Court Opinion

ID: 9444203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:45:48.800528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:46.227654
License: Public Domain

HUTCHESON, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
With deference I cannot agree with the opinion of the majority that Section 3116 renders forfeit an automobile used by its owner as a convoy, look out, decoy, or lure to facilitate his successful transportation in other vehicles of liquor or other contraband, by helping them elude pursuit, when there is no proof whatever that the automobile was an in rem violator in the sense of hauling, concealing, or otherwise harboring contraband.
To me it seems clear that in rejecting the conclusions of the district judge and the reasoning on which they are based, that it was not so forfeit, the majority is but seeking to breathe new life into a mistaken conception which had considerable district court and some appellate backing until its ghost was laid in United States v. Lane Motor Co., 344 U.S. 630, 74 S.Ct. 459, 97 L.Ed. 622. There, it seems to me, the court in and by its very laconicism made clearer than a multitude of words could have done the true meaning and effect of Section 3116 when viewed as the instrument and means of forfeiture. This is that, in joining “liquor” and “property” intended for “use”, subject to forfeiture, the statute deals with liquor and property alike as a res, which, having itself offended against, became forfeit to the law and subject to be declared forfeit in an in rem proceeding. It does not deal with it as, or provide that it becomes, subject to forfeiture because of the personal wrongful activities and wrong doings of its owner or driver. On the contrary, in the case of a car, the forfeiture provided for follows automatically from its in rem use, that is from the use of the car to handle, haul, remove or conceal contraband, wholly independently of the intention or knowledge of the driver, custodian, or owner, that the car is being or has been so used. This being so, it must, I think, be conceded that if the car is not so used, the fact that in committing a crime, the owner or driver of the car used it in aid of his criminal activities, such as going to and returning from the scene of his crimes, aiding others in the commission of a crime as a look out, or otherwise, or using it as an escape vehicle, cannot, under Section 3116, be imputed to the car so as to make it an in rem violator of the Internal Revenue laws, and, therefore, forfeit.
As clearly pointed out by the majority in United States v. Dixon, 347 U.S. 381, 74 S.Ct. 566, 98 L.Ed. -, a case dealing with the possession of contraband and, therefore, forfeited articles, Sec. 3116 has two aspects, each distinct from the *791other. One of these is its aspect as an in rem or civil statute of forfeiture, making the in rem violator forfeitable in rem. The other is its aspect as an in personam criminal statute, denouncing a criminal offense and making the offender liable personally for it.
With deference, it seems to me that the opinion of the majority in this case and the inability of the minority in the Dixon case to go along with the opinion of the majority in that case proceeds from the failure to give effect to the distinction between the civil and criminal sanctions imposed by Sec. 3116. The civil sanctions fixed for the in rem violation of the act are automatically imposed upon the in rem violator. The criminal sanctions fixed for personal violations of the act are imposed upon the person intentionally violating it.
I think the judgment should be affirmed, for the reasons given by the district judge. I dissent from the reversal of his judgment.