Court Opinion

ID: 9465712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:53:34.400518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:19.554706
License: Public Domain

*1172WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
In the case at bar, plaintiff brought suit under the Virginia uninsured motorist statute, Va.Code § 38.1-381(c)-(e). Section 38.-l-381(e) provides, in pertinent part: “If the owner or operator of any vehicle causing injury or damages be unknown, an action may be instituted against the unknown defendant as ‘John Doe’ . . . .” To maintain an action against “John Doe” under this statute, a plaintiff must prove that the operator of the vehicle is “unknown.” See Haymore v. Brizendine, 210 Va. 578, 172 S.E.2d 774, 777-78 (1970); Doe v. Simmers, 207 Va. 956, 154 S.E.2d 146, 148-149 (1967).
Plaintiff, a citizen of the District of Columbia, chose to bring suit against “John Doe” in the federal district court, basing the court’s jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. As such, the burden was upon plaintiff, as noted by the majority, to prove that “John Doe” was not a citizen of the District of Columbia.
I believe it is a contradiction in terms for a plaintiff to contend that the operator of a vehicle is “unknown” for purposes of Virginia’s uninsured motorist statute, yet sufficiently identified for purposes of diversity of citizenship. Either the court lacks jurisdiction because the citizenship of the defendant cannot be proven, or Virginia’s uninsured motorist statute does not apply because it cannot be proven that the operator is “unknown.” The two contentions cannot logically coexist.
If the coexistence of both contentions is accepted, the following dilemma becomes at once apparent. If one must persuade by a preponderance of the evidence that the operator is not a citizen of the State of the plaintiff, it as well must be possible to sufficiently identify the operator so that he is not “unknown” within the meaning of the Virginia statute. But to so identify the operator would render the Virginia statute inapplicable. On the other hand, if one must prove that the operator is “unknown” so that Virginia’s uninsured motorist statute applies, it must be that the district court would be without jurisdiction since it would be impossible to prove the citizenship of the operator. The result rendered by the majority makes it all too alluring for a plaintiff to try to walk the narrow line between too much and too little information concerning the identification of the operator in order to invoke the limited jurisdiction of the district court and yet keep within the Virginia statute. I believe the result strains to find jurisdiction where none should exist.
As an additional and equally valid reason for my opinion that diversity jurisdiction is not present here, I think the district court erred in determining that the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant operator, “John Doe,” was a citizen of Virginia. The court premised its conclusion solely on the following facts: the accident occurred in Virginia; the defendant was driving an automobile with Virginia license tags; and no contradictory evidence on defendant’s citizenship was introduced.
If the above evidence may show anything as to citizenship, at the very best it would go to the citizenship of the owner, and not the driver, of the car, for the owner is required to register an auto. See Va.Code § 46.1-41. And even that evidence does not support an inference that the owner of the car is a citizen of Virginia, for, in Virginia, there are a variety of circumstances in which a nonresident must register and license his vehicle in the State. See Va. Code §§ 46.1-131-139. Therefore, just because a vehicle bears Virginia license tags does not mean the owner is even a resident of Virginia, much less a citizen thereof. Furthermore, registration is keyed to the use of the use of the highways of the State, Va.Code § 46.1-41, or operation in the State, Va.Code § 46.1-134, not to either citizenship or residence.
It is even more speculative to infer that the driver of the car was a citizen of Virginia. As the majority points out, the hit- and-run car was occupied by four males. It is sheer speculation to assume that the driver of the car was also the owner of the car *1173in these circumstances. Therefore, the license tags tell us nothing about the citizenship of the driver of the car, even if we accept for argument the proposition that they tell us something about the owner of the car. Likewise, the fact that the accident occurred in Alexandria, Virginia, which is in close proximity to both Maryland and Washington, D. C., does not tell us anything about the citizenship of the driver.
The majority opinion states that “resort to speculation and conjecture would be necessary in order to overthrow [the district court’s] conclusion” as to defendant’s citizenship. Because I believe the evidence of record is silent as to the citizenship of the driver of the car, I think it is necessary to resort to speculation and conjecture in order to uphold the court’s finding. This, I am unwilling to do.
I would require the dismissal of the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction.