Court Opinion

ID: 9384723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 19:02:37.370418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.028231
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/4/23 Faitro v. Top Surgeons CA2/4
             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 JOHN FAITRO et al.,                                             B307742

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. BC454464)
           v.

 TOP SURGEONS, INC., et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Kenneth Freeman, Judge. Affirmed as Modified.
         Kamille Dean for Defendants and Appellants Michael Omidi, M.D., and
Cindy Omidi.
         Mark Madison for Defendants and Appellants Almont Ambulatory
Surgery Center, Inc.; Antelope Valley Surgical Center, Inc.; Beverly Hills
Surgery Center, LLC; California Hospital Management & Collections, Inc.;
Lap Band Specialists, LLC; New Life Surgery Center, LLC; Skin Cancer and
Reconstructive Surgery Specialists of Beverly Hills; Skin Cancer and
Reconstructive Surgery Specialists of Valencia; Top Surgeons, LLC;
Woodlake Ambulatory Surgery Center, Inc.; and 1 800 Get Thin, LLC.
      Ian Shakramy for Defendants and Appellants Surgery Center
Management, LLC.
      Julian Omidi, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant Julian Omidi.
      Law Offices of John M. Walker and John M. Walker; Robertson &
Associates and Alexander Robertson, IV, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                              ____________________

                               INTRODUCTION
      In 2011, plaintiffs initiated a class action lawsuit against various
defendants, including individuals and affiliated surgery centers, based on
their advertising campaign for “lap band” weight loss surgeries. In 2015, the
parties executed a final class action settlement agreement. Five years later,
in 2020, the trial court entered judgment after granting the motion approving
the class action settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.769(h).)1 The court took a pending petition to compel arbitration off
calendar as moot.
      The defendants raise a host of alleged shortcomings with the
proceedings below, including: (1) plaintiffs’ breaches of the settlement
agreement that undermined the propriety of the class action settlement;
(2) material departures from the settlement agreement in the trial court’s
judgment; (3) an unreasonably high attorney fee award for class counsel; and
(4) the “denial” of the petition to compel arbitration.
      As a preliminary matter, we conclude only two of the defendants (Top
Surgeons, LLC and Surgery Center Management, LLC) have standing to

1     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise stated.

                                        2
challenge the judgment, given that the judgment was not entered against the
remaining defendants and they were not aggrieved by it. In addition, while
Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management generally have standing on
appeal, they nevertheless lack standing to raise issues that affect class
members only.
         For the most part, we reject the contention that the judgment altered
the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement instead of mirroring them as
it should have. The judgment did alter two material terms as to the financial
obligation of Surgery Center Management and the timeline for payment of
the settlement amount; we thus modify the judgment to reflect the terms
agreed upon in the settlement agreement on those points.
         To the extent the issue has not been waived, we reject the contention
that the trial court failed to properly scrutinize the attorney fee award, and
we find no abuse of discretion in the amount of the award.
         As modified, we affirm the judgment.
         The trial court’s order taking the petition to compel arbitration off
calendar is a nonappealable order, and we dismiss the appeal taken from that
order.

                                          3
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
         In 2011, plaintiffs2 filed a class action lawsuit against 15 defendants
comprised of individuals and affiliated surgical centers3 (collectively,
defendants). The operative complaint alleged violations under the Unfair
Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), the False Advertising
Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.) and the Consumer Legal Remedies
Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), based on defendants’ advertising campaign for
“lap band” weight loss surgeries.

    I.      Settlement Agreement
         In February 2015, the parties executed a final written settlement
agreement and general release (settlement agreement). The settlement
agreement defined the “Settling Defendant” as Top Surgeons, the
“Guarantying Defendant” as Surgery Center Management, and the
“Dismissed Defendants” as Surgery Center Management along with the
remaining defendants. The “Settling Defendant” was to “wire to a qualified

2     The named plaintiffs were John Faitro, as an individual and as the
personal representative of the Estate of Laura Lee Faitro, deceased; Arturo
and Elvia Renteria, as individuals and as the personal representatives of the
Estate of Ana Renteria, deceased; Bridget Sandoval; Susan Blackburn,
guardian ad litem for Taylor Blackburn, a minor; Jessica Bleaman; Susan
Leverett; Connie Maria Herrera; and April Moreno.

3     Michael, Cindy, and Julian Omidi; Top Surgeons, LLC (Top Surgeons);
Surgery Center Management, LLC (Surgery Center Management); Almont
Ambulatory Surgery Center, Inc.; Antelope Valley Surgical Center, Inc.;
Beverly Hills Surgery Center, LLC; California Hospital Management &
Collections, Inc.; Lap Band Specialists, LLC; New Life Surgery Center, LLC;
Skin Cancer and Reconstructive Surgery Specialists of Beverly Hills; Skin
Cancer and Reconstructive Surgery Specialists of Valencia; Woodlake
Ambulatory Surgery Center, Inc.; and 1 800 Get Thin, LLC.

                                          4
settlement fund (‘QSF’), set up by a claims administrator for the benefit of
the settlement class, the sum of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000)
within fifteen (15) business days of the Court granting final approval of the
Settlement.” “If the Settling Defendant cannot or does not transfer payment
of the Settlement Funds as set forth in this Settlement Agreement, the
Guarantying Defendant will be responsible for payment of the Settlement
Funds within seven (7) calendar days of receiving notice that the Settling
Payment [sic] has not transferred the Settlement Funds as required.”
“Settling Defendant and Guarantying Defendant represent and warrant that
each is financially solvent at the time of entering into this Settlement
Agreement.” The agreement further stated, “It is affirmed and acknowledged
that the Dismissed Defendants make no monetary contribution or payment
toward settlement and are not apportioned any fault in connection with the
Claims and causes of action and are hereby dismissed for waivers of costs,
attorneys’ fees and claims for malicious prosecution.”
      The settlement agreement provided for the Settling Defendant to pay
attorney fees and costs: “Defendants will not oppose Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s
application to the appropriate court for attorneys’ fees up to and including
the amount of six hundred thousand dollars ($600,000) and expenses not to
exceed fifty-two thousand dollars ($52,000). The Parties acknowledge that
the Court may award less than the amount requested but that such lesser
award will not invalidate this Settlement.” The agreement also required
payment for $100,000 in educational advertising, up to $75,000 in settlement
administration costs, and $1,000 each for the nine class representatives.
      The agreement further provided: “Once the Settlement becomes Final
. . . , the Settlement Fund will be distributed within fifteen (15) days to the
Class Members who timely filed claim forms . . . . In addition, the payments

