Court Opinion

ID: 9776651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:41:28.695103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:41.239358
License: Public Domain

KING, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I write to dissent from my distinguished colleagues in the majority. For the same reasons I discuss at length in my dissenting opinion in our companion case of Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc., 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir.2011), we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal to decide, as the majority does, that the plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by federal law. Were we authorized to adjudicate the merits of the preemption defense, however, we should rule it unavailing here.
I.
A.
The plaintiffs’ claims arise from their maltreatment while detained at the Abu Ghraib prison during our nation’s military campaign in Iraq. According to the operative Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”), the allegations of which we are bound to take as true at this stage of the proceedings, civilian employees of CACI International, Inc., and CACI Premier Technology, Inc. (collectively “CACI”), while interrogating the plaintiffs or assisting in their interrogation, conspired with military personnel to “instigate[ ], directf ], participate[ ] in, [and] aid[] and abet[] conduct towards detainees that clearly violated the Geneva Conventions, the Army Field Manual, and the laws of the United States.” Complaint ¶ 67.1 One plaintiff alleges that he was “forcibly subjected to sexual acts by a female as he was cuffed and shackled to cell bars,” was “dragged by a rope where part of it was tied tightly to his penis,” and was “subjected to [a] mock execution.” Id. ¶¶ 32, 37, 39. Other asserted abuses include beatings, food and sleep deprivation, humiliation, and being forced to witness the rape of a female detainee. See generally id. ¶¶ 11-63.
The Complaint relates that CACI has “admitted ... that it had the ability to control, direct and influence the actions performed by employees,” and it insists that CACI was able “to prevent employees from torturing plaintiffs.” Complaint ¶¶ 76-77. The plaintiffs further maintain that “CACI at all times [was] obliged by the terms of its contract to supervise [its] employees.” Id. ¶ 78. CACI was aware, according to the plaintiffs, “that the United States intended and required that any person acting under the contract [with] the United States would conduct themselves in accordance with the relevant domestic and international laws.” Id. ¶ 98. Nonetheless, by engaging in and directing the torture of the plaintiffs, CACI “directly contradicted the contract terms, domestic law and the United States’ express policy against torture.” Id. ¶ 115. CACI, the plaintiffs say, is consequently liable to them under Virginia law for the torts of assault and battery, sexual assault, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring and supervision.
Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, CACI moved to dismiss the Complaint, asserting, among other things: (1) that the suit raised a nonjustieiable political question; (2) that CACI was entitled to immu*428nity derived from its association with the sovereign; and (3) that, as a logical extension of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988), the plaintiffs’ state law claims were preempted, having arisen in the context of combatant activities conducted in the federal interest. The district court denied CACI’s motion, rejecting its argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 657 F.Supp.2d 700, 708-14 (E.D.Va.2009). The court declined to decide the immunity issue at the dismissal stage, concluding that it could not “determine the scope of Defendants’ government contract, the amount of discretion it afforded Defendants in dealing with detainees, or the costs and benefits of recognizing immunity in this case without examining a complete record after discovery has taken place.” Id. at 714. The limited record, according to the district court, also cast doubt that CACI’s interrogation practices amounted to “combatant activities.” Id. at 725. The court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were in any event “not preempted under Boyle, ” because they “do not present a significant conflict with a uniquely federal interest.” Id.2 Five days following the district court’s ruling, before discovery could commence, CACI noted this appeal.
B.
I need not reiterate in extravagant detail why jurisdiction over this appeal is lacking, having devoted considerable space to the subject in my dissenting opinion in today’s companion case of Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc., 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir.2011). Suffice it to say that the only basis that could arguably support the exercise of collateral order jurisdiction, see Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), the denial of dismissal on the ground of derivative sovereign immunity, was not “conclusively determined” by the district court as required by Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006). The denials of dismissal based on the political question doctrine and on Boyle preemption, as applied by the District of Columbia Circuit in Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir.2009), though conclusively determined, abridged no immunity. As a result, neither ground meets the additional prerequisite of being “effectively unreviewable” on appeal from a final judgment. See Will, 546 U.S. at 349, 126 S.Ct. 952.
The majority nevertheless accepts appellate jurisdiction, see ante at 416-17, reversing the district court’s interlocutory order and remanding with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ remaining claims as preempted on the same theory underlying the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Saleh. Putting aside the jurisdictional defect for argument’s sake, I take issue with the majority’s embrace of Saleh preemption to relieve CACI of its potential liability in this matter.3
*429II.
A.
1.
