Court Opinion

ID: 9854725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:12:45.936155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:19.118702
License: Public Domain

*189BERRY, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with, the majority opinion.
Defendant in error here seeks to recover damages resulting from plaintiff in error’s breach of a contract. The following provisions of 23 O.S.1951, are therefore applicable :
“Sec. 3. Any person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which is called damages.
“Sec. 4. Detriment is a loss or harm suffered in person or property.”
“Sec. 21. For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this chapter, is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom. No damages can be recovered for a breach of contract, which are not clearly ascertainable in both their nature and origin.”
The quoted statutes were cited and applied in St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Freeman, 82 Okl. 6, 198 P. 298, 300, 25 A.L.R. 72, in which case a traveling salesman sought damages resulting from loss of time and travel expenses in recovering a sample trunk that the carrier had undertaken to transport. In speaking of the damages that the traveling salesman was entitled to recover, this was said:
“(2, 3) When the railway company accepted the trunk for transportation under its duty as a common carrier of passengers for hire, knowing that Freeman was a traveling salesman and that this was a trunk containing samples, it knew that, if it did not make immediate delivery of the trunk at its destination at Oklahoma City, W. S. Freeman, as such traveling salesman, would suffer other detriment and loss by reason of its failure to deliver the trunk. The detriment caused by the loss of time because of its failure to deliver the trunk and his inability to exhibit his samples to the trade, his loss of time looking for the trunk and his expenses incurred, were all such losses as would naturally flow from or follow its failure to deliver the trunk. It was such losses as it might anticipate and reasonably expect as a result of its failure to make the delivery.”
We stated in the second paragraph of the syllabus to Eason Oil Co. et al. v. Whiteside, 175 Okl. 254, 52 P.2d 35, that “Where parties have made a contract which one of them has breached, the damages which the other party may receive in respect to such breach of contract are such as may freely and reasonably be considered; either arising naturally, according to the actual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of it.”
This was said at p. 456, Sec. 53, “Damages”, 15 Am.Jur.:
“In addition to general damages, one injured by the breach of a contract to which he is a party is entitled to recover special damages which arise from circumstances peculiar to the particular case, where those circumstances were communicated to, or known by, the other party at the time the contract was made; that is, he may recover such damages as are the reasonable and natural consequences of the breach under the circumstances so disclosed and as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties. * * * ”
In Lewis et al. v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66, damages were sought for breach of a contract to make and timely deliver a trousseau. In speaking of damages allowable for the breach of such a contract, this was said in the first paragraph of the syllabus:
*190“Damages are recoverable for deprivation of intellectual enjoyment and for mental suffering, resulting from the breach of a contract.”
And in the body of the opinion, this was said:
“Although the general rule is that damages are the amount of the loss the creditor has sustained, or of the gain of which he has been deprived, yet there are cases in which damages may be assessed without calculating altogether on the pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary gain, to the party. When the contract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality, or taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification, although these are not appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due for their breach. A contract for a religious or charitable foundation, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for a work of some of the fine arts, are objects and examples of this rule.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
“ * * * In computing the damages the allowance must be restricted to what may reasonably be held to have been within the contemplation of the parties in entering into the contract. The contract was to furnish the dresses in time for the wedding on the 19th. D. H. Holmes must be held to have known that, if the dresses were not finished by that day, the bride would be keenly disappointed. Also that the bride would need the dresses for the festivities incident to her wedding and immediately following, for which it is customary for brides to provide themselves with a trousseau.”
The court of appeals of Alabama held in substance in Browning v. Fies et al., 3 Ala.App. 580, 58 So. 931, that when a person who operated a livery stable contracted with a groom to furnish a team at a specified time for use in carrying the groom and his friends to the groom’s wedding, the groom could recover special damages in the nature of mental anguish for breach of the contract.
In McConnell v. United States Express Co., 179 Mich. 522, 146 N.W. 428, the cases last above cited are cited and quoted from with approval. In the third paragraph of the syllabus to the McConnell case, this was said:
“Where special circumstances have been communicated to a party at the time of making the contract, so it is apparent that a breach will result in special damages, they are recoverable although they would not result ordinarily from failure to perform.”
We recognized in Koons v. Shelburne Motor Co., 167 Okl. 634, 31 P.2d 573, 574, that “the authorities almost unanimously recognize exceptions to the rule that mental suffering is not, ordinarily, an element of damage arising from a breach of a contract” ; that one of said exceptions is where a contract to furnish a wedding trousseau is breached.
As I read the authorities, it is settled law that where a contract is entered into under special circumstances known to both parties, damages for breach of the contract are measured not only by actual loss but also by special damages such as mental anguish where such damages were within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into.
In the instant case, the special circumstances were a formal church wedding. At the wedding the defendant in error, in keeping with custom, planned to wear an appropriate wedding gown, greet the wedding guests, assist in serving the wedding cake, pose for the usual photographs, etc. In brief, she, as the bride, planned to be appropriately attired and do those things which are usually done by a bride at a formal church wedding. It is apparent that her plans were built and centered around an appropriate wedding gown which is the keystone to a formal wedding. The embarrassment and humiliation that she ex*191perienced upon being compelled to appear at the wedding in street attire can readily be appreciated. Her embarrassment and humiliation was heightened by her swollen countenance which resulted from tears that she copiously shed.
At all times, plaintiff in error knew that defendant in error intended to wear the gown that it had contracted to supply at a formal wedding and is charged with knowledge of the customs followed at such weddings. Having such knowledge, plaintiff surely realized that its breach of the contract would disrupt defendant in error’s wedding plans and would cause her the mental anguish and distress that she underwent only because of said breach. Since damages attributable to such distress and anguish were within plaintiff in error’s contemplation and are damages which would likely result from the breach, defendant in error is entitled to recover such damages.
For reasons given, I respectfully dissent.