Court Opinion

ID: 9895346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 20:03:34.311066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:11.688798
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/6/23 In re Sean F.H. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

In re SEAN F. II., a Person Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                   B325170

LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                          Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP05311E)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

SEAN F.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robin R. Kesler, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
      David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

             ____________________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

      A few months after sustaining a petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300 and declaring Sean F. II (Sean) a
dependent child of the court, the juvenile court terminated its
jurisdiction and issued a custody and visitation order granting
Sean’s mother, April Z., sole custody of Sean.1 Sean’s father,
Sean F., appeals from the jurisdiction findings, arguing
substantial evidence did not support them. We conclude that
Sean F.’s appeal is not moot and that substantial evidence
supported the court’s findings Sean F.’s physical abuse of Sean’s
mother and two half-siblings placed Sean at substantial risk of
serious physical harm. Therefore, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Sean’s parents are April and Sean F. April has two other
children, Lennon, born in 2011, and Zoe, born in 2010, whose
father is not Sean F.2

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2    Neither April, Lennon, nor Zoe is a party to this appeal.

                               2
       In May 2022, when Sean was only a few months old, the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
filed a petition under section 300 on behalf of the three children.
The Department alleged Sean F. and April had “a history of
engaging in violent physical altercations,” including an incident
where Sean F. threatened to kill April with a knife and an
incident where Sean F. hit April in her eye with his fist, pushed
her onto a bed, and “straddled” her. The Department also alleged
Sean F. physically abused Lennon by grabbing his hair and
pushing him into a wall and physically abused Zoe by striking
her face. In addition, the Department alleged Sean F. was
“a current abuser of marijuana” and “used and was under the
influence of marijuana” in the presence of Lennon and Zoe. The
Department asserted nine counts against Sean F. on behalf of
Sean: three under section 300, subdivision (a) (one based on
engaging in domestic violence with April, one based on abusing
Zoe, and one based on abusing Lennon), alleging there was a
substantial risk Sean would suffer serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally; four under section 300, subdivision (b) (one
based on engaging in domestic violence with April, one based on
abusing Zoe, one based on abusing Lennon, and one based on
using cannabis), alleging there was a substantial risk Sean would
suffer serious physical harm because Sean F. failed and was
unable to supervise, protect, or provide regular care for Sean; and
two under section 300, subdivision (j) (one based on abusing
Lennon and one based on abusing Zoe), alleging there was a
substantial risk Sean F. would also abuse Sean.
       The juvenile court found the allegations true, sustained the
petition and each count against Sean F., declared Sean a
dependent child of the court, and removed Sean from Sean F. and

                                3
released Sean to April. Sean F. appealed from the jurisdiction
findings and disposition order.
      A few months after the disposition order, however, the
court terminated its jurisdiction and issued an order under
section 362.4 granting April sole legal and physical custody of
Sean, with monitored visits for Sean F. at least once per week.3
Sean F. appealed from the court’s order terminating its
jurisdiction and the custody and visitation order.

                          DISCUSSION

        A.    Sean F.’s Appeal Is Not Moot
        “Juvenile dependency appeals raise unique mootness
concerns because the parties have multiple opportunities to
appeal orders even as the proceedings in the juvenile court
proceed.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 59.) An appeal
“becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court,
if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant
him any effect[ive] relief.”’ . . . [¶] . . . A reviewing court must
‘“decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a
juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its]
decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.”’”
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276; see In re Damian L. (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 357, 369.)

3     “When terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has
been declared a dependent child of the court, section 362.4
authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation
order (commonly referred to as an ‘exit order’) that will become
part of the relevant family law file and remain in effect in the
family law action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent
order.’” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.)

                                 4
       “An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally
renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.” (In re Rashad D.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164; see In re G.Z. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 857, 874; In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481,
1488.) However, “when a juvenile court’s finding forms the basis
for an order that continues to impact a parent’s rights—for
instance, by restricting visitation or custody—that jurisdictional
finding remains subject to challenge, even if the juvenile court
has terminated its jurisdiction. [Citation.] Because reversal of
the jurisdictional finding calls into question the validity of orders
based on the finding, review of the jurisdictional finding can
grant the parent effective relief.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 276-277; see In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431-
1432; In re A.R. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 733, 740.)
       The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings were the bases of
the custody and visitation order that gave April sole physical and
legal custody of Sean and that required Sean F.’s visits with Sean
to be monitored. And because Sean F. appealed from the juvenile
court’s order terminating its jurisdiction and the custody and
visitation order, we can grant Sean F. effective relief if his appeal
from the jurisdiction findings were successful. (See In re
Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164, fn. omitted [“to the
extent an appellant argues . . . the challenged jurisdiction finding
resulted in an adverse juvenile custody order and seeks to have
that custody order set aside, in addition to the appeal from the
jurisdiction finding, an appeal from the orders terminating
jurisdiction and awarding custody is necessary”].)

