Court Opinion

ID: 9908245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:02:12.931228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:03.256605
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 8, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

 ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                                _________________________

                                         CL-2023-0392
                                   _________________________

                                     Sydney Claire Frosch

                                                      v.

                                       City of Birmingham

                        Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
                                  (CV-22-903566)

PER CURIAM.

        Sydney Claire Frosch appeals from the dismissal of her personal-

injury complaint against the City of Birmingham ("the City") on the

ground that she failed to comply with the notice-of-claim requirements of

§ 11-47-23 and § 11-47-192, Ala. Code 1975.
CL-2023-0392

                                Background

      On November 6, 2021, Frosch was injured in a fall while walking

on a sidewalk in Birmingham. (C. 7). On February 21, 2022, Frosch

signed and had notarized an "Affidavit of Claim" form, in pertinent part

provided by the City (“the affidavit-of-claim form”). That form states:

     "THE LAW OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA REQUIRES
     THAT A SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIM BE FILED WITH
     THE CITY CLERK OF THE CITY OF BIRMINGHAM (710
     NORTH 20TH STREET, SUITE 300, BIRMINGHAM,
     ALABAMA 35203) WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE 1
     INCIDENT ON WHICH THE CLAIM IS BASED. THIS
     FORM SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN FULL AND
     NOTARIZED. BE AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE. USE
     REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY, FOR VEHICLE
     DAMAGE, ATTACH COPIES OF AT LEAST TWO
     ESTIMATES OF REPAIR COSTS, ATTACH SPECIFIC,
     ITEMIZED LIST OF PERSONAL PROPERTY DAMAGED
     INCLUDING PURCHASE PRICE, AGE, ESTIMATED
     PRESENT VALUE (BEFORE AND AFTER DAMAGE).
     ATTACH PHOTO IF POSSIBLE (NOT REQUIRED). IF YOU
     HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL THE LAW
     DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF BIRMINGHAM AT (205)
     254-2369."

(Capitalization in original.)

     On March 7, 2022, Frosch's counsel mailed an envelope, via the

United States Postal Service, addressed to the City at the address the

city provided in the affidavit-of claim form - - 710 North 20th Street, Suite

300, Birmingham, AL 35203. The envelope contained a letter from

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Frosch’s counsel with a salutation of "To Whom It May Concern" and

stated that his firm had been retained to represent Frosch. Frosch’s

counsel also included the affidavit-of-claim form in the envelope. On

March 17, 2022, Frosch's counsel received a letter from the office of the

city attorney that stated, "This letter is to acknowledge receipt of the

affidavit-of-claim form you filed with the City of Birmingham." The letter

provided that if Frosch had any documents supporting her claim, "[o]ther

than the documents you have already provided," she was to send them to

the attention of the chief assistant city attorney. The letter also provided

that the city attorney's office would "proceed to investigate your claim

and you will be notified of our decision when our investigation is

complete."

     On November 23, 2022, Frosch filed a complaint in the Jefferson

Circuit Court against the City, alleging negligence. 1 On January 9, 2023,

     1Frosch also sued fictitiously named defendants as the individuals

or entities who controlled and/or constructed the sidewalk where Frosch
had fallen. The committee comments regarding the 1983 amendment to
Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., state:

          "Subdivision (b) is amended so as to harmonize it with
     the provisions of Rule 4(f)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] dealing with
     judgment against one or more defendants where other
     defendants have not yet been served with process. Thus, a
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CL-2023-0392

the City filed a motion to quash service because Frosch had served "The

City of Birmingham, Nicole E. King, City Attorney, Legal Department

6th Floor, 710 North 20th Street, Birmingham, AL 35202"; the City

argued that service was not properly addressed to the mayor or the city

clerk. The circuit court granted the motion. The record indicates that

service was reissued without further objection from the City.

     On March 6, 2023, the City filed a motion to dismiss Frosch's

complaint for failure to file a notice of claim pursuant to § 11-47-23 and

§ 11-47-192, Ala. Code 1975. Frosch filed a response arguing that the

affidavit-of-claim-form had been timely filed because the City had

acknowledged receipt of the affidavit-of-claim form. On April 25, 2023,

     judgment which disposes of fewer than all the parties is final
     where the parties as to whom there has been no judgment
     have not yet been served with process. See Ford Motor Credit
     Co. v. Carmichael, 383 So. 2d 539 (Ala. 1980), for a contrary
     result under Rules 4 and 54[,Ala. R. Civ. P.,] prior to the
     proposal of this revision."

