Court Opinion

ID: 9450530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:51:06.236952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:21.733581
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
As I read Judge SCHNACKENBERG’s opinion, this court is ruling that under no circumstances may a federal court jury in a felony criminal case be permitted to separate while it is deliberating upon its verdict. I must disagree. I believe that whether a jury is impounded during its deliberation is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge and that unless this discretion is abused or prejudice results, the verdict should stand.
Whereas, in Lucas v. United States, 275 F. 405 (8th Cir. 1921), the reason for the separation of the jury was the inability of the marshal to find quarters *672to house the jurors overnight, the reason in the instant case was an apparent practice of the district judge. In my opinion, this difference in reasons for separation does not constitute sufficient basis for a distinction.
Moreover, separation of the jury during deliberation of its verdict and separation during the course of the trial are not logically distinguishable. If jurors are apt to be influenced by outside contacts during periods when they are separated while deliberating, they are equally apt to be influenced by those contacts during the trial. The protection against such evil ordinarily is provided by an admonition from the judge and by an adherence to the admonition by conscientious jurors. When circumstances demand, confinement should be ordered. This, however, is a matter that ought to be left to the sound judgment of the trial judge.
Of course, whatever historical reasons there are for keeping the jury together until a verdict is reached should be considered ; however, the validity of the inflexible rule announced today ought to rest on grounds stronger than history alone. Prolonged deliberation and fatigue may force a verdict, but not necessarily a fair one or one that is free from attrition. Minds that are fresh after sleep and rest are more likely to produce a considered and deliberate judgment.
Although not approving of the rather casual treatment by the district judge of the question whether the jury should separate, I cannot say that he abused his discretion. Certainly, no prejudice was shown to have resulted.
Although I also deprecate the casual and unorthodox method of communication between the judge and the jury whereby the jurors were admonished through the marshal not to discuss the case with anyone nor to permit anyone to discuss it with them during separation, the defendant should not be heard to object to an instruction given, or to a procedure adopted, for his protection. It is difficult to imagine how he could have been harmed. Of course, as Judge SCHNACKENBERG suggests, the marshal may not have repeated the exact words of the judge or he may have said more; yet there is nothing in the record to indicate that he did so. I do not think we should reverse on speculation, that is, on the possibility that the officer deviated from the judge’s direction.
I would affirm.