Court Opinion

ID: 9449837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:24:52.083335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:25.836211
License: Public Domain

VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree that the policy exclusion denying coverage with respect to watercraft “owned by or rented to the insured” is ineffective under the facts of this case. If the exclusion were limited solely to ownership, I could go along with the ambiguity determination and agree that such word might be narrowly interpreted and that under such interpretation the facts would support a finding that Stover was not an owner. I also agree that a situation is not presented requiring the piercing of the corporate veil.
However, the use of the word “rented” in connection with the word “owned” leads me to believe that the parties intended the word “owned” to be used in a broader sense.
Additionally, I cannot acquiesce in the conclusion that “rented” as used in context here can reasonably be construed to exclude Stover as a renter of the boat. Stover under the undisputed evidence paid the corporation one-half of the cost of maintenance and depreciation with respect to the boat in the following amounts: 1958 — $411.56, 1959 — $741.15, 1960 — $1515.71. These payments represent a substantial consideration paid for *292the right to use the boat for personal purposes when it was not being used for business purposes. Such payments appear to meet all standard definitions of rental, including the definitions set out by the trial court.
I know of no requirement that rent be in a fixed, stated dollar amount or that rental be profitable or that it operate only in situations where the lessor is engaged primarily in the rental business. In my view, the trial court’s statement that the renter relationship applies in such situations “when a person goes to a boat dock and rents or hires a boat belonging to another” is much too restrictive.
I place no significance upon the fact that plaintiff during 1961, the accident year, paid no part of the boat expenses. The record fairly shows that such action was taken upon the advice of the attorneys given after the accident. There is no evidence to show any change of arrangements in 1961 with respect to the use of the boat.
Plaintiff used the boat at times for personal purposes. If the substantial payments he made for upkeep and depreciation were not by virtue of part ownership or by way of rental, what purpose could possiby exist for making the payments ?
While the rule requiring construction of ambiguous insurance policies liberally in favor of the insured has been frequently applied, such rule does not authorize a perversion of language to create an ambiguity. See Cass Bank & Trust Co. v. National Ind. Co., 8 Cir., 326 F.2d 308 (1/14/64). I believe that the payments made by Stover constitute rent under any reasonable definition of the word “rent”.
Inasmuch as plaintiff urged the exclusion did not apply whether the boat was being used for company business or Stover’s pleasure, and the court upheld such construction, no finding was made with respect to the nature of the use of the boat at the time of the accident. There is much to indicate that the boat was being used for personal purposes. If there is any serious question upon this issue, such issue should be resolved by the trial court.
I would reverse.