Court Opinion

ID: 9540843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:20:16.293137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:11.636945
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority determination that the circuit court's order of January 23, 1987 was void for want of jurisdiction. It must be noted that the circuit court action was for a declaratory judgment.
I agree, of course, that the parties could not reach their ongoing problem by means of TR 60(A). On the other hand, it is well established that our courts will determine the nature of a motion by what it seeks to accomplish rather than by how it is captioned. See, eg., Phillips v. Gammon (1919), 188 Ind. 497, 124 N.E. 699.
The statute governing actions for declaratory judgment provides in part:
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper....
IC 34-4-10-8. This provision has been construed as referring to additional declaratory relief. Brindley v. Meara (1985), 209 Ind. 144, 198 N.E. 801.
Accordingly, it is my view that the stat ute governing declaratory judgments expressly authorized the relief requested. The trial court had jurisdiction. That continuing jurisdiction granted by the statute was not divested by commencement of the mandate action in the superior court.
Concerning the relief granted, the evidence supports the court's determination that from and after the time of the original trial the city properly administered its incentive bonus system so that such payments should have been excluded in computing pension payments.
On the other hand, the original judgment did include the determination that the bonus system in practice constituted longevity pay up until the time of trial on December 8, 1982. That decision was affirmed on appeal and the doctrine of the law of the case precluded the trial court from redetermining pension benefit amounts for the period prior to the date of the original trial on December 8, 1982. It follows that the court erred in its order of January 23, 1987 to the extent it attempted to exclude the bonus payments from the pension calculation for the period from April 1, 1981 to December 8, 1982.
Pursuant to AR 15(N) we should therefore correct the judgment of the circuit court and affirm the judgment as corrected.
It then also follows that the mandate judgment of the superior court was not based upon a void judgment.
I agree with the majority analysis concerning the propriety of pre-judgment interest.
*1253The mandate order should be corrected to provide prejudgment interest for the additional payments due to and including December 8, 1982. The judgment of the superior court should be affirmed as corrected.