Court Opinion

ID: 9460802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:00:42.533584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:07.289740
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 21-2489
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                v.

SHANNON DONOHO,
                                              Defendant-Appellant.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                  Western District of Wisconsin.
         No. 3:19-cr-00149 — William M. Conley, Judge.
                    ____________________

   ARGUED OCTOBER 27, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 4, 2023
               ____________________

   Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
   RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. After downloading images of child
pornography from an internet address associated with de-
fendant Shannon Donoho, law enforcement officers executed
a search warrant at his Wisconsin residence and recovered
digital images of child pornography and evidence that he had
produced child pornography. In July 2020, Mr. Donoho was
charged by superseding indictment with possession of child
2                                                         No. 21-2489

pornography and production and attempted production of
child pornography. A jury convicted him on all counts.
    Mr. Donoho now appeals his conviction on all counts but
the possession charge, contending that the jury was improp-
erly instructed and that there was not sufficient evidence to
support the jury’s verdict. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm.
                                   I
                                   A
                          BACKGROUND
    In July 2018, law enforcement officers executed a search
warrant at Mr. Donoho’s residence in Tomah, Wisconsin.
They recovered a hard drive with files depicting child por-
nography, two GoPro cameras, and computer devices with
software for editing GoPro videos. As relevant here, forensic
examination of these devices revealed eight videos and im-
ages of nude or partially nude minor females. Based on these
videos and images, a grand jury indicted Mr. Donoho on one
count of attempted production of child pornography and
seven counts of production of child pornography in violation
                          1
of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
   Count 1 of the indictment charged Mr. Donoho with at-
tempted production of child pornography. The charged video
depicts Mr. Donoho sitting on a toilet seat in his residence.
Holding a phone in one hand, he places a GoPro camera

1 Mr. Donoho was also charged and convicted on one count of possession
of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2)
(Count 2). He does not challenge his possession conviction on appeal, and
the images underlying that charge are not related to those at issue here.
No. 21-2489                                                     3

underneath the bathroom sink and adjusts it to face the toilet
seat. Mr. Donoho exits, and a prepubescent female, Minor A,
enters the bathroom, pulls down her pants, and sits on the
toilet. Her buttocks are briefly visible, but her genitals are not
visible. Minor A leaves the bathroom, and Mr. Donoho re-
turns, sits on the toilet, looks at his phone, and reaches to turn
off the camera.
    Count 3 charged Mr. Donoho with production of child
pornography based on a GoPro video taken at the residence
of his former girlfriend. In the video, the camera appears to
be placed on top of the tub faucet in the shower. Minor B, the
niece of Mr. Donoho’s former girlfriend, enters the shower
and is completely nude. The camera captures her body from
chest to feet as well as areas of the shower, tub, and curtain.
At one point, Mr. Donoho enters the bathroom, and Minor B
is heard asking him whether the camera is on; he flips open
the shower curtain and falsely tells her it is not recording.
   A final video, charged in Count 4, begins with Mr. Donoho
walking out of the same bathroom as the Count 3 video. The
camera appears to be situated in a basket, facing the toilet
seat. Minor B enters the bathroom, takes off her clothes and
places them on the toilet seat, and gets into the shower. The
camera captures a shot from her navel to her thighs.
   Counts 5 through 9 charged still images of a nude minor
female, likely Minor B, in the same bathroom. In the Count 5
image, the nude minor appears to be stepping out of the
shower. The camera captures her neck to her knees, depicting
her vagina, breasts, and nipples. The Count 6 image shows a
partially nude minor with one leg lifted; her bare buttocks and
pubic area are visible from behind. Her face is not visible.
Count 7 charged an image showing a minor from chest to
4                                                  No. 21-2489

thigh level; she is pulling down her underwear, and her pubic
area is clearly visible.
    The images in Counts 8 and 9 depict Mr. Donoho with a
nude minor. In the first image, the camera again appears to be
situated in a basket, facing the toilet. Mr. Donoho’s legs and
shorts are visible, and a minor is seated on his lap. The minor
has one leg in the air and one leg down, and her vagina is
visible. The second image is similar: The minor is again seated
on Mr. Donoho’s lap, but both of her legs are spread in the air.
The minor’s vagina and anus are visible.
                               B
                    PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
    A person violates 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) if he “employs, uses,
persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in
… any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing
any visual depiction of such conduct.” A separate provision
defines “sexually explicit conduct” to mean “sexual inter-
course,” “bestiality,” “masturbation,” “sadistic or masochistic
abuse,” or “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pu-
bic area.” Id. § 2256(2)(A)(i)–(v).
    Mr. Donoho and the Government engaged in extensive
pretrial litigation over how the jury should be instructed on
the offense. Specifically, they disputed what constituted “sex-
ually explicit conduct” for purposes of § 2251(a) and whether
the statute required the Government to prove that a defend-
ant had caused a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct.
                               1
   Because the Government’s theory of the case was that
Mr. Donoho had produced or attempted to produce visual
No. 21-2489                                                   5