                                        5
to the individuals identified above for their awarded class representative
payments and to Plaintiffs’ Counsel for their awarded attorneys’ fees and
costs will be made within fifteen (15) business days after the Settlement
becomes Final. Once the Settling Defendant wires the funds [to the QSF],
the Action shall be dismissed with prejudice.” Moreover, “upon the
Settlement becoming Final, each Class Member shall release each Defendant
and their Related Parties from any Claims that were brought, or could have
been brought, arising out of or relating to the facts alleged in this Action.”
      The agreement defined the term “Final” as follows: “‘Final’ means if no
objections are filed, the Settlement will become ‘Final’ upon final approval by
the Court. If objection(s) are filed, the Settlement will become ‘Final’ either
(i) after the applicable date for seeking appellate review of the Court’s final
approval of the Settlement has passed without a timely appeal or request for
review having been made; or (ii) if a timely appeal is filed, the final resolution
of that appeal (including any requests for rehearing and/or petitions for writ
of certiorari) resulting in the final judicial approval of the Settlement.”
      The settlement agreement also detailed the process for final approval,
including the manner of class notice and the filing of class member objections
to the proposed settlement. The agreement provided: “Settling Defendant
will select the Settlement Administrator, subject to the reasonable approval
of Plaintiffs’ Counsel. The parties have agreed to the appointment of
Settlement Services, Inc., an experienced administrator, to administer the
claims process.”
      The settlement agreement included an arbitration clause providing
that “any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to this
Settlement Agreement (including its meaning and effect) shall first be
submitted to and decided by confidential arbitration,” with the arbitrator’s

                                         6
decision subject to the court’s review and approval. The settlement
agreement further stated: “Each of the Parties expressly understands and
agrees that this Settlement Agreement may not be amended, modified in any
respect, or waived, except by a writing duly executed by each of the settling
Parties or their duly authorized representatives.”

    II.      Court Approval of the Settlement
          On October 15, 2015, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for
preliminary approval of the class action settlement, which included the
proposed class notice. No opposition was filed by defendants.
          On January 5, 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement
agreement and enter judgment pursuant to section 664.6,4 because
defendants had failed to provide a class list to the settlement administrator
within 15 days of the court’s preliminary approval of the settlement, as
required by the settlement agreement. On April 25, 2016, the trial court
granted plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement, finding
defendants had “failed to comply with their obligations under the settlement,
and an enforcement order [was] appropriate.” However, the court found that
plaintiffs’ request to enter judgment as part of the motion to enforce the

4     Section 664.6 provides: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a
writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally
before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon
motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If
requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to
enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the
settlement.” (§ 664.6, subd. (a).) The parties stipulated in the settlement
agreement that the court would retain jurisdiction until the request for
dismissal had been filed and the settlement agreement had been fully
performed.

                                           7
settlement was premature, citing California Rules of Court, rule 3.769(h).5
The trial court then ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding a
schedule of ordered events leading to the final approval hearing.
      On May 15, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement
agreement and enter judgment against defendants pursuant to section 664.6,
based on (1) defendants’ misrepresentation that they had set aside funds to
pay the settlement, and (2) defendants’ refusal to pay the claims
administrator the fee to mail out the notice, claim form, and other court-
approved materials as required by the settlement agreement.6 The trial
court deferred a ruling on plaintiffs’ motion pending its final approval
hearing. The parties were ordered to meet and confer regarding payment to
the administrator and to submit proposed deadlines for producing the class
list to the administrator and class counsel.
      On September 18, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion to modify the order
granting preliminary approval of the settlement agreement based on
defendants’ failure to provide a class list and pay the claims administrator,
and their alleged misrepresentations that they had funds to pay the
settlement. Plaintiffs asked the court to substitute class counsel as the
settlement administrator in the place of Settlement Services, Inc., the
agreed-upon administrator. In opposition, defendants contended that the
trial court did not have the authority to rewrite the settlement agreement to

5     California Rules of Court, rule 8.769(h) provides, in pertinent part: “If
the court approves the settlement agreement after the final approval hearing,
the court must make and enter judgment.”

6      The settlement agreement obligates the Settling Defendant to “pay all
costs of administering the Settlement up to a maximum of seventy-five
thousand dollars ($75,000).”

                                       8
change the administrator and that appointing class counsel as the
administrator would create a conflict of interest.
      On January 8, 2019, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion. 7 In a
written ruling, the court stated, “Given the events that have transpired in
this litigation since the Court entered preliminary approval over three years
ago, it is appropriate for the Court, in the interests of fulfilling its fiduciary
obligation, to permit modification of the settlement agreement to provide
Plaintiffs as the settlement administrators.” The court further stated that
the substitution of class counsel for Settlement Services, Inc. as the
settlement administrator “would not affect a material term of the
settlement.” The court explained that a settlement administrator, “while
having an important role in class settlements generally, fulfills what is
essentially a ministerial (and limited) duty.” The court further found no
conflict of interest would arise from class counsel serving in this dual role.
      The court substituted class counsel as the settlement administrator,
and based on defendants’ representation of an inability to pay, ordered
plaintiffs to pay the costs of serving the class notice and claim forms (with the
right to claim such costs following final judgment). The court noted that
requiring defendants to serve notice would “frustrate efforts in moving the
case towards final approval.” In addition, class counsel was ordered to
include a statement in a modified class notice that it was fulfilling dual roles
as class counsel and claims administrator. The court then set forth a
calendar of events necessary to effectuate final approval of the settlement
agreement.

