Court Opinion

ID: 9895727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 16:11:23.964515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:25.794582
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Peters Township, a PA Municipality        :
                                          :
             v.                           :
                                          :
Jason H. Snyder and Sherri L. Snyder,     :
Husband and Wife,                         :   No. 45 C.D. 2023
                  Appellants              :   Argued: October 10, 2023

BEFORE:      HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
             HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                           FILED: November 8, 2023

             Jason H. Snyder (Jason Snyder) and Sherri L. Snyder (collectively, the
Snyders) appeal from the Washington County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court)
December 14, 2022 order dismissing the Snyders’ preliminary objections
(Preliminary Objections) to Peters Township’s (Township) Declaration of Taking
(Declaration). The Snyders present three issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether
the trial court erred by failing to conclude that the Township’s proposed taking was
for a prohibited, private purpose; (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to find
that the Township required a community’s property developer to provide a
connecting road to an existing development despite the fact that the Township’s
Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance does not require such connection;
and (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to conclude that the Township’s
Council (Council) was barred by res judicata when it approved the condemnation
approximately three months after voting against it. After review, this Court affirms.
             The Snyders own property located at 3112 Manor Way, Washington
County, Pennsylvania (Property), in a planned development called the Beacon
Manor Acres Plan (BMAP). The Township is a Home Rule Municipality organized
and existing pursuant to the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, 53 Pa.C.S.
§§ 2901-2984.1 On August 9, 2021, the Council approved Ordinance No. 8672
(Ordinance) authorizing the acquisition of a portion of the Snyders’ Property to
connect an existing private road on the Property with a new planned development
by Rywood, LLC (Rywood), called the Juniper Woods Plan (JWP).3                               See
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 14a-18a.
               In May 2021, the Council held a meeting during which it discussed the
JWP’s final approval, and the Council rejected the connecting road between the
BMAP and the JWP. Notwithstanding, at an August 9, 2021 meeting, the Council
reconsidered the issue and reversed its prior decision, thereby approving the
Ordinance that authorized the Declaration partially condemning the Property.
               The Declaration provides, in relevant part:

               The purpose of the partial condemnation of the [P]roperty
               involved herein is for the laying out, opening,
               establishment, widening, straightening, extension,
               improvement, construction, and maintenance of a public
               road connecting two existing public roads known as
               Manor Way; and for the better protection and safety of the
               travelling public because by connecting the two existing
               public roads known as Manor Way it will provide another
               point of access and means of ingress and egress to nearby
               property owners[,] Township police, fire fighters,
               ambulances, and other first responders; and for the

       1
          The Township’s Home Rule Charter, as amended (Home Rule Charter), was approved on
November 6, 1973, and was effective on January 5, 1976. Prior to the Home Rule Charter’s
adoption, the Township was governed by the Second Class Township Code, Act of May 1, 1933,
P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 65101 - 68701.
        2
          Township of Peters, Washington County Ordinance No. 867, adopted August 9, 2021,
effective August 9, 2021.
        3
          When the Township preliminarily approved the JWP, it did not include or require a public
road connector between the BMAP and the JWP.

                                                2
               performance of other Township services such as snow
               removal, trash pickup, and road maintenance.

R.R. at 9a (footnote omitted).
               On December 15, 2021, the Snyders filed the Preliminary Objections,
arguing therein that (1) the taking was arbitrary and capricious; (2) the taking served
no public purpose and was only for the JWP developer’s benefit; (3) the taking was
void because it served no public purpose; (4) there was no substantial or rational
proof that the authorized public purpose was the taking’s true goal; (5) the
Declaration failed to identify Wells Fargo Bank as a condemnee where it held a first
lien mortgage on the Property; and (6) the condemnation would not accomplish the
purported purpose.
               The trial court heard argument on February 16, 2022. On March 10,
2022, the trial court dismissed all but the public purpose, and arbitrary and capricious
Preliminary Objections.          The trial court permitted the Snyders to schedule
depositions to refine the issues of whether the condemnation was for a public
purpose, and whether the Township was acting arbitrarily and capriciously.
Thereafter, the parties deposed witnesses. On December 14, 2022, the trial court
dismissed the remaining two Preliminary Objections. The Snyders appealed to this
Court.4
               The Snyders first contend:

