Court Opinion

ID: 9561929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:18:54.981561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:33.702751
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Judge,
dissenting. I think the trial court erred in directing a verdict in this case for two very important reasons.
*515First, it is well settled that questions of value are peculiarly for the determination of the jury where there is any data in evidence upon which they may legitimately exercise their own knowledge and ideas. In making such determination they are not bound to accept as correct the opinion of witnesses as to such value. “Jurors are not absolutely bound to accept as correct the opinions or estimates of witnesses as to the value of property, though uncontradicted by other testimony, but have the right to consider the nature of the property involved, together with any other fact or circumstance properly within their knowledge, throwing light upon the question, and they may, by their verdict, fix either a lower or a higher value upon the property than that stated in the opinions or estimates of the witnesses. Georgia Northern R. Co. v. Battle, 22 Ga. App. 665, 666 (97 SE 94), and cit. See also Baker v. Richmond City Mill Works, 105 Ga. 225 (31 SE 426); McCarthy v. Lazarus, 137 Ga. 282 (2) (73 SE 493). Applying the foregoing ruling to the facts of the case at bar, this court cannot hold that the verdict was unauthorized by any evidence.” McLendon v. City of LaGrange, 47 Ga. App. 690, 691 (3) (171 SE 307); see also Chalker v. Raley, 73 Ga. App. 415 (37 SE2d 160); Southern v. Cobb County, 78 Ga. App. 58 (50 SE2d 226); and Nottingham v. West, 69 Ga. App. 876 (27 SE2d 44). To the same effect see Watson v. Tompkins Chevrolet Co., 83 Ga. App. 440 (63 SE2d 681) in'which it was held that a directed verdict was improper.
In order to aid the juiy in evaluating the opinion evidence as to value, the jury in this case had before it other evidence which might throw light on the question of value, such as (1) a plat of the property showing its size and dimensions, and its location at the corner of Peachtree Road and Piedmont Avenue, (2) four photographs of the property as it existed at the time of taking, illustrating to the jury the nature, extent and location of the improvements to the portion of the property not taken, (3) a lease describing the tract from which the property was taken and showing the value of the yearly rental, the term of the lease, etc., and (4) other pertinent facts concerning the property testified to by the same witness in explaining how he arrived at the valuation which he placed upon the property. In considering *516all these facts and circumstances, the jury certainly had ample other data before it which would have authorized a verdict in an amount different from the amount directed in this case.
Secondly, the testimony as to value given by the only witness was highly conflicting and on the basis of his testimony alone the jury could have reached a verdict different from that directed. In addition to his testimony that the value of the property taken was $11,500 he also positively testified that the market value of the entire property before the taking was $126,850 and that the market value of the property after the taking was still $126,850, the overall effect of such testimony being that the opinion of the witness as to the value of the property taken was somewhere between zero and $11,500'. His further testimony that the property owner had been damaged only to the extent of $3,800 further clouded the issue of the value of the property, leaving the jury no clear and unequivocal testimony from the opinion witness on this question.
Under the facts and circumstances set forth above the question of value in this case should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions from the court.
I am authorized to state that Judges Bell and Russell concur in this dissent.