Court Opinion

ID: 9543617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:47:09.157339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:42.398327
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Aohor, J.
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder by jury and sentenced on November 1, 1957, by the Fountain Circuit Court to suffer punishment by death.
The evidence at the trial is not included in the transcript and no issue is presented as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction.
The questions asserted as grounds for new trial and here argued as causes for appeal are presented by the fact that one of the jurors, Alice Leoma Harvey, (1) failed to disclose on her voir dire examination that she was acquainted with the murder victim or the family and (2) that she was in fact a first cousin once removed of the murder victim.
Appellant asserts first, that this failure to disclose the fact of her acquaintance with the murder victim and the family constituted misconduct, tending to prevent a fair and due consideration of the case, which is cause for new trial within the terms of §9-1903, Burns’ 1956 Repl.1
Secondly, appellant asserts that the fact of the proven relationship of the juror and the deceased, regardless of the knowledge of such relationship on the part of the juror, disqualified the juror, and, therefore, appellant was entitled to a new trial as a matter of right.
*91I am of the opinion that the case must be reversed because of the facts stated in the motion for new trial, but not upon the theory of appellant’s argument as stated above. In my opinion the fact of this erroneous answer in itself constituted cause for new trial. Acquaintance with the murder victim or her family was a matter going to the partiality of the juror.
Appellant was entitled to trial by an impartial jury.2 In order to guarantee this right appellant was entitled to truthful answers to questions asked of juror on voir dire, going to this important question. Therefore, upon failure of a juror to truthfully answer such questions an accused is entitled to relief from a verdict which is actually influenced by partiality and bias, or which by specific provisions of the statute are presumed to have been so influenced.
In this case the juror was specifically interrogated regarding her acquaintance with the murder victim or the family. By her own testimony, although she apparently did not identify the murder victim by her married name, she was acquainted “with the family,” and knew of her relationship to the family. Her answer in the negative, although honest, was erroneous. However, appellant has protected his right to challenge the juror for partiality by asking regarding her acquaintance with the family.
I do not concur in the majority opinion that appellant was entitled to a new trial, either on the ground of misconduct of the juror or that proof of relationship, in itself, constituted grounds for new trial as a matter of law.
Let us consider first the issue as to the alleged misconduct of the juror which appellant asserts tended to *92prevent a fair consideration of the case. There is no question that if a juror knowingly makes false answers on voir dire examination or fails to make full and complete answers to questions in matters related to the juror’s impartiality, such misconduct will be cause for new trial. Lamphier v. The State (1880), 70 Ind. 317, 321. Cf. Pearcy v. The Michigan Mutual Life Insurance Company (1887), 111 Ind. 59, 12 N. E. 98, 60 Am. Rep. 673; Foreman v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 324, 180 N. E. 291. See also, Ohlwine v. Pfaffman (1913), 52 Ind. App. 357, 100 N. E. 777; Sturrock v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 161, 96 N. E. 2d 226.
However, in the case before us the juror’s testimony on voir dire and at the hearing on the motion for new trial is unequivocal that she was not acquainted with the deceased or the family. Admittedly, there was some evidence from other witnesses that circumstances had existed out of which the juror might have become acquainted with the deceased victim, or associated her with members of her family with whom she was acquainted. However,, it cannot be said with certainty that this evidence did more than support the fact of an opportunity for such knowledge. The most that could be said is that there was a conflict in the evidence regarding full and honest answers of the juror on voir dire examination. This presented a question of fact for the trial court to determine. Holloway v. State (1876), 53 Ind. 554; McCulley v. The State (1878), 62 Ind. 428; Achey v. The State (1878), 64 Ind. 56; Walker v. The State (1885), 102 Ind. 502, 1 N. E. 856; Stephenson v. The State (1887), 110 Ind. 358, 11 N. E. 360, 59 Am. Rep. 216; Smith v. State (1895), 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. E. 595.
After considering all the evidence the court, by denying the motion for new trial, concluded that the juror *93was not, in fact, acquainted with the deceased victim and that she was not “guilty of any misconduct tending to prevent a fair and due consideration of the case.” [§9-1903, supra.] The action of the lower court will not be reversed by this court by reason of these circumstances. Smith v. State, supra.
The second question presented is whether appellant is entitled to a new trial because of the subsequently established relationship of the juror and the deceased victim, even though that relationship was unknown to the juror at the time of the trial. In order that mere relationship, not known to a juror, may constitute cause for disqualification as a matter of law, such disqualification must find its origin either within some constitutional or statutory declaration.
Specific constitutional provisions within the state and federal constitutions regarding the qualifications of a juror merely provide that the juror be “impartial.”3 Not knowing of her relationship to the murder victim, it cannot be said as a fact that the juror was biased because of that relationship. Therefore, grounds for disqualifying the juror as a matter of law must be found outside these explicit constitutional provisions. Appellant contends that such grounds exist in the statutes enacted to implement the above constitutional guarantee. The pertinent statutes which appellant relies upon are as follows:
“Eleventh. When a person is required to be disinterested or indifferent in acting on any question or matter affecting other parties, consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree, inclusive, by the civil law rules, or within the degree of second cousin, inclusive, shall be deemed to disqualify *94such person from acting, except by consent of parties.” [§1-201, Burns’ 1946 Repl.] [2 R. S. 1852, ch. 17, §1, p. 339.]
“The following shall be good causes for challenge to any person called as a juror in any criminal trial:
“Fourth. That he is related within the fifth degree to the person alleged to be injured or attempted to be injured, by the offense charged, or to the person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted, or to the defendant.” [§9-1504, Burns’ 1956 Repl.] [Acts 1905, ch. 169, §230, p. 584.]
A decision in this case must rest upon the construction of said statutes as applied to the facts before us.
In support of his contention that the relationship of the juror disqualified her as a matter of law, appellant cites numerous decisions of this court holding that if a juror makes false answers to questions regarding his competency or incompetency in matters which are by statute considered to affect his impartiality as a juror, such juror will be treated as incompetent and a new trial ordered, even though such false answers are innocently and honestly made. Hudspeth et al. v. Herston (1878), 64 Ind. 133; Rice v. The State (1861), 16 Ind. 298. Cf. Block v. The State (1884), 100 Ind. 357; Johnson et al. v. Tyler et al. (1891), 1 Ind. App. 387, 27 N. E. 643; Cf. Gaff v. State (1900), 155 Ind. 277, 58 N. E. 74, 80 Am. St. Rep. 235.
The reason supporting the ruling in those cases is that in matters which are by statute considered likely to affect his impartiality, a party who wishes to claim absolute protection of the statute as to the impartiality of a juror may do so by interrogating such juror upon the specific subjects. However, the above cited cases are distinguishable from the case before us, in that here it cannot be said that the juror made false answers, *95innocently or otherwise, upon the specific matter of her relationship to the murder victim, which relationship, by statute, carries a presumption of bias.
Furthermore, in support of his position, appellant relies upon the case of Hudspeth et al. v. Herston, supra [64 Ind. 133]. In that case it was discovered after trial that one of the jurors was related to the appellee within the sixth degree. There, as here, the juror was ignorant of his relationship. In that case the court used the following language, upon which appellant relies:
“. . . the fact . . . the juror . . . was wholly ignorant of any relationship between him and the appellee, can have no possible bearing on the correct decision of the question now under consideration. The appellants had a clear legal right to have their case tried by a disinterested jury. Under the law, the juror, Baker, was not a competent juror; but, without fault or negligence on the part of the appellants, and in ignorance of his incompetency, they accepted him as a juror. . . .”
The above statement of law is still good law, as applied to the facts in that case. Every accused was entitled to a “disinterested jury,” and the law provides extensive safeguards to which an accused may protect himself against jurors who are incompetent because of their impartiality. However, the statement, “under the law, the juror, Baker, was not a competent juror,” must be considered in the light of the facts in that case and the law as stated in the previous decisions of the court. In that case all the prospective jurors were expressly interrogated by the court as to their relationship to the parties, and each juror, including Baker, answered in the negative. The previous decisions of the court construing the statute [§1-201, supra}, had held that a party’s right to object to a *96juror on grounds of partiality, including the fact of his relationship, must be affirmatively exercised and that unless a party’s failure to assert his rights “without fault or negligence” on his part, failure to exercise the right constituted a waiver thereof.4 Accordingly the court, in the Hudspeth case, supra [64 Ind. 133, 135-136], recognized that waiver was an issue and proceeded to explain its decision under the facts presented, as follows:
“It can not be said, . . . under the facts . . . that the appellants consented to the trial of this action by a cousin of the appellee, ... Nor can it be correctly said, that the appellants have waived the objection to the juror, . . . The appellants had the right to rely implicitly, without any further examination, upon the answer of the juror to the question propounded to him by the court.” (Our italics.)
The Hudspeth case, supra, and the case at bar are clearly distinguishable regarding the facts constituting a waiver on the part of the appellant. In the case at bar, the interrogation of the juror went only to her actual knowledge or acquaintanceship with the deceased victim or her family. It did not purport to cover the question of her statutory incompetency because of relationship.
The controlling statutes do not, as contended by appellant, absolutely disqualify a juror as a matter of law because of his relationship to the deceased victim. The early statute, §1-201, supra, provided that “consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree, inclusive, . . . shall be deemed to disqualify such person from acting [as a juror], except by consent of *97parties.” (Our italics.) In construing this and similar statutes this court both before5 6and after6 the Hudspeth case, supra, has held that the right to challenge for cause is not self-exercising, but must be affirmatively and timely exercised, and that failing this the right is considered waived. The later statute, §9-1504, supra, enacted subsequent to the decisions in footnote 4, must be considered to have affirmed the construction placed upon the earlier statute, §1-201, supra, by stating that such relationship was one of the “causes for challenge.” Causes for challenge generally must be affirmatively exercised or are considered waived. In this case the appellant did not interrogate the juror on the subject of her relationship with the murder victim. Therefore, we must consider that right to challenge the juror for that specific reason was waived.
This position conforms with the great weight of authority in other jurisdictions. The general rule upon this subject has been stated as follows in 28 C. J. S., §1446, p. 1174:
“In general it is not alone ground for a new trial that, unknown to accused, a juror was related . . . to the person accused is charged to have killed,7 . . . The rule applies especially . . . where he failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the relationship ;8 . . .”
*98In other jurisdictions it has been held that failure to examine a juror regarding his relationship on voir dire constitutes failure to exercise due diligence within the above general rule.9 In fact the general rule seems now to be that a relationship, even though within the degree prohibited by statute, which is unknown to the juror, is not, standing alone, ground for a new trial.10 The reason for the rule is that a juror, though related to the deceased, if ignorant of that fact, could not be influenced or biased, nor could the accused be prejudiced thereby.11
NOTE.—Reported in 155 N. E. 2d 129.