depictions of “sexually explicit conduct” in the form of “las-
civious exhibition[s] of the anus, genitals, or pubic area” of
the minors, the parties argued at length over the correct in-
struction for determining what constitutes a “lascivious exhi-
bition.” In June 2020, a magistrate judge prepared draft jury
instructions explaining that, in deciding whether a visual de-
piction was a lascivious exhibition within the meaning of
§ 2256(2)(A)(v), the jury “must consider the overall content of
the visual depiction, while taking into account the age of the
child depicted. The exhibition of genitals or pubic area can
encompass visual depictions of a child’s genital or pubic area
                                                    2
even when those areas are covered by clothing.” The instruc-
tion added that the jury could consider the six non-exhaustive
factors from United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal.
1986). These so-called Dost factors have been endorsed by
many courts of appeals as helpful guides for juries in the “las-
civious exhibition” inquiry. The factors, as presented by the
magistrate judge, are:
        1. Whether the focal point of the visual depic-
           tion is on the child’s genitals or pubic area;
        2. Whether the setting of the visual depiction is
           sexually suggestive, that is, in a place or in a
           pose generally associated with sexual activ-
           ity;
        3. Whether the child is depicted in an unnatu-
           ral pose, or in inappropriate attire, consider-
           ing the age of the child;
        4. Whether the child is fully or partially
           clothed, or nude;

2 R.37-3 at 16.
6                                                    No. 21-2489

          5. Whether the visual depiction suggests sex-
             ual coyness or a willingness to engage in sex-
             ual activity;
          6. Whether the visual depiction is intended or
             designed to elicit a sexual response in the
                         3
               viewer.
    In their written responses to the draft instructions, the par-
ties did not address the inclusion of the Dost factors, but the
magistrate judge again raised the issue at a pretrial confer-
ence. The Government stated that it was not opposed to their
inclusion, but it noted that our case law revealed a “prefer-
                              4
ence” not to use them. Mr. Donoho asked that the factors be
included. The magistrate judge left the factors in the draft in-
structions for the time being.
     Mr. Donoho later changed course and requested a “modi-
                             5
fied Dost instruction.” Specifically, he asked that the court in-
struct the jury that “more than nudity is required to make an
image lascivious” and then instruct the jury on the first, sec-
                                     6
ond, third, and fifth Dost factors. He argued that the fourth
factor, concerning nudity, would cause confusion, because
United States v. Griesbach, 540 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir. 2008), had
established that mere nudity was not sufficient. And he was
most concerned with the sixth factor, which, “[i]nstead of di-
recting the jury to look at a specific attribute in the image,”

3 Id.

4 R.142 at 14.

5 R.57 at 1.

6 Id. at 3.
No. 21-2489                                                                   7

would invite the jury to decide whether the image was “in-
                                                                              7
tended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.”
Alternatively, Mr. Donoho sought an instruction following
Griesbach’s definition: “[M]ore than nudity is required to
make an image lascivious; the focus of the image must be on
the genitals or the image must be otherwise sexually sugges-
         8
tive.”
   In response, the Government, too, changed its position. It
now opposed the inclusion of the Dost factors and observed
that we had “discouraged their routine use, in part because
the factors may not helpfully clarify the statutory standard,
                                             9
which is clear enough on its face.” Jurors should simply ap-
ply a “commonsense understanding of ‘lascivious exhibi-
tion,’” and the Dost factors represented only “a partial list of
                                      10
things jurors could consider.”
   The district court addressed the issue with the parties in a
pretrial hearing. The court decided to remove the Dost factors
and to instruct the jury as follows:
             Mere nudity is not enough to make an image a
             lascivious exhibition of the genitals or the pubic
             area, nor is complete nudity a requirement. A
             lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
             area is an exhibition that calls attention to the

