Court Opinion

ID: 9811907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:32:43.965434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:40.310554
License: Public Domain

*414Stacy, C. J.,
dissenting: On 20 February, 1935, the General Assembly enacted a statute, ch. 37, Public Laws 1935, prohibiting the manufacture, sale, possession, and use of certain slot machines, gambling apparatus and devices, as therein defined, which by later amendment, ch. 85, was to become effective 1 May, 1935,'“it being the purpose of this amendment to permit the present owner and/or operators of the said machines until May first, one thousand nine hundred thirty-five, to dispose of the said machines.”
As originally adopted, the possession of defendant’s slot machine, for use or lease, was undoubtedly made unlawful by the terms of this act. The statute prohibited the possession for use of any and all such slot machines.
However, on 3 May, 1935, the above act was rewritten and reenacted in substantially different form, ch. 282, Public Laws 1935, and all laws and clauses of laws in conflict therewith were repealed. The purpose of this latter statute, as expressed in its title, is “to regulate the operation of certain coin operated games, devices, and apparatus,” etc. In the rewritten act, the prohibition or condemnation of the statute is limited to any slot machine, apparatus, or device, the operation of which is dependent upon some element of chance, or unpredictable outcome, and “not dependent in whole or in part upon skill and practice of the operator.” S. v. Gupton, 30 N. C., 271.
In addition to the change in title, which may be called in aid of construction, the first section of the rewritten act provides that it shall be unlawful to manufacture, sell, rent, lease, or operate any slot machine or device “except as hereinafter defined.” Section 3 then defines the slot machines “prohibited by the provisions of this act . . . except as herein permittedFollowing this exception is the language “or the outcome of such operation is not dependent in whole or in part upon skill and practice of the operator.”
It is further provided in section 4 of the rewritten act that “No person who has charge of the supervision of such coin operated devices shall permit any person under the age of eighteen (18) years to engage in the operation of such device unless such person be accompanied by a parent or other person in loco parentis who, being present, sanctions such play.”
This section 4 is new and is not to be found in ch. 37 at all. Indeed, it could have no place in a prohibitory statute, while it is quite in keeping with a permissive or regulatory one.
It seems clear that what the General Assembly intended to do was to recede from its position of absolute prohibition declared in ch. 37, and to permit the operation of some “such coin operated devices” under supervision and regulation. Yet, the Court says if any element of *415chance be present, or the outcome is unpredictable to the operator, the question of skill is not material. If this be the correct interpretation, then nothing was accomplished by the enactment of ch. 282, for the same thing had already been done in ch. 31, the only difference being that in the first act the purpose is clearly expressed, whereas in the second, if prohibition were also its purpose, a more inappropriate choice of language to express the legislative intent could hardly have been selected. S. v. Burnett, 173 N. C., 750, 91 S. E., 597. It is not to be supposed the lawmakers intended to execute a circular performance or to engage in a futile gesture. Garrison v. R. R., 150 N. C., 575, 64 S. E., 578.
Moreover, there is reason in the method pursued by the General Assembly in changing the statute from one of prohibition to one of regulation. It is not unlawful to engage in games of skill, or those wholly dependent upon “skill and practice of the operator.” They are neither immoral nor inherently wrong. Hence, it may have been regarded as an arbitrary discrimination to say that coin operated devices could not be kept and used for such purpose. S. v. Williams, 146 N. C., 618, 61 S. E., 61; Nance v. R. R., 149 N. C., 366. For example, it may be doubted whether the General Assembly could validly prohibit the possession for use of coin operated scales, music boxes, vending-machines, etc., so long as the purposes accomplished by them are lawful. In other words, given a lawful end, to wit, a game of skill, it may be doubted whether the possession of innocent means for the accomplishment of that end alone, could be made unlawful under our constitutional system. S. v. Brockwell, 209 N. C., 209. At any rate, this is what the General Assembly was trying to avoid, and investments have been retained on the strength of the effort thus made to relax the rigors of the prohibitory statutes on the subject. Conversely, if the General Assembly meant nothing by the enactment of ch. 282, as indicated by the present holding, then a false hope has been held out to those who have moneys invested in these properties. This was not intended by the General Assmbly, as witness ch. 85 of the same session.
However much our predilections may incline us to the prohibitive view, there is no justification for invading the legislative field. Wake County v. Faison, 204 N. C., 55, 167 S. E., 391; Person v. Doughton, 186 N. C., 723, 120 S. E., 481; Moore v. Jones, 76 N. C., 187. “It is ours to construe .the laws and not to make them” — Hoke, J., in S. v. Barksdale, 181 N. C., 621, 107 S. E., 505. “It is in the province of the lawmaking power to change or modify the statute, not ours” — Clarkson, J., in Dill-Cramer-Truitt Corp. v. Downs, 201 N. C., 478, 160 S. E., 492. The intention of the lawmaking body is not to be defeated by interpretation. Freight Discrimination Cases, 95 N. C., 434.
*416To interpret ch. 282 as a prohibitory statute, rather than a regulatory one, is to disregard its title, to overlook the expression “except as herein permitted,” and to strike out section 4 altogether. This strips the act of its pronounced features, sacrifices the spirit for the letter, and leaves the law as it was before its passage. Another case in which “the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.” 2 Cor., 3 :6.
There is no debate over the proposition that the heart of a statute is the intention of the lawmaking body (Trust Co. v. Hood, Comr., 206 N. C., 268, 173 S. E., 601), and that when not clearly expressed, this is to be ascertained by judicial interpretation. Abernethy v. Comrs., 169 N. C., 631, 86 S. E., 577; Fortune v. Comrs., 140 N. C., 322, 52 S. E., 950. Words obviously omitted may be interpolated to make the sense complete, but they are never to be added or deleted-so as to defeat or thwart the legislative will. Freight Discrimination Cases, supra. “It is fully established that where a literal interpretation of the language of a statute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded” — Hoke, J., in S. v. Barksdale, supra.
Speaking to the subject in S. v. Earnhardt, 170 N. C., 725, 86 S. E., 960, Walker, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, animadverted as follows:
“It is common learning that a statute must be so construed as to give effect to the presumed and reasonably probable intention of the Legislature, and so as to effectuate that intention and the object for which it was passed. Where it is clearly worded, so that it is free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded in favor of a mere presumption as to what policy was intended to be declared (Lewis v. U. S., 92 U. S., 618; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S., 662; B. R. Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S., 1); but where it admits of more than one construction, or is doubtful of meaning, uncertain, or ambiguous, it is not to be construed only by its exact language, but by its apparent general purpose, that meaning being adopted which will best serve to execute the design and purpose of the act, for a thing within the intention is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter,” citing as authority for the position: Wood v. U. S., 16 Peters, 342; Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S., 242; Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall., 374; Fortune v. Comrs., 140 N. C., 322; McLeod v. Comrs., 148 N. C., 85.
Under a proper interpretation of the statute, the evidence elicited on cross-examination from the State’s witness was admissible and the directed verdict erroneous. S. v. Ellis, ante, 166.
CONNOR, J., concurs in dissent.