Court Opinion

ID: 4497935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2020-01-23 18:15:41.244386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:15.590906
License: Public Domain

*427OPINION.
Keen :
The first issue presented for our decision involves, substantially, the same question that was decided by the Supreme Court in Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, whether in the case of an inter vivos transfer of property in trust, the donor reserving to himself the power to designate new beneficiaries other than himself, the gift becomes complete and subject to the Federal gift tax at the time of the relinquishment of the power.
In the Sanford, case the donor in 1913 created a trust of personal property for the benefit of named beneficiaries, reserving to himself the power to terminate the trust in whole or in part or to modify it. In 1919 he surrendered his power of revocation, reserving the right to modify the trust, but provided that such reservation should not be construed to include any right in the donor to withdraw principal or income from the trust. In 1924, after the effective date of the gift tax statute, the donor renounced his remaining power to modify the trust. The court held that the gift became completed and taxable only upon the donor’s final renunciation of his power to modify the trust.
The facts in the case before us bring it squarely within the decision of the Sanford case, supra, and upon the authority of that decision we hold that the renunciation by the decedent, in 1937, of his power to alter or amend the trust instrument resulted in the completion of a taxable *428gift with respect to the corpus of the trust to the extent of its fair market value at the date of the renunication of the power. Since the petitioner has offered no evidence of the value of the assets of the trust as of that date, the determination of the respondent is approved.
The second issue presents the question of whether the distribution by the trustee to Elise G. Mead, the beneficiary under the trust instrument of both the A and B trusts, resulted in taxable gifts by decedent in the amounts so distributed during the respective years before us. This issue arises from the determination by the respondent that each distribution of trust income made to the beneficiary, prior to the renunciation by the grantor of his reserved power to change beneficiaries, constituted a completed gift to her by the grantor in the amount distributed.
The respondent cites Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 Fed. (2d) 954; Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436; and Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, supra, as authority for his determination. In these and related cases cited by the respondent, the question before the court was whether the transfer of the corpus became completed and subject to tax on the termination of the reserved power to modify the trust either by renunciation of the power or by death of the donor.
The issue here involves only the income from the trust property and as we view the case the rationale of the decisions applicable to gifts of corpus is not controlling. Our attention has not been called to any decided case precisely in point. The argument of the respondent that the gift of income was completed when distribution was made by the trustee, “even though the first step of the gift may have been taken when the trust was established” is ingenious, but, in our opinion, is untenable under the facts before us.
The instrument creating the trust entitled the beneficiary to the net income of the property held in trust during her lifetime or until the donor exercised his power to change beneficiaries. She thus became the owner of an equitable interest in the corpus of the trust property, subject to being divested by the happening of a subsequent event. Cf. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5; Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U. S. 589; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161. By virtue of this interest in the corpus of the trust she was entitled to enforce the trust, to have a breach of trust enjoined, and to require the net income to be paid over to her by the trustee. The interest was present property, alienable like any other in the absence of a valid restraint upon alienation. Blair v. Commissioner, supra. Since the net income was currently distributable to her, it became her property within the meaning of the taxing statutes at the time of its receipt by the trustee. United States v. Arnold, 89 Fed. (2d) 246. The reserved power of the donor did not affect the quantum of her interest. It only made its duration contingent upon the exercise of the power by the decedent to change benefi*429ciaries. The termination of the power in 1937 merely removed the contingency. In this situation it is obvious that when net income from trust property accrued there arose an obligation of the trustee to distribute such income to the beneficiary of the trust. The distribution was in satisfaction of that obligation and not a gift of income to the beneficiary by the donor of the trust at the time of distribution. We hold that the amounts distributed are not taxable as gifts of the donor in the respective years before us.
It should be borne in mind that the trust involved herein is not a revocable trust of such a nature that the income therefrom would be taxable to the donor. Knapp v. Hoey, 104 Fed. (2d) 99; Ellsworth B. Buck, 41 B. T. A. 99. Since the income will not be considered for purposes of taxation as having been received by the donor of the trust, it would appear illogical to consider it as being the subject of a gift from the donor of the trust to the beneficiary.
Reviewed by the Board.

Decision will he entered under Rule 50.