Court Opinion

ID: 9909386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 14:06:06.8392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:12.428080
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Hull v. Poulos, 2023-Ohio-4500.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 BENNIE A. HULL,                            :    APPEAL NO. C-230063
                                                 TRIAL NO. A-2003579
           Plaintiff-Appellant,             :

     vs.                                    :
                                                       O P I N I O N.
 MATTHEW POLOUS,                            :

 FIDANT WEALTH PARTNERS,                    :

     and                                    :

 AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL                       :
 SERVICES, LLC,
                                            :
           Defendants-Appellees.            :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 13, 2023

Hochscheid Law and Tabitha M. Hochscheid, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

DeWitt Law, LLC, and Michael W. DeWitt, for Defendants-Appellees.
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}   Toward the end of George Hill’s life, he appointed his cousin, plaintiff-

appellant Bennie Hull, to be his power of attorney and executor of his estate. Hull

alleged that he relied on advice from Hill’s financial professionals in the course of his

actions as George’s agent, which ultimately led to his being removed as executor of the

estate and becoming liable for thousands of dollars. Hull sued defendants-appellants

Matt Poulos, Ameriprise Financial Services LLC (“Ameriprise”), and Fident Wealth

Partners (collectively, “the Advisors”), asserting professional negligence. The trial

court granted the Advisors’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, finding that Hull lacked standing.

       {¶2}   Hull appeals, arguing that the Advisors owed Hull an independent duty

of care. But because the Advisors owed a duty to Hull only in his capacity as George’s

power of attorney, rather than to Hull individually, Hull could not show that the

Advisors owed him a duty of care. Therefore, he cannot sustain his negligence action.

We overrule Hull’s sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                Facts and Procedure

       {¶3}   The allegations in Hull’s complaint, which we accept as true, assert that

in the last ten years of George’s life, Hull was his primary caretaker. George appointed

Hull as his power of attorney (“POA”) in November 2007. Hull remained George’s POA

until George died.

       {¶4}   The 2007 POA allowed Hull to make changes in George’s investments,

as long as they conformed with George’s estate plans. George also named Hull as the

executor of his estate in George’s various wills.

       {¶5}   George had several Ameriprise annuities accounts. Poulos, an

Ameriprise employee, served as George’s financial advisor. Poulos advised Hull in his

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

capacity as George’s POA. As George’s health declined, Poulos began to communicate

exclusively with Hull about George’s accounts.

       {¶6}   Per Ameriprise’s policy, Poulos requested a copy of George’s will to

ensure that his Ameriprise beneficiary designations matched the will. Hull provided

Poulos with a copy of George’s will. Ameriprise determined that George’s beneficiary

designations on his Ameriprise accounts had to change so that the designations would

be distributed as provided in George’s will.

       {¶7}   Although Hull had been George’s POA since November 2007,

Ameriprise requested George sign a new power of attorney form in 2016. Ameriprise

drafted a durable power of “Attorney for Ameriprise Financial Accounts and

Products.”

       {¶8}   After George signed the new POA, Poulos suggested that Hull update

the beneficiaries on George’s accounts. Poulos prepared for Hull’s signature a

beneficiary update form changing the Ameriprise account beneficiaries from George’s

heirs to George’s estate.

       {¶9}   The change in the beneficiary designations from George’s heirs to the

estate stripped George’s daughter, Jacqueline Hill, and George’s granddaughter and

niece of their inheritances. While the granddaughter and niece were beneficiaries

under the previous Ameriprise designation forms, no bequests were made for them in

George’s will. Jacqueline was to inherit the residuary of the estate after specific

bequests were made to George’s cousins—including Hull—totaling $800,455.07.

       {¶10} But for this change in beneficiary designation there would have been no

assets to probate. Without these beneficiary changes, the money in George’s accounts

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

would have passed to George’s relatives based on percentages as provided in the

Ameriprise beneficiary designation forms.

       {¶11} Following George’s death, Hull opened George’s estate in the Hamilton

County Probate Court. All of George’s heirs, including Jacqueline, were notified of the

inventory in the estate. After Jacqueline learned about the inventory, she objected and

later sued, alleging that Hull took assets that belonged to the estate.

       {¶12} The probate court found that the beneficiary changes that Hull made to

the Ameriprise accounts, as instructed by the Advisors, amounted to mishandling

George’s assets.

          Hull sued the Advisors and the trial court dismissed his complaint

       {¶13} Hull’s October 2020 complaint alleged that, absent Poulos’s

instructions, he would not have changed the Ameriprise beneficiaries.

