Court Opinion

ID: 9828909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:50:29.323175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:54.314863
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The majority of this court has reached the conclusion that we were in error in our construction of the deed from Sam Lee Gray to McFaddin-Wiess-Kyle Land Company. Mr. Chief Justice HIGHTOWER adheres to the original opinion, on the ground that the description given in this deed does not locate the land and does not give sufficient data by which it can be located, by the aid of extrinsic evidence. The description is given in full in the original opinion.
It would seem that this land is fully located by reference to the calls in this deed. In surveying this land, following the calls in this deed, the surveyor found all the objects called for at the place and on the course and distance given. It is a part of the J. S. Johnson one-fourth league, the only survey in Texas by that name. It lies adjacent to the T. S. Smith place, which was identified, and it was not shown that Sam Lee Gray owned any other land in the J. S. Johnson league adjacent to the T. S. Smith place. It does not seem probable that any other tract of land in the world could meet the calls in this deed, and it being shown that this tract in controversy meets all the descriptive elements contained in the deed under which appellants claim, it is our opinion that the description is sufficient.
In Arthur v. Ridge, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 137, 89 S. W. 15, the land was located with reference to “Bear creek.” It was not shown by the description that Bear creek was in Texas.
In Flanagan v. Boggess, 46 Tex. 330, our Supreme Court sustained this description:
“620 acres of headlight of David Brown, situated about twenty miles north of Henderson, in the neighborhood of Belview.”
It was not stated that this land was in Texas.
In Morrison v. Dailey, 6 S. W. 427, sustaining this description:
“Lancaster, June 28, 1887. Received from. H. Morrison forty dollars on my place, known as the ‘James Perry Tract of land,’ which tract I have sold to him for forty-five hundred dollars, part cash, and the balance to bear interest at ten per cent, per annum until paid.
“[Signed] Mrs. N. B. Dailey”
—our Supreme Court said:
“The petition described, by metes and bounds, the lands alleged to have been sold. * * * The description of the land is sufficient. All that is required is that the premises shall be so described that they can be definitely ascertained. By determining what land defendant owned at the date of the contract, which was known as the ‘James Perry tract,’ the property sold could be identified with certainty. So far, all the authorities are agreed. Ragsdale v. Mays, 65 Tex. 255; Fulton v. Robinson, 55 Tex. 491; Bitner v. Land Co., 67 Tex. 341, 3 S. W. Rep. 301; 1 Reed, St. Frauds, §§ 409-416; Browne, *745St. Frauds, § 3S5; Pom. Spec. Perf. § 90; Wat. Spec. Perf. § 237.”
See, also, Petty v. Wilkins, 190 S. W. 531.
In aid of this description, we announce the xollowing propositions, which seem to! be well sustained by the authorities:
1. On the fact that the date line of this deed shows that it was ■ executed at Beaumont, Tex., and the deed begins “State of Texas, County of Jefferson,” and recites that both the grantor and grantee are citizens of Jefferson county, Tex., the presumption follows that this land is located in Jefferson county, Tex.
In Frazier v. Lambert, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 606, 115 S. W. 1174, discussing this description, “Lot twenty-seven, block 3/929, and better known as No. 126 McKinnon street,” the court said:
“There is no such want of description of the lot as to make the contract nonenforeeable. The contract was dated Dallas, Tex., and the land described as follows: ‘Lot twenty-seven, block 3/929, and better known as No. 126 Mc-Kinnon street.’ This description was sufficient to identify the lot, and there was evidence, un-contradicted, fully identifying the lot mentioned in the contract. Watson v. Baker, 71 Tex. 748, 9 S. W. 867; Fulton v. Robinson, 55 Tex. 401; Morrison v. Dailey (Tex.) 6 S. W. 426.”
See, also, Horton v. Murden, 117 Ga. 72, 43 S. E. 786; Butler v. Davis, 5 Neb. 523; Scheuer v. Kelly, 121 Ala. 323, 26 South. 4; Garden City Sand Co. v. Miller, 157 Ill. 225, 41 N. E. 753.
2. At the time Gray delivered the deed to McFaddin, McFaddin delivered to him, in payment for this land, a check with this in-dorsement:
“About 100 acres of land out of J. S. Johnson league, known as the Leonard place, payment in full.”
The proof showed that the land in controversy was known as the Leonard place. This check was for $2,500, and was indorsed by Sam Lee Gray, in full for the above amount. At the time this check and deed were delivered, Gray also delivered to McFaddin the following written order:
“Beaumont, Tex., 6 — 26—11.
“John Puccio, Wall & Park Streets, City— Dear Sir: You are hereby notified that I have this day sold my place that you are living on to the McFaddin-Wiess-Kyle Land Company, so please turn the same over to them at the end of your month, which is the 6th day of July, 1911.
“Yours very truly, Sam Lee Gray.”
In connection with the delivery of this instrument, McFaddin testified:
“Saan Lee Gray and myself went to Puceio’s store on Park street, and Sam Lee Gray called Puccio out to the car, and he came out there, and he told him he had sold the place he was occupying down there where he had his crop and sold it to me.' He gave me a written order to Puccio to turn the property over to me at that time. I have that order.”
These instruments, delivered contemporaneously with the delivery of the deed, should be considered in connection therewith in aid of the description. Considering these two instruments together, in aid of the description, the land is definitely identified. Uecker v. Zuercher, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 289, 118 S. W. 149; Cleveland v. Stanley, 177 S. W. 1181; W. S. Quimby Co. v. Sheffield, 84 Conn. 177, 79 Atl. 179; Jack v. Hooker, 71 Kan. 652, 81 Pac, 203; Sugg v. Town of Greenville, 169 N. C. 606, 86 S. E. 695; Taylor v. Harvey, 90 Neb. 770, 134 N. W. 647; O’Barr v. Turner, 16 Ala. App. 65, 75 South. 271; Kyle v. Jordan, 187 Ala. 355, 65 South. 522.
On the issue of limitation which we discussed in our original opinion, it was necessary for appellants to show payment of taxes for the year 1912. The tax collector of Jefferson county testified:
That “in 1911 McFaddin-Wiess-Kyle Land Company, one of the appellants, rendered and paid taxes on 662.39 acres in the J. S. Johnson survey; that the taxes were paid January 29, 1912; that in 1912 they assessed and paid taxes on 670 acres of the Johnson survey and that the 1912 taxes were paid January 31, 1913; that for 1913 they assessed and paid taxes on 960 acres in the Johnson survey; and that the 1913 taxes were paid January 23, 1914.”
It will be noted that from this testimony that appellants did not increase their tax renditions on this survey so as to include this land in controversy until 1913. It is not shown that appellants sold any lands during the years 1911, 1912, and 1913 owned by them on this survey. In our judgment this testimony was not sufficient to raise the issue of payment of taxes for the year 1912.
In Bassett v. Martin, 83 Tex. 344, 18 S. W. 589, a somewhat similar case, though not so strong, Judge Gaines said:
“It would seem that it is to be presumed that the payment was made for the 200 acres, the title to which was undisputed.”
So without deciding whether this deed, under the construction which we have given it, could be the basis of a limitation title (Young v. Trahan, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 611, 97 S. W. 147; Brokel v. McKechnie, 69 Tex. 32, 6 S. W. 623), it is our judgment that this record does not raise such an issue.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is in all things overruled.
HIGHTOWER, C. J., dissenting in part.