Court Opinion

ID: 9411926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 16:01:51.873675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:18.595884
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                              For the Eighth Circuit
                          ___________________________

                                  No. 21-3052
                          ___________________________

               Pollyanna Burns; Rhonda Tomoson; Diane Gooding,

                        lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants,

                                             v.

School Service Employees Union Local 284; Independent School District No. 191,

                       lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees.
                                        ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                          for the District of Minnesota
                                  ____________

                            Submitted: February 14, 2023
                               Filed: July 28, 2023
                                  ____________

Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

       The principal issue in this appeal is whether a school district and a labor union
violated the free speech rights of union members by deducting union dues from
employee paychecks. We agree with the district court* that the school district’s
employees failed to state a claim, and we therefore affirm the judgment dismissing
the action.

                                          I.

       The appellants are food service managers employed by the Independent School
District 191 in Burnsville, Minnesota. In 2015, Pollyanna Burns and Rhonda
Tomoson signed a contract to join the union that represents service workers in the
school district, the School Service Employees International Union Local 284. Diane
Gooding joined Local 284 by executing a similar agreement in 2019. These contracts
authorized the school district to deduct monthly union dues from the union member’s
paycheck and to send those dues to Local 284 on the union member’s behalf.

       The employees terminated their membership in the union in March 2020, and
later sued the school district and Local 284. They alleged that the deduction of dues
from their paychecks violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and also contravened Minnesota law.

       In support of their claims, the appellants relied on legal developments relating
to employees who are not members of a union. Minnesota law permits public
employees to bargain collectively with the State by designating a labor union to serve
as the exclusive representative for employees in their bargaining unit. Minn. Stat.
§ 179A.06, subdiv. 2. If an employee declines to join the union, then state law
permits the union to require the employee to contribute a so-called “fair-share” or
“agency” fee. Id., subdiv. 3. This fee is equal to the cost of membership dues, less
the costs of benefits available only to members.

      *
       The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.

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      In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), the Supreme
Court upheld a similar regime that allowed public sector unions to compel the
payment of fees from state employees who chose not to join the unions. Five years
ago, in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees,
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), the Court overruled Abood, and held that public-
sector unions violated the First Amendment by deducting fair-share fees from
nonmember employees without first obtaining affirmative consent. Id. at 2486.

       Unlike the plaintiff in Janus, the employees in this case were union members.
To join Local 284, each signed an agreement to “request” membership in the union
and to “authorize” the union to represent them for the purpose of bargaining
collectively with their employer. In exchange for the benefits of membership in Local
284, each employee agreed to “request and voluntarily authorize” the school district
to deduct monthly union dues from her paycheck and transmit the union dues to Local
284. Each employee further agreed that if she resigned her union membership, then
her authorization to the school district would be “automatically renewed as an
irrevocable check-off from year to year,” unless she revoked it in writing “during the
period not less than thirty (30) days and not more than forty-five (45) days before the
annual anniversary date” of the agreement.

       On March 5, 2020, the employees notified Local 284 that they terminated their
membership in the union. Since this notification fell outside of the termination period
specified in each employee’s union membership agreement, the school district
continued to deduct monthly dues until the “anniversary date” of their agreement.
One year later, the employees sued Local 284 and the school district under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the deduction of union dues—before and after they resigned
from Local 284—violated their rights under the First Amendment as incorporated
against the States. They also asserted claims under Minnesota law for alleged
conversion, unjust enrichment, civil theft, tortious interference with contractual
relations, and unlawful wage deductions.

                                         -3-
       The district court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim, and
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims under state law. The
court reasoned that the employees voluntarily agreed to the deduction of dues when
they joined the union, and that the Janus decision concerning the rights of
nonmembers does not require any special waiver of rights by union members. We
review the district court’s decision de novo.

                                          II.

       Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a defendant whose actions
were taken “under color of” state law and deprived another of a federal right. Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 931 (1982). The right to be free from
compelled speech is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Janus, 138
S. Ct. at 2463. These constitutional provisions, however, prohibit only state action.
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019).

