Court Opinion

ID: 9919244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:43.908839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:44.537049
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                       NO. 1D2022-3155
                 _____________________________

WILLIAM KIEFER BRADLEY EGAN,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
Timothy Register, Judge.

                        January 17, 2024

RAY, J.

     A jury convicted William Kiefer Bradley Egan of two counts of
aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with special
findings that he possessed a firearm during the commission of the
crimes (counts I and II) and possession of a bulletproof vest while
committing the aggravated assaults (count III). The trial court
adjudicated him guilty on all counts and sentenced him to fifteen
years in prison on each of counts I and II and five years in prison
on count III.

     On appeal, Egan argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal on count III and by imposing
a $100 cost of prosecution without a request from the State. We
affirm his judgment and sentence in all respects.
    To begin, we find that the argument raised on appeal as to the
denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal has not been properly
preserved for appellate review by this court. Thus, it is waived.

     Section 775.0846(2), Florida Statutes, proscribes the
possession of a bulletproof vest while a person commits one of
various felonies, including aggravated assault, and “such
possession is in the course of and in furtherance of any such crime.”
At the close of the State’s case at trial, defense counsel moved for
a judgment of acquittal on all counts. The argument presented to
the trial court on count III was that the State failed to prove a
predicate offense:

    [T]hey have failed to prove the main charge on Counts I
    and II of aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer
    in that the facts and circumstances that have been
    testified to don’t indicate that any weapons that were
    definitively fired at, towards or near either officer. The
    facts may support a lesser included charge of improper
    exhibition of a firearm, but not the main charge alleged.
    And based on that, Count III would also fail because he
    would not be—have been engaged in the main charge
    and, therefore, wearing a vest would not be illegal under
    those circumstances.

     Egan now argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal on count III because the State
failed to prove that he wore a bulletproof vest “in furtherance of”
committing an aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer.
Contrary to his argument at trial, his argument on appeal
presupposes that he committed the aggravated assaults and
instead claims there was a lack of evidence that his act of wearing
a bulletproof vest furthered, advanced, or assisted the commission
of the crimes. He points to his testimony at trial that he wore the
vest “[a]ny time [he] went out” and submits that this odd habit did
nothing to further or escalate his encounter with law enforcement.
Without proof of mens rea, he argues that his conviction on count
III cannot be sustained based on mere possession of the bulletproof
vest alone.

    Egan’s appellate argument is based on an entirely different
theory than the one he advanced at trial. It is therefore not

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preserved for our review. See Morales v. State, 170 So. 3d 63, 66
(Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“Appellate courts have repeatedly declined to
review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal where the
motion failed to make the specific argument raised on appeal.”);
see also Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982)
(explaining that “in order for an argument to be cognizable on
appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground
for the objection, exception, or motion below”).

     Egan next argues that the trial court erroneously imposed a
$100 cost of prosecution under section 938.27, Florida Statutes,
without first receiving a request from the State. This argument
was preserved through his motion to correct sentencing error filed
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). But as this
Court has recently explained, “the [$100] cost for the state attorney
is a minimum cost that is mandated by subsection (8) and not an
‘investigative’ cost incurred by an agency, as described in
§ 938.27(1), which can only be imposed ‘if requested’ by the
agency.” Parks v. State, 371 So. 3d 392, 392–93 (Fla. 1st DCA
2023). Thus, the State need not request the cost. Id. at 393.

    AFFIRMED.

BILBREY and LONG, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Robert David Malove, The Law Office of Robert David Malove, P.A.,
Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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