Court Opinion

ID: 9487090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:08:01.02866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:05.594915
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join all of Judge Noonan’s well-reasoned opinion except that part which affirms the conspiracy conviction. I agree with Judge Noonan that this case is an example of the government’s attempt to expand the conspiracy statute significantly. As he persuasively explains, it is our obligation to hold the government strictly to its burden of proof in conspiracy cases, for history shows that prosecutors have too often sought to extend the conspiracy statute far beyond its limits.
I cannot agree, however, that the government has demonstrated sufficient evidence of a second object of the charged conspiracy. As the majority rightly notes, “[t]he government says nothing on this appeal about the charged objective of Liceiardi conducting financial transactions to conceal unlawful activities.” Majority opinion at 1133. Rather, the government relies solely on the charged objective of mail fraud. To support this objective, it points only to Licciardi’s convictions on Counts 5 and 6. Yet these convictions are insufficient to show, as the government must, that the use of the mails was actually contemplated at the time Liceiardi entered into the conspiracy to sell mislabeled grapes. See United States v. Donahue, 539 F.2d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir.1976); see also United States v. Reed, 721 F.2d 1059, 1061 (6th Cir.1983) (holding that the government must show “an agreement to defraud plus knowledge that the use of the mails was reasonably foreseeable”). Both convictions involved mailings that occurred nearly two years after Liceiardi entered into the conspiracy; they do not demonstrate that he foresaw using the mails when the conspiracy began.
I note that the majority points to facts which might indicate that Liceiardi foresaw using the mails at the time he entered into the conspiracy. However, the government has chosen not to rely on those facts. On appeal, it has relied exclusively on the facts underlying Licciardi’s two mail fraud convictions. Because the government has not seen fit to assert any other facts as alternate grounds for upholding the conviction, I do not think that it is appropriate for us to do so. In my opinion, an appellate court should not substitute its theory of the evidence for the prosecution’s in an effort to uphold a conviction on a basis that the government elects not to argue. We should assume that the prosecution knows more about its case than we do, and that if it chooses not to rely on particular evidence or theories that might *1138seem appealing to us, it has a valid reason for that decision.* While usurping the role of the prosecutor may not result in a serious injustice in this case, such judicial eagerness to uphold convictions — whether in business fraud, environmental, or more routine criminal cases — can readily lead to the undermining of our essential liberties. The practice is one that is injudicious and undesirable at best. It is also one that I trust my colleagues will join me in discouraging in future cases.
Because Licciardi’s conviction on Count One cannot be sustained on the basis of either of the arguments asserted by the government, I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which affirms that conviction.

 I note that we are now issuing a second opinion in this case, as a result of the challenge the government filed to our first — and, I believe, correct — decision. Not only did the government not rely on the majority's argument on its behalf the first time it presented its case to us, but it didn't rely on it the second time, either.