Court Opinion

ID: 9958646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 19:04:48.755002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:32.694067
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                           Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles
                      and Joseph B. Hoage, in his official capacity                                        FILED
                        as Commissioner of the Indiana Bureau                                         Apr 09 2024, 11:14 am

                                  of Motor Vehicles,                                                       CLERK
                                                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                         Appellants-Defendants,                                             and Tax Court

                                                       v.

                     Fitz Simmons, A.G., S.D., C.O., K.W.,
                                                                    1
                W.A., B.W., K.H., S.R., J.T., K.O., S.O., and J.L.,
                                           Appellees-Plaintiffs.

                                               April 9, 2024

                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                             23A-PL-899

1
 Although Plaintiff J.L. did not participate in this appeal, J.L. is a party on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule
17(A) (stating that a party of record in the trial court or administrative agency shall be a party on appeal).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024                                    Page 1 of 23
                                               Appeal from the
                                              Monroe Circuit Court

                                                 The Honorable
                                             Holly M. Harvey, Judge

                                              Trial Court Cause No.
                                              53C06-2106-PL-1347

                                     Opinion by Senior Judge Shepard
                                     Judges Bradford and Felix concur.

      Shepard, Senior Judge.

[1]   The Appellees initiated litigation seeking to compel the Indiana Bureau of

      Motor Vehicles and Commissioner Joseph B. Hoage to include a third gender

      option on driver’s licenses and identification cards. The trial court so ordered.

      Finding error, we reverse and remand with instructions.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In 2019, BMV began recognizing a third gender option on state driver’s licenses

      and identification cards. This option was represented by an “X” and meant

      “Not Specified.” That same year, the Appellees applied to amend the gender

      markers on their state credentials to “X” in order to reflect their nonbinary

      gender. However, in 2020, BMV stopped offering or processing transactions

      with the gender indicator of “X.” Consequently, it denied the Appellees’

      applications.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024         Page 2 of 23
[3]   Appellees Simmons, S.R., K.H, A.G., and S.D. sought administrative review of

      the denial. The Administrative Law Judge issued her recommended order

      affirming BMV’s denial in February 2021.

[4]   In June, all Appellees filed a complaint against BMV seeking declaratory and

      injunctive relief from BMV’s binary-only policy. The complaint alleged

      violations of the Administrative Rules and Procedures Act (ARPA), the

      Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and the

      First Amendment. It included a petition for judicial review of the ALJ’s

      decision concerning Simmons, S.R., K.H, A.G., and S.D. The BMV moved to

      dismiss the complaint, and the court granted the motion as to the First

      Amendment claim but denied the motion as to the remainder. The court

      subsequently denied BMV’s motion for summary judgment and granted the

      Appellees’ petition for judicial review and motion for summary judgment. The

      court then entered a declaratory judgment and permanently enjoined BMV

      from refusing to allow non-binary designations on state credentials. BMV
                 2
      appeals.

      Issues
      I. Whether the court erred by granting judicial review; and

      2
       We held oral argument in this case on January 23, 2024, in the Court of Appeals courtroom. We thank
      counsel for their valuable advocacy.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024                            Page 3 of 23
      II. Whether the court erred in granting summary judgment for the Appellees.

      Discussion and Decision
      I. Judicial Review
[5]   BMV contends the trial court erred in granting the petition for judicial review of

      the ALJ’s decision regarding Simmons, S.R., K.H, A.G., and S.D. because they

      failed to comply with the processes of the Administrative Orders and

      Procedures Act (AOPA). Specifically, BMV argues the request for review was

      untimely.

[6]   The AOPA requires a party to petition for judicial review within thirty days

      after service of notice of the agency action. Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-5 (1986). A

      party who fails to timely petition waives its right to judicial review. Ind. Code §

      4-21.5-5-4(b)(1) (1986). This Court has found it significant that the AOPA

      “‘establishes the exclusive means for judicial review of an agency action’” and

      that it does not include a provision similar to Appellate Rule 1 that permits

      deviation from the AOPA’s procedural rules. Hunter v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 67

      N.E.3d 1085, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-1

      (1994)), trans. denied. Citing Indiana Code section 4-21.5-2-2 (1986), the Court

      further emphasized that a person may waive any right conferred upon them by

      AOPA and concluded therefore that “there is no mechanism allowing the trial

      court to resurrect a waived right to judicial review.” Hunter, 67 N.E.3d at 1091.

