Court Opinion

ID: 9393956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 18:03:41.292506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.400858
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/11/23 Thomas v. Riverside County Dept. of Child Support Services CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 DENISE THOMAS,

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E076372

 v.                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. CSIN1900260)

 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT                                             OPINION
 OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,

          Plaintiff;

 GARY EVERETT THOMAS,

          Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Kristi Hester, Judge.

Affirmed.

         Law Offices of Ernest Calhoon and Ernest Calhoon, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

         No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

         No appearance for Plaintiff.

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                                             I.

                                     INTRODUCTION

          Denise Thomas appeals from the family court’s Order After Hearing (the OAH)
                                                                     1
denying her ex-husband’s request to reduce his child support. Denise contends the

family court erroneously ended the case by issuing the OAH without ruling on her

various discovery requests or her request to increase her ex-husband’s child support. We

affirm.

                                             II.
                                                                         2
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          Denise and her ex-husband, Gary, have a young child. In 2017, Gary was ordered

to provide child support to Denise. In 2019, the Riverside County Department of Social

Services (the Department), on Gary’s behalf, initiated this case by moving to lower his

monthly child support payment to Denise due a change in the parties’ financial

circumstances. Denise opposed the request on several grounds, including that Gary’s

earning capacity had not changed, he had not paid previously ordered child support

payments, and he had not complied with Denise’s various discovery requests. Denise

also requested that Gary’s child support obligations be reconsidered and additional

          1
       Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first
names. We mean no disrespect.
          2
         We provide only a brief overview of the facts and procedural history given our
resolution of the merits below.

                                             2
discovery ordered to determine his income. Around the same time, Denise subpoenaed

Gary to produce discovery.

       The Department’s motion was set to be heard on December 12, 2019. At the

hearing, however, Denise’s attorney, Ernest Calhoon, requested and was granted a

continuance until March 2020. The hearing was continued several times until October

15, 2020, due to the superior court’s closure caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

       In March 2020, Denise filed a motion to compel discovery from Gary. But

because the superior court was closed, the motion was not docketed and the hearing on it

was not scheduled.

       A day before the October 15, 2020 hearing, Denise filed a request that the family

court hear her motion to compel. At the hearing, the family court denied the

Department’s motion to modify Gary’s child support. In a written order after the hearing,

the family court stated it denied the motion because it did “not have sufficient

information to grant a modification at this time.” Denise timely appealed from this order.

                                            III.

                                      DISCUSSION

       Denise contends the family court erred during the December 12, 2019 and October

15, 2020 hearings by failing to enforce her subpoenas, failing to hear her motion to

compel, declining to order discovery or receive testimony to determine whether Gary’s

earning capacity had changed, and failing to rule on her request to increase Gary’s child

support.

                                             3
       We first must ensure we have jurisdiction. (See Harrington-Wisely v. State of

California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1494, 1498.) The Department’s motion on

Gary’s behalf formed the basis for this action, and Denise argues the OAH denying the

motion “end[ed] the case improperly.” Given “the conclusive nature of the [OAH], we

construe it to be a final and appealable judgment.” (Laws v. County of San Diego (1990)

219 Cal.App.3d 189, 196, fn. 8.)

       But that does not mean Denise has standing to appeal the OAH, which is another

jurisdictional prerequisite we must consider on our own. (Conservatorship of Gregory D.

(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67.) Only an “aggrieved party” has standing to appeal an

appealable order or judgment. (El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources

Control Bd. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 937, 977.) Although the family court denied the

Department’s motion in Denise’s favor by declining to reduce Gary’s child support

obligations, the court did so without ruling on her request that his obligations be revisited

with additional discovery and that his payments be increased. Denise was therefore

aggrieved by the OAH because it ended the case without resolving her outstanding

request to increase Gary’s child support payments.

       In any event, we lack a sufficient record to review Denise’s arguments. As Denise

notes, there is no reporter’s transcript from the December 12, 2019 and October 15, 2020

hearings, because the court reporter no longer works for the superior court, she did not

make a transcript of the hearings, and her notes from the hearings were unintelligible.

The minute order from the December 12 hearing states only that “[i]ssues” were

                                              4
discussed and argued by both sides and that Calhoon requested and was granted a

continuance. There is no indication that Calhoon raised issues about the subpoenas, and

Denise had not yet filed her motion to compel. In other words, we cannot tell from the

record what transpired at the hearing. We therefore cannot and do not find any reversible

error occurred at the December 12 hearing. (Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th

618, 620, fn. 1 [appellant’s failure to provide adequate record “precludes an adequate

review and results in affirmance of the trial court’s determination”]; Ballard v. Uribe

(1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [“a party challenging a judgment has the burden of showing

reversible error by an adequate record”].)