The majority purports merely to apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988), but by adopting the reasoning of Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir.2009), a case presenting facts highly similar to this one, it affords Boyle an excessively robust elasticity. The Boyle Court recognized a form of implicit preemption of state law, based on a “significant conflict” between “uniquely federal interests” and state law duties the plaintiff sought to impose on a private contractor. See 487 U.S. at 504, 506, 512,108 S.Ct. 2510.
The contract in Boyle was one for procurement in which the government contractor was to manufacture and deliver military helicopters with an outward-opening escape hatch. This hatch could not be opened underwater, which allegedly rendered the design defective under state law. To determine whether a significant conflict was present, the Court looked to the statutory “discretionary functions” exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (the “FTCA”), which reserves the sovereign immunity of the United States for, among other things, “[a]ny claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
Guided by this specific FTCA exception, the Supreme Court reasoned that “the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function” under the FTCA because “[i]t often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and great combat effectiveness.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511, 108 S.Ct. 2510. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “state law which holds Government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a ‘significant conflict’ with federal policy and must be displaced.” Id. at 512, 108 S.Ct. 2510. The Court acknowledged that the Boyle preemptive principle was distinct from “ordinary” preemption and was not tethered to “legislation specifically immunizing Government contractors from liability.” Id. at 504, 507, 108 S.Ct. 2510.
The Supreme Court stated in no uncertain terms, however, that the presence of a federal interest “merely establishes a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of state law.” 487 U.S. at 507, 108 S.Ct. 2510. Such a “Misplacement will occur only where ... a significant conflict exists between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the operation of state law, or the application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of federal legislation.” Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Although “[t]he conflict with federal policy need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary preemption ..., conflict there must be.” Id. at 507-08, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (emphasis added).
*4302.
The rather obvious problem with invoking the government’s “interest in conducting and controlling the conduct of war,” ante at 419, to preempt the plaintiffs’ claims of gratuitous torture by an independent contractor, is that there is no conflict between the two. No federal interest implicates the torture and abuse of detainees. To the contrary, the repeated declarations of our executives, echoed by the Congress, expressly disavow such practices.
For example, shortly after graphic photos depicting detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib became public, President Bush vowed that “the practices that took place in that prison are abhorrent and they don’t represent America.” White House, Press Release, President Bush Meets with Al Arabiya Television, 2004 WLNR 2540883 (May 5, 2004). He pledged to “[t]he people of the Middle East ... that we will investigate fully, that we will find out the truth,” and further assured that “justice will be served.” Id. Similarly, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld testified before Congress that the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses were “inconsistent with the values of our nation,” asserting that “[p]art of [our] mission — part of what we believe in — is making sure that when wrongdoing or scandal occur, that they are not covered up, but exposed, investigated, publicly disclosed— and the guilty brought to justice.” Donald H. Rumsfeld, Testimony Before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees 1, 6 (May 7, 2004).
For its part, the Senate “condemn[ed] in the strongest possible terms the despicable acts at Abu Ghraib prison.” S. Res. 356, 108th Cong. (2004). Meanwhile, the House of Representatives declared that the practices at Abu Ghraib “offenfd] ... the principles and values of the American people and the United States military ... and contradict the policies, orders, and laws of the United States military and undermine the ability of the United States military to achieve its mission in Iraq.” H.R. Res. 627,108th Cong. (2004).
The point is not confined to the facile observation that no federal interest encompasses the torture and abuses that the plaintiffs allege. Indeed, it is quite plausible that the government would view private tort actions against the perpetrators of such abuses as advancing the federal interest in effective military activities. The government has not intervened on behalf of the contractors in this dispute, and,, in fact, the Department of Defense (the “DOD”) has promulgated a final rule advising contractors that the “[inappropriate use of force could subject a contractor or its subcontractors or employees to prosecution or civil liability under the laws of the United States and the host nation.” Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany U.S. Armed Forces, 73 Fed.Reg. 16,764, 16,764, 16,767 (Mar. 31, 2008) (the “DOD Rule”).
The DOD Rule “may reflect the government’s general view that permitting contractor liability will advance, not impede, U.S. foreign policy by demonstrating that ‘the United States is committed to ensuring that its contractors are subject to proper oversight and held accountable for their actions.’ ” Saleh, 580 F.3d at 28 (Garland, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State, Press Release, Department of State Legal Adviser Promotes Accountability for Private Military and Security Companies (Sept. 17, 2008)). As the Saleh dissent emphasizes:
the government’s failure to defend the contractors may reflect the Executive Branch’s view that the country’s interests are better served by demonstrating that “people will be held to account according to our laws.” And the Executive may believe that one way to show *431that “people will be held to account” is to permit this country’s legal system to take its ordinary course and provide a remedy for those who were wrongfully injured.

