Court Opinion

ID: 9709177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:42:00.823506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:46.575908
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE MURRAY delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant, Bruce Jones, was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance (more than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine) with intent to deliver in violation of section 401(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56x/2, par. 1401(b)(2)). He filed a motion to suppress evidence. Following a hearing, the motion was denied, and defendant was found guilty after a stipulated bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County. He was sentenced to serve a prison term of six years. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying the suppression of evidence. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the initial encounter between defendant and the law officers was consensual or a Terry-type detention; (2) if the encounter was a Terry-type detention, whether sufficient facts justified the detention; and (3) whether the subsequent search of defendant’s shoulder bag violated his fourth amendment rights. On March 26, 1987, defendant took a one-way flight from Midway Airport in Chicago to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On March 29, 1987, he purchased a one-way Amtrak train ticket from Fort Lauderdale to Chicago via Washington, D.C. On March 30, 1987, Officer Christine Kolman, a 13-year veteran of the Chicago police department, learned from the Amtrak police that defendant would arrive in Chicago on Amtrak train No. 29. She also learned that day or the following day that defendant was traveling from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, via Washington, D.C., and that he had made several similar trips in the past. About 9:10 a.m. on March 31, 1987, defendant and a companion, Edward Borner, arrived at Union Station, 210 South Canal Street in Chicago, on Amtrak train No. 29. At that time, Kolman and other plainclothes narcotics agents were conducting a surveillance narcotics investigation. During the course of her surveillance, Kolman observed defendant and Borner exit the train. Defendant walked without hesitation through the waiting area and the rest of the train station, but he repeatedly turned around, looked behind him, and made eye contact several times with Kolman and one of the other officers. Defendant again made eye contact with Kolman once or twice as he rode up the escalator to the mezzanine level. Defendant stepped off the escalator on the mezzanine level and had walked about 5 to 10 feet away from the escalator when an Amtrak police officer approached him. This was a well-illuminated, crowded public area near the exit doors. Kolman approached defendant, identified herself as a Chicago police officer, and displayed her identification badge. The Amtrak police officer and a special narcotics agent were with Kolman and defendant, but the Amtrak police officer walked away when Kolman and the agent identified themselves. Kolman stood alongside defendant. Neither she nor the other officers touched or grabbed him, nor did they display their weapons. No one was standing in front of defendant; rather, the exit doors were in front of defendant. Defendant was not pinned against any wall or counter. After Kolman identified herself, she asked defendant and Borner whether they would agree to speak to the officers. When they stated that they would, Kolman asked them to produce their train tickets and driver’s licenses or other identification. They then produced their driver’s licenses and travel itineraries. Defendant’s travel itinerary reflected that he flew to Fort Lauderdale from Midway Airport in Chicago on March 26, and that he left Fort Lauderdale on March 29, on a train to Chicago via Washington, D.C. After Kolman read the documents, she returned them to defendant and Borner. She then explained that the officers were conducting a narcotics investigation, and she asked them how long they had been in Florida and whether the trip was for business or pleasure. Defendant stated that he had been on vacation in Florida since the previous Thursday and he asked Kolman what this was all about. Kolman again explained that the officers were conducting a narcotics investigation and she asked defendant and Borner whether they had illegal narcotics in their possession. Both defendant and Borner answered in the negative. Kolman then told them in a conversational tone that they were not under arrest and that they were free to leave at any time. She asked them whether they would consent to a search of their bags and she told them that they had a right to refuse. Borner stated, “Yes, go ahead,” but defendant did not answer and began to tremble. Kolman noticed that defendant was trembling and that he was very nervous and asked again whether he would consent to a search of his bags. At this point, defendant declined to consent to a search. Kolman stated again that they were free to leave and that they were not under arrest. She explained further that she was going to detain defendant’s bag temporarily in order to subject it to a canine sniff test. Defendant then stated, “You can search my bag, I’ve got narcotics in it but I’m carrying it for somebody else.” The officers were neither touching, grabbing, threatening nor blocking defendant, nor had they drawn their weapons. Defendant did not express any desire to terminate the conversation or to leave the area. Kolman proceeded to search defendant’s bag, found the contraband inside, and placed defendant under arrest. She did not arrest Borner because no contraband was found in his bags. It is undisputed that the officers had no warrant for the search or the arrest. In denying defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court noted that the initial encounter was consensual, that the officers had a right to detain defendant’s bag, and that the officers had probable cause for the search and the arrest following defendant’s statement that there were narcotics in the bag.  