Court Opinion

ID: 9466173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:07:17.565026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:35.045311
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
William Fitzgerald, a horse trainer and driver whose at-will stall agreement was terminated by Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc. because it believed he was driving horses that had been racing inconsistently,1 has brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights statute. To prevail under this enactment Fitzgerald must demonstrate that the defendants, under color of state law, deprived him of a constitutional right. The district court and now a majority of this Court have agreed with Fitzgerald that the termination of the stall agreement is properly termed, under the circumstances of this case, “state action.”2 They have also decided that the failure of Mountain Laurel and its officials to provide Fitzgerald with a hearing in connection with the termination of the stall agreement amounts to a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law — a constitutional violation. The majority does not address definitively, however, some of the problems inherent in the preliminary injunction itself. For the *605reasons set forth in this opinion, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority’s description of this case as requiring yet another “plunge into the murky waters of the state action doctrine” is quite apt. Few, if any, of the recent Supreme Court pronouncements on this subject have gone uncriticized; and, if the commentators differ about which precedents to assail and which to defend, there is virtual unanimity regarding the lack of a coherent state action doctrine.3 The paucity of consistent principles makes any adjudication in this area difficult, particularly when, as is true here, the evidence adduced in the district court reasonably lends itself to varying interpretations.
As the majority opinion demonstrates, two different approaches to the state action question might be applied here. First, it might be argued that state regulation of harness racing in Pennsylvania is so pervasive, and the relationship between the Commonwealth and the private racetracks so interdependent, that the acts of the track are inseparable from the acts of the government. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). The question for resolution under such an analysis is whether a “symbiotic relationship” may be said to exist between Pennsylvania and its privately licensed racetracks.
Although the majority declares that the state’s connections with Mountain Laurel are “decidedly more symbiotic” than was the state’s relationship to the public utility in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974), it decides that the claimed interdependence is not sufficient to meet the symbiotic relationship test. “We cannot say,” the majority concludes, “that every act of Mountain Laurel is an act of the State.” Majority opinion, supra, at 596. This position accords with that taken by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Fulton v. Hecht, 545 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984, 97 S.Ct. 1682, 52 L.Ed.2d 379 (1977). Although the question is a close one, I am persuaded by the majority’s reasoning that no symbiotic relationship exists here.4
The majority predicates its decision on the second approach, the “close nexus” test of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). It is from this proposition that I primarily diverge from the majority.
In Jackson, the Supreme Court, assessing whether a heavily regulated, privately owned utility company’s termination of service to a customer was state action, held *606that “the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. at 351, 95 S.Ct. at 453. In this case, the majority concludes that the Jackson test is satisfied because “the presiding racing judge and racing secretary, acting in their official capacities, participated in the decision to expel Fitzgerald.” Majority Opinion, supra, at 599 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). I believe that this application of Jackson to the facts of this case is incorrect. Further, I am concerned that today’s decision might Lead to an unprecedented degree of federal constitutional control over a broad range of heretofore private transactions.5
The hearings conducted by the district court revealed that Mountain Laurel and the Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission each possess independent, though often complementary, authority over racetrack operations. The Commission is charged with establishing rules and regulations governing the conduct of races and with licensing drivers, trainers, and other racing personnel. The Commission licenses several racetrack employees, racing judges and a racing secretary, to enforce on a daily basis the rules and regulations of the Commission and to administer various Commission policies.6 Commission Rule 18, section 5 authorizes the racing judges to discipline any driver who engages in inconsistent, careless, or indifferent driving.7 In turn, Mountain Laurel retains primary responsibility over the track facilities, including the authority to contract privately to provide stall space and other services for racing personnel. Neither the Commission nor the secretary and judges have authority to intervene in these private contractual relations.
In its stall agreement with Fitzgerald, Mountain Laurel specifically reserved the right to terminate Fitzgerald’s privileges, for any reason, on seventy-two hours notice. The racetrack management alone exercised that right because it suspected Fitzgerald’s horses of racing inconsistently. The majority would transform this otherwise private act into state action because Mountain Laurel consulted with the racing judges and the secretary before making that decision.
The record indicates that the management of Mountain Laurel, upon suspecting Fitzgerald of driving inconsistent horses, took the only logical and prudent course available: they confirmed their suspicions with the persons designated by the Commonwealth to monitor racing behavior — the racing judges. The record is totally barren, however, of any suggestion that the judges or the racing secretary told the track management to terminate Fitzgerald’s stall privileges or even encouraged it to do so. Rather, the record shows only that the secretary and judges, when asked, confirmed Mountain Laurel’s suspicions and that Mountain Laurel, alone, then made the decision to terminate the stall agreement.
