Court Opinion

ID: 9952804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 19:06:25.617676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:37.533163
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 231537-U
                                                                                  THIRD DIVISION
                                                                                  March 20, 2024
                                             No. 1-23-1537

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

                                                    ) Appeal from the
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                ) Circuit Court of
                                                    ) Cook County
     Plaintiff-Appellant,                           )
                                                    ) Nos. YK251577, YK251578,
v.                                                  ) YK251579, YK254360,
                                                    ) YK254361, and YK254362
ROBERT MOORE,                                       )
                                                    ) Honorable
     Defendant-Appellee.                            ) Kathaleen Lanahan,
                                                    ) Judge Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________

        PRESIDING JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.
        Justices Lampkin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1      Held: Reversing a circuit court order which barred the State from presenting evidence
        regarding defendant’s breath test results.

¶2      Defendant Robert Moore was arrested and charged with driving while under the influence

of alcohol (DUI) and other offenses. Following the State’s failure to produce certification

materials relating to the breathalyzer machine (the certification materials)1 in response to

        1
         Breathalyzer machines and other approved evidentiary instruments are required to be
periodically checked for accuracy. E.g., 20 Ill. Admin. Code. 1286.230 (2019). Also, the instrument
operator must be certified, and the methods of administering the tests are regulated by law. E.g., 625
1-23-1537

defendant’s discovery requests, the circuit court of Cook County granted his motion for sanctions

and barred the admission of “breath evidence” pursuant to section 11-501(a)(1) of the Illinois

Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2022)). After receiving and forwarding the

certification materials, the State filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied.

On appeal, the State contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in continuing to sanction

the State. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the order barring the State from

presenting “breath evidence” under section 11-501(a)(1) and remand for further proceedings.

¶3                                        BACKGROUND

¶4      In the early morning hours of June 22, 2022, defendant was arrested by the Oak Lawn

Police Department. Defendant was administered a breathalyzer test at the police station, and he

was charged with multiple offenses, including DUI under section 11-501(a)(1) (driving with a

blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or more) and section 11-501(a)(2) (driving while

“under the influence of alcohol”) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), 11-501(a)(2) (West 2022)).

¶5      The State has represented that on the initial court date of July 8, 2022, it sent a subpoena

duces tecum to the Oak Lawn Police Department, demanding a copy of all evidence relating to

defendant’s arrest. On July 22, 2022, the State provided defense counsel with various documents

and recordings, including a sworn report from law enforcement, a traffic accident report,

tow reports, breath tickets, squad recordings, and photographs.

¶6      After defense counsel indicated that there was outstanding discovery regarding the

certification materials, the State repeatedly requested all arrest-related evidence from the police

department. According to the State, the Oak Lawn Police Records Department responded on

ILCS 5/11-501.2 (West 2022). Upon the request of an individual who submitted to a chemical test at the
request of a law enforcement officer, “full information concerning the test” shall be made available to the
individual or their attorney. Id. § 11-501.2(a).
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December 13, 2022, that the department had submitted all requested materials on July 18, 2022.

¶7     In January 2023, defendant filed a motion for discovery sanctions, requesting that the

circuit court bar the admission of his breath test result as evidence. During the hearing on the

sanctions motion on April 13, 2023, the State represented that the certification materials existed

but had not yet been produced. While acknowledging that the currently-assigned assistant

State’s attorney (ASA) had been “working diligently,” the circuit court expressed frustration

regarding the delay. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion and imposed sanctions against

the State, i.e., the circuit court stated that “(a)(1) breath evidence will not be allowed” – relating

to the charge of a BAC of 0.08 or more – but “[y]ou have the (a)(2) to go on” – relating to the

charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol.

¶8     At the time of the hearing on April 13, 2023, the State was unaware that the certification

materials had, in fact, already been delivered to its office. The certification materials were

tendered to defense counsel shortly thereafter. On May 11, 2023, the State filed a motion to

reconsider the grant of discovery sanctions. The State argued that: (a) the need for sanctions no

longer existed since the discovery had been tendered; (b) the sanction was “extreme and

tantamount to dismissal of the pertinent charge and frustrates the truth-seeking process”;

(c) defendant was not prejudiced; and (d) there was no evidence of bad faith by the State.

