Court Opinion

ID: 9543341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:44:32.589181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:10.403551
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J.
I dissent. I would reverse the judgment for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Shoemaker in the opinion prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal in Harris v. Harris (Cal.App.), 16 Cal.Rptr. 561, which, so far as necessary for my purposes, reads:
[]*The defendants’ first contention on appeal is that the plaintiff Russell S. Harris, suing as executor of the estate of Susie Almeda Harris, does not have standing to sue to recover one-half of the community property transferred to defendants by Marshall C. Harris. We agree with this contention.
Civil Code, section 172, states (prior to the 1959 amendments), so far as is pertinent: “The husband has the management and control of the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, however, that he cannot make a gift of such community personal property, or dispose of the same without a valuable consideration, or sell, convey, or encumber the furniture, furnishings, or *372fittings of the home, or the clothing or wearing apparel of the wife or minor children that is community, without the written consent of the wife.”
A review of the California decisions involving Civil Code, section 172, indicates that the husband’s transfer of personal community property, without valuable consideration or without the wife’s consent, immediately vests the property in the donee subject to avoidance by the wife upon proof of facts necessary to that end. (Spreckels v. Spreckels (1916) 172 Cal. 775, 784 [158 P. 537] ; Trimble v. Trimble (1933) 219 Cal. 340, 344 [26 P.2d 477] ; Mayr v. Arana (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 471, 477 [284 P.2d 21].) The wife can set aside the transfer of the personal property by the husband, which is without valuable consideration or her consent, in its entirety during the lifetime of her husband. (Britton v. Hammell (1935) 4 Cal.2d 690 [52 P.2d 221].) After his death, the widow may set aside one-half of the unauthorized transfers (Trimble v. Trimble, supra), or recover one-half of the value from her husband’s estate. (Fields v. Michael (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 443, 448 [205 P.2d 402].)
We are of the opinion that the right to so avoid a transfer of community personal property made by the husband in violation of the statute is, however, personal to the wife, intended solely for her benefit and her protection (Italian American Bank v. Canepa (1921) 52 Cal.App. 619, 621 [199 P. 55] ; Pomper v. Behnke (1929) 97 Cal.App. 628, 638 [276 P. 122] ; Blethen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1926) 198 Cal. 91, 100 [243 P. 431] ; Spreckels v. Spreckels, supra ; Schindler v. Schindler (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 597, 603 [272 P.2d 566]), although not so personal that a guardian of an incompetent wife during her lifetime would not have the right to maintain an action on her behalf (Scott v. Austin (1922) 57 Cal.App. 553 [207 P. 710]) ; the right being purely personal to the wife, it must follow that if she, or her guardian in case of incompeteney, fails to act during her lifetime to invalidate a gift of community personal property, the gift becomes valid in its entirety. (United States v. Stewart (1959) 270 F.2d 894, 900 [applying California law] ; Mayr v. Arana, supra ; Italian American Bank v. Canepa, supra.) A personal right, which is not assignable, does not survive the death of the person entitled to it even if the wife is incompetent and the guardian has not acted on her behalf during her life. (Estate of Blair (1954) 42 Cal.2d 728, 731, 733 [269 P.2d 612].) []
*373Hansen v. Bear Film Co., Inc. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 154 [168 P.2d 946], and Pearl v. Pearl (1918) 177 Cal. 303 [177 P. 845], cited in respondent’s reply brief, concern cases wherein transfers of property were made to parties to be held in trust for the transferor. However, the court in the ease before us did not find that the defendants held the property in trust and the citations are inapplicable.
Stafford v. Martinoni (1923) 192 Cal. 724 [221 P. 919], and Makeig v. United Security Bank & Trust Co. (1931) 112 Cal.App. 138 [296 P. 673], also cited in respondent’s reply brief, concern actions for an accounting of community property which was in the deceased’s possession at death, and do not present the same fact situations as found in this case. Likewise, Probate Code, section 201, concerning succession of community property after death, does not affect the husband’s management and control during the lifetime of the parties. (Trimble v. Trimble, supra, at pp. 340, 345, 346.) []
Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied March 28, 1962. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Brackets together, in this manner [], are used to indicate deletions from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal.