Court Opinion

ID: 9369991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 16:00:52.473427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.682542
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1149     Document: 010110811173      Date Filed: 02/10/2023      Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        February 10, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                         No. 22-1149
                                                  (D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00397-CMA-1)
  JOEL THOMAS,                                                (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Joel Thomas, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his

 request to modify conditions of his supervised release requiring sex offender

 treatment and keystroke monitoring of his electronic activities. The district court

 found that the nature and circumstances of Thomas’s child pornography offense,

 a psychologist report recommending further treatment and monitoring, and other

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-1149     Document: 010110811173      Date Filed: 02/10/2023       Page: 2

 facts supported keeping the conditions in place. Exercising jurisdiction under

 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                      I. Background

        In 2019, Thomas pled guilty to one count of accessing child pornography with

 an intent to view in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He admitted that in

 2012 and 2013, he accessed websites on the dark web that facilitated transmission of

 child pornography and discussions between pedophiles. His posts on the sites

 described his use of encryption technology to securely maintain his “entire collection

 [of child pornography] on one device.” R., vol. 1 at 31. Authorities later found

 encrypted containers on Thomas’s computer but could not access their contents

 “[d]ue to the level of encryption.” Id. at 35. Authorities also discovered Thomas had

 installed software on his computer that enabled “the secure deletion of files and

 removal of remnant data.” Id.

        Thomas sought a below-guidelines sentence because he had abided by the law

 during the roughly six-year period between the government’s 2013 seizure of his

 computer and its 2019 indictment, had begun sex addiction therapy, and had started

 attending Sex Addicts Anonymous (SAA) meetings. To support his request, Thomas

 underwent a mental health evaluation and submitted the results to the court. The

 evaluating psychologist recommended he undergo further sex offender treatment and

 that his digital activity be strictly monitored.

        In January 2020, the district court sentenced Thomas to a below-guidelines

 term of 48 months in prison, to be followed by five years of supervised release. The

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 court imposed the following special conditions of supervision pertinent to this

 appeal:

               1. You must participate in and successfully complete a sex-
           offense specific evaluation and/or treatment program as approved by
           the probation officer. . . .

               ....

               4. . . . Any computer or Internet capable device must be able to be
           effectively monitored by and comply with the requirements of
           monitoring software utilized by the Probation Office. . . .

               ....

               6. You must allow the probation officer to install
           software/hardware designed to monitor computer activities on any
           computer you are authorized by the probation officer to use. The
           software may record any and all activity on the computer, including
           the capture of keystrokes, application information, Internet use
           history, email correspondence, and chat conversations.

 Id. at 47. Consistent with the appeal waiver in his plea agreement, Thomas did not

 appeal.

       Thomas instead filed a motion in 2022 to modify his supervised release

 conditions. Regarding special condition one, he asked the court to substitute his

 participation in SAA for the requirement that he undergo “a sex-offense specific

 evaluation and/or treatment program.” Id. He argued the special condition mandated

 a “mental health treatment,” id. at 118, and that the court lacked a basis for imposing

 it because the evidence did not establish he had a “mental health condition,” id. at

 120. He contended the court could not determine he needed mental health treatment

 “unless a[n] exam [wa]s performed and a report [wa]s filed by a court ordered

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 psychologist.” Id. at 118. And he asserted that he did not need sex offender

 evaluation and treatment because he had voluntarily seen a therapist before he went

 to prison and planned to participate in SAA upon his release.

       Regarding special conditions four and six, Thomas asked the court to eliminate

 the requirement that he submit to keystroke monitoring of his electronic activity. He

 argued that he did not present a risk to public safety and that the goals of the

 monitoring could be adequately achieved through unannounced searches of his home

 and personal property.

       On March 29, 2022, the district court denied Thomas’s request to modify

 special conditions one, four, and six. Regarding special condition one, it reasoned

 the nature and circumstances of Thomas’s offense warranted sex offender evaluation

 and treatment, which the Sentencing Guidelines recommend for all sex offenders.

 See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 5D1.3(d)(7)(A) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n

 2021). It also said Thomas’s refusal to participate in sex offender treatment while in

 prison further supported special condition one. Regarding special conditions four

 and six, the district court reasoned the nature and circumstances of Thomas’s offense

 warranted keystroke monitoring, noting Thomas used a computer to commit his

 offense and employed sophisticated techniques to evade detection. It further

 observed “the Sentencing Commission recommends limiting computer use or

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 otherwise imposing monitoring of computer and Internet use in cases like this one.”

 R., vol. 1 at 152 (citing USSG § 5D1.3(d)(7)).1

       On April 8, 2022, Thomas filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider

 its order as to special conditions one, four, and six. In this motion, Thomas mostly

 re-hashed arguments from his initial motion. But he also argued the district court

 incorrectly found he had refused to participate in sex therapy in prison, and that it

 exaggerated his technological expertise to support its ruling.

