Court Opinion

ID: 9793202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:44:24.371264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:53.488698
License: Public Domain

BOOCHEVER, Justice,
with whom RA-BINOWITZ, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
I do not agree with the portion of the opinion that holds that the requirement of art. IV, § 4, of Alaska’s Constitution specifying that: “[jjudges of other courts shall be selected . . . for terms . prescribed by law” is satisfied by the provisions of AS 22.15.170(c). That section specifies that:
The presiding judge of the superior court in each judicial district shall appoint the magistrates for the district court for the *247judicial district. Each magistrate serves at the pleasure of the presiding judge of the superior court in the judicial district for which appointed.
Specifying service “at the pleasure” of an authority seems to me to be the very antithesis of designating a “term.” There might be some argument if a term were prescribed — for one, two or more years — and removal specified at the pleasure of the presiding judge. But here no term has been prescribed so we need not reach that issue.1
The word “term” connotes a fixed period of time, and the use of the adjective “fixed” in connection with the noun “term” would be a redundancy. The framers of our Constitution sought to avoid redundancy.2
The majority admits that the word “term” as interpreted by courts in a variety of contexts refers to a period of service that is fixed in time. Among cases so holding are Bayley v. Garrison, 190 Cal. 690, 214 P. 871, 872 (1923); Kratzer v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 684, 15 S.W.2d 473, 474-75 (1929); Board of Education of Pendleton County v. Gulick, 398 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Ky.App.1966); State ex rel. Gilbert v. Board of Commissioners of Sierra County, 29 N.M. 209, 222 P. 654, 655 (1924); State ex rel. Matlack v. Oklahoma City, 38 Okl. 349, 134 P. 58, 59 (1913) (all cases construing “term” in a constitution). See also Sueppel v. City Council of Iowa City, 257 Iowa 1350, 136 N.W.2d 523, 527 (1965); Ida County Sav. Bank v. Seidensticker, 92 N.W. 862, 866 (Iowa 1902) (defining “term” in other contexts). In fact, it has been stated that “an officer removable at the pleasure of the appointing officer has, in the strict meaning of the word, no ‘term’ of office.” State ex rel. Bonner v. District Court, 122 Mont. 464, 206 P.2d 166 (Mont.1949), quoting, 46 C.J.S. Officers § 98.
The distinction between a requirement of specifying a “term” of office and a general authorization to the legislature is discussed in Collision v. State ex rel. Green, 2 A.2d 97 (Del.1938), wherein it was held that a provision authorizing the governor to remove members of the State Industrial Accident Board “with or without cause” was upheld because of the absence of a constitutional requirement that a “term” be prescribed for the office. The court stated:
As there is nothing in the Delaware Constitution which requires the legislature in the creation of statutory offices to prescribe fixed and definite terms for their occupancy, it must necessarily follow that no constitutional inhibition exists against the creation of such an office to be held during the pleasure of the appointing power.3
In contrast, Alaska’s Constitution does contain a provision requiring the legislature to prescribe “terms” of magistrates.
The majority further admits that as used elsewhere in Alaska’s Constitution, the word “term” refers to a “period of service that is fixed in time.”4 I fail to see any reason to utilize a different, and what seems to me to be a most strained, interpretation of the word “term” when applied to magistrates.
I would affirm Judge Rowland’s decision that service at the pleasure of the presiding judge falls short of the constitutional requirement that judges be selected for “terms prescribed by law.”

. But see Collision v. State ex rel. Green, 2 A.2d 97 (Del.1938), discussed infra.

. Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1979).

. Id. at 100. In our prior case concerning the office of a district judge, we did not have presented the issue of whether service “at pleasure” complied with the constitutional requirement of prescribing “terms” of office. Delahay v. State, 476 P.2d 908 (Alaska 1970).

.See Note 13 of the majority opinion, for examples.