Court Opinion

ID: 9965123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 18:03:47.45655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.621636
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DIVISION
                            MERCIER, C. J.,
                     MCFADDEN, P. J., and RICKMAN, J.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                        May 1, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

 A24A0534. TAMAYO v. THE STATE.

      MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

      After a jury trial, Pedro Tamayo was convicted of one count of aggravated

battery and two counts of cruelty to children in the first degree. He appeals the denial

of his motion for new trial.

      Tamayo argues that the trial court erred by denying a general demurrer to one

of the cruelty-to-children counts of the indictment because the indictment charged

him with failing to seek medical care for the victim, but he had no duty to seek medical

care. He also argues that the cruelty-to-children statute is unconstitutional and that

the evidence does not support the conviction entered on that count. Tamayo argues
that trial counsel performed deficiently in two respects: he failed to timely challenge

the cruelty-to children count based on his failure to seek medical care; and he did not

object to a jury instruction. Finally, Tamayo argues that the trial court should have

merged his aggravated battery conviction into one of the cruelty-to-children

convictions. We hold that most of Tamayo’s arguments are not properly before us;

that the evidence supports the conviction that he challenges; and that his aggravated

battery conviction does not merge with a cruelty-to-children conviction. So we affirm.

      1. Trial evidence

      Viewing “all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the

verdicts,” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 427 (2) (883 SE2d 317) (2023), the trial

evidence showed that Tamayo’s girlfriend and her three children lived with Tamayo.

The mother’s eldest child, an eight-year-old girl, cared for her younger siblings, a six-

year-old girl and the two-year-old victim, when the mother and Tamayo went to work.

At times, Tamayo returned from work before the mother, and he would watch the

children.

      Once the family began living with Tamayo, the mother noticed bruises on the

victim’s arms, legs, and cheeks. The victim had never had bruises like that before.

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      On one occasion, the mother returned from work and the victim was

unconscious. Tamayo told her that the victim had fallen off the bed. The victim began

vomiting, and the mother wanted to seek medical care for him, but Tamayo refused

to take them because he feared being deported.

      On the evening of June 20, 2018, while the mother was at work, Tamayo took

the victim into the bathroom to bathe or shower him. The victim was crying unusually

loudly, and then he stopped. Tamayo brought the victim out of the bathroom and

handed him to the victim’s sister. The victim was unconscious. When the sister

removed the victim’s towel to dress him, she saw that his body was cut and bruised.

The sister tried to awaken the victim, but he remained unresponsive.

      The mother called Tamayo to pick her up from work, and he told her that the

victim was having trouble breathing. Tamayo brought the victim with him to pick up

the mother as she had requested. It took Tamayo 30 minutes to drive to the mother’s

place of work, even though they lived only two minutes away. When Tamayo pulled

up, the mother saw that the victim was limp in his car seat and unresponsive. At the

mother’s insistence, Tamayo drove the mother and the victim to the hospital. Tamayo

did not want to go because of his immigration status.

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         The victim was admitted to the intensive care unit. An MRI revealed a severe

contusional injury to the victim’s brain and evidence of both chronic and recent

trauma. The MRI also showed a strain injury to the ligaments in the victim’s neck.

The MRI findings were consistent with abusive head trauma. There were multiple

hemorrhages in all layers of both of the victim’s retinas, also indicating abusive head

trauma. The victim additionally suffered an anoxic brain injury, and, at one point,

went into cardiac arrest and required resuscitation. The victim required an external

ventricular drain to lower the pressure within his head and he required a ventilator to

breathe.

         The victim’s face, ears, arms, abdomen, hip, legs, genital area, penis, and

buttocks were bruised. He also had scabbed-over injuries and burn injuries on his legs,

feet, and buttocks. Some of the injuries were in a pattern that indicated he may have

been struck by the buckle of a belt. The burn injuries were consistent with cigarette

burns.

         The victim remained in the hospital and in inpatient rehabilitation for more

than two months. Before his brain injuries, the victim met or exceeded standard

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childhood milestones. Now he has cerebral palsy, which impairs his mobility;

cognitive deficiencies; and dysphagia, or difficulty swallowing.

      After the victim was admitted to the hospital, the mother asked Tamayo to

come to the police station where she had been taken. (The mother eventually pleaded

guilty to multiple counts of first-degree child cruelty, second-degree child cruelty, and

aggravated assault as a party to the crime.) Tamayo texted the mother, “This what I

didn’t want now the police is calling me.” Tamayo testified that when he learned that

the police were looking for him, he went to Texas to evade arrest.

      2. Count 15

      Four of Tamayo’s arguments concern Count 15 of the indictment, which

alleged that Tamayo committed first-degree child cruelty under OCGA § 16-5-70 (b)

in that, on or about June 20, 2018, he “did maliciously cause [the victim] cruel and

excessive physical and mental pain, by failing to seek necessary and adequate medical

attention for injuries the child suffered. . . .” He argues that OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) is

unconstitutional; that the trial court should have granted a general demurrer on that

count because he had no duty to seek medical care for the victim; that trial counsel

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performed deficiently for failing to challenge that count; and that the evidence does

not support his conviction on that count. He has not shown reversible error.

