Court Opinion

ID: 9892824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 23:00:37.618775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:46:31.643239
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-1967
SHELLIE ELLISON,
                                                Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
                                               Defendant-Appellee.
                     ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
         Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
       No. 1:20-cv-00953-RLY-MPB — Richard L. Young, Judge.
                     ____________________

   ARGUED MARCH 27, 2023 — DECIDED OCTOBER 24, 2023
               ____________________

   Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
   PRYOR, Circuit Judge. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
makes it unlawful for the United States Postal Service to ex-
clude a person with a disability from its program solely be-
cause of that person’s disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). One of the
central purposes of the legislation was removing “shameful
oversights” that caused people with disabilities to “live
among society ‘shunted aside, hidden, and ignored.’”
2                                                   No. 22-1967

Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295–96 (1985) (quoting 117
CONG. REC. 45974 (1971)).
    Shellie Ellison is a person with a disability who uses a
wheelchair. She desires to visit her local post office but cannot
because the United States Postal Service refuses to build a
wheelchair ramp. Ellison sued the Postal Service under Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act seeking an injunction. The
district court entered summary judgment for the Postal Ser-
vice, concluding that the Postal Service need not install a
ramp at the inaccessible location because Ellison could mean-
ingfully access the program through its website and three
wheelchair-accessible Postal Service locations within a fif-
teen-minute drive of her home.
    On appeal, Ellison maintains that the district court erred
because the record shows that she lacks meaningful access to
the Postal Service’s program through these alternative meth-
ods. We agree. We therefore vacate and remand for the dis-
trict court to consider whether Ellison’s proposed accommo-
dation is reasonable.
                         I. BACKGROUND
    A. Factual History
    The Shelbyville Post Office is both the closest one to El-
lison’s home and the largest in that area of Indiana. When a
customer enters this location, she will find employees ready
to assist—by offering advice about shipping options or by as-
sembling and weighing packages for the customer. The cus-
tomer will then find a fully stocked retail lobby, where she
can buy anything from shipping supplies, such as packaging
and stamps, to gift cards. The Shelbyville location is also
where Ellison keeps a P.O. box for her non-profit, Wheels on
No. 22-1967                                                              3

the Ground—an organization striving to educate the public
about accessibility for people with disabilities. Despite all this,
Ellison cannot enter the Shelbyville Post Office because it has
only one customer entrance: at the top of its front steps.
    Given that Ellison cannot enter the building, three poten-
tial accommodations exist for her. 1 She can (1) ask for help
from the loading dock of the Shelbyville Post Office or from a
van-accessible parking space, (2) use the Postal Service’s web-
site, or (3) visit wheelchair-accessible locations in surround-
ing towns. We cover each of these accommodations in turn.
        1. The Shelbyville Post Office’s Loading Dock Area
    For a while, the Postal Service directed Ellison to the Shel-
byville Post Office’s loading dock. Once there, she would
make her way up a ramp and push the call button. If an em-
ployee responded—something that did not always happen—
the employee would not let Ellison in through the back door.
Instead, Ellison would have to wait outside on the loading
dock while the employee traveled back and forth between the
inside of the building and the dock to carry out her requests.
    Ellison eventually grew frustrated with this setup. She
complained to the United States Access Board, which con-
cluded that, because of the age of the Shelbyville Post Office,
it could not require the Postal Service to alter the front en-
trance. The Postal Service opted not to install a ramp on its
own, either. Instead, it spent around $60,000 renovating the
area around the loading dock. This money yielded a van-ac-
cessible parking space, a call button in that space, and a less

1 As we explain later, the Rehabilitation Act does not ensure that people

with disabilities can access each facility housing an agency’s program, but
it does ensure that they can access the program as a whole.
4                                                     No. 22-1967

