Court Opinion

ID: 9915110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 17:08:49.759382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:09.235651
License: Public Domain

80                       January 4, 2024            No. 6

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                 In the Matter of the Marriage of
                        Kelly Ann TROUT,
                      fka Kelly Ann Eitzen,
                      Petitioner-Respondent,
                                and
                      Mark James EITZEN,
                      Respondent-Appellant.
                 Washington County Circuit Court
                      16DR04709; A176845

     James Lee Fun, Jr., Judge.
     Argued and submitted June 21, 2023.
   Peter Bunch argued the cause for appellant. Also on the
briefs was The Law Firm of Peter Bunch, LLC.
   John Moore argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent.
   Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Pagán, Judge, and
Kistler, Senior Judge.
     PAGÁN, J.
     Affirmed.
Cite as 330 Or App 80 (2024)                               81

        PAGÁN, J.
         Husband appeals from a trial court judgment deny-
ing his request to modify or terminate a spousal support
obligation. The sole issue presented to us on this appeal is
whether wife’s remarriage constituted a substantial, unan-
ticipated change in economic circumstances despite wife
entering into a premarital agreement with her new spouse
that defines all income as separate property. For the follow-
ing reasons, we hold that the trial court correctly concluded
that there was not a substantial, unanticipated change in
economic circumstances justifying either a modification or
termination of husband’s monthly support obligation to wife.
Accordingly, we affirm.
         We decline to exercise our discretion to review
de novo as husband requests because he has not demon-
strated that this is an “exceptional case” warranting such
review. See ORS 19.415(3)(b); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (we exercise
our discretion to review de novo only in “exceptional cases”).
Accordingly, we recount the facts “consistently with the trial
court’s express and implied findings, supplemented with
uncontroverted information from the record.” Tilson and
Tilson, 260 Or App 427, 428, 317 P3d 391 (2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
         The parties were married for 27 years and have
three children together. Husband was the primary wage
earner and wife was a homemaker. In May 2017, the par-
ties divorced. As part of the dissolution judgment, the court
found that husband’s income was $421,530, gross, per year,
and awarded wife $15,000 per month in indefinite mainte-
nance spousal support.
         In November 2017, wife remarried. Before her
remarriage, wife and her new husband, Trout, signed a pre-
marital agreement that defined each person’s income from
all sources, including spousal support, as separate property.
         In 2018, after learning of wife’s remarriage, hus-
band filed a motion to modify his spousal support obliga-
tion. In the hearing on that motion, the trial court found
that Trout was not providing financial support to wife and
that Trout was “unlikely to have the means to do so in the
82                                         Trout and Eitzen

foreseeable future.” However, based on evidence regarding
wife’s financial needs, the trial court concluded that husband
proved sufficient unanticipated change of circumstances and
reduced the spousal support obligation to $11,050 per month
for seven months, with an additional payment of $26,600
from husband’s 2018 bonus, $9,500 a month for 24 months,
and then $7,500 per month thereafter.
         In April 2020, husband filed a second motion—the
subject of this appeal—to modify his spousal support obli-
gation. The court held a hearing on husband’s motion where
it heard testimony from both parties and Trout. The court
found that husband’s income “remain[ed] durably high and
within the range of income found by the court at the time
of dissolution.” Additionally, the court found that wife and
Trout had made a focused effort to comply with the terms of
their premarital agreement and that wife had not benefited
from Trout’s income. As such, the trial court denied hus-
band’s motion to modify or terminate his spousal support
obligation.
         On appeal, husband contends that the trial court
erred in concluding that there was not a substantial, unan-
ticipated change of circumstances that justified the termi-
nation or modification of husband’s spousal support obliga-
tion. Husband’s arguments primarily concern the court’s
findings regarding wife’s access to Trout’s income and the
effect of the premarital agreement as to that determina-
tion. The crux of husband’s argument, however, focuses on
whether the trial court erred by not considering the extent
of Trout’s income that was “actually or potentially available”
to wife.
         ORS 107.135(1)(a) authorizes a court to modify an
award of spousal support. The threshold issue in a spou-
sal support modification case is whether there has been a
substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances since
the time of the earlier support order. ORS 107.135(3)(a). In
reviewing the trial court’s conclusion as to that issue, we
consider “the trial court’s implicit and explicit findings of
historical fact regarding the parties’ economic circum-
stances to determine whether those findings are supported
by any evidence in the record.” Tilson, 260 Or App at 431.
Cite as 330 Or App 80 (2024)                                83

We then “review the court’s determination that those facts
constitute a substantial change in economic circumstance of
a party under ORS 107.135(3)(a) for legal error.” Id. at 431-
32. If the court concludes that there has been a substantial,
unanticipated change in economic circumstances, “then the
trial court must determine what amount of support is ‘just
and equitable under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Id.
at 432 (quoting Frost and Frost, 244 Or App 16, 23, 260 P3d
570 (2011)). If we reach that determination, we review the
court’s ultimate conclusion for abuse of discretion. Id.
          When determining whether a substantial change
of circumstances exists to warrant modification or termina-
tion of spousal support, the trial court must “consider income
opportunities and benefits of the respective parties from all
sources[.]” ORS 107.135(4)(a). The first factor in evaluating
spousal support after remarriage is whether the remarried
party has increased income as a result of their new spouse.
Lenhart and Lenhart, 213 Or App 480, 487, 162 P3d 292
(2007). That “potential shared income” is then weighed
against the standard of living that was enjoyed during the
previous marriage. Id. However, the new spouse’s income is
not automatically presumed as accessible to the remarried
party. Rubey and Rubey, 165 Or App 616, 622, 996 P2d 1006
(2000). Rather, the trial court must consider whether the
new spouse’s income is actually available to the remarried
party. Davis v. Lallement, 287 Or App 323, 329, 401 P3d
1230 (2017). Notably, whether the remarried party entered
into—and is abiding by—a premarital agreement is part
of that analysis. Jones and Jones, 172 Or App 199, 204, 17
P3d 491 (2001), adh’d to on recons, 174 Or App 33, 23 P3d
988 (2001). The above determination is not a matter of the
court’s discretion, rather the “overall record must support
the court’s factual findings as to what amount of income is,
in fact, available.” Davis, 287 Or App at 329.
         In the present case, the trial court did not err in
concluding that there was not a substantial, unanticipated
change in economic circumstances justifying the modifica-
tion or termination of husband’s spousal support obligation.
In making that decision, the trial court did not rely solely on
the terms of the premarital agreement. Instead, the court
84                                          Trout and Eitzen

properly considered all the evidence in the record to con-
clude that Trout and wife rigorously separated their income
and assets. That evidence included undisputed testimony
from wife stating that her only sources of income came from
the spousal support award and her earnings from working
at a winery. Further, exhibits and testimony reveal that,
other than a Comcast bill and some home improvement
costs, wife pays for all expenses related to her house, includ-
ing the mortgage, taxes, and utilities. Thus, the evidence in
the record supports the trial court’s finding that wife and
Trout clearly delineated their income and assets as sepa-
rate property. That rigid segregation of property—along
with the terms of the premarital agreement—do not sup-
port husband’s argument that Trout’s income is “actually or
potentially” available to wife.
        Finally, the trial court noted that husband’s income
remained “durably high” and that any alleged reduction in
his income was accommodated for in husband’s previous
motion to modify his support obligation. Thus, neither hus-
band’s earning capacity, nor wife’s reliance on the spousal
support, have substantially changed since entry of the last
judgment. The trial court did not err in concluding that there
was no substantial change in economic circumstances justi-
fying the modification or termination of husband’s spousal
support obligation.
        Affirmed.