¶9     During a hearing on the reconsideration motion on August 8, 2023, the circuit court again

acknowledged the current ASA’s diligence but opined that her predecessors and the Oak Lawn

Police Department were not diligent. After characterizing the 10-month period to obtain the

certification materials as a violation of defendant’s due process rights, the circuit court stated that

defendant was “put in a precarious situation” of potentially demanding trial prior to having all

discovery and then having the State answer ready for trial. The circuit court denied the motion to

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reconsider.

¶ 10   The State timely filed a notice of appeal and a certificate of substantial impairment

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017), which allows the State to

appeal in a criminal case where the circuit court’s decision results in suppressing evidence which

substantially impairs the State’s ability to prosecute the case.

¶ 11                                         ANALYSIS

¶ 12   The State argues on appeal that the circuit court abused its discretion in continuing to

sanction the State for noncompliance with defendant’s discovery request after the certification

materials were tendered. Defendant contends that the circuit court properly imposed a

“narrowly tailored” sanction after the State took 10 months to provide the certification materials.

¶ 13   As an initial matter, we observe that defendant’s reliance on Illinois Supreme Court Rule

415 is misplaced. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 415 (eff. Oct. 23, 2020). Defendant correctly states that Rule

415(g) expressly authorizes the circuit court to impose sanctions for failing to comply with a

discovery rule or order, including the exclusion of evidence. Ill. S. Ct. R. 415(g)(1). We note,

however, that Illinois Supreme Court Rules 411 through 417 – which provide for discovery in

criminal cases – only apply in cases wherein the accused is charged with a felony. Ill. S. Ct. R.

411 (eff. Dec. 9, 2011). See People v. Strobel, 2014 IL App (1st) 130300, ¶ 8; People v.

Menssen, 263 Ill. App. 3d 946, 950 (1994).

¶ 14    The Illinois Supreme Court has provided for limited discovery in misdemeanor cases,

such as this case. See Strobel, 2014 IL App (1st) 130300, ¶ 8. Among other things, the State

must furnish the defendant with a list of witnesses, any evidence negating the defendant’s guilt,

any confession by the defendant, the results of any breathalyzer test, and any relevant

videorecording made by a dashcam of the events leading to the defendant’s arrest. Id.

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(discussing People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill. 2d 572, 575 (1974), and People v. Kladis, 2011 IL 110920,

¶¶ 26-29). Although our supreme court rules do not provide a basis for discovery sanctions in a

misdemeanor case, the circuit court has the inherent authority to enforce its orders (Menssen, 263

Ill. App. 3d at 950) and to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial (People v. Stuckey, 78 Ill.

App. 3d 1085, 1090 (1979)).

¶ 15    The proper sanction to be applied for a discovery violation is a decision appropriately left

to the discretion of the circuit court. Kladis, 2011 IL 110920, ¶ 42. See also People v. Camp,

352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 262 (2004) (noting that the circuit court has “broad discretion to impose

sanctions that are proportionate to the magnitude of the discovery violation”). We thus review a

circuit court’s decision regarding sanctions for a discovery violation under an abuse of discretion

standard of review. Strobel, 2014 IL App (1st) 130300, ¶ 7. “The trial court abuses its discretion

where its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or no reasonable person would take the

view adopted by the trial court.” People v. Moravec, 2015 IL App (1st) 133869, ¶ 18. Although

the circuit court’s judgment is given great weight, reversible error may occur where the circuit

court abuses that discretion. People v. Hawkins, 235 Ill. App. 3d 39, 42 (1992).

¶ 16    In this case, a 10-month period preceded the State’s eventual full compliance with

defendant’s discovery requests. Regardless of whether the State or the police department was

the exact source of the delay, “it is the duty of the State to see that there is a proper flow of

information between the various branches and personnel of its law enforcement agencies and its

legal officers.” Id. We recognize how the apparent deficiencies in the discovery process in this

case may have frustrated the circuit court’s efforts to efficiently manage its docket. People v.

Rubino, 305 Ill. App. 3d 85, 89 (1999). Nevertheless, we find that the circuit court’s denial of

the motion for reconsideration – after the certification materials were provided to the defense –

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appears unreasonable under the circumstances herein.

