Court Opinion

ID: 9949978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 22:01:40.789438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:46.507153
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
              C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                         ________________________

                          No. ACM 40119 (f rev)
                         ________________________

                            UNITED STATES
                                Appellee
                                     v.
                          Ervin D. MCCOY
                 Airman (E-2), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                        ________________________

        Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                           Upon Further Review
                         Decided 12 March 2024
                        ________________________

Military Judge: Colin P. Eichenberger; Brian M. Thompson (remand).
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 1 April 2021 by GCM convened at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. 1 Sentence entered by military
judge on 26 April 2021: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 2
years, and reduction to E-1.
For Appellant: Major Matthew L. Blyth, USAF; Major Alexandra K.
Fleszar, USAF.
For Appellee: Colonel Steven R. Kaufman, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel
Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Neil, USAF;
Lieutenant Colonel Meredith L. Steer, USAF; Major John P. Patera,
USAF; Major Brittany M. Speirs, USAF; Captain Jocelyn Q. Wright,
USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before ANNEXSTAD, RAMÍREZ, and GRUEN, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge RAMÍREZ delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
Judge ANNEXSTAD and Judge GRUEN joined.

1 On 14 May 2021, Vandenberg Air Force Base was redesignated Vandenberg Space

Force Base.
                 United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

                             ________________________

    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
    precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                            ________________________

RAMÍREZ, Judge:
    A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members convicted
Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of sexual assault in
violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 920.2 The members found Appellant not guilty of a second specification of
sexual assault in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, against the same victim. The
panel sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for two
years, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority took no
action on the findings or sentence.
   Appellant raised eight issues on appeal, which we reword as follows: (1)
whether Appellant’s sexual assault conviction is factually sufficient; (2)
whether the military judge abused his discretion concerning Mil. R. Evid.
404(b) evidence; (3) whether the circuit trial counsel engaged in improper
argument; (4) whether the military judge erred when he denied a defense
request to instruct on a unanimous verdict; (5) whether the convening
authority erred when he denied a deferment request Appellant did not request,
but did not address Appellant’s suspension request; (6) whether the convening
authority had jurisdiction over Appellant; (7) whether Appellant’s sexual
assault conviction is legally sufficient; and (8) whether the record of trial’s
omission of the trial audio is a substantial omission warranting relief.3
   This case is before us a third time. Concerning Issue (8), on 31 October
2022, this court returned the record of trial to the military judge pursuant to
Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1112(d) because the disc containing the audio
recording from Appellant’s trial was missing from the record. United States v.
McCoy, No. ACM 40119, 2022 CCA LEXIS 632, at *3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 31
Oct. 2022) (order).4 On 5 December 2022, the case was re-docketed with our
court, and now contains the previously missing audio. Therefore, we find this

2 All references in this opinion to the UCMJ, the Military Rules of Evidence (Mil. R.

Evid.), and the Rules for Courts-Martial are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2019 ed.).
3 Issues 6, 7, and 8 are raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431

(C.M.A. 1982).
4 We note the remand order had a scrivener’s error incorrectly identifying the date of

docketing as 6 July 2022; the correct date is 6 July 2021.

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

issue has been resolved. On 9 November 2023, we remanded the case a second
time to address Issue (5), as we found the convening authority failed to
properly consider and act on Appellant’s suspension request. United States v.
McCoy, No. ACM 40119, 2023 CCA LEXIS 476, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 9
Nov. 2023) (unpub. op.). We returned jurisdiction over the case to a detailed
military judge and dismissed the appellate proceeding consistent with Rule
29(b)(2) of the Joint Rules for Appellate Procedure for Courts of Criminal
Appeals. Id. at *7. The case was re-docketed with this court for a second time
on 21 December 2023, after the convening authority considered and acted on
Appellant’s suspension request. Following the remands, Appellant filed a third
brief with the court submitting his case on its merits with no additional specific
assignments of error but preserving and maintaining those assignments of
error raised in his initial brief. Further, Appellant conceded that Issues (5) and
(8) were now moot.
    As to Appellant’s fourth issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces decided the case of United States v. Anderson, which held that a
military accused does not have a right to a unanimous verdict under the Sixth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, or the Fifth
Amendment’s component of equal protection.5 83 M.J. 291, 302 (C.A.A.F.
2023), cert denied, No. 23-437, 601 U.S. __ (20 Feb 2023). Therefore, Appellant
is not entitled to relief for this issue.
    After considering the five remaining issues, addressing the first and
seventh issues together in this opinion, we find no error materially prejudicial
to Appellant’s substantial rights and affirm the findings and sentence.

                                I. BACKGROUND
   In March 2019, after completing technical training school, CS arrived at
Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB), California, which was his first duty station.
Appellant and CS6 were part of the same friend group at Vandenberg AFB and
assigned to the security forces squadron.
    In September 2019, the friend group, to include Appellant, was at a flight
function and invited CS to go to Las Vegas, Nevada, for the weekend with
them. They planned to leave for Las Vegas within the hour, and CS agreed to
go. Prior to this trip to Las Vegas, CS and Appellant had never spent any time
alone with each other. The group of five Airmen, made up of three men
(Appellant, CS, and Senior Airman (SrA) GM) and two women, all rode in

5 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.

6 CS was an enlisted active-duty member of the United States Air Force.

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

Appellant’s car. In Las Vegas, the men and women stayed in separate houses.7
CS and SrA GM slept on a couch in the living room and Appellant slept in a
bedroom. CS testified at trial that going into this Las Vegas trip he was not
sexually interested in Appellant.
   After arriving, the group went to the Las Vegas strip to drink. They spent
between two and three hours there, however, only CS and Appellant were
drinking. CS had about four drinks that night but did not feel intoxicated. CS
and Appellant were communicating by Snapchat. CS explained that most
Snapchat messages disappear unless they are specifically saved.
    While they were on the Las Vegas strip, Appellant told CS that he wanted
to have sex with somebody that night and offered CS oral sex. CS testified that
he told Appellant, “no thanks” and, “I am good. I’m just going to go to bed.” CS
testified that when they got back to the house where they were staying,
Appellant sent CS a Snapchat message again offering him oral sex. CS again
declined.
    The next morning, CS “didn’t want to make the trip awkward,” so he had a
conversation with Appellant about Appellant’s comments. CS told Appellant
that oral sex from him is not something he was interested in, and they “were
just gonna not talk about it and just continue on with the trip.” That day, the
group drove to the Hoover Dam where, similar to their previous interactions,
CS and Appellant did not spend one-on-one time together. After the Hoover
Dam, the group went to a swimming pool, but again, CS and Appellant did not
spend one-on-one time together.
    That same night, the group went to Fremont Street area of Las Vegas,
where CS and Appellant drank a lot of alcohol. CS explained, “I was stopping
at every bar I saw to get a drink.” CS was drinking “Vegas Bomb[s] and Jaeger
Bombs.” Appellant was “going drink for drink with” CS. At some point in the
evening CS’s memory started to get hazy and progressed to him having no
memory of the rest of the night on Fremont Street, getting back to the house,
or being at the house. CS’s next memory is being on the couch where he had
slept the night before and Appellant “laying between [CS’s] legs . . . [while CS]
was laying on [his] back and [CS’s] penis was in [Appellant’s] mouth.” CS also
remembered feeling Appellant’s beard on his legs and Appellant showing CS
male/female porn on his phone and telling CS that “it would help.” CS felt
nauseated and “just wanted [it] to stop.” CS testified that he could only recall
“30 seconds to a minute” of that encounter.

