Court Opinion

ID: 9954777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 21:02:17.009105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:08.612174
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 Tobin v. City of San Jose CA6
             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 NONA TOBIN,                                     H049987
                                                 (Santa Clara County
 Plaintiff and Appellant,                        Super. Ct. No. 17CV312610)

 v.                                              ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND
                                                 DENYING PETITION FOR
 CITY OF SAN JOSE et al.,                        REHEARING

 Defendants and Respondents.                     NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:
      It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 28, 2024, be modified as
follows:
    1. On pages 12, line 23, the sentences starting with “As noted above,” and continuing
       on page 13, line 7 ending with “section 1542].)” are deleted and the following
       paragraphs are inserted in their place:

      Here, there is much more than a mere recital. As noted above, the separation
agreement contains two releases. The second release begins with the statement that
“Tobin has read and understands” Civil Code section 1542, which is initialed by Tobin.4
It continues that, “[h]aving reviewed Section 1542 of the California Civil Code, Tobin
voluntarily waives her rights under Section 1542” and releases any claims “known or
unknown” stemming from “conduct . . . prior to or simultaneously with the execution” of
the agreement. Finally, the release acknowledges that Tobin “has knowingly waived any
and all rights under Civil Code 1542.” Thus, the plain language of the release shows that
Tobin understood her rights under section 1542, knowingly waived those rights, and
released unknown claims arising out of conduct prior to or simultaneous with the
agreement.
   Tobin argues that this express waiver of Civil Code section 1542 is mere boilerplate,
which should be ignored under Casey. However, there was no express waiver of section
1542 in Casey, only a release of unknown claims without any reference to the section.
(See Casey, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 101.) Since Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159
(Winet) more than three decades ago, Court of Appeal decisions repeatedly have held that
unknown claims may be released pursuant to express contractual waivers of section 1542.

       4
        The second release states in full: “Tobin has read and understand the following
language of Section 1542 of the California Code:

     “A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE
CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HER FAVOR AT THE
TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HER MUST HAVE
MATERIALLY AFEFCTED HER SETTLEMENT WITH DEBTOR.

       “____/s/_______Initials

        “Having reviewed Section 1542 of the California Code, Tobin voluntarily waives
her rights under Section 1542, and releases the City, its current and former officials and
employees from any and all claims, whether known or unknown, stemming from any
event, action, inaction, or other conduct by the City of San Jose, its current and former
officials and employees that occurred prior to or simultaneously with the execution of
this Agreement and Release. By placing her initials in the foregoing paragraph, Tobin
acknowledges that she has knowingly waived any and all rights under Civil Code 1542.”
                                             2
(See id. at pp. 1170-1171; see also Belasco v. Wells (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 409, 422;
Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners’ Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159-
1161; San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1053-
1055.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has endorsed Winet and held it consistent with
Casey. (Jefferson v. California Dep’t of Youth Authority (2002) 28 Cal.4th 299, 306-
307.)
        Although Tobin attempts to distinguish Winet, these attempts are unpersuasive.
For example, Tobin notes that Winet involved wrongful conduct committed before the
release in that case was signed. But the same is true here: The City has applied the
release in the 2002 separation agreement only against Tobin’s fiduciary duty and estoppel
claims, both of which arise out of misrepresentations or omissions prior to the agreement.
Tobin also notes that the plaintiff in Winet consciously understood the benefits conferred
by Civil Code section 1542 and consciously waived those benefits after receiving
counsel’s advice. But the plain language of the second release here—including Tobin’s
initialing of the statement that she read and understood section 1542—demonstrates that
Tobin likewise consciously understood and waived her rights under section 1542. Tobin
points out that she was represented by counsel only in amending the separation
agreement, but this fact makes little difference here, as Tobin expressly acknowledged in
the separation agreement that she was “given the opportunity to have this Agreement and
Release reviewed by her attorney and that the City has encouraged her to do so.” Finally,
Tobin has not denied that she understood her rights under section 1542 and also
understood that she was waiving those rights and releasing unknown claims arising out of
conduct prior to or simultaneous with the separation agreement.5 As a consequence, we
see no material difference between Winet and this case.

