Court Opinion

ID: 9958517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 16:01:44.128887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:27.491162
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 24-4024     Document: 010111028961       Date Filed: 04/09/2024       Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            April 9, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 24-4024
                                                    (D.C. No. 2:23-CR-00403-DS-1)
  CHRISTOPHER THOMAS CAMPAS,                                   (D. Utah)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       In November 2023, a grand jury in the District of Utah indicted Christopher

 Thomas Campas on two charges: attempted coercion and enticement of a minor in

 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and interstate travel with the intent to engage in

 illicit sexual conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Campas appeals the

 district court’s pretrial detention order. Exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.

 § 3145(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 24-4024    Document: 010111028961         Date Filed: 04/09/2024        Page: 2

 I.    BAIL REFORM ACT STANDARDS

       The Bail Reform Act requires pretrial detention “[i]f, after a hearing . . . ,

 [a] judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will

 reasonably assure [1] the appearance of the person as required and [2] the safety of

 any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (bracketed numerals

 inserted for clarity). When contemplating detention, the district court must consider

 “available information concerning”:

              (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
              including whether the offense . . . involves a minor victim
              ...;

              (2) the weight of the evidence against the person;

              (3) the history and characteristics of the person . . . ; and

              (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person
              or the community that would be posed by the person’s
              release.

 § 3142(g).

       Section 3142 further creates a presumption “that no condition or combination

 of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the

 safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to

 believe that the person committed” certain enumerated offenses, including the

 offenses with which Campas has been charged. See § 3142(e)(3)(E). The defendant

 may rebut that presumption by producing “some evidence” that his appearance could

 be assured and that he would not be a danger to the community. United States v.

 Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1991). If the defendant meets that burden,

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 “the [statutory] presumption [of detention] remains a factor for consideration by the

 district court in determining whether to release or detain.” Id.

       Regardless of the presumption’s effect, “the burden of persuasion regarding

 risk-of-flight and danger to the community always remains with the government.” Id.

 at 1354–55. Specifically, “[t]he government must prove risk of flight by a

 preponderance of the evidence, and it must prove dangerousness to any other person

 or to the community by clear and convincing evidence.” United States v. Cisneros,

 328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

 II.   BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.     Preparation for the Detention Hearing

       When the grand jury indicted Campas in November 2023, he had already been

 arrested based on the alleged conduct underlying the indictment. Pursuant to the Bail

 Reform Act, a magistrate judge soon set a hearing to determine if Campas should

 remain detained pending trial.

       Ahead of the hearing, the government moved for detention, and submitted the

 following background:

              An FBI agent was acting in an undercover capacity on a
              social media platform, purporting to be a father who was
              offering his 7-year-old son for sex. Beginning on October
              11, 2023, Campas made contact with the UC on a social
              media platform. Over the course of the next two weeks,
              the two engaged in sexually explicit conversations. The
              FBI UC asked Campas if he had “age limits,” to which
              Campas responded, “F**k no, nothing hotter than a father
              nursing his newborn on his c**k.” Campas further stated
              that he was going to drive from Oregon to Utah to sexually

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              abuse the 7-yr-old. Campas described what he wanted to
              do to the boy in graphic detail, to include rape and sodomy.

              Campas arranged to meet the UC on October 27, 2023, at a
              prearranged location in North Salt Lake, Utah. Campas
              was arrested without incident at this location. Campas is a
              resident of Arizona and does not live in or have
              connections to Utah. It appears he was driving from
              Oregon, where he had been living on a marijuana farm for
              the previous month, to Utah for the purpose of sexually
              abusing this boy. A cell phone found with Campas was
              confirmed to be the cell phone communicating with the
              FBI UC.

              Campas made admissions during a post-arrest interview.
              During that interview, Campas stated that he believes
              children are capable of consenting to sex and he does not
              believe what he is doing is wrong.

              Of significance, Campas was also communicating with
              other UC law enforcement officers on various social media
              platforms at the same time regarding his sexual interest in
              children.

 Aplt. App. vol. I at 14 (capitalization normalized) (redactions in original). Moreover,

 the government said it had “a video recording of the interview with Campas, where

 he makes the admissions set forth in the [block-quoted text above].” Id.

 (capitalization normalized).

       Also in anticipation of the detention hearing, a probation officer submitted a

 pretrial services report. Some of this report repeats verbatim the government’s

 accusations from its motion to detain. But the report also offers more detail about

 what Campas said in his online chats with the undercover FBI agent:

              Campas described [to the undercover agent] what he
              wanted to do to the [seven-year-old] boy, to include:
              “Hang naked, suck each other’s cocks, rimming, making
              out, fucking, teach him how to fist me, teach him how to
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               fuck and get fucked.” Campas said he would “like to make
               it a lifelong love.”

