Court Opinion

ID: 9704936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:52:18.28677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:06.659665
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the majority holding. While I do not take issue with the majority’s conclusion that a motion for reconsideration should not be construed as a “pleading” for purposes of Pa.R.C.P. 1017, I nonetheless would hold that the judgment of default should be stricken on other grounds.
*120In this case, we are confronted with a jurisdictional defect in the proceedings below, which must be addressed before any discussion of the status of appellant’s motion for reconsideration is warranted.1
The initial set of preliminary objections filed by appellant to the original complaint were argued before, and decided by, Judge Narick of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. By order dated September 12, 1985, appellee was ordered by Judge Narick to file an amended complaint. After the amended complaint was filed, appellant, again, filed preliminary objections, alleging that the amended complaint still failed to set forth a cause of action. On December 6, 1985, argument upon the second set of preliminary objections was heard by Judge Standish of the same court. Appellant requested at that time that the argument be sent back to Judge Narick. That request was overruled, and Judge Standish denied the preliminary objections the same day. It was not until the January 24,1986 hearing upon the motion for reconsideration that Judge Narick ruled upon the sufficiency of the amended complaint.
It is well settled in Pennsylvania that a trial judge may not pass upon the decision of another trial judge of the same court on an interlocutory matter. Commonwealth v. Madden, 342 Pa.Super. 120, 126, 492 A.2d 420, 423 (1985); Reifinger v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 315 Pa.Super. 147, 151-153, 461 A.2d 839, 842-43 (1983). Yet that is precisely what occurred in this case. Judge Narick considered the sufficiency of the initial complaint, and determined that the facts set forth therein did not state a cause of action against appellant. He ordered appellee to file a more definite statement of claim, and granted him twenty (20) days to amend his complaint. This order neither ended the litigation nor put appellee out of court, but was clearly interlocutory. See Freeze v. Donegal Mutual Ins. Co., 504 Pa. 218, *121221, n. 5, 470 A.2d 958, 960 n. 5 (1983). Moreover, it became the “law of the case” with respect to the sufficiency of the facts as pled in the initial complaint. See Marmara v. Rawle, 264 Pa.Super. 229, 238, 399 A.2d 750, 755 (1979). As such, Judge Narick was empowered to evaluate the amended complaint, and to determine if amendment had cured the factual deficiencies present in the original complaint.2 By refusing to refer the argument on the sufficiency of the amended complaint back to Judge Narick, Judge Standish placed himself in a position to conceivably overrule the “law of the case”; that is to say, he might have found cure effectuated on the basis of superficial amendment which would have been deemed non-remedial by Judge Narick.3 This is precisely the type of scenario that the “co-equal judges” rule was designed to prevent. See Reifinger, supra.4 As such, Judge Standish’s order of December 6 was *122void ab initio. “When a court takes action beyond the power conferred on it by law (its jurisdiction), its action is a nullity, and objection to it cannot be waived ...” Dover v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 318 Pa.Super. 460, 469, 465 A.2d 644, 649 (1983).
*123Having so concluded, it is appropriate to reexamine the agreement made by counsel to extend the time for the filing of appellant’s responsive pleading; it must be determined what impact, if any, the void status of the December 6 order had upon the capacity of the parties to agree as they did.
Agreements between counsel are intended to be legally binding contracts. See Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital of Philadelphia v. Hubbard, 267 Pa.Super. 436, 406 A.2d 1120 (1979). However, they must be adjudged valid in accordance with the general principles of contract law to be enforceable. Hahnemann, supra.
With respect to the instant agreement, it would appear that the usual elements of a contract were present: a bargained-for exchange of promises, supported by valid consideration.5 Restatement, Second, Contracts §§ 1, 2, 71, 75. However, for an agreement of this nature to be enforceable, the promises exchanged must impose some legal duty of performance upon the parties, for which a remedy exists in the event of a breach. Where the law neither recognizes a duty nor provides a remedy for breach, the agreement is generally void. Restatement, Second, Contracts § 1, 7, Comment a. A void contract is of no legal effect whatsoever, and may be ignored by either party at *124will. See Yannuzzi v. Commonwealth State Horse Racing Commission, 37 Pa.Cmwlth. 288, 390 A.2d 331, 332 (1978); Black’s Law Dictionary 1745 (4th ed. 1968). This is in contrast to a voidable contract, where a party who is not legally bound to perform, selects to perform anyway, and terminates his right to avoid the agreement. Restatement, Second, Contracts § 7, Comments b, e. The crucial distinction is that a void agreement cannot be cured by an act of one or both of the parties, as the defect in the writing is beyond the control of the parties. Yannuzzi, supra; Black’s Law Dictionary.
Applying this void-voidable distinction, I would hold the agreement to be void. The agreement was premised upon the ability of Judge Standish’s order to compel an answer or responsive pleading, from appellant.6 However, Judge Standish’s order was void, and could compel nothing. It was of no legal effect. An answer or responsive pleading was not due from appellant until Judge Ñarick ruled upon the objections to the amended complaint. Furthermore, this defect could not be cured by either of the parties; neither, silence, consent, nor resignation can confer authority or jurisdiction over a cause of action where it does not exist. Commonwealth v. VanBuskirk, 303 Pa.Super. 148, 149, n. 1, 449 A.2d 621, 622 n. 1 (1982); In re Pozzuolo’s Estate, 433 Pa. 185, 249 A.2d 540, 545 (1969). As such, I would hold the agreement of counsel here void, as opposed to merely voidable. Appellant had twenty (20) days from the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file a responsive pleading. At the end of that 20 day period, appellant was entitled, then, to a formal notice of appellee’s intent to take default. Pa.R.C.P. 237.1(a). In the absence of such notice, *125the entry of default judgment against appellant was a snap judgment. Since snap judgments are highly disfavored, Nevils v. Chernitsky, 244 Pa.Super. 501, 504, 368 A.2d 1297, 1298 (1976), I would strike the judgment below, and permit appellant to file an answer only.7

