Court Opinion

ID: 9549107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:13:25.796304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:51.433865
License: Public Domain

Wertz, J.
(dissenting): Under the provisions of G. S. 1961 Supp., 44-556, the appellate jurisdiction of this court in compensation cases is confined to reviewing questions of law only. The question of whether the disability of a workman is due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment is a question of fact (Kafka v. Edwards, 182 Kan. 568, 569, 322 P. 2d 785; Allen v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 184 Kan. 184, 185, 334 P. 2d 370), and when determined by the trial court, will not be disturbed by this court where there is substantial evidence to sustain it. This court is required to view all the testimony in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. If, when so considered, the record contains any evidence which supports the trial court’s judgment, that judgment must be affirmed, being conscious at all times of the fact that this court has little concern with disputed questions of fact in ordinary lawsuits and none whatever in workmen’s compensation cases, except to ascertain whether the record contains any evidence which on any theory of credence would justify the trial court’s findings or conclusions of fact. (Silvers v. Wakefield, 176 Kan. 259, 270 P. 2d 259; Pence v Centex Construction Co., 189 Kan. 718, 722, 371 P. 2d 100.)
No useful purpose would be gained by narrating the evidence. Suffice it to say, in my opinion both the direct and circumstantial evidence were sufficient to sustain the trial court’s findings.
In a long line of decisions we have held that in a compensation case it is not required that the claimant shall establish his right to *286an award by direct evidence alone or that he produce an eyewitness to the accident. Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish the claim, and it is not necessary that the circumstantial evidence should rise to that degree of certainty as to exclude every reasonable conclusion other than that found by the trial court. (Silvers v. Wakefield, supra.)
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.