[7]   Here, the ALJ issued her recommended order in February 2021, and the five

      Appellees neither objected nor sought reconsideration of that order. Likewise,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024         Page 4 of 23
       they did not seek judicial review at any time before this lawsuit was filed in

       June 2021. Thus, their petition was untimely. The trial court erred in excusing

       the untimeliness. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s grant of the petition for

       judicial review.

[8]    Nevertheless, the Appellees’ procedural waiver of their right to judicial review

       does not adversely affect their claims here because these five Appellees, indeed

       the Appellees as a whole, have brought a declaratory judgment action, which is

       distinct from judicial review of the decision of an administrative agency.

[9]    The purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is “to settle and to

       afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and

       other legal relations . . . .” Ind. Code § 34-14-1-12 (1998). More particularly, a

       declaratory judgment action is a discrete action in which a person whose rights,

       status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute may seek a determination

       of any question of construction or validity arising under the statute to obtain a

       declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. Ind. Code § 34-

       14-1-2 (1998).

[10]   Accordingly, these Appellees are not challenging an agency action subject to

       judicial review but rather are contesting BMV’s binary-only policy. They asked

       the court to construe Indiana Code section 9-24-11-5, enter a declaratory

       judgment that BMV’s enforcement of the statute violated their rights, and

       permanently enjoin BMV from enforcing the policy.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024          Page 5 of 23
[11]   This Court has previously determined that “a challenge to the content of an

       agency’s rules and regulations was not properly raised in a petition for judicial

       review[] but is more appropriately considered in a declaratory judgment

       action.” Ind. Dep’t of Env’t Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt. of Ind., Inc., 604 N.E.2d

       1199, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Public Serv.

       Comm’n, 495 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), trans. denied), trans. denied. The

       Court further noted our Supreme Court’s observation that “‘under some

       circumstances a declaratory judgment is an available alternative to exhaustion

       of administrative remedies and judicial review.’” Chem. Waste Mgmt. of Ind.,

       604 N.E.2d at 1203 (quoting State ex. rel. State Election Bd. v. Superior Ct. of

       Marion Cnty., 519 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind. 1988)).

[12]   A recent decision of our Supreme Court sheds further light on this subject.

       There, the Court considered whether the merits of a declaratory judgment

       action should have been considered by the trial court where the plaintiff had

       filed for judicial review and included a claim for declaratory judgment. The

       trial court denied the declaratory judgment request partly because the plaintiff

       did not file a separate complaint for a declaratory judgment. Concluding the

       trial court should have considered the declaratory judgment request on the

       merits, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the judicial system’s

       principle of judicial economy and stated, “While a party typically can only

       obtain judicial review of issues raised before an agency, [the plaintiff] was not

       seeking judicial review of this issue—it was seeking a declaratory judgment. . . .

       [The plaintiff] could have filed this declaratory judgment request as a separate

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024              Page 6 of 23
       action . . . .” ResCare Health Servs., Inc. v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. - Off. of

       Medicaid Pol’y & Plan., 184 N.E.3d 1147, 1152 (Ind. 2022); see also Wilson v. Bd.

       of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 270 Ind. 302, 305, 385 N.E.2d 438, 441 (1979) (holding

       that, given the constitutional character of the issue presented, it was not

       necessary for plaintiff “to press the issue through administrative channels as a

       precondition to judicial review” where her action for declaratory judgment and

       injunctive relief was constitutional challenge to procedures employed by board

       in suspending and terminating benefits).

[13]   Thus, we conclude that while the petition for judicial review was untimely filed

       and therefore improvidently granted, the action for declaratory judgment and

       injunctive relief as it relates to Simmons, S.R., K.H, A.G., and S.D. may

       nevertheless proceed as it is a distinct action.

       II. Summary Judgment
[14]   BMV next asserts the trial court erred by entering summary judgment in favor

       of the Appellees on their claims that BMV violated the Administrative Rules

       and Procedures Act (ARPA) and violated the Appellees’ rights to equal

       protection and due process. We address each argument in turn.

