Court Opinion

ID: 9906645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 19:24:09.998933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:26.116248
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued November 30, 2023

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00594-CV
                            ———————————
                IN RE PETER ZHONGREN HUANG, Relator

            Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Relator Peter Zhongren Huang filed this petition for writ of mandamus,

asking that we vacate the trial court’s July 22, 2022 order compelling production of

Huang’s cell phone for inspection and imaging.1 Because the trial court did not

include reasonable limits as to scope and time and did not provide specific

1
      The underlying case is James R. Huey v. FL Transportation, Inc., Rolling Frito-
      Lay Sales, LP, and Peter Zhongren Huang, cause number 2021-77958, pending in
      the 125th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Kyle Carter
      presiding.
protections for confidential, private, or sensitive information, we conditionally

grant the petition.

                                   Background

      This case arises from a personal injury lawsuit. Real party in interest, James

R. Huey, alleged that he was driving a pickup truck, waiting his turn at an

intersection in which all traffic lights were not working. When Huey proceeded

through the intersection, Huang, who was driving an 18-wheeler, “t-boned” Huey’s

pickup and the force of the impact spun him and his pickup into a guard rail,

causing injuries to Huey and extensive damage to his vehicle. Huang disputes this

version of events and claims the traffic lights were working.

      Huey sued Huang and his employer, FL Transportation, Inc., for negligence,

negligent entrustment, negligent training, and negligent supervision. Huey alleged

that Huang was distracted while driving, based on multiple accounts that the traffic

lights were not functioning at the time of the collision, Huang’s speed of

approximately 50 mph without braking when he entered the intersection, and the

fact that Huang had more than one cell phone in the cab of his truck at the time of

the accident.

      Huey requested production of Huang’s cell phone for imaging, but Huang

claimed these requests were overly broad in time or scope. Huey also sent a

preservation letter to Huang’s counsel on January 25, 2022, stating his intent to

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conduct a “cellular image of [Huang’s] phone[s] for the 2-hour interval, one hour

preceding the wreck, and one hour following the wreck.”          Huang’s counsel

responded that Huang routinely deletes his cellphone data on a daily or weekly

basis, though Huang’s counsel ostensibly agreed to preserve the two cell phones.

Huang’s counsel also asked for the name of the person to perform the imaging and

inspection. Huang’s counsel asked for a proposed protocol to address Huang’s

concerns while providing Huey with his discovery.

      Huey emailed a proposed protocol on February 8, 2022, with time and scope

restrictions, which included the right for Huang to have ten days or longer to

designate “confidential information” from the extract of information and to provide

a privilege log of those items designated as confidential. The proposed protocol

also permitted redaction of confidential or privileged information by Huang.

Although Huey invited Huang’s counsel to review and revise the protocol, Huey

contends that Huang declined this invitation.

      Huang produced a redacted copy of his cell phone bill from the day of the

collision, but this provided no information about data usage or which applications

were in use, nor did it provide a timestamp as to any particular data usage. Huey

issued subpoenas to the carrier for both cell phones, T-Mobile, who provided only

a single-page call log that showed incoming and outgoing calls for one phone, but

nothing concerning data usage.

                                         3
      Huey then filed a motion to compel explaining the need for forensic imaging

of Huang’s phones and the factual circumstances suggesting distracted driving. On

July 22, 2022, the trial court signed an order granting the motion to compel and

ordering Huang’s cell phones to be imaged “under a narrow window of time, using

an appropriate protocol to protect any confidential, private, or sensitive

information . . . within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order.” Huang then

filed this petition for writ of mandamus.

                                      Analysis

      A. Standard of review and applicable legal principles

      To show entitlement to mandamus relief, a relator must show that the trial

court abused its discretion and that there is no adequate remedy by appeal. See

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). “Mandamus

relief is available when the trial court compels production beyond the permissible

bounds of discovery.” In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 322 (Tex.

2009).

      B. Huey met the threshold showing to obtain discovery

      Turning first to Huang’s third issue, he argues that the trial court improperly

compelled inspection and copying of his cell phones because Huey did not allege

that Huang failed to properly respond or show that Huang’s response to a

discovery request was inadequate. Huang also contends that discovery may not be

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compelled without a showing that relevant, discoverable information appropriately

bears on the claims at issue.

       Rule 192.3 provides for discovery of documents, which includes electronic

information relevant to the subject matter of the action. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

192.3(b) cmt. 1—1999 (“While the scope of discovery is quite broad, it is

nevertheless confined by the subject matter of the case and reasonable expectations

of obtaining information that will aid resolution of the dispute.”).     Rule 196

concerns requests for production of documents, and Rule 196.4 specifically applies

to requests for production of data in electronic or magnetic form. See TEX. R. CIV.

