Court Opinion

ID: 9584787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:52:42.101686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:58.528791
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Clark, Judge.
In his motion for rehearing appellant’s able attorney ardently argues his abhorrence to our adherence to stare decisis. He has been successful in persuading our colleague Judge Braswell Deen to withdraw his original concurrence and file a dissent, which under our practice converts this case into a full court decision.
We recognize some jurisdictions have no hesitation in legislation by litigation. Those courts have regarded hitherto accepted legal doctrines such as intra-familial immunity as being anachronisms which should be discarded.
Such departure from the wisdom of the past has not been universal. An example dealing with the parent-child im*724munity doctrine that is most analogous to our instant case is the decision rendered June 1972 by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N. C. 476 (189 SE2d 230). Our sister jurisdiction declined to abandon the time-honored rule of parental immunity in language and reasoning stated so well that we repeat much of what is said therein. It is there recognized the great majority of American jurisdictions adhere to the parental immunity doctrine because "this rule implements a public policy protecting family unity, domestic serenity, and parental discipline.” P. 478. The court points out at p. 480 that "An examination of cases applying the parental immunity doctrine reveals five policy reasons primarily relied on to support it: (1) disturbance of domestic tranquility, (2) danger of fraud and collusion, (3) depletion of the family exchequer, (4) the possibility of inheritance, by the parent, of the amount recovered in damages by the child, and (5) interference with parental care, discipline and control. However, domestic tranquility and the discipline and control of the family’s children are the policy reasons most frequently offered.”
The North Carolina court’s research developed the same conclusion reached in our study, that no state has totally abrogated parental immunity even though a minority of the states have modified the doctrine. Even those states generally express such modifications as being exceptions to the immunity rule. After pointing out that such modifications would create more problems and inequities than it cures, the North Carolina court uses this graphic language: "piecemeal abrogation of established law by judicial decree is, like a partial amputation, ordinarily unwise and usually unsuccessful.” P. 484.
To this court the rule of stare decisis is salutary because it preserves the harmony and stability of the law and requires that "in determining a case the court is not concerned with what the law ought to be, but its sole function is to declare what the law, as applicable to the facts of the case, is.” 21 CJS 304, § 187. As was said in Shaw v. State, *72560 Ga. 247, 253, "It is of more practical utility to have the law settled and let it remain so than to open it to new constructions, however obvious such constructions may appear, as the personnel of the court may change. Stare decisis is conservatism in practice, and conservatism is the preservation of the wisdom which comes from the experience of the past.” The great Chief Justice Logan Bleckley who is quoted in our colleague’s dissent, himself said in his concurring opinion in Blair v. State, 81 Ga. 629, 631 (7 SE 855) that . .it [the proceeding] appears to me to be violative of principle, but I yield to authority and do not purpose to follow my own head against the adjudications of wiser judges.”
Let us hope this court will never permit its decisions to be placed "into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only,” to quote the apt phrase of Justice Owen J. Roberts in his dissent in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 669 (64 SC 757, 88 LE 987, 151 ALR 1110).
'"Very weighty considerations underlie the principle that courts should not lightly overrule past decisions. Among these are the desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward surprise; the importance of furthering fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case; and the necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments. The reasons for rejecting any established rule must always be weighed against these factors.’ Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U. S. 375, 403 (90 SC 1772, 26 LE2d 339).” Crystal Springs Bleachery v. Roach, 123 Ga. App. 364, 368 (181 SE2d 79).
The writer of this opinion recognizes a simple disposition of appellant’s request for deviation from the doctrine of stare decisis would have been denial of the motion for rehearing on the authority of Frazier v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 596 (37 SE2d 774): "Decisions by the Court of *726Appeals establish a precedent for that court and for the superior courts, unless disapproved by the Supreme Court or made obsolete by subsequent statutory enactment.” Such easy determination, however, would be contrary to the zeal and dedication which I have observed in the conduct of my eight colleagues during the time I have been privileged to serve on this bench. Their earnest consideration of all points submitted by counsel may result in lengthy opinions but the result is that Georgia’s attorneys who undertake necessary research for the cause of their clients know their arguments are fully considered even though our decisions may be adverse to their contentions.

Judgment adhered to and motion for rehearing denied.

(Upon rehearing the original special concurrence by Judge Deen was withdrawn and a dissenting opinion filed by him. This brought about consideration by the full court. Upon such consideration the additional opinion was prepared by Judge Clark. Thereupon the motion for rehearing was denied and the judgment adhered to with Presiding Judge Eberhardt, Judges Pannell, Quillian and Evans concurring. Presiding Judge Hall filed a special concurrence in the affirmance. The dissent of Judge Deen was joined in by Judge Stolz, who also filed an additional opinion, which special dissent was joined in by Chief Judge Bell.)