Court Opinion

ID: 9642861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:11:07.53015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:53.686867
License: Public Domain

Andree Layton Roaf, Judge, dissenting. I would affirm udge, believe the devise at issue is a general devise, and because the appellant did not make this argument to the trial court, nor does she raise it on appeal. A specific legacy, as defined in Holcomb v. Mullin, 167 Ark. 622, 268 S.W. 32 (1925), is a “gift by will of a specific article or part of the testator’s estate, which is identified and distinguished from all other parts of the same kind, and which may be satisfied only by the delivery of the particular thing.” The devise at issue in the present case is worded as follows: “All the remaining monetary-assets go to my Brother John to do with as he sees fit.” Jack Parker, the testator, did not distinguish any funds he might own from the rest of his monetary assets. Here, he used the general term “monetary assets” and did not list any funds or accounts that this money might possibly come from. See Barnes v. Sewell, 269 Ark. 1, 598 S.W.2d 77 (1980) (holding that will paragraph in which testatrix bequeathed “all monies I may possess, my checking account monies, savings account monies, Certificates of Deposits, bonds of any nature and other evidence of debt such as promissory notes” was a specific rather than general bequest despite the contention that the bequest mentioned no amount and referred to no particular fund). Jack knew that he owned certain funds and could have listed the funds and account numbers in his will. Ifjack had referred to his “remaining monetary assets” and then listed out what funds and accounts he wished this money to come from, then it would have clearly been a specific devise. Here, the devise is only a general one because Jack did not even hint as to what these “monetary assets” were and, he, in no way, attempted to distinguish certain monetary assets from others. This case is confusing, however, because the parties have framed the issue in terms of specific devises versus residual devises when the issue is whether this is a specific devise or a general devise. According to the parties in this case, if it is not residual, then it is specific. This is not a correct statement of the law, because a devise can be properly classified as a general devise and neither a residual nor a specific devise. According to the Arkansas abatement statute, the order of abatement is as follows: (1) Property not disposed of by the will; (2) Property devised to the residuary devisee; (3) Property disposed of by the will but not specifically devised and not devised to the residuary devisee; and (4) Property specifically devised. Ark. Code Ann. § 28-53-107 (Repl. 2004). The trial court found that the appellee John’s devise falls into category (4) along with appellant’s devise, so that the two devises abate equally. However, John’s devise instead falls into category (3), which is “[pjroperty disposed of by the will but not specifically devised and not devised to the residuary devisee.” This means that the property of the devise at issue in the present case would abate before any property specifically devised. John’s bequest of monies therefore would abate before appellant’s specific bequest of the house. The language of Ark. Code Ann. § 28-53-107 (b)(1) further sheds some light on the issue. It states, “A general devise charged on any specific property or fund, for purpose of abatement, shall be deemed property specifically devised to the extent of the value of the thing on which it is charged.” This language clearly demonstrates that the “general devise” category (Category 3 in the statute) clearly exists. It also supports the argument that general devises of money not charged on a specific property or fund are deemed general devises and not specific devises. In the present case, the decedent did not charge his general devise of money on any specific property or fund. Finally, the trial court is correct in that the devise at issue is certainly not a residual devise. The appellant, however, has not argued that the bequest is a general devise, but rather that it is a residuary devise. We can affirm a trial court if it reaches the right result for the wrong reason Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark. 434, 139 W.W.3d 500 (2003); Moore Inv. Co., Inc. v. Mitchell, 91 Ark. App. 102, 208 S.W.3d 803 (2005). Flowever, we do not reverse a trial court where, as in the case before us, an argument is raised neither below nor on appeal. Crockett v. Essex, 341 Ark. 558, 19 S.W.3d 585 (2000); Sheets v. Dollarway Sch. Dist., 82 Ark. App. 539, 120 S.W.3d 119 (2003); McGuire v. Smith, 58 Ark. App. 68, 946 S.W.2d 717 (1997). We should not do so in this case.