Court Opinion

ID: 9516097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:34:28.211127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:27.580383
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). Although the majority appears to have cited the correct law to support their position, they have failed to come to grips with the basic issue of the case, namely, whether or not a plea bargain is a valid, enforceable bargain. Therefore, in view of Santobello v New York, 404 US 257; 92 S Ct 495; 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971), I am compelled to dissent.
My reading of Santobello leads me to the conclu*657sion that where a plea bargain is entered into by the prosecutor and the defendant, the defendant is entitled to the fruits of the bargain. Moreover Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court in Santobello, held that a defendant is entitled to "specific performance” of the agreement he enters into with the prosecutor.
Even though no plea was entered in the instant case, it was definitely a plea bargain situation. Before defendant’s preliminary examination, an agreement was reached between the prosecution and the defendant whereby the defendant would be allowed to plead guilty to possession of marijuana and Count I, charging sale of marijuana, would be nol-prossed.
Under the rationale of Santobello, the defendant is entitled to have his agreement with the prosecutor honored. Neither the trial judge nor the prosecution can frustrate this right.
Over and above the foregoing, it should be kept in mind that the prosecuting attorney has wide discretion on what charge a defendant will face. The majority opinion clearly indicates that the defendant was bound over on the sale count by mistake. The circuit court would not even have had jurisdiction over the case had it not been for the mistyping of the information. It is fundamental that we do not hold people to their mistakes. The trial judge should not seize upon an information filed by mistake.
Although it is a civil case, the Michigan Supreme Court appears to speak clearly on the issue of mistake in the case of Gordon v City of Warren Planning & Urban Renewal Commission, 388 Mich 82 (1972).
The facts in Gordon may be briefly summarized as follows:
*658Plaintiffs wanted to build a low-rise apartment complex in the City of Warren. They submitted their plan to the Warren Planning Commission. The planning commission failed to act. Therefore, the plaintiffs commenced an action for a writ of superintending control in the nature of a mandamus. In an attempt to settle the matter, the plaintiffs and the city entered into an agreement relative to the location of four of the apartment buildings. This agreement was based upon a site plan which had been prepared in good faith by a consultant employed by the plaintiffs. The agreement was embodied in a judgment which incorporated the site plan by reference. Construction was then begun on the four buildings. Subsequently, it developed that the site plan relied upon by the parties was erroneous. Thereupon, the city sought injunctive relief and an order to show cause why all four buildings should not be removed because they were not being built in conjunction with the correct site plan. The circuit court ruled that in order to conform to the correct site plan, two of the buildings would have to be removed.
This Court in reversing the circuit court held that the original judgment was based upon a material mistake of fact and that the parties would not be bound by it. See 29 Mich App 309. In Gordon, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court in affirming the Court of Appeals stated at p 89:
"Once a determination has been made that a mutual mistake of fact occurred, a court has the power to correct that mistake by vacating the judgment.”
Such is the case here. The defense and the prosecution agreed that an information would, be filed charging possession. Both believed such information was filed. Nevertheless, the circuit court *659ordered the defendant to be arraigned upon the sale charge. The circuit court should not now by its decree attempt to bind the parties to something other than what was mutually agreed upon. Under the rationale of Gordon, supra, the order directing the defendant to be arraigned on the sale charge should be vacated.
In view of the foregoing, it was error for the circuit court to order the district court to arraign the defendant on the charge of sale of marijuana.