7 Id.

8 Id. at 5 (quoting Griesbach, 540 F.3d at 656).

9 R.59 at 2.

10 Id. (quoting United States v. Price, 775 F.3d 828, 840 (7th Cir. 2014)).
8                                                    No. 21-2489

        genitals or pubic area for the purpose of elicit-
                                               11
        ing a sexual response in the viewer.
     Unhappy with that instruction, the Government again re-
quested a modification. It asked the court to use the original
draft instruction but without the Dost factors. In the Govern-
ment’s view, the district court’s new instruction “place[d] ar-
tificial limits” on the statutory standard by focusing on
whether an image “calls attention” to the genitals or pubic
area; instead, the focus should be on the “overall content” of
                12
the image. The Government was so displeased with this new
instruction that, although it opposed using the Dost factors in
principle, it preferred a list of those six factors to the court’s
new proposal.
    Mr. Donoho again modified his views. His preference now
was the definition set forth in Griesbach. Failing that, he
wanted a Dost instruction but without the sixth factor on in-
tent. (He no longer objected to the fourth factor concerning
full or partial nudity.) Again, he emphasized his concerns
with the intent factor: In his view, the producer’s or viewer’s
intent was not sufficient to render an image “lascivious” “if
the image [wa]s not sexually suggestive or focused on the
             13
genitals.”
    The Government responded that, if the Dost factors were
to be used at all, “all six factors should be included, along with

11 R.66-3 at 14.

12 R.67 at 4.

13 R.71 at 4.
No. 21-2489                                                            9

                                                                  14
the caveat that these factors are not an exclusive list.” The
Government further noted that, whether or not the factors
were included in the instruction, it would “surely be referenc-
ing” the substance of these factors in closing argument, in-
                             15
cluding the intent factor.
    The district court ultimately instructed the jury as follows:
         In order to determine whether a visual depic-
         tion is a lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals,
         or pubic area, you must consider the overall con-
         tent of the visual depiction, while taking into ac-
         count the age of the child depicted. Mere nudity
         does not make an image lascivious; instead, the
         image must tend to arouse sexual desire by the
         viewer. Accordingly, the focus of the image
         must be on the anus, genitals, or pubic area or
         the image of the anus, genitals, or pubic area
         must be otherwise sexually suggestive. Ulti-
         mately, whether the government has proven an
         image is lascivious beyond a reasonable doubt
         is left to you to decide on the facts before you
                                     16
         applying common sense.
Although Mr. Donoho objected to the sentence stating that
“the image must tend to arouse sexual desire by the viewer,”
the court denied his request to remove that language at the
final pretrial hearing.

14 R.72 at 3.

15 Id.

16 R.116 at 100–01.
10                                                 No. 21-2489

    Finally, after the parties made their closing arguments—
in which Mr. Donoho insisted that the jury should consider
whether the conduct depicted was sexually explicit under a
“community standard” and the Government argued that the
relevant inquiry was whether the images were intended to
arouse the viewer—the court explained to the jury that nei-
ther the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit had given an
answer as to which of these definitions controlled. The court
urged the jury to “consider the aspects of the image itself, the
setting, the pose assumed by the minor and any other persons
                                                            17
depicted,” as well as “the photographer’s state of mind.” Ul-
timately, the jury was required “to decide whether it [wa]s a
sexually explicit image,” and that determination was left to it
                                                       18
“as the conscience, the lay conscience, of society.”
                               2
    In August 2020, we decided United States v. Howard, which
addressed a “novel question about the interpretation of
§ 2251(a).” 968 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir. 2020). There, we ex-
plained that a defendant does not “use[]” a minor to engage
in sexually explicit conduct when the defendant only uses a
minor “as an object of sexual interest for the purpose of mak-
ing a video of himself masturbating and lasciviously display-
ing his genitals.” Id. at 720 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we
vacated the defendant’s § 2251(a) conviction for recording
videos of himself masturbating next to his sleeping, clothed,
nine-year-old niece because the jury instructions had not

17 Id. at 143–44.

18 Id. at 144.
No. 21-2489                                                   11

required the Government to prove any sexually explicit con-
duct of the minor.
    Soon after our decision in Howard, the district court or-
dered the parties to provide input on whether it needed to
modify its jury instructions in light of our construction of the
term “uses” in § 2251(a). Mr. Donoho contended that Howard
had interpreted the term “uses” in § 2251(a) to mean “causes,”
such that the Government could only prove a violation of the
statute by proving that a defendant caused a minor to engage
in sexually explicit conduct. Thus, the court was required to
instruct the jury that it could convict only if it found that the
defendant caused the minor to engage in the depicted con-
duct. The Government argued, instead, that Howard merely
clarified that it must be the minor—and not solely the defend-
ant—who is engaged in sexually explicit conduct. In its view,
Howard had not established a causation element under
§ 2251(a).
    The district court determined that Howard did not require
the Government to “prove the type of causal relationship that
[Mr. Donoho] s[ought] to read into” the decision, and it de-
clined to replace the word “used” with “caused” in the in-
                19
structions.   Although the district court conceded
Mr. Donoho’s point that Howard “created an oddity in light of
its apparent construction of the word ‘use’ as cause,” it
thought our treatment of the issue was due to the peculiar
                     20
facts of that case. Accordingly, the jury was instructed to
convict if it found that Mr. Donoho “knowingly used [the

