Court Opinion

ID: 9777311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:07:09.281639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:52.296699
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority’s disposition of appellants’ third ground of error. Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against them because the bond upon which the forfeiture was predicated was incomplete and therefore not a valid and binding undertaking in law. Appellants argue the bond failed to state the time and place where the principal was to appear or the court or magistrate before whom the principal was to appear, and therefore was not a valid and binding undertaking and was a cause for exoneration. See Article 22.13(1), V.A. C.C.P.
The bond in this case is captioned “IN THE JUSTICE COURT PRECINCT NO. _, PLACE_, BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS.” The body of the bond recites that it was “entered into by RAMON BARRERA BALBOA who has been arrested on a charge of AGG. ROBBERY-DEADLY WEAPON, a felony, by virtue of a warrant issued by_Justice of the Peace, Precinct No._, Bexar County, Texas.” The bond states the conditions of performance as follows:
“Now if the said RAMON BARRERA BALBOA shall be and personally appear instanter before _, Justice of the Peace, during’ the present term of the aforesaid Justice Court, at the Courthouse, in the City of San Antonio, Texas, *559in Justice Precinct No. -, Place _, Bexar County, Texas, there to remain in attendance . .. until discharged .. ., and shall personally appear for any and all subsequent proceedings had relative to the above charges . . . before any Court or Courts of the State of Texas in which said subsequent proceedings may be pending .. ., then in that case the bond will be null and void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect.”
Article 17.01, V.A.C.C.P., provides:
“ ‘Bail’ is the security given by the accused that he will appear and answer before the proper court the accusation brought against him, and includes a bail bond or a personal bond.”
Article 17.02, V.A.C.C.P., provides in part:
“A ‘bail bond’ is a written undertaking entered into by the defendant and his sureties for the appearance of the principal therein before some court or magistrate to answer a criminal accusation .. . . ” (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 17.08, V.A.C.C.P. (Requisites of a bail bond), provides:
“A bail bond shall be sufficient if it contain the following requisites:
“1. That it be made payable to “The State of Texas”;
“2. That the defendant and his sureties, if any, bind themselves that the defendant will appear before the proper court or magistrate to answer the accusation against him;
“3. If the defendant is charged with a felony, that it state that he is charged with a felony. If the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor, that it state that he is charged with a misdemeanor;
“4. That the bond be signed by name or mark by the principal and sureties, if any, each of whom shall write thereon his mailing address;
“5. That the bond state the time and place, when and where the accused binds himself to appear, and the court or magistrate before whom he is to appear. The bond shall also bind the defendant to appear before any court or magistrate before whom the cause may thereafter be pending at any time when, and place where, his presence may be required under this Code or by any court or magistrate;
“6. The bond shall also be conditioned that the principal and sureties, if any, will pay all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by any and all sheriffs or other peace officers in rearresting the principal in the event he fails to appear before the court or magistrate named in the bond at the time stated therein. The amount of such expense shall be in addition to the principal amount specified in the bond. The failure of any bail bond to contain the conditions specified in this paragraph shall in no manner affect the legality of any such bond, but it is intended that the sheriff or other peace officer shall look to the defendant and his sureties, if any, for expenses incurred by him, and not to the State for any fees earned by him in connection with the rearresting of an accused who has violated the conditions of his bond.” (Emphasis supplied.)
“Requisite” is defined as “that which is required or necessary, something indispensable.” Webster’s New International Dictionary.
It thus appears that Article 17.08, V.A.C. C.P., sets out that which is required and indispensable to a bail bond.
It has long been said that a bail bond is strictly a statutory bond, and to entitle the State to a forfeiture thereon, it must contain all the requisites prescribed by statute. Turner v. State, 14 Tex.App. 168 (1883); Wallen v. State, 18 Tex.App. 414 (1885); Douglas v. State, 26 Tex.App. 248, 9 S.W. 733 (1888); La Rose v. State, 29 Tex.App. 215, 15 S.W. 33 (1891); Turpin v. State, 86 Tex.Cr.R. 96, 215 S.W. 455 (1919). See also Sheppard v. Gill, 58 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Civ. App.1933), aff’d. 126 Tex. 603, 90 S.W.2d 563. See also 7 Tex.Jur.2d, Rev. Part 2, § 37, p. 644.
