Court Opinion

ID: 9836939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:34.814225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.379360
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge, with whom CRAWFORD, Judge,
joins (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I disagree with the majority’s decision to order further factfinding on Issue I. The issue was raised at trial and fully litigated. The military judge made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. There is no need for more factfinding on this issue.
By remanding the issue, the majority suggests that the military judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law, as well as the decision of the court below, are incorrect. To overturn the military judge’s ruling and the decision of the court below, without explanation or citation of authority, undermines the careful analytical framework recently adopted by this Court in United States v. Upshaw, 49 MJ 111 (1998), and United States v. Lewis, 46 MJ 338 (1997).
The alleged court packing arose from the actions of Colonel (Col) Murray, the chief of staff who was temporarily in command. In my view, the commanding general, Major General (MajGen) Howard, remedied any attempted court packing when he returned to his command and selected a new panel. Two of the officers initially appointed by Col Murray and then reappointed by MajGen Howard, Col Swords and Lieutenant Colonel Stevens, were not challenged for cause as being biased or improperly selected. In my view, any argument that the officers selected by MajGen Howard were tainted by the chief of staffs action rings hollow in the absence of any effort to challenge them.
I also disagree with the majority’s decision to remand Issue II. Because the issue was not raised at trial, it was waived unless it rises to the level of plain error. See United States v. Hamilton, 41 MJ 32 (CMA 1994).
In my view, any alleged unlawful command influence could have affected only Col Christy’s reconsideration of his decision to send the case to a special court-martial. Ap-> pellant asserts that Col Christy reconsidered because of unlawful command influence exercised by Col Murray. Col Christy unequivocally asserts that “[tjhere was absolutely no command influence associated with [his] decision.” He convened an Article 32 investigation of the original charge and specification, as well as three additional specifications. The investigating officer recommended that the allegation of obstructing justice be dismissed but that the remaining charge and specifications be referred to a general court-martial.
Before the Article 32 investigation was completed, Col Christy had been reassigned and replaced. Col March, his successor, forwarded the charges with a recommendation for trial by general court-martial. There is no evidence or allegation that Col March was subjected to unlawful command influence. There is no allegation and no evidence that MajGen Howard’s decision to refer the case to a general court-martial was tainted by unlawful command influence.
In my view, Col Christy’s decision to withdraw the charges from a special court-martial, prefer additional charges, and order an Article 32 investigation was part of the pre-ferral and forwarding process, not the referral. Accordingly, the waiver rule announced by this Court in United States v. Hamilton, supra, applies.
Under a plain-error analysis, appellant has the initial burden of persuading us that an error rises to the level of plain error. See United States v. Powell, 49 MJ 460, 464-65 (1998). In my view, appellant has not carried that burden.
I do not believe that a remand is necessary to determine if there was plain error. The issue can be resolved by assuming that Col Murray made the comments attributed to him, and that the comments were made on or about May 1, 1995, the date estimated by Maj Greene.
Col Murray was not in command when the statements allegedly were made. Col Murray was a staff officer, and Col Christy was a senior commander. Thus, Col Murray was not in Col Christy’s chain of command. Both Col Murray and Col Christy held the same *39military grade. There is nothing in the record showing that Col Murray participated in rating Col Christy’s performance. The appellate record shows only that Col Murray and Col Christy had known each other “for many years.” See United States v. Villareal, 52 MJ 27 (1999) (no unlawful command influence where commander sought out advice of “old shipmate” who was temporarily in command).
The record shows that Col Christy reconsidered his decision after his military justice officer pointed out the contradictions in his proposed disposition. Col Christy had directed referral to a special court-martial but had also checked the box on the preprinted form stating that “confinement is authorized.” Maj Niesen, the “military justice officer,” pointed out that a special court-martial may not impose confinement on a warrant officer. The record also demonstrates that, after COL Christy reconsidered his original decision, two additional fraternization offenses and an obstruction of justice offense were preferred. The record shows that an independent Article 32 investigating officer investigated all the charges and recommended trial by general court-martial. The charge of obstructing justice was dismissed in accordance with the recommendation of the Article 32 investigating officer. The record shows that Col Christy had departed the command by the time his successor, Col March, forwarded the Article 32 investigation and recommended trial by general court-martial. Finally, the record shows that MajGen Howard, an officer superior to the chief of staff, made the decision to refer the three fraternization offenses to a general court-martial. On this record, I do not find plain error.
With respect to Issue III, I agree that appellant’s assertions are sufficient to require explanation by defense counsel. See United States v. Lewis, 42 MJ 1, 6 (1995). In my view, however, a factfinding hearing is premature. Until defense counsel files an affidavit addressing appellant’s assertions, this Court cannot determine if there are controverted questions of fact requiring a factfinding hearing. See United States v. Ginn, 47 MJ 236 (1997).