Id.

At bottom, Boyle does not countenance the majority’s approach because there simply is no conflict — much less, a “significant conflict” — between the asserted state law duties and any uniquely federal interest. Quite the opposite: the plaintiffs allege that CACI violated federal policy. Boyle does not apply, because, as the Saleh dissent explained:
Boyle has never been applied to protect a contractor from liability resulting from the contractor’s violation of federal law and policy. And there is no dispute that the conduct alleged, if true, violated both. Hence, these cases are not within the area where the policy of the “discretionary function” would be frustrated, and they present no significant conflict with federal interests. Preemption is therefore not justified under Boyle.
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 23 (Garland, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
B.
1.
Another premise underlying Boyle’s reasoning — the rigid control that the government exerts over contractors in procuring military equipment — is absent where, as here, the government contracted for general services only. As the Boyle Court acknowledged, selecting military equipment “often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations.” 487 U.S. at 511, 108 S.Ct. 2510. Ultimately, the government rather than the contractor must be in charge of decisionmaking in order for the contractor to be shielded from liability. Consistently with that principle, the Boyle test for preemption “assure[s] that the suit is within the area where the policy of the ‘discretionary function’ would be frustrated” — that is, “that the design feature in question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the contractor itself.” M4
By contrast, the government itself has recognized that such judgments are not present in general services contracts. As the DOD explained in a recent rulemaking, “[t]he public policy rationale behind Boyle does not apply when a performance-based statement of work is used in a services contract, because the Government does not, in fact, exercise specific control over the actions and decisions of the contractor or its employees or subcontractors.” DOD Rule, 73 Fed.Reg. at 16,768. In other words, the government’s precise control over its contractor, which was so integral to Boyle’s reasoning, see 487 U.S. at 509-12, 108 S.Ct. 2510, is absent in a general services contract in which the government simply requires “a contractor to ensure its employees comply with host nation law *432and other authorities,” DOD Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 16,768.
It follows that while military contractors might be able to assert Boyle-type arguments when the government’s decisions result in injuries to third parties, the DOD adamantly opposes “sendpng] a signal that would invite courts to shift the risk of loss to innocent third parties” where “contractors ... seek[ ] to avoid accountability to third parties for their own actions by raising defenses based on the sovereignty of the United States.” DOD Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 16,768 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the DOD elected to “retain[] the current rule of law, holding contractors accountable for the negligent or willful actions of their employees, officers, and subcontractors.” Id. In obstinate opposition to the government’s prescribed path, the majority would protect contractors from civil liability even when there is no indication that the government authorized the conduct underlying the asserted liability.
2.
Contrary to the majority’s position, whether the government authorized CACI’s conduct in- this case can only be. ascertained by examining the contract between the parties, which, as the district court lamented, is not in the record at the dismissal stage. The contract would shed light on:
• The contractor’s delegated discretionary authority- — that is, the services the contractor was to provide under the contract — and whether the contractor acted within the bounds of such authority, see Rodriguez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 627 F.3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir.2010) (refusing to deem claim preempted under Boyle where “there is no proof to establish as a matter of law that the equipment [alleged to have injured the victims] conformed to the government’s precise specifications”);
• Whether such authority was “validly conferred” to the contractor, see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506, 108 S.Ct. 2510 (quoting Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21, 60 S.Ct. 413, 84 L.Ed. 554 (1940)); and
• Whether and to what extent the government had a significant interest in the specific services to be provided, see id. at 509,' 108 S.Ct. 2510 (recognizing that “significant conflict” justifying preemption may not be present even where state duty is “precisely contrary” to contractual duty, since government may lack “significant interest in th[e] particular feature” specified in contract).
The majority’s extra-contractual inquiry into whether “a civilian contractor is integrated into wartime combatant activities over which the military broadly retains command authority,” ante at 420 (citing Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9), is of scant moment considering the lack of agency possessed by the rank-and-file military to alter or augment the material terms of the contract.5
*433Of course, there is no evidence to support the majority’s supposition of “integration” (whatever that means) in this case, other than what can be gleaned from the bare allegations of the Complaint. But the question is wholly irrelevant absent any allegation that the terms of the written agreement were materially supplemented or changed (or even could be, in the event that the contract contained a valid provision barring parol alterations), either by representatives with authority to act or through the parties’ course of conduct or dealing. Here, although the plaintiffs allege a conspiracy with members of the military, they are entitled to the inference that the conspiracy did not define the contract, but instead permitted CACI to act outside its bounds. Cf. ante at 416 (“While some of the abuses that the plaintiffs detailed in the allegations of the complaint appear to have been approved by the military at one point or another, others were clearly not.”).6
C.
1.
By relying on the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) to identify the pertinent federal interest, the Supreme Court in Boyle required, at a minimum, that reviewing courts would examine a contractor’s allegedly tortious conduct to determine whether it was truly the product of the government’s exercise of discretion, or merely an ordinary, unprovoked lapse of care. The majority’s approach avoids even that minimal analysis by grounding the asserted federal interest in a different exception to the FTCA — the combatant activities exception — the umbrella of which the majority would deploy over government contractors whenever there are “actions taken in connection with U.S. military operations overseas.” Ante at 418.7
