Court Opinion

ID: 9892357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:11:58.418445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:27.050820
License: Public Domain

J-S21030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANDRE A. STONE                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1674 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 1, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Criminal
                 Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0000470-2020

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                          FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023

       Appellant Andre A. Stone appeals from the sentence imposed following

his conviction for first-degree murder. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence and argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his diminished

capacity defense. We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as follows:

       On the afternoon of April 14, 2020, in the City of Shamokin,
       Appellant kills his live-in girlfriend by strangling her in their home,
       then walks to the police station and tells the person who answers
       the door matter of factly that he wants to turn himself in. To
       dispel any disbelief he presents to the police a photo of the dead
       woman on the floor with her back against a couch. The police
       immediately go to the residence, where they find the victim as
       pictured and unresponsive, without any pulse. They return to the
       station to further question the Appellant after administering the
       Miranda[1] warnings. Appellant writes out a confession and then
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
J-S21030-23

      is questioned further whereby he elaborates on the event.
      Appellant is then charged with murder, aggravated assault and
      strangulation.

      In pretrial proceedings, Appellant makes application for a mental
      health evaluation, whereby the court appointed a forensic
      psychiatrist for purposes of compatibility and competency to stand
      trial. A report was provided to only Appellant’s counsel that was
      dated April 22, 2022. Thereafter, Appellant filed on October 13,
      2022, a notice of mental [infirmity] defense[, a]fter the
      psychiatrist found that he was competent to stand trial. At the
      same time, Appellant made an informed decision to forego a jury
      trial. The bench trial covered two days commencing on October
      18, 2022. At the conclusion, this court entered a verdict of guilty
      of murder in the first degree, as well as on the aggravated assault
      and strangulation charges.

Trial Ct. Op., 2/15/23, 1-2. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of

life without parole, and a concurrent term of four to eight years for

strangulation.   The aggravated assault charge merged with first-degree

murder for sentencing purposes.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, which we have

reordered as follows:

      1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding premeditation
         and malice aforethought (elements required for a first degree
         murder conviction) based on the weight of the evidence
         presented at trial.

      2. Whether or not the trial court erred in [its] consideration of a
         diminished capacity defense to mitigate murder in the first
         degree to murder in the [third] degree.

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       3. The questions involved in this appeal relate to whether or not
          reversible error was committed in the aforementioned [trial
          c]ourt order(s)/opinion(s)when the trial court misquoted a
          police transcript, and did thereby commit a mistake of fact that
          goes to specific intent. Specifically, when [Appellant] was
          asked, did you intend to kill the victim, he answered in the
          negative “No. I intended to kill myself.”

Appellant’s Brief at 10.

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

       In his first claim, Appellant challenges the evidence establishing the

intent element for first-degree murder.2         Appellant’s Brief at 13-14.

Specifically, Appellant argues that first-degree murder “requires malice

aforethought and premeditation” and “[t]here was little if any evidence

presented at trial to support that these elements were proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. In support, Appellant contends that “the weight of

the evidence supports the contrary” because “[t]he couple were in an

argument about having an affair on the part of the deceased at the time of

____________________________________________

2 Although Appellant appears to conflate weight and sufficiency claims in his

brief, the two concepts are distinct. Indeed, a weight claim concedes that
there is sufficient evidence, but that some facts so outweigh the others that
to ignore them or accord them equal weight would be a miscarriage of justice.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000). Further,
“[a] weight of the evidence claim must be preserved either in a post-sentence
motion, by a written motion before sentencing, or orally prior to sentencing.
Failure to properly preserve the claim will result in waiver, even if the trial
court addresses the issue in its opinion.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238
A.3d 482, 497 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P.
607(A). Here, our review of the record confirms that Appellant did not file a
post-sentence motion. Therefore, to the extent Appellant intends to challenge
the weight of the evidence on appeal, that claim is waived. See Rivera, 238
A.3d at 497.

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her death, they were drinking alcohol, [and Appellant] was not taking his

medications for a very serious mental illness, [p]sychosis.”        Id. at 14.

Additionally, Appellant claims that “[t]he weight of the evidence supports that

this crime occurred in the heat of passions, and was neither planned or

premeditated in any way.” Id.

