Court Opinion

ID: 9897098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:07:02.869536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:45.399961
License: Public Domain

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                        STATE OF FLORIDA
                       _____________________________

                              Case No. 6D23-492
                       Lower Tribunal No. 20-CA-002396
                       _____________________________

                     PEOPLE’S TRUST INSURANCE COMPANY,

                            Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
                                        v.

                                 PAUL GUNSSER,

                            Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
                       _____________________________

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County.
                            Sherra Winesett, Judge.

                                November 9, 2023

TRAVER, C.J.

      People’s Trust Insurance Company (“People’s Trust”) and Paul Gunsser both

appeal the final judgment entered in Gunsser’s favor.1 Water overflow from a

deteriorated cast iron plumbing system damaged Gunsser’s home. But Gunsser’s

homeowner’s insurance policy did not cover the costs to tear out and fix his home’s

      1
       This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this
Court on January 1, 2023. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A),
9.110(g).
concrete slab to access the system. This is because a water damage exclusion

(“WDX”) endorsement overwrote the original policy provision that would have

covered Gunsser’s loss caused by water discharging from his plumbing system and

the tear out and replacement costs to access the deteriorated pipes. The WDX

endorsement applied here because the deterioration, rust, and corrosion that caused

the plumbing system’s deterioration is “an act of nature.” While Gunsser bought a

limited water damage coverage (“LWD”) endorsement that modified the WDX

endorsement and covered his sudden and direct accidental water damage up to

$10,000, the LWD endorsement did not include tear out and replacement costs

coverage. In finding that the WDX endorsement applies, we affirm the trial court’s

ruling on this issue. And in concluding the LWD endorsement did not cover tear out

and replacement costs, we reverse the trial court’s final judgment with instructions

to enter an amended final judgment excluding these damages.

I.    Background and Operative Policy Provisions

      People’s Trust insured Gunsser under an all-risk policy. As a typical all-risk

policy, Gunsser’s policy covered all losses unless specifically excluded. See, e.g.,

Kokhan v. Auto Club Ins. Co. of Fla., 297 So. 3d 570, 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). For

this loss, four policy sections are at issue. The first two sections set the initial scope

of People’s Trust’s coverage if the plumbing leak warranted tear out and replacement

of Gunsser’s concrete slab to access the corroded plumbing system. Under those

                                            2
sections, the water loss and tear out and replacement costs would be covered under

the policy. The last two sections of the policy, the WDX and LWD endorsements,

however, overrode the first two sections to exclude tear out and replacement costs.

      First policy section. The first section of Gunsser’s policy outlined the basic

parameters of what the policy covered and excluded. It insured “against direct

physical loss to property,” including Gunsser’s dwelling. But the policy excluded,

among other occurrences, any loss caused by wear and tear, rust, or other corrosion.

Thus, because rust and corrosion damaged Gunsser’s cast iron plumbing system, he

would have no coverage but for a significant exception. That exception created

coverage for discharge or overflow from a plumbing system and added coverage for

tear out and replacement of any part of Gunsser’s house necessary to access and fix

the system. Thus, the scope of the exception is significant. By its nature, the

subsequent destruction and replacement of a concrete slab, unaffected by a water

leak, is not a “direct physical loss to property.” It is, rather, indirect or ancillary.

Even so, the first policy section illustrates that without the WDX endorsement, there

was no question that People’s Trust agreed to pay for Gunsser’s tear out and

replacement costs “unless the loss was otherwise excluded”:

                                           3
      SECTION I – PERILS INSURED AGAINST
      A. Coverage A – Dwelling and Coverage B – Other Structures
         1. We insure against risk of direct physical loss[2] to property
            described in Coverages A and B.
         2. We do not insure, however, for loss:
            ....
            c. Caused by:
               ....
               (5) Any of the following:
                  (a) Wear and tear, marring, deterioration;
                  (b) Mechanical breakdown, latent defect, inherent
                      vice or any quality in property that causes it to
                      damage or destroy itself;
                  (c) Smog, rust or other corrosion;
                      ....
                  Exception to c. (5)
                  Unless the loss is otherwise excluded, we cover loss
                  to property covered under Coverage A or B
                  resulting from accidental discharge or overflow of
                  water or steam within a:
                      i. Storm drain, or water, steam or water pipe, off the
                          “residence premises”; or
                      ii. Plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic
                          fire protective sprinkler system or household
                          appliance on the “residence premises”. This
                          includes the cost of tearing out and replacing any
                          part of a building necessary to repair the system or
                          appliance. However, such tear out and replacement
                          coverage only applies to other structures if the water
                          or steam causes actual damage to a building on the
                          “residence premises”.

