Court Opinion

ID: 9557507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:51:27.030161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:54.472054
License: Public Domain

Opinion of the court by
ACOBA, Judge,
except for Part IV.B.4, which is a dissenting opinion.
In a complaint filed on February 24, 1993, Defendant-Appellant John E. Sinagoga (Defendant) was charged with three counts of Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree. On August 9, 1993, he pleaded no contest to Count I and guilty to Counts II and III. Under the Judgment filed on September 29, 1993, Defendant was sentenced to consecutive indeterminate prison terms of five years each on Counts I, II and III. He appeals only the sentences imposed by the Judgment.
I.
On August 9, 1993, Defendant appeared with his counsel at a change of plea hearing. In preparation for the hearing, Defendant had entered into a plea agreement with the State. Under the agreement’s terms, Defendant would plead no contest to Count I, Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree as defined in Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-716(l)(d) (1993)1 and guilty to Counts II and III, Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree as defined in HRS § 707-716(l)(a) (1993).2 In exchange, the State of Hawai'i (the State) would agree to Defendant’s request for probation with one year of incarceration and credit for time served. The State also agreed not to seek “enhanced” sentencing.
At the beginning of the hearing, Judge Marcia Waldorf explained to Defendant that according to the change of plea document, Defendant had agreed to plead in accordance with the agreement. Defendant expressed reservations about signing the document, responding, “I do’t [sic] know, it just doesn’t seem right.” The judge recessed the court to allow Defendant time to consult with his counsel.
Reconvening several minutes later, Judge Waldorf reiterated that by signing the change of plea document, Defendant was agreeing to plead as provided in the agreement. Defendant answered that he under*425stood the document and confirmed, in responses to further questions, that he had the requisite capacity to enter the plea. In the course of accepting the plea, Judge Waldorf informed Defendant that the court could order an “extended term[,]” that is a “doubling” of the five-year ordinary sentence on each count to ten years on each count, which, if imposed consecutively, would total thirty years.3 The court also explained that neither she nor any other judge was bound by the plea agreement reached between Defendant’s attorney and the prosecutor. Defendant indicated that he understood this.
[Judge Waldorf:] All right. Do you further understand, though, [Defendant], that as a matter of fact, the court, whether it be me or any other judge, is not compelled to follow agreements that are reached by attorneys. You understand that?
[Defendant:] Yes, I do.
(Emphasis added.) Defendant then entered a plea of no contest to Count I and pleas of guilty to Counts II and III. After it accepted Defendant’s pleas, the court, through its clerk, informed the parties that sentencing would take place before “Judge Spencer” on September 29,1993.
At the sentencing hearing before Judge Leland H. Spencer, both the prosecutor and the public defender requested that the court follow the plea agreement. Instead, Judge Spencer orally reviewed Defendant’s prior criminal record, which included convictions in various jurisdictions for burglary, assault, driving under the influence, and drug and concealed weapon possession. Judge Spencer noted that the offenses Defendant was charged with in the present case were felonies involving violence, and that Defendant was not a young man. Judge Spencer then declared that Defendant would be “a danger to people, whether in Hawaii [Hawai'i] or any other state where he happens to be; and that as long as he’s free to do so, he’s going to continue to be a danger to both people and to property.” Judge Spencer, thereafter, sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of five years on each count, with the terms to run consecutively.
Defendant’s October 26, 1993 motion for reconsideration and modification was denied on January 13,1994.
Defendant raises four points on appeal. We consider them seriatim.
II.
Defendant argues that, in accepting Defendant’s plea, Judge Waldorf employed language indicating she would retain sentencing authority under the agreement. Thus, he maintains, an implied term of the plea agreement was that Judge Waldorf, not Judge Spencer, would impose the sentence. Defendant relies on People v. Arbuckle, 22 Cal.3d 749, 150 Cal.Rptr. 778, 587 P.2d 220 (Cal.1978).
In Arbuckle, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State of California. The first judge, who accepted the plea bargain, was transferred to another department of the Superior Court. The case was brought before a second judge for sentencing. The defendant’s request for sentencing before the first judge was denied. Id.
On appeal of the sentence, the California Supreme Court concluded that the defendant entered into the plea agreement “in expectation of and in reliance upon sentence being *426imposed by the same judge.” Id. 150 Cal.Rptr. at 782, 587 P.2d at 224. The court rested its decision on “the [first] judge’s repeated use of the personal pronoun when referring to sentencing in the proceeding in which the plea bargain was accepted.” Id. The transcript of that proceeding read as follows: “[Judge:] I have agreed, ... that before I could send you to the State Prison, I would have to get that 90-day diagnostic study and I would follow the recommendation.” Id. 150 Cal.Rptr. at 782 n. 4, 587 P.2d at 224 n. 4.
Here, Judge Waldorf did not repeatedly refer to herself when discussing sentencing. The judge did “[take] note that at least by the pretrial bail report there were no prior felony convictions.” However, when the subject of sentencing arose, Judge Waldorf did not specifically refer to herself as the person who would sentence Defendant. The judge said,
