Court Opinion

ID: 9466397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:14:35.983053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:42.576891
License: Public Domain

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In the folklore of crime, the principals in this case might not generate the popular appeal of Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, but in time they may become folk heroes to a growing fraternity of government informers, known as “snitchers” in the popular parlance. Notwithstanding their telegenic names, Drax Quatermain and Zelman A. Fairorth did not start out to make new law. They had other, more exciting things to do than to become embroiled in an academic discourse on the niceties that distinguish transactional and derivative use immunity. For his part, Fairorth was content to make a fast buck by concocting and peddling methamphetamine. Quatermain was more a generalist. Not only did he violate federal laws, he found a few state laws to break as well. And after entering into a contract with federal agents to snitch on Fairorth, he settled down to a quiet life of making silencers for his friends and customers, to whom the piercing sounds of gunfire in their business pursuits was anathematic.
Viewed against the record in this case, Drax Quatermain and Zelman Fairorth were not immoral men; they were amoral. Quatermain was pleased to make a deal in which, for his part, he would snitch on Fairorth and help the federal authorities salt him away. Having performed his end of the bargain, he saw nothing wrong with later approaching Fairorth to propose that they enter into a joint venture of their own. We have been spared the clinical details of this caper, the record disclosing only that it was just “another illegal scheme involving their committing a crime unrelated to methamphetamine.” Appendix at A-109. We may surmise, however, that before discussing the details of his proposition, Quatermain delivered a message reminiscent of Mario Puzo’s The Godfather, “About my testifying against you, Zelman old friend, forget it. It was nothing personal. Only business.” To which Zelman probably responded, “Sure, sure. I understand, pal,” *44and then promptly ran to the federal authorities to make his deal whereby, for some yet undisclosed consideration, he would deliver Quatermain to them on the silencer charge.
This delightful scenario featuring Zelman and Drax suggests that another bulwark of society — honor among thieves — is in danger of crumbling. The government, for its part, is promoting the disintegration process. As an equal opportunity employer it perceives no breach of morals in using a snitcher to convict a snitchee, and then later enlisting the snitchee to snitch on the snitcher.
I relate this factual background, somewhat extravagantly to be sure, because I think this is an important case. The use of government informers is critical in obtaining convictions in federal prosecutions, and it is therefore essential that the considerations of public policy governing this case be placed in proper perspective. To me, this is not a case of transactional or use immunity. Indeed, as the. majority properly observe, this is not a case of formal witness immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002. Decisions interpreting that statute, e. g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), while tangentially relevant, are not controlling. Stripped to its essence, this case is an odd mix of civil contract and estoppel law thrust into the context of a criminal prosecution. Notwithstanding the ambiguous language quoted by the majority, which is only part of the agreement reached between the United States attorney and Quatermain, I view the bargain between the government and Quatermain as an agreement not to prosecute, not as one conferring immunity.1
I.
The starting point of my analysis is that no assistant United States attorney, and indeed no United States attorney, has the power or authority to grant immunity under the federal immunity statutes. The United States attorney has the authority to request that a witness be subpoenaed to testify before certain tribunals. If the witness invokes the fifth amendment and refuses to testify, the operation of the immunity statute comes into play:
[Whenever] the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
*4518 U.S.C. § 6002. Should the witness persist in his refusal to testify, the United States attorney may request a court to order him to testify, and if duly requested by the United States attorney, the court has no discretion to refuse to issue the order. 18 U.S.C. § 6003.
Given the limitations of this statute and its predecessors, a practice has developed through the years whereby United States attorneys, on an ad hoc basis, make informal arrangements with witnesses that, although described informally as “grants of immunity” or, in Western Pennsylvania, where I practiced law, as “hip pocket immunity,” are really discretionary agreements not to prosecute. The authority to enter these agreements stems not from a specific federal immunity statute but from the power vested in United States attorneys giving them extensive discretionary authority to prosecute or not to prosecute a given case. In exercising his discretion not to prosecute a particular witness or informant, the United States attorney is at liberty to impose conditions that usually relate to testifying or providing certain information. For his part, the putative witness or informant often imposes conditions of his own, usually relating to agreements not to prosecute but often covering other matters as well, as was the case here. Quatermain sought and obtained from the government the following conditions as the quid for his quo of testifying against Fairorth:
1. An agreement not to prosecute, the precise meaning of which is in dispute here.
2. A letter showing the extent of his cooperation and the result in terms of seizure of contraband and prosecution of suspected violators.
3. An application to include him and his family under the Department of Justice witness protection plan.
4. Alternatively, a promise by the Drug Enforcement Administration to include him and his family in its witness protection plan.
5. Approval from the Pennsylvania Department of Parole allowing Quatermain to cooperate with the federal authorities.
See note 1, supra.
A bargain having been struck between the government and Quatermain, it seems to me that the question before us is whether there was a breach of that agreement. It must be conceded that the government will be required to respect the obligation it incurs' by such an agreement. In a related context, the Supreme Court teaches that “when a [guilty] plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). When a promise is not fulfilled, the Court has described this as “a breach of agreement” and has emphasized that inadvertence of the breach does not lessen its impact. Id. The government’s appeal then, in my view, stands or falls on the proper interpretation of its obligation under the agreement it made with Quatermain.
II.
