Court Opinion

ID: 9949108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 20:04:33.802705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:39.155260
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 230641

                                                                           SIXTH DIVISION
                                                                           March 8, 2024

                                           No. 1-23-0641

                                          IN THE
                                APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                      FIRST DISTRICT

 ALAN JOSEPHSEN CO. INC.,                                    )         Appeal from the
                                                             )         Circuit Court of
         Plaintiff-Appellant,                                )         Cook County
                                                             )
 v.                                                          )         No. 2021 CH 05777
                                                             )
 THE VILLAGE OF MUNDELEIN,                                   )         The Honorable
                                                             )         Neil H. Cohen,
         Defendant-Appellee.                                 )         Judge Presiding.

       JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Presiding Justice Oden Johnson and Justice C.A. Walker concurred in the judgment and
       opinion.

                                             OPINION

¶1     This appeal arises out of the denial of certain relocation expenses claimed by a recycling

company whose property was taken by a village through eminent domain. Finding no error, we

affirm the decision of the village’s hearing officer.

¶2                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶3     Alan Josephsen Co., Inc. (AJC), operated a recycling company at 101 E. Maple Avenue in

Mundelein, Illinois. In 2019, the Village of Mundelein (Village) obtained this property for public

use through its eminent domain power, which required AJC to relocate. The Village hired Land

Acquisitions, Inc., a professional consulting firm with expertise in relocation expense
No. 1-23-0641

reimbursement, to assist AJC and other displaced businesses with relocation. Gerald Cain, the

owner and principal of Land Acquisitions, Inc., who had worked in the field for more than 34

years, served as the Village’s relocation consultant. On January 11, 2019, Cain informed AJC that

it was eligible for relocation benefits under the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 30/1-1-1 et seq.

(West 2018)), the Displaced Person Relocation Act (310 ILCS 40/0.01 et seq. (West 2018)), and

the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA) (42

U.S.C. § 4601 et seq. (2018)).

¶4     AJC relocated to Waukegan, Illinois. Instead of submitting bills and invoices for actual

relocation expenses that it paid, AJC chose to seek reimbursement for its relocation expenses

pursuant to the “self-move” provision of a regulation under the URA (49 C.F.R. § 24.301(d)(2)(i)

(2018). In total, AJC submitted five claims and requested $2,188,920 for relocation expenses.

AJC’s “Claim One” for $2500 and “Claim Two” for $25,000 were paid by the Village in full. For

“Claim Four,” AJC requested $19,262.50 based on an estimate it received from CMIT Solutions.

After the Village obtained two estimates for the scope of work outlined in Claim Four, it paid AJC

$8500, the lower of the two estimates.

¶5     For “Claim Three,” AJC requested $324,983.50 based on an estimate it obtained from

InnVantage to relocate its office furniture, equipment, and inventory. After Cain reviewed the

InnVantage estimate, he determined that some of the scoped work was above what was reasonable

and that $88,598 did not qualify as eligible moving expenses under 49 C.F.R. § 24.301(g). The

Village then obtained two estimates for Claim Three, from Shur-Way Moving & Cartage (Shur-

Way) and McCollister’s Transportation Group, Inc. (McCollister’s). It paid AJC $136,385.50, the

lower of the two estimates, plus an additional $21,000 to cover the cost of an outside move

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No. 1-23-0641

coordinator, an expense that was not included in the estimates provided by Shur-Way and

McCollister’s. The Village paid AJC a total of $157,385.00 on “Claim Three.”

¶6     On November 21, 2019, AJC submitted “Claim Five” and requested $1,739,540 for the

relocation of certain personal property under 49 C.F.R. § 24.301(g)(3) and $55,000 for the

relocation of certain personal property under 49 C.F.R. § 24.301(g)(16). The estimate AJC

submitted, which was prepared by RRT Design & Construction (RRT), included 11 separate

expense items AJC claimed were necessary to move its heavy equipment to a new facility. Cain

reviewed the claim to determine whether the amounts listed were eligible moving expenses and

determined that items 6, 7, 10, and 11 were ineligible or duplicative of other claims and therefore

denied them.