*607Although the racing judges and secretary appear to have been involved in the discussions that resulted in Mountain Laurel’s decision to terminate Fitzgerald’s stall privileges, I cannot agree with the majority that this involvement transmutes the racetrack’s act into state action. The Commission and the racetrack each has strong interests in ensuring that races are conducted properly and that drivers and horses perform fairly and competitively in each race. The Commission acts, pursuant to Rule 18, to discipline drivers engaged in a pattern of inconsistent driving in order to vindicate the sporting and betting public’s interest in honest racing. At the same time, Mountain Laurel can be expected to use its independent authority — such as revocation of stall privileges — to remove from the track horses it suspects of inconsistent racing in order to protect its own integrity and goodwill.8 The two actions are complementary, but this confluence of interests does not mean that the state’s interests must swallow the private right. In short, Mountain Laurel’s decision to terminate Fitzgerald’s stall agreement was independently motivated and executed pursuant to its own, exclusive authority.
The record is clear that Mountain Laurel itself, not the secretary or the judges, terminated the stall agreement. The track was without power to suspend Fitzgerald’s license or to fine him, and neither the secretary nor the judges had any power to terminate his stall privileges. Although the track’s decision was communicated to Fitzgerald by the racing secretary, the secretary in effect was acting as a messenger for his employer, the racetrack. The secretary possessed no power whatsoever to terminate the stall agreement between Fitzgerald and the track, or even to reprimand him for “driving inconsistent horses.”9 Moreover, Mountain Laurel in no way sought to invoke the authority of the Commission. Because Mountain Laurel, alone, possessed the power to terminate the stall agreement, its action — despite the involvement of the secretary and judges — remained private in nature.10 Under these circumstances, I cannot agree that there was a close nexus between the state involvement — at most consultation and advice — and the challenged action of the regulated entity — an independently motivated decision based on Mountain Laurel’s exclusive authority— such that the action of the latter may fairly be termed state action under Jackson.
My disagreement with the majority’s application of the Jackson close nexus test to the facts of this case is underscored by concern regarding the possible extension of *608this holding to analogous situations. Two examples illustrate my apprehension.11
Commercial banks are heavily regulated by state and federal governments, yet they remain essentially private entities. As private businesses, they may hire and discharge their employees without providing them with hearings. Part of the system of state and federal regulation of banking includes a statutory prohibition against willful misapplication of bank funds. Suppose that a bank suspects one of its vice presidents of violating this statute and asks the Treasury Department to investigate. The investigators conclude that the vice president has willfully misapplied bank funds in violation of the statute and meet with bank officials to inform them of their conclusions. At this meeting, the bank decides that the proper course is to refer the matter to the United States Attorney and to discharge the vice president. I read the majority’s opinion as requiring the bank to abide by the procedural requirements of the fifth amendment’s due process clause because the bank officers made their decision to discharge the vice president in conjunction with the Treasury Department investigators. It is also worth noting that in this situation, as in the present case, only the bank has the authority to discharge employees; the Treasury officials, even if they “participated” in the decision, could only advise the bank regarding their investigative findings.
Similarly, states extensively regulate casinos, particularly to ensure that undesirable persons do not come to control or manipulate the industry. Suppose a casino suspects an employee of “fixing” a roulette wheel or of having contacts with organized crime — matters that would violate state law — and asks state gaming inspectors to investigate. The investigation then confirms the casino’s suspicions, and the general manager of the casino decides to discharge the employee based on his conversations with the investigators. Here again, I am troubled that the majority’s opinion would require a finding of state action, because of the investigators’ participation in the discharge decision.12
Ironically, a finding of state action in these types of situations could well harm more employees, and persons like Fitzgerald, than it benefits. Employers can be expected to balk at adopting the panoply of procedures mandated by due process.13 If consultation with regulatory officials brings about this burden, employers may be dissuaded from seeking advice from those in any way associated with governmental agencies before discharging employees suspected of impropriety. To the extent this occurs, there is a risk that more employees will be discharged summarily and erroneously than is the case today.
*609In sum, I agree with the majority that the relationship between Pennsylvania and Mountain Laurel is such that not every act of the track is attributable to the state. I also agree that there is nothing in Mountain Laurel’s exercise of the stall agreement revocation clause that, by its nature, implicates the state in that agreement or in the exercise of the rights enumerated therein. I disagree only with the majority’s determination that there is a sufficient nexus of state and private action when quasi-public officials participate in discussions that result in a business’ decision to invoke its private contractual prerogatives.14 In the present case, only Mountain Laurel, not the state, has acted so as to preserve the integrity of harness racing. Because I do not believe that its action is “properly attributable” 15 to the Commonwealth, I do not consider it to be state action under the federal Constitution or action under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.
II.
Inasmuch as I conclude state action is not present here — because Mountain Laurel did not terminate its stall agreement with Fitzgerald “under color of state law” — it would follow that Fitzgerald was not deprived of a constitutional right when the stall agreement was cancelled. The Constitution does not protect a citizen from a private party’s acts simply because such acts might have the effect of depriving him of what would be recognized for other purposes as a cognizable “property” or “liberty” interest.
Even if state action may be predicated on the facts of this case, however, I question whether, consonant with applicable Supreme Court cases, Fitzgerald can demonstrate that what occurred here amounts to a deprivation of a “liberty” interest without due process of law. Both the district court and the majority base their conclusion to the contrary on the likelihood that the termination of the stall agreement, because of the alleged inconsistency of his horses, will “stigmatize” Fitzgerald and lead to the loss of a tangible interest, such as future employment possibilities. In this regard they rely on Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1971). None of these cases held, however, that the state’s action created a stigma sufficient to implicate a constitutional liberty interest. Although some of the language of these opinions may be helpful to Fitzgerald, the decisions, taken as a whole, do not provide much support. Moreover, the case for such a stigma cannot be easily articulated. First, there is considerable question regarding the extent of the alleged harm to Fitzgerald’s reputation. The district court reasoned:
In the instant case . . . impairment of future business opportunities to the plaintiff as a result of the defendants’ acts has been alleged, and, we conclude the likelihood thereof sufficiently proved, because under Rule 23 § 8 of the Commission Rules and Regulations, the fact of plaintiff’s expulsion must be communicated to the Commission, which in turn must communicate it to every racing association in the state of Pennsylvania, which virtually assures that all of plaintiff’s potential clients will be aware of it.16
It is not at all obvious, however, that Rule 23, § 8 applies to Mountain Laurel’s action here. Fitzgerald was not excluded from the track pursuant to the racing officials’ delegated power to enforce Commission rules; rather, Mountain Laurel terminated his stall privileges. In fact, apparently believing that it was not acting in a manner *610requiring it to notify the Commission under Rule 23, § 8, Mountain Laurel did not report its decision regarding Fitzgerald to the Commission, and nothing in the record indicates that it ever intended to do so.17
Second, it is not clear, to me at least, that Fitzgerald even alleges that his reputation will be damaged. The complaint certainly was not premised on this theory. Paragraph 20 states that the charge of inconsistency was not based on “any discrepancy or inconsistency of the plaintiff but . solely due to the allegation of inconsistency of the three horses.”18 Paragraph 24 adds that Mountain Laurel “has not formally charged plaintiff with any form of wrongdoing.”19 Similarly, the affidavit filed in support of the complaint asserts in paragraph 3: “It must be carefully noted that at no time has said plaintiff been accused of misconduct, specific or otherwise.”20 Thus, Fitzgerald’s theory was not that a stigma would attach to him, but that the relatively few harness racing tracks in the area afforded Mountain Laurel a virtual monopoly over the sport, and that Mountain Laurel’s termination of the stall agreement had the effect of depriving him of the opportunity to make a living.
Finally, Fitzgerald does not assert that the charge of driving inconsistent horses was false. It may be doubted whether statements made by a state official can be said to defame or stigmatize one’s reputation so as to implicate a constitutionally protected interest when the truth of such statements is not called into question. Although Fitzgerald does not concede that he has driven inconsistent horses, neither does he allege that Mountain Laurel’s actions were defamatory or untrue.
In light of these weaknesses in Fitzgerald’s claim that he was deprived of a “liberty” interest, I am inclined to doubt whether Fitzgerald could prevail even if state action were established. Inasmuch as I reject the conclusion that state action is present, however, I have no occasion to address definitively the likelihood of Fitzgerald’s ultimate success in this regard.
III.
Putting aside my disagreement with the majority’s resolution of the state action question and my reservations about the merits of Fitzgerald’s due process claim, I also believe that the district court failed to adhere to the rules of this Court governing the issuance of preliminary injunctions.21 First, as discussed in part II above, I believe that Fitzgerald has not demonstrated that he is reasonably likely to prevail on his claim. Second, I am not convinced that Fitzgerald has shown irreparable injury to himself or that Mountain Laurel and the public will be injured less by the injunction than Fitzgerald would be without it. There is no indication that the district court balanced Fitzgerald’s interest in retaining his stall privileges against the racetrack’s and the public’s interests in ensuring that all races are, and appear to be, run competitively.22 Third, the duration of the preliminary injunction extends beyond the term of the stall agreement, which expired November 11, 1978. Mountain Laurel is ordered, *611pending further action by the district court, to issue a stall permit to Fitzgerald, upon the latter’s request, for future racing seasons, even though Fitzgerald’s rights under the stall agreement were specifically limited to the 1978 season. Therefore, the preliminary injunction extends beyond the period of time necessary to preserve the status quo ante and improperly forces Mountain Laurel to issue a permit to a person whom it otherwise has the legal right to refuse.
Because I would reverse the judgment of the district court and dissolve the preliminary injunction, I respectfully dissent.

