Court Opinion

ID: 9844815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:09:39.094181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:43.835935
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting in part, concurring in part.
Without commenting on the innocence or guilt of the defendant, this justice respectfully dissents from the majority opinion. Because of the various errors infecting Jones’s trial, the Court this day should reverse the judgment and remand for new proceedings. Those errors are enumerated and explained below.

I. BECAUSE OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING THE GRAND JURY INDICTMENT PROCEEDINGS, THE INDICTMENT SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

The grand jury proceeding was fundamentally tainted by the prosecution’s introduction of illegal and inadmissible evidence. The majority has concluded that such misconduct does not suffice to dismiss the indictment. I am not so persuaded. The basic question seems to be in determining when “a little” is too much.

A. The Proper Test for Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Proceedings

The majority opinion reaches the conclusion that Jones’s indictment was legally sufficient because the trial court found that there was sufficient competent evidence to support probable cause, citing State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 743 P.2d 459 (1987), and because the majority finds that the totality of the circumstances does not establish prejudice.
The majority opinion nobly attempts to make sense of Edmonson, a rather contradictory and confusing opinion, at least on the point of misconduct in grand jury proceedings. I write to disagree with the majority’s articulation of the “second prong” of the Edmonson test, specifically, its discussion of what constitutes “prejudice.”
In Edmonson, the defendant essentially complained of two transgressions during the grand jury proceedings: one, hearsay adduced in violation of I.C. § 19-1105; and two, prosecutorial misconduct consisting of comments on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. As to the hearsay claim, Edmonson held that a finding of probable cause established by admissible evidence is sufficient to overcome the prejudice incurred by hearsay evidence (the “independent probable cause” test). The majority opinion calls the independent probable cause test the “first prong” in determining the propriety of the grand jury indictment proceedings. The independent probable cause test, however, applies only when a defendant claims that inadmissible hearsay (or some other, similar illegal evidence) was introduced. Here, the heart of Jones’s claim is that the prosecutor engaged in various types of misconduct, including the introduction of privileged testimony. In that case, the independent probable cause test does not apply.
This leads us to the majority opinion’s “second prong.” The majority is absolutely correct wherein it holds that this Court must balance the gravity of the misconduct with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the probable cause. As Edmonson instructs,
To determine whether misconduct gives rise to a dismissal, a reviewing court will have to balance the gravity and the seriousness of this misconduct with the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the probable cause finding. At one extreme, the misconduct can be so outrageous that regardless of the extent of probable cause evidence, dismissal will be required. At *491the other extreme, the misconduct may be so slight, that it becomes unnecessary to question the independent judgment of the grand jury. In the middle of these extremes, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the indictment should be dismissed.
Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 237, 743 P.2d at 466 (emphasis added).6
A problem with Edmonson is that it sets forth what appear to be two mutually exclusive lines of analysis. The first line of analysis is that defendant must show prejudice in the guise of the but for test (the “but for/prejudice test”), which in reality is nothing more than the independent probable cause test restated: if defendants cannot show that the remaining evidence failed to establish probable cause, they will not be able to show that but for the illegal evidence, they would not have been indicted. The second, antithetical line of analysis is the above quoted paragraph, which sets forth a balancing test in which the reviewing court is to quantify the level of misconduct and the strength of the probable cause evidence (the “quantification test”). These two analyses are mutually exclusive in application because if misconduct is outrageous but probable cause is very strong, according to the but for/prejudice test, the indictment should be upheld. The quantification test, however, expressly precludes such a result. Another illustration of internal inconsistency rather fairly severely where prosecutorial misconduct is strong though not “outrageous,” and probable cause very weak, albeit existent. Under the but/for prejudice test, the indictment would survive; under the quantification test, the indictment would have to be dismissed.