[Judge Waldorf:] But just from the number of charges here presently it is possible that the court could order a sentence double, that is, extended term which is reflected on this document, double the normal sentence, and so that’s why your attorney has indicated that the.extended term could be 30 years.
(Emphasis added.) In addition, Judge Waldorf stated, “Do you further understand, though, [Defendant], that as a matter of fact, the court, whether it be me or any other judge, is not compelled to follow agreements that are reached by attorneys. You understand that?” (Emphasis added.)
Whatever language Judge Waldorf employed in accepting the plea, there was no doubt that Judge Spencer would sentence Defendant and Judge Waldorf would not. At the end of the hearing, the court said:
[Judge Waldorf:] And what that leaves remaining, [Defendant], is for the matter to be referred to the adult probation division for preparation of a presentence report. That is a report certainly in which you should cooperate, because it is in large part what the court will use, it’s not going to be I but it is what the court will use to determine whether it should follow the agreement reached by counsel and what all [sic]. So most naturally it would be [sic] behoove you to cooperate in that report.
And then the sentencing will be on — .
[The Clerk:] September 29, 1993 at 11:30, before Judge [Leland] Spencer.
(Emphases added.) Plainly, Judge Waldorf did not retain sentencing authority in this case as the judge did in Arbuckle, supra.
However, judges may now bind themselves to comply with plea agreements. Ha-wai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 11(e)(1), as amended in 1993, states in relevant part that, “[t]he court may participate in discussions leading to such plea agreements and may agree to be bound thereby.”4 Logically, it follows that a judge agreeing to a plea agreement under HRPP Rule 11(e)(1) should serve as the sentencing judge. But this version of HRPP Rule 11 was not in effect at the time of Defendant’s sentencing. We hold that, in the absence of a statute, governing procedural rule, or the tripartite concurrence of the prosecution, defense, and court, a judge who merely accepts a défen-dant’s plea is not bound to preside over the sentencing of that defendant.
III.
A.
As Defendant was informed at the time of his plea, the sentencing court was not *427required to follow the plea bargain,5 and Defendant does not challenge Judge Spencer’s decision in that regard. However, Defendant contests the court’s imposition of three consecutive terms of imprisonment on the three counts of terroristic threatening for which Defendant was convicted. A court’s authority to impose consecutive prison terms is granted by HRS § 706-668.5 (1993), which provides as follows:
(1) If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an unexpired term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively. Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms run consecutively. Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms run concurrently.
(2) The court, in determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider the factors set forth in section 706-606.
(Emphases added.)
HRS § 706-668.5 is the second version of what was originally HRS § 706-668 (1976). The original version “deprive[d] the court of the power to mandate that the sentences imposed upon a defendant be served consecutively” except “for crimes committed by prisoners while in custody or during escape.” Commentary to HRS § 706-668 (1985). In 1982, however, the section was amended “to provide the court discretion to sentence a person to a term of imprisonment to run consecutively or coneurrently[,]” because the “[pjrior law [which] allowed concurrent sentencing with no discretion to impose consecu-five sentences ... negated the deterrence of punishment in eases of a multiple offender[.]” Id. The Hawai'i legislature in 1982 concluded that by limiting judges to the imposition of concurrent sentences, the original statute “fail[ed] to deter similar future [criminal] behavior on the part of the particular individual involved.” Sen.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 382, in 1982 Senate Journal, at 1111. The legislature assumed “that judges will exercise their discretion in invoking consecutive terms of imprisonment when appropriate as in instances where the defendant committed multiple or subsequent offenses.” Id. HRS § 706-668 was repealed in 1986. 1986 Haw. Sess.L. Act 314, § 46 at 614. The substance of the repealed section, however, was retained in the newly enacted version of HRS § 706-668.5 which replaced it.
Accordingly, under HRS § 706-668.5, the court was well within its statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences. See Keawe v. State, 79 Hawai'i 281, 285, 901 P.2d 481, 485 (1995). Cf. State v. Akana, 10 Haw.App. 381, 384, 876 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1994) (the seven-day term of imprisonment was a condition well within the statutory scope of discretion accorded the sentencing court). This comports with “indeterminate sentencing systems ... [where] the choice of imposing either consecutive or concurrent sentences is usually left to the discretion of sentencing judges.” A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 9:10, at 271-72 (2d ed.1981) (footnote omitted).
B.
In imposing consecutive sentences, Judge Spencer was required to apply the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606 (1993). HRS § 706-606 was enacted with HRS § 706-668.5 in 1986. 1986 Haw.Sess.L. Act 314, § 15 at 599-600.6
The factors in HRS § 706-606 include:
*428(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The need for the sentence imposed:
(a) To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for [the] law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(b) To afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(c) To protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(d) To provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) The kinds of sentences available; and
(4) The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.
Defendant agrees the court considered the factors stated in HRS § 706-606(2)(b) and (c), but contends that it did not consider the factors listed in HRS § 706-606(2)(a), (2)(d), and (3).
