Court Opinion

ID: 9548542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:05:08.872992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:06.239206
License: Public Domain

RUSSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. As this court has long held, evidence of the “relative wealth” of a defendant is a factor that should be considered in the determination of punitive damages whether the defendant be an individual or a business. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). This is so because punitive damages are awarded as a measure of punishment to the defendant in the most egregious eases of malicious misconduct, not as additional compensation to the plaintiff, and the amount that will punish depends upon relative wealth. In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), we stated:
Although punitive damages may be awarded in an appropriate case, the general rule is that only compensatory damages are appropriate and that punitive damages may be awarded only in exceptional eases.... Since punitive damages are not intended as additional compensation to a plaintiff, they must, if awarded, serve a societal interest of punishing and deterring outrageous and malicious conduct which is not likely to be deterred by other means.
Id. at 1186 (citations omitted). Since the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter, certain factors must, of necessity, be considered in order to achieve that result. In Crookston, we set forth seven factors that should be considered in assessing the amount of punitive damages:
(i) the relative wealth of the defendant;
(ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct;
(iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct;
(iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others;
(v) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct;
(vi) the relationship of the parties; and
(vii)the amount of actual damages awarded.
817 P.2d at 808 (citations omitted).
The first factor listed, the relative wealth of the defendant, is necessary inasmuch as the amount of punitive damages cannot be determined without knowledge of the financial strength of the defendant. An award of punitive damages in the amount of $10,000 could totally destroy one defendant financially while hardly making a ripple against another defendant. Moreover, appearances may be deceiving. - One defendant may appear to have great wealth while actually being on the verge of bankruptcy, while another may actually have great wealth but appear to have little. This is true whether the defendant is an individual or a business.
To complicate this matter further, most, if not all, liability insurance policies do not protect a party against the very acts necessary to support an award of punitive damages— intentional and malicious wrongdoing. Since punitive damages have such personal impact, a jury must have evidence of a defendant’s relative wealth in order to intelligently establish an amount of punitive damages that will be fair but sufficiently punish that defendant and deter future conduct. Without such evidence, it would be impossible to make such a determination.
In the case before us, the majority has simply eliminated the “relative wealth” of the defendant as a factor. While the majority states that evidence of relative wealth may still be important where the excessiveness of a punitive damages award is at issue, what they do not understand is that excessiveness will never be an issue until after the jury has determined the amount of punitive damages. And determining whether the award is excessive depends upon the relative wealth of the defendant.
While Wal-Mart may well appear to have vast resources and be more than able to pay the amount of punitive damages awarded in this case, we have no evidence of those facts. If we allow ourselves to make such rulings without evidence, who will be next? Where do we draw the line? I am concerned not only about Wal-Mart but also about the next defendant who will be subject to the new rule *115For these set forth by the majority opinion, reasons, I would reverse the award of punitive damages.
HOWE, C.J., concurs in Justice RUSSON’s dissenting opinion.
Having disqualified himself, STEWART, J., does not participate. The Honorable HOMER F. WILKINSON sat.