      Second policy section. The second policy section at issue, standing alone, did

not alter coverage here. It merely defined “water” in a manner that did not affect

      2
       The underlined and italicized portions of the policy excerpts are added for
emphasis throughout this opinion.

                                          4
People’s Trust’s obligation to cover Gunsser’s loss, including his tear out and

replacement costs:

      SECTION I – EXCLUSIONS
      A. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the
         following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or
         event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.
         These exclusions apply whether or not the loss event results in
         widespread damage or affects a substantial area.
         ....
         3. Water
         This means:
         a. Flood, surface water, waves, including tidal water and tsunami,
             tides, tidal water, overflow of any body of water, or spray from
             any of these, all whether or not driven by wind, including storm
             surge;
         b. Water which:
             (1) Backs up through sewers or drains; or
             (2) Overflows or is otherwise discharged from a sump, sump
                 pump or related equipment.
         c. Water below the surface of the ground, including water which
             exerts pressure on or seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk,
             driveway, foundation, swimming pool or other structure.
         ....

Indeed, rust and corrosion caused Gunsser’s toilet to overflow, and not a tsunami, a

sump pump discharge, or a swimming pool leak.

      Third policy section: WDX endorsement. But, for a $151 premium credit,

Gunsser contracted with People’s Trust to modify the definition of “water.” The

third policy section at issue, the WDX endorsement, replaced the policy’s water

exclusion. It now defined water to mean, among others, discharge or overflow of

                                         5
water from Gunsser’s plumbing system, as long as “human, animal forces, or any

act of nature” caused it:

                        WATER DAMAGE EXCLUSION

             THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES YOUR POLICY,
                    PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY

      For a premium credit, your policy is changed as follows:

      ....

      Under SECTION I – EXCLUSIONS item 3. Water is replaced by the
      following:

          3. Water, meaning:
               ....
               e. Discharge or overflow of water or steam from within a
                  plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic fire
                  protective sprinkler system or from within a household
                  appliance; . . .
               ....
                  caused by or resulting from human or animal forces or any
                  act of nature.

      All other provisions of your policy that are not affected by this
      endorsement remain unchanged.

      Gunsser disputes that corrosion is an “act of nature.” If it is not, the WDX

endorsement does not apply, and Gunsser’s loss—including tear out and

replacement costs—is not “otherwise excluded” by his original policy. If corrosion

is an “act of nature,” then the WDX endorsement would leave Gunsser uncovered.

      Fourth policy section: LWD endorsement. But a fourth policy section could

prevent this outcome, because for an additional $91 premium, Gunsser bought back

                                        6
limited water damage coverage via the LWD endorsement. This endorsement covers

“[s]udden and accidental direct physical loss” due to water discharge from within a

plumbing system. But critically, the parties agreed to limit this type of loss only to

“covered property” and a set amount per occurrence:

                  LIMITED WATER DAMAGE COVERAGE

              THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES YOUR POLICY,
                      PLEASE READ CAREFULLY

      AGREEMENT
      “We” will provide the insurance described in this endorsement in return
      for an additional premium paid by “you” and “your” compliance with
      all applicable provisions of this policy.

      The policy is endorsed to provide the following:

         Sudden and accidental direct physical loss to covered property by
         discharge or overflow of water or steam from within a plumbing,
         heating, air conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler
         system or from within a household appliance.

      LIMIT OF LIABILITY:
      The Property Coverage limit for liability for all covered property
      provided by this endorsement is shown on your Declaration Page, per
      occurrence.

      This coverage does not increase the Property Coverage limit(s) of
      liability that apply to the damaged covered property.

      All other provisions of your policy that are not affected by this
      endorsement remain unchanged.

The policy’s Declaration Page provided for $10,000 in coverage per LWD

occurrence.