7 SrA GM’s aunt and a great aunt live in the area and agreed to host the Airmen in

their homes.

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                 United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

    At trial, circuit trial counsel asked CS if he tried to get away and he
answered, “I believe I pushed on his head,” but did not recall if anything
happened. CS was also asked if he ever gave Appellant his “freely given
agreement to give [him] oral sex,” and CS answered, “No.” CS was then asked,
“[D]o you have any reason in your mind to believe that for the parts of that
night you don’t remember that you, in fact, gave [Appellant] the freely given
agreement to give you a blowjob?” CS rejected that possibility by responding,
“No,” and explained that he was so confident in his answer because he is “not
interested in men at all.”
    CS testified that the next morning he looked at his phone and had a
Snapchat message from Appellant that read, “You are messed up,” and it
contained a picture of Appellant curled up on the couch in his underwear. CS
also testified that Appellant sent CS another Snapchat message which read,
“Please don’t hold this against me. I am not me when I am drunk.” CS
contacted his supervisor and his father on the drive back home and ultimately
decided to report the sexual assault.

                                 II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
   Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of his conviction for
sexual assault and provides the court with two arguments. First, Appellant
argues that lack of consent was not proven. Second, Appellant suggests that
we “should look skeptically at CS’s credibility.” We disagree with Appellant’s
arguments and find no relief is necessary.
   1. Additional Background
    SrA KE, a friend of Appellant, testified. She was one of the individuals that
went to Las Vegas with the group and knew CS from work. She testified that
Appellant had an interest in straight or straight-acting guys because he liked
the challenge of it. SrA KE explained that on the first night and the second
night in Las Vegas, both Appellant and CS were intoxicated. One of the things
that she saw, while on Fremont Street, was Appellant meeting with a guy he
met on Grindr.8 She testified that Appellant “went up to the guy that he met
on Grinder [sic] . . . and [she] just didn’t expect him to do that, and it was just
like all of a sudden. There was no real talk about him doing it.” While Appellant
was with the guy from Grindr, CS was asking about Appellant’s whereabouts.
It was “assumed that [CS] was just worried about where [Appellant] was at
because he didn’t want him to get hurt.”

8 SrA KE explained that Grindr is “an app where . . . people of gay orientation meet

each other to hook[ ]up.”

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

   At another point in the night while on Fremont Street, Appellant and CS
walked down the street holding hands and were joined by SrA GM also holding
their hands. CS initiated the hand holding. One of the friends made a video of
the three males holding hands and it was presented to the panel as evidence.
    The group decided to leave Fremont Street between 0300 and 0400 hours.
Their car was parked in a garage. In the garage, CS urinated off the side of the
parking garage, got in the car, fell asleep, started snoring, and later vomited
in his mouth. Once they started driving back to the house, CS vomited again,
this time all over the car. The group decided to go to a 24-hour car wash to
clean the inside of the car. At the car wash, CS was by himself, not talking to
anyone, and resting his head on the car. SrA GM described CS in the car, as
intoxicated, initially looking “drowsy, just a little out of it,” and then “knocked
out.”
    Once they got back to where they were staying, SrA KE left the car and
walked to the house where the women were staying. She did not know if CS
needed help walking into the men’s house. However, SrA GM testified that CS
did not need help walking to the house. SrA GM did not stay in the house for
very long because he went to meet SrA KE. When he got back to the house
where the men were staying, SrA GM “saw [CS] belly down on the couch. He
was shirtless, did not have his pants on, and then [he] saw . . . [Appellant]
relaxing on the other part of the couch with a beer in his hand.” Appellant
asked SrA GM if everything was okay, but SrA GM did not want to talk.
Appellant then walked to the room where he was staying and closed the door.
SrA GM testified that CS’s shorts were folded on a chair.
    The next day, on the drive back to their duty station, CS told SrA KE, via
Snapchat, what had occurred the night before with Appellant. After he told
her, SrA KE saw CS silently crying in the seat next to her. At one point on the
drive back, the group stopped at a gas station and CS used that time to tell
SrA GM about the sexual assault.
   CS was wearing a football shirt, underwear, and shorts the night of the
sexual assault. He provided the underwear to the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (AFOSI) for processing. AFOSI then sent it to the United States
Army Criminal Investigative Laboratory for DNA testing. At trial an expert in
the field of forensic biology and DNA analysis testified that the DNA profile
from the underwear was a mixture of two individuals, CS and Appellant.
   2. Law
  We review issues of legal and factual sufficiency de novo. United States v.
Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation omitted).
   The test for legal sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder

                                        6
                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

could have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A. 1987) (citation omitted). As we
resolve “questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound to draw every reasonable
inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.” United States
v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted).
    The test for factual sufficiency is “whether, after weighing the evidence in
the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed
the witnesses, . . . [we are] convinced of the . . . [appellant]’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Turner, 25 M.J. at 325. We take “a fresh, impartial look at
the evidence,” applying “neither a presumption of innocence nor a presumption
of guilt” to “make . . . [our] own independent determination as to whether the
evidence constitutes proof of each required element beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Washington, 57 M.J. at 399. As an evidentiary standard, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt does not require more than one witness to credibly testify.
See United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. 372, 383 (C.A.A.F. 2006)
(finding that the testimony of a single witness may satisfy the Government’s
burden to prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt)
(citations omitted).
   To find Appellant guilty of sexual assault, in violation of Article 120,
UCMJ, the court members were required to find the following elements beyond
a reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant committed a sexual act upon CS (causing
contact between Appellant’s mouth and CS’s penis) and (2) Appellant did so
without CS’s consent. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.)
(MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 60.b.(2)(d).
   “Consent” is defined as
       a freely given agreement to the conduct at issue by a competent
       person. An expression of lack of consent through words or
       conduct means there is no consent. Lack of verbal or physical
       resistance does not constitute consent. Submission resulting
       from the use of force, threat of force, or placing another person
       in fear also does not constitute consent. A current or previous
       dating or social or sexual relationship by itself or the manner of
       dress of the person involved with the accused in the conduct at
       issue does not constitute consent. All the surrounding
       circumstances are to be considered in determining whether a
       person gave consent.
MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 60.a.(g)(7).
    As it relates to consent, “the Government need not prove an appellant
intended the alleged sexual contact to be without consent.” United States v.
Rodela, 82 M.J. 521, 526 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021) (citation omitted).