       We reach the same conclusion as to the October 15, 2020 hearing for the same

reason. There is no reporter’s transcript from the hearing. The minute order states that

“[i]ssues” were discussed with the family court, the parties presented argument, the court

denied the Department’s motion to modify Gary’s child support, and the family court

directed the Department to prepare an order. The family court then issued the OAH

stating that it denied the Department’s motion because it did “not have sufficient

information.” We cannot tell from the minute order or the OAH whether Denise raised

her discovery concerns or request for Gary’s child support payments to be increased. Nor

can we tell whether the family court properly denied her requests or simply refused to

consider them, as she asserts on appeal. In short, the record is inadequate for us to

determine whether the family court erred for the reasons Denise asserts. We therefore

must affirm.

                                             5
       We affirm for the additional reason that Denise has failed to meet her burden of
                                                3
showing reversible error in her opening brief. (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol

(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125 [appellant must affirmatively show prejudicial error

because trial court’s judgment is presumed correct].) When assessing whether Denise

has met that burden, our review is guided by the headings in the argument section of her

opening brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Opdyk v. California Horse

Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830, fn. 4.) We disregard any argument that is

not clearly identified in a heading. (Opdyk, supra, at p. 1830, fn. 4.) We also disregard

any contention that is not supported by legal authority or reasoned argument. (See Badie

v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785; Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151

Cal.App.4th 818, 822, fn. 6.)

       The argument section of Denise’s opening brief has two subsections. The first

reads in full: “1. No Record [¶] What’s there to argue – there isn’t even a record to

argue against? The matter must be reversed, of course. The Superior Court IS a court of

record, after all, or it used to be.” This conclusory argument without authority or

meaningful argument is insufficient for Denise to prove, as she must, that the family

court prejudicially erred. (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728,

738; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(C), 8.204(a)(2)(C).)

       The second subsection of the argument of Denise’s opening brief reads in full: “2.

The Balance, but There’s No Record [¶] There is much more covered above, but you all

       3
           Because Gary did not file a respondent’s brief, Denise did not file a reply brief.

                                               6
won’t allow the addressing of facts without a record, and if there might possibly be

something that happened in some other proceeding and we don’t have that other

irrelevant record to positively affirm that it’s irrelevant – when then you throw the whole

appeal out even when offered to obtain whatever it is you need (even that irrelevant and

obviously so based upon the record we had) and even when it involved a 3 year old

having her skull bashed in – but give a chance to even go get that record for you – NO –

we have to stand on formality in this court, don’t we? Children’s skulls being bashed in

be damned (and I got to hear, for the first time ever in 36 plus years in court trying cases,

a jurist swear in this matter too, from the bench, on the record, and yell and be proud of

it, but you see he was stuck toiling in municipal court functions for 8 years after

graduating from Harvard, but the jurist who ‘rescued’ him had an axe to grind – children

be damned – and rights of counsel to not have defamation per se committed against them

at private parties and more be damned – Okay, we all understand what’s going on – but

now we don’t even have a transcript to pretend anymore – This matter must be reversed –

That’s the standard of review here, no discretion, not even De Novo – A Mulligan would

have to be allowed even if no mistakes were made, but pretty much all the court below

was make mistakes, and there’s not even a record to pretend about here at taxpayer

expense. We’ll have to see how that works out for you all? And for the children.)”

Denise goes on to block-quote several state and federal cases discussing the duty clerks

of court have to file documents presented to the trial court.

                                              7
       Denise’s second argument is inadequate to meet her burden of proving reversible

error. She provides no coherent explanation as to how the family court erred by denying

or failing to address her requests. And although she cites some authority, she fails to

explain how it supports her position. Her quoting various passages from cases, “without

pertinent argument or an attempt to apply the law to the circumstances of this case, is

inadequate” to show prejudicial error. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149

Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)

       Finally, even if the family court erred, Denise makes no attempt to explain why

the family court’s purported errors were prejudicial. She does not explain how the family

court’s failure to rule on her various discovery requests harmed her, why she would have

obtained a more favorable result had the court ordered her requested discovery, or why

the court likely would have increased Gary’s child support payments had the court ruled

on her request. For this reason alone, she failed to meet her burden on appeal. (See

Bianco v. California Highway Patrol, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1125 [appellant must

show that trial court erred and that error was prejudicial].)

       Simply put, Denise has made no cogent argument showing that the family court

committed reversible error. We therefore affirm.

                                              8
                                        IV.

                                  DISPOSITION

      The family court’s October 30, 2020 OAH is affirmed. Gary may recover his

costs on appeal.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                          CODRINGTON
                                                                                  J.

We concur:

MILLER
                   Acting P. J.

SLOUGH
                             J.

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