                                          7
      People’s Trust insists that the LWD endorsement only covers Gunsser’s water

damage and not his tear out and replacement costs. Gunsser responds that the LWD

endorsement is ambiguous on tear out and replacement coverage, and therefore, we

should construe the policy in his favor. Alternatively, Gunsser claims that because

the LWD endorsement is silent on tear out and replacement costs, the first policy

provision covering these items still applies.

      The parties framed their interpretive arguments below through competing

summary judgment motions. The trial court determined that the WDX endorsement

applied because corrosion was an “act of nature.” But it interpreted the LWD

endorsement to include tear out and replacement costs. The case proceeded to trial,

where a jury awarded Gunsser water damages of less than $10,000 and vastly larger

tear out and replacement costs necessary to fix his plumbing system. The trial court

ultimately entered judgment in Gunsser’s favor.

II.   Standard of Review and Applicable Insurance Law

      We review the policy de novo, guided by the principle that its text is

paramount. See Gov’t Emps. Ins. v. Macedo, 228 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 2017);

Auto-Owners Ins. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000). Indeed, we interpret

insurance contracts according to their plain language, as bargained for by the parties.

See Auto-Owners Ins., 756 So. 2d at 34. We read the policy as a whole, endeavoring

to give each provision its full meaning and operative effect. See U.S. Fire Ins. v.

                                          8
J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 877 (Fla. 2007); see § 627.419(1), Fla. Stat. (2019)

(requiring every insurance contract “be construed according to the entirety of its

terms and conditions as set forth in the policy and as amplified, extended, or

modified by any application therefor or any rider or endorsement thereto”). We will,

however, liberally construe any ambiguity remaining in favor of coverage and

against People’s Trust. See Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943,

949–50 (Fla. 2013). A provision is ambiguous if it is “susceptible to two reasonable

interpretations, one providing coverage and the other excluding coverage.” Fayad

v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins., 899 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 2005).

III.   Legal Analysis

       The trial court correctly determined the WDX endorsement applied because

corrosion is an “act of nature.” It erred, however, in concluding that the LWD

endorsement covers tear out and replacement costs. The LWD endorsement only

applies to “covered property” that suffers “[s]udden and accidental direct physical

loss.” The policy initially covered these ancillary losses unless they were “otherwise

excluded.” The WDX endorsement did precisely that, and regardless, ancillary slab

damage caused by tear out is not a direct physical loss, much less a sudden and

accidental one. The policy thus does not cover tear out and replacement costs, and

an amended final judgment must exclude them.

                                          9
      A.     The WDX endorsement applies because corrosion is an “act of
             nature.”

      The WDX endorsement applied to Gunsser’s claim for water damage because

corrosion to his cast iron plumbing system was an “act of nature.” Gunsser

disagrees, claiming that the policy does not define “act of nature,” and that we should

find this phrase synonymous with “act of God.” Gunsser contends an “act of God”

is an uncontrollable or unpreventable event like a hurricane, tornado, or flood, and

not a natural process like corrosion. He also categorizes it as a “term of art” in

insurance policies, and accordingly, relies on Black’s Law Dictionary, an insurance

treatise, and federal case law to define it instead of non-legal dictionaries and case

law from other states. He argues that at best, “act of nature” is ambiguous, and we

should therefore construe it in his favor.

      Three of our sister courts have rejected Gunsser’s arguments. See Dodge v.

People’s Tr. Ins., 321 So. 3d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), Rosa v. Safepoint Ins., 350

So. 3d 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022); Santana v. People’s Tr. Ins., 366 So. 3d 1130 (Fla.

3d DCA 2023). The Dodge court analyzed identical policy language on the same

facts. See Dodge, 321 So. 3d at 832–33. As here, the parties agreed that corrosion

caused the insureds’ plumbing leak. See id. at 832. Because “act of nature” is not

defined in the policy, the Dodge court analyzed both legal and non-legal dictionary

definitions to find the ordinary meaning of “act of nature.” See id. at 833–34; see

also Macedo, 228 So. 3d at 1113 (“When a term in an insurance policy is undefined,

                                             10
it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and courts may look to legal and

non-legal dictionary definitions to determine such a meaning.”). Citing two out-of-

state cases, 3 the Dodge court concluded that the ordinary meaning of “act of nature”

is “something that naturally occurs” and includes ordinary natural processes like rust

or corrosion—“the chemical reaction between iron and moist air.” Dodge, 321 So.

