Court Opinion

ID: 9646780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:10:59.645545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:41.829272
License: Public Domain

*479
Davidson, J.,

dissenting:

The first question this case presents is whether the exclusionary rule contained in Md. Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.) § 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which, under certain circumstances, renders the results of chemical tests for alcohol inadmissible in evidence, is applicable to chemical test results administered initially for the purpose of medical treatment of the accused. The majority concludes that the exclusionary rule applies to the results of chemical tests administered by, or at the direction of, a police officer initially for the purpose of prosecution but is inapplicable to tests administered by, or at the direction of, a physician for the initial purpose of medical treatment. In my view, the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history support the conclusion that the exclusionary rule contained in § 10-309 is applicable to evidence of chemical test results, regardless of the purpose for which they were initially administered.
The legislative history of Md. Code (1974,1980 Repl. Vol. & 1980 Supp.) § 10-302 through § 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, effective 1 January 1974, shows that these sections were preceded by Md. Code (1957, 1959 Repl. Vol.), Art. 35, § 100 of the Evidence Title, effective 1 June 1959. An examination of the legislative history of Art. 35, § 100 shows that as long ago as 1954, the Maryland Legislature was concerned with the problem of promoting safety on the highways through the successful prosecution of drunk drivers. One means considered was to make the results of chemical tests for alcohol admissible in evidence. For several years, the Legislature debated whether such tests for alcohol were sufficiently reliable to be admissible. See Burgee, A Study of Chemical Tests for Alcoholic Intoxication, 17 Md.L.Rev. 193 (1957); The Compulsory Use of Chemical Tests for Alcoholic Intoxication — A Symposium, 14 Md. L.Rev. 111 (1954). Ultimately, it decided that such tests could be admitted under certain limited conditions designed to protect the accused, the primary one being that the accused affirmatively consent to the adminis*480tration of the test. By creating statutory protectionsjor the individual, the Legislature established that while its purpose was to protect the societal interest in successful prosecution of drunk drivers, that purpose was not to be accomplished at the expense of individual rights which the Legislature deemed to be essential.
In 1954, in the House of Delegates (House), House Bill (HB) No. 94 was introduced as an amendment to the Motor Vehicles Title.1 House Bill No. 94 authorized the admission of chemical test results in evidence in prosecutions for a violation of a specified section of the Motor Vehicles Title 2 that made it unlawful for anyone under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive or attempt to drive any vehicle. It also established certain presumptions to be applied in determining whether an accused was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. House Bill No. 94 contained no protections for the accused in the form of conditions relating to the circumstances under which chemical tests must be administered. In the absence of any prescribed conditions, there was no basis for an exclusionary rule and none was provided. This Bill was not enacted.
In 1955, HB No. 41 was introduced, not as an amendment to the Motor Vehicles Title, but rather as an amendment to the Evidence Title, adding § 100 to Art. 35 of the Annotated *481Code of Maryland.3 House Bill No. 41 broadened the scope of its 1954 predecessor, HB No. 94, by authorizing the admission of chemical test results in evidence in any criminal prosecution for a violation of any law concerning a person driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Like HB No. 94, it also established certain presumptions; it contained no express protections for the accused in the form of conditions governing the administration of the tests; and it contained no exclusionary rule. House Bill No. 41 was, however, amended to provide that
"no person shall be compelled to submit... to the chemical analysis provided for in this section; and no inference or presumption concerning either his guilt or innocence shall be made by reason of his refusal to so submit to such chemical analysis.” House Journal of Proceedings, at 246 (1955).
This amendment was the initial indication of a legislative intent to create statutory protections deemed to be essential for an accused. It was also the initial indication of a legislative intent that test results be admissible only upon the condition that the accused not be compelled to submit to the test. Because the first condition created to protect an accused was that an accused not be compelled to submit to a chemical test, it is apparent that the protection of that right was deemed by the House to be essential and of paramount importance. House Bill No. 41, as amended, was passed by the House but not the Senate.
*482In 1956, the Legislative Council Committee on the Revision of the Motor Vehicle Laws of the State of Maryland drafted HB No. 13, introduced in 1957 as an amendment to Art. 35, the Evidence Title.4 House Bill No. 13 as originally introduced, like its 1955 predecessor, HB No. 41 as originally introduced, authorized the admission of chemical test results in evidence in any criminal prosecution for violation of any law concerning driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Like its 1955 predecessor, HB No. 41, it established certain presumptions; it contained no express protections for the accused in the form of conditions governing the administration of tests; and it contained no exclusionary rule. More specifically, it did not contain a provision expressly stating that no person be compelled to submit to a chemical test. Notwithstanding the absence of such an express provision, the Committee, in its Report to the General Assembly of 1957, stated at 382:
"... The proposed legislation does not require any involuntary taking of a person’s blood to determine the percentage of alcohol therein. It merely establishes the evidential effect of such tests based on the percentage of alcohol found in the blood.” (Emphasis added.)
