Court Opinion

ID: 9739120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:09:08.43329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.105656
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(concurring specially).
The trial court determined that it need not decide the question of
whether Trooper Chase was absolutely privileged to make allegedly defamatory statements in his arrest report and to disclose the contents of that report to the newspaper reporter because there is evidence in the record that Trooper Chase’s statements to the reporter were not in all respects consistent with the contents of the arrest report.
While I concur in the decision of the majority to deny immunity on the claims of defamation and negligent infliction of emotional distress, I would limit the issues at trial to the narrow basis identified by the trial court.
Common law tort claims that find their genesis in challenged arrest reports fall more properly, I believe, within the purview of a malicious prosecution action. To maintain a claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish both malice and want of probable cause. Mendota Heights Assocs. v. Friel, 414 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn.App.1987).
There is an additional element which a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit must prove: the criminal proceedings must have been concluded in favor of the accused. See Survis v. A. Y. McDonald Mfg. Co., 224 Minn. 479, 491, 28 N.W.2d 720, 727 (1947).
Carradine pleaded guilty to a charge of speeding in the criminal case out of which the present action arose. This plea may have greatly diminished his prospects of prevailing in a malicious prosecution suit. However, this fact neither weakens my belief that a malicious prosecution suit remains an appropriate method by which to challenge an allegedly incorrect arrest report nor dissuades me from urging that the defamation and negligent infliction of emotional distress issues here be litigated within the parameters set out by the trial court.