Court Opinion

ID: 9546725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:34:42.946556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:48.907468
License: Public Domain

EAGLESON, J. Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that petitioner has committed acts evincing moral turpitude. His criminal conviction is, on its face, a serious one. By pleading guilty to the lesser charge, he admitted that he specifically intended to commit a dangerous felony (assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily harm), and that he asked another person to do the act. (Pen. Code, § 653f, subd. (a).) Despite thorough presentation of all mitigating evidence to the sentencing court, petitioner was sentenced to two years in state prison.
Of greatest concern here is that petitioner’s actual wrongdoing is far more expansive than his conviction suggests. The record makes clear that petitioner intended to commit the ultimate act of murder, and paid money to guarantee that result. He also was willing to involve at least two other people (Donnelly and “partner”) in the scheme, and had every reason to believe that they would commit the crime. By his own admission, it was a mere “fortuity” that no injury or death occurred.
Petitioner also has not convinced either the review department or this court that his crime was the product of overwhelming fear or panic. (Cf., Montag v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 721 [186 Cal.Rptr. 894, 652 P.2d 1370].) Granted, he was the target of several acts of harassment, and believed that Roper was the cause. Yet the only incidents which could reason*744ably induce a fear of harm—the “death threat,” the lug nut incident and the hit-and-run collision—all occurred a significant period of time before his criminal solicitation began. If, as petitioner contends, these events uncontrollably drove him to commit the crime, why did he wait several months before accepting Donnelly’s standing offer to harm Roper? As suggested by the majority, the reason is that petitioner did not actually believe he and his family were in imminent danger, but decided to act only after his anger and “loathing” for Roper had peaked. (Ante, at p. 738.) No other conclusion is possible in light of statements he made during the taped conversations with Donnelly.
Because of petitioner’s clear culpability, and the presence of only “routine” factors in mitigation, I dissent from the majority’s decision to suspend, rather than disbar, petitioner.
In my view, little mitigating weight can be placed on petitioner’s failure to take so-called “questionable” referrals from Roper. This conclusion is speculative, and overlooks the likelihood that petitioner declined to act for purely business reasons. And, while the instant misconduct did not involve a breach in the performance of professional services, the majority overlooks the well-settled notion that an attorney may be disciplined for misdeeds not directly arising out of the practice of law. (See In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195, 202-204 [145 Cal.Rptr. 855, 578 P.2d 102].)
The majority’s willingness to accept petitioner’s “conspiracy” theory is also troublesome. Such an approach shifts the responsibility for conceded bad acts away from petitioner. Regardless of the alleged motivations of others, there is no dispute that petitioner intended to harm, and ultimately to kill, another person for reasons which are professionally and socially unacceptable.
Another uncompelling factor is petitioner’s troubled family history. While these problems are unfortunate, they fall within the realm of “normal” life occurrences. We have seen several cases in which an attorney has undergone marital or family health problems at the time he committed misconduct, but was nonetheless deserving of harsh discipline. (See, e.g., Kent v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 729, 736-737 [239 Cal.Rptr. 77, 739 P.2d 1244]; In re Nevill (1985) 39 Cal.3d 729, 735-736 [217 Cal.Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332]; cf., Schneider v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 784, 799-801 [239 Cal.Rptr. 111, 739 P.2d 1279].) Some of the family illnesses cited by the majority herein occurred 10 years before petitioner committed his crime.
Finally, undue emphasis has been placed on petitioner’s remorse and cooperation with the State Bar. This cooperation occurred, of course, after serving his prison term. While it is a commendable stance for him to take, it should not obscure our analysis of the key issue at hand—petitioner’s fitness *745to practice law. (In re Conflenti (1981) 29 Cal.3d 120, 124-125 [172 Cal.Rptr. 203, 624 P.2d 253]; see also, Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 658, 664 [238 Cal.Rptr. 394, 738 P.2d 740].) The source of petitioner’s wrongdoing was his admitted inability to handle stressful situations. While he insists that he has learned to prevent a recurrence of stress buildup, he has not engaged in a meaningful and sustained period of unsupervised law-abiding activity. Although the crime occurred in 1982, petitioner’s medical expert opined as recently as mid-1986 that additional therapy was necessary before a diagnosis of complete rehabilitation could be made. (Cf., In re Nadrich (1988) 44 Cal.3d 271, 279 [243 Cal.Rptr. 218, 747 P.2d 1146] [two years of noncustodial drug and alcohol rehabilitation insufficient to forestall disbarment where serious crime has been committed (in dictum)].) His current capacity to handle the pressures of a law practice and daily life is therefore uncertain.
Where “an attorney’s misconduct is egregious and is not substantially mitigated by other circumstances, once is one time too many.” (In re Nevill, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 736.) Here, the evidence shows petitioner’s willingness to do whatever was necessary to take another person’s life. The bar and the public should not be compelled to acquiesce in a determination that allows a person whose moral standard is so low, and whose judgment so lacking, to continue to wear the mantle of privilege and public trust that accompanies the calling of attorney at law. I would disbar petitioner.
Lucas, C. J., concurred.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied February 23, 1989, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.