Court Opinion

ID: 9896960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:42.980259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:54.211530
License: Public Domain

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       WILLIAM L. ROACH v. TRANSWASTE, INC.
                     (SC 20718)
             Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                        Ecker and Alexander, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for the allegedly
   wrongful termination of his employment, in violation of public policy
   and the statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 31-51q) prohibiting an employer from
   retaliating against an employee for exercising constitutionally protected
   speech. The plaintiff, who had been employed by the defendant as
   a commercial truck driver, alleged that the defendant terminated his
   employment after he raised complaints concerning the safety of its
   vehicles. At trial, the plaintiff testified that, following the termination
   of his employment, he was out of work for approximately 6 months,
   the defendant had paid him at a rate of 46 cents per mile, he had driven
   a little more than 2000 miles per week, and he had driven approximately
   230,000 miles during his 2 years with the defendant. The plaintiff’s
   testimony was the sole evidence presented with respect to his lost
   wages, and the defendant offered no evidence to impeach his testimony.
   The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded him $24,288
   in damages for lost wages. The jury interrogatories indicated that the
   jury had found that the plaintiff was owed wages corresponding to 2200
   miles per week at a rate of 46 cents per mile for a period of 24 weeks.
   The defendant filed a motion for remittitur, seeking to reduce the dam-
   ages award to zero. The defendant asserted that there was no evidence
   to support the damages award because the plaintiff had failed to provide
   tangible evidence or to testify with sufficient specificity as to his lost
   wages. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for remittitur,
   concluding that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to support
   the damages award and that, in light of the specific figures in the jury
   interrogatories, the award was a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff’s
   lost wages. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment for the plaintiff
   in accordance with the jury’s verdict. The plaintiff appealed and the
   defendant cross appealed to the Appellate Court. In its cross appeal,
   the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had erred by failing
   to set aside the damages award. The Appellate Court upheld the trial
   court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for remittitur, concluding that
   the trial court had not abused its discretion in declining to set aside the
   damages award. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed
   to this court.

Held that the Appellate Court did not err in upholding the trial court’s denial
   of the defendant’s motion for remittitur:

   Although the Appellate Court, in upholding the trial court’s denial of the
   defendant’s motion for remittitur, relied on the trial court’s characteriza-
   tion of the damages award as a reasonable estimate without citing the
   applicable reasonable certainty standard of proof, this court’s case law
   links the reasonable certainty standard to the ability to make a reasonable
   estimate, the reasonable estimate benchmark has consistently appeared
   in this court’s cases assessing damages awards, and the term ‘‘reasonable
   certainty’’ in this context requires only evidence that is sufficient to
   enable the fact finder to arrive at a reasonable estimate and thereby
   remove the award from the realm of speculation.

   Contrary to the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff did not prove his lost
   wages with reasonable certainty because the only evidence he offered
   was his own generalized and nonspecific testimony, the fact that the
   damages award was premised exclusively on testimonial evidence did
   not, in and of itself, render the evidence insufficient to meet the reason-
   able certainty standard, and the plaintiff’s testimony was sufficient to
   remove the damages award from the realm of speculation, as the plaintiff
   proved to the jury’s satisfaction that the defendant wrongfully terminated
   his employment, that the defendant owed him lost wages for the subse-
   quent period of approximately six months when he was unemployed, and
  that the distances and per mile amounts to which he testified accurately
  represented his former workload and compensation, and the jury used
  these proven facts to calculate a reasonable estimate, consistent with
  the evidence before it, of the amount of the plaintiff’s lost wages.

  Moreover, there was no merit to the defendant’s claim that the damages
  award was improperly speculative because it required the jury to guess
  at the number of miles that the plaintiff had driven for the defendant,
  the duration of his unemployment, and how any inclement weather could
  have affected his workload because, although the plaintiff could have
  provided a greater degree of specificity as to how many weeks he was
  unemployed, the jury apparently awarded damages on the low end of
  the range of a reasonable estimate, and the two year average from which
  the jury calculated the weekly mileage for lost wages was a sufficiently
  lengthy period to account for variances in the weather.

