Court Opinion

ID: 9785524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:07:48.319774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:27.890930
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice,
concurring in the result:
1 23 I concur in the result reached by my colleagues. However, I would reverse the trial court on the basis of jurisdiction afforded by application of the Utah long-arm statute alone. Analysis of the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction language of the contract between the parties is both unnecessary and, in my opinion, potentially misleading for other litigants and courts.
24 The relevant portion of Utah's long-arm statute provides:
*263Any person ... whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state....
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1996).
125 We have repeatedly held that the long-arm statute must be "'extended to the fullest extent allowed by due process of law." Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50 ¶ 7, 980 P.2d 204 (quoting Symergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985)). The undisputed facts here support such an application. - Henderson called PDC at PDC's Utah offices to initiate negotiation of the contract. He then visited PDC's Utah office to negotiate the terms of the contract, called PDC's Utah offices again to complete the negotiations, and sent the executed agreement to PDC in Utah. The suit arises from a dispute over the meaning and terms of the contract resulting from these negotiations. In my opinion, these contacts are enough to constitute the "transaction of any business within this state" as contemplated by our long-arm statute. All that remains to be evaluated is whether holding Henderson subject to Utah's jurisdiction accords with due process. i
126 Due process requires that the defendant has had "minimum contacts with [Utah] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (citation omitted). We look to the " 'relationship of the defendant, the forum, and the litigation to each other"" Parry v. Ernst Home Cir. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1989) (quoting Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110). Here, the controversy arises directly from the contract negotiations and the terms of the agreement created by Henderson's acts in Utah. I cannot see how the interests of fair play and substantial justice are compromised by requiring the defense of the action in Utah courts.
T27 Standing alone, Henderson's contacts with PDC in Utah regarding the contract giving rise to the litigation are sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Henderson. Discussion of a presumption relating to the forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause adds nothing in this particular case. In fact, discussing it in connection with this case may give the false impression that somehow it does make a difference. As a result, I would save evaluation of the legal impact of the forum - selection/consent-to-jurisdiction contractual clause for a case when our consideration will have real consequences and be less likely to muddy the waters.
128 I would reverse and remand to the trial court on the basis of jurisdiction premised on simple application of the long-arm statute.
1 29 Associate Chief Justice RUSSON concurs in Justice WILKINS' opinion.