 Aplt. App. vol. II at 1.1

        The pretrial services report further noted that Campas is thirty-five years old

 and has lived in Arizona his whole life. He is unemployed, single, and does not have

 a valid passport. In terms of prior criminal history, he had been twice arrested, ten

 years earlier, for simple possession of a controlled substance, but there was no record

 of any conviction.

        In the probation officer’s opinion, “the information known at this time” and

 “the comments made by the defendant at the time of his arrest” show “there are no

 conditions which can be imposed to mitigate the risk the defendant poses at this

 time.” Id. at 6.

        1
          Campas submitted the pretrial services report under seal as volume II of his
 appendix, and he moved to keep volume II sealed. The Clerk of Court granted that
 motion, subject to this panel’s further consideration. We do not disturb the Clerk’s
 order because the pretrial services report contains personal identifying information
 and other sensitive information. However, “information obtained in the course of
 performing pretrial services functions in relation to a particular accused shall be used
 only for the purposes of a bail determination and shall otherwise be confidential.”
 18 U.S.C. § 3153(c)(1) (emphasis added). The bail determination remains in play,
 obviously, and some of Campas’s arguments raise the question of where the district
 court obtained the information it relied upon. In our review, it is clear some of the
 challenged information ultimately traces back to the pretrial services report. Thus,
 although volume II of Campas’s appendix will remain sealed, we nonetheless find it
 necessary to quote portions of it in this order and judgment. Most of what we quote
 can already be found elsewhere in the unsealed record, although usually without
 attribution to the pretrial services report. See, e.g., Aplt. App. vol. I at 157 (district
 court decision listing the sexual acts Campas hoped to perform on the seven-year-old
 boy); Aplt. Opening Br. at 2–3 (summarizing information from the pretrial services
 report about Campas’s circumstances and prior arrests).

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       B.     The Detention Hearing Before the Magistrate Judge

       The magistrate judge held the detention hearing on November 29, 2023.

 There, the probation officer who prepared the pretrial services report informed the

 parties that he had since spoken with one of Campas’s brothers, who lives in Tucson.

 This brother was willing to have Campas live at his home while awaiting trial.

       As far as arguments for and against detention, the government rested heavily

 on Campas’s alleged danger to the community. The government emphasized “that the

 defendant stated in a recorded statement he does not believe what he did was wrong

 here. . . . [T]o not believe that there’s something wrong with that I think raises a

 huge concern if he were to be released.” Aplt. App. vol. I at 44. The government

 also noted that online communications led to this situation, and it opined that it is

 difficult to limit a person’s ability to communicate online.

       Campas’s attorney “[took] the government’s representation . . . that . . . there

 may have been some discussion about [Campas’s] beliefs,” apparently referring to the

 recorded statement relied upon by the government. Id. at 46. “But,” he countered,

 “certainly whatever those beliefs may be ha[ve] not led to prior arrests or prior

 investigations.” Id. As to the government’s concern about inability to restrict online

 communications, he conceded “we’re past the point where it’s feasible to function in

 the world without at least one [electronic device],” but the probation office could

 install monitoring software on a cell phone. Id. at 47–48. Finally, the defense

 attorney admitted “we don’t often . . . see . . . someone who makes a statement . . .

 that they have told the police that this type of conduct should be legal,” but he had

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 spoken to his client and “he has no intention of defying the Court’s orders, if [the

 court] were to release him, and engage in whatever his beliefs may be and engage in

 any type of conduct that is being alleged here.” Id. at 48.

       The magistrate judge first focused on “the allegation that [Campas] made some

 admissions to law enforcement about [his] belief system that are problematic. . . .

 [T]hose kinds of statements . . . move[] [the charges] into a different class in terms of

 risk.” Id. at 50. On the other hand, the magistrate judge found it significant that

 there was no evidence Campas had ever acted on his beliefs before now. That,

 combined with family support, convinced the magistrate judge that Campas could be

 released on “very strict conditions.” Id. at 51. Those conditions included, among

 other things, GPS monitoring, home detention in his brother’s home (with exceptions

 for work and other necessary activities), full-time employment, no use of devices that

 can access the Internet other than for employment purposes (and those devices must

 have monitoring software), no viewing of sexually explicit materials (including those

 involving only adults), and no contact with anyone younger than eighteen without

 supervision of a court-approved adult.

       C.     The Appeal to the District Court

       The government appealed the magistrate judge’s ruling to the district court.

 The district court held a hearing, at which the government’s attorney elaborated

 further on Campas’s confession to law enforcement:

              Apparently there was some dispute in front of [the
              magistrate judge] about whether or not the United States’
              summary of the defendant’s interview was accurate.

