Court Opinion

ID: 9373355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:24.291317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.127100
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KATHLEEN MARY KAPLAN,                           DOCKET NUMBERS
                 Appellant,                          DC-1221-15-1065-W-1
                                                     DC-1221-16-0503-W-1
                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
                 Agency.                             DATE: October 3, 2022

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Kathleen Mary Kaplan, Arlington, Virginia, pro se.

           Jeremiah Crowley, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed petitions for review of the initial decisions, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeals for lack of jurisdiction .
     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the petitions for review and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     REMAND the cases to the Washington Regional Office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant filed two IRA appeals—one on August 17, 2015, Kaplan v.
     Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-15-1065-W-1, Initial
     Appeal File (1065 IAF), Tab 1, and one on April 14, 2016, Kaplan v. Department
     of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-16-0503-W-1, Initial Appeal File
     (0503 IAF), Tab 1.      In these appeals, the appellant alleged that the agency
     subjected her to several personnel actions, including a reprimand, a suspension, a
     negative contribution evaluation, and depriving her of fellowship opportunities, in
     retaliation for disclosures concerning improper workplace relationship s, misuse
     of Government funds, violation of hiring and appraisal rules, and physical threats
     against her.   1065 IAF, Tab 6 at 21-33; 0503 IAF, Tab 7 at 12-30.                 The
     administrative judge joined the appeals for processing. 2 1065 IAF, Tab 19 at 1.
¶3        The    administrative   judge   found    that   the   appellant   exhausted   her
     administrative remedies with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and that she
     made a nonfrivolous allegation that at least one of her disclosures was protected
     and was a contributing factor in at least one personnel a ction. Id. He therefore
     found that the appellant established jurisdiction over the joined appeals, and he
     scheduled a hearing on the merits. 1065 IAF, Tab 19 at 1, Tab 27. The appeals
     then were reassigned to another administrative judge. 1065 IAF, Tab 43.
¶4        Prior to the scheduled hearing, the administrative judge issued two separate
     initial decisions dismissing the appeals of lack of jurisdiction. 1065 IAF, Tab 52 ,
     Initial Decision (1065 ID); 0503 IAF, Tab 52, Initial Decision (0503 ID). In both
     cases, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to make a

     2
       Although the order states that the appeals were consolidated, we find that they were
     joined. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(a).
                                                                                             3

     nonfrivolous allegation that any of her disclosures were protected.              1065 ID
     at 7-10; 0503 ID at 7-12.
¶5         The appellant has filed identical petitions for review in both appeals.
     Kaplan v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-15-1065-
     W-1, Petition for Review (1065 PFR) File, Tab 1; Kaplan v. Department of the
     Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-16-0503-W-1, Petition for Review (0503
     PFR) File, Tab 1. She expresses confusion about whether the appeals remain
     joined, and she objects to the dismissals for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that
     the original administrative judge assigned to these appeals already found that she
     met her jurisdictional burden. 1065 PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-12. She also disputes
     the substance of the initial decisions.        Id. at 12-33.     The agency has filed
     responses to the petitions for review, 1065 PFR File, Tab 4; 0503 PFR File,
     Tab 4, and the appellant has filed replies to the agency’ s responses, 1065 PFR
     File, Tab 5; 0503 PFR File, Tab 5. 3

     3
       After the close of the record on review, the appellant filed motions to disqualify the
     administrative judge. 1065 PFR File, Tab 7; 0503 PFR File, Tab 7. We deny the
     appellant’s motions as untimely. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.42(b), a party must file such a
     motion as soon as she has reason to believe that there is a basis for disqualification. In
     this case the appellant was aware of the alleged bias, conflict of interest, and improper
     comments underlying her motions for disqualification before she filed her petitions for
     review, 1065 PFR File, Tab 7 at 17; 0503 PFR File, Tab 7 at 17, yet she waited more
     than a year after the close of the record to file her motion s for disqualification. The
     delay was apparently due in part to the appellant’s decision to await the outcome of a
     complaint that she filed against the administrative judge with the Utah State Bar Office
     of Professional Conduct, Utah being the jurisdiction in which the administrative judge
     is licensed to practice law. However, the Office of Professional Conduct determined
     that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the administrative judge engaged in
     misconduct or that he should otherwise have recused himself from the appellant’s case s.
     1065 PFR File, Tab 7 at 12-13; 0503 PFR File, Tab 7 at 12-13. Hence, this evidence
     provides no support for the appellant’s motions and no basis for the Board to consider
     her untimely filings under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k). Moreover, we note that the
     appellant waited an additional 7 months to file her motion s after the Office of
     Professional Conduct issued its letter.
                                                                                       4

                                        ANALYSIS
¶6        Based on how these appeals were processed below, it is not clear whether
     they remain joined for processing. There does not appear to have been an order
     to undo the joinder action, yet the appeals were dismissed in separate initial
     decisions. To clarify matters at this stage of the proceedings, we JOIN these
     appeals. The parties should continue to follow the instructions in the original
     joinder order and file all of their submissions under the lead docket number until
     further notice. 1065 IAF, Tab 19 at 1.
¶7        The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts her
     administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that
     (1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
     protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),
     and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the
     agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(a).     Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 6 (2014).
     Although the administrative judge originally assigned to these appeals found th at
     the appellant met her jurisdictional burden, there is no procedural rule to prevent
     that order from being reconsidered and reversed.       See, e.g., Van Lancker v.
     Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 514, ¶ 3 (2013); Williams v. Defense
     Logistics Agency, 34 M.S.P.R. 54, 57-58 (1987). Nevertheless, for the reasons set
     forth below, we find that the appellant has, in fact established jurisdiction over
     her appeals.
¶8        Specifically, the initial jurisdictional ruling was that the appellant made a
     nonfrivolous allegation that she disclosed an abuse of authority when she reported
     to multiple agency officials that her supervisor had an “unprofessional
     relationship” with one of his subordinates and was allowing her to misuse travel
     funds and work less time than she was reporting on her time cards. 1065 IAF,
     Tab 6 at 24-25, Tab 19 at 1. However, the ruling in the initial decision was that
     the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she reasonably
                                                                                       5

