Court Opinion

ID: 9962582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 20:13:46.900648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:09.598735
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  RONALD B. SMITH                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1061 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 20, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-1241201-1993

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 23, 2024

       Ronald B. Smith (“Smith”) appeals pro se from the order dismissing his

serial petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       In 1992, Smith was arrested and charged in connection with the fatal

shooting of William Jones, who was seated in the driver’s seat of a vehicle at

the time he was shot. The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial at which two

eyewitnesses testified that Smith shot Jones at close range through the

passenger door of the vehicle. On July 22, 1994, at the conclusion of trial,

the trial court convicted Smith of first-degree murder and possession of an

instrument of crime and sentenced him to life in prison. This Court affirmed

the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal

on September 24, 1996. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 679 A.2d 258 (Pa.
____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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Super. 1996) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 683 A.2d 881 (Pa.

1996). Smith did not seek further review in the United States Supreme Court.

       Smith thereafter unsuccessfully filed several PCRA petitions.       See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 778 A.2d 1248 (Pa. Super. 2001) (unpublished

memorandum) (affirming the denial of Smith’s first PCRA petition);2 see also

Commonwealth v. Smith, 217 A.3d 407 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished

memorandum) (affirming the dismissal of Smith’s third PCRA petition). 3

       On June 21, 2019, Smith filed the instant petition, his fourth. Therein,

he averred that he recently discovered that a fellow prison inmate, Farran

Haynes, witnessed the 1992 murder and attested in an attached affidavit that

an unknown assailant was the actual shooter, rather than Smith. The PCRA

court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Smith filed a response in opposition to the Rule

907 notice. On March 20, 2023, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing

the petition as untimely filed. Smith filed a timely notice of appeal. 4

       Smith raises the following issues for our review:

____________________________________________

2 Smith’s second PCRA petition was dismissed in 2015; however, he did not

appeal the dismissal of that petition.

3 Smith attempted to file another petition while his third PCRA petition was

pending on appeal; however, that petition was dismissed as premature. See
Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000) (holding that a
subsequent PCRA petition cannot be filed until the resolution of review of the
pending PCRA petition).

4 The PCRA court did not order Smith to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement; nevertheless, Smith filed one of his own accord.

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      I.) Did the PCRA court err, and commit reversible error when
      [Smith] established that his new discovered [sic] facts claims was
      [sic] within the plain language of the timeliness exception set forth
      at 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§§] 9545(b)(1)(ii), 9545(b)(2), and section
      9543(a)(2)(vi)?

      II.) Is [Smith] entitled to a new trial, or a remand for an
      evidentiary hearing based upon the affidavit of Farran Haynes
      stating that he was a witness to the shooting death of Williams
      [sic] Jones?

      III.) Did the PCRA court err, and commit reversible error when it
      dismissed [Smith’s] petition without the benefit of appointing a
      [PCRA] counsel to amend, and perfect [Smith’s] petition?

Smith’s Brief at VI (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

   Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

             We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in
      the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
      This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
      evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it
      is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This
      Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the
      record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
      factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
      findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
      afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
      petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
      novo and our scope of review plenary.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

      Under the PCRA, any petition, including a second or subsequent petition,

must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).     A judgment of sentence becomes final at the

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conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the

expiration of time for seeking such review. Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s

timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not

address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely

filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

      This Court previously determined that Smith’s judgment of sentence

became final on December 23, 1996, when the period in which to file a timely

petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court expired. See Smith,

217 A.3d 407 (unpublished memorandum at *4); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(3) (providing that a judgment of sentence becomes final at the

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the

expiration of time for seeking the review); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13 (stating

appellant must file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court within ninety days after entry of judgment by a state court of

last resort). Smith had until December 23, 1997, to file the instant PCRA

petition, but did not do so until June 21, 2019. Thus, Smith’s petition is facially

untimely under the PCRA.

      Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the

petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of three exceptions set forth under

section 9545(b)(1). Any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions

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must “be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been

presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2).

      One of those statutory exceptions, the newly-discovered fact exception,

excuses the untimeliness of a petition where the petition alleges, and the

petitioner proves, that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise

of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). The due diligence inquiry

required by section 9545(b)(1)(ii) is fact-sensitive and dependent upon the

circumstances presented. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 1063,

1070 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). “[D]ue diligence requires neither perfect

vigilance nor punctilious care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a

petitioner, based on the particular circumstances, to uncover facts that may

support a claim for collateral relief.” Id. at 1071. The focus of the exception

found at section 9545(b)(1)(ii) is on newly-discovered facts, not on newly-

discovered   sources   that   corroborate   previously   known   facts.    See

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 185 A.3d 1055, 1064 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(en banc); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1269

(Pa. 2008) (holding that appellant’s discovery of another conduit for the same

claim did not transform his latest source into evidence falling within the ambit

of section 9545(b)(1)(ii)); Commonwealth v. Lambert, 57 A.3d 645, 649

(Pa. Super. 2012) (reiterating that the exception is not satisfied if the only

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new aspect of the claim is that a new witness has come forward to testify

regarding the previously raised claim).