. Fitzgerald did not allege that Mountain Laurel terminated the stall agreement because Fitzgerald had been driving inconsistently. Rather, the complaint avers that Mountain Laurel acted “solely due to the allegation of inconsistency of the three horses.” App. 9a. The distinction between “inconsistent driving” and “driving inconsistent horses” has been blurred throughout this litigation. The charge of “driving inconsistent horses” refers only to the performance of the horses. In contrast, “inconsistent driving” implies some degree of improper motive or lackadaisical behavior on the part of the driver. Because Fitzgerald claims only that Mountain Laurel suspected him of “driving inconsistent horses,” this opinion proceeds on that basis.

. The “under color of state law” requirement of section 1983 has been treated as essentially congruent with the “state action” requirement of the fourteenth amendment. See, e. g., Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 955 n.34 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (listing authorities).

. See, e. g., A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 65-70 (1970); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 473-75 (1978); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18-2, at 1156-57 (1979).

. Had the Pennsylvania Racing Commission specifically approved the terms of the stall agreement and their implications, there arguably would be state action under the doctrine of Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 72 S.Ct. 813, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (1952). In Pollak, a passenger of the Capitol Transit Company, a District of Columbia railway and bus service, sued to enjoin the company from playing radio programs on its streetcars and buses. Plaintiff alleged that the programs violated his first and fifth amendment rights. Transit’s operations were extensively regulated by the utilities commission; and the commission investigated Transit’s use of the radio programs, held public hearings, and concluded that the programs did not impair the public’s safety, comfort, or convenience. The Supreme Court held that the commission’s specific approval of Transit’s actions caused the latter to be state action. Id at 462, 72 S.Ct. 813.
In this case, although the Racing Commission received the stall agreement form, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Racing Commission’s review, if there was any at all, was anything but pro forma. Unlike the investigation in Poliak, the Commission did not “put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357, 95 S.Ct. at 456 (1974). If there were evidence that the Commission carefully reviewed the terms of the stall agreement and signaled its approval of the terms on policy grounds, this Court could more readily infer that the Racing Commission sought to use the stall agreement to help enforce the state’s goal of disciplining inconsistent drivers. Short of this kind of state involvement, however, the Poliak rationale would not appear to apply.

. I am also concerned that the decision reached by the majority is contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent refusal to define liberally state action in cases involving procedural due process claims. In both Jackson and Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978), the Court declined to find state action in transactions between private companies and customers who alleged that they had been denied the procedural guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. These cases may signal a reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to impose federal constitutional standards on the manner in which private parties choose to deal with one another in a business context. Moreover, if the Court in Jackson declined to treat the power company, which exercised monopolistic control over two basic services — the supply of gas and electricity — as if it were the state, it is doubtful whether it would hold the activities of a private racetrack to be state action. See generally Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The “Government Function” and “Power Theory” Approaches, 1979 Wash.U.L.Q. 755, 774-80.

. See Pennsylvania State Harness Racing Commission, Rules and Regulations, Rule 6, §§ 10-12, 23 (1977).