House Bill No. 13, like its 1955 predecessor HB No. 41, was amended to provide expressly for certain protections for the accused. It expressly stated that no person shall be compelled to submit to a chemical test and that inference of guilt or innocence should not arise because he refused to submit *483to the test. More significantly, HB No. 13 was further amended to provide that
"evidence of the said chemical analysis shall not be deemed admissible if obtained contrary to the provisions of this sub-section____” House Journal of Proceedings, at 272 (1957).
This amendment established for the first time an exclusionary rule that prohibited the admission of chemical test results in evidence unless certain conditions designed to protect the accused were satisfied. It indicated an intensification of a legislative intent to protect the accused by providing a method of enforcement for the statutory rights the amendment created. House Bill No. 13, as amended, was passed by the House but not by the Senate.
In 1958, Senate Bill (SB) No. 38 authorized the admission of chemical test results in evidence in any criminal prosecution for a violation of any law concerning driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.5 It also established certain presumptions, and it expressly protected the accused from being compelled to submit to such tests by making inadmissible evidence which violated that statutorily created right. The Legislative Council Committee on the Revision of the Motor Vehicle Laws, in its Report to the General Assembly of 1959, stated at 208:
"It is recognized by the Committee that indiscriminate use of chemical tests may abridge the rights of innocent persons. To mitigate this fear the Committee views favorably the provision of Senate Bill No. 38 of the 1958 regular session which stipulated that the chemical tests could not be given if the suspected person would not agree to it. With this qualifying proviso, the Committee would view favorably legislation introduced to provide chemical tests.” (Emphasis added.)
*484Thus, the Committee expressed the view that the provision that no person shall be compelled to submit to a test meant that the test could not be administered unless the accused affirmatively consented.
Although SB No. 38 was not enacted, in 1959, HB No. 132 was introduced to amend the Evidence Title adding "Section 100 to Article 35 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 Edition)____” House Bill No. 132, as originally introduced, was similar to its 1958 predecessor, SB No. 38, in that it authorized the admission of the results of chemical tests in evidence in any criminal prosecution for a violation of any law concerning driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. It established certain presumptions, and it expressly protected the accused from being compelled to submit to the test by making inadmissible evidence which violated that, statutory right. In addition, HB No. 132 as originally proposed, added three additional protections for the accused by imposing three additional conditions governing the administration of the tests. Only certain qualified medical personnel were authorized to perform the test.6 The accused was permitted to have a physician of his own choosing perform an additional test.7 The accused was entitled to the results of the test before trial.8 Moreover, two amendments providing additional protections for an accused were passed. The first amendment *485provided that a specimen of blood must be taken within two hours after the accused was apprehended by an arresting officer.9 The second amendment reinforced the exclusionary rule by making the fact that an accused refused to submit to a blood test inadmissible in evidence.10 House Bill No. 132 was enacted and became Art. 35, § 100 of the Evidence Title, effective 1 June 1959.
The legislative history of Art. 35, § 100, the predecessor of § 10-302 through § 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, embodied the Legislature’s initial determination that certain chemical test results for alcohol were sufficiently reliable to permit their admission in evidence under certain limited conditions. Those conditions embodied statutorily created rights, deemed to be essential for the protection of the accused, and were made enforceable by an exclusionary rule, rendering chemical test results inadmissible if obtained in violation of those express conditions. Of primary importance in the established statutory scheme was the express right of the accused not to be compelled to submit to a test and, as interpreted by the Legislative Council Committee, the right to have the chemical test results excluded unless the accused had affirmatively consented.
Thus, the legislative history of Art. 35, § 100 establishes that while the Legislature’s purpose was to protect the societal interest in successful prosecution of drunk drivers, *486that purpose was not to be accomplished at the expense of rights of an accused deemed to be essential. There is nothing to indicate that the applicability of the exclusionary rule depended upon whether chemical test results used in a prosecution were administered initially for the purpose of prosecution or initially for the purpose of medical treatment. The conclusion that whenever chemical test results are used for the purpose of criminal prosecution, the exclusionary rule applies regardless of the initial purpose for which the test was administered, is further supported by an examination of the subsequent development of the statutory scheme.
In 1968, after four years of intensive study and consideration, the Committee to Study the Revision of the Motor Vehicle Laws, under the chairmanship of Hon. S. Ralph Wamken, submitted a "Proposed Revision of the Motor Vehicle Laws of the State of Maryland” to the Legislative Council of Maryland. The Committee’s proposals were based upon the Uniform Vehicle Code, adopted in whole or in part by many other states. The proposed vdraft followed "very closely the organization of the parallel provisions of the Uniform Vehicle Code.”11 Included among the proposed improvements was a recommendation for the adoption of an implied consent law, which would have provided, "with many safeguards,” for the suspension of driving privileges of a person who refused to submit to chemical tests for alcohol.12
