Court Opinion

ID: 9898857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 15:08:19.76935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:34.384245
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1044-22

NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.M.W.,

          Defendant,

and

R.A.S., SR.,

          Defendant-Appellant.

IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF R.A.S.,
JR. and E.R.S., minors.

                   Submitted October 11, 2023 – Decided November 15, 2023

                   Before Judges Natali and Puglisi.
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
            Docket No. FG-09-0102-22.

            Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
            appellant (Meghan K. Gulczynski, Assistant Deputy
            Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

            Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
            respondent (Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General,
            of counsel; Wesley Hanna, Deputy Attorney General,
            on the brief).

            Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
            attorney for minors (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy
            Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa R. Vance,
            Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
            the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant R.A.S., Sr. (Richard) appeals from the November 14, 2022

judgment of guardianship terminating his parental rights to his children, R.A.S.,

Jr. (Ricky), born in 2009, and E.R.S. (Erica), born in 2010.1          The children's

biological mother, defendant A.M.W. (Aileen), does not appeal from the

guardianship judgment terminating her parental rights.        The Law Guardian

supports the termination on appeal as it did before the trial court.

1
  We use initials and pseudonyms to identify the parties, children, and others to
protect the children's privacy and because records relating to Division
proceedings held pursuant to Rule 5:12 are excluded from public access under
Rule 1:38-3(d)(12).
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      Based on our review of the record, the court's extensive findings of fact

and conclusions of law, and defendant's arguments, we are convinced the court

correctly determined the Division of Child Protection and Permanency

(Division) proved by clear and convincing evidence termination of Richard's

parental rights is in the children's best interests. We therefore affirm.

                                        I.

      The facts and procedural history of the underlying matter are fully set

forth in Judge Michael A. Jimenez's sixty-page opinion, which we incorporate

by reference. We highlight the following facts relevant to this appeal and,

although this appeal only concerns Richard, we will discuss Aileen where

pertinent.

      The Division first became involved with the family in 2012, on a report

of concerns about Richard and Aileen's mental health and substance abuse,

which the Division ultimately deemed unfounded. Over the course of the next

eight years, the Division received and investigated fourteen2 additional referrals

regarding Richard, Aileen, or both defendants, involving concerns about their

mental health, substance abuse, and care of Ricky and Erica. All but two of the

2
   Although the trial court's opinion indicates fourteen referrals, by our count
there were fifteen in total.
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allegations were deemed unfounded or not established.            Throughout its

involvement with the family, the Division offered services and referrals to both

defendants to assist them in addressing their mental health, substance abuse,

domestic violence and parenting issues.          Richard did not participate

meaningfully in any treatment and continually tested positive for illicit

substances.

      In September 2012, the Division substantiated an allegation of abuse and

neglect against Aileen. Based on both defendants' positive drug tests and failure

to comply with recommended services, along with Aileen's failure to self-

administer prescribed medication, the Division executed an emergency Dodd

removal.3 The Division was awarded custody of Ricky and Erica, who were

initially placed with a non-relative resource home with defendants having

supervised visitation. Eight months later, Ricky and Erica were placed with

Aileen's mother Dolores, who supervised the visits. The children remained with

Dolores for the next year and a half, when they were reunified with defendants.

Although the pending litigation was dismissed, Richard's visits with the children

3
   "A 'Dodd removal' refers to the emergency removal of a child from the home
without a court order, pursuant to the Dodd Act, which, as amended, is found
at N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82. The Act was authored by former Senate President
Frank J. 'Pat' Dodd in 1974." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J.
Super. 593, 609 n.2 (App. Div. 2010).
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remained supervised. Under a related docket, joint legal custody of the children

was granted to Dolores, Richard and Aileen.

      In February 2016, the Division was again granted care and supervision of

Ricky and Erica based on defendants' mental health and substance abuse issues.

Six weeks later, when the Division received another referral with similar

concerns, Richard refused to be interviewed or comply with the Division's

investigation or recommendations. The litigation was dismissed in December

2017, with Dolores, Richard and Aileen maintaining joint legal and physical

custody of the children.

      In March 2019, the Division was again granted care and supervision of

Ricky and Erica based on defendants' unresolved mental health and substance

abuse issues, along with their non-compliance with services.

      In May 2019, the Division substantiated an allegation of neglect against

defendants based on domestic violence. Specifically, Richard hit Aileen in the

face in the presence of the children, who later reported fearing Richard would

kill Aileen. Richard was subsequently discharged from mandatory substance

abuse treatment for failing to appear and continued to test positive for marijuana

and cocaine.

