Court Opinion

ID: 9382256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-25 18:11:53.580291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:37.728653
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-21-00342-CV

                              COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ANTHONY LEO SHERIDAN
AND CCS ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.,                                             Appellants,

                                                v.

KELLI D. WILLIAMS,
MICHAEL RICHARDSON,
AND SCOUTVIEW SPORTS,                                                         Appellees.

                     On appeal from the 26th District Court
                         of Williamson County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
             Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina
               Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

       This case stems from a dispute over a real estate transaction and involves claims

for breach of contract, statutory fraud, and an alter ego theory of liability. After granting

appellees, Kelli D. Williams, Michael Richardson, and ScoutsView Sports’s (ScoutsView)
motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court signed an order awarding damages.

By four issues that we have reordered, appellants Anthony Leo Sheridan and CCS Asset

Management, Inc. (CCS) claim: (1) the underlying order is not a final and appealable

order; (2) a genuine issue of material fact precluded summary judgment on the statutory

fraud claim; (3) summary judgment on the breach of contract claim was improper because

an “Advisory Committee” was a necessary party; and (4) Sheridan could not be held

individually liable because alter ego was not adequately shown. We affirm in part and

reverse and remand in part.

                                          I.       BACKGROUND1

        In 2016, Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView discussed Williams’s interest in

investing in ScoutsView. At the time, Williams owned a residential property (the Property)

that had been in her family for several decades. Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView

agreed to leverage the Property as collateral to secure funding for Williams to invest in

ScoutsView.

        Around September of that same year, Richardson, on behalf of ScoutsView, and

Williams spoke to Sheridan about brokering a loan to facilitate Williams’s investment in

ScoutsView. According to the pleadings, Sheridan is a broker, and the Vice President of

CCS. A “Corporate Partnership Agreement” was executed between CCS and

ScoutsView. Sheridan signed on behalf of CCS, and Richardson signed on behalf of

ScoutsView. Williams was not a signatory to the contract.

        1  This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin by order of
the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority
to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer).
                                                       2
       The stated purpose of the Corporate Partnership Agreement was to use the

Property as collateral to secure funding for the parties to invest in ScoutsView. According

to the Corporate Partnership Agreement, Williams would first use the Property as

collateral to net approximately $80,000, which Williams would use to invest in

ScoutsView. The Corporate Partnership Agreement provided that a second note would

be executed, and CCS would invest a minimum of “50% or $47,500” in ScoutsView. It

further set forth that an “Advisory Partnership” would be formed, and that partnership

would have “the full, exclusive and absolute right, power and authority to manage and

control the [p]artnership and the property, assets[,] and business thereof.” The

partnership would also approve work and construction on the Property. Williams was

listed as a member of this partnership, but Sheridan was not. Notably, the Corporate

Partnership Agreement also provided that “CCS . . . SHALL ALLOW [ScoutsView] TO

PURCHASE [the Property] FROM CCS . . . AT ANY TIME.”

       It is undisputed that in August of 2017, CCS and Sheridan sold the Property without

notifying Williams, Richardson, or ScoutsView. That same month, Williams, Richardson,

and ScoutsView filed suit against Sheridan and CCS for common law fraud.2 After filing

multiple amended petitions, Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView finally filed a third

amended petition, and their live pleading in this case, on August 30, 2018, asserting

causes of action against Sheridan and CCS for common law fraud, statutory fraud, and

breach of contract. They also asserted that Sheridan was the alter ego of CCS.

       2  A co-defendant, Kensington Peavy, LLC, was added to the case in September of 2017, but was
later severed out in September of 2018. Kensington Peavy, LLC, was allegedly the party to whom CCS and
Sheridan sold the Property. It is not a party to this appeal.
                                                  3
       On May 29, 2019, Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView filed a partial motion for

summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law solely on their breach of contract

and statutory fraud claims. Attached to the motion were affidavits from Williams and

Richardson, deemed admissions by Sheridan and CCS, the Corporate Partnership

Agreement, and an affidavit from plaintiffs’ counsel concerning the deemed admissions.

       Sheridan and CCS filed their summary judgment response on July 17, 2019.

Attached to their response was a deed of trust concerning the Property, a contract

between Williams and CCS, and affidavits by Sheridan and Robert E. Turner, who

claimed to have observed the execution of the Corporate Partnership Agreement.

Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView objected to CCS and Sheridan’s summary

judgment response on the basis that it included unsworn factual assertions. They also

objected to two paragraphs of Sheridan’s affidavit on the basis that those paragraphs

contained statements that were “self-serving,” “irrelevant,” and “factually incorrect.”