               Under [the Fifth Amendment to] the United States [U.S.]
               Constitution,[5] a sovereign may only condemn private
               property if the condemnation will serve a public use.
               Pennsylvania law further limits a sovereign’s ability to
               unilaterally confiscate private property. While the

       4
          “This Court’s standard of review of a decision to condemn property and of the extent of
the taking is to determine whether the trial court’s decision evidences an abuse of discretion or an
error of law.” In re Redevelopment Auth. of the City of Erie, 285 A.3d 986, 990 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2022).
        5
          U.S. CONST. amend. V.
                                                 3
               Township is permitted under [Section 1501 of] the
               Eminent Domain Code [(Code)6] to [condemn the
               Snyders’ P]roperty for “laying out, widening, extending,
               vacating, grading, or changing the grades of lines or
               streets,” 8 Pa.C.S.[] § 1501, same must still satisfy the []
               Code’s requirements, including the Property Rights
               Protection Act [(PRPA)].[7]

Snyders’ Br. at 15. The Snyders contend that the condemnation “will provide neither
a public use nor [a] public benefit and is thus arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of
discretion under the [U.S.] Constitution and Pennsylvania law.” Snyders’ Br. at 15.
The Snyders assert that the condemnation is “without basis or rational reason. Nor
has the Township articulated any reason or basis why it chose to condemn the
[Snyders’ Property] except under the auspices of public safety which it ignored for
67 years.” Id. at 16. The Snyders also claim the condemnation is excessive in that
the proposed connection between the BMAP and the JWP is unnecessary (where no
connection previously existed), and that the condemnation will negatively impact
the Snyders’ Property.
               This Court explained in In re General Municipal Authority of
Nanticoke, 292 A.3d 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023):

               While both the federal and state constitutions require that
               property taken must be for a “public use,” the
               constitutional meaning of “public use” is broader than
               actual “use” by the public. Snitzer, Pennsylvania Eminent
               Domain § 1.2.2.1 (2023 ed.). In Kelo v. City of New
               London, 545 U.S. 469 . . . (2005), the [U.S.] Supreme
               Court stated that since it began applying the Fifth
               Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST.
               amend. V.] to the [s]tates at the close of the 1800s, it has
               “embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of
               public use as ‘public purpose.’” Id. at 480 . . . . The [U.S.
               Supreme] Court stated that “[w]ithout exception, our cases
               have defined [public purpose] broadly, reflecting our

      6
          26 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-1106.
      7
          26 Pa.C.S. §§ 201-208.
                                            4
             longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments
             in this field.” Id.
             The courts of this Commonwealth take a somewhat more
             complex approach to the meaning of public use, rejecting
             legalistic formulae, instead leaving the definition to “the
             varying circumstances and situations which arise, with
             special reference to the social and economic background
             of the period in which the particular problem presents
             itself for consideration.” In re Condemnation by [the] City
             of Coatesville, 822 A.2d 846, 855 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)
             [quoting Dornan v. Phila. Hous[.] Auth., . . . 200 A. 834,
             840 ([Pa.] 1938)]. “A taking is proper if the benefit to
             the public is primary and any benefit to a private
             individual is only incidental.” In re Condemnation of
             Land for . . . the S.E. Cent. Bus. Dist. Redev[elopment]
             Area #1, 946 A.2d 1143, 1147 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). The
             question of what constitutes a public use is highly fact-
             dependent. Reading Area Water Auth. v. Schuylkill River
             Greenway Ass’n, . . . 100 A.3d 572, 580 ([Pa.] 2014). A
             “taking does not lose its public character merely
             because there may exist in the operation some feature
             of private gain, for if the public good is enhanced it is
             immaterial that a private interest also may be
             benefited.” In re Legis. Route 62214, Section 1-A, . . . 229
             A.2d 1, 3 ([Pa.] 1967) (quotation omitted).

