Court Opinion

ID: 9929244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 02:00:53.025238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:19.616982
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    EBONY WILSON,

                 Plaintiff,

          v.
                                                           Civil Action No. 22-604 (RDM)
    MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of the
    Social Security Administration,1

                 Defendant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

         Plaintiff Ebony Wilson alleges that the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Commissioner”) unlawfully denied her application for Disability Insurance

(“DI”) benefits and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits under Titles II and XVI of

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In particular, she alleges that the Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”) assigned to hear her case erred by failing to classify her chronic pain as a

“medically determinable impairment” at step two in the governing analysis and, by implication,

failed to consider her chronic pain when determining her Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)

at step five of the analysis. The Court referred this case to Magistrate Judge Michael Harvey for

a Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) pursuant to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and Judge Harvey agreed with Plaintiff’s first argument but rejected her second

argument. Overall, he concluded “the ALJ’s decision sufficiently considered Plaintiff’s

1
  The Court automatically substitutes the current Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration, Martin O’Malley, in the case caption. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (providing that
“when a public officer . . . ceases to hold office while the action is pending . . . [t]he officer’s
successor is automatically substituted as a party”).
complaints of pain after step two and took them into account in his decision.” Dkt. 20 at 24. As

a result, in Judge Harvey’s view, “‘any error committed by the ALJ in finding that [Plaintiff’s

chronic pain] was not a medically determinable impairment [at step two] was harmless.’” Id.

(alterations in original) (quoting Washington v. Saul, No. 20-cv-662, 2021 WL 2514691 at *6

(D.D.C. June 18, 2021).

       The Commissioner does not object to Judge Harvey’s R&R, and Plaintiff’s objection is a

narrow one: she merely argues that the ALJ’s error at step two carried over to his consideration

of her RFC and that, in the end, the ALJ failed to consider her chronic pain at any stage of the

process. Dkt. 21 at 4–6. Because that contention misunderstands both the ALJ’s decision and

Judge Harvey’s R&R, and because the Court agrees with Judge Harvey’s analysis, the Court will

ADOPT Judge Harvey’s recommendation, will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of

Reversal, Dkt. 13, and will GRANT the Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance,

Dkt. 14.

                                                  I.

       For purposes of the Social Security Act and the eligibility for SSI and DI benefits, a

person is “considered to be disabled . . . if [s]he is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determined physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). “To determine whether a claimant suffers

from a disability, the ALJ conducts a five-step sequential analysis.” Saunders v. Kijakazi,

6 F.4th 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2021). At the first step, “the claimant must show [that] she is not engaged

in substantial gainful activity.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)). “At step two, the ALJ

must determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R.

                                                   2
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c), 404.1509). And, at step three, the ALJ must “evaluate[]

whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations.” Id.

(citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d)). If the claimant clears each of these

hurdles, “she is deemed disabled.” Id. (citing Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir.

2004)).

          But even if the claimant is unsuccessful up to this point, a claimant may still qualify to

receive benefits if she can show, at step four, “that she is incapable of performing her previous

work.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f)). In particular, if the claimant

can demonstrate that she is unable “to perform her previous work, the ALJ must then determine

at step five whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work while taking into

consideration the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Id. at 3–4 (citing 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g)). Notably, “[t]he claimant bears the burden of proof on the

first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner on the fifth step.” Id. at 4 (citing

Butler, 353 F.3d at 993).

          Here, the ALJ held a hearing by telephone on April 7, 2021, at which Plaintiff testified

and submitted written evidence, including medical source statements from her doctors. Dkt. 10-

2 at 34–68 (Hrg. Tr.); see also, e.g., Dkt. 10-9 at 48–55 (Dr. Dominguez’s Medical Source

Statements). The ALJ issued his decision on April 21, 2021, denying her application for

benefits. Dkt.10-2 at 16–27. At step one, the ALJ found in Plaintiff’s favor, concluding that she

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2018. Id. at 18–19. At step two,

he found that she has “the following severe impairments: thyroid disorder, hernias, and obesity”

and “the following nonsevere impairments: obstructive sleep apnea, visual disturbances, and

chronic sinusitis.” Id. at 19. He further concluded, however, that her “alleged post-traumatic

                                                    3
stress disorder, anxiety disorder, and other mental health issues are not medically determinable

impairments due to a lack of objective evidence” and that her alleged fibromyalgia does not

constitute a medically determinable impairment under the relevant Social Security Ruling

(“SSR”). Id. at 19–20 (citing SSR 12-2p). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s thyroid

gland disorder, hernias, and obesity do not “meet[] or medically equal[]” the severity of any of

the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404. Id. at 20.

