Court Opinion

ID: 9931314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 19:04:09.616008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:07.924696
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/24 Sprewell v. Flores CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

TRIKA SPREWELL,                                                    B329537

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. 21LBCV00423)
         v.

JUANA FLORES,

         Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
     Trika Sprewell, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
                                ________________________
                        INTRODUCTION

        Trika Sprewell filed a quiet title action in 2021 against
Juana Flores seeking, among other things, a declaration of rights
regarding certain real property on Henderson Avenue in
Long Beach. Flores filed a cross-complaint for quiet title,
ejectment, cancellation of deeds, financial elder abuse, conversion
of personal property, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED).
        The trial court held a bench trial on the legal issues and a
three-day jury trial on the remaining claims. The trial court
entered judgment for Flores on Sprewell’s quiet title cause of
action. The court found for Flores on her cross-claims for quiet
title, ejectment, and cancellation of deeds. The jury found for
Flores on conversion of personal property and awarded Flores
damages of $387,530. The jury found for Sprewell on Flores’s
cross-claims for financial elder abuse and IIED.
        Sprewell appeals arguing, in essence, that the judgment is
not supported by sufficient evidence. It is a basic tenet of
appellate procedure that a party asserting a trial court
committed reversible error must provide the reviewing court with
an appellate record sufficient to evaluate the claims of error.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) Sprewell has
not demonstrated error on appeal because the record before us is
inadequate to consider her argument that no substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, we
affirm.

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      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

       In 2021 Sprewell filed a quiet title action against Flores
and additionally sought declaratory relief. The record does not
contain a copy of Sprewell’s complaint, but she appears to have
asserted inherited rights to certain property on Henderson
Avenue in Long Beach from her great-grandmother, Mamie
Butler. The record contains what purports to be a 1963 lease of
mineral rights on the property from Butler to Continental
Northern Oil and Gas.
       Sprewell obtained a default judgment against Flores in
December 2021. Sprewell either attempted to or actually had
Flores ejected from the property, including removal of Flores’s
personal property. A few days after entry of the default
judgment, Flores filed a cross-complaint and a motion to vacate
the default judgment. Flores’s cross-complaint alleged six causes
of action: quiet title; ejectment; cancellation of deeds; financial
elder abuse; conversion of personal property; and IIED.
       The trial court vacated the default judgment and
ultimately set the case for trial in March 2023. Sprewell
represented herself at trial. The following issues were tried to

1      Without the benefit of a complete record on appeal, we
recite the facts and procedural history as available. To aid in our
review, we augment the record with the trial court’s minute
orders on our own motion. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A); Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1570, fn. 3 [augmenting record on the
court’s own motion to include trial court documents that “were
not designated by the parties and were therefore not part of the
clerk’s transcript”].)

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the bench: the parties’ quiet title claims, Flores’s ejectment cross-
claim, and Flores’s cancellation of deeds cross-claim. Flores’s
cross-claims for financial elder abuse, conversion of personal
property, and IIED were tried to the jury. The trial court ordered
that, “As no court reporter is present the parties are ordered to
meet and confer at the end of each day and submit a settled
statement to the Court at 8:30 a.m. the following morning.” The
record on appeal does not contain the parties’ settled statement.
The minute orders reflect that Sprewell testified on her own
behalf at trial and filed 14 trial exhibits, and that Flores had five
witnesses testify and presented 27 trial exhibits. Sprewell
appeared for all three days of trial, but she “refused” to appear
for the reading of the jury verdict.
       After the first day of trial, the trial court ruled for Flores on
the parties’ competing quiet title causes of action, and on Flores’s
cross-claims for ejectment and cancellation of deeds. Addressing
the quiet title causes of action, the court found “by clear and
convincing evidence” that “there is no evidence to support”
Sprewell’s “contention that she inherited title to the real property
commonly known as 1752, 1754, 1756 Henderson Ave. . . . from
Mamie Butler, or the Estate of Mamie Butler,” or “that she has
any claim or right to title of the real property.” The court further
found Flores was “the title owner” of the property and enjoined
Sprewell from claiming any further interest in the property. As
to Flores’s cross-claim for cancellation of deeds, the court found
for Flores and canceled three deeds to the property filed in 2019,
presumably by Sprewell.
       The jury returned a verdict on Flores’s remaining cross-
claims. The jury ruled for Sprewell on Flores’s financial elder
abuse and IIED claims, but found Sprewell was liable for

