Court Opinion

ID: 9882058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 21:20:44.521236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:38.853682
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
      in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                 2023 IL App (3d) 230035-U

                            Order filed October 4, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE

                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                      THIRD DISTRICT

                                              2023

MARCELA ANDRADE, as Independent                )  Appeal from the Circuit Court
Administrator of the Estate of VICTOR          )  of the 21st Judicial Circuit,
ANDRADE, deceased, and MIGUEL                  )  Kankakee County, Illinois,
ANDRADE, and ADRIANNA GLASS, as                 )
Independent Administrator of the Estate of      )
ANDRE GLASS, deceased,                         )
                                               )
       Plaintiff-Appellants,                   )
                                               )
       v.                                      )  Appeal No. 3-23-0035
                                               )  Circuit No. 22-LA-58
                                               )
CITY OF KANKAKEE, A Municipal                  )
Corporation, and Unknown City of Kankakee )
Police Officers, Individually and as Agents of )
CITY OF KANKAKEE,                               )
and the KANKAKEE COUNTY SHERIFF,                )
and Unknown Kankakee County Sheriff             )
Officers, Individually and as Agents of         ) Honorable
KANKAKEE COUNTY SHERIFF,                       )  Lindsay A. Parkhurst,
                                               )  Judge, Presiding.
       Defendant-Appellees.                    )
____________________________________________________________________________

      JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
      Justices Hettel and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice
                  pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure, given that section 4-102
                  absolute immunity under the Tort Immunity Act applied to the allegations. The
                  trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint
                  where plaintiffs did not propose amendments that would cure the defect in the
                  pleadings. Affirmed.

¶2          Plaintiffs-Appellants, Victor Andrade, Miguel Andrade, and Andre Glass (with Victor and

     Andre being represented by the administrators of their estates), were victims of a shooting that

     occurred in close proximity to the Kankakee County courthouse.            They filed a four-count

     complaint against defendants-appellees, the City of Kankakee (and its police officers, individually

     and as agents) and the Kankakee County Sheriff (and its sheriff officers, individually and as

     agents), claiming: (1) wrongful death (willful and wanton conduct) as to Victor; (2) negligent

     infliction of emotional distress (willful and wanton conduct) as to Miguel; (3) negligence (willful

     and wanton conduct) as to Andre; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress (willful and

     wanton conduct) as to Andre. Defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to section

     2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code). 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020). The trial court

     dismissed the complaint with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) (pertaining to other

     affirmative matters defeating a plaintiff’s claim), because it determined that section 4-102 of the

     Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act)

     conferred defendants with absolute immunity from plaintiffs’ claims. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9)

     (West 2020); 745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2020) (conferring absolute immunity for the failure to

     provide adequate police protection or service). Plaintiffs appeal the section 2-619(a)(9) dismissal.

     In the alternative, plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have granted their first request for

     leave to amend their complaint to plead facts that would implicate section 2-202 qualified

     immunity. 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2020) (assigning liability to willful and wanton acts or

                                                      2
     omissions in the execution or enforcement of any law). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the

     dismissal with prejudice.

¶3                                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶4            The August 26, 2022, complaint filed by plaintiffs alleged the following. On August 25 or

     August 26, 2021, plaintiffs notified one or more Kankakee police officers of “a specific threatened

     homicide” that would take place August 26, 2021, at the courthouse in retaliation for Victor’s

     upcoming court appearance. A Kankakee police officer met with Victor and discussed the

     threatened homicide, as well as an open homicide case.                          The Kankakee police officer

     “communicated information regarding these specific threats to other local authorities[.]” On

     August 26, 2021, immediately following his court appearance, Victor was “ambushed, shot

     multiple times, and killed” at or near Merchant Street and Harrison Avenue in Kankakee. Victor’s

     cousin Miguel, who was mere feet away from Victor, was shot and wounded. Andre was also

     leaving the courthouse at the time of the shooting and was also shot and wounded.

¶5            Plaintiffs alleged as to each of the four counts set forth above that defendants breached

     their duty to refrain from engaging in willful and wanton conduct while plaintiffs and the location

     of the shooting were under their control in that defendants: (1) failed to take any measures to

     prevent the shooting when it knew (or should have known) when and where the shooting was

     likely to occur, as well as the identity of the shooter and the intended target (subparagraphs (a)

     through (e))1; (2) failed to place plaintiffs, members of the public attending court, and the

     courthouse under additional protection or surveillance given the threat (subparagraphs (f) and (g));

     (3) failed to contact the requisite authorities to move or cancel plaintiffs’ and other persons’

              1
                  Though not entirely clear from the complaint, it is strongly implied that Victor and possibly Miguel were

     the intended targets.

