Court Opinion

ID: 9739404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:14:26.158204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:57.164302
License: Public Domain

TERNUS, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority has tried to bandage a broken relationship; the result feels right, but its legal basis does not withstand close scrutiny.
As a court, we must “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624, 88 L.Ed.2d 598, 610 (1986). Our decisions should “furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise.” Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1789, 26 L.Ed.2d 339, 358 (1970). Our decisions should further “fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every ease.” Id. Such decisions maintain “public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.” Id.
I believe the decision announced today does not meet these expectations. The court’s opinion does not advance the law in a principled fashion because it is grounded upon an emotional reaction rather than sound legal reasoning. First, the majority has overturned the rule of law we applied in our recent decision, In re Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1993), without providing a solid legal basis for such a reversal. Second, the majority’s opinion is wrong for the same *484reasons that led this court to reject equitable parenthood two years ago in Ash.
I. Ash Overturned: Equitable Parenthood Recognized.
The majority refuses to acknowledge that Ash has been overruled. Instead, it states that “Ash furnished no factual basis for the adoption of the equitable parent doctrine in Iowa.” (Emphasis added.) It concludes that “Ash is not controlling under the circumstances here.” (Emphasis added.) These statements ignore Ash’s holding: We refused to adopt the equitable parent doctrine because we found “no statutory or common law basis” to support it, not because the facts precluded our application of that doctrine. Id. at 405 (emphasis added). Consequently, the Ash decision cannot be summarily dismissed with the oft-used phrase that it is “distinguishable on its facts,” as implied in the majority opinion.
Lest this be seen as a mere matter of semantics, we should remind ourselves of the value of precedent. “Precedent is the device by which a sequence of eases dealing with the same problem may be called law rather than will, rules rather than results.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability & Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L.Rev. 422, 422 (1988) (emphasis added). The doctrine of stare decisis
enhances the efficiency of judicial decision making, allowing judges to rely on settled law without having to reconsider the wisdom of prior decisions in every case they confront, and because it fosters predictability in the law, permitting litigants and potential litigants to act in the knowledge that precedent will not be overturned lightly and ensuring that they will not be treated unfairly as a result of frequent or unanticipated changes in the law.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 332, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1087, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 370 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord Hubbard v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1754, 1763, 131 L.Ed.2d 779, 792 (1995) ("Stare decisis is ‘a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon an arbitrary discretion.’ ”) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370, 105 L.Ed.2d 132, 147 (1989)). Thus, adherence to precedent has value. Kersten Co. v. Department of Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Iowa 1973) (“Stare decisis is a valuable legal doctrine which lends stability to the law-”). Consequently, we should not lightly disregard the rule of law embodied in our Ash decision.
To ensure that we are persuaded by reason and not result, we must be able to intelligently and specifically explain why precedent should be ignored: “Covert tools are never reliable tools.” Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 365 (1960). The majority must demonstrate a reason to overturn Ash: related principles of law have developed so far as to have left Ash a doctrinal anachronism; Ash’s rule has been found unworkable; or our decision was clearly erroneous. The majority fails to do so for good reason: There have been no developments in social values or the law in the two years since Ash was decided which can justify a different result here.
The real explanation for the rejection of Ash here is that the majority finds the conduct of Amy reprehensible; rewarding her deceit at John’s expense is an unacceptable result. The majority has been swayed by the result in this case and has forgotten the reason that led us to reject equitable parenthood in Ash. When we say
‘[tjhis is the basis of our decision,’ [we] not only constrain lower courts, [we] constrain [ourselves] as well. If the next ease should have such different facts that [our] political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite opposite, [we] will be unable to indulge those preferences; [we] have committed [ourselves] to the governing principle.
Antonin Sealia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1175, 1179 (1989). The majority has conveniently dismissed the fact that we committed ourselves to a principle in Ash. Overruling precedent based upon the majority’s motivation is exactly what the stare decisis doctrine is meant to prevent.
*485II. Overruling Precedent: Legitimate and Illegitimate Techniques.
A. Ash was a policy determination — not a fact-based decision. In the absence of any explanation of why equitable parenthood was inappropriate two years ago but is appropriate now, I must conclude that the majority has decided that Ash was wrongly decided in 1998. If our decision in Ash is “clearly erroneous,” we have a duty to overrule it. Kersten Co., 207 N.W.2d at 121 (stare decisis “should not be invoked to maintain a clearly erroneous result”); Doolittle v. Shelton, 1 Greene 272, 273 (Iowa 1848) (we will not disturb a prior decision “unless clearly erroneous”). However, we also have an obligation “to make clear our reasons for” doing so. Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 714, 74 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1956). The majority has failed to.elucidate its reasons for concluding that Ash was “clearly erroneous.”