. The record does not indicate that the Commission has authority, pursuant to this rule or any other rule, to discipline a driver or trainer because his horses had been racing inconsistently. Fitzgerald alleges only that his stall privileges were terminated because his horses were “inconsistent.” See note 1 supra.

. Over twenty years ago this Court recognized the importance of a private race track’s interest in protecting its good reputation when it affirmed Chief Judge Forman’s opinion in Martin v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 145 F.Supp. 439 (D.N.J.1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1957). Judge Forman had noted:
In a sport where the greatest importance should attach to dissipating any cloud of association with the undesirable, and in which the appearance as well as the fact of complete integrity is of paramount consideration, to exclude plaintiff from riding because of his record was an understandably warranted exercise of discretion.
Id. at 441.

. The record does not even establish that the Commission has any authority to deal with “inconsistent horses.” Rather, the Commission’s power appears to be limited to disciplining the driver for his own allegedly errant conduct. See note 7 supra.

. It is for this reason that I am not persuaded by the testimony of the racing secretary, Kenneth Marshall, that is set forth in footnotes 11 and 12 of the majority’s opinion. The majority cites this testimony as evidence that racing officials participated in the decision to terminate Fitzgerald’s stall agreement. The testimony certainly established that Mountain Laurel consulted with racing officials in order to determine whether Fitzgerald had been driving inconsistent horses. There is no evidence, however, that the racing officials compelled or even encouraged Mountain Laurel to revoke Fitzgerald’s stall privileges, or in any way urged Mountain Laurel to use its authority to terminate the stall agreement in order to further the Commission’s own regulatory purposes under Rule 18. In the absence of this kind of state involvement, and because neither the judges nor the racing secretary possessed any regulatory authority to terminate the stall agreement, I do not believe that Mr. Marshall’s testimony is dispositive.

. These analogies are given only as illustrations. It should be noted that although these examples concern employer-employee relationships, in the present case Fitzgerald is not an employee of Mountain Laurel.

. I am also apprehensive that litigants in future cases might attempt to extend today’s decision to nonregulated industries. The majority does not define the nexus between the state’s general regulation of harness racing and the racing officials’ participation in Mountain Laurel’s decision to terminate Fitzgerald’s stall privileges. It might be inferred from this that the majority attaches no significance to the Commonwealth’s general regulatory involvement in the industry. A future litigant thus might argue that a grocery store, or other small nonregulated business, that discharges an employee after confirming its suspicions of his criminal misconduct with local law enforcement officials should be held to the strictures of procedural due process. Although such an interpretation of the majority’s opinion is plausible, I read the decision as being limited to industries in which the state has assumed regulatory authority over a wide range of operations.

. Even if the employer is willing to sacrifice the additional time and expense necessitated by hearings, a neutral arbiter, transcripts, and representation by counsel in order to discharge an employee it believes to be dishonest, it may still be burdened by the standard of proof that is required before the “state” sanction may be imposed. Whereas a private party may cease dealing with, or discharge from its employ, one whom it suspects of illegal or immoral conduct, the state may not act against such a person where the evidence is not as great as would be required at a formal hearing. See Poisson v. State Harness Racing Comm’n, 5 Pa.Cmwlth.Ct. 20, 287 A.2d 352, 855 (1972).

. Mountain Laurel only terminated Fitzgerald’s stall agreement on seventy-two hours notice — a right given to it by that agreement. It did not seek to suspend or revoke Fitzgerald’s state-issued license to race. Nor did it seek to fine him. Such courses were open, and remain open, to the racing judges and ultimately the Harness Racing Commission if they believed that Fitzgerald, himself, had been racing inconsistently.

. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978).

. Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 464 F.Supp. 263, 266 (W.D.Pa.1979).

. Moreover, it is at least doubtful whether a stigma could be found even if such a report had been made. In Bishop v. Wood, supra, the charge was made that the false statements about the plaintiff would be repeated to prospective employers. Still, the Supreme Court declared that no stigma was present, in part because, there was no public announcement of the alleged false reasons for the discharge. 426 U.S. at 348, 96 S.Ct. 2074.

. App. 9a.

. App. 11a.

. App. 15a.

. In Delaware River Port Authority v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974), the Court reiterated the longstanding rule that, before issuing a preliminary injunction, a district court must find that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, and that the plaintiff is reasonably likely to prevail on the merits. In addition, the court must balance the possibility of harm to the defendant from the grant or denial of the relief, and consider the public interest as well.

. See note 8 supra.