Court Opinion

ID: 9430563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:04.792763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:24.983749
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor,
concurring in the denial of a stay.
In view of the discussion in the dissents, I write to summarize my reasons for voting to deny a stay in this case.
Ronald Straight is here on his second federal habeas corpus petition. In his first petition, Straight argued that he was handicapped by the reasonable belief of trial counsel and the trial judge that Florida law barred the introduction of nonstatutory mitigating evidence at capital sentencing proceedings. Cf. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978). The District Court denied relief on this claim, and on Straight’s other claims as well, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Straight v. Wainwright, 772 F. 2d 674 (1985). Less than seven weeks ago, this Court denied Straight’s petition for certiorari, a petition that again raised his Lockett argument. 475 U. S. 1099.
In his second habeas petition, filed late yesterday, Straight raises the same substantive legal claim, and adds various new *1133factual allegations in support. The District Court properly found that, to the extent Straight seeks to relitigate the same claims raised earlier, his petition should be dismissed under Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b) as a successive petition. The court also found that, to the extent that Straight sought to make new arguments that plainly could have been raised earlier, his petition was an abuse of the writ. See Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U. S. 377, 378-380 (1984) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., concurring). The Court of Appeals found no error in the District Court’s disposition, and denied a certificate of probable cause to appeal. The Court of Appeals granted a stay of execution until noon today to permit this Court to consider Straight’s belated application for a stay and petition for certiorari.1
I find no basis for concluding that the District Court abused its discretion. Applicant has not offered any reason why he should be permitted to relitigate his Lockett claim, nor has he justified his previous failure to allege the supporting factual grounds on which he now relies. Thus, the District Court’s decision to deny relief based on Rule 9 was plainly correct. That being the case, there is no ground for reaching the merits argument that the dissenting opinions now rely on.2

 Acting in my capacity as Circuit Justice, I extended the stay of petitioner’s execution until 5 p.m. today to allow fuller consideration of his stay application.

 Justice Brennan contends that, because four Justices have voted to “hold” this case pending disposition of Darden v. Wainwright, No. 85-5319, the Court is obliged to stay applicant’s execution in order that the case not be mooted. Justice Brennan correctly notes that, in the past, the Court has ordinarily stayed executions when four Members have voted to grant certiorari, and he maintains that “[a] ‘hold’ is analogous to a decision to grant a petition for certiorari.” Post, at 1135 (dissenting). In my view, this last assertion is incorrect on several levels. First and foremost, the Court often “holds” cases for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the cases being held, as when we wish not to “tip our hand” in advance of an opinion’s announcement. Second, when certiorari is granted, by definition the Court’s resolution of the issues presented in that case might affect the judgment rendered below. That is not necessarily true of held eases. The judgment in a held case may rest on a number of grounds sufficient to sustain it. In this ease, my vote to deny Straight’s petition for certiorari — and therefore not to hold the petition for Darden, supra — reflects my view that no matter how Darden is resolved, the judgment of the District Court will be unaffected. The reason for that conclusion is obvious: the District Court found that the pe*1134tition must be dismissed under Habeas Corpus Rule 9, and therefore did not reach the merits of applicant’s claim. Darden, of course, does not raise any issue concerning the applicability of Rule 9 in cases such as this one.