19 R.82 at 5.

20 R.148 at 19.
12                                                  No. 21-2489

minor] to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose
                                                    21
of producing a visual depiction” of that conduct.
                               3
   The case was tried to a jury in May 2021. At the close of
the Government’s case, Mr. Donoho moved for judgment of
acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) as
to Counts 1 and 3 through 9. The court ordered trial to pro-
ceed, and the jury convicted on all nine counts.
    After the verdict, Mr. Donoho renewed his Rule 29 mo-
tion, challenging the court’s instruction in Counts 1 and 3
through 7 as inconsistent with Howard and challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence for Counts 1 and 3 through 9. The
court denied the motion.
   The district court sentenced Mr. Donoho to 210 months’
imprisonment per count for Counts 1 and 3 through 9, to run
concurrently. On Count 2, the possession charge, the court
imposed 120 months’ imprisonment, to run concurrently with
the other term.
                               II
                        DISCUSSION
    Mr. Donoho now challenges the district court’s jury in-
structions and the sufficiency of the evidence. Because his suf-
ficiency challenge is premised on his understanding of the
proper legal standards on which the jury should have been
instructed, we begin by addressing his challenge to the jury
instructions.

21 R.116 at 98–99.
No. 21-2489                                                    13

                                A
    “When the challenge to a jury instruction implicates a
question of law, our review is de novo.” United States v. Gibson,
530 F.3d 606, 608–09 (7th Cir. 2008). We afford, however, the
district court substantial discretion in formulating “the pre-
cise wording of instructions so long as the final result, read as
a whole, completely and correctly states the law.” Id. at 609
(quoting United States v. Lee, 439 F.3d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 2006)).
    Mr. Donoho presents two primary arguments. First, he
contends that the district court’s instruction was inconsistent
with our decision in United States v. Howard, 968 F.3d 717 (7th
Cir. 2020), because it failed to require proof that Mr. Donoho
took some action to cause the minors to engage in the de-
picted conduct. Second, he contends that the court improp-
erly instructed the jury on the meaning of “lascivious exhibi-
tion” because the instructions permitted the jury to consider
his intent in creating the images and failed to require that the
charged images depict conduct connoting sex acts with the
minors. We address each argument in turn.
                                1
    Mr. Donoho first submits that the jury instruction was in-
consistent with Howard. In that case, we vacated the § 2251(a)
conviction of a defendant who had created videos of himself
masturbating next to his nine-year-old niece while she was
sleeping fully clothed. The trial court had instructed the jury
that to convict Howard it had to find that he “knowingly used
[his niece] to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the pur-
pose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct.” Id. at
720. The Government’s theory of the case was that Howard
had “‘used’ his niece in the sense that she was the ‘focus’ of
14                                                  No. 21-2489

his sexual attraction and ‘the reason’ he masturbated and ex-
hibited his genitals in the videos.” Id. at 721. In the Govern-
ment’s view, a person violated § 2251(a) by making a video
“of his own solo sexually explicit conduct” if he “‘use[d]’ a
child as an object of sexual interest.” Id. We concluded that
such an interpretation of the statute was a “strained” one, ex-
plaining that “[t]he most natural and contextual reading of
the statutory language” requires the Government to prove
that a defendant “cause[d] the minor to engage in sexually ex-
plicit conduct for the purpose of creating a visual image of
that conduct.” Id.
   Focusing on this last sentence, Mr. Donoho reads Howard
as establishing a rigid causation element. In his view, after
Howard, “uses” means “causes”; a defendant only “uses” a
minor in violation of § 2251(a) if he “took some action to cause
                                           22
the minor to engage in certain conduct.” Mr. Donoho main-
tains that, because the district court did not give any sort of
causation instruction in this case, the case went to the jury un-
der legally erroneous instructions.
    We cannot accept this argument. The district court cor-
rectly understood that our holding in Howard was concerned
with the particular facts presented in that case, where “it was
the defendant who was engaged in sexually explicit activity”
                           23
rather than the minor. Indeed, we already have observed in
a later case that Howard simply held that § 2251(a) “requires
that the offender create images that depict a minor, and not
the offender alone, engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”

