Court Opinion

ID: 9639297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:11:27.354103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:02.057604
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Several things about this conviction are troublesome. First I think it clear from the published transcript furnished as an exhibit here (Exhibit H, supra) that defendant was compelled by the congressional committee to make admissions of the facts essential to this later criminal proceeding. At the outset of his testimony before the committee he sought specific information as to his rights, including the “penalty” for refusing to answer, since he had never been “in front of a committee of this sort.” And the chairman then proceeded to enlighten him in a lengthy statement, of which much is quoted in the opinion, supra, wherein he was told specifically that he was under subpoena and could not avoid answering questions. The chairman also said that “this is not a court of law”; and hence he doubted if the witness could refuse to answer on the ground of self-incrimination, since no crime was charged, though he (the chairman) personally would not press him, as “the mere fact” of refusal to answer “would be sufficient evidence for me.”
The minatory nature of this statement alone seems to me obvious. But the chairman later made the compulsion quite definite during that part of the examination, conducted by another congressman, which is here crucial. This further admonition —not cited in the opinion, but quoted in the margin here — 1 was described by the *127chairman as a clarification or revision of what he had first said, since he did not have the law before him when the point first came up. And it led to a specific order to the witness to answer a definitely incriminating question. It was then that defendant agreed to answer privately, but added, “ * * * if you insist upon my answering it here, I will have to simply refuse to answer it and take my chances,” showing thereby that he understood the compulsion and its consequences, not the opposite as the opinion suggests. In fact he did answer the question privately, where-, upon the chairman stated its general tenor for the record.2 Then the questions and answers containing the admissions here important followed almost at once.
Moreover, the entire hearing — indeed the earlier hearings to which this was somewhat of a climax — is instinct with an intent upon the part of the examiners to demonstrate from his own mouth the evil character of this rebellious labor “dictator” who in their eyes was the cause of a serious lag in the production of navy fighter planes.3 The witness, unlike an accused in a court of law, had no option to refuse to take the stand; and it is neither feasible nor. fair to expect him to object to every question, notwithstanding compulsion thus direct. His chance reference to “counsel” does not identify any person at the hearing or show what, if any, protection he got or could get from such a quarter. Obviously all that any counsel could wisely tell him was that he must answer as the committee demanded and rely upon the immunity which the law gave him against any further consequences.
Next, if I understand the opinion correctly, it employs a view of immunity, even where gained, as applying only to the use of the actual testimony itself, a view which I had supposed was just what was repudiated in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195, 35 L.Ed. 1110, and in all the cases since, e. g., United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 428, 432-434, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 168, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 45 S.Ct. 16, 69 L.Ed. 158; Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 32 S.Ct. 71, 56 L.Ed. 128; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819. Such a limited immunity does not satisfy the Fifth Amendment which protects an individual from giving evidence only tending to criminate himself, and applies to testimony which may merely furnish the background which leads to the ultimate conviction. And a statute is not adequate unless it grants complete immunity, “in all respects commensurate with the protection guaranteed by the constitutional limitation.” Glickstein v. United States, supra, 222 U.S. 139, 141, 32 S.Ct. 71, 72, 156 L.Ed. 128. Hence it is no answer to say that the examiner had a background of facts sufficient to justify prosecution before he began his examination. In fact the examination was directed to procuring the witness’ admissions and was successful in so doing — so much so that the chairman of the main committee immediately sent a transcript thereof to the appropriate prosecuting authorities with a strong request for prosecution, a request vigorously reiterated in the committee’s final report. Admissions are, after all, the most convincing of evidence; at any rate they appear to have led here, perhaps almost inevitably, to the stipulation wherein the defendant conceded facts upon which the judge below based his finding of guilt of willful intent to defraud a governmental department.
Hence it does not seem to me that the application of the constitutional protection should be at all equivocal here. For this involves not only an important question of personal liberties, but also one going to the *128heart of the valuable investigative functions of Congress. It is to the public interest that the power to investigate be unhampered and that witnesses be induced, indeed forced, to testify with the complete protection which satisfies the constitutional intent, rather than be allowed to remain silent in reliance upon their constitutional prerogatives. It is desirable, therefore, that the statutory provisions be construed, if possible, to contain such immunity, rather than be held insufficient, with the privilege of refusing to testify then freely operative. There are difficulties in such interpretation, it is true, arising out of the history of the legislation; the situation is one where clarification must await the decision of the highest court.4 But for present purposes we need not decide finally whether the statutes are complete or not; for the force of the constitutional principle alone requires us to set aside a conviction based upon facts a witness was compelled to admit on his congressional examination.
There are other disquieting problems suggested by this record: the extension of civil service principles to this very limited and temporary job (at $10.55 per day for some 11 or 12 days) which the union people viewed more as labor representation on an arbitration panel than federal office-holding; the extension of the federal false-claim statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 80, to cover a form of application for such a job; the further necessary conclusion — to be assumed even though the judge made no specific finding or detailed analysis of the evidence — of willful intent to defraud, that is, of the evil purpose requisite under such statutes, as stated in Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 64 S.Ct. 1233, 88 L.Ed. 1534, and other cases cited at pages 686, 687, at pages 1236, 1237, of 64 S.Ct., in spite of the undisputed evidence that the labor members of the War Labor Board, fully acquainted with the defendant’s background here in issue, persuaded him against his own desires to take the job because most union leaders could not afford to do so and that his appointment was fully settled before the form was even called to his attention; and, possibly most important, the emotional background from which the demand for his prosecution stemmed. The committee members were aroused by this defendant’s iron control of some 18, 000 workers in opposition to the war needs and aims, as they viewed the situation; but however righteous was their anger on the main issue, the removal of this key labor figure through the route of imprisonment and fine for a collateral and profitless offense seems a somewhat doubtful method of securing labor co-operation in production, while it does jeopardize vitally necessary public confidence in the nonpartisan-ship of courts of justice. But the policy behind a prosecution cannot well be reviewed on appeal from a conviction; nor am I prepared to say that the judge erred as a matter of law in his conclusion of willful guilt or that my brothers are wrong in their legal conclusions on these latter issues. Consequently I limit my vote for reversal of the conviction to the first ground I have discussed above.