7     The hearing on the motion was held on November 14, 2018, with no
court reporter present.

                                          9
      On October 23, 2019, plaintiffs’ counsel represented to the trial court
that it had received the class list and on November 12, 2019, provided notice
to the class. The class notice described the settlement terms and included the
proposed attorney fee award for class counsel, a schedule for final approval,
and the procedure for making objections. The final approval hearing was set
for March 24, 2020. The notice stated that class counsel “may receive up to
$652,000 for their attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of costs. Payment of
attorneys’ fees [and] costs . . . are paid in addition to and will not affect the
benefits provided to the Class.” Class counsel’s dual role as settlement
administrator was disclosed. Written objections were due no later than
February 20, 2020.
      Defendants filed objections to the class action settlement contending
(1) the settlement agreement was unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate
because class members would receive nothing from defendants who could not
fund the settlement; (2) the $600,000 award of attorney fees was
unconscionable because plaintiffs’ counsel had recovered nothing for the class
members; and (3) the class notice of the settlement was misleading because it
misrepresented that defendants were solvent.
      On March 6, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for final approval of the
settlement agreement, attorney fees and costs, administration costs, and
incentive payments to the class representatives. Despite the class notice
listing March 24, 2020, as the date for the final approval hearing, the trial
court subsequently continued the hearing to April 23, 2020, and then to July
21, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.8

8     Defendants filed memoranda purporting to “forward” class members
Brian Oxman’s and Yuri Guzman’s objections to the class action settlement
and attorney fee request. Defendants explained that Oxman and Guzman
were prevented from filing their objections directly with the trial court, as the

                                        10
        At the July 21, 2020 hearing, objectors Oxman and Guzman were heard
and counsel argued the motion for final approval.9 On August 17, 2020, the
trial court granted final approval of the settlement agreement, determining
that the settlement was fair and reasonable and benefitted the class. The
court awarded plaintiffs $600,000 in attorney fees, $52,000 in costs, and
$75,000 in administration costs. Furthermore, the court awarded $9,000 in
incentive payments, with $1,000 going to each of the nine class
representatives. All objections were overruled. Plaintiffs were ordered to
prepare and lodge a proposed judgment.10

     III.   Judgment and Petition to Compel Arbitration
        On September 21, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of judgment
requesting the trial court enter judgment against all 15 named defendants,
jointly and severally, based on (1) defendants’ breaches of the settlement

class notice specified they do, due to a prohibitive $1,435 filing fee. These
memoranda collectively asserted that (1) the class notice requiring an
objection to be filed with the trial court violated the settlement agreement; (2)
the class notice misrepresented the facts of the settlement; (3) class counsel
had not set up a website in English and Spanish where class members could
opt out, as required by the settlement agreement; (4) class counsel failed to
send out the 15-day follow-up class notice required by the agreement; (5)
class members failed to receive notice of the final approval hearing date, as it
was twice continued; (6) any new notice would confuse and mislead potential
class members; and (7) the class notice was “false” in that it suggested
defendants had the ability to pay out claims, when they did not.

9       No court reporter was present for the July 21, 2020 hearing.

10     Defendants appealed from the order granting final approval, but we
dismissed the appeal because it was from a non-appealable interlocutory
order.

                                       11
agreement; (2) defendants’ fraud perpetrated on the court through the misuse
of a client trust account, which was intended to fund the settlement; (3) the
repeated representations to the court that Top Surgeons and Surgery Center
Management had no money to fund the settlement; and (4) Top Surgeons’
and Surgery Center Management’s status as the alter egos of the other
defendants.
      On October 9, 2020, defendants Surgery Center Management, Top
Surgeons, and Michael and Cindy Omidi filed a petition to compel arbitration
pursuant to the settlement agreement.11 In the petition, defendants
contended that plaintiffs’ request to enter judgment against all 15 defendants
was subject to the arbitration clause in the settlement agreement, because
entering judgment against all defendants would materially alter the
agreement between the parties. Defendant Julian Omidi joined in the
petition to compel arbitration.
      On October 23, 2020, the trial court found that on “the face of the
settlement, and from a purely procedural standpoint, judgment may only be
entered at this time as to Top Surgeons, LLC and Surgery Center
Management, LLC as, respectively, the Settling Defendant and the
Guarantying Defendant (i.e., in conformance with the terms of the
settlement).” The court therefore took plaintiffs’ motion for entry of judgment
against all defendants off-calendar and entered judgment against Top
Surgeons and Surgery Center Management only. The court then treated the

11     On the same day, these defendants filed a demand for arbitration,
which was nearly identical to their petition to compel arbitration. Aside from
mentioning both filings, defendants do not distinguish between the demand
for arbitration and petition to compel arbitration. For ease of reference, we
will treat both filings as one petition to compel arbitration (as it appears the
trial court did as well).

                                      12
motion for entry of judgment as a motion to amend the judgment to add all
other defendants as judgment debtors, ordered plaintiffs to serve the
amended motion on defendants, and invited defendants to supplement their
oppositions. The court took the petition to compel arbitration off-calendar as
moot.
        That same day, the trial court signed the judgment prepared by
plaintiffs. The names of all defendants except Top Surgeons and Surgery
Center Management were blacked out in the caption. However, paragraph 7
of the judgment listed all 15 named defendants and directed them, “jointly
and severally, to pay the settlement sum of $1,363,000” within 15 days to the
claim administrator. The administrator would in turn distribute all funds to
the class members, attorneys, and the class representatives within 30
calendar days after receipt of the settlement funds. The judgment ordered
the release of any claims against defendants “[u]pon satisfaction of all
payments and obligations under the Settlement Agreement and under this
Order.”
        Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the October 23, 2020 judgment
and the “order denying [the] petition to compel arbitration.”

