Court Opinion

ID: 9898543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:24.63939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:19.465705
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         MAY 23, 2023
                                                                In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                               WA State Court of Appeals Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

MARK R. HOFFMAN,                              )
                                              )         No. 38833-6-III
                     Appellant,               )
                                              )
       v.                                     )
                                              )
PROVIDENCE HEALTH &                           )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SERVICES - WASHINGTON, a                      )
Washington State Nonprofit Corporation,       )
dba Providence Medical Group,                 )
                                              )
                     Respondent.              )

       SIDDOWAY, J. — Mark Hoffman, M.D., appeals the summary judgment dismissal

of his lawsuit alleging wrongful termination of his employment by Providence Health &

Services - Washington (Providence). His specific assignments of error are to the

dismissal of his claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, disability

discrimination, and failure to accommodate his disability.

       Dr. Hoffman failed to present evidence that retaliation, or discrimination based on

his allergies, was a substantial factor in Providence management’s decision to terminate

his employment. We affirm.
No. 38833-6-III
Hoffman v. Providence Health & Servs. - Wash.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Because this case was resolved by summary judgment, the facts we recount come

from the declarations, depositions, and documents the parties submitted in connection

with their cross motions for judgment as a matter of law.

       In the beginning of 2020, Therese (Teri) Etherton was working as a practice

manager for Providence in Spokane, overseeing its three urgent care clinics, when

medical providers began closely following developing information on a potential global

pandemic from COVID-19 (coronavirus 2019). By the beginning of February, personnel

at Providence’s urgent care centers were screening and following protocols for patients

who had recently traveled to China or had close contact with persons suspected of having

contracted the virus. On Wednesday, February 5, Ms. Etherton sent an e-mail to staff

advising them that she had updated the travel questions on the workflow Providence had

created for patients. She expressed concern about sending patients away without being

seen and asked personnel to check with her or the charge nurse before taking that step.

       Dr. Mark Hoffman was employed by Providence as a physician at its urgent care

centers, assigned to its Spokane Valley (Valley) clinic. He is a board-certified physician

who has practiced medicine for over 30 years. He was occasionally assigned to work at

Providence’s two other urgent care centers, the North clinic and South clinic. On the

early afternoon of Sunday, February 9, 2020, Dr. Hoffman, having reviewed Ms.

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Etherton’s e-mail from a few days earlier, sent a response to her and staff via “Reply

All.”

        His e-mail began, “I am sorry for being the rust that makes the squeaky wheel.

But I must disagree with this policy.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 298. He recounted his

experience with the 2009 H1N1 virus1 and the process followed by the medical group

with which he was associated at that time. (Dr. Hoffman had become employed by

Providence in 2014.) His e-mail continued (spelling and punctuation in original):

        We are dealing with a novel virus. That could potentially put all of our
        staff and patients at risk in the urgent care setting. We do not have the
        ability here to truly isolate a patient. We do not have showers to use
        immediately after seeing the patient. We do not have the ability to
        decontaminate the waiting room or urgent care, in a timely manor. There
        are potently to many people who could enter the room to contain the virus
        to the room safely.
        From a strictly financial/legal standpoint. Some simple question’s for you.
        Would you go to an urgent care when it came out in the news that day that
        they saw a coronavirus patient in the urgent care? All of us would probably
        say yes. The general public will probably say no. Are you prepared to deal
        with the legal issues of death, or significant illness to a care provider
        exposed in a setting not set up to deal with a novel virus?
        The workman compensation issues here are significant. The OSHA
        [Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970] issues are significant. And
        the risks to our patient’s and staff issues our significant.

        1
         Commonly known as swine flu. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) describes the H1N1 flu virus as first being detected in April 2009 in the United
States, and being declared the start of the first flu pandemic in 40 years in June 2009 by
the World Health Organization. According to the CDC, H1N1 was estimated to have
killed between 151,700 and 575,400 people worldwide during the first year it circulated.
See Influenza (Flu): Summary of Progress Since 2009, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/flu
/pandemic-resources/h1n1-summary.htm [https://perma.cc/C9N6-CFXL].

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CP at 298. Dr. Hoffman then identified facilities and training “[w]e need to have.” Id.

Short of that, he “recommend[ed] the simple method outlined” as followed by his group

in the H1N1 era. Id. at 299.

       According to Dr. Hoffman, soon after he sent the e-mail, his supervisor, Dr.

Michael Ravelo, called him, “aggressively angry.” CP at 76. Dr. Hoffman alleges that

Dr. Ravelo told him he had no right to send the e-mail and said he “would pay for

sending that email.” CP at 328. Dr. Hoffman claims he offered to send a retraction

because the e-mail “was absolutely not meant to go to everyone,” but Dr. Ravelo said that

under no circumstances was Dr. Hoffman to communicate any further about it. CP at 76.

Dr. Ravelo said he would handle it.

       Dr. Hoffman contends that the next day, Dr. Ravelo approached him in person and

again told him “[he] would pay” and Dr. Ravelo would “‘take [him] down’ for th[e]

email.” CP at 328.2

       On Tuesday morning, February 11, Dr. Ravelo sent his own e-mail to Dr.