        Consistent with the governing framework, the ALJ then proceeded to step four and

found, “[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record, . . . that the claimant has the residual

functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)

except: occasionally climb stairs and ladders; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl;

frequently balance.” Id. at 21. Of particular relevance here, he concluded that Plaintiff’s

“medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms” but that her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of

these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the

record.” Id. at 22. He determined that she is “capable of performing past relevant work as a

Teacher Aide, a Retail Clerk, a Retail Supervisor, a Child Care Teacher, and as an Assistant

Manager” because that work “does not require the performance of work-related activities

precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Id. at 26. Based on these findings, the

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “is not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social

Security Act” and “is not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.” Id. at

27.

        Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal, but the Appeals Council declined to review the

decision. As a result, the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final decision of the Commissioner for

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present purposes. Plaintiff timely sought judicial review of that decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g), Dkt. 1, and the Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey for a

report and recommendation, Min. Order (Mar. 14, 2022). After considering Plaintiff’s Motion

for Judgment of Reversal, Dkt. 13, and the Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance,

Dkt. 14, Judge Harvey issued his Report & Recommendation, Dkt. 20.

       Judge Harvey first concluded that the ALJ erred at “step two” of his decision, when he

considered Wilson’s fibromyalgia diagnosis but not her chronic pain more generally. Dkt. 20 at

18. As Judge Harvey observed, the record was “replete with references to Plaintiff’s chronic

pain,” including Dr. Mbuyi’s diagnosis of chronic myofascial syndrome and Dr. Dominguez’s

diagnosis of chronic idiopathic syndrome, and the ALJ should have addressed this evidence at

step two. Id. Judge Harvey noted that it was possible that this evidence was insufficient to

support a finding that Plaintiff suffers from a medically determinable impairment, but he

concluded that the ALJ erred by failing to address this question and explained that counsel’s

post-hoc analysis of the record was no substitute for consideration—and explanation—by the

ALJ. Id. at 18–19.

       Judge Harvey was nonetheless persuaded that the ALJ’s error was harmless and did not

warrant reversal. Id. at 19–24. As Judge Harvey explained, when an ALJ finds, at step four, that

the claimant suffers from an impairment that prevents her from performing her past, relevant

work, and proceeds to consider how that an impairment affects the claimant’s Residual

Functional Capacity, the ALJ’s failure to consider the impairment at step two may be rendered

harmless. Id. at 19 (quoting Amos v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-1707, 2019 WL 3451313, at *9

(D.D.C. June 3, 2019)); see also id. at 19–20 (collecting cases). To show prejudice, Judge

Harvey explained, Plaintiff “must either demonstrate that [she] would meet a listing at step three,

                                                 5
or that the RFC did not adequately account for the omitted impairment or its symptoms.” Id. at

20. Here, she did neither. The RFC was based on careful consideration of the entire record,

including the symptoms of Plaintiff’s chronic pain, such as her joint pain and limitations

standing, walking, and moving about. Id. at 21–22. And, the ALJ did account for the medical

opinions, including those of Dr. Dominguez, that highlighted Plaintiff’s chronic pain; he just

found those opinions less persuasive than Plaintiff urges. The ALJ, moreover, did incorporate

Plaintiff’s complaints of pain and fatigue into his decision that she should be “limited to only

light work with the additional postural limitations detailed.” Id. at 23 (quoting Dkt. 10-2 at 24).

       Given the ALJ’s more complete consideration of the relevant medical opinions and

evidence at steps four and five, Judge Harvey concluded that the ALJ’s more truncated

consideration at step two was not prejudicial. Id. at 24. He, accordingly, recommends that the

Court deny Plaintiff’s motion and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion. Id. at 25.

                                                 II.

       Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, once a magistrate judge issues

a report and recommendation on a dispositive motion, the district judge must engage in de novo

review of “any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition” to which either party timely objects.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After doing so, the district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the

recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge

with instructions.” Id. Significantly, district courts review “only those issues that the parties

have raised in their objections,” Taylor v. District of Columbia, 205 F. Supp. 3d 75, 79 (D.D.C.