                                       7
                 United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

Similarly, “[t]he burden is on the actor to obtain consent, rather than the victim
to manifest a lack of consent.” United States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376, 381
(C.A.A.F. 2019).
    Mistake of fact as to a victim’s consent is an affirmative defense to the
offense of sexual assault. McDonald, 78 M.J. at 379. If an accused holds, based
on ignorance or mistake, an incorrect but reasonable belief that the victim
consented, the accused is not guilty of the offense of sexual assault. See R.C.M.
916(j)(1) (“[The] mistake must have existed in the mind of the accused and
must have been reasonable under all the circumstances.”) There must be some
evidence of the mistake of fact for the military judge to instruct the panel.
United States v. DiPaola, 67 M.J. 98, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Hibbard, 58 M.J. 71, 72 (C.A.A.F. 2003)).
   3. Analysis
   Appellant argues the element of lack of consent was not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and that CS is not credible. As outlined below, we disagree.
    Here, the evidence supports a finding that Appellant committed a sexual
act upon CS by placing his mouth on CS’s penis during the early morning hours
of 8 September 2019 and that it happened without CS’s consent. A review of
the evidence shows the following: Appellant offered CS oral sex the night prior
to the sexual assault. CS said no. Appellant sent CS a Snapchat message
offering oral sex. CS said no. This shows Appellant’s desire to perform oral sex
on CS and CS’s lack of consent going into the day of the assault. On the night
of the assault, CS consumed so much alcohol that he fell asleep and vomited in
Appellant’s car. While no witness was able to testify at what point CS fell
asleep on the couch, the evidence supports that CS did not wake up until
Appellant’s mouth was on CS’s penis. The evidence also supports that
Appellant was showing CS male/female pornography on his phone while
performing oral sex on CS, and that CS tried to push Appellant’s head away.
Finally, the evidence supports that Appellant apologized to CS for his conduct
when he sent CS a Snapchat picture of CS curled up on the couch in his
underwear and a Snapchat message which read, “Please don’t hold this against
me. I am not me when I am drunk.”
    Having given full consideration to Appellant’s arguments that lack of
consent was not proven and drawing every reasonable inference from the
evidence of record in favor of the Government, we conclude the evidence was
legally sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction as a rational factfinder
could have found all the essential elements of Appellant’s convicted offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.
   We also address each argument Appellant raises and ask ourselves if we
are convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                        8
                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

    Appellant does not contest the DNA results. He concedes that he performed
oral sex on CS. Instead, in his brief before this court, Appellant claims that
“[b]oiled down to its essence, the Government’s evidence on the key question,
consent, amounts to CS’s statement at trial that he was not interested in men.
Nothing in the record supports this statement except his own declaration.”
However, Appellant acknowledges CS testified that he believed he attempted
to push Appellant’s head away from his penis. Nonetheless, he questions this
because CS only testified about this at trial. Appellant claims the “potential
that [CS] consented . . . is inconsistent with his self-image.” As explained
below, however, a fresh, impartial look at the evidence points in a different
direction.
    Upon review of the evidence, we do not have a basis to question CS’s
credibility. Had CS consented but decided it was a bad idea the next morning,
it would make little sense to tell his friends, his supervisor, and his father that
he was sexually assaulted. We find CS credible when he testified that he did
not have a sexual interest in Appellant. While we do not know what happened
before CS woke up on the couch, we know that CS had already turned
Appellant down twice, even after consuming alcohol. We find credible CS’s
testimony that he attempted to push Appellant’s head away. While Appellant
argues that CS had not mentioned the push before trial and while challenged
at trial, the testimony itself is uncontroverted. We also find Appellant’s apology
for his conduct is some evidence as to his consciousness of guilt.
    Finally, we note the military judge instructed on mistake of fact, but
Appellant does not argue on appeal that he was mistaken as to consent.
Instead, he simply states, “Given the limited evidence produced, the
Government failed in its burden to prove CS did not consent, or to disprove
whether [Appellant] had a reasonable mistake of fact as to consent.” Appellant
offers no evidence that would support he had an honest and reasonable belief
that CS consented to the sexual act. The only evidence discussed by the
Defense at trial as to mistake of fact was the hand-holding incident on Fremont
Street. However, we are unpersuaded that Appellant holding hands in public
with two men demonstrates consent to oral sex from one of the men. As our
superior court has explained, consent to kissing or “‘making’ out is simply not
comparable to sexual intercourse.” United States v. St. Jean, 83 M.J. 109, 114
(C.A.A.F. 2023). Similarly, consent to holding hands is simply not comparable
to consent to oral sex.
    We have made allowances for not having personally observed the
witnesses, we have weighed the evidence in the record of trial, we have
considered the minor inconsistencies as argued by Appellant, and we are
convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find
his conviction factually sufficient.

                                        9
                 United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

B. Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) Evidence
    Appellant claims that the military judge abused his discretion in admitting
evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) that Appellant enjoyed the challenge of
trying to engage in sexual activity with straight men. Specifically, Appellant
contends that the military judge committed reversible error in (1) determining
that the underlying act actually occurred, (2) that there were non-propensity
uses of the evidence, and (3) that the probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
    1. Additional Background
    During the discovery phase of Appellant’s court-martial, the Government
provided trial defense counsel written Mil. R. Evid. 304(d) notice that it might
elicit statements made to various members of the group trip to Las Vegas that
Appellant “was turned on by trying to ‘turn’ straight guys, that he enjoyed the
challenge, and that this was a sexual fetish of his.”
   During the Government’s opening statement, the Defense objected to
comments explaining that Appellant had a sexual fetish. The military judge
addressed the issue of admissibility of this evidence in a hearing outside the
presence of the panel, and sustained the objection.
   After CS testified, the parties again raised this issue with the military
judge. The Defense agreed that Appellant made the statements at issue, and
agreed that SrA KE and SrA JG would testify consistent with the
Government’s notice. After the military judge gave both sides an opportunity
to argue the admissibility of this evidence, he ruled from the bench. The
military judge stated that he was analyzing the evidence under Mil. R. Evid.
404(b) “because the evidence offered by the Prosecution are statements of
[Appellant] wherein [Appellant] discussed his sexual enjoyment in committing
specific acts[, m]ainly the act of enticing straight men to engage in homosexual
conduct.” The military judge found that the “Prosecution is not introducing a
character trait nor eliciting testimony in a form of an opinion or reputation
that [Appellant] possesses a particular character trait.”
   The military judge then analyzed the evidence pursuant to the three prongs
our superior court laid out in United States v. Reynolds, 29 M.J. 105, 109
(C.M.A. 1989).9
   As to the first prong, the military judge found that both the Prosecution
and Defense agreed that Appellant made the statements to his friends “that

9 The three prongs in Reynolds are whether: (1) the evidence reasonably supports a

finding by the fact finder that the appellant committed prior crimes, wrongs, or acts;
(2) a fact of consequence is made more or less probable by the existence of the evidence;
and (3) the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. 29 M.J. at 109.