Which of these apparently irreconcilable analyses are we to follow? It is clear that the holding of Edmonson it is the quantification test; Edmonson actually applied the balancing test, determining that the misconduct was so slight that probable cause need not be questioned. On the other hand, the but for/prejudice test language amounts to mere dicta. Furthermore, the but for/prejudice language is unsupported by Idaho law. In Edmonson, we cited cases from New Mexico, Iowa, and Illinois. The only Idaho ease cited, State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho 877, 606 P.2d 981 (1980), was thoroughly inapposite. The Edmonson majority cited Kruse to support the statement that “[i]n order to be entitled to dismissal of an indictment on due process grounds, the defendant must affirmatively show prejudice caused by the misconduct”; Kruse, however, only dealt with preaccusatory delay, a complaint wholly different from prosecutorial misconduct during a constitutionally-bestowed grand jury proceeding.
It is thus clear that the majority opinion’s analysis should follow the quantification test rather than the but/for prejudice test. Of course, some prejudice must adhere from the complained-of misconduct for this Court to set aside an indictment. A more sensible test of prejudice and one in harmony with Edmonson’s various strictures is: is there a strong likelihood that the complained-of evidence significantly contribute to the indictment? This test is more in keeping with Edmonson’s balancing test: if the misconduct was severe, the likelihood that the effect of the misconduct was significant in obtaining an indictment is high, thereby mandating dismissal; if the misconduct was insignificant, as was found to be the case in Edmonson, the misconduct probably did not contribute in any significant manner to the indictment. This proposed test for determining prejudice in this particular context also comports with the various concerns underlying the issue of misconduct in grand jury proceedings. On one hand, not every indictment should be dismissed merely because the prosecutor did not dot all the “i” ’s and cross all the “t” ’s, particularly when the defendant ends up being convicted. On the other hand, we cannot feign ignorance and look away when significant misconduct is involved. Even if prosecutors eventually gain a conviction, it is still vital that they provide a mean*492ingful grand jury proceeding or other, impartial charging procedure, as mandated by the Idaho constitution. See IDAHO CONST., Art. I, § 8. The need for prosecutors to comport with the few rules by which they are bound is acute in light of the nature of present day grand jury proceedings. See generally, State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 743 P.2d 459 (1987) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (discussing history and procedure of grand jury proceedings). Even when grand jury proceedings are according to Idaho laws and procedures they oft-times fall short of what such proceedings were historically intended to be — a protection for defendants to ensure that sufficient probable cause exists to bind defendants over for trial. Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 243-245, 743 P.2d at 472-473. There is reason for concern that grand jury proceedings are notoriously the tools of the prosecutors, restrained by very few checks of prosecutorial power. Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 246, 743 P.2d at 475 (quoting from Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.3d 584, 587, 586 P.2d 916, 919 (1978), which in turned quoted a former prosecutor as stating that “[t]oday, the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything, before any grand jury.” Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury (1973) 64 J.Crim.L. & C. 174.) The prosecutor is free to interrogate any witness called by the grand jury, including potential defendants. Edmonson, 113 Idaho at 245, 743 P.2d at 474. Furthermore, these proceedings are closed to all but the prosecutor, witnesses, and grand jurors, meaning that neither defense counsel nor even an impartial judge may be present. Id. The few constraints that might check this immense power derive from the Idaho Code (and thereby, certain rules of evidence which it incorporates), the Rules of Professional Conduct,7 and the Idaho and United States constitutions. Jones’s argument, that because prosecutors are bestowed with tremendous power and defendants with none, prosecutors must at least play according to the few rules by which they are constrained, leaving it clearly up to the trial courts, and on appellate review, this Court to be overseeing referees lest justice not be done, is sound.

