Court Opinion

ID: 9585448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:00:35.669353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:47:10.049342
License: Public Domain

Fox, President,
dissenting:
I cannot concur in the majority opinion in this case, and, therefore, file this dissent. Said opinion contains a fair statement of the known facts surrounding the death of *433Harry Morris, claimant’s decedent, and I shall devote no time to discussing those facts, but will present my disagreement with the reasoning on which that opinion is based. One thing seems to be admitted by everyone, and that is that the cause of the death of Harry Morris has not been, and will probably never be determined. The majority opinion is based entirely upon simple conjecture as to what caused his death, and, as I view the case, every inference that he might have died through natural causes is rejected, leaving nothing except mere conjecture, upon which an inference is based, that he died from an electric shock while engaged in his employment. Men die suddenly from natural causes, and without any previous indication of physical ailments of any kind, and without any • revealment of the cause of death. It is just as probable that Harry Morris died of some physical ailment, not connected with his employment, as it is that he died from electrocution while engaged in his employment, in which event, of course, his widow would be entitled to compensation.
The evidence shows that Harry Morris was not feeling well on the day of his death, and vomit was found near his body after he was dead. What this indicates, I do not know; nor do the experts who had an opportunity to study the case reach any conclusion on that point. Electricity is employed in all large coal mines, and, of course, electrical current was present in the mine in which Morris died. It is just as probable that he died a natural death, as it is that he was electrocuted. Notwithstanding the liberality indulged in all compensation cases in favor of claimants, as it should be, the claimant bears the burden of proof and must establish the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. No rule of liberality should lead us to depart from the fundamental principle of law that he who asserts a claim has the burden of establishing it. The majority opinion states that the theory upon which the employer would resist an award of compensation, on the ground that death probably resulted from natural causes, is based upon unsupported conjecture. Let us admit this. On the other hand, the claim that his death resulted from *434electrocution is also based on unsupported conjecture. Why discard one conjecture, and fully and completely accept the other? In that connection, says the majority opinion, “There is nothing in the record of this case to indicate that Morris was suffering from ill health either before or on the day of his death.”, then explaining that while it was true that the decedent’s son stated that his faher said on the morning before his death that he would rather stay at home than go to work. This remark, called casual, is entirely ignored. The fact that vomit was found near him after he died did not register with the writer of the majority opinion. But, in this connection, it is stated that the sole abnormal finding in the report of autopsy is an edema of the brain, which a pathologist found was a terminal event, but not the cause of his death.
An able pathologist performed a complete autopsy on the body of the decedent. He reported that he found no pathological symptoms or indications of electrocution, but testified that death could have resulted from electrocution, without such evidence being present after death. The opinion then states: “The foregoing facts in our opinion warrant an inference that death was probably due to electrocution.” The mere fact that that death could have resulted from electrocution, a mere conjecture, is held to warrant an inference that death resulted from electrocution. Can this be the law?
Now in the first place, a finding based upon a mere probability is not usually upheld by the courts. In criminal cases, in particular, juries are often told that no degree of probability of guilt will suffice to convict a defendant. Of course, rules of evidence, with respect to criminal charges, are more favorable to a defendant than in law actions or in proceedings such as a claim for compensation. But even in a civil case, probability is not permitted to support a verdict unless there is some showing in the case that practically eliminates any other conclusion. To create an inference, itself based on conjecture and speculation, and base a finding of electrocution on the tes*435timony of a competent pathologist that he could find no pathological charge or external mark indicating electrocution, although at the same time he testified that death could have resulted from an electric shock, simply carries things too far, and such a rule of evidence has never been applied in any court that I know of.
To show the extent to which the Court has gone to make' this award of compensation, the same pathologist stated that in ninety-three cases out of one hundred, where death resulted from electrocution, some showing of that fact would appear externally upon the body of the deceased. This would certainly create an inference that Harry Morris died from some cause other than electrocution; and yet the seven chances that he might have died from electrocution are used as a basis for an inference that he did so die; and the ninety-three chances that he died from some other cause are ignored. This is carrying conjecture too far, even if it were permitted at all; and, of course, any lawyer knows that a court of law cannot reach conclusions in favor of either party based on mere conjecture.