We disagree with Defendant’s latter position. In light of the court’s finding that Defendant posed “a danger to people” and if “free[d]” would “continue to be a danger,” the court undoubtedly considered “[t]he need for the sentence ... [t]o reflect the seriousness of the offense[s], to promote respect for [the] law, and to provide just punish-ment_” HRS § 707-606(2)(a). Arguably, the “needed ... correctional treatment” factor in HRS § 706-606(2)(d) was implicit in the court’s sentence of incarceration, along with the court’s consideration of “[t]he- kinds of sentences available” as the factor in HRS § 706-606(3) required.7
The fact that a court does not orally address every factor stated in HRS § 706-606 at the time of sentencing does not mean the court failed to consider those factors. The statute contains no requirement that the court expressly recite its findings on the record for each of the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606. Nevertheless, under HRS § 706-668.5, judges are duty-bound to consider HRS § 706-606 factors before imposing sentence. The information relevant to HRS § 706-606 factors is made available to the judges in pre-sentence reports. HRS § 706-601 (1993). The law presumes that judges will conscientiously fulfill their duty to obey the directive of HRS § 706-668.5, and that counsel will offer factor-relevant information at sentencing hearings mandated by HRS § 706-604 (Supp.1992). Therefore, absent clear evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a sentencing court, following the receipt of a pre-sentence report under HRS § 706-601 and a mandated sentencing hearing under HRS § 706-604, will have considered all the factors in HRS § 706-606 before imposing concurrent or consecutive terms of imprisonment under HRS § 706-668.5.
C.
While there is no requirement that the court recite its findings on the record for each of the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has recommended that a sentencing court state the reasons for its sentence.
*429Although there is no requirement for the sentencing court to state its reasons for imposing sentence, we have urged and strongly recommended that the sentencing court do so and to also state that sentencing alternatives were considered, especially when a young adult defendant is sentenced.
State v. Lau, 73 Haw. 259, 263, 831 P.2d 523, 525 (1992).8
Unquestionably, Judge Spencer did state the reasons for the court’s sentence. Following the approach in Lau, however, we believe that the preferable practice is for the sentencing court to also acknowledge on the record that it has considered the factors enumerated in HRS § 706-606 when imposing concurrent or consecutive sentences under HRS § 706-668.5.
Here, the court had the pre-sentence investigation report before it. Defendant presented his own statement to the court. Counsel argued on behalf of Defendant. The court was apprised of the plea bargain. Pri- or to imposing sentence, the court orally reviewed the history of Defendant’s criminal record in detail. Because no clear evidence to the contrary exists, we cannot say, under the circumstances, that the court failed to consider all the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606. Furthermore, “[t]he weight to be given the factors set forth in HRS [§] 706-606 in imposing sentence is a matter generally left to the discretion of the sentencing court, taking into consideration the circumstances of each case.” State v. Akana, 10 Haw.App. 381, 386, 876 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1994).
The sentencing judge has broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 143-44, 890 P.2d 1167, 1183-84 (1995). Thus, typically, the sentencing court has “wide latitude in the selection of penalties from those prescribed by statute and in the determination of the severity of such penalties.” State v. Miller, 79 Hawai'i 194, 900 P.2d 770 (1995). As a result, absent an apparent abuse of discretion, State v. Johnson, 68 Haw. 292, 296, 711 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1985), or the court committing “a plain and manifest abuse of discretion in its decision[,]” State v. Fry, 61 Haw. 226, 231, 602 P.2d 13, 17 (1979), such as when the court “rigidly applfies] sentencing guidelines promulgated without legislative authority[,]” State v. Nunes, 72 Haw. 521, 524, 824 P.2d 837, 839 (1992), the sentencing court will not be reversed. See Akana, 10 Haw.App. 381, 876 P.2d 1331 (where a defendant pleads guilty with full knowledge of the court’s authority to impose an indeterminate term of imprisonment, the court’s imposition of imprisonment does not ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion).
rv.
Finally, Defendant maintains that his due process rights were violated because (1) Defendant’s sentence was in fact the imposition of an “extended” sentence imposed without benefit of the procedures mandated by HRS § 706-664 (1993), and (2) the prior convictions referred to by Judge Spencer may not be used against Defendant unless it is demonstrated that Defendant was represented by counsel in those cases.
A.
Defendant submits that if the court relied on his prior convictions, he should have been afforded the “procedural and substantive due process protection ... guaranteed to a criminal defendant before an extended sentence can be imposed[,]” as well as his “statutory due process rights” set forth in HRS §§ 706-664 and 706-662 (1993). HRS § 706-662 sets forth the criteria for imposing an extended term of imprisonment. HRS § 706-664 sets forth the procedure that must be followed prior to imposing an extended term of imprisonment. Thus, the “rights” Defendant claims pertain only to an extended sentence.
The sentence imposed here, however, was not an extended sentence. Defendant was *430convicted of three class C felonies. Under HRS § 706-660 (1993), the “ordinary term” for each class C felony was five years. By contrast, imprisonment for the same class C felony under the extended sentence provision, HRS § 706-661, would double the ordinary term to ten years, as Judge Waldorf informed Defendant. See supra note 3. Thus, if Defendant had been subjected to an extended term provision, he would have been sentenced to ten years of imprisonment on each of the counts.
