Court Opinion

ID: 9940787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 15:13:18.508569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:46.012873
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-23-00147-CR

                DAVID LONG, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

         On Appeal from the 102nd District Court
                 Bowie County, Texas
             Trial Court No. 22F0168-102

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

       On July 26, 2023, a Bowie County jury convicted David Long of possessing a deadly

weapon in a penal institution, which is a third-degree felony under Section 46.10 of the Texas

Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.10. The State charged Long with being a habitual

offender, a charge which carries the enhanced punishment range of “life, or for any term of not

more than 99 years or less than 25 years.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d). Long pled not

true to the State’s punishment-enhancement allegations.       The jury found the enhancement

allegations true and assessed a sentence of thirty-one years’ imprisonment. The trial court

adjudicated Long guilty and sentenced him in accordance with the jury’s verdict.

       On appeal, Long raises two bases for reversal: (1) his jury charge included the wrong

date for one of his felony convictions, which was egregious error, and (2) his trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to object to that jury-charge error and in failing to request that Long

undergo a competency evaluation. Because we disagree on both points, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

I.     There Was No Jury-Charge Error

       Long claims the jury charge was submitted in error because the enhancement questions

under Section 12.42(d) of the Texas Penal Code contained the wrong dates. We find that the

dates were correct and that there was no jury-charge error.

       To receive an enhancement under Section 12.42(d), a defendant must have two prior

felony convictions. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d). The timing of these convictions is

also important: “the defendant has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and

                                                2
the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first

previous conviction having become final.”       Id.   Accordingly, a defendant must be finally

convicted of the first felony prior to the date the second felony was committed. Id.

        Long claims his two prior felony convictions were in the following order: “(1) burglary

of a habitation and (2) evading arrest with a vehicle (enhanced).” He argues that his conviction

for burglary of a habitation did not become final until September 25, 2015, but he evaded arrest

prior to September 25, 2015. Thus, he claims his second felony conviction was not after his first

conviction became final.

        Based upon the record, Long is incorrect, and he actually had three prior felony

convictions that were relevant to the enhancement: two for burglary of a habitation and one for

evading arrest. For one of the convictions for burglary of a habitation, Long was sentenced to

“FIVE (5) YEARS,” and his conviction was final on May 14, 2013. The other conviction was

for “TEN (10) YEARS” with ten years probated, and his conviction was not final on May 14,

2013.   For the second felony, “EVADING ARREST OR DETENTION WITH VEHICLE

(ENHANCED),” the date of the offense was August 25, 2015, and, pursuant to a guilty plea,

Long’s conviction was final on September 25, 2015.

        The two prior felony convictions were submitted to the jury as follows:

               The indictment alleges in the Enhancement Paragraph one (1) that, prior to
        the commission of the offense of Deadly Weapon in a Penal Institution for which
        you returned a verdict herein, the defendant was finally convicted of a felony
        offense, namely, Burglary of Habitation in the 18th Judicial District Court of
        Johnson County, Texas, in Cause Number F47173, on or about the 14th day of
        May, 2013. To this allegation the defendant has pleaded “Not True.”

                                                3
               The indictment alleges in the Enhancement Paragraph two (2) that, prior to
       the commission of the offense of Deadly Weapon in a Penal Institution for which
       you returned a verdict herein, and after the conviction in cause number F47173
       was final, the defendant committed the felony offense of Evading
       Arrest/Detention with a Vehicle and was finally convicted in the 18th Judicial
       District Court of Johnson County, Texas, in Cause Number F49883 on or about
       the 25th day of September, 2015. To this allegation the defendant has pleaded
       “Not True.”

By submitting the conviction for burglary of a habitation (first felony) that was final on May 14,

2013, and the conviction for evading arrest (second felony), which was for an offense committed

on August 25, 2015, the trial court properly submitted two felony convictions in the appropriate

order and consistent with Section 12.42(d). Thus, we find no jury-charge error.

II.    Long’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective

       As for his second issue, Long claims his trial counsel was ineffective for “(1) fail[ing] to

object to the . . . jury charge and (2) fail[ing] to request a competency evaluation.” Because we

find that his trial counsel was not ineffective, we affirm.

       Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, an accused is guaranteed the right to effective

assistance of counsel.    U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The standard for assessing an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and the same

standard applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Texas. See Hernandez v. State,

726 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).             Under Strickland, to prove his counsel was

ineffective, Long must make two showings: “(1) that his trial counsel’s [performance] was

deficient” and (2) that he was prejudiced as a result of his counsel’s performance. McFarland v.

State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by

Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). To show deficient performance, Long
                                                  4
must prove his counsel’s actions fell “below the professional norm for reasonableness.”

McFarland, 928 S.W.2d at 500. To show prejudice, “[h]e must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors,” the result of the trial would have been different. Id.

       First, Long claims his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the

enhancement felonies under Section 12.42(d) of the Texas Penal Code and the jury-charge error.

As recognized above, however, there was no jury-charge error with the dates of his prior

felonies. Long’s counsel was not ineffective for his “failure to raise a meritless objection.” See

Speaker v. State, No. A14-92-00757-CR, 1993 WL 176249, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] May 27, 1993, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (citing Bonilla v. State, 740

S.W.2d 583, 586–87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d)). Thus, we find no

ineffective assistance of counsel on this claim.

       Second, Long claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a competency

evaluation. He claims that, “[t]hroughout the trial of this matter, Long continued to demonstrate

that he did not understand the proceedings,” spoke “out of turn,” and “had an outburst in front of

the jury.” He claims his trial counsel “should have questioned whether he was competent to

stand trial and request[ed] a competency evaluation.” We disagree.

       “A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient present

ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or

(2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.” TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a). “A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial . . . .”

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(b).

                                                   5
           Despite Long’s claim to the contrary, he demonstrated his competency throughout the

trial.     Long understood the charges against him and that he was in court because he had

possessed a deadly weapon, a fan motor. Long also repeatedly insisted on protecting his rights.

Long complained that he was not properly read his Miranda1 rights: “I come out my house with

a fan motor I got something going on, and whatever it is, it’s their job to read me my rights

correctly. That’s their job.”

           Long also demonstrated his understanding of his Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination: “But when the officers don’t give me the opportunity that’s my right to - - my

fifth amendment [sic] not to speak to that man or it’s my right to speak to him, so if you’re not

giving me the opportunity to speak or not somebody violated my rights right then.”

Furthermore, in the presence of the jury, Long again complained about not being read his

Miranda rights:

           If y’all offered to read me my rights and the officer didn’t come get me, is that my
           right or is that something that’s optional? Or is my option or y’all’s option that’s
           what I want to know because if I didn’t have that option my rights were violated
           right then.

           We find Long’s statements and behavior provide insufficient evidence to rebut the

presumption of competency, and his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this

issue. As a result, we find no ineffective assistance of counsel.

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                                    6
III.   Conclusion

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Jeff Rambin
                                               Justice

Date Submitted:       January 24, 2024
Date Decided:         February 15, 2024

Do Not Publish

                                                 7