 The questions had been directed to the witness’ use of other names and had veered to the suggestion of impersonation of one Sidney Traurig, that being a name used by the witness. Then this occurred (Exhibit H, p. 3012):
“Mr. Hébert. Then you weren’t impersonating that man ?
“Mi’. DeLorenzo. I don’t believe I was.
“Mr. Hébert. What was the occasion for using his name ?
“Mr. DeLorenzo. I would like to refuse to answer that question.
“The Chairman. I don’t think, Mr. DeLorenzo, that you have the right to refuse to answer that question. You must answer anything that goes to the credibility of the witness, and this certainly does.
“Mr. DeLorenzo. Does this have anything to do with the production at Brewster? '
“The Chairman. I now have before me the law. When this point came up before, I didn’t have the law before me, but since it has come up again, I am going to read from the law: [Reading in full first the statute making refusal to testify before a congressional committee a crime, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192, supra, and then the statute forbidding' use in evidence of the testimony given, 28 U.S.C.A. § 634, supra.]
“•So I think, sir, that you are called upon *127to answer the question that Mr. Hébert has asked you. He asked you why, as I understood the question, you impersonated a man. who was then living and within your knowledge and a member of your union, why you impersonated him and under what conditions and circumstances you did so. I think that is pertinent to the inquiry.”

 After the witness had given his answer to the committee privately, the chairman, thanking him for his co-operation, continued, “ * * * and your reply generally would be that you did it for personal reasons, is that right?” to which the witness answered, “That is correct, sir.” This was followed by questions and answers bringing out that he had used other names for business reasons. Exhibit H, p. 3013.

 In view of all this, it is somewhat odd that at the afternoon session and after the damage had been done, the examining congressman told the witness he might rely upon his privilege against self-incrimination. Exhibit H, p. 3023. The probable explanation is a very real and justifiable confusion as to the meaning of the statutes (discussed below in this opinion); perhaps, too, there were differing views of interpretation within the committee itself.

 28 U.S.C.A. § 634 (together with 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 192-194) was originally passed in 1857, 11 Stat. 155, 156, and then contained a broader provision of immunity from prosecution for matters testified to, which was stricken in 1862, 12 Stat. 333, as set forth in Re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 666, 17 S.Ct. 677, 679, 41 L.Ed. 1154, note. That change does tend to support the government’s argument as to the legislative intent, but the congressional debate on the amendment, particularly in the Senate and the remarks of Senator Sumner and others, shows a conception of the constitutional privilege quite contrary to that established in 1892 in the Counselman case; indeed, specific incorporation of the constitutional privilege in the statute was rejected by vote of 19 to 21. See 42 Cong. Globe 364, 428—431, 1862. Moreover, aftter the Counselman decision, the Court, in Re Chapman, supra, upheld the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C.A. § 192, making refusal to testify a crime; and finally, after the various cited constitutional decisions, Congress re-enacted the legislation with only minor changes in 1938, 52 Stat. 943, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 — thus perhaps suggesting a statutory interpretation consistent with, rather than opposed to, constitutional principles.