Consecutive sentences, accordingly, are not extended sentences. See State v. Ige, 61 Haw. 517, 519, 606 P.2d 83, 85 (1980) (in a pre-code sentence, exercise of discretion to retain consecutive sentence did not transform sentence into an extended sentence). See also HRS § 706-662(4)(b) (defendant is a multiple offender if the maximum terms of imprisonment would equal or exceed the maximum extended term possible). “Consecutive sentences follow one another seriatim, one being completely served before the next is begun. They result from either conviction of multiple crimes or from conviction of additional crimes while under a prior sentence.” A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 9:10, at 270 (2d ed. 1981) (footnote omitted). On the other hand, “[t]he extended term authorized under the penal code to be imposed by a sentencing judge is a sentence that enlarges the ordinary sentence for any given offense.” State v. Tyquiengco, 6 Haw.App. 409, 413, 723 P.2d 186, 189 (1986) (emphasis added). While a consecutive sentence increases the defendant’s overall term of imprisonment, it does not “enlarge[ ] the ordinary sentence for any given offense”; a consecutive sentence only specifies how multiple sentences will be served. See Tyquiengco, supra.
We believe Defendant was afforded due process at sentencing. Due process minimally requires “ ‘notice of the information which is being considered and an opportunity to participate which that notice affords.’” State v. Ortez, 60 Haw. 107, 120, 588 P.2d 898, 907 (1978) (quoting Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, American Bar Association, § 5.5, Comment c (1968)).
Defendant had been informed at his plea hearing that the sentencing court was not obligated to follow the plea bargain. The pre-sentence report listed consecutive sentences as one of the “Applicable [sentencing] dispositions.” Defendant received the statement of Defendant’s prior convictions in the pre-sentence report. At sentencing, defense counsel acknowledged receipt “of the presentence report dated September 27, 1993.” Defense counsel then proceeded to make corrections to the report. Defendant was present and submitted evidence at the sentencing and reconsideration hearings.
Plainly, Defendant received notice that he might be subject to consecutive terms of imprisonment in the pre-sentence report. See supra note 7. Hence, Defendant knew his conviction record had been provided to the court. Defendant had notice of the information the court was to consider. Because Defendant had the opportunity to argue and present evidence at his sentencing and reconsideration hearings, he was clearly afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings concerning the information being considered.
B.
Finally, we are confronted with Defendant’s assertion that a sentencing court may not consider a defendant’s prior convictions in imposing consecutive sentences unless it has been demonstrated that the defendant had the benefit of counsel or had properly waived counsel in the prior proceedings. This is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. See State v. Buffalo, 4 Haw.App. 646, 651 n. 7, 674 P.2d 1014, 1019 n. 7 (1983), cert. denied, 67 Haw. 686, 744 P.2d 781 (1984).
In sentencing Defendant to consecutive terms, the sentencing court expressly relied on Defendant’s prior convictions.9 The eon-*431victions were listed in the pre-sentence report without any indication of whether Defendant had counsel or waived counsel in the corresponding cases. The sentencing court made no determination on this issue. We examine separately whether the sentencing court erred in relying on the felony convictions and the misdemeanor and any petty misdemeanor convictions because it has been held that misdemeanor convictions do not necessarily invoke the right to counsel. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979).
1.
In United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that un-counseled felony convictions could not be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence. Tucker was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1976), which gave the court the discretion to sentence Tucker to up to twenty-five years in prison.10 In sentencing Tucker to the maximum prison term allowed, the sentencing court “gave explicit attention to the three previous felony convictions the [defendant] had acknowledged.” Id. at 444, 92 S.Ct. at 590 (footnote omitted). Several years after Tucker was sentenced, it was discovered that he did not have counsel and did not waive his right to counsel in two of the prior convictions considered. While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the sentencing court had the discretion to consider a broad and mostly unlimited spectrum of information, id. at 446, 92 S.Ct. at 590-91, it held that the sentencing court could not impose a sentence “founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude.” Id. at 447, 92 S.Ct. at 592.
Resting on the right to counsel guaranteed by the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, and the “unequivocal rule ... ‘making it unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state court unless he [or she] had a lawyer or had validly waived one[,]’ ” the Supreme Court reaffirmed its admonition in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967),11 that “ ‘[t]o permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright[, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963),] to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense ... is to erode the principle of that case.’” Tucker, 404 U.S. at 449, 92 S.Ct. at 593 (quoting Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114, 115, 88 S.Ct. at 262). The Court rejected prior uncounseled felony convictions as a basis for enhancing punishment through the imposition of a maximum allowable sentence. Therefore, absent a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the use of prior uncounseled felony convictions to enhance a prison sentence violates a defendant’s right to counsel. See id. We independently adopt this basic proposition under article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution, which affords accused persons the right to counsel.