Hoffman and Ms. Etherton with copies to staff who had received Dr. Hoffman’s “Reply

All” e-mail. It stated,

       Thank you for your input. In the future please direct input to myself and
       we will coordinate any changes as necessary. In the attempt to continue to

       2
         Dr. Ravelo agrees that he phoned Dr. Hoffman after seeing the “Reply All”
e-mail to say that Providence management was already working on further responses to
COVID-19. According to Dr. Ravelo, Dr. Hoffman apologized and said he had not
meant to send the e-mail to everyone. Dr. Ravelo denies ever threatening Dr. Hoffman.

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       streamline our care and workflow we will gracefully disregard this
       commentary as we have decided as a group to continue the process as it
       was agreed upon by our multi-disciplinary team.
       Again there will be NO CHANGES to our workflow.

CP at 297.

       Ms. Etherton later testified that on first seeing Dr. Hoffman’s e-mail, “I didn’t

understand why he sent it to the group that he did, so it kind of bugged me a little bit,”

since “[i]t made us look like we didn’t know what we were doing.” CP at 392, 394. But

Dr. Hoffman recalls that when he approached Ms. Etherton the day after sending the e-

mail to apologize for copying everyone, she told him not to worry about it, and that she

had made the same mistake many times. She also told him he’d “[made] some very good

points.” CP at 67.

       A little more than three weeks later, several employees at the Valley clinic

reported to Ms. Etherton that at the end of the shift on March 3, 2020, they had seen Dr.

Hoffman leave with his arms and backpack full of boxes of face masks from the clinic.

Obtaining adequate personal protective equipment was difficult at the time, according to

Ms. Etherton:

       [I]t was just a horrible time. We could not get supplies. The girls were
       wearing the simple paper mask for⎯you know, at least all day, sometimes
       two days until they were visibly so ill. That was our pushing through it at
       that point and the 95 masks were a little hard to find, and they would wear
       those for a week until they couldn’t stand it any longer. So the thought of
       somebody removing them from the site was very emotional, and I could
       just read it in their eyes that they felt betrayed.

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CP at 129.

       Ms. Etherton asked the employees to provide her with written reports of what they

had seen, and she received two e-mails on the afternoon of Thursday, March 5. Danielle

Paradiso, a medical assistant, wrote:

       On 3/3/20 Dr. Mark Hoffman was seen taking procedures masks from the
       UC [Urgent Care]. He had his bag full and an arm full of boxes of these
       masks, seen by me Danielle Paradiso, Ryan Taylor and Susie Linderman.
       Thank you,
       Danielle Paradiso

CP at 293. Ryan Taylor, also a medical assistant, wrote:

       Hi Teri- As requested, here is what I witness [sic] several nights ago
       regarding Dr. Hoffman. Please let me know if you need any further detail.
       I witnessed Dr. Hoffman “setting aside” upwards of 6-8 boxes (one arm-
       full, and in his personal bag) of our yellow procedure masks, stating that
       they were ordered for him specifically, as he has an “anaphylactic” type
       reaction when he wears the less expensive versions that central supply
       stocks. I was under the assumption that the “upgraded” masks were for
       ALL staff use, not just Dr. Hoffman?
       Thank you...
       Ryan

CP at 289.

       Ordinarily, the first person Ms. Etherton would have contacted about the

complaints was Dr. Ravelo, but he was out of town, so she notified Cora Kinney, her

Human Resources (H.R.) contact at Providence. Ms. Etherton had a COVID planning

meeting set for that afternoon with Providence’s chief operating officer for Spokane,

Kathy Tarcon, and its chief medical officer, Dr. Mike Marshall, and she reported the

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allegations to them as well. According to Ms. Etherton, H.R., Ms. Tarcon, and Dr.

Marshall assumed responsibility for addressing the issue. Ms. Etherton was notified on

Friday, March 6, that Dr. Hoffman would be informed he was being placed on

administrative leave. Drs. Robert Litchfield and David Page placed him on

administrative leave that day.

       The complaints were brought to the attention of Juliet Gerling, the chief H.R.

officer for Providence’s Eastern Washington, Montana Physician Enterprise, who

assigned Lourie Morse to investigate. Ms. Morse is employed by Providence as an H.R.

consultant, has over 30 years of H.R. experience, and is tasked with investigating “more

complex” employment issues, including issues that might result in litigation. CP at 172.

       Between March 11 and March 13, Ms. Morse interviewed Ms. Paradiso and Mr.

Taylor, Dr. Hoffman, and four other witnesses. Dr. Hoffman claims that it was only on

being contacted by Ms. Morse that he first learned why he had been placed on

administrative leave the prior Friday. She prepared a report on March 18 that

summarized her interviews and reflected her finding.

       She interviewed Mr. Taylor on March 11, and he repeated the substance of his

e-mail to Ms. Etherton. He said that he saw Dr. Hoffman leaving with the masks at

approximately 7:45 or 8:00 p.m. on March 3. He said he did not confront Dr. Hoffman,

but thought the doctor’s actions were unusual.

