Court Opinion

ID: 9911603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 16:01:30.03955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:04.747513
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12574    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 12/20/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12574
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       JEFREY ROSARIO,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00226-MW-MAF
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12574         Document: 31-1         Date Filed: 12/20/2023          Page: 2 of 8

       2                          Opinion of the Court                        22-12574

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Jefrey Rosario challenges the district court’s denial of his
       counseled 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The district court granted a
       certificate of appealability (COA) on one issue: “whether Petitioner
       was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance in failing to ob-
       ject to the state trial court’s erroneous ‘unlawful activity’ instruc-
       tion.” Rosario asserts his trial counsel performed deficiently by fail-
       ing to object to the state trial court’s instruction requiring him to
       retreat before using deadly force if he was engaged in unlawful ac-
       tivity and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him be-
       cause it negated his sole defense theory of self-defense. The State
       responds the instruction did not result in prejudice because the ev-
       idence at trial established Rosario was acting in retaliation, not de-
       fending himself, and the instruction was not the focus of the attor-
       neys’ arguments. After review, 1 we affirm.
                                   I. BACKGROUND
              Rosario is a Florida prisoner who is serving a 40-year sen-
       tence for two counts of attempted second-degree murder. At trial,
       Rosario’s defense attorneys argued Luis Torres-Gutierrez was
       robbed after Rosario drove him to deliver drugs and there would

       1 We review a district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition de novo. Bester v. War-

       den, 836 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016). The district court’s determination
       the state-court decision was reasonable is reviewed de novo. LeCroy v. Sec’y,
       Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005).
USCA11 Case: 22-12574        Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 3 of 8

       22-12574                 Opinion of the Court                        3

       not be a dispute that it was Torres-Gutierrez’s drug deal. Rosario
       thought someone would get hurt when Levar Morant punched
       Torres-Gutierrez and snatched marijuana from Torres-Gutierrez,
       so Rosario grabbed a gun from Torres-Gutierrez and started shoot-
       ing at Morant and Steven Key. Counsel contended Rosario was
       justified in shooting. In instructing the jury on the justifiable use
       of deadly force, the trial court included language stating, “[i]f the
       defendant was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was at-
       tacked in any place where he had the right to be, he had no duty to
       retreat and had the right to stand his ground and meet force with
       force, including deadly force.” The jury convicted Rosario on two
       counts of attempted second-degree murder.
                At the time of Rosario’s oﬀense conduct, Florida law pro-
       vided:
                [A] person is justiﬁed in the use of deadly force and
                does not have a duty to retreat if . . . [he] reasonably
                believes that such force is necessary to prevent immi-
                nent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself
                or another or to prevent the imminent commission of
                a forcible felony[.]
       Fla. Stat. § 776.012(1) (eﬀective Oct. 1, 2005, to June 19, 2014).
       However, in June 2014, Florida amended § 776.012 to provide that
       a person is justiﬁed in using deadly force and does not have a duty
       to retreat if, among other things, he is not engaged in criminal ac-
       tivity. See Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2) (eﬀective June 20, 2014).
             In a state postconviction motion under Florida Rule 3.850.
       Rosario first brought a claim that his trial counsel performed
USCA11 Case: 22-12574      Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 4 of 8

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12574

       ineffectively by failing to object to the jury instruction stating he
       could not stand his ground if he was engaged in unlawful activity,
       which negated his sole defense theory of self-defense. Rosario con-
       tended the “unlawful activity” instruction given did not apply to
       his conduct in 2011 because the amendment including the “unlaw-
       ful activity” language became effective in 2014, so the state trial
       court committed fundamental error when it read a jury instruction
       including that language. He argued his sole defense was self-de-
       fense, but there was evidence he was engaged in a drug deal, so the
       “unlawful activity” instruction deprived him of his sole defense.
       The state trial court denied relief after conducting an evidentiary
       hearing. The state trial court determined any potential error to be
       harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the overwhelming
       evidence in the case. The Florida First District Court of Appeal
       then per curiam affirmed without opinion.
               Rosario filed a counseled 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. As rele-
       vant to this appeal, Rosario’s third ground alleged his trial counsel
       performed ineffectively by failing to object to the jury instruction
       stating he could not stand his ground if he was engaged in unlawful
       activity, which negated his sole defense theory of self-defense. In
       recommending the district court deny Rosario’s § 2254 petition,
       the magistrate judge concluded Rosario was not prejudiced by his
       trial attorneys’ failure to object to the jury instruction. The magis-
       trate judge concluded the first prong of an ineffective assistance of
       counsel claim was satisfied, but the deficient performance did not
       result in prejudice because Rosario was not deprived of a self-de-
       fense claim. The magistrate judge noted the trial court provided
USCA11 Case: 22-12574      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 5 of 8