22 Appellant’s Br. 28, 43–44.

23 R.148 at 9.
No. 21-2489                                                      15

United States v. Sprenger, 14 F.4th 785, 791 (7th Cir. 2021). So
long as the visual depiction at issue depicts a minor engaged
in sexually explicit conduct, a defendant may “use[]” the mi-
nor within the meaning of § 2251(a) without causing the minor
to act in any particular way. To hold otherwise, as
Mr. Donoho urges, would overread our decision in Howard
and would improperly limit the scope of § 2251(a). Howard’s
holding is more limited: It makes clear that a defendant is lia-
ble under § 2251(a) only if the defendant’s “use[]” of a minor
entails the minor’s engagement in sexually explicit conduct.
   The district court’s instruction on “use” was not errone-
ous.
                                 2
    Mr. Donoho also contends that the district court in-
structed the jury incorrectly on the term “lascivious exhibi-
tion.” He submits that the jury instructions were erroneous
because they permitted consideration of his intent and failed
to require that the charged images depict conduct connoting
sex acts with the minor.
                                 a
    The district court did not err in instructing the jury that it
could consider Mr. Donoho’s intent in determining whether
the images were lascivious. Our cases provide a well-estab-
lished approach to the construction of the term “lascivious ex-
hibition” in § 2256(2)(A), and that case law forecloses
Mr. Donoho’s argument. In United States v. Russell, we ex-
plained that “a lascivious display is one that calls attention to
the genitals or pubic area for the purpose of eliciting a sexual re-
sponse in the viewer.” 662 F.3d 831, 843 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 745 (3d Cir. 1994), and
16                                                    No. 21-2489

United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822, 828 (5th Cir. 2011)) (em-
phasis added); see also United States v. Griesbach, 540 F.3d 654,
656 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, for an image to depict a
lascivious exhibition, “the focus of the image must be on the
genitals or the image must be otherwise sexually sugges-
tive”). Russell squarely held that evidence of the defendant’s
intent was “a relevant consideration” in evaluating the im-
ages at issue. 662 F.3d at 843. In reaching that conclusion, we
relied on an earlier decision, United States v. Burt, 495 F.3d 733,
741 (7th Cir. 2007), which similarly had held that a defend-
ant’s prior acts of molestation were admissible evidence to
show that the defendant’s photographs of nude children had
been created to elicit a sexual response in the viewer and not
for legitimate, nonsexual purposes. Russell and Burt plainly
recognize a defendant’s intent in creating images as relevant
to evaluating whether the depicted conduct constitutes a “las-
civious exhibition” of the genitals.
    Mr. Donoho maintains, however, that introducing intent
as a consideration distorts the statute’s text and structure: The
statute proscribes the production of images depicting sex-
ually explicit conduct, § 2251(a), and a “lascivious exhibition”
is simply one species of sexually explicit conduct,
§ 2256(2)(A)(v). As such, Mr. Donoho contends, § 2251(a)
does not make it unlawful to produce lascivious images; it pro-
hibits instead the production of images depicting lascivious ex-
hibitions. And he insists that his intent in viewing or creating
images—even if he did so for the purpose of sexual arousal—
does not transform the conduct depicted in those images into
a lascivious exhibition. Therefore, in his view, the district
court should not have allowed the jury to consider his intent
in evaluating the images.
No. 21-2489                                                     17

    We cannot accept this argument. It is true that lascivious-
ness must be an objective quality, but the purpose for which
certain conduct is captured in an image is a relevant factor in
an objective assessment of the lasciviousness of the depicted
conduct. We have recognized that conduct often takes on a
different significance by virtue of its being visually recorded.
For instance, we have observed that otherwise nonsexual set-
tings like showers and bathtubs “are frequent hosts to fantasy
sexual encounters as portrayed on television and in film.”
United States v. Schuster, 706 F.3d 800, 808 (7th Cir. 2013) (quot-
ing United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2010)). In
the act of recording a visual depiction, the manner in which
the depiction is framed very often changes the characteriza-
tion of the portrayed conduct. For example, excluding the face
and head of the photo’s subject and focusing instead on the
genitals, see id. at 807–08, as many of Mr. Donoho’s images
did, can alter significantly the relationship between image
and depicted conduct. The conduct is context dependent.
Consequently, we have held that “the primary focus in eval-
uating the legality of the charged photographs [or videos]
must be on the images themselves,” and “at least in some cir-
cumstances, evidence of motive and intent will help to place
an image in context.” Russell, 662 F.3d at 843–44. The reason
why the producer of the image elected to emphasize a partic-
ular gesture, pose, or expression can help the trier of fact to
assess the contextual significance of the conduct that is de-
picted. Schuster, 706 F.3d at 807–08; United States v. Holmes, 814
F.3d 1246, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2016). “[D]epictions of otherwise
innocent conduct may in fact constitute a ‘lascivious exhibi-
tion of the genitals or pubic area’ of a minor based on the ac-
tions of the individual creating the depiction.” Holmes, 814
F.3d at 1251–52. “[A] visual depiction of a minor is ‘a
18                                                   No. 21-2489