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       Ms. Morse interviewed Ms. Paradiso on March 12; she, too, repeated the

substance of her e-mailed report. She affirmed that when she asked Dr. Hoffman about

the masks, he told her his wife has an autoimmune disorder and they were for her.

       Ms. Morse interviewed Beth Olson, R.N., on March 12. Nurse Olson was

responsible for ordering masks. She told Ms. Morse that when ordering masks the last

week of February, she had been directed to order as many as she could. She worked on

Sunday, March 1, at which time there was an ample supply of masks. When she returned

to work on March 4, the supply was significantly diminished. She denied any knowledge

that Dr. Hoffman was ordering his own supply of masks or that masks she ordered were

not available to every employee who needed them. She said that the masks Dr. Hoffman

took from the clinic on March 3 are thicker and softer, and are preferred by all the staff.

       Ms. Morse interviewed Sue Linderman, R.N., on March 13. Nurse Linderman

reported seeing Dr. Hoffman move masks from his desk drawer to his bag on March 3

but did not report it because she did not believe he intended to steal the masks, which she

believed were ordered for him. She was unable to recall how she came to believe that the

masks were ordered for Dr. Hoffman.

       Ms. Morse interviewed Dr. Hoffman on March 13. He told Ms. Morse that the

masks he took were a type ordered just for him, because of his allergies. According to

Dr. Hoffman, a couple of years into working for Providence, he began to experience

symptoms commonly associated with allergies when he wore the standard mask. He

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reports that the mask “irritate[d] my nose and my throat, and . . . was progressive over

time,” and that “within seconds, you know, I could feel my throat scratching and

tightening.” CP at 104-05. He did not seek a formal diagnosis from another medical

professional. Having noticed that yellow masks sometimes available at the North clinic

did not present the same problems, Dr. Hoffman asked that the yellow masks be ordered

for the Valley location for him to use. He had used only the yellow masks ever since.

       Dr. Hoffman told Ms. Morse that when other staff use the yellow masks, there are

none left for him. He said that when he spoke to Ms. Etherton about this earlier, she told

him to keep the masks in his car or take them home. He said the prior practice manager

had approved him doing the same thing. He admitted that he left on the evening of

March 3 with six boxes of the masks: three in his bag, and three under his arm. He

denied saying they were for his wife and said he left them in his car.

       Ms. Morse interviewed Ms. Etherton on March 13. Ms. Etherton said she had not

had any conversation with Dr. Hoffman that would lead him to believe she approved him

taking masks out of the clinic or to his car. She said she did not know he had ever done

that. She was unaware that he had any such understanding with Jo-Ellen Thorne, the

practice manager who preceded her. She said there are 50 masks per box in the boxes

taken by Dr. Hoffman. Ms. Etherton had compared the three types of masks that are used

at Providence and found that all are latex free and have no identifiable differences.

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       Ms. Morse interviewed Ms. Thorne on March 13. Ms. Thorne said that as the

prior practice manager, she had worked with Dr. Hoffman for several years. (Ms. Thorne

had retired in October 2019.) She said that all staff were allowed to wear the preferred

mask because they are more comfortable. She said there was no understanding that they

were only for Dr. Hoffman or that he could take a supply of masks home with him. She

said that Dr. Hoffman had told her in the past that his wife was ill and he had to wear the

masks to ensure he did not take illnesses home with him.

       Ms. Morse found, based on her interviews, that Dr. Hoffman had removed six

boxes of face masks without permission.

       After concluding her interviews, Ms. Morse reported first to Ms. Gerling. While

Ms. Morse would often make a recommendation whether an employee should be

terminated, she recommended in this case that H.R. leave the decision to senior

management, since a physician was at issue.

       Ms. Gerling and Ms. Kinney then met with Ms. Tarcon and Dr. Marshall to report

their recommendation that Dr. Hoffman’s employment be terminated. Dr. Hoffman’s

employment agreement provided for immediate termination if he committed an act that

was grounds for immediate termination under Providence employment policies. He had

signed an acknowledgment that he received the policies and understood his obligation to

read and abide by them. Among standards contained in the policies was one dealing with

“[r]esources” that are “for use in serving patients and for supporting those who serve

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patients.” CP at 281. An example of use of resources identified as inappropriate were

“[t]heft or misappropriation of property (including drugs) belonging to the ministry.”

CP at 281-82. Ms. Gerling and Ms. Kinney considered taking 300 masks from the clinic

without authorization to be theft.

       According to Ms. Gerling, Ms. Kinney, and Ms. Tarcon, it was Ms. Tarcon and

Dr. Marshall who made the decision to terminate Dr. Hoffman’s employment. No

evidence to the contrary was presented by Dr. Hoffman.

       Dr. Hoffman was informed of the decision by Dr. Ravelo, who phoned him and

told him his employment was being terminated because he had stolen masks.

       Claims and defenses

       Several months later, Dr. Hoffman sued Providence for employment

discrimination, asserting claims for (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy,

(2) disability discrimination, including by failing to reasonably accommodate his

disability, and (3) breach of contract. The wrongful termination in violation of public

policy claim was based on Dr. Hoffman’s allegation that a substantial reason his

employment was terminated was because of his February 9 “Reply All” e-mail, which he

characterized as “confront[ing his] employer about deficient safety policies that could

affect the public.” CP at 10. His disability discrimination claims were based on his

allegation that he was allergic to Providence’s standard masks, that it was a disability,

and that while he was initially accommodated, he was discriminated against when the

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accommodation was withdrawn and he was terminated from employment for exercising

it. He asserted that his written contract with Providence had been violated in several

ways.

