Court Opinion

ID: 9793610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:50:28.958645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:14.418297
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with the reasoning of the majority in its affirmance of the award of custody to the defendants. I dissent on the modification of the decree relating to the defendants' living arrangements.
The controlling statute on modification of custody awards states, in relevant part:
The court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custo- • *631dian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.
RCW 26.09.260(1).
In. the findings at the time of the dissolutions, the trial court specifically found Sandra Schuster and Madeleine Isaacson were cohabiting and that "such living arrangements are not in the best interest of the children." However, the court in the modification proceedings which are now before us found:
That since the time of the Divorce Decree the respondents at first lived separate and apart and then moved into adjoining apartments where they in fact lived together as one household and that the living arrangement did not prove to be against the best interests of the children, except it added a financial burden.
Thus, contrary to the assertion of the majority, a change of circumstances is contained in the findings. This change went far beyond the personal convenience of the defendants and was not to be found against the best interests of the children. The crucial question, then, is not whether the trial court made a finding of changed circumstances but whether there is evidence in the record to support the findings.
During the trial, voluminous testimony was taken on the living environment in which the children of the parties were being raised. According to expert testimony, since the divorce decrees the Isaacsons and Schusters had come to regard themselves as a family of eight; the Isaacson and Schuster children would refer to one another as brother or sister. Testimony established that there was a "cross-over of the parent roles" between Ms. Isaacson and Ms. Schuster for the nurturing and assistance of the children. This development of a family unit and the strengthening of the relationships among the eight family members presents a significant change of circumstances which may appropriately be recognized and was recognized by the trial court in its findings.
*632Furthermore, in its oral opinion, the trial court stated that living apart for the sake of appearances was imposing a financial burden on the parties and their children. This circumstance was also recognized in the findings. Where the funds of the parties are limited, the children would naturally be affected adversely by an unnecessary expenditure of household resources.
The trial court should be given broad discretion in matters dealing with the welfare of the children. A finding was made of changed circumstances. Substantial evidence is in the record to support this finding. The disposition of this case should not be disturbed except for a manifest abuse of discretion. Lambert v. Lambert, 66 Wn.2d 503, 403 P.2d 664 (1965); Selivanoff v. Selivanoff, 12 Wn. App. 263, 266, 529 P.2d 486 (1974). No abuse has been shown.
The change of circumstances which occurred here may have developed while Ms. Schuster and Ms. Isaacson were in violation of the original decree, an act which this court need not approve. Nevertheless, it occurred. The trial court chose not to punish the parties for contempt and, finding no abuse of discretion, we have agreed. The majority rightly states that "Punishment of the parent for contempt may not be visited upon the child in custody cases. The custody of a child is not to be used as a reward or punishment for the conduct of the parents." This is a salutary rule. Having so held, we should not now punish the parties backhandedly by refusing to recognize an unquestionable change of circumstances found by the trial court and established by ample evidence.
Utter, J., concurs with Dolliver, J.