Court Opinion

ID: 9547014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:40:07.315543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:12.426213
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Sutton
also specially concurs.
Though I concur in the majority opinion I desire to comment upon another matter not fully treated therein and not discussed by either Mr. Justice Moore or Mr. Justice Hall in their separate dissents.
I am persuaded that we cannot act at this time because the people of Colorado have wisely and validly reserved to themselves the right and power to correct such matters as the one in dispute by use of the initiative and referendum (Art. V, Sec. 1, The Colorado Constitution) . Such a reserved power in the voters in Colorado distinguishes the present case from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L.Ed. 663, 82 S.Ct. 691. In Tennessee, where Baker arose, the voters had no way to correct the political inequality which has long existed. They were, in effect, remediless unless the judiciary assumed the responsibility of fashioning appropriate relief to insure constitutional voting rights. In Baker immediate judicial action was proper but even there the remedy could not be made available forthwith.
*393Here if the petitioner is not afforded relief either by action of the electorate in the November 1962 election or by the Forty-fourth General Assembly, then it will be the duty of this court under the Baker decision to take appropriate action.
I believe that matters such as the proportionate equality of voting stand on a somewhat different procedural plane for action than some other constitutional rights which require very prompt if not instantaneous adjudication by the courts to render effective relief. For example, if petitioner had been denied his right to vote at all, we would have a different problem. Or, if he were charged with a crime or were imprisoned without charge, then we would forthwith rule on his right to a writ of habeas corpus or to other protections to which he is entitled.
My belief that proportionate equality of voting is different is twofold: First, by its very nature it is a political problem. Constantly shifting population in affected areas make exact mathematical representation, even if required, impossible to attain or to maintain, even if by some legerdemain population in such areas could be kept static. Second, due to shifting population and the imbalance that results, it is obvious that for at least nine year periods (assuming representation were readjusted each tenth year) voters in the growing areas could be validly (but temporarily) denied theoretical equality. Even Mr. Justice Moore seems to accept such a constitutional lag.
Therefore this petitioner because of the political nature of the relief sought must await the turning of the wheel until it touches his grounded rights.
Thus my position over and above that of the majority opinion is that relief under the circumstances in Colorado must await first of all, the required constitutional span of time, then legislative action within the required period, and, if the latter fails then either timely action by the people by initiative and referendum (as is being *394sought here) or judicial action. The judiciary to intervene, however, only if the legislature or voters fail to act appropriately within a reasonable time.
Mr. Justice Pringle states that he concurs in these views as well as with the majority opinion.