        The parties engaged in written and deposition discovery. Over a year later, in

January 2022, Providence moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Dr.

Hoffman’s claims. In addition to presenting evidence of the matters recounted above,

Providence presented evidence and argument that Dr. Ravelo had not been asked for

input on the termination decision, and that individuals involved in recommending and

making the decision to discharge Dr. Hoffman had not been aware of his February 9

“Reply All” e-mail.

        Dr. Hoffman opposed the motion and filed his own cross motion. In support of

both, he submitted a declaration from Pamela Baynes, who had worked alongside Dr.

Hoffman for a couple of years before she retired as practice manager of the Valley clinic

in August 2016. Ms. Baynes testified that she was aware Dr. Hoffman had allergies. She

testified that she was also aware he “had difficulty using the provided mask and needed

an alternative,” although she could not recall the exact reason why. CP at 349. She

recalled that she made small orders of the alternate masks for Dr. Hoffman and “we

would keep [them] on an isolated shelf so other people would not use them.” Id.

        Declarations of two nurse practitioners were also submitted in support of Dr.

Hoffman’s briefing. Dani Fergen, R.N., testified that she had worked alongside Dr.

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Hoffman for six years, that she “was aware that Dr. Hoffman used specially ordered face

masks because he had difficulty with the provided face masks,” and testified that he told

her he had an allergic reaction to the masks. CP at 352. She said there was a filing

cabinet next to Dr. Hoffman’s desk where his specially ordered masks were stored. She

recalled asking Practice Manager Thorne to order Dr. Hoffman’s preferred masks for the

entire clinic. (When deposed, Ms. Thorne had similarly testified, although without

mentioning Nurse Fergen’s involvement, that when Dr. Hoffman complained to her that

other people were wearing “his masks,” she determined that the masks he preferred cost

“just pennies’” more than other masks. She told him, “‘If anyone’s wearing those masks,

they certainly can,’” and told him to let the purchasing nurse know to order more. CP at

241-42.

       Dr. Hoffman also relied on a declaration from Katie Kasunick, Nurse Practitioner,

who testified that while working alongside Dr. Hoffman for a few years, she never saw

him wear the standard mask; he always used an alternative mask. She said he had told

her this was because of an allergic reaction to the standard mask. She testified that he

would keep the alternative masks near his desk.3

       3
         Nurse Kasunick’s declaration contained two other assertions, but they do not
meet the criteria for summary judgment evidence, which is required to be made on
personal knowledge, set forth specific evidentiary facts, and affirmatively demonstrate
the witness’s competence to testify to the matters stated. CR 56(e). Nurse Kasunick
stated, “The ordering manager, Jo-Ellen Thorne, purchased alternative masks for Dr.
Hoffman,” but she did not identify a basis for personal knowledge of that matter. CP at

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       The trial court granted summary judgment dismissal of all of Dr. Hoffman’s

claims. He appeals.

                                        ANALYSIS

       Dr. Hoffman appeals the dismissal of only his claims for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy and disability discrimination.

I.     SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD AND APPELLATE REVIEW

       The summary judgment procedure is a means of avoiding the time and expense of

an unnecessary trial. Eakins v. Huber, 154 Wn. App. 592, 598, 225 P.3d 1041 (2010)

(citing Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989)). It is

proper when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions in the record, together with any

affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). The court views all facts and

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; in this case, Dr.

Hoffman. Watness v. City of Seattle, 16 Wn. App. 2d 297, 305, 481 P.3d 570 (2021).

Summary judgment should be granted if a reasonable person could reach but one

conclusion from looking at all the facts and evidence. Johnson v. Recreational Equip.,

Inc., 159 Wn. App. 939, 954, 247 P.3d 18 (2011).

356. She stated, “Those alternative masks were clearly for his use and considered for
him,” see id., but speculation and conclusory statements will not preclude summary
judgment. Strauss v. Premera Blue Cross, 194 Wn.2d 296, 301, 449 P.3d 640 (2019).

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       The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d

301 (1998). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to “establish a dispute regarding an

element essential to its case.” Byrd v. Sys. Transp., Inc., 124 Wn. App. 196, 202, 99 P.3d

394 (2004). To raise an issue of material fact, the nonmovant must do more than rely on

bare “conclusory statements of fact,” Snohomish County v. Rugg, 115 Wn. App. 218,

224, 61 P.3d 1184 (2002), or “allegations made in its pleadings,” Young, 112 Wn.2d

at 225. Instead, responsive evidence must establish specific, admissible facts, drawn

from a witness’s personal knowledge. CR 56(e). When evidence on material facts

conflicts, the case should be submitted to a jury to determine what occurred. Renz v.

Spokane Eye Clinic, PS, 114 Wn. App. 611, 623-24, 60 P.3d 106 (2002).

