Court Opinion

ID: 9399007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 17:04:06.105775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:37.949606
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
               CALIFORNIA

       LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
                    Petitioner,
                         v.
   THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
                    Respondent;
                    JANE DOE,
               Real Party in Interest.

                           S269608

          Second Appellate District, Division Three
                         B307389

             Los Angeles County Superior Court
                          BC659059

                         June 1, 2023

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and
Evans concurred.
      LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v.
                      SUPERIOR COURT
                            S269608

            Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

    Some statutory schemes provide for the recovery of treble
damages, meaning that actual compensatory damages awarded
to a prevailing plaintiff are multiplied by three. Here we
consider a statute that, as recently amended by the Legislature,
provides for up to treble damages when a plaintiff suing in tort
for childhood sexual assault proves that the assault “was as the
result of a cover up” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (b)(1)
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as section 340.1(b)(1))) by the
defendant, with a “ ‘cover up’ ” being defined as “a concerted
effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault” (id.,
subd. (b)(2)). The specific issue before us is whether enhanced
damages can be awarded under section 340.1(b)(1) against a
public entity named as a defendant in a lawsuit for childhood
sexual assault, or whether such awards are prohibited under
Government Code section 818 (hereinafter sometimes referred
to as section 818), a provision within the Government Claims
Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), which specifies in relevant part
that a public entity may not be held liable in tort for “damages
imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant.” (§ 818.)
      The Court of Appeal below determined that section 818
shields public entities from liability for enhanced damages
under section 340.1(b)(1).   Based on our review of both

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                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

provisions, we agree with the Court of Appeal. We therefore
affirm the judgment.
         I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The following facts are taken from the first amended
complaint (hereinafter, complaint) and are assumed true in
light of this case’s procedural posture. (See Turman v. Turning
Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)
      Real party in interest and plaintiff below Jane Doe
(hereinafter, plaintiff) was a student at Daniel Pearl Magnet
High School, operated by petitioner and defendant below Los
Angeles Unified School District (the District). Daniel Garcia
was an employee at the school when plaintiff enrolled in the
ninth grade for the 2014–2015 academic year. Garcia began to
give special attention to plaintiff. He acted affectionately
toward her at school, rubbing her legs and holding her hand.
Garcia also sent plaintiff flirtatious and sexual text messages. 1
In November 2014, Garcia sexually assaulted plaintiff. Plaintiff
later told her parents about Garcia’s actions. Her parents
immediately contacted the police. In May 2016, Garcia was
arrested and charged with criminal offenses associated with his
misconduct.

1
      The complaint also describes Garcia’s improper conduct
toward other female students at Jane Doe’s high school,
including an allegation that a student complained to the school’s
administration that Garcia had inappropriately touched her.
Despite this misbehavior, the complaint alleges, Garcia was
allowed to remain employed at the school, and “to continue his
grooming conduct directed at Plaintiff, and . . . to sexually abuse
her.”

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      Before these events occurred, the District had learned in
February 2014 that Garcia — who at the time worked as an aide
at a different school — was involved in a “boyfriend-girlfriend”
relationship with another female student, H.M. According to
the complaint, this relationship began while Garcia was
employed by the District. The District did not fire Garcia upon
learning of this relationship, but instead transferred him to the
high school where he would encounter plaintiff. The District
also created a false report stating that Garcia and H.M. had met
and dated before Garcia’s employment with the District
commenced.       The complaint alleges that this falsehood
represented “an effort to cover-up Garcia’s prior sexual assault
of minor female students within the” District and resulted in the
sexual assault of plaintiff later that same year.
      Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims for sexual abuse,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sexual
harassment against Garcia. Against the District, plaintiff
advances various negligence theories and a claim for failing to
report suspected child abuse. In addition to economic and
noneconomic damages, plaintiff seeks punitive and exemplary
damages from Garcia and an award of up to treble damages
under section 340.1(b)(1) from the District.
     The District brought a motion to strike the portions of the
complaint reciting allegations of a cover up, as well as the
request for up to treble damages. The District argued that the
allegations and request should be stricken pursuant to
section 818. The superior court denied the motion. It concluded
from the legislative history before it that section 340.1(b)(1)’s
treble damages provision was intended to be compensatory, not
punitive.

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      The District then sought writ relief from the Court of
Appeal. After issuing an order to show cause, the Court of
Appeal granted the writ petition and directed the trial court to
enter an order granting the District’s motion to strike the treble
damages request and related allegations. (Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. v. Superior Court (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 549, 567
(Los Angeles Unified School Dist.).)
      In granting the petition, the Court of Appeal determined
that section 818 protects public entities from the imposition of
enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1). The Court of
Appeal reasoned that because plaintiffs suing for childhood
sexual assault should receive full compensation for their injuries
in any event should they prevail at trial, the additional damages
authorized under section 340.1(b)(1) are primarily punitive and
thus cannot be assessed against a public entity. (Los Angeles
Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 561–562.)
According to the Court of Appeal, plaintiff had not articulated
“any injury from a childhood sexual assault or coverup for which
normal tort damages fail to provide full compensation” (id. at
p. 561), and the court itself had not identified any harm that
might be uncompensated or undercompensated without a
damages enhancement (ibid.). As for any other nonpunitive
purpose that might exist, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion
that the treble damages provision could be characterized as
nonpunitive because the possibility of enhanced damages might
incentivize lawsuits by victims of childhood sexual assaults. (Id.
at p. 566.) Summing up, the Court of Appeal explained that
“The treble damages provision in [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 340.1 does not have a compensatory function; its primary
purpose is to punish past childhood sexual abuse coverups to
deter future ones. While this is a worthy public policy objective,

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it is not one for which the state has waived sovereign immunity
under the Government Claims Act.” (Id. at p. 567.)
      We granted review. Since that time, other Courts of
Appeal also have determined that enhanced damages under
section 340.1(b)(1) are not recoverable against public entities.
The appellate court in X.M. v. Superior Court (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 1014, review granted December 1, 2021,
S271478 (X.M.) opined that “[i]t is the rare treble damages
provision that isn’t primarily designed to punish and deter
misconduct” (id. at pp. 1019–1020) and “treble damages will be
considered punitive when they apply to intentional misconduct
or morally offensive behavior, and the Legislature has not
clearly indicated an additional, compensatory purpose” (id. at
p. 1024). Regarding section 340.1(b)(1) specifically, the court
concluded that “the primary purpose of section 340.1’s treble
damages provision is punitive because it was designed to deter
future cover ups by punishing past ones,” with “the economic
and noneconomic damages available under general tort
principles . . . already [being] designed to make childhood sexual
assault victims whole — both for the physical and emotional
harm from the abuse itself, as well as for any additional
emotional harm from learning the abuse was the result of a
cover up.” (X.M., at p. 1019.) The court in X.M. regarded
section 818 as foreclosing application of section 340.1(b)(1) even
if enhanced damages might confer additional compensation
upon victims of childhood sexual assault or provide an incentive
for these individuals to bring lawsuits. (X.M., at pp. 1026‒
1030.)    Despite such possibilities, the court determined,
“nothing in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 340.1 or its
legislative history convinces us the Legislature intended the

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increased award to be more compensatory (or incentivizing)
than deterrent.” (Id. at p. 1020; see also id. at pp. 1027, 1030.)
      Even more recently, the court in K.M. v. Grossmont Union
High School Dist. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717 also concluded that
section 818 precludes the application of section 340.1(b)(1) to
public entities. (K.M., at p. 742.) The K.M. court’s reasoning
generally aligned with that of the X.M. court and the Court of
Appeal below. (Id. at pp. 742–750.)
                         II. DISCUSSION
      In deciding the issue before us, we first examine the
language of and rationales behind Government Code
section 818, as well as our case law applying this provision. We
then turn to section 340.1(b)(1) and consider whether
section 818 prohibits an award of enhanced damages under this
provision against a public entity, and we conclude that the
answer is yes.
      A. Government Code Section 818
      Our first task is to identify the kinds of damages awards
to which section 818 applies. Plaintiff argues that this provision
prohibits only the imposition of damages that are “simply and
solely punitive.” (People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976)
16 Cal.3d 30, 39 (Younger).) We conclude that section 818 is not
so limited, and instead immunizes public entities from damages
awarded under Civil Code section 3294 and from other damages
that would function, in essence, as an award of punitive or
exemplary damages.
         1. Statutory Language and Purpose
      Government Code section 818 provides, in full, as follows:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is
not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil

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Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.” 2
      To ascertain this provision’s reach, we follow our well-
established principles of statutory interpretation. “ ‘ “When we
interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine
the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We
first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and
commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in
isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a
whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to
harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language
is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a
literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the
Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and
public policy.’ [Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of
a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory
scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word,
phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the
legislative purpose.’ ” ’ ” (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates,
LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856–857.)

