Court Opinion

ID: 9584147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:44:58.097053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:40.997056
License: Public Domain

*232HOOVER, J.
(dissenting in part). I am compelled to dissent based upon what I perceive as a reasonable difference of legal opinion. I believe the majority's decision results in a drastic departure from firmly rooted law without the benefit of legislative mandate or pointed precedent.
Section 59.69(11), Stats., provides the methods by which a county may enforce its zoning ordinances. The statute requires ordinances to be enforced by appropriate forfeitures, but gives the county or an affected property owner the further option of pursuing injunc-tive relief to achieve compliance. The majority concludes that the statute vests discretion solely in the county to enforce through injunction. If it is proven at trial that a zoning ordinance was violated and the violation will continue indefinitely, the majority holds the trial court must issue an injunction to remedy the violation.
The majority reaches this result in part on its observation that the statute does not create a discretionary standard for the trial court to follow in determining whether injunctive relief is warranted. I cannot accept this interpretation. I respectfully suggest that the statute does not need to "create a discretionary standard" because the inveterate body of law relating to injunctions already provides those standards. They are well-settled and familiar. They include the following that are germane to the instant case: A prospective injunction is an equitable remedy. See Nelson v. Taff, 175 Wis. 2d 178, 187-88, 499 N.W.2d 685, 689 (Ct. App. 1993). "The granting or withholding of injunctions lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." Webster v. Dane Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 437, 440, 101 N.W.2d 616, 618 (1960); see also State v. C. Spielvogel & Sons Excavating, 193 Wis. 2d 464, 479, 535 N.W.2d *23328, 34 (Ct. App. 1995). An equitable remedy such as a prospective injunction, "must, of necessity, place heavy reliance on the facts of the particular controversy." Prince v. Bryant, 87 Wis. 2d 662, 668, 275 N.W.2d 676, 678 (1979). "[injunctions are not to be issued lightly . . . ." Bartell Broadcasters v. Milwaukee Broadcasting Co., 13 Wis. 2d 165, 171, 108 N.W.2d 129, 132 (1961). The general rule is that "injunctions do not issue for inconsequential or trivial causes," Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Pallange, 205 Wis. 126, 134, 236 N.W. 549, 552 (1931), but "only to restrain an act that is clearly contrary to equity and good conscience." Bartell, 13 Wis. 2d at 171, 108 N.W.2d at 132.
There is not a word in the statute to signal the legislature's purpose to radically depart from these well-established principles that guide the determination to grant or deny injunctive relief. At the very least, if in the area of zoning ordinance enforcement a court no longer has discretion as to when and how to grant an equitable remedy, the statute should explicitly say so. Thus, when the legislature merely granted in § 59.69(11), Stats., the authority to pursue an injunction, without saying more, it could only have intended that such grant of authority incorporated the existing body of law partially surveyed above. This is not only intuitively apparent, but consistent with fundamental maxims of statutory construction. For the purpose of interpreting statutes, the legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of existing case law. Ziulkowski v. Nierengarten, 210 Wis. 2d 98, 104, 565 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Ct. App. 1997). It is further presumed to know that, in absence of language explicitly changing the law, the appellate court's previous construction of the law will remain unchanged. In re Carol J.R., 196 Wis. 2d 882, 889, 540 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Ct. App. 1995). The statute's *234language will not carry the burden of the wholesale restructuring of injunctive relief that I believe the majority's interpretation works.
The majority also relies on its interpretation of County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980), to conclude that § 59.69(11), Stats., provides for mandatory injunctions under certain circumstances. The pertinent issue in Bylewski was whether "a county court of limited authority, in a small claims type action brought pursuant to sec. 299.01(2), Stats., to recover a forfeiture for violation of county zoning ordinances, [may] also enforce compliance with the code by means of an injunctional order in the absence of statutory authority or equitable jurisdiction?" Id. at 160-61, 288 N.W.2d at 133. While acknowledging Bylewski recognized a court's discretion to grant injunctive relief, the majority does not adequately disclose the nature, extent or proper application of this discretion or effectively reconcile the trial court's discretion with its holding. It merely asserts, again relying on Bylewski, that if the court finds there is a violation and it will continue, it must grant injunctive relief.
