Court Opinion

ID: 9791448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:10:57.772177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:36.377371
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OE
TSUKIYAMA, O. J.
Involved in this case is the paramount issue of whether the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Hawaii has the authority to entertain economic regulatory jurisdiction over interisland air transportation of persons or property vis-a-vis the Federal Civil Aeronautics Board. The question of jurisdiction has been squarely presented to this court as a result of the Commission’s decision in the affirmative.
In 1962, the legislature of the State of Hawaii passed an amendatory legislation providing, inter alia, that no common carrier shall engage in transportation by aircraft Avithout securing a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Public Utilities Commission, which provision to take effect upon final determination by the courts that the Commission has jurisdiction to regulate air carriers operating between the eight major islands of the State (Act 25, Regular Session, 1962).
In resolving the jurisdictional controversy between the *127Public Utilities Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, there loom before this court two acts of the Congress, to wit, the Hawaii Statehood Act, commonly referred to as the Hawaii Admission Act (P. L. 86-3, 86th Congress), and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.). To reach a correct interpretation of the pertinent provisions thereof, their legislative history as shown by the record as well as the geographical characteristics of the islands which comprise the State of Hawaii must perforce be carefully examined and considered.
Section 2 of the Hawaii Statehood Act provides: “The State of Hawaii shall consist of all the islands, together with their appurtenant reefs and territorial waters, included in the Territory of Hawaii on the date of enactment of this Act [March 18, 1959], except the atoll known as Palmyra Island, together with its appurtenant reefs and territorial waters, * * (P. L. 86-3, § 2, 73 Stat. 4.)
Section 1301(21) (a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 reads: “ ‘Interstate air transportation’ * * * means the carriage by aircraft of persons or property as a common carrier for compensation or hire * * * in commerce between, respectively — (a) A place in any State of the United States, * * * and a place in any other State of the United States; or between places in the same State of the United States through the airspace over any place outside thereof; * * Section 401(a) of the same Act (49 U.S.C. § 1371(a)) further reads: “No air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in force a certificate issued by the Board [Civil Aeronautics] authorizing such air carrier to engage in such transportation.”
The above-quoted language of the Hawaii Statehood Act initially raises the inquiry as to the meaning of the phrase “their appurtenant reefs and territorial waters, included in the Territory of Hawaii [on March 18, 1959].” *128The plethora of historical material relative to the manner in which the Hawaiian monarchy allegedly regarded or treated the channel waters between the islands, while academically enlightening, does not appear to serve as a practical aid to the ascertainment of the legislative intent of the Congress. In connection with the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States in 1898, the Republic of Hawaii ceded all rights of sovereignty in the “Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies.” The United States, under the Joint Resolution of the Congress, known as the Newlands Resolution (30 Stat. 750), accepted the cession of the “Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies.” It was then historically known that the Hawaiian government had always claimed ownership as a part of the archipelago the small islands, shoals and atolls within a radius of approximately 1000 miles to the northwest and southwest of the main islands of Hawaii. It is reasonable to assume that the term “dependencies” referred only to those remote areas. It is notable that neither the Republic of Hawaii nor the Congress in their respective annexation acts directly or indirectly alluded to the channel waters between the inhabited main islands of the Hawaiian group.
Though strongly urged by the Commission and the Island Airlines, appellees, I am unable to concur in the contention that their position with reference to Hawaii’s claim of jurisdiction over the channel waters is sustained by the acts of the monarchy and the decisional law of Hawaii. It is undisputed that the deep ocean waters between the islands which extend far beyond the three-mile limit are a part of the high seas. Accordingly, the voluminous record anent the various routes of flight by Island Airlines designated as “Pineapple,” “Hibiscus,” “Grass Shack,” “Hula Girl,” and “Orchid,” has no' relevancy in the determination of the instant jurisdictional controversy. It suffices that the air carrier does fly from one *129island to another over the high seas. If, as this cOnrt now rules, the contention is that the airspace traversed by the carrier is not subject to any other dominion or sovereignty, it should be of no consequence whether the flights are as the crow flies or there are occasional deviations from the airways under the visual flight or instrument flight rules.
