Court Opinion

ID: 9664299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:12:57.943551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:04.505919
License: Public Domain

RULING ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff John Masterson has filed a motion for a rehearing of defendant’s summary judgment motion. This Court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant Epic Divers, Inc. on October 29, 1992. Defendant opposes the motion for rehearing. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on December 9, 1992.
The Court has reconsidered its previous decision in light of the evidence that during the window of time in which plaintiff suffered his leg injury, he worked 51 days out of 53 days aboard five vessels, all of which were under the control of Chevron Oil Company. The evidence originally presented to the Court failed to provide such a clear picture. While the Court still believes that plaintiff does not fit into any exception to the vessel connection requirement (see ruling of the court entered on October 29, 1992, p. 7), the question of whether he was permanently assigned to, or performed a substantial amount of his duties on a fleet of vessels, is a question of fact for the jury. Given the facts submitted by plaintiff at the December 9 hearing, this Court cannot say “that there is no reasonable evidentiary basis to support a jury finding that the injured person is a seaman ... *873under the Jones Act.” Barrett v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1074 (5th Cir.1986).
“Determining seaman status under the Jones Act is ‘an inherently factual question’ generally left to the fact-finder. ‘Nonetheless, if the requisite proof is absent, a court may decide that seaman status is lacking as a matter of law.’ ” New v. Associated Painting Services, Inc., 863 F.2d 1205, 1207 (5th Cir.1989) (citations omitted). In this case, plaintiff has submitted the requisite proof to demonstrate that there exists a question of fact for the jury.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing be and is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment of this Court against plaintiff, entered on October 30, 1992, be and is hereby VACATED.