2
      Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) provides, “In an
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant.”

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      Government Code section 818 clearly shields public
entities from punitive damages, which are also sometimes
referred to as exemplary damages. Punitive damages are
distinct from compensatory damages. While compensatory
damages “ ‘are intended to redress the concrete loss that the
plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful
conduct,’ ” punitive damages “ ‘operate as “private fines”
intended to punish the defendant and to deter future
wrongdoing.’ ” (Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. (2016)
63 Cal.4th 363, 371; see also State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 416 [differentiating
between compensatory damages and punitive damages].) The
California Law Revision Commission comment to section 818
corroborates this reading of the statute, explaining that “[t]his
section exempts public entities from liability for punitive or
exemplary damages.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 pt. 1
West’s Ann. Gov. Code (2012 ed.) foll. § 818, p. 322.)3

3
      In enacting this statute, the Legislature apparently
recognized that although punitive and exemplary damages are
“imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant” (§ 818), they also could be perceived
as having additional, secondary functions. (Accord, Hofer v.
Lavender (Tex. 1984) 679 S.W.2d 470, 474–475 [reviewing
different purposes that courts have assigned to awards of
punitive damages]; Perry v. Melton (W.Va. 1982) 299 S.E.2d 8,
12–13 [describing various interests served by punitive
damages]; Walker v. Sheldon (N.Y. 1961) 179 N.E.2d 497, 498
[noting that the possibility of a punitive damages award “may
not infrequently induce the victim, otherwise unwilling to
proceed because of the attendant trouble and expense, to take
action against the wrongdoer”].) Although we had previously
described punitive damages as being awarded “purely as

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      Yet section 818’s plain language also establishes that its
prohibition can extend to more than just what are
conventionally referred to as “punitive damages.” In providing
that “a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under
Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed
primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant” (§ 818, italics added), the statute, with its focus on
the practical operation of a damages provision, conveys that it
also captures other kinds of damages when they function, in
essence, as awards of punitive or exemplary damages.
      This interpretation of section 818 comports with the
history behind this provision and the role it plays within the
statutory scheme. The majority rule in the United States long
has been that public entities are not liable for punitive damages
arising out of the acts or omissions of their employees, at least
without a clear expression of contrary legislative intent. (See,
e.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 259–
261; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases (1931) 44 Harv.
L.Rev. 1173, 1204.) This rule has been premised on various
policy rationales, including a sense that “[t]he money in the
[public] treasury is derived from the pockets of taxpayers who
have comparatively little to say about the actual management
of the [public] corporation’s business. It is not likely that the
political employee will be punished when the power of punishing
him is in the hands of his political patron, because of the
outcome of a damage suit against the city. Assessment of
punitive damages against a city would probably impoverish the

punishment and by way of example” (Gudarov v. Hadjieff (1952)
38 Cal.2d 412, 417), the Legislature was free to incorporate a
different understanding of these damages into section 818.

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public treasury without serving the admonitory function.”
(Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, at p. 1204; see also Newport,
at pp. 266–271 [detailing the policies that counsel against
allowing punitive damages against municipalities]; City of
Sanger v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 444, 450
[“Requiring . . . public entit[ies] to pay punitive damages would
punish the very group imposition of punitive damages was
intended to benefit”]; City of Gary v. Falcone (Ind.Ct.App. 1976)
348 N.E.2d 41, 42 [reciting explanations for the general rule
that public entities are immune from punitive damages].) The
disinclination to subject public entities to punitive and
exemplary damages has extended to treble damages in
circumstances where these damages are imbued with a
sufficiently exemplary character. (See, e.g., Hunt v. City of
Boonville (1877) 65 Mo. 620, 624–625; cf. Newport, at p. 261
[discussing Hunt].)4
      We read section 818 as codifying this common law rule.
The Government Claims Act as a whole reflects an awareness
that although tort claims can draw from public coffers and may
impose additional burdens on taxpayers, to the extent these
awards are necessary to compensate plaintiffs with meritorious
claims for their injuries, they simply reflect the loss-distributing
function of tort law at work. (See Recommendation Relating to
Sovereign Immunity, No. 1 — Tort Liability of Public Entities
and Public Employees (Jan. 1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com.

4
      We note that “exemplary” damages are sometimes framed
by statute as a multiple of actual damages incurred, whether
the multiplier serves as a base (e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 891, subd. (a),
1695.7, 2945.6, subd. (a)), ceiling (e.g., id., § 3426.3, subd. (c)), or
amount (e.g., id., § 3336.5, subd. (b)) of the “exemplary” damages
that can be recovered.

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Rep. (1963) pp. 810, 817.) Section 818, however, manifests an
appreciation that when additional impositions upon a public
entity are “primarily for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant” (ibid.), they further drain the public
fisc, create a liability that will be borne not by the immediate
wrongdoers but by taxpayers, and may not effectively achieve
the goals of retribution and deterrence — and for these reasons,
such awards should not be permitted, at least without a clear
indication by the Legislature that they may be imposed. As the
California Law Revision Commission explained in its report
transmitting the proposed law to the Legislature, “Public
entities should not be liable for punitive or exemplary damages.
Such damages are imposed to punish a defendant for
oppression, fraud, or malice. They are inappropriate where a
public entity is involved, since they would fall upon the innocent
taxpayers.” (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity,
at p. 817; cf. Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006)
39 Cal.4th 1164, 1196, fn. 20 (Wells) [describing “the purpose
behind the statutory ban on punitive damages against public
entities” as “to protect their tax-funded revenues from legal
judgments in amounts beyond those strictly necessary to
recompense the injured party”]; accord, Paulson v. County of De
Kalb (Ill.App.Ct. 1994) 644 N.E.2d 37, 40 [construing Illinois
law as prohibiting the imposition of treble damages on a public
entity].)5

5
      Whether this court would agree or disagree with these
policy arguments if presented to us as a matter of first
impression is of no consequence; what matters here is that the
Legislature apparently endorsed this reasoning when it enacted
what is now known as the Government Claims Act.