Nothing in Bylewski compels this result. Indeed, the very quote on which the majority relies for its proposition that an injunction is mandatory merely states that courts have properly granted injunctions in certain instances, not that they had no option but to grant the injunction.1 The majority nonetheless finds the limitation on the court's discretion in the language in *235Bylewski that asserts ”[t]he true inquiry" for the court is "whether the property in question is legally usable . . . Id. at 167, 288 N.W.2d at 136. This inquiry, the majority states, limits the scope of the trial court's balancing role. The majority implicitly suggests the discretion Bylewski acknowledges rests with the trial court in situations such as that involving Goode is limited to determining whether a property is legally usable. What the majority, however, curiously terms an exercise of discretion is simply a finding of fact. Finding facts is only one part of the process of exercising discretion. Upon finding the relevant facts, a court properly exercises discretion when it applies those facts to the appropriate law, and reaches a reasoned result. See Elfelt v. Cooper, 163 Wis. 2d 484, 498-99, 471 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 168 Wis. 2d 1008, 485 N.W.2d 56 (1992).
The majority also relies upon Town of Sherburne v. Carpenter, 582 A.2d 145, 147-48 (Vt. 1990), for the proposition that the trial court has only limited discretion to refuse to issue injunctive relief sought by a municipality for a zoning ordinance violation. As with its discussion of Bylewski, the majority does not fully explore the parameters of this discretion. A reading of Sherburne reveals that the limited discretion the trial court retains under that decision extends beyond making factual findings of a violation and permanency to denying an injunction in the face of a permanent violation when equity demands. See id. at 147-49.
In Sherburne, the defendant's screened porch violated the county's setback ordinance by two feet. Id. at 146. The defendant offered proof that the violation involved only several inches and was wholly uninten*236tional, the zoning administrator having told him that several feet would not make a difference. Id. at 147. The trial court denied the request for an injunction without explanation. Id. The Vermont supreme court remanded the matter for factual findings, with guidance to the lower court regarding balancing the equities in the case in arriving at its determination whether to grant an injunction. Id. at 148.
The Sherburne court concluded that the issuance of an injunction rests upon the trial court's determination of two issues. Id. at 149. The first is whether the violation was substantial as compared to the presumed public injury arising from the violation. Id. "While we recognize the difficulty in weighing public injury against private loss in the typical case, there comes a point were the violation is so insubstantial that it would be unjust and inequitable to require the removal of an offending structure through a mandatory injunction." Id. The second area of inquiry is "whether the landowner's violation is innocent or, alternatively, involves conscious wrongdoing." Id.
The Sherburne court does not support the majority's theory that the trial court's "discretion" is limited to determining what are nothing but factual findings: the existence of (1) a violation that (2) will be permanent. While Sherburne recognizes a presumption that the public injury resulting from a zoning violation outweighs the private cost of compliance and that balancing these two interests is therefore not appropriate, it nonetheless recognizes the trial court's authority to balance and indulge such other considerations as would avoid an inequitable result. The court thus retains the authority to deny an injunction in the instance of an unintentional, insubstantial yet permanent violation.
*237The majority also construes § 59.69(11), Stats., as mandating injunctive relief where a permanent violation is proven, because to permit discretion would usurp a separate branch's authority to grant or deny variances. What the court describes as usurpation of authority is rather an instance of overlapping authority:
The separation of powers doctrine was never intended to be strict and absolute. Rather, the doctrine envisions a system of separate branches sharing many powers while jealously guarding certain others, a system of "separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 ... (1952); State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d [31] 42-43, 315 N.W.2d 703 [1982], When the powers of the legislative and judicial branches overlap, the court has declared that the legislature is prohibited from unreasonably burdening or substantially interfering with the judicial branch. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 360, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989). This subtle balancing of shared powers, coupled with the sparing demarcation of exclusive powers, has enabled a deliberately unwieldy system of government to endure successfully for nearly 150 years.
State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 531 N.W.2d 32, 36 (1995).
