Court Opinion

ID: 9745330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:49:31.499406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:58.070329
License: Public Domain

PERLUSS, P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I fully agree with the majority’s analysis of Melinda Birke’s claim for public nuisance based on the presence of secondhand (or environmental) tobacco smoke in the outdoor common areas of her apartment complex and concur in its holding the *1554trial court erred in sustaining Oakwood Worldwide’s demurrer to that cause of action. However, I respectfully dissent from its conclusion Birke has not adequately pleaded a cause of action for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) (ADA).1
The majority accurately states a number of federal cases have held, while transient lodging like inns, hotels and motels is covered by the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)),2 residential housing such as apartments and condominiums is not. (See, e.g., Indep. Housing Services v. Fillmore Ctr. (N.D.Cal. 1993) 840 F.Supp. 1328, 1344, fn. 14 [“[T]he legislative history of the ADA clarifies that ‘other place of lodging’ does not include residential facilities. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1990).”]; accord, Phibbs v. Am. Prop. Mgmt. (D. Utah, Mar. 19, 2008, No. 2:02CV00260 DB) 2008 U.S.Dist. Lexis 21879; Lancaster v. Phillips Investments, LLC (M.D.Ala. 2007) 482 F.Supp.2d 1362, 1366-1367.) The ADA implementing regulations, however, expressly provide the ADA applies not only to hotels, motels and inns (establishments identified in the statute itself) but also to boarding houses, dormitories, resorts and other similar places of transient lodging. (28 C.F.R., § 36, appen. A, | 9.1 (2008); see Regents of Mercers. College v. Rep. Franklin Ins. (3d Cir. 2006) 458 F.3d 159, 166 [ADA applies to college dormitories].)
Moreover, the fact a facility such as an apartment complex itself may not fall within the ADA’s statutory definition of “public accommodation” does not mean the site may not contain one or more of the enumerated public accommodations within its confines. For example, a restaurant or a retail store located on a cruise ship is still a public accommodation subject to the provisions of the ADA, even if the ship itself is not. (Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc. (11th Cir. 2000) 215 F.3d 1237, 1241 [“That a cruise ship may contain some of the enumerated public accommodations is not in doubt. . . . And, a public accommodation aboard a cruise ship seems no less a public accommodation just because it is located on a ship instead of upon dry land. . . . Very important, Congress made no distinctions—in defining ‘public accommodation’—based on the physical location of the public accommodation.”].)3 Similarly, although a model home used only as an example of what *1555is being offered for sale is a residential property and not a “public accommodation” subject to the ADA, if a room in the model home functions as a sales office, the ADA applies at least to it. (Sapp v. MHI Partnership, Ltd. (N.D.Tex. 2002) 199 F.Supp.2d 578, 586.)
In the first amended complaint Birke has attempted to allege the ADA applies to the outdoor common areas at the Oakwood Woodland Hills apartment complex under both of these principles. First, to satisfy the broad definition of transient lodging applicable under the ADA, the complaint alleges, in part, Oakwood Worldwide offers and advertises temporary stay, resortlike facilities throughout California and the United States, offers fully furnished units without leases on a short-term basis and provides maid services in its units if requested by its “guests.” In addition, Birke alleges Oakwood Worldwide’s apartment complexes include onsite tennis courts and tennis instruction with equipment sales shops, onsite dry cleaning services and provide activities centers and conference rooms for seminars, presentations and events hosted and attended by individuals who are not occupying any unit in the Oakwood property. Second, although perhaps not as clearly articulated, the first amended complaint contains factual allegations sufficient to support the conclusion the swimming pool and playground areas at issue, used by both tenants and guests, are places of recreation within the meaning of title 42 United States Code section 12181(7)(L) (“a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation”) even if the apartment complex itself is a residential property and not a public accommodation. (See generally Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 960 P.2d 513] [demurrer should be overruled if complaint’s factual allegations are adequate to state a cause of action under any legal theory].)
In response the majority holds Birke has failed to allege specific facts concerning Oakwood’s Woodland Hills complex (rather than Oakwood Worldwide’s properties in general) that would bring it within the ADA either as transient lodging or because the specific outdoor common areas at issue fall within one of the other definitions of a public accommodation contained in the ADA. The majority also holds the first amended complaint fails to adequately plead the nature of the reasonable accommodations requested by Birke and refused by Oakwood Worldwide.4 Although I would hold the first amended complaint in its present form sufficiently alleges a violation of the ADA, at the very least Birke should be given an opportunity to amend the *1556pleading to include whatever additional allegations relating specifically to the Woodland Hills Oakwood complex the majority believes are missing. The more general allegations in the first amended complaint and the arguments presented on appeal (including at oral argument) demonstrate Birke is fully prepared to do so.
In sum, I believe the first amended complaint adequately pleads causes of action both for nuisance and for violation of the ADA. I would reverse in their entirety the trial court’s orders sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing the action and remand the matter for further proceedings.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 26, 2009, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 15, 2009, S170716.

 As the majority observes, Birke voluntarily dismissed her cause of action for violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (FEHA).

 Title 42 United States Code section 12181(7)(A) defines public accommodation for purposes of the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA to include “An inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging.”

 In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. (2005) 545 U.S. 119, 129 [162 L.Ed.2d 97, 125 S.Ct. 2169] the United States Supreme Court held, “Although the statutory definitions of ‘public accommodation’ and ‘specified public transportation’ do not expressly mention cruise ships, there can be no serious doubt that the NCL cruise ships in question fall within both definitions under conventional principles of interpretation.” A fractured court also discussed, in *1555a series of separate opinions, the extent to which the ADA applies to the internal affairs of foreign-flag cruise ships temporarily in United States waters.

 As the majority notes, the first amended complaint alleges Oakwood rejected all of John Birke’s requests that smoking be restricted or limited in the outdoor common areas used by his daughter. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 1552, fn. 6.)