Court Opinion

ID: 9632262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:08:00.626621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:44.523510
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
concurring.
In this post-conviction relief proceeding, petitioner contends that ORS 166.250 is unconstitutional because it does not define the term “concealed.” I write separately, *385because petitioner has not alleged a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief.
After his conviction under ORS 166.250, petitioner sought direct appellate review. At trial and on appeal, he did not challenge the constitutionality of ORS 166.250. He makes that challenge for the first time in this proceeding under ORS lSSNSOdXd).1 ORS 138.550(2) says, in part:
“[N]o ground for relief may be asserted by petitioner in a petition for relief under ORS 138.510 to 138.680 unless such ground was not asserted and could not reasonably have been asserted in the direct appellate review proceeding.”
In an effort to avoid the effect of ORS 138.550(2), petitioner argues that he could not have raised the constitutional argument on direct appeal because it was not made in the trial court. The majority agrees, holding that claims of error that are unpreserved at trial and not made on direct appeal can be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief.
That holding is contrary to what the Supreme Court said in North v. Cupp, 254 Or 451, 461 P2d 172 (1969), cert den 397 US 1057 (1970).2 In North, the petitioner was convicted of the crime of using explosives to commit a crime in a building entered in the nighttime. He was apprehended in the basement of a bank building. A warrantless search of his automobile six days after his arrest produced incriminating evidence. The petitioner did not object to the admission of that evidence at trial, was convicted, and did not assign error to the admission of the evidence on appeal. In a petition for post-conviction relief, he asserted that the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights occurred, because of the illegally seized evidence. He did not assert incompetence of counsel as *386a ground for relief. The Supreme Court said “[t]here can be little doubt that the search and seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” 254 Or at 453. However, in deciding the effect of the failure to preserve the objection at trial or to raise it on direct appeal, the court explained:
“ORS 138.550(1) provides as follows:
“ ‘The failure of petitioner * * * to have raised matters alleged in his petition at his trial, shall not affect the availability of relief under ORS 138.510 to 138.680 * *
“If the statute is interpreted literally, it can be construed to mean that petitioner must be granted relief even though he did not object at trial and regardless of the reason for his failure to do so.
“The quoted part of ORS 138.550(1) must not be construed in a vacuum but must be read with the other provisions of the act.
“If ORS 138.550(1) is construed as putting the petitioner, under all circumstances, in the same situation as he was at trial, insofar as his right to enforce his constitutional right is concerned, it has in effect said there can be no procedural restrictions on the subsequent assertion of constitutional rights. There has been a procedural rule of long standing in this state requiring contemporaneous objection to the introduction of inadmissible evidence before error may be asserted on appeal because of its admission. This rule serves a legitimate state purpose because it gives the trial court the opportunity to conduct a trial without using the tainted evidence, and a new trial may thus be avoided. Any other rule would destroy the possibility of giving any finality to the trial process. The defendant’s attorney could fail to object to the admission of constitutionally objectionable evidence, secure in the knowledge that his client always had an anchor to windward guaranteeing him a new trial if the jury’s verdict was adverse.
“This procedural rule would be completely eroded by permitting the granting of relief in post-conviction proceedings in the absence of an objection at trial. It would be senseless to require an objection to the evidence as a prerequisite to the assertion of error on appeal if the necessity for such an objection could subsequently be avoided by instituting an application for post-conviction relief. We cannot believe the legislature intended any such result.
*387“However, there are situations in which the law recognizes that it is inappropriate to require a contemporaneous objection at trial as a prerequisite to the subsequent raising of the constitutional issue. We believe that the provision in question was intended to prevent the assertion of the procedural rule in such situations. The most common illustration is where the objection could conceivably have been made but could not reasonably have been expected. Examples are where the right subsequently sought to be asserted was not generally recognized to be in existence at the time of trial; where counsel was excusably unaware of facts which would have disclosed a basis for the assertion of the right; and where duress or coercion prevented assertion of the right. Also, the failure to assert the right would not be a bar where counsel was incompetent or was guilty of bad faith.” (Emphasis in original.) 254 Or at 454-57.
In the light of that analysis, the court examined the circumstances under which the lack of preservation occurred and concluded that there was nothing that would make it procedurally unfair to require the petitioner to have raised his objection at the trial. It affirmed the trial court which had held that the petitioner was barred from post-conviction relief because of his failure to object.
We followed the holding in North in Franklin v. State of Oregon, 109 Or App 274, 819 P2d 739 (1991), rev den 312 Or 676 (1992). There, the petitioner brought a post-conviction relief proceeding to set aside convictions for driving while suspended and driving in violation of a habitual traffic offender order. ORS 811.175; ORS 811.182; ORS 811.185. He argued that the conviction should be set aside, because one of the convictions underlying the habitual traffic offender order was void as the result of a defective notice. The state conceded that the suspension orders were defective. However, it contended that there had not been a substantial denial of petitioner’s rights entitling him to post-conviction relief because he had the opportunity to raise the notice issue at trial and on appeal and did not do so. We said that petitioner “could reasonably have been expected to have recognized his rights * * 109 Or App at 278. We noted that he did not argue that his counsel was incompetent or was excusably unaware of the facts that provided a basis for the challenge that he was making on post-conviction relief. As a result, we held that the trial court properly denied his request *388to set aside his convictions. See also Lerch v. Cupp, 9 Or App 508, 497 P2d 379 (1972).
North and Franklin stand for the proposition that post-conviction relief is not available to those litigants who are able to raise their objection at trial or on appeal and don’t. Not only is the majority’s holding inconsistent with our and the Supreme Court’s precedents, but it effectively writes ORS 138.550(2) out of the Post-Conviction Relief Act. The argument that petitioner now makes was available and could have been asserted on appeal. The fact that it was not preserved at trial does not mean the issue could not have been raised on appeal. Although the argument’s chances of success were less likely because it was not preserved, the statute requires more than the unlikelihood of success as an excuse for lack of assertion on direct appeal. See North v. Cupp, supra, 254 Or at 457.1 agree with the majority that the term “concealed” in ORS 166.250 is not constitutionally vague. However, I would not reach that issue, because petitioner has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act.

 ORS 138.530(l)(d) provides:
“Post-conviction relief pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 shall be granted by the court when one or more of the following grounds is established by the petitioner:
“(d) Unconstitutionality of the statute making criminal the acts for which petitioner was convicted.”

 The majority says that this case differs from North because petitioner asserts alternative grounds under ORS 138.530(1) and the petitioner in North asserted only a violation of ORS 138.530(l)(a). 121 Or App at 383. Why that is a distinction that makes a difference in the interpretation of ORS 138.550(2) is not apparent.