Court Opinion

ID: 9629448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:43:08.721445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:19.564780
License: Public Domain

RENDELL, Circuit Judge
dissenting.
The majority renders complex what I suggest is a straightforward issue, susceptible of a straightforward analysis under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). The only relevant question required to be *617asked and answered here is whether the two types of conspiracy crimes outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 371, conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States and conspiracy to defraud the United States, constitute separate offenses, requiring proof of different elements, and for which different cumulative punishments can be meted out. I suggest that the answer is clearly and unequivocally “yes,” they are distinct offenses. Two of the three courts of appeals that have addressed this precise issue, have so held.18 Given that, the first part of the majority opinion, which reasons to the contrary, is wrong. The second part, which applies a test that is useful only if the fact pattern involved two alleged conspiracies for the same criminal offense (e.g. successive prosecutions for conspiracy to commit mail fraud) is unnecessary.19
The majority seizes on the use of the phrase “distinct statutory provisions” in Blockburger as indicating that its test only applies when the successive offenses are found in different statutes. 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. But that is not what Block-burger says. Rather it refers to “distinct statutory provisions.”20 “Distinct” means “distinguished from all others.” Web-steR’s II New RiveRside Dictionary 390 (1988). “Provision” means “[a] clause in a statute, contract or other legal instrument.” Black's Law Dictionary 1345 (9th ed.2009)(emphasis added). To say that the two provisions in § 371 are not distinct is to equate conspiracy to commit an offense with conspiracy to defraud. That makes no sense. Moreover, as is discussed in more detail below, application of Blockbur-ger is the way to determine the intent of Congress, and its application here leads to the conclusion that not only are these distinct provisions, but because the elements differ greatly, Congress intended different punishments and double jeopardy does not prevent the Rigases’ prosecution for conspiracy to evade taxes.21
*618If there were a doubt as to Congress’ intent as to whether these are distinct offenses, one need only look at a consideration deemed significant by the Supreme Court — the specific evil sought to be addressed by the respective provisions. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (“The conclusion we reach today regarding the intent of Congress [to create distinct statutory offenses] is reinforced by the fact that the two conspiracy statutes are directed to separate evils presented by drug trafficking.”). Virtually without exception, courts of appeals have held that the “offense” and “defraud” clauses aim to protect different actors and redress distinct social harms.22 On the one hand, the “defraud” clause focuses narrowly on conspiracies targeting the federal government. See United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 422 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Falcone, 960 F.2d 988, 990 (11th Cir.1992) (en banc); United States v. Thompson, 814 F.2d 1472, 1476-77 (10th Cir.1987). Its purpose is two-fold: (1) to ensure the integrity of the federal treasury and (2) to promote the smooth effective operation of the federal bureaucracy. Accordingly, the “defraud” clause prohibits efforts not only to cheat the government out of property or money but also to interfere with or obstruct the operation of government by deceit, craft, trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest. See United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1091-92 (4th Cir.1993); see also Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188, 44 S.Ct. 511, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924). On the other hand, the “offense” clause aims to protect the public generally. Brandon, 17 F.3d at 422. Accordingly, its applicability does not hinge on the identity of the target, which need not be the federal government. Id. Nor does the “offense” clause require proof of interference with government operations. Rather, it broadly embraces conspiracies aimed at violating any federal law. Id.; see also United States v. Hirsch, 100 U.S. 33, 35-36, 25 L.Ed. 539 (1879). Thus, contrary to the majority’s contention, the two prongs of § 371 do not simply describe alternative means of committing the same offense, but instead describe two distinct crimes.
The majority maintains that its position reflects the holding of the “majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals to consider the issue.” Just the opposite is true: the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals alone has held that the “offense” and “defraud” clauses identify the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Smith (David L.), 424 F.3d 992. In fact, two other courts of appeals have concluded that Congress intended to authorize cumulative punishment for violation of both provisions. In Ervasti, 201 F.3d at 1039-40, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that § 371, which uses “either ... or” language, “plainly establishes two offenses.” It bolstered this conclusion by noting the unique elements of proof required for the “offense” and “defraud” crimes. In Thompson, 814 F.2d at 1476-77, the Tenth Circuit, applying *619Blockburger, also found no “colorable claim” of double jeopardy. These courts had no difficulty reaching this conclusion, presumably because the two offenses are so clearly separate and distinct as a matter of substance. Smith, on the other hand, relied solely on form, and concluded without discussion that Blockburger did not apply because both crimes appear in the same statute. I submit that Ervasti and Thompson are more persuasive.23
The majority relies on cases interpreting § 371 in the duplicity context as authority for purposes of double jeopardy. The principle of duplicity emanates from Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a), which prohibits the government from charging separate offenses in a single indictment count. Several courts of appeals have concluded that the “offense” and “defraud” clauses do not constitute separate offenses for purposes of Rule 8(a). While at first blush, application of these precedents to the double jeopardy context seems sensible, I submit that the finding that the “offense” and “defraud” clauses are not separate offenses for duplicity purposes does not control the analysis for double jeopardy purposes. Rule 8(a) serves three key purposes: (1) to ensure the defendant receives adequate notice of the offenses charged; (2) to minimize the risk that jurors were not unanimous as to the particular offenses charged; and (3) to enable precise determination of the particular offenses of which the defendant was convicted or acquitted, critical to avoid re-prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. See United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir.1981); United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir.1980). These considerations determine, in large part, whether violation of distinct statutory provisions may be charged in a single indictment count— that is, whether an indictment count is impermissibly duplicitous. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Murray, “If the doctrine of duplicity is to be more than an exercise in mere formalism, it must be invoked only when an indictment affects the policy considerations discussed above; because those policy considerations are not thwarted here, we conclude that the indictment was not duplicitous .... ” 618 F.2d at 897-98. Accordingly, courts have held that a single indictment count charging violations of the “offense” and “defraud” clauses — if framed with adequate specificity — would enable determination of the “convicted” offenses and thus would not be impermis-sibly duplicitous.24
