Court Opinion

ID: 9776504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:38:09.951411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.323968
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The Majority Opinion states that the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a Batson hearing “because it determined that the striking alone of one black panel member when there are two blacks on the panel was sufficient under Batson" to require a Batson inquiry. The Majority found error in this proposition and required “other relevant circumstances” to raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude a venireman due to race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
I do not disagree that Batson requires more than merely a showing that the defendant is black and “the prosecutor struck a certain number of blacks from the jury panel.” But I think, as did the Court of Appeals, that “other relevant circumstances” exist here. The Court of Appeals explained:
“Even if the statistical evidence was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case, the fact that the defendant, a black middle-aged man, was charged with [third-degree rape of a white, under-aged female] is a ‘relevant circumstance.’ ”
Our Majority Opinion leaves out these significant facts. The Court of Appeals rests on more than “a simple numerical calculation.”
I cannot say the Court of Appeals clearly erred in its judgment that the particular circumstances of this case warranted a Batson inquiry. I would affirm the Court of Appeals.