Court Opinion

ID: 9564455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:00:59.598522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:26.377179
License: Public Domain

Smith, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b), punitive damages can be awarded if clear and convincing evidence shows that a defendant’s actions amounted to “willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” Ordinarily, whether a defendant’s actions were wilful or wanton so as to authorize a punitive damage award is a jury issue. Christopher Investment Properties v. Cox, 219 Ga. App. 440, 444 (465 SE2d 680) (1995). And on summary judgment, the trial court cannot resolve facts or reconcile the issues; instead, the court can only determine if a factual issue exists, and the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must “be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt and all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. [Git.]” Fowler v. Smith, 237 Ga. App. 841, 844 (516 SE2d 845) (1999).
Upon construing the evidence under the longstanding summary judgment standard and under the rule that only a jury can usually determine whether to award or deny punitive damages, I cannot agree that summary judgment on this issue was correctly granted.
Gray was driving at a time strictly and clearly prohibited by his Class D license under the former version of OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A). And nothing in the record suggests that he was exempted from the prohibition of driving between 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. by virtue of former OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A) (i)-(iv), which allowed drivers having a Class D license to drive during these hours for the limited purposes of employment, school or religious activities, and emergencies. On the contrary, Gray was driving home from a party. He drove in utter disregard of the unambiguous language set out by the legislature in OCGA § 40-5-24. And Gray did not simply violate a “rule of *236the road.” Instead, as argued by the appellants in this case, he should not have been driving, period.3
Decided July 9, 2003.
Jennings, Sparwath & Satcher, Daniel M. Jennings, Stephen H. Sparwath, for appellants.
I note that after the collision in this case, OCGA § 40-5-24 was amended to extend the hours during which Class D license holders are prohibited to drive and to omit the exceptions contained in the former statute. See Ga. L. 2001, pp. 184, 185-186, § 1-2. Under the new legislation, such drivers cannot drive at all between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m. OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (2) (A). While this statute’s purpose is not expressly recited in the statute itself, one such purpose is obvious: to protect the public in general in addition to protecting young, inexperienced drivers by curtailing such drivers’ ability to drive at a time of night when their already limited ability and judgment are surely compromised. Gray drove in complete disregard of this statute of which he presumably had knowledge, and but for his presence on the road, where he had no right to be in the first place, the collision in this case would not have occurred.
[W]here the facts and circumstances of the tort show an entire want of care, such conduct gives rise to a presumption of indifference to the consequences, i.e., wantonness, which is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. The peculiar facts and circumstances of a particular case, when supported by clear and convincing evidence of culpability, may cause ordinary negligence to give rise to the presumption that the conduct showed a conscious indifference to the consequences and an entire want of care.
(Citations omitted.) Langlois v. Wolford, 246 Ga. App. 209, 210 (1) (539 SE2d 565) (2000). In my view, the collision in this case was the very type of incident our licensing statute was designed to prevent, and at the very least, a jury issue exists as to whether Gray’s actions amounted to “a conscious indifference to the consequences” of his actions and an “entire want of care” authorizing an award of punitive damages. I must therefore dissent from the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Judge Barnes joins in this dissent.
*237Harper, Waldon & Craig, Russell D. Waldon, Trevor G. Hiestand, for appellee.

 Indeed, the “Uniform Rules of the Road” are found at OCGA §§ 40-6-1 through 40-6-397, a distinct chapter from that devoted to the law concerning driver’s licenses. See OCGA §§ 40-5-1 through 40-5-179.