Court Opinion

ID: 9749314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:33:07.150089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:32.797152
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.,
Dissenting.
Because I believe the majority misconstrues KRS 100.987,1 cannot join its opinion. Quite frankly, I cannot conceive that the General Assembly ever intended that cellular antenna towers — with all their transmission capabilities — would not be regulated in any way if a county fiscal court or planning commission defaulted. Therefore, I respectfully dissent as to the determination that the PSC does not have jurisdiction in this case.
KRS 100.987 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111 and legislative body or fiscal court that has adopted planning and zoning regulations may plan for and regulate the siting of cellular antenna towers in accordance with locally adopted planning or zoning regulations in this chapter.
(2) Every utility or a company that is engaged in the business of providing the required infrastructure to a utility that proposes to construct an antenna tower for cellular telecommunications services or personal communications services within the jurisdiction of a planning unit that has adopted planning and zoning regulations in accordance with this chapter shall: (a) Submit a copy of the applicant’s completed uniform application to the planning commission of the affected planning unit to construct an antenna tower for cellular or personal telecommunications services.
The majority makes much of the words “shall” and “every” in sub-section (2) of KRS 100.987, gleaning that the legislature intended local planning commissions to “always” maintain jurisdiction over cellular tower placement “if the area in question has such a commission.” I do not believe that “shall” and “every” as used in subsection (2) evinces such an intention, particularly given the question at hand— whether the PSC has jurisdiction in this case. To answer this question, I, like the Court of Appeals, concentrate on the description of the entity that may regulate cellular tower placement, i.e., “[a] planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111 and legislative body or fiscal court that has adopted planning and zoning regulations ....” in KRS 100.987(1) and “a planning unit that has adopted planning and zoning regulations ....” in KRS 100.987(2). A plain reading of these two provisions defies the majority’s conclusion that “a planning unit has the discretion to enact regulations pertaining to cellular antenna towers, as they do with any other activities or structures, but this exercise of discretion is not a condition of jurisdiction.” While it is true enough that no jurisdiction “must” enact planning and zoning regulations, the fact remains that pursuant to the plain reading of KRS 100.987(1) and (2), they are required to do so before asserting authority over the placement of cellular towers. Otherwise, KRS 100.987(1) would simply read,
A planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111 and legislative body or fiscal court that has adopted — planning—and zoning regulations may plan for and regulate the siting [sic] of cellular antenna towers in accordance with locally adopted planning or zoning regulations in this chapter.
I decline to so edit the statute and render superfluous the phrase “that has adopted *367planning and zoning regulations.” Instead, I would give full effect and meaning to the Legislature’s drafting of this provision.
My belief that the majority misconstrues KRS 100.987 is bolstered by the question begged by the majority’s opinion: when does the PSC have jurisdiction over the placement of cellular towers? Applying the rule announced by the Court today, and given the fact that every single jurisdiction in this Commonwealth has a fiscal court or a planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111,1 the answer is never.
This, I believe, is the result of the majority’s conclusion that the Legislature intended the placement and regulation of cellular antenna placement to “always be in the local planning commission if the area in question has such a commission.” To the contrary, it seems to me that the legislative intention to be gleaned from KRS 100.987 was to provide jurisdiction to planning units which have opted to zone and plan their jurisdictions, but only if demonstrated by the local unit’s adoption of “planning and zoning regulations” and not by the simple existence of the planning body. Where the local units decline to regulate, the Legislature intended the PSC to be the authority to fill the regulatory vacuum. Otherwise, and given the majority’s sweeping statements in this case, the PSC would never have jurisdiction and the possibility exists that the placement of cellular towers could go entirely unregulated.
My concern that the majority’s opinion could permit cellular towers to go unregulated derives from the fact that there may be counties and planning units which have not designated zoning regulations of any kind. Thus, where a cellular tower is to be placed in a jurisdiction with some type of planning body, but that jurisdiction is lacking in regulations, a court would look to this opinion and determine that jurisdiction over cellular tower placement always resides in the local planning commission. This would be so merely because the area in question “has such a commission” regardless of whether the commission has planned or zoned in any way. Thus, the placement of the tower in such a jurisdiction would go unregulated. I therefore, cannot agree with the majority on this issue.
In any event, while I think the majority reads out a key portion of KRS 100.987, I stop short of adopting the Court of Appeals’ position on this issue for one simple reason — I believe it goes one step too far. The Court of Appeals held that in order for the local planning unit to maintain jurisdiction it “must have first adopted local planning and zoning regulations dealing specifically with the construction of cellular towers.” (emphasis added) Nothing in KRS 100.987 supports the conclusion that a local planning unit must have “specifically” regulated cellular tower placement or construction, but rather the only requirement necessary is “that [it] has adopted planning and zoning regulations.” Thus, I believe that a local planning unit invokes its authority by creating any regulations that could be read to apply to the placement of cell towers, and need not be specifically so. Therefore, in cases such as the one at bar, I would ask a simple question: has the local jurisdiction *368adopted a planning and zoning regulation that would regulate the placement of cellular towers in any way? Where the question is answered in the affirmative, then the local planning unit should be considered as having invoked its permissive authority to regulate the cell towers. Where the question is answered in the negative, the PSC is vested with the regulatory function.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case.

. KRS 100.111(15) defines a planning unit as: "[A]ny city, county, or consolidated local government, or any combination of cities, counties, or parts of counties, or parts of consolidated local governments engaged in planning operations.” KRS 100.111(14) defines planning operations to "mean[] the formulating of plans for the physical development and social and economic well-being of a planning unit, and the formulating of proposals for means of implementing the plans."