Court Opinion

ID: 9566955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:45:24.946548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:56.383510
License: Public Domain

Brailsford, Justice
(dissenting).
I agree with the disposition which the opinion of Justice Littlejohn makes of questions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, but respect*437fully dissent from the conclusion that the evidence establishes a violation by appellant of Sections 56-1074 and 56-1075, Code of 1962. As I read the record, the catalogue, for which appellant is held responsible, contains general claims of savings, convenience and service in the sale of a great variety of items to eligible purchasers at the “lowest possible prices.” To sell all who are eligible at the same low price is not to give a discount; certainly it is not to give a thing of value to, induce the sale of spectacles within the meaning of the statute. The case would be no stronger if the advertisement should be construed as an offer to sell at discount prices, whatever that term may imply. To sell and to- give are readily distinguishable terms, and to offer to sell at a disco.unt is not an offer to give a thing of value as proscribed by the statute.
As to the other aspect of this question, the farthest reach of the advertisement attributed to appellant is an offer to sell spectacles on credit, to persons with approved credit ratings, with no cash down and the price payable in monthly installments. The statute do.es not prohibit advertising spectacles for sale on credit. It only prohibits advertising the terms on which credit will be extended, apparently to avoid competitive claims concerning such terms. When this penal statute is construed strictly, as it must be, the advertisement here, which does not specify terms but rather describes the type and extent of credit available, is not proscribed.
Fpr the reasons stated, I would reverse the order appealed from.
Bussey, J., concurs.