Court Opinion

ID: 9629640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:46:20.601806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:21.818370
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I dissent.
The majority purport to hold—without confronting the issue—that an order imposing sanctions on an attorney for misconduct resulting in mistrial of an action in which he appears only in a representative capacity, is an appealable order in that action.
In support of such proposition the majority state the rule that a final. order on a collateral matter directing payment of money is appealable, citing Wisniewski v. Clary (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 499 [120 Cal.Rptr. 176], (Ante, p. 634, fn. 3.) However, Wisniewski stands only for the proposition that such an order is appealable by an aggrieved party to the action. The issue here is not whether the order is appealable but whether the attorney has standing to take the appeal in his individual capacity. An appeal may be taken only by a “party” to an action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902.) Bach is not a party—he is not a designated party and no proper order has been made bringing him into the action. Bach simply cannot assert an appeal in this case. (See Rogers v. Transamerica Corp. (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 340 [44 P.2d 635]; Butchart v. Moorhead (1929) 101 Cal.App. 659 [282 P. 23] [a party dismissed from an action cannot appeal]; Shearer v. United California Theatres (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 720 [284 P.2d 934] [a party to an action not named in a cross-action cannot appeal from an order affecting only the cross-action].)1 Bach’s proper remedy is application for either writ of review (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068) or writ of prohibition to circumvent the imposition of sanctions claimed to be applied in excess of jurisdiction (Lund v. Superior Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 698, 709-710 [39 Cal.Rptr. 891, 394 P.2d 707]). The appeal, accordingly, should be dismissed.2
*641Even if Bach may appeal from the order imposing sanctions, the majority further err in concluding the trial court lacks authority to impose such sanctions against Bach. Essential to such determination is a fuller exposure of material facts attending the circumstances preceding Bach’s misconduct.
Exhibit 7 consists of a highway patrolman’s sketch offered into evidence by Bach in behalf of the plaintiff. Bach advised the court he had made copies of the exhibit for the individual jurors, and certainly we can assume his familiarity with the exhibit. Thereafter the court urged the jurors to make confidential notes on their copies of the sketch during testimony of the patrolman. The court observed that the jurors had done so not only during the patrolman’s testimony but also during reading of the deposition of an unavailable witness. Thereupon the court admonished in clear and unambiguous language as to the confidentiality of the notes; “. . . these are your personal notes and they are not to be shared with anyone until the case is finally submitted to you . . . but until such time they’re your own personal notes, not to be shown to any of your fellow jurors, your spouse or your neighbors, anybody. . . . [K]eep in mind you are to keep your own counsel and you are not to share them with anyone.” This admonition was made in open court in Bach’s presence.
It is clear Bach did not casually examine exhibit 7 for the purpose of ascertaining information contained in a duly received exhibit. After proceedings had been recessed he obtained exhibits 7 and 7A through 7M from the clerk, sat in the courtroom examining all exhibits, observing the confidential notes of individual jurors for the purpose of obtaining information which might give him a competitive advantage. In fact he later argued to the court he had a right to examine the jurors’ notes appearing on exhibits 7A through 7M notwithstanding direction to the contrary.3 In view of the court’s admonition as to the confidentiality of the notes, delivered that same day in Bach’s presence, Bach’s misconduct cannot be disputed. His claim he merely exercised a right to examine an exhibit is refuted by his own admission that his purpose was to gain intelligence from the jurors’ notes. I am distressed that the majority appear to condone both Bach’s astonishing imposition upon the orderly *642procedures of the court and the disingenuous explanation to which he continues to adhere.
I am unable to discern the precise ground upon which the majority conclude the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in these circumstances. They suggest that Bach is innocent of any misconduct (ante, p. 636, fn. 6) and was in no way restrained from examining the jurors’ notes because the admonitions of confidentiality had not been directed specifically to him (id). If that is the ground for the majority opinion, then the majority fail to recognize Bach’s stated and obvious motivations.
Most of the majority’s following discussion concerning the award of attorney fees is irrelevant to the issue presented—clearly this is not a case involving an award of attorney fees in the traditional sense. What is at issue is the inherent authority of a trial court to supervise and control proceedings by exercising reasonable restraints on counsel practicing before it. The majority conclude that because a court can hold an attorney in contempt there is no need for further controls—thus voiding the lesser power to impose sanctions.