Lastly, Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView objected to the entire affidavit of Turner on

the basis that it was “irrelevant” and “contains . . . hearsay.”

       On November 25, 2019, the trial court sustained the objections to Sheridan and

CCS’s summary judgment evidence in a written order and granted summary judgment on

“all claims asserted” by Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView. A final order was signed

on June 22, 2021, which determined the appropriate amount of damages. In the order,

the court stated that “[b]y this order, the court disposes of the issues of appropriate

damages and with the court’s November 25, 2019 order, all issues in the case are now

resolved.”

                                              4
       CCS and Sheridan filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of

law. This appeal followed.

                                    II.    JURISDICTION

       As a preliminary matter, Sheridan and CCS argue that we lack jurisdiction over this

appeal because there is no final, appealable order.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       In general, unless a statute provides otherwise, we lack jurisdiction over

interlocutory orders. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007).

There are two different ways a judgment issued without a conventional trial can be final

for purposes of appeal: (1) if the judgment clearly and unequivocally states that it finally

disposes of all claims and parties, even if it does not actually do so; or (2) if the judgment

actually disposes of every pending claim and party. Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601

S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).

       For a judgment’s language to clearly and unequivocally express finality, there is

no magic language requirement. Id. “If the order contains a ‘clear and unequivocal’ finality

phrase disposing of the entire case, the order is final, and the failure to actually dispose

of all claims and parties renders the order erroneous but not interlocutory.” In re

Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam). An order is not

final merely because it is entitled final or because it uses the word final within. Farm

Bureau Cnty. Mut. Ins. v. Rogers, 455 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). Rather,

there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to

completely dispose of the case. Id.

                                              5
B.     Analysis

       Here, because it was interlocutory, the November 25, 2019 order merged into the

final order. See Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co. v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d

385, 390 (Tex. 2020). The June 22, 2021 order explains that the November 25, 2019

order “disposed of the merits of this case except for an award of damages.” With the

determination of damages, the court represented that “all issues in the case are now

resolved.” Sheridan suggests that the trial court should have used language like, “This

order disposes of all parties and issues of the case and is appealable.” However, the

supreme court has specifically held that this phrasing, although preferred, is not required.

See In re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d at 924. Though the final order does not

state that it disposes of all parties or is appealable, the language in this order contains

clear and unequivocal language reflecting an intent to dispose of the entire case. See

Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 801–02. Thus, we must give that language effect. See id.

       Sheridan and CCS also argue that “it is clear from the record” that their

counterclaims for fraud and breach of contract were not disposed of by the final order.

However, when an order’s language clearly and unequivocally expresses finality, a review

of the record to determine finality is not appropriate. In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 827

(Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). Therefore, we conclude that the June 22,

2021 order was a final judgment, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal. We overrule

Sheridan and CCS’s first issue.

                                             6
                                III.   SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A.     Standard of Review

       We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment. Lujan v.

Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). “Summary judgment is appropriate only

when there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Tex. Com. Bank, N.A. v. Grizzle, 96 S.W.3d 240, 252 (Tex.

2002). “Summary judgments must stand on their own merits, and the non-movant’s failure

to answer or respond cannot supply by default the summary judgment proof necessary

to establish the movant’s right.” City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d

671, 678 (Tex. 1979). Only when the movant meets its burden to prove it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law does the burden then shift to the nonmovant to raise a

genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at

84.

       When reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment, we accept the

nonmovant’s evidence as true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any

doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211,

215 (Tex. 2003). When the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds for its summary

judgment, “we must affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the

trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious.” Id. at 216.

B.     Analysis

       1.     Statutory Fraud

       CCS and Sheridan contend that the summary judgment evidence was insufficient

                                             7
to establish as a matter of law the elements of statutory fraud. The elements for a statutory

fraud claim based on a real estate transaction are:

        (1)     there was a transaction involving real estate;

        (2)     during the transaction, the defendant made a false representation of
                fact, made a false promise, or benefited by not disclosing that a third
                party’s representation or promise was false;

        (3)     the false representation or promise was made for the purpose of
                inducing the plaintiff to enter into a contract;

        (4)     the plaintiff relied on the false representation or promise by entering
                into the contract; and

        (5)     the reliance caused the plaintiff injury.

Fibela v. Wood, 657 S.W.3d 664, 673 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (cleaned up);

see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE TEX ANN. § 27.01(a).