¶7     The Village then sought estimates for the work described in Claim 5. The Village received

an estimate from Spiral Services (Spiral) on March 16, 2020. The estimate encompassed all items

listed in Claim 5, including those Cain had already deemed ineligible. The Village then attempted

to obtain a comprehensive estimate for the items Cain deemed eligible for reimbursement, but due

to the COVID-19 pandemic, it had difficulty obtaining a single comprehensive estimate.

Accordingly, the Village sought separate estimates for the items that Cain determined were eligible

for reimbursement in Claim 5. Village administrator John Lobaito told AJC the Village would

promptly pay its actual expenses for the items that Cain determined were eligible for

reimbursement if AJC would submit its bills and invoices, but AJC declined to do so.

¶8     On June 5, 2020, the Village obtained estimates for items 3, 5, 8, and 9 in Claim 5. It paid

AJC for items 3, 5, 8, and 9 based on estimates it received from NorthRange Concrete Inc. and

Umbdenstock Electric Inc. The Village continued to review items 1, 2, and 4. On July 17, 2020,

Lobaito asked AJC to provide specifications for AJC’s equipment to assist the Village’s potential

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No. 1-23-0641

bidders. Although AJC said that it would, it never provided the specifications. In September 2020,

the Village obtained estimates for the work covered by items 1, 2 and 4 in Claim 5. It paid AJC

for items 1, 2, and 4 based on estimates from Ray Sagan & Sons Inc., Spiral Services LLC, and

RRT Design & Construction. The Village paid AJC $554,700.25 for Claim 5. In total, the Village

paid AJC $748,385.25 for relocation expenses under the self-move provision of the URA.

¶9     On October 7, 2020, AJC was notified of its right to appeal. On December 3, 2020, AJC

provided written notice of its appeal of payments made by the Village on Claims 3 and 5.

Afterwards, the Village informed AJC that it had collected all files pertinent to AJC’s appeal and

that it was “prepared to make them available for *** inspection and copying.” The Village

designated its former attorney, Charles F. Marino, to hear AJC’s appeal. Marino had not been

involved in the instant relocation expense claim review and ensuing dispute from which this appeal

was taken. AJC asked the Village to produce any specific rules it had created to govern the appeal

process, but no such rules existed. On January 11, 2021, Marino told AJC to submit any materials

it wanted him to consider and said he would “consider all pertinent justification and other material

*** and all other available information that is needed to ensure a fair and full review of the appeal.”

On January 22, 2021, AJC wrote to Marino, requesting that it be allowed to conduct additional

discovery, including taking the deposition of relocation consultant Cain and others. On January

27, 2021, the Village indicated that it did “not oppose any reasonable efforts by AJC to gather

whatever information it believes is necessary to support its appeal” but noted that it had “already

permitted AJC to inspect and copy all non-confidential materials in the Village files that are

pertinent to the appeal” and “produced the files of its consultant, Mr. Gerald Cain.” In response to

AJC’s request to take discovery, Marino said that AJC “d[id] not cite any authority supporting his

request” and he “ha[d] not found any Illinois statute or case law providing for interrogatories and

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No. 1-23-0641

depositions in an administrative proceeding.” He noted that “the Code of Civil Procedure does not

apply to administrative proceedings.” He therefore denied AJC’s request to conduct additional

discovery. Afterwards, AJC filed a “Motion for Substitution of Administrative Law Judge,” in

which it asked Marino to recuse himself and to appoint a hearing officer “who does not have an

appearance of a conflict or demonstrably extensive contacts with the Village.” Marino denied

AJC’s motion.