        5
         Tobin submitted a declaration denying that she intended to waive claims for
future failure to pay her pension benefits. The declaration states that “I did not know the
(continued)
                                             3
      There is no change in judgement.
      Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

City would break its promise to pay the retirement benefits I had earned,” and “I did not
waive my lifetime yearly guaranteed cost of living adjustment as a retiree as a
consideration for the earned management salary increases I received as a result of the
2002 settlement agreement.” But, as previously noted, the City has not argued that the
separation agreement bars Tobin’s impairment claim, which arises out of the alleged
failure to pay her full pension starting in 2016. It has argued that the agreement bars
Tobin’s estoppel and fiduciary duty claims, which arise out of conduct prior to the
agreement. Notably absent from Tobin’s declaration is any denial that she understood the
separation agreement to release all claims arising out of prior conduct.
                                            4
                                   ____________________________________
                                         BROMBERG, J.

                                   ____________________________________
                                   BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

                                   ____________________________________
                                   DANNER, J.

Tobin v. City of San Jose et al.
H049987
Filed 2/28/24 Tobin v. City of San Jose CA6 (unmodified opinion)
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 NONA TOBIN,                                                         H049987
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Super. Ct. No. 17CV312610)
           v.

 CITY OF SAN JOSE et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         This appeal is related to two other appeals resolved today. Like her coplaintiffs in
case Nos. H049387 (Preservation of Benefit Plan Retiree Association v. City of San José)
and H050036 (Loewen v. City of San José), Nona Tobin is a former employee of the City
of San José (City), who retired and received pension allowances under the City’s
Federated City Employees Retirement System (FCERS) defined benefit plan. Starting in
2014—and, in Tobin’s case, in 2016— based on the plan’s incorporation of limits that
federal law places on payments from qualified defined benefit plans, the City began
reducing retirement allowances for a small group of relatively well-compensated retirees
who had retired early. Tobin and 19 other such retirees, as well as a non-profit
corporation representing them, challenged these reductions, but the trial court eventually
dismissed all of their claims, either on demurrer or summary judgment. We ordered the
two appeals filed by Tobin’s coplaintiffs considered together for argument and
disposition, but we consider Tobin’s appeal separately because it raises issues unique to
her.
       Like her coplaintiffs, Tobin sued the City, its city manager, and the Board of
Administration of the FCERS (Board) (jointly Defendants) for unconstitutional
impairment of contract. Unlike her coplaintiffs, Tobin did not argue in her briefs before
this Court that her pension benefits were impaired by the enactment of an ordinance in
2011 retroactively imposing limits on benefits. Instead, Tobin’s briefs contended that she
was denied cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) increases due under the FCERS plan as it
stood in 1989. Because Tobin did not make this argument in the trial court, it has been
forfeited.
       Tobin also brings claims for equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, and breach
of fiduciary duty. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled that these claims were
barred by a release in Tobin’s 2002 separation agreement with the City. Tobin contends
that the release does not extend to her estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty claims. We
disagree. As the trial court recognized, the release executed by Tobin is broad and
extends to any claims “known and unknown, suspected or unsuspected, for damages . . .
past, present, and future . . . related to her employment with the City.” As Tobin’s
estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty claims are based on alleged misrepresentations and
omissions made prior to or simultaneously with her retirement, they fall squarely within
the plain language of the release, and Tobin’s attempts to avoid that plain language are
unpersuasive.
       Accordingly, the judgment in favor of the City and the city manager is affirmed.
In addition, because Tobin did not timely appeal the judgment in favor of the Board, her
appeal from that judgment is dismissed.