       We review a trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo. Folsom, 135

Wn.2d at 663. We can affirm the trial court even if we disagree with the basis on which

it grants summary judgment; we may affirm on any basis supported by the record.

Swinehart v. City of Spokane, 145 Wn. App. 836, 844, 187 P.3d 345 (2008).

II.    DR. HOFFMAN FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT WOULD ESTABLISH A
       RETALIATORY MOTIVE FOR HIS TERMINATION

       The Washington Supreme Court adopted the tort of wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy in 1984, as a narrow exception to the at-will doctrine. Martin

v. Gonzaga Univ., 191 Wn.2d 712, 722-23, 425 P.3d 837 (2018) (citing Thompson v. St.

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Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 232-33, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)). Thompson held that to

prevail on such a claim, “a plaintiff employee must demonstrate that his or her ‘discharge

may have been motivated by reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy.’”

Id. at 723 (quoting Thompson, 102 Wn.2d at 232). If that demonstration is made, “‘the

burden shifts to the employer to prove that the dismissal was for reasons other than those

alleged by the employee.’” Id. (quoting Thompson, 102 Wn.2d at 232-33).

       Twelve years after Thompson, the Supreme Court observed that the tort of

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy had generally been limited to four

scenarios: “(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where

employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation . . . ; (3) where employees

are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege . . . ; and (4) where employees are fired

in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.” Gardner v.

Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931, 936, 913 P.2d 377 (1996) (citing Dicomes v.

State, 113 Wn.2d 612, 618, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989)). Dr. Hoffman’s complaint alleges that

his employment was terminated because he confronted Providence about shortcomings in

its COVID-19 safety policies, and “[u]ndoubtedly, it is a matter of public policy to

protect staff, patients, and the populace from infection and death during a pandemic.”

CP at 10. His lawsuit thus falls into the fourth category—whistleblowing—and is

analyzed under the standard established in Thompson and further refined in Wilmot v.

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Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 118 Wn.2d 46, 821 P.2d 18 (1991). See Martin,

191 Wn.2d at 724.4

       The applicable standard required Dr. Hoffman to show, first, “that his discharge

may have been motivated by reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy,”

and second, “that the public-policy-linked conduct was a significant factor in the decision

to discharge the worker,” after which “the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate

a legitimate nonpretextual nonretaliatory reason for the discharge.” Martin, 191 Wn.2d

at 725-26 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thompson, 102 Wn.2d at 232)

(citing Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 75). The employer’s burden is one of production, not

persuasion; the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the employee. Id. at 726;

Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 68. If the employer articulates such a reason, the burden returns to

the plaintiff either to show that the reason is prextextual, or that the public-policy-linked

conduct was nevertheless a substantial factor motivating the employer to discharge the

worker. Martin, 191 Wn.2d at 726. A “substantial factor” need not be the only factor

       4
          Dr. Hoffman’s complaint suggested that his claim would be analyzed under a
four-element test named after Professor Henry Perritt Jr., who first proposed the test in a
1991 academic treatise. See HENRY H. PERRITT JR., WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND
LIABILITIES (1991). The test was applied in Gardner, 128 Wn.2d at 941, but our
Supreme Court has since clarified that the Perritt framework does not apply to a claim
that falls within one of the four categories of wrongful discharge identified in Dicomes.
Ross v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 184 Wn.2d 268, 287, 358 P.2d 1139 (2015) (Perritt
framework is “unnecessary” to such claims); accord Martin, 191 Wn.2d at 723-24;
Karstetter v. King County Corr. Guild, 193 Wn.2d 672, 686 n.7, 444 P.3d 1185 (2019)
(reliance on the Perritt framework in such cases is error).

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motivating the discharge because an employer’s decision may be based on both

legitimate and illegitimate reasons. Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn. App. 2d

557, 572, 459 P.3d 371 (2020) (citing Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas

County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 534, 404 P.3d 464 (2017)).

       Providence argued in the trial court and argues on appeal that there are several

bases on which Dr. Hoffman’s public-policy-related claim fails as a matter of law. It

contends he has not identified a clear public policy, which is the basis on which the trial

court dismissed the claim. It points out that Dr. Hoffman’s own testimony in deposition

was that his “Reply All” e-mail was not disagreeing with Ms. Etherton’s e-mail but “just

adding to it,” and providing her with his “thoughts.” CP at 67, 85. Finally, it contends

that Dr. Hoffman failed to present any evidence from which a jury could find that his

“Reply All” e-mail was a factor, let alone a substantial factor, in the decision to terminate

him. This last argument is a sufficient basis for dismissing the claim, and the basis on

which we affirm.

       As Dr. Hoffman points out, because an employer is not apt to announce retaliation

as a motive, an employee’s prima facie case must ordinarily be shown by circumstantial

evidence. Wilmot, 118 Wn.2d at 69. “Circumstantial evidence” is evidence from which,

based on common sense and experience, jurors may reasonably infer something at issue

in a case. 6 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS:

CIVIL 1.03 (7th ed. 2019). Circumstantial evidence is considered just as reliable as direct

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evidence. State v. Miller, 14 Wn. App. 2d 469, 481, 471 P.3d 927 (2020) (citing State v.

Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980)). By way of example, if there was

evidence that the decision whether to terminate Dr. Hoffman’s employment was entrusted

to Dr. Ravelo (there is no such evidence), then even if Dr. Ravelo claimed to fire Dr.

Hoffman for a different reason, the allegations that Dr. Ravelo had threatened to “take

him down” would be circumstantial evidence of retaliation.

       While jurors can rely on reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, they

cannot engage in speculation or conjecture. E.g., State v. Buford, 93 Wn. App. 149, 153,

967 P.2d 548 (1998). Thus, for example, jurors could not be asked to speculate that Mss.

Kinney, Gerling, Tarcon, and Dr. Marshall based the employment decision in whole or in

part on Dr. Hoffman’s “Reply All” e-mail, since there was no evidence they were aware

of the e-mail’s existence. “‘[A]n employer cannot retaliate against an employee for an

action of which the employer is unaware.’” Mackey, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 576 (alteration

in original) (quoting Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 192 Wn.2d 403, 414, 430 P.3d 229

(2018)).

       Dr. Hoffman contends that evidence that the “Reply All” e-mail “bugged” Ms.

Etherton and triggered Dr. Ravelo’s alleged threats to “take him down” are sufficient

evidence that his termination was retaliatory when considered alongside e-mails and text

messages he obtained in discovery. In an e-mail exchange between Ms. Etherton and Ms.

Kinney on March 6, after Ms. Kinney notified Ms. Etherton that Dr. Hoffman was going

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to be placed on administrative leave, Ms. Etherton responded, “Thank you so much for

taking care of this in such a timely manner. i [sic] feel so bad for him what a horrible

way to end your career.” CP at 490. He characterizes Ms. Etherton’s reference to

“end[ing his] career” as suspicious, because the decision to discharge him had not yet

been made. Yet the inference Dr. Hoffman would have jurors draw—that Ms. Etherton

knew of a plan to fire him for his February 9 e-mail—is pure speculation.

       In the following text message string between Dr. Litchfield and Dr. Ravelo on

March 6, after Dr. Litchfield placed Dr. Hoffman on administrative leave, Dr. Hoffman

attaches importance to several statements made by Dr. Ravelo. (The “scuffle with Todd”

mentioned at the end of the exchange refers to a telephone call with another doctor that

triggered a complaint from Dr. Hoffman in February 2020, but it is unrelated to his legal

claims.) Dr. Ravelo’s text messages are on the left; Dr. Litchfield’s on the right:

                                                                          Can you talk?
                                                         Called and gave Dr. Hoffman
                                                            advisory that he is On paid
                                                       administrative leave. Will make
                                                        arrangements with Dr. Volk for
                                                                        clinic coverage.
       Oh wow good I offense but I
       have saved his ass plenty of
       times. Who contacted you to put
       him on administrative leave? I
       spoke with he they said to hold off
                                                        Kathy and Mike Marshall pulled
                                                         me in after the meetings today
                                                     specifically and asked me to do it.
                                                  I’m fine with that it goes with the job.
                                                    I think they were directed by Cora.

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       Between you and I rob we . . . rip
       to bat for that guy plenty of times.
       I want to be present when something
       happens. I no longer feel bad. I tried
       really hard. Cora did not state that to
       me so please use caution.

       FYI he will claim he has allergies and
       that his wife is immunocompromised.
       I am hurt by his actions but I no
       longer feel bad. I want to be present
       when something happens.
                                                                                   Oh yeah
                                                       I think it’s unfortunately going to
                                                                   be pretty messy again.
                                                                  I didn’t feel under those
                                                       circumstances that we could go
                                                        against their recommendations
                                                          however and so I went ahead
                                                           and called. I apologize that I
                                                      didn’t let you know before I did it.
       Ur good. I feel horrible I wanted
       to retire that old guy for ur info
                                                      I know I don’t dislike him or want
                                                      him to go but this ball is rolling. I
                                                       didn’t even know the allegation I
                                                        just had heard about the scuffle
                                                                               with Todd.
       The scuffle with Todd was
       nothing I could of covers that up.
       He was caught stealing boxes of
       masks.

CP at 404-06 (format modified) (spelling and punctuation in original). Dr. Hoffman

attaches significance to the statements by Dr. Ravelo that he construes as, “[W]e . . . went

to bat for that guy plenty of times. . . . I want to be present when something happens. . . .

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I no longer feel bad,” and, “I wanted to retire that old guy for [yo]ur info.” Am. Opening

Br. of Appellant at 8.

       Even after deposing witnesses and obtaining records of these and other internal

communications in discovery, Dr. Hoffman could point to no evidence that Ms. Etherton

or Dr. Ravelo were responsible for the decision to terminate his employment, or that they

ever provided recommendations or information that was relied on by Ms. Tarcon and Dr.

Marshall in making the decision. If the matter had gone to trial, Dr. Hoffman’s lawyers

could point to no evidence that would support the element—essential to this claim—that

a substantial factor in the decision to terminate his employment was retaliation for his

February 9 e-mail about COVID-19 readiness. Since a party is not permitted to ask

jurors to speculate about something for which he has no evidence, a trial was not required

on the wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim.

