Court Opinion

ID: 9594206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:28:03.329285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:29.275556
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, J.,
dissenting.
The restrictive covenant relied on by the Homeowners cannot be fairly read to prohibit the activity complained of. The majority opinion marks a sharp departure from the way in which the Court has traditionally looked at restrictive covenants; it misapplies Schwarzschild v. Welborne, 186 Va. 1052, 45 S.E.2d 152 (1947); and it creates a threadbare distinction between conduct that violates the covenant and conduct that does not. In my opinion, the conclusion reached by the majority is bad law which will prove unworkable.
*21Traditionally, in Virginia, we have strictly construed restrictive covenants. Lewis v. Henry, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 192 (1877). Moreover, we have placed upon those who would enforce a restrictive covenant the burden of proving that the activity complained of falls within the terms of the restriction relied upon. Schwarzschild, 186 Va. at 1058, 45 S.E.2d at 155. In that same opinion, we stated that restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and that “[t]hey are to be construed most strictly against the grantor and persons seeking to enforce them, and substantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the free use of property and against restrictions.” Id. In addition to the foregoing, historically, we have focused upon the precise language used in the restriction without adding to or subtracting therefrom. Further, we have been careful not to imply that which was clearly stated. The majority opinion ignores these well-developed principles.
It would be difficult to imagine or to draft a restrictive covenant which more clearly sets forth a use restriction on the one hand and a structural restriction on the other. Both of the restrictive covenants considered in this appeal contained the following language:
No lot shall be used except for residential purposes. No building shall be erected, altered, placed, or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached single-family dwelling not to exceed two stories in height.
The first sentence contains the word “used.” This means that where the drafter intended to limit use he knew exactly what to write in order to accomplish that result. The majority concedes that Omega’s use of the property would comply with the residential use restriction contained in the first sentence.
Significantly, the second sentence makes no mention of “use” or “used.” The second sentence does not mention those words because it is not concerned with use. It is concerned with the type of building to be constructed on the property. In every respect, the predicate of the second sentence makes unmistakably clear that the sentence pertains to the structure that may be placed upon the lot, not the use to which the structure may be put. The second sentence requires no more than that the structure erected on the lot be a dwelling and that that dwelling meet the following description: that it be one structure, that it be detached, that it be *22single-family, and that it not exceed two stories in height. One can easily visualize a building that complies with these structural restrictions quite apart from any consideration of its use. Like the other descriptors in the list, “single-family” refers to a structural characteristic of a dwelling: one designed to accommodate a single cooperative living unit. In this sense, “single-family” is a shorthand reference for a type of design.* The majority concedes that the structure would comply with the restriction.
When the restrictive covenant is read as a whole, it is obviously a two-part restriction with the first part relating to use and the second part relating to structure. Nevertheless, the majority claims that by reading the covenant as a whole it finds a use restriction in the second sentence. What the majority has actually done is read language into the second sentence which cannot be found there. According to the majority, when read as a whole, “the covenants specify that only dwellings designed structurally for single-family occupancy may be erected and that the buildings may be used only for single-family residential purposes.” Ante, at 18 (emphasis added). The italicized language pinpoints the critical flaw in the majority opinion; that language cannot be found in the restrictive covenants here under review. That language was created and supplied by the majority. The majority’s “reading” of the covenant can be more properly characterized as a re-write of that covenant. The majority’s treatment of the restrictive covenant directly contravenes the rules this Court has evolved over the centuries concerning construction of restrictive covenants.
According to the majority, Schwarzschild v. Welborne justifies reading a use restriction into the second sentence of the covenant. In Schwarzschild, we said that the word “dwelling” when used by itself necessarily referred to both use and structure. However, in my view, the majority’s reliance upon Schwarzschild is misplaced. The majority ignores the fact that there we struck down an attempt to restrict use of the subject property, while here Schwarzschild is relied upon to uphold a restriction. In essence, the majority attempts to utilize a portion of Schwarzschild while *23distinguishing the great bulk of that opinion which runs counter to the majority’s rationale.
Because of the central role Schwarzschild plays in the majority’s analysis, that decision deserves detailed treatment. There, a homeowner sought to rent rooms in her house. Her deed contained a restrictive covenant which made two references to the word “dwelling.” The deed said “there shall not be erected more than two dwellings” and “such improvements shall be a dwelling or two dwellings.” 186 Va. at 1057, 45 S.E.2d at 154-55. The restrictive covenant in Schwarzschild was not comprised of a use component and a structural component. Instead, the restriction was embodied in one word: “dwelling.” In trying to decide whether rentals could be permitted under the restriction, we rejected the argument that the word “dwelling” had no impact on the use to which the property could be put. We commented that in our view, it would be improper to build what looked like a dwelling then use it for a funeral home. Thus, we concluded that the word “dwelling,” when used as it was in Schwarzschild, “necessarily” limited use. By contrast, in the instant appeal, there is no necessity to imply a use restriction. In this case, we need not fear that a building will be used for any thing other than a residential purpose. We do not need to imply a use restriction because one is stated explicitly.
The majority opinion is also disturbing because of the classification it develops. The majority states that it is willing to accept a broad definition of the word family. As result, the majority accepts as a single-family three unrelated school teachers who live together in a house, households containing maids, governesses, tutors, butlers and others. Indeed, the majority does not attempt to say what groups will be included in its broad definition of family. All it concludes is that four unrelated mentally retarded persons and a counselor do not fall within that broad definition. The explanation for the exclusion of the family group proposed by Omega is that the counselors will surveil and supervise the mentally retarded family members. The suggestion is that watching over and supervising individuals is somehow antithetical to the concept of family. In my view, watching over and supervising members of a family who need such attention is central to families. The majority’s explanation for excluding from the definition of family a group made up of a counselor and four individuals is unsatisfactory. The majority has drawn a line which will exclude *24appellants while including virtually everybody else. The facts and circumstances of this case do not support this result.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court, and dissolve its injunction.

 An analogous short-hand reference appears in the Providence Pines restrictive covenant which contains the additional proviso that the lot owner may erect “an attached private garage for not more than two cars.” No one would dispute that a “two-car garage” may be used for purposes other than housing cars. Surely this covenant would not be violated if a lot owner used such a garage to house a truck, a boat, two or more motorcycles, or even old newspapers.