Court Opinion

ID: 9648215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:10:02.047337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:57.495845
License: Public Domain

CUMMINGS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The issue here is not one of jurisdiction, but instead it is a question of residency to satisfy the requirements of Section 3.21 of the Texas Family Code in a divorce action. The question of residence is a question of fact. Bomar v. Bomar, 229 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1950, no writ).
Since the Beavers case relied on by the majority, the Texas Supreme Court has written on issues involving writs of mandamus. In Johnson, the Court instructs us that mandamus is a “discretionary remedy.” See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985). Mandamus issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy by law. See id. at 917; State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.1984). In Johnson the Court outlined the responsibility of the trial court, and stated: “A trial court, on the other hand, abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. (Cites omitted). A relator who attacks the ruling of a trial court as an abuse of discretion labors under a heavy burden. (Cite omitted). The relator must establish, under the circumstances of the case, that the facts and law permit the trial court to make but one decision. (Emphasis added). This determination is essential because mandamus will not issue to control the action of a lower court in a matter involving discretion. Id. at 917. (Other cites omitted). In order to find an abuse of discretion, the reviewing court must conclude that the facts and circumstances of the case extinguish any discretion in the matter. Id. at 918. A mere error in judgment is not an abuse of discretion. Id. If the matter is truly one requiring the exercise of discretion, such discretion lies with the trial court. An appellate court may not substitute its discretion for that of the trial court.” Id.
From the above authorities, I believe that when there is disputed evidence, such as in this case, such discretion should lie with the trial court. It is the trial judge’s duty to pass on the credibility of the witnesses and weight to be given their testimony, and he may reject the testimony of any witness in whole or in part, if he sees fit to do so. See Shaw v. Holmes, 524 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1975, no writ). For whatever reason, after observing the testimony and demeanor of the Relator, the trial court could have chosen not to consider parts or all of his testimony and could have believed the testimony of Ann Cook. During the hearing of the plea in abatement, Relator attempted to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination concerning why he had previously changed his name. He also was evasive in his testimony about what he had told his wife about how many times he had previously been married.
Mrs. Cook testified that she had always intended her residence to be in McLennan County, that she maintained furniture in her bedroom at her mother’s house, kept clothing in the bedroom closet, and that her son lived there. Relator admitted that Ann came to Waco consistently over a long period of time since their marriage and that she had spent from 50 to 70 nights in Waco apart from him. The court could have believed that Ann did not tell her husband about her intent to claim her residency in Waco because of her fear of him, since she testified he had threatened to kill her, that he tried to choke her son, that he kept guns everywhere, and that he was *844constantly telling her of his CIA connections. Under these disputed facts, I do not believe the Court was in a position to make but me decision, and I do not believe we should substitute our judgment on the credibility and weight to be given the testimony which was before the trial court.
Further, in Arbor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex.1985), the Supreme Court declared that it lacked jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to supervise or correct incidental rulings such as pleas in abatement, among other matters.
For these reasons, I would deny the application for writ of mandamus.