Court Opinion

ID: 9544166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:52:51.657676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:16.054734
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(dissenting) — The majority opinion, as well written as it is, demonstrates the ability of the law to use logic and traditional legal principles to reach an illogical result.
The essence of the majority opinion is that if the petitioner had physically remained in this state an additional 26 days, some jurisdictional alchemy would have occurred causing this action to be properly within the jurisdiction of the courts.
To me the resolution of this. case is very simple. The legislature has declared that our courts have authority to dissolve a marriage for “a party . . . who is a member *704of the armed forces and [who] is stationed in this state 1 . .” RCW 26.09.030.
Underlying this statute is a legislative determination that members of the armed services are entitled to access to and jurisdiction of our courts to enter a decree of dissolution: Contrary to the majority’s view, I find nothing ambiguous in the statute. Rather it is clear on its face that a petition may be filed by a member of the armed forces who is stationed in this state. The petitioner met these qualifications and should be entitled to a decree.
It seems to me to be absurd to hold that some vague constitutional purpose or need is met by requiring an additional 26 days of physical presence within the state. Once the legislature reached a policy conclusion that a member of the armed forces stationed here could invoke jurisdiction, that policy should be implemented by the courts.
I would affirm the trial court.
Finley, Rosellini, and Hunter, JJ., concur with Brach-TENBACH, J.
Petition for rehearing denied October 10, 1975.