Court Opinion

ID: 9754573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:04:33.664026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:54.734925
License: Public Domain

Joslin, J.,
dissenting. This case came to the court on the defendant’s exceptions to. the denials of his motions for a mistrial and a new trial. When the case was argued the state, not the defense, raised the question of whether it was error for the trial court to have admitted into evidence what the majority refer to as the defendant’s “incriminating statement.” I infer from that designation that they *616concede the statement falls short .of being a confession and that they denominate it as incriminating because in it the defendant admits that he had been drinking intoxicating liquors prior to the fatal accident and identifies the liquor establishment where his purchases had been made, thereby furnishing the prosecution with leads from which evidence was obtained as ¡to both the quantum and the time of his alcoholic consumption. The question- of the admissibility of that statement having thus been raised at oral argument, the court granted defendant leave to file a supplemental brief in which he now for the first time contends that its admission, notwithstanding his failure to object thereto at trial, constituted error so prejudicial as to entitle him to a new trial.
The majority agree with defendant and hold that the admission of his incriminating statement having been elicited iby the police during an interrogation strikes down his conviction because he had not prior to making that statement been warned by the police of his right to remain silent and advised by them of his right to the assistance of counsel. They -reach ¡that -conclusion in reliance on Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758. and without regard to the circumstances of this case which are substantially different from those surrounding the interrogation of Danny Escobedo-. They disregard also both defendant’s failure to object at trial to the admission of the statement and the silence of the trial record as to whether or not the warning and the advice were given. Escobedo is extended to its outermost limits -and the majority now go much further ¡than did the Chief Justice and my brother Powers in State v. Dufour, 99 R. I. 120, 206 A.2d 82. In that case the court was evenly divided on the thrust of Escobedo. My brother Paolino,. who now writes for the majority, concurred in the result reached by the Chief Justice and my brother Powers. Because his concurrence was without opinion, it could not be determined whether his agreement *617with the result they reached was grounded upon, their holding that the accused was the victim of an illegal search and seizure or, on the alternative basis, that it was error to admit Dufour’s confession for the reason that he had not been advised of his right to counsel and warned of his constitutional right to remain silent. Whatever doubts I may have had as to the reason for his concurrence in that case have now been removed.
While observing in passing the possible relevancy of rights guaranteed under our state constitution, supra, page 7, it is clearly evident that the majority hinge their conclusion on those guarantees possessed by an accused in criminal proceedings under the Bill of Rights and made obligatory upon the states 'by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution rather than on similar guarantees contained in the Declaration of Rights of our state constitution. It is the Bill of Rights upon which the Chief Justice’s opinion in State v. Dufour, supra, is grounded, and in Escobedo and Dorado• it was federal rights which were found to be violated. In effect the majority assume the role of forecasters of what the supreme court may in the future decide. Of course, I agree with the majority’s statement “that the search for truth and justice is the ultimate goal.” That sentiment is a truism with which all judges are in accord. In the attainment of that objective, however, the supreme court has not yet announced that the guarantees of the federal constitution make inadmissible in all circumstances a statement obtained by the police from an accused who is unadvised of his right to counsel and unwarned of his absolute right to remain silent. I would not extend the rule in Escobedo beyond the factual situation to which the supreme court in that case expressly confined it. See my concurring opinion in State v. Dufour, supra.
A substantial majority of the courts which have passed on the rule in Escobedo similarly restrict its application. State v. Fox, 257 Iowa 174, 131 N.W.2d 684; People v. Hart-*618graves, 31 Ill.2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33; Pece v. Cox, 74 N. M. 591, 396 P.2d 422; Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203 A.2d 782; Commonwealth v. Patrick, 416 Pa. 437, 206 A.2d 295; State v. Elam, 263 N. C. 273, 139 S.E.2d 601; Ward v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 564, 138 S.E.2d 293; Browne v. State, 24 Wis.2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169; Bean v. State, 81 Nev. 25, 398 P.2d 251; Mefford v. State, 235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824; People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226; 205 N.E.2d 852.
