Court Opinion

ID: 9764216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:15:23.110592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:54.875624
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Nix :
This appeal raises the interesting question of whether the Surety of Peace Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, §6, 19 P.S. §23, as amended by the Act of March 18, 1909, P. L. 42, §1, 19 P.S. §24, violates the Federal and State Constitutions in its failure to provide an alleged offender the right to trial by jury.1 In my judgment this is a most significant decision, not only because of the need in our law of a provision that will enable a court to take prompt and effective action to deter a *42threatened or imminent wrong, but also because the right to jury is so basic in our fabric of jurisprudence that its denial in any instance should be fully explained and cautiously limited. While I agree with the conclusion of the majority that this section does not offend either the United States or the Pennsylvania Constitutions in its failure to provide the right of trial by jury, I do so for the reasons set forth below.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, . . .”
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that this Sixth Amendment guarantee as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment required that defendants accused of serious crimes be afforded the right of trial by jury. It also recognized and reaffirmed the long-established view that so-called “petty offenses” may be tried without a jury. This distinction was again upheld by a majority of the court in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). Thus, it is clear that the Federal constitutional requirement of trial by jury is not absolute and does not require a jury trial for every criminal offense.
*43While the division, of the Court in Baldwin2, and the change in the membership of that Court since that decision leave open the question as to the precise definition of “petty offense”, it seems clear that the most relevant factor in making that determination is the severity of the maximum penalty authorized for the offense. Moreover, while there is now serious question as to what period of imprisonment ivill render an offense “serious”, and whether the states will be permitted to develop their own standards in this area,3 it is reasonably apparent that an offense which carries no threat of imprisonment may be classified as petty. See, Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
Under the Pennsylvania Surety of Peace procedure, the legislature has not seen fit to expressly impose any term of imprisonment; rather it has been content to provide that the violator “shall be bound over, with one sufficient surety, to appear at the next sessions, according to law, and in the meantime to be on his good behavior.” My research has revealed no case where a restriction short of actual confinement has been considered justification to classify an offense as serious. *44I am, therefore, convinced that the Surety of Peace procedure does not offend the Federal Constitution.
The Pennsylvania Constitution contains two provisions concerning trial by jury. The first is Article I, Section 6, which provides: “Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate.” One must therefore look to the common law at the time of the writing of the Constitution to determine whether the Surety of Peace procedure traditionally included a right to trial by jury. See, William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A. 2d 59 (1961) cert. denied 368 U.S. 897. Blackstone describes the common law procedure as follows: “1. This security consists in being bound, with one or more sureties, in a recognizance or obligation to the king, entered on record, and taken in some court or by some judicial officer; whereby the parties acknowledge themselves to be indebted to the crown in the sum required, (for instance £100,) with condition to be void and of none effect if the party shall appear in court on such a day, and in the mean time shall keep the peace, either generally toward the king and all his liege people, or particularly, also, with regard to the person who craves the security. Or, if it be for the good behavior, then on condition that he shall demean and behave himself well (or be of good behavior,) either generally or specially, for the time therein limited, as for one or more years, or for life. This recognizance, if taken by a justice of the peace, must be certified to the next sessions, in pursuance of the statute 3 Hen. YII.c.l; and if the condition of such recognizance be broken by any breach of the peace in the one case, or any misbehavior in the other, the recognizance becomes forfeited or absolute; and being es-treated or extracted (taken out from among the other records) and sent up to the Exchequer, the party and Ms sureties having now become the king’s absolute debtors, are sued for the several sums in which they *45are respectively bound. “2. Any justices of the peace, by virtue of their commission, or those who are ese officio conservators of the peace, as was mentioned in a former volume, may demand such security according to their own discretion; or it may be granted at the request of any subject, upon due cause shown, provided such demandant be under the king’s protection. ...” IY Blackstone’s Commentaries pp. 252-253 (1850).
It is apparent from Blackstone’s account that at common law surety of peace did not contemplate trial by jury. The legislature’s decisions to continue to follow that procedure therefore does not offend Article I, Section 6, of our Constitution.
The second provision in our State Constitution referring to the right of trial by jury presents a more difficult problem. Article I, Section 9 provides, inter alia, that: “. . . the accused hath a right... in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage. . . .”
At common law, there was a class of summary offenses that were not tried before a jury, IY Blackstone’s Commentaries p. 280 (1850), and Pennsylvania has continued to adhere to that practice. See, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 328, 333-334, 22 A. 2d 299 (1941), aff’d. on the opinion below, 345 Pa. 456, 28 A. 2d 894 (1942). The applicability of Article I, Section 9, therefore depends upon whether this is a prosecution by information, or whether it is a “summary offense”.
At first blush, the issue would seem to depend upon the procedural mechanism employed to commence the suit. However, it would derogate from the fundamental rights guaranteed in that section (trial by jury, speedy trial, etc.) to suggest that the existence of these basic rights hinge upon the particular procedure that the legislature might design to initiate the action. When *46this Court was called upon to interpret an analogous provision guaranteeing that all persons accused of “indictable” crimes would receive the protection afforded by a grand jury,4 we focused on the nature of the maximum punishment authorized for such crimes. Commonwealth v. Cano, 389 Pa. 639, 133 A. 2d 800 (1957). In Gamo, we acknowledged that “the term ‘indictable offense’ refers to common law and statutory offenses, the punishments for which are ‘infamous’ such as death or imprisonment in a penitentiary as distinguished from imprisonment in a county jail.” (citations omitted) Therefore, all felonies and most misdemeanors are indictable and other misdemeanors proceed by information. It is significant, however, that Gano recognizes a third category known as summary offenses. 389 Pa. at 651. It remains to define summary offense.
In arriving at that definition, I would follow the approach of Gano and the federal decisions concerning “petty” offenses, and focus upon the maximum authorized punishment for a particular offense. As I have noted, Surety of Peace violations involve no jail term and therefore can permissibly be adjudicated by summary procedures. Article I, Section 9, does not demand a jury trial in such cases.
Mr. Chief Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Pomeroy join in this concurring opinion.

