Court Opinion

ID: 9844182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:58:33.761138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:29.416844
License: Public Domain

McQUADE, Justice
(dissenting).
I.C. § 34-2001A (S.L.1969, Chapter 208, Section 2, approved March 21, 1969) reads in pertinent part as follows:
“B. When the validity of any bond election is contested upon any of the grounds enumerated in section 34 — 2001 or upon any other grounds whatsoever the plaintiff or plaintiffs must, within forty (40) days after the votes are canvassed and the results thereof declared, file in the proper court a verified written complaint setting forth, in addition to the other requirements of this chapter, the following:
(1) The name of the party contesting the bond election, and that he is an elector of the public entity conducting the bond election.
(2) The proposition or propositions voted on at the election which are contested.
(3) The particular grounds of such contest.
“C. No such election contest shall be maintained and no bond election shall be set aside or held invalid unless a complaint is filed as permitted hereunder within the period prescribed in this section. As to bond elections which have been held prior to the effective date [March 21, 1969] of this act, no such contest shall be maintained wherein it is alleged that the bond election should be set aside or held on any ground enumerated in section 34-2001 or on any other ground, unless such bond election contest be filed as herein provided within forty (40) days from and after the effective date of this act.”
This statute is clear and without exception. There is nothing in the section which even suggests that it does not now apply. Because the plaintiffs’ petition was not filed within forty days after the election held, the votes “canvassed, and the results thereof declared,” we should dismiss this action. It was not timely brought because it was barred by I.C. § 34-2001A.
The majority, understandably anxious to reach the important constitutional issue raised in this case, has held that the defendants “waived” I.C. § 34 — 2001A. Such waiver is not lawful. The defendants can not waive the bar of I.C. § 34 — 2001A. As was said by the Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of City of Glendale v. Coquat, 46 Ariz. 478, 52 P.2d 1178, 1180, 102 A.L.R. 837 (1935),
“It is apparently universally held that where a right has been given to an individual not alone for his private benefit *481but, as a matter of public policy, in the interest of the state, it may not be waived by any one. Day v. McAllister, 15 Gray 433, 81 Mass. 433; Clark v. Spencer, 14 Kan. 398, 19 Am.Rep. 96; State v. Carman, 63 Iowa 130, 18 N.W. 691, 50 Am. Rep. 741; Recht v. Kelly, 82 Ill. 147, 25 Am.Rep. 301; Bosler v. Rheem, 72 Pa. 54; Branch v. Tomlinson, 77 N.C. 388; Clark v. State, 142 N.Y. 101, 36 N.E. 817; Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, 171 P. 1037; Cato v. Grendel Cotton Mills, 132 S.C. 454, 129 S.E. 203, 41 A.L.R. 439. As was said by the New York Court of Appeals, in Wright v. State, 223 N.Y. 44, 119 N.E. 83, 85, ‘Such conclusion would permit an officer of the state to defeat the beneficent purpose of the statute and violate its provisions.’ ”
Buyers of Idaho bonds forty days, after an election must be secure in the knowledge that their investment will not be jeopardized by a legal action contesting that election. By allowing these defendants to waive I.C. § 34 — 2001A, this Court has thrown open to challenge every bond election in the past or in the future of this state.
A valid “waiver” necessarily involves a choice to give up a right personal to the party doing the waiving. In order for a “waiver” to be permissible in this case a representative of the purchasers of the bonds, issued as a result of the election which is challenged in this action, would have to be a party. There is no such representative before us. The record provides no indication that the defendants have been authorized to make a waiver under I.C. § 34-2001A for those bondholders. The defendants’ attempt to waive the provisions of the statute should be given no effect. This action was not timely brought.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.