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              Specifically the United States has taken the [position] that
              during a post Miranda interview with law enforcement
              follow[ing] his arrest Mr. Campas expressed that he did not
              believe that he had done anything wrong in communicating
              with an undercover officer about the possibility of
              engaging in sexual activity with a seven-year-old. I want
              to reiterate, Your Honor, that it remains the United States’
              position that is in fact a correct and fair summary of that
              interview.

              And I want to specifically mention[] a couple of comments
              that Mr. Campas made during his interview, the first of
              which involved him indicating or representing that he
              himself as a small child was sexually attracted to adult
              males. Without commenting further upon that claim, Your
              Honor, the defendant went on to explain to law
              enforcement that given his own sexual proclivities with
              respect to older men, he described the United States system
              of laws as it relates to consent as both discriminatory and
              arbitrary.

              Mr. Campas explained on more than one occasion to law
              enforcement that he was very troubled by United States
              law as it relates to the age of consent and the fact that it is
              a criminal offense in the United States for adults to engage
              in sexual activity with children.

              Mr. Campas expressed he wished he would be in the
              position to argue [as is] sometimes done apparently in
              Europe that he is a minor-attracted person, which is in his
              view not a choice. He then explained that he believed that
              all children should have the ability to control what they
              wanted to do in terms of their own sexuality and their own
              sexual activity even as it relates to sexual contact with
              adults.

              Mr. Campas was expressly asked if he had shown up on the
              evening of his arrest and there had been an actual seven-
              year-old that appeared willing to engage in sexual activity
              with him, he indicated that he would not have any problem
              with doing that. He indicated that he believed that children
              should be able to indulge in sexual curiosity in whatever
              way they wanted even if they were as young as seven years
              old.
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              Relatedly, Your Honor, Mr. Campas during his chats with
              the undercover officer indicated that he did not believe
              there was any age limit for adults and children to engaged
              in sexual activity. He described that he believed that
              children did have the ability in fact to engage in
              consensual activity, sexual activity with adults.

              ....

              Your Honor, in the government’s view the circumstances of
              this offense are extraordinarily egregious. Mr. Campas
              traveled to the state of Utah fully expecting that he would
              in fact engage in sexual activity with a seven-year-old.
              And in the government’s view there are no conditions or
              combination of conditions that would reasonably secure his
              appearance here in connection with this case and also the
              safety of the community.

 Aplt. App. vol. I at 65–68. The government also re-emphasized its skepticism that

 release conditions would protect the community:

              As the Court is well aware, any restriction that would
              prohibit Mr. Campas from accessing the Internet or
              engaging in chats in the future is virtually unenforceable.
              Once he would be released from custody Mr. Campas’
              activity as it relates to these kinds of chats and these kinds
              of efforts would be virtually impossible to police for the
              probation office or for anyone, quite frankly.

              So in light of all of those factors, Your Honor, the United
              States continues to firmly believe that Mr. Campas should
              be detained pending that outcome of this matter.

 Id. at 68.

        Campas’s attorney countered with further context about his client’s confession

 to the government:

              What we ended up here having something very unusual.
              About an hour and a half long conversation between Agent
              Ross who is quite experienced in investigating these kind
              of offenses and somebody who is a little out of ordinary,
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              right? Numerous times throughout this interview,
              Mr. Campas had told Agent Ross that he wasn’t going to
              act—you know, that he wasn’t there for the child, right?
              The crime with which he’s charged is the crime not so
              much of the completed act as an attempt to even engage in
              that act. It’s all based on communication. But if we’re
              going to talk about risks there’s a couple things that are
              important to know, and I don’t believe the government has
              evidence to the contrary.

              First, he’s denied being sexually attracted to children.
              He’s admitted that when he was 14 years old he was
              sexually attracted to an adult male, and that’s where some
              of his ideas and some of his thoughts and some of his
              musings on that particular area come from. He’s also
              discussed with Agent Ross in quite an open conversation
              that in his mind the laws that have to do with statutory rape
              and sex crimes when it comes to age are arbitrary. And he
              gave an example of somebody being 17 years old as
              opposed to 18 years old. That was the example that
              Mr. Campas gave in that particular conversation.

              He said he’s never done it in the past. He said there would
              be nothing on his phone that would reveal anything
              different. He has had he says since 2012 discussions with
              others about sexual[] attraction to children. He’s not
              denying that. And I believe the government in its last
              presentation said, yes, there were conversations that he has
              had with other individuals who were sexually attracted to
              children, or so they believed, but it was nothing of the sort
              where there would be some action or some agreement to
              meet somewhere.