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        2. Case Law Construing Government Code Section 818
     Section 818 therefore conveys that a damages provision
cannot be applied against a public entity if it functions, in
essence, as an award of punitive or exemplary damages. Yet,
except for its reference to Civil Code section 3294, the statute
does not explain how punitive and exemplary damages are to be
distinguished from other kinds of awards. Our case law
interpreting Government Code section 818 provides insight into
how the statute should be applied. We glean a series of helpful
guidelines from our prior decisions in this area, which we
discuss next.
      In Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970)
2 Cal.3d 1, we upheld the trial court’s refusal to allow a public
entity defendant sued in tort to introduce evidence that some of
the plaintiff’s medical bills had already been paid through
insurance. (Id. at pp. 4–6.) Explaining why the trial court’s
ruling, which implicated what is known as the “collateral
source” rule, was consistent with section 818, we regarded the
principle allowing plaintiffs to recover in tort against a
defendant notwithstanding a prior first-party insurance payout
as having “several legitimate and fully justified compensatory
functions.” (Helfend, at p. 13.) Our decision in Helfend
emphasized that “[t]he collateral source rule as applied here
embodies the venerable concept that a person who has invested
years of insurance premiums to assure his medical care should
receive the benefits of his thrift. The tortfeasor should not
garner the benefits of his victim’s providence.” (Id. at pp. 9–10,
fn. omitted.) We also reasoned that “[t]o permit the defendant
to tell the jury that the plaintiff has been recompensed by a
collateral source for his medical costs might irretrievably upset
the complex, delicate, and somewhat indefinable calculations

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which result in the normal jury verdict.” (Id. at pp. 11‒12.) Our
decision further explained that given the likelihood of a
contingency fee arrangement under which a plaintiff’s recovery
would be reduced by the amount owed to counsel, “[t]he
collateral source rule partially serves to compensate for the
attorney’s share and does not actually render ‘double recovery’
for the plaintiff” (id. at p. 12); in this respect, the rule “partially
provides a somewhat closer approximation to full compensation
for his injuries” (id. at p. 13).
      The next year, in State Dept. of Corrections v. Workmen’s
Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 885 (State Dept. of Corrections),
we considered the relationship between Government Code
section 818 and Labor Code section 4553. The latter statute is
part of the state workers’ compensation scheme, “pursuant to
which the employer assumes liability for industrial personal
injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for
limitations on the amount of that liability.” (Shoemaker v.
Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.) Labor Code section 4553 provides
that the amount recoverable as workers’ compensation for an
accident “shall be increased one-half, together with costs and
expenses not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250), where
the employee is injured by reason of the serious and willful
misconduct” of the employer. We explained in State Dept. of
Corrections that Labor Code section 4553 “is designed to provide
more nearly full compensation to an injured employee rather
than to penalize an employer.” (State Dept. of Corrections, at
p. 889.) “Although an employer against whom an increased
award is made under [Labor Code] section 4553 is penalized in
the sense that he is required to pay a higher amount of
compensation by reason of his serious and wilful misconduct
than he would have been compelled to pay if his conduct were

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less culpable,” we observed, “the employee does not receive more
than full compensation for his injuries. Thus the increased
award is not a penalty in the sense of being designed primarily
to punish the defendant rather than to more adequately
compensate the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 890.)
       Our subsequent decisions addressing section 818 also
involved contextual assessments of the particular awards under
review. In Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d 30, an enforcement action
brought by the state, we assumed that section 818 was
implicated insofar as the action was brought against a public
entity, but held that the statute did not preclude the imposition
of penalties to be paid into the State Water Pollution Cleanup
and Abatement Account (Wat. Code, § 13440) and dedicated to
the remediation of the unquantifiable harms associated with oil
spills. (Younger, at pp. 37–39.) We based this conclusion on our
determinations that these penalties “operate to more fully
compensate the people of this state and are not beyond an
amount equivalent to the harm done.” (Id. at pp. 38–39; see also
San Francisco Civil Service Assn. v. Superior Court (1976)
16 Cal.3d 46, 50–51 (San Francisco Civil Service Assn.)
[applying Younger’s reasoning in an action brought under
§ 13385 of the Wat. Code, also seeking civil penalties].)
      Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139 (Kizer)
similarly determined that section 818 did not prevent the state
from seeking statutory penalties from a county-run health care
facility in an enforcement action brought under the Long-Term
Care, Health, Safety, and Security Act of 1973 (Health & Saf.
Code, § 1417 et seq.). (Kizer, at pp. 145–146.) Whereas our
decision in Younger had assumed that a Government Code
section 818 inquiry was implicated, in Kizer we explained that
section 818 was simply inapplicable to the sort of enforcement

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action that was before us. Stressing that the Government
Claims Act is concerned with liability for claims that involve an
“ ‘injury’ ” (Kizer, at p. 145, quoting Gov. Code, § 810.8), we
found “nothing in the . . . Act to suggest that . . . section 818 was
intended to apply to statutory civil penalties designed to ensure
compliance with a detailed regulatory scheme, . . . even though
they may have a punitive effect.” (Kizer, at p. 146.)
      Having concluded that the Legislature did not intend for
“the immunity created by Government Code section 818 to apply
to statutory civil penalties expressly designed to enforce
minimum health and safety standards” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d
at p. 146), our opinion in Kizer then went on to explain why, in
any event, the penalties sought in that case were not primarily
punitive. In this portion of our decision, we stressed that unlike
punitive damages, the penalties at issue did not require any
showing of actual harm, were “imposed according to a range set
by statute irrespective of actual damage suffered,” could be
imposed without a showing of malfeasance or state of mind
commonly understood to be deserving of punishment, and were
“to be applied to offset the state’s costs in enforcing the health
and safety regulations” involved. (Id. at p. 147.) We determined
that “[w]hile the civil penalties may have a punitive or deterrent
aspect, their primary purpose is to secure obedience to statutes
and regulations imposed to assure important public policy
objectives” (id. at pp. 147–148), which we described as an
essentially “preventative” function (id. at p. 148, italics
omitted).
      These decisions, read together, establish that section 818
requires a fact-specific inquiry concerning the damages
provision or principle being applied. Our cases also yield some
guidance for this analysis. The statutory text and basic

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objective characteristics of the award at issue provide a starting
point. In some situations, as with an assessment of punitive
damages under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) at one
extreme and the conventional imposition of actual compensatory
damages at the other, it may easily be determined whether a
particular award is or is not barred under Government Code
section 818. When further inquiry is necessary, relevant
considerations may include, without limitation, whether the
damages involved go beyond those necessary to fully
compensate the plaintiff (State Dept. of Corrections, supra,
5 Cal.3d at p. 890); whether a damages remedy functions to
offset some otherwise applicable restriction on compensatory
damages (id. at pp. 888–890); whether the challenged form of
damages is conditioned on morally culpable conduct, beyond
mere negligence (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 147); whether
there is an element of discretion by the fact finder in the award
of damages (ibid.); and whether in the normal course actual
damages are likely to be difficult to establish or quantify
(Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 37). Whenever this inquiry
occurs, the ultimate question remains whether, by virtue of
being imposed “primarily for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant” (§ 818), the damages before the court
function, in essence, as a form of punitive or exemplary
damages.
         3. Government Code Section 818 Cannot Reasonably
            Be Construed as Concerned Only with Damages
            That Are “Simply and Solely” Punitive
      In arguing that section 818 applies only to damages
provisions that are simply or solely punitive, plaintiff relies on
language appearing in Younger, San Francisco Civil Service
Assn., and Kizer. As explained below, although plaintiff’s

                                  16
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

reliance on these decisions is understandable, we conclude that
the phrasing plaintiff focuses upon mischaracterizes the
section 818 inquiry. We further conclude that these decisions
therefore must be overruled insofar as they articulate a
standard whereby the section 818 inquiry hinges on whether a
damages provision is deemed solely punitive in nature.
       Our analysis in Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d 30 began with
the general observation that “[d]amages which are punitive in
nature, but not ‘simply’ or solely punitive in that they fulfill
‘legitimate and fully justified compensatory functions,’ have
been held not to be punitive damages within the meaning of
section 818 of the Government Code.” (Id. at pp. 35‒36.) We
ultimately concluded “that the civil penalties imposed pursuant
to [Water Code section 13350] are not simply and solely punitive
in nature but fulfill legitimate compensatory functions and are
not punitive damages within the meaning of Government Code
section 818 so as to preclude the recovery of such moneys against
public entities.” (Id. at p. 39, italics added.) In a footnote,
Younger distinguished a federal district court decision, People ex
rel. Cal. Reg. W. Q. C. Bd. v. Department of Navy (N.D.Cal. 1973)
371 F.Supp. 82, by stating that the applicable federal standard
at that time, “unlike the California standard set forth in Helfend
and State Dept. of Corrections which provides immunity only if
the damages are simply punitive, grants immunity to the
federal government for damages ‘which do not merely
compensate’ [citation], or where the ‘impact of [the] section is
more punitive than compensatory.’ ” (Younger, at p. 37, fn. 4.)
We explained that “[s]ince the federal standard for ascertaining
punitive damages for federal government immunity purposes
varies so significantly from the California standard,” under
which “the critical question is whether [the penalty] is simply,

