Court Opinion

ID: 9570303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:22:11.770449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:36.728971
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(concurring in the result):
I am persuaded that remand and reconsideration are appropriate, in view of the confusion about ownership of the real estate and the trial court’s decision not to award alimony apparently, at least in part, because of a more favorable property award than might otherwise have been ordered. See Note 1, supra. It is difficult to evaluate the trial court’s decision absent detailed findings concerning alimony, see, e.ff., Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 207, (Utah Ct.App.1987), and the status of the real estate. See generally Smith v. Smith, 738 P.2d 655 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
*834However, I see no error in the court’s reliance on expert testimony to fix a present value on the retirement program and I agree with the trial court that whenever it can be done — fairly and practically —immediate cash-out is to be preferred over deferred participation.1
As noted in the main opinion, Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), is our starting point in analyzing divorce cases posing retirement benefit issues. The Court in Woodward stated that if a present value of a pension plan is ascertainable, the trial court should fix the other spouse’s share and have it satisfied out of other assets, leaving all pension benefits to the employee spouse. 656 P.2d at 433. The Utah Supreme Court in Woodward upheld a deferred arrangement only because (1) other assets available for immediate distribution were inadequate and (2) the present value of the retirement benefits was “difficult if not impossible to ascertain because the value of the benefits [was] contingent on the husband’s decision to remain working for the government.” Id. Unlike my colleagues, I read Woodward as preferring immediate resolution of retirement benefits whenever that can be accomplished. Deferred participation in retirement benefits by the other spouse should be a last resort.
The factors which, under Woodward, require a deferred arrangement were not present in the instant case. Although the present value of the retirement benefits was perhaps difficult to ascertain, it clearly was not impossible to ascertain. The trial court heard, and based its findings as to value upon, the testimony of Frank Stuart.
As Stuart testified, the Utah State Retirement Fund is set up to encourage employees to continue their employment. Consequently, only the employee’s contributions are vested prior to eligibility for participation in plan benefits. Thus, if Mr. Bailey would have quit his teaching job at the time of the divorce he would have been entitled only to the vested amount. The cash value of the retirement fund, i.e., the vested total attributable to Mr. Bailey’s own contributions, was roughly $23,000 according to Stuart.
However, since the matured fund is in the nature of an annuity, Mr. Bailey’s account actually had a present value of $67,-591 as of January 1984. As noted in the main opinion, that figure reflects all amounts paid into the fund during the marriage, both by Mr. Bailey and the school district; interest to be earned on those amounts up until distribution; the total anticipated distributions, in view of actuarial data, attributable to the appreciated contributions made during the marriage; and a discount factor to arrive at a present value of those anticipated future distributions. *835Stuart’s calculation was structured to isolate marital contributions to the fund from those which would occur post-divorce and the calculation assumed compliance with the plan’s requirements for eligibility. Stuart refined his valuation of the fund with reference to several other factors: study and work life expectancy statistics from the Department of Labor, a mandatory annual cost of living salary increase of four percent,2 and the slight possibility that Mr. Bailey would leave his job and find other employment.3
Because the value of Mr. Bailey’s retirement fund was in fact ascertained, requiring immediate cash-out of Mrs. Bailey’s share would be within the court’s sound discretion under Woodward — where apparently there was no expert testimony as to value — if there are assets with which the cash-out can be appropriately effected.4
Of course, the spouse who is required to cash out the other’s interest in a retirement fund upon divorce should, ideally, be given the option of how best to meet that obligation. Trial courts should ordinarily not require settlement of the obligation in some mandatory way, as was done here. In addition, the spouse ought usually to have a reasonable time to discharge the obligation in situations where immediate cash-out is not possible but long-term deferral can be avoided. In Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah Ct.App.1987), the trial court permitted the husband to cash out his wife’s interest in five annual payments, leaving the husband the option of paying his retirement fund obligation out of current income or on some other basis. 738 P.2d at 242. In the present case, the trial court might have permitted Mr. Bailey an opportunity to cash out Mrs. Bailey’s interest in payments similar to those in Rayburn. However, unlike the wealthy husband in Rayburn, Mr. Bailey’s resources are quite limited and the court apparently concluded that the only method realistically available for short-term discharge of the obligation was via Mr. Bailey’s equity in the residence. On remand, I believe the court should specifically consider whether some less onerous approach might achieve a short-term resolution of Mrs. Bailey’s share of the retirement benefits. On the surface, divesting Mr. Bailey of his only “liquid” asset of any consequence — his share of the equity in the residence — seems a fairly exacting means for leaving him with the entirety of an asset which, as a practical matter, will do him no good until after the turn of the century.
In my judgment, any shift by the trial court to deferred participation by Mrs. Bailey should be the product of concern about the lack of such assets as will fairly permit immediate or short-term cash-out of Mrs. *836Bailey s share of the benefits, not because of trepidation about the expert’s valuation or a presumption that deferral should be ordered absent specific findings pointing to the contrary. While I concede Woodward contains doctrinal threads supporting the underlying position taken in the main opinion as well as the position I take, I see no preference in Woodward for deferred participation in retirement benefits. If anything, the preference is — and should be— just the opposite.