Committee Comments to Amendment to Rule 54(b) Effective July 1,
1983.

      Dismissal of all named defendants in a civil action disposes of the
remaining allegations against fictitiously named parties and, therefore,
is an appealable final judgment. Johnson v. Reddoch, 198 So. 3d 497
(Ala. 2015).

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the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. Frosch

timely appealed. 2

                                Discussion

     Frosch argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her

complaint because (1) the affidavit-of-claim form complied with § 11-47-

23 and § 11-47-192 and the city attorney acknowledged receipt of that

form; and (2) the City should be equitably estopped from claiming failure

to file a claim as a defense because, again, the city attorney acknowledged

receipt of the affidavit-of-claim form.

     Section 11-47-23 provides:

           "All claims against the municipality (except bonds and
     interest coupons and claims for damages) shall be presented
     to the clerk for payment within two years from the accrual of
     said claim or shall be barred. Claims for damages growing out
     of torts shall be presented within six months from the accrual
     thereof or shall be barred."

     Section 11-47-192 provides:

           "No recovery shall be had against any city or town on a
     claim for personal injury received, unless a sworn statement
     be filed with the clerk by the party injured or his personal
     representative in case of his death stating substantially the

     2Frosch's  appeal had originally been filed in this Court, and we
transferred the appeal to the supreme court based on lack of jurisdiction.
See § 12-3-10, Ala. Code 1975. The supreme court then transferred this
case back to our court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975.
                                     5
CL-2023-0392

     manner in which the injury was received, the day and time
     and the place where the accident occurred and the damages
     claimed."

     " 'These statutes are to be construed as being in pari materia.' "

Etherton v. City of Homewood, 741 So. 2d 1078, 1080 (Ala. 1999) (quoting

Poe v. Grove Hill Mem'l Hosp. Bd., 441 So. 2d 861, 863 (Ala. 1983)). This

court explained in Locker v. City of St. Florian, 989 So. 2d 546, 548-49

(Ala. Civ. App. 2008):

           "Section 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975, provides that a
     municipality may be liable to an injured party when the
     damage suffered by the injured party was due to the 'neglect,
     carelessness or unskillfulness' of an agent, employee, or
     officer of the municipality who was engaged in work for the
     municipality and who was acting within the line and scope of
     his or her employment. Section 11-47-23 provides, in
     pertinent part, that '[c]laims [against a municipality] for
     damages growing out of torts shall be presented [to the clerk
     for payment] within six months from the accrual thereof or
     shall be barred.' Pursuant to § 11-47-192, in order for an
     injured party to properly 'present' a claim under § 11-47-23,
     the injured party must file a sworn statement with the clerk
     'stating substantially the manner in which the injury was
     received, the day and time and the place where the accident
     occurred and the damages claimed.' See Poe v. Grove Hill
     Mem'l Hosp. Bd., 441 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 1983); and Etherton v.
     City of Homewood, 741 So. 2d 1078 (Ala. 1999). However, if
     an injured party files a complaint alleging tort claims against
     a municipality within the six-month period prescribed by §
     11–47–23, this will also satisfy the notice requirement. See
     Diemert v. City of Mobile, 474 So. 2d 663 (Ala. 1985). The
     purpose of the notice requirement is to furnish a municipality
     with 'sufficient physical details' of the incident to 'enable the

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     [municipality] to investigate the claim and settle with the
     claimant if it deems such action appropriate.' Cox v. City of
     Birmingham, 518 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Ala. 1987) (citing
     Hunnicutt v. City of Tuscaloosa, 337 So. 2d 346 (Ala. 1976))."

     In the present case, Frosch mailed her affidavit-of-claim form to the

address supplied by the City on the affidavit-of-claim form. In Perry v.

City of Birmingham, 906 So. 2d 174 (Ala. 2005), our supreme court held

that an injured pedestrian's mailing of a notice of the pedestrian's claim

against the City did not constitute "filing" the claim with the city clerk,

for purposes of complying with § 11-47-23 and § 11-47-192. The plaintiff

in Perry sued the City after he was injured when his wheelchair

overturned on the sidewalk, alleging that the City had negligently

maintained the sidewalk. The incident occurred on August 28, 2002, but

the plaintiff did not sue until July 26, 2003. The City moved to dismiss

because the plaintiff did not file his claim within six months of his injury.

The City submitted an affidavit from the city clerk, who stated that she

had no record of the claim.      In response, the plaintiff submitted an

affidavit from his counsel's secretary stating that she had mailed a

verified notice of claim on February 25, 2003. The trial court entered a

summary judgment for the City.

