Court Opinion

ID: 9819396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:24:29.343864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:15.826338
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Section 13 — 214(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13 — 214(a) (West 1998)) provides that “actions based upon tort, contract or otherwise against any person for an act or omission of such person in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property shall be commenced within 4 years from the time the person bringing an action, or his or her privity, knew or should reasonably have known of such act or omission.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs action was commenced within the four-year limitations period. Plaintiff argues that her wrongful death suit is one for “tort, contract or otherwise” and that, therefore, the four-year period of limitations in section 13 — 214(a) of the Code should apply. I agree. In Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 Ill. 2d 450 (1990), our supreme court interpreted the phrase “or otherwise” contained in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13 — 212(a)), which is the medical malpractice statute of repose. The court stated: “The inclusion of the term ‘or otherwise’ following more restrictive language in the statute seems to us to indicate that the legislature intended the term to be all-inclusive. We believe that the term demonstrates the General Assembly’s desire at the time it originally enacted the statute to limit a physician’s exposure to liability for damages for injury or death arising out of patient care under all theories of liability, whether then existing or not.” Hayes, 136 Ill. 2d at 458-59. In Carlson v. Moline Board of Education, School District No. 40, 231 Ill. App. 3d 493 (1992), the court adopted the supreme court’s reasoning in Hayes and concluded that the two-year statute of limitations (subsequently extended to four years) in section 13 — 214(a) of the Code barred the third-party contribution action. Relying on Hayes, the court held that, when describing the type of actions to which the limitations provision of section 13 — 214(a) applies, the term “otherwise” had the same meaning in the statute of limitations provision as it did in the medical statute of repose provision interpreted in Hayes. Carlson, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 496. In other words, the term was all-inclusive. The court concluded that the limitations provision of section 13— 214(a) applied to contribution actions based on “an act or omission in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property.” Carlson, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 497; see also LaSalle National Bank v. Edward M. Cohon & Associates, Ltd., 177 Ill. App. 3d 464, 472 (1988), (the “otherwise” language of the limitations provision set forth in section 13 — 214(a) is broad and includes an action for contribution). I also believe that the term “otherwise” in section 13 — 214(a) is intended to be all-inclusive. In my view, the “otherwise” language of the provision applies to any action, including a wrongful death action, based on an act or omission in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property. Although my research has revealed no Illinois cases exactly on point, it would appear that actions under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) would also be encompassed by the term “tort” set forth in section 13 — 214(a) of the Code. A “tort” is “a wrongful act for which a civil action will lie except one involving a breach of contract: a civil wrong independent of a contract.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2413 (1986); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1496 (7th ed. 1999). To maintain a claim under the Wrongful Death Act (Act), a plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant owed a duty to decedent; that defendant breached that duty; that the breach of duty proximately caused decedent’s death; and that pecuniary damages arose therefrom to persons designated under the Act. Leavitt v. Farwell Tower, Ltd. Partnership, 252 Ill. App. 3d 260, 264 (1993). A wrongful death action requires proof of the same elements — duty, breach of the duty, proximate cause and damages — as a common-law negligence action, a classic action in tort. Plaintiff also contends that section 3 — 214(a) of the Code takes precedence over section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/2 (West 1998)) because section 13 — 214(a) is more specific than section 2 of the Act. I agree. The Wrongful Death Act applies generally to actions arising from the death of a decedent, regardless of the type of activity from which the cause of action arose. On the other hand, section 13 — 214(a) of the Code “has been called a ‘special statute of limitations’ [citation] and a ‘specific’ statute of limitations [citation] and specifically applies to actions arising out of certain conduct, i.e., that related to construction activities.” LaSalle National Bank, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 473. When two limitations periods are applicable to a particular action, the more specific statute generally applies. Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186, 191 (1999). Because section 13 — 214(a) of the Code is more specific than section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act and because I believe a wrongful death action is one for “tort, contract or otherwise,” I would find that the four-year limitations period set forth in section 13 — 214(a) applies to plaintiffs cause of action. As plaintiff brought her action within the applicable four-year period, I would reverse the circuit court’s order dismissing her complaint as time-barred.