     believed this disclosure evidenced gross mismanagement or a gross waste of
     funds. 1065 ID at 8-9; 0503 ID at 8-9. The administrative judge does not appear
     to have considered whether the appellant’s disclosure might have evidenced an
     abuse of authority, as the first administrative judge found.     1065 ID at 8 -9;
     1065 IAF, Tab 19 at 1. Based on our review of the record, we agree with the
     initial ruling. An “abuse of authority” is an arbitrary or capricious exercise of
     power by a Federal official or employee that adversely affects the rights of any
     person or that results in personal gain or advantage to himself or to preferred
     other persons. Herman v. Department of Justice, 115 M.S.P.R. 386, ¶ 11 (2011).
     We find that the supervisor’s actions as the appellant describes them—
     preferential treatment of a subordinate based not on merit but on a personal
     relationship—could fall within this definition. 1065 IAF, Tab 6 at 24-25; see
     Sirgo v. Department of Justice, 66 M.S.P.R. 261, 267 (1995). We also find that
     the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that she reasonably beli eved her
     disclosure evidenced violations of a law, rule, or regulation concerning time and
     attendance reporting and use of Government travel funds.
¶9        We further find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation under the
     knowledge/timing test of 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e), that this disclosure was a
     contributing factor in a formal reprimand—a personnel action under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii). See Rice v. Department of Agriculture, 97 M.S.P.R. 501,
     ¶ 15 (2004). Specifically, the appellant alleged that she made this disclosure to
     her supervisor on August 7, 2012, and that her supervisor issued her a reprimand
     on October 23, 2013. 1065 IAF, Tab 6 at 23, 25, Tab 7 at 81; see Peterson v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 16 (2011) (finding that
     personnel actions taken within 1 to 2 years of the protected disclosure satisfy the
     timing prong of the knowledge/timing test). Finally, we find that the appellant
     exhausted her administrative remedies on this issue before OSC. 1065 IAF, Tab 1
     at 56-57, Tab 7 at 8, 12.    We therefore agree with the initial ruling that the
     appellant has established jurisdiction over her appeals. IAF, Tab 19 at 1.
                                                                                           6

¶10         The appellant has raised numerous other disclosures in these appeals—as
      many as 18 others—although there appears to be some overlap among the claims
      raised in the two appeals. 1065 IAF, Tab 6 at 22-33; 0503 IAF, Tab 7 at 12-30.
      The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous
      allegation that any of these other disclosures were protected because they did not
      concern gross mismanagement or a gross waste of funds. 4            1065 ID at 7-9;
      0503 ID at 8-9.     Again, the administrative judge does not appear to have
      considered whether any of these other disclosures might have evidenced any other
      category of danger or wrongdoing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). On remand, the
      administrative judge should conduct an individualized analysis, as appropriate,
      for each of these other disclosures to determine whether any of them might be
      protected as evidencing a violation of law, rule, or regulation, an abuse of
      authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety. See
      Horton v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 106 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 16 n.* (2007)
      (determining that the Board does not require, as a basis for its jurisdiction, that an
      appellant in an IRA appeal correctly label a category of wrongdoing under the
      Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA)). Furthermore, to the extent that any of the
      appellant’s disclosures were to the agency’s Inspector General or to OSC, the
      administrative judge should consider whether they are protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C).
¶11         The administrative judge made some more specific findings regarding two
      of the appellant’s disclosures.      Specifically, he found that the appellant’s
      disclosure concerning the legality of an agency performance appraisal process
      was not protected under the WPA because she made it in the context of judicial
      review proceedings of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission decision.

      4
       The administrative judge relied, in part, on case law stating that gross mismanagement
      must include an element of blatancy. 1065 ID at 8; 0503 ID at 8. This case law has
      been explicitly overruled. White v. Department of the Air Force, 391 F.3d 1377, 1383
      (Fed. Cir. 2004).
                                                                                            7

      0503 IAF, Tab 7 at 23; 0503 ID at 10-11. He also found that the appellant failed
      to make a nonfrivolous allegation that her disclosure concerning the conduct of an
      agency attorney was not protected under the WPA because she made it in the
      context of equal employment opportunity proceedings. 0503 IAF, Tab 7 at 29;
      0503 ID at 11. We agree. See Serrao v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 95 F.3d
      1569, 1576 (1996); Fisher v. Department of Defense, 52 M.S.P.R. 470, 473
      (1992). We therefore affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant
      failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that either of these two disclosures were
      protected. 5

                                             ORDER
¶12         For the reasons discussed above, we remand these cases to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                      /s/ for
                                                  Jennifer Everling
                                                  Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      5
        The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous
      allegation that either of these two disclosures wer e a contributing factor in any
      personnel action. 0503 ID at 11. In light of our finding that these disclosures were not
      protected, we decline to reach the issue of contributing factor.