Court Opinion

ID: 9533607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:33:08.014806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:06.003918
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Presiding Judge, and NIX, Judge
(concurring).
 The inhibition against unlawful search and seizure in the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 30, was copied almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States as follows :
“The right of the people to be secure • in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches or seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, describing as particularly as may be the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.”
*273In Edwards v. State, 83 Okl.Cr. 340, 177 P.2d 143, 145, in relation to the foregoing constitutional provision, it was said:
“The right of search and seizure is in derogation of the guaranties of the Constitution of the United States, the State of Oklahoma, and against the invasion of the privacy of the people. This guaranty has long been extended to include automobiles. Suffice, it to say, that these guaranties were born of the pre-revolution days, when the ' homes of the people were invaded by the British Red Coats and searched with or without the slightest reason, provocation, or authority of law. It was from such experiences that the constitutional barriers against its wrongful use have been erected. But the necessities of the law and its effective enforcement required that officers of the law be extended the right to search and seize. This right, in proper cases and when properly authorized and executed, was found to be an essential adjunct to proper protection to the public against law violators. It was recognized as an essential instrument in the detection and suppression of crime, and in the disclosure and seizure of contraband and the instruments of crime.
“The people recognized that in granting the right to search and .seize, they were doing so in derogation of one of their most sacred rights. To prevent abuses, its use was permitted under strict prescriptions of law. The barriers, which the people erected to prevent its misuse, are, the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, * * * ” and, “Article 2, section 30, of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma,
“These provisions, this court has held, secure the individual in his person, his 'home, and his property, from.. invasion through unbridled and unre-'. strained executive or administrative will. Gore v. State, 24 Okl.Cr. 394, 218 P. 545; Best v. State, 32 Okl.Cr. 89, 240 P. 159; Keith v. State, 30 Okl. Cr. 168, 235 P. 631; State v. Coburn, 68 Okl.Cr. 67, 95 P.2d 670.
“Moreover, it has also been held that the protection against unlawful search and seizure extends to all equally, those justly suspected or accused, as well as to the innocent. Wallace v. State, 42 Okl.Cr. 143, 275 P. 354.
“The constitutional provisions in the Bill of Rights do not prevent all searches and seizures but only those that are unreasonable and in violation of law. However, it is not permissible under such provisions to whittle away the substantial guaranties, limiting the use of a search warrant,- and, thereby, permit an abuse of its use. Abbott v. State, 30 Okl.Cr.. 98, 235 P. 550. To prevent the abuse of the right to search and seize, the provisions, under which the right is created, must be strictly construed. However, it is1 not to be so strictly construed as to thwart the reasonable and proper efforts of officers of the law to detect and prevent crime. These principles apply to searches made with or without -a warrant, and to automobiles, as well as private dwellings. Strong v. State, 42 Okl.Cr. 114, 274 P. 890; Perry v. State, 72 Okl. Cr. 149, 114 P.2d 185.”
Griffin v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 421, 246 P.2d 424, 426, which is relied on by the-state for sustaining the reserved question, is, as we realized when it was written, in the twilight zone. In that case, however, positive allegations were contained therein, which buttressed the allegations in the printed portion of the affidavit. The allegations in the Griffin case are: “I know that Winnie Johnson and John Doe are delivering whiskey on the streets and alleys in the City of Tulsa in this • automobile. I know that Winnie Johnson retails whiskey.” The allegations cannot strictly be denominated ultimate conclusions, for they are allegations of positive facts in support of-the preceding detail of facts therein- set forth. These allegations removed the Griffin case from the realm of speculation and suspi*274cion. They placed the automobile definitely in the service of a known whiskey dealer who was, therein, engaged in violating the prohibition act. There was, then, no exploratory search, in the Griffin case, based upon mere suspicion within the condemnation of O’Dell v. State, 80 Okl.Cr. 194, 158 P.2d 180. Nevertheless, in the Griffin case, it would have been better to have detailed more primary basic facts which were undoubtedly available.
