Court Opinion

ID: 9429827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:28:02.960755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:21.853359
License: Public Domain

Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins,
dissenting.
Consistently with my disagreement with the Court in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982); see id., at 827 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting), I dissent from today’s unwarranted extension of Ross. As a general rule the Fourth Amendment proscribes the warrantless search of closed packages and containers. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 10-11 (1977). Even when the authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, the Fourth Amendment generally permits no more than “seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents, if the exigencies of the situation demand it . . . .” United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 701 (1983). That a closed package is located within an automobile provides no reason for departing from the general rule that no more than seizure pending issuance of a warrant is constitutionally permissible. Ross, supra, at 831 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he traditional rationales for the automobile exception plainly do not support extending it to the search of a container found inside a vehicle”). A fortiori a warrantless search occurring three days after seizure of a package found in an automobile violates the Fourth Amendment.
But even accepting Ross, I disagree with today’s blithe extension of the temporal scope of a permissible search on *489analogy to Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 68 (1975) (per curiam), and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 52 (1970). I have previously made clear why I regard these decisions as questionable. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 384 (1976) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting); Texas v. White, supra, at 69 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting). There is simply no justification for departing from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement under the circumstances of this case; no exigency precluded reasonable efforts to obtain a warrant prior to the search of the packages in the warehouse.
It also cannot pass without comment that the Court has addressed an issue not before us. The Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s argument that the “plain odor” of marihuana emanating from the packages obviated the need for a warrant to search them, 707 F. 2d 1093, 1095-1096 (1983), and the Government has not renewed the argument here. Yet while properly noting that the “plain odor” issue is not before us, see ante, at 481, the Court suggests a very definite view with respect to the merits of this issue. Citing the Fourth Circuit case accepting the “plain odor” exception to the warrant requirement, United States v. Haley, 669 F. 2d 201, 203-204, and n. 3, cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1117 (1982), the Court today opines that “[wjhether respondents ever had a privacy interest in the packages reeking of marihuana is debatable.” Ante, at 486. This is an issue which is the subject of a significant divergence of opinion in the lower courts. Compare United States v. Haley, supra, with United States v. Dien, 609 F. 2d 1038, 1045 (CA2 1979). And most importantly, today’s offhand commentary contradicts this Court’s only precedent on the question. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13 (1948) (“[Ojdors alone do not authorize a search without warrant”). In these circumstances, surely it is improper for the Court without briefing or argument to suggest how it would resolve this important and unsettled question of law.
I dissent.