              In this particular instance as difficult as this is to hear, and
              I understand that, you know—what I hope comes across
              here is this is someone who is really struggling with his
              identity, with who he is, who had not acted on this in this
              same fashion for the 35 years of his life, and who is not
              here to—if it were the case that he is on a crusade because
              he believes the laws should be changed, then you would
              have reasons to believe that he’s not going to comply with
              your orders.

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  Id. at 72–74. As for the government’s concern that pretrial release conditions would

  not matter, Campas’s attorney asserted that the government was setting up a no-win

  scenario:

                  To say that he’s virtually unsupervisable is equal to saying
                  nobody is supervisable because I suppose anybody can
                  violate conditions. But you can impose conditions, and
                  some are mandatory with good reasons with these kind of
                  cases. He can have GPS monitoring. He can have no
                  Internet. He can be restricted to his brother’s home in
                  Tucson with the exception of probation visits, with
                  exception of contact with his attorney, with the condition
                  of church services and employment.

                  But those are conditions that are routinely imposed. And
                  based on the 35 years of his life, some of which was
                  commendable and remarkable, I worry that we are just
                  judging him on this allegation alone, which of course he
                  hasn’t yet been convicted. That’s why he’s been ordered
                  released, because all that the government has at this point
                  are the allegations in this case.

  Id. at 74–75.

        In rebuttal, the government asked the court to look again at Campas’s online

  dialogue with the undercover FBI agent, such as the exchange where Campas denied

  having “age limits.” In this light, the government claimed that

                  to suggest that this man does not have a sexual attraction to
                  children is simply false. Mr. Campas made those
                  representations to an undercover officer in a setting in
                  which he had no reason to believe that anyone else would
                  ever see those chats. These are completely unguarded
                  comments that he made in conjunction with his attempt to
                  engage in sexual activity with a seven-year-old. Not only
                  did he engage in chats about this activity, he actually
                  made—he deliberately came to Utah for purposes of
                  meeting with this seven-year-old. This wasn’t just
                  conversation that happened in a vacuum. He showed up

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                  here to meet with this seven-year-old. And he explained in
                  excruciating detail what he wanted to occur between
                  himself and this seven-year-old child.

                  He also acknowledged in his interview with the police that
                  had that actual seven-year-old child been at that hotel or at
                  that location he likely would have gone through with
                  engaging in sexual activity with that child. And when he
                  was specifically asked, you wouldn’t feel guilty about it if
                  that kid appeared to be consenting in the conduct,
                  Mr. Campas[] responded, that’s probably accurate.

  Id. at 76–77.

        The district court ruled from the bench that Campas would remain detained

  pending trial:

                  Based on my [review], counsel, of this very important
                  case, based on my review of the conversation with the
                  undercover contact, based on my review of the specificity
                  of that conversation, based on my review of experience
                  with these types of cases in the past, and the great respect I
                  have for [the magistrate judge],[2] the Court is of the view
                  that there is no fact or set of facts that can guarantee public
                  safety or appearance in this important matter. And I’m
                  accordingly going to find that Mr. Campas be held pending
                  trial in this very important case. I believe the evidence is
                  very strong, and we’ll just see how it unfolds as the case
                  proceeds.

                  But the Court will affirm the government’s objection to the
                  magistrate judge’s order and find that the judge’s,
                  magistrate judge’s order is overruled pursuant to what the
                  Court has just stated.

  Id. at 77–78.

        2
          In context, it appears the district court meant something to the effect of “and
  despite the great respect I have for [the magistrate judge].”

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         D.     The First Appeal to this Court (No. 24-4003)

         Campas appealed the district court’s decision to this court. He argued, among

  other things, that the district court failed to explain its decision with reference to the

  factors it was required to consider under the Bail Reform Act. This court agreed. We

  held that the district court did not adequately explain its decision. We therefore

  remanded for further explanation or, alternatively, for the district court to release

  Campas with conditions.

         E.     The District Court’s Remand Decision

         The district court did not call for further briefing or argument. Rather, a week

  after our decision, and before we had issued the mandate, the district court issued a

  written order reinstating its detention decision.

         In terms of factual findings, the district court’s order reproduces, mostly

  verbatim, a portion of the brief filed by the government when it appealed the

  magistrate judge’s release decision to the district court. That appeal brief went

  through each of the Bail Reform Act factors—the nature and circumstances of the

  offense, the weight of the evidence, Campas’s history and characteristics, and the

  nature and seriousness of the danger he poses if released—and listed facts allegedly

  supporting detention under each factor. The district court’s remand order generally

  tracks this factor-by-factor analysis precisely.