                                             2
                                     I.   BACKGROUND
       A.      The FCERS Plan
       The FCERS plan was established in 1975. (San José Ord. No. 17739.) Under the
plan, members generally are entitled to “annual service retirement allowances”—that is,
pension payments—under the following formula: “two and one-half percent (2.5%) of
such member’s final compensation times the years of Federated City Service,” up to “a
maximum of seventy-five (75%) of such member’s final compensation.” (San José Mun.
Code, § 3.28.1110, subd. (C).) In addition, starting in 1981, retirees were entitled to
COLA’s of up to 3 percent per year based on the consumer price index for the San
Francisco-Oakland area, with any increase above that amount “banked” for use when the
index dipped below 3 percent. (San José Ord. No. 20479)
       In 1989, in response to changes in federal law, the City enacted Ordinance
No. 23283 (1989 Ordinance), which incorporates into the FCERS plan the limits in
section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code3 (Section 415) on payments from defined
benefit pension plans. Before this change, state and local government plans apparently
were subject to more lenient limits than private plans, but in 1988 Congress extended the
limits on private plans to such government plans. (Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647 (Nov. 10, 1988) 102 Stat. 3342, § 6054.) Congress,
however, included a “grandfather” clause allowing government plans to elect to pay
existing participants benefits above Section 415’s general limit if those benefits are
“without regard to any amendment of the plan made after October 14, 1987.”
(§ 415(b)(10)(A) & (B).)
       The 1989 Ordinance added a section entitled “Benefit Limitations” to chapter 3.28
of the San José Municipal Code incorporating Section 415’s general limit and making a
grandfather election. (San José Ord. No. 23283, § 2, amending San José Mun. Code,

       3
           The Internal Revenue Code is found in title 26 of the United States Code.
                                              3
ch. 3.28, pt. 8 by adding § 3.28.995, underscoring omitted.) The first part of the section
imposes Section 415’s general limit on future members: “[T]he benefits payable to any
person who becomes a member of [the FCERS] on or after January 1, 1990, shall be
subject to the limitations set forth in Section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code . . . .”
(San José Ord. No. 23283, § 2, adding San José Mun. Code, former § 3.28.955, subd.
(A).) The second part makes the “grandfather” election allowing greater payments to
existing members: “[T]he benefits payable to any person who became a member of [the
FCERS plan] prior to January 1, 1990, shall be subject to the greater of the following
limitations as provided in Section 415(b)(10) of the Internal Revenue Code: [¶] 1. The
limitations set forth in Section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code; or [¶] 2. The accrued
benefit of the member without regard to any benefit increases pursuant to any amendment
of [the FCERS plan] adopted after October 14, 1987.” (San José Ord. No. 23283, § 2,
adding San José Mun. Code, former § 3.28.955, subd. (B).)
       The City subsequently made two important changes to the FCERS plan. In 2001,
the City changed the definition of “final compensation,” one of the terms in its retirement
allowance formula. (San José Ord. No. 26353, [adopted May 15, 2001], amending San
José Mun. Code, § 3.28.030; see also San José Mun. Code, § 3.28.030.11 [definition of
final compensation].) Previously, the term had been defined as “the highest average
annual compensation” over “three consecutive years” of service. In 2001, the City
changed the definition to the highest annual average over any “twelve consecutive
months” for individuals retiring after July 1, 2001. (San José Ord. No. 26353, amending
San José Mun. Code, § 3.28.030.11, subd. (B).) Additionally, in 2006, the City changed
the FCERS plan’s COLA formula. Instead of equaling the consumer price index up to 3
percent with banking of any excess, the City adopted a flat 3 percent annual increase.
(San José Ord. No. 27652, amending San José Mun. Code by adding § 3.44.160, see also
San José Mun. Code, § 3.44.160(A)(1).)