See also the recent text published under the auspices of The American Bar Foundation entitled “Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody,” Where Professor La-fave at page 395 said: “The court in 1964, in the Escobedo case, did find a violation of constitutional right to counsel at the police station, necessitating suppression of the suspect’s confession, but very cautiously limited the holding to the facts of that case * *
I am not unmindful of the contrary conclusions in State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 487, 395 P.2d 557, and People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361. The California court, which divided 4-3, held on reargument that the facts of that case brought “it squarely within the rule of Escobedo with the exception that Dorado did not retain or request counsel,” factors which in its opinion did not permit “a formalistic distinction” from the rule laid down in Esco-bedo. In State v. Neely, supra, the court, while expressly refraining from passing on the right to counsel, concluded that a failure tO' warn an accused of his right to remain silent made his confession inadmissible.
Even if the rule in Escobedo were to be extended it would not, in my opinion,, be applicable in a case such as this where defendant’s counsel expressly and not as a result of oversight, neglect, or inadvertence, refused to object to the admission of the statement. Indeed, defense counsel did more and in substance requested that the statement be admitted in order that it might become the basis for his' *619cross-examination of the interrogating police officers. Such a record precludes any conclusion other than that defendant, through his counsel, deliberately and intentionally elected against bringing into issue either the voluntariness of his incriminating statement or any other question which might affect its admission in evidence. That conduct, in my judgment, can only be described as trial strategy.
While I do not question that the practice in many jurisdictions imposes an affirmative burden on the prosecution to establish compliance with all constitutional safeguards as a predicate to the admission of an incriminating statement. it is nevertheless a condition precedent to the fulfillment of any such burden -that an objection to its admission be interposed. People v. Hegovic, 348 Ill. 58; Fisher v. State, 233 Md. 48; State v. Schmieder, 5 N. J. 40. It has, moreover, until today, always been the rule in this state that alleged errors made by a trial justice will not be reviewed in this court unless the defendant has sought and received an adverse ruling. Absent such a ruling, coupled with an exception thereto, it has consistently been held that there is nothing to review. State v. Casasanta, 29 R. I. 587, 595; State v. Arnold, 64 R. I. 355, 360; State v. Ruggiero, 93 R. I. 241, 247. In short, the rule in this state requires contemporaneous objection or, in the absence thereof, at least a motion to strike so that the attention of the trial justice may be alerted to the issue raised and in order that on review there will be a duly excepted to ruling upon which this court may pass. Our rule, procedural though it may be, is designed to provide for an orderly and expeditious adjudication of criminal matters. It serves a legitimate state interest and failure to comply with it will preclude a defendant from asserting either in this court or in the federal courts that his constitutional rights have been violated. Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 85 S. Ct. 564; Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Maroney, 417 Pa. 308, 207 A.2d 810.
*620In this case defendant was represented by counsel experienced in the trial of -criminal cases whio w-as wel-1 aware of the requirement of contemporaneous objection. -As part-of his trial tactics, deliberately adopted, he intentionally bypassed that requirement. By that conduct defendant forfeited his right to assert on review that the admission of the statement violated his federal constitutional rights. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438, 439.
The majority say that this conduct of counsel cannot be construed as a waiver by defendant and they hold, relying on Fay v. Noia, supra, that: “There is nothing in the record indicating that defendant participated in his counsel’s decision in this matter. Absent such participation defendant’s constitutional rights cannot be waived.”
In reaching that conclusion they both misread Fay v. Noia, and ignore the teachings of Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 85 S. Ct. 564, 569, and Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074. Those cases make clear that a criminal defendant may be foreclosed from contending that he did not waive his federal constitutional rights, if his counsel consciously and intentionally ignored state procedures adopted in order to insure an orderly trial. Thus in Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 85 S. Ct. 564, at page 569, Mr. Justice Brennan, who spoke also for the majority in Fay v. Noia said:
“The evidence suggests reasons for a strategic move. Both the complaining witness and the police officer testified that the cigarette lighter in the car did not work. After denial of its motion for a directed verdict the defense called a mechanic who had repaired the cigarette lighter. The defense might have planned to allow the complaining witness and the officer to testify that the -cigarette lighter did not work, and then, if the motion for directed verdict were not granted, to discredit both witnesses by showing that it did work, thereby persuading the jury to acquit. Or, by delaying objection to the evidence, the defense might have *621hoped to invite error and lay the foundation for a subsequent reversal. If either reason motivated the action of petitioner’s counsel and their plans backfired, counsels deliberate choice of the ■ strategy would amount to a waiver binding on petitioner and would preclude him from a decision on the merits of his federal claim either in the state courts or hereJ Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims, see Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (C.A.5th Cir. 1964), we think that the deliberate bypassing by counsel of the contemporaneous objection rule as a part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case.” (footnote 7 omitted) (italics ours)
What clearer expression is required in order to establish that a violation of federal rights, assuming there has been such a violation, is waived when competent counsel for reasons of trial strategy not only fails to object, but indeed in effect consents to the admission of an incriminating statement.
