Court Opinion

ID: 9653413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:46:28.326204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:59.056737
License: Public Domain

BIGGS, Circuit Judge.
The question presented by the case at bar is whether a transfer of property in trust made by the decedent, Church, in his lifetime is includible in his gross estate for the purpose of imposition of estate tax. See Section 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 811(c), Section 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 as amended, 44 Stat. 70. The trust indenture, executed by Church on May 17, 1924, provided that the income from the trust should be paid to him during life, that on his death the trust should terminate, the corpus to be distributed to his issue then surviving; that in the event he should have no lawful issue surviving the principal amount of the trust with any increment should be paid in equal shares to his brothers and sisters then surviving, any child or children of a deceased brother or sister to take the share per stirpes which the parent would have been entitled to receive if living. No power to amend, alter or revoke the trust was reserved by Church. On the date of the creation of the trust he had one brother and one sister of the full blood and four half-brothers. There were then living seven children of the brothers of the half-blood. Church was then unmarried and had no children. At his death he was survived by his brother of the whole blood who had two children who were then living; by his sister of the whole blood who had one child then living; and by his four half-brothers, who had seven children then living.
The Commissioner took the position that the corpus of the trust was includible in the decedent’s gross estate. The Tax Court overruled the Commissioner’s determination and he appealed.
We think that the decision of the Tax Court must be affirmed. The issue presented seems to be one reserved to the determination of the Tax Court by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct., 239, 88 L.Ed. 248, in Wilmington Trust Co. v. Helvering, 316 U.S. 164, 62 S.Ct. 984, 86 L.Ed. 1352 and in later very pertinent decisions. We cannot “identify a clear-cut mistake of law * * * ” in the Tax Court’s decision in the case at bar. See the Dobson case, supra, 320 U.S. at pages 501, 502, 64 S.Ct. 239, at page 247. In Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 560, 64 S.Ct. 722, 88 L.Ed. 927, the Supreme Court stated *12that it was not its task to draw inferences from facts or to supplement stipulated facts, that function resting with the Tax Court. The Supreme Court said that it could modify or reverse the decision of the Tax Court only if that tribunal’s determination was “not in accordance with law.” Assuredly the function referred to does not lie in this court.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Scottish American Co., 323 U.S. 119, 122, 65 S.Ct. 169, 89 L.Ed. 113, the Supreme Court reversed us, stating that the Tax Court drew certain inferences and conclusions which we could not overrule since there was no clear-cut mistake of law. Mr. Justice Murphy laid enaphasis upon the validity of factual patterns as found by the Tax Court saying, Id., 323 U.S. at page 125, 65 S.Ct. at page 172, “The skilled judgment of the Tax Court, which is the basic fact-finding and inference-making body, should thus be given wide range in such proceedings.” In Choate v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 469, 89 L.Ed. 653, the Supreme Court placed emphasis upon the right of the Tax Court to weigh the legal effect of documentary evidence and in effect admonished the-Circuit Courts of Appeals that the legal effect of the transactions as found by the Tax Court generally should not be disturbed. In Trust of Bing-ham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365, 370, 371, 65 S.Ct. 1232, 89 L.Ed. 1670, it was said that even if “clear-cut questions of law” were presented the Tax Court’s decision was entitled to great weight and that reviewing courts may set aside a decision of the Tax Court only when it announces a rule of general applicability which falls short of meeting statutory requirements. In this connection emphasis was laid on the fact that the Tax Court in general decided each case on a particular pattern of circumstances. In John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner and Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 66 S.Ct. 299, this doctrine seemingly was reiterated.
In the light of the foregoing decisions we think that we may not set aside the finding of the Tax Court in the instant case that “ * * * no part of the corpus of the trust is includible in the eslate of the decedent as a transfer ‘intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death.’ ” Accordingly the decision of the Tax Court will be affirmed.