Court Opinion

ID: 9905713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 22:01:11.778017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:51.373059
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11477    Document: 32-1     Date Filed: 11/29/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11477
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JAQUEZ L. GILBERT,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 7:20-cr-00026-HL-TQL-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11477

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Jaquez L. Gilbert appeals his conviction for possession of a
       firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, challenging the dis-
       trict court’s denial of his motion to suppress based on an eviden-
       tiary search of the home of his girlfriend, Rukeya Loveday. Gilbert
       argues, and the government does not dispute, that he had Fourth
       Amendment standing to challenge the search because he was a reg-
       ular overnight guest at Loveday’s house. Gilbert contends that his
       probation search waiver did not authorize the search because the
       probation condition did not permit warrantless searches at third
       party residences. He asserts that, contrary to the government’s ar-
       guments, neither the attenuation doctrine nor the inevitable dis-
       covery doctrine applies to allow the admission of the evidence. Af-
       ter reading the parties’ briefs and reviewing the record, we con-
       clude that the district court did not err in denying Gilbert’s motion
       to suppress, and we affirm Gilbert’s conviction.
                                             I.
              Regarding a motion to suppress, we review the district
       court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
       United States v. Barber, 777 F.3d 1303, 1304 (11th Cir. 2015). We
       may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground that
       the record supports. United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1222
       (11th Cir. 2010). We construe the facts “in the light most favorable
       to the prevailing party below,” affording substantial deference to
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       22-11477                Opinion of the Court                           3

       the district court’s explicit and implicit credibility determinations.
       United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012) (quota-
       tion marks omitted).
                                             II.
               Standing under the Fourth Amendment is non-jurisdic-
       tional, and “the government waives any standing objection that it
       fails to raise.” United States v. Ross, 963 F.3d 1056, 1065-66 (11th Cir.
       2020) (en banc). A legal claim or argument not briefed before our
       court is deemed forfeited, and we will consider its merits only in
       extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th
       860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).
              The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the peo-
       ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
       unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. The
       reasonableness of a search is “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth
       Amendment,” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S. Ct.
       587, 591 (2001), and without a warrant issued upon probable cause,
       a search is unreasonable unless it falls into a specifically established
       exception, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57, 88 S. Ct. 507,
       514 (1967).
              However, there is no rational basis to suppress evidence ob-
       tained by unconstitutional methods “if the government can prove
       that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably.” Nix v.
       Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2511 (1984). Thus, un-
       der the inevitable discovery doctrine, the government may intro-
       duce evidence that it obtained through an illegal search if it shows:
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11477

       (1) “by a preponderance of the evidence that if there had been no
       constitutional violation, the evidence in question would have been
       discovered by lawful means,” and (2) “that the lawful means which
       made discovery inevitable were being actively pursued prior to the
       occurrence of the illegal conduct.” United States v. Watkins,
       13 F.4th 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quotation marks
       omitted). When the “active pursuit” in question does not involve
       a search warrant, the government need not “have already planned
       the particular legal search that would obtain the evidence.” Id. at
       1215 (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted). Rather, the
       government only must show “that the police would have discov-
       ered the evidence by virtue of ordinary investigations of evidence or
       leads already in their possession.” Id. (quotation marks omitted, em-
       phasis added).
               Under the attenuation doctrine, courts are required to con-
       duct two separate inquiries where a consent to search follows prior
       illegal activity by the police: (1) whether the consent was volun-
       tary; and (2) whether the consent, even if voluntary, requires ex-
       clusion of the evidence found during the search because it was the
       product of an illegal entry, i.e., that it was the “fruit of the poison-
       ous tree.” United States v. Delancy, 502 F.3d 1297, 1308 (11th Cir.
       2007) (quotation marks omitted). The government must prove
       that the illegal action did not cause the consent, and the district
       court must determine whether the evidence in question was ob-
       tained by exploitation of the initial unlawful action or by “means
       sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id.
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       22-11477               Opinion of the Court                         5

       at 1309 (quotation marks omitted). “This is a fact-specific question,
       and no single fact is dispositive.” Id.
               Three non-exhaustive factors guide the attenuation analysis,
       which is a pragmatic evaluation of the extent to which the illegal
       police conduct caused the consent to be given: (1) the temporal
       proximity between the unlawful police conduct and the consent;
       (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose
       and flagrancy of the unlawful police conduct. Id. at 1309-10. As to
       temporal proximity, if only a short time has elapsed between the
       illegal act and a subject’s consent, the factor weighs in favor of ex-
       clusion of the evidence. Id. at 1310. An intervening circumstance
       is any event that interrupts the causal connection between the ille-
       gal act and the possibly tainted consent. Id. at 1311. As to purpose
       and flagrancy of the police conduct, “when the police act with the
       express purpose of exploiting an illegal action, the causation is so
       obvious that no real attenuation analysis is even necessary.” Id. at
       1312.
              Other factors that the court may consider are whether:
       (1) the seizure brought about police observation of the particular
       object for which the police sought consent to search, (2) the con-
       sent was volunteered rather than requested by the officers, (3) the
       detainee was made fully aware that she could decline to consent
       and thus prevent an immediate search of the home, (4) there has
       been a significant intervening event, and (5) the police purpose un-
       derlying the illegality was to obtain the consent. Id. at 1309-10.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11477

