Court Opinion

ID: 9729244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:29:57.315059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:56.420891
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 34. (dissenting). Two very subtle passages in the majority's opinion deserve attention. One has a substantial effect on the outcome of this case and the other affects the development of our law. Both could easily go unnoticed.
¶ 35. The first is a subtle shift in the analysis set forth in ¶ 25 of the opinioj). which erroneously transposes a promise of an offer of employment into an offer of employment. This seemingly slight shift is outcome determinative in this case.
¶ 36. The second is set forth in footnote 2, which at first blush is a rather innocuous statement indicating that "public officer immunity does not bar a lawsuit for breach of contract." However, in making this statement, the majority reaches out and arguably answers in a footnote an issue it need not address. Apparently, the majority fails to recognize that the extent to which public officer immunity applies in contract actions is an unsettled area of law.
¶ 37. Because I believe the subtle shift in analysis from a promise of an offer to an actual offer distorts the outcome of this case, and that the majority unnecessarily addresses, without adequate analysis or briefing, an otherwise unsettled area of law, I respectfully dissent.
HH
¶ 38. At the outset of the discussion of public officer immunity,- the majority correctly and artfully *737analyzes the "malicious, willful, and intentional" exception to immunity. It next discusses the breach of ministerial duty exception to immunity and appropriately sets forth the oft-quoted definition of ministerial duty which requires that the public officer's task be specifically prescribed and defined as to time, mode and occasion for its performance, leaving nothing for judgment or discretion.
¶ 39. Citing to the case of C.L. v. Olson, the majority correctly emphasizes that in analyzing public officer immunity we look to "the nature of the specific act upon which liability is based . . .." C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988). But without explanation, the majority then transposes the "act upon which liability is based" from a promise of an offer to an actual offer.
¶ 40. The cause of action before this court is one of promissory estoppel. It is not a cause of action for breach of contract. The "act upon which liability is" based" is a promise of an offer and not an actual offer. This case was pled on the basis of a promise of an offer, it was tried on the basis of a promise of an offer, and indeed the jury found liability on the basis of a promise of an offer. The jury answered "yes" to the first question of the special verdict which asked: "Did defendant promise plaintiff a job at the University of Wisconsin?" (emphasis supplied).
¶ 41. The subtle shift in analysis appears in ¶ 25 of the opinion when the majority focuses on another question set forth in the special verdict which addressed the tort of misrepresentation: "Did defendant (Sutula) make representations of fact that plaintiff had a job at University of Wisconsin Medical School?" Curiously, the majority takes the "yes" answer of the jury to this question and applies it to a different legal analysis. The *738majority transforms the jury findings regarding the existence of a tort of misrepresentation into findings related to elements necessary to create a binding contract.
¶ 42. The majority, in misconstruing the jury finding in the tort cause of action, states: "In other words, the jury found that Sutula made an offer of employment to Bicknese ..." Majority op., ¶ 25. Even the plaintiff acknowledged that Sutula could not make a contractual offer of employment. Only the University could make such an offer. That is why the plaintiff brought this case based on promissory estoppel and not based in contract.
¶ 43. Yet, the majority in ¶ 25 transposes the act of a promise of an offer, together with a jury finding addressing the tort of misrepresentation, into an actual contractual offer. Why? Because without this subtle change the majority's analysis collapses. The remaining analysis of the opinion relies on this misconstruction. Without an actual offer here, there is no ministerial duty.
¶ 44. The facts in this case present a series of negotiations in which a promise of an offer of employment was made. Such a promise, made in the course of negotiations, does not meet the definition of a ministerial duty. The basis for which liability is imposed here, i.e., the promise of an offer by Sutula, is not a specific task which the law imposes and which so certainly defines "the time, mode and occasion for [making the promise of an offer] .. . that nothing remains for judgment or discretion." Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).
¶ 45. Even the majority acknowledges that such a promise of an offer made in the course of negotiations is not so "absolute, certain and imperative" and so defined in "time, mode and occasion of its performance" to meet *739the stringent definition of a ministerial duty. But what the majority giveth, it taketh away, when it subtly transposes the basis of liability from the promise of an offer to making an offer, and thus adulterates its remaining analysis. The majority states: "We agree with Sutula that a mere promise does not necessarily create a ministerial duty; however, we disagree that Sutula, in making the offer. . . ." (emphasis supplied). Majority op., ¶ 23.
¶ 46. A ministerial duty did not exist because Sutula's promise of an appointment did not constitute an offer of an appointment. The majority advances that "Sutula had a ministerial duty to make the job offer consistent with the University of Wisconsin Faculty Policies and Procedures." Majority op., ¶ 2. The specific Faculty Procedure that created the ministerial duty states that each person "to whom an appointment is offered" must receive an appointment letter outlining various terms including the tenure clock. UW Faculty Policies and Procedures § 7.04(B).
