Court Opinion

ID: 9369361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 16:09:29.388272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.385489
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Rexroad, 2023-Ohio-356.]

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  SCIOTO COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                               :
                                             :    Case No. 21CA3972
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :
                                             :
        v.                                   :    DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                             :    ENTRY
MICHAEL L. REXROAD,                          :
                                             :    RELEASED: 01/31/2023
        Defendant-Appellant.                 :

                                        APPEARANCES:

Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.

Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jay S. Willis,
Assistant Scioto County Prosecutor, West Union, Ohio, for appellee.

Wilkin, J.

        {¶1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Court of Common Pleas

judgment of conviction in which the trial court accepted appellant, Michael L.

Rexroad’s, guilty plea to two counts of sexual battery, and one count of gross

sexual imposition. The trial court imposed the jointly recommended aggregate

prison term of 20 years. Rexroad first challenges the validity of his guilty plea

arguing the trial court failed to explain the nature of the charges and ascertain he

understood them. Rexroad second claims that the trial court abused its

discretion when it overruled his pro se, pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty

plea.

        {¶2} We overrule Rexroad’s two assignments of error. The trial court

substantially complied with Crim.R. 11 in which it advised Rexroad of the nature
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                             2

of the charges. The totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Rexroad

understood the nature of the charges he pleaded guilty to. We, therefore,

conclude that Rexroad knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered his guilty

plea.

        {¶3} With regard to Rexroad’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea, the trial

court entertained the hand-written, one-paragraph motion and conducted a full

hearing before denying the motion. The trial court was without authority to

conduct the hearing since Rexroad was represented by counsel, who did not join

the motion. It is well-established that a defendant is not entitled to hybrid

representation. Accordingly, we affirm Rexroad’s guilty plea and judgment of

conviction entry.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        {¶4} Rexroad resided with the adoptive parents of the minor victims, C.D.

and M.D., for almost a decade and began assaulting the minor C.D. when she

was eight years old. In June 2020, an indictment was issued alleging Rexroad

committed 19 sexual offenses against the minor victims, who were under the age

of 13 years. Most of the charges were for rape, first-degree felonies in violation

of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).

        {¶5} Rexroad initially pleaded not guilty to the charges, and several

hearings were held prior to Rexroad’s guilty plea in July 2021. The hearings

included an assessment on whether Rexroad was competent to stand trial and to

address the state’s request for closed circuit testimony of the victims at trial. The

competency hearing was held in August 2020, in which Dr. Emily Davis’ report
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                            3

was admitted as an exhibit. Dr. Davis conducted the evaluation and determined

Rexroad was competent to stand trial. Within Dr. Davis’ report, she indicates that

Rexroad correctly identified he was a defendant in the case, the charges against

him, the maximum penalty and understanding of the seriousness of the offenses,

and after some hesitation, offered some description of the conduct involved that

resulted in the charges. Based on Dr. Davis’ report, the trial court found Rexroad

competent to stand trial.

       {¶6} At the January 2021 pre-trial hearing, the trial court explained the

seriousness of the offenses and that for the rape charges, the maximum penalty

was life imprisonment. Similarly, at the March 2021 pre-trial hearing, the trial

court informed Rexroad of the indicted charges, and at three intervals, explained

the maximum penalty he was facing due to the tender age of the two victims.

Rexroad stated he understood.

       {¶7} In April 2021, a hearing was held pursuant to the state’s motion

requesting the victims to testify via closed circuit. The state presented the

testimony of four witnesses in support of its motion, including C.D.’s outpatient

therapist who treated C.D. for posttraumatic stress disorder. The therapist

indicated that the cause of the trauma was C.D. being raped by a family friend,

who was residing in her home since she was eight years old. C.D. identified the

family friend as “Rex.” C.D.’s other counselor also testified that she has

posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of childhood sexual abuse. The

principal at the victims school further indicated that C.D. revealed she was a
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                              4

victim of sexual assault, and that M.D. was less forthcoming of the abuse she

suffered.

