Court Opinion

ID: 9621322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:56:35.447267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:02.649684
License: Public Domain

FINNEY, Chief Justice:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the refusal to admit appellant’s statement constitutes reversible error under the facts of this case. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
I agree with the majority that appellant’s statement was not admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), SCRE. I base my conclusion *361not on the fact that the statement is “exculpatory,” 1 nor that it was not corroborated,2 nor on the fact that the majority is again3 willing to permit counsel’s argument to substitute for evidence, but rather on the plain language of the rule itself: “A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible.... ” It is clear this rule contemplates that the accused and the declarant are different people.
I would, never-the-less, reverse this case in light of what I perceive as improper actions by the solicitor. Prior to the taking of testimony, appellant moved to suppress this'confession. The State opposed the motion, and following a Jackson v. Denno4 hearing, the trial judge ruled the statement would be admitted. In order to defuse the statement’s impact, defense counsel acknowledged to the jury during his opening statement that appellant had given a confession in which he admitted having intercourse with the victim, and then killing her. The solicitor, however, never introduced the statement and appellant then sought to introduce it through the testimony of the police officer. This request was refused.
In my opinion, the solicitor’s actions in this capital case *362constitute “sandbagging”.5 I would not condone this type of conduct, but would hold that under these circumstances, the refusal to admit the statement was reversible error. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. It clearly exposes appellant to criminal liability.

. The majority misunderstands the corroboration requirement: it goes not to the contents of the statement or its truth, but to the trustworthiness of the statement itself. See State v. Kinloch, 338 S.C. 385, 526 S.E.2d 705 (2000). On the merits, I simply do not understand how the mere presence of semen in the victim’s vagina is proof of nonconsensual sexual activity as the majority asserts in footnote 7.

. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 328 S.C. 146, 493 S.E.2d 821 (1997) (Finney, C.J., dissenting) (argument of counsel is not evidence). Further, as explained later, under the circumstances here to use counsel’s admission in his opening statement to render the refusal to admit the statement harmless is disingenuous at best. Finally, I do not understand how the majority can conclude in one paragraph that counsel’s reference to the confession renders "[appellant’s] claim that the jury had the erroneous impression he had not cooperated with police ... simply untenable”, yet hold in the very next paragraph that to let the jury know the fact that appellant gave a confession "would have been confusing and misleading to the jury” and therefore evidence of its existence was properly excluded.

. 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).

. It was the uncorroborated fear of the use of this type tactic by defense counsel that led a majority of this Court to abolish in favorem vitae review. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) (Toal, A.J., concurring).