Each branch has a core zone of exclusive authority into which the other branches may not intrude. State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 N.W.2d. 770 (1990), citing In Matter of Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 776, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984). "Great borderlands of power" lie in the interstices among the branches' *238core zones of exclusive authority. In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 597, 124 N.W. 670 (1910). In these borderlands it is neither possible nor practical to categorize governmental action as exclusively legislative, executive or judicial. Layton School of Art & Design v. WERC, 82 Wis. 2d 324, 347, 262 N.W.2d 218 (1978).
Id. at 13-14, 531 N.W.2d at 36. When the legislature provided the option of seeking injunctive relief, it incorporated all the precedent defining the remedy and its proper imposition, presumably aware both that the court has discretion to grant an injunction and that declining to enjoin a nonconforming use effectively grants a judicial variance.
Aside from the authorities that define an injunction as an equitable, discretionary remedy, there is analogous precedent to demonstrate that equitable remedies are not mandatory when a statutory violation is proven. In Keane v. St. Francis Hosp., 186 Wis. 2d 637, 658-59, 522 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Ct. App. 1994), this court relied on several supreme court decisions in upholding the trial court's discretionary denial of a writ of mandamus where the grounds for issuance had been proven.
"Although classed as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. The rights of the public and of third persons may be considered." State ex rel. Sullivan v. Hauerwas, 254 Wis. 336, 340, 36 N.W.2d 427, 430 (1949). There can be occasions where a court concludes that the four legal prerequisites for mandamus have been satisfied and yet, on equitable grounds, decides that mandamus should be denied. In State ex rel. Horton v. Brechler, 185 Wis. 599, 202 N.W. 144 (1925), the petitioners sought writs of mandamus to compel *239town clerks to certify the valuation of real and personal property in certain outlying towns which, petitioners demonstrated, belonged in a school district from which the property had been excluded. Although the petitioners demonstrated their clear legal right and the clerks' plain and positive duty, and although the damage was clear and no other remedy existed, the supreme court vacated the temporary injunction ordered by the trial court and denied the petition for writs of mandamus. The supreme court explained:
While the foregoing establishes the legal duty of the defendant town clerks to make the certificate which these proceedings are brought to compel, we have nevertheless concluded that the writs should not issue. While as a rule the writ of mandamus should issue to enforce a clear legal right, it is a discretionary writ and may be withheld where its issuance will work confusion or lead to inequitable results.
Id. at 658-59, 522 N.W.2d at 525 (emphasis in original); see also State ex rel. Milwaukee Sewerage Comm'n v. Milwaukee County Board of Supvs., 211 Wis. 412, 248 N.W. 454 (1933), discussed in Keane, 186 Wis. 2d at 660-62, 522 N.W.2d at 526-67.
In this case, the trial court heard testimony that the board of adjustment granted eight variances of the type Goode sought between September 9, 1994, and June 26,1996. Variances were given to build additions within fifteen feet and eighteen feet of the OHWMs. The distance averaged 30.5 feet for the eight variances. The trial court found that no property owners in the area were harmed by Goode's nonconforming use. It considered that zoning ordinances in other counties require a final inspection before the foundation is poured to prevent inadvertent noncompliance. The trial court found this was, indeed, an unintentional *240violation. It found an inconsistency between the variance application form and the ordinance. It found it would be "very very expensive" to move the dwelling back from the OHWM. Finally, the trial court found that denying the injunction would not adversely affect zoning in Forest County. It then balanced these considerations against the County's interest in zoning compliance and determined that the equities dictated denial of the injunction.
The trial court could reasonably make the foregoing findings based upon the evidence introduced at the November 7, 1996, trial. The court applied those facts to the applicable law as set forth above. A reasonable judge could conclude that a municipality's generalized interest in gaining and assuring compliance with an ordinance is outweighed when an unintentional violation would result in great expense if conformity was ordered, where there is no tangible harm, where there is a pattern of granting variances to lesser-conforming properties and where imposition of a significant forféi-ture serves deterrence. We will sustain the trial court's exercise of discretion if the record reveals that the court examined relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion a reasonable judge could reach. Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15,320 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1982). I would hold that the trial court in this case reasonably exercised its discretion by denying the request for an injunction and would therefore affirm the denial order.
I agree with the majority's opinion regarding the forfeiture.