Court Opinion

ID: 9730340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:09:28.365118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:05.942479
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. As recently as February 28, 1977, this Court reiterated its recognition that because of the irreversible nature of an involuntary termination decree, and because of the severe emotional impact that such a decree might have *19upon the parties, such action should be taken only when it is “ . . . clearly warranted by a preponderance of the evidence.” Adoption of Baby Girl Fleming, 471 Pa. 73, 76, 369 A.2d 1200, 1202 (1977). See also, McAhren Adoption, 460 Pa. 63, 331 A.2d 419 (1975); Sarver Adoption, 444 Pa. 507, 281 A.2d 890 (1971). The burden of proof has, until today, always been on the party seeking the involuntary termination, Adoption of Baby Girl Fleming, supra; Adoption of McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 331 A.2d 652 (1975), to establish by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the parent whose rights are sought to be terminated has either “refused or failed to perform parental duties” or “evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim.” Adoption Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620 § 311, 1 P.S. § 311 (Supp.1977). The majority today overturns, sub silentio, this long established standard for assessing the sufficiency of the evidence in an involuntary termination proceeding.
Furthermore, the majority misperceives and misstates this Court’s scope of review in a case such as this. The majority states that our review in the instant case is “. limited to determining whether the decree of the orphans’ court is supported by competent evidence.” (at p. 5). This statement is correct only when the orphans’ court decree has granted the petition for involuntary termination of parental rights. As stated in Adoption of M.T.T., 467 Pa. 88, 91, 354 A.2d 564, 566 (1976), a case relied upon by the majority, our review,
“is limited to determining from the record whether the hearing court’s finding of abandonment is supported by competent evidence. Sheaffer Appeal, 452 Pa. 165, 305 A.2d 36 (1973); Vaders Adoption Case, 444 Pa. 428, 282 A.2d 359 (1971); Hookey Adoption Case, 419 Pa. 583, 215 A.2d 860 (1966); Harvey Adoption Case, 375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d 276 (1953).” (Emphasis added.)
Where, as here, the trial court has refused to grant the involuntary termination petition, holding that the petitioner has failed to sustain her burden of establishing either “refusal or failure to perform” or “a settled purpose of relin*20quishing parental claim,” we cannot reverse unless the record shows that the petitioner has met the burden of establishing these statutory prerequisites by a clear preponderance of the evidence. Adoption of Baby Girl Fleming; supra; McAhren Adoption, supra; Sarver Adoption, supra. Notwithstanding these cases, the majority states that the decree of the orphans’ court must be reversed, and appellee’s rights to his natural child terminated, because the refusal of orphans’ court to terminate appellee’s parental rights, “is not supported by the record” (at p. 5). This statement is but one of six which indicate the majority’s erroneous perception of the law as to who bears the burden of proof in an involuntary termination case. Other such misstatements include:
“There is no competent evidence supporting the orphans’ court’s finding that appellee affirmatively performed the essential parental duties of ‘care, control, love, protection, support and subsistence.’ (Citation omitted.) (At 7).
Based on this record, it cannot be said that appellee took affirmative action to provide his son with the necessary ‘love, protection, guidance and support,’ all of which was being provided by appellant. (Citation omitted.) (at p. 8)
The record is devoid of evidence that appellee used any other means ‘to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.’ (Citations omitted.) (at p. 8)
Appellee clearly ‘has refused or failed to perform parental duties’ within the meaning of section 311(1) of the 1970 Adoption Act. The orphans’ court’s contrary conclusion is not supported by competent evidence. (Citation omitted.) (at pp. 13, 14)
*21There is insufficient evidence to sustain the orphans’ court’s conclusion that appellant failed to prove that appellee, for a six month period, evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights or refused or failed to perform his parental duties.” (at p. 17)
It is true, as stated by the majority, that a parent has the affirmative duty to provide “love, protection, guidance and support” (at p. 8), we have never required the parent to bear the burden, in a termination hearing, of establishing such positive performance. Rather, the burden has rightly been placed, until today, upon the party seeking the involuntary termination, to prove by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that the natural parent has failed or refused to meet these affirmative obligations.
