Court Opinion

ID: 9626466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:13:49.22162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:27.951027
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL.
I respectfully dissent for the same reasons that I dissented in Hamm v. Cromer, 305 S.C. 305, 309-10, 408 S.E.2d 227, 229-30 (1991). In my opinion, the majority continues to ignore the essential purpose and intent of the constitutional provisions enacted to aid in “home rule.” See S.C. Constitution, Art. VIII, §§ 1 and 7 (significantly diminishing the power of the legislature to continuously engage itself in matters of local government).
Act No. 207 devolves the authority of the Richland County Legislative Delegation to recommend the appointment of the members of the Richland County Recreation Commission (Commission) to Richland County Council. This action clearly furthers the intent of §§ 1 and 7 to diminish legislative interaction in local government. Because Richland County Council has never had the legal authority to appoint the members of the Commission, in my opinion, the transfer of authority under Act No. 207 constitutes the establishment of initial county government. See Horry County v. Cooke, 275 S.C. 19, 23, 267 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1980) (limiting the Duncan exception to the establishment of initial county governments). Therefore, instead of continuing to invalidate such legislation and preserving legislative interference in local governmental affairs, I would hold Act 207 constitutional as “one shot” legislation under Duncan v. County of York, 267 S.C. 327, 228 S.E.2d 92 (1976).
Based on the reasons above, I respectfully dissent.
PLEICONES, J., concurs.