         By way of legal analysis, the order emphasizes that Campas’s danger to the

  community, standing alone, was enough under the circumstances to justify detention:

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                While it is true that Mr. Campas has no criminal record and
                that this is the first time he has acted out, the court finds
                that this allegation is so serious and potentially harmful to
                children, that judging Mr. Campas on this allegation alone
                is not only appropriate, but necessary. Mr. Campas made
                the disturbing admission that he does not believe there is
                anything wrong with sexually molesting seven-year-old
                boys. Mr. Campas’s belief that there is nothing wrong with
                sexually molesting young boys demonstrates a moral
                corruptness that is contrary to every principle of Western
                civilization throughout history. If Defendant is incapable
                of recognizing such an inherent depravity, it stands to
                reason that no external, court-ordered compulsory
                restrictions would overcome his internal justifications for
                this behavior.

  Aplt. App. vol. I at 161. Finally, as to potential release conditions, the district court

  stated:

                [1] The United States has emphasized the risk to the public
                that would exist if Mr. Campas were released on these
                charges. He engaged in similar behavior with three
                separate undercover officers, believing that he had the
                opportunity to engage in sexual conduct with
                extraordinarily young children. And whether the Court
                imposes restrictions or not, there is no practical way to
                enforce any restriction that would prohibit Mr. Campas
                from accessing the Internet. [2] Also, GPS monitoring
                does not tell us what a defendant is doing at any given
                time. It just tells us after-the-fact where the defendant has
                been. A person could arrange to meet another parent with
                sexual access to his child, arrive at the meet location and
                molest a young boy all before anyone would have any idea
                that he had violated a single term of pretrial release.

  Id. at 161–62 (bracketed numerals inserted for clarity). Part [1] of this paragraph

  is a near-verbatim quote of the government’s argument at the hearing preceding

  the district court’s original detention order. See id. at 77. Part [2] is another

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  near-verbatim quote from the government’s brief appealing the magistrate judge’s

  decision to release Campas. See id. at 23.

         Campas filed a notice of appeal from this decision, leading to the current

  proceeding (No. 24-4024). This court entered its mandate in the previous appeal

  (No. 24-4003) about two weeks later.

  III.   JURISDICTION

         As the government points out, the district court’s order on remand, which is

  the order on appeal here, was entered before this court’s mandate in the previous

  appeal issued. This raises a question of the district court’s jurisdiction to issue the

  order pre-mandate. Ideally, our remand in No. 24-4003, should have been a limited

  remand. But given the procedural reality of what actually happened, we conclude

  that it is in the interest of judicial efficiency to overlook any potential problem

  created by the fact that this court’s mandate followed, rather than preceded, the

  district court order on appeal.

         The rule that jurisdiction lies with the appellate court from the notice of appeal

  until the mandate is “a judge-made doctrine, designed to promote judicial economy

  and avoid the confusion and inefficiency that might flow from putting the same issue

  before two courts at the same time.” United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1226

  (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, there was no danger

  of confusion or inefficiency. In fact, the same issue was not before this court and the

  district court at the same time. Remanding to the district court with instructions to

  re-enter the same order now, post-mandate, would be the opposite of promoting

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  judicial economy and avoiding inefficiency. We therefore conclude, in this particular

  case and under these particular circumstances, the procedural irregularity is

  irrelevant, and we proceed to the merits.

  IV.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

          This court “accept[s] the district court’s findings of historical fact . . . unless

  they are clearly erroneous.” Cisneros, 328 F.3d at 613. The court reviews de novo

  the district court’s application of those facts to the law governing pretrial detention.

  Id.

  V.      ANALYSIS

          Campas offers several arguments in favor of a second remand, but this time in

  front of a different judge. We address his arguments in turn.

          A.     Failure to Say Whether Campas Met His Rebuttal Burden

          As previously noted, the crimes with which Campas has been charged carry a

  rebuttable presumption that he should be detained pending trial. No party disputes

  this.

          The district court’s order generically describes the rebuttable-presumption

  framework in § 3142(e), but the order does not say if Campas successfully produced

  “some evidence,” Stricklin, 932 F.2d at 1355, as required to overcome the

  presumption. Campas says the district court erred by not announcing whether he had

  rebutted the presumption.

          If this was error—a question we do not decide—it was harmless for at least

  two reasons. First, the district court never said anything to suggest Campas failed to

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  meet his burden, or that the court was holding any failure against him. Instead, it

  analyzed all the § 3142(g) factors, and it explained its conclusion with reference to

  the evidence, not the presumption. Second, regardless of the presumption, “the

  burden of persuasion regarding risk-of-flight and danger to the community always

  remains with the government.” Stricklin, 932 F.2d at 1354–55. There is no hint the

  district court disregarded this rule. Accordingly, the district court’s lack of an

  explicit statement about whether Campas rebutted the presumption provides no

  reason to vacate or reverse.3

        B.     Failure to Say Whether the Government Carried its Burden

        Campas next argues that the district court did not mention the government’s

  preponderance burden (for risk of flight) and clear-and-convincing burden (for

  danger to the community). Therefore, according to Campas, “[t]his court is left to

  speculate about the process the district court followed and the analysis the district

  court conducted.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 14–15.