      A private entity’s acts may qualify as state action in “limited circumstances.”
Id. For the First Amendment to apply, the acts of the private entity must have their
“source in state authority.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. We concluded in Hoeckman v.
Education Minnesota, 41 F.4th 969, 978 (8th Cir. 2022), that when a public sector
union—a private entity—deducts dues from its union members, the deduction is not
based on state authority, but rather on a private agreement between the union and the
union member. We therefore ruled in Hoeckman that a § 1983 claim brought by two
union members against their unions for deducting dues failed for lack of state action.
Id. Similarly, Local 284’s deduction of dues for these employees was authorized by
private agreement between the union and the employee. The employees’ § 1983
claims against the union are foreclosed by Hoeckman.

      The school district, however, is a public entity, see Minn. Stat. § 123A.55, so
our conclusion regarding deductions by a private entity does not control. Even so,

                                          -4-
the school district argues that the employees failed to allege sufficient state action by
the district. The school district contends that it performed merely a “ministerial role”
of honoring the private agreement between the union and its members, and that the
employees seek to hold the district liable for the actions of private parties. See Blum
v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982). We need not address this argument.
Assuming for the sake of analysis that the school district engaged in state action, the
free speech claims fail for other reasons.

      In the wake of Janus, every circuit to consider the matter has concluded that
the deduction of union dues under a valid contract between the union and a member
does not violate the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit described a “swelling
chorus of courts recognizing that Janus does not extend a First Amendment right to
avoid paying union dues.” Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2020).
Janus concerned compelled extraction of fees from non-union members; the opinion
said nothing about union members who “freely chose to join a union and voluntarily
authorized the deduction of union dues, and who thus consented to subsidizing a
union.” Bennett v. Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 991
F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2021).

       The employees nonetheless maintain that the reasoning of Janus extends to
union members who authorized the deduction of dues. They rely on the Court’s
statement in Janus that “[n]either an agency fee nor any other payment to the union
may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to
collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay.” Janus,
138 S. Ct. at 2486 (emphasis added). The employees argue that the phrase “nor any
other payment to the union” must include union membership dues.

       The sentence from Janus on which the employees rely, however, refers to any
other payment to the union that may be deducted from “a nonmember’s wages.” The
decision concluded only that a nonmember’s rights were violated by an automatic

                                          -5-
deduction without affirmative consent. Janus did not create “a new First Amendment
waiver requirement for union members before dues are deducted pursuant to a
voluntary agreement.” Belgau, 975 F.3d at 952; see Hendrickson v. AFSCME
Council 18, 992 F.3d 950, 962 (10th Cir. 2021). By signing a union membership
contract, an employee “clearly and affirmatively” waives her right to refrain from
joining the union, and consents to fund the union according to the terms of the
contract. Ramon Baro v. Lake Cnty. Fed’n of Tchrs. Loc. 504, 57 F.4th 582, 586 (7th
Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 22-1096, 2023 WL 3937633 (June 12, 2023). The First
Amendment does not provide the employees with an opportunity to “disregard
promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law.” Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991).

       The employees assert that they were coerced into their contractual relationship
with Local 284, because they were forced to choose between joining the union and
“paying 100% of dues” or not joining the union and paying 85% of dues through an
agency fee. This argument mischaracterizes their choice: they were “faced with a
constitutional choice—whether or not to join” the union. Oliver v. Serv. Emps. Int’l
Union Loc. 668, 830 F. App’x 76, 79 (3d Cir. 2020). They chose to join the union
and to authorize the school district to deduct dues from their paychecks. They did so
in exchange for the benefits of union membership, and they “assumed the risk that
subsequent changes in the law could alter the cost-benefit balance of their bargain.”
Fischer v. Governor of N.J., 842 F. App’x 741, 753 (3d Cir. 2021).

       For these reasons, we conclude that the employees did not state a claim for a
violation of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
                         ______________________________

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