Court Opinion

ID: 9853017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:41:18.570424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:39.835919
License: Public Domain

RUFFIN, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I cannot fully endorse the analysis employed with respect to Divisions 1 and 2. Thus, I am compelled to write separately.
At the outset, I must emphasize that I find the trial judge’s line of questioning regarding the victims’ credibility to be wholly inappropriate. It is axiomatic that judges are required to remain neutral.18 “As both the Supreme Court of Georgia and this Court have recognized, it is always wiser, safer, better, and juster that trial judges should confine themselves exclusively to an enunciation of the law, leaving to counsel the duty of elucidating the facts, and to juries the finding of the truth in the evidence.”19 Here, the trial court stepped beyond the bounds of appropriate questioning for the purpose of developing the truth, and instead acted as an advocate for the State by bolstering its witnesses. Indeed, I can conceive of no other purpose for such questions other than to bolster credibility.
Nonetheless, I do not believe that this impropriety — standing alone — rises to the level of “plain error.”20 And the inquiry at the outset must necessarily be whether the trial court’s violation of OCGA§ 17-8-57 constitutes plain error.21 Here, the court’s questions established solely that the two girls were good students and that at least one was a cheerleader. Although this evidence certainly bolstered the girls’ credibility, such bolstering does not constitute plain error; or “that which is so clearly erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice or which seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.”22
The true error lies with the trial court’s refusal to allow a thorough and sifting cross-examination regarding the girls’ academic performance. “Control of the nature and scope of cross-examination of a witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and *416will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.”23 Discretion, however, is not without limit. “Every party has a right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of witnesses called against him.”24 “Among the permissible purposes of cross-examination is the attempt to bring out facts that might show that a witness’s testimony is either unbelievable, biased, or partial to one party.”25
Both this Court and the Supreme Court have held that a trial court may abuse its discretion when it curtails cross-examination of witnesses.26 Here, Craft was entitled to fully cross-examine Moore on issues pertaining to the girls’ credibility. This is particularly true given the trial court’s improper bolstering of their testimony. The trial court’s questions about the girls’ academic performance and standing in school opened the door to additional inquiry into their school records, and Craft “was entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination on this issue.”27 Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in curtailing such questioning so that the girls would not “look bad.”28 Moreover, I cannot conclude that any error in this regard was harmless.29 The case against Craft rested exclusively on the credibility of the two victims. Under these circumstances, Craft’s ability to undermine the girls’ credibility should not have been limited, and Craft’s conviction should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn joins in this special concurrence.

 See Steele v. Atlanta Maternal-Fetal Medicine, 271 Ga. App. 622, 628-629, n. 10 (610 SE2d 546) (2005).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 628, n. 10.

 The majority conflates the plain error analysis in Division 1 with Division 2, which involves Craft’s right to thoroughly cross-examine witnesses. I find this conflation inappropriate, unnecessary, and confusing.

 See Lockaby v. State, 265 Ga. App. 527, 528 (1) (594 SE2d 729) (2004) (“Where a trial judge is alleged to have made a prejudicial remark during the course of the trial in violation of such Code section, absent plain error, an objection or motion for mistrial must he made in order to preserve the issue for appeal.”).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 265 Ga. App. 236, 239 (5) (593 SE2d 695) (2004).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Courrier v. State, 270 Ga.App. 622, 623 (1) (607 SE2d 221) (2004).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 623 (1) (a).

 Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 534-535 (5) (491 SE2d 343) (1997).

 See id.; Courrier, supra.

 Pye v. State, 269 Ga. 779, 788 (17) (505 SE2d 4) (1998).

 See Courrier, supra.

 Compare id.