Court Opinion

ID: 9949402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 16:11:37.909477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.573863
License: Public Domain

J-S47027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SHAHEED WARREN                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 923 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 6, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0008204-2014

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                           FILED MARCH 11, 2024

       Shaheed Warren appeals from the order denying his first petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

46. We affirm.

       The pertinent facts and procedural history may be summarized as

follows: In the early morning hours of May 2, 2014, Warren received a ride

from a friend, Cinquetta Perrin, to a bar in Philadelphia. Warren went into the

bar, while Ms. Perrin went to a nearby deli.           Upon leaving the bar at

approximately 1:25 a.m., Warren shot three individuals, two of whom died.

Following an investigation, police arrested Warren and charged him with

murder and related crimes.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S47027-23

      Warren waived a jury trial, and his bench trial began on March 19, 2015.

At that time, Warren was represented by court-appointed counsel. However,

trial was continued and did not resume until November 2015. At the start of

the November trial date, court-appointed counsel withdrew and was replaced

by privately-retained counsel, who was hired two days prior.

      At trial, Ms. Perrin testified she saw Warren leave the bar among a crowd

of people and pull a gun from his waist before he fired multiple shots toward

people in the crowd. A second witness, Jerry Carroll, also testified that he had

seen the shooting and identified Warren as the shooter. A third witness, Andre

Shaw, testified that he worked at the bar, and he knew Warren from seeing

him there. He also testified that Warren was involved in a minor altercation

before closing, and that he let Warren out of the door “seconds” before the

shooting began. After the shooting, Warren fled toward a “hack stand,” and

he then left the area in a hack taxi. The driver of the taxi, Randolph Joyner,

testified at trial and identified Warren as the occupant of his vehicle. N.T.,

11/23/15, at 112.

      On November 25, 2015, the trial court found Warren guilty of two counts

of first-degree murder and related charges.        The trial court proceeded

immediately to sentencing and imposed an aggregate term of life in prison

and a consecutive term of twenty to forty years of incarceration.

      Warren appealed to this Court.     On June 20, 2017, we affirmed his

judgment of sentence, and, on January 22, 2018, our Supreme Court denied

Warren’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Warren, 174

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A.3d 122 (Pa. Super. 2017) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 179

A.3d 457 (Pa. 2018).

      Warren filed a pro se PCRA petition on April 5, 2019. In that petition,

Warren raised three instances of trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness: 1)

failing to consult with him and gaining his consent prior to entering into various

stipulations with the Commonwealth at his bench trial; 2) failing to move for

the trial court’s recusal; and 3) failing to investigate, interview or otherwise

subpoena two crucial eyewitnesses to the incident so that they could testify

at trial. In addition, Warren asserted that he was entitled to a new trial due

to prosecutorial misconduct that occurred when the Commonwealth failed to

correct the false testimony of one of its witnesses. After removing the first

court-appointed counsel, the PCRA court appointed another attorney on

January 31, 2020.

      Although represented by counsel, Warren filed an amended pro se PCRA

petition in which he raised two additional claims of trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness: 1) failing to object to the false testimony of a police detective;

and   2)      entering    prior   bad   act   evidence   when   cross-examining   a

Commonwealth witness about an unrelated incident involving Warren’s

girlfriend.

      On October 1, 2021, PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on

Warren’s behalf.         In this petition, Warren alleged that trial counsel was

ineffective for three reasons: 1) failing to properly prepare for trial; 2) not

objecting to the hearsay “flash” description given by the surviving victim,

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Ronald Edwards, who did not testify at trial; and 3) “not calling nor attempting

to subpoena [Edwards] as a witness as this witness identified another

individual as the shooter prior to identifying [Warren].” Regarding this third

claim, Warren also alleged that trial counsel was “further ineffective for failing

to investigate the potential involvement of this other suspect.” In a footnote,

PCRA counsel averred that, after she had discussions with Warren, Warren

agreed to allow counsel to withdraw his remaining pro se claims of

ineffectiveness. PCRA counsel further averred that “other claims raised in the

pro se [PCRA] petition [were] either previously litigated and/or meritless, and

same was explained to [Warren] by counsel.”1

       The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss and PCRA counsel filed a

reply. On April 29, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of

its intent to dismiss Warren’s petition without a hearing. Warren filed a pro

se response on May 20, 2022, in which he claimed PCRA counsel was

ineffective, and he requested to proceed pro se.