We note that the Hawai'i Supreme Court has employed similar reasoning where a sen*432tence has been “enhanced” under the extended term sentencing provisions of the Hawai'i Penal Code. In State v. Kamae, 56 Haw. 628, 638, 548 P.2d 632, 639 (1976) the Hawai'i Supreme Court vacated the imposition of an extended term sentence under HRS § 706-662(4), the “multiple offender” section, because
the record [was] glaringly deficient as it d[id] not show that appellant was represented by counsel during any of the alleged prior offenses of which he was convicted, or that he intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to counsel. “To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right.” Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115, 88 S.Ct. 258, 262, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). We have also agreed with the precept stated in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), that “[p]resuming waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible.” Carvalho v. Olim, 55 Haw. 336, 519 P.2d 892 (1974); Wong v. Among, 52 Haw. 420, 477 P.2d 630 (1970).
(Emphasis added.) (Some citations omitted.) Similarly in State v. Morishige, 65 Haw. 354, 652 P.2d 1119 (1982), involving an extended term sentence under the “persistent offender” provision of HRS § 706-662(1) and “multiple offender” provision of HRS § 706-662(4), the court held that “when prior convictions are used to enhance the penalty for another offense, the record in each case must show that the defendant was represented by counsel during the alleged prior offenses of which he [or she] was convicted, or that he [or she] intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to counsel.” Id. at 367, 652 P.2d at 1129 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted) (citing Kamae, 56 Haw. at 638, 548 P.2d at 639).
2.
We examine whether there is a similar bar to the use of uncounseled misdemeanor and petty misdemeanor convictions.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,” the Sixth Amendment through the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “no person may be imprisoned for any offense whether classified as petty, misdemeanor or felony, unless he [or she] was represented by counsel at [his or her] trial.” (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.) Concurring, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that a layperson was no less able to defend against lesser offenses than he or she would be able to defend against serious offenses:
The issues that must be dealt with in a trial for a petty offense or a misdemeanor may often be simpler than those involved in a felony trial and yet be beyond the capability of a lay[person], especially when he [or she] is opposed by a law-trained prosecutor. There is little ground, therefore, to assume that a defendant, unaided by counsel, will be any more able adequately to defend himself [or herself] against the lesser charges that may involve confinement than more serious charges.
Id. at 41, 92 S.Ct. at 2014 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Later in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), the Supreme Court affirmed that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor had the right to be represented by counsel only if he or she was actually imprisoned, and not otherwise.12 Scott held that “actual impris*433onment is the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel [in misdemeanor cases].” Id. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1162. Hence, under the “actual imprisonment” standard of Scott, uneounseled convictions which did not result in imprisonment were considered constitutionally valid convictions.
In Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 1587, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring), however, the Court indicated that such a conviction was invalid for the purpose of imposing a sentence of imprisonment on a subsequent conviction. While acknowledging that Scott stated that “an uneounseled misdemeanor conviction is constitutionally valid [if] the offender is not incareerated[,]” the Baldasar plurality nevertheless held:
The sentence petitioner actually received would not have been authorized by statute but for the previous conviction. It was imposed as a direct consequence of that uneounseled conviction and is therefore forbidden under Scott and Argersinger.
Id. at 227, 100 S.Ct. at 1588 (Marshall, J., concurring).
In Baldasar, the defendant was charged with theft under a statute that allowed a second theft offense to be treated as a felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of one to three years. Although Baldasar did not command a majority approach,13 the plurality did agree that the right to counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is violated when a defendant is sentenced to incarceration on a subsequent offense because of a prior uneounseled misdemeanor conviction. 446 U.S. at 224, 100 S.Ct. at 1586 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 225-26, 100 S.Ct. at 1586-87 (Marshall,. J., concurring); see also Nichols v. United States, — U.S. -, - n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 1932 n. 1, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that while he did not explicitly state so in his concurrence in Baldasar, he had no disagreement with the premise that an un-counseled conviction was invalid for purposes of imposing imprisonment for a subsequent offense).
As Justice Marshall explained in his concurrence, when a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment because of a prior conviction, the court is actually sentencing the defendant based on the first conviction because imprisonment is imposed as a direct consequence of that conviction. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227, 100 S.Ct. at 1587-88. Hence, “a rule that [holds] a conviction invalid for imposing a prison term directly, but valid for imposing a prison term collaterally, would be an illogical and unworkable deviation from ... previous cases.” Id. at 228-29, 100 S.Ct. at 1588-89 (footnote omitted). The rationale supporting this approach is that “unless an accused has ‘the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him,’ his conviction is not sufficiently reliable to support the severe sanction of imprisonment.”14 Id. at 227-28, 100 S.Ct. at 1587-88 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (citing Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31-36, 92 S.Ct. at 2009-12)).