      In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

      Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
      question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
      of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
      we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
      favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
      to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
      The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
      need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the
      province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded
      to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
      evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
      every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
      finder.

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted and formatting altered).

      First-degree murder is defined as follows: “[a] criminal homicide

constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional

killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a). Our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]o

sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) a human being was unlawfully

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killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing; and (3) the defendant

acted with malice and the specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Jacoby,

170 A.3d 1065, 1076 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has

held that “[s]pecific intent to kill can be proven where the defendant knowingly

applies deadly force to the person of another. Death caused by strangulation

is sufficient to infer the specific intent required for a conviction of first degree

murder.”    Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492, 507 (Pa. 1997)

(citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      The very nature of strangulation provides an opportunity for the
      assailant to desist at any time during the period it takes to
      manually choke one to death.       There is the struggle until
      unconsciousness which offers a person significant opportunity for
      a change of heart. “The law does not require a lengthy period of
      premeditation; indeed, the design to kill can be formulated in a
      fraction of a second.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 65 A.3d 318,
      323 (Pa. 2013).

      This killing of his girlfriend by Appellant was not just accomplished
      by strangulation alone; rather, when she still showed signs of life,
      he proceeded to apply force on her neck with his foot. This brutal
      act reinforces the Commonwealth’s burden establishing
      premeditation. Appellant described in his police interview as
      noted above that despite his efforts in strangling her with his
      hands, she was still breathing and showed signs of life so he got
      on top of her, used his whole body, particularly his feet to make
      sure she was dead. The coroner’s findings corroborated that she
      had a fracture[d] hyoid bone in her neck that was uncommon with
      just strangulation.

      Clearly, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that
      Appellant had a willful, premeditated, and deliberate intent to kill
      his girlfriend.   His attack never let up or desist with the
      strangulation until he made sure with his feet that all of her life
      was gone.

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Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5.

      Following our review of the record, we agree with trial court’s

conclusions. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89. As noted by the trial court, the

Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant killed the victim by

strangulation, which is sufficient to establish specific intent for first-degree

murder. See Hawkins, 701 A.2d at 507. Further, to the extent Appellant

requests that we re-weigh the evidence presented at trial, we decline to do so

on appeal. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled

to relief on this claim.

                            Diminished Capacity

      Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his

diminished capacity defense. Appellant’s Brief at 14.      In support, Appellant

argues that he “suffered from a psychotic disorder” and the “possibility that

[he] was in a state of psychosis at the time of the incident was very real, as

[Appellant] was not taking his prescribed medications for a substantial period

of time and was also drinking alcohol at the time.” Id. He further contends

that the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence that Appellant was “not

in a state of psychosis at the time of the killing.” Id.

      A defense of diminished capacity is “an extremely limited defense”

where a defendant admits criminal liability generally but seeks to mitigate a

first-degree murder charge to third-degree murder.         Commonwealth v.

Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 312 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). “To establish

a diminished capacity defense, a defendant must prove that his cognitive

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abilities of deliberation and premeditation were so compromised, by mental

defect or voluntary intoxication, that he was unable to formulate the specific

intent to kill.” Id. (citations omitted).

      However, our Supreme Court has explained:

      The mere fact of intoxication does not give rise to a
      diminished capacity defense. Evidence that the defendant
      lacked the ability to control his or her actions or acted impulsively
      is irrelevant to specific intent to kill, and thus is not admissible to
      support a diminished capacity defense. Furthermore, diagnosis
      with a personality disorder does not suffice to establish
      diminished capacity.

Id. (citations omitted and emphases added); see also Commonwealth v.

Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1141 (Pa. Super. 2009) (explaining that

“personality disorders or schizoid or paranoid diagnoses are not relevant to a

diminished capacity defense” (citation omitted)).

      Additionally, “a showing of voluntary intoxication can negate the intent

necessary for a conviction of first-degree murder and reduce the crime of

murder from first to third degree.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 861 A.2d

898, 907 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted). However, the evidence presented

“must show that the defendant was unable to form the specific intent to kill

because he was so overwhelmed or overpowered by drugs to the point of

losing his faculties at the time the crime was committed.” Id. at 908 (citation

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 653 (Pa.