The Second Act of Kamehameha III (Statute Laws of 1846, Vol. I, Chap. VI, P. 83), The King v. Parish, 1 Haw. 36 (original print) (58 second print) (1849), Bishop v. Mahiko, 35 Haw. 608 (1940), to which appellees assign great prominence, all enunciated in consonance with the universal law of nations that the territorial jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Islands extended seaward to a distance of one marine league or three miles. Beyond this three-mile limit, the waters are universally recognized and honored as international waters or high seas. In, accord is In re Investigation of Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 24 Haw. 136 (1917) in which this court held that under the Shipping Act of 1916, as it then read, the company’s vessels plying between the islands were engaged in the transportation of passengers and property “on the high seas” and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the United States Shipping Board and not the Public Utilities Commission.
The Second Act of Kamehameha III contained, in its pertinent part, the following: “The Jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Islands shall extend and be exclusive for the distance of one marine league seaward, surrounding each of the islands of Hawaii, Maui, Kahoolawe, Lanai, Molokai, Oahu, Kauai and Niihau; commencing at low water mark on each of the respective coasts of said islands. The marine jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Islands shall also be exclusive in all the channels passing between the respective islands, and dividing them; which jurisdiction shall extend from island to island.” In the light of the *130positive jurisdictional declaration set forth in the first sentence, it is obvious that the term “marine jurisdiction” used in the second sentence was intended to refer to fisheries, registration and control of surface vessels plying between the islands in coasting trade, and to the exercise of local authority for the protection of the coast and the inhabitants. In any event, the foregoing statute was expressly repealed. (Civil Code of 1859, Chap. XL, § 1491.)
From the inception of its judicial history, this court has consistently recognized the law of nations governing the international status of the high seas. In The King v. Parish, 1 Haw. 36 (1849), the court upheld the jurisdiction of the Hawaiian authorities over an offense committed on an American vessel lying within the three-mile marginal sea. Chief Justice William L. Lee said: “That it was the unshaken doctrine of the law of nations, that the maritime territory of every state extends to the ports, harbors, bays, mouths of rivers, adjacent parts of the sea enclosed by headlands, belonging to the same, state. The general usage of nations superadds to this extent of territorial jurisdiction a distance of a marine league, or so far as a cannon shot will reach from the shore, along all the coasts of the state. * * * That the legislature of this Kingdom in claiming a jurisdiction over the seas surrounding our coasts to the distance of one marine league, had done no more than simply declare the universal law of nations.”
The case of Bishop v. Mahiko, 35 Haw. 608 (1940), is repeatedly cited by appellees in respect to a dictum therein (at page 643) which, it is claimed, indicated the court’s recognition of the “intervening and surrounding waters” as a part of Hawaii. The issue in that case involved the determination of the title to fishery appurtenant to the area of Makalawena. The court, however, referred to and quoted from Carter v. Territory of Hawaii, 14 Haw. 465, and Gould on Waters and clearly showed *131that the coverage of the term “waters” was known to be limited to the area lying within a distance of one marine league.
Significant is the observation that in Bishop v. Mahiko, supra, the term “territorial waters” appears in the court’s quotation from Gould on Waters, to wit: “By the modem law of nations, the territorial waters extend only to such distance as is capable of command from the shore, or the presumed range of cannon, which, for the purpose of certainty, is regarded as one marine league * * Indeed, that term has been used synonymously and interchangeably with “territorial sea,” “intervening waters,” “marginal sea,” and “marine belt.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, p. 2607, defines “territorial waters” as “The waters under the territorial jurisdiction of a state including (1) its marginal sea (called also marine belt or territorial sea), that part within three miles of its shore as measured from mean or low water mark * * In III Cyclopaedia of Political Science Political Economy and United States History, p. 910, we find the following definition: “Territorial waters are all waters within the jurisdictional limits set by international law to an independent state. Such waters comprise * * * 2, uninclosed waters, or the open sea to a distance of one marine league * * Again, in Ballantine Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, Second Edition, p. 1281: “The territorial waters of a state on the sea coast are often so designated since they include a strip three nautical miles wide off shore * * In III Cylopedia of American Government, p. 536: “Three-Mile-Limit. This is a phrase used to denote the extent of a state’s jurisdiction over the open sea. The marginal sea with the shore-bottom under it for a distance of at least three marine miles beyond low-water mark is recognized as a part of the territory of the adjacent state * * 18 *132Collier’s Encyclopedia, p. 552 (1955) : “Three-mile limit, the jurisdiction of a coastal state extending to the open sea a distance of three miles measured from low tide. In international law it is often called the marginal sea. * * * It is generally agreed that the three-mile limit includes the air above the waters as well as the bed of the sea and its subsoil.” 1 Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, p. 120: “Islands have their own territorial seas.” See also, 17 The World Book Encyclopedia, Territorial Waters, p. 140; Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (1927), p. 53.
