Court Opinion

ID: 9590777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:58:19.446868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:09.761149
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I fully concur in Division 1 but concur in the judgment only, with respect to Division 2.
I find no case where multiple stab wounds, inflicted sequentially and without interruption, constitute separate crimes. However, considering the indictment, the proof, and the verdict in this case, what we have is that one series of stabbings, unbroken by any other act of defendant, is regarded as two acts, one being the initial assault or all of the assaults which did not result in scarring to the neck, and the other being the several stabbings resulting in scars to the neck.
Although I have a hard time viewing these multiple stabs as two separate and independent crimes, I concede that it is analytically pos*89sible and so concur in the judgment. I do not believe, however, that we should open the door to multiple counts for each stab, which I read the opinion as doing.
Decided January 30, 1989.
Andrews & Seery, Stephen H. Andrews, for appellant.
H. Lamar Cole, District Attorney, James E. Hardy, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
This case is close to, but differs from, Mills v. State, 187 Ga. App. 79, 80 (4) (369 SE2d 283) (1988), where “[t]he facts adduced to support the aggravated assault charge, as it was set forth in the indictment, were the same facts used to support the aggravated battery charge, as it was set forth in the indictment, ...” The indictment against Knight alleged different facts as to each count. Likewise in Mitchell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 40, 44 (369 SE2d 487) (1988), where both charges referred to the same ultimately proved facts. In Mathis v. State, 184 Ga. App. 455, 457 (7) (361 SE2d 856) (1987), it was the “language of the indictment . . .” which governed the outcome. Unlike the Knight indictment, one count in Mathis was “plainly sufficient to include [both offenses].” The wording of the indictment is not set out in Moreland v. State, 183 Ga. App. 113, 114 (1) (358 SE2d 276) (1987), although the Court held that a merger occurred. This results when, unlike here, what is alleged in one count, matched with what is proved, covers both counts.