Court Opinion

ID: 9810712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:56:53.082691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:10.064989
License: Public Domain

Smith, C. J.,
(dissenting from the judgment granting a new trial). I fully concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice MekrimoN, that without regard to the date of the debt the insolvent debtor is entitled to have his homestead ascertained and laid off, to the end that the excess be first applied to its payment, when sold under execution, so that the proceeds, if sufficient to discharge the demand, may exonerate the exempted part, or reduce its amount. The only difference between debts contracted before and after the adoption of the Constitution in 1868, is, that those of the former class, if the proceeds of sale of the excess be inadequate, must be satisfied out of the land set apart as the homestead, while those of the latter class cannot be. The laying off the exemption part is the plain duty of the officer in every case where it does not distinctiy appear that there can be no excess in order that the fact may be determined in the manner and by the persons designated by law, as a guide to his further action under the execution. The validity of the sale is only supported when upon a trial of the title to the land it is manifest that the whole was required to meet the claim, and no detriment has come to the debtor by reason of the sale of the entirety. This view of the law is fully sustained by the authorities, and in the reasoning contained in the opinion, and meets my approval, while in another aspect of the case, I think- the judgment ought to be affirmed.
There were four tracts of land distinct one from the other, which under the plaintiff ’s directions were put up and sold together, himself becoming the purchaser at the price of $200. In his own testimony he estimated them to be worth $5.00 per acre, and in the aggregate $1,575.00, if sold with no cloud upon the title.
*376The debt was contracted in March, 1862, and no homestead was allotted to the owner before the sale.
The defendant demurred to the evidence produced before the jury, as insufficient to sustain the action in two respects:
1. The manner of selling vitiated the sale, and the plaintiff acquired no title.
2. The homestead not having been set apart to the debtor, and the plaintiff’s own proof being, that, had this been done, the excess would have been sufficient to pay the debt ($205.09), the sale was illegal and inoperative.
The Court ruling the sale to be void, sustained the demurrer, and from the judgment the plaintiff appealed.
Under the former practice a demurrer to the declaration, overruled, was followed by a final judgment, as thereby the facts were admitted for the purposes of the action. A demurrer to the evidence, when it was all in, (not unlike amotion for a nonsuit at this stage of the trial, except that the one was compulsory and the other voluntary, and the latter left the plaintiff free to bring a new action for the same cause;) if wpheld, alike disposed of the action and operated asa discharge of the jury. Stephen Pleading, 13; Black. Com., 372; Sellon’s Prac., 470.
It is otherwise under the present system, for if, interposed in good faith, the demurrer to the pleading be sustained, the party may plead over on such terms as may be prescribed, as if that defence had not been made. The Code, §272.
In analogy, if not upon a fair construction of the act, the legal effect of overruling a demurrer to the evidence would be to proceed with the trial, the jury being retained, while if it were sustained, the action would be terminated, unless the plaintiff obtained leave to introduce further evidence in support of his case.
While ordinarily a demurrer of this kind requires the setting out of the evidence in full, and the more so when no special defect is pointed out^yet it is otherwise if there is *377a fact shown-which is itself an element in the complaint fatal to the cause, or is so adjudged to be, I can see no good reason for stating in full evidence' wholly irrelevant to the point involved in the adjudication, and which cannot effect the result. Such in the present case is all that introduced and heard upon the question of the fraudulent intent imputed to the debtor in making the deeds to his two sons and sons-in-law, inasmuch as the inquiry, however answered, does not bear upon the ruling in the cause. The decision turns upon the point, whether there is ground for believing that the homestead, or some part of it, might not have been secured to the debtor after leaving out a part of the land sufficient to discharge the debt, and this affirmatively appears from the plaintiff’s own statement of the value of the tracts of land.
Certainly he cannot complain if his own statement is accepted as a correct valuation of the property; and so the mandate of the statute has been disregarded by the sheriff at the instance of the plaintiff and purchaser, one and the same person.
When a sale is made contrary to the requirements of the law, and the purchaser knows of and shares in the violation, he can acquire no title, such as a sale made not at the court house, or not on a day authorized; while the mere compliance of the officer with some prescribed duty imposed on himself, and not so known, such as a due advertisement of sale, will not invalidate the sale. In such cases the sale is voidable, as decided in Burton v. Spiers, 92 N. C., 503; Hinton v. Roach, 95 N. C., 106, and other authorities.
But it is void if the sale is not made at the time and place prescribed by law. State v. Rives, 5 Ire., 297.
The plaintiff insists, and in this he is sustained in the opinion of Mr. Justice Davis, that as the sale was to satisfy a debt contracted before the homestead law was in force, it was not void, but voidable only, even if, when laying off the *378exempted part, there would be an excess sufficient to discharge the claim, and this upon the authority of the ruling in the Kearsey case by the Supreme Court of the United States, and of this Court in Gheen v. Summey, 80 N. C., 187, and made two and a half years later. The latter case in general terms gives some countenance to the idea that the provisions for exemption are inoperative against process to enforce old debts.
But the declarations in that case have been since explained and corrected, and the true principle announced and vindicated, as shown in the opinion of Justice Merrimon. The statute cannot violate the obligation of contracts, when it leaves all the debtor’s property, before liable to execution, still so liable, and simply regulates the manner in which it is to be subjected. It withdraws nothing of the debtor’s property from the creditor, for, if need be, all can be sold and applied to his debt, but it directs primarily the excess’ above the exemption to be taken, and the exempt part only to be taken when the excess proves deficient. Cannot the-State regulate the manner in which the property of debtors may be reached, and what portions shall be first applied?' Does the creditor lose anything when he can exhaust all the debtor possesses until his demand is satisfied, because priorities of liability are declared ? The decision in the Kearsey case goes no' further than to declare void enactments that screen some of the property from liability to process, and in this way impairs the contract by preventing the application of a part withheld to its discharges.
It is all important that- the law be settled and understood, and I am unwilling to disturb the adjudications heretofore-made.
In my opinion, it appearing upon the plaintiff’s own showing, that the value of the tracts exceed in value both the debt and the full measure of the homestead, the sale is void,, and the judgment ought to be affirmed.
No error. Affirmed.