B. The Complained-of Misconduct

How severe is the misconduct and its effect here and is there a likelihood that the misconduct contributed significantly to the grand jury’s indictment? To detail the misconduct:
1) The hair. The prosecutor elicited a detective’s testimony relative to an FBI test comparing hair taken from the murder scene and from Jones. This testimony was the only direct, physical tie between Jones and the victim’s house. The result of the comparison test was a conclusion that two hairs had similar characteristics. The prosecutor did not advise the jury that the FBI, following its test results, had warned that hair comparison is not a means of positive identification. This was so notwithstanding that the detective had informed a questioning grand juror that the odds of such a match were one in several thousand. Ironically, the FBI in fact later determined that the tested hair was actually that of Vance, the victim.
Although the prosecutor may not have had an outright duty to volunteer to the grand jury the FBI’s warning as to the reliability, or lack thereof, regarding the hair comparison test as a means of positive identification, that duty matured once a grand juror inquired of a witness as to the import of the test. Having the detective testify as to the probability that the hair was defendant’s, and, moreover, failing to supply the jurors with the FBI’s limitation, appears to be a dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecutor.
2) The uncharged murder. Wystraeh mentioned that she first met Martinez after the “Goody Goodrich murder.” The prosecutor then engaged her in the following exchange:
*493PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Now you made a reference to a Goody — Goody Goodrich murder.
WITNESS [WYSTRACH]: Um-hum. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: When and where did that occur, if you know? WITNESS: It happened at their trailer, right outside the door. They came home from a party and he started to walk into the door and somebody shot him, killed him.
Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings of December 19, 1989, p. 39. Such testimony was clearly prejudicial, substantially outweighing any probative value. The prejudicial nature of the prosecutor’s elicitation of testimony about the Goodrich murder is reflected by a grand juror’s later questioning:
GRAND JUROR: Had they [Jones and Martinez] been involved in a murder before?
WITNESS [WYSTRACH]: Yes.
GRAND JUROR: Both of them? WITNESS: Yes.
GRAND JUROR: And they were not found guilty of that one?
WITNESS: No.
GRAND JUROR: Is that the one over at that trailer house in Boise?
WITNESS: That was one of them, yes.
GRAND JUROR: And they got out of that one too?
WITNESS: They were never charged.
Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings of December 19, 1989, p. 91. Presumably the prosecutor stood idly by while this highly prejudicial evidence was being introduced.
3) The privileged testimony. Undoubtedly the most serious, questionable, and likely inexcusable act of misconduct of which Jones complains was the prosecutor’s adducing confidential communications from Jones to Wystrach during their marriage after her testimony had made it quite clear as to the time when the marriage took place, thus evidencing that such communications were indeed privileged. Because the prosecutor chose to play fast and loose with the Rules of Evidence,8 the grand jury heard such testimony as the following:
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Did you have a conversation with Bob at that time? WITNESS [WYSTRACH]: Yes. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Would
you relate that conversation, please? WITNESS: I asked him if they had taken care of Troy Vance and he said yeah, that it was over with and that now we’d be set for a long time, meaning we had money to live on again.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Did he describe to you what occurred? WITNESS: Yes.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Can you tell us what occurred — or what he told you?
WITNESS: He went to the house — they went to the house, and he — and they went through the sliding glass door, they went through the kitchen, for whatever reason, I don’t know, and made a mess of that, then they went downstairs, waited for him to *494come in, when Vance came home, they tied him up, I would assume they used handcuffs because Bob used handcuffs when he stuck people up, and Al was giving Vance a real bad time and kind of beating him up a little bit and trying to scare him and Vance started begging for his life and started offering Al and Bob money or drugs or whatever they wanted just to, you know, not to hurt him. And Al made, for whatever reason, Bob took kind of orders from Al, and he took the first shot and then Al pulled the second two shots.
Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings of December 19,1989, pp. 69-70. It is noteworthy that no other testimony or evidence exists as to where Jones and Martinez were or what they were doing during the murder. Wystrach only testified that she was at the trailer site that entire evening and thus had no knowledge as to the events of the murder except for what Jones told her confidentially.
The instances of misconduct listed above show that the testimony arising from the prosecutor’s questioned actions likely had a significant, if not profound, effect on the grand jury. Even though independent probable cause is present on the cold record, such probable cause is not weighty;9 the complained-of misconduct is. In view of a showing of such clear prejudice and misconduct, dismissal of Jones’s indictment is, in this justice’s view, mandated.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING JONES’S MOTION FOR JUROR SEQUESTRATION.

The majority summarily concludes that “[i]n light of our holding concerning the motion for change of venue, we hold that a sequestered voir dire was not necessary and it was not error for the trial court to deny the motion.” No case law is cited in support of this proposition, which is understandable: there exists no case law holding that the standards for sequestered voir dire and change of venue are identical. Nor indeed should any case so hold. When extensive publicity precedes a trial and there is a reasonable possibility that jurors may be improperly informed by such publicity, it is crucial that sequestered voir dire be allowed so that each potential juror exposed to that publicity may articulate what is known without educating the rest of the venirepersons. Otherwise, it would appear well-nigh impossible to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the publicity, placing the defense in a Cateh-22.
It is noteworthy that in most of the cases upholding dismissal of a defendant’s motion for change of venue, the district court allowed sequestered voir dire of the witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct.App.1986), State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 655 P.2d 99 (Ct.App.1982). Even if the motion for change of venue in the case sub judice was properly denied, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to conduct sequestered voir dire of the jurors, considering that Jones’s showing satisfied several of the Needs factors (the affidavits and the short lapse of time between the articles and voir dire), as discussed in the majority opinion.