Nanticoke, 292 A.3d at 1169 (emphasis added).
             The Nanticoke Court warned that, “[a]lthough subject to limitations
made in the judgment of the General Assembly . . . , under the federal and state
constitutions, the occurrence of incidental private benefit does not categorically
prohibit individual takings which benefit the public.” Id. “To be a valid taking, the
public use must not only be one which satisfies the federal and state constitutions
but must also be a permitted use under legislation delegating the authority.” Id. at
1172.
             The Nantioke Court expounded:

             [T]he public use for which the properties are to be taken
             must not run afoul of the limitations of the PRPA.
             Reading Area Water Auth., 100 A.3d at 582 (even
                                          5
            assuming a condemnation can pass constitutional
            scrutiny, it must also be statutorily permissible).
            Section 204(a) of the PRPA prohibits generally the use
            of the power of eminent domain to take private
            property in order to use it for private enterprise. 26
            Pa.C.S. § 204(a). Our Supreme Court explained in
            Reading Area Water Authority that the protections
            afforded by Section 204(a) [of the PRPA] are to be
            construed in light of the Legislature’s post-Kelo intent to
            curtail abuse of the eminent domain power by effecting
            constitutionally permissible takings with substantial
            “ancillary” benefits to private enterprise:
                  Notably, [the] PRPA was passed as a direct
                  reaction to Kelo to curb what legislators
                  perceived as eminent domain abuse, and with
                  the goal of striking a reasonable balance
                  between (a) the need to defend private
                  property rights from takings accomplished
                  for economic development purposes, and (b)
                  the legitimate needs of urban centers to
                  rehabilitate blighted areas imposing
                  substantial, concrete harm upon the public.
                  See, e.g., House Legis[.] J[.], Nov. 1, 2005, at
                  2169-72; Senate Legis[.] J[.], April 25, 2006,
                  at 1552. Whether or not the Constitution
                  viewed as merely “ancillary” the benefits to
                  private enterprise ensuing from a plan to use
                  eminent domain to assist in economic
                  development, in the wake of Kelo the
                  Legislature began to view such benefits as
                  central and wanted to curtail the ability of
                  condemnors to take others’ property for such
                  purposes. . . .
            Id. at 583 (citation omitted).
Nanticoke, 292 A.3d at 1172-73 (bold emphasis added).
            The Nanticoke Court concluded:
            [T]he PRPA will not thwart a taking if there is a private
            benefit of any size or nature. While the constitutional
            analysis often focuses on weighing the respective benefits
            to the public and the private entity, requiring that the
            public must be found to be the primary beneficiary of the
                                             6
            project, the analysis under the PRPA is slightly different.
            Under the PRPA[,] the focus is on the purpose and the
            ultimate use to which the taking is directed. If the
            genuine purpose of the taking is for a public use, i.e.,
            the public use is the true driving force behind the
            taking, the PRPA is satisfied even if the project results
            in some private gain. For instance, the taking of land to
            build a highway to mitigate traffic congestion clearly has
            a public purpose, even though a number of private
            contractors may profit from doing the work. On the other
            hand, if a road is being built solely in order to provide
            access to a proposed private development, that likely will
            not be a public purpose, even though other members of the
            general public may use the road. In other words, if the role
            of the private actor is to facilitate creation of a genuine
            public use that is permissible under the PRPA, even if
            some benefit accrues to the private entity (so long as that
            benefit is not so disproportionate - i.e., primary - as to fail
            the constitutional test).

Id. at 1172-73 (bold emphasis added).
            Here, the trial court made the following factual findings:

            1. James Berquist [(Berquist)], councilman for [the]
            Township, voted in favor of the condemnation due to
            public safety reasons; he thought the chief of police and
            fire chief gave “compelling reasons.” He also believed
            that the residents of the [T]ownship were the beneficiaries.
            See [R.R. at 443a-444a.] Additionally, [] Berquist did not
            believe the connector road promoted the economic
            development of a private enterprise. [See i]d. at [445a].
            2. David Ball [(Ball)], councilman for [the] Township,
            testified that the [C]ouncil “consistently” connects
            adjacent developments for public safety, and believes
            there to be a public purpose for the connection for this
            condemnation. See [R.R. at 385a].
            3. [Township manager,] Paul Lauer [(Township Manager
            Lauer)], . . . testified that there was no benefit to the
            developer to do the connector; rather, the condemnation
            was done for improved access to public safety - fire,
            police, ambulance service, etc. See [R.R. at 335a-337a].
            [Township Manager] Lauer noted that first responders