                                  5
      B.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
            Jurisdiction Findings Based on Sean F.’s Abuse of
            April, Lennon, and Zoe

             1.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       “The purpose of section 300 ‘is to provide maximum safety
and protection for children who are currently being physically,
sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being
exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and
emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.’”
(In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601; see § 300.2,
subd. (a); In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “Although
section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk
of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the
court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.
[Citations.] The court may consider past events in deciding
whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.” (Cole L.,
at pp. 601-602; see In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411.)
       “Section 300, subdivision (a), provides that jurisdiction may
be assumed if the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally by the child’s parent or guardian.” (In re Cole L.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; see § 300, subd. (a).)
“‘Nonaccidental’ generally means a parent or guardian ‘acted
intentionally or willfully.’” (Cole L., at p. 601; see In re R.T.
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.)
       Section 300, subdivision (b), authorizes the juvenile court to
assert jurisdiction where “the ‘child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm

                                 6
or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s
parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.’”
(See In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712.) “A jurisdiction
finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires the
Department to prove three elements: (1) the parent’s or
guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the
child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re
Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; see S.F., at p. 713.)
       “‘“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings . . . , we determine
if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of
the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues
of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.”
[Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.”’”
[Citations.] However, “[s]ubstantial evidence is not synonymous
with any evidence. [Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence
must be of ponderable legal significance and must be reasonable
in nature, credible, and of solid value.”’” (In re S.F., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; see In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th
at p. 602.)

                                 7
            2.       Substantial Evidence Supported the
                     Jurisdiction Findings
       Sean F. contends substantial evidence did not support the
jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and
(j). But it did, at a minimum for the findings under
subdivisions (a) and (b), and substantial evidence need only
support one valid ground of jurisdiction. (In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 283.)
       The evidence was that Sean F. abused April on multiple
occasions and abused or physically harmed Lennon and Zoe. In
November 2020 April called law enforcement and reported that
Sean F. had “threatened to kill her” with a knife. In March 2022
law enforcement officers responded to a report of domestic
violence involving Sean F. and April. April told a responding
officer that Sean F. yelled at her, called her a “fucking bitch” for
“taking too long” in the bathroom, and punched her in the face
with a closed fist. When April tried to get away, Sean F. pushed
her onto a bed and got on top of her. The responding officer
observed that, consistent with April’s statement, April’s cheek
was swollen and red. Sean was in the home during the incident.
April said that the incident was the first time Sean F. had hit
her, but that previously he had pushed and shoved her and
thrown objects at her face.
       A few weeks later a case social worker interviewed Lennon
and Zoe—then eight years old and 10 years old—at their school.
Lennon said that he was “very scared” of Sean F. because Sean F.
was a violent person and that Sean F. had once “grabbed [his]
hair and pushed [his] head into [a] wall.” Lennon also said he
had seen Sean F. hit his mom and throw keys at her. Zoe told the

                                 8
social worker she was afraid of Sean F. because Sean F. had
slapped her on the cheek and would often yell at her and Lennon.
       When a Department investigator interviewed Zoe and
Lennon some months later, the children repeated their
statements. The Department also interviewed Lennon and Zoe’s
father, Abraham Z., who stated Sean F. had “smashed [Lennon’s]
head into a wall,” which caused bruises that would not go away.
Zoe confirmed that Sean F. had “slammed” Lennon into a wall
and that Lennon had “a bruise or something” on his forehead.
       Based on this evidence, the court could reasonably find that
there was a substantial risk Sean F. would inflict serious
physical harm nonaccidentally on Sean (section 300,
subdivision (a)) and that Sean would suffer serious physical harm
because Sean F. was unable to protect him (section 300,
subdivision (b)). (See § 300, subd. (a) [“[f]or purposes of this
subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious
future injury based on . . . a history of repeated inflictions of
injuries on . . . the child’s siblings, or a combination of these and
other actions by the parent or guardian that indicate the child is
at risk of serious physical harm”]; In re L.B., supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 411 [“[i]t is well settled that physical
violence between a child’s parents may support the exercise of
jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) of section 300 where there is
evidence that the domestic violence has placed the child at risk of
physical harm and the violence is ongoing or likely to recur”];
In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 239 [because “‘“[c]hildren
can be ‘put in a position of physical danger from [spousal]
violence,’”’” the “juvenile court may invoke jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b), even if a child has emerged
physically unscathed from an instance of domestic violence”];