III. THE JAMES HEARING PROCEDURE SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN IDAHO.

The first problem with Part III of the majority opinion is that it is not at all clear that the law in Idaho as to co-conspirator statements is what the majority declares it to be. This Court has never held that a trial court may admit statements of a co-eonspirator prior to proof of the conspiracy being laid before the court. The cases cited in the majority opinion supporting this proposition, State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 706 P.2d 456 (1985), and State v. So, 71 Idaho 324, 231 P.2d 734 (1951), are not fully apposite. So was decided before the Idaho Rules of Evidence, including I.R.E. 801, were adopted; the statement in Caudill that “[i]t is not necessary that a formal charge of conspiracy be made against co-conspirators before this exception applies, but is necessary that there be some evidence of conspiracy or promise of its production before the court can admit *495evidence of statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy” is sheer, unadulterated dicta.10 109 Idaho at 226, 706 P.2d at 460.
The second problem with the opinion is the failure of any reasoning to explain why the James procedure should not be adopted, at least prospectively. Jones, although he does not argue that James hearings are accepted law in this state, does argue that such should be the law. Jones makes a most persuasive case:
As a matter of public policy the Supreme Court should adopt the procedure of allowing a defendant the opportunity to have such a pre-trial [James hearing].... Based upon the following legal scholars and reported eases, we respectfully request that the Idaho Supreme Court adopt a pre-trial “James Hearing” procedure when requested by a defendant.
Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger state,
It is the contention of this treatise that the fair and practicable method of providing protection to the defendant without violating the letter or spirit of the rules lies in insisting on a stringent standard of proof before the court admits a co-conspirator statement in a criminal case.
Weinstein, J. and Berger, M., Weinstein on Evidence, Section 801(d)(2)(e), at 176 (1981) (emphasis added).
In the same spirit, the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit initiated the requirement of a pre-trial hearing at which the predicate for admissibility of any co-conspirator hearsay must be laid,
Courts have on occasion allowed such statements [i.e., alleged co-conspirator hearsay] to be heard by the jury upon the promise that the prosecutor will “connect it up.” Of course, if it is connected up, the defendant suffers no prejudice in the order of proof. If, however, the judge should conclude at the end of the trial that proper foundation has not been laid, the defendant will have been prejudiced from the jury’s having heard the inadmissible evidence____
Both because of the “danger” to the defendant if the statement is not connected and because of the inevitable serious waste of time, energy and efficiency when a mistrial is required in order to obviate such danger, we conclude that the present procedure warrants the statement of a preferred order of proof in such a case. The district court should, whenever reasonably practicable, require the showing of a conspiracy and of the connection of the defendant with it before admitting declarations of a co-conspirator.
James, supra, at 581-82 (emphasis added).
Different courts have at times followed other procedures, but no trial court has ever been reversed for affording a defendant a James hearing. Appellate courts have, however, reversed trial courts that failed to conduct James hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Radeker, 664 F.2d 242 (10th Cir.1981); United States v. Stipe, 653 F.2d 446, esp. at 449 (10th Cir.1981).
Leading state courts have come to the same conclusions. In People v. Montoya, 753 P.2d 729 (Colo.1988), the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
The prosecution ... bears the burden of establishing ... that the defendant and the declarant were members of a conspiracy and that the declarant’s statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Although [local rule of evidence] 104(b) authorizes a trial court to admit a co-conspirator’s statement conditionally11 *496... the preferred procedure, in our view, is to require the prosecution to establish the foundational requirements for the admission of a co-conspirator’s statement prior to any offer of the statement into evidence before the jury____
Montoya at 733-4 (emphasis supplied).
Similarly, in State v. St. Pierre, 111 Wash.2d 105, 759 P.2d 383 (1988), the Washington Supreme Court held:
Prior to admitting co-conspirator statements, the trial court must first determine whether the state has shown, with substantial independent evidence, a prima facie case of conspiracy____ The trial court must also find that the statements were made during the course and in the furtherance of the conspiracy____
St. Pierre at 391 citing State v. Dictado, 102 Wash.2d 277, 687 P.2d 172 (1984) and State v. Goodwin, 186 P.2d 935 (1947).
To the same effect, see, [e.g.,] ... Henderson v. State, 372 So.2d 217 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1979)____
A pre-trial hearing is the best available mechanism for avoiding the unnecessary waste, expense, and delay of mistrial should the court determine in the midst of a trial that a conspiracy has not been proved. The pre-trial James hearing sought by the Appellant needs not be lengthy [nor] time consuming in nature. Weinstein observes that in most cases the judge can determine from colloquy, documents marked in advance of trial suppression hearings, and one or two witnesses whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant admission of a co-conspirator’s statement. Armed with this information, the judge should rule conditionally on admissibility as soon as possible. Weinstein’s Evidence at 104-56.
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 40-44 (emphasis and footnote added). Unfortunately, the majority ignores this extremely persuasive argument as though appellant had never advanced it.
I am able to concur in the majority opinion result in this section only because Jones ultimately was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to hold a James hearing, as sufficient evidence of a conspiracy was introduced before the conclusion of the trial. For the future, however, the above well-worded excerpt from appellant’s brief is commended to the trial courts so that they may avoid the dual specters of unfairness to defendants and judicial inefficiency in the context of co-conspirator statements.