It is argued that the Constitutional Convention of 1950 regarded the channel waters between the islands of the Territory of Hawaii as a part of the territorial waters. (Standing Com. Rep. 56, p. 208.) In the light of the decisional law of the Territory and the time-honored position taken by the United States in respect to the international status of the high seas, the statement of the standing committee fails to carry a serious import.
Historically the United States has consistently not only recognized but insisted that an area extending three miles into the sea from the shoreline is the limit of territorial waters. Executive determinations, declarations and statements have never been known to deviate from that international rule. 32 Department of State Bulletin, p. 934 (1955); 40 Department of State Bulletin, p. 963 (1959) ; III United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Official Records), p. 25 (1958); 1 Hyde, Internatonal Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, p. 254. The following statement of United States Representative Dean, set forth in III United Nations Conference, supra, is significant: “The Committee should bear in mind that whatever was added to an individual State’s Territorial waters must inevitably be substracted from the high seas, the common property of *133all nations. For example, if islands were treated as an archipelago and a twelve-mile belt was drawn around the entire archipelago according to the straight baseline system, then areas of the high seas formerly used by ships of all countries would be unilaterally claimed as territorial waters or possibly even internal waters. It would be a misnomer to describe such restrictions on the free use of the high seas as ‘progressive’ measures.”
During the hearings on Statehood for Hawaii in the 83rd Congress, the State Department expressed its position on the three-mile rule in a letter to Senator Hugh Butler, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, dated January 20, 1954, which in part said: “* * * the traditional position of this Government from the time of Jefferson has been in favor of the so-called 3-mile limit as the breadth of Territorial waters, and the maintenance of this traditional position of the United States is considered vital * * *. It is the Department’s view, therefore, that limitation of the new State’s boundaries to 3 miles from the coast would not only be consistent with the interests of this Government in its relations with other foreign states, but also with its own concepts of defense.” (Senate Rep. 886 on S. 49, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 40.)
It is also to be noted that the Congress has expressly made applicable to the State of Hawaii the three-mile limit set forth in the Submerged Lands Act. Section 2 of said Act (67 Stat. 29) provides: “* * * in no event shall the term ‘boundaries’ * * * be interpreted as extending from the coast line more than three geographical miles into the * * * Pacific Ocean, * * Section 5(i) of the Hawaii Statehood Act reads: “The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 * * * and the Outer Continental Shelf Act of 1953 * * * shall be applicable to the State of Hawaii, and *134the said State shall have the same rights as do existing States thereunder.”
The courts of the nation have on numerous occasions made judicial enunciations on the three-mile doctrine. Said the court in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 at 122 (1923): “It is now settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under its dominion and control, the ports, harbors, bays and other enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coastline outward a marine league or three geographic miles.”
An interesting California case, In re Marincovich, 48 Cal. App. 474, 479, 192 Pac. 156, 157 (1920), held that the three-mile rule applied to the state because its organic law did not expressly exclude the waters from its territory and jurisdiction. Significantly, the court there said that California acquired “on her admission into the union, the sovereignty of an independent nation over a zone of waters three miles wide extending along the mainland, and also over similar zones or belts around the islands along and adjacent to her coast * * *.” (Emphasis supplied)
Firmly recognized and accepted is the principle that international law constitutes a part of the law of the nation and as such must be administered by its judiciary and conformed to by the executive and legislative branches. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700; Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 860. Said the court in the latter case: “* * * the very proposition that something known as international law exists carries with it tñe implication that national sovereignty is not absolute but is limited, where the international law impinges, by the dictates of the international law.” Moreover, in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953), the court *135adopted the “long-heeded admonition of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall that ‘an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains * * ”
On November 7, 1950, in anticipation of statehood the people of Hawaii had ratified a Constitution. Article XIII, Section 1, thereof established the boundaries of the State as follows: “Section 1. The State of Hawaii shall include the islands and territorial waters heretofore constituting the Territory of Hawaii.” In enacting the Hawaii Statehood Act, approved March 18, 1959, the 86th Congress described the boundaries of the State as in part quoted earlier in this opinion (P. L. 86-3, Section 2), to wit: “The State of Hawaii shall consist of all the islands together with their appurtenant reefs and territorial waters, included in the Territory of Hawaii on the date of enactment of this Act, * * *.” (Emphasis-supplied) As required by Section 7(b) of said Act, the boundary description was submitted to the people who voted in favor of the same on June 27, 1959. Of significance is the fact that, in conjunction with the adoption of the description, the people, as further required by said Section 7(b), also voted in favor of the additional stipulation “* * * and all claims of this State to any areas of land or sea outside the boundaries so described are hereby irrevocably relinquished to the United States.”