     IV.   Corrected Judgment
        While the appeal was pending, on March 19, 2021, this court directed
the trial court to consider whether to exercise its authority under section 473,
subdivision (d),12 to correct the October 23, 2020 judgment nunc pro tunc by
striking the names of the defendants against whom it did not intend to enter

12    Section 473, subdivision (d) provides, “The court may, upon motion of
the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment
or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed[.]”

                                       13
judgment, and thereby conform the judgment to its intent as set forth in its
October 23, 2020 minute order.
      On March 30, 2021, the trial court issued an order stating that “its
intent, consistent with its October 23, 2020 minute order, was to enter
judgment against Defendants Top Surgeons, LLC and Surgery Center
Management, LLC only.” Moreover, the trial court “intended to treat the
Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of judgment as a motion to amend the judgment to
add all other Defendants. Given the Defendants’ October 29, 2020 appeal of
the judgment, the [trial] court did not rule on the motion to amend the
judgment.” Therefore, the trial court, on its own motion, corrected its clerical
mistake in the October 23, 2020 judgment to conform to the minute order.
The court ordered “Top Surgeons, LLC and Surgery Center Management,
LLC, jointly and severally, to pay the settlement sum of $1,363,000 within
fifteen (15) days.” On April 22, 2021, the day this court lifted the stay on the
appeal, defendants filed a notice of appeal from the March 30, 2021 order
correcting the October 23, 2020 judgment.
      We granted defendants’ motion to consolidate the two appeals, and
subsequently invited briefing from the parties on standing, waiver, forfeiture,
and nonappealability issues. On November 23, 2022, the parties submitted
their respective letter briefs.
      At oral argument on January 12, 2023, plaintiffs’ counsel informed this
court that Top Surgeons’ corporate charter had been suspended by the
California Secretary of State on August 2, 2021, after the filing of Top
Surgeons’ notice of appeal but prior to the filing of its opening brief.
Plaintiffs’ counsel argued a corporation must be in good standing to defend
and participate in an appeal. (See Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris
Cerullo World Evangelism (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1215.) On January 17,

                                        14
2023, plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice of a copy of the Certificate of
Status from the Secretary of State for Top Surgeons, evidencing that its
corporate status was suspended by the California Franchise Tax Board. On
January 25, 2023, Top Surgeons filed a motion for a 30-day continuance to
effect revivor of its corporate charter, which this court granted on January
31, 2023. On March 2, 2023, Top Surgeons filed a copy of the Certificate of
Revivor evidencing Top Surgeons “was relieved of suspension or forfeiture
and is now in good standing with the Franchise Tax Board.” Because Top
Surgeons is now a corporation in good standing, it may participate and
defend in this action. (Ibid.)

                                  DISCUSSION13
     I.      Appealability and Standing
          As demonstrated by even our abbreviated recitation of the procedural
history, the trial court proceedings were convoluted and remained so even
after the court “enter[ed] final judgment in this case in accordance with the
terms of the Settlement Agreement” on October 23, 2020. To summarize, in
its October 23, 2020 minute order, the trial court stated it was entering
judgment against Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management only. It
noted that the settlement agreement defined the “Settling Defendant” as Top

13     Plaintiffs contend the lack of reporter’s transcripts is fatal to the
appeal. We disagree. Plaintiffs fail to identify any statement made by the
trial court, argument made by counsel, or additional evidence introduced at
any hearing that would be necessary for meaningful review. (See Bel Air
Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 933 [no reporter’s
transcript required because respondent did not “identify any particular
matter addressed at the hearing that [the] court must consider to decide the
appeal”].)

                                          15
Surgeons and the “Guarantying Defendant” as Surgery Center Management,
with all the other defendants falling into the category of “Dismissed
Defendants.” However, the actual October 23, 2020 judgment entered by the
trial court mistakenly included all the named defendants as being jointly and
severally liable for the damages. The court corrected the clerical error on
March 30, 2021. Only Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management are
subject to the corrected judgment and ordered to “jointly and severally . . .
pay the settlement sum of $1,363,000 within fifteen (15) days.” The
judgment, as corrected, does not purport to impose any liability on
defendants other than Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management.

      A. Appealability
            1. The Judgment is Appealable
      The question arises whether the judgment14 is appealable despite the
fact that the “Dismissed Defendants” currently remain as parties to the
action, with Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the judgment to add them as
judgment debtors still pending before the trial court. “The existence of an
appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal.” (Doran v.
Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292 (Doran).) Subject to some
exceptions, “if further judicial action is required for a final determination of
the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory [and] will not be
appealable.” (Id. at p. 1293.)
      Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200 (Viejo), is
instructive. In Viejo, as here, the defendant appealed from a judgment

14     We refer to both the October 23, 2020 judgment and March 30, 2021
nunc pro tunc order clarifying the judgment as the “judgment.” For purposes
of the issues raised on appeal, the parties do not distinguish between the two.

                                        16
purporting to enforce a settlement agreement pursuant to section 664.6. (217
Cal.App.3d at p. 203.) The appellate court considered the issue whether “the
judgment, which was entered in the still pending new action, is appealable
even though it does not finally conclude the new action.” (Id. at p. 205.) The
court held that it was appealable, where the trial court intended to effect a
final judgment, even if collateral matters remained to be addressed. (Viejo,
at p. 205; see § 904.1, subd. (a).)
      Here, the court clearly intended to enforce the settlement agreement,
stating it was “enter[ing] final judgment in this case in accordance with the
terms of the Settlement Agreement.” Under that agreement, only Top
Surgeons and Surgery Center Management bore liability and the remaining
defendants were “Dismissed Defendants” who were to be dismissed from the
suit. Because the judgment was intended to resolve the case as to all parties,
it was appealable.
      The fact that plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the judgment to add the
Dismissed Defendants as judgment debtors did not affect the appealability of
the underlying judgment. Any post-judgment order by the trial court on
plaintiffs’ motion to amend the judgment to add judgment debtors would be
separately appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (b). (Viejo, supra, 217
Cal.App.3d at p. 205; see Misik v. D'Arco (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1071
[postjudgment order denying motion to amend the judgment to add judgment
debtor as an alter ego is an order separately appealable from the original
judgment].)