¶ 10   On October 11, 2021, Marino issued his decision “[b]ased on his review of the briefs and

exhibits submitted on the appeal.” In it, he found that the Village properly removed certain items

from the scope of services and properly determined that AJC was entitled to $157,385 on Claim

3. With respect to Claim 5, Marino affirmed the Village’s decision to remove certain items from

the claim as well as its decision to pay $554,700.25 for AJC’s eligible expenses in relocating its

heavy equipment and machinery. However, he found that the Village improperly removed item 6

from Claim 5, which related to the fire sprinkler, and ordered the Village to pay AJC for the actual

cost of a new fire sprinkler “in an amount to be reasonably determined by the Village Staff and

Relocation Consultant.”

¶ 11   AJC then appealed to the circuit court, claiming that Marino abused his discretion when he

affirmed the Village’s payment awards. AJC also argued that the administrative proceedings failed

to afford it due process. The circuit court affirmed Marino’s decision. It found that AJC was not

denied due process; that Marino showed no dishonesty, bias, or prejudgment of facts; and that

there was competent evidence in the record to support Marino’s findings. This appeal followed.

¶ 12                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13                                      A. Jurisdiction

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No. 1-23-0641

¶ 14   We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303.

Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). We review the administrative

agency’s final decision and not the determination of the trial court. Marconi v. Chicago Heights

Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 531 (2006).

¶ 15                     B. The Village Properly Obtained and Based Its

                              Decision on More Than One Estimate

¶ 16   AJC argues that Marino misapplied the law and committed reversible error when he

affirmed the Village’s payments to AJC for relocation expenses based on estimates the Village

obtained from multiple contractors. When a business elects to do a self-move, as AJC did here, the

“self-move payment may be based on *** [t]he lower of two bids or estimates prepared by a

commercial mover or qualified Agency staff person.” 49 C.F.R. § 24.301(d)(2)(i) (2018). AJC

contends that, under the plain language of this regulation, “the Village was allowed two and only

two bids on AJC’s Claim No. 5, *** and those [first] two bids were RRT and Spiral. No other bids

were permitted, and *** Marino’s acceptance and reliance on numerous other bids is in clear

derogation of controlling law.” The Village obtained the Spiral bid, and AJC obtained the RRT

bid. The interpretation of agency regulations is a question of law, which we review de novo. Julie

Q. v. Department of Children & Family Services, 2011 IL App (2d) 100643, ¶ 26.

¶ 17   We disagree with AJC’s interpretation of the business self-move regulation for several

reasons. First, “[a]s a rule of statutory construction, the word ‘may’ is permissive, as opposed to

mandatory.” In re Estate of Ahmed, 322 Ill. App. 3d 741, 746 (2001). Therefore, the plain language

of the regulation, which states that “a self-move payment may be based on *** [t]he lower of two

bids or estimates” does not mandate that the Village base its relocation payment on “the lower of

two bids or estimates” as AJC contends. (Emphases added.) 49 C.F.R. § 24.301(d)(2)(i) (2018).

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No. 1-23-0641

See People v. Bledsoe, 268 Ill. App. 3d 869, 871-72 (1994) (“Generally, the word ‘shall’ is

regarded as indicative of mandatory intent.”). Nothing in the regulation prohibits an agency from

obtaining more than one estimate, as the Village did here, and AJC cites no authority that would

lead us to conclude otherwise. The regulation does not specify or limit the number of estimates

that a displaced party, like AJC, may obtain either.

¶ 18   The section of the regulation relating to self-move relocation payments is short on

specifics. For example, one court has observed that “[n]either caselaw nor the regulations assign

responsibility for obtaining estimates to a particular party.” In re Jensen Field Relocation Claims,

817 N.W.2d 724, 736 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (analyzing the language of the self-move provision

of the URA regulation). To address the issue of who can obtain estimates and how many estimates

can be obtained by either party, the Village argues that the court may look to the United States

Department of Transportation’s (USDOT) brochure, updated in 2014 and titled, “Your Rights and

Benefits as a Displaced Person Under the Federal Relocation Assistance Program,” which states

that, “[i]f you agree to take full responsibility for all or part of the move of your operation, the