        Sheridan and CCS challenge elements (2), (4), and (5). Here, Williams,

Richardson, and ScoutsView sought summary judgment on the grounds that Sheridan

and CCS “promised to abide by the terms of the [Corporate] Partnership Agreement,” but

failed to do so.3 Sheridan and CCS contend that the summary judgment evidence does

        3 We note that Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView’s live pleading was much more detailed than

their motion for summary judgment and corresponding summary judgment evidence. For instance, the live
pleading alleged that Sheridan represented that the Property would not actually change out of Williams’s
name, he misrepresented the importance of the second lien on the Property, he misrepresented the reasons
why the brokered loan resulted in significantly less funding than the partners originally agreed to, and he
also falsely stated that “the lenders” required the Property to be in Sheridan’s name, rather than in
Williams’s, in order to facilitate the loan.

        However, none of these alleged misrepresentations were echoed in the motion for summary
judgment. The facts asserted in the live pleading cannot supplant the sole ground for fraud expressly
asserted in the motion for summary judgment, as pleadings are not competent summary judgment
evidence, see Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dall.) v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1995), and summary
judgments must stand or fall on the grounds expressly asserted in the motion for summary judgment. See
McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 237, 339 (Tex. 1993).

                                                    8
not show that any false statement on their part was false at the time it was made. The

supreme court has “repeatedly recognized that a fraud claim can be based on a promise

made with no intention of performing, irrespective of whether the promise is later

subsumed within a contract.” Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs and

Contractors, 960 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. 1998). “A promise of future performance constitutes

an actionable misrepresentation if the promise was made with no intention of performing

at the time it was made.” Id. at 48; see T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847

S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tex. 1992); see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(2)(B)

(providing that in a real estate transaction, a “false promise to do an act” may be

fraudulent when it is “made with the intention of not fulfilling it”).

       But “[i]ntent is a fact question uniquely within the realm of the trier of fact because

it so depends upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their

testimony.” Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1986). Therefore,

it is exceedingly difficult, though not impossible, to establish that a defendant had

fraudulent intent as a matter of law. See Coleman Cattle Co. v. Carpentier, 10 S.W.3d

430, 434 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, no pet.) (explaining that summary judgment on

the issue of intent is appropriate if, for instance, the defendant admits the fraud); see also

In re Estate of Anderson, Nos. 13-07-112-CV, 13-07-131-CV, 2008 WL 3894653, at *3

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 25, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Issues of

intent and knowledge are not susceptible to being readily controverted and are

inappropriate for summary judgment.”).

       Here, the uncontroverted summary judgment evidence establishes that during

                                                9
negotiations, Sheridan expressed an interest in investing in ScoutsView. Sheridan agreed

to secure additional funding and to provide that funding to ScoutsView to realize his

intention of investing in the business. Sheridan was aware of the significance of the

Property to Williams, as it had been in her family for decades, and he was also cognizant

that Williams and Richardson were “adamant” that the Property was to remain in the

control of the partners to the agreement. Sheridan represented that he would have the

ability to control CCS’s possession and disposition of the Property. However,

approximately eight months after signing the Corporate Partnership Agreement, Sheridan

and CCS quickly and furtively sold the Property. ScoutsView never received the full

amount of investment funding that CCS and Sheridan agreed to provide, and CCS and

Sheridan ceased all involvement with ScoutsView after the sale of the Property.

      Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView assert that this issue “may simply be a

matter of one’s perspective of the clear evidence.” However, that is precisely what

precludes summary judgment in their favor on this issue. When reviewing a summary

judgment, the “[e]vidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant with all

reasonable inferences indulged and any doubts resolved in favor of the non-movant.”

Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Atty. Gen., 37 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tex. App.—Austin

2001, no pet.). Our “perspective” of the evidence, therefore, must favor Sheridan and

CCS. See id.

      According to the summary judgment evidence, Sheridan and CCS partially

performed on the contract for several months. See Oliver v. Rogers, 976 S.W.2d 792,

804 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (explaining that situations in which

                                           10
a “promisor had no intention of keeping [a promise] at the time he made the promise are

to be distinguished from situations in which a party has made a promise with an existent

intent to fulfill its terms and who then changes his mind and refuses to perform”).

According to the deemed admissions, Sheridan and CCS “intended for the agreement to

commence on December 16, 2016[,] and terminate on December 16, 2019, unless

terminated by mutual consent of the parties or by operation of [its] provisions,” and they

“intended for Defendant CCS to sell the Property to . . . ScoutsView ‘at any time’ between

December 16, 2016[,] and December 16, 2019.” Sheridan and CCS asserted that they

sold the property only when Williams and Richardson did not comply with certain requests

after the contract was signed.