. Appellant has not raised the jurisdictional issue to be discussed infra on appeal, despite the fact that it was raised at various points in the proceedings below. However, the Superior Court has the authority to address an issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360, 368-369, 490 A.2d 402, 406 (1985).

. It should be noted that Judge Narick was available to hear argument upon the motion for reconsideration in January. The general rule that co-equal judges should not pass upon each other’s decisions in the same case, has an unavailability exception; that is, where the initial judge is no longer available to reconsider his or her order, another co-equal judge may, on occasion, hear and rule upon an earlier order issued by a colleague. However, this exception is limited to select situations, such as irremediable unavailability of the initial judge through death, recusal, retirement, transfer, or other causes. See Reifinger, supra; Sherman v. Yoder, 59 Pa.Cmwlth. 430, 430 A.2d 347 (1981); Duffy v. Gerst, 286 Pa.Super. 523, 532, 429 A.2d 645, 650 (1981).
As Judge Narick was available in January, this limited exception is clearly inapplicable to the matter at bar.

. It is true, of course, that Judge Narick did, apparently, concur with Judge Standish’s ruling that appellee’s amendments were sufficiently remedial, as evidenced by Judge Narick’s later denial of appellant’s petition for reconsideration. The result, however, does not cure the jurisdictional problem. There was no guarantee that the two judges would agree. It was equally possible that Judge Narick would reach the opposite result. The harm committed by Judge Standish was in the exceeding of his lawful authority, and not in the result he reached. The ends do not validate the means.