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

he was turned on by trying to turn straight guys, and that he enjoyed the
challenge.” The military judge found that the “testimony, if believed, is
sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to conclude that [Appellant] made those
statements and committed the prior acts detailed in the statements.
Specifically, that on previous occasions, [Appellant] attempted to entice
straight men into engaging in homosexual acts with him.” (Emphasis added.)
   As to the second prong, the military judge found that “[t]he fact of
consequence made more probable by this evidence is [Appellant’s] motive in
engaging in the charged conduct, and the fact of consequence made less
probable is that [CS] initiated the sexual acts at issue.” As to the issue of
motivation, the military judge identified that facts had been presented during
the court-martial that CS identified as a straight male. During his ruling the
military judge stated:
       [Mil. R. Evid.] 404(b) evidence would have a tendency to show
       that despite the fact that [CS] identified as straight, and
       [Appellant] would have known he was straight, [Appellant]
       would still have a sexual interest in [CS], would still have an
       interest in pursuing him sexually, and in fact, would be
       motivated and potentially more motivated to pursue [CS]
       sexually by the enjoyment he found in overcoming such a
       challenge.
    With regards to initiation, the military judge identified testimony that CS
“was in a blackout, drunken stage at the time of the offense,” that CS “had been
blackout drunk before,” and that CS “was aware on prior occasions of blackout
that he had initiated activities on his own violation [sic] which were outside of
his normal character . . . .” Additionally, the military judge made the findings
that after the alleged sexual assault, CS’s “clothing was neatly folded near an
area where he was sleeping, that he is a large individual and would have been
difficult to undress without his cooperation and that it was possible that he
had engaged in a number of actions indicative of consent, which he did not
recall.” Based on these findings, the military judge concluded that the
       evidence that [Appellant] enjoyed pursuing straight men would
       tend to rebut the implication gleaned from that evidence that
       [CS] may have been the one who initiated the sexual activity
       during his blackout, because the evidence would demonstrate
       [Appellant’s] sexual interest in pursuing [CS] and the likelihood
       that he initiated the sexual interaction.
    As to the third prong the military judge found that the probative value of
this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. He found the probative value of this evidence “strong, as the

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

evidence indicates both a motive from [Appellant] and refutes an implication
that [CS] initiated the sexual acts.” The military judge specifically found that
the evidence would not “paint [Appellant] as a sexual predator.” Additionally,
the military judge found that “[n]othing about the statements indicate at all
that [Appellant] enjoyed [ ] engaging in unwanted sexual acts with unwilling
participants, but only that [Appellant] enjoyed the challenge of gaining consent
from straight men for sexual activity.” The military judge specifically found
“nothing criminal about such an act or interest,” that the “evidence does not
paint [Appellant] as a bad person,” and that “[t]here is nothing inherently bad
about pursuing someone of a different sexual orientation.”
   Finally, the military judge noted that an appropriately tailored instruction
would be sufficient to overcome any potential unfair prejudice related to this
evidence.
   2. Law
    A military judge’s rulings under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) and Mil. R. Evid. 403
will not be disturbed except for a “clear abuse of discretion.” United States v.
Morrison, 52 M.J. 117, 122 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting United States v. Miller, 46
M.J. 63, 65 (C.A.A.F. 1997)). “A military judge abuses his or her discretion
when: (1) the military judge predicates a ruling on findings of fact that are not
supported by the evidence of record; (2) the military judge uses incorrect legal
principles; (3) the military judge applies correct legal principles to the facts in
a way that is clearly unreasonable; or (4) the military judge fails to consider
important facts.” United States v. Rudometkin, 82 M.J. 396, 401 (C.A.A.F.
2022) (citations omitted). “The abuse of discretion standard is a strict one,
calling for more than a mere difference of opinion. The challenged action must
be arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.” United
States v. Solomon, 72 M.J. 176, 179 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (quoting United States v.
White, 69 M.J. 236, 239 (C.A.A.F. 2010)). “The standard requires that the
military judge be clearly wrong in his determination of the facts or that his
decision be influenced by an erroneous view of the law.” United States v.
Dooley, 61 M.J. 258, 262 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (footnote omitted). “When testing for
an abuse of discretion, this [c]ourt does not substitute its judgment for the
military judge’s.” United States v. Grant, 38 M.J. 684, 688 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993).
   “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.” Mil. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, this
same evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.” Mil. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The list of potential
purposes in Mil. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) “is illustrative, not exhaustive.” United
States v. Ferguson, 28 M.J. 104, 108 (C.M.A. 1989) (footnote omitted).

                                        12
                 United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

    Military judges apply a three-part test to review the admissibility of
evidence under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b): (1) whether the evidence reasonably
supports a finding that Appellant committed other crimes, wrongs, or acts; (2)
whether the evidence of the other act makes a fact of consequence to the instant
offense more or less probable; and (3) whether the probative value of the
evidence of the other act is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice under Mil. R. Evid. 403. Reynolds, 29 M.J. at 109 (citations omitted).
“If the evidence fails to meet any one of these three standards, it is
inadmissible.” Id.
    Statements, themselves, can qualify as MRE 404(b) evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Franklin, 35 M.J. 311, 318 (C.M.A. 1992) (finding appellant’s
prior statement, “did you ever wonder what it would be like to kill a b*tch,”
was admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) in prosecution for murder because
“the statement was relevant to establish appellant’s intent to kill and was not
unduly prejudicial”).
   3. Analysis
    Appellant claims that the military judge erroneously conflated the
statements at issue with the underlying conduct described in the statement.
We disagree.
    We find the military judge’s fact-finding on the first Reynolds prong was
supported by the evidence of record. That the statements were made was not
in issue; both the Prosecution and the Defense agreed that witnesses would
testify Appellant made the statements. Having found a reasonable fact finder
could conclude Appellant made statements to friends that he had enticed
straight men to engage in homosexual conduct, it was not inappropriate for the
military judge to determine that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that
Appellant actually committed the prior acts detailed in those statements.
Thus, we conclude that the military judge properly applied the first Reynolds
prong.
    We also find the military judge correctly applied the second Reynolds prong.
The facts of consequence in this litigated case included who had the motive or
intent to engage in the sexual act and who initiated the sexual act at issue. As
such, the military judge was not incorrect in his finding that the fact of
consequence made more probable by this evidence was Appellant’s motive in
engaging in the charged conduct, and the fact of consequence made less
probable is that CS initiated the sexual acts at issue.
   As to the third Reynolds prong, we find the military judge properly applied
the Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test. We find no error in the military judge’s
conclusion the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, the military judge found