                                          7
heading to Manor Way would usually need to first leave
the [T]ownship and return to provide services. [See i]d. at
[338a-339a]. [Township Manager] Lauer testified that it
is [T]ownship policy to connect neighboring
developments if possible. [See i]d. at [343a-347a]. . . .
Here, there was a recommendation by the planning
commission, [the T]ownship planning director, and the
[T]ownship manager. [See i]d. at [350a-352a].
4. [] Township Police Chief Douglas Grimes [(Police
Chief Grimes)] testified that he was present at the August
9, 2021[] [C]ouncil meeting, and gave his opinion that a
secondary point of access would be beneficial. See [R.R.
at 301a]. He noted that the purpose was to provide
ingress and egress to the plan such that emergency
services would not have to travel into another
jurisdiction, Upper St. Clair, and then return to [the
Township]; there would be two access points to the
developments, [the BMAP] and [the JWP], but [the
BMAP] specifically. [See i]d. at [294a-295a]. [Police
Chief] Grimes acknowledged that he did not conduct a
time study to confirm that an additional access road would
reduce the amount of time to reach the [BMAP], but it’s
“[j]ust simple logic.” Id. at [295a]. Further, if the plans
have two access points, [Police Chief] Grimes stated that
the “fatal funnel” effect would be avoided, meaning “you
set yourself up for whoever is opposing you. [The
situation] becomes much more dangerous.” Id. at [296a].
Having two access points provides a “tactical alternative
and opportunity to respond more quickly. . . .” Id. In sum,
he testified, “[i]t just creates a better situation from a
public safety perspective.” Id. at [297a]. “It is never
good to have one way in and one way out.” Id. at [305a].
5. Frank Arcuri [(Arcuri)], a councilman for [the]
Township who voted twice, recognized that all, or most
all, residents who spoke at the meetings who were opposed
to the condemnation were from the [BMAP]. See [R.R. at
273a, 281a]. He voted against the condemnation, but
testified that the purpose for the road was to connect the
new development to an old neighborhood so that
emergency service response could be quicker, as well
as for school bus route efficiency and ease of plowing
snow due to the topography. [See i]d. at [264a-268a]. []
Arcuri remembered presentations by the police and/or fire

                            8
departments that indicated it would be quicker for them to
provide their services to the [BMAP] if a connector road
w[as] built, although he was unsure of the benefit to the
[JWP] development. [See i]d. at [265a, 267a-268a]. []
Arcuri testified that the objections to a connector road
were about increased traffic, but that it is always a concern
“when we are trying to approve plans.” Id. at [269a; 273a-
275a]. He believed that it was [T]ownship policy to
require a connector between two housing plans. [See i]d.
at [273a].
6. Robert Lewis [(Lewis)], councilman for [the]Township
for 30 years, testified that it was the practice of [C]ouncil
to “attempt to interconnect developments as they emerge
or progress. The action we took was consistent with that
[practice].” [R.R. at 243a-244a]. He believed that both
housing plans were beneficiaries, as well as the greater
[Township] community. [See i]d. at [244a]. [] Lewis
acknowledged that most people at the meetings were
opposed to the connection; they were residents of the
[BMAP]. [See i]d. at [245a]. His experience is that traffic
concerns are an “unfounded fear.” “[I]t never comes to
pass” in his experience, which includes a half-dozen
developments where connector roads were discussed. Id.
at [246a]. [] Lewis noted that the [C]ouncil revisited the
issue of putting in a connecting road between the two plans
in August 2021[,] at the request of the roads department,
fire department, police department, and residents who
“advocate[d] for the need for public safety and access
into their community.” Id. at [246a-247a]. . . .
7. Gary Steigel [(Steigel)], councilman for [the]
Township, testified that the purpose of the connector
was “to improve emergency response times to the
[BMAP] via the [JWP].” See [R.R. at 225a]. He noted
that the Township looked at an alternate connector via
Ammons Drive, but “it was deemed unfeasible.” Id. at
[226a]. [] Steigel acknowledged that the public was
concerned about increased traffic, and [it was]
“unanimously opposed to the connector.” Id. at [228a-
229a]. He believed that the benefit of putting in a
connecting road was quicker response times for
services to the [BMAP] via the [JWP]. Id. at [229a]. . . .

