Court Opinion

ID: 9533199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:29:24.111977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:56.883256
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 67. 0dissenting). I agree with the majority opinion that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in holding that the defendant must prove that a reasonable jury would believe the recantation and that the recantation must be corroborated. Because of these errors of law, I would reverse the order of the circuit *302court and remand the cause to the circuit court to exercise its discretion under the standard I set forth below.
¶ 68. The law governing withdrawal of a guilty or no-contest plea before sentencing is easy to state. First, a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea before imposition of sentence. A plea is not a meaningless formality when the circuit court makes a full inquiry into the circumstances of the plea. Second, a circuit court should nevertheless allow a defendant to withdraw a plea before sentencing for "any fair and just reason" unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.1 Third, granting or denying the motion to withdraw the plea rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court.
¶ 69. The law governing withdrawal of a guilty or no-contest plea before sentencing is, however, not so easy to apply. The "any fair and just reason" standard "lack[s] any pretense of scientific exactness." United-States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 220 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975). Appellate decisions of state and federal courts give meaning to this standard.
¶ 70. The court of appeals certified the present case to this court because it perceived inconsistencies in certain Wisconsin appellate decisions interpreting and applying the "any fair and just reason" standard. The majority opinion does not, I conclude, resolve these perceived inconsistencies.
*303¶ 71. In its certification memorandum, the court of appeals asked this court "whether the plausibility approach of Shanks,2 which precludes a credibility assessment, is the correct law in light of Canedy,3 which permits such an assessment of defendant's testimony in a presentence setting, and McCallum,4 which contemplates an assessment of a recanter's testimony in a postsentence setting."
¶ 72. The majority opinion does not, in my view, clearly distinguish between and describe the applicability of the standards of plausibility and credibility. Similarly, the majority opinion fails to explain adequately the basis for the distinction it makes between the corroboration of recantation testimony and the reliability of recantation testimony.
¶ 73. Moreover, the majority opinion today departs from Wisconsin's tradition of applying federal case law to determine grounds for plea withdrawals5 and adopts a new four-part test used for motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.6 The majority opinion is not clear about the relation of this new test to the rules set forth in our prior cases. Also, I doubt that a test applicable to vacating a guilty verdict on the basis of new evidence should be a principal test to be applied to withdrawing a plea before sentencing. The rationale for allowing a verdict to be *304vacated after trial is different from the rationale for allowing the withdrawal of a plea that has waived the defendant's right to trial.
¶ 74. In a motion to withdraw a guilty or no-contest plea before sentencing I would apply the following test: The circuit court should determine, as a matter of law, whether the recanter's testimony is worthy of belief by the jury. The circuit court should not determine whether the recantation is true or false. Instead, it should merely determine whether the testimony of the recanting witness has any indicia of credibility that would be persuasive to a reasonable juror if the testimony were presented at trial. Cf. State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 487, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). In my view, this assessment of a recanter's testimony should be identical to a circuit court's assessment of a witness's testimony at a preliminary hearing.
¶ 75. I would remand the cause to the circuit court to determine whether, under the test I have set forth above, there is any fair and just reason to allow withdrawal of the no-contest plea in the present case.
¶ 76. For these reasons, I dissent.
¶ 77. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 579-584, 469 N.W.2d 163 (1991). The "any fair and just reason" test is set forth in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice — Pleas of Guilty, Standard 14-2.1 (1980) and in Rule 32(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Charles Alan Wright, 3 Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal 2d, Rule 32 (1998 Pocket Part).

 State v. Shanks, 152 Wis. 2d 284, 448 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1989).

 Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565.

 State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997).

 See Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 582-83.

 For the test applicable to motions for a new trial, see State v. Terrance, 202 Wis. 2d 496, 501, 550 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1996).