       {¶8} In July 2021, Rexroad signed a guilty plea form in which he

       waive[s] the reading of the indictment, and * * * [f]ully understand[s]
       these rights guaranteed me by the Constitution, I hereby waive them
       in writing. I withdraw my former plea of not guilty and enter a plea of
       guilty to the crime of: CT.2 Sexual Battery, * * *, being a felony of the
       second degree. CT.3 Gross Sexual Imposition, * * *, being a felony
       of the third degree. CT.9 Sexual Battery, * * *, being a felony of the
       second degree as amended.

Rexroad also signed a document explaining the maximum penalty for the offense

of gross sexual imposition, a felony in the third degree, and a document

explaining the maximum penalty for the two offenses of sexual battery, felonies in

the second degree.

       {¶9} On the same day as Rexroad signed the three documents, a plea

hearing was held. At the start of the hearing, the trial court observed an error in

the gross sexual imposition maximum penalty document that misstated the

mandatory postrelease control period. Due to the error, the trial court instructed

Rexroad’s counsel to re-review the document with him, and, if he wished to

proceed, to correct and initial it. The hearing proceeded with the state outlining

the plea agreement:

               Your Honor, the State has offered that the Defendant would
       enter a plea to Counts 2, 3, and 9. As to Count 2, the parties, I
       believe, have agreed that we would amend the dates from January
       1st, 2019 to March 1st, 2019. They are currently listed from January
       to June. As to Count 2 and 3 - - as to Count 2, it is an eight year
       mandatory prison term, as to Count 3 it is up to 60 months. The
       State’s recommendation would be four years. And then as to Count
       9, it would be amended to Sexual Battery under the same
       subsections as Count 2. Count [] 3 deal with minor child M.D., date
       of birth 12/24/2007, and Counts 2 and 3 it will be agreed to by the
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                              5

       parties are separate animus and would run consecutively. Back to
       Count 9, as to Count 9, we’ve agreed to amend that charge to Sexual
       Battery under those same subsections as Count 2 as to minor victim
       C.D., date of birth 9/27/2006. And we’ve also agreed to an
       amendment of the dates as to January 1st, 2019 to March 1st, 2019.

       {¶10} Rexroad’s counsel stated “[n]o objections to the amendments, and

we’ll stipulate to the periods of times as the Prosecutor has indicated.” The trial

court clarified that the parties are stipulating that Counts Two, Three and Nine

were committed with separate animus, to which Rexroad’s counsel agreed. At

this point, Rexroad informed the trial court he had difficulty hearing. He was

provided with a headphone set to assist him. The trial court then repeated what

had just occurred:

               All right. Sir, what the Prosecutor has indicated, they made an
       offer in this matter that they would amend the date range on Counts
       2 and 3 to January 1st, 2019 to March 1st, 2019, which changes the
       sentencing statute this would fall under. They would accept pleas of
       guilty to both of those counts, 2, which is Sexual Battery, which is a
       felony of the second degree, 3, which is Gross Sexual Imposition,
       which is a felony of the third degree, and they would amend Count 9
       to a charge of Sexual Battery, which would also be a felony of the
       second degree. They’ve indicated that they’re - - the matter would be
       set for sentencing on Monday, that the parties at that sentencing
       would be jointly recommending that you receive eight years on Count
       2, Sexual Battery, which is mandatory, 48 months on Count 3, Gross
       Sexual Imposition, which is not mandatory, and eight years on
       amended Count 9, Sexual Battery, which is a felony of the second
       degree, which would be mandatory.
               They’ve said that they’re agreement is also that these were
       committed with a separate animus or a separate - -or crimes of
       dissimilar import, which means that you would receive a sentence on
       each of those three to run consecutively, for a sentence of 20 years,
       with 16 of those years being mandatory. There would also be a
       requirement that you register as a Tier III Sex Offender. That would
       require you to - - upon your release from prison to register with the
       sheriff of the county of your residence or employment or schooling
       for the rest of your life, and you’d have to verify that address every
       90 days with that sheriff.
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                            6