      In his first issue, Smith contends that the PCRA court erred by

dismissing his petition as untimely filed. Smith concedes that his petition is

facially untimely under the PCRA; however, he claims that he satisfied the

newly-discovered fact exception provided by section 9545(b)(1)(ii) because

he did not discover that Haynes witnessed the murder — and could attest that

Smith was not the shooter — until June 26, 2018. Smith asserts that the

instant petition, filed on June 21, 2019, was filed within one year of his June

26, 2018 discovery. Smith argues that he could not have discovered these

new facts through the exercise of due diligence because he did not know

Haynes and was unaware that Haynes witnessed the murder until June 26,

2018. According to Smith, whereas other Commonwealth witnesses testified

that they saw Smith shoot Jones from the passenger door of the vehicle,

Haynes’ affidavit indicates that a tall, dark-skinned, bearded male shot Jones

from the driver’s side door of the vehicle.       Smith claims that Haynes’

attestations are consistent with the evidence presented at trial that Jones was

shot in the left side of his head. Smith insists that, if a new trial were to be

granted, Haynes’ testimony would result in a different verdict.

      The PCRA court considered Smith’s first issue and determined that it

lacked merit. The court explained:

           At the outset, the appended affidavit fails to provide any
      support to substantiate the alleged [“]facts[”] underlying

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      [Smith’s] claim.     [Smith] has neglected to explain how an
      individual he never met, nor aware that existed, possessed the
      ability to recall [Smith]’s appearance nearly three decades prior,
      much less claim it was “impossible” for [Smith] to be the shooter.
      Such a notion without any elaboration or corroboration strains
      credulity. Hayne[s’] alleged observation and description of the
      “shooter” is neither conclusive nor compelling. [Smith] is simply
      basing his argument on inmate Haynes[’] bald assertion.

             Furthermore, [Smith]’s contention that this unidentified
      assailant was the “actual shooter” is not a previously-unknown
      [“]fact[”] for purposes of subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). To the
      contrary, the alleged new fact (i.e., someone else committed the
      underlying murder) was already brought to this court’s attention
      in a previous unsuccessful PCRA petition. It is well[-]settled, the
      focus of this exception “is on the newly[-]discovered facts, not on
      a newly[-]discovered or newly[-]willing source for previously
      known facts.” [Smith]’s attempted use of inmate Haynes[’]
      proffered testimony is just another conduit for a previously raised
      claim, which does not transform his latest source into evidence
      failing within the ambit of subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii).

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/20/23, at 1-3 (footnotes, unnecessary capitalization,

and citations omitted).

      Based on our review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s ruling is

supported by the record and is free of legal error. At his bench trial, Smith

claimed that Shawn Parker, one of the two eyewitnesses to the shooting,

falsely identified Smith as the shooter.        See Smith, 217 A.3d 407

(unpublished memorandum at *7) (citing N.T., 7/21/94, at 355-98; N.T.,

7/22/94, at 430). Smith cross-examined Parker regarding the veracity of his

identification testimony, and presented a defense witness who contended that

Parker, and not Smith, was the shooter. Id. In his third PCRA petition, Smith

attempted to invoke the newly-discovered fact exception by claiming that he

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had a three-way telephone conversation with Parker and Johnny Walls in

2017, wherein Parker acknowledged that he falsely identified Smith as the

murderer. Id. (unpublished memorandum at *6). Smith attached an affidavit

from Walls to his third petition detailing this purported conversation. Id. On

appeal of the dismissal of Smith’s third PCRA petition, this Court determined

that Smith failed to prove that the alleged new “fact” (i.e., that Parker was

falsely inculpating him) was unknown to him nor undiscoverable through the

exercise of due diligence. Id. (unpublished memorandum at **6-7).

      In the instant petition, Smith attempted to invoke the newly-discovered

fact exception by providing an affidavit from a new witness, Haynes, who

attests (twenty-six years after the murder) that he witnessed the shooting,

that someone else shot Jones, and that Smith was not the shooter. These are

not new “facts.” Rather, Haynes is merely a newly-discovered or newly-willing

source for a previously raised claim (i.e., that Smith was not the shooter and

that someone else shot Jones). See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 249 A.3d

993, 1000 (Pa. 2021) (citations omitted) (holding that a newly-identified

source for a claim asserted in both a prior habeas petition and a prior PCRA

petition was merely a new source for previously known facts); see also Abu-

Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1269; Lambert, 57 A.3d at 649;           Consequently, the

record supports the PCRA court’s determination that Smith failed to satisfy the

newly-discovered fact exception provided by section 9545(b)(1)(ii).

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      In his second issue, Smith contends that the PCRA court abused its

discretion by dismissing his petition without conducting an evidentiary

hearing. The right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is

not absolute.   See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super.

2014). Rather, it is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold a

hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no support either

in the record or other evidence. Id. It is the responsibility of the reviewing

court on appeal to examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of

the record certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in

its determination that there were no issues of material fact in controversy and

in denying relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Id.

      As Smith’s fourth PCRA Petition was untimely filed and the record does

not reflect that any genuine issues of fact remain that would entitle him to

relief, we conclude that the PCRA court properly exercised its discretion in

dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Id.

      In his final issue, Smith contends that the PCRA court erred by

dismissing his petition without appointing PCRA counsel to file an amended

petition. A PCRA petitioner has a rule-based right to court-appointed counsel

for the first PCRA petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(A). However, with respect

to a second or subsequent PCRA petition, the PCRA court shall appoint counsel

when the judge determines that an evidentiary hearing is required.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(D); see also Comment (explaining that “counsel should be

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appointed only if the judge determines that an evidentiary hearing is

required”).

      As this is Smith’s fourth PCRA petition, the PCRA court could only

appoint Smith counsel if it determined that an evidentiary hearing was

required. Thus, because Smith was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the

PCRA court was not required to appoint Smith counsel.

      Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Smith’s fourth

PCRA petition as untimely filed.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 4/23/2024

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