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      In December 2019, Alison Strasser Winston, Ph.D., conducted a forensic

psychological/parenting evaluation of Richard, who presented with an extensive

history of substance and alcohol abuse, which impacted his overall functioning

and ability to parent the children. The evaluation found Richard to be highly

angry and untrusting; he lacked adequate resources to manage stressful or

challenging situations and instead chose to self-medicate with illicit substances.

Although Richard had an emotional attachment to his children, his antisocial

personality characteristics and anger issues impaired his ability to parent and

empathize with them. Dr. Winston diagnosed Richard with bipolar disorder,

antisocial personality disorder, and severe cannabis use disorder.            She

recommended Richard be restrained from the home until he complied with

services and "adequately reduced the risk he posed to his children ," and that his

contact with the children be supervised for the foreseeable future. She also

recommended substance abuse treatment, couples counseling, parenting training

and therapy with the children.

      In January 2020, Samiris Sostre, M.D. conducted a psychiatric evaluation

of Richard. Her findings were consistent with Dr. Winston's evaluation, in that

Richard endorsed symptoms of irritability, anger and frustration. Although he

tried to manage his anger issues with marijuana, Dr. Sostre found this strategy

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ineffective because he continued to have ongoing anger outbursts.             She

diagnosed him with bipolar disorder, impulse control disorder and antisocial

personality disorder. Dr. Sostre also recommended mental health treatment and

medication, classes in anger management and batterer's intervention, but noted

that individuals with antisocial personality disorder respond "very poorly" to

treatment and "the prognosis is poor."

      Based on the ongoing concerns regarding defendants' unabated substance

abuse, in May 2020 the court again granted the Division custody of Ricky and

Erica, placed them with Dolores, and banned Richard from the residence. A

week later, the court permitted therapeutic visits through Catholic Charities ;

Richard attended one visit and then was incarcerated.

      The court conducted a fact-finding hearing in September regarding

another domestic violence incident that occurred in January 2020. Although it

did not sustain a finding of abuse and neglect, the court determined it was in the

children's best interests to continue their custody, care and supervision with the

Division. Within three months, both defendants moved to Pennsylvania.

      On May 21, 2021, the court entered a permanency order approving the

Division's plan of termination of parental rights due to defendant's continued

mental health and substance abuse issues, for which neither parent took

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significant steps to address despite the Division's reasonable efforts.       On

September 29, 2021, the court entered a permanency order approving the plan

of termination of parental rights followed by relative resource home adoption.

      The guardianship trial was conducted over the course of three days before

Judge Jimenez. The Division presented the testimony of Dr. Sostre, an expert

in psychiatry and substance abuse; Dr. Jennifer Pacyon, an expert in

neuropsychological and forensic assessments; Dr. Winston, an expert in clinical

psychology; Lauren Burgos, the Division caseworker; and Dolores. Richard did

not present any witnesses.

      Judge Jimenez subsequently issued a thorough written decision detailing

defendants' prior history with the Division. He summarized the procedural

history and made detailed findings of fact as to each of the required elements of

the best-interests-of-the-child standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).

Based on those findings, Judge Jimenez concluded the Division sustained its

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence it was in Ricky's and Erica's

respective best interests to terminate defendants' parental rights.

      The judge accepted the testimony of the Division's experts, who testified

consistent with their prior evaluations of Richard. The judge also considered

the testimony of the caseworker and Dolores, and concluded the Division had

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proven by clear and convincing evidence reunification was not feasible. He

found "it would not be safe to return the children to [defendants], now or in the

foreseeable future, due to the extensive history of substance abuse, unaddressed

mental health issues, ongoing domestic violence concerns and both parents[']

lack of insight into the harm their conduct has and continues to cause their

children."

      The judge noted Ricky and Erica had been in the physical and legal

custody of the Division for two years preceding the litigation, having been

removed from defendants for the second time. He noted that the harm to the

children was "not one egregious harm, but a series of harms that have taken

place over time" because of untreated mental health issues, substance abuse and

domestic violence. Both Dr. Sostre and Dr. Winston testified about Richard's

poor judgment, untreated mental health issues, domestic violence, absence of

anger management and lack of desire to stop using substances and address these

longstanding, pervasive issues. Dr. Winston further testified of the harm to

Ricky and Erica caused by their parents' mental illness, substance abuse and

domestic violence.