 “If any person shall threaten the person of another to wound, kill or destroy him, or do him any harm in person or estate, and the person threatened shall appear before a justice of the peace, and attest, on oath or affirmation, that he believes that by such threatening he is in danger of being hurt in body or estate, such person so threatening as aforesaid shall be bound over, with one sufficient surety, to appear at the next sessions, according to law, and in the meantime to be of his good behavior, and keep the peace towards all citizens of this commonwealth. If any person, not being an officer on duty in the military or naval service of the state or of the United States shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword or pistol, or other offensive or dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence to his family, person or property, he may, on complaint of any person having reasonable cause to fear a breach of the peace therefrom, be required to find surety of the peace as aforesaid.
“In all cases of surety of the peace, the justice of the peace before whom such case is instituted shall, before he binds any one *42over to the next term of the court of quarter sessions and in the meantime to keep the peace, upon the oath of another, as provided by section six of the act of March thirty-one, one thousand eight hundred and sixty (Pamphlet Laws, four hundred and twenty-seven), enter into a full hearing and investigation of the facts; and shaU only bind over the defendant when the evidence shows, to the satisfaction of the justice, that the prosecutor’s or prosecutrix’s danger of being hurt in body or estate is actual, and that the threats were made by the defendant maliciously and with intent to do harm.”

 In Baldwin, White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., stated that no offense can be deemed “petty” for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six nionths is authorized. Black, J., joined by Douglas, jr., took the position that the Constitution guarantees a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions regardless of whether the offense charged is “petty” or “serious”. Burger, C.J., dissented, finding nothing in the Constitution that would invalidate the particular New York City trial scheme at issue. Harlan, J., dissented, stating that he would not encumber the states with a federal definition of “petty” offense. Stewart, J., dissented against the use of the “incorporation” theory of the Fourteenth Amendment.

 See Baldwin v. New York, supra, Burger, C.J., dissenting, 399 U.S. at 76, and Williams v. Florida, Harlan, J., dissenting, 399 U.S. 78 at 117 (1970).

 Art. I, Sec. 10: “No person shall, for any indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally by information. . .