       The district court denied Thomas’s motion for reconsideration by order entered

 April 28, 2022. It clarified that the psychologist report Thomas submitted at

 sentencing supported its initial imposition of special condition one and that Thomas’s

 voluntary participation in therapy and SAA, while laudable, did not support

 modification of special condition one. The district court further found “no error in its

 previous statement that [Thomas] has declined . . . sex offender treatment” in prison,

 id. at 184, relying on a declaration submitted by a prison employee. And it reiterated

 its position that the circumstances surrounding Thomas’s offense warranted

 imposition of special conditions one, four, and six.

       Thomas filed a notice of appeal on May 6, 2022.

       1
         In its order, the district court also granted Thomas’s request to remove
 special conditions seven to eleven because those special conditions related to his
 finances and he paid his restitution in full. The district court’s removal of those
 special conditions is not at issue in this appeal.

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                                     II. Discussion

 A. Orders on Appeal

       The government contends “Thomas appealed only the denial of his motion for

 reconsideration,” such that “this [c]ourt has jurisdiction only to review the denial of

 reconsideration.” Aplee. Br. at vii–viii (citation omitted). We disagree.

       A notice of appeal must “designate the judgment—or the appealable

 order—from which the appeal is taken.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). But a

 “notice . . . need not be perfect.” Sines v. Wilner, 609 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir.

 2010). We “liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3,” Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S.

 244, 248 (1992), and Thomas’s pro se filings, see Sines, 609 F.3d at 1074. Thomas’s

 notice of appeal is not a model of clarity regarding the order on appeal. But the

 notice references both the initial order denying Thomas’s motion to modify his

 supervised release conditions (by citing district court docket entry 61) and the order

 denying his motion for reconsideration (by citing district court docket entry 68 and

 the date of the order). We therefore conclude the notice confers jurisdiction to

 review both orders.

       The government also contends that because Thomas did not file his notice of

 appeal until May 6, 2022, the notice was untimely with respect to the district court’s

 March 29, 2022 order denying Thomas’s motion to modify his supervised release

 conditions. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (requiring a notice of appeal to be filed

 within 14 days of the applicable order). We disagree. Thomas filed a timely motion

 for reconsideration on April 8, 2022, see United States v. Randall, 666 F.3d 1238,

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 1242 (10th Cir. 2011), rendering the March 29 order non-final. See United States v.

 Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1991). As a result, the time for Thomas to file a notice of

 appeal did not begin to run until the district court entered its April 28, 2022 order

 denying the motion for reconsideration. See id. at 4–6 & n.2. And Thomas filed his

 notice of appeal within 14 days of that order. His notice was therefore timely with

 respect to both orders.

 B. Merits

        A district court has authority to “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of

 supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of

 supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). “The only statutory requirements for

 modification are that the district court consider [the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

 § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)], follow

 the procedure outlined in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1, and ensure that the modified

 conditions are consistent with the requirements applicable to all conditions of

 supervised release.” United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2011).2

 “[A] district court retains the discretion to determine whether there are valid reasons

        2
         The enumerated § 3553(a) factors require the court to consider “the nature
 and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
 defendant”; the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; the need
 “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; the need “to provide the
 defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
 correctional treatment”; “the [applicable] kinds of sentence and the [applicable]
 sentencing range”; “any pertinent policy statement”; “the need to avoid unwarranted
 sentencing disparities”; and “the need to provide restitution.”

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 to modify,” id. at 1173, and nothing in the statute “require[s] a district court to make

 particular findings” when deciding a motion to modify, id. at 1171. A district court

 can decide a motion to modify “based only on evidence that was available at the

 original sentencing.” Id. at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       “[A] motion to reconsider may be granted when the court has misapprehended

 the facts, a party’s position, or the law.” United States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917, 927

 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The specific grounds which

 allow granting such motions include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law,

 (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or

 prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

       We review the district court’s ruling on a motion to modify for an abuse of

 discretion. See United States v. Pugliese, 960 F.2d 913, 915 (10th Cir. 1992).

 “Likewise, we review the district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for

 abuse of discretion.” Warren, 22 F.4th at 927 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A

 district court abuses its discretion only where it (1) commits legal error, (2) relies on

 clearly erroneous factual findings, or (3) where no rational basis exists in the

 evidence to support its ruling.” United States v. Alfred, 982 F.3d 1273, 1279

 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court does not abuse

 its discretion if its ruling falls within the bounds of permissible choice in the

 circumstances and is not arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.” United States v.

 Armajo, 38 F.4th 80, 84 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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       Many of Thomas’s arguments proceed from the premise that in denying his

 modification motion, the district court effectively re-imposed the special conditions

 of supervised release it had ordered at his sentencing. From this premise, Thomas

 presumes the district court had to satisfy the standards applicable to imposing special

 conditions of supervised release.3 And he argues the district court erred because it

 failed to satisfy those standards. Regarding special condition one, he argues the

 district court erred by failing to order a psycho-sexual evaluation before imposing it

 and by failing to sufficiently analyze the propriety of this special condition.

