Court Opinion

ID: 9418011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:46:35.742185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.201412
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
It is clear from the averments of the bill that the insurance ■ companies had not, prior to the institution of this suit, made any combination or agreement, among themselves, relating to the rates,to be charged for insurance or to the amount of com*413missions to be allowed agents for procuring insurance or to the manner of transacting fire insurance business within .the State.. They expressed a desire to make such a combination or agreement, but were apprehensive that by doing so they would come into conflict with the state authorities. The auditor had done nothing under the statute and will have nothing to do in execution of its provisions, unless the insurance companies enter into the forbidden combination or agreement. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs came into court, avowed that they had not as yet violated' the statute, but asked to be informed whether, in the event they concluded to do so, their officers, agents or employes could be legally summoned before the state auditor for examination, as prescribed in section 1755. In other words, in advance of anything being done in violation of the statute or of any steps being taken by the auditor in execution of its provisions, the opinion of the court was asked and obtained as to its constitutionality. This is a very convenient — and, in my judgment, a mischievous — mode of obtaining the opinion of a court upon an abstract question of the constitutionality of a statute which has not been and may never be .violated, and under which no case may ever arise calling for judicial interference. It is as if the plaintiffs had addressed a personal communication to the court asking to be informed as to what they might safely do. It seems to me that the suit has been prematurely brought. If the plaintiffs .should make such a combination as is forbidden by the statute, the time to seek judicial interference in their behalf wpuld be when the state auditor proceeds or in some definite way indicates his purpose to proceed under section 1755. I think the decree below should be reversed and the bill ordered to be dismissed, upon the ground that no facts existed, at the time the suit was brought, to justify a judicial tribunal in delivering a judgment to the constitutionality of 'the state statute.
As, however, the court considered the case upon the merits, it is appropriate to say that I concur with the court in holding that the section of the statute which is assailed is not invalid,' *414The business of fire insurance is of such a peculiar character, so intimately connected with the prosperity of the whole community, and so vital to the security of property owners, that it is competent for the State to forbid combinations and agreements among fire insurance companies doing business within its limits, in reference to rates, agents’ commissions and the manner of transacting their business. If, in the judgment of the State,, the people who desire insurance upon their property are put at a disadvantage when confronted by a combination or agreement among insurance companies, I do not perceive any sound reason why, preserving the individual right of contracting, it may not forbid such combinations and agreements, and thereby enable the insured and insurer to meet on terms of equality. Surely, the State could enact,such a regulation with reference to companies organized under its own "laws. If that be so, it cannot be that such a regulation may not be made applicable to foreign insurance companies doing business in the State only by its consent.