        We agree that, through deemed admissions, Sheridan and CCS admitted to

breaching the contract and behaving in a suspicious manner after the contract was

signed.4 But even so, this does not prove, as a matter of law, that Sheridan and CCS had

no intention of performing at the time the contract was made. See Spoljaric, 708 S.W.2d

at 435 (“Failure to perform, standing alone, is no evidence of the promissor’s intent not to

perform when the promise was made.”); Carpentier, 10 S.W.3d at 434.

        Keeping in mind the deferential light in which we view summary judgment

evidence, and based on this standard, the record before us is not sufficient to establish

that Sheridan and CCS never intended to fulfill their contractual obligations as a matter

        4
          Specifically, Sheridan and CCS admitted that neither Sheridan nor CCS “obtained consent to sell
the Property,” that they did not give “notice to Plaintiff Richardson of Defendant CCS’[s] intention to sell the
Property,” and that Sheridan “wanted to consummate the sale of the Property . . . by closing ‘fast’ to prevent
the other parties to [the Corporate Partnership Agreement] from discovering Defendant Sheridan’s and
Defendant CCS’[s] plan to sell the Property . . . in violation of the terms of” the Corporate Partnership
Agreement.
                                                      11
of law. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(2); Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist., 37

S.W.3d at 156.

        We sustain this issue and reverse the trial court’s decision to grant summary

judgment as to Williams’s, Richardson’s, and ScoutsView’s statutory fraud claims against

CCS and Sheridan, and we remand for further proceedings.5

        2.      Breach of Contract

        Sheridan and CCS argue the trial court erred by granting Williams, Richardson,

and ScoutsView’s motion for summary judgment on their breach of contract claims. In

liberally construing CCS and Sheridan’s brief, we understand the sole joint issue they

assert concerning the breach of contract claims is that granting summary judgment was

improper because the advisory partnership was a necessary party to the case. However,

CCS and Sheridan cite no authority in support of this issue, and they do not explain why

the failure to include the advisory partnership as a party precluded the trial court from

granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)

(“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with

appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”).

        Rule 93(4) of the rules of civil procedure provides a method for defendants to alert

the trial court if a necessary party is not joined. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(4) (explaining that

a pleading alleging “[t]hat there is a defect of parties, plaintiff or defendant,” must be

verified by affidavit). CCS and Sheridan did not file any verified pleading asserting that

        5 Because we have decided this issue in his favor, we need not address whether an inadequate
showing of alter ego prevented the trial court from holding Sheridan individually liable for statutory fraud.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as
practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).
                                                    12
the advisory partnership was a necessary party to this suit, and thus, we conclude this

issue has not been adequately preserved for our review. See Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n,

141 S.W.3d 158, 163 (Tex. 2004) (“We conclude that Northglen ‘had an opportunity to

raise the absence of the nonjoined person and waived it.’”); cf. CHCA E. Hous., L.P. v.

Henderson, 99 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)

(“Generally, ‘a defect of parties’ refers to joinder problems involving necessary or

indispensable parties. It too must be raised by verified objection.” (citation omitted)).

       We overrule CCS and Sheridan’s third issue. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order

granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claims as to CCS. However,

Sheridan separately raises an issue concerning his individual liability for the breach of

contract claims that we will address next.

       3.     Sheridan’s Liability for Breach of Contract

       Sheridan argues separately that he cannot be held individually liable for breach of

contract because he was acting in his corporate capacity when he signed the Corporate

Partnership Agreement. Specifically, Sheridan argues that Williams, Richardson, and

ScoutsView did not adequately demonstrate that he was CCS’s alter ego, and thus, they

could not pierce the corporate veil and hold him individually liable for breach of contract.

       In their motion for summary judgment, Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView

acknowledged that Sheridan signed the Corporate Partnership Agreement “on behalf

of . . . CCS.” There is no evidence in the record that indicates Sheridan signed in his

individual capacity, and the motion for summary judgment did not allege that Sheridan

breached any contract other than the Corporate Partnership Agreement. The business

                                             13
organizations code describes the means by which a shareholder or a shareholder’s

affiliate of a for-profit corporation can be held individually liable for contractual obligations

or matters relating to or arising from contractual obligations:

       (a)    A holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a
              subscriber for shares whose subscription has been accepted, or any affiliate
              of such a holder, owner or subscriber of the corporation, may not be held
              liable to the corporation or its obligees with respect to:

                      ....