       {¶11} Rexroad advised the trial court that that was his understanding of

the plea agreement. The following exchange between the court and Rexroad

then followed:

       THE COURT: All right. And sir, do you understand that by proceeding
       in this fashion that you’d be entering pleas of guilty to two counts of
       Sexual Battery, felonies of the second degree, and one count of
       Gross Sexual Imposition, a felony of the third degree?
       DEFENDANT: Yes.
       THE COURT: Do you understand that by entering a plea of guilty that
       that would then allow me to proceed with sentencing in this matter?
       DEFENDANT: Yes.
       THE COURT: All right. Do you understand by entering pleas of guilty
       to these charges that you’d be admitting the truth of these charges
       and your guilt in committing these offenses? Do you understand
       that?
       DEFENDANT: Yes.

Rexroad also indicated that he understood that by pleading guilty to the three

counts, the state would dismiss the remaining charges. Rexroad further stated

that he understood that since this is a jointly recommended sentence he waives

the right to appeal his sentence.

       {¶12} The trial court then questioned Rexroad if he had the opportunity to

review the waiver and maximum penalty documents with his counsel. To which

Rexroad informed the trial court that he had reviewed them, understood them,

and signed them. The colloquy continued with Rexroad advising the court that

he was not under the influence of any substances, graduated high school, was

honorably discharged from the Marines, and is a United States citizen. Next, the

trial court notified Rexroad of the constitutional rights he waives by pleading

guilty, to which Rexroad replied that he understood.
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                           7

       {¶13} The trial court again explained the maximum penalty associated

with each offense and that for the sexual battery charges, they are second-

degree felonies with a maximum mandatory prison term of 8 years. As for the

gross sexual imposition offense, a third-degree felony, prison is not mandatory,

but, if prison is imposed, then the maximum term is 60 months. Rexroad

asserted that he understood the maximum prison terms associated with each

offense. Mandatory postrelease control is also part of Rexroad’s punishment,

and, so, the trial court advised him that it was mandatory for five years. Rexroad

stated that he understood that postrelease control was part of his sentence and

that he had to register as a sexual offender.

       {¶14} After these notifications were relayed to Rexroad, the trial court

inquired if Rexroad wished to proceed. Rexroad affirmed that he still wished to

proceed with the plea and asserted that he wished to keep his signature on the

documents. The state placed on the record that it was amending the indictment

as to Count Nine, and Rexroad’s counsel stated he has no objection. The trial

court began reading the offenses but realized there was a clerical error in the

numbering of the statutory provision for sexual battery as amended in Count

Nine. The trial court requested that the document be corrected, re-reviewed by

Rexroad and his counsel, and Rexroad initial the correction. Following the

correction, the trial court recited the offenses to Rexroad:

               Let’s do this again. Sir, as to Count 2 Sexual Battery, in
       violation of Revised Code Section 2907.03(A)(5) and (B), said
       offense a felony of the third degree, Count 3 Gross Sexual
       Imposition, in violation of Revised Code Section 2907.05(A)(4) and
       (C)(2), said offense a felony of the third degree, Count 9 as
       amended, being charge of Sexual Battery, in violation of Revised
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                             8

       Code Section 2907.03(A)(5) and (B), said offense a felony of the
       second degree[.]

Rexroad then pleaded guilty to the three offenses pursuant to the plea

agreement.

       {¶15} One day after pleading guilty, Rexroad filed a one-paragraph,

unsigned handwritten document asking to withdraw his plea. On July 26, 2021, a

combined motion to withdraw plea and sentencing hearing was held. At the start

of the hearing, the trial court recounted the procedural history of the case. The

trial court then stated that it received a handwritten letter in which Rexroad is

requesting to withdraw his plea. Both the state and Rexroad’s counsel indicated

they did not receive a copy of the letter. Rexroad’s counsel, however, was aware

of the letter after he reviewed the online docket and after speaking with Rexroad.

According to counsel, Rexroad has several reasons to withdraw his plea and one

of the reasons is a claim of tampering with evidence by the state in discovery.