       {¶14} The Advisors filed a motion to dismiss, citing R.C. 2711.01 and arguing

that Hull must engage in the arbitration process contained in the Ameriprise financial

agreement. The trial court denied the Advisors’ motion because Hull was not a party

to the Ameriprise financial agreement.

       {¶15} The Advisors filed another motion to dismiss, this time under Civ.R.

12(B)(6), arguing that Hull lacked standing as he was not a party to the Ameriprise

financial agreement. Hull had interacted with Ameriprise and signed documents solely

in his capacity as George’s POA, and, later, as executor of George’s estate. The trial

court granted the motion, finding that Hull lacked standing.

       {¶16} Hull now appeals.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                  Law and Analysis

       {¶17} Hull’s single assignment of error asserts that the trial court erroneously

granted the Advisors’ motion to dismiss. He argues that (1) the trial court failed to

accept the complaint’s allegations as true and failed to view the facts in the light most

favorable to him; (2) Poulos owed Hull a duty, independent of George, under the

Uniform Power of Attorney Act; (3) Hull had standing under the exception to the non-

economic loss doctrine under the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 552

(1979), as adopted in Ohio; and (4) the Ohio Constitution or common law imposed a

duty on Poulos because Hull’s injury was foreseeable.

       {¶18} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Brendamour v. City

of the Village of Indian Hill, 2022-Ohio-4724, 204 N.E.3d 1085, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.); see

White v. Pitman, 2020-Ohio-3957, 156 N.E.3d 1026, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.).

       {¶19} When considering a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must

accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. A court should not dismiss a complaint for failure

to state an actionable claim unless it appears “beyond doubt from the complaint that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling [the plaintiff] to recovery.” O’Brien v.

Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975),

syllabus.

             A. Plaintiffs must establish the existence of duty and standing

       {¶20} To succeed on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish the existence

of duty, breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. Rieger v.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Giant Eagle, Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 512, 2019-Ohio-3745, 138 N.E.3d 1121, ¶ 10. Failing

to prove any of these elements is fatal to a negligence claim. Id.

       {¶21} A duty is a legal obligation owed to one party by another. Pauley v. City

of Circleville, 137 Ohio St.3d 212, 2013-Ohio-4541, 998 N.E.2d 1083, ¶ 21. “The

existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question of law for the court to

determine.” Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989).

Generally, absent a relationship between a defendant and plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot

establish the existence of a duty. Perelman v. Meade, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-

06-054, 2021-Ohio-4247, ¶ 20.

       {¶22} Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that ensures a party is qualified

to bring a case—the party must have a sufficient stake in the controversy to obtain

judicial resolution of that controversy. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald,

134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 21-22; Kormanik, Guardian v.

HSBC Mtge., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-18, 2012-Ohio-5975, ¶ 41 (“The doctrine of

standing requires a litigant to be in the proper position to assert a claim or seek judicial

enforcement of a duty or right.”).

       {¶23} Although this case involves a financial advisor, rather than an attorney,

a legal-malpractice action is analogous to this case because Hull sued the Advisors

based on damages that he suffered due to allegedly-negligent professional services.

And whether a party has standing to bring a malpractice action requires the plaintiff

to establish that the defendant attorney owed the plaintiff a duty of care, and thus

requires a relationship between the attorney and the plaintiff. Shoemaker v.

Gindlesberger, 118 Ohio St.3d 226, 2008-Ohio-2012, 887 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 10

(Decedent’s children, including the estate executor in his individual capacity, did not

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

have an attorney-client relationship with their mother’s attorney and therefore lacked

standing to bring a malpractice claim); see RocketFuel Blockchain Co. v. Ellenoff

Grossman & Schole LLP, S.D.N.Y. No. 21-CV-1764 (VEC), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

4638, 12 (Jan. 7, 2022) (An entity had no standing to bring a legal-malpractice claim

against a law firm with which it had no attorney-client relationship.).

                 B. The trial court properly dismissed Hull’s complaint

       {¶24} Hull’s first issue for review asserts that the trial court did not accept

Hull’s asserted facts as true and instead interpreted the probate court’s decision. Hull

argues that the trial court erroneously found that Hull being removed as executor of

the estate by the probate court meant that he lacked standing, which was improper

because his complaint asserted that he was damaged individually.

       {¶25} This court reviews a trial court’s dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de

novo. State ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum, 152 Ohio St.3d 284, 2017-Ohio-9141, 95 N.E.3d

365, ¶ 10. Therefore, we have reviewed Hull’s allegations and consider his claim with

no deference to the trial court’s decision. And, after considering only the allegations in

Hull’s complaint, accepting the allegations in his complaint as true, and drawing all

reasonable inferences in Hull’s favor, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed

Hull’s complaint because he failed to establish that the Advisors owed him a duty of

care. Therefore, Hull lacked standing to maintain an action against the Advisors.

       {¶26} Hull claims that the Advisors’ action harmed him individually. But to

the extent that a relationship between the Advisors and Hull existed, that relationship

was between the Advisors and Hull in his capacity as George’s power of attorney. Hull

signed the relevant Ameriprise documents in his capacity as George’s power of

attorney or executor of his estate, not individually. The Advisors never provided any

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

instruction or advice to Hull in his individual capacity—any advice or instruction was

given solely as George’s or his estate’s agent.

       {¶27} The Advisors’ only legal duty was owed to George and George’s estate.

They owed nothing to Hull in his individual capacity. And that lack of duty is fatal to

Hull’s complaint. Because the Advisors had no legal relationship with Hull

individually, they owed him no duty of care. Hull lacked standing to bring his claim.

             C. The Uniform Power of Attorney Act did not create a duty

       {¶28} Hull next argues that the Advisors owed him an independent duty as

George’s agent under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act.

       {¶29} The Ohio Uniform Power of Attorney Act governs power-of-attorney

relationships in Ohio. Ohio adopted the Uniform Power of Attorney Act in March 2012.

McFarren v. Emeritus at Canton, 2013-Ohio-3900, 997 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.).

       {¶30} A “power of attorney” is a writing that grants an agent authority “to act

in the place of the principal.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 1337.22(G). The “principal” is

the person who grants an agent authority to perform acts. R.C. 1337.22(I). An “agent”

is the person to whom the principal has granted authority “to act for a principal.” R.C.

1337.22(A). Agents’ actions are attributed to the principal—not the agent—because the

agent is “standing in the shoes” of the principal. G.R.P.L. Enters. v. Sethi, 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 09 MA 205, 2010-Ohio-6513, ¶ 14; see First Natl. Bank of New Bremen

v. Burns, 88 Ohio St. 434, 441, 103 N.E. 93 (1913).

       {¶31} Hull argues that the Advisors owed him the same duty as George. He

provides no authority—and this court could find no authority—suggesting that a third

party owes an individual duty to the holder of a POA. This is because those holding a

POA do not act as individuals—instead, they act solely on behalf of their principals.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶32} Any advice provided to Hull or interactions between the Advisors and

Hull were, legally, advice to and interactions with George. Hull was simply standing in

George’s shoes. Thus, the Ohio Uniform Power of Attorney Act does not create an

individual duty on the Advisors to Hull.

                   D. Hull did not allege negligent misinformation

       {¶33} Hull argues that he has standing to maintain his action under Section

552’s exception to the noneconomic-loss doctrine, as adopted by Ohio. That doctrine

“recognizes professional liability, and thus a duty in tort, only in those limited

circumstances in which a person, in the course of business, negligently supplies false

information, knowing that the recipient either intends to rely on it in business, or

knowing that the recipient intends to pass the information on to a foreseen third party

or limited class of third persons who intend to rely on it in business.” Corporex Dev.

& Constr. Mgt. v. Shook, Inc., 106 Ohio St.3d 412, 2005-Ohio-5409, 835 N.E.2d 701,

¶ 9, citing Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 552 (1979), and Haddon View

Invest. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St.2d 154, 156, 436 N.E.2d 212 (1982).

       {¶34} Even if Hull could sustain a negligent-misinformation claim, he failed

to allege a negligent-misrepresentation claim. His complaint alleges only negligence.

Hull cannot succeed on a claim that he failed to make at the trial level.

          E. Neither common law nor the Ohio Constitution creates a duty

       {¶35} Finally, Hull asserts that the Ohio Constitution and common law

imposed a duty on the Advisors because his injury was foreseeable. As discussed

above, the Advisors did not owe Hull any individual duty. The Advisors only owed

George a duty, and any duty owed to Hull was solely in his capacity as George’s POA.

       {¶36} We overrule Hull’s sole assignment of error.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                     Conclusion

       {¶37} Hull cannot establish that the Advisors owed him any legal duty in his

individual capacity. Instead, the Advisors owed a duty solely to George. Hull simply

stood in George’s shoes. Because Hull cannot establish the existence of a duty from the

Advisors to him individually, we overrule his assignment of error and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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