  Furthermore, this was not a case in which it could not be determined
  how or why the jury arrived at its damages award or in which the award
  had been based on an unresolved contingency, as the jury based its
  award on figures drawn directly from uncontroverted testimony, and
  the method the jury employed for its calculations was set forth in its
  interrogatories form.

  Accordingly, it was clear that the damages award was not based on
  speculation or guesswork, and the plaintiff proved his damages to a
  reasonable certainty by providing nonspeculative evidence from which
  the jury derived a fair and reasonable estimate.
          Argued April 26—officially released August 1, 2023

                          Procedural History

  Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the allegedly
wrongful termination of the plaintiff’s employment, and
for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury before
Noble, J.; verdict for the plaintiff; thereafter, the court,
Noble, J., denied the defendant’s motion for remittitur
and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict,
and the plaintiff appealed and the defendant cross
appealed to the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and
Suarez and Vertefeuille, Js., which reversed the trial
court’s judgment in part and remanded the case for
further proceedings, and the defendant, on the granting
of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Glenn L. Formica, for the appellant (defendant).
  James V. Sabatini, for the appellee (plaintiff).
                          Opinion

   ALEXANDER, J. The sole issue in this certified appeal
is whether the jury was presented with sufficient evi-
dence to award the plaintiff, William L. Roach, lost
wages in this wrongful termination action. The defen-
dant, Transwaste, Inc., claims that the Appellate Court
improperly upheld the trial court’s denial of the defen-
dant’s motion for remittitur. We disagree with the defen-
dant and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
  The record reveals the following undisputed facts
and procedural history relevant to the damages issue
in the present appeal.1 The plaintiff was employed by
the defendant as a commercial truck driver from 2013
through 2015. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s
employment after the plaintiff raised several complaints
to the defendant about the safety of its vehicles. The
plaintiff thereafter commenced the present action, claim-
ing that his employment was wrongfully terminated in
violation of public policy and General Statutes (Rev. to
2015) § 31-51q.2
   At trial, the sole evidence relating to lost wages was
adduced through the plaintiff’s testimony. The plaintiff
testified that he had been out of work for ‘‘[a]bout six
months’’ following the termination of his employment.
He also testified that the defendant had paid him at a
rate of 46 cents per mile, that he always had driven a
little more than 2000 miles per week, and that he had
driven approximately 230,000 miles during his two years
with the defendant. The defendant offered no evidence
to impeach this testimony.
  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
and awarded him $24,288 in damages for lost wages.
The jury interrogatories reflected that it had found that
the plaintiff was owed wages corresponding to 2200
miles per week at a rate of 46 cents per mile for a
period of 24 weeks.
  The defendant filed several postverdict motions,
including a motion for remittitur, seeking to reduce
the award of damages to zero dollars. The defendant
contended that there was no evidence to support the
award because the plaintiff had neither provided tangi-
ble evidence nor testified with sufficient specificity
about his lost wages. The trial court denied all of the
defendant’s postverdict motions.
   With regard to the motion for remittitur, the trial
court concluded that the plaintiff had presented suffi-
cient evidence to support the award. The trial court
pointed to the specific figures in the jury interrogatories
and drew the following inferences. The jury had arrived
at the 2200 mile per week figure by dividing the 230,000
miles that the plaintiff had driven in his 2 years with
the defendant by the number of weeks in 2 years and
rounding down the resulting figure of 2211 miles. The
payment rate of 46 cents per mile to yield a weekly
income of $1012. By multiplying $1012 by 24 weeks (the
trial court assumed that the jury had used an estimate
of 4 weeks per month for a period of 6 months), the
jury reached the final amount of $24,288 in damages
for lost wages. The trial court determined that, although
the calculations of damages were ‘‘not reflective of
absolute precision, they nevertheless arrive at a reason-
able estimate derived from the trial evidence.’’
   The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment
to the Appellate Court. The defendant cross appealed,
claiming, among other things, that the trial court erred
by failing to set aside the jury’s damages award.3 See
Roach v. Transwaste, Inc., 210 Conn App. 686, 694, 697,
270 A.3d 786 (2022). The defendant argued that the
plaintiff had not produced any evidence to support his
claim of lost wages because his testimony was specula-
tive, and, thus, the jury’s award of damages was not
supported by sufficient evidence. Id., 697.
   The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to set aside the
award. Id., 698. The Appellate Court cited the deferen-
tial standard of review of denials of motions for remitti-
tur and the ‘‘clear evidence in the record from which
the jury could have arrived at its verdict and the amount
of the award of damages to the plaintiff.’’ Id. The court
also concluded that the trial court, ‘‘having observed
the trial and evaluated the testimony firsthand,’’ was
in a better position to determine ‘‘that the jury could
reasonably and legally have reached the verdict that it
did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 698–99.
This certified appeal followed.4
   On appeal to this court, the defendant claims that
the Appellate Court erred in upholding the trial court’s
denial of its motion for remittitur. Specifically, the defend-
ant claims that the plaintiff did not prove his lost wages
with reasonable certainty because the only evidence
he offered was his own ‘‘generalized and nonspecific’’
testimony. The defendant argues that, if we were to
affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment, we would be
lowering the established legal standard for proving eco-
nomic damages. The defendant asserts that the Appel-
late Court departed from the requirement that damages
be proven with reasonable certainty by applying the less
stringent standard of a reasonable estimate.5 We disagree.

