Court Opinion

ID: 2964383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:52.698989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:55.117077
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

        October 11, 1996        [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1151

                            MARTIN JAMES MALONEY, DEBTOR,

                                      Appellant,

                                          v.

                 SARA CONVERSE, f/k/a SARA MALONEY AND GERARD KELLEY,

                                      Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                     [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                          Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            Martin J. Maloney on brief pro se.
            _________________
            Richard S.  Emerson, Jr. and  Childs, Emerson, Rundlett, Fifield &
            ________________________      ____________________________________
        Childs on brief for appellee Sara Converse.
        ______

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.  Pro se debtor  Martin James Maloney appeals
                 __________   ___ __

            a  district  court order  that  affirmed  a bankruptcy  court

            decision which  held that  a $400,000 civil  judgment against

            Maloney was  not dischargeable under 11  U.S.C.   523(a)(6).1
                                                                        1

            We affirm.

                 The  record discloses that after a  bench trial, a Maine

            superior court  awarded the  foregoing judgment  to Maloney's

            ex-wife,  appellee  Sara  Converse,  in a  civil  action  for

            assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The

            bankruptcy  court concluded  that  the Maine  superior  court

            decision underlying the civil judgment  collaterally estopped

            Maloney from relitigating whether  his conduct in  assaulting

            appellee after murdering her  male companion was "willful and

            malicious" within the meaning of    523(a)(6).2  The superior
                                                          2

            court issued a four page decision which detailed its findings

            of fact and  conclusions of  law, which we  will not  recount

            here.  For  our purposes it  is sufficient  to note that  the

            superior  court specifically found that Maloney had committed

            a  "vicious  assault"  that was  "unmistakably  calculated to

            cause  great anguish" to appellee and that Maloney had spared

                                
            ____________________

               111 U.S.C.     523(a)(6) bars  a debtor  from obtaining  a
               1
            discharge of any  debt "for willful  and malicious injury  by
            the  debtor to another entity  or to the  property of another
            entity."

               2Maloney  is  presently  serving a  30-year  sentence  for
               2
            murder  and aggravated assault as a result of the events that
            gave rise to the civil tort judgment.

                                         -2-

            appellee's  life in order to witness her anguish at the death

            of her companion.3
                             3

                 Under both  Maine and federal  law, collateral  estoppel

            will bar a litigant from relitigating an issue if, in a prior

            proceeding,  the  issue  was:  (1)  actually  litigated,  (2)

            determined  by   a  valid,   final  judgment,  and   (3)  the

            determination is essential  to the judgment.   See Grogan  v.
                                                           ___ ______

            Garner,  498  U.S.  279,  284  (1991);  Lundborg  v.  Phoenix
            ______                                  ________      _______

            Leasing, Inc., 91 F.3d  265, 271 (1st Cir. 1996);  Sevigny v.
            _____________                                      _______

            Home  Builders  Assoc. of  Maine, 429  A.2d 197,  201-02 (Me.
            ________________________________

            1981).4   We  have no  trouble  concluding that  the superior
                  4

            court's  findings  established  that  Maloney's  conduct  was

            deliberate, intentional, and  therefore "willful" within  the

            meaning  of     523(a)(6).   See  3  Collier  on  Bankruptcy,
                                         ___     _______________________

             523.16[1], at 523-12 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong.,

            1st Sess. 363  (1977); S. Rep. No.  989, 95th Cong.  2d Sess.

            77-79 (1978)).   These  findings also establish  that Maloney

                                
            ____________________

               3In  addition, the  superior court  concluded that  "there
               3
            could  not be  a clearer  case of  intentional infliction  of
            emotional distress."   

               4We recognize that authority indicates that,  "[w]here the
               4
            issue previously  litigated was litigated under  state law, a
            bankruptcy court will apply the law of collateral estoppel of
            the relevant state."   See 3 Roy  Babitt, et al., Collier  on
                                   ___                        ___________
            Bankruptcy,  523.05D, at 523-20  (Lawrence King ed., 15th ed.
            __________
            1996)(collecting  cases); In  re McNallen,  62 F.3d  619, 624
                                      _______________
            (4th Cir. 1995).  But see Wood v. Dealers Financial Services,
                              ___ ___ ____    __________________________
            ___ B.R. ___, No.  95-40447, 1996 WESTLAW 434430  (E.D. Mich.
            July 31,  1996)(stating contrary view). As  the principles of
            collateral  estoppel are the same under Maine law and federal
            law, we need not decide which controls. 