        Campas is correct that the district court did not say anything about the

  preponderance or clear-and-convincing burdens, but we do not agree with his

  conclusion. The district court analyzed the § 3142(g) factors, reached a conclusion,

  and explained its reasoning. This court is not required to speculate. Cf. United

  States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating, in the sentencing

        3
           Campas also argues, without elaboration, that “the district court misstate[d]
  § 3142(e).” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13. We have not located any such misstatement in
  the district court’s order.

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  context, “We do not require a ritualistic incantation to establish consideration of a

  legal issue, nor do we demand that the district court recite any magic words to show

  us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has

  instructed it to consider.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, we review

  de novo whether the facts as found by the district court meet the legal standard for

  detention. Cisneros, 328 F.3d at 613. Thus, the fact that the district court’s decision

  does not recite the burdens of persuasion or state that the government met them does

  not provide a basis to vacate or reverse.

         C.     Failure to Make Factual Findings

         As already noted, the district court’s findings, and much of its analysis, came

  almost verbatim from the government’s arguments when it appealed the magistrate

  judge’s release order to the district court. Campas criticizes this approach, but this

  alone is not enough to justify a second remand. For instance, in the context of a civil

  bench trial, the Supreme Court has stated that “even when the trial judge adopts

  proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed

  only if clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572

  (1985). We believe the same rule applies in this context.

         Verbatim adoption of a party’s findings and conclusions is a problem, however,

  “when those findings [take] the form of conclusory statements unsupported by

  citation to the record.” Id. Apparently with this in mind, Campas says that “[s]ince

  the allegations in the government’s bail appeal are unsupported by the record, the

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  district court can not (and does not) make any reference to any document or transcript

  in this case.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 15 (footnote omitted).

        Campas is correct that the district court’s order does not cite any document or

  transcript. This makes our review more difficult. However, all of the district court’s

  findings have support in the government’s motion for detention, the pretrial services

  report, or the transcript of the hearing before the district judge (on appeal from the

  magistrate judge’s release order). The district court’s most important findings are as

  follows, to which we have added bracketed citations showing the record support:

               (a) An FBI agent, acting in an undercover capacity on a
               social media platform, purported to be a father who was
               offering his seven-year-old son for sex. Beginning on
               October 11, 2023, Mr. Campas contacted the undercover
               agent on a social media platform. Over the course of the
               next two weeks, the two engaged in sexually explicit
               conversations. [Aplt. App. vol. I at 14 (government’s
               motion for detention); Aplt. App. vol. II at 1 (pretrial
               services report).]

               (b) The FBI undercover agent asked Mr. Campas if he had
               “age limits,” to which he responded, “Fuck no, nothing
               hotter than a father nursing his newborn on his cock.”
               Defendant was very specific about what he wanted to do to
               the seven-year-old boy, to include: “Hang naked . . . suck
               each other’s cocks . . . rimming . . . making out . . . fucking
               . . . teach him how to fist me . . . Teach him how to fuck
               and get fucked.” Defendant said he would like to “make it
               a lifelong love.” [Aplt. App. vol. I at 14 (government’s
               motion for detention); Aplt. App. vol. II at 1 (pretrial
               services report).]

               (c) Mr. Campas had planned to drive from Oregon, where
               he had been living for the prior month on a marijuana
               farm, to his mother’s home in Arizona, by way of Las
               Vegas. However, after these conversations with the
               undercover agent, he decided to go out of his way and

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              travel to Utah so that he could sexually abuse the seven-
              year-old. [Aplt. App. vol. I at 14–15 (government’s motion
              for detention); Aplt. App. vol. II at 1–2 (pretrial services
              report).]

              (d) Mr. Campas arranged to meet the undercover agent and
              his seven-year-old boy on October 27, 2023, at a location
              in North Salt Lake, Utah. Mr. Campas arrived at that
              location as planned, where he was arrested. He had in his
              possession the cell phone he had been using to
              communicate with the undercover agent. [Aplt. App. vol. I
              at 14 (government’s motion for detention).]

              (e) Mr. Campas was interviewed following his arrest.
              During that interview, Mr. Campas stated that he did not
              believe that what he was doing was wrong. He stated that
              he knew from the time he was a very young boy that he
              wanted to have sex with adult males and, therefore,
              children are clearly capable of consenting to sex. [Aplt.
              App. vol. I at 14 (government’s motion for detention); id.
              at 66 (transcript of hearing before the district judge); Aplt.
              App. vol. II at 1 (pretrial services report).]