                                  17
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

that is solely, punitive,” the federal decision was inapposite.
(Ibid., italics added.)
      Relying on Younger, our decision in San Francisco Civil
Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d 46 described the section 818
analysis as turning on whether the penalties addressed by that
court were “simply and solely punitive in nature or fulfill
compensatory functions so as to remove them from the class of
punitive damages covered by section 818 of the Government
Code.” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn., at p. 50.) Kizer,
meanwhile, described the Younger approach as concerned with
whether damages “are not simply or solely punitive in that they
fulfill legitimate and fully justified compensatory functions.”
(Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145.)
      Plaintiff reads Younger, San Francisco Civil Service Assn.,
and Kizer as firmly establishing that only damages that are
“simply and solely punitive” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn.,
supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or
“simply or solely punitive” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145) run
afoul of section 818, and that a damages award that could
operate to incentivize lawsuits, offset or provide redress for
otherwise uncompensated harms or expenditures, or advance
some other policy goal does not meet this standard. As plaintiff
puts it, “damages which are punitive in nature but also aim to
more fully compensate the victim or encourage victims to bring
civil actions or otherwise achieve a non-punitive public policy
objective are not solely punitive and thus fall outside of the
ambit of Government Code section 818.”
      There are multiple problems with this interpretation of
the statute. Among them, it collides headlong with the text of
section 818 providing that “a public entity is not liable for

                                  18
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other
damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way
of punishing the defendant.” (Italics added.) “Primarily” (ibid.)
on the one hand, and “simply and solely” (San Francisco Civil
Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; Younger, supra,
16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or “simply or solely” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d
at p. 145) on the other, carry substantially different meanings,
and the Legislature’s use of the former term within section 818
communicates that the statute extends to damages that may
have secondary functions beyond punishment and the setting of
an example.
     Indeed, no form of damages — not even punitive damages
awarded under Civil Code section 3294 — would qualify as
“simply and solely punitive” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn.,
supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or
“simply or solely punitive” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145)
under the standard plaintiff asks us to endorse. Some kind of
assertedly nonpunitive function can always be hypothesized for
any award of damages, whether it be the incentivization of
lawsuits by holding out the prospect of a larger return, the
recovery of expenditures on attorney fees or litigation expenses,
or something else. The language of section 818 appears to
recognize the possibility that such secondary functions might be
assigned even to conventional punitive damages. To stay true
to the Legislature’s intent, then, the standard announced in
Younger, San Francisco Civil Service Assn., and Kizer cannot
supply the test for applying section 818. A contrary approach
would artificially and drastically limit this section’s
applicability in a manner inconsistent with its language and
evident purpose.

                                  19
    LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

      The decisions upon which plaintiff relies also include
express qualifications that damages will not be regarded as
simply or solely punitive when they “fulfill compensatory
functions” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d
at p. 50) or “they fulfill legitimate and fully justified
compensatory functions” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145; see
also Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 35‒36). Charitably read,
these qualifications could bring the standards articulated in
Younger, San Francisco Civil Service Assn., and Kizer closer to
conformity with section 818. On balance, however, we find it
necessary to foreclose future invocation of language so clearly at
odds with that of the statute it purports to apply. We therefore
overrule People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court, supra,
16 Cal.3d 30; San Francisco Civil Service Assn. v. Superior
Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 46; and Kizer v. County of San Mateo,
supra, 53 Cal.3d 139 insofar as these decisions articulate a
standard whereby the section 818 inquiry hinges on whether a
damages provision is deemed simply and solely, or simply or
solely, punitive. To repeat, the test under section 818 is whether
damages would be awarded under Civil Code section 3294, or
would otherwise be “imposed primarily for the sake of example
and by way of punishing the defendant” (Gov. Code, § 818) such
that they would function, in essence, as punitive or exemplary
damages.6

6
      In concluding that the state’s Uninsured Employers Fund
(UEF) was not liable for penalties under Labor Code
section 5814 for unreasonable delay in the payment of workers’
compensation, our decision in DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382 referenced Government Code
section 818 and explained that “[i]n light of the partially penal

                                  20
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

      Plaintiff’s other arguments in favor of a narrow reading of
section 818 fare no better. She argues that our construction of
this section should be informed by the United States Supreme
Court’s interpretation of language within the Federal Tort
Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.) providing that the federal
government is not liable for “punitive damages” (id., § 2674).
The high court has construed this term as it appears within the
Federal Tort Claims Act as bearing its “widely accepted
common-law meaning” — and not as connoting “ ‘damages
awards that may have a punitive effect.’ ” (Molzof v. United
States (1992) 502 U.S. 301, 306.) Plaintiff also argues that
textual clues within section 818 and elsewhere in the
Government Claims Act convey the Legislature’s intent to
prohibit only a limited array of damages. Specifically, plaintiff
assigns significance to section 818’s repetition of the “for the
sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant”
language appearing in Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a),
and to a reference within Government Code section 825, part of
the Government Claims Act that is concerned with the payment

nature of [Labor Code] section 5814, we believe that application
of the statutory penalty provision to the UEF is not permitted,
absent express legislative authorization.” (DuBois, at p. 398.)
At oral argument, counsel for the District asserted that this
discussion in DuBois manifested an understanding regarding
Government Code section 818’s purview, i.e., that section 818
applies to damages awards that are at least partially penal. It
is not clear whether this passage in DuBois, read in context,
carries this implication. In any event, our decision today makes
clear the standard for determining whether section 818
precludes the imposition of damages upon a public entity is
whether the award would function, in essence, as an award of
punitive or exemplary damages, and we reject any contrary
approach.

                                  21
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

of judgments, that describes section 818 as concerned with
“punitive damages.” (Gov. Code, § 825, subd. (e).)
      These arguments do not persuade us to interpret
section 818 as applicable to only a subset of the damages awards
captured by its language and rationale. Whatever the scope of
the Federal Tort Claims Act’s prohibition on punitive damages
may be — an issue we need not delve into here — it is the
language of section 818, read in context, and not the federal
statute that provides the touchstone for our analysis. Likewise,
the evident import of section 818 is not altered by the fact that
it incorporates certain language from Civil Code section 3294,
subdivision (a), or that another provision within the
Government Claims Act describes Government Code section 818
as applicable to “punitive damages.”         (Gov. Code, § 825,
subd. (e).) This borrowing and reference are consistent with our
interpretation of section 818, and do not convey a legislative
intent that this section should be interpreted in a manner that
would be inconsistent with its plain language and fail to fully
vindicate its apparent goals.
     B. Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1
      Having determined that in enacting Government Code
section 818 the Legislature intended to shield public entities
from damages under Civil Code section 3294 and damages that
function, in essence, as punitive or exemplary damages, we now
apply this standard to Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.1(b)(1).

                                  22
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

         1. The Enhanced Damages Authorized by
            Section 340.1(b)(1) Amount to Punitive Damages for
            Purposes of Section 818
      Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 is, for the most part,
a statute of limitations. We have described “the intent that
illuminates section 340.1 as a whole” as an aim “to expand the
ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account
individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.” (Doe v.
City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536.) Since its original
enactment in 1986 (Stats. 1986, ch. 914, § 1, pp. 3165–3166), the
statute has been amended on multiple occasions to extend the
filing periods for claims alleging childhood sexual assault and
revive otherwise time-barred claims.
      One such amendment occurred through the enactment of
Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill
No. 218) in 2019. (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1.) This revision made
several changes to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. Among
these adjustments, Assembly Bill No. 218 extended the time for
filing claims for childhood sexual assault (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 340.1, subds. (a), (c)) and created a revival window for lapsed
claims (id., subd. (q)), which included relief from the claim
presentation deadlines within the Government Claims Act.
(Gov. Code, § 905 et seq.) The 2019 amendment also revised
section 340.1(b)(1) to provide that in an action seeking damages
suffered due to childhood sexual assault, “a person who is
sexually assaulted and proves it was as the result of a cover up
may recover up to treble damages against a defendant who is
found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor, unless
prohibited by another law.” (Ibid., as amended by Stats. 2019,
ch. 861, § 1.)

