Court Opinion

ID: 9579821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:56.827374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:48.533502
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
I respectfully dissent. While I realize that this Court’s grant of leave to appeal was limited to the question whether there was sufficient evidence on record to support the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board’s finding of continuing disability, I am persuaded that the failure to squarely address another question is the reason why this case is before us. Simply stated, the question is whether the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (formerly, the wcab) has *72the authority to decide issues surrounding the reasons for termination that are not necessarily related to an injury-related disability. Plaintiff asserts the right to worker’s disability benefits as a result of her injury and alleged inability to adequately perform up to defendant’s standards as a consequence of the injury. Defendant claims that plaintiff was performing adequately for its purposes and that the decision to terminate resulted from some mistakes plaintiff made in defendant’s blood-testing process that, in at least one case, led to serious consequences that threatened to put defendant into a litigious situation.
Testimonial evidence of plaintiff and a co-worker lends support to plaintiff’s claim that her employment was terminated for her inability to keep up with her duties with defendant. Documentary evidence, which includes favorable work reports generated by plaintiff’s supervisor, supports defendant’s position that plaintiff was performing adequately for most purposes. In turn, this supports the notion that plaintiff’s employment was terminated as a result of mistakes made in the blood-testing process rather than for any inability to perform her duties. Thus, the question should be which of these positions is the real reason behind plaintiff’s termination.1 Stated another way, proper resolution of this case requires an answer to the question whether it was the alleged disability or the mistakes in the blood-testing process that led to defendant’s decision to terminate plaintiff_
*73I
As the majority notes, the hearing referee concluded that plaintiff resigned under threat of termination for the mistakes she made in the course of testing blood samples. To reach this conclusion, the referee considered plaintiff’s injuries and possible work restrictions. Presumably, the purpose of this inquiry was to provide the referee with enough background to determine whether the reason for termination was plaintiff’s inability to perform her duties up to the appropriate standard or the errors plaintiff allegedly made in the blood-sampling process.
The wcab reversed the hearing referee’s decision premised on its belief that the reason for termination had nothing to do with the flawed blood testing because defendant " 'has not shown a violation of company rules which would normally result in termination of a non-disabled employee.’ ”2 See majority, ante, p 63. The wcab, however, did opine that plaintiff was a victim of a "tactic of forc[ed] resignation” and that it suspected "that plaintiff was fired because of her disability.” WCAB slip op, p 7. However, the wcab did not make a specific finding on what I consider to be the pivotal issue because it was "not asked to nor able to do so.” Id.
Recognizing that the wcab’s finding of plaintiff’s injury-related limitations was binding on it, the Court of Appeals nonetheless ruled that the facts failed to establish disability as defined by MCL 418.301; MSA 17.237(301). The justification for the Court’s ability to so conclude was the "so-called *74'jural relationships’ ” as described in Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc, 394 Mich 466; 232 NW2d 146 (1975).3 Taking the "ordinary facts”4 of the wcab as binding, the Court emphasized the lack of proof on the question whether plaintiff’s slowed pace was unacceptable to defendant.5 Moreover, the Court noted that a different situation would have been presented "[h]ad plaintiff been fired because of inability to keep pace with the demands of her employer . . . .”6 Finally, the Court concluded that § 301(5) controlled the inquiry and that plaintiff’s resignation constituted an unreasonable refusal to perform reasonable employment under an employer’s bona fide offer.7
*75II
Of the three legal authorities to rule on the merits of this case to date, only the hearing referee decided between plaintiff’s and defendant’s theories regarding the reason for plaintiff’s termination. The wcab purportedly declined to address the issue by stating that it was neither asked nor able to consider the question. The Court of Appeals relied on the "jural relation” to reach its conclusion that plaintiff was not disabled under the wdca on the basis that plaintiff resigned from a bona fide offer of reasonable employment that she was physically able to perform up to defendant’s requirements, albeit with some pain. In my opinion, the failure of the wcab and the Court of Appeals to squarely address the hearing referee’s conclusion regarding causation has led to complications necessitating this appeal.
To be sure, there is little if any precedent on the issue whether anything in the wdca supports the wcac’s authority to decide between two different theories of causation with one clearly being within its jurisdiction (compensable work-related disability) and the other commonly addressed under another body of law, i.e., employment law. To date, causation questions ordinarily resolved by the worker’s disability compensation system have involved the issue whether employment causes or aggravates an' injury or disease that qualifies for compensation. In this case, however, the question *76whether plaintiff’s injury made her disabled under the terms of the act is not appropriately reached unless it is clear that her injury-related work performance rather than her alleged mistakes caused the termination.8 Resolution of this case is made difficult by the existence of facts to support both theories.9
hi
In my opinion, the proper resolution of this case is to remand to the wcac to determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide the issue whether plaintiff was terminated for poor performance unrelated to her injuries or work slowdown as a consequence thereof and, if so, whether there are facts on *77record to permit it to reverse what is in reality a credibility determination made by the hearing referee. This issue has not been briefed or argued. Still, I am convinced not only that it has led to this appeal, but also that a resolution on any other ground would do a disservice to this state’s jurisprudence. Moreover, the wcab has implicitly exercised its jurisdiction in this regard by awarding benefits under worker’s compensation law while disregarding defendant’s claim of a right to terminate employment for a nondisability reason. In effect, the wcab has asserted a right to disregard noninjury reasons for termination where causation is at issue. If the wcac is allowed to follow this course in subsequent cases, it would represent a procedural but not a legal solution to the issue and would rob an employer of a valid defense to a worker’s compensation claim in cases where there is evidence of work-related injury as well as of reasons to lawfully terminate employment. It would also provide employees with an option between pursuing a disability claim or a wrongful discharge claim under mixed facts of possible disability and possible justified termination. I have been unable to find anything in the wdca that directs the wcac to automatically award benefits where causation for the wage loss is in dispute.
Accordingly, I would either affirm the Court of Appeals decision for its implicit ruling that plaintiff’s termination was due to mistakes in the blood-testing process on the strength of the hearing referee’s determination of causation, or reverse the decision and remand to the wcac for further consideration of the jurisdiction issue and the appropriate standard with which it may review such findings made by a hearing referee.
Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, J.