       On June 24, 2022, the trial court held a Grazier hearing.2 During the

hearing, the PCRA court advised Warren of his right to have new counsel

appointed     to   represent     him,    given   his   claims   of   PCRA   counsel’s

ineffectiveness, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Betts, 240 A.3d 616 (Pa.

Super. 2020).      Warren elected to have new counsel appointed rather than
____________________________________________

1 Warren disputes these statements by PCRA counsel.

2 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

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proceed pro se. Thereafter, the PCRA Court appointed new counsel (“Betts

counsel”).

      On June 29, 2022, Betts counsel entered his appearance. On February

2, 2023, he filed a letter stating that, after reviewing the case and Warren’s

claims, he found “no legal ineffectiveness with prior counsel.” At a subsequent

status hearing on February 23, 2023, the PCRA court rejected Betts counsel’s

letter, and directed him to file a supplemental letter. That same day, Warren

filed a pro se response to Betts counsel’s letter. On March 30, 2023, Betts

counsel filed a supplemental letter in which he again concluded that PCRA

counsel was not ineffective. In addition, Betts counsel addressed the pro se

claims Warren raised in his original and amended PCRA petitions. By order

entered April 6, 2023, the PCRA court accepted Betts counsel’s letter, and

dismissed Warren’s petition. This appeal followed.

      As directed by the PCRA court, Betts counsel filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement. Therein, Warren asserted that the PCRA court erred in not holding

an evidentiary hearing regarding his claims that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to: 1) properly prepare for trial; 2) object to the hearsay statements

of victim Ronald Evans made by Officer Acevedo that provided a description

of the shooter; and 3) subpoena Ronald Edwards, who initially identified Keith

Carter at the shooter. On June 26, 2023, the PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, in which it addressed these claims and found them to be without

merit.

      Warren raises the following issue on appeal:

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      1. Did the PCRA [court] err by not granting an evidentiary hearing
         to investigate trial counsel’s ineffectiveness with respect to his
         overall preparedness for trial?

Warren’s Brief at 7.

      This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition

under the PCRA is to ascertain whether “the determination of the PCRA court

is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings

in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

      The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without a
      hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine
      issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
      to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
      would be served by further proceedings. [See Pa.R.Crim.P.
      909(B)(2).] To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
      dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that
      he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
      would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
      abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted).

      On appeal Warren raises a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. To

obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective,

a petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's

ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009).                 “Generally, counsel’s

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performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will

only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” Id.

This requires the petitioner to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is

of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her

action or inaction; and (3) counsel’s act or omission prejudiced the petitioner.

Id. at 533.

      In support of his claim that the PCRA court erred in failing to hold an

evidentiary hearing, Warren focuses on the timeline between when trial

counsel was retained and when trial resumed.       Warren acknowledges that

“having a short amount of time to prepare is not per se ineffectiveness.”

Warren’s Brief at 13 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 950 A.2d 294, 313

(Pa. 2008). However, Warren asserts that “it is unreasonable to believe that

an attorney who has less than 36 hours to prepare for a double-homicide and

attempted murder trial can do so adequately.” Warren’s Brief at 13.

