Court Opinion

ID: 9623690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:40:20.523873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:33.573759
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment but dissent to the majority’s analysis. By reason of the 1982 amendment to Penal Code section 868, preliminary hearings are required to be “open and public” unless the magistrate expressly finds that exclusion of the public is “necessary” to protect the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. In the present case, on denying petitioner’s motion to inspect the preliminary hearing transcripts, the trial court found merely that there was a “reasonable likelihood” of prejudice to the defendant, a standard which the majority *783now embraces. Yet a showing of “reasonable likelihood” of prejudice is not equivalent to a showing of necessity. In my view, the majority’s new standard improperly ignores the statutory language.
As the majority concedes, “The legislative history ... as well as its use of the word ‘necessary,’ makes clear that the Legislature was of the view that open preliminary hearings would be the rule rather than the exception. ‘Necessary’ is often used in the sense of essential . . . .” {Ante, p. 781.) Although a showing of actual prejudice may be difficult to marshall in advance of trial, certainly the defendant should be required at least to demonstrate a substantial probability of prejudice. (See United States v. Brooklier (9th Cir. 1982) 685 F.2d 1162, 1167.) No such showing was made here.
As the trial is completed and the case is now moot, I concur in the judgment denying the peremptory writ.