Court Opinion

ID: 9927796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 01:00:28.525961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:24.106964
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50151        Document: 00517047678             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/29/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-50151
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                               January 29, 2024
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Tomas Herrera-Quinones,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:21-CR-849-3
                     ______________________________

   Before Smith, Higginson, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge: *
         Tomas Herrera-Quinones was convicted, following a jury trial, of one
   count of conspiracy to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in
   violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B), and one count of
   possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in
   violation of § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Herrera-Quinones

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50151        Document: 00517047678          Page: 2     Date Filed: 01/29/2024

                                      No. 22-50151

   initially pled guilty, changed his plea to not guilty, went to trial,
   unsuccessfully moved to suppress an interview and confession on the
   grounds that he could not have voluntarily waived his Miranda rights in
   Spanish because of his limited understanding of that language as he is a
   Tepehuan speaker, and was convicted. On appeal, he seeks reversal of the
   conviction and a remand for a new suppression hearing, trial, and sentencing
   hearing. Herrera-Quinones argues that the district court erred in conducting
   a suppression hearing, jury trial, and sentencing hearing with a Spanish
   interpreter—rather than a Tepehuan interpreter—and in not advising him of
   his right to an interpreter.
          We review a district court’s decision to appoint an interpreter for
   abuse of discretion. United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 2004).
   We do not decide whether Herrera-Quinones’s claim should be reviewed for
   plain error because he failed to preserve the issue for appeal because we
   conclude that his argument fails under the less exacting abuse of discretion
   standard. 1 An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court “bases its
   decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the
   evidence.” United States v. Chambliss, 948 F. 3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he necessity for . . . an
   interpreter is a question of fact.” United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209
   (5th Cir. 1980).
          The Court Interpreters Act requires, in pertinent part, the
   appointment of an interpreter when a judge, either sua sponte or on the
   motion of a party, determines that the defendant “speak[s] only or primarily
   a language other than the English language” and that fact would “inhibit such

          _____________________
          1
             Nor do we decide whether the motion to suppress and statements made at the
   pretrial proceedings were sufficient to preserve this issue.

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Case: 22-50151     Document: 00517047678           Page: 3   Date Filed: 01/29/2024

                                    No. 22-50151

   party’s comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or
   the presiding judicial officer.” 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(A). In other words,
   an interpreter should be appointed when the district court finds that the
   “defendant’s ability to comprehend the proceedings or communicate with
   counsel is inhibited by language or hearing problems.” United States v. Perez,
   918 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
          A magistrate judge stopped Herrera-Quinones’s plea hearing because
   he was concerned that Herrera-Quinones could not understand the
   proceedings with a Spanish interpreter rather than an interpreter who spoke
   Herrera-Quinones’s native language of Tepehuan. At a subsequent hearing
   before the magistrate judge, the court conferred with Herrera-Quinones
   through a Tepehuan interpreter and Herrera-Quinones entered a plea of not
   guilty. As this court has explained, “the need for translation of the pretrial
   proceeding put[s] the district court on notice of the need to make inquiry
   regarding the defendant’s language competency.” Perez, 918 F.2d at 490
   (discussing Tapia).
          At the hearing on the motion to suppress Herrera-Quinones’s
   confession, the district court had the following colloquy with Herrera-
   Quinones’s trial counsel:
          The Court: [H]ave you been able to communicate with your client?
          Counsel: In this particular case, I have been able to communicate with
          him through a Tepehuan interpreter, and we have had very limited
          success with any other type of interpretation.
          The Court: Okay. And we have a Spanish speaker interpreting today.
          We also have a Tepehuan interpreter standing by, I think, which we
          will use if we get to that point.
   Suppression Hr’g Tr. 4:23- 5:7, ECF 184.

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Case: 22-50151      Document: 00517047678           Page: 4   Date Filed: 01/29/2024

                                     No. 22-50151

          Following this, Herrera-Quinones opted to proceed with only a
   Spanish interpreter and testified at the hearing that he understood—through
   the use of only the Spanish interpreter—what was said at the hearing
   including the testimony of the four witnesses against him that day. On appeal
   after trial and conviction, Herrera-Quinones fails to explain how, given the
   unaccepted offer of a Tepehuan interpreter and Herrera-Quinones’s
   testimony that he was able to understand the proceedings through a Spanish
   interpreter, the district court abused its discretion.
          We therefore AFFIRM.

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