. “The court shall grant a new trial to the defendant for the following causes, or any of them:
“Fourth. When the jury has been guilty of any misconduct tending to prevent a fair and due consideration of the case.” §9-1903, Burns’ 1956 Repl. [Acts 1905, ch. 169, §282, p. 584.]

. Art. 1, §13, Constitution of Indiana, Amend. 6, Constitution of the United States.

. Art. 1, §13, Constitution of Indiana, Amend. 6, Constitution of the United States, supra.

. Romaine v. The State (1885), 7 Ind. 63; Estep et al. v Waterous et al. (1873), 45 Ind. 140; Croy v. State (1869), 32 Ind. 384; Alexander v. Dunn (1854), 5 Ind. 122; Barlow v. The State (1827), 2 Blackf. 114.

. Romaine v. The State, supra; Estep et al. v. Waterous et al., supra; Crop v. State, supra; Alexander v. Dunn, supra; Barlow v. The State, supra.

. Douthitt v. The State (1896), 144 Ind. 397, 42 N. E. 907; Patterson v. The State (1880), 70 Ind. 341. See also Hodges v. Bales (1885), 102 Ind. 494, 1 N. E. 692.

. State v. Scott (1949), 359 Mo. 631, 223 S. W. 2d 453; Perkins v. State (1931), 120 Tex. Cr. 399, 46 S. W. 2d 672; State v. Carricut (1924), 157 La. 140, 102 So. 98; Traviss v. Commonwealth (1884), 106 Pa. 597.

. Lee v. State (1941), 64 Ga. App. 290, 13 S. E. 2d 79; Johnson v. State (1935), 53 Ohio App. 410, 5 N. E. 2d 343; Cambron v. State (1933), 227 Ala. 575, 151 So. 443; State v. Mouzon (1928), 148 S. C. 196, 145 S. E. 799.

. Edwards v. State (1938), 28 Ala. App. 409, 186 So. 582; People v. McNabb (1935), 3 Cal. 2d 441, 45 P. 2d 334, certiorari dismissed, McNabb v. People of State of California, 296 U. S. 660; Couch v. Commonwealth (1953), 255 S. W. 2d 478; State v. Carricut, supra; State v. Figuli (1938), 36 N. E. 2d 19, App. dism’d 134 Ohio St. 495, 17 N. E. 2d 920; Hill v. State (1935), 129 Tex. Cr. 451, 87 S. W. 2d 719.

. People v. Boren (1903), 139 Cal. 210, 72 P. 899; State v. Fox (1932), 52 Idaho 474, 16 P. 2d 663; Hodges v. Bales (1885), 102 Ind. 494, 1 N. E. 692; Jones v. Commonwealth (1953) (Ky.), 256 S. W. 2d 520; Brumfield v. State (1912), 102 Miss. 610, 59 So. 849; State v. Miller (1932), 331 Mo. 675, 56 S. W. 2d 92; State v. Cooke (1918), 176 N. C. 731, 97 S. E. 171; Traviss v. Commonwealth (1884), 106 Pa. 597, supra; State v. Mouzon (1928), 148 S. C. 196, 145 S. E. 799, supra; State v. Worthington (1930), 109 W. Va. 449, 155 S. E. 313.

. Miller v. Commonwealth (1924), 203 Ky. 437, 262 S. W. 579; State v. Stewart (1922), 296 Mo. 12, 246 S. W. 936; State v. Miller (1932), 331 Mo. 675, 56 S. W. 2d 92; Traviss v. Commonwealth (1884), 106 Pa. 597, supra; Rogers v. State (1927), 109 Tex. Cr. 88, 3 S. W. 2d 455.