2016) (quoting Aikens v. Shalala, 956 F. Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C. 1997)), and, as with appellate

review, the parties may not raise arguments or claims that were not raised and explicated before

the magistrate judge, id. (citation omitted).

                                                  6
                                                III.

       Here, neither party objects to Judge Harvey’s conclusion that the ALJ erred by failing to

consider Plaintiff’s chronic pain as a possible medically determinable impairment at step two.

Dkt. 20 at 16–19; see Dkts. 21, 22. Plaintiff does, however, object to Judge Harvey’s subsequent

conclusion that this error was harmless. Dkt. 21. The Commissioner does not raise any

objections of his own. See Dkt. 22. The Court will, accordingly, limit its review to Plaintiff’s

contention that Judge Harvey incorrectly concluded that the ALJ’s error was harmless. Dkt. 20

at 19–24; Dkt. 21 at 2–6.

       Plaintiff makes two arguments in support of her objection. First, she argues that the

ALJ’s error in not considering her chronic pain as a medically determinable impairment at step

two was inescapably prejudicial. Dkt. 21 at 3–4. In her view, “if the impairment is not

medically determinable [at step two], then [it] does not receive consideration” at any subsequent

step in the “sequential evaluation process.” Id. at 3. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ

committed prejudicial error in discrediting Dr. Dominguez’s opinions. Id. at 5. Echoing her first

argument, Plaintiff maintains that because the ALJ did not take Dr. Dominguez’s findings of

chronic pain seriously at step two, he must not have taken those findings seriously at the later

stages of the decision. Id. at 6. For the reasons explained below, the Court is not persuaded by

either argument.

                                                A.

       Plaintiff’s first argument misunderstands Judge Harvey’s R&R. She starts with the

following syllogism: “if the impairment is medically determinable, then the ALJ must consider

the impairment throughout the sequential evaluation process.” Dkt. 21 at 3. So far, so good.

But she then commits a logical misstep—the fallacy of denying the antecedent—and argues that

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the inverse must also be true: “if the impairment is not medically determinable, then the

impairment does not receive consideration.” Id. By way of analogy, it is, of course, true that “if

it is raining, the plants in your garden are wet.” But it does not follow that, if the plants in your

garden are wet, it must be raining—you might have just watered the garden with a hose.

       But, even beyond the rules of logic, Plaintiff’s argument ignores the fact that the record,

as thoroughly explicated by Judge Harvey, shows that the ALJ did, indeed, consider the evidence

at issue at steps four and five. See Dkt. 20 at 21–22. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not

consider her chronic pain, and associated symptoms of fatigue, sleeping problems, and trouble

lifting heavy objects, when deciding on her residual functional capacity at step four, see Dkt. 13-

1 at 13, but the record leaves little doubt that the ALJ considered the evidence of her chronic

pain, even if he failed to classify it as a medically determinable impairment at step two. See,

e.g., Dkt. 10-2 at 21 (deciding on her residual functional capacity after “careful consideration of

the entire record”); id. (taking note of her reports of extreme fatigue and joint pain limiting her

movement); id. at 22 (noting her descriptions of her significant joint pain and fatigue from her

hearing); id. (acknowledging references in the record to fatigue and diffuse pain but noting that

her “physical examinations do not reflect debilitating symptoms”); id. at 23 (analyzing her

complaints of fatigue and widespread bodily pain while noting reports of no acute distress and

normal physicality and strength). Plaintiff argues, for example, that “the ALJ did not consider

the chronic pain when constructing the residual functional capacity,” Dkt. 21 at 4, but the ALJ’s

opinion reveals otherwise: he repeatedly analyzed all of the “symptoms as alleged by [Plaintiff,]”

including “fatigue, daytime drowsiness, and ‘pain all over her body,’” Dkt. 10-2 at 22. The fact

that the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s complaints were not supported by the “totality of the

medical evidence,” id., does not mean he failed to consider them. Rather, he considered them

                                                  8
but was unpersuaded that they merited the relief that Plaintiff sought. Among other things, the

ALJ documented how Plaintiff complained of diffuse pain throughout 2020 and January 2021,

but he also considered the countervailing evidence that she had multiple physical examinations

that showed no acute distress, normal functioning and range of motion, healthy appearances, and

were generally unremarkable. Id.