      Judge Jimenez found Richard had not taken any meaningful steps to

address the issues that resulted in Ricky's and Erica's removal. Since its first

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                                       9
involvement in 2012, the Division had offered an "ampl[e] array of services" to

Richard, including substance abuse treatment programs and mental health

services. He refused to participate, instead continuing his "insatiable desire to

use illicit drugs." The court also noted defendants did not have safe and stable

housing. At the time of the hearing, they were living in a "vacant, unoccupied

home that is under construction," having previously resided in a tent.

      Judge Jimenez also considered Dr. Winston's bonding evaluations, during

which she observed Ricky's and Erica's strong emotional attachment to Dolores.

Although the children also had a "positive emotional bond" with Richard, it was

not a "strong and secure emotional attachment." Dr. Winston opined, and the

judge found, that removing the children from Dolores would cause them "serious

and enduring emotional harm."

      Judge Jimenez also found the Division had made reasonable efforts to

provide services directed at addressing Richard's mental health, substance abuse

and domestic violence issues, even after he had moved to Pennsylvania. The

judge further considered Dolores's testimony that she wanted to adopt the

children and was not amenable to kinship legal guardianship (KLG) "because

she believe[d] adoption is the best way to protect the children." Thus, he found

there was no alternative to termination of parental rights.

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                                       10
      Finally, Judge Jimenez considered Richard's inability to parent now or in

the foreseeable future, along with Ricky's and Erica's need for permanency and

their bond to Dolores, in whose care they were thriving. He found the Division's

testimony and evidence demonstrated that the termination of parental rights

would not do more harm than good, and adoption by Dolores was in the

children's best interests.

      On appeal, Richard presents the following arguments for our

consideration:

             I.  THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER
             CRUCIAL AMENDMENTS TO THE RELEVANT
             STATUTE WHEN IT MIS[S]TATED THE LAW.

             II. THE FATHER'S FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY
             INTEREST   SHOULD   NOT   HAVE  BEEN
             EXTINGUISHED WHEN THE CHILDREN WERE
             CARED    FOR   BY   THEIR   MATERNAL
             GRANDMOTHER AND THE COURT FAILED TO
             ADEQUATELY CONSIDER KINSHIP LEGAL
             GUARDIANSHIP.

             III. IT IS UNNECESSARY TO TERMINATE A
             POSITIVE PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP WHEN
             THE    CHILDREN'S   PLACEMENT   IS  A
             PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENT.

                                      II.

      Our review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is

limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012).

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                                      11
"A Family Part's decision to terminate parental rights will not be disturbed when

there is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the court's

findings." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.T.D., 439 N.J. Super.

363, 368 (App. Div. 2015) (citing F.M., 211 N.J. at 448). Our Supreme Court

has noted in respect to termination of parental rights cases, "a trial court's factual

findings 'should not be disturbed unless they are so wholly unsupportable as to

result in a denial of justice.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J.

494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472

(2002)).

      "We accord deference to factfindings of the family court because it has

the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before

it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the

family." F.M., 211 N.J. at 448.         This enhanced deference is particularly

appropriate where the court's findings are founded upon the credibility of the

witnesses' testimony. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. H.B., 375 N.J. Super.

148, 172 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of

Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).

      "Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide

of the mark' should an appellate court intervene and make its own findings to

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                                         12
ensure that there is not a denial of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L.,

191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)).         No deference is given to the trial court's

"interpretation of the law," which we review de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J.

232, 245-46 (2012).

      A parent has a constitutionally protected right "to enjoy a relationship with

his or her child . . . ." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999).

That right, however, "is not absolute" and is limited "by the State's parens

patriae responsibility   to   protect   children   whose     vulnerable    lives   or

psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously

endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." F.M., 211 N.J. at 447. Thus, a

parent's interest must, at times, yield to the State's obligation to protect children

from harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 (2009).

      When terminating parental rights, the court must consider the "best

interests of the child . . . ." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 347. A petition to terminate

parental rights may be granted only if the following four prongs enumerated in

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) are established by clear and convincing evidence:

             (1) The child's safety, health, or development has been
             or will continue to be endangered by the parental
             relationship;

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                                        13
            (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
            harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
            provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
            delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;

            (3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to
            provide services to help the parent correct the
            circumstances which led to the child's placement
            outside the home and the court has considered
            alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

            (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
            harm than good.

            [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1)-(4).]

      "The four criteria enumerated in the best interests standard are not discrete

and separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a

comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." K.H.O., 161 N.J.

at 348. "[T]he cornerstone of the inquiry [under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)] is not

whether the biological parents are fit but whether they can cease causing their

child harm." In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992).

