Court Opinion

ID: 9743817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:44:38.047171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.953573
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NICKELS, specially concurring: I would affirm the trial court; however, I do not agree with the underlying analysis of the majority as to defendant’s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The majority relies on the decision of the Appellate Court for the Third District in People v. Moore (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 694, which recognized the offense of attempted second degree murder, and proceeds to review defendant’s attorney’s failure to request such a jury instruction to determine if that omission affected the outcome of the proceeding. (See People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525-26.) However, such review is unnecessary because the Illinois Supreme Court has expressly rejected the existence of an offense of attempt based on an underlying offense of voluntary manslaughter, which is both the predecessor of and, for these purposes, indistinguishable from second degree murder. People v. Reagan (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 238, 240-41. In Reagan, the supreme court rejected the surface appeal of the argument accepted in Moore and by the majority here, that conduct susceptible to charges of second degree murder if the victim dies can form the basis of attempted second degree murder if the victim survives. (Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at 241.) Just as with voluntary manslaughter, to prove attempted second degree murder, the State must still prove that the defendant had the specific intent to “kill[ ] an individual without lawful justification.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9— 2; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 8 — 4, 9 — 1, 9 — 2; Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at 240-41.) However, a defendant guilty of second degree murder either believes himself lawfully justified and cannot, therefore, intend to kill without lawful justification or is acting under strong provocation engendering a sudden and intense passion, which, too, cannot be intended. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 9 — 2(aXl), (aX2).) Thus, the killing without lawful justification that results is unintended, and “[t]here is no such criminal offense as an attempt to achieve an unintended result.” People v. Viser (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 568, 581, cited bj Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at 240. Moore is the only authority that has recognized the offense of attempted second degree murder; however, it is in direct conflict with Reagan. (Compare Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d at 240-41, with Moore, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 698.) The legislature in enacting the 1987 second degree murder statute renamed voluntary manslaughter and, more importantly, substantively realigned the burden of proof so that a defendant must now prove either provocation or unreasonable belief by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the State disprove either beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Shumpert (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 344, 351-52.) In so doing, the second degree murder statute defines the offense in terms of first degree murder and then considers the mitigating factors of unreasonable belief or provocation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2(a).) Based solely on that change, Moore found that the second degree murder statute transformed voluntary manslaughter into a specific intent crime because the State must first prove a defendant guilty of the specific intent crime of first degree murder. (Moore, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 698.) However, voluntary manslaughter also required the State to first prove each of the elements of murder. (Shumpert, 126 Ill. 2d at 351.) Thus, the legislature neither changed the essential nonspecific nature of the offense of second degree murder nor diminished the applicability of Reagan and Viser. The majority’s analysis of the effect of defendant’s attorney’s failure to request a jury instruction on “attempted second degree murder” is unnecessary, and I do not partake in it. I concur in the balance of the majority opinion regarding the other issue raised concerning defendant’s sentence.