Court Opinion

ID: 9575001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:10:35.098026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:46.184447
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Justice
(dissenting).
The principal objection to the conclusion readied is that a new duty and a new liability is imposed upon the city, not heretofore recognized, and which is without precedent.
The primary duty of the city with respect to its streets and alleys is to “keep them in a reasonably safe condition for use by travelers in the usual modes”. Carson v. City of Genesee, 9 Idaho 244, 74 P. 862, 864, 108 Am.St.Rep. 127; Moreton v. St. Anthony, 9 Idaho 532, 75 P. 262; Powers v. Boise City, 22 Idaho 286, 125 P. 194; Baillie v. Wallace, 24 Idaho 706, 135 P. 850; Strickfaden v. Greencreek Highway Dist., 42 Idaho 738, 248 P. 456, 49 A.L.R. 1057.
To this primary duty, the statutes add that of keeping the streets free from nuisances. 50-1141, 52-101, 18-5901, I.C. As used in this connection, a nuisance is to ■be understood as that which is a nuisance per se, a nuisance as a matter of law, such *297as is defined by statute. 52-101 I.C.; City of Bellevue v. Daly, 14 Idaho 545, 94 P. 1036, 15 L.R.A..N.S., 992, 125 Am.St.Rep. 179, 14 Ann.Cas. 1136. In case of such a nuisance, the liability of the city is absolute and does not depend upon negligence. Where, however, the condition does not amount to an absolute nuisance as a matter of law, even though it be a nuisance in fact, where the substance of the underlying wrong is negligence, the liability arising out of it is not absolute, but is dependent upon negligence. The distinction was well drawn by Cardozo in McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391, 57 A.L.R. 1; also in Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724, 155 A.L.R. 44.
The liability of the city for breach of its duty to keep the streets and 'alleys in safe condition for travellers depends upon negligence, and absence of contributory negligence, in all cases where the wrong does not amount to an absolute nuisance as a matter of law. This proposition is universally accepted and is adhered to 'by all the decisions of this court on the subject.
Although the plaintiffs allege the situation caused by the location of the tank to be a nuisance, it cannot be contended that it constituted a nuisance as a matter of law, such as would impose a liability regardless of negligence. 52-101, 18-5901, I.C.
The statutes imply authority in the city to grant permission for such use of the public way. 62-901, 40-305, and 50-1141, I.C. Abutting property owners are' generally considered to have special privileges in the use of the streets and alleys adjacent to their property, Searcy v. Noll Welty Lumber Co., 295 Mo. 318, 243 S.W. 318, 23 A.L.R. 816, 4 McQuillan M.C.2d Ed. 100 et seq., and Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749, 95 P. 945, 17 L.R.A.,N.S., 497, and even greater subsurface rights, 4 McQuillan M.C.2d Ed. 165 et seq. Such privileges are generally recognized throughout this state, a fact of which this court will take notice. Subsurface rights were recognized by this court under charter provisions' of the city of Lewiston, which in effect gave that city authority similar to that given to other cities of the state by the provisions of section 50-1141, I.C. City of Lewiston v. Isaman, 19 Idaho 653, 115 P. 494. It was there held that the sidewalk cellar doors involved, being maintained by authority of law, could not be deemed a nuisance. It is stated that 52-108, I.C., refers only to statutes. However, the principle is sound, and was applied by this, court where no specific statute was involved. Olin v. Honstead, 60 Idaho 211, 91 P.2d 380. So the conclusion is unavoidable that the situation created by the installation of this tank was not a nuisance per se, nor a nuisance as defined by the statute, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs must allege negligence on the part of the city in order to impose any liability upon it.