              (2)     any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relating to
                      or arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder, beneficial
                      owner, subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the
                      corporation or on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to
                      perpetrate a fraud or other similar theory . . . .

                      ....

       (b)    Subsection (a)(2) does not prevent or limit the liability of a holder, beneficial
              owner, subscriber or affiliate if the obligee demonstrates that the holder,
              beneficial owner, subscriber, or affiliate caused the corporation to be used
              for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the
              obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder, beneficial
              owner, subscriber, or affiliate.

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(2), (b); see id. § 21.224 (“Section 21.223 is

exclusive and preempts any other liability imposed for that obligation under common law

or otherwise.”); TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589, 596 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). The Third Court of Appeals has extended the

application of this section to corporate officers. See Henderson v. Buttross, No. 03-17-

00285-CV, 2018 WL 3320984, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin July 5, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

       “It is important to note at the outset that disregard of the ‘legal fiction of corporate

entity’ is ‘an exception to the general rule which forbids disregarding corporate

                                               14
existence.’” Lucas v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. 1984). “Under Texas

law, a corporation is presumed to be a separate entity from its officers and shareholders.”

Richard Nugent and CAO, Inc. v. Estate of Ellickson, 543 S.W.3d 243, 266 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). “Generally, alter ego will not apply to disregard the

corporate form absent exceptional circumstances.” Id. “Alter ego applies ‘when there is

such unity between corporation and individual that the separateness of the corporation

has ceased and holding only the corporation liable would result in injustice.’” U.S.

KingKing, LLC v. Precision Energy Servs., Inc., 555 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). As proof of alter ego, a court may consider:

       (1)    the payment of alleged corporate debts with personal checks or other
              commingling of funds;

       (2)    representations that the individual will financially back the corporation;

       (3)    the diversion of company profits to the individual for his personal use;

       (4)    inadequate capitalization; and

       (5)    other failure to keep corporate and personal assets separate.

Penhollow Custom Homes, LLC v. Kim, 320 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010,

no pet.). Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView provided no evidence concerning any of

these factors and thus, they did not meet their burden to show that Sheridan was using

CCS as his alter ego when any breach of contract occurred. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE

ANN. § 21.223(a)(2).

       Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView urge that, even if the summary judgment

standard to prove alter ego was not met, the summary judgment standard to hold

Sheridan individually liable for breach of contract was met by the evidence of Sheridan’s

                                             15
fraudulent actions.6 While it is true that the statute at issue here applies when the plaintiff

seeks to hold a defendant individually liable for contractual obligations of a corporation if

the theory of individual liability relates to either alter ego or to “actual or constructive fraud,

a sham to perpetrate a fraud or other similar theory,” proving deceptive means is just one

of the elements necessary to impose individual liability on Sheridan for the contractual

obligations of CCS. See id. § 21.223(a)(2), (b).

        In their motion for summary judgment, Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView did

not claim that Sheridan’s actions were “primarily for [his] direct personal benefit.” See id.

§ 21.223(b). It is not clear from the summary judgment evidence who primarily pocketed

the funds that Sheridan and CCS received from the sale of the Property. And no other

evidence was produced to demonstrate that Sheridan may have directly benefited from

the results of his complained-of conduct. Therefore, we conclude that Williams,

Richardson, and ScoutsView did not establish, as a matter of law, that Sheridan could be

held individually liable for breach of contract. See id.; see also Henderson, 2018 WL

3320984, at *4.

        We sustain this issue and reverse and remand the summary judgment on

Williams’s, Richardson’s, and ScoutsView’s breach of contract claims against Sheridan.

                                         IV.     CONCLUSION

        We affirm the summary judgment on Williams’s, Richardson’s, and ScoutsView’s

          6 To the extent that Williams, Richardson, and ScoutsView are arguing that there are other

modalities available to pierce the corporate veil beyond § 21.223 of the business and commerce code, we
note that they did not assert any of these additional grounds in their motion for summary judgment. Thus,
if the trial court did grant summary judgment on grounds not asserted in the motion, we would still be
obligated to reverse and remand. See McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 339.

                                                  16
breach of contract claim against CCS. We reverse and remand summary judgment on

the remaining claims against Sheridan and CCS for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

                                                          GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                          Justice

Delivered and filed on the
23rd day of March, 2023.

                                         17