                                         -3-

            harbored a specific intent  to injure appellee, therefore his

            conduct was "malicious" under  either the implied malice test

            that this court has applied in the past, see In re Nance, 556
                                                     ___ ___________

            F.2d  602, 611  (1st Cir.  1977), or  the specific  and other

            malice  tests more  recently  employed by  other courts,  see
                                                                      ___

            Piccuto  v.  Dwyer,  39  F.3d  37,  41   &  n.  3  (1st  Cir.
            _______      _____

            1994)(collecting cases).   As  the superior  court's decision

            established  that   Maloney's   conduct  was   "willful   and

            malicious"  within the  meaning  of  523(a)(6)  and that  the

            other  prerequisites for  applying  collateral  estoppel  are

            present, the  bankruptcy court properly held  that Maloney is

            barred from relitigating these issues now.

                 On  appeal, Maloney  argues  that  the bankruptcy  court

            erred by applying collateral estoppel without first reviewing

            the  transcript of  his state  trial.   He contends  that the

            transcript  would show  that  the issues  of willfulness  and

            maliciousness were  not fully  and fairly litigated  in state

            court  because  his defense  attorney  failed  to present  an

            adequate defense.5  As Maloney did not assert this particular
                             5

            objection  in the bankruptcy court, it is not properly before

            us.  See In re Menna, 16  F.3d 7, 9 n.2 (1st Cir. 1994). Even
                 ___ ___________

            if it were, Maloney would not  prevail, for it was his burden

                                
            ____________________

               5Maloney specifically complains  that his attorney  waived
               5
            his right to trial  by jury without his knowledge  or consent
            and  failed  to  present  evidence, which  Maloney  does  not
            describe.     

                                         -4-

            to produce  the transcript as the  party resisting collateral

            estoppel. See Van Houten v. Harco Const., Inc., 655 A.2d 331,
                      ___ __________    __________________

            333-34 (Me. 1995); Hossler  v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762,  769 (Me.
                               _______     _____

            1979)(party  resisting  collateral  estoppel  has  burden  of

            proving  prejudice).    As   Maloney  failed  to  submit  the

            transcript  (indeed,  the record  suggests  that  he did  not

            attempt to secure  it until after  judgment was entered),  he

            failed to meet his  burden of proof, and the entry of summary

            judgment for appellee was proper. See In re Menna, 16 F.3d at
                                              ___ ___________

            9  ("'[a]s to any essential  factual element of  its claim on

            which  the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial,

            its  failure  to come  forward  with  sufficient evidence  to

            generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the

            moving party'"(citations omitted)).6    Maloney  also  claims
                                               6

                                
            ____________________

               6We note that in the context of cases in which the precise
               6
            grounds of a  prior state court  judgment were unclear,  some
            circuits have required bankruptcy courts to review the entire
            record  of   the  state  trial  before   applying  collateral
            estoppel. See, e.g.,  Wheeler v. Laudani,  783 F.2d 610,  615
                      ___  ____   _______    _______
            (6th  Cir. 1986); Spilman v.  Harley, 656 F.2d  224, 228 (6th
                              _______     ______
            Cir. 1981);  Matter of Ross, 602 F.2d 604, 605-08 & n. 10 (3d
                         ______________
            Cir. 1979).  We  do not think that such  review is invariably
            required where, as here, the portion of the  record submitted
            by the appellee  makes out  a prima facie  case for  applying
            collateral estoppel.  Cf. Combs v. Richardson,  838 F.2d 112,
                                  ___ _____    __________
            113-17 (4th Cir. 1988)(applying collateral estoppel based  on
            review of  jury instructions and verdict).   Moreover, review
            of the transcript was not necessary because even if Maloney's
            assertion that  defense counsel was inadequate  is true, "the
            general  rule  is  that  'ignorance  or  carelessness  of  an
            attorney'  does  not  provide a  basis  for  relief from  the
            effects  of an adverse civil judgment." In re Braen, 900 F.2d
                                                    ___________
            621, 629 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 498
                                                        _____ ______
            U.S. 1066 (1991).   

                                         -5-

            that  the bankruptcy court denied him the right to submit the

            transcript by issuing its  ruling before the 60-day discovery

            period that had been  set by a pretrial scheduling  order had

            expired.  The  point is meritless,  for the record  discloses

            that  the  discovery  period  expired on  the  day  that  the

            bankruptcy court  issued its  decision. Moreover,  this claim

            has also been  waived, for  Maloney did not  protest that  he

            required  further  time  to  complete  discovery  during  the

            hearing on appellee's motion for summary judgment.  See In re
                                                                ___ _____

            Cress, 106 B.R. 246,  248 (D. Kan. 1989), aff'd,  930 F.2d 32
            _____                                     _____

            (10th Cir. 1991)(TABLE)(debtors' failure to  seek continuance

            of summary judgment proceedings  until further discovery  was

            completed  barred debtors  from complaining  about incomplete

            discovery  on appeal).   As  both of  Maloney's arguments  on

            appeal  are  meritless  and  the  application  of  collateral

            estoppel  otherwise  appears  proper,  the  judgment  of  the

            district court is affirmed.
                              ________

                                         -6-