In State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 152, 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990), the Hawai'i Supreme Court, citing Baldasar, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, held that because no sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the defendant’s second conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor (DUI), the State was not obligated to prove that a prior DUI conviction was counseled. Ho-*434glund characterized Baldosar as meaning that “an ‘uncounseled misdemeanor conviction’ ” was “not sufficiently reliable to support the severe sanction of imprisonment.” Id. See also State v. Nishi, 9 Haw.App. 516, 527-28, 852 P.2d 476, 482 (1993) (State not required to show that the defendant was represented by counsel during his prior conviction where the defendant was not sentenced to any imprisonment for the instant offense). In State v. Vares, 71 Haw. 617, 621, 801 P.2d 555, 557 (1990), another misdemeanor DUI case, our supreme court stated that “[a]n uncounseled conviction cannot be used collaterally to support an enhanced sentence where such enhanced sentence includes a term of imprisonment.” (Citing Baldasar, supra; Kamae, supra.) The Vares court concluded that because the defendant was. not represented by counsel on a prior DUI misdemeanor conviction, he could not be subjected to the prison term mandated for a third DUI conviction. Thus, following the Baldosar approach, the appellate decisions in our jurisdiction have required proof that a prior misdemeanor conviction was counseled when used as a basis for imprisonment or an enhanced sentence of imprisonment.
Baldasar, supra, was later overruled by Nichols, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921. In Nichols, the Court held that a prior uncoun-seled misdemeanor conviction could be used as a basis for increasing the term of imprisonment under a recidivist statute. The Court explained that because a sentencing court might validly consider “the underlying conduct which gave rise” to the prior conviction, “it must be constitutionally permissible to consider a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction based on the same eonduct[.]” 511 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1928.
Nichols has not yet been the subject of any appellate discussion in our jurisdiction. In the context of consecutive term sentencing, we choose not to follow the rationale in Nichols, supra. See State v. Silva, 78 Hawai'i 115, 121, 890 P.2d 702, 708 (App.1995) (Hawaii appellate courts may interpret the state constitution to afford greater protection than the federal constitution). If an uncoun-seled misdemeanor conviction cannot result in imprisonment because of its unreliability in the first place, it is logically inconsistent to rely on it as a basis to enhance a prison term on a subsequent conviction. Therefore, we see no reason to depart from the current rule in our jurisdiction which prohibits the use of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction as a basis for the imposition or enhancement of a prison sentence.
Because the reliability of prior convictions is the linchpin for a sentencing court to consider such convictions, our holding, infra, must apply to uncounseled petty misdemeanors as well. We believe the controlling proposition is that in the absence of a valid waiver of counsel, an uncounseled conviction is not reliable for purposes of imposing or enhancing a sentence of imprisonment. We may be extending greater protection to an accused person than would the United States Supreme Court, but this is consistent with the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision to “afford[] greater protection of [defendants’] right to effective assistance of counsel” under article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution. State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54, 67 n. 2, 837 P.2d 1298, 1305 n. 2 (1992). We perceive no practical obstacle to this approach since our supreme court has already limited consideration of prior felony and misdemeanor convictions to counseled ones, where increased terms of imprisonment or imprisonment are sought to be imposed. See Vares, 71 Haw. at 621, 801 P.2d at 557; Morishige, 65 Haw. at 367, 652 P.2d at 1129.
3.
We are not faced with a statute which requires or allows the imposition of an increased sentence because of prior convictions. Nevertheless, a defendant sentenced to consecutive terms will obviously be subject to a longer term of imprisonment than if the terms were to ran concurrently. The situation here is similar to that in Tucker, where the sentencing court chose “to impose a heavier prison sentence than it otherwise [could] have imposed[,]” 404 U.S. at 446, 92 S.Ct. at 591, and “[t]he record ... makes evident that the sentencing judge gave specific consideration to the [defendant’s] previous convietions[.]” Id. at 447, 92 S.Ct. at 592. We may be left “not with a *435sentence imposed in the informed discretion of a [sentencing] judge, but with a sentence founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude.” Id. We have concluded that, under our constitution, an uncounseled conviction is not reliable for purposes of sentencing. See discussion supra, We hold, then, that if a sentencing court gives consideration to the defendant’s previous convictions in choosing to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, terms of imprisonment, the court must ensure that any prior felony, misdemeanor, and petty misdemeanor conviction relied on was a counseled one. See Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447, 92 S.Ct. at 591-92.
4.

. Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-716(l)(d) (1993) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person commits the offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree if the person commits terroristic threatening ... [w]ith the use of a dangerous instrument.”

. HRS § 707-716(l)(a) (1993) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person commits the offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree if the person commits terroristic threatening ... [b]y threatening another person on more than one occasion for the same or a similar purpose[.]”

. During the change of plea hearing, Judge Waldorf stated,
[Judge Waldorf:] But just from the number of charges here presently it is possible that the court could order a sentence double, that is, extended term which is reflected on this document, double the normal sentence, and so that’s why your attorney has indicated that the extended term could be 30 years. And the state’s not asking for that but I just want to tell you how that would work.
That would be by taking each of the 5 years and doubling them to 10, that would be the extended term, and then if the sentences were made to run consecutively, that is, back to back, that’s how it would come up to 30 years, obviously. But the sewntencing [sic] agreement is not only that the state won’t ask for that but actually has agreed to ask for one year of incarceration, total. You understand that part of it?
[Defendant:] Yes ma’am.
[Judge Waldorf:] You understand how it gets to 30 years?
[Defendant:] Yes, I do.
[Judge Waldorf:] And then you understand what the agreement is?
[Defendant:] Yes, I do.

. At the time of sentencing, Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 11(e)(1) stated in its entirety:
The prosecutor and counsel for the defendant, or the defendant when acting pro se, may enter into plea agreements that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to an included or related offense, the prosecutor will take certain actions or adopt certain positions, including the dismissal of other charges and the recommending or not opposing of specific sentences or dispositions on the charge to which a plea was entered. The court shall not participate. in discussions leading to such plea agreements nor agree to be bound thereby.
(Emphasis added.)
The last sentence in the rule was subsequently amended on October 28, 1993 to read, "The court may participate in discussions leading to such plea agreements and may agree to be bound thereby.''.

