Court Opinion

ID: 9848081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:12:28.547025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:00.664076
License: Public Domain

Justice Huskins
dissenting.
My views on kidnapping are fully expressed and documented in State v. Hudson, 281 N.C. 100, 187 S.E. 2d 756 (1972); State v. Murphy, 280 N.C. 1, 184 S.E. 2d 845 (1971); State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 178 S.E. 2d 577 (1971); and State v. Penley, 277 N.C. 704, 178 S.E. 2d 490 (1971). Like views are expressed by Chief Justice Bobbitt in State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 180 S.E. 2d 115 (1971). The foregoing decisions are supported by earlier decisions of this Court, including State v. Bruce, 268 N.C. 174, 150 S.E. 2d 216 (1966); State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 139 S.E. 2d 870 (1965); State v. Gough, 257 N.C. 348, 126 S.E. 2d 118 (1962); and State v. Kelly, 206 N.C. 660, 175 S.E. 2d 294 (1934).
Here, the majority opinion waters down the law which I regard as settled in this State and creates uncertainties of unknown dimensions. The common law definition of kidnapping obtains in North Carolina. It has been defined as “the unlawful taking and carrying away of a person by force and against his *503will.” State v. Lowry, supra. The use of fraud instead of force in effecting kidnapping is still kidnapping, State v. Gough, supra; and threats and intimidation are the equivalent of actual force. State v. Bruce, supra. It is perfectly apparent that this defendant unlawfully took and carried away the jailer by force and against his will. The majority says defendant “took” the victim but didn’t “carry him away enough.” How much is enough? The more often that question is answered in future decisions, the more indefinite the definition of kidnapping will become.
I agree that a mere technical asportation of the victim, such as moving him about in the same room, is not kidnapping; but where, as here, by force and against his will, the victim is unlawfully taken and carried away from the free environment in which he was found and locked in a jail cell located elsewhere, the asportation is more than “merely technical” and the “environment” after the abduction is not the environment in which the victim was found. As I see it, the legal principles enunciated in the majority opinion, while sound when applied in a proper factual setting, should not be applied to the facts in this case.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent and vote to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Justice Higgins joins in this dissenting opinion.