Court Opinion

ID: 9831734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:19:28.098654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.476262
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The able counsel for appellant presents a very forceful argument in support of the motion for rehearing .in this case, which has been read. The argument includes quotations from many authorities that at least seemingly support the principal point made, which is, as we g’ather from the argument, that, if the published article is susceptible of the meaning attributed thereto in the innuendos, it is libelous, and hence that it was error to sustain the general demurrer. Perhaps the essentials of appellant’s contention are more fully and accurately presented in a quotation made from Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, 105 Tex. 497, 150 S. W. 874, 878, 152 S. W. 167, which reads as follows:
"But whatever view may be taken of the language used, if its meaning is ambiguous and of doubtful import, as is conceded by the Court of Civil Appeals, the proper practice is to submit 'the question to the jury, which, was done. Under such circumstances, it was not proper for the court to dispose of the matter by determining what was the reasonable and natural meaning of the statement. That is the court’s duty in those cases where the publications admit of no ambiguity, but, where such ambiguity exists in the language complained of, it is the court’s duty 'to define libel and leave to the jury the question as to whether the language is libelous. Cotulla v. Kerr et al., 74 Tex. 89, 11 S. W. 105S, 15 Am. St. Rep. 819.”
 That case, as well as others cited in behalf of appellant, is, we think, distinguishable from the one now before us, and to now adopt the interpretation placed upon it would be to ignore the rule supported by all the authorities that the words of a publication claimed, to be libelous cannot be enlarged by innuendo alone. Where the publication is not libelous per se, as we think is the case here, it is essential that there be allegations of such extraneous circumstances as will enable the court to say that the publication, when read in the light of the circumstances, is reasonably capable of the meaning attributed to it in the innuendos. Such extraneous matter is sometimes designated by the authorities as a matter of “inducement,” sometimes as a “colloquium.”
In 25 Cyc. p. 437, it is said:
“⅜ * * when the words are not actionable per se, it is necessary to plead in the inducement such extrinsic facts as will render the words actionable, and to connect such extrinsic facts by proper colloquium with the particular words. The want of a proper inducement or colloquium can not be supplied by the innuendo.”
Upon the following pages, 438 and 439, it is further said:
“Where matter averred as defamatory requires a resort to extrinsic facts to make it applicable to plaintiff such facts must be averred, unless such averments are rendered unnecessary by provision of statute.
“Where defamatory matter imputing a crime is published in terms prima facie actionable and unequivocally expressive of the essential ingredients of the crime alleged to be charged, no prefatory averment of extraneous facts is required. But where the imputation does not per se import criminality and depends on extrinsic facts to explain it those facts must be set forth, and connected with the defamatory words by a colloquium so as to show that a crime was charged. If the words may be understood in a sense not criminal and there is no colloquium to show they were spoken in a criminal sense, they are not actionable.”
The rule is likewise so stated in 37 Corpus Juris, p. 22, § 329. The texts referred to are supported by decisions cited in notes.
There seems to be no serious contention on appellant’s part that the published article is libelous per se. If not, as we think must be held, the essential ground of our ruling on original consideration should be adhered to. Appellant’s petition, as we construe it, is wanting a sufficient statement of extraneous facts to sustain the innuendos and constitute the publication libelous.
Other reasons mentioned in our original opinion were mere argumentative suggestions that may; or may not, be entitled to weight, *845but we conclude that, for the reasons above stated, the motion for rehearing should be overruled.