“[Ejvery court of record has powers requisite to its proper functioning as an independent constitutional department of government . . . .” (Bloniarz v. Roloson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 143, 147-148 [74 Cal.Rptr. 285, 449 P.2d 221]; see also Mowrer v. Superior Court (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 223, 230 [83 Cal.Rptr. 125].) The exercise of this inherent power is limited only by sound discretion. (See Bailey v. Fosca Oil Co. (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 813, 818 [4 Cal.Rptr. 474].) Contempt is not the only tool at the court’s disposal. A court may adopt “any suitable process or mode of proceeding . . . which may appear most conformable to the spirit of” the Code of Civil Procedure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 187; Kent v. Superior Court (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 593, 595 [235 P.2d 420].) While there is no legislative authorization for the sanctions imposed in the instant case, the Legislature has enacted provisions. requiring a defaulting attorney to pay attorney fees of an opposing party when such attorney disrupts the judicial process by failing or refusing to comply with discovery orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016 et seq.) In view of such legislation it cannot be said the imposition of almost identical sanctions under the court’s inherent powers contravenes any legislative policy or that a court is restricted to its contempt powers in supervising proceedings before it.
In an analogous situation, wherein the court noted there was no legislative authorization for imposition of a sanction—including an order requiring an attorney for one party to pay attorney fees for an opposing *643party—when the first party refused to comply with particular discovery orders, the court held: “Every court has power ‘to compel obedience to its judgments, orders and process’ in an action or proceeding pending before it, and to use all necessary means to carry its jurisdiction into effect, even if those means are not specifically pointed out in the code.” (Fairfield v. Superior Court (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 113, 120 [54 Cal.Rptr. 721].)
In another case in which sanctions requiring payment of money to an opposing party were upheld, the court stated: “Every court has the inherent power to regulate the proceedings of matters before it and to effect an orderly disposition of the issues presented. [Citations.] Sanctions are expressly provided for in some situations [citations] but sanctions have also been approved in situations which are not expressly covered by statute or court rules. . . . [¶] . . . Although no direct order of the trial court was disobeyed, the facts support the view that the time of both the court and of opposing counsel was wasted. [¶] The exercise of the court’s inherent power to provide for the orderly conduct of the court’s business is a matter vested in the sound legal discretion of the trial court. Such a decision is subject to reversal only where there has been an abuse of that discretion.” (Santandrea v. Siltec Corp. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 525, 529-530 [128 Cal.Rptr. 629].)
Certainly it cannot be argued the court in the instant case abused its discretion by imposing a sanction in the amount of modest attorney fees for the two days of trial. The court could well consider that a penalty imposed for contempt would not compensate the damaged party for the expense of two wasted days. For that reason there is no abuse when the court elects to exercise its inherent power to impose sanctions rather than fix a penalty for Bach’s contempt. The only reported cases support the trial court’s action—the majority referring to no case in point supporting their judgment to ignore or disapprove existing authorities.4
The order imposing sanctions not being appealable, the appeal should be dismissed.

Although the circumstances of this case are novel, they are not unlike those in a discovery situation when sanctions, are imposed against an attorney who refuses or otherwise fails to comply with a discovery order. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.) An appeal does not lie from an order made for the purpose of furthering discovery or granting sanctions for refusal to make discovery. (See Lund v. Superior Court, supra, 61 Cal.2d 698, 709; Friedberg v. Friedberg (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 754, 764 [88 Cal.Rptr. 451].)

It may be noted dismissal of the appeal herein is not required merely because Bach seeks to appeal from an order the majority hold to be void. It can no longer be argued that because a trial court lacks jurisdiction to make a particular order a reviewing court *641lacks appellate jurisdiction to judge the validity of the order. (See Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363 [217 P.2d 951].)

In stating his position to the court, Bach said: “I do not think the court could have precluded me from looking at these notes in view of the state of this record.”

The majority rely on Young v. Redman (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 827 [128 Cal.Rptr. 86], for the proposition that a trial court should impose only those sanctions authorized by the Legislature. However, the holding in that case is that the court abused its discretion in imposing the particular sanctions. (Id., at p. 839.)