Rexroad’s counsel then advised the trial court that “I have no good faith basis for

that argument and will not make it before the Court.” The reasons to withdraw

the plea were handwritten by Rexroad and he was asked to read them into the

record since his counsel had a hard time reading his writing:

              I, Michael Rexroad, on July 25th, 2021, request to withdraw
       my plea of guilty and instead go to trial for some of the following
       reasons; one, I survived a year and a half in jail without signing a
       time waiver and believe I have earned the right to have - -earned to
       have that right returned to me. I feel that scare tactics were used to
       influence my decision. As a 50 percent disabled veteran that fought
       the state and the last year and a half after my injury, I requested I still
       be allowed to continue to fight for my innocence. I apologize for
       pulling the VA card, but I’m at my wits end. It has been brought to my
       attention- -I prefer not to read the fifth one, Your Honor. If you could
       take a look at it.
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                              9

              ***
              It has been brought to my attention that I do not have to
       convince 12 people of my innocence, only one - -or one that she is
       faking, or one that she is lying, which would be easier if I had my
       motion of discovery.

       {¶16} After Rexroad presented the reasons for his request to withdraw his

plea, the trial court inquired of his counsel if he wished to present any evidence in

support of the motion. Counsel reiterated:

               Your Honor, in good faith I cannot - -if - - argue on speedy trial
       issues. Everything has been - - there’s been motions to continue. I
       see no speedy trial issues. I will not put a - -forward a good faith basis
       for that. Scare tactics, Your Honor, everything has been explained to
       him in the court, consequences, I cannot - -there was no scare tactics
       used. He’s weighingly (sic) and knowingly made the choice he made.
       He - -we have went over and discussed the motion of discovery and
       so - -
               * * * So, I cannot put forward any good faith argument for a
       motion to withdraw guilty plea.

The trial court then questioned counsel whether Rexroad wished to testify in

support of his motion, and counsel left the decision to Rexroad, who indicated

that he did. This is when the trial court advised Rexroad that if he testifies, the

state will be permitted to question him regarding these issues. Rexroad indicated

that he understood and was sworn in.

       {¶17} Rexroad stated that the interrogation video provided in discovery

was not the complete video and that he was innocent of the offenses. During

cross-examination, Rexroad claimed he was coerced during his interrogation into

submitting the written statement admitted as State’s Exhibit 1, in which he

provided the date and the sexual act performed on the victims. Rexroad

acknowledged that the trial court advised him of his rights at the plea hearing,

and, at that time, indicated he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. In
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                           10

response to the court’s questioning, Rexroad elaborated that “[f]rom the time of

filing the guilty plea and approximately 30 minutes later I had that change of

heart[.]”

       {¶18} In rebuttal, the state presented the testimony of Detective Jodi

Conkel. The detective interviewed Rexroad twice and both were recorded. The

recordings are digital and were not tampered with. The detective denied

intimidating or coercing Rexroad, who is twice her size and a Marine.

       {¶19} At the conclusion of the detective’s testimony, the state presented

an argument in support of denying Rexroad’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea,

but his counsel declined to present an argument in support of the motion. The

trial court noted that “I am going to find that this was a request filed by the

Defendant individually and not through counsel. This Court did choose to

proceed with a hearing on this matter despite that fact.” The trial court then

denied the motion finding there is no reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw

the plea.

       {¶20} In support of denying the motion, the trial court found that Rexroad

was afforded a full Crim.R. 11 hearing, understood the nature of the charges he

was pleading guilty to, and understood the possible penalties including the jointly

recommended sentence. The trial court also held that Rexroad failed to present

evidence supporting his innocence, and, that to the contrary, the state presented

his admission of committing the offenses. Further, the trial court determined that

Rexroad filed his motion based on a change of heart and did not find credible his

assertion that the interrogation recording was tampered with.
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                         11

      {¶21} After denying the pro se motion to withdraw the plea, the trial court

proceeded to sentencing. Rexroad’s counsel requested that the trial court

impose the jointly recommended sentence. Rexroad did not make a statement

as to mitigation, but rather, requested that his interrogation video be copied and

shown to someone else. C.D. also addressed the trial court informing the court

that Rexroad is “very guilty” and had sex with her since she was eight years old.