P. 196, 196.4.     When a party has made a specific request for electronic

information, the responding party must produce responsive information that is

reasonably available or object on the ground that the information cannot be

retrieved through reasonable efforts or cannot be produced in the form requested.

See Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 315; TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4. When a specific

request for cell phone data has been lodged, and the responding party objects and

does not produce the data, the trial court “may order production subject to the

discovery limitations imposed by Rule 192.4.” Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at

315.

                                         5
      1. Huey established that Huang failed to produce the requested discovery

      Huang asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling

production of the cell phone data because Huey failed to show that Huang,

defaulted in his obligation to produce the requested data, that the production was

inadequate, and that there is a “reasonable likelihood that a search of the [device at

issue] would reveal the information [the party] sought.” Id. at 320–21; see also In

re Kuraray Am., Inc., 656 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. 2022) (holding that “to be

entitled to production of cell-phone-data, the party seeking it must allege or

provide some evidence of cell-phone use by the person whose data is sought at a

time when it could have been a contributing cause of the incident on which the

claim is based.”).

      As shown in the motion to compel, Huey requested production of Huang’s

cell phones so that they could be imaged for a two-hour interval—one hour before

the accident and one hour after, based on the time of the crash listed in the crash

report. In response to the request for production, Huang objected on the following

grounds:

             Defendant objects to this Request for Production on the grounds
      it is nothing more than an impermissible fishing expedition and seeks
      to expose defendant’s confidential and private information. The
      request is overly broad, unlimited in scope, and so unduly burdensome
      as to constitute harassment. It also seeks items and information that
      are irrelevant and immaterial and it is not reasonably calculated to
      lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

                                          6
      Huey demonstrated his attempt to obtain the information through less

intrusive means by obtaining cell phone records from Huang’s carrier, T-Mobile,

but this resulted in obtaining only a log of calls on one of the two phones owned by

Huang. Huey states that, after exhausting these measures for obtaining Huey’s cell

phone data and usage around the time of the collision, Huey ultimately filed a

motion to compel asking the trial court to order imaging of both of Huang’s cell

phones “using an appropriate protocol to protect any confidential, private, or

sensitive information.” The record shows that Huey attempted to obtain the cell

phone data via request for production and by obtaining the data by less intrusive

means and was unsuccessful.        Huey offered a protocol to address Huang’s

concerns about scope and private or confidential information, but Huang did not

agree to the proposed protocol. We conclude that Huang has not established the

trial court abused its discretion in ordering Huang to produce the cell phones.

      2. Huey established relevance of requested discovery

      Huang also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling

the imaging of his cell phones because Huey failed to show that the cell phone data

was relevant, discoverable information related to the claims at issue. The subject

of the lawsuit is Huey’s claim for damages allegedly caused when Huang, driving

an 18-wheeler, collided with Huey in a pickup truck after Huang failed to slow

down at an intersection with allegedly nonfunctional traffic lights. Huey alleged

                                          7
that certain facts tended to show that Huang was distracted while driving—likely

by use of one or more of his cell phones. These facts were Huang’s speed of

approximately 50 mph when he entered the intersection with allegedly

nonfunctional traffic lights, Huang’s failure to slow down or brake at the

intersection despite the allegedly nonfunctional traffic lights, and Huang’s

possession of more than one cell phone in the cab of his truck at the time of the

accident. The fact that Huang failed to slow down as he neared and entered the

intersection despite the alleged lack of functional traffic lights tends to show that

Huang was distracted at the time he approached and entered the intersection and

the two cell phones suggest that Huang may have been distracted from driving due

to cell phone use.

      Although Huang produced a redacted copy of his cell phone bill for the day

of the accident, Huey claims that this does not indicate which applications were in

use and generating data, nor does it provide a time stamp associated with any

particular data usage. In Kuraray, the Texas Supreme Court stated that “to be

entitled to production of cell-phone-data, the party seeking it must allege or

provide some evidence of cell-phone use by the person whose data is sought at a

time when it could have been a contributing cause of the incident on which the

claim is based.” Kuraray Am., 656 S.W.3d at 142. The Texas Supreme Court

explained that a requesting party “must allege or provide some evidence of cell-

                                         8
phone use by the person whose data is sought at a time when it could have been a

contributing cause of the incident on which the claim is based.” Id. In this case,

Huey alleged Huang was negligent in part due to distracted driving and in his

motion to compel, Huey asserted facts tending to show that cell phones could have

been the cause of the distraction.