              (f) Mr. Campas was expressly asked if he had shown up on
              the evening of his arrest and there had been an actual
              seven-year-old that appeared willing to engage in sexual
              activity with him, would he have engaged in sexual
              activity with the child, and he indicated that he would not
              have any problem with doing that. He indicated that he
              believed that children should be able to indulge in sexual
              curiosity in whatever way they wanted even if they were as
              young as seven years old. [Aplt. App. vol. I at 67
              (transcript of hearing before the district judge).]

              (a) [sic] At the time Mr. Campas was communicating with
              the undercover agent in this case, he was also
              communicating with at least two other undercover agents
              unrelated to this case on various social media platforms
              about his sexual interest in young children. [Aplt. App.
              vol. I at 14 (government’s motion for detention); Aplt.
              App. vol. II at 2 (pretrial services report).]

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  Aplt. App. vol. I at 157–58.4

         Campas also appears to argue that the district court could not rely on the

  government’s representations cited above because “[t]he only thing resembling a

  proffer in [the] government’s appeal [from the magistrate judge’s release order]” is a

  statement that “[o]fficers will testify that Mr. Campas arrived at the meet location

  exactly as planned.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 15 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

  Similarly, Campas asserts “[t]he post-arrest interview was not part of the record,” so

  “[t]he government’s interpretation of an alleged conversation about [his] supposed

  beliefs [about adult-child sexual relations] is irrelevant.” Id. at 5 n.3; see also id. at 6

  (“The government also pointed to Mr. Campas having made recorded statements

  concerning his involvement in the instant matter, but made no proffer as to those

  statements.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).

         Campas’s argument ignores that some of the district court’s information is

  found in the pretrial services report, not just the government’s submissions. The

  argument is also waived. When the government described its evidence to the district

  court, Campas’s attorney never objected that the government needed to introduce

         4
          These comprise the district court’s findings about the nature and
  circumstances of the offense. The district court repeated many of the same findings
  in summary form when it discussed the other § 3142(g) factors, i.e., the weight of the
  evidence, Campas’s history and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the
  danger he may pose. See Aplt. App. vol. I at 158–60. Under the circumstances, we
  see no error. For example, Campas’s statements in his recorded interview naturally
  matter to all of these factors. Thus, we find no basis to fault the district court for at
  times repeating the same material under the various factors.

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  something more than its own description. To be sure, as described above (Part II.C),

  Campas’s attorney tried to persuade the district court that the government was

  overstating what Campas had admitted in his post-arrest interview. But he never

  argued that the government failed to make a valid proffer, and “[a]rguments that were

  not raised below are waived for purposes of appeal,” Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 727 F.3d

  1273, 1284 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Even if not waived, we disagree with the argument on the merits. “Every

  circuit to have considered the matter . . . has . . . permitted the Government to

  proceed by way of proffer.” United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir.

  1996). Campas appears to believe a valid government proffer must begin with

  special words such as “we would proffer” or “officers will testify that.” He offers no

  authority for this position. We therefore reject the claim that the government’s

  description of its evidence was not something on which the district court could rely—

  or is not something on which this court may rely—for purposes of reaching a

  decision about pretrial detention.

        D.     Reliance on the Charges Alone

        Campas asserts it would be contrary to congressional intent if his alleged

  crimes, by themselves, were enough to justify detention, because Congress did not

  specify that any offense automatically requires detention. Campas further asserts the

  district court violated congressional intent because the remand order “states in no

  uncertain terms that the allegation itself is the sole ground upon which detention is

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  ordered,” and the district court further “assumed that anyone charged with such

  crimes presents a[n] unmitigated danger to society.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 17, 18.

        If this were true, it would not necessarily lead to vacatur or reversal because

  we review de novo the application of the historical facts to the detention standard. In

  any event, Campas does not accurately describe the district court’s reasoning. The

  district court did not conclude that the charged offenses, by themselves, are enough to

  justify detention. Rather, the court relied on Campas’s willingness to go hundreds of

  miles out of his way to commit the alleged crimes, his belief that he would have done

  nothing wrong if he had gone through with his very explicit intentions, and his

  simultaneous interactions with other undercover agents about the same topic.

  Looking at this matter de novo, we come to the same conclusion as the district court,

  namely, this combination of facts shows that Campas presents a unique danger.