      According to Warren, Betts counsel “offered a plethora of relevant but

unanswered questions that could have easily been addressed in an evidentiary

hearing.” Warren’s Brief at 20. Warren further asserts:

       An evidentiary hearing would have, minimally, unearthed: the
      nature, quality, and duration of the communications between
      [Warren] and [trial counsel] and his representatives [if any] prior
      to being retained; the exact date [trial counsel] was retained; the
      extent to which [Warren] knew [co-counsel] would be actively
      assisting in the defense; the cost of representation and other
      contents of [Warren’s] engagement letter/contract; the extent to
      which [trial counsel] had, or could have, contemplated strategy,
      for a double homicide trial, in 36 hours, the extent to which [trial
      counsel] had, or could have, contemplated motions, for a double

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      homicide trial, in 36 hours, including the complete abandonment
      (by trial counsel and the [trial court]) of [prior counsel’s] Motion
      to Compel; [trial counsel’s] ability to investigate and/or locate
      witnesses that could have assisted the defense; his conversations
      with [Warren] regarding his potential testimony; what additional
      evidence the defense sought to obtain when court adjourned on
      11/24/15, what efforts were made to obtain said evidence, and
      why the evidence was unobtainable. These are not new claims
      that the [PCRA] court can casually dismiss by asserting there were
      never presented to the PCRA court. Rather, they accurately serve
      as illustrations of the body of unanswered questions that, first, go
      directly to the unpreparedness of [trial counsel], and by
      extension, [co-counsel]; and second, could have been answered
      with an evidentiary hearing where counsel would have testified
      under oath.

Warren’s Brief at 20-21 (formatting altered).

      The PCRA court found that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted.

In so concluding, the court noted that Warren abandoned the more specific

claims of ineffectiveness raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement, and instead

raised a new claim regarding trial counsel’s alleged overall unpreparedness.

The PCRA court found Warren waived this general allegation because he raised

it for the first time on appeal, see PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/23, at 7-8.

Nevertheless, the court did address the specific ineffectiveness claims Warren

raised in his Rule 1925 statement and explained why an evidentiary hearing

was not warranted.

      We disagree with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Warren waived his

general claim that trial counsel was not prepared for trial.     See Amended

Petition, 10/1/21. However, we agree that Warren’s claim of “unanswered

questions” was not sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Claims of trial

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counsel’s ineffectiveness are not self-proving and therefore cannot be raised

in a vacuum. See generally, Commonwealth v. Pettus, 424 A.2d 1332

(Pa. 1981). Before an evidentiary hearing will be granted, a PCRA petitioner

“must set forth an offer to prove at an appropriate hearing sufficient facts

upon which a reviewing court can conclude that trial counsel may have, in

fact, been ineffective.” Commonwealth v. Begley, 780 A.2d 605, 635 (Pa.

2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pettus, 424 A.2d 1332, 1335 (Pa.

1981)). Warren made no such proffer. Given these circumstances, the PCRA

court did not err in dismissing Warren’s petition without first holding an

evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 961 A.2d 80, 94 (Pa.

2008) (explaining that, in the absence of a sufficient proffer, a petitioner’s

bare assertions would inappropriately convert an evidentiary hearing into a

“fishing expedition” for possible exculpatory evidence).

      Although Warren posits certain questions that could have been

answered by counsel at an evidentiary hearing, he does not proffer any facts

regarding any of his communications with trial counsel. As a participant with

counsel, prior to trial, Warren himself could have answered some of the

questions posed in support of his claim that an evidentiary hearing was

warranted. Moreover, Warren chose to proceed with private counsel only two

days before trial resumed. As such, he cannot now claim that trial counsel did

not have adequate time to prepare. "A defendant's right to choose private

counsel 'must be exercised at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.'"

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Commonwealth v. Broitman, 217 A.3d 297, 300 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Rucker, 761 A.2d 541, 542–43 (Pa. 2000)) (affirming

denial of motion to allow counsel to withdraw and newly retained counsel to

appear on the day of trial). Thus, his only issue on appeal does not entitle him

to post-conviction relief.

      Before concluding, we observe that, after this appeal was pending

before this Court, on May 19, 2023, Warren filed a pro se application for relief

in which he sought the removal of Betts counsel, due to his alleged

ineffectiveness, and the appointment of new counsel.

      We note that Betts was decided prior to our Supreme Court’s decision

in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).             In Betts, this

Court remanded for the appointment of new counsel because both the PCRA

court and PCRA counsel did not recognize the significance of Betts’ preserving

his claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness by raising them in his pro se

response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. Betts, 240 A.3d at 622-23.