                                  23
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

      Our application of section 818 to section 340.1(b)(1) begins
with the obvious fact that the latter statute provides for an
award of up to treble damages. While not dispositive, the fact
that it is a treble damages provision before us is nonetheless
significant. This court and others have frequently characterized
treble damages as exemplary or punitive. (Scholes v. Lambirth
Trucking Co. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1094, 1108 [“Many states,
including California, ‘provide[d] for exemplary damages in the
form of double or treble damages, or penalties, for the unlawful
cutting of timber on the land of another or on public land’ ”];
Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381,
394 [“Treble damages are punitive in nature”]; Harris v. Capital
Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1172 [describing
the treble damages authorized by Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a) for a
denial of civil rights as “an exemplary award” that “reveals a
desire to punish intentional and morally offensive conduct”];
Circle Oaks Sales Co. v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 682, 684–
685 [“a treble damages award is punitive in nature, imposed as
punishment against the defendant, rather than compensation to
the plaintiff”].) In adding the treble damages provision to
section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Legislature
presumably was aware of our prior decisions so characterizing
treble damages and understood that the provision could be
perceived similarly. (See Harris, at p. 1155 [courts “generally
presume the Legislature is aware of appellate court decisions”].)
Moreover, in authorizing damages that, by definition, may go
well beyond those necessary to provide full compensation for a
plaintiff’s legally recoverable actual damages, treble damages
provisions such as the one before us implicate a central concern
behind section 818: the protection of “tax-funded revenues from
legal judgments in amounts beyond those strictly necessary to

                                  24
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

recompense the injured party.”         (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
p. 1196, fn. 20.)
     Yet we have also suggested that treble damages may serve
nonpunitive purposes, as well. (See, e.g., Miller v. Municipal
Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 839 [favorably referencing case law
that described a treble damages provision within a federal
statute as having a remedial component].) Similarly, other
courts have determined that particular treble damages
provisions, understood in their respective statutory contexts,
possess an essentially remedial or otherwise nonpunitive
character. (See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc. (1977) 429 U.S. 477, 486 [explaining that § 4(a) of the
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15(a)) “is designed primarily as a
remedy”].) Therefore, the fact that we are concerned here with
a treble damages provision, though significant, is not conclusive
on the characterization question. (Accord, Alea London Ltd. v.
American Home Services, Inc. (11th Cir. 2011) 638 F.3d 768, 777
(Alea London Ltd.) [“Whether treble damages under a given
statute are considered compensatory or punitive is an intensely
fact-based inquiry that may vary statute-to-statute”]; see also
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book (2003) 538 U.S. 401, 405
[noting that the high court’s precedents “have placed different
statutory treble-damages provisions on different points along
the spectrum between purely compensatory and strictly
punitive awards”]; Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler
(2003) 538 U.S. 119, 130 [observing that with treble damages
provisions, “the tipping point between payback and punishment

                                  25
    LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

defies general formulation, being dependent on the workings of
a particular statute and the course of particular litigation”].)7
      Therefore, we undertake a closer examination of
section 340.1(b)(1). In doing so, we assign some significance to
the fact that section 340.1(b)(1) provides for up to treble
damages “unless prohibited by another law.” This caveat is
reasonably read as having section 818 in mind. Plaintiff has not
identified any law other than section 818 that this language
plausibly might be referring to, and even if there is such a
statute, section 818 is clearly “another law” that could function

7
       Courts have wrestled with the categorization of treble
damages in a variety of situations. Classification issues have
arisen not only when a public entity claims immunity from
treble damages on the ground that they are tantamount to
punitive damages, but also in other contexts, including when it
is claimed that allowing both treble damages and punitive
damages would amount to an impermissible double recovery
(e.g., Marshall v. Brown (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 408, 419); that a
reference to punitive or exemplary damages in an agreement
implicitly includes treble damages (e.g., Alea London Ltd.,
supra, 638 F.3d at pp. 776–777); or that treble damages require
the same malice or malfeasance that is demanded for an award
of punitive damages (e.g., District Cablevision Ltd. v. Bassin
(D.C. 2003) 828 A.2d 714, 727).
      In each of these scenarios, the classification analysis has
been framed by the statutory scheme or common law principles
involved and the precise legal issue presented. The outcome of
these inquiries may depend on whether a provision is regarded
as entirely, primarily, or only partially punitive in nature.
These subtleties make it conceivable that a particular treble
damages remedy will be regarded as sufficiently punitive to
trigger some consequence, but not so thoroughly punitive as to
bring about another.

                                  26
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

to prohibit damages under section 340.1(b)(1) in an appropriate
case. Although this language within section 340.1(b)(1) stops
short of expressly stating that enhanced damages under the
statute cannot be imposed against a public entity, at the very
least, it cuts against any assertion that the Legislature
affirmatively sought to avoid a section 818 analysis.
      Next, the damages authorized under section 340.1(b)(1)
have substantial punitive qualities beyond the simple fact that
they may go well beyond actual damages. These objective
characteristics confirm that enhanced damages under the
statute function, in essence, as punitive or exemplary damages
by serving “to punish past childhood sexual abuse coverups to
deter future ones.” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra,
64 Cal.App.5th at p. 567; see also Adams v. Murakami (1991)
54 Cal.3d 105, 110 [“the quintessence of punitive damages is to
deter future misconduct by the defendant”].)
      Several of the pertinent features of the damages available
under section 340.1(b)(1) were described by the court in X.M.,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, review granted. In determining
that section 818 prohibited the imposition of enhanced damages
under section 340.1(b)(1) against a public entity, the X.M. court
observed, “First, the statute authorizes treble damages only
upon proof of morally offensive behavior on behalf of the
defendant. A plaintiff receives actual (that is, economic and
noneconomic) damages if they prove they were the victim of
childhood sexual assault. But the statute authorizes an award
of three times their actual damages if they can also prove their
assault was the result of the defendant’s cover up of a previous
sexual assault of a child. [Citation.] Second, even if the plaintiff
presents the requisite proof, the decision to increase the damage
award beyond actual damages lies entirely with the fact finder.

                                  27
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

And third, if the fact finder does decide to increase the damage
award, the amount by which it does so, though capped, is not
fixed. As a result, the fact finder is free to increase the damage
award up to three times the plaintiff’s actual damages based on
factors specific to the defendant.” (X.M., at p. 1026.) The
features described by the X.M. court are important insofar as
they convey that the assessment of enhanced damages under
section 340.1(b)(1) will commonly resemble the imposition of
punitive damages, with the blameworthiness of a defendant’s
conduct and the need for punishment and example-setting
informing the amount of a discretionary damages award that is
additional to an award of actual damages.
      In short, the enhanced damages authorized under
section 340.1(b)(1) are recognizable as punitive or exemplary
damages for purposes of a section 818 analysis as a matter of
both substance and procedure. These awards require the
existence of actual injury, but may go substantially beyond the
amounts necessary to fully compensate plaintiffs for the injuries
they have suffered; they are premised on morally culpable
behavior by defendants, namely, participation in “a concerted
effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (b)(2)); and they are assessed on
a case- and fact-specific manner in much the same way that
punitive damages are, albeit being subject to a cap. With their
punitive and exemplary character having been shown, we now
consider whether damages under section 340.1(b)(1) are
nonetheless sufficiently distinguishable from punitive damages
as to fall outside the scope of section 818.

