Court Opinion

ID: 9863857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:55:29.313265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:29.066074
License: Public Domain

ZLAKET, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
¶ 19 The primary purpose of Article XXI’s single subject rule is to prevent “logrolling,” the practice of combining “dissimilar propositions into one proposed amendment so that voters must vote for or against the whole package even though they would have voted differently had the propositions been submitted separately.” Tilson v. Mofford, 153 Ariz. 468, 471, 737 P.2d 1367,1370 (1987). This political tactic seeks “to obtain a majority in favor of [a] joint proposal when neither standing alone could achieve such a majority.” Slayton v. Shumway, 166 Ariz. 87, 90, 800 P.2d 590, 593 (1990) (citations omitted). Article XXI is designed to ensure that decisions made at the polls “represent the free and mature judgment of the electors, so submitted that they cannot be constrained to adopt measures of which in reality they disapprove, in order to secure the enactment of others they earnestly desire.” Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 221, 36 P.2d 549, 554 (1934). I cannot reconcile today’s opinion with either Article XXI or our previous cases, and view the present measure as a clear example of log-rolling.
¶ 20 According to its text, the proposal in question “presents to the voters several components of the expanded growing smarter act.” (Emphasis added). More specifically, it:
1. Enables the state land department to transfer certain trust lands to school districts at no cost to the districts.
2. Authorizes the designation of Arizona conservation reserve lands to protect from development state trust lands....
3. Permits land exchanges and conveyances for conservation purposes.
4. Establishes that land designated for conservation or donated for schools may enhance the value of adjacent state trust land.
5. Permits up to five per cent of the income generated by the state land department to be appropriated to better manage the state trust land.
6. Authorizes agricultural and grazing trust land leases for longer than ten years without advertising or public auction....
I respectfully submit that transferring trust lands to school districts at no cost and authorizing long term grazing leases without public notice are not part and parcel of a single subject within the meaning of our constitution.
¶ 21 Indeed, the overly broad scope of this measure has left even its proponents scrambling to describe a “general topic” that will “constitute a consistent and workable whole,” as required by Kerby. 44 Ariz. at 221, 36 P.2d at 554. Appellant Preserve Arizona argued to the trial court that “all of [the initiative’s] provisions unquestionably relate to the general topic of land conservation.” Amicus Pfister expressly disagrees, submitting instead that the single purpose of the proposition is the “management of state trust land for quality growth.” Amici Groscost, Burns, McClendon, and Brown attempt to reconcile these positions by claiming that the initiative provides “inter-related tools under the penumbra of land management to promote conservation, accommodate growth and enhance the value of surrounding trust lands.” Whenever this court is asked to consider a measure’s “penumbra,” it should be alert that the single subject rule may be at risk.
¶ 22 The majority concedes that “[i]f the general topic of Proposition 100 were as amorphous as ‘state trust lands,’ we would agree that its various provisions are not adequately related to a common purpose or principle.” Supra at ¶ 15. I am not sure, however, which of the following is less vague— “state trust lands,” “land management,” “quality growth,” or “conservation.” Virtually anything having a relationship to one or more of these broad descriptive categories could be patched together under the majority’s “common purpose” analysis.
¶ 23 The danger, of course, is that similar multi-faceted proposals may be drafted to include all kinds of loosely connected items under the guise of being “inter-related tools.” One supposes, for example, that the umbrella of “environmental protection” encompasses *180such disparate threats as nuclear waste, automobile pollution, industrial chemicals, agricultural fertilizers, and pesticides. It seems clear, however, that a proposal addressing all of these together would violate Kerby.
¶ 24 I agree with the trial judge that this measure is constitutionally flawed. It is likely that a conservation-minded voter would favor saving unique trust lands, but disagree with permitting agricultural and grazing leases for longer than ten years without advertising or public auction. An education advocate may support the no-cost transfer of trust lands to school districts, but oppose the initiative’s appropriation section.
¶ 25 I do not view this case as being any different from Arizonans Against Unfair Tax Schemes v. Bayless, 199 Ariz. 180, 16 P.3d 207 (2000). There, we affirmed the trial court’s decision that an initiative violated the single-subject rule because it caged several subjects loosely related to income taxation together in one proposal.
¶ 26 Because I believe that the instant measure violates Article XXI of our constitution and fails the Kerby test, I respectfully dissent.