In 7 Tex.Jur.2d, Rev. Part 2, § 41, p. 649, it is written:
*560“A bail bond must state the time and place, when and where the accused binds himself to appear, and the court or magistrate before whom the bailee is to appear.”
And certainly the older cases made clear that a bail bond must bind the principal to appear before the proper court, failing which condition, the bond is of no force. Crouch v. State, 36 Tex. 333 (1872); State v. Phelps, 38 Tex. 555 (1873); Littlefield v. State, 1 Tex.App. 722 (1877); Wallen v. State, supra; Mackey v. State, 38 Tex.Cr.R. 24, 40 S.W. 982 (1897), and cases there cited.
The bond in question clearly fails the requirement discussed above and the requisites of Article 17.08, § 5, supra. The bond failed to specify which justice of the peace court the principal bound himself to appear except that it was in “the Courthouse, in the City of San Antonio, Texas.” This court can take judicial notice that there are five justice of the peace precincts in Bexar County, and further that none of said courts are in the county courthouse now or at the time the bond was made. See and cf. 23 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 23, p. 42; Gish v. State, 606 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Cf. also Barrientez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
The majority makes a ruling of first impression by holding that § 5 of Article 17.08, supra, making it a requisite that the bail state the court or magistrate before whom the principal is to appear is for the benefit of the principal and surety or sureties, if any, and is a “right” that he or they must insist upon being in the bond, or else the “right” is waived, and the principal or surety cannot be heard to complain after the bond had been forfeited.
This assumes that a requisite of a bail bond can be a “right” of a defendant in a criminal prosecution. How many of the requisites of a bail bond under Article 17.08, supra, are “rights” of a defendant and how many are perhaps not that at all and were never intended to be. Who knows? Only the majority can tell.
Perhaps it is time to decide what other requisites of a bail bond are “rights” of a defendant in a criminal prosecution which can be waived if not inserted in the bond by the defendant and his sureties. How about the requisite that the bond be made payable to “The State of Texas”? How about the requisite that it be signed by the principal and his sureties, if any? How about the requisite that the bond state whether the principal is charged with a felony or misdemeanor? See Article 17.08, supra. Were these requisites of a bail bond designed as the rights of a defendant in a criminal prosecution?
And what standard for waiver of a defendant’s rights is to be applied if the majority’s opinion stands? Certainly the waiver to the right to counsel, the appearance and confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, etc., must be intelligently, voluntarily and knowingly made. Is there a different standard when the “right” relates to the making of a bail bond, when a requisite of a bail bond is construed as such “right”? It would be difficult to conclude that a different standard should be applicable. If not, however, the majority should formulate the standard that applies.
It is common knowledge that many defendants, young and old, but inexperienced in law enforcement procedures, may appear without legal counsel before the official authorized to approve bond. In many instances he may be accompanied by a surety with no legal knowledge. Neither the principal nor the surety may have any knowledge of the judicial system and may not know from which court the warrant issued, if that be the case. Is it a waiver of his “right” if a defendant under the circumstances fails to fill in the proper blank on the printed form of a bond furnished him by the sheriff or other official as is often the case?
Today’s opinion makes it clear to officials who are authorized to approve bail bonds that it would be better practice to approve bonds failing to designate the court or magistrate before whom the principal is to appear. This is not a practice to be encouraged and certainly not one in conformity with Article 17.08, supra.
*561Today’s decision may often leave the defendant without a point of beginning to even trace where he is required to appear. The majority bootstraps their opinion by citing cases that hold that if a principal or his surety omit their addresses as required by Article 17.08, § 4, V.A.C.C.P., such omission will not exonerate them from their obligation whatever the validity of these cases when combined with today’s decision it means that where the bond leaves blank the court or magistrate before whom the principal-defendant is to appear and the mailing addresses are omitted, a bail bond may be legally forfeited in some court without the principal-defendant knowing when or where he was to appear all because he did not, perhaps without counsel or legal advice, fill out all the blanks in the bond.
Is there no responsibility on the part of the approving official when an incomplete bond is presented? Is there no waiver on the part of the State? If one requisite of a bail bond as established by the Legislature is not a requisite as decreed by this court, then are any of the other requisites valid?
I dissent.
TEAGUE, J., joins in this dissent.