Appellant’s adoption petition alleged, inter alia, that appellee had abandoned his rights to the child. The trial court concluded, after hearing, that appellant had failed to prove that at any time throughout the child’s life appellant had demonstrated an intent to relinquish his parental claim. Appellant had argued, and introduced evidence in an effort to prove, that appellee had failed to support, visit, or communicate with the child. The court found to the contrary. Furthermore, the trial court found that there was no evidence to indicate the existence of any “incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal” that could not or would not be remedied by appellant. My reading of the hearing transcript, and of the relevant statutory and case law confirms the correctness of the court’s ruling.
As I noted earlier, the burden of proof is on the party seeking termination (appellant here) to establish either conduct for a period in excess of six months evidencing a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or conduct indicating a refusal or failure to perform parental duties, which failure or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
The record reveals the following. Since the child’s birth in 1965 until the court awarded custody of the child to the appellant in 1973, support payments were made, as the trial court found, with “substantial regularity from 1966 until 1973.” After 1973, appellee stopped paying support.
*22Failure to support, standing alone, however, is not conclusive of an intent to relinquish parental rights. See e.g. Vadera Adoption Case, 444 Pa. 428, 282 A.2d 359 (1971). Appellee testified that he stopped paying support after April 1973 because the support payments he had been making were made to the child’s mother who was now dead. He stated that he then sought full custody and, having lost the custody suit, stopped paying support because the child was then living with appellant, whose income was much greater than his, and because no one told him he was supposed to continue making support payments. Although appellee may have been remiss in failing to provide any support at all for the period subsequent to April 1973,1 do not think this alone evidences an intent to abandon the child. To the contrary, the testimony reveals that appellee fully intended to gain custody following his former wife’s death and lost in his legal attempt to do so. Moreover, appellant admitted that she never sought any support payments from appellee.
Appellant also urges that appellee’s record of visits and communications with the child evidences an intent to relinquish parental claims. In the nine years of the child’s life the father visited him only three times, and communicated only with sporadic birthday and Christmas cards, letters, and telephone calls. In Appeal of Diane B, 456 Pa. 429, 321 A.2d 618 (1974), we held that a parent has a responsibility to provide care, control, and subsistence for his or her child, has a duty to love, protect, and support the child, and that this parental obligation was a positive duty requiring affirmative performance. The trial court in this case looked, properly I think, to the situation in which appellee found himself and concluded that under the circumstances, appellee’s failure to take more frequent affirmative action was justified, see Adoption of Farabelli, 460 Pa. 423, 333 A.2d 846 (1975), and that therefore, appellant had failed to meet her burden of establishing abandonment on this ground.
In the instant case the child has lived in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania area all of his life, while appellee has, because of his employment, been located in Troy, New York, Toledo, *23Ohio, and is presently living in Tampa, Florida. The substantial distances involved, combined with appellee’s modest annual income (ranging from $7,800 in 1966 to $13,000 at the time of the hearing) provide sufficient reason for the infrequency of appellee’s visits. As to the lack of communication, appellee testified to the fact of his infrequent telephone calls and letters, saying:
“You know, it is kind of difficult to write letters to a person that you don’t really know that well, especially a child. What do you say to a child? Like I said, how do you call a kid when he is four or five years old when he seen you once when he was a year and a half, and say, ‘Hello, I am your father.’ I never called David because what do you say to a child? I didn’t know him or see him except that one time when he was a year and a half old until his mother’s death. Since then I have called him and written him. But even now it is difficult. What do you say to a child that you don’t know that well, ‘Hi, how are you, what are you doing?’ What do you put in the letter?”
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly concluded that appellant had not sustained her burden of clearly showing that appellee had either refused or failed to perform his parental duties or evidenced an intent to abandon his child. I would therefore affirm the decree of the orphans’ court.