[15]   When reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, our standard of

       review is similar to that of the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate

       only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is

       entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); City of

       Indianapolis v. Cox, 20 N.E.3d 201, 205-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024               Page 7 of 23
       We consider only those materials properly designated pursuant to Trial Rule

       56, and we construe all factual inferences and resolve all doubts as to the

       existence of a material issue in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. Hood’s

       Gardens, Inc., 24 N.E.3d 421, 424 (Ind. 2015). We review a summary judgment

       de novo, and the fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary

       judgment does not alter the standard of review or change our analysis; “the

       party that lost in the trial court has the burden of persuading us that the trial

       court erred.” Speedy Wrecker Serv., LLC v. Frohman, 148 N.E.3d 1005, 1008

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

       A. Violation of ARPA

[16]   In entering summary judgment for the Appellees on this issue, the trial court

       concluded that BMV’s cessation of allowing a gender designation of “X” on

       state credentials constituted a new administrative rule that was not promulgated

       pursuant to the ARPA and was therefore void.

[17]   It is well settled that administrative agencies may make reasonable rules and

       regulations to apply and enforce legislative enactments (i.e., statutes). Ind. Dep’t

       of Env’t Mgmt. v. Twin Eagle LLC, 798 N.E.2d 839, 847 (Ind. 2003). However,

       an administrative agency may only regulate by a new rule if it has first complied

       with the proper rulemaking procedures set forth in the ARPA, which include

       public hearings and review by executive branch officials. Villegas v. Silverman,

       832 N.E.2d 598, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024           Page 8 of 23
[18]   BMV argues its discontinuation of the use of the “X” gender designation was

       not a new “rule.” More particularly, BMV claims it properly reverted to its

       previous procedure of not using the non-binary gender marker because it had

       neither the statutory nor the regulatory authority to issue credentials bearing

       such a designation in the first place. Accordingly, we must begin by examining

       BMV’s authority.

[19]   As an administrative agency, BMV has only those powers conferred on it by the

       legislature, and it has no power to act contrary to governing statutes. LTV Steel

       Co. v. Griffin, 730 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind. 2000). Pertinent here, BMV’s

       authority to issue driver’s licenses is governed by Indiana Code section 9-24-11-

       2 (2016). In executing this duty, BMV is required to include on learner’s

       permits and driver’s licenses some specific information including the “gender”

       of the permittee or licensee. See Ind. Code § 9-24-11-5(a)(6).

[20]   In this case, the Appellees contend the term “gender” means “gender

       identity”—how a person identifies themselves based on an internal sense—a

       definition that encompasses non-binary gender designations. On the other

       hand, BMV defines “gender” as synonymous with “sex”—i.e., the biological

       state of being either male or female. Based on this interpretation, BMV argues

       that, before a non-binary gender marker could be used on state credentials, a

       new gender designation would need to be created and implemented, and such

       actions are beyond the scope of BMV’s authority. Thus, the question presented

       here is whether the term “gender” in Section 9-24-11-5(a)(6) refers only to the

       binary biological classifications of male and female or whether it is a broader

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024         Page 9 of 23
       term that also includes non-binary classifications. As the legislature has not

       defined “gender,” we turn to the well-established rules of statutory

       interpretation.

[21]   We pause here to note that, while our review of a summary judgment is de

       novo, our review of this particular issue is de novo for the additional reason that

       we are presented with a question of statutory interpretation. Vanderburgh Cnty.

       Election Bd. v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 833 N.E.2d 508, 510

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for

       the court and is reviewed de novo.”)

[22]   The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of

       the legislature. Ind. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Elmer, 171 N.E.3d 1045, 1049 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2021) (quoting Ind. Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 79

       N.E.3d 371, 376 (Ind. 2017)), trans denied. “‘The best evidence of legislative

       intent is the language of the statute itself[.]’” Washington Cnty. Health Dep’t v.

       White, 878 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Scott v. Irmeger, 859

       N.E.2d 1238, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)), trans denied. Where, as here, a

       statutory term is undefined, the legislature has instructed us to “interpret the

       term using its ‘plain, or ordinary and usual, sense.’” Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v.

       Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 174 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Town of Brownsburg v. Fight

       Against Brownsburg Annexation, 124 N.E.3d 597, 605 (Ind. 2019)); see also Ind.

