Court Opinion

ID: 9724806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:14:58.604323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:06.416477
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WARD, dissenting: I believe that the majority seriously errs in holding that the trial judge properly denied the defendant’s motion for automatic substitution of judge because, the majority says, the case on remandment was with respect to statutory provisions for automatic substitution a continuation of the original proceedings. It is clear that the right to substitution is an absolute one. This court in People v. Peter (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 443, 458, stated: “Under section 114 — 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the absolute right to a change of venue previously given to the defendant was retained in paragraph (a).” See also People v. Samples (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 523, 526. Too, there is no question that the statutory provision for substitution should be liberally construed. In People v. Smith (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 445, 447, this court observed: “The Statutory provisions with respect to a change of venue should receive a liberal rather than a strict construction and should be construed to promote rather than to defeat an application for a change of venue, particularly where prejudice on the part of the judge is charged.” The trial judge denied the motion as untimely “because the case was not a new one but rather had been on his call for a long time.” That decision offended the intendment of section 114 — 5(a). The core of the provision is that substitution is to be allowed on the accused’s perception that the “judge is so prejudiced against him that he cannot receive a fair trial.” A liberal construction would require that a motion for substitution of a judge who presided over a trial and the introduction of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt, who refused to disturb a jury’s verdict of guilty, and who sentenced the defendant to death should have been allowed. To hold otherwise is to frustrate the purpose of the statute, which is to allow an accused one substitution of judges as an unquestioned right. A judge who has sentenced an accused to death may certainly be considered to have a fixed view of the defendant’s guilt. People v. McWilliams (1932), 350 Ill. 628, 632, involved a denial of a change of venue sought under the predecessor statute to section 114 — 5(a). When this court reversed the imposition of the death penalty, the defendant on remandment moved for a change of venue, stating that the judge who was to hear the cause had presided at the defendant’s trial and had sentenced him to death. This court, in holding the denial of the motion was error, said the statute should be construed to promote rather than to defeat the right to a change of venue, especially where prejudice on the part of the judge was charged. The court said that the right of a defendant who complies with the statute is absolute and declared that the denial of such a petition was reversible error. In People v. Smith (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 445, the case had been remanded for a new trial. Upon reversal, the People had another indictment returned against the defendant charging him with the same crime. The defendant moved for a change of venue because the judge who was to hear the case on remand had presided at the trial which resulted in the defendant’s conviction of robbery. This court reversed the denial of the defendant’s motion, holding in effect that the proceeding under the new indictment, though for the same crime, was not to be considered as simply an extension of the proceeding under the first indictment. This court said that though the question was novel, it was to be considered in light of the principle that a motion for change of venue is to be liberally construed and that the right to a change of venue upon a proper motion is absolute. I consider that the majority gravely errs in holding that the judge who presided at the trial could properly conduct the trial on remandment on the ground that the new trial was simply a continuation of the original proceeding. As this court did in a resembling situation in People v. McWilliams (1932), 350 Ill. 628,1 would regard the denial of the defendant’s motion as reversible error. CLARK, C.J., and SIMON, J., join in this dissent.