. The conclusion in the main opinion to the contrary is premised on, among other considerations, two factors which seem to have considerable merit: First, “[p]ostponing distribution equalizes the risks and the benefits to both parties” and is therefore fairer, and second, the difficulties of long-term financial entanglement can now be minimized through the device of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. The problem with reliance on these factors is demonstrated in this case. The value of the benefits Mrs. Bailey will ultimately receive depends to a large extent on Mr. Bailey's unilateral decision to continue his present employment. If he decides to quit before his benefits are fully vested, the benefits Mrs. Bailey would receive under the formula prescribed in the main opinion would be a fraction of what she would receive under that formula if he chose to continue working long enough to achieve full vesting. A QDRO concededly avoids one form of undesirable entanglement, namely that which results when one spouse is under an obligation to write the other a check following receipt of a single monthly benefit check, with concomitant risk of tardy payments and ensuing phone calls, letters, and motions. A QDRO does not, however, avoid another form of entanglement, namely that which results when one spouse is left with a perceived need to monitor the affairs and employment decisions of the other, with concomitant risk of interference and protest if one spouse then learns that the other is contemplating a career move which will have disastrous effects on the spouse’s anticipated share of benefits. Testy calls, nasty letters, and motions for modification of divorce decrees might well ensue. More generally, the risks and benefits are not really equalized with deferral where one spouse’s decisions can have such a significant impact on the benefits the other will receive.

. Stuart testified that for the past five years, Mr. Bailey’s salary had actually increased at eight percent per year, a trend which, if continued, would necessitate a higher present value estimate.

. Stuart testified that "particularly in the school system, longevity is quite high and tenure is quite high. And the probability that [Mr. Bailey] would leave and seek other employment is very low.” Mr. Bailey offered no testimony inconsistent with this assessment.

. In his brief, appellant also argues that, under Woodward, the present valuation of a retirement plan and immediate satisfaction of the other spouse’s interest therein should not be required unless "necessary criteria," such as a history of strife and hostility among the parties, are found. The main opinion gives some credence to this suggestion, contemplating "unusual hostility between the parties” as one fact which might support a decision not to defer participation, which the main opinion holds is ordinarily preferable. However, Woodward does not require a finding of actual animosity between the parties before the trial court can determine and award the present value of one’s spouse’s interest in a retirement fund. Instead, the Utah Supreme Court simply recognized that continued financial entanglement is inherently a source of strife and hostility and, thus, is best avoided. 656 P.2d at 433. "Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests are obviously too susceptible to continued strife and hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally strive to avoid to the greatest extent possible. This goal may be best accomplished, if a present value of the pension plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other spouse’s share thereof, as adjusted for all appropriate considerations, including the length of time the pensioner must survive to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of other assets leaving all pension benefits to the employee himself.” Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d at 433 (quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177 N.J.Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (1981)).