After considering the sentencing statutory provisions, the trial court imposed the

jointly recommended sentence of 8 years as to Count One, 8 years as to the

amended Count Nine, and 48 months as to Count Three. The counts were

ordered to be served consecutively. Rexroad was advised of his Tier III sexual

offender classification and of the mandatory five-year postrelease control.

Rexroad’s judgment of conviction entry is now before us on appeal.

                           ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

      I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MR.
             REXROAD BY ACCEPTING A PLEA OF GUILTY THAT WAS NOT
             MADE KNOWINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, AND INTELLIGENTLY.

      II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MR.
             REXROAD BY DENYING THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
             PLEA OF GUILTY.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

      {¶22} Rexroad argues his guilty plea is invalid because the trial court

failed to substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 before accepting his plea in which

the court failed to ensure Rexroad understood the nature of the charges against

him. During the plea colloquy, a statement of the facts establishing the criminal

charges was not read into the record and the trial court did not review the
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                           12

elements of the offenses. In addition, some of Rexroad’s responses during the

plea colloquy displayed hesitation. Rexroad thus maintains that his plea is

invalid and should be vacated.

       {¶23} The state asserts that Rexroad’s plea should be affirmed as a

thorough change of plea hearing was held by the trial court. A statement of facts

was not presented at the plea hearing but there is no legal authority that a

statement is required before a guilty plea is accepted. The state declares that

Rexroad’s plea should be affirmed.

                                 Law and Analysis

       {¶24} “ ‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must

be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States

Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.’ ” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176,

2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525,

527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). To determine whether a guilty plea was entered

“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, an appellate court examines the totality

of the circumstances through a de novo review of the record to ensure that the

trial court complied with constitutional and procedural safeguards.” State v.

Willison, 4th Dist. Athens No. 18CA18, 2019-Ohio-220, ¶ 11, citing State v.

Cooper, 4th Dist. Athens No. 11CA15, 2011-Ohio-6890, ¶ 35.

       {¶25} “Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process that a trial court must use

before accepting a felony plea of guilty[.]” Veney at ¶ 8. The trial court must

address the defendant and strictly comply with the provisions in Crim.R.
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                                13

11(C)(2)(c) in which the court advises a defendant of all of the constitutional

rights he waives by pleading guilty. See Id. at syllabus; Crim.R. 11(C)(2).

Rexroad concedes that the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)

and advised him of the constitutional rights he waives by pleading guilty,

including the state’s burden to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the

right to a jury trial, the right to confront the state’s witnesses, the right against

self-incrimination, and the right to compel witnesses to appear on his behalf.

(Brief page 3)

       {¶26} Strict compliance is not the standard with regard to the

nonconstitutional notifications. Rather, “with respect to the nonconstitutional

notifications required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and 11(C)(2)(b), substantial

compliance is sufficient.” Veney at ¶ 14, citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d

86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). “ ‘Substantial compliance means that under

the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the

implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.’ ” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting State

v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).

       {¶27} Pertinent to the issue here is the requirement that before accepting

a guilty plea, the trial court must address the defendant and determine

       that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding
       of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved,
       and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for
       the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing
       hearing.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).

       {¶28} “Substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) does not
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                                    14

necessarily require a detailed recitation of the elements of a charge by the court.”

State v. Hurst, 5th Dist. No. CT2019-0053, 2020-Ohio-2754, ¶ 21, citing State v.

Wright, 4th Dist. Highland No. 94CA853, 1995 WL 368319 (June 19, 1995).

Additionally, there is no requirement for the trial court to “explain the elements of

the crime to the defendant at the time of the plea.” State v. Nicholson, 8th Dist.

No. 91652, 2009-Ohio-3592, ¶ 19.