  Our review is guided by the following principles. In
considering the trial court’s decision whether to order
remittitur, a reviewing court must be mindful that ‘‘[t]he
court’s broad power to order a remittitur should be
exercised only when it is manifest that the jury [has
awarded damages that] are contrary to law, not sup-
ported by proof, or contrary to the court’s explicit and
unchallenged instructions.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Ashmore v. Hartford Hospital, 331 Conn. 777,
782, 208 A.3d 256 (2019). ‘‘[T]he decision whether to
reduce a jury verdict because it is excessive as a matter
of law . . . rests solely within the discretion of the
trial court. . . . [Consequently], the proper standard
of review . . . is that of an abuse of discretion. . . .
[T]he ruling of the trial court . . . is entitled to great
weight and every reasonable presumption should be
given in favor of its correctness.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 783.
   In the present case, the trial court’s denial of the
motion for remittitur was based on its determination
that the evidence was sufficient to support the damages
award. The law governing a claim of evidentiary insuffi-
ciency in this context is well settled. ‘‘Damages are
recoverable only to the extent that the evidence affords
a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in money
with reasonable certainty. . . . [T]he court must have
evidence by which it can calculate the damages, which
is not merely subjective or speculative . . . but which
allows for some objective ascertainment of the amount.
. . . This certainly does not mean that mathematical
exactitude is a precondition to an award of damages,
but we do require that the evidence, with such certainty
as the nature of the particular case may permit, lay
a foundation [that] will enable the trier to make a fair
and reasonable estimate.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v.
Smulders, 313 Conn. 227, 253–54, 96 A.3d 1175 (2014);
see also Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249
Conn. 523, 554, 733 A.2d 197 (1999) (‘‘[d]amages are
recoverable only to the extent that the evidence affords
a sufficient basis for estimating their amount in money
with reasonable certainty’’ (emphasis added)).
   Although the Appellate Court relied on the trial
court’s characterization of the damages award as a ‘‘rea-
sonable estimate’’ without citing the reasonable cer-
tainty standard of proof; (emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted) Roach v. Transwaste, Inc.,
supra, 210 Conn. App. 698; as the preceding discussion
demonstrates, our case law links the standard of reason-
able certainty to the ability to make a reasonable esti-
mate. See, e.g., Weiss v. Smulders, supra, 313 Conn.
253–54 (using both terms); Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn.
375, 441, 78 A.3d 76 (2013) (same); American Diamond
Exchange, Inc. v. Alpert, 302 Conn. 494, 510–11, 28
A.3d 976 (2011) (same); see also Connecticut Civil Jury
Instructions 4.5-4, available at https://jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/
Civil.pdf (last visited July 26, 2023); Connecticut Civil
Jury Instructions, supra, 4.5-8. The ‘‘reasonable esti-
mate’’ benchmark has consistently appeared in our
cases assessing damages awards since the early twenti-
eth century. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 287 Conn. 421,
463, 948 A.2d 982 (2008); Hedderman v. Robert Hall of
Waterbury, Inc., 145 Conn. 410, 414, 144 A.2d 60 (1958);
Ball v. T. J. Pardy Construction Co., 108 Conn. 549,
551, 143 A. 855 (1928). The term ‘‘reasonable certainty’’
in this context therefore requires only evidence that is
sufficient to enable the fact finder to arrive at a reason-
able estimate and thereby remove the award from the
realm of speculation. See, e.g., Carrano v. Yale-New
Haven Hospital, 279 Conn. 622, 650, 904 A.2d 149 (2006)
(‘‘[p]roof of damages should be established with reason-
able certainty and not speculatively and problemati-
cally’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. State v.
