Court Opinion

ID: 9676260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:19:22.364753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:46.510348
License: Public Domain

ZINTER, Justice
(concurring).
[¶ 17.] I concur because, in addition to the Court’s analysis, most courts conclude that relatives do not have a legally protect-able interest in another relative’s adoption. Lacking a legally protectable interest in their grandniece’s adoption, Degens were not entitled to intervene as a matter of right under SDCL 15-6-24(a)(2).4 I also write because the Legislature has explicitly precluded such interventions in adoptions. Therefore, 'Degens’ public policy arguments do not provide an alternative right of intervention.
[¶ 18.] As the Court notes, South Dakota’s intervention statute is almost identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), which is generally construed liberally in favor .of the proposed intervenor. United States, v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1158 (8thCir.1995). Liberality, however, •“ ‘does not equate with rights of indiscriminate intervention’ and the rule continues to set bounds that must be Observed.” 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, ■ Federal Practice and Procedure § 1904 (2d ed. 1986). The rule must be followed to protect the “original parties[’] ... interest in the prompt disposition of their controversy and the public[’s] ... interest in efficient disposition of court business.” Id. This case demonstrates the reason for this caveat because D.M.’s termination of parental rights and adoption proceedings, including two intervention attempts and two appeals to this Court, have now consumed four of the nine years of her life..
[¶ 19.] Under Rule 24, most jurisdictions conclude that after a Ghild has been placed for adoption,' even close relative's wishing to adopt lack the legally protecta-ble interest necessary to intervene and *448litigate as a matter of right. See In re Adoption of H.M.C., 11 S.W.3d 81, 89-90 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (using the Missouri Supreme Court’s definition of “interest” to conclude that even closer relatives (grandparents) did not have the legally protecta-ble interest necessary to intervene as a matter of right under Missouri’s similar version of Rule 24); In re Adoption of C.C.L.B., 305 Mont. 22, 28-29, 22 P.3d 646, 650 (2001) (concluding that the public policy underlying various statutes and department policies did not provide relatives with a legally protectable interest under a similar version of Rule 24); In re Adoption of Hilliard, 154 Ohio App.3d 54, 56, 796 N.E.2d 46, 48 (2003) (concluding that relatives have no “conditional or ... unconditional right to intervene”); Christian Placement Serv. v. Gordon, 102 N.M. 465, 472, 697 P.2d 148, 155 (N.M.Ct.App.1986) (concluding that a relative, “[s]imply by virtue of her status of grandparent,” was not able to intervene as a matter of right) (partially superseded by statute); Petition of Benavidez, 52 Ill.App.3d 626, 628, 367 N.E.2d 971, 973, 10 Ill.Dec. 362, 364 (1977) (holding that relatives have no “right to intervene in a private adoption where there is no question of the fitness of the adopting parents or the correctness of the mother’s consent, but only the question of whether the grandparents have a preference”); In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (concluding that “[t]here is nothing in the statute [that] provides for the intervention of grandparents [in the adoption proceeding,] and we see no useful purpose in their being permitted to do so as a matter of right”).5
*449[¶ 20.] Rather than citing contrary authority, Degens rely upon a public' policy for a family preference underlying a 2005 legislative enactment. See 2005 SD Sess. Laws Gh. 140, §§ 1-3 (amending SDCL 26-7A-19 and enacting SDCL 26-7A-19.1 and 26-8A-29.1 effective July 1, 2005). I agree with the Court’s observation that this legislation came' “too late” to benefit Degens, and the legislation only provides a family preference in the abuse and neglect proceedings.6 Supra ¶ 9.
■ [¶ 21.] Furthermore, even if the 2005 legislation applied, it explicitly prohibited a relative’s intervention in an adoption proceeding. Newly enacted SDCL 26-8A-29.1 plainly states “[n]o intervention may be allowed in ... an adoption ... proceeding.” Thus, the 2005 legislation could not have confirmed some public policy allowing Degens’ claim of right to intervene in a relative’s adoption.7
[¶ 22.] The Legislature’s express prohibition regarding intervention in adoption proceedings is understandable, considering strong' countervailing public policies. An Illinois court explained, one such countervailing public policy:
We note also that there is a grave matter of public policy implicit in the contention of the grandparents that they have a right to intervene because they are the grandparents and are the preferred parties in an adoption case. In the absence of a statute giving the grandparents a preference (which might be unconstitutionally discriminatory) where are we to stop in allowing relatives to block a proposed. adoption? Is an uncle or aunt in a less favorable position than a grandparent? Indeed, an adult cousin may have closer ties to the child than a grandparent. In many countries it is customary for a brother to adopt his deceased brother's children and the cases are legion in both fact and fiction, viz., David Copperfield and Tom Sawyer, of an aunt adopting a deceased sister’s child. How can we draw the line at- grandparents? Are we to subject every adoption to the hazard of being disrupted or pre-empted by an intervening relative who learns of it midway in *450its course? While consents cannot legally be required of such relatives, their rights to intervene might very well cause further delays and “red tape” in the adoption process and pose to prospective adopting parents and agencies the frustrating question whether to ignore such a possibility and be unpleasantly surprised half-way through the adoption, or to invite trouble by attempting to get some sort of waiver from the close relatives of the child. Nor can we overlook the possibility that such relationship might be exploited for the benefit of the relatives, disregarding the child’s best interests. A decision which invites such unwelcome possibilities would, we think, be contrary to public policy.
The trial court found that in the absence of any allegations of unfitness on the part of the adopting parents or any question relative to the mother’s consent or the termination of the putative father’s rights, there was no legal basis for the petition to intervene. We agree.
Petition of Benavidez, 52 Ill.App.3d 626, 630, 367 N.E.2d 971, 974-75, 10 Ill.Dec. 362, 365-66 (1977).
[¶ 23.] Considering the facts that there was no applicable law giving Degens a legally protected interest in this adoption, there are conflicting public policies concerning this matter, and the 2005 Legislature expressed its policy on this type of intervention, this Court has no authority to retroactively impose a contrary policy and afford rights that the Legislature has specifically rejected.
[¶ 24.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, joins this special writing.