Agency may approve a payment not to exceed the lower of two acceptable bids or estimates

obtained by the Agency from qualified moving firms, moving consultants, or a qualified Agency

staff employee.” (Emphasis added.) U.S. Dep’t of Transp. Fed. Highway Admin., Your Rights and

Benefits as a Displaced Person Under the Federal Relocation Assistance Program, at 28 (2014),

https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/49013 [https://perma.cc/A65Q-C2XN]. The Village contends

that, because an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to “great deference” by

the courts (LaBelle v. State Employees Retirement System, 265 Ill. App. 3d 733, 735 (1994)), we

should defer to the USDOT’s interpretation of the regulation, which allows the agency to obtain

two bids or estimates. We see no reason to reject the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.

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No. 1-23-0641

See Kronemeyer v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 368 Ill. App. 3d 224, 229 (2006) (“This principle of

deference to agency interpretation is even stronger when the agency is interpreting its own

regulation. When an agency interprets its own regulation, the agency’s interpretation is controlling

unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

AJC’s contention that the hearing officer was limited to the Spiral and RRT bids because those

were the first two bids that were submitted, on the other hand, could lead to an absurd result. For

example, if AJC submitted two contractor bids to the Village in the first instance, then the Village

would be precluded from obtaining its own contractor’s bid and would be required to pay AJC the

lower of the two bids AJC obtained. Moreover, it would make no sense to impose a limit on the

number of bids a party may obtain because it would be unenforceable. If a displaced party secretly

obtained multiple bids for relocation expenses but then submitted only the highest bid to the

agency, there would be no way for the agency to know that the displaced party had obtained other

bids. In fact, the record reflects that AJC obtained an estimate from Ray Sagan & Sons on October

24, 2017, yet it failed to submit this estimate to the Village and instead submitted only the estimate

it received from RRT, which was significantly higher. Here, the Village obtained and relied on no

more than two estimates for each of the items contained in Claims 3 and 5. Accordingly, we find

that the Village did not violate URA regulations when it based its payments to AJC for Claims 3

and 5 on estimates from different moving companies.

¶ 19                           C. Marino Demonstrated No Bias

¶ 20   AJC next argues that the Village’s designee, Marino, exercised “impermissible judicial

bias” as trier of fact in this matter. It argues that, because Marino was the Village’s attorney for

over 40 years, there was “at best” a “clear appearance of impropriety” and “at worst” a “conflict

of interest” in him serving as the designated hearing officer. However, “[i]t is well settled that

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No. 1-23-0641

administrative officials are presumed to be objective and capable of fairly judging a particular

controversy.” Turcol v. Pension Board of Trustees of Matteson Police Pension Fund, 359 Ill. App.

3d 795, 804 (2005); see also Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153

Ill. 2d 76, 95 (1992) (“[s]tate administrators are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual

discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). “A mere possibility of prejudice” is insufficient to show bias.

Collura v. Board of Police Commissioners of Itasca, 113 Ill. 2d 361, 370 (1986); Williams v.

Department of Employment Security, 2016 IL App (1st) 142376, ¶ 46. Instead, a party must

demonstrate that “the administrative proceedings were either tainted by dishonesty or contained

an unacceptable risk of bias. [Citations.] Bias may be indicated if a disinterested observer might

conclude that the administrative body *** had in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the

law of the case in advance of hearing it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wolin v. Department

of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2012 IL App (1st) 112113, ¶ 33.

¶ 21   Here, AJC points to nothing in the record to demonstrate that Marino adjudged the facts or

the law prior to hearing the case. Instead, it asserts that “Marino’s forty-plus years as the Village’s

attorney created a biased appeal process,” seemingly arguing that anyone long associated with the

Village would surely be biased and therefore unqualified to review the Village’s payment

decisions. But AJC’s argument ignores the fact that the relevant regulations require the Village (or

its designee) to review its own payment decisions. See 49 C.F.R. § 24.10(f), (h) (2018) (stating

that “[i]n deciding an appeal, the Agency shall consider all pertinent justification and other material

submitted by the person, and all other available information that is needed to ensure a fair and full

review of the appeal” and that “[t]he Agency official conducting the review of the appeal shall be

either the head of the Agency or his or her authorized designee” (emphasis added)). See Jensen

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No. 1-23-0641

Field Relocation Claims, 817 N.W.2d at 730 (finding a displacing university’s use of its vice

president to hear a displaced person’s appeal of a decision denying relocation benefits complied

with the URA). Accordingly, AJC’s bias argument is without merit.

