Court Opinion

ID: 9624063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:49:54.159101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:38.395962
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
(dissenting).
The question presented by this appeal is whether an election must be held in school district No. 2 of Yellowstone County to select trustees.
The facts giving rise to the controversy are these: On February 9, 1954, a nominating caucus was regularly held under R. C. M. 1947, section 75-1606, to nominate candidates for trustees for the election proposed to be held on April 3rd. Relators were nominated at that caucus as candidates to fill three expiring terms. On February 22nd two other caucuses were held at which Sterling Wood, Earl E. Tiffany and M. R. Colberg were nominated as candidates. Relators contend that the last named three were not properly nominated because the caucuses were held on a day less than forty days next preceding April 3rd. The district court ruled that the last three were not properly nominated and hence that an election need not be held.
The applicable statute is that part of R. C. M. 1947, section 75-1606, reading as follows: “In districts of the first class, no person shall be voted for or elected as trustee unless he has been nominated therefor at a bona fide public meeting, held in the district not more than sixty (60) days nor less than forty (40) days before the day of election * * *. ’ ’
The conclusion reached by the court that the meeting at which defendants were nominated came too late was correct. State ex rel. Bevan v. Mountjoy, 82 Mont. 594, 268 Pac. 558; State ex rel. St. George v. Justice Court, 80 Mont. 53, 257 Pac. 1034; Novack v. Pericich, 90 Mont. 91, 300 Pac. 240; State ex rel. Sullivan v. District Court, 122 Mont. 1, 196 Pac. (2d) 452. Defendants attempt to distinguish the foregoing cases from the instant ease, but they are in fact not distinguishable. The Bevan case was an election case construing a statute practically identical with the statute here involved. Attorney General Bottomly ruled on the identical question here presented and held under *258facts identical with those here that the meeting was too late. 21 Op. Atty. Gen., Op. No. 131, page 178.
There are decisions of other courts to the contrary as pointed out in the majority opinion. This court recognized the two lines of authorities in the case of State ex rel. St. George v. Justice Court, supra, by saying [80 Mont. 53, 257 Pac. 1038] : ‘ ‘ There is no lack of decisions holding to the contrary of those we have cited; there appear to be quite as many; but we believe the rule declared by those cited to be the sounder and based on the better reasoning and to be in accord with the intent of our statutes.”
This court in that case adopted the view that when an act is to be done not less than a given number of days before a given time, full days are contemplated. The court reasoned this way: That had the statute required the act to be done not less than one day before a certain date the doing of the act the day before the date would not be in time because it might be done at 11:55 p.m. the day before and hence that would not be “not less than one day before the date.” It would in fact be only five minutes before the date whereas the required number of full days are contemplated under the statute.
Section 90-407 which provides for excluding the first day and including the last was not overlooked. It was expressly referred to and discussed by the court. It was held inapplicable because of the wording of the statute requiring service the summons “at least four days ‘before’ the return day” (Rev. Codes 1921, section 9632, now R. C. M. 1947, section 93-6707, as amended) which the court held contemplated four full days.
The late eases from this court as above noted adhered to that view. To hold the nominating meeting on the 40th day before the election counting back from the day of election is not in time. State ex rel. Bevan v. Mountjoy, supra.
I concede that it is proper to depart from the doctrine of stare decisis in order to avoid perpetuating error. But where as here there are two lines of authority and the- court after careful consideration adopts one line and rejects the other, who is to *259say that the court adopted the wrong view? The only changes since that view was adopted in the St. George case, decided nearly 30 years ago and followed ever since, are in the personnel of this court and the litigants affected.
I think the trial judge was right in following the rule clearly stated and strictly followed in this jurisdiction for more than a quarter of a century and that it is now error to overrule those decisions.
Defendants contend that E. C. M. 1947, section 75-1606, so far as it dispenses with the necessity for an election is unconstitutional as in conflict with Art. IX, section 2, Art. IX, section 10, and Art. Ill, section 5, of our Constitution. If this view had merit then I would concur in the result reached in the majority opinion but for a different reason. However in my opinion there is no merit in the contention made on this point.
The pertinent langauge of E. C. M. 1947, section 75-1606, dispensing with the necessity of an election is as follows: “In the event there be held only one (1) such public meeting, and onl3 one (1) candidate be nominated for each term to be filled then and in that event no election need be held and the clerk of such district shall certify such facts to the board of trustees of the district, acting as a board of canvassers who shall thereupon certify the election of such persons to the county superintendent of schools.”
The right to vote at an election is a privilege conferred by the state and not a natural right, and is a privilege which may be waived. 29 C. J. S., Elections, section 2, page 23. The exercise of the right may be regulated by the legislature, providing that the regulatory laws are reasonable. Id., section 7, page 26; 18 Am. Jur., Elections, section 6, page 182; Gerende v. Board of Sup’rs, 341 U. S. 56, 71 S. Ct. 565, 95 L. Ed. 745. Thus it has provided that the privilege is waived if the voter fails to register.
The requirement of section 75-1606, supra, that no person shall be voted for unless he has been nominated, as therein provided, is a reasonable requirement, and the privilege of *260voting for a person for school trustee is waived where he is not nominated at a meeting at which at least 20 qualified electors are present.
In speaking of this question in Chamberlin v. Wood, 15 S. D. 216, 88 N. W. 109, 111, 56 L. E. A. 187, the Supreme Court of South Dakota said: ‘ ‘ The legislature, therefore,. having in effect limited the right of the elector to voting for candidates whose names are printed on the official ballots, he can only-exercise the right in the manner prescribed. But the elector is not thereby necessarily deprived of the right of suffrage, as he has the same right as any other elector to secure the printing of the name of his candidate upon the official ballot in the manner prescribed by law, namely, by nomination of some political party, or by securing the signatures of 20 electors, in the case of county office, to a certificate. This may occasion the elector some inconvenience and labor, but these constitute no objection to the law. In fact, the law requires many acts to be done by the elector not required under former laws, but these requirements have been generally held to be constitutional. We see no reason why the law as laid down by the courts in regard to those requirements should not be applicable to this case.”
The requirement that the name of a candidate may be placed upon the ballot only upon petition of 15 qualified electors was held to be a reasonable regulation in McKenzie v. Boykin, 111 Miss. 256, 71 So. 382, whereas the requirement of 500 up to 2,000 signatures has been held unreasonable, Jackson v. Norris, 173 Md. 579, 195 A. 576, as has the requirement of 250 signatures, Barr v. Cardell, 173 Iowa 18, 155 N. W. 312.
So far as this case is concerned I have assumed that all the constitutional provisions relating to elections have application to school elections although a statement is made in Lorang v. High School District, 126 Mont. 204, 247 Pac. (2d) 477, that they do not apply to school elections.
The design of the statute was to save the expense of an election on the supposition that if a candidate could not procure his *261nomination at a meeting of 20 electors lie probably could not be elected if an election were held and that the election would be an idle act. The requirement is a reasonable one and in my opinion the court was right in entering the judgment appealed from.
I think the judgment should be affirmed.