Court Opinion

ID: 9723024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:00:21.965933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:43.973536
License: Public Domain

OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
Garrard, J.
I do not agree that the facts of this case in the dispute between Como Feed Products (Corno) and Thompson Farms, Inc. (the buyer) can be properly characterized as a “sale of goods” so as to bring the parties’ dealings under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, IC 1971, 26-1-2-102,105.
*712However, I do not believe as the trial court apparently did,1 that this determination is dispositive of the buyer’s contentions as to breach of warranty.
The pretrial order asserted a contract between Corno and the buyer which gave rise to express and implied warranties which the buyer asserted were breached respecting a hog house. The facts, which are set forth in detail by the majority, disclose that Como desired to promote the sale of hog feed it manufactured. To do so it devised the Como Full Circle Hog Marketing Plan. The plan was designed to encourage farmers to engage in raising feeder pigs for market. Thus, Como designed a reasonably priced slatted-floor hog house which it promoted as a means for profitably raising pigs with the expenditure of little time by the farmer. Under the plan Corno agreed to finance the construction of such hog houses as well as the acquisition of the pigs to be fed. It provided arrangements for sale of the pigs when they reached market size. The condition of the plan was an agreement by the farmer to use only Corno feeds during the life of the financing agreements. In this case there is no doubt that Corno, directly negotiated and agreed with the buyer for implementation of the plan. It is also beyond question that the allegedly defective design of the hog house is the basis upon which the buyer premises any liability of Como.
Under these circumstances I believe it is immaterial whether the third party who supplied the materials and/or constructed the house to Corno’s approval according to its plans and specifications was a Como agent or merely an independent contractor. It is similarly immaterial whether Como sold its feed through its own agent or through a dealer. There was a bargained-for meeting of the minds between Corno and the buyer *713on use of the plan. While under such circumstances without the majority’s finding of special agency it is difficult to ascertain a benefit to Corno constituting consideration, no such benefit is necessary to the formation of a valid contract. The consideration arises from the detriment incurred by the buyer through its adoption of the plan and use of the hog house. Pitcher v. Dove (1884), 99 Ind. 175; Glasgow v. Hobbs (1869), 32 Ind. 440; Timberlake v. J.R. Watkins Co. (1965), 138 Ind. App. 554, 209 N.E.2d 909, reh. den. 138 Ind. App. 554, 211 N.E.2d 193.
Turning then to the question of warranty, Williston urges that the term “implied warranty” be restricted to warranties implied by law. 4 Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) § 969. Indiana decisions appear amenable to this limitation. (See, e.g., Theis v. Hewer (1972), 264 Ind. 1, 280 N.E.2d 300; Carmichael v. Lavengood (1942), 112 Ind. App. 144, 44 N.E.2d 177; Hitz v. Warner (1911), 47 Ind. App. 612, 93 N.E. 1005) and it accords with the broad definition of express warranty found in the Uniform Commercial Code, IC 1971, 26-1-2-313:
“(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows :
(a) any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express wárranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as ‘warrant’ or ‘guarantee’ or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.”
*714Express warranty has been similarly defined apart from special statute.2 I would therefore adopt the commercial code definition as the general definition of express warranty for purposes of contract law.
The case should therefore be remanded for a determination of whether .Como made express warranties ■ which. were breached, and, if so, the extent of the damages suffered by the buyer.
Since the contract with Como was not, in my view, within the sales .article of the commercial , code,, the implied warranties of IC 1971, 26-1-2-314 are not directly applicable. The traditional rule would apparently not imply warranties. of merchantability or fitness for particular purposes. Compare, however, Barnes v. Mac Brown &.Co., Inc. (1976), 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619; Theis v. Heuer, supra.
On the other hand, Indiana has long recognized that a promisor may owe a duty to use reasonable care in the performance of matters contemplated by the contract. Where the duty arises and is breached the promisee may maintain an action for negligence. Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett (1906), 167 Ind. 491, 79 N.E. 503. It appears to me that the liability imposed in such a case (as opposed to the theoretical, or doctrinal basis for liability) under such circumstances might closely approximate the liability imposed for merchantability.
However, I do not believe this is an appropriate case to determine the extent and effect to be given to these similarities.- The court, by the request for findings,- was permitted to make only general findings on the buyer’s counterclaim for *715negligence. Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52(D). It found against the buyer and there was evidence to support that result.
I would reverse for a determination of the liability, if any, of Como for breach of express warranty.
Note. — Reported at 366 N.E.2d 3.

. The special findings of the trial court determined that the situation did not constitute a sale of goods by Corno. A fair reading of the other findings and the court’s conclusions indicate that because of this determination the court found that Corno had no warranty obligations. Court’s conclusions 1 and 2 as to Affirmative Defense No. 1.

. “An affirmation of the quality or condition of the thing sold, (not uttered as a matter of opinion or belief).made by the seller at the time of sale, for the purpose of assuring the buyer of the truth of the facts affirmed, and inducing him to make the purchase, if so received and relied on by the purchaser, is an express warranty.” Shippen v. Bowen (1887), 122 U.S. 575, 7 S. Ct. 1283, 30 L. Ed. 1172.