Unlike many other states, the Maryland Legislature rejected the proposed implied consent law. Instead, on 23 April 1969, it enacted Chapter 158, Art. 66 Vfe, § 92A, effective 1 July 1969, which required Maryland residents to consent expressly to the administration of a chemical test as *487a condition to obtaining a driver’s license.13 By requiring the express consent of an accused before administering a chemical test, the Maryland Legislature reiterated its intent and purpose to protect rights of an accused deemed to be essential.14
On the same day the Legislature enacted Art. 66 V2, § 92A, it also repealed and reenacted Art. 35, § 100. Subsec*488tion (c) was amended to provide an additional protection to an accused by establishing the right to select the type of test to be administered.15 More important, Art. 35, § 100(g), which then provided that an officer advise an accused that he "may, but need not” submit to a chemical test, and had been interpreted by this Court in dicta in Mauldin v. State, 239 Md. 592, 595, 212 A.2d 502, 504 (1965), as not requiring that an accused affirmatively consent to a test, was deleted from the Evidence Title. A requirement that an officer request that the person take a chemical test and file a report if that person refused, was enacted in Art. 66V2, § 92A of the Motor Vehicles Title.16 By creating an additional statutory right and by explicitly providing that affirmative consent of the accused be obtained, the Legislature once again *489reiterated its determination to protect the rights of the accused.
In 1973, Art. 35, § 100 was revised and reenacted as § 10-302 through § 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The Revisor’s Notes accompanying § 10-302 through § 10-309 indicate that those sections contained new language derived from Art. 35, § 100 and that the changes made were changes in style and language. While the Revisor’s Notes are not law and may not be considered to have been enacted as part of the Act, ch. 2, § 19, 1973 Laws of Md. Spec. Sess., they are entitled to weight. See Rentals Unlimited, Inc. v. Administrator, Motor Vehicle Admin., 286 Md. 104, 109, 405 A.2d 744, 748 (1979). These Notes establish that the language revisions in § 10-302 through § 10-309 were not intended to produce substantive changes in the law or its purpose.
Only one other relevant change occurred when, in 1977, Art. 66V2, § 6-205.1, the successor to Art. 66V2, § 92A, was revised and reenacted as § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article. While Art. 66 V2, § 6-205.1 (c) (2) required that officers request persons to submit to chemical tests, § 16-205.1 (c) (2) requires that officers request such persons to permit chemical tests to be administered. The Revisor’s Note accompanying § 16-205.1 establishes that this language change is one of style, thus clarifying the previous language and establishing that the affirmative consent of an accused is required before a chemical test is administered by or at the direction of a police officer.
The Legislature’s initial determination to protect the rights of an accused by requiring that an accused not be compelled to submit to a chemical test, its adoption of an exclusionary rule to enforce that right, its subsequent repeated determinations to provide additional protections for an accused, its rejection of an implied consent statute and its adoption of an express consent statute, its requirement *490that an accused affirmatively consent to a test administered by or at the direction of a police officer, and the Legislative Council Committee’s repeated statements that there be no "involuntary taking of a person’s blood” and that chemical tests could not be administered if an accused "would not agree to it,” all lead to a single conclusion. In my view, this history establishes a legislative purpose to protect the rights of an accused, particularly the right not to be compelled to submit to a test, whenever chemical test results are ultimately used for the purpose of criminal prosecution.
Sections 10-302 through 10-309 expressly state that chemical test results are admissible in evidence under certain limited conditions in any criminal prosecution for a violation of any state law concerning a person accused of driving while intoxicated. More specifically, the exclusionary rule contained in § 10-309 expressly states that such test results are inadmissible in such prosecutions if obtained contrary to the requirements set forth in the subtitle. In my view, the plain and unambiguous language of the statute establishes that the exclusionary rule applies whenever test results are ultimately used for the purpose of criminal prosecution. Such an interpretation is manifestly consonant with the Legislature’s broad purpose.
Moreover, there is no express language in § 10-302 through § 10-309 that states that the exclusionary rule does not apply when results of a chemical test, administered by or at the direction of a physician initially for the purpose of medical treatment are subsequently used for the purpose of prosecution. In addition, there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate a legislative intent to make the applicability of the exclusionary rule dependent upon whether chemical test results used in a prosecution were administered initially for the purpose of prosecution or initially for the purpose of medical treatment. I cannot, as does the majority, insert words creating an exception tq the applicability of the exclusionary rule that makes the statute express an intention different from its clear meaning. See Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Maryland Employ*491ment Sec. Admin., 288 Md. 685, 698, 421 A.2d 944, 950 (1980); In re: James S., 286 Md. 702, 705, 410 A.2d 586, 591 (1980).