The double jeopardy inquiry, by contrast, focuses not on the clarity of the jury verdict but rather on whether a later prosecution entails the double punishment prohibited by the Constitution. The overriding issue is not whether a specific indictment count speaks with the requisite lucidity, enabling precise determination of the jury’s findings, but rather whether Congress intended to impose multiple punishment for violation of distinct statutory provisions. And, here, considering the obvious difference between the two types of conspiracies alleged and their im*620plications for purposes of sentence, surely it did not. These fundamentally distinct inquiries preclude rote application of duplicity precedents to the double jeopardy context. Accordingly, no federal court of appeals has relied on its duplicity precedents to determine whether the “offense” and “defraud” clauses define distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy.25 And, in fact, at least one court of appeals has construed § 371 differently in the double jeopardy than in the duplicity context. Compare Thompson, 814 F.2d at 1476-77 (double jeopardy), with United States v. Hauck, 980 F.2d 611, 615 (10th Cir.1992) (duplicity).26
Equally concerning is the majority’s rejection of Blockburger as the controlling test for double jeopardy in the situation before us. The majority relies on United States v. Liotard, 817 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir.1987), as setting forth the applicable test for defendants’ double jeopardy claim. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently held that where distinct conspiracy provisions are implicated, the Blockburger test governs whether separate prosecution of each violation offends the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 339-42, 101 S.Ct. 1137; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946). Liotard applies where there are successive prosecutions for the same offense. The central inquiry under Liotard is whether the particular agreements into which defendants entered were part of a single overarching conspiracy. But that consideration is relevant only if two criminal conspiracies involving the same offense are charged. That is not what is before us. Here, Blockburger not only applies; more than that, the result reached via the Blockburger analysis proves the point: the elements are different and separate punishments were therefore intended and double jeopardy does not apply.
Because Blockburger focuses on the elements of the provisions violated — not the factual details of the agreements into which defendants entered — it applies, even where the particular violations emanate from a single overarching agreement, (as the majority, applying the Liotard factors, concluded was the case here.)27 On this point, Albernaz is instructive. There, the *621Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding a single narcotics conspiracy or agreement, because distinct offenses of conspiracy to import marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 963, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 846, were separately charged, there is no double jeopardy violation. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. 1137. Because Congress intended to authorize consecutive sentences for violation of the two distinct offenses, the Court concluded that imposition of cumulative punishment was permissible, even where only a single overarching agreement or conspiracy existed. Albernaz applied Blockburger as the established methodology for adjudicating double jeopardy claims brought by conspiracy defendants. In American Tobacco Co., decided almost four decades before Albemaz, the Supreme Court, again applying Blockburger, approved the imposition of separate penalties for defendants convicted of conspiring to restrain trade in the tobacco industry in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and of conspiring to monopolize the tobacco industry in violation of section 2 of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). 328 U.S. at 788, 66 S.Ct. 1125. The Court rejected a double jeopardy argument similar to that pressed by defendants here:
On the authority of the Braverman case, petitioners claim that there is but one conspiracy, namely, a conspiracy to fix prices. In contrast to the single conspiracy described in that case in separate counts, all charged under the general conspiracy statute, we have here separate statutory offenses, one a conspiracy in restraint of trade that may stop short of monopoly, and the other a conspiracy to monopolize that may not be content with restraint short of monopoly. One is made criminal by § 1 and the other by § 2 of the Sherman Act.
We believe also that in accordance with the Blockburger case, §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act require proof of conspiracies which are reciprocally distinguishable from and independent of each other although the objects of the conspiracies may partially overlap.
Id. at 788, 66 S.Ct. 1125 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Because the Blockbur-ger test, which focuses on the elements of the offenses, controls here, the majority’s application of Liotardis multi-factor inquiry, examining whether the particular agreements into which defendants entered constituted a single overarching conspiracy, is misplaced and unnecessary. The distinctiveness of the offenses under Blockburger, not the existence of an overarching agreement under Liotard, is what matters here for purposes of double jeopardy.
Under Blockburger, the imposition of cumulative punishment is permissible for violation of distinct statutory provisions, provided that each provision requires a unique element of proof. Consistent with the position adopted by virtually all courts of appeals,28 we conclude that this requirement is easily satisfied here; the majority does not opine otherwise.29 Accordingly, *622successive prosecutions of the Rigases under the “offense” and “defraud” clauses of § 371 do not violate the Double Jeopardy-Clause.
I submit that the majority’s reasoning and result is not consistent with established double jeopardy jurisprudence and will bar prosecutions that Congress did not intend to prohibit. I therefore respectfully dissent