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conversion of personal property, and awarded Flores damages in
the amount of $387,530.2 The court entered judgment on April 4,
2023.
      Sprewell timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

       On appeal, Sprewell argues she was the heir of her great-
grandmother’s interest in the Henderson Avenue property and
asks the court to review the oil and gas lease she asserts her
great-grandmother signed with Continental Northern Oil and
Gas. She argues the trial court “erred in finding judgment
against Ms. Sprewell” on Flores’s quiet title, ejectment,
cancellation of deeds, and conversion causes of action because
“[t]here is no substantial evidence to support the findings.”
Sprewell does not otherwise appear to challenge the jury’s
damages award on Flores’s claim of conversion.3

A.    Standard of Review
      “When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on
the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the
power of an appellate court begins and ends with the

2     The jury found Sprewell “substantially interfere[d]” with
Flores’s “home furnishings, home décor, kitchen and home
appliances, electronic appliances, automobiles, clothing, shoes,
jewelry and accessories, and personal family memorabilia.”
3     Flores did not file a respondent’s brief. Accordingly, we
decide this appeal “on the record, the opening brief, and any oral
argument by the appellant.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220.)
Sprewell waived oral argument.

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determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will
support the determination.” (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant,
Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143 [emphasis omitted]; accord,
Adams v. Adams (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 654, 656 [reviewing trial
court’s factual findings in quiet title action for substantial
evidence]; Fallert v. Hamilton (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 399, 400,
404 [same, in suit for ejectment]; Anderson v. Anderson (1951)
107 Cal.App.2d 402, 402-404 [cancellation of deeds].) “[A]ll
conflicts must be resolved in favor of the successful party in the
court below” (Lauder v. Wright Investment Co. (1954)
126 Cal.App.2d 147, 151), and “all legitimate and reasonable
inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible.”
(Jackson v. Burke (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 519, 521.)

B.    Sprewell’s Motions To Augment the Record
      Sprewell proceeded by way of a clerk’s transcript (see Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.122), and presented no settled statement,
although the trial court had ordered the parties to prepare one
since there was no court reporter present during trial
proceedings. She designated for inclusion in the clerk’s
transcript the court’s final judgment, as well as 24 “joint trial
exhibits,” none of which appear to have been admitted at trial.
The trial exhibits did not appear in the clerk’s transcript.
      After filing her opening brief, Sprewell moved to augment
the record with 14 documents. This court denied her motion
because Sprewell had not shown the documents were “filed or
lodged in the case in superior court.” (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

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       Sprewell filed a second motion to augment the record. She
identified 20 documents as trial exhibits filed in the trial court
and provided a copy of her original filing of the exhibit list with
the trial court on December 26, 2022. In light of Sprewell’s
showing these exhibits were filed with the trial court, we grant
the motion to augment. (See Olen Commercial Realty Corp. v.
County of Orange (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1444, 1450, fn. 1
[granting appellant’s motion to augment the record with trial
exhibits].) We note, however, that Sprewell apparently did not
include any of Flores’s trial exhibits in her motion to augment.