The majority’s reliance on the case of Lilly v. State, 212 Md. 436, 129 A.2d 839 (1956), to support its conclusion that chemical test results administered for the purpose of medical treatment are admissible in evidence, is misplaced. In Lilly, a case involving a prosecution for a violation of the predecessor to Md. Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 388, the State was not contending that the accused was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor. Nevertheless, the results of a chemical test were admitted in evidence. The facts show, however, that the chemical test was administered at the direction of a police officer after he had obtained the affirmative consent of the accused. Under these circumstances, Lilly can lend no support to the majority’s conclusion that the results of chemical tests administered at the direction of a physician for the purpose of medical treatment are admissible in evidence. Rather, in my view, the plain language of the statute, the Legislature’s broad purpose, and its insistence on protecting the rights of an accused lead to the conclusion that whenever chemical test results are used for the purpose of criminal prosecution, the exclusionary rule applies regardless of the initial purpose for which the test was administered.
The remaining question this case presents is whether § 10-309 is violated when an accused does not affirmatively consent to a chemical test, administered by or at the direction of a physician, initially for the purpose of medical treatment.
Section 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides in pertinent part:
"A person may not be compelled to submit to a chemical analysis provided for in this subtitle. Evidence of chemical analysis is not admissible if obtained contrary to its provisions.”
The plain language of this section establishes that chemical *492test results are inadmissible in a prosecution if the accused is compelled to submit to the test.
In State v. Loscomb, 291 Md. 424, 435, 435 A.2d 764, 770 (1981), this Court unanimously agreed17 that § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article and § 10-302 through § 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article are in pari materia and must be construed harmoniously. Therefore, § 16-205.1 is significant in determining the meaning of the word "compelled.” Section 16-205.1 provides in pertinent part:
"(c) ... If a police officer stops or detains any individual who the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated or while his driving ability is impaired by the consumption of alcohol, the police officer shall:
"(2) Request that the individual permit a chemical test to be taken of his blood....” (Emphasis added.)
In Loscomb, we determined that when a chemical test is administered by or at the direction of a police officer initially for the purpose of prosecution, the affirmative consent of an accused must be obtained and that the exclusionary rule of § 10-309 applies when there has been a failure to obtain such affirmative consent. This conclusion was based upon the rationale that under such circumstances the accused was compelled to submit to the test.
I recognize that there is no express statutory provision requiring ’affirmative consent when a chemical test is administered by or at the direction of a physician for the initial purpose of medical treatment. However, the Legislature’s initial determination to protect the rights of an áccused by requiring that an accused not be compelled to *493submit to a chemical test, its adoption of an exclusionary rule to enforce that right, its rejection of an implied consent statute and its adoption of an express consent statute, its requirement that an accused affirmatively consent to a test administered by or at the direction of a police officer, and the Legislative Council Committee’s repeated statements that there be no "involuntary taking of a person’s blood,” and that chemical tests could not be administered if an accused "would not agree to it,” all lead to a single conclusion. In my view, this history establishes a legislative purpose to protect the rights of an accused by requiring affirmative consent to a chemical test whenever chemical test results are ulitmately used for the purpose of criminal prosecution. I cannot conclude, as does the majority, that the Legislature intended the definition of the word "compelled” to include a person who has not given affirmative consent to a chemical test administered by or at the direction of a police officer initially for the purpose of prosecution, but not to include a person who has not given affirmative consent to such a test administered by or at the direction of a physician initially for the purpose of medical treatment. In the final analysis, a person who has not affirmatively consented to the administration of a chemical test is equally compelled to submit to that test whether administered by a physician for the initial purpose of medical treatment or administered by a police officer for the initial purpose of prosecution. In addition, such a person is equally prejudiced when such chemical test results are admitted in evidence, whether the test was administered for the initial purpose of medical treatment or for the initial purpose of prosecution.
In view of the plain language of the statute, the Legislature’s broad purpose and its insistence on protecting the rights of an accused, I would hold that the exclusionary rule applies to and prohibits the admission in evidence of chemical test results administered by a physician initially for the purpose of medical treatment without the affirmative consent of the accused.
*494Here the record shows that the chemical test results admitted in evidence were administered at the direction of a physician for the purpose of medical treatment without obtaining the affirmative consent of the accused. Under these circumstances, the accused was compelled to submit to the chemical test in violation of § 10-309. Moreover, the record shows that the accused did not have the right to select the type of test administered as required by § 10-305. In my view, the exclusionary rule contained in § 10-309 prohibited the admission of such evidence. The trial court committed prejudicial error when it admitted the chemical test results. Given the majority’s view expressed in Loscomb, that the exclusionary rule contained in § 10-309 is applicable in prosecutions for violations of Art. 27, § 388 as well as in prosecutions for violations of Md. Code (1977) § 21-902 of the Transportation Article, effective 1 July 1977, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, reversing the trial court’s judgment.
Judge Eldridge authorizes me to say that he concurs in the views herein expressed.