The majority thereby ignores the Supreme Court’s warning that the FTCA’s exceptions are not equally equipped to define the contours of an implicit preemption. The Boyle Court made the point through its discussion of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), in which it was held that the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity with respect to suits brought against the United States by service members for injuries *434sustained in the course of their military service.
The Supreme Court declared the Feres doctrine unsuitable to ascertain whether a significant conflict exists between federal interests and an asserted state duty, in that it “logically produces results that are in some respects too broad' and in some respects too narrow.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510, 108 S.Ct. 2510. As an example of the former, the Court observed that “[s]ince Feres prohibits all service-related tort claims against the Government, a contractor defense that rests upon it should prohibit all service-related tort claims against the manufacturer,” id., a result that the Supreme Court deemed inadvisable. See also Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F.Supp.2d 702, 740 (D.Md.2010) (declining to adopt rationale of Saleh, based in part on Supreme Court’s rejection of Feres as basis for preemption, “because [the Feres defense] does not take into account whether the Government exercised any discretion or played any role in the contractor’s alleged tortious acts, as required by the three part test ultimately articulated in Boyle ”).
The majority’s invocation of the combatant activities exception suffers from the same defects. While the Supreme Court sought to discern an appropriate “limiting principle” to assist in identifying any significant conflict between state and federal policies under the discretionary function exception, Boyle, 487 U.S. at 509,108 S.Ct. 2510, the majority’s version of preemption under the combatant activities exception is “extraordinarily broad, ... resulting] not in conflict preemption but in field preemption.” Saleh, 580 F.3d at 23 (Garland, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).8
2.
The majority makes no attempt to conceal the sweeping breadth of the preemption doctrine it adopts today, confidently maintaining that its approach properly implements what it characterizes as “the FTCA’s policy of eliminating tort concepts from the battlefield.” Ante at 419 (quoting Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7). The majority vastly overstates its case, however, because, much more narrowly,
the FTCA’s policy is to eliminate the U.S. government’s liability for battlefield torts. That, after all, is what the FTCA says. But it is not plain that the FTCA’s policy is to eliminate liability when the alleged tortfeasor is a contractor rather than a soldier. That, after all, is not what the FTCA says.
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 26 (Garland, J., dissenting). Judge Garland’s eye is keen: the FTCA waives, with certain specific exceptions, the sovereign immunity constitutionally afforded the United States, which operates through its various federal agencies. *435See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2675. Government contractors, however, are expressly excluded from the FTCA’s reach. See id. § 2671 (“[T]he term ‘Federal agency’ ... does not include any contractor with the United States.”). The majority’s description of the FTCA’s policy as the wholesale elimination of wartime torts, even those committed by private parties, is therefore inaccurate.
Congress has had no difficulty exempting private parties from liability in other contexts. Consider, for example, the statute found at 22 U.S.C. § 2291 — 4(b), which provides that the interdiction of an aircraft over a foreign country, conducted pursuant to a presidentially approved program, “shall not give rise to any civil action ... against the United States or its employees or agents.” Id. (emphasis added). Congress has issued no similar exemption here. If anything, its wholesale exclusion of government contractors from the limited protections of the FTCA leads to the opposite conclusion — that CACI should be held liable for its civil misdeeds.
Further, the FTCA addresses only the immunity of the United States; it does not shield members of the armed services or other government employees from tort suits. Instead, the Westfall Act provides that sort of protection, so long as the Attorney General certifies “that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Upon such certification, the employee is dismissed from the lawsuit and the United States is substituted as the party defendant, after which the dispute is governed by the FTCA (as well as its exceptions that retain sovereign immunity). See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 230, 127 S.Ct. 881, 166 L.Ed.2d 819 (2007). But because the Westfall Act incorporates the FTCA’s definitions, it too excludes government contractors. Yet the majority deems the plaintiffs’ claims preempted in the absence of an Attorney General’s certification that would have been essential were these defendants soldiers or sailors rather than contractors. The majority thereby grants the defendants unqualified protection that even our citizens in uniform do not enjoy.
The majority also gleans several specific policy conflicts that tort suits against contractors would bring about, but these concerns evaporate upon closer inspection. The majority asserts that “[n]ot only would potential tort liability against ... contractors affect military costs and efficiencies and contractors’ availability,” but “would also present the possibility that military commanders could be hauled into civilian courts for the purpose of evaluating and differentiating between military and contractor decisions.” Ante at 418. But the possibility of cost-passing is already taken into consideration at an earlier stage of the Boyle inquiry, that is, in determining whether a uniquely federal interest “will be directly affected.” 487 U.S. at 507, 108 S.Ct. 2510.9
*436With respect to the majority’s concern that military commanders may be called to provide testimony in private tort suits, wholesale preemption remains unwarranted. Ordinary mechanisms of civil procedure and other legal doctrines provide ample safeguards against such interference. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, for example, compels the district courts to quash subpoenas calling for privileged matter or that would cause an undue burden. Moreover, the government remains free to invoke the state secrets doctrine. All this is to say, “[t]o deny preemption is not to grant plaintiffs free reign.” . Saleh, 580 F.3d at 29 (Garland, J., dissenting).10
The majority expresses its fear that lawsuits will “undermine the flexibility that military necessity requires in determining the methods for gathering intelligence.” Ante at 418. Such a concern also proves illusory. The plaintiffs allege that the contractor personnel acted contrary to military directives and law. The asserted basis of liability, then, is not one that would hamper the flexibility the military needs in determining how to gather intelligence, but rather one that would hold contractors to account for violating the bounds already set by the military.
m.
Because the majority erroneously strains to discover a new form of preemption unjustified by Supreme Court precedent, and, more fundamentally, because we lack jurisdiction to announce this new rule, I respectfully dissent.

