Court Opinion

ID: 9547789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:52:27.567922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:06.341632
License: Public Domain

PETERS, J.
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the judgments of guilt as to Terry, but I dissent in all other respects.
In my view, the trial court erred in excusing for cause a prospective juror, and this error alone requires reversal of the penalty judgments as to Terry. The trial court committed Aranda error, as conceded by the majority, and I believe this error also requires reversal of Terry’s penalty judgments. In addition, I am of the opinion that Juanelda’s confession was inadmissible and that the error in admitting it requires reversal of her guilt judgments. I believe that the trial court’s failure to grant a separate trial also requires reversal of her guilt judgments.
In my opinion, the judgments imposing the death penalty as to Terry must be reversed under the compulsion of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770]. I disagree with the majority’s opinion that juror Bolla was properly excluded for cause under the constitutional standards enunciated in Witherspoon.
*404Mrs. Bella’s first statement concerning her attitude toward the death penalty was “I feel like I wouldn’t be able to make a decision on the capital punishment, . . .” This statement clearly is not a sufficient basis for excluding Mrs. Bolla for cause under Witherspoon. First, Mrs. Bolla, “in qualifying her statement by the phrase T feel’ suggested that she might not be certain of her precise position.” (People v. Vaughn, 71 Cal.2d 406, 413 [78 Cal.Rptr. 186, 455 P.2d 122].) Moreover, the statement that “I wouldn’t be able to make a decision on the capital punishment” contains the same ambiguities as the statement that “I cannot serve on a capital punishment case.” The former statement, like the latter one, “is in the nature of a summary conclusion as to her ability to serve on the jury. It is susceptible of the interpretation that she had ‘general objections to the death penalty or . . . conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.’ (Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 522 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785].) Her answer might also mean that because of her conscientious feelings about the death penalty she would find it distressing to impose such a punishment.” (People v. Goodridge, 70 Cal.2d 824, 840 [76 Cal.Rptr. 421,452 P.2d 637].)
Mrs. Bella’s next statement was in response to the trial court’s inquiry whether if Terry were convicted of first degree murder she could under any circumstances vote for the death penalty; her reply was “Well, I believe that my religious beliefs would say no.” This statement too falls woefully short of the unambiguous response demanded by Witherspoon. First, her statement was hedged by the phrase “I believe.” (See People v. Vaughn, supra, 71 Cal.2d 406, 416.) More importantly, the statement “my religious beliefs would say no” is susceptible of the interpretation that she merely has “religious scruples” against the infliction of the death penalty but that she might be able to set aside those scruples or beliefs. (See Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 515-516, fn. 9, 522 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 781782, 784].)
Similarly, the court’s next inquiry that “You feel religiously your beliefs are against that?”, to which Mrs. Bolla replied “Yes,” was hedged by the phrase “I feel” (People v. Vaughan, supra, 71 Cal.2d 406, 413) and asked her about her religious scruples only.
In response to the defense counsel’s inquiry whether she could impose the death penalty in a case which she felt in her own mind was a proper one for the death penalty, Mrs. Bolla replied, “I think it would be rather hard for me to.” The implication of this statement is that, although such a decision would be “rather hard” for her, Mrs. Bolla could in some cases return *405a death verdict. This statement, which merely reflects “a strong distaste at the prospect of imposing a death sentence,” clearly does not meet the standard enunciated in Witherspoon. (People v. Fain, 70 Cal.2d 588, 602 [75 Cal.Rptr. 633, 451 P.2d 65].)
The majority themselves concede that “[t]his response, if considered by itself, left open the possibility that she could under some circumstances return a death penalty, . . .” (Ante, p. 380.) However, they go on to assert: “but that possibility was eliminated when defense counsel continued his questioning and asked in effect whether she could return the death penalty if she felt that it was the proper thing to do even if she did so with great reluctance, and she replied, T don’t think I could.’ ” (Id.) It is difficult to understand how the reply “I don’t think I could [impose the death penalty]” can eliminate the possibility that the juror could under some circumstances return a death penalty, when this court has repeatedly held that this very statement does not constitute an unambiguous expression of inability to return a death penalty under any circumstances. (People v. Osuna, 70 Cal.2d 759, 768 [76 Cal.Rptr. 462, 452 P.2d 678]; People v. Chacon, 69 Cal.2d 765, 772-773; [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106]; see In re Hillery, 71 Cal.2d 857, 863 [79 Cal.Rptr. 733, 457 P.2d 565].)
