Court Opinion

ID: 9666620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:22:53.645582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:30.504109
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting in part. I respectfully dissent. The jury, in my view, was well aware of the pertinent circumstances presented to it when deciding Alan Willett’s sentence, and after duly hearing and considering the evidence bearing on those circumstances, the jury concluded the aggravating circumstances justified beyond a reasonable doubt a sentence of death. For the readers’ benefit and understanding of this sentencing issue, I attach to my opinion the forms the jury utilized and checked when arriving at its death penalty decision. Those forms are identical to the ones set out in AMCI2d 1008 at pages 171 through 185.1  As instructed by the trial court, the jury first considered Form 1 which set forth a list of possible aggravating circumstances, and the jury unanimously found one of them existed, namely, Willett’s murders were committed in an especially cruel manner. One aggravating circumstance is enough to support a jury’s imposition of the death penalty. Hayes v. State, 280 Ark. 509, 660 S.W.2d 648 (1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984). Also, following the trial court’s instructions, the jury proceeded to Form 2, which contains four sections, A, B, C and D, which required the jury to determine whether mitigating circumstances were shown to exist. Sections A, C and D are relevant here. Under Section A, the jury unanimously found the evidence showed the following three mitigating circumstances: (/) Before the 14th of September, 1993 [the date of the murders], Alan Willett had no history of criminal conduct. (/) After the 14th of September, 1993, Alan Willett has been a model prisoner. (S) Alan Willett, after the 14th of September, 1993, cooperated with law enforcement in that he voluntarily gave a statement as to what happened on the 14th of September, 1993. Under Section C of Form 2, the jury then unanimously checked the same three circumstances listed in Section A, stating they were not mitigating. And the jury then left unchecked Section D which reads as follows: ( ) No evidence of a mitigating circumstance was presented by either party during any portion of the trial (check only if no evidence was presented. If evidence was presented but the jury agreed that it was not mitigating, check Section C). From the above forms, one vital point is clear — the jury agreed that evidence of the same three circumstances listed in sections A and C had been shown. The majority opinion, however, suggests it is impossible to discern whether the jury found any mitigating circumstances because Section C refers to the three circumstances as “not mitigating” while Section A referred to them as “mitigating.” The majority opinion, in my view, overlooks the jurors’ obvious consideration of the evidence and circumstances it rejected when imposing the death sentence, and it totally ignores what is meant by mitigating circumstances. Mitigating circumstances commonly represent evidence which a jury may consider as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1002 (6th ed. 1990). Here, the jury’s checked forms acknowledged there was evidence showing Willett (1) had no prior criminal history, (2) had been a model prisoner and (3) had voluntarily confessed to the murders; nonetheless the jury concluded those circumstances were insufficient to reduce his sentence to life without parole. Whether the circumstances checked in Form 2, Section C, were mislabeled “not mitigating” is of little consequence, so long as the penalty forms reflect the jurors considered the evidence bearing on Willett’s favorable conduct, but they decided those circumstances did not warrant reducing Willett’s punishment. While Form 2 should be slightly edited so as to provide some additional clarity to the jury when imposing sentencing, the majority court is far off the mark in suggesting the jury here was somehow confused when imposing the death penalty. Again, the sentencing forms here reveal with convincing clarity that the jury heard and considered evidence bearing on Willett’s favorable conduct exhibited before and after the murders he committed, but it still unanimously decided that Willett should be put to death. No amount of this court’s reshuffling and reinterpreting the language employed in the jury forms in this case can serve to muddle or eviscerate the jury’s obvious consideration of the relevant evidence when imposing the death penalty. I would affirm both the conviction and sentencing judgments. [[Image here]] [[Image here]] [[Image here]] ( ) Before the 14th of September, 1993, Allen Willet helped coach little league baseball and, in particular, helped a brain-damaged child. ( ) Allen Willet, after the 14th of September, 1993, cooperated with law enforcement in that he voluntarily gave a statement as to what happened on the 14th of September, 1993. ( ) Allen Willet can lead a productive life in prison as an inmate without the possibility of parole. ( yj) The capital murder occurred while the defendant was in an agitated state which was the result of the mismanagement of his valium therapy. ( ) Other: Specify in writing. ______ C. (>/) There was evidence of the following circumstances, but the jury unanimously agreed that they were not mitigating circumstances. (. ) The capital murder was committed while Allen Willet was under extreme emotional disturbance. ( ) The capital murder was committed while Allen Willet was acting under unusual pressures. { ) The capital murder was committed" while the capacity of Allen Willet to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect. (v/) Before the 14th of September, 1993, Allen Willet had no history of criminal conduct. (4 ) After the 14th of September, 1993, Allen Willet has been a model prisoner. [[Image here]] [[Image here]] [[Image here]]   The listed circumstances in the forms were modified to reflect the facts in this case.