Court Opinion

ID: 9688562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:56:39.616242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:40.289775
License: Public Domain

BIEGELMEIER, Presiding Judge
(concurring).
At the trial of the criminal action against Mrs. Austin before defendant testified, in fairness to the presiding Judge I add the record shows he advised defendant of his rights in the following words:
" 'By the Court: However, would you come forward, just a moment, Mr. Goode. I wish to advise you of your rights. Now before you are sworn as a witness in this case, or take the witness stand, Mr. Goode, I want to advise you that you have the right to refuse to answer any questions, the answer to which may tend to incriminate you, and any time that you desire to exercise that privilege, do so by stating that—in response to a question, just state that you refuse to answer the question on the grounds that it'might tend to incriminate you, and, of course, I'd permit your counsel to prompt you to make that statement at any time he ,an*376ticipates a question would be put to you that — of a nature that you should not answer for that reason, and so I want you to fully understand that, and understand that any testimony you give here today can be used against you. You understand that?
" 'By Mr. Goode: Yes, I do.' "
As I read the opinion the court holds when the same lawyer is appointed for two defendants and one defendant in a separate trial gives testimony on behalf of, and in aid to the other, but damaging to himself, he is constitutionally denied effective assistance of counsel, even though advised by the court of his right to refuse to answer questions and that his answers could be used against him. Assuming as I believe the opinion concludes, defendant's decision to proceed with one attorney and consent to continue with him as his attorney and to then testify to his prejudice in that action was not an "informed decision", I concur in the opinion that the conviction cannot stand. Campbell v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 352 F.2d 359 (1965). Without that assumption, this question would necessarily be one for determination in a post-conviction proceeding. Ch. 23-52 SDCL 1967.