Court Opinion

ID: 9527748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:33:47.584933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:11.042220
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).

Defendant, now appellant, was in prison for 18 months. From date of conviction to receipt of parole discharge, nearly 4 years elapsed. Believing he had paid his debt to society, he protested in writing, by an attorney, the Judicial System’s attempt to reach out and supervise him after his discharge. He is correct. See Application of Adams, 360 N.W.2d 513, 517 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting, and Fosheim, C.J., joining “Rationale Two” of dissent); State v. Adams, 360 N.W.2d 519, 522 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., and Fosheim, C.J., dissenting); State v. Griffee, 331 N.W.2d 576 (S.D.1983); State v. Means, 268 N.W.2d 802 (S.D.1978). See also, Dunker v. Brown County Bd. of Educ., 80 S.D. 193, 121 N.W.2d 10 (1963); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo.1979); S.D. Const, art. IV, § 3 and art. XIV, §§ 1 and 2; accord with my view: In re Question Concerning State Judicial Review, 199 Colo. 463, 610 P.2d 1340 (1980).
As we have before us an invasion of the domain of the executive branch of government by the judicial branch of government, I dissent. Further, I dissent because neither the trial court nor the majority opinion recognizes the difference between a suspended sentence (such as the case here) and probation. A revocation of probation cannot ensue from a suspended sentence. Moreover, parole and probation are distinctly separate concepts and cannot be merged.