steep loading ramp. But delivery trucks often blocked the
parking space, meaning Ellison still had to stay outside while
waiting for an employee to help her. The Postal Service also
offered to deliver the mail from Ellison’s P.O. box to her
home. Ellison, however, preferred to keep the mail delivered
to her P.O. box separate from her personal mail so that exec-
utives in her non-profit could easily collect documents they
needed.
   Others were dissatisfied with these means of accessing the
Postal Service’s program too. After a slew of complaints, the
City of Shelbyville offered to pay for a ramp at the Shelbyville
Post Office’s front entrance. The Postal Service declined, cit-
ing a policy of refusing donations for exterior physical im-
provements.
       2. The Postal Service’s Website
    The Postal Service has also pointed Ellison to its website.
From there, customers can pick between several forms of
shipping, schedule an at-home pickup, and purchase various
retail goods. That said, according to the website, ground ship-
ping—the cheapest shipping option for packages weighing
more than about a pound—is not available online; shipping
materials can take over a week to arrive; some products come
with delivery fees; and customers cannot receive hands-on as-
sistance online.
       3. Alternative, Accessible Postal Service Locations
   The Postal Service also offers three smaller but wheel-
chair-accessible post offices in rural areas surrounding Shel-
byville that Ellison can visit. They take her longer to reach—
eleven, thirteen, and fifteen minutes by car, as opposed to the
seven minutes it takes her to drive to the Shelbyville Post
No. 22-1967                                                   5

Office. In addition, their storefronts are open for fewer
hours—about twenty-two, thirty-two, and forty-one hours
per week, as opposed to the forty-nine hours a week the Shel-
byville Post Office is open. The record does not reveal which
services the wheelchair-accessible locations offer or whether
these alternative locations provide the same assistance to cus-
tomers as the Shelbyville Post Office.
   Finding these options unsatisfactory, Ellison now visits a
wheelchair-accessible private shipping company, where she
must pay three times as much for the same services offered at
the Postal Service.
   B. Procedural History
    Ellison sued the Postal Service, alleging that it failed to
provide her with meaningful access to its program in viola-
tion of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794. In her view, the Postal Service’s accommodations and
recommendations did not make her access meaningful even
when combined. By way of a remedy, she sought an injunc-
tion requiring the Postal Service to build a wheelchair ramp
at the front of the Shelbyville Post Office. Both parties even-
tually moved for summary judgment.
    After Ellison moved for summary judgment, the Postal
Service filed a cross motion for summary judgment pointing
for the first time to three wheelchair-accessible post offices.
These locations along with the website, it asserted, provided
Ellison with meaningful access to the Postal Service’s pro-
gram. In support, the Postal Service submitted evidence
showing that the alternative locations were wheelchair acces-
sible and had P.O. boxes. It did not, however, detail which
services each of these alternative locations offered.
6                                                    No. 22-1967

    After briefing closed, the district court, to its credit, con-
ducted a status hearing to obtain more information on the
wheelchair-accessible post offices. At the hearing, it asked the
parties to submit a joint stipulation on how far the alternative
locations were from Ellison’s house. The court also asked one
of Ellison’s attorneys during the hearing whether the retail of-
ferings at the alternative post offices were comparable to
those at the Shelbyville Post Office. She answered to the best
of her recollection.
    Soon after, the parties submitted the joint declaration on
the distance of the alternative locations. The same day, Ellison
moved to file a supplemental declaration expanding on the
retail products sold at those post offices. The proposed affida-
vit explained that the alternative locations lacked shipping
materials and carried either no retail items or fewer retail
items than the Shelbyville location; it said nothing about the
customer services each provides.
    The district court granted the Postal Service’s motion for
summary judgment and denied Ellison’s. It concluded that,
although the loading dock of the Shelbyville location did not
furnish meaningful access, the totality of the other services
did. Through the website and the other nearby locations, the
court explained, Ellison could obtain the benefits of the Postal
Service’s program. In making this ruling, the court denied El-
lison’s motion to file the supplemental declaration as moot,
reasoning that she could buy any retail items not sold at the
alternative locations on the website.
    Because the court concluded that Ellison had meaningful
access to the Postal Service, it did not move to the second part
of the analysis and consider whether her proposed accommo-
dation was reasonable. Ellison now appeals, arguing that the
No. 22-1967                                                              7

district court should have entered summary judgment in her
favor.
                            II. DISCUSSION
    We review a district court’s summary judgment decision
de novo, meaning we take a fresh look at the issues. Groves v.
S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 51 F.4th 766, 769 (7th Cir. 2022). When
both parties move for summary judgment, we take the mo-
tions one at a time, viewing the facts and drawing all reason-
able inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion
under consideration was made. N.J. ex rel. Jacob v. Sonnabend,
37 F.4th 412, 420 (7th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment, in turn,
is warranted when no material fact is in genuine dispute and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when,
based on the evidence, a jury could find for the non-moving
party. Birch|Rea Partners, Inc. v. Regent Bank, 27 F.4th 1245,
1249 (7th Cir. 2022).
    A. Legal Background
   Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 2 prevents the Postal
Service from excluding people from its program solely be-
cause of their disabilities. That prohibition reads:
        No otherwise qualified individual with a disa-
        bility … shall, solely by reason of her or his dis-
        ability, be excluded from the participation in, be
        denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
        crimination under any program or activity …