                                              4
       In 2011, the City passed Ordinance No. 28885 (2011 Ordinance). (San José Ord.
No. 28885.) According to the memorandum from the city attorney proposing the
ordinance, the ordinance was intended to make amendments that were “technical in
nature” in preparation for an IRS review of the FCERS plan. Among other things, the
2011 Ordinance amended the provisions concerning Section 415. It left the provision
concerning new members largely untouched, adding only a reference to subsequent
subsections. (San José Ord. No. 28885, § 21, amending San José Mun. Code, former
§ 3.28.955, subd. (A).) The ordinance, however, amended the subsection on existing
members to state that “the 415(b) limit shall not be less than the accrued benefit of the
member under this system determined without regard to any amendment of the plan made
after October 14, 1987.” (Id., amending San José Mun. Code, former § 3.28.955,
subd. (B).) In addition, the ordinance added new provisions detailing the limits imposed
by Section 415, as well as explaining how to deal with issues such as service credit
purchases and participation in other plans. (San José Ord. No. 28885, § 21, adding San
José Mun. Code,§ 3.28.955, subds. (E)-(P).)
       B.     Tobin
       Nona Tobin began working for the City in 1976. In 2004, after serving as the
City’s Director of Human Resources, she retired at age 55.
       Before her retirement, Tobin was “loaned” to the United Way of Silicon Valley.
In December 2002, in the midst of this loan, Tobin entered into a separation agreement
with the City to resolve “any dispute or potential disputes between the parties.” In the
agreement, she agreed to resign as a City employee “voluntarily and irrevocably,”
effective December 31, 2003. The agreement also contained two releases. First, Tobin
agreed to release “any and all claims, of any kind,” against the City, including any
“misrepresentation or fraud, tort claims of any nature known and unknown, suspected or
unsuspected for damages . . . past, present and future . . . related to her employment with
the City . . . .” This release, however, contained a carve-out: It would not affect “Tobin’s
                                              5
right to service retirement benefits” under the FCERS plan. Second, Tobin agreed to
waive her rights under section 1542 of the Civil Code against releasing unknown claims.
This waiver included “any and all claims, whether known or unknown,” stemming from
conduct by the City “prior to or simultaneously with the execution” of the separation
agreement. To acknowledge that she knowingly waived the protections of Civil Code
section 1542, Tobin initialed the paragraph containing this waiver.
       C.     The Reductions in Tobin’s Pension Payments
       Tobin appears to have begun receiving retirement allowances upon her retirement
in 2004. In March 2016, the City sent Tobin a letter informing her that her monthly
allowance had reached the limits imposed by Section 415(b) and that beginning the next
month her allowance would be adjusted to keep her benefit payments under the Section
415(b) limit. The following month, a City official informed Tobin that “[u]nder the
grandfather benefit, the old COLA rules apply,” and the following year Tobin was
informed that, based on the 3.5 percent consumer price index for the previous year, she
would receive a 3-percent COLA with 0.5 percent “banked for future use.”
       D.     The Proceedings Below
       In November 2016, Tobin, 21 other retirees, and a non-profit corporation
representing them filed a government claim with the City challenging reductions in their
pension allowances. Nine months later, Tobin, the other retirees, and the non-profit filed
a petition for writ of mandate and complaint against the City, the city manager, and the
Board. In the petition and complaint, which was amended three times, Tobin and the
other plaintiffs (jointly Plaintiffs) claimed unconstitutional impairment of their vested
rights to pension benefits based on the 2011 Ordinance—not the 1989 Ordinance—
which, Plaintiffs alleged, for the first time imposed Section 415’s limits on total benefits
payments and did so retroactively. Tobin and the other retirees also asserted claims for
equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty based on alleged
misrepresentations and omissions concerning their retirement benefits.
                                              6
       When Defendants demurred to the first amended petition and complaint, the trial
court overruled the demurrer on the impairment claims but sustained the demurrer on the
estoppel and fiduciary duty claims against the Board because no government claim had
been filed with the Board. It also sustained the demurrers on the estoppel and fiduciary
duty claims against the City with respect to all Plaintiffs except Tobin and Evet Loewen
on the ground that the joint government claim Plaintiffs submitted to the City was
untimely.
       In 2021, Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the
motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ impairment claim. Rejecting Plaintiffs’ contention that
the 1989 Ordinance imposed only a “tax-qualification limit,” the court concluded that the
ordinance instead imposed caps on the payment of benefits. Because the ordinance
imposed the Section 415 general limit only on future employees and included a
grandfather provision protecting the rights of existing employees, the court concluded
that 1989 Ordinance did not impair Plaintiffs’ vested pension rights. The trial court also
held that the Government Claims Act barred the remaining claims of all Plaintiffs except
Tobin and Loewen. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment against all
Plaintiffs except Tobin and Loewen and granted summary adjudication of Tobin’s and
Loewen’s impairment claims. On July 16, 2021, the court entered judgment in favor of
the Board against all Plaintiffs and in favor of the City and the city manager against all
the plaintiffs except Tobin and Loewen.
       The City and the city manager later moved for summary judgment on Tobin’s
estoppel and fiduciary duty claims, and on February 24, 2022, the trial court granted the
motion based on the releases in Tobin’s 2002 separation agreement. Noting that the
language of the releases is broad and unequivocal, the court held that the releases covered
Tobin’s estoppel and fiduciary duty claims because those claims stemmed from alleged
conduct prior to or simultaneous with the agreement.