      Huang argues that Huey is unable to meet the burden of proof required

without offering a witness affidavit attesting that the truck driver had admitted to

looking at his phone at the time of the accident. See id. at 143 (citing In re UV

Logistics, LLC, No. 12-20-00196-CV, 2021 WL 306205, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler

Jan. 29, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). There are no witnesses in this case, as

there were in Kuraray, who can testify about Huang’s alleged cell phone use. But

Huey alleged facts supporting the implication that Huang was distracted and using

a cell phone at the time of the collision, such as the fact that, while driving an 18-

wheeler, Huang did not slow down or apply his brakes as he neared and entered the

intersection where the traffic lights were allegedly not functioning, and he had

more than one personal cell phone in the cab of the truck. These facts, if proven,

support the pleading allegation that Huang was distracted while driving, possibly

by cell phone use. These facts are more specific than the allegation in Kuraray, in

which the plaintiffs did not plead cell phone use as a contributing cause of the

release of ethylene vapor. See id. Here, Huey did plead that Huang was driving

                                          9
while distracted and alleged facts in his motion to compel that tended to indicate

the distraction was cell phone use.

      Because Huey established that he made a specific request for the data, the

production was insufficient, and there was a relationship between the cell phone

data and Huey’s allegation of distracted driving, we conclude that Huang has not

established an abuse of discretion by the trial court as to the threshold showing for

compelling production of the cell phone data.

      C. Lack of date or subject matter restrictions and safeguards for
      confidential information was an abuse of discretion

      Huang complains in his first two issues that the trial court’s order was an

abuse of discretion because it did not comply with the Texas Supreme Court and

Rule 196 requirements that the ordered discovery must be specific, relevant,

appropriately tailored in time and scope, and with adequate safeguards for

confidential or sensitive information. In his fifth issue, Huang also complains that

the trial court did not ensure the inspection and copying of his cell phone data

would utilize the least intrusive means. Huey responds that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion because the discovery was ordered produced in accordance

with “appropriate” protocol. Huey contends that he furnished security measures in

a protocol to protect confidential information.

      In his motion to compel, Huey asked the trial court to order inspection and

imaging of Huang’s cell phones under a narrow window of time using an
                                         10
appropriate protocol to protect confidential, private, or sensitive information.

Huey asserted that this information was relevant to determine whether Huang was

distracted by using his cell phones at the time of the accident. Huey sought only

usage data from the two-hour interval around the time of the accident (one hour

before the accident and one hour after).

      The trial court abuses its discretion when it compels production beyond the

rules of procedure. See Kuraray, 656 S.W.3d at 142. “While trial courts enjoy

discretion in determining what is ‘relevant to the subject matter,’ that discretion is

not unlimited.” Id.     One limitation on the trial court’s discretion is that the

“discovery requests must not be overbroad.” In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 507

S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2016). Once the party seeking production has shown that

the cell phone use could have been a contributing cause to the incident on which

the claim is based, “the trial court may order production of cell-phone data,

provided its temporal scope is tailored to encompass only the period in which cell-

phone use could have contributed to the incident.” Kuraray, 656 S.W.3d at 142.

      In Weekley Homes, the Texas Supreme Court set out the proper procedure

for discovery of electronic information under Rule 196.4. See 295 S.W.3d at 322.

One of these requirements is that, if the trial court determines that the benefits

outweigh the burdens of production and orders production of information not

                                           11
reasonably available, “sensitive information should be protected and the least

intrusive means should be employed.” Id.

      Although Huey clearly asked for production of cell phone data limited to

one hour before and one hour after the collision and suggested a protocol, the trial

court did not specify the temporal scope of the compelled production other than to

say that the “cell phones be imaged under a narrow window of time . . . .” Huey

asked for production and imaging of cell-phone data during a one-hour window of

time—one hour before and one hour after the accident—when the use of the

phones could have contributed to the accident and the trial court abused its

discretion by failing to order production of the cell-phone data within a temporal

scope tailored to encompass only the time in which the use of the phones could

have contributed to the accident. See id.

      Moreover, the trial court should have considered Huang’s objections

concerning the privacy or confidentiality of the cell-phone data. See id. 145 n.3.

In Exhibit H to the motion to compel, Huey included a proposed protocol

agreement and stated that the forensic investigator was Digital Discovery of

Dallas, Texas who would inspect for data from 12:21 pm to 2:21 pm on September

14, 2021, and that Huang would be able to designate for redaction any privileged,

personal, or sensitive information. Moreover, the imaging data would not be

retained longer than the time to complete the digital data extraction, or about half a

                                            12
day, and then the phones would be returned to Huang. Although Huey proposed a

protocol to protect confidential or personal information, Huang did not agree to

this and stated in his response to the motion to compel that the proposed protocol

provided no assurance that his confidential or personal information would be

protected. In its order, the trial court set out no safeguards for the protection of

confidential or personal information, but ordered the cell phones imaged “using an

appropriate protocol to protect any confidential, private, or sensitive information . .

. .” This statement in the order is no more than encouragement that offers Huang

no protection for personal or confidential information.        See In re Clark, 345

S.W.3d 209, 213 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, orig. proceeding) (holding that

order including no search parameters limiting access to personal and confidential

information was abuse of discretion).

