Court Opinion

ID: 9571505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:16.570628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:29.935781
License: Public Domain

UDALL, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The trial court took the view that there was no evidence to show that any negligence of defendant had proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries. While we recognize the possibility of more than one proximate cause, Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124, 202 P.2d 201 (1949), it is equally well-established that contributory negligence, if itself a “proximate cause,” operates as an absolute bar to recovery. Sanders v. Beckwith, 79 Ariz. 67, 283 P.2d 235 (1955). Comparative negligence, in other words, is not recognized in this state. These principles should be controlling here.
I have no quarrel with the statement of facts set out in the court’s opinion but its elaborate emphasis on detail is distracting from the salient features of the evidence. When defendant’s driver slowed his vehicle and commenced a right turn off 20th Street, the rear of his load swung left. Plaintiff pulled over to the left side of the street to pass and ran into the end of the pole.
Classification of lawsuits is a delicate business. Precedents must be examined with care lest we create an intolerable conflict between legal rules and the demands of justice. From any effort to apply “general principles” of law there emerges a natural tendency to emphasize common factors of different cases while important distinctions go unnoticed or ignored. And the underlying policies which prompted an earlier result often escape the scrutiny which in light of altered conditions within the community as a whole they deserve.
These dangers are realized in the majority approach categorizing this appeal as a “pivot problem.” The authorities cited *10in support of that holding are easily distinguished from the case at hand. In Dorris v. Bridgman & Co., a pipe had been carelessly loaded so that it extended from the side of the truck at an angle to the direction in which the truck was moving. This is seen from the following description given by the court:
“One of the pipes, weighing 150 pounds, thus extended, diagonally, overhung the side of the truck, beyond the body line, from 12 inches to 2 feet. * * * The space in the cartway so occupied by the truck and trailer would include its normal width, plus the distance the pipe in question projected beyond the body line, in all approximately from 8 to 10 feet. * * * We regard the movement and space in front of the projection in the same light as the space in front of the truck itself. As described by some of plaintiff’s testimony, the case has all the aspects of a frontal collision, where a man is standing in the highway and a driver runs him down.”
As the truck passed a pedestrian standing at an intersection waiting to cross the street, the pipe struck her on the head causing serious injuries. The plaintiff in Barzen v. Kepler was riding in a car when it ran into timbers protruding from the rear of a truck which had stopped on the highway at night. Neither truck nor timbers were lighted in any way at the time of collision. Clearly, these cases presented no principles unique to extended and pivoting loads. Denny v. Strauss involved a horse-drawn wagon which, as it proceeded west along the street, swerved suddenly to the south so that a ladder projecting from the rear swung north. The ladder struck and damaged plaintiff’s car which was parked on the north side of the street.
In all three of the above cases, the plaintiff’s conduct was altogether proper and he had a legal right to be where he was. To borrow the phraseology used by the majority, the struck vehicles had lawfully reached the positions in which they were struck. Not so in the instant case. Plaintiff’s action in turning into the left or passing lane of 20th Street was in direct violation of A.R.S. § 28-726 which provides, inter alia:
“No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions:
í|í >fc ‡ ‡ #
2. When approaching within one hundred feet of or traversing any intersection or railroad grade crossing.”
That plaintiff was in fact driving on the “left side of the roadway” within one hundred feet of an intersection is established by undisputed testimony. His car came to rest only two feet from the left edge of 20th Street and only 35 feet north of the intersecting street. The point of impact and the scuff marks were all to the left of the center line. These facts leave no doubt that plaintiff was in the *11wrong lane; furthermore, he was acting in disregard of A.R.S. § 28-730 which prohibits following other vehicles more closely than is “reasonable and prudent,” having due regard for their speed and for highway conditions.