*298The complaints allege that the tank was installed by the Butane company under the direction and supervision' of the city engineer. It also appears from the complaints that the tank was installed pursuant to some agreement between the tenant and the American Butane Company as a means of delivery to, and for use by, the tenant of Butane gas; that the ground floor space was divided and rented to two different tenants. The lease attached provides for. the rental of one of the storerooms and the basement thereunder. The lease further provides for repairs by the tenant and that the tenant shall "not make or suffer alterations without the written consent of the lessor, and that “the lessors may at any reasonable time enter the premises to view the same or make improvements or repairs at their option.” From these allegations, it follows that the installation was made by the occupant and the Butane company for their mutual benefit. So far as the benefit to the tenant is concerned, that will also be regarded as a benefit to the occupancy, or to the leasehold estate and, as such, an indirect benefit to the owner. This is so, even though he alleges that it was done without his knowledge or consent. The city, despite its permit and supervision by its engineer, was not an actor. It was not in the gas business and the installation was not made for its benefit. The duty of the city involved in this transaction was limited to that imposed by the statutes to see to it that the installation was made in such manner as not to interfere with the free and unobstructed use of the alley by the public in the usual modes, and to prevent the establishment of a nuisance therein. The facts alleged show that the city fully performed this duty. The alley was left open and free from obstructions and no nuisance was created. No duty devolved upon the city to protect either of the parties to the installation of the tank, nor the owner of the building, from any negligence on their part, in the manner in which the work authorized by the permit was done. 2 Sherman & Redfield, sec. 296, p. 726; Trueman v. Village of St. Maries, 21 Idaho 632, 123 P. 508; Foster v. City of Chicago, 197 Ill. 264, 64 N.E. 322; Macer v. O’Brien, 356 Ill. 486, 190 N.E. 904; 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporation, § 859, 861b. (b) (c), 864b., 867; 62 A.L.R. 1088, 70 A.L.R. 1365; Sanders v. First Nat. Bank, 183 Okl. 112, 80 P.2d 207. The specific charge is that the tank was so placed that its service valves extended into the pit which in turn opened into the basement. It is obvious that this particular location was chosen by those who installed the tank as a matter of convenience to themselves, and possibly to save the expense of constructing another means of access to the valves in filling the tank, and a few feet more of pipe leading from the tank to the building, or of making another hole through the foundation for the service pipe. In any event, whatever their motive may have *299been, the selection of the particular site, in that regard, was a matter which did not concern the city.
It is fundamental that actionable negligence is founded upon a breach of some duty owed by the party charged, as a consequence of which breach the complainant is injured. 45 C.J. 631-632, 38 Am.Jur. 642. Hence, the city, owing no duty to the owner of the building to safeguard his property against acts of negligence on the part of his tenant, or third parties dealing with his tenant, there could be no breach of duty alleged by the owner which would impose a liability upon the city.
It is stated in the majority opinion that the city’s liability in such a case is the same as that of a private owner with reference to damages inflicted upon persons in or near his premises. This is contrary to the 'holding in Trueman v. St. Maries, supra, where it is held that the issuing of such permit is a governmental function. But, assume the proposition is sound. If A owns land with a common 'boundary to that of B, and has a building adjacent to the line, alongside of which on his side of the line B maintains a driveway; and if A’s tenant, without A’s knowledge or permission, desiring to use Butane gas in the building, either directly or through the gas company, obtains the consent of B to install a tank for such use on B’s side of the line; and if we further assume that B gives such consent, provided it is so installed that his driveway is not interfered with, and he is personally present to see to it that it is so installed; and there is negligence on the part of those who do the work, say an opening surrounding the supply pipe into the building is permitted to remain unclosed; and if we further assume that an employee of the gas company thereafter spills gas in filling the tank, and the gas finds its way into the building and is there exploded; under such circumstances can it possibly be contended that B would be liable to A for the damage to his building? The question answers itself. B owed no duty to A to protect his property against the negligence of either his tenant, the gas company, or anyone employed by them, merely because he gave his consent to their use of his property. The rule apparently invoked by the majority is that, every person shall so use and enjoy his own property as not to interfere with the equal right of others to use and enjoy their property, and so as not to impinge the rights of the public. But a reading of the cases cited clearly indicates that this rule has no application here. In this case the city did not “so use” its alley. The use and enjoyment was by the tenant and the gas company. The principle referred to was correctly applied by this court in Bellevue v. Daly, supra; Strong v. Brown, 26 Idaho 1, 140 P. 773, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 140, Ann.Cas.1916E, 482; Gould v. Reed, 34 Idaho 618, 203 P. 284; and Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 277 P. 542. These cases also demonstrate that the rule does not apply here for the reason stated.