                                  28
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

        2. No Nonpunitive Characteristic or Function
           Sufficiently Distinguishes Damages Under Code of
           Civil Procedure Section 340.1(b)(1) from Punitive
           Damages
     Plaintiff offers several reasons why section 340.1(b)(1)
should be regarded as applicable to public entities. Some of her
arguments essentially assert that in adopting this enhanced
damages provision, the Legislature did not intend for a
section 818 analysis to apply at all. Her other contentions
assume that such an analysis applies, but characterize damages
under section 340.1(b)(1) as sufficiently nonpunitive in nature
that they may be imposed upon a public entity. We conclude
that all of these arguments are unpersuasive.
      First, plaintiff argues that cover ups occurring in schools
featured so prominently in legislative dialogue concerning
Assembly Bill No. 218 that it would be nonsensical to regard
section 340.1(b)(1) as inapplicable to public entities such as
school districts. But the legislative history materials manifest
a concern with childhood sexual assaults occurring not only at
public schools, but also at private schools, sporting leagues and
organizations, religious institutions, and wherever else they
may occur. (See, e.g., Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 25, 2019, pp. 1,
2; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, pp. 1, 3, 4,
7.) A Senate analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 referred to “the
systematic incidence of childhood sexual assault in numerous
institutions in this country and the cover-ups that accompanied
them.” (Sen. Rules Com., Office of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis
of Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Aug. 30, 2019, p. 5, italics added.)        There being significant

                                  29
    LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

cohorts of defendants that might be subject to treble damages
for engaging in cover ups even if public entities are not, and with
section 340.1(b)(1) providing on its face that enhanced damages
are available “unless prohibited by another law,” we cannot
conclude that the Legislature intended to avoid a section 818
analysis altogether.8
      Second, plaintiff contends that the treble damages
provision within section 340.1(b)(1) must be construed as
applicable to public entities, or else it would merely duplicate
plaintiffs’ existing right to pursue punitive damages against
private defendants. Such an interpretation, plaintiff argues,
would render the provision mere surplusage. (See Brennon B.
v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 691 [courts aim
to interpret statutes in a manner that avoids surplusage].) But
our interpretation has no such effect.          At a minimum,
section 340.1(b)(1) establishes that enhanced damages may be
awarded to plaintiffs who prove that they were the victims of
sexual assaults that result from cover ups, regardless of whether
these plaintiffs also specifically demonstrate the “oppression,
fraud, or malice” that Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a)
requires for an award of punitive damages. And even if we were
to assume for sake of argument that the evidence necessary to
prove a cover up under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1,

8
      Plaintiff also argues that a reference in section 340.1(b)(1)
to claims authorized under Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.1, subdivision (a) implies an intent to make public
entities subject to treble damages, because subdivision (a) refers
to actions “for liability against any person or entity.” (Id.,
§ 340.1, subd. (a)(2), (3).) This argument fails to account for the
significance of section 340.1(b)(1)’s “unless prohibited by
another law” language.

                                  30
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

subdivision (b)(1) and (2) is always sufficient to establish the
“oppression, fraud, or malice” that must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence under Civil Code section 3294,
subdivision (a), “Legislatures are free to state legal principles in
statutes, even if they repeat preexisting law, without fear the
courts will find them unnecessary . . . .” (Reno v. Baird (1998)
18 Cal.4th 640, 658.) The enhanced damages provision is
therefore not surplusage, even as applicable only to private
entities.
      Third, in arguing that the Legislature must have intended
for the treble damages provision to apply to public entities,
plaintiff observes that an analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 that
circulated after the “unless prohibited by another law” language
was added to the proposed text of section 340.1(b)(1) by a bill
amendment (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020
Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 2019) explained that the measure “applies
equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and
applies to all local public entities” (Assem. Conc. in Sen.
Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Aug. 30, 2019, p. 2). Plaintiff also notes that bill
analyses published before and after this amendment included
statements by a contingent of opponents, including but not
limited to public entities, lamenting the treble damages
provision’s potential financial impact and seeking its removal.
(E.g., id., at pp. 2–3; Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 218, supra, as amended Mar. 25, 2019, p. 2; Sen. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Mar. 25, 2019, pp. 12–13.)
      These snippets of legislative history carry little weight.
The description of Assembly Bill No. 218 as equally applicable
to public and private entities, read in context, appears directed

                                  31
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

at the bill’s statute of limitations and claim-revival provisions.
Meanwhile, the views of the bill’s opponents found in committee
and floor analyses regarding this measure shed little light on
the Legislature’s intent, which is the focus of our analysis. (See
American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1239, 1264 [“this restatement of an argument made
by certain industry groups does not purport to reflect debate
within the Legislature”]; Purifoy v. Howell (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 166, 179, fn. 14 [describing a statement by an
opponent of a bill as “not evidence of the Legislature’s collective
intent”]; accord, Labor Board v. Fruit Packers (1964) 377 U.S.
58, 66 [cautioning “against the danger, when interpreting a
statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents”].)
Even when taken into consideration, the continued entreaties of
opponents to remove the treble damages provision might have
reflected a preference for the certainty that would come from
having the treble damages provision deleted from the measure
entirely (which would be of particularly clear benefit to the
private entities that joined their public counterparts in lobbying
against the bill), over the possibility that a court might later
reject a claim of immunity under section 818 and find both
public and private defendants subject to enhanced damages
under section 340.1(b)(1).
      Fourth, plaintiff argues that enhanced damages under
section 340.1(b)(1) serve important nonpunitive functions that
distinguish them from conventional punitive or exemplary
damages. In particular, plaintiff hypothesizes that the damages
authorized under this provision might compensate plaintiffs for
the stress associated with pursuing a claim for childhood sexual
assault in court, or incentivize claims for childhood sexual

                                  32
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

assault that might not otherwise be expected to lead to
substantial damages awards.
      Plaintiff claims to find support for these rationales in the
legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 218. She points to
multiple analyses of this measure that quoted its author as
stating, in relevant part, that Assembly Bill No. 218 “would also
confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from
schools to sports league[s], which result in continuing
victimization and the sexual assault of additional children. The
bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the
defendant who covered up sexual assault. This reform is clearly
needed both to compensate victims who never should have been
victims — and would not have been if past sexual assault had
been properly brought to light — and also as an effective
deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to
protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.”
(Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218,
supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4, italics added; see also
Assem. Conc. in Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as
amended Aug. 30, 2019, p. 2; Assem. 3d reading analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as amended Mar. 25, 2019, p. 2.)
Plaintiff also observes that legislators were made aware of
instances in which schoolteachers engaged in a course of
misconduct, some of which may not have led to substantial
actual damages if it had become the subject of a lawsuit. The
treble damages provision, she argues, could have been designed
to address these scenarios, providing an inducement to present
what otherwise might constitute low-value claims and by doing
so, avoid future assaults.
     We conclude that plaintiff fails to sufficiently distinguish
the enhanced damages authorized under section 340.1(b)(1)

                                  33
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

from punitive or exemplary damages. As a threshold matter, we
discern that enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1)
represent an awkward and somewhat ineffective way to achieve
the functions plaintiff assigns to them. Because enhanced
damages are available only when a sexual assault “was as the
result of a cover up” (§ 340.1(b)(1)), they are available in only a
subset of the cases identified by plaintiff, involving litigation-
related trauma or low compensatory damages. What is more,
unlike other facts relevant to a claim for childhood sexual
assault, the existence of a prior cover up may be unknown to a
prospective plaintiff until after a lawsuit is filed, blunting any
incentivizing effect. These circumstances make it difficult to
perceive any clear connection between the provision of enhanced
damages for a sexual assault that results from a cover up and
the policy goals that plaintiff assigns to these damages, casting
doubt on whether section 340.1(b)(1) was designed to serve these
ends.
      In any event, nothing associated with section 340.1(b)(1)
conveys that a nonpunitive purpose or purposes are sufficiently
implicated here as to allow public entities to be held liable for
enhanced damages under this provision.
      We do not perceive any clear indication in the text of the
statute or in its legislative history that legislators intended for
enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1) to compensate
plaintiffs suing for childhood sexual assault for litigation-
related stress that would otherwise go unremedied. Regarding
the more generic references to compensation in legislative
analyses (e.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4) and the
broader function of providing larger recoveries for prevailing
plaintiffs, as the Court of Appeal below recognized (Los Angeles

