Court Opinion

ID: 9523316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:38:56.858678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:53.185256
License: Public Domain

Concurring on Petition for Rehearing
Kelley, J.
We have denied the petition for rehearing filed by the appellees in the above appeal. That the petition should be denied for the reason that it fails to show error in the opinion handed down, meets with no opposition. However, an additional element or reason for denial has been injected which I think needs some attention. The new matter pertains to the compliance by the petitioner with Rule 2-22 of the Supreme Court. This rule was adopted April 17, 1940 and became effective *144September 2, 1940. It was amended June 17, 1943, effective September 6, 1943.
The material substance of this particular rule, as it now stands, has been in effect for 15 years. Yet I know of no case, nor have I been able to find any, until a recent case in which I did not participate, in which a petition for rehearing was denied or dismissed on the ground that it contained some argument or citation of authorities.
It has been a somewhat common practice fqr attorneys to incorporate a degree of argument with citation of authorities in their petitions for rehearing, and, to my best recollection, we never have raised or noted any objection to the consideration of such petitions because they did not strictly comply with the rule stated. Vainly have I endeavored to find one case, other than the aforesaid recent one not participated in by me, wherein the rehearing petition was denied or dismissed upon the ground now referred to. All of the cases I found held that the petition stated no proper ground for rehearing or that the petition “does not state any particular cause or errors by reason of which the decision of the court . . . is supposed to be erroneous.” Reed v. Kalfsbeck, et al. (1897), 147 Ind. 148, 157, 46 N. E. 466. See, also, The Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Company v. Conoyer (1898), 149 Ind. 524, 532, 49 N. E. 452; Goodwin v. Goodwin, Executor, (1874), 48 Ind. 584, 596; and Terre Haute, Indianapolis and Eastern Traction Company v. Scott (1930), 91 Ind. App. 690, 694, 172 N. E. 659.
The cases and the rule all provide that the petition must state concisely the reasons why the decision is thought to be erroneous. That, of course, is fundamental. But under the present inclination of this court, a petition which does concisely state such reasons is to be denied or dismissed because some argument or citation *145of authorities is contained therein. Certainly, the rule does not state that the petition can contain no words of argument and no citation of authorities, no matter how brief or few in number. Under the rule, what prevents our consideration of such matter as surplusage? In our Code pleading, a complaint, answer, or other pleading, is not dismissed or thrown out because it contains surplusage. The only right given with reference thereto is to have the surplusage set aside or stricken out on motion. Burns’ 1946 Replacement, Sec. 2-1054. But under our construction of said Rule 2-22, a client or litigant, perhaps in a very important and essential appeal, with vital interests and much property at stake, is to be deprived of consideration by our Supreme Court of the merits of his cause and the virtue of our opinion by the sudden and unexpected asserted violation of the rule which, in fact, does not provide that he can have no argument nor citation of authorities in his petition. The rule states that the “reasons” must be concisely stated. It does not provide that the “petition”, itself, must be concise nor that it can contain nothing but the stated reasons.
All these many years we have lulled the profession, and particularly those attorneys who participate frequently in appeals and appellate procedure, into a belief that we do not insist upon a rigid compliance with the stated rule and they have come, insofar as more or less minor infractions are concerned, to rely upon our past record with regard thereto. If we now intend to insist upon strict compliance with the rule, then let us first determine exactly what the rule means, the scope thereof, and advise the bar of our intention to dismiss all rehearing petitions which are not in complete compliance therewith.
Under the circumstances, it seems to me that we would do well to heed the expression of the highest au*146thority in our Nation. As stated in 14 Am. Jur., Courts, page 361, Sec. 157, “. . . the statement has been made by the very highest authority that rules of court are merely the means to accomplish justice, and that it is always in the power of the court to suspend its own rules and except a particular case from its operation whenever the purposes of justice require it.” The United States v. Gotlieb Breitling (1858), 20 How. (U. S.) 252, 15 L. Ed. 900.
We are not unfamiliar with the fact that well intentioned attorneys with little experience in appellate practice are very apt to in some way infract not only this rule, but others, in the honest belief that they have complied therewith and with good faith effort so to do. Notwithstanding such, we who constantly deal with the rules and who sometimes find ourselves at variance as to their interpretation and application, now propose, upon grounds not clearly defined by the rule, to dismiss the rehearing petitions and with them the coveted right of the unfortunate clients to have their cause reviewed by the Supreme Court. Is this meeting the ends of justice?
I would not want it understood that I am proposing that parties litigant can violate the rules, in a substantial manner, and escape the consequences upon the plea of “good faith effort” or want of knowledge. Most of the rules are clear and unambiguous. But the rule now being considered, in my opinion, is not as clear as could be hoped for. It is evident that the petition cannot be merged in the briefs and must be separate and apart therefrom. And it is clear that the petition must be concise as to the “reasons” specified. But wherein does the rule provide that if the petition contains anything other than the reasons, concisely stated, it must be denied or dismissed?
I think the rehearing petition before us should be denied, but upon the ground that it does not show error.