Court Opinion

ID: 9910441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 17:08:52.564862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:56.310297
License: Public Domain

J-A22004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 DAWN BROWN                              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :         PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant            :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH            :    No. 297 WDA 2023
 AND COURTNEY DINGLE                     :

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 16, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Civil Division at No(s):
                               10317-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                      FILED: December 15, 2023

      Dawn Brown appeals from the February 16, 2023 custody order that

announced the court’s finding that she lacked standing to pursue physical

custody of her biological granddaughter, O.O., following the child’s adoption

by an individual that was not a stepparent, grandparent, or great-

grandparent, and dismissed with prejudice her petition to modify custody. We

dismiss the appeal as moot.

      In May 2019, O.O. was born out of wedlock to Courtney Dingle (“Birth

Mother”) and M.O., whose death preceded the child’s birth. Appellant is O.O.’s

biological paternal grandmother.   Erie County Office of Children and Youth

(“OCY”) obtained emergency care of the child on January 17, 2020, and the

juvenile court adjudicated her dependent approximately two weeks later.

O.O. reunited with Birth Mother, briefly, during October 2020, but the juvenile
J-A22004-23

court subsequently removed her and adjudicated her dependent for the

second time on December 7, 2020. O.O. has remained in the pre-adoptive

kinship home with two of her three siblings since that time.

      On February 2, 2022, the juvenile court granted the agency’s petition

to change O.O.’s permanency goal to adoption. Three weeks later, OCY filed

a petition to involuntarily terminate Birth Mother’s parental rights, and on June

1, 2022, Birth Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to O.O.

      Appellant neglected to appeal any of the juvenile court decisions.

Instead, on February 8, 2022, between the dates of the juvenile court’s goal

change order and OCY’s petition to terminate Birth Mother’s parental rights,

Appellant pro se filed a custody complaint at the above-captioned civil docket

number seeking sole physical custody of O.O. The complaint named both OCY

and Birth Mother as defendants. The portion of the complaint dedicated to

stating why the custody order would serve O.O.’s best interest asserted,

“[O.O.] was born after the death of her father. Since then[,] there had been

OCY involvement. At this time[,] they are getting a goal for adoption. [O.O.]

should be with her family.” Complaint for Custody, 2/8/22, at 3. As it relates

to standing, Appellant pled, “[w]ith my son [M.O.] being deceased[,] I feel I

should have custody of [O.O.] I am her grandmother and have done a home

study and everything OCY told me to do.         But they will not give me my

granddaughter.” Id.

      The trial court summarized the ensuing custody proceedings as follow:

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       The parties were present for a custody pretrial settlement
       conference in front of this [c]ourt on May 3, 2022. However, due
       to the pending appeal by [Birth Mother] challenging the change of
       goal and the pending involuntary termination trial, this Court
       found it was in the child’s best interest to hold Appellant’s
       complaint for custody in abeyance until after the matter concluded
       in dependency court. This Court further reasoned, and the child’s
       [guardian ad litem (“GAL”)] agreed, that a custody trial at this
       juncture would be premature and not in the child’s best interest.
       Shortly after, [Birth Mother] discontinued her appeal and
       voluntarily relinquished her parental rights.

              On June 16, 2022, despite this Court’s order holding
       Appellant’s complaint for custody in abeyance, Appellant filed a
       custody modification petition [that largely repeated the prior best-
       interest allegations and added as to standing “The father of the
       child is deceased The Mother of the child has terminated rights.”
       Modification Petition, 6/15/22 at 3]. A custody trial was held
       before [a different custody judge, who] ultimately dismissed
       Appellant’s modification petition. Unsatisfied with the result,
       Appellant filed her third request [to modify] custody on October
       26, 2022.[1] While that petition was pending, O.O.’s adoption was
       finalized on December 9, 2022[, and the child was discharged
       from the care and supervision of OCY.2]

Trial Court Opinion, 4/6/23, at 2-3.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s third petition for modification did not assert any new facts.
Appellant simply proffered the following narrative:

       I have had a steady on-going relationship with [O.O.] since birth.
       She is my granddaughter and also a niece, cousin, etc. She
       deserves to be with her family that loves her. [O.O.] and I have a
       great relationship and I miss her as I’m sure she misses me. I
       feel children should always have their family.

Modification Petition, 10/26/22, at 3. Appellant failed to plead facts that would
establish that she had standing pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5324 or 5325.

2 Notably, Appellant did not intervene in the orphans’ court’s proceedings,
challenge Birth Mother’s voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, or appeal
the adoption decree.