                                                                3
     mandatory court appearance given the threat (subparagraph (h)); and (4) were otherwise willful

     and wanton in their actions toward preventing a threatened homicide and “enforcing the criminal

     code in general” after creating a special relationship with plaintiffs (subparagraphs (i) and (j)).

¶6          On October 24, 2022, defendants filed a section 2-619.1 combined motion to dismiss. 735

     ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020). As to section 2-615, which challenges the legal sufficiency of the

     complaint, defendants argued that the allegations in the complaint were conclusory. 735 ILCS

     5/2-615 (West 2020). Further, what facts were pled—that the shooting occurred at the intersection

     of Merchant Street and Harrison Avenue—undermined the allegation of control over plaintiffs

     (and therefore proximate cause as to plaintiffs’ injuries) as that location is outside the courthouse.

¶7          As to section 2-619(a)(9), which admits the legal sufficiency of the claim but asserts an

     affirmative defense or other matter to defeat the claim, defendants argued that section 4-102 of the

     Tort Immunity Act barred plaintiffs’ claims. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2020); 745 ILCS 10/4-

     102 (West 2020). Defendants noted that section 4-102 provides absolute immunity in situations

     where no police protection is provided or where inadequate police protection is provided. 745

     ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2020); Schultz v. St. Clair County, 2022 IL 126856, ¶¶ 21-22. There are no

     exceptions for willful and wanton conduct (DeSmet ex rel. Estate of Hays v. County of Rock Island,

     219 Ill. 2d 497, 515 (2006)), nor is there a special duty exception. Coleman v. East Joliet Fire

     Protection District, 2016 IL 117952, ¶¶ 60-61; Wisnasky v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2020 IL

     App (5th) 170418, ¶ 49. Defendants contended that plaintiffs’ own complaint makes clear that the

     basis of their lawsuit is that defendants “did not take any measures to prevent the shooting,” a

     claim which falls squarely within section 4-102.

¶8          On November 29, 2022, plaintiffs responded to the motion to dismiss. As to section 2-615,

     plaintiffs argued that they had pled facts sufficient to establish that section 2-202 of the Tort

                                                       4
       Immunity Act, not section 4-102, applied. Section 2-202 allows for liability for acts or omissions

       in the execution or enforcement of a law, provided such acts or omissions constitute willful and

       wanton conduct. 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2020). Plaintiffs noted that the complaint generally

       alleged that co-defendant the City of Kankakee (and its police) were executing the law at all times

       relevant—the police met with Victor prior to the shooting to discuss the threat and open homicide

       case, and, at the time of the shooting, the police were investigating the same and were trying to

       locate the shooter. The complaint also generally alleged that co-defendant the Kankakee Sheriff

       (and its officers) were executing the law at all times relevant—the Sheriff’s personnel were

       involved in maintaining courthouse security at the time of the shooting. 55 ILCS 5/3-6023 (West

       2020) (Each sheriff shall *** maintain the security of the courthouse.) According to plaintiffs, a

       reasonable fact finder could understand these allegations to mean the use of x-ray machines, metal

       detectors, one-way entrance/exits, and banning weapons. From this, a fact finder could further

       find that it was more likely true than not that the Sheriff was both executing the law and had “a

       degree of control” over the adjacent lawn at the time of the shooting. In the event that these facts

       were insufficient to establish a cause of action for wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional

       distress, and negligence (willful and wanton conduct) and to implicate section 2-202 qualified

       immunity, plaintiffs sought leave to amend.

¶9            As to section 2-619(a)(9), plaintiffs argued that section 4-102 did not apply to defeat their

       claim, because, for the reasons previously argued, section 2-202 applied to the facts pled.

¶ 10          On December 9, 2022, defendants replied. As to section 2-615, defendants argued again

       that the complaint’s allegations were conclusory. As to section 2-619, defendants argued that,

       even if the allegations in the complaint were “well pled and true, they point to nothing more than

       the inadequacy of police protection or service provided to Victor, Miguel, and Andre.” Defendants

                                                         5
       continued that allegations of inadequate police protection plainly invoked section 4-102 of the Tort

       Immunity Act, and no amount of creative pleading could make the case about anything else.