      In In re Honza, 242 S.W.3d 578, 584 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, orig.

proceeding), the trial court’s order preserved privileged or confidential information

in several ways: (1) the search was limited to two documents which the Honzas

could review before they were produced; (2) the Honzas could withhold from

discovery any documents they claimed were privileged or confidential and could

instead provide a privilege log subject to in camera review by the trial court; (3)

the order provided that observation of information during imaging did not waive

privilege or confidentiality; (4) a protective order prohibited parties from

                                          13
unauthorized disclosure of information; and (5) the expert had to prove he was

bonded and had liability insurance to fully indemnify the Honzas against any

monetary loss.

      Here, the trial court provided no protocol or specific guidelines to protect

personal, confidential, or sensitive data by employing the least intrusive means for

obtaining the data. Although the protocol suggested by Huey included some

procedures for protection of personal, sensitive, or confidential data, that protocol

was not included in the trial court’s order and nothing in the order requires the use

of that protocol. The failure to include reasonable guidelines for protection of

Huang’s personal, confidential, or sensitive data was an abuse of discretion.

      D. Expert Qualifications

      In his fourth issue, Huang claims the trial court abused its discretion by

compelling inspection and copying of his personal cell phone data when Huey

failed to prove that (1) his proposed expert was qualified; and (2) the expert’s

proposed methodology was appropriate and reasonably likely to yield information.2

      Exhibit H to Huey’s motion to compel was a proposed agreement regarding

the protocol to be used during the forensic imaging, search, and inspection of

Huang’s cell phones. In this protocol, Huey specified that the proposed forensic

2
      In this issue, Huang also complained that the order did not require the expert to
      use the least intrusive means for obtaining the data. This complaint has been
      discussed in the previous section concerning safeguards of privacy and temporal
      scope.
                                          14
investigator was Digital Discovery of Dallas, Texas but there does not appear to be

any evidence explaining the experience and expertise of Digital Discovery as to

inspection and copying of cell phone data.

         Even if a party meets the threshold showing that the opposing party

defaulted in its discovery obligation, the trial court “should not permit the

requesting party itself to access the opponent’s storage device; rather, only a

qualified expert should be afforded such access.” Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at

318. Although the record shows that Huang challenged the proposed protocol for

the expert’s inspection and imaging of his cell phones, the record does not show

that Huang challenged the qualifications of Huey’s forensic expert in the trial

court.

         “Equity is generally not served by issuing an extraordinary writ against a

trial court on a ground that was never presented to the court and that the court thus

had no opportunity to address.” In re Bank of Am., N.A., No. 01-02-00567-CV,

2003 WL 22310800, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 9, 2003, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.).       Mandamus relief generally requires a showing of a

predicate request and the trial court’s erroneous refusal of that request. See In re

Eagleridge Operating, LLC, 642 S.W.3d 518, 525 (Tex. 2022). There can be no

showing of an abuse of discretion when Huang did not object to the expert’s

qualification in the trial court. See id.

                                            15
      E. Huang lacks an adequate remedy by appeal

      “Mandamus relief is available when a trial court compels production of

electronic data and information beyond the permissible bounds of discovery.” In

re Pinnacle Eng’g, Inc., 405 S.W.3d 835, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2013, orig. proceeding) (citing Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 322). The harm a

party will suffer from an order requiring relinquishment of data for forensic

examination and the harm that may result from revealing private information and

confidential communications, “cannot be remedied on appeal.” In re Methodist

Primary Care Grp., 553 S.W.3d 709, 714–15 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2018, orig. proceeding).

      Here, the trial court ordered Huang to produce his two cell phones for

imaging without specifying any temporal scope and without addressing safeguards

for Huang’s private or confidential information, such as that set out in Huey’s

proposed protocol. Instead, the trial court merely suggested in the order that the

imaging occur “under a narrow window of time” and that private, confidential, or

sensitive information be protected by “an appropriate protocol.” By failing to

order the imaging to occur within a specified window of time and without any

specific guidelines for protecting confidential, personal, or sensitive information,

the trial court’s order compelled production “beyond the permissible bounds of

discovery.”   Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 322.         Thus, mandamus relief is

                                        16
available. If the appellate court is unable to “remedy the trial court’s discovery

error,” such as the production of confidential or private information, there is no

adequate remedy by appeal. Id. We conclude that Huang lacks an adequate

remedy by appeal of the trial court’s order compelling production of data without

adequate protections for confidential, private, or sensitive information and without

limitations as to temporal scope.

                                    Conclusion

      Because we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

include limitations as to temporal scope of production of cell phone data and

protection of confidential, sensitive, or personal data, we conditionally grant the

petition for writ of mandamus and order the trial court to vacate the order signed

on July 22, 2022. We are confident that the trial court with comply, and our writ

will issue only if it does not. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

                                    PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Guerra.

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