. HB No. 94, introduced 12 February 1954, 1st reading, Committee on Judiciary, 1954 House Journal of Proceedings, pp. 198, 223, proposed an amendment to
"... Section 171 of Article 66 Vz of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1951 Edition), title 'Motor Vehicles,’ sub-title 'Persons Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Narcotic Drugs,’ authorizing the admission into evidence of the findings of chemical tests for intoxication, and relating generally to the provisions applying to such tests.”

. Md. Code (1951), Art. 66 1/2, § 171 provided in pertinent part:
"(Persons Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Narcotic Drugs.) It shall be unlawful for any person who is an habitual user of narcotic drugs or any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive or attempt to drive any vehicle, street car or trackless trolley within this State.”

. HB No. 41, introduced 12 January 1955, passed in House, 1955 House Journal of Proceedings, pp. 58, 246, 259,1st reading in Senate, Committee on Judicial Proceedings, 1955 Senate Journal of Proceedings, p. 240-41, proposed an amendment
"to add Section 100 to Article 35 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1951 Edition and 1954 Supplement), title 'Evidence’,... to be under the new sub-title 'Chemical Tests for Intoxication’, establishing certain tests for the amount of alcohol in the defendant’s blood in any criminal prosecution for a violation of the laws concerning driving or attempting to drive certain vehicles while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and establishing the evidential effect of such tests.” (Emphasis added.)

. HB No. 13, introduced 2 January 1957, passed in House, 1957 House Journal of Proceedings, pp. 298-99, 1st reading in Senate, Committee on Judicial Proceedings, 1957 Senate Journal of Proceedings, p. 241, proposed
"to add Section 108 to Article 35 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1951 Edition and 1956 Supplement), title 'Evidence’... to be under the new sub-title 'Chemical Tests for Intoxication’, establishing certain tests for the amount of alcohol in the defendant’s blood in any criminal prosecution for a violation of the laws concerning driving or attempting to drive certain vehicles while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and establishing the evidential effect of such tests.”

. SB No. 38, introduced 6 February 1958, 2nd reading, Judicial Proceedings Committee, 1958 Senate Journal of Proceedings, pp. 64, 70.