In the light of the cumulus of authorities defining “territorial waters” and the limited extent of the off-shore area embraced by them, it is indubitable that the Congress used those words fully advised as to their universally accepted meaning. A fortiori, the pronoun “their” which modifies the word “islands” appears to have been deliberately employed to leave no doubt that territorial waters meant the waters surrounding each island. It is all too patent that the Congress, with knowledge that miles of *136international waters intervene between tbe main islands, intentionally avoided tbe nse of any language in its legislation susceptible of the construction that the United States government or the State of Hawaii claimed jurisdiction over the high seas to the exclusion of other nations.
I cannot more fully agree with the court’s statement in its opinion in the case at bar quoting, with approval, the cannon of statutory construction that “significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word * * * ‘a statute ought upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ”
I now reach the point which requires an examination of the Federal Aviation Act under which the Civil Aeronautics Board exists and derives its powers and the ascertainment of the intent and purpose of the Congress in employing the phrase “places in the same State of the United States through the airspace over any place outside thereof.” (49 U.S.C. § 1301(21) (a).)
It has been argued that insofar as the State of Hawaii is concerned, the word “place” does not or was not intended to cover the channel waters intervening between the islands. As seen above, it is my view that the ocean channels intervening between the main islands and covering distances extending miles and miles beyond the three-mile belt of each island have always been and are still deemed to be high seas or international waters. This unique geographical feature of the Hawaiian Islands was under discussion and consideration by the Congress in connection with its legislation on Statehood for Hawaii.
In reviewing the legislative history in interstate air commerce, it is observed that, when the first comprehensive bill on the subject was under consideration (S. 3027, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935), the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Mr. Joseph Eastman, suggested a certain *137language change in the bill particularly in respect to the definition of interstate commerce which then read “commerce * * * between places in the same State through another State * * The suggestion, set forth in his letter of July 31, 1935 (Hearings of Subcommittee on Interstate Commerce, U. S. Senate, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 3027, p. 68), was in haec verba: “* * * that after the word ‘through’ in line 18 there be substituted for the words ‘another state,’ the words ‘the air space over any place outside thereof.’ The latter change would include as interstate commerce, transportation between points in the same State over a foreign country or the high seas as well as over another State.” (Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, in the 75th Congress which followed, Mr. Eastman’s full letter of July 31, 1935, which had been made part of the record by Senator Harry S. Truman, then Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, along with the entire record of the hearings on S. 3027, were included in the appendix of the April 1937 hearings on S. 2 — A bill to amend the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, by providing for the regulation of the transportation of passengers and property by aircraft in Interstate Commerce. (Appendix, Hearings, Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, April 1937, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 673.)
The change thus suggested was adopted and the revised language incorporated in all subsequent measures, such as the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. § 401(21) (a) and Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(21) (a)).
During the 83rd Congress, First Session, extensive public hearings were held by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on Senate Bill 49, Hawaii Statehood Bill. The Department of the Interior submitted *138a memorandum dated March 13,1953, commenting, among other things, on air transportation with particular reference to the language “between places in the same State through the air space over any place outside thereof,” as follows:
“Under the Civil Aeronautics Act (52 Stat. 977, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1946 ed., sec. 401 et seq.), the Civil Aeronautics Board exercises economic regulatory jurisdiction over carriers engaging in interstate air transportation, overseas air transportation, and foreign air transportation. ‘Interstate air transportation’ is defined in relevant part to mean (a) transportation between a place in any State and a place in any other State, or (b) between places in the same State through the air space over any place outside thereof, or (c) between places in the same Territory of the United States. ‘Overseas air transportation’ is defined in relevant part to mean transportation between a place in any State and any place in a Territory of the United States.
