Court Opinion

ID: 9381032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 19:03:52.427185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:29.244510
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 210647-U
                                          No. 2-21-0647
                                    Order filed March 20, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is precedent except
      in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                               IN THE

                               APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST           ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR INDYMAC        ) of Du Page County.
INDX MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST               )
2006-FLX1, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH       )
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-FLX1,        )
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              ) No. 13-CH-3472
                                       )
v.                                     )
                                       )
YUKI SHELTON                           ) Honorable
                                       ) Robert G. Gibson,
      Defendants-Appellee.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Jorgensen and Hudson concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to vacate certain orders in the
             underlying proceedings for plaintiff’s alleged non-compliance with Rule 11 was
             not an abuse of discretion.

¶2     Defendant appeals from the trial court’s order approving report of sale and distribution of

the subject property commonly known as 17W545 Southlane Drive, Villa Park. Defendant

contends in this appeal that her motion to vacate the amended judgment of foreclosure and sale in

favor of plaintiff was denied in error as, she argues, plaintiff failed to comply with Illinois Supreme
2023 IL App (2d) 210647-U

Court Rule 11 (IL. S. Ct. R. 11 (eff. July 1, 2021)) by serving notices throughout the underlying

proceedings at her residence, as opposed to her former attorney’s address. Defendant’s contention

is without merit, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of that motion.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On December 18, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant to foreclose mortgage

on the subject property. The complaint was served on defendant at her residence, the subject

property. On April 9, 2014, defendant’s son and attorney, Paul Shelton (Shelton), entered an

appearance on her behalf. Shelton’s appearance filing listed 3 Grant Square, Suite 363, Hinsdale,

as his address.

¶5     On January 20, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for entry of an order of default which claimed

that defendant failed to file a responsive pleading to the complaint for foreclosure. The service list

attached to plaintiff’s motion listed Shelton at 7 North Grant Street, Suite LL, Hinsdale. On January

22, 2015, the trial court ordered defendant to file an answer to plaintiff’s complaint within 14 days.

Defendant was further ordered to “file updated contact information and serve plaintiff.”

¶6     On February 9, 2015, defendant, still represented by Shelton, filed an answer to the

foreclosure complaint with affirmative defenses. Therein, defendant averred that she “maintains a

mailing address at 17W545 Southlane Drive” in Villa Park. Plaintiff subsequently withdrew its

motion for entry of an order of default. Plaintiff’s answer to defendant’s affirmative defenses was

filed on March 20, 2015, with an attachment detailing service on Shelton at 3 Grant Square, Suite

363, Hinsdale.

¶7     On February 17, 2016, the trial court entered the following order:

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2023 IL App (2d) 210647-U

               “Paul Shelton’s appearance on behalf of [defendant] is stricken as Paul Shelton has

       been disbarred; [defendant] shall have 21 days to file an appearance; plaintiff may send

       future notices directly to [defendant].”

¶8     On April 1, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. Notice of the motion was

served on defendant at her residence, the subject property. Defendant entered a pro se “substitute”

appearance on April 12, 2016, and filed a motion for additional time to file her response to

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Defendant attached a proposed order to her motion

which continued to list her address as her disbarred son’s address at 3 Grant Square, Suite 363,

Hinsdale. Defendant was allowed 28 days to respond to plaintiff’s motion. She never filed a

response. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and entered a judgment

of foreclosure and sale on June 15, 2016.

¶9     On May 2, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended foreclosure

complaint seeking to add Shelton and Donna J. Bissett as defendants because plaintiff believed

they may have had some interest in the subject property. Notice of the motion was served on

defendant by mail at the subject property address. The trial court granted the motion and plaintiff

filed an amended complaint to foreclose mortgage on May 17, 2018. The complaint was served on

defendant by mail at the subject property address. Defendant filed no response.

¶ 10   On April 4, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default and motion for entry of

judgment of foreclosure against Shelton and Bissett. Notice of the motions were served on

defendant by mail at the subject property address. On April 17, 2019, the trial court entered an

order of default against Shelton and Bissett. An amended judgment of foreclosure and sale was

also entered on that date.

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2023 IL App (2d) 210647-U

¶ 11   Defendant was served by mail at the subject property with several notices of pending

sheriff sales (June 17, 2019, September 18, 2019, June 17, 2020, December 8, 2020) that did not

proceed. On December 22, 2020, defendant, represented by Giovanni Raimondi, filed a motion to

vacate the June 15, 2016, judgment of foreclosure and sale pursuant to 2-1203(a) of the Code of

Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2020)). The motion argued that plaintiff

“failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 11 when serving any notices or orders on

Defendant following the filing of her pro se substitute appearance.” Defendant’s motion requested,

inter alia, that the trial court vacate the June 15, 2016, judgment of foreclosure and the April 17,

2019, amended judgment of foreclosure against her as a matter of “substantial justice.”

¶ 12   The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to vacate on March 16, 2021. At the

hearing, defense counsel admitted that defendant resided at the subject property. Further, counsel

was unaware who occupied 3 Grant Square, Suite 363, Hinsdale, following Shelton’s disbarment.