The majority opinion is in direct conflict with the case of Williams v. Comp. Com’r., 127 W. Va. 78, 31 S. E. 2d 546. That case is ignored, discarded as inapplicable for no reason that I can see. As correctly stated in the majority opinion, it was well established that the death involved in that case was due to either heat prostration or to a heart attack. The doctors could not agree as to what caused death. One of them thought death was caused by heat exposure, but admitted that it might have been caused by a heart attack; and the other admitted that it could have been caused by a heart attack, but in his opinion heat prostration was the cause of death,- in which event claimant’s widow would have been entitled to compensation. This Court held that the claim had not been established. In principle, I can see no distinction whatever between that case and the case at bar. The majority opinion is attempted to be sustained by reference to the case of Pannell v. Comp. Com’r., 126 W. Va. 725, 30 S. E. 2d 129. That *436was a case where the claimant’s decedent suffered from high blood pressure. He was working in a mine and broke through into an abandoned section of the mine. This Court assumed that the air from that abandoned section of the mine was impure and dangerous, and that the sudden death of claimant’s decedent was caused by coming in contact with that dangerous air. That case was criticized as being too liberal. However, it does not support the present claimant, because there was a specific isolated event which, in all reasonable probability, had caused death and made that death compensable. Here there is nothing of that character. There was no specific event from which anyone -could reasonably draw the conclusion that claimant’s decedent came in contact with electricity and thereby lost his life. All we can say is that he might have done so.
I agree with everything that has been said in the argument of this case, and in- the majority opinion, that in compensation cases the law should be interpreted with great liberality in favor of claimants. The statute itself is a humanitarian one, and the result of the State’s act in trespassing on private rights to the extent of imposing liability on employers for compensation for death or injury without wrong on their part, and on the other hand curtailing the rights of injured persons, and their wives and children in case of death, from instituting actions of law against employers for injuries or death. The Legislature in taking this marked and humanitarian step, to provide against, so far as possible, fatalities which grow out of our industrial age, must have contemplated that the laws it enacted should be liberally construed and liberally applied in favor of the employee; but I cannot concur in an opinion which, in my judgment, departs from fundamental and well settled principles of law, as applied to the evidence necessary to establish a claim for compensation. Whenever we depart from those principles, and apply the law to one group of people in one way, and apply the same law to another group of people in a different way, we are simply leading the way to judicial an*437archy, and, if that practice be followed, cases will be decided according to the personal inclination of the court hearing them regardless of the character or weight of the evidence. I think no one gains from any departure from old and well settled principles. I do not think that this or any other court in the land would, in a civil case between two litigants engaged in private enterprise, and on mere conjecture, and in a situation kindred to the one presented in this case, permit a recovery. All courts in dealing with compensation want to grant compensation. But we should not set up special rules, and violate fundamental rules of law and evidence to do so. .
There is another rule of law which is plainly violated by the majority opinion, and that is that this Court will not reverse the Compensation Appeal Board unless it believes them to be plainly wrong. Scores of cases decided by this Court state this as a plain principle that should govern our decisions in this class of cases. In a case where no one knows what has happened, but where some decision is necessary, there can be no basis for an opinion which overrules the fact finding body. There is nothing here that plainly shows that the Appeal Board was wrong. In such a case, it must follow that a claimant who failed to meet the test by failing to substantiate his claim by evidence, or circumstances that may be properly taken into consideration, the claimant simply loses his case. He is not entitled to win because the personal inclination on the part of the courts is to be liberal towards people who come within the compensation laws of the State. No doubt this allowance to this widow will take care of her, in a measure, for the remainder of her life, and it is but natural that courts should have an inclination to make awards without too strict regard to law. All this may be highly commendable from the emotionable viewpoint, but the courts sit to administer justice according to the law which has been set up for the settlement of disputes. There should be no departure from the rules of law which requires that he who presents his case must establish it by a preponderance of the evidence and circumstances.
*438I do not think what has been presented in this case affords any grounds whatever for any inference that claimant’s decedent died from electrocution or from natural causes; we simply do not know what caused his death; and when in this situation the Court goes out of its way to overrule the decision of the Appeal Board upon an inference based upon conjecture and allows the claim, it has, in my opinion, committed grave error affecting fundamental principles of law and justice.
I am authorized to state that Judge Haymond joins in the views herein expressed.