Court Opinion

ID: 9659882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:56:51.268694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:12.524579
License: Public Domain

VOGEL, Justice
(dissenting in part and concurring in part).
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds as a matter of law that the rental value of a substitute automobile is not allowable as damages in this case and, presumably, in others like it.
I agree with the statement of what the law is on this subject, but it seems to me that the application of that law to the facts raises a question of fact which is for the judge or jury: whether the need for substitute transportation (cost of automobile rental for 41 days) after loss of use of the stolen automobile is a foreseeable consequence of the breach of a warranty of title, under all the circumstances of the case. I would not decide this question as a matter of law. It is, I believe, a question of fact which has been decided by the trier of fact, the district judge, and contrary to the majority opinion. The conclusions of law of the trial judge say, in part:
“. . . Similarly, . . . the need of the rental vehicle arose as the direct consequence of the seller’s breach. The plaintiff supplied Mr. Bentley with the rental car in a good faith effort to supply him with an automobile as they had agreed.”
I believe that the quoted language might better have been placed in the findings of fact, since it constitutes a finding that the rental of a substitute automobile for 41 days during the period of uncertainty of the title was a reasonable and foreseeable consequence of a breach of warranty of title. As we said, in Stockmen’s Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Guarantee Reserve Life Insurance Co., 217 N.W.2d 455, 462-463 (N.D.1974),
“Whether a particular finding is a finding of fact or is a conclusion of law will be determined by the reviewing court, and a designation by the trial court is not conclusive.”
I would therefore affirm the trial court on this point.
I also dissent from that paragraph of the opinion stating the writer’s view as to why the general rule of admissibility of offers of settlement does not apply to this case. I agree that the general rule should not be applied here, but solely for the reason that the case was tried on the basis that the offer was admissible, no one objected to it, and the pleadings, the decision of the trial court, and the briefs on appeal all assumed the admissibility of the compromise offer. My reason for raising the question is that I am much concerned that the majority opinion might leave the impression that there is, or under some circumstances may be, a duty to minimize damages by accepting a compromise offer. The majority opinion should not be so read, in my opinion.
The same paragraph of the majority opinion gives as the reason for the discussion of compromise offers in this case that
“The evidence of the Hertz offer was not submitted as proof of an offer of compromise on the part of any of the litigants to this lawsuit.”
The statement is true, but unhelpful. The evidence of the Hertz offer was submitted not as an offer of compromise by a *801litigant, but as an offer to a litigant, which the parties obviously thought he must accept in order to mitigate damages. This, of course, was not true — there is no duty to accept compromise offers.
I concur in the result of that portion of the majority opinion discussing the Hertz offer in compromise, but only because it was litigated by consent of the parties.
SAND, J., concurs.