¶ 11          On December 19, 2022, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to

       section 2-619(a)(9). It explained that, even if it accepted the facts as well-pled as opposed to

       conclusory, those facts fit squarely within a section 4-102 framework, conferring absolute

       immunity to defendants. The trial court denied leave to amend the complaint. The court explained

       that it gave plaintiffs the “benefit of the doubt” that they had adequately pled the elements of their

       claims, such as duty and willful and wanton conduct. However, it continued, plaintiffs maintained

       that defendants’ protection was absent or inadequate and, in so doing, plaintiffs continued to

       invoke defendants’ section 4-102 absolute immunity. Therefore, no amendment could bring the

       allegations outside the scope of section 4-102. This appeal followed.

¶ 12                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13          Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their original complaint with prejudice.

       Initially, we consider whether the trial court correctly dismissed the original complaint pursuant

       to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code because section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act provided

       defendants with absolute immunity against plaintiffs’ claims. Determining that it did, we next

       consider the gravamen of plaintiffs’ appeal, whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying

       plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to plead facts sufficient implicate section 2-202 qualified

       immunity as opposed to section 4-102 absolute immunity.

¶ 14                    A. Section 619(a)(9) Dismissal Due to Section 4-102 Absolute Immunity

¶ 15          Under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code, the moving party admits the legal sufficiency of

       the complaint but asserts an affirmative defense or “other affirmative matter avoiding the legal

       effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2020); Van Meter v. Darien Park

                                                         6
       District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367 (2003). An affirmative matter in the context of a section 2-619(a)(9)

       motion is something in the nature of a defense that negates the cause of action completely. Id. at

       367. “Immunity under the [Tort Immunity] Act is an affirmative matter properly raised in a section

       2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss.” Id. When the trial court rules on a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to

       dismiss, it must consider the pleadings and supporting documents in a light most favorable to the

       non-movant. Id. at 367-68. Section 2-619(a)(9) dismissals are reviewed de novo. Lacey v. Village

       of Palatine, 232 Ill. 2d 349, 359 (2009).

¶ 16          The Tort Immunity Act protects local public entities and public employees from liability

       arising from the operation of government. Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196

       Ill. 2d 484, 490 (2001). Immunity safeguards public funds for their intended purposes, rather than

       the payment of certain damages. Id.         Section 4-102 provides that a public entity or public

       employee enjoys absolute immunity for a failure to provide police protection or a failure to prevent

       the commission of a crime:

                      “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish

              a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection

              service is provided, for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to

              prevent the commission of crimes, failure to detect or solve crimes, and failure to identify

              or apprehend criminals. This immunity is not waived by a contract for private security

              service, but cannot be transferred to any non-public entity or employee.” 745 ILCS 10/4-

              102 (West 2020).

¶ 17          Section 4-102 does not contain any exceptions and absolutely immunizes local public

       entities and their employees for both negligent and willful and wanton conduct in failing to protect

       or in providing inadequate police protection services. DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 515. Further, section

                                                        7
       4-102 is broad in its scope and has been applied in a wide range of circumstances. See, e.g., Lacey,

       232 Ill. 2d at 368 (section 4-102 absolute immunity applied to a claim that police failed to protect

       a woman experiencing domestic abuse who was later murdered by her abuser); Wisnasky, 2020 IL

       App (5th) 170418, ¶ 50 (section 4-102 absolute immunity applied to the claim brought by estate

       of a family killed at a railroad crossing that the municipality provided inadequate crowd control

       and traffic management); Wright-Young v. Chicago State University, 2019 IL App (1st) 181073, ¶

       65 (section 4-102 absolute immunity applied to allegations that the school board failed to

       implement appropriate security in light of increased gang violence); Albert v. Board of Education

       of City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 123544, ¶ 55 (section 4-102 absolute immunity applied to

       alleged omissions of the school board to prevent a fight amongst students that occurred on the way

       home from school); Prough v. Madison County, 2013 IL App (5th) 110146, ¶ 26 (section 4-102

       absolute immunity applied to a claim that the sheriff’s department released a man in custody and

       the man subsequently murdered his father); Fender v. Town of Cicero, 347 Ill. App. 3d 46, 53

       (2004) (section 4-102 absolute immunity applied to a claim that the defendants failed to rescue

       victims of a residential fire).

