Court Opinion

ID: 9850743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:17.407317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:42.683595
License: Public Domain

McFarland, J.,
dissenting: I would affirm the district court. The proposed annexation herein is under K.S.A. 12-520c. A condition of any annexation petition under the statute by a city is that “[t]he owner or owners of the land petition for or consent in writing to the annexation of such land.”
As we stated in City of Lenexa v. City of Olathe, 233 Kan. 159, 164, 660 P.2d 1368 (1983):
“The general purpose of the annexation statutes is to protect the rights of landowners against unilateral action by a city in annexing their land. Clarke v. City of Wichita, 218 Kan. at 348; Grandon v. City of Hutchinson, 6 Kan. App. 2d at 899. Because all the land involved here was land which the owners petitioned the city to annex, this general objective has been served.”
In the City of Lenexa. case there was a defect in the publication notice under K.S.A. 12-523 at issue. We held:
“If that were the only objective the publication requirement in K.S.A. 12-523 would be redundant. However, the publication requirement is there. It can be assumed the legislature intended publication to be of some importance and not merely a useless or meaningless act when it passed K.S.A. 12-523. Herd v. Chambers, 158 Kan. 614, 628, 149 P.2d 583 (1944).
“ ‘Publication’ refers to ‘An advising of the public; a making known of something to them for a purpose.’ Regarding the publishing of ordinances publication means ‘printing or otherwise reproducing copies of them and distributing them in such a manner as to make their contents easily accessible to the public.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1463-64 (3rd ed. 1933). The definition reveals the purpose behind the publication requirement. The objective of K.S.A. 12-523 is to inform the public of the city boundaries as a result of annexation. Thus, for publication of an annexation ordinance to properly serve its purpose the public must be accurately informed of what land is to be annexed.” 233 Kan. at 164.
*161The City of Lenexa case was one of a number of annexation cases that arose out of Johnson County at a time when various municipalities in the county were experiencing rapid growth and were hungrily eyeing undeveloped areas in the county. Each city was concerned that its future growth would be stymied by annexation policies of the other cities. Happily, this problem has been resolved by an agreement whereby the county has essentially been divvied up for future annexation. It is undisputed that the tract before us is in Lenexa’s portion. Ultimately, if annexed to any municipality, the tract will be part of Lenexa. If the petition is approved by this island annexation procedure, the tract will become part of Lenexa before its boundaries become contiguous with those of that city. But for emphasis it is repeated, this is not unilateral annexation — the landowner has consented to the annexation of its property.
I believe this fact restricts the issues. K.S.A. 12-520c(a)(3) provides:
“The board of county commissioners of the county find and determine that the annexation of such land will not hinder or prevent the proper growth and development of the area or that of any other incorporated city located within such county.”
The requirement that the annexation not hinder or prevent the proper growth and development of any other city is not involved herein. We are confronted only with whether or not the annexation will hinder or prevent proper growth and development in the area. The annexation, itself, is apparently not a problem with any of the “contras” herein. It is the anticipated use of the property upon annexation which has caused the neighboring property owners to arm themselves with staves and pitchforks. Yet the objected-to use, a rock quarry, asphalt plant, etc., is the subject of a pending special use permit proceeding now on appeal to the district court. I believe that is the proper forum for the controversy herein.
In the matter before us, the “hindering or preventing” determination is confined to the annexation itself. Here, the proposed use is upfront and known. In many instances it would not be. Let us assume the 328 acres had been owned and farmed for many years by a Miss Annie Purvis. She petitions Lenexa for *162annexation for the stated reason she had always had a hankering to be a Lenexa resident. What would be the scope of the “hindering or preventing” determination? It would be confined simply to how the annexation of the Purvis tract by Lenexa would affect the area. Forgetting about the agreement among the various municipalities for the moment, let us assume the Purvis tract, called tract A, lies much closer to Overland Park than to Lenexa. If the Purvis tract lies between tract B and Overland Park, granting the annexation could seriously hinder and certainly delay development of tract B. The extension of Lenexa services to the area could be 20 or 30 years away. Overland Park might be ready to expand its services within five years. Certainly, this factor would be extremely important in determining whether or not to grant annexation to Lenexa. This scenario underscores the problem with considering the proposed use of the property in determining whether or not to grant the annexation petition. Let us further assume Miss Purvis’ wish to be part of Lenexa is granted. Six months later, she petitions Lenexa for a special use permit to operate a rock quarry on the property. Even if it could be established that operation of a rock quarry had been her real goal all along (she had a lucrative option contract with the Holland Corporation in the drawer which predated the annexation proceedings), this fact could never be used to invalidate the annexation. The irate adjoining landowners would have their forum in the special use permit proceedings.
The fact that the proposed use is “up front” in the case before us, coupled with the fact Lenexa has granted the permit (which is on appeal at the present time) should not, in my opinion, expand the issues in the annexation to include those properly in the special use permit proceedings. As the district court held in its memorandum opinion, to interject the proposed usage into the annexation proceeding improperly transfers Lenexa’s zoning prerogatives to the board of county commissioners.
I can well understand the adjoining landowners’ concerns herein, but their forum is the special use permit proceedings, not the annexation proceedings. I would affirm the district court.