        E.     Failure to Review the Magistrate Judge’s Release Conditions

        When a party appeals a magistrate judge’s detention decision to the district

  court, the district court “acts de novo and must make an independent determination of

  the proper pretrial detention or conditions for release.” Cisneros, 328 F.3d at 616

  n.1. Relying on Cisneros, Campas says “[t]he district court failed to make the

  requisite independent determination of the magistrate [judge]’s findings that a

  combination of conditions exist that would reasonably assure [his appearance and

  community safety].” Aplt. Opening Br. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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          This argument appears to assume the magistrate judge’s findings bear some

  sort of presumptive weight before the district court. They do not. Again, the district

  court reviews the matter de novo.

          In any event, the district court considered potential release conditions.

  Campas recognizes this because he goes on to criticize the district court’s finding that

  GPS monitoring probably could only help to discover a violation after the fact.

  Campas says the district court impermissibly relied on a “theoretical possibility that

  [he] could do while under court supervision what he has never done before [i.e.,

  commit a hands-on offense].” Id. at 21.

          District courts making detention decisions are routinely engaging in

  “theoretical” possibilities because they cannot know the future with certainty. This

  alone cannot undermine the district court’s decision. In addition, the district court

  considered Campas’s heretofore clean record. See Aplt. App. vol. I at 161 (finding

  detention appropriate even though “it is true that Mr. Campas has no criminal record

  and that this is the first time he has acted out”). If Campas means to say there is a

  presumption in favor of release for first-time offenders, he offers no supporting

  authority.

          Campas also appears to be suggesting that the district court’s reasoning, if

  affirmed, could allow district courts to discount GPS monitoring as a possible

  condition of pretrial release in essentially all cases. We need not engage with that

  argument because we evaluate the matter de novo, under the specific facts of this

  case.

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        Given Campas’s unique threat, the two most important considerations when

  thinking about pretrial release are his ability to communicate and his ability to travel.

  Concerning communication, the district court found—and Campas does not dispute—

  that restrictions on Internet access would be ineffectual. We agree that the ubiquity

  of devices with Internet access, combined with Campas’s unique beliefs and

  motivations concerning adult-child sexual relations, demonstrate that restrictions on

  Internet access would not be enough to adequately guarantee Campas’s inability to

  engage in the kinds of communications that led to this prosecution. As for travel, we

  conclude that the acknowledged weaknesses in GPS monitoring combined with the

  unique threat posed by Campas (as demonstrated by his words and actions) show that

  GPS monitoring would not be adequate in his case to protect the public.

  VI.   CONCLUSION

        The government has carried its burden to show by clear and convincing

  evidence that no conditions will protect the community from Campas’s behavior

  while he awaits trial. We therefore affirm the district court’s detention order.

  We deny as moot Campas’s request that the case be remanded to a different judge.

                                              Entered for the Court
                                              Per Curiam

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  No. 24-4024, United States v. Campas
  EID, J., dissenting.

         A case cannot be in two places at once. Yet here, that is exactly what happened.

  Before this Court had issued its mandate in the earlier appeal, the district court issued the

  order underlying today’s per curiam decision determining the merits of the appellant’s

  claims. Federal courts have “generally understood” that an appeal “divests the district

  court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v.

  Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Nonetheless, the per curiam

  charts this course, reaching the merits of the case by deciding “in the interest of judicial

  efficiency to overlook” the jurisdictional error. Per Curiam at 15. Respectfully, I would

  not “overlook” the error for two reasons.

         First, jurisdiction is jurisdiction, and this Court is bound by jurisdictional rules.

  True, this case does not involve the more stringent jurisdictional requirements imposed

  by Article III of the U.S. Constitution or a statute; rather, we are dealing with a “judge-

  made doctrine.” Id. (quoting United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir.

  2011)). But the jurisdictional rule in this case is “a longstanding tenet of American

  procedure.” Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 740 (2023). The per curiam

  unnecessarily “expand[s] the universe of court-created exceptions to the general rule

  depriving the district court of authority to rule on matters once the case is in the court of

  appeals.” Madrid, 633 F.3d at 1226–27 (citation omitted). Indeed, the new exception

  now allows this Court to overlook a jurisdictional problem between a district court and
Appellate Case: 24-4024       Document: 010111028961          Date Filed: 04/09/2024       Page: 27

  itself so long as this Court finds it convenient to do so in the interest of “judicial

  efficiency.” Per Curiam at 15.

         Second, we had a simple solution here, one that we had complete control over.

  This Court could have easily fixed the jurisdictional problem by entering an order

  requiring the district court to fix the procedural defect via a re-entry of its findings and

  conclusions. Such a solution would have posed no threat to judicial economy. The

  district court could have fixed the jurisdictional error, and we could have then proceeded

  to the merits without dismantling “a longstanding tenet of American procedure.”

  Coinbase, Inc., 599 U.S. at 740. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

                                                     2