Court Opinion

ID: 9602390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:54:05.770275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:03.212227
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting in part.
We granted defendant’s discretionary appeal in part to address a question of first impression: whether an order terminating probation under which a defendant is “placed” by authority of the First Offender Act falls within the “[a]ppeals from orders revoking probation” language of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5), thereby requiring an application for appeal, or whether a direct appeal would lie. The subsection 5 category of cases was added by the legislature, along with other categories expanding the discretionary appeal route, in 1984.
In an appeal from a revocation of a probated sentence following a trial or guilty plea, a defendant has already had the right to appeal directly all aspects of the formal adjudication of guilt as well as of the *128sentence which is bottomed on the judgment of guilt. Later, when he is found to have violated the terms of the probation, a matter subsequent to the conviction, and subject to the “slight evidence” rule, he may apply for application for discretionary review of the revocation order. Such is not the identical case with an appeal from a termination of probation under the First Offender Act. In this latter type of case, although a First Offender could directly appeal the first sentence imposed by agreement, OCGA § 42-8-64, there is no adjudication of guilt from which to appeal until the court determines that there has been a violation of First Offender status and proceeds to enter a judgment of guilt. Thus, such an appeal is from more than a mere “order revoking probation.” It is actually an appeal also from the judgment of guilt itself as well as from the new sentence. These are entered after the earlier-ordered sentence has been frustrated. The resentencing may actually be more severe than the consented-to sentence. Beasley v. State, 165 Ga. App. 160 (299 SE2d 886) (1983); Hogan v. State, 158 Ga. App 495, 496 (2) (280 SE2d 891) (1981); State v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 316, 318 (210 SE2d 790) (1974). There may be some limitation, of course, arising from the original agreement and that sentence. Saladine v. State, 165 Ga. App. 836 (302 SE2d 739) (1983); Stephens v. State, 245 Ga. 835 (268 SE2d 330) (1980); Johnson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 506 (288 SE2d 366) (1982). At any rate, the new sentence is based on an just-arrived at adjudication of guilt, whereas a mere order revoking probation proceeds from a sentence based on a judgment entered previously and the appeal is only from the order. The important distinction was recognized in Beasley v. State, supra. It is illustrated by this very case, where appellant challenges also the validity of the adjudication of guilt, claiming that his 1980 guilty plea was neither voluntary and intelligent nor accompanied by a finding that a crime had occurred.1 This extends beyond inquiry into whether he violated the terms of probation and the legality of the length of the new sentence. Accordingly, appeals of this nature do not fall within the scope of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5) in my view; they are directly appealable. OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1).
Could we put this case in the right track? There appears to be no authority for “transferring” this case to direct appeal status. The statutory procedure for appealing does not provide anything to the effect that if the losing party below follows the wrong appellate course, albeit in a timely fashion as to the course he chooses, his case will be shifted to the proper course by the court appealed to. Although the 1983 Constitution of Georgia, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. VIII *129provides for the transfer of cases to the appropriate court when jurisdiction is found to be elsewhere, there is no similar provision in the appellate practice, as amended, for transfer of discretionary appeals to direct appeals or vice versa.
To conclude that such transfers are proper would have undesirable consequences. It is only after the grant of discretionary appeal that appellant must file his notice of appeal below. OCGA § 5-6-35 (g). If an appeal were transferred from the discretionary statutory track to the direct appeal track, a change in the time requirements would be effected. A party could successfully delay the effects of a judgment by intentionally filing improperly. Moreover, a party who mistakenly misfiled would be rewarded by obtaining a delay from the effects of judgment. In addition, the discretionary appeal procedure allows the filing of an application to act as a supersedeas. OCGA § 5-6-35 (h). Of course, the winner could require the posting of a supersedeas bond, but that is not the equivalent of recovery of judgment. Finally, for those who erroneously filed a direct appeal, we would have to give appellants direction to follow the discretionary route and establish deadlines for compliance.
It is not manifest that this is what the legislature intended. Nor has this court or the Supreme Court adopted this approach and transferred erroneously filed discretionary appeals to direct appeals or the opposite. Appeals that have not been filed in compliance with OCGA § 5-6-35 have been dismissed. See, e.g., Russo v. Manning, 252 Ga. 155 (312 SE2d 319) (1984); Strickland v. Strickland, 252 Ga. 218 (312 SE2d 606) (1984); In the Interest of J. E. P. III, 252 Ga. 520 (315 SE2d 416) (1984); Beckman v. Black, 170 Ga. App. 193 (316 SE2d 784) (1984); Burnett v. Coleman, 170 Ga. App. 394 (317 SE2d 546) (1984).2
Where there is an issue of statutory interpretation of OCGA § 5-6-35, dismissal for choosing the track later construed as the wrong one can be avoided by simultaneously filing both a direct appeal and an application for appeal. Defendant did not do so here. Ordinarily, failure to follow the correct appellate procedure would work a dismissal because under such circumstances we would not have jurisdiction to hear the merits. But where the choice is based on a reasonable interpretation of unclear portion of the statute which has not been previously judicially construed, and the choice is deemed by the court *130as a matter of law to have been wrong, the court’s statutory construction ought to be given prospective application only. Otherwise unnecessary injustice may result. See dissent in Noggle v. Arnold, 177 Ga. App. 119 (338 SE2d 763) (1985).
Decided November 26, 1985
Rehearing denied December 19, 1985.
Roger L. Curry, for appellant.
Frank C. Winn, District Attorney, Richard S. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Thus I would reach the merits here and, in doing so as to those matters, agree with the majority.

 He could have appealed these two matters when initially sentenced, as a First Offender, OCGA § 42-8-64, but that would not foreclose his contesting them now as infecting the adjudication of guilt because it has just been entered.

 But see Wright v. Hanson, 248 Ga. 523 (283 SE2d 882) (1981), which concluded that although the filing of an application for review of a child custody habeas corpus proceeding was improper, the court had jurisdiction since the application was granted and notice of appeal was timely filed. This case was decided under the former OCGA § 5-6-35, and is no longer good law under amended OCGA § 5-6-35. Leonard v. Benjamin, 253 Ga. 718 (324 SE2d 185) (1985).