Court Opinion

ID: 9477101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:14:02.456818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:41.450855
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I concur in the judgment of the court and in Parts I through III of the opinion. I disagree, however, with the holding of the majority in Part IV that the district court is without authority under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (Act) to require Corn to make restitution to his victims for losses they suffered as a result of Corn’s activity before January 1, 1983.
*898The key to resolving this issue is determining the date of Corn’s offense, because the Act provides that it shall apply to “offenses occurring on or after January 1, 1983.” Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-291, § 9(b)(2), 96 Stat. 1248, 1258 (1982) (emphasis added.)
Corn’s conviction for the single offense of contempt resulted from sales of unregistered securities he made both before the effective date of the Act — January 1, 1983 —and after that date. The conduct throughout this period violated the court’s order. In analyzing when the offense occurred for purposes of the Act, I agree with the majority that Corn’s continuing conduct is analogous to a continuing conspiracy or scheme to defraud.
Four other circuits have considered when the offense occurs for purposes of the Act in continuing conspiracy or fraud cases.1 I agree with the position taken by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits on this issue. In cases of continuing conspiracy or schemes to defraud they hold that if the conduct began before the effective date of the Act, and continued after that date, the offense is subject to the provisions of the Act.2
Professors LaFave and Scott in their hornbook on criminal law consider the problem of determining the date of an offense for ex post facto purposes and they reach a conclusion consistent with that of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits:
The problem of determining the date of the offense for ex post facto purposes may also be present when the offense is of a continuing nature, as with an ongoing conspiracy or where the offense is defined in terms of allowing a certain condition to continue or is based upon omissions by the defendant. If the conduct, condition, or failure to act continues after the enactment or amendment of the statute in question, this statute may be applied without violating the ex post facto prohibition. Thus, a statute increasing the penalty with respect to a conspiracy may be applied to a conspiracy which commenced prior to but was carried on and continued beyond the effective date of the new act.
W. Lafave &. A. Scott, Criminal Law 94 (1972).
Because I conclude that the Act authorizes the district court to order Corn to make restitution to his victims for losses caused by Corn’s conduct both before January 1, 1983 and thereafter, I respectfully dissent from the contrary conclusion of the majority.

. United States v. Oldaker, 823 F.2d 778, 781-82 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Martin, 788 F.2d 184, 188-89 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Purther, 823 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.1987); United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558, 1571 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1578, 94 L.Ed.2d 769 (1987).

. United States v. Purther, 823 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.1987); United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558, 1571 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1578, 94 L.Ed.2d 769 (1987).