¶ 18           We find Wright-Young instructive because, as here, it involves a public entity’s alleged

       failure to perform a police protection service given a known risk or threat of increased violence.

       In Wright-Young, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against, inter alia, the board of

       education, when her 17-year-old son was shot at a high school basketball game. Wright-Young,

       2019 IL App (1st) 181073, ¶ 1. The complaint alleged that the board was aware of increased

       violence at other recent sporting events. Id. ¶ 6. It continued that the board failed to “ ‘implement

       an appropriate security plan for the safety of the students given the elevated risks for violence at

       the event,’ to ‘assign or maintain posts within the arena,’ to ‘keep entrances and exits clear of

                                                        8
       crowds during and immediately after the game,’ to prevent fans from ‘engag[ing] in multiple fights

       inside the arena and outside [its] entrances,’ and to ‘prevent fans from exiting the arena in a

       disorderly manner.’ ” Id. ¶ 64. The appellate court determined that these allegations describe

       police protection services, for which section 4-102 absolute immunity applies. Id. ¶ 65.

¶ 19          Here, plaintiffs’ claims are similar to those pled in Wright-Young. The plaintiffs in Wright-

       Young alleged that the public entity knew that the likelihood of violence on the day in question

       was high yet did not take adequate measures to prevent the ensuing harm. Similarly, the instant

       plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to take any measures to prevent the shooting when they

       knew (or should have known) when and where the shooting was likely to occur, as well as the

       identity of the shooter and the intended target, “failed to place plaintiffs, members of the public

       attending court, and the courthouse under additional protection or surveillance given the threat,”

       and failed to “prevent a threatened homicide.” Indeed, the allegations contained in subparagraphs

       (a) through (j) use the express terms “failure to prevent” and “failure to protect” no less than eight

       times. As in Wright-Young these allegations plainly describe police protection services, for which

       section 4-102 absolute immunity applies. As such, the existing complaint cannot survive a section

       2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss.

¶ 20                        B. Request to Amend to Plead Facts Sufficient to Implicate

                                        Section 2-202 Qualified Immunity

¶ 21          We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to

       amend the existing complaint. In Illinois, trial courts are encouraged to freely and liberally allow

       the amendment of pleadings so that a litigant can completely present its cause of action. Senese v.

       Climatemp, Inc., 222 Ill. App. 3d 302, 320 (1991). “The decision to deny a request to amend is a

       matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. The court should consider: (1) whether

                                                         9
       the proposed amendment would cure the defect in the pleading; (2) whether other parties would

       be prejudiced or surprised by the proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is

       timely; and (4) whether the party seeking to amend had other opportunities to do so.        Winfrey v.

       Chicago Park District, 274 Ill. App. 3d 939, 947 (1995). “Before a trial judge can be found to

       have abused his discretion in denying a party leave to amend, it must be clear from the record that

       sufficient reasons or facts were presented to the trial judge and that his exercise of discretion is

       clearly contrary to the facts.” Senese, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 321.

¶ 22          Here, in denying leave to amend, the trial court was required to balance competing

       principles. On the one hand, Illinois encourages the liberal amendment of pleadings, this was

       plaintiffs’ first request, and there would likely be little prejudice or surprise given the request was

       made before discovery had begun. On the other hand, plaintiffs never made clear before the trial

       court what facts, exactly, they would plead to cure the defect in the pleading. To the contrary, they

       argued before the trial court in a manner that reinforced the court’s determination that plaintiffs

       would continue to proffer facts that called for an application of section 4-102 absolute immunity:

              “[T]he police were executing the law at the time of the shooting; specifically, for searching

              for their suspect and/or the shooter who they were told where and when he would be, [and]

              they were willful and wanton because they did not correctly stop this person from the

              shooting.”

       In this statement, plaintiffs perfunctorily reference the execution of the law yet substantively set

       forth facts involving the failure to prevent a crime and plainly implicate section 4-102 absolute

       immunity.