                                      13
                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

that the probative value was “strong” as it indicates both a motive from
Appellant and refutes an implication that CS initiated the sexual acts. The
military judge also acknowledged the risk of unfair prejudice was low, as the
statements at issue did not portray Appellant as someone who enjoyed
engaging in unwanted sexual acts with unwilling participants. Rather, these
statements show that Appellant enjoyed the challenge of gaining consent from
straight men for sexual activity.
    We conclude that the military judge properly applied the Reynolds test, and
his ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we hold that the military
judge did not commit error in admitting the evidence. We further note that the
military judge provided the panel a proper limiting instruction.
C. Circuit Trial Counsel’s Closing Argument
   Appellant claims that circuit trial counsel engaged in “improper argument,”
by (1) misstating the law to the members; (2) impermissibly exceeding the
scope of Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence; (3) improperly using gender-based
hypotheticals; and (4) arguing the members should convict Appellant to “give
meaning to [CS’s] year.”
   1. Additional Background
    In support of his claims, Appellant points to selections of circuit trial
counsel’s closing argument and rebuttal argument. We have included the full
paragraphs and italicized the specific portions with which Appellant takes
issue.
    For his first claim, that the argument misstated the law, Appellant points
to the following:
       Members, you were presented with one set of facts in this case,
       but two very different understandings of the law. On one hand,
       you’ve been presented with the Defense’s view and that is, if
       someone drinks to the point that they pass out on a couch, fall
       asleep, fall asleep in the back of a car, vomit repeatedly, that if
       that person can’t remember a portion of the evening, that they
       cannot be sexually assaulted. That in other words, unless you
       have an eyewitness, there can be no conviction.
       On the other hand, is the Government’s view which is the law,
       which states, and we’ll talk about some of the judge’s
       instructions shortly, that you are not stuck with just throwing up
       your hands and going, “Well, there’s no eyewitness, therefore, I
       cannot convict.”
       That is not the law, [m]embers. What the military judge
       instructs you in this case is that you must take into account all

                                       14
        United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

of the evidence to determine whether there was consent, and
what we know from this case, what we know from Friday night,
what we know from Saturday night, what we know from Sunday
morning is not that all of a sudden [CS] completely changes his
personality and is interested in [Appellant]. There is not a shred
of evidence. Not a shred.
....
. . . The military judge at no point tells you and the law does not
require, what the Defense has invited you to do in this case, which
again, is to throw up your hands and say, “Well, if someone is
that drunk, I cannot convict.” It’s not the law.
....
Number one, [Appellant] must get consent from a sexual
partner. That is relatively obvious. The law does not conflict
with your common sense. Someone who wants to engage in
sexual activity must get consent from their partner. In other
words, it’s not [CS’s] job to say, “No.” It was [Appellant’s] job to
make sure that he says, “Yes.” That there is, in fact, consent, and
the judge’s instruction on consent makes that very clear. He
defines consent as a freely given agreement to the conduct at
issue by a competent person. Someone who, when propositioned,
someone who when asked say, “Yes,” and in a way that makes it
clear to everyone in that encounter that the answer is actually yes.
“Yup, I understand what’s going on and I am down for this.”
That’s what the law requires, and it is on [Appellant] to make
sure that that happens.
The judge additionally instructs you that an expression of lack
of consent or conduct means there is no consent. In other words,
when you heard, [m]embers, that Friday night when [CS] said,
“Thank you, but that’s not something I’m interested in at all,”
that was the rule going forward unless there was something clear
that contradicted that. And you heard nothing like that.
Nothing. You see, [CS] did what we would hope an Airman
[would do] in the situation that he was confronted with. “I
appreciate the compliment, [Appellant], but why don’t we just
forget that happened and have a good weekend.” And that’s
exactly what you saw [CS] do for the rest of that weekend. “No,
thank you. I’m not interested. But let’s still have a good time.”
....

                                15
               United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

       Consent means [Appellant] needed to ask [CS], get permission
       from [CS], “Hey, you said no already. Do you want me to do this?”
       And had to have done it with someone, right, where in
       [Appellant’s] mind it’s obvious that everyone is on the same page.
(Emphasis added).
   For his second claim, that the circuit trial counsel impermissibly exceeded
the scope of Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence, Appellant points to the following:
       Members, consider from [Appellant’s] perspective, then, what life
       was like going into Saturday. Because this is what [Appellant]
       was thinking about, and the military judge gives you this
       instruction. “You may consider evidence that [Appellant] told
       [SrA KE] that he enjoyed engaging in sexual activity with
       straight men, and enjoyed the challenge of straight men for the
       purpose, if any, to determine whether [Appellant] had a motive to
       engage in the charged conduct.”
       In other words, on Friday night when [CS] shot him down, here
       was the challenge. This was the fun. This was to see if whether
       Saturday night, [CS] would get drunk enough so that what
       [Appellant] was interested in very openly with his friends, liking
       trying to turn straight men, would pan out. And so ask yourself,
       other than alcohol, other than alcohol, what changed between
       Friday and Saturday night?
       ....
       What happened, [m]embers, is clear from the evidence, clear
       from, if nothing else, the layout of this house, that this was an
       opportunity. It was an opportunity for [Appellant] to do what he
       had an interest in, which was to at that point take advantage of
       [CS]. Put another tally on his belt. Put another trophy on his
       shelf, and it didn’t take much, [m]embers.
   For his third claim, that the circuit trial counsel improperly argued gender-
based hypotheticals, Appellant points to the following argument:
       And, [m]embers, I encourage you to think about when you are
       back in deliberations, if this were a male on female sexual assault
       whether we would even be talking about some of the silly things
       that you’ve heard in this courtroom. If this were a male on female
       sexual assault, does anyone reasonably think that being in a hot
       tub with someone, not touching, not sitting on each other’s lap,
       but being in a hot tub with Uncle Frank means that you want to
       have sex with that person, or is it simply because the victim is a

                                       16
               United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

      male in this case we’re going to treat him differently? That unless
      they are 12 feet or more from each other, there must be consent or
      reasonable mistake of fact as to consent. How insulting. How
      insulting.
      You also heard that early on at Fremont Street, this much
      vaunted handholding. Members, just look at the video. Just look
      at the video, because what happened in that video, you can
      watch it for yourself, is that [Appellant] is standing in the middle
      of [CS] and [SrA GM], and the Defense wants to make a lot of
      hay out [of] this. Well, it was [CS] that grabbed his hand
      first. . . . No one thought it was sexual, not [Appellant], no one.
      They were swinging their arms around acting like idiots. Having
      fun. Exactly what [CS] promised he would do. Overlook the
      weirdness from the night before and just move on. To try to make
      that sexual, to try to get out of these witnesses and force the
      Government to give you a video showing you what actually
      happened. There is nothing that is sexual about that encounter
      whatsoever, and again, if that were a woman, to say that they
      briefly held hands and swung their arms around acting like fools,
      that that somehow amounts to consent to sex is insulting to your
      intelligence and understanding of the common sense and
      knowledge of the ways of the world.
      ....
      . . . There is nothing else at Fremont Street that indicates that
      [CS] was all of a sudden sexually interested in [Appellant].
      What? That they drank together because of the two of them were
      of drinking age? Ask yourself, if it were a female victim, would
      you accept that a male and a female drinking together is evidence
      that they want to have sex? How insulting.
(Emphasis added).
   For his fourth claim, that the circuit trial counsel impermissibly argued
that the members should convict Appellant to “give meaning to [CS’s] year,”
Appellant points to the following:
      [Circuit Trial Counsel (CTC)]: And so [CS], and being honest
      with you, gave to you the people that know more than almost
      anyone else in this world what actually happened in that house.
      Leaves to you the charge of doing the right thing, to give meaning
      to his year and to convict [Appellant].
      [Circuit Defense Counsel]: Objection, that’s an improper
      argument.

