Court Opinion

ID: 9829273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:08:40.763843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:59.313339
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
It is contended for defendant in error that we erred in holding that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, on the theory that the bank failed to offer affirmative evidence showing indebtedness by the garnishee, because we should presume, in support of the judgment, that such proof was offered.
■ [10] We recognize that, in the absence of a statement of facts or findings of fact by the trial court, an appellate court should presume that the judgment of the trial court was supported by sufficient evidence. This, however, is a presumption of fact, and where the recitals of the judgment disclose that the trial court did not hear evidence, but rendered judgment alone upon a theory of law disclosed in the decree itself, the rule should not apply. While the question as applied to the decree in this case is not free from difficulty, we have concluded that the judgment, with reasonable certainty, shows that the court here rendered judgment without any proof of indebtedness whatever from, the garnishee to the judgment debtor, but gave judgment upon the theory that the bank, the plaintiff, was entitled to judgment without proof, because the garnishee had failed to file a legal answer. Especially are we convinced of this, because of the admissions in the brief filed for defendant in error, in which it is substantially conceded that the judgment was rendered without proof, and in which the legal theory adopted by the trial court was sought to be defended.
Our opinion is also assailed as being in conflict with certain 'decisions by the Supreme Court and by other Courts of Civil Appeals. We will briefly review the cases chiefly relied upon.
The first case cited is Freeman v. Miller, 51 Tex. 443. This authority was considered by us on the original hearing, but thought to be distinguishable on the facts. The ground of distinction which we think clearly applies is that in that case the judgment by default was not taken upon a mere defective answer of the garnishee to the original writ. The judgment there was based upon the failure or refusal of the garnishee to make full answer to the commission, which was issued after his failure to answer the writ. The right of the plaintiff to take judgment in such case would seem to be clearly authorized by article 292, Revised Statutes, and we have not and do not hold to the contrary. In the instant case no commission at all was issued and the garnishee, being a nonresident of the county in which the proceeding was instituted, was entitled to the issuance of a commission before judgment could be taken against it, unless the plaintiff chose to take the alternative of controverting the answer filed and proving indebtedness. Hence we think the decision in Freeman v. Miller does not apply.
The same facts were involved in Selman v. Orr, 75 Tex. 528, 12 S. W. 697, as were found in Freeman v. Miller.
Melton v. Lewis, 74 Tex. 411, 12 S. W. 93, another Supreme Court decision relied upon, was an injunction case. It was sought to restrain the execution of a judgment in garnishment. As reported, the case does not show whether the garnishee was a resident or nonresident of the county in which the garnishment was sued out.
Defendant in error also cited Machine Co. v. Edwards, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 537, 29 S. W. 418, a case referred to in our opinion, and Hardware Co. v. Cotton Press Co., 26 S. W. 168, decisions by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals. While the reports of these cases do not show whether the judgments were taken without proof, there are expressions therein which would seem to support the contention of defendant in error. The same may be said of Jones Hardware Co. v. Gunter, 184 S. W. 342, decided by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Seventh District. However, the latter case was reversed and remanded, because of the failure of the trial judge to grant the garnishee’s equitable motion for new trial.
If the cases last cited should be construed to hold that a judgment may be taken without proof, in circumstances such as exist in this case, we cannot follow these holdings, for the reasons heretofore given and these hereafter indicated.
It is also vigorously insisted by counsel that, independently of the claimed conflict with prior Adjudications, our decision substantially destroys the effectiveness of our garnishment statutes. It is said that our construction of these statutes, in effect, invites evasiop by a garnishee, or, by the filing of incomplete and unverified answers, the garnishee is permitted to shift the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to establish the very things the writ commanded him to answer. We do not think such a result from our decision is justified; but, if so, it is because of the statutes themselves. It must be kept in mind that we are here considering the ease of a nonresident garnishee. There is nothing in our opinion to deny a plaintiff *521in garnishment his right to judgment by default, where a resident garnishee has made no answer, or has filed an answer so defective as to constitute no legal answer at all. In such case the plaintiff is, by article 282, cleárly entitled to his judgment without proof. Nor have we held that, where a garnishee residing out of the county has failed or refused to answer interrogatories contained in a commission, issued and served upon him, the plaintiff is not entitled to his judgment without proof. As decided by the Supreme Court frequently, and by several of the Courts of Civil Appeals, the plaintiff in such circumstances is entitled to his judgment without proof, as is expressly authorized by article 292. We have merely held that, where no commission has issued to a nonresident, there is no authority in the garnishment statutes to render a judgment against him without proof, merely because he has filed a defective answer to the writ, subjecting himself to the jurisdiction over his person of the court from which the writ issued. This matter, if governed at all by the statutes on garnishment, is controlled by article 293 and succeeding articles. Under these provisions, if the answer of the garnishee should disclose indebtedness to the defendant, a judgment would be authorized without further proof. If such admissions are not contained in the answer as appears in the instant case, then, under article 293 and subsequent articles, it must be made to appear by proof that the garnishee is so indebted.
We have given to this matter unusually careful attention, pnd we are convinced that our original holding was correct. If the result should seem to be too favorable to a nonresident garnishee, that is a matter for which the Legislature is responsible. It has seen fit to give a garnishee residing out' of the county the right to ignore the writ of garnishment and to refuse to answer thereunder without penalty of judgment, unless the plaintiff shall follow it up with a commission, which, in turn, the garnishee fails or refuses to answer. Indeed, so liberal is this statute that even then the plaintiff may not take judgment, if the garnishee shall previously have filed a full and complete answer to the writ, and shall have excused his failure to answer interrogatories in the commission. . Obviously, we think, it was not intended that a garnishee who could ignore a writ of garnishment without subjecting himself to the risk of judgment would incur . that penalty, under the statutes, where he, presumably in good faith, files an incomplete or insufficient answer, unless the admissions in his answer should justify a judgment.
The motion for rehearing will be overruled.
Motion overruled.