Court Opinion

ID: 9779326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:46:54.32246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:25.401627
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
concurring.
Although I agree with the majority’s ultimate holding that the trial court improperly rescinded its order granting applicant’s motion for new trial, I am disturbed by the following language in the majority’s opinion:
“This Court has repeatedly held that a notice of appeal which was filed prior to the overruling of a motion for new trial was untimely or prematurely filed and as such was ineffective....6
While the majority recognizes that the issue is not properly before the Court and is not necessary to the resolution of this cause, by its language the majority implies that “the past precedents of this Court” on this issue are still applicable.
Although it has been held that notice of appeal is untimely if filed before the disposition of a motion for new trial by action of the court or by operation of law, Gordon v. State, 627 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), citing Menasco v. State, 503 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); these holdings preceded the enactment of the Texas Rules of Post-Trial and Appellate Procedure in criminal cases which went into effect on September 1, 1981. Specifically, Tex.Cr.App.R. 211 provides
“Where not inconsistent with the Code of Criminal Procedure and these rules, as they now exist or may hereafter exist, the Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern proceedings in the courts of appeals in criminal cases.”
The importance of Rule 211 to the disposition of this issue becomes obvious when one considers Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 306(c)(1977), which states:
“[n]o notice of appeal ... shall be held ineffective because prematurely filed; and every such ... notice of appeal ... shall be deemed to have been filed on the date of but subsequent to ... the date of the overruling of motion for new trial, if such motion is filed.”
The question then is, under the mandate of Tex.Cr.App.R. 211, whether Tex.R.Civ.P. Ann. 306(c) is consistent with the Code of Criminal Procedure and with the Texas Rules of Post-Trial and Appellate Procedure in criminal cases.
This question has twice been answered in the affirmative by Texas Courts of Appeals.1 In Johnson v. State, 649 S.W.2d *538153 (Tex.App.—Austin 1983), the Austin court, speaking of Rule 306(c), said, “The purpose of this rule is such that a party who appeals will not lose his appeal because he filed his notice prematurely. The purpose of Tex.Cr.App.R. 211 is to make the criminal and civil practice as consistent as possible.” The court went on to find no inconsistency between Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 306(c) and Art. 44.08(b), V.A.C.C.P.
In Mayfield v. State, 627 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1981), the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, speaking of Tex.Cr.App.R. 211, stated:
“The purpose of this rule is such that a party who appeals will not be denied his appeal because of the technical reason that he filed his notice prematurely.
“Rule 211, Tex.Cr.App. Rules (1981) provides that:
‘Where not inconsistent with the Code of Criminal Procedure and these rules, as they now exist or may hereafter exist, the Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern proceedings in the courts of appeals in criminal cases.’
“The purpose of this rule as we see it is to make as many Rules of Civil Procedure consistent with the Rules of Criminal Procedure so that the attorneys who practice both civil and criminal law will be guided as nearly as possible by the same rules.”
The court went on to find that Tex.R.Civ.P. Ann. 306(c) was consistent with Art. 44.-08(b), V.A.C.C.P.
The holding and the analysis of the Courts of Appeals in Johnson, supra, and Mayfield, supra, that when an applicant in a criminal case gives notice of appeal prematurely, the notice of appeal should be governed by Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 306(c), is sound and deserves due consideration. With that statement and recognizing that the issue is not directly before us, I concur in the judgment of the majority.

"6 In Johnson, Mayfield, Mosqueda, the respective Courts of Appeals further held, in accordance with civil rules of appellate procedure that a prematurely filed notice of appeal would be deemed filed as of the date of the overruling of motion for new trial. This is contrary to past precedents of this Court requiring refiling of notice of appeal. However, since this issue is not before the court we express no opinion as to the validity of these holdings.” Slip opinion, p. 536.

. Contrary to the majority’s statement in fn. 6, Mosqueda v. State, 646 S.W.2d 589 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983), followed the old rule and held that the premature filing of the notice of appeal was ineffective and failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.