Court Opinion

ID: 9687175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:17:49.690856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:24.674170
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
(concurring). Because sec. 752.41(2), Stats., gives published court of appeals opinions statewide precedential effect, we are required to follow those opinions unless we overrule them. The majority has overruled State v. Damon, 140 Wis. 2d 297, 409 N.W.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1987), but has not said it is doing so. This creates confusion in the law. When we overrule our previous decisions, we should do so directly.
In Damon, we concluded that prior exceptions to the jury instruction waiver rule had been abolished by sec. 805.13(3), Stats. We said:
Under the court’s analysis in C.E.W. and Shah, the enactment of sec. 805.13(3) in 1978 [sic]1 abolished the previous exceptions to the waiver rule regarding jury instructions. These exceptions include the "plain error” test enunciated in Clay-brooks in 1971, and the "form-substance” test enunciated in Lambert in 1976. In accord with that reasoning, the "compelling circumstances” test adopted in Brown v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 200, 214, 207 N.W.2d 602, 609, (1973), was also abolished with *835the adoption of sec. 805.13(3). Accordingly, we conclude that the plain error, form-substance, and compelling circumstances exceptions to the instructional waiver rule no longer exist. To conclude otherwise would render sec. 805.13(3) meaningless. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 304, 409 N.W.2d at 447.
The majority resurrects one of these exceptions. The term "integrity of the fact-finding process” is taken from State v. Baldwin, 101 Wis. 2d 441, 445-46, 304 N.W.2d 742, 746 (1981), and is not a test, but an example of "compelling circumstances.” This is made clear by the court’s use of that term:
It is true as a general rule that failure to object to a jury instruction in timely fashion constitutes a waiver of the objection. Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 534, 551, 230 N.W.2d 750 (1975); State v. Cydzik, 60 Wis. 2d 683, 694, 211 N.W.2d 241 (1973); State v. Schenk, 53 Wis. 2d 327, 333, 193 N.W.2d 26 (1972). "This rule, however, is not inflexible and admits of exceptions in cases of 'compelling circumstances.’” Brown v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 200, 214, 207 N.W.2d 602 (1973). The defendant’s challenge to the disjunctive jury instruction raises state and federal constitutional questions relative to the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict. These matters go directly to the integrity of the fact finding process, and the defendant’s failure to object at trial should not preclude him from raising them on appeal. (Footnote omitted.) Id.
Had the supreme court intended another exception to the waiver rule, it would have identified this new rule.
The supreme court has held that the "misstate the law or mislead the jury” test did not survive the adoption of sec. 805.13(3), Stats., State v. Shah, 134 Wis. 2d 246, 251-52 n. 4, 397 N.W.2d 492, 495 (1986), *836and the "plain error” test is applicable only to evidentiary rules in sec. 901.03(4), Stats. In Interest of C.E.W., 124 Wis. 2d 47, 55, 368 N.W.2d 47, 51-52 (1985). We held that the "compelling circumstances” exception to the waiver rule was abolished when sec. 805.13(3) was adopted. Damon, 140 Wis. 2d at 304, 409 N.W.2d at 447. "Integrity of the fact-finding process,” being an example of "compelling circumstances,” could not have survived sec. 805.13(3)’s adoption.
As we noted in Damon, exceptions to sec. 805.13(3), Stats., render that rule meaningless. The majority’s opinion destroys any incentive to bring instruction errors to the attention of the trial court. Instead of giving a trial court "an opportunity to correct the error,” Air Wisconsin, Inc. v. North Cent. Airlines, Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 301, 311, 296 N.W.2d 749, 753 (1980), we have now encouraged litigants to lie in the weeds if they conclude the trial court has omitted a jury instruction which later can be described as vital. The court of appeals should strongly encourage litigants to bring perceived error to the attention of the trial court, for only then can the error be corrected and an appeal avoided.
The majority fails to recognize that a strict application of the sec. 805.13(3), Stats., waiver rule does not leave this court helpless in the face of injustice. Air Wisconsin addressed a waived objection to an instruction through the use of sec. 751.06, Stats. Id. at 317, 296 N.W.2d at 756. Section 752.35, Stats., is identical to sec. 751.06 except that sec. 752.35 applies to the court of appeals. Also, some waivers may be considered under an ineffective assistance of counsel review. See State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 217, 395 N.W.2d 176, 181 (1986) (assistance of counsel must not fall below objective standard of reasonableness). My *837disagreement with the majority is not that it considers an issue not raised at trial but that it has amended sec. 805.13(3) by adding an exception to that rule.
The majority has not only resurrected a once-invalidated exception to sec. 805.13(3), Stats., but has concluded that the trial court’s failure to sua sponte give a specialized instruction "affects the integrity of the fact-finding process.” That term is unexplained and undefined. The "constitutional right to a fair trial” suggested as a definition by the majority, is a term so broad that it gives little guidance. There is no way that future litigants can know when or why a trial court’s failure to instruct a jury when not asked to do so "affects the integrity of the fact-finding process.” With no guidance, it will be a rare appellant who, having discovered a new or better instruction, will not conclude that the trial court’s failure to give that instruction affected the integrity of the fact-finding process. By accepting this notion, we repeal sec. 805.13(3), and require that we address future claims of instructional error whether or not the trial court was given the opportunity to avoid error by changing the instruction.
This case is a good example of why we should conclude that defendant has failed to preserve his issues. It would have been a simple matter for defendant to ask the trial court to include Rankin’s and Larsen’s names in the verdicts, and to instruct the jury on burden of proof and unanimity as to each charge. This would have been an unremarkable and probably unopposed request, and would probably have been granted. The potential appellate issue would have evaporated.

Section 805.13(3), Stats., was adopted by supreme court order on February 17,1975, and was made effective January 1,1976. 67 Wis. 2d 585, 703 (1975).