                             9
8. [] Township Fire Chief Michael McLaughlin [(Fire
Chief McLaughlin)] . . . testified that there were persons
who spoke at the public meeting against the condemnation
due to perceived traffic increase. He, however, believes
there needs to be a connector for public safety reasons.
[See i]d. at [204a-205a]. These benefits are for public
safety response times, as well as for assisting/benefiting
public works, school buses, and commerce generally.
[See i]d. at [205a]. [Fire Chief] McLaughlin noted that his
testing showed that it would save 2 minutes and 10
seconds of response time in getting to the [BMAP] by
having the connector. He also noted that it is not practical
to have only one way in and out of a development; for
example, if there were down power wires, fallen trees, or
a major accident. [See i]d. at [206a]. [Fire Chief]
McLaughlin emphasized that the 2 minutes and 10 second
difference is “important” during an emergency. “The
faster you can get people there, the better off you are.”
“Fire doubles in size about every minute. The chance of
surviving cardiac arrest decreases significantly every
minute that a patient goes without cardiopulmonary
resuscitation.” Id. at [207a].
9. Monica Merrell [(Merrell)], councilwoman of [the]
Township, testified that the municipal manager, the
planning department, and the [T]ownship “have tried to
enforce connections between new developments and
existing developments.” [R.R. at 168a]. Additionally, the
[C]ouncil was informed by the planning department at a
meeting “that there were no viable alternatives” to connect
the two housing plans. Id. at [170a]. [] Merrell recalled
that no resident was in favor of the connector, and that she
voted no both times. [See i]d. at [178a-180a]. She, as well
as the residents, thought there would be an increase in
traffic if the condemnation [was] approved, but [] Merrell
recognized that the public purpose for the
condemnations was to connect neighboring housing
plans. [See i]d. at [180a-181a]. Further, [] Merrell is not
opposed to the “concept of two points of entry on a plan.”
Id. at [182a].       She, however, voted against the
condemnation because eminent domain was not right if
people do not want it for that purpose, even though she
“recognize[s] that the [T]ownship prefers to have
connections[,] [and does not] discount that desire.” Id. at
[179a]. . . .
                            10
               10. Woodrow Welsch [(Welsch)] was the developer of the
               [JWP]. [] Welsch testified that he received no benefit
               from the connecting road being built. See [id. at 416a-
               417a]. The connecting road cost him $200,000[.00] to
               install. [See i]d. at [411a-412a]. [] Welsch stated that he
               constructed the road because the [T]ownship required it;
               he assumed that if he did not build it, [it] would not
               approve his development plan. [See i]d. at [416a-417a].
               11. Jason Snyder . . . testified that he purchased his
               [P]roperty in [the] Township because it was on a dead-end
               road next to the woods; he wanted few neighbors. See
               Deposition of [Jason] Snyder, June 13, 2021, [at] 14.[8] . .
               . Now, there is a new development, [the JWP], abutting
               his [P]roperty. [See i]d. at 15. [] [Jason] Snyder testified
               that the purpose of the condemnation was “safety -
               safety of taking that - taking my [P]roperty to have
               quicker access for emergency vehicles.” Id.