lascivious exhibition because the photographer array[s] it to
suit his peculiar lust.’” United States v. Wells, 843 F.3d 1251,
1254 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d
241, 245 (10th Cir. 1989)).
     Indeed, we already have rejected squarely the argument
that intent is an improper consideration in the trier of fact’s
determination as to whether the image is “lascivious.” In
United States v. Miller, we observed that the term “lascivious”
means “tending to arouse sexual desire.” 829 F.3d 519, 524
(7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Webster’s Third New Int’l Diction-
ary). Consideration of a creator’s intent, then, is “[o]f course …
embodied” in a determination of whether the depicted con-
duct is lascivious: “Whether the image ‘arouses sexual desire’
is informed by the intent of the person creating the image.” Id.
at 525–26. Miller also made clear, however, that “subjective
intent … cannot be the only consideration”; an image does not
depict a lascivious exhibition “merely because [the defend-
ant] found [it] sexually arousing.” Id. at 526 n.3 (quoting
United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1989)).
   The district court did not err in instructing the jury that it
could consider whether the images were intended to arouse
sexual desire.
                                b
   We now turn to Mr. Donoho’s claim that the district court
should have instructed the jury to convict only if it found that
No. 21-2489                                                             19

the images depicted “conduct that connotes sex acts involving
                                       24
a minor, evaluated objectively.”
     Our case law establishes that the question “whether an im-
age is lascivious ‘is left to the factfinder to resolve, on the facts
of each case, applying common sense.’” Miller, 829 F.3d at 525
(quoting Russell, 662 F.3d at 843). Or, as the district court put
it, it was for the jury to decide this question “as the conscience
                   25
… of society.” This instruction adequately framed the in-
quiry for the jury that, as the trier of fact, had the ultimate
responsibility to determine whether the image was lascivious.
    Mr. Donoho submits, however, that the instruction should
have contained a narrower definition of the statutory term
“lascivious.” Specifically, the jury should have been in-
structed that the image in question had to depict conduct con-
noting commission of a sex act with a minor. Mr. Donoho
draws this conclusion from the decision of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in United States v. Hillie, 39 F.4th 674 (D.C. Cir.
2022). In his view, in a series of First Amendment cases ad-
dressing the constitutionality of obscenity and pornography
statutes, the Supreme Court narrowed the range of regulable
child pornography material to “hard core” depictions of sex-
ual abuse of children. See id. at 680–84. Mr. Donoho, like Hillie,
seizes on the term “hard core” in this line of Supreme Court
cases and suggests that this term represents an independent
restriction on the definition of “lascivious exhibition.” See id.

24 Appellant’s Br. 28. The Government argues that Mr. Donoho forfeited
this argument and is therefore entitled only to plain-error review. Because
we find no error, plain or otherwise, we need not address forfeiture.
25 R.116 at 144.
20                                                             No. 21-2489

at 682. Then, relying on the canon of noscitur a sociis, he insists
that “lascivious exhibition” is narrowed by the other catego-
ries of sexual conduct enumerated in § 2256(2)(A). See id. at
685. Thus, he maintains, the broader definition of lascivious-
ness on which the jury was instructed was legally erroneous
                                                                        26
and allowed the jury to convict on insufficient evidence.
    We respectfully disagree with this reasoning. In crafting
§ 2251(a), Congress employed a well-established lexicon. Ever
since its decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25
(1973), the Supreme Court has considered “[p]atently offen-
sive representation or descriptions of … lewd exhibition of
the genitals” a sufficiently concise and definite description of
prohibited obscene conduct. This category of conduct, the

26 To the extent Mr. Donoho relies on Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234 (2002), to argue that the depicted conduct must itself constitute
child sexual abuse, his position is entirely without merit. That case held
that the harm to children resulting from “virtual child pornography” was
too attenuated for the ban of this material to withstand First Amendment
scrutiny. Id. at 250. But it does not follow that the conduct depicted in an
image must inflict immediate harm to the child in the form of physical,
sexual abuse. The mere depiction of a child as a sexual object inflicts a
range of harms on the child, and Congress intended to combat these harms
in all their forms when it enacted § 2251. See, e.g., United States v. Wiegand,
812 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The crime is the offense against the
child—the harm ‘to the physiological, emotional, and mental health’ of the
child; the ‘psychological harm’; the invasion of the child’s ‘vulnerability.’
These harms collectively are the consequential damages that flow from the
trespass against the dignity of the child.” (citations omitted)); Knox, 32
F.3d at 750 (“The harm Congress attempted to eradicate by enacting the
child pornography laws is present when a photographer unnaturally fo-
cuses on a minor child’s clothed genital area with the obvious intent to
produce an image sexually arousing to pedophiles. The child is treated as
a sexual object ….”).
No. 21-2489                                                       21

