Court Opinion

ID: 9377910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 00:02:16.397305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:17.897152
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/23 P. v. Bess CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          H048744
                                                                     (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  Super. Ct. Nos. B2000478 &
                                                                      C1919395)
           v.

 RICHARD LEE BESS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Richard Lee Bess was sentenced to 11 years 8 months in prison after he
pleaded no contest to, among other things, multiple counts of robbery and identity theft
related to crimes that occurred in 2019. Defendant contends on appeal that he is entitled
to resentencing under recent amendments to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b).
We will remand for resentencing.
                                  I.     TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
         Defendant’s negotiated disposition resolved two cases (whose underlying facts are
not directly relevant to the issue raised on appeal). In case No. C1919395, defendant was
charged with five counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c), counts
A1, A4, A7, A8 & A10; unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code); two
counts of second degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (b), counts A2 & A5); four counts of
using personal identifying information without authorization (§ 530.5, subd. (a), counts
A3, A6, A9 & A11); and misdemeanor counts of possessing personal identifying
information with intent to defraud (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1), count A12); driving with a
suspended license (Veh. Code § 14601.2, subd. (a), count A13); and misuse of a disabled
person placard (Veh. Code § 4461, subd. (c), count A14). The complaint alleged
defendant personally used a firearm in counts A1 and A4 (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and
personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in count A10 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The
complaint also alleged defendant was on bail when he committed counts A1 through A7
(§ 12022.1, subd. (b)).
       In case No. B2000478, defendant was charged with second degree burglary
(§ 460, subd. (b), count B1); using personal identifying information without authorization
(§ 530.5, subd. (a), count B2); and using an altered, stolen, or counterfeit access card to
commit grand theft (§ 484g, subd. (a), count B3). In that case also, the complaint alleged
that defendant was on bail when he committed the charged offenses (§ 12022.1,
subd. (b)).
       Defendant pleaded no contest as to all counts and admitted the on bail
enhancement in exchange for a sentence not to exceed 12 years. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 11 years 8 months on the felony convictions (with sentences on the
misdemeanors deemed served). The sentence included “the upper term of five years” on
count A1 and “a concurrent upper term of three years” on each of counts A3, A6, A9, B2,
and B3. The remaining enhancements in case No. C1919395 were dismissed on the
prosecution’s motion.
                                    II.   DISCUSSION
       Defendant argues the judgment must be reversed and the matter remanded for
resentencing so that he can receive the benefit of recent amendments to section 1170.
The Attorney General agrees defendant is entitled to the benefit of those amendments
under the reasoning of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, but argues reversal is not
required because any error was harmless.
       When defendant was sentenced in 2020, trial courts had broad discretion under
section 1170, subdivision (b) to select the “appropriate term” for offenses having a
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prescribed sentencing triad. (Former § 1170, subd. (b); Stats. 2018, ch. 1001, § 1.)
Under amendments to that section effective January 1, 2022, trial courts are now
generally required to select the middle term (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)) and may impose an
upper term “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) A trial court may consider “defendant’s prior convictions in
determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the
prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
       The trial court identified numerous aggravating factors, including that: “the
crimes involved great violence” and “a threat of great bodily harm and callousness”
because defendant “used a firearm in some of the offenses and he also assaulted a victim
with a tire iron”; defendant’s “offenses involved some planning, given the manner in
which they were carried out”; one of the crimes involved defendant “taking advantage of
an apparent position of trust in that he posed as a police officer in order to subdue and
gain control of that particular victim”; defendant had “served a prior prison term”;
defendant’s “violations are numerous”; defendant’s “conduct in these cases demonstrates
that he is a serious threat to the public”; and defendant’s “history demonstrates a
continued victimization of others over a span of many years.” The trial court also
identified one factor in mitigation: that defendant “accepted responsibility early in the
course of these proceedings.” As the parties note, not all of the aggravating factors cited
by the trial court were stipulated to by defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt
by a factfinder. But appellate courts are divided on the prejudice standard that applies in
this context. (See People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495 (Flores); People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459 (Lopez); People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, rev.
granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655 (Dunn).)
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       The Flores court held that such an error is harmless so long as even one of the
aggravating factors relied on by the trial court was proven beyond a reasonable doubt or
by stipulation, or would have unquestionably been found true beyond a reasonable doubt
by a jury. (Flores, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 500–501.) The Lopez court rejected
Flores, asking first whether a jury would unquestionably have found all aggravating
factors relied on true beyond a reasonable doubt, and if not, then whether it is reasonably
probable that a lesser sentence would have been imposed had the sentencing court
considered only the aggravating factors that would have unquestionably been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn. 11.) The Dunn