       Code § 1-1-4-1(1) (1991).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024           Page 10 of 23
[23]   To obtain the plain meaning of a term, we consult “general-language

       dictionaries.” Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc., 131 N.E.3d at 174. One such

       dictionary defines “gender” as “sex.” https://www.merriam-

       webster.com/dictionary/gender [https://perma.cc/6GVX-64VG] (last visited

       March 28, 2024). While it also supplies the alternative definition of “gender

       identity,” the usage guide states: “[I]n nonmedical and nontechnical contexts,

       there is no clear delineation [between the words “gender” and “sex”], and the

       status of the words remains complicated.” Id.

[24]   Another dictionary defines the term “gender” as: “Either of the two divisions,

       designated female and male, by which most organisms are classified on the

       basis of their reproductive organs and functions; sex.”

       https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=gender

       [https://perma.cc/A24J-P4MK] (last visited March 28, 2024). And

       alternatively, “One’s identity as female or male or as neither entirely female nor

       entirely male.” Id. The usage note with this definition states: “Some people

       maintain that the word sex should be reserved for reference to the biological

       aspects of being male or female or to sexual activity, and that the word gender

       should be used only to refer to sociocultural roles. . . . The distinction can be

       problematic, however.” Id.

[25]   In determining legislative intent, we also examine the entire statute, prior

       versions, changes made, and the reasons for making them. Lincoln Nat. Bank v.

       Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 446 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).

       Prior to July 2007, Section 9-24-11-5 provided, in part:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024         Page 11 of 23
               (a) A permit or license issued under this chapter must bear the
               distinguishing number assigned to the permittee or licensee, and
               must contain:

               (1) the name of the permittee or licensee;
               (2) the date of birth of the permittee or licensee;
               (3) the mailing address or residence address of the permittee or
               licensee;
               (4) a brief description of the permittee or licensee;
               (5) if the permittee or licensee is less than eighteen (18) years of
               age at the time of issuance, the dates on which the permittee or
               licensee will become:
                       (A) eighteen (18) years of age; and
                       (B) twenty-one (21) years of age;
               (6) if the permittee or licensee is at least eighteen (18) years of age
               but less than twenty-one (21) years of age at the time of issuance,
               the date on which the permittee or licensee will become twenty-
               one (21) years of age; and
               (7) except as provided in subsection (c), for the purpose of
               identification, a:
                       (A) photograph; or
                       (B) computerized image;
               of the permittee or licensee[.]

[26]   Effective July 1, 2007, Sub-section 9-24-11-5(a) was expanded to require

       permits and licenses to contain, in pertinent part:

               (1) The full legal name of the permittee or licensee.
               (2) The date of birth of the permittee or licensee.
               (3) The address of the principal residence of the permittee or
               licensee.
               (4) The hair color and eye color of the permittee or licensee.
               (5) The date of issue and expiration date of the permit or license.
               (6) The gender of the permittee or licensee.
               (7) The unique identifying number of the permit or license.
               (8) The weight of the permittee or licensee.
               (9) The height of the permittee or licensee.
               (10) A reproduction of the signature of the permittee or licensee.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024             Page 12 of 23
       (emphasis added). The General Assembly amended the statute to comply with

       the requirements of the federal law commonly known as the REAL ID Act. See

       Indiana Conference Committee Report, 2007 Reg. Sess. S.B. 463; see also 2007

       Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 184-2007 (S.E.A. 463).

[27]   The REAL ID Act is a product of our country’s post-9/11 war on terrorism. A

       Real ID-compliant driver’s license, permit, or identification card will be

       required in order to board commercial airplanes or enter certain federal

       facilities. https://www.in.gov/bmv/licenses-permits-ids/real-id-overview/

       [https://perma.cc/3QD6-BZEW] (last visited March 28, 2024). While the

       deadline for this requirement has been extended several times, as of the writing

       of this opinion, the current deadline is May 7, 2025.

[28]   The Act sets forth the minimum document requirements and issuance standards

       established by the Department of Homeland Security for federal recognition of

       state identification. Among these is the information state driver’s licenses and

       identification cards must contain, which includes “[t]he person’s gender.”

       REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title II, § 202(b)(3)

       (codified in 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note). In establishing these minimum standards,

       the Department of Homeland Security left the determination of “gender” up to

       each state. See Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification

       Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5272-

       01, 5301 (January 29, 2008) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 37). Thus, our

       legislature’s amendment is not necessarily indicative of an intention to allow

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024        Page 13 of 23
       additional gender markers on state credentials but rather simply a result of

       implementing the federal requirements under the REAL ID Act.

