Court Opinion

ID: 9827239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:19:07.825317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:27.384571
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
There is no conflict between the cause and that of Galveston Tribune v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 302, nor against that “unbroken line of authorities in other states.’’ Where is that “unbroken line of authorities?” The Tribune v. Johnson has no question at all similar to the one presented in this case. In the cited case it was held that the publication could not be justified on the ground that it had been published in other papers. We agree with that ruling, and nothing to the contrary can be found in the opinion of this court. We still hold, however, that, when plaintiff injected the information into his testimony that other papers had published the same article, defendant was authorized to cross-examine plaintiff. It is now contended that plaintiff did not so testify on his direct examination. It is also stated that “it is undisputed that the account sent out by the Associated Press was not libelous,” and if that bo true then it was not libelous when published by defendant, for plaintiff, in his direct evidence when testifying for himself, stated that he saw the identical article published by defendant, headlines and all “before it got into the papers.” In order that there might be no mistake as to the article he saw beforehand, it was copied verbatim et literatim into his testimony, and he said: “I saw the following article before August 18, 1921, I saw it before it got into the papers.” Then after a copy of the article he reiterates: “I saw the above article in Omaha. It was communicated to me by representatives of both the International News Agency and the Associated Press.” He also swore in connection with the publication of the article by defendant. “It was brought to my attention first — that was in August, that paper and other papers — I got all of my Texas papers.” What article was he referring to? None other than the one shown him by the Associated Press Agency .“before it got into the papers.” Was not that testifying that the article published by defendant was the same one shown plaintiff, “before it got into the papers,” the same one published by the papers?
The American rule, as generally understood and applied, permits the investigation, on cross-examination, not only of the specific matter of the examination in chief, but extends it to the general subject thereof. The American rule permits cross-examination which tends to discredit or impeach the witness, or to show his interest, prejudice, or motives, or to test his accuracy. Elliott Ev. §§ 920-925, 926, and long list of authorities cited in footnotes. The matter of cross-ex-, amination is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling will not be disturbed, if not arbitrarily and unreasonably made. As said by the great author Green-leaf:
“The power of cross-examination has been justly said to be one of the principal, as it certainly is one of the most efficacious, tests, which the law has devised for the discovery of truth. By means of it, the situation of the witness with respect to the parties, and to the subject of litigation, his interest, his motives, his inclination and prejudices, his means of obtaining a correct and certain knowledge of the facts to which he bears testimony, the manner in which he has used those means, his powers of discernment, memory, and descrip-, tion, are all fully ascertained and submitted to the consideration of the jury, before whom he has testified, and who have thus had an opportunity of observing his demeanor and of determining the just weight and value of his testimony.”
If that be the rule as to the ordinary witness, with what intensity does it apply to the testimony of a plaintiff who is testifying in his own behalf. In this instance the plaintiff had told how he was “all broken up” over the publication, how “ashamed to go out on the street and meet people.” He sought appeal to the emotions of the jury by stating: “I thought of my mother and my wife, and knew that they would be held up to scorn — my *1083old mother down in Texas.” It cannot be said that the trial judge acted oppressively and arbitrarily in permitting defendant to show by plaintiff on cross-examination that he had broadcasted the Union with suits against newspapers for damages in connection with the same article as a vindication of his wounded honor, and as a balm for his intense sorrow and humiliation. The evidence was not to justify the publication by defendant, but to show that along with his sorrow and mortification plaintiff was putting money in his purse.
While the American rule is as herein before stated, in Texas the rule is broader and more comprehensive, and a witness can be cross-examined in regard to questions not asked and answered on the examination in chief. Wentworth v. Crawford, 11 Tex. 127; Rhine v. Blake, 59 Tex. 240; Evansich v. Railway, 61 Tex. 24. As said in the Wentworth v. Crawford Case:
“We are aware that some dicta are to be found, from respectable names, that the cross-examination must be confined to the questions propounded and answered on the examination in chief; but this is not believed to be the established doctrine on the subject. We believe that it is regular to ask a witness, on a cross-examination, any question that may be pertinent to the questions to be decided by the jury; and that any fact, to show a bias on the evidence of the opposite party, is admissible, whether the same be offered by the examination in chief or cross-examination.”
The whole of this discussion of the admissibility of evidence could, and doubtless should, have been omitted, for the reason that the bill of exceptions does not indicate what the answers of the plaintiff were to the questions objected to, and consequently fail to show that plaintiff was injured by the answers, even though the questions were not permissible. Plaintiff m'ay not have answered anything that could have had any injurious effect. Where error is assigned to the admission or exclusion of evidence, the evidence must be set out and its materiality shown. Whitaker v. Gee, 61 Tex. 217; Herring v. Mason, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 559, 43 S. W. 797; Railway v. Stoker (Tex. Civ. App.) 142 S. W. 972; Bank v. Cameron (Tex. Civ. App.) 203 S. W. 1167; Willard v. Knoblauch (Tex. Civ. App.) 206 S. W. 734.
There is no conflict in the opinion of this court on any point raised in this case with any Texas case, although it is asserted positively that the opinion clashes with some half a dozen decisions of the Courts of Civil Appeals and several Supreme Court decisions. Wherein the conflict arises is not pointed out.
There is no weight to be attached to the fact that the Associated Press did not believe the report charged plaintiff with conspiracy, or that newspapers under the fear of claims for damages retracted and apologized. They know what it usually means to go before a jury on a charge of libel. It is on the order of testimony extracted from) accused persons by detectives and prosecutors. This court may undoubtedly be correct in its construction of the congressional report, although every press agency and newspaper may, under fear of prosecution, have retracted and published such retractions as plaintiff may have demanded. Their retractions, while advanced as authority by plaintiff, cannot be so taken by this court.
It does not seem to occur to plaintiff in his motion for a rehearing that it was not necessary for plaintiff to have been actively engaged in the conspiracy to allowBergdoll to escape, in order to become a conspirator after that escape which involved him in the whole conspiracy. It is admitted that the report charged plaintiff to be a party to the conspiracy to acquit Hunt. If he was, he became a party to the whole conspiracy, from its inception to its culmination. To again quote from’ the congressional report:
“Moreover, all the conspirators need not enter into the agreement at the same time. When a new party, with knowledge of the facts, concurs in the plans of the original conspirators, and comes in to aid in the execution of them, he is from that moment a conspirator.”
When using the quoted language, to whom was the report referring? It could not have referred to Ansell and Hunt, because they were shown to be the original offenders, and must necessarily have referred to the only other man connected with the affair in a leading role, who was the plaintiff in this ease. If he conspired to assist in thwarting justice by failing and refusing to prosecute Hunt as he should have done, he became a conspirator in the whole infamous scheme of releasing Bergdoll, and then releasing the active agents of such escape before a court martial. Oliver v. Huckins (Tex. Civ. App.) 244 S. W. 625.
The motion is overruled.