Court Opinion

ID: 9768736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:46:27.933318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:43.962017
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the Court of Appeals as to whether KRS 304.33-010, et seq., affords an adequate basis for extending jurisdiction over Sulli*257van Payne Company (Sullivan) in this matter.
KRS 304.33-040(5) is a long-arm statute specifically tailored to extend jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in statutory liquidation proceedings. Under the statute which prevailed at the relevant time, personal jurisdiction was extended to persons who were obligated to the insurer “... in any way as an incident to any agency or brokerage arrangement.” Therefore, for valid personal jurisdiction to attach, the record must reflect that Sullivan, the intermediary, was obligated to Delta, the rein-surer, in some way incident to an agency or brokerage arrangement In addition, Constitutional Due Process requires that Sullivan have sufficient minimum contacts with Kentucky as the forum state to avoid offense to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. These issues will be addressed in turn.
As to the first issue, the trial record discloses facts sufficient to support the finding that Sullivan was obligated to Delta incident to an agency or brokerage arrangement. Though both parties supplemented the record on appeal with evidence on the agency question, the only pertinent evidence put before the trial court is contained in a verified application for a restraining order filed by the appellant and a responsive affidavit filed by Sullivan. Any additional evidence as to the existence or non-existence of an agency relationship between Sullivan and Delta is not properly before this Court and is thus inappropriate for consideration here.
Contained in the application for restraining order was the Commissioner’s affidavit that Sullivan was, at all times relevant to these proceedings, “an agent and broker of Delta Re.” Though Sullivan subsequently contested this point on appeal, it failed to contest or rebut the statement before the trial court. The affidavit asserting an agency relationship between Sullivan and Delta not having been negated, appellant met its burden of proof and the trial court properly accepted its facts as proven. Appellant was not required to introduce further evidence on the point.
The affidavit put forward by the Commissioner was ample to sustain the trial court’s finding of fact, i.e. that Sullivan was at all pertinent times an agent of Delta. The aforesaid affidavit and the absence of rebuttal by Sullivan is clearly set forth in the record and provides a sufficient basis for meaningful appellate review. Under this Court’s ruling in Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet v. Taub, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 49 (1988), it was beyond the Court of Appeals permissible scope of review to hear extraneous evidence of rebuttal on appeal. The trial court’s finding that Sullivan acted as Delta’s agent not being clearly erroneous, the application of KRS 304.33-040(5) is appropriate to Sullivan.
Apart from Sullivan’s failure to timely contest the Commissioner’s affidavit relating to the court’s jurisdiction, ample facts are before this Court to sustain the trial court’s determination. The statute which confers jurisdiction is broadly written and provides notice to any person, including a foreign corporation, that it will be subject to insolvency litigation in Kentucky arising out of any obligation to a Kentucky insurance corporation which is incident to any “agency or brokerage arrangement.”
The affidavit of D. John Jolly, an employee of Sullivan who testified on its behalf, is dispositive of this point.
“Sullivan is named as intermediary in treaties entered into between Delta American Re Insurance Company (‘Delta’) and various ceding companies (‘ce-dents’). Sullivan is not, however a party to the treaties. On information and belief, the treaties were negotiated and executed by the parties outside the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Acting as intermediary on the treaties, Sullivan has coordinated and administered the flow of information, documents and funds between the cedents [including American Home] and Delta. Except as noted below, all communication including phone calls, telex transmittals, correspondence and personal visits between employees and representatives of Sullivan and Delta has been with Delta at its administrative of*258fices located in New York, New York. Pursuant to instructions from Delta dated January 13, 1985 and from that date, Sullivan has sent premium checks to Delta in care of lockbox UKS 016, Louisville, Kentucky. The transmittal of checks to Delta is the only contact Sullivan has had with Kentucky under the treaties between Delta and the cedents.”
In the foregoing affidavit, Sullivan characterized itself as an “intermediary” with respect to Delta and admitted that it coordinated and administered the flow of information, documents and funds between American Home and Delta. Finally, it acknowledged that, pursuant to Delta’s instructions, it sent premium checks to Delta at Louisville, Kentucky. When the foregoing facts are considered in light of the broad jurisdictional basis set forth in the statute, there can be no doubt that, based on reasonable expectations and valid contacts, Sullivan is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court in this proceeding. While Sullivan denies its status as a named party to the treaty between American Home and Delta, in all practical respects, it was a party and served as Delta’s agent at least for transmittal of information and funds.
Sullivan had sufficient contacts with Kentucky to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause. Under the modern approach, actual in-state contacts with the forum state are no longer required. What is required, is that the relationship between the nonresident defendant (Sullivan) and the forum state (Kentucky) be such that the defendant should “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” as a result of his dealings. World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
In the matter at hand, Sullivan held itself out to be an intermediary in the reinsurance business. As a result, Sullivan is a highly sophisticated actor in the industry. Sullivan advises and represents large insurance corporations in highly diverse interstate and multinational transactions. To competently fulfill its obligations, Sullivan is necessarily charged with the knowledge of the expansive government regulation of the insurance industry — including liquidation procedures upon insolvency.