2 Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act to ensure that, no matter how old

and inaccessible some of a federal agencies’ facilities may be, people with
disabilities are still granted access to the agency’s services.
8                                                   No. 22-1967

       conducted … by the United States Postal Ser-
       vice.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Act defines “program or activity” as
“all of the operations of” the agency. Id. § 794(b)(1)(A).
    By its terms, then, Section 504 limits its coverage to the
Postal Service’s program. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Vet-
erans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 604 (1986). The statute, therefore,
does not necessarily guarantee access to all facilities housing
this program.
   Sometimes Congress compromises. It did so when decid-
ing whether the Postal Service must make each of its build-
ings accessible to people with disabilities. The dividing line
on which Congress settled was the age of the building.
    Under the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, the Postal
Service must make any building it constructs or alters after
that year readily accessible to people with disabilities. 42
U.S.C. §§ 4151, 4154a, 4155. Different rules apply to structures
built or last modified before 1968. Those structures are cov-
ered only by the more general prohibition on disability dis-
crimination passed five years later in Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act. Here, the parties agree that the Shelbyville Post
Office was constructed before 1968 and has not been modified
since, meaning the Rehabilitation Act is the only applicable
statute.
    The Rehabilitation Act’s focus on “program accessibility”
rather than “facilities accessibility” ensures access to the ben-
efits of the Postal Service while giving the agency flexibility
in deciding how to make those benefits available. See Daubert
v. Lindsay Unified Sch. Dist., 760 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2014)
(concluding the same with respect to a similarly worded
No. 22-1967                                                                   9

provision in the Americans with Disabilities Act); Parker v.
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (same). 3
In light of that flexibility, the Supreme Court has instructed
this court to balance two competing considerations when in-
terpreting Section 504: “the need to give effect to the statutory
objectives” and “the desire to keep [the statute] within man-
ageable bounds.” Choate, 469 U.S. at 299.
    Recognizing the tension between those goals, regulations
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act provide additional guid-
ance. 4 Under these regulations, the Postal Service is required
to operate its program so that each part, viewed in its entirety,
is “readily accessible.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.22(a). Therefore, the
Postal Service must alter existing facilities only if other meth-
ods do not make the program readily accessible to people
with disabilities. Id. § 84.22(b).
    In turn, a plaintiff suing under Section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act must show that: (1) she is a person with a disabil-
ity, (2) she is qualified to participate in the relevant program,
and (3) the defendant excluded her from or denied her the
benefit of that program because of her disability. Khan v. Mid-
western Univ., 879 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 2018), as amended on
denial of reh’g (Feb. 26, 2018). To establish causation, a plaintiff
need not prove intentional discrimination. She may alterna-
tively show that the defendant disparately impacted people

3 We often draw on the ADA in Rehabilitation Act cases because the two

statutes and their implementing regulations are nearly identical. A.H. ex
rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 2018).
4 The Supreme Court has explained that these regulations serve as an “im-

portant source of guidance on the meaning of § 504.” Choate, 469 U.S. at
304 n.24.
10                                                            No. 22-1967

with disabilities or refused her a reasonable accommodation.
A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587,
592–93 (7th Cir. 2018). Under the reasonable accommodation
theory, the plaintiff must also show that her proposed accom-
modation is indeed reasonable. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002) (applying a burden-shifting frame-
work to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested accommo-
dation under the ADA).
    Here, the first two elements are undisputed, but the par-
ties disagree on the third element: whether the Postal Service
denied Ellison the benefit of its program. Before reaching the
merits, we elaborate on what it means to deny someone the
benefit of a program under the Rehabilitation Act.
        1. Defining the Program
    First, we must map out the contours of the program in
question. As discussed, the Rehabilitation Act defines the
Postal Service’s program in a broad way—as “all of [its] oper-
ations.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A). The statute establishing the
Postal Service, however, provides a clearer window into its
purpose. According to that statute, the Postal Service’s “basic
function” is facilitating “correspondence of the people.” 39
U.S.C. § 101(a).
    This goal is accomplished by providing “adequate and ef-
ficient postal services at fair and reasonable rates and fees.”
Id. § 403(a). The phrase “postal service,” in turn, is defined as
the “delivery of letters” and “packages,” and “other functions
ancillary” to mailing letters and packages. Id. § 102(5). 5 Even