                                      17
            2. Defendants May Appeal from the Order Substituting Plaintiffs’
               Counsel as Claims Administrator

      Plaintiffs challenge the appealability of the trial court’s determination,
as part of its January 8, 2019 order granting plaintiffs’ motion to modify the
order granting preliminary approval, that plaintiffs’ counsel would be
substituted as claims administrator. Plaintiffs contend this order was not
identified in the notice of appeal from the October 23, 2020 judgment, and in
any event, any appeal of the order is untimely.
      We liberally construe the notice of appeal as including the order
substituting class counsel as the settlement administrator. That order was a
nonappealable interlocutory order, and therefore defendants could only
challenge it upon judgment being entered. (Doran, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1292–1293 [“‘interlocutory or interim orders are not appealable, but are
only “reviewable on appeal” from the final judgment’”]; Viejo, supra, 217
Cal.App.3d at p. 205; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) Plaintiffs fail
to cite any legal authority to the contrary. We therefore address in section
II.D below the merits of the argument as to the substitution of the claims
administrator.

            3. The Order Taking the Petition to Compel Arbitration Off-
               Calendar as Moot is not Appealable

      Defendants Michael, Cindy and Julian Omidi contend that the trial
court committed reversible error by denying their petition to compel
arbitration. Their request for arbitration centered on plaintiffs’ request to
enter judgment against all 15 named defendants, which defendants
contended would materially alter the agreement between the parties.
However, the trial court did not deny the petition to compel arbitration; it

                                       18
placed it off calendar as moot since it was entering judgment only against
Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management.
      A postjudgment order placing a motion off calendar is not appealable.
(See Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651–652 [to
be appealable, a postjudgment order “‘must either affect the judgment or
relate to it by enforcing it or staying its execution’”]; M. G. Chamberlain &
Co. v. Simpson (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 263, 281 & fn. 1 [concluding order
made after entry of judgment and placing motion off calendar is
nonappealable]; see also Barnes v. Litton Systems, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th
681, 685 [“an essential element of an appealable postjudgment order is one
which is not preliminary to later proceedings”]; R & A Vending Services, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1188, 1193–1194 [off calendar
“‘is not synonymous with “dismissal”’” and “‘merely means a
postponement’”].)
      Defendants rely on American Advertising & Sales Co. v. Mid-Western
Transport (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 875, in which the court deemed an order
taking a motion for leave to file an amended complaint off calendar to be a
denial of the motion. (Id. at p. 877, fn. 1.) However, the order in that case
was “in effect a final determination of plaintiff’s rights.” (Ibid.) The order
before us simply cannot be deemed a final determination. Rather, the court
took the petition to compel arbitration off calendar as moot because it was
filed solely in response to plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the judgment against
all the defendants, which was taken off-calendar. Thus, there was no final
determination of defendants’ rights. We therefore lack jurisdiction to
entertain the merits of this nonappealable order. (See Walker v. Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 21 [“a
reviewing court lacks jurisdiction on direct appeal in the absence of an

                                       19
appealable order or judgment”]; accord, Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.)15

      B. Standing
            1.    Only Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management Have
                  Standing to Appeal from the Judgment

      Plaintiffs contend Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management are
the only two defendants who have standing to challenge the judgment. We
agree.
      The rule of appellate standing is codified in section 902, which
provides, “[a]ny party aggrieved” may appeal a judgment. (See Hernandez v.
Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 263; accord, Eck v. City of
Los Angeles (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 141, 145.) A party is aggrieved if its
“rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment.” (County of
Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 (Carleson); accord In re K.C.
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236.) The injury “‘“must be immediate, pecuniary, and
substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.”’”
(Carleson, supra, at p. 737.) The standing requirement is jurisdictional.
(Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947.)
      As noted above, while the original October 23, 2020 judgment entered
by the trial court appeared to include all 15 named defendants as jointly and
severally liable judgment debtors, the March 30, 2021 order corrected this
clerical error. In the final, corrected judgment, only Top Surgeons and
Surgery Center Management are subject to the order to “jointly and severally

15   Top Surgeons’ request for judicial notice of the patient arbitration
agreements contained in the record of a related appeal (Faitro v. Top
Surgeons, Inc. (Mar. 14, 2017, B241353) [nonpub. opn.]) is denied.

                                      20
. . . pay the settlement sum of $1,363,000 within fifteen (15) days.” The
judgment, as corrected, does not purport to affect the rights of any defendants
besides Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management. Therefore, only Top
Surgeons and Surgery Center Management have standing to appeal from
that judgment, and we do not consider the claims of the remaining
defendants purportedly arising out of the judgment.

            2.     Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management Lack
                   Standing to Raise Issues on Behalf of Class Members

      Although Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management are proper
parties to the appeal, they may only raise issues that have directly affected
them and caused them injury. (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 737.) They
lack standing to raise any issues on behalf of others. (See Six4Three, LLC v.
Facebook, Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 109, 115 [“‘a would-be appellant “lacks
standing to raise issues affecting another person’s interests”’”]; In re K.C.,
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 236.) Most of their claims on appeal concern alleged
breaches of the settlement agreement that would affect only class members,
not defendants. Falling within this category are their contentions that (1)
the settlement administrator failed, in violation of the settlement agreement,
to set up a Spanish and English website where class members could submit
claims forms if they chose not to do so by mail; (2) the settlement
administrator failed to serve 15-day follow-up notices to class members after
sending the original notice; (3) the class notice was deficient in that it
required class members to file an objection with the trial court, thereby
incurring a $1,435 filing fee; (4) the class notice misrepresented that Top

                                        21
Surgeons would be able to fund the settlement;16 (5) the requirement that
unnamed class members file objections to the proposed settlement and
request for attorney fees before class counsel had filed their motion for final
approval was a violation of due process; and (6) the failure to provide
unnamed class members with notice of the continuance of the final approval
hearing also violated their due process rights. Top Surgeons and Surgery
Center Management fail to allege how they, as opposed to the class members,
were injured by any of these purported violations.17 Thus, defendants have
no standing to raise those arguments on appeal.

