Court Opinion

ID: 9452321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:37:12.370587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:10.161781
License: Public Domain

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority has ordered reversal because the District Court permitted Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent Williams to testify that Illinois license plate CX 3017 was assigned to defendant at his Chicago residence, covering a Plymouth car, even though Mr. Williams had obtained this information from a book published by the Illinois Secretary of State and not in the courtroom.
Defense counsel made an objection when the book was mentioned but neglected to state his ground, as required by Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Earlier he had objected to testimony with respect to registrations, grounding that objection on the best evidence rule. Assuming arguendo that the defendant’s “blind” objection to the book was based on the best evidence rule,1 there must still be no “over-technical and strained application” of the rule, for, as Mr. Justice Sutherland observed in United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 845 (2nd Cir. 1938), certiorari denied, 309 U.S. 664, 60 S.Ct. 590, 84 L.Ed. 1012, that would serve “only to hamper the inquiry without at all advancing the cause of truth.”
The book in question was available in the Federal Bureau of Investigation office in the United States Courthouse. If defense counsel had really been interested in cheeking the truth of Agent Williams’ testimony, he would have demanded the production of the book 2 instead of trying to create error.
As Professor Wigmore has pointed out, “flexibility” is needed in interpreting the best evidence rule, for it “tends to become encased in a stiff bark of rigidity.” As he noted:
“Thousands of times it is enforced needlessly. Hundreds of appeals are made upon nice points of its detailed application which bear no relation at *225all to the truth of the case at bar. For this reason the whole rule is in an unhealthy state. The most repugnant features of teehnicalism are illustrated in this part of the law of Evidence.” (IV Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940) § 1191.)
Professor Wigmore concluded that the trial court has discretion to dispense with the production of the original unless the opponent “bona fide disputes the content of the document” (idem; United States v. Vandersee, 279 F.2d 176, 181 (3rd Cir. 1960), certiorari denied, 364 U.S. 943, 81 S.Ct. 463, 5 L.Ed.2d 374).
The policy of the best evidence rule was fully satisfied, for if Agent Williams’ testimony about the license plate had been inaccurate, the defendant would have introduced contrary evidence in order to impeach Williams. Defense counsel did cross-examine Williams about the book and was unable to undermine his testimony. The Secretary of State’s office advises that the book in question showed exactly what Agent Williams said. Instead of accepting its truth, as a trial tactic, defense counsel’s closing statement chose to argue that the absence of the book should make the jury suspicious of Agent Williams’ testimony!
Even if there was any evidentiary error in this respect, the verdict and the judgment should stand if “the conviction [of the reviewing court] is sure that the error * * * had but very slight effect” on the jury. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557. Thus in Ahlstedt v. United States, 315 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1963), certiorari denied, 375 U.S. 847, 84 S.Ct. 101, 11 L.Ed.2d 74, the court considered it was erroneous to have received a photostat of a traffic citation but concluded that the error was harmless under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, because the traffic citation was “a minor circumstance among several major factors strongly indicating guilt”. Similarly in United States v. Wheeler, 219 F.2d 773, 778 (7th Cir. 1955), certiorari denied, 349 U.S. 944, 75 S.Ct. 872, 99 L.Ed. 1271, Judge Schnack enberg’s concurring opinion considered that the best evidence rule had been violated by permitting two Government witnesses to testify what they had learned from examining certain records. Nevertheless, he concluded “in view of the other evidence in the record showing the guilt of the defendants, these errors were not prejudicial and do not require a new trial.”
In this case, this “error” was certainly not prejudicial. The majority opinion does not show why it prejudiced defendant. The testimony was not contradicted by defendant; yet the defendant would know what license plate had issued for his car. Also, the absence of the book permitted defense counsel in his closing statement to cast innuendos on the failure to produce it, so that if anything, the absence of the book helped defendant’s case before the jury. The production of the book would surely have been demanded by defense counsel if he doubted the veracity of Agent Williams’ testimony. Finally, the evidence summarized in the majority opinion fully supports this conviction even -if Agent Williams’ testimony were completely disregarded. The testimony of witnesses Storey, Morgan, Viola and Lytle all presented strong evidence of defendant’s guilt. In fact, the defendant does not even argue that his conviction was unsupported by otherwise competent evidence.
In applying the best evidence rule, we should heed this admonition of Professor McCormick:
“A mystical ideal of seeking ‘the best evidence’ or the ‘original document,’ as an end in itself is no longer the goal. Consequently when an attack is made on motion for new trial or on appeal, upon the judge’s admission of secondary evidence, it seems that the reviewing tribunal, should ordinarily make inquiry of the complaining counsel, ‘Does the party whom you represent actually dispute the accuracy of the evidence received as to the material terms of the writing?’ If the counsel cannot assure the court that such a good faith dispute exists, it seems clear that any depart*226ure from the regulations in respect to secondary evidence must be classed as harmless error.” (McCormick on Evidence § 209.)
Since defendant’s counsel did not assure this Court that “a good faith dispute exists” about the accuracy of this secondary evidence, its receipt “must be classed as harmless error.”
In my view, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.

. Defendant’s two briefs in this Court refer mainly to the hearsay nature of Agent Williams’ testimony. Only one sentence in defendant’s principal brief refers to the best evidence rule.

. See Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 418-419, 73 S.Ct. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447; United States v. White, 223 F.2d 674, 675 (2nd Cir. 1955), certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 888, 76 S.Ct. 143, 100 L.Ed. 782.