                                     7
CL-2023-0392

     On appeal, our supreme court, in affirming the trial court,

reasoned:

     "Rule 3(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that '[a] civil action is
     commenced by filing a complaint with the court.' Rule 5(e),
     Ala. R. Civ. P., defines filing with the court as '[t]he filing of
     papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made
     by filing them with the clerk of the court, except that the judge
     may permit the papers to be filed with the judge ....' Rule 25,
     Ala. R. App. P., provides:

                   " '(a) Filing. Papers required or permitted to
            be filed in an appellate court shall be filed with the
            clerk. Filing may be accomplished by mail
            addressed to the clerk, but filing shall not be
            timely unless the papers are received by the clerk
            within the time fixed for the filing, except that
            papers shall be deemed filed on the day of mailing
            if certified, registered, or express mail of the
            United States Postal Service is utilized.'

     "Thus, Rule 25 implies that a mailing generally does not
     constitute a completed filing and that only an express
     provision in the law can impart completed filing status to a
     mailing.

           "Perry cited Rule 5(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., to the trial court
     for the proposition that '[s]ervice by mail is complete upon
     mailing.' The defect in this argument is that neither § 11-47-
     23 nor § 11-47-192[, Ala. Code 1975,] provides for 'service by
     mail' or filing by mail. …

            "….

          "Perry has not presented this Court with any authority
     or any compelling legal reason to hold that a mailing of a claim
     against an Alabama municipality, without receipt of the

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CL-2023-0392

     claim, is a presentment or a filing within the meaning of § 11-
     47-23 and § 11-47-192. As the Olsen [v. Moffat Road
     Veterinary Clinic, 441 So. 2d 971 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983)] court
     observed, § 11-47-23 and § 11-47-192 do not prohibit the
     mailing of the claim by the plaintiff, but they do require the
     receipt of the claim by the city clerk within the specified six
     months as a condition precedent to further prosecution of the
     claim in court. "

Perry, 906 So. 2d at 177-179 (emphasis added).

     Here, Frosch mailed the affidavit-of-claim form to the address

supplied by the City. Although there is nothing in the record showing

that the city clerk received the notice of Frosch's claim within six months

of her injury, the city attorney acknowledged receipt of Frosch's claim

within six months.

     Large v. City of Birmingham, 547 So. 2d 457 (Ala. 1989), involved

a fireman for the city who was injured during a training exercise on

October 16, 1986. He submitted an injury report that same day. On

March 5, 1987, the fireman was placed on "injured with pay status." 547

So. 2d at 458. On June 17, 1987, more than six months after the injury,

the fireman filed a notice of the claim with the city. On October 26, 1987,

he sued the city for damages for injuries received, claiming negligence

and wantonness. The trial court dismissed the City, ruling that the

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fireman had failed to comply with the notice-of-claim requirement of §11-

47-23.

     On appeal, the fireman in Large argued that the City had had

actual notice of the incident and that that actual notice rendered strict

compliance with § 11-47-23 unnecessary. In addition to filing an accident

report, the fireman communicated, cooperated, and maintained contact

with the city. "However, the required notice must be served upon the

authorized representative of the City, in this case, the city clerk, and

disclosure to any other division or supervisor cannot be treated as notice

for the purposes of instituting a claim."    547 So. 2d at 458.     Mere

knowledge of the incident resulting in the injury did not satisfy the

objectives of § 11-47-23, especially when the fireman had not previously

indicated that he intended to sue the city. Unlike in Large, the City in

this case had notice that Frosch intended to sue the City.

     Our supreme court has held that substantial compliance with

notice-of-claim requirements to a municipality is permissible when that

notice comports with its purpose, which is to provide sufficient notice so

that the municipality has an opportunity to investigate the claim,

prepare its defenses, or negotiate a settlement. In Brasher v. City of

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CL-2023-0392

Birmingham, 341 So. 2d 137 (Ala. 1976), the plaintiffs filed the notices of

their claims with the mayor's office and requested that the mayor forward

those notices to the City's legal department. The supreme court construed

a local act 3 which provided in pertinent part that "No suit shall be

brought or maintained … against the city on a claim for personal injury

… unless within ninety days from the receipt of such injury, a sworn

statement be filed with the city clerk, or the city officer corresponding

thereto…" 341 So. 2d at 138. The supreme court held that the plaintiffs

had substantially complied with the notice-of-claim requirements within

the local act.