The majority purport to distinguish Chacon and Osuna by stating that “[t]his is not a case where the venireman answered T don’t think so’ in reply to the question ‘if he could impose the death penalty.’ In such a context the answer has been regarded as ambiguous. (People v. Chacon, 69 Cal.2d 765, 772-773; see also People v. Osuna, 70 Cal.2d 759, 768-769.)” (Ante, p. 380.) The implication of this statement is that Chacon and Osuna were narrowly limited to the situation where the juror states “I don’t think so” in reply to the precise question “if he could impose the death penalty”—that only because it was made in “such a context” was the answer regarded as ambiguous.
Contrary to the implication of the majority’s statement, both Chacon and Osuna quoted—in whole or in part—only the answers given by the prospective jurors; neither case set forth the precise question to which the jurors responded. And when one reads the language of Chacon and Osuna it becomes clear that these cases were concerned with the ambiguity of the answers, the statements by the jurors, caused by the ambiguity inherent in the word “think.” In Chacon we held improperly excused a prospective juror “who answered, T don’t think so’ when asked if he could impose the death penalty. He was not allowed to give an unambiguous yes or no answer to the question.” (69 Cal.2d 765, 772-773; italics added.) In Osuna, *406relying upon Chacon, we held improperly excused four prospective jurors “who stated that they did not ‘think’ that they could impose the death penalty, but none [of whom] gave an unambiguous answer to the question whether he could or could not do so.” (70 Cal.2d 759, 768; italics added.)1
In the instant case, Mrs. Bolla stated “I don’t think I could” when asked whether she could return the death penalty if she felt that it were the proper thing to do even if she would do so with great reluctance. Like the prospective jurors in Chacon and Osuna, Mrs. Bolla did not give an “unambiguous answer” when asked whether she could impose the death penalty. A prospective juror’s reply that he does not “think” he could when asked whether he could ever impose the death penalty is an equivocal answer; it indicates that the juror has some doubts as to his position and is not cerain in his own mind that he could not impose the death penalty. Such an equivocal response simply is not the “unmistakably clear” statement of automatic opposition demanded by Witherspoon. (See Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 522, in. 21.)
Until the recent decision in People v. Floyd, 1 Cal.3d 694, 726 [83 Cal.Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64], written by Mr. Justice Burke, this court had never held that a statement of opposition to the death penalty that is hedged by equivocal words such as “think” or “believe” satisfies the Witherspoon requirement of an unambiguous expression of automatic opposition to the death penalty. (See my dissenting opinion in People v. Floyd, supra, 1 Cal.3d 694, 732-733, fn. 1.) The majority in Floyd ignored the prior cases holding that answers hedged by the term “think” were ambiguous in stating both unnecessarily and, in my opinion, incorrectly (see id.) that a juror is properly excluded who answers “I believe so” in response to the question whether he would be unable to return a death penalty verdict regardless of the evidence. (1 Cal.3d at p. 726.)
By broadly applying the above proposition set forth in Floyd and by narrowly restricting the holdings of Chacon and Osuna, the majority is obviously overruling the latter cases: Apparently the rule in California henceforth is that a prospective juror’s statement that he does not “think” *407he could impose the death penalty satisfies the constitutional standards enunciated in Witherspoon.
The majority assert that when Mrs. Bolla’s statements are “viewed'as a whole,” her automatic opposition to the death penalty under any circumstances is made unmistakably clear. (Ante, p. 380.) As I have pointed out above, not one of Mrs. Bolla’s statements constituted an unambiguous expression of opposition to the death penalty under the past holdings of this court. Rather, one of Mrs. Bolla’s responses indicated that she could return a death verdict in some cases and every single one of “[h]er statements of opposition to the death penalty were hedged by phrases such as T think,’ T feel,’ [and] T believe,’ . . .” (People v. Vaughn, supra, 71 Cal.2d 406, 416.)2 It is difficult to see how the combining of these statements can result in the “unmistakably clear” statement that Witherspoon demands. I would hold that “[h]aving firmly declined to give the sort of ‘unambiguous yes or no answer’ required by Witherspoon (People v. Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d 765, 772), [Mrs. Bolla] was improperly excused.” (People v. Vaughn, supra, 71 Cal.2d 406, 416.)