In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 402 (Pa. 2021), the High

Court found that “the current Rule 907 procedure for preserving claims of

PCRA counsel ineffectiveness . . . is deeply flawed.” In its place, our Supreme

Court held, “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after

obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Bradley,

261 A.3d at 401 (footnote omitted).

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      As recently stated by this Court: “Bradley did not guarantee a PCRA

petitioner substantive review of claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, nor

did it create an absolute right to remand for development of those claims.”

Commonwealth v. Lawrence, ___ A.3d ___, WL 2024 221021 at *2 (Pa.

Super. 2024). Regarding the need for a remand, in Bradley, our Supreme

Court stated:

      In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
      sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
      ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
      court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
      development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
      claims as an initial matter.

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402 (citation omitted).

      In his application for relief, Warren’s claim that Betts counsel was

ineffective is actually a raised a layered claim of ineffectiveness; he alleges no

direct claims against Betts counsel other than a failure to address his pro se

claims against trial counsel. In making a layered claim of ineffectiveness, a

PCRA petitioner “must properly argue each prong of the three-prong

ineffectiveness test for each separate attorney.” Commonwealth v. Rykard,

55 A.3d 1177, 1190 (Pa. Super. 2012). “In determining a layered claim of

ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the

defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).

“If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective for failing to raise the underlying issue.” Id.

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       Here, we have detailed above the trial counsel ineffectiveness claims

Warren wished to have raised. Because the present record is sufficient to

dispose of these challenges, a remand pursuant to Bradley is not warranted,

and we deny Warren’s pro se application for relief.3

       Instead,    we    will   address    the     three   claims   of   trial   counsel’s

ineffectiveness that Warren raised in his 2019 pro se PCRA petition, and the

two additional claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness he raised in his 2020

pro se amended petition. Burkett, supra.

       Warren first claims that trial counsel failed to consult with him prior to

entering into stipulations with the Commonwealth regarding the identity of

Edwards, a portion of Edwards’ hospital records, and that the DNA analysis of

the shirt police officers found at Warren’s home had a “partial DNA profile”

that matched Warren’s DNA from a buccal swab. According to Warren, these

stipulations constituted “inadmissible testimonial hearsay evidence, that

conceded [Warren’s] guilt and made the outcome of the trial a foregone

conclusion.” Warren’s PCRA petition, 4/5/19, at 4.

____________________________________________

3 We are aware of this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Valerio,

2024 WL 620291, at * 2 (Pa. Super. 2024) (non-precedential decision), which
remanded the case so that Betts counsel could file “a Turner/Finley motion,
Appellant’s response to the Turner/Finley motion, appointment of new
counsel (if necessary)” and the compliance with Rule 1925 by both counsel
and the PCRA court. Here, by contrast, Betts counsel explained why Warren’s
pro se ineffectiveness claims are meritless, the PCRA court accepted these
explanations, and we can review them based on the present record. Under
these circumstances, a remand for further proceedings before the PCRA court
would be a waste of judicial resources.

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      Warren’s claim is meritless. Initially, as to Edwards’ identity, the record

reveals that neither the Commonwealth nor original trial counsel could locate

him. Clearly, however, the Commonwealth could have introduced Edwards

identity as the surviving victim of the shooting incident via the testimony of

the police officers who interviewed him. The stipulations regarding Edwards’

medical records and the DNA analysis were for purposes of authentication.

See generally, Pa.R.E. 901. By entering these stipulations, Warren’s guilt

was not a “foregone conclusion,” but rather, they did no more than relieve the

Commonwealth from calling witnesses to authenticate them. Thus, Warren’s

first ineffectiveness claim fails.

