Court Opinion

ID: 9797684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:27:14.661195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:45.412776
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
dissenting.
¶ 50 I would affirm the trial court’s ruling that the statements at issue fall within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The majority believes that “the scene [of the accident] was not the basis for these excited utterances because, though the bystanders viewed the wreckage, their statements did not relate to it.” Ante, at ¶23. The central issue in this case is the relationship between the defendant’s speed and the accident. It is inconsistent to say that this relationship can form the basis of criminal charges but that the speed which caused the accident did not “relate to” it.
¶ 51 We have long followed the Wigmore formulation of the test for excited utterances, which requires a startling event, no opportunity for fabrication or reflection on the part of the declarant, and a relationship between the statement and the startling event. See State v. Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409, 411, 678 P.2d 1373, 1375 (1984); see also 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1750 at 202 (Chadbourn rev.1976). The crux of the exception is that the speaker is startled and excited by an event and delivers information “relating to,” not necessarily directly about, the event. See Rule 803(2), Ariz. R. Evid. This is in contrast to the more narrow present sense impression exception, Rule 803(1), which requires description of an event “made while the declarant was perceiv*583ing the event or condition or immediately thereafter.” Rule 803(1), Ariz. R. Evid.
¶ 52 The majority is uncertain about whether the startling event was: (1) being passed by the defendant at a high rate of speed; (2) witnessing the accident; or (3) coming upon the accident scene. I submit that it is irrelevant The bystanders saw the accident scene which was certainly startling. The statements at issue related to the accident scene. The bystanders had no opportunity for fabrication or reflection between observing the accident scene and making the statements.
¶ 53 Other cases have addressed the relationship required between the subject matter of an utterance and the startling event. See State v. Carr, 154 Ariz. 468, 470, 743 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1987) (finding testimony of defendant’s prior statements of intent to kill victim fell under excited utterance exception although “startling event” was actual attack, not prior statements); Yellow Cab Co. of Phoenix v. Green, 16 Ariz.App. 485, 488-89, 494 P.2d 385, 388-89 (1972) (finding excited utterance exception applied when, after a taxi accident, taxi passenger stated “Well, he could hardly get stopped at the last intersection.”). In one case, a brutal assault resulted in weeks of hospitalization and significant brain damage. See United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316, 316-17 (9th Cir.1975). Eight weeks after the assault, the victim saw a picture of her assailant in the newspaper, became agitated, and blurted out, “He killed me, he killed me.” Id. at 317. “The display of the photograph, on the facts of this case, qualifies as a sufficiently ‘startling1 event to render the statement made in response thereto admissible.” Id. at 318.
¶54 The language and intent of the rule and the cases are clear-the statement elicited by a startling event does not have to bear directly on the startling event. The only requirement is that the statement relate to the startling event. “Relate” means: “to show or establish logical or causal connection between.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1916 (1976). If we say that the speed of the defendant’s car when it passed the bystanders did not relate to the accident, then we draw into question the causal relationship between speed and the collision. See 6 Wigmore § 1754 at 226 (“[T]he matter to be ‘elucidated’ is, by hypothesis, the occurrence or act which has led to the utterance, and not some distinctly separate and prior matter.”) (emphasis in original). How could Ms. Bass’ speed have caused the accident if it did not relate to the accident?
¶ 55 The majority suggests that Rule 806 modifies Rule 803, thus providing some previously unknown right to cross examination of declarants whose statements are admittéd under Rule 803. See ante, at ¶ 31. But that cannot be. Rule 803 collects hearsay exceptions for which the “[a]vailability of [the][d]eclarant is [¡Immaterial.” Rule 803, Ariz. R. Evid. And, Rule 806 provides for cross-examination only “[i]f the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness____” Rule 806, Ariz. R. Evid. (emphasis added). If, as in if the declarant is available as a witness, which is not a requirement under Rule 803.
¶56 The majority relies heavily on the notion that because the declarants were unidentified, their statements are unreliable. However, their statements meet the reliability standards of Rule 803(2) and Wigmore. While there may be reason to believe that Ms. Farrell’s testimony is self-serving, this goes to its weight, not its admissibility. Upon cross-examination, the defendant could attack this testimony based upon Ms. Farrell’s motivation to testify and her nebulous and inconsistent descriptions of the bystanders. Instead of allowing the jury to decide questions of credibility, the majority revises the Arizona Rules of Evidence to add a new reliability determination under Rule 803(2) when the declarant is unidentified. Although we have the constitutional authority to do so, see Ariz. Const. art. 6 § 5, we have adopted procedures for doing so which call for circulation of proposed changes and public comment. See Rule 28, Ariz. R.S.Ct.
¶57 The inquiry into the existence of an excited utterance is fact-intensive.
There is a lamentable waste of time by Supreme Courts in [excited utterance determination] attempting either to create or to respect precedents. Instead of strug*584gling weakly for the impossible, they should decisively insist that every case be treated upon its own circumstances. They should, if they are able, lift themselves sensibly to the even greater height of leaving the application of the principle absolutely to the determination of the trial court.
6 Wigmore § 1750 at 221 (emphasis in original). The trial court was in the best position to determine if the bystanders’ statements were excited utterances. See Rivera, 139 Ariz. at 410, 678 P.2d at 1374 (“The modem trend is toward a liberal interpretation of this exception, leaving admissibility largely to the discretion of the court.”). Because there was no abuse of discretion here, I would affirm.