. Degens did not make an argument for permissive intervention under SDCL' 15-6-24(b) or an argument for intervention, as a matter of right under SDCL 15-6-24(a)(l).

. The Court cites three cases suggesting that some states have, under different statutes, permitted relatives to intervene in adoption proceedings. See supra ¶ 11. While the Court acknowledges that these cases "offer little guidance because of their dependence on their own state statutes,” the cases actually provide no guidance in determining the right to intervene under Rule 24.
In re Adoption of B.T., 150 Wash.2d 409, 78 P.3d 634 (2003), is inapposite because it only involved the question of standing; i.e., who could petition for adoption. The Washington court noted that "the issue before [that court was] whether grandparents [had] standing to even petition the court for the adoption of their grandchild.” Id. at 417, 78 P.3d at 638. In answering that question, the court looked "to the statutes to define standing in the adoption process.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, In re Adoption of B.T. did not involve the right to intervene in a third party's adoption under Rule 24.
In Baker v. Webb, 127 S.W.3d 622 (Ky.2004), a divided court did consider a biological relative’s (second cousin's) request for intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24. Although the court found a sufficient interest, the case involved statutes and formally adopted administrative regulations that clearly provided "a preference for relative placement in adoption proceedings." Id. at 625 (emphasis added). Thus, a legally protectable interest was provided by statute. However, as is explained hereinafter, South Dakota does not have a regulation or statute granting such a preference in adoption proceedings.
Finally, in Matter of B.C., 749 P.2d 542 (Okla.1988), the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that foster parents could intervene as a matter a right because they were "in loco parentis.” Id. at 545. Under Oklahoma law, " ‘in loco parentis' means in place of a parent, and a 'person in loco parentis' [is] defined as one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent without a formal adoption.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, the foster parents, who had cared for and treated the child as a member of their family for approximately six and a half years, were "persons in loco parentis.” Id. Their status as "persons in loco parentis” also provided them with "standing to intervene and to assert their justiciable interest in the adoption.” Id. Unlike Matter of B.C., however, D.M. has never become a member of the Degen family by residing with them for an extended period of time. Therefore, Degens did not possess in loco parentis status. On the contrary, only the foster family (who ultimately adopted D.M.) held in loco parentis status sufficient to *449establish a legally protectable interest under the reasoning of Matter ofB.C.

. I also agree that DSS’s internal policy of providing adoptive preference to family members, as reflected in its procedures manual, does not provide Degens with .a legally pro-tectable interest. See supra 11 12. The policy is only an executive branch policy that guides and assists DSS employees in making their discretionary recommendations for placement and adoption. The policy does not, however, purport to extend a legally protectable interest in extended relatives. In fact, because DSS's internal procedure manual was not adopted as an administrative rule of South Dakota, it could not have afforded Degens a legally protectable interest in the adoption of any child. Internal policies generally do not create a legally protectable interest because only duly “adopted” rules express "the will of the” State, and only duly “adopted” rules have the "force of law.” See SDCL 1-1-23 (providing that the will of the sovereign is expressed through various methods including "[r]ules. of practice and procedure adopted by departments”); Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., 449 N.W.2d 240, 243 (S.D.1989) (concluding that "rules and regulations of an administrative agency governing proceedings before it, duly adopted and within the authority of the agency are binding as if they were statutes enacted by the legislature”) (citations omitted). See also Feltrop v. South Dakota Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 1997 SD 13, ¶ 5, 559 N.W.2d 883, 884 (recognizing that only "[a]d-ministrative rules have the force of law and are presumed valid”) (citations omitted).

. The dissent suggests that this writing has applied the "detriment of the amended statutes” without applying the "benefit.” See infra n. 8. However, it is Degens rather than this writing that seek to apply some but not all of the policy underlying the 2005 amendments.