Court Opinion

ID: 9678959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:37:23.054275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:09.118274
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(dissenting). The trial chancellor found that plaintiff’s drive-in theater, as operated by him, constituted a nuisance. The injunction granted by the chancellor permanently enjoins plaintiff from operating his theater in any manner; it does not enjoin plaintiff only from operating the theater in the manner which was found to constitute a nuisance. The Chief Justice has written to affirm. I dissent.
We have held that a drive-in theater is a legitimate business enterprise. Bsovi v. City of Livonia (1957), 350 Mich 489, 492. Accordingly, a drive-in theater cannot be held to be a nuisance per se subject to judicial abatement by injunction. If, on the other *474band, a legitimate business is operated in sucb a way that sucb operation constitutes a nuisance, sucb as was found by tbe chancellor in tbis case, then operation of tbe business m that manner properly may be enjoined. In short, tbe extraordinary writ of injunction may be issued to regulate tbe operation of a legitimate business to tbe end that its operation does not constitute a nuisance, but it may not be issued to ban tbe proper conduct of sucb a business if tbe business can be conducted without committing a nuisance. See Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co. (1928), 245 Mich 261, 264, where we said:
“Plaintiffs concede that an ice distributing station is not a nuisance per se, but contend that tbis one is a nuisance per accidens. If tbe ice station is a nuisance by reason of method of its operation, then ■regulation, if adequate, and not abatement, is tbe remedy.”
Violation of a properly limited injunction, aimed at the nuisance found by the chancellor, would subject plaintiff to the contempt power of the Court. I am not persuaded by this record that such a limited injunction, enforced by the Court’s power to find its violation a contempt, would not be an adequate remedy to protect the public in defendant township. In any event, I know of no warrant in law that justifies injunctive relief so broad that it bans totally the operation of a legitimate business even if conducted in such manner that no nuisance is committed.
Por tbe foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand for modification of tbe injunction in accordance with tbis opinion. Furthermore, I would award plaintiff bis costs.