Court Opinion

ID: 9834423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:34:35.542828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:14.963577
License: Public Domain

WALKER, J.
This was a suit by appel-lee against appellants for the value of his automobile negligently lost by them on or about the 8th day of August, 1018, while they held it for repair. On the 9th day of July, 1918, appellee purchased the automobile from appellants, paying part cash, and at the time the automobile was lost owed a balance of $315 on the purchase price, which was evidenced by promissory notes dated the 9th day of July, 1918, drawing interest at 8 per cent, per annum from date, stipulating for 10 per cent: attorney’s fees, and secured by a chattel mortgage on the automobile. Appellee prayed for judgment for the amount of the automobile and for the cancellation of the unpaid purchase-money notes by having them applied as a credit against the value of the automobile. Appellants prayed for judgment on their notes, with interest and attorney’s fees, and for foreclosure of their chattel mortgage lien. On a trial to a jury on special issues, facts were found making appellants liable for the value of the car, which was fixed by them at $700. Judgment was entered on the verdict of the jui& in favor of appellee for $700, with interest at 8 per cent, per annum from the 8th day of August, the day the automobile was delivered to appellants, to the date of judgment, and in favor of appellants for the balance due on their notes, with interest at 8 per cent, per annum from date to the date of the judgment. As of date of the judgment appellee’s recovery was credited with the balance due on the notes. Appellants were denied recovery for attorney’s fees. The judgment in appellee’s favor draws interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum from date until paid.
Appellants advance the following propositions:
(1) The judgment has no support in the evidence on the issue of market value of the automobile.
(2) The court erred in refusing to award attorney’s fees;
(3) The court erred in awarding interest at 8 per cent, per annum on the value of the automobile.
Opinion.
The judgment has sufficient support in the evidence. One witness, fully qualified to testify as to the market value of the lost automobile, said that it was worth about two-thirds of its purchase price, which was $850. He said his estimate was within $50 or $100 of the value of the car. Appellee had owned the car only a month. The testimony was that the injury to the automobile at the time it was delivered to appellants was only slight. Mrs. Dunham testified that she told appellants on the day the automobile was delivered to them for repair that she was dissatisfied with it, and wanted them to sell it, and 'they told her it could be sold at a small loss. Appellants testified that they sold the car to appellee at its reasonable market value. Beaumont, Sour Lake & Western Ry. Co. v. Myrick (Tex. Civ. App.) 208 S. W. 939.
Appellants were not entitled to attorney’s fees. After the loss, appellee admitted liability on the notes, pleaded them as an obligation, and prayed that appellants be .given full credit therefor. Appellee did not refuse to pay the notes within the meaning of the clause providing for attorney’s fees. As the appellants had negligently lost the property on which they held the lien, thus causing appellee to suffer damages in excess of their lien, no caus.e of action could arise for attorney’s fees, in view of the prayer of appellee asking that tbe full amount of the notes be credited against his recovery.
Appellee’s measure of damages was the value of the automobile at the date it was lost, deducting the amount due on the purchase-money notes as of that date, with interest at 6 per cent, per annum on the balance due him. The rule is thus stated in the syllabus to Fowler v. Gilmer, 54 Mass. (13 Metc.) 267:
“When the plaintiff, in an action of trover, admits that the defendant, at the time of the conversion, had a lien on the goods for an ascertained amount, the rule of damages is the .value of the goods, deducting the amount of the lien, and adding interest on the balance.”
■ For other authorities, see 47 Cent. Dig. Trover and Conversion, § 279.
Of course, it will not be questioned that the same measure of damages applies to a bailee in default as to one guilty of a conversion.
“Whether he recovers the value for the failure of a vendor or bailee to deliver, or by reason of the destruction, asportation, or conversion of the property by a wrongdoer, interest is as necessary to a complete indemnity as the value itself. The injured party ought to be put in the same condition, so far as money can do it, in which he would have been if the contract had been fulfilled or the tort had not been committed, or the loss had been instantly • repaired when compensation was due.” Sutherland on-Damages (3(1 Ed.) § 105.
See, also, Baker v. Clayton, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 586, 90 S. W. 519; Masterson v. Goodlet, 46 Tex. 402; Phillips v. Hughes (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. 157; Smith v. Stratton, *104634 Tex. Civ. App. 171, 78 S. W. 4; Robinson v. Varnell, 16 Tex. 382.
The judgment of the trial court will be reformed, and judgment here entered as indicated. As it appears that interest at 8 per cent, was awarded appellee on his motion, and that the error was called to the attention of the trial court by appellants in their motion for rehearing, it is further ordered that the costs of this appeal be taxed against appellee.