Court Opinion

ID: 9864787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:11:40.694846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:53.115557
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Campbell,
dissenting.
This action by plaintiff Elizabeth Brubaker against the defendant, the City and County of Denver, a municipal corporation, has for its object the recovery of a money judgment against the city for injuries which she sustained while walking on the southerly side of Eighteenth avenue between Sherman and Grant streets in the city of Denver, which sidewalk at the time, as she says, was in a dangerous condition for pedestrians to walk upon. The plaintiff alleges that, without any fault on her part, she slipped and fell upon the snow and ice which had been allowed to remain over and upon the sidewalk for a considerable period of time prior to the time she fell, the result of which fall caused her serious injuries for which she seeks damages against the city for its alleged negligence in thus permiting the snow and ice to remain there. The city in its answer denied any negligence on its part. On the issues thus joined and upon the evidence taken the jury found for the *507plaintiff and awarded her damages in the sum of $5,000, to review which judgment this writ of error was sued out.
The evidence is more or less conflicting. That produced by the plaintiff tends to show that accumulation of ice and snow on the sidewalk where plaintiff slipped and fell caused the injury which was suffered from the fall thereon. Evidence for the defendant tends to show that the city is not liable for reasons which will presently be stated. If there was no error in the instructions to the jury and in the admission of evidence harmful to the defendant, the judgment should be affirmed. I think, however, that the trial court in some of its instructions to the jury, and in failing to give appropriate instructions asked by the defendant, committed error prejudicial to the city, for which the judgment should be reversed.
That snow and ice were on this sidewalk when plaintiff fell is not denied. How long it had been there when she fell the evidence does not disclose. The city may not be held liable to a pedestrian who slips and falls on a sidewalk on which ice and snow have accumulated, unless, among other things, the city suffers or permits such accumulation to remain there for an unreasonable length of time in a condition which is unsafe and dangerous to pedestrians to walk upon the same. Plaintiff fell on this walk about 8 o’clock in the morning. There is no evidence that the city or its officers knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have acquired knowledge, of this accumulation before plaintiff fell. If, however, it be conceded that the evidence introduced by plaintiff tends to establish that it was prima facie negligence of the city not to remove the snow and ice before she fell on the sidewalk, the judgment must be set aside because of erroneous instructions to the jury that were prejudicial to the defendant city and in rulings upon objections to evidence by the defendant. These in their order.
Denver v. Willson, 81 Colo. 134, 254 Pac. 153, was a *508case in which the plaintiff Willson sued the city to recover damages resulting from a fall on an icy sidewalk in the city. We held, among other things, that if the presence of freshly fallen snow was — and such is the claim in the instant ease — the sole proximate cause of the injury, and if the city had not had sufficient time after the snow fell to remove it before the accident, it would not be liable. In that case, however, the fact was that the sole proximate cause of the injury was the presence of ice on the sidewalk which had been there for more than ten days before the accident and the mere fact that freshly fallen snow might have contributed to the injury did not relieve the negligent city. For aught that appears in the record now before us, the snow that was on the sidewalk fell and the ice thereon formed for the first time only a short time before, or about the hour of 8 o ’clock when plaintiff was walking thereon.
There is a distinction between the liability of a municipality when the condition of a sidewalk is due to artificial rather than to natural causes, especially as to the notice or knowledge of the city. Although the snow upon this sidewalk fell and the ice formed thereon some time before 8 o’clock in the morning, the evidence does not show how long before the accident. There is no evidence at all that the city authorities knew of their presence on the walk, or that they had been there for a length of time sufficient for the city to have taken steps to effect their removal. The city had no actual knowledge of the existence of the ice and snow on this walk. In the "Willson case it was said that there is a distinction between the liability of a municipality for personal injury resulting from a fall on a sidewalk when the condition of the walk causing an injury is due to artificial, and when it is brought about by natural, causes. Plaintiff’s injury from her fall on the sidewalk was due to a natural cause, the presence of ice and snow thereon. Since it was not shown that the ice and snow on which *509plaintiff slipped and fell had been there for any considerable period of time before the morning she was walking thereon, it would seem that the city is not liable, for it did not have sufficient time after the snow fell and before the accident to clear the walk. But if I am in error as to the assertion that defendant may not under the evidence be properly chargeable with notice of the dangerous condition of this sidewalk, still this judgment ought to be set aside as above indicated, because the trial court failed or refused properly and fully to instruct the jury in the following particulars.
The trial court, over objection of the defendant city, admitted evidence by plaintiff of other accidents at or about the same time at the place on the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. It was admitted upon the theory then advanced by plaintiff because of its alleged tendency to show the existence of the defect or other dangerous condition of the sidewalk, and also as tending to show notice to the city of the defective condition of the place.
In the answer brief of plaintiff’s counsel a different explanation or theory is announced for they now say that the admission of this evidence was not competent to show negligence of the city in not sooner removing the ice and snow from the sidewalk, but only to show an existing condition of an inanimate object — a sidewalk, with regard to safety. And, therefore, they say this question of evidence was competent for that purpose alone, hence, the trial court was not in error in permitting its introduction for that purpose without at the same time instructing the jury so to consider it only for a proper purpose. Taking counsel’s explanation, therefore, as justification for the admission of this evidence, I say that plaintiff thus virtually admits that, over defendant’s objection, she was permitted to introduce evidence some of which was competent only on the issue of negligence in permitting ice and snow to remain on the sidewalk, and some of which had no bearing thereon at all. If *510counsel are correct in this statement, it necessarily follows that it was error for the trial court to admit such inconsistent bits of evidence, without explaining to the jury in some way, and there was no explanation at all, to what particular issue the apparently inconsistent part of the evidence was appropriate. The jury must have been mystified or misled by such statements. It is no answer to say that the jury was the only tribunal to pass upon the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. That is true generally speaking. But the observation has no application or bearing upon such a general charge to a jury, some of which is pertinent to one issue involved and not pertinent to any other issue, without explaining to the jury to what particular issue the evidence is. directed and to what issue it is not pertinent.
I say, therefore, that because of such errors of the trial court properly and fully to charge the jury on controverted issues of fact, the judgment should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Holland concurs in this dissenting opinion.