              “In order for a trial court to determine that a defendant is
       making a plea with an understanding of the nature of the charge to
       which he is entering a plea, it is not always necessary that the trial
       court advise the defendant of the elements of the crime, or to
       specifically ask the defendant if he understands the charge, so long
       as the totality of the circumstances are such that the trial court is
       warranted in making a determination that the defendant understands
       the charge.” State v. Rainey, 3 Ohio App.3d 441, 442, 446 N.E.2d
       188 (10th Dist.1982)

Hurst at ¶ 21.1

       {¶29} The totality of the circumstances here demonstrate that Rexroad

was notified of the nature of the charges and he understood them. Rexroad’s

indictment as to Counts Two and Three specified the name of the offenses, listed

the applicable statutory provisions, the level of the felony, identified the victim,

and that the victim was under the age of 13 years. As for the amended Count

Nine, which tracked the same language as Count Two, Rexroad waived the

reading of the indictment. Rexroad was provided with a bill of particulars in

which it stated that Rexroad committed the offense of sexual battery, in violation

of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), R.C. 2907.03(B)(3), a second-degree felony, in Count

1
 We decline Rexroad’s assertion that we apply R.C. 2937.07 and require “an explanation of the
circumstances of the offense” before a trial court accepts a guilty plea. As Rexroad
acknowledges, R.C. 2937.07 applies only to misdemeanor offenses. Therefore, this statutory
provision is inapplicable as Rexroad pleaded guilty to felony charges.
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                           15

Two based on his act of engaging in sexual conduct with the minor M.D., with a

date of birth of 12/24/2007, who was less than 13 years of age. Similarly, the

state as to Count Three, informed Rexroad that he is charged with committing

gross sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), R.C. 2907.05(C)(2), a

third-degree felony, for his conduct of having sexual contact with M.D., who was

less than 13 years old.

       {¶30} Additionally, before signing the guilty plea form and the maximum

penalty documents, Rexroad through several hearings was advised that the

crimes are about his sexual assault of the two minors C.D. and M.D. The state’s

evidence of the criminal conduct included Rexroad’s handwritten admission.

       {¶31} And then there are the guilty plea and maximum penalty documents.

Rexroad reviewed the documents with counsel, was questioned about them at

the plea hearing by the trial court, and, more than once, indicated he signed them

and wished to keep his signature on them. The documents identified each

offense Rexroad was pleading guilty to, including the name, the statutory

provisions, and the maximum penalty involved. Additionally, at the plea hearing,

the trial court had several exchanges with Rexroad advising him repeatedly of

the offenses he was pleading guilty to. Rexroad informed the trial court that he

understood and wished to proceed with the plea. See State v. Vialva, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 104199, 2017-Ohio-1279, ¶ 8 (The trial court substantially

complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) in advising Vialva of the nature of the charges

where the trial court at the plea hearing stated the offense, the statutory code

section and the degree of the offense.)
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                           16

       {¶32} Rexroad now construes his one response “I’m going to have to say,

yes” when questioned by the trial court if he wished to proceed as demonstrating

hesitation. We disagree. First, this response was in regard to the trial court

advising Rexroad that a jointly recommended sentence means he waives the

right to appeal the sentence:

       THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rexroad, do you understand by doing it
       in this fashion that you’d be waiving your right to appeal the sentence
       that I’d give you?
       THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
       THE COURT: Is this what you want to do here today?
       THE DEFENDANT: I’m going to have to say, yes.

Second, Rexroad provided similar responses that he does not challenge as a

demonstration of hesitation. Rexroad does not challenge his understanding that

by pleading guilty he waived the right to have the state prove his case beyond a

reasonable doubt and his right against self-incrimination. When questioned if he

understood he was waiving these rights, Rexroad responded: “I believe so, yes.”

Further, when asked if he had any questions, Rexroad answered “I don’t think

so.”

       {¶33} We, therefore, conclude that the trial court substantially complied

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) in advising Rexroad of the nature of the charges.

Rexroad understood the nature of the charges when he pleaded guilty to the two

counts of sexual battery and one count of gross sexual imposition.