                                              7
       On March 4, 2022, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the City and the
city manager against Tobin, and on April 29, 2022, Tobin filed a notice of appeal.
                                      II. DISCUSSION
       In her briefing on appeal, Tobin asks that the judgment based on the summary
adjudication of her impairment claim and the summary judgments concerning her
remaining claims be reversed. This request appears designed to exclude her claims
against the Board, which were the subject of an earlier judgment, that Tobin did not
timely appeal. Accordingly, we construe Tobin’s arguments to concern only her claims
against the City and the city manager.

        A.    Tobin’s Appeal Concerning the Board
       As in the related appeal by Evet Loewen, the Board argues that this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear Tobin’s appeal from the judgment against her in favor of the Board
because Tobin did not timely appeal that judgment. We agree.
       The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Board against all Plaintiffs on July
19, 2021, and notice of entry of that judgment was served the following day, starting the
clock running on an appeal. A timely notice of appeal by all Plaintiffs, including Tobin,
was filed on August 26, 2021. However, on September 2, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an
amended notice of appeal that deleted Tobin and Loewen.
       On March 4, 2022, after the trial court granted summary judgment on Tobin’s
“ancillary” claims, it entered judgment in favor of the City and the city manager against
Tobin, and four days later, Defendants filed and served notice of entry of that judgment.
On April 29, 2022, Tobin filed a notice of appeal from the March 4, 2022, judgment.
       Tobin’s appeal is untimely as to the July 2021 judgment in favor of the Board. In
multiparty cases, a judgment leaving no issues to be determined concerning a party is
final as to that party (see, e.g., In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 759
(Baycol)) and therefore immediately appealable. (See, e.g., Heshejin v. Rostami (2020)

                                              8
54 Cal.App.5th 984, 991.) As Tobin was served with notice of entry of the judgment in
favor of the Board on July 20, 2021, she had 60 days from that date—or until
September 18, 2021—to notice an appeal from that judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).) Although Tobin originally filed a notice of appeal within that time
period, she abandoned that appeal (see Dow v. Superior Court (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d
399, 401-402), and did not file another notice of appeal until April 2022, well outside the
60-day period. Consequently, to the extent that Tobin’s second notice of appeal
purported to appeal from the judgment in favor of the Board, it is untimely and must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Baycol, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 761, fn. 8; Hollister
Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 666-667.)
       B.     The Impairment Claim
       The California Constitution prohibits laws “impairing the obligation of contracts.”
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.) California courts have long recognized that statutes and
municipal ordinances establishing pension plans create implied contractual rights that the
contract clause protects against impairment. (See, e.g., Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s
Assn. v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032, 1076). In
their appeals, Tobin’s coplaintiffs deny that the City adopted pension payment caps in the
1989 Ordinance and instead assert that the caps were imposed by the 2011 Ordinance,
which impaired pension rights that had vested since 1989. In her briefing on appeal,
Tobin takes a different approach.4 She contends that she was deprived of COLA
increases that were promised before the 1989 Ordinance, and she faults Defendants for
failing to present evidence that the reductions in her pension benefits were limited to
increases adopted after 1989. Because Tobin did not make these arguments in the trial
court, we hold them forfeited.

