Court Opinion

ID: 9617958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:04:12.749314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:21.386364
License: Public Domain

Banke, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the trial court was not authorized to conclude that the absent witness had been “completely excused . . . from the full power of the subpoena” on the mere basis of defense counsel’s statement to that effect, absent evidence indicating who had excused the witness and whether or not he had been instructed to return at a later date. Does this mean that the trial court was required to cross-examine defense counsel on these issues? Does it mean that the state was required to produce evidence to substantiate defense counsel’s statement? If so, then the burden of proof in such matters has been dramatically altered. See generally OCGA § 17-8-25; Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496 (2) (246 SE2d 642) (1978); Brown v. State, 169 Ga. App. 520, 521 (313 SE2d 777) (1984).
While there is indeed a presumption that a valid subpoena, once issued, continues in force from term to term until the case is ended (see OCGA § 17-7-191), that presumption may obviously be dispelled by a showing that the witness has been excused from the subpoena. Where it is defense counsel himself who makes such a showing, I do not believe that a refusal to grant a continuance based on the absence of the witness results in a denial of the defendant’s right to “fundamental fairness.” If it was not within the power of the appellant in *737this case to show that the witness was still subject to the original subpoena, then it was certainly within his power simply to have a new one issued to him. It was the appellant’s responsibility to prepare his case for trial, not the state’s and not the court’s. I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance. See generally Grimes v. State, 168 Ga. App. 372, 377 (308 SE2d 863) (1983); OCGA § 17-7-192.
Decided January 14, 1987
Rehearing denied February 11, 1987
Howard T. Scott, for appellant.
Ken Stula, Solicitor, Kristopher Shepherd, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Pope join in this dissent.