Court Opinion

ID: 9378618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-11 01:00:29.278541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.186676
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60423     Document: 00516673578          Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/10/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                                                            FILED
                                                                      March 10, 2023
                                   No. 21-60423
                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                            Clerk
   Tomas Magdy Mady,

                                                                      Petitioner,

                                       versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                     Respondent.

                      Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals
                            Agency No. A058 574 948

   Before Jones, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Tomas Mady is a citizen of Egypt and lawful permanent resident of
   the United States. In 2012, he was convicted of attempted aggravated
   robbery in violation of Tennessee law and was sentenced to three years in
   prison. The federal government found him seven years later and placed him
   in removal     proceedings    for   an “aggravated felony”        conviction.

          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-60423       Document: 00516673578            Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/10/2023

                                       No. 21-60423

   8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Mady applied for withholding of removal
   under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under the
   Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained
   the charge of removal because his conviction constituted an aggravated
   felony; denied withholding because he committed a particularly serious
   crime; and rejected CAT deferral of removal on the absence of proof that he
   would likely suffer state-sanctioned torture if he returned to Egypt. The
   Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found no error and dismissed his appeal.
   Mady now petitions this court for review. We DENY his petition.
                                   I. Jurisdiction
          We generally lack jurisdiction to review “any final order of removal
   against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” an
   aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). 1 But “we retain jurisdiction to
   review related questions of law, including whether an alien’s conviction
   constitutes an aggravated felony.” Fosu v. Garland, 36 F.4th 634, 636–37
   (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We
   review the BIA’s decision and will consider the IJ’s decision only to the
   extent it influenced the BIA. Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 517
   (5th Cir. 2012). The limited factual findings over which we have jurisdiction
   are reviewed for substantial evidence, and legal conclusions are reviewed de
   novo. Id. at 517–18.
                                 II. Removability
          An alien is removable if he is convicted of an aggravated felony.
   8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). As defined by Congress, an “aggravated
   felony” includes any “crime of violence . . . for which the term of

          1
             This jurisdictional bar does not apply to CAT orders. See Nasrallah v. Barr,
   140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020).

                                             2
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                                        No. 21-60423

   imprisonment [is] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), 2 as well as
   attempts to commit an aggravated felony, id. § 1101(a)(43)(U).                     The
   Attorney General asserts that aggravated robbery qualifies as a crime of
   violence and that Mady is removable for attempting to commit it. To
   determine if that is so, we ask “whether the state statute defining the crime
   of conviction categorically fits within the generic federal definition of a
   corresponding aggravated felony” that would make the alien removable.
   Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385, 389, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 (2017)
   (internal quotation marks omitted).
          The generic definition of a crime of violence is “an offense that has as
   an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
   the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). The Tennessee
   statute under which Mady was convicted makes it a felony to accomplish a
   robbery “with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or fashioned
   to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon; or . . . where
   the victim suffers serious bodily injury.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-13-402.
          The Sixth Circuit, which encompasses the jurisdiction of Mady’s
   conviction, has held that Tennessee aggravated robbery is a crime of
   violence. See United States v. Gloss, 661 F.3d 317, 319, 320 (6th Cir. 2011).
   We agree with that court’s reasoning, for it only makes sense that any robbery
   “with a real or disguised deadly weapon, or that causes serious bodily injury,
   falls under . . . the definition of violent felony, as it necessarily involves ‘the
   use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of
   another.’” Id. at 319. Further, we agree with the Sixth Circuit that
   Tennessee simple robbery—the taking of property “from the person of

          2
           Mady was sentenced to three years in prison, satisfying the term of imprisonment
   requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

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   another by violence or putting the person in fear”—is itself a crime of
   violence. United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 2014)
   (quoting Tenn. Code. Ann. § 39-13-401). Thus, Mady’s conviction for
   attempted aggravated robbery fits squarely within the definition of an
   aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), making Mady removable.
                       III. Withholding of Removal
            An applicant for withholding of removal is ineligible if he was
   convicted of a “particularly serious crime.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). An
   “aggravated felony” conviction with a sentence of at least 5 years is a
   particularly serious crime per se. Id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv). A conviction
   carrying a shorter sentence can also constitute a particularly serious crime if
   the Attorney General, in his discretion, so determines through a case-specific
   adjudication. Id.; see also Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 154–55 (5th Cir.
   2010).
            Because Mady’s conviction of an aggravated felony carried a sentence
   of less than five years, withholding of removal remains available to him unless
   his conviction is deemed “particularly serious.” Vetcher v. Barr, 953 F.3d
   361, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2020). Here, the Attorney General found that Mady’s
   crime was particularly serious, and the BIA agreed, noting the dangerous
   nature of the crime and the underlying facts of Mady’s conviction. Our
   review is limited to whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard. See
   Hakim, 628 F.3d at 154–55; Tibakweitira v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 905, 910 (5th
   Cir. 2011). We find that it did. Accordingly, Mady’s petition for review of
   withholding of removal is denied. To the extent Mady “asks us to reweigh
   the facts and find that his crime was not particularly serious,” we lack
   jurisdiction to do so under § 1252(a)(2)(C). Tibakweitira, 986 F.3d at 911.

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                                     No. 21-60423

                              IV. CAT Deferral
          To obtain protection under CAT, a petitioner must show that “(1) it
   is more likely [than] not that he will be tortured upon return to his homeland;
   and (2) sufficient state action will be involved in that torture.” Tibakweitira,
   986 F.3d at 911. “Sufficient state action” can take the form of “consent or
   acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
          Mady, an Orthodox Christian, contends that he likely faces torture in
   Egypt and is eligible for CAT relief given his credible testimony showing
   regular   discrimination    and   criminal       extortion   against   Christians.
   The testimony of his expert, a professor at George Washington University,
   contains some assertions of discrimination, but none of torture. Further,
   though Mady’s evidence describes instances of persecution against
   Christians by Muslims, it does not show that the Egyptian government has
   acquiesced to this violence. In sum, we find that substantial evidence
   supports the conclusion of the BIA that Mady failed to meet his burden of
   proof for CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see also Chen v. Gonzalez,
   470 F.3d 1131, 1142–43 (5th Cir. 2006). Mady fails to show that his evidence
   compelled a different result. See Munoz-Granados v. Barr, 958 F.3d 402, 406
   (5th Cir. 2020).
                                IV. Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mady’s petition for review.

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