*300Moreover, this court has always recognized that, even in cases involving a breach of primary and mandatory duty of the city to keep its streets and alleys open and free -from obstructions, contributory negligence -is a defense. Giffen v. Lewiston, 6 Idaho 231, 55 P. 545; Carson v. City of Genesee, 9 Idaho 244, 74 P. 862, 108 Am.St.Rep. 127; Smith v. City of Rexburg, 24 Idaho 176, 132 P. 1153, Ann.Cas.1915B, 276; Muir v. Pocatello, 36 Idaho 532, 212 P. 345; Butland v. City of Caldwell, 51 Idaho 483, 6 P.2d 493. So that even in a case where the city is negligent, if the plaintiff is guilty of negligence which proximately contributes to the injury, he cannot recover. How then can it be, if there was no negligence on the part of the city, and such negligence as is pleaded is negligence on the part of the tenant and a third person, that the city can be held liable? It is apparent too from the facts pleaded that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. In his lease he reserved the right to inspect the premises, and certainly he owed himself a duty in that regard. The complaint alleges that the city’s permit was issued December 3, 1945, and that the explosion occurred November 15, 1947. Assuming that the installation was made shortly -after the permit was issued, the plaintiff failed for a period of almost two years to inform himself of the condition created by the installation of the tank. To permit him to recover in this case would be to permit him to recoup a loss caused by his own neglect.
A comparison may properly be drawn from the rule generally applied in most jurisdictions to the effect that, where the abutting property owner makes a special use of the adjacent street, sidewalk, or alley, he is liable over to the city for negligence on his part either in the installation of fixtures for such use, or in the maintenance thereof. This rule is based upon the fact that the use of the public way is for the benefit of the -owner or his tenant, and in return for that benefit the law imposes the obligation to so install 'and operate such use as not to interfere with the paramount public use of the way. Out of this arises the. duty of the abutting owner, or his tenant, and his liability to indemnify the city. 7 McQuillan 65-72; 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 861, p. 223-228; Salt Lake City v. Schuback, 108 Utah 266, 159 P.2d 149, 160 A.L.R. 809. In this Utah case, where both the landlord and the tenant were held liable, it was said to be the duty o-f the landlord to make inspection and keep the trap-door in repair. The court also cites three Washington cases and quotes from Spokane v. Crane Company, 98 Wash. 49, 167 P. 63-64, as follows: “But the person -Who actually created or maintained for his -own use the dangerous condition is, as between the city and himself, still primarily liable on elementary principles, and regardless of any statute or charter provision so declaring, simply because the dangerous condition was the result of his own personal negligence. As *301between him and the city, his was the active negligence, while that of the city was merely passive. These considerations make it plain that there is no differentiating significance to be found in the fact that the active negligence in this case was that of the tenant, who had complete possession and control of the premises, and not that of the owner.” It is to be remembered that this was a case involving an injury to a pedestrian, lawfully upon the sidewalk, and not an injury, such as here, to a party to whom the city owed no such duty. On this question of the obligation of the owner see Mitchell v. Thomas, 91 Mont. 370, 8 P.2d 639, 641. There the owner was sued by the party injured and defended upon the ground that the premises were in control of the lessee. The court held that “a tenant in possession is, for all practical purposes, the owner of the property,” and found the owner liable. This court has recognized the duty of one making special use of a public street to safeguard the public in its use thereof. Horn v. Boise City Canal Company, 7 Idaho 640, 65 P. 145. If the abutting owner is primarily responsible for injuries caused through his negligence in connection with the use of a public way, established and maintained by himself or his tenant, for the benefit of his property, how can he shift that primary obligation to the city, where the city is not .in any way benefitted, nor a party to the installation ?