. Art. 35, § 100 (d) provided:
"Only a physician, or qualified medical personnel, acting at the request of a police officer, or a person acting at the request of a physician, can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein. This limitation does not apply to the taking' of a breath test or a urine specimen.”

. Art. 35, § 100 (e) provided:
"The person tested shall be permitted to have a physician of his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the one administered at the direction of the police officer.”

. Art. 35, § 100 (f), as amended, provided:
"Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test will be made available to him before trial by an official certificate which shall be admissible in evidence.”

. Art. 35, § 100 (a), as amended, provided in pertinent part:
"In any criminal prosecution for a violation of Section 206 of Article 66 % of this Code (1957 Edition, as amended from time to time) or for a violation of any other law of this State concerning a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor driving or attempting to drive any vehicle as specified in other laws, the amount of alcohol in the defendant’s blood at the time alleged as shown bv chemical analysis of the defendant’s blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance, shall be admitted as evidence, provided, however, that the specimen of blood, breath, or urine must have been taken within two hours after theperson being prosecuted was Grst apprehended by the arresting officer....” (Emphasis added.)

. Art. 35, § 100 (c), as amended, provided in pertinent part:
"... nor shall the fact of his refusal to so submit be admissible into evidence at his trial.”

. See Wamken Committee to Study the Revision of the Motor Vehicle Laws, "Proposed Revision of the Motor Vehicle Laws” (1968), p. iii.

. See Warnken Committee Report at p. v. The proposed text of the implied consent provision provided at p. 82:
"Any person who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent... to a chemical test or tests of his breath or urine, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood....” (Emphasis added.)

. The preamble to Art. 66V2, § 92A states that the purpose of the Act is
"to provide as a condition to obtaining or renewing a motor vehicle driver’s license, the applicant shall expressly consent to the taking of a chemical test. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Art. 66V2, § 92A (a) and (b) provided in pertinent part:
"(a) Prior to the issuance of any license or renewal thereof to exercise the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State, the applicant, as a condition precedent to the issuance or renewal of said license, shall be required by the Department to sign a statement, under oath or affirmation, containing the following language:
'I hereby consent to take a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of my blood, breath, or urine....’”
"(b) In return for the privilege of operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this State given to a nonresident under this Article, any nonresident who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State, shall be deemed to have given consent to take a chemical test for alcohol.” (Emphasis added.)
The successor to Art. 66V2, § 92A, Md. Code (1977, 1980 Cum. Supp.) § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, effective 1 July 1977, was amended, by Chapter 244 of the 1981 Laws of Maryland, effective 1 July 1981, and therefore, not applicable here, to provide an implied consent provision applicable to Maryland residents. That Chapter states in pertinent part:
"(a) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a chemical test to determine the alcohol content of his blood if he should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated or while under the influence of alcohol.”
"(b) A person may not he compelled to take a chemical test for alcohol____”

. In light of the Maryland Legislature’s rejection of the implied consent provisions contained in the Uniform Motor Vehicle Code, cases from jurisdictions other than Maryland, relied upon by the majority, are not persuasive.

. Art. 35, § 100 (c), as amended, provided in pertinent part:
"In any event, the defendant shall have the right to select the type of test administered, and if facilities or equipment are not available for such test then none shall be given, and this fact shall not create any inference or presumption concerning either his guilt or innocence by reason of his inability to take a test, nor shall the fact of his inability to take such a test be admissible in evidence at his trial, nor shall this fact be considered a refusal to take a test under Section 92A of this Article.”
Chapter 240 of the 1981 Laws of Maryland, effective 1 July 1981, not here applicable, amended § 10-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the successor to Art. 35,. § 100(c), to provide that under certain circumstances a police officer, rather than an accused, may select the type of test to be administered and that persons incapable of refusing to take a test shall be deemed not to have withdrawn consent. More specifically, § 10-305 (c) provides:
"Any person who is dead, unconscious, or otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of test refusal shall be deemed not to have withdrawn consent.”

. Art. 66%, § 92A (c) provided in pertinent part:
"(c) It shall be the duty of any police officer who stops or detains any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, or who is or has been operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle while his ability was impaired by the consumption of alcohol to do all the following things:
"2. Request that he take a chemical tester tests of his blood____
"4. File with the Department of Motor Vehicles ... a sworn *489report ... that said person refused to take the chemical test for alcohol____” (Emphasis added.)

. Eldridge, J., did not participate.