Court Opinion

ID: 9662282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:04:45.79452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:38.339485
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant attacks, in one of the most scholarly briefs to bé *247filed in this court in some time, the soundness of our original opinion herein and points out that the affidavit of Kimes was sworn to before a notary public and not before a magistrate. This fact, he says, prevents its use.for the purpose of extradition.
According to Section 3 of Article 1008a, V.A.C.C.P., no demand shall be recognized unless accompanied by
1. Copy of indictment, or
2. Information supported by affidavit, or
3. Copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate, together with a copy of a warrant which was issued thereupon, or
4. Copy of a judgment of conviction.
We have concluded that the demand in the instant case falls within category (2) above and that the Act does not require the affidavit mentioned in that category to be made before a magistrate.
He further calls attention to the fact that Title 18, Section 3182, U.S.C.A., provides, in part, that the demand must be accompanied by “an affidavit made before a magistrate” and contends that any order of extradition based upon the affidavit before us would be invalid and in violation of such Act. This contention requires more study.
The legislature of this state enacted Article 1008a, V.A.P.C., Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, in 1951. Forty of our states, including Arkansas, have now adopted such an Act.
Following such adoption, the Federal rendition statute (Title 18, Section 3182) ceased to- be the exclusive method of extradition between states who have adopted the Uniform Act. Gulley v. Apple (Ark.), 210 S.W. 2d 514; Ex parte Tenner (Cal.), 128 Pac. 2d 338, 314 U.S. 585, 86 L. Ed. 473, 217 U.S. 597, 87 L. Ed. 488.
A state statute on the subject of extradition is unconstitutional only when it seeks to abridge or lessen the duty placed by the Constitution on the part of the chief executive of the asylum state. It follows that any state statute which facilitates the rendition of persons charged with crime is not in conflict with the Federal Constitution and rests rather upon the comity between states and not upon the Federal Constitution. Culbertson v. *248Sweeney, 44 N.E. 2d 809, and Cassis v. Fair (Texas), 29 S.W. 2d 245, 151 A.L.R. 233, at page 237.
A state statute which makes less strenuous requirements than those set forth in the Federal rendition statute is valid and does not conflict with the Federal statute.
Prior to the enactment of Article 1008a in 1951, there was no statute in this state which set forth the requirements of a demand, and so naturally the Federal statute was looked to in order to determine its requisites. Such reference is no longer necessary if the statute meets the test set forth above.
Appellant cites many cases decided in this and other courts and prior to the adoption of the State Uniform Criminal Extradition Acts. Such cases ceased to be authority following this basic change in our law relating to extradition and need not be here discussed.
Appellant’s last contention is that the affidavit of Kimes is insufficient to support the information because it- was made several days after the information was filed but before the issuance of the demand. It is the general rule that for an information to be valid it must be based upon a complaint then in existence. This is true in all prosecutions for misdemeanors in this state, but does it necessarily follow that this is true where we are testing the authority of the Governor to grant extradition? It is interesting to note that the extradition statute says information supported by affidavit, not based upon an affidavit.
By a well reasoned opinion (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department), People v. Skinner, 135 N.Y.S. 2d 107, this identical question has been decided. The court said:
“We are of the opinion that a proper and judicious interpretation of the language of the statute requires that the affidavits referred to as in support of an information are only for the purpose of demonstrating to- the governors of both the demanding state and the state of asylum that there is merit in the formal charge laid by a public prosecuting officer, or at least that the information, rarely ever made upon personal knowledge, is not unfounded. As such, the date of the supporting affidavits has no bearing upon their sufficiency to meet the requirements of the New York statute.”
In opposition to this holding, we are cited Ex parte Gardner, 159 Texas Cr. R. 365, 264 S.W. 2d 125. There we said:
*249“There is no showing in the record that the laws of Arkansas are any different from those of this State. In the absence of such a showing, we are bound to assume that they are the same. Ex parte Cherry, 155 Texas Cr. R. 324, 234 S.W. 2d 1011.
* * *
“It is apparent that the affidavit was made after the execution of the information. This Court has always required that an information be based upon a complaint then in existence.”
In the instant case, the laws of Arkansas are shown, and we learn therefrom that prosecution in that state may be instituted upon information alone. It therefore follows that the affidavit of Kimes was not necessary in order to institute prosecution. Its sole function was to meet the requirements of our extradition statute. When considered in that light, the holding in People v. Skinner, supra, is in point. At the time the Governor of Arkansas issued the demand and at the time the Governor of this state granted the same and issued the warrant, each had before him an “information supported by affidavit,” as required by the extradition acts of each state.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.