* *
“Upon the admission of Hawaii as a State, the CAB would continue to exercise economic regulatory jurisdiction over air transportation between the State and the continental United States, by virtue of the portion of the definition of ‘interstate air transportation’ labeled ‘(a)’ above. To the extent that the channels and waters between the islands comprising the land area of the State of Hawaii are not defined or considered to be a part of the State of Hawaii, the CAB would continue to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over air transportation between the islands by virtue of the definition of interstate air transportation labeled ‘(b)’ above, * * (Senate Report 886, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., on S. 49, p. 87.)
*139As seen, the Congress did ultimately refer to “all the islands, together with their appurtenant reefs and territorial waters, included in the Territory of Hawaii * * *” as constituting the State of Hawaii, obviously attributing to “territorial waters” the recognized meaning thereof under the law of nations.
It is particularly notable that in the course of the hearings on Senate Bill 50, 86th Congress, which culminated in the passage of the Hawaii Statehood Act, there were discussions on the very subject of interisland air transportation because of the geographic characteristics of the Hawaiian Islands. The Civil Aeronautics Board expressed its concern about the jurisdictional aspect. (Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 50, pp. 52-61.)
Hearings concluded, the Senate Committee submitted its report embodying therein the following statement on “Aviation Matters,” which, in my view, constitutes an unmistakable and convincing exposition of the basic legislative intent:
“Hawaii presents a unique situation with respect to the impact of statehood on the Federal regulation of air transportation between the main islands. This is because of the geographical structure of the Territory, the land areas being separated by substantial expanses of ocean which are not included in the territorial limits of Hawaii. Hence, most, if not all, of the interisland air transportation passes through airspace not a part of the Territory. Under the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and other applicable Federal legislation, the Civil Aeronautics Board exercises economic regulatory jurisdiction over carriers engaged in interstate air transportation, which is defined to include not only transportation between a *140place in a State and a place in any other State, bnt also transportation between places in the same State through the airspace over any place outside thereof. Consequently, with the admission of Hawaii as a State, interisland air transportation will remain subject to the economic controls provided by the Federal' Aviation Act including other applicable Federal legislation, because that transportation, or most of it, while between places in the same State, will pass through airspace outside the State. In the other States, air transportation of this kind passing through airspace outside the State is of slight volume in comparison with air transportation merely between places in the same State. In the case of Hawaii, the reverse would be true. The committee wishes to make it clear that it believes the application of the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act and other applicable Federal legislation to the State of Hawaii should continue in accordance with the definition of interstate air transportation as contained in that act." (Emphasis supplied)
With due deference, I am unable to follow the court’s view that the word “place” as employed in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 means “a specific area with definite physical limits.” Lexicographers define the word in several alternatives ranging from the simple to the technical. The conclusion of Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a Circuit Justice in The Adventure, 1 Brock 235, 1 Fed. Cas. 202, C.C. Va., rev’d on other grounds, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 221, upon which the court relies, has no application here. Upon analysis of a nonimportation statute which was in question, the conclusion was that the high seas were not a “foreign port or place.” The Chief Justice did not observe or say that the high seas were not a place. Contextually and under the maxim noscitur a sociis, “place” as *141used in the statute could not be construed as having any meaning other than a place in the class of a foreign “port.” Suffice it to say that “place,” in its common and popular usage, does not mean “a specific area with definite physical limits,” unless clearly so intended by the user. As seen, the legislative history of both the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1988 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 evinces that the specific intent and purpose of the word “place” as used therein was to refer to all places, including the high seas, outside of any particular State.
A case squarely in point is United Air Lines v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 109 Fed. Supp. 13 (1952). The Commission sought to require airlines operating under authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board to file tariffs. The routes of flight included Catalina Island off the mainland coast of California. In holding the Commission without jurisdiction, the three-judge United States District Court of Northern California applied the language “through the air space over any place outside thereof,” appearing in the then Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and said:
“The record here shows, by stipulation, that there is a distance of about 30 miles between the shore line of the United States and the Santa Catalina Island. We have no difficulty in finding, and so find that a substantial portion of these 30 miles lies over the high seas and is not within the State of California. Hence it follows that air transportation through the air space thereover is over a place outside of the State of California.
