Court Opinion

ID: 9777486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:13:05.361089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:20.606332
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

KELLER, Judge.
In Price v. State, 866 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), this Court determined that, in misdemeanor prosecutions, Article 42.12, Sec. 5(a), TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.,1 does not require the trial court to “inform the defendant ... of the ... possible consequences ... of a violation of probation,” as set forth in Art. 42.12, Sec. 5(b), before placing him on deferred adjudication probation and that a failure to do so will not alone render a plea involuntary. We granted review in this cause to address the requirements of Sec. 5(a) in the context of a non-negotiated (open) plea of guilt in a felony *126prosecution and specifically to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding: that no admonishment was given pursuant to Sec. 5(a), that appellant’s plea was thereby rendered involuntary, and that the error was not subject to a harmless error analysis. See Ray v. State, 877 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994). We will reverse.
I.
Without benefit of a plea bargain, appellant pled guilty to felony theft and pled true to two enhancement paragraphs. The applicable range of punishment was 25 years to life imprisonment. During the sentencing phase of the trial, appellant asked the court to place him on deferred adjudication probation so that he could be placed in a drug treatment program. Appellant testified that he understood that the trial court was not required to grant such probation and that, because of the absence of a plea bargain, once appellant had made his plea, he could not withdraw it. Before accepting the plea, the trial court indicated its willingness to place appellant on deferred adjudication but warned him: “If you don’t make it, I’m going to bring it back in here and send you to the penitentiary somewhere between twenty-five years and life.”
The court set the case for pronouncement of sentence. At that hearing, the trial court placed appellant on deferred adjudication and ordered appellant to drug treatment as a condition of probation. The trial court repeated the warning that he had given at the plea hearing and asked appellant if he had any questions.2 Appellant had no questions about his sentence.
Subsequently, the State sought to revoke appellant’s probation. The trial court adjudicated appellant guilty on all grounds alleged by the State and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
The Court of Appeals found that the information required by Sec. 5(a) had not been given, and held that such failure resulted in an involuntary plea. The court reversed appellant’s conviction, holding that error in failing to comply with Sec. 5(a) is not subject to a harmless error analysis.
II.
In Price, a misdemeanor case, we determined that Sec. 5(a) does not require that a defendant be informed of the possible consequences of a violation of probation prior to his plea. Although a single statutory provision applies to misdemeanors and felonies alike, we limited our decision in Price to misdemeanors. We premised our decision in part upon the assumption that a defendant need not even be present in court to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. But the language of the statute draws no relevant distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. We find no reason to conclude that the statute is to be applied differently in felony cases than in misdemeanor cases, except in certain situations envisioned in Price.
Much of our reasoning in Price applies equally in the present case. In Price we relied on the chronological order of proceedings in Sec. 5(a). The court is to: first, receive the plea; second, hear the evidence; third, find whether the evidence substantiates guilt; fourth, defer further proceedings without adjudicating guilt; and fifth, place defendant on probation. It is only after these steps that the statute tells the court to inform the defendant of the Sec. 5(b) consequences of a violation of probation. The order of the proceedings in the statute thus supports the view that a defendant need not be informed of the Sec. 5(b) consequences until after he is placed on probation.
Also, Art. 26.13 dictates the steps to be taken before a court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. If the Legislature had intended that the Sec. 5(b) information be given prior to the plea, the logical place for the Legislature to include the instruction to give the cautionary statement would have been with the pre-plea admonishments in Art. 26.13.
Furthermore, there is no policy reason to require a trial court to inform every defen*127dant that pleads guilty of the possible consequences of a violation of deferred adjudication. The information becomes relevant only after the steps outlined above are taken. That is, unless the court decides to defer adjudication, there is no reason to tell a defendant what might happen if he violates the terms and conditions of his probation.
In Price, we advanced the view that a guilty plea was not rendered involuntary by the failure to give a cautionary statement that need not be given until after the court has accepted the plea and the defendant is placed upon probation:
It is a perverse notion that a plea made voluntarily and knowingly somehow becomes “unintelligent” and thus “involuntary” because the judge failed to [disjabuse a defendant of the idea that he would not be held accountable should he thereafter commit an offense against the laws of this State ...
866 S.W.2d at 612. The proposition that a plea that is voluntary when made may retroactively become involuntary is as perverse in the context of felonies as in the context of misdemeanors.
Appellant argues that a defendant should know the possible consequences of deferred adjudication before he asks the court to defer adjudication in his case, and contends that in the absence of such knowledge, his plea is involuntary. The difficulty with appellant’s argument is that, in the absence of a plea bargain, a court may grant or refuse deferred adjudication regardless of the defendant’s wishes. In the present case, appellant plead guilty with absolutely no assurance that the court would defer adjudication. When appellant plead guilty he subjected himself immediately to the entire range of punishment. The possible consequences he faced upon adjudication were exactly the same as the possible consequences he faced at the time of his plea. Therefore there was no lack of knowledge that could negate the voluntariness of the plea.
We conclude that Sec. 5(a) does not require, either in felonies or misdemeanors, that the defendant entering an open plea of guilty or nolo contendere be informed prior to his plea of the possible consequences under Sec. 5(b) of a probation violation. Therefore, the failure to provide the information does not render such a plea involuntary.
Although Sec. 5(a) does not require in an open plea of guilty or nolo contendere that the information in Sec. 5(b) be provided to the defendant prior to his plea, the statute does require that it be provided at some time. As we said in Pnce, when and how the court conveys the information to the defendant will depend upon the circumstances of the defendant. 866 S.W.2d at 613. Means of compliance are matters within the informed discretion of the court. Price, 866 S.W.2d at 613.
Given our determination under ground two that no error was committed, the issues presented by the State in grounds one and three are moot.
The Court of Appeals found appellant’s first point of error dispositive of the case. The court therefore did not reach appellant’s second point of error, which claimed that the trial court failed to properly admonish appellant under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or appellant’s third point of error, which claimed that he was denied due process during the revocation hearing when he, in effect, changed his plea without being informed of the consequences.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court in order to address appellant’s remaining points of error.

. Art. 42.12, Sec. 5(a) states in relevant part:
The Judge shall inform the defendant orally or in writing of the possible consequences under Subsection (b) of this section of a violation of community supervision. If the information is provided orally, the judge must record and maintain the judge's statement to the defendant.
All statutory references are to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure unless otherwise provided.

. The written conditions of probation form also contained the following statement: "The Court also has the authority at any time during the period of probation to revoke your probation, or proceed to adjudication, for violation of any of the conditions of your probation set out above.”