                                 9
In re Marquis H. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 718, 727 [although the
parents had not abused the child, their abuse of their
grandchildren supported jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (a)]; cf. In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332
[multiple injuries suffered by an infant’s sibling permitted
reasonable inference the infant was at a substantial risk of
serious physical harm because “even a single episode of corporal
punishment could have devastating consequences to [the infant’s]
physical health and safety”].) Sean F. had been violent with each
member of the family and had seriously injured April and
Lennon. The court could reasonably find it was only a matter of
time before Sean suffered the same fate. (See In re Mariah T.
(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 439 [“a reasonable trier of fact was
free to . . . conclude that without intervention, the severity of
punishment could escalate even further”].)
       Moreover, Sean F. refused to take responsibility for his
actions. (See In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 622
[“‘[o]ne cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge’”]; In re
A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“‘[d]enial is a factor often
relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify
their behavior in the future without court supervision’”].) Sean F.
repeatedly told social workers and investigators from the
Department that he had never abused anyone in the family.
Indeed, at the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
Sean F. testified: “I have never laid a hand on any of these
children or the mother.” Sean F.’s denial he ever injured April or
her children only increased the risk he would at some point injure
Sean. (See In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156 [“A parent’s
denial of domestic violence increases the risk of it recurring.”].)

                                10
       Sean F. argues “a single incident of recent domestic
violence” that does “not harm the children” cannot support a
jurisdiction finding under section 300 where there is no risk of
ongoing harm. He further argues he had been out of April’s home
for “months” by the time of the jurisdiction hearing. Sean F.’s
statement of the law is generally correct (see In re M.W. (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453 [“domestic violence between a child’s
parents may support the exercise of jurisdiction only if there is
evidence that the violence harmed the children or placed them at
risk of harm, and ‘the violence is ongoing or likely to continue’”]),
but his application of the law to the facts of this case is not.
There was more than one incident of domestic violence between
him and April. While April told law enforcement officers that the
March 2022 incident was the first time Sean F. had hit her, she
also stated that he had previously shoved her and thrown things
at her. In addition, she had called law enforcement within the
previous year to report Sean F. had threatened to kill her with a
knife.4 (See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 134 [parents’
“lengthy history of domestic violence” placed the child at a

4     Sean F. asserts, without citing any authority, his threat to
kill April with a knife “certainly” does not constitute domestic
violence. The law is to the contrary. (See Vinson v. Kinsey (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1166, 1170, 1178-1179 [father’s threat he would
beat the mother’s face in and kill her was domestic violence
under Domestic Violence Prevention Act]; People v. Caceres
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917, 920 [defendant who threatened to use
a knife to “chop” up his daughter’s mother committed domestic
violence for purposes of Domestic Violence Prevention Act]; see
also Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (a)(3) [for purposes of the Act,
“abuse” includes “plac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension
of imminent serious bodily injury”].)

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substantial risk of physical harm].) And April was not the only
person Sean F. had abused in the household. He physically
assaulted Lennon and he hit Zoe, which evidenced a propensity
for violence against family members. (See In re M.W., supra,
238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1454 [“past abuse or violent behavior may
predict future abuse”]; see also In re Cole L., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602 [“A parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be
probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that
the conduct will continue.’”].)
       Sean F. also asserts substantial evidence did not support
the findings he abused or harmed Lennon and Zoe because
neither child described the “details” of the abuse and their
injuries. The record does not support that assertion. Lennon told
a social worker that Sean F. rammed his head into a wall causing
him to bleed, and Abraham and Zoe confirmed Lennon had a
bruise on his forehead. (See In re David H. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1644 [serious physical harm includes
“bruises, red marks, welts, and broken skin”].) The incident was
so traumatic for Lennon that he said he never wanted to see
Sean F. again. Zoe similarly reported that Sean F. hit her in the
face. While Zoe’s injury was perhaps not as serious as the head
injury Sean F. inflicted on Lennon, the incident was yet another
example of Sean F.’s long history of violent conduct toward his
family, for which he refused to take accountability. The juvenile
court could reasonably conclude Sean was at a substantial risk of
serious future injury under both subdivisions (a) and (b) of
section 300. (See § 300, subd. (a) [“a court may find there is a
substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in
which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated
inflictions of injuries on . . . the child’s siblings, and a

                                12
combination of these and other actions”]; In re Mariah T., supra,
159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438-439 [substantial evidence supported
jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b), where
mother repeatedly used corporal punishment on children and
“den[ied] and minimize[d] what she had done”.)5

                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding is affirmed.

                                           SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.                MARTINEZ, J.

5     Because we affirm the jurisdiction findings under
subdivisions (a) and (b) based on domestic violence between
Sean F. and April and on Sean F.’s abuse of Lennon and Zoe, we
need not consider whether substantial evidence supported the
jurisdiction findings based on Sean F.’s use of cannabis or the
jurisdiction findings under subdivision (j). (See In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 293; In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773; In re
J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774.)

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