IV. WYSTRACH’S TESTIMONY AS TO THE “MEANINGFUL GLANCE” WAS A PRIVILEGED MARITAL COMMUNICATION AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED.

I fully concur with the majority opinion’s analysis of Jones’s surveillance of the Vance property — such an act clearly was not communicative. But the majority fundamentally misapplies the concept of “confidential” and thereby missteps in its analysis of the “meaningful glance.” The mere fact that the glance occurred in front of Wystrach’s parents hardly proves that the glance was not confidential.12 The pivotal question determining whether a communication is confidential when third parties are present should be whether those third parties perceived (i.e., heard, or, in this case, saw) the communication. At the very least, it should be demonstrated that the “speaker” did not intend the communication to be confidential, even though the third parties present did not perceive the communication.13
*497The State, as proponent of the challenged evidence, needed to prove that the communication was not intended to be confidential and therefore not privileged. This the State utterly failed to do. As to the physical setup, Wystrach testified only that “Mom and [D]ad had two recliners and they sat on the recliners and Bob and I sat down on the ground in front of the couch with our feet out and we all watched the news____ The only thing that really bothered me was sitting in front of my parents.” This testimony does not constitute an adequate foundation by which the trial court (or this Court) could determine that the glance between two individuals was not confidentially exchanged.
If Jones had whispered something to Wystrach while her parents were across the room, it would be ridiculous to contend that such a communication was not confidential nor was it intended to be confidential. Cf. State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 158, 160, 657 P.2d 17, 24 (1983) (conversation between defendant and client overheard by court reporter held to be admissible and that the alternative to speaking aloud in the courtroom, “client and counsel [having] to converse in whispers,” is adequate to safeguard defendant’s constitutional rights). Similarly, if Wystrach’s parents were not in a position to observe the glance, it would still be confidential.

V. THE EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED CRIMES WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AND WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.