The majority merely notes that “[t]he facts assumed in the adjudication here are far different” from those in Ash. But as previously noted, Ash rejected the equitable parent doctrine, not for lack of factual support, but for policy reasons: There was no “statutory or common law basis” for the doctrine. See Ash, 507 N.W.2d at 404-05 (“The same constraints and policy reasons cited earlier in Olds and Lihs apply with equal force to questions of paternity.”; “We find no statutory or common law basis for James’ claim of paternity.”). Our earlier rejection of equitable parenthood on a doctrinal basis is further evidenced by the varying factual patterns of the cases we cited in support of our holding — including cases with married couples. Id. (citing In re Marriage of O’Brien, 13 Kan.App.2d 402, 772 P.2d 278, 283-84 (1989) (rejecting equitable parent claim by mother’s former husband); Lipiano v. Lipiano, 89 Md.App. 571, 598 A.2d 854, 857 (1991) (refusing to apply doctrine to husband who was not biological father of child born during marriage); Zuziak v. Zuziak, 169 Mich.App. 741, 426 N.W.2d 761, 766 (1988) (declining to extend Atkinson to custody dispute between mother and stepmother); In re Z.J.H., 162 Wis.2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d 202, 209 (1991) (rejecting claim by adoptive parent’s former partner)).
“The doctrine of stare decisis renders the ruling of law in a case binding in future cases before the same court.” Gately v. Commonwealth, 2 F.3d 1221, 1226 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1832, 128 L.Ed.2d 461 (1994). The fact that the issue presented in Ash might be considered difficult or close is not an adequate reason to disregard our decision in that ease. Goodman v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 218 Iowa 529, 530-31, 255 N.W. 667, 668 (1934).
B. Equity without a legal basis cannot overturn Ash. The majority makes no effort to address the policy concerns raised in Ash but instead relies on the court’s general equitable power. However, even our equitable powers should be exercised in a principled fashion, consistent with precedent; equity is not an opportunity to do whatever we think is right regardless of the law. The majority has failed to heed Blackstone’s warning:
And law, without equity, tho’ hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good, than equity without law; which would make every judge a legislator. ...
William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 62 (U.Chi.Press 1979). A reexamination of our decision in Ash and the reasons underlying that decision demonstrate that Ash was correctly decided and should remain binding precedent.
III. Policy Demands a Rejection of Equitable Fatherhood.
The majority states, “A number of reasons exist for adopting the equitable parent doctrine.... These [reasons] are essentially the same considerations that underlie any application of estoppel.” The majority fails to reveal what these “reasons” or “considerations” are. Moreover, to imply that this case involves the “same considerations that underlie any application of estoppel” is to reveal a profoundly superficial understanding of the legal and social implications of the court’s decision. This case is not a routine estoppel case.
A. Equitable fatherhood is inconsistent with visitation principles. In Ash, the court refused to bestow parental rights upon a person who was not an adoptive or biological *486parent. Ash, 507 N.W.2d at 405. We pointed out that unlike some states, a stepparent in Iowa cannot be treated as a natural parent against the stepparent’s will and cannot be forced to pay child support. Id. at 404. We concluded that “[t]he logical extension of orn-ease law is that a stepparent is not treated as a natural parent and is, therefore, not entitled to -visitation.” Id.
We relied on our cases and statutes defining visitation rights of third persons to identify the policy considerations militating against recognition of equitable parenthood. Our decision in Ash “ ‘demonstrates a respect for family privacy and parental autonomy.’ ” Id. at 403 (quoting Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1984)). ‘“It also recognizes that the parenting right is a fundamental liberty interest that is protected against unwarranted state intrusion.’ ” Id. The judicial creation of a parent “ “would divide and thereby hamper proper parental authority, force the child into the midst of a conflict of authority and ill feelings’ between the parents and other persons, and ‘coerce what should remain a moral rather than legal obligation.’” Id. at 403 (quoting Olds, 356 N.W.2d at 573).
We concluded that the recognition of equitable parenthood status would be inconsistent with our visitation cases and the policies underlying those cases:
Nevertheless, James [the third party] has no legal basis for asserting parental status. This conclusion is consistent with our recent holdings in the three visitation cases cited earlier, Lihs, Freel, and Olds. In those cases, several third parties outside the realm of legitimate claimants sought visitation with children with whom they had some special relationship. And, while we sympathized with their plight, we consistently refused to grant visitation. The reason was simple: absent any statutory or common law authority authorizing such relationships, our courts lack the power to order visitation in such circumstances.