[29]   Other rules of statutory construction serve to bolster BMV’s interpretation. A

       principle paramount to the interpretation of a statute instructs that statutes

       concerning the same subject matter should be harmonized to give effect to each,

       and this rule takes precedence over other rules of statutory construction. McNeil

       v. Anonymous Hosp., 219 N.E.3d 789, 796-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting

       McCabe v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Ins., 949 N.E.2d 816, 820 (Ind. 2011)).

       Application of this principle in this case suggests legislative intent to consider

       the term “sex” synonymous with the term “gender.” For example, Section 9-

       30-3-6, concerning data to be included in an information and summons in

       traffic cases, specifically requires the “sex” of the operator of the vehicle to be

       recorded. See Ind. Code § 9-30-3-6(b) (2007). Notably, this statute was

       amended effective July 1, 2007, the same time Section 9-24-11-5 was amended

       to incorporate the federal terminology of “gender,” yet the legislature chose to

       maintain the term of “sex” in the text of Section 9-30-3-6. Likewise, Section 9-

       30-6-16 includes the “sex” of the licensee as one piece of required information

       to be included in a bureau certificate when a licensee either fails or refuses a

       chemical test. See Ind. Code § 9-30-6-16 (2005).

[30]   An additional principle to be considered in construing an ambiguous statute is

       the weight we give to the interpretation of the administrative agency charged

       with enforcing the statute. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. McClung, 138 N.E.3d

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024           Page 14 of 23
       303, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We assign the agency’s interpretation significant

       weight, provided it is reasonable and consistent with the statute itself. Id.

[31]   BMV, the agency tasked with enforcing Section 9-24-11-5, construes the term

       “gender” as synonymous with “sex.” In discharging its mandated duty under

       Sub-section 9-24-11-5(a)(6) to indicate on Indiana driver’s licenses the “gender”

       of the licensee, BMV includes on the face of licenses category 15 labeled “Sex.”

       This label is followed by either an “M” for male or an “F” for female, as

       evidenced below in the example displayed on BMV’s website. Moreover, BMV

       follows this procedure even on those licenses issued in compliance with the
                                                                                                                 3
       federal REAL ID Act, whose terminology Section 9-24-11-5(a)(6) mirrors.

       https://www.in.gov/bmv/licenses-permits-ids/learners-permits-and-drivers-

       licenses-overview/drivers-license/ [https://perma.cc/Q269-CPRR] (last visited

       March 28, 2024).

       3
         A Real ID is indicated by the star in the upper right-hand corner of a driver’s license, permit, or state
       identification card. https://www.in.gov/bmv/licenses-permits-ids/real-id-overview/
       [https://perma.cc/VF4A-W7DY] (last visited March 28, 2024).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024                                    Page 15 of 23
[32]   In sum, general-language dictionaries define “gender” as “sex.” They further

       state that typically there is no clear delineation between the two terms and

       when a distinction is made between them, it proves to be problematic. Further,

       our examination suggests the legislature incorporated the term “gender” into

       our state statute simply to comply with the federal REAL ID Act, and it has not

       embarked on creating a new gender designation, which it alone has the

       authority to do. Moreover, even since the 2007 amendment adding the term

       “gender,” Indiana driver’s licenses bear an “M” or “F” in the category entitled

       “Sex,” and other statutes within Title 9 likewise use “gender” and “sex”

       interchangeably.

[33]   Thus, until the legislature otherwise directs, we conclude “sex” is the definition

       of “gender” and understand the “gender” of a permittee or licensee, under Title

       9 generally and under Sub-section 9-24-11-5(a)(6) specifically, to refer to the

       biological division of being either female or male. Applying that definition

       here, we hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the

       Appellees on their claim that BMV violated ARPA by ceasing to issue

       identification credentials with non-binary gender designations.

       B. Equal Protection Claim

[34]   BMV claims the trial court erred in concluding that the agency’s refusal to issue

       a non-binary designation on state credentials violates the Appellees’ Fourteenth

       Amendment right to equal protection by impermissibly treating them differently

       from persons who identify as binary.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024         Page 16 of 23
[35]   The guarantee of equal protection prohibits states from denying “to any person

       within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend.

       XIV, § 1. While the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that similar

       individuals will be treated in a similar manner by the government, it does not

       deny the government’s ability to classify persons in the application of its laws.