The error in excluding one juror in violation of the standard enunciated in Witherspoon automatically requires reversal of the death sentence. (In re Arguello, 71 Cal.2d 13, 14-16 [76 Cal.Rptr. 633, 452 P.2d 921]; People v. Bradford, 70 Cal.2d 333, 346-347 [74 Cal.Rptr. 726, 450 P.2d 46].) Thus I would reverse the penalty judgments as to Terry because of Witherspoon error.
There is another error requiring reversal of Terry’s penalty judgments.
Although I agree that the conceded violation of Terry’s rights under People v. Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518 [47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265], may reasonably be deemed harmless as to his guilt judgments, I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that this error was harmless as to the penalty judgments.
*408As the majority note, any correct assessment of the impact of an Aranda error must “weigh the prejudicial impact of all of the significant effects that may reasonably be assumed to have stemmed from the erroneous denial of a separate trial,” and we must reverse if there is “a reasonable probability that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable result at a separate trial.” (People v. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, at pp. 922-923 [59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869].) And, as the majority also note, even if an error is nonprejudicial as to guilt, we must reverse a death penalty verdict in the face of any substantial error which could have affected the result. (People v. Hines, 61 Cal.2d 164, 168-170 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398]; see also, The Death Penalty Cases (1968) 56 Cal.L.Rev. 1268, 1434-1441.)
In relevant part, the majority describe the impact of the Aranda error as follows: “If the court had correctly ordered a severance when the Aranda problem presented itself, the jury in Terry’s case would not have heard Juanelda’s extrajudicial confessions. Further, it probably would not have heard her testimony that Terry pushed her around, that she was afraid of him, and that they had intercourse on their first date. There was also testimony that Terry beat Juanelda on one occasion and that he threatened to kidnap her. If there had been separate trials Juanelda probably would not have testified against Terry. Since she loved him, she probably would have invoked her privilege against self-incrimination. Had she testified, Terry would have been entitled to instructions that her testimony, as that of an accomplice, should be considered with caution. Furthermore, had there been separate trials, Terry’s attorney probably would not have brought out—as he did on cross-examination of Juanelda—several prior crimes Terry and Juanelda allegedly engaged in together.” (Ante, p. 387.)
I would add to this description of the effects of Aranda error on Terry’s case the fact that a severance would have removed from the jury evidence— relating to Juanelda’s duress theory—that Terry dominated Juanelda, that he used her youth, her submissiveness, and her love to coerce her into a life of vicious and brutal crime.
In denying that these incidents of Aranda error “were substantial and could have affected the result” (ante, p. 388), the majority blandly assert “the evidence in question, reasonably, did not affect the death penalty verdict. There was "evidence introduced at the penalty trial that Terry had committed numerous priors. In view of this evidence, and the evidence properly introduced, of the brutality of the two killings, Juanelda’s extrajudicial confessions and even her court testimony, were insignificant and unimportant. In fact, at the penalty trial, Terry’s attorneys did not deny that he was a vicious killer or a depraved man. They argued that this condition was due to a form of mental illness in that he had sudden uncontrollable outbursts of fury.” (Ante, p. 388.)
*409It is not clear that Terry’s attorneys would have argued as they did at the penalty trial had a separate trial been granted. Even if a severance would not have altered the attorneys’ penalty trial argument tactics, the majority’s resolution of the harmless error question is totally unsatisfactory. Although we now have empirical evidence that introduction of a defendant’s priors heightens the probabilities that he will receive a death verdict (A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree-Murder Cases (1969) 21 Stan.L.Rev. 1297, 1326-1330), nothing has altered the reason for the Hines penalty harmless error rule: our virtual ignorance as to what criteria are applied by any single penalty jury. (Id., at p. 1420.) In Hines, we examined the unique aspects of penalty trials which render inapposite the “reasonably probable” harmless error rule which is applicable to guilt errors. Because of the absolute discretion afforded a jury presented with “a mass of material,” because “[t]he precise point which prompts the penalty in the mind of any one juror is not known to us and may not even be known to him,” and because “ ‘[t]o attempt to assess the effect of error in this legal vacuum is to superimpose one untestable surmise upon another,’ ” we reaffirmed the rule that “ ‘any substantial error,’ ” since it reasonably may have swayed a juror, must be deemed to have been prejudicial. (61 Cal.2d at pp. 168-170, and cases cited.)