16     Even if they had standing to make these arguments, any alleged
deficiencies in the class notice were not raised in the trial court and are
therefore forfeited on appeal. In filing the motion for preliminary approval of
the class action settlement, plaintiffs included the class notice for approval.
Defendants did not file an objection raising any error with the notice prior to
the trial court granting the motion. Accordingly, defendants forfeited this
argument on appeal, and we decline to review it. (See Bikkina v. Mahadevan
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 70, 92.) Even if defendants made these objections at
the preliminary approval hearing, defendants provide us with no reporter’s
transcript or suitable substitute that would document the proceedings. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 8.130, 8.134, 8.137.)

17     Defendants contend they have standing to assert claims on behalf of
unnamed class members because “[e]ach [c]lass [m]ember is a patient of
[d]efendants, and the relationship between them is a fiduciary relationship of
a physician or health care provider and patient.” This contention is
preposterous given that defendants and the unnamed class members (along
with the class representatives) are on opposite sides of this adversarial
proceeding.
       We note that in the context of class actions, unnamed class members
are not “parties” pursuant to section 902. (Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co.
(1942) 20 Cal.2d 199, 201 (Eggert).) Therefore, unnamed class members “may
not appeal a class judgment, settlement, or attorney fees award unless they
intervene in the action.” (Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc., supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 263.) A class member who wishes to challenge a judgment
pursuant to settlement on appeal must have become a party of record in the

                                       22
   II.        Defendants’ Contentions that the Trial Court “Rewrote” the
              Settlement Agreement in its Judgment

         A.     Relevant Legal Standards
         “If the court approves the settlement agreement after the final approval
hearing, the court must make and enter judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.769(h).) The trial court’s power to enter judgment after approval of a class
action settlement derives from section 664.6, which provides that where the
parties so stipulate, the trial court may enter judgment pursuant to the
terms of a settlement. (§ 664.6; Reed v. United Teachers Los Angeles (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 322, 341–342.) Section 664.6 affords a trial court the
authority to streamline the process for enforcing a settlement agreement
without the need for a new lawsuit. (Hernandez v. Board of Education (2004)
126 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1175–1176 (Hernandez).) A judgment entered
pursuant to section 664.6 should reflect all the material terms of settlement
so as not to “defeat the purposes of the settlement and spawn further
litigation.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1185.)
         The court “may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter
the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment.” (Weddington
Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 (Weddington).) The
trial court may not “create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to
deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.”
(Ibid., italics added and omitted; Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
779, 790; Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 724, 732; Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360;

trial court, either by formally intervening in the class action or by filing a
motion to vacate the judgment. (Eggert, at p. 201.) Here, no unnamed class
member became a party of record in the trial court.

                                          23
Hernandez, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 [“[t]he court is powerless to
impose on the parties more restrictive or less restrictive or different terms
than those contained in their settlement agreement”].) A material term is
one that is not a “minor, immaterial or separatable issue.” (Weddington, at p.
815.)
        “A trial court’s factual findings on a motion to enforce a settlement
pursuant to section 664.6 are subject to limited appellate review and will not
be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.” (Machado v. Myers,
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 790–791; Weddington, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at
p. 815.) However, legal questions, including whether the granting of a
motion satisfied the requirements of section 664.6, are reviewed de novo.
(Machado v. Myers, at p. 791; Weddington, at p. 815.) We review de novo
whether the trial court’s judgment altered material terms of the settlement
agreement.

        B.    The Judgment Altered the Payment Obligations and Payment
              Timetable Agreed to by the Parties

        Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management correctly contend the
trial court changed material terms of the settlement agreement in the
judgment by (1) holding Surgery Center Management jointly and severally
liable instead of as a guarantor, and (2) altering the timeline for the
settlement payment.
        “Whenever an appellate court may make a final determination of the
rights of the parties from the record on appeal, it may, in order to avoid
subjecting the parties to any further delay or expense, modify the judgment
and affirm it, rather than remand for a new determination. [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (AB Cellular LA, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 150

                                         24
Cal.App.4th 747, 767; see § 906 [“Upon an appeal pursuant to Section 904.1
or 904.2, the reviewing court may review the verdict or decision . . . and may
affirm, reverse or modify any judgment or order appealed from and may
direct the proper judgment or order to be entered” (italics added)]; see e.g.,
Shapiro v. Clark (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1150 [modifying judgment and
affirming it as modified “[i]n the interest of judicial economy” and to avoid
“further delay in this matter” and “another appeal”].) As discussed below, we
modify the judgment in several respects to conform to the parties’ agreement.
      Surgery Center Management contends the trial court impermissibly
altered its financial obligation under the settlement agreement in paragraph
7 of the judgment by ordering that Top Surgeons and Surgery Center
Management be jointly and severally liable for the settlement payment.
Under the settlement agreement, as the “Guarantying Defendant,” Surgery
Center Management is only obligated to assume financial responsibility if it
receives notice that Top Surgeons as the “Settling Defendant” “cannot or does
not transfer payment of the Settlement Funds as set forth in [the] Settlement
Agreement.” However, paragraph 7 of the judgment, as corrected nunc pro
tunc by the trial court, orders “Top Surgeons, LLC and Surgery Center
Management, LLC, jointly and severally, to pay the settlement sum of
$1,363,000 within fifteen (15) days.” (Italics added.) We agree with Surgery
Center Management that the change was material.
      Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management also contend the trial
court shortened the deadline for payment of the settlement funds. The
settlement agreement provides for the payment to be made once the
settlement was “final,” which term is defined to mean after the resolution of a
timely filed appeal resulting in the “final judicial approval of the Settlement.”

