Court Opinion

ID: 9712277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:50:38.355837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.267421
License: Public Domain

Hennessey, C.J.
(dissenting). I would affirm. After reviewing the record, I conclude that all of the rulings of the trial judge *191were free of error. The court in its opinion obviously, and I think incorrectly, interprets the record differently.
. The court today holds that “objective reasonableness” is the standard to be applied when a discrimination plaintiff rejects an offer of reinstatement. This issue simply was not before the trial judge, and is not properly before this court on appeal. The law of the case as shown by the judge’s instructions to the jury was that the plaintiff could recover back pay after August 1, 1975, if her rejection of Itek’s reinstatement offer was “reasonable.” The defendant did not object to this instruction, or request a charge of “objective reasonableness.” The defendant first raised the issue of “objective reasonableness” (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 [1982]) in his memorandum on the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This came too late. The law of the case had already been established by the trial judge without assistance or objection from the defendant, and the jury had returned its verdict.
Thus, the law as presented to the jury was “reasonableness,” and the question properly before this court on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence on this issue to send the question of damages to the jury. In reviewing a denial of the defendant’s motion for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we must consider whether “ ‘ anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. ’ ” Forlano v. Hughes, 393 Mass. 502, 504 (1984), and cases cited. The defendant testified that his client rejected the reinstatement offer because “she’d be going back into the same kind of circumstances that existed,” and because “there were several people that she would be working for she didn’t feel comfortable with.” The majority opinion, without explanation or citation to authority, concludes: “Surely, . . . [this] is not alone a sufficient reason for a reasonable person to have refused reemployment,” ante at 190. I disagree. There was evidence that the plaintiff feared further discrimination, and it was properly a question for the jury whether this fear was “reasonable” under the circumstances.
*192Contrary to the above reasoning, the court today establishes for the first timé that the concept of “reinstatement offers” should be treated under State law similarly to Ford Motor Co., supra. Having strained to adopt Ford Motor Co. as the law of this Commonwealth under G. L. c. 15IB (1984 ed.), the majority goes on to conclude that a directed verdict should have been entered for the defendant. Even if by some reasoning, and at this late date, the Ford Motor Co. rule should be applied in this case, at best the defendant is entitled to a new trial. As I read the record, a jury question is presented as to whether the plaintiff’s rejection of Itek’s reinstatement offer was “objectively reasonable.”