5 The fact that the Postal Service’s program involves both mailing and

functions related to mailing is endorsed by the Postal Service’s brief in this
No. 22-1967                                                              11

functions “incidental” to sending mail are part of the “[g]en-
eral duties” of the Postal Service. Id. § 403(a). 6
    Against this backdrop, we understand that the core bene-
fits of the Postal Service’s program are services necessary to
sending and receiving mail, including P.O. boxes, the availa-
bility of employees to help assemble and weigh packages, and
the ability to purchase critical shipping supplies such as
stamps, envelopes, and boxes.
        2. Meaningful Access
    Second, after we define the parameters of the program in
question, the Supreme Court has directed us to assess
whether the agency in question provides “meaningful access”
to that program. Choate, 469 U.S. at 300–01. As for what con-
stitutes “meaningful access,” the inquiry is whether people
with disabilities have an “equal opportunity to … gain the
same benefit” from the program as people without disabili-
ties. Id. at 305 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (1984)); see also
Disabled in Action v. Bd. of Elections in City of New York, 752 F.3d
189, 199–201 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that blind voters
lacked meaningful access to the program of voting because
accommodations did not allow them to cast ballots in private,
which was core to the voting program). That said, the services

case, which defines the “program as a whole” as “various mailing and
other services, including in-person experiences” and defines the “Postal
Service” as “the provision of mailing services and other associated activi-
ties.” App. Dkt. 24 at 13, 17–18.
6 In another case, the Postal Service argued that ReadyPost mailers, greet-

ing cards, and even bubble wrap were “postal services” as opposed to
“nonpostal services” under 39 U.S.C. § 102(5). LePage's 2000, Inc. v. Postal
Regul. Comm'n, 642 F.3d 225, 231–32 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
12                                                    No. 22-1967

furnished to each group need only be equivalent, not identi-
cal. Choate, 469 U.S. at 305 n.26; see also Kirola v. City & County
of San Francisco, 860 F.3d 1164, 1184 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding
that plaintiffs had meaningful access to a park system even
though they could not enter certain parks).
    The Supreme Court has explained that if a plaintiff cannot
enjoy a program’s fundamental benefits, her access is unlikely
to be meaningful. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 302 (considering
whether the limitation denied “the benefits … the State has
chosen to provide”); Daubert, 760 F.3d at 987–88 (distinguish-
ing experiences that are “incidental” to government functions
from the functions themselves). Conversely, the inability to
make use of a minor benefit—at least standing alone—will
struggle to move the meaningful-access needle very far. This
concept is embedded within the word “meaningful”: the
smaller a benefit is, the less significance it has on a plaintiff’s
access to the program as a whole.
    To put this all together, the idea of meaningful access
might permit small differences between the experiences of
people with and without disabilities. The applicable standard
is not “perfect accessibility.” Kirola, 860 F.3d at 1184. At the
same time, a plaintiff need not show that she has been com-
pletely deprived of access to prevail. See Disabled in Action, 752
F.3d at 198 (concluding the same); Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d
1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding the same with respect
to the ADA).
     B. Ellison’s Access to the Postal Service’s Program
   With these guideposts in mind, we pivot to the merits and
ask whether the Postal Service could avoid making structural
No. 22-1967                                                  13