¶ 17   The goals of discovery are to eliminate unfairness and surprise and to afford an

opportunity to investigate. Strobel, 2014 IL App (1st) 130300, ¶ 9. See also In re H.C., 2023 IL

App (1st) 220881, ¶ 124 (noting that the “purpose of pretrial discovery is to promote fair,

efficient, and expeditious proceedings leading to the truth, as opposed to a trial that is nothing

more than a battle of wits”). “Discovery sanctions are not designed to punish and should be used

to further these goals and to compel compliance.” Strobel, 2014 IL App (1st) 130300, ¶ 9.

¶ 18   Illinois courts have recognized that “harsh sanctions, such as the exclusion of evidence,

may be warranted where the defendant is denied a full opportunity to prepare his defense and

make tactical decisions with the aid of the information that was withheld.” Id. As it does not

further the goal of truth seeking, however, the exclusion of evidence generally is not a preferred

sanction. Id.; Menssen, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 950; Stuckey, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 1090. “Such a severe

sanction is appropriate only where it is necessary to cure any prejudice caused by the discovery

violation, or where the offending party’s violation is determined to be willful and blatant.”

People v. Schlott, 2015 IL App (3d) 130725, ¶ 25. See also People v. Anderson, 80 Ill. App. 3d

1018, 1020 (1980) (stating that the exclusion of evidence as a sanction for noncompliance with

discovery in a misdemeanor case “is such a drastic sanction that it should be applied only where

there is a flagrant or willful disregard of the court’s authority”). This court has referred to the

exclusion of evidence as an appropriate sanction “only in the most extreme situations” (Strobel,

2014 IL App (1st) 130300, ¶ 9) and as a “last resort” (Rubino, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 88).

¶ 19     In this case, defendant was not in custody during the discovery delay. Id. (noting that

the “State correctly argued that defendants would not be prejudiced because they had not been in

custody during the period of noncompliance”). See also People v. Dewey, 2023 IL App (3d)

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220285-U, ¶ 29. But cf. People v. Leon, 306 Ill. App. 3d 707, 711 (1999) (affirming the trial

court’s sanction for a violation of a discovery rule; noting that the “record indicates that

defendant had been held in jail on a very high bond for 116 days at the time of the hearing”).

Although the circuit court speculated regarding the potential impact of the State’s failure to

provide complete discovery responses if defendant had answered “ready” for trial, we observe

that this case had not actually been set for trial at the time the missing certification materials

were provided. As this court has routinely held, the “exclusion of evidence is less appropriate

where the party discloses the material before rather than during the trial.” Rubino, 305 Ill. App.

3d at 89. Given that the missing certification materials were provided, we see no impediment to

defendant’s ability to fully prepare for trial. E.g., Schlott, 2015 IL App (3d) 130725, ¶ 26

(stating that the defendant has the burden of demonstrating surprise or prejudice resulting from a

discovery violation); Hawkins, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 42-43 (reversing the imposition of the sanction

of exclusion of evidence where the defendant’s trial had not yet commenced, and he would have

the opportunity to prepare his defense with the benefit of the supplemental materials).

¶ 20   We further observe that the circuit court’s ruling – banning the introduction of “breath

evidence” – effectively precludes the State from prosecuting the DUI charge against defendant

under section 11-501(a)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (driving with a BAC of 0.08 or higher).

625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2022). While we recognize that the State could prosecute

defendant for DUI solely under section 11-501(a)(2) (driving while “under the influence of

alcohol”) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2022)), the practical impact of the circuit court’s

discovery ruling is essentially the dismissal of a charge. Such sanction appears neither narrowly

tailored (Kladis, 2011 IL 110920, ¶ 43) nor proportionate to the magnitude of the now-corrected

violation (People v. Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App. 3d 306, 314 (1993)). Although the circuit court

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expressly stated that the discovery sanction in this case was not intended to be punitive, its ruling

ultimately had an unduly punitive effect on the State in this matter. See Dewey, 2023 IL App

(3d) 220285-U, ¶ 32.

¶ 21   For the reasons discussed above, we find that the circuit court’s denial of the State’s

motion to reconsider imposition of a discovery sanction consisting of the exclusion of evidence

was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. We thus conclude that the circuit court

abused its discretion in continuing to impose the sanction.

¶ 22                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 23   The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 24   Reversed and remanded.

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