A. Drug offenses

The majority opinion contends that the various testimony regarding the sale, possession, use, and delivery of controlled substance is admissible under I.R.E. 404(b). Yet it arrives at this conclusion without expounding upon any legal or factual analysis. This is not a surprise, for such an analysis would reveal that the challenged testimony is patently inadmissible, violating both I.R.E. 404 and 403.
For instance, the testimony as to drug offenses of which Jones complains embraces Wystrach’s testimony that Jones sold drugs roughly thirteen years before the trial date. How this testimony could demonstrate Jones’s motive, intent, or plan to murder Vance approximately seven years later is utterly inconceivable. Similarly, Wystrach’s testimony of Jones’s and Martinez’s drug dealing prior to when Cordell approached them cannot have any bearing on the Vance murder. Moreover, Jones never disputed lack of motive14 or intent. As for the plan exception, testimony as to drug possession and sale after the murder might satisfy I.R.E. 404(b)’s “plan” exception to the general prohibition against character evidence. But the trial court allowed Wystrach to testify to a multitude of instances beyond such evidence, holding that “I think that [the testimony as to drugs] does fall within the exception to show the general scheme or plan, the life-style, as long as you don’t get specific.” Tr., p. 509. This instance is certainly a first in advancing the “lifestyle” exception to I.R.E. 404. The court went much too far in determining that the evidence fell within a “general scheme or plan.” In fact, the only scheme or plan apparent from such testimony would be Jones’s general scheme or plan to break the law — in other words, propensity evidence, the very evidence I.R.E. 404 strictly prohibits.
But even if it were clear that all the testimony as to controlled substances satisfied I.R.E. 404(b)’s exceptions, the majority fails to apply I.R.E. 403, as did the trial court fail to apply it. Rule 404(b) hardly marks the end of the analysis. The probity of the drug testimony was minimal at best, as demonstrated above; the potential for undue prejudice, however, was great. The jury could have concluded that because Jones allegedly dealt in drugs and involved Wystrach in that trade at a young age, he deserved to be sent *498to prison, even were he not guilty of the murder. Furthermore, the juiy might have concluded that the type of person to engage in such conduct was perfectly capable of murder for hire, again, precisely the type of conclusion the Rules of Evidence seek to prevent the jury from arriving at.
The vast majority of the drug testimony, then, should not have been admitted, and its inclusion constituted reversible error.

B. Unspecified Murder

To find that an admitted violation of the Rules of Evidence is harmless error should require a strong conviction that “there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 762, 810 P.2d 680, 700 (1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1268, 117 L.Ed.2d 495 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991) (emphasis added, citation omitted). Such a standard is about as high as they come. The fact that the jurors “had ample other opportunity to discern the credibility of Wystrach and weigh it against that of appellant” does not support the majority’s conclusion that “beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence of the prior unspecified murder did not influence the jury’s verdict.” The question properly posed is, can the majority confidently assert that because the jurors had other evidence of Wystrach’s credibility, the unspecified murder had no effect on the jury’s verdict? I do not think so. In addition thereto, it is far from clear that the jurors did indeed have many other opportunities to discern the credibility of Wystrach apart from Wystrach’s own testimony.
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “[t]he most that the complained of testimony could have contributed was to bolster the credibility of Wystrach.” The majority opinion finds the testimony as to the murder to be error in light of the fact that ‘Wystrach’s inference is vague as to the victim” and “lack[s] specificity.” Thus, we may conclude that the jury could have believed that the murder was actually another murder, admission of which would thus violate I.R.E. 404.
In view of the questions surrounding the significance of the psychiatrist’s testimony, a wiser course would be to conclude that this Court cannot declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such powerful evidence could not conceivably have impermissibly contributed to the jury’s verdict.

VI. ALL EVIDENCE NEED NOT BE CIRCUMSTANTIAL TO REQUIRE A HOLDER INSTRUCTION.

The Justices comprising a majority engage in a subtle yet significant non sequitur when, after correctly stating that “Holder requires a circumstantial instruction to be given when the evidence linking the defendant to the crime charged is entirely circumstantial,” they hold that “the trial court properly refused to give a Holder instruction because the case is not based entirely on circumstantial evidence.” In Holder, it so happened that all of the evidence was circumstantial. State v. Holder, 100 Idaho 129, 133, 594 P.2d 639, 643 (1979). The Court reads into Holder a binary opposition where none exists. The third alternative is that a Holder instruction is required even when the evidence is not entirely but mostly circumstantial. As the author of the Holder opinion, this justice believes that Holder in no way limited itself, nor has this Court limited it, to instances in which the evidence is entirely circumstantial. Nor indeed is there any reason to so limit Holder. Even if Holder implicitly limited its holding to cases in which the evidence against a defendant is entirely circumstantial, it would be more logical to adopt the California test, as expressed in People v. Wiley, 18 Cal.3d 162, 133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881 (1976):
It is the duty of the trial court to instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the facts of the ease before it____ This obligation includes the duty to instruct on the effect to be given circumstantial evidence but only when circumstantial evidence is ‘substantially relied upon for proof of guilt.’
Wiley, 133 Cal.Rptr. at 142, 554 P.2d at 888 (citing People v. Yrigoyen, 45 Cal.2d 65, 286 P.2d 1 (1955) (emphasis added)). Since the jury requires help in understanding how to *499interpret circumstantial evidence in light of the reasonable evidence standard, there is no reason to refrain from giving such an instruction when most, but not all, the evidence is circumstantial.