. The majority opinion, at footnote 3, finds fault with the preceding analysis on the basis that Judge Standish’s order did not overrule or rescind the previous order of Judge Narick. As such, it is the majority's view that the "co-equal judges” rule does not apply in this instance.
*122The Reifinger decision, authored by Judge Rowley of this panel, is, however, supportive of the position taken in this dissent. In Reifinger, preliminary objections challenging in personam jurisdiction were filed to the complaint, and denied by Judge Rosenwald of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Later, a motion for summary judgment, again challenging in personam jurisdiction, came before Judge Chalfin of the same court, and was granted.
In his analysis of this question, i.e. the propriety of Judge Chalfin’s ruling, Judge Rowley does not confine his finding of reversible error to Judge Chalfin’s overruling of the previous order by Judge Rosen-wald. Rather, he clearly states that "(W)e hold that it was error for Judge Chalfin to consider Appellee Wilson & Savage's motion for summary judgment.” Reifinger, supra, 461 A.2d at p. 842 (Emphasis supplied). Judge Rowley’s holding is premised upon a common sense interpretation of the "co-equal judges” rule. If one judge is not empowered to overrule a colleague's holding with respect to a particular issue, it is pointless to permit that judge to reconsider his colleague’s holding, when his discretion would be limited to a mere "rubber-stamp” approval of the previous decision. In the words of Judge Rowley, a party who desires reconsideration should, where circumstances permit, "prepare a motion for reconsideration and submit it to the same judge who had decided the issue in the first instance." Reifinger, supra, at pp. 842-43.
The majority attempts to distinguish Reifinger on the basis that the second co-equal judge in Reifinger had no new evidence to consider. The majority contends that the amended complaint in the instant matter contained new averments of fact, and, as such, presented "new evidence” to be considered by Judge Standish, thereby rendering the "co-equal judges” rule inapposite. The majority is correct in its assertion that the “co-equal judges” rule does not apply when the record before the second judge contains new evidence. However, the averments in pleadings are not evidence, nor are permitted to contain evidentiary material. The allegations in a pleading merely set forth material facts so as to frame the issues which will be tried. See Pa.R.C.P. § 1019; also see Goodrich-Amram 2d § 1019:1, § 1019(a):l, § 1019(a):ll. In Reifinger, the second judge was not called upon to review an amended pleading, but a motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment is not a pleading, but an attempt by a party, after the pleadings are closed, to have judgment entered in its favor. Pa.R.C.P. 1035(a). Furthermore, a motion for summary judgment is permitted to include material of an evidentiary nature, such as deposition testimony, answers to discovery requests, and affidavits. Id.; see also Goodrich Amram 2d § 1035:1. Hence, the Reifinger court initially had to determine if the second judge was presented *123with any new evidence through the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the majority’s attempt to distinguish Reifinger is flawed.

. Because of the conclusion to be reached infra, that the agreement was void ab initio, it may be argued that there was also no consideration to support the parties’ mutual promises. A promise to forbear given in exchange for a promise to perform a legal duty is supported by valid consideration where the parties possess a good faith belief in the action or defense they are permanently surrendering, or temporarily forbearing from asserting. This is true even where their agreement is ultimately determined to be invalid. The fact that a rule of law renders a promise voidable or unenforceable, does not mean that the promise was not valid consideration. Restatement, Second, Contracts §§ 73; 74, comments, a, b, d; 75; 78.
Here, appellee agreed to temporarily forbear from taking a default judgment, while appellant waived its right to further notice prior to the taking of default if a responsive pleading was not filed by February 3, 1986. As such, the conclusion to be reached infra does not affect the validity of the consideration supporting this agreement.

. While this premise is not stated in the January 3, 1986 letter confirming the agreement, courts are permitted to "imply” a term which is a logical deduction from agreed terms and circumstances, or would appear a common tacit assumption, when the term supplied would appear essential to a determination of the rights and duties of the parties. Restatement, Second, Contracts § 204, Comment c. Clearly, it would appear logical to assume that this agreement would never have come into being had the parties known that the December 6 order was a nullity.

. There is a further issue as to whether the agreement here, because of the parties’ disagreement concerning the status of a motion for reconsideration, would be unenforceable for lack of mutual assent to the same terms. However, this issue has not been raised, and is waived. The previous discussion upon various principles of contract law related solely to the jurisdictional issue: that is, did the lack of authority for the December 6 order prevent a contract from being formed? Any further discussion as to the term “motion for reconsideration” in contractual terms would be inappropriate. The majority has limited its discussion to the status of such motions for procedural purposes. I believe the majority’s decision to confine itself thus was entirely correct.