3d at 834–35 (noting “rust” is defined as “reddish brittle coating formed on iron

especially when chemically attacked by moist air” and “corrosion” is defined as “the

action, process, or effect of corroding,” which is “to wear away gradually by

chemical action” (quoting Rust and Corrosion, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

Dictionary (11th ed. 2003))). It does not require an uncontrollable or unpreventable

event. See id. at 835.

      The Rosa court, analyzing similar policy language in an identical factual

context, adopted Dodge’s reasoning and its definition for “act of nature” as

“something that naturally occurs.” Rosa, 350 So. 3d at 470. It also noted the

operative policy separately referenced “an Act of God” more than once. This

undermined the insured’s argument that the definitions of “an act of God” and “any

      3
        See Holben v. GC Acquisition Corp., No. 1996-CA-261, 1997 WL 115843,
at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1997) (natural accumulation of snow and ice on
rooftop); Coyle v. City of Waterbury, No. 96884, 1991 WL 270291, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1991) (growth of tree root into abutting sidewalk); see also Bibeau
v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins., 244 A.3d 712, 714 (Me. 2021) (gradual earth movement
below home’s foundation).

                                         11
act of nature” were interchangeable. See id. at 471 (citing Ahearn v. Mayo Clinic,

180 So. 3d 165, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“[W]here the document has used one term

in one place, and a materially different term in another, the presumption is that the

different term denotes a different idea.” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 25, at 170 (2012)))). 4

      We find the Dodge and Rosa courts’ reasoning persuasive. Here, context is

key. The only contextually reasonable meaning of “act of nature” is “something that

naturally occurs,” and therefore, includes a naturally occurring process like rust and

corrosion. See Dodge, 321 So. 3d at 834–35; Rosa, 350 So. 3d at 471; see also Scalia

& Garner, supra, at § 70 (“Most common English words have a number of dictionary

definitions, some of them quite abstruse and rarely intended. One should assume the

contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think

otherwise.”).

      At bottom, Gunsser’s alternative interpretation requires us to view “an act of

nature” synonymously with “an act of God,” or an uncontrollable or unpreventable

event. We do not look solely to legal dictionaries like Black’s Law Dictionary to

find the plain and ordinary meaning of an undefined insurance policy term like “act

      4
         The Santana court followed Dodge and Rosa in a citation opinion. 366 So.
3d at 1130. Later, in a case involving identical policy language and a similar fact
pattern, the Third District emphasized that it had “chosen to follow the precedent set
by Dodge and Rosa.” See People’s Tr. Ins. v. Banks, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1819,
D1820 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 13, 2023).

                                         12
of nature.” See Macedo, 228 So. 3d at 1113 (quoting Botee v. S. Fid. Ins., 162 So.

3d 183, 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)). Non-legal dictionaries are also fair game. Id.

So, we reject Gunsser’s invitation to stop with Black’s Law Dictionary and go no

further. Black’s Law Dictionary is not contextually appropriate here. It defines “act

of God” inconsistently with the circumstances and references broadening the

definition based on an inapplicable federal statute:

             [A]n overwhelming, unpreventable event caused
             exclusively by forces of nature, such as an earthquake,
             flood, or tornado. The definition has been statutorily
             broadened to include all natural phenomena that are
             exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible, the effects of
             which could not be prevented or avoided by the exercise
             of due care or foresight. 42 USCA § 9601(1). – Also
             termed act of nature . . . .

Act of God, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).

      We cannot rely on Gunsser’s cited insurance treatise either, because it does

not define “act of nature.” See 11 Couch on Insurance § 153:3 (3d ed. 2023)

(defining “forces of nature” and “natural processes”). Gunsser’s federal case law

also provides no help because every situation involved an “act of God.” See Legree

v. United States, No. 5:05-CV-173-SPM, 2006 WL 2190580 (N.D. Fla. July 31,

2006) (tornado during hurricane destroys warehouse facility); Chartis Prop. Cas.

