Court Opinion

ID: 9884129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:39:34.127283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:35.850619
License: Public Domain

Heher, J.
(dissenting in part). I hold the view that it was within the competency of the Legislature, in establishing the mechanism for the effectuation of the statutorily created mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens, to limit the time for the commencement of the enforcement action and, by the same token, the time for the issuance of the summons and the prosecution of the action. If the lawgiver may place a time limitation upon the commencement of the action, and there can be no doubt of this, it may also provide for the diligent prosecution of the action, as was done here. L. 1949, c. Ill, pp. 444, 445, amending B. 8. 2:60-136 and 2:60-137; N. J. S. 2A:44-98 and 2A :44-99. It may condition the lien and its enforcement according to its own ideas of policy directed to the expeditious service of the relative rights of the landowner and the unpaid mechanics and materialmen in realizing the security for the satisfaction of their claims; and such limitations are of the essence of the right and not merely procedural within the concept of Article VI, Section II, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of 1947, conferring upon the Supreme Court jurisdiction to regulate by rule “the practice and procedure in all * * * courts in the State.”
Although known to the civil law, the mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens were not given recognition at common law *127nor allowed in equity. South Fork Canal Co. v. Gordon, 6 Wall. 561, 18 L. ed. 894 (1868); Van Stone v. Stillwell & B. Mfg. Co., 142 U. S. 128, 12 S. Ct. 181, 35 L. ed. 961 (1891); Springer Land Association v. Ford, 168 U. S. 513, 18 S. Ct. 170, 42 L. ed. 562 (1897). In New Jersey, such liens are exclusively statutory in origin; and, being in derogation of the common law, the provisions of the statute giving rise to the lien are to be strictly construed, while the provisions for the enforcement of the lien thereby created are to be liberally construed to effectuate the remedial statutory policy of rendering the land and buildings collaterally liable for the payment of the price or value of work performed and materials furnished in the erection or reparation of the buildings. The claim for labor and materials is a property right which does not ripen into an enforceable lien until there has been substantial compliance with all the statutory conditions prerequisite. This is fundamental in the law of exegesis. The lien does not materialize until all the statutory requisites are met. This by legislative ordinance, in a field peculiarly its own. The statutory lien affords a cumulative remedy for the enforcement of the underlying debt. The claimant’s status is that of a general creditor until all the things are done which give him the security of the statutory lien. Until then, the lien is inchoate merely. Friedman v. Stein, 4 N. J. 34 (1950).
The constitutional rule-making function of the Supreme Court does not modify or impair the basic power of the Legislature, in the creation of rights and the prescription of duties and the establishment of statutory jurisdictions for their enforcement, to provide the procedural due process made a sine qua non by Article I, paragraph 1 of the State Constitution of 1947 and the Eourteenth Amendment to the Eederal Constitution. Even under the interpretive principle of Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N. J. 240 (1950), this must necessarily be so; for, if the exercise of legislative power were made absolutely dependent upon the provision of procedural due process by rule of court, the failure of such action by the court would subvert the legislative process. It *128will not do to say that such an impasse is beyond the realm of reasonable likelihood. The possibility of a stalemate is a factor of major import in assessing the essential quality and meaning of the constitutional rule-making grant to the court. The related constitutional provisions, legislative and judicial, are to be taken and compared together in assaying the elemental content and significance of each, and effectuated in keeping with the reasonably discernible intention of the framers of the instrument and the electorate in according ratification.
Eor instance, the exercise of the State’s right to effect an escheat by the judicial process of property Iona vacantia is in its very nature the sole province of the Legislature; and the Legislature may, as an inseparable incident of its power in this regard, condition the judicial declaration of escheat upon such notice and hearing as it may deem appropriate to the nature of the proceeding and consonant with the reasonable demands of due process. The Legislature may also provide for a claim of property by the unknown or missing owner before and after the judgment of escheat, reasonably conditioned as to time and otherwise, and the procedure for the establishment and prosecution of the claim; and a rule of court cannot enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction thus conferred nor abridge or enlarge the substantive rights of litigants. The Legislature may define the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit; and it is axiomatic that the exercise of the jurisdiction is subject to the terms of the grant. A statute providing for an escheat of property without procedural due process would be void. State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N. J. 281 (1950), affirmed sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. State of New Jersey, 341 U. S. 428, 71 S. Ct. 822, 95 L. ed. 1078 (1951). See, also, the dissenting opinions in State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N. J. 1 (1953). This is not perforce to say that the Legislature may not supply due process by relation to existing rules of court; but in that event the provision of process would be the Legislature’s nonetheless. Jersey City v. Martin, 127 N. J. L. *12918 (E. & A. 1941); Hutches v. Borough of Hohokus, 82 N. J. L. 140 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
So, too, it is the exclusive province of the Legislature to provide for mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens, and to condition their enforcement as to time and mode in keeping with what it conceives to be the relative rights of the parties in interest; and where the conditions imposed are of the substance of the special statutory jurisdiction, they are not procedural within the intendment of the cited constitutional grant of authority to the Supreme Court to regulate matters of practice and procedure in the courts. Such limitations are so intimately identified with the substantive process as to be inseparable from it. The lien is a statutory creation; the conditions upon which its creation and enforcement depend are of the substance and cannot be varied or modified by rules of court. Vide Ward v. Chamberlain, 2 Black 430, 17 L. ed. 319 (1863). Such liens have their genesis in the exercise of the legislative power. Until all the statutory jurisdictional requirements and conditions precedent are satisfied, there is no enforceable lien.
I cannot accept the thesis that Rules 3:4 — 1 and 3:41-3 supersede the statute and regularize summons issued within ten days after the filing of the complaint, with dismissal of the action discretionary for noncompliance with the regulation. Apart from the question of power, these are rules of general practice not designed to cover actions to enforce mechanics’ liens.
In No. A-100, involving the claim of Columbia Lumber and Millwork Co., Ine., I find a timely compliance with the statutory requirement for the issuance of the summons. There was no issue of fact in this regard; and it was error to submit the question to the jury. Since the verdict of the jury may have turned upon this point, the judgment must be reversed and a new trial awarded on the issue of timely commencement of the enforcement action.
In No. A-101, the Nitti claim, the summons was not issued within the time prescribed by the statute. The statute then in force empowered the court to extend the prescribed *130time for issuing the summons. There was no extension of the time here; nor was an extension sought. There is no occasion to determine whether under this statutory authority a nunc pro iunc extension would be permissible, if application were made. The statute then also provided that for failure to issue the summons within the time fixed, or within such further time as the court by order should direct, “the lien shall be discharged.” This course is mandatory; and accordingly I would affirm the judgment in this case.
No. A-100:
Heher, J., concurring in,result.
For reversal — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan—6.
For affirmance — Justice Wachenfeld—1.
No. A-101:
For reversal — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Oliphant, Burling and Brennan — 4.
For affirmance — Justices Heher, Wachenfeld and Jacobs —3.