. The Complaint is found at J.A. 16-41. (Citations herein to "J.A._” refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties to this appeal.)

. Though it declined to dismiss the state law claims, the district court granted CACI's motion insofar as it pertained to federal claims asserted by the plaintiffs pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See Al Shimari, 657 F.Supp.2d at 726-28.

. I address Saleh preemption on the merits because there is much in the majority’s provocative analysis of the issue that should not be left unanswered. Inasmuch as CACI's derivative sovereign immunity and political question defenses are not addressed in the majority opinion, but discussed only in Judge Niemeyer’s separate, nonprecedential opinion, I believe it would be unhelpful and confusing to debate them here. Left to my own devices, I would not resolve any of CACI’s arguments on the merits as we lack jurisdiction to consider them. In Taylor v. Kellogg, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir.2011), also decided *429today, I authored the opinion of the Court in which, as Judge Niemeyer points out, ante at 421-22, we affirmed the district court’s judgment on the ground that the dispute in that case presented a nonjusticiable political question. Our jurisdiction in Taylor was unquestioned, however, in that the appeal was taken from the district court's indisputably final decision dismissing the plaintiff’s case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

. More recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated the narrow scope of the Boyle preemption defense, as well as its grounding in a contractor’s compliance with government instructions. For example, the Court has referred to Boyle as presenting a "special circumstance” in which "the government has directed a contractor to do the very thing that is the subject of the claim.” Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001). As the Fifth Circuit recently explained, "[t]he government contractor defense in Boyle, stripped to its essentials, is fundamentally a claim that the Government made me do it.” Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. Steering Comm. v. Wash. Group Int’l, Inc., 620 F.3d 455, 465 (5th Cir.2010).

