Court Opinion

ID: 9746587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:28:30.022769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:15.160420
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant was convicted of five counts of robbery, two counts of conspiracy and two counts of possession of an instrument of crime relating to two armed robberies occurring at two apartment building complexes in Philadelphia in a single afternoon. The sentencing court, perhaps understandably outraged, exasperated and frustrated by appellant’s continuing involvement in criminal conduct despite numerous previous encounters with the criminal justice system, including periods of incarceration, threw the proverbial “book” at appellant and imposed the maximum sentences allowed by law on all charges and ordered them to be served consecutively. All told, appellant was sentenced to serve a total period of 65 to 130 years of imprisonment. I understand that appellant has engaged in reprehensible behavior and does not inspire a lot of hope for successful rehabilitation, particularly in the short run. Nevertheless, at some point it becomes necessary to take a step backwards, observe the larger picture in as detached a manner as possible and say “enough is enough.” The imposition of a 65 to 130 year sentence for appellant’s participation in two holdups is in effect a “life sentence.” A life sentence in Pennsylvania is imposed for first degree murder and, as such, the sentencing court’s action could be thought of as equating appellant’s conduct with cold-blooded murder.
I find the present case too similar to our decision rendered 12 years ago in Commonwealth v. Simpson, 353 Pa.Super. 474, 510 A.2d 760 (1986), to ignore. In the respect I *771consider most relevant the two cases are quite similar, except that the sentence imposed here is essentially twice as harsh as the one imposed in Simpson. In Simpson we dealt with the imposition of a total of 30 to 60 years imprisonment for six counts of robbery, four counts of conspiracy and six counts of possessing an instrument of crime which arose from six robberies of two appliance stores in a five month period. In vacating the sentence we stated that while considering the gravity of the offense and the need for society to be protected it was also incumbent upon the sentencing court to “weigh the effect of a cumulative minimum sentence of thirty years, which would take a relatively young man through the prime of his life for a term twice as long as the average life sentence, ...” We further noted that criminal conduct tends to diminish in offenders as they age and that the imposition of a thirty year sentence “effectively removes appellant from society for his potential working life, precluding the possibility of his ever becoming a contributing member of society.” If the above is true of a thirty year sentence then it is doubly true of a sixty-five year sentence.
It could be argued that appellant has a significantly worse criminal history than did Simpson prior to his crime spree, which is true. Nevertheless, when dealing with the imposition of a sixty-five year minimum sentence the sheer length of the sentence overwhelms such differences. A defendant’s criminal history may be highly relevant when deciding whether to impose a ten-year sentence or a fifteen-year sentence. But when considering locking someone up for life, for all practical purposes, that criminal history is less significant than the overriding question of whether a de facto life sentence should be imposed for participation in two robberies. Conversely, it could be argued in appellant’s behalf that Simpson participated in six separate robbery episodes whereas here the appellant was convicted of participation in two. The fact that there were five victims, thereby allowing the charging of five robberies, does not change the essential nature of the criminal conduct appellant engaged in. It merely provided a vehicle whereby the Commonwealth and the sentencing court could effectively put appellant away for life. Presumably, if appellant had held up a transit bus with forty passengers he would have received 400 years in prison. Indeed, the sentence imposed here smacks of a judicially imposed “three strikes” then life type of sentence even though our legislature has not seen fit to adopt such a measure.
Although apparently out of vogue there was a time, shortly after the imposition of the sentencing guidelines, where this court took to heart its obligation to review sentences rather than to blindly defer to the sentencing court, and was willing to vacate a sentence for no other reason than because the sentence was deemed manifestly excessive by the panel reviewing the sentence. Simpson was such a case as was Commonwealth v. Parrish, 340 Pa.Super. 528, 490 A.2d 905 (1985), and Commonwealth v. Smart, 387 Pa.Super. 518, 564 A.2d 512 (Pa.Super.1989). Since these cases remain good law I would vacate the sentence imposed and remand for resentencing upon their authority.
I would note my agreement with the general expression of my concurring colleague, Judge Tamilia as set forth in his Concurring Statement. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the arguments I advance are merely sociological or philosophical. The Superior Court exists for the purpose of reviewing actions of the trial court, just as the Supreme Court, in large part, exists for the purpose of reviewing actions of this court. There are many times when this court takes action merely because the assumed collective wisdom of a panel of three judges is deemed to be greater than the wisdom of a single judge. There is nothing inherently wrong with this aspect of appellate review. Concepts of reasonableness permeate decisions relating to child custody matters, contract interpretations and search and seizure issues, to name a few. When reviewing these cases we will routinely vacate or reverse the judgment of the lower court based upon nothing more than that our collective sense of reasonableness differs from that of the lower court. I see no reason that the same approach should be abdicated when it comes to sentencing matters.
*772Under the current sentencing scheme judges are supposed to not only refer to the sentencing guidelines but to adhere to them. This does not mean that sentences cannot be imposed in the aggravated ranges of the guidelines or even outside the guidelines where circumstances warrant. However, there are supposed to be valid reasons for sentencing in the aggravated or mitigated ranges or for going outside the guidelines altogether. If this court is not empowered to review the sentencing court’s reasons and disregard them if considered invalid or insufficient then, from a practical standpoint, there is no appellate review and the guidelines become essentially a voluntary exercise.