The trial court made the following findings and observations on defendant’s motion:

               “I mean you understand that the whole purpose of appearances is to make sure that

       parties get notice of a case, and you don’t even know if there’s anyone connected to this

       case who’s at that address. So why should they be sending notices to an address that ***

       may have no connection to the property, whether there’s an appearance on file or not, when

       [defendant] *** was pro se at the time of the incidents that are being discussed here at the

       property address where she’s living?

               *** I know [defense counsel] said that until that appearance is stricken, whether

       it’s a bad address or not, those notices should be sent there. But, and this is why I gave you

       a backdrop here. Mr. Shelton, it was correct that he was disbarred in the Court’s view,

       because this Court observed *** his actions and inactions in this Court. And certainly it

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2023 IL App (2d) 210647-U

       doesn’t escape this Court’s notice that somehow [defendant], who I believe is a 95-year-

       old woman if I’m not mistaken, somehow is during the course of the foreclosure, deeding

       the property to, among other, Paul Shelton. And then we get into a whole sidelight because

       of that action as to an amended complaint being filed.

       ***

                Why the plaintiff sought leave to amend the complaint to add these individuals ***

       is another question. But I did want to recite for the record that that is in fact the case. And

       in this case [defendant] on April 12, 2016, filed, or somebody filed on her behalf, the pro

       se appearance, and also a motion to extend time to respond to the motion for summary

       judgment. *** [U]ltimately summary judgement was entered.

                So, I’m having trouble here seeing any demonstration of why substantial justice

       would call into question anything that occurred here. And if you had anything else you

       wanted to say, please do say it.”

Defense counsel had nothing else to add. The motion was denied.

¶ 13   Following a sheriff’s sale, plaintiff filed a motion for order approving sale and distribution.

The trial court granted that motion on October 4, 2021, and this appeal followed.

¶ 14                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15   Defendant raises several contentions in this appeal. However, all of defendant’s

contentions can be reduced to whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to vacate

the June 15, 2016, judgment of foreclosure and the April 17, 2019, amended judgment of

foreclosure against her as a matter of “substantial justice” due to plaintiff’s alleged non-compliance

with Rule 11.

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2023 IL App (2d) 210647-U

¶ 16    The purpose of a motion to vacate under section 2-1203 of the Code is to alert the trial

court to errors it has committed and to afford it an opportunity to correct those errors. Steiner v.

Eckert, 2013 IL App (2d) 121290, ¶ 16. We review the trial court’s denial of a section 2-1203

motion for an abuse of discretion. Id. “In deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in

this context, the question is not whether we agree with the trial court, but whether the trial court

acted arbitrarily without conscientious judgment, or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeded

the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law such that substantial prejudice

resulted.” Id.

¶ 17    Rule 11 states, in relevant part, as follows:

        “(a) On Whom Made. If a party is represented by an attorney of record, service shall be

        made upon the attorney. Otherwise service shall be made upon the party.

        ***

        (c) Method. Unless otherwise specified by rule or order of court, documents shall be

        served electronically.

        ***

          (2) If a self-represented party does not have an e-mail address, or if service other than

        electronic service is specified by rule or order of court, or if extraordinary circumstances

        prevent timely electronic service in a particular instance, service of documents may be

        made by one of the following alternative methods:

        ***

                 (iii) United States Mail. Depositing the document in a United States post office or

        post office box, enclosed in an envelope to the party's address, as identified by the party’s

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2023 IL App (2d) 210647-U

        appearance in the matter, with postage fully prepaid[.]” IL S. Ct. R. 11 (eff. July 1, 2021)

        (Emphases added.)

Defendant argues that plaintiff was required by Rule 11 to mail all notices to 3 Grant Square, Suite

363, Hinsdale, as that was the address listed in her pro se substitute appearance form. This

argument would have merit only if this court were to ignore the facts and circumstances contained

in the record to this case.

¶ 18    Following the disbarment of her counsel and son, the trial court’s February 17, 2016, order

directed plaintiff to send all future notices directly to defendant. Plaintiff complied with that order

throughout the proceedings, including service of its April 1, 2016, motion for summary judgment.

Defendant responded to the notice served to her residence by filing her pro se substitute appearance

and motion for extension of time to respond. Interestingly, her pro se substitute appearance form

looked identical to Shelton’s filed appearance form with only defendant’s electronic signature

inserted where her son’s once was. And, of course, her disbarred son’s address remained

unchanged.

¶ 19    During the March 16, 2021, hearing on defendant’s motion to vacate, defendant’s counsel

admitted that she resided at the subject property where plaintiff’s notices and orders had been

served. He further admitted that he did not know who occupied her son’s former office address.

Defendant’s counsel never averred at any point that the notices sent to her residence were not

received. Counsel never addressed how serving defendant at her residence by order of the trial

court, as opposed to her disbarred son’s former office address, posed an impediment to the

administration of “substantial justice.”

¶ 20    We agree with the trial court’s assertion that there has been no “demonstration of why

substantial justice would call into question anything that occurred here.” We find no abuse of

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2023 IL App (2d) 210647-U

discretion in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to vacate the June 15, 2016, judgment

of foreclosure and the April 17, 2019, amended judgment of foreclosure.

¶ 21                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.

¶ 23   Affirmed.

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