Court Opinion

ID: 9931685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 18:01:24.854094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:18.386184
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3139     Document: 010110997692      Date Filed: 02/09/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        February 9, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  BENJAMIN VELAYO,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 23-3139
                                                 (D.C. No. 2:23-CV-02249-JAR-ADM)
  CHERYL FOX; DEPARTMENT OF                                    (D. Kan.)
  VETERANS AFFAIRS,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Benjamin Velayo appeals the dismissal of his pro se action under the Federal Tort

 Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2675(a) (FTCA), for failure to exhaust the

 FTCA notice requirements. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

                                            I

       Velayo sued the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and a VA employee,

 Cheryl Fox, alleging various grievances sounding in tort. He filed his complaint

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-3139    Document: 010110997692        Date Filed: 02/09/2024    Page: 2

 using a template form that asked, “Have the claims which you make in this civil

 action been presented through any type of Administrative Procedure within any

 government agency?” R. at 7. Velayo marked a box answering, “No.” Id.

       A magistrate judge screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and

 determined that Velayo conceded he did not present his claims to the VA, which

 precluded him from proceeding under the FTCA. The magistrate judge explained

 that the FTCA constitutes a limited waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity,

 and that, “[u]nder the FTCA, ‘a tort claim against the United States is barred unless it

 is presented in writing to the appropriate federal agency within two years after such

 claim accrues,’” R. at 13-14 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113

 (1979) (further internal quotation marks omitted). The magistrate judge stated that

 the FTCA’s notice requirements are jurisdictional, and, because Velayo did not

 present his claims to the VA at any time, the action should be dismissed for lack of

 subject matter jurisdiction.

       The magistrate judge notified Velayo that he had 14 days to object to the

 report and recommendation and that his failure to do so would waive appellate

 review. Velayo objected, stating as follows: “I, Benjamin Velayo[,] disagree [with]

 the decision of U.S. Magistrate Judge Mitchell. I received the certified mail on June

 10, 2023.” Id. at 16 (capitalization omitted). This was the entirety of his objection.

         The district court overruled the objection, reasoning that Velayo failed to

 specifically identify any issue with which he disagreed. Absent any explanation for

 Velayo’s disagreement with the magistrate judge’s decision, the district court

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Appellate Case: 23-3139    Document: 010110997692         Date Filed: 02/09/2024    Page: 3

 adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed the suit for lack of subject

 matter jurisdiction. Velayo now appeals.

                                             II

       We normally review de novo the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

 See Est. of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 852 (10th Cir.

 2005). Here, however, we confront the threshold issue of whether Velayo waived

 appellate review by failing to file specific objections to the magistrate judge’s report

 and recommendation. Under this court’s firm-waiver rule, the failure to file timely,

 specific objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation waives

 appellate review of both factual and legal questions. United States v. 2121 E. 30th

 St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059-60 (10th Cir. 1996). “[A] party’s objections to the magistrate

 judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an

 issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review.” Id. at 1060.

 “[T]he district court’s decision to conduct a de novo review, sua sponte, does not

 warrant lifting the bar of appellate review . . . .” Id. at 1061. “This rule does not

 apply, however, when (1) a pro se litigant has not been informed of the time period

 for objecting and the consequences of failing to object, or when (2) the interests of

 justice require review.” Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir.

 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Velayo’s objection is not sufficiently specific to preserve appellate review. An

 objection must be “sufficiently specific to focus the district court’s attention on the

 factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute.” 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d at 1060.

                                             3
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 But Velayo simply asserted in general that he disagreed with the magistrate judge’s

 decision. This falls far short of the specificity needed to preserve appellate review.

 See id. (“Just as a complaint stating only ‘I complain’ states no claim, an objection

 stating only ‘I object’ preserves no issue for review.” (internal quotation marks

 omitted)). Further, neither exception to the firm-waiver rule applies. The magistrate

 judge clearly warned Velayo that he had 14 days to object and that if he failed to file

 objections within that time no appellate review would be allowed. See R. at 14-15.

 As for the interests of justice, we consider “a pro se litigant’s efforts to comply, the

 force and plausibility of the explanation for his failure to comply, and the importance

 of the issues raised.” Morales-Fernandez, 418 F.3d at 1120. Velayo made no

 attempt to identify any specific issue in his objection, he offers no explanation for

 failing to do so, and nothing in his materials suggests the issues here are so important

 as to warrant overlooking the waiver.

          Indeed, even if we overlooked the waiver, the result here would be the same.

 Velayo alleged that Fox is bothering him and interfering with his privacy. The

 district court, in adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,

 correctly recognized that to proceed under the FTCA, Velayo was required to provide

 notice of his claims to the VA. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a). 1 “Because the

 1
     Section 2401(b) states:

          A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
          presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years
          after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months

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Appellate Case: 23-3139    Document: 010110997692        Date Filed: 02/09/2024    Page: 5

 FTCA constitutes a waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity, the notice

 requirements established by the FTCA must be strictly construed. The requirements

 are jurisdictional and cannot be waived.” Trentadue, 397 F.3d at 852 (internal

 quotation marks omitted). Velayo expressly conceded on the face of his complaint

 that he did not present his claims to the VA. He does not contend otherwise on

 appeal or even address his failure to satisfy the FTCA’s notice requirements.

 Because he failed to satisfy the FTCA’s notice requirements, the district court lacked

 subject matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed the suit.

                                            III

       The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                        Entered for the Court

                                                        Bobby R. Baldock
                                                        Circuit Judge

       after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of
       final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.

 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (emphasis added).

 Section 2675(a) states:

       An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States
       for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or
       death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
       employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office
       or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim
       to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally
       denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.

 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added).
                                            5