      In his next challenge to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, Warren faults trial

counsel for failing to move for the trial court’s recusal as factfinder after the

court was exposed to several instances in which trial counsel informed the

court that he wished to explore a diminished capacity defense, and the

surprise testimony from a Commonwealth witness that Warren informed her

that he “ain’t mean to kill old head, but he was in the way.” N.T., 11/23/15,

at 132. Warren further asserts that the trial court demonstrated actual bias

by asking the prosecutor if the firearm charge was severed from the other

charges. According to Warren, “the only inference that can be drawn from

[these] above facts of record is that the [trial court] decided that [he] was

guilty before the [court] conducted [Warren’s] trial. Warren’s PCRA petition,

4/5/19, at 28.

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      Warren’s claim is meritless. As factfinder, the trial court is presumed to

ignore prejudicial evidence. “It has long been held that trial judges, sitting as

factfinders, are presumed to ignore prejudicial evidence in reaching a verdict.”

Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 582 (Pa. Super. 2003). There is no

indication in the record that trial counsel’s suggestion that Warren might

pursue   a   diminished   capacity    defense   prejudiced   Warren.     After   a

Commonwealth witness testified that Warren confessed killing one of the men,

the trial court questioned the prosecutor. Upon learning from her that the

witness’s testimony was not in her prior statement, and trial counsel moving

for a mistrial, the trial court excluded the statement and stated the court

would not consider it.    Finally, the trial court’s discussion of whether the

firearm charge was severed provides no basis for recusal. Thus, Warren’s

second ineffectiveness claim fails.

      In his third ineffectiveness claim, Warren asserts trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate, interview or otherwise subpoena “two

crucial eyewitnesses to testify at trial” in support of his defense. Warren’s

PCRA petition, 4/5/19, at 36.

      To establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate

and/or call a witness at trial, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that:

         (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available; (3)
         trial counsel was informed of the existence of the witness or
         should have known of the witness’s existence; (4) the
         witness was prepared to cooperate and would have testified
         on appellant’s behalf; and (5) the absence of the testimony
         prejudiced appellant.

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Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108-09 (Pa. 2012).                       In his

petition, Warren identifies these two eyewitnesses as Edwards and Priscilla

Davis.

     The PCRA court found that Warren failed to meet his burden as to

Edwards:

            Here, [Warren] never submitted a witness certification for
     Edwards. Accordingly, Edwards would have been barred from
     testifying at an evidentiary hearing.                  See 42 Pa.C.S.
     § 9545(d)(1)(iii) (testimony of proposed witnesses for who
     certifications were not submitted is inadmissible). Moreover,
     [Warren] failed to proffer any evidence to show that Edwards was
     available or willing to testify at trial, of that if he testified, he would
     have provided evidence favorable for the defense. Accordingly,
     the [PCRA court] did not err by failing to hold an evidentiary
     hearing regarding this witness.

           In addition, there was substantial evidence presented by the
     Commonwealth corroborating Edwards’ positive identification of
     [Warren] as the shooter in Edwards’ second statement to police.
     In Edwards’ second statement, in addition to identifying [Warren]
     as the shooter, Edwards provided a description of the shooter as
     wearing a black shirt with a white collar. This description was
     consiste[nt] with the description given by witness Randolph
     Joyner, who testified that the shooter was wearing a black rugby
     shirt with a gray collar, as well as witness Cinquetta Perrin, who
     told police [Warren] was wearing a blue button down polo shirt
     the night of the shooting. These descriptions were further
     corroborated by video footage from the night of the incident.
     Additionally, when the police executed a search warrant on
     [Warren’s] residence, they recovered a black polo shirt with a
     white collar. Accordingly, there was substantial corroboration of
     Edwards’ positive identification of [Warren] as the shooter in his
     second police interview, and nothing in the record to suggest that
     would have been helpful to [Warren] as a trial witness.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/23, at 11-12 (footnote and citations omitted).

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       We find ample support for the PCRA court’s conclusions regarding the

failure to call Edwards as a defense witness. As we noted above, none of the

parties could locate Edwards at the time of trial. Indeed, almost five years

later, when Warren filed his 2019 his pro se PCRA petition, there was no

indication that Edwards has been located.