R.R. at 626a-631a (emphasis added).
               The trial court concluded:

               Based upon this testimony, the [trial] court cannot find that
               the [Snyders] met their “heavy” burden of proving that the
               condemnation was for anything but a public purpose. All
               of the deponents recognized why the [] [C]ouncil
               condemned the [P]roperty - permitting emergency
               services to more quickly access the [BMAP] of homes.
               Even those councilpersons who did not vote for the plan
               understood why the [] Township [p]lanning [d]epartment,
               the fire chief, and the police chief recommended the
               condemnation. Although the [T]ownship does not
               mandate a connecting road between two developments, it
               is the policy to do so if reasonably feasible. As noted in
               the [T]ownship’s Comprehensive Plan adopted on
               December 9, 2013, “[c]onnections between subdivisions
               can help manage traffic flow. Many of the [T]ownship’s
               subdivisions do not connect with neighboring properties,
               so travelers are forced to drive between subdivisions.” See
               [Snyders’] Brief in Opposition to Preliminary Objections,
               Feb[.] 22, 2022, Exhibit A, [] Township Comprehensive
               Plan, [at] 62. The plan notes that a goal is to “improve

      8
          Jason Snyder’s deposition transcript is not included in the Reproduced Record.
                                               11
             traffic efficiency and safety along Route 19 and at major
             intersections throughout the [T]ownship.” Id. at [] 64. To
             address this goal, the [T]ownship concluded that it should,
             among other things, “[c]onsistently require road
             interconnectivity between both residential and non-
             residential developments to disperse traffic, provide route
             options, reduce conflict points along major roads, and
             improve access for emergency services.” Id. Further, no
             benefit inured to [] Welsch, the developer, by building the
             connecting road. [] Welsch certainly benefited by
             developing the [JWP], but he was required to put in the
             connecting road as a condition to develop the plan.

R.R. at 631a-632a (citation omitted).
             The law is well established:

             As the fact-finder, the trial court had the authority to make
             credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in
             evidence. Merrell v. Chartiers Valley Sch[.] Dist[.], 51
             A.3d 286, 293 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). In so doing, the trial
             court was “free to believe all, part, or none of the
             evidence.” In re Funds in Possession of Conemaugh
             [Twp.] Supervisors, . . . 753 A.2d 788, 790 ([Pa.] 2000).

Schnarrs v. Rush Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 210 A.3d 1161, 1175 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
“[A]rguments go[ing] to the credibility and weight of the evidence [are] issues
within the sole province of the trial court as the fact[-]finder, and [this Court] will
not disturb them on appeal.” Belleville v. David Cutler Grp., 118 A.3d 1184, 1196
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
             Here, the trial court credited numerous witnesses’ testimony, including
that of Township Manager Lauer, who stated that the condemnation’s purpose was
to improve public safety, and Police Chief Grimes and Fire Chief McLaughlin, who
testified that the connecting road would provide quick access for emergency
responses. That testimony was substantial evidence that the condemnation’s actual
purpose is improved access to public safety services such as fire, police, and
ambulance service, and thus, the “benefit to the public is primary and any benefit to

                                          12
a private individual is only incidental.” Nanticoke, 292 A.3d at 1169 quoting (In re
Condemnation of Land for the S.E. Cent. Bus. Dist. Redev. Area #1, 946 A.2d at
1147). Thus, the condemnation at issue here does not violate the U.S. Constitution.
Further, the condemnation complies with the PRPA because the record evidence
supports the conclusion that the Township’s “genuine purpose of the taking is for a
public use, i.e., the public use is the true driving force behind the taking[.]”
Nanticoke, 292 A.3d at 1173.
             With respect to the Snyders’ contention that the condemnation is
excessive, this Court acknowledges that “a plan to take must be tailored to the actual
purpose or it will be overturned as excessive.” Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone,
939 A.2d 331, 338 (Pa. 2007). The trial court correctly recognized, “there was
nothing of record discussing, addressing[,] or indicating that the condemnation was
excessive, i.e.[,] that the size of the connecting road was greater than the size of
typical housing plan roads or beyond the size permitted by zoning ordinances.” R.R.
at 632a-633a. Thus, the Snyders’ argument is not supported by the record evidence.
             The Snyders also assert that the condemnation was unnecessary and
that it simply satisfied a Township requirement that there be interconnections
between subdivisions, rather than benefitting the public. The Snyders also assert
that the condemnation was unnecessary and that it simply satisfied a Township
requirement that there be interconnections between subdivisions, rather than
benefitting the public. Township Manager Lauer testified that the development
plan’s approval was not conditioned upon the developer constructing a connector,
and that no Township ordinance requires it. The trial court found that, although not
required in an ordinance, it is the Township’s policy to require a developer to
construct a connector between developments if it is reasonably feasible to do so.
More importantly, the trial court found that the purpose for the taking was to improve
public safety. Thus, the Snyders’ claim is without merit.
                                         13
             Finally, the Snyders contend that the trial court erred by failing to
conclude that the Council was barred by res judicata when it approved the
condemnation on August 9, 2021, approximately three months after voting against
it. “Res judicata - literally, a thing adjudicated - is a judicially-created doctrine. It
bars actions on a claim, or any part of a claim, which was the subject of a prior
action, or could have been raised in that action.” In re Coatesville Area Sch. Dist.,
244 A.3d 373, 379 (Pa. 2021) (bold emphasis added; citation omitted).