                                      17
                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

       [Military judge]: Overruled. You may continue, [circuit] [t]rial
       [c]ounsel.
       [CTC]: And based on what you know, what you’ve heard, and
       what you’ve seen, to convict [Appellant] of what he’s done.
(Emphasis added).
    At the end of circuit trial counsel’s closing arguments, the military judge
gave the panel members a recess, but before doing so, gave the following
instruction:
       Before we go on that recess, I do want to give you just a couple
       of reminders. Counsel for both sides may refer to the instructions
       that I have given you, but as a reminder, to the extent that any
       of their reference differs from the instructions that I gave you,
       you must accept my statement as being correct. You will be
       provided a written copy of the instructions in this case.
       As a reminder, consent means a freely given agreement to the
       conduct at issue by a competent person. There are no specific
       actions that are required to demonstrate consent. All the
       surrounding circumstances are to be considered in determining
       whether a person gave consent.
   2. Law
    The issue of “[i]mproper argument is a question of law that we review de
novo.” United States v. Marsh, 70 M.J. 101, 104 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citation
omitted). However, if the defense does not object to the argument by trial
counsel, we review the issue for plain error. Id. (citing United States v.
Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2007)). To establish plain error, an
appellant “must prove that: ‘(1) there was an error; (2) it was plain or obvious;
(3) and the error materially prejudiced a substantial right.’” Id. (quoting
Erickson, 65 M.J. at 223). “As all three prongs must be satisfied in order to find
plain error, the failure to establish any one of the prongs is fatal to a plain
error claim.” United States v. Bungert, 62 M.J. 346, 348 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
“Appellant has the burden of persuading this Court that there was plain error.”
United States v. Barraza[ M]artinez, 58 M.J. 173, 175 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citation
omitted).
   When preserved by objection, this court reviews allegations of improper
argument for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sewell, 76 M.J. 14, 18
(C.A.A.F. 2017) (citations omitted).
    “In his arguments, trial counsel may strike hard blows, but he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted). Trial counsel may “argue the evidence of record, as well as

                                       18
                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

all reasonable inferences fairly derived from such evidence.” Id. (citation
omitted). “He may not, however, inject his personal opinion into the panel’s
deliberations, inflame the members’ passions or prejudices, or ask them to
convict the accused on the basis of criminal predisposition.” Id. (citations
omitted).
    “Relief will be granted only if the trial counsel’s misconduct ‘actually
impacted on a substantial right of an accused (i.e., resulted in prejudice).’”
United States v. Frey, 73 M.J. 245, 249 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (citation omitted). “In
assessing prejudice, we look at the cumulative impact of any prosecutorial
misconduct on the accused’s substantial rights and the fairness and integrity
of his trial.” United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 184 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citation
omitted). Fletcher set out three factors to weigh in the determination of the
prejudicial effect of improper argument: “(1) the severity of the misconduct, (2)
the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and (3) the weight of the
evidence supporting the conviction.” Id. “In other words, prosecutorial
misconduct by a trial counsel will require reversal when the trial counsel’s
comments, taken as a whole, were so damaging that we cannot be confident
that the members convicted the appellant on the basis of the evidence alone.”
Id.
    Finally, “the argument by a trial counsel must be viewed within the context
of the entire court-martial.” United States v. Baer, 53 M.J. 235, 238 (C.A.A.F
2000). Thus, “[t]he focus of our inquiry should not be on words in isolation, but
on the argument as viewed in context.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
   3. Analysis
       a. Misstating the Law
   As there was no objection, we review this claim for plain error.
    Appellant first contends that trial counsel’s argument attacked a “straw
man argument” that trial defense counsel had not made. However, Appellant
cites no legal authority as to why this is error and we conclude that it is not.
When we view circuit trial counsel’s argument in context, we read it as
countering Appellant’s defense at trial that CS’s memory or lack of memory
could not be trusted and that the panel should disregard CS’s testimony as to
lack of consent. “Under the ‘invited response’ or ‘invited reply’ doctrine, the
prosecution is not prohibited from offering a comment that provides a fair
response to claims made by the defense.” United States v. Carter, 61 M.J. 30,
33 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citations omitted).
   Next, Appellant argues that when circuit trial counsel told the panel
members that CS had to say “yes,” what he really meant was that it was a
“verbal” yes. We disagree. What circuit trial counsel said after that was:

                                        19
                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

“[S]omeone who, when propositioned, someone who when asked say[s], ‘Yes,’
and in a way that makes it clear to everyone in that encounter that the answer
is actually yes.” We read circuit trial counsel’s argument as just that,
argument, and we do not read this as an argument requiring a verbal “yes,”
but action that would reflect an affirmative response to both individuals
involved, not a literal or verbal “yes, I consent.” However, even if circuit trial
counsel’s argument can be read to require the word “yes,” the military judge’s
curative instruction after circuit trial counsel’s closing argument cured any
prejudice.
    Finally, Appellant contends that circuit trial counsel improperly shifted the
burden of proof to Appellant when he argued, “[c]onsent means [Appellant]
needed to ask [CS], get permission from [CS], ‘Hey, you said no already. Do you
want me to do this?’ And had to have done it with someone, right, where in
[Appellant’s] mind it’s obvious that everyone is on the same page.” While we
do not conclude that Appellant needed to use those words or any magic words
to obtain consent, this goes to the instruction that the military judge provided.
The military judge instructed the members that “consent means a freely given
agreement to the conduct at issue by a competent person. There are no specific
actions that are required to demonstrate consent. All the surrounding
circumstances are to be considered in determining whether a person gave
consent.” Additionally, the military judge instructed the members that it was
the Government’s burden to prove that the sexual acts occurred without
consent. Here, Appellant does not demonstrate how the burden was shifted
and we do not find that that circuit trial counsel was telling the members that
that Appellant had to literally use those or any specific words. We also do not
agree that circuit trial counsel was telling the panel that Appellant was
required to testify.
    Upon considering circuit trial counsel’s argument viewed within the
context of the entire court-martial and not looking at the words in isolation, we
conclude that Appellant has not met his burden in persuading this court that
there was error. Because he does not meet the first plain error prong, we do
not reach the other two. See Bungert, 62 M.J. at 348. (“As all three prongs must
be satisfied in order to find plain error, the failure to establish any one of the
prongs is fatal to a plain error claim.”).
       b. Exceeding the Scope of 404(b) Evidence
   As there was no objection, we review this claim for plain error.
   Here, Appellant does not attack the words that circuit trial counsel used,
but the inference that Appellant draws from the words. Appellant argues that
the first inference is that Appellant “supplies straight men with alcohol and
then takes advantage of them when they are incapacitated.” However, as