Whatever would have been the result if the only incidents of an Aranda violation were the introduction of Juanelda’s confessions and evidence of several priors, I submit that it defies reality to assert that evidence that Terry coerced a young and submissive girl into a life of homicidal crime could not reasonably have swayed a juror on the issue of penalty. It bears emphasis that the majority concede this evidence would probably have been absent had Terry’s Aranda rights been vindicated by a severance. To deny that this evidence could reasonably have affected his death verdict and to affirm on that basis is to “pile conjecture upon conjecture and posit the decision of life or death upon a pyramid of guesses.” (People v. Terry, 61 Cal.2d 137, 154 [37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) Accordingly, I would reverse Terry’s penalty verdicts because of Aranda error alone.
As to Juanelda Allen, the judgments of guilt should be reversed.
In the first place, the Escobedo-Dorado warning given to her was insufficient and incomplete as a matter of law, and in the second place, the record shows that before confessing she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her constitutional rights. Her confession was therefore inadmissible, and the error in admitting it was prejudicial and requires a reversal of the judgments against her.
*410The transcript discloses the exact words of the warning given to her before she confessed. The arresting and interrogating officer told her after her arrest that the police wanted to interrogate her “and that if you do want to answer the questions you are entitled to have an attorney present.” This warning was insufficient, incomplete and incorrect. Of course, she was entitled to have an attorney whether or not she wanted to answer questions. To hold that a warning that the accused was entitled to have an attorney only if she decided to answer questions is sufficient to reduce the warning to a mere “ceremonial formula.” Such a warning is inadequate. (People v. Ford, 234 Cal.App.2d 480, 489 [44 Cal.Rptr. 556].) As was said in that case the accused is entitled to “full advice as to his rights, with full comprehension of what they consist.” The basic purpose for requiring counsel at the interrogation stage is to enable the accused to secure expert advice as to whether he should make any comments at all, and if so, of what nature. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 484-486, 490 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 982-983, 985, 84 S.Ct. 1758], it was clearly indicated that the right to counsel was a right to consult with an attorney and to obtain advice from him so that the accused could make an intelligent decision as to whether to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 721, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], it was expressly held that the right to counsel includes the “right to consult with counsel prior to questioning.” A comparison of the EscobedoMiranda opinions demonstrates that this last quotation from Miranda was not one of the newly announced rules stated in that case which are not retroactive, but an explanation of why Escobedo was decided as it was. Although Miranda is not retroactive as to the newly stated rules set forth in that opinion (People v. Rollins, 65 Cal.2d 681 [56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221]), it is quite clear that the right to consult with counsel prior to interrogation and the right to be advised thereof, existed under the rules announced in Escobedo, and so existed at all relevant times in the instant case.
It is true that for Escobedo-Dorado purposes a warning has been held sufficient if the interrogating officer tells the accused that he has a “ ‘right to an attorney, . . .’ ” (People v. Thomas, 65 Cal.2d 698, 704-705 [56 Cal.Rptr. 305, 423 P.2d 233] [cert. den. 389 U.S. 868 (19 L.Ed.id 143, 88 S.Ct. 140)].) But such language is broad and general and not misleading. It does not suggest, as does the warning here given, that the right to counsel is limited and circumscribed as to time and place. It has uniformly been held that when the warning is accompanied by conditions rendering it more limited than the right guaranteed by Escobedo, it is insufficient. An illustrative case is People v. Kelley, 66 Cal.2d 232 [57 Cal.Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947]. There the interrogating officer told the accused “that he *411was entitled to an attorney ‘now and at any time that I talked to him.’ ” (Id., at p. 247.) That warning was held sufficient to justify an interrogation by the officer who gave it, but it was held insufficient to justify a subsequent interrogation by the military police. The error in the present case is similar. Juanelda Allen was told that she could have an attorney present while answering questions. She was never told that she had a right to consult with an attorney before she was interrogated—in fact the fair implication from the warning given is that she was told that she had no such right. Although she testified that she understood the warning to mean that she had a right to counsel, she did not testify, and there is no evidence to indicate, that she understood this warning to mean that she had a right to an attorney before interrogation. Under such circumstances, the warning was insufficient, the interrogation improper, and the confession inadmissible.