       While that is dispositive of this claim, we note that Dr. Hoffman’s briefing

periodically segues into immaterial discussion of whether Providence employees

consistently labeled his actions as “theft” or “stealing”; whether those terms would be fair

if the jury believed he intended to use the masks, over time, on the job;5 and whether

Providence’s policies literally forbad taking resources out of one clinic with a view to

using them at another clinic. It was Dr. Hoffman’s burden to prove that retaliation for his

       5
         Providence’s policies identified as an “inappropriate” use of resources, not only
“theft,” but also “[t]aking ministry . . . property . . . without authorization.” CP at 281-82.

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February 9 observations about COVID-19 readiness was a substantial factor in his firing,

however. Providence had only a limited burden of producing evidence that it had a

different reason for firing him; it was not required to defend its decision from all attacks.

As federal courts have observed when applying the same burden-shifting approach,

“courts ‘only require that an employer honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if

its reason is “foolish or trivial or even baseless.”’” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.,

281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727,

733 (7th Cir. 2001)).6 Providence’s evidence of the decision made following the H.R.

investigation into the mask issue met its burden.

III.   DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

       Dr. Hoffman was likewise unable to demonstrate evidence that justified a trial of

his disability discrimination claims.

       Washington statutes make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any

person in terms or conditions of employment because of “the presence of any sensory,

mental, or physical disability.” RCW 49.60.180(3). “An employer who fails to

accommodate an employee’s disability faces an accommodation claim, while an

employer who discharges an employee for a discriminatory reason faces a disparate

       6
         The burden-shifting approach applied to the Title VII claims in Villiarimo and
Nordstrom is that from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct.
1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), which is the same approach Washington applies to
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claims. Mackey, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 571
(citing Martin, 191 Wn.2d at 725-26).

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treatment claim.” Becker v. Cashman, 128 Wn. App. 79, 84, 114 P.3d 1210 (2005)

(citing Roeber v. Dowty Aerospace Yakima, 116 Wn. App. 127, 135, 64 P.3d 691 (2003)).

Dr. Hoffman asserted both claims. We address his disparate treatment claim first.

       A.     Disparate treatment: the allegation that Providence terminated
              Dr. Hoffman’s employment because of his allergy

       To establish a prima facie case of discharge based on disability, Dr. Hoffman was

required to show that he was (1) disabled, (2) discharged, (3) doing satisfactory work,

and (4) discharged under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of

discrimination. See Callahan v. Walla Walla Hous. Auth., 126 Wn. App. 812, 819-20,

110 P.3d 782 (2005).

       As with his wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim, a burden-

shifting approach is applied. Demonstration by Dr. Hoffman of a prima facie case creates

a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. Mikkelsen, 189 Wn.2d at 527. The burden

shifts to Providence, which must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

discharge. Id. If Providence meets this burden, Dr. Hoffman must produce evidence

sufficient to show that the alleged nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext, and here, too,

it is sufficient if he shows that discrimination based on his disability was a substantial

factor motivating his discharge. Id.

       Providence contended in the trial court and on appeal that this claim, too, failed for

multiple reasons. It argued that Dr. Hoffman failed to demonstrate that he had a

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No. 38833-6-III
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disability, that he had provided notice of a medical disability to Providence, and that he

was discharged under circumstances raising a reasonable inference of discrimination.

The last argument is, again, a sufficient basis for dismissing the claim and the basis on

which we affirm. We will assume without deciding that Dr. Hoffman had a disability and

provided notice.

         Even Dr. Hoffman does not believe he was fired because of his allergy to the

standard masks. Asked, “[Y]ou think that they—one of the reasons they decided to fire

you was because you were allergic to those masks?” he answered, “I would not agree

with that statement.” CP at 120; and see CP at 117-19. His own evidence shows that

when he brought his difficulty with the standard masks to the attention of Ms. Baynes,

she ordered him a type of mask that did not cause him problems. Staff continued to order

the masks that he preferred up to the time his employment was terminated (and

presumably even thereafter7). There is no evidence he was ever told he could not use his

preferred masks. He offers no evidence of any Providence employee stating or behaving

in a way that suggests they had a discriminatory animus toward people with allergies.

Where Dr. Hoffman lacked any evidence of a discriminatory intent, there was no need for

a trial on this claim.

         7
             As earlier related, witnesses stated that other members of staff preferred the same
masks.

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No. 38833-6-III
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      B.     Reasonable accommodation: the allegation that Providence failed to
             accommodate Dr. Hoffman’s allergy

      To establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate a disability, a plaintiff

must show that

      “(1) the employee had a sensory, mental, or physical abnormality that
      substantially limited his or her ability to perform the job; (2) the employee
      was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job in question;
      (3) the employee gave the employer notice of the abnormality and its
      accompanying substantial limitations; and (4) upon notice, the employer
      failed to affirmatively adopt measures that were available to the employer
      and medically necessary to accommodate the abnormality.”

Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 149 Wn.2d 521, 532, 70 P.3d 126 (2003) (emphasis omitted)

(quoting Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wn.2d 172, 193, 23 P.3d 440 (2001),

abrogated by Mikkelsen, 189 Wn.2d 516).