      "Compliance with the provisions of this statute is a condition
      precedent to bringing suit. But, it is sufficient if there is
      substantial compliance, and the statute will be liberally
      construed in an effort to determine whether a claimant has so
      complied with its requisites as to serve the purpose of the
      statute. Allbritton v. City of Birmingham, 274 Ala. 550, 150
      So. 2d 717 (1963).

           Its purpose is to provide sufficient notice so that the City
      has an opportunity to investigate the claim, prepare its
      defenses or negotiate a settlement."

      3The local act, Tit. 62, § 659, Ala. Code 1940 (1958 Recomp.), was

not repealed upon adoption of the Alabama Code of 1975, see Ala. Code
1975, § 1-1-10, but it was found unconstitutional in Crandall v. City of
Birmingham, 442 So. 2d 77 (Ala. 1983).

                                     11
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341 So. 2d at 138 (emphasis added).

     More recently, in Etherton v. City of Homewood, 741 So. 2d 1078,

1080 (Ala. 1999), our supreme court explained that the purpose of § 11-

47-23 and § 11-47-192 " is to give notice of a claim in order that the

municipality may investigate and determine the merits of the claim, 714

So, 2d at 1080 (quoting McCarroll v. City of Bessemer, 289 Ala. 449, 455,

268 So. 2d 731, 736 (1972)).." In Etherton, the notice was insufficient

because the plaintiff's notice stated that he was making a claim against

the Birmingham Water Works Board; it did not suggest that he was

making a claim against the City.         Consequently, the City had not

investigated the claim. The notice therefore did not satisfy the objectives

of the notice-of-claim requirements.

     In Brasher, supra, the court discussed another case, City of

Montgomery v. Weldon, 280 Ala. 463, 195 So. 2d 110 (1967), explaining

that, in Weldon,

     "the claimant failed to file a sworn statement with the city
     clerk, but instead, wrote a letter to the mayor informing him
     of the claim. Although that case differs from the present one
     in that it went off on an estoppel theory when it was shown
     that the city had actually mislead claimant as to the
     sufficiency of his notice, it is authority for us to say that
     compliance with the statute as to with whom notice was filed
     may not be subject to a test of technical accuracy. In keeping

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     with the purpose of the statute, plaintiffs should be permitted
     to develop facts which would indicate the City did have benefit
     of notice; therefore there was either substantial compliance
     with the statute or the City is estopped to deny there was."

Brasher, 341 So. 2d at 138 (emphasis added).

     In the present case, on March 7, 2022, within six months of the

incident made the basis of her complaint, Frosch's attorney sent a letter

and the notarized, completed affidavit-of-claim form to the "City of

Birmingham." The record shows that Frosch addressed the letter to the

"City of Birmingham" and mailed it and the completed form to the city

clerk's office, located at 710 North 20th Street, Suite 300, Birmingham,

AL 35203, which the city-prepared affidavit-of-claim form lists as the city

clerk's address. The salutation on the letter was "To Whom It May

Concern."

     On March 17, 2022, the chief assistant city attorney sent Frosch's

counsel a letter acknowledging receipt of the affidavit-of-claim form "you

filed with the City of Birmingham." In the letter, the city attorney wrote

that if Frosch had any documentation supporting her claim "[o]ther than

the documents you have already provided," she was to send them to his

attention. The letter ended: "We will proceed to investigate your claim

and you will be notified of our decision when our investigation is

                                    13
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complete." (Emphasis added.) We note that the city attorney's address is

different from the city clerk's office; specifically, the city attorney's office

is in a different suite than the city clerk's office.

      Here, it is undisputed that the affidavit-of-claim form was mailed

to the City at the city clerk's address, an address the City itself supplied

on its affidavit-of-claim form. The letter the city attorney mailed to

Frosch's attorney makes clear that the City was investigating Frosch's

claim and was taking advantage of the opportunity to prepare a defense

to her claim or negotiate a settlement with her; thus, the purpose of the

notice-of-claim requirements was fulfilled. Under these circumstances,

the rejection of the propriety of the notice of claim based merely on the

absence of the word "clerk" in the address line of the envelope enclosing

her affidavit-of-claim form is nothing more than an attempt to enforce

technical accuracy with § 11-47-193, and our supreme court has already

rebuffed a lack of such accuracy as a ground for dismissing a complaint.

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      Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court dismissing

Frosch's complaint and remand the case for proceedings consistent with

this opinion. 4

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

      Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

      4Based  on our holding, we pretermit discussion of Frosch's
equitable estoppel argument.
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