. See United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1039-40 (8th Cir.2000) (finding that § 371 clearly establishes two offenses); United States v. Thompson, 814 F.2d 1472, 1476-77 (10th Cir.1987) (applying Blockburger to § 371 to determine that double jeopardy does not bar prosecutions for conspiracy to commit mail fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States); but see United States v. Smith (David L.), 424 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir.2005) (declining to apply Blockburger to assess double jeopardy because all of the conspiracy counts at issue alleged a violation of the same statute, § 371).

. The majority does not refer to the comprehensive, thoughtful, 38 page opinion of the District Court concluding that double jeopardy does not apply. I agree entirely with Judge Jones' reasoning and I commend the District Court opinion to the reader as its clarity is persuasive. See United States v. Rigas, 565 F.Supp.2d 620 (M.D.Pa.2008).

. “The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180 (emphasis added).

.The majority relies on inapposite cases that tend to cloud the issue. United States v. Evans and Sanabria v. United States dealt with single act — single statutory provision offenses. 854 F.2d 56 (5th Cir.1988); 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170 (1978). Bravermanv. United States involved the issue of “duplicity” where a single conspiracy had several objects and differentiated that fact pattern from cases in which a single act violated two statutes. 317 U.S. 49, 63 S.Ct. 99, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942). These cases are factually distinguishable and not controlling. Moreover, as I suggest is the correct approach here, the Xavier court applied the Blockburger test in order to assess whether two crimes under a single statute that was divided into distinct statutory provisions were the “same offense.” 2 F.3d 1281, 1291 (3d Cir.1993).