Plaintiff’s conduct thus amounted to a statutory violation and as such constituted negligence per se. See Alabam Freight Lines v. Phoenix Bakery, 64 Ariz. 101, 166 P.2d 816 (1946); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Morris, 78 Ariz. 24, 275 P. 2d 389 (1954), involving collisions where one vehicle was on the wrpng side of the road. There can be little doubt that A.R.S. § 28-726 was designed to protect against the intersectional hazards created by traffic turning on and off the highway. It would hardly be contended that defendant was liable had the truck been making a left turn off 20th Street and been struck by the plaintiff in his effort to pass. I see no sound reason for a different result merely because defendant was turning right instead of left and the pole trailer obeyed its natural and obvious proclivity to swing across the highway.
An entirely different case is presented when the pivoting load strikes a vehicle coming on from the opposite direction. Such was the case in Callahan v. David M. Oltarsh Iron Works, Sup., 112 N.Y. Supp. 1102 (1908), characterized by the majority as “virtually the accident before us in slow motion and in miniature.” Again it is clear that plaintiff there was well within his rights; the burden in such a situation is upon the turning driver to complete the maneuver safely. But surely any driver of minimum experience recognizes the obligation of following vehicles to slacken speed or even stop if necessary to permit the vehicle ahead to make a safe turn off the street.
We have consistently held that a defendant driver who is acting within the law has the right to assume that other drivers will do likewise. Henderson v. Breesman, 77 Ariz. 256, 269 P.2d 1059 (1954); Nichols v. City of Phoenix, 68 Ariz. 124, 202 P. 2d 201 (1949). It is true that his right to do so is not absolute and once it becomes clear that the other driver will not or cannot comply with the law, there is a duty to take avoiding action. This latter principle has been given effect most often in cases involving collisions at intersections where defendant had the right of way, and is expressed as the doctrine of “last clear chance.” See Egurrola v. Szychowski, 95 Ariz. 194, 388 P.2d 242 (1964). That doctrine is inappropriate, however, where, as here, defendant had no opportunity to avoid the effect of plaintiff’s misconduct. Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 87, 366 P.2d 80 (1961).
While certain other conduct of plaintiff might constitute specific acts of contributory negligence, viz., the failure to heed or even see the red flag on the pole, or *12the truck driver’s signal, I would willingly leave such matters to the jury. But never before has this court gone so far as to declare that a plaintiff may recover even though his unquestioned breach of a statute amounted to negligence per se.
According to the majority opinion, the jury might find that reasonable care by the power company required use of a helper or a follow up car. The jury might indeed so find. And had such precautions been adopted, they might still conclude that reasonable care required even further safety measures; a warning car proceeding in advance of the load, for example, as well as one following behind; or attempting to move the pole only during those hours in which traffic is least congested. They might find that reasonable men would not attempt to move a pole of these dimensions on this type of rig at all, despite the express sanction of the legislature.
The question before us, however, is what the jury could reasonably find; what issues the trial judge could properly submit to the jury. It is established by the record and conceded by the majority that the pole trailer met the statutory specifications for such vehicles; that a red flag was properly attached to the pole; that the driver signaled his intention to turn. Moreover, when he commenced his turn the truck was moving at a speed of only five miles per hour — so slowly that after the collision it was stopped within a distance of three or four feet.
Our decided cases are replete with denunciation of jury speculation. See, e. g., Alires v. Southern Pacific Co., 93 Ariz. 97, 378 P.2d 913 (1963). The law has always provided standards for the guidance of trial judges in determining whether a jury question is presented. Foremost among these is the rule stated in Ong v. Pacific Finance Corp., 70 Ariz. 426, 222 P.2d 801 (1950), to the effect that when the evidence establishes no “probative facts” from which negligence of defendant, or any causal relation between any acts of defendant and plaintiff’s injury may be found, a verdict is properly instructed for defendant. The same rule was again announced and followed in Bogard G.M.C. Co. v. Henley, 92 Ariz. 107, 374 P.2d 660 (1962). And in Butane Corp. v. Kirby, 66 Ariz. 272, 187 P.2d 325 (1947), this court declared: “It is not sufficient that the facts are such that [negligence] might have existed. It must appear affirmatively that it did.”
No “probative facts” which “affirmatively” tend to show negligence on the part of defendant can be found in the present' record. On the other hand, uncontroverted evidence establishes plaintiff’s disregard of positive law as the sole proximate cause of injury. The judgment should be affirmed.