Court Opinion

ID: 9711267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:27:42.934442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:03.266484
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(dissenting), I am not in accord with Mr. Justice Souris’ result. I have no specific disagreement with the broad principles of law he enunciates, but I fail to see, short of imposing counsel upon the defendant and refusing to accept his plea of guilty, how the trial court could have done more to,. apprise him of his constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The whole record my colleague quotes portrays to me the sincere effort of a trial judge to bend over backward in complying with a federally ordained format to advise an accused of his right to retained counsel or counsel at public expense. I find the examination of the. accused fulfilled every constitutional requirement, State or Federal.
My specific point of difference with Mr. Justice Souris is in his statement:
' “Unfortunately, the trial judge did not ask the defendant whether he wanted an opportunity ‘to retain his own attorney or, if indigent, that an attorney be appointed for him.”
I do not so read the record. I quote:
“The Court. I want to advise you that you are entitled to a jury trial to have it determined whether you are guilty or not guilty, do you understand that?
“(Respondent nods head up and down.)
“The Court. You understand?
“The Respondent. Yeah, yeah.

“The Court. And also that you are entitled to be represented by an attorney in this matter, that is, an attorney of your own choice. If you have no money to'.employ an attorney, if you so request, I will'appoint an attorney to represent you. Do you understand thatf

“(Respondent nods head up and down.)
*21“The Court. Your answer is yes?
“The Respondent. Yes.
“The Court. Knowing what the charge is in the first count in the information, Mowing what your rights are as 1 explained them to you, are you prepared to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty?
“The Respondent. Guilty.” (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing excerpt, saving some super semantics, I conclude the trial court did just exactly what my esteemed colleague says he' did not do. Hence, I opine the Federal cases he has cited are not controlling.
Kelly and Black, JJ., concurred with O’Hara, J.
Adams, J.
{for remand). I am unable to agree with Justice Souris or Justice O’Hara. The crucial issue is not defendant’s right to counsel — no one seriously questions the existence of this right, both as a Federal and State right — but whether defendant waived such right.
What took place upon arraignment has been set forth in the opinions of Justices Souris and O’Hara and need not be repeated. Possibly pertinent to defendant’s behavior upon his arraignment was his detention for eight days before he was taken before a magistrate. The record before us, to some extent, gives support to defendant’s contention that he was hold incommunicado for an eight-day period.1
*22On May 25, 1964, without the assistance of counsel, defendant filed in the trial court pleadings entitled “Application for leave to appeal in the superior court of Grand Rapids in the nature of a general appeal,” by which he sought to have his conviction set aside and a new trial granted. One day later, on May 26, 1964, Judge Yander Ploeg rendered an opinion in which he reviewed Parshay’s application for leave to appeal and found no error. The opinion was nothing more than a statement of Parshay’s claims, of the charge in the information, and of the stenographic report of the arraignment proceedings. No finding is made by the Judge with regard to Parshays’ eight-day detention. No finding is made with regard to defendant’s mental condition.2 No finding is made as to whether Parshay waived his right to counsel at the time of arraignment.
Based upon the record which is before us, I am unpersuaded that defendant waived his right to counsel. "Waiver is a question of fact. Johnson v. Zerbst 304 US 458, 464 (58 S Ct 1019, 82 L ed 1461, 146 ALR 357); Rice v. Olson, 324 US 786, 788, 789 (65 S Ct *23989, 89 L ed 1367); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 US 506, 515 (82 S Ct 884, 8 L ed 2d 70).
Based upon the record before ns, members of this Court have come to completely contrary conclusions on the issue as to whether “the accused did * * * intelligently and understandingly waive his constitutional right.” Carnley v. Cochran, supra. People v. Whitsitt, 366 Mich 609; In re Palmer, 371 Mich 656.
“The constitutional right of an accused to he represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused — whose life or liberty is at stake — is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, p 465.
I would remand to the circuit court for Kent county for a testimonial hearing and a determination by the trial judge on the issue of waiver and such further postconviction proceedings as may he deemed necessary.
Brennan, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 In a letter dated April 22, 1965, Arnold O. Pigorsh, sheriff of Kent County, wrote defendant as. follows:
“In reply to your letter pleased be advised that your records indicate you were placed in semi-solitary on the lower floor of the institution and that you were brought in by the Grand Rapids Police on Feb. 8, 1963, at 4 p.m. charged with armed robbery. A bond of $5,000 was set plus a detainer dated Feb. 8, 1963, from the bureau of pardons and paroles signed by a Mr. Faber.
“The dates show you were taken to police court' on Feb. 11-14-15- and bound over to superior court also on Peb. 18th a guilty plea was entered in superior court.
*22“On March 18, 1963, you were taken to superior court and the sentence indicates 12-1/2 to 25 years in Jaekson.
“On March 20, 1963, at 10:15 p.m. you were taken to the hospital for slashed wrists and returned at 11 p.m.
“You were in this jail a total of 43 days and no record indicates any denial of your right as an inmate, only that you were kept in semi-solitary.
“Also in our files I do have the petition of the prosecuting attorney where you were returned to this jail regarding a case in which you were to be a witness. Further, I do not have any records on relatives or lawyers visiting you.”

 On the day defendant entered his plea of guilty, he said: “They have a law under which if a man is confined for a number of years and sexual abreviations [aberrations sic?] seem to be connected with the crime, he can request a hearing as a sexual psychopath, and I would like to request a hearing at this time.” On the day of sentencing, defendant said:
“Well, the last time I appeared before this court, I asked this court for a hearing as an habitual criminal and psychopath, and I would like to know why this request was denied?”
Two days later defendant was treated for slashed wrists.