Court Opinion

ID: 9497129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:44:21.533343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:56.620875
License: Public Domain

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I conclude that the Missouri sexual assault statute, which punishes a person for having “sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he does so without that person’s consent,” Mo. Ann Stat. § 566.040(1) (West 1999), is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(ii) (2002), because it has as an element the use of force: I accept, for purposes of this opinion, the majority opinion’s rule, based upon the rationale in United States v. Houston, 364 F.3d 243 (5th Cir.2004), that “intercourse does not involve the use of force when it- is accompanied by consent-in-fact.” However, I do not accept the majority opinion’s holding that the Missouri sexual assault statute does not require the use of force.
The majority opinion’s holding is based upon its conclusion that a defendant can be convicted under the Missouri sexual assault statute in eases where the victim gave consent-in-fact. This conclusion, based on Houston, necessarily assumes that a victim under the Missouri sexual assault statute can give consent-in-fact. Houston turned on the fact that an underage victim of statutory rape was capable of giving consent-in-fact to the sexual intercourse. In contrast, as explained below, a victim under the Missouri sexual assault statute is, by definition and as a matter of law, unable to give consent-in-fact to sexual intercourse. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.061(5) (West 1999). Therefore, sexual assault under the Missouri statute involves the use of force and is a crime of violence.
Houston holds that a statutory rape victim can give consent-in-fact to sexual intercourse even though the victim cannot give legal consent, and, as a result, that statutory rape is not a crime of violence. See Houston, 364 F.3d at 247. Houston distinguished between legal consent and consent-in-fact based upon the assumption that the victim was able to consciously decide whether or not to engage in sexual intercourse with the defendant, and that the intercourse would be consensual were it not for her age. See id. at 247-48. That is, consent-in-fact only accompanies sexual intercourse in those situations where the parties were able to decide for themselves whether or not they wished to participate.
However, under the Missouri sexual assault statute a victim cannot give consent-*347in-fact because, by definition, the victim is unable to decide whether to participate in the sexual intercourse. In Missouri assent to sexual intercourse is not legal consent in situations where the defendant knew (or it was manifest) that the victim “lacked the mental capacity to authorize” the sexual intercourse or because of certain specified impairments was “unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of’ the sexual activity. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.061(5)(a), (b) (West 1999).
Under the Missouri statutory definition of consent, even though the victim may have demonstrated some physical assent to the sexual intercourse, the victim was “unable to make a reasonable judgment” or “lacked the mental capacity” to do so and thus did not make the mental decision to engage in intercourse.1 Id.. Furthermore, Missouri’s definition of consent requires that the defendant either knew of the impairment in the victim’s cognitive ability or that the condition was “manifest.” Id. If a person is convicted under Missouri’s sexual assault statute, the victim was unable to givé consent-in-fact' and the defendant knew so.2 Such a conviction involves a use, of force. Therefore, I believe that a Missouri sexual assault conviction is a crime of violence for purposes of the 16-level enhancement under § 2L1.2.
I respectfully dissent..

. For example, in normal circumstances a twenty-five year old woman is able to consent to sex. However, under Missouri law, if she is "unable to make a reasonable judgment” due to intoxication, for example, she is unable to consent-in-fact to sexual intercourse.

. The Missouri definition of consent also provides that assent does not constitute legal consent when "[fit is induced by force, duress or deception.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 556.061(5)(c) (West 1999). Even assent procured by means of deception is not consent-in-fact because the defendant deprives the victim of the opportunity to make a mental decision whether or not to participate in the sexual intercourse. The victim is equally unable to give consent-in-fact whether such incapacity is caused by intoxication, mental retardation, or deception.