¶ 23          Plaintiffs did not file a motion to reconsider with the trial court, attaching a proposed

       amended complaint alleging facts to implicate section 2-202. Plaintiffs acknowledged at oral

                                                         10
       argument on appeal that attaching a proposed amended complaint to a motion to reconsider would

       have been an appropriate procedure, but explained that they had instead discussed the nature of

       the proposed amendments with the trial court at the hearing. The record, however, discloses only

       the perfunctory references indicated supra ¶ 22. Nor do plaintiffs’ briefs on appeal set forth

       proposed facts implicating section 2-202. When asked at oral argument what new facts they would

       plead if given the opportunity to amend, plaintiffs answered that: (1) the day before the shooting,

       in the course of investigating the pending threat and open homicide case, the police defendants

       instructed Victor to attend court; and (2) on the day of the shooting, armed sheriff defendants

       allowed plaintiffs to exit the courthouse building and shooting began immediately upon plaintiffs’

       exit.

¶ 24           According to plaintiffs, these facts would implicate section 2-202 qualified immunity. For

       section 2-202 qualified immunity to apply, the public employee must be engaged in the execution

       or enforcement of law at the time of the willful and wanton conduct. Pouk v. Village of Romeoville,

       405 Ill. App. 3d 194, 197 (2010). Being engaged in the execution or enforcement of a law means

       that the public employee is engaged in a course of conduct designed to carry out or put into effect

       a law. Id. Whereas section 4-102 is broad in scope, section 2-202 is narrow in scope, and not

       every act performed in the course of an officer’s employment qualifies as acting in the execution

       or enforcement of law. Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 284 (1991) (officer was not executing or

       enforcing a law when transporting a jail inmate from one facility to another when he struck the

       plaintiff’s vehicle). The question of whether a public employee is executing or enforcing the law

       under section 2-202, rather than failing to provide an adequate police protection service under

       section 4-102, is typically a question of fact. Payne v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 123010,

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       ¶ 32. However, the question may be decided as a matter of law when the facts alleged are

       susceptible to only one possible conclusion. Id.

¶ 25          A comparison of two cases, Albert and Glover v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL App (1st)

       211353 (petition for leave to appeal denied May 24, 2023), illustrates the scope of section 2-202

       and when immunity questions may be decided as a matter of law.

¶ 26          In Albert, as here, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in finding that section 4-102

       absolute immunity applied and argued that section 2-202 qualified immunity applied instead.

       Albert, 2014 IL App (1st) 123544, ¶ 28. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the school board

       owed her child a duty not to act willfully or wantonly in its execution or enforcement of the student

       code of conduct and that it breached that duty in the manner that it disciplined, or failed to

       discipline, the students earlier that day, which enabled a second, deadly fight to ensue. Id. ¶ 40.

       The parties debated whether the student code could be considered a law subject to execution or

       enforcement for the purposes of section 2-202. Id. ¶ 41. The court answered:

                      “Regardless of how plaintiff attempts to couch the facts, here the facts can lead to

              only one conclusion: that the Board was not engaged in executing or enforcing anything at

              the time of the tragic incident leading to Derrion’s death, including the student code.

              Alleging a failure to act means section 2-202 is inapplicable. Plaintiff alleges that the

              Board failed to take certain actions, such as staggering dismissal times or ensuring

              Derrion’s safety after school off school property on his commute home. According to the

              complaint, the Board was doing nothing at the time of Derrion’s injuries. Such allegations

              can implicate section 4-102, but not section 2-202. ‘Section 4-102 immunity may apply in

              the context where police officers are simply providing or failing to provide police services,

              but section 2-202 immunity requires more particular circumstances for its application, i.e.,

                                                         12
              an act or a course of conduct ‘in the execution or enforcement’ of law.’ When a complaint

              ‘alleges that public employees were doing nothing at the time of an injury,’ or ‘where a

              plaintiff alleges that a public employee took some action to enforce a law but then stopped

              and an injury occurred thereafter,” section [2]-202 is inapplicable. Section 2-202 ‘provides

              immunity only where the public employee is [willful and wanton] while actually engaged

              in the execution or enforcement of a law.” (Internal citations omitted; first emphasis added;

              subsequent emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 42.

¶ 27          In Glover, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint based

       on its determination that section 4-102, being the more specific immunity provision, controlled

       over section 2-202. Glover, 2023 IL App (1st) 211353, ¶ 28. Specifically, the plaintiff had alleged

       that the police willfully and wantonly instructed him to step outside the safety of a bar and go to

       his car despite knowing that the man who had just threatened to shoot him remained outside. Id.

       ¶ 10. The man shot the plaintiff. Id.