                                        25
The judgment, however, orders payment to be made “within fifteen (15) days
of entry of this Order.” We also deem this difference to be material.
      We thus modify the judgment to make the financial obligations and
payment deadlines consistent with those agreed to by the parties. Paragraph
7 of the judgment is modified to state as follows: “The Court directs
defendant Top Surgeons to pay to the settlement administrator, Robertson &
Associates, LLP the settlement sum of $1,336,000 within 15 days of the
remittitur issuing in the appeal No. B307742. If Top Surgeons fails to timely
make such payment, within seven calendar days of receiving notice of such
non-payment, Surgery Center Management will be responsible for such
payment.” In so modifying the judgment, we correct an obvious clerical error
in paragraph 7 of the judgment that listed a total judgment amount of
$1,363,000 instead of the correct total of $1,336,000. 18 (See Campbell v.
Southern Pacific Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 51, 62–63 [correcting on appeal a
clerical error as to judgment amount].)

      C.    The Judgment Did Not Materially Alter the Parties’ Agreed Terms
            Regarding Dismissal and Releases

      Surgery Center Management contends that in its judgment, the trial
court should have dismissed it as a defendant, notwithstanding its obligation
as a Guarantying Defendant. Surgery Center Management correctly points
out that the settlement agreement lists it among the “Dismissed Defendants”
that include the remaining defendants other than Top Surgeons. The
settlement agreement states, “It is affirmed and acknowledged that the

18    The individual components of the total monetary judgment set forth in
subparagraphs (a) through (f) of paragraph 7 of the judgment total
$1,336,000.

                                      26
Dismissed Defendants make no monetary contribution or payment toward
settlement and are not apportioned any fault in connection with the Claims
and causes of action and are hereby dismissed for waivers of costs, attorneys’
fees and claims for malicious prosecution.” As plaintiffs contend, however, it
would be absurd to dismiss Surgery Center Management as a defendant
when it has not yet fulfilled obligations it may have as the Guarantying
Defendant. As the sole Guarantying Defendant, it is financially responsible
to pay the settlement amount if Top Surgeons does not timely satisfy the
obligation. Yet under the settlement agreement, “Dismissed Defendants
make no monetary contribution or payment toward settlement.” Those two
provisions cannot be reconciled if Surgery Center Management was
intentionally included among the Dismissed Defendants. It is quite apparent
that Surgery Center Management’s inclusion in the long list of Dismissed
Defendants was inadvertent and erroneous. (See McNeil v. Graner (1949) 91
Cal.App.2d 858, 863 [“‘Where it is clear that a word or term has been used
inadvertently, and it is clearly inconsistent with, and repugnant to, the
meaning of the parties, it will be rejected altogether’”].) Rather, the parties
plainly intended for Surgery Center Management to remain a party to the
case pending its performance of its potential payment obligations under the
agreement. Accordingly, we find no error in the judgment’s failure to dismiss
Surgery Center Management.
      Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management also contend the
judgment materially altered the timing of the release of claims against them.
The settlement agreement provides for such a release when the settlement
becomes final (defined to mean after the appellate process has completed).
On the other hand, the judgment provides for a release of claims “[u]pon
satisfaction of all payments and obligations under the Settlement Agreement

                                       27
and under this Order.” We conclude the difference is not material. Once the
appellate process is final, Top Surgeons (and then potentially Surgery Center
Management) is obligated to make the agreed-to settlement payment. It
would be nonsensical to release either defendant prior to their performance of
the main obligations under the settlement agreement, and the parties did not
set forth in the agreement any intention to release Top Surgeons and Surgery
Center Management from any claims or liability prior to their fulfilling their
obligations.

      D.       The Substitution of Class Counsel as Settlement Administrator
               Was Not a Material Change

      Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management argue that the trial
court improperly rewrote the settlement agreement by substituting plaintiffs’
counsel for Settlement Services, Inc., as claims administrator. The
agreement provided: “Settling Defendant will select the Settlement
Administrator, subject to the reasonable approval of Plaintiffs’ Counsel. The
parties have agreed to the appointment of Settlement Services, Inc., an
experienced administrator, to administer the claims process.” Under the
agreement, defendants were required to provide a class list to Settlement
Services, Inc. and to pay the administrator. For more than four years,
defendants failed to meet these obligations. Plaintiffs finally filed a motion to
modify the order granting preliminary approval of the settlement agreement
in which they requested, in part, that the trial court substitute class counsel
as the settlement administrator. In granting the motion, the court noted its
fiduciary duty to effectuate the settlement agreement. The court found that
the substitution of plaintiffs’ counsel for Settlement Services, Inc. as the
settlement administrator “would not affect a material term of the settlement”

                                        28
given that the administrator “fulfills what is essentially a ministerial (and
limited) duty.” The court further found no conflict of interest if class counsel
also served as the administrator. Top Surgeons and Surgery Center
Management challenge the court’s authority to modify this term of the
settlement agreement.
      Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management cite In re Black
Farmers Discrimination Litigation (D.D.C. 2013) 950 F.Supp.2d 196 for the
proposition that trial courts cannot change the agreed upon settlement
administrator. The case stands for no such thing. Rather, the district court
merely held that the plaintiffs in that class action failed to meet their burden
to show “‘a significant change either in factual conditions or in law’” that
warranted revision of the settlement administrator’s review process for
claims. (Id. at p. 200.)
      Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management also argue the
settlement administrator must be a neutral party, relying on Sample v.
Centurylink Communications, LLC (Sample), an unreported federal district
court case from Arizona, in which the court found “unreviewability”
provisions allowing settlement administrators ultimate authority to
determine which claims are valid “have consistently been enforced so long as
the claims administrator is neutral and independent.” (2018 WL 3997484, at
p. *5.) This case is not on point. Unlike in Sample, there is no provision in
the settlement agreement providing for any type of claims review process by
the settlement administrator, let alone one that prohibits a claimant from
seeking appellate review, thereby requiring a “neutral and independent”
administrator. Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management fail to cite
any authority, and we are aware of none, requiring that a settlement