Even if the warning were sufficient there is no evidence that Juanelda knowingly and intelligently waived her constitutional rights. She was an immature minor of 17. While it is true that a majority of this court have held that a minor, in a proper case, may competently waive his constitutional rights (People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365 [62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202] [cert. den. 392 U.S. 945 (20 L.Ed.2d 1407, 88 S.Ct. 2303)]), the determination of whether a minor has waived those rights is governed by rules much stricter than those applicable to adults (id., at p. 381). In the case of minors this court is required to consider the “totality of circumstances” surrounding the waiver. In the “totality of circumstances” minority is a most important factor but here there was much more than minority alone. Juanelda was a member of a minority race. She was peculiarly immature. She was grilled for some time before she confessed. No friendly adult was present. In addition, the fact that the warning given her was misleading, if not incorrect, must weight heavily on the scales and is sufficient to tip them in her favor when considered as part of the “totality of circumstances” under which the confession was secured.
The circumstances under which this confession was obtained are accurately described in Juanelda’s opening brief as follows: “We have here a young, seventeen year old, immature Negro girl . . . who is abruptly arrested and handcuffed by a horde of Police officers entering her apartment with guns drawn. . . . This, of course, makes her, as she termed it, ‘more nervous than anything.’ . . . She is then quickly transported to the Police Station and placed in a 8'x 10' room with no windows and a peephole that allows one to see in, but not to see out. . . . She is not told how long she will be there or when she will be taken to Court, nor is she given any information concerning her ability to place a telephone call to her family or to anyone else for aid or advice. . . . She is drilled [jv'c] intermittently by officers coming in and out and leaving her alone for various periods of *412time. . . . She is completely alone in an antagonistic environment. . . . Without a specific explanation of what rights and ability she has to get counsel and advice without funds, her limited education . . . lack of maturity, and judgment, and her non-aggressive and passive personality .' . . did not permit her to exercise sufficient determination or ingenuity to obtain the counsel and support which she needed in this environment to be sure that the whole story was presented and not just the facts which helped the Prosecution.”
Moreover, there is no evidence that Juanelda knew or was advised of the elements of first degree murder or of the defenses available to her. While such warnings are not indispensable (People v. Lara, supra, 67 Cal.2d 365, 376), certainly Juanelda’s ignorance of the nature of the offense, and the possible defenses of duress and coercion, is part of the “totality of circumstances” to be considered, and bolsters her argument that her waiver was unknowing and unintelligent. Her testimony is uncontradicted that when she was arrested she did not know that she could be held criminally responsible for the killings committed by Terry.
The caséis indistingushablefrom People v. Hildabrandt, 244 Cal.App.2d 423 [53 Cal.Rptr. 99]. There an 18-year-old boy of subnormal intelligence confessed after an hour of police grilling preceded by the general warning that he had “a right to have an attorney present with him.” (Id., at p. 426.) The appellate court, after making the required independent examination of the record (id., at p. 428) to determine whether the waiver of counsel had been knowingly and intelligently made, found that under the facts the general warning was insufficient and was given as a mere formality, and that as a matter of law the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proof on the issue. (People v. Davis, 66 Cal.2d 175, 181 [57 Cal.Rptr. 130, 424 P.2d 682].) The court mentioned the accused’s lack of experience with the police, his physical and mental state, his youth, and the shabbiness of the warning (244 Cal.App.2d at p. 431) and came to the conclusion that there had not been an intelligent and knowing waiver.
There is another prejudicial error requiring a reversal of the judgments as to Juanelda.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the reporter’s transcript discloses that prior to trial counsel for Juanelda moved for a severance. The motion was denied, and the parties were tried jointly. When the trial judge became aware of the rule then recently announced in People v. Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d 518, he refused to grant a severance for reasons the majority correctly hold to be inadequate. The majority contend, however, that the failure to grant her a separate trial was not prejudicial. In People v. Massie, supra, 66 Cal.2d 899, 921, the court in discussing the prejudicial effect *413of failing to grant a separate trial stated that one test was “significant differences from the joint trial that would have occurred if the defendant had been tried separately, . . The majority recognize this standard but fail to apply it properly.