2008) (requiring that a defendant show that he was “overwhelmed to the point

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of losing his faculties and sensibilities” to prove a voluntary intoxication

defense (citation omitted)).

      The defendant bears the burden to prove any defense related to his

mental state by a preponderance of the evidence. See Commonwealth v.

Collins, 810 A.2d 698, 701 (Pa. Super. 2002).          As noted previously, the

Commonwealth bears the burden to prove each element of first-degree

murder, including the defendant acted with specific intent to kill, beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jacoby, 170 A.3d at 1076. However, “evidence of

intoxication places no additional burden on the Commonwealth . . . . [T]he

Commonwealth [is] not required to ‘disprove’ [the defendant’s] intoxication at

the time of the crimes.” Commonwealth v. S. Miller, 897 A.2d 1281, 1285

(Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

      Finally, a defense of voluntary intoxication “is a question of fact solely

within the province of the [fact-finder], who is free to believe any, all, or none

of the testimony regarding intoxication. Similarly, the defense of diminished

capacity is a matter for a [fact-finder] to believe or disbelieve as it sees fit.”

Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 2009) (citations

omitted and formatting altered).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      When the Appellant came to the police station to turn himself in,
      he said that his girlfriend was cheating on him and he would not
      take it anymore. In his written statement he said, “the last straw
      was telling me she was having sex with her cousin and I killed
      her.” In the police interview, he related that they argued the night
      before, the next day they had more conversation about lost

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     pregnancies, being a family, and her cheating on him.           This
     argument led to him snapping.

     Revelations of infidelity are not sufficient provocation to support a
     heat of passion defense. Commonwealth v. [D.] Miller, 987
     A.2d 638, 649-51 (Pa. 2009); see Commonwealth v. Mason,
     130 A.3d 601, 629-30 (Pa. 2015). Appellant’s arguments over
     her sex with others as he told it was not such a provoking event
     or a surprising revelation. Id. Appellant stated and testified the
     argument started the day before, and then it died down. See
     Commonwealth v. Frederick, 498 A.2d 1322 (Pa. 1985).

     The diminished capacity defense requires proof by a defendant
     “that his cognitive abilities of deliberation and premeditation were
     so compromised, by mental defect or voluntary intoxication, that
     he was unable to formulate the specific intent to kill.”
     Hutchinson, 25 A.3d at 312. The defense is extremely limited,
     and it operates only to negate premeditation and if successful,
     reduces a first-degree murder charge to third-degree murder. A
     “diagnosis with a personality disorder does not suffice to establish
     diminished capacity.” Mason, 130 A.3d at 631.

     The diminished capacity-mental defect defense and the
     diminished capacity-voluntary intoxication defense operate the
     same way. Id.

     Appellant argues that there was photographic evidence of his
     drinking to support his brief testimony that he was drinking at the
     time, i.e. two red cups on a coffee table in the room. Yet none of
     the police noticed any signs of intoxication. They testified he was
     lucid, with a normal demeanor at the station. Appellant’s scant
     evidence is clearly insufficient.

     With regard to his mental state at the time of the strangulation,
     Appellant testified that he had a diagnosis of “psychosis not
     otherwise specified.” His frame of mind was one of “disbelief that
     I just completed such a horrific crime,” and that voices in his head
     were telling him to kill, “mostly kill myself.”

     The forensic psychiatrist opined that Appellant’s diagnosis was
     mild symptoms of an unspecified psychotic disorder. His not
     taking medications had only a minimal ramification at the time.
     In his report, he concludes that Appellant’s descriptions of
     supposed psychiatric symptoms at the time of the offense is
     “inconsistent and implausible.” Further, he found upon his
     evaluation that there is no objective, contemporaneous evidence

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      that he had mental impairments at the time of the offense.
      Nothing impaired his capacity to understand the wrongfulness of
      his actions or to refrain from engaging in wrongful activity.

      Based on all of the foregoing, the diminished capacity-voluntary
      intoxication, and diminished capacity-mental defect defenses are
      rejected.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-7.

      Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the trial

court’s opinion, we affirm based on the trial court’s analysis of this issue. See

id. The trial court considered Appellant’s mental state and alleged impairment

at the time of the murder, but ultimately concluded that he failed to present

evidence to support a diminished capacity defense.          See id.     As noted

previously, both voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity are questions

of fact for the fact-finder. See Vandivner, 962 A.2d at 1177. Therefore,

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

                                Mistake of Fact

      In his remaining claim, Appellant argues that the trial court made a

mistake of fact when considering Appellant’s statement to police. Appellant’s

Brief at 13. Specifically, Appellant refers to the trial court’s statement when

announcing the verdict, where the court noted that Appellant had told police

that he had intended to kill the victim. Id. However, Appellant contends that

when he was specifically asked about his intent during the interview, he told

police that he did not intend to kill the victim and had intended to kill himself.

Id. Appellant argues that although the trial court “points to different more

general areas of the transcript” to support its conclusion, “it is a point of

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construction in any written document, that the specific language controls the

general language contained in the document.”           Id.   Therefore, Appellant

concludes that the trial court made a “mistake of fact” when concluding that

Appellant confessed his intent to kill in the initial interview with police. Id.

      The trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      In announcing the verdict in open court, this court stated that
      “[Appellant] was asked at the interview [by police] did you intend
      to kill her and he answered, yes.” Appellant contends that this
      was an erroneous statement of fact by referencing another part of
      the interview where Appellant stated that it was not his intention
      to kill her but he intended to kill himself. The court’s statement
      is a correct finding of fact and conclusion of law. In the police
      interviews the same day as the crime was committed, the
      following exchange took place:

         Office Ray Siko: You said that she wouldn’t die.

         [Appellant]: No

         Officer Ray Siko: What were you doing at that point when
         you said that she wouldn’t die?

         [Appellant]: I was trying to get the life out of her.

         Officer Ray Siko: And how we[r]e you doing that?

         [Appellant]: I was choking her. I was standing on her.

         Officer Ray Siko: With your hands?

         [Appellant]: And my feet, my whole body.

      Further along in the interview, this line of questioning continued:
      (Transcript p. 19[.])

         Officer Ray Siko: Did you use anything else other than your
         hands on her body?

         [Appellant]: I just made sure that she was dead.

      And Appellant further explained: (Transcript p. 31)

         [Appellant]: I realized that she is still alive.

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         Office Ray Siko: mm-hmm

         [Appellant]: And I made sure. I got on top of her, put my
         foot on her just to make sure.

      In addition, the court’s statement was in direct reference to the
      Appellant’s admission: (Transcript p. 12)

         Officer Ray Siko: Can you tell me what happened today?

         [Appellant]: Yeah, I killed her.

      So, the intention was clear, i.e., to kill, and his girlfriend was the
      intended victim as he went to great lengths to make sure she was
      actually dead, including taking her pulse in several places and
      then stepping on her neck with his foot to end her life for sure.

      The autopsy did confirm that the victim died of asphyxia second
      to strangulation. The injuries were consistent with strangulation
      by two hands around the neck. But a unique finding here by the
      autopsy was a fractured neck hyoid bone that is uncommon with
      strangulation, but it is explained by a foot impressed on the neck.

      There was no evidence whatsoever that backs up Appellant’s
      response at the interview, or his trial stating that he wanted to kill
      himself. No evidence of any attempt on his part to do any harm
      to himself; rather, all the evidence supported his intentional act
      of killing his girlfriend.

Trial Ct. Op. at 2-4.

      Following our review of the record, we conclude that Appellant is not

entitled to relief on this issue. As noted previously, “[i]t is within the province

of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’s

testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Palmer, 192

A.3d at 89 (citation omitted). Here, although Appellant told police that he did

not intend to kill the victim, he gave multiple responses indicating the

contrary. See N.T. Trial, 10/18/22, at 101 (reflecting that when Appellant

realized the victim was still alive after the manual strangulation, he placed his

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foot on her neck to make sure she was dead). Further, Appellant does not

dispute that he killed the victim by way of strangulation.        As discussed

previously, “[d]eath caused by strangulation is sufficient to infer the specific

intent required for a conviction of first degree murder.” Hawkins, 701 A.2d

at 507 (citation omitted). Under these circumstances, we discern no merit to

Appellant’s mistake of fact claim and conclude that Appellant has no basis for

relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/23/2023

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