court found a middle ground between Flores and Lopez; it adopted the two-step approach
of Lopez, but held that only one of the identified aggravating factors need satisfy the
reasonable doubt standard, and any other factors relied upon could be analyzed under the
reasonable probability standard. (Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 405–410.)
       Common to all three approaches is first asking whether at least one aggravating
factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt or by stipulation, or would have
unquestionably been found true beyond a reasonable doubt. Here defendant pleaded no
contest to numerous offenses committed over multiple months, including five counts of
robbery, a violent felony. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9).) Those convictions support a finding
that he “has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1).) Although a single aggravating factor can support an
upper term (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728), and that factor was
permissibly considered under amended section 1170, it was not the only factor cited by
the trial court. Because we are unpersuaded by the reasoning of Flores, we will proceed
to consider the other factors relied upon, as called for in Lopez and Dunn. The Lopez
court would analyze the remaining factors under the prejudice standard of Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, while the Dunn court would apply the standard of People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). We need not decide that question here
                                             4
because we conclude the error was prejudicial under even the more lenient Watson
standard, as we will discuss below.
       The cited factors based on defendant’s criminal history were supported only by the
probation report. Although a trial court may consider a “defendant’s prior convictions in
determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the
prior convictions to a jury” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3)), that exception does not extend to the
contents of extrarecord materials such as probation reports. (See People v. Zabelle
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1114 (Zabelle).) We will not presume the existence of
extrarecord materials, nor that a factfinder would have found the contents of such
materials true beyond a reasonable doubt.
       The remaining factors relied on by the trial court were that defendant’s crimes
involved great violence, threat of great bodily harm, and callousness (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1)); the manner in which the crimes were carried out indicated planning
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8)); and defendant took advantage of a position of
trust or confidence to commit the offenses (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)).
Given the subjectivity inherent in those factors, it is difficult to “conclude with
confidence that, had the issue[s] been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed
the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” (People v. Sandoval (2007)
41 Cal.4th 825, 840.) Nor can we “be confident that the factual record would have been
the same had aggravating circumstances been charged and tried to the jury.” (Ibid.; see
People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 54 [“When a defendant pleads guilty or no
contest, … the record generally does not contain a full presentation of evidence
concerning the circumstances of the offense.”].) The result satisfies even the Watson
standard for prejudice, as we see a reasonable probability that a jury may not have found
those particular circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt.
       The Attorney General suggests that an additional aggravating factor was present
because consecutive sentences could have been imposed for the multiple identity theft
                                              5
convictions, even though defendant was sentenced concurrently. While that may be a
proper and less subjective factor in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(7)), it
was not among the factors specifically cited by the trial court and we will not speculate
about its possible effect.
       The final step in our prejudice analysis is to consider the likelihood that the trial
court would have imposed a lesser sentence had it considered only the single aggravating
factor supported by defendant’s no contest pleas. As Lopez explained, the question “is
whether a reviewing court can be certain, to the degree required by [Watson], that the
trial court would nevertheless have exercised its discretion to select the upper term if it
had recognized that it could permissibly rely on only a single one of the aggravating
factors[.]” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn. 11.) Reversal is appropriate
where a trial court relied on both permissible and impermissible factors, and did not
describe giving “particular weight to any of its listed aggravating circumstances” or
“indicate whether its decision to impose the upper term was (or was not) a close call.”
(Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1115; see People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216,
233 [appellate court must “reverse where it cannot determine whether the improper factor
was determinative for the sentencing court”].) We conclude that a lesser sentence was
reasonably probable had the trial court considered only the single aggravating factor. The
court selected the upper term based on numerous aggravating factors of unspecified
weight and it also identified early resolution as a mitigating factor.
       On remand, the prosecution may accept resentencing on the current record or seek
to prove any aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the full
resentencing rule, the trial court may then revisit all of its previous sentencing decisions
(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425), provided the new sentence is
consistent with both amended section 1170 and the plea agreement.

                                              6
                                 III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed. On remand, the prosecution may elect to proceed by
meeting the requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) regarding aggravating
circumstances or may elect to proceed on the current record. After the prosecution makes
that election, the trial court shall resentence defendant according to amended
section 1170.

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                               ____________________________________
                               Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________
Lie, J.

H048744
The People v. Bess