Court Opinion

ID: 9408815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 20:00:51.969278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:47.014251
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0317n.06

                                            No. 22-1314

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                    FILED
                                                                                    Jul 13, 2023
                                                          )                    DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
 JEBRIE CROSS,
                                                          )
         Petitioner-Appellant,                            )
                                                          )       ON APPEAL FROM THE
 v.                                                       )       UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                          )       COURT FOR THE EASTERN
 MELINDA K. BRAMAN, Warden,                               )       DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
 Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility,                )
         Respondent-Appellee.                             )                               OPINION
                                                          )

Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

       LARSEN, Circuit Judge.         Jebrie Cross filed a habeas petition challenging his state

convictions stemming from firebombing a house, contending that his trial counsel performed in a

constitutionally deficient manner. The district court denied his petition but granted a certificate of

appealability. We AFFIRM.

                                                  I.

       Jebrie Cross was convicted for firebombing a house in Detroit, Michigan. People v.

Thomas, No. 335071, 2018 WL 5304897, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018) (per curiam). On

December 13, 2015, two women got into a verbal and physical fight with the house’s occupants.

Id. The women left and recruited Cross and others to “retaliate for the earlier assault.” Id. On

their way back to the house, the group stopped at a gas station where Cross poured gasoline into

“at least one,” and maybe as many as three, glass bottles. Id. The group then drove to the house,

lit the bottles of gasoline on fire, and threw them into the house. Id. The jury heard testimony that
No. 22-1314, Cross v. Braman

Cross threw at least one bottle. Id. The firebomb resulted in an intense, quick-spreading fire that

killed two people and injured a third. Id.

       Two days later, two Detroit police officers interviewed Cross. Cross told the officers that

he suffered from a learning disability, so the officers read Cross’s Miranda rights to him and

confirmed he understood them. Id. at *9. Cross seemed “eager” to tell the police his account of

the events, which “largely minimized” his role “and shifted the blame to others.” Id. Cross was

charged with two counts of first-degree felony murder, one count of first-degree arson, assault with

the intent to commit murder, and assault with the intent to commit great bodily harm less than

murder.

       During pre-trial proceedings in January 2016, Cross’s trial counsel requested an evaluation

to determine Cross’s competency to stand trial and to waive his Miranda rights. Id. at *7. In June

2016, the trial court found Cross competent to stand trial based on a report by the state’s Center

for Forensic Psychiatry (CFP). Id. But the CFP had not yet completed its evaluation of Cross’s

competency to waive his Miranda rights; the trial court warned Cross’s counsel that there was not

much time before Cross’s August trial date to obtain an independent evaluation, should the defense

desire one. Id. In August, after the CFP report was ready, the trial court held a hearing to determine

the admissibility of Cross’s police interview. Id. at *9. The CFP report concluded that Cross was

competent to waive his Miranda rights, noting that “Cross possessed the intellectual capacity to

make a valid waiver and that he attempted to misrepresent his academic abilities and his psychiatric

symptoms.” Id. Cross’s trial counsel told the court that Cross’s family had hired an independent

psychologist to examine him. Id. The trial court considered the CFP report, testimony, and the

video recording of Cross’s police interview, and ruled that Cross was competent to waive his

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No. 22-1314, Cross v. Braman

Miranda rights and that Cross made his inculpatory statements intelligently and voluntarily. Id. at

*7.

       Cross stood trial. “Mid-trial,” Cross’s counsel advised the court that he had received a new

independent evaluation of Cross. Id. at *8. The report had been prepared “at the request of another

attorney and without trial counsel’s knowledge or involvement.” Id. That evaluation, done by

Leslie Kaye, Ph. D., found that Cross was not competent to waive his Miranda rights. Id. Cross’s

counsel asked for a new competency hearing considering the independent evaluation or for Kaye

to testify as a trial witness. Id. The trial court denied both requests. Id. The court found that

Cross was too late in procuring the evaluation; the state had not been provided with adequate

notice; and there was nothing to establish Kaye’s credentials as an expert witness, though the court

did allow Cross to submit the new evaluation and Kaye’s curriculum vitae into the record. Id.