. At the time of sentencing, HRPP Rule 11(e)(3) provided, "Upon disclosure of any plea agreement, the court shall not accept the tendered plea unless the defendant is informed that the court is not bound by such agreement.” The rule was subsequently amended on October 28, 1993 to add the words "unless the court agreed otherwise” to the end of the sentence.

. While not making specific reference to HRS § 706-668.5 (1993), the 1986 legislature pointed out that HRS § 706-606 (1993) and other amendments to HRS chapter 706 were intended to emphasize deterrence and punishment:
The amendments to section 706, disposition of convicted defendants, demonstrate a shift from the present approach of sentencing which emphasizes rehabilitation toward achieving the *428goal of just punishment. The corresponding deletion of section 706-620, Hawaii [Hawai'i] Revised Statutes, which requires the court to withhold imprisonment unless circumstances mandate otherwise, and the addition of a new section, section 706-606, outlining sections to be considered when imposing sentence, including the need to afford deterrence and to provide just punishment, establish a different view of both incarceration and probation.
Hse.Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 51, in 1986 House Journal, at 938.

. The pre-sentence report provided the court with the following sentencing alternatives:
Probation for 5 years (HRS [§] 706-623) Imprisonment for 5 years (HRS [§] 706-660(2))
Fine of Up to $10,000.00 (HRS [§] 706-640(3)) Community Service (HRS [§] 706-605(e)) Extended Term of Imprisonment (HRS [§] 706-662)
Persistent Offender (HRS [§] 706-662(1)) Multiple Offender (HRS [§] 706-662(4))
Multiple Sentence of Imprisonment (HRS [§] 706-668.5)
Repeat Offender (HRS [§] 706-606.5)

. State v. Lau, 73 Haw. 259, 263, 831 P.2d 523, 525 (1992), concerned the sentencing of a young adult under the age of twenty-two years who could have been sentenced under the special provisions of HRS § 706-667 (1985). Such a sentence would reduce the length of incarceration for a young adult defendant.

. THE COURT: All right. The Court has a few comments to make in this case, and it begins with the criminal record of [Defendant] as set forth in the presentence report. Let me begin and end with the criminal record.
[ (The court reviewed Defendant's conviction record.) ]
*431That is the state of his record of convictions, with a few additional offenses in which there are bench warrants outstanding involving a substantial number of the states in our nation. And then he came to Hawaii [Hawai'i].

. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1976) provided:
Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) [ (bank robbeiy) ] of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty five years, or both. (Emphasis added.) Under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (b) (1976), depending on the circumstances, a defendant was possibly subject to maximum terms of imprisonment of one, ten, or twenty years. Tucker was subject tó sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) because of aggravating factors surrounding the commission of the crime and not his prior criminal record. Therefore, Tucker was not sentenced under a recidivist statute.

. In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the principles underlying Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), prohibited, in sentencing under a recidivist statute, the use of prior convictions for which the defendant did not have counsel and where the records did not establish that he waived his right to counsel. Burgett and Gideon concerned the right to counsel guaranteed under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. The right is also guaranteed by article 1, section 14 of the Hawai'i State Constitution.

. This court has held that under article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution and HRS § 801-1 (1993), a criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel in every case where the defendant is charged with a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment and not only where defendant is actually imprisoned. State v. Dowler, 80 Hawai'i 246, 909 P.2d 574 (App.), cert. granted, 80 Hawai'i 187, 907 P.2d 773 (1995), and cert. dismissed, 80 Hawai'i 357, 910 P.2d 128 (1996). This applies to petty misdemeanors as well as to misdemeanors.

. Four opinions were rendered in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980) (per curiam). Justice Stewart, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun wrote separate concurring opinions. The opinions by Justice Stewart and Justice Marshall were joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens. Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist.

. Justice Marshall also noted that the Argersinger Court
recognized [that] misdemeanor convictions may actually be less reliable than felony convictions. "[Tjhe volume of misdemeanor cases may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result. ... 'Everything is rush, rush.' There is evidence of the prejudice which results to misdemeanor defendants from this ‘assembly-line justice.'"
Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 228 n. 2, 100 S.Ct. at 1588 n. 2 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnote, citations, and ellipses omitted) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-36, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2011-12, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)).