Court Opinion

ID: 9537322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:15:49.315754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:26.595357
License: Public Domain

*678Batjer, J.,
concurring in the result but for a different reason:
Certain exhibits filed in the hearing before James Carmany, director of juvenile services in Clark County, Nevada, have not been filed with this court. The record does not reveal whether or not those exhibits were before the district court. Whether those exhibits would have been sufficiently persuasive to justify this court in reaching a different result is speculative.
I agree that upon the record before us there is insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that “cause” existed for the appellant’s termination.
Nevertheless, I would reverse the order of the district court because the appellant was denied a hearing before a disinterested and impartial hearing officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the State of Nevada.
It was Carmany, as director of juvenile services, who discharged the appellant, and was then called upon, pursuant to NRS 62.115(l)1 and an order of the district court, to conduct a hearing and sit in judgment of his original order. This procedure was not only unfair to the appellant but it was also unfair to any director of juvenile services.
In reaching this decision I am aware of Hampton v. Wart-man, 85 Nev. 408, 455 P.2d 921 (1969), where the juvenile judge of the district court approved a recommendation of the probation committee that Hampton be demoted. Hampton inappropriately sought a hearing before county officials, then he requested a hearing before a district court judge other than the juvenile judge. The juvenile judge refused to disqualify himself and Hampton sought a writ of certiorari or in the alternative a writ of prohibition in this court. There the juvenile judge afforded Hampton an opportunity for a hearing before him and Hampton did not avail himself of that opportunity. That case is distinguished from this one because the juvenile judge approved the recommendation of the probation committee but here Carmany personally discharged the appellant *679before the hearing. Furthermore, the hearing in this case was demanded and held.
After we decided Hampton v. Wartman, supra, the United States Supreme Court decided the cases of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970), and Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80 (1972), which cast a shadow upon the validity of our pronouncement in Hampton v. Wartman that, “Petitioner’s [Hampton’s] January 17, 1969 request that the juvenile judge disqualify himself was improper.”
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, a fourteen year old girl was found murdered and Coolidge was apprehended, tried and convicted of her murder. In that case arrest and search warrants were issued by the state attorney general acting as justice of the peace. Prior to issuing the warrants the attorney general had personally taken charge of all police activity relating to the murder and he later served as chief prosecutor at Coolidge’s trial. In reversing and remanding the case the High Court found that the warrant authorizing the search of the automobile was invalid on the ground that it was not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate and that seizure and subsequent search of the Coolidge automobile did not constitutionally rest upon such a warrant. In Ward v. Monroeville, supra, the High Court held that Ward had been denied a trial before a disinterested and impartial judicial officer as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where he was compelled to stand trial for traffic offenses before the mayor who was responsible for village finances and whose court through fines, forfeitures, costs and fees provided a substantial portion of village funds.
Although those cases decided by the High Court dealt with criminal proceedings, I believe the same standard for a disinterested and impartial hearing officer is required in a hearing in a civil case where an attempt is being made to discharge an employee with tenure.2
*680Mowbray, J., concurring in part with Batjer, J., and dissenting in part:
I agree with Mr. Justice Batjer’s position that the appellant Hardison was entitled to a hearing before a disinterested person under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the State of Nevada. The Legislature has now provided for such a hearing. NRS 62.117.1 I would therefore remand the case to the lower court with instructions that the appellant be granted a hearing before the Clark County Probation committee, in accordance with the procedural provisions of the statute.

 NRS 62.115(1) (In pertinent part): “. . . Probation officers and employees may be removed only for cause after having been given the reasons therefor in writing and being afforded an opportunity to be heard before the director of juvenile services in answer thereto.”

 In 1971 the legislature apparently recognized the inherent inequities and repealed the provision for a hearing before the director of juvenile services and added NRS 62.117.
NRS 62.117: “In each judicial district which includes a county having a population of 200,000 or more, as determined by the last preceding national census of the Bureau of the Census of the United States Department of Commerce, any probation officer or employee of the probation department, any detention home or other commitment facility administered or financed by the county, appointed under the provisions of NRS 62.115, who has been employed in such capacity for 12 months or more and is dismissed from such employment may:
“1. Within 15 days of his dismissal, request a written statement *680from the director of juvenile services specifically setting forth the reasons for such dismissal; and within 15 days of the date of such request he shall be furnished such a written statement.
“2. Within 30 days after receipt of such written statement, request, in writing, a public hearing before the probation committee. The probation committee shall adopt rules for the conduct of such hearing.
“3. Appeal the decision of the probation committee to the board or boards of county commissioners.”

 NRS 62.117: “In each judicial district which includes a county having a population of 200,000 or more, as determined by the last preceding national census of the Bureau of the Census of the United States Department of Commerce, any probation officer or employee of the probation department, any detention home or other commitment facility administered or financed by the county, appointed under the provisions of NRS 62.115, who has been employed in such capacity for 12 months or more and is dismissed from such employment may:
“1. Within 15 days of his dismissal, request a written statement from the director of juvenile services specifically setting forth the reasons for such dismissal; and within 15 days of the date of such request he shall be furnished such a written statement.
“2. Within 30 days after receipt of such written statement request, in writing, a public hearing before the probation committee. The probation committee shall adopt rules for the conduct of such hearing.
“3. Appeal the decision of the probation committee to the board or boards of county commissioners.”