        Nor does Plaintiff even argue (1) that the outcome at steps three and four would have

been different had the ALJ classified her chronic pain as “a medically determinable impairment”

at step two or (2) that the ALJ should have classified the impairment as severe at step two. See

Dkt. 21 at 3. In her Motion for Judgment of Reversal, moreover, Plaintiff merely noted, “if the

ALJ properly considered [her] chronic pain as a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ

may have then classified the impairment as severe, thus requiring the ALJ to move on to step

three of the sequential evaluation process.” Dkt. 13-1 at 14 (emphasis added). Given the ALJ’s

conclusions at steps four and five, that speculation is far from sufficient to overturn the ALJ’s

determination. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s objections to Judge Harvey’s decision, which are all that

is properly before the Court, offer no basis to conclude that the ALJ should have found that the

impairments were “severe” and, even more importantly, do not take issue with the portion of

Judge Harvey’s R&R explaining that Plaintiff “does not argue that the ALJ should have

classified her chronic pain as severe [. . . or] that her chronic pain met a listing at step three.”

Dkt. 20 at 15. Instead, Plaintiff argues only that it does not matter whether the ALJ would have

considered the impairment severe because the “ALJ would still be obligated to consider the

impact of that impairment when creating the residual functional capacity.” Dkt. 21 at 3. But, as

previously explained, that is precisely what the ALJ did.

                                                   9
       Plaintiff’s argument that she was prejudiced because the ALJ did not consider her chronic

pain after step two is therefore unpersuasive.

                                                 B.

       Plaintiff’s second argument fares no better. She contends that the ALJ also committed

prejudicial error by not fully crediting Dr. Dominguez’s opinions. See Dkt. 21 at 5. The

Commissioner objects to this argument as it was not raised in prior briefing and, thus, may not be

raised as an objection to the R&R. Dkt. 22 at 4 (citing Thomas v. Moreland, No.18-cv-800, 2022

WL 2168109, at *2 (D.D.C. June 16, 2022); Aikens v. Shalala, 956 F. Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C.

1997)). The Court disagrees—at least in part. As Plaintiff responds, one of the arguments she

presented to Judge Harvey—namely, that the ALJ committed an error at step two by overlooking

Dr. Dominguez’s opinions—requires consideration of whether the error was prejudicial and,

therefore, requires the Court to assess whether the error affected later stages of the sequential

analysis. The Court will give Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and will consider on the merits

her contention that the ALJ failed to take Dr. Dominguez’s opinions “seriously” through the

process. Dkt. 21 at 6. But, even with that leeway, the argument fails for a number of reasons.

       To start, Plaintiff overreads Judge Harvey’s conclusion that the ALJ erred in not

assessing whether her chronic pain was a medically determinable impairment. She claims that

“Judge [Harvey] made it clear that the record supported [her] diagnosis of chronic pain,” Dkt. 21

at 4, but that misstates Judge Harvey’s conclusion. More accurately stated, Judge Harvey merely

observed that, apart from the discussion of fibromyalgia, the ALJ’s decision at step two was

“otherwise silent as to her reports of chronic pain.” Dkt. 20 at 18. The error that Judge Harvey

identified at step two was the ALJ’s failure fully to consider other chronic pain impairments—

Judge Harvey did not conclude that the ALJ should have found, based on the record evidence,

                                                 10
that Plaintiff’s chronic pain, in fact, constituted a medically determinable physical impairment.

Id. Indeed, Judge Harvey could not have been clearer about the scope of his conclusions, noting

that “[t]he government may be correct that the medical evidence concerning Plaintiff’s reports of

chronic pain is insufficient to find such an impairment,” and merely found that it was an error not

to discuss that in the analysis. Id. (emphasis added).

       Plaintiff further argues that because the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Dominguez’s

opinion at step two, he must have done the same at steps three and four. That argument, again,

cannot be squared with the record. At step two, the ALJ determined that Dr. Dominguez’s

opinion that Plaintiff has fibromyalgia was not a sufficient basis for concluding that she had

fibromyalgia as a medically determinable impairment. The ALJ reached this conclusion because

the record showed neither “the requisite number of tender point findings” nor “evidence that

medical doctors have excluded other impairments as required in SSR 12-2p.” Dkt. 10-2 at 19.