“The Congress, by the statute, assumed jurisdiction over this area. This it had the power to do. In this field it has supremacy. Since the Congress had the power to assert federal jurisdiction, the plain language of the statute compels the conclusion that the Public *142Utilities Commission of the State of California has no jurisdiction or power to regulate in any manner the transportation activities of the plaintiff over the route in question.”
Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the judgment in the above case was reversed, not on the merits thereof respecting the jurisdictional issue, but on the ground (upon authority of Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237) that the declaratory judgment procedure pursued in the lower court was inappropriate under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Public Utilities Commission of California v. United Air Lines, 346 U.S. 402. As seen, although reversed on other grounds the lower court’s decision in United Air Lines, supra, may be deemed to succinctly present a sound rationale compatible with the historical background of our national legislation on air transportation.
In holding that the Island Airlines is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board on the ground that, because its flights will not traverse the airspace of “any other jurisdiction” there will be no operation through the airspace over any “place” outside the islands, this court advances a theory which, in my opinion, is susceptible to the implication that neither the United States Government nor a foreign nation may assert any semblance of jurisdictional authority over the airspace above the high seas between the islands. In the Congress is constitutionally vested the exclusive power to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign nations. “The power to admit new States resides in Congress. The President, on the other hand, is the constitutional representative of the United States in its dealings with foreign nations. Prom the former springs the power to establish state boundaries; from the latter comes the power to determine how far this country will claim territorial rights *143in the marginal sea as against other nations * * *. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that there is no question of Congress’ power to fix state land and water boundaries as a domestic matter.” United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 35. Cf., Higgins, International Law of the Sea (Fourth Edition by John Colombos, p. 60 (1959)).
Under its power to regulate commerce, interstate and foreign, the Legislative Branch of the nation prescribes by enacting appropriate laws the manner in which transportation facilities are to be operated. To the Executive Branch, on the other hand, is entrusted the executive and diplomatic functions of dealing with foreign nations in all matters pertaining to treaties and the law of nations. The use of airspace and the high seas from the international point of view is a matter with which the United States Government is deeply concerned. The ocean areas beyond the marginal waters of each island and the airspace over them are clearly places or a “place” in, to or concerning which the United States Government can assert its rights. By the same token, foreign nations too may do likewise. I therefore find it difficult to rationalize the court’s theory.
I do not perceive that in connection with the use of the word “place” in the Interstate Commerce Act in respect to the means of transportation such as rail carriers, water carriers and motor vehicle carriers (49 U.S.C. § 902(i), § 1(1), § 303(a) (10),(11)), there is, or there was intended to be, any relationship comparable to the use of the same word in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 or the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. It is evident that the one was clearly intended to apply to any state or country and the other, to the high seas as well as a state or country. The language of the latter “between places in the same State of the United States through the airspace over any place outside thereof,” is sui generis and was employed specifically to comport with the meaning *144ascribed thereto by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation. To that extent, the Interstate Commerce Act cannot be deemed a law in pari materia as that term is generally used in statutory construction.
Summarizing, it is my view that in declaring the State of Hawaii as consisting of all the islands including “their” appurtenant reefs and territorial waters, the Congress manifested its recognition of the universally accepted law of nations establishing the off-shore extent of waters surrounding each island; that to remove any possible adverse claim, the electors were required to cast their votes— which they did affirmatively — on the proposition as to whether the description of the State as set forth in Section 2, Hawaii Statehood Act, was acceptable to them and also whether they would irrevocably relinquish “all claims of this State to any areas of land or sea outside the boundaries so described;” that for the maintenance of uniformity in the regulatory control of air transportation of persons and property, the Congress under its power over interstate and foreign commerce established such agency as the Civil Aeronautics Board to supervise such transportation moving in commerce over places including the high seas to the extent that domestic air carriers are concerned; that in the light of the legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the conclusion is inescapable that the phrase “through the airspace over any place outside thereof,” was written into the Act to include the high seas; and that the United States Government, in its concern for the proper regulation of domestic air carriers, has dominion and sovereignty over the airspace above the high seas, even though other nations may share such dominion and sovereignty.
I would reverse the decision and order of the Public Utilities Commission for want of jurisdiction in that body to regulate interisland air transportation by the Island Airlines.