       Phelps v. Sybinsky, 736 N.E.2d 809, 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting 3

       RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON

       CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.2, at 208 (3d ed. 1999)), trans. denied. Rather, it

       guarantees the “‘classifications will not be based on impermissible criteria or

       arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals.’” Id.

[36]   In assessing whether the classification violates the Equal Protection Clause, we

       must first determine the applicable level of scrutiny, which is determined by the

       nature of the classification. Thomas v. Greencastle Cmty. Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d

       190, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). We apply strict scrutiny to a classification if the

       unequal treatment is based on membership in a protected class (e.g., race) or

       denial of a fundamental right (e.g., right to vote). Shepler v. State, 758 N.E.2d

       966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. When the unequal treatment is

       premised on a quasi-suspect classification, such as sex, we apply intermediate

       scrutiny. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L. Ed. 2d

       465 (1988). In all other cases, courts default to rational basis review. Shepler,

       758 N.E.2d at 969.

[37]   Here, the Appellees argue that a person’s status as non-binary is a classification

       based on sex, thus triggering intermediate scrutiny. They cite Bostock v. Clayton

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024         Page 17 of 23
       County, Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020) and

       claim the U.S. Supreme Court has held that discrimination based on gender

       identity is discrimination based on sex. See Appellees’ Br. p. 37. For its part,

       BMV contends that an individual’s non-binary status is different from an

       individual’s sex and it has not been recognized as a protected characteristic that

       triggers heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. For these

       reasons, BMV urges a rational basis review.

[38]   In Bostock, the Supreme Court established that Title VII’s prohibition of

       discrimination based on an individual’s sex encompasses discrimination based

       on an individual’s sexual orientation or transgender status. Yet, the Court

       explicitly noted that only Title VII was before it and not other federal or state

       laws that prohibit sex discrimination. Id., at 681, 140 S. Ct. at 1753. Thus,

       neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Indiana Supreme Court has definitively

       recognized those individuals who identify as non-binary as a protected class

       under the Equal Protection Clause so as to trigger a heightened level of

       scrutiny. Accordingly, we believe the rational basis test represents the proper

       level of scrutiny to be applied here.

[39]   We turn then to a rational basis review, which requires us to determine whether

       the unequal treatment is rationally related to a legitimate governmental

       purpose. Shepler, 758 N.E.2d at 969. In doing so, we are mindful that

       government action is clothed with a presumption of constitutionality and the

       party challenging the action must overcome that presumption “‘by a clear

       showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.’” Reinoehl v. St. Joseph Cnty. Health

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024          Page 18 of 23
       Dep’t, 181 N.E.3d 341, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Kadrmas v. Dickinson

       Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 451, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 101 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1988)), trans.

       denied. A classification will be upheld against an equal protection challenge if

       there is “‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational

       basis for the classification.’” Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S. Ct.

       2637, 2642, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993) (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,

       508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1993)). Moreover,

       legitimate governmental interests of states are numerous and include an interest

       in their efficient and effective operation. City of Indianapolis v. Armour, 946

       N.E.2d 553, 560 (Ind. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind.,

       566 U.S. 673, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 182 L. Ed. 2d 998 (2012).

[40]   BMV asserts its binary-only policy for state credentials is designed to accurately,

       consistently, and efficiently identify licensees. The agency indicates that

       recording an individual’s objective characteristic of sex better advances the state

       interest in accurate identification than would recording a person’s subjective

       non-binary identity. See Appellees’ Br. p. 15 (defining non-binary as “a term

       used by some people who experience their gender as not falling within the

       binary categories of man and woman”); see also Appellants’ App. Conf. Vol. II,

       p. 42 (Plaintiffs’ Compl.) (defining non-binary as term used to describe an

       individual whose “internal and inherent sense” of being does not fall into the

       binary categories of male or female). Additionally, identifying an individual’s

       sex on their state credentials promotes consistency within the system as other

       statutes require the licensee’s sex to be identified and recorded. See Ind. Code

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024           Page 19 of 23
       §§ 9-30-3-6(b), 9-30-6-16. Finally, BMV suggests that issuing credentials

       identifying an individual’s sex better serves to further administrative efficiency

       than reporting a subjective status with innumerable designations.