                                       20
                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

Appellant points out, he was charged with two specifications of sexual assault,
including one which alleged CS was asleep. Therefore, even assuming this was
error, and that it was plain or obvious, we cannot find that the claimed error
materially prejudiced a substantial right when the panel found him not guilty
of the “asleep” specification. Put another way, Appellant cannot show a
reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted in the absence of
these arguments.
    Appellant contends that the next inference concerns propensity when
circuit trial counsel argued:
       What happened, [m]embers, is clear from the evidence, clear
       from, if nothing else, the layout of this house, that this was an
       opportunity. It was an opportunity for [Appellant] to do what he
       had an interest in, which was to at that point take advantage of
       [CS]. Put another tally on his belt. Put another trophy on his
       shelf, and it didn’t take much, [m]embers.
    We do not see this as a propensity argument because Mil. R. Evid. 404(b)
specifically allows evidence as it relates to opportunity and motive. The
military judge properly allowed this evidence in and could have allowed this
evidence for several reasons, including motive. An appellate court may affirm
the decision of a trial court on the theory it articulated “or on any other basis
that we find in the record.” Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, 346 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Bess, 80 M.J. 1, 11–12 (C.A.A.F. 2020) (citations omitted)
(discussing the upholding of a trial judge’s decision on appeal for a different
reason).
    That said, we are concerned with the small portion of the argument in
which circuit trial counsel argues that “[i]t was an opportunity for [Appellant]
to do what he had an interest in, which was to at that point take advantage of
[CS]. Put another tally on his belt. Put another trophy on his shelf . . . .” While
we do not see this as propensity evidence, we think it is a close call. Assuming
arguendo that these statements constituted improper argument, we test for
prejudice.
    In testing for material prejudice, the first Fletcher factor considers the
severity of the misconduct. 62 M.J. at 184. On this matter, we note that the
“lack of a defense objection is some measure of the minimal impact of a
prosecutor’s improper comment.” United States v. Gilley, 56 M.J. 113, 123
(C.A.A.F. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, we find
that the comment was minor. The comment was isolated, not the gravamen of
trial counsel’s argument, and surrounded by appropriate argument. We find
the comment had minimal impact, if any, on the findings.

                                        21
                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

   Regarding the second Fletcher factor, curative measures taken, there were
none. As mentioned above, trial defense counsel did not object and the military
judge did not sua sponte draw attention to this one sentence in the argument.
    As to the third Fletcher factor, the weight of the evidence supporting the
conviction, we find this factor weighs in the Government’s favor. Our
assessment here relies on our analysis for the first and seventh appellate
issues as to this point.
   In conclusion, we find that Appellant has failed to meet his burden to
demonstrate that any error from the circuit trial counsel’s reference to Mil. R.
Evid. 404(b) evidence resulted in material prejudice to a substantial right.
After considering trial counsel’s comments as a whole, we are confident that
Appellant was convicted based on the evidence alone.
       c. Using Gender-Based Hypotheticals
   As there was no objection, we review this claim for plain error.
     Appellant contends that the circuit trial counsel asked the members three
times to think about the facts as though this were a male-on-female sexual
assault allegation. According to Appellant, the gender of an accused and victim
“should not affect the analysis” and “[p]erhaps this was the [circuit trial
counsel]’s point, but it was made so crudely that the members may have
received a different message.” (Emphasis added). While Appellant claims that
“[i]t is deeply problematic for trial counsel to hatch gender-based hypotheticals
to illustrate a point,” he does not provide any legal authority for this position.
    This court has addressed the same argument hypothetical concerning the
genders of an appellant and victim. See United States v. Emas, No. ACM 40020,
2022 CCA LEXIS 373, *48–50 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 21 Jun. 2022) (unpub. op.),
rev. denied, 83 M.J. 73 (C.A.A.F. 2022). We agree with the analysis in Emas.
“[W]e are at a loss to understand, how Appellant’s conduct would be any more
or less criminal by virtue of the gender of his victim.” Id. at *49. Upon
considering the argument viewed within the context of the entire court-
martial, we conclude that Appellant has not met his burden in persuading this
court that there was error. However, even if we were to find that this was error
and that it was obvious, Appellant does not argue actual prejudice and we find
no prejudice because, as a matter of law, the consent standard does not
fluctuate based upon gender. He states the argument “was a gratuitous
argument that would only serve to mislead the members.” We do not agree as
we do not find sufficient support in the record that discussing gender would
mislead the members. As such, Appellant cannot show a reasonable probability
that he would not have been convicted in the absence of this argument.

                                       22
                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

       d. Give Meaning to CS’s Year
   As there was an objection, we review this claim for abuse of discretion.
    Appellant claims the military judge abused his discretion in overruling trial
defense counsel’s objection to circuit trial counsel’s argument that CS left the
panel with “the charge of doing the right thing, to give meaning to his year and
to convict [Appellant].” The objection to the argument was “that’s an improper
argument,” and the military judge summarily overruled the objection.
    We agree with Appellant and find the military judge abused his discretion.
There was nothing relevant about the argument for findings. As such, this was
error, and the error was obvious. Therefore, we must test for prejudice. As
explained above, we use the three Fletcher factors to weigh the prejudicial
effect of improper argument.
    First, the severity of the misconduct, was low. We do not find that one
sentence at issue, compared to the entire closing argument, to be material or
severe. While not relevant, it was one sentence in pages and pages of closing
and rebuttal closing argument. The argument did not continue after the
objection even though the military judge overruled the objection. Counsel’s
very next statement was, “And based on what you know, what you’ve heard,
and what you’ve seen, to convict [Appellant] of what he’s done.” Counsel’s
argument finished there.
  Second, as the military judge overruled the objection, there were no
measures adopted to cure the misconduct.
    Third, the weight of the evidence supporting the conviction was high. The
record shows that CS told Appellant that he was not interested in him sexually
on more than one occasion. CS spoke to Appellant to clear the air between the
two of them, but also to make sure Appellant understood that he was not
interested in men. Nonetheless, Appellant performed oral sex on CS and CS
tried to push Appellant’s head away from him to no avail.
   Here, this improper argument by a trial counsel will not require reversal
because circuit trial counsel’s comments, taken as a whole, were not so
damaging that we cannot be confident that the members convicted Appellant
on the basis of the evidence alone. Therefore, we conclude that while the
military judge abused his discretion, there was no prejudice.
D. Convening Authority’s Jurisdiction Over Appellant
   Appellant argues that the convening authority, a member of the Space
Force, did not properly exercise jurisdiction over Appellant, a member of the
Air Force. He also argues, as an alternative, that the transfer of the referred
charges to a parallel convening authority failed because the previous