Nunes, 260 Conn. 649, 672, 800 A.2d 23 1160 (2002)
(term ‘‘reasonable medical certainty’’ means ‘‘reason-
able medical probability standard,’’ which is standard
that is applied to ensure that expert opinions are not
based on mere speculation or conjecture).
   The fact that a damages award is premised exclu-
sively on testimonial evidence, as it was in the present
case, does not, in and of itself, render the evidence
insufficient to meet the reasonable certainty standard.
Rather, ‘‘testimonial evidence is sufficient to support
an award of economic damages, provided the jury’s
reliance on this evidence is reasonable.’’ Carrano v.
Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 279 Conn. 647. ‘‘[E]xcept
in rare instances, there is no requirement that a [witness’]
testimony be corroborated by other evidence.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘We [have seen] no reason
why the traditional tests of credibility, testimony under
oath and cross-examination, coupled with the claim-
ant’s burden of proof, are insufficient to measure the
accuracy and reliability of testimonial evidence con-
cerning economic damages.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 647–48; see also Duncan v. Mill Manage-
ment Co. of Greenwich, Inc., 308 Conn. 1, 37, 60 A.3d
222 (2013) (concluding that it was reasonable for jury
to credit plaintiff’s unsubstantiated testimony on loss
of earning capacity); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Raffile, 225
Conn. 223, 236–37, 622 A.2d 564 (1993) (testimony with-
out corroborating evidence was sufficient to recover
uninsured motorist benefits).
   With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue
of whether the plaintiff’s testimony was sufficient to
remove the damages award from the realm of specula-
tion. We agree with the Appellate Court’s endorsement
of the trial court’s explanation as to why the jury had
sufficient evidence before it to meet this standard. See
Roach v. Transwaste, Inc., supra, 210 Conn. App. 698–
99. The plaintiff proved to the jury’s satisfaction that
he was wrongfully terminated from his employment,
that the defendant owed him lost wages for the subse-
quent period of roughly six months when he was unem-
ployed, and that the distances and per mile amounts
to which he testified accurately represented his former
workload and compensation. The jury used these
proven facts to calculate a reasonable estimate, consis-
tent with the evidence before it, of the amount of the
plaintiff’s lost wages.
  The defendant argues that the damages award was
improperly speculative because it required the jury to
guess at the number of miles that the plaintiff drove
for the defendant, the duration of his unemployment,
and how the weather may have affected his workload.
We disagree. We make two additional comments to
supplement the trial court’s detailed explanation for
how the jury likely arrived at the damages amount
awarded. First, although it may have been possible for
the plaintiff to have provided a greater degree of speci-
ficity as to how many weeks he was unemployed, rather
than his approximation of six months, the jury appears
to have awarded damages on the low end of the range
of a reasonable estimate. The jury awarded lost wages
for twenty-four weeks, whereas six months equates to
twenty-six weeks. Second, the two year average from
which the weekly mileage for lost wages was calculated
was a sufficiently lengthy period to account for vari-
ances in the weather.
   This is not a case in which ‘‘we cannot know how
or why the jury arrived at its determination of damages.’’
Caruso v. Quickie Cab Co., 48 Conn. App. 459, 462,
709 A.2d 1154 (1998). Nor is the award based on an
unresolved contingency, as the defendant contends.6
Given that the plaintiff’s pay was based on factors such
as mileage that varied from week to week, it was not
feasible to ascertain the exact amount he would have
earned if not for the wrongful termination of his employ-
ment. The jury, however, based its award on figures
drawn directly from uncontroverted testimony, and the