 This Court’s grant of leave encompasses only the question whether there is any evidence on record supporting the wcab’s decision in this case. While this properly respects the deferential standard of review that decisions of the wcac enjoy under MCL 418.861; MSA 17.237(861) and Const 1963, art 6, § 28, it limits the focus of this Court’s inquiry to plaintiff’s version of the facts. As noted earlier, the importance of plaintiff’s alleged disability to defendant’s decision to terminate is a disputed issue.

 Company termination policies and justifications for termination of employment at will are the subject of employment law rather than the traditional laws of worker’s disability. This inherent distinction goes to the root of the difficulties involved in this case.

 In Deziel, a majority of this Court stated:
In the first place we consider it in order to discuss a claim that is asserted in each of these cases, viz., that the ruling by the Appeal Board is a finding of fact which is made binding upon us if supported by any evidence by Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
What is always at issue in these cases is a "jural relation”—a right to compensation in the claimant, and a liability for it in the defendant. As pointed out in 1 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed), § 1, p 2, "[t]he material on which this claim of the plaintiff rests, if successful, is composite.”
This means simply that in determining any jural relationship, the facts upon which such relationship is to be predicated are "ordinary facts” and the jural relationship itself (which in a very real sense is also a fact) is deemed a "holding,” "ruling,” or "conclusion” of law.
It is to the former, the facts upon which the jural relationship is based—"ordinary facts”—that the constitution addresses itself, and not the latter-—which are called legal principles. See, generally, Wigmore, supra, "(a) Law and Fact, distinguished.” [Id. at 474-475.]

 See n 3.

 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 29, 1992 (Docket No. 141512).

 Id.

 At the time of plaintiff’s termination, MCL 418.301(5); MSA 17.237(301X5) provided:
If disability is established pursuant to subsection (4), entitlement to weekly wage loss benefits shall be determined pursuant to this section and as follows:
*75(a) If an employee receives a bona fide offer of reasonable employment from previous employer, another employer, or through the Michigan employment security commission and the employee refuses that employment without good and reasonable cause, the employee shall be considered to have voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force and is no longer entitled to any wage loss benefits under this act during the period of such refusal.

 It is also conceivable that the injury could be the cause of the mistakes that led to termination. Indeed, the wcab decided as a matter of fact "that the mistake made by plaintiff was due to the 'speed up’ forced upon her by her supervisor when she was unable to work quickly.” By treating this aspect of the case as a disability, the wcab attempted to neutralize the hearing referee’s conclusion regarding the causation issue. Thus, the wcab manipulated the primary issue that it purportedly neither was asked nor was able to address. Further evidence of this manipulation is the statement of the wcab regarding the fact that defendant failed to demonstrate a company rule on blood-sample testing, the violation of which would support termination of plaintiff’s employment at will. See WCAB slip op, pp 3-4. By disposing of defendant’s theory in this manner, the wcab avoided the conflict between the two theories of causation.

 Our courts have already recognized certain occurrences that terminate the link between work-related, compensable disability and wage loss. For example, a heart attack unrelated to conditions of employment has been held to terminate an established causal connection between a work-related injury and wage loss. See MacDonald v State Farm Mutual Ins Co, 419 Mich 146; 350 NW2d 233 (1984). In Luberda v Farm Bureau General Ins Co, 163 Mich App 457; 415 NW2d 245 (1987), the Court of Appeals concluded that incarceration of a person receiving disability benefits terminated the connection between compensable injury and wage loss for the period of incarceration.
In the same vein, termination of employment for a valid business reason should also sever the connection between a work-related disability and, therefore, any entitlement to worker’s disability benefits. Similarly, an employee should not be awarded disability benefits where termination and its ensuing wage loss are causally linked to a valid reason for termination rather than a work-related injury.