                                       29
administrator be a neutral party or prohibiting class counsel from fulfilling
this role.
        Further, Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management make no
effort to demonstrate that the identity of the class administrator was a
material term here, or that this modification affected any of the material
terms of the settlement agreement. They do not contest that the
administrator fulfills only a ministerial duty. They fail to make any
argument that substituting class counsel as the settlement administrator
was prejudicial to them in any way. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Century
Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 [“we cannot presume
prejudice and will not reverse the judgment in the absence of an affirmative
showing there was a miscarriage of justice”].) We conclude the trial court did
not err in making this minor modification to the settlement agreement
necessitated by defendants’ dilatory conduct.19

     III.    Attorney Fees
        Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management contend the attorney
fee award of $600,000 as provided for in the settlement agreement was
unreasonable. We disagree.
        The settlement agreement included a “clear sailing” provision, which is
typical in class action settlements. (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 545, 553 (Consumer Privacy).) Class counsel agreed to petition

19     At oral argument, defendants argued that the trial court failed to
define the settlement class in the judgment as required by Civil Code section
1781, subdivision (g) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.771. This issue is
forfeited on appeal as it was raised for the first time in defendants’ reply
briefs. (See Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052,
1066.)

                                       30
for an attorney fee award that would not exceed a fixed amount (here,
$600,000), and the defendants agreed not to oppose the fee petition. A clear
sailing provision allows the parties to establish the outer limits of a
defendant’s liability for fees, with the defendant agreeing not to oppose a fee
application within a defined range, “without conceding the propriety of any
particular amount.” (Consumer Privacy, at p. 559; see 4 Newberg and
Rubenstein on Class Actions, Class Actions in State Courts, Preliminary
Approval (6th ed. 2022) § 13:9.) While the propriety of clear sailing
agreements has been debated, “‘[t]o the extent it facilitates completion of
settlements, this practice should not be discouraged.’” (Id. at p. 553, quoting
4 Newberg et al., on Class Actions, supra, § 15:34, p. 112, fn. omitted.)
      Given that defendants explicitly agreed in the settlement agreement
not to challenge any attorney fee award up to $600,000, it appears they
expressly waived any claim that the $600,000 fee award was excessive. Even
if they did not waive the claim, it fails on the merits.
      In challenging the reasonableness of the attorney fee award, Top
Surgeons and Surgery Center Management argue that the trial court failed
to apply a “heightened scrutiny” as outlined by the Ninth Circuit in In re
Bluetooth Headset Products Liability (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 935 (Bluetooth).
The Ninth Circuit held that trial courts have a heightened duty to examine
clear sailing provisions carefully and to “scrutinize closely the relationship
between attorneys’ fees and benefit to the class, being careful to avoid
awarding ‘unreasonably high’ fees simply because they are uncontested.
[Citation.]” (Bluetooth, supra, 654 F.3d at p. 948.) The approval of the
settlement must be “supported by a clear explanation of why the
disproportionate fee is justified and does not betray the class’s interests.” (Id.
at p. 949.)

                                        31
      No published California decision has held that trial courts must apply
the heightened scrutiny standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit. However,
it is certainly the case that “[b]ecause of the potential for fraud, collusion or
unfairness, thorough judicial review of fee applications is required in all class
action settlements and the fairness of the fees must be assessed
independently of determining the fairness of the substantive settlement
terms.” (Consumer Privacy, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 555.) “A court must
. . . determine the reasonableness of the fee . . . whether or not there is an
objection presented from the class.” (Id. at p. 559; see Garabedian v. Los
Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 125 [court retains
obligation to award only attorney fees that are reasonable despite agreement
of parties that defendant would pay a maximum of $14,125,000].)
      We review an attorney fee award in a class action settlement under an
abuse of discretion standard. (Consumer Privacy, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
p. 556.) “[T]he ‘“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of
professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her]
judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the
appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
      Here, in its written ruling, the trial court noted its obligation to
carefully examine the fees requested given the existence of the clear sailing
provision, and it found no evidence that the parties “colluded in negotiating”
the provision. The court expressly found that the fee award was reasonable
under the circumstances. When the court made its determination, it had
reviewed declarations from plaintiffs’ counsel attesting to their hourly rates
and time spent working on the case. The court acknowledged that the
attorney fee award was “on the high side,” but found the amount of fees
sought was tied to counsel’s actual work and efforts to benefit the class. The

                                        32
court also stated that class members who filed claims could each receive over
$900 each under the settlement agreement, which was a significant amount
in light of the nature of the claims alleged in the case. Because the lodestar
amount ($1,845,465) far exceeded the attorney fees bargained for in the
settlement agreement, the court applied a negative multiplier thereby
reducing the attorney fee award to the $600,000 agreed-upon sum.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court was acutely aware of its
responsibility in assessing the attorney fee request and properly exercised its
discretion in its award.20
                                       //
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20     Top Surgeons and Surgery Center Management also contend the
attorney fee award was unreasonable because they had no funds to pay for
the settlement and therefore class counsel recovered nothing for class
members. They are putting the proverbial cart before the horse. In ruling on
the motion for final approval, the trial court decides solely whether the
settlement agreement, including the attorney fees, is fair and reasonable
under the circumstances. Despite these defendants’ claim they lacked funds
(without proper documentation and any finding by the trial court), their
ability to pay along with the means by which plaintiffs may ultimately
recover the funds owed under the class settlement were not before the court.

                                       33
                                DISPOSITION
      Paragraph 7 of the judgment filed October 23, 2020 is modified as set
forth in section II.B of this opinion. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The trial court shall retain jurisdiction pursuant to section 664.6. The
parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                            STONE, J.*

      We concur:

      COLLINS, Acting P. J.

      CURREY, J.

*
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                       34