method it employed for its calculations is set forth in the
jury interrogatories form. Consequently, the damages
award was not based on speculation or guesswork. But
cf. Bronson & Townsend Co. v. Battistoni, 167 Conn.
321, 326–27, 355 A.2d 299 (1974) (rejecting claim for
damages when there was no formula for calculating
claimant’s bonus and claimant ‘‘failed to allege or even
to submit any testimony as to what constituted a reason-
able bonus, leaving the trial court without basis by
which to accord him relief’’). Rather, the plaintiff proved
his damages to a reasonable certainty by providing non-
speculative evidence from which the jury derived a fair
and reasonable estimate.
      The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     A more comprehensive discussion of the merits of the underlying case
is set forth in the Appellate Court’s decision. See Roach v. Transwaste, Inc.,
210 Conn. App. 686, 688–91, 697–99, 270 A.3d 786 (2022).
   2
     General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 31-51q provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any
employer . . . who subjects any employee to . . . discharge on account
of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment
to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the
Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or
materially interfere with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the
working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable
to such employee for damages caused by such . . . discharge, including
punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs of
any such action for damages. . . .’’
   3
     The plaintiff’s appeal challenged the trial court’s calculation of attorney’s
fees. The defendant’s cross appeal challenged the judgment on the merits
and as to damages. See Roach v. Transwaste, Inc., 210 Conn App. 686,
688–89, 270 A.3d 786 (2022). The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s
calculation of attorney’s fees but affirmed the trial court’s judgment as to
liability and damages. See id., 689. Only the defendant’s claim regarding
damages is at issue in this appeal.
   4
     This court granted certification, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the
Appellate Court correctly conclude that the evidence was sufficient to allow
the jury to award the plaintiff future lost damages?’’ Roach v. Transwaste,
Inc., 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d 1212 (2022). Although the plaintiff, in his brief
to this court, challenges the framing of the issue in terms of ‘‘future’’ lost
damages, we need not address this contention in light of our conclusion
that the defendant cannot prevail on appeal.
   5
     The reasonable estimate language set forth in the Appellate Court’s
decision was a direct quote from the trial court’s memorandum of decision.
See Roach v. Transwaste, Inc., supra, 210 Conn App. 698. The defendant
made no claim in its cross appeal to the Appellate Court that the trial
court had applied an incorrect legal standard. The defendant’s insufficient
evidence claim nonetheless requires us to assess the evidence against the
proper legal standard.
   6
     The defendant argues that, because the plaintiff acknowledged that the
weather influenced the amount he drove from week to week and subse-
quently the amount he was paid, the award was impermissibly predicated
on a contingency. The contingency cases that the defendant cites in support
of its argument, however, are distinguishable from the present case because
they involved questions whose unresolved outcomes necessarily required
speculation as to damages. See, e.g., Leisure Resort Technology, Inc. v.
Trading Cove Associates, 277 Conn. 21, 36, 889 A.2d 785 (2006) (rejecting
award of damages based on market values that assumed incomplete sales
agreement would be consummated); Lewis v. Hartford Dredging Co., 68
Conn. 221, 234–37, 35 A. 1127 (1896) (rejecting award of damages based on
projected market value of oyster beds, which, in turn, assumed successful
cultivation thereof).