       Regarding the failure to interview or call Priscilla Davis at trial, we first

note that she was not an eyewitness to the shooting. Rather, Warren proffers

her as a witness to contradict Commonwealth witness Andre Shaw’s testimony

that Warren was involved in a minor altercation before leaving the bar.

Warren did not file a certification regarding Ms. Davis, and he has established

none of the Sneed factors regarding this witness.           Thus, Warren’s third

ineffectiveness claim fails.4

       As noted above, after executing a search warrant at Warren’s home, the

police recovered a black polo shirt with a white collar. In his amended pro se

PCRA petition, Warren raised an additional claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object at trial “when the prosecutor knowingly elicited

false and perjured testimony” on direct examination of Philadelphia Homicide

____________________________________________

4 In his pro se PCRA petition Warren also asserted prosecutorial misconduct

for failing to correct the “false, misleading and perjured testimony” of a
Commonwealth witness regarding that witness’s sentence on criminal
charges. This claim could have been raised on direct appeal and is, therefore
waived under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b). Moreover, even if
Warren had raised this claim as trial counsel’s failure to object, we would find
it to lack merit as the only minor differences appear in the witness’s testimony
and the actual sentence he received.

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Detective Golphin that he seized the black polo shirt.       Warren’s Amended

Petition, 5/14/20 at 3. According to Warren, the Commonwealth “knew” that

it was another police officer, Philadelphia Homicide Detective Phillip Nordo,

who actually seized the evidence. Warren asserts that his claim is supported

by the search and seizure warrant and affidavit of probable cause prepared by

Detective Nordo.

       Warren’s claim is frivolous. At trial, Detective Golphin testified that he

participated in executing the search warrant and a black polo shirt was

recovered. Although the prosecutor used the word “you” when asking her

questions, we cannot interpret the detective’s testimony as acknowledging

that he actually found the shirt. The opposite is also true, while Detective

Nordo certified that the affidavit listed all property seized pursuant to the

search warrant, Detective Nordo does not state that he personally found the

item. Rather these documents can be read as no more than a summary of

what the officers who executed the search warrant jointly found as a result of

the search. Thus, Warren’s ineffectiveness claim fails.5
____________________________________________

5 In a related claim, Warren asserts that “the Commonwealth had to be aware

of the facts that they did not call Detective Nordo to testify at trial regarding
the shirt seized by him because Detective Nordo [had] already been accused
of misconduct and corruption in various other criminal homicide investigations
and trials[.]” Warren’s Amended Petition, 5/14/20, at 9-10. Although in his
application for relief Warren asserts a “newly-discovered evidence” claim
based on this fact, he has proffered no evidence that any such misconduct
occurred in his case. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532,
537-38 (Pa. Super. 2012) (affirming denial of PCRA after-discovered evidence
claim because police detective's subsequent misconduct would not lead to a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       In his final claim of ineffectiveness raised in his pro se amended petition,

Warren contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with

him prior to introducing “highly prejudicial, inflammatory, irrelevant, and

inadmissible testimonial hearsay and prior bad acts evidence” on cross-

examination of Ms. Perrin.         To support this claim, Warren references trial

counsel’s questioning Ms. Perrin regarding an unrelated incident of domestic

violence against Warren’s girlfriend. See N.T. 11/23/15, at 177-78.

       We have reviewed the pertinent testimony. When doing so, it is clear

that trial counsel introduced this incident to suggest to the factfinder that Ms.

Perrin changed the facts in her second statement because Ms. Perrin and

Warren’s girlfriend were close. Nevertheless, as noted above, in a waiver trial,

the court is presumed to ignore prejudicial evidence. Dent, supra. Thus,

Warren’s final claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness fails.

       In sum, the sole ineffectiveness claim raised by Betts counsel is without

merit. In addition, our review of the certified record permits us to consider

and dismiss Warren’s pro se ineffectiveness claims as meritless. Because all

of Warren’s ineffectiveness claims regarding trial counsel fail, so does his

layered claim regarding Betts counsel.

       Application for relief denied. Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

different verdict; there was no nexus shown between the defendant's case
and the misconduct that occurred two years later).

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Date: 3/11/2024

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