The conclusion that Dr. Dominguez did not provide enough evidence to satisfy SSR 12-2p with

respect to fibromyalgia does not mean that the ALJ ignored the evidence that Dr. Dominguez did

provide (regarding both fibromyalgia and other possible conditions) or that the ALJ failed to

consider that evidence at later points in the process. Plaintiff points to nothing in the record that

suggests a different outcome at step two would have changed how the ALJ approached steps four

and five.

       To the extent that Plaintiff is separately challenging the ALJ’s step-four assessment of the

evidence from Dr. Dominguez, moreover, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s analysis is

supported by “substantial evidence.” Dkt. 20 at 13. Courts review the factual findings of an

agency under the “substantial evidence” standard. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In applying this standard,

“a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t]

                                                 11
evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148

1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In this

context, “the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high[:]” it is just “‘more than a

mere scintilla.’” Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 229). “It means—and means

only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co., 305 U.S. at 229; citing Dickinson v. Zurko,

527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999)). Notably, an “agency’s factual findings may be supported by

substantial evidence even though a plausible alternative interpretation of the evidence would

support a contrary view.” Dillmon v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 588 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C. Cir.

2009) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, it is not enough for Plaintiff to show that Dr.

Dominguez’s opinion pointed towards a different conclusion; she must demonstrate that, after

considering the record as whole, no “reasonable mind” could have reached the conclusion that

the ALJ did regarding her RFC. She has not met that burden.

       At step four, the ALJ found that the extent of the physical limitations that Dr. Dominguez

identified were inconsistent with the other objective medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s

condition. Dkt. 10-2 at 24–25. The ALJ had previously considered the opinions of Dr. Bedeau

and Dr. Williams, which indicated that Plaintiff could perform light work, ambulate six hours of

an eight-hour workday and lift up to 20 pounds. Id. at 23. Dr. Dominguez’s opinion that

Plaintiff could sit, stand, or walk for less than two hours and only occasionally move her lower

body in other fashions was significantly more restrictive. Id. at 24. The ALJ recognized that Dr.

Dominguez’s opinion may have reflected Wilson’s subjective complaints of pain and fatigue, but

he found those complaints incongruous with the “generally unremarkable” results of her many

physical examinations, which showed few restrictions on her various bodily systems. Id. To the

                                                 12
extent the ALJ’s conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the ALJ. Here, moreover, the record includes numerous physical

examinations reporting that the Plaintiff was in “no apparent distress” and had “normal” system

functioning even though she reported chronic pain. See, e.g., Dkt. 10-9 at 11, 21, 25. Even the

physical exam that Dr. Dominguez conducted on January 6, 2021, reported a range of motion

within normal limits with no pain (“MSK” (musculoskeletal): “ROM WNL, no pain”). Dkt. 10-

9 at 8. And even if Dr. Dominguez’s medical source statement provides some objective

evidence that might have supported a narrower residual functioning capacity, the Court is

persuaded that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that at least portions of Dr.

Dominguez’s opinion were inconsistent with other evidence in the record.

       Finally, the Court notes that to establish prejudice, Plaintiff would need to show that, had

the ALJ had found Dr. Dominguez’s medical opinion persuasive, he would have adopted a

different RFC. Here, however, the ALJ gave Plaintiff “the upmost benefit of the doubt that can

be reasonabl[y] supported by the medical evidence,” Dkt. 10-2 at 23, and limited her to “light

work” with only occasional stairs, ladders, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. Id.

Without substituting its judgment for that of the ALJ and reweighing the evidence presented,

there are no grounds from which the Court can conclude that the ALJ would have come to a

different conclusion as to her RFC had he found Dr. Dominguez’s statement more compelling.

       Plaintiff’s argument that she was prejudiced because the ALJ discredited Dr.

Dominguez’s opinions is therefore also unpersuasive.

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                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the Court will ADOPT the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, Dkt. 20, will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal, Dkt. 13, and

will GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance, Dkt. 14.

       A separate order will issue.

                                                  /s/ Randolph D. Moss
                                                  RANDOLPH D. MOSS
                                                  United States District Judge

Date: February 1, 2024

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