      (a) Constitutional challenge

      Tamayo argues that OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) is unconstitutional, but he did not

raise this argument until the motion for new trial proceedings. “[A] constitutional

attack on a criminal statute may not be raised for the first time on motion for new

trial.” Amos v. State, 298 Ga. 804, 807 (2) (783 SE2d 900) (2016). Instead, “[s]uch

challenges must be raised at the first opportunity, and certainly before the verdicts;

[Tamayo’s] failure to do so waives the issues on appeal.” Robles v. State, 277 Ga. 415,

421 (9) (589 SE2d 566) (2003).

      (b) General demurrer

      Tamayo argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant a general demurrer

on this count. He has not preserved this argument.

      [G]eneral demurrers, which challenge the substance of the indictment,
      can be made before trial, but they are not required to be raised at that
      time. A challenge to the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment
      can be made after trial by means of a motion in arrest of judgment, or
      attention may be called to such a defect at any time during the trial.

                                          6
Rivera v. State, 317 Ga. 398, 406 (1) (a) (893 SE2d 696) (2023) (citations, punctuation,

and emphasis omitted).

      Tamayo did not file a general demurrer before trial nor did he raise the issue

during the trial. And although he did not file a separate motion in arrest of judgment,

in his amended motion for new trial he sought “to arrest and set aside the judgment”

on this count. Assuming this amounted to a motion in arrest of judgment, the motion

was untimely. “The law is clear that a defendant must file a motion in arrest of

judgment during the term in which the judgment was entered. See OCGA § 17-9-61

(b) (‘A motion in arrest of judgment must be made during the term at which the

judgment was obtained.’).” Ware v. State, 313 Ga. 324, 325 (869 SE2d 479) (2022).

      Tamayo’s judgment of conviction was entered August 25, 2022. His amended

motion for new trial in which he sought to arrest the judgment was filed on July 24,

2023, well after the term of court in which the judgment of conviction was entered.

See OCGA § 15-6-3 (11) (providing that Cobb County has six terms of court per year,

commencing on the second Monday in January, March, May, July, September, and

November). Tamayo has failed to show that the trial court erred.

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       (c) Counsel’s failure to file a timely general demurrer or motion in arrest of

judgment

      Tamayo argues that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel

because trial counsel failed to file a timely general demurrer or motion in arrest of

judgment as to Count 15. We hold that Tamayo has failed to show deficient

performance.

             To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
      defendant generally must show that counsel’s performance was deficient
      and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the
      defendant. To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must
      demonstrate that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively
      unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of
      prevailing professional norms.

Moss v. State, 311 Ga. 123, 126 (2) (856 SE2d 280) (2021) (citations and punctuation

omitted). Because Tamayo’s argument regarding Count 15 is novel, as he

acknowledges in his reply brief, he “cannot show that trial counsel’s failure to file a

demurrer [or a timely motion in arrest of judgment raising this issue] amounted to

deficient performance.” Id. at 129-130 (2) (b). See also Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 516,

520 (2) (847 SE2d 168) (2020) (where our courts “have not yet squarely decided” an

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issue, “trial counsel’s failure to raise a novel legal argument does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Rhoden v.

State, 303 Ga. 482, 486 (2) (a) (813 SE2d 375) (2018) (“[T]here is no requirement for

an attorney to prognosticate future law in order to render effective representation.

Counsel is not obligated to argue beyond existing precedent.”) (citations and

punctuation omitted).

      (d) Sufficiency of the evidence to support Count 15

      Tamayo argues that the evidence does not support his conviction on Count 15

because he did not have a duty to seek medical attention for the victim. We hold that

the evidence supports the conviction.

      We note at the outset that our law provides explicitly that an omission to act can

be a crime. OCGA § 16-2-1 (a) provides, “A ‘crime’ is a violation of a statute of this

state in which there is a joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or

criminal negligence.”(Emphasis added.)

      More particularly, the cruelty-to-children statute, OCGA § 16-5-70, sets out

two ways that the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree can be committed.

Count 15 tracks subsection (b), which provides, “Any person commits the offense of

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cruelty to children in the first degree when such person maliciously causes a child

under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.”(Emphasis added.) In

imposing a duty on “any person,” OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) differs from subsection (a) of

the statute, which limits its application by the victim’s relationship to the defendant.

Subsection (a) applies to “[a] parent, guardian, or other person supervising the

welfare of or having immediate charge or custody of a child.”

      So subsection (a) limits its application by the victim’s relationship to the

defendant. On the other hand, subsection (b), under which Tamayo has been

convicted, limits its application by the intent required of the defendant: to be

convicted under subsection (b), the defendant must have “maliciously” caused the

child cruel or excessive pain.