       4
        At oral argument, Tobin sought to adopt her coplaintiffs’ arguments on appeal.
Because Tobin did not do so in her briefing, this opinion does not consider those
arguments (which we found unpersuasive).
                                              9
       In the trial court, Tobin was represented by the same counsel as her coplaintiffs,
and Plaintiffs jointly opposed Defendants’ request for summary adjudication on their
impairment claims. In their memorandum of points and authorities, Plaintiffs argued that
“the City modified [their] vested rights” in “the 2011 Ordinance, which imposed a total
cap on [Plaintiffs’] pension benefits” and deprived them of benefit enhancements adopted
in 2001 and 2006. Nothing in Plaintiffs’ memorandum suggested that the City failed to
pay COLA benefits that vested before the 1989 Ordinance.
       Indeed, Plaintiffs presented evidence showing just the opposite. For example,
exhibit 9 to the declaration that Tobin submitted in connection with Plaintiffs’ joint
opposition to the first motion for summary judgment is an April 6, 2016 e-mail from a
manager in the Office of Retirement Services informing Tobin that “[u]nder the
grandfather benefit, the old COLA rules apply.” Another exhibit contains a March 2017
letter from the City informing Tobin that she would receive a 3 percent COLA based on a
consumer price index (CPI) of 3.5 percent and “0.5% will be banked for future use when
the CPI is under 3%.” This letter shows that the City was applying the COLA rule
adopted prior to the 1989 Ordinance, which rule authorized COLA adjustments up to
3 percent with banking of any excess, rather than the flat 3 percent adopted in 2006 for
individuals such as Tobin who retired after July 1, 2001. (See San José Ord. No. 26353,
amending San José Mun. Code, § 3.28.30.1, subd. (B).)
       Tobin cannot turn around now and argue for the first time on appeal that she did
not receive the COLA payments due her under the FCERS plan before the 1989
Ordinance. “ ‘ “As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted
for the first time on appeal . . . .” ’ ” (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 506, 548.) There is an exception to this rule giving appellate courts
discretion to consider for the first time on appeal “a pure question of law which is
presented by undisputed facts.” (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394; Ward v.
Taggart (1969) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742.) But this exception does not apply where, as here,
                                             10
the appellant makes fact-based arguments because it is unfair to consider such arguments
without giving the opposing party an opportunity to present evidence contesting the facts
on which the arguments are based. (Panopulos v. Maders (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 341;
Krechniak v. Noorzoy (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 713, 725.)
       Accordingly, Tobin has forfeited the argument that the City impaired her pension
rights by failing to make COLA payments owed under the FCERS plan prior to the 1989
Ordinance. Moreover, as she has not challenged the denial of her impairment claim on
any other ground in her briefing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the claim.
       C.      The Remaining Claims
       The trial court denied Tobin’s remaining claims for promissory estoppel, equitable
estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty because they fall within the releases in her 2002
separation agreement. On appeal, Tobin does not dispute that her claims fit within the
plain language of the releases. Instead, she argues that the releases should not be applied
according to their plain language for three reasons: (1) she did not intend to release her
estoppel and fiduciary duty claims; (2) the releases were for claims relating to her work
for United Way of Silicon Valley; and (3) her estoppel and fiduciary duty claims fall
within a carve-out for service retirement benefits. These arguments are unpersuasive.
       In December 2002, Tobin and the City entered into a separation agreement. The
stated purpose of the agreement was to resolve “any dispute or potential disputes”
between Tobin and the City. To this end, the agreement contained two releases. First,
Tobin promised to release “any and all claims, of any kind, against” against the City and
its officials, and to not initiate “ any claim . . . of any kind, including claims relating to
. . . misrepresentation or fraud” and “tort claims of any nature known and unknown,
suspected or unsuspected, for damages . . . past, present and future” that are “related to
her employment with the City.” Second, Tobin waived Civil Code section 1542, which
prohibits releases of unknown claims, and released “any and all claims” stemming from
conduct “prior to or simultaneously with” execution of the agreement.
                                               11
       Tobin’s equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty
claims fall squarely within these releases. As the trial court recognized, the releases are
“extremely broad.” In addition to covering “any and all claims” against the City and its
officials, the first release expressly includes claims for “misrepresentation or fraud” and
“tort” seeking “damages . . . past, present, and future . . . related to [Tobin’s] employment
with the City.” Tobin’s estoppel and fiduciary duty claims fit within this release because
they are based on misleading representations and omissions, seek damages, and concern
the pension that she earned while working for the City. Tobin’s estoppel and fiduciary
duty claims also fit within the agreement’s second release because, as the trial court
determined, these claims stem from alleged conduct by the City prior to or
simultaneously with the separation agreement’s execution.
       With one immaterial exception,5 Tobin does not dispute that her estoppel and
fiduciary duty claims are based on representations and omissions prior to or
simultaneously with execution of the separation agreement or that they otherwise fit
within the literal language of the releases. Instead, Tobin argues that the releases are not
enforceable because she did not intend to release future claims against the City for cutting
her COLA. In support of this argument, Tobin cites a 1963 Supreme Court decision,
Casey v. Proctor (1963) 59 Cal.2d 97 (Casey). In Casey, the Supreme Court held that
Civil Code section 1542 prevents “the mere recital” that unknown claims are released
from barring claims for injuries not discovered until later “in the absence of a showing of
a conscious understanding that if the injuries were suffered which had not yet manifested
themselves, they too would be discharged by the release.” (Casey, at p. 109.) Here,
however, there is much more than a mere recital. As noted above, the separation

