Court Opinion

ID: 9568770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:22.532159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:06:39.735022
License: Public Domain

M. Warshawsky, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from the majority.
I adopt the facts as they are clearly and concisely set forth in the majority’s opinion.
MCR 2.313(B) provides a variety of remedies for a party’s failure to respond to discovery orders or permit discovery. This Court has previously stated that the above provision is broad enough to permit a trial court to exclude evidence if the trial court, in its discretion, believes that such action is an appropriate remedy for violation of discovery practice. Kurczewski v State Highway Comm, 112 Mich App 544, 549; 316 NW2d 484 (1982), lv den 414 Mich 957 (1982).
This Court will not reverse the trial court’s decision to bar expert testimony from trial absent a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. Thorne v Carter, 149 Mich App 90; 385 NW2d 738 (1986), Banaszewski v Colman, 131 Mich App 92; 345 NW2d 647 (1983).
I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court imposed "too harsh a sanction for the circumstances” and that the trial court should have chosen less drastic measures to compel discovery.
To impose a sanction of costs and allow plaintiffs to bring in experts just before trial without allowing defense counsel sufficient time for proper preparation of his case would be unjust and prejudicial to the defendants.
*225On the other hand, if the trial court applies the sanction of barring the expert’s testimony, the consequences, as here, are harsh on the plaintiffs.
Thus, the issue becomes simplified: Whose action or lack of action, in a lawsuit, caused the impasse? These plaintiffs, utilizing the judicial system to redress an alleged wrong, have a duty to use diligence in advancing the action in fairness to these defendants who did not invite themselves to be sued.
The plaintiffs cannot deny they were given ample opportunity to disclose their experts. The plaintiffs failed to explain why they did not furnish to defense counsel their list of expert witnesses earlier as they stated in their supplemental answers to interrogatories filed on November 13, 1985, that they first consulted with their expert witnesses sometime in 1984.
Barring the expert testimony is a reasonable sanction under the circumstances in this case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
I would affirm.