      [T]he statute, [which applies to “any person,”] requires only that the
      defendant commit an act with malice and, in so doing, cause a child the
      requisite pain. Regarding the intent component, we have stated that it
      must be established that the mental state of the defendant has the
      absence of all elements of justification or excuse and the presence of an
      actual intent to cause the particular harm, or [that] there is the wanton
      and wilful doing of an act with an awareness of a plain and strong
      likelihood that such harm might result.

                                          10
Oliphant v. State, 295 Ga. 597, 600 (1) (759 SE2d 821) (2014) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

      And such intent may be shown by delaying medical attention: “Malice, as an

element of the crime of cruelty to children, can be shown by intentionally and

unjustifiably delaying necessary medical attention for a child, as that delay may cause

the child to suffer from cruel and excessive physical pain.” Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga.

392, 396 (3) (627 SE2d 579) (2006).”What is cruel and unreasonable treatment of a

child is primarily a question for a jury.” Murray v. State, 135 Ga. App. 264 (1) (217

SE2d 293) (1975) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      The evidence described above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact

to find Tamayo guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree cruelty to children as

alleged in Count 15. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979). See Wells v. State, 309 Ga. App. 661, 663-664 (2) (a) (710 SE2d 860) (2011)

(affirming first-degree child cruelty conviction of mother’s boyfriend, who failed to

seek immediate medical attention for burned child); Hoang v. State, 250 Ga. App. 403,

406-408 (1) (551 SE2d 813) (2001) (affirming babysitter’s conviction for first-degree

child cruelty by unlawfully and maliciously causing child excessive pain by failing to

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seek medical treatment after the child had sustained a serious head injury, even though

babysitter testified that parents had instructed her to call them first if anything

happened to their child). See also Headspeth v. State, 265 Ga. App. 288, 290 (4) (593

SE2d 742) (2004) (“unlike OCGA § 16-5-70 (a)[, OCGA § 16-5-70 (b)] does not

require that the perpetrator be a parent or guardian of the child”) (punctuation

omitted).

      3. Counsel’s failure to object to a jury charge

      Tamayo argues that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to

the jury charge that “[t]he dates recited in the indictment are not material elements.”

This argument is waived because Tamayo

      did not raise this particular claim of ineffectiveness in his initial motion
      for new trial or the amendments made thereto by appellate counsel. He
      did not raise such a claim in the hearing on the motion. . . . The trial
      court did not address in its order denying the motion for new trial a claim
      that counsel was ineffective for failing to [object to the jury charge.
      Tamayo] therefore forfeited any such claim.

Allen v. State, 317 Ga. 1, 12-13 (4) (e) (890 SE2d 700) (2023) (citations and

punctuation omitted).

      4. Merger

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      Tamayo argues that two of his convictions merge. We disagree.

      Count 3 charged Tamayo with aggravated battery in that he “maliciously

cause[d] bodily harm to [the victim] by seriously disfiguring the child’s head. . . .”

Count 4 charged him with first-degree child cruelty in that he “maliciously cause[d

the victim], a child under the age of eighteen (18) cruel and excessive physical and

mental pain by inflicting blunt force to the child’s head . . . .”

      Cruelty to children, but not aggravated battery, requires proof that the
      victim was a child under the age of 18 who was caused cruel or excessive
      physical or mental pain. OCGA § 16-5-70 (b). Aggravated battery, but
      not cruelty to children, requires proof that the victim was deprived of a
      member of his body . . . or that such member was rendered useless or
      seriously disfigured. OCGA § 16-5-24 (a). Therefore, each crime
      requires proof of at least one additional element which the other does
      not. Furthermore, the two crimes are not so closely related that multiple
      convictions are prohibited under other provisions of OCGA §§ 16-1-6
      and 16-1-7. Accordingly, even if the “same conduct” establishes the
      commission of both aggravated battery and cruelty to children, the two
      crimes do not merge. . . .

Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 4-5 (2) (644 SE2d 127) (2007) (citations omitted), overruled

on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 23 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). Accord

McFadden v. State, 354 Ga. App. 377, 384-385 (3) (841 SE2d 18) (2020).

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      Tamayo cites Regent v. State, 299 Ga. 172 (787 SE2d 217) (2016), in which our

Supreme Court held that even if two crimes do not merge under the required evidence

test applicable under OCGA § 16-1-6 (1), merger still may be required under other

statutory definitions of included offenses, including OCGA § 16-1-6 (2). That statute

provides that one crime is included in another if that crime differs from the other

“only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person,

property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its

commission.” Regent, 299 Ga. at 175 (citation and punctuation omitted). See also

OCGA § 16-1-7.

      But in Waits, our Supreme Court expressly held that cruelty to children and

aggravated battery not only do not merge under the required evidence test of OCGA

§ 16-1-6 (a) but also “are not so closely related that multiple convictions are

prohibited under other provisions of OCGA §§ 16-1-6 and 16-1-7.” Waits, 282 Ga. at

5 (2). So the trial court did not err by failing to merge the convictions on Count 3 and

Count 4.

      Judgment affirmed. Mercier, C. J., and Rickman, J., concur.

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