Court Opinion

ID: 9664833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:31:23.341144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.664625
License: Public Domain

Gribbs, P.J.
(concurring). I concur in the result but for reasons different than those stated in my brother Lambros’s opinion. I would find that the plaintiff is bound by the arbitration agreement because plaintiff’s claim is grounded in negligence in the performance of professional services by defendant hospital or, in the alternative, negligence arising out of health care or treatment.
A hospital may be sued for either malpractice1 or "ordinary” negligence. See Adkins v Annapolis Hospital, 116 Mich App 558; 323 NW2d 482 (1982), aff'd 420 Mich 87; 360 NW2d 150 (1984); MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838. Malpractice is essentially negligence in the performance of professional services utilizing the standard of care of the profession. See Rogers v Horvath, 65 Mich App 644, 646-647; 237 NW2d 595 (1975); Siirila v Barrios, 58 Mich App 721, 725; 228 NW2d 801 (1975), aff'd 398 Mich 576; 248 NW2d 171 (1976).
In the case at bar, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that plaintiff entered defendant hospital for surgery, relying on the specialty and skill of the hospital in the care and treatment of patients. It *805alleged that defendant hospital undertook to provide the services of doctors, nurses and other health care personnel and had a duty to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence ordinarily used by hospitals in the same or similar locality in furnishing a patient with care and attention as required by the patient’s condition. The complaint further alleged that defendant hospital breached this duty and was negligent in the care and treatment of plaintiff by failing to select, engage and/or hire capable, competent, skilled and qualified health care providers and personnel, failing to adequately direct, supervise, monitor and control such providers and personnel, failing to supervise the care and treatment of plaintiff, failing to provide a safe environment for plaintiff’s post-operative recovery, and failing to protect an unconscious patient and timely attend to plaintiff’s condition after he sustained injuries in the fall from the hospital bed.
1 would find that plaintiff’s claim against defendant hospital sounds in malpractice, rather than "ordinary” negligence. See Penner v Seaway Hospital, 102 Mich App 697, 704-705; 302 NW2d 285 (1981). Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that defendant hospital did not comply with the standard of care and skill of hospitals in similar localities. It alleged that defendant hospital breached its duty to meet this standard of care in its care and treatment of plaintiff, in its selection and supervision of staff, and in providing a safe environment for post-surgical care. In sum, plaintiff claimed defendant hospital was negligent in performing those professional services rendered by a hospital.2 Thus plain*806tiffs claim was within the scope of MCL 600.5040; MSA 27A.5040, providing for arbitration agreements covering negligence in the performance of professional services of a hospital.
In the alternative, if plaintiffs claim sounds in ordinary negligence3 since it was ultimately based on the failure to raise a bedrail, I would still find that his claim falls within the scope of the medical malpractice arbitration act. Assuming arguendo that the majority correctly construes MCL 600.5040(1); MSA 27A.5040(1) as encompassing "ordinary” negligence, I find too broad the majority’s opinion that all negligence on the part of a health care provider or hospital falls within the scope of the medical malpractice arbitration act. The provision in question must be read in context with the entire medical malpractice arbitration act. See Arrowhead Development Co v Livingston County Road Comm, 413 Mich 505, 516; 322 NW2d 702 (1982). MCL 600.5041(1); MSA 27A.5041(1), and MCL 600.5042(1); MSA 27A.5042(1) provide that a person receiving health care, i.e., a patient, may execute an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of health care or treatment by a health care provider or hospital. Reading MCL 600.5040(1); MSA 27A.5040(1) in context with these provisions *807of the act, I would hold that the scope of arbitration agreements is limited to claims arising out of health care or treatment, whether they be labeled malpractice or negligence.
Extending the medical malpractice arbitration act to all negligence on the part of a health care provider or hospital, without limiting it to claims arising out of health care or treatment, would yield untenable results. For example, if an able-bodied patient executed an arbitration agreement with a treating physician, and tripped on torn carpeting in the physician’s office lobby, I would be hard pressed to find that the arbitration agreement covered the negligence of the physician in failing to maintain or repair the carpet. Similarly, I would not find that the arbitration act extended to a negligence claim brought against a hospital by a patient who slips and falls in the visitors’ gift shop solely due to an overwaxed floor.
In the case at bar, even if plaintiff’s claim against defendant hospital is characterized as "ordinary” negligence, his claim arises out of his post-surgical care and treatment and thus falls within the scope of the arbitration act.
I concur in affirming the trial court.

 Although a malpractice claim against a hospital may be based on vicarious liability for the malpractice of health care personnel for their negligent performance of professional services such as diagnoses, prescriptions, operation, etc., the hospital may also be liable for its own malpractice which consists of the professional services rendered by a hospital which are distinct from the services of its employees and agents, such as, for example, the hiring and supervision of medical personnel.

 In the case at bar, plaintiffs complaint alleged that a hospital employee, agent or servant examined plaintiff after surgery and failed to replace the safety rails on plaintiffs hospital bed. The failure to replace the bedrail may sound in ordinary negligence. Cf., D’Antoni v *806Sara Mayo Hospital, 144 So 2d 643 (La App, 1962); contra, American Policyholders Ins Co v Michota, 156 Ohio St 578; 103 NE2d 817 (1952) ("professional services” construed in the context of insurance policies). Plaintiff did not, however, base his claim on the employee’s negligence or assert that defendant hospital was vicariously liable for the negligent actions of the employee in failing to replace the bedrail. Plaintiff alleged that his injuries were due to the misfeasance or nonfeasance of services performed by defendant hospital, such as hiring, supervision of care and treatment, etc. Contrast Grewe v Mt Clemens General Hospital, 404 Mich 240, 248; 273 NW2d 429 (1978) (plaintiff’s complaint alleged negligence on the part of the hospital’s "agents” and the pleadings were’ broad enough to encompass an allegation of derivative liability of the hospital).

 Some hospital errors in patient treatment may be ordinary negligence rather than malpractice. Adkins, 420 Mich 95, fn 10.