I add, however, to what I have said that my opinion would ibe otherwise if the requirement of contemporaneous objection were a procedural technicality having- no rational relationship to a well ordered trial. If such were the case, I would not insist, nor would I have any right to, on compliance at the expense of ignoring a defendant’s constitutional rights. See Brown v. State of Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278; Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U. S. 199; my concurring opinion in State v. Dufour, 99 R. I. 120, 206 A.2d 82, 88. It is otherwise, however, when the procedure deliberately 'bypassed is basic to our adversary system of trial. In such >a case, insistence may be mandated and in any event is justified. When such a procedure is intentionally disregarded by competent trial counsel, in my judgment the constitutional right, which might have been brought into issue by compliance, is waived. It matters not either *622that the accused did not participate in his counsel’s decision, nor that the trial strategy .deemed advantageous to the accused’s cause when adopted subsequently backfired.
I freely concede that what I here say as to the necessity of an objection by defendant to bring upon the record the question of the admissibility of a confession might not be germane if the meaning, of Escobedo were that the sixth amendment mandates that every suspect must during police interrogation, absent affirmative waiver, be advised of his right to counsel and warned of his constitutional right to remain silent. See State v. Johnson, 43 N. J. 572, 206 A.2d 737, 743. If that were the meaning which the majority give to Escobedo, the issue would not turn on the admission of an incriminating statement but on whether the commencement of police interrogation iis the critical moment at which the right to .counsel attaches. The majority do not so, construe Escobedo, but instead hold that the admission of an incriminating statement made to the police during an “investigation” in the absence of advice to the accused of his right to counsel or warning of his right to remain silent renders his conviction void. It is upon that hypothesis that in my view noncompliance for reasons of trial strategy by competent counsel with the requirement of contemporaneous objection should prevent consideration upon review of the question of the admissibility of defendant, Mendes’ statement.
The conclusion is inescapable that the majority announce two new rules. Specifically, they fix a different test from that which has heretofore been in effect for the admission of an incriminating statement given by an accused while in police custody at the station house. In order to, make that principle applicable to the facts of this case, they also hold that where constitutional rights are at issue, an accused cannot be bound by the trial judgments of his counsel, however competent, unless he has participated in the process leading to the decision as to whether an objection should *623be made or an exception taken. The implications of the latter pronouncement are both manifold and disturbing. Referring, however, only to the specific, an incriminating statement may no longer be admitted into. evidence, even though not objected to, unless inquiry has first been made as to whether there has been compliance with the new standards. Again, the majority go further than the supreme court in Escobedo or the California court in People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361. In each of those cases the record affirmatively showed that neither the advice nor the warning had been given. In short, it is now mandatory upon a trial justice to inquire from the interrogating police officer prior to the admission of an incriminating statement, if counsel has not, whether prior to the questioning of an accused at the station house he was advised of his right to counsel and warned of his right to remain silent. This may be a salutary.procedural rule but it represents an abrupt bréale with the past and a departure from what until today has always been the accepted practice in .this state. I cannot agree that the reasoning in Escobedo either compels or invites that result.
J. Joseph Nugent, Attorney General, Francis A. Kelleher, Assistant Attorney General, for State.
Dick & Carty-, Joseph B. Carty, for defendant.
It would serve no- useful purpose to consider the other exceptions before the court. On the assumption that they are without merit, I would overrule them and remit the case to the superior court for further proceedings.
Roberts, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of Joslin, J.