C.     Sprewell Has Not Demonstrated Error on Appeal Because
       the Record Is Inadequate To Consider Her Argument That
       No Substantial Evidence Supports the Judgment
       “One of the essential rules of appellate law is that ‘[a]
judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on
appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in
favor of its correctness.’” (Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997)
55 Cal.App.4th 853, 865.) For this reason, “an appellant ‘“must
affirmatively show error by an adequate record.”’” (Null v. City of
Los Angeles (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1528, 1532.) “Failure to
provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be
resolved against plaintiff.” (Hernandez v. California Hospital
Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502.)
       Sprewell argues the judgment is not supported by
substantial evidence. When an appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment,
she must demonstrate the error by providing an appellate record
containing the evidence before the trial court. If the appellate
record “does not contain the evidence before the trial court,” the

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appellate court must “conclusively presume[] that the evidence
sustained the [trial court’s] findings.” (Kubon v. Kubon (1958)
51 Cal.2d 229, 232; accord, 569 East County Boulevard LLC v.
Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426,
434, fn. 9 (East County) [“[I]f the record on appeal does not
contain all of the documents or other evidence considered by the
trial court, a reviewing court will ‘decline to find error on a silent
record, and thus infer that substantial evidence’ supports the
trial court’s findings.”]; Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973,
992 (Fain) [“Where no reporter’s transcript has been provided
and no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate
record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to
all evidentiary matters. . . . The effect of this rule is that an
appellant who attacks a judgment but supplies no reporter’s
transcript will be precluded from raising an argument as to the
sufficiency of the evidence.”]; Construction Financial v. Perlite
Plastering Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 170, 179.)
       Evidence presented to the trial court may become part of
the record on appeal by designating trial exhibits (see Lincoln
Fountain Villas Homeowners Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Ins. Co. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 999, 1003, fn. 1); a reporter’s
transcript of trial testimony (see Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at
p. 992); or “any other adequate statement of the evidence” such as
an agreed or settled statement (see Foust v. San Jose
Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186 (Foust)).
       Sprewell has not provided this court with a record that
“contain[s] all of the documents or other evidence considered by
the trial court” necessary to demonstrate that the judgment is not
supported by substantial evidence. (See East County, supra,
6 Cal.App.5th at p. 434, fn. 9; accord, Haywood v. Superior Court

                                  8
(2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949, 955.) There was no court reporter
present at trial, but the trial court ordered the parties to submit
settled statements of the daily proceedings. The record before us
does not indicate the parties did so, but Sprewell could also have
proceeded by the settled statement procedure available at
rule 8.137 of the California Rules of Court.
       The clerk’s transcript only contains the trial court’s docket
entries, the trial court’s judgment, Sprewell’s notice of appeal,
and her notice designating the record on appeal. It also contains
a document recounting Sprewell’s view of the case, but because
this document was not filed in the trial court, we are unable to
consider it on appeal. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest
Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [generally an
appellate court will consider only evidence presented to the trial
court].) While the augmented record includes some exhibits
Sprewell submitted to the trial court, the court’s minute orders
reflect they were not actually admitted into evidence. Further,
the record on appeal remains incomplete because it does not
contain any of Flores’s trial exhibits, nor do we have anything
before us reflecting the trial testimony of any of the witnesses
who testified at trial. (See Foust, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at
p. 186, fn. 3 [record inadequate where there was “no way of
knowing the true number” of trial exhibits, “what those exhibits
contained,” or what “witnesses may have had to say about their
content”].)
       “Without a reporter’s transcript or the exhibits presented at
trial we cannot undertake a meaningful review” of Sprewell’s
argument on appeal. (See Foust, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 186-187 [“partial clerk’s transcript” containing only some trial
exhibits did not meet appellant’s burden to demonstrate error

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through an adequate record]; accord, Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A.
Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 [appellant
did not provide adequate record or demonstrate error without
reporter’s transcript or “copies of the documentary evidence”].)
And because Flores’s trial evidence is absent from the record, we
must presume that evidence adequately supported the trial
court’s judgment in Flores’s favor. (See Fain, supra,
75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 [“[I]t is presumed that the unreported
trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.”];
Bennett v. McCall (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 122, 127 [“‘If any
matters could have been presented to the court below which
would have authorized the order complained of, it will be
presumed that such matters were presented.’”].)
       In sum, Sprewell has not met her burden “to demonstrate,
on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that
the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the
judgment.” (See Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)

                         DISPOSITION

      The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                      MARTINEZ, J.
We concur:

      SEGAL, Acting P. J.                 FEUER, J.

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