Court Opinion

ID: 9819322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:22:37.12494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:34.272311
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge did not commit reversible error in refusing Hopp’s non-IPI conspiracy instruction. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the judge committed reversible error in failing to sua sponte instruct the juzy that conspiracy to commit murder requires intent to kill. Such intent is an element of first degree murder (the object offense), not conspiracy (the charged offense). The significance of this distinction was explained in People v. Ambrose, 28 Ill. App. 3d 627 (1975), a case involving conspiracy to commit armed robbery: “The gist of the offense of conspiracy is the agreement to commit the object offense rather than the object offense itself. It is not necessary to prove an act in furtherance of the actual object offense for conspiracy as it would be for attempt. *** [0]nly an act in furtherance of the agreement is necessary for conspiracy. This distinction *** controls the outcome of this case. The jury as ordinary laymen have a general knowledge of what constitutes armed robbery which is self-defining. If the offense which was the object of the conspiracy were some technical or unusually complex offense of which the trier of fact has no general impression, a suitable instruction explaining such an offense would be mandatory. This is not such a case.” Ambrose, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 633. Neither is the instant case such a case. The judge clearly and repeatedly instructed the jury that a guilty verdict on the conspiracy count required a finding that Hopp acted “with the intent that the offense of First Degree Murder be committed.” Every layperson knows that first degree murder requires a killing. Thus, the jury was clearly informed that it could not find Hopp guilty on the conspiracy count without first finding that she acted with intent to kill her estranged husband. The majority’s contrary assertion is unbelievable. The cases the majority cites to support its conclusion (People v. Trinkle, 68 Ill. 2d 198 (1977), and People v. Harris, 72 Ill. 2d 16 (1978)) dealt with the offense of attempt, not conspiracy. Those cases are thus distinguishable from the instant case. See Ambrose, 28 Ill. App. 3d 627. The only other authority the majority musters is the committee notes to IPI Criminal 4th Nos. 6.03 and 7.01. Although those notes call for an instruction on the intentional killing aspect of first degree murder in a conspiracy case, they do not resolve the instant issue— whether the absence of such an instruction rises to the level of reversibility. Hopp’s failure to assert the instant issue below constitutes a waiver of her claim on appeal. See People v. Huckstead, 91 Ill. 2d 536 (1982). The majority circumvents this well-established rule by invoking the plain error doctrine as an exception. But that doctrine only applies where a substantial defect at trial threatens the interests of justice. Huckstead, 91 Ill. 2d 536. No such defect occurred at Hopp’s trial because, considering the instructions the jury received, any layperson would have known what she claims was missing. I find it curious that the majority supports Part B of its analysis with lay knowledge (the meaning of the phrase “to agree”) but ignores such knowledge in Part A. In People v. Carey, 94 Ill. App. 3d 631 (1981), the defendant was convicted on a charge of conspiracy to commit murder. She appealed her conviction using the same argument Hopp now uses: “that the [judge] committed reversible error in failing to, sua sponte, instruct the jury as to the object offense of murder.” Carey, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 632. The court, noting the obvious distinction between conspiracy and attempt, found no reversible error. Specifically, the court observed: “the failure of the [judge] to give such an instruction sua sponte does not constitute a substantial defect invoking the ‘limited exception to the waiver rule.’ ” Carey, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 637, quoting People v. Underwood, 72 Ill. 2d 124, 131 (1978). The majority deprecates Carey based on (1) the legislature’s subsequent abolishment of the murder statute and enactment of a first degree murder statute, (2) the Carey court’s reference to the definitional murder instruction as nonmandatory, and (3) an assertion that without the instruction the jury would be left alone to determine the object offense. These points do not provide meaningful distinction. First, the change from “murder” to “first degree murder” does not obscure the patently obvious fact that a killing is still required. Furthermore, the majority’s reliance on the committee note to IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.01 contradicts its claim that “[t]he jury needs to be instructed on which form of murder the defendant is charged with conspiring to do.” 336 Ill. App. 3d at 528. In the note’s prescribed instruction, all forms other than intentional first degree murder are excluded. Second, despite the “nonmandatory” language in Carey, the court said, “even assuming that *** [definitional] instructions are required, such a result would not deter us from reaching the conclusion that we do in the solicitation and conspiracy context.” Carey, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 636. Third, the jury had no need to “determine” the object offense (first degree murder). As the note to IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.01 illustrates, the only pertinent element of first degree murder in the instant case was intent to kill. Based on the instructions the judge gave, the jury knew it had to find such intent before returning a guilty verdict. Carey is on point. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority’s order reversing the trial court’s judgment.