              We find Delancy instructive to the present case. In that case,
       officers came to LaSandra Godfrey’s home to question her boy-
       friend, Ronald Delancy, about several crimes. Id. at 1301. After
       placing something in the sofa, Delancy voluntarily exited the
       home, and officers arrested him outside. Id. Officers then con-
       ducted a protective sweep. Id. Officers asked Godfrey if they could
       search her home, providing a written consent form, which she
       signed, that informed her of her Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at
       1301-02. Officers testified that the tone of the conversation was
       conversational rather than threatening and that they did not point
       a gun or threaten Godfrey for her consent. Id. at 1303. Godfrey
       agreed that the officers were polite but stated that they threatened
       her about her kids. Id. Before Godfrey consented to the search,
       officers found contraband in the sofa. Id.
              We noted that, while the temporal proximity was close, tim-
       ing was not the most important factor because the interaction was
       conversational in tone and the officers did not threaten, handcuff,
       or detain Godfrey to force consent. Id. at 1310-11. We emphasized
       that intervening circumstances required an event that severed the
       causal connection between the illegal activity and the consent, such
       as when the officers made Godfrey aware of her rights under the
       Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1312. As to purpose and flagrancy, we
       noted that the officers intended to comply with the law, did not act
       flagrantly in searching large areas of the house, and did not use the
       evidence found to obtain consent. Id. at 1312-13. We noted as sig-
       nificant that Godfrey was not the defendant in the case. Id. at 1314.
       We ultimately concluded that the attenuation doctrine applied
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       22-11477              Opinion of the Court                        7

       because Godfrey’s consent was not tainted by the illegal entry. Id.
       at 1316. As to the contraband found prior to Godfrey’s consent, we
       concluded that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable
       discovery doctrine because Godfrey’s consent was voluntary and
       there was a reasonable probability that the officers would have
       found the drugs in the sofa after Godfrey’s consent because they
       had observed Delancy place something in the sofa. Id. at 1315.
                                           III.
              As an initial matter, the record discloses that the govern-
       ment has forfeited any challenge to Gilbert’s Fourth Amendment
       standing by failing to raise the issue on appeal, so we need not ad-
       dress that issue.
              The record demonstrates that the district court did not err
       in finding that exclusion of the evidence was unwarranted under
       the attenuation doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine.
       Thus, we decline to reach the issue of whether the Fourth Amend-
       ment permits officers to conduct a probationary search in a third
       party’s residence where a probationer is staying as an overnight
       guest.
               First, as to the attenuation doctrine, we conclude that the
       illegal conduct did not cause Loveday’s consent because the factors
       weigh against exclusion. While the temporal proximity was close,
       timing was not the most important factor because nothing in the
       record suggests that the officers threatened, handcuffed, or de-
       tained Loveday to secure her consent. Because Investigator Wil-
       liams testified that he planned to obtain Loveday’s consent to
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       8                     Opinion of the Court                22-11477

       conduct an evidentiary search before entering the house, the pur-
       pose of the search was not based on the findings of the initial
       search. The record confirms that the officers did not act flagrantly
       because, during the initial search, they only searched the bedroom
       area rather than the entire house. Further, nothing in the record
       suggests that the officers made Loveday aware of the contraband
       to obtain consent. Notably, like in Delancy, Loveday is not the de-
       fendant. While the record does not show any intervening circum-
       stances, the other factors outweigh the lack of intervening circum-
       stances.
              Further, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, we con-
       clude that the officers would have discovered the evidence by law-
       ful means, as they searched the bedroom after obtaining consent
       from Loveday. The officers were actively pursuing the lawful
       means prior to discovering the evidence because Investigator Wil-
       liams testified that he planned to ask Loveday for her consent to
       conduct an evidentiary search when she arrived. Accordingly,
       based on the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the district
       court did not err in denying Gilbert’s motion to suppress the fire-
       arms and ammunition found during the search of Loveday’s home,
       and, therefore, we affirm Gilbert’s conviction.
             AFFIRMED.