Court Opinion

ID: 9567610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:56:07.810929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:42.772013
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the judgment affirming the order of suppression. While a reviewing court should accept a trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by competent evidence, it also should not hesitate to correct an ultimate constitutional conclusion that is inconsistent with or unsupported by the undisputed historical facts. People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730 (Colo.1987). In my opinion, the undisputed historical facts in this case add up to exigent circumstances as a matter of law.
A sexual assault on a thirteen-year-old girl was committed sometime between 11:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. and was reported to the police in the early morning hours of July 26,1988. Several officers went to the apartment complex where the assault had occurred for the purpose of taking the offender into custody. Although the officers did not know the suspect’s name or his precise address, they were able to locate his apartment by a process of elimination. Realizing that it would take two to three hours before an arrest warrant could be obtained, the officers entered the apartment, took the defendant into custody, and seized items directly connected to the sexual assault.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally prohibits police officers from entering a home in order to make a warrantless arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The Fourth Amendment, however, does not prevent police officers from entering a home in the face of compelling or exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo.1981). Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into a home include those situations where a delay might endanger the police officers or other persons, might result in the flight of the suspect, or might risk the destruction of crucial evidence. See generally People v. Thompson, 770 P.2d 1282 (Colo.1989); People v. Bustam, 641 P.2d 968 (Colo.1982). The determination that a warrantless entry is justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine must be based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances confronting the police officers at the time the warrantless entry is made. No one factor, in other words, is conclusive of the issue. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.1973), cert. denied sub nom. Agran v. United States, 414 U.S. 833, 94 S.Ct. 173, 38 L.Ed.2d 68 (1973); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1970); People v. Williams, 200 Colo. 187, 613 P.2d 879 (1980).
In this case, although the police officers were not engaged in an eyeball chase of the suspect, they nonetheless were close on the trail of a person who had recently *1059committed a sexual assault with a knife, who might be armed with a gun, and who might well constitute a danger to the arresting officers or to others. In the course of their pursuit, the officers had determined the location of the crime by eliminating other possible locations in the apartment complex. Upon arriving at the defendant’s apartment, they had probable cause to believe that the person who committed the sexual assault was inside.
The justification for the entry into the defendant’s apartment was clearly established at the suppression hearing. Some officers were concerned about the defendant’s escape, while others were concerned about the possible destruction of evidence inside the apartment. These concerns were not illusory. The defendant would likely have been alerted to the presence of the police officers as a result of the extended knocking on his apartment door at three o’clock in the morning. Moreover, it was not implausible that if the officers waited outside the apartment for a warrant, the defendant might attempt to escape, thereby endangering the officers or others, or might attempt to dispose of critical evidence during the delay. In short, the circumstances confronting the officers at the time of their entry were sufficiently compelling to justify the action taken.
Since, in my view, the entry into the apartment was constitutionally permissible, I have no hesitation in concluding that the defendant’s custodial statement, given after proper Miranda warnings, was not the fruit of any Fourth Amendment violation. I am also satisfied that the warrantless seizure of the check, the bedsheet rolled up on the floor, the large kitchen knife, as well as several items of clothing, was constitutionally justified as the fruit of a valid search incident to the defendant’s arrest.
I would reverse the order of suppression.
I am authorized to say that Justice RO-VIRA and Justice MULLARKEY join in this dissent.