       {¶34} Accordingly, we overrule Rexroad’s first assignment of error.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       {¶35} Rexroad argues that the trial court erred in denying his pro se, pre-

sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Rexroad asserts that the trial court
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                           17

erred in several of its findings in support of its decision to deny his motion.

Specifically, Rexroad disagrees that he was afforded a full Crim.R. 11 hearing as

there was no reading of the facts and he appeared uncertain before pleading, as

previously argued in the first assignment of error. Rexroad reiterates that he did

not understand the nature of the charges against him. Similarly, Rexroad

disagrees that he was afforded a full hearing on his motion to withdraw since he

was not appointed new counsel after his counsel stated he was unable to put

forth a good faith argument in support of the motion. Rexroad proclaimed his

innocence prior to sentencing and presented potential defenses to the charges.

Finally, he argues that any prejudice to the state would have been trivial.

       {¶36} The state, on the other hand, maintains that Rexroad was afforded a

full and informative plea colloquy and a full hearing on his motion to withdraw.

Rexroad admitted to the crimes and his handwritten statement was presented as

an exhibit at the motion to withdraw hearing. The trial court in evaluating

Rexroad’s motion to withdraw properly applied the relevant factors and its

decision should be affirmed.

                                  Law and Analysis

       {¶37} “In Ohio, a criminal defendant has the right to representation by

counsel or to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby counsel. However,

these two rights are independent of each other and may not be asserted

simultaneously.” State v. Martin, 103 Ohio St.3d 385, 2004-Ohio-5471, 816

N.E.2d 227, paragraph one of the syllabus. “Appellate courts have determined

that when counsel represents a criminal defendant, a trial court may not entertain
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                           18

a defendant’s pro se motion.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. James, 4th Dist. Ross No.

13CA3393, 2014-Ohio-1702, ¶ 13. Thus, “[w]hen a criminal defendant is

represented by counsel and counsel does not join in the defendant’s pro se

motion or otherwise indicate a need for the relief sought by the defendant pro se,

the trial court cannot properly consider the defendant’s pro se motion.” State v.

Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-160836 and C-160837, 2017-Ohio-8558, ¶ 32.

          {¶38} In the case at bar, Rexroad was represented by counsel. Yet, one

day after pleading guilty, Rexroad filed a pro se, one-paragraph motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. At the motion to withdraw hearing, Rexroad read into

the record several reasons he believed warranted granting his request to

withdraw his plea. Rexroad’s attorney did not join the motion and on multiple

occasions informed the trial court that he could not in good faith argue in support

of the motion. Rexroad testified in support of his motion, but was minimally

questioned by his counsel. Rexroad’s counsel declined to present a closing

argument in support of the motion to withdraw. Based on counsel’s failure to join

the motion, the trial court held that “this was a request filed by the Defendant

individually and not through counsel. This Court did choose to proceed with a

hearing on this matter despite that fact.”

          {¶39} The trial court improperly considered Rexroad’s pro se motion to

withdraw his plea as he was represented by counsel who did not join the motion.2

Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying his motion. See

State v. Lamb, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 17CA3796, 2018-Ohio-1405, ¶ 57 (Hybrid

2
    Rexroad did not request new counsel or to represent himself in the case.
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                             19

representation is prohibited and because appellant’s counsel did not join or adopt

the pro se motions, “the trial court was not permitted to entertain the motions.”)

See also State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109972, 2021-Ohio-2032, ¶

15 (A trial court entertaining a defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea

when the defendant is represented by counsel who declines to join the motion

constitutes “hybrid representation in violation of the established law.”)

       {¶40} Accordingly, we overrule Rexroad’s second assignment of error.

                                   CONCLUSION

       {¶41} Having overruled Rexroad’s two assignments of error, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment entry of conviction.

                                                          JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Scioto App. No. 21CA3972                                                             20

                                JUDGMENT ENTRY

      It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall
pay the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS
COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to
file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency
of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at
the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to
file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to
expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                        For the Court,

                                    BY: ____________________________
                                       Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

                               NOTICE TO COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.