¶ 22                   D. The Administrative Proceedings Afforded AJC Due Process

¶ 23   AJC argues that its due process rights were violated when Marino denied its discovery

requests and failed to conduct a hearing prior to issuing his decision. It argues that under 49 C.F.R.

§ 24.10(f) (2018), which states that an “Agency shall consider all pertinent justification and other

material submitted by the person, and all other available information that is needed to ensure a fair

and full review of the appeal,” Marino was required to permit additional discovery, allow

depositions, and provide AJC with the Village’s rules regarding its handling of URA appeals. AJC

also contends that Marino’s failure to “provide any hearing” where it could “cross examine or

challenge the Village’s estimates” and his decision to deny depositions and subpoenas deprived it

of due process. We review de novo whether the administrative proceedings violated AJC’s right

to due process. Engle v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2018 IL App (1st)

162602, ¶ 40.

¶ 24   Again, 49 C.F.R. § 24.10(f) (2018) states that, “[i]n deciding an appeal, the Agency shall

consider all pertinent justification and other material submitted by the person, and all other

available information that is needed to ensure a fair and full review of the appeal.” While

administrative proceedings are governed by the fundamental principles and requirements of due

process of law (Village of South Elgin v. Pollution Control Board, 64 Ill. App. 3d 565, 567 (1978)),

due process requirements in administrative proceedings are simpler and less formal than judicial

proceedings. Daniels v. Police Board of Chicago, 338 Ill. App. 3d 851, 860 (2003). In

administrative proceedings, the formal procedures of a trial are not required; instead, “due process

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No. 1-23-0641

is satisfied by a procedure that is suitable for the nature of the determination to be made and

conforms to the fundamental principles of justice.” Desai v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of

Greater Chicago, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1033 (1984).

¶ 25   In Kroger Co. v. Regional Airport Authority of Louisville and Jefferson County, 286 F.3d

382 (6th Cir. 2002), the court addressed a similar due process argument related to proceedings

involving relocation payments. After the Regional Airport Authority (RAA) denied certain

expenditures claimed by Kroger as ineligible relocation expenses or in excess of reasonable and

necessary amounts, Kroger appealed. Id. at 386. In addition to reviewing the documentation that

had been submitted, RAA’s general manager considered Kroger’s oral presentation and a written

position statement but denied Kroger’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Id. He “informed Kroger

that it was free to supplement the record with additional materials or legal authorities, but Kroger

did not do so.” Id. After the general manager affirmed the RAA’s determination, Kroger sought

district court review of the decision. Id. After the district court affirmed the RAA’s decision,

Kroger appealed. Id. On appeal, the court found that the RAA did not err in denying Kroger’s

request for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 388. It noted that “the [Administrative Procedure Act (5

U.S.C. § 551 (2000))] requires hearings only where an on-the-record adjudication is required by

the appropriate substantive statute” and that the regulations “provide simply that an agency

determination be made ‘promptly after receipt of all information submitted by a person in support

of an appeal.’ ” Id. (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 24.10(g) (2002)). The court noted that the RAA “allowed

Kroger to submit any relevant information it wished to tender,” then reviewed the record and

permitted an oral presentation, a written statement, and a supplementation of the record. Id. The

court concluded that “Kroger received all the process it was due under the URA, the

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No. 1-23-0641

[Administrative Procedure Act], and the Constitution, and it was not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing at any level.” Id.

¶ 26   Similarly here, in line with the URA regulations, Marino informed AJC that he would

“consider all pertinent justification and other material you submit, and all other available

information that is needed to ensure a fair and full review of the appeal, including a response and

any additional material from the Village’s legal counsel *** and any additional material *** you

submit[ ].” After the parties submitted additional materials, Marino noted that he based his

decision on his “review of the briefs and exhibits submitted [i]n the appeal.” We therefore find

that the procedures employed by the Village complied with the relevant regulations, that an

evidentiary hearing or additional discovery was not required, and that the proceedings comported

with due process.

¶ 27                         E. Marino Did Not Abuse His Discretion When

                                  He Upheld the Village’s Payments

¶ 28   AJC argues that Marino abused his decision when he upheld the Village’s relocation

payment decisions. He argues that Marino’s decision should be reviewed de novo because he “had

never worked on a matter involving the URA before this case” and, therefore, “[h]is ruling should

not be accorded any deference.” However, because AJC is asking us to review an administrative

agency’s findings of fact, we review under the manifest weight of the evidence standard.

Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88. The “mere fact that an opposite conclusion is reasonable or that the

reviewing court might have ruled differently will not justify reversal of the administrative

findings.” Id. Instead, “[i]f the record contains evidence to support the agency’s decision, it should

be affirmed.” Id. AJC has not cited any authority to support its position that a less deferential

standard of review applies because this was the first URA case Marino presided over.

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No. 1-23-0641

¶ 29   AJC argues that Marino erred in considering “unqualified” estimates that were submitted

by the Village. It asserts that several of the estimates relied upon by the Village were “unqualified”

because they did not cover the scope of the entire move and instead, addressed limited scopes of

work, like electrical and concrete, or because they lacked sufficient detail. However, the

regulations neither indicate that self-move payments must be based on comprehensive estimates

nor discuss the level of specificity required. Instead, the regulations merely state that an agency

must base its self-move payments on “estimates prepared by a commercial mover or qualified

Agency staff person.” 49 C.F.R. § 24.301(d)(2)(i) (2018). The record reflects that the estimates

prepared by RRT Design & Construction, Spiral Services LLC, McCollister’s, Ray Sagan & Sons

Inc., NorthRange Concrete Inc., and Umbdenstock Electric, Inc., were relied upon by Cain, who

had worked in the field of relocation payments for more than 34 years, to support the Village’s

payments to AJC. Accordingly, we find that these estimates satisfy the language of the regulation

and see no reason to deem them “unqualified.” AJC points us to nothing in the record or to any

authority that would lead us to conclude otherwise.

¶ 30   AJC also argues that Marino abused his discretion when he failed to consider relevant

evidence, including the affidavits of Alan and Peter Josephsen, Nathaniel Egosi, and Nick Salemi

and the report of Robert Swenson. However, Marino expressly stated in his decision that he

“considered the exhibits submitted,” which included the aforementioned affidavits and report. See

People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 117 (2007) (“the mandate to consider all the evidence on review

does not necessitate a point-by-point discussion of every piece of evidence”). It was within

Marino’s purview to determine how much weight to give to each piece of evidence, and we will

not second-guess his factual determinations. See Haynes v. Police Board of Chicago, 293 Ill. App.

3d 508, 511-12 (1997) (“On administrative review, neither this court nor the circuit court can

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No. 1-23-0641

reweigh the evidence or the determination of the credibility of the witnesses, which is to be made

by the agency.”). Because evidence in the record, including statements from Cain and estimates

from various contractors, supported the Village’s payments to AJC, we conclude that Marino’s

factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 31                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32   For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Village’s hearing officer is affirmed.

¶ 33   Affirmed.

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No. 1-23-0641

            Alan Josephsen Co. v. Village of Mundelein, 2024 IL App (1st) 230641

Decision Under Review:         Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2021-CH-
                               05777; the Hon. Neil H. Cohen, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                      Bryan P. Lynch, of Law Office of Bryan P. Lynch, P.C., of
for                            Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                      Brandy S. Quance, of Zukowski, Rogers, Flood & McArdle, of
for                            Crystal Lake, for appellee.
Appellee:

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