Court clarified, fits within the “‘hard core’ sexual conduct”
that may be regulated without offending the First Amend-
ment. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413
U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973). In New York v. Ferber, the Court found
that a substantially identical prohibition, aimed specifically at
material involving children, was sufficiently definite and
“limited” even without a requirement that it be legally ob-
scene. 458 U.S. 747, 751, 764 (1982); see also id. at 773 (describ-
ing a state child pornography statute—which covered a range
of conduct substantially similar to the examples in Miller, in-
cluding “lewd exhibition”—as “directed at the hard core of
child pornography”). And when Congress employed the term
“lascivious” in the federal child pornography statute, the
Court gave it the same meaning as “lewd.” United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1992); see
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1994)
(adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as to “lascivious” but
reversing in other respects).
    In sum, the Supreme Court’s decisions make clear that
“lascivious exhibition” is already a sufficiently concise and
definite description of prohibited depicted conduct. We see
no basis for concluding that a further narrowing construction
must be placed upon that term, particularly in the realm of
child pornography, where Congress and the States enjoy
“greater leeway” in regulating even non-obscene depictions.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756; see also United States v. Frabizio, 459 F.3d
80, 85–86 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The statutory standard needs no
adornment. The Supreme Court has made clear that the Con-
stitution does not require additional glossing or narrowing of
the standard, and Congress has chosen not to employ any ad-
ditional glossing.” (citation omitted)). The Court’s use of the
term “hard core” certainly cannot be understood to be the
22                                                            No. 21-2489

source of such a narrowing construction; that term is em-
ployed simply to refer to categories of “suitably limited and
described” conduct, of which “lascivious exhibition” is one.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. We also do not believe that the associ-
ated-words canon can be invoked here to limit this term in the
manner Mr. Donoho proposes, following the reasoning of
Hillie. The term “lascivious exhibition” has its own meaning
that is plainly related to, but distinct from, the other terms in
§ 2256(2)(A). See Knox, 32 F.3d at 745 (“[T]he ordinary mean-
ing of the phrase ‘lascivious exhibition’ means a depiction
which displays or brings forth to view in order to attract no-
tice to the genitals or pubic area of children, in order to excite
lustfulness or sexual stimulation in the viewer.”). This mean-
ing is neither overbroad with respect to the other terms nor
naturally construed in the narrow sense that Mr. Donoho pro-
poses: to mean conduct connoting the commission of a sex act.
Cf. id. (relying on the associated-words canon to reject a nar-
rowing construction of “lascivious exhibition”).
   The district court’s instruction on lascivious exhibition
was consistent with the text of the statute and the decisions of
the Supreme Court and this court.
                                     B
    Mr. Donoho also contends that the evidence was not suf-
ficient to support his convictions on Counts 1 and 3 through
  27
7. We review a sufficiency challenge de novo, viewing the ev-
idence in the light most favorable to the Government. United
States v. Thomas, 845 F.3d 824, 830 (7th Cir. 2017). Accordingly,

27 Mr. Donoho’s challenge to his convictions on Counts 8 and 9 was lim-
ited to the alleged error in the jury instructions. He does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence on those counts.
No. 21-2489                                                   23

we will “uphold the conviction if ‘any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Granados,
142 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1998)).
    This sufficiency challenge is predicated on Mr. Donoho’s
proposed interpretation of the applicable legal standards. Be-
cause we have rejected these legal arguments, his arguments
on the sufficiency of the evidence must fail. For the sake of
completeness, we add that the Government presented ample
evidence at trial that Mr. Donoho was the individual who hid
and operated the GoPro cameras that captured visual depic-
tions of the nude or partially nude minors. The video charged
in Count 1 shows Mr. Donoho setting up and adjusting a cam-
era. The Count 3 video records him acknowledging that there
is a camera placed inside the shower as he falsely tells Minor
B that it is not recording. The other charged videos and im-
ages also show that Mr. Donoho aimed the camera in direc-
tions that were likely to capture the minors nude and took
steps to hide the camera from the view of the minors. Indeed,
each of the images and videos in Counts 3 through 7 actually
captured depictions of Minor B’s pubic area or genitals, and
the Count 1 video, which captured Minor A pulling down her
pants to use the toilet, reflected an attempt to capture a depic-
tion of her genitals or pubic area. The Government also pre-
sented evidence that Mr. Donoho had downloaded applica-
tions to his phone to control the GoPro cameras and to edit
video footage for the purpose of creating the still images at
issue in Counts 5, 6, and 7. Moreover, the jury saw evidence,
related to the Count 2 possession charge, that Mr. Donoho
possessed a large number of child pornography images unre-
lated to the images he himself had produced, and it could rea-
sonably conclude from this that he had a sexual interest in
24                                                  No. 21-2489