A trial court’s finding on a motion to suppress evidence will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. (People v. Long (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 219; People v. Reynolds (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 160.) However, under the statute, the burden is upon defendant to prove his allegations at a suppression hearing: “The motion shall be in writing and state facts showing wherein the search and seizure were unlawful. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion and the burden of proving that the search and seizure were unlawful shall be on the defendant.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114-12(b).) In our view, defendant failed to meet his statutory burden of proof.  The fourth amendment provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” (U.S. Const., amend. IV.) In Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868, the Supreme Court authorized a limited, investigative detention short of a full arrest and short of probable cause. However, not all encounters between citizens and law enforcement officers implicate the fourth amendment. (Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319; People v. Long, 99 Ill. 2d at 229.) A seizure occurs only when a law officer restrains a citizen’s liberty by physical force or show of authority. (People v. Long, 99 Ill. 2d at 229.) Consensual questioning does not implicate the fourth amendment. (See Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 1324; Florida v. Rodriguez (1984), 469 U.S. 1, 83 L. Ed. 2d 164, 105 S. Ct. 308.) According to four members of the United States Supreme Court, the fourth amendment is not violated when a law officer merely approaches a person in a public place, asks him whether he is willing to answer some questions, asks him questions if the person is willing to listen, or offers in evidence the voluntary answers to the questions. (Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 1324 (opinion of White, J., joined by Marshall, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); also see People v. Long, 99 Ill. 2d 219; People v. Alcantara (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 105.) The mere fact that the officer identifies himself as an officer, without more, does not convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. (United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870.) Therefore, the threshold question in a case of this type is whether a seizure has occurred.  In Illinois, the test for determining whether a seizure has occurred is an objective one, namely, whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave under the circumstances. (See People v. Miller (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 620; People v. Brett (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 191.) This comports with the test set forth in United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870. There, Justice Stewart, in a portion of the opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, stated that a seizure has occurred implicating the fourth amendment when, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” (Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877; see also Michigan v. Chesternut (1988), 486 U.S. 567, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 108 S. Ct. 1975.) The Mendenhall Court noted the following examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where there was no attempt to leave: (1) the “threatening presence of several officers”; (2) the “display of a weapon by an officer”; (3) “some physical touching of the person or the citizen”; or (4) the “use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.  By the same token, the test for determining whether an encounter is consensual also involves an analysis of the totality of the circumstances and is a matter which the prosecution has the burden of proving. (Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 511, 100 S. Ct. at 1879.) However, the prosecution need not prove that defendant knew he could withhold his consent. Florida v. Rodriguez (1984), 469 U.S. 1, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165,105 S. Ct. 308.  If a seizure rather than a consensual encounter has occurred, only then should attention be focused on whether the seizure was a full arrest requiring probable cause, or instead a limited investigative stop, commonly called a Terry-type stop. (See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868.) Although a Terry-type stop does not require probable cause, it does require some adequate objective justification for the intrusion short of probable cause. (Reid v. Georgia (1980), 448 U.S. 438, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 100 S. Ct. 2752.) A hunch does not qualify as justification for a Terry-type stop. (Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880; see also People v. Long, 99 Ill. 2d at 228.) Instead, justification for a Terry-type stop consists of “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.) Another way of stating the rule is that a Terry-type stop “must be supported at least by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity.” (Reid, 438 U.S. at 440, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 894, 100 S. Ct. at 2754.) The facts or suspicion must be tested at the moment of the seizure or the search. (Terry, 396 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.) In evaluating the validity of a stop, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances. (United States v. Sokolow (1989), 490 U.S. 1, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581.) In Illinois, the Terry rules have been codified in sections 107 — 14 and 108 — 1.