             “Four elements common to both actions, sometimes
             termed the “four identities,” see, e.g., Est[.] of Tower, . . .
             343 A.2d 671, 674 ([Pa.] 1975), must be present for res
             judicata to apply: “an identity of issues, an identity of
             causes of action, identity of persons and parties to the
             action, and identity of the quality or capacity of the parties
             suing or being sued.” In re Iulo, . . . 766 A.2d 335, 337
             ([Pa.] 2001).

Coatesville, 244 A.3d at 379. “In order for the principles of res judicata . . . to apply
there must be a final adjudication on the merits by a [tribunal] of competent
jurisdiction.” Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Fiore, 682 A.2d 860, 862 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)
(italic and bold emphasis added).
             The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that “the decision to exercise the
power of eminent domain is a legislative function . . . .” First Eng. Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)
(emphasis added). Long ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained:

             Taking land for a public highway is taking it for a public
             use. The degree of the public necessity is exclusively
             for the legislature. It is not a judicial question. We may
             and will take care that private property is taken under an
             assertion of eminent domain for no other than a public use.

                                           14
Smedley v. Erwin, 51 Pa. 445, 451(1866) (emphasis added). Referencing assertions
made by Judge Rogers in Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Pa. 309 (Pa. 1845), the Smedley Court
continued:

               [T]o justify the exercise of the right to take the property of
               the citizen, “it must be for the use of the public, to be
               determined in the first place by the legislature, subject,
               however, to correction or restriction when it clearly
               appears the right is abused, either by design, which we
               cannot well suppose, or, what is more to apprehend, by
               hasty and improvident legislation.” The abuse of which
               he spoke is the transgression of power in attempting to
               take private property for private use.
               That might be by design, or, more likely, improvidently
               and hastily. But when the use is an undoubted public one,
               as is appropriation for a highway, it would be usurpation
               in us to prevent the execution of an act of the legislature
               because we might think it indiscreetly passed or enacted
               without proper consideration.

Smedley, 51 Pa. at 451 (emphasis added).9
               Consequently, the Council’s May and August 2021 votes were
legislative decisions pertaining to whether the Council should approve the
Ordinance. Because they were not judicial adjudications, res judicata does not
apply. Accordingly, res judicata did not prohibit the Council’s August 9, 2021 vote
approving the Ordinance.
               For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

                                             _________________________________
                                             ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

       9
          Notably, this Court has previously applied the application of res judicata sparingly in
zoning matters, “perceiving the need for flexibility in land use matters to outweigh the burdens of
repetitive litigation.” Dubois Dutch, LLC v. Sandy Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 940 A.2d 576, 580
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
                                                15
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Peters Township, a PA Municipality        :
                                          :
            v.                            :
                                          :
Jason H. Snyder and Sherri L. Snyder,     :
Husband and Wife,                         :   No. 45 C.D. 2023
                  Appellants              :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2023, the Washington County
Common Pleas Court’s December 14, 2022 order is affirmed.

                                        _________________________________
                                        ANNE E. COVEY, Judge