¶ 47. Section 7.04(B) is not triggered when an appointment is promised. Rather, it is triggered when an appointment is actually offered. In order to circumvent this fatal distinction, the majority attempts to blur the distinction by re-characterizing the finding of the jury.
¶ 48. As noted above, in ¶ 25 the majority states: "In other words, the jury found that Sutula made an offer of employment to Bicknese, and, because there is ample evidence to support this determination, this court will not upset that jury finding." (Emphasis supplied.) Even though the majority says it is simply upholding the jury's finding that there was an "offer," the reality is that the majority is independently making its own conclusion that an "offer" existed.
*740¶ 49. The majority must make this re-characterization so that it can use § 7.04(B) as the basis for imposing the ministerial duty. However, the question asked of the jury was not whether Sutula made an offer, but rather "Did defendant promise plaintiff a job at the University of Wisconsin?" Thus the subtle shift in analysis and re-characterization of the jury finding fundamentally distorts the outcome of this case.
II
¶ 50. Additionally, I take issue with footnote 2 of the majority's opinion. Footnote 2 begins with an introductory statement which concludes that "public officer immunity does not bar a lawsuit for a breach of contract."
¶ 51. The majority should not make this conclusion for three reasons. First and foremost, the conclusion arguably settles an otherwise unsettled area of law even though the making of the conclusion has no impact on the majority's analysis of this case. Second, the majority does not discuss its reasoning for making the conclusion. Third, the parties have not adequately briefed this issue. Nevertheless, the majority makes the conclusion, and in a footnote no less.
¶ 52. I pause to voice my concern about this court's growing tendency to reach out and address, in footnotes, issues that it need not address. See Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 2003 WI 8, ¶¶ 72-79, 259 Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). The problem is exacerbated here because the majority makes its bald assertion in an unsettled area of law without adequate analysis or briefing. This problematic approach hampers the development of our law because when the issue is squarely presented in the future, fully *741briefed and argued, it will be unclear what effect should be given to the majority's cursory footnote resolution.
¶ 53. Contrary to the majority's statement in footnote 2, the extent to which public officer immunity applies in contract actions is unsettled. In Energy Complexes, we addressed whether a contract claim against Eau Claire County was barred either by common law immunity for counties or by statutory immunity for counties under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). We concluded that these types of immunity do not apply to breach of contract actions. Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 464-65, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989). In Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶ 35, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693, we described Energy Complexes as holding that "Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) does not grant immunity to actions based in contract." Although Energy Complexes did not deal specifically with public officer immunity, its holding indicates that public officer immunity analysis may not be applicable in contract actions.
¶ 54. However, other cases apply the breach of ministerial duty analysis in connection with contract actions, thereby implying that common law immunity and statutory immunity analysis are applicable in contract actions. In Major v. County of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 2d 939, 944-945, 539 N.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1995), the court of appeals concluded that Milwaukee County and its officers had discretion to determine the terms of the sale of the property, but once those terms were set in the contract, the County was under a ministerial duty to comply with the terms of the contract. We discussed the Major case in Kierstyn v. Racine Unified School District, 228 Wis. 2d 81, 94, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999), in which we stated: "while the public officers in Major were not obligated to sell county property or were free *742to sell it on their own terms, once they signed a sales contract they were under a ministerial duty to follow the terms of that contract." As these cases indicate, the extent to which public officer immunity applies in contract actions is unsettled.
¶ 55. Further, because public officer immunity may not be applicable to contract claims, we need to address as a threshold question whether a promissory estoppel claim is to be treated the same as a contract. Footnote 2 recognizes that public officer immunity may not be applicable to promissory estoppel claims such as the one in this case. The court nevertheless decides that since the parties did not adequately raise the issue, it would apply the public officer immunity analysis even though it might not be applicable.
¶ 56. I suppose that, if public officer immunity does not apply to promissory estoppel claims, the fact that the majority nevertheless proceeds to examine an exception to public officer immunity does not affect the outcome of this case. However, I agree with Justice Sykes that we "should not expound upon an exception to an immunity defense if the immunity defense is unavailable in the first place." Justice Sykes' dissent, ¶ 66.
¶ 57. In sum, I conclude that the shift in analysis from a promise of an offer to an actual offer distorts the outcome of this case and that there is no breach of a ministerial duty. Additionally, I disagree with the majority's reaching out in a footnote and arguably settling, without adequate analysis or briefing, an issue it need not address. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.