Court Opinion

ID: 9733919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:20:26.592138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.502056
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
dissenting:
I do not agree with the majority that the evidence adduced below was sufficient to convict the appellant of disorderly conduct. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth fails to establish two of the requisite elements of the crime of disorderly conduct: 1) that appellant intentionally or recklessly caused or created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm by his actions; and, 2) that the appellant’s actions created a hazardous or physically offensive condition.
The evidence adduced below establishes that the complainant, a female student, was sitting in a stall in the women’s bathroom on the first floor of a college dormitory. The bathroom was located in the women’s side of the dormitory building and was within the residential portion of the dormitory. A visitor could enter the residential area with a key or be escorted by a female resident of the dormitory. Neither the bathroom door nor the stall door was locked. As the complainant was sitting within the stall, appellant and his companion pushed open the stall door and asked the complainant what she was doing. When the complainant jumped up and yelled, appellant and his companion ran out of the building. The evidence further established that the appellant and his co-defendant were admitted by a female resident into the restricted area of the dormitory and had visited another resident right before this incident.
The Disorderly Conduct statute under which appellant was convicted provides as follows:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
*49(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5503 (Purdon 1981). Thus, the statute by its terms imposes a mens rea requirement: the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant intentionally or recklessly caused or created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm by his actions. Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 489 Pa. 254, 414 A.2d 54 (1980), appeal dismissed 449 U.S. 894, 101 S.Ct. 259, 66 L.Ed.2d 124 (1980); Commonwealth v. Weiss, 340 Pa.Super. 427, 490 A.2d 853 (1985); Commonwealth v. Navarro, 251 Pa.Super. 125, 130, 380 A.2d 409, 412 (1977).1 The Commonwealth here has altogether failed to prove that appellant had the requisite intent to cause public harm.2 The evidence shows only that appellant’s actions and words were directed at a lone individual sitting in a private stall in an otherwise empty *50restroom located in a residential, restricted-access area of a dormitory. A reasonable man, looking at the restroom and adjoining areas, could not say that in such a situation appellant acted with a “conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that public annoyance or alarm would result from [his] conduct.” Commonwealth v. Weiss, 340 Pa.Super. at 434-35, 490 A.2d at 857. Nothing more than an intent to cause private discomfort or embarrassment was shown.
The evidence presented by the Commonwealth is deficient in another respect: it fails to show that the appellant’s actions created a hazardous or physically offensive condition. I do not agree with the majority that the complainant’s embarrassment while performing a private bodily function and her fear of further assault amounted to a physically offensive condition. The statute specifically provides an objective standard requiring the creation of a hazardous or physically offensive condition. The majority’s focus on the subjective feelings of one individual is misplaced. Appellant’s conduct was morally offensive and embarrassing to the victim, but that conduct was in no way hazardous or physically offensive. The actions did not affect the women’s physical being, but rather her sense of decency. I do not here make light of the woman’s fright and distress nor condone appellant’s reprehensible behavior. However, although appellant committed a wrongdoing, he did not commit the crime of disorderly conduct. “The crime of disorderly conduct is not intended as a catchall for every act which annoys or disturbs people ... it is intended to preserve the public peace; it thus has a limited periphery beyond which the prosecuting authorities have no right to transgress — ” Commonwealth v. Greene, 410 Pa. 111, 189 A.2d 141 (1963). That periphery has been transgressed here.
I would therefore vacate appellant’s judgement of sentence and discharge the appellant.

. In so requiring mens rea, the statute supplanted earlier law which focused not on the defendant’s intent, but on the effects of the defendant’s conduct on others. Under the old law, a speaker who had no intent to disrupt the public could have been held criminally liable for the provocation of unruly behavior on the part of his listeners. Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 489 Pa. at 263, 414 A.2d at 59, quoting Comment, Public Disorder Offenses Under Pennsylvania’s New Crimes Code, 78 Dick.L.R. 15, 30 (1973). Thus, the actions of the victim in yelling at the appellant cannot convert this private offense into a public one since our focus is now on the appellant’s intent. Moreover, the fact that others could hear the disturbance is not dispositive under the present statute. See Commonwealth v. Weiss, (loud, vulgar language not disorderly conduct simply because others stop and listen).

. The word "public” is defined by the statute as "affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses ... or any premises which are open to the public.” 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5503(c) (Purdon 1981). The fact that the dormitory and bathroom were on a school campus does not make those areas "public” under the statute, as access to the areas in question was restricted. Further, even public premises can contain areas which are private in character. See e.g., City of St. Joseph v. Christgen, 513 S.W.2d 458 (Mo.1974) (restroom in a hotel not a public place where hotel reserved for a party). Even if the dormitory bathroom were to be regarded as a public place, appellant’s intent must still be proven. Commonwealth v. Navarro.