Court Opinion

ID: 9588690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:58.127619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:14.535914
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The appellant asserted the defenses of novation and accord and satisfaction. The trial court granted judgment for the appellee nowithstanding the verdict, finding no competent evidence to support those defenses, and, in any event, a total lack of consideration for either a novation or an accord and satisfaction.
A novation must be supported by a new consideration. OCGA § 13-4-5 generally; Maguire v. Ivey, 212 Ga. 151 (91 SE2d 35) (1956). In the instant case, the only difference between the original note sued upon the subsequent notes allegedly executed solely by John Lewis Mitchell at the time of the payments to Johnnie Mitchell was the omission of the appellant as one of the obligors. Quite simply, no new consideration was given.
“Accord and satisfaction occurs where the parties to an agreement, by a subsequent agreement, have satisfied the former agreement, and the latter agreement has been executed. The execution of a new agreement may itself amount to a satisfaction of the former agreement, where it is so expressly agreed by the parties; and, without such agreement, if the new promise is founded on a new consideration, the taking of it is a satisfaction of the former agreement.” OCGA § 13-4-101; Kent v. First Nat. Bank, 57 Ga. App. 751 (196 SE 103) (1938). Additionally, “[a]n accord and satisfaction must be of some advantage, legal or equitable, to the creditor or it shall not have the effect of barring him from his legal rights under the original agreement.” OCGA § 13-4-102.
In the instant case, there was no evidence that Exie Mitchell was even empowered, at the time of John Lewis Mitchell’s execution of the two notes in favor of his siblings, to agree to an accord and satisfaction on behalf of the estate of Johnnie Mitchell. Moreover, the ar*142rangement, which neither gave the estate the benefit of any payment nor increased the estate, could hardly be said to result in any advantage or benefit to the estate. Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense, and the party asserting it has the burden of proof. McCullough v. Mobiland, Inc., 139 Ga. App. 260 (228 SE2d 146) (1976). The appellant’s proof in this case failed to raise an issue of fact as to the creditor’s express agreement or the existence of a new consideration.
Decided March 10, 1989
Rehearing denied March 29, 1989
Hurt, Pfeiffer & Hyman, Thomas H. Hyman, for appellant.
The majority opinion confuses the factual posture of this case. As discussed above, the appellant asserted two defenses, novation and accord and satisfaction. The claim of novation related to the alleged agreement between Johnnie Mitchell and John Lewis Mitchell to omit Harriet Mitchell as obligor on the alleged renewal notes. The claim of accord and satisfaction concerned John Lewis Mitchell’s subsequent sale of a portion of the property to his niece and purported payment of the remaining indebtedness by executing promissory notes to the anticipated heirs of Exie Mitchell. The testimony regarding John Lewis Mitchell’s motivation to restore family harmony related only to this subsequent sale to the niece and was no consideration whatsoever in the alleged earlier transaction between Johnnie Mitchell and John Lewis Mitchell when the agreement to remove Harriet Mitchell as obligor supposedly occurred.
Concerning the alleged novation, the appellant’s evidence was that John Lewis Mitchell requested that Harriet Mitchell be omitted as obligor on the renewal notes because he wanted to spare her the familial acrimony over the father’s sale of the property to John Lewis Mitchell and Harriet Mitchell. Not even the appellant claimed that his motive was to restore family harmony by doing so, and for good reason: removal of Harriet Mitchell as obligor obviously would not eliminate the stated basis for the family’s ill-will towards her, i.e., her ownership of the property, because her name remained on the warranty deed. Indeed, if anything, omission of Harriet Mitchell as obligor on the promissory note, eliminating her obligation to pay for her ownership interest, logically would exacerbate any bad feelings held by the family towards Harriet Mitchell.
In summary, the trial court correctly concluded that the evidence totally failed to show either novation or accord and a satisfaction. Grant of judgment for the appellee notwithstanding the verdict was proper. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s contrary conclusion.
I am authorized to state that Judge Beasley joins in this dissent.
*143Gary C. McCorvey, Richard English Thomas, for appellee.