Court Opinion

ID: 9929353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:07:46.310452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:13.988396
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2023-CA-0246-MR

DAVID GIBBS                                                        APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE ABIGAIL E. VOELKER, JUDGE
                            ACTION NO. 21-CI-00934

LORA GIBBS                                                           APPELLEE

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a dissolution of marriage, wherein the

Campbell County Circuit Court, Family Division, equitably divided various marital

and nonmarital assets. The Decree of Dissolution was entered on November 8,

2022. The Appellant is David Gibbs, (David). The Appellee is Lora Gibbs,

(Lora). David filed a motion for post-judgment relief pursuant to CR1 59 and

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
60.02, which was denied. He appeals to this Court as a matter of right. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

                A recent panel of this Court has summarized the relevant standards of

review as follows:

                        KRS 403.190 governs the disposition of marital
                property in a dissolution of marriage. Family courts have
                broad discretion in dividing marital property, and this
                Court may not disturb a family court’s ruling on the
                division of marital property unless it has abused its
                discretion. Smith v. Smith, 235 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. App.
                2006) (citation omitted). “The test for abuse of
                discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
                arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
                legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d
                941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted). Similarly, we
                review denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of
                discretion. Age v. Age, 340 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Ky. App.
                2011) (citing Richardson v. Brunner, 327 S.W.2d 572,
                574 (Ky. 1959)). “The decision as to whether to grant or
                to deny a motion filed pursuant to the provisions of CR
                60.02 lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
                Id. (citation omitted).

Lusardi v. Lusardi, No. 2022-CA-1305-MR, 2023 WL 6522185, at *3 (Ky. App.

Oct. 6, 2023). Similarly, “[a] trial judge’s ruling pursuant to CR 59.05 is reviewed

by an appellate court under the abuse of discretion standard.” Bowling v. Kentucky

Dep’t of Corr., 301 S.W.3d 478, 483 (Ky. 2009), as corrected (Jan. 4, 2010). With

these standards in mind, we now return to the arguments and record at issue in the

present case.

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                                    ANALYSIS

             In its order denying post-judgment relief, the family court aptly

summarized the underlying facts and issues, in relevant part, as follows:

                    [David] alleges the Court abused its discretion
             when it did not give [David] credit for a $15,000 down
             payment on the marital residence. [David] also takes
             issue that the Court did not reserve on the issue of
             valuation of the marital residence and order an appraisal.
             [David] alleges issues with the adequacy of prior
             counsel’s representation during the pendency of the
             proceedings.

                    First, to address [David’s] issues with prior
             counsel is outside the scope of this Court and is not
             grounds to warrant relief under CR 59 or CR 60.02.
             [David] has remedies available to him if he believes his
             prior counsel’s representation was inadequate, but that is
             not for this Court to determine.

                     [David] alleges that the Court abused its discretion
             when it did not give [David] credit for a $15,000 down
             payment on the marital residence. The party claiming a
             nonmarital interest bears the burden to show such by
             clear and convincing evidence. See Sexton v. Sexton, 125
             S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 2004). [David] did not provide
             supporting evidence at the trial showing any nonmarital
             interest, and [Lora] was not willing to concede such, as
             stated on the record (VR at 48:40). The Court made a
             determination using the information it had at the time of
             the hearing. While [David] also notes that paperwork
             was subsequently discovered after the trial which might
             support his nonmarital claim, the onus was on [David] to
             come prepared to trial. Further, due diligence would
             have allowed for the evidence to be discovered prior to
             trial. [David] noted at the trial on November 7, 2022 that
             he could have had his mother testify regarding the down
             payment, however, he did not call her as a witness.

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                    [David] also notes that the Court should have
             ordered an appraisal of the marital property to determine
             a valuation. Once again, the Court weighed the evidence
             as it was presented by the parties at the trial. The Court
             has discretion with respect to weighing evidence,
             determining credibility, etc.

During trial, David’s counsel requested that David get credit for the $15,000 down

payment. The parties and the court then discussed whether that issue was waived

by not requesting that credit in the necessary pre-trial disclosures. Thereafter,

David testified, in relevant part, that:

             I had a 15,000 down payment and it wasn’t just five
             months in the home. It was two years prior to that that I
             was making house payments, so the amount I paid into
             the house was around $30,000. I am fine not accepting,
             and I could not get paperwork, I went to Fifth/Third, I
             called the mortgage company. It’s too old, they don’t
             have anything that says when it was the first time that the
             home was documented with that. The house payment
             was in November of, I believe of ’95, when we
             refinanced in both of our names.

In support of his argument that the court erred in not assessing the down payment

as David’s nonmarital asset, he relies primarily on Chenault v. Chenault, 799

S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1990). The Supreme Court has summarized a similar issue and

Chenault as follows:

                   The presumption in Kentucky is that all property
             acquired during the course of the marriage is marital
             property, unless the property can be shown to have
             originated in one of the excepted ways outlined in KRS
             403.190(2). A party claiming that property acquired
             during the marriage is other than marital property, bears

                                           -4-
              the burden of proof. KRS 403.190(3), Brosick v.
              Brosick, Ky. App., 974 S.W.2d 498 (1998). While the
              word does not appear in the statute, judicial construction
              of KRS 403.190 has given rise to the concept of
              “tracing.” Chenault v. Chenault, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 575
              (1990). In Chenault, this Court recognized that tracing to
              a mathematical certainty is not always possible, noting
              that: “While such precise requirements for nonmarital
              asset-tracing may be appropriate for skilled business
              persons who maintain comprehensive records of their
              financial affairs, such may not be appropriate for persons
              of lesser business skill or persons who are imprecise in
              their record-keeping abilities.” Id. at 578.

               . . . While Chenault recognized the potential difficulties
              of tracing and sought to relax the draconian requirements
              laid down in prior case law, it did not do away with the
              tracing requirements altogether.

Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 64 S.W.3d 816, 820-21 (Ky. 2002), as modified (Feb.

11, 2002). In consideration of the foregoing, we agree with Lora, that the present

case does not turn on the necessity or adequacy of asset tracing. Rather, this

present issue was addressed succinctly by the family court in its findings of fact in

support of the Decree of Dissolution:

              Pursuant to testimony, Husband owned the home prior to
              the parties’ marriage, though the actual time of such was
              in dispute. Husband conceded that he did not have any
              paperwork to prove any nonmarital interest and further
              Husband waived any nonmarital Interest by failing to
              make such claim on the parties’ Final Verified Disclosure
              filed with the Court.[2]

2
  See Kentucky Family Court Rules of Practice and Procedure (FCRPP) 3(b); and Rules of
Court Practice and Procedure for the 17th Judicial Circuit, Family Court Division, Rule 7(A).

                                              -5-
Therefore, having reviewed the record, law, and the arguments presented, we

cannot conclude that the family court abused its discretion here. We further

conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying David’s motion for

post-judgment relief.

                                 CONCLUSION

            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the family court’s Findings and

Decree of Dissolution entered on November 8, 2022. We also affirm the court’s

denial of David’s request for post-judgment relief entered on January 23, 2023.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Marvin A. Knorr III                       Thomas L. Rouse
Covington, Kentucky                       Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky

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