       5
         At oral argument, Tobin pointed to a January 9, 2004 letter that she requested
from the City for her bank. The letter, however, merely stated that Tobin would receive a
monthly pension of slightly more than $8,000 plus a COLA of “3% maximum each April
1 beginning in 2005 . . . based on the Bay Area Consumer Price Index.” This statement is
consistent with the benefits promised in the 1989 Ordinance and provided to Tobin.
                                             12
agreement contains two releases, one of which expressly states that “Tobin voluntarily
waives her rights under Section 1542.” Moreover, the agreement required Tobin to
“acknowledge[] that she has knowingly waived any and all rights under Civil Code 1542”
by initialing the waiver, which Tobin did. Tobin offers no reason why the express waiver
initialed by her fails to satisfy Casey. (See Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159,
1170-1171 [finding unknown claims released under Casey based on an express waiver of
section 1542].)
       Citing a Court of Appeal decision, Butler v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 943 (Butler), Tobin also argues that the separation agreement’s release
should be construed to be implicitly limited to claims concerning Tobin’s “loan” to
United Way of Silicon Valley. However, far from suggesting that it is so limited, the
separation agreement states that it is intended to resolve “any dispute or potential disputes
between the parties, except as otherwise explicitly stated.” (Italics added.) In addition,
the first release states that it includes claims “during, from or related to employment with
the City of San Jose,” not United Way of Silicon Valley, as Tobin’s argument would
suggest.
       Nor does Butler suggest otherwise. That case dealt with a release agreement
signed by an employee and his union as well as the employer in connection with a
grievance that the union filed on behalf of the employee. (Butler, at p. 946.) The
decision found it reasonable to conclude that the release was limited to the matters
covered by the grievance because “[the union’s] standing was limited to negotiating
the . . . grievance.” (Id. at p. 948). Here, however, the agreement containing the release
was not joined by a third party, and there is no reason to infer that the agreement was
limited to matters involving the third party.
       Finally, Tobin argues that, even if her claims are covered by the separation
agreement’s releases, they fall within an exception carved out of the releases. The first
release, Tobin notes, states that “nothing in this release affects Tobin’s right to service
                                                13
retirement benefits as provided by the terms of the Federated Employees’ Retirement
Plan in effect on the date of Tobin’s retirement.” Tobin argues that this carve-out applies
to her estoppel and fiduciary duty claims because those claims are based on reduction of
her retirement benefits and damages will be measured by the amount of the reduction in
those benefits. The carve-out, however, does not cover all claims relating to retirement
benefits; it applies only to Tobin’s “right to service benefits as provided by the terms” of
the FCERS plan. As a consequence, the carve-out covers a claim for breach of the plan
or for impairment of contract relating to the plan because such claims are based on
Tobin’s rights under the plan.
       However, as the trial court recognized, Tobin’s estoppel and fiduciary duty claims
are not based on her right to benefits under the FCERS plan. For example, her equitable
estoppel claim is based on alleged misrepresentations concerning the retirement
allowances that she would receive, upon which Tobin and other retirees allegedly relied
in deciding whether to retire or to leave City service for other opportunities with better
retirement benefits. Similarly, Tobin’s promissory estoppel claim is based on the City’s
alleged promises to provide retirees with “the full amount of their promised pension
benefits without regard to any limits imposed by IRC 415(b),” not her actual right to
benefits under the terms of the FCERS plan. And her fiduciary duty claim is based on an
alleged failure to inform retirees of limitations that might be imposed on their pension
benefits. As Tobin herself notes, these claims are independent of her impairment claim,
and theoretically she could prevail on them even if the impairment claim fails. As a
consequence, Tobin’s estoppel claims are not based on her right to service benefits under
the terms of the FCERS plan and therefore fall outside the separation agreement’s
carve-out.

                                             14
                                   III.   DISPOSITION
      Tobin’s appeal of the judgment in favor of the Board of Administration of the
Federated City Employees Retirement System is dismissed. The judgment in favor of the
City and the city manager is affirmed.

                                           15
                                       _________________________
                                       BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.

_________________________
DANNER, J.

Tobin v. City of San Jose et al.
H049987