changes to the Shelbyville Post Office because other methods
allow Ellison to adequately access its program.
    Ellison argues that the only way she can meaningfully ac-
cess the Postal Service’s program is by entering the Shel-
byville Post Office. In her view, the alternatives—the Shel-
byville Post Office’s loading dock, the Postal Service’s web-
site, and the accessible locations—don’t provide her with a
meaningful level of access to the Postal Service’s program.
The Postal Service responds that a patchwork of these alter-
natives produces meaningful access, negating the need for a
ramp.
   We evaluate Ellison’s options in turn to determine
whether they, alone or in combination, provide meaningful
access.
       1. The Shelbyville Post Office’s Loading Dock
    To start, we agree with Ellison that the Shelbyville Post
Office’s loading dock area does not supply meaningful access
to the Postal Service’s program. Even after the modifications
to the van-accessible parking space, Ellison has repeatedly
been denied access to benefits of the Postal Service’s program.
As noted, delivery trucks often blocked the parking space and
postal employees often ignored her calls.
       2. Website
    The website alone also does not offer meaningful access.
To be sure, we recognize that it seems to at first blush because
Ellison can order some products and services online.
   Once we dig deeper, however, problems arise. To start, the
cheapest shipping option for packages weighing more than
about a pound is not available on the website. In addition, the
14                                                        No. 22-1967

website forces users to pay shipping and handling fees that
they would not incur in person. Customers must also wait—
sometimes more than a week—for goods, including packag-
ing materials, to arrive. Once items do arrive, no one is there
to assist the customer with tasks essential to packaging and
mailing. A customer cannot, for example, ask anyone to help
her assemble, weigh, or tape a package. 7 The website thus re-
quires people with disabilities to wait longer, pay more, and
receive less assistance than someone without a disability.
   A larger concern is at play as well. If brick-and-mortar es-
tablishments could use websites alone as an excuse to forgo
physical accommodations, they could relegate people with
disabilities to a digital world. This could in essence under-
mine the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act. See Choate, 469
U.S. at 295–96 (explaining that Congress passed the statute to
prevent people with disabilities from “liv[ing] among society
‘shunted aside, hidden, and ignored’”) (quoting 117 CONG.
REC. 45974 (1971)).
    Recognizing that forcing Ellison to rely exclusively on the
website would undermine the statute’s purpose, the Postal
Service points out that the website merely factors into the
meaningful-access equation, and that the Rehabilitation Act
allows it to combine accommodations that together create
meaningful access. We agree that the website could play a role
at the margins to supplement other means of access, if those
other means provided significant levels of access on their
own. Because the accommodations, as noted above, at the

7 The Postal Service maintains a help line where customers can ask ques-

tions, but a customer using the website would not receive physical assis-
tance.
No. 22-1967                                                    15

Shelbyville Post Office do not provide a significant level of
access, we must ask whether the three wheelchair-accessible
locations do so.
       3. Alternative Locations
    Dotted on the outskirts of Shelbyville are three wheel-
chair-accessible post offices relatively close to Ellison’s house.
Through these locations, one can assume Ellison has some ac-
cess to the Postal Service’s program. The question is whether
this access is meaningful. The Postal Service tells us that the
services at the alternative locations are comparable to those at
the Shelbyville Post Office. According to the Postal Service,
Ellison can still make use of the full range of the Postal Ser-
vice’s benefits, interact with employees, and ask for physical
assistance.
    The record does not support any of these claims. In es-
sence, all we know from the record is that the alternative post
offices have P.O. boxes and are further away and open for
fewer hours than the Shelbyville Post Office.
    The Postal Service’s lack of evidence on the alternative lo-
cations is fatal to its argument. In moving for summary judg-
ment, the Postal Service had to either point out that an essen-
tial element of Ellison’s claim lacked evidence or present evi-
dence of its own that negated an essential element of her
claim. Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 817 F.3d 1010,
1016 (7th Cir. 2016). Conversely, in opposing Ellison’s motion
for summary judgment, the Postal Service had to show that a
reasonable jury would not be required to find for her based
on the record. Lesiv v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 911
(7th Cir. 2022). In addition, summary judgment is the prover-
bial “put up or shut up” moment in a lawsuit, when a party
16                                                    No. 22-1967