. The Army Field Manual provides that ■ “[cjommanders do not have direct control over contractors or their employees ...; only contractors manage, supervise, and give directions to their employees.” U.S. Dep’t- of the Army, Field Manual 3-100.21, Contractors on the • Battlefield § 1-22 (2003). In turn, the contractors must adhere to their contractual obligations without regard to the chain of command. As the Field Manual emphasizes, "the terms and conditions of the contract establish the relationship between the military (U.S. Government) and the contractor. .... Only the contractor can directly supervise its employees. The military chain of command exercises management control through the contract.” Id. at 3-100.21, § 1-25. As such, the government has “no more *433control than any contracting party has over its counterparty. And that — without more — is not enough to make the conduct of a contractor 'the combatant activities of the military or naval forces.’ ” Saleh, 580 F.3d at 34 (Garland, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680©).

. The majority seizes upon the plaintiffs’ allegation of a conspiracy between CACI and military personnel, see ante at 418-19, in support of its irrelevant supposition that CACI employees were integrated into the mission at Abu Ghraib. Whatever the military “mission” was at Abu Ghraib, it did not include torturing the plaintiffs. In any event, regardless of the relationship between the soldiers and civilians at the prison, the duties of the latter were defined exclusively by CACI’s contract with the government. We do not know whether governmental authority to amend the contract resided at the Pentagon or elsewhere, but we may be fairly certain that such authority did not reside at Abu Ghraib. That relatively low-level military personnel may have violated their orders and encouraged their civilian counterparts to act outside the bounds of the contract — and settled legal principles — in no way translates to a conclusion that CACI should summarily escape liability on the ground that the actions imputed to it were somehow consistent with the government's interests.

. By enacting the combatant activities exception to the FTCA, Congress expressly reserved the sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).

. Inasmuch as the FTCA contains other potentially applicable exceptions — for "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,” and for "[a]ny claim arising out of assault [and] battery” regardless of where it occurs, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), (k) — it is baffling that the majority can correctly identify the combatant activities exception as the one that decrees the relevant federal policy. This is particularly so absent any meaningful discussion by the majority of what constitutes a "combatant activity,” whether such activities may take place domestically, or how they may be distinguished from an ordinary assault or battery. The difficulties in identifying the relevant FTCA exception makes it almost impossible to articulate why the one for combatant activities matters at all. As Judge Garland observes, "the 'degree of integration’ test ... seems wholly beside the point” once these other exceptions are considered. Saleh, 580 F.3d at 23 (Garland, J., dissenting). Inevitably, "[o]nce we depart from the limiting principle of Boyle, it is hard to tell where to draw the line.” Id.

. In Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997), the Supreme Court declined to extend qualified immunity to privately employed prison guards in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court reasoned that, because contractors performing service contracts are subject to “competitive market pressures,” the threat of tort liability encourages them to comply with contractual obligations to screen, train, and supervise their employees, so as to promote effectiveness while preventing and deterring contractors and their employees from taking unlawful actions. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 409, 117 S.Ct. 2100 ("Competitive pressures mean not only that a firm whose guards are too aggressive will face damages that raise costs, thereby threatening its replacement, but also that a firm whose guards are too timid will face threats of replacement by other firms with records that demonstrate their ability to do both a safer and a more *436effective job.”). As in the Richardson litigation, the potential for tort liability and competition between contractors may well facilitate the government’s selection of contractors who will perform in a more effective, lawful, and inexpensive manner.

. Moreover, the majority’s approach brings about the very problems it seeks to avert. That is, if the courts "ignore the military’s own description of its chain of command” by looking to the "degree of integration that, in fact, existed between the military and [contractor] employees,” then they thereby "invite the wide-ranging judicial inquiry — with affidavits, depositions, and conflicting testimony — that the court rightly abjures.” Saleh, 580 F.3d at 34 (Garland, J., dissenting).