                                       23
               United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

convening authority transferred these charges to a convening authority that
did not exist.
   1. Additional Background
    The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY20 NDAA)
redesignated the United States Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) as the
United States Space Force (USSF), a separate armed service within the
Department of the Air Force, effective 20 December 2019. See Pub. L. No. 116-
92, §§ 952–53, 133 Stat. 1198, 1561–64 (2019); see also 10 U.S.C. § 9081.
    Major General (Maj Gen) John E. Shaw, the then-commander of the United
States Air Force (USAF) Space Operations Command (USAF SpOC; formerly
the Fourteenth Air Force at Vandenberg AFB, California) referred this case to
a general court-martial on 31 March 2020. On 19 October 2020, Maj Gen Shaw
signed a transfer of authority memorandum for this case pursuant to R.C.M.
601(g) and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-201, Administration of Military
Justice, ¶ 9.5 (30 Oct. 2019). The memorandum explained that in accordance
with Secretarial guidance and in anticipation of USAF SpOC being
disestablished as a unit, Maj Gen Shaw was transferring this court-martial to
the commander of the USSF Space Operations Command (USSF SpOC
FIELDCOM at Peterson Space Force Base (SFB), Colorado). The
memorandum identified the USSF SpOC commander as a parallel convening
authority having general court-martial jurisdiction within the broader
Department of the Air Force and that the transfer of authority would become
effective upon the establishment of the new FIELDCOM.
    On 20 October 2020, the Secretary of the Air Force issued a memorandum
entitled United States Space Force and United States Air Force Space Delta
and Garrison Convening Authority Designations, which designated the USAF
SpOC commander a general court-martial convening authority and stated that
USSF SpOC was the successor organization. It also explained that
commanders of units which had not yet organizationally aligned within the
United States Space Force would assume their convening authority status
upon the latter of the date that the organizational change occurred or the date
of the Secretary’s memorandum.
   The USAF SpOC was inactivated on 20 October 2020 and re-designated the
USSF SpOC, a field command at Peterson SFB. The commander of the newly
designated USSF SpOC, Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Stephen N. Whiting,
accepted Maj Gen Shaw’s 19 October 2020 transfer of this court-martial on 23
October 2020.
    At trial, the Defense objected to the transfer of charges from Maj Gen Shaw
to Lt Gen Whiting. The Defense argued that the transfer was not conducted in
accordance with R.C.M. 601(g). This issue was litigated at Appellant’s court-

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

martial. After both sides briefed the issue, the military judge made findings of
fact and conclusions of law. The military judge found “that the transfer of
charges from Maj Gen Shaw to Lt Gen Whiting was an authorized transmittal
of charges between parallel convening authorities and [did] not negate the
jurisdiction of th[e] court-martial.”
   2. Law
    This court reviews questions of jurisdiction de novo. United States v.
Harmon, 63 M.J. 98, 101 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citation omitted). We also review
questions of statutory and regulatory interpretation de novo. United States v.
Atchak, 75 M.J. 193, 195 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citation omitted). “When challenged
at trial, the prosecution must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of
evidence.” United States v. Hennis, 79 M.J. 370, 374–75 (C.A.A.F. 2020)
(footnote, internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    “Jurisdiction depends upon a properly convened court, composed of
qualified members chosen by a proper convening authority, and with charges
properly referred.” United States v. Adams, 66 M.J. 255, 258 (C.A.A.F. 2008)
(citations omitted). “When charges are referred to a court-martial, that court
retains jurisdiction over the case from the point of referral through
authentication of the record by the military judge, except when the convening
authority withdraws the charges from the court-martial under R.C.M. 604(a).”
United States v. Williams, 55 M.J. 302, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citation omitted).
    “An accused should not ordinarily be tried by a court-martial convened by
a member of a different armed force except when the circumstances described
in [subparagraphs (e)(2)](A) or (B) exist. However, failure to comply with this
policy does not affect an otherwise valid referral.” R.C.M. 201(e)(3)(B). Rule for
Courts-Martial 601(g) states,
       If it is impracticable for the original convening authority to
       continue exercising authority over the charges, the convening
       authority may cause the charges, even if referred, to be
       transmitted to a parallel convening authority. This transmittal
       must be in writing and in accordance with such regulations as
       the Secretary concerned may prescribe. Subsequent actions
       taken by the parallel convening authority are within the sole
       discretion of that convening authority.
See also AFI 51-201, ¶ 9.5 (citing the same language from R.C.M. 601(g)). A
parallel convening authority is “defined as a convening authority of the same
level.” Id.
   “Unless otherwise limited by superior competent authority, general courts-
martial may be convened by . . . any commander designated by the Secretary
concerned or empowered by the President.” R.C.M. 504(b)(1). “Under

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                 United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a commissioned officer
commanding for the time being, a successor in command, or any person
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction may act under this section in
place of the convening authority.” Article 60b(a)(5), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 860b(a)(5)
   3. Analysis
    Appellant makes two arguments concerning jurisdiction. First, he claims
that the convening authority was a member of the Space Force while Appellant
was a member of the Air Force, thus based on R.C.M. 201(e)(3), the court-
martial lacked jurisdiction. Second, Appellant argues that the transfer of
convening authority “broke the chain of jurisdiction, divesting the court-
martial of jurisdiction” because “[w]hen Maj Gen [Shaw] attempted to transfer
to a parallel convening authority, that authority did not exist.” Appellant
contends that transferring to a non-existent convening authority means there
was, for a period of four days, no convening authority responsible for the
referred charges and this invalidated the prior referral. As outlined below, we
disagree with both arguments.
    As to Appellant’s R.C.M. 201 argument, he claims that because the
circumstances described in subparagraphs (e)(2)(A) or (B) of the Rule do not
apply, jurisdiction does not apply. We agree with Appellant that the two
exceptions: (1) commanders of a unified or specified combatant command and
(2) commanding officer of a joint command or joint task force do not apply.
However, Appellant’s argument fails because the Rule itself explains that
“failure to comply with this policy does not affect an otherwise valid referral.”
R.C.M. 201(e)(3)(B). Here, Appellant does not claim that the referral was
otherwise invalid.
   As to Appellant’s second argument, that a gap of four days means that there
was no parallel command to transfer to, we are unconvinced.
    This court has reviewed a similar issue. United States v. Prescott, No. ACM
39931, 2022 CCA LEXIS 205, at *79 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1 Apr. 2022) (unpub.
op.), rev. denied, 83 M.J. 93 (C.A.A.F. 2022). In Prescott this court noted that:
       The basic flaw in Appellant’s argument is that jurisdiction is not
       predicated on the continuous existence of the convening
       authority that originally convened the court, or of any particular
       [general court-martial convening authority]. Instead, the UCMJ
       relies upon actors with appropriate authority taking actions at
       the relevant point in time.
Id. Here, just like in Prescott, Appellant’s court-martial was properly convened
and, as the military judge correctly concluded, the Appellant’s “position ignores
the wording of the transfer, seeks to have this Court institute an unreasonable

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

application of the rules and builds in a timing requirement that is not present
in the wording of Rule for Court[s]-Martial 601(g) or AFI 51-201.” Both Lt Gen
Whiting and Maj Gen Shaw were both valid general court-martial convening
authorities.
    We conclude, as did the military judge, that on 19 October 2020, while still
operating in his status as a general court-martial convening authority,
Maj Gen Shaw appropriately initiated a transfer of Appellant’s court-martial
to another general court-martial convening authority, which he knew would be
created by subsequent Secretarial action two days later on 21 October 2020.
We find this to be an appropriate transfer of parallel convening authority
jurisdiction because Maj Gen Shaw initiated the transfer of authority for this
case while he was still a general court-martial convening authority, and
ultimately transferred this case to a general court-martial convening authority
created two days later. As such, his actions complied with R.C.M. 601(g) and
AFI 51-201, ¶ 9.5.
   Applying de novo standard to the question of jurisdiction, we find against
Appellant.

                               III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. See
Articles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the
findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                     FOR THE COURT

                     CAROL K. JOYCE
                     Clerk of the Court

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