Keeping this standard in mind it is apparent that if ever a defendant was prejudiced by a joint trial, it was defendant Juanelda Allen. Had the trials been separate Terry’s counsel would not have been able to cross-examine Juanelda. The record demonstrates that the attorneys for Terry in effect prosecuted Juanelda as effectively if not more so than did the prosecutor. Apparently it was the plan of Terry’s counsel in a desperate effort to save their client’s life, to try to prove that although Terry was guilty of first degree murder, Juanelda was equally as guilty, in that she helped actively to plan, and participated in, the crimes. Terry’s counsel argued that although their client was guilty of first degree murder so was Juanelda, and since because of her youth, she could not be given the death penalty, Terry should not be sentenced to death either. It was Terry’s attorneys who suggested that Juanelda stabbed Burnett. On the guilt trial Terry’s attorneys devoted their entire argument to securing first degree murder convictions of Juanelda. It was Terry’s attorneys who brought out in cross-examination of Juanelda, before it could be halted by objection, that she had been denied custody of her child and probably had been guilty of a welfare fraud. Other facts of which the prosecutor was apparently not aware (at least he did not bring them out) were developed by Terry’s counsel in their cross-examination of Juanelda. They brought up the very damaging subject of Juanelda purchasing bullets for Terry’s revolver after the Burnett killing, but before the Safeway episode. Terry’s attorneys also intimated that Juanelda had gone target shooting with Terry, had actively planned with him the Alamo robbery, and had instigated a burglary in Oakland. In other words, Terry’s counsel produced evidence against Juanelda not known to the prosecution.
Terry’s attorneys cross-examined the psychiatrist called by Juanelda more effectively than did the prosecutor. It was they who elicited from him the admission that Juanelda had the ability and competency to aid and abet, and that the psychiatrist’s testimony on direct went only to motivation.
It is clear that had separate trials been held the prosecution of Juanelda would have been vastly different from the joint trial. Because of the joint trial, there were three attorneys prosecuting Juanelda from two different points of view and sources of information, who were given two chances to argue her guilt to the jury, as well as two chances to cross-examine her. This eloquently demonstrates how and why she was prejudiced by a joint trial. What happened at the joint trial tended to obscure Juanelda’s main *414defense, that she did not know of Terry’s criminal intent at either of the crimes prior to seeing him draw his revolver and that she aided him out of fear once he had drawn his gun. Although there was properly admitted evidence that strongly suggests that Juanelda knew robberies had been planned at both places, the psychiatric testimony produced by her was to the effect that she was immature and submissive and that she would blindly follow the man she loved without thinking about it.
Under such circumstances, Juanelda did not have a fair trial at her joint trial. Coupled with the other errors this requires a reversal. The deprivation of a fair trial is, of course, a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Sarazzowski, 27 Cal.2d 7,11 [161 P.2d 934].)
I conclude that there was an Escobedo-Dorado error as to Juanelda; that there was no intelligent waiver of her right to counsel; that her con-' fession was illegally secured and should not have been admitted into evidence; that she was erroneously denied a separate trial; and that these errors were prejudicial and require a reversal as to her.
Thus, I would reverse the judgments of guilt as to Juanelda Allen and the judgments as to Terry only insofar as they relate to the penalty.
The petition of appellant Terry for a rehearing was denied April 29, 1970, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 In In re Hillery, supra, 71 Cal.2d 857, 863, we stated that “[the prospective juror’s] first expression of scruples concerning the imposition of capital punishment appeared in her statement, ‘Well, I don’t think I could send anyone to death.’ We have held that such a statement would not, by itself, satisfy the Witherspoon requirement of unambiguous expression of an absolute inability to consider imposing the death penalty in any case. (People v. Osuna . . . People v. Chacon ....)” (Italics added.) We then set forth the question to which the prospective juror responded, in making the additional point that the context in which the juror’s response was made compounded the ambiguity that we had already found present in the juror’s statement itself.

 The prospective juror held improperly excluded for cause in People v. Vaughn, supra, 71 Cal.2d 406, 412-417, was able to predict how she would vote in any case whatever insofar as she was able to state that she did not “believe” or “think” that she could ever bring in a death penalty. Similarly, Mrs. Bolla never stated unequivocally that she could not ever impose the death penalty, but only that she did not “think” she could ever do so. Vaughn distinguished People V. Beivelman, 70 Cal.2d 60, 78-79, fn. 4 [73 Cal.Rptr. 521, 447 P.2d 913], where the prospective jurors were able to state unequivocally that they would never vote for the death penalty in any case whatever—to predict how they would vote without qualifying their predictions by such equivocal terms as “think” or “believe.”