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       Thereafter, on January 30, 2023, OCY filed a motion to dismiss

Appellant’s custody action due to a lack of standing pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 5326, which we discuss infra, following the adoption by an individual that

was not the child’s “stepparent, grandparent, or great-grandparent.” The trial

court granted the motion summarily, but it subsequently vacated that order

and scheduled a hearing to allow Appellant to develop the record.

       During the ensuing hearing, Appellant did not challenge the application

of § 5326 or assert any form of standing under the Child Custody Act. Instead,

she sought to assail OCY’s stewardship of O.O.’s best interest in the now-

closed dependency proceedings.           Specifically, she challenged the agency’s

decision to place O.O. in the pre-adoptive kinship home rather than place her

in Appellant’s care.      See N.T., 2/15/23, at 6-8. Appellant asserted, “The

problem lies with [the fact that] this started before I had to file for custody

because kinship wasn’t honored.” Id. at 6. She continued, “It goes to family.

I’m her biological grandmother. How did she end up at [pre-adoptive kinship

parent’s] house would be the better question.” Id. at 7-8.3

____________________________________________

3 Ignoring for the sake of argument that Appellant failed to appeal the juvenile

court decisions that she sought to challenge in the custody proceedings,
Appellant’s position was founded upon the misapprehension that “kinship
care” requires some degree of biological consanguinity. It does not. The
statutory regime governing the use of family finding and kinship care defines
“Kin” as “[a]n individual [21 years of age or older] with a significant, positive
relationship with the child or family.” 67 Pa.C.S. § 7502.

                                           -4-
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      Following the hearing, the trial court granted OCY’s motion and

dismissed OCY as a named defendant in the custody proceedings, dismissed

Appellant’s petition for custody, and cancelled the pending custody trial. This

timely appeal followed.

      Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925;

however, as the trial court observed in discussing the child custody order,

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was laden with claims that “attempt[ed]

to re-litigate what occurred in dependency court and/or other proceedings.”

Trial Court Opinion, 4/6/23, at 2.          Appellant’s misapprehension of the

procedural posture of this appeal from the underlying custody order continues

in the presentation of her single issue for our review: “Whether the juvenile

court committed an abuse of discretion and/or error of law when it determined

kinship/foster care for the child [O.O.]”    Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 1.

      In its brief, OCY asserts, inter alia, that Appellant’s appeal from the

custody order dismissing her petition is moot because any potential custody

rights that Appellant may have possessed were extinguished on December 9,

2022, when the orphans’ court entered the decree finalizing O.O.’s adoption.

OCY’s brief at 22-21. For the following reasons, we agree.

      Typically, “an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the

judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.” In re D.A., 801 A.2d

614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (citation omitted).           As we have

explained, “[a]n issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the

                                      -5-
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court    cannot   enter   an   order   that   has   any   legal   force   or   effect.”

Id. Nevertheless, we may reach the merits of an appeal if one of the following

exceptions applies: “1) the case involves a question of great public

importance, 2) the question presented is capable of repetition and apt to elude

appellate review, or 3) a party to the controversy will suffer some detriment

due to the decision of the trial court.” Id. (citations omitted).

        As it relates to the effect of a third-party adoption on a grandparent’s

standing to pursue custody, § 5326 of Pennsylvania’s child custody statute

provides as follows:

        Any rights to seek physical custody or legal custody rights and any
        custody rights that have been granted under section 5324
        (relating to standing for any form of physical custody or legal
        custody) or 5325 (relating to standing for partial physical custody
        and supervised physical custody) to a grandparent or great-
        grandparent prior to the adoption of the child by an individual
        other than a stepparent, grandparent or great-grandparent shall
        be automatically terminated upon such adoption.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5326.

        Considering the forgoing statutory provision, no case or controversy

currently exists in this appeal because, as a matter of law, Appellant was

divested of any potential rights to standing on December 9, 2022, when the

orphans’ court entered the final adoption decree. As Appellant no longer has

the right to pursue any form of standing in the underlying custody

proceedings, any ruling that this Court could enter addressing the merits of

the custody order dismissing with prejudice Appellant’s petition to modify

custody will have no legal force or effect. Moreover, Appellant does not invoke

                                        -6-
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any of the above-mentioned exceptions and, frankly, none apply in this

situation. Thus, this appeal is moot and subject to dismissal pursuant to the

mootness doctrine.

     Appeal dismissed as moot.

  12/15/2023

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