       The jury convicted Cross of two counts of first-degree felony murder, one count of

first‑degree arson, and one count of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.

Id. at *1. Cross was deemed a habitual offender and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole

for each murder conviction and 10 to 20 years in prison for the assault conviction. Id. Cross filed

a motion for a new trial and requested an evidentiary hearing on the claim that his trial counsel

had been ineffective for not properly pursuing his competency to waive his constitutional rights.

Id. at *8. The state trial court denied the motion, finding that the delayed evaluation was the fault

of Cross or his family, not his trial counsel, and that there was overwhelming evidence of Cross’s

guilt even without his confession. Id. Cross appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed

the trial court, see id. at *9–10, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave

to appeal, see People v. Cross, 924 N.W.2d 560 (Mich. 2019) (unpublished table decision). Cross

filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district court. See Cross

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No. 22-1314, Cross v. Braman

v. Burton, No. 2:20-CV-10846, 2022 WL 996012, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2022). The district

court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability. Id. at *10. This appeal followed.

                                                  II.

       Cross argues that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing

to properly pursue his claim that he was not competent to waive his Miranda rights.

       To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show both

(1) that his “counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We may address

the Strickland prongs in either order. Id. at 697. The Strickland standard is highly deferential.

See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). And because the Michigan Court of Appeals

adjudicated Cross’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, our review under § 2254 is “doubly”

deferential. Id. (citation omitted). In this posture, the proper “question is not whether counsel’s

actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably

explained why Cross’s counsel did not fail the performance prong, so we cannot grant relief on

Cross’s ineffective assistance claim.1

       The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that trial counsel had “considered seeking an

independent evaluation, but was unlikely to obtain funding for an independent evaluation at state

expense because he had been retained.” Thomas, 2018 WL 5304897, at *9. And there was “no

evidence, such as an affidavit from Cross’s family members or trial counsel, to support any claim

that there was a plan to have the family fund an independent evaluation as part of Cross’s defense

1
 We look to the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals as the last reasoned state court decision.
See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

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No. 22-1314, Cross v. Braman

strategy, other than a brief comment at the hearing on August 24, 2016.” Id. Finally, “the record

show[ed] that trial counsel was unaware that Cross’s family had actually obtained an independent

evaluation to challenge his competency.” Id. We give the state court’s recitation of facts a

presumption of correctness that Cross has not rebutted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Treesh v.

Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 431 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying the standard to state appellate court

findings of fact). Because Cross’s counsel was unlikely to get funding for an earlier independent

evaluation and did not know that the family had engaged another attorney to secure its own

independent evaluation, the Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably determined that counsel could

not “be faulted for not seeking an adjournment to procure or present the evaluation in a timelier

manner.” Thomas, 2018 WL 5304897, at *9.

         Once Cross’s trial counsel became aware of the report, he promptly presented the trial court

with two paths forward: an additional evidentiary hearing or putting Kaye on the stand. Id. at *8.

That was enough to satisfy the performance prong under our doubly deferential review. Our

question is not whether we think “the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard

was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We are not convinced that the Michigan Court of Appeals made an unreasonable determination.

And because Cross’s claim fails on the performance prong, we need not address the prejudice

prong.

         Cross also raises a due process claim. But he did not raise that claim in his direct appeal

in state court. See Thomas, 2018 WL 5304897, at *6 (“The sole issue Cross raises on appeal is a

claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.”). And he does not claim to have “cause

and prejudice” that would allow him to pursue this claim now on state collateral review. See Mich.

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No. 22-1314, Cross v. Braman

Ct. R. 6.508(d)(3). So this claim is procedurally defaulted. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789,

806 (6th Cir. 2006). And we cannot review a procedurally defaulted claim without a showing of

cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 805–06. Cross has not even

attempted to make either showing, so we do not review the merits of his claim.

                                                 ***

       We AFFIRM.

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