Court Opinion

ID: 9642033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:46:28.442325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:42.290314
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Associate Justice.
I dissent. I am of the view that the statute means to denounce the use of medicines, drugs, substances, instruments or means with intent to procure a miscarriage unless the miscarriage is necessary to preserve life or health. I think State v. Rudman, 126 Me. 177, 136 A. 817, not persuasive because the Maine statute [Me.Rev.Stat.(1930) c. 135, § 9] is materially differ-ent from that here involved. I think, moreover, that the local decisions relied upon by the majority for a contrary construction of the statute are quite indecisive of the question, because while in those cases the indictments were drawn on the majority’s theory of the meaning of the statute no question was raised as to the sufficiency of the indictments under the statute. Moreover, the administrative construction of the statute is not binding upon the court. It is to be noted further that in two of the cases relied upon by the majority, to wit, Maxey v. United States, 30 App.D.C. 63, and Thompson v. United States, 30 App.D.C. 352, 12 Ann.Cas. 1004, the Government, notwithstanding that it had drawn the indictments upon the theory the statute subscribed to by the majority, nevertheless introduced evidence under the contrary theory, that is to say, introduced evidence that it was the miscarriage that was not necessary to preserve life or health,
I think also there was prejudicial error in the admission of the testimony of Dr. Mandy. A careful reading of the record convinces me -that his testimony to the effect that an abortion had been produced, and that it was at least partly an induced abortion, was based in part upon the hear-say statement of Mrs. Chariot.