The vice of the affidavit herein involved is that under its naked allegation, the deletion of the description of the automobile herein involved, and the insertion of the description of the automobile of any law abiding citizen might subject him to an unlawful search and seizure on nothing more than suspicion for the purpose of persecution, harassment, or embarrassment. Every automobile would therefore become liable to search and seizure on the basis of sheer suspicion.
The affidavit at bar could have so easily been removed from the realm of doubt, for, the owner of the automobile was a known bootlegger, the automobile was undoubtedly registered in his name, no doubt he had been observed making deliveries in and about Tulsa under circumstances and conditions which might have been readily detailed, which would have brought the case within the purview of Baker v. State, 28 Okl.Cr. 408, 231 P. 320, wherein this Court said:
“There are three forms of affidavits for search warrants more or less prevalent.
“(1) Affidavits on mere information or belief.
“(2) Affidavits importing positive knowledge of the possession of the instruments or things used or obtained in violating the law.
“(3) Affidavits setting out facts showing probable cause for a belief that the law has been violated by the accused and facts showing probable cause for believing that the accused is in possession of the instruments used in its violation or of the products of its violation.
“Method numbered 1 is always bad. Method numbered 2 may be employed where the affiant can truthfully state of his own personal knowledge that the law has been violated and that the accused is in possession of the physical evidence demonstrating that fact. Method numbered 3 is sufficient in every case, and is therefore the safer method.”
In the body of the opinion, 231 P. at page 321, it was further said:
“The affiant should swear to facts showing probable cause for his belief. That does not mean that the affiant must know absolutely that the person is a thief, or has liquor in his possession, or is guilty of some other offense. To make an affidavit based on positive knowledge of guilt would in many instances be impossible, but the affidavit should state facts upon which the belief is founded. The records of this court have demonstrated, over and over again, that most sheriffs and peace officers (also some county attorneys) do not comprehend the true purpose and requisite features of an affidavit for a search warrant.”
Judge Bessey follows this observation with a specific example of how the affidavit in the Balter case could have been drawn by detailing facts which would have given it sufficiency to meet the law.
As Judge Powell so aptly said, the Griffin case shows the extent this Court will go in upholding the officers of the law. But, there must be a limit and the limit was reached in the Griffin case. Only the legislature has the power to alter the situation, and even it is limited by the constitutional inhibitions.
So long as the historical basis and the purpose of the constitutional inhibitions are understood and applied, we shall be reasonably free from unlawful police intrusion. That is, so long as the magistrates to whom application is made for the is*275suance of a search warrant are required by law to issue the warrant only on a complaint in writing executed under oath detailing the facts tending to establish probable cause upon which the warrant is sought. He should be more than a mere automaton for the officer seeking the search warrant. Unless the magistrate is of the opinion that sufficient facts have been detailed to establish probable cause, the search warrant should not be issued, 22 O. S.1951 § 1224, 37 O.S.1951 § 84, and that is a matter to be determined within his sound judicial discretion.
This case has caused us great concern and it is only after long deliberation that we have concluded to concur. We were torn between our desire to uphold the enforcement of the law by the government on the one hand, and the protection of the individual rights of the people on the other. We have resolved the issue in favor of the rights of the citizen and his great heritage, purchased at the price of blood to be secure in his person, his home, his papers, and his effects against unlawful searches and seizures. The fact that an occasional law violator might benefit is of little consequence when measured by the rights of those citizens who have violated no law to be free from the ravages of police intrusion that might become unrestrained. This must be so, lest America degenerate into a police state so akin to the characterization so aptly made: “Whether it be * * * Communist Russia, or their lesser followers, the result is the same. Every day they repudiate every principle of the Bill of Rights. * * * They are subject to searches and seizures by spies and inquisitors who haunt the land. * * * Whatever these governments are, they have one common denominator — the citizen has no assured rights.”
One of the most certain deterrents to the establishment of a totalitarian government in America is to prevent the destruction of the safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures. By the Constitution and vitalizing statutes, individual rights are-assured under limitations which say to the government, “This far you shall go but no farther.” This is the foundation underlying citizenship in this country which gives it substance and keeps it from degenerating into a thing of specious and speculative value. But, to be efficacious, these constitutional and statutory rights must be enforced.
On this premise, we concur.