Co. v. Inganamort, Civ. No. 12-040075, 2019 WL 1277518 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2019)

(unpublished) (boat sinks during heavy rain, lightning, and heavy thunderstorms);

Fed. Ins. v. PGG Realty, LLC, 538 F. Supp. 2d 680, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (megayacht

                                         13
capsizes amid extreme weather), aff’d sub nom., 340 F. App’x 5 (2d Cir. 2009); see

also Rivera-Carraquillo v. Centro Ecuestre Madrigal, Inc., 812 F.3d 213, 227 n.25

(11th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff flung from horse is force majeure or superior force).

      Instead, the Fourth and Fifth Districts’ examinations of non-legal dictionary

definitions and applicable case law in Dodge and Rosa to analyze the phrase’s usage

provides a better process to determine the contextual meaning of “act of nature.”

And in the context of this policy, we agree with Dodge and Rosa that the everyday

interpretation of the phrase “act of nature” means “something that naturally occurs,”

rather than an uncontrollable or unpreventable event, such as a hurricane, flood, or

tornado, usually classified as an “act of God.” See Rosa, 350 So. 3d at 471

(determining that “any ‘act of nature’ is an act that occurs naturally and encompasses

rust or other corrosion”); Dodge, 321 So. 3d at 834 (agreeing with insurer that

“ordinary meaning of the term ‘act of nature’ is something that naturally occurs”);

see also People’s Tr. Ins. v. Banks, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1819, D1820 (Fla. 3d DCA

Sept. 13, 2023) (agreeing with Dodge and Rosa that phrase “act of nature” used in

insurance policy included ordinary natural processes).

      Even if we construed some overlap between the definitions of “act of nature”

and “act of God,” additional contextual clues in Gunsser’s policy preclude the

finding of an ambiguity. Gunsser’s policy specifically references “an Act of God”

more than once in its Cancellation and Nonrenewal sections. We agree with the

                                         14
Rosa court that the separate uses of “an Act of God” and “any act of nature” in the

same policy connote different meanings of the terms. See Rosa, 350 So. 3d at 471;

see also Kel Homes, LLC v. Burris, 933 So. 2d 699, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“As a

general proposition, the use of different language in different contractual provisions

strongly implies that a different meaning was intended.”). For these reasons, the

trial court correctly ruled that it could not read “act of nature” synonymously with

“act of God.” In context, synonymous interpretation is unreasonable. The only

contextually reasonable definition of “act of nature” in this specific insurance policy

is “something that occurs naturally” that is not necessarily an “act of God.”

Gunsser’s WDX endorsement therefore excluded any coverage here. Accordingly,

we must now analyze the LWD endorsement.

      B.     The LWD endorsement provides water loss coverage that does not
             include tear out and replacement costs.

      The LWD endorsement’s coverage does not include tear out and replacement

costs because they are not “covered losses,” much less “[s]udden and accidental

direct physical losses.” Unlike the first policy section, the LWD endorsement does

not mention tear out and replacement costs. And we cannot conclude that the

destruction of a concrete slab and its subsequent replacement following a water leak

are direct, sudden, or accidental. By their nature, they are instead indirect, delayed,

and purposeful. The LWD endorsement’s plain language, therefore, does not cover

tear out or replacement costs.

                                          15
      We therefore reject Gunsser’s contention—grounded in a Fifth District

decision with different LWD endorsement language—that this provision is

ambiguous. See Sec. First Ins. v. Vazquez, 336 So. 3d 350, 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022);

see also Sec. First Ins. v. Nichols, 363 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (citation

opinion to Vazquez). Like Gunsser’s policy, the Vazquez policy covered tear out and

replacement costs in connection with water damage not otherwise excluded from a

plumbing system. See Vazquez, 336 So. 3d at 352. But Vazquez is different from

this case in at least two ways.