Id. at 404. This reasoning holds true today. If our court lacks the power to order visitation in circumstances outside the statute, where have we found the power to decree parental status in circumstances outside our statutes governing that status? A review of Iowa statutes and case law in the area of parental rights illustrates that we do not have that power.
B. Equitable fatherhood is inconsistent with custody principles. We should consider the relationship between the doctrine adopted by the majority and our long-standing rule that a biological parent has a right to custody over third parties unless the biological parent is unsuitable. See In re Marriage of Halvorsen, 521 N.W.2d 725 (Iowa 1994). We said in Halvorsen that “[a] court may only grant a nonparent custody of a child over a parent when the nonparent proves that the parent seeking custody is not suitable to have custody.” Id. at 729. By virtue of our decision today, however, we have set the stage for an entirely suitable “real” parent to lose custody if the elements of equitable parenthood are met. The court-created fiction that John is now a “parent” does not alter the fact that our traditional rule giving priority to the biological or adoptive parent is severely undermined.
C. Equitable fatherhood is inconsistent with adoption principles. It is also important to remember that we do not recognize equitable adoption. The majority relies on the Michigan case of Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich.App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987), wherein the Michigan court of appeals adopted the theory of equitable parenthood. In doing so the Michigan court recognized that the legal relationship created by the theory of equitable parenthood is “akin” to the doctrine of equitable adoption, recognized in Michigan. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 520.
In contrast, adoptions in Iowa are exclusively creatures of statute. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1993). Indeed, we have required strict adherence to our adoption laws. E.g., id. at 243; Sampson v. Holton, 185 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 1971) (holding that the failure of the parties to follow the adoption provisions in any material respect deprives the court of the power to decree an adoption). Nevertheless, we are establishing parenthood in this case without any of the protections inherent in the adoption statutes.
*487We should recall the principles of law set forth in our earlier adoption cases:
We cannot cut across the statutes. The rules have been laid down by the legislature, and we must give them effect....
[[Image here]]
Courts cannot decide cases like this one on the basis of grief....
The statutes regulating the transfer of permanent rights and responsibilities with respect to children constitute an enlightened effort by the legislature to protect the interests of the child, the natural parents, and the adopters.
Sampson, 185 N.W.2d at 219. In In re B.G.C., we cautioned against letting the facts of a particular case lead us to unprincipled decisions:
As tempting as it is to resolve this highly emotional issue with one’s heart, we do not have the unbridled discretion of a Solomon. Ours is a system of law, and adoptions are solely creatures of statute. As the district court noted, without established procedures to guide courts in such matters, they would “be engaged in uncontrolled social engineering.”
In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241. The majority ignores these words of advice and makes John a father in direct contravention of the requirements set forth by the legislature.
D. Equitable fatherhood is inconsistent with termination principles. Our court has also required strict adherence to the procedures dictated by the legislature for termination of parental rights. Id. at 245; Iowa Code § 600A.3 (1995) (“Termination of parental rights shall be accomplished only according to the provisions of this chapter.”). Clearly, the result of the pending dissolution ease will not be effective to terminate the natural father’s parental rights. Nevertheless, bestowing parental rights on John will have a profound impact on the natural father’s rights. This impact is tantamount to a partial termination of rights insofar as the natural father will have to share his parental rights. Although the majority emphasizes that any adjudication in the present case does not bind the natural father, such a conclusion is unreasonable. To the extent John is given parental rights, they must be taken from the natural father. I do not think we have the power to do this in the face of the detailed and historical regulation of parent-child relationships by the legislature.
IV. Ramifications of Adopting Equitable Fatherhood.
Even if our statutes regulating child visitation, adoption and termination of parental rights are not seen as a barrier to our recognition of equitable parenthood, we should be very slow to venture into an area that is so fraught with unsolvable problems. The majority conveniently remands the case to the trial court “for further proceedings in conformance with this opinion.” It fails to consider the complex consequences of its decision.