                                  34
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 561–562),
conventional damages principles already provide for full
compensation for victims of childhood sexual assault who prove
their claims at trial. With or without a cover up, individuals
who establish that they were victimized by a childhood sexual
assault are entitled to actual, compensatory damages in an
“amount which will compensate for all the detriment
proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been
anticipated or not.” (Civ. Code, § 3333; see also id., § 3282
[defining “[d]etriment” as “a loss or harm suffered in person or
property”].) These damages may, as appropriate, include
compensation for mental suffering. “[I]t is settled in this state
that mental suffering constitutes an aggravation of damages
when it naturally ensues from the act complained of, and in this
connection mental suffering includes nervousness, grief,
anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation and indignity as well as
physical pain.” (Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425,
433; see also X.M., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1028, review
granted; Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th
at p. 561.) Enhanced damages are therefore not necessary here
to fill an obvious gap or deficiency in compensation.
      The legislative history materials that plaintiff draws from
must be understood in this light. With plaintiffs already being
entitled to full compensation for their injuries, the assertions
within the legislative analyses that additional damages under
section 340.1(b)(1) would function to “compensate” some
prevailing plaintiffs (e.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4) fail
to sufficiently distinguish these awards from the assessment of
punitive damages. Such references could well have used
“compensate” in the colloquial sense of providing plaintiffs with

                                  35
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

greater monetary recoveries.      But, as we have already
explained, all damages — even punitive damages under Civil
Code section 3294 — have that effect. If a bare acknowledgment
of this fact by legislators considering a proposed law were
enough to make section 818 inapplicable, the statute would be
eviscerated.
      Additionally, the significance of any references to
compensation within legislative history materials is lessened by
the fact that these same analyses also reveal an appreciation
among legislators that the enhanced damages available under
section 340.1(b)(1) would function to punish defendants who
engage in cover ups. As excerpted above, analyses prepared
during the Legislature’s deliberations coupled mentions of the
need to “compensate” victims of sexual assault with references
to the essentially punitive deterrent effect that the imposition of
enhanced damages would have.            (E.g., Assem. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced
Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4.) To similar effect, a committee analysis of
Assembly Bill No. 218 explained that “[t]he bill also exposes
those who cover up the sexual abuse of children to additional
punishment. In addition to extending the statute of limitations
for childhood sexual assault, reviving old claims, and removing
the protections of the [Government Claims Act] from local public
entities, this bill allows a victim of childhood sexual assault to
recover tremble [sic] damages against a defendant if the victim’s
assault was the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior
sexual assault of a minor.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis

                                  36
    LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 9,
boldface omitted.)9
      Ultimately, we conclude that the legislative history of
Assembly Bill No. 218 does not provide substantial support for
plaintiff’s view that the enhanced damages authorized under
section 340.1(b)(1) are meaningfully distinguishable from
punitive or exemplary damages on the ground that they
recognize and provide redress for litigation-related trauma.
This is not a situation where, in the words of the court in X.M.,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, review granted, the Legislature has
“clearly indicated an additional, compensatory purpose” (id. at
p. 1024) of sufficient magnitude that it would allow us to regard
a treble damages provision as outside of section 818’s purview.
      There is also no clear indication in the text of
section 340.1(b)(1), its practical application, or its legislative
history that legislators sought to use the possibility of enhanced
damages to incentivize the filing of claims that might involve
relatively modest damages awards. We presume that such cases
are possible; the statutory definition of “ ‘[c]hildhood sexual
assault’ ” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (d)) captures a range of
conduct. (Cf. People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 442
[construing Pen. Code, § 288], 447 [discussing Court of Appeal

9
      The reference within the above-quoted committee analysis
to “removing the protections of the [Government Claims Act]
from local public entities” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis
of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 9),
read in context, appears to refer to the bill’s lifting of the act’s
claim-presentation deadline incident to the revival of lapsed
claims (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q)), and not to
Government Code section 818.

                                  37
     LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                 Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

decisions applying that statute].) Still, the fact remains that
childhood sexual assaults that implicate Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.1 would not normally be expected to yield only
minimal damages, and the fact that members of the Legislature
may have been aware of counterexamples does not establish
that these circumstances were a significant motive behind the
treble damages provision.10
      Even if we were to sum the various nonpunitive rationales
advanced by plaintiff or otherwise capable of being
hypothesized, and indulge the possibility that, in practice, the
prospect of enhanced damages will have an incentivizing effect
on some lawsuits and provide additional recoveries to plaintiffs
that may offset litigation-related expenditures or contribute to
their financial recoveries, that would not alter our conclusion.
We remain convinced that the enhanced damages authorized
under section 340.1(b)(1) are “imposed primarily for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant” (§ 818), and
therefore are incapable of being imposed upon a public entity.
As has been explained, the objective characteristics of these
awards establish that they qualify as a form of punitive or
exemplary damages for purposes of a section 818 analysis, and

10
      In supplemental briefing filed shortly before oral
argument, plaintiff asserted that a recent amendment (Stats.
2022, ch. 442, § 3) to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16,
which prescribes the statute of limitations for claims of sexual
abuse suffered as an adult, and legislative history materials
associated with this amendment provide additional indications
of the nonpunitive intentions behind the 2019 revision of Code
of Civil Procedure section 340.1 through Assembly Bill No. 218
to add its treble damages provision. Having reviewed these
materials, we do not regard them as probative of the
Legislature’s intent in this respect.

                                   38
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

there are no clear indications within the statutory text, the
expected application of section 340.1(b)(1), or otherwise of a
nonpunitive purpose or purposes that carry sufficient force here
as to compel a different characterization.
         3. Case Law Cited by Plaintiff Is Distinguishable
     Plaintiff asserts that several Court of Appeal decisions
support her view that section 818 does not preclude the recovery
of enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1) from a public
entity. We conclude that those matters are all fundamentally
distinguishable from the circumstances before us and thus do
not provide significant support for plaintiff’s position. These
distinctions also mean we need not pass on whether those cases
were properly decided, or entirely correct in all their particulars.
      Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281 did not
involve Government Code section 818 or a treble damages
provision. It instead addressed whether the double damages
authorized under Probate Code section 859 for the improper
taking, concealment, or disposal of a vulnerable person’s
property were a kind of punitive or exemplary damages that,
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.42, cannot be
recovered against the successor of a deceased defendant. (Hill,
at pp. 1285–1286.) Hill, like this case, involved a prohibition on
the recovery of certain enhanced damages. But here we are
concerned with the availability of treble damages, not double
damages (cf. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel. Stevens (2000) 529 U.S. 765, 784 [regarding an
amendment to the federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729 et
seq.) that increased the available damages from double damages
to treble damages as making its remedies “essentially
punitive”]), and we are construing an altogether different pair