      Here, Judge Jimenez made extensive findings of fact and well-reasoned

credibility determinations, and he engaged in a comprehensive, fact -sensitive

analysis of all the statutory factors as to the termination of Richard's parental

rights. See K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. We affirm substantially for the reasons set

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                                       14
forth in his thorough and well-reasoned opinion. We add only the following

comments.

      First, we reject Richard's arguments the court erred by failing to consider

KLG as an alternative to termination of parental rights. He argues that under

the 2021 amendments to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2), L. 2021, c. 154, § 9, and the

KLG statute, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3), L. 2021, c. 154, § 4, KLG is preferred to

termination of parental rights, and that the amendments are inconsistent with

giving effect, as Richard contends the court did here, to the resource parent's

preference for termination of parental rights and adoption over KLG. Thus, he

argues the court erred by determining termination of their parental rights is in

the best interests of the children.

      The 2021 amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) deleted the second

sentence of the second prong of the best interests standard. Prior to the

amendment, the second prong of the standard read as follows:

             The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm
             facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a
             safe and stable home for the child and the delay of
             permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm
             may include evidence that separating the child from his
             resource family parents would cause serious and
             enduring emotional or psychological harm to the
             child[.]

             [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (emphasis added).]

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                                      15
      The 2021 amendment thus deleted the provision stating, "Such harm may

include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents

would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the

child[.]"

      The 2021 amendments also modified the KLG analysis. L. 2021, c. 154, §

4. Prior to the July 1, 2021 effective date of the amendments, the KLG statute,

N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3), required a determination by clear and convincing

evidence that adoption was neither feasible nor likely before awarding KLG. In

part, the statute provided a court could appoint a caregiver as a KLG, if "based

on clear and convincing evidence" a series of express conditions were satisfied,

including "adoption of the child is neither feasible nor likely." N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-

6(d)(3). The 2021 amendment deleted that condition, making KLG an equally

available permanency plan for children in Division custody, like Erica and

Ricky. L. 2021, c. 154, § 4; N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3).

      In New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. D.C.A.,

we rejected a claim the 2021 amendment to the second prong of the statutory

standard under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) barred the court's consideration of "all

evidence concerning a child's relationship with [the] resource caregiver[] . . .

even in the context of the other prongs of the best-interests standard." 474 N.J.

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Super. 11, 25-26 (App. Div. 2022). We explained, "[t]he Legislature did not

alter the other components of the best interest standard[,]" and we rejected an

interpretation of "the amendments to prong two to mean that such a bond may

never be considered within any part of the best interests analysis." Ibid. We

further determined "the statute still requires a finding that '[t]ermination of

parental rights will not do more harm than good[,]'" id. at 26 (quoting N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a)(4)), and stated, "[t]he court must make an evidentiary inquiry into

the status of children in placement, to determine whether the child[ren] [are]

likely to suffer worse harm in foster or adoptive care than from termination of

the biological parental bond." Ibid.

      We also noted the amendments to the KLG statute were intended "to make

it clear . . . that the judge should be considering the totality of the circumstances

in every case in evaluating facts and making a particularized decision based on

the best interests of each child . . . ." Id. at 28 (citation omitted). We explained

a court should not limit its focus to "the harm from separation from foster

families . . . at the exclusion of other factors." Ibid. (citation omitted). We

concluded the modification to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) "requires a court to

make a finding under prong two that does not include considerations of caregiver

bonding, and then weigh that finding against all the evidence that may be

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                                        17
considered under prong four—including the harm that would result from

disrupting whatever bonds the child has formed." Id. at 29.

      Even if Judge Jimenez considered the bonding evaluation in the context

of prong two, the misapplication was harmless error. "The harmless error

standard requires that there be some degree of possibility that [the error] led to

an unjust result." State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012). The record supports the

finding that Richard refused to address his issues that caused the children harm

and he was unable to provide them a safe and stable home both now and in the

foreseeable future. The judge's consideration of the bonding evaluation in prong

four was wholly appropriate and supported the correct conclusion that

termination of parental rights would not do more harm than good. Thus, the

error in considering bonding in prong two did not lead to an unjust result.

      Moreover, contrary to Richard's claims, the amendments did not require

the imposition of KLG over termination and adoption under the circumstances

presented. As Judge Jimenez explained, KLG was not acceptable to Dolores,

there was no other viable caretaker who sought or was available for KLG, and a

coparenting arrangement was not feasible or in the children's best interests

because of Richard's inability to parent.        Therefore, the totality of the

circumstances detailed in the judge's painstaking analysis supported his

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                                       18
conclusion that the Division presented clear and convincing evidence

termination of Richard's parental rights was appropriate under each prong of the

best interests standard.

      To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by

defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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