Court Opinion

ID: 9427733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:43.745954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:09.334253
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
The issue raised by these cases is far more difficult than the per curiam opinion suggests. The Court of Appeals held that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had acted arbitrarily in concluding that prevention of a delay in the construction process justified the selection of a housing site which could produce adverse social environmental effects, including racial and economic concentration. Today the majority responds that “once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences,” and that in this litigation “there is no doubt that HUD considered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing. NEPA requires no more.” The majority finds support for this conclusion in the closing para*229graph of our decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U. S. 519, 558 (1978).
Vermont Yankee does not stand for the broad proposition that the majority advances today. The relevant passage in that opinion was meant to be only a “further observation of some relevance to this case,” id., at 557. That “observation” was a response to this Court’s perception that the Court of Appeals in that case was attempting “under the guise of judicial review of agency action” to assert its own policy judgment as to the desirability of developing nuclear energy as an energy source for this Nation, a judgment which is properly left to Congress. Id., at 558. The Court of Appeals had remanded the case to the agency because of “a single alleged oversight on a peripheral issue, urged by parties who never fully cooperated or indeed raised the issue below,” ibid. It was in this context that the Court remarked that “NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.” Ibid, (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, “[a]dmin-istrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute,” ibid, (emphasis supplied). Thus Vermont Yankee does not stand for the proposition that a court reviewing agency action under NEPA is limited solely to the factual-issue of whether the agency “considered” environmental consequences. .The agency’s decision must still be set aside if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2) (A), and the reviewing court must still insure that the agency “has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences,” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 410, n. 21 (1976).
In the present case, the Court of Appeals did not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions,” ibid., for HUD in its *230Special Environmental Clearance Report acknowledged the adverse environmental consequences of its proposed action: “the choice of Site 30 for development as a 100 percent low-income project has raised valid questions about the potential social environmental impacts involved.” These valid questions arise from the fact that 68% of all public housing units would be sited on only one crosstown axis in this area of New York City. As the Court of Appeals observed, the resulting high concentration of low-income housing would hardly further racial and economic integration. The environmental “impact... on social fabric and community structures” was given a B rating in the report, indicating that from this perspective the project is “questionable” and ameliorative measures are “mandated.” The report lists 10 ameliorative measures necessary to make the project acceptable. The report also discusses two alternatives, Sites 9 and 41, both of which are the appropriate size for the project and require “only minimal” amounts of relocation and clearance. Concerning Site 9 the report explicitly concludes that “[f]rom the standpoint of social environmental impact, this location would be superior to Site 30 for the development of low-rent public housing.” The sole reason for rejecting the environmentally superior site was the fact that if the location were shifted to Site 9, there would be a projected delay of two years in the construction of the housing.
The issue before the Court of Appeals, therefore, was whether HUD was free under NEPA to reject an alternative acknowledged to be environmentally preferable solely on the ground that any change in sites would cause delay. This was hardly a “peripheral issue” in the case. Whether NEPA, which sets forth “significant substantive goals,” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, supra, at 558, permits a projected 2-year time difference to be controlling over environmental superiority is by no means clear. Resolution of the issue, however, is certainly within the normal scope of review of agency action to determine if it is arbitrary, *231capricious, or an abuse of discretion.* The question whether HUD can make delay the paramount concern over environmental superiority is essentially a restatement of the question whether HUD in considering the environmental consequences of its proposed action gave those consequences a “hard look,” which is exactly the proper question for the reviewing court to ask. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra, at 410, n. 21.
The issue of whether the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary or capricious is sufficiently difficult and important to. merit plenary consideration in this Court. Further, I do not subscribe to the Court’s apparent suggestion that Vermont Yankee limits the reviewing court to the essentially mindless task of determining whether an agency “considered” environmental factors even if that agency may have effectively decided to ignore those factors in reaching its conclusion. Indeed, I cannot believe that the Court would adhere to that position in a different factual setting. Our cases establish that the arbitrary-or-capricious standard prescribes a “searching and careful” judicial inquiry designed to ensure that the agency has not exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971). Believing that today’s summary reversal represents a departure from that principle, I respectfully dissent.
It is apparent to me that this is not the type of case for a summary disposition. We should at least have a plenary hearing.

The Secretary concedes that if an agency gave little or no weight to environmental values its decision might be arbitrary or capricious. Pet. for Cert, in No. 79-184, p. 15, n. 16.