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 107-14, 108-1.01). Section 107 — 14 provides, in relevant part: “A peace officer, after having identified himself as a peace officer, may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to commit or has committed an offense ***.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 107 — 14. According to the above principles, the threshold issue in the instant case is whether the officers’ initial encounter with defendant constituted a seizure. If it was not a seizure, then it is unnecessary to determine whether it was justified by sufficient, articulable facts or by a reasonable suspicion. In our view, the circumstances of defendant’s initial encounter with the officers indicate that the encounter was consensual. He agreed to speak to the officers. They neither cornered him nor otherwise prevented his departure through physical contact, language, or tone of voice, nor did they threaten him physically or verbally or display any weapons. They did not block his way and he could have exited the train station through the doors directly in front of him. They did not retain his driver’s license or his travel itinerary. To the contrary, Kolman immediately returned defendant’s driver’s license and travel itinerary. If the retention of his driver’s license would have tended to negate his freedom to leave (see Royer, 460 U.S. at 501, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 239, 103 S. Ct. at 1326; People v. Hardy (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 108), then immediate return of the driver’s license to defendant should have had the opposite effect — it should have communicated to defendant that the officers were satisfied with his identification (People v. Brett (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 191), and that defendant was free to leave if he chose to do so. (See People v. Claver (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 62.) Indeed, Kolman specifically informed defendant that he was free to leave at any time. Furthermore, she specifically informed him that he did not have to consent to a search. This statement is also consistent with the conclusion that defendant was free to leave. People v. Miller (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 620.  We believe that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have considered that he was free to leave. If defendant believed that he was not free to leave, then his belief was unreasonable. (People v. Brett, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 196.) In our opinion, the State met its burden under United States v. Mendenhall of proving that defendant’s consent was freely and voluntarily given. Although the State did not have to show that defendant subjectively knew he could refuse to consent (Florida v. Rodriguez (1984), 469 U.S. 1, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165, 105 S. Ct. 308), the record discloses that defendant was specifically advised that he was free to leave and that he could refuse to consent. It was only after defendant started to tremble and did not respond to Kolman’s statement that defendant was told his bag would be detained. We conclude that defendant failed to meet his statutory burden of proving the allegations in his motion to suppress and that he was not seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114 — 12(b).  To summarize, the manifest weight of the evidence discloses that the encounter between defendant and the narcotics agents was consensual rather than a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Therefore, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the encounter did not taint the search of defendant’s shoulder bag and did not warrant suppression of the cocaine found therein or of defendant’s statement.  Furthermore, the search of defendant’s shoulder bag did not violate his protected fourth amendment interest in retaining possession of his personal effects and property. United States v. Place (1983), 462 U.S. 696, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 103 S. Ct. 2637, allows this interest to be overcome and authorizes a limited intrusion if the law officers have reason to suspect that the luggage contains narcotics. Under United States v. Place, probable cause is not a prerequisite for the seizure of luggage; instead, luggage can be seized based upon a reasonable suspicion that it contains narcotics. (462 U.S. at 702, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 117, 103 S. Ct. at 2642.) In the instant case, the manifest weight of the evidence indicates that Kolman reasonably suspected that defendant’s shoulder bag contained narcotics. Moreover, Kolman had probable cause to search the bag and to arrest defendant when defendant volunteered that the bag contained narcotics. We hold that the search of the shoulder bag was neither tainted by the preceding events nor independently amounted to a separate violation of the fourth amendment. Our conclusions are consistent with the following cases cited in defendant’s brief. For example, we recently noted that People v. DeLisle (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 297, follows an outdated analysis and essentially has been overruled. (See People v. Forrest (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 385.) In People v. Kiser (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 501, the agents physically blocked defendant’s exit onto an escalator. Considering the reasonable and articulable factor used by the Court in Reid v. Georgia (1980), 448 U.S. 438, 65 L. Ed. 2d 890, 100 S. Ct. 2752, to determine whether an investigatory stop is justified, we must conclude that the encounter in the instant case was consensual, and not an investigatory stop. Judgment affirmed. COCCIA, J., concurs.