Court Opinion

ID: 9676217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:17:58.030837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:45.773788
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which reverses and remands this case to the district court because of the interpretation placed by the majority on the phrase “use of a weapon.”
The key to this case is the interpretation placed on Haymon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 239 (1983). In Haymon, supra, the phrase “use of a weapon” was determined to be subject to two interpretations: one being mere possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony, and the other being that the weapon was employed in the commission of the offense. The language of Haymon that possession of a firearm did not constitute use of a firearm was made in the context of deciding whether a person who stole a firearm during the commission of a burglary could be denied probation. Haymon acknowledged that the use of a firearm might mean it is employed in the commission of the offense. Haymon recognized an ambiguity in the language of KRS 533.060(1), and resolved such ambiguity in favor of the defendant.
In this case, no ambiguity exists. The offense of “unlawful possession of a weapon on school property” is defined by KRS 527.070. It states in pertinent part:
... a person is guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon on school property when he knowingly deposits, possesses, or carries ... any firearm or other deadly weapon in any public or private school building or bus, on any public or private school campus, grounds, recreational area, athletic field, or any other property owned, used or operated by any board of education....
The statute prohibits anyone to knowingly possess a firearm on school property, for purposes “other than instructional or school sanctioned ceremonial purposes.” It is possession of a weapon on school property, in violation of KRS 527.070, which constitutes the offense committed for purposes of KRS 635.020(4), the Juvenile Transfer Provision. A firearm possessed in violation of KRS 527.070 is the use of a firearm for purposes of KRS 635.020(4). Haymon understood that in certain circumstances possession of a weapon involves the use of the weapon when it admitted that the word “use” is subject to a construction which involves possession only. Haymon at 240. Two statutory syllogisms are helpful. A person who possesses a firearm on school property commits a felony. Darden possessed a firearm on school property. Therefore, Darden committed a felony. A child over the age of 14 who commits a felony and uses a firearm during the commission of an offense shall be transferred to circuit court. Darden is over the age of 14, committed a felony and used a firearm during *579the commission of an offense. Therefore, Darden shall be transferred to circuit court.
The legislative intent of the General Assembly was abundantly clear in that it was to deter involvement or the presence of weapons in the commission of crimes on school property. Such a construction is not unduly harsh, nor does it produce an incongruous or disproportionate result. It is not necessary to dwell on the tragic consequences of school-related weapon possession which has touched every community in the nation, including Kentucky.
There is no ambiguity between the word “use” or “possession” of a weapon insofar as it relates to the commission of an offense prohibited by KRS 527.070. The trial judge was correct when he authorized the juvenile transfer and the Court of Appeals was correct when it affirmed such a decision.
LAMBERT, C.J., joins in this dissent.