 Regarding special conditions four and six, he argues the conditions violate his Fourth

 Amendment rights and that the district court erred by failing to provide sufficient

 reasons supporting their imposition.

       3
         In United States v. Martinez-Torres, this court explained that special
 conditions of supervised release must meet three statutory tests.

              The conditions of release must (1) be “reasonably related” to the
       nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and
       characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the
       public from further crimes of the defendant, or the defendant’s
       educational, vocational, medical, or other correctional needs;
       (2) “involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
       necessary” for the purposes of deterring criminal activity, protecting the
       public, and promoting the defendant’s rehabilitation; and (3) be
       consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
       Commission.

 795 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
 § 3583(d)). And “before a district court can impose upon a defendant a special
 condition of supervised release, the district court must analyze and generally explain
 how, with regard to the specific defendant being sentenced, the special condition
 furthers the three statutory requirements set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).” United
 States v. Koch, 978 F.3d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 2020).
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        We reject all these arguments because the district court did not impose any

  special conditions of supervised release when it denied Thomas’s motion. The court

  had imposed the challenged special conditions of supervised release years earlier in

  its judgment that Thomas did not appeal. Thomas cannot now challenge the legality

  of those conditions or the process leading to their imposition. See Begay, 631 F.3d at

  1172–73 (recognizing case law holding that “a district court does not have the

  authority to modify conditions of supervised release based on an argument that a

  particular condition is unlawful, because lawfulness is not one of the § 3553(a)

  factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)”; instead, “any challenge to the legality of a

  condition of supervised release must be raised on direct appeal or in a habeas

  petition” (citing United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also

  United States v. Morris, 37 F.4th 971, 976 (4th Cir. 2022) (observing that challenges

  to conditions of supervised release “rest[ing] on the factual and legal premises that

  existed at the time of the defendant’s sentencing are impermissible” (brackets and

  internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1070

  (11th Cir. 2021) (“join[ing] the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that

  § 3582(e)(2) cannot be used to challenge the legality or constitutionality of

  supervised release conditions”); United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043, 1044

  (9th Cir. 2002) (holding “§ 3583(e)(2) may not be used as a backdoor to challenge

  the legality of a sentence” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

        We now turn to Thomas’s arguments pertinent to modification. Regarding

  special condition one, Thomas argues the district court should have modified it

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  because (1) he had already undergone sex offender treatment and “[i]t would be

  irrational for him to complete the treatment again when the outcome would be the

  same,” Aplt. Reply Br. at 5; (2) his proposed alternative of attending SAA meetings

  would be more effective; and (3) the effectiveness of his prior therapy and SAA

  attendance, as proven by his remorse and law abidance, renders other treatment

  unnecessary. He does not argue the district court committed legal error or based its

  ruling on an unsupported finding of fact.

        We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

  modify special condition one in either order. The district court based its decision in

  part on the psychologist report Thomas submitted in connection with his sentencing.

  That report recommended additional treatment beyond what Thomas had undergone

  already. The district court further based its decision on record evidence Thomas had

  foregone an opportunity to get treatment in prison. And the district court implicitly

  rejected Thomas’s argument that his remorse and law abidance supported

  modification by finding the nature and circumstances of his offense, combined with

  his history and characteristics, continued to support special condition one, which the

  Sentencing Guidelines recommend in cases like this one. The district court’s

  reasoned application of the facts to deny both modification and reconsideration fell

  within the bounds of permissible choice.

        Regarding special conditions four and six, Thomas argues the district court

  should have eliminated keystroke monitoring because he has expressed remorse and

  accepted responsibility for his actions, has not accessed child pornography since

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  2013, and is not a threat to the public. But he does not argue the district court

  committed legal error or relied on an unsupported finding of fact.

        We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

  modify special conditions four and six in either order. The district court found that

  the nature and circumstances of Thomas’s offense continued to support keystroke

  monitoring in part because Thomas “committed his offense solely through use of the

  computer and the Internet, and he demonstrated sophisticated computer skills through

  his access of child pornography websites on the dark web and his encryption of his

  laptop.” R., vol. 1 at 151. It also found support for keystroke monitoring in

  Thomas’s encouragement to “others on those websites to stay safe.” Id. at 152

  (internal quotation marks omitted). And it further found support for this condition in

  the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendation that child pornography offenders be

  subjected to monitoring. Again, the district court’s reasoned application of the facts

  to deny both modification and reconsideration fell within the bounds of permissible

  choice.

                                     III. Conclusion

        We affirm the district court’s order denying Thomas’s motion for modification

  and the district court’s order denying Thomas’s motion for reconsideration.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Gregory A. Phillips
                                              Circuit Judge

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