      Employers have an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate an employee’s

disability, unless doing so imposes an undue hardship on the employer’s business.

Gamble v. City of Seattle, 6 Wn. App. 2d 883, 889, 431 P.3d 1091 (2018); Snyder v. Med.

Serv. Corp. of E. Wash., 145 Wn.2d 233, 239, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001). Reasonable

accommodation envisions an interactive process, “an exchange between employer and

employee where each seeks and shares information to achieve the best match between the

employee’s capabilities and available positions.” Goodman v. Boeing Co., 127 Wn.2d

401, 408-09, 899 P.2d 1265 (1995).

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No. 38833-6-III
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       To accommodate, the employer must affirmatively take steps to help the disabled

employee continue working at their existing position or attempt to find a position

compatible with their limitations. Griffith v. Boise Cascade, Inc., 111 Wn. App. 436,

442-43, 45 P.3d 589 (2002) (citing Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wn.2d 8, 18, 846 P.2d 531

(1993); Clarke v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 106 Wn.2d 102, 120, 720 P.2d 793

(1986)). Washington law “does not require an employer to offer the employee the

precise accommodation he or she requests.” Griffith, 111 Wn. App. at 443 (quoting

Sharpe v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 66 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1995)). For an employer to

satisfy its legal obligation, it merely needs to show it provided an accommodation, and

that the accommodation was reasonable. Id.

       Where multiple potential modes of accommodation exist, the employer is entitled

to select the mode, the employee is not. Frisino v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 160 Wn. App.

765, 779, 249 P.3d 1044 (2011). If the accommodation the employer provides is

reasonable, then the employer has satisfied its legal obligation and the inquiry is over.

Griffith, 111 Wn. App. at 443.

       Dr. Hoffman’s reasonable accommodation claim is unique. Providence disputes

that Dr. Hoffman’s 2016 request for particular masks was presented as one for

accommodation of a disability and Dr. Hoffman contends that it was, but what sets this

case apart is that Dr. Hoffman admits his disability was initially accommodated: Ms.

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No. 38833-6-III
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Baynes ordered his requested masks. See CP at 492. He admits that staff continued to

order and make available masks that did not trigger an allergic reaction.

       Nevertheless, he claims to have demonstrated the essential element that he was

later not accommodated, “in two ways.” CP at 503. He asserts first, that Providence had

a duty to “go through a process to withdraw [the] mask accommodation,” relying on

testimony from Ms. Gerling. Id. His second contention is that “after putting Dr.

Hoffman on leave . . . [Providence] had a duty to engage in the interactive process before

terminating him.” Id. (citing Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (2000)).

       His first attempted proof that Providence failed to accommodate relies on the

following deposition testimony from Ms. Gerling:

               Q. . . . Once a reasonable accommodation is in place, can it be taken
       away?
             A. If there’s⎯if there’s a change in the, you know, the need for the
       accommodation, it might be. It might be. It depends on if it’s permanent or
       temporary.
              Q. Is there some type of procedure or policy that goes through
       taking away an accommodation?
              A. There is a procedure. So, all of our accommodation requests go
       through our third-party vendor, Sedgwick, and we have an absence and
       disability management team at Providence that reviews that with Sedgwick
       and partners with our business partners.
              So if⎯you know, if an employee’s circumstances changed and they
       wanted to submit new medical information, they would do that.

CP at 484-85. There is no evidence that the accommodation of ordering Dr. Hoffman’s

preferred masks and making them available for his use was ever taken away.

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No. 38833-6-III
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       Dr. Hoffman attempts to demonstrate a material dispute of fact requiring trial with

his testimony that Ms. Etherton, Ms. Thorne, and Ms. Baynes all approved of him taking

home, or to his car, as many of “his” specially-ordered masks as he desired. That is a

disputed fact, to be sure. But it is not material. The fourth and dispositive element of his

reasonable accommodation claim is his burden of proving that Providence failed to adopt

any measure to accommodate his allergy. The undisputed material evidence is that

Providence made a reasonable accommodation: it ordered and made available masks, on

site, to which he was not allergic. For him to dispute the practice managers’ testimony on

a different matter does not save his claim.

       As for the federal Barnett decision on which Dr. Hoffman relies, we note, first,

that the opinion was vacated by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. Airways, Inc. v.

Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 152 L. Ed. 2d 589 (2002). Moreover, the

discussion in Barnett that Dr. Hoffman cites deals with an issue different from any

presented by his case: it deals with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, and the

duty to engage in the interactive process that is “triggered by an employee or an

employee’s representative giving notice of the employee’s disability and the desire for

accommodation.” Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1114. Here, it is undisputed that masks that did

not trigger Dr. Hoffman’s allergies were ordered as requested and made available to him

for four-plus years. Barnett is inapposite.

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       In light of undisputed evidence that Dr. Hoffman’s alleged allergy was reasonably

accommodated after being brought to Providence’s attention, no trial is required.

       Dismissal of the claims is affirmed.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                                   Siddoway, J.

WE CONCUR:

Fearing, C.J.

Staab, J.

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