Court Opinion

ID: 9581522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:15:45.831004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:02.000808
License: Public Domain

Berry, President,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion wherein it now holds that the provisions of Code 3-7-7, as amended, limits the jurisdiction of the county court to hear and determine primary election contests to a three months period from the date of the election and disapproves the unanimous holding of this Court on this same question just two years ago in the case of State ex rel. Palumbo and Loop v. County Court, 151 W. Va. 61, 150 S. E. 2d 887.
When the Palumbo case was argued in this Court in September, 1966, the attorney for the respondents contended this Court did not have jurisdiction to hear or decide the case for the reason that more than three months had elapsed since the primary election. It was necessary to dispose of this question before the question of when the case should be docketed for trial in the county court could be taken up, because this Court would not have jurisdiction to determine that question if the three months period prohibited the county court from hearing the case. This is made abundantly clear in the Palumbo case wherein it is stated in the unanimous opinion of the Court that:
“It also appears to be the contention of the respondents that inasmuch as three months have elapsed from the day of the election, which was May 10, 1966, the county court has no jurisdiction to hear the contest. This is based on the provisions *396in Code 3-7-7, as amended, dealing with continuances by the county court of the hearing in a general election contest which reads in part as follows: ‘The hearing may be continued by the court from time to time, if it be shown that justice and right require it, but not beyond three months from the day of the election.’
“It will be noted that at the time the request for the contest was made in this case the county court refused to hold hearings of the contest and set them to be heard at the next regular term beginning October 1, 1966, which would have been more than three months after the 'primary election, a time that they contend they have no jurisdiction to hear them. The three months period provided for in Code 3-7-7, as amended, applies only to hearing procedure, and the time element applicable to determining of contests in primary elections is governed by Code 3-5-20, as 'amended, which reads as follows: ‘Any such contest, or petition for review, of a candidate for a nomination not finally determined within ten days next preceding the date of the next election after the primary * * * shall stand dismissed, * * ” [Emphasis supplied.]
Chapter 3 of the Code of West Virginia which was generally amended in 1963 deals with elections in this State. All of the provisions of this Chapter apply to all elections whether they be general, primary, or special elections unless certain provisions of the various sections are restricted by the context. This is clearly set out at the beginning of the chapter wherein it is stated in Code 3-1-2, as amended, that: “Unless restricted by the context, the provisions of this chapter shall apply to every general, primary, and special election in which candidates are nominated or elected * * [Emphasis supplied.] The provisions of Code 3-7-7, as amended, provide that: “* * * The hearing may be continued by the court from time to time, if it be shown that justice and right require it, but not beyond three months from the day of election * * This provision has been in the Code since 1863 and, of course, only applied to election contest before the county court in general elections until 1915 when this state had primary elections at which time Code 3-5-20, as amended, was enacted for election con*397tests for primary elections and it provided that: “Any such contest, * * * of a candidate for a nomination not finally determined within ten days next preceding the date of the next election after the primary * * * shall stand dismissed * * * !>
There was no procedure at common law for election contests and such contests must be governed as to the specific provisions as contained in either the constitution or statute. State ex rel. Daugherty v. Lincoln County Court, 127 W. Va. 35, 31 S. E. 2d 321; State ex rel. Myers v. Garner, 148 W. Va. 92, 133 S. E. 2d 82. Certainly the context of Code 3-5-20, as amended, clearly restricts the context of Code 3-7-7, as amended, as far as primary election contests are concerned. The wording of these sections as to the time limit for hearings is entirely different. The section specifically applying to contests of primary elections fixes a different time limit for primary election contests to be determined in the same manner that procedure for election contests for state offices are different from contests for county offices. Code 3-7-1, as amended. Code 3-7-3, as amended, provides for election contests before a special court for secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, attorney general, commissioner of agriculture, judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and judges of a circuit court. All of the sections in Chapter 3 apply to both primary and general elections unless there is some difference between the procedure in a primary and general election. Code 3-1-2, as amended. It will be noted that the election contests for certain state offices are not governed by the provisions in Codes 3-7-6 and 7, as amended. The provisions of these sections do not apply to such contested elections and the continuance beyond three months is not applicable in the contest of these cases, as well as in the primary election contest before a county court. See State ex rel. Daugherty v. Lincoln County Court, 127 W. Va. 35, 31 S. E. 2d 321.
It is true that considerable confusion with regard to the provisions relating to the time limit for contested elections, both primary and general, has existed by virtue of the decisions of this Court over a period of years and in an attempt to reconcile the- cases the following statement was placed in the Palumbo case: “'Due to the fact that confusion *398has arisen in connection with election contest cases, any statement that may be contained in any of the prior decided cases of this Court dealing with such matters not consistent with the decision of this case in connection therewith is disapproved.” It was also stated in the Palumbo case that: “Code, 3-5-20, as amended, provides that contests as the result of primary elections for state offices or offices in political subdivisions of the state shall be conducted under the same procedure as provided for contests in a general election involving county offices. This provision, of course, is only applicable to the procedure where appropriate.” It was further stated in the Palumbo case: “It would be senseless to say that the county court did not have jurisdiction to hear a contested election case three months after the date of the primary election when the statute dealing with primary elections specifically gives the county court and appellate courts jurisdiction to finally determine such contested elections up until * * within ten days next preceding the date of the next election after the primary * * *’. Therefore, the wording of the statute with regard to the three months period clearly refers or pertains only to the continuances of hearings in election contest cases in order to require such election contest cases to be completed as soon as possible after the date of the election.”
The provisions in Code 3-7-7, as amended, deal with continuances of the hearing from time to time and no doubt it was originally intended to refer to continuances for a period of time, such as a week or two, in order to have contested elections disposed of with dispatch.
I agree with the statement of Judge Brannon in the case of Stafford v. Mingo County Court, 58 W. Va. 88, 51 S. E. 2, which was apparently the first case in which this matter was discussed, and although it is dicta he questioned whether or not the provisions in question forbid a continuance beyond three months. The present decision of this Court, and some former cases prohibit the completion of a contest hearing even if the three months period had elapsed if the parties were in the middle of the taking of evidence and the case had never been continued.
*399The majority opinion in the case at b'ar would in effect prohibit election contests in counties such as Kanawha with the present ballot in use because it appears from the Palumbo case that election contests could not be completed within three months from the primary election. The primary election in that case was held on May 10, 1966, and the canvass and recount were not completed until July 20, 1966, about two months and ten days after the primary and notices of contest, as provided by the statute, had to be given and were not returned to the county court until August 1, 1966. Rules were issued by this Court on August 13, 1966, as prayed for in the petition which was over three months after the primary election and the case was not submitted for decision until September 7, 1966. It is therefore clear in the Palumbo case that under the ruling of the case at bar this Court would not have had jurisdiction to hear that case and although jurisdiction of the Court was specifically questioned by the attorney for. the respondents this Court could even have raised the question on its own motion and need never have decided the other point presented in the case and the hearing would have never taken place in the county court of Kanawha County subjecting the parties to unnecessary expense. Grottendick v. Webber, 134 W. Va. 798, 61 S. E. 2d 854; Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 W. Va. 449, 128 S. E. 2d 480; Lester v. Rose, 147 W. Va. 575, 130 S. E. 2d 80.
For the reasons stated in this dissenting opinion, I do not think that syllabus point one of the Palumbo casé and the part of the opinion pertaining thereto should have been overruled.