Court Opinion

ID: 9663335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:35:31.757186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:48.023981
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court. I conclude that its decisions both as to current child support and as to arrears are supported by adequate findings and are within its broad discretion.
I.
With regard to current child support, the trial court and this court recognized that *526appellant experienced a substantial change in circumstances since entry of the dissolution decree. I agree. However, that substantial change is but one prong of the test set forth in Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2. The second prong of this statute requires a determination that the substantial change in circumstances has rendered the terms of the present order unreasonable and unfair. Here, the trial court’s explicit refusal to draw that conclusion is supported by the record and by adequate findings and should be affirmed.
While I share the majority’s disagreement “with the trial court’s determination that appellant’s job search was deficient or unsatisfactory,” that disagreement should not require a remand. The trial court also rested its conclusion that the current support order was neither unreasonable nor unfair on consideration of “[appellant’s] overall financial situation.” I submit that the trial court acted within its broad discretion in considering appellant’s overall financial situation at the evidentiary hearing ending in March, 1989.
Appellant lost his job in February, 1987, but received compensation and benefits of approximately $238,000 throughout the remainder of that year. Further, when his severance pay was extended through March, 1988, he received an additional $29,-000. Appellant was current in his child support as of March, 1988. In 1987, with knowledge of his unemployment status, appellant made tax shelter payments of $33,-000 and repaid premarital debts of his second wife of $46,000. He unilaterally reduced his child support payments from the stipulated $2,000 per month to $500 per month in April, 1988, and to $200 per month in May, 1988. In June, 1988, he received his $45,000 share of the sale of a home of his current marriage. He and his current wife live with her parents and pay a nominal $100 per month to them. The trial court’s finding of fact in regard to appellant’s financial activities contains the following:
In March of 1988, the last month for which he paid child support in the amount ordered, [appellant] paid $15,780 into [a tax shelter]. In October 1988, [appellant] paid $16,000 into [another tax shelter]. He also contributed an additional $7,000 to a limited charge account. It is clear that [appellant] has used assets from his first marriage for joint expenses of his new family unit * * * when those funds could have been used to pay his child support obligation. [Ap- , pellant] claims his use of these funds was pursuant to agreement with his current wife and that her parents would supply room and board but there is no written agreement concerning such a distribution.
[Appellant’s] obligation to support his children’s needs is primary. The fact that [appellant] has chosen to use his resources to invest in tax shelters that cost $2,666 per month rather than investing in interest-producing accounts, to pay premarital debts of his current wife and to make other expenditures that enable him to enjoy a comfortable standard of living, is not an appropriate basis for finding that a reduction in child support is required.
The trial court’s conclusion that despite appellant's substantial change in circumstances the terms of the current stipulated support order were not unreasonable and unfair has adequate support in the record and should be affirmed.
II.
I would also affirm the trial court’s determination regarding an award of support arrearages. Minn.Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 provides:
a modification of support * * * may be made retroactive only with respect to any period during which the petitioning party has pending a motion for modification.
A fair reading of this section indicates that even if a trial court grants a motion to modify support prospectively, it has discretion regarding whether to forgive accrued arrears (which forgiveness would be tantamount to a retroactive modification) or to award judgment for the entire past-due amount. If in this case the trial court’s refusal to prospectively modify support is within its discretion, and I believe it is, it *527follows that its refusal to retroactively modify support is also within its discretion.