Court Opinion

ID: 9641221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:25:34.975347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:38.405779
License: Public Domain

CORNYN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. By holding that a litigant may preserve error by presenting a complaint to the court of appeals for the first time on appeal, the majority has rendered the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52(a) and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 324(b)(2) meaningless.1 *513Furthermore, the majority gives its blessing to a practice that was specifically eliminated by the 1984 amendment to Rule 324. Factual insufficiency complaints, never brought to the trial judge’s attention, may ultimately result in a new trial, but only after the added expense and delay of an appeal. Rules 324, 329b and 52(a) should be interpreted, without ignoring any one rule at the expense of the others, to require that the trial court be given an opportunity to pass at least once on all claimed errors so that a potentially unnecessary appeal can be avoided.
Confusion about when a motion for new trial is required as a prerequisite to appeal is not new. See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 322-24 (Tex.1984). Adding to the confusion is the fact that this court has amended Rule 324 four times since 1978. In 1978, Rule 324 was amended to remove the requirement of a motion for new trial as a prerequisite for appeal in most cases. Id. at 322; Tex.R. Civ.P. 324 historical note, 1978 amendment (Vernon Supp.1991). This amendment stemmed from the desire to eliminate appellate traps for the unwary, fatal to the preservation of error. Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, 32 SW. L.J. 407, 422-23 (1978). The 1978 amendment expressly eliminated the need for a motion for new trial when the complaint concerned the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, permitting such complaint to be made for the first time on appeal. Tex.R. Civ.P. 324 historical note, 1981 amendment (Vernon Supp.1991). In 1981, the requirement of a motion for new trial was even further limited to when the movant alleged grounds “upon which evidence must be heard, such as one of jury misconduct or of newly discovered evidence.” Id.
But in 1984, this court reversed the trend toward limiting the requirement of a motion for new trial in jury cases. That year, the rule was changed to specifically require a motion for new trial, inter alia, when the complaint concerns “the factual insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 324 (Vernon Supp. 1991). The purpose of the amendment was to prevent a party from complaining of the sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal. 31 J. Wicker, Civil Trial and Appellate Procedure § 353 (Texas Practice 1985).
The general requirement of preservation of error is articulated in Rule 52(a):2
General Rule. In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context. It is also necessary for the complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the party’s request, objection or motion. If the trial judge refuses to rule, an objection to the court’s refusal to rule is sufficient to preserve the complaint. (Emphasis added).
The majority opinion eviscerates this principle when a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law. It also overlooks part of the sound rationale for this principle we expressed in Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 919-20 (Tex.1982) (per curiam):
The reason for the requirement that a litigant preserve a trial predicate for complaint on appeal is that one should not be permitted to waive, consent to, or neglect to complain about an error at trial and then surprise his opponent on appeal by stating his complaint for the first time.
Further, it thwarts the purpose of motion for new trial practice, which is to avoid *514unnecessary appeals. Park v. Essa Tex. Corp., 158 Tex. 269, 271, 311 S.W.2d 228, 230 (1958).
The irony in the majority’s holding becomes even more apparent when one considers that the trial court is required to submit a jury question when there is “some evidence” to support the issue, even where the jury’s affirmative answer would be based on factually insufficient evidence, Brown v. Goldstein, 685 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.1985), or would be against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Gulf Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Deen, 158 Tex. 466, 470, 312 S.W.2d 933, 937, rev’d on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Deen v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 874, 79 S.Ct. 111, 3 L.Ed.2d 105 (1958). When factual sufficiency assignments of error are raised by a motion for new trial, the trial court is given its first opportunity to cure these errors in the judgment by granting a new trial. But when a motion for new trial is never presented to the trial court for a ruling, the majority holds that error is nevertheless preserved for appellate review, even though the trial court has ruled correctly on all objections presented. 3
It is ironic indeed that the appellant could thereafter allege in a point of error to the court of appeals that “the trial court erred ...” in failing to grant a new trial based on the sufficiency of the evidence when in fact the trial court committed no error. This clearly violates the rule that one may not appeal from a judgment having received all the relief requested in the court below. Trad v. General Crude Oil Co., 474 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Tex.1971) (per curiam); City of San Antonio v. Munoz, 159 Tex. 436, 321 S.W.2d 573 (1959) (per curiam).
This court never intended the overruling of a motion for new trial by operation of law to supersede the rules regarding preservation of error. A review of the historical evolution of Rule 329b shows that the concept of overruling a motion for new trial by operation of law arose, at part, from problems created by the now discarded concept of “terms of court.” This problem no longer exists under the modern notion of “continuous” terms of court.4 Another reason for the concept of overruling a motion for new trial by operation of law was the desire to establish a uniform timetable for post-verdict motions and appellate steps.5 The amendments to present Rule 329b were never intended to supersede the principle that a trial judge should have an opportunity to rule on a motion for new trial before the litigants appeal the case.
The majority infers that the elimination of the “presentment” requirement from *515Rule 329b in 1981 evidences an intent that the trial court need not be given an opportunity to rule. This inference is unjustified in view of the fact that “presentment” became unnecessary after the necessity for a motion for new trial as a predicate for preserving error for appellate review was virtually eliminated in 1978. Only after 1984, when Rule 324 was amended to require a motion for new trial when the complaint concerned the factual sufficiency of the evidence, did this apparently inadvertent omission become problematic.
Even when Rule 329b required “presentment,” the movant was never required to actually set the motion for hearing but only to call the trial court’s attention to the error alleged and request a ruling. Moore v. Mauldin, 428 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex.1968) (per curiam); University of Texas v. Morris, 163 Tex. 130, 133, 352 S.W.2d 947, 949 (1962). The rule did not require a request for a hearing when it would only be an empty formality, e.g. where the trial court already had an opportunity to rule on a complaint and had overruled the objection. Id. That is all Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52(a) requires. Allowing an appellant to appeal an objection never ruled upon by the trial court is tantamount to “resurrecting the rejected fundamental error rule.” Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, supra, at 323-24.
In many, if not most, trial courts in Texas the judge will never know that a motion for new trial has been filed in the clerk’s office unless a litigant brings it to the court’s attention. With literally hundreds and perhaps thousands of cases on their docket, it is only reasonable that we require litigants to affirmatively direct the judge’s attention to their complaints so the court can make a deliberate decision. If the judge chooses not to set the motion for hearing or otherwise rule on the motion, the litigant need only object to meet the requirements of Rule 52(a).6
Once brought to the court’s attention, the judge has the discretion to grant a new trial for almost any reason. Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex.1984) (per curiam).7 The trial court even has the authority to grant a new trial if, in its sole opinion, such an order is required “in the interest of justice and fairness,” Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex.1985, orig. proceeding), but for reasons which might not amount to reversible error. “[T]he rendition of judgement puts no period to the trial judge’s responsibility to see that, to the limit of his ability, justice be done in the cause.” 4 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in District and County Courts § 18.01, at 262 (rev. 1984).
Litigation is already too expensive and time consuming, foreclosing many litigants from redress of their lawful rights. Allowing litigants to raise alleged errors for the first time on appeal exacerbates this serious problem. The following language in Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex.1989), although not addressing the rules at issue here, is apt:
In a time when the cost and delay of litigation threaten the right of meaningful access to the courts for many of our citizens, we cannot condone an erroneous interpretation of our rules, however embedded in our practice, which discourages litigants from availing themselves of a cheaper and quicker means of judicial resolution.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that Petitioner’s points of error, raised for the first time in her motion for new trial but never presented to the trial court for a ruling, were waived.

. Petitioner also made “no-evidence" complaints for the first time in her motion for new trial. Since she failed to: 1) object to submission of the pertinent jury question(s) to the jury; 2) move for a directed verdict; 3) move to disregard the jury's answer to the question(s) or 4) move for judgement non obstante veredicto, her *513"no-evidence” points could only be preserved as error in her motion for new trial. Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex.1985). I would also hold that these complaints were not preserved for appellate review under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52(a) since the trial court was never given the opportunity to rule on them.

. Contrary to the majority's assertion, this court’s various amendments to Rule 324 and its adoption of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52(d) did not alter the requirements of Rule 52(a). 31 J. Wicker, Civil Trial and Appellate Procedure § 353 (Texas Practice Supp.1987).

. This is also the result when the complaint is that the jury’s verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or, as here, a litigant waits until a motion for new trial to raise "no evidence" arguments for the first time.

. Before 1923, all pending motions for new trial were overruled when the term of the particular court expired. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b comment (Vernon 1977). To provide the trial court the power to rule on a motion for new trial filed during the preceding term, the legislature passed the Special Practice Act in 1923. Act of March 21, 1923, 38th Leg., R.S., ch. 105, §§ 14-17, 1923 Tex.Gen.Laws 215, 220, repealed by Act of May 15, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 25, 1939 Tex.Gen.Laws 201. That Act gave a trial judge the power to rule on a motion for new trial filed during "the succeeding term or at any time which may be fixed by the judge, or to which it may have been postponed or continued by agreement of the parties with leave of the court." Act of March 21, 1923, 38th Leg., R.S., ch. 105, 1923 Tex.Gen.Laws 215, 220 (repealed 1939). If the trial judge and the parties did not agree otherwise, the motion was automatically overruled “as if the term of court had expired.” Id. In 1941, this court promulgated Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 330, which incorporated the relevant sections of the Special Practice Act with minor changes. In 1955, Rule 330 became Rule 329b.

. In 1955, Rule 329b first placed a ninety-day limit on the time within which a trial judge could rule on a motion for new trial. The purpose of this amendment was to "achieve uniformity of practice in all district courts with respect to a motion for new trial.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b comment. Later, Rule 329b was completely rewritten "so that appellate steps will run from the date the judgment or order is signed." Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b historical note, 1981 amendment (Vernon Supp.1991). The purpose of the 1981 amendment of Rule 329b, among other rules, was to permit the establishment of a uniform appellate timetable. Minutes of the Advisory Committee for the Supreme Court of Texas at 197 (November 16-17, 1979).

. This could be done orally on the record or by filing a written objection.

. The granting of a new trial by the trial court is not reviewable on appeal but only by mandamus in two circumstances not at issue here: (1) where the trial court rules after its jurisdiction lapses, Thursby v. Stovall, 647 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex.1983, orig. proceeding) (per curiam); or (2) when a new trial is erroneously granted because of a perceived conflict in the jury verdict. Johnson v. Court of Appeals, 162 Tex. 613, 615, 350 S.W.2d 330, 331 (1961, orig. proceeding).