CONCLUSION

Because of the aforementioned errors, as well as the error pointed out by the majority, this Court should reverse and remand the cause for a new trial.

. In Edmonson, this Court held that the prosecutor's misconduct was so insignificant that the sufficiency of the evidence establishing probable cause was irrelevant. 113 Idaho at 237, 743 P.2d at 466.

. The Comment to Rule 3.8 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct reminds prosecutors that they have "the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilty is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence.”

. During the hearing on defendant’s pretrial dismissal motion, the prosecutor attempted to explain away this breach of the Rules of Evidence by advancing the notion that an exception exists to the marital privilege when the spouses are co-conspirators. The prosecutor argued that public policy supports a reading of the Rules of Evidence wherein I.R.E. 801(d), the co-conspirator hearsay exception, trumps the express provisions of I.R.E. 504 and I.C. § 9-203, governing marital privilege. Even a superficial reading of the two rules of evidence controverts this argument, however. The co-conspirator exception merely provides that what otherwise would be considered inadmissible hearsay is not hearsay, not that a statement qualifying under the co-conspirator exception .is per se admissible. But such an exception has no support in the rules of evidence, statutes, or case law of this state. One thing is certain: even if the prosecutor’s explanation stemmed from a good faith belief that such an exception exists (rather than an after-the-fact attempt to insulate himself from perfidious acts), grand jury proceedings are not the forum in which to advance new evidentiary theories which appear to be unsupported by the Rules of Evidence, evidentiary statutes, or by case law. Fairness dictates that the proper forum for advancing such dicey theories is in a court of law, whereat the prosecutor may be held in check by defense counsel and by the court. Not surprisingly, the trial court excluded this privileged testimony at trial.

. One is brought to wonder why the prosecutor felt the need to allow in all sorts of illegal evidence if he had a strong case to begin with.

. Caudill held that a co-conspirator's statement was inadmissible hearsay. 109 Idaho at 226, 706 P.2d at 460. Moreover, the only authority Caudill cites for the proposition that a promise of production is sufficient is a Court of Appeals case, State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 655 P.2d 99 (Ct.App.1983), which in this Court is not binding case law precedent.

. Idaho Rule of Evidence 104(b) only allows evidence to be admitted conditionally when the issue is relevance. I.R.E. 104(b) ("Whenever the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or in the court’s discretion subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition” (emphasis added).). But the issue at stake in co-*496conspirator statements is not relevance; rather, it is whether the statement is inadmissible hearsay.

. One is brought to wonder at the evolution of a "meaningful glance” into admissible evidence, especially in the setting of a capital case. The supposed "meaningful glance” proposition requires an undue strain on credulity. For certain it is not the equivalent of a spoken word, for which reason alone, as a mode of communication between two persons, there need be the element of telepathy which, according to Webster is "communication through means other than the senses, as by the exercise of mystical powers.” Webster’s II, New Riverside Dictionary, 1190 (1988).

. It might be contended that the lack of a basis of knowledge as to the fact that a communication is indeed communicative goes to show that the communication was intended to be confidential. In this instance, even accepting Wystrach’s interpretation of the "glance,” Jones knew Wystrach’s *497parents did not have sufficient knowledge of underlying facts sufficient to understand the significance of the glance. Thus, because there is no evidence the Wystrach’s parents either perceived or were even reasonably intended to perceive the glance, the glance was privileged.

. Logic would seem to dictate that the $15,000 allegedly offered to Jones and Martinez to kill Vance would be motive enough.