Perhaps we should take a moment to think about the task facing the trial court. If the biological father appears, will his assertion of custody or visitation rights prevent the assertion of similar rights by John? If not, do John and the biological father have the parental rights of a father? Are the expectations of a third party or the actions of the child’s mother a constitutionally-sufficient basis to require the biological father to share his precious parental rights with another man?1 If the biological father is reasonably *488unaware of the present proceedings, may he later overturn a finding of equitable parenthood in order to preserve his rights as a father for himself alone? Are the rights of the biological father superior to those of the equitable father, or do the superior rights belong to the “father” most bonded to the child? If the “father” with the strongest emotional ties to the child has the superior rights, does he lose those rights if the child’s emotional ties to the other “father” become predominant? With whom does the child spend father’s day? As one court has commented in considering whether to bestow parental rights on a person who is neither the biological nor adoptive parent, “It would be virtually impossible to ensure equity to all parties and protect the best interests of the child under such a scenario.” In re Z.J.H., 162 Wis.2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d 202, 209 (1991) (emphasis added).
The collateral problems that the courts will be asked to resolve are nearly endless. Can the child inherit from both fathers? If the child dies, do the two fathers share the inheritance to which the biological father would normally be entitled? Can a child bring a wrongful death claim for her equitable father’s death? Does the tortfeasor negligently causing the death of a child owe loss of consortium damages to both natural parents and the equitable father? Iowa Code chapter 232 governs juvenile delinquency, termination of parental rights and ehild-in-need-of-assistance proceedings. It defines a “parent” as “a biological or adoptive mother or father of a child.” Iowa Code § 232.2(39) (1995). Will John as an equitable parent have any rights or responsibilities under this statute? Will all parents — biological, adoptive and equitable — have the same rights and responsibilities, or are we establishing degrees of parenthood?
V. Equitable Fatherhood Adopted: Result Over Reason.
What the majority does today is a profound departure from the philosophy of our prior eases and the statutes enacted by the Iowa legislature. Both the judicial branch and the legislative branch have placed paramount importance on the relationship between the biological or adoptive parents and the child. Today we run roughshod over that relationship because we are offended by the biological mother’s conduct and sympathize with the third party’s emotional plight. Given the complex practical, social and constitutional ramifications of the equitable parent doctrine, we should have a much more solid basis upon which to rest our decision than our general sense that equity requires this result.
In Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1984), we observed that “the government is ill-equipped to dictate the details of social interaction among family members.” Olds, 356 N.W.2d at 574. We are equally ill-equipped to dictate the details of social interaction between the unrelated persons before us today. Amy knows, John knows, Riley undoubtedly knows, and we know that John is not Riley’s father. Nothing we say or do will change this biological fact. The sooner the courts acknowledge this fact as determi*489native of the parties’ legal status, the sooner all concerned can get on with their lives.
I would affirm the ruling of the district court that John Gallagher, who is neither the biological father nor the adoptive father of Riley, has no parental rights to the child.
McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER and LAVORATO, JJ., join this dissent.

. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an unwed biological father who has developed a relationship with his child acquires a constitutionally protected interest. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614, 626 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). Moreover, courts have recognized that biological parenthood offers a father a constitutionally protected "opportunity interest” to develop a relationship with his offspring. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262, 103 S.Ct. at 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d at 627; In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal.4th 816, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 627, 823 P.2d 1216, 1228 (1992) (en banc); Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d 468, 208 Ill.Dec. 268, 277, 649 N.E.2d 324, 333, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2599, 132 L.Ed.2d 846 cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2600, 132 L.Ed.2d 846 (1995); In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So.2d 545 (La.1990); R.B. v. C.S., 536 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn.Ct.App.1995); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex.1994). We *488referred to such an opportunity interest in In re B.G.C.: "[A] finding of abandonment under these circumstances would deprive a father of a meaningful right, protected by the Constitution, to develop a parent-child relationship.” In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241 n. 1.
“This opportunity interest begins at conception and endures probably throughout the minority of the child.” In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462 (1987). “Absent abandonment of his interest, a state may not deny a biological father a reasonable opportunity to establish a relationship with his child.” Id. If the mother thwarts an unwed father’s ability to cultivate his opportunity interest, the father has a lesser burden to show that he has not abandoned his interest. See Kirchner, 208 Ill.Dec. at 277, 649 N.E.2d at 333 (unwed fathers prevented from grasping opportunity through deception are entitled to same protections as fathers who are given the opportunity and do develop a relationship: “To hold otherwise would be to encourage and reward deceit.”); Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tenn.1994) (despite mother giving child up for adoption father made reasonable effort to establish relationship, thus establishing "a fundamental liberty interest in the child”); accord Abernathy v. Baby Boy, 437 S.E.2d 25, 29 (S.C.1993).
Here the record is silent as to the biological father’s actions toward his child. Establishing an equitable father without this knowledge may violate the biological father’s constitutional rights.