily prepared by Mr. St. Onge at

or near the time dated thereon.”

      The defendant cites one case in support of her contention that plaintiff failed

to meet his burden in establishing the premarital value of his assets. See

Ryan-Gamron v. Gamron, 47 A.3d 333, 335 (R.I. 2012) (mem.). Unlike the case at

bar, the trial justice there determined that “[n]o credible evidence was provided at

trial” as to a premarital mortgage and that the plaintiff “failed to provide valid

documentation regarding a mortgage.” Id. Here, the general magistrate found the

                                        - 30 -
testimony of St. Onge to be “accurate and reliable” and, when questioned by the

general magistrate as to how the document he produced was created, St. Onge

affirmed that the document is “a true and accurate record of what [he] pulled off, the

data from the databases, what the value of the accounts were” and that “[i]t’s not a

situation where [he] took the values today and tried to extrapolate back to what they

were[;] those were actual records that [he] pulled information from[.]”

      Although the general magistrate additionally noted in his decision that St.

Onge made a request for paper statements as to the June 30, 2006 valuation of

plaintiff’s RIMI 401(k) that was formerly managed by Prudential, at the time of the

decision it appears that no paper statements had been produced. Nevertheless,

because the document was clearly established as a business record, we hold that the

general magistrate did not abuse his discretion in admitting this evidence and,

through this document and the “accurate and reliable” testimony of St. Onge,

plaintiff met his burden of establishing the value of his premarital assets.

                                      Alimony

      Finally, defendant submits that the general magistrate erred in denying her

claim for alimony. She argues that he erred in not considering all of the alimony

factors, but instead in relying on McAuliffe, who made her projections on her

assumption that defendant would receive a greater share of the marital assets.

                                        - 31 -
      “The grant of alimony is authorized by statute.” Saltzman v. Saltzman, 218

A.3d 551, 558 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Meyer v. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571, 585 (R.I. 2013)).

Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16(c)(2), “[a]limony is designed to provide support for

a spouse for a reasonable length of time to enable the recipient to become financially

independent and self-sufficient.”

      At the outset of his discussion of alimony, the general magistrate set forth the

factors for determining an award of alimony as set forth in § 15-5-16(b). The general

magistrate then found that defendant has an “independent ability to support herself

in the future.” He noted that, although she has not worked in private industry since

just after her marriage in 2006, defendant indicated that she worked ten hours per

day, seven days per week on her own business. The general magistrate further found

that, even if defendant decides not to seek employment, she will have sufficient

assets to support herself at the same standard of living she enjoyed during the

marriage. He stated that his decision to deny defendant alimony “is not based on

[plaintiff’s] testimony that he is retiring in June, but rather on [defendant’s]

independent ability to support herself in the future.”

      The general magistrate further supported his decision to deny alimony with

the “relevant and credible testimony of Jane McAuliffe, CDFA, [who was] accepted

as an expert witness relating to divorce financial planning and analysis.” He found

that McAuliffe “formulated a financial plan for [defendant] based on a life

                                        - 32 -
expectancy of age of 90, suggested assets of $3,946,605 from the marriage, and a

listing of expenses identified in [defendant’s] DR-6.” After extensively reviewing

McAuliffe’s testimony, the general magistrate noted in his decision his awareness

that the 60/40 division of assets in favor of plaintiff reduced the amount on which

McAuliffe based her projections. He stated, “[h]owever, by the Court’s calculations

the marital estate to be divided has a total value of approximately $9,000,000 and

the deviation still provides [defendant] with significant and substantial funds to

support herself for the remainder of her life.”

      We discern no error in his analysis, nor in his decision to deny defendant’s

claim for alimony. Although he did not explicitly reference each factor as he

considered it, it is clear to us that he considered each of the factors set forth in

§ 15-5-16(b). As long as the court did not overlook or misconceive material

evidence, and as long as the court considered the elements set forth in § 15-5-16(b),

we will not disturb the denial of the discretionary award of alimony. Cf. Saltzman,

218 A.3d at 559 (“[I]f the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material

evidence, and if he or she considered all the requisite statutory elements set forth in

§ 15-5-16, we will not disturb the discretionary award of alimony.”) (brackets

omitted) (quoting Meyer, 68 A.3d at 586).

      It is clear from the testimony of McAuliffe and the findings of the general

magistrate that without alimony, defendant will be “financially independent and

                                        - 33 -
self-sufficient.” Section 15-5-16(c)(2). Indeed, the general magistrate’s decision

was based on defendant’s “independent ability to support herself” as demonstrated

by her own testimony as to her business and McAuliffe’s projections.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the general magistrate did not err in denying

the defendant’s claim for alimony.9

                                          III

                                      Conclusion

      For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decision pending entry of final

judgment of the Family Court. The record may be returned to the Family Court.

9
  The defendant additionally alleges that, “[o]ther than the $600,000 advancement to
[defendant] after the sale of the marital domicile, [plaintiff] has been in full control
of the lion’s share of the marital estate with no support to [defendant,]” suggesting
that defendant should have been entitled to temporary support during the pendency
of the case. We now deem this issue moot.

                                         - 34 -
                                          STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                     SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                           Licht Judicial Complex
                                             250 Benefit Street
                                           Providence, RI 02903

                                 OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case                        John J. Cronan v. Laurie A. Cronan.

                                     No. 2022-219-Appeal.
Case Number
                                     (P 20-2673)

Date Opinion Filed                   January 24, 2024

                                     Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
                                     Long, JJ.

Written By                           Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal                     Providence County Family Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court    General Magistrate Daniel V. Ballirano

                                     For Plaintiff:

                                     Timothy K. Baldwin, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
                                     For Defendant:

                                     Michael J. Lepizzera, Jr., Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)