Court Opinion

ID: 9687142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:16:51.938477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:24.506015
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Chief Justice
(specially concurring).
Despite the disclaimer in the majority opinion and Justice Sabers’ special concurrence, we are reversing Opperman II. I join their “modification.”
SABERS, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur, especially in the preservation of State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976) (Opperman II), as modified. Although the differences in these two cases do not appear to be great, they are sufficient to produce different results. In this case, the vehicle was involved in a DWI in Rapid City. The defendant was not the registered owner of the vehicle. The doors of the vehicle would not lock. The registered owner of the vehicle had a Sturgis address and it was not practical to locate him. Therefore, unlike Opperman II, it was reasonable to tow, impound, open, and inventory the contents of the vehicle, including those contained in the locked trunk. This inventory procedure was reasonable and did not violate the provisions of the state or federal constitutions against unreasonable searches and seizures.
I am authorized to state that Justice MORGAN joins in this special concurrence.
HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, concurring in result in part).
I join the majority opinion in a reversal of the sentencing for the reason that the sentencing was a habitual offender sentencing and was incorrectly imposed because conspiracy to commit murder and accessory after the fact to murder was the “same transaction” under SDCL 22-7-9.
I concur in result on Issue II in that this author believes in the holding of Opper-man II. This author has attended, like thousands of other trial judges, the courses at the National Judicial College where this Supreme Court’s decision in Opperman has been taught and held up as a vanguard for state constitutional rights and, more specifically, the right of a state to grant its citizens more protection under its own state constitution than those rights afforded under the Fourth Amendment under the United States Constitution. Later, as an appellate judge attending appellate seminars in the nation, I have been likewise impressed with the frequent reference to the Opperman II holding by noted appellate scholars. It is noteworthy that Opper-man II held that an “inventory search” fell under a scrutiny of the “unreasonable search and seizure” provision of our state constitution, as an “inventory search” was a “search.” We further held in Opperman II that it was necessary that there be a determination of reasonableness which re*7quired a balancing of the need for a search in a particular case vis-á-vis the scope of the particular intrusion. For well over a decade, we have preserved this holding in this state and have often times cited our Opperman decision noting that there must be a “minimal interference” with an individual’s protected rights. I do not wish to depart from our Opperman holding.
Routine procedures of the Rapid City Police Department in taking inventory of the contents of this car, including the trunk, are totally immaterial. The procedures could be, in any given police scenario, foolhardy or unlawful, i.e., simply because some police department in any hamlet or city decides to establish a certain policy or procedure — such a procedure does not eradicate the Bill of Rights.
Officer Burdick, arresting officer on the DUI, conducted a search of the inside of the vehicle which Flittie drove in Rapid City when arrested for DUI. Burdick found four bags of what he believed to be marijuana under the driver’s side of the front seat. Such a discovery, without question, triggered a “probable cause” to look in the trunk of the car to discover more marijuana. Furthermore, the vehicle did not belong to Flittie. Additionally, this was a search contemporaneous with an arrest and was confined to the vicinity of the arrest and could be reasonably interpreted to obtain evidence so that it would not either be concealed or destroyed once the impoundment of the vehicle no longer existed.
Discovering four bags of marijuana under the driver’s side of the front seat, Officer Burdick had probable cause for searching this automobile under the “automobile exception.” Officer Burdick, having discovered marijuana within the inside chassis of the vehicle, had probable cause to believe that the trunk contained contraband or evidence of a crime. Therefore, under past precedent of this Court, namely, State v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d 128 (S.D.1982), and State v. Boardman, 264 N.W.2d 503 (S.D. 1978), this evidence should not have been suppressed. It was properly receivable in trial under both the “search incident to arrest exception” and the “automobile exception.”
My research reveals twenty-five separate jurisdictions which have cited Opperman II with approval. We need not depart from our Opperman II holding which has been cited throughout the nation, taught at national appellate seminars, and is deeply imbedded in the written law of this state. The majority’s phrase, “reasonable, standardized and uniform policies,” has a lofty ring, but in Podunk, USA, that might very well be — bad.