. See United States v. Alston, 77 F.3d 713, 718 (3d Cir.1996) (noting that § 371 refers to "two types of conspiracies''); United States v. Tham, 960 F.2d 1391, 1399 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that the "offense” and "defraud” clauses of § 371 identify two separate conspiracies with two separate objectives); see abo United States v. Vazquez, 319 F.2d 381, 384 (3d Cir.1963) ("The general conspiracy section of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 ... condemns two types of conspiracies.”); United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 422 (1st Cir.1994) ("18 U.S.C. § 371 creates two distinct criminal offenses: conspiracies to commit offenses against the United States and conspiracies to defraud the United States.”); United States v. Haga, 821 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir.1987) (noting that § 371 "criminalizes conspiracies of two sorts”).

. The majority fails to discuss Ervasti and Thompson and merely cites these cases in a string citation as contrary authority.

. See United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 624 (2d Cir.1983) (“The specificity of the conspiracy-to-defraud allegations and the jury's verdicts on the substantive counts eliminate any possibility of the concerns expressed in United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F.2d 36, 40-42 (2d Cir.1977), on which appellants rely, that a count alleging only a conspiracy to defraud the United States in some unspecified way risks conviction without either an allegation or proof of the essential nature of the fraud.”).

. In Smith (David L.), the court held that § 371 does not create distinct statutory offenses; it did so, however, without reference to, and independent of, case law reaching the same conclusion in the duplicity context. 424 F.3d at 1000.

. See also United States v. Dale, 782 F.Supp. 615, 619 (D.D.C.1991) (distinguishing courts’ construction of § 371 in the duplicity and double jeopardy contexts and rejecting application of double jeopardy cases to the duplicity inquiry).

. See United States v. Marren, 890 F.2d 924, 936 (7th Cir.1989) ("In general, an agreement to commit several unlawful acts must be charged as a single conspiracy. An exception, however, exists where Congress has manifested an intent to authorize multiple punishments for conduct that violates two statutory provisions.”) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1007 (5th Cir.1981) ("[U]nder the Blockburger test it is possible for a single criminal agreement or conspiracy to give rise to distinct offenses under specific, separate conspiracy statutes.”); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 235 (2d Cir.1981) ("It is undisputed that a single transaction may give rise to liability for distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. This is true whether the offenses be substantive crimes ... or crimes of conspiracy.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Morris, 99 F.3d 476 (1st Cir.1996) (applying Blockburger test to determine whether Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited prosecution under two distinct conspiracy provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846).

. See Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029; United States v. Morris, 99 F.3d 476 (1st Cir.1996); Marren, 890 F.2d 924; United States v. Thompson, 814 F.2d 1472 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Nakashian, 820 F.2d 549, 552-54 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Twomey, 806 F.2d 1136, 1143 (1st Cir.1986).

. The "offense” clause of § 371 requires proof: (1) of an agreement to commit an offense proscribed by federal law; (2) that the defendant was a party to the agreement; (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the agreement with an awareness of its unlawful objectives; and (4) that one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Third Circuit Mod.Crim. *622Jury Instr. 6.18.371A (2008). The "defraud” clause of § 371 requires proof: (1) of an agreement among two or more persons to defraud the United States; (2) that the defendant was a party to the agreement; (3) that the defendant intentionally joined the agreement aware of its objective to defraud the United States; and (4) that one of the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Third Circuit Mod.Crim. Jury Instr. 6.18.371B (2008). The Model Jury Instructions define “defraud” as to "cheat the United States government or any of its agencies out of money or property” or to “obstruct or interfere with one of the United States government’s lawful functions, by deceit, craft, trickery, or dishonest means.” Id.