[41]   The Appellees, although denouncing BMV’s proffered objectives, fail to

       clearly demonstrate this classification is arbitrary and irrational in order to

       overcome the presumption of constitutionality. In the absence of such a

       showing by the Appellees, we find these to be legitimate government interests

       and conclude that the binary-only policy is rationally related to these goals.

       Thus, we reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the

       Appellees on their equal protection claim.

       C. Due Process Claim

[42]   Lastly, BMV contends the trial court erred by determining that the agency

       violated the Appellees’ right to informational privacy under the Fourteenth

       Amendment. Specifically, the trial court concluded the Appellees’ rights were

       infringed upon when they were forced to select a binary designation for their

       state credentials that is inconsistent with their gender status, thereby possibly

       revealing private health information.

[43]   Within due process doctrine, there are two branches of claims—procedural and

       substantive. In a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must establish a

       deprivation of an interest in life, liberty, or property. Snyder v. Smith, 7 F. Supp.

       3d 842, 858 (S.D. Ind. 2014). A substantive due process claim is one of the

       “fundamental rights.” Id. The Supreme Court, while strictly limiting this

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024          Page 20 of 23
       category, has held it includes matters relating to “‘marriage, family,

       procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.’” Id. (quoting Albright v. Oliver,

       510 U.S. 266, 272, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion)).

       Further, in our review of such a claim, state laws are afforded deference and

       “need only be rational and non-arbitrary in order to satisfy the right to

       substantive due process.” Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 760 F.3d 600, 614 (7th

       Cir. 2014).

[44]   First and foremost, as this is not a claim relating to marriage, family,

       procreation, or the right to bodily integrity (e.g., refusal of unwanted medical

       treatment), the Appellees are seeking to expand the Supreme Court’s

       purposefully narrow concept of substantive due process. We think the statutes,

       case decisions, and structure weigh against doing so.

[45]   Furthermore, as we determined in Section B., supra, the Appellees have not

       shown Section 9-24-11-5 to be irrational or arbitrary in order to succeed on their

       constitutional claims. See Gibson, 760 F.3d at 614 (saying that rational and non-

       arbitrary state laws satisfy substantive due process). In addition, their due

       process claim seems to be speculative. They assert that when choosing between

       the binary designations for their credentials, non-binary applicants “will likely

       understand” they must select their sex assigned at birth and that “[i]n certain

       instances,” this disclosure will reveal an applicant’s non-binary status.

       Appellees’ Br. p. 54. And finally, it seems that the use of a non-binary

       designation such as “X” on their credentials discloses the Appellees’ gender

       status in the same manner they are attempting to avoid.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024            Page 21 of 23
[46]   We hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the Appellees

       on their substantive due process claim.

       Conclusion
[47]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court erred by granting the

       Appellees’ untimely petition for judicial review. Nevertheless, as the action for

       declaratory judgment and injunctive relief is a distinct action, we rule on its

       merits.

[48]   Until the General Assembly determines otherwise, we hold that “gender” in

       Title 9 of the state statutory scheme means “sex” and conclude the trial court

       erred by entering summary judgment for the Appellees on their claim that BMV

       violated ARPA by ceasing to issue identification credentials with non-binary

       gender designations. In addition, we determine an individual’s non-binary

       status necessitates only the standard scrutiny of the rational basis test and, as

       Appellees were unable to demonstrate that there was no reasonably conceivable

       state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification, we

       conclude the trial court erred by entering summary judgment for Appellees on

       their equal protection claim. Finally, we decline the invitation to expand the

       category of substantive due process to include the Appellees’ claim and

       conclude that, because the trial court erroneously did so, it also erred by

       entering summary judgment for the Appellees on their due process claim.

[49]   Accordingly, we reverse the court’s grant of judicial review and summary

       judgment in favor of the Appellees and remand with instructions to dissolve the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024           Page 22 of 23
       injunction against BMV and enter summary judgment and declaratory

       judgment for BMV consistent with this opinion.

[50]   Reversed and remanded with instructions.

       Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana

       James A. Barta
       Solicitor General of Indiana

       Katelyn E. Doering
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
       Jon Laramore
       Indiana Legal Services, Inc.
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Megan Stuart
       Jessica Meltzer
       Indiana Legal Services, Inc.
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Brent A. Auberry
       David A. Suess
       Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-899 | April 9, 2024   Page 23 of 23