Court Opinion

ID: 9795119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:20:44.521717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:27:59.682897
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
with whom BRYNER, Justice, joins, dissenting.
The trial court did not find that active efforts to preserve T.F.'s family relationship with the children had proved to be unsue-cessful. Further, if such a finding had been made, it would not have been supported by the record. Because subsection 1912(d) of ICWA requires a showing that active efforts "have proved unsuccessful," and as to TF. such a showing was neither found nor made, I dissent.
I.
The State's ICWA-imposed duty to provide active family-saving efforts to T.F. was not triggered until February 29, 2000. At that point a paternity test demonstrated that he was the father of the children. When the test results were received the termination trial was scheduled to take place in six weeks. That schedule was never altered. What active efforts did the State make with respect to TF.?
What DFYS did was to formulate a case plan and arrange three visits between TF. and the children. The case plan itself does not qualify as a family uniting effort because the stated objective of the plan was adoption.
The three visits were initiated by T.F. When he called the DFYS social worker to request the visits she attempted to dissuade him. Ultimately, however, she relented and the visits took place. T.F. also availed himself of a number of prison-operated programs. These included a parenting class, a class on fetal alcohol consequences, substance abuse treatment, and group therapy sessions. These programs can be considered active efforts that might satisfy ICWA.1
The prison programs and the three visits arranged by DFYS were a good start toward compliance with ICWA's active efforts requirement. But they had no real chance of success at uniting T.F. with his children because they were cut short by the termination decree.
As noted, ICWA requires that before there can be a termination of parental rights the active efforts that have been made must prove to be unsuccessful2 The trial court made no finding as to T.F. that the efforts had proved unsuccessful. The closest the court came was to find that "the department did not receive cooperation from the parties." The lack of cooperation finding was directed only at TF 's failure to take the paternity test scheduled for October 18. The court did not find that TF. was uncooperative with respect to any of the efforts that were taken after the test established his paternity. More to the point, for ICWA purposes, the court did not find that any of these efforts had proved unsuccessful. If these efforts are to be counted as meeting the "active efforts" requirement of subsection 1912(d) of ICWA, they must ultimately be unsuccessful.
My reading of the record indicates that onee T.F'.'s paternity was established he showed no lack of willingness to participate in the prison rehabilitation programs and took the initiative to arrange visits with his children. The record does not show cither *1098that the visits or TF.'s participation in the prisoner programs were unsuccessful.
In K.N. v. State, we addressed the burden of proof required under subsection 1912(d), holding that the State was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it had - made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family and that those efforts had been unsuccessful.3 In that case, we approved as active and unsuccessful the State's efforts to provide services to the father, finding that his refusal to work with DFYS, his denial of his mental problems, and his recalcitrant attitude toward treatment demonstrated that the State's efforts had been unsuccessful*4 The present case does not present analogous facts, as there was no showing regarding the failure of the State's efforts with regard to TF. Other states interpreting ICWA have required an affirmative showing by the state that its efforts have been unsuccessful.5
In 1998 the legislature mandated strict and short time schedules for filing termination petitions and holding termination trials.6 Acting in response to this new mandate, DFYS and the trial court put this termination proceeding on a fast track. After TF. was determined to be the father of the children, the active efforts to unite him with his children were unsuccessful because they were necessarily ended by the termination decree. But under ICWA lack of success is a precondition to termination. Termination cannot serve as the reason why active efforts fail to succeed. It should go without saying based on the supremacy clause of the federal constitution 7 that the requirements of ICWA must be observed even if that means some slippage in the state statutory scheduling requirements.
IL
The main point of this dissent is that since subsection 1912(d) of ICWA imposes a duty to take active reuniting efforts and provides that those active efforts that satisfy this duty must have proved unsuccessful, this means that time must be allowed for active reuniting efforts to either fail or succeed. Reuniting efforts, such as the Department of Corrections programs in this case, that have not been given sufficient time to fail or succeed do not satisfy subsection 1912(d). In this case the only active reuniting effort that failed was distinctly preliminary in character; it was the effort to set up a paternity test for T.F. that was scheduled to take place on October 18, 1999. As of that date TF. was away without leave from the halfway house where he was incarcerated and thus missed the test. Since this is the only active effort that proved unsuccessful, the real issue in this case is whether T.PF.'s failure to show up for the October 13 test discharged the State from any further duty to take active efforts to unite TF. with his children.
My view on this question is that under the cireumstances of this case T.F.'s failure to take the test on October 18 did not discharge the State from its duty to take further active efforts under subsection 1912(d). The time frame of the events in this case is very compressed. The children were born on July 22, 1999, and within nine months thereafter the parental rights of both parents were terminated. The State delayed in arranging paternity tests before the October 18 date. Further, although TF. was AWOL on October 13, he was back in custody as of November 7, 1999,8 yet the State delayed for another seven weeks in taking a saliva sample *1099from him for DNA testing purposes. Overall, it appears that T.F.'s AWOL directly caused a three-week delay, whereas the State bears the responsibility for failing to take a saliva sample earlier, and a heavy share of the responsibility for the delay after November 7 until December 28, when T.F.'s saliva was finally taken.
The underlying idea of subsection 1912(d) is that troubled and situationally unfit parents should receive rehabilitative services so that they may be able to fulfill traditional parental roles. In the process of receiving rehabilitative services some false starts and setbacks are to be expected. Treating one missed appointment for testing as a discharge of subsection 1912(d)'s active efforts duty seems inconsistent with the remedial purposes of subsection 1912(d). I do not believe that a "one strike and you're out" approach to reunification services is what Congress had in mind in enacting ICWA. Thus I do not believe that the missed October appointment can be said to have discharged the State from its duty to take further active family unification efforts. And since, as noted above, those further efforts that were taken did not prove unsuccessful, the requirements of subsection 1912(d) of ICWA, in my view, have not been satisfied.
For the above reasons I would reverse the termination decree as to T.F. and remand for further proceedings so that the requirements of subsection 1912(d) of ICWA can be satisfied.

. See A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296, 305 (Alaska 1997).

. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1983):
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.

. 856 P.2d 468, 476 (Alaska 1993).

. Id.

. See, eg., State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v. Charles, 70 Or.App. 10, 688 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1984) ("'the state must show that the efforts have been made but have not worked"); In re Dependency of A.M., 106 Wash.App. 123, 22 P.3d 828, 834 (Wa.App.2001) (failure [of state efforts] must be shown before parental rights to an Indian child may be terminated"); In Interest of M.S., 624 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D.2001) (affirming termination order where active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs were undertaken and proved unsuccessful); In re E.M., A.M., and J.M., 466 N.W.2d 168, 173-74 (S.D.1991) (finding § 1912(d) satisfied where court made detailed findings regarding provision of services and failure by parent).

. See AS 47.10.088.

. See U.S. Const. art. VL.

. Far from being the "eve of trial," see Slip Op. at 1094, the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights was not even filed at this point.