children. See Schuster, 706 F.3d at 808 (defendant’s collection
of child pornography “shed[] light on why [he] took the pho-
tograph of a nude boy’s genitals”). Collectively, these facts al-
lowed a jury to conclude that Mr. Donoho created these im-
ages and videos for the purpose of satisfying his sexual de-
sires. See Miller, 829 F.3d at 526 (jury could find, based on the
defendant’s “substantial steps in modifying” the bathroom so
that he could capture video of it, that he “creat[ed] the videos”
of minor females showering “because they sexually excite[d]
him”).
   In short, based on the content, setting, and framing of
these images and videos and the steps Mr. Donoho took to
capture them, see Holmes, 814 F.3d at 1252, a reasonable jury
could find that he used or attempted to use Minor A and Mi-
nor B to create visual depictions of lascivious exhibitions of
their genitals, anus, or pubic area. The evidence was therefore
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty on Counts 1
and 3 through 7.
                            Conclusion
  For these reasons, we affirm Mr. Donoho’s convictions on
Counts 1 and 3 through 9.
                                                    AFFIRMED
No. 21-2489                                                    25

     EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, concurring. Shannon Donoho
is a liar and invader of young girls’ privacy. He has committed
torts actionable under Wisconsin’s law and may well have
committed crimes deﬁned by that state’s law. But he did not
produce child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2251(a).
     I concur in the judgment only because United States v. Mil-
ler, 829 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2016), aﬃrms a conviction based on
hidden-camera movies of young girls taking showers. Miller
deﬁnes “lascivious exhibition of the genitals” in a way that is
hopelessly vague, leaving judges, prosecutors, jurors, and,
most important, photographers, unable to determine what is
and what is not lawful. On the one hand Miller says that the
standard is objective; on the other hand it asserts that the pho-
tographer’s intent and personal reactions, plus other ambula-
tory factors, must be considered. Well, the standard must be
either objective or subjective, but Miller has things both ways.
Laws are supposed to give notice so that people know what
they may and may not do. Yet §2251(a), as understood in Mil-
ler, leaves everything to a jury’s sensibilities. That is not how
criminal law should work. A conclusion that someone is a
scoundrel—a fair description of both Miller and Donoho—is
not enough for criminal liability. See, e.g., Ciminelli v. United
States, 143 S. Ct. 1121 (2023); Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct.
1565 (2020).
   Images such as the ones Donoho produced appear in
widely distributed ﬁlms. That he lied to the girls about what
he was doing does not change the images’ nature. That
Donoho may have found the images sexually exciting also
can’t suﬃce. Are ﬁlms such as The Blue Lagoon, in which
Brooke Shields appeared unclothed while only 15, child por-
nography because some viewers become sexually excited?
26                                                   No. 21-2489

How about Pretty Baby, ﬁlmed when Shields was 12? Or
Franco Zeﬃrelli’s version of Romeo and Juliet, in which Olivia
Hussey appeared naked at age 16?
    True, the statute is limited to exhibitions of the genitals,
but full frontal nudity is common in ﬁlms and television;
§2251(a) makes liability depend on a “lascivious exhibition”
of the genitals, see 18 U.S.C. §2256(2)(A)(v)—which is to say,
depicting the genitals in a sexually suggestive way. There is
nothing sexually suggestive in the videos that Donoho made
of girls taking showers and using the toilet.
    United States v. Hillie, 14 F.4th 677 (D.C. Cir. 2021),
amended, 39 F.4th 674 (2022), rehearing en banc denied, 38
F.4th 235 (2022), rejects this circuit’s approach and reverses a
conviction based on facts materially identical to Donoho’s be-
havior. The law in some other circuits also is more favorable
to Donoho than is Miller. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 579
F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Spoor, 904 F.3d 141 (2d
Cir. 2018).
    I agree with the views expressed by Judge Katsas in Hillie.
38 F.4th at 236–41 (concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc). He explained: “A child who uncovers her private parts
to change clothes, use the toilet, clean herself, or bathe does
not lasciviously exhibit them. To be sure, a voyeur who secretly
ﬁlms a child engaged in such tasks may do so for his own sex-
ual gratiﬁcation, or for the gratiﬁcation of others who will see
the depiction. But the [statutory] deﬁnition turns on whether
the exhibition itself is lascivious, not whether the photogra-
pher has a lustful motive in visually depicting the exhibition
or whether other viewers have a lustful motive in watching
the depiction.” Id. at 237 (emphasis in original). The extensive
No. 21-2489                                             27

coverage of statutory meaning in Hillie’s multiple opinions
makes it unnecessary for me to say more.