¶ 28          The appellate court determined that the question was not, in the abstract, whether section

       4-102 absolute immunity was a more specific immunity provision such that it trumped section 2-

       202 qualified immunity in every instance. Id. ¶¶ 68-70. Rather, the question was whether the

       specific circumstances of the case before it more neatly fell within the purview of section 4-102 or

       section 2-202. Id. The appellate court determined that the allegations in the complaint

              “do not fall neatly under the purview of a specific immunity provision. These allegations,

              and the course of police conduct they describe, could well be characterized as either the

              execution and enforcement of the laws [against disorderly conduct], implicating the

              qualified immunity of section 2-202, or as a failure to provide police protection service,

              implicating the absolute immunity of section 4-102.” Id. ¶ 70.

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       The appellate court noted that the plaintiff had set forth several precise laws that the officers were

       at least arguably enforcing when they directed the plaintiff to step outside the bar and go to his car,

       including the disorderly conduct ordinance. Id. ¶ 71 (citing the Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-

       010 (amended Sept. 21, 2022)). The court then reversed the dismissal, concluding that a trier of

       fact should be given the opportunity to determine whether the defendants’ actions in enforcing a

       law against disorderly conduct were a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries such that the

       defendants would be subject to qualified, rather than absolute, immunity. Id.

¶ 29          As in Albert and unlike in Glover, the instant plaintiffs have not identified any laws being

       enforced by defendants as to plaintiffs; nor were defendants in control of or directing plaintiffs’

       movements at the time of the shooting. Neither of the two new facts proposed by plaintiffs during

       oral argument undermine the trial court’s assessment that plaintiffs’ theory of the case fell squarely

       within the purview of section 4-102’s absolute immunity.

¶ 30          The first new fact—that the police defendants instructed Victor to attend court the next

       day—speaks to the duty element of the underlying offenses. Conventional tort principles dictate

       that we all owe each other a duty of ordinary care to guard against injuries that naturally flow as a

       reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of an act. Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District

       No. 5 Board of Directors, 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 21. When a defendant’s course of action creates a

       foreseeable risk of injury, the defendant has a duty to protect others from that injury. Id. However,

       accepting for the sake of analysis that the police defendants created a foreseeable risk of injury by

       telling Victor to attend court in compliance with an existing subpoena, and even accepting that the

       police defendants breached that duty of care by failing to protect Victor after creating that risk,

       plaintiffs at best establish the elements of their underlying claims. As noted, the trial court gave

       plaintiffs “the benefit of the doubt” that defendants had a duty to plaintiffs. The question, rather,

                                                         14
       was whether an immunity applied despite having met the elements of the claims. Instructing Victor

       to attend court does nothing to undermine the application of section 4-102 absolute immunity.

¶ 31          The second new fact—that the sheriff defendants allowed plaintiffs to exit the courthouse

       (whereupon their security efforts ceased)—again implicates only section 4-102 absolute immunity.

       Although the application of section 2-202 is typically one of fact, the proffered facts are susceptible

       to only one legal conclusion. Payne, 2014 IL App (1st) 123010, ¶ 32. The sheriff defendants were

       not executing or enforcing a law at the time of the injury. Rather, as to plaintiffs, they had ceased

       executing or enforcing any law and were doing nothing at the time of the injury. See Albert, 2014

       IL App (1st) 123544, ¶ 42.

¶ 32          Most critical, however, is that unlike in Glover, plaintiffs are unable to point to a law that

       defendants were executing or enforcing that is not itself a subject of section 4-102. Plaintiffs allege

       that police defendants were investigating a homicide, investigating a threatened homicide, and

       searching for a suspect. However, these allegations—the failure to solve crimes, prevent crimes,

       and apprehend criminals—fall squarely into the purview of section 4-102. Plaintiffs allege that

       the sheriff defendants were performing courthouse security as required by section 3-6023 of the

       Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3-6023) (West 2020)). However, the failure to provide adequate police

       protection services again falls neatly in the purview of section 4-102.

¶ 33          In sum, the trial court gave plaintiffs every benefit of the doubt as to any amendment that

       might possibly cure the defect in their pleadings. Plaintiffs failed to proffer any facts in the

       proceedings below or before this court undermining the trial court’s assessment that they would

       be unable to cure the defect in their pleadings. Illinois favors the liberal amendment of pleadings,

       but there is no absolute right to amend. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion

                                                         15
       where plaintiffs did not then provide, and still have not provided, proposed facts that would cure

       the defect in their pleadings.

¶ 34                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 35          The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.

¶ 36          Affirmed.

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