Court Opinion

ID: 9709425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:47:16.485528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:48.760089
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I conclude that Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3 (1998), has to include a scienter element. The only way this subdivision can read to include basic *495fairness and due process is that the driver/owner must knowingly allow an open bottle to be kept in the ear.
The majority decides that by enacting both Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 2 (1998) and subd. 3, the legislature must have intended to impose strict liability on owners and drivers for a subdivision 3 offense. The majority reasons that because any person who possesses an open bottle in a motor vehicle violates subdivision 2, and because a nonpos-sessing driver or owner does not violate subdivision 2 if a passenger possesses an open bottle, the most logical inference is that subdivision 3 must mean there is strict criminal liability on owners or drivers (when the owner is not present) if they “keep,” or “allow to be kept,” an open bottle in a vehicle, whether they know it is there or not.
The majority concludes that subdivision 3 makes innocent drivers/owners liable if their passengers violate subdivision 2. Contrary to the majority’s analysis, I conclude that the fact the legislature separated these two provisions does not equate to legislative intent to impose strict liability on innocent drivers/owners. Subdivision 3 merely states, and states quite plainly and clearly, that if a driver or owner is knowledgeable about someone else in the car possessing an open bottle, then the driver or owner has criminal liability, even if the driver or owner himself does not technically possess the open bottle.
The plain meaning of Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, indicates that the legislature intended to criminalize only the knowing possession of an open bottle in a motor vehicle. See Turna v. Commissioner of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1986) (stating if statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, court may not attempt to construe or interpret but must “give effect to the statute’s plain meaning”). It is unlawful under subdivision 3 “to keep or allow to be kept” an open bottle containing intoxicating liquor in a motor vehicle. Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3. The phrase “to keep or allow to be kept” requires knowledge by the actor. Logic and fairness mandate only that conclusion. To “keep” is to maintain, or cause to stay or continue in a specified condition, position, etc.” Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 997 (Jean L. McKechnie ed., 2d ed.1983). To “allow” is “to permit.” Id. at 49. One- cannot “cause” or “permit”1 something to stay in a specified condition if one has absolutely no knowledge that it exists. The statute’s plain language incorporates a mens rea requirement. See Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (1998) (“Words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ .”).
I conclude that Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, is clear on its face. But if, for the sake of argument, we conclude the statute is ambiguous, then a reviewing court should determine the probable legislative intent of an ambiguous statute. See Tumo, 386 N.W.2d at 706 (stating court must determine probable legislative intent of ambiguous statute). I find that subdivision 3 is clear and requires knowledge on the part of the driver or owner for that person to be criminally liable. But if the statute is ambiguous, the probable legislative intent still requires scienter or actual knowledge, as legislatures do not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (1998) (legislature does not intent absurd or unreasonable result).
A determination that Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, imposes strict criminal liability on innocent drivers and owners would lead to a variety of unreasonable results the legislature could not have intended. For example, it would expose all unsuspecting drivers, young and old, to criminal liability if they offer a ride to a friend or colleague who happens to have a concealed open bottle on his or her person. See City of Hutchinson v. Weems, 173 Kan. 452, 249 P.2d 633, 638 (Kan.1952) (determining Kansas open bottle statute is not strict-liability crime and listing possible unreasonable results of imposing strict liability, including offering ride to acquaintance who, unbeknownst to driver, is carrying open bottle in bag). It would also expose innocent parents or other adults to *496criminal liability if they loan their car to their children, or anyone else, who, unknown to the parents, buy a container of liquor, open it, and leave it under the seat of the car or some other place not readily apparent when returning the vehicle. Cf. People v. DeVoss, 150 Ill.App.3d 38, 103 Ill.Dec. 523, 501 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Ill.App.Ct.1986) (concluding Illinois statute prohibiting transportation of open bottle by passenger not strict-liability offense and noting if it were, even out-of-town visitor picked up at airport would be liable if driver’s son had hidden opened bottles in vehicle). A strict-liability open bottle law would
drag[ ] in both the ‘hot rodder’ whose buddies had open beers in the car and the unsuspecting, kind old gentleman who drove home from church with the little old lady with the open flask of communion wine in her handbag.
Id. 103 Ill.Dec. 523, 501 N.E.2d at 841 (citing People v. Hutchison, 46 Ill.App.3d 725, 5 Ill.Dec. 189, 361 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ill.App.Ct.1977) (Mill, J., dissenting), overruled by People v. Graven, 124 Ill.App.3d 990, 80 Ill.Dec. 149, 464 N.E.2d 1132 (Ill.App.Ct.1984)).
Finally, to determine legislative intent, this court may also consider “[t]he occasion and necessity for the law” and “[t]he mischief to be remedied” by the law. Minn.Stat. § 645.16(1), (3) (1998). As the majority points out, the purpose of this statute is to prevent drinking while driving. A scienter or knowledge requirement does not hinder that purpose. If the driver has no knowledge that there is an open bottle in the vehicle, there is no danger that the driver will drink alcohol while driving. Cf. DeVoss, 103 Ill.Dec. 523, 501 N.E.2d at 842 (stating if passenger does not know there is open bottle in vehicle, “there can be little practical justification for concluding that he contributed to the danger which the instant prohibition addresses”). If the driver does know there is an open bottle in the vehicle, then, in that case, the driver clearly comes under the purview of subdivision 3. But that is not this case. The same clear logic is true with owners who are not present in the car but have loaned the car to someone else. If, upon turning over the car, the owner is aware that the recipient has containers, then you can legitimately impose criminal liability on the owner under subdivision 3. That makes sense. The owner has every right, and in fact a legal obligation, to have open containers of alcohol known to him removed from the car before turning it over. Once that lack of knowledge becomes actual knowledge, and that is an element of proof for the state, the driver or owner loses the protection of “no knowledge” and is now properly subject to criminal liability under subdivision 3. This principle of law is in no way hampered by not imposing strict liability on innocent drivers and owners.
Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, cannot, with fairness and logic, be a strict-liability offense. I would reverse Loge’s conviction, as the state failed to prove an essential element of the crime, namely that he knowingly kept, or allowed to be kept, an open container in the vehicle he was driving.

. Even taking, at face value, the majority’s linguistic argument that "allow” means “to approve by not objecting” or "merely the absence of opposition,” I can only note that a person cannot object or demonstrate opposition to something without knowledge of its existence.