      First, we agree with our sister courts that we can distinguish Vazquez because,

unlike here, the parties stipulated that the LWD endorsement included tear out and

replacement costs. See Vazquez, 336 So. 3d at 352; Panettieri v. People’s Tr. Ins.,

344 So. 3d 35, 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022); Banks, 48 Fla. L. Weekly at D1821.

      Second, the LWD endorsement’s language in Vazquez differs significantly

from the language in the LWD endorsement here:

 Gunsser:                                  Vazquez:

 “The Property Coverage limit for          “The limit of liability for all damage to
 liability for all covered property        covered property provided by this
 provided by this endorsement is shown     endorsement is $10,000 per loss. This
 on “your” Declaration page, per           coverage does not increase the limit of
 occurrence.” (Emphasis added).            liability that applies to the damaged
                                           covered property.” (Emphasis added).

The Vazquez court noted that the LWD endorsement there limited liability for “all

damage to covered property” while observing that the water leak did not damage the

                                        16
concrete slab. 336 So. 3d at 353. It also remarked that if the insurer had wished to

tie the limitation of liability to that part of the property damaged by water, it could

have used the term “water damage loss” instead of “damage to covered property.”

Id. Finally, it opined that even if a water damage loss included both direct damage

to covered property and indirect damage in the form of tear out costs, there was no

reason why an LWD endorsement necessarily applied to both categories of loss. Id.

On the other hand, the Vazquez court reasoned that “damage to covered property”

could also include tear out costs because the insured’s concrete slab would be

damaged in connection with the plumbing repairs. Id. Based on these observations,

the Vazquez court concluded that the LWD endorsement drafted by the insurer was

ambiguous, and therefore, it should be interpreted in the insured’s favor. Id.

      Here, the LWD endorsement limits recovery “for liability for all covered

property.” It does not raise the ambiguity of what “damage” means in connection

with a subsequent slab repair; it only asks whether the loss is covered. In this sense,

People’s Trust accepted the Vazquez court’s tacit invitation to define its liability

limits more clearly. Id. Unlike Vazquez, Gunsser’s LWD endorsement is clear and

unambiguous; it does not cover tear out and replacement costs.

      The policy’s plain language also impedes Gunsser’s argument that tear out

and replacement costs are covered despite what the LWD endorsement

unquestionably declares. The policy’s only reference to tear out and replacement

                                          17
costs is in the first policy section, and that provision only applies “[u]nless the loss

is otherwise excluded.”      When Gunsser agreed to the WDX endorsement in

exchange for a lower premium, his amended policy did not just exclude tear out and

replacement costs suffered in connection with a plumbing leak, but all water damage

from leaks in his plumbing system caused by human or animal forces or any act of

nature. The WDX endorsement, therefore, “otherwise excluded” water damage

coverage in the first policy section, and Gunsser’s exclusive coverage for this type

of loss now comes only from the LWD endorsement. Put differently, the LWD

endorsement’s silence on tear out and replacement costs does not resurrect the first

policy section’s inclusion of them.

      We are not the first to interpret this policy language, and our sister courts share

our interpretation. See Panettieri, 344 So. 3d at 39–40 (“A plain reading of the

exception to [the first policy section] indicates that tear out coverage is included as

part of the loss to property unless the loss is excluded. Therefore, no separate and

distinct coverage exists for tear out costs apart from water damage.”); Banks, 48 Fla.

L. Weekly at D1820–21 (holding that limited water damage coverage endorsement

did not cover “tear out” costs associated with replacement of insured homeowners’

old cast iron plumbing pipes after pipes caused water damage; endorsement only

covered sudden and accidental direct physical loss by water). Gunsser is therefore

                                          18
entitled to recover for his water damage loss, but not his ancillary tear out and

replacement costs.

IV.   Conclusion

      For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that the WDX endorsement

applies but reverse its determination that the LWD endorsement includes tear out

and replacements costs. These determinations moot People’s Trust’s remaining

appellate arguments relating to the trial. We remand for entry of an amended final

judgment that does not include tear out and replacement costs.

      AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

GANNAM, J., concurs.
MIZE, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
                       _____________________________

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
          AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
                 _____________________________

MIZE, J., concurring specially, with opinion.

      I fully concur in Section II and Section III.B. of the majority's opinion. As to

the remainder of the opinion, I concur in result only.

                        _____________________________

Mark D. Tinker and Francesca M. Stein, of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Tampa, for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Mark A. Nation, of The Nation Law Firm, Longwood, Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., of
Buell & Elligett, P.A., for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

                                         19