       22-12574               Opinion of the Court                          5

       four other instructions related to self-defense and the evidence at
       trial suggested the shooting was retaliatory and not in self-defense
       because Rosario used the gun after the snatching, from fifty feet
       away, and while the victims were running away. The magistrate
       judge concluded the state court did not unreasonably apply Strick-
       land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or make an unreasonable
       determination of the facts.
              The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s report and
       recommendation and denied Rosario’s § 2254 petition, but granted
       a COA on “whether Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s defi-
       cient performance in failing to object to the state trial court’s erro-
       neous ‘unlawful activity’ instruction.”
                                II. DISCUSSION
                The Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
       provides that, after a state court has adjudicated a claim on the mer-
       its, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s
       decision was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
       tion of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Su-
       preme Court of the United States, or (2) based on an unreasonable
       determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the
       state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). AEDPA imposes a “highly
       deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands
       that state-court decisions be given the beneﬁt of the doubt.” Renico
       v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omit-
       ted). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit pre-
       cludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could
USCA11 Case: 22-12574        Document: 31-1         Date Filed: 12/20/2023        Page: 6 of 8

       6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-12574

       disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harring-
       ton v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quotation marks omitted).
               The Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants the right
       to eﬀective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amend. VI. To es-
       tablish ineﬀective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show
       that (1) his attorney’s performance was deﬁcient, and (2) the deﬁ-
       cient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
       687. Failure to establish either prong of the test is fatal and makes
       it unnecessary for us to consider the other. See id. at 697. Prejudice
       occurs when there is a “reasonable probability that, but for coun-
       sel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
       been diﬀerent.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability
       suﬃcient to undermine conﬁdence in the outcome.” Id. A peti-
       tioner must establish “that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
       deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
       Id. at 687. A court must consider the totality of the evidence before
       the jury. Id. at 695.
              The district court did not err in denying relief because Ro-
       sario has not established prejudice. 2 Rosario asserts the state courts
       unreasonably applied Strickland when assessing prejudice, and alt-
       hough he cites several Florida cases, those cases are inapplicable

       2 We do not address Rosario’s arguments regarding his trial counsel’s deficient

       performance because the COA does not address this prong of the analysis and
       the district court found there was deficient performance. See Hodges v. Att’y
       Gen., State of Fla., 506 F.3d 1337, 1340-42 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining in the
       context of an unsuccessful § 2254 petition, the scope of our review is limited
       to the issues specified in the COA).
USCA11 Case: 22-12574      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 7 of 8

       22-12574               Opinion of the Court                          7

       when deciding whether the state court unreasonably applied
       clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Applying the
       Strickland standard alongside § 2254(d) deference, it is not clear that
       every fairminded jurist would conclude that prejudice was estab-
       lished. See Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d 1335,
       1351 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining when applying § 2254(d) deference
       to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, the question is
       “whether every fairminded jurist would conclude that prejudice
       has been established”).
               Considering the totality of the evidence, every fairminded
       jurist would not conclude there is a reasonable probability that but
       for defense counsel’s error in failing to object to the “unlawful ac-
       tivity” jury instruction, the jury would have found Rosario was jus-
       tiﬁed in using self-defense. See id.; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
       There was evidence presented at trial that Rosario was present
       while Torres-Gutierrez was engaged in a drug deal and was thus
       engaged in unlawful activity, but the court granted a judgment of
       acquittal on Rosario’s possession with intent to sell charge. While
       there was evidence of a robbery between Torres-Gutierrez and
       Morant with Torres-Gutierrez telling Rosario, “they got me,” there
       was also evidence Rosario shot at Morant and Key while they were
       running away over 50 feet from him, suggesting he was not in fear
       of imminent death, great bodily harm, or being robbed. The law-
       yers’ closing arguments did not highlight the “unlawful activity”
       instruction. The defense relied heavily on self-defense, but defense
       counsel only mentioned the “unlawful activity” instruction to say
       the court took care of that count, so the jury did not need to worry
USCA11 Case: 22-12574      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 8 of 8

       8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12574

       about that instruction. And although the State mentioned the drug
       deal, it did not argue that Rosario could not defend himself or was
       required to retreat because he was part of an unlawful activity, but
       argued there was not an imminent threat because the victims were
       running away.
               Every fairminded jurist would not necessarily conclude that
       prejudice was established given the other evidence suggesting Ro-
       sario was not in fear of imminent death, great bodily harm, or rob-
       bery. Meders, 911 F.3d at 1351. Therefore, fairminded jurists could
       disagree about the correctness of the state trial court’s decision that
       the jury instruction did not result in prejudice, and the conclusion
       was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
       law under Strickland. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101; 28 U.S.C.
       § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, we aﬃrm.
               AFFIRMED.