Court Opinion

ID: 9718117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:17:18.928413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:57.410119
License: Public Domain

*106Concurring Opinion by
Chief Justice CORNELIUS.
I agree that the judgment should be affirmed, but I write separately because I believe the majority opinion misinterprets bolstering and Tex.R. Evid. 701.
The testimony was not bolstering. Bolstering is the giving of evidence whose sole purpose is to vouch that a particular witness or source of evidence is worthy of belief, without substantially contributing to make the existence of a fact more or less probable. Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). As pointed out in the court’s opinion in Cohn v. State, evidence that corroborates or enhances another witness’s testimony or another source of evidence, if it also has a tendency to establish a fact of consequence, is not bolstering.
The witnesses here were testifying to what they saw in the reproduction of a crime scene. Their testimony tended to prove facts within their knowledge. The fact that this testimony also may have added to the credibility or reliability of the videotape, or any other evidence or witness’s testimony, is immaterial. A party may prove a fact by as many witnesses as he chooses, subject only to control by the court for cumulative excess. Repetitious testimony is not bolstering so long as it tends to prove a fact in issue. Thus, the testimony here was not bolstering. Compare: Marras v. State, 741 S.W.2d 395, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Roy v. State, 608 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Price v. State, 923 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1996, pet. ref'd).
Three of the witnesses who testified they recognized Woods in the videotape testified that they had known or seen him before they viewed the videotape. There is no evidence showing whether the other three witnesses, who were police officers, had known or seen Woods previously. They simply said they “recognized” Woods in the videotape. If they had not seen him before, their testimony could possibly have been challenged on the ground that they did not have personal knowledge. Woods, however, did not object on that ground or ask to take the witnesses on voir dire to test their knowledge.
The testimony in question here also did not violate Tex.R. Evid. 701. The witnesses who testified were fact witnesses, and fact witnesses testifying to a crime scene may certainly identify who they saw in that crime scene. Even if the identification testimony of the witnesses can be considered to be opinions, Rule 701 was not violated because their identification was rationally based on their perception, and was helpful to the determination of a fact in issue. The fact that the jury could also see the same evidence did not prohibit the witnesses from testifying to what they saw. Witnesses are always allowed to testify to their personal knowledge or perceptions, even though the same evidence may have been introduced from another witness or source. For example, a witness may testify that a writing appears to be his own signature, even though the writing is in evidence for the jury to see and compare with other writings. Likewise, a witness may testify that a gun looks like the same gun he saw at a crime scene, even though other witnesses have also testified that the gun is the same as the one found at the crime scene.
Because it was not error to admit the testimony of the witnesses, there is no need for a harm analysis. I concur in the judgment, but not in the finding of error.