Court Opinion

ID: 9549379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:17:14.867966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:13.405674
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe that the protective order in the instant case was authorized under our Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the substance of that order was a permissible restriction on the nature of discovery sought. Accordingly, I dissent.
The rule provides:
26(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense including one or more of the following: * * * (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; * * *.
As the majority notes, the language of subsection (5) of our rule mirrors that of Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(c)(5) which was amended in 1970. The majority relies, however, on an interpretation of this passage with which I disagree. See 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2041, at 295-96. I believe that since the federal amendment, the trial court has complete discretion over the persons permitted to participate in, or tacitly witness, the deposition. See 4 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, paragraph 26.73 at 26-539 (2d ed. 1982).
The majority also appears to restrict the trial court’s discretion by elevating the interest of a party or his agent in attending depositions to the level of a constitutional right: “the right of representation is basic to our system of justice and extends to every facet of the judicial process.” I know of no authority for the proposition that there is a due process right to attend a *436deposition. Depositions are but one element of a panoply of discovery devices. If the trial court had precluded the use of all discovery techniques by the defendants, then due process might have been implicated. The instant protective order, however, did not foreclose the use of any discovery device; it merely limited the presence of defense counsel at each deposition session.
I can think of but two aspects of the adversary process that defendants will suffer by proceeding in the manner ordered by the trial court: first, counsel for two defendants will be unable to observe the demeanor of the deponent at the session conducted by counsel for the third defendant, and second, counsel cannot create, by their collective presence and participation, a discomforting atmosphere for the deponent. As to the first aspect, the counsel for the non-participating defendants may have, seriatim, their opportunity to observe the deponent’s demeanor when they ask their questions at their own sessions. As to the second aspect, there is no due process right to bring collective psychological pressures to bear on a deponent. And this is not a proceeding where a sixth amendment right to counsel or confrontation of adverse witnesses is implicated.
I believe that the trial court acted within his discretion in shaping the order to protect the sensibilities of the young deponent. He may also have felt it necessary to fashion the order to enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process, by reducing the element of intimidation, for the benefit of all parties. The accuracy of fact determination is a basic premise of the discovery process.