                                  39
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
               Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

of statutes. The court in Hill perceived Code of Civil Procedure
section 377.42 as recognizing a strict distinction between
“ ‘punitive or exemplary damages’ ” (Hill, at p. 1285, quoting
Code Civ. Proc., § 377.42) on the one hand and a “statutory
penalty,” including treble damages, on the other (Hill, at
p. 1286). Here, as explained previously, the language of
section 818 and the intent behind this text call for a more
functional analysis that does not cleave in quite the same
manner. Under the analysis that applies here, enhanced
damages under section 340.1(b)(1) may be regarded as “other
damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way
of punishing the defendant” (§ 818) and thus incapable of being
recovered against a public entity.
       Next, the issue presented in Beeman v. Burling (1990)
216 Cal.App.3d 1586 and Kelly v. Yee (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 336
was whether an award of treble damages authorized under a
local rent ordinance was preempted by Civil Code section 3294.
These courts concluded that there was no conflict warranting a
finding of preemption because the ordinance’s automatic
trebling of damages awards and the role of this trebling in
promoting enforcement of the rent ordinance distinguished the
treble damages provision from punitive damages awarded under
Civil Code section 3294. (See Beeman, at pp. 1597–1598
[discussing the character of the ordinance’s treble damages
provision]; Kelly, at p. 342 [explaining that trebling of actual
damages serves to “promote effective enforcement of the
ordinance on behalf of low-income tenants”].) In light of the
differences between the legal issues, treble damages provisions,
and underlying claims involved in those cases and this one,
there is no manifest inconsistency between the outcomes in
Beeman and Kelly and our determination that enhanced

                                 40
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

damages under section 340.1(b)(1) are “imposed primarily for
the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”
(§ 818.)
      In LeVine v. Weis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 201 (LeVine), the
court concluded that section 818 did not prohibit an award of
double back pay under Government Code section 12653, part of
the state False Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.), against
a public entity. (LeVine, at p. 209.) In so holding, the court
emphasized that Government Code section 12653 expressly
distinguishes between back pay and punitive damages in its
description of available remedies, and lists back pay among the
kinds of relief necessary to make an employee “ ‘whole.’ ”
(LeVine, at p. 209, quoting Gov. Code, § 12653, former subd. (c).)
These features persuaded the Court of Appeal that “the statute
treats double backpay as remedial” (LeVine, at p. 209), and serve
to distinguish the section 818 question that was before that
court from the one we address here.
      Marron v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049
involved a claim that a defendant was “guilty of recklessness,
oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of [elder or
dependent adult] abuse . . . .” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.)
Upon a sufficient showing of such misconduct, the plaintiffs
could recover attorney fees and costs as well as pain and
suffering damages that otherwise would have been prohibited
under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 15657, subds. (a), (b).) The Court of Appeal in Marron
determined that Government Code section 818 did not prohibit
holding a public entity liable for these awards, reasoning that
“[p]unitive damages are dissimilar to pain and suffering and
other compensatory damages” (Marron, at p. 1063), that the
pain and suffering damages provided compensation for the

                                  41
     LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                 Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

decedent’s “actual loss or injury” (id. at p. 1062), and that the
relevant legislative history and codified findings established
that Welfare and Institutions Code “[s]ection 15657’s
authorization of awards of attorney fees and costs was intended
to act as an incentive for attorneys to accept elder or dependent
adult abuse cases that involve recklessness or more egregious
conduct” (Marron, at p. 1064). The court also saw nothing in the
statute or its history to suggest “that awards of reasonable
attorney fees and costs under [Welfare and Institutions Code]
section 15657 are intended to punish defendants.” (Id. at
p. 1065.) Marron thus involved different kinds of awards from
those involved in this case — one of which simply removed an
otherwise applicable limitation on compensatory damages —
and there the Legislature appears to have provided more
evidence of nonpunitive intent than exists here.11
     Similarly distinguishable is Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Superior Court (2004)
123 Cal.App.4th 261 (Los Angeles Transportation Authority), in
which the court considered a challenge to the imposition of
statutory penalties under Civil Code section 52 for violations of
Civil Code section 51.7, the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976. The
Court of Appeal in Los Angeles Transportation Authority
determined that these penalties could be imposed upon a public

11
       The Legislature recently amended Code of Civil Procedure
section 377.34 to provide that “in an action or proceeding by a
decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest on
the decedent’s cause of action, the damages recoverable may
include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement if the
action or proceeding was granted a preference pursuant to [Code
of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 36 before January 1, 2022, or was
filed on or after January 1, 2022, and before January 1, 2026.”
(Id., subd. (b), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 448, § 1.)

                                   42
     LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                 Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

entity, Government Code section 818 notwithstanding. (Los
Angeles Transportation Authority, at pp. 263–264.) Among the
distinctions between this case and Los Angeles Transportation
Authority, Civil Code section 52 separately authorizes both
exemplary damages (id., subd. (b)(1)) and penalties (id.,
subd. (b)(2)) for violations of Civil Code section 51.7; the
penalties authorized under section 52 are fixed at $25,000, and
not tethered to actual damages (id., subd. (b)(2)); and there were
more compelling indications that legislators regarded penalties
under Civil Code section 52 as having an important nonpunitive
function than appears in the legislative history for Assembly
Bill No. 218 (Los Angeles Transportation Authority, at pp. 268–
271).12

12
      We note that portions of the analysis in Los Angeles
Transportation Authority, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 261 relied
heavily on our characterization of section 818 as concerned
exclusively with damages that are “simply and solely punitive”
(San Francisco Civil Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50;
Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or “simply or solely punitive”
(Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145), an understanding of the
statute that we have rejected today.               (Los Angeles
Transportation Authority, at pp. 272–275.) Similarly, the court
in LeVine, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 201 drew from our now-
repudiated analysis of section 818 in Younger in characterizing
double back pay as having “a legitimate and fully justified
compensatory function,” to wit, serving “to more fully
compensate the employee for the incalculable risk he takes
when he threatens to disclose or discloses his employer’s false
claim.” (LeVine, at p. 209.) Although such reliance on Younger
and its progeny is no longer permitted, we do not otherwise
believe it necessary to review the reasoning of these decisions
beyond what we have discussed in the main text.

                                   43
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
                 Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

      To summarize, due to differences in the issues they
involved, the statutes they interpreted, and the prominence and
plausibility of the nonpunitive rationales they considered, the
Court of Appeal decisions described above neither conflict with
our holding today nor suggest that we should interpret or apply
section 818 differently than we have.
      In closing, we observe that our decision today does not in
any way minimize the trauma that victims of childhood sexual
assault must endure. Yet our job is to interpret Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.1 as written, relying on the guideposts the
Legislature has provided and our own interpretive tools. As it
appears before us, the statute, read in conjunction with
Government Code section 818, does not reveal an intent to have
section 340.1(b)(1) apply to public entities. The Legislature may
as a matter of course choose to revisit the issue if it believes that
these entities should potentially be held liable for enhanced
damages when a childhood sexual assault is the result of a cover
up.

                                   44
  LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT
               Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

                       III. DISPOSITION
      We hold that Government Code section 818 prohibits the
imposition of enhanced damages under Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.1, subdivision (b)(1) against a public entity. We
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

                                             GUERRERO, C. J.
We Concur:
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.

                                 45
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Los Angeles Unified School District v. Superior
Court
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 64 Cal.App.5th 549
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S269608
Date Filed: June 1, 2023
__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Shirley K. Watkins
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Gutierrez, Preciado & House, Calvin House and Arthur C. Preciado for
Petitioner.

Leone Alberts & Duus, Louis A. Leone and Seth L. Gordon for
Northern California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Southern
California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Statewide Association of
Community Colleges and School Association for Excess Risk as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Meyers Fozi & Dwork, Golnar J. Fozi and Daniel S. Modafferi for
Association of Schools for Cooperative Insurance Programs, Public
Risk Innovation, Solutions, and Management and California
Association of Joint Powers Authorities as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Petitioner.

Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.

Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates and Ryan D. Miller for
Hesperia Unified School District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Respondent.

Taylor & Ring, David M. Ring, Natalie L. Weatherford; Esner, Chang
& Boyer, Holly N. Boyer, Kevin K. Nguyen and Kathleen J. Becket for
Real Party in Interest.

The Zalkin Law Firm and Devin M. Storey for National Center for the
Victims of Crime as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Alan Charles Dell’Ario for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Calvin House
Gutierrez, Preciado & House, LLP
3020 East Colorado Boulevard
Pasadena, CA 91107
(626) 449-2300

Holly N. Boyer
Esner, Chang & Boyer
234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 975
Pasadena, CA 91101
(626) 535-9860