Another comparison can be drawn between the position of the city in this case and those cases wherein gas companies, engaged in distributing gas to the public for profit, have been sued for negligence resulting in injury to customers or third persons. Here, of course, the gas company, being engaged in a private business for profit, has a primary duty to exercise due care for the protection of its customers and the public. But even in these cases it is universally held that (1) the gas company is not liable as an insurer; (2) its negligence must be established; (3) while it has a duty to make reasonable inspection, it must have some knowledge or notice of the defect or danger; (4) it is not liable for leaks in the pipes, fittings or appliances of its customers over which it has no control; (5) contributory negligence is a defense ; and (6) it is not liable for the negligence of third persons. 25 A.L.R. 262, Reid v. Westchester Lighting Co., 236 N.Y. 322, 140 N.E. 712, 29 A.L.R. 1250; Prestonbury Superior Oil Gas Co. v. Vance, 215 Ky. 77, 224 S.W. 405, 47 A.L.R. 488; Gerdes v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 219 Cal. 459, 27 P.2d 365, 90 A.L.R. 1082; Scarborough v. Central Arizona Light & Power Co., 58 Ariz. 51, 117 P.2d 487, 138 A.L.R. 870. It is at once apparent that the rule applied here makes the city liable where a private party (even though it be a party to, and a beneficiary of, the transaction) would not be liable. Further, it has been held that a gas company is not liable to the owner for injury to his property caused by the negligence of a tenant. *302Smith v. Pawtucket Gas Co., 24 R.I. 292, 52 A. 1078, 96 Am.St.Rep. 713. Creel v. Charleston Natural Gas Co., 51 W.Va. 129, 41 S.E. 174, 90 Am.St.Rep. 772. This seems a sound rule. Why shouldn’t the owner be bound by the act of his tenant as regards the liability asserted against the city? He entrusted his property to the .possession, control and care of the tenant, for a profit, reserving in his lease the right to inspect at reasonable times for the protection of his reversionary estate. The negligence of the tenant should not be charged to the city, which had no interest, whatever, in the transaction.
I have examined all of the authorities cited by the majority. None supports the conclusion reached. Most of them concern injuries to persons using the public streets. Such cases, involving, as they do, the basic duty of the city to keep the streets safe, obviously are not in point. In each of the other cases cited, the liability imposed upon the defendant, whether a private owner or a city, is based upon a breach of some well-recognized duty owed to the injured party. In no case has a liability been imposed where the facts are similar to these. The nearest in point of facts is Nixon v. Chicago, a case where the abutting owner’s building was damaged by removal of lateral support by a private party tunnelling in an alley, under a permit issued by the city. There are two distinctions: first, the duty of care in removing lateral support was involved; second, neither the owner nor his tenant was a party to the tunnelling, and it was not done for the benefit of his property.
The following authorities support respondent’s position: Wheeler v. City of Plymouth, 116 Ind. 158, 18 N.E. 532, 9 Am. St.Rep. 837; Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N.Y. 198, 199 N.E. 56; Macer v. O’Brien, 356 Ill. 486, 190 N.E. 904; Foster v. City of Chicago, 197 Ill. 264, 64 N.E. 322; Trueman v. St. Maries, supra; 2 Sherman & Redfield, Negligence, 726.
What has been said on the basic duty and responsibility of the city as to the claim of the abutting owner, applies with equal force to the claim of the plaintiff Metzer. The city owed her no duty which was breached by it. She was an employee of the tenant. The primary duty involved was that of her employer to furnish her a safe place to work. Coupled with -that was a duty of the Butane company to safeguard its customers, their employees, and invitees, and the public, against dangers arising out of its negligence in supplying the gas. Foster v. City of Chicago, 356 Ill. 486, 64 N.E. 322.
In view of the lapse of time between the installation and the occurrence of the explosion, during which it appears no explosive accumulation of gas occurred in the basement, I am inclined to think that the damage was not necessarily foreseeable. But more important here, this fact amply shows, at least as far as the city is concerned, that the manner of installation *303was not the proximate cause of the explosion. Otherwise, the frequent filling of the tank during the intervening period, together with the heater fire and electric motors alleged to have been operating in the basement, would have caused an earlier explosion. It appears that there was a distinct intervening act of negligence on the part of the gas company’s employee in filling the tank on November 15th.
The judgment should be affirmed.
I am authorized to say that Justice KEETON concurs in this dissenting opinion.