must reveal what evidence it has to convince a jury. Wade v.
Ramos, 26 F.4th 440, 446 (7th Cir. 2022). This means that a
party may not manufacture a genuine issue of material fact by
speculating about evidence not in the record. Khungar v. Ac-
cess Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 2021).
These principles are critical to our evaluation of both the
Postal Service’s response to Ellison’s motion for summary
judgment and to its own cross motion.
     When Ellison moved for summary judgment, she estab-
lished that the options available to her were insufficient to
give her meaningful access to the Postal Service program. The
Postal Service had the burden of showing why this was not
the case—both in opposing Ellison’s motion and in making its
own motion. In attempting to do so, the Postal Service identi-
fied for the first time three alternative post offices. No doubt,
under the Rehabilitation Act, alternative facilities can supply
meaningful access. But the Postal Service had to do more than
tell the district court that these facilities existed. To prove that
the other locations along with the website gave Ellison mean-
ingful access, or to create a factual dispute on that point, the
Postal Service needed to show that the services and products
offered at the alternative locations allowed Ellison to have
meaningful access to the Postal Service program when
viewed as a whole.
    Given that “we can look at the facts only with as much
specificity as the summary judgment record allows,” Strand v.
Minchuk, 910 F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 2018), we conclude that
the district court should not have entered summary judgment
No. 22-1967                                                                 17

for the Postal Service. 8 A reasonable jury looking at this rec-
ord—which shows why the Shelbyville Post Office and web-
site were insufficient yet contains no information about the
services provided at the alternative post offices—would have
to conclude that Ellison lacked meaningful access to the Postal
Service’s program. The only way a jury could find for the
Postal Service on this question would be by impermissibly
speculating about what lies inside the wheelchair-accessible
post offices. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 573.
   Ellison therefore showed that without an accommodation
she lacks meaningful access to the Postal Service’s program.
   B. The Reasonableness of Ellison’s Proposed Accommo-
dation.
   Before we can determine whether the district court should
have granted summary judgment to Ellison, we must con-
sider whether her proposed accommodation is reasonable.
     To meet her initial burden at this stage, Ellison needed
only to suggest an accommodation that seemed reasonable on
its face. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–02. We think that her pro-
posed accommodation—a ramp or other means for her to en-
ter the Shelbyville Post Office—cleared this low bar. The
Postal Service then had to show that, in reality, the proposed
accommodation is not reasonable or would impose an undue

8 Ellison also contends that the district court should have considered her

affidavit on the lack of retail products sold at the alternative locations. Be-
cause we have determined that summary judgment for the government
was improper regardless of the affidavit, we need not reach this argument.
18                                                             No. 22-1967

hardship. 9 Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Mil-
waukee, 300 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2002). The problem is that
the Postal Service has claimed work-product privilege over its
calculations on the cost of a ramp.
   Because the district court did not reach this fact-sensitive
question, and we prefer to let district courts make factual
findings in the first instance, United States v. Outland, 993 F.3d
1017, 1023 (7th Cir. 2021), we remand for further proceedings
to determine if the proposed accommodation is reasonable.
We leave it up to the sound discretion of the district court to
determine whether to resolve this issue through further sum-
mary judgment proceedings or through trial.
                            III. CONCLUSION
    In sum, Ellison showed that she lacks meaningful access
to the Postal Service’s program without an accommodation.
We therefore VACATE the grant of summary judgment in fa-
vor of the Postal Service and REMAND for further proceed-
ings on whether Ellison’s proposed accommodation is reason-
able.

9 Ellison argues that this defense is an affirmative one and that the Postal

Service forfeited it by not asserting it in the answer. We need not decide
whether the Postal Service’s argument amounts to an affirmative defense
or whether the Postal Service forfeited it. Failing to plead an affirmative
defense typically results in forfeiture only if the delay harmed the plaintiff,
Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2019), and
Ellison has not argued that the delay harmed her or told us why the gen-
eral rule does not apply.
No. 22-1967                                                    19

     HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join Judge Pryor’s
opinion for the court. I write separately to note that I would
be willing to go further and reject on broader grounds the
Postal Service’s theory that it “accommodated” plaintiff El-
lison by sending her to other post offices in other towns. Judge
Pryor’s opinion explains persuasively that sending the plain-
tiff to wait outside at the back door of the Shelbyville Post Of-
fice, hoping the ramp would not be blocked and that an em-
ployee would come to the door and help her, did not offer
Ellison “meaningful access” to the Postal Service’s programs.
Nor did leaving plaintiff to shop on the website for slow and
incomplete access to products and services. The court’s opin-
ion also explains persuasively how the Postal Service failed to
show in the district court that other post offices in other towns
offered Ellison meaningful access.
    At a more fundamental level, though, the Postal Service
should not be allowed to refuse to make the Shelbyville Post
Office itself wheelchair accessible, regardless of the precise of-
ferings and hours of the other post offices. The federal gov-
ernment itself reports that nearly one in eight American
adults cannot manage to go up and down stairs. Centers for
Disease      Control,   Disability     Impacts   All     of   Us,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/info-
graphic-disability-impacts-all.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2023)
(12.1% of adults in the U.S. have “serious difficulty walking
or climbing stairs).
    It’s 2023, for heaven’s sake. The Rehabilitation Act was en-
acted 49 years ago. The Americans with Disabilities Act was
enacted more than 30 years ago. One would be hard pressed
to find any institution other than the Postal Service that would
20                                                  No. 22-1967

even dare make the arguments the defense has made in this
case.
    Imagine a fast-food chain with an inaccessible restaurant
telling wheelchair-bound customers they should be satisfied
driving to another restaurant across town, or to the next town
over, or even to the next county. Or suppose one of the Postal
Service’s competitors—FedEx or UPS or DHL—operated an in-
accessible facility. Imagine they told wheelchair-bound cus-
tomers, or even the United States Attorney, that it’s sufficient
that another wheelchair-accessible facility is located in the
next town over. Those defenses would be laughed out of court
these days. And ironically, a federal enforcement action
against that hypothetical fast-food chain or Postal Service
competitor would be brought by the same United States At-
torney’s Office defending the Postal Service’s refusal to build
a ramp in this case.
    All members of the panel agree that plaintiff met her bur-
den of proposing an apparently reasonable accommodation—
installing a ramp at the Shelbyville Post Office. Ante at 17.
That shifted the burden to the Postal Service to show that
plaintiff’s proposed accommodation is not reasonable. There
are at least three major problems with the Postal Service’s ob-
jections to plaintiff’s proposal. First, safe ramps for wheel-
chairs are surely the most common, ordinary, and visible ac-
commodation required under the Rehabilitation Act (as well
as the Americans with Disabilities Act). See Disabled in Action
v. Board of Elections, 752 F.3d 189, 201 (2d Cir. 2014) (ordering
broad injunctive relief to make all polling places in New York
City accessible). Plaintiff seeks a perfectly ordinary accommo-
dation.
No. 22-1967                                                    21

     Second, in this case, the record shows that the Postal Ser-
vice has studied the costs of building a ramp. But it has re-
fused to disclose the cost estimate to plaintiff or the court,
claiming attorney work-product privilege. Whether that priv-
ilege claim is valid or not, the Postal Service simply has not
offered evidence that a ramp would be unreasonable. We
could just as well order summary judgment in favor of plain-
tiff on this point rather than order further proceedings on re-
mand.
    Third, at the risk of stating the obvious, the proposed
ramp will benefit not just plaintiff Ellison, but thousands of
other residents of Shelby County who would like to use the
Shelbyville Post Office but cannot cope with its inaccessible
entrance. These broader benefits need to be part of any calcu-
lation of reasonableness.
     I recognize that the standard is not “perfect accessibility.”
Kirola v. City and County of San Francisco, 860 F.3d 1164, 1184
(9th Cir. 2017); Disabled in Action, 752 F.3d at 198–99. But the
specific context is important. In Kirola, for example, the plain-
tiffs were seeking complete access to all parks in San Fran-
cisco. Not all obstacles to wheelchair access could be elimi-
nated without changing the nature of the parks (although
there was apparently plenty of room for reasonable improve-
ments). A local post office is inarguably very different from
an entire parks system. This self-evident difference explains
why ordering the Postal Service to build a ramp at the Shel-
byville Post Office would not inexorably require the National
Park Service to build ramps throughout the Grand Canyon.
More pointedly, as the Second Circuit wrote in Disabled in Ac-
tion: “It is not enough to open the door for the handicapped
…; a ramp must be built so the door can be reached.” 752 F.3d
22                                               No. 22-1967

at 200, quoting with approval Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d
644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982), in turn quoting with approval plain-
tiffs’ brief.
   Just so, and that was more than forty years ago. In 2023,
the refusal to make a post oﬃce wheelchair-accessible should
be deemed “discrimination” under the Rehabilitation Act
without further ado.