Court Opinion

ID: 9475175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:19:08.641348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:33.066591
License: Public Domain

SETH, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur specially in the majority opinion in this appeal and arrive at the same result but by a slightly different route.
In my view there is no substantial problem as to the product market. The case was tried on the assumption that the product market was restaurant equipment and restaurant supplies. The testimony was so directed. The trial court so found by its adoption of the one-stop shopping distribution method wherein all needed equipment and supplies were provided.
My definition of a geographic market may be somewhat different from that expressed by the majority in Part II of the opinion. I would disregard the location of the suppliers and instead examine the proof to determine the trade area — that is, where the products are made available to the buyers with the prices at balance, thus the area where a price increase or supply reduction would cause a prompt influx of the products of others not already in the area.
As to the proof, in my view, the trial itself proceeded on the assumption that “the Denver area” was the geographic market area. Again, the proof was so. directed. However, the trial court took the proof one step beyond this “Denver area” geographic market and moved into another and quite different subject. Thus, as the majority points out, the trial court’s “one-stop shopping” was not a market conclusion. It was instead a description of a marketing method in the Denver area and that alone. I would thus stop with the “Denver area” as the geographic market. This does not necessarily do violence to the trial court’s conclusion as it backs it off to the last real geographic market proof before the extra step was taken — the step beyond. In addition, there was shown to be only one distributor using the one-stop method in the Denver area.
I would thus agree with the majority, but on these somewhat different grounds that the Denver area was the geographic mar*1230ket and restaurant equipment and supplies constituted the products market.
I agree with the majority that the position taken by the plaintiff and the uncontroverted proof demonstrate that there was no market power exercised by the defendant, and to the extent the trial court found that there was, it was clearly erroneous.
I also agree with the majority that there can be no per se violation in these circumstances, that is, in the absence of allegations of illegal pricing (maintenance or increases) or tying arrangements.
I am uncertain as to what really remains of the decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 87 S.Ct. 1856, and for that reason I am not prepared to rely on segments of it.
Sections V and YI of the majority opinion are concerned with economic theory and I am unable to concur in them. Section V begins with an express reliance on what it terms “sound economic theory.” I am not sure there is any such thing as a characterization of the new and retreaded economic theories depends so much on where you sit.
For the above reasons I would reverse.