Traditionally, the trial court determines the factual content of any agreement. I see no reason to depart from that practice in this appeal. Here the sole factual controversy is over the extent of the prosecution’s promise not to prosecute. The government insists that its promise was limited to withholding prosecution only in cases involving Fairorth and relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine, and that therefore it cannot have breached any agreement by prosecuting a subsequent crime involving the manufacture or distribution of silencers for firearms. Simply stated, it is the government’s position- that the agreement focused on activities and those activities were limited to the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine.
Quatermain has a different view. He puts the emphasis, not on activities, but, in the words of the letter agreement, on any “involvement with Zelman A. Fairorth.” *46(my emphasis). His argument is basically an argument of the street. Because among the denizens of the underworld a police informant is not exactly a persona grata, the snitch must be protected from any retaliation by the person snitched on — any retaliation, be it physical harm necessitating protection under a witness protection program, or, as here, a subsequent prosecution against him inspired by Fairorth. Based on the letter and the testimony adduced at the hearing, Judge Shapiro found the agreement ambiguous, 467 F.Supp. at 789, and then resolved the ambiguity by making certain factual determinations.
In the district court, and on appeal, the government concedes that Fairorth’s cooperation with the government “at least in part ... is derived from the prior cooperation of [Quatermain] with the Government in the prosecution of Zelman Fairorth.” Appendix at A-104; see Appellant’s Brief at vi. Thus a critical causal relationship between the two cases was conceded by the government. It was then left for the district court to make findings on whether the parties intended that the agreement not to prosecute extend to activities occurring after the striking of the bargain or to activities other than the illegal manufacture of drugs. The court found adversely to the government on both points. Although the district court phrased its legal discussion in terms of transactional and use immunity, an analysis that I would not particularly endorse except in cases implementing the immunity statute, I arrive at the same result. Judge Shapiro reasoned that, inasmuch as at the striking of the bargain the government was represented by lawyers and Quatermain was not, she would “construe any ambiguities in the letter against the government.” 467 F.Supp. at 788. She then proceeded to examine other evidence including testimony from DEA special agents that they instructed Quatermain “that he had to call them for authorization before engaging in any other illegal conduct . . . .” Id at 789.
Applying the clearly erroneous rule, United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156, 159-60 (3d Cir. 1972), I would hold there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain a factual finding that the parties intended that the promise not to prosecute extends to the instant prosecution. First, this prosecution involved Fairorth; second, Fairorth’s motivation to inform on Quatermain resulted directly from Quatermain’s testifying against him; and third, there was evidence that Quatermain was given some kind of license to participate in future illegal activities as testified to by Drug Enforcement Special Agent Donn Jerre Miller, Appendix at A-123, A-132.
III.
Experienced federal judges recognize that informers play an important role in prosecution under federal statutes. They also recognize that given the frequent use of no-prosecution agreements we are forced to live in a society where one who is guilty of transgressing the law will often go unpunished so that another, equally guilty, may be the target of the prosecution. The ultimate choice of who is to be prosecuted is not left to the courts, but is committed to the discretion of the United States attorneys.2 It is therefore to be expected that no-prosecution agreements will be controversial and subject to scrutiny. While recognizing that in entering these agreements the government is not negotiating with Sunday School teachers and that the negotiations may be, if not loathsome, at least unpleasant experiences, it seems to me a clearer understanding of the bargain than that presented by the facts of this case should be the sine qua non of any such undertaking. Conditions describing the extent of no-prosecution should be set forth with maximum specificity. The courts should put a premium on such specificity and impose a penalty on generality. Especially when, as here, the informant is not *47represented by counsel, the burden of proving the limitations of the no-prosecution provisions of the agreement should be on the government and ambiguities resolved against it, as they would be against the drafter of any written instrument. I recognize that the putatively criminal party to such agreements may be guilty of antisocial and reprehensible acts, but in the context of the law of bargains, he stands on equal footing with the government, and, if not represented by counsel, he should be entitled to the benefit of the doubt in interpreting agreements.
I defend this position because of the sensitive dictates of public policy that inhere in any decision by a prosecutor not to prosecute when there is probable cause to believe that the witness or informant is guilty. At the very least, the agreement should explain exactly what is being surrendered by the prosecutor and what the government is receiving in return.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. The letter states in full:
This letter is to confirm our understanding with respect to your cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the United States Attorney’s Office in its investigation of Zelman A. Fairorth and others who are allegedly involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine. It has béen agreed that in return for your cooperation and truthful testimony in any court proceeding related to these matters that the Government will provide you with immunity from prosecution for your participation and involvement with Zelman A. Fairorth and others relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine. It is further agreed that at the completion of our investigation the Government will provide you with a letter setting forth the extent of your cooperation and the results of that cooperation in terms of seizure of contraband and prosecution of suspected violators. Finally, it is understood that application has been made on your behalf to include you and your family under the Department of Justice witness protection plan. In the event that you are not accepted into the witness protection plan the Drug Enforcement Administration has agreed to provide you with the same services and protections afforded by the Department of Justice witness plan.
The Government represents that it has contacted the appropriate officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Parole and has received approval for your assistance in this investigation.
Very truly yours,
David W. Marston United States Attorney
By:-
Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr. Assistant U. S. Attorney
Appendix at A-106.

. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis puts what he describes as the “central question about justice” thus: “If A and B are equally deserving of prosecution, or if A is more deserving of prosecution than B, is a decision to prosecute B but not A unjust?” Quoted in R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 772 (1976); see also K. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 4.09 (3d ed. 1972).