In Commonwealth v. Smart, 387 Pa.Super. 518, 564 A.2d 512 (1989), while writing for a majority of a panel of this court, I indicated that “[ajppellate review of sentencing matters would become a mockery and a sham if all sentences were routinely affirmed under the guise of discretion of the trial court.” Id., 564 A.2d at 514. Now, more than eight years later, I dare say that this is precisely the state of appellate review of sentencing matters in this Commonwealth. Judge Ta-milia states that a vast majority of sentences are in compliance with the guidelines. Although I would like to believe this to be the case, I am not so sure. But I am sure that numerous sentences are routinely affirmed by this court that are outside the guidelines, or are maximum sentences, despite the fact that the circumstances of the case are not out of the realm of the ordinary for the type of crime committed.
I further agree with Judge Tamilia that the guidelines are designed to give “appropriate weight to the nature of the crime.” As I observed in Commonwealth v. Gause, 442 Pa.Super. 329, 659 A.2d 1014 (1995), the guidelines take into account the inherent egregiousness of the crime in question by calling for “increasingly greater sentences for increasingly egregious conduct.” Id., 659 A.2d at 1016. Each offense is assigned an offense gravity score which, generally speaking, sets forth the appropriate period of incarceration for that particular offense. We must assume that the sentencing commission understood what a robbery was when it assigned an offense gravity score for robbery, or what a rape was when it assigned an offense gravity score for that particular offense.
As I further noted in Gause, when the court sentences outside the guidelines for conduct which is not unusual for the crime committed, in reality it reflects the sentencing court’s rejection of the legislature’s and sentencing commission’s sense of appropriate punishment and the substitution of its own. Although when this practice occurs there are likely to be individuals in full agreement with the sentence handed down, nevertheless, this is contrary to the purpose behind imposition of the guidelines in the first place. As we noted in Commonwealth v. Chesson, 353 Pa.Super. 255, 509 A.2d 875 (1986), the guidelines were formulated with the purpose of standardizing sentences and diminishing the disparity in sentencing that often developed from county to county and even courtroom to courtroom. Lest the impact of this goal escapes anyone, implementation of this policy necessarily requires the reining in of sentencing discretion, a matter that was recognized by both the legislature in passage of the guidelines and this court back in 1986. See, Chesson, for discussion.
For the above reasons, I believe that not only are we empowered to reject sentences for manifest “exeessiveness,” I also believe we are duty bound to do so as long as the guidelines remain in effect. If the legislature sees fit to repeal the sentencing guidelines and restore maximum discretion to the sentencing courts then this court’s current reviewing practices as it relates to sentences will be justified. However, until such time I believe we are abdicating our responsibility as an appellate court by routinely affirming sentences like that presented here under the guise of deference to sentencing discretion.
Lastly, I also believe it was error to sentence appellant for two counts of conspiracy and two counts of possessing an instrument of crime. Although ideally a challenge to the imposition of multiple sentences for what is essentially one crime should be made through a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, there is precedent for vacating sentences via a challenge to the sentence. It is *773well established that conspiracy is an inchoate crime and the number of conspiracies depends upon the number of conspiratorial agreements reached not the number of crimes committed within a conspiratorial arrangement. In the present case there is nothing that suggests that the commission of the ci’imes resulted from separate conspiratorial agreements. Indeed, given the short time between robberies it strains logic to suggest that both robberies were not the result of a single criminal conspiracy. In Commonwealth v. Perez, 381 Pa.Super. 149, 553 A.2d 79 (1988), we vacated a sentence for conspiracy upon appeal even though the appellant had pled guilty to two conspiracies. We noted that there was nothing in the record, nor anything offered by the Commonwealth, to suggest that there were two separate conspiracies. The same logic applies here. Nothing proffered by the Commonwealth, in its brief, or in its petition for consolidation, supports a conclusion that there was more than one criminal conspiracy. Consequently, I would be inclined to reverse one of the sentences for criminal conspiracy.
The above rationale is even stronger in the context of the possession of an instrument of crime context. The offense charged relates to the possession of an instrument of crime with the intent to employ it criminally. Since appellant did in fact employ a handgun criminally, that aspect of the offense is established. However, the Commonwealth’s practice of tying this offense to the number of robberies is not supported by the language of the statute. What the offense prohibits is the possession of the weapon with criminal intent. Possession is a continuing status. There is nothing to indicate that appellant’s possession of the handgun was interrupted at any time during the commission of the offenses in question. As such, although appellant may have employed the handgun in two separate robberies there is nothing to suggest that he did not possess the gun continuously throughout the relevant time frame. Consequently, he committed but one offense of weapon possession.
I would note that under a similar scenario this very panel vacated a second sentence for a possession of a weapon offense in Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998). The majority attempts to distinguish Woods from the present case but the point we made in Woods has not been refuted. In Woods we stressed that possession of weapons offenses were not tied to the commission of an offense with the weapon and, in fact, a violation would occur even if no crime were actually committed with the weapon. The controlling factor, as stated in Woods, was the possession of the weapon. We concluded in Woods that since there was no evidence that the possession of the weapon was interrupted Woods had committed only one possession offense, even though there were two separate assaults. The majority has not presented a meaningful distinguishing factor from Woods and, therefore, principles of stare decisis dictate that the same result should be reached here.
For the above reasons, I believe the sentence should be vacated as manifestly excessive and remanded for resentencing. Further, I believe that the sentences for one count of conspiracy and one count of possessing an instrument of crime should be reversed as illegal.